THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
AND ELECTION OF 1916

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PREFACE

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S. D. Lovell
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CHAPTER I

The Background of the Campaign

Although all political campaigns and elections are guided and determined in some respects and degree by the not so dead hand of the past and also by intangibles of the present, both of which often are difficult to trace or even detect, there are a few basic, not imponderable, events and influences fundamental to the study of any election. The Presidential campaign and election of 1916 was affected by four of these determining influences: the resurgence of progressivism; the social legislation of the Wilson Administration; the European war as reflected in the United States; and the character, personality and leadership of two men who were or had been occupants of the White House--Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt.

The Progressive Movement and the Split in the Republican Party

Progressivism, the movement of protest, unrest and opposition, was one of the most important background influences upon the campaign of 1916. A replacement for the Populism of the last decades of the Nineteenth Century, progressivism was a lineal descendant of the Populist, agrarian revolt, and represented the same idea running in the same direction--that the rule of the majority should be
expressed in a stronger government, one with a broader social and economic program. It essentially was a deviation from the policy of laissez-faire which was producing many poor people in "the richest country in the world".

The progressive movement, particularly the Midwestern and most important variety, deeply rooted in the social and economic soil of the times, was a shift away from the individualism of the period toward greater social control. Functions of government should be extended to meet the growing needs of the people, the progressives maintained, and control should be both negative and positive, negative to control the capital and business and positive to protect the public social and economic welfare. Regulation was necessary for political and social justice.

The spirit of social change and regulation of industry was present in all political parties during the early years of the present century and the effect in one party—the Republican—was of such importance that two Presidential nominations and elections were vitally affected. Rumblings of discontent could be heard even in the "full dinnerpail" years of McKinley. Theodore Roosevelt, with an ear to the ground, incorporated in his public addresses suggestions for national control of corporations and revision of the tariff. With radicalism growing in the West, something had to be done. Republicans were lining up on each side of the fence. Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin, Albert
J. Beveridge of Indiana, Joseph L. Bristow of Kansas, Moses E. Clapp of Minnesota, and sometimes Knute Nelson of Minnesota and William E. Borah of Idaho, led the fight against standpattism leadership of Henry Cabot Lodge, Nelson Aldrich and Joe Cannon.

During the Taft term the breach between the Insurgent Republicans and the Regulars widened. Instead of a lower tariff as Taft had promised, at least by implication, during his campaign, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1910 brought a decided increase in rates. Many wage earners of the East and farmers of the West were resentful of the tariff, and their discontent was reflected in the 1910 Congressional elections when the Republicans met defeat in the House and lost seats in the Senate. Not since 1888 had a national party won a Presidential election without having had a majority in the House in the preceding biennium, so in looking forward to 1912 the Democrats were very hopeful.

Later action of the Taft administration further widened the gap, and by 1912 the break in the Republican Party was virtually assured. Insurgents, who had organized under the banner of the National Progressive League, would not accept Taft as their candidate, rallying first behind LaFollette, then Roosevelt. The Regulars were left with

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few alternatives of action. They had no hope of combining with any large group of the Democratic Party. However, they controlled most of the local party organizations, and as a result, the Old Guard strength was sufficient to nominate Taft in the convention. Not only did "T R" assure the election of a Democratic President in 1912 when he led his followers away to hold their own convention and form their own party, but his action also was instrumental in the Democratic victory in 1916.

So far as 1912 was concerned, old experienced Republican politicians knew the import of the renomination of President Taft. Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania, perhaps the most powerful leader in the party, realized the threat by the Progressives, and the danger of party death. However, he held that there never was a political compromise that did not bring regret to both parties, so he resigned himself to a fight between the two factions, with no quarter given or asked. He insisted that President Taft be nominated in Chicago in 1912, although he knew it meant defeat for the Republicans and victory for the Democrats. There was no search for a better candidate. Why sacrifice a strong candidate who might come in handy later, Penrose argued. Right now the people are tired of us, but we will come back later, he prophesied.¹

¹ Before the convention "Uncle" Joe Cannon, Elihu Root, Senator Crane, Reed Smoot, Bill Barnes, Jim Watson, and
Penrose was more of a prophet than he realized. The Democrats were ready to take advantage of the Republican breach, and stood a chance of harvesting many Progressive votes, for they had been growing a crop of liberalism for several years. In 1892 the Democrats had taken over the Populists and their advocacy of social and economic reform, and pledged themselves to business regulation. In 1896, 1900, and again in 1908 Bryan, "The Great Commoner", had led the fight against established privilege. He had lost because his was a sectional fight—he never had the support of the populous East. In 1912 the split in the Republican Party showed that the East, too, was ready to fight for the "common man". The answer was to find a man from the East who would appeal to the West and to the nation as a whole.

Penrose met for a conference. There was much talk of a compromise with Roosevelt, but Penrose decided it when he got to his feet and began to speak:

Here we sit, a group of supposedly political men trying to deceive ourselves that the people want us. They are tired of us. They're tired of the Republican Party... We're going to lose this election; for God's sake don't let us lose control of ourselves.

There is only one way to go and that's straight ahead. We've got to stick to the road we're on. I know dammed well it leads over a precipice. You know it too. But that's what we got to do. All right, let's drive the machine into the chasm.

After the crash we can pick ourselves out of the wreck—those of us who survive. With what's left of the machine we can begin building another. It's an outworn model anyway. In the reconstructed machine we'll ride back home.

Walter Davenport, Power and Glory, The Life of Boies Penrose, 192.
It was to take a man with a liberal point of view to pull the vote to the common man (and later the vote of the Progressives) but strangely enough the person to lead the Democrats to certain victory in 1912 was not chosen at first by the directing powers in the Democratic Party for his liberal point of view. Colonel George Harvey, a magazine editor and publisher and friend of Morgan and Wall Street, had first pushed educator Woodrow Wilson for the Presidency. Harvey and his friends had considered Wilson back in 1904, but finally chose Judge Parker as the candidate to appeal to the conservatives. Later Wilson caught the feeling of the time and began to favor certain popular programs. Catching the public's eye with his fights against the aristocratic clubs at Princeton University and against boss rule while governor of New Jersey, his success in pushing liberal laws through the legislature definitely made him a Presidential possibility. Harvey had persuaded the political bosses of New Jersey to nominate Wilson, but after being elected with the help of the party machine, Wilson immediately disabused almost everyone, including Harvey, of the idea that he could be bossed, and broke with the machine, and later Harvey, himself. The Democrats figured that in Wilson they had a candidate the people wanted, and after a hard fight in the convention, Wilson became a nominee of the party.

Since Wilson had turned from his more conservative ways, and Roosevelt was termed a liberal, the two most
popular candidates in 1912 were both on the same side of the political-social cleavage. It was a reflection of the feeling of the time. Penrose had been right, the people were tired of the evils growing out of unrestricted big business. Both candidates were alike in their convictions that democracy must be revitalized by limiting the powers of corporations and the political bosses. They differed in their remedies however. Roosevelt's New Nationalism insisted upon the recognition of the advantages of large combinations and proposed that the public interest be protected by governmental regulation. Wilson and the New Freedom demanded the dissolution of all combinations which might threaten to restrain trade. Competition must be re-established, the rights of small businessmen must be protected and the powers of the state governments preserved.

If the Progressive Party is considered as part of the Republican Party, from the election figures it does not appear that many voters changed their party allegiance in 1912. The combined vote of Taft and Roosevelt was a little less than the vote of Taft in 1908, while Wilson received only a hundred thousand less votes than Bryan in 1908. The Socialists were the only apparent gainers; they received 6% of the popular vote and more than doubled their own vote of 1908.\(^1\) Evidently the Democratic ticket did not appeal to

many voters of the progressive element in the party; Wilson had turned liberal only recently. Some Eastern conservatives were gained. Changes, however, were small. The figures also show that Roosevelt and the Progressives were not successful in attracting any measurable support from the Democratic ranks. Both leaders and programs were sufficiently liberal to hold the progressive minded, and at the same time sanely conservative enough to allay the fears of all but the most conservative.

The doubts that were held by "T R" in establishing a new party were borne out by the election. He had been unable to capture any considerable element of the Democratic Party and had failed to capture the Old Guard industrial stronghold of the East. The hopes of the Progressives now lay in taking over the badly defeated regular Republican Party before the next election. But the fate of the Progressives lay with the new occupant of the White House. If President Wilson retained his liberal beliefs and was willing and able to push through Congress legislation which was liberal and designed to meet the demands of the people for remedies of their social plights, then the Progressive Party was faced with extinction. The Republican Party would suffer another defeat from which it might not be able to recover. So much hinged upon the new President's

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1 However, the percentage of the total vote received by Wilson in 1912 was less than that received by Bryan in 1908.
attitude toward reform, and his leadership and personality, that it might be well to discuss the man who determined much of the political history between 1913 and 1920, including, as part of that history, his own re-election in 1916.

**Personality and Leadership of Woodrow Wilson**

Much has been written and spoken on the character and personality of Thomas Woodrow Wilson. Yet what he actually was remains in dispute, almost as much as ever. He was a paradox to many. To his family and to those who worked with him every day, he was a warm and sympathetic man, full of wit. To those on the outside he seemed cold and distant. To the militaristic minded in 1916, Wilson was almost if not, cowardly and vacillating. But it is safe to say that Wilson, as shown in his activities at Princeton, Trenton, and as a President during a critical period, was a fighter who would not deviate from what he thought was the proper course. Wilson has been termed as arrogant and one of the most egotistical men who ever attained public prominence. However, to different observers Wilson was sweet-tempered and listened to what others had to say with complete attention. Often it has been stated that criticism, even constructive, was one of the things he could not stand. This has been denied categorically. It is apparent that there surely were at least two sides to Wilson.
Wilson himself explained the apparent contradiction in his character. Tumulty, his devoted secretary, reported President Wilson as saying to him one day:

You know, Tumulty, there are two natures combined in me that every day fight for supremacy and control. On the one side there is the Irish in me, quick, generous, impulsive, passionate, anxious always to help and to sympathize with those in distress. And like the Irishman at Donnybrook Fair, always willin' to raise me shillalah and to hit any head which stands firminest me. Then on the other side there is the Scotch—canny, tenacious, cold, and perhaps a little exclusive. I tell you, my dear friend, that when these two fellows get to quarreling among themselves, it is hard to act as umpire between them.¹

Wilson, himself, knew the popular conception as to his lack of warmth, and perhaps recognized his own failure. After reading an article suggesting that he was cold natured, he said to Tumulty, "It is no compliment to me to have it said that I am only a highly developed intellectual machine. Good God, there is more in me than that. Well, I want people to love me, but I suppose they never will".² Tumulty thought Wilson the warmest hearted man he ever met. Others close to him have testified that they agreed. A fellow professor at Princeton wrote at Wilson's death in 1924: "Woodrow's power over men was based on a courteous, friendly, unselfish warmth of character shot through with shrewd Scotch-Irish humor. The dignified, conventional

¹ Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, 457.
² Ibid., 473.
'front' that is almost essential to college authority, no
doubt hid his nature from many, but it was there.¹ Professor Frank Thilly, also with Wilson at Princeton, agreed:
"He was a man full of deep and warm feeling.... And he was
one of the most lovable men I have ever..." known.²

While certainly Wilson was no hermit, and had friends, the feeling that he lacked the capacity to fraternize was a popular conception. While those who worked for him, as Tumulty, Rudolph Forster, his Executive Secretary, "Ike" Hoover, the Chief Usher in the White House,³ and Colonel Starling, the Secret Service man,⁴ liked and respected him, there was no fraternizing between Wilson and others even more on his official level. His relations were cordial, but never fraternal. Perhaps the relationship between Wilson and Colonel House was closest to that, but there always was a certain reserve even there, if the letters between them can be used as a guide.⁵

¹ Walter L. Whittlesey, "The Woodrow We Knew", Collier's, V. 73 (March 1, 1924), 7.
² Josephus Daniels, The Life of Wilson, 236.
³ Hoover said that of all the Presidents that he worked for during his forty-two years in the White House, Wilson was the most intelligent and most satisfactory to work with. I. H. Hoover, Forty-Two Years in the White House, 244.
⁴ Thomas Sugrue, Starling of the White House, 75.
⁵ See Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.
Woodrow Wilson's inability to keep the friendships he had made has been noted many times. House lasted until the end of the Paris Conference. Tumulty fell into his bad graces during the 1920 campaign. McCombs, his 1912 campaign manager, and Colonel Harvey, the man who first "plugged" him for the Presidency, early fell by the wayside. Bernard Baruch and Josephus Daniels were two of the few whose friendship withstood the strain of politics and the test of time. A friendly biographer (or perhaps characterizer would be a better term) has explained in part why those friendships were often short in duration: "He demanded dog-like fidelity from his friends, and he had it." 1 Another wrote that Wilson "had a genius for rubbing men the wrong way. He could—and frequently did—convert former friends and admirers into the bitterest of enemies." 2

Wilson has been accused of having been arrogant and unable to take criticism. "He was arrogant. He was bullheaded. He was puritanical. He was vengeful." 3 A famous reporter of the time quoted Wilson, when urged to establish better relations with his party leaders, and discuss policies with them, as replying: "Futile! I tell you, futile. I can make better headway by giving consideration to my own

1 Wells Wells, Wilson The Unknown, 3.
2 Gerald W. Johnson, Woodrow Wilson, 9.
3 Ibid.
ideas, whipping them into shape, testing them out in my own way...". But "Ike" Hoover seemed to disagree, and maintained that of the Presidents he knew, Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson especially sought the other side of the question. "Neither seemed to change but they did like to argue it out". A later commentator has taken the stand that Wilson welcomed candid and sincere criticism when he was satisfied that the criticism was not motivated by antagonism to his fundamental ideals and purposes, but was the product of thinking by minds as loyal to those ideals and purposes as his own.

He had a mind which set him apart, and he knew it. He thought "perhaps in mental images". The realization of his ability, coupled with a firm belief in the righteousness of his cause made him "willful" and difficult to sidetrack once he started on a course in line with those ideals and purposes. This is connected with another paradox. He seldom admitted that he was wrong; those who differed with him either became "willful" or they "did not know what they were talking about". He mostly saw man, the individual, in his littleness, and was "intolerant, impatient, and disgusted

1 Henry L. Stoddard, As I Knew Them, 481.
4 Wells, op. cit., 28.
with him". Yet he had great faith in the people. In the last days of his election campaigns, he showed less nervousness than any around him. He took the attitude of "Let the people speak, and we shall abide by that decision". He never doubted the verdict of the people. If it was not right today, it would be right tomorrow.

There were those who considered Wilson opportunistic. But was it opportunism merely, or was it a method to attain the high ideals he had held since early days? In his Congressional Government, accepted as a dissertation leading to a Ph. D. degree, Wilson indicated his ideas of government. He favored a government closer to that of the British Cabinet System, with executive leadership playing a greater role than it had in this country. When he attained a position in which his belief could be practiced, he still maintained the idea, and practiced what he preached. He saw himself as the responsible leader acting in the interests of the people. His leadership was the voice and action of the majority of the people. This belief, coupled with the Calvinistic theory of predestination that he held, joined

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1 Kerney, op. cit., xiii.

2 Theodore Roosevelt, a great rival of Wilson's, wrote to friend Henry Cabot Lodge in 1917: "He is neither for nor against Democracy or reaction, Germany or the Allies, socialism or high finance; he is for himself, and for or against any man or any cause exactly as it suits his own interests". Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, 526.
with a great confidence in himself, was certainly sufficient to make Woodrow Wilson a strong President. "His disposition to play a lone hand and to depend for success upon the adequacy of his own internal resources, particularly in eloquent words, was, of course, much increased by the aggrandizement of the Presidential office...." Wilson, then, was similar to Jefferson in his attitude toward men. Wilson did not take a tremendous interest in individual men, but he had an ultimate faith in the integrity of all the Joe Does, if Democracy gave them sufficient training for the task.

The embittered McCombs did not agree that Wilson was the spokesman for the people. He maintained that Wilson was aiming at the power of a dictator:

The Wilson ideal was Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist—not Thomas Jefferson, the Democrat. Like Hamilton, he believed in a limited monarchy—a life tenure for the President. He was an advocate of the British Government system. He taught it at Princeton University. While President he regarded himself not only as a President, but Premier. Had he dared, he would have prorogued Congress as the King of England prorogues Parliament.

Others do not agree with this interpretation of the Wilsonian desires. Herbert Agar interpreted the first Democratic President since Cleveland in this way:

In character Wilson resembled Jefferson rather than Jackson. His well trained mind but rigid intellect did not fit him for the rough and tumble politics and his cool aloof nature made it impossible for him to mingle

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2 William McCombs, Making Woodrow Wilson President, 18.
with the people, whom he loved in the abstract and served well. Jefferson, who never appeared in public, who preferred to deal even with his friends by letter, could nevertheless build and lead a party, but it was a small and simple affair compared to the party which Wilson inherited.  

Another writer has compared him not with Hamilton or Jefferson, but with other great leaders of the past:

Wilson was a genuine stalwart American of the type of Lincoln and Cleveland, and in his desire to dominate the type of Jackson. His supreme doctrine of politics was leadership. He was confident of his ability to interpret the spirit of the genius of the American People.

While the above statements and opinions may appear contradictory, they at least show the difficulty in interpreting the character and actions of such an enigma as Woodrow Wilson, as a man, and as a politician and President. There are one or two things about him, however that few will contest. He had a great ability to think with lucidity and to express those thoughts in graceful language. His character was marked by a strength of will, and a moral idealism which, combined with his ability in expression, his sensitivity to popular feeling, and his shrewdness in partisan strategy, fitted him pre-eminently for the role he was to play.

Wilson was not always considered the liberal or progressive supporter of the people. In fact, as we have said,

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1 The Price of Union, 665.
2 Paul McKown, Certain Important Domestic Policies of Woodrow Wilson, 1.
the conservative wing of the Democratic party of the industrial East had, in the first decade of the century, considered him as a possible Presidential candidate. At one time, before the election of 1904, a committee representing that element interviewed Wilson with the object, unknown to Wilson, of passing upon his qualifications for the Democratic nomination. Harvey's support through the years, it is suspected, was partly, if not mainly, because of Wilson's conservative ideas. In his writings Wilson had indicated that he believed that a temperate and honest pursuit of private good was a moral blessing. He was critical of the Populists and often the trade unions. His admiration was for the conservative Burke, who hated the French revolutionary philosophy. Jefferson's failure to understand Burke's thesis: that justice to all classes, not liberty, is the object of government, was his chief weakness. ¹

While the early Wilson tended toward conservatism, always present was the room in his philosophy for change and for reform. This was the principal difference between Roosevelt and Wilson. Theodore Roosevelt had no principle of change evident in his philosophy. When Wilson changed it was merely placing emphasis upon the new and the needs of the time. The switch was made, it appears, during his campaign for Governor of New Jersey. He was still conservative

¹ Richard Hofstader, The American Political Tradition, 289.
while the President of Princeton. He remarked during that time that Bryan the Boy Orator, should be knocked "into a cocked hat". He thought the nation should be steered in a middle course between the masses and the plutocracy. But in conducting the campaign he began to see the side of the common people and dedicated himself to regeneration and reform.

In the campaign of 1912, Wilson had emerged as the candidate desiring a change in order to re-attain the advantages of the past. What had happened to America, he told the voters, is that industry has ceased to be free because the laws do not protect the weak. The middle class is being crushed in the "processes of prosperity". So he made a declaration of war upon privilege and vested interests. The emancipation of the consumer oppressed by high tariffs and uncompetitive prices and of the small employer crushed out of existence by the organized undercutting of the trusts and restriction of access to credits, was the keynote of almost every speech during the 1912 campaign.

The New Freedom, the title given to his book of 1912 campaign speeches and also to the program during his term of office, was essentially, as Hofstader states, "an attempt of the middle class, with agrarian and labor support, to arrest the exploitation of community, the concentration of wealth, and the growing control of politics by insiders, and to restore, as far as possible, competitive opportunities in
business". Wilson realized that the laws of this country protected those "already made" rather than the men "on the make". They should be changed so that the group which was struggling to improve could do so. "The man who is on the make is the judge of what is happening in this country, not the man who has made good...that is the man by whose judgment I, for one, wish to be guided."  

Social Legislation of the Wilson Administration

Perhaps no Presidential candidate has carried out his campaign promises more fully and no party has fulfilled the planks of its platform more completely than Wilson and his party after the campaign and election of 1912. The conceptions set forth in Wilson's speeches were translated into legislation with remarkable success and fidelity during his first four years of office. It is difficult to dispute the oft-made assertion that the first two years of Wilson's administration saw more positive legislative achievements than any administration since the days of Hamilton and Washington. The tariff was revised downward materially. This was the first successful effort to lower the tariff since the Civil War. The Federal Reserve Act, which effected a revamping of the nations banking and credit system was pushed through. Farm legislation, including a Federal Farm Loan


Act, benefitted the farmers. The Anti-Trust Act (Sherman Act) was strengthened; a Federal Trade Commission was established; an income tax marking a change in tax policy based upon ability to pay and other progressive and often much needed laws were passed. In this remarkable succession of liberal measures, Wilson was carrying out his platform of 1912, and was filling the need of the day, and the desire of the "common man".

The new President was fortunate in having a majority in Congress of the same party as the one of which he had been a life-long member. The party which was coming back into control after 16 years of wandering in the wilderness had a majority of five in the Senate and held more than two-thirds of the seats in the lower house. With the opposition party divided into two wings, the Democrats and Wilson seemed to have a clear field to enact legislation including sweeping reforms which large elements of the public had been demanding for more than a decade.

Although Wilson was fortunate to have the majority in Congress of his own party, it was necessary for him to attain considerable popular support. While he had a Democratic Congress, the fact was that he was not the party leader. There was an enormous amount of Wilson sentiment over the country, and there were many enthusiastic Wilson men, but a good many of these were of the old Mugwump type, or men who had hitherto held aloof from politics. Most of
the Democrats who had come into office in the Democratic landslide were the old party regulars. Many of them were not affiliated with the New Freedom as such and certainly many were conservative.

To force any recalcitrant conservatives into line to support his liberal program, the President early took a positive stand. Following the thesis presented in his *Congressional Government*, the President acted as innovator and leader. Renewing an old practice neglected since John Adams, he addressed Congress personally, and often held conferences in the President's room of the Capitol with Senators and Representatives regarding legislation of importance before Congress. Throughout his administration Mr. Wilson made effective use of his influence in securing favorable action from the legislators. In this way he killed two birds, focusing the attention of Congress upon his favorite bills, and at the same time focusing the attention of the public upon Congress.

To administer the liberal legislation once Congress had passed it, Wilson desired men in sympathy with his program, as well as experts in their particular fields. At the same time he recognized that the election meant not only a change in party but a deep-seated shift in geographical control. The government for years had been Republican and conservative, Eastern, urban and industrial. Now Wilson was determined to make it Western, Southern and agricultural. A
new type of man, as well as new men, was desired.

Wilson had very little difficulty making up his mind in the selection of one member of his Cabinet. Political necessity required that the man who had led the party in three previous attempts to gain control of the government, and who was even yet the leader of the Democrats, should be handled with extreme care. Beyond those reasons for appointment to an important position within the Administration was the fact that Bryan had been instrumental in the nomination of Wilson in Baltimore in 1912.

As it turned out, Bryan's appointment was a lifesaver for Wilson. If he had been left out of the Administration he could have been a great handicap to the President both in the domestic and in the foreign field. As it was, he was valuable, with his political know-how and his power, in pushing through the liberal legislation of 1913 and 1914, and later gave support to Wilson's foreign policy although their differences were great enough to cause the resignation of Bryan as Secretary of State.

The President found in 1913 that Bryan could work on a team of which he was not captain. His support was valuable even beyond his political influence, for in the passage of liberal legislation the Mid-Western liberal proved a most willing and able helper.

Wilson's other cabinet appointments showed the new alignment of the South and the West in the Administration.
He had hoped to get such men as President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard, Dean Henry B. Fine of Princeton and Louis D. Brandeis as Secretaries or Ambassadors. But there was too much opposition, particularly to Brandeis, and Wilson had to content himself with a compromise between his personal choices and political expediency. Of the 10 original appointments, four were from the South, two from the Midwest and one from the far West, while one listed from New York was a Southerner by birth and training.

The influence and work of Bryan and other liberals was not the only reason why such a broad domestic program was pushed through Congress so successfully. In the first legislation considered by the Congress—the tariff—the new President showed to the voters and Congress both his fighting qualities and his independence. He conferred with the Congressmen often and informed many about various aspects of tariff legislation. When the lobbyists of the various sugar and manufacturing interests became excessively evident, Wilson, without consulting or notifying the party leaders at all, declared to the public that there was an insidious lobby in Washington working industriously against the public interest. This utterance, and the

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1 Matthew Josephson, *The President Makers*, 467.
2 William G. McAdoo, then residing in New York, but originally from Georgia and Tennessee.
3 *The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, V. 1, 9.
resultant investigation, was effective for a time, for the lobbyists were afraid now to work out in the open. President Wilson, by this action, had certainly not increased his popularity with the manufacturing interests of the East, but he had attracted great attention and support from the average voter throughout the nation. And in Congress, those members who had been besieged by the interests, and wavering in their support, now fell into line.

The fight over the passage of the Underwood bill was the first important test of the dependability of the Democratic Congressmen. Would the Democrats now be able to hold their narrow margin of six in the Senate? How many of the Progressives who had condemned the Payne-Aldrich act would vote for the Democratic tariff? Such colorful exponents of political independence as Senators LaFollette of Wisconsin and Lane of Washington supported the bill, but Senator Norris of Nebraska remained firm in his opposition to any approach to free trade. Only six Democrats voted against the Underwood bill when it was passed by the House of Representatives on May 8, 1913, while two Republicans, four Progressives and one Independent voted with the majority. Four of those six Democrats were from the "sugar districts" of Louisiana. A similar bill, the Simmons bill, passed the Senate by a good majority. Again

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1 Richard L. Neuberger and Stephen B. Kahn, Integrity --The Life of George W. Norris, 58.
the representatives of Louisiana, Senators Ransdell and Thornton, voted against the bill. After conferences, the final bill was passed in the House by a vote of 254 to 103 and in the Senate by 36 to 17. In the House four Democrats voted against the bill and seven minority members for it. In the Senate two Democrats voted against it and two Progressives for it.\(^1\)

Because of the many individual items and rates it is difficult to say how much one tariff legislation reduces or increases the legislation which had been in effect, but one student of Wilson's domestic policies estimated a reduction of 26\% in rates over the Payne-Aldrich Act.\(^2\) The Republicans predicted dire consequences resulting from inundation of our home markets by foreign goods, but their fears were exaggerated. A deficit did threaten in 1915, but it was because of the European war. There is good argument for the statement that the deficit would have been greater had the Payne-Aldrich high rates on imports still been in effect.

With the advent of the Wilson administration and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff came a new principle in federal taxation. The Sixteenth Amendment had been passed and ratified during Taft's term but did not go into effect.

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\(^2\) McKown, op. cit., 67.
until 1913. It was the duty of the Congress and President Wilson to exact laws determining the extent and direction of this new policy. The drafting of the income tax clauses was done under the direction of Congressman Cordell Hull. They were graduated to the extent of no tax for a $3,000 (single person) income and fixed a rate of 1% on any income in excess of this amount, with an additional 1% on incomes above $20,000 and reaching 6% on incomes over $500,000.¹ Compared to present day rates, the tax did not amount to much, but it marked a change in the basis of taxation which the rich of the North and East did not appreciate. The alignment of the South with the West in 1916 was indicated already in the income tax of 1913.

In attempting to redeem his second party pledge, the passage of an adequate currency and banking law, President Wilson early found opposition both within the ranks of his own party and from the minority. Representative Glass and Senator Owen led the extended fight in the two houses. While the President needed only eleven minutes of the time of both houses to describe to them the need for banking reform,² it took Congress six months to complete the Federal Reserve Act. A central authority over banking was

¹ United States Statutes at Large, V. 39, Pt. 1 (64th Congress, Session I), Ch. 436.
² The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, V. 1, 11-14.
needed, even most bankers would admit, but the question of who would be in authority was the catch. The bankers desired that they, as the group experienced in such affairs, should make up the central body or at least it should be under their control, but many Democrats protested that the fundamental principles of the party would be betrayed if the bankers had their way. A large faction of the party, including Bryan, still represented the old hostility to the "money power", and when a Wall Street banker was appointed to the Federal Reserve Board, there were many protests from politicians who professed to believe that the "big boys" were taking over.  

Bryan, Senator Owen, and the liberal Brandeis maintained that the central governing board of the system should not be composed of bankers but should be made up exclusively of government employees and that the currency to be issued should be an obligation of the United States rather than of the banks. Senator Glass, the "father" of the bill, favored greater control by the bankers, and a split in the party, or at least between Bryan and Wilson, who tended to support Glass, was threatened. Bryan warned the President that if the Glass bill was introduced he would use his influence to defeat it. Some weeks later the President endeavored to get Bryan to drop his resistance to the bill, but the "Great Commoner"

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1 Frank B. Lord and James W. Bryan (editors), Woodrow Wilson's Administration and Achievements, 21.
persisted in his original view. His firmness gave hints that he might resign from the Cabinet and fight Wilson within the Democratic party. The difficulty was solved when Wilson, heeding the advice of Brandeis to curb the money trust, made his terms with the progressives. Glass made stormy protests, but saw the light when Wilson summoned a delegation of bankers and explained to them that a private activity could not control a regulatory organization set up to regulate that particular activity.

On September 18, 1913 the bill passed the House by 278 to 85 with 48 Republicans for it and only three Democrats opposed. The Senate took longer, finally seeing it through on December 19 by a vote of 54 to 43. After the passage of the Federal Reserve Act when the machinery actually began to operate criticism almost disappeared.

The third reform Wilson sought was legislation to curb monopoly and to protect the rights of labor. In the winter of 1913-1914 Wilson started his drive to enact laws

2 Alfred Lief, Brandeis: The Personal History of an American Ideal, 273-274.
4 Congressional Record, V. 5, Pt. 2 (63rd Congress, 2nd Session), 1230.
5 Ruth Cranston, The Story of Woodrow Wilson, 148-149.
strengthening the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, set up a Federal Trade Commission, safeguarding the rights of labor unions, and establishing more liberal credits for farmers. "Big Business" perhaps thought it was best to beat a strategic retreat, for the younger Morgan and George F. Baker, the President of the First National Bank of New York, announced they intended to withdraw from directorships they held in a large number of corporations. Although the President assured business that he was ready to meet them half way, he continued with the reforms which he avowed would bring "peace" and success to the average businessman.

The principle of exempting trade unions and agriculture from prosecution under the Sherman Act had been close to passage twice in previous years. Wilson and the Democrats fulfilled their campaign promises by passing the exemptions as a rider on the main bill, the Clayton Act, which clarified and extended the Sherman Act. Later a Federal Trade Commission was established for the purpose of setting up machinery of enforcement. While there was some question of where the President stood on trust busting, the Democratic party dissenters were afraid to break with the President.

1 Josephson, op. cit., 488.

2 Some thought he tended to follow the feeling of the time that the game of trust-busting had gone far enough. The conservative McReynolds, the Attorney General, had shown willingness to work with the corporations. Frederick L. Paxson, Pre-War Years, 1913-1917, 97.
As Representative Hardwick of Georgia remarked, "If we tear Woodrow Wilson down there is no hope or chance for any other Democrat in this land". We must "support this administration or be turned into the wilderness for forty years more."\(^1\)

Perhaps as important as the Clayton Act, or possibly more important, was the legislation affecting the farmers of the nation. The Underwood Act had removed import duties from a greatly expanded list of commodities the farmer purchased as a consumer. In recent years the farmer had been placed at the mercy of the manufacturing monopolies by the rapid introduction of farm machinery. The new tariff act aimed to correct that indirectly by reducing the tariff rates behind which the monopolies were sustained. Agricultural cooperatives were aided when the Clayton Act exempted them from the anti-trust laws. The Federal Reserve Act permitted loans by national banks on farm mortgages and permitted the extension of time payments. In May, 1916, after two years of debate, Congress passed the Federal Farm Loan Act, with the purpose of creating banking machinery suited to the farmer's needs—long term credits at reduced rates, and to make farms an attractive field of investment.\(^2\) Another piece of legislation aiding

\(^1\) *Ibid.*, 98.

\(^2\) *U. S. Statues at Large*, V. 39, Pt. 1 (64th Congress 1st Session), Ch. 245.
the farmer was the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 which made available money from the Federal Government to be matched by the states for county-farm demonstration work.

In the 1912 campaign Wilson declared for a policy of "positive conservation", and stated, "We must use the resources of the country, not lock them up." During his first years Wilson, and his Secretary of Interior, Lane, pressed for the development of the mineral resources of the United States and Alaska. Royalties and leases in Alaska and in the West were granted but care was taken that monopolies were not established. Secretary of the Navy Daniels fought to keep the oil reserves set aside by Roosevelt from the hands of those who sought illegally, as he thought, to set up claims within the reserves. Certain acts were passed which benefitted the dairyman and the farmer of the West. Farmers with irrigation systems were given twice as long to pay off their debts to the government incident to establishing the system on their land. In 1916 funds were made available for the construction of roads, fire prevention, and the application of modern forest science in the National Forests. Several states cooperated with the Federal Government in this program.

1 The New Freedom, op. cit., 77-79.
2 McKown, op. cit., 34-35. Lane was more successful in this than his counterpart in the Harding Administration.
3 Ibid., 44.
And so Wilson and the Democrats legislated their 1912 platform of regulation of business into effect. The legislation in general was such to meet the demands of those who desired changes by law to stop the inroads of business and vested interests upon the economic liberty of the average consumer that the Republicans were to leave off almost all mention of domestic issues concerning legislation during the 1916 campaign. Progressives, although they had fought also for political rights which were for the most part within the power of states to grant, recognized in Wilson by this time a man who was putting into law many of the things they had fought for during the past several years. It was going to be difficult for the Republican Party to name a candidate who could make the Western Progressives overlook the man in the White House.

Foreign Policy

As he was liberal in domestic policy, so Wilson also tried to pursue a "democratic" diplomacy. In the period preceding Wilson's administration, American foreign policy had followed either the line of expansion through "dollar diplomacy" or the line of the "balance of power". The Democratic platform of 1912 rejected our imperialistic policy when it stated: "We condemn the experiment in imperialism as an inexcusable blunder". When in power

1 South Trimble (Compiler), Platforms of the Two Great Political Parties, 178.
the Democrats and Wilson spoke more softly but did not overlook their pledges. The new Administration gave more self-government to Puerto Rico and to the Philippines, promising the latter independence in the future. President Wilson neglected to help economic interests exploit China and refused to utter threats against Japan. Closer home his practices were not so liberal; he promised Latin America freedom from intervention on behalf of the economic interests of the United States, but he never was able to carry out his pledges, and our Caribbean policy continued practically the same.

Mexico was a sore spot during Wilson's first administration. What was happening in such an important nation so near our borders was naturally of great importance to the Administration and of great interest to the people. Wilson, as had his predecessor, Taft, took an attitude of "watchful waiting"—waiting for the internal disturbances in Mexico to cease, at the same time desiring to assist her to self-stabilization. Although President Wilson was stubbornly insistent that "Huerto must go", he was never anxious to precipitate a controversy with Mexico which might result in war. In April 1914, however, he felt forced to send in a landing party at Vera Cruz as a reprisal for what was termed an insult to American blue jackets.¹ Forcible intervention in Mexico appeared to the

¹ David Lawrence, The True Story of Woodrow Wilson, 103.
American people as an unwelcome duty, and was not in the serious thought of either party even when the outs were making points against the ins. ¹

As serious as was the problem of the relationship with the country on our Southern border, the war in Europe brought far greater troubles to the Wilson Administration. The Campaign of 1916 was fought with a backdrop of war. Few people in America at the time had realized the importance to Europe of the assassination of a relatively obscure Archduke and his wife at Sarajevo in the Summer of 1914. Even when most of Europe had entered the conflict the practically unanimous sentiment of the Americans was gratitude that we were not involved. The President saw the far-reaching importance of the conflict but had no idea that the war would last over six months. ² He offered to the belligerents his tender of good offices, issued a proclamation of neutrality a few days later, and asked the American people to be "impartial in thought as well as in action" in order that the country might be "neutral in fact as well as in name". ³

Neutrality and peace were what most Americans surely desired to keep. The reasons were historical, geographical

¹ Fred Palmer, Newton D. Baker, 16.
² Lawrence, op. cit., 141.
³ August 20, 1914, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V. XVI, 7978.
and economic, as well as humane. The idea that America should keep to herself, and not mix in the feuds of the old world was one of the "maxims of political sagacity" "bequeathed to his successors by the Father of his Country; and it was a maxim that entirely harmonized with every American instinct."¹ The Monroe Doctrine and its recipro­cate was still held in high esteem. Anyway, Europe was too far away from the people of America in 1914 to mean much to them; even some of the "statesmen" had a difficult time in visualizing the reality of such a horrible war.² In addition to sheer indifference there was a promise of heavy economic gains to be derived from the sale of goods to the warring powers. At the time of the outbreak of the war, the United States was in the midst of a recession. Over 200,000 railway workers were laid off during the winter of 1914-1915. Miners were out of work. A total of 2,250,000 workers were unemployed. But by the summer of 1915 the war boom had taken effect and instead of unem­ployment there was a shortage of workers.³

There were factors and influences on the side of non­neutrality, however. The world-wide extent of the war, and the closer inter-relations of nations which had grown up in

¹ William Archer, The Peace President, 86-87.
² It was generally held that Bryan was one of those.
³ "Hunger and the Public Memory", Sunset, V. 37 (No­vember, 1916), 35-36.
recent years made almost from the first a series of conflicts between the interests of the United States and those of one or the other set of belligerents. Preservation of neutrality was hard, and was rendered harder by the active sympathy felt for the different belligerents by many Americans. A further complication came from the growing feeling that the United States did not possess an army and navy sufficiently strong to meet a possible situation in a world so full of strife. The last few months of 1914 saw the rise of organized peace-at-any-price sentiment as a counter for this national preparedness agitation, and it drew much support from pro-German circles.

The President appeared to incline toward the Pacifists. He called the discussion of preparedness "good mental exercise", referred to some of its advocates as "nervous and excitable", and in his message to Congress in December, 1914, took the position that American armaments were quite sufficient for our needs. He urged that we maintain our strength by retention of our self-possession, and by an increase in the strength of the National Guard, "the citizen's army". 1 In his policy of anti-preparedness he did not reflect the opinions of a large number of Americans--how large a number it is impossible to say. But the Congressional elections of 1914 gave some clue. In that election, which was held several weeks after the President's

1 The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, V. 1, 78.
neutrality statements, the Democrats lost 63 seats in the House, retaining a majority of 27, and held their majority of 10 in the Senate.\(^1\)

While almost everyone in America wanted to stay clear of the conflict in Europe, it is natural that the majority would sympathize with one side. That side was the Allied. Most people here were descendants of the Anglo-Saxons. Further, the ideologies, philosophy and moral values were close kin to those of the English. Nevertheless, the natural disposition of Americans was to like Germans. Most Americans had neighbors of German birth or ancestry. Germans had been with us in large numbers since the immigration of 1849 and as Mark Sullivan said, we liked them. But when Belgium was invaded and the propagandistic atrocity stories made the rounds, we began to look askance upon those of German blood.

When the German submarines began sinking ships and endangering the lives of Americans, the neutrality of President Wilson was strained. There was a difference between the interference by the British and by the Germans. While the British injured only property Germany endangered

\(^1\) Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era, Years of Peace, 1910-1917*, 425. It should be noted here that the West stood with Wilson. It is stated in another source that the majority of the Democrats was reduced to 29 in the House, but they gained two in the Senate. William S. Meyers, *The Republican Party: A History*, 419. The classification of former Progressives was difficult in some cases, perhaps explaining the discrepancies.
life as well. The average American felt this and was pleased when the President warned the German Government that he would hold Germany to "strict accountability". This action met the approval of almost everyone but the pro-German. The average man probably thought that America's rights were being adequately defended so far as words could do so.

The climax came with the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915, when 1,198 persons were drowned, 114 of whom were Americans. Many people were sure that war with Germany would result. Colonel House, in England at the time, was one of those. Popular sentiment would have been with the President, it is generally thought, if he had asked Congress to declare war. Instead, he spoke before a group of new citizens and uttered the unfortunate phrase, "too proud to fight". Perhaps Wilson was right in judging that the feeling then was only temporary, that after time for reflection the hearts of the people would not be in a war at that time. At the bottom he knew that the United States generally desired peace.

1 See his note to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin, February 10, 1915. Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, V. 1, 222.

2 He said to Ambassador Page that night, "We shall be at war with Germany within a month". The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, V. 7, 12.
Theodore Roosevelt and the Background

While Wilson believed in peace and strived to maintain it, another very important leader opposed him in most of his efforts. 1 Theodore Roosevelt, along with Wilson, was the key figure in the background of the 1916 campaign, as well as in the preconvention campaign and the election itself. One of the most outstanding personalities in the history of this country, Roosevelt early had caught the public eye. As a member of the New York Legislature he was in the news with his idiosyncrasies and his investigations. As Police Commissioner of New York City the public was not unaware of his presence. Even as Civil Service Commissioner he made the news by public fights with and chastisements of certain politicians. When the Spanish American War began he found himself in his element, and as a result of a brave dash up San Juan Hill (or one nearby) 2 the attention of the public was upon the spirited colonel. When he returned the New York gubernatorial seat awaited him.

No man ever stepped into the Presidency with more personal prestige and power than "T R". With a quick mind, sharp intellect, young and energetic, Theodore Roosevelt

1 See William Allen White, Autobiography, 544.

2 Probably it was Kettle Hill, the hill to the right of the San Juan Fort. See Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 192.
was one to keep the public interested. At the same time he somehow was able to please many people, to have something for almost everybody, and somehow almost always spoke the prevailing tone of the people. Neither a liberal nor a conservative, he struck the middle ground. Many felt at the end of his years as President that he was not a progressive at all, or a progressive of very limited aims. La-Follette and Eugene Debs thought little of him. 1 "T R"'s real value to the Progressive Party was in the leadership he assumed, and which was accepted with some reservations. "The mass of people did not quite know which way to turn in the titanic conflict between progressivism and the interests, and Roosevelt quite honestly reflected their indecision." 2

While Roosevelt represented those who took the middle ground in the fight between the interests and the liberals, there was no middle ground connected with his attitude on war. The warrior strain was evident in him from his youth. As a boy he had been ready to fight. And he failed to grow out of the stage. Twice between 1911 and 1914 he had talked of raising a troop of mounted infantry to invade Mexico. There was no war, so he substituted the Brazilian jungles for the human enemy. Back in 1898 he was in a

1 Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics, 249.
2 Ibid., 251.
tizzy to organize his "Rough Riders" and lead them into glorious battle. He pulled strings and worked like a beaver to get his group across to Cuba among the first so he could be in the fight before the Spaniards were routed. After the war broke out in Europe, he saw a great threat to the safety of America. Preparedness became a watchword and objective for "T R" to such a degree that many named him as leading jingoist of this nation.²

It was perhaps the warlike side of his character which was most obviously different from Wilson. It became a factor in the campaign, for Roosevelt's dislike of Wilson turned to hate when the President suggested that reparation be paid to Columbia because of the possible injustice of the Panama incident. In this suggestion Wilson was officially acknowledging that Roosevelt had been guilty of bad international manners. And in 1914, "if one accepted the Wilson interpretation, the parallel between Belgium and Panama was too close to make the subject completely academic."³ In striking back, Roosevelt described Wilson's

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¹ See Pringle, op. cit., 187.
² A moderate viewpoint of this side of Roosevelt was presented by the editor of a Western newspaper: "The Colonel is a good citizen and would not be for war. However, he is so enthusiastic and intemperate in his ideas and inflammable that he might lead us into war." Cheyenne State Leader, May 3, 1916, 4.
³ George Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, 314.
Mexican policy as one of "mushy amiability". In July, 1914, he wrote that he had no choice but to make war on the administration whose policy "meant the abandonment of the interest and honor of America".

But Roosevelt accused Wilson of timidity in a much more important quarrel. When war broke out in Europe he kept quiet for a while. Later, when the Colonel saw that President Wilson was doing little if anything to prepare for what Roosevelt thought was certain war for us in the future, the virile man of San Juan Hill and of the African jungles revolted. He felt that the safety of the country demanded that Wilson be defeated. As one newspaperman friend of his, the editor of the New York Evening Mail, has written:

Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to Roosevelt's desires in 1912, there can be no doubt that he had any purpose in 1916 other than to find the man most certain to beat Wilson and his supreme reason for desiring Wilson's defeat was his conviction that the President's timid policies were forcing the nation on the rocks.

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1 Ibid., 308, quoted from Outlook of July 11, 1914. However, for the rest of the campaign Roosevelt was strongly silent on the subject of Mexico. His friends had told him that he was losing votes for the Republicans by his extreme criticism.

CHAPTER II

The Pre-Convention Campaign

Progressives, Roosevelt and the Republicans

The politics of the United States in the months preceding the nominations by the parties in the early summer of 1916 was dominated by the personal readjustments of individual Progressives, the scrambling for position among the leaders, the maneuvering by the regular Republicans to once again build a united front, and the efforts of the Administration to show a record of performance before the showdown. Some of the more important problems revolved around the question of how the Progressives would use their waning but still formidable strength, and more particularly, what the old Bull Moose himself would do now that his try at forming a new party to replace the old apparently had failed. The 1914 Congressional election returns showed the Progressives that neither had their party attracted those Republicans who were dissatisfied with the conservatism of the Old Guard, nor had the Democrats lost to the new party. Rather it was the reverse. Many Progressives returned to the Republican ranks, while others were won over to the Democrats and Wilson. That the third party had failed to achieve permanency was clear after November, 1914. Apparently the only questions remaining were how long it would be before the party completely collapsed, and what
would be the terms, if any, the weakened organization could exact before complete surrender.

What the fate of the Progressive Party would be and what the terms of its possible surrender to the Republicans would be depended to a considerable extent upon Theodore Roosevelt. Probably never completely sympathetic with the split with the Republicans, although he had led the rebellion in 1912, Roosevelt early showed doubts about the future of the new party. Immediately after the 1912 election, feeling that the 4,000,000 votes the Progressives garnered were more for the leader than for its party and its principles, he was ready to give up the party as a lost cause. He campaigned in 1914 only because he felt it his duty. As it appeared to him, he was paying his debts incurred in 1912. As he declared to O.K. Davis, the Progressive Party Secretary: "This election makes me a free man. Thereafter I am going to do what I damn please." 

1 William Allen White sensed that Roosevelt was "leery" of the "divine mission of the Progressive Party." A considerable percentage (40 to 60 percent) of the Roosevelt vote in 1912 was a protest against the outrageous action of the Republicans National Committee, White, and apparently Roosevelt, thought. Autobiography of William Allen White, 503.

