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THE STRUCTURE OF SOCRATIC DIALOGUE:
AN ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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*****

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This dissertation advances a solution to a problem intrinsic to understanding the dialogues of Plato. How are we to understand Plato's thought when he never speaks in his own name in any of his dialogues? Many writers assume that Plato's characters (e.g., Socrates) speak for him. With this assumption, they study the thought articulated by Plato's characters as if it were his own, and elaborate a so-called "doctrinal" interpretation. A variety of subjective readings follows, since what Socrates and other characters say in the dialogues is often inconsistent or contradictory. To resolve these problems the dissertation constructs a method for interpreting Socratic dialogue which is true to the genre. Extending the work of Bakhtin, Clay, and Kahn, it develops a metalanguage for specifying the structure, plot, aim (telos), and effect (ergon) of a dialogue as well as the thought (dianoia), character (ethos), and pathos of its participants, by applying concepts in Plato's dialogues and in Aristotle's Poetics, Ethics, Politics, Metaphysics, Physics, and other works. The dissertation shows that the Republic represents Glaucon as
subject to erotic desire and desires for luxury and honor, and that the aim of Socrates' discourse is to induce a catharsis in Glaucon in order to change these states of character.

To support this interpretation, the dissertation shows:

1) Aristotle does not apply a doctrinal reading to Plato's dialogues; he does not attribute the remarks of the character Socrates to Plato. Irwin's claims in "Plato's Ethics" are not supported by the texts of Aristotle which he cites.

2) Aristotle's treatment of the Republic in Politics II is consistent with a mimetic interpretation of the dialogue. His treatment of the Republic is peirastic: he refutes Socrates' proposals with premisses and arguments that Socrates himself expresses in the dialogue. The dissertation discusses Aristotle's treatment of Socrates' proposals for unity in the city of the guardians, the sharing of women and children, gender, sacrilegious acts and incest, property, and the minimum necessary elements for a city.

3) Aristotle's concept of catharsis can be derived from Sophist 230 and Republic X.
meae nuptae
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CHAPTER 1

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF SOCRATIC DIALOGUE

"The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato," once said Alfred North Whitehead. [1] For the most part, however, these lengthy "footnotes" are written in a literary genre very different from that of the Socratic dialogue, namely, in the genre of expository philosophical prose. Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Gilbert Ryle’s Concept of Mind are written in a genre of nonfiction, in which an author speaks, for the most part, in his own voice. Socratic dialogues, however, are dramatic and/or narrated by a character. They are aptly called a genre of imaginative fiction. [2] Plato does not speak in his own voice. Indeed, in the Republic, Socrates states that a poet who writes as a dramatist, as Plato does, "hides himself" (393C). [3]

Nonetheless, twenty-three hundred years after Plato composed his dialogues, many scholars overlook the essential generic distinction between the Socratic
dialogue and the prose they write themselves. Commonly, scholars, such as Terry Irwin, whose views are examined below, assert that in the dialogues Socrates is Plato's mouthpiece [4], attribute the views expressed by the character Socrates to Plato, and then discuss the dialogues after having mentally replaced all occurrences of "Socrates" in the text by "Plato." The matter of identifying Plato's voice and views in the dialogues is not so simple. The study of ancient philosophy lacks foundation and rigor when scholars treat complicated dialogues like the Republic as though they were reading a modern philosophy text.

The generic distinctiveness of the Socratic dialogue has been argued by Diskin Clay, M. M. Bakhtin, C. Kahn and others; [5] this work will be discussed below. It constitutes a revolutionary trend in Platonic studies. Clay has argued that the generic nature of Socratic dialogue must influence its interpretation: much of what Socrates says in the Republic, he writes, is often challenged "by the very structure of the dialogue." [6] Clay's remark constitutes a challenge to Platonic studies.

As is often the case, however, whenever a new paradigm of research in a field is being formulated, initial hypotheses are of an exploratory nature. [7] So, to date, no one has specified what should be understood by the phrase "structure of a dialogue" when a dialogue is
considered as a work of mimetic fiction. Nor has any rigorous metalanguage for analyzing, or even talking about philosophical dialogues been developed. The purpose of this study is to elaborate such a metalanguage for analyzing and specifying the structure of a dialogue, and then apply this new tool to understand one well-known Socratic dialogue. First, I discuss some contemporary views of the genre.

A. Socratic dialogues as historiography.

Socratic dialogues are reported to have been composed by many of the followers of Socrates in the years following his death, though only the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon have survived, together with fragments of the dialogues of Aeschines and others. [8] In addition, Aristophanes' Clouds is argued to contain at least a parody of Socratic dialogue. [9]

One popular belief concerning the nature of Socratic dialogue as a literary genre is that it is a genre of historiography. Indeed, in 1956, A. Dihle tried to trace the origins of Greek biography to Socrates and the Socratics. [10] If we were to classify Socratic dialogue as part of history, it would seem to make sense to regard it as biographical, since it represents conversations in which Socrates and other historical individuals participated. Yet, "biography was never considered as
history in the ancient world," writes Momigliano. [11]
Ancient Greek historiography is concerned with political
and military actions, [12] so Plutarch strongly contrasted
his lives with history (Plut. Alexander 1.2).
Furthermore, Momigliano argues that the origin of
biography is found earlier, in the fifth century, long
before Socrates and the Socratics [13], and that Socratic
dialogue fails to satisfy his elementary definition of
biography as "an account of the life of a man from birth
to death." [14] At most, some Socratic dialogues, such as
Xenophon's, might qualify as apomnemoneumata, i.e.,
memoirs. Momigliano argues, however, that neither Plato,
nor Xenophon intended to preserve the life of the real
Socrates. [15] "All the Socratics were involved in
elaborate developments of Socrates' thought which bore
little resemblance to the original," he writes. [16] The
Socratics existed "in that zone between truth and fiction
that is so bewildering to the professional historian."
They were concerned "with capturing the potentialities,
rather than the realities of individual lives. Socrates,
the main subject of their considerations, was not so much
the real Socrates, as the potential Socrates. He was not
a dead man whose life could be recounted. He was the
guide to territories as yet unexplored." [17]

Momigliano's doubt that Socratic dialogues fall
within historiography is confirmed by examination of the
dialogues themselves. Serious problems with the notion that Socratic dialogues are historiographical arise as soon as one begins to compare the representations of Socrates that appear in the works of the three principal authors of Socratic dialogues whose works survive (Aristophanes, Plato and Xenophon), or surveys the host of divergent philosophical schools that claimed they each were the true representatives of Socrates' thought or way of life. [18] The texts of these three authors contradict each other on the important issue of whether Socrates was ever a natural philosopher. Aristophanes portrays Socrates as an enthusiastic one. Though the Socrates of Plato's Apology denies that he ever discussed natural philosophy (Apol. 18-19), the Socrates of the Phaedo states that he was very interested in natural philosophy as a youth (Phaedo 96-99). Similarly, Xenophon's Memorabilia denies that Socrates conversed on the nature of the cosmos (1.1.11), and yet presents him as giving an account of the nature of human beings that presupposes a teleological natural philosophy (1.4). [19]

Furthermore, there is other internal evidence that neither the dialogues of Xenophon nor those of Plato are historical documents. Xenophon's contact with Socrates was limited and his Socratic writings seem not to have been composed prior to the 360's, long after Socrates' death. [20] In these circumstances, he seems to have
relied on the dialogues of Plato in composing his own Socratic treatises. Charles Kahn has identified a dozen passages of Xenophon's Memorabilia and Symposium where Xenophon draws on material from Plato. [21] Yet, none of Plato's dialogues purports to be an actual event witnessed by the author. Only the Apology--which is not a dialogue, but a speech--reports that Plato was present at its delivery. "In the one case where the setting of a dialogue is unquestionably historical, namely in the death scene in the Phaedo, we are explicitly told that Plato was not present." [22]

The task of deducing what may have been the actual views of Socrates becomes even more complicated when we review the various philosophical schools that claimed to trace their ancestry to him and to expound the authentic version of his philosophy. In addition to Plato, there is Antisthenes, an influential Socratic and writer of dialogues, who is the father of the Cynics, and Aristippus, a Socratic and writer of dialogues, to whom the Cyrenaics traced their ancestry. Socrates was adopted as the principal ancestor of both the Stoics and Academic skeptics--the former wishing to be called Socratics, while the latter claimed that their skeptical practice represented the proper interpretation of Socrates' dialectic. Vander Waerdt writes: "The Academic skeptics and the Stoics, Socrates' most important Hellenistic
heirs, construe his understanding of such central subjects as virtue as knowledge of good and evil so differently that it is clear that no consensus about the substance of Socrates' philosophy emerged over the century following his death.” [23]

In sum, the Socratic works which have survived give contradictory accounts of Socrates’ life and philosophical interests, and contain internal evidence that indicates that they are not historiographical; at the same time, since nearly every Hellenistic philosophical sect (save the Epicureans) claimed to be the true Socratics, no consensus on the views of the historical Socrates seems possible. These and other difficulties confront any attempt to consider the surviving Socratic dialogues as historical writing.

B. The doctrinal interpretation of Socratic dialogue.

Another popular interpretation of Socratic dialogue recognizes that the dialogues are not historiographical, but considers them a genre of expository philosophical prose, in which the character Socrates expresses the author’s views and other characters are in various relationships to the author. This interpretation is primarily concerned with Plato’s dialogues, and attributes a system of philosophical thought to Plato advanced by his
T. Irwin proposes such an interpretation in Chapter 1 of his Plato's Ethics. Irwin argues that the remarks of the character Socrates in Plato's dialogues can be reasonably attributed to Plato because, Irwin claims, Aristotle himself did precisely that. He writes that Aristotle's "approach to the dialogues is firmly doctrinal: he regularly treats the dialogues as evidence for Plato's views, and regularly attributes some of the views of the Platonic Socrates to Plato, without seeing any need to explain or defend the attribution." [24] Irwin cites twelve passages from Aristotle as evidence for his claims. The passages, however, do not support the argument that Irwin wishes to make. An appendix to this dissertation discusses the passages that Irwin claims support his argument. Here I only summarize the results.

Of the twelve passages in Aristotle's work which Irwin says support his claim that Aristotle attributes to Plato the views expressed by Socrates in the dialogues, none of them hold up under examination. Four texts (Metaphysics 991b3-4, 1024b14 [25], Generation and Corruption 335b9-17, De Caelo 279b32) don't even name Plato. Three texts refer to dialogues or sections of dialogues in which Socrates is not a speaker (De Caelo 279b32; Politics 1265a10, 1271b1). In three cases, references to dialogues are inferred by Irwin, not made by
Aristotle (Metaphysics 1010b11, 1071b37; Nicomachean Ethics 1172b28). In one case (Physics 209b11), Aristotle explicitly states that Plato's unwritten doctrines differed from what he wrote into a dialogue; in another (Politics 1266b5) he explicitly refers to a view which Plato did not write into a dialogue; and in a third (Politics 1274b9) he only refers to Plato as an author of books, not as someone sharing opinions with the character Socrates. Irwin's citations do not support his claim that Aristotle "regularly" attributes to Plato what is said by Socrates in a dialogue.

Irwin considers Plato to have been "a biographer" of Socrates, "a reporter of Socrates," and "a Socratic philosopher," [26] but he does not consider him to have been a dramatist, though Plato was trained as a tragedian and wrote a tetralogy for presentation at the theatre of Dionysus. [27] Irwin writes: "the fact that Plato wrote dialogues rather than treatises has sometimes been taken as evidence for a non-doctrinal interpretation. In fact, it provides no such evidence until we can rule out an explanation of Plato's choice of the dialogue form that is consistent with a doctrinal interpretation." [28] It seems to me that Irwin's logic is wrong. What he really can say is that we can't rule out a doctrinal interpretation just because Plato wrote dialogues, though
Plato's choice of genre is most consistent with a non-doctrinal interpretation.

C. A moderate doctrinal interpretation.

Charles Kahn has made important contributions towards the construction of a mimetic interpretation of Socratic dialogue (see section D, below). In contrast with Irwin, Kahn writes in Plato and the Socratic dialogue that "the imaginative and essentially fictional nature of Socratic literature" "can be of decisive importance for an interpretation of Plato's thought." [29] He says that the "distance between text and message, or between what Plato writes and what he means to convey, is the first problem that any interpretation must confront. Behind it looms a larger problem: the distance between what Plato means to say in a specific passage and what he thinks in general, or, to put it differently, the place of a particular text within the larger world of Plato's philosophy." [30] These are important issues which any interpretation of Plato's dialogues must settle. To deal with these two problems, Kahn proposes his "ingressive interpretation." "My notion of ingressive interpretation," he says, "is a proposal to deal with the first problem in the light of the second: to identify the meaning of a particular argument or an entire work by locating it within the larger thought-world articulated in the middle dialogues."
With this interpretation, he concludes, "we know that it is Plato speaking, and not merely the dialogue persona of Socrates, in the central books of the Republic" because "we all implicitly recognize" "a meaningful design leading from the earlier dialogues to the Republic" and that there is "authorial intent" in this alleged design.

There are serious difficulties with this interpretation. First, as Kahn himself admits, he is "begging the question against the developmental reading" of Plato's dialogues. In order to be able to locate an argument or dialogue in the "thought-world" of the middle dialogues, this "thought-world" must be stable. So Kahn writes: "I assume that Plato did not change his mind in any fundamental way between the Laches and Protagoras, on the one hand, and the Phaedo and Republic on the other." He explains that we can read ten dialogues "as if Plato had written them all at the same time, but offered them to the world in successive stages." These include: Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis, Euthydemus, Symposium, Phaedo, Cratylus, all together quite a chunk of Plato's work. Half of these dialogues, the Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Lysis, and Euthydemus, are arguably "early," based on the narrowness of their concerns and the behavior of Socrates in them; they are believed to differ in type from the so-called
middle dialogues, the Phaedo, Symposium and Cratylus. [36]

So, not only is Kahn's interpretation "begging the question," but it also mixes what are regarded as different types of dialogues. Furthermore, Kahn attempts to build his case for a stable "thought world" out of alleged references of later dialogues to earlier ones. [37] Recent scholarship, however, has shown that most, if not all such alleged cross-references refer to conversations that are not represented in dialogues. [38] When Socrates says "you have often heard this before", he frequently points to a non-existent literary space. No seamless thought-world can be constructed out of such alleged cross-references.

Moreover, there is a more serious difficulty. In seeking to locate an argument or work within a larger context of the middle dialogues, Kahn's interpretation puts the cart before the horse. He assumes that he already knows what Plato "intends to transmit to the reader" [39] in the middle dialogues, but what Plato "intends to transmit" is precisely what is in dispute.

A reader can not know "the message that an author intends to transmit" in a dialogue without identifying and analyzing the dialogue's argument and structure. Only after so analyzing and understanding individual dialogues will it be possible to talk about a larger positive "thought world" defined by those dialogues. In other
words, such a "thought world" needs to be constructed from the analysis of individual dialogues. So, Kahn's assumption of such a stable thought world must be rejected as a demonstrandum. In addition, Kahn's theories about the dialogues produce their own problems. Because he believes that Socrates actually does speak for Plato, at least in the Republic, he must accuse Plato of "holding back," of "deviousness," and of "a temperamental aversion to direct statement." [40]

All efforts to construct a Platonic doctrine from the remarks of Socrates fail to deal with important questions concerning the late dialogues in which Socrates does not appear (the Laws), or plays little or no part and is on the receiving end of the discourse, i.e., the conversation is directed towards him, not by him (the Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus, Critias). That Plato cuts Socrates out of the discussions in these late dialogues could be regarded as evidence that Plato is emphasizing differences with the Socrates of the middle dialogues. This would make any doctrinal interpretation of the middle dialogues problematic. The simplest explanation for Plato distancing himself from the Socrates of the middle dialogues is that Socrates does not speak for Plato in those dialogues. But even if Plato at one time agreed with what the Socrates of the middle dialogues says, we
would be on thin ice to base a Platonic doctrine on something from which he later distanced himself.

Moreover, it has been argued that the text of at least one middle dialogue is critical of Socrates. M. Gagarin argues that in the Symposium "Plato portrays Socrates as a failure in certain respects, and that his failure in this dialogue is also to be understood as a 'failure of love,'" [41] with which Gagarin borrows a phrase from G. Vlastos' related criticism of Socrates in a famous essay. [42] Gagarin points out that Plato's text contains direct criticism of Socrates in the speech of Alcibiades, who concludes by saying that he has both praised and found fault with Socrates, because Socrates mistreated him (222A7). [43] More subtle criticism is found in reading the discourse of Diotima. Diotima tells Socrates that she does not know whether he is capable of understanding the conclusion of her speech (210A). The point of her speech is that the older lover must create the beautiful in the youth who is beloved. The speech of Alcibiades, however, shows that Socrates failed: Alcibiades thinks the beautiful is only in Socrates and that he has to crack open Socrates to get at it. Alcibiades also says that he is ashamed before Soc. (216B) and is humiliated by him (219D). Alcibiades' humiliation, induced through his association with Socrates, is a barrier to him experiencing the beautiful inside himself,
and in that way, solving his problems. Socrates can represent beauty but does not create it in others. Socrates only frustrates Alcibiades. In frustration, Alcibiades turns away from Socrates and pursues the very political glory which Socrates argued was harmful. Gagarin holds that the Symposium represents Socrates as guilty of hybris through his "false pretense" of ignorance and the "scorn" with which he treats his associates, such as Alcibiades. The Symposium represents "Socrates' failure to produce intellectual or moral improvement in the promising young men with whom he associates." [44] Through his failure as a teacher, writes Gagarin, "Socrates must bear some responsibility for the failure of Alcibiades." [45]

D. Pathos in Socratic dialogue.

The difficulties raised by doctrinal interpretations might be resolved if we interpret Socratic dialogue as a literary genre of mimesis, rather than force an interpretation upon the text. Several writers have advanced aspects of such an interpretation, including M. M. Bakhtin, D. Clay, D. Blank, and even C. Kahn. In my view, Kahn's important contributions to the mimetic interpretation of Socratic dialogue represent a distinct line of his critical thought, independent of his "ingressive interpretation" discussed above.
In "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's Gorgias," Kahn argues that "we need something like literary criticism in addition to philosophic analysis in order to understand what is going on" in Socrates' refutations of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles, which have, he says, dramatic as well as logical structure. Kahn analyzes the Gorgias into "a drama in three acts:" the refutation of Gorgias, the refutation of Polus, and the refutation of Callicles. A mere temporal division of the dialogue in this way is not what justifies calling it a "drama," however. Rather, Kahn discusses a specific dramatic device employed in the dialogue that makes it more than a philosophical discourse, and determines the character of its arguments. This is the arousal of shame, which is usually understood as a result of refutation (Pl. Soph. 230D1). Kahn argues--like Polus (461B) and Callicles (482CDE)--that Socrates makes use of the arousal of shame as a means of refutation, to evoke specific answers from Gorgias and Polus which then lead to their self-contradiction and refutation, even if Socrates' arguments are logically weak. Socrates manipulates "their sense of shame to force them to confront the incoherence of their own position," says Kahn. Kahn concludes that Socrates' arguments in the Gorgias are "in a deep sense ad hominem: directed against the man and not only against his statements." The arguments have a
personal as well as a propositional nature. Rather than having general validity, Socrates's arguments are customized for the individual interlocutor.

Gorgias is refuted first. In analyzing the refutation immediately afterwards, Polus says that Gorgias was refuted because he was ashamed (eischunthe) to deny Socrates' claim that the man skilled in oratory must know what is just, good and noble, and so Gorgias said that if someone who did not know these things came to him, he would teach him himself (461B). From this, Socrates was able to get Gorgias to concede that an orator is incapable of using oratory unjustly (461A), the opposite of what Gorgias maintained at the beginning of the argument (457A). Agreeing with Polus, Callicles says that Gorgias conceded Socrates' claim out of deference to human custom (ethos ton anthropon) because those standing by and listening to the dialogue would have been angry at him if he denied it (482D). In support of the analysis of Polus and Callicles, Kahn says that "there is good reason to suppose that Gorgias in fact did not propose to teach virtue, and made fun of those who claimed to do so." [51] Kahn cites the Meno, where Meno tells Socrates that Gorgias never professes to teach virtue and laughs at those who profess to do so (95C). Meno adds that Gorgias claims only to make his students clever at speaking. Kahn argues that if Gorgias had answered Socrates sincerely, he
would have said he did not make his students good men but only effective speakers, and there would have then been no direct contradiction with his earlier claim that he was not responsible for unjust actions by the students he had trained (457BC). [52] "So, the refutation of Gorgias ... follows not from his real beliefs but from a claim to teach morality that he is forced to make because of his position in the public eye." [53] "The purely instrumental, amoral conception of rhetoric can be consistently stated; but Gorgias himself cannot make this statement without incurring public hostility and grave personal risk. This is what lies behind the 'shame' which prevents him from saying what he thinks." [54] Because Gorgias is vulnerable as a foreigner in Athens, he has no choice but to answer as he does. In another situation, Gorgias could have claimed moral neutrality for his training (as reported in the Meno). But in the Gorgias, Socrates draws him into a situation where this claim can no longer be comfortably made. Socrates, Kahn argues, conducts the discussion with Gorgias in such a way that he entraps Gorgias into making his insincere reply, and then refutes him.

Socrates refutes Polus next. In analyzing the refutation afterwards, Callicles calls Socrates a crowd pleaser, and says, "Polus has suffered (pathon) the same pathos which he accused Gorgias of suffering (pathein)
Callicles explains that Polus suffered (epathen) the same thing, i.e., was refuted, because he was ashamed to deny that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, and that from this concession, Socrates "bound and gagged" him in the argument, and was ashamed to say what he really thought, namely, that he admires injustice (482D). Polus, Kahn argues, conceded that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it only because he is slave to public opinion. Indeed, the phrase to which he agrees is represented and repeated in the dialogue four times as the opinion of the multitude (475D, 488E7, 489A2, 489A8). Callicles' assertion that Polus doesn't really agree with the argument he is conducting with Socrates is confirmed when Polus rejects the argument after he is refuted. When Socrates proposes that the orator use oratory to expose any unjust acts by himself, his family or his friends, Polus exclaims that the statements are absurd (atopa), and says that the earlier argument should be abandoned (480E).

In his discussion of Polus' refutation, Callicles makes a general criticism of Socrates' method of argument: he says that in a discussion with Socrates if someone is ashamed to say what he thinks, he is forced to contradict himself (483E), that is, Socrates will shame the interlocutor into conceding something with which he disagrees and which is inconsistent with his real beliefs,
and then draw a contradiction from it. Socrates responds by mocking Callicles' criticism of his use of shame in argument. "Take care not to be ashamed" (489A, 494C), he twice warns Callicles. He boasts of having used shame in refuting Gorgias and Polus, but ironically remarks that Callicles won't be shamed (494D).

Socrates' arguments in the Gorgias show that he leads his interlocutors in discussions in such a way that he tries to shame them into conceding something they don't believe, in order to derive a contradiction with their previous statements, and reduce them to refutation. The arguments in the dialogue, however, mean much more than this, for our commentary on Socrates' use of shame in the Gorgias is based on the commentary that Polus and Callicles make on that very subject in the dialogue itself. What is unique about the Gorgias is not that it represents Socrates shaming an interlocutor, but that it represents interlocutors criticizing Socrates for using this technique. At the least, the Gorgias is a 'meta-dialogue' on the nature of Socratic discourse, and one by which we might evaluate the arousal of shame in other dialogues. Since the alleged purpose of the dialogue is to study rhetoric, it makes complete sense that Socratic rhetoric would itself come under examination. In his analysis of Socrates' discourse, Callicles says that an essential ingredient of it is its
subjection of the interlocutor to pathos. Aristotle in the Poetics calls pathos an important part of mimesis. So, in saying that Socratic discourse tends to subject an interlocutor to pathos, Callicles identifies a mimetic element in Socratic dialogue.

E. The Origins of Socratic dialogue.

Diskin Clay has reflected upon the origins and genre characteristics of Socratic dialogue. Clay calls Socratic dialogue "a genre of literature that is the mimesis of a philosophical life." He notes that Aristotle classifies Socratic dialogues (Sokratikoi logoi) with the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus in a nameless genre of Greek poetry, and that Athenaeus produces a quotation from Aristotle's On Poets, the sense of which is that Alexamenus of Teos was the first to write Socratic dialogues and that these were "a form of mimesis in prose." Clay makes three points that relate to a genre definition of Socratic dialogue: that Socratic dialogues are modeled on Attic comedy and tragedy; that Socratic dialogue is the imitation of the character of Socrates; and that the authors of Socratic dialogues attempt to form the character of their listeners.

Clay asks, On what genre of Greek literature were Socratic dialogues modeled? He first eliminates from consideration the Syracusan mimes of Sophron and his son
Xenarchus: Plato only learned about them twelve years after the death of Socrates, though by then Plato himself, not to mention other Socratics, had already written several dialogues.

Next, Clay considers Aristophanes' Clouds 482-88, and argues that it is "our first example of the imitation of Sokratikoi logoi." [61] Clay points out that this text is our oldest surviving exemplar of a Socratic conversation employing the method of question and answer: "The character of Aristophanes' representation of Socratic questioning coheres with what we know of the character of his conversations rendered by the Socratics who wrote later. Socrates [in the Clouds] operates by question and answer rather than by long epideictic speeches; he prefers brachulogia and is concerned with the quickness to learn and the memories of his would-be associates." [62] Discussing the passage from the Clouds, Clay writes: "One of the striking features of our first exhibit of the Sokratikoi logoi on the comic stage (Nub. 482-88) is that this interrogation involves not only question and answer but a trial of character. In posing his questions to Strepsiades, Socrates is more concerned with coming to an understanding of Strepsiades' character than he is with finding answers to questions that genuinely perplex him. Indeed, his questions do not involve any issue larger than Strepsiades' memory and verbal abilities. In asking these
questions, he is following the instructions of the clouds, who ask him to stir his intellectuals and test his character: diakinei ton noun autou kai tes gnomes apopeiro (477)." [63] Clay adds that passages in Aechines and Xenophon show Socrates interrogating his interlocutor's character rather than his knowledge, and that Plato uses apopeiromai in exactly the sense of Clouds 477 to describe what Socrates does to an interlocutor (Theae. 157C). The authors of Socratic dialogues, writes Clay, were "ethopoioi," [64] i.e., persons who attempt to form character.

Clay passes on to ask, What did Plato add to the literary form of Sokratikoi logoi? Clay argues that Plato "seems to have invented the historical setting for some of his dialogues--which allows him as an author and his reader as his audience the ironies of the tragic dramatist." [65] Clay cites the Charmides, in which Socrates discourses with two future members of the Thirty Tyrants, and the Alcibiades I, in which Socrates utters dark prophecies for both himself and Alcibiades, which are later, of course, fulfilled. Clay comments that "In Plato, a dark form of irony hovers over the bright irony of Socrates himself." [66] "It is only in the Socratic dialogues of Plato that Socrates' words apply to himself and possess a significance that he himself could not have been aware of." [67] He concludes: "Plato exploited the

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ironies of the tragic poet in his dramatizations of Socrates' conversations. Like the tragic poet, he worked with a myth well known to his contemporaries in the fourth century--the myth of Socrates' life." [68] "The Socratic dialogues of Plato allow us to realize that if the comic poets of Athens offered models for the literary Socratics while Socrates was alive, the tragic poets of Athens offered models for the dramatic representation of Socrates once he was dead." [69] In conclusion, writes Clay, "the authors of the Sokratikoi logoi imitated the character of Socrates as he engaged in his characteristic manner of conversation and interrogation" [70]. The Socratic dialogues, he says, are "dramatic representations of Socrates in conversation and in action," [71] that are modeled on Attic comedy and tragedy. Clay writes elsewhere that Plato found in Socrates "the only object worthy of serious imitation." [72] Socratic dialogue, writes Clay, is "a new form of philosophical drama which, in the object of its imitation, comprehends and transcends both tragedy and comedy." [73]

F. Catharsis in Socratic dialogue.

David Blank has attempted to apply the notion of catharsis to the way emotion is aroused by Socratic dialogue. [74] A starting point for his discussions is the passage in Plato's Sophist which provides the most
complete account of catharsis that we have before Aristotle. At Sophist 226-231 the stranger discusses the sophist "who purifies/purges (kathartes) the soul of beliefs impeding learning" (331E5). The stranger says that such sophists cross-examine whoever thinks they are saying something when they are saying nothing. Since the opinions of such people will vary inconsistently, he says, these sophists show that their opinions conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects. The stranger then describes how this examination leads to the arousal of emotion in the subjects and in listeners.

"The people who are being examined see that their opinions contradict, get angry at themselves, and become gentle towards others. In that way they are released from their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves, and of all releases (apallagai) it is most pleasant to hear and most lasting for the one experiencing it" (230B8).

He adds that these sophists "who cleanse the soul" (kathairontes)

"suppose that the soul will have no benefit from any learning that's offered it until someone refutes it and brings it refuted to shame" (aichune) (230B4).

Significantly, this account notes emotional states of interlocutors and observers. At the beginning of the cross-examination, interlocutors have "inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves." When they are shown that their opinions contradict, they "get angry at themselves, and become gentle towards others." They are brought to shame.
Their release from their beliefs, however, is "most pleasant to hear" for those listening. This account describes a catharsis for an interlocutor, which is pleasant to listeners.

Blank comments: "How does the catharsis of the respondent’s false opinions provide the listener with pleasure? Surely it is because the listener experiences emotions aroused by those of the respondent himself. The listener will not necessarily experience the very same emotions in the very same way as the respondent, since the listener and respondent are neither in the same position nor in the same precise state of knowledge, ignorance, prestige, committedness, or vulnerability." He adds: "At times, as with Nicias’ attempted definition of courage, the listener may be carried away and believe the definition a good one, so that when the respondent is thrown into aporia, the listener finds himself there too."

[75] Blank documents many cases in which listeners engrossed or agitated by the course of a dialogue are moved to intervene, and comments: "Plato and his Socrates use to fullest advantage all the personality quirks of the characters in the dialogues, as well as all the possibilities inherent in their interpersonal dynamics. Their desire to show off, their pride, their shame, their shyness, loves and lusts are all manipulated by Socratic dialectic to heighten the emotions of the interlocutors.
and listeners. These heightened emotions eventually lead them to the cathartic experience of aporia, to the pleasure which results from this aporia, and to the new-found willingness to learn which now takes the place of their prejudice and braggadocio." [76] Blank sums up: "In Socratic dialogue, then, the conversation and the respondent’s reactions affect the bystanders, and the recounting of the scene for the audience affects the audience." Blank continues, "The audience follows the arguments, being alternately persuaded and disappointed, just like the bystanders at the conversation. The audience’s own sense of pride and anger are implicated, as are those of the bystanders. Furthermore, the audience’s witnessing of Socrates’ manipulation of the respondent and bystanders produces feelings of pity and superiority—for how else could irony function—which will only heighten the emotion with which they follow the action and the pleasure they will take in their own and the character’s catharsis." [77]

So, a listener’s own statements need not be the explicit subject of a discourse for the listener to be affected by the discourse. Moreover, a listener of a dialogue can become a participant, and a participant can become a listener. For most of Republic I, Glaucon and Adeimantus are listeners, while Cephalus, Polemarchus and finally Thrasymachus discourse with Socrates. Then,
Glaucon and Adeimantus become participants, while Polemarchus and Thrasymachus become listeners, only to intervene in Republic V. The point of these phenomena is that in Socratic dialogue, the clear division which exists in a performance of a tragedy between actors representing characters and the audience of listeners hearing the mimesis does not exist. No member of the audience of listeners of a tragedy can become a participant. If one of the three tragic actors is a listener, it is only for the short span of a speech, or part of a scene. In Socratic dialogue, however, an interlocutor can have one of two semi-permanent status: 1) the interlocutor is a respondent, as Glaucon is during Book VII, while he listens and responds to Socrates; 2) an interlocutor is a listener, as Glaucon is during most of Book VIII, while he listens to Socrates and Adeimantus. Yet, he has not merged with the anonymous host which reads the Republic. In Socratic dialogue a listener who became a respondent can always return to being a listener, and later even again become a respondent.

G. Dianoia in Socratic dialogue.

M. M. Bakhtin preceded Kahn, Clay, and Blank in the articulation of a mimetic interpretation of Socratic dialogue. The Russian classicist can easily be regarded as a forerunner of the post-modern, mimetic interpretation.
of the genre. I consider Bakhtin last, however, because his notions are the most abstract and because he does not attempt to support them by reference to texts of individual dialogues.

Bakhtin calls Socratic dialogues "the novels of their time" [78] and, because of Bakhtin's interest in the modern 'philosophical' novel, he has written on Socratic dialogue in Problems of Doestoevsky's Poetics (Problemy poetiki Doestoevskogo, Moscow, 1963) and in Questions of Literature and Aesthetics (Voprosy literatury i estetiki, Moscow, 1975). Bakhtin's work is of interest to us for two reasons: First, his aim in his work on Dostoevsky, like ours here on Socratic dialogue, is to distinguish the thought of an author from the thought of the persons an author represents. [79] For Bakhtin the thought expressed by a character is part of the definition of the character and should not automatically be regarded as consonant with the thought of the author. Second, Bakhtin says that Socratic dialogue was a starting point for the authorial method of "dialogism," which he studied extensively in the works of Dostoevsky and other novelists. [80]

The reference point for much of Bakhtin's discussion of literary criticism is Aristotle's Poetics. Bakhtin states: "Right up to the present day, in fact, theory dealing with these already completed genres [epic and tragedy] can add almost nothing to Aristotle's
formulations. Aristotle's Poetics, although occasionally so deeply embedded as to be almost invisible, remains the stable foundation for the theory of genres." [81] Bakhtin's frequent references to the comic Margites, which Aristotle attributed to Homer (Poet. 48b30), and to the mimes of Sophron, which Aristotle classifies in the same genre as Socratic dialogue (47b9-11), betray his admiration for the philosopher. Moreover, Bakhtin's literary emphasis on the thought of persons represented in novel may be an expansion of Aristotle's concept of the thought (dianoia) of a character as an element of mimesis. For both literary theorists, thought is an important element in defining the nature of the person represented in mimesis. As Aristotle writes:

"Since mimesis is of action, and is performed by people doing things, these people are necessarily of a certain sort with respect to their character (ethos) and thought (dianoia)" (49b36-38).

On the one hand, it is reasonable to consider whether Bakhtin's poetics show influence from Aristotle's. But since Bakhtin writes that Socratic dialogue is "one of the starting points for that line of development in European artistic prose and the novel that leads to the work of Dostoevsky," [82] it is also possible that the novelistic genre characteristics that Bakhtin finds in Socratic dialogue influenced, or are represented in, Aristotle's formulations in the Poetics. The crucial
concept to be investigated is Bakhtin's notion of the dialogic. Writing on Socratic dialogue, Bakhtin says:

"At the base of the genre lies the Socratic notion of the dialogic nature of truth, and the dialogic nature of human thinking about truth. The dialogic means of seeking truth is counterposed to official monologism, which pretends to possess a ready-made truth, and it is also counterposed to the naive self-confidence of those people who think that they know something, that is, who think that they possess certain truths. Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born among people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction. Socrates called himself a 'pander': he brought people together and made them collide in a quarrel, and as a result truth was born; with respect to this emerging truth Socrates called himself a 'midwife,' since he assisted at the birth. For this reason, he called his method 'obstetric.'" [83]

Bakhtin discusses the structure of Socratic discourse. He writes that "the two basic devices" of the Socratic dialogue are "syncrisis" and "anacrisis" (which he even supplies in Greek as sugkrisis and anakrisis). He defines anacrisis as "a means for eliciting and provoking the words of one's interlocutor, forcing him to express his opinion and express it thoroughly. Socrates was a
great master of anacrisis: he knew how to force people to speak, to clothe in discourse their dim but stubbornly preconceived opinions, to illuminate them by the word and in this way to expose their falseness or incompleteness."

Syncrisis is "the technique of juxtaposing various discourse-opinions on an object." [84]

A description of anacritical and syncritical procedures in dialogue appears in the Sophist at the beginning of the same passage discussed above in connection with catharsis. The Eleatic stranger discusses the sophists who treat those who think they know something when they do not, a condition which the stranger calls "the source of every error we make in thought (dianoia)" (229C).

"They cross-examine whoever thinks they are saying something when they are saying nothing. Then, since their opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize them" (230B4-5).

The above text describes anacrisis and accords with its usage in Xenophon and Plato. [85] The Eleatic stranger continues:

"They collect the opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects in relation to the same things and in the same respects" (230B6-8).

This text describes syncrisis, which Bakhtin describes as a "technique of juxtaposing various discourse-opinions on an object." Anacrisis and syncrisis name phases in Socrates' examination of an interlocutor. "Syncrisis and
anacrisis," writes Bakhtin, "dialogize thought, they carry it into the open, turn it into a rejoinder, and attach it to dialogic intercourse among people. Both of these devices have their origin in the notion of the dialogic nature of truth, which lies at the base of Socratic dialogue." [86]

While Bakhtin's literary critical notion of the dialogic is rooted in his understanding of Socratic dialogue, Socratic dialogue exhibits, he says, "little more than an external form of dialogism." [87] Socrates disputes with his interlocutors and subjects their opinions in spoken dialogue to scrutiny. In such dialogue, as in tragedy, a character's thought (dianoia) reveals itself primarily in the spoken word. So, Aristotle defines thought (dianoia) in tragedy as "the many ways in which they use language to argue something or declare their opinion about something" (Poet. 50a6-7). Bakhtin finds such "external dialogism" transformed in the modern novel, where dialogism takes the form of an interaction between the author and an "internally dialogized image" of a character's (unspoken) thought, or stream of consciousness. In contrast to the conventional notion of language, Bakhtin refers to the complex of a character's thought, beliefs and dialect, as the character's "language." For example, on Pushkin's Eugene Onegin, he writes:
"The author represents Onegin's 'language' (a period-bound language associated with a particular world view) as an image that speaks... the author is far from neutral in his relationship to this image: to a certain extent he even polemicizes with this language, argues with it, agrees with it (although with conditions), interrogates it, eavesdrops on it, but also ridicules it, parodically exaggerates it and so forth--in other words, the author is in a dialogical relationship with Onegin's language; the author is actually conversing with Onegin, and such a conversation is the fundamental constitutive element of all novelistic style as well as of the controlling image of Onegin's language... all essentially novelistic images share this quality: they are internally dialogized images--of the languages, styles, world views of another." [88]

Bakhtin emphasizes that the utterances and reflections of a character represent a distinct language or dialect which expresses the beliefs and opinions of the character. An author represents a character's world view, system of beliefs, and patterns of thought (dianoia) through the presentation of the character's spoken or mental discourse. In neither Bakhtin's poetics nor Socratic dialogue is a character's thought fixed and unchallenged. Socrates attempts to transform an interlocutor's thought through his questioning. For
Bakhtin, the author of a philosophical novel carries out a similar scrutiny of the thought of a character: he argues with the language of the character, agrees with it, interrogates it, and parodies it.

Bakhtin sees these phenomena in Socratic dialogue. He writes that Socratic dialogue is "a rather complex system of styles and dialects, which enter it as more-or-less parodied models of languages and styles." It is "a multi-styled genre." [89] I interpret these remarks as follows: Using anacrisis Socrates extracts the beliefs of an interlocutor; using syncrisis, he arranges them together into a model of the interlocutor's system of beliefs, or thought (dianoia). He then shows that elements of the model contradict each other (Soph. 230B4), and ridicules this contradictory characteristic of it. This is the parody that Bakhtin sees in Socratic dialogue.

Using 'texts' spoken by his interlocutors, Socrates constructs a representation of their thought, criticizes that representation, and parodies it. Socratic dialogue entails an elementary form of parody. [90]

H. Conclusion.

Kahn, Clay, Blank and Bakhtin, have employed concepts that Aristotle discusses in his Poetics to frame their discourses on Socratic dialogue as a literary genre. Kahn has understood the Gorgias by discussing how
Socrates' questioning arouses pathos in his interlocutor, which Aristotle names one of the three part of plot in mimesis in the Poetics (52b10). Clay has argued that Socratic dialogue is modeled on tragedy and comedy, and has discussed the genre's "object," which Aristotle writes is one of the three ways in which genres of mimesis differ (Poet. 47a16). Blank has attempted to understand how Socratic dialogues might induce catharsis. Finally, Bakhtin has emphasized that Aristotle's Poetics is the stable foundation for the theory of genres--extended only by his own work and that of others on the philosophical novel. I have argued that Bakhtin has elaborated Aristotle's concept of the "thought" (dianoia) of a character in developing his notion of "dialogism." It seems evident that application of concepts in Aristotle's Poetics has produced some progress in understanding Socratic dialogue as a literary genre. This suggests that even more will be gained from a systematic investigation of the genre in terms of the array of concepts developed in the Poetics. Accordingly, Chapter 2 will discuss further concepts in the Poetics that are useful for understanding Socratic dialogue, and Chapter 3 will illustrate these concepts in Socratic dialogues. Subsequent chapters will undertake a more thorough discussion of Plato's Republic.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE


17. Momigliano, op. cit., 46.
25. Metaphysics 1024b14-15 names neither Plato, nor Socrates, nor a dialogue, and must be cited in error. Irwin apparently has in mind some other passage which he believes refers to the Sophist.


