

Can Immigrants Save the Rust Belt? Struggling Cities, Immigration, and Revitalization

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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Graduate Program in Sociology

The Ohio State University

2017

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Abstract

Since the mid-1900s, former industrial strongholds in the Midwestern and Northeastern United States—the Rust Belt—have struggled with population loss and economic declines stemming from deindustrialization. These cities have tried a number of revitalization strategies, which have been largely (though not completely) unsuccessful. The latest attempt in several of these cities is immigrant-driven revitalization, where the cities try to create a positive context of reception in an attempt to attract immigrants who could restore their populations, rebuild their neighborhoods, and restart their economies. This dissertation focuses on the challenges these cities face in implementing these strategies. I focus on three main challenges: 1) the difficulty inherent in trying to create a positive context of reception; 2) the difficulty inherent in providing services to a small, diverse, and disadvantaged (in this case, disproportionately refugee) population; and 3) difficulties created by decentralization and federalization.

Using a combination of data from municipal codes, newspaper archives, the Census, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and Immigrations and Customs enforcement, the empirical chapters focus on these three challenges. Chapter 2 considers how official policymaking efforts—policies that are codified in the city’s municipal code—affect the context of reception in 16 Rust Belt cities. I consider both whether cities are passing new policies with the intent of changing their context of reception, and

whether they have existing policies on the books that could affect immigrant experiences. I find that with the exception of two cities—Chicago and Detroit—these cities are not passing new immigration laws, and that they all maintain existing laws that can both positively and negatively affect the context of reception. If these cities are trying to attract immigrants as a revitalization strategy, most of them are not doing it through changes to their municipal codes. They also are maintaining policies that could undermine their efforts.

Chapter 3 examines the effect of decentralization and federalism on social services in 6 Rust Belt cities, and considers how the characteristics of the Rust Belt's immigrant populations affects the provision of those services. After considering educational services and the services provided to refugees, I find that decentralization makes it more difficult for the city government to provide services, and that much of these cities' immigrant service provisions are handled by the civil society.

Chapter 4 focuses on the effects of decentralization and federalization on immigration enforcement. While some of these cities, particularly Dayton, have made efforts to reduce their participation in immigration enforcement, changes to the immigration enforcement structure have essentially federalized person-to-person policing interactions, making it very hard for local police to actually limit their participation in enforcement. This makes it much more difficult for local governments and law enforcement agencies to engage in pro-immigrant policymaking that could help with their immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

I conclude with a discussion of how the results of the 2016 Presidential election have affected both local immigration policymaking and immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

Acknowledgments

I grew up in a literal village, where the role of the community in raising a child was quite obvious. Just as children do not grow up on their own, academics do not complete dissertations without significant support. The following people and organizations provided the essential assistance, encouragement, and guidance that allowed me to complete this project.

The Department of Sociology at Ohio State has been my academic home for nearly a decade now. It is where I've grown up intellectually, and has been as important in shaping me as any other community of which I've been a part. Talking with and being around brilliant researchers and scholars from the department, and listening to high-quality speakers from outside the department has fed my intellectual curiosity, and has made me a better researcher and social thinker. The Criminal Justice Research Center has also provided valuable support and opportunities.

A few key faculty members have been particularly supportive. This includes the members of my committee, Dana Haynie and Reanne Frank, who've helped me through more rounds on the job market than they likely anticipated, and who've provided valuable feedback on this project. I'm very appreciative of their support. I also thank Ruth Peterson and Vinnie Roscigno, who have been very supportive of my research and helpful in the job search as well.

I could not have completed this research without the resources provided by public libraries. Many of the newspapers I used in my analyses were not available through the resources we have at Ohio State, and so I depended on local libraries to provide access to those papers. Libraries also provided quiet places to work that were not quite as isolated as my home or office. The Columbus Metropolitan Library, the Old Worthington Library, the Findlay-Hancock County Public Library, the Monroe County (NY) Library System, the State Library of Ohio, and the Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh all provided such resources and were thus crucial in completing this research. I am so grateful to the communities that support these fine institutions. In addition, special thanks go to the reference librarian at the Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh, who offered perhaps the best perspective on research when she said that “no matter how big your research problems seem, they are nothing compared to the challenge of global climate change.” She was right.

I also owe thanks to the friends and family that have supported me while I’ve been in grad school. My parents, Deb and Wes Shrider, my sister, Betsy, my brother, Nathan, their spouses—Robert and Samantha—and my dear grandma, Dolores Shrider, have been especially supportive. They watched my dog, Watson, while I was out of town or needed to be super productive. They gave me a place to live when my apartment crumbled around me. They encouraged me to never give up, and they never missed an opportunity to remind me that I was supposed to be writing.

My friends provided a welcome distraction, along with ample encouragement, and for that I owe special thanks to Julie Brewer, the gloriously entertaining Reverend

Gretchen Deeg, Laura DeMarco, Scott Duxbury, Lindsey Ibañez, Jen Mendoza, Dave Ramey, and Tate Steidley. I owe particularly special thanks to Lindsey, Tate and Dave, who always provided an excellent sounding board for research ideas, and who forced me to actually finish some projects. This is particularly true of Dave. I have thoroughly enjoyed working with him, and look forward to the projects we have coming up.

Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to my mentor, advisor, and friend, Rachel Dwyer. She has the patience of Job, and without her support, I would have dropped out years ago. Her guidance and encouragement, in both the professional and personal spheres, have meant the world to me. I cannot express adequately how much I value her, so I will instead provide an extended manure metaphor, courtesy of Don Quixote's squire, Sancho Panza:

“Yes, some of your good sense is bound to stick on to me,” Sancho replied. “Soil that left to itself would be poor and sterile gives good yields when you manure it and you till it. What I’m trying to say is that being with you is the manure that’s been spread over the barren soil of my poor wits, and the tilling is all this time I’ve been with you, serving you, so I’m hoping to give wonderful yields that won’t be unworthy to be piled up beside the paths of good breeding that you’ve trodden over this feeble understanding of mine.”^a

Thank you for nurturing me.

^a Cervantes. 2001. *Don Quixote*. John Rutherford, translator. New York, NY: Penguin Books. Page 558.

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Major Field: Sociology

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Chapter 1: Introduction- The Rust Belt, Immigrants, and Revitalization

In 2011, while the dust was still settling from the Great Recession, news broke on the latest Census figures, which indicated that Detroit lost 25% of its population between 2000 and 2010. Though this should not have been shocking—many news reports on the financial collapse were filmed on completely abandoned Detroit streets (Binelli 2012)—the news elicited a great deal of handwringing from people concerned with the fate of Detroit and other Rust Belt¹ cities. Most of this concern revolved around one question: “What, if anything, could be done to save the Rust Belt?”

One of the more interesting and seemingly unique answers to this question came from then-New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who suggested that immigrants could save Detroit by repopulating neighborhoods and starting businesses (Associated Press 2011). What Bloomberg and his plan’s supporters did not know, however, was that leaders in the Rust Belt had already thought of this, and that some of them—including in Detroit—were already actively trying to attract immigrants as a revitalization strategy.

¹ By “Rust Belt cities,” I mean cities that experienced population decline and associated social problems following deindustrialization. Specifically, I’m considering 16 cities: Akron, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, Detroit, Flint, Gary, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Rochester, St. Louis, South Bend, Syracuse, and Youngstown. A detailed discussion of my definition of “Rust Belt” and how I selected these cities is on page 29.

Their plans were similar to Bloomberg's: they would try to create "immigrant friendly" cities to attract immigrants who would hopefully restore their populations, rejuvenate declining neighborhoods, and fix the local economy. To this end, city leaders made pro-immigrant statements and proposed pro-immigrant policies that they hoped would attract immigrants who would rather live somewhere friendly than hostile, even if the area in question lacks the qualities that usually attract immigrants, like existing immigrant populations and strong economies.

It is still too soon to determine whether these plans can be successful. It is already clear, however, that this is a case of "easier said than done." While there is significant evidence that immigrants can restore neighborhoods, populations, and economies, Rust Belt cities face substantial challenges in implementing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. These challenges mainly stem from three sources. The first is related to the strategies themselves. Rust Belt cities are trying to revitalize by attracting immigrants, but they are limited in how much they can do to woo this population. Immigration scholars have argued that immigrant settlement patterns are shaped by the local *context of reception*, or how welcoming an area is to immigrants (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). The context of reception is in turn shaped by three factors: the local immigration laws and policies, the local labor market, and the existing immigrant population in an area (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Two of these factors—the local labor market and the existing immigrant population—are outside the city's control. This limits how much the city can do to attract immigrants, and creates a significant challenge for cities pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

The second challenge is related to the characteristics of the Rust Belt's immigrant population, which, though small, is incredibly diverse. This makes providing services and support—an essential part of creating an “immigrant-friendly city”—more difficult than it is in a city with a more homogeneous immigrant population. These cities must provide services in more languages, which is more expensive and complicated than providing for one or two. Additionally, without a dominant immigrant group to advocate for services, the city might have trouble determining what services and support immigrants need. Furthermore, many of these immigrants are refugees, which also complicates service provision and integration efforts, as such immigrants require unique services and additional support.

The final challenge is related to the simultaneous decentralization and federalization of immigration control and enforcement. Since the mid-1990s, the federal government has decentralized immigration control, giving local governments the ability to participate in immigration enforcement and engage in immigration policymaking. This ostensibly gives local governments the ability to either take a lenient or a punitive position towards immigrants, and thus to create policies that are either friendly or hostile to them. However, since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the federal government also has implemented new programs that make participation in immigration enforcement compulsory. As I will argue, this has essentially federalized person-to-person policing interactions, making it more difficult for cities to engage in pro-immigrant efforts. When these changes in enforcement combine with other federal policies that make providing services like education, language training, and identification

provision more difficult, it raises serious questions about those cities' ability to attract immigrants and succeed at their immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

This research focuses on these complications. There is value in understanding the challenges cities face in their revitalization efforts, particularly when those efforts are new or unique, which is the case here. However, there are other justifications for studying this case. First, these immigrant-driven revitalization strategies provide a unique insight into decentralization and federalism. Since the 1980s, the United States has been in the midst of a shift, where the federal government has increasingly passed the responsibility of providing social services, like welfare, to local governments. This has led to a debate among social scientists over whether local governments can adequately provide services and whether they are willing to do so (Lobao 2016).

Immigration is an interesting case of this. As I will discuss, some of the decentralization surrounding immigration did involve service provision, but most of it was related to immigration enforcement. While local governments have a clear reason to provide welfare and other decentralized social services—they are decidedly in citizens' best interests—the calculation is not as clear in the case of immigration enforcement. Though some claim that leaving immigration unchecked can create crime and safety problems, that is up for debate. Many, including many police officers (Khashu 2009), argue that engaging in local immigration enforcement can create public safety issues by raising immigrants' fear and distrust of the police. This does not even take into consideration the effect that immigration enforcement could have on immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. If local enforcement makes it harder for cities to attract

immigrants, which subsequently would make it harder for cities to revitalize, participating in decentralized immigration control seems like a poor choice. Seeing how cities respond to this more complicated case of decentralization could help us understand how local governments respond to decentralization in general, and whether they can be successful in their efforts.

Second, the Rust Belt provides a unique and understudied case of immigrant populations and integration efforts. Most research on immigration has focused on new or established destinations and the predominantly Hispanic immigrant populations that live there (see Massey 2008; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008; and Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2006 for examples). As I will discuss, Rust Belt cities, with the exception of Chicago, are not major immigrant destinations. Their immigrant populations are relatively small, especially for mid-sized to large cities. In spite of their small size, their immigrant populations are incredibly diverse. Most of these cities have Hispanic populations that are smaller than average, and have larger than average African and Asian immigrant populations. They also resettle a disproportionate number of refugees. Refugees are a unique type of immigrant—they have no say in where they are initially resettled—and require more social support and services than economic migrants. It is likely that the size and composition of the Rust Belt's immigrant population affects local policymaking, service provision, and ultimately, the context of reception. Examining immigrant experiences in the Rust Belt, then, might help us develop more complete theories on immigrant incorporation and how immigrants decide where to live.

Finally, the 2016 presidential election drew a significant amount of attention to the Rust Belt. Rust Belt states provided the votes that gave Donald Trump the Electoral College and the presidency. Because Trump's campaign focused so heavily on anti-immigrant sentiment—one of the only policies he discussed during the campaign was the border wall and associated crackdown on immigrants—many people pointed to his victory as evidence that Rust Belt voters accepted and possibly embraced Trump's messaging about immigration. This is overly simplistic, and paints the Rust Belt with too broad a brush. While Rust Belt states voted for Trump, the votes were not distributed evenly across counties. Rural counties voted overwhelmingly for Trump, while urban counties went for Hillary Clinton. In addition, many of these urban counties continue to pursue immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. This suggests that there are significant differences between the rural and urban parts of the Rust Belt. By voting for Trump and his explicitly anti-immigrant policies, rural Rust Belt counties jeopardized the immigrant-driven revitalization strategies pursued by their states' cities. The case of immigration thus provides an interesting and important addition to discussions of the urban-rural divide.

Thus, while the focus of this research is on the complications Rust Belt cities face in pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, the findings can speak to these broader issues. To get to that point, however, it is important to understand both the history of the Rust Belt and the details of immigrant-driven revitalization strategies and the challenges they face. The remainder of this chapter provides this background

information, further explains the challenges Rust Belt cities face in adopting these plans, outlines the rest of the dissertation, and explains the sources of my data.

