ELIZABETH Cady Stanton's Reform Rhetoric 1848-1854:
A PERELMAN ANALYSIS OF PRACTICAL REASONING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

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* * * * *

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The efforts behind this work are dedicated to the Waggenspacks, whose love and support, confidence and trust, have always been there whenever I needed them.

Old friends...
They mean much more to me than the new friends.
For they can see where you are
And they know where you've been.

-Stephen Chapin
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Rationale

The history of Western civilization records many challenges to its basic assumptions. The divine rights of kings, the propriety of slavery were once accepted as naturally correct ideas. If these assumptions had not been challenged, had not been replaced by what was right based upon important values, then America would not now be the democracy we known. Ours is a history of crucial decisions where our nation's fate hung in the balance.

Another perilous juncture existed in the issues raised in the mid-Nineteenth Century by people agitating for reforms in woman's roles, rights, and status in society. The ideals espoused by our founders to justify the American Revolution were used by feminists to legitimize their demands. When Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, and three others walled the first Woman's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, NY, in 1848, they began a movement to achieve sexual equality which has reverberations lingering today. Elizabeth Cady Stanton is a prototype of modern feminists, and a study of her early reform rhetoric reveals insight into the start of the women's rights movement and today's feminist revolution. Such a study sheds light on the constraints which prevented her persuasive appeals from achieving their desired effects. Her leadership is demonstrated in many ways: she was one of the organizers of the convention; she was also one of the editors of The
Revolution (1868-1870), an early feminist newspaper; she served as president of both the National Woman Suffrage Association (1869-1890) and the National American Woman Suffrage Association (1890-1892).

It would appear that if the Twentieth Century Women's Movement is to achieve its equal rights goals, then it must first be aware of and understand the successes and failures in theory and practice of someone such as Cady Stanton, a Nineteenth Century leader whose reform rhetoric and desires foreshadow the persuasive efforts of our own day.¹ By studying Cady Stanton's techniques of argumentation, we may more clearly understand the present and preview the future.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton appears to have been almost instinctively drawn to women's reform causes. She became unsettled over the law's treatment of women as a child listening to clients' woes in her father's law office. Here the seeds of discontent were sown; Cady Stanton's expectations of woman's sphere expanded into concepts of individuality and self-determination.

Significance of Study

During America's early years, women were largely denied the speaker's platform to air their grievances.² Woman's role in society was defined as a private one; opponents to reform cited Biblical inhibitions against women speaking in public. Women were expected to be interested only in the home; educationally, they were taught domestic arts, sewing, and social graces. Women were denied access to professions. Theatrical productions were suspiciously viewed as immoral, so women were limited in social events they could attend with society's approval. However, women could extend their religious rights by attending public prayer
meetings and inspirational lectures and sermons. Parlor meetings and discussion groups were also permitted.

Reformers such as Frederick Douglass, Theodore Dwight Weld, and Wendell Phillips brought to the platform rhetoric which ranged from graphic descriptions of slavery to rebukes for audience complacency. The excitement and zeal provided by these and other orators brought entertainment and education to people starved for stimulation. As Bormann noted, many women found such reform oratory to be a rewarding change of pace from the routine boredom of their lives. In fact, they found in reform meetings outlets for their desire to improve mankind. By the 1830's, women began to organize and present their own reform meetings, gradually addressing mixed audiences.

In evaluating the suffragists' expectations of the power the vote would bring women, one must keep in mind the values of the Nineteenth Century. Suffragists assumed women would use the ballot to protect themselves as well as to impose their viewpoint on political and social issues. They anticipated that by strategic use of political power, women could break into new occupations, raise pay, win strikes, force reform in marriage and family law, and improve their lot in society. This suffrage demand drew together protest against all the abuses in a single argument for the right to shape society and the public sphere.

Even more, they expected enfranchisement to transform woman's consciousness, to re-anchor her self-image, not in the subordination of her family role, but in the individuality and self-determination they saw as citizenship. As Ellen DuBois noted,

This was a particularly important aspect of the thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the chief ideologue of Nineteenth Century suffragism.
It has been said of Cady Stanton that, like many of the early feminists, she "swallowed all the formulas." Before her marriage, she was absorbed by the temperance cause. When she wed abolitionist Henry B. Stanton, she joined him in the slavery fight. While she bore and raised seven children, her dedication to women's rights reform was conceived. Her devotion began with women's more obvious and immediate disabilities: legal barriers against holding property and guardianship of children, the refusal of industry to grant equal pay for equal work, societal taboos on education and public expression, and superstitions surrounding women's physical capabilities.

Cady Stanton's reform rhetoric defied established custom, questioned social and religious tradition, and challenged values. She fully expected enfranchisement to convert society's awareness of women's abilities. It is the roots of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's arguments as an advocate of women's rights reform which bear further examination for this study. These basic arguments present the germ of her case as it was expanded over the next fifty years.

Cady Stanton was a woman whose discontent had its birth early in her life. My interest in her and the women's rights question in general stem from recognition of my own malcontent. Although I never felt mistreated or "unequal" as a child, as I matured the term "tomboy" was used to label me; this somehow depicted society's displeasure of such behavior. The desires to achieve, compete, and be assertive which I possessed were not consistent with society's definition of the proper female role behavior. With the push for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 1972, I initiated my own self-discovery. I
began to experience the rich, diverse history of woman's search for independence as well as the false assumptions of her abilities and spheres. My explorations revealed that from the historical limitations placed upon women, there often evolved statements of self-determination, dignity, and purpose. From this start, my feminist stance was born.

I did not encounter Elizabeth Cady Stanton in any depth until a graduate seminar on human rights sparked my interest. As noted by Campbell, Cady Stanton reminded listeners of common philosophical precepts of humanism. 6 Despite my growing familiarity with the ERA, its proponents and opponents and their rhetoric, I realized my deficiency in perceiving its taproots. This led me by what in retrospect appears to be chance, to Elizabeth Cady Stanton.

Cady Stanton's reform rhetoric, although relatively untouched by rhetorical critics, bears investigation. Because she was long a leader in calling for enfranchisement and other rights for women, I expected to find much published about her. Although the Cady Stanton biography is one which has been richly detailed, her rhetorical theory and practice have been largely unexplored. She was the one whose philosophic thought guided the nation towards recognition of women as equals to men. Cady Stanton was the thinker and writer who crystallized ideas, which were in turn publicized by her close friend, Susan B. Anthony. Because it was Anthony, the canvasser, orator, organizer, and petitioner, who spread most of the ideas, Anthony is much more well known and recognized in American history.
Cady Stanton's disquieting challenges to established mores and values startled men and women into reviewing settled custom. Besides suffrage, she espoused major changes in statutes concerning women's property, divorce, individuality, and religion. The concepts Cady Stanton promoted threatened the most personal relationships in people's lives. Once again, however, more attention has been given in print to Lucretia Mott's denunciation of the clergy for preaching that God made woman inferior to man, Lucy Stone's opinions of marriage, and the Grimke sisters' anti-slavery campaigns.

While Cady Stanton may not be the name that most Americans recognize in women's rights, it was her insistence on a suffrage plank in the Seneca Falls Resolutions which instituted over seventy years of conventions, marches, meetings, speeches, and demonstrations until the Nineteenth Amendment was made law in 1920. She played a role as a speaker, writer, editor, critic, and model for other women, but it is her demand for an instigation of reforms in women's rights which is the focus for this study.

Purpose and Method

Recent studies have demonstrated several ways in which the rhetoric of women's rights differs from other rhetorical movements. As Campbell noted in "The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation: An Oxymoron," societal female gender roles are not congruent with what usually are those abilities expected of a successful rhetor. Also, a demand for role stereotype alteration requires both self- and societal change, necessitating discourse which is both personal (dealing with individual experience and desire) and political (dealing with customs and
organizations affecting all). Finally, the reforms which Cady Stanton
called for carried within them their own paradox: while she claimed
sexual equality, her discourse asked society to grant that equality to
her and her sex.

The author has chosen to apply contemporary theory to Cady Stanton's
timeless arguments. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca present
such a rhetorical model. Their *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumen-
tation* includes theories on the nature of the audience, persuasive
strategy, and lines of argument. Further, *The New Rhetoric* broadens
argumentation to include oral and written messages. Perhaps even
more essential is the treatise's innovative vocabulary, which allows
for a critic to examine discourse with a new perspective on technique.
*The New Rhetoric* provides a theory of practical reasoning, with its
focus upon quasi-logical (nonformal) reasoning rather than formal
logic; such quasi-logical reasons are bound in reality and require that
the rhetor focus primary attention on audience values, presumptions,
and facts. All argument is aimed at obtaining or reinforcing the
adherence of the audience to some proposition; it presupposes a meeting
of the minds which allows the speaker to persuade and the audience to
be willing to listen. According to *The New Rhetoric*, the argumentative
process involves a series of links by which listeners come to adhere
to a speaker's ideas.

This particular model as described in *The New Rhetoric* presents
nonformal argument as consisting of a group of reasons which combine
to achieve a goal, to bring the audience to accept the rhetor's con-
clusions. The argumentative process describes a series of techniques
which allow for the establishment of links by which adherence to ideas is passed, these techniques consist of methods of association and dissociation, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

Cady Stanton's discourse chosen for analysis includes two speeches, three letters, and a series of resolutions and a declarative manifesto from the earliest years of Cady Stanton's woman's rights reform arguments. Between 1848 and 1854, two highly significant events occurred in the history of the woman's rights movement, each involving Cady Stanton. In July 1848, the First Woman's Rights Convention was held, organized by her and four others. Here, in addition to her first public address, she drafted and presented the series of grievances and plea for action which are considered to be the birth of the movement. The years between 1848-1854 witnessed a rapid spread of belief through a number of similiar conventions, and the letters of Cady Stanton provide a number of arguments for debate. In 1854, she became the first woman to speak in front of the New York State Legislature; her address contains the primary arguments which most other women's reform advocates promoted in the next decades.

Therefore, this study involves a detailed analysis of six selected pieces of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's 1848-1854 rhetoric by a model of practical reasoning. The author wishes to examine not only the techniques of quasi-logical argumentation in actual use but also to determine why the arguments which Cady Stanton employed failed to convert adherence into action: why were women not given enfranchisement until over seventy years after the initial arguments were forwarded? It may be that such a study will reveal that as a practitioner, Cady
Stanton's arguments were sound, but the techniques she chose were weak. Perhaps she failed to reach only part of her goal; perhaps enfranchisement could only occur after self-respect and self-determination had been achieved. The author feels that a contemporary understanding of the theory and practice of practical reasoning of one of the Nineteenth Century's leading woman's rights reform rhetors may advance the success of the Twentieth Century woman's search for equality.

Literature Review

Elizabeth Cady Stanton was responsible for a wide range of discourse involving a number of topics. The most famous documents are contained in the first three volumes of The History of Woman Suffrage (1881-1886), of which she served as one of three editors. These volumes contain documents and letters of the early days of the movement for equal rights for women. Three later volumes carried the story through 1920. Cady Stanton's reminiscences in Eighty Years and More (1891-1897): Reminiscences of Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1898) serve as her autobiography. A two-volume set edited by two of her children, Theodore Stanton and Harriot Stanton Blatch, and entitled Elizabeth Cady Stanton as Revealed in Her Letters, Diary, and Reminiscences provide further insight into her style, practice, and creed. Cady Stanton's Woman's Bible (1895) serves as both a review and a commentary analyzing the Bible's disparaging remarks against women. In addition, collections of her speech manuscripts, newspaper articles, and the like can be found at both Vassar College and the Library of Congress. Other letters exist at the Henry E. Huntington Library, New York Public Library, at Smith
and Radcliffe Colleges, and at the Schlesinger Library. A prolific writer, Cady Stanton can provide a vast array of discourse on a number of topics.

Several other authors have discussed Cady Stanton, primarily remarking upon her life and contributions to woman's suffrage. Notable are Lutz's biography *Created Equal: A Biography of Elizabeth Cady Stanton*, 1815-1920, Gurko's *The Ladies of Seneca Falls: The Birth of the Woman's Rights Movement* (1974), and Banner's *Elizabeth Cady Stanton, A Radical for Woman's Rights* (1980). Cady Stanton's roles in suffragist and other causes are also recorded in some detail in works such as Graham's *Ladies in Revolt* (1934), Flexnor's *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (1959), Haynes-Irwin's *Angels and Amazons: A Hundred Years of American Women* (1933), O'Neill's *Everyone Was Brave: The Rise and Fall of Feminism in America* (1969) and Parton, *Dauntless Women of the Age: Being Narratives of the Lives and Deeds of the Most Prominent Women of the Present Generation* (1869). Each of these works serves chiefly to illuminate biographical and historical events of Cady Stanton's world.

Woman Suffrage and Politics: The Inner Story of the Suffrage Movement (1926) gave particular assistance from the view of those within the fight.

A number of books were consulted to explore the general topic of women's rights. Among them are Kraditor's Up From the Pedestal: Selected Writings in the History of American Feminism (1968), Krichmar's The Women's Rights Movement in the United States (1972), and Papachristou's Women Together: A History in Documents of the Women's Movement in the United States (1976). As in earlier works mentioned, these volumes survey the woman's movement, its principal documents, and its general stance.

It was also necessary to examine the traditions in America and the values placed upon women's role in them. A wide variety of materials were examined to give the author a perspective in which to develop the analysis of the discourse. Among the works consulted which proved to have especially high value were Beard's Woman as Force in History: A Study in Traditions and Realities (1967), Burnap's The Sphere and Duties of Woman (1848), Benson's Women in Eighteenth-Century America: A Study of Opinion and Social Usage (1935), Rode's American Life in the 1840's (1967), Boorstin's The Americans: The Colonial Experience (1958), Calhoun's A Social History of the American Family: From Colonial Times to the Present (1918), Cobbe's The Duties of Women: A Course of Lectures (1882), Delamont and Duffin's The Nineteenth-Century Woman: Her Cultural and Physical World (1978), DeTocqueville's Democracy in America (1873), Duff's Letters on the Intellectual and Moral Character of Women (1974), Holliday's Woman's Life in Colonial Days (1922), May's The Enlightenment in America (1976), and Thomson's Education for Ladies 1830-1860: Ideas

I found no mention of previous dissertations which analyze Cady Stanton's rhetoric in the Comprehensive Dissertation Index or Dissertation Abstracts International.


Specific literature within the communication dealing with women's rhetoric, reform movements, and women speakers is more recent and appearing monthly. Relevant entries for this study include Resenwasser's "Rhetoric and the Progress of the Women's Liberation Movement," Today's Speech, (Summer 1972); Hope's "Redefinition of Self: A Comparison of the Rhetoric of the Women's Liberation and Black Liberation Movements,"


In conclusion, no one appears to have previously undertaken a critical analysis of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's reform rhetoric. Her biography has been outlined several times, and her works have been collected. However, her rhetorical contributions have been largely ignored. It is the purpose of this study to at least begin to fill that vacuum. To that end, the author intends to evaluate the use of practical reasoning demonstrated in the early arguments presented by Elizabeth Cady Stanton in the first six years of her public career. Her advocacy of reform causes, especially those calling for changes in women's rights, set the philosophical path upon which contemporary advocates find themselves firmly based. The strengths and weaknesses of Cady Stanton's arguments should shed light upon timeless arguments concerning human equality.
CHAPTER TWO
THE THRUST OF REFORM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Americans of the early Nineteenth Century faced their future with self-assurance and strong drives toward progress and perfection. Emerson, commenting upon the nation's idealism, remarked upon its spirit of "restless, prying, conscientious criticism" and summarized by asking "What is a man born for, but to be a Reformer, a Remaker of what man has made?" 1 Citizens assumed that they were divinely intended to live in peace and morality; if there existed stumbling blocks to such conditions, such as poverty, ignorance, or sickness, they they should be eliminated.

The large number of important inventions and discoveries of the period created a technological impetus for societal change. McCormick's 1834 reaper began the mechanization of agriculture. Great railways were made possible by the development of the steam engine. Goodyear vulcanized rubber in 1844, the same year Morse perfected the telegraph. The country was shrinking in size through its inventions. Howe's sewing machine was invented two years later; the rotary printing press came into use in 1848. In 1854, the Bessemer Process of steelmaking was advanced. Each discovery was to change the way Americans worked. In the twenty year span between 1840 and 1860, the United States issued more than 30,000 patents. 2 As technology advanced, society progressed in other areas.

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Society's modes of living were rapidly shifting as improvements in transportation, produced by the construction of canals and railroads, closed the gaps between territories. Coastal ports swarmed with immigrant ships, bringing human cargo to farm lands and factories. During the 1820's, an average of 14,300 immigrants came annually to the United States; a decade later, the number grew to 60,000. Most of these newcomers were from Great Britain and Germany, with an increasing number from Ireland. Between 1830-1840, more than half a million poured into the United States: 44% were Irish, 30% were German, and 15% came from elsewhere in Great Britain. Many of these immigrants were resented because of their willingness to work for low pay, their strange customs and language, and their "threats" to the traditional ways of living. As manufacturing centers grew, the size of cities increased. Between 1820 and 1860, the nation's population increased 226%.

As urbanization grew, people's living habits changed. In 1820, the proportion of the total population living in cities of 2,500 or more was 6.1%; by 1860, nearly 20% of America's citizens were considered urban dwellers. In 1820, only 12 cities had populations exceeding 10,000; by 1860 there were 101. Population density was accompanied by urban blight, poverty, and undesirable social conditions which eventually gave birth to the reform movements.

The Nature of American Reform

American reform was marked by pragmatics; it was more concerned with practical means of improving society than with the root causes of the problems themselves. As a result, studies of the sources of
disease, crime, insanity, and poverty were neglected in favor of curatives. In addition, reform was comprehensive in scope; reformers, confident in their abilities, attacked on all fronts. One could work simultaneously on temperance and Christianizing Africa, prison reform and sensible dress for women with equal fervor.

The American reformer was intent upon helping his/her less fortunate brother or sister. The traditions of mutual aid and philanthropy held roots in Calvinism, Quakerism, frontier democracy, and evangelical zeal. The principles of giving included money as well as spiritual aid. Reform advocacy was marked by peaceful non-violence; eggs and rotten vegetables were the most dangerous missiles hurled at unpopular platform speakers.

Another characteristic of American reform was that it was largely regional, centering in the North and West; the South was relatively untouched. Since one reform usually snowballed into another, Southerners could not risk opening the door to even one, for fear of granting inroads to abolitionism. Further, until mid-century, reform was largely apolitical, doing its work from outside partisan political frameworks. There was no single national reform leader or party.

The roots of Nineteenth Century reform first grew in the soil of the Eighteenth Century. The Enlightenment provided a faith in progress and the conviction that mankind could be improved by self-determination. With science, democracy, and divine guidance as aids, reformers were convinced that life on earth could be perfected. In addition, they believed in the individual's ability to direct him/herself to the good, toward right thinking and acting. DeTocqueville noted
(The idea of human perfectibility) is one of the principle notions that the intellect can conceive...

Although man has many points of resemblance with the brutes, one trait is peculiar to himself—he improves...His reverses teach him that none have discovered absolute good, his success stimulates him to the neverending pursuit of it. He tends unceasingly towards that unmeasured greatness so indistinctly visible at the end of the long track which humanity has yet to tread.

May remarked that the belief in human freedom was morally necessary to keep the world from ruin. Jonathan Mayhew said that Christianity consisted of three simple, strenuous propositions:

I. THAT there is a natural difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong.
II. THAT men are naturally endowed with faculties proper for the discerning of these differences.
III. THAT men are under obligation to exert these faculties; and to judge for themselves in things of a religious concern.

This orientation resulted in a mystical conviction that each person could surmount all obstacles. Beliefs in benevolence and social responsibility combined to charge reformers with being their "brothers and sisters' keep er." Americans were convinced that it was their national mission to provide the world with a model of what ought to and could be. William E. Channing, the Unitarian leader, summed up the new spirit of brotherhood thus: "The lesson of this age is that of sympathy with the suffering, and of devotion to the progress of the whole human race." All of these elements combined to give the reform plant its vitality and nourishment in Nineteenth Century soil.

Reforms and Reformers: The Search for Perfection

Religious evangelism provided reform with most of its powerful support bases. From evangelical revivalism came two beliefs: perfectionism and practicality. The conviction that life could be arranged to meet God's moral requirements for the perfect society and the
application of religious piety to a practical life joined to create in salvation the beginning of a useful life. Revivalists preached that man was perfectable, that he was a free agent and morally responsible for his behavior.¹¹ This zeal made social reform a moral imperative, for if sin and selfishness resulted in social evils, then religious conversion could reform individuals, who in turn would reform society.¹² John Humphrey Noyes, founder of the Oneida Community, explained:

The Revivalists had for their one great idea the regeneration of the soul. The great idea of the Socialists was the regeneration of society, which is the soul's environment. These ideas belong together and are the complements of each other.¹³

The instrument chosen to accomplish reform was the voluntary association, like-minded individuals who organized community groups of their own. These groups—missionary societies, education societies, moral societies—published journals, organized speakers' bureaus, held conventions, and grew into powerful lobbies in government. De Tocqueville noted:

Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have...associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive.

If it be proposed to inculcate some truth, or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society.¹⁴

Often, the leaders of one group held similar positions of power in other groups, thereby establishing a coalition which served to centralize communication and control. For example, William Lloyd Garrison held office in six different associations; Theodore Parker was involved in seven; Horace Greeley belonged to eleven.
Despite the stress upon organization and collective action, these associations, and indeed, the entire reform movement, remained highly individualistic due to emphasis on the right of private judgement. For example, the history of the antislavery movement was plagued by divisions caused by internal quarrels. It appears that American reformers could not decide whether the group or individual counted most, so instead they kept up an uneasy truce between them. As DeTocqueville summarized:

When the inhabitant of a democratic country compares himself individually with all those about him, he feels with pride that he is the equal of any of them; but when he comes to survey the totality of his fellows, and to place himself in contrast with so huge a body, he is instantly overwhelmed by the sense of his own insignificance.

While some reform associations were broadly religious, others had social goals aimed directly at changing specific practices. Examples of the former include the American Bible Society and the American Home Missionary Society; representing the latter were the American Peace Society and the Anti-Duelling Society. In the search for earthly perfection, most aspects of American society were scrutinized: a ten-hour working day, better jails, and the abolition of slavery were all seen as means towards the ideal society. Laws against duelling were lax, and that practice continued to be the way to settle gentlemanly disputes; from 1809 on, the Anti-Duelling Society worked for stricter enforcement. Poverty and vice, both highly visible urban problems, were targeted for reform, as was the lot of such underprivileged groups as old sailors, immigrants, juveniles, alcoholics, and prostitutes.

Rather than examining causes, most reformers chose to assault effects. No one knew why some people were poor, nor did anyone know how
to find out. It was assumed that those without means were morally derelict, that they brought the conditions of poverty upon themselves, or that elements in the environment forced them to be poor. Vices were considered a personal responsibility rather than a social one, so the most effective reforms were those designed to deal with individual weaknesses. It was not until the mid-1840's that a shift in reform emphasis occurred.

The Reverend Joseph Tuckerman of Boston is credited with organizing that city's major charitable societies into a coalition for greater effort. These reform programs included improvement in housing, employment, and health care. The Children's Aid Society, founded by Charles Loring Brace in New York City, provided supervision, education, and housing for the thousands of vagrant children of the city. Such efforts marked a new emphasis toward reform as a social as well as an individual moral problem.

Reformers also examined the problems of those who traditionally were considered the divinely handicapped: the blind, deaf, orphaned, and insane, whose lives were explained as acts of God. Reverend Thomas Gallaudet opened the country's first school for the deaf in 1817. The first recognition of the orphan as a ward of the state (and therefore a public responsibility) was in Massachusetts's reform school for boys (1845) and girls (1847). During the early Nineteenth Century, separate asylums for the insane appeared, removing them from the company of criminals and paupers; Philadelphia's Quaker Retreat (1817) and the Kentucky State Asylum (1824) are early examples.
The temperance movement gained force from many quarters. Evangelistic religion felt the saved world would have no need for alcohol, since there seemed to be an obvious relation between drinking and vice. Economic pressures also came to bear. Poverty could be the end result of a laborer who spent money on gin rather than on the needs of his family. Whatever the basis of argument, most reformers considered drinking a sin. In 1826, the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance began its national work, sponsoring group meetings, enrolling members, publishing tracts, sending out speakers, and administering temperance pledges. Still, the movement was plagued by internal dissent over its goals: abstinence or temperance. In addition, those in the movement could not agree on the answer to the problem; did it lie in education, persuasion, or legislation? The debates on the issue ranged over a thirty-year period and from state to state; if a solution existed, it was left to a later time.¹⁷

Agitation about slavery began as a small part of the humanistic revolt of the Nineteenth Century. While antislavery societies were organized as early as 1775 (the Pennsylvania Abolition Society), the early abolitionists had been gradualists in their approach to the problem. The abolition movement of the 1830's was marked by zeal, intensity, and a religiously-oriented demand for immediate emancipation.¹⁸ Slavery existed ideologically near enough to touch everyone but spatially far enough to be judged by some more impersonally. It also existed in the segment of the country whose economic and political interests differed sharply from that segment which was nonslaveholding. Northern industrialism, supplemented by an immigrant population and increasing
mechanization, transformed that region into one distinct from the agrarian South. Although scattered opposition to slavery existed in Colonial times, the practice did not become widely contested until 1830.\textsuperscript{19} By then, most states outside the South created societies to prohibit slave trade. At the same time, Southerners defended slavery as essential to their economic welfare. While they asserted their rights to retain prosperity and expand the system, Northern sentiments changed. Mild disapproval became aggressive demands for the immediate abolition of slavery.\textsuperscript{20}

William Lloyd Garrison, fiery editor of \textit{The Liberator}, demonstrated this change in Northern attitudes:

\begin{quote}
I am in earnest. I will not equivocate—I will not excuse—I will not retreat a single inch—and I will be heard.
\end{quote}

Garrison and others founded the New England Anti-Slavery Society in Boston in 1832; in the following year, the national organization, the American Anti-Slavery Society, was organized around the demand for abandonment of slaveholding. Other societies grew, each pursuing the abolitionist cause with untiring zeal.\textsuperscript{22} With numbers came complications in the arguments; compromise among the adherents for abolition, anti-slavery, and pro-slavery seemed unlikely. Slavery was argued on moral, democratic, economic, and social grounds, and ultimately this issue led to war. As Bormann noted:

\begin{quote}
Few reform efforts in American history can challenge the abolition movement of the years from 1830 to 1860 in terms of entertainment, excitement, and violence. Few reforms have been supported by so many inspired, dedicated, involved, and admirable people and few by as many crackpots, radicals, neurotics, and fanatics as the antislavery movement.
\end{quote}

America's search for perfection in self and society also marked the creation of several experiments in utopian communities, with their
millenialism and demands for radical social reconstruction. Conditions for social experimentation were ripe: cheap land, few governmental or societal controls, religious toleration, and a flexible economy. The communities tended to group themselves in three general areas: those based upon an economic plan, those whose origins were religious, and those begun by a charismatic leader. Robert Dale Owen's progressive cooperative called New Harmony (Indiana) was designed around a model where cooperation replaced competition, where common property and an equal share in profits existed. The American Fourierists attacked the evils of monopoly and speculation, recommending that communities should act as joint stock companies which would distribute income among capital, labor, and skill at a ratio of 4:5:3. Utopian impulses were expressed in a number of religious experiments. Joseph Smith's Mormon Church, founded in 1830, emphasized communal practices which eventually became a new social order. Ann Lee Stanley founded the Shaker movement, whose members lived in celibacy, equality, and quiet Christian harmony. Brook Farm, established by George Ripley, was supported by Boston intellectuals such as Emerson, Hawthorne, and Margaret Fuller; its members believed in a socialistic intellectual oasis in a materialistic world.