27. Diogenes Laertius III.5-6.


31. Ibid.


34. Ibid.


43. Gagarin, op. cit., 22.
44. Gagarin, op. cit., 35.
45. Gagarin, op. cit., 36.
50. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
Anakrisis and sugkrisis appear in Socratic dialogues. In Xenophon's Symposium Socrates summons Critobolus to "a pre-trial hearing" (anakrisis) to determine which of them is prettier (Symp. 5.2). Socrates proceeds to interrogate Critobolus. His questioning reveals Critobolus' thought (dianoia), and he uses Critobolus' thought to refute him, and
proves that he, Socrates, is more beautiful than Critobolus. In the Charmides (176C7) and the Laws (766D5) anakrisis is used in the same sense as in Xenophon. Similarly, in Plato's Phaedrus, Socrates uses anakrisis in the sense of "questioning" (227E). Sugkrisis, on the other hand, in the Philebus (42C10), Laws (894B10, 897A6) and Timaeus (64E4, 65C4) refers to "combinations" of various sorts.

86. Bakhtin, 1984, op. cit., 111.
90. Andrea Nightengale, Genres in Dialogue, Cambridge University Press, 1995, discusses Plato's parody of other literary genres in the dialogues, but overlooks the parody intrinsic to the genre of dialogue itself.
CHAPTER 2

MIMESIS AS TECHNE:

ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

In the Poetics Aristotle classifies Socratic dialogue among the genres of mimesis together with the comic mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus (47b9). In the Rhetoric he remarks that Socratic dialogues depict states of character (ethe) (1417a21), which he says in the Poetics is one of the six parts of tragedy (49b36ff.). So, Aristotle's own remarks justify treatment of Socratic dialogue as a genre of mimesis. Thus, it seems reasonable to apply the concepts in Aristotle's Poetics and other writings to the interpretation of Socratic dialogue. The first step in such a project is to come to terms with what Aristotle meant by mimesis. I review first some of the remarks of Socrates.

In the Republic Socrates states that

"The mimetic art represents people doing forced or voluntary actions, and as a result of so acting, supposing themselves to have fared well or badly,
and in all this experiencing either pain or delight" (603c4).

Socrates here and elsewhere classifies mimesis as a "craft" or "art" (techne) in accordance with a general principle:

"With respect to each thing, there are three arts (technai): one that uses it, one that makes it, and one that imitates it" (601D).

Aristotle echoes Socrates when he writes that "those who represent," i.e., mimetic artists, "represent people doing things" (Poet. 48a1), and throughout the Poetics he refers to the various genres of mimesis as technai (e.g., 47a21): poetry, painting, sculpture, music and dancing are all forms of techne. Aristotle defines techne as "a state or capacity to make things in accordance with true reasoning (logos alethes)" (EN 1140a9-10), that is, the artisan can give an account of what is done in practicing the techne and that account is true. Aristotle continues:

"Every art (techne) is concerned with coming-into-being, that is, with contriving and considering how something may come into existence out of those things that are able either to exist or not exist, and of those things their origin is in the one making them, not in the thing made" (EN 1140a10-14).

Aristotle held that there are objective, rational standards for all technai. [1] To practice an art, the artisan must be able to give a correct account of what is done at each step of the activity and how it contributes to the outcome. The artisan is the source of the new thing that is brought into existence.
In the Physics, Aristotle compares techne and nature with respect to end (telos):

"Wherever there is some end (telos), all the preceding steps are done in succession for the sake of it. So, in the same way as each thing is made, so it arises by nature (phusis), and in the same way that it arises by nature, so each thing is made, unless something impedes. It is made for the sake of something; so also it arises by nature for the sake of something. For example, if a house was one of the things brought into existence by nature, it would come into existence in the same way as it is now made by art (techne), and if the things that come into existence by nature came into existence not only by nature but also by art, they would come into existence by art in the same way as by nature... in general, art accomplishes the things that nature is not able to finish, and imitates (mimeitai) the things that nature does complete. So, if things done by art are for the sake of something, then it is clear that things done by nature are too." (199a8-18).

The art of the artisan complements and completes the work of nature; art and nature use the same methods; when an art produces something also made by nature, it imitates nature. So, Aristotle follows Socrates in Republic X in holding that technai imitate nature.

Art and nature also have teleology in common (199b29). Because the human race is part of nature, all technai are part of nature, and their ends are to be regarded as naturally given or determined; because the human race is part of nature and all technai involve human rational productive capacities, the teleology of 'art' is subordinate to and dependent on that of nature as a whole. [2]
In accordance with these views, Aristotle provides a naturalistic account of the origin and development of mimesis in general, and of epic, tragedy and comedy in particular, in Poetics iv, [3] and asserts that nature determined the detailed characteristics of tragedy and epic (see 49a14, a23, 51a9, 60a4). The chief purpose of Aristotle’s account is to discern a pattern of movement towards a natural telos in the development of poetry, an end or fulfillment which is intrinsic and determined, not simply the result of choices or acts which might have turned out otherwise. [4]

Accordingly, Aristotle distinguishes those who represent through mastery of an art (techne) from those who represent by practice (sunetheia) (47a19) and argues that deficiencies in mimesis occur when the artist does not follow the principles of the art (60b22f.). Aristotle holds that like all technai, mimesis has a ‘work’ or effect (ergon) (50a31) and an end (telos) (50a22).

A. telos and ergon in mimesis.

Aristotle speaks of the end (telos) of mimesis as its action or a segment of its action. In Poetics 6, he writes that the end (telos) of tragedy is the plot (muthos) and the acts (pragmata) performed by the mimetic artists (50a22). In Poetics 23 he speaks of telos as a segment of the action (praxis); he writes that epic poets
should construct plots that are concerned with a single
action which has "a beginning, a middle and an end
(telos)" (59a19; see also 59b19). This remark appears to
paraphrase an earlier statement in Poetics 7 about
tragedy, that for the action of a tragedy to be whole it
must have "a beginning, a middle and a conclusion
(teleute)" (50b26). It is reasonable to consider whether
Aristotle means teleute in both places, or telos.
Aristotle clarifies his meaning by explaining the remark
made in chapter 23 with an example in which he repeatedly
refers to telos. He writes that the compositions should
not be like histories, which necessarily produce a
description not of a single action (praxis) but of a
single span of time, and as many things as happen in it to
one person or many people which have only an accidental
relationship to each other. For example, he writes,
although the sea battle at Salamis occurred at the same
time as a battle against the Carthagineans in Sicily,
"they did not contribute to the same end" (telos);
similarly, he adds, sometimes one thing happens after
another in temporal sequence, but from such events no
single end (telos) comes about (59a21-29). Aristotle’s
use of telos here, as a segment of the action to which all
previous segments contribute, coincides with his use of
telos in the Physics, where he writes: "Wherever there is
some end (telos), all the preceding steps are done in
succession for the sake of it" (199a8). It also conforms to Aristotle's definition of teleute as that which naturally comes to be after something else either out of necessity or for the most part, but after which there is nothing else (50b29). Teleute, which occurs in the Poetics only three times, seems to be a synonym for telos.

So, the telos of a work of mimesis is the action or a segment of the action. Aristotle also discusses telos in mimesis in comparing tragedy with epic. In tragedy, "the end (telos) of the mimesis is in a shorter length than in epic" (62a18), he writes; that is, the action is more concentrated. Concentration makes tragedy a superior genre, he argues, "for the more condensed is more pleasurable than that diluted with a lot of time" (62b1). Sophocles' Oedipus is intrinsically preferable to an epic based on it but written in as many verses as the Iliad, he argues. Here Aristotle clearly refers to the action or a segment of the action in his use of telos. But telos also captures some sense of the aim of the mimesis, for Aristotle immediately adds that because of its concentration and for other reasons, tragedy is superior to epic since it "obtains its end more than epic does" (62b14).

Aristotle also speaks about the 'effect' (ergon) of mimesis in the Poetics. At the beginning of Poetics 13, he writes that he will discuss "what those who construct
plots should aim at and what they should avoid and from what source will come the effect (ergon) of the tragedy" (52b28), but the 'effect' of a tragedy is not defined per se in the text of the Poetics that we have. In Poetics 6, he states that if someone should string together speeches expressive of character and well constructed in diction (lexis) and thought (dianoia), it will not produce "what was the effect (ergon) of the tragedy," but the work using less of these things, and having a plot and a structure to its acts will produce it much more (50a29-33). And when comparing tragedy and epic at the end of our Poetics text, Aristotle states that tragedy is superior in the effect (ergon) of its art (techne), "for tragedies should not produce just any pleasure, but the one previously discussed" (62b12-15). Presumably, this last phrase refers to his comment in Poetics 14 that we should not seek every pleasure from tragedy but only "its proper one;" since the poet should provide this pleasure from pity and fear through mimesis, he clearly has to provide this by means of the acts performed by the mimetic artists (53b10-14). Yet, Aristotle does not mean that the ergon of tragedy is a pleasure of some sort. He clearly states in the Ethics that "there is no art (techne) of pleasure, and indeed, every effect (ergon) of an art is a good" (EN 1152b18), and pleasure is not an unqualified good. "It follows with reason that no pleasure is the effect (ergon)
of an art: for art is of no other operation (energeia) than capacity (dunamis)” (EN 1153a23-5), i.e., art produces the capacity for an activity that may result in the experience of pleasure, but not the experience itself.

We might be at a loss in understanding Aristotle's concept of the ergon of mimesis were it not for Politics VIII, where in a discussion of music education Aristotle asks "what is the capacity (dunamis) of music (mousike)," and "for the sake of what (tinos charin) should someone partake of it" (1339a14-16). Now, as indicated in the Ethics passage quoted above, the ergon of an art is a function of its power or capacity (dunamis). Furthermore, that for the sake of which is the end (Phys. 199a8). So, Aristotle’s answers to these two questions may help us understand what he means by the telos and ergon of music and of other forms of mimesis.

Aristotle considers one set of possible answers to both questions. He considers whether we partake of music for the sake of amusement (paidia) and rest (anapausis), or, because it contributes to leisure (diagoge) and prudence (phronesis), or "even more, that music contributes somehow to virtue (arete)," since just as gymnastics trains the body, so music somehow has an effect (ergon) on the states of character (ethos), habituating it to be able to take delight in the right things (1339a21-5). So, he says that the nature of music is more
honorable than that of mere amusement (1340a1), as it contributes both to the character and to the soul (1340a6).

Before we summarize Aristotle's arguments for this, we review his definition of character in the Eudemian Ethics. There Aristotle says that character is a quality of the irrational part of the soul which is nonetheless capable of following reason (1220b5, see also 20a10). He says that states of character (ethe) pertain to 1) the soul's capacities (dunameis) for the passions (pathemata), in virtue of which human beings are said to be subject to passion (pathetikoi), and 2) the dispositions (hexeis), in virtue of which they are said either to experience to some degree or to be insensitive to those emotions (pathe) (1220b7). By pathe Aristotle says he means anger (thumos), fear (phobos), modesty (aidos), desire (epithumia), and all such states which are usually followed by sensuous pleasure or pain. He says that a quality (such as character) is not due to these emotions, but due to the capacities for them. By capacities Aristotle says he means that those traits because of which human beings who act in accord with their emotions are described, as irascible, insensitive, amorous, modest, or shameless. The dispositions (hexeis), he says, are the causes of these capacities which we have in accordance with reason or in opposition to it, for example, courage.
(andreia), temperance (sophrosune), cowardice (deilia), and incontinence (akolasia) (1220b12-20). Finally, Aristotle states that the dispositions may be divided into excesses, deficiencies and means, and he presents a table of dispositions, of which the first column is excesses (e.g., audacity), the second deficiencies (e.g., cowardice), and the third means (e.g., courage) (1220b21f.).

Returning to the Politics, we note that Aristotle presents a series of arguments to support his view that music contributes to the character and the soul: First, the music (mela) of Olympus make the soul "inspired" (enthousiastike), and the inspiration is an emotion (pathos) of the character of the soul (1340a10). Second, all those listening to mimetic performances (mimeseis) become sympathetic (sumpatheis), apart from the dance rhythms and the music itself (1340a12). The third reason is the most important. Aristotle says since music is among the pleasures and since it is a virtue to take delight in, and to love and hate the right things, then clearly in experiencing music we must learn and become habituated to make correct judgments and to take delight in good states of character and in fine actions (praxeis). Now, dance rhythms and music, he continues, help educate us in this way because they supply likenesses (homoiomata) of states of character (ethe) very close to their true
natures, likenesses of anger and gentleness, of courage
and temperance, and of their opposites as well as other
states of character; this is obvious, he says, from the
effects (erga) of rhythms and music, for our souls are
changed by listening to them. Feeling pain or pleasure
through likenesses (ta homoia) is close to being in the
same state in reality. For example, he says, if someone
delights in seeing the image of something, for no other
reason than its form, the sight of that very thing, whose
image was observed, is necessarily pleasant to the person.

Other senses, such as taste and touch, do not transmit
likenesses of character, and sight does so only a little,
but in music, he says, there are representations
(mimemata) of states of character: different harmonies
have different natures so that listeners are disposed
towards each of them differently. Aristotle then lists
various effects of musical modes upon states of character:
Some make listeners sad and grave, like the so-called
Myxolydian, others make the thought feeble, like the
relaxed modes, still another makes people especially
moderate and calm, which seems to be the effect of the
Dorian mode alone, while the Phrygian makes listeners
inspired. Those who study musical education, he says,
speak correctly about the modes because they draw the
evidence for their theories from the effects (erga) of the
modes. From all these arguments, it is clear, concludes
Aristotle, that music has the capacity to form the character of the soul in some way, and so, young people should study it (1340a14-b13).

This passage of the Politics makes clear that for Aristotle the ergon of a particular mode of music is to effect a particular change in the state of character of the soul. Aristotle's views on the erga of music and rhythms on character seems consonant with Socrates' discourses in the Republic. Socrates in Republic III also says that specific musical modes and rhythms represent specific states of character (see 399-402). The states of character which Aristotle provides as examples of those represented by music appear on the table of means and extremes which he presents in the Eumedian Ethics after defining character. So, in Aristotelian terms, the effect (ergon) of some music could be to move the character towards the excess or deficiency of a disposition, while others could move it towards the mean. [6]

Now, mousike refers to music and to any art inspired by the Muses, such as lyric poetry, or tragedy or comedy. Aristotle, we have seen, uses the word in both senses, referring to lyric song (1340a9) and dance (1340a19) as well as mimetic performances quite apart from either (1340a12). We can safely assume that although Aristotle more often names musike in Politics VIII.5, his comments also apply to other forms of mimesis as well.
We have reached some understanding of what Aristotle meant by the ergon of a work of mimesis. The Politics also provides some useful suggestions for what he meant by telos as well. In Politics VIII.7, when discussing the sort of melodies that children should play, Aristotle writes: "I say that one should use music for the sake of not just one benefit (ou mias heneken opheleias) but for the sake of several," and he lists education (paideia), catharsis, and third, leisure (diagoge), rest (anapausis) and relaxation (anesis) (1341b32). As discussed above, in Politics VIII.5 Aristotle asked "for the sake of what" do people partake of the musical arts. Here, two chapters later, he has answered the question he posed earlier. Again, 'that for the sake of which' is an end. In Politics VIII.7 we have a summary statement of the various ends for which, Aristotle believes, one would partake of music, or other genres of mimesis. We must now consider what the elements of this list have to do with the notion of telos in the Poetics, i.e., if the end of tragedy is the plot or a segment of the action, how are these related to the above mentioned benefits? In Politics VIII, Aristotle discusses the role of music education in the education of young people, as well as the role of musical performances in providing entertainment, rest and relaxation for all. Though these ends for partaking of mimesis seem intuitively obvious, it is not so clear what
they have to do with plot and action in a mimetic performance, except perhaps to say that people would learn something from the plot, or find it entertaining. "Catharsis" is also on the list. Perhaps, by investigating what Aristotle means by catharsis we can come to some conclusions regarding what he means by the end (telos) of mimesis.

B. Catharsis.

In his definition of tragedy in Poetics 6, Aristotle says that tragedy accomplishes through pity and fear the catharsis of such emotions (49b27). Aristotle is believed to have also written about comic catharsis. [7] The Tractatus Coislinianus, certainly at least influenced by Aristotle, states that comedy accomplishes by means of pleasure and laughter the catharsis of such emotions. [8] Much more, however, is known about Aristotle’s theory of tragedy, than of his thoughts on comedy, and so we will tend to focus more on tragic catharsis in what follows.

Aristotle defines elements of his brief statement on tragic catharsis in Poetics 6 and elsewhere in the Poetics and in other works. Concerning fear for the person represented in tragedy, i.e., the person who is the object of tragedy, Aristotle says that the listeners feel this fear for someone who is like themselves (53a4-6). Elsewhere in the Poetics he says that the object of
tragedy should be neither someone who is superior in virtue or justice, nor someone who falls into misfortune because of vice or wickedness, but someone who suffers this because of some error (hamartia) (53a7-12). Aristotle defines the sort of persons represented in tragedy by their thought (dianoia) and character (ethos) (49b37). Clearly, if Aristotle held that the object of tragedy meets a tragic fate because of some error, and is not a person superior in virtue or justice, then clearly such a person might be educated in thought and character so that the error would be removed, and/or their virtue and justice increased. If this is true about the object of tragedy, it is just as true about the listeners whom Aristotle says are like the tragic figure. Yet, some contend that catharsis cannot be a corrective or educational experience because, in their view, tragic catharsis was and is for virtuous, educated, cultivated adults who needed no further education. [9] If this were true, then the listeners could not have been like the object of tragedy, could not have feared for that person represented, and could not have experienced catharsis, at least the sort that Aristotle had in mind.

I believe that this sort of confusion about Aristotle's views results from critics studying Aristotle's remarks on catharsis in, as it were, a vacuum--not considering their literary and social context.
Prior to Aristotle several discussions of catharsis occur in the dialogues of his teacher, Plato, in particular in the Sophist. At Sophist 226-231 the Eleatic stranger discusses the sixth way in which the sophist appears as "one who purifies/purges (kathartes) the soul of beliefs impeding learning" (331E5).

Scholars debating what Aristotle meant by catharsis, however, have either overlooked Sophist 226-231 [10] or made little of it. [11] But if Aristotle is in general responding to Plato in the Poetics, as some writers claim [12], a passage on catharsis that appears in a dialogue of Plato merits attention and analysis. The discussion in the Sophist also has the merit of being applicable to both tragedy and comedy. Blank discusses the passage while articulating his own views concerning catharsis in Socratic dialogue, but does not consider whether the passage influenced Aristotle in his development of the notion of tragic catharsis. [13] Let us now consider whether and how the discussion in Sophist 226-231 can help us understand Aristotle's notion of catharsis.

In this discussion, the Eleatic stranger focuses on "the cleansing of thinking" (ho peri dianoian katharmos) (227C2-5). It is cleansing (katharmos), he says, to leave virtue in the soul, and throw out whatever is bad (227D6). For example, in the souls of people who are thoughtless,
"their beliefs (doxai) struggle with their passions (epithumiai), their anger (thumos) with their pleasures (hedonai), their reason (logos) with their pains (lupai) and all these things with each other" (228B2).

One of the forms of badness in the soul is

"not knowing but thinking you know. This is probably the source of every error we make in thought (dianoia)" (229C5).

To deal with this, the stranger says, some people use refutation (elegchos), which he then describes. He first discusses the phases of Socratic discourse which Bakhtin names anacrisis and syncrisis:

"They cross-examine whoever thinks they are saying something when they are saying nothing. Then, since their opinions will vary inconsistently, these people will easily scrutinize them. They collect the opinions together during the discussion, put them side by side, and show that they conflict (enantiai) with each other at the same time on the same subjects (hama peri ton auton) in relation to the same things and in the same respects" (230B4).

Next, the stranger notes that the subjects recognize that their beliefs contradict:

"The people who are being examined see that their opinions contradict" (230B8).

Next, he describes their emotional reaction to this recognition, and their release from their beliefs, and the reaction of bystanders:

"They get angry at themselves, and become gentle (hemerountai) towards others. In that way they are released (apallattontai) from their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves, and of all releases (apallagai) it is most pleasant to hear and most lasting for the one experiencing it (paschon)" (230B9).
In conclusion, he describes the benefits of this refutation to the subjects:

"Just as the doctors of the body believe that the body would not be able to draw the nourishment offered it until someone expels the things impeding it inside, so the ones who cleanse (kathairontes) the soul believe the same thing and suppose that the soul will have no benefit from any learning that's offered it until someone refutes (elegchon) it and brings it refuted (elegchomenos) to shame, expels the opinions hindering (empodious) learning, and exhibits it purified and believing that it knows only what it knows and nothing more" (230C3).

Refutation, adds the stranger, is "the greatest and most decisive catharsis" (230D6).

Notice that the Eleatic stranger refers to the medical form of catharsis (catharsis of the body) (230C4) by way of analogy to elucidate the catharsis of the soul. Secondly, this account of catharsis speaks of purging harmful material, i.e., beliefs (doxai) from the soul. [14] I analyze the account of Sophist 230 into the following model:

Model I

1) Anacrisis: the examiner elicits from a subject speech representing the thought (dianoia) and states of character of the subject (230B4-5).

2) Syncrisis: the examiner juxtaposes conflicting statements (beliefs) to show that they contradict (230B6-8).
3) Recognition: the subject recognizes that the beliefs contradict (230B8).

4) Release (apallage): the subject is brought to shame and becomes angry with the self (i.e., the subject experiences suffering, pathos), becomes calmer towards others, and is released from the conflicting beliefs previously held (230B9-C2). In Aristotelian terms, the subject has changed in disposition towards the mean of gentleness (see EE 1220b38). The subject's thought (dianoia) and character (ethos) have changed (230D3-4).

5) Listeners experience pleasure in observing the catharsis of the subject (230C2).

By this account based on the Sophist, catharsis is a purging of false beliefs and associated states of character from the soul of a subject through a process involving suffering (pathos); more exactly, it is the transformation of a subject from one system of thought (dianoia) to another through anacrisis, synecrisis, and the recognition of, and release from, false beliefs and passions. In the release, the subject suffers, i.e., experiences shame and perhaps some other intense emotion, e.g., anger, but afterwards is calm. The character of the subject has been moved from the extreme of irascibility to the mean of gentleness. Listeners are pleased by observing this transformation.
This account of the catharsis of individuals subjected to refutation may serve as a model for developing an account of catharsis with respect to any work of mimesis, whether it be of tragedy or comedy or another genre. Indeed, by itself, Sophist 226-231 already presents a model for catharsis of interlocutors in that genre of mimesis known as Socratic dialogue. For example, in the Alcibiades of Aeschines, Alcibiades undergoes catharsis when subjected to the Socratic elenchus. In that dialogue Socrates challenges Alcibiades' pride and his envy of Themistocles. Finally, after Socrates delivers a long speech on Themistocles, which serves in part as the synecisis of Alcibiades' beliefs, Alcibiades burst into tears, and "weeping, laid his head upon his knees in despair," and "begged Socrates to teach him virtue and expel his depravity." [15] Not only does Alcibiades undergo the kind of arousal of emotion discussed in Sophist 230 but he actually demands catharsis from Socrates. In Aristotelian terms, Alcibiades is led away from the excesses of envy and boastfulness to the mean of sincerity (EE 1221a6).

I begin to apply the model of catharsis from the Sophist to tragedy by comparing it with the course of a particular tragic character. I choose Sophocles' Oedipus. Oedipus is someone who does not know what he thinks he knows (like those described in Sophist 229C5). He believes, or rather insists, that Polybus and Merope are
his natural parents, despite denials of this belief by a
man at a banquest in Corinth and by the prophet Teiresias.
Aristotle identifies this error of Oedipus as the pivot
around which the tragedy develops (Rhet. 1415a19).
Oedipus also believes that he was justified in killing out
of anger (orge: Soph. Oed. Tyr. 807) [16] a sacred herald
and an older gentleman whom he met at a crossroads and who
later turns out to have been his father, Laius. He boasts
that he is great (megas: 441) for defeating the Sphinx
with his mind (gnome: 399), as a result of which he became
king of Thebes and won marriage to its leading lady, who
turned out to be his mother, Iocasta. Certain states of
character accompany Oedipus' false beliefs. He prizes his
stubbornness (authadeia), says Creon (549-50); and he is
blind to his own anger (orge), says Teiresias (337-8). He
is boastful. The unfolding of the plot of Oedipus
Tyrannus subjects Oedipus to refutation, not by a
Socrates--for Teiresias does not engage him in Socratic
dialogue--but by its gradual presentation to Oedipus of
the facts, of the persons who refute his beliefs about
himself, and about his life and career. In the course of
this dramatic anacrisis and syncrisis, Oedipus becomes
angry at all the other principals of the tragedy: at
Teiresias, at Creon, at the Herdsman; he even speaks ill
of Iocasta (1078). Finally, Oedipus is refuted; he
experiences a terrible recognition, becomes angry with
himself and blinds himself. Afterwards, he becomes modest and gentle toward others and even thankful to Creon, when the latter does Oedipus a service (1467-79). Oedipus' painful release (apallage) continues as the play closes. While in the Sophist the emotional turmoil or suffering of the subject arises in response to the questioning of the examiners, Oedipus' suffering arises paradoxically as a result of his own inquiry into the circumstances of the death of Laius and into his own origin. His inquiry in question and answer drives the tragedy forward as he questions first Creon, then Teiresias, Iocasta, the Messenger and, finally, the Herdsman.

The case of Oedipus is highly unusual. Most of the leading figures of Greek tragedy go to their deaths (e.g., Clytaemestra) or escape from the drama (e.g., Medea) before their beliefs are refuted; they make their final exit without the sort of catharsis of identity and belief that Oedipus suffers in Sophocles' play. Oedipus and a few other figures (e.g., Orestes in the Oresteia), however, experience catharsis inside the plot of tragedy: Oedipus passes through experiences comparable to the steps described in Sophist 230BD. At the beginning of the play, he is the imposing ruler of Thebes, who has saved the city from disaster; he has an impressive curriculum vitae and seemingly consistent beliefs. Yet, as the plot unfolds he is shown to be the kind of person in whose soul "beliefs
struggle with passions, anger with pleasures, reason with pains and all these things with each other" (as described of subjects in need of refutation in Sophist 228B2). He becomes angry as his beliefs are questioned or contradicted. He is stubborn before sound advice. Finally, he is told the truth and his identity collapses. After an orgy of self-destruction, he becomes calm and gentle. Let us now recast the model of Sophist 230BD to describe the case of Oedipus, as follows.

Model II

1) Anacrisis: the plot of mimesis represents acts and speech expressive of the thought and states of character of the subject.

2) Syncrisis: the plot presents difficulties and/or contradictions in the acts and expressed beliefs, in the thought and states of character, to the subject.

3) Recognition: the subject recognizes that the acts and beliefs, the thought and states of character, contain difficulties.

4) Release: the subject becomes ashamed, angry with self, and otherwise suffers, while being released from the beliefs and states of character previously held. The subject's thought and character change.

5) Listeners, Aristotle says, experience pleasure in observing the tragedy.
As in the case of the individual subjected to elenctic scrutiny (Model I), Oedipus experiences a purging of false beliefs and associated states of character from the soul. Oedipus' thought and character are transformed. In Aristotelian terms, he is moved from the extremes of boastfulness, irascibility and stubbornness to the means of modesty, gentleness and sincerity. Such transformations of thought and states of character are qualities of catharsis that are the same in the model based on the Sophist and the one based on the Oedipus. What differs is the instrumentality for bringing about these changes in the subject: in the case of the Sophist, it is the questioning of examiners; in the case of tragedy, it is the unfolding of the plot (muthos), the representation of the action (praxis). These concepts will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section. For the present, however, it remains to extend our understanding of catharsis to the experience of the listeners of mimesis. We begin with the treatment of catharsis in Republic X: though the character Socrates does not use the term catharsis there, catharsis is the very phenomenon which he is discussing. Socrates' remarks parallel the account of catharsis in the Sophist and suggest a third model of the catharsis of listeners of mimesis.
In Republic X, Socrates says that mimesis represents people doing things, and as a result of their actions, believing themselves to have fared well or badly (603C4). He then says of the persons represented:

"So, then, in all these actions, is a man in a state of harmony? Or, just as when in the case of sight [i.e., optical illusions: 602C] he was at discord with himself (estasiazen) and held contrary opinions (enantiai doxai) in himself at the same time about the same things (hama peri ton auton), now also in his actions is he both at discord (stasiazei) and struggling with himself?" (603C10)

Socrates concludes:

"Our soul is full of thousands of such oppositions that exist at the same time" (603D6).

The state of the soul that Socrates here ascribes to persons represented in mimesis is the same as that which we have seen the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist ascribes to those in need of catharsis. The stranger says that in the souls of thoughtless people, their beliefs struggle with their passions, their anger with their pleasures, their reason with their pains and all these things with each other (228B). He also says that elenctic examiners of such people show that their opinions conflict with each other at the same time on the same subjects (230B6). Some of the very language used is the same as that used by Socrates, for the stranger calls this condition in which the soul struggles with itself discord (stasis) (228B8), while Socrates says the soul of the confused man is in discord (stasizaei) (603D3); both say that the beliefs of
their subjects are in conflict (enantiai) with each other, at the same time on the same subjects (hama peri ton auton) (Soph. 230B6; Rep. 603CD). So, the state of the soul which Socrates describes in Republic X, that is, the state of the soul represented by mimetic artists, is the same one that the stranger in the Sophist describes as in need of catharsis.

As Socrates continues his discussion in Republic X, he turns to discuss tragic mimesis. As an example of a person "in discord," he presents the case of a decent (epieikes) man who has lost his son: two tendencies will struggle inside the man, says Socrates: 1) to grieve deeply over his loss, and 2) to fight the pain and hold out against it (603E-604A). Reason (logos) and custom (nomos) will bid him to resist, while the suffering (pathos) itself will drag him towards the pain. Whenever there is contradictory movement in a man about the same thing at the same time (peri to auto hama), there are necessarily two things in him, adds Socrates (604B). He is in discord. To be in a state of pain in this way, however, is an "impediment" (empodon) to deliberating about what has happened in accordance with reason (604C), says Socrates. Again, the argument of Republic X parallels that of Sophist 230BD, which speaks of expelling opinions impeding (empodious) learning. So, by the argument of the Sophist, this impediment of pain, of grief
discussed in Republic X, should be removed from the decent man by catharsis so that he can deliberate. Indeed, Socrates himself says in Republic X that such a man needs his soul to be healed (iasthai) by removing (aphanizo) his grief through medicine (604D). Socrates regards the grief to be a noxious substance hindering the man's thought, [17] and, like the Stranger, compares the healing of his soul by the removal of grief to medical treatment.

In sum, Socrates presents a model of a decent man in grief who needs catharsis to remove an impediment to deliberation. He next projects this emotional turmoil of an individual into the listener of tragic mimesis. He says that the struggle between reason and emotion represented by mimetic artists is transferred to the listeners so that the listeners imitate the emotional turmoil of the hero represented as they witness the mimesis.

"For we know that even the best of us while listening to Homer or to one of the tragic poets representing one of the heroes in mourning and prolonging a great speech in his lamentations or singing and beating his breast, delight in it and, giving into ourselves, follow it and share in his suffering, and with all earnestness we praise as a good poet the one who especially stirs us in this way" (605c10).

And as a result, the listeners indulge in emotions that they would ordinarily repress, says Socrates:

"If you consider that the part of us held down by force at the time of personal misfortunes and which hungers for crying and sufficient weeping and for being satisfied is the sort of part that desires
these things, then it is this part which is satiated by, and delights in, the poets; but the part of us that is best by nature, inasmuch as it is not sufficiently educated by reason or habit, relaxes its guard against this lamentation, inasmuch as while observing another's sufferings it also thinks that it is nothing shameful for it, if another man who says he is good laments at the wrong time, to praise and pity him, but that it gains pleasure, and would not allow itself to be deprived of it though it despise the poem as a whole" (606AB).

The listeners respond to the likeness of a person in grief and lamentation. Plato and Aristotle both wrote that likenesses can be used to educate and lead people towards ethical truths (see, e.g., Plat. Phaedrus 250, 273D, Rep. 401-402, 532B; Aris. Politics 1340a18f). Plato employs this pedagogic principal in his own writings in his use of myth, allegory, and simile (e.g., the Myth of Er, the allegory of the cave, the simile of the divided line, etc.), and as we have discussed, his works all fall into a genre of representation (mimesis). Aristotle says that mimesis helps to educate our judgment and dispositions because it supplies likenesses of states of character very close to their true natures. "Feeling pain and pleasure through likenesses," he says, "is close to being in the same state in reality" (Pol. 1340a18). So, for Plato and Aristotle, when listeners imitate a character who is in discord within the self between grief and reason--like the decent man who lost his son, and like themselves "at the time of personal misfortunes" though they repressed their emotions at that time--they
approximate an actual experience (pathos) of grief and sorrow, and so, become in need of catharsis, by the argument of the Sophist, or of healing, by Republic 603E-604D, because when hearing imitation they are "in discord" as they were "at the time of personal misfortune" in the past.

There is a difficulty in Socrates' discourse between his apparent endorsement of an individual repressing emotions (604B, 606AB) and his recommendation that the internal cause of the emotions (e.g., pain) be removed (604C). If the pain is to be "held down by force" how can it be removed? [18] To resolve this difficulty one might propose that the emotional experience of the listener qua listener can be a positive benefit. [19] So Aristotle argues in Politics VIII.7, and explains:

"The emotion (pathos) that occurs in the souls of some exists to some degree in everyone, for example, pity (eleos) and fear (phobos), and, moreover, inspiration; for some are subject to being possessed by this movement, and we notice that such people are affected by religious music and that whenever they indulge in the music that exorgiazise (exorgiazo) the soul they are calmed (kathistamenoi), just as those who obtain medical treatment and catharsis" (1342a4-ll).

The first thing to note about this passage is that it discusses an experience that Aristotle referenced a few pages earlier in the Politics. There Aristotle proposes that music contributes to the character and the soul, and to support that view he writes:
"This would be clear if we became affected in various ways in our character through music. And the fact is that we become so, for many reasons, especially through the music of Olympus. This music, by common consent, make our souls inspired" (1340a10).

So, Aristotle seems to consider the experience of inspiration from religious music to be rather commonplace. Indeed, he seems to say that he himself is inspired by it. So, he hardly considers the experience of those affected by religious music to be pathological. [20]

Second, we should note that Aristotle’s account of the catharsis of people affected by religious music bears remarkable similarity in its progression to the account of catharsis in the Sophist. In both accounts, the subjects become emotionally excited: subjected to refutation, a subject becomes ashamed and angry at the self; subjected to religious music, the soul of the subject becomes frenzied. After the excitement aroused in either case, the subject becomes calm (Pol.: kathistamenoi, Soph.: hemerountai). Both Aristotle and the Eleatic stranger compare the therapy and result to medical treatment. In the Politics, Aristotle proposes the example of persons affected by religious music as a model for tragic catharsis. For immediately after his description of inspiration, he says:

"The same sort of effect is necessarily experienced by those who are prone to pity and fear or are in general passionate; similarly, it is produced in everyone else inasmuch as each of us is prone to these emotions, and so some catharsis occurs in
everyone and is alleviated with pleasure" (1342al1-15).

The aim and method of catharsis in the Sophist is clear enough: to transform the thought and character of the subject by means of Socratic dialogue. What does Aristotle regard as the aim and means of the catharsis of pity and fear induced by tragedy which he compares to inspiration in the Politics? An interesting passage in the Nicomachean Ethics may provide the beginning of a clear answer.

"If arguments (logoi) were sufficient to make people decent (epieikeis), they would justly command great pay, according to Theognis, and we ought to procure them... but they do not appear to be able to exhort the multitude (hoi polloi) towards goodness. For by nature they are not obedient to modesty or shame (aidos) but only to fear (phobos), and do not abstain from base acts because of their baseness but because of the punishments. For living by passion (pathos), they pursue their private pleasures and the means to them, and flee the opposite pains, and they have no understanding of the good or the truly pleasant since they are without taste. What argument (logos) could reform such people? It is not easy, indeed, it is impossible, to change by argument what has been bound to the character (ethos) for a long time... For the one who lives for passion (pathos) would not listen to an argument that would turn him away from passion, nor again would he agree with it. So, how is it possible to change the mind of someone in this state? In general, it seems that passion (pathos) yields not to argument, but to force" (1179b4).

In my view, the above passage suggests that as much as catharsis occurs in everyone (Pol. 1342a14), it is particularly beneficial to the person ruled by passion. For though the virtuous may be influenced by argument, Aristotle believes those ruled by passion will only yield
to force. The arousal of their own pity and fear in witnessing a mimetic performance, Aristotle holds, may actually produce the force within them necessary and able to move them somewhat away from a life ruled by passion. Though those ruled by passion do not respond to reason, nor follow modesty, they do obey fear, and choose to avoid base acts because they wish to avoid the punishment that they fear may follow them. For Aristotle, then, the aim of tragic catharsis is to "exhort the many towards goodness" by inducing mental states that will bring them to avoid certain types of actions, i.e., "to hate the right things." It seems then that Aristotle believes that poets have a great power to effect good or evil insofar as they know how to use likenesses to move listeners towards a mean or an extreme in ethical disposition. Socrates seems to agree with this view in Republic III when he distinguishes between musical modes and rhythms that have a good effect in the soul and those that are useless (398D-402). The agencies by which tragedy may achieve the aims that Aristotle discusses is again in likenesses, the likeness of the thought and states of character of the tragic figure to those of the listeners. As Aristotle writes:

"Pity is for someone who suffers misfortune undeservedly, while fear is for someone who is like ourselves" (53a4-6).
Aristotle explains in the Rhetoric that pity is some feeling of pain at an apparent destructive (phthartikon) or painful (luperon) evil which befalls someone who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to suffer ourselves, or someone in our family to suffer. So, according to Aristotle, listeners pity tragic figures because they believe themselves that what the tragic figures suffer may happen to them, and they fear for them because they themselves are like them. According to Aristotle, the point of resemblance is in thought and character, since that is how he defines the persons represented in mimesis (49b37). Character concerns whether and how one is subject to passion (pathos) (EE 1220b7). So, for Aristotle, listeners resemble a tragic figure in their faculties of passion: When the tragic figure expresses emotion, listeners experience the emotion; when that the tragic figure experiences physical suffering (pathos) (52b11), listeners experience the suffering as emotion (pathos), namely, as pity and fear. This reciprocity in which an action on stage evokes emotion in listeners is a dialogic form through which the poet involves listeners in the tragedy. As the thought and character of the tragic figure is refuted, so also is that of the listeners. As they suffer pity and fear for the one who suffers misfortune, they fear that they may also suffer misfortune due to the same thought and
character. As a result, they are prompted to abandon aspects of that thought and character, as a way of escaping such fate, and so rid themselves of that pity and fear they felt for the tragic figure whom they now resemble less. Yet, because the listeners are not the person represented, their catharsis is alleviated by pleasure (Pol. 1342a14), as in the Sophist. Thus, the dialogic interpretation of tragic catharsis holds that listeners who share thought and states of character with a tragic figure experience a catharsis of the pity and fear evoked by refutation of that thought and character. This reciprocity is evoked by the plot, the representation of the action. So, Aristotle writes that in tragedy the terrifying and the pitiable should arise "from the structure of the acts" performed by the mimetic artists.

"For the plot should be constructed in such a way that, even without seeing it, someone who hears about the incidents will shudder and feel pity at the outcome, as someone would feel upon hearing the plot of the Oedipus... Since the poet should produce the pleasure that comes from pity and fear through the mimesis, it is obvious that this must be built into the acts" (53b1).

For Aristotle, tragic mimesis can exhort the many ruled by passion to goodness, by representing a tragic figure who is like them in thought and character experience misfortune because of that very thought and character. To effect this aim, poets have to imitate the irritable disposition (orgilotes, EE 1220b38) since such is the disposition of those who are ruled by passion. So,
Socrates' objection against the imitation of the irritable disposition (Rep. 604E) is without force.

