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Esno, Tyler P.Trading with the Enemy: U.S. Economic Policies and the End of the Cold War
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2017, History (Arts and Sciences)
This dissertation argues that U.S. economic strategies and policies were effective means to wage the Cold War during its final years and conclude the conflict on terms favorable to the United States. Using recently declassified U.S. and British government documents, among other sources, this analysis reveals that actions in East-West economic relations undermined cooperative U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1970s, contributed to heightened tensions in the early 1980s, and helped renew the U.S.-Soviet dialogue in the late 1980s. Scholars have focused on the role arms control initiatives and political actions played in the end of the Cold War. Arms control agreements, however, failed to resolve the underlying ideological and geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Through economic statecraft, the United States strengthened Western security and moved beyond containment to aid the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, help settle U.S.-Soviet political differences, and encourage the transformation of the oppressive Soviet system. In effect, this analysis highlights the ways in which U.S. economic statecraft served as an instrument to promote national interests and peace. Between the 1970s and early 1990s, the Soviet Union intended to overcome its economic decline through deeper commercial relations with the West. But, the United States continually sought to block Soviet moves, fearing deeper East-West economic relations would enhance Soviet military potential and grant Moscow leverage over the Atlantic alliance. While working with its West European allies to strengthen the regulation of East-West trade and protect alliance security, the United States also attempted to place further pressure on the Soviet economy and punish Moscow for its aggressive international behavior. In the late 1980s, trade restrictions and limited economic engagement helped the United States negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, moving beyond the Cold War. Lastly, as the Soviet empire crumbled, economic instruments proved to be the West’s most powerful tool in ending the division of Europe, aiding the institutionalization of democratic, market-oriented systems in Eastern Europe, and encouraging Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to undertake deeper economic reforms.

Committee:

Chester Pach, PhD (Advisor); Paul Milazzo, PhD (Committee Member); Ingo Trauschweizer, PhD (Committee Member); James Mosher, PhD (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; American Studies; Economic History; Economics; European History; History; Military History; Modern History; Peace Studies; Russian History; World History

Keywords:

Reagan; Ronald Reagan; Cold War; economic sanctions; trade; economic defense; economic policies; end of the Cold War; Bush; George HW Bush; East-West trade; East-West economic relations; economic relations; Soviet Union; Russia; embargo; grain embargo;

Riotto, Angela MBeyond `the scrawl'd, worn slips of paper’: Union and Confederate Prisoners of War and their Postwar Memories
Doctor of Philosophy, University of Akron, 2018, History
The following dissertation examines the ways in which Union and Confederate ex-prisoners of war discussed their experiences of captivity between 1862 and 1930. By examining former prisoners’ captivity narratives, this dissertation demonstrates that to the end of their lives, ex-prisoners worked to construct a public image—one of suffering—that differed from the typical gallant volunteer who fought and died on the battlefield. Ex-prisoners shared their stories of captivity as a way of affirming their identities as a distinct type of veteran and to affirm their place as American men, regardless of their time as a prisoner of war. Viewed singly, any of these narratives might be dismissed as a fascinating story of personal suffering and survival, but when they are considered as a body of literature, one can trace the development of a master narrative, both separate from and intertwined with the American public’s postwar memory. This dissertation challenges conventional understandings of postwar reconciliation and adds to recent scholarship on veterans’ reintegration into civilian life. Both Union and Confederate ex-prisoners of war often contradicted this preferred heroic narrative of the war. Some men, as they got older, accepted reconciliation and censored their bitterness and hatred. Others promised to never forget their sufferings and, as a result, remained obstacles to reconciliation. By examining ex-prisoners’ narratives, this dissertation reveals how ex-prisoners did not accept or fit into the ideal trajectory of reconciliation.

Committee:

Walter Hixson (Committee Chair); Lesley Gordon (Committee Co-Chair); Stephen Harp (Committee Member); Kevin Adams (Committee Member); Patrick Chura (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; American Literature; History; Military History

Keywords:

prisoners of war; reconciliation; American Civil War; military history; war and society; veterans; Andersonville; Confederate; Union; Henry Wirz; Memory; Memorialization; Memory Studies; Prison Camps; Captivity; Imprisonment; Literary Studies

Troy, Daniel ConorRuining the King’s Cause in America: The Defeat of the Loyalists in the Revolutionary South, 1774-1781
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2015, History
This dissertation examines the dynamics of political violence in the Revolutionary South from 1774 to 1776 as manifested in the rebels’ strategy to overthrow the royal provincial governments in that region. It connects the failure of the British to recapture the southern provinces beginning in 1779 to this strategy implemented early in the war. It also offers a logic to the violence of the war in the South, which is often depicted as random and lacking any broader purpose but annihilation of the American Loyalists. British strategy for the southern colonies throughout the war was heavily reliant on the support of Loyalists, a reality that the rebels understood even before the war began. Most historians who have written on the British southern strategy have argued that the British failure was due to exaggerated reports of Loyalist strength in the South, usually the result of misleading reports from self-interested Loyalist officials or officials in London who had no better solution and grasped desperately for any proposal that looked promising. These historians have often drawn their evidence from the letters of General Charles, Lord Cornwallis, who had similar complaints about the Loyalists, who he believed were to blame for his lack of success. Recently historians have started to question this historiographical argument, suggesting that those of Loyalist sentiment were more numerous and willing to act than previously assumed. As with their earlier counterparts, however, these historians suggest the rebels undertook an indiscriminate and brutal campaign of violence aimed at simply eradicating Loyalists in a process reminiscent of The Terror to come in the French Revolution. The rebels’ strategy instead emphasized control more than indiscriminate destruction. They were not attempting to eradicate an irreconcilable population or “purify” their society, the actions typically associated with revolutionary violence. The real threat for the rebels was the British rather than the Loyalists. As a result they used violent as well as non-violent measures to control the Loyalists and prevent them from supporting the British. So long as they could maintain that control, they often avoided expending the resources that would have been required to capture, imprison, and even execute large numbers of Loyalists. The rebels maintained this strategy of control throughout the war, even through conventional military defeats. Though the British had a number of battlefield victories beginning in 1779, they did not understand how to leverage Loyalist support. They instead expected Loyalists to find their own way to British lines, over miles of territory controlled by the rebels. When this did not yield the expected support, the British blamed the Loyalists, calling them weak, lazy, and indifferent. The British debated whether they should organize support through conciliatory measures, including offering political incentives, or through punitive measures to punish those who did not actively support the British. The historiography mirrors this debate, but neither measure would have brought the British success. They did not understand how the rebels maintained their control over the population, did not prioritize intelligence or other measures that would allow them to tell friend from foe and isolate rebels from the population, and failed to temper expectations for the long-term process of organizing and training Loyalist militia. The British southern strategy was not a hopeless cause, even as late in the war as 1779. The fundamental mistake the British made was instead in failing to first understand their opponent’s strategy.