Most of these communities, except the ones held together by religious bonds, passed out of existence at the time of the Civil War. Although open, optimistic societies thrust people toward perfection, it appears that the placid life was unadventurous when compared to the challenges of a growing America.

Women's Role in Reform Causes
Women figured prominently in many of these movements, even though their early roles denied them the speaker's platform or legal rights. Their status remained much as it had been in the Eighteenth Century; legally, women were minors, with married women existing as their husband's chattels and unmarried as wards of their male relatives. DeTocqueville remarked that "In America, the independence of woman is irrecoverably lost in the bonds of matrimony." A wife could make no will, sign no contract, or witness a deed without a male's permission. Her property rights were curtailed. Sexual double standards were divinely ordained and acclaimed. Most professions were closed to women. Divorce was next to impossible. Women could not hold office or vote; as Benson noted, women may be said to have had no political rights in the eyes of the law and were as a rule left out of account in any provision for political action. Such conditions would prove to be both troublesome and provocative by mid-century.

Woman's role in society was defined as a private one; opponents to reform cited Biblical inhibitions against women speaking in public as the basis for their concerns. Most often quoted was the apostle Paul, who, in his letter to the Corinthians, directed people how to act and speak in church:

Let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home: for it is a shame for women to speak in the church.

The Congregational Church of Massachusetts brought the proper role of women in society to national attention in their famous Brookfield Bull:
We invite your attention to the dangers which at present threaten the female character with widespread and permanent injury.

The appropriate duties and influence of women are clearly stated in the New Testament. Those duties and that influence are unobtrusive and private, but the source of mighty power...we appreciate the unostentatious prayers and efforts of woman in advancing the cause of religion at home and abroad.

But when she assumes the place and tone of a man as a public reformer our care and protection of her seem unnecessary; she yields the power which God has given for her protection and her character becomes unnatural. 28

Women were expected to foster interests only in the home; educationally, they were taught domestic arts, sewing, and social graces. Cott notes that the literary market between 1820-1830 offered five categories of works for women which emphasized domesticity. These included mother's responsibility, principles for childrearing, social roles, education, and etiquette. 29 Theatrical productions were viewed as immoral, so women were limited in the social events they could attend with propriety. However, women could participate in religious prayer meetings and attend inspirational lectures and sermons. Parlor meetings and discussion groups were also permitted, as long as they were sexually restricted. 30

Although the Vindication of the Rights of Woman by Mary Wollstonecraft appeared in England in 1792 and was widely circulated (by 1796 it gained its third English edition), the status of women in America remained largely uncontested. Wollstonecraft's argument was for a revolution in female matters to make them more human. The contemporary feminist Kate Millet praised the book as the first document asserting the full humanity of women and insisting upon its recognition. 31 This recognition would in turn change sexual relationships and reform the world. Her appeal for more opportunities for women included criticism
of marriage and fixed blame upon society for woman's condition.

Popular ideas concerning the education of girls evolved from the base point of no formal education to the acknowledgment of a girl's right to acquaintance with reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and physiology. Proponents of change argued that more knowledge would make women better mothers and housewives.

A different tact in education was utilized by Emma Willard (1787–1870) and others in their attempts to promote formal education for females. In 1821, the Troy Female Seminary was opened by Mrs. Willard; it was the first higher education institution for women in the United States. Willard saw the cardinal purpose of education "to bring its subjects to the perfection of their moral, intellectual, and physical nature: in order, that they may be of the greatest possible use to themselves and others." 32 The Troy Seminary offered a systematic course of study and discipline including such subjects as solid geometry, trigonometry, algebra, geography, the "living process" of history, physiology, and elocution. The latter subject was a required course using Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres as text, allowing for the writing of compositions and oral reading. Student authors would never serve as readers of their own material for fear of putting a strain on their modesty; instead, a teacher or fellow classmate would present the work orally. 33

The coeducational movement made some headway in the Midwest when Oberlin College in Ohio became the first institution to offer women a curriculum comparable to its men in 1837. Even so, the attitude there persisted that women should listen and learn. Lucy Stone (1818–
and Antoinette Brown were permitted to join Professor James Thome's rhetoric class in 1845; after participating in one debate (to the horror of the class), they were requested by the College Ladies Board to limit their participation to silent attention. Other colleges slowly followed Oberlin's open-door policy; in 1856 the University of Iowa became the first state university to admit women.

Little advancement was made before 1840 to free women from restrictive laws and customs. Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England provided the basic account of English common law; this was the foundation of American legal tradition. Boorstin says of Blackstone's Commentaries:

In the history of American institutions, no other book—except the Bible—has played so great a role as Blackstone's Commentaries. Blackstone's work...became the bible of American legal institutions. His account of the British constitution and the common law was so comprehensive, so compendious, and so attractive that Americans were hardly tempted to make pretentions and dogmatic codifications of their own.

Although the romantic ideals of happy marriage and contented family life were widely publicized, many women found that reality and law did not match such claims. Not only did her prenuptial property become the legal possession of her husband, but so did her earnings. Mothers had no control over their children's destinies; if a father died when children were small, the mother was considered an unfit guardian and a male was made court-appointed custodian. Under the law, the husband was responsible for his wife's conduct and deportment. These and similar laws negated the existence of a married woman, submerging her life to that of her husband and defining her total dependence on him.

For women choosing to remain single, once they passed the stigma forced upon them by society for their failure to secure a mate and
bear and raise his children, life was a bit less restrictive. The single woman could own and control her property and earnings. However, she was restricted by custom to a few fields of low-paying employment; many of the trades women practiced in colonial times now required the very training from which women were excluded. Now open were jobs such as sewing, teaching, factory work, and domestic service. By 1850, there were 225,000 women in industrial jobs, mostly in the textile industry. Women worked 13-14 hours per day and were paid one-seventh to one-fourth of men's salaries for the same work. A woman was tolerated in the teaching field because she could be paid so much less; a man usually would teach only if he could find nothing else to do.

The initial improvements in laws governing women's rights came through legislation fostered by men. In 1839, Mississippi passed a law which allowed a married woman to own and control the property which had been hers before marriage; Maryland added a "Married Woman's Property Act" two years later. Nevertheless, most American women remained in legal bondage to their husbands throughout much of the century.

Meanwhile, out of the efforts of women to speak for abolition and temperance grew the most compelling motive for women to take part in public affairs. As working hours shortened at home due to the advancements in technology, women had time to read tracts, discuss issues, and conduct public meetings. The Grimke sisters, Sara and Angelina, began using the public platform in order to speak about the conditions of slavery; since both were raised in Charleston, South
Carolina, as daughters in a slave-holding family, they could speak with authority. Their presence on the platform aroused fury and persecution, for not only were they breaking the boundaries of woman's sphere, they were also endorsing an unpopular cause. In fact, it was Angelina Grimke's addresses, particularly in Massachusetts, which gave rise to the General Association of Congregational Ministers' letter admonishing churches against women speaking in public.41

As an outcome of frequent riots and abuse, the National Female Anti-Slavery Society was formed in 1833; it was the first effort by an organized women's society to attack a political question. The Society attracted intolerance from many quarters, the most vehement being religious. Followers were denounced as unwomanly and unChristian. Nevertheless, the Grimkes and others persisted in their work, gaining insight into their opposition. In their speeches and articles, they met the religious assault head on; they denied Biblical justification for woman's so-called inferior position.

A second censure came from the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1840. While that Society accepted women as persons able to pay dues, it was unsure of the propriety of women and men serving on committees together. When Abby Kelley was voted in as a member of a committee, a large number of members resigned, thus splitting the ranks. In the same year, the British Anti-Slavery Society invited all opposed to slavery to a World Convention in London. A stormy debate ensued in the first session over female representation; it ended with a vote to bar women delegates. This unwarranted rejection of properly accredited delegates solely on the basis of sex gave impulse to the later organized demands of women for equal rights at Seneca Falls, New York.
While the first efforts of women to help slaves and improve society were largely ineffectual, their attempts at reform did bring them into public contact with assembled listeners of both sexes. The beginnings of higher education, coupled with their emergence of platform speakers and organized workers, gave women the opportunity to utilize their talents and to compete equally with men. The way had been opened and there were scattered, articulate voices speaking out. What was needed was further organization and leadership. These were to be the accomplishments of the First Woman's Rights Convention held at Seneca Falls on July 19 and 20, 1848.

**Key Value Orientations**

Democratic idealism which infused the first half of the Nineteenth Century was met by staunch resistance in the form of traditional values. With the ferment of intellectual activity and reform, old ways were now being questioned. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, values are those objects of agreement that make possible a communion with regard to a particular way of acting. 43 It is important to note here some of the objects of agreement which impeded reform efforts.

With the increasing urbanization and industrialization, the value placed upon the family underwent a shift. During Colonial times, a man and a woman were considered to share in a co-equal partnership; the family was a primary economic unit requiring the labor of both sexes. The demands of the New World allowed colonial women more freedom than was often available to those of later generations. In an undeveloped, sparsely populated land, the labor of every able-bodied settler was vital, and woman's traditional chores of providing food, shelter,
clothing, and hygiene were essential to survival; therefore, women were highly valued. The latitude of colonial society regarding women was more a product of necessity than ideology; while men brought with them their European ideas that women were inferior beings, the New World conditions minimized their importance. As long as the colonies remained undeveloped, women enjoyed a rare sense of independence.

Women were an integral part of the New World’s permanent settlements. Where there were women, there were permanent settlements and civilization. The organizers of Virginia understood this, and they sought to attract women to their colony so that the men who came might create stronger ties to the land. In Georgia’s early days, the proprietors advertised for male recruits with "industrious wives."  

The lives of colonial men and women tended to center around family and farm. For the most part, a traditional division of labor was observed; men did outside work, planting and harvesting crops; women worked inside, transforming raw materials into usable commodities. Despite regional variations (Boorstin notes Northern women spent hours spinning and weaving; Southern women tended herb gardens and were expected to be experts at doctoring), women’s activities were much the same throughout the colonies; they were expected to supervise the home, manage family books, order provisions, keep the garden and hen yard. Further, they were expected to be expert at sewing, knitting, and quilting. The following account, taken from the diary of a young colonial woman in 1775, indicates the emphasis placed upon the heavy work load which was often taken for granted:
Fixed gown for Prude...mended mothers riding hood, spun short thread fix'd two gowns for Welsh girls...carded, spun linens...worked on cheese basket...hatched flax with Hannah, we did 51 pounds a piece...pleated and ironed...milked cows...spun linen...did 50 knots...made a broom of guireau wheat straw, spun thread to whiten...set a red dye, spun harness twine, scoured the pewter. 46

Colonial women also worked outside the home, performing virtually every trade held by men. They ran taverns, inns, and boarding houses; they were teachers, publishers, and shopkeepers. 47 For the most part, colonial women were fully equal to men and were competent to deal with the harsh realities of their lives. The image of colonial women is extraordinary in its spirit, energy, and stamina. Because of their abilities, women were valued as equal partners, for their contribution to the quality of daily living on a practical basis was essential.

Following the Revolutionary War and in the early decades of the 1800s, a new middle class emerged in the Northeast. As men began to work away from their homes in commercial enterprise, home and family came to be seen as separate entities from the work world. Where money was earned for labor, a new valuation on work and roles began to emerge. Women of the middle class were isolated from the world of men and commerce. 48 This new separation affected women in several significant ways: while they continued to perform traditional domestic work, those endeavors were no longer considered "real work" because they earned no money. So, cut off from a monetary-oriented economy, a woman might labor all day cooking, cleaning, making clothing and essential household goods, and caring for children, but she would still be slighted in society's eyes. No longer was woman a partner of man; she was defined as a supported dependant. Factories began producing many essential family goods, which further shifted the value placed upon
family; tasks such as spinning, weaving, and creating small artisan works were taken from woman. As factories emerged, women were even more dependent upon their husband's earnings to buy factory-made goods which they formerly made themselves.49

While woman's household work and worth became devalued, the ideas about home, children, and wife took on new levels of emotional significance. Here were beings to be cherished and protected from the cruelties of the outside world. A wife was seen as her husband's "better half;" while he was struggling in the demanding, unsympathetic business environment, she could embody all of the goodness, purity, and emotionality he had to stifle. Thus, the home and family became the emotional altar for all the sentiment and feelings men felt incapable of expressing in the business side of their lives.

An equally important value to come to the fore was a revised definition of the proper "sphere" of each sex. This theory of human personality evolved from an almost religious emotionalism based upon the belief that men and women were polar opposites. The concept of separate spheres is one which changed over time.50 As men began to distinguish "women's work" from their own because of specialized occupational demands, the idea of spheres also changed; women's sphere was separate because it was at home, where demands for logic and money that men faced were excluded; thus, the sphere began to be seen as being opposite of an occupation, and therefore it was of less value. Woman's character, as defined by the limitations of this sphere, was simultaneously glorified and devalued.
Even during America's early days, men appear to have held the belief that woman's sphere was the home and its domestic duties; women were to avoid dabbling in public affairs or politics. Governor Winthrop in 1645 spoke in no uncertain terms for the Seventeenth Century when he wrote:

Mr. Hopkins, the governour of Hartford upon Connecticut, came to Boston and brought his wife with him (a godly young woman, and of special parts) who has fallen into a sad infirmity, the loss of her understanding and reason, which had been growing upon her divers years, by occasion of her giving herself wholly to reading and writing, and had written many books. If she had attended to her household affairs, and such things as belong to women, and not gone out of her way and calling to meddle in such things as are proper for men, whose minds are stronger, etc., she had kept her wits, and might have improved them usefully and honorably in the place God had set her. 51

Thomas Jefferson, writing from Paris in 1788 to Mrs. Bingham, bespoke the opinions of the Eighteenth Century:

But our good ladies, I trust, have been too wise to wrinkle their foreheads with politics. They are contented to soothe and calm the minds of their husbands returning ruffled from political debate. They have the good sense to value domestic happiness above all others. There is no part of the earth where so much of this is enjoyed as in America. 52

And Benjamin Franklin wrote the following to his wife from London:

You are very prudent not to engage in party Disputes. Women never should meddle with them except in Endeavors to reconcile their Husbands, Brothers, and Friends, who happen to be of contrary Sides. If your Sex can keep cool, you may be a means of cooling our the sooner, and restoring more speedily that social Harmony among Fellow Citizens that is so desirable after long and bitter Dissention. Remember that modesty, as it makes the most homely virgin amiable and charming, so the want of it unfallably renders the perfect beauty disagreeable and odious. But when that brightest of female virtues shines among other perfections of body and mind in the same mind, it makes the woman more lovely than angel. 53

Abigail Adams frequently expressed her belief that it was the woman's first duty to help her husband. that the greatest pleasure came from such a responsibility:
To be the strength, the inmost joy, of a man who within the conditions of his life seems to you a hero at every turn—there is no happiness more penetrating for a wife than this.

George Burnap, in an 1847 lecture on the sphere and duties of woman, handled his topic in the following manner:

...whatever may be the original equality of the sexes in intellect and capacity, it is evident that it was intended by God that they should move in different spheres, and of course that their powers should be developed in different directions. They are created not to be alike but to be different. This difference runs through the whole of their physical, moral, and intellectual constitution.

To woman are given the care of home, the preparation of food, the making of clothing, the nursing and education of children. To her is given in larger measure sensibility, tenderness, patience. She feels herself weak and timid. She needs a protector. She is in a measure dependent.

(There is) an instinctive reverence which the two sexes have for each other. It is a sort of human religion. The human soul, made after the similitude of God, has ever a sort of Divinity about it. The God who made them knew the sphere in which each of them was to act, and he fitted them for it by their physical frames, by their intellectual susceptibilities, by their tastes and affections.

These separate branches of humankind, or spheres, had opposing characteristics which simultaneously elevated and lowered woman. Her central virtues were piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity.

In contrast to the picture of the woman of the 1700's who was strong, hardy, brave and adventurous. One description of the Nineteenth Century woman presented her in the following manner:

Her attributes are rather of a passive than active character. Her power is more emblematic of divinity. Women we behold dependent and wark, but out of that very weakness and dependence springs an irresistible power.

Man, on the other hand

...leaves the domestic scenes; he plunges into the turmoil and bustle of an active, selfish world; in his journey through life, he has to encounter innumerable difficulties, hardships, and labors which constantly beset him. His mind must be girded against them. Hence courage and boldness are his attributes.
Religious work did not take away from woman's true sphere, because it was her duty to be the savior of men. Piety was the core of woman's virtue. "From her home woman performed her great task of bringing men back to God." Because woman was the repositor of life-giving maternity and in possession of intuition and refinement, she was morally and spiritually superior to man. Welter said that religion belonged to woman by diving right, a gift of God and nature. Woman could become another, better Eve, working in cooperation with the Redeemer, bringing the world back from sin and revolt. As the General Association of Congregational Ministers' letter piously advised: "When the mild, dependent, softening influence of woman on the sternness of man's opinions is fully exercised, society feels the effect of it in a thousand forms."

Woman's responsibility to adhere to her sphere without question was regarded as a moral issue with scriptural backing. Most often quoted was St. Paul's injunction for women to keep silent in church. In exchange for woman's sacrifice of the outside world, her sphere presented her with a near-reverent regard, a power "emblematic of divinity." Burnap regarded woman's condition as the gift of God which would in turn elevate her state:

What woman is today, she owes entirely to Christianity and the doctrine of immortality which accompanies it. It is the new sentiment of respect for woman, introduced by Christianity, which gave rise to Chivalry...which elevated woman from a slave to a diety.

Woman's sphere defined her as physically weaker than man, inferior to him intellectually, and unsuited for business or worldly pursuits. Sarah Hale, publisher of the influential Godey's Lady's Book, made a crusade of analyzing and prescribing woman's sphere. A true woman,
she wrote, was "delicate and timid, required protection, possessed a sweet dependency, was above all things modest, and had charming and insinuating manners."64

Women's efforts for reform were confined to private prayer, attendance at public prayer meetings and sewing circles, and contributions of money, all acceptable activities to her sphere. Public speaking was approved of only when women spoke to other women; it was man's presence which made speaking to a mixed audience immodest. Frances J. Hosford noted:

Public speech was outside a mystical geometrical entity called "woman's sphere." The religious called it unscriptural for a woman, the cultured thought it unseemly, the cynical found in it material for their bitterest sneers, the evil-minded felt free to make a woman orator the target of vulgarity.

The further separation into distinct spheres which emphasized the opposite nature and differences of the sexes altered the relationships between them as well as changed the value attached to the sexes' manner and activity. De Tocqueville remarked, "In no country has such constant care been taken as in America to trace two clearly distinct lines of action for the two sexes, in two pathways which are always different."65 Along with the shift in economic conditions, society placed newly emergent values upon activities of both sexes. The home was no longer the economic nucleus of family life. And as the need for woman declined in some social areas and rose in others, her own value changed, as did the respect given her. On one hand, tradition and contemporary literature encouraged the idea of a perfect woman with requisite virtues, but forces were at work in society which impelled woman herself to change, to play a more active, creative role. Reform
movements, westward migration, and industrialism demanded responses from woman that differed from those she was told were hers by nature or divine decree. The value orientations which predominated at the time would prove to be major obstacles to reform efforts, especially in the arguments for women's rights.
CHAPTER THREE
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: BIOGRAPHY

Elizabeth Cady Stanton lived during an era when the law placed the burden on women: a "defect of sex," which was related to conditions concerning women's property, children, employment, and marriage. Born November 12, 1815, in Johnstown, NY, Elizabeth Cady was the daughter of Margaret Livingston, whose father, Colonel James Livingston, fought in the Revolution under General Washington, and Daniel Cady, a distinguished lawyer, New York State Judge and Congressman. Of her birth, Cady Stanton later noted:

With several generations of vigorous, enterprising ancestors behind me, I commenced the struggle of life under favorable circumstances...the same year that my father...was elected to Congress. Perhaps the excitement of a political campaign, in which my mother took the deepest interest, may have had an influence on my life and given me the strong desire that I have always felt to participate in the rights and duties of government.¹

Margaret Livingston Cady (1785-1871), of Scottish and Dutch descent, was said by Cady Stanton to have the "military idea of government,"² which relied heavily upon the use of fear rather than love and compassion in raising children. Combined with the Puritan ideas on ever-present evil, she controlled servants and children with a firm hand.

Daniel Cady (1773-1859), the earliest influential figure in Cady Stanton's life, was both "loved the feared by his family. Elizabeth called him "a man of firm character and unimpeachable integrity, and yet sensitive and modest to a painful degree."³
As fitting a family of moderate wealth, the Cadys' home was a two-story white frame house with grounds joining those of a Presbyterian minister, Simon Hosack. A series of nurses, tutors, and negro servants added to the quality of life. Elizabeth Cady noted that Johnstown was an intellectual center which also allowed for ample outdoor activity. Most clearly remembered were the Johnstown Academy and churchez, each of which owned bells which "seemed to be forever tolling for school, funerals, church, or prayer meetings."4 These bells were warnings of an eternal future, and Cady Stanton saw in them visions of the inferno. The religious fascination in which she was raised chafed her early in life. She recalled that a nurse challenged her pensive expression as one disguising mischief. Elizabeth replied:

I was wondering why it was that everything we like to do is a sin, and that everything we dislike is commanded by God or some one on earth. I am so tired of that everlasting no! no! no! 5

This early resistance to established custom was further strengthened by Elizabeth's ability to use words effectively in expressing her thoughts and arousing action in others. She recalls setting forth the constant hindering of a child's life to her sister Margaret, who agreed to act upon desires without asking. "I have a confused memory of being often under punishment for what was in those days were called 'tantrums.' I suppose they were really justifiable acts of rebellion against the tyranny of those in authority."6

Two events were engraved early upon Elizabeth's memory. The first, birth of a sister in 1819, was a cause for pity on her part. Having heard many visitors remark upon the pity that the child was a girl, Elizabeth felt compassion for the stranger. When she was eleven, her
her only brother Eleazer, who had just graduated from Union College, died of an illness, the effect of an accident. Elizabeth went to her father’s study to comfort him, and,

We both sat in silence, he thinking of the wreck of all his hopes in the loss of a dear son, and I wondering what could be said or done to fill the void in his breast. At length he heaved a deep sigh and said “Oh, my daughter, would that you were a boy!”

This statement was to be repeated by her father several more times in her growing years, but it was at this point that she resolved to pledge her life to study in order to be the best in her father’s eyes, even though she was of the incorrect sex.

At the time of that resolution, the Reverend Simon Hosack came to be Elizabeth’s primary intellectual influence. As their gardens shared common boundaries, she was Hosack’s frequent visitor; he seemed never too weary to answer her endless questions. Elizabeth Cady was also Hosack’s companion on his parish rounds, and they rode endless miles together, talking for hours. Hosack had the habit of using adult expressions and explaining them; Elizabeth called these the earliest influences on her intellectual development. “Some of the rare phrases with which he besprinkled his conversation have always abided with me and did not a little to awaken in my young and receptive brain a taste for rhetoric.” Hosack also sensitized the young girl to respond with compassion to her surroundings, creating in her an openness and liberal view which was beyond her years.

Elizabeth Cady turned to Hosack for tutelage in horseback riding, Greek, and grammar. He also provided comfort for her feelings of suffering and sorrow at being female. He instilled in her a feeling of self-confidence as he told her:
It is your mission to help mold the world anew. May good angels give you thoughts and move you to do the work which they want done on earth. You must promise me one thing, and that is that you will always say what you think. Your thoughts are given to you to utter, not to conceal; and if you are true to yourself, and give to others all you see and know, God will pour more light and truth into your soul.

At age eleven, Elizabeth Cady was enrolled at the Johnstown Academy, where she studied Latin, Greek, and mathematics with boys. She received class honors in Greek, but when she told her father of her prize, beyond a look of pleasure and some questions about her class and teachers, his only comment was a sighed, "Ah, you should have been a boy!" as he kissed her forehead.

Since her father's law office joined the house, Elizabeth spent much of her time there listening to clients' cases, talking with law students, and becoming familiar with laws affecting women. "The tears and complaints of the women who came to my father for legal advice touched my heart, and early drew my attention to the injustice and cruelty of the laws."11 Such experiences were to form the foundation for most of her life's work toward changing statutes unfair to women. Judge Cady eventually acknowledged her interests and told her:

When you are grown up, and able to prepare a speech, you must go down to Albany and talk to the legislators; tell them all you have seen in this office...and, if you can persuade them to pass new laws, the old ones will be a dead letter.12

Until age 15, Elizabeth studied at the Johnstown Academy. Boys graduating went to the Union College at Schenectady, where women were barred. In the winter of 1830, Elizabeth Cady was enrolled at the fashionable Willard's Troy Seminary, which was considered an intellectual Mecca, albeit entirely female. Here she came into contact with girls from Europe, Canada, and all parts of the United States. Emma Hart
Willard (1787-1870), schooled at one of Connecticut's first academies, gave her students a thorough grounding in physiology (shocking for the times), geography (from her own text), higher mathematics, Greek and Latin, French, music, and elocution (utilizing Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.)

Another important event which happened in Troy and influenced Elizabeth Cady's character was the public services of a fiery pulpit orator, Reverend Charles G. Finney, whom she termed "a terrorier of human souls." Six weeks of revival sessions, daily prayer, and experience meetings at the Seminary had a tremendous effect on Elizabeth. The young listeners were exhorted on their assured eternal damnation due to the total depravity of humanity and God's hatred of sin. Finney was able to bring his audience into a state of total humility, which had only one source of salvation: turning their hearts over to Jesus. Elizabeth noted the results in her diary: "Owing to my gloomy Calvinistic training in the old scotch Presbyterian Church, and my vivid imagination, I was one of the first victims." Although many imagined themselves converted and saved, rather than sinful outcasts, Finney's oratory and theatrics shortened their hopes. Elizabeth found herself prostrated from the mental anguish of visions of hell; such a nervous condition endangered her health. Returning home, she often awoke her family to pray for her immortal soul.

In order to ease her anguish, a family trip to Niagara Falls was planned. This six-week sojourn proved highly beneficial, and Elizabeth found her mental condition shifting from religious superstition to rational ideas whose basis existed in fact.
After two or three years at Troy, Elizabeth Cady returned home to Johnstown. Frequent visits with friends and relatives in nearby towns and villages offered her the opportunity to enjoy new freedom in thought and action. Of particular importance was her eldest sister Tryphena's husband, homeopathic surgeon Edward Bayard. Elizabeth viewed Bayard as companion, counselor, and confidant because "in the pursuit of truth (he) was in no way trammeled by popular superstitions. He took nothing for granted, and, like Socrates, went about asking questions." Bayard's discussions about law, philosophy, history, and literature sharpened the young girl's abilities in logic, analysis, and debate.

