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Urban, CurtisAdversarial Allies: The Cultural Influence of the French Military in Rhode Island During the American Revolution
Master of Arts, Miami University, 2011, History
This thesis focuses on the influence of the French military on the residents of Newport, Rhode Island during the American Revolution by highlighting the impact of the French presence in New England on American cultural development. This study sets itself apart from the historiography by offering an innovative approach to understanding the Revolutionary era by demonstrating how military conflict influences the construction of a shared identity. By examining colonial newspapers, the correspondence of American and French military personnel, and Newport church records, this thesis illustrates the consequences of the changing relationship between two different cultures during the late eighteenth century. Exploring how the French as neighbors and allies influenced the construction of a shared identity for New England colonists, this paper argues that New Englanders defined their communal identities against the French military presence inserted into their lives, ultimately seeing themselves as no longer British subjects.

Committee:

Andrew Cayton, PhD (Advisor); Carla Pestana, PhD (Other); Stephen Norris, PhD (Other)

Subjects:

American History; History

Keywords:

Newport; American Revolution; Communal Identity; French Military; Cultural History; Military History

Fischer, James C.Not fallen, but flooded: the war department supply bureaus in 1917
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2003, History
By the declaration of the armistice on November 11, 1918, the United States had mobilized and deployed millions of soldiers to France helping to break German resistance and end the war. The expansion of American capabilities that contributed to the decision on the Western Front was astounding. The agencies responsible for equipping and supplying forces had increased their operations several hundred-fold as the army expanded from 290,000 to over four million men in 19 months. However, for all its achievements, the American mobilization had been a close run thing. For a time, the obstacles seemed so great that many doubted whether the United States would propel sufficient force overseas to contribute to the war before German victory in Russia or Franco-British exhaustion led to Allied defeat. In the winter of 1917, a crisis arose that led Congress to investigate and the administration to reorganize the War Department. This work examines the targets of the investigations and public distress: the five War Department supply bureaus. The Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Signal Departments were the nucleus of the system to support the troops in the field, develop equipment, and purchase necessary items for the Army. These bureaus, which reported to the Secretary of War and assisted his administration of the Army, provided the resources that allowed the Infantry and Artillery to operate in peace and war. Critics at the time pointed to the five supply bureaus as the cause of the War Department’s inability to manage the mobilization effort. What caused the near collapse of the United States’ mobilization program in 1917? In their analyses of the War Department’s supply bureaus, nearly every historian attributes the collapse of the Army’s industrial mobilization effort to some combination of four fatal flaws. They suggest that the bureaus and their chiefs opposed coordination that endangered their autonomy, regularly went around the War Department hierarchy to secure support for their programs, consciously competed with each other for scarce resources, and avoided the most advanced business systems. The emphasis on bureau culpability is misdirected. While incidents related to the four flaws did occur, they were ultimately symptoms of a larger problem. This dissertation will show that the bureaus failed in 1917 because their organizational system was designed for financially accountable and economical purchase in support of a small peacetime force, not operationally efficient high volume procurement at an accelerated tempo for a large force overseas. The real culprit proved to be a major change in American national security strategy that placed more pressure on the organizational structure of the military establishment than its designers had intended it to bear. With the commitment to send a mass army to France, the managerial form of the War Department no longer matched its function. As the scale and scope of responsibilities increased, the supply bureaus did not fall, but were flooded by the requirements of an unprecedented and unanticipated mission. The story of 1917 is one of an administrative system striving to adapt to rapid growth. Within the span of eight months, American plans changed from a strategy of mobile defense of U.S. coasts and territories to the deployment of millions across the ocean to fight a war of attrition in France. Although the bureaus were viable institutions before the war, the existing bureau form proved incompatible with this evolving wartime function. After they had analyzed events in Europe, bureau leaders decided to utilize the existing forms and structures to manage the new functions and strategies. Because it initially appeared that many of the pre-war assumptions about the operating tempo and size of the army would remain valid, it seemed this moderate approach would succeed. But as the realization of the depth and breadth of the commitment to the Allied coalition clarified, the stresses on the existing system increased. Progress in many areas (the bureaus found sources of supply, brought in thousands of new personnel, and adjusted their internal systems) was not enough to retain the confidence of civilian leaders. Overall bureau performance reveals the incompatibility of an existing system with a new mission rather than some conspiracy, general incompetence, or internal power struggle. The United States got more than it bargained for when it declared war on Germany in 1917: it faced an enemy that was far from beaten and faced it with allies who were close to defeat. The amorphous and unpredictable nature of war proved to be the greatest influence on American political economy, not only in 1917, but also for the entire period of the war. By orienting the causes of the crisis away from ignorance and toward the tension that has always existed in America over the resourcing and control of national defense, one can better understand the real challenges facing the army in 1917.

