Communal Divides on Citizenship in Jordan

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Chapter 1: Introduction

An Investigation into Citizenship and National Identity in Jordan

Abstract

There is a continuing discussion of national identity and what it means to be a citizen across the globe. These identity debates take place in a highly “securitized” environment where national security discussions intersect and sometimes collide with civil liberties discourses. This project investigates the changing concepts of citizenship in Jordan, one of the very few Middle Eastern countries regarded as an US ally in “War on Terrorism”. In recent years in Jordan, the government has released media campaigns to further a certain image of who is Jordanian. By identifying trends in social media, state constructed museums, and officially published material, I examine the way in which the state, top down, forms conceptions of national identity and citizenship in a region that faces multiple conflicts and wars. In This project contributes to the literature on national identity and citizenship while integrating modern source work. Citizenship and identity have faced several important transitions, this project focuses on the most recent regime change to see how citizenship has been constructed in this highly authoritarian environment. Citizenship in Jordan is constantly being negotiated down communal lines and have a major affect on the livelihood of citizens.
I. Introduction

Across the world, states and their citizens are debating issues of immigration, refugee settlement, and sometimes, how these two factors compromise their national identities. Conflicts in the Middle East have led to an influx in the number of refugees worldwide. Today, the Kingdom of Jordan struggles with an identity question on issues of immigration and refugees much like the rest of the world. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in many ways can be exemplary of a multicultural society. Due to unique historical circumstances, Jordan has become home to Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, and Circassian refugees. However, the state and its guidelines for citizenship do not reflect openness to pluralism and multiculturalism. The recent influx of refugees into Jordanian territory have reignited the politics of identity and belonging into the political sphere.

However, waves of refugees are not a new phenomenon in Jordan. The case study of Jordan is exceptional for its national identity development because it has taken in an extraordinary number of refugees since its founding. It was also the only state in the region, besides Egypt, to annex a portion of Palestinian land. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the Jordanian state has retained a critical role in the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Peace Process, and at one point as an administrator of Palestinian land. During the 1990’s, some politicians and journalists called for the idea of the “Jordan Option” whereby the Palestinian refugees in Jordan be made
citizens as a solution to Palestinian statelessness (Arzt, 1997). This came largely from Israeli politicians who sought to avoid a peace deal and create a solution devoid of any real implications for Israel (Lynch, 1999). However, this can be incredibly threatening to the status quo of power relations within Jordan. Citizenship is not only a matter of national identity within Jordan but also as part of a larger Israel/Palestine conflict. Because of this long history of immigration and refugee integration, the conditions surrounding citizenship and identity have always been contentious issues. In addition, the Hashemite regime has reified this view of who is Jordanian via citizenship laws and through official media platforms. This has led to some groups in Jordan feeling isolated from the state.

In more recent times, the Jordanian state has become a refuge for neighboring Syria and Iraq. But the kingdom has not totally opened its doors and has since securitized its borders with both Iraq and Syria. In fact, with the assistance of the United States, Jordan has constructed a wall to monitor and control the borders, in regards to both arms and refugees (Arkin, 2016). Rukban, an arid post near borders of both Iraq and Syria, contains 75,000 refugees who are unable to enter Jordan and in many cases unable to receive aid from non-profit organizations (Hume, 2016). The official Jordan rhetoric reflects that this influx of refugees is not a Jordan specific problem but an international problem. Jordan has maneuvered away from its role as a place of refuge in the region. This echoes what many ethnocentric nationalists in Jordan have
argued for decades. In short, these nationalists believe the territory nor the resources of the state should be made available to those without roots in the Transjordan base of the regime.

II. Methods

To examine the question of identity and citizenship, I will employ qualitative methods that involve process tracing and discourse analysis. Process tracing is defined as “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic evidence” (Collier, 2011, p.824). I situate the study of Jordan as a case study as an analysis of the effects of immigration and multiculturalism on nationalism and conceptions of citizenship.

Furthermore, social media analysis will be used as primary sources to uncover how coverage on events such as protests, events, and policy is perceived by the Hashemite regime. The official media usage will be critically analyzed via Facebook, Twitter, Official website narrative, and from the Official media center. While Lauri Brand and other scholars of Jordan have made excellent strides at uncovering Jordanian historical narratives, there is still much to be studied. Perhaps a newer and less observed, is the concept of online social media. Much like the textbooks sources used in Brand’s study, the online official statements and documents project national narratives.

The second form of collection involves visual clues to citizenship in Jordan. Over the past year, Jordan has been spreading messages about the kingdom via fliers, billboards, media
screens in popular centers. I will be documenting these visual clues in the capital city of Amman, Jordan. Visual representation of citizenship is extremely important and often unexamined conception of citizenship. This is modeled after the Kimberly Katz “Jordan in Jerusalem: Holy Places and National Spaces” (2005). In December of 2016, I traveled to Amman, Jordan to study the visual aspects of citizenship available in libraries and national spaces. My sampling data was pulled from the state administered museums in Amman and in Madaba that are maintained by the Tourism department.

III. Concepts and Literature Review

The following concepts will be critically examined throughout this thesis and be drawing upon literatures from their definitions. Nationally identity, minorities, citizenship, refugees, and social media are all terms that will be essential to answering the research question.

National Identity

National identity is “constituted through interpellation by nationalist discourse and the definitional fiat of nationality law” (Massad, 2001, p.20). Furthermore, Massad (2001) distinguishes national identity as “the set of characteristics and markers (territorial origins, patrilineal or matrilineal origins, religion, race, gender, class language) which are defined by nationalist discourse and the laws of the nation state” in the text “Colonial Effects” (p.21).
National identity can also be extended to the label of “outsider” versus “insider” of the state (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008, p.1245). The concept can be racially and ethnically constructed in many ways and gain a new set of markers that define the nation. In this case, the contemporary national identity can be based directly on territorial origins even if the early nationalism was based on Arab nationalism. National identity is fluid and it can be re-imagined in line with changing conditions of the state (Anderson, 2006). The national identity of Jordan has fluctuated over time and has taken the form of many different characteristics. The identity relies on a “political-cultural identification with territory” which make some groups feel like outsiders (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008, p. 1245). Within this atmosphere, Jordan securitizes its national identity and redefines it accordingly after every wave of refugees.

**Minority**

The boundaries for what is considered a minority are not so manichean, especially in Jordan. This thesis will rely on the text “Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in the Middle East” by Will Kymlicka and Eva Pfostl (2014) to distinguish which groups in Jordan can be considered minority. Minority groups are defined as “groups that express (or to whom are attributed) an ethnic and national identity distinct from that of the Arab majority” (Kymlicka, 2014, p.2). Kymlicka describes a fear for political mobilization by Middle Eastern states. The same could not be more true for Jordan where the Hashemite regime’s base lies on the
Transjordanian civil society for support and maintenance in times of trouble. Kymlick and Pfostl (2014) go on to say that “Relations between states and minorities are seen, not as a matter of normal democratic politics to be negotiated and debated, but as a matter of state security” (p.12). Minority politics came to be seen as a securitized issue centering around debates on citizenship. This can be seen through the development of Palestinian Jordanian citizenship with the loss of the West Bank. The Hashemite vision of Jordan as Arab state and with “Arab” citizens have evolved into a more exclusive and ethnocentric based identity. Those who have not been received what Shahar calls “birthright citizenship” will be referred minority population (Shahar & Hirschl, 2007).

**Citizenship**

Citizenship has transformed over time with the national identity. Turner (1993) broadly defines citizenship as a “set of practices which define a person as a competent and, as a consequence, shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups” (p.2). Shachar defines this as a birthright form of property transfer whereby a person born in the territorial region can interact with the state as their representative and access its benefits (Shachar & Hirschl, 2007). In this sense citizenship and often national identity are a form of capital transfer. Shachar (2007) defines and extrapolates on the relationship of property to individuals “ownership and possession of property affects people’s livelihoods, opportunities, and freedoms” (p. 260). This is quite
evident in Jordan as those without citizenship are worth less in terms of capital. Sassoon demonstrates this in his study on Iraqi refugees in Jordan who are more than qualified for positions but instead face discrimination, unequal access to jobs, and demotion in all aspects (Sassoon, 2009). The value of citizenship cannot be understood without including the repercussions of living in Jordan without citizens. Therefore, Shachar definitions of citizenship are derivative of definitions of property as a “scarce resource” (Shachar, 2007, p.265). Moreover, the debate in Jordan has treated citizenship as just that a scarce resource that can no longer be extended to floods of refugees entering Jordan.

But birthright citizenship is a limited scope for the Jordanian case of citizenship. Citizenship in Jordan is a major issue and has become a gatekeeper of national identity. Therefore, in this article, the concept of citizenship will not only rely on *jus sangi*, birthright definitions of citizenship but rather as a tool of control for state regulation. Salter (2008) visualizes citizenship as a constructed legal status that allows the individual access into a certain political community, but a status that is under constant scrutiny from the nation state (p.368). Much like the national identity, the laws defining citizenship have changed overtimes and has been decided by state interests. The status of citizenship in Jordan is only retained based on the individual's qualifications; namely loyalty or ethnic affiliation.

Citizenship and parameters of belonging are reconstructed and renegotiated regularly among the elites. These epistemic communities are made up of Hashemite policy makers as well
as informal spheres of power. My project situates the most recent debates on Jordanian citizenship and national identity in the unique historical trajectory of the country. These debates have significant implications for the conflicts and identities in the region in general. Citizenship is defined here as a “scarce resource” that is distributed almost exclusively for regime security.

**Refugee**

At its base, a refugee is an individual forced to leave their home state and reside in another state. The United Nations High Commissioner designated the category of ‘refugee’ for people who are “people fleeing conflict or persecution” (UNHCR). While some debate about the term exchange between refugee and immigration has been highly misleading. The Oxford Dictionary defines immigrant as “A person who comes to live permanently in a foreign country”. However, many of the refugees in Jordan do not seek permanent residence but are simply waiting for conditions in their own countries to improve. Jordan has become a waiting ground for 664,100 refugees who have registered with UNHCR. The UNHCR also lists Jordan among its top countries for accepting refugees.