The Cady family spent yearly visits at the home of Margaret Livingstone's nephew, Gerrit Smith (1797-1874) of Peterboro, NY. Smith was a leading orator of the day who supported many reform causes and whose home was used for action as well as discussion. Oneida Indians maintained a long-established tradition of hospitality in his home. Escaped slaves knew the site as a station on the Underground Railroad; they often stopped there on their way north to Canada and freedom. It was at Peterboro where Elizabeth Cady became fast friends with Smith's daughter Libby (Elizabeth), who enjoyed arguing about philosophy as much as Elizabeth. Subjects as diverse as politics, temperence, religion, slavery, women's rights, and dress reform were freely discussed; Smith's generosity extended to guests from all walks of life. As Elizabeth later noted, "These rousing arguments at Peterboro made social life seem tame and profitless elsewhere, and the youngest of us felt that the conclusions reached in this school of philosophy were not to be questioned."
Henry Brewster Stanton (1805-1887) held a series of antislavery meetings in Madison County, making Gerrit Smith's home his base. He preached political action, saying the way to reform lay through the ballot. Stanton's impassioned oratory attracted the attention of Elizabeth Cady, who remarked on his power to make audiences cry and laugh. In October 1839, the two became engaged.

Elizabeth Cady termed her engagement season one of doubt and conflict. Judge Cady was adamant over his disapproval of this antislavery lecturer and radical who was too impractical to be able to support a wife. Gerrit Smith warned her of the pitfalls of the marriage relationship. Nevertheless, Stanton's letters, according to Elizabeth, consisted of "the brilliant word-painting of one of the most eloquent pens of this generation." Elizabeth Cady broke the engagement but renewed it upon learning of Stanton's plans to attend the World's Anti-Slavery convention in London as a delegate; they did not want an ocean separating them.

Despite family objections to Stanton's radicalism, their ten years' age difference, and the unlucky marriage day of a Friday, the two were wed on May 10, 1840. Stanton proved to be an apt partner for Elizabeth Cady, as theirs was a marriage which lasted nearly half a century; he, too, acted upon strongly held beliefs. As Elizabeth noted, "I felt a new inspiration in life and was enthused with new ideas of individual rights and the basic principles of government." The tone for the equal marriage partnership was set when Elizabeth persuaded the Scotch clergyman to eliminate the word "obey" from the wedding vows; she declared that she wished to be known as Elizabeth Cady Stanton. She
supported this belief in the following manner:

There is a great deal in a name. It often signifies much and may involve a great principle. Why are slaves nameless unless they take that of their master? Simply because they have no independent existence; even so with women. The custom of calling women Mrs. John This or Mrs. Tom That is founded on the principle that white men are lords of us all.  

The newlyweds' wedding journey put them aboard the trans-Atlantic ship the Montreal, bound for England. They were to visit London, Scotland, Ireland, and Paris. Sharing the ship's 18-day passage was James G. Birney (1792-1857), the conservative antislavery nominee for President of the United States. His ideas on proper manners and conversation were diligently applied in an attempt to improve Cady Stanton's demeanor, to little avail. Birney's excessive polish and hypercritical remarks concerning her manners (including such unladylike behaviors as referring to her husband as "Henry" rather than "Mr. Stanton" in the presence of strangers) were listened to goodheartedly but were ignored. As Elizabeth stated, "Being...endowed with a good degree of self-esteem, neither the praise nor the blame of mankind was overpowering."  

The World's Anti-Slavery Convention met June 12, 1840, in London's Freemason's Hall with delegates from numerous antislavery societies. Though women were equal member of the American National Antislavery Society, their representation was rejected by the dominating English factions who felt women were not fit to be delegates. The question was hotly debated, with the clerical delegates being the most violently opposed. With assurance backed by Biblical clout, they argued woman's divinely decreed subjection. Cady Stanton pointed up her disdain:
It was really pitiful to hear the narrow-minded bigots, pretending to be teachers and leaders of men, so cruelly remanding their own mothers, with the rest of womankind, to absolute subjection to the ordinary masculine type of humanity.  

She also described her disgust at the lack of consistency of those who, after eloquently decrying slavery, denied freedom to one-half of the human race:

Such was the consistancy of an assemblage of philanthropists! They would have been horrified at the idea of burning the flesh of the distinguished women present with red-hot irons, but the crucifixion of their pride and self-respect, the humiliation of spirit, seemed to them a most trifling matter.  

Following the convention, Birney, Stanton, and others spoke throughout England, Scotland and Ireland. Hosted by leading Quaker families and other philanthropists concerned with the antislavery movement, Cady Stanton had the opportunity to sightsee extensively, hearing famous preachers, actors, and statesmen. Among the notable was Daniel O'Connell (1775-1847), the Irish "Great Liberator," who endeared himself to her by presenting a beautiful tribute to women and pleading his support to them. The Stantons visited Wordsworth's Grasmere home, met with Lady Byron, and spent time in Thomas Clarkson's Ipswich mansion.  

After London, the Stantons visited Paris, sightseeing for a month. Napoleon's sarcophagus was being readied at the Hotel des Invalides, and the national excitement and pageantry invigorated Cady Stanton. The next tours led them through Great Britain, where they visited scenes made classic by Burns, Dickens, Shakespears, Scott, and Byron. Finally, in December, they left Europe, arriving in Boston after a passage on the Sirius of the Cunard Line.
Cady Stanton quickly had another concern which occupied much of her time—a baby, Daniel Cady Stanton, born March 2, 1842. Her eagerness to raise her son in the best manner caused her to read everything in her reach; the lack of attention to such an important topic appalled her. Her thoughts about the traditions and misconceptions of doctors and nurses were characteristically biting: "I had been thinking, reading, observing, and had as little faith in the popular theories in regard to babies as on any other subject." After disagreeing with a doctor's treatment of Daniel's bent collarbone, she provided her own successful treatment. She later commented:

Thus, in the supreme moment of a young mother's life, when I needed tender care and support, the whole responsibility of my child's supervision fell upon me; but though uncertain at every step of my own knowledge, I learned another lesson in self-reliance. I trusted neither men nor books absolutely after this, either in regard to the heavens above or the earth beneath, but continued to use my "mother's instinct," if "reason" is too dignified a term to apply to a woman's thoughts.

The concern over misinformation on babies was to become another important dimension of Cady Stanton's personality, and she felt bound to improve their lot.

In the autumn of 1843, Henry was admitted to the bar and entered legal practice with John Bowles in Boston. The stimulating intellectual climate opened an activity-filled life for Elizabeth, who attended antislavery conventions, temperance, peace, and prison reform fairs, and as many lectures, concerts, and theaters as possible. It was in Boston that she met John Pierpoint, John Greenleaf Whittier, Parker Pillsbury. Lydia Marie Child, Abby Kelly, and Stephen Foster. Her desire to find an understandable, logical religion found her encouraged by Theodore Parker's rejection of miracles and prayer to a god who was
father and mother to all. Her frequent visits to William Lloyd Garrison's home allowed for lively, intriguing discussions. In addition, she spent time at the Brook Farm Community at the height of its prosperity. There she met the Ripleys, William Henry Channing, Bronson Alcott, William Chase, and Mrs. Horace Greely. At one local convention she met and heard Frederick Douglass, whose friendship was to be fruitful and lasting.

Daniel Cady moved to Albany in 1843 to establish his sons-in-law, Samuel Wilkeson and Daniel McMartin, in a legal practice. During the winter of 1844, Elizabeth left the activity of Boston to retreat to the family rallying point, awaiting the birth of Henry B. Stanton, Jr. Daniel Cady bought the growing family a house in Chelsea with a view of Boston Bay.

Elizabeth enjoyed housekeeping, which she saw as a new chapter in her book of experiences. She studied all aspects of running a household, including washing, meals, cleaning, and childrearing. She noted in her diary:

I felt the same ambition to excel in all departments of the culinary arts that I did at school in the different branches of learning. My love of order and cleanliness was carried throughout, from parlor to kitchen, from the front door to the back.

Into this happy regime, Elizabeth's third son was born in September 1845. Due to the visit of her cousin Gerrit Smith, the child was named in his honor. Elizabeth's protests were ignored, for she didn't care for the practice of labeling children with family names. In addition, "I had a list of beautiful names for sons and daughters, from which to designate each newcomer; but, as yet, not one on my list had been used for my children."
The Stanton's home was often the site of dinner parties and stimulating conversations. John Greenleaf Whittier was an admired visitor who also dedicated a volume of his poetry (Poems: First Edition, Philadelphia: Joseph Healy Company, 1848) to Henry for his devotion to humanity. Whittier appealed to Elizabeth's sense of righteousness, and she attributed to him the ability through his poetry to "emancipate the minds of his generation from the gloomy superstitions of puritanical religion."^40

Henry's law practice was growing and he was considered to be a man of political promise. However, his delicate health was harmed by Boston's fierce winters. On the advice of family and friends, the Stantons moved to Seneca Falls, NY, where Daniel Cady gave them a home on the outskirts of town. The next sixteen years there saw the birth of other Stanton children: Theodore, 1851; Margaret, 1852; Harriot, 1856; and Robert, 1859.

While the year 1848 was a turning point in the Stanton Family's lives, momentous changes were occurring all over the nation. Gold was discovered at Sutter's mill in California and Americans by the thousands swarmed westward. With the overthrow of government in France and Germany, immigrants by the hundreds fled to America's freedom. Temperence and prison reforms came to dominate the headlines. In New York, the Married Woman's Property Act was passed, giving women control for the first time over the property they owned at the time of their marriage; what belonged to a wife could no longer be used to defray her husband's debts. Anesthesia was first used in childbirth, a blessed reform in medical care. But perhaps the most significant of these many
many turning points as far as women were concerned, was the First Woman's Rights Convention held on July 19 and 20 at Seneca Falls.

Lucretia Mott, a 47 year old Quaker who was a liberal thinker on politics, religion, and social questions in general, had been a delegate refused seating at the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention in London. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, on her honeymoon, had largely lived outside of reform causes to any significant degree. Fortuitously, these two shared lodging in London, spending hours in each others' company. Discussions around the dinner table centered on the split in the American antislavery ranks. Cady Stanton saw the major issue of the day not as slavery but as woman's rights. She noted:

The potent element which caused the division was the woman question, and as the Garrisonian branch maintained the right of women to speak and vote in the conventions, all my sympathies were with the Garrisonians though Mr. Stanton and Mr. Birney belonged to the other Branch, called political abolitionists. To me there was no question so important as the emancipation of women from the dogmas of the past, political, religious, and social. It struck me as very remarkable that abolitionists who felt so keenly the wrongs of the slave, should be so oblivious to the equal wrongs of their own mothers, wives, and sisters. 41

The discussions were a revelation to Elizabeth, who said:

These were the first women I had ever met who believed in the equality of the sexes. The acquaintance of Lucretia Mott...opened to me a new world of thought. 42

Long walks together and six weeks' time allowed the two to converse over social theories, religious issues, and reform programs of the day. These discussions culminated in an agreement between Mott and Cady Stanton to "hold a convention as soon as we returned home, and form a society to advocate the rights of women." 43

Although conceived in 1840, the compact was not to be given birth for eight years. Mrs. Mott was preoccupied with illness, family
responsibilities, and religious obligations. Cady Stanton was caught up in the births of her seven children. Her life was rich, and she had lived in relative ease. Yet, neither woman lost sight of the disadvantages of being a woman. Cady Stanton and Mott corresponded for several years, but they made no attempt to call a protest convention.

In 1846, the Stantons moved to Seneca Falls; life there in this small upstate town proved to be less stimulating for Elizabeth than her previous homes. Running a household held limited challenge, and there was a distinct lack of intellectual activity; Cady Stanton found her life narrowing into a small domestic focus. Her diary reports:

My duties were too numerous and varied, and no one sufficiently exhilarating or intellectual to bring into play my higher faculties. I suffered with mental hunger, which, like an empty stomach, is very depressing.

The isolated household, frequently absent husband, and demanding children filled Elizabeth with discontent:

My experience at the World's Anti-Slavery Convention, all I had read of the legal status of women, and the oppression I saw everywhere, together swept across my soul, intensified now by many personal experiences. It seemed as if all the elements had conspired to impel me to some onward step. I could not see what to do or where to begin—my only thought was a public meeting for protest and discussion.

An invitation for a reunion with Lucretia Mott at the home of Mrs. Jane Hunt in Waterloo, NY, offered Cady Stanton the chance to act. On July 13, 1848, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, Mary Ann McClintock, Jane Hunt, and Martha C. Wright issued a call for a convention to discuss women's grievances. The call was published on July 14 in the Seneca County Courier, giving five days' notice for the convention to be held in Seneca Falls' Wesleyan Chapel on July 19 and 20. The first day's meeting was held exclusively for women, the second for
the general public. There were to be several speakers, but only
Lucretia Mott was named for the second day.

The five intervening days were hectic. The planners discussed
women's wrongs and the means to make them apparent to the world. What
they felt was needed was some kind of declaration such as they were
familiar with from antislavery experiences. Their ideas needed to be
organized into one clear statement which could guide future action.
In an appeal to abstract justice, Cady Stanton noticed that the
Declaration of Independence appeared tailored to their needs. They
found as many grievances against man's government as the colonists
had found against King George's; consequently, they drew up the Declara-
tion of Women's Rights, which they also called the Declaration of
Sentiments. The resulting document was presented by Cady Stanton on
the first morning of the convention; its underlying thesis was that the
rights declared in the Declaration of Independence must be extended
to women as well as men. It stated: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident: that all men and women are created equal."[^46] Using phrases
from the 1776 Declaration, the women's statement claimed that "the
history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations
on the part of man to woman, having in direct object the establishment
of absolute tyranny over her."[^47] Following this statement were a list
of injuries to women done by men. Perhaps most damaging was the claim
that man attempts to destroy woman's self-confidence and self-respect.
The Declaration ended by insisting that women have "immediate admission
to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of
the United States."[^48] The framers pledged to use all means possible
to fight the ridicule and misrepresentations they knew would follow. As foretold, the Declaration aroused a storm of controversy.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton was charged with drafting the majority of the resolutions to strengthen the Declaration's demands. These resolutions attempted to improve woman's lot in two distinct ways: the legal one of removing barriers to political, educational, and professional equality; and the personal one of causing women to acknowledge their inferior position and demand change.

The ninth resolution, drafted by Cady Stanton alone, proved to be the most contentious. It read: "Resolved, that it is the duty of the women of this country to secure to themselves their sacred right to the elective franchise." In creating these resolutions, Cady Stanton consulted her husband Henry, who insisted that the very mention of such a farfetched notion would make the entire project appear preposterous. While he willingly helped with the list of grievances, Henry urged Elizabeth to give up such a revolutionary idea. When his protests were ignored, Henry threatened to leave town and attend none of the meetings. He kept his word. Lucretia Mott, arriving shortly before the convention was to begin, examined the resolutions with an approving eye until reaching the Ninth. Elizabeth noted: "When I spoke to Lucretia Mott about my intention to present this, she amazed my by objecting, 'Why Lizzie, thee will make us ridiculous.' Cady Stanton refused to remove the resolution, for she believed that the ability to vote gave the power to make the laws. This was how all other rights could be won."
July 19, 1848, dawned, a fine summer morning. Carriages and
wagons converged upon Seneca Falls from a radius of fifty miles. The
Weslyan Chapel was found to be locked, but a nephew of Cady Stanton's
was boosted through a window, and the crowd of about 300 was let in.
Although men were not supposed to attend the first day's session, about
forty were admitted. Although this was to be a convention for women,
it was still unthinkable for a woman to preside; James Mott was asked
to serve as moderator. Lucretia Mott was given the floor to explain the
convention's purpose; she was followed by Cady Stanton's reading of
the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions.

Cady Stanton's maiden public speech was made despite a combination
of stage fright and the formidable undertaking of initiating action by
and for women. The opening of the address admitted her strong feelings:

I should feel exceedingly diffident to appear before you at this
time, having never before spoken in public, were I not nerv'd by a sense
of right and duty, did I not feel that the time had come for the
question of woman's wrongs to be laid before the public, did I not
believe that woman herself must do this work, for woman alone can un-
derstand the height, the depth, the length, and the breadth of her degra-
dation.

Following Cady Stanton's remarks, Lucretia Mott read a humorous
article by Martha C. Wright and Elizabeth McClintock presented an
address.

Day two found further discussions of the Declaration and Resolutions.
Resolution IX was the only one not passed unanimously. Only after a
heated discussion and with the support of Frederick Douglass was this
carried by a small majority. Cady Stanton had met Douglass when she
lived in Boston, and he had long been the Motts' friend. Douglass' stir-
ring speech claimed that suffrage was an indispensable basis for
for winning freedom and equality, whether it was for slaves or women. Both the Declaration and Resolutions were signed by 68 women and 32 men.

Although the two days' meetings were considered highly successful, there was so much more to be discussed that the sessions were continued two weeks later in Rochester, NY. News of the conventions spread rapidly. Reports were published widely; the proceedings were ridiculed by the press and denounced by the clergy. (Appendix A) By itself, the convention might not reach many, for a meeting of 300 people in a small New York town was not a national event. But the venomous attacks by newspapers gave the meetings a publicity boost which no one had dreamed of. Typical of press statements was one editorial which called the convention "the most shocking and unnatural incident ever recorded in the history of womanity." Cady Stanton noted in her diary:

No words could express our astonishment on finding that what seemed to us so timely, so rational, and so sacred, should be the subject for sarcasm and ridicule to the entire press of the nation... so pronounced was the popular voice against us, in the parlor, press, and pulpit, that most of the ladies who had attended the convention and signed the declaration, one by one, withdrew their names and influence, and joined our persecutors.

Nevertheless, she and other instigators reassembled at Rochester to find growing numbers in attendance.

In identifying the Seneca Falls convention with the birth of the women's rights movement, it must be noted that this was only one step in the growth process, for many of the stated grievances had been conceived years earlier. The Rochester convention, which was an expanded version of the one at Seneca Falls, raised the issue of whether men and women were really equal mentally and physically; if women were in any sense inferior, did that not mean they needed men's protection? This issue
would haunt the movement for decades. As news of the two conventions spread, people were aroused to prepare their own local conventions. Although no formal ones took place for a year and a half, the first of four Ohio conventions took place in Salem in April 1850. From then on, until the inception of the Civil War, meetings were held throughout New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. Cady Stanton remarked:

The effect of the (Seneca Falls) convention on my own mind was most salutary. The discussions had cleared my ideas as to the primal step to be taken for woman's emancipation, and the opportunity of expressing myself fully and freely on a subject I felt so deeply about was a great relief. I think all women who attended the convention felt better for the statement of their wrongs, believing that the first step had been taken to right them. 55

Following the Seneca Falls Convention, Cady Stanton began a "conversation club" of men and women in her village. The Seneca Falls Convention Club argued topics of the day from slavery to immigration, territorial rights to women's rights. In 1849, Amelia Bloomer became deputy postmaster of the village, and her assumption of a position outside "woman's sphere" met with Cady Stanton's approval. In addition to the postal duties, Bloomer56 published a monthly temperance paper called the Lily, a six-page paper, and Cady Stanton was soon writing articles under the pen name "Sunflower."57 Her first contribution was on the subject of temperance (a series of dialogues called "Henry Niel and his Mother"); her first women's rights article was published on January 1, 1850. Then followed a series of articles refuting man's claim to superiority. Growing bolder, Cady Stanton dropped the pseudonym and signed her initials. Her topics, ranging from woman's vote to free schools to sewing, startled and stimulated her
readers. She also began her lifelong campaign against women's false traditions, including women paying for their share of "dates."

The seeds of rebellion planted in 1848 quickly took root. Salem, Ohio, became the site for an April 1850 woman's rights convention, and Cady Stanton urged the delegates by letter to amend the state constitution to include woman suffrage. October 1850 found a national woman's rights convention in Worcester, Massachusetts, and once again, Cady Stanton's encouragement through the mail was appreciated. The Lily published these letters as well as information about the conventions' proceedings. Thus the Lily became the principal medium for spreading among women accurate news of the growing woman's rights movement.

During the winter of 1851, Cady Stanton's cousin, Elizabeth Smith Miller, daughter of Gerrit Smith, visited Seneca Falls in a startling costume: "...dressed somewhat in the Turkish stype-short skirt, full trousers of fine black broadcloth; a Spanish cloak of the same material, reaching to the knee; beaver hat and feathers and dark futs; altogether a most becoming costume and exceedingly convienent for walking in all kinds of weather." For a woman to let the public see her knees was daring and at the height of indiscretion. Cady Stanton promptly adopted the costume, declaring herself like a captive set free. Amelia Bloomer also advocated it in the Lily, and national newspapers raised a furor over this shocking mode. Seneca Falls was again the nucleus of a daring reform movement; the name "Bloomer Costume" appealed to the public, and Amelia became its namesake. With public interest increasing circulation of the Lily and women from diverse
occupations adopting the new style, the clergy vociferously denounced trousers as the devil's instrument.

The news of the conventions and the Bloomer shockwaves attracted the attention of a young Quaker teacher, Susan Brownwell Anthony, whose future activities and friendship were to have a marked effect on the progress of American feminism. Both Anthony and Cady Stanton were active in antislavery causes, and in May 1851, the two met at a convention in Seneca Falls. At this time, Anthony was more curious about than sympathetic to Cady Stanton's ideas on woman's rights, but Cady Stanton eventually converted her. A letter from April 2, 1852, illustrates their early relationship. Suggesting a positive approach to a temperance convention, Cady Stanton cautioned Anthony against conservatism; further, she warned about the danger of religion. She said:

The Church is a terrible engine of oppression, especially as concerns woman. (Volunteering her aid in preparation of an address, Cady Stanton says:) I will gladly do all in my power to aid you in getting up such a lecture as you desire...if my speech as it stands would serve you as a kind of skeleton for a lecture I will send it to you and you can fill out the heads more fully. (Decrying her present position, she calls out) Men and angels give me patience! I am at the boiling point! If I do not find some day the use of my tongue on this question, I shall die of an intellectual repression, a woman's rights convulsion!  

The half-century collaboration found the pair complementing each other's abilities. Anthony served as a stimulus to Cady Stanton to work, and together they wrote addresses for causes ranging from temperance to women's rights. Cady Stanton reminisced:

We forged resolutions, protests, appeals, petitions, agricultural reports, and constitutional arguments; for we make it a matter of conscience to accept every invitation to speak on every question, in order to maintain woman's right to do so.
Commenting on their partnership, Cady Stanton noted:

It has been said, by those who know me best, that I forged the thunderbolts and she in the early days fired them...In thought and sympathy we were one, and in the division of labor we exactly complimented each other. I am the better writer, she the better critic. She supplied the facts and statistics, I the philosophy and rhetoric, and together, we have made arguments that have stood unshaken through the storms of long years; arguments that no one has answered.

Theodore Tilton described in 1868 the Cady Stanton-Anthony association in the following manner:

Mrs. Stanton is a fine writer, but a poor executant; Miss Anthony is a thorough manager, but a poor writer...neither has any selfish ambition for celebrity; but each vies with the other in a noble enthusiasm for the cause to which they are devoting their lives. These two women have...been diligent forgers of all manners of projectiles, from fireworks to thunderbolts, and have hurled them with unexpected explosion into the midst of all manner of educational, reformatory, religious, and political assemblies. I know of no two more pertinacious incendiaries in the whole country. In fact, this noise-making twain are the two sticks of a drum, keeping up what Daniel Webster called "The rub-a-dub of agitation."

Susan B. Anthony, as a member of the Daughters of Temperence, suffered through reproaches to keep silent at the convention held in Rochester in 1852 by the Sons of Temperence. Such treatment aroused her zeal, and she called for a Woman's State Temperence Convention to be held in Rochester several months later. Enlisting Cady Stanton's aid, Anthony attempted to build the strength and importance of women in that particular cause. Cady Stanton saw this topic as a stepping-stone to woman's rights, and she used the opportunities to broach previously ignored topics. When the first Woman's State Temperence Convention met in Corinthian Hall on April 20, 1852, Cady Stanton served as presiding officer. Her opening address advocated temperence, modification of marriage and divorce laws, and ended with radical remarks aimed at the Church. She stated:
Good schools and homes...would do much more to prevent immorality and crime in our cities than all the churches in the land could ever possibly do toward the regeneration of the multitude sunk in poverty, ignorance, and vice.

Anthony called for a State Woman's Rights Convention in Albany in February 1854, planning for Cady Stanton to deliver an address on the legal disabilities of women both to the convention and to the joint judiciary committees of the legislature. Enthusiastic allies to the cause were Rochester Unitarian pastor William Henry Channing and Judge William Hay of Saratoga Springs. Hay prepared notes on points of unjust law and wrote to Anthony: "The person who arranges and condenses our suggestions into an address should, from every consideration, be Mrs. Stanton, because her style is admirably suited to such a subject." Channing wrote to Stanton:

On all accounts you are the person to do it. There is not one of us who could tell the story of woman's wrongs as strongly, clearly, tersely, eloquently as yourself.

Cady Stanton was thus encouraged to develop an address which would meet her supporter's expectations. Laboring under domestic difficulties (including an arrow shot through the eye of her daughter by an older son) she nevertheless completed the work. Channing was its first critic, offering only several more legal references. Henry Stanton also critiqued her, pronouncing her address excellent. He strongest critic was to be next: Judge Cady, hoping to dissuade his daughter, urged her to read the speech to him. It appeared, to his chagrin, that Judge Cady's admonitions to his youthful daughter about speaking to the legislators to change the law were about to come true.
Cady Stanton remembered the occasion of presenting the speech to her father quite clearly. She noted in her diary: "On no occasion, before or since, was I ever more embarrassed—an audience of one, and that the one of all others whose approbation I most desired, whose disapproval I most feared." Cady Stanton persevered, detailing the legal disabilities of woman; the speech was carefully documented and eloquently delivered. She said of it:

I threw all the pathos I could into my voice and language at his point, and, to my intense satisfaction, I saw tears filling my father's eyes...when I had finished, I saw that he was thoroughly magnetized. He was evidently deeply pondering over all he had heard, and did not speak for a long time. I believed I had opened to him a new world of thought.

When the New York State Woman's Rights Convention met in Albany's Association Hall on February 14, 1854, Cady Stanton, as president, delivered the address which was destined for the legislature. Her appeal to the New York State Legislature came a few days later to a packed Senate chamber. In addition to the entire Joint Judiciary Committee of both houses, the galleries contained many prominent Albany citizens. As Cady Stanton recited case after case of woman's humiliating legal status as wife, widow, and mother, her voice and demeanor became impassioned. She demanded a new, just code of laws:

In conclusion, then, let us say, in behalf of the women of this State, we ask for all that you have asked for yourselves in the progress of your development, since the Mayflower cast anchor beside Plymouth Rock; and simply on the ground that the rights of every human being are the same and identical.