Committee:

Peter Mansoor (Advisor); John Brooke (Committee Member); Mark Grimsley (Committee Member); Andrew O'Shaughnessy (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; History; Military History

Keywords:

American Revolution; Revolutionary War; South Carolina; Georgia; North Carolina; Southern Strategy; counterinsurgency; political violence; urban violence; James Wright; Cornwallis; Henry Clinton; Henry Laurens; William Henry Drayton; John Rutledge

Bentley, Caitlin T.Linking Communications: the Philippine Regional Section of the Allied Intelligence Bureau's Operations in the Occupied Islands,1942-1945
Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2015, History (Arts and Sciences)
The Philippines lay in the middle of Japanese shipping lanes to the Dutch East Indies, a region that provided them with the oil necessary to keep their navy at sea. Japanese possession of the Philippines ensured them not only access to such shipping lanes, but also unrestricted communication with Tokyo. Allied command GHQ SWPA began maneuvering to sever this linkage. As this thesis will argue, there was already an effective local guerilla intelligence network in existence before the war, having been maintained by the guerrilla groups that emerged.The effectiveness of these existing channels and the guerrillas as operatives was illustrated by the speed with which information began to flow back to Australia once these networks were aligned under the Philippine Regional Section. The volume of material produced, of their own volition, while the guerillas unable to maintain reliable contact with GHQ in early 1942, as well as their maintenance of the networks through the war is evidence that the intelligence shared between Filipino guerrilla districts and GHQ was a mutually beneficial endeavor. The PRS provided the communications apparatus to link these movements, but they themselves did not control or muster the forces necessary to operate it with the islands. It was the intelligence provided by the guerillas and the Coastwatch stations they supported that provided information crucial to an American reinvasion of the Philippine Archipelago. Without the intelligence gathered by the resistance, American forces would have been operating without a precise understanding of enemy positions during battles like Leyte, making any attempt to retake the islands difficult, if not far too risky to be sold to the high command. Despite General MacArthur’s selective use of guerilla reports, often favoring the discoveries of signals intelligence, at each crucial stage of operations, Filipino guerrilla reports alerted Allied forces outside the Philippines to minute changes in enemy positions in a way only local operatives were able. Whether or not MacArthur used the intelligence presented to him to its full capacity, the information disseminated through the ranks of GHQ SWPA transformed the collective mind of the Allied approach from a Headquarters questioning the loyalty of the Philippine populace to an operational taskforce in possession of Japanese plans, strategy, and positions.

Committee:

Ingo Trauschweizer, Dr (Advisor); John Brobst, Dr (Committee Member); Alec Holcombe, Dr (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; Military History; South Asian Studies

Keywords:

Filipino guerrillas; World War II; Allied Intelligence Bureau; Philippine Regional Section; AIB penetration parties; intelligence World War II; guerrilla warfare; radio networks

Stevens, Ashley MarieAmerican Society, Stereotypical Roles, and Asian Characters in M*A*S*H
Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2016, History
M*A*S*H is an iconic, eleven season (1972-1983), American television series that was produced on the tail end of the Vietnam War during a period of upheaval for the American public. Set in Korea during the Korean War, M*A*S*H was a satire on the war in Vietnam. As a result, M*A*S*H presents numerous Asian (Korean) characters throughout the series, but often in limited, stereotypical roles. Despite producing America's most watched final season episode; "Goodbye, Farewell, and Amen," and being granted several Emmy nominations and awards, M*A*S*H has all but evaded lengthy academic study. This thesis primarily uses newspapers, both local and national, to understand how Asian stereotypes are presented in M*A*S*H with relationship to American society. Through the analysis of seven Asian-centered character roles, including; farmer/villager, houseboy/housekeeper, prostitute, war bride, peddler/hustler, orphan, and enemy, I explore the foundations of these stereotypes as well as how they were being utilized to reassure Americans of their own communal, Cold War, beliefs in a time of distress. I explore how these roles change and adapt over the course of the series and what may be motivating these changes, such as the Asian-American, Civil Rights and women's rights movements, and changing Cold War ideologies and objectives.

Committee:

Michael Brooks, Dr. (Advisor); Kristen Rudisill, Dr. (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; Asian American Studies; Asian Studies; Folklore; Mass Communications; Military History

Keywords:

MASH television; Asian Stereotypes; Korean War; Vietnam War; houseboy; moose; war orphan; war bride; Korean; Vietnamese; Gook; Gook Complex; Mobile Army Surgical Hospital; MASH; Cold War; friendly fire; American Television; military prostitution; History