WHAT IS THE RUST BELT AND WHY DOES IT NEED TO REVITALIZE?

The term “Rust Belt” and its predecessor, “Rust Bowl” (Byron 1982), were coined by journalists in the early 1980s. They denote cities in the industrial Midwestern and Northeastern United States, the darker region in Figure 1, that had a significant manufacturing presence in the mid-1900s, but that had lost it by the late 1970s or early 1980s. Such cities then experienced negative social outcomes, such as population decline and rising unemployment, as a result (Oxford English Dictionary 2012; McClelland 2013).

The problems Rust Belt cities face are the result of deindustrialization and economic restructuring. Since the mid-1900s, America has experienced widespread disinvestment in manufacturing and production (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). This led to factory closures, which resulted in job and revenue loss. For example, the Northeast and Midwest census regions, home to the Rust Belt and its cities, lost 1.5 million manufacturing jobs and \$40 billion (in constant 1989 dollars, which is over \$77 billion in constant 2016 dollars) in worker earnings between 1980 and 1990 (Kasarda 1995).

This decline in manufacturing continues. Between 2000 and 2005, 37.5% of the manufacturing jobs lost nationwide came from seven Rust Belt states—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin (Wial and Friedhoff 2006). Many of these were middle income jobs, which were lost just as middle income job




Figure 1: Rust Belt Region Map

growth stagnated. The 1990s witnessed very strong job growth in high-skilled, high-income jobs and expansion in low-wage retail and service jobs, but very little growth in middle-income jobs (Wright and Dwyer 2003). In the seven Rust Belt states that lost the most manufacturing jobs, the growth in high-skill jobs was not enough to offset those manufacturing job losses (Wial and Friedhoff 2006). When this combined with nationwide slow growth in middle-income jobs, the result was a shortage of well-paid jobs in Rust Belt cities. In addition to removing jobs, factory closures have removed a

significant amount of money from the local economy, costing retailers and service providers business and raising the number of people relying on public services (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). These changes in the manufacturing sector affected the entire economy in these cities and caused many residents to leave.

Following deindustrialization, these cities experienced a growth in social problems. Table 1 presents relevant demographic characteristics for 16 Rust Belt cities. On average, these cities lost 42.75% of their population between 1960 and 2010, ranging from a low of 19.76% in Milwaukee to a high of 59.82% in Youngstown. They also lost 26.37% of their manufacturing employment, on average. Cincinnati fared best in this regard, only losing 18.15% of its manufacturing employment, while Gary was hit hardest, losing 37.05%. On average, 14.49% of the residents in these cities were unemployed in 2010, while 28.96% were living below the poverty line. Finally, with the exception of Chicago (20.69% foreign-born), these cities have relatively small immigrant populations, ranging from 1.65% of the population in Flint to 10.23% in Syracuse. Rust Belt cities have clearly declined over time.

These changes have been devastating. In response to their struggles, these cities have tried a variety of revitalization schemes. They tried traditional strategies, like attempting to attract new businesses and factories by providing incentives to companies, such as tax abatements and new infrastructure specifically constructed for the company's benefit (Atkins et al. 2011). They tried building downtown entertainment districts to draw money into the city from the suburbs (Atkins et al. 2011). Cleveland, for example, created an entertainment district, which contains Quicken Loans Arena (home to the

<i>City</i>	<i>Population, 1960</i>	<i>Population, 2010</i>	<i>Percent Population Change, 1960 to 2010</i>	<i>Percent Employed in Manufacturing, 1960</i>	<i>Percent Employed in Manufacturing, 2010</i>	<i>Percent Change in Manufacturing Employment, 1960 to 2010</i>
<i>Akron, OH</i>	290,351	199,110	-31.42	43.99	15.67	-28.32
<i>Buffalo, NY</i>	532,759	261,310	-50.95	36.19	9.44	-26.75
<i>Chicago, IL</i>	3,550,404	2,695,598	-24.08	33.54	9.46	-24.08
<i>Cincinnati, OH</i>	502,550	296,943	-40.91	29.40	11.24	-18.16
<i>Cleveland, OH</i>	876,050	396,815	-54.70	40.81	13.58	-27.23
<i>Dayton, OH</i>	262,332	141,759	-45.96	36.40	12.64	-23.75
<i>Detroit, MI</i>	1,670,144	731,777	-56.18	40.69	13.61	-27.08
<i>Flint, MI</i>	196,940	102,434	-47.99	51.43	15.37	-36.07
<i>Gary, IN</i>	178,320	80,294	-54.97	50.49	13.44	-37.05
<i>Milwaukee, WI</i>	741,324	594,833	-19.76	40.56	15.40	-25.16
<i>Pittsburgh, PA</i>	604,332	305,704	-49.41	26.06	5.39	-20.67
<i>Rochester, NY</i>	318,611	210,565	-33.91	41.21	10.54	-30.68
<i>St. Louis, MO</i>	750,026	319,294	-57.43	32.28	8.71	-23.58
<i>South Bend, IN</i>	132,445	101,168	-23.62	39.43	16.88	-22.55
<i>Syracuse, NY</i>	216,038	145,170	-32.80	31.27	8.06	-23.21
<i>Youngstown, OH</i>	166,689	66,982	-59.82	40.96	13.42	-27.55
<i>Average</i>	686,832	415,610	-42.74	38.42	12.05	-26.37

Continued

Table 1. Rust Belt Characteristics

Table 1 continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Percent Unemployed, 2010</i>	<i>Percent in Poverty, 2010</i>	<i>Percent Black, 2010</i>	<i>Percent Foreign Born, 2010</i>
<i>Akron, OH</i>	12.90	23.90	31.88	4.46
<i>Buffalo, NY</i>	12.40	29.60	39.12	7.11
<i>Chicago, IL</i>	9.70	22.50	32.93	20.69
<i>Cincinnati, OH</i>	10.70	27.20	44.51	4.53
<i>Cleveland, OH</i>	17.80	31.20	54.73	4.77
<i>Dayton, OH</i>	16.10	31.00	44.62	2.58
<i>Detroit, MI</i>	24.80	34.50	85.85	5.25
<i>Flint, MI</i>	21.70	36.60	57.72	1.65
<i>Gary, IN</i>	19.10	34.20	86.97	1.78
<i>Milwaukee, WI</i>	11.60	26.30	39.04	9.60
<i>Pittsburgh, PA</i>	8.60	21.90	25.98	6.99
<i>Rochester, NY</i>	11.70	30.40	41.04	8.21
<i>St. Louis, MO</i>	12.70	26.00	49.75	6.65
<i>South Bend, IN</i>	13.50	24.30	25.70	7.74
<i>Syracuse, NY</i>	10.20	31.10	28.68	10.23
<i>Youngstown, OH</i>	18.40	32.70	47.04	3.82
<i>Average</i>	14.49	28.96	45.97	6.63

NBA's Cleveland Cavaliers), Progressive Field (home to Cleveland's professional baseball team), and now Cleveland's casino.

Some of these cities have also tried to attract the “creative class” in the hope that STEM workers, healthcare workers, and other creative professionals would restore the population and revive the economy (Florida 2012). Some cities paid consultants to come up with city-specific plans, which were sometimes unworkable. One particularly egregious example saw Detroit pay a consultant \$112,000 (in 2004 dollars, over \$142,000 in 2016 dollars) for a revitalization plan that called for the creation of an “African Town,” based not on tourism, like Detroit's Greektown neighborhood, but on seafood production² (Moore 2004). These cities have tried a lot of strategies, and although some of these efforts have found success—Pittsburgh features heavily in Richard Florida's (2014) book on the creative class, and Cleveland's sporting venues have drawn business back downtown, for example—many problems remain. Most of these cities are still struggling.

WHY PURSUE IMMIGRANT-DRIVEN REVITALIZATION?

It is in this context, then, that we find cities pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. Dayton provides the most well-known example of these efforts. On October 5, 2011, the Dayton City Commission voted unanimously to adopt the

² This plan hinged on the unsubstantiated claim that African Americans eat three to four times as much seafood as whites. Since Detroit is a predominantly black city, the planner argued, a seafood-based strategy would be a natural fit. This plan had also been peddled in Akron (Moore 2004).

Welcome Dayton resolution, which outlined the steps Dayton could take to become an “immigrant-friendly” city within three to five years (Welcome Dayton 2017). Though the plan is framed as an effort to “integrate new residents and help them on a path to citizenship” (Dayton Human Relations Council 2015), it is very clear that the plan is also meant to help Dayton. For every mention of integrating immigrants, there is another about how immigrants create jobs, start businesses, and revive neighborhoods. At its root, the Welcome Dayton plan is as much about fixing Dayton as it is about aiding immigrants.

The city hopes that by welcoming immigrants, Dayton will experience some of the positive outcomes associated with immigration, namely, economic and neighborhood improvements. To this end, the plan calls for changes in four areas—business and economic development; the local government and justice system; social and health services; and community, culture, and education—that can help ease immigrants’ integration into the city. The specific goals for each area are presented in Appendix 1, but the overarching theme is that these changes should remove as many barriers to immigrant success as possible.

While Dayton’s plan is in some ways unique—most cities have not generated such specific goals nor outlined clear strategies for reaching them—the basic idea is typical. These strategies depend on creating an environment where immigrants can thrive in the hope that they will return the favor and help the city. This may seem like an odd

choice for a renewal strategy, especially given the hostile national rhetoric³ that casts immigrants as criminals and a drain on the economy, but there is actually significant evidence that such strategies could work. Specifically, immigrants have been shown to have a positive effect on four areas: population recovery, economic revitalization, neighborhood renewal, and crime reduction.

First, immigrants have replenished the population or contributed to population growth in many communities. In the 1990s, emerging immigrant destinations saw substantial growth in both their immigrant and native populations (Singer 2004). Additionally, economic migration has stemmed or reversed population loss in several rural areas (Carr et al. 2012; Lichter 2012), while refugees have stopped population loss and contributed to population growth in several small metropolitan areas (Singer and Wilson 2006).

Second, immigration is associated with economic growth. Latino immigrants have boosted economies in many rural Midwestern towns (Lichter 2012), and in some

³ Immigrants are currently some of America's favorite scapegoats. They have recently been blamed for terrorism (Executive Order 13769), drug dealing (Nixon and Santos 2017), healthcare costs (Martin and Ruark 2010), gang activity (Winston 2017), and unemployment (Trump 2016). Despite the pervasiveness of these claims, little evidence exists supporting them. Most of these claims rely on anecdotes, which is perhaps to be expected in public discourse.

Academic studies often contradict these claims, but not universally. While I focus on research on the positive effects of immigration, this is just one perspective. Some immigration scholars, such as George Borjas, argue that immigrants can negatively affect communities and the economy. Even these arguments are not entirely negative, however. Borjas (1999) argues that some immigrants help, while some hurt, and advocates for a more selective selection process that prioritizes high-skill immigrants over family reunification. On balance, then, the academic views of immigrants are much more positive than those common in the national public rhetoric, so there is little reason to discuss those negative views in depth.

urban areas, immigrants have revitalized entire neighborhoods through entrepreneurship (Borges-Mendez et al. 2005). Immigrants are at least 30% more likely than native-born Americans to start and run their own businesses (Herman and Smith 2009), and tend to open them in areas ignored by traditional investors. One can see the fruits of these labors in places like Sunset Park, Brooklyn, which was revitalized by Asian and Latino immigrants (Hum 2002), and Manhattan's Chinatown, which is now the center of the national ethnic restaurant economy, thanks to the efforts of Fuzhounese immigrants (Guest 2011). In addition to creating jobs, immigrant workers have kept some industries afloat by filling jobs that natives would not take (Hirshman and Massey 2008; Linton 2002).

Third, immigrants have restored many failing neighborhoods. For example, Schenectady, New York's mayor traveled to New York City to recruit Guyanese immigrants to buy and remodel dilapidated houses in his city. These efforts have led to a rapid rise in Schenectady's Guyanese population, who have in turn renovated several houses and neighborhoods (Herman and Smith 2009). This effect is also already evident in some Rust Belt cities. Buffalo, for instance, has seen marked improvements to the city's West Side neighborhood, thanks to the renewal efforts of refugees (Hayden 2009; Sapong 2012).

Finally, immigration is associated with a reduction in crime. Studies consistently find that immigration is negatively associated with violent crime rates, particularly in terms of robberies and murders (Desmond and Kubrin 2009; Ramey 2013; Velez 2009; Wadsworth 2010). Furthermore, one recent study found that between 1970 and 2010,

rates of burglary and larceny, in addition to murder and robbery, also decreased as immigration increased in 200 metropolitan areas (Adelman et al. 2017).