Committee:

Allan Millett (Advisor)

Keywords:

United States. Army&160;&8211; Supply and Stores&160;&8211; History&160;&8211; Twentieth Century; United States. Army&160;&8211; Procurement&160;&8211; history&160;&8211; twentieth century; Military History

Young, James MichaelTo Transform a Culture: The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Program, 1970–1985
Ph.D., Antioch University, 2014, Leadership and Change
In the early 1970s, following a decade of social upheaval in the US and a traumatizing military defeat in Vietnam, a group of progressive army officers, armed with recent graduate degrees in the social and behavioral sciences, created a grass roots movement that soon led to the implementation of the largest organizational development program ever conducted. Wartime atrocities and chronic careerism in the Army officer corps, along with President Richard Nixon’s promise to create an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), opened up a window of opportunity for these progressives to promote transformational leadership theories grounded in humanistic psychology. In institutionalizing OD across the Army, these officers attempted to transform the leadership culture throughout the institution. However, various strategies employed to effect cultural change met with strong resistance from an officer corps that rejected the strong humanistic elements that characterized OD in the 1970s. Although institutionalization progressed with strong support from Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Bernard Rogers, the program proved unsustainable once he vacated his position. By 1980, conservative views of leadership permeated the Army’s school system and its leadership doctrine. Concurrently, OD evolved in its theoretical application and shifted its emphasis from humanistic psychology to open systems. At that point, the Army OE Program was relegated to a far less priority and essentially became a process improvement mechanism. By 1985, a new CSA terminated the program. This is a history of the Army OE Program and the efforts of the progressive officers who implemented it. The electronic version of this Dissertation is at OhioLink ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd

Committee:

Carolyn B. Kenny, PhD (Committee Chair); Alan E. Guskin, PhD (Committee Member); Jerome V. Martin, PhD (Committee Member); Brian M. Linn, PhD (Other)

Subjects:

American History; Armed Forces; Behavioral Psychology; Behaviorial Sciences; Ethics; History; Management; Military History; Organization Theory; Organizational Behavior

Keywords:

organizational development; organizational effectiveness; humanistic psychology; leadership; Army leadership doctrine; military history; Armed Forces;

Perrin, James K."Knavish Charges, Numerous Contractors, and a Devouring Monster": The Supply of the U.S. Army and Its Impact Upon Economic Policy, 1775-1815
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2016, History
This dissertation explores the idea that the heightened level of economic activity required to supply the army acted as a powerful force engendering economic change within early America. The central question driving my research places the supply of the early American army in conversation with the nation's financial development. How did efforts to supply the army evolve over time and what role did this activity play in influencing the nation's changing economic policy in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries? How indeed did military procurement impact American economic development during the early years of the republic? It is my argument that supply by contract emerged as the principal means by which to feed the army during the early republic due to expediency. Quite simply, early government officials reduced significant overhead procurement and distribution costs by turning over these responsibilities to credible bidders in a manner that fit well with the prevailing tenets of republican ideology yet acknowledged the advent of liberal motivations. Leaner government, for example, especially in those offices intimately connected with the military, appealed to those revolutionaries concerned about large standing armies. Reliance upon contractors, moreover, minimized in theory the likelihood that the military would need to forcibly impress supplies from the civilian population from which it so dearly needed support. These negotiated agreements shifted considerable burden away from the government while shielding it somewhat from any criticism accompanying failure. The relative merits of the system never endured sustained scrutiny—more often than not, the end of a campaign or conflict obscured those inadequacies of the system that continued war would likely have exposed. The interaction of government official, supply contractor, and army officer suggested a society struggling to reconcile values in a changing economic world. The triangular nature of their relationship revealed considerable tension in early America as the government sought to harness the forces of nascent capitalism to better supply armies made up of leaders who embraced a republican ideology. The results proved not always agreeable. Military leaders questioned the actions of even the most reliable contractors, doubting that any other motivation save profit could explain their behavior. Contractors in turn, while certainly driven by the desire to achieve a return on their investment, more often struggled to break even once the friction of war had its way with paper agreements. Finally, government officials, while ecstatic about the perceived savings accompanying supply by contract, wrestled with the question of how to ensure adequate supplies for the army now that they had relinquished a large amount of control to enterprising businessmen. Most importantly, the support of the United States' early military efforts came at a high cost. Contracting, as the principal method by which to feed the army, played a substantial role in generating these expenses. The importance of paying these bills drove the financial reform that created the conditions for the country's rise to both economic and military power.

