University of Cincinnati

Date: 7/17/2018

I, Omeed S Ilchi, hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminal Justice.

It is entitled:

**Public Servants or Soldiers? A Test of the Police-Military
Equivalency Hypothesis**

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Public Servants or Soldiers? A Test of the Police-Military Equivalency Hypothesis

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School
of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the School of Criminal Justice
of the College of Education, Criminal Justice, and Human Services

2018

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ABSTRACT

During these times of escalating tensions between the police and the communities they serve, the news and social media have been full of images of police officers wearing military gear, armed with military weapons, and driving military vehicles. This study examined whether the blurred lines between police officers and soldiers have caused the public to begin to see police officers who work in urban areas as equivalent to soldiers in war zones. Using a sample of undergraduate college students in criminal justice classes at a Midwestern university, this study asks whether perceiving police officers to be equivalent to soldiers is related to negative attitudes towards the residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods, weaker support for policies that seek to increase police accountability, an opposition to groups which seek to increase police accountability, and an opposition to convicting a local police officer for the shooting death of an unarmed African American man.

The results of the study indicate that a belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers is not common in the sample, but it can be predicted by being white, holding more conservative values, and having more negative attitudes toward the residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods. When used as an explanatory variable, a belief in the police-military equivalency does predict lower levels of support for independent prosecutions of police officers who shoot civilians, more negative attitudes toward the Black Lives Matter movement, and a lack of support for convicting a former campus police officer who was charged with murder for the shooting death of an unarmed African American man. The equivalency did not predict lower levels of support for independent investigations of police officers who shoot civilians. This would suggest that there is credibility to the idea that people who view the police as military may be more forgiving or permissive of police misconduct. In addition, the most consistent predictor

of police accountability in the study was negative attitudes toward residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Overall, support for police accountability policies (independent investigations and prosecutions) was high, especially compared to support for Black Lives Matter and convicting the former campus police officer. The significance of race in predicting attitudes toward Black Lives Matter and support for convicting the former campus police officer suggests that white respondents are more likely to be opposed to or ambivalent towards these social justice causes. This could mean that the white respondents in the study supported the idea of police accountability in theory more than they support ways of accomplishing the goal of increasing police accountability and police accountability in action.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For a while, it seemed like I was never going to finish this dissertation. The fact that I made it this far is due in large part to my support network.

First of all, I would like to thank my dissertation committee: Jim Frank, Bonnie Fisher, Ed Latessa, and Bobby Brown. Thank you all for all of your help and guidance during this long process. Your feedback and advice as I was developing a framework for the study, preparing the survey, conducting the data analysis, interpreting the results, and organizing the dissertation was extremely helpful.

I do want to single out Jim Frank for being my dissertation committee chair and agreeing to talk to me on the phone almost every week while I was writing this dissertation. I want you to know that you were instrumental in the completion of this dissertation. Thank you for holding me accountable, keeping me focused, telling me when my ideas were poorly developed or nonsensical, and making me feel like I was part of the School of Criminal Justice even after I moved away. I could not have asked for a better dissertation committee chair.

I am grateful for all of the faculty members in the School of Criminal Justice, but I do want to single out a few who had a significant effect on me. Dr. Cullen was the first faculty member to hear my idea for this study. Thank you for listening to me, giving me advice, and encouraging me to turn this raw idea into a study. Dr. Sullivan: thank you for inviting me to work with you on your research early in my graduate career. It was a tremendous opportunity and I thank you for being a good mentor. There are many other faculty members at UC who fostered my development as a scholar and a teacher, and in addition to those who I have already named, I would like to thank Drs. Benson, Browning, Eck, Wilcox, and Wooldredge for all that you have taught me since I came to Cincinnati.

I am also extremely appreciative of Mario Paparozzi for giving me an opportunity to teach at UNC-Pembroke while I worked on this dissertation. This opportunity helped me grow as a teacher and better prepare me for the next phase of my career. Thank you.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to everyone who helped me with the data collection for this study. Thank you to every professor who allowed my survey to be conducted during their classes. I owe a great deal to Cherie Carter, Stephanie Duriez, Cheryl Johnson, Shamma Hickling, Danika McLeod, Derek Mueller, and Lindsey Mueller for administering my surveys. I could not have finished this dissertation without you. I cannot thank you enough for giving up your free time to help me.

I met several other great people in Cincinnati who made my time in graduate school special. In addition to those who helped me with data collection, thank you to Marshall Beckett, Rachel Eccles, Travis Eccles, Gina Gibbs, Kerby Henderson, Spencer Hochstetler, YongJei Lee, Lydie Loth, Ian Maloney, Joyce Maloney, Amanda Pompoco, Candra Reeves, and Mel Warner for being such good friends during this period of my life. I hope our paths continue to cross in the future.

I also have to thank some of my oldest friends: Paul Bloomer, Mike Dutka, Will Harvey, Jason Kaleko, Marcos Nolan, John Song, Fan Yang, and Tim Yen. Most people do not stay close with

their friends from high school, but somehow, we did. You were not with me in Cincinnati, but you were in spirit. I hope we continue to meet up once a year until we are all old and grey (or in my case, greyer).

I owe my family a great deal for their support over the years. Thank you to my brothers, uncles, aunts, grandparents, and cousins who have been such an important part of my life. I need to give a very special thanks to my Mom for well, everything. For my entire life, she has been my biggest supporter and believer. She has always been there for me, even though I have not always made it easier for her to do so. She made so many sacrifices to help me get where I am today. Thank you, Mom. I think this dissertation took me a little longer to complete than you would have liked, but I hope that I have made you proud.

Finally, I want to thank Christine Lee. The past three years have been the best of my life. Thank you for being supportive and patient with me, but never coddling me. Thank you for believing in me and encouraging me to keep writing when I felt discouraged or stressed out. I cannot wait to start the next part of our lives together.

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CHAPTER 1: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

They called him “G.I. Joe.” His real name was Joe Gliniewicz and he was a lieutenant in the Fox Lake, Illinois Police Department. On September 1, 2015, he was shot and killed while allegedly chasing three suspects. As his nickname would suggest, he was mourned like a military hero, and thousands attended his funeral (McLaughlin & Almasy, 2015). Politicians and political pundits used his death as evidence that there was a “war on cops” (Balko, 2015a). There was a manhunt for his killers. Months later, G.I. Joe was revealed as a fraud; Lt. Gliniewicz had embezzled thousands of dollars from a youth outreach program and carefully staged his suicide once he realized that the authorities were closing in on him (Martinez, 2016). He even tried (and failed) to hire a contract killer to eliminate a city official who was conducting an audit out of a fear that she would discover his crimes (Johnson, 2015).

Corrupt police officers like Gliniewicz are rare, but after his death, many around the country were quick to point the finger at police accountability groups like Black Lives Matter for fostering a climate of hostility between the public and the police (Balko, 2015a). The Gliniewicz case does highlight a serious issue in how the public views the police; instead of being seen as a civil servant, Gliniewicz was seen as a soldier (hence his nickname, “G.I. Joe”). Until the public learned the truth about his crimes and cause of death, he was treated like a fallen war hero. While there is no doubt that police officers’ jobs can be both dangerous and difficult, there is a problematic ramification of viewing police officers as soldiers; the logical extension of believing that police officers are analogous to soldiers is that the people being policed, the residents of poor and disadvantaged neighborhoods, are the enemy. They are no longer taxpaying American citizens; they are foreign combatants or insurgents who need to be struck down with force. The

police are not serving them. They are fighting them. And because these neighborhoods tend to have large minority populations, it is possible that this belief contains an element of racial bias.

The Black Lives Matter movement started in the summer of 2013, shortly after George Zimmerman was acquitted in Florida for shooting Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black teenager. It began as a phrase in a Facebook post in response to a perception that the criminal justice system did not value the lives of black people as much as it values the lives of others. A year later, after a grand jury failed to indict Darren Wilson, an officer in the Ferguson, Missouri police department, for killing Michael Brown, another unarmed black teenager, this phrase became a full-fledged movement for police accountability. It is important to note that “Black Lives Matter” was never intended to mean that the lives of black people matter more than the lives of others, but that they matter as much as everyone else’s (Cobb, 2016). It is a statement of equality, not a statement of supremacy.

In August 2015, Campaign Zero, a group affiliated with Black Lives Matter, released a platform for criminal justice reform. Their suggested policy solutions include ending “broken windows” policing, requiring independent investigations of police officers who kill or seriously injure civilians, requiring police officers to wear body cameras, and demilitarizing the police (Newkirk, 2016).

Several public figures have suggested that movements like Black Lives Matter and Campaign Zero have created a hostile environment towards the police and led to a “war on cops” (e.g., Flores, 2016; Ocasio, 2016; Velez & Golding, 2015). The public appears to agree; a 2015 survey of 1,000 likely voters found that 58 percent believe there is a “war on cops” in America (Rasmussen Reports, 2015). Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the nation is very protective of the police as an institution and sees calls for them to be held accountable as attacks. There is

however, no evidence in the platform of either Black Lives Matter or Campaign Zero to suggest that they are calling for a war or any violence against the police. It is important to note that many Americans still perceive these calls for accountability as declarations of war. The key word here is “war.” It is worth considering whether police officers are being seen as soldiers and those who oppose or criticize them are being seen as the enemy.

The militarization of police departments throughout the country is hardly a new development. In the 1980s, as the Cold War was coming to a close and the “war on drugs” was escalating, more police departments began to adopt paramilitary police units (PPUs) (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997). Hypothetically, a PPU would be used for dangerous situations involving armed offenders such as hostage takers and bank robbers. As it turned out, these units became commonly used for routine police work and patrol (Kraska, 1999). Kraska (1999) feared that the rise in militarization would lead police officers to adopting an “us versus them” mentality and viewing members of the communities they police as what Skolnick (2011) calls “symbolic offenders.” In other words, officers begin to stereotype certain citizens as suspects who are willing to attack them. As a consequence of the perceived dangerousness of their job, police officers can become overly stressed and adapt a crime-fighting mentality instead of focusing on serving the community (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

Unfortunately, research on police attitudes towards civilians generally does not explicitly examine the prevalence of the “us versus them” attitude among the police, but there is evidence that high perceptions of danger are common and are significant sources of job-related stress (e.g., Brooks & Piquero, 1998; Cullen, Link, Travis, & Lemming, 1983; Violanti et al., 2016). Under President Barack Obama, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) recommended that law enforcement agencies focus on building and maintaining relationships

with their communities and emphasized the importance of the police embracing a role as guardians of a community instead of acting like soldiers who were deployed to a warzone. Studies of citizens' attitudes toward the police are common (e.g., Brandl, Frank, Worden, & Bynum, 1994; Frank, Brandl, Cullen, & Stichman, 1996), but studies of citizen attitudes towards the communities who the police serve are less common. Most of these studies focus on how police view the communities they serve (e.g., Paoline III, Myers, & Worden, 2000; Sun, 2003; Worden, 1993). While there is research on how the public views the poor (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Gilens, 1996), there is little on how the public at large views "the policed," specifically. It is important to research this topic to understand how perceptions of "the policed" can influence perceptions of the police as being equivalent to the military. Theoretically, people with negative perceptions of the residents of poor, high crime neighborhoods would be more likely to believe that these neighborhoods are dangerous and out of control. They could be more likely to believe that police officers need to do whatever they feel is necessary to win the "war on crime" in these neighborhoods. These attitudes could cause some citizens to be more forgiving of police misconduct and officer-involved shootings.

The current study will assess for whether the "us versus them" mentality has transferred from the police to the citizenry. It will survey students from the University of Cincinnati, a predominantly white institution of higher education in a large urban city with an African American population that comprises almost 50 percent of the overall population (United States Census Bureau, n.d.). Furthermore, the history of this school is notable for the purposes of this study. In the summer of 2015, a high-profile officer-involved shooting of an unarmed African American man named Samuel DuBose occurred within a mile of this school's main campus. Ray Tensing, the police officer in this case, was charged with murder and tried twice, but both

trials ended in mistrials (Bidgood & Perez-Pina, 2017; Ortiz, 2016). After the surveys are completed by the students and the responses are compiled, this study will estimate a model for the belief in a police-military equivalency and four models related to support for holding police accountable. The police accountability measures are attitudes towards Black Lives Matter (a movement to increase police accountability), support for policies that seek to increase police accountability, and support for convicting Ray Tensing for the shooting death of Samuel DuBose. Two different models will be used for support for policies to increase police accountability, with one measuring support for independent investigations of incidents where police officers shoot civilians and the other measuring support for independent prosecutors for cases where police officer shoot civilians. The “Tensing model” will examine factors that predict police accountability for a specific high-profile case. These models will be used to seek the answers to four research questions:

1. Do respondents believe that there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers?
2. Are people with negative attitudes toward “the policed” less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability and convicting Ray Tensing for the shooting death of Samuel DuBose?
3. Are people with more conservative crime ideologies more likely to believe there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers and less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?
4. Are citizens who believe in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?

During these times of escalating mistrust and tensions between communities and the police who serve them, it would be beneficial to expand knowledge about citizen attitudes towards both parties. It is important to expand knowledge about these topics because the relationship between these parties is critical to the success of the police. In addition, by surveying a third party and asking questions about people who live in neighborhoods that tend to be patrolled by the police, this study can possibly uncover coded or symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005) among the respondents. With the rise of social movements like Black Lives Matter, it is also important to analyze support for the movement and their proposals to increase police accountability. This study can also learn about the impact of the killing of Samuel DuBose on citizens' perceptions of the police and their support for holding a specific police officer accountable for killing an unarmed African American man. Finally, the police-military equivalency hypothesis is an entirely new idea that has not been tested or considered in the past. This study will be an exploratory analysis that seeks to learn whether the police-military equivalency is a phenomenon that actually exists or is a phenomenon created by right-wing media pundits and politicians with no public support.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

The current study seeks to add to what is known about how Americans feel about the police, the militarization of the police, increasing police accountability, and those who live in neighborhoods that are commonly patrolled by the police. Before beginning this study, it is first important to explore previous research in an effort to create a framework for this study and to explore the relationship between the concepts that are being examined. This study takes an unconventional approach to examining citizen perceptions of the police. Because of the movement to increase police accountability and the pushback to that movement, it is important to expand how the field looks at citizen perceptions of the police. The public pushback to the movement to increase police accountability has demonstrated that some in society are very permissive of police misconduct and treat calls for accountability as acts of hostility toward all police officers (e.g., Flores, 2016; Ocasio, 2016; Velez & Golding, 2015). This reaction makes it necessary to explore why people feel this way about misconduct, and this study will do so by examining attitudes towards the movement itself, support for specific policies to increase police accountability, and support for convicting a police officer in a high-profile case of police misconduct.

This review of previous research begins with a discussion of the militarization of the police over time and how it might have influenced the way that Americans perceive the police. Specifically, it is possible that increases in militarization have led citizens to perceive police officers as soldiers fighting a war on crime against the residents of urban areas instead of public servants who are tasked with protecting these citizens. Second, it will discuss “the Ferguson Effect” and the “war on the cops.” This section will discuss some of the arguments used to dismiss Black Lives Matter and the movement to increase police accountability and determine

whether these arguments have any merit or empirical support. Third, it will discuss citizen perceptions of police misconduct and discuss how they may be related to support for increasing police accountability. Fourth, it will discuss previous research on citizen perceptions of the police and some of the main predictors that have been used to explain it. In doing so, it will discuss how some of these predictors may be used to predict a new way of examining citizen perceptions of the police: the police-military equivalency hypothesis. Finally, it will discuss the influence of conservative attitudes on perceptions of police misconduct and support for police use of force, as well as negative attitudes toward minorities and the poor. This section will use the past research to predict how these attitudes may influence this study's new way of measuring perceptions of the police and the idea of increasing police accountability. Overall, the point of this chapter is to set up how this study will move beyond past research and expand what is known about citizen perceptions of the police and support for holding the police responsible for their misconduct.

The Evolution of Policing and the Move to Militarization

During the 2014 protests in Ferguson, Missouri, the news and social media were full of images of police officers wearing military fatigues, armed with military weaponry, and driving military vehicles. These images caused some to question whether it was necessary to deploy what they perceived to be a small army in response to what they perceived to be a peaceful demonstration (Chokshi, 2014). Police militarization began long before Ferguson, but the events of that summer in Ferguson perhaps represent a moment in American history when Americans became more aware of police militarization. The Department of Justice's 2015 report on the Ferguson Police Department found that they were engaging in a number of abusive, predatory, and racist practices. For instance, African Americans were disproportionately arrested, ticketed,

and the victims of force. The report concluded that these disparities were caused “at least in part, because of unlawful bias against and stereotypes about African Americans” (Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2015, p. 5).

It is important to note that the idea that police departments are organizations designed to discriminate against African Americans is not an unfounded one, historically speaking. In the early days of the United States, night watch patrols were created as a means of dealing with crime. In the South, these patrols were used to round up runaway slaves, quell possible slave rebellions, and instill fear among slaves and freedmen. Patrolmen would be free to search the homes of slaves and freedmen and beat and harass them with impunity (Barlow & Barlow, 2000). In cities with large African American populations, many white citizens were afraid of what would happen if the slaves were to revolt and fight back against their oppressors.

Unsurprisingly, the first municipal police department was established in Charleston, South Carolina, a major hub of the slave trade. The main duties of this department included “regulating the movement of slaves and free blacks, checking documents, enforcing slave codes, guarding against slave revolts, and catching runaway slaves” (Barlow & Barlow, 2000, p. 22). Essentially, their job was to maintain the status quo and keep African Americans in their place. This is an early example of the “us versus them” mentality manifesting in policing and society, with slaves and freedmen being labeled as “the enemy.”

It is important to note that police departments were originally formed in this country because citizens feared military control. The Third Amendment to the United States Constitution addressed this fear, and prohibited soldiers from being quartered in the homes of citizens. This was a common practice by the British before the Revolutionary War (Balko, 2013). While police departments have a military-style structure in terms of rank and order, the original plan

was for them to be public servants, with a greater emphasis on serving the priorities of the community than the rule of law (Balko, 2013). Over time, police agencies began to embrace a more a militaristic and professional style of organization and enforcement. This escalated in the 1980s, around the same time that the aforementioned “War on Drugs” began (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997).

The nation had declared war on crime and did so by equipping its police officers like soldiers. This time period saw an increase in police paramilitary units (e.g., SWAT teams), which are closely modeled after military special operations units. Kraska and Cubellis (1997) identified three main characteristics of a police paramilitary unit (PPU):

- “Train and function as a military operations team with a strict military command structure and discipline” (p. 610)
- “Unit must have at the forefront of their function to threaten or use force collectively and not always as an option of last resort (e.g., in conducting a no-knock drug raid)” (p. 610)
- “Unit must operate under legitimate state authority, and its activities must be sanctioned by the state and coordinated by a government agency” (p. 610)

Compared to traditional police officers, officers in PPUs tend to use more militaristic equipment and technology. They often wear military fatigues and body armor and carry heavier weapons than traditional police officers. Originally, these units were meant to be used for high risk situations involving armed suspects, riots, or a hostage; these situations were considered too dangerous for routine police officers to be deployed to them. Over time, this would change and police departments around the country would rely more heavily on PPUs to do routine police work such as patrol (Kraska & Cubellis, 1997; Kraska & Kappeler, 1997).

Kraska (1999) noted several possible problems with the trend towards relying on PPUs to do routine police work and using war and military terminology to describe police interventions to reduce crime and drug trafficking. He noted that “these use of force entities have the capability to handle the drug/crime problem as a type of ‘insurrection,’ justifying a militaristic response, including campaigns to occupy, control, and restore state-defined order to public and private space, as well as operating detention facilities designed to punish and warehouse the prisoners of this ‘war’” (Kraska, 1999, p. 210). In other words, he believed that normalizing the use of military force and terminology leads the police down a slippery slope of using more aggressive tactics. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many of these predictions came true (Kraska, 2007).

Since these attacks, the lines between the police and the military have become blurred. In addition to fighting a “war on drugs” and a “war on crime,” the police have joined the “war on terror.” The U.S. military and U.S. police agencies are more cooperative with each other in terms of sharing weapons, technology, and information. Furthermore, police paramilitary units are being more commonly used for routine police patrols instead of for dangerous situations where they would be normally required (Kraska, 2007). It is possible that by normalizing the use of these paramilitary units in everyday police situations, the police are damaging their relationships with the communities they serve. Campbell and Campbell (2010) note that this increase in militarization could endanger civil rights, civil liberties, and overall trust in the police. According to some, this prediction came true during the Ferguson protests of 2014, as police officers armed and dressed like soldiers were used to deal with what appeared to be a peaceful protest (Chokshi, 2014).

It is worth noting that there is some opposition to the idea that police militarization has been unwarranted and dangerous. Some agree that the number of PPU's has increased and that their roles within police departments have been expanded, but disagree that police departments as a whole have become more militarized (den Heyer, 2014). Others argue that militarization (specifically, the arming of street-level officers with assault rifles) has occurred because the public has an expectation for street-level officers to be able to quickly and effectively respond to mass shootings and terrorist attacks (Phillips, 2016). Whether or not police departments are actually becoming more militarized is irrelevant to the focus of this paper. While Kraska and others' work are mostly descriptive and attempt to interpret militarization of the police, this study is interested in citizen perceptions of police militarization and whether any possible increases in militarization have created an equivalency between police officers and soldiers in the eyes of the public. If citizens perceive police officers to be equivalent to soldiers, then they might be willing to give officers more power to do whatever they need to do to control crime. This would hypothetically mean less support for police accountability.