Being practical minded, Roosevelt recognized a sinking ship when he was on one, and was preparing to act accordingly. Soon after the outbreak of the war in Europe, however, Roosevelt began to see a possible use for those Progressive votes. The need for a more militaristic viewpoint on the part of the country required a strong leader to push it through. Wilson was doing little to get us prepared for the eventual conflict, so Roosevelt saw the necessity for his defeat by a strong preparedness advocate. It was Roosevelt's objective to see that the Republicans nominated such a man. And although his love for his country and his belief in the necessity for preparedness were his dominant desires, he, being Roosevelt, saw himself as that leader. If another who believed in strong preparedness could be nominated and elected Roosevelt would support him, but as time went on more and more he considered himself the logical candidate if the country was ready for what he offered.

But the Colonel was a long time fully making up his mind to run for the Presidency again. His defeat in 1912, although expected, was galling. This time he wished to be sure he had sufficient support; the old fighter was not yet ready to enter the contest until he knew who would be in his corner. Roosevelt's chief support in 1912 had been in the

1 As late as October, 1915, he wrote to a friend that there was "not the slightest possibility of my returning to public life". Roosevelt to Strachey, October 9, 1915. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, box 394.
West, a section of the country which had shown no great desire to join in "T. R.'s" recent fight for preparedness. Would a sufficient number of Progressives support him in spite of his preparedness stand? To see for himself Roosevelt made a journey through that section and found his suspicions verified; there was a bent for peace in the old Bull Moose. In fact, some of the most militant opposition to any entanglement in European affairs was voiced by Progressives. Many important people in the party, such as Albert J. Beveridge, Amos Pinchot and Jane Addams felt that America should steer clear of the conflict in Europe. Roosevelt was finding that many people with convictions of neutrality, and with a belief that many hard won social reforms can be lost by wars, do not jump the gun in times of international stress. As Roosevelt continued his preparedness campaign, which as time went on became more jingoistic in character to the peace-minded, large groups of Progressives deserted him on the issue.¹

But he continued his efforts to awaken the country. The cause was too important, and apparently, the pull of the Presidency was too great. The former President held back for some time, but in the end, as in 1912, the attraction was irresistible. In 1908 he fought against the

¹ William Allen White, while a great friend and admirer of Roosevelt, wrote in his Autobiography: "Many Progressives heard Roosevelt's war drums with distaste and uneasiness. . . .", p. 513.
nomination. In 1912 he, at first at least, did not really want it, but this time his "strong meat", foreign affairs, was in the foreground. To determine further (and later) the strength of the Progressive Party and surrepticiously, the strength of Roosevelt with it and with Republicans, a questionnaire was sent out by certain Progressives to the Progressive leaders in the various states: How many Progressives have gone back into the Republican Party? What chance do the Progressives have of controlling the selection of delegates to the Republican Convention? The answers, carefully forwarded to Roosevelt, indicated that he might have a chance after all, since the state leaders felt, by a five to four margin, that Roosevelt could secure the state delegations if he so desired.¹

But would a sufficient number of Republicans, along with many of his still faithful Progressives, support Roosevelt in a drive for the Republican nomination? He wrote to his old friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, for his opinion. The Massachusetts Senator replied that he would like nothing better, but doubted that Roosevelt had a chance under the circumstances. He knew that too many Republicans were still too bitter because Roosevelt had split the party in 1912 and that insufficient time had elapsed for the sores to heal. Mr. Lodge could have added that the Old Guard wanted a

¹ Ibid., 327.
candidate whom they could control, one who had not revolted in 1912, and one who would unite the party sufficiently to win. To most of the Old Guard Roosevelt was anathema, and failed to meet their requirements.

Not all of the Republican leaders felt that Roosevelt should be shunted aside. Senator Fall of New Mexico offered his support in December. An Illinois Congressman lined up some other members of Congress for "T. R." in January and expected quite a pilgrimage to Oyster Bay within the next two or three months. Other Republicans followed with renewed demands that Roosevelt pitch his hat into the ring. In fact at an earlier date there must have been some realization of the cards Roosevelt held. There is some feeling that the Colonel as early as 1914 had made an agreement, or at least had reached an understanding with Republican leaders. The essence of the agreement was supposed to have been that the Republicans were to give "T. R." a fair chance

1 Lodge himself had thought that Roosevelt's objective was to kill the Republican Party.


4 John Spargo, "Bainbridge Colby", *American Secretaries of State*, 185-186. Spargo declares there was such an agreement, but fails to cite particulars in sufficient proof to completely verify his claim. Such a possibility is mentioned also in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, V. 6, 246.
to get the Republican nomination in 1916. In return, Roosevelt was not to run as the Progressive candidate if he failed to obtain the Republican nomination. Whether true or not, the claim of such an agreement is not far-fetched, judging from actions of certain leaders of the two parties. As early as 1913 Senator Bird of Massachusetts reported to Roosevelt that there was a rumor going around that the Colonel would be the candidate of the Republican Party in 1916. In 1914 Bird specifically mentioned the danger of "the feeling of a secret deal to bring the Progressive and the Republican Parties together....". Roosevelt's endorsement of a Republican in the Massachusetts election, the Senator warned Roosevelt, would be called a surrender to the Republicans.

While actions of Progressive leaders George Perkins, Roosevelt and others in holding the Progressive Convention at the same time and city with the Republican Convention does nothing to refute such a theory, it is probable that the feeling and rumor arose out of Roosevelt's belief that the Progressive Party was doomed and his desire to return to the Republican fold. Since 1912, particularly since 1914, Roosevelt had shown that he was becoming less "radical", and during 1915 he continued judiciously to mix preparedness and conservatism. The control of business he now advocated as a mild, benevolent control. No longer did he emphasize the evil deeds of the malefactors of great
wealth. Many letters of his were addressed to the captains of big industry. Preparedness and business are practically inseparable. More and more often he could be seen in the company of Republicans. Editors of business and Republican publications such as the New York Sun, New York Tribune, the Bankers Magazine, and George Harvey's North American Review, editorially pledged their support.

By December, 1915, the bug had really bitten Mr. Roosevelt. The country needed a strong hand at the helm to guide it through the troubled waters where future Lusitania's might be sunk. So he wrote to Progressive leaders that he did not want to give the erroneous impression that he was a candidate, but he would be gratified if it could be made known that there was a "growth of sentiment in favor of my ideas and what I stand for."¹ The word got around that he was receptive and to take himself out of a situation that was developing too fast—the Republicans had not been sufficiently cultivated as yet—he sailed for the West Indies.²

Roosevelt in the Ring

Although Roosevelt detached himself from the scene, his friends guarded his interests back home, and when it was

² Stoddard, op. cit., 429.
reported Elihu Root wrote a sort of Republican platform to be read at a meeting a month later, Roosevelt was warned that Root was intending this to be a platform for himself. So from Trinidad, Roosevelt, with the aid of Stoddard, issued the famous Trinidad statement, which to the "amazement" of its authors, was interpreted "by some Republicans" (and also the press), as a bid for the Republican nomination.¹ Seizing the opportunity afforded him by a Massachusetts request that his name be placed on the primary ballot, Mr. Roosevelt made public what he had been saying privately for some time:

I will not enter into any fight for the nomination and I will not permit any factional fight to be made in my behalf. Indeed, I will go further and say that it would be a mistake to nominate me unless the country has in its mood something of the heroic, unless it feels not

¹ Ibid., 429. In another book, Stoddard explains it this way. Elihu Root had been persuaded that he could be nominated and elected President. He gave way to the persuasions of the Wadsworth-Penrose-Roraback faction. The platform that Root would run on was an "out and out Bull Moose document". They were going to nominate Root on a "T R" platform. A conference of Roosevelt's friends was called by Stoddard and it was decided that only one thing could be done—Roosevelt must anticipate that publication; Root must not be permitted to steal his thunder. After Roosevelt's "heroic mood" declaration, Root had his platform pulled from under him, and it was never published. Stoddard, It Costs to Be President, 108-109.

Mr. Stoddard is more illuminating and frank when he comments: "Of course, the Trinidad statement was not merely to prevent Root's nomination, for that was always classed as impossible; there could only be one interpreter of Progressive party principles, however, and his name was not Root". Ibid., 110.
only like devoting itself to ideals, but...to realize those ideals in action. ¹

Reaction to Roosevelt's Trinidad statement was varied; many were startled by the possibilities, but at the National Progressive headquarters the statement was received with enthusiasm. ² The innermost council of the Progressive leaders realized that they were now assured of a Progressive Convention to hold over the heads of the Republicans. In July, 1915, a conference of Progressive leaders had met in New York, and in line with Roosevelt's ideas, had decided to allow the party in each state to determine for itself whether to run local tickets in 1916 or to fuse with the Republicans. But under no circumstances was the party to disband or to lose its identity. In January, 1916, the Progressive leaders decided to hold the 1916 Progressive National Convention at the same time as the Republican Convention, thus while they were bidding for reconciliation with the Republicans, at the same time they were holding a


² Actually, Roosevelt referred to the Republican nomination in his Trinidad speech. The rejoicing on the part of most of the Progressives was a presumptuous mistake which only added to their disappointment when Roosevelt declined the nomination by the Progressive Convention. To assist in determining the reason for the "misunderstanding", Roosevelt never indicated specifically that he would refuse the Progressive nomination.
club over their heads. ^ Now, with Roosevelt's hat in the ring, that club possibly could be an armored one.

To different people that club represented power to attain different objectives. To Mr. Roosevelt it was a way to take advantage of the trading power of the Progressive vote. His objectives were to defeat Wilson and to elect a strong America first national preparedness man. Since he could picture no other person with stronger qualities along these lines than himself, he hoped for the nomination by the Republicans. If he could not obtain the coveted prize, then perhaps he could force the Republicans to name a candidate with the necessary qualifications. As time went on his own candidacy became more and more important to him. Perkins agreed with Roosevelt that preparedness was the chief aim and that the way to achieve the aim, since the Progressive Party was "dead", was to return to the Republican fold. But Perkins saw the futility of Roosevelt's attempt to regain the Presidency. What he really wanted, according to William Allen White, was an effective fusion

^ William Allen White thought they already had used a club. White knew that the Republicans would nominate an acceptable candidate only if they were sure that otherwise the Progressives would run their own candidate. His plan was to file a full set of Presidential electors before the convention in June, and to have a candidate for Congress file his nomination papers in every district. Walter Johnson, *William Allen White's America*, 261.
of the two parties and the nomination of Charles E. Hughes.¹ Others, also preparedness advocates and friends of Roosevelt, desired to influence the Republican nomination, but not in the Colonel's direction. Sculptor Gutzon Borglum, New Hampshire Progressive leader, communicated with Roosevelt very often and many times asked him at least indirectly to use his influence not to obtain the nomination for himself but instead to "name a close and trusted friend". Borglum desired a preparedness advocate, but did not desire to endanger chances of Republican and Progressive harmony.²

A second group desired Roosevelt as a candidate of the Progressives and were practical enough to attempt to get the Republicans to nominate him also. To most of the Progressives the threat of a third candidate was intended to force the Republicans to publicly announce themselves for social reforms, and probably to some, the maintenance of neutrality and peace. Those who favored the latter purposes surely were blind in supporting Roosevelt, but

¹ White, Autobiography, 523.
² Borglum worked diligently for General Wood, a good friend of Roosevelt. In January Borglum wrote a long, philosophical letter to the ex-President advising the Colonel to retain his past honors and to win even greater acclaim by remaining a private citizen, and "automatically become the center of world arbitration; you would remain a great unprejudiced force, and in readiness to wait upon the world." Roosevelt could do that, Borglum thought, if he would name Wood, a man who would "include you in his privatest councils." Borglum to Roosevelt, January 31, 1916. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, box 185.
to them he was still their hero and if he could be nomi-
inated everything would be fine for their aims, for the
party and for their country.

In order to obtain the desired nomination by the Re-
publicans, Roosevelt decided it was best not to make a
straight out fight but to run without appearing to do so.
The Progressive Convention would be held, but the dele-
gates were to go uninstructed for any man. He desired
that the more conservative men be chosen as delegates and
wherever they had a chance to capture the delegation to
the Republican Convention, they should do so and rejoin
the old party. Ex-Senator Albert J. Beveridge of Indi-
ana, who had suspected the drift of affairs since the Sum-
mer of 1914, took these actions as final evidence that the
Colonel was ready to go back into the Republican Party "on
his own terms and in his own interests".1

But was the Republican Party willing to accept the
Colonel "on his own terms"? Certainly at an earlier date,
as Lodge had indicated, the old party would not have been
willing. For a long time after the election of 1914 the
Republicans believed that "all they had to do was to name
a candidate and he would be elected".2 When war came to


2 Arthur W. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, 283.
Europe they began to see that a victory for the party might require some work, yet they remained confident. At that stage they were not amenable to Colonel Roosevelt's return as a possible candidate. Early in 1916 at a testimonial dinner for the president of the Republican Club of New York, the leaders of the party made it plain that if an effort was made to make Roosevelt the nominee of the party it would never win their sanction and would be fought to the end.1

By Spring conditions had changed. Wilson's strength had been under-estimated; the Republicans would need all the support and votes that they could get. Roosevelt's strength was becoming more evident also. Various polls indicated that he was the top-ranking candidate in certain areas.2 In addition his personal appeal attracted many ordinary voters as well as leaders to his home at Sagamore Hill. Bus and train loads of New Yorkers came to cheer him on. More and more politicians visited "T. R." to bask within the glow of his effervescent personality. On April 8, the former Secretary of the Navy under Taft, George Von L. Meyer, caused a "sensation" when he called at

1 "I believe," said Franklin Murphy, Republican National Committeeman from New Jersey, "that any strong man the Republicans nominate can defeat Mr. Wilson. It is a Republican year and we are certain of victory." Atlanta Constitution, January 25, 1916, 1.

Sagamore Hill and after a conference with Roosevelt came out unreservedly for "T. R." as the "psychological candidate". With him at the conference was Charles G. Washburn who managed the campaign in Massachusetts to have Senator John W. Weeks, an Old Guard, named as the favorite son. Other standpatters came over for Roosevelt. The vice-president of the Union League Club, of which Elihu Root was president, came out for the Colonel. This man, Robert C. Morris, was a former president of the Republican Club, and a supporter of Taft in 1912. Senator Boies Penrose, Pennsylvania Old Guard and Republican boss, held several conferences with Roosevelt. This action by such a staunch Old Guard and such a powerful man caused much anxiety in certain circles. The conferences were held before the date of the primaries in Pennsylvania and the wily old reprobate, Penrose, was only temporarily affiliating himself with the Progressives in order to assure his own renomination for Senator. The reports that the Roosevelt backers received,

1 Ibid., April 9, 1916, I.

2 When asked by Nicholas Butler just what the facts were, Penrose made a characteristic reply: My dear boy, you people must remember that the Progressives carried Pennsylvania in 1912, and that they are very strong there now. I am going to have a hard fight in the primaries next Tuesday, so I have entered into partnership with the Roosevelt men, which partnership will be dissolved on Tuesday afternoon at six o'clock. I shall have all the assets and they will have all the liabilities. See Butler, op. cit., 549.
however, were that Penrose had fallen into line and that the delegates from West Virginia would follow suit. The Progressive Party's financial backer, Perkins, must have been happy to hear that reports from Wall Street, his old stomping ground, now were encouraging for Roosevelt. The Colonel's good friend, Senator Lodge, had changed his mind since he had earlier informed Roosevelt that he had no chance of nomination, and wrote to "T R" that he now noticed a steady drift of Republicans toward Roosevelt, principally because of his stand on preparedness.

With such encouragement from some of the Old Guard, the campaign to nominate Roosevelt by indirection now was thrown into high gear. On May 11, Roosevelt formally entered the race for the nomination. In writing a letter approving the activities of the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League, an organization established for the purpose of obtaining his nomination, Roosevelt continued his preparedness crusade, and characteristically, coupled his own candidacy, the league and those supporting both, with patriotism. In his opening campaign address he


2 Lodge, to Roosevelt, February 1, 1916. Ibid., box 286.

3 New York Times, May 12, 1916, 1. The League never lacked funds in its drive to nominate Roosevelt. The automobile group in Detroit, Ogden Armour, Alfred I. DuPont, and others with money contributed generously.
concentrated on Wilson and the lack of preparedness shown by the Administration.¹ He made a few other speeches, all on preparedness. On a comparatively short western tour, speaking before rather large crowds at Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, Little Rock, and Detroit he did not pussy-foot or soften his attack upon those who did not believe in preparedness. The Colonel really believed in what he was preaching—the necessity that this country should be strong to meet the German menace—and furthermore he believed that he was the man who could build that strength.

His sister explained:

Theodore Roosevelt believed that he could help not only his country but the countries of the world were he nominated and elected in 1916, just as he firmly believed that should Mr. Wilson be renominated and re-elected to that position, America and the countries of the world would be worse off rather than better off, and yet, no matter before what audience he spoke, were it East, West, North, or South, he spoke with the ardor of conviction, never for one moment withholding one belief, no matter how unpalatable it might be to the section of the country to which he was giving his message, did he feel that that belief should be clearly demonstrated to that portion of the people.²

Old Guard Roots for Root

During 1915 and early 1916, before it became evident that the support of Roosevelt would be necessary for Republican leaders desired to get Elihu Root to be a

¹ Ibid., April 28, 1916, 6.
² Corinne Roosevelt Robinson, My Brother Theodore Roosevelt, 296–297.
candidate. It is difficult to say whether the loudest exponents of his candidacy thought he had a good chance to win, but everyone had a great admiration for Root's unquestioned ability. Root himself did not desire the honor. He was seventy-two and considered himself too old for the task. "You are bent on killing me," was Root's plaintive remark when the matter was put up to him. He had been so close to the Presidency for so long that it had lost its glamour; all he could see in it was hard work. Charles Hilles, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, perhaps speaking for the Old Guard, came to see him and told him of the support for him throughout the country, and that many states would fall in line and support his candidacy if given the lead by New York.

In order to better Root's chances, a New York Republican Convention was held. Instructions for the delegates-at-large to the National Convention were to be taken up at that time. Root was named Temporary Chairman, and the speech that he gave was considered to be the keynote of the Republican campaign—an attack upon Wilson's policies. He was practically saying that Wilson would put

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1 Dunn, op. cit., 284.

2 What the emphasis upon Americanism and preparedness really signified, it has been stated, and validly it seems, was that to the Republicans and some Progressives Bull Moose issues were dead. Other issues had arisen. The topic of his speech was a bid for Roosevelt support. See New York Times, February 19, 1916, 4.
us into war when Wilson was about to run on the slogan that he kept us out of war.\footnote{Philip C. Jessup, \textit{Elihu Root}, V. II, 338-339.} The Hughes element at the convention won a partial victory, at least when it was decided to send the delegates unpledged. However, three of the four delegates met and endorsed Root as candidate for the Republican nomination. It was agreed that the significance of the move in general was that in addition to placing Root as a candidate it pointed out that Roosevelt was through in New York. Root was instrumental in driving Mr. Roosevelt from the National Convention four years before.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, February 17, 1916, 1.} William Barnes, Republican boss in Albany, and former Republican State Chairman fighting to maintain his leadership, was described as being all smiles because Roosevelt had been stopped. Barnes, wishing to bring Root forward as a desirable and available candidate, had insisted that the New York lawyer be chosen as Temporary Chairman of the State Convention. The effect of the speech was a dubious one. It was considered by many as a remarkable and skillful speech; however, as a fellow Republican leader wrote later, it desperately offended the pro-German element and it failed to influence the votes of many Republican Congressmen on the McLemore.
After the "keynote speech", a delegation from the Old Guard group in New York came to see Root and insisted that he run, as he was the only standard bearer behind whom the Republicans could rally "to carry out the ideas which he had so eloquently phrased at Carnegie Hall". Root accepted with reluctance and with the qualification that he would not work for his own nomination. He perhaps realized that he had only two slim chances of being nominated. If Hughes made a statement he would not resign from the Supreme Court even if nominated, or if Theodore Roosevelt endorsed Root, and his name was presented to the country as a nominee of a united party, Root would have a chance. The first possibility did not occur, and neither did the second. Roosevelt remembered that it was Root who was the chairman of the 1912 convention. A good friend of Roosevelt, Judge Albert D. Nortone of the Missouri Court of Appeals, said in April that he knew that Colonel Roosevelt would not support Root on the Republican ticket. He added that if Root were nominated it would simply mean a straight-out third party right down the line, just as in 1912. The judge let it be known that the Colonel was the

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1 Nicholas Murray Butler, *Across the Busy Years*, V. I, 251-252. The McLemore Resolution, which came before the House of Representatives not long afterward, warned Americans against traveling on English or French vessels.
only man who could carry Missouri. He and the Progressive leaders believed that if the Old Guard were in command of the Republican Convention Roosevelt again would lead a third party. At the same time he added that the sentiment of the West and Middle West "is very great against Root".  

When Root and Roosevelt had luncheon together there was great speculation as to what it meant. Robert Bacon, a good friend of both, asked them to his house on Park Avenue on March 31, and General Wood was invited also. The *New York Times* called it the most significant event of the campaign. Some Roosevelt adherents thought that it meant that their Colonel was as good as nominated. Some concluded that it meant that Root would be named Secretary of State if Roosevelt were elected. Roosevelt, careful to report to the Progressives without delay, said that at the luncheon they had talked only of preparedness and the necessity of doing something "that would enable us to get rid of Wilson". Ex-President Taft thought that Root had not improved his position by the meeting, and that Roosevelt had enveigled him into it to give the impression that Root favored him for the nomination.  

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1 April 1, 1916, 1.  
2 Jessup, *op. cit.*, 345.  
3 *Ibid.*, Mr. Taft, still with influence, continued to oppose Roosevelt's candidacy. He felt that although many who supported him in 1912 would support Roosevelt, a considerable number, sufficient to turn the scale in doubtful
Among the political leaders there was no serious belief that Root could be nominated. He was considered a Wall Street man. All over the West, according to William Allen White, there was a deep revulsion to Root and his type of mind.1 Perhaps Root realized this, and since he was an advocate of preparedness, Roosevelt was the logical candidate for him to support. At the same time he could not forget 1912, so he permitted his backers to start his campaign in earnest. The headquarters of Elihu Root were established in New York, and the money was obtained chiefly from the group commonly referred to as "Wall Street". This perhaps was one reason that led a Republican leader aligned with Governor Whitman of New York, a staunch Hughes man, to say that the propaganda for Root in New York was begun less for his nomination than for the purpose of thwarting any attempt on the part of Whitman to influence the New York delegation to swing to Hughes. 2 But this theory does not hold up all the way at least as far as Root is concerned, for in the middle of May Root

1 Jessup, op. cit., 348.

insisted that if Roosevelt were to run against him or even refused to support him, Hughes would be the best possible choice of the Republican Party. Many Root supporters said they knew Root did not have a chance, but that they were booming him in hope of smoking out Justice Hughes as the only possible candidate able to settle the squabble.

Pressure on Hughes

Charles E. Hughes had certain qualifications. As an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court he had made few political enemies. He was reputed to be able and honest. He had been mentioned for the nomination in previous campaigns. Left to themselves the standpat element of the Republican party would have nominated Root or perhaps Charles W. Fairbanks or Theodore E. Burton. But it was feared that none of these would be acceptable to either the liberals or to the Progressives. And so the name of Hughes, who was neither a liberal nor a conservative in the minds of many, was mulled over and over, and reluctantly accepted by more and more.

The one big drawback to the selection of Hughes was no one knew whether he would accept if nominated. Charles Hilles, Chairman of the Republican National Committee,

said that Hughes in 1912 when accepting the Justiceship had told a friend that he took the veil and renounced the world.¹

Rabbi Wise reported that in 1912 when he asked Hughes if he would accept the nomination in order to render a great public service, Hughes replied that "the Supreme Court must not be dragged into politics, and no man is as essential to his country's well-being as is the unstained integrity of the courts". Wise had not seen anything since that time to give the slightest basis for belief that the conviction had been altered.² Early in 1916 Justice Hughes reiterated his attitude when he wrote to a member of Congress:³ "I am entirely out of politics....I am totally opposed to the use of my name in connection with the nomination and selection or instruction of any delegates in my interests, either directly or indirectly."⁴

But such a declaration was not sufficient to quell all the hopes of those who saw in Hughes a candidate who might unify the party, or those who hoped to gain in some

¹ Ibid., January 26, 1916, 22.
² Frederick M. Davenport, "The Republican Nomination—Shall It Be Hughes?", Outlook, V. 112. (March 15, 1916), 628-632.
³ Representative C. Bascomb Slemp, only Republican Representative from Virginia in Congress.
way by his candidacy and election. Governor Whitman of
New York worked hard and diligently for the nomination of
the Justice. After the Slemp letter was made public the
Governor apparently thought it best to go easy for a while.
He said then that he never seriously entertained a plan to
make a fight for Hughes, but that he had "good reason to
think that he would run if nominated."1 A few weeks
earlier Whitman had stated that the Justice was undoubtedly
the choice of the majority of the representatives of the
state and nation. "He will be the best candidate and the
best President of any whose names have been suggested."2
In April Whitman was again out strong for his man. Since
the re-election of his friend, Frederick Tanner, to the
Republican State Chairmanship, the Governor felt himself
secure in the leadership of the Republican party in New
York. Many had felt that the Governor was backing Hughes
so that he could secure the re-nomination as Governor.
The opposing faction was backing Root.

The Governor of New York was not the only one for the
ex-Governor's candidacy, regardless of his campaign of
silence. When the Hughes name was mentioned in Congress,
he was cheered lustily by the Republican members.3

1 Ibid., February 15, 1916, 1.
3 Ibid., March 27, 1916, 4.
people recalled his prosecution of the life insurance companies and the gas monopolies in New York, and his record as Governor of New York when he fought the Republican bosses.\(^1\) He was respected for his integrity and good works, as well as for his brilliant mind. Many of the Republican leaders turned to him because of this support. He appeared to be the only man who had general support and a chance to beat President Wilson.

The question of how Hughes stood on the issues, however, was another big drawback. He had been on the bench since 1912 and had uttered no opinions in the political arena. The lack was particularly true in the field of foreign relations. The editorial writer of a periodical of the time early expressed this doubt and demonstrated political perspicacity when he wrote that one of the great issues in the campaign would be the policies of the Chief Executive with regard to the protection of American citizens on the high seas. "The supreme difficulty in nomi-

\(^1\) Irving Stone, *They Also Ran*, 100.

\(^2\) "Justice Hughes and the Presidency", *Outlook*, V. 112 (March 15, 1916), 602-615.
But did Justice Hughes himself agree? No one knew—

for publication. Editor Stoddard talked to him about this
time, but what was said did not become public until sev-
eral years after the campaign. Hughes had said, according
to Stoddard:

If there is any man supporting me or urging me to be
a candidate who has not now a fixed idea of the
course I would take if I were in the White House, then
he is doing his country a great wrong in placing my
name, even tentatively, before it. He has gone too
far in a state of ignorance which I am not called upon
to enlighten, or else his faith in me will last him
through the convention. I doubt whether those who
declare I should speak on national issues would be
satisfied with anything I should say, no matter how
definite and candid it should be. It may be as you
tell me, that those who are most solicitous that I
should remain silent are close friends of the Wilson
Administration. I have given no attention to such
matters and know nothing about them.

There were those who thought Hughes as a Supreme
Court Justice should remain silent, and should not resign
from that highest of our tribunals of justice. The Outlook expressed it well when it stated: "To allow the
element of change to enter into the court through polit-
ical controversy would be to deprive the Court of its chief
usefulness." Ex-President Taft expressed his feelings

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1 William Allen White maintained in his Autobiography (p. 521) that the Eastern Progressives who rallied around George Perkins, and Frank Hitchcock "had every reason to believe that if Roosevelt was not nominated by the Progressives, Hughes would accept a Republican nomination.

2 Stoddard, It Costs to Be President, 113.

3 V. 112 (February 23, 1916), 404.
directly to Hughes in a long letter. He told the Justice that he was as anxious as anyone to keep the Court and the Judges out of politics, but that there were "a few general rules of policy, not involving moral considerations, to which circumstances of the country's need may not justify an exception." To some of the Republicans the appointment of Brandeis to the Supreme Court became one of the important considerations in Hughes' possible decision to resign from that Court. Some Republican members of the bench with the respect of the people of the nation would be needed to counteract the influence of Brandeis. Not only that consideration, but the resignation of Hughes would give President Wilson an opportunity to appoint another liberal to the court. Such thoughts gave no impetus to the Hughes movement, rather the chances of Theodore Roosevelt were enhanced. Roosevelt himself at one time expressed disapproval that Hughes might resign from the Court to run for the Presidency. At another time he said he would

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1 To Taft the great need of the country was the restoration of the Republican Party to do the constructive work needed to carry out a policy of reasonable preparedness which involved financial and economic preparedness. The candidate must be one who would not revive the enmities of the internecine struggle of 1912, and who would because of his record stimulate the enthusiasm of both elements and give them confidence in victory. Taft to Hughes (Longhand, postmarked April 11, 1916). Hughes Papers, general correspondence, box 3.
"support Hughes..., but not unless he declares himself. We must know where he stands on national honor, on national defense, and on all the other great questions before we accept him." He wanted to "smoke out" Hughes, but Hughes would not come out.

Primaries and Polls

The Republican primaries in 1916 were most peculiar. Both Hughes and Roosevelt, the only real candidates for the Republican nomination, refused to permit their names to be submitted to the voters. The voters had to vote for someone, however. The result was a pervading feeling of unreality and an excessively large group of "favorite sons." Delegates were instructed to vote for candidates for whom they had not intended and did not intend to vote. Often a state would vote for one candidate, and the delegates would meet and immediately decide to vote for another. The refusal of the two real candidates to permit their names to be presented to the voters led to a demand for delegations which, while technically uninstructed, would be favorable to Hughes or to Roosevelt, as the case might be, and would throw their support to these candidates

1 Dunn, op. cit., 285.

2 In Pennsylvania the Penrose delegates did not hesitate to have printed after their names: "Does not promise to support popular choice of party in District for President." Louise Overacker, The Presidential Primary, 69.
if their names were presented to the convention. When Roosevelt in his Trinidad statement informed Massachusetts that he did not desire his name on the Republican primary ballot, his request was granted, but certain candidates continued to support him, and four of the delegates-at-large were generally known to be the "Roosevelt delegates".

The pre-convention campaign turned upon national issues primarily, but there was no cleavage running through all the states—national issues were inextricably bound up with state issues. In California, North Dakota and Wisconsin there was a recrudescence of the progressive versus conservative split of 1912, in all the cases there was a factional contest to control the state organization. Any other conclusions are hard to reach. Henry Ford's victory over William Alden Smith in the Republican Presidential Primary in Michigan might lead one to conclude Ford's pacifism was a deciding factor. But in the Democratic primaries Bryan, certainly a pacifist, was defeated by Hitchcock, who was "always running the German flag as high as he can over the capital". Bryan, Smith, LaFollette, and Cummins were all, except one who was non-committal, "German pacifists". Was their defeat or near defeat due to the fact that they were pacifists or was it because the


2 Ibid., April 30, 1916, Section V., 6.
people were tired of progressivism and radicalism of any kind? To a certain extent these primaries were a preview of the coming Presidential campaign. If the political managers could have been able to interpret the early results, perhaps the course and the conduct of the campaign would have been different. But as a writer in the New York Times remarked, "It has always been the most dreaded thing about the silent vote that no politician could interpret its pre-election rumblings until the day after the election". In this case it was difficult to interpret the results even afterwards.

The preferential primaries and primaries where delegates were chosen did show one thing that by then was generally recognized. Although various "favorite sons" such as Theodore E. Burton of Ohio, Albert Cummins of Iowa, Senator John W. Weeks and Governor McCall of Massachusetts, Charles Fairbanks of Indiana, Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin, and a few others might receive the votes of their own states and perhaps a few scattered votes from other states, the real fight would be between Hughes and Roosevelt, even though neither made any campaign speeches or permitted his name to be placed on the ballots. This was borne out by straw polls taken by newspapers and individuals. In a poll taken in March by the Minneapolis

1 Ibid.
Journal, out of 13,258 votes Mr. Roosevelt received 6,234 and Hughes was second with 3,220. 1 Ralph Williams of Oregon, one of Roosevelt's stalwarts in 1912, said that the Colonel was getting strong support in Oregon. Henry Allen of Kansas said also in March that Roosevelt sentiment was growing there. 2 Nicholas Murray Butler reported after a 23 day trip through the West that Roosevelt had many friends and admirers out there but many felt that to nominate him would open up old wounds and feuds. The name of Justice Hughes was always mentioned with the greatest respect, he added. 3 On April 6, John C. Shaffer, who had an interest in seven newspapers in the West, said that contrary to opinion in the East, the Mid-West and Rocky Mountain Region was not anti-preparedness—on the contrary, the people there favored real preparedness—the Roosevelt kind, and the people were for him. 4 In a poll conducted by the Philadelphia Evening Telegraph, Roosevelt received 6,000 more votes than Governor Brumbaugh in the city and Pennsylvania poll for preference for a Republican candidate for the Presidency. 5

2 Ibid., March 20, 1916, 7.
3 Ibid., March 31, 1916, 6.
5 Ibid., April 29, 1916, 18.
But all were not in favor of "Teddy". In Massachusetts the four "regular" unpledged delegates-at-large and 14 of the 16 district delegates chosen were regular. However, the unpledged were not for Hughes, so Roosevelt's followers could get some consolation. Neither were any Hughes delegates chosen in Ohio and New Jersey, and Roosevelt men felt that Hughes was out of the race. 1 But perhaps most of it was wishful thinking, for the Literary Digest had taken a poll a few days earlier, and announced the result about the time the returns from Massachusetts were in. Out of 1500 republican and Progressive members of state legislatures, 758 preferred Hughes, 275 were for Roosevelt, 138 for Root, and the remainder were scattered among favorite sons. 2 According to Frederick Tanner the April 4 New York primary had resulted in a victory for Hughes and a total loss for Roosevelt. 3 Several Republican leaders from the Midwest told Tanner their states would be for native sons first, but ultimately would switch to Hughes if he developed any strength in the convention. On the first of May Congressmen "in close touch with the situation" said that Hughes

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1 Ibid., April 27, 1916, 1. This result was in spite of the fact that Charles Sumner Bird, the former Bull Moose leader of Massachusetts, had sent out 80,000 telegrams just prior to the primary. New York Times, April 25, 1916, 1.


was gaining, and added that the Massachusetts primary was the political Gettysburg of Theodore Roosevelt. ¹

Favorite Sons

There was some remaining hope for the favorite sons, however. A stalemate is always a possibility in a national convention, and many hopes are flames which shoot high and alternately fade away. Indiana had two Senatorial chairs standing empty. The Republicans of that state were fondly hoping to fill them with good Republicans and at the same time nominate and elect a citizen of their own state, Charles Fairbanks, to the Presidency. He had been Vice-President under Roosevelt and it was urged by his supporters, who had one of the best organizations among the favorite sons, that he would be able to get the support of the Progressives. ² He had supported Taft in 1912 but had not identified himself with the steam-roller tactics of the Old Guard. The ex-Vice President was conservative but not reactionary and was a believer in party government. He was well liked and had few enemies, but in the opinion of many impartial observers, not so resolute and qualified in the field of foreign affairs as was required in the crucial year of 1916. ³

² Ibid., June 2, 1916, 8.
³ "Mr. Fairbanks and the Presidency", Outlook, V. 113 (May 17, 1916), 110-113.
Other favorite sons included former Senator Theodore E. Burton of Ohio and Senator Albert B. Cummins of Iowa. Burton had served in Congress for nineteen years before he retired in the Spring of 1915. He had made a speciality of public expenditures and filibusters against measures that seemed to him extravagant. A "regular", he had remained within the Republican fold in 1912. Senator Cummins of Iowa, like Burton, ready to enter the convention with delegates from his own state, was considered by one editor to be "incomparably the ablest and best qualified of the Western candidates." He had served as Governor for three terms and had made a record of achievement in those administrations. However his chances were slim. The standpatters thought of him as being too radical; he had supported Roosevelt in 1912.¹

Other candidates, avowed or silent, who could boost support, were numerous. Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin again was willing to serve. But in the primaries held within his state he was not completely successful; nearly half of the delegates were pledged to other candidates. The pendulum was swinging away from "LaFollettism" in Wisconsin. "The State no longer finds anything magnetic in his mixture.

of sincerity, opportunism, radicalism, and freakishness.\(^1\) Another candidate for the nomination, but less active in seeking the honor, was Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, a Republican who had remained with the party in 1912, but one perhaps acceptable to many Progressives. He had upheld Roosevelt in his contest before the Republican National Committee in 1912, but had refused to leave the party. There were those who were influential in politics who might have come out for Borah had he built upon an organization and beat his own drums,\(^2\) but he was never, although a fighter for a principle which he thought important and right, one who would jump in and take a chance for furtherance of his own political advancement. He wanted to be free to say anything he wanted to in the Senate. But if he had had a chance thrown at him he would have accepted. Another Westerner would have accepted somewhat more eagerly if the chance had come. Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman of Illinois had an organized campaign movement toward his nomination, and one which went so far as to compare, at

\(^1\) "A Bad Year for Favorite Sons", *Nation*, V. 102 (April 13, 1916), 400-401.

\(^2\) Claudius O. Johnson, *Borah of Idaho*, 169. As related here, Roosevelt favored Borah. In 1915, according to C. C. Connally, Roosevelt said, while at a luncheon with Borah and others, that he had all he could get out of the Presidency, and that Borah was the man to lead the party to victory against Wilson.
least indirectly, with another fellow from Illinois, Abraham Lincoln. The writers of Sherman's campaign literature used the method of analogy and pointed out the similarity of the times of 1860 and of 1916. Although of humble origin, Sherman was not considered another Lincoln by the voters. Sherman's name was the only one on the primary ballot in Illinois, but 12,000 voters took the trouble to write in the name of Roosevelt. ¹

In the East there were those who had the Presidential gleam in their eyes. The hopefuls included Governor Whitman of New York, ex-Senator Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania, T. Coleman DuPont of Delaware and Senator Weeks and Governor McCall of Massachusetts. In early 1916 Governor Whitman was insisting that he had a better chance than anyone except Hughes to obtain the Republican nomination. He had been building up a personal machine in New York which the Republicans would have to reckon with in the Spring primaries. He wanted the New York delegates instructed for him. The leaders decided to send an un instructed delegation and Whitman's chances left with this defeat. ² The other "booms" were soon squelched also.

Dupont started out with six delegates from Delaware, but

was unable to go any farther. The others saw some hope early in the pre-convention campaign, but soon were made aware of the impossibility of their success.  

There was an apparent contradiction in the favorite son situation in the pre-convention campaign of 1916. There were many favorite sons in the scramble for the Republican nomination, but none was important. Most of them had delegations of their own, but none had much of a chance. The reasons were historical and immediate. For twenty years the Republican party had accustomed itself to look to an outstanding personality for leadership. The rank and file had lost much of its feeling about honoring some local dignitary who happened to be a neighbor. Perhaps the voters were becoming more cognizant that national availability is the touchstone in examining aspirants for the nomination. The growth of the independent vote placed a higher demand upon the candidate, also the new method of choosing delegates, the primary, placed early attention upon central figures. Probably the most important reason was the realization that 1916 called for a man who could unify the factions within the party so as to present a closed front in opposition to the incumbent Democrats, and a candidate who would be able to meet the serious problems of a nation in a war-torn world.

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1 In an editorial the New York Times, in commenting upon the aspirants, remarked, "Were ever old birds caught with such chaff?" January 1, 1916, 8.
One possible candidate, other than the "big three", Roosevelt, Hughes, and Root, perhaps met these qualifications. Major General Leonard Wood, a good friend of Colonel Roosevelt, and prominent with Roosevelt for his part in the Spanish-American War, was mentioned as early as 1915 here and there as a possible candidate upon whom the Republicans and the Progressives could unite. Early in 1916 when a prominent New Yorker told him he thought he could make him the nominee, he "heard the bees humming", but he did not care to interfere with Roosevelt's chances. However, when Lodge, Robert Bacon, Root, Roosevelt and Wood met at their famous luncheon in March, "T. R." declared to Wood in the presence of others that he would be for him "if things went right". Roosevelt suspected that Wood had as little chance as himself but took steps to advance his cause. He sent his cousin, Nicholas Roosevelt, to Wood to say that it seemed to him the time had come for some of the important old timers to come out for Wood's nomination. Early in May Wood's "boom" was brought out into the open. It began to gain impetus at Chicago when the delegates arrived and two committees, one headed by a Republican, the other by a Progressive, started to work for him.  

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2 Ibid., 187.
Last Stages of the Hesitant Scramble for the Nomination

As usual however, the "favorite sons" had little chance of winning the nomination. In this campaign there were too many national figures hovering around the lamp for a local figure to achieve his great ambition. If the major figures appeared hesitant their supporters showed no such hesitation.

While Roosevelt was touring the West and Hughes continued his silence on the bench, there was a continued effort to put Root's name before the public. Campaign headquarters had been established in Chicago. Republican National Committee members were sent letters asking them to support Root. "The situation is big; it is too big for trifling", it was warned in the circular letter, and it was implied that Root was the only candidate big enough to handle it.\(^1\) It was reported that the defeat of Johnson in California and of Roosevelt in Massachusetts and Montana indicated to the Republican leaders that the "T R" boom was gone and so were his chances. Telegrams were received from California assuring Root and his managers that the anti-Johnson-Roosevelt delegates in that state numbered more than a majority of the Root men. Senator Poindexter of Washington, a stronghold of Progressivism, was now back in the ranks of the Republicans, it was reported.

Such information had some students of the political situation to declare that the nomination fight now lay between Justice Hughes and Elihu Root. "The Root boom has been uncovered as an organized, practical, financed movement. That manifestation followed immediately on the conclusion, to which the political chieftain arrived about the first of the month, that Colonel Roosevelt was not going to be nominated."

Perhaps the support of Root was not to secure his nomination, for few believed he could be elected, but was to be used to defeat the aspirations of other candidates, particularly Roosevelt and Hughes. The Colonel had been uncomfortable to the capitalists. His bark was greater than his bite, but the capitalists recalled the edge of the seat they sat on. The financial leaders favored Root but failing to nominate him they would prefer a "blank sheet of paper upon which to write"—a gleam of hope for favorite sons.

But between the hopes of the favorite sons, and of Root as well as Roosevelt, lay the shadow of the bearded Justice. Popular sentiment and the sentiment of the delegates to the Republican Convention for Hughes was growing. Toward the middle of May the New York Times reported that trend toward Hughes among Republicans "is so obvious to

Congressmen that some of them are saying that his nomination is assured. The movement was reported to have been especially marked. Even prominent men who had been aligned with the Old Guard were for Mr. Hughes. Old line leaders from other sections were credited with making up their minds to support Hughes. The Oregon primaries in which Cummins and Burton had made personal campaigns were a boost to Hughes and a blow to the favorite sons. After the favorable results were known, it was reported that an effort had been made to draw the Justice out, but it failed as had all other such efforts.

The boom for Hughes had reached such a state by a week before the opening of the Republican Convention that Republican National Committeeman from Oregon, Ralph E. Williams, declared that "the only thing that can prevent the nomination of Hughes is a flat declaration of opposition by Roosevelt....The whole Northwest is for Hughes." Frank Hitchcock, the unofficial campaign manager for Hughes, declared that he was confident that the Justice would get the nomination and that he would accept. Added to the

1 May 14, 1916, 1.

2 Ex-Senator Crane of Massachusetts was said to be for Hughes. West Virginia reports were that while Burton may get the Presidential preference, the delegates would be for Hughes. The Vermont primaries went to Hughes men by a 2-1 margin. Ibid., May 17, 1916, 4.

Hughes converts was the German-American Alliance. This organization, reported to have a membership of 2,000,000 voters, had come out against Wilson, Roosevelt and Root back in April. A few days before the convention the Alliance endorsed Hughes, who was spoken of as "the right man for the position and one of high character who would stay neutral in all matters."¹

The "conversion" of many Republican leaders to the candidacy of Hughes during the last few days prior to the convention was a result of underlying factors which had existed all along. The threat of a second disastrous revolt by the Progressives was again very imminent in 1916. Although the liberal segment of the Republican party was much smaller than in 1912 it was still large and strong enough to cause defeat if the regular element failed to conciliate. A candidate generally regarded as a member of the Old Guard, as Root, would not be tolerated by the Progressives. So the Republicans must nominate Roosevelt who would get the whole-hearted support from the Progressives, or a man who would drive down the middle of the road, and could be accepted by all but the most fanatic. Since Roosevelt was recalled by many as the man who split the party in 1912, and would not obtain general support for that reason, the indicators of political necessity all pointed to a man in Hughes' position.

¹ Ibid.
The eve of the Republican Convention in Chicago found the Progressives still fighting for Roosevelt or at least an acceptable substitute, while the Old Guard was fighting for Root, but principally against the two principal contenders, Hughes and Roosevelt. The Progressives, led by George W. Perkins, did not intend to run their convention as a sideshow to the Republicans. In order to make a strong physical showing, they had rented the second largest hall in Chicago, and not less than 800 rooms in one of the big hotels and scheduled their convention at the same time the Republicans held theirs. Their intention was to force the Republicans to take them into consideration when the time came for a nomination of a candidate.\footnote{Ibid., January 5, 1916, 3.}

In the middle of May the Progressive Executive Committee met and held out the olive branch to the Republicans. They would not attempt to force Roosevelt upon the Republicans, but would be ready to unite with them upon the "right kind of man". Following their leader's motto, while they spoke softly, they were to carry a big stick.\footnote{Or what they hoped would be a big stick.} And their convention was to be it. If the Republicans failed to nominate a man who pleased them or was, at least, satisfactory to them, the Progressives would nominate their own candidate and run him in a three-way-race. If the
Republicans nominated a "reactionary" the Progressives were sure to "bolt" again.\footnote{Stoddard, As I knew Them, 428.} However, there were several meanings of the word "reactionary", as will be seen later.

As the convention time grew near the main strength of the reactionaries of the Old Guard was concentrated on stopping Hughes. Not only did they recognize by this time that he had the best chance of being nominated, but they disliked him and distrusted him. His life insurance investigations in which he had excoriated the leaders who for years had controlled the Republican Party had left them very unhappy. In addition, his administration as Governor of New York had shown that he was not a party man, and, in the opinion of the reactionaries, the wrong appointments were made.\footnote{"The Recall of Justice Hughes", World's Work, V. 32 (September, 1916), 397-400.} Roosevelt had proved that although he was an inconoclast in some ways, he kept fairly close to party procedures and practices. In the vernacular of the politician, Mr. Roosevelt would pay off a political obligation, and Justice Hughes would not even assume one. Moreover, it was rumored that the leaders of the Old Guard had acted for some time on the theory that anything they did with a view of "stopping Hughes" would be as fully pleasing to Colonel Roosevelt as to themselves. In fact,
there had been some actions by both the Old Guard and by Roosevelt in the past months which appeared to lend some credence to the report that there had been an agreement between them. The Gary and Collier dinners, Root's keynote speech, and the meeting of Root and Roosevelt had left many people wondering. However, the Old Guard was plainly taken aback when on June 6, when the spokesmen in Chicago for Roosevelt, John McGrath, George Perkins, and the Colonel himself, repudiated the Old Guard declaration that an understanding had ever been reached. The objective of the Republican maneuver was plain, McGrath stated. "They are trying to put the Kibosh on Hughes so that they can name Root".