Committee:

Mark Grimsley (Advisor); Peter Mansoor (Committee Member); John Brooke (Committee Member)

Subjects:

American History; Economic History; Finance; History; Military History

Keywords:

US Military History; logistics; financial revolution; military contractors; army supplies; Continental Army; Revolutionary War; War of 1812; fiscal-military state

Winters, John D. P.Prelude to Dreadnought: Battleship Development in the Royal Navy, 1889-1905
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2010, History
The Royal Navy went through an important period of growth and development between 1889, with the passage of the Naval Defense Act, and 1905, when construction on the Dreadnought commenced. Though the pre-Dreadnought era of ship design and construction is often seen as a period characterized by resistance to change and self-satisfied indifference to the value of new technology for naval warfare, it was instead a period of cautious, measured and successful adaptation of new technology, which produced powerful and effective battleships. The Royal Navy was able to do this because it had developed a systemic method for designing ships and incorporating new technology into those designs. The system was able to effectively decide on the role the battleship would fill within the broader context of naval operations. It decided how to balance the competing demands of the capabilities that were wanted to fill that role in an environment of strict limits on space, weight and money available. The system also evaluated new technology and determined what filled the Navy’s needs and produced better ships. The period between the Naval Defense Act in 1889 and the Dreadnought in 1905 is a vastly underappreciated period in the history of the Royal Navy. It was not a period of failure for the Royal Navy, as least so far as ship design and technological advancement were concerned, that can be dismissed as something that “Jackie” Fisher needed to fix. The Royal Navy had its failures at that time, to be sure. However, the failure effectively design its ships and to grapple with new technology and adapt and adopt it for its ships, most importantly, its battleships, was not one of them.

Committee:

John Guilmartin, F (Advisor); Alan Beyerchen (Committee Member); Jennifer Siegel (Committee Member)

Subjects:

History

Keywords:

Royal Navy; technology; history; naval history; British History; military history; decision-making; warship design;

Sidwell, Robert WilliamMaintaining Order in the Midst of Chaos: Robert E. Lee's Usage of His Personal Staff
MA, Kent State University, 2009, College of Arts and Sciences / Department of History
In the mid-nineteenth century, prevailing military theory held that a commanding general was supposed to use his personal staff to deliver his orders and supervise their execution by his subordinates, thus facilitating his command and control over his army. Historians have usually portrayed Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s personal staff as inept or incompetent to perform these tasks. An in-depth examination of the historical record, however, reveals that despite its inexperience, Lee’s personal staff performed its assigned duties with skill and dedication. Lee, on the other hand, often did not use his personal staff officers as military theory dictated. While his usage of the staff improved as the war progressed, he never fully realized the Jominian ideal of using his staff as an extension of himself, to assert his will over the Army of Northern Virginia. Because of this failure, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia suffered from mistakes in coordination and communication which often led to battlefield reverses. This thesis does not suggest that better staff work alone would have changed the outcome of the Civil War; rather, it argues that if General Lee had better utilized his personal staff, the outcomes of several battles might have been different.