Given these findings and the Rust Belt's problems—population loss, flagging economies, declining neighborhoods, and crime—attracting immigrants almost seems like a panacea. Given that nothing else has stopped their population loss or bolstered their economies, these cities really do not have anything to lose—and possibly everything to gain—from trying immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

THE CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT-DRIVEN REVITALIZATION

The idea behind these strategies—attract immigrants and have them fix the city's problems—is very simple, but the execution is anything but. These cities face significant challenges in implementing these plans. Governments are limited in how much they can control the flow of immigrants. In *Immigrant America* (2006), Portes and Rumbaut argue that a nation's migration flow depends on its *context of reception*, or how welcoming it is to immigrants. The context of reception is primarily shaped by three factors: the government's immigration policies, the labor market, and the area's existing immigrant population (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Because the government can really only control one of these factors—the policies—basing a revitalization plan on increasing the flow of immigrants to an area is complicated.⁴

⁴ North Korea provides an interesting thought experiment on this point. One could argue that North Korea, which essentially experiences no migration, has total control over their immigration flow, as the government prevents anyone from coming or going. Imagine, however, that Kim Jong Un decided to pursue an immigrant-driven revitalization strategy, and changed the laws so that immigrants were welcomed and

Although Portes and Rubaut (2006) were discussing national immigration policies, this theory can apply to local areas, as well. Indeed, cities that are trying to attract immigrants as part of a revitalization strategy are essentially trying to improve their context of reception by changing their immigration policies. Portes and Rumbaut (2006) argue that immigration policies largely fall into three categories: *exclusion*, *passive acceptance*, and *active encouragement*. Each type of policy has a different effect on the context of reception, and thus, the immigration flow to that area.

The first type of policies, *exclusionary*, are intended to make life more difficult for immigrants with the intention of dissuading them from settling in a community, thus reducing the flow of immigrants. Several communities have enacted draconian immigration policies with the goal of driving immigrants from the area or discouraging them from settling there in the first place (Esbenshade et al. 2010; Fleury-Steiner and Longazel 2010). Examples of this include state efforts, like Arizona's SB 1070, which allowed police officers to ask for immigration papers from anyone they suspected of being an immigrant (Archibold 2010), and Alabama's HB 56, which included the same "papers please" provisions as SB 1070, but also prohibited undocumented immigrants from receiving public benefits and required public schools to enquire about legal status (Preston 2011). Many exclusionary local policies are modeled after Hazelton,

supported. It seems unlikely that North Korea would then experience massive—or any—in-migration, due to their economic challenges and political system (like Admiral Ackbar, many people would also probably assume that this was a trap). It would take massive political and economic restructuring to restart the flow of migrants, which is something the government theoretically could control, but which will never happen because it is outside their personal best interests. This reinforces the argument that immigrant-friendly policies are just one part of the equation.

Pennsylvania's law preventing anyone from selling or renting housing to undocumented immigrants (Esbenshade et al. 2010; Fluery-Steiner and Longazel 2010). Other policies, like those restricting welfare and other public benefits to citizens (Graefe et al. 2010) can be considered exclusionary, as can policies that increase local enforcement of federal immigration laws (Varsanyi et al. 2010b).

Passive acceptance occurs when the government is content with maintaining the status quo; no efforts are made to limit or encourage immigration (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Such efforts have no effect on the context of reception, and subsequently should not affect the flow of immigrants to the area. A community characterized by passive acceptance would make little attempt to actively regulate immigration at the local level. In this situation, federal policy would be followed, but nothing would be done to amplify or diminish its effects. Research suggests that this is the most common approach taken at the municipal and county level (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Lewis et al. 2012).

Finally, *active encouragement* occurs when the government enacts policies meant to support immigrants and encourage immigration to an area (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Such efforts are meant to improve the context of reception and increase in-migration. Areas engaging in active encouragement might provide healthcare to noncitizens (Mitnik and Halpern-Finnerty 2010; Marrow 2012), provide protections to immigrant day laborers (Danielson 2010), or limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement agencies (Carlberg 2009).

Because immigrant-driven revitalization strategies depend on attracting immigrants, cities pursuing these strategies need to make policies that actively encourage

immigration. If they were to engage in passive acceptance, making no policies to encourage or discourage immigration, they would be doing nothing to improve their context of reception. Their context of reception would then be primarily shaped by the local labor market and immigrant communities. Because Rust Belt cities have struggling economies and few immigrants, failing to improve the context of reception through pro-immigrant policymaking means that those cities would likely attract few immigrants. Similarly, passing exclusionary policies would only make a community less welcoming and thus less likely to attract immigrants. Thus, these immigrant-driven revitalization strategies depend on cities engaging in active encouragement. For them to succeed, the cities have to improve the context of reception to the point that immigrants would want to settle there and could integrate successfully once settled.

This is the basic process underlying immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. Cities pursuing such strategies need to improve their context of reception, but are inherently limited in their ability to do so. On top of this, Rust Belt cities face additional challenges. Both the characteristics of their existing immigrant populations and changing federal policies limit their ability to improve their context of reception and make their communities more welcoming.

Immigration in the Rust Belt

The second challenge Rust Belt Cities face in pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies is related to the characteristics of their immigrant population. As Table 1 displayed (on page 11), Rust Belt cities, excluding Chicago, have very small

<i>City</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>Asia</i>	<i>Africa</i>	<i>Oceania</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>North America</i>
<i>Akron, Ohio</i>	28.7	45.9	5.4	0.0	18.0	2.1
<i>Buffalo, New York</i>	22.5	32.5	17.8	0.1	21.4	5.8
<i>Chicago, Illinois</i>	18.4	20.2	3.7	0.2	56.9	0.7
<i>Cincinnati, Ohio</i>	19.4	28.3	21.9	1.1	26.5	2.8
<i>Cleveland, Ohio</i>	30.4	33.4	8.4	0.0	25.4	2.4
<i>Dayton, Ohio</i>	15.7	31.2	17.0	0.8	32.8	2.5
<i>Detroit, Michigan</i>	6.7	29.1	7.4	0.2	54.1	2.5
<i>Flint, Michigan</i>	15.8	37.8	10.0	0.5	31.1	4.8
<i>Gary, Indiana</i>	18.3	17.0	11.7	0.8	51.2	0.9
<i>Milwaukee, Wisconsin</i>	10.2	21.7	5.3	0.1	61.9	0.8
<i>Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania</i>	25.7	50.4	6.1	0.4	14.4	2.9
<i>Rochester, New York</i>	16.5	32.1	11.0	0.2	37.6	2.6
<i>St. Louis, Missouri</i>	25.4	37.6	12.9	0.1	22.9	1.3
<i>South Bend, Indiana</i>	13.0	16.8	5.7	0.0	62.8	1.7
<i>Syracuse, New York</i>	20.7	41.7	11.0	0.7	23.1	2.8
<i>Youngstown, Ohio</i>	28.0	21.9	1.4	1.1	47.0	0.6
<i>US Midsized Cities</i>	13.3	29.4	6.6	0.6	47.9	2.2

Table 2. Region of Origin for Rust Belt Immigrants, ACS 2010 5-Year Sample

immigrant populations. In spite of this, their immigrant populations are incredibly diverse. As Table 2 demonstrates, the immigrant composition in these cities is very different than in the United States as a whole. With the exception of Chicago, all of the cities have a smaller proportion of Latino immigrants than is found elsewhere in the United States. Most Rust Belt cities' immigrant populations are below 35% Latino, compared to the nation as a whole, where Latin American immigrants make up about half of the immigrant population. Instead, these cities have larger than average African and Asian immigrant populations. This means that instead of providing services to an immigrant population that is dominated by a single language—Spanish—Rust Belt cities

must provide services for several smaller populations that all speak different languages. This is a much more difficult undertaking. Additionally, because smaller populations are less noticeable, it can be more difficult for small, diverse groups of immigrants to draw attention to their problems and concerns, which can make it difficult for cities to know which services are needed.

Part of the immigrant diversity these cities experience results from local refugee resettlement efforts. Rust Belt cities resettle a disproportionate number of refugees. Table 3 displays the number of refugees resettled by each Rust Belt city by year, as well as the percent of the US refugee population settled in Rust Belt cities. Between 1983, the first year for which the Office of Refugee Resettlement has city-level resettlement data, and 2013, the 16 cities of the Rust Belt have resettled 162,534 refugees, or 7.29% of the United States' incoming refugee population. These cities resettle a disproportionate number of refugees, given that their populations only made up about 3.6% of the total US population in 2010 (Census statistics not shown).

Of course, these refugees are not evenly distributed around the region. Buffalo has resettled significantly more refugees than Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh, despite the fact that all of these cities have larger populations. Similarly, since 1996, Akron (2010 population: 290,351) has resettled more refugees than neighboring Cleveland (2010 population: 396,815). The cities that are struggling the most—Gary, Flint, and Youngstown—have resettled the fewest refugees. In fact, Gary has not resettled a refugee since 1992. Since 2001, Youngstown has only resettled 12, while Flint has only received 8 since 2005. Despite this uneven distribution, Rust Belt

City	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
<i>Akron, OH</i>	33	44	73	91	145	81	120	82	132
<i>Buffalo, NY</i>	99	118	149	98	62	106	196	440	355
<i>Chicago, IL</i>	2,040	2,314	1,866	1,155	1,244	1,468	3,546	2,408	2,507
<i>Cincinnati, OH</i>	105	189	124	49	41	51	215	176	198
<i>Cleveland, OH</i>	166	160	177	119	144	161	345	508	252
<i>Dayton, OH</i>	36	57	42	55	5	24	38	89	46
<i>Detroit, MI</i>	485	259	205	190	231	208	286	217	301
<i>Flint, MI</i>	3	12	0	0	1	8	9	36	44
<i>Gary, IN</i>	5	25	0	1	0	1	0	0	7
<i>Milwaukee, WI</i>	173	155	102	241	410	446	644	449	506
<i>Pittsburgh, PA</i>	70	41	114	52	36	54	222	297	315
<i>Rochester, NY</i>	128	328	286	226	165	211	575	520	566
<i>St. Louis, MO</i>	391	476	583	467	427	448	914	1,002	965
<i>South Bend, IN</i>	24	17	39	37	3	7	2	34	12
<i>Syracuse, NY</i>	119	110	124	197	85	95	305	334	347
<i>Youngstown, OH</i>	30	19	13	5	10	6	50	98	78
<i>Rust Belt Total</i>	3,907	4,324	3,897	2,983	3,009	3,375	7,467	6,690	6,631
<i>U.S. Total</i>	47,734	66,760	60,140	52,030	56,117	81,627	115,497	119,228	115,095
<i>% Resettled in Rust Belt</i>	8.18	6.48	6.48	5.73	5.36	4.13	6.47	5.61	5.76

Continued

Table 3. Refugee Resettlement by City and Year

Table 3 Continued

City	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
<i>Akron, OH</i>	124	93	105	113	104	135	196	192	188
<i>Buffalo, NY</i>	355	282	254	263	270	381	485	511	501
<i>Chicago, IL</i>	3,014	2,493	2,728	2,454	2,078	2,685	2,216	2,317	1,744
<i>Cincinnati, OH</i>	261	165	186	163	96	113	96	112	110
<i>Cleveland, OH</i>	390	253	166	246	162	294	304	385	148
<i>Dayton, OH</i>	69	97	62	27	36	21	19	61	9
<i>Detroit, MI</i>	415	362	377	211	174	197	113	310	150
<i>Flint, MI</i>	51	68	51	38	34	19	16	16	9
<i>Gary, IN</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Milwaukee, WI</i>	538	526	605	324	301	227	150	265	348
<i>Pittsburgh, PA</i>	411	341	369	381	276	289	283	339	252
<i>Rochester, NY</i>	648	588	587	527	418	493	431	601	345
<i>St. Louis, MO</i>	1,015	1,024	1,325	1,211	1,336	1,733	1,786	2,371	1,773
<i>South Bend, IN</i>	7	13	16	30	24	43	41	36	35
<i>Syracuse, NY</i>	327	258	216	167	199	276	349	408	347
<i>Youngstown, OH</i>	60	65	49	39	26	9	9	8	6
<i>Rust Belt Total</i>	7,686	6,628	7,096	6,194	5,534	6,915	6,494	7,932	5,965
<i>U.S. Total</i>	129,876	116,978	109,878	94,209	73,410	71,521	74,900	81,564	70,821
<i>% Resettled in Rust Belt</i>	5.92	5.67	6.46	6.57	7.54	9.67	8.67	9.72	8.42

Continued

Table 3 Continued

City	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<i>Akron, OH</i>	126	95	54	164	101	153	205	256	342
<i>Buffalo, NY</i>	419	174	208	671	600	544	617	956	1,514
<i>Chicago, IL</i>	1,254	432	450	725	824	620	950	1,211	1,062
<i>Cincinnati, OH</i>	102	50	38	90	59	55	68	174	129
<i>Cleveland, OH</i>	151	90	122	258	156	100	176	244	275
<i>Dayton, OH</i>	3	10	16	31	39	64	103	142	185
<i>Detroit, MI</i>	105	29	13	34	22	28	7	83	61
<i>Flint, MI</i>	5	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0
<i>Gary, IN</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Milwaukee, WI</i>	251	127	156	706	333	132	311	418	573
<i>Pittsburgh, PA</i>	215	107	102	176	195	136	207	320	434
<i>Rochester, NY</i>	268	168	199	407	292	250	422	555	727
<i>St. Louis, MO</i>	1,486	600	293	580	565	358	455	520	725
<i>South Bend, IN</i>	28	9	36	25	50	19	6	1	3
<i>Syracuse, NY</i>	377	289	208	518	333	361	512	875	1,223
<i>Youngstown, OH</i>	0	4	5	0	2	1	0	0	0
<i>Rust Belt Total</i>	4,790	2,184	1,900	4,385	3,614	2,821	4,039	5,755	7,253
<i>U.S. Total</i>	55,802	30,270	32,192	56,384	51,883	39,551	47,744	64,727	79,942
<i>% Resettled in Rust Belt</i>	8.58	7.22	5.90	7.78	6.97	7.13	8.46	8.89	9.07

Continued

Table 3 Continued

City	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total 1983-2013
<i>Akron, OH</i>	255	274	515	252	4,843
<i>Buffalo, NY</i>	1,315	1,010	1,158	862	14,973
<i>Chicago, IL</i>	1,035	735	1,140	685	51,400
<i>Cincinnati, OH</i>	128	145	193	137	3,818
<i>Cleveland, OH</i>	279	250	414	201	7,096
<i>Dayton, OH</i>	160	144	141	96	1,927
<i>Detroit, MI</i>	16	16	33	14	5,152
<i>Flint, MI</i>	4	0	0	4	471
<i>Gary, IN</i>	0	0	0	0	40
<i>Milwaukee, WI</i>	663	554	726	458	11,818
<i>Pittsburgh, PA</i>	192	466	454	306	7,452
<i>Rochester, NY</i>	619	671	662	409	13,292
<i>St. Louis, MO</i>	594	414	661	409	26,907
<i>South Bend, IN</i>	26	28	25	6	682
<i>Syracuse, NY</i>	882	827	805	598	12,071
<i>Youngstown, OH</i>	0	0	0	0	592
<i>Rust Belt Total</i>	6,168	5,534	6,927	4,437	162,534
<i>U.S. Total</i>	71,358	51,458	66,290	44,343	2,229,329
<i>% Resettled in Rust Belt</i>	8.64	10.75	10.45	10.01	7.29

cities as a whole resettle many refugees, which contributes to their diverse immigrant populations.