The reactionaries were correct in fearing Hughes boom as the biggest threat. The New York Times had stated on June 4 that there was nothing to prevent the nomination of Hughes in early balloting except the insistence of the Progressives that they must know that he is for their pro-American policy. A poll taken by the Times on June 6 found the strength of Hughes far greater than any of the other candidates. Hughes had 224 votes of the delegates of all states, while no other received over 100 votes. New York Times, June 7, 1916, 1.

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remained how to get around his silence. George Perkins was ready to try to attempt to break it with his conference idea. Each convention, he proposed, should name a committee and these committees, meeting jointly, should decide upon a candidate that both conventions could support. But Hughes would not be smoked out, so the two conventions got underway with the leading candidate for the nomination still silent on not only whether he would accept if nominated, but mum on his stand on the chief issues of the day. ¹

So the Republican and Progressive Conventions were ready to get underway with conditions as involved as at almost any time in history of conventions. The chief candidate for the Republicans, again the principal opponents to the Democrats, had made no recognized moves to obtain the nomination, but because of his peculiar status as a "non-combatant" in the 1912 fiasco, as well as his prestige, he was considered the man to beat for the nomination. The other important figure was a man who had led his

¹ Mr. Hughes did make a speech on June 6 to his daughter's graduating class, in which he declared that the American flag means "America first", and "undivided allegiance". This was interpreted by some in Chicago as a "keynote" but the Justice did not admit it. His secretary maintained that it had no political significance, that the speech had been scheduled three months earlier. The speech was read with avid interest by the politicians in Chicago. It was termed unfortunate by many, in that it might be construed as a bid for the nomination by a man who right along had declared with the utmost emphasis that he is not a candidate. Ibid., June 7, 1916, 4.
followers away in 1912 to split the Republican Party and now after a short four years, was back using his smaller but important following as a lever to force his nomination, or the nomination of a "strong American", by the same party he fought in 1912. His practical but rather painful, and to some, very shoddy treatment of his still faithful followers, was a factor in pushing many of the Progressives away from the Republican side of the election of 1916. They were, however, not to realize the intentions of their great leader until at the end of the next episode, the convention in Chicago.

The Democrats—An Easy Decision

While their opponents were having considerable difficulty in reaching an agreement on their nominee or nominees to represent them in the coming Presidential campaign, the Democrats were comparatively sure who would be their entry into the race. As the days of the convention in St. Louis in June approached, it was a foregone conclusion that there would be no serious contender against President Wilson for the nomination and that he would win the nomination in easy fashion. Mr. Wilson had early let it be known that he was a candidate to succeed himself. In a letter to A. Mitchell Palmer on February 3, 1913, he wrote that he was not in sympathy with the one-term plank
adopted by the 1912 Democratic Convention at Baltimore.\(^1\) All doubt as to Wilson's candidacy for a second term was removed when authority came from the White House to place the President's name on the ballot to be voted at Indiana's first primary election in March, 1916.\(^2\)

Almost the only possible men who might have had chance of winning the nomination from Wilson were the three-time nominees, William Jennings Bryan and the man from Missouri who received a majority of the votes in the convention in 1912 but who failed to get the necessary two-thirds to win, Champ Clark. Bryan had resigned from the Cabinet in 1915 and many at the time wondered if he would make any efforts to stop Wilson in 1916. But the Nebraskan indicated where he stood by a letter he wrote to a fellow Democrat.\(^3\) In the letter he expressed willingness that President Wilson should be exempt from the provision of the one-term plank. However, there were some nervous Democrats in Washington for a while after it was announced that Bryan would take the stump to oppose Wilson's plan for preparedness and would trail him in a tour of the country. Wilson supporters

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1 Ray S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters*, V. 6, 232. The people would not have a chance to determine whether their President deserved to be continued, he argued.


thought that a bitter factional battle had begun because of the differences between Wilson and Bryan which began with the Lusitania negotiations. But the Bryan spokesman, Representative Bailey of Pennsylvania, made it plain that such opposition should not be construed as a split in the Democratic party or animosity toward the President. In January there was some talk of a boom for Champ Clark, to be started by the "Chamber of Commerce Presidential Campaign Committee" of New York. Friends of Clark quickly announced that he would not consider the Presidency under any condition if Wilson wanted it. It was suspected that the Chamber of Commerce action was a move to embarrass the President.

Whether Wilson wanted to run again or not, he knew that no escape was possible. As his official biographer put it, "...a successful general might as well try to resign from his army in the midst of a battle, as a political leader in such a crisis". Postmaster-General Burleson told him that the party helped him in 1912, now it was time to stand by the party. "You are the only Democrat who can be elected", he told the President. Burleson's opinion evidently was held by Democrats in general, for in the primaries Wilson was virtually unopposed, and in the

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1 Ibid., January 20, 1916, 1.
2 Baker, op. cit., V. 6, 238; also Ruth Cranston, The Story of Woodrow Wilson, 205.
preparations for the coming convention in St. Louis no one seemed willing to move, either in the matter of appointments, or in the drafting of a platform, without his approval.¹ Wilson was still the strong leader of his party platform and the choice of issues upon which the party would make its stand in the coming campaign, rested largely in his hands.

¹ When Wilson received via a Congressman a telegram from St. Louis suggesting that the President approve the tentative selection of certain men to make seconding speeches, Wilson instructed Tumulty to answer that "I do not feel at liberty to suggest everything about the convention..." Wilson to Tumulty (undated but in reply to telegram of June 7, 1916). Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 501, file 2621.
CHAPTER III

The 1916 Political Extravaganzas

On June 7 both the Republican and the Progressive conventions opened in Chicago. Both political "families" realized the importance of the cooperation and support of the other if success was to be realized. The Republicans were "sure" of that success in the coming campaign if they could nominate a candidate whom Roosevelt, the leader of the Progressives, would support, and who would be accepted by the Progressives as well as by the German voter.\(^1\) Republican leaders had in mind a man who would meet their qualifications but were not too happy about the choice. Such hesitancy on the part of certain influential Republicans was understood by the average Progressive delegate, but he was opposed to any man who was a candidate in opposition to his hero, Roosevelt.

Actually, to say that the Republicans were for this man, or were for a certain principle, would be over simplification. There were various groups pulling in different directions. What the Old Guard, as one of those groups, would finally accept was one of the

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\(^1\) Chairman Hilles of the Republican National Convention was visited by three German-American editors who informed him that the German-American voters would never accept either Roosevelt or Root, but would support Hughes. *Independent*, v. 86 (June 12, 1916), 132.
important questions as the convention convened. Would the standpat element force through one of their own candidates or voluntarily conciliate the liberals and possibly the Progressives by accepting Hughes, or would the Old Guard turn to "T R" as some of the group had shown signs of doing?

Early actions had pointed to Old Guard acceptance of neither leading candidate. Many of the Republican delegates had been hand-picked by the "reactionary" Republican leaders. "The instructions of the Republican state conventions to their delegates had but one refrain: vote for a "tried" or a "good" Republican"\(^1\)--in other words, non-Roosevelt and perhaps non-Hughes men. The fact that the chief candidates would not permit their names to be placed on the primary ballots increased the number of favorite sons. In the selection of delegates the candidacy of favorite sons afforded an opportunity from the Old Guard to choose men of their own kind. In the seating of delegates the Old Guard, led by Reed Smoot, exercised the authority of the undisputed members, to throw out the 17 Hughes delegates from Georgia, and permit the substitution of 17 delegates who were not Roosevelt men but delegates who would do what Smoot, Root,\(^1\)

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\(^1\) George E. Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and The Progressive Movement*, 345.
Penrose and Crane told them to do. To make its position more secure, the standpat, Old-Guard dominated Republican National Committee selected a regular and pliable, Temporary Chairman, Warren G. Harding. It was evident that the Old Guard was in control of the machinery of the convention and was exercising its authority and power in opposition to Roosevelt and to Hughes.

Harmony--The Keynote of the Leaders

But would the standpatters be able to stop Roosevelt and Hughes? Harding's speech gave evidence that the Old Guard was not so sure. His keynote was the olive branch--for harmony with the Progressives. In both conventions the same tone was sounded. "Let us forget", said Harding, the Republican. "Let us be patient," entreated Raymond

1 San Francisco Examiner, June 2, 1916, 1.

2 When Harry Daugherty of Ohio, at a meeting of the National Committee which was considering the Temporary Chairmanship, put to his fellow workers, "Why not Warren G. Harding," there was no logical alternative. He was neither a Roosevelt man, nor was he anathema to the Progressives. He would be for whomever the leaders dictated. Samuel H. Adams, Incredible Era, 110. Nicholas Murray Butler had been asked to serve as Temporary Chairman or as Permanent Chairman whichever he preferred, as early as January. A conflicting Commencement at Columbia made it impossible to take the former job. And upon the decision by the leaders that the nomination of Root, which they wanted Butler to make, was more important than the Permanent Chairmanship, that office also was given to Harding. Nicholas M. Butler, Across the Busy Years, 254.
Robins, the Progressive keynoter. "This is not the day of recriminations, it is the day of reconsecration," declared Harding. "Petty wrongs which gave affront as between brother and brother should not keep apart those who are brothers in spirit," was the way Robins emphasized the spirit of harmony.

The spirit of conciliation and toleration on the part of leaders of both parties was apparent in their contacts before the convention got underway. Too many of both parties recalled very vividly the result of the dissension in 1912 to play tough and hard to get now. Four years of looking in on the party in power rather than holding the reins themselves was a softening influence. The leaders of the Republican Party who had loosed the furies in 1912 now were in no such strong position of cohesion and control. They might control the mechanism of the convention, but they lacked a candidate whom even the Old Guard members themselves would generously support. Murray Crane gave signs of being for Root and then for

1 The selection of Robins, as keynoter and also as chairman, represented another compromise; he was acceptable to both factions in the Progressive Convention—the Eastern and Western groups. White, Autobiography, 522.

2 Robins advised the Progressive delegates to "cling no longer to dear names at the expense of the national interest." He must have breathed easier when he had passed over this point of danger. New York Times, June 8, 1916, 2. The fact that he managed to get by with this evidence of his willingness by-pass the great Roosevelt certainly exemplified the realization of the necessity for cooperation.
Hughes after the deflation of the boom for Weeks, whom he had initially supported. An enlightened self-interest drew Penrose toward Roosevelt.

As part of the cooperative movement, a conference committee, composed of representatives of each convention, was established. The idea seemed to have been developed originally, with the consent and approval of Roosevelt, as part of the strategy to get the Republicans to nominate the Colonel or a substitute acceptable to the Progressives and to smoke out Mr. Hughes. A few days prior to the opening of the convention the Old Guard had looked upon the idea of a joint committee with some disfavor, for they were maneuvering to get the Progressives to commit themselves in advance to support the Republican ticket. However, informal, unofficial conferences had been held a few days prior to the opening of the convention and an agreement had been reached as to the precise method to be adopted.

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1 Pennsylvania was strongly Roosevelt. By a Roosevelt coup Penrose could unhorse his foes, the Brumbaugh-Vare machine. On the other hand, the German-Americans were against Roosevelt and were bombarding Penrose with countless telegrams of antagonism toward the Colonel. Much depended on how Penrose finally voted.

2 Butler, a day late, arrived on the eighth and found plans for a "harmony committee" already made. The Progressives, he learned, had asked for a conference, and the Republicans would probably accept. Butler, op. cit., 257.
In the Republican Convention there was doubt as to what such a joint conference proposal meant. Some thought that it insured the nomination of Roosevelt by both conventions. The Hughes supporters, reasonably enough, were afraid that the movement was aimed at their man, and began to advance reasons why the plan would not be feasible. The Republican delegates thought that it would be outside the bounds of propriety to go to the prodigals and ask them "to partake of the fatted calf", and they indicated that if the proposal did not come from the Progressives they would fight the conference idea. After urging by Roosevelt, the Progressives advanced the idea, and the Republicans, without a dissenting vote, approved the motion to appoint a conference committee.¹

When the two groups met on the night of the eighth and each side had presented its views, the committees found that they agreed upon the platform to be adopted,

¹ Nevertheless, some of the Hughes men were not happy about the selections for the committee, which was composed of Reed Smoot, Murray Crane, Nicholas Butler, Senator Borah and A. R. Johnson. Borah was considered a Hughes man; Smoot supposedly was, but the Hughes people doubted him. Crane at heart was a Hughes man, but felt he must support Weeks. Johnson was a close friend of Harding, while Butler advocated Root.

but were unable to get together on a candidate. Roosevelt was pushed by the Progressives as the logical and necessary candidate, but after two and a half hours, when the Republicans were asked to present their views, Butler made it plain to the Progressives that the Republicans would not accept Roosevelt. When Borah agreed that Roosevelt had no chance Perkins reverted to the stand he seemed to have held all along; if the Progressives could not get Roosevelt, they were ready to consider a substitute. Since the Republicans did not feel free to name a man before the convention met for the purpose, the meeting adjourned, at three o'clock Friday morning.

Later in the day when regular proceedings convened, the two conference committees reported to their respective conventions. Butler's report, which he had written in the early morning hours after adjournment of the harmony committee, was confusing to some of the delegates, leading them to reach the understandable first impression that Roosevelt was the nominee of the committee.\(^1\) It was clearly apparent however, as Butler had predicted, that the Republican delegates would not accept Roosevelt. The Progressives heard the report of their committee in silence, their deep suspicion apparent. They almost

\(^1\) For the wording of the report see *Official Proceedings of the Sixteenth Republican National Convention, III*. Butler's own comment is in his *Across the Busy Years*, 265.
nominated Roosevelt by acclamation, but their leaders were successful in deferring that conclusive action.

A Dry Convention and Confused Delegates

The Republican Convention was a lifeless affair. "A convention of oysters probably would compare to advantage with the animated churchyard that listened to Harding's keynote speech."¹ Over at the Auditorium, where 5,000 of the faithful gathered, the Progressives showed somewhat more life, but not the old enthusiasm of 1912. The reasons for such quiescence in both conventions was not difficult to find. Almost everything being done in the formal procedure of the conventions was mere scenery. Because of the nature of the situation, the leaders were making the decision, even to a greater degree than usual, in the "smoke-filled rooms". In addition, the only available Republican candidate in the fullest sense of the term, was like the convention, cold and dry, as well as distant.² The Progressives awaited, as did the Republicans, the results of the harmony conferences, few knowing where their leaders were taking them. More than usual the conventions were backstage conferences, not battles on the floor.

² Hughes was not only available in the usual sense of the term, but was the only man of prominence to whom Roosevelt had no valid objection.
To the Progressive the situation in his own convention was confusing. Not all of the delegates were willing to await the results of attempted harmony with the Republicans. Most of the Progressives had come to Chicago with the firm intention of nominating Roosevelt. With the exception of a small minority of extreme partisans, they were anxious to do what their leaders, particularly Roosevelt, desired. The difficulty lay in the lack of knowledge as to those desires for the leaders themselves were divided, forming three rather distinct groups. A small minority of practicing politicians, headed by Walter Brown of Ohio, William Flinn of Pennsylvania, and Horace Wilkinson, wanted the Progressives, in the last resort, to endorse the choice of the Republican Convention and merge the two parties. A second group, close to Roosevelt, supported the leadership of George Perkins, whose aim was to force the Republicans to nominate Roosevelt or as a second choice a "preparedness man" with progressive leanings and then fuse with the Republicans. A third group, led by Hiram Johnson, John Parker of Louisiana and Victor Murdock, a Progressive Congressman, and other leaders and followers chiefly from the West, opposed Roosevelt's recent change to conservatism and nationalism. Their aim was to preserve the party by prompt nomination of Roosevelt, and permit the Republicans to like or leave it and decide who would be
responsible for the re-election of Wilson. Some of the third group thought that "TR" could be elected on such a ticket, others that it would be well to defeat the Republican candidate anyhow. A majority of the delegates supported the views of the third group.

**Nominations and Attempts to Nominate**

One of Roosevelt's hardest tasks, as he directed the convention by private wire from his house at Oyster Bay to Perkins's suite at the convention, was to keep the delegates from nominating him at once. Practically all of the messages received by him from the convention read, "How long must we wait to nominate you?" For a time it appeared that it would be necessary for Roosevelt to come to Chicago to direct affairs in person, for the delegates were getting out of hand. On the second day, when it became known that Perkins advocated appointment of the conference committee, the delegates wildly called for Roosevelt. Bedlam set in when Murdock arose to ask if the convention and Roosevelt were to be turned over to the "Robbers of 1912." Only the forethought of Roosevelt saved the day, for he had prepared before the convention convened a statement for such an emergency which was now

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read. It was a request for the delegates to cooperate with the Republican Convention. The delegates quietened and passed a motion to appoint members of the conference committee; Roosevelt had his way, and his nomination was put off. Perhaps he still had a chance to capture the nomination of the other convention.

Republican Nominations

On Friday morning, after the report of the conference committee, the Republicans got down to the business at hand—the nomination of a candidate for the Presidency. The nominating speeches were begun by New York after Arizona had yielded to the Empire State. Demonstrating her split, which was not unusual in that period, and which weakened her influence in the determination of a candidate, she placed in nomination both Hughes and Root.1 Governor Whitman's speech nominating Hughes must have been disappointing to those who had expected him to set forth his candidate's position on the issues in a tone so certain it would meet the demand of the Progressives for the nearest he came to it was to say, "He is the American spirit incarnate." Whitman's main point was that Hughes, when Governor of New York, had gone on

1 The split in the state with the largest delegation illustrated the cleavage, or at least the lack of cohesion, in the Republican leadership.
the stump in the Middle West for Taft. The naming of Hughes, as Whitman closed, was a signal for a demonstration which a majority of the delegates seemed to join in, but when the New York group marched around only Oregon, Mississippi, and a few others went marching in "a joyless demonstration". The demonstration lasted seven or eight minutes, but was mechanically continued with rattles and conversation for several minutes longer.

Then Butler nominated his man, Root, and the demonstration lasted thirteen minutes. It was as cheerless and painstaking as that for Hughes.

When Ohio's turn came, Governor Willis nominated the favorite son, Burton. After pinning a Burton button on a donkey, Willis began a serious speech which held the attention of his audience; particularly so when he called his fellow Ohioan "a man whose manner is cordial without being effusive". However, it was more than the applause received by Weeks, who was the subject of the next speaker; he received practically no demonstration of any kind.

The next two speakers placed the names of Sherman and Burton before the convention. Sherman's hour of glory

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2 Burton's enemies said that he was a human iceberg; his friends skated over the subject.
included some strong arm tactics. Major Thompson's rooters and henchmen had invaded the hall ten minutes before, and had kept out all those who had left temporarily and removed all those standing around. Not even the Sergeant of Arms could get in. There were several Thompson men around the walls and in strategic places, and well organized force was used to insure a big demonstration for Sherman.¹ But the plan did not work; the cheering was as weak and cheerless as the rest. Senator Fall's nomination of Roosevelt met with the most spirited and enthusiastic reception of the day. However, it lacked much of the excitement and support of his nomination of 1912. A pedestrian walk started but only 25 joined. A demonstration lasted for half an hour, but the efforts of the woman in the balcony who had come near stampeding the convention in 1912, did not quite click this time. Following Roosevelt's nomination came that of Senator LaFollette, and that of Governor Brumbaugh, who was the last nominee.²

When the balloting began Hughes stood as the prime favorite. A favorite when the proceedings began two days

¹ Ibid.
² Nominating speeches for DuPont and Fairbanks had been made before those heard for Roosevelt. Official Proceedings, op. cit., 132-140.
before, his stock had received added boosts and now there was a steady shift to Hughes among delegates all over the country. Delegates from Michigan, North Carolina, Missouri, and Nebraska who had been listed in other ranks, were reported to be ready to vote for Hughes on the first or second ballot. The backers of the favorite sons realized that something must be done to stop Hughes or he would win the necessary majority of the votes of the delegates at an early time and in a relatively easy fashion. Meetings were held for the purpose of reaching an agreement to combine forces to stop the bearded Justice. Ex-Senator Hemenway, manager of the Fairbanks boom, seemed to be the leader of the movement. Those concerned believed that Cummins and Sherman would be the first to fall by the wayside. But they nor any of the other favorite sons would agree to withdraw their candidacy and support a common candidate who would then have some chance to stop the Hughes bandwagon. Each group agreed that something should be done but at the same time maintained that the man upon whom to centralize all support was their own particular favorite son.

On Friday afternoon the balloting to determine the Republican nominee began. At the end of the first ballot it was apparent that unless something drastic was done, Hughes would be the party choice. Although the first
ballot, as common in national conventions, was used for the purpose of clearing the air and relieving the delegates of promises and commitments, voluntary or required, Hughes was the prominent leader even under these conditions. He received $243\frac{1}{2}$ votes, while his nearest competitors, Weeks with 105 and Root with 103, were far behind. The delegates demonstrated that their careful selection by the party regulars had not been in vain, for Roosevelt received but 65 votes. The other votes were distributed among the favorite sons.\(^1\) Some calls were made to adjourn to eat supper, but the chairman ignored them, and the roll of the states was called for the second time.\(^2\) On this second ballot Hughes' total increased to $328\frac{1}{2}$ while that of Roosevelt increased, but only to 81. On the first ballot Hughes had received over twice as many votes as his nearest competitor, and on the second ballot more than three times as many. He had gained a few in many of the states but Michigan added the largest number when she withdrew all support from Ford and transferred all of her 28 votes to Hughes.\(^3\) After the second

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\(^1\) The results of the first balloting: Hughes 253\frac{1}{2}; Root 103; Burton 77\frac{1}{2}; Weeks 105; DuPont 12; Sherman 66; Fairbanks 74\frac{1}{2}; Cummins 85; Roosevelt 65; LaFollette 25; Brumbaugh 29; Ford 32; Knox 36; Borah 2; Willis 4; McCall 1; Taft 14; absent 2\frac{1}{2}; total 987. Ibid., 180.

\(^2\) According to Nicholas Butler, it was prearranged program to take two ballots after the nominating speeches. Butler, op. cit., 265.

ballot a motion to adjourn was carried. Since Hughes was
gaining, many of his supporters considered such a move a
threat to his chances and that it was intended as such.
There is little doubt that they had good reason for such a
deduction. However, Root's champion, Butler, ridicules
such an inference, and maintains that Hughes perhaps had
a chance to add ten or twenty votes to his total, but no
more than that until the situation with the Progressives
had been cleared up.

Although Hughes was in front by a considerable mar-
gin, not all of the other candidates had given up the
battle. Nicholas Butler continued to work for the inter-
nationalist and arch-Republican, Root. He felt that the
"first choice of the convention's head and heart was, by
an overwhelming majority, Mr. Root," and added that al-
though the New York lawyer was best qualified for the
Presidency there was a feeling that it might not be pos-
sible to elect him unless Roosevelt would either advocate
his election or at least state that he would not oppose
him. Among other political leaders, however, there was no
serious belief that Root could be nominated. He was

1 To Butler, those who opposed adjournment were
"stupid." Butler, op. cit., 266.

2 Ibid., 266. Murray Crane also was will-
ing to influence the Massachusetts voters toward Root if
Roosevelt accepted him as a candidate. Crane would do
almost anything to rid the convention of Roosevelt.
Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, V. II, 351.
considered to be a representative of Eastern money, and his personality was not conducive to popular appeal.

About Roosevelt the experts were not so sure. On Friday the *New York Times* reported that he was full of fight, continuing the battle with vigor, dispatching more orders to his subordinates in Chicago. Although Hughes had gained from 253 3/4 votes on his first ballot to 328 1/2 on the second and Roosevelt's total remained small, the Colonel was reported to have remained hopeful, believing that the maximum Hughes strength was received on the second ballot. The fact that Senator Penrose, who had been friendly toward Roosevelt, asked for adjournment, was taken as a favorable sign. Roosevelt's supporters hoped that the Week's delegation would turn to "TR", that the Cummins delegates would fall into line, and a sufficient number of others would turn to him so that a deadlock would occur. Roosevelt remained outwardly hopeful and was careful to do nothing to indicate any sympathy or support for the Hughes nomination movement.¹

The Colonel remained in the race all the way.²


² Just before the convention convened, a statement by Lucien Bonheur, Progressive leader of Long Island where Roosevelt lived, indicated that Roosevelt was more than ever in contention for the Republican nomination. Bonheur questioned Hughes continued silence in the face of a recent reported statement by the German-American Alliance that no man who had incurred the displeasure of the German government or of the Alliance would become the President of the United States. *Ibid.*, June 5, 1916, 3.
The Progressive delegates also were in the fight. When their convention met on Friday morning they were in an unpleasant mood. After hearing the second report of the conference committee, which placed the blame upon the Republicans for not agreeing upon Roosevelt or naming someone to agree upon, the delegates moved to nominate their man. They had been willing to wait good-naturedly at first, knowing that they would nominate Roosevelt sooner or later, but by this time they had grown more suspicious of their leaders. At 8:30 that night when they heard the result of the second ballot, their agitation for the nomination was great, the delegates shouting as at a revival meeting, "Why not? Why not nominate him now?" Only by the supreme effort of the recognized liberal Progressive, Hiram Johnson, was the movement for immediate nomination stopped. He took the action only because of the expressed desire of Roosevelt, not because he was in sympathy with Perkins's "stall and dicker" policy.

Crisis for the Old Guard and the Progressives

At this stage of the convention, those fighting against the nomination of Hughes knew that something must give, or the Justice would be the named on the next

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1 Mowry, op. cit., 351.
ballot. The Old Guard and the Progressives must get together to stop Hughes, the extremes against the middle. When the conference committee met again however, there was no meeting of minds. Perkins asked for a second choice, but the Old Guard leaders had no one to offer, and again at 3 A.M. the meeting broke up without any agreement except to disagree. However, on the way out Perkins asked Butler if he would speak to Roosevelt over his private wire. After consulting with a group of leaders Butler acquiesced. By this time the Republican leaders knew that Root's chances were killed and that they were unable to agree on any other with any chance at the nomination. If they could get together with Roosevelt on a man of his choice, it would be their only hope. According to one report they were ready to take any man the Colonel would name, provided the Colonel would go with the man. 

Then Roosevelt played his last cards, and lost. When Butler asked him if he would accept Root, Knox or Fairbanks, in that order, Roosevelt wanted to know, "What about me?" When informed that his chance was nil, Roosevelt then suggested the man whom Borglum had been

2 James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years, 253.
pushing so long—General Leonard Wood. The general was the man who was close to Roosevelt and would, if elected, "include him in his privatest councils." But Butler turned down Wood on the ground that a soldier would not be acceptable to the Middle West. Then both turned tentatively to Senator Lodge, the old friend of Roosevelt, and there the conference ended. The attempt at harmony had failed.

1 Borglum wrote many letters to Roosevelt before and during the convention pointing out that Wood was the man to name and support. See Theodore Roosevelt Papers, particularly box 185. Apparently "TR" had made additional efforts to obtain the nomination for Wood, for after the convention he wrote, privately, "I don't know whether you know that to the last I tried to get the Republicans to accept Leonard Wood as the nominee upon both parties could join." Roosevelt to A. L. Key (of Chattanooga), June 26, 1916. Ibid., box 395.

2 Wood was too close to Roosevelt in friendship and in beliefs for him to be accepted by the Old Guard. While not charged by the Old Guard with dividing the party in 1912, Wood did stand with Roosevelt in lack of appeal, to put it mildly, to the German-American group, an appeal which appeared to have been important factor in availability for the candidacy, in the eyes of many Republican politicians.

3 Butler, op. cit., 269. The accounts of the conversations vary somewhat. Wise relates that Butler asked Roosevelt to name a man. Perhaps recalling what happened when he chose one in 1908, Roosevelt refused to name a candidate, but did name Wood as one to whom he would give his entire and energetic support. Butler declared that they would not nominate a soldier, and Wood's chances were gone. Op. cit., 474. Roosevelt subsequently declared that Butler called him a second time and asked him whether he would support Lodge. He hesitated and finally said "Yes, but-" and Butler did not give him time to continue, instead, he hung up and informed the joint committee that Roosevelt suggested Lodge, and failed to say that Roosevelt first suggested Wood. Ibid. Hagedorn
Roosevelt and the Old Guard had lost most of the battle. One of the extremes had a strong organization but no real candidate, the other had a candidate but lacked a strong organization, and they were too far apart in policy and philosophy to combine their strong points. When Butler reported to the conference committee the next morning it was plain that Hughes was the choice of the Republican Convention. Lodge's chances were not taken seriously by anyone; he resembled Root too much. A middle-of-the-road candidate would win the nomination, certainly not a man identified with the East and reaction.

Just before the final ballot the "sedate landslide" to Hughes began. The Pennsylvania delegation showed that it had switched from Roosevelt to the Justice, and when its name was called the delegation cast 72 of its 76 votes for Hughes. Burton withdrew early in the morning in time for his supporters to go over to Hughes. A representative of the Illinois delegation called Sherman and told him they were ready to vote for the Justice, while LaFollette and Cummins gave up and released their

agrees that Butler hung up without giving Roosevelt a chance to complete his sentence and objections. Butler had first asked Roosevelt if he would not support Lodge. Op. cit., 189. The 1920 Democratic nominee says that before Butler could get in a half dozen words, Roosevelt cut in and asked him, "What about me?" James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years, 253.
delegates to the undeclared candidate. The Old Guard, the favorite sons and Roosevelt had all failed to stop a man who had been out of politics for years and who had not said one word in favor of his own candidacy or even declare that he would accept if nominated.  

To the Progressive delegates also it was apparent that Hughes would be the nominee of the Republicans; no longer could they be held back in their desire to nominate "TR". Instead of nominating immediately upon the realization of the certain nomination of Hughes, communication with the Republican Convention was established, and when the Republicans were about to nominate, Bainbridge Colby asked for recognition. As Robins was recognizing the "gentlemen from New York", Perkins, knowing what was up, rushed forward to interrupt. However, Chairman Robins pushed him back in his seat and continued, and Roosevelt was nominated by a voice vote.  

Finally the Progressives again had nominated their beloved leader of 1912. The strange and embarrassing efforts of one group of delegates trying to nominate one man in two conventions was at an end. They had failed to force his nomination in the second convention, but had  

1 Hughes total vote on the third and final ballot was 949 out of a possible 987. Official Proceedings, op. cit., 198.  

2 Ickes, loc. cit.
carried out their promise to nominate him themselves. Would he run another separate race or would he support the other candidate to whom he had been rather antagonistic and whom he had once called a "bearded iceberg"? Would the Justice run, anyway?

Hughes the Candidate: Would Roosevelt Support Him?

Although friends of Hughes thought that the Associate Justice was not a candidate, it was generally regarded in political circles during the convention that he would accept if nominated. It was felt that the Justice would not have permitted the campaign to have gone so far if he were not willing to run if called upon. Those who predicted that he would accept did not have a long wait after the third and decisive ballot to have their prediction borne out, for Hughes broke all records by accepting the nomination by telegraph, without waiting for a formal notification by the regularly appointed committees. In his message of acceptance he declared his position not only on the issues regarded by Roosevelt as the test issues, but also on the other principal questions raised by the Republican platform. In his telegram he declared emphatically that he was for protection of American rights, and his statement would have passed as a complete endorsement of the Roosevelt position if he had not specifically mentioned the Mexican issue. That emphasis raised
the question in the Progressive mind why he should pick out only one phase of the Wilson foreign policy and not couple it with greater infractions of American rights from other countries, as in the case of the Lusitania. Hughes followed closely the lines of the Republican platform, but the preparedness group within the Progressive Party wanted more—a declaration as clear and specific as those their "Teddy" had been making.¹

While the delegates in the Coliseum were digesting this climatic utterance "which put more life into the Republicans than had happened before or afterwards",² the Progressives were receiving saddening news from Sagamore Hill. On Saturday afternoon the convention had hardly nominated John M. Parker of Louisiana for Vice President when a telegram arrived from Roosevelt:

I am very grateful for the honor you confer upon me. I cannot accept it at this time. I do not know the attitude of the candidate of the Republican party toward the vital questions of the day. Therefore if you desire an immediate decision, I must decline the nomination; but if you prefer, I suggest that my conditional refusal to run be placed in the hands of the Progressive National Committee.³

¹ See Republican Campaign Textbook, 1916, 30-31.
² Dunn, op. cit., 330.
³ Columbus (Georgia) Inquirer Sun, June 11, 1916, 1. Actually the telegram had arrived earlier, probably in the morning. White could never understand why Perkins withheld the message from Roosevelt longer than the time of Hughes' nomination by the Republicans. The Progressives had raised over $100,000 for Roosevelt's campaign when the message was read. White, Autobiography, 526.
If the Committee could be satisfied with the statements of Mr. Hughes on the issues, then they could accept his refusal as definite. If not, they could confer with him on what action "we may severally deem appropriate to meet the needs of the country."\(^1\)

Although they should have been prepared for Roosevelt's declination earlier when his letter suggesting Lodge was read to them, his refusal to run was a great blow to the Progressive delegates. Distinct mutterings of "apostate" and "running out" could be heard. William Allen White reported that he saw "hundreds of men tear the Roosevelt picture on the Roosevelt badge from their coats, and throw it on the floor."\(^2\) However, Roosevelt's action was to be expected. It could be explained from two viewpoints. Those who continued to regard Roosevelt as a man who possessed no ulterior motives could explain it in this way: Mr. Roosevelt was big enough to deny his own personal ambitions for the good of the cause of the nation and of the party. He could have gotten the nomination, some argued, if he had set out to work for it. But he thought of the welfare of the country in the face of imminent foreign danger, and continued to preach preparedness, a practice which alienated many who thought preparedness

\(^1\) Mowry, op. cit., 354.

\(^2\) White, Autobiography, 527.
was the forerunner of war.¹

Professor Mowry, who studied the Roosevelt correspondence of the time, looks at his decision not to run from a more practical standpoint:

It is obvious from Roosevelt's correspondence that he thought he had some small chance of winning the nomination from both conventions. He had resolved not to run on a third-term ticket alone unless perhaps the character of the Republican nomination forced him to do so to maintain his self-respect. More specifically, he had perhaps decided in advance with the knowledge of several leading Progressives that he would not accept a nomination against Charles Evans Hughes.²

Actually, it appears that Roosevelt's actions were governed by a combination of the two motives outlined. He was very serious in his efforts toward arousing this country to a realization of its danger. At the same time he came to desire greatly the nomination. The two motives did not conflict for he, being Roosevelt, believed that his own election would be best for achieving the awakening of the country. This could most probably be brought about by nominations by both the Progressive and Republican parties, to fully unite them once again into one party opposing the Democrats and the hated Wilson. When finally he saw that his nomination was not to be, and that others who were preparedness minded could not heal

¹ This is the viewpoint expounded by Mowry, *op. cit.*, 424.

the breach in the forces, he accepted the "Bearded Jus-
tice" who, although personally disliked by Roosevelt, and
whose policies were unknown, might meet the requirements
of the situation. What else could Roosevelt do but sup-
port him? To oppose meant the certain re-election of
Wilson. Anything to him was better than that.

Not all of the delegates to the Progressive Conven-
tion shared Roosevelt's extreme antipathy toward Wilson
and certainly not all of them felt that the Colonel should
drop out of the fight. Although Roosevelt's lieutenants
(and the Republicans) had been successful in delaying
Roosevelt's nomination by the Progressives until the last
moment, an indication possibly that a considerable number
of the delegates, as well as certain of their leaders
were "cooperating" with the Republicans, the average Pro-
gressive delegate did not know that his convention was to
be used only as a stalking and trading horse. It is this
conclusion which explains not only the great disappoint-
ment felt when Roosevelt announced his intention not to
run, but also the failure on the part of the group of Pro-
gressives, in the majority, who wanted to nominate the
Colonel before the Republican Convention had chosen its
candidate. Otherwise it is difficult to explain one of
the greatest anomalies of the Progressive Convention--
the failure of the Western group to nominate Roosevelt
and "get it over with." Looking back on the situation it
appears that they had greater possibility to gain by such action. If Roosevelt had been nominated on Thursday, when he almost was, the Colonel might have had a chance at the Republican nomination. William Allen White, an astute political observer, doubted that Hughes would have been willing to run if Roosevelt had been nominated at that time and White doubted also that Roosevelt could or would have refused to accept the Progressive nomination. The desire of the delegates to cooperate with their leaders, particularly Roosevelt, in their policy of delaying the Colonel’s nomination by the Progressives as long as possible, probably would not have stopped them from nominating early had they realized Roosevelt would decline their own nomination.

Certainly, Roosevelt’s refusal to run was a jolt to many of the Progressives, and their leader’s actions resulted in the loss of some of his power to carry the Progressives with him wherever he chose to go. The Progressive Party ostensibly had been organized to protest in the name of popular rule against a bossed convention. Ironically enough, it held its second and last convention bossed and "deceived" by the man who had led his followers

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1 White, Penchot, Ickes, and Garfield and Murdock decided to place Roosevelt's name in nomination, but Perkins found out about the "plot" and managed to maneuver them out of position. Walter Johnson, *William Allen White's America*, 262.

into the fray to "march to Armageddon to battle for the Lord." This feeling by many Progressives that their leader had "betrayed" them was to have its effect on the outcome in November.¹

Republican and Progressive Platforms

A comparison of the platforms of the two conventions

¹ Harold Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party" American Historical Review, V. 46 (January 1941), 306-337. Ickes' thesis is that Perkins was the traitor to the Progressive Party. His scheme was to use the Progressives as a lure in Chicago, and accomplish as much political trading as possible by holding the threat of Roosevelt and another third ticket over the heads of the Republicans. However, as Ickes points out, he had negated any bargaining power the Progressives might have had by his statement to the press five months before the convention, at the time of the meeting of the National Committee in Chicago, when a "declaration of principles" was issued. "We are all hoping that both the Progressive and the Republican parties will agree on a candidate, and it will not necessarily have to be Colonel Roosevelt." Ickes comments that: "From the moment that this "declaration of principles" was issued and the statement of George W. Perkins published, it was a foregone conclusion that the Republican and the Progressive parties would not unite on Theodore Roosevelt as their candidate for President; that if Theodore Roosevelt ran at all it would be as the forlorn hope of the Progressive Party after he had been offered to the Republicans and refused by them." Ickes is rather harsh with Perkins. The Committee's statement, although not naming Roosevelt, was so worded that it could be interpreted in the way that Perkins explained it to the press. Anyway, the decision to "trade" with the Republicans was by unanimous vote of the committee and met with Roosevelt's approval, to say the least.

William Allen White came closest, perhaps, to criticizing his good friend outright when he remarked after the convention that we now "have the picture of dear, tender-hearted Colonel, cutting off the tail of the dog an inch at a time, to save the feelings of the dog." Rich, William Allen White, 157.
which met in Chicago suggests that both were drawn up by those with similar ideas and objectives. Those in charge of the Progressive Convention illustrated their conciliatory attitude toward the Republicans by adopting a platform which could well have been that of the Republicans themselves. The latter in turn kept the Progressives and the value of their support in the coming campaign in mind when they drew up their own platform. The same animating spirit is apparent in both; in many of their declarations the language is practically the same, and in none is there any animosity shown toward the policies to which the other claimed to uphold. As a New York newspaper

1 There is a difference of opinion as to which party conceded more to the other. Claudius Johnson, in a biography of William E. Borah, speaking generally, states that Borah's attempt to make the Republican party more liberal was a failure. Wise political observers, Johnson comments, agreed that the Republican party was being revived because Progressives were coming back to the fold, not because Republicans were becoming more progressive. Borah of Idaho, 161.

Editorial opinion of the day divided on the question of whether the 1916 Progressive social legislation plank was less progressive than that of 1912. See Literary Digest, V. 52 (June 17, 1916), 1762-1763.

Nicholas Murray Butler, whose draft of the platform was turned down by the Platform Committee in favor of one which was the work of Senator Lodge, states that his draft was far more progressive, more definite and more constructive than the one adopted. Butler, op. cit., 255-256.

2 For the complete text of the Republican platform, as well as the Democratic platform, see Kirk Porter, National Party Platforms, 273-413.
commented, the two parties were one in their definition of Americanism, military preparedness, on the tariff, on social legislation, and on the regulation of business. Also both parties came out for woman suffrage.

The Progressive platform did show some influence of Roosevelt's drive for preparedness. Republican drafters were satisfied with a general demand for a "sufficient and effective regular army..." and "a navy so strong and so well proportioned, so thoroughly ready and prepared, that no enemy can effect a landing force..." More specific and more radical demands were made by the Progressives: A navy "restored to at least second rank in battle efficiency"; a "regular army of 250,000 men, fully armed and trained, as a first line of land defense."

Both parties called for a unified America and both condemned the Democratic Administration. If America is to count as a force in world opinion, or as a participant in aligning the framework for a new understanding among nations, we must have solidarity, a common mind to play our part. This was recognized in the Democratic platform, as well. The two Chicago conventions, particularly the Republican, chose to damn the Administration

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1 The Sun, quoted in Literary Digest, V. 52 (June 17, 1916), 1762-1763.

policies rather than come out with clear cut policies in another direction (a preview of their campaign policy, as it turned out.) The Republicans castigated the Democratic Administration for intervening in Mexico, but at the same time pledged "our aid in restoring order and maintaining peace in Mexico", and protecting the rights of our citizens on the border and in Mexico.

The Democrats at St. Louis

In the convention meeting in St. Louis later on in June there was no necessity for devious maneuvering and deception. President Wilson could have the nomination if he wanted it, and already he had signified that he would run. The convention meeting in St. Louis on June 14th was little more than a "colossal ratification meeting". But curiously enough, it was far more enthusiastic than either of the two conventions in Chicago. The delegates, with united leadership and unity among themselves, were inspired with a sense of victory presaging triumph in November.

This inspiration was greatly magnified when the delegates heard the speech of former Governor Martin H. Glynn of New York, the Temporary Chairman and keynoter, and Senator Ollie James, of Kentucky, the
Chairman. At the outset Glynn defined the avoidance of war as the paramount issue and his argument was designed to prove that Wilson's determined adherence to neutrality was the traditional policy of America. What followed was an indication of the emotional appeal of peace. When Glynn began to cite historical precedents of efforts of Presidents to keep the peace, even in some cases where the nation's honor was besmirched, the response from the delegates was immediate and emotional in approval of the theme. The reaction was not expected, for Glynn had planned to omit many of the instances, but the crowd yelled for more. After each citation he would affirm, "But we didn't go to war!" and the delegates went wild. Glynn climaxed his speech which received such an amazing reception with more old-fashioned oratory: "...when Reason primes the rifle, when Honor draws the sword, when Justice

1 Baker, op. cit., 250. Glynn was selected after he had made the keynote address in the New York Democratic Convention which had met in March. A National Committeeman wrote to Tumulty praising Glynn and his ability as a keynoter. Norman E. Mack to Tumulty, April 18, 1916. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 501, file 2621.

2 Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, 185. It is not clear whether Wilson intended to emphasize this part of the speech or whether Glynn added some historical references of his own on the spur of the moment. The speech was the work not only of Glynn but of House, and the final draft was approved by the President himself. Charles Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House, V. 2, 356, Also Baker, op. cit., 50.
breathes a blessing on the standards they uphold.\textsuperscript{1}

Permanent Chairman James, with the "face of a prize-fighter, body of an oak, and the voice of a pipe organ", knew well by this time what the convention wanted, and he played upon the peace theme again with tremendous effect. Again the crowd gave the unprecedented demand, "Repeat it, repeat it!", and James responded by touching the heights in a final flight:

Without orphaning a single American child, without widowing a single American mother, without firing a single gun, without the shedding of a single drop of blood, he wrung from the most militant spirits that ever brooded above a battlefield an acknowledgment of American rights and an agreement to American demands.\textsuperscript{2}

Bryan was then called upon to make his contribution of oratory upon the peace theme.\textsuperscript{3} His address was an assurance that unity would prevail in the party.

Although the origin of the exact wording is not known, the speeches by Glynn and James were the inspiration of the famous campaign slogan, "He kept us out of

\textsuperscript{1} For the complete speech see Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1916, 14-41.

\textsuperscript{2} For the James speech, ibid., 79-91. For an interesting account and press comment on the speeches, see "Why the Democracy Asks for Four Years More", Literary Digest, V. 52 (June 24, 1916) 1828-1829.

\textsuperscript{3} Bryan was not a delegate, but sat among the representatives of the press, as he had done in the Republican convention.
It certainly had not been the intent of President Wilson to rest the most important phase of his recent record to the naive generality that he had kept the country out of war (and with the implication that he would continue to do so). In fact there are evidences that Wilson did not like the phrase at all, and never used it himself.

His real attitude toward the war and foreign relationships can be found in the platform plank in which he outlined his constructive proposals to which he wanted to commit his party and the nation. The changed position of America in the world relationship was emphasized. In the "interest of humanity" America must "assist the world in securing settled peace and justice". Wilson stated further that

1 Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, who took the Wilson draft of the platform to St. Louis, says that the phrase was put in by the Resolution Committee, "by which member I do not know". Burleson agrees. Baker, op. cit., 257, Arthur F. Mullen maintains plausibly that it was the power of Senators Stone and Clark which forced the Administration men to the declaration which would please the peace loving West. Mullen, Western Democrat, 180.

2 Josephus Daniels, Woodrow Wilson, 274; he told Secretary of the Navy Daniels, "I can't keep the country out of war. They talk of me as though I were a god. Any little German lieutenant can push us into the war at any time by some calculated outrage." Baker, op. cit., 258. McCombs, the National Chairman, was taken aback by such extensive and emotional support for the peace policy. "Everybody at the convention was saying, 'Wilson kept us out of the War!' To h---l with the rest of the platform!'" he reported. Jennings C. Wise, Woodrow Wilson, Disciple of Revolution, 476.
...the time has come when it is the duty of the United States to join with the other nations of the world in any feasible association that will effectively serve these principles, to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and frank admission of the provocation and causes to the opinion of mankind. 1

The platform as adopted contained a plank on Mexico in which the temporary use of force by the United States was supported, but stated that intervention as such was repulsive to the people of the United States. The Democrats and the President gave a preview of their attitude toward the so-called hyphenates when, at the suggestion of Wilson, a plank in the platform condemned as subversive

...the activities and designs of every group or organization, political or otherwise, that has for its object the advancement of the interest of a foreign power, whether such object is promoted by intimidating the Government, a political party, or representatives of the people, or which is calculated and tends to divide our people into antagonistic groups.... We condemn any political party which in view of the activity of such conspirators, surrenders its integrity or modifies its policy. 2

Not all of the Democratic platform was devoted to the war and preparedness issues. Taking its place with equal

1 For the complete platform, see Official Proceedings of the Democratic Party, 1916, 121-130. The part underscored was not included in the platform as recommended by the platform Committee, and was not adopted by the convention.