Committee:

Kevin Adams (Advisor); Kim Gruenwald (Committee Member); Leonne Hudson (Committee Member)

Subjects:

Military History

Keywords:

military history; U. S. Civil War; Confederate army; Army of Northern Virginia; Lee, Robert E.; staff

de la Garza, AndrewMughals at War: Babur, Akbar and the Indian Military Revolution, 1500 - 1605
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2010, History
This doctoral dissertation, Mughals at War: Babur, Akbar and the Indian Military Revolution, examines the transformation of warfare in South Asia during the foundation and consolidation of the Mughal Empire. It emphasizes the practical specifics of how the Imperial army waged war and prepared for war—technology, tactics, operations, training and logistics. These are topics poorly covered in the existing Mughal historiography, which primarily addresses military affairs through their background and context—cultural, political and economic. I argue that events in India during this period in many ways paralleled the early stages of the ongoing “Military Revolution” in early modern Europe. The Mughals effectively combined the martial implements and practices of Europe, Central Asia and India into a model that was well suited for the unique demands and challenges of their setting.

Committee:

John Guilmartin, PhD (Committee Chair); Stephen Dale, PhD (Committee Member); Jennifer Siegel, PhD (Committee Member); Laura Podalsky, PhD (Other)

Subjects:

History; Military History

Keywords:

History; South Asia; military history; Mughal Empire; 16th century

Douglas, Sarah KThe Price of Pestilence: England’s response to the Black Death in the face of the Hundred Years War
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2015, History
In 1348, the Black Death swept across Europe and killed nearly 50% of the population. Immediately prices for labor, livestock, and consumables skyrocketed and governments everywhere ground to a halt. England was no exception as King Edward III had the additional concern of paying for his military campaigns against France during the opening phase of the Hundred Years War (1337-1453). While the Black Death has received ample attention from historians of everything from economics and culture to disease and environment, none have addressed the effect of the plague upon military affairs. This has generated a significant gap, not only in the study of medieval military history, but in our understanding of the effects of pandemic as a whole. This dissertation compares two expeditions, one before the plague and one after: the 1346-47 Crecy-Calais campaign and the 1359-60 Reims campaign. This comparison reveals that despite the shock caused by the plague to all spheres of life, the English Crown quickly and efficiently adapted to its new political, economic, and demographic limitations. Not only did government offices resume business as usual within three years of the disease’s arrival, but they adopted innovative methods of taxation and customs manipulation with the sole intent of permitting the government to go to war.

Committee:

John Guilmartin (Advisor); Geoffrey Parker (Advisor); Barbara Hanawalt (Committee Member)

Subjects:

European History; Medieval History; Military History

Keywords:

Medieval; military; history; logistics; Black Death; Hundred Years War; Edward III

Wilhite, Vincent StevenGuerrilla war, counterinsurgency, and state formation in Ottoman Yemen
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2004, History
The Zaydī Imamate of Yemen collapsed in the nineteenth century as a result of inherent conflicts in its structure as a tribal quasi-state, between the Zaydī tribesmens culture of honor and the Islamic values of the Imamate. This in turn facilitated the Ottoman conquest of the Yemeni highlands in 1872. The inferior weaponry of the Zaydī tribes and their political fragmentation made it impossible for them to conduct a sustained resistance against the Ottomans. As a result, the Ottomans were able to maintain control in the early years of the occupation by the methods of indirect rule: divide-and-conquer tactics coupled with intermittent punitive expeditions. The presence of the Ottoman state, however, created the political conditions under which the Zaydī tribes would unite to defend themselves. This allowed the Imāms to rebuild the Imamate as a supra-tribal state deriving its authority from Islamic principles, organized to unite the tribes in a long-term jihād against the Ottomans. In turn, this compelled the Ottomans to change their methods of dealing with rebellion in Yemen. Ottoman statesmen sought increasingly to employ the techniques of the bureaucratic nation-state to consolidate their grip on Yemen: police repression, counter-guerrilla tactics, and programs of social and economic development designed to win the support of the population. Such measures failed as a result of the poverty of the Ottoman state and the dictatorial practices of the Hamidian regime. Together with the growing military sophistication of the Zaydīs, however, they did push the conflict in Yemen toward total war. The culmination of this process would come in the rebellion of 1905, characterized by grinding campaigns of attrition and massive social destruction in Yemen. After this rebellion, the Ottomans would realize the futility of a total war policy, and seek a negotiated settlement with the Imām. Such a settlement finally came after the Young Turk era,peace was made with the Imām on the basis of political and cultural autonomy for the Zaydīs.