Although the speech was well received, neither her eloquence nor the justice and logic of her pleas influenced the legislators to alter laws at this time. The time was not yet ripe for change.
CHAPTER FOUR
PERELMAN’S NEW RHETORIC: PRACTICAL REASONING IN ARGUMENTATION

Elizabeth Cady Stanton has been hailed as the founding philosopher of what is now known as the women’s rights movement. Her years of agitation over the reform causes of temperance, abolition, marriage laws, women’s property rights, and suffrage, were remarkable not only in the intensity of her convictions and breadth of her discourse, but also because of her orientation to an alteration of values held by society and her demonstrated use of Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of "practical reasoning." Cady Stanton has been lauded as a visionary, a person with a biting sense of humor, and a fearless advocate of social reform. As Banner noted, "She liked theory and ideas; she disliked facts."¹

The New Rhetoric is an attempt to display the role of reason in practical argument.² Perelman found that traditional, formal logic was inadequate to explain practical answers to human problems, including those of defining justice or how laws are made, justified, and evolved. He became convinced that classical rhetoric contained principles by which human affairs could be understood and the role of reason within them identified. The object of Perelman’s argumentation theory is the "study of discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent."³ Arguments always aim at intensifying the adherence of an audience; it is audience-centered. As Carroll C. Arnold described it in his 1970 initial critical
review of *The New Rhetoric*:

It is difficult to see how any rhetorician, rhetorical critic, logician interested in verbal logic can claim competence without a familiarity of this work. It challenges orthodoxies and suggests fresh modes of inquiry. *The New Rhetoric* is a major challenge to both logical and rhetorical theory.

Perelman's concern over logic developed from his discovery that value preferences held no place in formal logic. Formal proof contends that argumentation is irrational. The positions that *The New Rhetoric* seeks to combat include:

uncompromising and irreducible philosophical oppositions presented by all kinds of absolutism: dualisms of reason and imagination, of knowledge and opinion, of irrefutable self-evidence and deceptive will, of a universally accepted objectivity and an incommunicable subjectivity of a reality binding on everybody and values that are purely individual.

Perelman came to see the complement of formal logic to be argumentation, which holds a sphere of influence in the domain of reasoning. According to Perelman, the distinguishing mark of rhetoric is that a person's adherence to a proposition contributes to its value. When one judges and justifies the proposition, s/he is operating in a behavioral realm by stating a position.

*The New Rhetoric* attempts to explicate the dimensions of human experience that are rational and reasonable, even though not logical in a formal sense. The mind is seen not in terms of "faculties" but by its governing role in the processes of persuading, convincing, justifying, and criticizing, which are all argumentative processes. The speaker's originality, the audience's needs, and the contact between minds combine to create the areas of arguments on disputable issues. This theory of practical reasoning depends upon the firm commitment of audience and speaker who are swept up in a common social matrix.
The scope of *The New Rhetoric* may be deciphered by its elements; sixty-five characteristics are demonstrated to show the role of reason in practical discourse. The premises and inferences used to promote and transfer adherence to a thesis are bound into a cultural web of opinions and concepts. The character of the speaker is seen as an argumentative stance; as Perelman describes it, each speaker may be characterized by the opinions (the ensemble of propositions) which s/he considers valid for a universal audience. 7 *The New Rhetoric* expands the use of reason by creating a new resource of the involvement of people in it. All argument presupposes a meeting of minds: the speaker's will to persuade and the audience's disposition to listen and act.

Three broad rhetorical concepts developed in *The New Rhetoric* will be employed to evaluate the logic of the argumentation of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's reform rhetoric. These concepts concern the framework of argumentation, which is the social structure into which argument is inserted; the starting points of argument, which consist of the agreements between speaker and audience which are essential to the formation of premises; and the specific techniques of argumentation, which include associative and dissociative techniques.

**The Framework of Argumentation**

Since all argumentation aims at gaining the adherence of minds, it assumes the existence of intellectual contact between speaker and audience. For argumentation to exist, an effective communion of minds must be present. The conditions essential for such a contact of minds include a common language, the mental cooperation of speaker and audience, and certain social factors of contact and class. Perelman feels that by
increasing the intensity of adherence, the listeners will act in the desired fashion. Therefore, argument is relative to the audience to be influenced. Perelman defines an audience as "the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation." 8

When one attempts to argue, s/he must visualize and systematically construct the audience to whom the speech is addressed. The essential consideration is that the construction be adequate to their composite nature and the occasion. The speaker must know what listeners hold as true or important. An inadequate picture, whether it results from ignorance or unplanned circumstances, may cause opposition in the audience, giving them reasons to be against rather than for an idea. Therefore, preliminary to effective argument, the speaker must have knowledge of those to be won over. The basic rule of argumentation is that a speaker must adapt the speech to the audience, whatever its nature.

Perelman's emphasis upon the audience provides the basic direction of inquiry into the theory of argumentation. It is the audience, not the form of the discourse, which determines the nature of the persuasion. Instead of manipulating "canons" which develop the message, the persuader manipulates the factors or conditions which exist in the audience in order to gain adherence to the thesis. Thus, it is the speaker's construct of the audience which determines the construct of the argumentation.

The listener assumes a personality which is essential in the formulation of argument. While classical theorists recognized three types of oratory (forensic, deliberative, and ἔπαιδεικτικό), each having a corresponding
audience, Perelman rejects such distinctions as inadequate. Because a speaker must often persuade an audience of people differing in functions, character, beliefs, and loyalties, s/he will have to use a multiplicity of arguments. According to The New Rhetoric, "a great orator is one who possesses the art of taking into consideration the composite nature of his audience." As an example, one might consider the difficulties of speeches before political assemblies, which consist of a kind of composite audience with varying constituent elements.

The speaker must continually adapt the discourse to the audience in order to influence it. "This will result in the audience no longer being exactly the same at the end of the speech as it was at the beginning." In argumentation, it is not as important to understand what the speaker regards as truth or important as to know the views of the audience. Perelman disagrees with ardent enthusiasts whose sole concerns are those ideas they consider important, because these reasons will only effect suggestible persons and will be perceived by most as unreasonable. Perelman says of this type of speaker:

Carried away by enthusiasm, he imagines his audience to be susceptible to the same arguments that persuaded him. Thus, passion, in causing the audience to be forgotten, creates less an absence than a poor choice of reasons.

The nature of the audience will determine both the arguments' direction and the significant character that will be given them. Perelman recognizes three kinds of audiences:

(1) the universal audience, consisting of the whole of humanity;
(2) the interlocutor, whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue;
(3) the speaker, when he gives himself reasons for his actions.
The Universal Audience

The universal audience transcends all others in providing a norm for objective argumentation; it is composed of all reasonable people and is a construct of the speaker's mind. Because of its reasonableness, "the agreement of a universal audience is thus a matter, not of fact, but of right." The universal audience represents the height of unanimity. Arguments which are presented to this audience must be of compelling character, be self-evident, and possess an absolute and timeless validity independent of local or historical contingencies. The universal audience, with its freedom of thought and choice, will acquiesce to reason, taking it out of the realm of doubt.

Perelman feels it is more accurate to justify the speaker by the images s/he holds of the universal audience, since such an image is held from what s/he knows about others. He notes, "Each individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of the universal audience." In addition, Perelman feels that if arguments addressed to universal audiences do not convince all, the recalcitrant may be disqualified by being classified as abnormal or stupid.

The Particular Audience

The particular audience, which includes specific groups, may be considered to be a more concrete construct by the persuader. A speaker may be justified in visualizing the listeners as simultaneously belonging to a number of varying groups, because it is possible s/he will not be sure of which arguments will be the most convincing. In such instances, s/he may place the audience into a series of different audiences, as Perelman notes Tristram in Tristram Shandy does:
(My father) placed his arguments in all lights; argued the matter with her like a Christian, like a heathen, like a husband, like a father, like a patriot, like a man. My mother answered everything only like a woman, which was a little hard on her, for, as she could not assume and fight it out behind such a variety of characters, 'twas no fair match: 'twas seven to one.

A speaker may attempt to locate an audience in a particular social setting. If it is necessary to divide the groups, s/he may do so in a number of ways. The audience may be divided in terms of political, religious, or occupational groups, or the speaker may concentrate on the values held. In the same sense, if the speaker is an extremist, s/he may consider all opposing listeners as a single group; if s/he is a moderate, the audience will be seen as forming at least two groups.

According to Perelman, the weakest arguments are the ones accepted only by these particular audiences. Therefore, while the particular audience may validate a concept of the universal audience which characterizes them, the universal audience passes judgment upon the arguments. In summary, then, it is necessary to formulate a construct of the speaker's audience. A critic must draw conclusions about whether the speaker was addressing a universal or particular audience. What are the conclusions which can be drawn from the attempts by the speaker to gain or increase the intensity of adherence by justifying choices; does the quality of arguments in terms of success or failure due to the construct of a universal or particular audience?

The Starting Points of Argumentation

Perelman suggests that when the speaker selects and advances the premises to serve as the argument's foundation, s/he relies upon the audience's adherence to initial propositions. The starting points of argumentation and the unfolding of the arguments presuppose the
audience's agreement. They may refuse adherence because they may see the premises as one-sided or may disagree with the way they were presented. The choice and formulation of premises establish the elements of argumentation and also constitute the first step in persuasion. When a speaker selects and forwards premises which are the argument's foundation, s/he relies upon the audience's adherence to the initial propositions. The possibilities for argumentation depend upon what the audience is willing to concede, on the values it holds, on the facts it agrees upon.

The New Rhetoric describes two classes of objects of agreement which serve as starting points of argument: (1) the Real, which consist of facts, truths, and presumptions; and (2) the Preferable, which consist of values, hierarchies, and lines of argument relating to the preferred. These premises will play differing roles in the arguing process. Generally, the arguments relating to the Real are characterized with validity to the universal audience; all pertaining to the Preferable will be connected to a particular audience. By identifying the speaker's objects of agreements, conclusions about the construct of the audience can be made.

The Real

Objects of agreement which are classified as Real consist of facts, truths, and presumptions. Facts are objects of precise, limited agreement related to particular data; they refer to an objective reality, require no justification, and designate what is common to all. Facts may lose their status if called into question or if used as an argument's conclusion rather than its starting point. A truth is a complex system
which relates to the connections between facts; Perelman includes here scientific theories, religious concepts, or philosophic tenets which transcend experience.

The second type of Real agreements are presumptions which enjoy universal agreement but need their adherence to be reinforced; facts and truths normally do not require such an increase in intensity of adherence. The use of presumption presents statements which may not be derived from manipulation or calculation of facts. Perelman suggests several common presumptions, including:

(1) The quality of an act will reveal the quality of the person responsible for it.
(2) The natural trustfulness of our first reaction is to accept what someone tells us as being true, as long as they give us no cause for distrust;
(3) Any statement brought to our knowledge is supposed to hold our interest;
(4) Until the contrary is proved, we presume the normal will occur;
(5) People will act in a sensible fashion.

These presumptions of the Real permit the norm to be safely used as a foundation in reasoning.

The Preferable

The second class of objects of agreement are those of the Preferable, which relate only to the adherence of a particular audience. These include values, hierarchies, and loci of the preferable.

Agreements of value mean that an admission that an object, being, or ideal must have a specific influence on actions. The existence of values makes possible a communion (joining) of speaker and audience. A value can intervene as a basis of argument in varying stages; for example, a speaker may appeal the values in order to induce and justify certain choices so they will be accepted. A listener is unable to
escape a value by merely denying it; s/he may reinterpret it, disqualify it, or subordinate it, but s/he may not reject it as a whole.

While values influence the choice of action, they also supply the reason for preferring one type of behavior over another. Universal values (such as true, good, absolute) can be regarded as valid for a universal audience only as long as their content remains unspecified. Their role is to justify choices on which unanimous agreement does not exist by inserting these choices in a sort of empty framework with respect to which a wider agreement exists. While facts and truths are expressions of the Real, values are essentially concerned with attitudes toward the Real. When they are placed into a universally valid system of beliefs, values may be treated as truths or facts. The importance of this is that the particular audience will be able to consider itself closer to the universal as its particular value seems to fade before the universal value.

Perelman distinguishes between two types of values, concrete and abstract. A concrete value is one which is attached to a living being, specific group, or particular object. As *The New Rhetoric* suggests, when an orator displays the unique character of something, we automatically increase its value. Abstract values are "spiritual tools" which can be used for all audiences. Concrete values may be used as foundations for abstracts, and the opposite also holds true. As an example, we may use a model which is to be imitated in order to convey virtuous conduct. According to Perelman, abstract values are best used for criticism, because they are irrespective of people and provide criteria in order to alter the status quo. They seem to be connected
with change; "They seemingly manifest a revolutionary spirit." ^20 Perelman contends that arguments of abstract values are better suited for raising incompatibilities, because when an orator does so, new conceptualizations of the values occur. This allows for great activity in the evolution of values as they are "constantly recast and remodeled." ^21 In contrast, conservatives tend to consider themselves as realists because they put concrete values into the foreground; Perelman provides examples of fidelity, loyalty, and solidarity as characterizing conservative arguments. It is easier to rely upon concrete values when one wants to preserve the established.

In addition to values, argumentation relies upon hierarchies, which may also be concrete or abstract. Value hierarchies are essential to the argument's structure, because an audience is characterized by the way it supports its values. An orator is obligated to order values in a hierarchy, because the simultaneous pursuit of values leads to incompatibilities. A hierarchy will indicate which values in a given situation are incompatible and which will need to be sacrificed.

Finally, Perelman describes the last type of object of agreement, the Preferable, in terms of _loci_, which are premises of a very general nature akin to the Greek conception of _topoi_. When a speaker tries to establish or intensify the adherence to a value or hierarchy, s/he may consolidate them by association of _loci_. By grouping relevant materials, an orator can help invention by creating a storehouse of arguments, an "indispensable arsenal on which a person wishing to persuade another will draw." ^22

A _locus of quantity_ is one which says that one thing is better than another based upon quantitative reasons. An example of this
would be a statement such as "A greater number is more desirable than a smaller number." Perelman notes that "The superiority of that which is accepted by the greater number of people forms the basis of certain conceptions of democracy and also of conceptions of reason which equate reason with 'common sense.'"23 Most arguments which aim at demonstrating the effectiveness of a particular means are this type of loci. The usual, that which is done most often, and the normal are also examples.

**Loci of quality** concern themselves with the value of the unique. These occur most often when the strength of numbers is challenged, and they are used by reformers against commonly held opinions. When the value of the unique is presented, it lowers the value of the normal, the ordinary, or the usual. The audience may be made to appreciate that which is difficult to obtain. For example, this locus is commonly used to sell antique items; an auctioneer will point out that a particular item is a "one of a kind," which usually hikes up the price bid on the item. Other examples of such loci are precariousness over durability, timeliness, or the irreparable; each is a rarity which may be threatened and enjoys a dimension of prestige.

Beyond the first two major loci, Perelman also suggests several others. **Loci of order** affirm the superiority of that which is earlier over that which is later; they justify the superiority of laws and principles. **Loci of the existent** affirm the superiority of that which is real or actual over the possible or probable. **Loci of essence** provide value to something which embodies the essence of an ideal; as an example, we value highly an athlete such as Bruce Jenner who exhibits
all the qualities of an athlete. Another example might be the achievement of all that one is capable of. The final general locus is the value of a person. This confers value upon dignity, autonomy, and self-worth of individuals.

As loci supply premises which are starting points of argument analysis is essential. Another essential element in argumentation is Perelman's notion of presence, which he defines as "making present, by verbal magic alone, what is actually absent but what he considers important to his argument or, by making them more present, to enhance the value of some elements." An audience can accept only so much from a body of discourse, so the orator must focus their attention on certain select elements. By choosing the element, an orator implies its importance. Presence, which is initially a psychological contract which says that something present to the consciousness will assume the greatest importance, becomes an essential argumentative element. All argumentation presupposes a choice which consists of both selection of elements and techniques for their presentation.

Every thought is inserted into a preformed framework which the speaker must utilize to best cause action in others. If a speaker can make a classification dominant and at the center of attention, s/he will push all others into the background. The emphasizing of one idea pushes others into shadow; the core of many arguments is formed of this struggle of various interpretations. As soon as one interpretation appears more adequate, it becomes the only one present in the audience's consciousness, and the problem which initiated the argument may recede.
The Techniques of Argumentation

Based upon the foundation that argumentation is, for both speaker and listener, an object of thought, Perelman builds his techniques of argumentation. It is the task of the speaker to guide the listener's mental activity either by supplying information or arguments which stimulate the listener to reason in the desired way. Two general techniques of argumentation are association and dissociation. Association brings separate elements together, allowing for connecting links to be established which make the concepts interdependent. Dissociation is the separation or disuniting of elements, the breaking of connecting links, which results in the modification of a system of thought. The two techniques are complementary; the speaker must make explicit data which promotes one without stressing the other. Perelman suggests a variety of association schemes, including quasi-logical arguments and arguments aimed at establishing the structure of the real; dissociative techniques attempt to modify ideas while moving toward new formulations.

Association: Quasi-logical Arguments.

Quasi-logical arguments lay claim to a power of conviction, much like formal logic. Quasi-logical arguments are nonfomal in character, requiring strength of thought to become formalized. These arguments may depend upon logical relations or mathematical calculations.

Use of contradiction, asserting a proposition and its negation, may be used to show the inconsistancy and undesirability of a system. A speaker may need to display a system in an attempt to get others to condemn it. In the same sense, it may be useful to demonstrate an incompatibility, which shows that two assertions demand a choice. For
example, a leader may create an incompatibility by presenting his cabinet with an ultimatum: either present him with a vote of confidence or reject his peaceful overtures to others. Incompatibilities may exist from the use of moral or legal rules dependent upon definite situations; they always oblige a choice to be made.

Perelman also suggests that ridicule has a role in argumentation by condemning eccentric behavior or breaking an accepted rule. It is a "powerful weapon at the disposal of a speaker against those who might undermine his argument by refusing, without cause, to accept some premise of his discourse." 25 Ridicule is used when a listener persists in maintaining two incompatible points of view; "ridicule is the penalty for blindness." 26 Perelman suggests that a speaker may produce ridicule statements by temporarily accepting an idea contradictory to hers/his, deduce its consequences, show the incompatibilities, and infer the originally held truth.

Perelman's Rule of Justice requires giving identical treatment to beings or situations which are of the same class. It allows a speaker to utilize precedent as a form of quasi-logical reasoning. "The rule requires a foundation in the concrete, anchored to opinions and agreements which are rarely behind argument." 27 As an example of the Rule of Justice, a student may argue that all students in the same classroom should receive identical treatment in the grading of tests, answering of questions, and the like. Failure to treat all in the same manner would be in violation of the Rule.

Arguments of reciprocity require the same treatment of two concepts which are counterpoints; this utilizes the concept of symmetry. A
connection between antecedent and consequent such as this is a familiar form in formal logic. For example, I might say, "If it was legal for you to sell these items and it caused you no disgrace, then it is no disgrace for me to buy them." This type of argument is a relatively common one on which ethics are based; the Golden Rule of "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" represents an argument of reciprocity.

Transitivity is also a type of quasi-logical argument which allows for inferences, such as "if A equals B and B equals C, then A equals C." It allows for the transfer of qualities (such as equality and superiority) from one item to another. Transitivity can also enable an ordering of events and beings which cannot be directly compared such as in the case of greater than or broader than. A contemporary example would be that sports seedings are based upon transitivity. Unless all teams play all others (which is usually an impossibility), transitivity of "Team A beat Team B, Team B beat Team C, so Team A is better than Team C" is accepted as a means of argument.

Arguments by comparison utilize an evaluation of several objects among each other. They are quasi-logical because, while they sound like simple analogies, they present a measurement such as a claim of equality. An example of this is "lying is the same crime whether it is falsifying tax returns or telling a friend a falsehood." One is an established crime with legal punishment; the other has no legal qualification. Comparisons can bring together terms which were once thought to be incommensurable; they also discredit by making light of the uniqueness of incomparable items. One of the more famous
arguments of comparison is that of sacrifice, where "sacrifice is a measure of the value attributed to the thing for which the sacrifice is made." It is this type of argument which is at the heart of every service, barter or exchange; it indicates the price attached to something.

Each of the preceding techniques of association bear some relation to formal logic, either by mathematical constructions or by their logical relations. There are others discussed in The New Rhetoric, but the ones presented here represent the major tactics employed in the discourse to be analyzed.

Association: Arguments Which Establish the Structure of Reality

The second general area of association, arguments based upon the structure of reality, make use of this structure to create a solidarity of the accepted and the proposed; quasi-logical arguments claim their validity from their relatively close relation with rationality. By using arguments based upon the structure of reality, a speaker can conceive a particular reality. Perelman discusses several techniques to utilize this method.

A causal link, which may attach two given events, reveal the cause which creates an event, or show the effect which will result from an event, plays an essential role in argumentation. Causal lin are common to law enforcement as well as historical reasoning. For example, an officer may have to help determine if the death of a person was actually suicide or merely a freak auto accident; the officer will attempt to trace a series of actions such as reported depression, the buying of pills, the giving away of possessions, and the leaving of
a note, all of which indicate a causal link to explain how the car
could go off the road at such a safe place. Causal links are also the
basis of religious thought, which asserts that acts will receive
eternal rewards or punishments.

Pragmatic arguments permit the evaluation of an act in terms of
its favorable or unfavorable consequences. For example, the choice of
accepting a new job may be based upon the assumed consequences—will
the proposed salary and position compensate for the expense of moving
and uprooting the family? One judges the event by referring to its
effects. Perelman feels that the pragmatic argument develops easily,
"for the transfer of the value of the consequences to the cause comes
about by itself."29 The consequences may be positive or hypothetical
and can influence behavior. A pragmatic argument allows
for the passing from one kind of value to another; it can also allow
for good consequences to serve as proof of the truth of a thesis.

Ends and means interact in arguments to form another technique
for establishing the structure of reality. For example, some ends may
become desirable because their means are easily accessible or because
their realization is easy. In some cases, means become ends to be
pursued for themselves (education, once a means to the goal of success,
becomes a goal itself to those in graduate school).

The argument of waste refers to tasks which one already began,
sacrifices have been made, and waste would occur if one should give up;
therefore, one should continue. It is the justification a teacher gives
to continue to help a failing student in the hope of getting him on
the right track. An orator can use this in stressing opportunities
not to be missed, talents not to be wasted. This argues against the feeling of loss, indecisiveness, unnecessity.

The argument of unlimited development insists on the possibility of always going further without foreseeing limits, which attains increasing value. It is the type of argument which allows for the defense of behavior for religious fanaticism in true believers, for instance. In order to utilize this method, a speaker will present at one end an unrealizable ideal, then s/he will show realizable terms merging closer and closer to the end.

These techniques of establishing reality serve in practical reasoning to demonstrate a structure which does not yet exist but which is attainable. They use association by creating connecting links to ideas which previously had been independent but now are interdependent. Thus, in the minds of the audience, a new mode of thinking may be established.

Dissociation

The associative techniques (connecting links) previously discussed allow for the speaker to join formerly independent elements. The technique of breaking connecting links, dissociation, affirms that elements have been improperly associated; it brings about a profound change in the argumentation's conceptual data. This classical solution for incompatibilities calls for an alteration of conventional ways of thinking. This results in a deprecation of what until then had been an accepted value. The new conception must be shown to be relevent, valuable, and incompatible with the original notion. Examples of dissociative pairs include reality and appearance, common sense and opinion.
Ferelman utilizes the following as an example of a philosophical pair: \( \text{appearance} = \frac{\text{Term I}}{\text{reality}} \), where Term I is what is actual, immediate, and known directly; Term II provides a norm by which we can distinguish aspects of Term I which are of value and which are not. For example, a common fallacy is that rhetoric is merely ornament or involves only delivery and style; this could be viewed as a Term I, "appearance."

Those of us who teach rhetoric attempt to conceive a different mode (Term II) in which rhetoric is seen as a vital instrument of persuasion in society. Term II can only be understood in relation to Term I and its dissociation. "Term II is both normative and explanatory." In Term II, reality and value are closely linked.

Ferelman also provides several other philosophical pairs which may suggest means of dissociation; these include \( \frac{\text{act}}{\text{subjective}}, \frac{\text{person}}{\text{objective}}, \frac{\text{individual}}{\text{universal}}, \frac{\text{theory}}{\text{practice}} \). Each pair acts as a common form in argumentation, and each may have repercussions on others. For example a line of argument may be developed among \( \frac{\text{appearance}}{\text{reality}} \) to \( \frac{\text{means}}{\text{end}} \) and \( \frac{\text{consequence}}{\text{fact}} \) or opinion to subjective. Dissociation, then, is a technique which may be used to devaluate the accepted and forward the desired. It demonstrates that persuaders deliberately detach or add "appearances" to ideas in order to alter their "reality" in the audience's perception. As Carroll Arnold pointed out: "...using these authors' concept of 'dissociation,' it may be possible to describe systematically how 'values' and 'images' are operationally controlled in verbal discourse."
Argumentation is a combination of many arguments aimed at winning the adherence of an audience to one or more given theses. A speaker attempts to establish a sense of communion which is centered around the audience's recognized values; to this goal, s/he uses a wide range of means in order to enhance the arguments. Each argument interacts within the mind of the audience; each strengthens or weakens the other; each interacts with opposition. Perelman presents a method of analyzing argumentation in which reasonable choice is exercised. He posits it as a development of a logic of value judgements where justification cannot be based solely on objective truth or reality.

In the conclusion of *The New Rhetoric*, Perelman comments upon the effect of restricting logic to the examination of "analytical proofs" which has removed all reference to argumentation in the study of reasoning. This narrow conception of proof and logic has been too constricting, and the broadening of the concepts of proof can only enrich logic. Instead of basing philosophy on unquestionable truths, men and women adhere to opinions of all sorts with varying reasons and degrees of intensity. Common sense will regularly oppose facts and theories, truths to opinions, and objectivity to subjectivity. By this opposition, it indicates what opinions are preferable, as well as the criterion on which the preference is based. Most people will act in a manner which appears to them to be logical or reasonable, but they will refuse to apply the same standards to solutions they do not recognize as well founded. When a controversial situation occurs, agreement of minds cannot be reestablished by a logical method; this places a person in the sphere of the irrational, which is the location
of much of the daily affairs of human activity. This sphere is assigned to deliberation; the point of The New Rhetoric is that argumentation is rational even though it is not formally logical. Perelman concludes by noting:

Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable choice can be exercised. It is because of the possibility of argumentation which provides reasons, but not compelling reasons, that it is possible to escape the dilemma: adherence to an objectivity and universally valid truth, or recourse to suggestion and violence to secure acceptance for our opinions and decisions. The theory of argumentation will help to develop what a logic of value judgements has tried in vain to provide, namely the justification of the possibility of a human community in the sphere of action with this justification cannot be based on a reality or objective truth.  

The techniques of argumentative reasoning Perelman presents allow for the interaction of orator and audience in approaching adherence and action. This "new rhetoric" merges classical rhetoric's relativity to the audience's action with dialectic's universal opinions. Perelman has created a complement to formal logic; a different domain within and completing the sphere of reason.
CHAPTER FIVE
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON'S REFORM RHETORIC 1848-1854

Based upon the elements of The New Rhetoric which have just been outlined, the author has devised the following format for the evaluation of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's reform rhetoric. The questions will be applied to selected pieces of discourse involving the issue of women's rights between 1848-1854 in an attempt to reach conclusions concerning the role of practical reasoning in the process of her persuasive efforts.

I. What are the characteristics of the argumentative framework into which Cady Stanton inserted her discourse?

A. From the content of the discourse, what conclusions can be drawn concerning her construct of the audience? Was it universal or particular?

B. What efforts did Cady Stanton make to establish an adherence of minds and communion?

C. How did she employ argumentative effects aimed at increasing the intensity of adherence and justifying choices?

II. What were the starting points of argument Cady Stanton used?

A. What factors formed the premises of the universal audience? What was Cady Stanton's use of the Real: facts, truths, presumptions?