Additionally, for Jordan the term refugee and the debate about immigration is nothing new. Refugee is often referenced to the more than 2 million Palestinians registered as refugees living in Jordan with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. The Palestinian refugee population of Jordan resides in a primarily urban setting and as a result the split between
competing identities is not only tied to ethnic characteristics but an urban versus rural divide as well (UNRWA, 2016).

Refugee influx is a critical issue in Jordan still today with neighboring Iraq and Syria destabilized. With conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and previously Palestine/Israel, Jordan has seen massive waves of migration since its founding. Most famous, is the refugee camp Zaatari which has become home to nearly 80,000 refugees according to the (UNHCR, 2016, 3). The issue of refugees has highly contributed to the status of citizenship as highly securitized in Jordan.

Social Media

The Oxford Dictionary defines social media as “Websites and applications that enable users to create and share content or to participate in social networking.” The words social media are often confused or confined to apps such as Facebook posts. However, the official websites of Jordan are also representative of social media and are created solely for sharing content. This content will be the subject of the thesis. In the realm of politics, little has been done to access the connection of states to their social media. Especially in the era of post Arab Uprisings, scholars have focused on the effects of social media on protest and social movement. However, this thesis seeks to analyze the social media of the Hashemite regime in the post Arab Uprisings. How did and how does Jordan continue to use its official social media campaigns in the political realm? Social media is now a major outlet for identity politics and here the definition of social media is
broad enough to include any online resource that has been used for sharing content and Jordanian national identity. This study identifies Twitter, Facebook, and Official Hashemite Court Press as social media.

III. Historical background

The foundations of the Jordanian state can be found during the Ottoman reign of the Transjordan, formerly known as the province of Southeastern Syria (Massad, 2001, p.26). The infrastructure for governance in the Transjordan region, from Irbid to Aqaba, was constructed under the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat reform period (Tell, 2013, p.42). However, the infrastructure was implemented unevenly leaving the southern portion of the Transjordan underdeveloped in comparison to the north. It was during this time of Ottoman reform that state penetrated the lives of the inhabitants of the Transjordan.

During World War I, the European powers dismembered the Ottoman Empire with the help of certain Arab powers. The Arab Revolt of 1916 was crucial to the placement of the Hashemite regime in Jordan under the famous leader King Abdullah, formerly the sharif of Mecca in the Hijaz (Tell, 2013, p.41). The Revolt coincided with the secretive Sykes Picot agreement of 1916 which would designate the Transjordan as a British mandate (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.7) (Massad, 2001, p.27). In 1922, the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was declared a mandate under the British empire. Much of the cabinet formed during this time were part of the
Istiqlal administration of the failed Faysali, Hashemite monarch in Syria (Tell, 2013, p.63).

During the mandate, the Hashemite government became involved in the growing tension happening next door in the Palestine Mandate. The monarch also worked to establish a national identity and eventually came up with the Organic Law of 1928 which marked individuals as Jordanian or not in the territories (Massad, 2001, p.20).

By the early rumblings of a second world war, Transjordan had been transformed economically through a process of “military Keynesianism” (Tell, 2013, p.97). The state had well penetrated into the steppe, settled most traditionally bedouin populations, and constructed a dependent, stable social underpinnings East Bank (Tell, 2013, p.112). In 1946, the kingdom received formal independence from Great Britain. However, many of its institutions remained under British management (Tell, 2013, p.115). King Abdullah had finally succeeded in claiming Transjordan as a Hashemite kingdom. In exchange for state loyalty, the kingdom promised economic security to its clientele in the East Bank (Tell, 2013, p.12).

Only two years after its independence, the Jordanian kingdom was at war. In 1948, Israel declared independence and the Haganah forces moved on the offensive to grab Palestinian territory (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.35). In response, the Arab invasion of Palestine began in May 15, 1948 and the Arab Legion of Jordan was widely successful in defending Latrun and East Jerusalem (Tell, 2013, p.116). An armistice between Israel and the Arab powers of Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan was signed on 1949 (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.99). The Jordanian army proved
itself a force to be reckoned with as it succeeded in defending Jerusalem and large portions of the West Bank.

The 1948 Israeli War was the start of a larger trend building a narrative of (Trans) Jordanian’s helping their Palestinian brethren. The “Nakba” or fleeing of over 750,000 Palestinians into the Jordanian had tremendous effects on the kingdom and the regime (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.99). With an influx of refugees to cities, such as Irbid, Amman, and Zarqa, a guest and host mentality developed within the Jordanian national sentiment. This, combined with the inclusion of the West Bank into the kingdom, tripled the population and brought about discontent among populations. Together all Palestinians and Jordanians were allowed the right to vote in the 1950 general parliamentary elections for the first time (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.49). By 1950, the Jordanian kingdom formerly consolidated the West Bank into its governance however their identities remained very distinct.

In 1950, shortly after claiming glory in seizing Jerusalem, the life of King Hussein was claimed by an assassin (Tell, 2013, p.117). The throne was passed to Prince Talal in September of 1951 (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.61) (Massad, 2001, p.171). He enacted liberal, political reforms that would allow more representation and dissent. In 1953, there was a shuffle of power when Talal, who was declared mentally unfit to rule, abdicated eldest son King Hussein (Tell, 2013, p.117) (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.69)(Massad, 2001, p.171).
By the mid 1950s, opposition to rule had formed a vast coalition known as the Jordanian National Movement (JNM) which erupted onto the streets in 1955 (Tell, 2013, p. 119). These demonstrations were powerful enough to topple two prime ministers (al-Majali and Mufti) from office (Tell, 2013, p. 119). The opposition blocked the Baghdad Pact from including Jordan in 1955. And to the relief of many Jordanians, the famous General Glubb Pasha, a British general in charge of the Arab Army, was dismissed from duty in 1956 (Tell, 2013, p. 119) (Abu Odeh, 1999, p. 77) (Massad, 2001, p. 183). The opposition leader and Prime Minister, Al Nabulsi, also actively worked against the regime by consulting with the Soviet Union against the regime’s demands (Abu Odeh, 1999, p. 79).

In reaction to these internal uprisings, King Hussein and his dependent elite called upon the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957 to attack the JNM (Tell, 2013, p. 120) (Massad, 2001, p. 191). In 1957, King Hussein issued public warnings against the dangers of communism to the then Prime Minister Nabulsi (Abu Odeh, 1999, p. 80). The young king disbanded parliament and enacted martial law. The years of 1957-1959 saw a regression in any sort of democratic system in Jordan as well as the aggressive attack to any sort of political mobilization against the regime.

This political oppression would prove unsustainable and would lead to the issuance of the “White Paper” in 1962 by then Prime Minister al-Tall (Tell, 2013, p. 124) (Abu Odeh, 1999, p. 115). This declaration was made while an aggressing Israel on border towns like ‘Sammu in 1966 (Abu Odeh, 1999, p. 130) (Massad, 2001, p. 238). Incidents like this and other regional
factors would drive the Israelis to war with the Arab armies once again. This time Jordan would not come out as a victor. Israel decisively won against the combined Arab forces.


Fighting between Israel and Fatah continued well after the official truce. In 1967 after the truce, the Jordanian town of al Karama came under attack from heavy Israeli artillery. The Israeli forces were confronted by the Jordanian military and Palestinian fighters(Abu Odeh, 1999, p.171)(Massad, 2001, p.239). Karama was not a coordinated defense between fida’iyyun and Jordanian army. This event demonstrates the first major rift in national narratives between two
communities in Jordan. Both the PLO and the Jordanian armed forces choose to remember their respective roles as inflated (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.171).

Two years later the rift had grown to confrontation in the streets of Jordan. The first major conflict between security forces and these PLO groups is known as the “Dablin Affair” of February 1969 (Tell, 2013, p.126). In June of 1970, the motorcar of King Hussein was attacked. This caused retaliation from Bedouin units of the army (Massad, 2001, p.244). By September of 1970, the conflicts had escalated so high that Amman and surrounding refugee camps experienced series of devastating conflicts (Tell, 2013, p.127) (Massad, 2001, p.245). The PLO were eventually overtaken by Jordanian security services and dispelled from Jordan in July of 1971. However, the assault on independent Palestinian nationalism and opposition continued after the dispersal of the PLO. The most evident of this is the Jordanian army's occupation and attack on Jarash (Tell, 2013, p.127) (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.183) (Massad, 2001, p.245).

These events ushered in a new era in Jordanian politics and a substantial shift in the trajectory of national identity prior. The Jordanian National Union, a loyalist social movement, formed in November 1971 (Tell, 2013, p.128). The Jordanian National Union represents a major ethnocentric form of nationalism that would emerge as a dominant narrative. This party was the major backing of the regime which helped it supplant the PLO. The regime had successfully defended itself from the biggest challenge it had to its rule since its founding. These events

“Jordan for Jordanians” nationalism flourished throughout the 80’s and 90’s and would later spark tensions between Jordanians and ethnically Palestinian Jordanians in Jordan. By this time, the Transjordanian base of the regime had come to dominate public sector jobs such as the military, the inflated bureaucracy, and police force. Tell (2015) traces the “Early Arab Spring” of Transjordanian nationalism which arises pronounced after the process of neoliberalism. When the government agreed to take loans from the IMF, the Transjordanian south rioted and demanded their stake in the public sector. This portrays the solidification of the right of the Transjordanian in the state of Jordan. This conversation would continue into the present and continue to affect the contending identities.