Committee:

Carter Findley (Advisor)

Subjects:

History, Middle Eastern

Keywords:

Yemen; Zayd&299;s; Military History; Ottoman History; Guerrilla War; Counterinsurgency

Keith, Matthew EThe logistics of power: Tokugawa response to the Shimabara Rebellion and power projection in 17th-Century Japan
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2006, History
How would America react if today’s top news story told us that over three million U.S. soldiers, sailors, and marines, sent to southern Florida to quiet a regional rebellion against Federal authority, executed nearly 650,000 of their fellow countrymen in a single day? Violence of this scale and severity seems almost beyond our comprehension. However, a scenario of exactly these hideous proportions played out in southwestern Japan almost four centuries years ago. After a generation of peace in Japan, in 1637 peasants on Kyushu Island in southern Japan, distraught over horrible treatment at the hands of cruel lords, killed the local magistrate and took control of their village. The rebellion soon spread as peasants in village after village rose up against the taxation and collection methods that left them destitute, starving, and subject to routine torture. Christianity, introduced a century earlier by Portuguese Jesuits, re-emerged as a rallying ideology for the peasants whose numbers swelled to over 30,000. Within just a few weeks the Tokugawa Shogun, the central authority in early modern Japan, assembled and deployed an army of perhaps 150,000 soldiers to Kyushu (750 miles from the capital in present-day Tokyo) to confront the rebel peasants who took refuge in an abandoned castle. After a three-month siege, the castle fell to the central government army, and a general slaughter followed as almost 30,000 Japanese peasants were beheaded, burnt, or drowned. This dissertation examines the mechanics of how the Tokugawa were able to project military and political authority by fielding one of the largest, and potentially forceful, armies in the early modern world to confront and massacre their own subjects. It details the military, political, and economic apparatus used by the Tokugawa to mobilize, equip, and deploy an army greater than any European state could have at that time. This study will argue that the ability to maintain tremendous logistical ability, even during prolonged periods without war, underpinned the Tokugawa ability to project power, and thereby impose their authority on Japan for over two centuries.

Committee:

Noel Parker (Advisor)

Subjects:

History, Asia, Australia and Oceania

Keywords:

Tokugawa Japan; Military History; Military Logistics

Vandegrift, David W.Lived Experience of Military Mental Health Clinicians: Provided Care to OIF and OEF Active Duty Service Members Experiencing War Stress Injury
Psy. D., Antioch University, 2017, Antioch Seattle: Clinical Psychology
Military mental health clinicians (MMHCs) have been essential to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. They served in extreme stress conditions, including on the frontlines. As co-combatant/clinician, the MMHC bridged unique perspectives on the effects of war stress experienced by Active-Duty Service Members (ADSMs). To date, no study has focused uniquely on MMHCs narratives as they provided care from this multiple perspective. This investigation was carried out from a phenomenological “Duty to military mission or service member?” This dilemma could not be reconciled that resulted in unrealized fulfillment of duty. MMHCs responses to unrealized duty defined an overarching polarity of Integrity—Corruption. A hermeneutic approach was used to identify the author&perspective. A single, open-ended question was asked of seven MMHCs about lived experiences while serving, resulting in in-depth interviews. These were textually coded. Though clinician positive and negative experiences were consistent with previous research, significant differences bear discussion. Following data analysis, participants identified duty as the superordinate theme that led to the question, #x2019;s relevant understandings before, during, and after the interview process. In reconstructing and contextualizing interview material, one finding was that MMHCs were required to operate in a place of turbulence between contradictory military and psychological traditions. Another finding concerned a growing divisive fissure between military and the public at-large, impacting reintegration efforts for those who serve. Public and governmental silence about traumas of ADSMs and MMHCs suggests a parallel, cultural dissociation occurring about war trauma. A question is posed if diagnosing trauma as pathology is a further way that external, contextual forces are consistently kept unformulated, distanced, or denied. Rather than locating the etiology and treatment entirely within the individual—resulting in blaming and isolating of those who serve—the suggestion is made for widespread discussion of socioeconomic and political factors that are behind psychological war injury. This dissertation is available in open access at AURA: Antioch University Repository and Archive, http://aura.antioch.edu/ and OhioLink ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu

Committee:

Mark Russell, Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Philip Cushman, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Li Ravicz, Ph.D. (Committee Member)

Subjects:

Armed Forces; Behavioral Psychology; Mental Health; Military History; Multicultural Education; Public Policy; Therapy