2 Tumulty, op. cit., 191.
space and importance was the record of constructive legis­
lation passed during the Wilson Administration. Within
the platform is found the reiteration of the Wilson poli­
cies—that the energies of the people should be set
free—not be concentrated in the hands of a few powerful
guides and guardians. A citation of acts and achieve­
ments was included, drawing attention to what had been
actually accomplished in limiting concentrations and in
freeing the people from economic controls of trusts and
financial interests. The West was appealed to by the
emphasis placed upon the assistance to farmers by giving
them opportunity to borrow money at reasonable rates, by
direction and guidance in scientific farming, and other
measures.

The Progressives, who were principally from the West,
were not appealed to outright by the Democrats in their
platform, but certainly the appeal was there. Senator
Owen, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency had written to the President emphasizing the
importance of placing in the platform the Progressive
principles of the Progressive platform of 1912 "in which
ninety-nine Democrats out of a hundred believe, and which
would make special appeal to the progressive Republicans
of the Nation".¹ President Wilson agreed as to the

¹ Owen to Wilson, June 2, 1916, Wilson Papers, Series
VI, box 278, file 389.
importance of Senator Stone's suggestion, but he pointed out that many of the Progressive principles set forth in the Progressive platform of 1912 affected matters controlled by the state and not by the national government. Nevertheless, the President implied that the platform should be pointed to catch the eye of the Progressive, and that the liberal achievements of the Administration should be emphasized. The platform and speeches concerning it should emphasize the difference in the two parties: the Republican Party—the party of the vested interests, protection and industrial nursing and the status quo; the Democratic Party—the party of ideals, of legislation to free the energy and initiative of the people, the party of Progressive legislation to give the little business and the common man a chance.

Probably the most acrimonious debate in the Democratic Convention was on the subject of woman suffrage. Large numbers of women, representatives of women's organizations, demanded loudly the inclusion of a plank calling for national suffrage for women. Although Wilson had prepared a plank which expressed his long-held view that woman suffrage should be a matter left to the individual states, there was a long debate on the floor. But when the matter was put to a vote, the Wilson version was the winner by a large majority.

1 Wilson to Stone, June 5, 1916. Ibid.
The proceedings of the entire convention, with the exception of the initiation and use of the phrase "He kept us out of war", were a series of continuous victories for President Wilson. He had written his own platform and sent his own man to St. Louis to present it to the convention, and it was adopted almost intact. There was no opposition to his re-nomination; he was nominated by acclamation, with only one vote cast against the motion. His choice for Vice President, the incumbent, Thomas R. Marshall, received the vote of the convention, however hesitant on the part of some of the delegates. President Wilson entered the campaign the undisputed leader of the Democratic party, with his policies adopted by the organization of that party. One of the major questions of the campaign then was apparent: could a unified "minority"

1 Secretary of Interior Lane thought that someone other than Wilson should write the platform. "Our platform should contain such an appreciation of you, that you could not write it, much less have it known that you have written it. It should be one joyful shout of exaltation over the achievements of the Administration, and I can't quite see you leading the shout..." But Wilson did not propose to entrust the job to anyone else. Wise, op. cit., 475.

2 Before the convention there had been talk of shelving Marshall for a stronger man, but when Wilson wrote that Marshall had been "loyal and generous" and had given the President every reason to "admire and trust him"; the delegates knew an order when they saw one, and voted accordingly. Baker, op. cit., 255.
party beat one which was ordinarily numerically stronger but weakened to some degree by internal strife and unhealed sores?
CHAPTER IV

The Issues: Peace, Preparedness and Mexico

With the possible exception of 1860, the Presidential Campaign of 1916 presented issues of greater importance and meaning than perhaps any in the history of the United States until that time. Due to the outbreak and continuance of the great war in Europe, Americans found themselves faced with problems and issues far beyond the usual. When the Wilson Administration took the reins from the Republicans in 1913, the principal issues and topics were internal and domestic. The Mexican problem was not a new one, but had not yet reached its climax. But with the outbreak of the European war in 1914, a new, important topic and issue arose, one few people even dreamed of in 1912.

By the time the campaign of 1916 rolled around the place and action of America in relation to the belligerent nations of Europe had become one of the great issues. Although the issue was important, and required clear, unimpassioned thinking, the voice and opinion of the electorate was emotional, confused and often confusing. The great melting pot that the United States was at that time hardly knew which way to turn, an indecision which became more evident as time and the war continued.

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The changing popular reaction to the war news from Europe, the sectionalism and factionalism of the voters in the United States and the pronounced differences among the social, business and political leaders, even within party lines, reflected the indecision, at least the disagreement, as to what to do about the great conflict across the Atlantic.

The Leaders, Peace and Preparedness

At the outbreak of the war in Europe President Wilson showed no indecision, rather his first actions were to assure the neutrality of the United States and thus maintain peace. The President was by temperament a man of peace; at the same time he believed that America desired peace, that "peace is rooted in the hearts of the people". America had been shocked by the horror of the conflagration across the seas. Daily tidings of wholesale slaughter brought to Americans a renewed appreciation of the blessings of peace, and opinion was almost unanimous that the United States "must keep out".

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2 President Wilson was so conscious of the necessity to "observe the very utmost ceremonial cleanliness in all things touching the awful struggle on the other side of the water" that he did not think it advisable for Mrs. Wilson to accept a cutting of a rose bush from the
But as the war news and its stories of great battles and terrible human losses continued and became the commonplace, sensibilities dulled, and perhaps emotions became numbed. Former habits, old attitudes, differences, and prejudices reasserted themselves, and a certain unity, born of a certain common reaction to the tragedy of war and the peculiar insanity of this conflict began to be dissipated under the partisanship stirred and many Americans began to take sides with one or the other opposing forces in Europe. Trouble lay ahead for a Président bent on maintaining neutrality and peace.

Much of the trouble centered in the preparedness issue. Wilson apparently connected preparedness with non-neutrality and did little to get the nation prepared for future contingencies. In fact, during the first few months of the war he saw little need for a larger army and

battlefield of Verdun to be tendered her by a friend of a friend of Mr. Wilson. Wilson to Byron R. Newton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, June 9, 1916, Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 62, 41.

Mr. Wilson had reasons beyond peace at home for abstaining from appearance of partiality to one side or the other in the great conflict. As Herbert Hoover wrote: "President Wilson's constant purpose from 1914 on was to find some ground upon which the war could be ended. From time to time I furnished the Colonel with memoranda and other information as to peace possibilities...." The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover Years of Adventure 1874–1920, 213.
navy. Soon however, the belligerents showed him that no nation with its own commerce and citizens who travel on the high seas can be free of contact with warring nations powerful enough to blockade ports and sink commerce. After the attacks by German submarines on ships on which Americans were passengers and the increasing sentiment among many citizens that we should prepare to defend ourselves against possible attack, his own opinion on preparedness changed.

Several months prior to November, the month usually given as the time the President changed his mind, definite indication that he was being won to preparedness is found in his letter to Secretary of War Garrison, himself a positive preparedness advocate, July 21, 1915:

I have been giving scarcely less thought than you yourself have to the question of adequate preparedness for national defense, and I am anxious, as you know, to incorporate in my next message to Congress a programme regarding the development and equipment of the Army and a proper training of our own citizens to arms, which, while in every way consistent with our traditions and our national policy, will be such a character as to commend itself to every patriotic and practical mind.2

1 In an address to Congress on December 8, 1914, he said: "We never shall have a large standing army.... We shall not turn America into a military camp." Donald Day (editor), Woodrow Wilson's Own Story, (A collection of significant quotations from Wilson's speeches and writings), 176.

2 Wilson Papers, box 74.
In his Third Annual Message to Congress on December 7, 1915, President Wilson called for preparedness, following this appeal to Congress by one to the country, in the form of a speaking tour of the North and West. Advising him to make the trip in order to awaken the people (of the West, particularly) to the need of preparedness, was Tumulty, his secretary. Also "friendly newspapers joined in asking Wilson to employ his eloquence and logic in overcoming the apathetic indifference or unreasonable hostility to preparedness exhibited in Congress".

If the President visited the West with the thought that the people were all against war, he certainly must have returned with the realization that many accepted the necessity of preparedness. The President was heard by great crowds and the response to his outline and explanation of preparedness was beyond expectations. According to the New York Times, Wilson received more applause in the Midwest than any other President. In Des Moines, when he inquired if the people wanted him to guard the nation's honor and the flag from smirch, crowds roared approval. "I know there is not a man or woman

1 The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, V. 1., 133-155.
2 James Kerney, Political Education of Woodrow Wilson, 361.
3 February 2, 1916, 1.
within the hearing of my voice who would wish peace at
the expense of the honor of the United States", he said,
and heard thunderous applause.\footnote{Atlanta Constitution, February 2, 1916, 1.} At Omaha the crowds were
very enthusiastic, and generally the reception the Presi-
dent received was very encouraging to him personally and
to his program.\footnote{New York Times, February 5, 1916, 1.}

In advocating preparedness, the President was shift-
ing to middle ground. How much the political aspects
entered into his decision to support preparedness is not
known. Different reasons are advanced for the change.
The \textit{New Republic} saw the combination of reasons, saying that
he realized the country was against war, but he knew also
that there was no way out of the impasse (in the dispute
with Germany) except war.\footnote{"Mr. Wilson on the Stump", New Republic, February 12, 1916.} Hermann Hagedorn, usually
partial to Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt, maintains
that the President acted because of political reasons.
Furthermore, Hagedorn maintains Mr. Wilson was successful
in "stemming the rising tide of preparedness...by his
almost passionate embrace of the cause...leaving the gen-
eral public under the impression that with everybody
demanding preparedness, all must be well, and remained
thus free to pursue his opportunistic policy.¹ Mark Sullivan suggests that the President knew that the war would not last forever and he wished to be ready with peace proposals and be ready to use them when peace came. To accomplish this purpose it was desirable that America should not enter the war. And it was imperative that Wilson be re-elected. To be re-elected he should guardedly endorse preparedness and otherwise take account of the varied and shifting currents of feeling in America. He was obliged to be for preparedness but against war.²

Whatever the factors for his stand on preparedness, that he was on middle ground is evident when his opposition is noted. Both the imperialists, or "jingoists", on one extreme, and "Bryanites" and pacifists on the other extreme, opposed Wilson's Western stand. To the fiery Teddy Roosevelt, Wilson's belated advocacy of preparedness was inadequate, pusillanimous and to be distrusted.³ In April he charged that Wilson had done

² Sullivan, Our Times, V. 5, 231.
nothing to get us prepared for conflict, even though the war in Europe had been going on for 21 months.¹ To the New York Times "Teddy" was a spoiled child; no one could offer a program for America except "T R" himself. Wilson now had adopted preparedness, what Roosevelt has preached for so long, the New York Times continued, but "Teddy" will have none of it.²

President Wilson's preparedness program was opposed not only by those who thought he was not going far enough, but by those—many within his own party—who thought that he was going too far. William Jennings Bryan, who had resigned as Secretary of State because of his opposition to a strongly worded note to Germany, was greatly opposed to war, or any step by the Administration which might lead to war, because of the many citizens who appeared to be peaceminded the Democratic Administration feared what Bryan might do because of his opposition to the new program. Several organizations for peace had spent and were

¹ Ibid., April 24, 1916, 1. To Roosevelt, preparedness was a must, and morally right. He wrote to Henry Ford in February, 1916: "I do not object to the professional peace movement merely because it is futile; I object to it primarily because it is profoundly mischievous from the moral standpoint." And he ended the letter with this observation: "Righteousness, if triumphant brings peace, but peace does not necessarily bring righteousness." Theodore Roosevelt Papers, box 394.

² Ibid., January 1, 1916.
spending time and money for the cause.¹

The attitude of Jane Addams was perhaps typical of many who were leaders or members of pacifist organizations. Because of President Wilson's efforts toward peace during all the time since the war began, Miss Addams said she would support him through the campaign, that her vote would go to one "who had been so essentially right in international affairs".² Bryan, too, indicated by his support of Wilson during the campaign that the preparedness program of the President's would have to be overlooked, and the overall peace and domestic record and objectives of Mr. Wilson should be decisive.³

The Middle Western farmers had been obstructionists to a Merchant Marine before the war. They said it made very little difference whose ships haul the goods across.

¹ Some of these organizations were the "Women's Peace Party" with Jane Addams as head and spending $600 per month in New York alone; the "American Union" in Washington, D. C. and denouncing patriotism; Labor's "National Peace Council", Brooklyn and pro-German. Samuel Crowther, "The Nourishment of the Pacifists", Forum, V. 56 (July, 1916).

² Other peace societies included the "American Peace Society", the oldest of all, and the "World Peace Foundation". The A P S was not entirely pacifistic; the president, Senator Burton, and a vice-president, William Howard Taft, were lovers of peace, but believers in preparedness. Two other vice-presidents, however, were pacifists, namely W. J. Bryan and Andrew Carnegie. Each organization, the A P S and the W P F, spent about $100,000 per year for the cause of peace. Ibid.

³ Santa Fe New Mexican, May 15, 1916, 4.
But this attitude changed when the European war began.\textsuperscript{1}
When McAdoo attempted to put through his Government Shipping Bill he depended almost entirely for support from the Middle West—and got it, for the price of wheat was going down and down principally because of lack of shipping bottoms.

In the issue of preparedness it is seen that the West found itself in sufficient agreement with the President that, since he had shown that he was a man of peace, and had demonstrated effective leadership in progressive legislation to win their support and trust, the normally Republican section would look twice at any candidate the Republicans might put up before seriously considering supporting anyone in opposition to the President.

The President's preparedness policy, if it was to be activated, first must pass the test of Congressional inspection and approval. The greatest obstacles were the opposition of some Democrats, following Bryan's policy of "turning the other cheek", and the possible opposition of those, particularly the military, and the munitions manufacturers of the East, who desired much greater efforts toward preparedness. The attitude and action of Bryan toward the President's preparedness

\textsuperscript{1} Agnes C. Laut, "The Merchant Marine and the Farmer". Forum, V. 56 (December, 1916), 735-742.
program worried Wilson to some extent. Wilson's Cleveland and Pittsburg speeches advocating preparedness had been attacked by Democratic leaders in a mass meeting in Washington. Representative Bailey, a close Friend of Bryan's, presided. The consensus of opinion in the Cabinet was that the Bryan anti-preparedness campaign, managed in the House by Majority Leader Kitchin, had made such important advances after the Presidential address to Congress advocating preparedness (November 1915), that the

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1 When someone questioned Bryan's sincerity in opposing sending strong notes to Germany, Wilson remarked seriously, "He is absolutely sincere. That is what makes him dangerous". Baker, op. cit., V. 5, 360. Others wondered how strong the Bryan influence and anti-preparedness feeling among the voters really was. W. W. Marsh of Iowa, shortly to become the Democratic Campaign Treasurer, suggested to Postmaster General Burleson that since Marsh was unopposed for Democratic National Committeeman from Iowa, "Why don't we name a straw man opponent so that it would appear as a contest between the Bryan and the Wilson forces". He thought that it would go overwhelmingly for Wilson, and produce a moral effect. Marsh to Burleson, February 25, 1916. Albert S. Burleson Papers, V. 16, 2543.

The suggestion apparently was carried out, for on March 2, 1915, a District Judge from Iowa wrote to Burleson that unaccountably, exasperatingly and humiliatingly, "a few days ago there was a conference of disappointed office seekers, prohibitionists, Bryanites, etc., who have opened headquarters in Des Moines and have a candidate, E. G. Dunn, former Democratic candidate for Governor." Ibid.

Administration's program stood in danger of defeat.\(^1\)

Representative Kitchin thought it silly that we had to prepare against Germany, maintaining that a threatened embargo on munitions would bring Britain to terms. He was against preparedness all the way, but would build some submarines and destroyers as a defense measure.\(^2\)

There were other regular Democrats, such as Senator Stone of Missouri, who opposed the preparations for preparedness. Definitely pacifistic were several Progressive and Republican Senators: Lafollette of Wisconsin, Norris of Nebraska, Gronna of North Dakota, Works of California, Clapp and Moses of Minnesota, and O'Gorman of New York.\(^3\)

The first serious opposition the President faced when he returned from the preparedness tour was not a Senator, pacifist or jingoist; it was his own Secretary of War.


\(^2\) Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 48. He felt that the United States Navy was stronger than the Navy Year Book ranked it. *Ibid.*, 59.

\(^3\) Edward S. Martin of *Life Magazine* divided the voters or parties into two classifications, the Celestials and the Carnals. Mr. Wilson was the leader of the Celestials, who believed in changing the world for good, while the Carnals believed that the early bird gets the worm and the battle goes to the strong. "A lot of the Celestials are mad at Mr. Wilson just now because they think he manifests a disposition to use Carnal weapons," Martin wrote in regard to Wilson's preparedness stand. And the Carnals, he continued, had been "mad at him this long time because he has stuck so persistently to Celestial methods." Edward S. Martin, *The Diary of a Nation*, 250.
Secretary Garrison was in favor of compulsory military service and the federalization of the National Guard, and a larger army than Wilson had recommended. The House Military Affairs Committee would not accept Garrison's recommendations, and the President, seeing his hoped for conciliation in danger, refused to lend further support, and Garrison resigned.

The military bill placed the Republicans on a spot. They had the choice of either condemning sweepingly the bill, or of condoning it. If they condoned it they would have to go on record as declaring that the Administration had dealt adequately with the problem of preparedness. If they condemned it thoroughly they would offend very powerful political elements.

The propaganda for preparedness was furthered by various "patriotic" organizations, including the Navy League, sponsored by J. P. Morgan and partners, Thomas W. Lamont and others, including Elbert H. Gary of United States Steel, Cornelius Vanderbilt and Ogden Mills. The National Security League, fostered by Theodore Roosevelt, Solomon S. Menchen, Robert Bacon and others, and the American Defense Society sponsored and fostered fervid appeals for preparedness against German invasion.¹

In failing to support Garrison and attempting to force

¹ Arnett, op. cit., 53-54.
the big military bill through Congress, Wilson demonstrated that he was steering the middle road for preparedness, but not to the extent of those who believed we could not be kept out of war. As a friend wrote him at the time:

Verily, you have your trials; but certainly this latest development [resignation of Garrison] must afford you relief and infinite amusement. For now we have Garrison and the big Federal army men shouting loudly on one side, while on the other we have Bryan, Villard and company shouting "peace at any price" vociferously for self-advertising purposes. This makes it plainly evident to all sensible people that you are prudently steering your course between the two extremes; and that Congress will vindicate you by overwhelming majorities of approval seems positively clear.¹

The prediction was borne out. After a great deal of indecision and hesitation on the part of the leadership, the military bill was passed in June by an overwhelming vote. The provisions raised the army from 101,856 men (actual strength) to a peace strength of approximately 223,580 and a war strength of 298,000.² Also the National Guard was to be strengthened, and the number of West Point cadets was to be increased. Although the National Defense Act satisfied neither the war element nor the Bryan peace group, it was a satisfactory compromise to most, and failed to alienate the "average" voter.

¹ John R. Dunlap to Wilson, February 14, 1916, Wilson Papers, Box 500, 2598.
² United States Statutes at Large, 64th Congress, 1st Session, V. 39, 5928.
Although several Democratic Congressmen were against preparedness as such, it was apparent in the vote on preparedness measures in Congress that such beliefs could and would be subordinated to the desire for a unified party and the general belief that Wilson was for peace. Many Western newspapers supported the measures. The Salt Lake Tribune declared that with the world in such a state and Britain declaring a commercial blacklist, we, as the richest nation in the world, need a big navy.¹ The Leavenworth Times maintained that the preparedness and military bills were the best obtainable—a compromise between those who would go to the extreme in preparation and "the theorists and pacifists who believed that the millenium had arrived on Earth and no armed force at all was necessary".²

Nathan Strauss, after a trip through the West in the early spring, brought back word that although the desire to remain at peace was uppermost in peoples' minds, the sentiment throughout the West was for adequate preparedness.³ William Allen White, one of the most famous of the editors of the West, wrote to Theodore Roosevelt, whom he supported, that ever since the Germans overran Serbia

¹ July 20, 1916, 6.
² May 21, 1916, 4.
³ New York Times, April 17, 16.
and Russia that "We have been going through a change of heart in this part of the country"—in support of preparedness.

National Honor

More fundamental than the preparedness issue was the question whether the United States should enter the conflict in Europe. This subject, however, was seldom overtly discussed. In the debates in Congress in 1916 there were many lengthy discussions of preparedness measures, but not a word was spoken concerning sending a single soldier to Europe. Preparedness efforts were to be efforts toward building an adequate defense, not offense. Some difficulty was encountered in answering the question, "defense against whom?", nevertheless most people apparently felt we should be prepared for eventualities in such a war torn world.

The line between preparedness for defense and preparedness for offense can at times be tenuous and difficult to determine. The pacifists believed there was often little distinction between the two; preparedness for defense admitted danger of war. Many Americans in favor of preparedness were in favor of peace also—with strength as a deterrent to attack. There were those however, who would not have been very unhappy had the United States

entered the war.  

While working for preparedness did not necessarily indicate a desire for war, there were some individuals who apparently wanted the United States to enter the conflict. Judging by his statement made during 1916, Theodore Roosevelt felt the honor of the country would require, and should already have required, the United States to enter on the side of Great Britain. He was appalled at the actions of Germany in the invasion of defenseless Belgium. (This reaction was not immediate, however.) He expected a wave of indignation from the public at the sinking of the Lusitania, and wrote in the Metropolitan, "I do not believe that the firm assertion of our rights means war, but, in any event, it is well to remember there are things worse than war." Roosevelt considered Wilson's sanction of the slogan, "He kept us out of war," used by

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1 It appeared to the pacifists that the ultra-patriotic societies, such as the Navy League, the National Security League and the American Defense Society were groups organized for the purpose of leading us into war.

2 At first Roosevelt seemed rather sympathetic to the Kaiser, and qualifedly upheld him in Germany's action against Belgium. Shortly, however, the "wave of rage in the United States carried the Colonel along with it, and by early winter he was well established as a Man of Wrath, raging at Wilson for his neutrality". White, Autobiography, 507.

3 Quoted in Hermann Hagedorn, The Bugle That Woke America, 70.
the Democrats during the campaign, as "doing more to emasculate American manhood and weaken its fiber" than anything else he could think of.\(^1\) The Colonel thought that this country should enter for the sake not only of honor, but also because of expediency. Stoddard reported that as far back as October, 1914, Roosevelt had told him the United States would have to go into the war in order to defeat Germany.

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\text{I don't say that Germany will win, but I do say that the Allies cannot. They may check Germany, but not more. For us the question to determine is whether we will get into this war with the Allies cooperating with us, or go into a later war against Germany without help from the Allies.}\(^2\)
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He blamed the President for not making a choice; if he would, then he would "stand shoulder to shoulder with him— if he ever takes a stand I shall be with him." The choice he meant, apparently, was the proper time to enter the war on the side of Great Britain, not merely a choice of sides in the conflict.

To men like Roosevelt, national honor required the American people to do something about real or fancied wrongs done us by the warring nations, particularly Germany. The American people "must find its own soul. National honor is a spiritual thing which cannot be haggled over in terms of dollars. We must stand not only

\(^1\) Ibid., 87. Actually, Wilson opposed the use of the slogan.

\(^2\) Stoddard, As I Knew Them, 427.
for America first but for America first and last and all the time and without any second. To the fiery Roosevelt national honor was the chief issue and he did not hesitate to vent his feelings against President Wilson for the latter's inaction in the face of German affronts to the United States. To Roosevelt, the President was a Micawber, one who issued notes but never honored them when they came due. Micawber, "TR" said, was so constituted that he felt that when a note became due he met it adequately by writing another. At another time the former President called the one in the White House a "dangerous man for the country, for he is a man of brains and he debauches men of brains. Bryan and X only debauch fools."

Mr. Wilson probably did not care for such vituperative language, but the cutting edge of Roosevelt's remarks was dulled by Wilson's knowledge that, as the President remarked, "the very extravagance and unrestrained ill

3 As stated to Charles W. Thompson as reported in Herman Hagedorn, The Bugle That Woke America, 87. "X" is unidentified. In his Battle Creek, Michigan address, Roosevelt declared: "President Wilson, by his policy of tame submission to insult and injury from all whom he feared, has invited the murder of our men, women and children by Mexican bandits on land and by German submarines at sea". Walter Millis, Road to War, 343. Also see San Francisco Chronicle, October 1, 1916, 31.
feeling of what he is now writing serve to nullify any influence that his utterances could have. Wilson, however, always steered clear of a public answer to the former Bull Moose's charges. Whether his hesitation was due to his unwillingness for the Presidency to become involved in an argument which might further arouse already over-heated emotions, or whether he thought Roosevelt would better him in the exchange is not known. "TR" was known to be a tough man to tangle with and he here had the probable advantage of advocating action which was positive and which aroused the emotions.

What ever the most popular platitude, whether "Preparedness without militarism", "American Rights", "American Honor", "Deeds not Words", "Americanism", whatever fervent ideal one claimed adhesion to, whatever grandiose abstractions that anxiety and fear naturally brought on during such troubled times, many people, if not most, continued to want to keep out of war. This was particularly true in the Middle West and West. Although the people of these sections were not so far behind those of

1 Wilson to Dudley Field Malone, December 9, 1916. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 74.

2 It has been reported that Wilson and his advisers, however, would have preferred Roosevelt over Hughes as an opponent in the Presidential race. His extreme viewpoint on entering the war would have alienated too many middle-of-the-roads for him to have been a successful candidate himself.
other parts of the country in favoring preparedness, their desire for peace was predominant. Henry Morgenthau, the Democratic Campaign financial manager, reported to Wilson that during a trip through the West in the Spring of 1916 the people were not as "heroic" as Roosevelt wished, and they wanted to keep out of war—"almost at any price". He thought that the West was not in favor of "TR"'s extreme preparedness and desire for war; in fact, the "desire to nominate Hughes, the 'bewhiskered Wilson'," he advised the President, "is the strongest vote of confidence and approval that the Republican party can give you".¹ Whatever the government did or failed to do in regard to Europe or Mexico, a political writer maintained,² was preferable to war to those in the West. There may be some distrust of the Democratic Party, he said, but because they trust Wilson, there isn't enough to overbalance the feeling against war.

Actually, it appears that the West, while not in Roosevelt's "heroic mood"—ready to go into the war on the side of the Allies—did have a feeling of nationalism—or "national honor", if you will. The people of that

¹ Wilson Papers, Letter, Morgenthau to Wilson, June 2, 1916.
² Ben F. Allen in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 9, 1916, 1. The writer would not have included Mexico in such a statement, however.
section were as willing, or more so, as the East to use force if necessary to settle the Mexican question. In the Gore and McLeMore resolutions several of those Representatives and Senators who voted to table the resolution, that is, to continue to uphold the right of Americans to travel on armed merchant ships, were from the West. In past and in later history it has been demonstrated that the West was as ready and as willing to fight as the East.

In this instance, however, the majority of the people in the West had not been shown that going to war was necessary. Perhaps the principal reason for the attitude of the West against any action bringing us closer to war was the relative isolation and the distance from the Atlantic Coast. To the people of the Trans-Mississippi the submarine menace was far away. The danger of invasion by

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1 The vote in the Senate was 64-14 to table. Out of the 64, seven were Western Senators of the Republican Party. For the voting record in the Senate, see the *Congressional Record*, V. 53, Pt. 5 (64th Congress, 1st Session) March 3, 1916, 3465.

2 Herman Hagedorn, in *The Bugle That Awoke America*, presents the thesis that reason the West was relatively unconcerned about the war was the high cost of telegraph service—which kept war news in the press to a minimum. While this idea could have a degree of validity, the writer found in his perusal of many Western newspapers that there was considerable space devoted to war news in those papers.

Hagedorn added that Wilson had not informed the public, as was his duty, the seriousness of war, and failed to clarify the public mind; rather he confused it. 77.
the forces of a foreign power was ridiculed by thinking people in the West. Why should Americans get into the conflict? The emotions of those in the East had been aroused to the extreme so that they were ready to enter into something unnecessarily. Show the West that the nation was in danger, then it would be aroused and ready for war; until the "sensible" preparedness was sufficient. The people of the Trans-Mississippi in 1916 did not think that the United States had reached the point where war was necessary to uphold her national honor.

Mexico--To Invade or Not to Invade?

The situation in Mexico during President Wilson's first term, as in the preceding Taft administration, was one to cause a great deal of worry and disquiet in the United States. Revolutions and counter-revolutions occurred with disturbing frequency. Late in the Taft administration Huerta overthrew by force the elected Madero, and President Wilson found the problem of recognition in

1 After the election of 1916 Roosevelt wrote William Allen White denouncing the west as "yellow" for voting for Wilson. White replied that his friend was "plumb crazy". The west hated "pussyfooting" and Hughes did that. The westerners have stood for "TR" since the beginning. White advised "TR" to "get out of sight of the Wall Street ticker and the munition makers public sentiment and then you will see that the West did the only thing it could have done with self respect." Walter Johnson (ed.), Selected Letters of William Allen White, 172, 174.
his lap. Deciding against recognition of Huerta, Wilson awaited developments, and after several months Huerta abdicated and left for Spain in July 1914, leaving leadership to Carranza and Villa. Wilson recognized Carranza as the head of the de facto government of Mexico and Pancho Villa became an "insurgent".

There existed little unity of purpose in either the Democratic or Republican Party in regard to the difficult question as to what faction in Mexico to recognize. However, the President had definite policies in view. He believed that all nations, both weak and strong, should have the right to control their internal affairs, and that Mexico would never become a peaceful or law-abiding nation until she had been permitted to achieve basic settlement of her own troubles without outside interference, therefore a policy of "watchful waiting" was in order.1 The President, and at least two of his more peace-minded cabinet members, Daniels and Bryan, was adamant in opposition to the risk of American troop action in protection of vested interests in

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1 Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, 145. His policy in regard to Huerta was the exception. John Lind, of the American Consular Service wrote to the American charge d'affaires in Mexico, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, in April 1914, that President Wilson had said repeatedly that Huerta must go, and Wilson had authorized Lind to inform the German minister that "Huerta will be put out if he does not get out", that the President preferred domestic means, but if necessary "other means adequate for the purpose will be resorted to". Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 3.
Mexico. In an article published in a leading women's magazine of that day (and this), the President answered his critics by explaining that the Latin Americans had their side of the question and were watching us closely. The United States will treat Mexico, the President maintained, as she would like Mexico to treat the United States. He hit hard at those who would invade Mexico, and declared that most of suggestions of action came from those who wished to possess her, who regarded the Mexicans with condescension and a touch of contempt. "Such men cannot and will not determine the policy of the United States. They are not of the true American breed or motive."

But to stay out of involvements in troubled Mexico was impossible. The Tampico affair in which 21 Americans were killed resulted from an attempt by the United States to force an apology and salute from Huerta when a boat crew of United States sailors were arrested. Later the Vera Cruz incident demonstrated that while Wilson did not want war, he would act to keep a foreign country from landing munitions in Mexico when those munitions were for the use of Huerta.

Such actions by the President were not passed up

1 Robert E. Armin, Woodrow Wilson, 152.

without much criticism. He was accused by party opponents of assuming all possible positions on the arms questions, by first placing an embargo on all arms to Mexico, then lifting the embargo to both and later following with violating a truce by permitting arms to be shipped to only one party, the Carranzistas. Later when Pancho Villa raided the border and killed several Americans at Columbus, New Mexico, the National Guard was called and General Pershing was sent on an expedition into Mexico chasing Villa and his bandits.

Such difficulties and maneuvering by the Administration gave political opponents much to criticize. In his Lewiston, Maine speech in August, 1916, Theodore Roosevelt dwelt long and ardently on the subject. He ridiculed the President's or the Democratic Party's slogan, "He kept us out of war". This is war, Roosevelt said. What we have had in Mexico is wars, "ignoble, pointless, unsuccessful little wars; but wars".1 And they have accomplished no purpose. Wilson's policy in Mexico "has combined all the evils of feeble peace with all the evils of feeble war".2 To Roosevelt, the Wilson policy in Mexico, as well as in Europe, was not "watchful waiting", but a "policy of

1 "Duty First", pamphlet issued by the National Hughes Alliance, undated.
2 Ibid.
poltroonery,” and contrasted Wilson's policy of "peace" in Mexico under which many Americans had been killed, with Roosevelt's own terms when, according to him, not a single American had lost his life in Mexico.

Other Republicans joined in public criticism. In an open letter to the President, George Perkins quoted Wilson's Columbus, Ohio speech in which he had reiterated his stand of no war with Mexico if he could prevent it, to which the erstwhile Progressive commented that this statement seemed to be in sharp contrast to Wilson's actions in Mexico, and recounted the incidents in which "war" had occurred. Senator Harding declared in 1916 that we were legally and actually at war with Mexico. Senator Lodge, while in agreement with Wilson in many of his earlier moves regarding Mexico, crossed swords with the President for the first time over his action in sending ships and marines to Vera Cruz. Lodge wanted a blockade and war if necessary in order to end Mexican threats to American lives and property. Half-way measures aimed at one man (Huerta) would not work, Lodge submitted. 3

1 Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Crowded Hours, 237.
3 This conflict of opinion between Lodge and Wilson marked a turning point in the Senator's attitude toward Wilson. From that time on Lodge became a definite critic of the Administration. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, 303-305.
Even some Democratic leaders were glad for an opportunity to send troops into Mexico. Secretary McAdoo, writing from the U.S.S. Tennessee bound for South America, thought perhaps that "Villa has rendered the country a service in giving us, at last, an ample justification for going into Mexico..." It "should result in a solution of the long and vexing Mexican problem...", he added. From many of the Southern Senators, particularly those along the border, came pleas to the President to settle, once and for all, the Mexican question. Even Tumulty, the President's most devoted Secretary, wrote to the President that something drastic should be done. The Governor of Texas, an enthusiastic supporter of Mr. Wilson, wrote to him in 1915 asking for help in patrolling the border.

Mr. Wilson was not alone in his determination to avoid war with our neighbor to the South. Robert

2 Tumulty, op. cit., 156.
3 Governor Ferguson to Wilson, June 11, 1915. Ferguson said that the situation was so serious that he needed an appropriation of $30,000 from Congress for the maintenance of 30 additional Texas Rangers, or 50 troops to be placed under the Texas Adjutant General to increase the river guard of the Federal Government. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 492, folder 2446.
LaFollette made a seven hour speech in Congress in which he vehemently supported Wilson's policies in Mexico. 1 Senator Borah agreed with the President's actions, with some qualifications. There were many others who approved the stand of the President, and his papers include numerous letters praising him for his stand, many emphasizing that we as a great nation should not "pick on" Mexico because she is much weaker than the United States. Even then, several emphasized, many American boys would be killed if the United States sent an army in to conquer Mexico.

The press of the nation was divided on the issue of supporting President Wilson's "watchful waiting" in Mexico. Since it was from the West that the peace sentiment is said to have come, it is interesting to examine the sentiment of the editors of the newspapers of that section of the nation. In the newspapers checked, the stand on the Mexican issue was mixed, some for pulling out of Mexico, others neutral and on the fence, and still others for waging heavy war on the troubled country at our Southern border. The Democratic Omaha World-Herald

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1Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 21, 1916, 1. He said, "I sincerely hope the standard bearer of the Republican party...will not feel himself constrained and will not under any circumstance take the position that it is the duty of this government to put the flag of the United States behind the investments of speculation in Mexico or elsewhere".
praised Wilson and his policies in Mexico. Peace with honor is the President's motto, "and it looks like he is attaining it", ran an editorial in midsummer. The Des Moines Register apparently supported Wilson; at least the difficulties inherent in the situation were recognized. Several editors were neutral, or for the President in some of his actions or policies, while opposing others, or for him on the Mexican issue at one time and opposing him later, or vice versa. A paper very close to the action on the border, the independent Albuquerque Morning Journal, realized the difficulties inherited from President Taft's administration, and the strain of the pull from each extreme—Bryan's peace at any price, and those who wanted to annex Mexico, or at least the northern part. Later the time is changed, and the editor calls the Administration policy of non-protection "a nauseating one". At the same time it is pointed out that such a policy follows historic precedent. Another editor advised that the United States should pull out from the chase of Villa; the issue is dead. In June the Seattle Times was critical of

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1 August 2, 1916, 6.
4 May 10, 1916, 6. Really, Congress was blamed for many inadequacies; "...the old time ability is not there". May 8, 6.
Wilson's Mexican policies, but by October the paper was more neutral, taking neither side of the issue.\footnote{October 26, 1916.}

Another Seattle paper also took a somewhat neutral position, but favored withdrawing the National Guard from the border and substituting the regular army—if this country had one big enough.\footnote{Seattle Post Intelligencer, August 23, 1916, 6.}

The Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, that famous organ of a famous editor, contained little, if any, mention of the Mexican trouble. The implication is, perhaps, since White was a Progressive-Republican, that the editor disapproved little of the policy and practices of President Wilson in regard to Mexico. It was left to the relatively unknown (nation­ally) Cheyenne State Leader to express the point of view probably held by many pacifists in the West. If America had invaded Mexico all Latin America would have turned more against her. The United States has a treaty as a result of the last Mexican war, the Leader stated, which commits this country to settle disputes with Mexico by arbitration. This country should make the greatest efforts to abide by the agreement to arbitrate because the last Mexican war is judged by historians to be largely a war of aggression.\footnote{July 13, 1916, 4.}
But all of the newspapers of the West were not all either favorable to or on the fence in regard to Administration policies in Mexico. The Santa Fe New Mexican felt that the border states did not have sufficient security against raids. The best way to assure that security would not be to send small bands on punitive expeditions, but to equip and send into Mexico in a wholesale armed intervention, a United States Army. Less men would be lost in the long run.¹ At that time the Seattle Times agreed. The nation had been humiliated long enough, we should do something with strength.² Another paper, also far from the Mexican border, agreed something should be done. The Bismarck (North Dakota) Tribune favored intervention if necessary to protect the border. It should have been done two years before.³ A powerful West Coast newspaper, the San Francisco Examiner, for Wilson in most of his domestic policies, was strongly in favor of intervention.⁴ A few hundred miles east another editor held the same views, as far as Mexico was concerned, and never failed to take advantage of an opportunity to say so.

¹ May 9, 1916, 4.
³ June 24, 1916, 4.
⁴ See editorial pages almost any day during period of Mexican issue.
In fact the editorial page was almost filled, day after day, with preparedness and Mexico, criticizing the Administration. A paper still farther east, was critical, but not so boisterously so, and called for a sharper attitude in the country south of the border. Back farther west again, the Reno Gazette, for Hughes and Republicans, in commenting upon a statement by the Administration in Washington that the situation was satisfactory, said, "If a few more Americans were killed, perhaps the Administration would be even more satisfied."

A North Dakota editor was not so satirical, but nevertheless favored going into Mexico to "quieten a disorderly neighbor". The Leavenworth (Kansas) Times reflected the views of apparently many in the section and throughout the West. America's policy has failed in Mexico; she must change it now—if necessary let her send an army to penetrate into the middle of Mexico. Judging by the number of newspapers of the section, a considerable sentiment in the West was for actions which meant war or could easily lead to war—perhaps not in Europe but in the weak,

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1 The Idaho Statesman (Boise).
2 Omaha (Nebraska) Bee, See June 24, p. 8 and June 28, p. 4.
5 May 9, 1916, 4.
Southern neighbor, Mexico.

In other parts of the United States there was much criticism of Wilson's policy in the country across our Southern border. Two newspapers from the New England state which was carried by Wilson were strongly for a rejuvenated Mexican policy. The Concord Evening Monitor described the current one as lame-brained, while the Manchester Union termed the President's policy as "watch, wait, wobble and withdraw". In New England generally the Mexican policy of the President was a subject of much criticism, with one of Wilson's favorite newspapers, the Manchester Guardian, as an oasis in a sea of Republican, anti-peace-with-Mexico policy.

The Mexican policy of the Administration, probably gained Wilson few if any total votes. There were too many difficulties involved for an early and easy solution. Too many Americans were willing to get tough with weak Mexico. Even in the West, if one can judge the opinion of the voters by the attitude of the newspapers, the President's determination to keep peace with Mexico failed to meet with the general approval accorded his efforts to stay out of involvements in the European Struggle. The fact that the West in part was willing

1 July 7, 1916, 6.
to risk a struggle with Mexico casts a shadow and ques-
tion over its alleged complete peace-at-any-price atti-
tude toward Europe.
The Issues—Internal

At campaign and election time in 1916 the great surface and emotional issues revolved around the conflagration in Europe and to a lesser extent the situation in Mexico. Nevertheless, the internal issues and the domestic legislation of the Wilson Administration had been of great interest before the outbreak of the war in 1914. As we have pointed out earlier, President Wilson executed many of the plans of his "New Freedom", principally concerned with remedying the social and economic situations of this country. Although many of the reforms were supported by both Republicans and Democrats, certain of them became issues of importance during the campaign.¹

Hyphenism

One important issue which was not a subject of legislation, but one serving to tie in the external problems with the internal issues, was that of "hyphenism". The question of the extent of loyalty of certain groups of Americans comparatively recently transplanted to this country placed a great strain upon the basic

¹ Others not so controversial in nature will be discussed as "Factors in the Campaign." (Chapter VIII).
homogeneity of this great melting pot.

The most important of these groups of "hyphenated Americans" were those of German origin, the total in this country second only to those coming from England. Before the outbreak of the war in Europe, involving Germany on one side and Great Britain on the other, the problem of amalgamation of these groups was one of no tremendous importance. But with such a conflict between two of our "mother countries", the influence was bound to be felt in the United States.

Because of their minority position and because of the extreme attitude of some of their group, the German-Americans, in the eyes of the English origin majority, became loyalty suspects. Always a difficult matter to define and assess, "loyalty" became a serious, perplexing problem. Perhaps influenced to an extreme by pro-British propaganda, Americans began to treat German-Americans as Germans in America rather than as American citizens. This discrimination was especially true in relation to the various organized groups of German-Americans, particularly the National German-American Alliance. After the outbreak of the war in Europe many British sympathizers here began to cast reflection upon the aim and loyalty of the Alliance and accused it and similar
organizations as agents of Pan-Germanism.¹

Since most newspapers in the United States were owned and edited by Americans of English descent, it perhaps was only natural that soon after the war broke out in Europe the papers began the use of news, pictures and cartoons propagandistic in total effect toward creating a bad impression and of questioning the loyalty of a large group of American citizens.² Perhaps the climax of

¹ This point is still debated. However, Clifton James Child, in The German-Americans in Politics 1914-1917, a study in the main of the National German-American Alliance during the war period, maintains that the Alliance was originated to fight the Prohibitionists, whose movement threatened the maintenance of their social customs—and incidentally the breweries—and that the Alliances were not following directions of the German Government.

James Middleton, writing for a periodical at the time, expressed the popular view, pointing out that during the last 15 years certain influences had worked hard to preserve teutonism; that of Pan-Germanism had not overlooked the opportunity to take advantage of the presence of so many Germans in the United States. The German-American Alliance was founded at a time when the German Navy League was started and when Anglo-phobia became a ruling passion. "Are Americans More German Than British?" World's Work, V. 21 (December, 1915), 141-147.

² The size of the German population in this country was great, with the largest concentrations in the North Central States. The following figures are taken from the census report of 1910, Thirteenth Census of the United States, V. VI, 903.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>East North Central States</th>
<th>German-American Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>673,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>264,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>1,014,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>424,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>794,943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
unfavorable newspaper publicity came with the "expose" by the **New York World** of a plan by the Alliance and secret German organizations to "control the National Convention" and to influence generally the actions of Congress and the government in behalf of the interests of Germany. The occasion was the debate on the Gore and McLemore resolutions to prevent Americans from traveling upon armed merchant ships of the belligerents. The resolutions were the work of the Alliance. Although great doubt has been thrown upon the validity and certainly the extreme interpretation of certain papers discovered in the briefcase of a certain Alphonse G. Koelble, president of the United German Societies in New York, the "plan"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West North Central States</th>
<th>German-American Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>396,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>360,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>367,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Dakota</td>
<td>59,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Dakota</td>
<td>82,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>201,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>132,534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indiana and Missouri had the greatest percentage of German-Americans of the total white foreign born, with 43%. Many of German stock were found in other states: New York, 1,234,580; Pennsylvania, 654,684; Maryland, 135,325; Texas, 171,776; New Jersey, 333,636; California, 206,382. By "German-Americans" is meant people born in Germany, and those of German parentage (either one or two parents.)


"exposed" by the World was taken seriously even by Congress and the State Department, producing great consternation among those Congressmen and Senators who were named as being connected with the Alliance.¹

Even President Wilson is said to have been convinced that the "expose" indicated a widespread German plot.² This was not the first time Wilson had indicated a distrust of German-American organizations, however. In 1915 he began to call attention to the dangers of "hyphenism" as he termed it, and to urge legislation to check conspirators and plotters against American neutrality.³ He was annoyed at those persons who, as he was alleged to have said, wanted to take care of American neutrality, but whose help had never been solicited.⁴ In using his influence to defeat the Gore and McLemore resolutions, to float loans to the Allies, and to refuse to place an embargo on munitions and weapons to participants in the war (in reality to the Allies due to British control of the


² Ibid., 93.

³ Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, 42.

⁴ Child, op. cit., 56.
surface of the seas), the President showed his willingness to buck the displeasure of the German-Americans. A sentence or two in his acceptance speech of September 2 assured all interested that "I neither seek the favour nor fear the displeasure of the small alien element amongst us which puts party loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States."  

At the same time Wilson distinguished between the Alliance and such groups and the average citizen of German birth or descent. The President wrote in October to Herman Bernstein of the American Hebrew in New York City that "...I am particularly gratified to have my judgment confirmed by yours that the so-called German-American agitation being conducted in this country against my re-election represents only the machinations of a small number of professional German-Americans."  

Earlier he had expressed a like belief and added, "It is my earnest desire to receive the support of every foreign born citizen of the United States who loves the country of his adoption and is ready to support it with unflinching loyalty and undivided affection...I have never doubted

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1 Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The New Democracy, V. II, 283. Tumulty, his Secretary, had a few days earlier suggested such a statement. Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, 208-209. Note that Wilson referred to "the small alien element". Tumulty had mentioned "any German-American".