Let us now recast the models of catharsis for someone subjected to elenctic scrutiny (Model I) and for a tragic character (Model II) into a model of catharsis for listeners of tragedy.

Model III

1) Anacrisis: the plot of the mimesis represents acts and speech expressive of the thought and states of character of the person(s) represented, which thought and states of character are shared by listeners.

2) Syncrisis: the plot presents difficulties and/or contradictions in the acts and expressed beliefs, thought and states of character, of the person(s) represented, and so of the listeners.

3) Recognition. The listeners recognize that if the person(s) represented continue to adhere to the thought and states of character that the listeners share with them, it would result in suffering for such persons.

4) Release. The listeners suffer pity and fear for the persons represented, and fear for themselves that their sharing in such thought and states of character may subject them to personal suffering. As a result, they may change in thought and character.
5) Yet, because the listeners are not the person represented, their catharsis is alleviated by pleasure (Pol. 1342a14).

The invariant characteristic of our three models of catharsis---one based on Plato's Sophist, the second based on the plot of Oedipus Rex, and the third based on Republic X and Politics VIII.7---is that catharsis is the transformation of an individual with respect to thought and state of character through some pathos after his or her thought and character have been refuted.

Finally, it seems obvious that there is a close relationship between catharsis and the effect (ergon) of mimesis. Earlier we saw that for Aristotle the ergon of a particular mode of music is to effect a particular change in the state of character of the soul. It would be expected that for Aristotle the preferred mode of music would move the character towards the mean. In analyzing the ergon of a complicated genre of mimesis, such as tragedy, we must recognize that, during enactment, a tragedy will continuously be producing effects (erga) in the states of character of the soul of a listener. Thus, one might distinguish between the ergon of a particular scene and the ergon of the tragedy as a whole. We are concerned here with the latter. If the effect (ergon) of a mimetic performance is a particular change in the character of the soul, and if catharsis is the
transformation of an individual with respect to thought and character, then the effect (ergon) of the mimesis is an end-result of the process of catharsis.

Catharsis, on the other hand, has been identified by Aristotle, as one of the benefits of mimesis; it is "that for the sake of which" one partakes of musike, i.e., an end of mimesis. This is consistent with his definition of the end (telos) of mimesis in the Poetics, where he says that the end of mimesis is the plot or action, since catharsis entails the experience of some pathos by a listener in response to the action (53b1).

C. Plot and action.

Aristotle writes that plot is the origin and soul of tragedy (50a38). Plot is the representation of the action, and the structure (sunthesis) of the acts represented by the mimetic artists; it is the end (telos) and most important part of tragedy (50a3-23). Before we discuss Aristotle’s theory of plot in more detail, it is fitting to review the remarks of Socrates and Phaedrus on the structure of tragedies and speeches in Plato’s Phaedrus, as the discussion represented in that dialogue may have influenced Aristotle’s formulation of the concept of plot in the Poetics. In the Phaedrus, Socrates discusses the virtues of a hypothetical apprentice tragedian:
"What if someone would go to Sophocles and Euripides and say that he knows how to make long speeches (rheeseis) concerning a small matter, and quite short ones concerning an important matter, and whenever he wishes, pitiful ones or fearful ones or threatening ones and as many other kinds as there are, and says that by teaching these things he supposes to teach others how to make a tragedy?"

Phaedrus responds:

"I suppose, Socrates, that Sophocles and Euripides would laugh if someone thinks that a tragedy is something other than the structure (sustasis) of these things, composed fitting to each other and to the whole (holon)" (268c5).

Earlier, in criticizing a speech of Lysias Socrates speaks about the need for speeches to have structure. He argues that the organization of speeches should follow a "logographic necessity" (anagke logographike) which determines the ordering of its parts.

"Every speech should be composed (sunestanai) just like an animal (zoon) having a body of its own, so that it is neither headless nor footless but has centers and extremities written fitting to each other and to the whole." (264c2)

Aristotle’s theory of plot can be read as a representation and elaboration of these remarks by Socrates and Phaedrus. Indeed, when he discusses plot as the end of tragedy, Aristotle considers the work of a hypothetical poet in a way that is nearly identical to the example proposed by Socrates in the Phaedrus. Aristotle states that if someone should string together speeches (rheeseis) expressive of character and well constructed in diction and thought, these parts by themselves will not produce the effect of tragedy; rather, a plot, a structure
to the actions, is needed far more than such speeches (50a29-33). So, Aristotle says that a poet must be a composer of plots rather than of verses, insofar as he is a poet by virtue of representation, and represents actions (51b27). Furthermore, in Poetics 7, which discusses the nature of plot, Aristotle compares the structure of the action represented by plot to that of an animal in the same way as Socrates compares the structure of speeches to that of an animal. Aristotle writes that tragedy is the representation of a complete and whole action (teleia kai hole praxis) (50b24). He adds that for an animal (zoon) or anything else composed of parts to be beautiful (kalon) it must not only be ordered but must also have a magnitude which is not arbitrary (50b34), and later he states that epic poets should also construct plots about a single action that is whole and complete and has a beginning, middle and end, so that just like an animal (zoon) it will produce the pleasure particular to it (59a18-21).

Aristotle explains what he means when he says that the action represented by the plot must be whole. He says that a whole is that which has a beginning, a middle and a conclusion (50b26); for the action to be a whole, the parts must be combined so that if any section is transposed or removed the whole is torn asunder and disturbed, since something which in being present or absent makes no manifest contribution to the whole is not
part of it (51a30). This explanation elaborates the rule of Phaedrus that the structure of the elements of a tragedy be composed fitting to each other and to the whole (268d4).

In his own treatment of plot, on which we now focus, Aristotle divides the whole of a tragedy into its "binding" (desis) and "lysis" (lusis). The "binding" (sometimes called the "complication") is the tragedy from the beginning up to the furthest point from which it changes towards good fortune or misfortune (55b26); much of the binding is "outside" the tragedy and prior to the time of its action, e.g., the encounter between Oedipus and Laius at the crossroads, though some of the binding is inside the tragedy. The lysis is the tragedy from the beginning of the change towards good fortune or misfortune up to the end (telos) (55b28-9), i.e., the lysis includes the end (telos) of the tragedy, at least in the sense of a segment of the action. So, in Sophocles' Oedipus Rex, the binding includes: the oracle telling Laius and Jocasta not to have children, the birth of Oedipus, the oracle on his life, his attempted murder, his life in Corinth, his trip to Delphi, his flight towards Thebes, his solution of the riddle of the Sphinx, his reign in Thebes, the birth of his children, and the outbreak of a plague in Thebes, Creon's departure for Delphi (all of which occur before the time of the setting of the play), and, finally, the
supplicants' visit to the palace, with which the play opens. The binding is complete with the return of Creon from Delphi, for there the listeners hear that Thebes will continue to suffer plague until the killer of Laius, i.e., Oedipus, is caught and punished. Thence begins the lysis—with the speech in which Oedipus pronounces the curse of exile upon the killer of Laius, for he is that very man and so curses himself.

Lysis is usually taken to mean "solution," or "dissolution," but Plato and Aristotle also use the term to signify "releasing," and "refutation." In the Republic, Socrates uses lysis to refer to "the releasing from bonds" of the prisoners in the cave (515C4, 532B6) as they are led away from contemplation of the shadows inside the cave to the light outside it. One passage states that "the releasing from bonds" of the prisoners and their being led up to the light is a metaphor representing how education leads the soul up to the contemplation of what is best in the things that are (532B6).

Aristotle uses lysis to refer to the refutation of enthumemata in the Rhetoric (1402a30, b23, etc.); and in the Sophistical Refutations he defines lysis as "the exhibition of a false deduction" (179b23). Whether we consider lysis the solution to the binding, or the refutation and/or release of a tragic figure, such as Oedipus, or both, it seems to include that section of the
action in response to which listeners experience catharsis. Insofar as catharsis is an end of tragedy, the lysis includes the end of tragedy in that sense as well.

Aristotle says a plot is either simple (haplos) or intertwined (peplegmenos), arguing that the action which a plot represent is of these two kinds (52a12). He calls an action simple which is continuous and unitary and in which the change from good fortune to misfortune occurs without reversal or recognition. In intertwined action, however, the change occurs with reversal or recognition or both. The structure (sunthesis) of the finest tragedies is not simple, but intertwined (52b31). Aristotle decomposes intertwined plots in both tragedy and epic into parts, which he lists as reversals (peripeteiai), recognitions (anagnoriseis) and suffering (pathos or pathemata) (52b9, 59b10). Of the three parts of plot, Aristotle says that reversals and recognitions are the most important, for with them a tragedy attracts and persuades our souls (psuchagogei) (50a33). So, Aristotle even conducts his discussion of the parts of plot with attention to their effects (erga) on the souls of the listeners, and therefore on their states of character. In addition, he says that reversals and recognitions should arise out of the very structure (sustasis) of the plot, so that they occur as a result of preceding events either by necessity or what is likely (52a17). It makes a big difference
whether reversals and recognitions occur as a result of these events or simply after them (52a18).

Aristotle defines reversal as a change of actions into the opposite of how they were intended, in accordance with probability or necessity (52a22). For his first example of reversal, he writes "in the Oedipus the one who comes to bring delight to Oedipus and free him of his fear of his mother does the opposite by revealing who Oedipus is" (52a25). Aristotle’s account is compressed. The messenger from Corinth, who comes to announce that Oedipus is elected king of that city, reveals that Oedipus is the child which Laius’ Herdsman had given to him; this news brings Oedipus to question the Herdsman. The Herdsman reveals that Oedipus is the son of Jocasta and Laius. So, the Messenger’s intent to bring delight to Oedipus, instead, brings him misery, the reverse of what the Messenger intended. Oedipus’ self-recognition—that he had married his mother and killed his father—completes the reversal, which is set in motion by the Messenger and is shown to be in progress even before the Herdsman arrives when Jocasta recognizes who Oedipus is from what the Messenger says, and runs into the house to kill herself. The reversal solves the binding: It brings to light the murderer of Laius and the cause of pollution in Thebes: Oedipus’ marriage and patricide. [21] The second example that Aristotle cites is from Theodectes’ lost
play, the Lynceus. [22] Aristotle describes a scene in which Danaus is leading off Lynceus to kill him, but "it comes about as a result of the preceding actions that Danaus is killed and Lynceus is rescued" (52a28). In the first example, there is a reversal from good fortune to bad fortune, while in the second example, it is from bad fortune to good. So, a reversal need not have any particular relationship to good or bad fortune; it need only be the reverse of what is expected. Accordingly, one scholar has proposed "backfire" as a free translation of peripateia. [23]

Aristotle writes in the Rhetoric that one reason that we derive pleasure from mimesis is because of reversals: "Reversals (peripeteiai) and hairbreadth escapes from danger give pleasure, because all such things are wondrous" (1371b10).

Plato's dialogues may have provided Aristotle with paradigms for his notion of reversal. For instance, in the Republic, after Socrates refutes Thrasymachus by showing that his statements entail the opposite of what he believes, as narrator of the dialogue Socrates comments to the reader that "it was evident to all that the argument about the just had turned about (perieistekei) into its opposite" (343A). With this remark, Plato has the character Socrates identify a reversal. Later in the dialogue, right after the Allegory of the Cave, which

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speaks of a cave dweller being turned around towards the
light, Socrates speaks of a "turning around" of the soul
as a method of education. He says that education is an
art (techne) of turning around (periagoge) the soul away
from the transitory towards that which is (518CD). So, we
might consider that the reversal described above in the
Oedipus turns Oedipus' beliefs about himself into their
opposite, and turns his soul away from his delusions about
himself towards who he truly is.

Recognition, writes Aristotle, is a change from
ignorance to knowledge, and either towards affection or
hatred, of persons defined with respect to good fortune,
or misfortune (52a29). For example, Oedipus, who is
defined as fortunate within the Sophocles' play,
recognizes who he is, and so experiences a change from
ignorance to knowledge, and to self-hatred. In addition,
Aristotle says, there are also other kinds of recognition,
since recognition can be in reference to inanimate things,
or chance events, or whether someone has done something or
not done something (52a33).

Aristotle says that the finest recognitions occur
together with a reversal, as does Oedipus' recognition of
himself (52a32). This sort of recognition particularly
arises from the plot, that is, from the action (52a36).
The messenger comes from Corinth, produces a reversal in
the action, and, as a result, Oedipus recognizes who he
himself is. Iphigenia as priestess is about to order the sacrifice of her brother Orestes unknowingly, but first makes Pylades swear that he will go to Argos and give a letter to Orestes, and Pylades turns around and gives it right to Orestes in her presence, which leads to their mutual recognition. Aristotle says that such recognition and reversal will contain either pity or fear since the experience of misfortune or good fortune will occur with them (52a38). So, as a result of the reversal and recognition, Oedipus experiences misfortune, which produces pity. Aristotle adds that the representation of such actions underlies tragedy (52b1).

Characters in Plato's dialogues speak of recognition in ways similar to how Aristotle does: as recognition of a person from memory (Parm. 127A); as recognition of a person by stepping into their footprint (Theae. 193C) (as Electra begins to recognize Orestes in the Choephori); and as recognition of a blood relative whom one did not know by means of conversation with that person (Pol. 258A). In addition, after Lysimachus learns that Socrates, whom he had not known, is as interested and knowledgeable in education as he is, he says that he and Socrates have "come to know each other," (anagnorismen allelous), i.e., they have recognized what sort of persons they each are (Laches 181C).
We should also consider what recognition in tragedy has to do with the recognition of error which is discussed in the Sophist in connection with catharsis. The Sophist says that subjects recognize that their beliefs contradict, and then get angry at themselves, as does Oedipus in his self-recognition discussed above.

"They get angry at themselves, and become gentle towards others. In that way they are released from their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves, and of all releases it is most pleasant to hear and most lasting for the one experiencing it" (230B9).

The subjects recognize that "their inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves" are false, that they are not the sort of person they thought they were; they come to a more accurate self-recognition of who they are, in which the soul "knows only what it knows and nothing more" (230C3). So, recognition of a serious error one commits can be understood as recognition of the sort of person one is.

We have seen that this is the kind of recognition that Oedipus experiences in the play of Sophocles: he recognizes that he is not the person he thought he was. His passion to affirm who he thought he was led him to ruin.

Not all reversals or recognitions solve the binding of the plot. For example, in discussing how the best recognitions are those that occur with a reversal, Aristotle gives as an example the nurse's recognition of Odysseus in the "bath scene," in which the nurse
recognizes Odysseus from his scar--contrary to his expectation, and contrary to his desire to keep his identity a secret. Such minor reversals and recognitions are among the many that occur in the course of an intertwined plot. I call a reversal which resolves the binding the principal reversal of the mimesis, and a recognition that occurs at the same time with the principal reversal the principal recognition. Other reversals and recognitions are called "minor."

The third part of the plot of tragedy is pathos, which Aristotle defines as some destructive or painful action, such as deaths in plain view, painful agonies, woundings, and the like (52b11). Such a definition is surprising given the opposition between pathos and praxis (and other nouns expressing action) in earlier Greek literature (Aesch. Ag. 533; Pl. Soph. 248D, Laws 876D), and even in the Poetics itself (47a27). The idea of defining pathos in terms of action is paradoxical. The problem is illustrated in Plato’s Laws, where in discussing rules for determining appropriate punishments the Athenian distinguishes between the deed committed (praxis) and the suffering (pathos) inflicted on the victim (876D). Here, praxis seems to designate an observable event, while pathos designates its subjective correlate. Similarly, in discussing dance in Poetics 1, Aristotle distinguishes pathos and praxis in remarking
that dancers can represent states of character, emotions (pathe), and actions (praxeis) by means of rhythms (47a27). Moreover, in the Ethics, he defines pathos as emotion: it is the genus into which Aristotle classifies fear, anger, shame, desire, and the like (EE 1220b12). In tragedy, however, it is not always possible to separate the representation of the destructive act from that of the pathos it causes. The deed frequently occurs offstage; we learn of it by observation of its effect: a body rolled out on an eccyclema, an actor who is represented as having just been blinded, a mortally injured Hyppolytus. Such are "deaths in plain view, painful agonies, woundings, and the like" (52b11). The representation of the deed is the representation of the pathos: the representation collapses the deed of the murderer or assailant, which occur offstage, with the effect on the sufferer, which is exhibited after the fact and by means of which the execution of the deed is known to the audience. So, Aristotle writes that "pathos is a destructive or painful action" (52b11).

D. Universals in mimesis.

Aristotle provides us with plot descriptions of two works of mimesis in Poetics 17 that further illustrate his concepts of binding, lysis, reversal and recognition. His examples may serve as paradigms, in accordance with which
we might set down the plot of a work of mimesis. In Poetics 17, Aristotle writes that a poet should set out his stories (logoi) in a universal form (katholou), and only then extend them through the development of episodes (55a34). He explains: "I say that the universal (to katholou) is observed in the following way, for example, that of the Iphigenia." He then gives the story of the Iphigenia in Tauris:

"After some girl is sacrificed and disappears in a way unclear to the sacrificers and is put down in a foreign land, where the custom was to sacrifice foreigners to the goddess, she holds this priesthood. Some time later, it happens that the brother of the priestess comes, but the fact that the god ordered him to come there for some reason is outside the universal, and for what purpose he comes is outside the plot. After he arrives and is captured and is about to be sacrificed, he makes himself known (anagnorizo), either as Euripides or Poluidos composed it, by saying, as is probable, that not only did his sister have to be sacrificed but also himself, and from that comes his deliverance (soteria). After this the poet assigns the names and introduces episodes" (55b3).

Removing Aristotle's running commentary on what not to include in a story in a universal form, the story of the Iphigenia reduces to:

"After some girl is sacrificed and disappears in a way unclear to the sacrificers and is put down in a foreign land, where the custom was to sacrifice foreigners to the goddess, she holds this priesthood. Some time later, it happens that the brother of the priestess comes... After he arrives and is captured and is about to be sacrificed, he makes himself known (anagnorizo)... and from that comes his deliverance (soteria)."

Aristotle then summarizes the plot of the Odyssey as follows:
"After someone has been away from home for many years, is watched closely by Poseidon, and is alone, and, furthermore, affairs at home are such that his wealth is being squandered by suitors and his son is being plotted against, he himself arrives after much distress, makes himself known, attacks, is preserved (esothe), and destroys his enemies" (55b17).

Aristotle concludes this description with the remark:

"This is what is peculiar to the Odyssey, the rest is its episodes."

Aristotle describes what he means by a universal in mimesis earlier in the Poetics when he is comparing history and poetry. He says that history and poetry differ in so far as history speaks of the things that have happened, while poetry speaks of the sort of things that could happen. He says that because of this poetry is more philosophical and serious than history, for poetry speaks of universals, while history speaks of particulars. He then says:

"The kinds of things that a certain type of person happens to say or do, in accordance with probability or necessity, are a universal. This is what poetry aims at" (51b8). [24]

This description of a universal in mimesis is compatible with Aristotle's logical definition of a universal elsewhere. For example, in De Interpretatione, he writes: "I call a universal that which by nature is predicated of a number of things" (17a39). [25] So, in the Poetics, Aristotle writes that "the kinds of things that a certain type of person happens to say or do" are a universal, which means that actions that are predicable of
a certain type of person, and, therefore, of the number of persons who are of that type, are a universal. So, Aristotle's description of a universal in the Poetics is compatible with the definition in De Interpretatione. It is compatible because mimesis does not represent a unique person, but a certain type of person.

Given this account of a universal in mimesis, what does Aristotle mean when he says about his plot summaries that "the universal is observed" in them? Omitted from these summaries is any account of the types of people represented, and of the sorts of things they say and do, except that they make themselves known to other characters. If the kinds of things that certain types of people happen to say or do, by probability or necessity, are a universal, then why does Aristotle leave out of these plots, or "stories in a universal form," any account of these matters, i.e., any account of the sorts of things that the type of person represented by Iphigeneia does, or the type of person represented by Odysseus?

Aristotle says that the people represented in mimesis are of a certain sort with respect to their states of character and their thought (49b36). So, to be a certain type of person means to be a certain type in character and thought. One reason why Aristotle excludes descriptions of the states of character of the persons represented in tragedy from his plot summaries might be
that he realizes that different representations of the same tragedy can represent the same tragic figures with different states of character. We have a good example of just this phenomena in the three Electra plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. The universal form of the plot in each of the three plays is the same; the character of Electra, however, is very different in each.

We can set down the plot in universal form of the three Electra plays as follows:

"After a father has been killed by his wife and her paramour, and his infant son is sent into exile for his safety, and the wife and her paramour take over the household, and the daughter who stays at home is mistreated, finally, the son returns. The daughter and the son recognize each other, and avenge their father."

Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides each follow this plot, yet each represent the states of character of Electra differently:

Electra of Aeschylus' Choephori is gentle, temperate, and modest. At the beginning of the play, she even prays to Agamemnon that she be more temperate (sophronestera) and more pious (eusebestera) than her mother (Aesch. Cho. 139-141). [26] This Electra also accepts the authority of her brother.

By contrast, the Electra of Sophocles tells the Chorus that it is impossible for her to be temperate (sophronein), or pious (eusebein), and that amidst evils she must practice evil (Soph. El. 307-309). [27]
Chorus later says that "she breathes forth rage" (menos pneousa) (610). During the murders, she speaks as if commanding Orestes (e.g., 1415). Clearly, the characters of the Electras of Aeschylus and Sophocles are very different.

The Electra of Euripides seems more intensely intemperate and impious than the Electra of Sophocles. She rebukes the gods for not heeding her cries (Eur. El. 198-200), [28] and she constantly indulges in lamentation (e.g., 125-126). She is irascible, nasty and insolent towards her kind and modest husband (404-405, 408f.), and has been described as without nobility, grandeur, and dignity. [29] Yet, though she says she would love to slaughter her mother (281), after the murders she is contrite, unlike the Electra of Sophocles, who seems unperturbed by her role in her mother's death.

Clearly, the states of characters represented in these three Electras are very different, though the plot of the three tragedies is the same. Accordingly, Aristotle distinguishes plot and states of character as separate parts of mimesis (50a38f). A description of plot, of "stories in a universal form," should exclude description of the states of character of the people represented, because plot and character are distinct degrees of freedom for the dramatist, as demonstrated by the Electra plays.
Also omitted from both summaries are episodes that fascinate and excite the reader. Omitted from the Iphigenia is the conspiracy to steal the statue of Artemis. Omitted from the Odyssey is Odysseus' lengthy visit in Phaiakia, which lasts from Book 6 through Book 13 and contains his story of his adventures, which itself comprises four books. But these middle books of the Odyssey are episodic to the main plot, according to Aristotle.

Analysis of Aristotle's plot descriptions of the Iphigenia and the Odyssey reveals the following characteristics.

1) In each description, Aristotle summarizes the binding and lysis of the plot.

   The binding is the circumstance in which the central figures of the mimesis are bound. For the Iphigenia, Aristotle describes the binding as follows:

   "After some girl is sacrificed and disappears in a way unclear to the sacrificers and is put down in a foreign land, where the custom was to sacrifice foreigners to the goddess, she holds this priesthood. Some time later, it happens that the brother of the priestess comes."

   For the Odyssey, Aristotle describes the binding as follows:

   "Someone has been away from home for many years, is watched closely by Poseidon, and is alone, and, furthermore, affairs at home are such that his wealth is being squandered by suitors and his son is being plotted against."
2) After describing the binding, Aristotle represents the lysis in each description with a recognition and reversal which occur simultaneously: a person makes known who he or she is to others, and together with their recognition occurs a reversal through which the person is preserved from some danger.

The reversals and recognitions described in the plot summaries are ones that resolve the binding. About the recognition in the Iphigenia, Aristotle says, "from that comes his deliverance," i.e., Orestes reveals himself and the recognition is the reversal that saves him. About the recognition in the Odyssey, Aristotle says that the person who reveals himself, "attacks, is preserved and destroys his enemies." Aristotle's account is compressed. In the epic, Odysseus disguised as a beggar strings the bow, and, as a result, "A great sorrow fell now upon the suitors, and all their color was changed, and Zeus showing forth his portents thundered mightily" (21.412). [30] Odysseus shoots an arrow through the axe handles, kills Antinoos, and reveals himself to the suitors. "So, he spoke, and the green fear took hold of all of them, and each man looked about him for a way to escape sheer death" (22.42). [31] Zeus' thunder signals the beginning of the reversal. It is complete with the destruction of the suitors. Odysseus reveals himself after shooting the first one.
In conclusion, in the Poetics, the parts of a plot description in a universal form are descriptions of the binding, of the lysis, and of the recognition and reversal in the lysis, which solve the binding.

E. The 'object' of mimesis.

Aristotle says that genres of mimesis differ in the objects they represent (Poet. 47a17).

"Since mimetic artists represent people doing things, these people are necessarily either men of good character and importance (spoudaioi), or common (phauloi)... Comedy prefers to represent people who are inferior (cheirous) to those who exist now, tragedy people who are better (beltious)" (48a1-2, 16-18).

Later, Aristotle explains what he means by "better."

He specifies that the object of tragedy

"is neither someone who is superior in virtue or justice, nor someone who falls into misfortune because of vice or wickedness, but someone who suffers this because of some error (hamartia), and is one of those people with great reputation and good fortune, such as Oedipus, Thyestes and distinguished men from such noble families" (53a7-12; see also 53a12-17).

At the same time, the character of a tragic figure must be similar to the way people are (54a25). Otherwise, listeners will not suffer fear when witnessing the tragedy, since we fear for people who are like ourselves (53a4-6).
F. Character and thought.

Aristotle says that the persons represented in mimesis are necessarily of a certain sort in character (ethos) and thought (dianoia), since it is because of their character and thought that their actions are said to be of a certain sort, and it is because of actions that everyone succeeds or fails (49b36). Aristotle ranks the character and thought of the persons represented to be the second and third most important parts of tragedy, second only to plot (50a39, b4).

In defining character (ethos) in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says that it is a quality of the irrational part of the soul which is nonetheless capable of following reason; character concerns whether and how one is subject to emotions (pathe), such as anger, fear, shame, and desire (EE 1220b5f.). In the Poetics, Aristotle says that people are such as they are in virtue of their states of character, but they are fortunate or unfortunate in virtue of their actions; so actors don’t act in order to represent states of character but they comprehend the states of character through the actions (50a19). Character is made clear in making a decision or choice of action (proairesis); so, speeches in which the speaker decides or avoids nothing do not reveal character (50b8). If a speech or action makes clear some decision
whatever it may be, the speech or action will exhibit character (54a17).

Character must also be similar (homoion) to the way people are (54a24; see also 53a5). Since tragedy is the representation of people who are better than we are, poets should imitate good portrait-painters, who in rendering the individual form make them similar (homoioi) to people as they are, yet more handsome; so, a poet representing irritable or lazy people or people with other such traits should make them such in their characters but also decent (epieikeis) (54b8). In the states of character just as in the structure of the acts, the poet must design either what is necessary or what is likely, so that it is necessary or likely that such a person would say or do such things, or that this occur after that (54a33).

Thought is the many ways in which the persons represented use language to argue something or in general declare their opinion about something (50a6-7, 50b11). The many things that have to be prepared by speech pertain to thought; these include to argue something, to refute someone, and to arouse emotions (e.g., pity, fear, anger and the like) (56a36). The function of thought is the ability to say all that is possible and fitting, which is the function of the political and oratorical art in the case of speeches. Aristotle adds that the ancient poets
made people speak like citizens, while the poets of his time
make them speak like orators (50b5).

Aristotle frequently speaks of thought and diction
in the same sentence. Good speeches are well-constructed
in thought and diction (50a29). On the other hand,
excessively replendent diction obscures states of
character and thought (60b4). Aristotle groups thought
and diction together while discussing both tragedy and
epic (56a34, 59b11), and he praises Homer for surpassing
other epic poets in thought and diction (59b16).

Both character and thought have been discussed in
detail earlier in this chapter, and thought is discussed
also in Chapter 1. Here, it is important only to
emphasize a conclusion that has already been reached and
justified, that is, in general, according to Aristotle,
neither character nor thought are fixed aspects of persons
represented throughout the time frame of a work of
mimesis. The lysis of tragedy, by its very nature,
frequently brings about changes in the thought and
character of a tragic figure.

G. Media and modes of representation.

Following Republic 392D-98D, Aristotle distinguishes
types of mimesis by their media and modes of
representation (47a16). The mode (tropos) of
representation can be: a) simple narrative (as in
dithyrambs), b) dramatic, which uses imitation only
(tragedy and comedy), or c) narrative with imitation
(epic) (48a20; see Rep. 392D-94C). Media are: a) speech
(logos), with or without verse, b) harmony, and c) rhythm
(47a20; see Rep. 398D). Epic and tragedy differ with
respect to their media and mode. The mode of tragedy is
dramatic: performers act out the action of the plot before
an audience; in epic, on the other hand, the poet narrates
the action, imitating only the speeches of the characters.
While tragedy uses all the available media, epic uses
only speech.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. S. Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics, London:
   Duckworth, 1986, p. 47.
   account.
5. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff (Plato: Symposium,
   Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989, p. 66) note: "Olympos

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was a legendary musician who was said to be loved by Marsyas (Minos 318B5) and to have made music that moved its listeners out of their senses and so brought about a katharsis." Alcibiades in the Symposium says that the tunes of Olympos bewitched his listeners (215C). Other references to Olympos appear in Ion 533B and Laws 677D. Also see Der Kleine Pauly, Munich, 1972, vol. iv, c. 295.


8. See Janko, 1984, op. cit., p. 24 for the Greek text.


14. So, Lear, 1992, op. cit., 317 is mistaken in suggesting that purgation and catharsis have nothing to do with each other.
15. Kahn, 1994, op. cit., 91; also Dittmar fr. 9, 10 (notes Cicero and Augustine; see also G. C. Fields, Plato and his Contemporaries, London, 1930.


17. So, grief is an example of a noxious substance to be purged by catharsis—to answer the query of Lear, 1992, op. cit., 317.

18. Perhaps, the difficulty really lies in Glaucon, for he is the one to whom the argument belongs, as he assents to it; Socrates only proposes it. Indeed, in the Gorgias Socrates says explicitly that the argument he conducts isn’t his, but belongs to his interlocutor (495E). See M. Frede, "Plato’s arguments and the dialogue form," in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, Oxford, 1992, 212.

19. Socrates seems to say the opposite, but he is talking about mimesis in an ideal educational system that is to produce adults without emotional imperfections, who are subject to neither pity nor fear (395C). It is not obvious that the effect (ergon) of mimesis would necessarily be bad for people with the states of character that Aristotle discusses.

21. Actually, Oedipus only concludes that he had killed Laius, but does not really know it, for he never questions the Herdsman, as he had planned, about the number of assailants of Laius' party. If there was more than one assailant, as the Herdsman had originally testified, then Oedipus would have been innocent of the murder of Laius.


23. David Hahm, personal communication.

24. I translate katholou at Poet. 51b8 as predicative as it is in Meta. B 6.1003a13, or Pol. B 6.1265a31. The 'kernel' sentence is: estin katholou ta poia atta. The position of katholou in the Oxford text is that of a predicate. The comma inserted by Kassel is not required. Others (e.g., Bywater, Else, Janko) translate the Oxford text as though it were a definition of katholou, i.e., "A universal is the kinds of things that a certain type of person happens to say or do, in accordance with probability or necessity." Janko, however, notes that Aristotle is only giving an example of what universal means
"in the context of human action," and denies that the sentence is "a true philosophical definition" (Janko, op. cit., 1987, 92). It seems simpler to take katholou as predicative. My argument is not affected in either case.

25. See also Meta. Z 13.1038b11.


27. Line references are to Pearson, op. cit.


31. Translation from Lattimore, op. cit.

32. In addition, a sentence bracketed in Kassell's Oxford edition states that "There are two causes of actions: character and thought" (50a1).
CHAPTER 3

THE MIMETIC STRUCTURE OF SOCRATIC DIALOGUE

The representation of Socratic dialogue as a literary genre was begun in Socratic dialogues themselves. This is hardly surprising: a Socratic dialogue examines the speech of its interlocutors as that speech unfolds; it is of the very nature of the genre to be self-reflexive. Socratic dialogues examine claims and arguments advanced by interlocutors, and in the process they also examine the dialectical art (e.g., Phaedr. 276). Accordingly, we might expect to find evidence in the genre of the genre examining itself. Moreover, literary criticism is a frequent topic of Socratic dialogues (e.g., Republic, Ion, Phaedrus, Symposium); the inventors of a new literary genre that criticizes predecessor genres could hardly be expected to ignore their own. Plato did not leave to others the claim to have been the first commentator on the genre in whose development he collaborated and excelled. Comment on the genre appears in his own dialogues. This comment takes a mimetic form, i.e., Socratic dialogues
represent people talking about Socratic dialogues and treating them as a form of literature. On the most superficial level, we see this in the mode (tropos) of the narrated dialogue, the dialogue which we do not read as a play, with alternating speakers, like the Crito, but hear through the eyes and ears of a narrator, who objectifies the dialogue as a report, as something to be contemplated and studied, as something to be preserved and valued, as a piece of literature. We hear about the dialogue, but we are not present at its original occurrence. The narration of Socratic dialogues represents individual dialogues as oral texts whose transmission is made possible by memorization of a narration of the event of the dialogue, statement by statement. This is true whether or not Socrates is the narrator: all narrators, including Socrates, are represented as careful to relate what they remember was actually said in a dialogue by the participants, rather than amend that in any way in order to convey some special or personal teaching.

This representation of Socratic dialogues as transmitted oral texts, I emphasize, is only a representation. It does not mean, for example, that any dialogues are historical. Rather, it means that Plato represented Socratic dialogues as literary objects that people contemplate, study and preserve, as his characters do in his dialogues. [1]
The dialogues call these oral texts logoi (Symp. 172B6, 173E6; Parm. 126C, 127A6; Theae. 142D5) or sunousia (Prot. 310A2), both of which mean "conversation." So, not only do Socratic dialogues represent people talking about Socratic dialogues, but they also give a name to Socratic dialogues, and so identify them as a genre.

When narrated dialogues represent someone going through a dialogue for an audience, they sometimes give a reason for why the narrator is sharing it. There are two cases:

1) Someone else wants to hear the dialogue, as does Cephalus in the Parmenides, so a narrator narrates the dialogue as a favor, as did Antiphon in response to Cephalus' request, though it requires much effort (127A). Note that Cephalus does not ask for a summary of the dialogue, or an account of its chief points, whatever that might be; he says he needs to hear it through to the end (126C5: deometha diakousai). He wants to come as close as possible to the experience of being present at the imagined original event of the dialogue.

2) The narrator wants to narrate the dialogue for his own reasons. It is possible that the narrator wants to go through the dialogue in order to help himself understand it. At the beginning of the Protagoras, Socrates tells an unnamed friend that he has just come from speaking with Protagoras (309D). The friend asks
Socrates to narrate (diegeomai) the conversation. Socrates answers that he will be in debt to his friend (eisomai charin) if he listens to it. Is Socrates only being polite? The end of the Protagoras provides evidence that he is quite serious. There Socrates says that at the end of his conversation with Protagoras he said that the matters that they were discussing are terribly confused (361C2), and that the outcome of the arguments accuses and ridicules both of them (361A4) as ridiculous. No wonder he wants to talk to somebody about it. So, both listeners (Cephalus) and narrators seem to treat the narration of a Socratic dialogue as a way to experience, or re-experience the original dialogue whether they were present or not.

Narrators differ in their relationship to the event. First, there is Socrates, a central participant who also narrates dialogues (e.g., Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus, Protagoras, Republic)--at least on one occasion to help himself understand what was said. Second, there is Phaedo, Socrates' follower who was present at his death and at the dialogue that day in the prison, and reports on it to others yearning for information about the last days of Socrates. Third, there are the narrators who were not present at the dialogues they narrate, and who learn of them only second- or third-hand. These include Apollodorus, the narrator of the Symposium, Cephalus of
the Parmenides, or Eucleides, the disguised narrator of the Theaetetus.

In the Symposium, Apollodorus (who is present in the Phaedo) is sought out by a friend who wants to hear the speeches on love. Apollodorus answers that his memory is fresh since Glaucon recently coaxed him to go through the whole thing. He says that the symposium occurred when he was a boy (173A), and that he learned it from Aristodemus, who was present at it, and confirmed details with Socrates himself (173B). So, the Symposium represents a Socratic dialogue as a sought-after oral text whose transmission refers to the person from whom the narrator learned the text, and who actually was present at the dialogue himself, e.g., Aristodemus. Apollodorus tells the entire dialogue just as Aristodemus had told it to him. He narrates Aristodemus' own narration. Syntactically, this leads Apollodorus to use continued indirect statement, and embedded narrative constructions, such as the following: "And I, he [Aristodemus] answered, said that I would do whatever you bid" (174B2). So, the very language of the narration represents the source of the story and how removed the narrator is from it; in this case, Apollodorus is once removed from a witness of the actual event (Aristodemus).

Likewise, the Parmenides opens with Cephalus telling us the story of how he learned the narration of the
dialogue which he there repeats. He and several companions from Clazomenae came to Athens in search of someone whom they had been told had been associated with Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno's, and to whom Pythodorus had so frequently related the conversations which Socrates once had with Parmenides and Zeno that he had learned them by heart. But Cephalus and his companions didn't know his name. They only knew that he was half-brother to Glaucon. They found Glaucon, who led them to this half-brother, whose name was Antiphon, who, Glaucon explains, practiced the conversations especially diligently as a lad (meirakion), though now he devotes all his time to horses (126C). Antiphon obliged Cephalus, and told him the entire dialogue just as Pythodorus had told it to him. Again, as in the Symposium, the Parmenides represents a Socratic dialogue as an oral text that leads back to someone who heard the original conversation, e.g., Pythodorus, so that when Cephalus repeats the story (which he is represented as doing in the dialogue), like Apollodorus, he uses embedded narration and continued indirect statement. For example, "Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that Zeno and Parmenides once both came to the great Panathenaea" (127A7). Again, the language represents the sources of the story and how far removed the narrator is from the event; in this case, Cephalus is
twice removed from a witness to the actual event (Pythodorus via Antiphon).

In addition, the Parmenides also represents a Socratic dialogue as the sort of discourse that someone might work to memorize as a youth, even though he would not necessarily devote himself to philosophy later as an adult. So, here, in Plato’s text, we see it suggested that a Socratic dialogue is a discourse which a youth may learn as part of his initiation into adulthood.

Lastly, in the Theaetetus, Eucleides mentions to Terpsion that Socrates himself repeated for him the conversation he had had with Theaetetus. Terpsion asks Eucleides to narrate the conversation. Instead, Eucleides produces a book (biblion) in which he had written out the dialogue, not as Socrates had narrated it (diegoumenon) but as Eucleides understood it to have originally been argued (dialegomenon) by the participants. Eucleides explained that he removed (exaireo) all the narrative sentences (diegeses) between the speeches in Socrates’ narration, "for example, whenever Socrates would say, ‘and I asserted,’ or ‘and I said,’ or, concerning his interlocutor, that ‘he agreed’ or ‘he did not agree’" (143BC). So, Eucleides is represented as having edited Socrates’ oral account into a dramatic dialogue. He says that he checked his work by questioning Socrates later about details (143A). So, in response to Terpsion’s
request to hear the dialogue, Eucleides handed this book over to a slave, who read it aloud. As a result, the Theaetetus is one dramatic dialogue followed by another. In the first, the two followers of Socrates discuss how one of them edited Socrates' narration of a dialogue into a book; the reading of this text is the second dialogue, of Socrates, Theaetetus and Theodorus. The Theaetetus represents the transformation of Socratic dialogue from (memorized) oral text into a piece of written literature. This representation suggests that if someone hands you a dramatic dialogue to read, it may have been written out by someone using the memory of a narration as a source. In removing the narrative sentences, Eucleides removes all evidence of oral transmission. Since narrated dialogues are represented as on-the-scene reports of oral dramatic dialogues, the Theaetetus suggests that a written dramatic dialogue does not constitute an urtext in some way superior to a narrated one.

The emphasis on the primacy of oral texts in the prefaces to the Symposium, Parmenides, and Theaetetus, is consistent with the claim in the Phaedrus that the written word is the phantom or image (eidolon) of "the speech of the one who knows, which is living and ensouled" (276A8). To motivate this, Socrates argues that writing is like painting: both seem to be alive, but neither can answer questions or explain what it is representing, and so each
is subject to misinterpretation (275D). In contrast to the ordinary written word, Socrates praises "his brother," who is "legitimate," and "better and more powerful by nature." This is "the word which is written with knowledge in the soul of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows before whom it should speak and before whom it should be silent" (276A). Socrates says that this word is composed whenever someone using the dialectical art (dialektike techne) plants and sows in a fitting soul discourses (logoi) with knowledge. Such discourses, he says, can defend themselves and their sower, and are not fruitless but yield seed from which other discourses grow in other characters (ethe), and reproduce themselves forever (276E). So, Socrates argues for the superiority of oral texts, composed with the dialectical art, over ordinary written discourse.