Keywords:

military history, military psychology, deployment, phenomenology, resiliency, trauma, Adjustment Disorders, PTSD, war stress, evidence based treatment, hermeneutics, unformulated experience, moral pain, dissociation, demobilization

Jordan, Daniel WSocialism Gone Awry: A Study in Bureaucratic Dysfunction in the Armed Forces of the German Democratic Republic
PhD, University of Cincinnati, 2014, Arts and Sciences: History
This dissertation establishes the existence of organizational dysfunction within a socialist army. It then posits a cause and outlines the tragic effects of that dysfunction on the average East German soldier. The East German Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic was a representation of the state in many different ways. Its demographic closely matched that of the general population, not only in terms of class, but also in educational levels. The army also closely paralleled the larger state in structure and in political ideology. As the state was militarized in the broadest sense of the word, the NVA represented in the development of its political-ideological discourse and its socialist consciousness. There were surprising continuities between state organs and its army, including its politicization, its training, and its structure. Like the army, the GDR closely paralleled the operational hierarchies of industry, business, and education with its national security equivalents. Like the political committees on the factory floor, the army also had formal and informal structures of political operatives who oversaw operational and managerial leaders, as well as the political development of the lowest workers and soldiers. Because of this sharp parallel, the records of the NVA provide a unique view into the effect of politicization and ideology on the lowest soldiers. Army records are detailed and filled with its own analysis for the causes of special incidents, including accidents, disciplinary problems, training problems, desertions, and suicides. These records also provide rare insight into the operations and functions of a socialist bureaucracy. Clearly, Marxist-Leninist ideology had an impact on the progress of Soviet client states. What is new here is the ability to watch the ideology evolve into a political-military discourse that adversely affected the training and function of East German army officers. In turn, the reduction in effective leadership had adverse effects on traditional indicators of smooth-running bureaucracies or military organizations. High rates of desertion, accidents, suicide, and disciplinary issues were tolerated on a daily basis in the NVA. Consequently, the negative work environment and chronic toxic leadership of its political and military leadership adversely affected the lives of their soldiers. The effect on the soldiers had long-term effects on the political stability of the East German regime and the eventual demise of the state.

Committee:

Martin Francis, Ph.D. (Committee Chair); Edward Ross Dickinson, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Katherine Sorrels, Ph.D. (Committee Member)

Subjects:

History

Keywords:

East German Army NVA;History of East Germany;Military History of the GDR;Dysfunction;toxic leadership;German Democratic Republic

Coventry, Fred R.Acrid Smoke and Horses' Breath: The Adaptability of the British Cavalry
Master of Arts (MA), Wright State University, 2014, History
The purpose of this thesis is to re-examine the nineteenth century British cavalry as an organization, one which has generally been characterized as deeply conservative and resistant to change in organization, operations and tactics. While the charge of conservatism is true in terms of the command structure of the British cavalry, this research demonstrates that the British cavalry of the nineteenth century typically adapted itself to the conditions in which it found itself, adopting whatever methods, tactics and weapons best suited the campaigns in which it fought. Beginning with the Crimean War’s cavalry actions as a baseline for what was generally expected of nineteenth century cavalry in the British Army, the thesis then moves on to demonstrate that in other circumstances the cavalry would neither follow such strict and stringent rules of engagement nor rely on the massed charge as the best or only method of engaging the enemy. Moving chronologically through several campaigns in which cavalry figured prominently, including the Indian Mutiny, Anglo-Zulu War, the war in the Sudan and the Anglo-Boer War, this thesis points out the many and varied ways in which the British cavalry adapted itself to different climates, opponents and tactics around the globe, and makes clear that the British cavalry was capable of a great deal of flexibility and resourcefulness. Thus, institutional intransigence was offset by operational flexibility in the actual theaters of battle, with official doctrine often being changed in the wake of a successful campaign or battle.

