The selection of judges is a well researched area of judicial politics. However, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to explaining why some lawyers decide to seek judgeships and others do not. Some lawyers are born to be judges; they are arbitrators by nature and inclination or they have specific ideas about justice and how best to achieve it. Others may never have considered a career on the bench if not for the urging of friends, family, and party members. In contrast, there are lawyers who would love to be judges, who have the drive and ambition, but who, for whatever reason, never pursue the matter. However, not all lawyers who have an interest in serving choose to make the effort to achieve their ambitions. I would like to learn what encourages them and what deters them when they are deciding whether or not to make a run for office. The data for this study were gathered using a mail survey sent out to 1500 members of the Ohio legal community in June, 2002. The respondents were selected by random computer draw from the Ohio State Supreme Court’s lawyer registry, which lists all lawyers practicing in Ohio. The survey consisted of a single mailing with no follow-ups or reminders. Of the 1500 respondents, 655 individuals completed and returned the surveys and sixty two (about 4%) were returned as undeliverable. This gave a response rate of 43.67%. I have developed several hypotheses concerning the ways in which lawyers weigh the costs and benefits of running for judicial office. These hypotheses are divided into two basic categories dealing with internal motivations and politics. Variables of internal motivation are those that relate to career choices, job satisfaction, family life, age, and a lawyer’s current position. Political variables deal with the influence of politics on the lawyer’s choices, whether it is the political identification of the members of the lawyer’s community, the degree to which each person is politically active, or the degree to which his family was involved in politics.