2 Wilson Papers, box 18, letterbook 32, p. 498.
that the great majority of them were of that temper and purpose.¹

Naturally, the German-American organizations fought back against such accusations as made by the World, and the opposition of the President. Reviving the epithets of "Know Nothingism" and "Nativism" for their opponents, they warned against the dangers of intolerance, and pointed out that while several outstanding supporters of the Allies, such as Charles W. Eliot, William A. White and Theodore Roosevelt had advocated an entente with Great Britain, not a single one of the German-American leaders had suggested that the United States enter the war on the side of Germany.² The attacks by the pro-British press and the long drawn out controversy between the Government and the German Foreign office had established a unity of antagonism and resentment among the German-Americans. An observer traveling through the country stated that the average German of the Middle-West had no thought of any other country. But he had a deep feeling of resentment against what he regarded as an attack upon the integrity of the German character. Many would go to the extremes of voting for Henry Ford and disarmament

¹ To Albert Seigal of New York City, August 2, 1916, ibid., box 17, letterbook 31, p. 306.
² Child, op. cit., 106.
when believing thoroughly in preparedness, in order to register antagonism to what they regarded as an unwarranted attack and infringement upon their sense of honor and neutrality. Practically all of the German-American editors agreed that by the use of hyphenated "Americanism" in his 1915 speech, the President had meant German-Americans, and his message demanding new laws against conspirators was regarded as an insult to the German-Americans. ¹ Early in the war the alliances had agreed with the President's insistence upon strict neutrality, but his later deviation from the rule, as the German-Americans thought of it, changed their opinion of the President from a favorable one to the opposite. As the war progressed and America's neutrality worked more and more to the disadvantage of Germany, the more the general conflict between the German-American Alliance and those opposed to it became a more specific conflict between such organizations and the Administration, culminating in their attempts to destroy Wilson politically in 1916.

Hughes, The Republicans and the German-Americans

The antagonism in German-American organized circles toward President Wilson would appear to have been a great

¹ Walter Davenport, "The Pre-Nomination Campaign", Outlook, V. CXIII (January-April, 1916), 322-325.
² Wittke, op. cit., 43.
opportunity for Mr. Hughes and the Republicans to gain many votes from a large and dissatisfied segment of the voting population. Hughes had not alienated the German-Americans by any speeches. As a justice he had not spoken on the issues at all. In addition to his silence in the past, the very fact that he was the political opponent of Wilson was an apparent advantage. But the situation was not all favorable to Mr. Hughes; in fact his position was a difficult one. While the President was opposed by the German-American leaders because of non-observance of real neutrality, Hughes was the candidate of a party whose platform called for "strict neutrality"¹ but whose leaders in the main favored stronger action against Germany. At the same time Hughes was the candidate opposing an incumbent who had "kept us out of war", a policy apparently approved by the majority of people. So where could the candidate of the Republican Party turn from the neutrality of President Wilson? The question plagued him throughout the campaign.

Possibly the original plan of the Republicans was to officially ignore hyphenism as an issue, for there is no mention of the subject in their platform and no discussion of it in their Campaign Text-Book.² However, such an

¹ Platforms of the Two Great Political Parties 1856-1916.
issue was too important and too hot to ignore completely, and soon the Republicans were trying to convince the Irish and German-Americans that Republicans who clamored for preparedness aimed to aid the Central Powers thereby. Any attempt to gain favor from the German-Americans would probably alienate many in the majority pro-English group, particularly the doubtful progressives, so as in other instances and issues, Hughes was forced to carry water on both shoulders. On June 13 he made a statement in which he came out for "undiluted Americanism", and maintained that anybody "who supports me is supporting an out-and-out American and an out-and-out-American policy and absolutely nothing else". During the campaign he again emphasized his Americanism and in St. Louis, a hot-bed of Germanism, he made a speech in which he followed the lead of Roosevelt in Maine, and again emphasized the need for national unity and patriotism.

Although Hughes belatedly came out for "undiluted Americanism", the professional German-Americans were for him from the beginning. Even before the National Convention certain alliances were using their influence to defeat Roosevelt and Root and in support of Hughes.

3 Child, op. cit., 130.
Upon the nomination of Hughes the German language papers carried stories of his life and pictures of himself and Mrs. Hughes, and during the campaign supported him with few exceptions. The National Alliance was prevented from officially supporting a candidate, but its president, Charles John Hexamer, personally conducted a campaign for the Republican nominee, the first time in 16 years a candidate had been endorsed by him.¹

After his nomination Hughes became saddled with his support and the Democrats seized upon it as a chance to discredit his candidacy. The Text-Book of the Democrats stressed the relationship and pointed out that the Alliance worked hard in Chicago for Hughes,² and Democratic newspapers such as the New York World depicted Hughes with the Kaiser and wearing a German helmet.³

Rumors of a secret pact between Hughes and the German-Americans began to circulate. Norman Hapgood, acting chairman of the Woodrow Wilson Independent League, made the flat charge that Hughes had reached an understanding with leading German-Americans regarding his attitude upon the question of British interference with

¹ Ibid., 135.
American mails and that the Republican candidate had made good his agreement to denounce such interference in his speech at Philadelphia a few days before. State Senator Kent E. Keller of Illinois added that Victor Ridder of the New Yorker Staats Zeitung was writing Hughes' speeches for him. Again Hughes, it was rumored, had told one Sandford, a German-American, as reported by Horace Brand, editor of the Illinois Staats Zeitung, that he was "with them to the finish". Hughes wrote to "T R" that the report was absolutely false, that he had not

2 Ibid., October 13, 1916, 1.
3 Ralph M. Easley to Roosevelt, August 24, and September 27, 1916. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, box 398. As "T R" wrote to Hughes on August 28, he had been informed by three different people that a "confidential agent", who had gained access to German organizations, had said that these organizations had received assurance from Attorney Sandford, former law partner of Hughes and in 1916 counsel for the German steamship companies in New York City, that if Hughes became President all restrictions upon submarine warfare—with exception of war on vessels flying the United States Flag—would be treated as enemy if they carried ammunition or other war supplies to a European port.

Roosevelt assured the gentlemen that Hughes had made no such statement or promise, and that he, "T R" was certain, would not reverse the President's policy on two of the very few points where he was right, that is, upon his attitude regarding the shipment of munitions, and his attitude (in words) in the objections he had made to the submarine warfare. Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4.
even seen Sandford since "last winter",\(^1\) and that Sandford had denied to Hughes ever making such a statement. Later the Democratic National Committee published the records of what was alleged to have been a secret meeting between the Republican candidate and a pro-German committee headed by Jeremiah O'Leary.\(^2\)

The German-Americans had committed a political blunder in making it obvious so early that they were irreconciliable to Wilson's re-election. It could easily be assumed by Wilson that the German-Americans were lost already, so whatever was done during the campaign could be done without considering them; even outright repudiation might be used to possible advantage. In view of the subsequent campaign against the hyphen it soon became, in the words of Ambassador Gerard, "an asset to have the German-Americans against him."\(^3\) Colonel House agreed that "their votes against the President gave us no concern.\(^4\) Early in the campaign House had commented

\(^1\) Hughes to Roosevelt, September 7 and September 15, 1916, \textit{ibid.}, also in Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4.

\(^2\) George S. Viereck, \textit{Spreading Germs of Hate}, 245-246. O'Leary, an Irish American, was chairman of the American Truth Society, a society definitely pro-German and anti-British.

\(^3\) Charles Seymour, \textit{Intimate Papers of Colonel House}, V. II, 23.

\(^4\) \textit{Ibid.}, 372.
that for some time it had looked as if the hyphenate issue would be a paramount one on which Wilson could win easily.\footnote{1}

Because most German-Americans usually voted Republican anyway, the Gerard and House lack of concern was understandable. There were, however, many of German descent who were Democrats, particularly in Ohio, and loud wails came from some Democratic politicians who were afraid that Wilson's strong stand against the hyphenate would alienate these regular Democratic voters.\footnote{2} Senator Stone of Missouri, a friend of the German-Americans, met with a group of them and pleaded for the re-election of Wilson.\footnote{3} While it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of such pleas, it is known that toward the end of the campaign some German-American groups, if none of the professional organizations were for Wilson. The \textit{Omaha World-Herald} reported that "an enthusiastic group of

\footnote{1} Ibid., 359. He apparently still thought so but thought that if the Allies continued their blockade and "pushed the Germans back rigorously, a feeling of something akin to sympathy might arise here".

\footnote{2} Representative Charles Lieb of Indiana, himself born and reared in Germany, spoke before Congress on July 18, 1916, praising the President and pleading for him. \textit{Congressional Record}, 64th Congress, 1st Session V. 53, 11254-11258.

\footnote{3} Viereck, \textit{op. cit.}, 242.
German-Americans met at the Lindell Hotel last night and organized a German-American Wilson and Marshall club of Lincoln.\(^1\) The Cleveland Plain-Dealer reported in October\(^2\) that polls indicated that those German-Americans who could not speak English were for Hughes, but only 10% of the Germans were in that category. Those who spoke English were normally Democratic but the percentage of that group voting Democratic would show a loss in 1916. There was one factor, however, which would reduce the loss to a minimum—the anti-hyphenate speeches of Theodore Roosevelt.

**Roosevelt Against All Hyphenates**

As in relation to preparedness and the war issue, Theodore Roosevelt's vehement speeches against hyphenism became a handicap to the Republican Party and its candidate. Roosevelt believed in America and Americanism; no qualifications would be accepted. As he wrote to his son-in-law, Nicholas Longworth, in January 1916, "I hold that the hyphenated American, the man who has to call himself German-American, Irish-American, English-American, or Jewish-American, is almost invariably loyal only to

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1 October 1, 1916, 8.

2 October 7, 1916, 2.
what comes before the hyphen". In his speech before the Illinois American Bar Association a few days before the Republican National Convention, Roosevelt let it be known publicly how he stood on the issue. "There is no room in this country for German-Americans or English-Americans, Irish-Americans or French-Americans..."

"The man who tries to be loyal to this country and also to some other country is certain in the end to put his loyalty to the other country ahead of his loyalty to his. The politico racial hyphen is the breeder of moral treason".

Apparently Hughes thought that Roosevelt had gone to the extreme, particularly with the use of the term "hyphen" or "hyphenate", and had written him a letter to that extent, for in August Roosevelt wrote to the Republican candidate and agreed to discontinue the use of the term: "I shall profit by your suggestions as to the use of the hyphen...and...I shall do as you suggest, and while I shall set forth my principles just as unequivocally as I have been setting them forth for the last two years, I shall avoid the particular phrase which lends

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1 January 24, 1916, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, box 394.

2 "National Unity and International Ideals". Chicago, April 29, 1916. Reprinted as a pamphlet, undated, and with no publisher given.
itself to misunderstanding.\footnote{1}

In his famous speech at Lewiston, Maine, Roosevelt although he abstained from use of the term, hit hard against the hyphenates:

Any organization of American citizens which acts in the interest of a foreign power is guilty of moral treason to the Republic. It is because of such action that I condemn those professional German-Americans who in our politics act as servants and allies of Germany, not as Americans, interested solely in the honor and welfare of America; and I would condemn just as quickly English-Americans or French-Americans or Irish-Americans who acted in such a manner.\footnote{2}

Both Roosevelt and the German-American Alliance were working to defeat Wilson, but by the strange quirks of politics both were hurting the chances of Wilson's opponent, and increasing the votes of Wilson himself.\footnote{3}

Some Republican leaders realized the danger and on October 26 asked "T R" to "soft-pedal" the hyphen question but he threatened to retire from the campaign rather than comply.\footnote{4} His attitude played right into

\footnote{1}Roosevelt to Hughes, August 11, 1916, Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4.

\footnote{2}"Duty First", August 31, 1916, pamphlet issued by the National Hughes Alliance.

\footnote{3}At an annual convention of the German American Alliance of Ohio, the President and Roosevelt were excoriated, the president of the convention, John Schwaab of Cincinnati, charged both had endeavored to make the German-American elements as well as others vassals of England. Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 19, 1916, 2.

\footnote{4}Child, op. cit., 1950.
the hands of Wilson who already had declared himself unwilling to be supported by the element Roosevelt was so persistently attacking. Thus again Hughes was handicapped by the man who was trying to help him.

Prohibition and Suffrage

The prohibition of the sale and the use of intoxicating liquors and the right of women to vote had been linked together for many years before 1916. In 1881, the National Brewers' Congress adopted a resolution condemning the suffrage movement and since that time the women had fought the "vetos" and vice versa. In 1914 the connection between the two developments was apparent, for many of the Western states, whence rose the suffrage movement, went dry. California, a suffrage state, went overwhelmingly against prohibition, but four other Western states made advances toward "dryness", and 53 counties in Illinois were dry. Later, in 1916 and after, the two issues were linked by persons, efforts and results.

1 Wilson, in response to heavy criticism of O'Leary, said that he did not desire the vote of such as he. See chapter on Campaign Strategy.


3 Colorado, Washington, Oregon and Arizona.
Both issues contained a mixture of local and national implications, and because of so many cross currents and diverse elements their effect upon the national election is difficult to determine. Although prohibition was somewhat of a national subject of discussion, the issue was being settled, for the most part, on the local and state level. Reflecting the local nature of the fight for and against liquor at that time were the candidates and platforms of the major parties. The subject was omitted from both platforms, and the candidates steered clear of entanglements on the question. Mr. Wilson took the stand that the liquor question was "essentially a non-political, non-partisan, moral and social in its nature" and should remain an issue to be decided by the individual communities. The Volstead Act, in his opinion, was the wrong way to do the right thing. "You cannot regulate the habits of a great cosmopolitan people by placing unreasonable restrictions upon their liberty and freedom". Mr. Hughes abstained from making any direct statement regarding liquor and prohibition, but it was the belief of astute politicians that the

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1 With the exception of the efforts of the Anti-Saloon League and possibly one or two other such organizations.

2 Tumulty, op. cit., 411.

3 Ibid., 410.
Republican candidate favored, as the wets termed it, "the restriction of personal liberty."¹

President Wilson's opposition to the Volstead Act, in contrast to the silence of his opponent, apparently had little general effect upon the final outcome in the election. The wave of prohibition sentiment, particularly in the Western States, continued. Certainly many of the states in the West either already had, or in 1916 voted for prohibition.² Broadly speaking, the territory where prohibition sentiment was dominant was co-extensive with the section of the country carried by Wilson in the election. The exceptions are notable however, particularly Maine and Oregon as prohibitionist states which went Republican, one in the West, a region mainly Progressive and prohibitionist, and the other completely removed from the West, and in a region almost completely Republican and almost completely wet. At the same time California and Ohio, perhaps the most decisive states in


² After the election, the Anti-Saloon League listed the following states which had adopted or declared for state-wide prohibition: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Oklahoma, Maine and Colorado. Ibid.
the victory for Wilson, were states which remained wet.¹

Support for prohibition varied among the states and among the local party organizations. The Democrats in Iowa could not agree among themselves on their liquor policy, although the platform called for better enforcement of present prohibition laws.² In Ohio the Democratic candidates for the lower house of the state legislature were "wetter" than the Republican candidates, however, it was reported that the dry forces would campaign for certain Democrats.³ In Nebraska the great bulwark of the drys was one William J. Bryan, who campaigned through the West for President Wilson. According to the Nebraskan, the wet forces of his state were trying to influence the selection of the delegates to the Democratic National Convention and objected to his attendance as a delegate.⁴

¹ Prohibition would have worked a hardship upon the wine growers of California. There was a feeling among Californians and others that prohibition could not be morally right unless the "innocent grower of wine grapes who can make no other use of his land receives compensation for his loss." "Prohibition and the Square Deal," Sunset, V. 37 (October, 1916), 36.

² Des Moines Register, July 12, 1916, 1.

³ Cleveland Plain-Dealer, September 10, 1916, 6A.

⁴ March 8, 1916. Bryan to Postmaster-General Burleson. Albert S. Burleson Papers, V. 17, p. 2559. Burleson assured Bryan that there was no truth in the reports that liquor representatives were attempting to pick out wet delegates. The Postmaster-General said that he had consistently advised that this issue be kept out of national politics, and that he had advised the Democratic leaders in each state that the President agreed with him on the matter. March 19, 1916., ibid., 25.
If such an attempt was made, the Nebraskan wets were successful so far as Bryan was concerned; in fact, if the reports of an extreme Republican newspaper are correct, the wet forces could compliment themselves, for they had supported Wilson, the Senators, and all the state officials who were subsequently elected.\(^1\)

In some states, as in California and Utah, the drys were more cautious, supporting neither party more than the other. At the same time the major political parties found themselves straddling the same fence; in California both came out for the drys, while in Utah both were sworn against liquor.\(^2\) Generally, the liquor question in 1916 was a non-partisan, local issue with only overtones on the national scale.

**Woman Suffrage**

In 1916 for the first time, all 48 of our present number of states participated in a presidential election, and for the first time at least one-fourth of

\(^1\) *The Omaha Bee*, disappointed in the outcome of the election described it in this way: "The Wilson wave, lavishly aided and promoted by the money put up by the "wets" has engulfed nearly every place on the state ticket in Nebraska." Added was a touch of solace that most lost votes of the winners compared to the efforts of the winning candidates in the last election, Nov. 11, 1916, 6.

these 48 states permitted women to participate in the balloting. The influence and effect upon the outcome of the election again here is difficult to determine. Both parties mentioned suffrage in the platforms, the planks were stated differently, but meant the same—that the parties favored state option rather than an amendment to the Constitution or a federal law requiring national woman suffrage.

This stand was not in agreement with the objectives of the various women's organizations throughout the country. One of the strongest, the non-partisan Woman's Party, had claimed considerable success in the 1914 Congressional elections, and expected to wield power in 1916. The leaders were convinced that they held the balance of power in the 1916 elections, and claimed 4,000,000 female voters.

1 The states were Montana, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Washington, Colorado, Arizona, Idaho, California, Oregon and Kansas.

2 So termed by leaders of the organization.

3 Alice Paul, before the House Judiciary Committee, stated that the party had campaigned against everyone of the 43 men who were running for Congress on the Democratic ticket in any of the Suffrage states, and only 19 of those returned to Washington. Inez H. Irwin, Story of the Woman's Party, 119.

4 Only 2,000,000 registered to vote, it was estimated by the New York Times, October 29, 1916, 8.
Great pressure was placed upon the two candidates for the Presidency by the suffrage organizations to announce a stand for nation-wide suffrage. After Hughes was nominated he found himself bombarded with letters and telegrams. Leaders of the various women's organizations sought an audience with him. Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt expressed herself as having had "very satisfactory reassurance" from Hughes after a half hour chat. Perhaps it was Alice Paul who was most influential, for after a talk with her, in which she was supposed to have explained to him that he would have all to gain and little to lose by siding with the women, Hughes declared himself for the suffrage amendment.¹

With Hughes' conversion came support from the women. The Republicans already had their own woman's organizations, such as the National Women's Republican Association which was said to have controlled the women's (Republican) clubs and leagues in the country,² the Roosevelt Women's League endorsing Hughes, and the

¹ Irwin, op. cit., 160. Also New York Times, August 2, 1916, 1. The announcement was made in the form of a telegram to Senator George Sutherland of Salt Lake City. Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4. Miss Paul had pointed out to Mr. Hughes that he would not alienate the Progressive, because the Progressives have a suffrage plank, and the old stand-pat Republicans would not vote for a Democrat, no matter what Hughes "put in his platform."

Women's Auxiliary of the Hughes Alliance;\(^1\) and his declaration of support to the movement brought in other organizations to his support.

Not content with the conversion of one of the two Presidential candidates to their cause, the suffragists worked hard on President Wilson. This was nothing new, however. Such efforts had been made for several months and even years before the campaign. But the President remained adamant that the states should decide. In January he finally consented to address a meeting of suffragettes and was forced to take a definite stand against a national amendment.\(^2\) At the opening of the Democratic National Convention in June the Women's Party found every sentiment in favor of a suffrage amendment among the Democratic delegation until Secretary of War Baker arrived from Washington bringing the platform drawn up by Wilson. Then the atmosphere changed.\(^3\) After the convention every effort was made to get the President to change his mind. Finally, on July 24, Mr. Wilson, in talking to a delegation of suffragettes,

\(^{1}\) Robert H. Filler to Hughes, July 18, 1916. Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 3.


\(^{3}\) Irwin, op. cit., 160.
failed to mention the states-rights formula, and conveyed the impression that his opposition was not necessarily permanent. However on August 3 there came from the White House the announcement that President Wilson's attitude toward the Susan B. Anthony Amendment remained unchanged. Again a few days later, the President, when writing to the Jane Jefferson Club of Colorado, pointed out that both parties had as their platform that "each state should determine for itself when and in what direction to extend the suffrage", and "...I shall endeavor to make the declaration of my own party in this matter effectual by every influence that I can properly and legitimately exercise."

During the campaign the President emphasized in various letters to interested people that he was for woman suffrage, not against it; he differed from the women only in the method of application. On June 19, he wrote to Mrs. Catt that he joined with fellow Democrats in recommending to the several states that they extend the suffrage to women upon the same terms as men. The letter to the Jane Jefferson Club in Denver had included that

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1 Ibid., 168.
4 Ibid., letterbook 30, p. 115.
thought. Also during the campaign he had emphasized that he did not approve of great emphasis being placed upon suffrage as an issue:

As a very sincere advocate of the extension of the suffrage to women, it seems to me a great disservice to the cause that partisan use should be made of it, particularly at a time so critical as this when the question is about to be determined whether we shall keep the nation upon its present terms of peace and goodwill with the world or turn to radical changes of policy which may alter the whole aspect of a nation's life. ¹

Whether it was because he did not want suffrage to become more of a political issue, or because of political expediency, or whether his change of position was merely an attempt to mollify a group which was pestering him, in September he went perhaps half way to meeting the demand of the suffragettes. On September 8 he had spoken before the delegates at the National Woman Suffrage Association in Atlantic City, where he told the representatives of the parent organization of the Woman's Party, "I have come here to fight with you." He did not speak on the method he would bring about woman suffrage but said, "We shall not quarrel in the long run as to the method of it." ² The suffragettes interpreted this action and other recent ones as movement, cautiously to

¹ To Miss Leona L. Larrabee, Portland, Oregon, September 27, 1916, ibid., box 18, letterbook 32, p. 455.
be sure, in the right direction. He had progressed a measurable distance from the man who just after his inauguration admitted that he had never considered the subject of suffrage.¹

All the women were not against Wilson, even prior to the September speech before the suffrage convention and after the Hughes "conversion" to suffrage. Wilson and Marshall clubs composed of women were established in New York and elsewhere.² Among the applications for membership in the Woodrow Wilson Independent League received at the Democratic National Headquarters were hundreds of letters from women voters in the western part of the United States.³ School teachers were sending in contributions to Democratic Headquarters.⁴ Jane Addams, the great social worker and humanitarian was enthusiastically for the President.⁵ Other women may have questioned the seriousness of Hughes' "eleventh hour advocacy

¹ Irwin, op. cit., 170.
³ Ibid., July 17, 1916, 6.
⁵ Robert Woolley to Joseph Tumulty, August 11, 1916, Robert Woolley Papers, box 41.
of the Susan B. Anthony Amendment", as did one member of the Congressional Union for Woman's Suffrage an affiliate of the Woman's Party.¹

Whether the political rule that women vote as their husbands was true so far as the West was concerned, it is evident that the women of that section of the country were not so enthusiastically for the Republican candidate as was the women's organization of the East. When one such organization attempted to form a unit of the Woman's Party in Reno they were met courteously but not enthusiastically, and it was reported to have been impossible to find one woman willing to serve on a reception committee to meet the delegation at the station.² In fact, the women of the West apparently could see "how the wind was blowing," for Alice Paul, after receiving reports from campaigners throughout the West which predicted a Democratic victory, warned her Eastern Republican sisters that they would lose the West.³ Other reports belie the belief that the Hughes candidacy received great support from the women of the West. One was that

² Ibid., August 12, 1916, 8.
³ Irwin, op. cit., 179. The Republicans only laughed and said, "Nonsense, we are sure to win there, absolutely sure."
of Gilson Gardner who insisted that in California "labor and women are Wilson's strongest hold. The women are for peace."¹

Since 10 of the 12 states in which women voted for the President went for Wilson, it is difficult to claim that the females voted for Hughes. On the other hand, Illinois, the only state in which the women vote was recorded separate from that of the men, went for Hughes, both the male vote as well as the female. Perhaps the appeal to the "peace instincts" of the women of the West counteracted any advantage Hughes may have had in coming out for the Suffrage Amendment. The author of the history of the Woman's Party, however, attributed the Wilson victory in the West to the almost solid vote of labor, the Progressives and the farmers, and maintained that the efforts of the Party held the vote of Women of the West in line with that of the rest of the country.² She pointed out that the Wilson popular majority in the 12 suffrage states was only 22,171 out of a popular vote of more than 4,810,000, and added that the strength of the campaign by the Woman's Party was contained in the remarks of a woman who was in charge of the campaign of the Democratic women voters. Out of six leaflets which her

¹ Columbus (Ohio) Citizen, September 12, 1916, 12.
² Irwin, op. cit., 179.
organ got out, five were on the subject of suffrage. While suffrage was not an issue in the West, "We had to combat the Woman's Party," she said.¹

The Tariff Issue and Prosperity

As it had been for almost every Presidential campaign since the advent of political parties in this country, the tariff was an issue of some importance in 1916. In answer to the earlier Taft Administration Payne-Aldrich Tariff of the high rates, Wilson and the Democratic Congress had passed the Underwood-Simmons Law of 1913 which lowered rates generally and provided for negotiation of trade agreements with foreign nations.²

The Democrats believed in tariff for revenue only, as they reaffirmed in the 1916 platform,³ while the Republicans reiterated their policy of "tariff protection to American industries and American labor."⁴

A difference of opinion existed between the two major political parties in regard to the importance of the tariff as an issue. The Democrats, since they claimed that the Underwood Law was the best and an answer to a

¹ Ibid.
³ Platforms of the Two Great Political Parties, 192.
⁴ Ibid., 208.
long felt need of the people, laughed at the efforts of the Republicans to build up tariff as an issue. Robert Woolley, before a large group of Democratic local leaders meeting in Washington, told of the editor of a Memphis newspaper who, when called to another city, placed one of his reporters as substitute chief editorial writer and warned him to stay clear of all important matters. "Write about Bulgaria", the editor suggested, "and after you have travelled through Bulgaria and have completely exhausted that subject, write about the tariff." "The Republican candidate is evidently through with Bulgaria", Woolley commented.¹

Whether he had exhausted the subject of Bulgaria or not, certainly Mr. Hughes did considerable talking about the tariff during the campaign, referring to the subject as one of paramount importance and promised to work for a law to protect American industry.² One point that he kept driving home was that the prosperity that existed at the time was artificial and could not last after the end of the hostilities in Europe. To prevent a flood of goods into this country from the factories in Europe, a protective tariff was absolutely necessary.

¹ Robert Woolley Papers, box 6.
Agreeing with that point of view was Theodore Roosevelt, who added, as did Hughes, that the unemployment and the recession of 1914 was due to the Underwood Tariff. Both claimed that the war was the only thing which could have saved us from a bad recession. With exports increasing and imports decreasing, we were in a bad way.¹

The Democrats admitted that there had been a temporary recession in 1914 but disagreed with the Republicans both as to its cause and to its alleviating factors. The recession, they said, was due to readjustment uncertainties naturally coincident with such an important change. As pointed out also in the *Nation*, the impending crisis in Europe, the reduced yields in agriculture because of droughts, and the large gold exports were factors indicating lack of confidence due to the impending calamity in Europe and reflected in our trade. Subscribing to this thesis, the Democrats attributed the subsequent boom to the certainty that the new tariff and progressive legislation was a boon to business.² In June, 1914, before the European war was even suspected, President Wilson predicted a business upswing, declaring to a group of

¹ According to the figures quoted in the Republican Campaign Text-Book 1916, p. 194, imports in 1914 were increasing by $26,000,000 per month over the exports.

businessmen that the signs of a business revival were becoming more and more evident every day.¹

Whatever the reason, the country was prosperous. Two dollar wheat was common in the West, the workers in the East were employed full time with high wages. Hughes and Roosevelt might talk about 1914 conditions and a possible slump after cessation of hostilities, but prosperity was a factual condition. They might be living in a "fool's paradise" as the Republican candidate warned, but the people seemed to enjoy prosperity while they had it, whatever it was called.

Returning to the tariff issue, as did Hughes in the campaign, the question of protection of domestic goods by an import tax had its sectional aspects. Although Hughes included the tariff question in many of his speeches during the campaign, the best reception given his efforts was in the manufacturing East. Not everyone in the West disapproved of the tariff as an issue, however. M. H. de Young, editor of the San Francisco Chronicle, insisted that the tariff was the big issue and wondered why other Republican newspapers neglected that important subject.² The Grand Forks (N. D.) Herald maintained that the Democratic platforms had always stated that we should

¹ Ibid.
² August 28, 1916, 16.
have tariffs for revenue only, but the one in effect actually was regulatory. The Reno Gazette, another Republican organ, came out flatly for a protective tariff, particularly for the protection of the farmers. The Leavenworth Times stated positively that the Underwood Tariff would ruin our economy. A newspaperman in the Northwest was more specific in his indictment of the Democratic tariff, maintaining that it had closed shingle mills, had driven a considerable part of our fishing industry to Canada, opened the way to the importation of cheap Chinese eggs to the detriment of our poultrymen, and deprived agriculture interests of protection of all they produced.

There was one viewpoint held by some in the West that the Underwood Law was to the interest of the South to the detriment of the West. One Republican organizer in Colorado suggested that Hughes emphasize in his speeches that the law discriminated against the farmer and the working man in favor of Southern interests. Practically all the products of the farmers of the Northwest, it was claimed, were placed on the free list while the

1 August 12, 1916, 4.
2 October 1, 1916, 1.
3 September 10, 1916, 4.
4 Tacoma Ledger, September 10, 1916, 34.
Southern products received the benefit of the protective tariff.  

Although the Republican newspapers in part gave Hughes support on the tariff issue, throughout the West and even in the East, the issue was not so popular and not so strong as the Republicans, at times at least, attempted to make it. In Washington, a state which Republican leaders claimed would be badly crippled by competition from China and Canada, Senator Poindexter, Republican, but formerly a Progressive who supported the Underwood Tariff, was re-elected in the primary over the regular Republican and anti-Underwood man, Will E. Humphrey.

In Ohio the Republicans fell back upon the tariff issue, declaring for a protective tariff and protection against European competition. Myron T. Herrick, speaking before the railwaymen at the Pennsylvania shops at Columbus, insisted that the tariff was the big issue. Such emphasis was placed upon the tariff largely because of the failure in Ohio of the Hughes appeal to labor.  

1 Birch Helms to Hughes, August 25, 1916, Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4.

2 Humphrey did poll small pluralities in the timber countries (the source of the lumber for the shingle mills which, the Ledger claimed, were not protected from Canadian competition). Tacoma Ledger, September 10, 1916, 34.

3 Cleveland Plain-Dealer, October 3, 1 and October 5, 1916, 7.
Also a failure was the appeal on the basis of a protective tariff. Arguments that Hughes was backed by moneyed interests for whom a protective tariff would be beneficial probably had much to do with crystallizing the attitude of labor on the issue. This factor, coupled with general prosperity, with farmers getting unheard of prices for their crops and laborers quitting their good paying jobs for better ones, was a counterbalancing factor too heavy for any feeling of resentment for possible lack of protection of United States goods and services. Even in the manufacturing East, where protection traditionally is held in a favorable light, there was no great or immediate demand for a tariff on top of war restrictions on foreign trade. The old pull of the protectionist idea no longer was so strong and many businessmen were comparatively indifferent to the tariff as an issue.

The Eight-Hour Day

One of the most striking and important of the

1 Of course there were exceptions. The American Cotton Manufacturers Association was unanimously for high tariffs on coal tar dye stuffs, and insisted that "as sure as shooting that when the war is over belligerent nations are going to dump on our shores cargo after cargo of cotton goods."

At the same meeting where the resolution was adopted a speech was made in which the speaker declared that the rate then on cotton goods were "unjust and absolutely confiscatory." A Democrat attending the meeting of the Association in Atlanta was greatly amused. William L. Wilson to Woolley, April 7, 1916. Robert Woolley Papers, box 43.
internal or domestic issues in the Presidential campaign of 1916 was the so-called eight hour day, or the Adamson Law, passed by Congress and signed by the President in the middle of the campaign, the first week of September. To be seized by the Republican candidate as the first important act of the Administration which could be criticized unequivocally the eight hour day issue became the subject of rather emotional discussions throughout the country.

Labor, feeling that the European war would become a source of great income to the manufacturers in this country, early determined to secure its share and "not allow the contracting employers to secure all the profits of this imperative but transient activity in the production of war supplies." Encouraged by Mr. Wilson's stand on the exemption of labor from application by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and by his general attitude toward labor, the Railway Brotherhoods demanded certain rights and advantages, including most importantly the eight hour day. Agitation by the workers began in

1 George Weiss, "Labor and the Railroads," *Forum* V. 56. (September, 1916), 370-384. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in partial reply to the refusal of the railway unions to arbitrate, said that the workers have "learned that those who are necessary to the world's production need not be the victims of employers' oppression and greed. They recognize no divine right to exploitation." *Ibid.*
January 1916, the demands of the unions were made in May, and by the middle of the campaign, a red-hot situation was in the hands of the President. Not only did the railroads and the unions fail to reach an agreement on the terms of a compromise or settlement, but they failed to reach an agreement to arbitrate. Much of this criticism was caused by the failure to perceive that the management had suggested arbitration, not for the eight hour day, but for a modification—a "contingent proposition."  

With a disastrous nation-wide strike threatening, President Wilson in August called the disputants together for an attempt to settle the differences, and proposed that the eight hour day be substituted for the "present ten hour day in all existing practices and agreements." The executive refused to appear and so Wilson made public a statement that the eight hour day was just, and "had the sanction of society in its favor."  

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3 August 19, 1916. *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, V. IV, pp. 264-266. The next day Wilson wrote to the National Association of Manufacturers that he believed in the principle of arbitration, "but unfortunately there is no means in existence by which arbitration can be secured", and added that what he proposed "did not weaken the principle of arbitration; instead, it strengthens it. The whole movement of the immediate
days later he informed the railway executives, who had assembled in the White House upon his request, that the whole spirit of the time and the preponderant evidence of recent economic experience spoke for the eight hour day,¹ and that the interests of society warranted it.

The same day Wilson went to Congress and asked for legislation establishing the eight hour day as the legal basis for work and wages of the railroads, and for full public investigation of the merits of such disputes in the future.² The President was not sure that the Congress would act upon his suggestion,³ since the unions had set September 4 as the strike date in case of no settlement, but both Houses did act with alacrity, and the President signed the Adamson Act into law, September 3.

Before the ink of the President's signature was dry the Republican Presidential candidate began a determined criticism of the entire action of the President in relation to the eight hour legislation, particularly, creation of an agency for determining all the arbitration elements in this case in the light, not of predictions or forecasts, but of established and ascertained facts." Wilson Papers, Series VII, box 18, letterbook 32, p. 45.

¹ Ibid., 268-269.
his part in the act requiring the eight hour day for railroad workers. A few days before Congressional action was taken, Mr. Hughes had written privately:

It seems to me the President's course in surrendering the principle of arbitration is deplorable. It is a shocking exhibition of the lack of both wisdom and courage and ought to defeat him. I do not speak of the merits of the demands—I have had no chance to study them—but it seems to me clear that he should have directed the entire force of public opinion to the requirement of prompt arbitration. We cannot afford in this country to rule by force.¹

These thoughts represented the real opinion of Hughes and were, beginning very shortly, expressed publicly in the campaign. First however, it was necessary to consult the campaign managers. Chairman Willcox conferred with Hughes and the Eastern managers, and it was decided, since there was a paucity of campaign issues, the eight hour law was too big an issue and too opportune to be passed over lightly.² Investigators among labor generally had concluded that although those workers directly affected by the Adamson Law were for Wilson, the 65% not affected were "open to arguments of the skilled Republican orators."³

Mr. Hughes already had opened the campaign against the Adamson Law. In a speech at Lexington, Kentucky he

¹ Hughes to Jacob Gould Schurman, August 30, 1916. Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4.
³ Ibid.
asserted that the Administration "had gone very far toward that day when we shall have any action under pressure instead of a consideration of the facts." In Maine a few days later he renewed the attack, and in Springfield, Illinois charged that the law was nothing but a measure to fix wages. By the time he hit Ohio, Hughes was swinging hard, asserting that Wilson had pursued an unwarranted and dictatorial policy, and roundly denouncing the President's claim that the principle of the eight hour law was not capable of being arbitrated.

That Hughes was making a mistake in hitting hard on the eight hour law in Ohio was the opinion of many Republican politicians and local figures at the time. Nearly all his speeches were to be delivered in cities where the eight hour day was already entrenched, where it was growing, and where there was a large independent vote. The leaders in Ohio recognized the delicacy of local authorities presuming to dictate to a Presidential

1 Ibid., September 6, 1916, 4.
2 Ibid., September 10, 1916, 4.
3 Ibid., September 20, 1916, 1.
4 In a speech at Dayton on September 26, Dozer, op. cit., 15.
candidate, but they were convinced it should be done.\footnote{All 7 Democrats and 8 of the 9 Republicans voted for the act. \textit{Congressional Record}, V. 53, pt. 13, p. 13608.} For at the time Ohio was a labor state. Most of the large newspapers, including the \textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer}, were for the eight hour law. Even the Republican office holders were in favor of it. Only one of the Ohio Congressmen voted against the act and Governor Willis had informed railmen in July that he was in sympathy with the movement for an eight hour day.\footnote{\textit{Cleveland Plain Dealer}, July 31, 1916, 5.} A considerable part, at least, of organized labor agreed with the newspapers and the Congressmen. The four railway brotherhoods made the eight hour law a political issue and sent appeal to members to support "our friends" in Congress who made the law possible.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, September 15, 1916, 3.} Samuel Gompers, the influential head of the A F of L, gave his blessing to the law; in fact, he approved Wilson's almost every move concerning labor.

Although heeding the advice of the local Republican leaders to some extent,\footnote{On later trips to Ohio he attached the law not because it reduced hours of labor but because it forced an increase of wages.} the Republican candidate continued to criticize the President and his part in the eight hour legislation. In other states he reiterated his
stand and when a heckler asked him if he would repeal the law he replied, "A surrender cannot be repealed." Instead, he would have offered arbitration and would have appointed a fair and impartial commission. In Brooklyn, referring to the eight hour law and to a protective tariff, Hughes said he wanted to see labor 100% satisfied, not 20%.2

Possibly the Democrats thought that some of the points being made by Hughes were effective, for after consultation with Burleson President Wilson, in his opening campaign speech and later, defended his actions in regard to the Adamson Law.3 From Shadow Lawn in his first speech of the campaign he emphasized that he had asked neither side if the legislation would suit them, and declared that

1 At Sioux City, Iowa, New York Times, October 18, 1916, 1.

2 Ibid., November 4, 1916, 1.

3 In September Vice-President Marshall, the Democratic nominee for the same post, wrote to Wilson that he was saying nothing in his speeches about the eight hour law "other than to make fun of it as an issue until the Republican candidates for President, Senators and Representatives will join in a written statement to the American people that they will repeal the law if elected." To which Wilson replied that he thought that Marshall was taking the right attitude." For a little while I felt that in some quarters he was making an impression, but it will prove to be a broken reed in his hand, as everything else has." September 22 and September 27, 1916. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 103, folder 87.
because of the war and because such action was the demand
of society the issue was not arbitrable. In this opening
speech he also emphasized, as did the Democratic campaign
managers later, that 70 out of 124 Republicans in the
House voted for the measure and that the Republicans
in the Senate placed no obstacles in the way. In Demo­
cratic campaign literature Wilson emphasized again that
the issue was not arbitrable and that "abundant exper­
ience" had proved that "workers' efficiency is increased,
their spirit improved," and the "whole moral and physical
vigor of the man is added to" by the use of the eight hour
day. In answer to the critics who accused him of capit­
ulating to the railway unions, Wilson said emphatically
that:

The answer to those who wonder why I 'allowed myself
to be coerced' in regard to the eight-hour law is
that I was not coerced. Neither the railroad presi­
dents nor the representatives of the brotherhoods
desired legislation. I took the matter into my
own hands because I was determined to save the
country from a great disaster, and I recommended the
terms of the Adamson Bill because I thought they

1 Ibid., By "obstacles" he referred to filibustering
tactics. Some Republican Senators had considered fili­
bustering but it was decided that it would not be the best
policy to do so and it was arranged for Republican Senators
to make speeches for the Congressional Record against the
measure and vote against it but not to fillbuster. In this
way, said the New York Times, they dodged all responsibil­
ity for bringing the strike, if any occurred. New York

2 "The Whole Truth about the Eight-Hour Law". A pam­
phlet in "Campaign Literature, Miscellaneous", Robert
Woolley Papers, box 29A.
were just and right, as I do now. The whole thing has been so systematically and deliberately misrepresented that there is no use trying to alter at this stage of the campaign the impressions which have been created. I am sure the right impressions have been made upon the vast majority of our fellow citizens.1

Had the right impressions been made? It is difficult to say. A majority of the Western newspapers checked by the writer were in favor of Wilson's actions in establishing the eight hour day. Such approval was by no means unanimous however. On or near the West Coast where labor was strong, some of the papers followed their Republican preference, whether consciously or not, and attacked the Adamson Law. The (Boise) Idaho Statesman maintained that Wilson acted too hastily. "Makeship measures, mere temporary expedients—these seem to be the only things which Wilson can devise."2 The Salt Lake Tribune waited several days after passage of the Adamson Act to attack it; then accused the President of weakness in giving in to force.3 One paper farther south pointed to Wilson's conservative utterances regarding labor back in his pre-political years, and in regard to the eight hour law said

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2 September 5, 1916, 4.

3 September 6, 1916, 6. At the same time it soft pedaled the "force" of the trainmen, assuring their readers that the workers "did not desire injustice," that "in refusing arbitration, they judged they were doing right."
that no comment was necessary.\textsuperscript{1} Back up in the Rocky Mountain Region, a Denver newspaper editor was on the fence on the issue earlier in the Summer,\textsuperscript{2} but later, as Hughes made his position clear, the Rocky Mountain News was insistent against the Adamson Act as a raise in pay rather than shorter hours as such.\textsuperscript{3}

Other papers of the general Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast Region were unopposed or in favor of the President’s actions. In Washington the Tacoma Ledger was neutral, devoting much news space but made little editorial comment. The Nevada State Journal also was silent. Others however, definitely approved the action taken by Wilson and the Democratic Congress. The Sacramento Union favored the action and the law.\textsuperscript{4} In Seattle the Post Intelligencer based its approval on a definite economic factor, maintaining that if the act had not been passed the Washington fruit crop would have been lost and every industry would have suffered terribly.\textsuperscript{5} Another Seattle daily publication, the Times, insisted that "no matter how peace may be brought about, the public is

\begin{itemize}
\item[(1)] Santa Fe New Mexican, September 6, 1916, 4.
\item[(2)] August 19, 1916, 6.
\item[(3)] September 29, 1916, 6.
\item[(4)] September 4, 1916, 4.
\item[(5)] September 2, 1916, 4.
\end{itemize}
prepared to approve the result and commend those responsible for accomplishing the desired end."\(^1\)agreeing with the Seattle Post Intelligencer on the economic consequences of a strike, the San Francisco Chronicle maintained that a stoppage of railroad transportation would bankrupt a great many groves of grapes and other late shipping fruits.\(^2\) In New Mexico the Albuquerque Journal emphasized a point not mentioned in many papers. The Adamson Bill was an emergency measure and no one was claiming more for it; undoubtedly a permanent act would supplant it, along lines outlined by the President, the Journal predicted.\(^3\) In Reno the Gazette approved of the President's actions in taking things into his own hands, and

\(^1\)September 3, 1916, 6. At the same time and later the paper gave considerable play to labor, on Labor Day quoting in full a message from Samuel Gompers.

\(^2\)August 3, 1916, 16. At the same time the Chronicle recommended that Congress arbitrate the dispute. Another San Francisco paper, the Examiner was very much in favor of Wilson and of labor, but of its stand on the eight hour law the writer is not sure.

\(^3\)September 6, 1916, 6. President Wilson had submitted five other recommendations to Congress, among those the appointment of a commission to observe and report on the actual results of the adoption of an eight hour law, an increase in freight rates, and public investigation of every such (industrial) dispute before a strike or lockout could be lawfully attempted. (Shades of Taft-Hartley!) Charles W. Eliot, "Why the Independent Voter Should Support Wilson," New York Times, October 22, 1916, Sec. V., 3-4.
blamed, tentatively at least, the Democratic Congress for the situation requiring such action by the President. ¹

In the Mid-Western states there was also a division of opinion on the President's action dealing with the railway situation. Perhaps the center of criticism rested in the Kansas, Nebraska and North Dakota region (at least so far as the papers the writer checked were concerned). The famous Kansas City Star, which had praised Mr. Wilson's liberal legislation, "unhappily interrupted by the war", called the Adamson Act "a surrender to force as against arbitration", and "inevitably recalls the 'too proud to fight' phrase and increases the doubt as to what Mr. Wilson would do in an emergency that required the fighting quality in the chief executive".²

Farther north in North Dakota the Bismarck Tribune thought that the establishment of the eight hour day with "punitive overtime" was not feasible in transportation,³ and considered the legislation as passed "a sham and a fraud" and complete surrender of the principle of arbitration.⁴ However, it was the opinion of the Tribune that

¹ August 7, 1916, 4.
³ August 24, 1916, 4.
⁴ September 5, 1916, 4.
Congress should have acted to stop the threatened tie-up of transportation. In the other papers of the Mid-West the opinion of the Adamson Law were neither completely opposed nor unopposed. Just prior to the passage of the Act the Republican Omaha Bee maintained that the Congress had the right and should go ahead if the workers accepted, but the value of such a law was questionable. The Chicago Tribune was somewhat sympathetic with the railroad men but warned them to go slower, pointing out that this was the first attempt to get the eight hour day and that they should wait for arbitration.

The opinions expressed in several other Mid-Western newspapers showed a definite approval of Wilson's actions to avert a serious strike. While against Wilson and his "shifting opportunism, the Des Moines Register admitted the necessity for the Adamson Law, and favored the eight hour day, pointing out that the shortened working day was accepted in the skilled trades and the right of Congress to order it was not seriously questioned. The Omaha World-Herald criticized Hughes for criticizing Wilson and for not uttering a word of advice or warning before

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1 September 1, 1916, 4.
2 September 1, 1916, 4.
3 August 2, 1916, 5.
4 September 4 and 8, 1916, 4.
final action in the situation was taken by the President. Two Kansas papers, the *Leavenworth Times* and the (Lincoln) *Nebraska State Journal*, agreed that an arbitration procedure should be set up by law for future similar situations and that the act was necessary at the time to avert a serious strike. William Allen White, the Progressive, in his famous *Emporia Gazette*, looked at the legislation from the standpoint of the regulation of the railroads. He considered that Hughes would be correct to raise the vital question of how far the trend in government regulation of railroads would go, but to carp at the eight hour law as surrender of the principle of arbitration was "taking a rather superficial view of a grave situation." In Ohio as we have pointed out, almost all of the principal daily newspapers vigorously supported Mr. Wilson's actions in relation to the eight hour day.