Perkowski, Leon JCold War Credibility in the Shadow of Vietnam: Politics and Discourse of U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Korea, 1969-1979
PHD, Kent State University, 2015, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of History
The strains and aftermath of the Vietnam War prompted U.S. presidents of the 1970s to be the first ones to contemplate a complete withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea. The ensuing debate forced American civilian and military leaders to confront a long-held traditional mindset about the importance of U.S. credibility and reputation that had been forged in the early Cold War. Scholars have long noted that this identifiable Cold War mindset consisted of apparent lessons from World War II about appeasement and key assumptions about the nature of the Soviet enemy and the broader Cold War conflict that encouraged a "fixation" on U.S. credibility. The presence and influence of this traditional mindset's "credibility" imperative in the post-Vietnam Cold War, however, has largely been ignored or discounted. The debate over withdrawing U.S. ground forces from South Korea in the 1970s occurred in the context of a relatively static conflict between North Korea and South Korea, which provides a unique, relatively unchanging backdrop against which to evaluate this neglected period of U.S. Cold War credibility concerns. Diachronic analysis of the troop withdrawal debate and decision making reveals important continuities and discontinuities in U.S. Cold War thinking, and highlights the ebb and flow of the influence of a persistent early Cold War mindset as it competed with other values and imperatives, especially fiscal responsibility and disentanglement, in the shadow of the Vietnam War. Using the debate as barometer of U.S. Cold War discourse, one finds that the post-Vietnam recession in the prominence of credibility concerns was modest and temporary, and that a traditional Cold War mindset and credibility fixation still exerted considerable influence on U.S. policymakers. It overarched the withdrawal debate and defined much of the conceptual space in which the debate could take place. As in other debates over national security in previous decades, the concept of credibility exerted particularly powerful influence on policy elites and senior U.S. military commanders, and sometimes unhelpfully distorted their decision making while providing enemies and allies opportunities to leverage exaggerated U.S. concerns about credibility to their advantage.

Committee:

Mary Ann Heiss (Advisor); Steven Hook (Committee Member); Kevin Adams (Committee Member); Clarence Wunderin (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; International Relations; Military History; Military Studies; Modern History; Peace Studies

Keywords:

Cold War; credibility; reputation; resolve; deterrence; Jimmy Carter; Richard Nixon; troop withdrawal; alliances

Burke, Eric MichaelDecidedly Unmilitary: The Roots of Social Order in the Union Army
Bachelor of Arts (BA), Ohio University, 2014, History
Since the late 1980s, historians of American Civil War soldiers have struggled to understand the nature, character, and social order of the volunteer Union Army. Debates over individual motivations to enlist and serve, the success or failure of the institution to instill proper military discipline, and the peculiar requirements of leading volunteer citizen-soldiers have remained salient elements of Civil War soldier studies historiography. This thesis offers a new methodology for addressing these questions by examining the antebellum worldview of men from a single regiment -- the 55th Illinois Volunteer Infantry -- in order to create a lens through which to view their wartime behavior in uniform. This allows for an examination of how the antebellum voluntarist social order of Illinois towns continued to structure life in the ranks. Leaders who were aware of this cultural factor were often more successful in enlisting the support and cooperation of their subordinates than those who sought to breakdown their men and force them into the traditional mold of military subordination. Finally, the decision to enlist, cooperate, and remain in the volunteer force was governed by the same personal calculus of individual self-interest that governed men before entering into military service.

Committee:

Brian Schoen (Advisor)

Subjects:

American History; History; Military History

Keywords:

Civil War; Union Army; voluntary association; voluntarism; Illinois; antebellum; leadership; social order; citizen-soldiers; citizen soldiers; volunteers; 55th Illinois; 55th Illinois Infantry

Ambrose, Matthew JohnThe Limits of Control: A History of the SALT Process, 1969-1983
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2014, History
Historians have only begun to grapple with the implications of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the longest-running arms control negotiation in modern history. This dissertation breaks with the existing literature by examining the process from beginning to end, and placing an in-depth examination of SALT at the center of the narrative. In effect, SALT’s structural constraints limited the progress that could actually be achieved in reducing arms. Rather than retreating from the process, the leaderships of both superpowers embraced it as a way to reassert their control over fractious domestic interests and restive polities, using foreign policy to effect a “domestic condominium” between them. Widespread discontent with the threat of nuclear annihilation prompted the superpowers to redirect SALT to enhance their control over their military and diplomatic apparatuses and insulate themselves from the political consequences of continued competition. Prolonged engagement with arms control issues introduced dynamic effects into nuclear policy in the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union. Arms control considerations came to influence most areas of defense decision making, while the measure of stability SALT provided allowed the examination of new and potentially dangerous nuclear doctrines. Verification and compliance concerns by the United States prompted continuous reassessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions, while challenging their definitions of knowledge itself. This framework grew strained as the short and long-term interests of the superpowers began to diverge. The Reagan administration came to power promising to break this cycle, but could not find a way to operate constructively within the existing framework. The SALT process, broadly construed, reached its definitive end with the Soviet walkout from arms control talks in 1983.

Committee:

Peter Hahn (Advisor); Robert McMahon (Advisor); Jennifer Siegel (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; History; International Relations; Military History

Keywords:

Foreign Policy; National Security; Nuclear History; Arms Control; SALT I; SALT II; INF; Nuclear Strategy; Cold War; Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; Detente; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces; Nuclear Weapons; International Relations; Diplomatic History

Wallace, Jessica Lynn"Building Forts in Their Heart": Anglo-Cherokee Relations on the Mid-Eighteenth-Century Southern Frontier
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2014, History
This dissertation examines the relationship between the Cherokees and South Carolina in the mid-eighteenth-century. Specifically, it focuses on the military and economic alliance begun in the early eighteenth century and formalized with the Treaty of Whitehall in 1730. This alliance was both strengthened and strained in the 1750s, temporarily breaking in the Cherokee War of 1759-1761. While most historians of the Seven Years' War treat the Cherokee War as a minor incident and blame the outbreak of war on the heavy handed tactics of South Carolina's young and relatively inexperienced governor, this project examines the tensions in place before the Seven Years' War, and the interplay between Cherokee and colonial perceptions of alliance. In the mid-eighteenth century, Cherokee and South Carolinian diplomatic decisions were shaped by the need to address new security concerns and develop defenses against the French and other American Indian groups. This dissertation focuses on the political, diplomatic, and economic activities of these allies, unpacking the cultural significances of public exchanges such as treaty making, negotiations, trade, and the evolving political climates in both Native and colonial centers of power. These public actions demonstrate commitment to protection against mutual enemies, particularly in the Seven Years' War. At the same time, the alliance was tension-filled, as Cherokees and South Carolinians alike regarded each other as untrustworthy. This study also examines the personal and kin-based relationships at trading and military posts to uncover the meaning of imperial and colonial policies on the local level for Cherokees, traders, and soldiers. Ultimately, these relationships could not contain the rupture that led to the Cherokee War of 1759-1761. The Cherokee War was the result not of the poor decisions of one man but of an alliance strained to the breaking point by a host of factors in 1759. The strength of the alliance, built by compromise, trade, and negotiation over the past sixty years, meant that Cherokees and South Carolinians attempted to rebuild the alliance in the aftermath of war, though its nature irrevocably changed, becoming less focused on trade and more concerned with land sales and delineation of boundaries.