B. What factors formed the premises of the particular audience? What was Cady Stanton's use of the Preferable: values, logi, hierarchies?

C. How was presence achieved?

III. What are the specific techniques of argumentation employed by Cady Stanton in her discourse?

A. What are her techniques of Association?
   1. Quasi-logical arguments
a. contradiction
b. ridicule
c. Rule of Justice
d. arguments of reciprocity
e. transitivity
f. comparison
g. sacrifice

2. Arguments based upon the structure of reality
   a. causality
   b. pragmatics
   c. unlimited development
   d. waste

B. What are the techniques employed by Cady Stanton which are those of Dissociation?

IV. What are the conclusions which can be generated about the use of practical reasoning and Cady Stanton's reform rhetoric 1848-1854?

In order to apply these bases of analysis to rhetoric, the following procedure will be followed. From the social background already described, representative pieces from Cady Stanton's early reform career will be analyzed. This discourse will be limited to topics of women's rights; this selectivity is done for several reasons. First, Cady Stanton's interest in women's right was paramount, and those issues gained for her recognition as the prime philosopher of the early movement. While she was also involved in other reform issues, they did not gain recognition or arouse controversy as did the women's rights cause. Women's rights was the founding concern of a movement which remains controversial and powerful today. The selection of the discourse is grounded in several important "firsts." The Seneca Falls Resolutions, Declaration, and Cady Stanton's maiden speech represent the movement's birth. The next several years saw many conventions further the arguments to gain presence. The 1854 speech was the first ever given to the New York Legislature by a
woman to that body. Cady Stanton's address gave the primary arguments which other women's reform advocates utilized over the next several decades. The arguments presented in these representative pieces of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's discourse present the germ of her case as it was expanded over the next fifty years.

1848 Address to the Woman's Rights Convention, Seneca Falls

Elizabeth Cady Stanton's first address on women's rights focused on the demand for political equality, a stand which gave feminism a clear strategy which set it upon firm ground. She understood that the law played a major role in setting men over women; by demanding political power, women could struggle collectively against degradation, rather than singly against individual men. This speech, presented July 19, 1848, on the opening day of the Seneca Falls Convention, criticized not only the ideology of male superiority but also the ideas that the sexes were different but equal. She pointed out how women contribute to their own degradation. Finally, Cady Stanton's prediction about her proposal was that it would lead to both social and domestic upheaval. The manuscript was eventually given in 1866 to her daughters, Harriot and Margaret. Cady Stanton wrote in the margin:

This is my first lecture. It contains all I knew at the time. I give this manuscript to my precious daughters, in the hope that they will finish the work which I have begun.¹

The speech itself is primarily a series of dissociative pairs which attempt to demonstrate the incompatibilities of connected ideas presently existing in society (and the audience's minds). Cady Stanton's address serves as a basis for enlisting adherence to the idea that men are incapable of granting rights to women because they are living a life
of inconsistency. Cady Stanton sets out her basic goal in the introduction: creating presence for the idea that the abstract values of justice and self-reliance, which all hold dear, are calling for her to speak out:

I should feel exceedingly diffident to appear before you at this time, having never before spoken in public, were I not nerved by a sense of right and duty, did I not feel the time had fully come for the question of woman's wrongs to be laid before the public, did I not believe that woman herself must do this work; for woman alone can understand the height, the depth, the length, and the breadth of her own degradation.  

Once the idea has been forwarded into the minds of the audience, it becomes Cady Stanton's task to demonstrate how the present society is in violation of the basic values. She will describe the present situation through a number of dissociative pairs, each showing the way things appear to be versus the way norms and rights would say they should be. By using dissociation, Cady Stanton appears to be hopeful of creating a kind of cognitive dissonance in the minds of her listeners; if she can show them that they are living a life which violates basic principles, then she will more likely to be able to establish an adherence to her ideas and cause.

The first dissociative pair is that of opinion, in which Cady Stanton begins to devalue the accepted in favor of what is right. She also shows the violation of a basic truth in man's assumptions about women:

Man cannot speak for her, because he has been educated to believe that she differs from him so materially, that he cannot judge of her thoughts, feelings, and opinions by his own. Moral beings can only judge of others by themselves. The moment they assume a different nature for any of their own kind, they utterly fail.

Cady Stanton then asserts her basic presumption: no question is more important than that of women's rights. Because man has degraded
woman, he has violated her basic nature. Cady Stanton demonstrates presence as she states:

So long has man exercised tyranny over her, injurious to himself and benumbing to her faculties, that few can nerve themselves to meet the storm; and so long has the chain been about her that she knows not there is a remedy.

Continuing to devalue the way society treats women, Cady Stanton demonstrates a dissociative pair of opinion: what woman is "given" by truth man's civilizations is not the God-given right of equality. Cady Stanton provides a number of supporting examples which show how men across the globe regard women as being inferior:

From the Arabian Kerek, whose wife is obliged to steal from her husband to supply the necessities of life; from the Mahometan who forbids pigs, dogs, women and other impure animals, to enter a Mosque; from the German who complacently smokes while his wife, yoked with the ox, draws the plough through its furrow; to the legislator, who considers her incapable of saying what laws shall govern her, is the same feeling manifested...

The basic fact has been established: man treats woman as inferior because he considers himself superior intellectually, morally, and physically. Cady Stanton's task is to call this accepted fact into question, for, as Perelman notes, once a fact is called into question, it loses its status and a new fact may replace it. Through a combined method of dissociation and association, Cady Stanton then systematically proceeds to tear apart present reality and forward a new reality of her own design which she wishes the audience to accept.

The first area of argumentation, man's supposed intellectual superiority, is questioned by two quasi-logical techniques, contradiction (showing the inconsistencies of a system) and comparison (showing the incomparable cannot be compared.) Cady Stanton notes:
Man's intellectual superiority cannot be a question until woman has had a fair trial. When we shall have had our freedom to find out our own sphere, when we shall have had our colleges, our professions, our trades, for a century, a comparison then may be justly instituted. When she shall be just to herself before she is generous to others; improving the talents God has given her, and leaving her neighbor to do the same for himself, we shall not hear so much about this boasted superiority.6

Cady Stanton now proceeds to demonstrate an appearance dissociation.

Man claims to be morally superior to woman, but in reality he is lacking in principle:

In consideration of man's claim to moral superiority, glance now at our theological seminaries, our divinity students, the long line of descendants of our Apostolic fathers, the immaculate priesthood, and what do we find there? Is the moral and religious life of this class what we might expect from minds said to be fixed on such mighty themes? By no means...The lamentable want of principle among our lawyers, generally, is too well known to need comment. The disgraceful riots at our polls...the perfect rowdism that now characterizes the debates in our national Congress, all these are great facts which rise up against man's claim for moral superiority.

To further demonstrate this claim of man's lack of superiority, Cady Stanton shows how man's mistreatment causes women to be degraded; this is a pragmatic argument which illustrates and evaluates the consequences of certain actions:

In carrying out his own selfishness, man has greatly improved woman's moral nature, but by an almost total shipwreck of his own. Woman now has the noble virtues of the martyr. She is early schooled to self-denial and suffering.

Cady Stanton is aware of the arguments which men may use to validate their selfishness toward women. She notes men may say that God has given certain qualities which make women able to give up their wishes. She dissociates through opinion by showing that men's ideas violate God's higher values of self-determination and self-respect:

(Man says) "God made woman more self-denying than man. It is her nature." No, I think not...God's commands rest upon man as well as
woman. It is as much his duty to be kind, self-denying and full of
good works, as it is hers.

Cady Stanton then demonstrates how these false beliefs men hold
create a society which is harmful to all; this is another pragmatic
argument which questions the present reality:

The false ideas that prevail with regard to the purity necessary
to constitute the perfect character in woman, and that requisite for
man, has done an infinite deal of mischief in the world.

Cady Stanton has now placed the audience in the position of
realizing that things in society are not the way that they should be.
Through the separation of appearance and reality, she has effectively
generated a dissonance in the value perceptions of the audience which they
must resolve.

The next area of argumentation that Cady Stanton attacks is man’s
claim of physical superiority. An appearance dissociation shows
reality
that while men may seem to be superior, in fact no such claim is valid
until women are given the opportunity to develop and prove themselves.
Cady Stanton argues:

We cannot say what the woman might be physically, if the girl
were allowed all the freedom of the boy in romping, climbing, swimming,
playing whoop and ball. We must not give an inch...we cannot accord
to man even this much, and he has no right to claim it until the fact
has been fully demonstrated.

Cady Stanton creates presence for this "shocking" idea by illustrating
several cases of women who hunt, farm, and do all manner of physical
tasks with apparent ease and ability. Use is the only means of physi-
cal and mental growth and development, and women are denied this outlet.

Once again, Cady Stanton recognizes her objectors who will say
that men are not superior, they are different. She utilizes ridicule
by demonstrating that those people soon turn this mere difference into the "old groove of superiority."\textsuperscript{12}

Cady Stanton has now questioned the basic principles upon which the present reality is built. It is time for her to begin to insert the conception of the new reality which she seeks, so that the audience will have a grasp of the values and ideas she wishes them to adhere to. She states the basic facts of this new reality:

We have met here to-day to discuss our rights and wrongs, civil and political, and not, as some have supposed, to go into the detail of social life alone. We are assembled to protest against a form of government, existing without the consent of the governed to declare our right to be free as man is free, to be represented in the government which we are taxed to support. It is to protest against such unjust laws that we are assembled today, and to have them, if possible, forever erased from our statute-books, deeming them a shame and a disgrace to a Christian republic in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{13}

This new reality, one which demands political power and equality of rights for women, is presented and developed through a number of arguments. Cady Stanton begins with invoking Perelman's Rule of Justice, which establishes a basic premise for the framework of the argument:

All white men in this country have the same rights, however they may differ in mind, body, or estate. The right is ours.\textsuperscript{14}

To deny this Rule of Justice violates the basic values which all Americans hold dear, the rights of equality and justice which belong to all citizens:

But to have drunkards, idiots, horse-racing, rumselling rowdies, ignorant foreigners, and silly boys fully recognized, while we ourselves are thrust out from all the rights that belong to citizens, it is too grossly insulting to the dignity of woman to be longer quietly submitted to.\textsuperscript{15}

She invokes a basic truth reminiscent of the forefathers, who fought for our original freedoms:
The great truth, that no just government can be formed without the consent of the governed, we shall echo and re-echo in the ears of the unjust judge, until by continual coming we shall weary him.

Cady Stanton has now reaffirmed a truth which all Americans must claim if they are patriots. She has aligned the right of protest with her cause and made it appear to be firmly fixed in the area of the right.

She is faced with developing her new reality further, and Cady Stanton attempts to answer critics who would ask what woman would gain by having the right to vote. A pragmatic argument presents the consequences of such a right and privilege:

Think you, if woman had a vote in this government, that all those laws affecting her interests would so entirely violate every principle of right and justice? Had woman a vote to give, might not the office-holders and seekers propose some change in her condition?

Another potential skeptical question from an audience member is countered by a dissociation of both theory and opinion. In theory, men may say that women are amply represented by fathers, husbands, and sons. In reality, women are not fairly represented, because men cannot understand women's needs. In addition, men's opinions of women, which create her as an angel not fitted to struggle with public life, violate woman's true nature and cause her to become entrapped. Cady Stanton says:

(Men) make her believe that her organization is so much finer than theirs, that she is not fitted to struggle with the tempests of public life, but needs their care and protections! Care and protection--such as the wolf gives the lamb--most cunningly her entraps her, and then takes from her all those rights which are dearer to him than life itself--rights which have been baptized in blood...

At this point, Cady Stanton calls into question those women whose indifference and contempt allow ridicule and scorn to be heaped on others of their own sex. She utilizes a subjective dissociation here, objective
saying that a lack of information is the true culprit:

When women know the laws and constitutions under which they live, they will not publish their degradation by declaring themselves satisfied, for their ignorance, by declaring they have all the rights they want.

With this dissociation, Cady Stanton is warning two different audiences of the same idea: men and women must each realize that a lack of knowledge about conditions is holding women back; men are to blame for fostering this condition, and women are to blame for accepting it.

Cady Stanton now turns her arguments presenting the new reality through a locus of essence, a general argumentative theme which is a plea for picturing women in their true ideal state. This locus ties in a great number of values of which adherence is vital and already inherent within the audience:

Let woman live as she should. Let her feel her accountability to her Maker. Let her know that her spirit is fitted for as high a sphere as men's, and that her soul requires food as pure and exalted as his. Teach her the responsibility as a human being of conscience and reason, that all earthly support is weak and unstable, that her only safe dependence is the arm of omnipotence, and that true happiness springs from duty accomplished. Thus will she learn the lesson of individual responsibility for time and eternity.20

Another dissociation is again forwarded to meet objections to the new movement: appearance of presently existing "happy homes." reality

Cady Stanton acknowledges that society acts as though domestic family life is truly harmonious and that any change in society would damage that relationship. She denies the implied "fact" that marriages are largely happy and states:

There can be no true dignity or independence where there is subordination to the absolute will of another, no happiness without freedom. Let us have no fears that the movement will disturb what is seldom found, a truly united and happy family.
Cady Stanton continues to structure her new reality as her address nears its conclusion. She provides several examples of "moral stagnation" in society as she attempts to create presence for the idea that the world has never seen yet a truly great and virtuous nation, because in the degradation of woman the very fountains of life are poisoned at their source.22

Cady Stanton contends that vice is rising despite the multiplying of churches, charities, and reform organizations, each of which silence the voice of women. She argues through a causal connection which shows how woman's degradation harms the entire fabric of society, but only woman's elevation can save it:

God, in his wisdom, has so linked the whole human family together that any violence done at one end of the chain is felt throughout its length, and here, too, is the law of restoration, as in woman all have fallen, so in her elevation shall the race be recreated.23

The new order has been clearly presented; its basic values are in concert with the audience's originally held ones, but the task ahead is not a simple one. Cady Stanton solidifies this newly established reality by arguing from unlimited development, which demonstrates getting closer to a desired ideal. It is this conclusion which serves as a guiding torch to the start of the movement:

We do not expect our path will be strewn with the flowers of popular applause, but over the thorns of bigotry and prejudice will be our way, and on our banners will beat the dark storm-clouds of opposition from those who have entrenched themselves behind the stormy bulwarks of custom and authority, and who have fortified their position by every means, holy and unholy. But we will steadfastly abide the result. Unmoved we will bear it aloft. Undaunted we will unfurl it to the gale, for we know that the storm cannot rend from it a shred, that the electric flash will but more clearly show to us the glorious words inscribed upon it, "Equality of Rights."24

Cady Stanton's maiden address exemplifies many of the types of argument she repeatedly uses in her reform discourse. The primary
utilization of dissociation to break notions of the present systems and
desired values and the concerns of structuring a new reality based
upon those same desired values would be the major techniques evident in
her discourse. Because of her reliance upon practical reasoning, Cady
Stanton utilizes concepts which often transcend experience, ideas
which connect complex systems of nonformal arguments.

**Seneca Falls Resolutions**

Although it is the product of five authors, it is widely acknow-
ledged that the Declaration of Sentiments had Elizabeth Cady Stanton
as its guiding force. She chose the 1776 Declaration of Independence
as the model and did most of the writing, utilizing as much of the
original phraseology as possible, merely substituting the word "male"
in place of "King George." Since the 1776 Declaration contained
eighteen grievances, the 1848 document included the same number. To
Cady Stanton, the list of women's grievances justified the charge of
tyranny leveled at custom in general and men in particular; this was
to become a trademark theme in later discourse.

By using the 1776 Declaration as model, Cady Stanton showed a
brilliant persuasive technique; she connected her cause with a symbol
of American liberty. She adopted Jefferson's widely accepted style;
the author of the 1776 document was in his own time a proponent of
human rights (at least for white men). By using this basis, Cady Stanton
placed her movement it its inception within America's main values. This
also allowed her to settle her loyalty to the original revolutionary
forefathers, whom she would often call upon as a powerful symbol.
Prior to the reading of the Declaration of Sentiments on Thursday, July 20, 1848, a list of eleven grievances or resolutions was presented on the afternoon of July 19. These Resolutions, which argue that present laws violate a locus of essence, begin with a starting point of truth; truths are universal binding forces which state that nature endows all people with the right to pursue their own happiness. This value of self-determination will consistently serve as the top rung of a value hierarchy around which Cady Stanton will form all of her major arguments. The list of Resolutions begins:

Whereas the great precept of nature is conceded to be, "that man shall pursue his own true and substantial happiness." Nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this, and such of them as are valid, derive all their force, and all their validity, and all their authority, mediately and immediately, from this original.

Once Cady Stanton has announced this truth and its inherent value, it is her task to demonstrate that the current system is in violation of that hierarchy. The Resolutions utilize a unifying theme of the locus of essence; that the ideal woman is being harmed by unjust laws. Cady Stanton demonstrates a number of techniques in forwarding this argumentation.

Resolutions one and two demonstrate contradiction within the system of justice. This technique attempts to show inconsistencies in beliefs or actions.

Resolved, That such laws as conflict, in any way, with the true and substantial happiness of woman, are contrary to the great precept of nature, and of no validity; for this is "superior in obligation to any other."
Resolved, That all laws which prevent woman from occupying such a station in society as her conscience shall dictate, or which place her in a position inferior to that of man, are contrary to the great precept of nature, and therefore of no force or authority.26

Resolution three states that God created men and women as equals. Invoking the Rule of Justice, Cady Stanton notes that the highest good of society can only be served when woman is recognized as man's true equal. Resolution four sets forth the first of many dissociations, which Cady Stanton will generate continuously in order to demonstrate that the way people accept reality is false and misleading. In this case, she uses an appearance pair, which shows that women are not reality what they think they are:

Resolved, That the women of this country ought to be enlightened in regard to the laws under which they live, that they may no longer publish their degradation, by declaring themselves satisfied with their present position, nor their ignorance, by asserting that they have all the rights they want.27

The appearance is that women have all the rights they need; the reality is that laws do not grant them all necessary rights. As in any dissociative pair, the Term I (appearance) has now been separated from the Term II (reality), and the audience has had its connecting links of thought broken.

The next four Resolutions (numbers five through eight) utilize dissociation of both appearance and opinion in asserting that both reality and truth sexes have incorrect ideas about women and their "sphere." In truth, people need to realize and utilize the enlarged sphere which God has granted all people. An example of this is demonstrated in Resolution eight:
Resolved, That woman has too long rested satisfied in the circumscribed limits which corrupt customs and a perverted application of the Scriptures have marked out for her, and that it is time she should move in the enlarged sphere which her great Creator has assigned her.

The most contentious Resolution, the ninth, associates the right of suffrage to a sacred right, using the quasi-logical technique of transitivity: the duties and privileges of one area are therefore transferred to the other.

Resolution ten structures the reality by causality:

Resolved, That the equality of human rights results necessarily from the fact of the identity of the race in capabilities and responsibilities.

Thus, a cause-effect relationship is drawn between human rights and maintaining a good society where the race is kept at its best.

The final Resolution reiterates the locus of essence: based upon their unique abilities and ideal qualities, it is the duty of woman to seek change. A failure to challenge the system would be in violation of the basic truths of God's laws:

Resolved, therefore, That, being invested by the Creator with the same capabilities, and the same consciousness of responsibility for their exercise, it is demonstrably the right, the duty of woman, equally with man, to promote every righteous cause, by every righteous means; and especially in regard to the great subjects of morals and religion, it is self-evidently her right to participate with her brother in teaching them, both in private and in public, by writing and by speaking, by any instrumentalities proper to be used, and in any assemblies proper to be held; and this being a self-evident truth, growing out of the divinely implanted principles of human nature, any custom or authority adverse to it, whether modern or wearing the hoary sanction of antiquity, is to be regarded as a self-evident falsehood, and at war with mankind.

This final Resolution is a powerful one, attempting to intensify the adherence to the ideals originally agreed upon by the audience. In one fell swoop, Cady Stanton has utilized both techniques of
(appearance) by showing that laws which may exist may also violate reality

the essential nature of humans, as well as the associative technique of

the Rule of Justice: because of their God-given rights, it is the duty

of all people to improve society by all means possible. The Resolution

serves also to reinforce in the audience the strength of original

convictions; it appears that Cady Stanton is talking to the reasonable

side of the audience, the universal audience, for she speaks clearly

of the "self-evident" nature of her ideas. According to Perelman,

a universal audience would recognize the self-evident nature of

reason.

All of the Resolutions helped to instigate thought about the true

condition of women; they, in effect, achieved presence for the concerns

which the manifesto of the desired course of action would expand upon.

The combination of the two documents, the Resolutions and the Declaration

of Sentiments, serve to create presence for the reality of violations

of truths and values, as well as designing the course of action to

be followed for the upcoming decades of the movement.

Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments

The Declaration of Sentiments begins with a starting point of truth:

that God grants certain rights to all humans; the Declaration assumes

a presumption present in the audience based on the concept that a

person must explain his/her actions if s/he feels those basic values have

been violated. From this start, the Declaration has set up the audience

in a position to at least pay attention.

The opening statements are practically a verbatim recitation of the

original 1776 Declaration's opening sentiments, so the intensity of the
audience's initial adherence to its basic principles is thus doubly accentuated:

We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. These truths and their attached values of self-determination and self-reliance then lead to the newly established presumption which all in the audience must hold: a person has the right to seek change if his/her rights are violated.

Before establishing the presence needed to advance the idea that man's society violates basic human rights, Cady Stanton utilizes the dissociative technique of appearance: what is known about the government, what presently exists (appearance), is missing basic tenets and is not following a desired right course (reality):

Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly, all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they were accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariable the same object envisions a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of the women under this government, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to demand the equal station to which they are entitled.

At this point, Cady Stanton has now begun to devalue the accepted and must replace it with a newly conceived reality; in order to show all of the wrongs done to women, the violations must achieve presence in the minds of the audience. Cady Stanton utilizes two primary techniques of establishing presence: the example and illustrations. A few are presented below:
The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. (establishes presence)

He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise. (illustration)

He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. (example which creates generalization)

He has made her, morally, an irresponsible being, as she can commit many crimes with impunity, provided they be done in the presence of her husband. (example)

He closes against her all the avenues to wealth and distinction, which he considers most honorable to himself. As a teacher of theology, medicine, or law, she is now known. (illustration)

There is a series of these examples and illustrations, and as Perelman notes, each serves to create a damning list of grievances against custom and tradition. Presence is achieved.

Once the audience has been made aware of the wrongs done to women, Cady Stanton then structures this reality by cause-effect and pragmatic arguments. These demonstrate the consequences of the violations men place upon women:

He has created a false public sentiment, by giving to the world a different code of morals for men and women, by which moral delinquencies which exclude women from society, are not only tolerated but deemed of little account in man.

He has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself, claiming it as his right to assign for her a sphere of action, when that belongs to her conscience and to her God.

He has endeavored, in every way that he could, to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life.34

Cady Stanton has now accomplished her initial goal, that of demonstrating to the audience the irrefutable fact that women are being treated as second-class beings who are denied God-given rights. She calls upon the Rule of Justice, which should promote an intensity of adherence to the values of self-reliance and self-determination which the audience already holds.
Now, in view of this entire disfranchisement of one-half of the people of this country, their social and religious degradation, in view of the unjust laws above mentioned, and because women do feel themselves aggrieved, oppressed, and fraudulently deprived of their most sacred rights, we insist that they have immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United States. 

The end of the Declaration of Sentiments pictures the new reality where women demand and achieve their just rights. Cady Stanton helps the audience conceive of this new world by the use of two techniques: unlimited development, showing the drawing closer to an ideal state, and argument of waste, which argues for the continuation of a course of action and cause once action has begun.

In entering upon the great work before us, we anticipate no small amount of misconception, misrepresentation, and ridicule; but we shall use every instrumentality within our power to effect our object. We shall employ agents, circulate tracts, petition the state and national legislatures, and endeavor to enlist the pulpit and the press in our behalf. We hope this convention will be followed by a series of Conventions, embracing every part of the country.

Firmly relying upon the final triumph of the Right and the True, we do this day affix our signatures to this declaration.

Although the Seneca Falls convention was intended to stimulate widespread equality, it was almost two years before a women's rights convention was held outside New York. Finally, in April 1850, feminists in the abolition stronghold of Salem, Ohio, organized a women's rights meeting to exert pressure on the state constitutional convention.

Cady Stanton was unable to attend most of the early women's rights conventions because of a multitude of housekeeping demands, but nothing kept her from writing. She sent letters of encouragement to those she did not attend and began to plan future strategy. The three representative letters analyzed here demonstrate the formulation of arguments which gave the newly emergent movement its basic impetus.
Letter to Salem Convention

In a letter she wrote to members of the Salem, Ohio, Convention in April 1850, Elizabeth Cady Stanton's most common techniques of argument are easily discerned. She favors an argumentative structure which sets out the starting point very quickly, proceeds to dissociative techniques, and then relies upon the structuring of a new reality to intensify her initial theme. In this case, the proposed starting point (one of truth) is a widely accepted truth: "The remodeling of a Constitution, in the nineteenth century, speaks of progress, of greater freedom, and of more enlarged views of human rights and duties." \(^{37}\) The audience's assumed truth, that progress is a positive step, connects well with the values of self-respect and self-determination. By joining values and theory, she creates a basis for the letter's content: a catalogue of concepts to be petitioned for. If the desired end of all the arguments is societal improvement, then it is essential that the means be carefully conceived and begun.

For Cady Stanton, only one petition is essential: the right to vote; from this all other rights will surely flow. To demonstrate the validity of this position, she employs several techniques. By beginning with dissociation, which demonstrates the values of the desired while devaluing the accepted, she seeks to structure a new reality.

An appearance statement "to grant to you of this right (suffrage) will secure all others; and the granting of every other right, whilst this is denied, is a mocking." \(^{38}\) In essence, Cady Stanton is saying that the appearance of equality (through the granting of some rights) is devalued in light
of the denial of even one right. She strengthens this dissociation by claiming that "The enjoyment of that right (the right to property) is no security that it will be continued to-morrow, so long as it is granted to us as a favor, and not claimed by us as a right."39 This dissociative pair, favor, which may be translated into Perelman's right appearance, shows a norm based upon the value of self-determination; reality it is not enough to be given something in appearance, for the true right of reality for the individual is possession in the first place. Once this desired end of dissociation has been presented, Cady Stanton can then begin to establish the structure of reality, the purpose of which is to abolish the old and develop the new.

Her first contention of what the women of Salem should petition for in the new state constitution is based upon the premise that men cannot represent women. Using causal argumentation, she advances the idea that men are so convinced that women are different that males are incapable of seeing women held to the same laws, including those which guarantee to citizens the rights of representation. Because of this conception, women are treated like lesser beings:

So far from viewing us like themselves, they seem, from their legislation, to consider us their moral and intellectual antipodes; for whatever law they find good for themselves, they forthwith pass its opposite for us, and express the most profound astonishment if we manifest the least dissatisfaction.40

The next technique used to establish a present reality is analogy: women are viewed as no more than slaves:

A married woman has no legal existence; she has no more absolute rights than a slave on a Southern plantation. She takes the name of her master, holds nothing, owns nothing, can bring no action in her own name; and the principle on which she and the slave is educated is the
same. The slave is taught what is considered best for him to know—which is nothing; the woman is taught what is best for her to know—which is little more than nothing, men being the umpire in both cases. A woman can not follow out the impulses of her own mind in her sphere, any more than the slave can in his sphere. Civilly, socially, and religiously, she is what man chooses her to be, nothing more or less, and such is the slave.\footnote{41}

This argument by analogy demonstrates the reality of woman's lowly position and gives presence to the new proposition that only woman can represent herself:

It is impossible for us to convince man that we think and feel exactly as he does; that we have the same sense of right and justice, the same love of freedom and independence.\footnote{42}

The conception that woman and man are equal in their desires will later evoke Perelman's Rule of Justice, which compels the listener to treat equal entities equally.