In summary, the prefaces to the Parmenides, Protagoras, Symposium, and Theaetetus represent Socratic dialogues as a genre of oral texts called "conversations" (logoi or sunousiai), which are preserved by memorization and studied in recitation before an audience. Written dramatic dialogues are represented as produced from the editing of such oral texts (Theae. 142-3). Socratic dialogues are also represented as a form of initiation literature (Parm. 126-7).
Socratic dialogues also describe the nature of Socratic discourse, and analyze it and explain it. In the Sophist, the Eleatic stranger analyzes Socratic refutation; this text has been discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. In addition, in the Theaetetus, the character Socrates himself discusses the method and aim of his questioning of an interlocutor. The Theaetetus represents Socratic discourse in a way that parallels that of the Sophist. Socrates' self-described "art of midwifery" bears remarkable similarity to the art of the sixth type of Sophist described by the Eleatic stranger.

1) In the Theaetetus, Socrates says that he examines the thought (dianoia) of his interlocutor to see if it is a phantom and falsehood, or fruitful and true (150B9; 157CD).

2) This examination induces pathos in the interlocutors. "Those who associate with me," says Socrates, "suffer like women giving birth. For they are in labor and are filled with perplexity and difficulty (aporia) day and night, much more than the women. My art is able to stir up and check this anguish" (151A5). Some interlocutors respond to Socrates by becoming almost angry enough to bite him (151C5).

3) The result of refutation is a change in character of the interlocutor. The interlocutor will become "less obnoxious (barus) and more gentle" to his associates
because he is prudent not to suppose to know something that he does not know (210C2).

So, the subject here, as in the Sophist, experiences a catharsis.

Furthermore, the doctrine of recollection in the Meno, as Burnyeat has argued, is "a theory of the Socratic method, designed to explain how the dialectical process of eliciting an interlocutor’s beliefs and testing them for consistency need not be wholly negative and destructive; if the discussion is pursued with sincerity and determination, Socratic inquiry can lead to knowledge."

[2]

Finally, for a full account of how the Socratic genre represents itself, discussion is needed of Socrates’ claims in the Theaetetus and elsewhere that the source for the arguments he expresses is not himself, but his interlocutors. In the Theaetetus, when Theodorus asks him to criticize the theory that knowledge is perception, Socrates says:

"You are a real lover of argument, Theodorus, and it is good of you to think that I am a bag of arguments and can easily pick one out that will explain that this is wrong. But you don’t understand what happens. None of the arguments comes from me; they always come from the person who is answering my questions. I know nothing except how to take an argument from someone else who is wise and give it a fair reception (apodexasthai metrios)" (161AB).

It has been argued that Socrates’ claim that "none of the arguments comes from me" is true for aporetic dialogues,
such as the Euthyphro, but not true for middle dialogues, such as the Republic. [2a] Burnyeat's interpretation of the doctrine of recollection, however, allows a Socratic discussion of the beliefs of an interlocutor to lead to a positive non-aporetic result. Socrates seems to refer to such a possibility earlier in the Theaetetus, when he says:

"I am not in any sense a wise man, and there is no wise discovery that I have produced as the offspring of my soul. But for those who associate with me it is different. At first, some of them also give the impression of being quite ignorant; but as our association continues, all whom God permits make such progress that it seems amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet it is clear that they never learn anything from me, but discover within themselves a multitude of fine things, which they bring forth into the light of day" (150CD).

Socrates questions those who choose to associate with him. As a result of this association, he claims, they at first appear to be ignorant, i.e., they are refuted. But eventually some make progress in wisdom, and discover inside themselves many fine things. This progress is clearly something other than refutation, in which interlocutors "give the impression of being quite ignorant," the first stage in their association with Socrates described in this passage.

Socrates makes this distinction elsewhere in the dialogue. When Theaetetus complains that he can't figure out whether Socrates agrees with the ideas he is expressing or is only testing him, Socrates says:
"You are forgetting, my friend. I don't know anything about this kind of thing myself, and I don't claim any of it as my own. I am barren of ideas; I just serve you as midwife, and sing incantations for that end, and offer you tid-bits to taste from each of the wise, until I succeed in helping you bring your own belief forth into the light. When it has been born, I shall consider whether it is fruitful or just hot air" (157CD).

So, Socrates is always testing his interlocutor—whether the interlocutor has something to say which is hot air and will be refuted, and even if he has something fruitful to say. Such a mode of discourse embraces not only the elenchus (refutation) but also other testings of interlocutors in which the outcome may produce a positive result. Burnyeat agrees:

"Like childbirth, the process can be painful, for its hurts to be made to formulate one's own ideas and, having done so, to find out for oneself what they are worth (151AC); many turn on Socrates in angry resentment at seeing some nonsense they have produced exposed by him (151AD). But the other side of the coin is the progress that can be made this way, progress measured not only by the valuable truths found within oneself and brought to light (150DE), but also by the accompanying growth in self-knowledge, the awareness of what one knows and does not know (210BC). Self-knowledge is the benefit peculiarly associated with the Socratic method, and Theaetetus is already dimly aware that he is in travail with a conception of what knowledge is (151B with 148E).
Orthodox teaching ... does not have the same effect, save per accidens, because the thoughts imparted to the pupil are not his to begin with and do not have their roots in his experience and attachments." [2b]

In contrast with the Meno, "the Theaetetus is more modest: it is not said or implied that all truths, or all knowable truths, are to be got from within, only that many important ones are delivered by Socrates' skill (150D)." [2c]

For Theaetetus in the dialogue the outcome appears to be negative; Theaetetus' view of knowledge is refuted. But Theaetetus, says Socrates, has become less obnoxious and more gentle (210C), and that is probably the first step for him to discover "many fine things" within himself.

A. Aristotle on the genre.

In the Poetics Aristotle classifies Socratic conversations with other genres of mimesis, which, unlike tragedy, comedy, and lyric, make no use of dance rhythms or harmony (see 47a22). He says that the mimetic art which uses only words--whether they are "bare" (psiloi), i.e., prose, or in meter--includes the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, Socratic conversations (logoi), and any mimesis that someone might compose in trimeters, elegiacs or some other such verse (47a28). So, this class of
genres includes epic (which is composed in hexameters but also does not use dance rhythms or harmony), the elegies of Tyrtaeus, and other poetry. [3] Except for Socratic dialogue and Sicilian mime, all the other genres in this category make use of meter. At first hearing, it may appear that the description--using only "bare words" (47a29)--designates what a genre lacks, i.e., meter. A passage in the Symposium, however, indicates that something that uses only "bare words" may accomplish in a different but just as powerful way the effect (ergon) of genres that use music or meter. To understand what Aristotle may mean by the use of "bare words" in mimesis, it is useful to consider how the character Alcibiades uses psiloi logoi in the Symposium. Alcibiades says that Socrates is like the satyr Marsyas. Addressing Socrates he says:

"Aren't you a flutist? But one much more wondrous than Marsyas, who needed instruments to enchant people... His tunes alone make people possessed (katechesteinai), and reveal those ready for the gods and the mysteries, because his tunes are divine themselves. The only difference between you and Marsyas is that you need no instruments, but have the same effect with words alone (psiloi)" (215BC).

So, a genre of mimesis that uses "bare words" can accomplish more with less. Aristotle classifies the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and Socratic dialogues within an art (technē) of poetry (he poietike technē) because they are both
By contrast, neither the verse of Empedocles (47b18), nor the histories of Herodotus (51b2), are poetry, since they are not representational. Rather than a poet (poietes), Empedocles is a natural philosopher (phisiologos) (47b19), says Aristotle, and Herodotus is an historian (historikes) (51b1), who concerns himself with fact (51b7), rather than representation.

In other works, Aristotle supplements his brief treatment of Socratic dialogue in the Poetics. In the Politics he says that all the Socratic dialogues are ingenious, innovative, and inquisitive (1265a10). What is interesting about this passage is that it occurs in the midst of Aristotle's discussion of the Laws, and in reference to the Laws. Socrates, however, does not appear in the Laws. Thus, the passage indicates that, as far as Aristotle is concerned, the genre "Socratic dialogues" includes dialogues in which Socrates does not appear. The character of Socrates so pervades the genre that it seems natural to Aristotle to even name dialogues in which he is not a participant "Socratic." [5] Aristotle names no other genre of mimesis after an individual: not tragedy, not comedy, not epic, not mime, not dance, not music, not elegy, but we do have Sokratikoi logoi. The characteristics of Socrates as the origin of Socratic dialogue transfer themselves to the genre and define its nature. The genre mimics Socrates' daily intercourse with
fellow citizens and visitors to Athens. So, even without the participation of Socrates, any individual dialogue is nonetheless Socratic.

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that Socratic dialogues depict character (1417a21). He makes this remark while discussing narration in epideictic oratory. He says that the narration should express the character of the defendant, which will be indicated by the decisions or choices (prohairesis) the defendant is described as making; the kind of character he has is indicated by the sort of choice he makes, and the sort of choice he makes is indicated by the end he seeks. Because of this, writes Aristotle, mathematical discourses do not depict character, because, since they do not represent anyone pursuing an end, they do not depict choice. Socratic dialogues, however, depict these things. So, according to Aristotle, Socratic dialogues depict people making choices in pursuit of an end; in that respect, Socratic dialogues are similar to tragedy and comedy, one of whose parts is the depiction of character (49b36; TC [6]), but dissimilar to mathematical discourse, which someone may master as a youth, without displaying practical wisdom (EN 1142a12).

Aristotle's comments on Socratic dialogue as a literary genre are thoroughly consistent with treating Socratic dialogue as a genre of mimesis (representation). The remainder of this chapter will apply concepts from the
Poetics and other sources to define the mimetic structures of Socratic dialogue. My interaction with text, however, will differ from Aristotle's. While Aristotle puts forth a literary theory and cites individual works only for examples of his concepts, I will discuss individual works in detail while exploring the adequacy of Aristotle's concepts.

B. Plot in Socratic dialogue.

Aristotle says that plot is the structure of the actions represented by the mimetic artists (50a3). Since much of a Socratic dialogue is concerned with arguments, it might seem reasonable to equate the actions represented by a Socratic dialogue with its arguments. So, M. Frede has written in a brilliant essay that "As a rule it is an argument that forms the backbone of a dialogue and gives it its structure." [7] Certainly, arguments in a Socratic dialogue may correspond to a certain micro-structure of sections of the dialogue, but I will argue that in general an argument does not form the backbone of a dialogue and does not give it its overall structure.

The texts of the dialogues themselves say that Socrates is concerned not only with arguments but also with the examination of his own and his interlocutors' lives and characters. In the Protagoras, Socrates says that he primarily examines the argument, "but at the same
time it happens that I who am questioning and the one who is answering are also examined" (333C7). In the Laches, Nicias says to Lysimachus that whenever anyone engages in conversation with Socrates, no matter what topic he begins to discuss, he will end up being obliged to give an account of himself, how he leads his life and how he has led his life up to that point, and Socrates will not let him go until he has thoroughly examined him in all these matters (187E6). So, at least according to these texts, Socrates' examination of the character of his interlocutor(s) is at least as much the subject of a Socratic dialogue as any specific argument.

Moreover, there is evidence that arguments that Socrates uses in dialogues are made to order for the individual(s) with whom he is arguing and whom he seeks to refute. Charles Kahn argues that Socrates' arguments in the Gorgias "are in a deep sense ad hominem." [8] Discussing the refutations of Gorgias, Polus and Callicles in that dialogue, Kahn argues that Socrates chooses arguments to which his opponents are personally vulnerable so that the arguments, rather than having general validity, are made to defeat a specific interlocutor; they are "directed against the man and not only against his statements." [9] Kahn says that in the Gorgias Socrates manipulates "their sense of shame to force them to confront the incoherence of their own position." Thus,
arguments in Socratic dialogue have a personal as well as a propositional nature.

H. Brown makes a similar argument concerning the Crito [10]. Brown argues that after Crito fails to apply Socrates' principle of non-retaliation to his argument that Socrates escape, and instead attempts to justify retaliation for wrong-doing, Socrates "allows the discussion to shift to Crito's ground" of "appealing to justifying considerations" for committing a wrong in retaliation. [11] Brown points out that both the discourse of the laws and the arguments of Crito reject Socrates' principle of non-retaliation and attempt to justify retaliation for wrong-doing; as a result, Socrates "only partially concurs with what the Laws say through him." [12] Brown proposes that "the speech of the laws must be seen as geared to Socrates' deliberate indulgence of Crito's movement in the wrong direction of pursuing justifying reasons for harming the state." [13] Socrates' strategy, proposes Brown, is "to take up and push Crito's own approach farther than Crito has pushed it so as to explore more fully its possible deficiencies. Crito's recognition of such deficiencies, should they exist, would go a long way towards persuading him to take Socrates' apparently impractical position [of non-retaliation] more seriously. While Socrates could have argued for his own position by abstract appeal to the good of the soul, such
would be unlikely to have succeeded with Crito, for under the circumstances portrayed in this dialogue Crito is already deeply convinced that the good of the soul is to be found in pursuing the harmful, albeit justifiable course of action. By taking up Crito's own preferred view and pushing it to the point where it reveals its liabilities..., Socrates can help Crito to discover more concretely for himself that the main contender with the Socratic view—the retributive position of Crito and the Laws that the doing of harm is admissible when justified by circumstance—fails."

While the speech of the Laws may challenge Crito's conclusions, it is essentially in accord with Crito's point of departure in the search for the justified doing of harm." Brown's argument amounts to a claim that Socrates' use of the discourse of the Laws in the Crito is ad hominem.

In sum, the texts of the Protagoras and the Laches show that a Socratic dialogue is an encounter or confrontation between Socrates and one or more interlocutors over issues of moral import that are revealing of character. The twists and turns of such an encounter, discussed below, constitute the plot. Argument is only a mode of plot development. In addition, Kahn and Brown have shown that arguments in two very important Socratic dialogues are ad hominem, developed for the encounter with a specific interlocutor, and not generally
valid. If an argument is ad hominem, however, it cannot serve as the backbone of a dialogue but only as a means of Socrates' encounter with an interlocutor, the course of which has greater structural importance than any particular argument used in that encounter.

Socrates is a professional examiner of the character (ethos) of his interlocutor(s); he is an Ethologe, writes Hermann Reich, and Socratic dialogues practice Ethologie, the examination of character. [16] The plot of a Socratic dialogue evolves from the encounter of the characters of Socrates and his interlocutors. In Socratic dialogue, character comes under direct scrutiny in connection with the examination of a claim maintained by an interlocutor; that scrutiny and a character's response to it constitute the action represented by the plot. In order to define this action more precisely, I will discuss instances of the "parts of plot" identified by Aristotle in the Poetics, i.e., reversals, recognitions, and pathos, and attempt to determine the desis and lysis of Socrates dialogues.

C. Reversals.

Aristotle defines reversal as a change of actions into the opposite of how they were intended, in accordance with probability or necessity (52a22). The examples of reversal which Aristotle provides show that the result of
a reversal is the reverse of what the characters expect. The first reversal that Aristotle cites occurs in the Oedipus when the messenger from Corinth comes to tell Oedipus that Polybus has died and that he has been elected king of Corinth. The messenger expects that the news that Oedipus was elected king will bring him joy, but the scene leads to the revelation of Oedipus' identity, and to intense suffering for Oedipus instead. As shown in Chapter 2, a reversal need not have any particular relationship to good or bad fortune; it need only be the reverse of what is expected. In Socratic dialogues there are many instances of arguments which lead to the reverse of what an interlocutor expected. Such reversals are a principal tool by which Socrates attempts to show people who believe they know something that they are actually ignorant, and so attempts to accomplish the purging of their false belief. The following reversals are of the type we defined as "minor" in Chapter 2.

1) In the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro what is the holy and the unholy (5D), and then reverses (i.e., refutes) all of Euthyphro's arguments. For example, Euthyphro says that that which is pleasing to the gods is holy, and that which is not is unholy (6E). Socrates combines this statement with Euthyphro's beliefs on the nature of the gods to show that together they entail that what would please one god, might displease another, so
that the same things, at the same time, will be both holy and unholy (8A).

2) In the Crito, while arguing that Socrates should escape from prison, Crito claims that they should pay attention to the opinion of the multitude (44D). In response, Socrates asks Crito whether one should value all the opinions people hold, or only some of them (47A). In the conversation that follows, Crito concedes that one should value the good opinions, and not the bad, and that the good opinions are those of the wise, and the bad are those of the foolish. Finally, Crito agrees that concerning the just and unjust, the shameful and noble, the good and the bad, and on the very issue they are trying to decide, that they should be guided not by the opinions of the many, but by the opinions of the one who knows (if one exists), and that they should respect and fear this person more than the multitude, which is the reverse of what Crito had originally claimed.

3) In the Gorgias, Gorgias claims that although an orator should use his skill justly, it is possible for him to commit wrongdoing with it (457A). Socrates then leads Gorgias to concede that to be an orator it is necessary to know what is just and unjust, and if someone came to him for instruction in oratory who did not know these things, then Gorgias would teach him (460A). Gorgias then concedes that a man who has learned what is just is a just
man and acts justly (460B). Finally, Gorgias concedes that an orator is incapable of using oratory unjustly, the reverse of what he originally maintained (461A).

4) In the Gorgias, Polus maintains that suffering injustice is worse (kakion) than doing it (474C). He then concedes that doing what's unjust is more shameful than suffering it (474C), and that something is more shameful than something else because it surpasses the other in pain or evil (kakon) (475A). Polus next admits that doing what is unjust surpasses suffering injustice in evil, and so is more evil (kakion) (475C). He then concedes that he would not welcome what is more evil over what is less so, and finally admits that no one would choose to do injustice rather than suffer it (475E), the reverse of what he first maintained.

5) In the Gorgias, Callicles announces that he is undertaking a political career and urges Socrates to do the same. Later, Socrates asks Callicles whether they should serve the city and the citizens so that they make the citizens as good as possible (513E). Callicles agrees. Next, Socrates leads Callicles to concede that if they were to take up the public business of constructing building projects for the city, they would have to prove that they were capable for the task, show that they had had reliable teachers, and had built good and numerous works under their teachers, and that later, after they had
left their teachers, they had also built numerous works; but that if they could point out neither teachers, nor construction works that were good, then they would be stupid to enter into public business (514A). Next, Callicles concedes that if they were to enter into the public practice of medicine, they should be able to show that they had improved the physical state of so many people in private practice (514D). Finally, Socrates asks Callicles, now that he is about to engage in the public business of the city, what citizen he has made better, and whether there is someone who was wicked, unjust, undisciplined or foolish who because of Callicles became noble and good (515A). Callicles can only answer, "You love to win, Socrates" (515B), in recognition that he has been refuted, for Socrates had shown that Callicles was unprepared for a political career.

6) In Republic I, Polemarchus claims that justice means doing good to friends and harm to enemies (332D). Socrates, however, convinces Polemarchus that a consequence of his belief is that error in judgment concerning who is a friend or who is an enemy will bring it about that it is also just to injure friends and to help enemies (334E). Finally, Socrates convinces Polemarchus that it is never just to injure anyone (335E). This reversal of the argument of Polemarchus introduces Socrates' argument with Thrasymachus.

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7) Thrasymachus asserts that the just is the advantage of the stronger (338C). But Socrates soon shows that Thrasymachus' beliefs entail that because rulers sometimes mistake what is advantageous for themselves, it turns out to be just to do what is disadvantageous for the stronger (339E). Socrates then develops a craft analogy with which he extracts from Thrasymachus the reluctant assent that a pilot and ruler will consider and prescribe the interest not of the pilot but of the sailor and the ruled (342E). Socrates concludes that no true ruler ever seeks his own advantage, but rather seeks that of the ruled. As the narrator, he then comments to the reader that "it was evident to all that the argument about the just had turned about (perieistekei) into its opposite" (343A). As noted above, with this comment, Plato has the character Socrates identify a reversal.

Sometimes, Socrates accomplishes a reversal by representing in his speech the speech of an imagined or absent speaker, whom he pretends to report, and uses to refute or overwhelm his original interlocutor.

8) In the Crito, although Socrates obtains agreement from Crito that they should value only the opinion of the one who knows what is just and unjust (46D-48A), and not the opinion of the many (see Reversal 2), he fails to obtain agreement that if he leaves prison without the permission of the state, he would be doing wrong (50A).
Then Socrates turns the tables on his friend. He introduces hypothetical parties to speak as those who would be injured by Socrates escaping: the laws and constitution of Athens, which then carry on the argument. In his own discourse Socrates represents the arguments that he proposes the laws of Athens would make to him if he tried to escape. Socrates makes three long speeches (50C-51C, 51C-52D, 52E-54D), in which he reports at length what the laws would say to him, and gives brief answers. At the end of each of the first two speeches, Socrates asks Crito if he agrees with what the laws say, and Crito says he agrees. After the third speech, Crito says he has nothing to say. In this example, the interlocutor’s argument is not per se refuted. Socrates does not question Crito, step by step, as to whether he agrees with the arguments of the laws. The reversal consists in Socrates’ surprising introduction of the speech of the laws, with which he overwhelms his friend rhetorically, not elenctically.

Sometimes, Socrates’ interlocutors turn the argument to the reverse of what Socrates expects or desires.

9) After refuting Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Republic I, Socrates believes that he is freed from argument (357A), but then Glaucon suddenly takes up Thrasymachus’ position that perfect injustice is more profitable than perfect justice (Rep. I 343Bf., 348B).
Glaucon says that he is at a loss (359C: aporo) as to how to respond to the various arguments for injustice, which he then states at length for four Stephanus pages. Using a wrestling metaphor Socrates says, "What Glaucon said was enough to throw me, so that I am unable to come to the aide of justice" (362D). Yet, Adeimantus elaborates the argument for injustice for five more pages. When he is finished, Socrates says that he is at a loss and incapable of coming to the aid of justice, though he feels he must (368B). The entire movement of the dialogue since the beginning has been reversed. Socrates must begin the argument anew.

This reversal illustrates the generality of Kahn's point that some of Socrates' arguments are ad hominem. In Republic I, Socrates developed arguments that refuted Thrasy machus, but the same arguments are not adequate to convince Glaucon and Adeimantus, who argue the same thing as Thrasy machus, though with more sophistication. Socrates must develop a new argument suited to them. In interrupting Socrates, Glaucon asks him if he wants to seem to persuade them or truly persuade them that it is always better to be just than unjust (357A). Socrates says he wants to truly persuade them, and Glaucon replies that he's not doing what he wants. Glaucon says that Thrasy machus has been charmed by Socrates like a snake, and sooner than he ought, and that as far as he's
concerned no proof has yet been presented concerning justice and injustice. He declares that he will renew the argument of Thrasymachus (358B). His declaration in Book II takes the dialogue back to the ninth page of Book I where Thrasymachus first challenges the conversation of Socrates and Polemarchus (336B).

10) At the end of Republic IV Socrates and his interlocutors agree that they "have found the just man and the just city and what justice is in them" (444A), and Socrates is about to pass on to discuss injustice, when Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupt him (449B), and, with the support of Glaucon and Thrasymachus, demand that he discuss the sharing of women and children, which had been introduced earlier but without argument (at Rep. IV 423E). Adeimantus accuses Socrates of robbing them of a whole form (eidos) of the argument by speaking glibly about the community of women and children (449C). Socrates exclaims: "What a thing you've done in arresting me. How much argument you set in motion again, from a beginning as it were, about the constitution which I was delighted to have already completed" (450A). He doubts that the proposals would be possible, and that they would be best. He says he would be slipping from the truth to express them, and that he might turn out to be a deceiver of what is good, noble and just in laws. Nonetheless, after exhortations from his interlocutors, Socrates goes on to
discuss the sharing of women and children. In this reversal, Socrates is forced to return to "a beginning" of the argument for the just city. In addition, he is forced to treat a matter he was eager to pass over. Plato signals the reversal by having Polemarchus initiate it. Polemarchus pulls on Adeimantus' cloak, and asks whether they should let Socrates go (449B). The scene mirrors the beginning of Book I, where Polemarchus is also the agent of Socrates' arrest, when he sends his slave to hold Socrates by the cloak, and say, "Polemarchus orders you to wait." [17]

Finally, Socrates himself or another interlocutor sometimes reverses the argument of a discourse.

11) Socrates introduces a reversal in Republic VIII: after the sharing of women and children is established for the sake of the unity of the city (462), and marriage relations are regulated to ensure that the offspring are as good as possible (460B), he says that faction will arise among the rulers of the city nonetheless because they will fail to regulate procreation properly so that the offspring will have neither good nature nor good fortune, and when becoming rulers themselves will fail to keep the races of gold, silver, bronze and iron separate (546). The iron and bronze races will pull the regime towards money making, and, as a result, the aristocracy of guardians will decline to a timocracy (547). Ultimately,
the aristocracy of the guardians decays all the way to a tyranny.

Socrates' presentation of the reversal emphasizes that it is a new beginning. Parodying Homer, Socrates asks Glaucon if he wants them "like Homer, to pray to the Muses to tell us how faction first attacked" (545D). The reference is to Iliad xvi.112-113, [18] where Homer chants:

"Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes in Olympos, how fire was first thrown upon the ships of the Achaians." [19]

The burning of a Greek ship in Iliad xvi brings Patroclus onto the battlefield, and he drives the Trojans clear across the plain before the walls of their city. It is a new beginning for the Greeks. "An appeal to the muses is a way of enhancing the importance of what follows, and so drawing attention to a critical moment in the action." [20] Socrates' parody of Homer draws attention to an important turn in the discourse on the city of the guardians. Adam recognized the moment as a turn when he wrote, "Plato, like Milton, fitly invokes them (the Muses) at the commencement of his Epic of the Fall of Man." [21]

12) In Republic II, soon after Socrates and his interlocutors begin to "bring a city into being in speech" (369A), and Socrates is nearly finished describing "the city with the minimum necessary elements" (369D), whose citizens are beware of poverty and war (372C), Glaucon
interrupts to call the city that Socrates is proposing "a city of pigs" (372D). If the citizens are not going to suffer hardship, he says, they should recline on coaches for their meals, and dine from tables and have seasonings and desserts as people now have. Socrates immediately yields to Glaucon, and begins to consider how a "luxurious city" (truphosan polin) would come into being (372E). This second city quickly expands to need more land, and then seizes land from its neighbors, and goes to war to keep it (373D), in reverse of the policy of the first city. This second city becomes the city of the guardians.

Finally, Socrates' interlocutors will sometimes defy him and reject the argument.

13) In the Gorgias, Socrates refutes Polus (see Reversal 4), and then with Polus develops consequences of the argument, and finally says that an orator should use his skills to accuse himself and his family and friends of any wrongdoing, should they be guilty of it, so that they may have the benefit of punishment (480BD). Polus rejects these statements, calls them absurd (atopa) (480E), and then reverses himself on their earlier argument.

D. Reversals and difficulties.

The reversals at the beginnings of Republic II and V (Reversals 9 and 10, above) illustrate a special relationship between arguments and plot in Socratic
dialogues. The discourse of a dialogue will frequently pass over a difficulty in an argument, which difficulty either may be raised later by an interlocutor to effect a reversal in the dialogue, or, if unaddressed, undermines the validity of the argument. Ad hominem arguments are a sort that tend to contain difficulties. The interlocutor to whom they are convincing may overlook a difficulty in the argument, which undermines its validity and may be raised as an objection by a subsequent interlocutor to effect a reversal.

1) In Republic II Glaucon says that Socrates used seemingly persuasive arguments, rather than truly persuasive ones, to refute Thrasymachus earlier (357AB). Glaucon says that Thrasymachus was charmed more quickly than he should have been, and that by his way of thinking no proof (apodeixis) was yet produced concerning either justice or injustice (358B). Glaucon comes close to saying that Socrates' refutation of Thrasymachus was ad hominem. After Glaucon and Adeimantus renew the argument of Thrasymachus, Socrates declares that he has been thrown, is at a loss, and is incapable of helping out justice. A difficulty in the argument of Book I is raised by Glaucon to produce a reversal in Book II.

2) At Republic 423E, Socrates mentions without argument that women and children will be held in common. Since this is unsupported by argument, its status in the
dialogue is that of a difficulty. Indeed, Socrates even calls it a difficulty (duschereia) later, in Book VI (502D). So, in Republic V, Adeimantus accuses Socrates of robbing them of a whole form of the argument (449C). Socrates confesses that when he mentioned it earlier he saw that it involved "a swarm of arguments" but passed by it lest it "cause a lot of trouble" (450A). Thrasymachus asks Socrates if he thinks they came to him to look for fool's gold, rather than to hear arguments. The group adds that they also want him to talk about the rearing of the children and their education. But Socrates expresses doubts about the whole matter, and wonders whether such an arrangement would be possible, and even whether it would be good. In this example, an unresolved difficulty causes a reversal in the plot. The reversal forces from Socrates the recognition that the difficulty is so complicated that it may not be possible to resolve it and adhere to the truth at the same time.

These two reversals in Republic II and V warn the reader of the Republic that unresolved difficulties may lurk in the text which are not made explicit by the interlocutors. [22] The following are examples of such difficulties:

1) In Republic I Socrates and Polemarchus agree that "it is never just to injure anyone" (335E), but later Socrates has the city that evolves into the city of the
guardians seize the land of its neighbors (373D), and then go to war to hold it.

2) The treatment of the sharing of women and children in Republic V produces confusion and contradictions among the various characterizations of a just man, which are not mentioned by the interlocutors: Socrates says a just man has nothing to do with adultery (443A), but later he makes clear that the guardians share wives with each other in the city (459-68), which guardians and city he calls just (see Chapter 4).

Such difficulties constitute singularities in the text. They point to, as it were, discontinuities in the argument, places where it is unsupported, and, if pressed, may fail. Aristotle discusses the importance of identifying the difficulties in a discourse in Metaphysics B1.

"For those who wish to get clear of difficulties (euporesai) it is necessary to state the difficulties (diaporesai) well, since getting subsequently clear of difficulties (euporia) requires the solution of previous difficulties (aporoumenon), for we are not able to untie a knot (desmon) which we don't perceive, though the difficulty in our thought (he tes dianoias aporia) points to a knot in the subject. The experience of those who are tied up is similar to the way in which someone experiences a difficulty in reasoning (aporei). For it is impossible in either case to go forward. Therefore, we must review all the difficulties (duskhereias) beforehand, both for the reasons we have stated and because those who inquire without first stating the difficulties (diaporesai) are like those who don’t know where they should go; besides, someone does not otherwise know whether or not he ever found what he was seeking; for the goal is not clear to such a man, but it is clear to the
Aristotle applies this method to his own investigation of Socratic dialogues. In his discussion of the Republic in the Politics, Aristotle focuses on identifying places where there is a difficulty (duskhereia) or something paradoxical (atopon) in the discourse. He opens his treatment of the Republic by saying that the sharing of women involves many difficulties (1261a10: duskhereiai), which he discusses and says will destroy the city. (Recall that Socrates also called the sharing of women a difficulty.) Aristotle says that there are other difficulties (1262a25: duskhereiai) in the proposals of Socrates that will lead to homicide between relatives and other breaches of natural piety. Later, in speaking of the sharing of property he says it involves many difficulties (1263a22: duskhereiai). In pointing out a contradiction in Socrates' discourse, he says that it is paradoxical (1263b39: atopon) that Socrates proposes to achieve unity in the city by practicing the sharing of women, children and property when elsewhere in the Republic Socrates emphasizes that education is the means to achieve unity in a city. He concludes his treatment of the Republic by saying that the constitution described by Socrates "has these difficulties (aporias) and others as important" (1264b25).
To identify the difficulties in a discourse is to describe a certain structure which it has, which I call an "aporetic structure" or "knot structure" following Aristotle’s discussion in Meta. B1. The aporetic structure of a dialogue is to be distinguished from an "aporetic dialogue," which is thought to end with an aporia. The aporetic structure of a dialogue is a network of the difficulties in the argument of the dialogue. It is not a random list of difficulties: because a dialogue has direction, its difficulties are ordered. If a difficulty in an argument may at first be passed over, but later addressed, at that point an aporetic structure folds back on itself. Reversals caused by unresolved difficulties return the argument to a previous place and are thus connected with that place. An aporetic structure is thus a detailed structure paralleling a dialogue’s plot structure which is constructed out of reversals, recognitions, and pathos.

E. Recognitions.

Recognition, writes Aristotle, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, and either towards affection or hatred, of persons defined with respect to good fortune, or misfortune (52a29). For example, Oedipus, who is defined as fortunate within the Sophocles' play, recognizes who he is, and so experiences a change from
ignorance to knowledge, and to self-hatred. In addition, Aristotle says, there are also other kinds of recognition, since recognition can be in reference to inanimate things, or chance events, or whether someone has done something or not done something (52a33). Aristotle says that the finest recognitions occur together with a reversal, and that this sort of recognition particularly arises from the plot, that is, from the action (52a32). His examples are discussed in Chapter 2.

By the very nature of Socratic dialogue as a genre, Socratic dialogues contain recognitions. In Socratic dialogues, an interlocutor makes a claim. Socrates questions the claim, and leads the interlocutor through reasoning that shows that the claim leads to a contradiction, or entails a conclusion with which that the interlocutor disagrees, leading him to abandon the original claim. Some interlocutors express recognition that their original claim was false. Other interlocutors resist Socrates' questioning and become belligerent towards Socrates, as Thrasymachus does at first in Republic I. In either case, recognition, or the lack of it, is a signpost, a turning point in a dialogue: recognition allows the argument to go on to another topic; with the refusal of recognition, the argument may intensify, as it does when Callicles withholds recognition and Socrates calls him a rascal (panourgos) (Soph. 499B);
or, the argument may take a different form, as it does when Crito withholds recognition, and Socrates introduces the discourse of the laws (Crito 50A). Some examples of recognition in Socratic dialogue follow:

1) In the Euthyphro, Euthyphro concedes to Socrates that he is right after each of the first three refutations (6E, 8A, 10E).

2) In the Crito, Crito concedes to Socrates that they should pay attention to the opinion of the one who knows rather than to the many in regards to what is just and unjust (47D).

3) In the Gorgias, Gorgias concedes, contrary to what he originally maintained, that the orator would never do what is unjust (460E).

4) In Republic I Polemarchus interrupts Socrates to insist that justice is to give to each what is owed (331DE), which, he says, means doing good to friends and harm to enemies (332D). After Socrates leads him through some of the implications of his claim, he recognizes that there was something wrong with his reasoning, and, finally, agrees with Socrates that it is never just to injure anyone, and pledges to join Socrates as a partner in battle against anyone who claims otherwise (335E).

5) In Republic I, after Socrates three times refutes the claim of Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus finally exhibits recognition
that Socrates has refuted him by blushing (350D). Then, he acts as a civil interlocutor for Socrates, in a discussion on the natures of the just and unjust man. Socrates says that Thrasymachus has become gentle (354A).

Socrates also expresses recognition, and this sometimes is a recognition of the virtue of his interlocutors.

6) In Republic II, after Glaucon and Adeimantus renew the argument of Thrasymachus and thereby accomplish a reversal, Socrates describes the brothers as "the divine offspring" of their father. As narrator he says he always admired their nature, and was particularly pleased with their intervention. He tells them that they have experienced "something quite divine" if they are not convinced that injustice is better than justice, yet are able to speak in its behalf. On his part, he says that he is at a loss and is incapable of coming to the aid of justice, yet feels that he must try nonetheless (368AB).

7) In Republic V, after Polemarchus and Adeimantus raise the difficulty of the sharing of women and children and thereby reverse the argument, Socrates doubts that his proposals are possible, or that they would be good. He says he would be slipping from the truth to express them, and that he might turn out to be a deceiver of what is good, noble and just in laws.
Finally, an interlocutor and Socrates will recognize each other as adversaries in argument.

8) In the Gorgias, Callicles witnesses Socrates refute Gorgias and Polus. In response, he calls Socrates a "crowd pleaser" (demegoros), and accuses him of working mischief in his discourses. He claims that Socrates uses his interlocutors' shame to force them into conceding something with which they disagree, from which Socrates then derives a contradiction (482Cf). Callicles then fails to behave as a pliable interlocutor to Socrates, and evades refutation three times (495A, 497AB, 499B). He never concedes to have been refuted in these three arguments. Either Callicles maintains something which Socrates says he doesn't believe (495A), or he changes his position to avoid refutation (499B). To accomplish a refutation, however, Socrates says he needs the agreement of his interlocutor. Socrates tells Polus that he knows how to produce one witness to whatever he says, and that is the man with whom he is having a discussion. He ignores everyone else (474A). Later, he emphasizes this. Socrates tells Polus again, that while everyone else but he himself agrees with Polus, Polus satisfies Socrates, though only one person, by agreeing and witnessing for Socrates: he counts only his vote and ignores everyone else (476A). But Callicles withholds his vote and his agreement, so, by Socrates' own standard, Socrates never
refutes Callicles. Indeed, after Callicles evades refutation a third time, Socrates degenerates to name-calling. He calls Callicles a rascal (panourgos), and says he thought Callicles was a friend, but now knows better (499C). Callicles and Socrates have recognized each other as adversaries in argument.

F. Pathos.

Aristotle defines pathos, the third part of plot in tragedy, as some destructive or painful action (praxis), such as deaths in plain view, painful agonies, woundings, and the like (52b11), since in tragedy it is not always possible to separate the representation of a destructive act from that of the pathos it causes. The deed frequently occurs offstage; we learn of it by observation of its effect. In Socratic dialogue, however, the action that produces pathos in a character occurs 'on-stage' in the form of the questioning of Socrates. This is stated explicitly in the Sophist and the Theaetetus. Socrates says in the Theaetetus that his questioning induces pathos in his interlocutors. He says his interlocutors suffer like women giving birth. Some interlocutors become almost angry enough to bite him, he says (151C5). In the Sophist, the Eleatic stranger says that by questioning subjects and showing them that their beliefs contradict, elenctic examiners cause their subjects to get angry with
themselves and so bring them to shame (aischune), a state of pathos, or suffering (230D; see EE 1220b12).

Such is a difficult experience. So, Nicias warns Lysimachus in the Laches, that if he engages in conversation with Socrates, no matter what topic he begins to discuss, he will end up being obliged to give an account of himself, how he leads his life and how he has lead his life up to that point, and Socrates will not let him go until he has throughly examined him in all these matters (187E6), an examination which few enjoyed.

As indicated in the Sophist, the pathos that is evoked in a subject by Socratic refutation is shame (aischune). In Chapter 1, we saw how the Gorgias represents the role that shame can play in Socratic dialogue. Shame is not only the effect of refutation; the evocation of shame is first and foremost the means of refutation. [25] Our discussion of the Gorgias in Chapter 1 argued that Socrates leads his interlocutors in discussions in such a way that he tries to shame them into conceding something they don't believe, in order to derive a contradiction with their previous statements, and reduce them to refutation. Interlocutors suffer shame in other dialogues.

1) In Republic I, in response to the dialogue between Polemarchus and Socrates, Thrasymachus becomes belligerent like a wild beast (therion) (336B5) and
difficult (chalepos) (336E2). But under questioning from Socrates, he sweats profusely and blushes in shame out of recognition of his error (350D).

Shame is not the only emotion felt in connection with a reversal in Socratic dialogue. During reversals in Republic II and V (Reversals 9 and 10, above) Socrates says that he is afraid.

2) After Glaucon and Adeimantus renew the argument of Thrasymachus in behalf of injustice, Socrates says that he is at a loss (aporo) for how to respond, but is afraid (dedoika) that it would be impious to abandon justice when she is being attacked and not come to her aid (368B).

3) When Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupt Socrates and produce the reversal in the argument at the beginning of Republic V, Socrates says that he is fearful (phoberos) to be inventing the arguments when he is doubtful and seeking (450E). He says that he's not afraid of being ridiculed, but is afraid of slipping from the truth and dragging his friends together with himself (451A). Glaucon laughs at Socrates' speech, but Socrates himself seems serious, not ironic here.