These historical trends greatly affect the major communal divides on citizenship in Jordan today. These trends have seeped into the public sphere, memory, and the state down approaches to nationalism. This thesis seeks to determine how citizenship continues to be shaped by the policies of King Abdullah. The first chapter examines the way in which public memorialization carefully upholds East Bank versions of nationalism all the while reinforcing the centrality of Hashemites to the community. The second chapter looks at the regression of communal Palestinian citizenship under his reign. The third chapter looks at the privileged citizenship of Transjordanians, who claim greater resources and access to the state. These three
chapters demonstrate the ability of communal affiliation to determine one’s relation to the state and how an individual experiences Jordanian citizenship.
CHAPTER 2: Representations of Citizenship in Jordanian National Spaces

In contemporary Jordan, a central debate around citizenship and identity has extended beyond the government departments which issue birth certificates and declare citizens; This debate has reached museums, memorialization, and the media. The debate about citizenship has become an issue of memory, of historicity, and of power. Jordan is by no means an outlier or exception to this regional and global issue (Sandal, 2013; Jabareen, 2014; Maktabi, 2010). Every modern nation state has been built upon its ability to mobilize national myths and sentiment all the while inscribing them into the public sphere.

In *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson (2006) captures this ability of nations to produce community and how the modern nation states draw exclusive boundaries of belonging along community lines. Anderson (2006) defines nations as it is “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (p.5). In “Census, Map, Museum”, Anderson (2006) analyzes how these three establishments have become tools of nation building and creating such “imagined communities” (p. 168). The state has direct influence on the representations of nation and its members (citizens) which have been shaped by the maps, the museums and memorialization, the census, and through media mediums. These representations are critical to the development of citizenship in Jordan as they perform only certain segments of the population and give certain citizens more claim to the state than others.

Since the rise of Abdullah II, the regime has been active in creating “theaters of memory” in museums, largely replicated from Western historical museums (Mack, 2003, p.15). These museums create a “theater of memory” in which the objects and artifacts serve specific purposes and perform a certain duty to remember certain time periods, emotions, identities, etc. (Mack,
In this way museums have often been used by the Hashemite to legitimate the monarch’s very existence and its monopoly on the history of Jordan.

Furthermore, Jordanian national identity has fluctuated over time since its inception even though the Hashemite monarch have remained central to the national narrative and construction of the state. Gelvin (2011) identifies five pillars of nationalism of which a nation may retain one or more (p.209). These pillars include that there are inherent differences between groups of humans and at the same time there are certain shared characteristics like ethnicity, linguistics, or historical traditions. Moreover, although time may pass, these nations are often unchanging or time immemorial and the importance of timeless connection to a certain place. Lastly, that membership implies a certain responsibility to others of the nation. These pillars have formed a modern nationalism in the states of the Middle East and specifically in Jordan which has been founded on a “state building by decree” method (Gelvin, 2011, p.190). Jordan, as a state was issued by decree by the British, trace the roots of Jordanian nationalism back to the British colonial interventions into the region that placed the Hashemite monarch into power. Overtime, the Hashemite regime has consistently weaved itself into the local nationalism by a multitude of ceremonial, memorial, and other symbolic politics.

Museums are places of ultimate display for the historical myth of the nation by representing in part each other five pillars of nationalism. Kaufman(2015) finds that “historical myths explain ethnic conflict most of all by explaining how ethnic groups understand their interests” thus making museums critical ethnic division (p. 206). Museums represent three dominant narratives of nation and levels citizenship in Jordan. The first, interconnected to the second, is the centrality of Hashemite authority to Jordanian identity. The second, is the “trans-Jordanian” and Bedouin dominated representations. The third and most rare, the melting pot
interpretation where histories of Palestinian Jordanians and Trans-Jordanians were equated in state representations of identity. These three aspects strain belonging and membership, and inscribe state attitudes and actions towards different groups in Jordanian society.

Moreover, citizenship is a fusion of belonging, representation, duties, legal belonging all of which can be seen through memorialization of the state. The state ultimately chooses certain aspects of history and certain aspects of society to memorialize and celebrate. Visual representations are very evident in Amman the capital city, although in other national spaces like Petra. “Jordanian Jerusalem” by Kimberly Katz (2006) explores the inclusion and exclusion in the national identity in Jordan in relation to its ties to Jerusalem. Her examination of Jerusalem in the public sphere in Jordan leads to critical conclusions that affect the current studies of the nation-state. Katz demonstrates the importance of Jerusalem in the map of Jordan, on the coins, on the history, and more generally on its symbolic value within the kingdom during its inclusion into the Kingdom of Jordan.

In her conclusion, Katz (2005) notes that King Abdullah was a break from the past in terms of his national symbols, the previous being more Jerusalem and Holy Land focused (p.149). In fact, for the first time since its inception Jordan produced a coin series in 2002 featuring all “modern leaders and a founder of the dynasty Sharif Husayn” even though Sharif Husayn had never ruled Jordan (Katz, 2005, p. 149). In addition, this choice of coin also features the Arab revolt flag on the back of the coin and other editions focusing on the Arab Revolt of 1916, the military, and the Trans-Jordanian based national images such as Ma’an Palace or Wadi Rum (Katz, 2005, p.50). This study continues to build upon the visual analysis and critical discourse how King Abdullah’s regime has newly represented and memorialized “Jordanian” identity in national spaces, especially museums.
This study therefore builds upon this literature and uses it as a guidance point for methodology. The methodology used for data collection included in this chapter varies between discourse analysis of texts and published articles by the museums (some news outlets) and visual analysis of materials on show at the museums. I visited majority of museums in Amman, Jordan; except for the Martyrs Museum for closure reasons. In addition to the capital city, museums in Madaba were examined and the plethora of public information surrounding Petra. For the most part, critical discourse analysis was employed to examine further what each public space said about being included into the national narrative. In addition, national symbols became central to the research.

This chapter serves as an examination into the national spaces and faces created or facilitated by the Hashemite regime to reify national boundaries and belonging which affects the status of an individual’s citizenship to a nation state. The first sections explore the role of museums in the performance of identity and legitimacy in Jordan. The second section exposes the way in which maps in national spaces have served as state building tools and how these maps often lend exclusivity to the role of citizenship. The third section briefly discusses the role of census. Finally, the chapter ends with an analysis of the role of social media in top down citizenship, identity performance, and regime legitimation.

The Museum

The museum is especially critical to conceptualizing the citizen and belonging because it is home to the official state narratives and performance of the state in the public sphere. Public museums of history are visual and public space that the state has intentionally created to reify narratives, enforce history, and present its position on various aspects of society. The museum is
a “theater for memory” in which processes are actively being presented (Mack, 2003). As a state tool, historical memory can be mobilized to create change, enforce identity, and reify state narratives. Salter (2008) states “The ability of the sovereign to inscribe a founding moment which shuts down the past and renders primary decision out of politics- a politics of forgetting (p.367). Museums are often seen as apolitical and indecisive when in fact they are the home of state narrative and representations which are the very root of politics. Historical memory builds the foundation of the state and its legitimacy (Davis, 2005, p.244).

A related example in the region can be found just across the border in Israel where memorialization has occurred at similar rates to Jordan. Without the usage of history, Zionism would have little to no basis. Its historical roots reaching as far back as the Israelites of BCE era as legitimation of their claim to historical Palestine as their “holy land”. Israel’s as a nation-state’s history reaches to its Zionist roots of the late 19th century to the present (Boord, 2016). The museums in Israel also display a contested history. In a study conducted in 2016, Boord (2016) found that the narratives surrounding the War of independence displayed at the Etzel, Haganah, and Rabin Museum, all located in Tel Aviv, differed by political preference or objective. Each museum highlights, downplays, or totally ignores certain aspects of history. Nonetheless, all three museums follow a standard narrative about the creation of the state of Israel.

In recent years, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has developed similar nation building strategies and museums. These nation-building projects have taken form in new national museums which display Jordan as time immemorial, ancient, and in many ways as strengthening the Hashemite connection to the land of Transjordan. The growth of public spaces in Amman and many cities in Jordan has risen since King Abdullah came to power in 1999. During field
research, I visited various national museums in Amman to uncover the performance of the state’s citizens, their heritage, and where it places itself in the national narrative. These museums perform nationalism from a specifically Hashemite and Transjordan based light which leaves some citizens outside the realm of remembrance and of the nation.

Majority of the museums relied heavily on Hashemite funding, approval, or patronage. It is evident that the Hashemite regime has placed itself as gatekeepers of Jordanian history and identity in this way. The development of historical museums in Amman has been a more recent development of the Hashemite regime's dominance over national spaces and memory. Most of the national museums boast of at least one the royal family member heading every museum board committee or as patron. For example, the Children’s Museum of Jordan when searching for “About Us” Queen Rania’s letter to the organizations ranks higher than the actual description of the Museum (JCM, 2017). Furthermore, the first sentence about the National Museum reads “The Children’s Museum Jordan is a registered non-profit educational organization launched by Her Majesty Queen Rania Al Abdullah in 2007 and located in King Hussein Parks.” which places the monarch at front and center of national museum (JCM, 2017).

Another particularly new and problematic museum is the Museum on Parliamentary Life. In theory, this museum celebrates the democratic forms of governance in Jordan and the parliament’s history, accomplishments, etc. The performance of the museum is much different in reality. Instead, it focuses more on a restricted and narrow version of history that highlights the Hashemite regime at every turn. There are pictures of the monarchs in every room, both glorifying their placement in government. Several events are completely missing from the timeline such as Black September, an internal Jordanian civil war, or brushed over such as JMF turbulence of the 50’s that called for liberalization.
Particularly the Jordan Museum is known for its all-encompassing history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. First, a major issue that is present throughout the museum is the reference to Jordan as a nation state throughout every period of time. This creates a narrative that paints Jordan as an entity time immemorial and seemingly on covers the premodern period. They National Museum, like many of the museums, distances or simply doesn’t display any relationship between Jordan and the West Bank. This is problematic for a state whose population is more than half of Palestinian ancestry and essentially diverts the population from the national narrative. It also reemphasizes the role of the relationship between Hashemite monarch and Trans-Jordanians, especially the more rural hinterlands. This relationship fluctuates between traditional paternal Arab leaders or as the revolutionary leaders.