When communities resettle refugees, they are required to provide a number of social services. Although refugees eventually assimilate into the community and succeed in the labor market (Akresh 2008; Allen 2009), they originally need significant social support. This can be difficult for communities to provide, especially if the refugees arrive on short notice or speak a language that few people in the community speak. Refugee resettlement thus creates extra challenges for receiving communities, who must find a way to provide services to these new migrants if they want them to successfully integrate into the community.

Decentralization and Federalization

The final challenge Rust Belt cities face in implementing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies stem from decentralization and federalism. As mentioned earlier, the federal government has devolved some of their control over immigration to local governments. This is something of a historical anomaly. For much of US history, state and local governments had no control over immigration policy. The federal government has “plenary power,” or sole authority, over immigration (Varsanyi 2010b; Varsanyi 2011), which historically had constrained local government’s ability to make decisions that differed from those made in Washington. The fact that local governments can even attempt to create immigration policies today is the result of significant changes to federal immigration law and enforcement in the mid-1990s and early 2000s. These changes

resulted in a “devolution” of immigration policymaking (Provine and Varsanyi 2012) that gave cities and states some latitude in determining how immigrants are treated within their borders.

As I will discuss in Chapter 4, this period of freedom was fairly short-lived. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began implementing programs that decentralized immigration enforcement. Although these programs were initially optional—local law enforcement agencies had to decide whether they wanted to participate—they eventually became compulsory. In effect, these changes have federalized person-to-person policing interactions; because of the way the system is now constructed, police automatically feed immigrants into the federal immigration enforcement structure in the course of their routine interactions.

This shift has the potential to undermine immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. Limiting immigration enforcement is one of the major strategies cities employ when trying to improve their context of reception. By making participation in federal immigration enforcement compulsory, the federal government hamstringing those efforts. This is a significant challenge for those cities and their efforts.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The remaining chapters focus on these three challenges. Chapter 2 focuses on the local context of reception, specifically examining the policies Rust Belt cities have adopted that affect immigrants. While many Rust Belt cities are now pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, they do not make the decision to do so in a

vacuum. These efforts exist in cities with long histories and established laws. These existing policies can either help make a community more welcoming to immigrants, or they can make integrating and supporting immigrants more difficult. The analysis in Chapter 2 examines what effect existing policies could have on the context of reception, and examines the newer policies cities have passed with the goal of improving it. This analysis can help us better understand some of the limitations Rust Belt cities face in making policies that can improve their context of reception.

Chapter 3 examines how decentralization and federalism affect social services, and how the characteristics of the Rust Belt's immigrant population further complicate these issues. Because the federal government has decentralized the provision of many social services, cities are tasked with providing support for their citizens, often without much federal financial support (Lobao 2016). This is particularly problematic for Rust Belt cities, which have limited tax bases due to their shrinking populations and struggling economies. These areas often have trouble providing social services (see Binelli 2012 for examples of this in Detroit). Chapter 3 examines the social services provided to immigrants in 6 Rust Belt cities. It focuses primarily on education and the services provided to refugees, both by the city government and civil society, specifically, churches, VOLAGS (the *vol*untary *ag*encies that resettle refugees), and individual doctors.

Chapter 4 focuses on the effect of decentralization and federalization on immigration enforcement. It focuses on two cases: cities' attempts to limit their participation in federal immigration enforcement, and local attempts to provide

identification to undocumented immigrants. In both of these cases, federal law has complicated and undermined these efforts, calling into question these cities' ability to successfully alter their context of reception and revitalize via immigration.

Finally, Chapter 5, the conclusion, considers how all of these challenges affect the local context of reception and immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. It also considers how these analyses contribute to our understanding of decentralization. It ends with a discussion of how changes in federal immigration policy will affect these efforts and what the results of the 2016 presidential election say about this region.

ABOUT THE DATA

To examine immigrant-driven revitalization strategies and the challenges Rust Belt cities face in implementing them, I have gathered several qualitative and quantitative sources of data. In order to gather this data, I had to first define what I meant by “Rust Belt” and “Rust Belt city.” Because the term “Rust Belt” was developed by the popular press, there is no existing formal definition of what counts as a Rust Belt city. For the purposes of this study, I developed a definition based on the popular usage. Generally, when people refer to the Rust Belt, they mean the industrial areas of the Midwestern and Northeastern United States that experienced population and manufacturing loss following deindustrialization, and that are facing economic problems, like high unemployment, as a result (Oxford English Dictionary 2012; McClelland 2013).

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Measurement</i>
Cities in the Industrial Midwest and Northeast	Located in the Midwestern and Northeastern US census regions Cities in the Great Lakes states, plus St. Louis
Significant Manufacturing Centers	At least 25% of the employed population working in manufacturing, 1980
Population Loss	Lost at least 10% of their population between 1960 and 1980
Growth in Unemployment	Growth in percent unemployed between 1960 and 1980
Little population growth since 1980	Population has remained stagnant or decreased between 1980 and 2010
Mid-sized and large cities	Cities that ranked in the top 100 in the United States in 1960 population size

Table 4. Rust Belt Definition Criteria

Based on this usage, I developed a definition that employs six criteria, which are listed in Table 4. First, I only include cities in the industrial Midwest and Northeast (the dark blue area in Figure 1, on page 8). Second, I only include cities that were significant manufacturing centers, and thus only retain cities that had at least 25% of their employed population working in manufacturing in 1980, when the term “Rust Belt” originated. Third, I include only cities that lost at least 10% of their population between 1960 and 1980, and fourth, that experienced a growth in unemployment during the same period. These constraints exclude cities like Indianapolis, Indiana, and Columbus, Ohio, which experienced significant population growth across the period, partly because they had been slightly less dependent on manufacturing in the middle of the 20th century relative to other cities in the region. Fifth, I only include cities that saw little population growth

since 1980. This limitation excludes one city, Worcester, Massachusetts, which lost 13.28% of its population between 1960 and 1980, but regained nearly all of it by 2010 (Census statistics not shown).

Finally, I only include cities that ranked within the top 100 in the United States in terms of 1960 population size. I use this constraint for two reasons. First, immigrants are more likely to live in big or mid-sized metropolitan areas than smaller areas, even with the recent shifts in immigrant destinations (Singer 2004; Singer 2015). Consequently, smaller cities likely have very different expectations regarding immigrants than bigger cities. Second, the immigration flow to non-metropolitan areas is significantly different than the flows elsewhere (Donato et al. 2008). The case studies on new destinations suggest that many small town immigrants work on farms or in low-skill meat processing jobs for very low wages (for examples, see Massey 2008 and Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2006). That difference makes comparisons between large cities and small towns on any other immigrant-related dimensions inappropriate, though understanding these dynamics is important to research examining the region as a whole.

Sixteen cities meet this criteria: Akron, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, Detroit, Flint, Gary, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Rochester, St. Louis, South Bend, Syracuse, and Youngstown. I use all sixteen cities in the general discussion of Rust Belt cities and in the analysis in Chapter 2. I then focus on a subset of these cities in Chapters 3 and 4. These are the starred cities in Figure 2. I focused on cities located in Michigan



Figure 2. Rust Belt Cities Map

and Ohio—Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, Detroit, and Flint⁵—and also included Buffalo. I included Buffalo because its position as a major international entry point makes it unique among Rust Belt cities, and thus a worthwhile case to consider.

Quantitative Data

With this definition, I was able to gather data to address my research questions. I gathered three quantitative datasets. The first is the 1960 through 2010 US Census,

⁵ Youngstown is also in Ohio, but has presented some challenges. The local paper, *The Vindicator*, is only partially digitally archived, and the archives have a tendency to crash. I was only able to get data from approximately 3 years—2003-2005—before the archives ceased working altogether. If something significant were to happen in Youngstown, it would have been covered in the Akron or Cleveland papers, so I monitored for that possibility. There were no relevant stories from Youngstown, so it is essentially excluded from this analysis.

which provided demographic data on Rust Belt cities and the counties in which they are located. I used this when defining the Rust Belt and for providing context throughout the dissertation. The 2000 and 2010 waves of the Census are available on the Census Bureau's website (factfinder.census.gov). The 1960 through 1990 waves are partially archived online. The data that was missing from the online archives was culled from the State Library of Ohio's bound copies.

The second quantitative dataset is from the Office of Refugee Resettlement, which is the federal agency responsible for refugee placement in the United States. This dataset was obtained through a records request. It provides information on refugee resettlement in the US between 1983 and 2013. It includes counts of how many refugees have been resettled in each city by year and country of origin. This data is used to provide context for the discussion of the Rust Belt's immigrant population found earlier in this chapter and for the discussion of refugee service provision in Chapter 3.

The final quantitative dataset is Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Interoperability Statistics from 2009 to 2014. This data indicates the number of background checks run on immigrants through the Secure Communities program. It also provides the number of removals and returns resulting from those checks by county. This data was acquired through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. ICE has Interoperability Statistics online, but they are cumulative, starting at the program's inception. My FOIA request was for the annual counts. Having the annual data allowed me to calculate annual removal rates, or the rate at which foreign-born residents are

removed from each county. I discuss the Secure Communities program and these removal rates in Chapter 4.

Qualitative Data

In addition to the quantitative data, I use two sets of qualitative data. The first set comes from the municipal codes of the 16 Rust Belt cities discussed in this chapter. I found the most recent municipal code from each city and then employed a keyword search to find laws that specifically could affect immigrants. I searched for 14 terms: immigration, immigrant, alien, foreign, refugee, asylum, native, nation, national, nationality, citizens, citizenship, E-Verify, and English. I read each policy and retained those that both flagged one of these words and that actually applied to immigrants. I discarded any policies that use one of these terms in a different context. Common examples of discarded policies include references to “foreign substances” in water or soil samples, the maintenance of “asylums for the insane,” and references to citizens that just mean “residents of the city.” The results of this search yielded 497 subsections of relevant policy,⁶ ranging from a low of 14 in Akron to a high of 89 in Chicago. The number of policies found in each city is listed in Table 5, along with the date at which the municipal code was last updated. With the exception of Flint, Gary, and Syracuse, all of

⁶ There were no matches for *E-Verify*, and no relevant matches for *asylum*. I did not count how many policies I discarded for being irrelevant, but they vastly outnumbered relevant policies, likely by at least a four-to-one ratio. This was mostly due to the use of “citizen” as a synonym for “resident.”

<i>City</i>	<i>Code Up-to-Date</i>	<i>Number of Relevant Policies</i>
Akron, Ohio	January 19, 2016	14
Buffalo, New York	May 12, 2015	28
Chicago, Illinois	September 24, 2015	89
Cincinnati, Ohio	February 25, 2016	19
Cleveland, Ohio	February 8, 2016	42
Dayton, Ohio	January 26, 2016	27
Detroit, Ohio	July 31, 2015	66
Flint, Michigan	March 1, 2012	21
Gary, Indiana	January 10, 2010	21
Milwaukee, Wisconsin	February 9, 2016	23
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	August 11, 2015	27
Rochester, New York	January 19, 2016	17
St. Louis, Missouri	September 10, 2015	36
South Bend, Indiana	May 6, 2016	19
Syracuse, New York	August 26, 2013	23
Youngstown, Ohio	March 4, 2015	25

Table 5. Number of Policies and Date at which Municipal Codes are Up-to-Date

these codes were updated in either 2015 or 2016.⁷ Because the codes are so recent, they provide a current picture of local immigration policymaking.