As stated earlier, a common criticism about the police at the moment is that they have started to take on the role of the military in society (Chokshi, 2014). Some would say that the police have overstepped their bounds, but others have argued that the military response is both warranted and necessary for the police to do their jobs effectively and protect themselves (Anemone, 2014; Bello & Alcindor, 2014). This level of support for the police is a more extreme version of typical support for the police. Generally, studies that examine citizen perceptions of the police focus on attitudes towards (e.g., Brandl, Frank, Worden, & Bynum, 1994; Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2005) and confidence in the police. The perception of the police being equivalent to the military is not technically a measure of attitudes or confidence, but it is a

way of examining how people feel about the police in a way that has not been addressed by the literature. Specifically, it examines the perception of the police as being something greater than traditional public servants; they are soldiers and they must be given the leeway to do what they need to do to fight the “war on crime,” without having to worry about being held accountable for the means they used to achieve their goals (“all’s fair in love and war”). This would make them less accountable to the public they are sworn to serve; they are soldiers, not public servants. This study seeks to learn whether this extreme perception of the police exists and, if so, what factors predict it. In addition, it will examine whether holding this perception can predict support for increasing police accountability, attitudes towards Black Lives Matter, which has been perceived by some to be an anti-police movement (Flores, 2016; Mac Donald, 2015), and support for holding a specific police officer accountable for the death of an unarmed motorist.

“The Ferguson Effect” and the “War on Cops”

Since Black Lives Matter rose to prominence and began calling for increased police accountability, many who oppose it have talked about a “Ferguson Effect” or a “war on cops.” Believers in the “Ferguson Effect” claim that the criticisms levied against the police and protests of the police have caused officers to become more apprehensive about proactive policing. According to proponents of the “Ferguson Effect,” police officers are afraid to fire their weapon or do anything that could be construed as racist. Police officers’ hesitance towards performing their duties is believed by some to be causing a nationwide crime epidemic (Mac Donald, 2015).

However, support for any kind of “Ferguson Effect” on crime rates is mixed. Believers in the “Ferguson Effect” point to the fact that there was a 32.5 percent increase in homicides in Saint Louis from 2013 to 2014 (120 homicides to 159 homicides). However, when comparing the two years on a month by month basis, it becomes clear that the rise in homicides in 2014

predates the Michael Brown shooting, which occurred in August, by two months (Rosenfeld, 2015). In addition, the greatest disparity between the two years in the number of homicides occurred early in the year. Thus, the rise in homicide rates cannot be attributed to the Ferguson protests. Similarly, Saint Louis violent crimes in general peaked early in 2014, several months before Michael Brown was killed. There was an increase in the rate of growth of violent crime after Michael Brown's death, but not enough of a change to fully support the idea of a "Ferguson Effect." There is however, some evidence to suggest that property crimes did increase after the Michael Brown shooting (Rosenfeld, 2015).

In a study of crime rates in 81 large U.S. cities, Pyrooz, Decker, Wolfe, and Shjarback (2016) compared official crime data from a year before Ferguson to a year after Ferguson. They found no support for a "Ferguson Effect" on overall, violent, or property crime rates. There was however, a nationwide increase in robbery rates after Ferguson. Still, they did not find enough evidence to suggest that the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement led to a nationwide crime wave.

Wolfe and Nix (2016) examined whether there was a "Ferguson Effect" on police officers' willingness to engage with their community. They specifically asked 567 deputies in a sheriff's department in the southeastern United States whether negative publicity surrounding law enforcement affected their motivation, proactivity, apprehensiveness about using force, enjoyment of their work, and the way they perform their duties. This survey was conducted about six months after Michael Brown's death in Ferguson. They found no significant "Ferguson Effect" on willingness to engage with the community.

On the other hand, Rosenfeld (2016) found some evidence to support a possible "Ferguson Effect." Compared to 2014, there was a 16.8 percent increase in homicide rates in 56

large American cities in 2015. Rosenfeld discussed three hypotheses to explain this rise in homicides: the expansion in urban drug markets, the decrease in imprisonment rates, and the “Ferguson Effect.” Out of those three hypotheses, Rosenfeld found that the “Ferguson Effect” was the most likely cause of the rise in homicides. He found that ten of the cities in his sample accounted for two-thirds of the increase in homicides. All ten of these cities had large African American populations. Furthermore, the timing of the rise in homicides in these cities coincided with the aftermath of the Ferguson incident. Rosenfeld concluded that it is possible that the Ferguson incident decreased confidence in the police, which led the police to become more apprehensive when engaging in crime control efforts. However, he could not explicitly test whether the “Ferguson Effect” increased homicide rates; he simply could not rule it out as a cause. Overall, there is still not enough evidence to definitively state that the outcry to Michael Brown’s death and protests which followed it caused a “crime wave” as others have suggested (Mac Donald, 2015). Overall, the research would indicate that the “Ferguson Effect” is overblown and the support for it is limited; any suggestions that Black Lives Matter has made the country less safe are largely unfounded.

The public figures who have recently stated that there is a “war on cops” tend to say that Black Lives Matter is contributing towards a dangerous work environment for police officers or even specifically calling for the murder of police officers (e.g., Flores, 2016; Ocasio, 2016; Velez & Golding, 2015). As stated earlier, there is no evidence in their platform or the platform of Campaign Zero to suggest that they are calling for the murder of police officers (Newkirk, 2016). Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest police officers’ jobs have become significantly more dangerous in recent years.

Since Ferguson, there have been high profile homicides of police officers in New York, Dallas, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Achenbach, Wan, Berman, & Ballingit, 2016; Bloom, Fausset, & McPhate, 2016; Mueller & Baker, 2014). However, as a whole, police officer deaths are not rapidly increasing. Data show that 2015 was one of the safest years for cops in decades, and even safer than 2014. Forty-two police officers were fatally shot in 2015, which was a 14 percent decrease from the previous year (Balko, 2015b). Likely because of the mass shootings in Dallas and Baton Rouge, that number sharply increased by over 34 percent to 64 fatalities in 2016 (National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, 2016). However, this figure is not substantially higher than figures from previous years. From 2011 to 2014, the number of police officers feloniously killed has ranged from 27 (in 2013) to 72 (in 2011) (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). In terms of assaults on police officers, the assault rate in 2015 was 9.9 per 100 officers (FBI, 2016). This was a 10 percent increase from 2014, when the assault rate was 9 per 100 officers (FBI, 2015). However, this figure is lower than the assault rates from 2011 and 2012, which were 10.2 per 100 officers (FBI, 2012, 2013). In addition, using a time series analysis of police officer homicide data, Maguire, Nix, and Campbell (2017) found that there was no evidence to suggest that the events in Ferguson caused an increase in officer homicides. Thus, it is possible that any spikes in violence against police officers are simply fluctuations over time instead of a dangerous new trend being fueled by calls for police accountability. This is not to suggest that shootings and assaults of police officers are insignificant, but that the “war on cops” narrative is not substantiated by any data. It is a false narrative that treats any criticism of the police or call for accountability as a declaration of war instead of a call to hold civil servants accountable for their misconduct (Balko, 2015c).

Despite the lack of evidence supporting Black Lives Matter as a group that promotes violence against the police, Americans still have mixed feelings about it. Because Black Lives Matter is a relatively new organization, there is not a great deal of research on attitudes towards it. However, in a nationwide survey of over 3,700 Americans, the Pew Research Center found that 43 percent of Americans either strongly or somewhat supported Black Lives Matter (Horowitz & Livingston, 2016). However, there was a significant racial and partisan divide in support. African Americans were substantially more likely to support Black Lives Matter than white and Hispanic Americans (65 percent versus 40 percent versus 33 percent). In terms of political alignment, white Democrats were significantly more likely to support it than white Republicans (65 percent versus 20 percent). In addition, more than half of the white Republicans in the survey reported that they had some degree of opposition to Black Lives Matter.

It is important to note that none of the ideas for police reform suggested by Black Lives Matter and Campaign Zero (Newkirk, 2016) are new. Legal and criminal justice scholars have been advocating for independent investigations and prosecutions of police misconduct for a long time (Katz, 2015; Levine, 2016; Prenzler & Ronken, 2001; Simmons, 2015). The belief is that independent investigators and prosecutors would be less likely to be biased because they would not have a direct relationship with the officers or departments under scrutiny for misconduct. This is the exact reasoning that Black Lives Matter gives for supporting these policies (Newkirk, 2016).

The main point here is that Black Lives Matter and its goal of increasing police accountability should not be summarily dismissed; they are not a hate group with the intention of harming society in some way, their ideas are not radical, and their negative portrayal in the

media has been unwarranted. It is worth considering what factors can predict such an empathic rejection and dismissal of this organization and its ideas for increasing accountability.

The Perceptions and Effects of Police Misconduct

The job of police officer is one of the most well-regarded and respected jobs in the country. In 2016, a Gallup poll found that over three-fourths of Americans had a “great deal” of respect for the police (McCarthy, 2016); this marked a 12 percentage point increase from 2015. While the position is highly respected overall, fewer Americans have a great deal of confidence in the police. Specifically, a 2015 Gallup poll found that 52 percent of Americans had a “great deal” or “quite a lot of confidence in the police” (Jones, 2015b). This figure was the lowest level of confidence in the police that Gallup had recorded since 1993. Still, compared to other institutions in the United States, only the military and small businesses had higher levels of confidence among Americans (Jones, 2015a).

There is evidence to suggest that high profile incidents of police misconduct can have a negative effect on public opinions towards the police. For the purposes of this study, it is worth considering that Americans may have both a great deal of respect for the police in principle, even though recent highly publicized incidents of misconduct may have degraded their confidence that the police can perform their duties well and in a lawful manner.

Weitzer and Tuch (2002) found that African Americans and those who had personally experienced racial profiling were more likely to have negative attitudes toward racial profiling and believe that the police frequently do it. There is also a racial divide in how citizens view the treatment of African Americans by the police. A nationwide study based on Gallup data found that African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to believe that the police treat African Americans unfairly than whites. In addition, respondents who believe that race relations are a

major issue in the United States were more likely to believe that African Americans are treated unfairly (Gabbidon & Higgins, 2009).

There is evidence to support the idea that police misconduct can have a negative impact on attitudes towards the police (Weitzer, 2002). Weitzer and Tuch (2005) examined racial differences in attitudes toward the police and in addition to commonly examined factors such as direct and vicarious contact with the police, controlled for respondents' perceptions of the prevalence of police misconduct and how often they had seen or read media coverage of police misconduct incidents. They estimated separate models for white, Hispanic, and African American respondents. Their results indicated that African Americans and Hispanics had lower overall satisfaction with the police. While perceptions of police misconduct had a significant negative relationship with satisfaction with the police, the effects of media exposure were non-significant. It is interesting to note that media exposure to police misconduct was significant for African American respondents, but not for white or Hispanic respondents (Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). It is possible that because many of the most publicized incidents of police misconduct and abuse involve African American victims, African Americans are more likely to internalize these acts of police misconduct and shape their views of the police because of them.

Chermak, McGarrell, and Gruenewald (2006) examined attitudes towards the police in Indianapolis before and after a high profile incident of police misconduct. They found that media consumption of the incident did not have a significant effect on general or specific attitudes. In addition, there was no evidence to suggest that one's level of consumption of the event (e.g., number of days per week the respondents read the local paper; how many newspaper stories they read and television stories they watched about the incident) affected whether the respondents believed that the Indianapolis Police Department harassed citizens before or after the

incident. However, after the incident, media consumption did affect whether or not the respondents believed that the officers involved were guilty of wrongdoing.

In a study of perceptions of police misconduct, race was a significant predictor of perceptions of police misconduct; specifically, African American and Hispanic respondents were more likely to perceive higher levels of police misconduct. The relationship between race and perceptions of misconduct did not change when controlling for media exposure to police misconduct, direct and vicarious contact with the police, and neighborhood conditions like quality of life. This finding was likely due to the fact that African Americans and Hispanics in the sample tended to have more negative contacts with the police and were more likely to live in high crime neighborhoods, which would theoretically have higher levels of police presence and patrol (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004). In terms of perceptions of racial injustice within the criminal justice system (specifically, whether African American citizens are differentially stopped, given speeding tickets, incarcerated, and executed), there was a major racial divide. African Americans (particularly those of lower socioeconomic class) were more likely to perceive higher levels of racial injustice than whites and Hispanics.

Because of the sample being used for the present study, it is important to examine the literature on perceptions of police misconduct among college students. When asked about both general and neighborhood-level police misconduct, African American students perceived significantly higher levels of police misconduct than white, Hispanic, and Asian students (Sethuraju, Sole, Oliver, & Prew, 2017). Sethuraju and colleagues also found that students who majored in law enforcement studies perceived significantly lower levels of misconduct in their own neighborhoods than students majoring in fields other than criminal justice or law enforcement studies. This finding was not replicated when asking the respondents about general

police misconduct. Finally, direct and vicarious police misconduct, as well as media exposure to police misconduct and perceptions of neighborhood crime, were all positively related to perceptions of both general and neighborhood-level police misconduct.

The findings for these studies show that there are many factors that can influence perceptions of police misconduct, including media exposure, personal experiences, and vicarious experiences. However, just like with examining attitudes toward the police, race cannot be eliminated as a factor and likely has some influence in determining perceptions of misconduct. The current study is not interested in explaining citizens' perceptions of the prevalence of police misconduct. Instead, it will use perceptions of police misconduct as an explanatory variable in predicting attitudes toward police accountability and groups that seek to increase police accountability. Hypothetically, citizens who perceive police misconduct to be less of a problem would be less likely to support policies that would increase police accountability because they do not believe they are necessary. In addition, they might be less likely to support Black Lives Matter because they could believe that they are focusing on a nonexistent issue. It will also be considered whether perceptions of misconduct can predict whether or not one views an equivalency between police officers and soldiers. Citizens who perceive lower levels of police misconduct might be more permissive of it and believe that it is acceptable to use whatever means necessary to achieve the goal of crime control.

Predictors of Perceptions of the Police

The current study is treating the police-military hypothesis as a different way of examining citizen perceptions of the police and an extension of past research of perceptions of the police. Thus, it is important to identify some of the most commonly used measures in the citizen perceptions of police research, discuss how they predict perceptions of the police, and

examine whether they can be used in the current study's models. First, it will discuss the difference between general and specific attitudes, which are two of the most common dependent variables in research on citizen perceptions of the police. Second, it will examine different types of contact with the police and how contact can affect attitudes. Third, it will discuss the impact of more aggressive policing styles on police legitimacy and attitudes toward the police. Fourth, it will explore whether controlling for neighborhood context and quality of life can account for the relationship between race and attitudes towards the police. Fifth, it will discuss incidents of police misconduct and how they can color citizens' perceptions of the police. Finally, it will discuss demographic characteristics that can predict citizen perceptions of the police (most notably, race and ethnicity).

General and Specific Attitudes

When examining attitudes towards the police, it is common for researchers to study two different types of attitudes: general and specific. The basis for research on general and specific attitudes comes from Easton's (1965) work on public support of different political systems. He identified two types of public support for political systems: diffuse and specific. Diffuse support is defined as "that which continues independently of the specific rewards which the member may feel he obtains from belonging to the system" (Easton, 1965, p. 125). Specific support is defined as "input to a system that occurs as a return for the specific benefits and advantages that members of a system experience as part of their membership. It represents or reflects the satisfaction a member feels when he perceives his demands as having been met" (Easton, 1965, p. 125). In the context of support for policing, diffuse support refers to attitudes towards the institution of policing in general and specific support would refer to perceptions of more local police and how well they are doing at their job or how well one feels like they were treated

during an encounter. As used in policing research examining citizens' attitudes toward the police, general attitudes refer to citizens' attitudes toward the police as an institution (e.g., "In general, how satisfied are you with the police?"), while specific attitudes refer to how citizens perceive their personal interactions with police and their attitudes toward their local police departments (e.g., When you were stopped by the police, how satisfied were you with the way you were treated?).

Past research has found that general attitudes toward the police can influence specific attitudes toward the police (Brandl et al., 1994). In other words, one's attitudes towards the police as a whole can color one's perceptions of their personal interactions with the police; a person with negative attitudes toward the police is likely to be dissatisfied with how they were treated by the police.

The current study will use two types of general attitudes (confidence in the police and perceptions of police misconduct) as independent variables in the analysis. As discussed earlier, the police-military equivalency hypothesis is being treated as a more extreme level of support for the police. Thus, this study hypothesizes that citizens who have higher confidence in the police and lower perceptions of misconduct will be more likely to believe in the police-military equivalency and less likely to support police accountability, particularly policies that would involve independent investigations of incidents like the Tensing-DuBose incident.

Direct and Indirect Contact

Direct contact with the police is commonly tested as an explanatory variable in the literature. Hypothetically, citizens who have negative contacts with the police are more likely to have negative attitudes towards them, and citizens who have positive contacts with the police are more likely to have positive attitudes towards them. Whether the contact was considered

positive or negative depended on how the citizen rated the officer's conduct during their encounter. The research shows some support for this idea, but the effects of the police contact are inconsistent and can differ depending on how the contact occurred.

Brandl, Frank, Worden, and Bynum (1994) studied the effects of four different types of direct contact on general satisfaction with the police. The types of contact they examined were citizen-initiated requests for information, citizen-initiated requests for assistance, citizen-initiated requests for service after being victimized, and police-initiated stops. They discovered that negatively evaluated contacts with the police when requesting information and negative contacts after contacting the police as a victim of a crime had a significant negative impact on general satisfaction with the police. On the other hand, positive interactions with the police when asking for assistance had a strong positive relationship with general attitudes towards the police. Surprisingly, the perceived quality of a stop did not have an impact on general satisfaction. This study was an important early examination of the impact of different types of direct contact on attitudes toward the police.

In a study of African American adolescents in Saint Louis, Brunson (2007) found that unwanted contacts with the police were common. Specifically, 83 percent of the respondents reported being personally harassed or mistreated by the police. When describing these uninitiated contacts, the youths said that officers were often hostile and racist towards them. They described these contacts as having a major impact on their attitudes toward the police. Similar views towards the police were expressed by juveniles in a study conducted in Philadelphia; many of the youths reported having negative direct encounters with the police, which caused them to have a negative disposition towards them (Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007).

Schuck and Rosenbaum (2005) also examined different types of contact with the police and their assorted effects on attitudes toward the police. Specifically, they examined their respondents' level of agreement with believing that police officers are often rude, are verbally abusive, are physically abusive, and stop people without a legitimate reason. They collected both general and specific attitudes towards the police using these four items. The types of contact they examined were contacts that occurred within their neighborhood and contacts that were considered to be negative by the respondent. A negative contact was one where the respondent felt that the police were disrespectful, impolite, rude, unhelpful, or insulting. Other reasons for rating a contact as negative included believing that the police did not handle the situation well or that they stopped the respondent without a legitimate reason. They also created an interaction term between these two types of contacts to create a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondents had a negative contact with the police in their neighborhoods. The findings indicated that "residents who had negative contact with the police in their neighborhood were more likely to report negative neighborhood attitudes about the police" (Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2005, p. 407). In addition, no matter where they occurred, negative contacts were significantly related to negative general attitudes toward the police. In other words, the quality of contact, and not whether the contact was voluntary, shaped how the respondents felt about the police.

When studying a sample of juveniles, Hurst and Frank (2000) found that positive citizen-initiated contacts were strong predictors of both general and specific attitudes toward the police. Like in the previously discussed studies, Hurst and Frank measured the type of contacts in several different ways. Some of these types of contacts included encountering the police after being victimized, asking for information or help, being stopped on the street, being stopped in a car, being arrested, and talking to an officer at school. They used these measures to create four

variables for police contact: positive police-initiated contact, negative police-initiated contact, positive citizen-initiated contact, and negative citizen-initiated contact. Whether or not a contact was scored as positive or negative depended on whether the youth felt they were treated in a good or poor manner. The findings indicated that negative contacts with the police, no matter who initiated them, were related to negative general and specific attitudes toward the police. In addition, positive citizen-initiated contacts with the police were predictive of positive attitudes toward the police (both general and specific). On the other hand, positive police-initiated contacts did not have a significant effect on attitudes, neither general nor specific. By examining types of contact in greater detail, Schuck and Rosenbaum (2005) and Hurst and Frank (2000) were able to find that both citizen-initiated and officer-initiated contacts can have an impact on attitudes toward the police, depending on the quality of the contact.

In a study of a non-urban community in the Pacific Northwest, Gau (2010) examined whether perceived procedural justice influenced confidence in the police's ability to control crime. She measured trust in the police at two different points in order to establish temporal order and determine whether police contact in the intervening three years had an impact on trust. Even after controlling for initial levels of trust in the police, she found that the quality of a stop had a positive relationship with trust in the police at the latter wave. In other words, respondents who had positive contacts with the police were more likely to trust the police and respondents who had negative contacts with the police were less likely to trust the police to do their jobs effectively.

It is also evident that there is an asymmetry in the impact of positive and negative encounters with the police on confidence, with negative contacts having a far greater impact than positive contacts. Specifically, Skogan (2006) found that negative encounters were four to

twenty-three times more influential than positive encounters. The findings of a disparity between the effects of negative contacts and positive contacts are not new (Cheurprakobkit, 2000; Jacob, 1971; Leiber, Nalla, & Farnsworth, 1998; Miller, Davis, Henderson, Markovic, & Ortiz, 2004). This study is notable for being among the first to specifically focus on the asymmetry in the impact of positive and negative contacts with the police and its findings are important in understanding how direct contact can influence attitudes toward the police.

Overall, research on direct contact with the police indicates that negative interactions with the police can have a detrimental effect on attitudes toward and confidence in the police. The asymmetry of effects indicates that negative contacts can have a substantially stronger impact on attitudes and confidence than positive contacts. In addition, one negative contact can cancel any goodwill towards the police gained by several positive contacts (Skogan, 2006). For the purposes of this study, it is worth considering whether a negative contact with the police may lead to support for increasing police accountability to prevent these negative contacts from occurring again in the future. This support for increasing police accountability could manifest itself into support for specific policies that seek to increase accountability, positive attitudes towards a movement to increase accountability, and a desire to see a police officer in a high profile case of police misconduct convicted.