The exhibit for Great Arab Revolt (GAR) also plays a significant role in the museum as its newest exhibit and as a reminder for its role in the national narrative. The Arab Revolt has become much more of a buzz word and pride reflection that historical truth. Guns. Grains, and Steel, Tell reveals a more complicated narrative than those presented by the regime in any public space in contemporary Jordan. Tell notes “The Arabist pretensions of the Hashemites have in turn ensured that Jordan’s official historians chronicle the transition from Ottoman rule in patriotic terms” (Tell, 2015). Tell demonstrates that more than Arab sentiment of calls to Arab independence, the Hasehmites were able not only succeed in the revolt but call people to the cause by providing guns, gold, and grains which were allocated by their British counterpart.

By this time, WWI had crept into the Levant region and the Allied powers had instilled blockades which left many without means to survive. To compound this, the year of the Great Arab Revolt was the year of draught and environmental disaster for farmers. This made the prospects of joining the Hijazi Hashemite leaders more coersive than collaborative or
ideological. However, the story of patriotic Abdullah has become the dominant narrative. This has been reified over and over in the museums, in the text books, holidays, and in public spaces.

The exhibit on the Great Arab Revolt in the Jordan National Museum was opened on the centennial of the Arab Revolt commemoration also known as “Arab Renaissance Day” (‘Id al Nahda al Arabiyya) and Army Day (Podeh, 2011, p.198). King Abdullah has been integrating the Hashemite narrative with the state narrative since his ascension. The exhibit and the celebration both exhibit the importance Trans-Jordanian identity and Hashemite paternalism. This was a central message in the Jordanian National Museum where old photographs from the period are captioned with historical notes. Some of these notes focus on the demonization of the Ottoman Empire as an occupying and Turkish power with a section entitled “Persecution”. This section is also particular striking because its mentioning of the abduction of “Jordanian sons” prior to any sort of Jordanian state.

The exhibit goes on to set the stage for Hashemite monarch to enter Jordan as paternal and savior figures in Jordanian history. Sharif Hussein is dubbed “King of the Arabs” in one portrait and in many the Hashemite monarch, Abdullah I, is seen with prominent leaders of the region, especially from Ma’an. This emphasis on Hashemite connection has had a drastic effect on citizenship formation. Pattern of the recurrence of the Great Arab Revolt was not only in the Jordanian National Museum, but also in several of the archeological museums and prominently in the Parliamentary life museum and the Royal Automobile museum.

Another aspect is critical to understanding the current theatrics of Hashemite authoritarian memorialization: the erasure of Palestinian affiliated history. The Jordan National Museum only leaves hints that the Palestinian territories were included in the national narrative. For example, there is a sentence in the display on the Dead Sea Scrolls exhibit in the museum
that reads “All the Dead Sea Scrolls on Display in the special room at The Jordan Museum comes from archaeological excavations, which were carried out at a time when the West Bank (including the site) was part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan”. Yet this is the only glance in the entire museum where the borders of Jordan are not their post disengagement form.

Katz (2005) discusses the Dead sea scrolls dilemma that occurred when the West Bank was integrated into Jordan during the 1960’s. This exhibit stands out in many ways. Visually it is set aside from the rest of the museum in a small room. It is also not mentioned that the exhibit was previously featured as a major display of the Palestine Archeological Museum, which had been administratively part of Jordan (Katz, 2005, p.153). This, found in Palestine, item was put on show for a global audience as well, it traveled to the US for World Fairs and became a central point of pride for conceptions of Jordanian holiness. None of this previous publication was mentioned prominently at the display.

The dead sea scrolls were a battle over national identity between Israel and Jordan both of whom sought to obtain the role of custodian over the ‘holy’ material in Palestine (McGregor-Wood, 2010). This dispute traces its roots back to the 1940s when both states were formed. This was especially important during the Jordanian administration of West Bank and Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967 (Katz, 2005 p.118). These intentional choices to edit history leave Palestinians outside and alienated from the official narrative of the Transjordan as the primary story. They are strategic choice made by the administration. This has been part of erasure of Palestinian narratives into the Kingdom. Now the Kingdom features much more on traditional bases of support such as Petra, Karak, Ma’an and boasts Madaba (Mt. Nebo, Jordan River baptism site) as its holy sites.
The disengagement of the West Bank simultaneously crippled and catalyzed the Department of Tourism and Antiquities in Jordan. On one hand, Jordan had just lost Jerusalem, a major tourist site for Western Christians in the region. On the other hand, the government had to look at its East Bank histories. The government had to produce and invest in biblical archeological sites across the East Bank in Jordan as it had now lost the sites it had formerly considered as “Holy Land”. While Jordan contains many ancient and archeologically scientific based sites, it does not mean by any means exempt the archeology museums from their state-building and narrative fulfilling purpose.

Lastly, the art museums represented another face of the Hashemite vision of Jordanian belonging and identity. These museums are also important to the study as “Art is not independent of the political, economic, and cultural environment in which it exists” (Alexander and Rueschemeyer, 2005, p.2). In this way, state funded art displays have many stories to tell and many implications to their very purpose. The Gallery of National Art in Jordan displays two major functions: an emphasis on art from the Islamic world and an emphasis on modern. These two points have been major selling points of the regime for years. The Hashemites have been able to produce an image that displays its belonging to the Islamic world and themselves a modernizing force in Jordan.

Overall, these museums shed light on much of the identity discussion surrounding citizenship. Often, the simple questions of “whose history is represented at this museum?” was major in analysis. The answer is often exclusively Bedouin focused, which even at times excludes many urban East Bank Jordanians. There will be caravan tents as the major cultural history whereas urban, such as Amman, is left out of the narrative. This in turn directly affects citizenship as certain groups are left out, excluded, and at times negatively portrayed.
The Maps

Constructing borders for states goes hand in hand with citizenship. Borders can define who is a citizen and who is not. They provide a resource structure for states as well. Territory affects much of the state’s identity and economic status. Moreover, for Salter, the border is the ultimate institutionalization of the state. This is a specific site that contains the gatekeeping of citizenship and membership. Salter (2008) uses borders as keeping with a “specific and longstanding institutionalization of the state of exception at the borders” (p. 366). For Jordan, these exclusionary lines have caused identity crisis, national narrative expansion and retraction, and harsh realities for those separated by the border.

The maps above tell a story of a nation-state who has been forced to extend and restrict its concepts of borders and of nation since its formation in 1932. Since its inception, maps have been an essential and demonstrative area of identity in Jordan. The critical change regards the West Bank which remained a part of Jordanian administration for 20 years and because a large portion of the population is of Palestinian descent (Tell, 2013, p.118). However, this map was essentially buried by the Hashemite regime and by trans Jordanian nationalist. Instead, the top down approach to guarding national identity has relied much on the politics of forgetting and the forward push of “Jordanianess” in all aspects of civic life.

The National Museum perpetuates a time immemorial of Jordan post disengagement which has the effect of implanting ideas of community into its own citizens. Jordan as time immemorial has consequences for many citizens who do not meet the nativist narrative that is supported in public space. For example, Jordan as the modern territorial confines has seen waves of migration of kingdoms, peoples, rules, and religions. The national museum does incorporate
ancient peoples and cultures. However, this map of prehistory Jordan simply does not fit. These borders were only constructed in the mandate period following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the state has entrenched its investment in the idea of Jordan being natural, time immemorial, and ancient.

**The Census**

Census is a critical tool for state building because it identifies division, no matter how important, within the population. The census in Jordan is very critical for determining imagination of the national community. For example, the Anderson piece looks at the effect of the implementation of census by British colonial forces into Malaysia, and the colonized world more generally. Anderson (2006) explores and exposes the reification of these boundaries as divisions within the national community that were retained even after independence (p.244). While most Jordanians will admit that much of the country is of Palestinian descent, there is little official evidence of this (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.256). In fact, there is a movement for quite the opposite. The government has not revealed the numbers for the census and considers the question of ethnic identity to be a “highly classified secret” (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.257).

The importance of census can be examined from a comparative case study of Lebanon who has experienced a deep division in society based on these “imagined” groupings. A more famous example is the Lebanese census taking the state has not conducted a census since 1932 when it was under the French mandate. Lebanon is the only country in its member states who has not conducted a census since the end of World War II (Faour, 2007, p.910). There scholarly consensus is the demography of Lebanon has changed, probably substantially, and the state has intentionally refused to do a census due to the fragile balance of politics.
In the case of Jordan, the census is purposely hidden or unreported results have had heavy consequences during the reign of Abdullah II. The factor of census is discussed in the next two chapters as they look at the citizenship status two major ethnic groups in Jordan. The analysis on census is built in the following chapters where distinct groups are used as case studies.

**Flags as National Spaces**

Flags as national symbols have always held sway in every state as a visual tool for nation building. They are held above coronation ceremonies, military parades, government building, the windows of people’s homes, bumper stickers, Facebook pictures, and more. Flags have developed as a marker of belonging for every nation across the globe. Flags are a constant marker of symbolic politics that form the represent the idea of nationalism (Kaufman, 2015). Jordan has developed as a nation state with three different flags that have marked certain developments and power relations within the state and society. The Arab Revolt flag, the Hashemite family crest flag, and the Jordanian flag are all visual indicators of identity and belonging in Jordan.

The most important aspect of the Jordanian flag is that it is rarely flown alone in public places or at government offices. It is most likely accompanied by the Hashemite flag or the Arab Revolt flag. This is indicative of associational necessity of the state to call upon multiple aspects of identity and the Hashemites. This was represented at many of the national museums, parks, and flag poles around Amman.

Recent developments in coordination with centennial celebration have hoisted the Arab Revolt flag next to the Jordanian national flag and the Hashemite flag. The official GAR website features a section simply on the flag where it is named “the mother flag” (ArabRevolt.jo, 2017).
A poet in the ceremony marking the return of the original revolt flag says demonstrates its important to every Jordanian citizen calling: “‘God bless the apple of my eye that has protected the banner of the ancestors. It is the mother flag, bestowing a birth certificate unto every free spirit’ (ArabRevolt.jo, 2017). This fact calls attention its centrality in contemporary Jordan and the civic duty of respect enshrined in the symbol of Jordan’s founding myth.