Committee:

Alan Gallay (Advisor); Margaret Newell (Advisor); Lucy Murphy (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; History; Military History; Native Americans

Keywords:

Cherokee War; South Carolina; colonial America; Cherokee; Seven Years War; frontier; backcountry; deerskin trade; alliance; cultural misunderstanding; forts; French and Indian War

Bolzenius, Sandra M.The 1945 Black Wac Strike at Ft. Devens
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2013, History
In March 1945, a WAC (Women’s Army Corps) detachment of African Americans stationed at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts organized a strike action to protest discriminatory treatment in the Army. As a microcosm of military directives and black women’s assertions of their rights, the Ft. Devens strike provides a revealing context to explore connections between state policy and citizenship during World War II. This project investigates the manner in which state policies reflected and reinforced rigid distinctions between constructed categories of citizens, and it examines the attempts of African American women, who stood among the nation’s most marginalized persons, to assert their rights to full citizenship through military service. The purpose of this study is threefold: to investigate the Army’s determination to strictly segment its troops according to race and gender in addition to its customary rank divisions; to explore state policies during the war years from the vantage point of black women; and to recognize the agency, experiences, and resistance strategies of back women who enlisted in the WAC during its first years. The Ft. Devens incident showcases a little known, yet extraordinary event of the era that features the interaction between black enlisted women and the Army’s white elite in accordance with standard military protocol. This protocol demanded respect all who wore the uniform, albeit within a force segregated by gender, race, and rank. It is this conflict that gave rise to one of World War II’s most publicized courts-martial, the black Wac strike at Ft. Devens.

Committee:

Judy Wu (Advisor); Susan Hartmann (Committee Member); Tiyi Morris (Committee Member); Peter Mansoor (Committee Member)

Subjects:

African American Studies; African Americans; American History; American Studies; Armed Forces; Black History; Black Studies; Gender; Gender Studies; History; Military History; Military Studies; Public Policy; Womens Studies

Keywords:

WAC; WAAC; World War II; Fort Devens; strike; African American women; military; court- martial; intersectionality; culture of dissemblance; Fort Des Moines; Alice Young; Anna Morrison; Mary Green; Johnnie Murphy; WAAC; African American; public policy

Prentice, David L.Ending America's Vietnam War: Vietnamization's Domestic Origins and International Ramifications, 1968-1970
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2013, History (Arts and Sciences)
America's exit from Vietnam was as contingent, complicated, and agonizing as its decision to pursue war in Indochina, and this dissertation focuses on the critical period—1968-1970. Based on research at eight domestic and foreign archives, I argue that the perception of a crumbling home front drove U.S. policymaking and that America's allies and enemies appreciated and reacted to this domestic context and decision-making. In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson concluded he had little choice but to cap U.S. troop strength, stop bombing North Vietnam, and begin negotiations, but he drew the line at unilateral withdrawals and kept military escalation on the table. Hence, the battle over America's exit strategy occurred during Richard Nixon's first year in office. During 1969, three individuals—Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Melvin Laird—plotted, schemed, and wrangled over Nixon's Vietnam strategy. The allure of victory remained strong as Nixon and Kissinger devised an elaborate plan to threaten and then launch a savage bombing campaign against North Vietnam to compel its capitulation before time ran out at home. Secretary of Defense Laird argued the domestic front would not tolerate such a mad scheme. Instead, Laird developed what became America's exit strategy, Vietnamization—the strategy of improving South Vietnamese military capabilities while withdrawing American troops. Though overlooked by historians, Laird's Vietnamization defeated Kissinger's militant strategy to halt U.S. troop reductions and escalate the war. By the end of 1969, Nixon sided with Laird, hoping that Vietnamization could win the war at home and abroad. Vietnamization's domestic origins reflect only part of the story, and this dissertation establishes its international context as well. Foreign officials understood U.S. policymakers had changed course to abate pressure at home. Whereas both the North and (surprisingly) South Vietnamese greeted Vietnamization with confidence, Australia and Great Britain worried it could be an early symptom of a global American retreat. They feared humiliation in Vietnam would create an isolationist lobby that would curtail U.S. commitments worldwide. Nevertheless, they judged Nixon's resolve and Vietnamization positively. The Nixon administration was holding the line in the United States and South Vietnam, but all understood that Vietnamization marked the beginning of the end of America's Vietnam War.

Committee:

Chester Pach (Advisor); Paul Milazzo (Committee Member); Ingo Trauschweizer (Committee Member); Patrick Washburn (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; European History; History; International Relations; Military History; World History

Keywords:

Vietnamization; Melvin Laird; Vietnam War; exit strategy; Nixon; Kissinger; Ending the Vietnam War; Clark Clifford; de-Americanization; Lyndon Johnson; North Vietnam; South Vietnam; troop withdrawal; Australia and Vietnam; Britain and Vietnam; Thieu