Finally, in at least one reversal, the dominant pathos is laughter (gelotos), which is given as the operative pathos in comedy in the Tractatus Coislinianus (T.C. iv). [26]
4) In developing the reversal in Republic VIII which leads to the decline of the city of the guardians (Reversal 11, above), Socrates presents a comic parody of Homer's Iliad. Socrates says to Glaucon:

"How will our city be moved and in what way will the auxiliaries and the rulers divide into factions against each other and among themselves? Or do you want us, as does Homer, to pray to the Muses to tell us how 'faction first attacked,' and shall we say that they speak in a high tragic style, as though they were speaking seriously, when mocking and jesting with us like children?" (545D)

Socrates then begins to tell the story "in a high tragic style" of how the guardians will fail to hit upon the proper time--represented by the nuptial number--for bringing men and women together to beget children in the city of the guardians. The quality of the ruling guardians will decline, and as a result there will be mixing of iron and bronze souls with gold and silver, which will give rise to faction. Socrates concludes his speech with another parody of Homer. [27]

G. Binding and Lysis

Aristotle says that reversals, recognitions and suffering are the parts of plot. We have found such parts to exist in Socratic dialogues. In addition, Aristotle divides plot into the desis (or "binding") and the lysis (the "solution"). Aristotle defines the binding of a tragedy as the tragedy from the beginning up to the furthest point from which it changes towards good fortune.
or misfortune (55b26); as discussed in Chapter 2, much of the binding is "outside" the tragedy and prior to the time of its action, e.g., the birth of Oedipus. The binding represents the problem that confronts the characters of the tragedy; the lysis represents the working out of the binding. (See Chapter 2 for further discussion.)

In tragedy, much of the binding is already known to the spectators. They know the myths which are the subject matter of tragedy, and which provide much of the background detail, i.e., much of the binding. Similarly, every dialogue has its own pre-history in the lives of the real persons who are represented in the dialogue, e.g., Agathon, Alcibiades, Aristophanes, Critias, Gorgias, Protagoras, and, especially, Socrates himself. Before any such person represented in a dialogue says anything, the listener can reflect that this is so-and-so, who did such-and-such in their life, and the listener can have this memory before the mind in evaluating and understanding the remarks of the character. This is especially important in the case of Socrates himself. Every dialogue in which he participates includes the life of the real Socrates as part of the binding. For example, when Socrates speaks in the Allegory of the Cave in the Republic, of how the cave dwellers would resent the man who attempts to release and lead them up to the light, and would kill him (517A), the passage evokes pathos because
it calls to mind Socrates' own trial and execution. This is a simple example of how the binding influences the experience of a dialogue, but there are other examples:

In the Gorgias, Callicles announces that he is undertaking a political career and urges Socrates to do the same. Socrates challenges Callicles by inquiring whether as a private citizen he ever demonstrated the ability of a political leader. He asks Callicles what citizen he has made better, and whether there is someone who was wicked, unjust, undisciplined or foolish who because of Callicles became noble and good (515A). The question, however, could just as well be asked of Socrates himself (though, of course, in the dialogue Socrates does not intend a political career), and the answer that the listener knows is true for Socrates, is worse than the answer that Socrates forces out of Callicles, an embarrassed admission that he has improved no one: "You love to win an argument," says Callicles. Elsewhere in this same dialogue Socrates has reminded us that he is a lover (eron) of Alcibiades (481D), the infamous aristocrat who came under Socrates' influence but who later betrayed Athens and joined with Sparta in the Peloponnesian War after being charged with impiety at Athens. Although Socrates could probably point to citizens whom he had made better, his enemies could point to Alcibiades as someone they could charge he had made worse. In this way, the
binding, including as it does the life of Socrates, challenges Socrates with the very challenge Socrates makes to Callicles.

Aristotle says that the binding ends at the point when the mimesis changes towards good fortune or misfortune (55b26). Socratic dialogue, however, does not represent changes towards good fortune or misfortune of the sort represented in tragedy, i.e., deaths, blindings, loss of power and prestige. The changes are less physical and devastating. An example is refutation. Both the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist and Socrates in the Theaetetus say that Socratic questioning induces suffering in the interlocutor. Subjects who at the beginning of dialogues are proud and certain ("with inflated beliefs about themselves," says Sophist 230B) see that their opinions contradict, and become angry at themselves, and ashamed. They experience misfortune.

Such an experience, however, is by no means a necessary feature of Socratic dialogue. In order to complete a refutation Socrates says he needs the agreement of his interlocutor (474A, 476A). The opinion of Socrates, or an observer, that the interlocutor is refuted, is not sufficient. The reason for this is that if the interlocutor does not admit that he has been refuted, he holds onto his beliefs, and becomes angry not at himself but at Socrates. In the Gorgias, after Polus
admits refutation, he reverses himself and calls Socrates’
statements absurd (atopa) (480D). Furthermore, Callicles
evades refutation three times (495A, 497AC, 499B); each
time, he responds to Socrates’ questioning in such a way
that he can claim not to have been refuted. If both Polus
and Callicles resist refutation, neither could be proven
to have suffered its pathos of anger at the self. Even if
such a change from good fortune to misfortune were
adequate for determining the binding, it would only be
able to describe aporetic dialogues with a single
interlocutor. It would not apply to the Gorgias in which
Socrates attempts to refute three interlocutors in
succession, and it would not apply to the Republic where
Glaucon, the principal interlocutor, is not per se
refuted.

These examples indicate that although a transition
from good fortune to misfortune is possible in Socratic
dialogue, it is not a necessary part of the genre. For
this reason, I define the binding of a Socratic dialogue
as the dialogue from the beginning up to the point at
which the problem that the dialogue attempts to solve has
been completely presented. The remainder of the dialogue
is the lysis.

In Chapter 2, we found that for Aristotle the main
elements of the lysis are the principal reversal and
recognition of the mimesis, which solve the binding.
Accordingly, in the following I outline the binding and lysis of two dialogues of Plato, the Euthyphro and the Crito.

a. The Euthyphro.

1) Binding 2A-5D. Socrates learns from Euthyphro that he is prosecuting his father for the death, by exposure, of a workman who killed one of the family slaves. Euthyphro says he must prosecute his father to cleanse both himself and his father of religious pollution from the death of the workman. Euthyphro's relatives are angry and believe his action impious. Socrates asks him if he isn't sure that he is doing an unholy deed in prosecuting his father. Finally, Socrates asks Euthyphro to define the holy. The binding poses the question: Does Euthyphro know what the holy is? Notice that in this dialogue the end of the binding happens to coincide with the beginning of Socrates' interrogation of Euthyphro, and a transition to misfortune for him.

2) Lysis 5Dff. After Socrates asks Euthyphro to define the holy and the unholy (5D), Euthyphro answers, but his answers are all refuted by Socrates (6E-15A) (see, e.g., Reversal 1, above). After refutation of his last proposal, Euthyphro reverts to his earlier definitions of the holy, but under questioning from Socrates concedes that they had already been refuted (15BC). Socrates urges
Euthyphro to begin anew their quest for a definition of the holy. He says that Euthyphro must know, because if he did not clearly know the holy and the unholy, it is unthinkable that he would try to prosecute his aged father for murder for the sake of a hireling, but instead would fear the wrath of the gods, and be ashamed before his fellow citizens. Socrates demands that Euthyphro tell him the holy and unholy and not hide what he knows. Euthyphro replies, "Some other time, Socrates," and says he must hurry and departs (15CDE).

Euthyphro admits after each of Socrates' refutations of his definitions of the holy that Socrates is right in locating problems in the definitions he offers, and, at the end, after he repeats his first definitions, that they had already been refuted. The lysis shows that Euthyphro does not know what the holy is. This solves the binding of the dialogue. The principal recognition occurs when Euthyphro, who claimed at the beginning of the dialogue to know what the holy is, admits that all his definitions of the holy have been refuted (15C). This is the reversal that solves the binding of the dialogue. Accordingly, for the Euthyphro, its story in universal form is as follows:

After a young man, who boasts that he understands what is holy and unholy better than anyone else, decides to prosecute his father in order to cleanse his family of religious pollution, and his relatives say his action is unholy, someone asks him to define the holy and the unholy. The young man attempts to do so, but none of his definitions stand up under scrutiny, as he himself admits.
It may seem paradoxical to say that a so-called aporetic dialogue solves anything, since it does not answer the 'what is X' question. Here, however, I analyze the dialogue on the level of the plot of the encounter between Socrates and Euthyphro, rather than at the episodic level of argument.

b. The Crito

1) Binding 43A-46B. Socrates has been condemned to death. Crito comes to his cell to urge Socrates to escape from prison. Crito gives Socrates the following reasons why he should escape: a) If Socrates dies in prison, Crito will not only lose his best friend, he will also lose face, since most people will not believe that Socrates chose to stay in prison, but will assume that Crito and his friends did not care to save Socrates, or didn’t want to spend the money (44BC). b) Crito and his friends prefer to take the risks involved, rather than let Socrates die; all arrangements have been made; Socrates can go into exile in Thessaly (44E-45C). c) Socrates is attempting an unjust act in remaining in prison: i) he is treating himself as his enemies would; ii) he is abandoning his sons; iii) he is taking the easy way out, not the path of a noble and brave (andreios) man. d) Crito is ashamed of the whole situation from Socrates' first response to the charge, to his defense, to his
refusal to escape; it will all seem to have turned out the way it did due to some cowardice of Crito and Socrates' other friends (anandria he hemetera) (45C-46A). In response, Socrates says that they should examine Crito's proposal to see if it is the best course of action. The binding poses the question: Should Socrates be convinced by Crito's argument and escape?

2) Lysis 46Af. Socrates refutes Crito's claim that they should care for the opinion of the multitude, and Crito concedes that they should value only the opinion of the one who knows what is just and unjust (46D-48A). Crito concedes that it is never right to do a wrong or return a wrong or defend oneself against injury by retaliation, and that one should always fulfill one's agreements (49E). But he stubbornly resists the conclusion which Socrates suggests, that in escaping they would be committing a wrong, and breaking an agreement (50A). Socrates then introduces the Laws of Athens which speak as those that would be injured if Socrates escaped (50A-54C). The laws present a variety of arguments against Socrates escaping, which Crito accepts when Socrates questions him (51C, 52D). Finally, after Socrates presents the last speech of the Laws, he tells Crito to speak if he has anything to say in rebuttal (54D). Crito says he has nothing to say.
The lysis refutes all of Crito's arguments for Socrates to escape. The principal recognition occurs at the end of the dialogue, when Crito admits that he has nothing to say contrary to the arguments of the Laws. This recognition is the reversal which solves the binding and which is set in motion when Socrates introduces the Laws midway through the dialogue (50A). In the course of the reversal Crito expresses recognition three times (51C, 52D, 54D). Accordingly, the story of the Crito in universal form is as follows:

After someone has been unjustly condemned by the state, and a friend comes to prison to urge the condemned man to escape, and argues that escape is morally justified, the condemned man refutes the arguments of his friend, and they agree that the condemned man should remain in prison.

It is interesting to note that in the course of the lysis, there is an important minor reversal with the introduction of the Laws. At that point, Socrates has failed to refute Crito with his method of question and answer (the elenchus), and so shifts to another approach to deal with Crito's argument. Socrates is not abandoning argument, but is employing a different way to argue with Crito (or any other interlocutor) than the method of question and answer. Crito has just resisted applying Socrates' principle of non-retaliation to the circumstance of Socrates' condemnation by the state. Crito wants to make an exception in this one case, believing that Socrates is justified in retaliating against the state by
escaping from prison. The discourse of the laws responds to Crito by presenting an elaborate counter-argument against Socrates escaping that justifies retaliation by the state upon the individual, with particular reference to Socrates. The argument justifies any punishment, including floggings and imprisonment, both forms of retaliation against wrongdoing. As Brown points out, the laws argue for the power of the state to retaliate against the individual for whatever the state may regard as wrongdoing by the individual, in response to Crito’s claim for the right of Socrates to retaliate against the state for a wrongful verdict. [28] In this respect, the discourse of the laws is a parody of Crito’s speeches justifying that Socrates escape. It shows Crito that his desperation to save Socrates has driven him to the methods and reasoning of those who condemned his friend. Socrates continues the parody in his conclusion to the discourse of the laws. He adds that the arguments of the laws resounds inside him and makes him unable to hear anything else. He tells Crito that if he says anything contrary, he will speak in vain. Socrates mimics Crito’s own stubbornness. In response, Crito is ashamed. He has nothing to say (54D). The discourse of the laws is an ad hominem argument, specially made to refute and shame Crito. I re-emphasize that the discourse of the laws is not Socrates’ argument, since the laws argue for retaliating
in response to wrongdoing, a practice that Socrates rejects. Rather, it represents a different method of refutation, other than the method of question and answer that Socrates uses in Euthyphro and which the Eleatic stranger discusses in the Sophist. This other method involves the elaboration in long speeches of the implications of an interlocutor's argument. As such it is rhetorical, rather than an instance of the elenchus.

H. Thought in Socratic dialogue.

Thought (dianoia) is defined by the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist and by Socrates in the Theaetetus. The Eleatic stranger says that thought and speech are the same, with the difference that the inner dialogue of the soul with itself without voice is called thought (dianoia), while the flow that comes through the mouth with sound is called speech (logos) (Soph. 263E). Similarly, Socrates says that thinking (dianoeisthai) is speech which the soul goes through with itself about whatever it is considering; when the soul is thinking it is doing nothing other than discoursing: it asks itself and it answers, and assents and disagrees (Theae. 189E).

Aristotle, in defining thought represented in mimesis, focuses on its external representation in speech, presumably because thought that is not in some way externalized cannot be represented. Aristotle says that
thought (dianoia) is the many ways in which the persons represented use language to argue something or in general declare their opinion about something (Poet. 50a6-7, 50b11). He adds that the many things that have to be prepared by speech pertain to thought: to argue something, to refute someone, and to arouse emotions (56a36).

By any of these accounts, Socratic dialogue represents the thought of the participants of a dialogue. They speak, they ask questions and they answer them, they argue, refute each other, and arouse each others’ emotions. A more important question is whether Socratic dialogue represents their thought changing, or not changing, in the course of a dialogue. If a participant in a dialogue is shown that his or her opinions contradict, and is released from "inflated and rigid beliefs" (as described in Sophist 230B), then it seems reasonable to conclude that the participant’s thought has changed. The case of Polemarchus in Republic I provides a clear example. Polemarchus at first contends that it is just to help friends and harm enemies, but as a result of his discussion with Socrates, Polemarchus agrees that it is never just to injure anyone. His thought has changed. So, the dialogue between Socrates and Polemarchus (331D-336A) does not represent the thought of Polemarchus as a static unchanging entity, but rather it represents that thought undergoing change.
Dialogues also represent interlocutors resisting change in their thought.

1) After Polus is refuted by Socrates in the Gorgias (474C-475E), Socrates argues that a consequence of their argument is that an orator should use his talent to accuse himself and his friends of wrong-doing if they are guilty of it (480B). Polus immediately rejects this conclusion, and then rejects their previous argument.

2) In the same dialogue, Callicles resists Socrates' questioning and evades refutation.

3) In Republic I, after Socrates refutes Thrasytus three times, Thrasytus blushes in recognition, but his thought does not seem to have changed. He complains that what Socrates says does not satisfy him. He says if Socrates insists on using the method of question and answer, he will nod his head and says he agrees, only to satisfy Socrates, even when he disagrees, because Socrates won't let him speak, he says (350DE). Later in the discussion, when Socrates says he is giving good answers, Thrasytus says "Because I am gratifying you" (351C), and soon afterwards says, "Let it be so, so that I don't differ with you" (351D), and then, "Feast confidently on the argument, since I will not oppose you so that I don't become hateful to these men" (352B). Thrasytus has not been released from his beliefs, but has only abandoned irascibility. As Socrates
says, he has "become gentle" (354A). Glaucon says Thrasymachus has been charmed (358C).

The resistance of Socrates' interlocutors in the Gorgias and the Republic render these dialogues "polyphonic," as Bakhtin uses that term. The thought of Polus and of Callicles is not absorbed or dissolved into some consensus brought to birth by the questioning of Socrates. Despite reversal, Thrasymachus holds onto his own thinking. These characters fulfill a principle of the polyphonic novel, as conceived by Bakhtin, that everything in life is "dialogic opposition." [30]

I. Character in Socratic dialogue.

Aristotle says that character concerns whether and how one is subject to emotions (pathe), such as anger, fear, shame, and desire (EE 1220b5f.). In the Rhetoric Aristotle says that Socratic dialogues depict character (Rhet. 1417a21). There he says that character--i.e., whether and how someone is subject to emotions--is indicated by the decisions or choices (prohairesis) someone is described as making; the kind of character someone has is indicated by the sort of choice the person makes, and the sort of choice someone makes is indicated by the end he seeks. So, according to Aristotle, Socratic dialogues depict people making decisions or choices, often under the influence of emotion, in pursuit of an end.
Perhaps the most common character traits found in Socratic dialogues are vanity (chaunotes) and boastfulness (alazoneia), since many of Plato's characters claim to know something others do not know, or claim to know it better than others. Those subjected to the elenchus, explains the Eleatic Stranger, have inflated and rigid beliefs about themselves (Soph. 230C). For example, Euthyphro boasts that his knowledge of religious matters is so great that nothing he has predicted in the Assembly has not turned out to be true (Euthyph. 3C). Thrasymachus boasts that he will provide a definition of justice better than those proposed by Socrates and Polemarchus (Rep. 337D).

The character traits of boastfulness and vanity, however, are frequently joined with other traits that are linked with decisions or choices that the character makes.

1) Euthyphro. What is most remarkable about Euthyphro is not his boastfulness and vanity, but his shamelessness (anaischuntia) in prosecuting his own father for the accidental death of a murderer. Socrates suggests that Euthyphro is shameless at the end of the dialogue, when he remarks that Euthyphro must know what is the holy and the unholy, because if he did not clearly know this, it is unthinkable that he would try to prosecute his aged father for murder for the sake of a hireling, but would be ashamed before his fellow citizens (Euthyph. 15D).
Euthyphro's vanity that he knows what is holy better than anyone else permits him to decide that his father is a source of pollution (miasma) because of the death of the workman, and that therefore someone should prosecute him (4BCD); his shamelessness allows him to decide to proceed to do it himself. These decisions, however, Euthyphro makes prior to the time of the dialogue. If Socratic dialogue depicts character (Rhet. 1417a21), and character is revealed in decision (Poet. 50b8), the state of character examined in the Euthyphro should be revealed in some decision Euthyphro makes in the course of the dialogue. Euthyphro makes two sorts of decisions in the dialogue. First, he moderates his claim to know what is holy and unholy. After being refuted a third time by Socrates, who nonetheless insists that Euthyphro explain what is the holy and unholy, Euthyphro exclaims, "But, Socrates, I do not know how to tell you what I think" (11B), and after yet another refutation, he says, "It is a great task to learn exactly how all these matters stand" (14A). With these decisions, he might be described, in Aristotelian terms, to be moving away from boastfulness and vanity and towards the mean of sincerity. Euthyphro, however, makes a much more important decision in the course of the dialogue. After Socrates has refuted all his proposed definitions of the holy, but nonetheless continues to ask Euthyphro for a new one, Euthyphro cuts
off the discussion and departs. He does not say that he
doesn't really know what is holy, or that he is ashamed of
what he is doing, and must run off to stop the prosecution
of his father. No, he simply says, "Some other time,
Socrates. I'm in a hurry. I'm losing time" (15E).
Euthyphro departs with his shamelessness intact. He is
stubborn before Socrates' questioning. The Euthyphro
depicts a person whose character does not significantly
change in the course of the dialogue.

2) Crito. After Crito makes his speech urging
Socrates to escape from prison, Socrates identifies two
emotions related to states of character that Crito seems
to exhibit in the dialogue. First, Socrates says that
Crito's zeal (prothumia) for Socrates' safety will be
difficult for him to deal with (46B). Second, Socrates
hints twice that Crito is frightened. He says that unless
they come up with better arguments than the ones that
persuade Socrates to remain in prison, he will not agree
with Crito, not even if the power of the multitude should
frighten (mormoluttetai) them, like children, with chains,
death and confiscations of property (46C). And later,
Socrates asks Crito whether they don't still hold the
principle with which they have often agreed, that
wrongdoing is never good or honorable, or have they thrown
out all their convictions because of Socrates' trial, and
now realize that when they were discussing with each other

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earnestly for so many years that they were nothing different than children (49AB). In making both these remarks, Socrates is responding to Crito's charge that Socrates is not making the choice that a brave man would (45D), and that if he does not escape it will appear that Crito was a coward (45E). In effect, Socrates is saying to Crito, "You are the one who is not brave. You are acting cowardly right now!"

Crito chooses to yield to his fears about the situation prior to the time of the dialogue. We see him in the prison after he has already decided to try to convince Socrates to escape. Although he exhibits his fears in his speech proposing that Socrates escape, it is rather another state of character that governs his behavior in the dialogue itself. Although Crito concedes that it is never right to do a wrong or return a wrong or defend oneself against injury by retaliation, and that one should always fulfill one's agreements (49E), he resists the conclusion which Socrates suggests, that if Socrates escaped, he would be committing a wrong, and breaking an agreement (50A). In this he exhibits that zeal of which Socrates had warned earlier, i.e., Crito exhibits stubbornness (authadeia). Socrates responds to Crito's stubbornness, by mimicking it. After the discourse of the laws, Socrates declares to Crito that it would be useless for him to speak against his resolution to remain in
prison. So, Socrates practices mimesis in confronting the character of his interlocutors.

3) Thrasymachus. Unlike Euthyphro, Thrasymachus exhibits definite change in his character in the course of the Republic. The most striking character state of Thrasymachus is his irascibility (orgilotes). We first become acquainted with him after Polemarchus and Socrates agree that it is never just to injure anyone. At that point, "gathering himself together like a wild beast, he threw himself at us as though to tear us to pieces," so Socrates as narrator describes him (336B). Thrasymachus calls the preceding discussion "Nonsense" (phluaria), and laughs scornfully when Socrates asks him not to be hard (chalepos) on them (337A). After Thrasymachus states that justice is the advantage of the stronger, and Socrates questions his answer, Thrasymachus calls Socrates "disgusting" (bdeluros), for working evil with his argument (338D). After Socrates refutes him the first time (see Reversal 7), he calls Socrates "a slanderer (sukophantes) in arguments" (340D). After the second refutation, he tells Socrates his wet nurse should wipe his nose (343A). Finally, in the third refutation, he sweats profusely and blushes in recognition (350D). Apparently, Thrasymachus is irascible out of frustration of his own desires. The narrator says that he was made savage (exagriainesthai) by the discussion between
Socrates and Polemarchus (336D), and explains: "Thrasymachus evidently desired to speak so that he could win a good reputation, since he believed that he had a good answer" to the question, what is justice (338A). Indeed, after he speaks at length (343B-344C), he decides to leave--as though he had accomplished what he set out to do--and must be restrained by his friends (344D). So, the behavior of Thrasymachus is a clear case of Aristotle’s account of character in the Rhetoric. Out of vanity, he desires to exhibit what he believes in a speech, and decides to exhibit anger to obtain that end. Moreover, after he obtains his end in making a long speech, he desists from verbal abuse of Socrates. Yet, the story doesn’t end there, for after he blushes in recognition of his third refutation, Thrasymachus becomes a cooperative, if ironic, interlocutor for Socrates’ final argument in Republic I. He provides insightful answers, about which Socrates says, in recognition, that he is quite in awe (351C), and that Thrasymachus has become gentle (praos) and has stopped being difficult (chalepainon). Socrates’ statements show that Thrasymachus has changed in character since the time when Socrates earlier asked Thrasymachus not to be difficult (337A). So, in Republic I, Thrasymachus, following the model of Sophist 230, undergoes a change in character from the extreme of irascibility to the mean of gentleness (praotes), i.e., he
undergoes catharsis, as defined in the Sophist. At the same time, however, he appears to change from boastfulness to irony (eironeia), of which he had earlier accused Socrates (337A).

J. The Object of representation in Socratic dialogue.

Clay argues in his essay, "The tragic and comic poet of the Symposium," that Socrates is the object of representation of Plato's dialogues. [31] Plato encountered in Socrates, writes Clay, "the only object worthy of serious imitation." [32] The aim of Plato's poetics, he says, "is to implant into the soul the image and example of human character which are good and noble." [33]

Similarly, Kahn argues that in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Symposium and Republic, "the personal figure of Socrates still stands before us as the paradigm lover of the good." [34] "It is the extraordinarily seductive power of this portrait of Socrates," he continues, "that helps to make so many of us sympathetic, at least at the instinctive level, to the philosophic claims of these dialogues." [35] Kahn says that he sees "Plato as exploiting his artistic powers to produce in us the readers a simulacrum of the personal impact of Socrates upon the life of his original auditors, and first and foremost upon Plato himself." [36]
Bakhtin agrees that Socrates is the "central hero of the genre," [37], but says that Socrates' interlocutors are also "heroes" and objects of representation. "The heroes of the Socratic dialogue," writes Bakhtin, using the plural, "are ideologists. The prime ideologist is Socrates himself, but everyone he converses with is an ideologist as well--his pupils, the Sophists, the simple people whom he draws into dialogue and makes ideologists against their will." [38]

I evaluate the views of these scholars in the light of Aristotle's comments in the Poetics on the object of mimesis. Aristotle says that the character of the object of mimetic representation must be similar to the way people are (54a25). Otherwise, listeners will not suffer fear when witnessing tragedy, since we fear for people who are like ourselves (53a46). In general, listeners will not be able to identify with a character, who is "superior in virtue or justice" (Poet. 53a7).

I do not wish to question the central importance of the figure of Socrates within Socratic dialogue. I only suggest, as does Bakhtin, that Socrates is not the only object of Socratic dialogue. Moreover, if Socrates is "the image and example of human character which are good and noble" [39] and "the paradigm lover of the good" [40], then he is not like most of Plato's listeners, many of whom will certainly have some difficulty in identifying
with Socrates at first. Socrates explains in the Republic that the imitation of the prudent and quiet character is alien to the people who gather at the theatre; instead, the poet who seeks to be popular imitates the irritable disposition, which offers much and varied imitation and is easy to imitate (604D-605E). Indeed, it is Socrates' irritable interlocutors who are more like Plato's listeners, and with whom his listeners more easily identify. Transformation and change, however, is characteristic of Socratic discourse. We observe an interlocutor who claims in the beginning of a dialogue to know something admit at the end that he does not, or otherwise change his opinion. It is doubtful that a listener continues to identify with a character who is so shown to be in error. So, I propose that the effect of Socratic discourse, in refuting and/or improving Socrates' interlocutor, is to transfer the listener's affection from the interlocutor to Socrates, so that although the listener is more like the interlocutor, the listener may desire to become like Socrates, to become a "lover of the good." In this way, Plato solves the problem of mimesis to which Socrates refers in the passage mentioned above, for in imitating both the irritable and the prudent disposition, he demonstrates the superiority of the latter. This is the way, in my view, that the dialogues
produce "a simulacrum of the personal impact of Socrates upon the life of his original auditors," as Kahn suggests. [41]

K. Catharsis in Socratic dialogue.

In the Sophist, the Eleatic stranger says that subjects refuted in Socratic dialogue may undergo catharsis in which they are brought to shame and released from their empty beliefs in their own wisdom when they are shown that their opinions contradict each other. He says that in this process they get angry with themselves and become gentle towards others (Soph. 230Bf.) and so undergo a transformation in their states of character (see Chapter 2). This sort of catharsis is primarily a catharsis of shame. Under the elenchus, interlocutors are brought to shame, but as they are released from their mistaken beliefs in their own wisdom, they are also released from the shame which these beliefs caused. Socratic dialogues contain cases of such catharsis in individual interlocutors, that is, cases of transformations in their state(s) of character when they are refuted. For example, in the Alcibiades of Aeschines, Socrates exposes the folly of Alcibiades' vanity to the proud youth. After a long discussion, Alcibiades bursts into tears and begs Socrates to rid him of his depraved condition, and help him to attain virtue. [42] So, the character Alcibiades is represented as undergoing a change in state of character
from boastfulness and vanity to sincerity (aletheia). Similarly, in Republic I, as Thrasymachus is refuted by Socrates, he is represented as undergoing a change in state of character from irritability to gentleness (see Character, 3, above). In other Socratic dialogues, however, the catharsis of Socrates' respondent is not always represented. Euthyphro departs from Socrates adhering to his belief in his knowledge of the holy. So, the catharsis of an interlocutor is not an essential part of Socratic dialogue. As in tragedy, many characters in dialogue never experience catharsis in the dialogue itself. Yet, as Socrates says in Republic X, the representation in tragedy of persons in discord with themselves, whose reason and emotions struggle with each other, induces similar states in listeners, who delight in the pathos, yield to it, follow it and share in it (Rep. 605C). This mental turmoil is of the same sort as that present in interlocutors who are in need of refutation, according to the Eleatic stranger (Soph. 228BC). Indeed, the vain beliefs and extreme states of character that are displayed in tragedy, are also exhibited by interlocutors in Socratic dialogue. So, just as a conflict in a tragic figure is induced in a listener of tragedy, so also the conflict in an interlocutor in Socratic dialogue can be induced in a listener of the dialogue. The experience of this conflict by the listener is the basis for the
experience of catharsis, which Aristotle identifies as an end (telos) of mimesis (see Chapter 2).

In the Sophist, the Eleatic stranger says that the experience of observing refutation is pleasurable to the listener (230B). Commenting on this passage, Blank has discussed how Socratic dialogues represent participants and bystanders in a dialogue to be emotionally moved by listening to Socrates' questions and a respondent's answers (see Chapter 1). As a result of such arousal, a bystander may decide to take over the argument and become a respondent, and a respondent may decide to become a listener and bystander. In the following I consider whether and how we can speak of such a listener experiencing a catharsis of pity and fear in the course of a dialogue.

Blank notes that in Socratic dialogues listeners may feel pity for subjects as they are being examined. Concerning whether listeners feel fear, he only says that Socratic dialectic manipulates its interlocutors' shame—which Aristotle says is the fear of disgrace (EN 1128b11). In the Poetics, Aristotle writes that pity is for someone who suffers misfortune undeservedly, while fear is for someone who is like ourselves (53a4-6). He explains in the Rhetoric that pity is some feeling of pain at an apparently painful misfortune which befalls someone who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to
suffer ourselves, or someone in our family to suffer (1185b13). So, according to Aristotle, listeners pity tragic figures because they believe that what the tragic figures suffer could happen to themselves, and they fear for them because they themselves are like them. For Aristotle, the point of resemblance must be in thought and states of character, since that is how he defines the persons represented in mimesis (49b37). These persons, he says, should be neither someone who is superior in virtue or justice, nor someone who falls into misfortune because of wickedness (kakia, mochtheria), but someone who suffers this because of some error (hamartia) (53a7-12). The error will be some speech or action. So, for listeners of Socratic dialogues to experience a catharsis of pity and fear, the dialogue should represent one or more subjects who exhibit thought or states of character which listeners share with them, and who commit some error because of which they suffer an apparently painful experience which listeners believe could happen to themselves or those close to them.

The evidence that a listener would feel pity for a subject, in Aristotle's account of pity in mimesis, lies not in the speech or actions of the listener, but in whether the misfortune experienced by the subject is undeserved. According to Aristotle, misfortune is deserved if it results from the subject's own wickedness.
Misfortune is undeserved if it is to some external agent, or due to some error of the subject. In general, misfortune can result from the sufferer’s own actions or from some external agent. If the misfortune results from the sufferer’s own actions, it can be due to wickedness or error. Aristotle says that there are many ways to err since evil (to kakon) is unlimited (EN 1106b28), but the distinguishing characteristic of wickedness is that it is continuous (EN 1150b34). So, even though we see Oedipus become unjustly angry with Creon, Teiresias, and the Herdsman, and hear that in anger he killed a sacred herald and old man whom he met on the road, we do not lose sympathy for him because his badness is not continuous. In sum, for Aristotle, listeners may pity a subject who suffers misfortune due to an external agent or due to some error which the subject commits.

Plato’s dialogues seem to extend the domain of subjects of pity to an even larger group. Socrates says in the Gorgias that people who unjustly put others to death or commit other injustices should be pitied (469AB), and the Laws says that though it is especially allowed to pity those unjust persons whose evil is curable, any person who is unjust or evil is always pitiable (731CD).

The evidence that a listener would feel fear, according to Aristotle’s account of fear in mimesis, lies not in the speech or actions of the listener but in the
thought and/or character of the subject and the listener. Listeners of a Socratic dialogue can be like a subject in sharing thought or states of character with the subject. This applies as well to listeners who are participants in the dialogue. In fact, for them, unlike the anonymous host of listeners/readers, we might even have concrete evidence of what their thought and states of character are, which, in as much as they are the same as the subject’s, stand as evidence that they would feel fear for the subject and for themselves, according to Aristotle, when the subject suffers misfortune. In Socratic dialogue, the misfortune could simply be the examination and refutation of the subject’s thought or states of character, since to someone who shares certain thought or states of character with the subject refutation of that thought or criticism of those states of character may be painful and thus a misfortune. This accords with the definition of fear in Plato’s Laws as the expectation of pain (644D).

Finally, Aristotle says that listeners will feel pity and fear simply from listening to the story of the tragedy. He says that the poet should construct the plot in such a way that even without seeing it someone who hears the acts that occur both shudders in fear and feels pity from the outcome, which very things someone might suffer from hearing the plot of the Oedipus (53b3).

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Chapter 6 will present an illustration of the ideas discussed in this section.

L. Conclusion.

This chapter has argued that:

1) Plato himself represents Socratic dialogue as a genre of oral mimesis in the prefaces to several dialogues.

2) Plato represents Socrates as an examiner of the character of his interlocutor(s). A Socratic dialogue is an encounter or confrontation between Socrates and one or more interlocutors over issues of moral import that are revealing of character. The plot of a Socratic dialogue evolves from this encounter of Socrates and his interlocutors. In Socratic dialogue, character comes under direct scrutiny in connection with the examination of a claim maintained by an interlocutor; that scrutiny and a character's response to it constitute the action represented by the plot.

3) Both Socrates and his interlocutor(s) are the objects of Socratic dialogue. The interlocutor is the sort of person who is like the listeners of Socratic dialogue and with whom the listeners can readily identify. Insofar as Socratic dialogue concerns itself with the thought of the interlocutor, it expounds on the philosophy of the interlocutor, as well as the philosophy of Socrates.
4) Socratic dialogues have the distinguishing features of genres of mimesis, e.g., tragedy, discussed by Aristotle in the Poetics. Socratic dialogues have plot, which exhibits reversal, recognition, and pathos. They exhibit the thought and character of the persons they represent.

With these results, it seems fitting to return to an issue raised in Chapter 1: For whom does a character in a Socratic dialogue (e.g., Socrates) speak? Aristotle emphasizes that, in speaking, persons represented in mimesis represent their own character and thought, which show what sort of persons they are. Thus, characters speak at most for themselves. Sometimes, however, the remarks of a character cannot even be attributed to the character. Frede has argued that during the elenchus the responsibility for an argument lies with the respondent (e.g., Euthyphro) not the questioner (i.e., Socrates). [44] We also have the argument of Burnyeat that the doctrine of recollection supports the view that Socratic questioning can draw positive knowledge out of the interlocutor, so that the responsibility for arguments of even a non-aporetic dialogue could lie with the respondent, rather than the questioner. [2a] For all these reasons, and others discussed earlier in this work, we are not justified in attributing the remarks of a
character in a dialogue to its author. We must instead
distinguish several levels of discourse:

1) The thought of an individual character.

This is dianoia in the Poetics. The thought of a
character frequently is in conflict not only with the
thought of other characters, but also with itself, and not
only with the character’s thought in a single dialogue,
but also with the thought of the same named character in
other dialogues.

An example of Socrates in conflict with his own
remarks in a single dialogue is the following: In
Republic I Socrates and Polemarchus agree that "it is
never just to injure anyone" (335E), but later Socrates
has the city that evolves into the city of the guardians
seize the land of its neighbors (373D), and then go to war
to hold it.

An example of Socrates in conflict with what he says
in another dialogue is the following: In the Crito,
Socrates emphasizes that "we should set the highest value,
not on mere living (zen), but on living well (eu zen),"
which he says is the same as living honorably (kalos) and
justly (dikaios) (48B). This distinction between mere
living and living well becomes an important component of
the argument which Socrates makes in the Crito for
remaining in prison, rather than escaping with the help of
Crito and his friends, and so is no passing remark but
represents a view confirmed by the plot of the dialogue.
Yet in the Republic Socrates concerns himself with a "city
with the minimum necessary elements," which is meant to
support only mere living, not living well, in the sense of
the Crito. Aristotle remarks in the Politics that this
first city in the Republic is described "as though every
city was established for the sake of necessities but not
rather for the sake of the good (kalou)" (1291A17).

2) The plot and aim of the dialogue.

This is muthos and telos in the Poetics. Plot
subsumes the binding and lysis of the dialogue, which
includes the outcome and conclusion to draw from the
action, as well as the catharsis it induces. The fact
that the thought of an interlocutor suffers reversal in
the course of the plot (e.g., that of Socrates in Republic
II and at the beginning of Republic V) shows that plot
(muthos) must be distinguished from the thought (dianoia)
of any individual represented.

3) The view of the author.

In general, the view of the author is not the view
of a dialogue, but must be interpreted based on other
available evidence, e.g., other dialogues or works of
other authors. An individual dialogue may represent "work
in progress," and by the time of its completion, may
represent views that the author no longer holds, or
perhaps never held. The fact that Socrates either does
not appear, or plays little or no part in several late dialogues can be regarded as evidence that Plato, at least at one time or other, had differences with the Socrates of the middle dialogues (see Chapter 1). As Frede writes, the dialogue form allowed Plato "to present views and arguments which in his opinion deserved closer scrutiny and further reflection of a kind needed if one wanted to arrive at a clearer understanding of the matter at issue. Obviously one can think that certain views and arguments deserve reflection even if one does not endorse them."

[45]

In the next Chapter, discussion of Aristotle's treatment of the Republic will argue that Aristotle distinguishes these same three levels of discourse in his discussions of that dialogue.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

Parmenides that "By their external form they seem to possess a more historical character," but that Kierkegaard disputed this in his Concept of Irony, London, 1966, p. 68-9.


3. Manuscript Pi of the Poetics names this genre "epic poetry" (epopoia); this word is bracketed by Kassel. An Arabic version of the Poetics and a text used by the Byzantine scholar J. Tzetzes say that the genre is without a name (Kassel, op. cit., 4; Janko, 1987, op. cit., 69). Based on this, Kassel and Janko read "without a name" into the Greek manuscript that we have. Setting aside for the moment this textual problem, I note that it makes some sense to name the genre epopoia. Within the genre, epic towers over all the other types of mimesis included by Aristotle in it. Furthermore, a grand dialogue like the Republic has various
characteristics of epic, such as length, narration, and others, as will be discussed further in this chapter.

4. According to Athenaeus, Aristotle wrote in On Poets that the mimes of Sophron and the Socratic dialogues of Alexamenus of Teos are representations. See Janko, op. cit., 1987, p. 56, 176.

5. So, this remark is no "slip," as claims Kahn, op. cit., 1996, p. 71.


9. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


19. Translation from Lattimore.


23. Textual references are to Oxford text of Jaeger.


27. Iliad, vi, 211.

27a. Alternatively, Socrates says that to experience refutation is a good (agathon), because to be refuted is to be freed of the greatest evil (kakou tou megistou), i.e., false belief about important moral questions (Gorg. 458A). Insofar as the experience of refutation is a good, in which one is freed from an evil, then the interlocutor who is refuted in Socratic dialogue experiences a change from misfortune to good fortune. But the interlocutor who resists refutation (e.g., Callicles) cannot experience that change.


29. Ibid.


32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
40. Kahn, op. cit., 1983, p. 120.
41. Kahn, op. cit., 1983, p. 120.
43. Similarly, "someone errs whenever the origin of the cause is in him, but is unfortunate whenever it is outside" (EN 1135b18).
44. Frede, op. cit., 212.
In the Poetics, Aristotle distinguishes between the thought (dianoia) of individuals represented in a work of mimesis and the work's plot (muthos). He writes that plot is the representation of the action (50a3), and the end and aim (telos), origin (arche), and soul (psuche) of tragedy (50a22, a38), but that characters are second to plot in importance (50a15-39), and thought is third (50b4). The thought of an individual Aristotle understands from the speeches the individual makes. This is reasonable, since we know the character's thought by means of the words the character speaks. So, Aristotle writes that by thought he means the many ways in which a person represented uses language to argue something or declare an opinion about something (50a6, b11). So, in the Republic the speeches of the character Glaucon and the speeches of Socrates to which Glaucon expresses agreement represent his thought. Accordingly, in the Poetics, where Aristotle classifies Socratic dialogue as a genre of
mimesis, he distinguishes between the thought of an individual character and the plot of the representation, which are the first two levels of discourse distinguished in the analysis of Socratic dialogue in the conclusion to Chapter 3, above.