The Arab Revolt as the “foundational myth” of the Hashemite Monarch in Jordan (ArabRevolt.jo, 2017). This has become reified across the state of Jordan in the museums, in the flags, in the media, and the history books. It’s most famous form is in Aqaba where the flag towers over the only port city of Jordan. But now it has become characteristic of public flag poles across the streets of the capital city of Amman.

Social Media

Visual representations in the forms of hashtags and social media posts have also grown as significant areas in state representations. This subject is a major gap in current research surrounding representation in Jordan. The Royal family has increased its social media presence and continues to distribute images of Jordan, Jordanians, and national identity via photographs, videos, posts, and hashtag creation. Particularly with #WeareallJo and #LoveJo the Hashemite media outlets have increased their visibility as the representations of Jordan and the Jordanian people. This diverges from much of the visual representation in Museums and in history books. As social media portrays a more melting pot based identity. However, even in this case the Hashemite regime retains the centrality of themselves in Jordanian identity.

Social media and internet presence presents a new platform of the regime to reproduce state narratives. Taking the new “Arab Revolt” website funded and created by the Jordanian
government as a case study for the use of media (ArabRevolt.jo). The website places the regime as central to all aspects of the founding myth of Jordan. This follows much of the analysis on museums and other forms of visual representation. The website highlights major events, of course in complementary to the regime narrative way. The website also tries to recognize the Jordanian leaders who took part in the revolt as integral.

In this way, the top down approach to nationalism has been able to approach it’s two major national narratives in a way that supports both. With social media, often the liberal values of the Hashemites are abound. Still in line with the narrow conceptions of Jordanian identity the website reinforces the Arab Revolt as the critical moment of liberations for Jordanians. Both of which seem ironic coming from a government which is authoritative in nature and has supported no means of liberation for Jordanians to rule themselves.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the visual representations of citizenship and belonging display a narrative in which the Hashemite regime is entrenched and in which Trans-Jordanianness is necessary. As an arena of identity, museums have a key role of shaping the national identity and memory surrounding important events in state formation. Museums also operate in a way that citizens often visit these places as part of a duty and acknowledgement of their belonging. In this case study, it is apparent that the Jordanian museums enshrine a sense of pride in their Trans Jordanian origins and in the Hashemite monarch. These two pillars of identity have been projected and enshrined into many aspects of Jordanian citizenship.

As Mack (2003) notes “Shared memory promotes coherent communities” but this research presents the ability of memory to also promote distinct communities in a nation (p.20). These differences have affected the way in which citizens even conduct their selves in relation to
the state. The relationship to the state has been ultimately shaped on constructed identity and the central position of the Hashemite monarchy to every Jordanian. Later chapters discuss the two subgroups as case studies to demonstrate how the constraints of citizenship reach further than visual representation in public space.
Chapter 3: Rebranding Jordan and the Boundaries of Citizenship

The current king of Jordan, Abdullah II, has faced many unique challenges to his reign, has operated much differently than King Hussein, and has shaped greatly citizenship in Jordan. Abdullah’s rise to power was not a predicted and not thoroughly predetermined fact, at least to public eye. In King Hussein’s final days, he switched the succession line from his brother, then crown prince, Hassan, to his son oldest son, Abdullah II. The new king began a series of changes and worked to consolidate his rule and brand his style of rule in the Kingdom. Focusing on the early rhetoric of King Abdullah, a critical juncture in Jordanian citizenship is the expulsion of Hamas and Hamas leader, Mash’al, who was a Jordanian citizen at the time of his deportation. This chapter uses critical discourse analysis to demonstrate the mask of official rhetoric in contrast to the on the ground political reality of citizenship that is enforced and controlled by the Hashemite regime.

Historical Background

The collapse of the Oslo Accords not only greatly affected Israelis and Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel, it directly affected neighboring Jordan. When Abdullah came to power, there were 2,117,361 refugees on record with UNRWA (2015). Furthermore, in Jordan, as it had been for the past 61 years, Palestinians were integrating into Jordan and gaining citizenship within the Hashemite kingdom. It had only been 10 years since Jordan had an official policy that severed its ties to the West Bank, lost in the 1967 defeat. Since then, Jordan had revoked many citizenships and instead distributed only travel passports to Palestinians living in Occupied Palestinian Territories.

To either the disdain or excitement of Jordanians, Abdullah had Palestinian connections much closer to home. Queen Rania is Palestinian which continues to raise concern from
Transjordanian nationalists (Magid, 2016). In 2000, King Abdullah himself said in an interview with Larry King that “my children are the future, a mixture of Jordanian and Palestinian. This is the type of nation that we're going to embark on.” (Larry King, 2000). However, much earlier, the Hashemite regime had consolidated a loyal base of Transjordanian and bedouin citizens. It chose the sort of nation is would “embark” on. It did so by securing a flow of external rents, establishing military and security institutions allowing special access, and allowing the inclusion of Transjordanians into the regime while excluding the Palestinians (Tell, 2010). King Abdullah’s personal ties would not impede or uproot the systems of privilege by the Transjordanian base of the regime. However, the policy the young monarch diverged greatly from King Hussein, in many ways strengthening the dominance of Transjordanian nationalism in the state narrative.

The rebranding of Jordan would not be based on the inclusion of Palestinian identity to the Jordanian one. In fact, much of the policy and attachments to Palestinian landmarks like Jerusalem would be abandoned as a policy priority for the new monarch (Katz, 2005). Abdullah II sought to rebrand foreign relations, normalize relations with Israel, and rebrand the Jordanian nationalism. Jordan had finally concluded a peace deal with Israel, one that was not well received on the home front. In this platform, the emphasis of Jordanian would be tested by the loyalty to the regime and to the Hashemite based nation state.

The Disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 meant the official and final separation of a Jordanian and Palestinian entity. This move again brought to question the loyalty of Palestinian nationalists to the Jordanian state in the public sphere. It also meant that the disengagement revoked citizenship from over a million Palestinians in the West Bank; practically doing so overnight. The PLO’s goal of separateness from the Hashemite Kingdom
had finally been realized at the expense of those living in the West Bank. While these peace talks suited the PLO, many Palestinians and Palestinian parties were unhappy about the final agreement. Palestinian Jordanians and Palestinians alike faced new challenges. The disengagement promoted discrimination in the economic and social spheres

Hamas was named responsible for much of violence that tanked the Oslo Accords. The history of Hamas in Jordan is intricately connected to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, both of which had been incubated as another option for Palestinian leadership by King Hussein. Amman became a major center for Hamas operations and members. When King Abdullah came to power in 1999 he faced a dilemma between Israel, the United States, and the Palestinian cause.

Furthermore, the early years of Abdullah’s reign were turbulent to say the least. Transjordanians were dissatisfied with the economic slump in the public sector. The privatizing reforms of the late 90’s helped Palestinians who at that time controlled 82.6% of a nationwide capital (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.197). Any attack or cut back on the public sector was seen as an attack on the traditional Transjordanian turf of government employment. The economic imbalance was bound to cause tension. The uprisings that occurred in 1989, 1996, and 1998 all erupted from the southern cities of the country which had all been thought to be a secure, and loyal base for the Hashemite regime (Massad, 2001, p.273). This was compounded with the Palestinian rage in Jordan as as a result of the Second Intifada growing more and more violent. In response to international pressure and the United States, the new monarch would have to uproot Hamas and its leader, including Jordanian citizen Khaled Mash’al in order to appease its neighbor and its U.S. patron.
Jordanians Voicing Palestinian Nationalism in the Public Sphere

The Palestinian nationalism and nationalist organizations in Jordan, including Hamas, would not be entertained as a pluralist identity under the new monarch. They would not be entertained as organizations of citizens of the Hashemite kingdom either. During the reign of King Hussein rhetoric of “Al balad al wahid” (one country) and “al a3ilah al wahidah” (one family) was typical as the king constantly sought to intertwine the identities in the public sphere even after Black September Civil War (Oudat & Alshboul, 2010, p. 73). He often paid lip service to the Palestinian cause. This was especially evident in his hand in the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Jerusalem and later his defense of Hamas within Jordanian borders.

Moreover, the development of a relationship with Hamas as an organization reached back to the inclusion of the West Bank in 1948. Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood were founded in 1945 in Palestine but with roots reaching back to Cairo in the 1930’s (Milton-Edwards, p.64). Where the Hashemite monarch would develop a relationship of loyal opposition with the Islamic movement (Abu-Rish). Following turbulence in the Kingdom, King Hussein decreed all political parties illegal with the exception of the Brotherhood who operated as a charity organization for years (Milton-Edwards, p.67). The Jordanian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood would later support Hamas and its rise in Jordan.

However, the rise of Abdullah marks a drastic change in policy. In much of the rhetoric, King Abdullah would express similar quotations of “one family”. For example, during his first visit to Israel and his first interview with Israeli news channels, King Abdullah stated “I believe that as we said on this issue, we look at Jordanians being one family. And Jordanians of Palestinian origin, I believe, are my brothers and sisters. They are my people, we are one nation.”
(Ehud Yaari, Israel TV, 2000). Only months before had his government expelled prominent members of Hamas and shut down expressions of Palestinian nationalism.

Policy records and political decisions proved that Hamas, an earlier member of the Muslim Brotherhood, would be treated very differently by King Abdullah than previous his father King Hussein. In August of 1999, Hamas offices were shut down by the government across Jordan and its leaders, including Jordanian citizens, “expelled” (Lucas, 2004, p.110). This was the beginning in the process of rebranding Jordan away from Palestine and in a sense rebranding citizenship duties in Jordan.