To seal the contention that man is incapable of representing woman because he does not conceive of her as being worthy of representation, Cady Stanton employs ridicule, which Perelman contends is used to point up the absurdity of two incompatible points of view. Men may think they know what women are like, but even those ideas have obvious flaws:

Some men regard us as devils, and some as angels; hence, one class would shut us up in a certain sphere for fear of the evil we might do, and the other for fear of the evil that might be done to us; thus, except for the sentiment of the thing, for all the good that it does us, we might as well be thought the one as the other.\footnote{43}

Because of their false views, men are unable to represent women fairly. Cady Stanton concludes her first argument by intensifying adherence to the self-determination principle that only women can represent themselves, for only they know what they really are. She thereby advances a value statement by asserting a \textit{locus} of quality to be remembered.
The second contention Cady Stanton advances is that men cannot legislate for women. Beginning again with dissociation, she demonstrates a combination of appearance and individual, where men's reality is not only false but also denies the value of universal conception of women is not only false but also denies the value of all people (self-reliance, self-determination, equality) over norms which relate to only certain groups. If men do not see women as essentially the same as themselves, then they are incapable of judging women's needs and wants. Cady Stanton employs the Rule of Justice along with comparison techniques (showing how the incomparable cannot be compared) in an attempt to establish presence for the idea of suffrage as a basic right:

If we are alike in our mental structure, then there is no reason why we should not have a voice in making the laws which govern us; but if we are not alike, most certainly we must make laws for ourselves, for who else can understand what we need and desire? If it be admitted in this Government that all men and women are free and equal, then must we claim a place in our Senate Chamber and House of Representatives. But if, after all, it be found that even here we have classes and caste, not "Lords and Commons," but lords and women, then must we claim a lower House, where our Representatives can watch the passage of all bills affecting our own welfare, or the good of our country.

Once woman attains the right of self-determination, a new structure of reality is visualized. The pragmatic arguments Cady Stanton utilizes emphasize the consequences of suffrage and evaluate their worth in terms of a universally desired goal, namely the value of justice for all.

Had the women of this country had a voice in the Government, think you our national escutcheon would have been stained with the guilt of aggressive warfare upon such weak, defenceless nations as the Seminoles and Mexicans? Think you we should cherish and defend, in the heart of our nation, such a wholesale system of piracy, cruelty, licentiousness, and ignorance as is our slavery? Think you that relic of barbarism, the gallows, by which the wretched murderer is sent with
blood upon his soul, uncalled for, into the presence of his God, would be sustained by law? Verily, no, or I mistake woman's heart, her instinctive love of justice, and mercy, and truth! 

Once the two major arguments for suffrage have been delineated, Cady Stanton then must intensify the worthiness of that goal. Beginning with a locus of the value of a person (in this case, the value of God-given rights that each person has to self-government), she challenges the audience to action. It is here that Cady Stanton employs two techniques of establishing the structure of reality; waste, where one must not give up once an act has been started, and unlimited development, which demonstrates approaching an ideal. The use of these methods is demonstrated in several examples and illustrations; Perelman says the former is designed to form generalizations and the latter to achieve presence. As an example of waste, Cady Stanton cautions:

Let no sallies of wit or ridicule at our expense; no soft nonsense of woman's beauty, delicacy, and refinement; no promise of gold and silver, bank stock, road stock, or landed estate, seduce us from our position until that one stronghold totters to the ground.

Next, Cady Stanton demonstrates unlimited development by example:

This done, the rest they will surrender at discretion. Then comes equality in Church and State, in the family circle, and in all our social relations.

Illustrations, which can aid in achieving presence of a concept, are also utilized in both arguments of waste and unlimited development:

The cause of woman is onward. For our encouragement, let us take a review of what has occurred during the last few years. Not two years since the women of New York held several Conventions. Their meetings were well attended by both men and women, and the question of woman's true position was fully and freely discussed...before that time, the newspapers said but little on that subject. Immediately after there was scarcely a newspaper in the Union that did not notice their Conventions. Now you seldom take up a paper that has not something about woman; but the tone is changing—ridicule is giving way to reason. Our papers begin to see this is no subject for mirth, but one for serious consideration.
These two concepts, joined as they are in a quasi-logical association, lead to a locus of essence, a picture of the ideal, and a common-place which the audience is likely to remember:

The heroine of our fashionable novel is now a being of spirit, of energy, of will, with a conscience, with high moral principle, great decision, and self-reliance.

This locus is later to be used as a starting point for a call for further action. What Cady Stanton has thus far achieved is a conception of a preferred reality with realistic reasons for attempting its achievement. She has demonstrated a concern for common values, shown how those values are currently being ignored or trampled, and presented the conception that the way to the preferred reality is already present; the end is attainable.

A further combination of waste and unlimited development occurs in Cady Stanton's recitation of present lecture subjects, where contemporary magazines and orators are abandoning time-worn subjects in favor of the general theme of women. She admires that even though the skill with which the new themes are presented is weak and the philosophy less than desired, it is enough that "...the great minds of the day are taking this direction." The unlimited development of progress toward the suffrage right once again shows the locus of essence (woman's ideal quality) in the statement "Woman seems to be preparing herself for a higher and holier destiny." Here, the value of self-determination is coupled with the truth tenet of a sacred experience.

The letter concludes with a plea for further movement. Cady Stanton has established a new reality, has attached the important values to it, and has utilized in her ending a repetition of her original starting
point, that progress will result in enlarged views of human rights.

I see a brighter, happier day yet to come; but woman must say
how soon the dawn shall be, and whether the light shall first shine
in the East or the West. By her own efforts the change must come.
She must carve out her future destiny with her own right hand. If
she have not the energy to secure for herself her true position,
neither would she have the force or stability to maintain it, if placed
there by another.52

The letter demonstrates a clear structure of practical reasoning.
Cady Stanton begins by breaking the links between appearance and
reality, opinion and truth, then offers a new reality, one which
intensifies basic values already held by the audience. She demon-
strates this new reality while at the same time advocating its
lasting value. This type of ordering of arguments will be repeated in
many of her other letters and tracts during the time period of 1850-
1860, when the importance of drumming up support and gathering
arguments is crucial to the movement for women's rights.

Letter to Akron Convention

Similar structuring of argumentation can also be witnessed in
the contents of a letter to the Woman's Convention held in Akron,
Ohio, on May 25, 1851. The focus of this letter is on the need for
woman to exercise not only the rights she currently has, but also to
develop further independence in order to gain a better place in
society.

The dissociative pair of theory which attempts to provide a basis
practice
for distinguishing between what is thought to be and what should be is
subtly represented in the opening lines. Man taunts woman, saying
that woman has been full of ideas and plans that have been rehearsed,
but no real action has come of them, a sort of form without reality.
Cady Stanton concedes that often, actions are hard to conceive, but she begins with the starting point that there are positive steps women may employ.

It is often said to us tauntingly, "Well, you have held Conventions, you have speeched and resolved, protested and appealed, declared and petitioned, and now, what next? Why do you not do something?" I have as often heard the reply, "We know not what to do." Having for some years rehearsed to the unjust judge our grievances, our legal and political disabilities and social wrongs, let us glance at what we may do, at the various rights of which we may, even now, quietly take possession.

This starting point—the presumption that women will do what they can do—is furthered by a series of facts, each of which solidifies agreement to the starting point. Cady Stanton points up the rights women do have at present and of which they may quietly take possession:

True, our right to vote we can not exercise until our State Constitutions are remodelled; but we can petition our legislators every session, and plead our cause before them. We can make a manifestation by going to the polls, at each returning election, bearing banners, with inscriptions thereon of great sentiments handed down to us by our Revolutionary fathers—such as "No Taxation without Representation," "No just Government can be formed without the consent of the Governed," etc. We can refuse to pay all taxes, and, like the English dissenters, suffer our goods to be seized and sold, if need be.

What are the purposes of these facts? They serve to create presence for those who do not have a true picture of women.

Such manifestations would appeal to a class of minds that now take no note of our Conventions or their proceedings; who never dream, even, that woman thinks herself defrauded of a single right.

Cady Stanton has now set out her course: that of establishing a structured new reality where women are granted the opportunity to reach for their highest ability through training and equal rights; here, she is touching upon the universal values of the dignity of the individual and his/her right to self-determination and self-reliance.
The next phase of argumentation, that which begins to establish a stronger picture of the new reality, utilizes the quasi-logical technique of transitivity. This method draws inferences, which then can be inserted into the framework of a pragmatic argument. Cady Stanton notes that women have already demonstrated their competence in a number of trades and professions. They have also been perceived to be highly moral and more competent in emotion and religious piety. Theology requires high moral sentiments, yet the pulpit is barred to women. By asserting transitivity, Cady Stanton proposes:

Who so well fitted to fill the pulpits of our day as woman? So long as our popular theology and reason are at loggerheads, we have no need of acute metaphysicians or skillful logicians in our pulpits. We want those who can make the most effective appeals to our imaginations, our hopes and fears.

The same type of arguments, transitivity and pragmatics, are used to argue for women as physicians. All that women are lacking is education:

Give her knowledge commensurate with her natural qualifications, and there is no position woman could assume that would be so preeminently useful to her race at large, and her own sex in particular, as that of ministering angel to the sick and afflicted; an angel, not capable of sympathy merely, but armed with the power to relieve suffering and prevent disease.

Up to this point, Cady Stanton has been attempting to both destroy the present condition and forward a new idea. She continues with dissociating appearance from reality to demonstrate the falseness of current practices; Perelman might design this dissociative pair as opinion. Cady Stanton notes truth

The science of obstetrics is a branch of the profession which should be monopolized by woman. The fact that it is now almost wholly in the hands of the male practitioner, is an outrage on common decency
that nothing but the tyrant custom can excuse.

I hope this custom may be abolished as speedily as possible, for no excuse can be found, for its continuance, in the want of knowledge and skill in our own sex.

Opinion here is that woman cannot deal with medicine; truth is that common decency demands the false custom and tradition be altered. This destruction of the present reality is ended by the showing of the newly conceived order where women are educated to their own abilities. An example which attempts to form a generalization is shown in the statement:

It seems to me that the existence of this custom argues a much greater want of delicacy and refinement in woman, than would the practice of the profession by her in all its various branches.

Cady Stanton has now achieved presence for the conceptualization of equal education opportunities for both sexes, because the end result of such education will in turn result in the betterment of all society. Thus, the values of self-determination and self-reliance are presented for adherence and intensification. Cady Stanton needs to develop those values' strength, so she advances a locus of essence: the description of the perfect childhood for a girl. Once such a childhood is established, the new structure of reality can be described, primarily by the technique of unlimited development. First, Cady Stanton argues and supports the locus of essence and new reality as follows:

The childhood of woman must be free and untrammeled. The girl must be allowed to romp and play, climb, skate, and swim; her clothing must be more like that of the boy—strong, loose-fitting garments, thick boots, etc., that she may be out at all times, and enter freely into all kinds of sports. Teach her to go alone, by night and by day, if need be, on the lonely highway, or through the bust streets of the crowded metropolis.
As she structures reality, she also utilizes the dissociative techniques of appearance and theory, each designed to show the folly of the present concepts:

The best protector any woman can have, one that will serve her at all times and in all places, is courage; this she must get by her own experience, and experience comes by exposure. Let the girl be thoroughly developed in body and soul, not modeled, like a piece of clay, after some artificial specimen of humanity, with a body like some plate in Godey's book of fashion, and a mind after the type of Father Gregory's pattern: daughters, loaded down with the traditions, proprieties, and sentimentalities of generations of silly mothers and grandmothers, but left free to be, to grow, to feel, to think, to act. Development is one thing, that system of cramping, restraining, torturing, perverting, and mystifying, called education, is quite another.

Cady Stanton further shows the incompatibility of the connected ideas of how women want to be treated and how they are treated through an opinion dissociation: "It is a settled maxim with me, truth after much examination and reflection, that public sentiment is false on every subject."  

Once tradition and common practice have been devalued, Cady Stanton then is able to retrace to her locus of essence and end with a pragmatic argument. Each solidifies the new reality she has created and serves to spur the audience to action.

Outrage this tyrant (custom), place yourself beyond his jurisdiction, taste the joy of free thought and action, and how powerless is his rule over you! His scepter lies broken at your feet; his very babblings of condemnation are sweet music in your ears; his darkening frown is sunshine to your heart, for they tell of your triumph and his discomfort. Think you, women thus educated would long remain the weak, dependent beings we now find them? By no means. As educated capitalists and skillful laborers, they would not be long in finding their true level in political and social life.

In sum, this letter once again laid out the basic structure of argumentation which Cady Stanton was developing in her early reform
discourse. The arguments for equal treatment and the new reality which it would present were fully developed through practical reasoning.

Letter to Syracuse Convention

In her letter to the delegates to the Syracuse Convention (Sept. 8-10, 1852), Cady Stanton attempted to argue for their education, elevation, and enfranchisement. Here, she set forth three questions about present presumptions which are then supported by structuring a sense of a new reality.

The first question, which deals with the presumption that an unrepresented citizen should refuse to obey all laws, is argued from the quasi-logical techniques of comparison and ridicule. It is a common theme of Cady Stanton's to refer to the forefathers' fights for justice and equality as an analogy for the women's battles:

Shall we deny the faith of the old Revolutionary heroes, and purchase for ourselves a false power and ignoble ease, by declaring in action that taxation without representation is just? Ah, No! like the English Dissenters and high-souled Quakers of our own land, let us suffer our property to be seized and sold, but let us never pay another tax until our existence as citizens, our civil and political rights be fully recognized.64

Note that a special type of comparison is being exemplified: sacrifice, where the price of an action is shown.

Such a movement, if simultaneous, would no doubt produce a great deal of confusion, litigation, and suffering on the part of woman; but shall we fear to suffer for the maintenance of the same glorious principle for which our forefathers fought, bled, and died?

The dissociative technique of theory is then employed, demonstrating the hypocrisy of the connected links between how women are apparently recognized and how they are "taken" by man. In theory, women are
not recognized as having a legal existence or any civil or political rights; they are merely satellites of man. In practice, women are able to be recognized if:

...by the fruit of her industry, she becomes the owner of a house and lot, and now her existence is remembered and recognized, and she too may have the privilege of contributing to the support of this mighty Republic, for the "white male citizen" claims of her one dollar and seventy-five cents a year, because, under the glorious institutions of this free and happy land, she has been able, at the age of fifty years, to possess herself of a property worth the enormous sum of three hundred dollars...

The norm of treating a taxpaying citizen as a citizen is violated; Perelman's Rule of Justice is broken. If women decide to fight unjust laws, they will be faced with a desired but difficult future. A causal link is developed: if such a course of action (refusal to obey unjust laws) is followed, the effects will be challenging, for women will face litigation.

Cady Stanton dissociates theory again, demonstrating how laws practice are currently used by men for their own gain:

Laws are capable of many and various constructions; we find among men that as they have new wants, that as they develop into more enlarged views of justice, the laws are susceptible of more generous interpretation, or changed altogether.

This dissociation is strengthened by Cady Stanton's pointing up of the system's contradictions:

While man has abolished hanging for theft, imprisonment for debt, and secured universal suffrage for himself, a married woman, in most of the States in the Union, remains a non-entity in law can own nothing; can be whipped and locked up by her lord; can be worked without wages, be robbed of her inheritance, stripped of her children, and left alone and penniless; and all this, they say, according to law.
What Cady Stanton has accomplished is a denial of the present system and its structure; into this vacuum she must create a new reality. Through a process of pragmatic argument and those of unlimited development, she posits a notion of a world where women make their own laws. In order to have such a society, women must first become professionals.

Now, it is quite time that we have these laws revised by our own sex, for man does not yet feel that what is unjust for himself, is also unjust for woman. Yes, we must have our own lawyers, as well as our physicians and priests. Some of our women should go at once into this profession, and see if there is no way by which we may shuffle off our shackles and assume our civil and political rights. We cannot accept man's interpretation of the law.

The second major presumption is that sound thinking and experience show men and women should be treated alike in education. Cady Stanton demonstrates the evils in the present system of isolation of the sexes. A subjective dissociation is shown by her discussion of men as statesmen and politicians on one hand and fathers and husbands on the other. Men are enacting a variety of roles beneficial to women. She evokes the Rule of Justice by stating:

Inasmuch, therefore, as we have the same objects in life, namely the full development of all our powers, and should, to some extent, have the same employments, we need precisely the same education; and we therefore claim that the best colleges of our country be open to us.

Cady Stanton reiterates her presumption, which is stated then as a locus of quality:

My ground is, that the boy and the girl, the man and the woman, should be always together in the business and pleasures of life, sharing alike its joys and sorrow, its distinction and fame; nor will they ever be harmoniously developed until they are educated together, physically, intellectually, and morally.
In achieving equal educational opportunities with men, Cady Stanton demonstrates the causes and effects of unequal treatment. In addition, the pragmatics of such actions are described:

Men having separated themselves from women in the business of life, and thus made their natures coarse by contact with their own sex exclusively, now demand separate pleasures too; and in lieu of the cheerful family circle, its books, games, music, and pleasant conversation, they congregate in clubs to discuss politics, gamble, drink, etc., in those costly, splendid establishments, got up for such as can not find sufficient excitement in their own parlors or studios. It seems never to enter the heads of these fashionable husbands, that the hours drag as heavily with their fashionable wives, as they sit alone, night after night, in their solitary elegance, wholly given up to their own cheerless reflections; for what subjects of thought have they? Gossip and fashion will do for talk, but not for thought. Their theology is too gloomy and shadowy to afford them much pleasure in contemplation; their religion is a thing of form and not of life, so it brings them no joy or satisfaction. As to the reforms of the day, they are too genteel to feel much interest in them. There is no class more pitiable than the unoccupied woman of fashion thrown wholly upon herself. [72]

The third major presumption, women are being duped by organized religion, is echoed by the presumption that the quality of the act will reveal the quality of the person behind it. Cady Stanton argues a dangerous course: the contradictions of a "true" religion and its present-day incarnations. In order to accomplish this argumentation, she uses several dissociations. The first, theory, shows that ministers practice are largely wastrels supported by women who are fooled into thinking that they are doing good. The apparent contradiction between the two systems is clearly established as Cady Stanton shows:

Look at the long line of benevolent societies, all filled with these male agents (ministers) living, like so many leeches, on the religious element in our natures most of them from the ranks of the clergy, who, unable to build up or keep a church, have taken refuge in some of these theological asylums for the intellectually maimed and blind of this profession.
The next dissociative pair, appearance, mocks the hypocrisy of reality ministers who seem to oppose women's equality but use women to meet their own ends.

Among the clergy we find our most violent enemies—those most opposed to any change in women's position; yet no sooner does one of these find himself out of place and pocket than, if all the places in the various benevolent societies chance to be occupied, he takes a kind of philanthropic, survey of the whole habitable globe, and forthwith forms a Female Benevolent Society for the conversion of the Jews ... and he is, in himself, the law for one the the gospel for the other. Now, the question is, not whether the Jews are converted, but does the agent flourish? Is his post profitable? and does woman beg and stitch faithfully for his support and for the promotion of his glorious mission? As a summary of the evils of the current system of religious hypocrisy, Cady Stanton uses contradiction, showing the inconsistencies of the present society:

Woman in her present ignorance is made to rest in the most distorted views of God and the Bible and the laws of her being; and like the poor slave "Uncle Tom," her religion, instead of making her noble and free, and impelling her to flee from all gross surroundings, but the false lessons of her spiritual teachers, by the wrong application of great principles of right and justice, has made her bondage but more certain and lasting, her degradation more helpless and complete.

Once the present system has been exposed for the destructive evil that it is, Cady Stanton utilizes pragmatic arguments and reasons of unlimited development to point the way to a new reality. She poses a series of questions, each showing the direction women should be choosing:

Now, I ask women with all seriousness, considering that we have little to give, had we not better bestow our own charities with our own hands? And instead of sending our benevolent outgushings in steamers to parts unknown, had we not better let them flow in streams whose length and breadth we can survey at pleasure, knowing their source and where they empty themselves? Instead of any further efforts in behalf of a pin-cushion ministry, I conjure my countrywomen to devote themselves from this hour to the education, elevation, and enfranchisement of their own sex.
Such a clearly set course of direction would lead naturally to Cady Stanton's major locus of essence: the conception of the perfect woman:

If the same amount of devotion and self-sacrifice could be given in this direction now poured out on the churches, another generation would give us a nobler type of womanhood than any yet molded by any Bishop, Priest, or Pope.

The three preceeding letters demonstrate the basic strategies of argumentation which Elizabeth Cady Stanton utilized. She questioned the present system and dissociated appearances of right from reality and justice. Once the audience has been made to realize the errors of their practice, she forwards a new reality, which represents the truth of absolute values. As Perelman described this type of structure, Cady Stanton was developing a means for the audience to establish a new value of the norm.

1854 Address Before New York State Legislature

One of the most important speeches given in the early years of the women's movement was Elizabeth Cady Stanton's address before the New York State Legislature. It was a speech which had been given a few days earlier on February 14, 1854, to the New York State Woman's Rights Convention at Albany. Susan B. Anthony was so enthusiastic about the address that she had 50,000 copies printed and included a copy on the desk of every legislator. The speech's focus was upon establishing presence for women's legal disabilities, and Cady Stanton chose four major topic for consideration by her listeners: woman's position as woman, as wife, as widow, and as mother. Filled with concrete examples of the legal handicaps of women, the speech
clarified women's demands. The combination of the four areas of miscarriages of justice and equality was designed to promote a new ideal or truth about woman and her position in society.

Cady Stanton was faced with a different type of particular audience in this instance—rather than the partisan supporters of women's rights, here was a group which at best was skeptical and at worse adamantly opposed to women's rights.

The speech begins with a dissociative pair we have witnessed before in Cady Stanton's discourse: the appearance of custom. Once reality common sense something which is considered to be fact (in Cady Stanton's case, the tyrant of custom) is called into question, it loses much of its validity:

The tyrant, Custom, has been summoned before the bar of Common-Sense. His majesty no longer awes the multitude—his crown is trampled in the dust—his scepter is broken—the sentence of death is pronounced upon him. All nations, ranks, and classes have, in turn, questioned and repudiated his authority; and now, that the monster is chained and caged, timid woman, on tiptoe, comes to look him in the face, and to demand of her brave sires and sons, who have struck stout blows for liberty if, in this change of dynasty, she, too, shall find relief. 78

Cady Stanton then states her demand: a revision of the New York State Constitution to include new laws and provisions which treat women equally with men. The primary reason for such a new code is based throughout the speech in comparison and the Rule of Justice: women are just like the Revolutionary heroes of 1776 and therefore they deserve redress of their grievances.

The first area of argumentation which Cady Stanton discusses is the disability of women as perceived in their proper "sphere." Using as a primary base a dissociative tool of opinion, Cady Stanton attempts to truth
show that man's conception of women is in violation of their basic right as citizen; this base will in turn serve as a locus of essence. She demonstrates a number of inconsistencies in the societal system:

We are persons; native, free-born citizens; property-holders, tax-payers; yet are we denied the exercise of our right to the elective franchise. We support ourselves, and, in part, your schools, colleges, churches, your poor-houses, jails, prisons, the army, the navy, the whole machinery of government, and yet we have no voice in your councils. We have every qualification required by the Constitution, necessary to the legal voter, but the one of sex. We are moral, virtuous, and intelligent, and in all respects quite equal to the proud white man himself, and yet by your laws we are classed with idiots, lunatics, and negroes; and though we do not feel honored by the place assigned us, yet, in fact, our legal position is lower than that of either.

Note here that Cady Stanton has utilized a number of techniques which she will parallel all of her arguments; first, there is a statement of fact (persons have basic rights and duties). She then shows how man, in his refusal to allow woman to take her rightful position, is in violation of the Rule of Justice as well as demonstrating inconsistencies in his behavior; if woman is indeed moral, virtuous, and intelligent, then she should not be treated as those who are not. Through these analogies and examples, Cady Stanton has led the audience to realize that women are denied citizen's rights:

...but we, who have guided great movements of charity, estab-
lished missions, edited journals, published works on history, economy, and statistics; who have governed nations, led armies, filled the professor's chair, taught philosophy and mathematics to the savants of our age...are denied the most sacred rights of citizens, because, forsooth, we came not into this republic crowned with the dignity of manhood.

She strengthens acceptance of this idea by showing a fact which exists in present law; this demonstrates a contradiction on man's part:
Woman is theoretically absolved from all allegiance to the laws of the State. Sec. 1, Bill of Rights, 2 R.S., 301, says that no authority can, on any pretence whatever, be exercised over the citizens of this State but such is or shall be derived from and granted by the people of this State.

This contradiction serves to establish the groundwork for further destruction of presently conceived reality.

Cady Stanton challenges the men of the audience to support their inconsistencies in the following passage:

Now, gentlemen, we would fain know by what authority you have disfranchised one-half the people of this State? You who have so boldly taken possession of the bulwarks of this republic, show us your credentials, and thus prove your exclusive right to govern, not only yourselves, but us.

She also ridicules men's building up of a male aristocracy which places an ignorant, vulgar sux above the half which is educated and refined. Perelman notes that ridicule is a means of demonstrating tow incompatible points of view to someone who is like the blind.

Would that the men who can sanction a Constitution so opposed to the genius of this government, who can enact and execute laws so degrading to womankind, had sprung, Minerva-like, from the brains of their fathers, that the matrons of this republic need not blush to their own sons!

These apparent contradictions lead to Cady Stanton's first attempt at establishing presence: "Woman's position, under our free institutions, is much lower than under the monarchy of England." She is trying to demonstrate to the men that their view of woman's sphere is in violation of the ground from which it sprang. In England, women may act as judges, constables, sextons, jailors, and so on. The Rule of Justice would indicate that women in the United States should be granted the same position, since common law in both countries started from the same root. Unfortunately, the two are not treated in the same
fashion. In the same sense, a type of reciprocity relationship (opposites treated alike) between woman and negroes is developed. Negro males can vote if they own property, but without property and other qualifications, they cannot be taxed. Women are subject to taxation on all property and still may not vote. There is a basic inconsistancy in the treatment of these two groups of people.