MacRobbie, Danielle ElizabethAn Investigation of Technological Impressions in Steve Reich and Beryl Korot's Three Tales
Master of Music (MM), Bowling Green State University, 2013, Music History
The impact of technology upon the twentieth century and the influence it continues to exert upon the present human community is self-evident. The allure and power of technology are broadcast via the grandest media and performance entertainment, while on the opposite spectrum, technology is being continually refined to render its electro-mechanical or bio-technical feats for humans. It is this theme of the increasing growth and import of technology upon every facet of human life that serves as the subject of Three Tales, a twenty-first century documentary digital video opera by composer Steve Reich and video artist Beryl Korot. In this work, Reich and Korot confront society's negligence of particular directions that technological development and application have undergone in the past century, and advise against taking the same paths in the coming era. Even as modern technology is critiqued in Three Tales, the work itself bends to accept the reality of technology's significance upon modern thought and life. In keeping with Reich and Korot's categorization of the work as a "documentary digital video opera," Three Tales is a performance work heavily dependent upon technology for its generation, presentation, and discussion of the interchange between technology and humankind. This thesis will investigate how technology has shaped the course of an artwork whose purpose is to expose and debate the handling of technology in current society. Technology in Three Tales is examined from various perspectives. Chapter one presents the foundational role of technology as "tool," "subject," and "theme." Chapter two considers how visual and audio technologies are used in Three Tales to suggest the effects technology may have upon perceptions of human connectedness and isolation. Chapter three investigates the inherent paradox in Three Tales that occurs from using technological devices for the work's production while its theme critiques modern, technological advances. The chapter also considers the influence technology has upon the formation of Three Tales's generic identification.

Committee:

Eftychia Papanikolaou (Advisor); Alexa Woloshyn (Committee Member); Mary Natvig (Committee Member)

Subjects:

Biology; Ethics; History; Information Technology; Medical Ethics; Military History; Minority and Ethnic Groups; Music; Nanotechnology; Robotics; Robots; Spirituality; Technology; Theology

Keywords:

Steve Reich; Beryl Korot; Three Tales; Technology; Hindenburg zeppelin; Bikini Atoll; Cloning; electronic music; IRCAM; freeze frame sound; new music theater; Kismet; human connectedness; human isolation; technology and art; art and politics; paradox

Cousineau, R LaurentWars Without Risk: U.S. Humanitarian Interventions in the 1990s
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2010, History
Wars Without Risk is an analysis of U.S. foreign policy under George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton involving forced humanitarian military operations in Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s. The dissertation examines American post-Cold war foreign policy and the abrupt shift to involve U.S. armed forces in United Nations peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations to conduct limited humanitarian and nation-building projects. The focus of the study is on policy formulation and execution in two case studies of Somalia and Haiti.Wars Without Risk examines the fundamental flaws in the attempt to embrace assertive multilateralism (a neo-Wilsonian Progressive attempt to create world peace and stability through international force, collective security, international aid, and democratization) and to overextend the traditional democratization mandates of American foreign policy which inevitably led to failure, fraud, and waste. U.S. military might was haphazardly injected in ill-defined UN operations to save nations from themselves and to spread or “save” democracy in nations that were not strongly rooted in Western enlightenment foundations. Missions in Somalia and Haiti were launched as “feel good” humanitarian operations designed as attempts to rescue “failed states” but these emotionally-based operations had no chance of success in realistic terms because the root causes of poverty and conflict in targeted nations were too great to address through half-hearted international paternalism. Trapped by policies driven by empty rhetoric but lacking any validation in terms of national interests, Bush and Clinton weren’t willing to take serious risks in order to fulfill their overly idealistic mandates over unwilling or unmotivated populations. The operations in Somalia and Haiti were poorly conceived and lacked and real public support at home, thus perpetuating the need of policymakers to focus on crafting political theater and positive imagery over generating viable strategies to accomplish these missions. Both interventions in Somalia and Haiti were initiated and executed on the basis of their promise of producing risk-free operations for policies built upon flimsy foundations of empty rhetoric, internationalism, idealism, and the desire to create positive imagery for the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world and for the presidents that conducted humanitarian operations.

Committee:

Gary Hess, Dr. (Advisor); Robert Buffington, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Stephen Ortiz, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Neal Jesse, Ph.D. (Other)

Subjects:

History; Military History

Keywords:

foreign policy; peacekeeping; Somalia; Haiti; Bush; Clinton; assertive multilateralism

Levinson, BruceThe U.S. - U.S.S.R. Nuclear Balance: Present and Future
BA, Oberlin College, 1976, History

The purpose of this paper will be to arrive at some sort of understanding about the real importance of nuclear weapons in the hands of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., something which has not been done heretofore in as skilled a fashion as is possible. There are a number of reasons for this, some of which are worth looking into because of the impact they have had on the actual policies of the United States.

Committee:

Bruce Tufts (Advisor)

Subjects:

American History; European History; History; Military History

Keywords:

nuclear weapons;United States;USSR;military;

Childers, Rex A.The Rationality of Nonconformity: the United States decision to refuse ratification of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2008, History
On December 12, 1977, the U.S. signed a treaty offered through the ICRC entitled Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. This treaty drastically altered the relationship between individual behavior in warfare and combatant status. For the United States, the impact of domestic political tensions, the fresh and painful experience in Vietnam, and a continued emphasis on Détente all played parts in the decision to participate in the conference and sign the treaty. Signature during the Carter administration would not be followed by ratification, and would be rejected by subsequent administrations. Was this decision, continued through every administration to date, a simple outcome of a rogue nation exercising its sovereign right based upon its own ability to wage war, or is there more to the story? In this thesis, a new analysis of the political processes and environment surrounding the final treaty's outcomes is offered. The global tensions between superpowers are examined, emphasizing the United States response, in the context of its perceptions of the treaty's requirements. A broader coalition of actors, both state and non-state, would ultimately hold the key to the treaty's significance to conventional warfare. The Global South engaged the issue of lawful behavior in war with a distinct set of outcomes in mind. Their ability to gain agency, build effective coalitions addressing inequities in the asymmetry of warfare that had historically disadvantaged them, and then alter the outcomes of international humanitarian law through democratic practices, are placed in the context of rational choice theory. The logical and methodical approach used by these actors to deconstruct the central premise of conventional warfare distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, consistently the hallmark of advancing improvements in international humanitarian law, resulted in a treaty reversing advancements in civilian protections through a new set of dangerous behaviors made allowable for a new category of privileged combatants (organized resistance movements). The United State's options were limited, and a new and regressive standard for conventional warfare was instituted.