Furthermore, Khaled Mash’al embodies the citizenship debate in Jordan in many ways due to this extreme circumstance. Mash’al was born in Silwan, a small town near Ramallah, in 1956 (BBC, 1999). Silwan is a city located in the West Bank. At the time of Mash’al’s birth was included as a part of the Jordanian state. Therefore, upon his birth Khaled Mash’al was a Jordanian citizen by law. After 1967, his family, like many others, fled to the gulf for work after the occupation by Israel (BBC, 1999). Masha’l was based out of Kuwait for much of the years after his family’s flight. He taught physics and became increasingly involved in the Muslim Brotherhood (BBC, 1999). When Iraq invaded Kuwait, he fled to Jordan like many other Palestinians in Kuwait. In Amman, he became a manager of Hamas operations at the bureau.

With a botched assassination attempt in September 25th, 1997 by the Israeli Mossad agents, Khaled Mash'al became well known in both Western media and by the Jordanian regime (Kumaraswamy, 2003). When the Mash’al affair happened in Jordan, King Hussein notably called Mash’al a Jordanian son and went quickly to his defense (Hilalah, 2013). King Hussein, angered by the Israeli violation of the peace agreement and failure to respect sovereignty, demanded the safeguard of Mash’al. He even demanded that Israel provide an antidote and an
unprecedented prisoner exchange. King Hussein at that time was more sympathetic to the plight of Mash’al because Jordanian legitimacy and sovereignty had been in question. This was seen as the end of the normalization process in Jordanian public opinion (Lucas, 2004, p.98).

With the rise of Abdullah, the relationship between Mash’al and the Jordanian regime would change. Before the state had come to his rescue and now the state would maneuver to displace the Hamas leader. In 1999, Khaled Mash’al, Hamas leader, requested to stand trial as the Jordanian regime prosecuted the Islamic Palestinian party. Instead of trial, Mash’al is deported with another Hamas leader to Qatar (Lucas, 2005, pg.32). The government then faced criticism as both Mash’al and Ghoshah were Jordanian nationals and Jordanian citizens. Mash’al responded in interviews with major media outlets. In an interview with BBC in 1999, he stated that “We were forcibly deported and we were not consulted at all about leaving Jordan. We are Jordanian citizens and no-one has the right to send us away from home” (BBC, 1999).

In order to advance King Abdullah II’s cooperation with the United States, he would have to implement the peace process with Israel and create a normalized environment between the two nation states. King Hussein had been very aware and attuned to the recent breaks in trust by the Netanyahu government in Israel (Lucas, 2005, p.99). King Abdullah however would organize a fresh start and attempt at normalization with a more willing Labor Party government in Israel (Lucas, 2005, p.110). However, in Jordan “Anti Normalization Committees” (ANC) formed in professional associations and the normalization was countered by a well-organized Islamist response as well.

From its bases in Amman, Hamas was an active obstruction to this peace process and was an active opposition to the Hashemite plan of normalization. This opposition would not be tolerated by the Jordanian state which eventually uprooted the organization in 1999. This itself is
curious considering the majority of its members residing in Jordan were Jordanian citizens. The government made the argument that since Hamas is not a Jordanian organization that it was not legally permitted to operate. In the same interview with al-Wasat, King Abdullah stated “The director of the political office of Hamas is a Jordanian citizen who belongs to a non-Jordanian organisation…” (Translated from Arabic (Sharbel, 1999). The organization was shut down on the premise of licensing issues in the name of the “Law on Charitable Societies and Social Institutions” which actually targets parties across the political, religious, or organizational spectrum (HRW, 2007).

In conclusion, the removal of Mash’al from Jordan speaks to the level of loyalty required for Jordanian citizen and speaks to a greater issue of Palestinian nationhood in Jordan. In order to harness any right or obligation from the state, an individual must prove their loyalty and their choice. In the case of Mash’al the Jordanian government displayed its authoritarian concept of citizenship and subject. After leaving Jordan, Khaled Mash’al would continue his role in Hamas and become an international figure during the Second Intifada. In this instance, his choice and loyalty negate his Jordanian citizenship. While the monarch before had called him a “Jordanian son”, the new monarch would call “foreign national”.

These events surrounding the status of Khaled Mash’al were indicators of what government policy would be during the Second Intifada. In neighboring Jordan, the violence was felt by Palestinians and Transjordanians alike. Many people went to the street to protest in solidarity with Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In accordance with authoritarian trends in Jordan, the Jordanian government outlawed public demonstration on October 6th 2000, less than two weeks after Sharon stepped into al Aqsa in Jerusalem (Nevo,
Loyalty and identity again became center stage in Jordan as the regime increasingly implemented more repressive policies and ideologies into the Jordanian national narrative.

The Hashemites and their transjordanian base in the public sector released rhetoric that ignited much of the age old citizenship debates in Jordan. For example, in interviews “Jordanian deputies questioned the Palestinians' loyalty and advised them to return to Palestine to fight [the Israelis] there.” (Nevo, p.76). This exhibits the role of loyalty in determining belonging and citizenship. The expression and inquiry into the loyalty of Palestinian citizens rises to the surface at the fear of more immigration and fear of public unrest in the name of Palestinian national ties. During a 2001 interview with Jordan Television, Abdullah stated that parties and press must not comply or exhibit “foreign affiliations or directives”. During the Intifada, this can be examined through the framework of Palestinian organizations, as such would be considered foreign.

In 2001, the regime faced its first test for enforcing a loyal and compliant citizen population. On May 2011, several organizations went to the street to commemorate the “Nakba”, translated as the catastrophe, to express solidarity with the Second Intifada raging in neighboring OPT. The Nakba occurred in 1948 when over 500,000 Palestinians were forced from their land, many arriving in Jordan poverty stricken. The rallies commemorating the event were mainly Islamist ones, including the Islamic Action Front which is the Jordanian political branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Jordan, Muslim Brotherhood was often regarded as “loyal opposition”. Loyalist opposition meaning the group reinforced the monarch’s power structures and existence but perhaps disagreeing on policy. The Intifada protest was disbanded by violent police force in the streets of Amman (Greenwood, 2003, p.91).

Not only had the regime disbanded the demonstrators on the street, but the regime next attacked the facade of democratic transition in Jordan. The Hashemite disbanded parliament and
postponed elections (Greenwood, 2003, p.93). King Abdullah was aware of the popular opinion at the time. His regime survival strategy relied upon the repression of public dissent. At this time, citizens of Jordan did not have the right to vote, to express their solidarity with Palestine, or maintain a basic level of human rights.

The regime itself expressed sympathies for the Palestinian plight but only in carefully coordinated ways. For example, Queen Rania led a “solidarity march” which was clearly organized and publicized by the regime (Schwedler, 2003, p.18). It wasn’t until 2002 when bilateral violence picked up, that King Abdullah responded in line to the popular opinion by disavowing Israeli actions (Nevo, 2003, p.79). These were demonstrations of limitations that Jordanians could and should express. The instances of sympathy and expression by the Hashemite demonstrate to its citizens when it is okay to feel for another foreign nation. However, bypassing or opposing the regime in these terms meant disloyalty to Jordan. Only when it was deemed appropriate or in line with the regime was it truly permitted. This process of loyalty determination, which had been increasingly enforced by Abdullah’s rise, had surpassed the limitations on Palestinian-Jordanians. As the War on Terror began to take off and the Jordanian regime had more freedom from international gaze, the definition of citizen would be regulated even further.

In many ways, the King Abdullah reaction was able to take Mash'al claims and justify their actions with the same brush. In a November 15th, 1999 interview with Al Wasat, King Abdullah answered as follows to Ghassan Sharbel’s inquiries:

**Al Wasat:** How can you balance both the Jordanian citizenship of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan and their right to return to Palestine? *(Translated from Arabic)*
King Abdullah: The Palestinian refugees in Jordan are Jordanian citizens, and the international laws have granted them the right of return and compensation. I don't see any conflict between their citizenship and their right of return to the home from which they were driven out. The citizenship granted them by Jordan shall never deprive them of this right. They are now Jordanians with rights as well as duties. (Translated from Arabic)

Inscribed in this interview is a call for Jordanian citizenship to not simply encompass the legal document sphere to citizenship but rather to follow the “duties” that are required by each and every citizen. Khaled Mash’al was deported not as a citizen but as a foreign national because he had not kept up with these duties. The first and foremost duty being loyalty to the authoritarian regime who “bestows” citizenship on its residents. Therefore, his expulsion from the country is not seen as expelling a citizen but rather a foreign national without allegiance to the Hashemite regime. Paramount to the duty of citizenship is loyalty in the eyes of the Jordanian state. This framing of citizenship to loyalty has made Palestinians a focal point for Transjordanian nationalists who feel that the Palestinian Jordanians are disloyal or undeserving of Jordan.

Agency as Determinant of Citizenship Claims

Choice and loyalty are critical factors in not only group identity but legal status of citizenship itself. Nanes(2008) is right to demonstrate how these two factors frame the debate of citizenship within Jordan (p.96). This frame provides the viewpoint to illustrate how Mash’al was never actually considered a citizen under the reign of Abdullah. An argument could be made for the inclusion of Mash’al under Hussein who greatly sympathised with the Palestinian cause and Hamas as an organization. However, Abdullah II had a very different policy goal in mind in relation to Hamas and Israel.
By illuminating the goals of Abdullah towards Israel and Hamas, the authoritarian boundaries of citizenship are made clear from the frame of choice and loyalty. Nanes (2008) considers that under nationalist rhetoric and beliefs that “a person cannot be “both” of anything” (p.99). This means that there is a choice to be made for Palestinian Jordanians between a nationalism of Palestine and a nationalism of Jordan. One cannot maintain deep nationalist sympathies for a state foreign to Jordan. However, this presents a conflict as well. Since Palestinians did not choose Jordan, due to the nonexistence of the right to return to a Palestinian land(eventual state), they cannot be considered as making that choice simply by being citizens (Nanes, 2008, p.100). Then comes the question of loyalty to the state and to the identity of the state. The Hashemites have enforced themselves as central to the Jordanian nationalism. Therefore, to be loyal to Jordan one must also be loyal to the Hashemites. This framework was used by the Hashemite regime in order to secure unpopular peace deals with Israel which required the taming or removal of Hamas from Jordanian soil.