Another commonly studied predictor for attitudes toward the police is vicarious or indirect contact. The basis for examining vicarious contact with the police comes from past research on vicarious victimization, which is the idea that knowing someone who is the victim of a crime can increase one's fear of victimization (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). Similarly, vicarious or indirect contacts are encounters with the police that are experienced by someone the respondent knows. Most Americans rarely, if ever, interact directly with police officers, so their

perceptions of the police could be influenced more by what they hear about other people's interactions with the police (Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). Theoretically, knowing someone who had a negative contact with the police would have a negative impact on a person's attitudes toward the police and knowing someone who had a positive contact with the police would have a positive impact on a person's attitudes toward the police.

The aforementioned Hurst and Frank (2000) article contained an early look at the effects of vicarious police contact. They found that vicarious police misconduct was significantly related to general, specific, and overall attitudes of juveniles toward the police. As expected, respondents who had heard of police misconduct that was targeted at another person had more negative attitudes toward the police. Similarly, a study of New Yorkers found that confidence in the police is lower for people whose family and friends have had negative contacts with the police (Miller et al., 2004).

Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, and Ring (2005) found that after controlling for initial attitudes toward the police and vicarious contact, direct contact did not have a significant impact on attitudes at the second wave (one year later). However, vicarious contact with the police did have a significant impact on attitudes, positively and negatively; in other words, knowing someone who had a good experience with the police was related to positive attitudes toward the police and knowing someone who had a bad experience with the police was related to negative attitudes toward the police. In addition, the effect of negative vicarious contact on attitudes toward the police was strongest for African American respondents.

Weitzer and Tuch (2005) used multiple items to create a binary measure for vicarious negative experiences with the police. Using a nationwide sample of adults, they found a link between negative vicarious experiences and dissatisfaction with the police. This relationship

was significant for their overall sample and their subsamples of white and African American respondents. Curiously enough, this relationship was non-significant for Hispanic respondents in the study. In Brunson's (2007) study of young African American men in Saint Louis, 93 percent of the youths reported that they knew someone who had been harassed or mistreated by the police. These indirect negative contacts were linked to lower levels of confidence in the police to do their jobs effectively and in a lawful manner.

The studies discussed above are all notable for shining a light on how attitudes towards the police can be affected by indirect contact as well as direct contact. Thus far, research has not examined whether vicarious contact can impact support for police accountability and groups like Black Lives Matter that advocate about holding police accountable. The current study will examine whether knowing somebody who has been mistreated by the police makes one more likely to support policies and movements that seek to increase police accountability, as well as convicting a local police officer for shooting and killing an unarmed man.

The Effects of Aggressive Policing Strategies

Aggressive policing strategies like order maintenance policing, which emphasize frequent stops and subjects community residents to regular unwanted contact with the police, can also have an impact on attitudes toward the police. These types of policies tend to have a disproportionate impact on minorities and people of low socioeconomic class because enforcement is focused on disadvantaged areas (Roberts, 1999). A study by Chermak, McGarrell, and Weiss (2001) examined how the citizens of Indianapolis viewed aggressive traffic enforcement strategies and whether this type of policing increased hostility towards the police. They found that these strategies generally had high levels of support from their respondents and that support was not affected by whether the respondents lived in the areas

being targeted by these more aggressive patrols. There was also no evidence to suggest that areas with aggressive patrols had higher levels of hostility toward the police than areas without these patrols. Finally, Chermak et al. did not find any significant racial differences in either hostility or support for aggressive enforcement.

Later, Gau and Brunson (2010) examined the effects of order maintenance policing on police legitimacy and perceptions of procedural justice among teenagers in Saint Louis. Police legitimacy and perceptions of procedural justice are related to how fairly citizens believe they would be treated by the police and their confidence in the police's ability to do their jobs fairly and effectively. Similar to Brunson's (2007) previous study, Gau and Brunson (2010) found that citizens who were stopped for low-level offenses and were stopped more often were more likely to feel harassed by the police than those who were stopped for more serious offenses and were stopped less often. Specifically, they found that 60 percent of the respondents knew someone who had been harassed by the police and 46.7 percent felt like they had been personally harassed by the police. Furthermore, by making youths feel harassed, these aggressive policing tactics damaged perceptions of police legitimacy and undermined the police's own crime control efforts.

Aggressive policing tactics in urban areas can have a negative impact on mental health of the community members. In a study of young men living in New York City, Geller, Fagan, Tyler, and Link (2014) found that increased contact with the police was related to higher levels of trauma and anxiety. Furthermore, respondents who were stopped more often by the police and described their experiences as more intrusive suffered greater trauma and anxiety. While research does not explicitly address how officer-involved shootings affect perceptions of the police, there is evidence to suggest that aggressive policing tactics like order maintenance

policing can have an influence. It is worth noting that the Tensing-DuBose incident occurred after Tensing pulled DuBose over for not having a front license plate. Because order maintenance policing can involve police intervention for minor offenses (e.g., Gau & Brunson, 2010), it can be said that aggressive policing tactics contributed to Samuel DuBose's death. The current study will take the existing research a step further and attempt to learn whether a high-profile incident of police shooting can impact support for police accountability.

Quality of Life and Neighborhood Context

Contextual factors such as neighborhood characteristics and perceived quality of life can also affect attitudes toward the police. In a study of confidence in the police, Cao, Frank, and Cullen (1996) found that controlling for neighborhood factors (community disorder and informal collective security) rendered the effects of race, age, income, fear of crime, prior victimization, and political ideology non-significant. The only factor other than the neighborhood context that significantly predicted confidence in the police was gender; men were less likely to have confidence in the police than women. Similar findings were reported by Wu, Sun, and Triplett (2009). After controlling for neighborhood level characteristics like neighborhood racial composition, concentrated disadvantage, residential mobility, and the violent crime rate in a hierarchical linear model, race and socioeconomic class did not have a significant effect on satisfaction with the police. Of the neighborhood level characteristics, the racial composition of a neighborhood (specifically, whether or not the neighborhood was predominantly black) was related to satisfaction.

Dai and Johnson (2009) used hierarchical models to examine the effects of race on satisfaction with the police. Using a sample of 29 Cincinnati neighborhoods, they found that race was no longer a significant predictor after controlling for neighborhood context. In

addition, similar to Reisig and Parks (2000), this study found that quality of life was a stronger predictor of satisfaction with the police than neighborhood context.

In a study of three Washington, D.C. neighborhoods, Weitzer (1999) tested whether perceptions and experiences of police misconduct varied by neighborhood context and if that variation outweighed any racial differences. He found that citizens' perceptions and experiences of police misconduct within their own neighborhoods was largely explained by contextual factors; in other words, in middle-class neighborhoods, white and African American residents were less likely to perceive or experience misconduct, while in a lower-class neighborhood, white and African American residents more were likely to perceive or experience police misconduct. However, regardless of where they lived, African American respondents were more likely to perceive or experience police misconduct outside of their neighborhoods. Thus, while affluence can offer some degree of insulation from police misconduct, African Americans in this study were still more likely to experience and be aware of police misconduct.

Reisig and Parks (2000) used hierarchical models to examine the role of quality of life and neighborhood context in predicting satisfaction with the police in a multi-neighborhood study. Their quality of life measures were related to perceptions of neighborhood safety, incivility, and crime. Neighborhood context was measured by concentrated disadvantage and homicide rates. Reisig and Parks (2000) found that between-neighborhood variation in satisfaction with the police could largely be explained by neighborhood context. However, neighborhood context did not fully account for racial variation in satisfaction towards the police, and even when controlling for police contacts, perceived quality of life was the strongest predictor of satisfaction. In addition, quality of life was one of the strongest predictors of satisfaction with the police; lower perceptions of safety and higher perceptions of neighborhood

crime and incivility were associated with lower levels of satisfaction. The direction and significance of the relationship between quality of life and satisfaction is consistent with other research on this relationship (e.g., Percy, 1986; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998).

The current study will not be using hierarchical linear models or considering any neighborhood factors. However, it will be using a measure of perceptions of quality of life (specifically, perceptions of safety and crime). Traditionally, lower levels of quality of life have been linked to more negative attitudes toward the police. The current study will instead examine whether University of Cincinnati students' perceptions of quality of life in Cincinnati are related to whether or not they believe local police officers are analogous to soldiers. This is an unexplored relationship, but it is worth exploring whether believing one's city is unsafe and crime-ridden makes one more likely to believe that the police officers working in that neighborhood are patrolling a war zone. Past research indicates that quality of life is inversely related to perceptions of the police (Percy, 1986; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998; Reisig & Parks, 2000), but this study will consider an alternative relationship. It will examine whether lower perceptions of quality of life (specifically, perceptions of crime and safety) could cause citizens to believe that military action and force are required to respond to crime in their neighborhoods and cities.

Demographic Factors

Existing research has also identified certain demographic characteristics that might exert independent effects on perceptions of the police, even after controlling for some of the previously discussed factors. With few exceptions (e.g., Frank, Brandl, Cullen, & Stichman, 1996), research has consistently found that minorities, particularly African Americans, have more negative attitudes toward the police (Brunson, 2007; Skogan, 2005). Recent Gallup polls

found lower levels of confidence and respect for the police among minorities compared to white people (Jones, 2015b; McCarthy, 2016). The differences in attitudes towards the police are apparent for Hispanics as well as for African Americans (e.g., Carter, 1985; Peck, 2015; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). Specifically, Hispanic Americans tend to have more negative attitudes toward the police than whites, but more positive attitudes than African Americans (e.g., Carter, 1985; Peck, 2015). Research on gender differences in perceptions of the police is mixed; some studies have found no difference between males and females (e.g., Brandl, Frank, Worden, & Bynum, 1994) and others have found that females tend to have more positive perceptions than males (e.g., Cao, Frank, & Cullen, 1996; Hurst & Frank, 2000; Taylor, Turner, Esbensen, & Winfree, 2001). In addition, younger people (e.g., Cao, Frank, & Cullen, 1996; Reisig & Correia, 1997) are more likely to have negative perceptions and attitudes towards the police. These measures will not be the foci of this study, but in the interests of consistency with other studies involving perceptions of the police, the current study will include measures for them.

The current study will examine whether the factors discussed in this section have a relationship with a perception that police officers are equivalent to soldiers. The idea that police officers and soldiers are equivalent or similar can be seen as a more extreme level of support for the police with higher levels of permissiveness for controversial actions that are perceived to be necessary to control crime. If factors such as race, quality of life, and contact with the police have a relationship with citizen perceptions of the police, they might also be related to police-military equivalency.

The Influence of a Conservative Ideology and Attitudes towards Minorities and the Poor

Since Black Lives Matter's rise to prominence, the public figures who have been most critical and vocal in their opposition to Black Lives Matter are white conservatives (e.g., Flores,

2016; Mac Donald, 2015; Weigel, 2016). As discussed earlier, prior research has found a racial and partisan divide in support for Black Lives Matter. A nationwide survey found that nearly two-thirds of African Americans supported the movement while only 40 percent of whites supported it. There was also a major divide in white support by political affiliation, with more than half of white Republicans opposing it and nearly two-thirds of white Democrats supporting it (Horowitz & Livingston, 2016). In a second poll (Marist College Institute for Public Opinion, 2015), 65 percent of African Americans reported agreeing with Black Lives Matter, while only 31 percent of whites did the same. In addition, 57 percent of liberals said they agreed with Black Lives Matter, compared to only 22 percent of conservatives. Differences in levels of support between liberals and conservatives were similar to the differences in support between Democrats and Republicans (51 percent versus 17 percent).

Given white America's history of support for the civil rights movement of the 1960s, it is not entirely surprising that their support for Black Lives Matter is either tepid or non-existent. Public opinion polls from the early 1960s (Izadi, 2016) show that a majority of Americans did not support civil rights activists and felt that their actions (e.g., sit-ins at lunch counters, freedom rides, demonstrations) were actually hurting African Americans' chances of being integrated in the South. In addition, prior to the March on Washington on August 28, 1963, 60 percent of a national sample of Americans said they had "unfavorable" feelings about the movement. When specifically looking at white Americans, the lack of support for civil rights demonstrations is staggering; in 1966, 85 percent of a national sample of white people said that the civil rights movement was hindering the advancement of civil rights (Izadi, 2016). Over time, attitudes toward the civil rights movement became more positive. Activists like Martin Luther King Jr. were hailed as American heroes. Still, it is worth remembering that at one point in American

history, these figures and this movement was highly controversial. White people eventually supported the outcomes of the movement but found the process and the means to achieve these outcomes to be troubling.

It is important to explain what it means to be conservative in the context of attitudes towards the criminal justice system and support for certain policies. Having a conservative ideology when it comes to the criminal justice system tends to mean holding more punitive attitudes, desiring policies that are “tough on crime,” and believing that offenders have too many rights (e.g., Dunaway & Cullen, 1991). Conservatives tend to be more supportive of capital punishment (e.g., Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2007b), be less supportive of rehabilitation programs (e.g., Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher, 1997), and have more positive attitudes toward the police (e.g., Cao et al., 1996). They have also been found to be less likely to believe that African Americans are treated unfairly by the police (Gabbidon & Higgins, 2009). Perhaps unsurprisingly, based on previously discussed research, white people are more likely to hold conservative crime ideologies (Browning & Cao, 1992).

Especially pertinent to the current study is whether those with a more conservative crime ideology tend to be more supportive and permissive of a police officer’s use of force. Cullen and his colleagues used a multi-item measure of conservatism that specifically captured conservatism when it comes to criminal justice policies. This eleven-item scale ($\alpha = 0.87$) measured whether the respondents believed that society is too soft on crime and that more severe criminal sanctions were needed to properly deter offenders. One of these items was “we should hire a lot more police and give them the power to catch criminals,” so the measure does account for pro-police attitudes. In addition, it is plausible to expect that citizens who believe that society is too soft on crime would be more in favor of reducing constraints on police action so that officers can be

tougher on crime and do whatever is necessary to control it. Higher scores on the conservative crime ideology scale were significantly related to higher levels of support for police use of deadly force (specifically, whether they would support an officer firing their gun to stop a “fleeing felon”) (Cullen et al., 1996).

In a nationwide survey, respondents were asked if there were situations where they would approve of a police officer hitting an adult male citizen. There was a large racial divide in support with 70 percent of white respondents approving and only 43 percent of African American respondents approving (Arthur & Case, 1994). In addition, having racist attitudes (specifically, believing that black people are more violent than white people) and being Republican was a strong predictor of support. Surprisingly, political ideology (being liberal or conservative) was not a significant predictor of support for using force.

Barkan and Cohn (1998) had similar findings when examining support for use of excessive force. In their study, approval for excessive force was measured by asking the respondents if they supported the use of force if someone said vulgar or obscene things to an officer or was a suspect in a murder case. Using the results of a nationwide survey, they found that white Americans who had negative stereotypes of African Americans (i.e., believing that they are lazy, unintelligent, taking advantage of welfare, and unpatriotic) were more likely to support excessive force. Again, conservatism was non-significant in this analysis. Still, the significance of white racism in predicting police use of force is noteworthy. Although conservatism was not significant in either this study or Arthur and Case’s (1994) study, this could be due to the fact that they used single item measures for political ideology where respondents were asked to rate how liberal or conservative they were on a seven-point Likert scale from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” The multi-item measure used by

Cullen and his colleagues (1996) is preferable for these kinds of studies and the current study because it specifically captures conservative ideology when it comes to the criminal justice system.

In a more recent study, Silver and Pickett (2015) examined differences among support for police of use of force between consistent conservatives, consistent liberals, and what they called conflicted or symbolic conservatives. Conflicted and symbolic conservatives self-identify as conservative, but their policy preferences (e.g., being willing to spend more taxpayer dollars to protect the environment, provide welfare to the poor, and improving the nation's health) were more aligned with liberals. This study found differences in use of support for use of force between consistent conservatives and symbolic conservatives, with extremely conservative respondents being more likely to support it. In terms of excessive force, which was measured identically to how Barkan and Cohn (1998) measured it, racial prejudice was a significant predictor of support regardless of political ideology.

It is also worth noting that conservatives tend to have more negative views of the poor and those on public assistance than moderates and liberals (Cozzarelli et al., 2001). In addition, there is evidence to suggest that strong feelings against providing public assistance to the poor may be driven by a belief that African Americans are lazy (Gilens, 1996) and that neighborhoods with higher percentages of African American residents are more likely to be perceived by white Americans as dangerous and lacking social control (Pickett, Chiricos, Golden, & Gertz, 2012; Quillian & Pager, 2001, 2010). There is an element of coded or symbolic racism here; when Americans express negative attitudes towards the poor or the residents of what they perceive to be crime-ridden neighborhoods, they are symbolically speaking about African Americans. In addition, conservatives are more likely to place the blame of poverty on the poor and not on

external factors like discrimination (Zucker & Weiner, 1993). There is an abundance of research on the topic of coded or symbolic racism, but most of it is related to a perception of African Americans being lazy, taking advantage of public assistance, and being responsible for their own problems (e.g., Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005). Perhaps unsurprisingly, conservatism has been found to be a strong predictor of symbolic racism (Tarman & Sears, 2005).

The main takeaway here is that overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward the police and negative attitudes toward “the policed” (those who live in poor, disadvantaged neighborhoods) could be driven by conservative or even racist attitudes. Conservatives tend to be more supportive of the police (e.g., Cao et al., 1996), are less likely to believe that African Americans are being treated unfairly by the police (e.g., Gabbidon & Higgins, 2009), have more negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter (Marist College Institute for Public Opinion, 2015), and more likely to support police action that can result in the death of civilians (e.g., Cullen et al., 1996). Ultimately, this study is not interested in what is causing negative attitudes toward the “policed.” Pertinent to this study is the possibility that negative attitudes toward “the policed” could be affecting whether citizens view police officers as soldiers because they view poor people in disadvantaged neighborhoods as a problem that must be controlled. They are not taxpaying citizens served by the police. They are insurgents who must be quelled. Attitudes toward “the policed” could also be affecting support for groups like Black Lives Matter, who seek justice for “the policed,” and policies that seek to hold the police accountable for misconduct towards “the policed.” The current study seeks to explore these topics and learn how pervasive the effects of conservatism and negatives attitudes toward “the policed” are.

Moving Forward to the Current Study

With all of this in mind, it is time to advance the research. Research on attitudes towards the police is robust, but research on attitudes from the angle of militarization is scarce. As stated earlier, it is possible that the “us versus them” mentality has transferred from the police to the citizenry. In other words, the belief that the police, in their “war on crime,” are equivalent to soldiers, has affected attitudes toward “the policed” and turned them against the idea of holding police officers accountable for their misconduct. People with these attitudes could have become more forgiving of police shootings because they occur in the heat of the moment and believe that common citizens are in no place to judge them. Because there is no research on the mental connection one makes between the police and the military, this study will be a purely exploratory one that aims to expand knowledge about perceptions of the police and the effects of one’s perceptions of the police on several concepts related to police accountability.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This study seeks to enhance knowledge about citizens' attitudes toward a wide range of topics. As previously discussed, the main topic of interest is whether respondents believe police officers to be equivalent to soldiers. When examining the police-military equivalency hypothesis, this study uses a number of factors that are traditionally used as explanatory variables in studies of citizen perceptions of the police (e.g., race, direct contact, vicarious contact, political ideology, quality of life). In addition, it examines whether a perception that police officers are equivalent to soldiers is related to a number of concepts related to holding police accountable for their misconduct. In doing so, it seeks the answers to four research questions:

1. Do respondents believe that there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers?
2. Are people with negative attitudes toward “the policed” less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability and convicting Ray Tensing for the shooting death of Samuel DuBose?
3. Are people with more conservative crime ideologies more likely to believe there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers and less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?
4. Are citizens who believe in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?

Targeted Sample

The University of Cincinnati is a public university in Cincinnati, Ohio with over 44,000 students (University of Cincinnati, n.d.). While over 45 percent of the city of Cincinnati's

population are African American (United States Census Bureau, n.d.), less than eight percent of the student body are African American and approximately 75 percent are white (Forbes, n.d.); it is a university with a predominantly white student population in a city with a large African American population. In addition, this city made national news in the summer of 2015 when Ray Tensing, a University of Cincinnati police officer, shot and killed Samuel DuBose, an unarmed black motorist, after pulling him over for driving without a front license plate. The incident was captured by Tensing's body camera. This shooting occurred approximately a mile south of campus (Petracco, 2015). In the aftermath of this shooting, Black Lives Matter became very active in the city and there were several protests and marches demanding justice for DuBose (Molski & Butts, 2015). Tensing was eventually charged with murder, but in November of 2016, the judge declared a mistrial (Ortiz, 2016). Tensing's second trial, which began in May of 2017, ended in a mistrial in June (Bidgood & Perez-Pina, 2017). In July, Hamilton County Prosecutor Joe Deters announced that there would not be a third trial (Strickley & Grasha, 2017).

While the results from this study cannot be generalized to the rest of the student body, residents of Cincinnati, or Americans as a whole, studies involving non-probability samples of students have been used in the past for exploratory studies in the field of criminal justice (Metcalf, Pickett, & Mancini, 2015). In addition, Kaminski and Jefferies (1998) also looked at the effects of a highly publicized local incident of police misconduct on the attitudes of Cincinnati residents. Like the Tensing-DuBose incident, the incident Kaminski and Jefferies focused on was caught on film. They found that the incident had a significant impact on attitudes toward the police. Furthermore, they found that the effects of police misconduct were more pronounced for minority respondents than they were for white respondents. The current

study is a similar attempt to learn about perceptions of the police in the aftermath of a highly publicized incident of police misconduct.

Dependent Variables

This study examines five outcome measures to answer its research questions. The first outcome variable in this study captures *police-military equivalency*. Respondents rated their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale to the following statements: “Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods face similar dangers as soldiers in war zones,” “Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods should be allowed to do anything they need to do (e.g., use force, stop and frisk) to control and reduce crime,” and “Police officers working in high crime neighborhoods need military equipment and weapons to control and deter crime.” The first of these survey items captures whether respondents believe the risks of being a police officer are equivalent to the risks of being a soldier and whether they believe that high crime areas are similar to war zones. The second captures the respondents’ level of permissiveness of actions by the police; essentially, it asks the respondents if the proverb “all’s fair in love in war” applies to the police. The third measure captures general support for police militarization. The responses to these statements were summed to create a scale. This scale is also used as an independent variable in the models of the other outcome measures.