I use the municipal code data in Chapter 2 to examine how existing laws influence the context of reception. Municipal codes establish the responsibilities and practices of the local government and the rights of residents and thus can play a significant role in

⁷ For midsized cities, recodification—merging new ordinances with the existing code—happens approximately every five years (Gary City Clerk 2010). From that standpoint, Flint and Syracuse’s codes would still be considered up-to-date. Gary has had trouble maintaining an up-to-date code. Prior to the update in 2009-2010 that produced the current edition, Gary’s municipal code had not undergone recodification in 21 years (Gary City Clerk 2010). In light of this, Gary’s municipal code is still relatively up-to-date.

shaping how friendly a city seems. Most existing studies on local immigration policymaking have focused on single cases or single policies, like those expanding acceptable sources of identification (Varsanyi 2007) or creating day labor ordinances (Danielson 2010). Those that have taken a broader approach include all types of restrictive and permissive policies, but only focus on new policymaking efforts (for examples, see Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005 and Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). I take a slightly different approach and examine all new and existing laws that could affect immigrants, which provides a more complete picture of the legal context immigrants experience when they enter these cities.

The final set of data is drawn from newspaper articles. Using Lexis-Nexis, Newsbank, and Proquest's digital paper archives, I gathered all of the articles about immigrants and immigration in six cities. I used one daily local paper from each city. If the city has more than one daily, I used the paper with greater readership, unless that paper was not fully archived. In those instances, I went with the paper with greater archive coverage. The newspapers used and their dates of coverage are listed in Table 6.

When possible, I gathered articles beginning on January 1, 1995 and ending on December 31, 2014. I started in 1995 primarily because it is an important point in US immigration history. In November 1994, California's voters passed Proposition 187, a highly restrictive anti-immigration measure. It was challenged and struck down in 1995, but many of its base concerns were addressed by the welfare and immigration reforms of 1996, which ceded some of the federal government's control over immigration to local governments (Varsanyi 2010a). Starting in 1995, then, captures the point when tensions

City	Newspaper	Dates Covered
Akron, Ohio	Akron Beacon Journal	1/1/1995-12/31/2014
Buffalo, New York	The Buffalo News	1/1/1995-12/31/2014
Cincinnati, Ohio	The Cincinnati Enquirer	1/1/1999-12/31/2014
Cleveland, Ohio	The Plain Dealer	1/1/1995-12/31/2014
Dayton, Ohio	Dayton Daily News	1/1/1995-12/31/2014
Detroit, Michigan	Detroit News	1/1/1999-12/31/2014
Flint, Michigan	The Flint Journal	3/5/1995-12/31/2014

Table 6. Case Study Cities, Newspapers Used, and Dates Newspapers Cover

started to rise nationwide on immigration, but when the law had not yet shifted to allow for local immigration policymaking. The next important point in US immigration history was the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which triggered a wave of immigration policymaking in response to the threat of terrorism and started the shift toward compulsory participation in enforcement programs. Thus, if the newspaper archives do not go back to 1995, I made sure they at least covered 2001, which is perhaps an even more significant turning point in local immigration responses than the 1996 laws.

I searched the archives using six keywords: immigrant, immigration, refugee, undocumented, illegal alien, and foreign born. As with the municipal codes, I worked through each article and only retained those that used these terms in the context of international migration. I also excluded any stories written outside the city, like Associated Press wire reports or syndicated columns, as well as stories that were written by local reporters about events in other countries. Of the stories that were excluded due to content, not authorship, some were excluded due to alternate uses of the search terms. This included usages such as “undocumented expenses” and references to “refugees”

from Hurricane Katrina. Other commonly excluded articles were obituaries, recipes (i.e., “This was my immigrant grandmother’s soup recipe”), articles about churches built by immigrants (i.e., “St. Mark’s, slated for demolition in August, was built by German immigrants in the 1880s”), and articles about mission trips to foreign refugee camps. After applying these exclusions, I was left with approximately 9,800 relevant articles.⁸

After limiting the articles in this way, I read them and top-coded by subject. I explored the subjects in search of themes related to immigrant incorporation, service provision, and immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. The vast majority of the articles were unrelated to these topics, and covered issues such as overseas adoptions, immigrant entrepreneurs, and criminal activity, where an immigrant is either the victim or perpetrator. There were approximately 300 articles⁹ related to my interests. I further coded these articles to determine subthemes, like refugee services, language provisions, education issues, and policing problems. These articles provided the basis for the arguments in Chapters 4 and 5.

⁸ As with the municipal codes, I did not count how many articles there were before I discarded the irrelevant ones. There was great variation between papers, but I would guess that I retained somewhere between one-quarter and one-half of the total articles after the first cut.

⁹ Only one of these articles is from Flint, so like Youngstown, it is essentially excluded from the analysis. Given that Flint resettles very few refugees and that less than 2% of its population is foreign born, it is perhaps unsurprising that their newspaper has not covered immigrant incorporation efforts. The few articles that Flint did have about immigrants mostly covered criminal activity.

CONCLUSION

Taken together, these analyses and the following chapters provide essential information on revitalization strategies and local immigration policymaking, which are very important given our current political climate. Since at least 1996, when federal law changed to allow more latitude in local immigration policymaking, local laws and decisions have played an important role in moderating federal immigration enforcement and policies (Varsanyi 2008). This allowed the context of reception to vary between cities, and laid the groundwork for immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. In our current context, where the federal government's position towards immigrants is poised to become much stricter (Kelly and Sprunt 2016), the ability to dampen federal efforts is key if cities want to pursue immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. Understanding these cities' abilities to do that in a complicated context characterized by both decentralization and federalization is essential.

Chapter 2: Immigration Policymaking and Immigrant Renewal Strategies in the Rust Belt

As Portes and Rumbaut (2006) argue in *Immigrant America*, the context of reception influences whether immigrants move to a particular location and shapes their assimilation experience after they have arrived. If cities are trying to attract immigrants as a revitalization strategy, they need to create a context of reception that is welcoming and supportive of immigrants, or immigrants will settle elsewhere. Additionally, if cities want immigrants to flourish to the point that they can open businesses and restore neighborhoods, cities need to support them so that they can integrate into the community. Establishing a positive context of reception is thus crucial to immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

While three factors shape the context of reception—the policies of the local government, the local labor market, and the characteristics of the immigrant community—only one of these factors, the policies of the local government, are under local control. Cities cannot control their labor markets or the characteristics of the immigrant population. If they are trying to revitalize by making their cities more “immigrant-friendly,” their efforts must include local immigration policymaking. This is particularly true in the Rust Belt, where the desire to attract immigrants stems from deficiencies in the other factors that shape the context of reception, namely, their

relatively small existing immigrant populations and struggling economies.

Because these cities are trying to attract immigrants, their policies need to actively encourage immigration, or create a positive context of reception that makes immigrants' economic and social integration as easy as possible. Each city's ability to do this significantly shapes the probability that their immigrant-driven revitalization strategies will be successful. There is more to this, however, than just creating new immigrant-friendly policies, though new policies are undoubtedly important. Cities do not make the decision to become immigrant-friendly in a vacuum, and they are not writing policy on a clean slate. There are existing laws in these cities that also affect the context of reception, and this can present a challenge to cities pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. This is particularly true if the existing policies make integration and assimilation more difficult. Attention must be paid to the entire local immigration policy context—both old policies and new—if we are to truly evaluate whether these cities are creating a positive context of reception. If old policies exist that discourage immigration and undercut current goals, they could stymie these immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

This chapter examines this issue by analyzing immigration policies in Rust Belt cities, considering whether their effects would positively or negatively affect immigrants and immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, and the degree to which the policies would actually affect immigrants and the context of reception. This can help us understand the context of reception in Rust Belt cities and the challenges cities face in shaping it.

LOCAL IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING

Before analyzing Rust Belt policies, it would be beneficial to consider what we already know about local immigration policymaking and its potential effects. Much of this knowledge comes from case studies of particular policies in particular cities. Thus, we do not know the full extent of local immigration policymaking. We know what policies have been passed in some communities, particularly those with large immigrant populations or especially hostile immigration laws, but we know little of the policies passed in the rest of the country, including the cities of the Rust Belt. We also know nothing of local immigration policies that were already on the books, as both the case studies and the survey studies on local immigration policymaking (i.e., Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005) focus on new policies. Subsequently, there is little-to-no existing information about immigration policymaking in the Rust Belt.

Existing studies do suggest some possible avenues for local immigration policymaking, however. Such studies have examined the intention and possible effects of policies on immigrants, making it possible for us to determine whether such policies would contribute to the active encouragement, passive acceptance, or exclusion of immigrants and immigration (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). This typology provides a useful framework for understanding local immigration policymaking. I have thus fit the local policies found in the existing literature into this framework. This is presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Existing Immigration Policies Typology

Active Encouragement

As Figure 3 demonstrates, existing research has uncovered three types of local policies that can be considered to actively encourage immigration. The first are policies that provide healthcare to immigrants. While many immigrants rely on emergency room services for healthcare, some cities have tried to reduce that dependency by providing health clinics or other health services for immigrants, regardless of legal status. In San Francisco, for example, local policies allow doctors to treat immigrants without having to

worry about the patient's legal status or the direct costs of their treatment (Marrow 2012). Such policies provide essential services to immigrants that make integration into the community easier.

The second type of policies are non-cooperation policies. These are sometimes referred to as "Sanctuary City" policies. These policies limit local government employees' cooperation with federal immigration agents. These policies tend to take two forms. The first involves police departments refusing to execute immigration holds—requests that immigrants be detained and then turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—unless the detainee in question is a serious violent offender or is wanted on a criminal warrant (Pedroza 2013). The second form involves passing a "non-cooperation law." These laws essentially institute a "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy regarding immigration status. Federal laws make it illegal for local officials to withhold immigration information from federal authorities, so local governments have gone around this by prohibiting government employees from asking about immigration status at all (Carlberg 2009; Mitnik and Halpern-Finnerty 2010). Non-cooperation policies reduce immigrants' fear of immigration enforcement and deportation, and free them to move about the city unhindered. This makes their integration into the community easier than if they are relegated to the shadows of society due to fear of apprehension.

The final type of policies that actively encourage immigration are those that provide for alternative identification. In a post-9/11 world, individuals need identification or risk being detained while police run their information through the criminal and immigration databases. If the individual is an undocumented immigrant,

this raises their chance of discovery and deportation, and thus likely makes them wary of government and police officials. To combat this, many cities have moved to accept the *matricula consular* (the identification card provided by the Mexican consulate) as acceptable ID, thus limiting the number of people being run through the federal databases (Varsanyi 2007; Mitnik and Halpern-Finnerty 2010). Like non-cooperation policies, alternative ID laws make it easier for immigrants to move about and integrate into communities.

Passive Acceptance

Because passive acceptance means that the local government is maintaining the status quo, there are no local policies that can be classified as passive acceptance. Passing immigration laws would necessarily mean changing the context of reception, resulting in either active encouragement or exclusion. However, this does not mean that these cities are completely separated from immigration policymaking and its effects. As I will discuss at length in Chapter 4, passive acceptance means participating in federal immigration enforcement through the Secure Communities program and the Criminal Alien Program (CAP). Cities that engage in passive acceptance, which research suggests is the most common approach (Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005; Lewis et al. 2012), still participate in programs that can have an exclusionary effect.

Exclusion

The final type of local immigration policies are exclusionary, or those that try to

discourage immigration by making life difficult or unpleasant for immigrants. Most of these policies focus on discouraging undocumented immigrants, but can also deter documented immigrants by encouraging fear and hostility toward the foreign-born. Existing research has explored five types of exclusionary policies. The first type are those that require employers to use the E-Verify system, the national database that allows employers to verify that employees are authorized to work in the US (Rodriguez et al. 2010). Sometimes this is required for all employers, and sometimes just government agencies or those seeking government contracts (Chavez et al. 2013). Such policies make it more difficult for immigrants to get jobs, especially since E-Verify is slow and error-prone, frequently indicating that immigrants do not have work authorization when they really do (Rodriguez et al. 2010).

The second type of exclusionary policies are those that restrict benefits based on immigration status. For example, states get to decide who is eligible for welfare, and some have restricted immigrants' access (Graefe et al. 2008). Other policies restrict immigrant access to housing, requiring that potential tenants demonstrate that they are legally in the country, and imposing fines on landlords who rent to undocumented immigrants (Esbenshade 2007). Such policies make it more difficult for immigrants to integrate into a community.

The third type of policy encourages "backdoor enforcement" of immigration laws (Varsanyi 2008). These take advantage of federal enforcement programs like Secure Communities and CAP to remove immigrants from the community. Under these policies, local police crackdown on civil ordinances like loitering, solicitation, and overcrowding

in the hope that they catch deportable immigrants. These immigrants could then be removed through one of the federal immigration enforcement programs (Varsanyi 2008). The fourth type of policy establishes a 287(g) program. This is an optional federal program that takes local officers and deputizes them as ICE agents. This allows the officers to interview suspected immigration violators and begin deportation proceedings from the local jail. The 287(g) program is considered to be one of the most draconian immigration control efforts a local law enforcement agency can introduce, and is fairly uncommon. In fact, although the 287(g) program was established in 1996, no law enforcement agencies signed the Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) that establish 287(g) partnerships until after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. At the program's height in 2011, only 72 local agencies had signed MOAs (Capps et al. 2011). By June 2015, only 34 agencies were enrolled (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2015). It has never been a popular program, but it has been used, much like backdoor enforcement, to scare immigrants and drive them underground or out of an area.

Finally, the fifth type of policy requires that all government business be conducted in English. Such policies are meant to either make life more difficult for those who do not speak English and keep them from integrating into the community, or encourage them to learn English faster (Esbenshade et al. 2010).¹⁰

¹⁰ This is a hot-button issue. Though I do not discuss this in Chapters 3 and 4, every newspaper had a debate at least once (and in some cities every few years) about whether cities and states should enact English-only policies. Occasionally, these arguments were triggered by ill-fated state- and federal-level English-only bills, but often, they were carried out entirely between members of the community in letters to the editor. None of the cities considered such bills, and as this chapter will demonstrate, none of them have such laws on the books, either.

IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING IN THE RUST BELT

These existing studies give us some sense of the laws cities have passed regarding immigration, but do not tell us what is happening in the Rust Belt, or whether those cities are passing laws that can help with their immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. Again, because these revitalization strategies depend on attracting immigrants, these cities need to be creating pro-immigrant policies that could actively encourage immigration. I explored this issue by examining the municipal codes of 16 Rust Belt cities, which allowed me to compile a list of all policies that could affect immigrants. I then determined whether the likely effects of these policies could be considered as active encouragement or exclusion, and how this affects the context of reception in these cities.

In the course of this analysis, I discovered that some of the policies that are popular elsewhere have not been passed by any Rust Belt cities, and that many policies that exist in Rust Belt cities have not been discussed in the existing literature. This does not mean that those laws do not exist elsewhere—they almost certainly do—just that they have not been examined as immigration policies. I have added these new types of policies to the classification scheme presented in Figure 3. The new scheme is shown in Figure 4, where the new categories are presented in lighter colored boxes with broken borders. These policies can also affect the context of reception, and should be considered in future research that examines local immigration policymaking.

Every Rust Belt city has at least some policies that could affect immigrants. However, it is unlikely that all the policies that could affect immigrants would actually affect the context of reception. Some policies are so obscure—such as Milwaukee’s law




Figure 4. Expanded Immigration Policies Typology

allowing residents to use alien registration cards at pawn brokers (*Milwaukee 92-11*) or South Bend's policy requiring that tattoo and piercing aftercare instructions be provided in English and Spanish (*South Bend 13-135*)—that they would have a limited effect on immigrants' lives. Other policies, like those requiring the use of English on some signage and in some recordkeeping, could put immigrants with low English proficiency at a disadvantage, but are unlikely to distinguish one context of reception from another. This indicates a caveat to the discussion of local immigration policymaking. Not all policies that affect immigrants affect the context of reception. Thus, we also must consider the degree to which a policy affects immigrant outcomes. So, while there are many policies related to immigrants in these municipal codes, only a subset are relevant to this discussion.

Additionally, we must consider the timing of the implementation of these policies. While immigrant-driven revitalization strategies are a fairly recent development, and though immigration policymaking and enforcement has devolved since the mid-1990s and early 2000s, many of these policies have been on the books for several decades. With a few notable exceptions, most of these policies are not a result of immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, but rather stem from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. This suggests that existing policies can affect the context of reception, and should be considered. Additionally, the lack of new policies raises questions about how much effort these cities are putting into their immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

Active Encouragement

Of most interest are the policies that could actively encourage immigration by making the city more welcoming to immigrants. There are several of these, but few of them are policies that other research has uncovered. For example, none of the Rust Belt cities have passed laws about immigrant health care, but all of them have passed laws protecting or expanding immigrants' civil rights. I found six types of immigration policies in the Rust Belt that can be considered to be active encouragement policies: civil and voting rights policies; policies establishing Human Relation Commissions and Citizen Review Boards; language provisions; non-cooperation policies; Welcoming City ordinances; and policies allowing for alternative identification.

With the exception of non-cooperation policies and policies permitting alternative IDs, none of these are policies that have been previously discussed by researchers. Additionally, most of these policies have been on the books for decades. With the exception of non-cooperation policies, Welcoming City ordinances, and alternative identification policies—which are only found in Detroit and Chicago, and which have all been passed in the last 7 or 8 years—the majority of these policies are at least 30 years old.

The first, and most common, type of immigration policies found in the Rust Belt are those that protect or provide civil rights. All of the Rust Belt cities have passed laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin. Appendix B contains a complete list of such policies. Almost every city has outlawed discrimination in employment and housing (see Appendix B), while many cities also ban discrimination in

more specific circumstances. Examples of this include Chicago's prohibition on discrimination in ambulance services (*Chicago 4-68-180*), Cleveland's protections against discrimination at go-cart tracks (*Cleveland 691.16*), and St. Louis' policy on equal treatment in refuse service provision (*St. Louis 11.02.120*).

Chicago and Detroit both provide additional civil rights protections. Chicago guarantees that services, provisions, and benefits cannot be withheld on account of immigration or citizenship status, unless required by state and federal statutes or a court decision (*Chicago 2-173-040a*). Chicago also requires that anyone providing legal or paperwork assistance to immigrants have a license to do so (*Chicago 4-6-240*). As fraud among immigration service providers is an ongoing concern (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 2010), this is a potentially helpful protection.

Detroit provides an additional right to immigrants by allowing noncitizen residents to vote in some elections. Noncitizen residents can vote in Citizen's District Council elections as long as they have registered with the U.S. Immigration Service and are at least 18-years-old (*Detroit 14-6-10*). Although this does not provide full voting rights—federal and state laws prevent that—it does give immigrants a voice and a vote in some local matters, which can encourage integration into the community. Detroit also guarantees that immigrants living in Michigan have the same property rights as all other citizens (*Detroit 6*).

The second type of pro-immigrant policies found in Rust Belt cities are laws that establish Human Relations Commissions and Citizen Review Boards (or comparable organizations with different names). Human Relations Commissions deal with

discrimination and intra-group tensions that might arise within the city. Like discrimination policies, Human Relations Commissions are meant to protect several classes of residents, including people who could be targeted for discrimination based on nationality or national origin. Akron (3.33), Buffalo (2-10-480; 2-120-510; 2-120-515), Dayton (2.31.11), Detroit (7-804; *Chpt. 21-Art. II*), Flint (2-19; 2-130), Syracuse (28), and Youngstown (547) all have such organizations.

Similarly, several cities have Citizen Review Boards. These are meant to give residents some oversight over policing and complaints about law enforcement. In Rust Belt cities, these boards investigate complaints against the police, including complaints related to mistreatment or discrimination on the basis of immigration status. Chicago (2-57-010), Pittsburgh (621.06), St. Louis (3.140.020), and Syracuse (12-186) all have Citizen Review Boards.

The third type of pro-immigrant policies provide language accommodations for those who do not speak English. Although not all immigrants have limited English proficiency, enough do that language provisions could contribute to a more welcoming context of reception. There are different types of policies that provide language provisions. Many of these policies have to do with providing paperwork and signage in multiple common languages. Examples include Syracuse's requirement that living wage forms be available in English and Spanish (*Syracuse 50-10*); Chicago's policy that signage at day labor agencies about employer, employee, and agency rights must be in English, Spanish, and Polish (*Chicago 4-6-140*); and Rochester's law requiring that lead paint warnings be issued in English and Spanish (*Rochester 90-58*).

Four cities make language provisions beyond those related to paperwork and signage. These cities have language policies related to the provision of municipal services. In Chicago, if a population exists that speaks a language other than English and it makes up either 5% of the total city population or at least 10,000 residents, whichever is less, city departments are required to provide assistance in that language (*Chicago 2-40-020*). Buffalo and Syracuse both require that some departments provide special accommodations to assist non-English speakers. Syracuse has a consumer affairs office, which is required to make special efforts to assist people who do not speak English or who otherwise “operate at a disadvantage in the marketplace” (*Syracuse Sec. 2-9*). This includes producing special media communications and simplified versions of the consumer protection code, and creating temporary offices to serve disadvantaged customers. Similarly, in Buffalo, the council of the Department of Human Resources has to make additional language provisions by providing extra employment services for people with limited English proficiency (*Buffalo 16-21*).

Milwaukee has two special language provisions. The police department pays for interpreters in eight languages,¹¹ and has provisions to provide additional language support by written request (*Milwaukee 350-134*). Additionally, the commissioner in charge of food service operator certification can waive certain requirements for up to six months if the individual seeking the certification has failed to meet requirements because they have trouble with the English language (*Milwaukee 68-15*).

¹¹ Milwaukee pays for interpreters in American Sign Language, German, Greek, Italian, Kurdish, Polish, Russian, and Spanish.

The remaining pro-immigrant policies are held exclusively by Detroit and Chicago, which go far beyond other cities in their attempts to provide services to immigrants. First, both of these cities have noncooperation policies. In Detroit, police cannot ask about immigration status to see if someone is following federal immigration laws (*Detroit 27-9-4-a-1*), or ask victims of, or witnesses to, a crime about their immigration status (*Detroit 27-9-4-a-2*). Detroit's public servants also cannot ask about immigration status unless it is required by federal law (*Detroit 27-9-5*). Similarly, in Chicago, no agent or agency can ask about immigration status or investigate immigration status unless it is required by a state or federal statute or a court order (*Chicago 2-173-020*). Chicago also has a law forbidding employers from sharing citizenship or immigration status unless it is required by federal law (*Chicago 2-173-030*). Additionally, Chicago has a policy limiting police participation in federal immigration enforcement. Chicago's policy indicates that the police cannot hold someone simply because they believe the individual is an immigration violator. They also cannot detain someone on an immigration hold unless that person is subject to a criminal warrant or had previously committed a felony (*Chicago 2-173-042*).

The second policy that Chicago and Detroit share is a "Welcoming City" ordinance. These policies clarify the city and the police's approach immigration and immigration enforcement. These policies go beyond outlawing or mandating certain behaviors to explaining the reasoning behind the positions. Chicago's policy is particularly illuminating:

The vitality of the City of Chicago ("The City"), one of the most

ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse cities in the world, where one-out-of-five of the City's residents is an immigrant, has been built on the strength of its immigrant communities. The City Council finds that the cooperation of all persons, both documented citizens and those without documentation status, is essential to achieve the City's goals of protecting life and property, preventing crime and resolving problems. The City Council further finds that assistance from a person, whether documented or not, who is a victim of, or witness to, a crime is important to promoting the safety of all its residents. The cooperation of the City's immigrant communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety and security in the entire City. One of the City's most important goals is to enhance the City's relationship with the immigrant communities.

Due to the City's limited resources; the complexity of immigration laws; the clear need to foster the trust and cooperation from the public, including members of the immigrant communities; and to effectuate the City's goals, the City Council finds that there is a need to clarify the communications and enforcement relationship between the City and the federal government. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the City's procedures concerning immigration status and enforcement of federal civil immigration laws. (*Chicago 9-12-12*)

Essentially, this policy outlines why immigrants are important to the city and explains

their role in crime control, and then later outlines the police's involvement in immigration enforcement. This policy, along with the comparable one in Detroit,¹² are the closest examples we have to codified immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. While the policy does not focus on economic outcomes, it is clear that the city feels that immigrants are beneficial to the community, and that welcoming those immigrants is essential to retaining those benefits.

Finally, Chicago has policies providing for alternative identification. These laws broaden the definition of what forms of identification are acceptable, which allows immigrants to access more services. It also allows them to signal their identity to the police, which keeps the police from having to consult the federal immigration databases. Chicago has two such policies, which seem to have overlapping effects. The first is that the Mexican *matricula consular* is acceptable identification at any city department. These departments can also accept the consular identification of any country that has a

¹² Detroit's Welcoming City ordinance is similar to Chicago's: "It is the policy of the City of Detroit to respect the rights of, and provide equal services to, all persons regardless of appearance, ethnicity, immigration status, manner of dress, national origin, physical characteristics, race, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression; to ensure the enforcement of rights under the United States constitution, including due process and equal protection; to promote community safety; to encourage victims of crime and witnesses to cooperate with law enforcement authority without regard to immigration status; to prevent bias-based policing; and to promote acceptance. In order to permit members of immigrant communities to access services that are provided by the City of Detroit government to which they are entitled; and to ensure that city public servants are acting consistent with federal law regarding local governments cooperating with federal immigration authorities, the City of Detroit enacts this article as an effective way to guide city public servants in adhering to rights under the United States Constitution, including due process and equal protection, and under federal law, while protecting the safety and health of all members of the Detroit community" (*Detroit 27-9-1*).

consulate¹³ in Chicago (*Chicago 2-160-065*). The second policy is broader. It states that any time an Illinois driver's license is considered to be acceptable ID, an individual can present photo identification from their home country—whether it is a driver's license, a passport, or a consular ID card—and it will be accepted. The only exception is for the completion of federal I-9 forms (*Chicago 2-173-040b*).

The six types of active encouragement policies found in Rust Belt cities all contribute to a positive context of reception and could aid immigrants in their assimilation. How helpful these policies are, however, is up for some debate. While some of the policies, like Detroit and Chicago's Welcoming City ordinances and noncooperation policies, are clearly beneficial and would ease integration, the most common policies are of dubious utility. The majority of the pro-immigrant policies simply uphold civil rights legislation or provide a framework for investigating civil rights abuses (Human Rights Commissions and Citizen Review Boards). This is not particularly unique; the vast majority of cities have anti-discrimination ordinances, and

¹³ Chicago houses the Midwestern consulates of many countries, so this policy has the potential to protect the majority of foreign-born visitors and residents of Chicago, should all the countries provide consular identification cards. This is not necessarily the case. Regardless, the following countries have consulates in Chicago: Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Choose Chicago 2014).

most contain protections based on national origin. While not having these policies could discourage immigration, there is no reason to expect that having anti-discrimination policies would encourage it, especially since most cities have identical policies. Furthermore, it is not clear that anti-discrimination policies actually work. It is well-established that racial bias in housing (Massey 2016) and employment (Pager 2003) still exist, despite laws prohibiting them. Such laws have good intentions, but do not inevitably change reality as much as other policies might. Policies discouraging discrimination against immigrants are important, but it is unlikely that such policies would significantly alter the local context of reception independent of other pro-immigrant measures.