In addition, insofar as Aristotle considers mimesis an art (techne), he distinguishes between an individual work of mimesis and the thought-processes of its author. If an art (techne) is a capacity to make things in accordance with correct reasoning (EN 1140a9), and if the origin of what is produced through an art is in the artist, and not in the product (EN 1140a10), then a work of mimesis, as a product, is to be distinguished from the thought processes of the author, whose capacity made it, and is its origin. This distinction underlies the distinction between the plot and aim (telos) of a work of mimesis, and the thought of its author, a distinction which is also proposed in Chapter 3 for the analysis of Socratic dialogue.

So, in the Poetics, Aristotle makes the same distinction made in Chapter 3, between the thought or speeches of a character, and the plot and aim of a work of representation. Furthermore, his belief that mimesis is an art means that he distinguishes between the product and the thought-processes of the artist. As a result, we might expect that in writing about the Republic in the
Politics Aristotle respects these distinctions in level of discourse himself. Indeed, we find, first, that Aristotle never attributes proposals expressed by the character Socrates in the dialogue to Plato, but always and only to the character Socrates. Thus, he distinguishes between the thought expressed by a character and the thought of the author. Since Aristotle does not attribute Socrates' proposals to Plato, he is clearly avoiding a "doctrinal" reading of the Republic (see Chapter 1). Second, as I will discuss below, Aristotle frequently criticizes proposals or arguments expressed by Socrates in the Republic by means of remarks or arguments expressed by Socrates elsewhere in the dialogue. He points out that Socrates' remarks in one place (i.e., Rep. V) seem not to fit with those in other places (i.e., Rep. I, II, IV), and, in this way, he identifies "difficulties" (duschereiai) or "paradoxes" (atopa) in the discourse of the Republic. In doing so, he analyzes an individual speech of a character (e.g., Socrates in Rep. V) within the larger context of the dialogue as a whole, and so analyzes the thought expressed by the character (dianoia) within the broader level of discourse of plot.

A. The nature of Aristotle's argument in the Politics.

Scholars have argued over the value of Aristotle's discussion of the Republic in Book II of the Politics for
more than a century. On one side, many charge that Aristotle's criticisms of what Socrates says in the dialogue are unfair, and that Aristotle does not understand Plato's text. In 1894 Susemihl and Hicks judged that Aristotle "had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost grove of Plato's thought." [1] In 1923 Bornemann concluded that Aristotle was incapable of understanding Plato and shows only the most cursory acquaintance with the Republic. [2] More recently, Annas writes that Aristotle's criticisms are "often surprisingly crass and literal-minded, much below Aristotle's best." [3]

On the other side, Benardete proclaims that "Aristotle's objections to the communism of women and children" are "obvious," [4] and Mayhew in a recent book argues that Aristotle's criticisms are right, and Plato is wrong. [5] Stalley and Irwin have attempted to steer between these extremes by agreeing with Aristotle's criticisms in some places, while rejecting them elsewhere. [6] In my view, the approach taken by all these scholars of deciding whether Aristotle, or Plato is right, in one place or the other, overlooks the literary character and intertextuality of Aristotle's discourse.

Modern scholars generally assume that in his discussion of the Republic Aristotle expresses disagreements with Plato. This assumption has had great
influence over the interpretation of Politics II. The
textual evidence, however, does not confirm this
assumption. Rather, it indicates that Aristotle is
criticizing only the discourse of the character Socrates.
Aristotle criticizes the proposals expressed by Socrates
in the Republic in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Politics II
and in a section of chapter 4 of Politics IV. In these
sections of the Politics Aristotle does not mention Plato
once. Translators, such as Barker and Stalley, Jowett,
and Sinclair and Saunders, have inserted Plato's name into
the text anyway. [7] In these same five chapters,
however, where he does not mention Plato at all, Aristotle
names Socrates twelve times while attributing proposals to
him and him alone throughout the text. So, it is not
self-evident that Aristotle is criticizing Plato here.
Then his discourse in the Politics is not as adversarial
as scholars have assumed in the past. It is possible that
Aristotle is only discussing Socrates' proposals in the
Republic in order to introduce topics that interest him in
the Politics.

I say that we should reconsider what is the nature
of this text in which Aristotle discusses the discourse of
Socrates in the Republic. In this text, Aristotle says
that he finds "difficulties" and "paradoxes" in the
discourse of the Republic. He opens his treatment of the
Republic by saying that the sharing of women involves many
difficulties, which he discusses and says will destroy the city (1261a10). He says that there are other difficulties in the proposals of Socrates that will lead to homicide against relatives and incest (1262a25). In speaking of the sharing of property he says it involves many difficulties (1263a21). Furthermore, Aristotle says that it is paradoxical that Socrates proposes achieving unity in the city by practicing the sharing of women, children and property when elsewhere in the Republic Socrates emphasizes that education is the means to achieve unity in a city (1264a37). Aristotle concludes his treatment of the Republic by saying that the regime described by Socrates "has these difficulties and others as important" (1264b24).

In the Topics, Aristotle explains that a difficulty, or aporia in thought is produced by a state of balance or equality between contrary arguments (145b16). Sometimes, a difficulty will result from the opposition of two rival views, which may each be internally consistent, but which contradict each other. Other times, a difficulty may arise within the views of an individual, as they frequently do in Socratic dialogues. Accordingly, there are two ways to interpret Aristotle's arguments that the proposals of Socrates involve difficulties. First, we could say that Socrates' proposals conflict with views that Aristotle accepts. Second, we could say that they
conflict with views that Socrates himself expresses. In addition, both of these statements could be true: we could say that Socrates' proposals conflict with views that he expresses himself and with which Aristotle agrees. If Aristotle is arguing from premises that he accepts and which Socrates rejects, we would say that his treatment of the Republic is dialectical, in accordance with his definition of dialectical argument in the Sophistical Refutations (165b3), that is, one that argues from generally accepted premises, or endoxa, to the contradiction of Socrates' proposals. If Aristotle is arguing from premises that Socrates himself expresses, we could say that his treatment is peirastic (165b4), that is, it argues from Socrates' own statements to their contradiction. Previous interpretations of the Politics have assumed that Aristotle's arguments are dialectical. To my knowledge, no one has attempted to find the premises that Aristotle uses amidst Socrates' own statements in the Republic. This chapter reports on the results of such a search. The chapter discusses premises and arguments of Aristotle, and provides parallel passages from the Republic which say essentially the same things and which may have served as Aristotle's sources. The chapter treats Aristotle's discussions of: unity in the ideal city (Pol. II.2, 5), friendship and eros (II.3, 4, 5), gender
(II.5), sacrilegious acts and incest (II.4), property (II.5), and the minimum necessary elements for a city (IV.4).

B. Unity in the city of the guardians.

The first difficulty in the discourse of the Republic that Aristotle discusses concerns Socrates' assumption that the greatest possible unity of a city is the supreme good (1261a15; see Rep. 462B). Aristotle says that a city which goes on becoming more and more of a unit, will eventually cease to be a city. Aristotle's argument has four parts. In each part, Aristotle refutes Socrates with premises and arguments that I have found in Socrates' own discourse. This makes Aristotle's argument qualify as being peirastic. The very points made by Aristotle are made by Socrates in the Republic, sometimes more forcefully. There is a one-to-one correspondence between these arguments of Aristotle and arguments of Socrates in the Republic.

1) First, Aristotle emphasizes that a city, by nature, is a plurality (plethos) (1261a18). Socrates also says this: he explains that in forming a city "many men gather together in one settlement as partners and helpers" (369C1). But from this same premise, and in argument against Socrates' program for unity, Aristotle says that if a city keeps becoming more and more of a unit, first, it will take on the characteristics of a household, and
then, those of an individual, and cease to be a city, because it will no longer be a plurality (1261a18). Aristotle's argument implies that the discourse of Socrates obliterates the distinctions between a city, a household, and an individual, and confuses different senses of unity namely, that of a city, that of a household, and that of an individual. He explains that we would call the household more a unit than the city, and the individual more a unit than the household. In either case, the members are more closely united than in a city. The difficulties that Aristotle sees in Socrates' discourse are the following: Socrates establishes the first city of the Republic out of a plurality of individuals who maintain separate households, who have different skills and who come together to form a city because they can meet each other's needs, but later Socrates designs another city, in which citizens share women and children in common, which practice would reduce the city to a huge household, as Aristotle says. [8] Furthermore, Socrates emphasizes that a city is a plurality composed of different kinds of people, but he also states that "the best governed city is that which is most like a single human being" (462C). He gives as an example the pain of a cut finger; the entire person feels the pain, though only a part is injured; so should it be in a state, he says: all should feel the suffering of
another. Aristotle's point is that Socrates' argument not only rests on a bad metaphor but reflects an inconsistency in Socrates' discourse. Susemihl and Hicks have criticized Aristotle for "an excessive striving after logical clearness" in the way he criticizes Socrates' proposals for making a city a unity. [9] I say that Aristotle’s method of argument is similar to the method of Socrates in Plato's early dialogues. Like Socrates, he sifts through his interlocutor's statements for premises that can lead to contradiction. If this is excessive, the charge should be made against Socrates as well.

2) Aristotle next argues that not only is a city a plurality, but a city is also composed of people who differ in kind. He adds that cities are preserved by the existence of an equal reciprocity among their various and different citizens (1261a30). Now, Socrates also says these things. His remarks are actually stronger than Aristotle's. He says that "each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but rather differs in nature (phusis)" (370B). From this, he concludes that different people are fit for doing different tasks. With this reasoning, Socrates establishes a division of labor in the city: he requires that each citizen fulfill a specialized task, and he does not allow them to each separately provide for themselves. Socrates also says that a reciprocity exists by nature among the people who form a
city. He says that a city comes into existence "when one takes on another for one need and another for another need, and since many things are needed, many people gather in one habitation as partners and helpers, and to this common settlement we give the name city" (369C).

Furthermore, Socrates says later that justice is the rule that "each must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which nature has made each naturally most fit" (433A). But in Republic V, Socrates proposes to make the citizens of the city "affected alike by pain and pleasure" (464D). In response, Aristotle repeats Socrates' advice of Republic II and says that "a city cannot be composed of those who are like one another" (1261a24). Aristotle's point is that Socrates, after founding the city out of different kinds of people, seeks to make them similar to one another through the social prescriptions on marriage, children and property. This argument is peirastic because when Socrates says he wishes to establish a communion (koinonia) of pleasure and pain in which the citizens say "mine" and "not mine" at the same time and about the same things (462C), he is proposing that the citizens' feelings and emotions, and their states of character, be assimilated to each other, eroding the very distinct characteristics by which each differs in nature (370A) and is able to contribute to meeting the needs of the city (369C). [10] "It is just as
if someone turned a harmony into a unison, or a rhythm into a single foot," writes Aristotle (1263b34). If the citizens no longer differ from one another, they will no longer be able to fulfill each other's various needs: people who are the same do not have anything to exchange with each other. As a result, the reciprocity upon which the city is based will pass out of existence, and the city will pass away. Finally, for Socrates to establish a social system that would change the natures of the citizens so that they become alike seems to violate the conception of justice he expresses in Republic IV (at 433A, quoted above).

3) Aristotle next argues that Socrates' goal of "the greatest possible unity" contradicts Socrates' own requirement that a city must be self-sufficient because that which is more unified such as a household or an individual is naturally less self-sufficient (see passage 4A). Indeed, Socrates himself says that as individuals "each of us isn't self-sufficient but is in need of much" (369B5). He is careful to include among the citizens of a city those skilled in a variety of occupations (369-71), and he requires that they produce a surplus product which they can trade with other cities to obtain the things they do not or cannot produce (371A). On Socrates' contradictory goal of "the greatest possible unity," Aristotle argues that "A household is more self-sufficient
than an individual, and a city more than a household; a plurality, however, professes to be a city, only when it happens that the association (koinonia) of the plurality is self-sufficing (autarkes). So, if the more self-sufficient is more preferable, then also that which is less a unity is more preferable than that which is more so" (1261b11). Here Aristotle argues that Socrates' goal of the greatest possible unity conflicts with Socrates' goal of self-sufficiency, since that which is most unified, i.e., the individual, is least self-sufficient. In summarizing his argument about unity, Aristotle writes: "both a household and a city must in some way be a unit, but not entirely. For just as there is a point at which in progressing in unity it will no longer be a city, there is another point at which it will still be a city, but a worse one, because it is close to not being a city" (1263b31).

4) Aristotle identifies another inconsistency between Socrates' remarks on education and his proposals for the sharing of women, children and property. In chapter 4 of Politics II, Aristotle says that a city is a plurality, and education is the means of making it a community and giving it unity (1263b36). Then, in continuing his remarks, Aristotle says that it is paradoxical that the very man who intends to introduce a system of education, and who believes that education will
make the city virtuous should nonetheless think that he is setting it on the right track by imposing the sharing of women, children and property, rather than through customs (ethe), culture (philosophia), and legislation (nomoi) (1263b38). Aristotle refers, among other places, to Republic Book III where Socrates discusses education in the city he is designing and how it should be designed so that "right from childhood, it will, without their awareness, lead the youth with fair speech to likeness and friendship as well as harmony" (401D). In this passage, Socrates speaks of a way of producing friendship among the citizens and unifying the city that is independent of, and of a different sort from, the sharing of women, children and property that he speaks of elsewhere in the dialogue. We note that the means that Aristotle identifies as the ones appropriate for making a city a unity are of the same sort as Socrates himself proposes in his discussions on education in Republic III.

Aristotle takes up the question of unity one more time in Politics II.5. There he contends that Socrates is unclear whether the mass of other citizens apart from the guardians will participate in the sharing of women, children and property (1264a11). Aristotle argues that if the farmers and others are not to share in these arrangements but follow the social practices that exist in other Greek cities (as scholars assumed in the 19th
century [11]), then there will necessarily be two cities in one, and these cities will be opposed to each other, with the guardians functioning as a garrison over the rest of the city (1264a24). He says that this situation will lead to disunity in two ways: first, among the farmers and others, since they will be subject to the usual private cares that Socrates argues tear cities apart (1264a27; see, e.g., Rep. V.462B); and second, between the city of the guardians and the city of the farmers, since the latter will support the former, and will become arrogant and difficult to govern (1264a32). But if the farmers are to practice the sharing of women, children and property, Aristotle asks, how will they differ from the guardians? What would they gain in submitting to the rule of the guardians, or what convinces them to submit? (1264a17)

Recent scholarship has supported Aristotle’s view that Socrates is unclear about the life of the farming class (see note 8).

Finally, in parody of Socrates’ discourse on the good, Aristotle writes that what Socrates says is the good in the city would really ruin it. "But surely," says Aristotle, "the good of each thing is what preserves it in being" (1261b8). Here Aristotle parodies Socrates’ statement in Republic VI that things have being as a result of the good (509B6), because implementing Socrates’
policy that the greatest unity is the greatest good would actually destroy a city.

In sum, in the Politics, Aristotle uses arguments proposed by Socrates in the Republic to argue that Socrates' assumption that the greatest possible unity of the whole city is the supreme good contradicts the need, also stated by Socrates, for a city to be composed of a plurality of different kinds of people so that the city will be self-sufficient. My analysis shows that Aristotle's criticisms of what Socrates says in the Republic are based on concepts which Socrates himself expresses elsewhere in the dialogue. Such a treatment is peirastic. It is of the nature of an exegesis of the dialogue; it illuminates the structure of the dialogue (see Chapter 3), rather than criticizes it or its author.

C. The sharing of women and children.

Aristotle also finds difficulties in the proposal that women and children be shared in common. Aristotle says that "friendship will be weaker when women and children are shared in common" (1262b1). He holds that the proposal would accomplish the opposite of what Socrates supposes (1262b3). Socrates says that the policies would produce unity in the city of the guardians. So, Aristotle seems to be claiming that the policies would produce disunity or conflict.
Aristotle explains that friendship among citizens is one of the greatest goods for cities, since with friendship a city is less distracted by factions (1262b7). He notes that Socrates says that the effect of friendship is to make a city a unity. Aristotle is probably referring to a passage in Republic IV where Socrates and Glaucon agree that both an individual and a city are made temperate by friendship and accord among their parts (442C10). Aristotle argues, however, that in the city of the guardians the social relations will produce only a watery affection among the citizens, and therefore its unity would be weaker, not stronger than under traditional arrangements (1262b15). Aristotle explains that people care for and cherish something because they love it, but, he asserts, that motive cannot exist in the city of the guardians (1262b22). Again, Aristotle responds to Socrates with Socrates' own words. For in the Republic, Socrates says that "People would care most for that which they happen to love (phileo)" (412D), and he repeats the idea elsewhere in the dialogue with regards to erotic affection: he tells Glaucon that someone in love with another naturally always loves everything related and personal to the beloved (485C). Aristotle seems to hold that Socrates' remarks conflict with the social policies Socrates proposes in the dialogue.
Indeed, it would seem impossible to form strong individual bonds of friendship and love (philia) in the Republic since no one is permitted to have their own husband, wife, son, daughter, father or mother to "care most for," or "care for everything related or akin to," as Socrates commends for someone who regards another with affection. Rather, thousands of wives, sons, etc., will collectively belong to thousands of men. As Aristotle points out, the affection in such relationships will be diluted and weak, since they are civil relationships, not personal ones. The "wife" or "son" that is shared with thousands of others will be neglected by all, argues Aristotle. He explains: "What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care. People pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is common; or at any rate, they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned" (1261b33).

So, Aristotle argues that friendship will be diluted and weak in the Republic, because no one will be able to care most for a special someone, whether a friend or a beloved. As a result, the sharing of women and children will produce less unity in a city than traditional arrangements. Aristotle again refutes Socrates' proposals with Socrates' own discourse. Aristotle’s argument is again peirastic.
But Aristotle also says that the sharing of women and children would produce not only weak affection but actual disunity or conflict. We need also consider whether there is anything in the social prescriptions of the Republic that would actually destroy friendship or engender distrust, resentment or even hatred, something that would produce the sort of private cares that Socrates says tear cities apart (462A). If we find something of that sort, then we would have found a serious contradiction in the design of the city of the guardians. Aristotle says that the social policies of Republic V would destroy the practice of temperance in sexual relations, for it is a good practice to refrain from the spouse of another through temperance (1263b9). [12] This seems an application of Socrates' remark in Republic IV that the just never commit adultery (443A9). By Aristotle's reasoning, the practice of temperance in sexual matters is a good in social relations: presumably it preserves and promotes friendship. Intemperance, on the other hand, i.e., not refraining from the spouse of another, is not a good, but is destructive of friendship, and--because friendship is what produces unity in a city--would destroy unity in a city. In Republic IV Socrates himself says that friendship has something to do with temperance. A city is temperate because of friendship among its citizens (442C). A citizen is
temperate because of friendship and accord among the parts of the citizen's soul. So, it seems that citizens who are temperate are more likely to share in friendship with each other than those who are intemperate. So, Socrates and Aristotle seem to agree that temperance is a good in social relations.

But is Aristotle right to say that the social policies proposed in the Republic would destroy the practice of temperance in sexual relations? What does it mean to refrain from the spouse of another when in the Republic no one has his own wife or her own husband? In the Republic, brides (numphai) and bridegrooms (numphioi) are brought together in marriages (gamoi) at special festivals (459E), but under the policy of the sharing of wives, they would not continue to live with each other because "these women are all common to all these men, and no woman may live by herself with any man" (457C10). Moreover, under the eugenics policies (459D), the young men who are "good in war" are encouraged to have sexual relations with as many of the wives as possible. Socrates says that along with other rewards (gera) and prizes, the license of intercourse with the women must be given more abundantly to those of the young who are good in war, so that under this pretext the most children will be sown by such men (460B). Clearly, these policies will permit and/or require that such a man marry a woman who has
already been married at a festival to another man. This could lead to quarrels and fights. Furthermore, Glaucon proposes, and Socrates agrees, that for the man who is proved best in war on a military campaign, as long as that campaign lasts no one whom he wants to kiss (philein) be permitted to refuse, so that if a man happens to love (erōn) someone, either male or female, he would be more eager to win the rewards of valor (468C). Note that this particular injunction admits eros into the city and legitimizes it for the guardians, but eros is a passion to possess another, and so, with this law, Socrates and Glaucon re-introduce private cares into the city. It is unlikely that such expressions of eros will stop at kissing. At least some heroes, if their beloved is a woman, will seek an official marriage with her as a reward (geras) of service. The woman will have no choice in the matter. If the hero wants her, she is his. So, the Republic seems to sanction a form of legal rape, and call it marriage. Socrates and Glaucon clearly identify the gender of those who are proved best in war as male (468B: ton aristeusanta), for, as they agree elsewhere, "the race of men excels the race of women in all respects" (455C).

If a man and a woman love each other, however, whether affectionately or erotically, and wish to "care most for" each other and "for everything related and personal to" each other, this may not be permitted them 1)
because their union may not be approved by the rulers (458D), 2) because the marriage laws, which require that they either move on to another sexual partner, or refrain from sex, forbid it, or, 3) because of the privileges extended to those young men "best in war," one of whom may decide he wants the woman as a prize (geras) in the way that Agamemnon decided he wanted Briseis, the wife of Achilles in the Iliad. Only when the man and woman are old and infertile will they be able to choose to express their love for each other (461C). If a hero decides to claim a woman loved by a lesser guardian as a geras, it is hard to believe that the lesser man would remain a friend to the hero, if they ever were friends. Indeed, it is provided in the Republic that such conflicts lead to fights (464C). On the other hand, a guardian woman in love with a guardian man may resent being claimed as a prize by a superior warrior, but she will have no choice. In the city of the guardians, she must submit. Under the Republic, women would become sex objects to a group of elite male warriors. I propose that these may be the matters to which Aristotle refers when he says, that the social policies of the Republic would destroy temperance with respect to spouses, and so destroy a good in social relations, which preserves and promotes friendship among citizens. In destroying such temperance, the social
policies of Republic V would destroy the unity of the city—just as Aristotle argues.

Indeed, the law that no one loved by a hero can refuse his advances admits eros into the city and legitimizes it for the guardians, but eros is a passion to possess another, and so, with this law, Socrates and Glaucon re-introduce private cares into the city—contrary to Socrates' own statement in Republic V (462A9). In addition, the license that the law grants the heroes violates Socrates' account of temperance in sexual matters and fosters intemperance among the guardians. It breaks the rules for relations between a lover and a beloved which Socrates set down in Republic III, where he says that a lover must obtain the permission of his beloved in order to kiss or touch the beloved (403B). Glaucon's law granting the contrary license to heroes steps over the line that Socrates laid down separating loving temperately and musically from being subject to blame for the way one loves as unmusical and vulgar (403AC). Socrates says that temperance is a certain kind of order and mastery of certain pleasures and desires (430E), and the individual is temperate (sophron) when the reasoning, spirited, and desiring parts of the soul agree that the reasoning part should rule and that the others should raise no faction against it (442C). This is why the temperate man is said to be stronger than himself (430E), since his reason rules
his desires. The law concerning heroes, however, will affect the guardians in the way in which Socrates warns that "an evil nurture" would give license to someone's desire, empowering the desiring part of the soul to overcome the reasoning part so that the individual becomes "weaker than himself" and licentious (431A). Socrates' own discourse confirms Aristotle's claims that the social policies of Republic V would destroy the practice of temperance in sexual relations and would produce conflict rather than unity in the city of the guardians. Aristotle again has produced a peirastic refutation of Socrates' proposals.

In conclusion, Socrates' social system would breed resentment, quarrels, and even hatred, rather than friendship, and so--as Aristotle warns--it would produce disunity, the opposite of what Socrates supposes. The privileges accorded the heroes in the Republic make the scheme rather like an attempt to impose a return to Homeric society upon fourth century Athens. The privileges seem most obviously to be a contradiction that would destroy friendship, and, therefore (by Socrates' reasoning), the unity of the city, because, with the privileges, Socrates seems to legitimize the sort of private cares which he says tear cities apart (462B). Furthermore, the entire system of marriage would seem to undermine the "caring" that Socrates says must exist
between a lover and the beloved, because it necessitates the break-up of every such relationship.

Finally, the marriage laws, the privileges for the heroes, both seem to violate Socrates' definition of moderation and his account of the just man. Socrates says that the just man will have nothing to do with adultery (443A). But a woman who was one man's wife at one festival, will become another man's wife as another festival, not only by the choice of the government, but sometimes perhaps by the choice of the second man, who saw and desired her while he was proving himself the best on a military campaign. In either case the earlier marriage ends under coercion of the government, not by the choice of the bride or bridegroom. The situation is not comparable to: marriage by choice, followed by divorce by choice, and remarriage by choice. A woman in the city of the guardians is granted no choice.

So, under the circumstances that Socrates proposes for the city, in order for a just man to follow Socrates' injunction against adultery (443A), he could not participate in the marriage arrangements of the Republic, and could not utilize his privileges as a hero. As a result, just men would not reproduce as much as unjust men--nullifying, we presume, a goal of the marriage laws. Those guardians who did participate in the marriage arrangements, especially the heroes who utilize their
privileges, would fail to meet a feature of Socrates’ account of the just man, and thus would not seem to be just.

Thus, in Politics II.3-5, Aristotle sketches out some of the difficulties with the sharing of women and children in the Republic. Again, his criticisms are in accord with Socrates’ own statements elsewhere in the dialogue, and show that the proposal would disunite the city, rather than bring its citizens together. His treatment is peirastic. Interestingly, Aristotle says that in the city proposed in Republic V guardian men would lack temperance, because they could exploit the sharing of women for the satisfaction of their own desire.

D. Gender.

Socrates and Glaucon agree on a law that no woman will be permitted to refuse the advances of a man who proves himself best in war on a military campaign (468C). This law shows that women in the city of the Republic would have fewer rights than in the Athens of Socrates’ own time. There a hero could receive a rebuke for his impositions. We may be able to understand why the city proposed by Socrates reduces women to such a state by examining Aristotle’s claim that a fallacy appears early in Republic V in the arguments regarding gender. Aristotle charges that there is a problem in the argument
from the comparison with dogs that is made in Republic V (451D), and which we know runs throughout the discourse on the city of the guardians--appearing as early as Republic II (376A). In Politics II.5, Aristotle says that it is strange (atropon) to argue from comparison (parabole) with beasts that women should follow the same pursuits as men, because beasts do not at all share in household management with each other (1264b4).

Aristotle is saying that the argument is bad because the comparison is bad. In Metaphysics Z.11, he explains why another comparison--of the flesh and bones of an animal to the bronze that may make up a circle--"is not good, because it leads away from the truth" (1036b24).

Aristotle says that the comparison makes one assume that it is possible for the human being to exist without parts, just like the circle without the bronze, but, he explains, the case is not similar, because an animal is something perceptible, and cannot be defined without reference to its motion, and, therefore, without reference to its parts and to their being in a certain state (1036b26). Similarly, Aristotle holds that the comparison which Socrates makes in the Republic between dogs and human beings does not hold because the case to which Socrates attempts to apply it, namely, the practices of the male and female of a species, is not similar for human beings and dogs. Aristotle explains one way that they
differ in the Ethics. He says that procreation is more shared between man and woman than it is between animals. He explains that between other animals the association is just for the moment, but human beings live together not only for the sake of procreation, but also for the things pertaining to life, because, from the start, the tasks are divided, and those of man and woman are different, and so, they help each other, by devoting their individual talents to their common effort (EN 1162a19). Therefore, in the Politics, Aristotle says that Socrates' comparison with dogs does not hold, because beasts do not share in household management (1264b4) as human couples do. In forming a household, man and woman each contribute their individual talents to their common effort; their tasks are different because their talents are peculiar to each of themselves, and, as a result, they complement each other and form a unity, for a unity is formed of elements which differ in kind (Pol. 1261a29). The fact that male and female beasts, however, do not form households shows that the differentiation that exists between them is not comparable to that that exists between man and woman. Therefore, it is wrong to argue from a comparison with beasts that men and women should carry out the same functions, because the cases are not comparable. Indeed, dogs not only do not form households, they do not even
form herds, as the Eleatic Stranger points out in the Statesman (266A).

By revealing that Socrates' comparison is bad, Aristotle illuminates another difficulty in the discourse of the Republic. Stalley says that in making his criticism Aristotle "simply takes for granted what Plato [sic] means to deny, that there must be households and that the domestic duties must be carried out by women." [14] Stalley would do better to follow Aristotle's example and not attribute to Plato what his character Socrates says. Stalley's reading of Aristotle's argument is also superficial, in particular, his reading of the phrase "do not share in household management" (oikonomiasouden metestin), which Stalley degrades to "do not have households to manage." Aristotle's argument is that household management is a species-differentiating activity that distinguishes male and female human beings from male and female beasts in respect of their practices, so that arguments about the practices of male and female human beings based on comparisons to beasts are invalid. Furthermore, Aristotle represents household management as a joint enterprise of woman and man: they share in this enterprise, and in doing so exhibit different talents, and show themselves to be different, and not the same.

Again, as I discuss below, Socrates' discourse outside Republic V is in accord with Aristotle's argument.
The text of the Republic suggests that Socrates does not take the comparison with beasts all that seriously himself, and believes that households are a necessary part of human life. In addition, Socrates' discourse on gender in Republic V contains multiple difficulties, and, does not support the notion that women and men have the same nature.

1) In introducing the comparison of the guardians to dogs, Socrates calls the dog a beast (therion), the name with which he had earlier described the irascible Thrasymachus (336B). He subsequently calls the hater of arguments a beast (411E), and says that the philosopher in a city is like a man who has fallen in with beasts (496D), that the one who wallows in ignorance is like a beast (535E), and that one who subjects the spirited part of the soul to the desiring part subjects it to a beast (590B). So, Socrates compares human beings to beasts when he wants to insult or criticize them. His comparisons of human beings to beasts are negative. This suggests that the comparison he makes between the guardians and beasts in arguing that women should follow the same pursuits as men may be ironic.

2) In discussing the first city, which he calls "healthy" (372E) as opposed to the one which becomes the city of the guardians, Socrates lists housing as the second need of the citizens, after food (369D), and says
that each citizen needs a house (370A), and that the citizens will build houses (372A), beget children and feast with their children (372B)--all of which indicates that they will establish households and share in household management, and that this is right and good.

3) Socrates' discourse over the nature of women and men contains difficulties. Right after arguing that women and men have the same nature because they can both practice the same skills in civil society (454-55A), Socrates asks Glaucon: "Do you know of anything practiced by human beings in which the race of men (to ton andron genos) does not excel that of women (to ton gunaikon) in all these respects?" (455C), or, to translate the idiom literally, "in which the race of men is not different (i.e., superior) (diapherontos echei) than the race of women in all these respects." It is odd that after saying women and men have the same nature, Socrates should say that they belong to different races, or kinds, and that the male race differs from the female in every enterprise.

Furthermore, Socrates' distinctions in regards to women are appropriate for a race kept in subjection, not for one granted equal rights. For Socrates strips woman of her differentia from man and reduces her to a functionary in civil society. It is as a functionary with a skill (techne) in civil society that woman does not differ from man, except that she is weaker (451E, 455E, 456A, 457A)
and does not accomplish any task as well (455C). As a result, she has nothing left to contribute which is uniquely hers, for "there is no practice peculiar to women for the governing of a city" (455B). So, woman is debased and ridiculed: Her role as the mother and educator of future citizens, which is a role the male can never fulfill, is compared to a bitch suckling puppies and is described as less important than the civil functions of the male (451D). Woman is only different from man to the extent that the bald is different from the longhaired (454C), which is less than a carpenter is different from a doctor (454D). Since the race of men excels the race of women in all things (455C), Socrates hands women over to the class of men (458C), and woman tags along in the rear ranks at battle (471D) to satisfy the eros of the male hero (468C).

So, Socrates compares human beings to beasts when he wants to insult them; he builds household management into the city that he calls "healthy;" and the argument he offers that the nature of men and women is the same and therefore should follow the same pursuits is fraught with difficulties. Indeed, that very argument asserts that men and women are of different races or kinds (genos). Furthermore, the notion that man and woman have the same nature contradicts Socrates' earlier statement in Republic II that each human being differs from each other human
being in their nature (370A). This is noted in Republic V (453Bf), but, as shown above, discussion of the contradiction leads to more difficulties not less. If it is true that the natures of men and women are different, as Republic II would suggest, then, by the same argument, the talents of men and women are different—as Aristotle also contends—and, as a result, man and woman complement each other—like the different citizens that Socrates brings together to form a city in Republic II—and so, man and woman form a unity. This unity, Aristotle says, is the household. So, again, Aristotle’s discussion of a difficulty in the discourse of Socrates, namely, the argument by comparison with beasts that men and women should follow the same pursuits, seems to be in agreement with, and make use of, ideas stated by Socrates himself.

Aristotle’s criticisms of what Socrates says elsewhere in the Republic are also relevant to a discussion of the treatment of gender in the dialogue. Socrates assumes in his discourse that the only functions of value in a city are those that meet some physical necessity, whether food, shelter, clothing, or defense, and so he evaluates the roles of women and men by discussing shoemakers, doctors and carpenters (454CD), as if the only functions to be performed in a city are those of an artisan. Later in the Politics, Aristotle challenges this assumption. He says that Socrates designs
the first city of the Republic "as though every city was established for the sake of necessities but not rather for the sake of the good (to kalon)" (1291a17). Aristotle explains that Socrates has omitted the soul of the city in focusing on elements that serve necessary utility. Aristotle makes these remarks in his own discussion of the elements necessary for a city. He says that Socrates should have included military, judicial, and deliberative functions in the elements necessary for a city. Earlier he argues that Socrates' discourse in Republic V on the sharing of women and children excludes a broader range of culture. He says that it is paradoxical that someone who believes so much in education should propose to set the city right with the sharing of women, children and property, rather than with customs, philosophy and laws (1263b37). Aristotle here identifies a broad continuum of cultural phenomena which lay beyond the crafts of the artisans and the military deployments of the guardians, and which Socrates does not consider in his discussion of the practices in which women and men can engage. Perhaps he found no "practice peculiar to women for governing a city" because he had already excluded these areas. Perhaps, he finds that "the race of men excels the race of women in all respects" because he had excluded areas in which women excel men. Aristotle emphasizes in the Ethics that the tasks or functions (erga) of women and men are
different (1162a22). This implies that they excel in different areas. Since the men in the Republic are clearly assigned to the domains of artisanship, and political-military affairs, and Aristotle designates whole realms of cultural matters that lie outside these domains, it seems reasonable to conclude that Aristotle reserves for women important cultural functions, such as in management of the state religion in which they "excel" men in Athens in the classical period. Modernists might consider management of the state religion to be less fulfilling that being a shoemaker, a carpenter, a soldier, or a doctor, but the ancient Greeks did not share such a view. [14a]

Other writers mistake the Republic to be arguing for women's rights while overlooking the problematic passages we have reviewed here, and their insults to women (see, for example, 455B4), and failing to treat the dialogue as a mimetic, rather than expository text. [15] Whether Plato himself supported equality for women is a separate question from evaluating what Socrates says in Republic V, and has been argued on other grounds, i.e., the theory of recollection. [16]

E. Sacrilegious acts and incest.

Another difficulty which Aristotle finds in the proposals for the city of the guardians is that its
citizens would not know who their parents or relations are, and, as a result, cases of assault, murder, fighting or slander would in all likelihood occur between child and parent or among relations, which, he writes, are all sacrilegious acts for which no one could atone because they would be done in ignorance (1262A25). Stalley claims that Plato could deny that such biological relations are of importance, [17] but Socrates says they are important. He says that the just man is noted for his care and concern for his parents (443A). The tyrannic man, however, he says, will seize his parents' property and strike them if they resist him, or for the sake of lovers he may bring into their home (574AC). In addition, he relates in the Myth of Er that those who commit violence against parents and relations receive horrible punishments in the afterlife (615C-616A), and he seeks to ban Hesiod's account of how Cronus took revenge on his father, so that young people will not follow his example (377E-78B). Socrates' statements confirm that Aristotle is correct to say that it would be a difficulty if violence against parents could occur in the city that Socrates outlines in the Republic, and that, consequently, it would be a problem for people not to know who their parents are. Again, in criticizing Socrates' discourse in Republic V, Aristotle makes use of ideas that Socrates expresses elsewhere in the dialogue. Yet, Socrates also says that
the proposed organization of the city would prevent such acts of violence against parents. Socrates argues that shame and fear will restrain a younger man from assaulting an older man in the city, that is, the fear that other men will come to the defense of the one he might attack (465B). So, we might wonder whether there is any basis to Aristotle’s claim that such acts could occur. Upon closer examination, it seems that such violence against parents or other relations is made possible in the city Socrates proposes. For in seeking to eliminate legal suits, Socrates says that it is fine and just for men to take care of their own defense against others of the same age, so that if a man should become angry (thumoito) with someone, by satisfying his anger (thumos) in this way he would be less likely to enter into greater discord (464C).

Though Socrates specifies that this license for expressing one’s anger would be allowed only among "those of the same age," and argues that shame and fear would hinder someone from attacking an older man (465B), it is uncertain whether the diluted social relations of the city would restrain the heroes accorded various privileges (460B, 468C) from taking out their anger on anyone who annoys them. If a 20-year old hero and his 40-year old father both were interested in the same woman, what would actually prevent them from assaulting each other in accordance with Socrates’ dictum on civil disputes while
failing to notice or overlooking their difference in age? It seems rather that Aristotle is being reasonable to consider this a difficulty in Socrates' discourse. Again, he illuminates a difficulty in the discourse of the Republic through a peirastic argument.

In addition, Aristotle argues that ignorance of who one's relations are produces another problem: father and son, or brother and brother could develop "indecent" affection for each other. He argues that while Socrates makes all sons common, it is strange (atopon) that he only forbids male lovers intercourse--because of the intensity of the pleasure--but does not discourage their love, nor any other intimacies, which Aristotle says are the height of indecency (aprepestaton) between father and son or between brothers (1262a32). In Republic IV, however, Socrates says that a lover should treat his beloved like his son, and should cherish, associate with him, and kiss and touch him as though he were his son, and in no other way (403AB), and so Socrates seems to discourage the erotic in such relationships. Yet, subsequently, in Republic V, Glaucon proposes, and Socrates agrees, that they set down as law that if a man who proves himself best on a military campaign should happen to desire someone, whether male or female, they may not refuse his affection so that he would be more eager to carry off the prize of valor (taristeia) (468BC). Here, the prize of valor
includes the license to satisfy passion for another, whether they like it or not. This license breaks the rules for relations between a lover and a beloved which Socrates set down in Republic III, since there a lover must obtain the permission of his beloved (ean peithei) in order to kiss or touch him (403B). So, Glaucon’s law granting such license to heroes steps over the line that Socrates laid down between loving temperately and musically (403A) and being subject to blame for the way one loves as unmusical and vulgar (403C). It is unlikely that such actualization of passion would stop at kissing. Again, Aristotle has illuminated a difficulty in the discourse of the Republic through his peirastic treatment of the text.

We might add that once the city is transformed into an extended family, actual incest also becomes likely, [18] not only between males, but also among all relations. Since everyone that a citizen will meet will be a father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter (463C), any feelings against incest will be weakened by the dilution of family relationships. The policies could "fill the whole land with Oedipoi" (Ar. Eccl. 1042), as young warrior vies with his father for the prize (geras) of marriage to his mother.
F. Property.

Aristotle also finds difficulties with Socrates' proposal to eliminate private property. Aristotle introduces his discussion of property in the Republic by dividing the subject into the use of property and the ownership of property. Holding that property should be owned privately but available for common use, Aristotle finds the following difficulties in public ownership: He argues that elimination of private property 1) would destroy the exercise of the virtue of generosity (eleutheriotes) with one's possessions (1263b7), and, 2) would make life completely impossible (1263b29).

Aristotle explains that without private property, no one will be able to be generous, nor will anyone do a generous deed, because the act of generosity requires the use of possessions (1263b7). This is clearly a problem for the proposal of the city of the guardians since the guardians are supposed to be educated to practice all the virtues. The sharing of property, however, seems to prevent them from practicing generosity. Irwin has suggested that generosity is possible without private property, [19] but the occurrences of eleutheriotes in the Platonic corpus--in the Theaetetus and the Republic--support the view that one needs money to exercise generosity. In the Theaetetus, Theodorus praises Theaetetus for his generosity with his money (144D).
the Republic Socrates lists generosity among the virtues (402C), and says that the lack of generosity (aneleutheria) is accompanied by the love of money (391C), and that the guardians should guard against poverty among the craftsmen since it leads to a lack of generosity (aneleutheria) (422A). [20] So, insofar as the Platonic corpus and, in particular, Socrates in the Republic, speak of generosity, they support Aristotle's view that possessions are necessary for the exercise of generosity and that eliminating private property would destroy its exercise by individuals. Again, Aristotle has identified a difficulty in the Republic with his peirastic treatment of Socrates' discourse.