These measures were focus tested with several doctoral students in the School of Criminal Justice. Their feedback led to the addition of the examples in the second question and the use of the word “control” instead of “combat” in the second and third questions. After reviewing the measures, this group of graduate students found that this scale had high levels of face and content validity. The focus group said that these measures fully captured the concept of

the police-military equivalency by combining a belief in an equivalency of dangerousness, support for extralegal tactics, and support for the use of military technology.

The second outcome measure in this study is related to the respondents' *attitudes towards Black Lives Matter*. Respondents were asked to respond to the question "How do you feel about Black Lives Matter?" using a five-point Likert scale from strongly support to strongly oppose. The survey also asked respondents to rate their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale to the statement "Black Lives Matter is promoting a 'War on Cops.'" Higher scores on both items indicate weaker support for Black Lives Matter and lower scores indicate stronger support. This study examines whether viewing the police similarly to the military is related to negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter and its overall goals of increasing police accountability. The participants' responses to these two measures will be summed to create a scale for attitudes towards Black Lives Matter.

The third and fourth outcome measures in this study are related to *support for policies that seek to increase police accountability*. The respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with "Shootings of people by local police officers should be investigated by third parties who do not have connections to that department (e.g., state or federal law enforcement)" and "Decisions to charge and prosecute local police officers who shoot people should be handled by third parties who do not have connections to that department (e.g., state or federal prosecutors)." As stated earlier, independent investigations and prosecutions are two police accountability policies that have been suggested by Black Lives Matter and Campaign Zero (Newkirk, 2016).

The fifth and final outcome measure for this study captures the respondents' *feelings about the Ray Tensing trial*. Although both of Tensing's trials ended in a mistrial, it is possible

that the respondents have strong feelings about the case. The respondents are asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement “Ray Tensing should have been convicted and sent to prison for killing Samuel DuBose.” This measure will allow this study to not only examine support for police accountability, but attitudes towards a specific case where a police officer was not held accountable for killing an unarmed African American man. This model only includes students who indicate that they are aware of the 2015 incident where Tensing killed Dubose. This model allows this study to examine support for police accountability in a specific case, in addition to looking at support for policies and a movement that seeks to increase it.

Main Explanatory Variables

In addition to the police-military equivalency measure, this study has two main explanatory variables. One of them is *attitudes toward “the policed.”* This measure is the sum of the respondents’ level of agreement (on a five-point Likert scale) with four statements about people who live in poor neighborhoods with high levels of crime. Specifically, the respondents will be asked if they believe these people are lazy, take advantage of welfare, should be more respectful of the police, and are responsible for their own problems. The first two of these items are based upon the measures Barkan and Cohn (1998) used to measure racism towards African Americans. Because this study is interested in attitudes toward “the policed,” it does not ask specifically about attitudes towards African Americans. Still, it is worth noting that many similar statements have been used when measuring symbolic racism and racially coded language in the past (Tarman & Sears, 2005). They do not explicitly measure racism and bigotry, but they do capture a belief in stereotypes and a rejection of social and economic problems that people in these communities might be facing. The responses to these statements will be summed together to create a scale that measures attitudes toward “the policed,” with higher values indicating more

negative attitudes. This study posits that respondents with more negative attitudes toward “the policed” will be more likely to believe police officers and soldiers are equivalent and less likely to support increasing police accountability and believe that Ray Tensing should have been convicted. In addition, because this measure is meant to capture symbolic or coded racism, it is hypothesized that respondents with more negative attitudes toward “the policed” will be more likely to oppose Black Lives Matter.

The other main explanatory variable that will be used in this study is *conservative crime ideology*. It is the sum of eleven items designed to capture the belief in more punitive attitudes when it comes to crime and the criminal justice system and a belief that a lack of respect for authority has led to a breakdown of society and high levels of crime. Respondents will rate their level of agreement with each statement on a five-point Likert scale. This scale has been used in a number of prior studies on use of force and attitudes toward the police and consistently has a Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.8 (e.g., Cao et al., 1996; Cullen et al., 1996). Thus far, no published study has used this scale in a survey of college students. The items included in this scale are:

1. Crime has increased because society has become too permissive.
2. Stiffer jail sentences are needed to show criminals that crime does not pay and thus to make sure that they do not go into crime again.
3. We should hire a lot more police and give them the power to catch criminals.
4. If we really cared about crime victims, we would make sure that criminals were caught and given harsh punishments.
5. We should stop viewing criminals as victims of society who deserve our help, and start paying more attention to the victims of these criminals.

6. Criminals these days have too many legal rights.
7. The best way to reduce crime is to reestablish the traditional values that made our country great: hard work, religion, respect for authority, and firm discipline in both home and school.
8. Even if prisons cannot deter or rehabilitate criminals, long prison sentences are needed so that we can keep habitual and dangerous offenders off of our streets.
9. Juveniles are treated too leniently by our courts.
10. Punishing criminals more harshly would reduce crime by setting an example and showing others in society that crime does not pay.
11. A main reason why we have so many crimes these days is because young people are just not taught to respect authority.

Consistent with other studies that use this scale (Cullen et al., 1996; Dunaway & Cullen, 1991), this study also includes a standard single item measure of *political ideology*, which is measured on a seven-point Likert scale from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” This measure is commonly used by the General Social Survey (e.g., Silver & Pickett, 2015). Past research has found that respondents who rate themselves as more conservative on similar single-item measures of political ideology tend to score higher on the conservative crime ideology scale (Browning & Cao, 1992). Based on previous research that uses the conservative crime ideology scale, it is expected that more conservative respondents will be more likely to believe that police officers and soldiers are equivalent and have negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter and less likely to support increasing police accountability and wish that Ray Tensing was convicted of killing Samuel DuBose.

Control Variables

In addition to the three main explanatory variables, the models in this study include a number of other variables as controls. One variable measures *general attitudes toward the police*. The respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with the statement “In general, I am confident in the police” on a five-point Likert scale (from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” While this is typically used as a dependent variable in research on attitudes towards the police (Brandl et al., 1994), it is possible that respondents with higher confidence in the police would be less likely to support increasing police accountability and groups that seek to increase police accountability.

Past research has found that *direct contact* is a strong predictor of attitudes toward the police (Brandl et al., 1994). Respondents were asked to indicate whether they have contacted or been stopped by a police officer within the past year and then rate how well they were treated by the police on a four-point Likert scale (very fairly; somewhat fairly; somewhat unfairly; very unfairly). For the analyses, a binary measure will be used for whether or not the respondent had a stop or contact with the police where they believe they were treated unfairly in the past year. This study is not interested in whether the contact was citizen- or officer-initiated because it is not specifically looking at the effects of contact.

Another strong predictor of attitudes toward the police is *vicarious contact* (Hurst & Frank, 2000; Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, & Ring, 2005). Theoretically, respondents who know someone who has been mistreated by the police would be more likely to have negative attitudes toward the police. The students in the survey were asked whether they know someone who has had contact with the police in the past year and to rate how fairly they believe that person was treated (very fairly; somewhat fairly; somewhat unfairly; very unfairly).

Similar to the direct contact measure, responses were used to create a binary measure that captures whether or not the respondent knows someone who has been treated unfairly by the police in the past year. The direct and vicarious contact measures are included in the Black Lives Matter model, the police accountability models, and the model that captures attitudes toward the Ray Tensing case. Theoretically, respondents who have had negative contacts with the police or know someone who has had a negative contact with the police would be more likely to support increasing police accountability and groups that seek to increase police accountability. In addition, these respondents might be more likely to empathize with Samuel DuBose and believe that Ray Tensing should have been convicted.

Perceived quality of life has also been linked by research to attitudes toward the police. Specifically, perceptions about crime and safety can influence how people view the police (Dai & Johnson, 2009; Reisig & Parks, 2000). The respondents reported whether they believe crime is getting worse, staying the same, or getting better in Cincinnati and how safe they feel walking alone on and around campus (very safe; somewhat safe; somewhat unsafe; very unsafe). While past research indicates that lower perceptions of quality of life would be related to lower satisfaction towards the police (Percy, 1986; Reisig & Correia, 1997; Reisig & Giacomazzi, 1998), it is possible that lower perceptions of quality of life are related to believing that police officers are similar to soldiers. The current study posits that respondents with lower perceptions of quality of life will be more likely to see Cincinnati as a war zone and believe that police officers are equivalent to soldiers.

While direct contact, vicarious contact, and quality of life are generally used to predict attitudes toward the police, this study is interested in whether they can also predict support for concepts related to police accountability. There is no published research to support these links,

and thus, this study is an exploratory one that seeks to learn more about the factors that can predict these attitudes and beliefs.

This study also uses general *perceptions of police misconduct* as a control variable. This item is based upon a measure from Weitzer's (1999) study of perceptions of police misconduct in Washington, D.C. The students in the current study are asked to respond to "How often do you think the police commit acts of misconduct (e.g., excessive force, verbal abuse, corruption)?" on a four-point Likert scale (Never; On Occasion; Fairly Often; Very Often). This study will also use a measure for *media exposure to incidents of police misconduct*. Students were asked to answer "How often do you read or hear about incidents of police misconduct (e.g., excessive force, verbal abuse, corruption)?" (Never; On Occasion; Fairly Often; Very Often). It is believed that respondents who perceive or hear about more police misconduct will be less likely to believe in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers and more likely to support Black Lives Matter and policies that seek to increase police accountability. These variables will also be used to predict attitudes towards the Tensing case. Theoretically, those who perceive misconduct to be more common or hear about more incidents of police misconduct would be more likely to want a police officer involved in a high profile case of police misconduct to be convicted.

Lastly, this study uses measures related to the Ray Tensing case. First, respondents were asked if they watched the video of the 2015 incident where Tensing shot and killed Samuel DuBose. Second, they rated how closely they followed the case (very closely; somewhat closely; not very closely; not at all). These survey items capture the respondents' level of awareness of the incident and their feelings about it. While it is possible that many students have neither watched the video nor followed the case closely, it is important to control for these

factors when examining the respondents' stances toward the Tensing/DuBose incident. These measures will also be used as an explanatory variable in the police accountability models. The rationale for its inclusion is that it is possible that following the investigation and the prosecution of the case had an impact on how the respondents feel about policies that have a goal of increasing police accountability. If the survey results indicate that very few of the respondents followed the Tensing trial or watched the video of DuBose's death, these measures may be dropped from the models of support for police accountability policies and the Tensing model may be dropped from the study entirely.

The survey completed by the respondents is provided in Appendix A and the variables used in each model are listed below in Table 3.1. In addition, all five models for this study will include a number of other personal characteristics, including sex, race/ethnicity, age, whether or not they are a criminal justice major, and whether or not they are considering a career in law enforcement. The police-military equivalency model will also use whether or not they are a military dependent, a veteran, in R.O.T.C., or considering a career in the military. Sex, race/ethnicity, and age are common control variables in studies of perceptions of the police (e.g., Cao et al., 1996; Hurst & Frank, 2000) and studies of college students' attitudes about criminal justice topics typically control for a student's major (e.g., Mbuba, 2010; Sethuraju et al., 2017; Tsoudis, 2000). For the interests of this study, it is worth considering whether being interested in a career in law enforcement is related to support for independent investigations of police officers and perceptions of the police and whether being interested or related to the military could impact the likelihood that one sees police officers as equivalent to soldiers.

Table 3.1. Model Specifications and the Directions of the Hypothesized Relationships

Variables Included*	Model 1: Police-Military Equivalency	Model 2: Black Lives Matter	Model 3: Police Accountability: Investigations	Model 4: Police Accountability: Prosecutions	Model 5: The Ray Tensing Case
<i>Police Military-Equivalency</i>		+	-	-	-
<i>Negative Attitudes toward “the Policed”</i>	+	+	-	-	-
<i>Conservative Crime Ideology</i>	+	+	-	-	-
<i>General Attitudes toward the Police</i>	+	+	-	-	
<i>Direct Negative Contact with the Police</i>		-	+	+	+
<i>Vicarious Negative Contact with the Police</i>		-	+	+	+
<i>Perceived Quality of Life</i>	+				
<i>Perceptions of Police Misconduct</i>	-	-	+	+	+
<i>Media Exposure to Incidents of Police Misconduct</i>	-	-	+	+	+
<i>Watched Tensing/DuBose Video</i>					+
<i>Followed Tensing Case Closely</i>					+

* All five models will also include measures of respondents’ sex, race/ethnicity, age, academic major, and interest in a career in policing

Analytic Plan

Surveys will be conducted in undergraduate criminal justice classes taught during the spring semester of the 2017-2018 school year on the Uptown West Campus of the University of Cincinnati. There were approximately 1,200 students enrolled in 27 classes. I emailed the professors or instructors for these classes and asked them to allow a third party (another graduate

student in the School of Criminal Justice) to come to their class to distribute and administer a survey to their students. The professors were asked to leave the room during the distribution and administration of the survey so that the students did not feel like they are being coerced to participate. The paper survey filled out by students is located in Appendix A. The surveys were completed in class on the day that they were distributed and collected by the administrator after their completion. The survey administrator asked students who had completed the survey in a previous class not to take the survey a second time. The surveys did not ask for any information that would identify the students by name and students were promised that their responses are confidential. Consistent with studies with similar data collection strategies (e.g., Sethuraju, Sole, Oliver, & Prew, 2017), this study aimed for a sample size of 500 students. This study (ID #2017-3871) was approved by the University of Cincinnati Institutional Review Board (IRB) on September 12, 2017. The email invitation to professors, information sheet for the participants, and notice of approval from the IRB are located in Appendix A.

Prior research indicates that criminal justice majors are less punitive and tend to be more supportive of individual rights compared to the average college student (Tsoudis, 2000). In another study, students focusing on law enforcement and criminal justice studies were less likely to perceive police misconduct in their own neighborhoods (Sethuraju et al., 2017). Thus, it is difficult to conclude one way or another about which way majoring in criminal justice might influence responses to questions about the police. As a whole, college students tend to have more negative views of the police and are more likely to believe they discriminate against minorities than the general population (Mbuba, 2010).

After the surveys were completed and I compiled the responses, the data was analyzed with ordinal logistic regression (or multinomial logistic regression if the assumptions of ordinal

regression are violated) for the dependent variables measured by a single ordinal measure and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the dependent variables measured on a scale that comprises multiple items.

For variables that are captured by multiple items, Cronbach's alphas were calculated to examine the internal consistency of the scales. In addition, factor analyses was conducted to ensure the items used in scales load onto the same factor. For missing data, listwise deletion was used to exclude cases with missing data from the analyses. The five models used in this study seek to answer the research questions and expand upon what is known about attitudes toward the police, police accountability, and "the policed."

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

This chapter discusses the results of the survey and the findings of the analyses used to test the police-military equivalency hypothesis and support for three types of police accountability. First, this chapter will discuss how the survey was administered and its response rate. Second, it will discuss the process involved in creating the scales used in the analysis and statistics used to consider whether or not the measures that went into these scales were well-matched. Finally, it will discuss the results of all of the models used in the study.

This study has four main research questions:

1. Do respondents believe that there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers?
2. Are people with negative attitudes toward “the policed” less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability and convicting Ray Tensing for the shooting death of Samuel DuBose?
3. Are people with more conservative crime ideologies more likely to believe there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers and less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?
4. Are citizens who believe in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?

Survey Administration and Response Rate

As discussed in Chapter 3, professors of the 27 undergraduate classes offered by University of Cincinnati’s School of Criminal Justice during the spring 2018 semester were sent an email asking them to allow someone to come to their class to administer a survey. Professors in 23 classes agreed to allow someone to administer the survey in class. Within those 23 classes,

668 students were asked to participate and 580 of them participated. Of the 580 students who consented to take the survey, 571 completed it to the end. The nine students who did not finish the survey were excluded from all analyses. This gave the survey a final response rate of 85.5%. Because listwise deletion was used for cases with missing data, 45 other cases were removed for having missing data on any of the variables used in the analyses. This resulted in a final sample size of 526 and response rate of 78.7% for the first four models in the study.

Of this final sample, 47.7% are male and 52.3% are female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 72.2% identified as White and the remaining respondents identified as African American (15.2%), Hispanic (2.7%), Asian (3.6%), or “other” (6.3%). The respondents who did not identify as White or identified as white and at least one other race or ethnicity were combined into a minority category so that a dummy variable could be created for the analyses (0 = minority; 1 = White). The mean age of the sample is 20.14 years with a standard deviation of 3.11. In addition, 68.5% of the sample reported that they were criminal justice majors, 60.1% said they were considering a career in law enforcement, 37.1% said they lived on campus, and 91.1% said they lived within the city limits of Cincinnati. 5.3% of the sample reported that they were a veteran or military dependent and 8.4% reported that they were an R.O.T.C. member or considering a career in the military. A single dummy variable for answering yes to either question was created. Based on this new measure, 11.6% of the sample said they were a veteran, an R.O.T.C. member, a military dependent, or interested in a career in the military. The demographic characteristics of the sample are displayed in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics: Respondent Characteristics (N = 526)

Race/Ethnicity
• <i>Minority: 27.8%</i>
• <i>White: 72.2%</i>
Sex
• <i>Male: 47.7%</i>
• <i>Women: 52.3%</i>
Age
• Mean = 20.14; SD = 3.11
Criminal Justice Major
• <i>Yes: 68.6%</i>
• <i>No: 31.4%</i>
Live on Campus
• <i>Yes: 62.9%</i>
• <i>No: 37.1%</i>
Live in Cincinnati
• <i>Yes: 91.1%</i>
• <i>No: 8.9%</i>
Considering Career in Law Enforcement?
• <i>Yes: 39.9%</i>
• <i>No: 60.1%</i>
Veteran, Military Dependent, ROTC, or Considering Career in Military?
• <i>Yes: 11.6%</i>
• <i>No: 88.4%</i>

Dependent Variables

As stated earlier, there are five dependent variables used to answer this study's research questions. The first dependent variable is measuring a belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers. It is a multi-item composite measure comprised of the responses to three items measured on a five-point Likert Scale: equivalency in perceived dangerousness, equivalency in required tactics, and equivalency in required equipment:

- Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods face similar dangers as soldiers in war zones.

- Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods should be allowed to do anything they need to do (e.g., use force, stop and frisk) to control and reduce crime.
- Police officers working in high crime neighborhoods need military equipment and weapons to control and deter crime.

The frequency distribution of the responses to each of these items is displayed in Table 4.2. The results of the survey indicate that more respondents disagreed with these statements than agreed with them. While 34.8% of the students agreed or strongly agreed that police officers and soldiers face similar dangers, 40.8% disagreed or strongly disagreed. The disparity between agreement and disagreement was greater for the tactics (57.6% disagreed and 21.7% agreed; difference in 35.9 percentage points) and equipment (67.8% disagreed and 12.7% agreed; difference in 55.1 percentage points) items. These findings indicate that a belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers might not be a common one in the sample.

Table 4.2. Distribution of Responses: Police-Military Equivalency Measures

	Equivalency in Dangerousness		Equivalency in Required Tactics		Equivalency in Required Equipment	
	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	76	14.4	98	18.6	137	26.0
<i>Disagree</i>	139	26.4	205	39.0	220	41.8
<i>Neither Disagree nor Agree</i>	128	24.3	109	20.7	102	19.4
<i>Agree</i>	158	30.0	99	18.8	58	11.0
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	25	4.8	15	2.9	9	1.7
Total	526	100	526	100	526	100

The multi-item composite measure created from these three measures ranges from 3 to 15 and has a mean of 7.53 and a standard deviation of 2.48. The police-military equivalency scale's Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = 0.65$) indicates that it has a questionable level of internal inconsistency (George & Mallery, 2003). However, an exploratory factor analysis found that all three measures loaded onto a single factor, and thus, this scale will be used in the analyses. The factor

loadings for this exploratory factor analysis are located in Appendix B. This scale is also used as an independent variable for models of the other dependent variables in order to learn whether a belief in the equivalency between police officers and soldiers predicts support for police accountability.

The second dependent variable in the analysis is related to how students in the sample feel about Black Lives Matter. Students were asked to report their feelings about Black Lives Matter on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose.” In addition, they were asked about their level of agreement with the statement “Black Lives Matter is promoting a ‘War on Cops’” on a five-point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Responses for these two items were summed together to create a multi-item composite measure.

The frequency distributions of the responses to these questions are displayed in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Support for Black Lives Matter outweighed opposition to it; while 52.1% of students indicated that they strongly or somewhat support it, only 24.7% reported that they somewhat or strongly opposed it. In addition, while 32.9% of the sample reported some level of disagreement with the statement “Black Lives Matter is promoting a ‘War on Cops,’” 40.9% reported some level of agreement. This would suggest that some of the students in the sample support Black Lives Matter despite believing or being unsure about whether or not it is promoting a war on police.

Table 4.3. Distribution of Responses: Feelings about Black Lives Matter

	<i>f</i>	%
<i>Strongly Support</i>	139	26.4
<i>Somewhat Support</i>	135	25.7
<i>Neither Support nor Oppose</i>	122	23.2
<i>Somewhat Oppose</i>	67	12.7
<i>Strongly Oppose</i>	63	12.0
<i>Total</i>	526	100

Table 4.4. Distribution of Response: Black Lives Matter is Promoting a “War on Cops”

	<i>f</i>	%
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	80	15.2
<i>Disagree</i>	93	17.7
<i>Neither Disagree nor Agree</i>	138	26.2
<i>Agree</i>	153	29.1
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	62	11.8
<i>Total</i>	526	100

The scale that comprises these two measures ranges from 2 to 10 and has a mean of 5.63 and a standard deviation of 2.36. It has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82, which indicates that it has a high level of internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). In addition, an exploratory factor analysis found that both measures loaded onto a single factor. Factor loadings are displayed in Appendix B.