Conclusion

Overall, Jordanians who are considered outside of the national narrative face much different expectations and care of citizenship. For Palestinian Jordanians, loyalty becomes a critical point of contention and examination. Before the state all citizens are not considered equal. National loyalty and further, Hashemite loyalty is the most important factor. It seems that without a solution to Israeli Palestine land/state debates, that the Palestinian Jordanians will be expected to live up to these unequal standards.
Chapter 4: Nativist Citizenship Claims

Introduction

With the erasure of other groups from the national narrative, “Transjordanianness” continues to monopolize the national narrative and further regulate citizenship. This focus on the East Bank has led to the privilege of Jordanians who claim heritage in the East Bank to government resources and different civic expectations. This has led to a highly narrow view about what it means to be Jordanian and a restrictive regime surrounding citizenship. National identity then becomes intricately connected to “access to and denial of certain advantages and even rights” by the creation of “social inclusion and exclusion” along nationally communal lines (McCrone and Bechhofer, 2008, p.1246). Citizenship and civic responsibility rely further on the military, bureaucracy, and engagement to the state, even in times of protest. This presents a form of “Hierarchical citizenship”, theoretical approach to citizenship that show the institutionalized discrepancy between groups that is often left out of liberal forms of citizenship (Krasiniqi, 2015, p.199). The depth of difference between “Transjordanian” and other citizens is far reaching and made visible through government policy, protest, and national spaces.

Historical Background

The rise in Transjordanian nationalism and the consolidation of the regime’s ruling base occurred simultaneously. A government once dependent on Arab elite from Syria, Palestine, and the Hijaz would move to consolidate its rule among the Transjordanian groups who had once been excluded largely from the Hashemite regime. It is in this context that overtime the Great Arab Revolt, religious legitimacy of Hashemites, tribal authority became the pillars of East Bank Jordanian nationalism (Layne, 1994, p.26). With this nationalism and Hashemite patronage,
Transjordanian citizenship would take on different dynamics of citizenship than their fellow Palestinian or Circassian descended citizens.

But in the early days of King Abdullah I, the rule and support of the East Bank was by no means secure. The first cabinet of Jordan was made up of Istqlal Arabs from Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and the Hijaz. This would change once Abdullah surrendered much of his Syria ambitions. Still overtime, Abdullah and later King Hussein, would extend certain entitlements, through rents from Great Britain, to certain segments of the population. The consolidation of the took place largely because Hashemite regime was successful in allocating entitlements, the material resources necessary for individual or collective well-being, to the East Bank communities it needed to rule (Tell, 2013, p.12). The first sign of this investment into the indigenous population was the “Desert Control” in 1930 to combat the Ikhwan in the south and to provide a means of dependency to rural more Bedouin populations (Tell, 2013, p.76). The Hashemites would supplant the Shayk’s authority be means “soldiering, subsidies, and relief work” according to Tell (2013, p.112).

Moreover, the Hashemite regime has survived largely because of the East Bank based and US financial support that keep these military and welfare subsidies flowing. Several battles in Jordanian history have become an important symbolic politics that are relevant even today. The Battle of Karama is used quite frequently in primordial Jordanian nationalism as a source of pride. The second well known is the Civil war in 1970-1971 to Black September. Robins (2009) sees the Black September as the formalization of East Bank rural hinterland support for the monarch noting that “This dynamic culminated in the victory of the Jordanian state”. Abu Odeh (1999) and Tell (2013) also nod in the direction of Black September as the culmination of what Tell calls “the Hashemite Pact”.
Rise of Transjordanian Nationalism: A Case of Ruling Minority Fear?

The public Israeli position “Jordan as Palestine” triggered an outcry from both Palestinians and Transjordanian communities in very different ways. Palestinians of course still sought the right to return, their land, recognition, and more. Transjordanian nationalism reacted as though their state were under siege and that the “guests” would be sent back. Many scholars assume this ruling base to be a minority in the state of Jordan. This is often inferred because the government’s 1994 census has never been published (Abu Odeh, 1999, p.256). The breakdown percentage of Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanian has been considered sensitive material. Many scholars infer that the census revealed a Palestinian majority due to the proportionality of voting remains highly favorable to Transjordanian dominated regions.

As this East Bank historiography provides a much different account than other groups in Jordan, Transjordanian or East Bank heritage is distinct ethnic group who have formed their own “myth and symbol” traditions overtime (Kaufman). Take for example the battle of Karameh, where in PLO and Palestinian nationalists even in Jordan claim victory. While at the same time, the Jordanian military, Arab legion consisting largely of East Bank population, take full responsibility of the win in national narrative, popular song and literature. As a distinct ethnic group citizenship has been performed distinct from other groups as well. Recent media and popular slogans have begun to show how this nationalism has dominated the public space, national narrative, and discussion of citizenship. Below will continue to discuss the distinct ways in which Transjordanian citizenship remains privileged and distinct to other communal groups in Jordan.
Civic Participation and Dominance in the Public Sector

Overtime, the Transjordanian national community have developed deep connection to the Hashemite state, military participation, police force, and government programs. This is an exercise of citizenship that differs from every other community in Jordan. It is in this way that Transjordanian national pride has developed and monopolized the state. This is one major way that the citizenship of Transjordanians significantly differs from others. Representation in government, the presence in the public sector (including the military), and the economic structures in Jordan all highlight these differences in citizenship.

Government positions

Before 1971, the regime in Jordan was inclusive. Following this Black September, Nanes (2008) notes “the inclusive policies weakened, such that the government today is seen by Jordanians of both origins as the exclusive preserve of Transjordanians” (91). Elections in Jordan are less run by political parties and more by links to the regime. Often voters in authoritarian monarch vote to “seek to reap patronage benefits support candidates whom they view as sufficiently close to the regime to obtain resources” and even more importantly bring those resources back to the voter and his/her community (Ghandi & Lust-Okar, 2009, p.409). The insurance of the East Bank representation comes through a heavy gerrymandering issue in Jordan. The government in Amman “ensures that despite their minority population, tribal groups maintain outsized influence” (Magid, 2016). Further demonstrating the issue, the study found that “votes in urban centers were reduced almost half their weight relative to their actual population count” (Magid, 2016). This reaps heavy inequality in representation and voter apathy from citizens who feel alienated from the process altogether.
Public Sector and the Military Employment

Since the Black September incident, discrimination in the public sector became rampant. Further, Transjordanianness was used as “ample qualification for jobs” and obtained largely through *wasta* (Baylouny, 2008, 289). Due to the oil boom in the Arabian gulf and the increase in American aid, the public sector was in a boom. By 1975, “one fourth of the employed labor was in the Jordanian security forces in some capacity” (Baylouny, 2008, 288). This created a strong sense of patronage and entitlement to the state, especially in rural areas. Over 90 percent of the employed labor force in the southern governorates of Ma'an, al-Karak, and Tafilah worked in the public sector (Tell, 2015).

However, as neoliberalism became a dominant policy constraint, due to IMF and American aid, the government advanced the militarization of welfare and the cutting of subsidies and public sector jobs (Baylouny, 2008). This meant that Jordanians were not getting welfare packages as handouts but rather the government instead bumped security spending. This also meant that a central window of employment was being cut back. This heavily increased on rural communities especially on the military. In the late 1990s, in Jordan “military became the one area on which the state could spend generously to generate political backing” (Baylouny, 2008, 282). Therefore, the military became a place to practice citizenship and identity. Family and community traditions were formed. The military has become a strong pillar of Transjordanian citizenship.

Economic sector
In a study by Reiter (2004), a comparison between ethnic groups concerning the control of the public and private sectors of the economy demonstrate a major rift between communities. His study found that while Palestinians controlled majority of the private economy while the public sector and public shared companies were predominantly of East Bank identification. This has caused major resentment from Transjordanians who don’t control the more lucrative industries. Bureaucracy cannot amount to the profit made by the private industry in Jordan.

**Exercising Differential Citizenship through Opposition**

Over the course of state formation, the ruling pact of the monarch has been shaped sectarian preference and expectation that have developed over time. This section compares the civic participation in protest and in consequences by the authoritarian regime in response to these protests. By comparing and highlighting major protests and regime reaction, it is clear there is a differential expectation in behavior and rights between citizens. This expectation can be seen during times of protest when citizens take to streets, sit ins, and petitions to voice their opposition in the public sphere.

Protests for the strongholds of the East Bank are no new phenomena. The towns of Karak and Ma’an have been especially active since the arrival of the Hashemites and the British into the Transjordanian hinterland. The strong Transjordanian resistance to liberalization and the cutting of subsidies has been evident since the late 1980’s. There was a protest in Ma’an 1989 over the rise in cost of fuel (Baylouny, 2008, p.292). Then the 1996 riots in Karak over the cut of wheat subsidy (Baylouny, 2008, p.293). These have continued as a staple of resistance to neoliberal policies which rural areas feel directly hurt them.
A case study to further deconstruct narrative of the submissive East Bank Transjordanians is the continuance of protests in Dhiban. Dhiban is critical to the regime and security for a multitude of reasons. First, it was known for a loyal region to the Hashemite crown. Second, its protest to economic policy and situations. These two traits clash. Sharp (2012) demonstrates that Dhiban “provoked the emergence of a vibrant protest movement in the south of the country, a region perceived fiercely loyal to the King”. How can a region be known for loyalty to the regime and at the same time known for protest and unrest? In 2016, Al Jazeera reported in Dhiban “Protesters have clashed with police and paramilitary units at a demonstration in a town south of Amman, demanding jobs and better economic conditions for their region” (Younes, 2016). This was an indicator of the obvious dissatisfaction about the stagnation of the public sector and welfare which had formerly dominated the area. Dhiban emerged as the major protesting region in the Arab Uprisings and only after Dhiban protesters took to the streets did protests in Amman appear.