Committee:

Paul Lockhart, Ph.D. (Advisor); Carol Herringer, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Jonathan Winkler, Ph.D. (Committee Member)

Subjects:

History; Military History; Military Studies

Keywords:

history;military history;military studies

Evans, HugoDe-Basing the San Francisco Bay Area: The Racial, Regional, and Environmental Politics of the 1991-1995 Brac Military Closures
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), Bowling Green State University, 2013, History
The San Francisco Bay Area played a critical role in supporting military activities throughout the twentieth century. Due to its location, the Bay Area served as one of the key military staging grounds for the Pacific campaign of WWII, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The region benefited from war-related industry, housing the largest shipyard west of the Mississippi and supporting the burgeoning postwar military industrial complex. Its demographics diversified dramatically as soldiers, Vietnam War refugees, and war workers migrated to the region. As part of the Sunbelt, the Bay Area benefited economically from generous military procurement spending. However, over the course of the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s, the Bay Area shifted away from having a significant military presence to having practically none. Compared to the approximately thirty military facilities operating in 1980, today all but a handful are either closed or slated for closure. Residents, experts, and scholars wondered how could a single region in the Sun Belt, which benefited from significant federal defense investment, lose so much, so quickly? Many locals blamed the region's "liberal" people and politicians for inciting the military's wrath. Hence, a popular social narrative evolved. Many contended that the navy and Department of Defense deliberately targeted bases in the Bay Area for closure as a way of punishing the Bay Area for its anti-war intransigence. This dissertation challenges the narrative that the Bay Area was punished. It examines the causal factors that led to the elimination of the region's bases. Through three case studies covering base closures in three Bay Area cities, Alameda (Alameda Naval Air Station), Vallejo (Mare Island Naval Shipyard), and Oakland (Oakland Army Base and Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland), a different explanation for the closures emerges. This project demonstrates that the passage of federal policies and legislation, urban encroachment, the reduction of military need, the advancement of military technologies, the enforcement of environmental policies, and shifts in military procurement processes caused a collective cascading effect, which yielded unintended consequences on the region. Going further, this dissertation likewise investigates the effectiveness and fairness of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC). The BRAC was designed as a way to close bases in an independent, equal, and apolitical manner. Taken together, these factors demonstrate that Bay Area bases closed due to politics, just not the punishment kind.

Committee:

Stephen Ortiz, Ph.D. (Advisor); Douglas Forsyth, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Gary Hess, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Amy Robinson, Ph.D. (Committee Member)

Subjects:

History

Keywords:

Alameda Naval Air Station; Base Closure and Realignment Commission; BRAC; Environmental History; Fleet Industrial Supply Center Oakland; Mare Island Naval Shipyard; Military History; Oakland Army Base; Policy History; San Francisco Bay Area; Urban History

Becker, Katherine A.THE SWISS WAY OF WAR: A STUDY ON THE TRANSMISSION AND CONTINUITY OF CLASSICAL AND MILITARY IDEAS AND PRACTICE IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
Doctor of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 2009, History
The transmission of military ideas across time and the problems arising from tracing diffusion were examined. A major theme was investigating the similarities between Greco-Roman military formations and traditions (eighth century B.C. to 400 A.D.) and those of the medieval Swiss (1315-1544). Only six possibilities could explain the similarities. Stimulus Diffusion was examined as an explanation. This theory suggested that military ideas spread, by word of mouth. It was determined that, in the Swiss case, stimulus diffusion was not a factor, since inherent in the definition of stimulus diffusion is the requirement of an originality (“ideational germ”) on the part of the diffusing society. The evidence suggested the opposite, that the use of pike formations in Italy, Scotland, Flanders, and elsewhere in Europe, had an earlier origin. In order to determine what this earlier origin had been, Hanson’s theory of a “Continuous European Tradition,” with Greco-Roman roots, of fighting in organized columns was explored with the Swiss as a test case. Contact between the Helvetii and Alemanii, along with other Germanic tribes with ties to ancient “Switzerland,” and the ancient Greeks and Romans was established. However, it was determined that a “continuous tradition” of fighting in the classical Greco-Roman style was unlikely due to medieval Feudalism. The possibility the Swiss may have created formations in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries using Greco-Roman military treatises was viable. Similarities between the Swiss long-pike formations (1474-1550) and those described by Asklepiodotus (second century B.C.) were persuasive. Yet, since Swiss long-pike columns were developed in the fifteenth century, and Asklepiodotus appeared in Switzerland in the seventeenth century, alternative pathways had to be considered. The notion that Swiss formations were the result of an egalitarian society was also considered. The ratification of oaths for perpetual support coupled with egalitarian laws, even as more oligarchic cantons joined the original Confederacy of the Forest Cantons, gave the Swiss militias an egalitarian and secular nature. However, the best explanation was battlefield experience. At Laupen (1339) the Swiss, under the leadership of the knight, Erlach, changed their tactics. Heavy losses taken by Swiss halberdiers at Sempach (1386) led officials to push for a decrease in the number of halberds and increase in the number of pikes. A further reorganization of the Swiss formation resulted from a defeat at Arbedo in 1422. Here, dismounted knights created an infantry formation of lances, out-distancing the shorter Swiss halberds and short-pikes. As a result the Confederates reorganized their militias into long-pike formations. By 1474 the standard length of the Swiss pike was eighteen feet long with a ten inch steel head (similar to Hellenistic sarissas). In conclusion: 1) Archeological and literary evidence suggests early Switzerland arose out of, and carried on, Roman culture in some form. 2) Elites sometimes had knowledge of classical texts whose lessons occasionally filtered down to the battlefield. 3) Despite a rich popular military tradition with classical roots, and direct literary inheritance of classical military practice, Swiss formations evolved out of battlefield experience of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.