This is not to say that Rust Belt cities are only passing ineffective pro-immigrant policies. As mentioned above, Chicago and Detroit's Welcoming City ordinances and noncooperation policies are very beneficial. Chicago's alternative ID policy is also helpful, as it makes it easier and safer for immigrants to move through the community and access services. Detroit's voting provision is also a potentially useful policy. Allowing non-citizens to vote can help with integration, as voting draws immigrants into the local community. The policies in Chicago, Buffalo, and Syracuse that provide employment services and other information to people who are not fluent in English could also improve the immigration experience. Being able to access services and find jobs are clearly essential to successful integration. Finally, Milwaukee's policy that allows some leeway for non-English speakers when filing food service permits is a very helpful policy, particularly for cities trying to bolster their economies through immigration. Such

a policy could encourage immigrant entrepreneurs as it lowers one barrier to business formation. Taken together, these policies suggest that Rust Belt cities have taken some steps that could contribute to a positive context of reception, although there is more that they could do.

EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE RUST BELT

All the policies discussed thus far ostensibly encourage immigration and contribute to a positive context of reception, but Rust Belt cities have also all passed laws that can contribute to a negative context of reception and be considered exclusionary. While none of these policies were created recently—most were passed in the 1960s and 1970s—and while none of these cities have codified backdoor enforcement policies or signed 287(g) MOAs, they have policies on the books that can make life difficult for immigrants. These policies fall into two categories. The first has to do with the provision of services, specifically, policies limiting participation in Business Enterprise programs based on an immigrant's legal status. Business Enterprise programs are meant to support certain classes of businesses so that they can compete for and receive government contracts. Such classes include small businesses (Small Business Enterprises, or SBEs), women-owned businesses (Women's Business Enterprises, or WBEs), and minority-owned businesses (Minority Business Enterprises, or MBEs). In Cincinnati and Syracuse, the MBE and WBE programs are restricted to U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted permanent residents (*Cincinnati* 324; *Syracuse* 42). Milwaukee's policy is more restrictive; their SBE is only open to U.S. citizens (*Milwaukee* 370-1; 370-

25).

The second type of restrictive policies make employment contingent on English language proficiency or citizenship. Appendix C provides a full list of such policies by city. These policies keep non-citizens and individuals with limited English proficiency from receiving the certification to work certain jobs. These restrictions cover everything from fireworks operators (*Cincinnati 1213-17*) to licensed plumbers (*Buffalo 419-2*) and billiards hall operators (*Youngstown 763.03*).

Many of these restrictions seem like they are intended to protect consumers. This is particularly true of work restrictions based on language proficiency. For example, several cities restrict taxicab operators licenses to those who at least speak English fluently (see Appendix C). This seems like a reasonable restriction in cities where the majority of potential customers speak English; it could be quite chaotic if passengers and taxi drivers could not communicate. However, many of these cities place restrictions on employment beyond what could reasonably help consumers. Requiring that taxi drivers be able to write in English, for example, is perhaps unnecessarily restrictive. Restricting licensure to citizens also has limited utility as a consumer protection. Such policies thus seem more exclusionary. They could make it difficult for immigrants to find employment and start businesses.

Additionally, these policies run counter to the goals of immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, which emphasize how immigrants can help the local economy. First, many of the licenses with citizenship or language restrictions are for businesses with low overhead (see Appendix C), which are likely easier for new business owners to

start. Keeping non-citizens from operating such businesses could hamper their ability to start bigger businesses in the future. It could also discourage immigration, especially if other cities do not have the same restrictions.

The restrictions on SBE participation could also have a similar effect. While immigrants are unlikely to choose their destination based on access to an SBE, being able to participate in one after they arrive could make a big difference in whether or not their businesses are successful. Having an SBE program that supports immigrant business owners could help in revitalization efforts, while keeping immigrants from the program could provide an unnecessary barrier to their success.

CONCLUSION

Considered together, the number of policies that could actively encourage immigration far outstrip the number of restrictive policies, but it is not clear that these cities are welcoming as a result. Although the sheer number of pro-immigrant policies could make it seem like these cities are overwhelmingly receptive to immigrants, many of these laws are not particularly unique—most US cities have anti-discrimination policies that include immigrants, for example—so it is doubtful that these policies would actually distinguish one context of reception from another. While there are exceptions, like the Welcoming City ordinances, noncooperation policies, and provisions for alternative identification found in Chicago and Detroit, most Rust Belt cities have done little to positively change their context of reception through immigration policymaking.

At the same time, these cities have numerous exclusionary policies on the books that could hamper immigrants' economic incorporation by keeping them from certain jobs. By keeping old laws—most of them were passed before 1980—that restrict employment on the basis of naturalization status, citizenship, or language ability, these cities are maintaining barriers to economic assimilation and success. Given that one of the goals of immigrant-driven revitalization is economic development, these cities are potentially sabotaging their renewal efforts by maintaining these policies. Despite this, it is also possible that these policies have a negligible effect on the context of reception. Given the pervasiveness of these policies in Rust Belt cities, it seems likely that such policies exist in many, if not most, other midsize- to large cities. If that is the case, these exclusionary policies do nothing more to distinguish the context of reception in these areas than do anti-discrimination policies. The fact that these policies run counter to the goals of immigrant-driven revitalization, however, suggests that the policies could still be holding these cities back.

If we accept that most of these policies do little to alter the context of reception, it becomes clear that most of these cities are taking a passive approach to local immigration policymaking. Indeed, of the 16 cities in this analysis, five—Cincinnati, Cleveland, Gary, Rochester, and South Bend—have made no immigration policies that distinguish themselves from other Rust Belt cities in any way, but rather only have policies that all other Rust Belt cities have. Another six—Akron, Dayton, Flint, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Youngstown—have only distinguished themselves by establishing Human Relations Commissions or Citizen Review Boards. Only 2—Detroit and Chicago—have passed

pro-immigrant legislation in the era of immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. Thus, 11 of the 16 cities have done little to change their context of reception through legislation, and 14 of the 16 have done nothing to support immigrant-driven revitalization strategies with legal changes. This includes cities that have government sponsored immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, like Dayton and Cincinnati.

Of the five Rust Belt cities that have additional pro-immigrant policies—regardless of when they created them—three have extra language accommodations that could actually contribute to a positive context of reception. Although these cities could do more, the language accommodations in Buffalo and Syracuse that open government services to non-English speakers are a step in the right direction. So is Milwaukee’s provision that gives non-English speakers some leeway in filing their business permits. In addition to being explicitly pro-immigrant, this policy also supports the economic goals of immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, and could benefit cities pursuing such strategies.

The final two cities, Chicago and Detroit, have actually passed several laws that could actively encourage immigration. In the last five years, both Chicago and Detroit made changes to their municipal codes that provide support to immigrants, whether it is by limiting immigration enforcement, providing language support, expanding voting rights, or providing for alternative identification. Although both cities still have exclusionary policies, like those limiting employment, their new pro-immigrant policies likely outweigh them. If other Rust Belt cities want to create a positive context of reception, it would behoove them to follow Chicago and Detroit’s example.

As it stands, if Rust Belt cities are pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, they are potentially being undermined by their own inaction and existing laws. This raises questions about how successful their immigrant-driven renewal strategies might be. If the success of these strategies depends on the cities creating a welcoming environment and a positive context of reception, but the cities are doing little to create a positive context of reception, can they be successful? What we know about the factors that shape immigrant settlement and integration suggest that they cannot. This is a significant obstacle, but one that cities could easily overcome by passing more pro-immigrant policies.

Chapter 3: Immigrant Incorporation, Refugees, and the Civil Society

As Chapter 2 demonstrated, Rust Belt city governments, with the exception of Detroit and Chicago, have passed few laws that could help improve their context of reception. Although the laws that govern immigrant lives are important, they do not comprise the entirety of local immigrant policymaking. The Welcome Dayton plan, for example, is a city initiative and city policy, but it has never been codified. However, it is still part of the city's response to immigrants, and it still affects the context of reception. Similarly, the services that cities provide their residents are a matter of local policy, but are not necessarily written into law. Thus, the official statutes found in the municipal code are only part of the local policy context.

The other facets of local policy, like initiatives and service provision, can be quite important in shaping the context of reception. A city's ability to provide support services for immigrants—like language instruction, translation services, and healthcare—likely affects immigrant assimilation, and thus immigrants' ability to succeed in the community. This is especially likely in an area with few existing immigrants. Absent an existing immigrant population that can help with incorporation, local programs and services that provide aid are possibly the best (or only) integration assistance immigrants can access. Without such assistance, assimilation would be much more difficult, and immigrants would be less likely to thrive in a way that could benefit the community.

This raises some questions. Are Rust Belt cities providing services to immigrants? And if so, what are they doing? Because there has been so little research on immigration in Rust Belt cities, we really have no idea how those cities respond to immigrants. We do, however, know that these cities face unique challenges that can affect both the quality and quantity of services they provide. This chapter explores the issues facing these cities, as well as the services provided to immigrants within them, by using newspaper data drawn from six Rust Belt cities: Akron, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, and Flint. I first examine the challenges Rust Belt cities face in providing services, focusing on issues that arise due to the composition of the immigrant population and the processes of decentralization and federalization. I then consider how these issues affect service provision and conclude with a discussion of how this likely affects immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

CHALLENGES OF SERVING A SMALL, DIVERSE IMMIGRANT POPULATION

As I discussed in Chapter 1, Rust Belt cities have relatively small immigrant populations, but those populations are much more diverse than those found elsewhere. While approximately half of the immigrants in the US are from Latin America, this population makes up fewer than a third of the immigrants in nine of the 16 Rust Belt cities I consider (see Table 2, pg. 20). In exchange, those cities often have disproportionately large European, Asian, and African immigrant populations. The diversity found in these populations creates two related challenges for cities trying to create a welcoming context of reception. First, it is much more difficult to provide

services to immigrants—which often involves providing translation support and culturally-specific assistance—when there is not a large population group that speaks a single language and shares a common culture. Diverse populations require diverse accommodations.

The second challenge is related. Because the overall immigrant population in Rust Belt cities is so small and diverse, these cities often lack a visible immigrant presence. With no large immigrant group standing out, the problems immigrants face often go unnoticed. When issues do come to the attention of city leaders and service agencies, they have to scramble to respond. This leaves them a step behind, and often creates additional problems.

The clearest example of these twin challenges was reported in the *Dayton Daily News* (Debrosse 2000). In 2000, a five-year-old Lebanese immigrant girl was killed in a car accident. The police were having trouble communicating with her family, who only spoke Arabic, so they tried to get a translator using a list of community interpreters provided by Red Cross International Services. There were four Arabic interpreters on the list, but none of the phone numbers worked. Desperately needing to communicate, officers contacted the University of Dayton police, who found a staff member who then hunted down an Arabic-speaking student who could help (Debrosse 2000). This tragedy, and all the complications that ensued, caused the Red Cross, local hospitals, and local law enforcement agencies to rethink their emergency plans. This single incident alerted them to the fact that they had an Arabic-speaking immigrant population, and that their existing

strategies for serving them, and other immigrant groups, were insufficient (Debrosse 2000).

This is just one example, but it demonstrates how complicated it is to adequately provide even very basic social services when immigrant populations are small. It is difficult to anticipate needs, and hard to provide them when the area lacks an existing immigrant population that can help. This is only part of the problem. As the next two sections will demonstrate, the diversity of these populations also drives up the cost of service provision, which these cities can ill-afford.

DECENTRALIZATION AND SERVICE PROVISION

As I've discussed, Rust Belt cities have experienced significant population loss. Population loss is often associated with decreased tax revenues, which limits the money a city can spend on public services. Detroit provides a striking example of this. In the years prior to its 2013 bankruptcy, Detroit was so poor that the city drastically reduced trash collection, cut bus routes, stopped replacing streetlights, and otherwise reduced normal public services. To maintain their neighborhoods and the city, citizens took it upon themselves to serve as volunteer dog-catchers, groundskeepers, and crime fighters (Binelli 2012).

These financial issues, and those of other Rust Belt cities, overlapped with the federal decentralization of responsibility for social services. Since the 1980s, the federal government has passed control over many social services to states and local governments (Lobao 2016). This includes many social safety net programs, like welfare (Lobao et al.

2014). These shifts increase state and local governments' financial responsibility for these programs, although they still receive some federal aid. As I mentioned in Chapter 1 and as I'll discuss more in Chapter 4, some of this decentralization allowed local governments to make policies that actively encourage immigration by expanding service provision to immigrants (i.e., Graefe et al. 2010). But in many cases, this decentralization has placed great financial strain on local governments, particularly those that were already struggling financially, like Detroit. This has caused them to make hard decisions about how much support they can afford to provide residents, whether they are citizens or not.