Committee:

Dr. Gary Hess, PhD (Advisor); Dr. Douglas Forsyth, PhD (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; Armed Forces; History; International Law; International Relations; Military History

Keywords:

asymmetrical warfare; Carter; civilian; combatant; noncombatant; freedom fighter; geneva conventions; global north; global south; international humanitarian law; law of war; mercenary; national liberation movements; prisoner of war; protocol I

Atkins, Elizabeth“The Prisoners Are Not Hard to Handle:” Cultural Views of German Prisoners of War and Their Captors in Camp Sharpe, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2008, History
This paper explores how perceived cultural and ethnic identities effected the interactions between German prisoners of war and the citizens of Adams County, Pennsylvania during the Second World War. Newspapers articles, oral histories and government documents were analyzed to gauge the level of interaction between and the reception of German POWs who worked in the community as temporary labor relieve. The first chapter locates Camp Sharpe geographically within the history of Adams County and Pennsylvania, historically within the larger study of German prisoners of war in America and outlines the development of German culture within southern Pennsylvania. Chapter two provides a chronology of the creation and management of Camp Sharpe and the temporary work camp in Gettysburg. It also details the interactions between German prisoners of war and the citizens of Adams Country, showing that there was ample opportunity for German prisoners and Americans to communicate with each other due to the peculiar policies for prisoner of war labor. The last chapter examines the creation and maintenance of German culture and the existence and influences of several factors that could impact the formation of identity. By acknowledging these factors, this work will explore why German prisoners of war and the citizens of Gettysburg generally responded favorably to each others’ presence and try to account for the varying influences that caused both this reaction and less frequent negative responses.

Committee:

Beth Griech-Polelle, PhD (Advisor); Christina Guenther, PhD (Advisor); Geoffrey Howes, PhD (Committee Member); Gary Hess (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; European History; History; Language; Military History

Keywords:

World War II; homefront; prisoners of war; Gettysburg; German

Bauman, Lindsey M"A Bitter Wet-Dry Fight:" How an Infantry Regiment Influenced the Nebraska Prohibition Vote of 1944
Master of Arts (MA), Bowling Green State University, 2017, History
This thesis examines the often-overlooked connection between the home front and battle front during World War II, specifically between Nebraska communities and the 134th Infantry Regiment, which was originally part of the Nebraska National Guard. The Allied Dry Forces of Nebraska petitioned to put a prohibition initiative on the state ballot during the election of 1944, while thousands of servicemen were overseas. This case study discusses the ways in which Nebraska residents and servicemen responded to it. Most significant was a petition from members of the 134th Infantry, which was sent to the Committee of Men and Women Against Prohibition to denounce the initiative due to the timing of its proposal. Already viewed as important figures in the war in Europe, their military service gave their voices more credence within the community. A vote against the initiative was portrayed by anti-prohibitionists as a way to support the troops, a resident’s patriotic duty during World War II. The servicemen became an essential point of contention and their unexpected involvement in the election ultimately resulted in a bitter struggle between individuals and organizations on both sides. This case study examines how their petition, as well as the letters of other servicemen, impacted the outcome of the vote on the initiative during the election in November.

Committee:

Rebecca Mancuso (Advisor); Amilcar Challu (Committee Member); Benjamin Greene (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; Armed Forces; History; Military History; Modern History; Regional Studies

Keywords:

Nebraska; World War II; Prohibition; 134th Infantry Regiment; Butler B Miltonberger; Allied Dry Forces; Committee of Men and Women Against Prohibition; Keith Neville; Harold D Wilson; Election; 1944; Politics; Morality; Patriotism

Wills, Steven T.Replacing the Maritime Strategy: The Change in Naval Strategy from 1989-1994
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Ohio University, 2017, History (Arts and Sciences)
The change in U.S. naval strategy from 1989 to 1994 was the most significant of its kind since the end of the Second World War. The end of the Cold War, the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 and the effects of the First Gulf War of 1991 combined to radically alter U.S. and naval strategic thinking. The end of the Cold War brought about a review of U.S. naval strategy, but the personalities involved created a new process that greatly hampered the re-creation of strategy designed to combat peer competitors. The provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 indirectly affected the Navy staff where strategy documents had heretofore been produced. Talented officers that had sought service on the Navy Staff gravitated instead toward the Joint Staff and regional Commander Staffs as these positions offered better chances for promotion and advancement. Finally the First Gulf War caused a crisis of confidence among the Navy’s senior leaders in that they did not get to validate traditional naval warfare concepts against Saddam Hussein’s limited Iraqi naval forces. This feeling seems to have further convinced leaders to leave behind traditional concepts and the service staff structures that created them in favor of Army and Air Force methods of organization for combat. Those services appeared to have confirmed their warfare doctrines in the 1991 conflict. Congress agreed and the Navy was concerned that vital funding in the post-Cold War-era required the seagoing service to also adjust to a warfare organization more favorable to legislative support. These factors combined to produce a different kind of new naval strategy in the form of the “From the Sea” white paper. It eschewed blue water naval operations for those in the coastal regions of the world know as the littorals. U.S. Marine Corps forces, which had almost always had a secondary role in naval strategic planning in the past, were in many cases given the leading role in From the Sea with the regular Navy providing logistics support. Once adopted, however, From the Sea was increasingly less relevant as an active document as its predecessor (the 1980’s Maritime Strategy.) In the absence of an integrating opponent like the Soviet Union, the fight with the other military services for scarce budgetary resources dominated the concerns of naval leadership. The Budgets and Assessment arm of the Navy Staff had achieved a significant superiority in authority and influence over its peer staff counterparts as a result of post-Cold War reorganization in response to this concern. Preservation of shrinking naval force structure rather than future strategic planning dominated naval thinking for the next quarter century. The strategy arm of the Naval Staff, weakened in influence due to reorganization, and less well staffed by talented officers due to the Goldwater Nichols Act provisions, was unable to conduct effective strategic planning that had an influence on naval budgets and force structure planning. As a result, the naval service was increasingly less capable of producing new strategic concepts in the post-Cold War era.