In addition, Aristotle says that public ownership of property would make life impossible (1263b29) and lead to quarreling, but when responsibilities are divided among people, he says, they don't complain as much against each other, but each assiduously applies themselves to their own business (1263a27). We must consider in what sense would life become "impossible" when property is held in common. Socrates says in Republic V that the only personal possession of guardians will be their own bodies (464D8). Accordingly, I suggest that Aristotle means that if property were held in common it would be difficult or impossible for an individual to practice a specialized function, as Socrates requires each citizen of the city to
do. The arrangement would interfere with and disrupt the need for "the man who does a job to follow close upon the thing done" (370C).

Holding property in common would disrupt the work of the defense force of the guardians, because soldiers need their own horses, armor and weapons: horses tend to be best suited to one rider rather than many; armor is fitted to the individual soldier; the same armor will certainly not fit everyone; a stronger soldier will wear heavier armor and carry a heavier spear. Mustering the army would be a nightmare if each warrior could take each other's weapons and equipment. On the other hand, if some rule were established to separate each soldier's weapons in storage, and protect the weapons of each, and prevent some other soldier from using them, then property would no longer be common, but would be private.

The same sort of problems would arise among artisans if they are supposed to hold property in common in the city, which, as discussed above in section A, is not clear. Supposing that farmers, housebuilders, weavers, shoemakers, carpenters, blacksmiths, sailors and others all held all the gear and tools they use in common: the plows, seed, scythes, sickles, hammers, nails, bricks, mortar, looms, leather, wood, forges, sails, tackle, etc.; these and other such things are what constitute private property in many cases. Under this arrangement, each day
farmers or artisans would have to fetch their tools from the common storage, though they would not belong to them, nor would there be any guarantee that the tools would be there, for if a new artisan had entered the ranks of the existing ones, nothing would prevent the new artisan from seizing the tools used by another if they are held in common. Artisans would be placed in a situation where they would not be able to use and maintain the same tools day in and day out, and would have great difficulty in accomplishing a task (370C).

In short, Aristotle’s objection, that holding property in common would make life impossible, seems in accord with the remarks of Socrates in Republic II that it is best to arrange things so that the one who does a job follows close upon the work done. On the issue of property, Socrates’ proposals in Republic V again seem incompatible with arguments and concepts Socrates expresses elsewhere in the dialogue.

G. The minimum necessary elements for a city.

Aristotle also argues in Politics IV that Socrates’ account in Republic II (369D) of the minimum elements necessary to form a self-sufficient city is inadequate (1291a10). There Socrates proposes that the minimum city would be composed of four individuals—a weaver, a farmer, a shoemaker, and a housebuilder (369D), and shortly
thereafter he adds artisans, herders, merchants, sailors, retailers, and laborers (370D-371D). Aristotle comments that Socrates composes the original city "as though every city was established for the sake of necessities but not rather for the sake of the good (to kalon)" (1291a17). This comment may refer to Socrates' remark in Republic VI that every soul pursues the good and does everything for the sake of it (505D). Aristotle continues: "inasmuch as one would consider the soul to be more a part of an animal than the body, so also the following kinds of things in cities must be considered more a part of them than those which exert themselves toward necessary utility, I mean, the military class, the judicial class, and in addition to these the deliberative class, deliberation being a function of political intelligence" (1291A24). To pursue Aristotle's analogy, if an animal without a soul cannot live, neither can a city without the functions which Aristotle lists. So, Aristotle holds that Socrates omits vital organs from the minimum city.

Aristotle's remarks stand in agreement with what Socrates says elsewhere in the Republic and in the Crito. First, based on what he says in Republic I Socrates would seem to endorse Aristotle's analogy between the soul and the deliberative function of government, since he proposes to Thrasymachus that the functions of the soul include managing (epimeleisthai), ruling (archein), and
deliberating (bouleuesthai) (353D). Second, there is a correspondence between Socrates' division of the soul and Aristotle's division of the city. Just as Aristotle divides a city into: a) deliberative and judicial parts, b) a defense part, and c) farmers, artisans and laborers, Socrates divides the soul into: a) a reasoning part, b) a spirited or courageous part, and c) a desiring part, and proposes that the reasoning part (logistikon) rules the others, and deliberates (441Ef). Third, in discussing the nature of wisdom and deliberation in a city, Socrates specifically says that the crafts which he proposed for the minimum necessary elements of a city possess neither wisdom nor good counsel; he locates the element which deliberates (bouleuesthai) and provides good counsel, outside the crafts, among the guardians (428BD), who also comprise the ruling element (428E), and the courageous, or military element (429E). Fourth, and in accordance with all this, Socrates revises his list of minimum necessary elements later in the Republic, as Aristotle also notes (1291a19). Socrates adds the guardians, or military class, which receives its support in exchange for guarding, managing (epimeleisthai) (543C), and preserving the city (465D). So, Socrates seems to add managing and preserving the city to the elements necessary for a city, for certainly whatever preserves the city is necessary for its existence. Like the farmer, weaver, shoemaker and
housebuilder, the guardian exchanges this service for the necessities provided by the others. So, again, Aristotle's criticisms are in accord with Socrates' own remarks.

Yet, Aristotle says that the military, judicial and deliberative classes are more a part of a city than farmers, artisans, or merchants (1291a24). It needs these additional other classes to achieve the good (1291a17). This view is reflected in the Republic in Socrates' elevation of the guardians to the ruling class of the city. Even so, Aristotle may be speaking also with other dialogues of Plato in mind. Earlier in the Politics, Aristotle states that if a city is formed for the sake of life only (tou zen monon heneka) rather than living well (tou eu zen) then a collection of slaves and of lower animals would be a city, but as it is, it is not a city, because slaves and animals have no share in happiness or in purposive life (1280a31). Though this passage appears in a discussion of oligarchy and democracy, it also speaks to the minimum city of the Republic, which Glaucon fittingly calls a "city of pigs," and where the satisfaction of material needs is the only object in its design and in the selection of its population. It exists only for living, not for living well. Though its citizens are distinguished from pigs with respect to their occupations, in respect to culture, they are not
distinguished from pigs. Therefore, it is not a city. Aristotle could be drawing this argument between mere living and living well from the Crito, where Socrates proposes that they should set the highest value, not on mere living (zen), but on living well (eu zen), which he says is the same as living honorably and justly (48B). This argument is supported by the plot of the Crito (see Chapter 3). Accordingly, when Aristotle says that cities need elements which Socrates does not propose to include in the minimum city in order to achieve the good, he may base his argument on what Socrates says in the Crito as well as what Socrates says in the Republic. Aristotle's comments on the "city of pigs" stand in agreement not only with Socrates' own revision of the necessities required by a city in the Republic, but also with what Socrates is represented to have said in the famous argument in prison with his friend.

H. Discussion.

We have seen that when Aristotle argues that there are difficulties in the proposals of Socrates in the Republic, he is using premises that can actually be found in other remarks of Socrates in the dialogue. Because the premises that Aristotle uses can be found in Socrates' own mouth, we can say that Aristotle's arguments are peirastic, that is, they argue from Socrates' own
statements to their contradiction. At the same time, these same premises have the character of generally accepted beliefs, or, in Greek, endoxa. Let's listen to a few of them again: A city, by its nature, is some sort of plurality. Not only is a city composed of a number of people; it is also composed of different kinds of people. A city is more self-sufficient than an individual or a household. No one could disagree with these premises. Clearly, these premises are generally accepted. So, we can say that Aristotle's arguments can be explained to proceed from endoxa, and therefore are dialectical. So, it seems that we can argue that Aristotle's arguments are dialectical and that Aristotle's arguments are peirastic. Indeed, it is possible that Aristotle believed that he was arguing from endoxa, and, whether he knew it or not, was actually showing internal inconsistencies in the discourse of Socrates. But in chapter 4 of Politics II (at 1263b38; see Section B.4, above), Aristotle himself explicitly points to internal inconsistency in the discourse of Socrates, and argues from this inconsistency. To explain this passage, we have to say that at least in this one case, Aristotle's argument is peirastic, rather than dialectical. So, in one case, we must explain Aristotle's argument as peirastic, but in the other cases discussed above, we can explain his arguments either as peirastic or
dialectical. Therefore, based on economy of interpretation, we can conclude that Aristotle’s treatment of Socrates’ discourse in the Republic is peirastic. Aristotle refutes Socrates with Socrates’ own premises; he uses self-refutation in his treatment of the Republic.

So, Aristotle provides a peirastic refutation of Socrates’ proposals for the sharing of women, children and property. But why should Aristotle bother? Why take a detour from developing his own political thought to slam the Republic’s peculiar proposals that women, children and property be held in common? I believe that Aristotle’s peirastic treatment of the Republic serves another purpose. His discussion of the Republic in Book II of the Politics prepares his listeners for his recommendation later in Book VII that under the best constitution, though property should not be held in common, it should be available for use in common (1329b41). In Book II of the Politics, in the last chapter in which he criticizes Socrates’ proposals for the sharing of women, children and property, Aristotle concludes that it is clear that it is better for property to be private but available for common use (1263a37). He adds that it is the special task of legislators to make citizens disposed to treat property in this way. This conclusion points forward to Book VI of the Politics, where he commends the Tarentines for following this very practice (1320b9), and finally to Book
VII, where he says that "In my view, property ought not to be owned in common, as some have said; rather, it ought to be used in common as befits friends" (1329b41).

So, Aristotle’s treatment of the Republic in Book II of the Politics is protreptic. This is why Politics II does not discuss the Republic as a whole. [21] Aristotle restricts his discussion to those passages of the Republic where Socrates proposes that women, children and property be held in common in the city of the guardians. His approach is to find difficulties and paradoxes in Socrates’ discourse, while expressing sympathy with the proposal that property be available for use in common. As a result, Aristotle’s own proposal that property be private but available for use in common appears to result from the refutation of various aspects of Socrates’ proposals. Aristotle’s treatment of the Republic is both peirastic and protreptic.

Finally, Aristotle’s Politics displays a peculiar type of intertextuality. The text of Plato’s Republic is clearly present in Aristotle’s text: it is present not only in content, as we have seen, but also in form. In using self-refutation against Socrates, the very man whom Plato has made famous for the use of self-refutation against his own interlocutors, Aristotle uses Socrates’ own method of argument against Socrates himself. Many scholars have overlooked this feature of Aristotle’s
discourse on the Republic V. E. Bornemann stated that Aristotle shows only the most cursory acquaintance with the Republic. [2] Our investigation shows rather that Aristotle understood the Republic far better than Bornemann and other scholars have realized.

I. More intertextuality in the Politics: Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae.

For two centuries, scholars have debated whether Republic V parodies Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae, or the Aristophanes play an early edition of the Republic, or whether the works are independent. [22] Adam concludes that "Plato had the Ecclesiazusae and its author in his mind when he wrote that part of the fifth book which deals with the subject of women and children." [23] It is certain that Aristotle was familiar with the Ecclesiazusae and the proposals of its character Praxagora for the sharing of women, children and property in Athens. [24] Since a close relationship has been thought to exist between Republic V and Ecclesiazusae, one might expect to find references to the content of the Aristophanes play in Aristotle's treatment of the Republic.

The texts considered are Republic V.451B-469D and Ecclesiazusae 583-727. In the latter, Praxagora conducts a dialogue with her husband Blepyros on the nature of the government she is establishing in Athens, in which women,
children and property will be held in common. Nearly all the proposals of Ecclesiazuzae 583-727 make it into Republic V, except for a few details. These include: Praxagora's explicit statement that she will make the city into a single household (673-75); and Blepyros' comic warnings that because people won't know who their parents are, sons will strangle all elder men in their effort to strangle their fathers (638-40), or, pretending that all elder men are their fathers, will try to make them their lovers (644-50). Although it can be argued from the text of Republic V that its proposal for the holding of women and children in common would reduce a city to a household (see section A, above), or permit violence or eros among relations (see section D, above), such outcomes are nowhere explicitly stated in the text, not to mention, recommended. Yet, they do appear in the Politics, which suggests that the Ecclesiazuzae may have been one of the texts which Aristotle was contemplating in writing about Socrates' proposal for the sharing of women and children in Politics II.2-5, which group of texts we already know included not only the Republic but also the speech of Aristophanes in the Symposium (1262b9-16), and, as we have argued, the Crito as well (see Section E, above).
a. The city as a household.

In Politics II.2 Aristotle says that if a city becomes more of a unit, it will become a household instead of a city (1261a18), but a household, he adds, is less self-sufficient than a city; therefore, he argues, Socrates' program for unifying a city is undesirable (1261b10). Socrates, however, at no place in the Republic proposes that the city he is discussing be made like a household. He does, of course, say that in the city women and children will be shared in common by the men (457C10), and such an arrangement would suggest that the city would become one big household, but Socrates does not formulate it that way. Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to have such a formulation in mind, and Praxagora provides it in the Ecclesiazusae:

"I say that I will make the city a single household, by breaking down all the walls into one, so that everything is accessible to all" (673-5).

As an example of what she means, she says that she will make the courts and public buildings into public dining halls (676). Bowie comments that in the Ecclesiazusae women assume power "as the model of the oikos is imposed upon the polis." [25] Taaffe writes: "Praxagora chooses to change society by inventing a large oikos in which all women are mothers, wives and lovers... At the end of Ecclesiazusae, Athens is one big oikos with the women in charge, a pleasurable, albeit thought-provoking, comic
utopia." [26] I suggest that Aristotle has the Ecclesiazusae in mind as well as the Republic in writing Politics II.2.

b. Sacrilegious acts and incest.

In Politics II.4, Aristotle writes that because people do not know who their parents or close relatives are, they would be liable to engage in assault, murder, fighting or slander against their own kin, which acts are sacrilegious when committed against one's parents or other relatives (1262a25). Aristotle continues that it is strange that Socrates permits erotic affection between males, which would be liable to occur between son and father or between brothers for the same reason that they will be ignorant of who their relations are (1262a32).

In the Republic, however, Socrates claims that the social system of the city he is proposing provides against younger men assaulting older (465B), and, twice explicitly denounces violence against parents and close relations (574A, 615Cf). Similarly, he provides against a father expressing erotic affection in error towards his son (403AB). No one in the Republic argues that such acts would occur under the sharing of women and children, but characters in the Ecclesiazusae do. Surprisingly, Aristotle's discussion of sacrilegious acts and indecent
affection in Politics II.4 (1262a25-40) follows the text of Ecclesiazusae 635-650 rather closely.

During Praxagora's dialogue on the new regime in Athens, and the sharing of women and children that it will practice, she is asked how will people be able to recognize their children (635). Praxagora says they won't have to, for younger people will consider all older men of the appropriate ages to be their fathers. Blepyros exclaims that in the past a son would knowingly strangle his own father, but now he will strangle each old man out of ignorance for which is his father (638-40). Praxagora answers that bystanders won't permit it, but will come to the older man's defense, fearing that the victim is their own father (641-43). Republic V follows this passage with an important omission: Glauccon asks how will people know their relations (461C), and Socrates answers in the manner of Praxagora (461D), but on the issue of violence against parents, the Republic only contains Praxagora’s explanation of the preventive, not Blepyros' charge that it will occur (465AB). Politics II.4, however, does contain the charge. Next, the Ecclesiazusae goes on to treat indecent affection. Blepyros says Praxagora's answers are good, but what "if Epicouros or Leucolophas should come and call me 'Daddy'" (644-45). Praxagora answers, "what if Aristullos should say you are his father and kiss you!" (647) But she explains that he was born
before the new regime, and so Blepyros need not fear that he will kiss him (649-50). Scholars agree that at least Aristullos and probably also Epicouros and Leucolophas were famous homosexuals. [27] Nothing of this sort appears in the Republic: at no point does Glaucon charge, or Socrates suggest, that the sharing of women and children will encourage affection of this kind. Politics II.4, however, asserts this. Surprisingly, not only does the content of Politics II.4 follow the Ecclesiazusae rather closely, but Politics II.4 also treats the same subjects in the same order as in Ecclesiazusae 635-50. This suggests that in treating the sharing of women and children, Aristotle considered the representations of the proposal in the Ecclesiazusae as well as in the Republic.

J. Conclusion.

In Book II of the Politics, Aristotle discusses the proposals for the sharing of women, children and property expressed by Socrates in Book V of Plato’s Republic in order to motivate the proposal he makes later in the Politics that property be private but available for use in common. Thus, Aristotle’s discourse in Politics II is protreptic. In conducting his discourse, Aristotle shows that there are many "difficulties" and "paradoxes" in the proposals expressed by Socrates in Republic V. By identifying such difficulties and sometimes outright
contradictions, Aristotle conducts a peirastic refutation of the proposals expressed by Socrates. In doing this, Aristotle presents an exegesis of aspects of the aporetic structure of the dialogue (see Chapter 3).

This chapter has argued that the text of Aristotle’s discussion of the Republic in Politics II.2-5 does not exhibit any clear disagreement with Plato. First, Aristotle is always careful to attribute only to the character Socrates the proposals that he criticizes in the dialogue. In doing so, he distinguishes between the thought expressed by the character Socrates and the thought of Plato. Second, Aristotle criticizes the proposals enunciated by Socrates by means of concepts that Socrates expresses elsewhere in the dialogue or in other dialogues, such as the Crito. In doing so, Aristotle analyzes an individual speech of a character (e.g., Socrates) within the larger context of the dialogue as a whole, and so analyzes the thought expressed by the character (dianoia) as a whole within the broader level of discourse of plot. In sum, Aristotle’s discussion of the Republic in the Politics maintains the same distinctions in level of discourse as Chapter 3 proposes should be followed in interpreting Socratic dialogue.

These results do not mean that the thought of the character Socrates is contradictory or incoherent. As discussed in previous chapters, the fact that Socrates
proposes an argument does not mean that he agrees with it. Indeed, the very nature of his role of 'midwife' of the thought of others brings him to propose and articulate arguments with which his interlocutors agree, but with which he disagrees (see Chapter 3).

Finally, this chapter argues that there is evidence that Aristotle included Aristophanes’ Ecclesiazusae among the texts that he considered in writing his criticisms of the proposal for the sharing of women, children and property.

Regarding the Republic, this chapter’s treatment of Aristotle’s text reaches the following results:

1) Aristotle argues that Socrates’ assumption that the greatest possible unity of the whole city is the supreme good contradicts the need—stated by Socrates in Republic II—for a city to be composed of a plurality of different kinds of people so that the city will be self-sufficient.

2) Aristotle’s argument that friendship would be weaker when women and children are held in common is in accord with Socrates’ statements on love and friendship. Aristotle’s warning that the sharing of women and children would create disunity and produce sexual intemperance is in accord with Socrates’ own remarks on sexuality and temperance.
3) Aristotle’s rejection of Socrates’ comparison of human beings and beasts to argue that women and men should practice the same things accords with Socrates’ other remarks on beasts in the Republic. In addition, like Aristotle, Socrates seems to consider households necessary elsewhere in the dialogue. Moreover, Socrates’ proposal that women and men practice the same things contains difficulties. In particular, it seems to deprive women of rights and status, and deny them opportunities in which they may excel men.

4) Aristotle argues that another difficulty in the sharing of women and children is that since people will not know who their relatives are there could be instances of violence against parents and other relations or of incestuous affection. Although Socrates opposes such acts, the social policies he proposes for the city would seem to allow them to occur.

5) Aristotle’s claim that the elimination of private property would destroy the exercise of generosity is consistent with the entire Platonic corpus, especially with the remarks of Socrates in the Republic. His claim that the sharing of property would make life impossible seems in part based on the notion that private property is required to carry out any specialized function, which Socrates requires each citizen of the city to do.
6) Aristotle's argument that the minimum necessary components of city outlined by Socrates in Republic II is inadequate is consistent with Socrates' own revision of the list of necessary components for a city later in the Republic as well as with Socrates' remarks in the Crito.

NOTES

* The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy has accepted a paper composed of sections A, B, C, F, and H of this chapter for presentation on the Society's panel at the January 1999 meeting of American Philological Association in Washington, D.C.


8. Or, at least would reduce the class of guardians to a single household. In Politics II.5, Aristotle contends that Socrates is unclear whether the mass of other citizens apart from the guardians will participate in the sharing of women, children and property (1264a11). Recent scholarship has supported Aristotle's view that Socrates is unclear about the life of the farming class. Mayhew ("Aristotle on the Extent of the Communism in Plato's Republic," Ancient Philosophy 13, 1993, 313-321) argues that Socrates' discourse calls for at least a moderate form of the sharing of women, children and property for the farmers and other
workers. He points out that the myth of metals (415A, 423C) requires some form of state control over the women and children of the farming class to permit the guardians to inspect offspring at some point early in life, and transfer them between classes. Mayhew also points out that Socrates calls for state control over the property of the farmers and other workers since the guardians are to guard against the development of both wealth and poverty in the lower class (421DE). Mayhew and Stalley, op. cit., 1991 both argue that the logic of Socrates' argument in Republic V (462A) is that all citizens should share as much as possible. Stalley asks: 'If the lowest class does not partake in the communal arrangements how can the city as a whole be a unity?' But if they do share in them, he says that "much of the distinction between the classes would disappear."

9. Susemihl and Hicks, op. cit., 215.

10. Stalley, op. cit., 1991, p. 187 recognizes that this would be the result of Socrates' social prescriptions, but fails to recognize that Aristotle's criticisms agree with Socrates' remarks elsewhere in Republic.

12. I have modernized the translation, which would read literally, "the practice of temperance with respect to wives, for it is a good act to refrain from the wife of another" etc.

In addition, it is useful to note that the word gune which is translated here as "spouse" or "wife" is the same word which Socrates uses in proposing the sharing of "women." This is not an ambiguity, since an adult female in ancient Athens was, generally speaking, either a virgin (parthenos) or sexually experienced and married (gune). As Simon Goldhill writes, "In the word gune, it is difficult to separate the senses of 'woman' and 'wife'" ("The Great Dionysia and civic ideology," in J. Winkler and F. Zeitlin, eds., Nothing to Do with Dionysos?, Princeton, 1990, p. 107). So when Socrates talks about the sharing of women, he is talking about the sharing of wives, or spouses.


17. Barker and Stalley, op. cit., 335.


20. In addition, the unauthentic Definitions says that generosity is a habit with respect to one's dealings with one's property (412D).


CHAPTER 5

PLOT, CHARACTER, AND CATHARSIS IN THE REPUBLIC

The previous chapter has shown that Aristotle’s treatment of the Republic is consistent with a mimetic interpretation of that dialogue. Aristotle criticizes the discourse of Socrates in the Republic, and identifies inconsistencies and contradictions in that discourse. He does not attribute the statements of Socrates to Plato. In fact, he does not even mention Plato’s name while criticizing the discourse of Socrates. Since Aristotle does not attribute the statements of Socrates to Plato, it seems reasonable to hold that he does not regard the statements of Socrates in the Republic to be the aim (telos) of the dialogue. Furthermore, in the Poetics, Aristotle classifies Socratic dialogues within a genre of mimesis. Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate what aim an Aristotelian-mimetic analysis of the Republic would assign to the dialogue.

This chapter presents a partial report on the author’s investigations into the Republic. The discussion
here narrowly focuses on the overall plot of the dialogue, on the character of Glaucon--Socrates' principal interlocutor--and on whether there is evidence in the dialogue that Socrates induces catharsis in Glaucon. Neglected are many of the arguments that Socrates conducts with his interlocutors, some of which receive partial treatment elsewhere in this dissertation, i.e., the discourses on the sharing of property and of women and children (416-423, 449-468); the discourses on justice, the soul, and the just man (427-444); the discourses on poetry and mimesis (376-400, 595-608); the divided line (509-511); the allegory of the cave (514-520). The author plans to deal with these matters elsewhere. [1]

A. The Plot of the Republic.

In order to identify the aim (telos) of the discourse of the Republic, let us first set out the plot of the dialogue, for as we saw in Chapter 2, according to Aristotle, the aim of dramatic mimesis is a catharsis induced by the action, i.e., by the plot (see Chapter 2).

In the Poetics, Aristotle writes that a poet should set out his stories (logoi) in a universal form (katholou), and only then extend them through the development of episodes (55a34). For Aristotle, a story or plot in universal form contains: 1) an account of the binding of the mimesis, and 2) an account of the lysis,
including the principal recognition and reversal (see Chapter 2, Section C). Accordingly, before I present a description of the plot in universal form for the Republic, I first describe these parts in the dialogue.

In Chapter 3, the binding of a Socratic dialogue was defined as the dialogue from its beginning up to the point at which the ethical or philosophical dilemma that the dialogue attempts to solve has been completely presented (see Chapter 3, section G). For example, in the Euthyphro, the binding poses the question: Does Euthyphro know what the holy is? In the Crito, the binding poses the question: Should Socrates escape from prison?

The remainder of a Socratic dialogue is its lysis, which resolves the binding. In Socratic dialogue, the Platonic and Aristotelian meanings of lysis as "releasing" and "refutation" seem rather appropriate (see Chapter 2, section C). Indeed, the Eleatic stranger explains that when elenctic examiners refute their subjects, the subjects are released from their inflated and rigid beliefs (Soph. 230B) (see Chapter 2, section B). So, in the lysis of the Euthyphro, Socrates refutes Euthyphro's definitions of the holy. In the Crito, Socrates refutes Crito's arguments that he should escape from prison.

The main elements of the lysis are the principal reversal and recognition of the dialogue. These are the recognition and reversal that solve the binding.
Recognition, writes Aristotle, is a change from ignorance to knowledge of the persons involved in a tragedy or epic. Recognition can be of who someone is, as in the Odyssey or the Iphigenia, or it can be simply of a fact, or an object, or an action (52a29) (see Chapter 2, section C). In Socratic dialogue, the principal recognition is an answer to the philosophical and ethical problem that constitutes the binding (see Chapter 3, section G). Euthyphro recognizes that Socrates has refuted all of his definitions of the holy. This recognition solves the binding and is the principal reversal of the dialogue. Crito concedes that he has nothing to say in response to the arguments of the Laws.

Accordingly, I say that the parts of the Republic necessary to set out its plot in a universal form are as follows.

1) The binding, or problem, of the Republic is the problem posed by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II of the dialogue: Which man is happier--the just man who is stripped of everything but justice, or the unjust man who nonetheless possesses every worldly good and honor? (361BD) The brothers wonder whether justice is an intrinsic good, or only a social fiction, the reputation for which is a means to secure power and wealth. (This is discussed further in the following section.) [2] They propose that this question be the focus of discussion.

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while presenting an elaborate argument in behalf of pursuing a life of injustice. They make clear that their question concerns prudence, i.e., it is ethical and practical. As Adeimantus warns, "if we are going to be happy, we must go where the tracks of the argument takes us" (365D), i.e., toward a life of either justice or injustice.

Whether Socrates does or does not have an answer to this question when it is posed in Republic II is not relevant to an account of the binding, since it is Glaucon and Adeimantus' question and they say they don't have an answer. The problem for Socrates is to convince them that the just man is intrinsically happier than the unjust man.

Whether Socrates already has an opinion, or is himself just, might contribute to the formulation of an answer but does not affect the kind of summary of the binding required for a story in universal form. [3]

In response to their question, Socrates first declares that he is at a loss as to how to defend justice, but finally proposes that they first study justice and injustice in cities, and then in individuals, "by considering the likeness (homoioites) of the larger [i.e., the city] in the nature of the smaller" [i.e., the individual] (369A).

2) As this discussion draws to an end in Republic IX, Glaucon answers the question which he and Adeimantus
had posed in Republic II, and so solves the binding of the dialogue. Socrates tells Glaucon to decide (krine) who is happiest of the persons they have studied--the kingly, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic or the tyrannic. Glaucon says that the decision (krisis) is easy. He says that the happiest is the one who is most just, and the most miserable the one who is most unjust (580BC). With this decision, Glaucon solves the binding of the dialogue: he expresses recognition that the just are happier than the unjust: his doubt regarding that question had constituted the binding. This is the principal reversal of the dialogue: the doubt which Glaucon expresses at the beginning of Republic II is resolved; his thought (dianoia) changes; he is released (lysis) from the argument for injustice.

Accordingly, following Aristotle, I describe the plot of the Republic:

"After some people meet and discuss the nature of justice, someone makes an argument for injustice, and asks: Which man is the happiest--the just man who has nothing but justice or the unjust man who has every material and political advantage including a reputation for justice? He says that if we are going to be happy, we must go where the argument leads us, i.e., towards lives of justice or injustice. Someone else proposes that they study justice and injustice in cities as a model for justice and injustice in individuals. After such discussion, the first person decides that the just man is the happiest man, no matter how little he possesses, and that the unjust man is the most miserable, no matter how much he commands. He is saved from pursuing injustice."
In this summary, I have collapsed the persons of Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus into a single person, since with minor differences they argue the same thing and names are not yet assigned, and since differences in character are, in Aristotle's model, episodic. In the summary, I outline the binding and the solution, which includes the principal recognition of the Republic that leads to the character's deliverance from the argument for injustice. Notice that the summary does not describe the specific way that Socrates convinces Glaucon that the just man is the happiest. Following Aristotle, I consider this episodic. As in Aristotle's summary of the Odyssey (see Chapter 2, section C), it is only important that the reversal and recognition occur, not the specific circumstances that bring this about. So, the summary refers to the discourse on the city of guardians in only general terms.

To continue my investigation of the aim of the Republic and of the universal in the dialogue, I consider how and whether the dialogue induces catharsis in a participant or a listener. Aristotle says that tragedy accomplishes through pity and fear the catharsis of such emotions (Poet. 49a27), and he writes that fear is for someone who is like the listeners of mimesis (53a4). Since the persons represented in mimesis are of a certain sort with respect to thought and states of character.
(49b36), the resemblance between the listeners and them must be in thought and/or states of character. So, catharsis has to do with the thought and states of character represented by figures of a drama. In Chapter 3, we saw that it is Socrates' interlocutors who are more like Plato's listeners in states of character and in thought than is Socrates (see Chapter 3, section J). Indeed, Socrates himself says in the Republic that the quiet and prudent character is alien to theater-goers. Therefore, in order to discuss whether catharsis can help us understand the Republic, I first discuss whether the text of the Republic represents Socrates' interlocutors as having states of character, what those states of character might be, and whether and how they are relevant to understanding the resolution of the philosophical problem of the dialogue.

Chapter 3 has already discussed the character of Thrasymachus and the catharsis which he experiences in Republic I (see Chapter 3, section I.3). It is Glaucon, however, who is the central interlocutor to Socrates in the dialogue: in Book II, he proposes the philosophical problem that occupies the remainder of the dialogue; later, in Republic IX, Glaucon states the solution to the problem he had proposed. Since Glaucon is such an important figure in the dialogue, it is reasonable to focus our investigation of character in the Republic on
his and see whether and how Glaucon's states of character are depicted in the Republic, what they are, and how they are relevant to the dialogue as a whole.

B. Glaucon's states of character.

Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that Socratic dialogues depict states of character (1417a21). In the Poetics, he says that if a speech or action makes clear some choice or decision, whatever it may be, the speech or action will exhibit character (54a17). In Socratic dialogue, decision occurs as the decision to say something—whether to make an argument, or to agree or disagree with someone, or to interrupt someone. In defining character in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle says that character concerns whether and how one is subject to emotions (pathē), such as anger, fear, shame, and desire (EE 1220b5f.). So, interlocutors in Socratic dialogue display character when they decide to say or do something under the influence of some emotion. As we will see, Glaucon is particularly subject to desires and shame, and these emotions influence his decision-making in the dialogue. Glaucon's states of character are represented in the speech of Socrates and Adeimantus, and in Glaucon's own actions.
1) Socrates calls Glaucón "erotic."

In Republic V, Glaucón says that he needs to be reminded why someone who loves something must show love for all of it, and not just for a part. Socrates replies:

"That was fitting for someone else to say, Glaucón. It’s not proper for an erotic man to forget that all boys in the bloom of youth in someway or other sting and arouse the man who is a lover of boys and erotic. All seem worthy of attention and of being embraced. Or, isn’t that the way you all act towards the fair?" (474D)

In his reply, Glaucón accepts the description of himself as "erotic."

In this passage, Socrates separates himself from those who are erotic in the way Glaucón is. He speaks of them in the second person plural, not the first. Later, he expresses his view of eroticism clearly, when he says that "A man becomes tyrannic in the precise sense, whenever by nature or practices or both he becomes drunken, erotic and melancholic" (573C). Glaucón clearly is represented as subject to erotic desires.

2) Adeimantus and Socrates agree that Glaucón is a lover of victory.

In Republic VIII when Socrates and Glaucón discuss the decline of the city of the guardians to timocracy (547-48), Socrates asks Glaucón, "Who is the man in accordance with this constitution?" (548D). Glaucón falls silent, but Adeimantus answers. "I suppose," he says, "he
is close to Glaucon here and exerts himself out of love of victory." Socrates agrees that in respect of the love of victory Glaucon and the timocratic man are similar, though in other respects they are different. Glaucon does not object to Adeimantus' and Socrates' remarks. This passage makes it clear that Glaucon, at least in the opinion of Socrates and Adeimantus, is spirited and subject to a desire for honor. So, at least in the opinion of Socrates, Glaucon is subject to erotic desires and a desire for honor.

Aristotle says that the persons represented exhibit their character in their speech or actions, in so far as their speech or actions make clear some choice or decision (54a17). Socrates' and Adeimantus' remarks on Glaucon's states of character are important, and illustrate Aristotle's definition of character in the Ethics. The exhibition of character in mimesis, however, is not just by report of other parties but more dramatically through the actions and speech of the figures themselves. So, we should consider whether Glaucon's own actions exhibit character.

3) Glaucon exhibits a desire for luxury.

In Republic II, Socrates is finishing his description of life in the city with the minimum necessary elements, and has asked his interlocutors where in the
city would justice and injustice be. But Glaucon decides to interrupt Socrates. Glaucon interrupts to object to the diet that Socrates assigns the citizens of the city. He first says that Socrates makes his citizens eat without opson, which means seasonings, relish, and delicacies. So, Socrates proposes to give the citizens salt, olives, cheese, onions and greens. For desserts he gives them figs, berries and acorns (372C). But these are not the sort of opsa that Glaucon had in mind. He objects that Socrates proposes a diet fit for "a city of pigs." Socrates asks him what the diet should be. Glaucon says it should be as customary in Athens:

"I think that if they are not going to be wretched, they should recline on couches, and from tables dine on both the sort of opsa that people have now, and also desserts" (372D).

So, Glaucon demands a diet more refined than what Socrates proposes for the citizens of the city with the minimum necessary elements. Socrates replies:

"O.K. I understand. We should examine not only how a city comes to be, but also a luxurious (truphon) city" (372E).

Glaucon's action in interrupting Socrates, and speaking as he does, is primafacie evidence that he is subject to a desire for luxury. Later, Socrates calls "unnecessary" a desire for foods that go beyond the simple foods he proposes for the city with the minimum necessary elements (559B). [4]
The above passages show that Glaucon is subject to erotic desire, desire for luxury and desire for honor. These states of character are important for understanding Glaucon’s actions in the dialogue. Notably, Glaucon says in Republic II that the unjust man obtains the objects of these same desires, according to those who argue for injustice. Glaucon says that the unjust man marries whomever he wishes (362B3). So, the unjust man obtains the object of erotic desires. Glaucon also says that the unjust man is wealthy (362B7). So, he can obtain luxury. Glaucon says that the unjust man rules in the city (362B2) and enters contests and prevails over his enemies (362B5).

So, the unjust man obtains honor. So, the Republic represents Glaucon as having desires, the objects of which he says the unjust man actually obtains, according to those who argue for injustice. Although he says that the argument for injustice is not his, his states of character show that he desires the objects of the life it advocates.

Glaucon precedes the argument for injustice with a preface, in which he divides goods into three classes: [5]

A) those that we like to have not because we desire their consequences, but welcome for their own sake;

B) those that we like both for their own sake and for their consequences; and

C) those that we choose not for themselves, because they are painful, but for their wages and consequences.
Glaucan then asks Socrates in which category justice belongs. Socrates answers that justice is the sort of thing that someone should like both for itself and for its consequences, and thereby places it in category B. Glaucan responds by stating that most people place it in category C. Glaucan continues his preface by dissociating the qualities of being just or unjust from their consequences. About justice and injustice, he says:

"I desire to hear what power each has in itself when it dwells in the soul, dismissing the wages and the consequences of each" (358B4).

Glaucan distinguishes between justice as an intrinsic good for the soul and justice as an instrumental good, how the reputation for justice can serve as a means to obtain the satisfaction of desires. By asking to hear how justice and injustice each affect the soul by themselves, apart from their benefits and consequences, Glaucan separates the study of justice and injustice from the objects of the desires which the Republic represents himself as having. He explicitly asks to study the just man stripped of everything but justice (361C3), i.e., stripped of the objects of his own, Glaucan’s, desires. The purpose of this is as follows. Glaucan is not sure whether justice belongs to the second category or the third, those things that are not beneficial in themselves, but only for their consequences, i.e., Glaucan is not sure whether justice is an intrinsic good. [6] In addition,
Thrasymachus has made him doubt whether it is not really the unjust man who only achieves the ends which Glaucon seeks, rather than the just man. This doubt is what Glaucon is expressing in reproducing the argument for injustice. If justice is not an intrinsic good, and all the benefits go to the unjust, what is the point of being just? So, Glaucon is tied in knots. He tells Socrates, "I am at a loss, since I have been talked deaf from hearing Thrasymachus and countless others" (358C7). Glaucon is so much under the influence of the argument for injustice that he even thinks that he might change Socrates' own mind about the category to which justice belongs. After Socrates places justice in category B, Glaucon says: "Come now. Hear me too, and see if you have the same opinion" (358B1). [7]

So, Glaucon, not sure whether justice is an intrinsic good, adopts the argument for injustice, which holds that justice belongs in category C, not category B. If justice belongs in category C, and justice and injustice are in themselves of no consequence for the soul, then someone could live an unjust life while developing a reputation for justice, and enjoy the benefits of both injustice and justice, and the satisfaction of his desires, without the pain of actually being just--since, as those who argue for injustice say, it is the unjust man who "practices something that clings
to truth" (362A5). But if injustice in the soul makes one wretched, but justice makes one happy, then justice belongs in category B, and the argument for injustice is refuted. This conflict of contrary arguments is Glaucon's philosophical and ethical dilemma and is the problem of the Republic. This is why Glaucon is at a loss. He presently thinks that the principal reason to be just may be to receive certain benefits which he now supposes only the unjust life may attain. If he were not subject to desires for those benefits, as the Republic represents him, if he did not have those states of character, he would be personally indifferent to whether the fulfillment of those desires came with being just, and he would not be in an ethical dilemma, and he would not have decided under the influence of those desires to reproduce the argument for injustice. Perhaps someone else who does not have the same states of character as Glaucon, and who is not subject to the same desires in the same way, and who therefore is not Glaucon, would raise an argument for injustice for other reasons (e.g., Callicles in the Gorgias). But that case does not occur in the Republic.

Glaucon's dilemma bears a certain similarity to that of someone who believes that the reason to be just is so that one can experience rewards in an afterlife, but then comes to doubt that such an afterlife exists. Many people are subject to the kind of desires that Glaucon is, and as
a result, many people may share Glaucon’s dilemma. But that does not make the dilemma any less Glaucon’s, nor any less important. Rather, it makes it universal; his speech and actions are the kinds of things that a certain type of person happens to say or do, in accordance with probability or necessity (Aris. Poet. 51b8). Socrates’ task is to convince Glaucon that justice is an intrinsic good, and that if he arranges his life in order to satisfy the desires which the Republic represents him as having, and so yields to those desires, he will be wretched; so instead he should subordinate his desires to reason and not allow them to determine his decision making. Socrates has to convince him that it is rewarding enough only to be just, without receiving any benefits.

4) Glaucon exhibits a desire for wisdom.

To Glaucon’s credit, by dissociating the study of justice and injustice from their consequences, i.e., from the objects of his own desires, Glaucon displays some awareness of the way that his desires influence his thought processes, and so he wants to leave their satisfaction out of the discussion.

"I’ve yet to hear from anyone," he says, "the argument for justice, that it is better than injustice, in the way I want. I want to hear it praised by itself" (358C8), i.e., without references to its alleged benefits and consequences. In this way, he shows that although he has
erotic desires, and desires for luxury and honor, he also has a desire for wisdom. We will see that later in the Republic Socrates appeals to Glaucon’s desire for wisdom in order to move him to control his other desires.