In the East the newspapers generally divided on the issue according to party affiliation. Some of those in favor were the *New York Times*, *New York World*, and the

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1 September 6, 1916, 6. Vance McCormick, Democratic Campaign Manager, minimized the attack by Hughes, pointing out that Hughes offered no solution during the crisis, but only as usual, after the accomplishment. *New York Times*, September 6, 1916, 4.


3 September 9, 1916, 2.
Among those opposing were the two New Hampshire Republican papers, the Manchester Union and the Concord Monitor, of which the Union was arbitrary in its opposition. While the majority of the two opposing groups, the railroads and the workers, took opposite viewpoints on the Adamson Law, there were those on each side who disagreed with what was apparently their own group interest. Both Robert S. Lovett, Chairman of the Board of the Union Pacific Railroad, and the President of the Erie Railroad, F. D. Underwood, thought that Wilson had acted in good faith, and both favored him for re-election. They maintained that the President had been fair to business, dispensing with government by decree and favoritism. Counteracting what influence these prominent railway executives may have had was the opposition to the eight hour legislation by some railroad workers. The Labor World of Pittsburg reported that an official in a local order of railway conductors was for Wilson until the

1 President Wilson is said to have read the Republican daily.

2 The Monitor had little comment to make regarding the issue, but on August 31 it asked, "How do the Progressives like President Wilson's deal with the Railroads to put a new tax of $100,000,000 upon the people?", p. 4.

3 New York Times, October 9, 6.
legislation, then turned to Hughes. At the same time railroad and shopmen pledged themselves to Hughes when a railroad Republican club was formed. It was the opinion of some former Progressives in Pittsburg that the coal miners of the region would not be influenced toward Wilson because of the Adamson Act, rather they would resent the eight hour limit. It has been claimed by others that since the law only affected a part of the railway workers of the country— the trainmen— the other railway workers as well as workers in general, through envy or because of dislike of the methods used by the government, would vote against Wilson, the man responsible for the Adamson Law as energetically as one might have expected. On September 20, the Railways Executive Advisory Committee voted not to decide upon means to nullify the eight hour law but instead to work for a more comprehensive regulation act, altering the railroad laws in effect. Two reasons for soft-pedaling the eight-hour "outrageousness" were that the majority of the members of the committee studying the proposed changes in

1 October 26, 1916.
3 Ibid., September 21, 1916, 1.
4 Newlands Committee.
the general railroad legislation were the same members of the majority which passed the Adamson Law; also the President had promised he would recommend the remainder of his strike settlement program, which involved compulsory investigation laws and an assurance to the railroads that they would be able to compensate themselves by higher freight rates any losses incurred as a result of the eight hour law.  

The labor journals for the most part sustained the President in his "forced arbitration". In Western Pennsylvania, the Labor World, a Republican labor sheet sternly opposed to Wilson in almost all of his efforts, made no exception on the eight hour issue. But in Ohio the Zanesville Labor Journal, an American Federation of Labor affiliation, supported Wilson on the issue, accusing the railroads of refusing to arbitrate. Earlier the paper quoted the New York World in stating sarcastically that it was difficult to see how the railroads could afford the eight hour day when their net earnings for the


2 The Labor World was critical even more of the "insistent demand of the organized railway employees", forcing the President and Congress "to bow to the dictator of this same authority". Pittsburg, September 7, 1916. At the same time the paper calls the Adamson Law one of the greatest victories in history for labor. Ibid.

3 October 16, 1916.
past year was only 26.6% more than their earnings for the previous year.\footnote{September 29, 1916.} The Labor Record of Columbus maintained that the reduction of hours to eight would not result in an economy, as proved already in certain industries.\footnote{October 7, 1916. A report by Armour and Company was quoted.}

Farther West the United Mine Workers Journal, while against compulsory arbitration, was otherwise unequivocably for the eight hour law, maintaining that it would eventually work out to the interest of all concerned.\footnote{Indianapolis, September 28, 1916.}

President Wilson's decisive action in the railway labor dispute was an important and favorable factor in his re-election. While it is possible he lost votes in some areas, it is a reasonable conclusion that he gained more than he lost in others, particularly in the state that, as it turned out, it was essential to win--

\footnote{Hughes attributed the Republican majority in the Maine election to "what I said on the Adamson Bill." Hughes to Taft, September 28, 1916. Hughes Papers, general correspondence, box 4. He was supported in his opinion that the people of Maine and the East opposed the Adamson Law others who corresponded with him or his campaign manager. One Benjamin J. Richmond of Cumberland, Maryland wrote to Chairman Willcox warning Hughes and Willcox not to listen to Murray Crane who would soft pedal the issue, but that many people including labor leaders, both Republican and Democrats, were against such action by the President. "Press the issue....Pussyfooting will get us nowhere." September 13, 1916. \textit{Ibid.}}
Ohio. The fact that most of the important daily newspapers and the labor papers of that industrial state were in favor of Wilson and his action, the fact that all but one of the Representatives and Senators from Ohio who cast a vote on the Adamson Bill voted for it, the fact that Hughes' reception in the state was a comparatively cool one, particularly in the industrial areas—all are indicative of the importance of the Adamson Law as a factor in Hughes defeat in Ohio.
CHAPTER VI

The Democratic Campaign: How It Was Conducted

The importance of the political campaign, so far as the outcome of the election is concerned, is sometimes questioned, the detractors maintaining that the results in November would be the same if the candidates for political office did no campaigning whatsoever. There may be considerable truth in this contention, but the fact remains that campaigns have been accepted as a part of the procedure in selecting a President since the days of Washington. It is human nature and the nature of the political process that one of the candidates—usually that one on the outside—will open the attack, and the incumbent, in order to defend himself, will attack his opponent in return and praise his own administration.

In 1916 President Wilson probably would have been content to let his record speak for itself and, since he had great trust in the general discretion and decisions of the people, would have gone on about his usual duties as Chief Executive, perfectly willing to let the voters decide on that basis. But since it was out of the question that the outs—the Republicans—would sit idly by awaiting the decision in November, Wilson and his party leaders, long before the summer months of 1916, had decided upon their basic strategy in the campaign.
The Democrats decided to concentrate the major part of their efforts and strength in the West. Wilson's entire administration, and even his election in 1912, had been pointed toward this strategem. His victory in that year had been in large part due to the insurgent movement of the Progressives who, as had their forerunners the Populists, had been born and bred in the West. If some of these former Republicans could be made permanent members of the Democratic ranks, the Democrats could win. In 1914, there were indications that the great section west of the Mississippi had not returned to the Republican fold. It was at this time that Tumulty wrote to Colonel House that the returns from the West showed a new field for conquest in 1916. He pointed out that several states had for the first time sent Democratic Representatives to Congress,¹ and that it was the first time in his memory that the great Republican states of California, Wisconsin, and South Dakota elected Democratic Senators. Colonel House, the politically astute confidant of the President, seeing that the Republicans planned to concentrate on New York State and the East, agreed that the Democrats should concentrate quietly on the West, particularly those

¹ These states were Utah, Washington, South Dakota and North Dakota. Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson, As I Know Him, 184.
states which had shown erratic tendencies in recent elections, especially the Woman Suffrage states. The Democrats should "let themselves out" in the few states outside of the East in which the Republicans were working hard, namely Ohio, Kansas, and California.¹

Not every leader in the Democratic Party considered the West the happy hunting ground for votes, however, not that they thought the East was the section most favorable to the Democrats. Rather it was a fear of the general strength of the Republicans. According to Henry Morgenthau, who had just returned from abroad, not one of the many men high in the Administration felt that Wilson would be re-elected. Their reasoning was based on the belief that the Progressives had returned to the fold and that the Administration had made too many enemies in the past three years for such handicaps to be overcome.²

While the report of the soon to be appointed Finance Director was rather a pessimistic one, it is true, if one agrees with many political experts that the incumbent is almost always at a disadvantage as compared with his


² Morgenthau, All In a Life Time, 234-235.
opponent, President Wilson entered the campaign with chances distinctly against him. His record was known, and his mistakes were apparent to many. No President since Lincoln had been confronted with so many varied and perplexing problems. Time and again he had been forced to make decisions and to choose between two courses of action, with the knowledge that no matter which way he directed his steps he would encounter bitter denunciation.

Because of so many difficult decisions which had fallen on the President, giving the Republicans great opportunities for criticism, it might reasonably be expected that the Democrats would have been placed on the defensive in the campaign. Such was not to be the case. The President himself emphasized that no apologies were to be made regarding either domestic or foreign issues. Several weeks before his initial campaign speeches, the President wrote to the Temporary Chairman of the Nebraska Democratic Convention that

Your speech to be delivered at the Nebraska Democratic Convention has a progressive ring and presents national issues in a vigorous way, but perhaps it would be better not to make such frequent mention of what the opposition are saying about Democratic policies and the Democratic candidates. We have no need to take the defensive and should not seem to do so. Our case is absolutely sound and absolutely strong and we can afford simply to state it aggressively without regard even to partisan efforts to misrepresent and mislead.1

Colonel House suggested to Wilson that since the Republicans would hold their party convention first, it might be best to make a speech outlining his policies on war and peace settlement so the Republicans could not steal his thunder. Consequently Wilson made the speech in May before the League to Enforce Peace, advocating a force which "shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambitions, but to the service of a common order, a common justice and a common peace." House was delighted with the way the speech was accepted, and suggested that it be endorsed by the convention in St. Louis, which was done, and the Democratic platform endorsed a league to enforce peace.2

In the domestic field the Democrats, realizing that they had a definite advantage, decided that Wilson should rest his case upon the mass of liberal legislation "which he had extracted from a Democratic Congress" and should emphasize the degree which the platform of 1912 had been carried into effect and that the President should appear as the champion of Progressive principles.3 Such a

1 The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, V. IV, 188.
2 The Democratic Text Book 1916, 10.
3 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, V. II, 335.
decision to emphasize the domestic record was a wise if obvious one, its basic appeal to the voter to be emphasized by the almost complete silence on the subject by the Republicans during the campaign.

Wilson's son-in-law, William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury and an important figure during the campaign, agreed with the President that a positive approach was necessary and pointed out the advantages of a publicity campaign depicting the constructive work of the Wilson Administration. Early in the campaign, or perhaps before it began, he worked out a plan of publicity listing those acts of the Wilson term which should be emphasized. Writers of outstanding ability should be hired to place before the people the Administration's record of achievement. Interesting speakers should be sent out, particularly in those districts remote from the cities. Realizing the value of favorable comment from impartial observers, he would stress the necessity of obtaining and publicizing the comments of leaders and famous people from foreign countries. On the war issue McAdoo would be careful to present both sides. Not only should it be emphasized that Wilson has kept this country out of war,

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1 The plan of publicity, consisting of three mimeographed pages, was undated and unsigned, but was attached to letters signed by McAdoo. Robert Woolley Papers, box 21.
but at the same time it should be stressed that the Administration is not too proud to fight by pointing out the necessity for preparedness.

**Implementation—Organization**

Victory was not to be won by mere statements of generalizations. The working plan must be detailed, and a working organization must be established. It was the idea of House that the Democrats should determine what districts were certain either way, then concentrate on others. These districts should be subdivided into the smallest possible units that could be arranged for with available campaign funds. Only the undecided 20% of the voters who could be influenced by argument should receive intensive attention. The Colonel told Daniel C. Roper, recently resigned Postmaster-General now in charge of Organization, "We must run the President for the Justice of the Peace...." Roper suggested that use be made of his own acquaintance with many key men in the National Democratic organization throughout the country. They should report to him every two weeks and answer questions on their local political situation. Such a plan was carried out.

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1 Seymour, op. cit., 358.

2 Daniel Roper, Fifty Years of Public Life, 148.
In their search for capable men to staff the organization to conduct the campaign, the Democrats were comparatively fortunate. The only difficulty, and it was not of serious nature, was in the selection of the campaign manager. Henry Morgenthau was asked to direct the campaign but he declined, and suggested Vance C. McCormick of Pennsylvania.\(^1\) After some delay, and upon the approval of House, who considered him not too high-brow and not too likely to be very soft with certain "rouglier elements" which Wilson felt must be dealt with, McCormick was approved and accepted. Perhaps the most important factor in his selection, however, was his purported influence with the Progressive vote. Roosevelt himself had stumped for him when the Scotch-Irishman was running for the Governorship of Pennsylvania in 1914 as the joint candidate of the Democrats and Progressives.\(^2\)

Other campaign administrators included: Robert

\(^1\)William McCombs, the National Committee Chairman and the campaign manager for Wilson in 1912 was not considered physically or temperamentally fitted for leadership in the new campaign. Wilson, House and others, through the diplomatic efforts of Bernard Baruch, persuaded the embittered McCombs to resign. Seymour, op. cit., 347.

\(^2\)New York Times, June 16, 1916, 3. McCormick and ex-Congressman Mitchell Palmer had been in control of the rejuvenated Democratic Party in Pennsylvania for the last three years. They had wrested control of the party from Colonel James McGuffey, a boss of the old school, who had held the party in an iron grip for many years.
Woolley, formerly of the New York World, Publicity;
Homer S. Cummins, a Connecticut lawyer, Speakers' Bureau;
Henry Morgenthau, Sr., Finance Committee; W. R. Marsh,
Treasurer; Daniel Roper, Organization; and Carter Glass,
Secretary.1 These men, with offices in New York, worked
together harmoniously toward the common goal—the re-
election of President Wilson.

The Democrats were fortunate in obtaining a pub­
licity organization which functioned to the advantage of
the candidate. Such a publicity expert as Robert Woolley
proved himself to be direly needed, as McAdoo pointed
out as early as 1915. Wilson's earlier policy of "piti­
less publicity" had degenerated to such an extent that
newsmen now termed it "pitiful publicity" instead.2
Woolley, who had been head of the Government Mint when
tabbed for the job of Publicity Director, and others
concerned with "informing" the public, worked hard at
publicizing Wilson and the Administration, and also to

1 Roper, op. cit., 150; also New York Times,
August 11, 1916, 3. The President, in a telegram to
Cummins, in St. Louis at the Democratic Convention, sug­
gested that McCormick, Cummins, Glass, and Marsh, with
the Committee Chairman, appoint the Campaign and other
necessary committees. This suggestion, as Wilson men­
tioned, was in pursuance of the suggestion to Wilson by
Cummins, June 15, 1916. Wilson Papers, Series VII,
box 5, letterbook 30.

2 McAdoo to Carl Vrooman, Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture, November 3, 1915. Robert Woolley Papers,
box 21.
meet the thrusts of Hughes during the campaign.¹

While the pamphlets² of the Democrats covered most of the issues of the campaign and the planks of their platforms, the principal emphasis was on the appeals to labor, the farmers, the Progressives and the independent voter. Through many of the pamphlets and leaflets ran the liberal record of Wilson. One leaflet, published by the Woodrow Wilson Independent League pointed out "why independents were for Wilson" by reviewing his record in regard to currency, tariff, rural credits, agriculture, child labor, the working man, trade commission, justness in taxation, prosperity, as well as peace, preparedness and Mexico. Another pamphlet issued was entitled "Woodrow Wilson and Social Justice." Others, such as "Labor's Charter of Freedom", "Worker's Manual", appealed directly to the working man. "How Wilson Has Kept Faith with the Farmer", a 32 page booklet, listed and discussed farm legislation of the Wilson Administration, including rural credits, good roads, the Federal Reserve System

¹ The Publicity Bureau and Woolley's management brought forth praises from the campaign manager. Writing to Woolley in 1942, McCormick said: "...I have always felt that our publicity was the strongest factor in the campaign which was ably handled by you and your associates." Ibid., box 22.

² The campaign leaflets, pamphlets and cards are found in Ibid., box 29A.
and the extended postal system.\textsuperscript{1}

Many pages of various campaign documents were devoted to pointing out the reasons why Progressives should vote for Wilson. Many of the statements the Republicans found difficulty in answering. While taking credit for the liberal legislation, the Democrats pointed out that: "Every measure of legislation proposed by Woodrow Wilson since he became President and enacted into law, has received the votes of the Republicans, as well as the Democrats in both the Senate and House".\textsuperscript{2} Another campaign pamphlet, this one issued by the Committee of Progressives formed to promote the re-election of President Wilson, termed the actions of the Progressive National Committee in nominating Hughes as traitorous and should be indignantly repudiated. Progressives cannot be sold and delivered, it was maintained. By his record as Governor of New Jersey and his record as President, President Wilson had proved himself a true progressive.

Foreign affairs and issues were not avoided. Defending Wilson's policies in Mexico, the Democratic publicity experts attempted to show that the President had been fighting for the "Just Rights and the Liberty of an

\textsuperscript{1} The Federal Farm Loan Act had not been passed before most of this material was published.

\textsuperscript{2} From a pamphlet entitled, "What Woodrow Wilson and the Congress Have Done for the American People".
Oppressed People", and attacked the Republican candidate for his support of Huerta. Hughes is in complete accord with Roosevelt, the Democratic National Committee informed their readers. Early statements by ex-President Taft were used to advantage. He was quoted as saying that Hughes was supported by a jingo who, had he been President during the last two years, would have led into war. Quotations from Wilson's New York Press Club Speech, in which he had asked those who would have us forcibly intervene in Mexico if the glory of America would be enhanced by a war of conquest, were printed and distributed in large numbers.

Toward the last stage of the campaign the Democratic campaign leaders turned more and more to the direct use of vote-catching slogans designed to influence the peace element, particularly in the West. The slogan "He kept us out of war" was plastered on billboards throughout the country. Republicans, hoping to hold the German vote, charged that the Democrats were angling for it. The Democrats excoriated the so called "hyphenates" but concentrated on the peace-minded citizens of the West, many of them of German descent. All is fair in love and war--and politics!

1 Walter Millis, The Road to War, America 1914-1917, 348.
Woolley was fortunate in obtaining the service of some exceptional and willing writers, among whom were George Creel and Richard Linthicum. Among other campaign literature, Creel wrote a 71 page booklet called "Wilson and the Issues", a work of some skill. Linthicum, one of the editors of the *New York World*, contributed a 70,000 word volume on the *Wit and Wisdom of Woodrow Wilson*, containing excerpts from the President's speeches. Woolley distributed 20,000 copies of this book among the editors and libraries of the country.

Probably one of the most effective publicity strategies used by the Democrats was the insertion of an open letter in the form of quarter and half page advertisements in the newspapers of the cities the day Hughes was scheduled to speak. A list of questions had been composed by a group of editors and authors friendly to the

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1 Published by Doubleday, Page and Company.
3 The authors, organized by George Creel into committee form for the issuance of pamphlets and statements, as well as the list of questions directed to Hughes, included many famous names: Irwin S. Cobb, Samuel Hopkins Adams, Ray Stannard Baker, W. R. Chamney, Zona Gale, Fannie Hurst, Peter B. Kyne, Edgar Lee Masters, Kathleen Norris, Harvey O'Higgins, Earnest Poole, Lincoln Steffens, Augustus Thomas, Ida Tarbell, and Henry Leon Wilson. George Creel, *Rebel at Large*, 153.
Democratic cause, questions on Hughes' campaign utterances which they dared the Republican candidate to answer. Centered around the challenge, "What would you have done that Wilson has not done?" or "What would you have not done that Wilson has done?", almost all of the questions concerned foreign policy, and included: "Would you have filed protest against the invasion of Belgium and backed up that protest with the United States Navy?" "Would you have urged Congress to embargo the shipment of munitions to the Allies?" "Are you in favor of intervening in Mexico?" "Where do you stand on equal suffrage?" Apparently the questions were too tough to handle, for Hughes did not attempt a reply. On the other hand the Democrats were well pleased with the use and results of the questions; Tumulty wrote to Woolley that he had heard many favorable comments on them.¹

Free publicity often was given the Democrats by the news that a prominent Republican Progressive or an independent voter had announced his support or favor of Wilson. Because of the President's liberal policies, particularly his work in the passage of the Keating Child Labor Law, the famous Judge Ben B. Lindsay of Denver, a

¹ August 5, 1916, Robert Woolley Papers, box 41.
former Republican who supported Roosevelt in 1912, in August declared his intention of supporting Wilson for re-election.\(^1\) Another Republican or ex-Republican, Bainbridge Colby, aided the cause of the Democrats in the West. He too was attracted by the progressive character of Wilson, and worked for him on his own initiative.\(^2\) Farther east a Michigan Progressive Committeeman, Wallace, a former great friend of Roosevelt, had helped the Bull Moose leader carry Michigan in 1912 by a 100,000 majority. In 1916 he became one of Wilson's strongest supporters.\(^3\)

Two of the most prominent businessmen and inventors of the country carried great influence, and when they took their stand for Wilson, the Democrats had gained a very important talking point. These men were Henry Ford and Thomas A. Edison. The support by Edison was of particular importance. The great inventor, a life-long Republican and a supporter of "T R", came out for the President because of Wilson's ability to meet the fundamental problems, to change his mind when necessary, and because of Hughes' "capacity for hindsight," which, said Edison, was highly developed, "but as to his foresight we are not equally well informed."\(^4\) The Democrats used

\(^{1}\) New York Times, August 10, 1916, p. 4.
\(^{2}\) Morgenthau, op. cit., 245.
\(^{3}\) McCormick to Tumulty, August 14, 1916. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 524, file 3211.
Edison's support to good effect during the campaign, distributing pamphlets reporting a George Creel interview with the inventor, entitled "I'm for Woodrow Wilson", in which the famous man of science endorsed one by one the major policies of the President. Edison was credited with making one of the most famous utterances in support of Wilson: "They say Wilson has blundered—perhaps he has—but I notice he usually blunders forward." House considered the Edison pamphlet as the best campaign document other than the President's Speech of Acceptance.¹

Henry Ford also approved most of Wilson's policies. He would cast his vote for the President, he said, because the President had kept us out of war and would continue to do so with better chances of success than any other candidate. He favored Wilson's stand on the Adamson Act, maintaining that the eight hour law was good for business. Men cannot work longer than eight hours and do good work, he maintained. Ford denied that the European war was the reason for prosperity in this country, and pointed out that Ford Motor Company had not taken a dollar of war contracts. Another of his statements was used to good effect by the Democrats:

The tariff is nothing but a hot-house remedy. I'm a Republican but I'm for Wilson. I'm a Republican for the same reason I have ears—I was born that way. But I'm for Wilson because I believe he can do more to enhance the prosperity and ensure the peace of this nation than any other candidate.¹

Ford was not captured without a struggle and some bargaining. In August Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels wrote to Wilson that he had been informed that Ford would become a strong and active supporter if Wilson would take a strong stand for world disarmament.² Wilson replied that to come out for world disarmament would be hard to explain for we would appear to be going in two directions at once, but "I can speak out very plainly for organized peace, and I think that has all the elements in it that these friends of ours and we ourselves agree."³ Later Daniels and McCormick met the Detroit automobile builder and Edison in a hotel. There apparently Ford let it be known that he was for Wilson, but when the two Democratic officials tried to pin him down on what he would contribute to the campaign, he was evasive, and spent much of the time in a contest with

¹ Columbus Citizen, September 27, 1916, 1.
³ August 16, 1916, ibid.
Edison to see which could kick the higher.¹ Later Ford was taken to see Morgenthau, who managed to pin him down. Ford's position was that he would contribute to the campaign but he wanted terms that would advertise himself and his cars. The advertisements, when published, were to be in the form of a statement of Ford's personal views of the campaign and must bear his signature. In addition he was to call on the President and present him with a plan of hiring women at five dollars per day, the same pay his men received. The proposition was accepted, but his contributions were, according to Morgenthau, disproportionate to his means.²

Financing the campaign, as usual, was a rather difficult task for the Democrats. At the end of the campaign they were $200,000 in the hole, with total receipts amounting to $1,650,000 while expenses were $1,850,000.³ The deficit, however, was not so large as some had been

¹ Morgenthau, op. cit., 242. Edison won when he smashed the chandelier. It was the highest kick Daniels had ever seen. Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917, 463.

² Ibid., 244. A man in the White House at the time says that the agreement to advocate the election of Wilson was made between the President and Ford when the latter visited Shadow Lawn sometime in the summer of 1916. Wilson remarked later that Ford's patriotism was measured along with the sale of his cars. Irwin H. Hoover, Forty Two Years in the White House, 113.

³ Undated New York Evening Sun clipping found in Charles E. Hughes Papers, box 14, folder 18.
in past campaigns and certainly not so large as deficits in the election efforts of the future. Henry Morgenthau was assisted in his efforts to bring in money by Thomas L. Chadbourne and Bernard Baruch. "I had only to suggest, to one or to the other, where I thought they might find some prosperous and as yet untaxed Democrat", stated Morgenthau, "to have him eagerly exclaim, 'I'll get him'; neither of them ever failed to make good his boast." Various contributions, solicited or unsolicited, were received from all parts of the country and from, sometimes, what might appear to be rather surprising sources. William Huttig of Kansas City, a German-American, sent $1,000 to President Wilson. \(^1\) Contributions were received from the Panama Canal Zone. \(^2\) It should be pointed out, however, that Huttig was connected with the Federal Reserve Bank and the money from the Canal Zone was from Federal employees or those who had been helped by President Wilson in some economic way. Postmasters were among

\(^1\) Morgenthau, op. cit., 242. The support of Baruch and Chadbourne indicated that not all of Wall Street favored Hughes.  

\(^2\) The President wrote him a nice note of thanks on September 20, then ten days later wrote another saying he had found out that it was against the law for one Federal office holder to receive contributions from another. Wilson Papers, Series VII, box 18, letterbook 32, p. 350. 

\(^3\) Ibid., Series VI, box 594, file 3200.
those expected to contribute. And if a Republican newspaper's claim was correct, in at least one state, the postmasters were expected to contribute 10% of a year's salary.¹ If all the Presidential appointees had contributed like amounts, the money problem would have been virtually solved.

Apparently, however, the campaign purse was pinched, and Mr. Morgenthau had to cut corners wherever possible. Publicity Director Woolley must have been irritated when he paid out of his own pocket one-half of the overtime compensation of certain of his own workers when Morgenthau cut their overtime pay by 50%, even though Woolley had approved the overtime.²

Efforts to Obtain Support of Progressives and Independents

In line with the belief of President Wilson and others that there were enough independent votes to swing the election, a great deal of effort and publicity was

¹ The Manchester (N. H.) Guardian on October 10, 1916, carried a copy of a letter from R. Bonna Ridgway, Chairman of the Democratic Central Committee of Texas to the County Chairmen, in which he was suggesting, at the instance of a National Committeeman who had just come from a meeting of the National Committee, that "you have a private inter­view with the postmasters in your county who were appoint­ed by the administration in regard to contributing to the Democratic Campaign fund." He continued that 10% of a year's salary was expected, adding that a list of the con­tributors would be kept and "note would be made of the loyal and unloyal".

pointed toward winning the independent and Progressive vote. Pamphlets, as we have mentioned, were prepared describing the liberal legislation passed by the Administration. Further, on the organizational level, the Democrats planned to form a Wilson Independent League, a Progressive Committee, and a Bulletin of advice to the Bull Moosers, as well as making a point of emphasizing in speeches and other means generally, the advantage of a Democratic Administration to the independents and Progressives.

The Bulletin, a weekly news sheet, was first issued on July 23, and contained columns of reading matter principally designed for the conversion of Progressives to the Democratic cause. In the first issue one column was devoted to George Perkins. A number of passages from his letters were cited, in which he had denounced the Republican Party and asserted that it was farther away from Progressive ideals than the Democrats were.  

Although Henry Morgenthau thought that since they would not know from which branch of the independents they were to recruit until after the Republican Convention, it would be best to wait until then to start the campaign to win them over, Norman Hapgood, editor of Harper's

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2 As he wrote to Woolley, April 29, 1916. Robert Woolley Papers, box 25.
Weekly, who had the job of organizing independent leagues for Wilson, went ahead and felt out certain individuals in various cities as to their attitude toward joining such a movement and to act as leaders in their particular cities.

Although Hapgood and his associates had some difficulty in some cities and localities in locating their contacts, success was soon to come in California and several other states. The California Woodrow Wilson Non-Partisan League was getting organized in the spring and the founders planned by the end of the Republican Convention to be sending out a weekly supplement to be sent to such weekly newspapers as would include them with their regular issues.¹ Frank V. McCormick wrote to Hapgood in April that the movement for Wilson was gaining favor everywhere in the state.² A month before, an official of the California organization had informed Hapgood that there would be university clubs, businessmen's clubs, women's clubs and other organizations, all to be affiliated with the central body.³

When Hapgood had lined up a sufficient number of

¹ Isidor Jaliolis to Norman Hapgood, March 14, 1916.  
² Ibid., box 12.  
key independents, a national Woodrow Wilson Independent League was formed, with a California Congressman, William Kent, as its chairman. Later, independent leagues were formed in other states, with those in Washington and in North Dakota, particularly, performing yeomen service for Wilson. During the campaign President Wilson sent to them a message of greeting and praise in which he expressed his gratification with their work and how proud he was "to have friends who voluntarily combine to fight the battles of progressive government in my name."

The Progressives had their own organizations for Wilson. Encouraged by the endorsement of the President by 11 of the 19 members of the Bull Moose resolutions committee that drafted the original Progressive Party platform in Chicago in 1912, and by statements by

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1 This particular message was to Melvin D. Hildreth, General Secretary, Woodrow Wilson League of North Dakota, September 21, 1916. Wilson Papers, box 18, letterbook 32, p. 388.

2 The endorsement read: "Without a candidate of our own for President, we are unalterably in favor of the retention in office of President Wilson, under whose guidance and leadership more progressive principles have been enacted into law than we believe might have been accomplished had the Progressive Party been in power." It was signed by John M. Parker (La.), ex-Governor Garwin of Rhode Island, Judge Albert D. Nortini (Mo.), Hugh T. Halbert (Minn.), Frank N. Howard (Vt.), McDebaca (N. M.), James M. Ingersoll (Idaho), Arthur G. Wray (Neb.), Clarence B. Strouse (Va.), J. W. McCormick (Tex.) and ex-Governor Carey of Wyoming. Columbus Citizen, October 31, 1916, 1.
Wilson that he welcomed Progressive aid from whatever 
party,\(^1\) as well as by the recognition of Progressives in 
the National organization,\(^2\) Woodrow Wilson Progressive 
Leagues were established in several states. In Cali-
ifornia, Francis J. Heney of Los Angeles, elected presi-
dent of the California Woodrow Wilson Progressive League, 
was very active for the re-election of the President.\(^3\) 
Young people were active also. By the last of July the 
Bull Moose Committee of the Young Men's Democratic 
League had been organized in 17 states.\(^4\)

**President Wilson in the Campaign**

Mr. Wilson kept in mind the strength and character 
of the independent and Progressive vote during the cam-
paign. He felt that propagandizing would not be the

\(^1\) In a letter to J. C. Parker, editor of the *Lefax Magazine* of Philadelphia, who wrote to Wilson asking him if he would accept the leadership of all parties, President Wilson replied that he would be glad to receive the support of the Progressives of all parties. (He spelled Progressive once with a capital P and twice with a small p.) *New York Times*, July 15, 1916, 5.

\(^2\) Two campaign committees were announced: the regular Democratic one, and one of Progressives as an Associate committee, the latter composed of Bainbridge Colby (N.Y.), Matthew Hak (Mass.), Albert Nortini (Mo.), Francis J. Heney (Cal.), J. A. H. Hopkins (N.J.), Ole Hansen (Wash.), and Henry M. Wallace (Mich.). *Ibid.*, August 11, 1916, 3.


proper approach, that the winner of the election would owe his success to the fact that his character and abilities had been weighed by the independent voters and judged to be superior to that of his opponent. He considered the best kind of appeal to the perhaps 5,000,000 possible voters who had entered the campaign in the best possible state of intellectual preparedness would be the appeal based solely upon policies and acts of national scope. Thinking this way, he planned to emphasize the eight hour law and social legislation to supplement it, the negative record of the Republican administrations in the past, the Underwood Tariff, the Tariff Commission, rural credits and other social legislation passed by the Administration during the last four years.  

Although Wilson realized it would be necessary to meet the attack of the Republicans on certain issues, he was in no hurry to begin his campaign. In fact he refused to stump the country. He would make some speeches from his summer home, Shadow Lawn in New Jersey, and consented to make some trips, but no stumping as such. He made three visits to the Middle West on non-partisan occasions, one to Hodgenville, Kentucky, to give a memorial address on the occasion of the dedication of a monument.

at the birthplace of Abraham Lincoln; one to Indianapolis
to speak in the interest of good roads and before a body
of farmers on the subject of rural credits; and a visit
to Omaha in which he spoke for world peace and explained
his foreign policy.

Awaiting the end of the Congressional session President Wilson delivered his speech of acceptance of the
Democratic nomination on September 2 at Shadow Lawn. Al­
though Hughes had been firing away at the Administration
since early August, Wilson delayed his acceptance and his
answer to Republican charges because he was busy with
Congress and because he wanted to see the Federal Work­
men's Compensation Bill and the National Child Labor Law
passed. Both the strength of his speech and the chances
for re-election might depend upon those important laws.
Upon their passage he could appeal to the Roosevelt sup­
porters of four years ago on the ground that as President
he and the Democratic Congress in cooperation had been
instrumental in placing on the Federal statute books the
bulk of the "T R" program for "Social and Industrial
Justice". In his acceptance speech the President summed up
his promises made and kept, and the services rendered.

In turning to foreign issues, Wilson pointed out that
our guiding principle was that property rights could be
vindicated by damages when the war was over; but loss of
life and the violation of the nation's sovereignty could
not await suits for damages. The President, defending his action toward Huerta's Government in Mexico, expressed the hope that America would be able to contribute toward world peace and that his country would not be forced to take sides in a quarrel which its own honor and integrity and the fortunes of its own people were not involved.  

In his second Shadow Lawn speech, September 30, Mr. Wilson hit hard at the Republican criticism of his foreign policy. There, as Mark Sullivan commented, he "practiced a Gettysburg maneuver of dialectic" against the Republicans:

We must draw the conclusion that if the Republican Party is put into power at the coming election, our foreign policy will be radically changed. They say all our present policy is wrong. If it is wrong and they are men of conscience, they must change it; and if they are going to change it, in what direction are they going to change it? There is only one choice against peace and that is war. A very great body of the supporters of that party outspokenly declare that they want war, so that the certain prospect of success of the Republican Party is that we shall be drawn, in one form or another, into the embroilments of the European war. He was saying in effect: elect me and remain in peace; elect Republicans and go to war. The Republicans were

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2 Sullivan, Our Times, V. 5, 238.

put in a hole from which they never were able completely to extricate themselves.

But Wilson realized the closeness of war to the United States. Speaking less than a month later he brought out to a Middle-Western audience that he believed that we could not keep out of another European war. "The business of neutrality is over....war now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable." At Omaha he had told an enthusiastic crowd of thousands that Americans are ready to fight any nation—but the cause must be just.

In many of his speeches the President hit hard at hyphenism. In his acceptance speech at Shadow Lawn he set the keynote. There he emphasized that he was a candidate of a party, but above all things else, he was an American citizen. As a candidate he neither, he said, sought the favor nor feared the displeasure of "that small alien element among us which puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States". It was in this connection—willingness to stand up to the criticism of certain German—and Irish-Americans—that Wilson won one of his most important strategic victories.

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It was claimed by the Anti-British Irish and certain organizations of Germans in America, such as the German-American Alliance, that they had been instrumental in carrying some of the primaries in a way to rebuke the President and his policies. Robert L. Bacon, a Republican of pronounced pro-Ally sympathies, running for United States Senator in New York, and Senator Martine of New Jersey, a Democrat who had voted to withdraw protection from Americans on the seas, had been defeated in the primaries. The Anti-British agitator, Jeremiah O'Leary, who had been organizing and speaking against the President and trying to array alien votes against him, wrote an offensive letter to Wilson, calling attention to the result of the Maine election and to the New Jersey primaries and to his anticipated defeat in November. The President replied quickly and tersely:

Your telegram received. I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them.¹

This sharp and as many considered it, timely rebuke, to an alien and unpatriotic spirit in America won approval and support for Mr. Wilson. Nothing like this bold

defiance of strong alien influences in American politics came from Mr. Hughes until a few days before the election.

The President received a great reception on his trips. In Omaha thousands saw and heard him, and received him enthusiastically. Approximately 150,000 people lined the streets of Indianapolis to see the President go by.¹ The train to Omaha stopped 14 times in Ohio and several times in Indiana. Although he was a reserved man, he joked some with his audiences, remarking to a college crowd in Indiana, "Well, I see that you're a clean shaven crowd, yourselves."² That was the closest he came to calling his opponent by name.

The President hit hard at the Republican Party. At Shadow Lawn he charged that reactionary leaders of the opposing party desired the scalp of the Comptroller-General to get control of the new banking system and put the army and navy back of their financial enterprises in Mexico and throughout the world. To Wilson the Republicans represented reaction. In one speech he asserted that the opposition party had not had a new idea for 30 years.³

² Ibid., October 5, 1916, 1.
³ Jackson Day Address at Indianapolis, January 8, 1915. Messages and Papers of the President, V., XVI, 8025.

Other Democrats hit at the Republicans also. One of the most interesting comments was by Robert Woolley at the Jefferson Day Dinner. "We have taken common counsel
At the height of the campaign Wilson was made the target of character assassins. Whether the whispering campaign against the private life of Wilson was condoned by Republican leaders, as biographers of Wilson have at least implied, such a campaign was apparently conducted. The stories centered around the remarriage of Wilson in 1915 to Mrs. Galt, a Washington widow, and his friendship with a family friend, Mrs. Peck, whom the entire family had visited for a month in Bermuda and who had several times visited them. Attempts by the Democrats to check these rumors were partially successful, but not entirely so.¹

Further Concentration on the West

While Wilson, House and perhaps other leading Democrats early had seen the promise of Democratic victory in the West, the success of the campaign there was not taken for granted. Many speakers were sent into the

this day and let us not forget that, in spite of the string of Republican possibilities and impossibilities, which resembles a laundry list, our battle cry is to be found in a telegram sent from New York by a Chicago doctor who had just been advised of the death of his mother-in-law and asked for instructions: 'Embalm her', he wired, 'Then cremate her. Take no chances'. "Robert Woolley Papers, box 17.

¹ Professor Stockton Axson, brother of the first Mrs. Wilson, wrote an article entitled, "The Private Life of President Wilson," which was published in various newspapers and distributed as a campaign document to stop such rumors which had gained such headway by October.
area to conduct a drive for Wilson and the Democrats. By late September the Speakers' Bureau in Chicago had such speechmakers as W. J. Bryan, Senator Hamilton Lewis of Illinois, Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia, Senator Stone of Missouri, Senator Robinson of Arkansas, and others on the go in the Middle-Western and Western states. What the Democratic Administration had done for labor, for agriculture and for the nation at large was hammered into the public mind by the 100 speakers on the circuit.

Reports were received that Mr. Bryan, the erstwhile perennial Democratic candidate, and still popular Nebraskan, was doing his party a world of good by his speeches. In Salt Lake City he talked to 7,000 people, with 5,000 turned away. Similar reports were received by Democratic campaign headquarters from Reno and other Western cities. The Utah chairman wired that what the good Bryan was doing could scarcely be overestimated. Not only was Bryan talking for peace, but he also was praising the President's liberal domestic program. In attacking Hughes he said that the Republican candidate lacked the candor to praise the President's remedial measures; instead Hughes ignored them and confined himself to picking microscopic details. Again Bryan hit where it hurt, emphasizing

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that in international affairs Hughes merely found fault without suggesting what he would have done in the circumstances. Certainly the Democrats were glad Mr. Bryan had not turned against the President when he resigned from the cabinet.  

Secretary of the Navy Daniels and Secretary of the Interior Lane assisted in the campaign to capture the West. Lane, a Californian himself, was very popular in the region west of the Mississippi, and was considered by many as the strong exception in a generally weak cabinet. He was kept busy making speeches and earlier had spoken for several weeks three or four times per day to farmers and businessmen in Wyoming, Montana, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, receiving a fine reception, even from Republicans. The Secretary of the Interior was particularly concerned with conservation of natural resources, and received praise for his knowledge of the subject and his efforts to conserve them. Robert Woolley made an extended tour through the West and in 1915 wrote to Colonel House:

Secretary Lane is, in the hearts of the people, far and away ahead of any man in the cabinet... He seems to have given a touch of genius to the administration of the affairs of the Interior Department which has gripped the imagination of citizens.

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1 On September 27, the President wrote to Bryan expressing his appreciation of his efforts. Ibid.

2 In 1913 and also later. Wilson Papers. Series VI, box 46, file 23.
of all political faiths in the states where conservation is an issue and where the development of Alaska is of vital moment.¹

Prior to and during the campaign Daniels made visits to the West Coast where he made known his intention of providing excellent naval facilities there for the establishment of a two ocean Navy. Having felt neglected by the Navy for a long time, the people of the Coast naturally welcomed Daniels with open arms. In later years Daniels himself claims a great part of the credit for the Democratic upsurge in that section in 1916 was due to this new emphasis upon the Navy on the West Coast.²

Secretary Daniels himself was not so great a vote getter in many other areas. From the date of his appointment the North Carolina newspaper publisher and editor had been subject to much abuse. Much of the ridicule flowed from his abolition of the officers' wine mess

¹ Robert Woolley Papers, box 14. The total influence of Lane upon the election is indeterminate, but Lane himself in a letter to Cobb of the New York World, patted himself on the back: "Speaking of the election, there are two things I want you to keep in mind, Mr. Cobb. One is that the states which the Interior Department deals with are the states which elected Mr. Wilson...and the second is that we kept the Mexican situation from blowing up in a most critical part of the campaign, which is also due to the Secretary of the Interior, damm you! In fact, next to you, I think the Department of Interior is the most important part of the whole show!" Jennings C. Wise, Woodrow Wilson, 527.

in the Navy. Many other innovations, including his attempts to "democratize" the Navy by the establishment of schools on board ship for enlisted men and the selection of 15 enlisted men for training at Annapolis each year, were met with sneers and jeers, particularly in the "enemy" press. Perhaps back of much of the criticism was Daniels' refusal to bow low to the armor plate and powder manufacturers, whom Daniels and the Administration had relieved of the ability to establish exhorbitant prices in their sales to the Navy.

Wilson stood by his Navy Secretary through great criticism, as he stood by all who were his supporters. During the campaign measures were taken to counteract the antagonism which had been built up against Daniels. George Creel, in his Wilson and the Issues, wrote one chapter on Daniels, showing why the Navy Secretary was maligned and pointing out the accomplishments of the Navy under Daniels' leadership. Other effective work was done by more impartial sources, particularly the editor of the Engineering Magazine, who, exasperated over the "persistent and sinful abuse" of Daniels, wrote articles and editorials in defense of the Secretary and pointed out that Daniels was the first Secretary of the Navy to appoint

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1 Actually, his Assistant Secretary, one Franklin D. Roosevelt, originated the "dry order" while acting as Secretary in Daniels' absence. William D. Hassett, "The President Was My Boss," Saturday Evening Post, October 31, 1933, 39.
a board of civilian engineers to advise and assist the Navy. Included were articles by Admiral John R. Edwards and Admiral Dewey praising Daniels.¹ Many daily papers throughout the country printed excerpts from the Engineering Magazine articles, and the Daniels criticism lost some of its virulence.²

¹ Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 500, file 2599.

² Many letters had demanded the resignation or the dismissal of Daniels, but such a move might have been damaging to the Democrats during the campaign, for it developed that when moving pictures were used to illustrate the achievement of the various departments the Cabinet Officer and the department that the theatre crowds applauded most vigorously and generously were Daniels and the Navy. Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters, V. 6, 283.
CHAPTER VII

THE REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN

In the two party system of American politics, the basic strategy of compromise has its place, but to the campaigner the middle of the road, the make-no-enemies approach, may have its serious drawbacks. This was particularly true in the case of Charles E. Hughes and his campaign. His job was to make speeches radical enough to please the Progressives and former Progressives and conservative enough to please the regulars. On the subject of foreign affairs he must, for the benefit of the nationalist group in his party, appear to criticize Wilson for having been week-kneed in failing to stand up to protect the honor of this country; to satisfy the peace minded he should emphasize any risks which the Administration had subjected this country. Actually any definite stand in the foreign policy area would have brought down the wrath of many voters upon the head of the Republican candidate. At the same time, failure to take a definite stand would create something less than tremendous enthusiasm. Nevertheless, as unity was to be the keynote, so generalizations if not outright non-committalness was to be the campaign policy.

Another major drawback encountered by the Republican
candidate lay in the record of his opponent in the domestic area. Mr. Hughes himself, while Governor of New York, had approved some rather liberal legislation. So when President Wilson pushed through liberal legislation of his own, Hughes could do little but approve or remain silent. By his almost complete silence he gave tacit approval to the major part of the domestic program of the Administration. This handicap was to be a great one throughout the campaign, forcing Hughes in his speeches to turn to domestic subjects of comparatively little public appeal, such as civil service and the tariff.

Not all of the handicaps under which Mr. Hughes labored were due to the situation in which he found himself as chief mollifier. By popular conception he was a frigid person, aloof from the problems and emotions of the "common man". His sojourn in the isolation of the Supreme Court had added to the general effect and a long beard served as a further buffer between himself and the public. Theodore Roosevelt once called him the "bearded iceberg". ¹ To dispel such attitudes Mr. Hughes made determined efforts to appear more the hail-fellow-well-met on his campaign tours, and succeeded reasonably well in dispersing some of the belief that he was a cold, reserved man.

Not all of the facets of the character of Hughes or of the position he was in as a candidate were handicaps in his campaign. He possessed "in plentiful measure the outstanding virtues of sobriety, steadfastness, trustworthiness, honesty, industry and intelligence, capacity, application and the will to succeed." ¹ A lucidity of expression as well as clarity of mind had been adequately evidenced in the past. Although he had been brought up in the old tradition, educated as Walter Lippmann wrote, "in the old dogmas about government, business and labor" ² where he had studied the facts he was more liberal and modern. Hughes gained fame in his prosecution of the insurance companies in New York and achieved a reputation for uprightness of character and a willingness to fight corruption wherever found. As a Republican governor of New York he had never been the darling of the Old Guard and had forced measures upon the boss controlled legislature by going to the people. As a Supreme Court Justice he perhaps had not added much to any reputation for liberalism he might have attained, but his solidness and intelligence were emphasized. So the Republican candidate entered the campaign buttressed by the reputation for

honesty, integrity, intelligence, and all the basic, solid attributes of a successful man, even if not the flair for meeting people and the ability to captivate an audience.