Committee:

Ingo Trauschweizer, Dr (Advisor); Peter John Brobst, Dr (Committee Member); Paul Milazzo, Dr (Committee Member)

Subjects:

Military History

Keywords:

United States Naval Strategy; United States Naval History; United States Navy; Military Strategy; The Maritime Strategy; The Cold War; Strategic Geography; War Plans; Naval Warfare; Naval History

Gomes, Jenna M.The Things He Left Behind
Master of Arts (M.A.), University of Dayton, 2018, English
"The Things He Left Behind" is a short story cycle inspired by the consequences of war and the power of legacy. It follows a young soldier, Felix Rocha, through the eyes of the many friends, family, and strangers that he impacted throughout his short life. The character is based off of a real-life soldier, Felix Del Greco, who was the first Connecticut National Guardsman to be killed in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The incorporation of artifacts into the story is meant to mix fiction and reality; to present to the reader both the real Felix and the fictional Felix. As Tim O’Brien famously said, “story-truth is truer sometimes than happening-truth.” This short story cycle is meant to make a lasting impact on the reader, leaving them with the question, “What are the things that I will leave behind?”

Committee:

Meredith Doench (Advisor); David Fine (Committee Member); Christopher Burnside (Committee Member)

Subjects:

Families and Family Life; Literature; Military History; Military Studies; Personal Relationships

Keywords:

creative writing; war; iraq; operation iraqi freedom; connecticut; short story cycle; tim obrien; bruce springsteen; soldiers; national guard; family; friends; death; love; loss; military

Higley, JoelThe Brains of the Air Force: Laurence Kuter and the Making of the United States Air Force
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2016, History
This study examines the establishment of the United States Air Force as an independent service, through the lens of General Laurence Kuter. Covering from his birth through the end of the Second World War, it yields five observations. First, Laurence “Larry” Kuter played an unappreciated role in shaping the United States Air Force and its antecedents. Second, the Air Corps Tactical School’s impact on its students was likely minimal, but the school’s impact on its faculty—particularly its most junior members—was almost inestimable. Third, fighter pilots dominated the senior ranks of the Air Force and its antecedents from the Interwar Period through well into the 1950s. Fourth, the Army’s interwar personnel policies had disproportionately negative impacts on Air Corps development, but very positive impacts on Kuter’s career. The effects of those policies, combined with the massive army air corps/army air forces expansion from 1939 through 1944, provided a greater justification for service independence than strategic bombing did. Finally, the first major war that the Air Force fought, wherein it had reasonably full control over the selection and professional development of its people, all the way up to its senior leaders, was the First Gulf War in 1991.

Committee:

Peter Mansoor (Advisor); Paula Baker (Committee Member); Mark Grimsley (Committee Member)

Subjects:

Biographies; Military History

Keywords:

airpower; Second World War; World War II; Air Force; Cold War

Cayias, JenniferA Strategic Analysis of the Chechen Wars: The Keystone of Good Leadership
Master of Arts, The Ohio State University, 2012, History
At the start of the First Chechen war, the Russian Federation had recently inherited a fractured polity. New leaders tried to piece together a new identity and grand strategy for a state that was still coming to terms with the fact that it was no longer the center of a union. Its new borders were unstable and unsecure, and secession of any one republic threatened a potential chain reaction throughout the region. What Russia needed was a strong, experienced leader, with a clear sense of direction and purpose for the Russian Federation. While many factors contributed to Russia’s domestic troubles, Boris Yeltsin proved unequal to the task of effectively consolidating and directing what remained of the Russian Republic. In the case of Chechnya, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian military still retained a vast arsenal and reserves of manpower, which could have overwhelmed Chechnya from the outset – had they been well coordinated and directed. Dzhokhar Dudaev was exactly what Chechnya needed. He had decades of experience in the ranks of the Russian military and thoroughly understood their tactics, and he also had experience in irregular warfare from his service in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. And, of course, he was very familiar with the irregular and unconventional style of warfare that traversed Chechen history. In 1994 and 1995 Dudaev proved his ability to out-strategize the dysfunctional Russian forces, both politically and militarily. In 1996, two factors brought him down: the sheer mass of the Russian forces sent to Chechnya and their tactical adjustments, as well as undermining from competing Chechen factions. His death to a Russian air strike in that same year hamstrung the Chechen government with weak leadership that resulted in disaster for the nascent Chechen state. Neither the 1994 war nor that of 1999 was won or lost solely by the actions of one side or one leader. A mosaic of complex factors, acting on both sides, contributed to the origins, developments, and outcomes of each war. Technological, training, and coordinative flaws in the Russian strategy during the first war were largely rectified in the second. Additionally, the image of potentially legitimate statehood and victimization that the Chechens enjoyed at the start of the first war vanished by the second, causing the republic to lose its badly needed public support in both Russia and abroad in the international community. While noting the complexity of factors involved in the outcome if each war, key individuals at the helm of each polity created successes and failures out of the assets and liabilities at hand. Similarities between the origins of each war, contrasted with the stark differences in how forces executed their operations and the results they achieved, exemplify the significance that leadership has on an army’s success or failure.

Committee:

Peter Mansoor, PhD (Advisor); Nicholas Breyfogle, PhD (Committee Member); Peter Hahn, PhD (Committee Member); Theodore Hopf, PhD (Committee Member)

Subjects:

History; Military History; Russian History; Slavic Studies

Keywords:

Chechnya; Chechen Wars; Dudaev

Alloy, Phillip CThe Role of Jewish Women as Primary Organizers of the Minsk Ghetto Resistance During the World War II German Occupation
Master of Arts, University of Toledo, 2013, History
It is a common belief the Jewish population of Europe did little to resist the genocide perpetrated by Nazi Germany. However, there were many instances of armed resistance in both city ghettos and concentration camps. The most well-known ghetto uprisings took place in Vilna, Lithuania, and Warsaw, Poland. In 1943 Jewish prisoners staged rebellions in Treblinka and Sobibor camps, destroying portions of the facilities and managing short-lived escapes. Due to lack of outside support, each of these actions—ghetto and concentration camp—was doomed from the initial stages, and none had any long term success. Still, these were not the only examples of wartime Jewish resistance. Starting shortly after the city of Minsk, Byelorussia, was occupied by German forces, a resistance organization arose from within the Jewish ghetto in that city. Until the fall of the Soviet Union, and access to archival documents and individuals living in that area, this aspect of wartime Jewish resistance had evidenced little study. More recently, access to post-Soviet information sources has allowed for a better understanding of the depth of the Minsk ghetto resistance. Of particular interest in the Minsk Jewish resistance is its apparent reliance upon women for major support within the organizational makeup and at the uppermost levels of the ghetto underground command structure. This paper will study the contribution of Jewish women to the Minsk ghetto resistance. Primary resource material has been obtained from first-person published accounts of the resistance, wartime archival material, and direct interviews with Jewish women and men active in the partisan and underground movement.