The third and fourth dependent variables in this study are related to support for policies that seek to increase police accountability. One of the variables, independent investigations, captures support for independent investigations of police officer-involved shootings. The other variable, independent prosecutions, captures support for independent prosecutions of those police officers. The frequency distribution of responses for these two measures is displayed in Table 4.5. The results indicate that these policies are popular among the students in the sample. Specifically, 80.6% of the sample indicated some level of agreement with a policy that would require independent investigations of police officer-involved shootings and 76.4% of the sample indicated some level of agreement with a policy that would require decisions to charge and prosecute police officers who shoot people to be made by third parties. On the other hand, only 7% disagreed with the idea of independent investigations and 8.7% disagreed with the idea of independent prosecutions.

Table 4.5. Distribution of Responses: Support for Police Accountability Policies Measures

	Independent Investigations		Independent Prosecutions	
	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	11	2.1	17	3.2
<i>Disagree</i>	26	4.9	29	5.5
<i>Neither Disagree nor Agree</i>	65	12.4	78	14.8
<i>Agree</i>	252	47.9	234	44.5
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	172	32.7	168	31.9
<i>Total</i>	526	100	526	100

The final dependent variable, support for convicting Ray Tensing, captures support for convicting a former officer with the Cincinnati Police Department for the 2015 shooting death of Samuel DuBose, an unarmed black motorist. Of the 526 students in the reduced sample, 447 (84.8%) said that they were aware of the incident. The frequency distribution of the responses to this item by the students who were familiar with the incident is displayed in Table 4.6. Support for convicting Tensing for Samuel DuBose's death was higher than opposition to convicting him (51.4% versus 16.8%), but it is worth noting that nearly one-third of this subsample did not have an opinion about the case.

Table 4.6. Distribution of Responses: Support for Convicting Ray Tensing

	<i>f</i>	%
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	25	5.6
<i>Disagree</i>	50	11.2
<i>Neither Disagree nor Agree</i>	142	31.8
<i>Agree</i>	131	29.4
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	98	22.0
<i>Total</i>	446	100

Independent Variables

All of the models in this study use political ideology as an independent variable. Political ideology was measured in two different ways: a single ordinal measure on a seven-point Likert scale from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative" and a series of responses to eleven ordinal-level measures that capture a belief in a conservative crime ideology. The frequency

distribution of the responses to the items on the conservative crime ideology scale is displayed in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7. Distribution of Responses: Conservative Crime Ideology Measures

	<i>Strongly Disagree</i>		<i>Disagree</i>		<i>Neither Disagree nor Agree</i>		<i>Agree</i>		<i>Strongly Agree</i>		<i>Total</i>
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	
1. Crime has increased because society has become too permissive.	19	3.6	144	27.4	248	47.1	105	20.0	10	1.9	526
2. Stiffer jail sentences are needed to show criminals that crime does not pay and thus to make sure that they do not go into crime again.	75	14.3	170	32.3	150	28.5	117	28.5	14	2.7	526
3. We should hire a lot more police and give them the power to catch criminals.	47	8.9	162	30.8	217	41.3	93	17.7	7	1.3	526
4. If we really cared about crime victims, we would make sure that criminals were caught and given harsh punishments.	40	7.6	161	30.6	184	35.0	125	23.8	16	3.0	526
5. We should stop viewing criminals as victims of society who deserve our help, and start paying more attention to the victims of these criminals.	31	5.9	104	19.8	180	34.2	167	31.7	44	8.4	526
6. Criminals these days have too many rights.	90	17.1	205	39.0	158	30.0	61	11.6	12	2.3	526
7. The best way to reduce crime is to reestablish the traditional values that made our country great: hard work, religion, respect for authority, and firm discipline in both home and school.	47	8.9	118	22.4	139	26.4	154	29.3	68	12.9	526
8. Even if prisons cannot deter or rehabilitate criminals, long prison sentences are needed so that we can keep habitual and dangerous offenders off of our streets.	43	8.2	136	25.9	96	18.3	218	41.4	33	6.3	526
9. Juveniles are treated too leniently by courts.	34	6.5	199	37.8	196	37.3	85	16.2	12	2.3	526
10. Punishing criminals more harshly would reduce crime by setting an example and showing others in society that crime does not pay.	75	14.3	186	35.4	138	26.2	109	20.7	18	3.4	526
11. A main reason why we have so many crimes these days is because young people are just not taught to respect authority.	69	13.1	124	23.6	105	20.0	159	30.2	69	13.1	526

For respondents that answered all eleven questions, a scale was created by summing the responses. Students who did not complete all eleven questions were omitted from all analyses. The conservative crime ideology scale has a minimum of 11 and a maximum of 53, with a mean of 31.38 and a standard deviation of 7.64. In the past, this scale has been used in several studies and its Cronbach's alpha is consistently over 0.8 (e.g., Cao et al., 1996; Cullen et al., 1996). The high reliability for this scale continues with the current study ($\alpha = 0.88$). An exploratory factor analysis found that all eleven measures loaded onto a single factor. Factor loadings are displayed in Appendix B.

The single-item measure of political orientation is moderately correlated with conservative crime ideology ($r = 0.57$). However, of the 526 students in the sample, 80 (15.2%) reported that they do not know what their overall political orientation is. As such, the conservative crime ideology scale will be used in the five models instead of the political orientation measure to answer the third research question.

Attitudes toward the "policed" (conceptualized as people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods) is one of the two main independent variables of interest in the study. It is captured by four measures that ask respondents to rate their level of agreement with a series of statements about people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods on a five-point Likert scale. The distribution of responses for these measures is located in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8. Distribution of Responses: Attitudes toward “the Policed”

	Are Lazy		Take Advantage of Welfare		Should Be More Respectful of the Police		Are Responsible for Their Own Problems	
	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%
<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	132	25.1	78	14.8	28	5.3	76	14.4
<i>Disagree</i>	221	42.0	115	21.9	49	9.3	174	33.1
<i>Neither Disagree nor Agree</i>	125	23.8	200	38.0	214	40.7	158	30.0
<i>Agree</i>	43	8.2	108	20.5	178	33.8	95	18.1
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	5	1.0	25	4.8	57	10.8	23	4.4
Total	526	100	526	100	526	100	526	100

The results indicate that 9.2% of respondents agreed that residents of these neighborhoods are lazy, 25.3% agreed that they take advantage of welfare, 44.6% agreed they should be more respectful towards the police, and 22.5% agreed that they are responsible for their own problems. Responses to these measures were summed to create a scale. This scale is used in all five models to answer the second research question. It ranges from 4 to 20 and has a mean of 10.97 and a standard deviation of 3.13. It has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.77, which indicates that it has an acceptable level of internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). In addition, an exploratory factor analysis found that all four measures loaded onto a single factor. Factor loadings are located in Appendix B.

There were also several items in the survey related to confidence in the police and personal and vicarious contact with the police. The survey results indicate that 71.3% of respondents reported some level of agreement with the statement “In general, I am confident in the police,” 8% said they had a negative direct contact with the police in the past year, and 19.4% reported that they knew someone who had a negative contact with the police in the past year. As for perceptions of police misconduct, 1.3% believe that it never happens, 68.6% believe that it happens on occasion, 21.7% believe that it happens fairly often, and 8.4% believe that it happens very often. When asked how often they hear or read about incidents of police

misconduct, 0.8% responded that they never do, 22.2% responded that they do on occasion, 40.3% responded that they do fairly often, and 36.7% said that they do fairly often. Finally, as for quality of life, 40.3% of respondents report feeling somewhat or very unsafe while walking alone on or around campus at night and 6.1% reported feeling that crime in Cincinnati was getting worse. A table of the descriptive statistics for all of the variables in the analyses is located in Appendix B.

Findings

The next section presents the results from all five models. Before presenting the model estimates, each section discusses model diagnostics and whether the assumptions of the chosen types of regression are met.

Model 1: The Police Military Equivalency Hypothesis

The first model uses the police-military equivalency scale as a dependent variable. Because this variable is an interval-level scale, an OLS regression model is estimated. To use OLS regression, the model must meet the assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and the absence of multicollinearity.

To test the assumption of normality, a histogram of the standardized residuals was created and a normal curve was overlaid on top of it. While there are moderate departures from the normal curve, the histogram for the most part, resembles a normal curve. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the assumption of normality has been violated in this model.

For linearity, it must be shown that the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables is linear. To do this, residuals were plotted against predicted values for all of the main variables of interest to ensure that the residuals form a straight line. The plots indicate that linearity is not an issue in this model.

Next, homoscedasticity, or equality of variance, is tested by creating a plot of the standardized residuals on the standardized predicted values. If this assumption is met, then the spread of the residuals should remain constant instead of increasing or decreasing with increasing predicted values. The plot indicates the spread of residuals remains constant and the assumption of homoscedasticity has not been violated. The plots created to test the assumptions for this OLS model are located in Appendix C.

Finally, the model must meet the assumption of the absence of multicollinearity. To test this, a correlation matrix was created using all of the main explanatory variables in the analysis and race. In addition, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are calculated for each of the independent variables. While conservative crime ideology and attitudes toward the “policed” have a moderately strong correlation to each other ($r = 0.69$), the highest VIF in the model is 2.02. This would indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue in this model (Allison, 2012). The correlation coefficients and multicollinearity diagnostics are displayed in Table 4.9. Thus, it is safe to assume that the model does not violate any of the assumptions of OLS regression.

Table 4.9. Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics – Police-Military Equivalency Model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	VIF
1. <i>PME</i>	-									
2. <i>Race</i>	0.27**	-								1.21
3. <i>Conservatism</i>	0.52**	0.19**	-							1.99
4. <i>Negative Attitudes toward “the Policed”</i>	0.53**	0.23**	0.69**	-						2.02
5. <i>General Attitudes toward the Police</i>	0.33**	0.32**	0.27**	0.26**	-					1.41
6. <i>Perceived Quality of Life (Walking Alone around Campus)</i>	-0.01	0.05	-0.03	-0.07	0.02	-				1.22
7. <i>Perceived Quality of Life (Crime in Cincinnati)</i>	-0.07	-0.14**	0.02	-0.05	-0.20**	0.19**	-			1.16
8. <i>Perceptions of Police Misconduct</i>	-0.36**	-0.32**	-0.31**	-0.32**	-0.46**	0.07	0.23**	-		1.56
9. <i>Media Exposure to Police Misconduct</i>	-0.20**	-0.20**	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.25**	0.06	0.12**	0.39**	-	1.23

*p < .05, **p < .01

The results of the OLS regression are displayed in Table 4.10. Two cases had standardized residuals greater than 3, but removing these outliers did not significantly impact the significance or direction of any of the independent variables.

Table 4.10. OLS Regression Results: Police-Military Equivalency Model

	B (S.E.)	t
<i>Independent Variables</i>		
Conservatism	0.07** (0.02)	4.74
Negative Attitudes toward “the Policed”	0.22** (0.04)	5.60
<i>Control Variables</i>		
General Attitudes toward the Police	0.24* (0.10)	2.52
Perceived Quality of Life (Walking Alone on Campus)	0.17 (0.12)	1.46
Perceived Quality of Life (Crime in Cincinnati)	0.02 (0.16)	0.11
Perceptions of Police Misconduct	-0.44** (0.16)	-2.69
Media Exposure to Police Misconduct	0.03 (0.12)	0.23
<i>Demographic Variables</i>		
White	0.54* (0.21)	2.56
Female	-0.55** (0.19)	-2.89
Age	0.06* (0.03)	2.03
Criminal Justice Major	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.79
Interested in Policing	0.16 (0.20)	0.80
Interested in or Related to Military	-0.03 (0.28)	-0.12
N = 526; Adjusted R ² = 0.38		

*p<.05, **p<.01

The adjusted R² (0.38) indicates that 38% of the variation in the police-military equivalency scale can be explained by the variables in the model. As hypothesized, holding more negative attitudes toward “the policed” and having a more conservative crime ideology are significantly related to a stronger belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers. General attitudes toward the police are also significant and positively related to this perception, meaning that respondents with higher confidence in the police had higher levels of belief in the equivalency. Sex and race were also significant variables in the model, with White respondents and men having higher scores on the equivalency scale than minorities and women, respectively. Age had a significant positive relationship with the equivalency, with older respondents having higher level of belief in the equivalency. In addition, those with lower perceptions of police misconduct tended to have higher levels of belief in the equivalency. Contrary to what was

hypothesized, neither quality of life measure was a significant predictor of belief in the equivalency. Unlike perceptions of police misconduct, media exposure to police misconduct was not predictive of a belief in the equivalency. Being interested in a career in law enforcement, majoring in criminal justice, and being in, related, or interested in the military were also non-significant in this model¹.

Model 2: Negative Attitudes toward Black Lives Matter

The Black Lives Matter model also uses an interval-level scale for its dependent variable and thus, OLS regression is used for the analysis. As stated earlier, a model using OLS regression must meet the assumptions of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, and the absence of multicollinearity.

A histogram of standardized residuals was created to test the assumption of normality. The shape of the histogram resembles a normal curve, and thus, there is no reason to believe that this assumption has been violated. Residuals were also plotted against the predicted values of each independent variables to ensure that the assumption of linearity is not violated. The plots confirm that linearity is not violated by this model. A plot was also created of the standardized residuals on the standardized predicted values. Because the spread of the residuals remains constant as the predicted values increase, it can be concluded that the assumption of homoscedasticity has been met. The plots created to test these assumptions are located in Appendix C. To test the assumption of the absence of multicollinearity, correlation coefficients and VIFs were calculated. Because the highest VIF is 2.16, it can be assumed that multicollinearity is not an issue in this model (Allison, 2012). The correlation coefficients and multicollinearity diagnostics are displayed in Table 4.11.

¹ Separate ordinal regression models were also estimated using each of the police-military equivalency measures as dependent variables. There were no major changes in the results of the models.

Table 4.11. Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics – Black Lives Matter Model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	VIF
1. <i>BLM Scale</i>	-											
2. <i>PME</i>	0.53**	-										1.65
3. <i>Race</i>	0.46**	0.27**	-									1.26
4. <i>Conservatism</i>	0.51**	0.52**	0.19**	-								2.07
5. <i>Negative Attitudes toward “The Policed”</i>	0.57**	0.53**	0.23**	0.69**	-							2.16
6. <i>General Attitudes toward the Police</i>	0.37**	0.33**	0.32**	0.27**	0.26**	-						1.42
7. <i>Negative Direct Contact</i>	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.15**	-0.20**	-					1.15
8. <i>Negative Vicarious Contact</i>	-0.17**	-0.16**	-0.20**	-0.12**	-0.18**	-0.25**	0.28**	-				1.21
9. <i>Perceptions of Police Misconduct</i>	-0.47**	-0.36**	-0.32**	-0.31**	-0.32**	-0.46**	0.23**	0.30**	-			1.62
10. <i>Media Exposure to Police Misconduct</i>	-0.25**	-0.20**	-0.20**	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.25**	0.12**	0.10*	0.39**	-		1.25
11. <i>Familiarity with Black Lives Matter</i>	-0.23**	-0.18**	-0.25**	-0.21**	-0.20**	-0.19**	0.02	0.10*	0.26**	0.25**	-	1.17

*p < .05, **p < .01

The results of the Black Lives Matter model are displayed in Table 4.12. An examination for outliers found that three cases had standardized residuals larger than 3. However, removing these cases from the analyses did not impact the significance or direction of any of the independent variables. Thus, these cases were retained in the analysis.

Table 4.12. OLS Regression Results: Attitudes toward Black Lives Matter

Variable	B (S.E.)	t
<i>Independent Variables</i>		
Police-Military Equivalency	0.13** (0.04)	3.64
Conservatism	0.04** (0.01)	3.00
Negative Attitudes toward “the Policed”	0.19** (0.03)	5.72
<i>Control Variables</i>		
General Attitudes toward the Police	0.10 (0.08)	1.33
Negative Direct Contact with the Police	0.14 (0.27)	0.51
Negative Vicarious Contact with the Police	0.34 (0.19)	1.75
Perceptions of Police Misconduct	-0.67** (0.13)	-4.97
Media Exposure to Police Misconduct	0.02 (0.10)	0.84
Familiarity with Black Lives Matter	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.13
<i>Demographic Variables</i>		
White	1.43** (0.17)	8.32
Female	-0.83** (0.15)	-5.73
Age	0.01 (0.02)	0.56
Criminal Justice Major	0.17 (0.16)	1.04
Interested in Policing	0.29 (0.16)	1.87
N = 526; Adjusted R ² = 0.55		

*p<.05, **p<.01

According to the adjusted R² (0.55), 55% of the variation in the scale can be explained by the independent variables in the model. The strongest predictors of negative attitudes toward Black Lives Matter were being white and holding negative attitudes toward “the policed”. After these variables, the strongest predictors were being male and having low perceptions of police misconduct. Although less predictive than the previously named variables, a belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers and conservatism were significantly related to negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter, as hypothesized. None of the other variables, including general attitudes toward the police, negative direct and vicarious contact, familiarity with Black Lives Matter, and majoring in criminal justice, were significant in the model.

Model 3: Independent Investigations

The next two models are related to support for police accountability policies. The first of these models examines support for a policy that would require independent investigations of shootings of civilians by police officers. Because the dependent variable for this model is measured on a five-point Likert scale, ordinal logistic regression is used. To use this type of regression, it is important to make sure that the model meets the assumptions of proportional odds and the absence of multicollinearity.

To test whether the model meets the assumption of proportional odds, the test of parallel lines is conducted with the full model. This test statistic ($\chi^2 = 67.92$) is significant at $p < .01$ with 39 degrees of freedom, which indicates that the model violates the assumption of proportional odds. Thus, a multinomial logistic regression is estimated because it does not have this assumption. To make the results of the multinomial logistic regression model easier to interpret, the responses are recoded into a three-category measure (strongly disagree or disagree, neither agree nor disagree, and agree or strongly agree). According to this new measure, 7% of the respondents disagreed with this proposed policy, 12.4% were neutral (neither disagreed nor agreed), and 80.6% agreed. A second test of parallel lines using this three-category measure of support for independent investigations was conducted to see if it could be used in an ordinal regression model. The test statistic ($\chi^2 = 26.87$) is significant at $p < .05$ with 13 degrees of freedom, which indicates that multinomial logistic regression is the appropriate type of regression for this model.

The multinomial logistic regression model still has an assumption that there is an absence of multicollinearity. To examine this, correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors are calculated for all of the variables in the analysis. They are displayed in Table 4.13. Because the

highest variance inflation factor in the model is 2.16, it can be concluded that multicollinearity is not an issue in the model (Allison, 2012).

Table 4.13. Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics – Independent Investigations Model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VIF
1. <i>Independent Investigations</i>	-										
2. <i>PME</i>	-0.21**	-									1.65
3. <i>Race</i>	-0.05	0.27**	-								1.22
4. <i>Conservatism</i>	-0.14**	0.52**	0.19**	-							2.06
5. <i>Attitudes toward “the Policed”</i>	-0.24**	0.53**	0.23**	0.69**	-						2.16
6. <i>General Attitudes toward the Police</i>	-0.09	0.33**	0.32**	0.27**	0.26**	-					1.42
7. <i>Negative Direct Contact</i>	0.06	-0.13**	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.15**	-0.20**	-				1.14
8. <i>Negative Vicarious Contact</i>	0.06	-0.16**	-0.20**	-0.12*	-0.18**	-0.25**	0.28**	-			1.21
9. <i>Perceptions of Police Misconduct</i>	0.15**	-0.36**	-0.32**	-0.31**	-0.32**	-0.46**	0.23**	0.30**	-		1.61
10. <i>Media Exposure to Police Misconduct</i>	0.11*	-0.20**	-0.20**	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.25**	0.12**	0.10*	0.39**	-	1.23

*p < .05, **p < .01

Table 4.14. Multinomial Regression Results: Independent Investigations

	Disagree+			Agree+			Agree++		
	<i>B</i> (S.E.)	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Exp</i> (<i>B</i>)	<i>B</i> (S.E.)	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Exp</i> (<i>B</i>)	<i>B</i> (S.E.)	<i>Wald</i>	<i>Exp</i> (<i>B</i>)
<i>Independent Variables</i>									
PME	0.04 (0.10)	0.17	1.04	-0.10 (0.07)	2.11	0.90	-0.15 (0.09)	2.70	0.87
Conservatism	-0.07 (0.04)	2.33	0.94	0.01 (0.03)	0.09	1.01	0.07* (0.04)	4.08	1.08
Attitudes towards the “Policed”	0.02 (0.11)	0.04	1.02	-0.22** (0.07)	11.02	0.80	-0.25** (0.09)	7.22	0.78
<i>Control Variables</i>									
General Attitudes toward the Police	-0.02 (0.21)	0.01	0.98	0.03 (0.14)	0.04	1.03	0.05 (0.18)	0.08	1.05
Negative Direct	0.46 (1.09)	0.18	1.58	0.45 (0.78)	0.33	1.57	0.00 (0.82)	0.00	1.00
Negative Vicarious	0.26 (0.63)	0.17	1.30	0.00 (0.44)	0.00	1.00	-0.26 (0.52)	0.25	0.77
Perceptions of Police Misconduct	0.01 (0.50)	0.00	1.01	0.50 (0.33)	2.25	1.64	0.49 (0.41)	1.43	1.63
Media Exposure to Police Misconduct	-0.17 (0.28)	0.36	0.84	0.09 (0.19)	0.22	1.09	0.26 (0.24)	1.14	1.30
<i>Demographic Variables</i>									
White	-0.47 (0.53)	0.81	0.63	0.00 (0.37)	0.00	1.00	0.47 (0.43)	1.19	1.60
Female	-0.83 (0.46)	3.21	0.44	-0.21 (0.29)	0.49	0.81	0.62 (0.40)	2.44	1.86
Age	-0.05 (0.10)	0.28	0.95	-0.01 (0.04)	0.05	0.99	0.04 (0.10)	0.21	1.05
CJ Major	1.00 (0.61)	2.70	2.72	-0.06 (0.34)	0.03	0.94	-1.06* (0.54)	3.89	0.35
Interested in Policing	-0.33 (0.53)	0.38	0.72	-0.46 (0.34)	1.82	0.63	-0.13 (0.45)	0.09	0.88

N = 526; Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.18$; $\chi^2 = 70.82$

*p<.05, **p<.01

+Neither Agree nor Disagree is the reference category; ++Disagree is the reference category

The multinomial logistic regression results for the independent investigations model are displayed in Table 4.14. The model fit statistic ($\chi^2 = 70.82$) is significant at $p < .01$ with 26 degrees of freedom, which means that the model is a good fit for the data. The Nagelkerke R-square (0.18) indicates that approximately 18 percent of the variation in support for independent investigations can be explained by the independent variables in the model; however, it is worth noting that pseudo R-squares like Nagelkerke R-square are not as reliable as R-square values in linear regression. When using this type of regression, each category can only be compared to the other.