Hughes, the Beginning of the Campaign, and Unity

Apparently to steer clear of the Old Guard label, Hughes, after his nomination in Chicago, hurried to New York to open his campaign headquarters before any of the leaders could reach him from Chicago. Within a short time the impression was gained that he had firmly established himself, by rallying around himself all elements of the party, Old Guard, Progressive, and those in between, as the leader of his own campaign.¹

The big jobs to be done in New York before the campaign started in earnest in August were organization and strategy. One of the first tasks was the selection of the campaign manager. Among the moves most prominent in the discussion for the position was Frank H. Hitchcock, the man who had led the fight in the pre-convention days, and in the convention itself, for the nomination of Hughes. In participating in the battle for the nomination.

¹ Hughes, himself, had nothing to do with the creation of the headquarters in the Astor. The long since forgotten Hughes Alliance of 1908 arranged it without any communication at all with the new candidate. New York Times, June 18, 1916, Section V, 7.
Hitchcock had made enemies, however, and several interested parties telegraphed Hughes that Hitchcock would not be acceptable to them. It was claimed by some of his opponents that Hitchcock had made enemies in the South, antagonizing Congressman Slemp of Virginia and the three Republican Congressmen from North Carolina, as well as others.\(^1\) He had made enemies of the Old Guard earlier by "betraying" Taft in the 1912 convention when he called Roosevelt in Chicago and offered to work for the leader of the Bull Moose.\(^2\) Mr. Hughes, trying to avoid the appearance of favoring any faction, turned to a man not actively engaged in politics, and so Hitchcock, a politician who had demonstrated his worth in the pre-convention and convention efforts to nominate Hughes, was shunted aside in favor of party harmony.\(^3\)

The man selected by Hughes to run his campaign was

\(^1\) Henry W. Taft to Hughes, June 15, 1916, Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 3. Hughes received letters from a Missouri Congressman, L. C. Dyer, advising Hughes that he should not select Hitchcock because he had interfered in the current primary campaign for the selection of a Republican candidate for the United States Senate. June 17, 1916, ibid., box 3. A Walter S. Dickey of Kansas City had expressed the same attitude toward Hitchcock. June 13, 1916, ibid.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Hitchcock himself wired Hughes on June 12 that Hughes should disregard the suggestion of friends that Hitchcock should be the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, saying he wasn't a candidate for the position. Ibid.
William R. Willcox, a New Yorker and who had been appointed to the chairmanship of the New York State Public Service Commission when Hughes was Governor and had been the Postmaster for New York City for over two years when Roosevelt was President. How well Hughes succeeded in pleasing the Progressives by the appointment of Willcox is not known, but Harold Ickes, the fiery Illinois Progressive, writing years later, considered the appointment due in large part to the suggestion of George Perkins, which, to Ickes, was not conducive to success.

Mr. Hughes and Mr. Willcox were interested in saving their own party and thought one of the necessary means to accomplish the end would be the naming of several Progressives to the campaign committee. Murray Crane and other Old Guards were against such peace offers, but as announced on July 11, out of the 17 members of the committee, six were Progressives, five were Old Guards, and the remainder somewhere in between. ¹ A few days later Hughes called upon Republicans and Progressives alike to

¹ The Committee, as given by the New York Times, July 11, 1916, 6.

John T. Adams Iowa
Everett Colby (P) N.J.
W. H. Crocker Calif.
F. W. Estabrook (OG) N.H.
James R. Garfield (P) Ohio
J. A. Hemenway (OG) Ind.
A. T. Hert N.Y.
R. B. Howell Neb.
Harold Ickes (P) Ill.

Alvah H. Martin (OG) Va.
Herbert Parsons N.Y.
George W. Perkins (P) N.Y.
S. A. Perkins (OG) Wash.
Chester A. Rowell (P) Cal.
Oscar S. Straus (P) N.Y.
Ralph E. Williams Ore.
get together to win a thorough victory. And on the 20th of July the campaign committee met to discuss campaign plans. All was harmony. Hughes dwelt on the necessity for electing Republican Congressmen. In the morning the members each told of conditions in his state. Since Republicans and Progressives were united again, the outlook was very hopeful, they reported.

All, however, was not in apple pie order for the Republicans in many states—certainly not in the Progressive organization itself. Mr. Hughes, desiring to show the Progressive National Committee that he was anxious to cooperate, wrote to the Secretary, O. K. Davis, that he welcomed the support of the Progressives. "We make common cause in the interest of national honor, of national security, of national efficiency. We unite in the demand for a whole hearted patriotic devotion overriding all racial differences. We want a revival of the American spirit—a Nation restored." 1

The Progressives were not to be 100% in favor of Hughes and rejoining the Republicans. Most of the members of the Progressive State Committee of Illinois favored, at least informally, the Republican candidate, but 25% would not go along. As a result, the committee

1 Mr. Hughes stated other general themes of what the Republicans and he hoped, the Progressives, stood for. Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 3.
refused to endorse any national and state ticket.\textsuperscript{1} In a stormy session in New York the New York County Progressive Executive Committee adopted a resolution demanding that the National Committee should not fill the vacancy at the head of the Bull Moose ticket by naming Hughes.\textsuperscript{2} The Brooklyn Moose leaders adopted a resolution condemning Roosevelt's and Perkins' attempt to have the party support the Republican ticket.\textsuperscript{3} In Oregon the Republicans fared better, as the Progressive Committee believed that Hughes stood "exactly where Roosevelt" did "in regard to main issues of patriotism and preparedness...."\textsuperscript{4} In Nebraska there was fireworks in July, but after the vote in support of Hughes by the Progressive National Committee the Nebraska State Committee of the party, according to perhaps a prejudiced observer, George Perkins, agreed with the national organization unanimously, "and the situation straightened out beautifully."\textsuperscript{5}

The action and vote of the national organization reflected the attitude of the state organizations. Meeting in Chicago in late July, the Progressive National Committee,

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{New York Times}, June 24, 1916, 6.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Ibid.}, June 16, 1916, 4.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, June 24, 1916, 7.
\textsuperscript{4} T. B. Neuhausen to Hughes, June 14, 1916. \textit{Hughes Papers}, General Correspondence, box 4.
\textsuperscript{5} Perkins to Hughes, July 14, 1916. \textit{Ibid.}
after several hours of wrangling, voted to adopt the recom-
mendation from "T R" that the Progressive Party endorse
Hughes for President. The vote was 32-6, with nine not
voting. Among the 15 recalcitrants was John Parker of
Louisiana, the Progressive Vice-Presidential nominee, who
was strong for a third ticket. But a majority of the
leaders had returned to the fold of the old mother party,
the Republicans. Willcox was sure his party was reunited.

It remained to be seen, however, if the important
remainder of the Progressives would return to the Repub-
lican Party. Much depended not only on the further
policies and actions of Mr. Hughes, but the attitude of
the other Republicans, particularly the Old Guard. In
the early part of the campaign, the conservative (or
reactionary) branch of the party, in some places and
times at least, showed little desire to accept the re-
turning prodigals. In New York even though "Welcome,
Progressives" was woven in large red letters on every
doormat at the headquarters of the Republican National
Committee, the state committee conducted its campaign for
the re-election of Governor Whitman under the chilling
slogan of "Quick death to the Progressives". Chairman
Tanner explained that he did not believe in coddling the
Progressives, because, he said, there were so few of them

in the state. 1 In other states the Progressives found the Old Guard and other regular Republicans awaiting them with no open arms and no fatted calf. (The California situation, the worst, will be described later.) Even on the national basis, the welcome was not so cordial as had appeared when Mr. Hughes appointed several Progressives on his campaign committee. Mr. Ickes, one of those Progressives, said later that the committee never met once. 2 Ickes added that during the campaign he had been attached to the Western Headquarters at Chicago charged with the particular duty of trying to hold the Western Progressives in line, but not one dime had been proffered to him for the purpose of building up an organization in three or four critical states. Probably typical of how some Republicans looked at receiving those who had split the party in 1912 was expressed by a President of a Kansas Trust Company who wrote to Hughes' secretary: "Am anxious to assist him (Hughes) all I can..." but "Be careful not to go too far in lining up the Progressive branch. There is a dignified way of procedure. Do not go to the extent of nauseating some of the rockribbed conservative Republicans. I send you here with a clipping from the Morning

1 Ibid., 1.

2 Ickes, "Who killed the Progressive Party?" American Historical Review, V. 46 (January 1941), 306-337. But the New York Times reported a meeting a few days after the announcement of organization of the committee.
Daily Capital which illustrates what I have in mind."
The clipping read: "While the topic is in mind we re­spectfully suggest to HTC that if he wishes us to vote for
Mr. Hughes he mustn't make him too dad-blamed progressive."

Hughes Goes West

Because the name of Hughes had been out of active
politics for six years or so and was not so well known as
that of the President, Hughes felt it necessary that he
tour the country, particularly the Western states, the
fartherest from his home state, New York. His western
trip was to begin the second week in August and to end in
mid-September, with speeches in Detroit and Chicago, then
at various points to and from San Francisco and the West
Coast. Two other trips were to follow.²

1 Scott H. Hopkins to Lawrence Greene, July 7, 1916. Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4. It is not
known whether Mr. Hughes was influenced by this advice,
but he did take time to answer the letter, calling Hopkins
a "friend." He did not, however, mention the advice.
July 14, 1916. Ibid.

2 The three principal tours included speeches in the
following cities:
a. First, and major, tour: Detroit, Chicago, St.
Paul, Grand Forks, Fargo, Helena, Butte, Missoula, Coeur
d'Alene, Spokane, Tacoma, Seattle, Portland, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento, Reno,
Ogden, Cheyenne, Denver, Topeka, Kansas City, St. Louis,
Lexington (Nashville substituted), and Portland, Maine.
b. Latter half of September. In Wisconsin:
Sheboygan, Manitowao, Green Bay, Appleton, Oshkosh, Fond
Du Lac and Milwaukee. In Illinois: Chicago, Peoria and
Springfield. In Indiana and Illinois: Monon, LaFayette,
Logansport, Oelphi, Logansport (again), Peru, Wabash,
All in all, Hughes as a campaigner and as a speaker was to be disappointing. His acceptance speech at Carnegie Hall a few days before he started on his first Western tour was an exception to a certain extent, but at the same time it indicated the type of speeches to come, and the general strategy of playing it safe, gathering in as many factions and groups as possible while making enemies of none. Upon first glance many of his statements of attitudes and policy sounded definite and concise, but upon re-examination one was not so sure. He was for a "firm and efficient foreign policy", for being "definite consistent and firm with Mexico," and in favor of appointing only first class men to the cabinet.\footnote{"America First and America Efficient", Hughes acceptance address, July 31, 1916. Issued by the Republican National Committee.} He was more definite, one must hasten to add, in certain advised legislation: a tariff sufficient to meet foreign competition; Federal workingmen's compensation; woman suffrage
by state action; and a Federal budget prepared by the Executive. Reaction to the speech was extremely varied. To the Chicago Tribune it was a statesmanlike message, laying emphasis upon an "issue transcending party--the issue of America's place in the world." Another Republican organ agreed, declaring the acceptance speech as one "never excelled for clearness and manliness of expression." Differing was the New York Times which, commenting upon the Hughes statement that this is a "time of national exigency, transcending merely party considerations," said: "As Mr. Hughes rambles around the country, new reasons occur to him every moment for thinking that the period is critical, the time is exigent, and parties on considerations are transcended. Each time he hits one of those reasons he is visibly astonished and delighted." One author, years later describing the campaigns of those Presidential candidates who lost, takes the viewpoint that Hughes was the speech-maker scientist, handling the task as one to be performed in a laboratory, and "with almost geometric precision he wooed the camp followers of Taft, placated Roosevelt and his

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1 August 2, 1916, 6. From a clipping in Hughes Papers, box 4 folder 14.

2 Labor World, August 3, 1916.

3 This comment appeared in a review of the campaign, published September 6, 1916, 8.
recalcitrants, shined up to the liberal independents, made sheep's eyes at the diverse and quarreling anti-Wilson forces.\textsuperscript{1} Considering his basic strategy—steps to heal the party wounds—it was perhaps Mr. Hughes best speech.

Starting West on the early date of August 7, in order to get his views before the people "while they are still reading and not just before election day when many minds will be made up",\textsuperscript{2} the Republican candidate attacked the Wilson Administration on grounds of waste, extravagance, "pork" legislation, sectionalism, unfit appointments in the foreign service and violation of sound civil service principles. His efforts and himself were received cordially but the crowds were not quite so large as those which had met Wilson in Omaha and other cities visited on his preparedness tour, and not quite so vociferous as those listening to Teddy Roosevelt.

While Hughes and his followers were publicly satisfied with his reception the first few days of the initial tour,\textsuperscript{3} they were affected by criticism that the candidate was not discussing important issues such as the European war and the Mexican trouble, but merely scolding and fault finding. In answer to such censure, Hughes turned to the

\textsuperscript{1} Irving S. Stone, \textit{They Also Ran}, 114.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., August 15, 1916, 5.
advocation of "protection to American citizens, protection to the property of American citizens, protection to our border from incursions, the rights that we have as one nation relatively to another nation at our doors.... We are going to insist that these obligations be performed".¹ Beyond that general criticism of Wilson's foreign policy Hughes was unwilling to go.

Such generalities were not enough for many people who had expected a serious discussion of the major issues conducted on a high, intelligent level. Instead Hughes was criticized as "a man walks over the issues like a cat and springs only at small game".² The New Republic, which had been critical of Wilson, wondered why Mr. Hughes was acting as he had been, and thought it "very interesting to find a man of rare courage and frankness, of balanced mind, a man of experience in politics should be wandering around over the country trailing nothing but cold and damp platitudes".³

Not all the comments about Hughes' speeches on his big jaunt westward and back were derogatory. Republican papers for the most part saw some hopeful aspects, one

¹ The American Yearbook, 1916, 38.
voicing a hope for the future—that Hughes was developing into a seasoned campaigner.\(^1\) The *Kansas City Star*, the independent paper, ran a favorable editorial on his acceptance speech.\(^2\) Hughes himself thought the opposition press of the East unfair, maintaining that the largest part of his speeches had been constructive, and that his audiences had been large, "in many cases larger than any previous political gatherings, and the deep interest and cordiality of the people have been marked".\(^3\)

At the same time Hughes became somewhat worried about the reaction to his campaign efforts. By the time he reached Washington (state) his reception was not so keen and his hearers not so numerous. And after California he thought it best to stay for a rest and a chance to review his campaign efforts.\(^4\) Back East at campaign headquarters there also was anxiety over how the campaign was progressing. Nine members of the newly appointed

1 August 11, 1916. Clipping found in Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 4.
2 Goodwin Lathrop to Hughes, August 4, 1916, *ibid*.
3 Hughes to Jacob Schurman, August 30, 1916, *ibid*.
4 Frederick Davenport, "Did Hughes Snub Johnson, An Inside Story", *American Political Science Review*, V. XLIII (April, 1949), 321-332. Perhaps Hughes had read what the independent *Seattle Times*, usually friendly toward him, had to say. On August 17, an editorial read: "Mr. Hughes, hit out!... His thin ideas and lack of constructive program at this most important moment of his political career is on the most astonishing features of the present campaign".
advisory committee of the National Campaign Committee held a long conference on Fifth Avenue late in August and informed Chairman Willcox that Hughes' "swing around the circle" was a mistake and that a new method of campaign publicity would have to be adopted. There had been too much pussy-footing, he was informed, especially on the part of the Republican candidate. The consensus of opinion was that the trip had been made too early. The heat, the primaries and the lack of time for preparation of speeches were pointed out as the reasons why the trip should have been delayed. Several days later Old Guard leaders expressed the feeling that Hughes had had ample opportunity to run his campaign as he saw fit and that in the face of results he should listen to reason. Some Progressive leaders made known the same reasoning. They thought that he had been wasting his time in definite Democratic or Republican states; he should spend most of his time in regions such as Illinois, New York, Indiana, Missouri, and possibly Iowa and Wisconsin.

Apparently Mr. Hughes took some of the criticism of his conduct of the campaign to heart, for after his return from the long tour of the West, he made a second trip, this time through several doubtful states: Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana and into New York. This time

he seemed more vigorous and sure of himself. Finally he had an issue in which he could, he thought, criticize the President for something definitely wrong. Making the most of what he probably considered his first real issue in regard to which he could conscientiously take the opposite side, the Republican candidate made the Adamson Law one of the principal subjects of many of his speeches during the remainder of the campaign, delivering his attacks against Wilson's adherence to the "rule of force" rather than to the "rule of reason".

The hour issue was not the only subject of Hughes' later speeches, of course. In Omaha, replying to the Wilson charges that a Hughes victory would result in the rule of invisible government (lobbyists), Hughes said that he entered politics fighting invisible government, and thrusting at Wilson's advisor from Texas he commented: "I desire government through two houses and not three". He renewed his attack on "false prosperity" of the Wilson Administration, warning that a higher tariff would be needed to reduce the shock of the impact of the flow of foreign goods to this country at the end of hostilities in Europe.

During the campaign, particularly in the latter part, Hughes was disturbed by hecklers, who often wanted to know

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what the Republican candidate would have done had he been President. For a time he disregarded such questioners, or asked the crowds to let them have their say, but finally aroused by one such heckler, he made a statement which gave the Democrats ammunition for their campaign guns. Prior to such time he had, as noted before, been vague and general in his denunciation of Wilson's foreign policy, but aroused by the heckler he maintained that he would not place an embargo on munitions of war to Europe or countenance the passage of any legislation calling upon Americans to stay off merchantmen of warring nations. Many Republican Congressmen, as the Democrats were quick to point out, had voted the other way when the McLeMore and Gore Resolutions were tabled in March.

As Mr. Hughes proceeded further in his efforts to win votes, he and his managers received advice on how to run a campaign. On his long trip West his press back East was not encouraging. George Perkins wrote him early in September informing him that his speeches were getting scant publicity in Eastern newspapers. One reason, he said, was that there were no written speeches available to the press. If Hughes could sit down at the end of a week of campaigning and summarize in 1500 words what he

had said during the week, the effort would be worth it. ¹
Others interested in the Republican campaign realized the
need for better preparation for the press. Medill
McCormick took a not obtuse slap at the repetition found
in Hughes' campaign efforts when he wrote to the Republi­
can candidate to have three or four regular speeches
rather than one speech in order to secure the maximum of
publicity. He went on to criticize the inadequacy of the
campaign organization and to suggest the use of definite
and impressive figures rather than general criticism. ²
Robert McCormick of the Chicago Tribune added his entreaty
to Hughes to get copies of his speeches to the Chicago
paper in time for the Sunday edition, and emphasized that
it was necessary for the candidate to get his speeches to
the press in sufficient time to write editorial comment
and take out telling points and box them where the eye of
the average reader could be guided to them. ³ Leaders in
the National Hughes Alliance agreed with Medill McCormick
that a candidate should have several speeches—"as many

¹ Perkins to Hughes, September 6, 1916, Hughes Papers, box 4.
² He would inform the public as to the exact number of
inexperienced ambassadors appointed by Wilson, the exact
number of classified positions made exempt from Civil
Service regulations, the number of Americans killed on the
Lusitania because the German warning was not taken serious­
ly by the Administration, etc. August 25, 1916. Ibid.,
box 3.
³ McCormick to Hughes, October 2, 1916. Ibid., box 4.
as there are important issues”.¹

Whether Hughes and his managers took advantage of the advice given them, Hughes' campaign efforts picked up when he concentrated on the Eastern section of the country. At South Bend, at Evansville (Indiana) as well as in New York, Hughes received a great welcome and he seemed to be able to meet the crowds on their own grounds. The New York and Eastern newspapers gave more space to the Republican candidate, and perhaps at times, a somewhat more favorable editorial could be read. He was now more the Hughes of the 1908 campaign when he had vigorously toured the country for William H. Taft.

Ohio, California and Hughes

Out of the many states which Mr. Hughes visited during his campaign trips, the two in which he met with more rebuff, and the two which were to defeat him in the election, were Ohio and California. In the Mid-Western commonwealth, Hughes' chances were lessened even before he toured the state; there were factional troubles in the Republican Party in Ohio. In the Republican Convention in Chicago bitterness was evident among the Ohions, particularly among the Cincinnati and the Cleveland

¹ In a letter to Hughes, October 18, 1916, signed by T. A. Vanderlip, Henry L. Stimson and others. Ibid.
politicians. The Cincinnatians were ready to back Miner G. Norton who had decided to enter the race for Governor, since it appeared Governor Willis had a good chance to land the nomination for Vice President. But such a movement had to steer clear of the Harding-for-President movement which already had been built up awaiting an opportunity. The Progressive bugaboo also was present when James R. Garfield, a former Moose, was elevated to a position in the Hughes National Council. Walter F. Brown of Toledo was called from retirement where he had gone after the 1914 election, and the former Moose was put in charge of the Republican organization representing the interests of the national campaign. Old line Republicans, such as R. K. Hynicka of Cincinnati, a member of the National Committee, were not pleased with such action superimposing forces over their own state organization not in any way connected with it.

So when Hughes entered Ohio he was already at a disadvantage because of a lack of cooperation among the campaign leaders and the Republican organization in the state, as well as among the Republican leaders and candidates for offices. When Hughes lauded Myron T. Herrick, and criticized Wilson for recalling him as Ambassador to

1 Ibid., July 18, 1916, 8.
2 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 23, 1916, 8 A.
France, the eulogy was not appreciated by the Daugherty Republicans. While there was no definite defined break of relations between the factions in Ohio as in California, the organization was loose and apparently half-spirited. In October it was reported that even at that time the Republican leaders in Ohio had given up insofar as the 1916 election was concerned, and had turned their attention to planning for 1920 in a really big movement. This news would not disconcert the local committees, it was suggested, for they already had decided to ignore state and national tickets and endeavor to save their local tickets from the landslide.

As pointed out in the discussion of the eight hour issue, Hughes spoke before many workers in Ohio who were against him and who let him know it. At Toledo the workers in the Willis-Overland plant heckled him, and shouted at him derisively, and cheered President Wilson. Reports of the attitude of the farmers and the small town people also were not favorable to Hughes, a situation even more startling to Republican leaders than the lack

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1 Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 24, 1916, 6. However, Walter F. Brown wrote to George Perkins on October 28 that some of the county chairmen were reporting the situation was getting better. Brown himself was not clear whether that was true, or whether "the tightening of the organization lines simply make it appear so". Robert Wooley Papers, box 325.
of enthusiasm in the industrial centers.¹

It was in California however, where the Hughes campaign, the Hughes management and Hughes himself failed spectacularly. In Ohio the Democrats won with votes to spare, but in California the vote was so close (less than 4,000 difference) that a mistake such as the Republicans made was costly. The closeness of the vote and the fact that the returns from California came in last, brought the California episode of the campaign into the focus of limelight.

The situation in California at campaign time was a complex one, but at the same time rather an obvious one, at least from the "Monday morning" advantage. California was a state with many Progressive voters. Whatever the other reasons for the many Progressives in the state, one important one was the control of the legislature and politics by the "Southern Pacific crowd". At the beginning of the 20th century evidences of graft were everywhere.² The rise of revolt against such evils coincided

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¹ Columbus Citizen, October 21, 1916, 1. The Citizen attributed this attitude to Wilson, and "He kept us out of war".

² During the 1907 session of the legislature 83 doorkeepers guarded three doors opening into one narrow corridor. The Assembly appointed stenographers who could neither read nor write. Some of the Senators appointed women of dubious reputation to serve as committee clerks and allowed them free access to the Senate Chamber. Robert C. Cleland, California In Our Time, 20.
with the national development of the split of the Republican Party and the birth of the Progressive Party. In protest against the extremes of the control of the conservatives, the liberals turned Progressive and in 1912 helped elect Wilson. In 1916, although nationally the Progressives were returning to the Republican fold, the movement to reunite in California was not so fast nor so pronounced as in other states and many erstwhile Republicans remained registered Progressives.

In 1914 the leader of these Progressives, Hiram Johnson, had been re-elected Governor, the first California governor to succeed himself since 1853.\(^1\) When Hughes arrived in the state, Johnson was in the middle of a campaign against a Republican opponent for the nomination for United States Senator. Johnson was an embittered man. The running mate to Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, the California Progressive leader had seen his hopes for the Presidency and then the Vice-Presidency in 1916 knocked to the ground. Back in 1914 Roosevelt himself had told Johnson that he would, if ever a chance arose, work for Johnson's nomination. After no popular enthusiasm for such an occurrence developed, the Californian set his eyes on the second position, the Vice-Presidency. But in a

\(^1\) George E. Mowry, *The California Progressives*, 216.
combined election of delegates to the National Convention, the Progressives would not vote for Johnson delegates, an indication they were not yet willing to see their party die. When Roosevelt himself came out for the Presidential nomination by the Republicans, Johnson's hopes for the second place were doomed. Subsequent events at the convention in Chicago mollified him not at all. Furthermore, his fight for the Senatorial nomination was opposed vigorously and with no quarter by the Old Guard and the conservative newspapers in California. The strength of the Regulars was fully mobilized against Johnson, and from that time on it was all-out political war between the two factions for the control of the state. It was this situation with its factional fights and bitter strife that Hughes walked into when he crossed the California line.

In fact, the trouble was brought to him before he reached California. Chester A. Rowell, a friend of Johnson, and one of the leaders of the Progressives in California, met Hughes in Portland, Oregon and on the train trip to San Francisco told the Republican candidate of the real danger of California going Democratic unless something was done to satisfy the Progressives who had been almost completely disregarded by the Old Guard.

In view of the contents in the exchange of telegrams
between Chairman Willcox and the principals in California, W. H. Crocker, Republican National Committeeman, Francis S. Keesling, State Chairman of the Republican organization, and Rowell, also a National Committeeman, and in view of what happened after Hughes entered California, the contention of Rowell that the Old Guard was trying to "freeze out" the Progressives had considerable truth. On July 8, Keesling, hitting an early cooperative note, wired Willcox requesting that Hughes visit California. "We assure you of a most cordial reception under the auspices of a reunited party."  

1 Apparently Willcox had heard that the situation could not be pictured as really rosy, for he sent Crocker and Rowell similar telegrams in which he stated that in several states there were contests over nomination of the senatorships that were causing bitterness and confusion, and expressed hope that Crocker and Rowell would confer upon the matter.  

2 Crocker within a few days asked Willcox to interpose to settle the dispute over the senatorial nomination,  

3 but Willcox refused to intervene in local matters.  

4 Then Rowell began to present his side, informing Willcox that "This is the only state

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1 Hughes Papers, General Correspondence, box 3.
2 July 13, ibid.
3 July 13, ibid.
4 July 18, ibid.
having two committeemen of opposite positions which makes the situation uniquely difficult here", and hinted that he failed to "get in" on the information and instructions from Willcox if Crocker received the wire.¹ Both Rowell and Crocker sent a telegram to Willcox telling him in their opinion it would be best for all concerned if Hughes spoke after the primaries took place, but if the schedule would be disturbed too much, before would do.²

Then came the interchange of wires about Johnson and the part he was to play in the welcome of Hughes to the state, the problem which upset the Republican applicant in California. Rowell thought that Johnson, since he was the Governor of the state, should be the obvious man to preside at Hughes' San Francisco speech. He had no objection if the other Senatorial candidate presided at the Los Angeles meeting.³ Willcox agreed, and wired Crocker: "I may say personally and not officially that there is some force in the Governor of a state supporting the presidential candidate having the privilege to preside at one of the meetings".⁴ Apparently the National

¹ July 19, ibid.
² Ibid.
³ Rowell to Willcox, July 28, ibid.
⁴ July 30, ibid.
Chairman did not inform Rowell of what he had said to Crocker, instead he wired him the same day that it was "extremely distasteful to suggest who shall preside at meetings in the various states". Then followed a sequence of telegrams to Willcox from Crocker and Rowell, disagreeing upon what had been agreed upon. Crocker claimed they had been in accord upon Crocker presiding at the Los Angeles meeting and Rowell in San Francisco, but Rowell maintained no such agreement had been reached. Instead, he said, the Republicans had left him out of their plans altogether, and added:

I regard myself in equal authority with Crocker, but apparently the whole matter has been placed in his [Crocker's] hands and he has used that authority for complete exclusion of Progressives and liberal Republicans. If you do not wish to interfere in what you mistakenly consider local matters can you not at least exercise authority as chairman to notify Crocker and me both officially that arrangements in our joint charge. [Sic.]

The Progressive leader was getting impatient with the Republican Chairman for permitting a rule of not interfering in local matters to blind him to the necessity for action, rule or no rule. Rowell ridiculed Crocker's statement that Californians would vote for Wilson if they found any act which they construed as surrender to the Progressives. Rowell cited cooperation and support in

1 Ibid.
2 August 6, Ibid.
of Illinois, and referred to Hughes message to the California Progressives asking their cooperation.\textsuperscript{1}

It was at this time, August 11, that Willcox wired Crocker suggesting that he and Rowell meet Hughes at Portland and ride to San Francisco with him.\textsuperscript{2} Crocker apparently considered himself in the saddle now and sent the Republican Campaign Manager this rather cryptic message: "Replying your telegram today—all arrangements for California meetings have been completed".\textsuperscript{3} Rowell, to whom Willcox had sent a copy of his suggestion, was "happy" to go, and met Hughes in Portland.

As the Hughes train crossed the Oregon-California border, there were Crocker, Keesling, Mr. de Young, editor of the Los Angeles Times, and "two or three others" to meet Hughes. Several conferences were held and all participated. According to Farnham, the train manager,

\textsuperscript{1} August 6, \textit{ibid.} Hughes early in the campaign had sent a message to the California Progressives, through Johnson, calling for strong and effective cooperation, and said that he warmly appreciated many assurances of support from Progressives: "We are not divided in our ideals, let us work together to attain them." July 8, 1916, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{2} Willcox did this only upon the suggestion of Charles W. Farnham, the Hughes train manager. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}
who has written an unpublished story on the "California Incident", there did not appear to be any lack of harmony, and it was agreed that Crocker was to preside at San Francisco. The next morning after the San Francisco meeting however, Rowell had a long talk with reporters, and though later denied the story, the newspapers reported that he had termed the meeting of the previous day a "frost" and saying his wife was to undergo an operation, left the group, not to return.

There occurred at the San Francisco Civic Auditorium the night of the Hughes speech an incident which further alienated the Progressives. As Keesling wrote later:

I shall never forget what happened. Just as Mr. Crocker finished his introduction of Governor Hughes, an individual arose in the gallery. I recognized him immediately as an employee of Crocker's bank. He shouted, 'Three cheers for California's favorite son'. Of course, with all his good qualities, Mr. Crocker was never California's favorite son, but Mr. Hughes graciously turned, addressing Mr. Crocker, said, 'I salute California's favorite son,...'! It was one of the most unfortunate circumstances of the campaign, and gave additional ammunition to the Johnson Progressives.

The slip-up was a blow to the Republican hopes of pulling the Progressive votes. Crocker, the inheritor of

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1 Farnham enclosed a rough draft of his story of Hughes trip to California to Hughes. January 19, 1916. This story is found in the Hughes Papers.

2 From "Hiram Johnson and the Hughes Campaign in California", a monograph by Francis W. Keesling, found in Hughes Papers, box 4.
the millions of a "Southern Pacific" fortune, was known to be no liberal and no friend of the Progressives, and it was unfortunate that Hughes termed him the "favorite son". Such an incident was almost bound to take place, and was no accident, in fact it was only a part of the total picture. The California regulars had planted themselves around Hughes so thickly and closely that such a faux pax was only a matter of time. From the very start of the Republican candidate's campaign in California the regulars had made all the arrangements and planned the complete itinerary so that Hughes, the Presidential candidate, would be steered clear of Johnson, the Governor of the state.¹ Hughes' policy of steering clear of involvements in local situations had been all to the advantage of the group in control of Republican organization. His assertion made that night that he had no concern in local squabbles, was accepted by many Progressives as a decision on his part to endorse what they termed the insulting attitude of the old time Republican opponents of Governor Johnson.²

¹ Farnham attempts to explain why this was done. "If there had been any confidence that Governor Johnson would have been fair to the Republican candidate for president and the audience would have not been packed with his followers and heelers who would have affronted him, he might have been given that recognition as governor of the state, despite the fact that he was a Progressive candidate for a Republican nomination."

Two other incidents marred the California tour for Hughes: the Commercial Club trouble and the failure to meet Johnson when in the same hotel with him. The next day after the San Francisco speech Hughes was scheduled to attend a luncheon at the local Commercial Club, which was having its labor troubles, and had an "open shop" sign over its doors. Before the luncheon the waiters had walked out, and since the request for 65 replacements was refused by the union leaders, Hughes and his fellow diners were served by non-union men. San Francisco was not Mr. Hughes' lucky city, for it was known to be a labor town and many laborers were bound to blame him for what occurred.¹

But what happened to Hughes a short time later might be described as the nadir of Hughes' California experiences. While Mr. Hughes was speaking in the northern and central part of the state, Governor Johnson was campaigning for himself in Southern California. On what had been scheduled as a day of rest for the Republican candidate, Hughes was invited to take a Sunday trip arranged by a friend of Chairman Willcox. On the

¹ San Francisco had seen great and continuous strife between business and labor during several years preceding Hughes visit. The bombings of a Chamber of Commerce sponsored preparedness parade for which Tom Mooney, Warren K. Billings and others were imprisoned had occurred only a month before the Commercial Club incident.
unscheduled jaunt, which perhaps was not much of a holi-
day for Mr. Hughes, his group stopped at the Virginia
Hotel at Long Beach. As it so happened, Governor Johnson
stopped at the same hotel. It never has been definitely
proved whose fault it was, but the two candidates failed
to meet. As Johnson came in the lobby of the hotel, an
Old Guard enemy noticed the Governor and remarked, loudly,
so that he could hear: "Wouldn't it be just like the
Progressives to horn in on our party?" Johnson, annoyed,
going to his room and remained there until after Hughes
left. It was not until that night when Hughes was back
in Los Angeles that he learned of the near meeting with
the powerful Progressive. Then he had Farnham to call
Johnson to ask him if the Governor could come to Los
Angeles for a conference. Johnson could not but said that
Farnham could come down if he wished, whereupon Farnham
and Keesling motored to Long Beach that night. At the
late meeting the Governor was cordial to Farnham but let
Keesling know what he thought of him, in no uncertain
terms. The reason that he had not contacted Hughes while
he was in the hotel, Johnson explained, was that he was

1 Keesling, op. cit.

2 Frederick Davenport reported that when the Justice
found that Johnson had been in the hotel, the Republican
candidate had said to Davenport: "If I had known that
Johnson was in that hotel, I would have seen him if I had
been obliged to kick the door down". Davenport, loc. cit.
fearful of being considered breaking into Hughes' reception and people would say that he was trying to hang on the coat tails of the Republican candidate.

Farnham, acting for Hughes, then attempted to act directly to do something to obtain public support from Johnson while Hughes was in California. Johnson replied that night that it was impossible to preside at Sacramento where Hughes was to make a speech. He did consent, according to Farnham, to send to Hughes a telegram of greeting; but the next morning Farnham received the wire addressed to him rather than to the Republican candidate. In the message Johnson declared that he wished and had wished to send greetings to Hughes, but because of the men surrounding the Republican candidate and in charge of his tour, he had found it impossible. So Hughes and the Republicans lost their last chance to win what later perhaps became the deciding votes, and Hughes left California without once seeing the man who was governor of that doubtful state and the leader within the state of a still powerful insurgent party which Hughes had initially set out to bring back into the fold.

On the 29th of August Johnson won the Republican nomination from his strong opponent and in November was chosen Senator by a lopsided vote over his Democratic opponent, demonstrating the failure to make friends of
Johnson, whatever the tactical justifications, was a blunder of serious consequence. Much has been written about Johnson's failure to campaign for Hughes after Johnson's selection in the primaries, and such neglect caused the loss of California by Hughes, but the fact is that the Governor did campaign, perhaps not overenthusiastically, for the Republican Presidential candidate, certainly in the last days of the campaign.\(^1\) Johnson, because of his leadership of a party not yet dead, possessed the political cards. By their disregard of such facts, the leaders of the Republican organization in California, in fighting to maintain their political position and power, dealt Hughes, and themselves also, a blow from which they were unable to recover.

The mistake of underestimating the strength of Johnson and his Progressives was made also by Willoox, the Republican campaign committee and by Hughes. Influenced by the loss of the Johnson men in the selection of

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\(^1\) The *San Francisco Chronicle*, in a post-election comment said: "Hughes, although Johnson campaigned for him, lost." November 10, 1916, 1. In a statement in manuscript form, issued by the Republican State Executive Committee (successor to the Crocker and Keesling controlled Regular Republican one) entitled: "Was Hughes Betrayed in California", there are facsimiles of headlines of various California newspapers in which Johnson is quoted praising Hughes. Most of the dates are within the week just prior to the November 7 election. The newspapers mentioned were *San Jose Mercury, San Francisco Chronicle, Oakland Tribune, Alameda Times*. Hughes Papers, In-Period 1910-1921, box 4.
delegates to the National Republican Convention, and by
the propaganda of the Regulars in California, as well as
by their campaign rule to stay out of local politics,
Willcox and Hughes permitted the Regulars to take over the
entire direction of Hughes in California.¹

By taking the easiest road in California, Hughes helped
defeat himself. In this western state he definitely
demonstrated his lack of political acuteness which had
dogged him less dramatically throughout the 1916 Cam­
paign. But perhaps even this weakness in method and
finesse could have been overcome had the Republican candi­
date gone into California with less reputation for cold­
ness and dignity and more of real progressiveness evident
in his character and philosophy.

Roosevelt in the Campaign

Most Republicans were happy when Roosevelt announced
his refusal of the nomination of the Progressives and the
endorsement of the Republican candidate, Charles E. Hughes.
On June 27 the erstwhile leader of the Progressives had
written a public letter to those Progressives, thanking
them for their efforts, pointing out that much had been

¹ Of course, it was a difficult thing to try to buck
the state organization. Donald Richberg had a conference
with Willcox and talked to him about the knifing of the
Progressives in California. "What can I do? What can I
do?" was Willcox's futile cry.
accomplished in awakening the public to a better understanding of the problems of social and industrial welfare. However, he continued, a Progressive national organization "no longer offers the means to make our convictions effective. We must face the situation and do our best for the nation as a whole. Hughes meets the conditions set forth by the Progressive Committee, issued last January, and my own conditions." 1 The Republicans had written their platform and nominated their ticket, with an eye to the Progressives and Roosevelt. They did not nominate the man the Progressives and Roosevelt desired, but as William Allen White commented, "the Republicans did nominate a man good enough to make it wicked and unpatriotic for the Progressives to oppose him, when opposing him means the sure election of a Democratic Administration." 2

The Republican candidate himself was very pleased that Roosevelt had rejected the Progressive nomination and would support Hughes against Wilson. He sent an invitation to Roosevelt to dine with him, and on June 28 they talked for three hours, and appeared to be in complete accord, Roosevelt promising to campaign for the Republican


2 Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, June 20, 1916, 2.
candidate. Hughes had won his first big post-convention victory in his efforts to obtain the support of a reunited party.

One battle was not the war, however. Roosevelt could actually cast only one vote. Would the Progressives follow him back into the fold? Hughes was confident that they would. The refusal of the New York Progressive State Committee to endorse him and the call for another Progressive Convention by Parker, the Vice-Presidential nominee of the Progressives, caused no great disturbance in the Hughes camp. Hughes was reported as being convinced that he would receive the whole hearted support of the rank and file Progressives.2

There were many evidences however, that many Progressives were very greatly displeased with Roosevelt's actions in returning to the Republican Party. Roosevelt himself received many letters protesting his actions.3 Bainbridge Colby, who was a faithful follower of Roosevelt until the Colonel decided to leave the Progressive ship high and dry, received many letters and telegrams

2 Ibid., June 17, 1916, 6.
3 On June 19 Roosevelt wrote to Lawrence F. Abbott, one of his publishers, commenting that "the Progressives who were angry with me were angry with me because they had not believed the words I had been saying over and over again". Here he probably referred to the stand first announced in his "heroic mood" message from Trinidad. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, box 395.
from Progressives indicating that they would work for the election of President Wilson.\footnote{New York Times, July 6, 1916, 8.} Colby had indicated at the meeting of the Progressive National Committee in Chicago that he would not support Roosevelt or Hughes.

Roosevelt carried out his agreement with Hughes to make some campaign speeches. Whether they helped or hurt Hughes has been debated; the opinion expressed at the time depended a great deal upon who was talking. When he heard that Roosevelt was to help out in the campaign, William Howard Taft, a former President thanks largely to the help of Roosevelt, could not decide whether "Teddy's" campaigning would benefit or injure Hughes. Hughes he knew was anxious to have Roosevelt's help. But a candidate, Taft observed wisely, "is more or less like a woman about to bear a child. He loses somewhat his sense of proportion. He may find Roosevelt something of a danger in the campaign if he becomes vociferous."\footnote{Pringle, Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 893.} Warren G. Harding, the future President, was definitely pleased, writing to Roosevelt that such a move by Roosevelt would "re-enlist the devotion of thousands of Republicans". Probably he thought also that it would bring thousands of ex-Republicans back into the voting booth of the
Grand Old Party.  

The former Progressive leader did become rather vociferous in his speeches. His hate for Wilson was apparent in his bitter and vitriolic speeches in which he condemned the President. In his first address at Lewiston, Maine, Roosevelt attacked Wilson's Mexican policy, saying that the President had "kissed the hand that slapped his face".  

He thought Wilson a coward, and in a later speech at Cooper Union, New York, he compared Wilson with Buchanan and Pierce, and declared that Wilson in the White House was one of the great misfortunes of history.  

At Denver Roosevelt called National Guard mobilization a most atrocious system. He hit hard at Wilson and his lack of preparedness: we owe our military weakness primarily, he stated, to the "evil leadership given our people in high places. Mr. Wilson has not only been too proud to fight, but has been too proud to

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2 "Duty First", speech of Roosevelt at Lewiston, Maine, August 31, 1916, published in pamphlet form by the National Hughes Alliance, n.d.

3 A year before the campaign Roosevelt wrote to his son, Kermit: "I agree with all you say about the German brutality and ruthlessness. But after all a brute is not any worse than a coward. Wilson is at heart an abject coward; or else he has a heart so cold and selfish that he is entirely willing to sacrifice the honor and the evident interest of the country to his own political advancement.... The United States would stand like a unit if we had in the Presidency a man of the stamp of Andrew Jackson". August 28, 1915. Theodore Roosevelt Papers, box 394.

prepare. At Battle Creek, Michigan, he had maintained the same theme: Wilson was weak and unfit to lead our nation in times like these. Roosevelt did not stop there. He was willing to say what he thought, and his thinking was along the lines of a strong America, America first, and 100% Americanism. While Hughes was careful, at least until the last few days of the campaign, to say little if anything about German-Americans, Roosevelt led off at Lewiston with a heavy attack on the "disloyal Americans", and never let up until the election was all over.

Although Roosevelt's tough speeches may have served their purpose, in part at least, of awakening Americans, particularly Charles E. Hughes, to the threat of an alien group among us, those in charge of schedules for Republican speeches made sure that Roosevelt's contributions "to the cause" would not be made in the German-American centers of population. While Roosevelt was needed to add more punch to the campaign, and even though after the Lewiston speech he was in demand, his speeches were scheduled and motion pictures of "T R" in consultation with Willcox, Perkins and others were made, there was

1 Rocky Mountain News, October 25, 1916, 1.
2 San Francisco Chronicle, October 1, 1916, 31.
great fear that the former President would do more harm than good in cities like St. Louis where there were a great number of German-Americans. The fear was based on firm ground, if the report of the *Omaha World-Herald* is correct, for the Republican National Committee received frantic appeals from the managers in such German-American areas to keep Roosevelt out of their territory.¹

Heeding the warnings, the Republican campaign leaders kept Roosevelt out of the Mid-Western German centers, scheduling him to speak in Wilkes-barre, Louisville, Phoenix, Albuquerque, Denver, Chicago and Brooklyn in the latter stages of the campaign, and cancelling engagements in St. Louis and Kansas City.² The Albuquerque speech, along with talks to our troops along the Mexican border, were called off also, the reason here probably connected with Roosevelt's pro-war sentiments.

It was in relation to his criticism of our lack of a stand when Belgium was overrun by Germany that Roosevelt received much criticism in return. When the small neutral was invaded in 1914, Roosevelt took no stand for intervention even though he wrote of the action in one of his articles in the *Outlook*. In fact, he wrote a sentence

¹ October 12, 1916, 3.

² *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, October 17, 1916, 1.
which later was to embarrass him: "We have not the slightest responsibility for what has befallen her."¹ Later after aligning himself with the Allied cause, he began a severe criticism of the President, for failure to take steps against Germany when Belgium was violated.

During the campaign Roosevelt and the Republican lambasted Wilson on this issue but not once in the year following Germany's action, if George Creel's statement is correct, did a Republican Congressman or other Republican leader make demands upon Washington for official protest.²

After the Lusitania was torpedoed on May 7, 1915, Roosevelt was ready to believe anything of the German nation. "The American who defends the action taken against Belgium, or who fails to condemn it," he wrote, "is unworthy to live in a free country, or to associate with men of lofty soul and generous temper."³ Definitely, to many people, his own neutrality had given way to an unreasonable stand.⁴ No one who disagreed with him was

¹ Outlook, V. 108 (September 23, 1914), 169-178.
² Creel, Wilson and the Issues, 37.
³ Roosevelt, "International Duty and Hyphenated Americans", Metropolitan, V. 42 (October 1914), 2-8.
⁴ Probably one of the greatest factors in his rather sudden hatred of the German was his access to a copy of "German War Plans to Invade the United States", which he disclosed to a German-American leader. Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate, 256. Later the Emperor and General Ludendorf said the papers were forged.
spared the Roosevelt reprobation. The pacifists and the peace-at-any price men were doing more harm to the country, he wrote, than all the crooked in business and politics combined.

From observation of the emphasis placed upon the Roosevelt speeches in the West, there is some evidence, beyond the antagonism of the German-Americans, that the Republican campaign managers were correct in keeping Roosevelt in the East for the majority of his speeches. For a man who won the West in 1912, Roosevelt was given little notice in the editorial columns of the newspapers of that section of the country. Some of the papers failed to report on many of his speeches. Others, although devoting front page space to "T.R.'s" major addresses failed to mention several of his other speeches. Studied indifference was noted in the Omaha Bee, the Nevada State Journal, and other newspapers of the West; wherein no mention of Roosevelt's campaign efforts was made. One exception, and perhaps indicative of the realization among the Progressives of a feeling of antagonism toward the man who had "betrayed them" was a remark in the editorial columns of the Grand Forks (N.D.) Herald that "it makes little difference whether Roosevelt deserted the

Progressives or vice versa; Hughes is the nominee of the Republican Party." ¹

Certainly one would have expected more than a token amount, if that much, of comment in the newspapers of a section in which the Populist and Progressive movement had been born and "reared", about a man who was the leader of one of those movements and about whom those Progressives had raved and had almost worshipped only a short time before.