5) Glaucon seems to exhibit shame.

When Socrates asks Glaucon in Republic VIII what kind of person corresponds to timocracy, Glaucon, who has served as Socrates’ respondent since Republic VI, but who loves honor, falls silent. We don’t know how long a silence follows Socrates’ question before anyone breaks the silence. All we know is that it is Adeimantus who finally answers Socrates and who says that the timocratic man is like Glaucon. Socrates agrees. So, Glaucon falls silent when the subject of the discourse turns to someone whom Glaucon resembles in character. He remains silent until Socrates has finished discussing all inferior character-types of the inferior states, who each share with Glaucon a particular state of character. Like Glaucon, the oligarchic youth is subject to desires for luxury (556B). Like Glaucon, the tyrannic youth is erotic (572Ef). Like Glaucon, the democratic youth is simultaneously subject to desires for honor, gain and wisdom (559B).
I interpret Glaucon’s silence and withdrawal from the argument as signs of an arousal of emotion in his soul, of shame over the turn of the conversation towards the timocrat and others who share one of his own states of character. The text satisfies Aristotle’s conditions for the representation of a state of character: Glaucon, who has been discoursing continuously with Socrates since Book VI, acts; he decides not to answer after he had been answering alone for quite a long time. Such a decision, says Aristotle, exhibits character. It is our responsibility to explain why he does not answer. The only explanation the text offers for Glaucon’s withdrawal from the discourse appears to be the turn of the conversation towards someone who resembles himself. Now, Aristotle says that listeners feel fear concerning someone who is like themselves (53a4). So, it is consistent with Plato’s text to say that some kind of fear moves Glaucon to withdraw as Socrates’ respondent. Fear is an expectation of pain (Laws 644D). In this case, since no physical suffering is involved, the fear would be a fear of disgrace (e.g., from refutation), namely, the fear we call shame (EN 1268b11; Laws 646E10f). Glaucon seems to be ashamed to admit that the sort of man who is characteristic of the decline of the city of the guardians to timocracy resembles himself.
Perhaps I have not proven to every reader's satisfaction that Glaucon withdraws from the discourse out of shame. Nonetheless, it is a credible and likely explanation for why he withdraws from the discourse, and one supported by the text. Furthermore, the discourse of the Eleatic stranger in the Sophist and the many instances of the arousal of shame in Socratic dialogue discussed in earlier chapters (Chapter 1, section D; Chapter 3, section F) show that the arousal of shame in an interlocutor is a dramatic effect (ergon) characteristic of Socratic dialogue.

Prior to the composition of the Republic, silence had already been established within 5th century Greek literature as a means by which a poet could indicate a character's emotional reaction to an event. For example, in Sophocles' Antigone, after the messenger informs Queen Eurydice of how her son died, she withdraws in silence back into the house. The chorus and the messenger are left wondering about her. Finally, the messenger enters the house to investigate. Two scenes later, after Creon has brought the body of their son before the house, the Messenger emerges from the house to announce that the Queen has committed suicide. Thus, Eurydice's silence was a "heavy weight" (Antig. 1256), the Messenger had guessed, by which she concealed her angry heart (1254). Similarly, I interpret Glaucon's silence at Republic 548D as a sign
of shame, i.e., a fear of disgrace, over the turn of the discussion to a subject who resembles himself in character.

In sum, our investigation of states of character in the Republic has indicated that the text of the dialogue represents Glaucon, Socrates' principal interlocutor, as someone subject to erotic desire, and desires for luxury, honor, and wisdom. In addition, it is reasonable to conclude that Glaucon is also subject to shame. In so far as Glaucon desires luxury in dining and is erotic, he is a lover of gain, for lovers of gain pursue their desires for eating, drinking, sex and money (580E). Glaucon is also, as we have noted, a lover of victory and honor and a lover of wisdom. So, Glaucon is a lover of gain, a lover of honor, and a lover of wisdom. Late in the Republic, Socrates defines each of these as an individual in whom one of the three parts of the soul dominates (581C). But Glaucon is all three of these; he permits each part of his soul to dominate, though perhaps at different times. He establishes a certain equality among the parts of his soul.

The youthful listener of the Republic can identify with Glaucon. Glaucon's states of character are rather common among youths: desires for luxury and honor, an interest in sex, and also an interest in ideas are common to many of them. As Aristotle writes, youths live by their feelings and pursue whatever is pleasant to
themselves; they are erotic (EN 1156a32), and they do not find it pleasant to live temperately (EN 1179b33).

The Role of Adeimantus

Our source that Glaucon is a lover of victory, like the timocrat, is an answer which Adeimantus gives to a question that Socrates addresses to Glaucon. Socrates asks Glaucon, what sort of man is in accordance with timocracy (548D). Glaucon falls silent, but Adeimantus answers. "I suppose," he says, "he is close to Glaucon here and exerts himself out of love of victory."

Adeimantus functions here as a commentator on Glaucon's character. Earlier, in Republic II, he is even represented as speaking for Glaucon. After Glaucon finishes his version of the argument for injustice, Adeimantus insists that "what especially needed to be said has not been said" (362D). Socrates replies: "Let a brother stand by his brother, so that if he has left anything out, you come to his defense." Adeimantus adds that he makes his speech "so that it is clearer what Glaucon, in my opinion, wants" (362E4). Throughout all this, Glaucon does not object to Adeimantus acting as his spokesman. Adeimantus is clearly represented as completing Glaucon's argument.

Adeimantus first discusses the argument which praises justice and blames injustice. He says that
fathers and other guardians of youths exhort them to be just, but don’t praise justice itself, but only the consequences of the good reputations that come from it. Then Adeimantus summarizes the discourse of the poets who chant that temperance and justice are fair, but difficult and painful, while intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire (364A1). They say that unjust men need not fear the gods, since the unjust man can always placate the gods and appease their wrath with sacrifices and vows, so that he need not suffer in the underworld as a result of his unjust acts (364). Since the poets are the source of our knowledge of the gods, what they say about these matters must be true (365E1, 366A6).

Adeimantus asks:

"With all these many sorts of things being said about virtue and vice and how men and gods honor them, how do we suppose they affect the souls of the young men who hear them—especially those who have good natures and are capable, as it were, to fly to all the things said and conclude from them what sort of man one should be and how one should go through life so that one passes through it best?" (365A4)

Adeimantus answers his own question:

"In all probability such a young man would say to himself, as in Pindar, Should I ‘climb the high wall with justice, or with crooked deceits,’ and fence myself around and live out my life in that way? For what is said indicates that there is no advantage for me to be just, unless I also seem so, while the hardships and penalties involved are evident. But for one who is unjust but has the reputation of justice, life is said to be divine. Therefore, since the seeming overpowers even the truth (as the wise men tell me) and is the master of happiness, one must turn wholly to that. So, I must draw a
shadow painting of virtue all about myself as a facade and pretense" (365B1).

And then comes the very important conclusion:

"If we are going to be happy, we must go where the tracks of the argument takes us" (365D1).

Adeimantus' speech spells out how Glaucon and he believe that the argument for injustice pertains to the exercise of prudence, i.e., deliberation over what is good and beneficial for oneself (EN 1140a25). The argument if unrefuted calls upon the listener to pursue injustice. Socrates later agrees with this when he says that the point of the discourse of the Republic is whether they are convinced by Thrasymachus and so pursue injustice, or by the argument they are producing and pursue justice (545A).

Adeimantus' speech concerns the appeal of the argument of injustice to youths, such as Glaucon, who are facing ethical choices. Socrates will respond to this focus later in the Republic.

C. Evidence for Catharsis in the Republic

Now that I have discussed the states of character of Glaucon, I will next discuss whether and how he undergoes catharsis in the Republic.

Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of this dissertation discuss catharsis. Chapter 2 traced the development of the concept of catharsis from Plato's seminal treatment of the
concept in the Sophist and the Republic to the more condensed statements in Aristotle’s Poetics and Politics. I have applied the Eleatic stranger’s treatment in the Sophist to develop models of the catharsis of an interlocutor in Socratic dialogue (Chapter 2, Section B, Model I), the catharsis of a figure in tragedy (Chapter 2, Section B, Model II), and I have interpreted Socrates’ representation of the arousal of emotion in the listeners of mimesis in Republic X to explicate Aristotle’s concept of tragic catharsis (Chapter 2, Section B, Model III).

In addition, we have seen that Plato represents interlocutors of Socratic dialogue both as participants, e.g., Socrates’ respondent, and as forming an audience. So, in considering catharsis in Socratic dialogue, we can consider the catharsis of Socrates’ respondent interlocutor, the catharsis of the listener interlocutor, and the catharsis of the listener reader. (Examples of catharsis of Socrates’ respondent are discussed in Chapter 1, section F; Chapter 2, section B; and Chapter 3, section I.)

Finally, Chapter 3 argued that the evidence that a listener would feel pity for a subject lies not in the speech or actions of the listener, but in whether the misfortune suffered by the subject is due to wickedness. The chapter also argued that the evidence that a listener would feel fear lies not in the speech or actions of the
listener but in whether the thought and/or character of
the subject suffering misfortune is similar to that of the
listener. The chapter noted that for listeners who are
interlocutors we may even have evidence of what their
thought and states of character are. We have just
discussed at length Glaucon’s states of character and to
some degree his thought. Accordingly, I now turn to
whether and how Socrates induces Glaucon to undergo catharsis.

Earlier in this chapter, we argued that in the
Republic Glaucon undergoes a change in thought, and
resolves his doubts, as to who is happier, the just man or
the unjust man, and that this recognition by Glaucon is
the principal reversal of the mimesis of the Republic. In
this section, I will discuss evidence that in the Republic
Glaucon experiences a catharsis of pity and fear as a
result of listening to Socrates’ accounts of subjects who
suffer misfortune, and that this catharsis releases
Glaucon from his doubts and facilitates his recognition.
It is first necessary to summarize the preparatory
discourse, which introduces the lysis of the Republic.

After Glaucon asks to investigate which man is
happier--the just man who is stripped of everything but
justice, or the unjust man who possesses every worldly
good and honor-- Socrates proposes that they study justice
and injustice first in cities, and then in individuals,
"by considering the likeness (homoiotes) of the larger

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[i.e., the city] in the nature of the smaller" [i.e., the individual] (369A). The subsequent discourse outlines the features of the city of the guardians. Socrates then announces that it is time to search for justice in the city they have described (427D). He proposes that wisdom in the city resides in the perfect guardians who rule (428E), courage in the auxiliary guardians who defend the city (429Bf), but that temperance doesn’t reside in any one part, but stretches through the whole of the city as a kind of harmony (431E). Socrates then proposes that justice subsists in each class minding its own business, and not meddling in the business of the others, and that injustice subsists in meddling among the classes (433E). Next Socrates says that now that they have identified where justice is in 'the larger'--the city, it is now time to see where it is in 'the smaller'--the individual, as they planned earlier in their discourse (434DE).

After a brief discussion, Socrates proposes, and Glaucon agrees, that in the same way as the city has three parts--the rulers, the auxiliaries, and the farmers and craftsmen, the soul also has three parts--a reasoning part, a spirited part, and a desiring part. Socrates proposes that the soul of an individual appears to be composed of such parts when its desires struggle with its wisdom, and its spirit with its wisdom or desires (439A-441C), [8] so that the separate parts appear to
separately control or influence decision making in the soul. Now, we have seen that the Republic represents Glaucon as simultaneously subject to desires for wisdom, honor and gain. So, Socrates' model of the soul seems apt as a model of Glaucon's soul.

Socrates continues and proposes that in the same way as the city was found to be just when each of its parts minded its own business, so an individual is just when each of its parts minds its own business, and the calculating part rules, and the spirited part is obedient to it and is its ally against the desiring part (441DE). The just man does not allow the classes in his soul to meddle with each other but orders his soul well, rules himself and harmonizes his three parts like notes on a scale; he binds them together and becomes from many entirely one, temperate and harmonized. Whether he acts concerning the acquisition of money, or the care of the body, or even something political or concerning private contracts, in all these actions, he believes and names a just and fine action one which preserves and helps in producing this harmonized disposition; wisdom the knowledge supporting this action; an unjust action one which always undoes this disposition; and ignorance the opinion that supports this action in turn (443CDE). Socrates and Glaucon say that they have found the just man and the just city and what justice is in them. They say
that injustice in an individual is a discord of the three parts and a meddling, interference and rebellion of one part of the soul against the whole, so that it rules in the soul though this is not proper. Socrates then argues, and Glaucon agrees, that the soul is healthy when the calculating part rules the desiring and spirited parts, but sick when this is not so.

Socrates then proposes that it remains to consider whether it is profitable to do just acts and follow fine practices and be just, with or without a reputation for justice, or whether it is profitable to commit injustice and be unjust, provided one isn't punished (444E). But Glaucon disagrees. He argues that such an inquiry now seems to him to be ridiculous, since if life is not livable with the nature of the body corrupted, how could it be livable when the nature of that by which we live, namely, the soul, is confused and corrupted (445A). Socrates replies that they must not grow weary, and then begins to introduce discussion about the four inferior forms of state and of the soul. Glaucon, however, hasn't said that he is weary. He has simply indicated that he is satisfied that the answer to the question he posed in Republic II as to whether the just man is happier than the unjust man is now clear to him. Why does Socrates persist after Glaucon has said this? For he embarked on the discourse only at the request of Glaucon and his brother Adeimantus. If
Glaucon says that he is satisfied, why continue the discussion as though he still had doubts? Perhaps answers to these questions are found in what Socrates says he wants to discuss with Glaucon, and eventually does discuss with him in Republic VIII and IX. At the end of Republic IV, Socrates says he wants to discuss four forms of wickedness (kakia) in cities and in the souls of individuals. Before he can, however, he is interrupted by Adeimantus and Polemarchus who want him to first discuss the sharing of women and children and whether the city of the guardians is even possible. The subsequent discourse lasts until the beginning of Book VIII when Socrates' interlocutors finally permit him to discuss what he says are the four inferior forms of states and of the soul. These states are timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny, and the forms of the soul are the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannic. It will serve an investigation of catharsis in Socratic dialogue to focus on Socrates' accounts of the origins of the so-called inferior forms of the soul.

After proposing how the city of the guardians could decline to a timocracy, Socrates begins the discussion of the inferior forms of the soul by asking Glaucon what is the sort of individual who corresponds to timocracy? Glaucon, as we have noted, falls silent. After serving as Socrates' respondent since Republic VI, he decides not to
answer—perhaps out of shame since Socrates has steered the conversation towards discussion of a subject whom Adeimantus tells us is like Glaucon in his love of victory.

Socrates proposes that the origin of the timocratic man lies in a deterioration in the states of character of a son of a noble father who lives in a city which is not well governed and who flees honors, offices and lawsuits so as not to be bothered. The timocratic youth comes to be when this son listens to his mother complaining that his father is not one of the rulers, and is not very serious about money, and, as a result, she is inferior among the other women in the city (549C). While his father fosters the calculating part of his soul, his mother and others foster the desiring and spirited parts. Drawn by both influences, the son came to the middle, and turns the rule in himself over to the middle part, which loves victory and is spirited. He becomes haughty (hupselophron), and, like Glaucon, a lover of honor (philotimos) (550AB). This decision to turn the rule in himself over to the spirited part is an error (hamartia) of the sort that Aristotle says brings about misfortune in tragedy: in turning the rule in himself over to the spirited part, which by the model of the just man in Republic IV should by nature obey the calculating part (444B), not only does the youth produce discord in his own
soul and make himself wretched but he also brings about the decline of aristocracy to timocracy, since, as Socrates says, regimes are not born from oaks or from rocks but rather from the states of character of those in the cities (544D). In this way, the aristocratic man is destroyed, and the timocratic man is born to a life which is not livable because his soul is confused and corrupted (445A).

When Socrates calls so-called inferior states of the soul "forms of wickedness" in comparison with the soul of the just, he is not saying that persons in those states are not to be pitied or even that they are wicked. Indeed, he says of the timocratic youth that his nature is not that of an evil man (550B3). The youth’s decision to follow the advice of his mother and others who criticize his father is not due to wickedness. Rather, as Socrates tells the story, he seems only to have made an error. Listeners might believe that they or their family members would act in such a way in similar circumstances and so bring misfortune upon themselves. So, the story of the timocratic youth satisfies Aristotle’s conditions for a story to evoke pity in its listeners, such as Glaucon. Since Aristotle says that fear is for someone who is like ourselves (53a4-6) and Glaucon is like the timocratic youth in character in his love of victory, the story of the timocratic youth satisfies Aristotle’s conditions for a story that would arouse fear in Glaucon. We have

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already discussed how it is reasonable to conclude that it is out of shame that Glaucon withdraws from discussing the timocratic youth, and shame is a form of fear, namely, of disgrace (Aris. EN 1128b11; Pl. Laws 646E10f).

Socrates next proposes that the oligarchic man arises from the timocratic man by further deterioration in character: When the son of a timocratic father follows in his father’s footsteps, but then sees his father lose his wealth, his honor, and even his life because of slanderers, after he has held some important office for the city, and when the son himself also suffers and loses his own wealth, he is frightened and throws love of honor from the throne of his soul and installs the desiring- and money-loving part in its place (553B). Humbled by poverty, he turns greedily to money-making, satisfies only his necessary desires, and represses all unnecessary desires. He enslaves the calculating and spirited parts of his soul to the desiring part and to its goal of money making (553D). The transformation from timocracy to oligarchy occurs through the treasure of gold that each timocrat has (550D). Socrates says that timocrats will be lovers of money, just like those in oligarchies, savagely honoring gold and silver under cover of darkness, inasmuch as they possess treasuries and store houses where they can place and hide the precious metals, and have private dwellings in which they can make lavish expenditure on
whomever they wish (548A). They pervert the laws in order to pursue extravagance. By going into rivalry with each other, they make the multitude like themselves. The more honorable they consider money-making, the less honorable they consider virtue, since virtue and wealth are naturally at odds (550E). So, from men who are lovers of victory and honor, they become lovers of money and money making (551A). They exclude those without enough wealth from ruling offices (551B), and divide the city into two, a city of the wealthy and a city of the poor, which continually plot against each other (551D). The oligarchic man holds down his evil desires not by reason but by force and by fear—trembling for his whole substance. Such a man has faction within himself; he is divided against himself (554D). So, the tragic error of the son of the timocratic father, when reduced to poverty, is in yielding to his desire for gain and turning the rule in himself over to the desiring part; as a result, he produces discord in both his own soul and his city. Both his soul and his city become divided against themselves. The timocratic man is destroyed, and the oligarchic man is born to a life which is not livable because his soul is confused and corrupted. Adeimantus comments that no other transformation is as quick and as sure as from a youth who loves honor to one who loves money (553D).
Yet, the oligarchic youth comes to be, not due to wickedness but because he yields to a desire for gain after slanderers drag his father into court and reduce his family to poverty. Though he placed his desiring part in control, for the most part his better desires master his worse ones (554D). In yielding to his desire for gain, however, he brings further misfortune upon himself and his city. Listeners might believe that they or their family members would act in such a way in similar circumstances and so bring misfortune upon themselves. So, the story of the oligarchic youth satisfies Aristotle's conditions for a story to evoke pity in its listeners, such as Glaucon. Since Glaucon is like the oligarchic youth in character in his desire for gain, the story of the timocratic youth satisfies Aristotle's conditions for a story that would arouse fear in Glaucon.

Next, Socrates proposes that the democratic man arises from the oligarchic man when the oligarchic youth abandons all the moderate practices of his father and indulges in the satisfaction of the unnecessary desires which his father had repressed (558-559). Unnecessary desires, says Socrates, include desires for a refined diet (559B) and for sex (559C). Under the influence of others, the uneducated oligarchic youth indulges in satisfying these desires. As a result, discord arises in his soul between a 'democratic' party urging indulgence and an
'oligarchic' party urging restraint (559E). Sometimes shame arises in his soul and drives out the unnecessary desires (560A). But, finally, false and boasting arguments join with unnecessary desires to seize the acropolis of his soul (560B). They drive from his soul modesty, temperance, measure, and orderly expenditure, and welcome into it, in their place, hubris, anarchy, wastefulness, and shamelessness. But as time passes, he re-admits some of the exiles (560CE). Then he lives his life in accordance with a certain equality of pleasures he has established: to whichever one happens along, he hands over the rule within himself until it is satisfied, and then again to another, dishonoring none but fostering them all on the basis of equality (561A). The tragic error of the democratic youth is in yielding to his unnecessary desires for luxury, a refined diet, sex and other objects, and in overturning any rule in himself and allowing each desire to rule equally (561A). In this way, the oligarchic man is destroyed, and the democratic man is born to a life which is not livable because there is no order or necessity in his life (561D). Yet, the democratic youth comes to be, not due to wickedness but because he is raised without education and miserly (554D). As a result, he yields to unnecessary desires. That he is not wicked is shown by the restraint that shame exerts upon his desires (see 560A), and that he readmits some of the
traditional virtues back into his soul after he matures (561B). Certainly listeners would believe that they or their relations might commit the same sort of errors. So, the story of the democratic youth satisfies Aristotle’s conditions for a story to evoke pity in its listeners, such as Glaucon. Since Glaucon is like the democratic youth in character in so far as he is subject to desires for a refined diet and for sex and allows himself to be simultaneously subject to desires for luxury, honor, and wisdom, and has established a certain equality of desires, the story of the democratic youth satisfies Aristotle’s conditions for a story that would arouse fear in Glaucon.

Finally, Socrates proposes that the tyrannic man arises from the democratic man when son like father indulges in satisfying unnecessary desires and is led into every transgression of law, so that the same struggles between lawless and moderate desires that arose in his father arise also in him. But this time "enchanters and tyrant makers" implant some erotic passion (eros) in the youth’s soul "like a great winged drone" to lead his idle desires (572E). Eros drives out all good opinions and desires and purges (katherei) the soul of temperance, and fills it with madness (573B), in the reverse of the catharsis described in the Sophist. Because of this, eros is called a tyrant, says Socrates (573B). A man becomes tyrannic whenever either by nature or by his practices or
by both he becomes drunken, erotic and melancholic (573C). The tyrant eros dwelling in the soul drives the tyrannic man to feasts, revels, and courtesans (573D). Many terrible and needy desires spring up beside eros and cry out for satisfaction (573D). Their victim, the tyrannic man to be, is driven mad (573E) and is afflicted with anguish and distress (574A). To satisfy his eros, the tyrannic man uses force against his parents and expropriates their property for the sake of a concubine or boy friend (574BC). The democratic regime in his soul is replaced by a tyranny of eros (574E). Eros lives like a tyrant within him (575A). Such men live their whole life without ever being friends of anyone, always one man’s master or another one’s slave. The tyrannic nature never tastes freedom or true friendship. Such men are faithless. They are as unjust as possible (576A). When awake tyrannic man is like someone fulfilling nightmarish passions (576B). He is the most wretched (576C). He struts the stage of life in tragic gear (577B). He is maddened by his desires and erotic passions (578A). But the most wretched man is the tyrannic man who actually becomes a ruling tyrant (578C). He is full of all kinds of fears and passions (579B). He has the hardest life (579D). The democratic man is destroyed, and the tyrannic man is born to a life which is the most miserable (578B).
The tyrannic youth comes to be when after he yields to lawless desires, others implant some eros in his soul to lead his idle desires (572E). So, the misfortune which he suffers is not out of his own wickedness, because in Socrates' account the causes are not only his own error but also an external agent. Only later does he become as unjust as possible (576A). So, the tyrannic youth is unfortunate, and his misfortune is undeserved. Although it is not clear that all listeners would believe that his misfortune could happen to them or their relatives, listeners who share his eroticism, such as the young (EN 1156a32), would be likely to pity him. So, the story of the tyrannic youth may satisfy Aristotle's conditions for a story to evoke pity in Glaucon and other youths. Since Glaucon is like the tyrannic youth in character in so far as he is subject to erotic desires, the story of the tyrannic youth satisfies Aristotle's conditions for a story that would arouse fear in Glaucon.

Towards the end of the discussion of the tyrant, Glaucon suddenly takes over the argument from Adeimantus. He again changes from a listener to a participant. Socrates asks Glaucon--not Adeimantus who had been the respondent for some 30 pages of text--to draw the conclusions of the preceding discussions, just like a judge in a drama competition, and declare who is the first in happiness, who is second and the rest for the five
citizens they have discussed. In this way, Socrates formulates his question in a way to suggest to listeners that they have just heard a series of tragedies. Glaucon answers in like fashion,

"Just as they came on the stage so I judge them like choruses in virtue and vice, happiness and the opposite" (580B).

And Socrates replies,

"Shall we hire a herald, or shall I myself announce that the son of Ariston judged that the best and most just man is the happiest, and that this is the most kingly man, the one who rules himself, and that the most evil and most unjust man is the most miserable, and this happens to be the one who is most tyrannic because he most tyrannizes both himself and his city."

Now that we have discussed what Socrates wanted to discuss with Glaucon at the end of Republic IV, we may now be able to say why Socrates insisted on discussing the four inferior forms of states and of the soul after Glaucon had already said that it was not necessary and had indicated that he was satisfied that the just lead a better life than the unjust. By discussing these matters Socrates was able to represent for Glaucon how injustice in the soul is a rebellion of one part of the soul against the whole (444B) in specific cases, and how those specific forms of rebellion affect the soul. In each case, Socrates tries to show, as Glaucon requested in Republic II, what power (dunamis: 358B5) injustice has in the soul: each youth who surrenders his soul to disorder by yielding to his desires becomes wretched. But the desires to which
the youths yield are all desires to which Glaucon himself is also subject. So, in discoursing on the origins of the four inferior states of the soul, Socrates has shown Glaucon what would be the effect (ergon) in his soul of yielding to his various desires, and, in those various ways, making his soul unjust, i.e., what would be the power of injustice in his own soul. Glaucon responds by expressing recognition that the just must always be happier than the unjust. This recognition is a change from ignorance and doubt to knowledge. This change reflects change in his states of character: since his states of character are what prevented him from recognizing in Republic II that the just must always be happier than the unjust (see section B, above), his recognition signals a modification in his states of character: the extent to which he is subject to erotic desire, and desires for luxury and honor has deceased: this is the effect (ergon) of Socrates' discourse; this change in Glaucon's states of character makes his recognition possible. Accordingly, I propose that these discourses induce catharsis in Glaucon.

Socrates' discourses on the inferior forms of soul satisfy Aristotle's conditions for representations which would arouse pity and fear in Glaucon. Socrates speaks of his discourses on the timocrat, oligarch, democrat and tyrant, as though they represented tragic figures. He
describes the tyrant as clothed in tragic gear, and asks Glaucon to judge the four, like the judge in a drama competition (580A9). Glaucon continues the comparison to tragedy by saying, "Just as they came on the stage, I judge them like choruses" (580B). Though Glaucon does not observe tragedies of the four men, he hears their stories, and, according to Aristotle, that is sufficient to arouse pity and fear, for if a story is properly composed, someone who hears the actions that occur in it will shudder and feel pity from the outcome (53b4).

Such arousal of pity and fear in Glaucon, from hearing how youths suffer wretchedness as a result of yielding to the same desires that he has, may reasonably be considered a means to release Glaucon from subjection to these desires and from his doubts that the just life is the best, and so make his recognition that the just are always happier than the unjust possible. Such release and recognition constitute catharsis, as is discussed in Chapter 2. So, the concept of catharsis expounded in Plato's Sophist and appearing only later in Aristotle's Poetics can help us describe and understand the Republic. Though some may claim that I have not proven that catharsis is induced in Glaucon in the Republic, it is nonetheless a reasonable interpretation for what appears in the text. Glaucon's case is fittingly contrasted with that of Callicles in the Gorgias. Like Glaucon, Callicles
enters into discussion with Socrates on the nature of justice. Yet, Callicles resists Socrates' questioning, avoids refutation, and resists change in his states of character. He says six times that Socrates speaks nonsense (phluareo, phluaria, lereo) (486C, 489B, 490C, 490E, 492C, 497A), and declares that he could not care less about what Socrates says (505C). Callicles experiences no catharsis. Glaucon, however, who begins his discourse in Republic II with the belief that he may change Socrates' mind, abandons his doubts about justice and injustice, and changes in character in response to Socrates' discourse.

Socrates facilitates Glaucon's release by redirecting his eros away from sex and towards philosophy by promoting an eros for wisdom. He says that those with philosophic natures love (erao) learning because it reveals to them the nature of that which is (485A). They do not lose the keenness of their eros for philosophy, nor cease from it, before grasping the nature of each thing which is with the part of the soul fit for grasping it (490B). Philosophers are true lovers of that which is (501D).

Socrates addresses all of Glaucon's states of character together when he divides human beings into lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, and lovers of gain (581C). He proposes that if the soul is divided into
three parts, so also are the pleasures that someone can experience (580D). The desiring part of the soul is concerned with eating, drinking, sex and other pleasures that involve the body, and is called gain-loving (580E); the spirited part is victory-loving and honor-loving; and the calculating part is wisdom-loving (581AB). Depending on which of the three parts rule in the soul, someone is a lover of wisdom (philosophos), a lover of victory (philonikos), or a lover of gain (philokerdes) (581C). Then Socrates asks the key question for Glaucon: Which of the three lovers is most experienced in all three types of pleasures? Is the lover of gain more experienced in the pleasure that comes from knowing than the lover of wisdom is in the pleasure that comes from gaining? (582A) Glaucon answers that the lover of wisdom can experience all three pleasures, while the other two cannot experience the pleasure connected with the vision of what is (582C). Glaucon agrees that the pleasure experienced by the lover of gain is the least pleasant of the three pleasures (583A).

Glaucon decides that the happiest man is the just man, the one who rules himself. He and Socrates agree that the just man gazes steadfastly at the regime within himself (ten en hautoi politeian) and guards against disturbing anything in it by possessing too much or too little (591E). He will behave the same way with respect
to honors as well. He will partake of, and taste, those that he believes will make him better, but flee in private and in public those that would destroy his established disposition (592A). "Then, he won't wish to be busy with political matters, or take part in government," adds Glaucon. "Right," replies Socrates, "he will govern in the city of himself (en ge tei heautou polei), and very much so, but not perhaps in the city of his fathers (en ge tei patridi) unless some divine chance comes to pass" (592A). "You mean he would govern in the city we just found and described, which exists in words, since I suppose it exists nowhere on earth." "But," said Socrates, "perhaps a pattern lies up in heaven for someone wishing to see it, and, having seen it, to establish himself (heauton katoikizein) accordingly. It makes no difference whether it exists or will exist anywhere, since he would be busy with the things of it alone, and no other" (592B).

In this section, we have discussed the catharsis of Glaucon as a catharsis of pity and fear. This is not, however, the only form of catharsis in Socratic dialogue. In particular, the Sophist speaks of a catharsis of shame (see Chapter 2, section B). So, perhaps, the catharsis of Glaucon in the Republic can be interpreted as a catharsis of shame. Indeed, I have argued that shame is the emotion aroused in Glaucon by the introduction of the discussion
of the timocratic youth in Republic VIII. It is possible to interpret his emotional arousal throughout the discussions of the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and tyrannic youth, as one of shame at the similarity of his states of character with those of the objects under discussion. To some readers such an analysis might appear more Platonic, than one that interprets Glaucon's catharsis as of pity and fear. In either case, an aim of the Republic seems to be to represent the catharsis of Glaucon.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. In the view of the author several of these discourses are parodic elaborations of the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Republic II. Accordingly, a proper treatment of these discourses requires investigation of the comic element in Socratic dialogue and of Aristotle's notion of comic mimesis, which was relegated to post-doctoral research.

2. On intrinsic and instrumental goods, see Aris. EN 1096b15f. On these in Republic II, see C. Reeve, Philosopher Kings, Princeton, 1988, 24f.

3. As a matter of fact, Socrates concludes the discussion of Republic I by saying that "as a result of the discussion, I know nothing. Since I don't know what the just is, I hardly know whether it happens to be
some virtue or not, or whether the one who has it is unhappy or happy" (354C). So, Glaucon's question seems to be a problem also for Socrates, if we are going to accept Socrates' earlier statement that he does not know what the just is.

4. Plato may accomplish more with Glaucon's interruption than simply exhibit an aspect of his character. The discourse of the Republic is supposed to reflect on the nature of justice and injustice. It is not clear whether it would be easy to study injustice in the city with minimum necessary elements, since as described it provides for no unnecessary desires. It may not be possible to discuss injustice without discussing in some way the role of unnecessary desires in the human mind. So, with Glaucon's interruption, Plato both displays the interlocutor's character and turns the discourse towards what may be a useful direction.

5. N. White in A Companion to Plato's Republic (Hackett, 1979) says that it is Socrates who "draws a distinction among three kinds of goods" (p. 74). Perhaps, White means that because Socrates assents to the distinctions that Glaucon proposes that therefore he makes the distinctions himself.

6. Annas claims that Socrates and Glaucon "themselves both agree that justice belongs in the 'fairest'
class, the second, among things like health" (An Introduction to Plato's Republic, Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, p. 60), but right after Socrates says he places justice in the second category, Glaucon says most people place it in the third, and states: "Come on. Hear me too, and see if you still have the same opinion" (358B1). So, Glaucon thinks he might change Socrates' mind, which indicates either he is not sure to which category justice belongs, or believes it in the third. C. D. C. Reeve agrees in Philosopher-kings (Princeton 1988, p. 25) that Socrates and Glaucon do not agree: "Since both parties agree that justice is wanted for its G-consequences, and disagree only about whether it is also wanted for its own sake, it is natural to expect that debate will focus on the latter topic." Cornford, Shorey and Bloom all translate 358B1 as though Glaucon is trying to change Socrates' mind.

7. This strictly speaking future more vivid condition seems to have the force of an indirect question, as often; see Smyth 2672. As a condition, it would read: "Hear me too, if you still have the same opinion." But Socrates has just stated his opinion, so the protasis seems to mean: "and see if you still have the same opinion." By either translation, Glaucon indicates that he is challenging Socrates' view.
8. Compare the state of those who are thoughtless and in need of catharsis in the Sophist: "their beliefs struggle with their passions, their anger with their pleasures, their reason with their pains and all these things with each other" (228B2). 
APPENDIX.

IRWIN'S DOCTRINAL INTERPRETATION.

In Plato's Ethics Terry Irwin argues that the remarks of the character Socrates in Plato's dialogues can be attributed to Plato because Aristotle did the same. He writes that Aristotle's "approach to the dialogues is firmly doctrinal: he regularly treats the dialogues as evidence for Plato's views, and regularly attributes some of the views of the Platonic Socrates to Plato, without seeing any need to explain or defend the attribution." [1]

Irwin cites twelve passages from Aristotle as evidence for his claims. The passages, however, do not support the argument that Irwin wishes to make:

1) As Irwin himself notes, neither Metaphysics 991b3-4 nor Generation and Corruption 335b9-17, which he cites, attribute views to Plato: the first passage simply refers to what is stated in the Phaedo, and the second discusses what is said by "Socrates in the Phaedo."

2) Irwin cites Metaphysics 1024b14-15 [2] and De Caelo 279b32-280a3 as naming Plato while referencing the
Sophist and Timaeus, respectively. Such references could not support his argument that Aristotle "regularly attributes some of the views of the Platonic Socrates to Plato" since Socrates does not speak in the Sophist (beyond the beginning of the dialogue) and the De Caelo passage cites a place in the Timaeus where Timaeus, not Socrates, is the speaker. Furthermore, the De Caelo passage does not name Plato but only "some people" (tines), and later at 280a29, it refers by name only to the Timaeus. [3]

3) Irwin says that Aristotle "treats the dialogues as evidence for Plato's views" and cites Metaphysics 1010b11 and 1071b37 [4] and Nicomachean Ethics 1172b28 [5], which all name Plato, as referring to the Theaetetus, Phaedrus, and Philebus, respectively. The references to the dialogues, however, are inferred; they do not appear in the text. Irwin states earlier that Aristotle refers to "Plato's unwritten doctrines" and "oral comments." How can we know whether Aristotle is not referring to these rather than a dialogue, when a dialogue is not named? [6] Irwin assumes, without argument, that when Aristotle mentions Plato he is referring to a dialogue.

4) Irwin writes that "In criticizing Plato, [Aristotle] contrasts the view taken in the Timaeus with the view taken in the unwritten doctrines, without suggesting that either is to be taken more or less
seriously as a statement of Plato’s view (Physics 209b11-16)." [7] The cited passage, however, does not criticize Plato, but expresses agreement with him and seems to say that the view in the Timaeus is NOT Plato’s real view since Plato held another view not expressed in the dialogue. This passage is evidence that Aristotle did NOT treat the dialogues as evidence of Plato’s views. In addition, if Aristotle says that he likes what Plato said in the Timaeus or in unwritten teaching, that is not evidence that Plato believed either of them. This comment also applies to the other passages cited by Irwin in which Aristotle expresses his agreement with something Plato said or wrote: Nicomachean Ethics 1172b28-32, Metaphysics 1010b11-14, and Politics 1271b1.

5) Irwin writes that "Aristotle’s criticism of the Republic and the Laws in Politics II provides a striking example of his identification of Plato with the Platonic Socrates. After speaking of the Socrates in the Republic, Aristotle goes on to speak of the Laws as another ‘Socratic discourse’ (1265a10-13), even though Socrates is not a speaker in the Laws." [8] This citation clearly does not support Irwin’s claim that Aristotle identifies Plato with the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. Rather, at Politics 1265a10 Aristotle seems only to be indicating that he includes all Plato’s dialogues in the genre of mimesis, "Socratic dialogues," that he discusses in the
Poetics--whether Socrates is a speaker in a particular dialogue of Plato, or not.

Irwin then cites Politics 1266b5, 1271b1, and 1274b9 as grounds that Aristotle treats "both the Republic and Laws as evidence of Plato's views." [9] At 1266b5, however, Aristotle refers only to an opinion held by Plato at the time that he was writing the Laws, not to anything written in the Laws. Second, at Politics 1274b9 Aristotle only refers to Plato as an author of books, not as someone sharing opinions with the character Socrates; there Aristotle is in the midst of listing legislative proposals that are peculiar (idion) to individual authors; he includes Plato in the list and lists various proposals from the Republic and the Laws which appear in the writings of no other author. Third, at 1271b1, Aristotle states a criticism of the Spartan constitution which he says "is also made by Plato in the Laws." Here again, contrary to Irwin, Aristotle is not criticizing, but agreeing with Plato. Such a reference is non-controversial, and can be construed to refer only to Plato as the author of the Laws, rather than to someone who held certain beliefs. As noted above, Aristotle's agreement with something expressed in a dialogue of Plato is not evidence that Plato believed what Aristotle agreed with. Lastly, Irwin omits mentioning the many places where Aristotle names Socrates when discussing an opinion
expressed in a dialogue. There are nineteen such places in the Politics alone (thirteen in Politics II).

In sum, of the twelve passages in Aristotle's work which Irwin says support his claim that Aristotle attributes to Plato the views expressed by Socrates in the dialogues, none of them hold up under examination. Four cited texts (Metaphysics 991b3-4, 1024b14 [2], Generation and Corruption 335b9-17, De Caelo 279b32) don’t even name Plato. Three texts refer to dialogues or sections of dialogues in which Socrates is not a speaker (De Caelo 279b32; Politics 1265a10, 1271b1). In three cases, references to dialogues are inferred by Irwin, not made by Aristotle (Metaphysics 1010b11, 1071b37; Nicomachean Ethics 1172b28). In one case (Physics 209b11), Aristotle explicitly states that Plato's unwritten doctrines differed from what he wrote into a dialogue; in another (Politics 1266b5) he explicitly refers to something Plato didn’t write into a dialogue; and in a third (Politics 1274b9) he only refers to Plato as an author of books, not as someone sharing opinions with the character Socrates. Irwin's citations do not support his claim that Aristotle "regularly" attributes to Plato what is said by Socrates in a dialogue.

NOTES TO THE APPENDIX

2. Metaphysics 1024b14-15 names neither Plato, nor Socrates, nor a dialogue, and must be cited in error. Irwin apparently has in mind some other passage which he believes refers to the Sophist.

3. The subject is phesi at 280a30 is either the character Timaeus or the dialogue.

4. Irwin mistakenly cites 1071b22-23, which names neither Plato, nor the Phaedrus.

5. Irwin mistakenly cites 1072b28, which does not appear in the Nicomachean Ethics.

6. To see a reference to Phaedrus, Irwin may be relying on H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Academy, New York, 1972, p. 389. Besides Theaetetus, Metaphysics 1010b11 could also refer to Crito 47.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid, p. 6. Stalley says that Aristotle may have read an early version of the Laws that included Socrates as one of the speakers; see Barker and Stalley, op. cit., p. 340.

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