The first column compares respondents who disagreed with the idea of independent investigations to those who reported being neutral about this policy. The results indicate that no variable could predict the likelihood of disagreeing with this policy relative to being neutral about it. The second column compares those who fall in the “agree” category to those who fall in the “neutral” category. Attitudes toward “the policed” was the only significant variable in this model; specifically, respondents who held more negative attitudes toward the “policed” were significantly less likely to support this policy than be neutral about it. The third column compares those who support the policy with those who disagree with it. Once again, those with more negative attitudes toward “the policed” were more likely to oppose the policy instead of supporting it. Surprisingly, scoring higher on the conservative crime ideology scale increased the likelihood of falling into the “agree” category relative to the “disagree” category. In addition, being a criminal justice major decreased the likelihood of agreeing with this policy. No other variables, including race and a belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers, were significant in any of the analyses.

Model 4: Independent Prosecutions

The fourth model examines support for a policy that would require decisions to charge and prosecute police officers who shoot people to be handled by third parties (e.g., state or federal prosecutors). Like the independent investigations model, an ordinal logistic regression was estimated because its dependent variable is measured on a five-point Likert scale. As stated earlier, ordinal regression models must meet the assumptions of proportional odds and the absence of multicollinearity.

When estimating the model, a test of parallel lines was conducted. The chi-square statistic for this test ($\chi^2 = 29.40$) is not significant at $p < .05$ with 39 degrees of freedom. Thus, it can be assumed that the assumption of proportional odds has not been violated by the model. To test for the absence of multicollinearity, bivariate correlation coefficients and VIFs were calculated for all of the variables used in the model. They are displayed in Table 4.15. Because the highest VIF among the independent variables used in the model is 2.16, it can be concluded that multicollinearity is not an issue in this model (Allison, 2012).

Table 4.15. Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics – Independent Prosecutions Model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VIF
1. <i>Independent Prosecutions</i>	-										
2. <i>PME</i>	-0.37**	-									1.65
3. <i>Race</i>	-0.13**	0.27**	-								1.22
4. <i>Conservatism</i>	-0.28**	0.52**	0.19**	-							2.06
5. <i>Attitudes toward “the Policed”</i>	-0.33**	0.53**	0.23**	0.69**	-						2.16
6. <i>General Attitudes toward the Police</i>	-0.14**	0.33**	0.32**	0.27**	0.26**	-					1.42
7. <i>Negative Direct Contact</i>	0.12**	-0.13**	-0.10*	-0.13**	-0.15**	-0.20**	-				1.14
8. <i>Negative Vicarious Contact</i>	0.12**	-0.16**	-0.20**	-0.12**	-0.18**	-0.25**	0.28**	-			1.21
9. <i>Perceptions of Police Misconduct</i>	0.30**	-0.36**	-0.32**	-0.31**	-0.32**	-0.46**	0.23**	0.30**	-		1.61
10. <i>Media Exposure to Police Misconduct</i>	0.21**	-0.20**	-0.20**	-0.24**	-0.24**	-0.25**	0.12**	0.10*	0.39**	-	1.23

*p < .05, **p < .01

Table 4.16. Ordinal Logistic Regression Results: Independent Prosecutions

Variable	B (S.E.)	Wald
<i>Independent Variables</i>		
Police-Military Equivalency	-0.19** (0.04)	18.32
Conservatism	-0.01 (0.02)	0.46
Negative Attitudes toward “the Policed”	-0.10* (0.04)	5.68
<i>Control Variables</i>		
General Attitudes toward the Police	0.09 (0.09)	0.92
Negative Direct Contact	0.17 (0.35)	0.24
Negative Vicarious Contact	-0.03 (0.24)	0.02
Perceptions of Police Misconduct	0.66** (0.17)	14.60
Media Exposure to Police Misconduct	0.27* (0.12)	4.96
<i>Demographic Variables</i>		
White	-0.08 (0.21)	0.13
Female	0.39* (0.18)	4.80
Age	0.00 (0.03)	0.02
Criminal Justice Major	-0.28 (0.20)	1.95
Interested in Policing	-0.24 (0.20)	1.51
Thresholds		
1	-4.07 (1.05)	15.02
2	-2.95 (1.03)	8.16
3	-1.64 (1.02)	2.57
4	0.78 (1.02)	0.58
N = 526; Nagelkerke R^2 = 0.28; χ^2 = 157.16; -2 Log Likelihood = 1186.53		

*p<.05, **p<.01

The results of the independent prosecutions model are displayed in Table 4.16. The model fit statistic ($\chi^2 = 157.16$) is significant at $p < .01$ with 13 degrees of freedom, which means that the model is a good fit for the data. The Nagelkerke R^2 indicates that 28% of the variation in support for independent prosecutions can be explained by the independent variables in the model. The findings of this model indicate that higher levels of belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers are significantly related to lower levels of support for independent prosecutions. Interestingly, race and conservatism were not significant in the model, but attitudes toward “the policed” is significant just as it was in the other models; respondents with more negative attitudes toward people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods tended to have lower levels of support for this police accountability policy. In addition, both perceptions of and media exposure to police misconduct were positive significant predictors of support for independent prosecutions; in other words, respondents who perceived more police misconduct or

heard about cases of police misconduct more often were more likely to support this policy.

Finally, sex was a significant predictor of support for this policy, with female respondents having significantly higher levels of support than male respondents.

Model 5: The Ray Tensing Case

The final model examines support for convicting former University of Cincinnati Police Department officer Ray Tensing for the 2015 shooting death of Samuel DuBose, an unarmed African American motorist. The dependent variable for this model is measured on a five-point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” and thus, ordinal logistic regression will be used if the model meets the required assumptions. However, the statistic for the test of parallel lines ($\chi^2 = 106.84$) for this model is significant at $p < .01$ with 45 degrees of freedom, which means multinomial logistic regression was used instead and the responses were recoded into three categories (disagree, neutral, and agree). The results of the survey indicate that 16.8% of the respondents did not believe Tensing should have been convicted, 31.8% did not have an opinion, and 51.3% believed that he should have been convicted. A second test of parallel lines using this three-category measure of support for convicting Tensing was conducted to see if it could be used in an ordinal regression model. The test statistic ($\chi^2 = 68.72$) is significant at $p < .01$ with 15 degrees of freedom, which indicates that multinomial logistic regression is the correct type of regression to be used for this model.

Before estimating the model, it is also important to test whether multicollinearity is an issue for the variables in the analysis. Table 4.17 displays correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors for all of the main variables in the analysis. Because the highest VIF of any of the variables in the analysis is 2.28, it can be concluded that multicollinearity is not present in this model (Allison, 2012).

Table 4.17. Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics – Ray Tensing Model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	VIF
1. <i>Support for Convicting Tensing</i>	-											
2. <i>PME</i>	-0.42**	-										1.64
3. <i>Race</i>	-0.30**	0.30**	-									1.23
4. <i>Conservatism</i>	-0.32**	0.52**	0.20**	-								2.08
5. <i>Attitudes toward “the Policed”</i>	-0.36**	0.55**	0.25**	0.70**	-							2.28
6. <i>Negative Direct Contact</i>	0.16**	-0.15**	-0.11*	-0.16**	-0.16**	-						1.15
7. <i>Negative Vicarious Contact</i>	0.18**	-0.17**	-0.22**	-0.14**	-0.21**	0.29**	-					1.23
8. <i>Perceptions of Police Misconduct</i>	0.36**	-0.33**	-0.34**	-0.29**	-0.31**	0.23**	0.30**	-				1.48
9. <i>Media Exposure to Police Misconduct</i>	0.23**	-0.20**	-0.18**	-0.23**	-0.23**	0.11*	0.11*	0.38**	-			1.21
10. <i>Watched Video of Incident</i>	0.10*	0.00	-0.07	0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.09	0.09	0.01	-		1.53
11. <i>Followed Case Closely</i>	0.07	-0.10*	-0.05	-0.10*	-0.12*	0.06	0.16**	0.17**	0.13**	0.53**	-	1.54

*p < .05, **p < .01

Table 4.18. Multinomial Regression Results: Convict Ray Tensing

	Disagree+			Agree+			Agree++		
	B(S.E.)	Wald	Exp(B)	B(S.E.)	Wald	Exp(B)	B (S.E.)	Wald	Exp(B)
<i>Independent Variables</i>									
PME	0.12 (0.08)	1.98	1.12	-0.17** (0.07)	6.76	0.84	-0.29** (0.08)	12.99	0.75
Conservatism	0.03 (0.03)	0.82	1.03	0.01 (0.03)	0.27	1.01	-0.02 (0.03)	0.26	0.98
Attitudes toward “the Policed”	0.13 (0.08)	2.64	1.14	-0.05 (0.06)	0.63	0.95	-0.18* (0.08)	4.98	0.83
<i>Control Variables</i>									
Negative Direct	-0.54 (1.13)	0.22	0.58	0.80 (0.58)	1.91	2.23	1.33 (1.13)	1.40	3.78
Negative Vicarious	-0.08 (0.52)	0.03	0.92	0.05 (0.38)	0.02	1.05	0.14 (0.51)	0.07	1.15
Perceptions of Police Misconduct	-0.39 (0.47)	0.68	0.68	0.80** (0.29)	7.98	2.23	1.19** (0.44)	7.31	3.30
Media Exposure to Police Misconduct	0.01 (0.22)	0.00	1.01	0.33 (0.18)	3.47	1.39	0.33 (0.21)	2.31	1.38
Followed Trial	1.00** (0.24)	18.09	2.73	0.53** (0.19)	7.83	1.70	-0.48* (0.23)	4.33	0.62
Watched Video of Incident	0.43 (0.49)	0.78	1.54	1.32** (0.37)	13.16	3.74	0.90 (0.53)	2.81	2.46
<i>Demographic Variables</i>									
White	-0.08 (0.50)	0.03	0.92	-0.96** (0.33)	8.68	0.38	-0.88 (0.47)	3.48	0.41
Female	-0.30 (0.35)	0.74	0.74	0.43 (0.27)	2.57	1.54	0.73* (0.35)	4.46	2.08
Age	0.08 (0.08)	0.95	1.08	0.08 (0.07)	1.20	1.08	0.01 (0.05)	0.01	1.01
CJ Major	0.33 (0.42)	0.60	1.39	0.14 (0.31)	0.19	1.15	-0.19 (0.43)	0.21	0.83
Live on Campus	0.04 (0.40)	0.01	1.04	0.48 (0.31)	2.44	1.62	0.44 (0.39)	1.32	1.55
Interested in Policing	-0.31 (0.39)	0.61	0.73	-0.01 (0.30)	0.00	0.99	0.29 (0.39)	0.57	1.34

N = 446; Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.47$; $\chi^2 = 235.96$

*p<.05, **p<.01

+Neither Agree nor Disagree is the reference category; ++Disagree is the reference category

The results of the multinomial logistic regression used for the Ray Tensing model are displayed in Table 4.18. The model fit statistic ($\chi^2 = 235.96$) is significant at $p < .01$ with 30 degrees of freedom, which means that the model is a good fit for the data. The Nagelkerke R^2 (0.47) indicates that approximately 47% of the variation in support for convicting Tensing can be explained by the independent variables used in the model. The first two columns in Table 4.18 use not having an opinion about the case as the reference category. Unsurprisingly, respondents who followed the case more closely were significantly more likely to have an opinion about it, whether they believed he should have been convicted or not. When comparing those who disagreed with the idea of convicting Tensing to those who were neutral, no other variable was a significant predictor of falling into one category or the other. When comparing those who supported convicting Tensing to those who were neutral, respondents who possessed a higher level of agreement in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers were more likely to be neutral. In addition, minority respondents, female respondents, and respondents who watched the video of Tensing's death were significantly more likely to fall into the agree category relative to the neutral category.

The third column compares those who support the idea of convicting Tensing with those who oppose it. As hypothesized, the findings indicate that respondents with a higher level of belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers are significantly more likely to disagree with the idea of convicting Tensing than agree. More negative attitudes toward "the policed" are also significantly related to being opposed to convicting Tensing relative to supporting convicting him. Finally, even after controlling for all of the other variables in the analysis, male respondents were more likely to disagree with the idea of convicting Tensing than to agree with it. However, race was not a significant factor in the third column; white

respondents were not more likely to fall into the disagree category than the agree category. To examine race further, a crosstab was created of support for convicting Tensing by race. The results are displayed in Table 4.19.

Table 4.19. Support for Convicting Tensing by Race

	Race					
	Minority		White		Total	
	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%	<i>f</i>	%
<i>Disagree</i>	7	5.7	68	21.0	75	16.8
<i>Neutral</i>	21	17.2	121	37.3	142	31.8
<i>Agree</i>	94	77.0	135	41.7	229	51.3
<i>Total</i>	122	100	324	100	446	100

The chi-square test of independence ($\chi^2 = 45.15$) for this crosstab is significant at $p < .01$ with 2 degrees of freedom, which means that there is significant association between race and support for convicting Tensing. In addition, the Cramer's V (0.32) indicates that there is a moderate relationship between race and support for convicting Tensing. While over three-fourths of the minority respondents in the subsample agreed that Tensing should be convicted, only 41.5% of white respondents felt the same way. In addition, a higher percentage of white respondents did not have an opinion about the Tensing case (37.3%) than minority respondents (17.2%). Crosstabs were also created of support for convicting Tensing by how closely respondents followed the case. Crosstabs were created separately for white and minority respondents and are displayed in Tables 4.20 and 4.21.

Table 4.20. Crosstab of Support for Convicting Tensing by How Closely They Followed the Case - White Respondents

How Closely Did You Follow Ray Tensing's Trials?											
		<i>Not at All</i>		<i>Not Very Closely</i>		<i>Fairly Closely</i>		<i>Very Closely</i>		<i>Total</i>	
		<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>
Ray Tensing Should Have Been Convicted and Sent to Prison	Disagree	3	7.5	16	13.7	39	30.7	10	25.0	68	21.0
	Neutral	31	77.5	55	47.0	25	19.7	10	25.0	121	37.3
	Agree	6	15.0	46	39.3	63	49.6	20	50.0	135	41.7
Total		40	100	117	100	127	100	40	100	324	100

Table 4.21. Crosstab of Support for Convicting Tensing by How Closely They Followed the Case - Minority Respondents

How Closely Did You Follow Ray Tensing's Trials?											
		<i>Not at All</i>		<i>Not Very Closely</i>		<i>Fairly Closely</i>		<i>Very Closely</i>		<i>Total</i>	
		<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>
Ray Tensing Should Have Been Convicted and Sent to Prison	Disagree	0	0.0	3	7.0	2	5.1	2	8.0	7	5.7
	Neutral	7	46.7	10	23.3	3	7.7	1	4.0	21	17.2
	Agree	8	53.3	30	69.8	34	87.2	22	88.0	94	77.0
Total		15	100	43	100	39	100	25	100	124	100

In comparing the two crosstabs, it would appear that minorities were more likely to support convicting Tensing, particularly if they followed the case fairly or very closely. Among white respondents, support for convicting Tensing stayed pretty consistent for those who followed the case not very closely, fairly closely, and very closely. Neutrality for both white and minority respondents tended to decrease the more they followed the case, but white neutrality remained nearly four times higher for white respondents who followed the case very closely compared to minority respondents who followed the case very closely.

Conclusion

In the next chapter, a discussion of the study findings is presented. Specifically, they will be discussed in the context of the current research. Furthermore, the final chapter also discusses

limitations of the study and offers suggestions about future research that examines the police-military equivalency, citizen beliefs about policies intended to increase police accountability and their support for groups that favor increased accountability of the police.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION

This final chapter will review the main findings of the study and discuss what they mean in detail. As a reminder, the research questions for this study were:

1. Do respondents believe that there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers?
2. Are people with negative attitudes toward “the policed” less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability and convicting Ray Tensing for the shooting death of Samuel DuBose?
3. Are people with more conservative crime ideologies more likely to believe there is an equivalency between police officers and soldiers and less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?
4. Are citizens who believe in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers less likely to support Black Lives Matter, increasing police accountability, and convicting Ray Tensing?

This chapter will explore what this study adds to the literature about perceptions of the police and support for police accountability. Next, it will discuss possible limitations of the study that should be considered when examining the results. Finally, it will suggest directions for future research and ways that this study can be replicated and improved upon in the future.

A Review of the Findings

The purpose of this study was to examine perceptions of the police from an angle not previously examined by researchers. Generally, past studies of perceptions of the police have focused on confidence in or satisfaction with the police (e.g., Brandl, Frank, Worden, & Bynum, 1994; Hurst & Frank, 2000; Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2005). This study examined attitudes toward the police from the angle of police militarization with the idea that police-militarization has

transferred the “us versus them” mentality from police officers to the citizenry and impacted the way that citizens perceive the police and those who are being policed. This perceived equivalency between police officers and soldiers is measured as a scale comprised of three measures related to equivalency in perceived dangerousness, equivalency in required tactics, and equivalency in required equipment. This study used this scale to examine whether a belief that police officers are equivalent to soldiers can be predicted by conservatism and negative attitudes toward people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods and be predictive of support for three different types of police accountability (policies, a movement, and holding a specific police officer accountable for shooting an unarmed civilian).

The two key independent variables in the study are attitudes toward “the policed” and conservatism. As stated earlier, past research has found that neighborhoods with higher percentages of African Americans are more likely to be perceived by white Americans as being dangerous and low in social control (Pickett, Chiricos, Golden, & Gertz, 2012; Quillian & Pager, 2001, 2010). Thus, when the respondents were asked about their attitudes toward “people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods,” they could be symbolically answering questions about African Americans. In fact, the wording for three of the items on the attitudes toward “the policed” scale came from past studies on symbolic racism toward African Americans: the idea of them being lazy, the idea of them taking advantage of public assistance, and the idea of being responsible for their own problems (e.g., Barkan & Cohn, 1998; Henry & Sears, 2002; Tarman & Sears, 2005). In addition to these three items, the scale includes a measure of whether people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods should be more respectful towards the police. For conservatism, an eleven-item scale that captures a belief in a conservative crime ideology was used (e.g., Dunaway & Cullen, 1991). Conservatism has also been linked to higher levels of

support for the police (e.g., Cao, Frank, & Cullen, 1996), lower levels of belief in the idea that African Americans are being treated unfairly by the police (e.g., Gabbidon & Higgins, 2009), and more likely to support police use of deadly force (e.g., Cullen et al., 1996). In the past, symbolic racism has also been linked to higher levels of conservatism (Tarman & Sears, 2005).

To test the hypotheses, a sample of undergraduate students taking criminal justice classes at the University of Cincinnati's Uptown West Campus was surveyed in January of 2018. The findings of the study are generally supportive of the proposed hypotheses, with some exceptions. White respondents, male respondents, more conservative respondents, and respondents with more negative attitudes toward residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods had higher levels of belief in a police-military equivalency. In turn, a belief in the police-military equivalency was predictive of more negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter and higher levels of support for independent prosecutions of police officers who shoot civilians and convicting Ray Tensing, a former officer with the University of Cincinnati Police Department, for the 2015 shooting death of Samuel DuBose, an unarmed African American motorist. In addition, more conservative respondents tended to have more negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter and surprisingly, were more likely to support independent investigations. Attitudes towards "the policed" was more consistently significant in the police accountability models than conservatism, with more negative attitudes being related to negative attitudes toward Black Lives Matter and an opposition to independent investigations, independent prosecutions, and convicting Tensing. The following sections will discuss what these findings mean, what they contribute to the literature on perceptions of the police, and what can be concluded about public support for police accountability.

The Existence of a Belief in Police-Military Equivalency

As discussed earlier, the police-military equivalency, as expected, can be predicted by higher levels of conservatism and more negative attitudes toward people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods. This lends some credibility to the idea that the “us versus them” mentality that has developed over time, likely due to police militarization (Campbell & Campbell, 2010), has been transferred from the minds of police officers to the minds of some of the citizenry.

However, it is important to keep in mind that more respondents in the sample disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statements related to police-military equivalency than agreed or strongly agreed. For example, while 35.6% of respondents agreed that there was an equivalency in dangerousness between police officers and soldiers, 39.8% disagreed. This pattern was even more pronounced when examining the responses to the equivalency in required tactics (20.8% agreed versus 58% disagreed) and required equipment (12.6% agreed versus 67.6% disagreed) items. This could indicate that a belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers is not necessarily a common one in the sample.

While it is possible that high levels of belief in the police-military equivalency are predicting low levels of support for police accountability, the skewed distribution of responses could indicate that the opposite is actually the case. Students who outright reject any equivalency between soldiers and police officers could be more likely to strongly support police accountability. A replication of this study with supplemental qualitative analysis could examine the thought processes of those who reject that there is any equivalency between police officers and soldiers.