Committee:

Geoffrey Parker (Committee Chair); John F. Guilmartin, Jr. (Committee Co-Chair); Nathan Rosenstein (Committee Member)

Subjects:

Military History

Keywords:

Swiss History; Military History; Pike Columns; Dissemination; Classical Knowledge

Streckfuss, James A.Eyes All Over the Sky: The Significance of Aerial Reconnaissance in the First World War
PhD, University of Cincinnati, 2011, Arts and Sciences: History

Historians have portrayed aviation in the First World War as a romantic alternative to the mass slaughter playing out on the ground and at sea. Young men volunteered for service in the air to escape the horrors of the trenches and their exploits made them into heroes a war-weary public could revere. As valuable as this diversion proved to civilian morale, it contributed little, if anything, to the military victory. Another global conflict broke out before aviation’s destructive power matured into a potential war winning force. This characterization has allowed historians to discuss World War I without any meaningful analysis of what role aviation played in the fighting. Connections between the air war and ground and naval operations are missing from most contemporary accounts of the war. This dissertation argues that airmen contributed greatly, shaping the manner in which armies and navies functioned in ways that influenced the outcome of battles and the length of the war. Reconnaissance, observation and photography made up the branch of World War I military and naval aeronautics that most significantly impacted the fighting. Observation balloons and airplanes regulated artillery fire, infantry liaison aircraft kept track of the advances made by attacking troops and the retreats of defenders, aerial photographers produced pictures that aided operational planners and provided the basis for perpetually updated maps, and naval airplanes, airships, and tethered balloons acted as aerial sentinels in a complex anti-submarine warfare organization that developed in the last half of the war.

In the decade following the armistice, aviation leaders had to abandon the proven aerial reconnaissance model they developed during the war in favor of organizations that specialized in bombing and aerial combat. Achieving independence from the army and navy, as well as simple financial survival in an era of draconian military budget cuts, forced them to demonstrate that airmen possessed their own ability to destroy the enemy. Acting as auxiliaries to the other services would no longer suffice. Aviators had to substitute for soldiers and sailors, not merely service them. This atmosphere prompted air power advocates like William Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard, and Guilio Douhet to preach the future potential of bombing and to minimize the past accomplishments of reconnaissance. The record compiled by the Second World War’s bombing forces appeared to prove their arguments. This dissertation contends that in the aftermath of World War II historians examining aviation in the First World War joined their chorus. Instead of acknowledging the solid contributions made by aerial reconnaissance crews they have focused their analyses on the largely ineffectual record compiled by World War I bombing crews or the glamorous lives of the flying aces. Failing to uncover the type of massive damage produced by the U.S. Army Air Force, Britain’s Royal Air Force, or Germany’s Luftwaffe, they have dismissed the efforts of World War I aircrews as meaningless. This dissertation’s goal is to give the First World War’s aviators their rightful place in the war by documenting the achievements of reconnaissance airmen.

Committee:

Christopher Phillips, PhD (Committee Chair); Martin Francis, PhD (Committee Member); Willard Sunderland, PhD (Committee Member)

Subjects:

History

Keywords:

WWI Aviation;Aerial Reconnaissance;Aerial Photography;Observation Balloons;Military History;U.S. Air Service;