Demonstrating their sway on the monarchy, King ‘Abdullah conceded to these protests by sacking the Rifa‘i cabinet (Yom, 2014, p.233). He quickly reshuffled to a more likable candidate for East Bank Jordanians. This still would not quell his opposition. Yom outlines his response method which was highly divisive when he states “The mukhabarat sowed friction within many tribal communities, playing on anti-Palestinian sentiment by spreading rumors that Hirak protesters were actually Palestinian provocateurs. Mukhabarat pressure also induced many shaykhs to threaten discipline against local youths who refused to demobilize.” (Yom, 2014, p.235). This violent and tense interaction displays the deep dependency of both the regime and Transjordanians. It also demonstrates how the regime calls upon its “divide and rule” methods to control the Transjordanian populace.
Quite simply, Transjordanians were never at risk of losing their citizenship or sense of belonging in the nation state of Jordan. If the right of citizenship is based on the place of origin than Palestinian Jordanians would be held to the same standards as the Transjordanian. When discussing aspects of communal citizenship, Nanes (2008) states “For nationalists, individuals can have only one loyalty or at least one dominant loyalty” (p.86). This chapter accentuates how the facet of loyalty and patronage undermine the citizenship of other communal groups in Jordan.

These tests of loyalty prove however that the Transjordanian status as citizen is secured by birthright. For Jordanians of Palestinian descent, this is not so. This discrimination in terms of citizenship shapes Jordanian politics and the escalation of tension between the two ethnic groups. Perhaps the answer to differences in citizenship treatment lies in the Al Jazeera article covering the Dhiban protests in the summer of 2016. The journalist interviews a man that states “We have no political demands other than improving our dire conditions” (Younes, 2016). This is just one example of a loyal opposition that the regime perceives from its East bank based population. Moreover, the birthright loyalty earned in no way endangers the Transjordanian from losing his place in the nation.

Even so these advantages have not secured the population as silent and complicit to the authoritarian demands of the Hashemites nor its policies made independent of East Bank leaders. Under King Hussein, there were protests largely in reaction to the implementation of privatization measures by the IMF. The National Committee for Retired Servicemen (N CRS) and the later Hirak movements embodied the sentiment of Transjordanians who felt personally attacked by the privatization efforts of the King Abdullah regime. This group of army veterans released a letter to the government and to King Abdullah. It outlined a list of demands. This can
be framed in terms of the patronage and privilege network that had been established. These officers saw themselves as calling for the rights of the “true Jordanians” and to those who were loyal to the state. They also saw the privatization of industry and the cut to state sanction pensions as an attack to the ruling pact. The Transjordanians were only restoring what they saw as the lawful balance for “Jordanian citizens”. In fact, the Hirak petition issued in February 2011 stated “compact between Jordanians and the Hashemite dynasty, once based on mutual partnership, was being violated” (Tell, 2015). Many feel that the Hashemite has broke their part of the ruling pact and would like to be restored to even greater dominance in narrative, in the economy, and in the regime policies.

**Conclusion**

For many, ethnic group survival strategy that competes over scarce resources with other communal groups has been largely tied to the Hashemite regime as the arbiter of identity and citizenship. This has shaped the way in which traditionally East Bank Jordanians interact with their state and access its resources. These trends in interaction has made the Transjordanian community dominant in government elections, public sector positions, and a powerful oppositional group. And while more attention usually goes to “the larger Islamist-led protests of ‘Amman garnered more attention, the upstart Hirak represented a significant new vector in Jordanian politics” (Yom, 2014, p.229). The Transjordanian sector of society has been empowered and entitled in their citizenship. Feeling that this privilege was under fire in the 1990’s, the community has led to more discussions of securitized citizenship and of alienation those who lay outside their version of Jordanian nationalism. This securitized citizenship
response from “native” populations is not a Jordan specific phenomena. The securitized and inherited conceptions of citizenship are in the rise globally.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

Jordanian citizenship has been reified largely by communal boundaries. These communal boundaries have shaped the way Jordanians interact with the state and what resources should be given to certain communities. This thesis examines the development of communal factors that have shaped Jordanian citizenship during the first decade of King Abdullah’s rule. Nationalism, based on ethno communities in Jordan, have led to the variation in citizenship. This variation has shaped the sociopolitical aspects of Jordanian society and continue to dominate debate in the public sphere.

This thesis explored various aspects of differential communal citizenship in Jordan. The first chapter introduced a literature on citizenship in the Middle East as well as a critical historical backing of top down approaches to citizenship in Jordan. The second chapter studied the way in which top down state building has narrowly focused Jordanian national narratives into its ruling base and monarchy. This was evident from visual and textual representations found in the various museums across Jordan as well as the erasure of Palestinian-Jordanian identity in many aspects of public life. The way in which citizens are represented in their national narrative and public spaces has large effects on the way they imagine themselves in relation to the state and how the citizens are interact with their state. The third chapter analyzed how this national narrative pushed out Palestinian identity in the early reign of Abdullah. This chapter demonstrates the ways in which the top down state has approached loyalty as a cornerstone variable effecting Palestinian citizenship. The fourth chapter focused on the aspects that make Transjordanian communal citizenship exception in Jordan. These three chapters explored current issues in the debate about citizenship and the nature of divide and rule authoritarianism in Jordan.
As citizenship debate in Jordan continues as does the inequalities between communal groups, ethnicities, and genders continues to differentiate levels of citizenship. In 2014, a discussion of citizenship reemerged as a topic as the reformation of citizenship laws landed on Parliament floor. During this period of debate, the primary issue was deciding whether women could pass their basic rights to their children born from the marriage with a foreigner. Barhmoumeh (2014) states “Following a decision by the Jordanian government to grant basic civil rights to children of Jordanian women married to foreign men, a fierce debate on Jordanian "authenticity" and racism has re-emerged in the country.”. This debate about authenticity has been on the table for debate since Jordan’s inception and will likely continue as these issues reoccur in pop culture and governmental policy.

However, these debates are not only effecting the high rungs of government but rather play out in the everyday life of Jordanians. This system levels citizens and impedes some individuals from accessing the state. This has resulted in a direct system of privileges for certain communities in Jordan. “Jordanian citizens encounter the dichotomous structure on a day-to-day basis in every sphere of life from shopping to requesting the services of a government ministry” (Reiter, 2004, p.91). This interaction is the effect of reified “Transjordanian” focused nationality which leads to direct discrimination and obstruction of others to resources of the state.

On a more systematic scale, citizenship has become a privilege for those who are not in the national narrative of Jordan. While the case of Khaled Mash’al is exceptional it does shed light on the fragility of citizenship rights for Palestinians who express other loyalties. They are stripped of nationality with little say or agency in the matter. Even less high profile Palestinian with national pride or without ties to the regime face the stripping of their citizenship.
Authorities stripped more than 2,700 of these Jordanians of their nationality between 2004 and 2008, and the practice continued in 2009, Human Rights Watch said. (HRW, 2010)

When Palestinian Jordanians have issues within the Jordanian state they are less likely to access state resources like judicial process due to their limited citizenship. Associated Press reported “Most Palestinians hesitate to take their cases to the courts, fearing legal steps would only finalize their loss of Jordanian citizenship” (AP, 2010). This indicates a lack of trust in the government bureaucracy and judicial systems. It also indicates the problem of belonging in Jordan. Pertaining to this obstruction to basic rights, Human Rights Watch states “Without nationality, individuals and families find it difficult to exercise their citizenship rights, including obtaining health care; finding work; owning property; traveling; and sending their children to public schools and universities.” (HRW, 2010). This critically differentiates the communal boundaries of citizenship.

It would also be wrong to analyze citizenship without noting the constraints on citizenship because of the authoritarian features of the Jordanian state. Even if the regime has chosen preferences and bases, it cannot mask the fact that people are not guaranteed certain rights from all communities. Free press and the political parties are severely limited. 7iber has been blocked

While many authors betray the situation in Jordan as liberalizing or enlightened monarch, the future of government and life for Jordanians is unclear. For the current moment, the Hashemites have secured their rule with various divide and rule measures. These include leveling citizenship in ways that citizens are constantly feeling communally divided. This is compounded by the monarch’s illiberal policies of the past 10 years. In an analysis looking back at the transitions since the Arab Uprisings, Abu Rish (2017) states “All the while, sociopolitical and
institutional dynamics continue to shift in specific ways, betraying the reality of popular desires of meaningful change, regime policies of counter-revolution, and a regional-international context that complicates the rational choices of those seeking more accountability, transparency, and social justice.”. Meaningful change is still yet to come and the trends of the Abdullah regime display continued moves towards discrimination, authoritarianism, and regressing basic human rights.
REFERENCES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION


**CHAPTER 2: CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NARRATIVE AND MEMORIALIZATION**


CHAPTER 3:


**CHAPTER 4:**


CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Jordan-strips-Palestinians-citizenship


Gazal, M (2016). “Population Stands Around 9.5 Million, Including 2.9 Million Guests”


RESEARCH VISIT INDEX

Amman, Jordan Dec 27th- Jan 5th (Provost Undergraduate Research Funding)

Parliamentary Life Museum Visit on 1/8/2017

Jordan National Museum Visit on 1/2/2017

Sarh Al Shaheed Museum Visit (not open to public due to construction)

The Jordan National Gallery of the Fine Arts visit on 1/2/2017

Jordanian Museum of Popular Tradition visit on 1/2/2017

Jordanian Folklore Museum visit on 1/2/2017

Jordanian Children’s Museum visit 1/5/2017

The Jordan National Gallery of the Fine Arts visit on 1/2/2017

The Exhibition of Arab Heritage and Recent Discoveries (Department of the Antiquities) visit on 1/7/2017

The Royal Automobile Museum visit on 1/5/17

Dead Sea Museum visit on 1/4/2017

Madaba Archaeological Park and Folklore Museum of the Madaba Apostles Church (administered by the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities) visit on 1/8/2017

Tiraz Foundation visit on 1/5/2017

Jordan River Foundation visit on 1/9/2017