As hypothesized, attitudes toward “the policed” were significant predictors of believing in the police-military equivalency. As stated earlier, one of the hypotheses of this study was that

the logical extension of believing police officers to be equivalent to soldiers is that the people being policed are enemy combatants that need to be fought instead of citizens that need to be served. The results of the first model are consistent with this hypothesis; respondents with more negative attitudes toward people living in poor, high crime neighborhoods were more likely to believe in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers.

The multi-item conservatism scale was also a significant predictor of a belief in the police-military equivalency. Because this scale captures a belief that society is too soft on crime and that more severe criminal sanctions and policies are needed to control and deter crime (Dunaway & Cullen, 1991), this finding is not surprising. Another reason that this finding is not surprising is that past research has found that higher values on this scale are related to more permissive attitudes towards police use of force (Cullen et al., 1996). It makes sense that respondents with higher levels of conservatism would also be more accepting of police using military tactics and equipment to control and reduce crime, and thus believing that they are equivalent to the military.

In addition to conservatism and attitudes toward “the policed,” confidence in or general attitudes toward the police was a significant predictor of a belief in the equivalency. General attitudes toward the police is typically used as a dependent variable in studies of perception of the police (e.g., Brandl, Frank, Worden, & Bynum, 1994). It is possible that being more confident in the police could be related to one’s willingness to trust them with using military tactics and equipment.

Another significant predictor of the equivalency is perceptions of police misconduct; specifically, respondents with higher perceptions of the frequency of police misconduct are less likely to believe in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers. This could be because

respondents who believe police misconduct is more common would be less likely to trust police officers with military weapons and technology. This is consistent with past research, which has found that people with higher perceptions of police misconduct are less likely to have positive perceptions of the police (e.g., Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). The current study has another finding in common with the Weitzer and Tuch (2005) study: media exposure to police misconduct was not significant in predicting perceptions of the police. It is possible that one could hear and read about incidents of police misconduct, but believe they are being exaggerated or overreported by the media. However, media exposure to police misconduct was not significant in predicting a belief in the equivalency between police officers and soldiers. This could also be called a “fake news” effect, meaning that people doubt the veracity of stories reported by media that they believe to be biased in some way. This could also be because the effect of the media coverage of police misconduct is not strong enough to overcome how people feel about the police or the people who are being policed.

As for the relationship between students’ race and their perceptions of the police as soldiers, this study’s findings are consistent with past research on attitudes toward the police. Past research has consistently found that white students are more likely to have more positive perceptions of the police than minorities (e.g., Brunson, 2007; Carter, 1985; Skogan, 2005). For the new dimension of perceptions of the police examined by the current study, white students had significantly higher levels of a belief in a police-military equivalency than minority students. The finding that female respondents were less likely to believe in the equivalency than male respondents adds to the already mixed findings on the relationship between gender and perceptions of the police. Past research has found evidence of no gender differences in perceptions of the police (e.g., Brandl et al., 1994) and of women having more positive

perceptions of the police than men (e.g., Brandl et al., 1994; Hurst & Frank, 2000). The next section will discuss the findings of the models related to support for police accountability.

The Disparities in Support between Police Accountability Policies and Movements

One of the more interesting findings from the study is the disparity in support for police accountability policies (independent investigations and prosecutions of police officers who shoot civilians) and attitudes towards Black Lives Matter, which has made the implementation of these policies a goal. Specifically, there was far greater support for the policies in the sample than there was for Black Lives Matter. The results of the survey indicate that 81.1% of the respondents agreed with the idea of independent investigations and 76.9% agreed with the idea of independent prosecutions. On the other hand, 51.8% of respondents reported some level of support for Black Lives Matter. It would appear that the respondents support the message more than they support the messenger.

The high level of support for the two police accountability policies could be the reason that many of the key variables in the analyses were non-significant or not significant in the hypothesized direction. Even though a belief in the equivalency between police officers and soldiers was only significant in the independent prosecutions model, negative attitudes toward “the policed” (the residents of poor, high crime neighborhoods) were a significant predictor of opposition to independent investigations and prosecutions.

It is important to remember that the attitudes toward “the policed” scale was meant to represent symbolic racism and some of the measures on the scale are based on past research on symbolic racism toward African Americans (Barkan & Cohn, 1998). This could mean that respondents’ willingness to hold police officers accountable for their actions could be related to their negative or racially-biased perceptions of those who are being policed. These attitudes

could make them more likely to be permissive of police misconduct toward the residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods. Conservatism was non-significant in the independent prosecutions model but significantly related to support for independent investigations (relative to opposing them), which would lead to a conclusion that symbolic racism is more of a barrier to implementing these police accountability policies than political ideology.

While no key variables were significant in the independent investigations model other than symbolic racism, the police-military equivalency scale, perceptions of the police, media exposure to police misconduct, and gender were significant in the independent prosecutions model. The significance of the equivalency lends more credibility to the hypothesis that higher levels of belief in it can predict lower support for police accountability. The fact that media exposure to police misconduct was significant in this model but not in any of the others could mean that some respondents are aware of the fact that relatively few police officers are charged or indicted for shooting unarmed civilians and of those who are charged, a small percentage are convicted (Fischer-Baum, 2014; Kindy & Kelly, 2015). If one were to follow high-profile cases where a police officer who shot a civilian did not get charged or indicted, one may feel more strongly about having an independent prosecutor make decisions to charge and prosecute police officers who shoot civilians.

The fact that more variables are significant in the independent prosecutions model than independent investigations model could also mean that the slightly lower level of support for independent prosecutions leads to more variation in responses and that the use of the ordinal regression model instead of the multinomial regression model led to different results. In the future, it would be useful for a study about this topic to ask respondents more questions related to prosecutors and other actors in the criminal justice system besides the police. This study was

primarily interested in perceptions of the police and did not include any variables that specifically measure confidence in prosecutors and the criminal justice system as a whole.

Symbolic racism was also significant in the Black Lives Matter model. This raises more questions about why respondents tend to be supportive of Black Lives Matter's policy recommendations, but not of the movement itself. Perhaps the answer is that racial bias plays a role in the perceptions of Black Lives Matter, with people holding more negative attitudes towards people who live in disadvantaged neighborhoods being more likely to hold negative attitudes towards the movement. It is possible that the rejection of Black Lives Matter is not because of their goals, but because of factors such as their name, which could be mistaken as a statement of supremacy, a disapproval of their tactics of using street protests in response to police officer-involved shootings, or a general indifference or antipathy toward African Americans and any movement that seeks to combat injustice faced by them. This could be explored further in future studies that examine perceptions of Black Lives Matter.

In addition to symbolic racism, the police-military equivalency scale, conservatism, perceptions of police misconduct, race, and gender were significant in the Black Lives Matter model. For the latter two variables, white and male respondents were more likely to have negative attitudes toward Black Lives Matter than minority and female respondents. The significance of the equivalency is further evidence of the relationship between viewing police officers as soldiers and opposing police accountability (or in this case, opposing a movement that is voicing a need for increased police accountability). The significance of race, gender, conservatism is consistent with prior research on attitudes towards Black Lives Matter (Horowitz & Livingston, 2016; Marist College Institute for Public Opinion, 2015). It is logical for perceptions of police misconduct to be significant in the model; one who perceives police

misconduct to be more common in society might be more supportive of a movement with a goal of increasing police accountability for misconduct. It is worth noting that one could argue that respondents who disagreed with the idea of independent investigations and prosecutions are not necessarily anti-police accountability; they could just have high enough confidence in police officers and prosecutors to investigate police officers' in their jurisdiction in an unbiased manner. However, confidence in the police was not a significant predictor of support for independent investigations. It would be beneficial to ask respondents in a future survey that seeks to replicate these results about their attitudes toward local prosecutors in order to examine whether they predict support for independent prosecutions. The next section will discuss the findings of the Ray Tensing model in detail and examine not just support for convicting him for killing Samuel DuBose, but also question why some respondents had strong opinions about the case while others did not.

The Tensing Incident

The fifth model in this study examined support for convicting Ray Tensing and sending him to prison for killing Samuel DuBose. The findings of this model, which included a subsample of the survey respondents who were familiar with the Tensing-DuBose incident, indicate that respondents with higher levels of belief in police-military equivalency were more likely to disagree with or be neutral about the idea of convicting Tensing than agree with it. This is consistent with the hypothesis that those who believe in the equivalency would be more forgiving or permissive of police misconduct.

In addition, while conservatism was not significant in this multinomial regression model, respondents with more negative attitudes toward people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods were more likely to oppose convicting Tensing than support it. This would

suggest that symbolic racism, perhaps even racism specifically towards DuBose, the victim of the shooting, could be a factor in how people feel about the case. They might see DuBose as less of a victim and more like someone who deserved to be killed.

Beyond the key independent variables in the analysis, respondents with higher perceptions of police misconduct tended to be more supportive of convicting Tensing. Perhaps some respondents saw convicting Tensing as a way of sending a message to police officers who commit acts of misconduct, and not just punishing Tensing. The finding of women being more supportive of police accountability than men continued with this model, with female respondents being more likely to fall into the “agree” category than the “disagree” category. While race did not play a significant role in determining whether one supported or opposed convicting Tensing, white respondents were more likely to not have an opinion about the case than minority respondents. The next session will delve deeper into the idea of white ambivalence towards this case, Black Lives Matter, and injustices faced by minorities in the United States.

The “White Moderate”

In April of 1963, during a protest of racial segregation in Birmingham, Alabama, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was arrested and confined in the Birmingham city jail. During his time in the Birmingham jail, a group of white Alabama clergymen put out a statement urging African Americans to abandon the civil rights movement and their methods; even though these clergymen said that they agreed with the goals of the movement, they opposed its methods and felt that they would only lead to disorder, deteriorated race relations, and violence. In response to these clergymen, Dr. King wrote the “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” One passage in this letter stands out as being particularly relevant to the findings of this study:

I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Council or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the time table for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. (King, 2018)

This section will show that some of results of the current study reflect Dr. King's frustrations from 55 years ago.

Black Lives Matter is a movement with the goal of increasing police accountability. The results of the third and the fourth models indicate that support for policies that would require independent investigations and prosecutions of shootings involving police officers is strong. Race and a conservative political ideology were not significant predictors of lower support for these policies. However, even after controlling for the other key variables in the analysis, including conservatism and symbolic racism, being white was a significant predictor of negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter, a movement that seeks to implement these police accountability policies. In other words, white respondents in this sample tended to agree with

this goal of increasing police accountability that Black Lives Matter seeks, but could not agree with its tactics, or as Dr. King put it, “methods of direct action,” to achieve them.

When it comes to support for convicting Ray Tensing of murder for killing Samuel DuBose, there is more evidence of the existence of King’s idea of the “white moderate.” White respondents were not more or less likely to oppose convicting Tensing than they were to support convicting him. They were however, more likely to be neutral towards the idea of convicting him than they were to support convicting him. Again, the vast majority of the sample supported the idea of increasing police accountability through policy implementation. Still, when asked about holding a specific police officer accountable, many white respondents were ambivalent or neutral towards the outcome of the case. The crosstabs of support for convicting Tensing indicate that white respondents were more likely to be neutral about the outcome of the case, no matter how closely they followed the case.

Based on these findings, along with the significance of race in predicting agreement with convicting Tensing relative to being neutral about the case, it would be reasonable to conclude that white respondents were more likely to be ambivalent about the case decision. This does not mean that ambivalence towards the outcome of the case did not exist among minority respondents; it just means that ambivalence is far more common among the white respondents in this subsample. One could conceivably argue that minority respondents could be biased toward the outcome of the case and that could be driving their support for convicting Tensing. However, if it were the facts of the case that were driving this racial disparity in ambivalence toward its result (meaning white respondents were viewing the case more objectively), one could expect there to be a significant difference in race when comparing those who support convicting Tensing to those who oppose it. Since race is only significant when comparing support to

neutrality, it is more likely that white respondents are simply less likely to be invested in or have any opinion about the case than minority respondents.

It would appear that for the sample surveyed for this study, King's words about the "white moderate" are as true today as they were 55 years ago; many of the white respondents in the study support the idea of police accountability, but there is a sizable portion of them that seem to get apprehensive when it comes to supporting a movement that wishes to increase police accountability or seeing a police officer charged with murder held accountable for his actions. They support the goals in theory, but not the path taken to achieve them or seeing one of those goals accomplished in an actual situation of police misconduct.

Limitations

This study is a novel one that examines attitudes toward the police from an angle that has not been explored in previous research. Instead of examining perceptions of police in terms of confidence in or satisfaction with the police, this study asked respondents questions related to whether they perceived them to be equivalent to the military. As stated earlier, this is a new dimension of attitudes towards the police. It also adds to the currently minimal research on support for police accountability by examining three different types of it: support for a police accountability movement, support for implementing police accountability policies, and support for holding a specific police officer accountable for shooting an unarmed African American civilian. However, there are still several limitations to this study that must be remembered when considering the results of the analyses.

The three measures used for the police-military equivalency scale were created for this study and had not been used in any previous surveys. While an exploratory factor analysis led to all three measures loading onto a single factor, this scale's Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = 0.65$) suggests

that it has a questionable level of internal consistency and the measures are moderately correlated to each other at best, with correlation coefficients between the measures ranging from 0.31 to 0.46. In the future, it is recommended that new, additional, or rephrased measures of police-military equivalency be used to create the scale so that a higher level of reliability can be attained. For instance, a future survey could ask respondents whether they believe police officers in high crime neighborhoods should place a greater emphasis on fighting crime rather than focusing on serving the residents of those neighborhoods. This measure would theoretically do a better job of capturing a belief that police officers are soldiers in a “war on crime” instead of public servants. By recalibrating the measures in this scale, one who replicates this study can be more confident in the accuracy of their results.

There are also not enough items on the survey related to reasons why one might oppose Black Lives Matter. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude why some respondents have negative attitudes towards this movement. Future studies would benefit from including measures related to different perceptions about Black Lives Matter in order to fully examine the basis for people’s opinions about it.

In addition, it is important to note that this is a study of college students taking criminal justice classes and not a study of a randomized or more general population. Thus, the results cannot be generalized to the general public to make conclusions about how Americans or even students at the University of Cincinnati as a whole perceive the police and feel about police accountability. Past research has found that compared to the general population, college students tend to have more negative attitudes toward the police and are more likely to believe that the police discriminate against minorities (Mbuba, 2010). Past research has also found that criminal justice majors tend to be more supportive of individual rights compared to students of other

majors (Tsoudis, 2000). Findings related to whether or not criminal justice majors have more or less punitive attitudes than non-criminal justice majors are mixed (Farnworth, Longmire, & West, 1998; Mackey & Courtright, 2000; Shelley, Waid, & Dobbs, 2011; Tsoudis, 2000) and being a criminal justice major was only significant in one of the models used in this study. Still, all of the students in the survey were taking criminal justice classes, which may affect how they perceive the police and think about police accountability. The fact that this study uses a sample of emerging adults and not a more general sample could have also influenced the results. The significance of age in the police-military equivalency model could mean that an older sample of adults might have different perceptions of police-military equivalency. Future studies that seek to replicate the current one should use a more general population to see if the results remain the same. This could mean surveying a sample drawn from a city or state to get more variation in age and education level or an entire college campus to get more variation in academic major. Despite these limitations, the sample did have a representative sample in terms of race and sex and there are still several conclusions and lessons that can be learned from this study. The next and final section will discuss these conclusions and make suggestions for future research involving this topic.

Conclusion

The basis for this study came from listening to how conservative pundits and politicians talk about the police and anyone who seeks to hold them accountable (Balko, 2015a, Flores, 2016; Mac Donald, 2015; Ocasio, 2016; Velez & Golding, 2015). Police officers were being spoken about like they were soldiers in a war on crime instead of public officials with a goal of serving the public. Further, it was hypothesized that believing police officers are equivalent to soldiers would be related to lower levels of support for police accountability and that the logical

extension of believing in this equivalency would be thinking that the people who are most heavily policed (residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods) are enemy combatants. For the most part, the results of the study confirmed these hypotheses.

A belief in the police-military equivalency in terms of the dangerousness of their jobs, required tactics, and required equipment was not common in the sample, but negative attitudes toward residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods was a significant predictor of believing it. In addition, higher levels of belief in the equivalency were related to more negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter, a group that seeks to increase police accountability, and both opposition and indifference to holding a local police officer charged with murder accountable. Thus, the idea that people who believe in this equivalency would be more forgiving or permissive of police misconduct is supported.

On the other hand, support for policies suggested by Black Lives Matter to increase police accountability was extremely high; the vast majority of the respondents agreed that third parties should be conducting investigations in and making prosecutorial decisions about cases involving police officers who shoot civilians. The disparity in support for Black Lives Matter and these policies could indicate that misinformation has caused some to believe many of the falsehoods conservative pundits and politicians have spread about this movement being anti-police and pro-violence against the police (Balko, 2015a, Flores, 2016; Ocasio, 2016; Velez & Golding, 2015). However, it is also important to remember that white Americans had very similar views about the civil rights movement of the 1960s; public opinion polls from the 1960s show that most white Americans did not support the civil rights movement and felt that their actions were causing more harm to their cause than good (Izadi, 2016). While the United States has undoubtedly evolved since the 1960s, it would appear that white ambivalence toward issues

of social justice in the United States still exists. This ambivalence toward the issue of police-involved shootings could mean that some white people are supportive of the policies recommended by Black Lives Matter to hold police accountable, but also believe that Black Lives Matter is doing more harm than good to its cause. A future survey on this topic should specifically ask respondents whether they believe Black Lives Matter is doing more harm than good to its cause.

One thing that this study fails to do is specifically explain why some people have negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter. While symbolic racism and believing the police to be equivalent to the military are significant predictors, this does not provide a clear explanation for the respondents' feelings about this movement. In addition, it is interesting that 24% of respondents reported opposing Black Lives Matter, but 39.9% of respondents agreed that Black Lives Matter is promoting a "war on cops." A crosstab of the responses to these two items is displayed in Appendix D.

The Chi-Square test of independence ($\chi^2 = 401.56$) for the relationship between these two items is significant at $p < .01$ with 16 degrees of freedom. The Cramer's V for this relationship is 0.44. This would mean that there is a significant and moderate relationship between opposing Black Lives Matter and believing that it is promoting a "war on cops." The crosstab indicates that responses to both Black Lives Matter items are highly correlated ($r = 0.7$). Of the 526 respondents in the sample, 41 (7.8%) reported some level of agreement with the idea that Black Lives Matter is promoting a "war on cops" but somewhat or strongly supported the movement anyway. This would suggest that there are some respondents who support Black Lives Matter despite thinking (or because they think) that it is promoting a "war on cops." Only 5 (0.1%) respondents disagreed with the "war on cops" item but still opposed Black Lives Matter. Of the

130 who opposed Black Lives Matter, 117 (90%) of them believed that it was promoting a “war on cops.” The fact that the vast majority of those who oppose Black Lives Matter also believe in the “war on cops” narrative could mean that believing in this narrative is a key reason why many in the sample oppose the movement.

It would be helpful for future studies about attitudes toward Black Lives Matter to include items in their survey about other potential opinions about this movement (e.g., “Black Lives Matter’s name is offensive,” “Black Lives Matter’s tactics are dangerous,” “Black Lives Matter is unpatriotic,” “Black Lives Matter’s primary goal is to increase police accountability”). It would also be a good idea to include a qualitative component where respondents are asked to explain why they support or oppose Black Lives Matter. This would provide a clearer idea of why some people feel so negatively about this movement, whether it is a belief that it is encouraging people to kill police officers, an objection to the name, a disagreement with their methods of protesting injustice, or even a disagreement with the idea that black lives matter.

As discussed earlier, one of the inspirations for this study was research on police militarization. Past researchers have hypothesized that increases in police militarization would lead police officers to adopt an “us versus them” mentality and start viewing members of the communities they work in as threats worthy of being feared instead of citizens who deserve to be served (Campbell & Campbell, 2010). My hypothesis was that the “us versus them” mentality has transferred from the police to the public at-large and that citizens would begin seeing people who live in disadvantaged communities as less worthy of being served and more deserving of military-style tactics. The findings of this study are generally supportive of this hypothesis. Even though a belief in a police-military equivalency is uncommon, negative attitudes toward residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods is a significant predictor of it. It is possible that

increases in police militarization and negative attitudes toward people who live in disadvantaged neighborhoods (symbolic racism) have combined to create an equivalency between police officers and soldiers in the minds of some members of the public, which has led them to be more permissive of police misconduct and reluctant to support increasing police accountability.

An interesting path forward in the research on this topic is examining police-military equivalency in the minds of police officers. One could survey police officers who work in urban areas to examine whether they believe in an equivalency between themselves and soldiers in terms of the dangerousness of their jobs, required equipment, and required tactics. It is also worth examining whether the existence of this equivalency among police officers can be predicted by negative attitudes towards the people that they police. It would also be helpful to explore whether a belief in police-military equivalency among police officers would influence their support for police accountability policies and movements like Black Lives Matter. This potential study could extend this hypothesis to another population and enhance what is known about police perceptions of the people they serve.

The main purposes of this study were to examine perceptions of the police from a new dimension unexplored by previous research, examine support for police accountability, and to test a new hypothesis for why some people may oppose it. The results of the study indicate that a belief in an equivalency between police officers and soldiers is negatively related to support for independent prosecutions of police officers who shoot civilians, attitudes towards Black Lives Matter, and support for convicting a specific police officer who was charged with murder for shooting and killing an unarmed African American man during a traffic stop. The fact that symbolic racism was significant in the equivalency model and all the police accountability models means that one should not be so quick to dismiss calls for police accountability, knowing

the people that oppose it. If the results of this study are replicated with a more general sample, policymakers who hear these calls for accountability and are considering implementing these policies should understand the basis for the pushback against them. They should ask themselves whether they wish to align themselves with the legal scholars, criminal justice scholars, and activists for social justice who support these policies or a minority of people who hold negative and perhaps even racially biased attitudes toward the citizens that the police are meant to serve and protect.