Because women are not seen as citizens, they are denied their due rights. Cady Stanton uses a type of presumption to assert that a trial by peers (act) is the mark of quality of a civilization. The Rule of Justice demands that women be allowed the same treatment as men: trial by a jury of peers. Cady Stanton challenges:

And shall woman here consent to be tried by her liege lord, who has dubbed himself law-maker, judge, juror, and sheriff, too?—whose power, though sanctioned by Church and State, has no foundation in justice and equity, and is a bold assumption of our unalienable rights. 85

Cady Stanton attempts to chip away at the present system through transitivity by suggesting that since man cannot treat woman fairly, he cannot treat others in society in a just manner, either:

Having seen that man fails to do justice to woman in her best estate, to the vigorous, the noble, the true of our sex, should we trust to his tender mercies the weak, the ignorant, the morally insane? 86

This system of men serving as judges over women is called into account further by a lengthy subjective dissociation; men, who only objectively have their own interests at heart, cannot objectively apply immutable principles of right to anyone but themselves. Cady Stanton utilizes a series of questions to create presence for this basic inconsistancy:
Shall an erring woman be dragged before a bar of grim-visaged judges, lawyers, and jurors, there to be grossly questioned in public on subjects which women scarce breathe in secret to one another? Shall the most sacred relations of life be called up and rudely scanned by men who, by their own admission, are so coarse that women could not meet them even at the polls without contamination? How can man enter into the feelings of that woman? How can he judge of the agonies of soul that impell her?

Shall laws which come from the logical brain of man take cognizance of violence done to the moral and affectional nature which predominates, as is said, in woman?

Cady Stanton then attempts to create a new reality: she pictures for the men a time when their own women are faced with a trial. They would be degraded and unsupported, blinded by custom and prejudice.

Cady Stanton asks:

Would it not be some consolation to see that she (the wife or mother) was surrounded by the wise and virtuous of her own sex; by those who had known the depth of a mother's love and the misery of a lover's falsehood; to know that to these she could make her confession, and from them receive her sentence?

Her basic request is thus reiterated: allow woman a trial by a jury of her peers, her true peers.

The second area of argumentation which Cady Stanton highlights is that of woman as wife. Once again, an appearance dissociation begins the argumentation: English common laws, which form the basis of marriage rules, are in violation of enlightened ideas of justice.

Attached to this opening argument is an opinion dissociation: men feel truth they are the rulers of the marriage contract, when that perogative belongs to God. Cady Stanton shows how the present system is inherently corrupt, filled with contradictions.

If you regard marriage as a civil contract, then let it be subject to the same laws which control all other contracts. Do not make it a kind of half-human, half-divine institution, which you may build up, but cannot regulate. Do not, by your special legislation for this one
kind of contract involve yourselves in the grossest absurdities and contradictions.

Transitivity in the argumentative process is presented in the preceding passage: no man may make a contract for a horse or other piece of property until age 21, for the young cannot be held responsible for their actions. In the same sense, a youth, male or female, should not be held responsible for a marriage contract, which is a momentous bond.

Presence to the true situation of a married woman is developed in a list of grievances Cady Stanton presents:

The woman who but yesterday was sued on bended knee, who stood so high in the scale of being as to make an agreement on equal terms with a proud Saxon man, today has no civil existence, no social freedom. She is not held morally responsible for any crime committed in the presence of her husband, so completely is her very existence supposed by the law to be merged in that of another.

Such a view of woman violates the locus of essence which Cady Stanton sets up; this violation takes away woman's spirit and God-given principles and rights. The law allows for man to do what he wants with his wife and children, while the woman is not granted the same privileges toward her husband. This violation of essence is described by Cady Stanton:

If she have a worthless husband, a confirmed drunkard, a villain, or a vagrant, he has still all the rights of a man, a husband, and a father. Though the whole support of the family be thrown upon the wife, if the wages she earns be paid to her by her employer, the husband can receive them again. If, by unwearied industry and perseverance, she can earn for herself and children a patch of ground and a shed to cover them, the husband can strip her of all her hard earnings, turn her and her little ones out in the cold northern blast, take the clothes from their backs, the bread from their mouths, all this by your laws may he do, and has he done, oft and again, to satisfy the rapacity of that monster in human form, the rum-seller.
There is a direct violation of any principles of justice or equality which allow for such offenses against human beings to occur.

Cady Stanton does acknowledge that a new New York State law, one which grants women the right to inherited property, which she sees leading eventually to the rights to buy and sell, will and bequeath, is a positive step. This law allows women the right to make contracts. Even so, Cady Stanton says that his new reality, which only grants partial rights, is not nearly enough. A causal link and pragmatic argument combine to describe her desired new state.

But what is property without the right to protect that property by law? It is mockery to say that a certain estate is mine, if, without my consent, you have the right to tax me then and how you please, while I have no voice in making the tax-gatherer, the legislator, or the law. The right of property will, of necessity, compel us in due time to the exercise of our right to the elective franchise, and then naturally follows the right to hold office.

Cady Stanton's third major area of argumentation, the position of woman as widow, is first presented with the dissociative pair of appearance. Men tend to see the position of privilege held by widows reality as a high ideal which represents reality for all women. Cady Stanton then illustrates by example to demonstrate the true state of affairs:

The law, which takes no cognizance of widows left with twelve children and not one cent, instantly spies out this widow, takes into account of her effects, and announces to her the startling intelligence that but one-third of the house and lot, and one-half of the personal property, are hers. In this dark hour of grief, the course minions of the law gather round the widow's hearthstone, and, in the name of justice, outrage all natural sense of right; mock at the sacredness of human love, and with cold familiarity proceed to place a moneyed value on the old arm-chair, in which, but a few grief hours since, she closed the eyes that had ever beamed on her with kindness and affection.

While man in theory appears to treat the widow fairly, in practice he gives himself all of the benefits and restricts her, demeaning even
the most noble of values. In this case, a dissociative pair of

justice may be considered as an illustration of a theory pair:
false justice

practice

Behold the magnanimity of the law in allowing the widow to retain
a life interest in one-third the landed estate and taking the lion's
share to itself! Had she died first, the house and land would all
have been the husband's still. No one would have dared to intrude
upon the privacy of his home, or to molest him in his sacred
retreat of sorrow. How, I ask you, can that be called justice, which
makes such a distinction as this between man and woman?

Cady Stanton demonstrates her outrage at the inconsistent points
of view expressed in the current taxation system; widows must pay
taxes but have no representation as to how those monies are spent.
Further contradiction is demonstrated in her description of how
widows are suddenly made bereft by the system man has designed:

The cases are without number where women, who have lived in
ease and elegance, at the death of their husbands have, by will,
been reduced to the bare necessities of life. The man who leaves
his wife the sole guardian of his property and children is an exception
to the general rule. Man has ever manifested a wish that the world
should indeed be a blank to the companion whom he leaves behind him.

Cady Stanton's last area of concern, the position of woman as
mother, begins with a demonstration of an opinion dissociation:

man's law (opinion) violates nature's law (truth).

There is no human love so strong and steadfast as that of the
mother for her child; yet behold how ruthless are your laws touching
this most sacred relation. Nature has clearly made the mother the
guardian of the child; but man, in his inordinate love of power, does
continually set nature and nature's laws at open defiance.

A series of illustrations follow, showing how fathers are given full
legal right over unmarried children under age 21; they may apprentice
children out, will away guardianship, and degrade them all without
the mother's consent.
The laws are contradictory to common values of justice; in all cases of separation, children are given by law to the father, regardless of his condition or character. The price attached to such actions, an argument of sacrifice, shows the shortsightedness of such laws:

Neither at home nor abroad can a mother protect her son. Look at the temptations that surround the paths of our youth at every step; look at the gambling and drinking saloons, the club rooms, the dens of infamy and abomination that infest all our villages and cities—slowly but surely sapping the very foundations of all virtue and strength. By your laws, all these abominable reseorts are permitted. It is folly to talk of a mother moulding the character of her son, when all mankind, backed up by law and public sentiment, conspire to destroy her influence.

Cady Stanton has now demonstrated the severe violations to woman's basic rights and privileges which current laws generate. She has dissociated the perceived reality from the absolute truth, has called upon contradiction and ridicule to show the folly of man's ways, and has challenged him to support his beliefs. These techniques have combined to demonstrate woman's true condition, and in doing so, her concern for woman has achieved presence. It is now her task to join with the legislator in conceiving a new, desired reality.

She begins the structuring of this new reality with a pragmatic argument: woman's moral power can best speak through the ballot box, thus positively influencing society. Cady Stanton needs to first achieve presence for the true desires of women, and to do so, she utilizes an analogy:

It is impossible to make the Southern planter believe that his slave feels and reasons just as he does—that injustice and subjection are as galling as to him—that the degradation of living by the will of another, the mere dependent on his caprice, at the mercy of his passions, is as keenly felt by him as his master. If you can force on his
unwilling vision a vivid picture of the negro's wrongs, and for a moment touch his soul, his logic brings him instant consolation. Here, gentlemen, is our difficulty: When we plead our cause before the law-makers and savants of the republic, they can not take in the idea that men and women are alike; and so long as the mass rest in this delusion, the public mind will not be so much startled by the revelations made of the injustice and degradation of woman's position as by the fact that she should at length wake up to a sense of it.

Cady Stanton is appealing to an audience which is at least enlightened enough to let a woman address them who have recently passed a married women's property act, so she feels some safety in appealing to the legislators' sense of equality. Cady Stanton ridicules the unjust treatment of women by arguing from a locus of essence:

If you, too, are thus deluded, what avails it that we show by your statute books that your laws are unjust? What avails it that we point out the wrongs of woman in social life; the victim of passion and lust? You scorn the thought that she has any natural love of freedom burning in her breast, any clear perception of justice urging her on to demand her rights.

Once again, Cady Stanton must use examples to achieve presence for woman's true state:

Would to God you could know the burning indignation that fills woman's soul when she turns over the pages of your statute books, and sees there how like feudal barons you freemen hold your women. Would that you could know all the humiliation she feels for sex, when she thinks of all the beardless boys in your law offices, learning these ideas of one-sided justice-taking their first lessons in contempt for all womankind-being indoctrinated into the incapacities of their mothers, and the lorgly, absolute rights of man over all women, and to know that these are to be our future presidents, judges, husbands, and fathers.

Returning to the locus of essence, she queries the men on their views of women's true condition. By using ridicule, Cady Stanton attempts to demonstrate the incompatibilities of two points of view as well as violations of Perelman's Rule of Justice:
If, gentlemen, you take the ground that the sexes are alike, and, therefore, you are our faithful representatives—then why all these special laws for woman? Would not one code answer all of like needs and wants? Christ's golden rule is better than all the special legislation that the ingenuity of man can devise: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." This, is all we ask at your hands. We ask no better laws than those you have made for yourselves. We need no other protection than that which your present laws secure to you.

Cady Stanton has now successfully joined women's demands to a sacred right, one which professes a value of self-determination and justice which no one in the audience is willing to abandon. The invocation of God's rule of justice has placed the men in the audience in the position of achieving adherence to a new reality or being in violation of basic tenets which control their lives.

With the conception of this new reality, where women are given equal rights under the law because of an overriding God-given right to do so, Cady Stanton can begin to close the address. However, should men not believe women want this new world, Cady Stanton calls upon the ancient value on which America was founded: equality of rights under the law. In order to combine these ideas and strengthen adherence to the value, Cady Stanton utilizes a locus of quantity (strength in numbers) and also points up violations of such a locus. The locus is simply stated: the mass of women speak through those who stand before the podium. The majority of women of New York support themselves, their children, and their husbands. Cady Stanton asks:

Now do you candidly think these wives do not wish to control the wages they earn—to own the land—they buy—the houses they build? Do you suppose that any woman is such a pattern of devotion and submission that she willingly stitches all day for the small sum of fifty cents, that she may enjoy the unspeakable privilege, in obedience to your laws, of paying for husband's tobacco and rum?
Think you the wife with whom endurance has ceased to be a virtue, who, through much suffering, has lost all faith in the justice of both heaven and earth, and turns her back forever upon him whom she once called husband, consents to the law that in such an hour tears her child from her? The drunkards' wives speak through us, and they number 50,000. Think you the woman who has worked hard all her days in helping her husband to accumulate a large property, consents to the law that places this sholly at his disposal? Would not the mother whose only child is bound out for a term of years against her expressed wish, deprive the father of this absolute power if she could?

For all these, then, we speak.102

The speech ends with a return to the desired new reality: a world where women have equal rights under the law with men. To confirm this reality and strengthen adherence to it, Cady Stanton utilizes the technique of unlimited development, which is used when a speaker wants to demonstrate a cause getting closer to an ideal or goal:

Wo are they that we do not now represent? But a small class of the fashionable butterflies, who, through the short summer days, seek the sunshine and flowers; but the cool breezes of autumn and the hoary frosts of winter will soon chase all these away; then they, too, will need and seek protection, and through other lips demand in their turn justice and equity at your hands.103

The address presented a number of specific miscarriages of justice which men were able to understand, even if they preferred not to remedy them. In the impassioned conclusion, Cady Stanton touched upon a psychic kind of injustice: the demeaning of the spirit of women. Women were asking for no special laws; they only wanted what American men had possessed since the Mayflower cast anchor by Plymouth rock: the right to be treated as equal and identical to every other being. Although it was a well-received address, there was no action taken on Cady Stanton's desired results at that time.
Summary

The first six years of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's public career as a reform advocate provide a diverse range of discourse which present her timeless arguments for women's rights issues. The germ of her case for equality of the sexes was established by a series of associative and dissociative techniques, each of which employed a number of Perelman's concerns for practical reasoning. From her initial address to the 1848 Convention, which demonstrated how man's opinions were in violation of God-given truths, to the 1854 Address which sharpened the arguments concerning the dimensions of woman's dissent, Cady Stanton created a presence for the ideas of an order yet to come: a society where all people are allowed to strive for their ideal state.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

This study examined several pieces of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's reform rhetoric from 1848-1854 in an attempt to elicit and evaluate the form and method utilized by the rhetor in her attempts at practical reasoning. Chaim Perelman's theories as presented in *The New Rhetoric* provide a detailed treatment of argumentative techniques aimed at gaining or intensifying the adherence of an audience to a particular thesis, and it was this methodology which was chosen to critique the discourse. In this author's opinion, Cady Stanton was successful in her attempts to establish presence of her ideas and the co-mingling of those arguments with presently held audience values; however, she damaged that communion in several instances by forwarding a choice which was perhaps ahead of its time. To examine how well Cady Stanton performed as an advocate as well as how useful Perelman is in criticizing Nineteenth Century reform rhetoric, four topics will comprise the focus of this final section. First, a summary of Cady Stanton's arguments will be reviewed so as to demonstrate the central concerns of her feminist philosophy. Following this summary will be a discussion of the argumentative techniques of practical reasoning she employed; arguments' strengths and weaknesses will be evaluated. Next shall be a brief comment upon the use of Perelman as a methodological instrument for criticizing arguments; a problem inherent in Perelman's notion
of audience will be examined and a solution presented. Finally, areas of possible future study will be presented.

Summary of Cady Stanton's Arguments

The opening of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's diary contains the following verse from Linnaeus Banks:

I live...
For the cause that lacks assistance,
For the wrong that needs resistance,
For the future in the distance,
And the good that I can do.

It is the theme of those lines which describes the goals inherent in Cady Stanton's early reform rhetoric: the essential goal was to give presence to the ideas she espoused concerning attitudes society held about women; the second goal was to achieve suffrage for women. This author contends that suffrage was more a means to an end; the lack of woman's right to vote was more a symbol used by Cady Stanton to demonstrate woman's low status and degradation rather than the main cause of those problems.

Cady Stanton argued that there was no justification for denying women the freedoms which were theirs from nature as well as American governmental precepts. As heirs of their Revolutionary forefathers, women were entitled to certain basic human rights denied to them by the tyranny of the opposite sex. This so-called "aristocracy of sex" was perceived to be highly damaging to the entire fabric of society, not merely to women. The attitudes of society led to rape, prostitution, masculine arrogance, loss of woman's dignity, family destruction, and other abuses of power. Such attitudes injured all concerned, because they supported a false order for both sexes.
In keeping with this individualistic reform spirit, Cady Stanton believed that a more realistic view of women was the central strategy for social change. She believed that reform began in each person, whose rights and responsibilities would emphasize self-reliance and self-control. The rights of the individual were more important than society. However, she appeared to argue for a community which was part of a holistic system; when one member was treated ill, all others would suffer. Conversely, the good of one would contribute to the betterment of all.

Banner points out that "the central themes of Cady Stanton's feminist position and her characteristically pragmatic and polemical presentation of them were in full evidence in her 1854 speech...." Cady Stanton detailed the specifics of woman's oppression and degradation; she argued that by right women were owed equality under the law. Cady Stanton demonstrated her belief that woman's oppression was the basic issue and that women should be the agents of social change. These arguments were to be re-echoed throughout her career.

It has been written of Elizabeth Cady Stanton that "the past and the present, as well as the future were intertwined in the impression she conveyed. She seemed to live in several centuries at once." She achieved presence for the ideal that societal conceptions of men and women's "correct roles and spheres" were incorrect. For this reason, she is widely acknowledged to be the philosophical mother of the women's rights movement. The actual legal changes in women's rights--and her initial demands for suffrage--were much slower in coming. One contradiction in her argument is particularly puzzling: she wanted to
argue that men and women are equal in all moral, spiritual, and physical dimensions, but she also argued that women with rights to the ballot would refine society where men could not. It is interesting to note that after women did receive the right to suffrage with the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, societal transformation did not occur. However, the League of Women Voters did come into existence in an attempt to further that goal.

**Evaluation of Cady Stanton's Use of Practical Reasoning**

The specific techniques of Perelman's model of practical reasoning which Cady Stanton demonstrated in her 1848-1854 reform rhetoric successfully achieved her goal of establishing presence for the conceptualization of a newly structured reality where men and women are treated as self-reliant, equal, independent beings. However, Cady Stanton at times diminished the effectiveness of her arguments by soliciting a choice from the audience which damaged the communion she attempted to strengthen.

The general framework into which Cady Stanton inserts her arguments begins with the demonstration of communion between rhetor and audience. The typical starting point is usually either an abstract value or statement of truth (which Perelman says characterize the universal audience) such as "God has linked all people together, so harm to one is harm to all," or ideas evident in the early revolutionary spirit and documents of the United States that all citizens are created equal. Normally, these starting points were very briefly stated; it appears that Cady Stanton wanted to establish initial adherence (or at least acceptance) on a higher intellectual, idealized, rational level
before dealing with particular concerns. It is these abstract starting points, however, which Cady Stanton uses to raise incompatibilities within the present system. As earlier noted in Chapter Four, abstract values are able to provide criteria in order to alter the status quo. By calling upon values and truths at the outset, Cady Stanton effectively sets up a hierarchy which practically forces the audience to support certain ideas and abandon others. She creates a communion by showing a mutually shared framework of beliefs with her audience.

Thus, Cady Stanton usually begins by focusing audience attention on a central concern which is being violated. By emphasizing this idea, she pushes aside other arguments so that she can present her interpretations of social problems. This "presence" is essential at the start, and Cady Stanton reemphasizes it in various stages of her discourse. It is the establishment of presence which is Cady Stanton's most effective tool. By strengthening the awareness of the audience to her central concerns she puts them in a frame of mind where other argumentative techniques developed to present a clear choice of her own design are more easily forwarded. The success of Cady Stanton's establishment of presence is aptly demonstrated in the response of the public to her philosophical ideas: the number of conventions, newspaper responses, and societies which rapidly grew from the 1848 convention bear witness to the created exigence for an examination of the status of women and their resultant inequality. The techniques Cady Stanton utilized to intensify this adherence to her ideas demonstrate both her strengths and weaknesses as an advocate.
It is the task of the speaker to guide the audience's mental activity toward adherence to an idea. To this end, Cady Stanton must utilize both association and dissociation. The general pattern her discourse employs is as follows. First, her arguments generally employ some form of dissociation, especially appearance or opinion in order reality truth to alter the audience's conventional means of thinking. She demonstrates that the present mode of thinking is irrelevant or incompatible with what is an accepted value. The use of these dissociative pairs (for instance, the appearance of women as intellectually or physically inferior versus the reality of their true beings as granted by nature and God) alter reality in the audience's minds; in essence, they control images of reality which the audience perceives. If Cady Stanton is to be successful, as this author contends she is to a large degree, then her dissociation technique must damage the present system so that the audience is willing to at least contemplate that a new reality could exist. By showing all of society's violations of higher truths in its degradation of women, she achieves presence for her beliefs that woman's nature is being harmed, which in turn harms society.

The dissociation or breaking of connecting links between truth and values on one hand and present society on the other allows Cady Stanton to devalue the accepted. She must then replace that vacuum with a new reality of her own conception. It is normally here that she utilizes a number of associative techniques aimed at establishing the new structure of reality where woman is granted the opportunity for self-development, self-reliance, and independence. Cady Stanton relies
heavily upon pragmatic and causal arguments; each not only envisions means but also forwards or evaluates effects, normally in terms of social betterment. The new reality is developed by a number of quasi-logical techniques, each demonstrating a link between the audiences' accepted values and the elements, facets, or results of the new system. In addition, in an apparent attempt to refute audience objections to her arguments, Cady Stanton often shows the inconsistency of the present system's reasoning in order to discredit it. Of great importance in such refutation are the techniques of comparison and ridicule; Cady Stanton employs them throughout her discourse, showing how others' arguments are ineffectual.

It is perhaps here where Cady Stanton's discourse contains the seeds of its lack of total success. While arguing, she presents a dual level of choice: one level (based in abstraction) argues for a choice between following a universal truth established by God and accepted by a democracy that all citizens are equal or the denial of that truth and its accompanying rights; the second level (based in pragmatics) argues for a change of a material sense, the ballot, which will elevate society. When Cady Stanton demonstrates the flaws of a democracy which denies its citizens equality, she attacks traditions; thus, she damages the communion which she previously established with her audience. She is, in effect, pointing out human flaws which many would prefer not to acknowledge and sets herself above such frailities. It is frightening for most people to contemplate an alteration of the status quo, and certainly, Cady Stanton was demanding such a change. Thus, the choices offered to the audience, while interconnected in Cady Stanton's mind,
also were seen by the audience as too diverse and threatening, and she lost ground. The same difficulties can be witnessed in the contemporary crusade for the Equal Rights Amendment; it is quite common to hear people say, "I'm all for equality but the ERA is not the way to attain it." Thus, the audience can safely maintain its image of agreeing to a higher value while rejecting the suggested means of attaining it. This loss of communion because of choices offered was perhaps responsible for Cady Stanton's arguments' failures to achieve immediate equality and societal reform.

The conclusions of most of Cady Stanton's pieces of discourse demonstrate the same techniques of reinforcing the newly conceptualized (and hopefully accepted) reality; she demonstrates unlimited development, which shows a cause getting closer to an ideal. In her case, this goal is usually a manifestation of God-given rights or the revolutionary spirit on which the nation was founded, which are the starting points of her discourse's argument. By tying together the new world she envisions, where men and women are equal, with the initial values of justice, equality, and truth, she gives the audience a clear picture of the concepts for which she pleads adherence; a clear choice can then be made.

Cady Stanton aptly demonstrates the techniques of practical reasoning which The New Rhetoric provides. The process of establishment of a clear pattern of argumentation toward an adherence of minds can be plainly observed. Cady Stanton's advocacy of equality of the sexes demonstrates a recurring dilemma for reform advocates: a rhetor may intellectually succeed in presenting ideas, but formulating a practical
means of achieving those ideas is often rejected by the audience. Once
tradition enshrines the status quo, an advocate faces an insurmountable
task of immediate alteration of it.

*Perelman's The New Rhetoric*

The strengths presented in *The New Rhetoric* lie in its detailed
treatments of argumentative techniques having their base in the
audience. The communion which must exist between speaker and audience
at the inception of argument presupposes that the speaker will consider
values and truths held by those with whom s/he speaks. This centers
argument, not in the area of the rational, but rather in the dimension
of the reasonable, where audience and speaker begin with certain tenets
and then the speaker is permitted to reason practically from established
agreement to the desired conclusion. Perelman's detailed discussion
of varied argumentative techniques, including those of association and
dissociation, allow a critic to recognize the speaker's audience as
s/he conceived of it as well as evaluate the efficacy of those arguments
in achieving an adherence of minds.

In this author's opinion, there is one central flaw in *The New
Rhetoric* which hampers its effectiveness as a critical methodology.
Perelman's focus on argumentation as an attempt by a speaker to
gain or intensify the universal audience's adherence to a set of values
might better be viewed as a "process of becoming" rather than as a
philosophical model of what already exists. If rhetoric is seen as a
means to develop an ethical epistemology of argument, then Perelman's
own ambiguity of what constitutes the universal audience, this hypo-
thetical construct of the *rhetor*, cannot be totally justified when
placed into an actual application such as the one previously presented.

In *The New Rhetoric* Perelman at times addresses the universal audience as being above influence; at other times, the universal audience is an empirical construct capable of modification by a variety of techniques. Thus, as Lisa Ede noted, not only are Perelman's descriptions of the universal audience conflicting, but also, this universal audience plays only a small role in Perelman's descriptions of argumentative techniques. Because of these inconsistencies, "What is important is the general irrelevance of the universal audience for Perelman's exhaustive analysis of technique—the fact that this concept, so critical to his theory seems so dysfunctional in practice."  

Perelman at one point (p. 30) argues that the universal audience is a timeless body of rational humans, independent of local or historical contingencies; later (p. 33) he posits that its basis is composed of the rhetor's own unique perceptions of the culture. This would seem to suggest that there can be as many constructs of the universal audience as there are rhetors. In addition, Perelman's argument that the universal audience loses its validity when concerned with particular situations does not allow for practical use; arguments used in speeches, such as those presented by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, rarely are formal, abstract questions. Instead, these arguments are usually concerned with the current, emotionally-charged, irrational world.

Because of the author's position that *The New Rhetoric* contains at least one fundamental inconsistency in its description of the audience due to Perelman's failure to develop his theoretical base around the concept, I suggest a different future direction for analysis
utilizing Perelman's ideas of practical reasoning. This focus would be upon Perelman's model as one which Ede calls an "intersubjective model" which emphasizes interaction between rhetor and audience; a process of argument. Barry Brummett noted that intersubjectivity in rhetoric is based upon assumptions that meaning is created by rhetors participating with audiences in creating a reality. This requires mutual influence among them, since rhetoric is "in the deepest and most fundamental sense, the advocacy of realities." Since Perelman sees rhetoric as aiming at communion between rhetor and audience, where values are adopted or intensified, it seems that The New Rhetoric incorporates this intersubjective perspective. If, as Perelman describes it, the universal audience functions as the ethical perspective in a model of truth, then intersubjectivity is further advanced. Brummett notes that truth is the reality of the experience as shared by the speaker and others; "Truth is agreement." 

Therefore, the role of the universal audience may serve a rhetorical critic in two distinct ways: first, it is a partial bridge between rational reasoning (formal logic) and rhetorical reasoning (non-formal logic); second, it allows a rhetor to envision her/his audience in much the same fashion as does Plato's concept of the noble lover--the universal audience is an idealized concept which one strives toward in an attempt to elevate the particular, real audience to what they are capable of becoming through an adherence of minds. The greatest value of Perelman's new rhetoric are the many techniques of practical reasoning which allow a rhetorician to gain that adherence.
Future Considerations

One possible area of study could include a re-examination of the concept of the universal audience and its role in the development of choices to be presented in discourse. Because of the ambiguity of this concept, it cannot be clearly identified in actual use, as in the reform rhetoric of Elizabeth Cady Stanton; perhaps it is more appropriate to consider the universal audience as a construct of an ideal which the rhetor is hoping to take the present listeners toward. Clearly, this is Cady Stanton's purpose. She wants to create within the present society an appetite towards the good as she sees it.