Committee:

Michael Jakobson, PhD (Committee Chair)

Subjects:

European History; European Studies; Gender Studies; History; Holocaust Studies; Judaic Studies; Military History; Military Studies; Modern History; Russian History; Womens Studies

Keywords:

Jewish resistance; womens history; Minsk; Belarus; World War II; WWII; partisans; ghetto; underground; Holocaust; Russia; Byelorussia; Jewish partisans; concentration camp; Nazi; Communist Party

Wurl, William M.Admiral William S. Benson and the American Tradition of Sea Power
MA, Kent State University, 2009, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of History
This thesis will examine the American sea power tradition, the ideas expressed by U.S. Navy officers regarding the contribution the maritime services made to national power and prosperity. In particular, this study will focus on the relationship between two key components identified by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, historian and naval theorist, in his 1890 classic, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783: the nation’s naval service and its merchant marine. In doing so, this thesis will explore the power-political and mercantile-commercial dimensions of the American sea power tradition formulated in the four decades before World War I and the influence of those dimensions on Admiral William S. Benson, wartime chief of naval operations (CNO) and postwar member of the United States Shipping Board (USSB). Naval historiography centers the American sea power tradition on Mahan. However, his emphasis on the necessity of a large battle fleet and of a large merchant marine was not original, and he deemphasized the merchant marine’s importance over time. Instead, he contributed to a “tradition of thought” regarding these services a decade before his 1890 book. Admiral Benson is depicted in naval historiography as a nationalist and anti-British because of his position at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and his protectionist policies while chairman of the USSB. What is missing in the historiography of Benson is how this multi-generational intellectual tradition shaped his ideas during his varied careers. Benson’s support of a strong navy and a merchant marine not only came from Mahan, but from other sources in his generation. The context that created these ideas changed, but those ideas were modified to be used in the given situations by Benson and his contemporaries during and after World War I. This study divides the period of the 1880s to the 1920s into three distinct but overlapping eras. The late 1870s to late 1890s composed the first era, consisting of a rapid commercial expansion and “new empire” colonialism, and an obsolete navy with a continental view of defense. The late 1890s to 1919 presented a change in American naval policy as the changing great power rivalry of Europe demanded a large navy and a merchant marine for defense. The 1920s was an era of peace and armament limitation led by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. Benson became worried that American naval preparedness would be jeopardized by the armament limitation treaty. The sea power tradition influenced Benson’s views as he sought to preserve the war-built merchant marine for national defense.

Committee:

Dr. Clarence Wunderlin, Jr. (Advisor)

Subjects:

American History; Armed Forces; History; Military History

Keywords:

American sea power; U.S. Navy; American merchant marine; William S. Benson; Alfred Thayer Mahan; Bradley A. Fiske

Brown, Katie Lynn“The Bomber Will Always Get Through”: The Evolution of British Air Policy and Doctrine, 1914–1940
Master of Arts (MA), Ohio University, 2011, History (Arts and Sciences)
The historiography of British grand strategy in the interwar years overlooks the importance air power had in determining Britain's interwar strategy. Rather than acknowledging the newly developed third dimension of warfare, most historians attempt to place air power in the traditional debate between a Continental commitment and a strong navy. By examining the development of the Royal Air Force in the interwar years, this thesis will show that air power was extremely influential in developing Britain's grand strategy. Moreover, this thesis will study the Royal Air Force's reliance on strategic bombing to consider any legal or moral issues. Finally, this thesis will explore British air defenses in the 1930s as well as the first major air battle in World War II, the Battle of Britain, to see if the Royal Air Force's almost uncompromising faith in strategic bombing was warranted.

Committee:

Peter John Brobst, PhD (Committee Chair); Robert Ingram, PhD (Committee Member); Ingo Trauschweizer, PhD (Committee Member)

Subjects:

European History; History; Military History; Modern History

Keywords:

Royal Air Force; World War II; Great Britain; Battle of Britain; strategic bombing

Malone, Chad AllenA Socio-Historical Analysis of U.S. State Terrorism from 1948 to 2008
Master of Arts, University of Toledo, 2008, Sociology
This thesis is a critical examination of U.S. foreign intervention from 1948 to 2008. Using a comparative/historical analysis of seven cases – Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Chile, Nicaragua, Panama, and Iraq – this study finds patterns of U.S. state/state-sponsored terror and intervention. Using world-system theory and G. William Domhoff’s class-domination theory of power, this study explains how and why the U.S. government, the U.S. military, the CIA, and U.S. corporations participate in economically motivated terrorist acts to support the capitalist mode of production, U.S. investments, and access to markets and natural resources. Finally, this study reveals patterns (in addition to the use of terror) that the U.S. government follows while intervening in the affairs of foreign nations.

Committee:

Elias Nigem (Committee Chair); Dwight Haase (Committee Member); Marietta Morrissey (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; Economics; European History; History; International Law; International Relations; Labor Economics; Latin American History; Middle Eastern History; Military History; Petroleum Production; Political Science; Social Research; Social Structure; Sociology

Keywords:

terrorism; U.S. state terrorism; elite theory; world-system theory; state-sponsored terrorism; CIA; U.S. military; U.S. foreign policy; assassinations; Arbenz; Mossadeq; Sukarno; Allende; Noriega; Hussein; U.S. intervention; 9/11; WTC; political terrorism

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