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APPENDIX A – SURVEY MATERIALS AND IRB APPROVAL

Survey Questionnaire

Questions 1 through 9 will ask you about yourself and your status at the University of Cincinnati.

1. Please indicate your race or ethnicity.
 - A. White
 - B. Black/African American
 - C. Hispanic
 - D. Asian
 - E. Other (please specify) _____
2. Please indicate your sex.
 - A. Male
 - B. Female
3. What is your age? _____
4. Are you majoring in Criminal Justice?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
5. Do you live on or off campus?
 - A. On-campus
 - B. Off-campus
6. Do you live within the city limits of Cincinnati?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
7. Are you considering a career in law enforcement?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
8. Are you a veteran or a military dependent?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
9. Are you in an R.O.T.C. program or considering a career in the military?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No

Questions 10 through 24 will ask you about your attitudes toward the police and any contacts you or your friends may have had with them in the past year.

10. In general, I am confident in the police.
 - A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
11. Have you had an interaction with a police officer (local or state) within the past year?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - C. Skip
12. How do you feel you were treated by the police officer during that interaction?
 - A. Very Fairly
 - B. Somewhat Fairly
 - C. Somewhat Unfairly
 - D. Very Unfairly
 - E. Not applicable
13. Within the past year, has anyone you know had an interaction with a police officer (local or state)?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No
 - C. Skip
14. If so, how do you feel this person was treated by the police?
 - A. Very Fairly
 - B. Somewhat Fairly
 - C. Somewhat Unfairly
 - D. Very Unfairly
 - E. Not applicable
15. How often do you think the police commit acts of misconduct (e.g., excessive force, verbal abuse, corruption)?
 - A. Very Often
 - B. Fairly Often
 - C. On Occasion
 - D. Never

16. How often do you read or hear about incidents of police misconduct (e.g., excessive force, verbal abuse, corruption)?
- A. Very Often
 - B. Fairly Often
 - C. On Occasion
 - D. Never
17. The media is promoting a “war on police” today.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
18. There is a “war on police” in America today.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
19. Police officers are equivalent to soldiers.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
20. Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods face similar dangers as soldiers in war zones.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
21. Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods should be allowed to do anything they need to do (e.g., use force, stop and frisk) to control and reduce crime.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree

22. Police officers working in high crime neighborhoods need military equipment and weapons to control and deter crime.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
23. Shootings of people by local police officers should be investigated by third parties who do not have connections to that department (e.g., state or federal law enforcement).
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
24. Decisions to charge and prosecute local police officers who shoot people should be handled by third parties who do not have connections to that department (e.g., state or federal prosecutors).
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree

Questions 25 through 28 will ask you about your thoughts regarding and the extent that you followed the 2015 incident where Ray Tensing, an officer in the University of Cincinnati Police Department, shot and killed an unarmed motorist named Samuel DuBose near campus.

25. Are you aware of the 2015 incident where University of Cincinnati police officer Ray Tensing shot and killed Samuel DuBose?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
26. Have you seen the video of Ray Tensing shooting Samuel DuBose?
- A. Yes
 - B. No
27. How closely did you follow Ray Tensing's trials?
- A. Very Closely
 - B. Fairly Closely
 - C. Not Very Closely
 - D. Not at All

28. Ray Tensing should have been convicted and sent to prison for killing Samuel DuBose.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree

Questions 29 and 30 will ask about your perceptions of safety and crime in Cincinnati.

29. How safe do you or would you feel walking alone at night on campus and in the areas immediately surrounding campus (e.g., McMillan, Calhoun, Short Vine)?
- A. Very unsafe
 - B. Somewhat unsafe
 - C. Somewhat safe
 - D. Very safe
30. Do you feel that overall crime in Cincinnati is improving, staying the same, or getting worse?
- A. Getting worse
 - B. Staying the same
 - C. Getting better

Questions 31 through 34 will ask you about your feelings towards people who live in poor, high crime neighborhoods.

31. People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods are lazy.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
32. People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods take advantage of welfare.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
33. People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods should be more respectful of the police.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree

34. People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods are responsible for their own problems.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree

Questions 35 through 37 will ask you about your feelings towards Black Lives Matter.

35. How familiar are you with Black Lives Matter?

- A. Very familiar
- B. Somewhat familiar
- C. Not very familiar
- D. Not familiar at all

36. How do you feel about Black Lives Matter?

- A. Strongly Support
- B. Somewhat Support
- C. Neither Support nor Oppose
- D. Somewhat Oppose
- E. Strongly Oppose

37. Black Lives Matter is promoting a “War on Cops.”

- A. Strongly Disagree
- B. Disagree
- C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
- D. Agree
- E. Strongly Agree

Questions 38 through 49 will ask you about your political orientation and your feelings about crime and policies meant to control and prevent crime in this country.

38. How would you describe your political orientation?

- A. Extremely Liberal
- B. Liberal
- C. Slightly Liberal
- D. Moderate
- E. Slightly Conservative
- F. Conservative
- G. Extremely Conservative
- H. Don't Know

39. Crime has increased because society has become too permissive.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
40. Stiffer jail sentences are needed to show criminals that crime does not pay and thus to make sure that they do not go into crime again.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
41. We should hire a lot more police and give them the power to catch criminals.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
42. If we really cared about crime victims, we would make sure that criminals were caught and given harsh punishments.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
43. We should stop viewing criminals as victims of society who deserve our help, and start paying more attention to the victims of these criminals.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
44. Criminals these days have too many legal rights.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree

45. The best way to reduce crime is to reestablish the traditional values that made our country great: hard work, religion, respect for authority, and firm discipline in both home and school.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
46. Even if prisons cannot deter or rehabilitate criminals, long prison sentences are needed so that we can keep habitual and dangerous offenders off of our streets.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
47. Juveniles are treated too leniently by our courts.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
48. Punishing criminals more harshly would reduce crime by setting an example and showing others in society that crime does not pay.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree
49. A main reason why we have so many crimes these days is because young people are just not taught to respect authority.
- A. Strongly Disagree
 - B. Disagree
 - C. Neither Disagree nor Agree
 - D. Agree
 - E. Strongly Agree

Invitation Email to Professors

Dear Professor,

We are asking your help with administering a survey to students that asks about their attitudes toward the police, Black Lives Matter, and crime in their community. We are contacting professors who teach undergraduate courses and asking them to administer surveys in their classes. The study is anonymous and student participation is voluntary. The survey should only take around 15 to 20 minutes to complete.

The study entitled "Perceptions of the Police, Black Lives Matter, and Crime in the Community" has been approved by the UC Institutional Review Board. The study does not pose any risks to study participants and meets all Human Subjects requirements.

We would welcome the opportunity to talk with you to discuss the proposed administration of the survey, if you think that is necessary. If you are willing to help with the process, please contact us by email. We will provide you with copies of the survey instrument and the accompanying information sheet for students. We will send a proctor to your class to distribute and administer the survey. To avoid the possibility of your students feeling like they are being coerced into participating in the survey, we request that you please wait outside of the classroom while the survey is being distributed and administered.

We look forward to hearing of your decision. Thank you for your consideration of this project.

Sincerely,

Omeed Ilchi
ilchios@ucmail.uc.edu
240-620-5154

James Frank
james.frank@uc.edu
556-5832

Survey Information Sheet for Students

**Information Sheet for Research
University of Cincinnati
School of Criminal Justice
Principal Investigators: James Frank and Omeed Ilchi**

Title of the Study: Perceptions of the Police, Black Lives Matter, and Crime in the Community

Introduction:

You are being asked to assist with the data collection for a research study. Please read this sheet carefully and email Omeed Ilchi at ilchios@ucmail.uc.edu if you have any questions.

Who is doing this research study?

The persons in charge of this research study are James Frank, a Professor in the University of Cincinnati School of Criminal Justice and Omeed Ilchi, a Doctoral Candidate in the University of Cincinnati School of Criminal Justice.

What is the purpose of this research study?

The purpose of this study is to examine students' attitudes toward the police, Black Lives Matter, and crime in the community.

Who will be in this research study?

Surveys will be distributed to all undergraduate classes within the School of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati. If you have already taken the survey, please do not take it again.

What will you be asked to do in this research study, and how long will it take?

You will be asked to complete a survey in class. This survey is designed to be completed within 15 to 20 minutes. Once the surveys are done, please return them to the person who distributed the survey.

Are there any risks to being in this research study?

Because the topics covered in this survey can be considered sensitive, there is a chance that the questions will make you uncomfortable. Feel free to skip any questions that you do not feel comfortable answering.

Are there any benefits from being in this research study?

There are no expected benefits for you, but participating in this study could help enhance knowledge about attitudes toward the police and Black Lives Matter.

What will you get because of being in this research study?

You will not be paid to take part in this study.

Do you have choices about taking part in this research study?

Participation in the study is completely voluntary. Your participation, or failure to participate, will not influence your grade in this course. By submitting your completed survey, you are indicating your consent for your answers to be used in our study.

How will your research information be kept confidential?

You may be assured that your answers to these questions will be kept strictly confidential. After you return your survey to the proctor, he or she will put it in a sealed envelope with the rest of your classmates' surveys. The envelope will not be opened until it is received by the PIs. All of the information you provide will be stored electronically off-campus on the co-PI's non-shared, password-protected computer. The results of the survey will be held indefinitely for potential future research. However, your name does not appear anywhere on the survey, so even though findings from this research study may be published, you will not be identified by name.

What are your legal rights in this research study?

Nothing in this consent form waives any legal rights you may have. This consent form also does not release the investigator, the University, or its agents from liability for negligence.

What if you have questions about this research study?

If you have any questions or concerns about this research study, please email the PIs at ilchios@ucmail.uc.edu and james.frank@uc.edu. You can also call Omeed Ilchi at REDACTED.

The UC Institutional Review Board reviews all research projects that involve human participants to be sure the rights and welfare of participants are protected.

If you have questions about your rights as a participant or complaints about the study, you may contact the UC IRB at (513) 558-5259. Or, you may call the UC Research Compliance Hotline at (800) 889-1547, or write to the IRB, 300 University Hall, ML 0567, 51 Goodman Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0567, or email the IRB office at irb@ucmail.uc.edu.

Do you HAVE to take part in this research study?

No one has to be in this research study. Refusing to take part will NOT cause any penalty or loss of benefits that you would otherwise have.

You may start the survey and then change your mind and stop at any time. You may also skip any questions that you don't want to answer.

BY SUBMITTING YOUR SURVEY YOU INDICATE YOUR CONSENT FOR YOUR ANSWERS TO BE USED IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY.

PLEASE KEEP THIS INFORMATION SHEET FOR YOUR REFERENCE.

Institutional Review Board Approval

**Institutional Review Board - Federalwide Assurance
#00003152
University of Cincinnati**

Date: 9/13/2017
From: UC IRB
To: Principal Investigator: James Frank
CECH Criminal Justice
Study ID: [2017-3871](#)
Re: Study Title: Perceptions of the Police, Black Lives Matter, and the Crime in the Community

The above referenced protocol and all applicable additional documentation provided to the IRB were reviewed and **APPROVED** using an **EXPEDITED** review procedure in accordance with 45 CFR 46.110(b)(1)(see below) on **9/12/2017**.

This study will be due for continuing review at least 30 days before: 9/11/2018.

The following was reviewed:

Study Documents

Ilchi Survey Letter 9-11-17.docx

Information Sheet for Students

James Frank's CV

Omeed Ilchi's CV

Police and Community IRB

Survey Questions

The IRB reviewer has determined that this research presents **no greater than minimal risk**.

Please note the following requirements:

Consent Requirements

Per 45 CFR 46.117 (21 CFR 56.109) the IRB has waived the requirement to obtain DOCUMENTATION of informed consent for all adult participants.

AMENDMENTS: The principal investigator is responsible for notifying the IRB of any changes in the protocol, participating investigators, procedures, recruitment, consent forms, FDA status, or conflicts of interest. Approval is based on the information as submitted. New procedures cannot be initiated until IRB approval has been given. If you wish to change any aspect of this study, please submit an Amendment via ePAS to the IRB, providing a justification for each requested change.

CONTINUING REVIEW: The investigator is responsible for submitting a Continuing Review via ePAS to the IRB at least 30 days prior to the expiration date listed above. Please note that study procedures may only continue into the next cycle if the IRB has reviewed and granted re-approval prior to the expiration date.

UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS: The investigator is responsible for reporting **unanticipated problems** promptly to the IRB via ePAS according to current reporting policies.

STUDY COMPLETION: The investigator is responsible for notifying the IRB by submitting a Request to Close via ePAS when the research, including data analysis, has completed.

Please note: This approval is through the IRB only. You may be responsible for reporting to other regulatory officials (e.g. VA Research and Development Office, UC Health – University Hospital). Please check with your institution and department to ensure you have met all reporting requirements.

Statement regarding The International Conference on Harmonization and Good clinical Practices: The Institutional Review Board is duly constituted (fulfilling FDA requirements for diversity), has written procedures for initial and continuing review of clinical trials: prepares written minutes of convened meetings and retains records pertaining to the review and approval process all in compliance with requirements defined in 21 CFR Parts 50, 56 and 312 Code of Federal Regulations. This institution is in compliance with the ICH GCP as adopted by FDA/DHHS.

Thank you for your cooperation during the review process.

Research Categories

7. Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or quality assurance methodologies. (NOTE: Some research in this category may be exempt from the HHS regulations for the protection of human subjects. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) and (b)(3). This listing refers only to research that is not exempt.)

APPENDIX B: SURVEY RESULTS

Exploratory Factor Analysis Results

Variable	Loading on Factor 1
<u><i>Police-Military Equivalency</i></u>	
1. Equivalency in Dangerousness	0.716
2. Equivalency in Required Tactics	0.772
3. Equivalency in Required Equipment	0.813
<u><i>Negative Attitudes toward Black Lives Matter</i></u>	
1. Opposition to Black Lives Matter	0.919
2. Black Lives Matter is promoting a War on Cops	0.919
<u><i>Conservative Crime Ideology</i></u>	
1. Society is too permissive	0.574
2. Stiffer jail sentences are needed	0.748
3. More police needed	0.653
4. Make sure criminals get harsh punishments	0.706
5. Stop viewing criminals as victims	0.661
6. Criminals have too many rights	0.699
7. Reestablish traditional values	0.648
8. Long prison sentences needed to incapacitate	0.669
9. Juveniles treated too leniently by courts	0.554
10. Show society crime does not pay	0.785
11. Young people not taught to respect authority	0.710
<u><i>Attitudes toward the "Policed"</i></u>	
1. Are lazy	0.854
2. Take advantage of welfare	0.857
3. Should be more respectful of the police	0.729
4. Are responsible for their own problems	0.639

Descriptive Statistics for All Key Variables in the Analyses

<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Police Military Equivalency Measures (<i>1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree</i>)					
• Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods face similar dangers as soldiers in war zones.	526	1	5	2.84	1.15
• Police officers who work in high crime neighborhoods should be allowed to do anything they need to do (e.g., use force, stop and frisk) to control and reduce crime.	526	1	5	2.48	1.08
• Police officers working in high crime neighborhoods need military equipment and weapons to control and deter crime.	526	1	5	2.21	1.01
• “Police-Military Equivalency” Scale ($\alpha = 0.65$)	526	3	15	7.53	2.48
Black Lives Matter Measures					
• How do you feel about Black Lives Matter? (<i>1 = Strongly Support; 2 = Somewhat Support; 3 = Neither Support nor Oppose; 4 = Somewhat Oppose; 5 = Strongly Oppose</i>)	526	1	5	2.58	1.32
• Black Lives Matter is promoting a “War on Cops.” (<i>1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree</i>)	526	1	5	3.05	1.24
• “Attitudes towards Black Lives Matter” Scale ($\alpha = 0.82$)	526	2	10	5.63	2.36
• How familiar are you with Black Lives Matter? (<i>1 = Not Familiar at All; 2 = Not Very Familiar; 3 = Somewhat Familiar; 4 = Very Familiar</i>)	526	1	4	3.32	0.63
Police Accountability Policies (<i>1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree</i>)					
• Shootings of people by local police officers should be investigated by third parties who do not have connections to that department (e.g., state or federal law enforcement).	526	1	5	4.04	0.92
• Decisions to charge and prosecute local police officers who shoot people should be handled by third parties who do not have connections to that department (e.g., state or federal prosecutors).	526	1	5	3.96	0.99

Attitudes toward “the Policed” Measures (<i>1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree</i>)					
• People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods are lazy.	526	1	5	2.18	0.93
• People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods take advantage of welfare.	526	1	5	2.79	1.08
• People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods should be more respectful of the police	526	1	5	3.36	0.98
• People living in poor, high crime neighborhoods are responsible for their own problems.	526	1	5	2.65	1.07
• “Attitudes toward ‘the Policed’” Scale ($\alpha = 0.77$)	526	4	20	10.97	3.13
Conservative Crime Ideology (<i>1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree</i>)					
• Crime has increased because society has become too permissive.	526	1	5	2.89	0.83
• Stiffer jail sentences are needed to show criminals that crime does not pay and thus to make sure that they do not go into crime again.	526	1	5	2.67	1.06
• We should hire a lot more police and give them the power to catch criminals.	526	1	5	2.72	0.90
• If we really cared about crime victims, we would make sure that criminals were caught and given harsh punishments.	526	1	5	2.84	0.97
• We should stop viewing criminals as victims of society who deserve our help, and start paying more attention to the victims of these criminals.	526	1	5	3.17	1.03
• Criminals these days have too many legal rights.	526	1	5	2.43	0.98
• The best way to reduce crime is to reestablish the traditional values that made our country great: hard work, religion, respect for authority, and firm discipline in both home and school.	526	1	5	3.15	1.17
• Even if prisons cannot deter or rehabilitate criminals, long prison sentences are needed so that we can keep habitual and dangerous offenders off of our streets.	526	1	5	3.12	1.11
• Juveniles are treated too leniently by our courts.	526	1	5	2.70	0.90
• Punishing criminals more harshly would reduce crime by setting an example and showing others in society that crime does not pay.	526	1	5	2.64	1.07
• A main reason why we have so many crimes these days is because young people are just not taught to respect authority.	526	1	5	3.07	1.26
• “Conservative Crime Ideology” Scale ($\alpha = 0.88$)	526	11	53	31.38	7.64
Political Orientation (<i>1 = Extremely Liberal; 2 = Liberal; 3 = Slightly Liberal; 4 = Moderate; 5 = Slightly Conservative; 6 = Conservative; 7 = Extremely Conservative</i>)	443	1	7	3.95	1.63

General Attitudes toward the Police — “In general, I am confident in the police.” (1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree)	526	1	5	3.69	1.06
Negative Direct Contact with the Police (N = 526)					
• Yes: 8%					
• No: 92%					
Negative Vicarious Contact with the Police (N = 526)					
• Yes: 19.4%					
• No: 80.6%					
Perceptions of Police Misconduct — “How often do you think the police commit acts of misconduct (e.g., excessive force, verbal abuse, corruption)?” (1 = Never; 2 = On Occasion; 3 = Fairly Often; 4 = Very Often)	526	1	4	2.37	0.65
Media Exposure to Police Misconduct — “How often do you hear or read about incidents of police misconduct (excessive force, verbal abuse, corruption)?” (1 = Never; 2 = On Occasion; 3 = Fairly Often; 4 = Very Often)	526	1	4	3.13	0.78
Quality of Life Measures					
• How safe do you feel walking alone at night on campus and in the areas immediately surrounding campus (e.g., McMillan, Calhoun, Short Vine)? (1 = Very safe; 2 = Somewhat Safe; 3 = Somewhat Unsafe; 4 = Very Unsafe)	526	1	4	2.36	0.80
• Do you feel that overall crime in Cincinnati is improving, staying the same, or getting worse? (1 = Getting Better; 2 = Staying the Same; 3 = Getting Worse)	526	1	3	1.71	0.57
Ray Tensing Case Measures					
• Ray Tensing should have been convicted and sent to prison for killing Samuel DuBose. (1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Disagree nor Agree; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree)	446	1	5	3.51	1.12
• How closely did you follow Ray Tensing’s trials? (1 = Not at All; 2 = Not Very Closely; 3 = Fairly Closely; 4 = Very Closely)	446	1	4	2.54	0.89
• Watched Video of Tensing-Dubose Incident (N = 446)					
○ Yes: 77.8%					
○ No: 22.2%					

APPENDIX C: MODEL DIAGNOSTICS

Police-Military Equivalency Model: Normality Assumption

Police Military Equivalency Model: Linearity Assumption

Police Military Equivalency Model: Homoscedasticity Assumption

Black Lives Matter Model: Normality Assumption

Black Lives Matter Model: Linearity Assumption

Black Lives Matter Model: Homoscedasticity Assumption

APPENDIX D: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES

Crosstab of Believing Black Lives Matter Is Promoting a “War on Cops” by Feelings about Black Lives Matter

		How Do You Feel About Black Lives Matter?											
		<i>Strongly Support</i>		<i>Somewhat Support</i>		<i>Neither Support nor Oppose</i>		<i>Somewhat Oppose</i>		<i>Strongly Oppose</i>		<i>Total</i>	
		<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>f</i>	<i>%</i>
Black Lives Matter Is Promoting a “War on Cops.”	<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	58	41.7	14	10.4	6	4.9	1	1.5	1	1.6	80	15.2
	<i>Disagree</i>	42	30.2	39	28.9	9	7.4	3	4.5	0	0.0	93	17.7
	<i>Neither Disagree nor Agree</i>	31	22.3	49	36.3	50	41.0	6	9.0	2	3.2	138	26.2
	<i>Agree</i>	7	5.0	29	21.5	52	42.6	43	64.2	22	34.9	153	29.1
	<i>Strongly Agree</i>	1	0.7	4	3.0	5	4.1	14	20.9	38	60.3	62	11.8
Total		139	100	135	100	122	100	67	100	63	100	526	100