Cady Stanton had a vision of liberation for the future which challenged social customs as violating basic human principles. Although the particular audience was unable to promote immediate action (in the form of suffrage), Cady Stanton's ideals did create a re-examination of accepted tradition, which in turn developed into a new adherence to values. She attempted to create presence for her concerns in order to direct her audience toward the universal. It would be of interest to the rhetorical critic to continue an examination of Cady Stanton's arguments over the next fifty years in light of Perelman's treatment of practical reasoning to see if her basic tactic changed.

The simple process of argumentation which Cady Stanton employed demonstrated practical, nonformal reasoning. She did not utilize witness testimony, perhaps because of a lack of accepted male speakers in favor of her cause at the time of the movement's inception. Nor did she rely upon her own ethos to prove her case. Instead, her reasoning is based upon an audience-centered rhetoric. She was concerned
with a meeting of minds to exercise reasonable choice. Of future value might be an analysis of other topics of her interest, including the attacks on organized religious thought proposed in the Woman's Bible, to see how the techniques of her argumentation developed. As Cady Stanton was also a speaker on the lecture circuit for a number of years, it might prove valuable to examine the rhetoric of those speeches, since they appear to deal primarily with the sanctity of the self. It would seem that her original creed was expended into many argas.

This author also believes a possible area of study of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's rhetoric might be a correlation of the places she lived and the people she met, as well as the roles they played in her discourse. Her small town upbringing stimulated independence; Seneca Falls triggered involvement with women's rights; living in New York City later influenced concern over social problems and the dangers faced by urban women; in each of these locales, Cady Stanton became involved with a number of highly influential historical figures. The shifts in her support for a number of causes might be traced to such places and people.

One final future area of study is indicated: after 1851, it becomes difficult if not impossible to separate the contributions of Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony. The problem of originality may suggest that in further studies of Cady Stanton's rhetoric, the view must be taken that an effective rhetorical stance can be the result of a joint effort of two outstanding persuasive strategists. Further exploration of the relationship between these two, the organizations and newspaper
they founded, and the causes they championed would provide light into the murky areas of historical record.

Banner calls Cady Stanton "the foremost American woman intellectual of her generation."8 Cady Stanton's central aim was to alter societal attitudes toward women, and to do this, she had to utilize persuasive strategies which were practical and nonformal rather than lofty and formal. Her dedication in argument lay in feminist individualism; coeducation, marriage reform, and changes in conception about inherent abilities shared her concerns. She argued that whatever differences existed between women and men were culturally bound rather than a product of nature. If women were more prone to illness, less intelligent, more emotional, then it was because society had made them so by causing them to restrict exercise, miss an education of any value and a profession of consequence, and confine their contributions to matters of sentiment. She was a prolific writer who gave birth to timeless arguments, an advocate who originated a movement still active today, and a remarkable individual whose power of personality and ideas challenged accepted custom. Elizabeth Cady Stanton's stance on women's rights reform has been validated through many of the changes in society which she envisioned. She deserves the historical stature which recent studies, including this one, are beginning to advance.
CHAPTER ONE: ENDNOTES

1 Because of Elizabeth Cady Stanton's firm commitment that much of a person's entire being rested in her name, the author feels compelled to honor that value. To this end, this dissertation will refer to the adult woman as Cady Stanton.


3 Bormann, Black Power, p. 15.


CHAPTER TWO: ENDNOTES


10. DeTocqueville said, "Religion is mingled with all the habits of the nation... whence it derives a particular force. The Americans, having admitted the principle doctrines of the Christian religion... are obliged to accept a great number of moral truths originating in it and connected with it." Democracy in America, Vol. 1, Part 2, Ch. 1.


13 Rozwenc, American Society, p. 37.

14 DeToqueville, Democracy in America, Book 2, p. 129.

15 for a basic understanding of the structure of reform efforts, see Barnes, the Anti-Slavery Impulse; Curry, The Abolitionists: Reformers or Fanatics; Lawrence R. Veysey, The Perfectionists: Radical Social Thought in the North, 1815-1860, M.A. thesis, Ohio State University 1978.

16 DeToqueville, Democracy in America, Book 1, p. 11.


18 Barnes, Anti-Slavery Impulse chapter one describes the intensity of abolition zeal.

19 Barnes, Anti-Slavery Impulse, Chapters one and two give detailed insights.

20 While abolition and its causes and effects are not the central concerns of this work, further information about the issues may be discovered in Barnes, Anti-Slavery Impulse and John R. McKivigan, Abolitionism and the Church 1830-1865: A Study of Attitudes and Tactics. M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University 1977, for example.

21 Rozwenc, American Society, p. 62. Bormann says that Garrison was a paradox in many ways. He was a stubborn crusader, agitator, inept politician, and imaginative, tireless worker. He was tenacious and hardworking, gracious and generous, humorless and opinionated. Bormann, Black Power, p. 94-95.

23 Bormann, Black Power, p. 1

24 For a detailed discussion of woman's role during this era, see Mary Sumner Benson, Women in Eighteenth-Century America: A Study of Opinion and Social Usage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935).


27 I Cor. 14: 34-35.


33 O'Connor, Pioneer Women Orators, p. 29.

34 Oberlin College, 1847: married abolitionist Henry Blackwell in 1855; social reformer who chartered in 1869 the American Woman Suffrage Association; founded and edited Woman's Journal in 1870, a leading magazine (1870-1917) promoting woman suffrage.


39 Examples of famous women speakers include Quaker reformers Sarah Grimke (1792-1873) and her sister, Angelina (1805-1870) who later married Theodore Weld; Frances Wright (1795-1853) who was involved in New Harmony and lectured on feminism, slavery, and labor; Margaret Fuller (1810-1850) who edited the Transcendentalist periodical *The Dial*; and Francis Willard (1839-1899), president of the Women's Christian Temperance Union.

40 For a discussion of female anti-slavery speakers, see chapter 4 in Bormann, *Black Power*.

41 Cady Stanton, *HWS* vol. 1, p. 61.


48. A number of sources were useful in arriving at an understanding of the relationship between women and the commercial, industrial revolution. Among these were Mary R. Beard, Women as a Force in History: A Study of Traditions and Realities (New York: Octagon Books, 1967); Benson, Women in Eighteenth-Century America; Carle Bode, ed., American Life in the 1840s (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967); and Cott, Bonds of Woman.


50. for an extended discussion of the "sphere" concept, two books provide detailed discussions: Cott, Bonds of Woman, and Flexner, Century of Struggle.


55. George W. Burnap, The Sphere and Duties of Woman (Baltimore: John Murphy, 1848), pp. 45-47.


58. Kraditor, Up From The Pedestal, p. 45.


61. Pastoral Letter, Cady Stanton, HWS vol. 1, p. 81.


64. Excerpts from *Godey's Lady's Book* July 1842 in Hymowitz, *History of Women*, p. 67. For a discussion of a variety of women's magazines, see the thorough review in Welter, "True Womanhood."


CHAPTER THREE: ENDTINES


2 Stanton, Diary, p. 3

3 Stanton, Diary, p. 4.

4 Stanton, Diary, p. 6.

5 Stanton, Diary, p. 5.

6 Stanton, Diary, p. 6.

7 Stanton, Diary, p. 22.

8 Stanton, Diary, p. 20.


10 Stanton, Diary, p. 25.

11 Stanton, Diary, p. 33.

12 Stanton, Diary, p. 35.

13 Willard's Troy Seminary, founded in 1821, served as a model for higher education for women for the United States and Europe. For further information on Willard, see John Lord, The Life of Emma Willard (1873) or Alma Lutz, Emma Willard, Daughter of Democracy (1929).

15 Stanton, Diary, p. 46.

16 Stanton, Diary, p. 16.


18 Stanton, Diary, p. 50.

19 Smith, co-founder of the Liberty Party, believed in political action as a means of reform for a variety of causes he championed; among them were vegetarianism, temperance, prison reform, and anti-mason. For further information, see Octavius Frothingham Gerrit Smith (1878) or C.A. Hammond Gerrit Smith (1900).

20 Some of the leading reformers whom Cady Stanton met as Smith's home were James G. Birney, William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Samuel J. May, Stephen Foster, Abby Kelly, Lucretia Mott, John Brown, Frank Sanborn, and Frederick Douglass. For further detail, see Stanton, Diary, p. 56.

21 Stanton, Diary, p. 56.

22 Stanton, Diary, p. 60.

23 Stanton, Diary, p. 67.

24 Stanton, Diary, p. 59.


26 For further information, see for example William Birney, James G. Birney and His Times (1890).

27 Stanton, Diary, p. 70.

28 Stanton, Diary, p. 77-78.

29 Stanton, Diary, p. 79.

30 Cady Stanton notes: "As we were generally invited to stay with
Friends, it gave us a good opportunity to see the leading families, such as the Ashwists, the Alexanders, the Priestmans, the Braithwaites, and Buxtons, the Gurneys, the Peases..." Stanton, Diary, p. 82.

31 O'Connell, the Irish Statesman, secured the rights of Catholics to sit in the United Kingdom Parliament.

32 Stanton, Diary, p. 87.

33 The Sirius was the first regular steamship to cross the Atlantic Ocean.

34 Stanton, Diary, p. 110.

35 Stanton, Diary, p. 117.

36 For further information on Parker, see for example William E. Coleman, The Role of Prophet in the Abolition Rhetoric of the Reverend Theodore Parker, 1845-1860, Dissertal, The Ohio State University, 1974.


38 Stanton, Diary, p. 134.

39 Stanton, Diary, p. 136.

40 Stanton, Diary, p. 139.

41 Stanton, Diary, p. 75.

42 Stanton, Diary, p. 80.

43 Stanton, Diary, p. 79.

44 Stanton, Diary, p. 144.

45 Stanton, Diary, p. 145.


47 Woman's Rights Conventions, p. 6.


51. Stanton, *Diary*, p. 146.


53. Stanton, *Diary*, p. 148


55. Stanton, *Diary*, p. 150


57. Alma Lutz notes that this pseudonym was characteristic of Cady Stanton's vitality and color. *Created Equal*, p. 57.

58. Lutz, *Created Equal*, p. 64.


61. Stanton, *Diary*, p. 171.


64. Stanton, *Diary* vol. 1, p. 154.


68 Stanton, Diary vol. 2, p. 54.

69 Stanton, Diary Vol. 2, p. 54.


71 Stanton, Diary vol. 1, p. 160.

72 Stanton, Diary vol. 1, p. 161.

73 Elizabeth Cady Stanton address to the Legislature of the State of New York, Feb. 14, 1854, in Cady Stanton, HWS vol. 1, p. 595.

74 Lutz notes "The Senate Committee made a favorable majority report. The House Committee were so impressed by her speech that they had copies reprinted from the Congressional Record and sent throughout the country. Created Equal, p. 290."
CHAPTER FOUR: ENDNOTES


2 While it is recognized that The New Rhetoric, A Treatise on Argumentation was written by two authors, the custom has been to refer to the ideas developed in the treatise as being those of Perelman. That pattern, as well as referring to the treatise as The New Rhetoric, will be followed throughout this study. Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, A Treatise on Argumentation, translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

3 Perelman, New Rhetoric, p. 4.


5 Perelman, New Rhetoric, p. 510.


7 Perelman, New Rhetoric and Humanities, p. 19.

8 Perelman, New Rhetoric, p. 19.

9 Perelman, New Rhetoric, p. 22.

10 Perelman, New Rhetoric, p. 23.


13 Perelman, New Rhetoric, p. 31.

14 Perelman, New Rhetoric, p. 32.


CHAPTER FIVE: ENDTOTES


4. Seneca Falls, p. 1

5. Seneca Falls, p. 2.

6. Seneca Falls, p. 3.

7. Seneca Falls, p. 4.

8. Seneca Falls, p. 4

9. Seneca Falls, p. 4

10. Seneca Falls, p. 4.


12. Seneca Falls, p. 5.

13. Seneca Falls, p. 5


15. Seneca Falls, p. 5.

17. Seneca Falls, p. 5.
27. Conventions, p. 4.
28. Conventions, p. 4.
29. Conventions, p. 4.
30. Conventions, p. 4.
31. Conventions, p. 4.
32. Conventions, p. 5.
33. Conventions, p. 5.
34. Conventions, p. 6.
35. Conventions, p. 7
36. Conventions, p. 7

38 Salem, p. 810.

39 Salem, p. 811.

40 Salem, p. 811.

41 Salem, p. 811.

42 Salem, p. 811.

43 Salem, p. 811.

44 Salem, p. 811.

45 Salem, p. 811.

46 Salem, p. 812.

47 Salem, p. 812.

48 Salem, p. 812.

49 Salem, p. 812.

50 Salem, p. 812.

51 Salem, p. 812.

52 Salem, p. 812.

53 Elizabeth Cady Stanton's letter to Woman's Convention, Akron, May 25, 1851, in Cady Stanton, HWS vol. 1, p. 815.

54 Akron, p. 815.

55 Akron, p. 815.

56 Akron, p. 816
57 Akron, p. 815.
58 Akron, p. 816.
59 Akron, p. 816.
60 Akron, p. 816.
61 Akron, p. 816.
62 Akron, p. 816.
63 Akron, p. 816.

64 Elizabeth Cady Stanton's letter to Syracuse Convention, Sept. 6, 1852 in Cady Stanton, HWS vol. 1, p. 849.
65 Syracuse, p. 849.
66 Syracuse, p. 849.
67 Syracuse, p. 849.
68 Syracuse, p. 849.
69 Syracuse, p. 849.
70 Syracuse, p. 849.
71 Syracuse, p. 850.
72 Syracuse, p. 850.
73 Syracuse, p. 850.
74 Syracuse, p. 850.
75 Syracuse, p. 851.
76 Syracuse, p. 851.
77 Syracuse, p. 851.

Legislature, p. 596.

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Legislature, p. 597-98.

Legislature, p. 598.

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Legislature, p. 600.

Legislature, p. 601.

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Legislature, p. 602.

Legislature, p. 602

Legislature, p. 603.
98. Legislature, p. 604.


100. Legislature, p. 604.


102. Legislature, p. 605.

103. Legislature, p. 605.
CHAPTER SIX: ENDNOTES


3 Banner, Radical for Rights, p. 89.


6 Brummett, "Intersubjectivity," p. 31.

7 Brummett, "Intersubjectivity," p. 34.

8 Banner, Radical for Rights, p. 69.
APPENDIX A

The following are samples of newspaper editorials which followed the Woman's Rights Convention of Seneca Falls 1848, as well as Cady Stanton's reply. They are taken from pages 802-805 of the History of Woman Suffrage, Vol. 1.

WOMEN OUT OF THEIR LATITUDE.

We are sorry to see that the women in several parts of this State are holding what they call "Woman's Rights Conventions," and setting forth a formidable list of those rights in a parody upon the Declaration of American Independence.

The papers of the day contain extended notices of these Conventions. Some of them fall in with their objects and praise the meetings highly; but the majority either deplore or ridicule both.

The women who attend these meetings, no doubt at the expense of their more appropriate duties, act as committees, write resolutions and addresses, hold much correspondence, make speeches, etc., etc. They affirm, as among their rights, that of unrestricted franchise, and assert that it is wrong to deprive them of the privilege to become legislators, lawyers, doctors, divines, etc., etc.; and they are holding Conventions and making an agitational movement, with the object to win revolutionizing public opinion and the laws of the land, and changing their relative position in society in such ways as to divide with the male sex the labors and responsibilities of active life in every branch of art, science, trade, and profession.

Now, it requires no argument to prove that this is all wrong. Every true hearted female will instantly feel that this is unwarranted, and that, to be practically carried out, the males must change their position in society to the same extent in an opposite direction, in order to enable them to discharge an equal share of the domestic duties which now appertain to females, and which must be neglected, to a great extent, if women are allowed to exercise all the "rights" that are claimed by these Convention-holders.

Society would have to be radically remodeled in order to accommodate itself to so great a change in the most vital part of the compact of the social relations of life; and the order of things established at the creation of mankind, and continued six thousand years, would be completely broken up. The organic laws of our country, and of each State, would have to be licked into new shapes, in order to admit of the introduction of the vast change that it contemplated. In a thousand other ways that might be mentioned, if we had room to make, our readers had patience to hear them, would this sweeping reform be attended by fundamental changes in the public and private, civil and religious, moral and social relations of the sexes, of life, and of the Government.

But this change is impracticable, useless for, and unnecessary. If effected, it would set the world by the ears, make "confusion worse confounded," demoralize and degrade from their high sphere and noble destiny, women of all respectable and useful classes, and prove a monstrous injury to all mankind. It would be productive of no positive good, that would not be outweighed tenfold by positive evil. It would alter the relations of females without bettering their condition. Besides all, and above all, it presents no remedy for the evil evils that the millions of the industrious, hard-working, and much suffering women of our country groan under and seek to redress.—Mechanics' (Albany, N. Y.) Advocate.
INSURRECTION AMONG THE WOMEN.

A female Convention has just been held at Seneca Falls, N. Y., at which was adopted a "declaration of rights," setting forth, among other things, that "all men and women are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." The list of grievances which the Amazons exhibit, concludes by expressing a determination to insist that woman shall have "immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United States." It is stated that they design, in spite of all misrepresentations and ridicule, to employ agents, circulate tracts, petition the State and National Legislatures, and endeavor to enlist the pulpit and the press in their behalf. This is belied with a vengeance.—Worcester (Mass.) Telegram.

THE UNION OF PETTICOATS.

The women in various parts of the State have taken the field in favor of a petticoat empire, with a zeal and energy which show that their hearts are in the cause, and that they are resolved no longer to submit to the tyrannical rule of the heartless "lords of creation," but have solemnly determined to demand their "natural and inalienable right" to attend the polls, and assist in electing out Presidents, and Governors, and Members of Congress, and State Representatives, and Sheriffs, and County Clerks, and Supervisors, and Constables, etc., etc., and to write in the general scramble for office. This is right and proper. It is but just that they should participate in the beautiful and feminine business of politics, and enjoy their proportion of the "spoils of victory." Nature never designed that she should be confined exclusively to the drudgery of raising children, and superintending the kitchen, and to the performance of the various other household duties which the cruelty of men and the customs of society have so long assigned to them. This is emphatically the age of "democratic progress," of equality and abolition—the age when all colors and sexes, the bond and free, black and white, male and female, are, as they by right ought to be, at tending downward and upward toward the common level of equality.

The harmony of this great movement in the cause of freedom would not be perfect if women were still to be confined to petticoats, and men to breeches. There must be an "interchange" of these "commodities" to complete the system. Why should it not be so? Can not women fill an office, or cast a vote, or conduct a campaign, as judiciously and vigorously as men? And, on the other hand, can not men "nurse" the babies, or preside at the wash-tub, or boil a pot as safely and as well as women? If they can not, the evil is in that arbitrary organization of society which has excluded them from the practice of these pursuits. It is time these false notions and practices were changed, or, rather, removed, and for the political millennium foreshadowed by this petticoat movement to be ushered in. Let the women keep the ball moving, so bravely started by those who have become tired of the restraint imposed upon them by the blood-tainted notions of a Paul or the tyranny of man.—Rochester (N. Y.) Daily Advertiser.

H. Montgomery, Editor.

"Progress!" is the grand bubble which is now blown up to balloon bulk by the windy philosophers of the age. The women folks have just held a Convention in New York State, and passed a sort of "bill of rights," affirming it their right to vote, to become teachers, legislators, lawyers, divines, and do all and sundry the "lords" may, and of right now do. They should have asserted at the same time, that it was obligatory also upon the "lords" aforesaid, to wash dishes, scour up, be put to the tub, handle the broom, darn stockings, patch breeches, scold the servants, dress in the latest fashion, wear trinkets, look beautiful, and be as fascinating as those blessed morals of humanity whom God gave to preserve that rough animal man, in something like a reasonable civilization.

"Progress!" Progress, forever!—Lowell (Mass.) Courier.

To us they appear extremely dull and uninteresting, and, aside from their novelty, hardly worth notice.—Rochester Advertiser.

This has been a remarkable Convention. It was composed of those holding to some one of the various sects of the day, and some, who embraced them all. The only practical good proposed—the adoption of measures for the relief and amelioration of the condition of indigent, industrious, laboring females—was almost scouted by the leading ones composing the meeting. The great effort seemed to be in bringing out some new, impracticable, absurd, and ridiculous proposition, and the greater its absurdity the better. In short, it was a regular ensue of a congregation of females gathered from various quarters, who seem to be really in earnest in their aim at revolution, and who evince entire confidence that "the day of their deliverance is at hand." Verily, this is a progressive era!—Rochester Democrat.
WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION.

This is the age of revolutions. To whatever part of the world the attention is directed, the political and social fabric is crumbling to pieces; and changes which far exceed the wildest dreams of the enthusiastic Utopians of the last generation, are now pursued with ardor and perseverance. The principal agent, however, that has hitherto taken part in these movements has been the rougher sex. It was by man the flame of liberty, now burning with such fury on the continent of Europe, was first kindled; and though it is asserted that no insconsiderable assistance was contributed by the gentler sex to the late revolution in France, we are disposed to believe that such a revolting imputation proceeds from base calumniators, and is a libel upon woman.

By the intelligence, however, which we have lately received, the work of revolution is no longer confined to the Old World, nor to the masculine gender. The flag of independence has been hoisted, for the second time, on this side of the Atlantic; and a solemn league and covenant has just been entered into by a Convention of women at Seneca Falls, to "throw off the despotism under which they are growing, and provide new guards for their future security." Little did we expect this new element to be thrown into the cauldron of agitation which is now bubbling around us with such fury. We have had one Baltimore Convention, one Philadelphia Convention, one Utica Convention, and we shall also have, in a few days, the Buffalo Convention. But we never dreamed that Lucretia Mott had convened a fifth Convention, which, if it be ratified by those whom it purports to represent, will exercise an influence that will not only control our own Presidential elections, but the whole governmental system throughout the world.

The declaration is a most interesting document. We published it in extenso the other day. The amusing part is the preamble, where they assert their equality, and that they have certain inscrutable rights, to secure which governments, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, are instituted; and that after the long train of abuses and usurpations to which they have been subjected, evincing a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government.

The declaration is, in some respects, defective. It complains of the want of the elective franchise, and that ladies are not recognized as teachers of theology, medicine, and law. . . . These departments, however, do not comprise the whole of the many avenues to wealth, distinction, and honor. We do not see by what principle of right the angelic creatures should compete with the preacher, and refuse to enter the lists with the merchant. A lawyer's brief would not, we admit, carry the hands so much as the tairy ropes of a man-of-war; and a box of Brandreth's pills are more safely and easily preserved than the sheets of a boiler, or the flasks of an anchor; but if they must have competition in one branch, why not in another? There must be no monopoly or exclusiveness. If they will put on the inexpressibles, it will not do to select those employments only which require the least exertion and are exempt from danger. The laborious employments, however, are not the only ones which the ladies, in right of their admission to all rights and privileges, would have to undertake. It might happen that the citizen would have to don the apron and buckle on the sword! Now, though we have the most perfect confidence in the courage and daring of Miss Lucretia Mott and several others of our lady acquaintance, we confess it would go to our hearts to see them putting on the panoply of war, and mixing in scenes like those at which, it is said, the fair sex in Paris lately took prominent part.

It is not the business, however, of the despis to decide upon the rights of his victims; nor do we undertake to define the duties of women. Their standard is now unfurled by their own hands. The Convention of Seneca Falls has appealed to the country. Miss Lucretia Mott has propounded the principles of the party. Ratification meetings will no doubt shortly be held, and if it be the general impression that this lady is a more eligible candidate for the Presidential chair than McLean or Cass, Van Buren or old "Rough and Ready," then let the Salle Jaws be abolished forthwith from this great Republic. We are much mistaken if Lucretia would not make a better President than some of those who have lately tenantied the White House.—New York Herald, James Gordon Bennett, Proprietor.
Mrs. Stanton's Reply.

In answer to all the newspaper objections, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, in an article published in the National Reformer, Rochester, N. Y., Geo. G. Cooper, Editor, Sept. 14, 1848, said as follows:

There is no danger of this question dying for want of notice. Every paper you take up has something to say about it, and just in proportion to the refinement and intelligence of the editor, has this movement been favorably noticed. But one might suppose from the articles that you find in some papers, that there were editors so ignorant as to believe that the chief object of these recent Conventions was to seat every lord at the head of a cradle, and to clothe every woman in her lord's attire. Now, neither of these points, however important they be considered by humble minds, were touched upon in the Conventions. . . . For those who do not yet understand the real objects of our recent Conventions at Rochester and Seneca Falls, I would state that we did not meet to discuss fashions, customs, or dress, the rights or duties of man, or the propriety of the sexes changing positions, but simply our own inalienable rights, our duties, our true sphere. If God has assigned a sphere to man and one to woman, we claim the right to judge ourselves of His design in reference to us, and we accord to man the same privilege. We think a man has quite enough in this life to find out his own individual calling, without being taxed to decide where every woman belongs; and the fact that so many men fall in the business they undertake, calls loudly for their concentrating more thought on their own faculties, capabilities, and sphere of action. We have all seen a man making a jackass of himself in the pulpit, at the bar, or in our legislative halls, when he might have shown as a general in our Mexican war, captain of a naval boat, or a tullor on his bench. Now, is it to be wondered at that woman has some doubts about the present position assigned her being the true one, when her every-day experience shows her that man makes such fatal mistakes in regard to himself?

There is no such thing as a sphere for a sex. Every man has a different sphere, and one in which he may shine, and it is the same with every woman; and the same woman may have a different sphere at different times. The distinguished Angelina Grimké was acknowledged by all the anti-slavery host to be in her sphere, when, years ago, she went through the length and breadth of New England, telling the people of her personal experience of the horrors and abominations of the slave system, and by her eloquence and power as a public speaker, producing an effect unsurpassed by any of the highly gifted men of her day. Who dares to say that is thus using her splendid talents in speaking for the dumb, pleading the cause of the poor friendless slave, that she was out of her sphere? Angelina Grimké is now a wife and the mother of several children. We hear of her no more in public. Her sphere and her duties have changed. She devotes her first and her most sacred duty to devote all her time and talents to her household and to the education of her children. We do not say that she is not now in her sphere. The highly gifted Quakeress, Lucretia Mott, married early in life, and brought up a large family of children. All who have seen her at home agree that she was a pattern as a wife, mother, and housekeeper. No one ever fulfilled all the duties of that sphere more perfectly than did she. Her children are now settled in their own homes. Her husband and herself, having a comfortable fortune, pass much of their time in going about and doing good. Lucretia Mott has now no domestic cares. She has a talent for public speaking; her mind is of a high order; her moral perceptions remarkably clear; her religious fervor deep and intense; and who shall tell us that this divinely inspired woman is out of her sphere in her public endeavors to rouse this wicked nation to a sense of its awful guilt, to its great sins of war, slavery, injustice to woman and the hiborning poor. As many inquiries are made about Lucretia Mott's husband, allow me, through your columns, to say to those who think he must be a ninny because his wife is so distinguished, that James Mott is head and shoulders above the greater part of his sex, intellectually, morally, and physically. As a man of business, his talents are of the highest order. As an author, I refer you to his interesting book of travels, 'Three Months in Great Britain.' In manners he is a gentleman; in appearance, six feet high, and well-proportioned, dignified, and sensible, and in every respect worthy to be the companion of Lucretia Mott.


Burnap, George W. The Sphere and Duties of Woman. Baltimore: John Murphy, 1848.