The Maine Elections and Other Encouragement to the Republicans

The campaign was not entirely full of disappointments to the Republicans. On September 11, the state elections in Maine were carried by the Republicans. Realizing the importance in making an impressive showing in this one state which held its state elections earlier than the National elections, both parties sent in its big campaigners. The Democrats' big guns included Secretary of War Baker, Secretary of Labor Wilson, Secretary of Commerce Redfield, Attorney-General Gregory, Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, Carl S. Vrooman, Senator Hamilton Lewis and others. While President Wilson had not begun his campaign and did not participate actively in the Maine

¹ July 1, 1916, 1.
fight, both the Republican candidate and Roosevelt made speeches. Also there were others who were pounding the circuit: Vice-Presidential candidate Fairbanks, Senators Harding of Ohio, Weeks and Lodge of Massachusetts, Borah of Idaho, Wadsworth of New York, Norris of Nebraska and others.¹

The victory by the Republicans on September 11 boosted morale in all ranks of the party. Hughes himself wrote to Taft that the victory was most encouraging and to him indicated a response to his attack on the eight hour law.² Frederick H. Parkhurst, writing to Hughes about the same time, agreed in part, that is, that the victory was due to Hughes' speeches in Maine, pointing out that in the nine cities in which the Republican candidate spoke, the Republican gains over the 1914 returns were greatest.³

Democrats did not agree that the eight hour issue was the decisive one in Maine. Norman Hapgood, among others, thought that the Mexican issue had been the important one; he had reported so to McCormick during the


³ September 21, 1916. The Democratic vote actually was reduced in the nine cities. *Ibid.*
political firing in August. President Wilson differed, agreeing with McCormick that the liquor issue was the prime cause of their defeat.

Whatever the real reasons for the Republican victory in Maine, the Republicans, for a change, were happy. The old slogan, "As Maine goes in September, so goes the nation in November" was quoted at every opportunity. Hughes received new vigor from the victory and declared it proved a reunited Republican Party. Charles B. Warren, Republican National Committeeman from Michigan, agreed, concluding that the election result in the extreme Northeastern state showed that the Progressive voters "had returned in a body to the Republican Party".

Many Democrats were afraid that the Republicans could be correct. Nevertheless, several leaders called attention to returns of previous elections and pointed out that in 1916 the Democrats had polled more than usual in Maine. The New York Times added a cheerful

1 August 26, 1916. Robert Woolley Papers, box 12.

2 McCormick wrote to Wilson in September that: "The more data I get the more convinced I am that the liquor question was the prime cause of our defeat." Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 524, file 3211.


note in substantiation, pointing out that Maine was not an infallible guide, having been out of step with the majority of the nation in 1876, 1880, 1884 and 1908. Nevertheless, the returns had a psychological effect which some of the Democrats found hard to shake off, and which gave impetus to the Hughes efforts in the East.

Not all the good news for the Republicans arose out of the Maine northwoods, nor did the Democrats obtain all of the prominent Progressives who had not returned to the Republican fold by the time the campaign was begun. One of the prizes was Robin Roberts, the Chairman of the Progressive Convention. The Democrats had itched to obtain the support of this popular and liberal Progressive leader. It was rumored that Robin was promised the nomination for Governor of Illinois if he would support the Democratic ticket. Robins, however, was won over to the Republican side. As a result, the Republicans expected not only to swing many Progressive votes over to them, but many Illinois labor votes as well, for Robins possessed considerable influence with the workers in his state.

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., August 6, 1916, 1.
CHAPTER VIII

THE UNDERLYING FACTORS

In any political campaign there are certain underlying factors influencing the outcome of the election. Often these circumstances are the attitude of certain minorities or special groups, as part of the particular economic or social situation existing during the pre-election period. In 1916 there were several factors of sufficient importance to warrant their consideration here. Among them were the religious groups, Negroes, prosperity, farmers, and labor. ¹

Religion

Since the major candidates in 1916 had similar religious backgrounds—both Protestants—and each the son of a minister, the religious factors in the Campaign of 1916 certainly were not of the tremendous importance as in 1928 or 1840. There were a few strains, however. Wilson and his secretary received several letters in 1915 written by Catholics who were critical of the President's refusal to stay out of Mexico. It was claimed that 16,000,000 Catholics in Mexico were badly mistreated by Carranza and

¹ The subjects of Progressives and social legislation have been covered in previous chapters sufficiently so as perhaps not to require additional discussion here.
and his group. Secretary Tumulty, himself a Catholic, attempted to answer these critics by pointing out, among other things, that reports of atrocities had been greatly exaggerated, that other countries, some with Catholic administration, also had recognized Carranza.

The Catholic question may have entered into the decision on the passage of the Philippine (Independence) Bill. Such a possibility was emphasized by ex-President Taft when, in an advisory letter to Hughes, he suggested that since Wilson in his Congressional Government had supported the Republican's policy of holding on to the Philippines until the great body of the people had been educated in the English language and free institutions, but now supported the Clark Amendment which would give absolute independence to the Philippines in four years, political capital could be made of the switch by Wilson. This opportunity was enhanced by the fact that the Clark

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1 The Morning Star, official organ of the New Orleans diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, sharply attacked the President. "The Religious Issue Contrives to Raise Its Head in American Politics," Current Opinion, V. 60 (January, 1916). The more radical Catholic organs had been assailing Tumulty prior to this time.

2 Tumulty wrote a pamphlet answering the attacks on the Administration. It was regarded as satisfactory by some, as unsatisfactory by others. See John D. Crimmons to Tumulty, December 1, 1915, and J. Mullany to Tumulty, December 2, 1915, and other letters. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 144, file 95.
Amendment was defeated in the House through a defection of 30 Democrats, 28 of whom were Roman Catholics.

Offsetting at least part of the dissatisfaction of some Catholics with the Administration policies in regard to Mexico and the Philippines was the number of Catholics found in the Federal Government. According to an article in the Christian Standard, two of the justices of the Supreme Court, the Treasurer of the United States, several Representatives and Senators, as well as most of the Ambassadors, department chiefs and those who filled "practically all" of the important Federal positions in large cities were Catholics.¹

The struggle in the Senate over the confirmation of Louis Brandeis' appointment to the Supreme Court had its religious as well as labor and political overtones. Brandeis was the first Jew nominated to the highest court in the United States. While possibly most of the opposition to his appointment was due to his pronounced liberal record, the opposition of the Republicans probably cost their party the loss of many of the Jewish votes.

Negroes

Judging from comments in leading journals of the Negroes in the United States, that minority group in 1916

¹ Newspaper clipping, unidentified, sent to Burleson by Thomas J. Pence, November 9, 1916. Albert S. Burleson Papers, V. 16, p. 2426-A.
was on the fence with no place to jump. Very little was offered the black man by either candidate. In 1912 Wilson had promised the American Negroes "not more grudging justice, but justice executed with liberality and cordial good feeling".¹ The President, as the Crisis warned, was satisfactory in getting liberal legislation passed, but he was "still the representative of the southern Negro-hating oligarchy and acknowledged its leadership."² Some of the colored were distressed by segregation in the Federal offices in Washington. Early in his Administration Mr. Wilson had answered this charge of discrimination in the executive offices by pointing out that segregation was caused by friction between colored and white workers and was not done to injure or humiliate the colored clerk, but to avoid friction.³ Wilson had placed certain bureaus and sections of the service in charge of Negroes, and he thought that the more equalized segregation would be better for all concerned. But many failed to agree with the President. There are many messages in his

¹ "The Presidential Campaign", Crisis, V. 12 (October, 1916), 268.
² Ibid., V. 13 (November, 1916), 12.
³ Wilson to Oswald G. Villard, July 23, 1913. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 193, file 152a. See also "Mr. Trotter and Mr. Wilson", Crisis, V. 9 (July, 1914), 119-120.
files, from both white and colored, including one letter from the powerful National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,\(^1\) questioning his action.

One Negro paper went so far as to declare that to the colored people the Democratic nominee was the most cordially disliked and distrusted President in the history of the United States.\(^2\) He had promised Bishop Alexander Walters of Boston that he would treat the colored justly, the \textit{Age} declared, but the segregation and the wholesale dismissal of the colored from office was too well known. Other organizations and newspapers of the colored brought pressure to bear upon the President to appoint more of the Negro race to certain positions in Washington.\(^3\)

Not all of the leaders of Negro groups were against Wilson. Bishop Walters himself, president of the National Colored Democratic League, appreciated, he said, the efforts of the President to appoint Negroes to certain positions. In an open letter to the President he praised

\(^{1}\) Dr. W. E. B. DuBois, Director of Publications and Research, October 6, 1915. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 191, file 152.

\(^{2}\) The New York \textit{Age}, (From undated clipping, but attached to letter dated July 16, 1916, found in \textit{ibid.}).

\(^{3}\) Some of these organizations: National Independent Political League (Boston), the NCAAP, the Afro-American Council of San Francisco, and the National Colored Democratic League (Washington, D. C.).
Wilson for favors granted him and for the promotions of colored in various departments. Other organizations, although not fully satisfied with the President's efforts to help the colored, favored him over Hughes in the campaign.¹

Many Negroes felt that if they did not support Wilson they had nowhere to go, for Hughes had no record favorable to the colored, and was making little effort during the Campaign to win them over. The editor of the Crisis expressed the sentiment of many of his minority group: "Mr. Hughes is a northern man of sterling honesty, but he knows nothing about Negroes and he has neither time nor inclination to learn."² A colored Kansas editor claimed that as Governor of New York Hughes had turned out all colored office-holders. On the other hand, the Kansan maintained, President Wilson not only had a liberal record generally, but a record of colored appointments.³

¹ R. L. Perry, president of the Hannibal Club and Forum of Brooklyn, wrote to Wilson for an expression from him which could be circulated through the 250 colored journals in the country. June 29, 1916, Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 191, file 152.

² "The Presidential Campaign", loc. cit.

³ The article, written by P. C. Thomas of Topeka, was used as a Democratic campaign pamphlet. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 191, file 152. The Emancipator, published by the National Colored Democratic League, praised Wilson highly.
It is doubtful, even if some Negroes considered Wilson a real friend of the black citizen, that the President garnered many votes from the northern Negro. His efforts were not sufficiently outstanding to counteract his segregation order and the known leaning of the Negro to the party which had "freed them from bondage" only six decades ago.

The Democrats and the Farmers

The majority of the voters in the West in 1916 were farmers. How they were affected, what influenced them, how they voted was important to the outcome of the election of 1916. As people of the frontier they, as most of the Westerners of that time, were enveloped in an atmosphere of independence, and a feeling of antipathy toward control. The progressive forces historically had in the main emanated from the West. Very possibly then, the farmers of that section were appreciative of the efforts of the Democratic Administration and President Wilson in passing legislation limiting the powers of the men of finance and the direct efforts to aid and assist the farmer.

Although the Wilson Administration did not go to the extremes in attempting to aid the farmer, the Democrats could and did claim credit for legislation of consequence in that field. In the Democratic Campaign Text
Book¹ and in other campaign materials, the farmer was shown what the Democrats, the Jeffersonians, had done for the agrarians of 1916. Some of the more important legislation included the Cooperative Agricultural Extension Act, Cotton Futures Act, Grain Standards Act, Warehouse Act, Federal Aid Road Act, Federal Reserve Act, and the Federal Farm Loan Act. The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 had given a boost to farm cooperatives.

Of the several acts concerning the farmers, two were passed during the campaign months of the Summer of 1916. The Federal Farm Loan, or Rural Credits Act, established banking machinery for the rural districts, and enabled farmers to obtain loans at a smaller cost.² This was the first federal act of its kind. Reaction to the banking legislation was mixed, but on the whole was favorable. Farmers, and farm organizations had been asking President Wilson for such legislation since 1914 or earlier.³ When

¹ See pages 311-322.

² See United States Statutes At Large, V. 39, part 1, 360-385.

³ See Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 205, file 183. In early 1916 the Georgia Farmers' Union criticized the alleged indifference of the Administration in 1914 at a time when the farmers were forced to sell cotton at six cents per pound. At the same time the organization called for redemption in good faith of the Baltimore pledge of 1912 in favor of rural credits, increase of the income tax, and other measures. Atlanta Constitution, January 23, 1916, 1.
finally it was passed on July 17, 1916, the farm organiza-
tions gave support to it, although with some qualifications. The Farmers' National Congress supported the loan act with energy.¹ At the same time the Farming Business, of Chicago, described the act as not perfect, but as helpful to the farmer.²

Approval of the Farm Loan Act by the daily newspapers of the West followed the same pattern: general approval with some qualifications. All, or practically all, of the papers with Democratic affiliations approved the legislation, while a few Republican newspapers opposed it, some either omitted any reference to the act, or pointed out its handicaps or weaknesses of much "red tape" and lack of aid to those who really needed the loans—the tenant farmers.³ The Seattle Times voiced an independent view, explained the act, and printed both sides of the issue. After the election however, the Times gave rural credits a share in the credit for the Wilson victory in the West.⁴

¹ Wilson wrote to H. E. Stockbridge, the president of the organization, October 23, 1916: "I am proud...to be so supported and so understood by the great organization which you represent...". Ibid., Series VII, box 18, letterbook 33, p. 232.

² June 24, 1916, p. 430. Ibid., box 205, file 183.

³ The Nebraska State Journal, as perhaps other papers, pointed this out. July 18, 1916. ⁴.

⁴ November 10, 1916, 6. On November 1 the Better Farming Club of Chicago gave an important boost to the Democrats.
A study of the election returns shows that the rural or farm areas voted for Wilson in at least as great a proportion as did other economic groups. In the three Pacific Coast States¹ 62% of the 132 counties voted Democratic. Taking the five least populous counties in each of the three states, the Democrats were winners in only 53%.² But extending the number to include 28 of the least populous counties results in a Democratic victory in 21 counties, or 75%. Out of the 15 least populous counties in California 13 went Democratic.

The Mountain States,³ rural areas for the most part, went overwhelmingly Democratic, with a majority in 94% of the total number of counties voting for Wilson. The least populous counties almost kept pace, with 83% voting Democratic.

In the states of the West North Central section⁴ a

¹ California, Oregon and Washington. Only Oregon went Republican.

² A study of the population and the crop production as recorded in the Commercial Atlas for the period of 1916 indicates that the five smallest (population) counties in each state were almost always farm counties. In some states it was deemed necessary to use more than five counties as a basis for comparison of Democratic and Republican victories in farm areas.


⁴ Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas.
great farming region, the smallest counties kept pace with the total result by county. Of the 611 counties in this section, 55% voted for the President, while of the five smallest counties in each state, 60% went Democratic. In the farming and industrial states of the East North Central region\(^1\) 44% of the smallest counties went Democratic, compared to 36% of the total number of counties.

In the Northeastern quarter of the country, particularly in the Middle Atlantic States,\(^2\) the small counties, contrary to popular belief, voted in larger proportion for Wilson than did the counties of that section generally. The Democratic county strength in the New England States\(^3\) and the strength of the Democrats in the smallest counties were practically the same—23%.

Of the sections of the country considered here, the Democrats carried only 44% of all counties, while over half (54%) of the smallest voted for the President. Or putting it the other way, over half of the total counties of the sections considered went Republican (voted for Hughes) while over half of the smallest counties went Democratic (voted for Wilson).\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin.

\(^2\) New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

\(^3\) Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut.

\(^4\) At the same time over half of the largest counties were carried by Wilson. The great Republican strength lay in counties of average size.
Another important group in the election of 1916 was labor. Just how important a factor it was in the outcome of the election is difficult to determine. There are certain facts, however. The leaders of organized labor were for Wilson. As mentioned in the discussion of the eight hour day issue, Samuel Gompers, the President of the American Federation of Labor, was a tireless worker for the President. Gompers liked and respected Wilson, and considered him a President who always worked for "the cause of labor, justice, freedom, American patriotism and humanity".  

The Democratic Party, Gompers was quoted as saying during the campaign, had in its legislative achievements "placed the highest valuation upon human life and human attributes that has ever been declared and enacted by any political party in power".

Another action of President Wilson which was pleasing to labor was the appointment of William B. Wilson as Secretary of Labor. Wilson at the time of appointment was a Congressman and Chairman of the House Committee on Labor, and formerly a secretary-treasurer of the Mine Workers of America. The appointment of a former labor

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1 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, 542.
leader pleased Gompers greatly, so much so that when he heard that Secretary Wilson was being pushed by Democrats of Pennsylvania for candidate for the Senate, he wrote to President Wilson urging him to keep in the Cabinet this "direct representative of labor." The President's appointment of the first Secretary of Labor from the ranks of the workers made a hit with Gompers and labor.

To the advantage of the Administration too was the legislation passed concerning labor. In addition to the Adamson Act of 1916, the record of the sessions of Congress during the Wilson Administration was one favorable to workers. The Child Labor Law was received favorably by a majority of the people, particularly the editors of the West. Credit for the act was divided, however. Some of the Republican papers west of the Mississippi pointed out that Progressives had introduced the bill, that Republicans voted for it, and many Democratic (Southern) Congressmen opposed it. Nevertheless, the President

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2 The Labor Record of Youngstown, Ohio, reported in 1915 that the officers of the A.F. of L. had compiled a record of remedial legislation passed by the Congress just adjourned. 26 acts were listed as favoring, or of interest to, labor; 12 others failed of enactment. This record was termed one of "remarkable legislative advances". April 19, 1915, 1.

3 The vote in the Senate was 52-12. Of the 12 voting against the bill 10 were from the South while the other two were the Pennsylvania Senators. See the Congressional Record, V. 53, part 12 (64th Congress, 1st session), 1916, p. 12313.
received credit for pushing the legislation through Congress.¹

Whether the Republicans won or lost votes on the record of their candidate may be open to debate. On one issue, however, Mr. Hughes and the Republicans probably lost votes among the working people. During the campaign Hughes often heard this question from hecklers in the crowd, "What about your vote in the Danbury Hatters Case?" The Danbury decision, first rendered by the Supreme Court in 1908, awoke the resentment of labor because of its effect of bringing secondary boycotts under the ban of the Sherman Act and subjecting individual members to damage suits through the revival of the hated power of injunction. Justice Hughes in 1914 had voted to sustain the early

¹ Secretary of the Navy Daniels wrote that Senator Gallinger was taking advantage of the situation in Congress by stating in a speech in the Senate that the minority (Republicans) favored Child Labor (also Workmen's Compensation and the immigration bill), but that they were powerless to force the legislation through before the end of the session. Daniels advised the President, in view of the closeness of the vote in many states, that it would be a mistake if the Senate did not pass the Child Labor bill and Workmen's Compensation before the end of the session in the Summer of 1916. He pointed out that the Democrats might lose the vote of the Progressives if the legislation was not pushed through. Daniels to Wilson, July 17, 1916. Correspondence with Woodrow Wilson, Josephus Daniels Papers.

Wilson replied that he would do something about the situation and would assist the Senators to "get out of the hole the old fox put them in." July 18, 1916. Ibid.
decision, and thus subjected himself to the ire of labor.¹

Not all of Mr. Hughes' acts were considered to be anti-labor. As Governor of New York he had reorganized the state labor department, improved the system of factory inspection, and had pushed through the legislature a workmen's compensation act. During the campaign the Republicans published this record in a one page advertisement in many newspapers. The Kansas City Star, friendly to Hughes, quoted in an editorial the editor of the Legislative Labor News in 1910 when he was favorable to the Republican candidate. A short time later the Democrats called attention to the fact that the editor now favored Wilson and had favored him since his renomination.²

For the leaders of organized labor to support a candidate is one thing, for the laborers to cast their

¹ Samuel Gompers wrote to an Ohio who had requested from him the Hughes' labor record, that "Mr. Hughes has taken an unequivocable position. He endorses the abuse of the writ of injunction against which wage earners have vigorously protested, and which they have tried to correct by remedial legislation in order that they might enjoy the rights and opportunities of free citizens." Gompers to Thomas H. Nichols, July 31, 1916. Wilson Papers, Series VI, box 594, file 3200. Also see Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America, 197-198.

votes for that candidate may be something else. Would the workers vote for Wilson? The Democratic National Committee thought so. In New York Hugh Frayne, the head of the A. F. of L. office there, declared that it would be difficult to estimate the vote in the state but that 80% of the 600,000 unionists in New York were voters, and most of them should vote Democratic. However, the votes for Socialists and other minor parties should be taken into consideration.\(^1\) In Ohio it was recognized even by the Republicans that the workers in that industrial state were for Wilson. The four railroad brotherhoods had given their official endorsement to the President.\(^2\) Republicans were most apprehensive of results in the 13 most populous and industrial counties. Railwaymen and other workers were out working for Wilson. Even their friends and the organizations to which they belonged were active in his behalf.\(^3\) Most of the metropolitan newspapers, even some usually Republican, were working enthusiastically for the re-election of the President. Certainly in Ohio the labor leaders were not alone in their active support of the President.

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\(^1\) *New York Times*, September 2, 1916, 2.


\(^3\) *New York Times*, October 20, 1916, 3.
Farther west the situation so far as labor support was concerned was more doubtful. In many states there were few laborers as such. Most of the potential voters were farmers. It was claimed by a Democratic paper in Nebraska that that Mid-Western state would go Democratic not only because the farmers were for Wilson, but because the Union Pacific Railroad was a big labor factor in the state. The chairman of the Board of the Union Pacific was Judge Robert S. Lovett, who had endorsed Wilson.\(^1\) In Washington the Eight Hour Law was expected to bring many votes for the Administration because crops would have been lost if a prolonged strike had occurred.

California, with Ohio, was the other big strategic state with many labor votes. Too many other factors were involved to predict safely the labor districts would go one way or another. Traditionally the southern part of California, including San Diego and Los Angeles, voted Republican. Would the working men vote Democratic in such numbers to outweigh tradition and the opponents? San Francisco, more inclined to go Democratic, and a "labor" town, was expected to vote for Wilson, but would it be enough to counterbalance the Republican advantages in the South? A labor paper reported that Mayor James Rolph, Jr., mayor of San Francisco and a non-self-made

\(^1\) *Omaha World-Herald*, October 24, 1916, 2.
man, said that there was a campaign to defeat labor and labor unions, but that labor unions and collective bar-
gaining "have come to stay, because they are necessary to modern civilization."\(^1\)

The election results are not conclusive evidence that overall the working class voted for Wilson. However, there were states in which the labor vote played an important part in the victory for the Democrats. In the Pacific States Washington and California voted for Wilson, while Oregon remained Republican. In this section of the nation 62% of the total counties in the three states voted Democratic, but only 42% of the largest counties voted that way.\(^2\) Oregon kept the average down with all five of her largest counties voting for Hughes. In California it was 3-2 in favor of the Republicans in the five largest counties, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Alameda, Fresno and San Diego. But of the 13 largest counties, the count was 7-6 in favor of the Democrats. Three of those seven counties had not voted Democratic in several Presidential elections and were not to do so again until 1932. San Diego County, which usually went Republican by a large


\(^{2}\) On the basis of the five most populous counties in each state.
majority, voted for Hughes over Wilson by only 163 votes.

The Mountain States unanimously indicated their choice of Wilson, and the results show that 91% of the counties voted that way. It is difficult to obtain indications of how labor voted by comparing the results of large counties and of small counties; many of the large counties were also farm areas. Nevertheless, the fact that 91% of the largest counties voted for the President can be taken as an indication that the labor vote certainly was no handicap to the Democrats. In fact, in New Mexico, where the "railroad vote" was tabulated separate from the other vote, Wilson received an overwhelming approbation from that particular labor group. ¹

The returns from West North Central States show a definite margin of large counties going Democratic. While only 55% of the total number of counties voted Democratic, 69% of the largest counties voted for the President. Wilson won the majority of the vote in a majority of the five largest counties in each of the states of this section, without exception. ²

In the East North-Central States, with only one of

¹ 166 to 11. World Almanac, 1917, 800.

² Even Iowa, with all but 16 of its total of 99 going Republican, showed a score of 3-2 in favor of Wilson in the five largest counties.
the five states giving a majority to Wilson, 36% of the
total number of counties went Democratic while 44 of the
largest counties voted for Wilson. Ohio was the only
state with the largest counties going Democratic; the
margin was 4-1. Carrying it farther, 9 out of 10 of the
largest Ohio counties were carried by Wilson, a definite
indication, since the counties for the most part were
industrial areas, that laborers were voting for Wilson.
The one exception in Ohio was Hamilton County (Cincin-
nati), with its many German-Americans. In Illinois and
Wisconsin two of the five largest counties went Democrat-
ic while the state went Republican, but in each case the
two Democratic counties were the two largest in the state.
In Michigan, however, Wayne County (Detroit) went Re-
publican.

The Middle Atlantic States check shows nothing so
conclusive as the results in Ohio. New York, Pennsylvania
and New Jersey had a total of 150 counties, 37 or 26%
of which went Democratic. Of the largest counties 28%
were carried by Wilson (this percentage is practically the
same when more than five of the largest counties of each
state are used). New York showed positive results for
the Democrats (3-2) in the first five, but for the
largest 19 counties, the count was 14-4 in favor of the
Republicans. Pennsylvania results show the other trend:
no Democratic victories in the first five, but 8 victories in the largest 23 counties.

New England counties went Republican 52-15, and the largest counties followed suit, 20-9. The percentages show an advantage to the Democrats in the larger areas over the percentage of Democratic victories in toto, 31%-22%. The results in Maine showed a possible labor vote for Wilson, with the largest counties voting 3-2 in favor of the President, while the total number of counties went 11-5 for Hughes. Connecticut industrial counties voted 3-1 for Wilson while the total ratio was 5-3, Republican.

What are the conclusions from such a study of results in the largest counties in the important (politically) sections of the country? It is to be noted that in the largest counties the Democrats held their own, winning a slightly greater percentage of the most populous counties than of the total number of counties. While many other economic groups other than workers vote in the larger counties, the fact that the President was slightly stronger in the industrial counties indicates that, although other factors certainly were present, the majority of labor probably voted for the Democrats in 1916. In Ohio, particularly, the workers voted for the President, and against Justice Hughes.
CHAPTER IX

THE OUTCOME AND THE CONCLUSION

An election with so many important issues became even more outstanding historically because of its close and climatic ending. As the returns started to come in on the eve of election day, November 7, 1916, Hughes appeared to be the winner. Early that night it was apparent that the Republican candidate had carried the Eastern states, and since only once had a Presidential candidate carried New York and most of the other states of the Northeast and failed to win the election, Republicans began to claim that their man had won. All through the night, as Tumulty reported, the Republican managers "were blatantly proclaiming to the country the Republican victory." But the Republicans were not alone in their proclamation of a GOP triumph. By morning the Brooklyn Eagle, the New York Times, and the New York World, all strong supporters of Wilson, conceded the election to Hughes.

Gloom pervaded the Democratic camp. An elaborate banquet had been prepared at a New York hotel on the eve of the election, but by the time it was held no one was in a festive mood. When McCormick heard that Michigan had gone to Hughes by 50,000 votes, he thought that the

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1 Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, 218.
election was all over.\textsuperscript{1} Others shared his extreme pessimism. That banquet was one of the unhappiest on record!

Nevertheless, not all Democratic leaders gave up hope. House, Tumulty and Woolley pointed out that the West, where the Democratic hopes really lay in 1916, had as yet not completed its returns. Kansas returns were now pointing to a Democratic victory in a normally Republican state. When the President's secretary received a report from the World carrying news of Hughes' election, he issued a statement in which he pointed out that the West had not been heard from and predicted that "Sufficient gains will be made in the West and along the Pacific slope to offset the losses in the East."\textsuperscript{2}

The candidates themselves evidenced greater caution than had the newspapers upon the receipt of the election returns from the East. Mr. Hughes went to bed in New York Tuesday night thinking that he was the President-elect, but gave no official indication that he was ready to claim victory.\textsuperscript{3} Mr. Wilson, feeling that by election day the verdict was now out of his hands, had gone on a trip to attend the Christening of a grandchild, and had left word that no message should be sent to him until the election

\begin{enumerate}
\item Daniel Roper, \textit{Fifty Years of Public Life}, 155.
\item Tumulty, \textit{op. cit.}, 219.
\item Mrs. Hughes, however, was not so reticent privately, calling her husband "Mr. President."
\end{enumerate}
was decided. The President apparently had steeled himself to a possible defeat, for when Tumulty informed his boss on Wednesday morning that the Eastern press had conceded the election to Hughes, the secretary detected no note of sadness in the President's voice as he discussed the news. In fact Mr. Wilson, as he stated later, had begun to enjoy the reaction of defeat when the tide swung in his favor.

As the day progressed it became clear that the Democrats, or Wilson at least, were making inroads on the normally Republican states in the West. As one after another of the Western states was counted for Wilson, it became evident that the election hinged on the way California, Minnesota and New Mexico voted. Wilson could win with either large state and the small one. Minnesota finally settled on Hughes by a small majority, but New Mexico and also New Hampshire turned to Wilson. In the meantime the districts in San Francisco were lengthening a small Wilson lead in California but the votes of districts in Southern California, normally Republican by large majorities, were yet to be counted. By Thursday it was evident that Los Angeles and San Diego, particularly the latter city had not given Hughes the usual number of votes received by a Republican candidate. Wilson came through with a 3,773 plurality in popular vote and
California's 13 electoral votes enabled him to win the election, giving him a total of 277 electoral votes to 254 for his opponent. Although Hughes did not concede the election to Mr. Wilson until the final and complete returns were in (November 21), Wilson was re-elected, the first Democratic President to succeed himself since Andrew Jackson.\(^1\)

Although Wilson's victory margin of electoral votes was so small that if 2,000 Californians who voted for him had voted for Hughes, the latter would have been elected President, the margin in popular votes was not quite so

\(^1\) The states carried by Wilson, and their electoral vote:

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<th>State</th>
<th>Electoral Votes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
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<td>West Virginia</td>
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<td>(electors split)</td>
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<td>Wyoming</td>
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The states carried by Hughes, and their electoral vote:

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<th>State</th>
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slim. In a surprisingly large turn-out, Wilson received 9,127,695 votes to 8,533,507 votes for Hughes, a difference of almost 600,000 popular votes. In geographical area, the President was far ahead, carrying the South, the border states, most of the West and part of the Mid-West, as well as New Hampshire.

The Western section was the important area in Wilson's victory. Although in the East he received a larger proportion of the total vote than had been given to the Democrats for several elections before and after (except 1912), the Democratic vote in the Western half of the country was sufficient to carry all but four of those states for the President.¹ The Mountain States, West North Central States and the Pacific States gave Wilson the largest Democratic percentage of total votes cast since 1896 and the largest to be received in future elections until Roosevelt's landslide in 1932.² Of 200 counties which were carried by a Democratic candidate for the Presidency for the first time, most were in the states west of the Mississippi (and in the northern half of that section). The noticeable shift to the Democrats was remarkable and effective in the

¹ The Western states voting for Hughes were Iowa, South Dakota, Minnesota and Oregon.

² For the North Central States and the Pacific States Wilson's percentage was slightly higher than the percentage received by Bryan in 1896.
West, for the victories resulting from such gain were sufficient, along with the votes of the South, to counteract the Republican majorities in practically all of the states in the Northeast, including the populous states of New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Indiana and Michigan.

**Background of the Election and Democratic Victory**

The Wilson victory over Hughes was a close one and a difficult one to interpret. The perplexity lies not in the fact that the incumbent won, but rather as to what particular factor was most important in the victory for the Democrats. But certainly the basis for their triumph lay in the background of the election and Wilson's appeal to the West. As it had been the liberal movement which had placed Wilson "on the throne" in 1912, so it was the weaker but still effective liberalism of the times which kept him there in 1916. Wilson, who had emerged a liberal simultaneously with the public acceptance of progressivism, piloted through Congress sufficient liberal legislation in sufficient time to please the Progressives of the West, who had in large part been the guiding force behind the "movement of munificence" since its inception.

In the Congress the Senators and Representatives from the West in large part voted for the constructive legislation of the Democratic Administration. On the Child Labor
Bill all Senators from west of the Mississippi voted "Aye".\(^1\) Of the seven Republicans and one Progressive in the Senate who voted for the Clayton Act, all were from the West.\(^2\) All of the 12 Republican Senators who voted for the Federal Reserve Act were from that same section,\(^3\) while all of the 16 Senators who opposed were from the Eastern half of the country. The Trade Commission Act received greater opposition from the Western Senators. Nevertheless six of the 20 Republicans and one Progressive of that area, while only one from the East, voted for its passage. The same general pattern is found in other acts considered part of the liberal legislation passed during Wilson's first term.

The results in the election of 1916 indicate that the voters of the West agreed with their Senators that the major acts of the Administration were for the best interests of their section and for the nation. Of the outstanding progressive-minded Senators who stood for re-election all came out victorious. Wilson won all but four

\(^1\) For the roll call vote see the *Congressional Record*, V. 53, part 72 (1st Session, 64th Congress), August 8, 1916, p. 12313.

\(^2\) Ibid., V. 51, part 15 (2nd Session, 63rd Congress), September 2, 1914, p. 14610.

\(^3\) Ibid., V. 51, part 2, (2nd Session, 63rd Congress), December 19, 1913, p. 1230.
of the Western States, many by large majorities. From such facts it is reasonable to assume that the people of the West in 1916 were still progressive in spirit and voted accordingly.

Of assistance to the Democrats also was the fact that the United States had managed to stay out of the European conflict. How much this non-participation aided Wilson is undetermined; to what degree the peace element influenced the outcome of the election also is not known. But the enthusiasm which greeted the President's preparedness speeches in the Middle-West, and the desire of so many people in that section to teach Mexico a lesson, casts some doubt upon the belief of the total lack of support for preparedness, and for war if necessary. Nevertheless, the desire to remain out of war was strong, if for no other reason beyond that of the distance intervening and the failure to see what business we would have in entering such a conflict. Roosevelt's stand on preparedness and aid to the Allies not short of war probably antagonized many voters, particularly those in the West. Evidence of this reaction is seen in the scant reporting of Roosevelt's speeches during the campaign in many Western newspapers, as well as the cancellation of his scheduled speeches in certain Mid-Western cities, particularly the centers of German-American sympathy.
Charges that Wilson lost many votes on his outspoken stand on hyphenism appear to be unsubstantiated so far as total results are concerned. While organized German-American groups, particularly the German-American Alliance, kept up a constant stream of criticism of the President, it is doubtful that a great majority of German-American voters followed their lead. The effect of those who did probably was counterbalanced by non-German-Americans. Hughes ability to walk the tight-rope received a severe test, and finally he had to come out with an attack of his own against hyphenism. Here again Roosevelt's extreme stand on the issue probably lost more votes than it won for the Republicans.

A considerable aid to the Democrats, the liberal trend of the times proved a serious stumbling-block to the Republicans. Disagreement as to the policy to adopt concerning the progressive movement resulted in the development of factionalism and the ultimate split of the Republican Party in 1912. Bitterness engendered in and as a result of the conflict and cleavage still remained, to a degree, in 1916. Although many members of each group recognized the political necessity for complete amalgamation, there were

1 In St. Louis and Cincinnati, both centers of the German vote, Wilson failed to obtain a majority. Nevertheless, his share of the vote in each of the two cities was as great as the average for the Democrats in the preceding elections when "Germanism" was not an issue. Other cities with a high percentage of the German vote, as Hoboken, New Jersey, voted for Wilson.
those on both sides who could not forget their differences. Only with difficulty, if at all, could the Taft supporters of 1912 bring themselves to associate with Progressive leaders who had split their party four years before. In turn, Progressives often continued to bear ill-will toward those "regular" leaders who had "robbed" them in the Republican Convention of 1912.

The need, as well as the desire on the part of many, for harmony was evident in the scheduling of both the Republicans and Progressive conventions in the same city at the same time, and the appointment of joint committees to agree on a candidate agreeable to both groups. As it was proved, however, the willingness to harmonize and the proof in real compromise can be two different things. The Old Guard and the Western Progressives were too far apart in their political outlook. A successful union of forces depended upon the selection of a candidate which both groups could support. If the Republican choice was agreeable to the progressive element the fighting would be over.

Such a selection was not to occur. Die-hard Progressives, principally from the West, had only one candidate—Roosevelt. But Old Guard bitterness toward the leader of the Bull Moose Party in 1912 was too strong. Having no candidate of their own upon whom they could agree, the Old
Guard fell back to the choice of the more liberal elements in their party—Justice Hughes. His nomination, however, while apparently the only solution to the problem, was in itself a weakening influence. Too liberal for the Old Guard and too conservative for many of the Progressives, he received in many instances only grudging support from both groups. While in any national campaign it probably is impossible to name any candidate who would be acceptable to all members of a political party, the task of the 1916 Republican Convention was to name a candidate whose choice would please all factions of two parties, as weak as one of them might have been. The "left-overs" of the split of 1912 proved to be a serious handicap to the Republicans as they began the campaign of 1916.

Republican on the Defensive

With the Democratic Administration receiving credit for important liberal legislation, and with the country still at peace, the Republicans were from the beginning at a disadvantage. Where could they attack, or would it be advisable to attack at all? While the Democrats could "point with pride" to a record of accomplishments, the Republican leaders were in a quandary, whether recognized at first or not, as how to develop a campaign thesis of their own. Much of the domestic legislation was supported in all
sections of the country; often the Republican Congressmen themselves had voted for the measures. Could the Republican Party repudiate the legislation under such circumstances? Hughes was handicapped greatly.

The Republican strategy then was to turn their efforts to foreign affairs. There, however, the difficulties inherent in the situation were little less. Criticism of parts of Wilson's policy and actions might prove successful, but a repudiation of his basic policy of maintenance of peace could be interpreted that the Republican Party desired war. As the campaign wore on it became painfully evident to the Republicans that the voters were not willing to go that far. Why change administrations? The GOP had no reasonable reply.

In neglecting the domestic area and concentrating on foreign affairs the Republicans were doing little to persuade the "wandering Progressives" to "return home". Most Progressives were from the West, a section of the country which had been chiefly responsible for the introduction of much of the recent liberal legislation, and the section with the greatest desire to keep out of the European conflict. A greater degree of imagination and skill than the candidate and the campaign managers demonstrated was needed to compensate for such a handicap. One of their policies was not to interfere in local situations
but to permit the Progressives and regulars to solve their own problems of amalgamation. No exception was made in California, where Progressives had demonstrated tremendous strength. As the situation developed, Progressives abstained themselves from participation in the activities involving Mr. Hughes in his visit to the state, a circumstance which was an important factor in the Democratic victory in the state and in the nation in November.

California was not the only state in which the Republicans failed to conciliate the Progressives. In Kansas and New Hampshire, as well as in other states, the lack of recognition of Progressives had its effect. In Kansas the Republicans and the Progressives were unable to work in cooperation. In New Hampshire, Luther Borglum, the state Progressive leader, attributed the loss of the state to the failure of Republicans to cooperate with his faction. The famous sculptor rather adequately summarized the Republican troubles in 1916 when he described their actions as "mental insomnia, chronic in the GOP", which "coupled with Boss ambition and unfaithfulness to national needs", resulted in death to Republican hopes.¹


In Kansas the Republicans had little to do with the Progressives, and this normally Republican state voted for Wilson by a large majority. Chicago Evening Post, November 14, 1916, 1.
California and Ohio "Swing the Election"

California and Ohio were the decisive states in the election. Colorful and dramatic, the Democratic victory in California for the Democrats was a home run in the ninth inning that broke up the ball game. Hughes' defeat in a state in which the Republican (Progressive) Senatorial candidate was victorious by such a huge margin was not so startling as it might appear. Rather it demonstrated two or three Republican weaknesses: Hughes lack of appeal as a real liberal, his lack of campaign finesse and the power of Progressives scorned.

While the California victory was the spectacular one for the Democrats, the Ohio results perhaps were the more startling. Ohio, in the midst of an area voting Republican, and itself with a record of Republican majorities, gave a 90,000 margin of victory to President Wilson. In that state the Democrats managed to have every factor to favor them. Most of the voters desired maintenance of peace. Farmers were receiving big prices for their crops. Laborers were employed at relatively high wages. But beyond the economic forces lay the advantages of the differences in management of the campaign in Ohio. The planning and strategy of the national Democratic campaign leaders was accepted at all levels, national, state and local. But the Republicans never were able to work as a
Factionalism within the Ohio Republicans remained during the entire campaign. With most of the working men, the farmers, and even many business men and important newspapers favoring Wilson, the lack of unity in Republican ranks only added to the majority of Democratic votes in Ohio.

Farmers, Labor and Prosperity

The farmer, labor and prosperity were factors of importance not only in Ohio and perhaps California, but throughout the United States, in general. Although traditionally farmers may be Republican, Hughes was unable to draw half of them to his side. Liberal legislation, including a farm loan act, rural roads, as well as the maintenance of peace and prosperity probably were the important factors to the rural grower of crops. The majority of laborers probably favored Democratic eight hour legislation and the general labor record, as evidenced by the results of the survey of the voting results in the most populous counties in each state of the North and West.

Prosperity, although not always a decisive factor in a political campaign (as demonstrated in 1952), probably acted in favor of the encumbents in 1916. The repeated contention of the Republicans that good times was only a temporary condition due to the war in Europe indicated the importance they attributed to the factor. Hughes' speeches
on the tariff often were pointed toward the same objective: to make the people "see" permanent prosperity could best be assured them in the hands of Republicans. The indications are that neither argument had appreciable effect, except perhaps to some extent in some parts of the East, where the Republican talks on the tariff enjoyed a warm reception.

A Personal Victory for Wilson

President Wilson's re-election was to a great extent a personal victory. While the concentration of party effort in certain key counties and districts, particularly in the West, was the idea of Tumulty, House and other campaign leaders, early in the campaign (or before it began) the President saw the importance of the appeal to the Progressives and to the Independents. During the campaign he continually referred to the record of liberal legislation. It was Wilson's decision also not to make an extensive campaign tour. Rather, with the exception of one trip to the Mid-West and another to Kentucky, he stayed in Washington to take care of the pressing duties of the office. Wilson's appeal to the Progressive and the Independent, particularly in the western half of the United States, paid off. As a result he achieved his greatest personal victory.

In a comparison of the votes received by Wilson and
the votes received by other Democratic candidates, the President was ahead in almost every case. Not only did he receive a greater number of votes, but more important, he received a greater percentage of the votes cast for the respective offices for which the candidates were striving. In comparing the vote of the Democratic Senatorial candidates with the Wilson vote, the President was far ahead. In the ten Western states in which Senators were chosen in 1916, Wilson received, in all but two instances, a higher percentage of the vote for the respective offices than did the Democratic Senatorial candidates. In the East he was even more successful, receiving a greater percentage of the votes in all but one of the 13 states in which Senators were elected.

The same general picture is true in relation to the election of governors in the North and West in 1916. In all but two out of 29 states which elected governors Wilson received a greater proportion of the total votes for President than the Democratic gubernatorial candidates received of the total votes for governor. Iowa and West Virginia gave a greater percentage to the Democratic gubernatorial candidate than to Wilson. Conversely, Mr. Hughes led in only one state, and tied the Republican candidate for Governor in Illinois and West Virginia.

While Wilson's lead in percentage of total vote in a few
of the states may have been due in part to third party
candidates in the gubernatorial races, the fact that Hughes
was led, almost invariably, by the Republican candidate for
governor indicates his relative lack of vote-getting power
throughout the North and West. In contrast, the President
demonstrated his ability to attract votes beyond his party
strength.

Republican Strength

With the Democrats holding so many advantages how did
the Republicans run such a close race? There were several
factors or points on which the latter either held their
own or even gained votes. The desire on the part of some
industrialists and munition makers, as well as certain
other business men, to reap the profits of war possibly
had some influence on the voters of that section. A
considerable portion of the citizens of the East, whether
concerned with the business of ocean transportation or
not, desired stronger protection of American shipping and
particularly, the travel of American citizens on the high
seas. Wilson's Mexican policy probably lost more voters
than it gained, particularly in New England. It was a
common expression that "National Honor" was not being pre-
served by Wilson, either in Mexico or in Europe. At the
same time Hughes found support in certain areas from those
who wanted the United States to treat Germany with care
and consideration. "Haranged" by Roosevelt and chastised by Wilson, the "professional" German-American saw in Hughes their greatest hope of support.

In the domestic area the Republicans were not at a complete loss in attracting votes. The GOP emphasis upon the need for a high tariff was welcomed in certain parts of the East. Important too were the voters who considered the Adamson Act the result of Wilson's conciliation of a comparatively small but politically important, selfish group. Judging from the statements of several leaders of their race, many Negroes were dissatisfied with the President's approval of segregation of workers in Federal offices in Washington. Some women were dissatisfied with his failure to support a suffrage amendment to the Constitution. All of these and other factors resulted in votes for Hughes, in some cases compensating or more than compensating for losses incurred.

Important as they were, the particular factors mentioned were all subordinate to a background condition—the strong backlog of Republican voters. Since the beginning of the Civil War the Republicans had lost the Presidential election only three times, and one of these was the 1912 loss to Wilson when the Republicans split. Only one other candidate had defeated the GOP during those 56 years since Lincoln's victory in 1860. For several campaigns
after 1916 the chief opponents of the Democrats continued to win elections, doing so with the ease demonstrated since 1896. In other words, during the period of American history from 1860 to 1928 most voters were supporters of the Republican Party. In 1916 it took a strong Democratic Administration and candidate to emerge victorious, once the Republicans were virtually re-united.

What are the general conclusions as to the decisive factors in the Democratic victory in 1916? There are two. The Wilson victory, as are most political victories, was the result not of one lone event, but the accumulative total of many factors and reasons. To say, for example, that Hughes' failure to meet Johnson at the hotel in Long Beach, or more positively, the Democratic use of the slogan, "He kept us out of war", won the election for Wilson would be oversimplification. Such events or strategems were important but they could not be termed decisive by any interpretation except for the numerous other influences which together with them had built up a mound of Democratic voting strength sufficient to place the hillock of Republican voters in the shadow. As important as certain events and actions appeared to have been, no one factor elected Wilson in 1916.

The really basic influences on the election--the foundation stones for the greater mound of Democratic
votes—were social legislation and peace. The demand for the maintenance of peace, particularly in the West, was evident from the beginning of the campaign. Throughout the campaign and throughout most of the country, particularly the West, Republicans were handicapped by the fact that they were opposing a President who "had maintained peace."

Perhaps even more important was the liberal legislative record of that same President. Picture the result of the election if such legislation as the Federal Reserve Act, the Clayton Act, Federal Farm Loan Act and Underwood-Simmons Tariff had not been passed. It would have been difficult if not impossible for Wilson to have captured the Progressive West had not his Administration built such a record of liberal legislation. The Democratic fusion of the cause of peace with the record of progressive legislation, with its particular effects in the West, was a handicap too great for Republicans to overcome.
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