Sometimes, the cities have an actual choice in whether they provide services. For example, in 1997, federal law changed and decentralized food stamp provision. Though the federal government had paid the full cost for food stamps, the 1997 change shifted 50% of non-citizen food stamp costs onto local agencies (Hammersley 1997). Local agencies then had a choice. They could either pick up the other half of the tab, or they could cut food stamp benefits for non-citizens. This was a debate in Buffalo and Erie County. Although they could afford to pay their half, which was \$312,888 in 1997, local officials believed this would set a costly precedent. At the same time, they did not want to take away food stamp benefits. They ultimately came up with a cost-saving plan, where Erie County welfare officials paid the International Institute of Buffalo \$65,000 to help 587 legal residents become citizens so that they could keep their food stamp benefits and Erie County could avoid the costs. Though this plan saved those services, there was a real debate over whether or not they should provide them.

While local governments can sometimes make choices about whether they will provide services, oftentimes they have no say in the matter, and simply have to find a way to pay for them. Because they are running on such thin margins, cities often balk at this, especially when the costs are for immigration services. Generally, when questions of immigrant service provision arise, they are immediately followed by concerns about costs. Concerns over the cost of translation services in the criminal justice system are an example of this. Because of legal protections guaranteeing fair trials, courts and law enforcement agencies must provide translation assistance. Officials in Buffalo, Cincinnati, and Dayton have all expressed concern about rising costs associated with this.

In Cincinnati, the city faced a growing bill for court translators in the mid-2000s that made people question whether such provisions were necessary and worthwhile (Kimball 2005; Morse 2007). They were especially concerned that the majority of the people requiring the translators were in the country illegally (Bronson 2005). Nearby, Dayton also experienced a similar growth in translation costs (Keilman 2000). In 2011, local criminal justice agencies spent \$7,000 on interpreters and expected that those costs would rise as the city implemented its Welcome Dayton plan (Page 2011). Part of the plan called for reducing language barriers across government, community, and healthcare services (Dayton Human Relations Council 2015), which would cost additional money. The county emergency dispatch also spent \$1,300 to have emergency calls translated over the phone (Page 2011). Both of these expenditures, though notably low, raised questions and concerns about additional costs. Though these concerns were considered to be relatively minor, the fact that there were concerns at all about an \$8,300 expenditure

spread across multiple agencies and levels of government demonstrates the challenges Dayton faces in funding social services.

In Buffalo and the surrounding county, concerns about translation fees have led to innovative solutions to reduce costs. Instead of hiring interpreters, they rely on services that provide translation over the phone whenever possible (Gee 2011). Some agencies have established “language days,” where they schedule multiple appointments with people who need the same interpretation service in order to maximize efficiency and minimize interpreter costs (Gee 2011). In Buffalo’s public schools, where approximately ten percent of students speak English as a second language (ESL) (Simon 2009), teachers and administrators are limited in how many documents they can have translated. Documents that can be reused, like permission slips, have been translated into Spanish and four other frequently spoken languages. All other important documents are sent home in English with a translated note attached informing parents that they need to have the document interpreted (Gee 2011).

While the examples in Buffalo might be a case of thrifty spending rather than a sign of destitution, the attention Buffalo and the other cities pay to costs suggest that funding social services is a concern. Given that they chafe at providing basic services they are required to provide, it seems unlikely that they would be able to provide many extra services, or to expand the provision of services when permitted by decentralization. While decentralization might give them the legal latitude to pursue pro-immigrant policies, the costs of such provisions are likely prohibitive, especially given the cities’ other financial responsibilities that are only growing (also due to decentralization). It is

likely that many Rust Belt cities simply cannot afford to provide a number of quality services for immigrants.

The newspaper data provides some support for this assertion. The newspapers rarely mention city-sponsored immigration services.¹⁴ Aside from translation services and some services provided by public schools, which I'll discuss later in this chapter, local governments are not and have not engaged in much immigrant service provision. There are a few exceptions. Public libraries provide classes and reading materials for immigrants. For example, in the mid-1990s, the Cleveland Public Library's foreign literature department housed materials in 45 different languages and employed staff members that spoke 12 different languages (Miller 1995). Cities also sometimes provide training for employees to help them learn basic Spanish skills. In the early 2000s, Dayton's police department started offering Spanish language and culture classes to officers, while the county's department of Children's Services began offering 10-week Spanish courses for caseworkers and started translating some of their materials into

¹⁴ The fact that newspapers aren't covering city-sponsored immigration services does not necessarily mean that they provide no services. This is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of using newspaper data for this type of analysis. While the newspaper data is good in that it covers a long period of time and is very accessible, there is no guarantee that it is painting a complete picture. It can provide a basic picture of what is happening in an area, but there is no way of knowing if it missing something. In this case, however, it seems unlikely that the newspapers are missing much coverage of government services. The newspapers cover many other government programs, and all of the papers provide weekly or monthly roundups of special programs and services in the area. It would be surprising if they excluded governmental immigration programs, given their other coverage. If anything, they might be accurately reporting the programs provided by the government, but under-reporting the programs provided by private and volunteer agencies, which do not receive dedicated coverage. It seems likely, then, that these governments really are not providing many services for immigrants and refugees.

Spanish (Franklin 2001). However, aside from these few examples, city governments have not provided many services for immigrants, and thus are not contributing to a positive context of reception in this way.

DECENTRALIZATION AND REFUGEES

While the decentralization of social service provision puts cities in a financial bind and raises questions about which and how many services they will provide, it is not the only way that the federal government passes off responsibility to local agencies. This also happens through the process of refugee resettlement, which is coordinated by local non-governmental organizations.¹⁵

Unlike economic migrants, who get to decide when they immigrate and where they go, refugees are settled entirely at the discretion of government officials and refugee resettlement agencies. They have no say in when they are relocated, and no say in where they are originally resettled. Similarly, the cities that receive them have little say. While the local resettlement agencies have to agree to take the refugees, the rest of the

¹⁵ Refugee resettlement is an interesting case of decentralization. If we think of decentralization as a process—the government had control over something, then gave it to local governments—refugee resettlement is not an example of decentralization. The federal government has always left refugee resettlement up to local agencies. However, if we think of decentralization as a type of action, where local governments are responsible for a national program, refugee resettlement is an example of decentralization. As I will discuss, the federal government makes nearly all of the decisions about refugee placement, then leaves the maintenance of the program up to the local communities. This is very similar to how welfare works. The federal government provides guidelines, then makes the local government interpret and execute them. So, while refugee resettlement has not decentralized, it is a decentralized program.

community—which, as I will demonstrate, ends up supporting resettlement efforts—does not. Although local communities do not get to decide whether or not they receive economic migrants either (a complication that immigrant-driven revitalization strategies are trying to overcome), they also do not have to provide social support services for economic migrants, which are a necessary part of refugee resettlement. This makes the refugee resettlement experience very unique, and places a burden on receiving communities.

The decisions about where refugees are resettled happen far from the receiving communities. This process has been standard since the 1980s. It begins when refugees apply for resettlement. Refugees apply for resettlement when they are outside both the United States and their country of origin (Singer and Wilson 2006). They must already be displaced from their home to be considered for resettlement. They are then screened, and a representative of either the Department of Homeland Security or the United Nations High Commission for Refugees decides whether the applicant qualifies as a refugee. Then, representatives from the ten national VOLAGS (the *voluntary agencies* that resettle immigrants) and the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) decide which refugees will go to which states. The national VOLAGS then work with their local partners and other local agencies to resettle the refugees (Singer and Wilson 2006). The federal government provides the travel funds to transport the refugees to the United States, but the refugees have to repay the government unless a local sponsor (not the VOLAGS) agrees to foot the bill. This encourages refugees to quickly find employment (Curnutte 2010).

Refugees receive “reception and placement” services from PRM for their first 30 days in the US (Singer and Wilson 2006). Federal assistance ends at this point. All services that come after 30 days must be provided by the local community, who, again, have little say in receiving refugees. Local agencies have many responsibilities in refugee resettlement. After the PRM funding ends, VOLAGS and local agencies then provide services for another four to eight months. This includes language assistance and help finding housing and employment (Singer and Wilson 2006).

Although VOLAG assistance is set to end within months of arrival, the needs of refugees last far longer. It takes time to adapt to a completely new society and learn a new language, which makes immediately finding a job that offers a living wage difficult. Additionally, because of their backgrounds, which involve significant disruptions and often extreme violence or danger, refugees often require additional services to help them cope that aren’t explicitly covered by national and international resettlement agreements. This includes mental health services for coping with post-traumatic stress disorder (Spector 2001) and the ESL classes provided by local school districts. If Rust Belt cities want to successfully integrate their refugees, they need to provide these additional services.

Rust Belt VOLAGS do provide many services for refugees, often going above and beyond what is required. This helps reduce the pressure on other local groups to provide services, though it does not alleviate it entirely. The cities that are most active in refugee resettlement—Akron, Buffalo, Cleveland, and Detroit—all have a primary refugee resettlement agency that provides additional services, not just for refugees, but

for all immigrants. In Northeast Ohio, this role is played by the International Institute of Akron and the International Services Center in Cleveland. Buffalo has several refugee resettlement and refugee services agencies, including VIVE La Casa, Mosaic, Catholic Charities, Journey's End Refugee Services, and the International Institute of Buffalo. Journey's End and VIVE provide many services beyond refugee resettlement. The International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit provides services for immigrants in Southeast Michigan (Mercer 2002).

The extra services these centers provide vary. In addition to providing refugee resettlement assistance, the International Institute of Akron has provided a number of services over the last two decades, including adjustment counseling (Umrigar 1996; Cardwell 2004), translators (Umrigar 1998), transportation (Kirksey 1997), employment counseling and job search assistance (Kirksey 1997; Schleis 1997; Cardwell 2004), mental health counseling (Schleis 1997), assistance with naturalization (Schleis 1997), and summer ESL programs for children (Byard 2001; Spencer 2002). They have also held annual immigrant health fairs, which they co-sponsored with the Ohio Commission of Minority Health. The health fairs gave immigrants a chance to receive health screenings and information about other social services (Reyes 1997).

In addition to these services, the International Institute of Akron is also sometimes asked to step in when specific issues arise. After several immigrants accidentally started fires cooking over open flames indoors, the International Institute worked with local fire departments to translate safety information and provide fire alarm outreach (Warsmith 2014). Similarly, they worked with local public health agencies, the Ohio Department of

Natural Resources (ODNR), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to produce pamphlets on the dangers of eating fish from local rivers, how to reduce those dangers, and how to fish legally (Downing 2014). This pamphlet was produced because there were too many refugees eating fish from the Cuyahoga River¹⁶ and other polluted local waterways, raising public health concerns.¹⁷

The refugee resettlement agencies in Buffalo provide similar services. All of the agencies provide basic immigration services, including ESL classes (Condren 1999; Kearns 2003; Continelli 2004; Brown 2010), employment counseling and job search assistance (Continelli 2004; Brown 2010; Sommer 2013a; Buffalo News 2014), and assistance finding housing (Continelli 2004). Journey's End has provided many additional services, including naturalization workshops (Buffalo News 2004), legal aid for immigrant nonprofits (Buffalo News 2013a), a program on farming in America (Mansfield 2014), and summer ESL programming for refugee children (Miller 2005; Hearey 2006). They also partnered with Literacy Volunteers to open a "drop in" language and literacy center to assist English language learners (Sapong 2003), and developed a high school alternative for refugees. This program is designed to prepare students for the GED, teach them English, and help them integrate into American society

¹⁶ This river caught fire several times between the 1890s and 1969. The last fire, which was not the biggest nor the most damaging, gained national attention and spurred the creation of the federal Clean Water Act.

¹⁷ Buffalo faced the same problem. There, Buffalo Niagara Riverkeeper, a local environmental group, made the pamphlets. They produced them in English, Burmese, Nepali, French, and Spanish, and also produced a picture version for those with low literacy (Kwiatkowski 2013).

(Harris 2012). The International Institute of Buffalo also provides additional services. They worked with the Concerned Ecumenical Ministry and all of Buffalo's VOLAGS to create Mosaic, an agency that helps refugees beyond the first few months of their resettlement. Mosaic has provided workshops on topics like living in America, taking public transportation, and receiving social services. It also has hosted play groups for children and a homework help center (Herbeck 2000).

The International Services Center provides the bulk of immigrant services in metropolitan Cleveland. In addition to providing the regular refugee services, they also help immigrants register their children in schools, offer visa counseling, and teach classes on survival and cultural skills (Miller 1996; Smith 2007; Smith 2009). In addition, they house the Language Bank, a network of people in Northeast Ohio who can serve as emergency translators (Miller 1996; Miller 1999b). They also run a unique local refugee resettlement program. In 2011, they partnered with the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corp. to help settle refugees into vacant houses in distressed neighborhoods. The program provides houses from the land bank at a low cost to refugees who agree to renovate them. The goal of this program is to help both struggling neighborhoods and refugees eager to rebuild their lives (Smith 2011c). The program resettled its first family in 2012 (O'Malley 2012).

The number of services provided by VOLAGS is astounding, but they still do not provide everything refugees need. Refugees have other needs that these services cannot meet, and those fall to the rest of the community. While community groups often step in,

the result is a hodgepodge of services that are subject to the whims of organizations that do not have immigrant and refugee services as their primary missions.

Sometimes the services community groups provide are only temporary or focus on a single refugee population. For example, in Buffalo, Central Park United Methodist Church resettled Somali Bantus, some of the most disadvantaged and discriminated against people in the world (Rey 2003). The church provided the first month's rent and food. They also helped the family navigate their new world, which included providing information on personal hygiene norms and using public transit (Rey 2003). Buffalo's League of Muslim Women has helped resettle Somali refugees (Allen 1997), while several of Buffalo's churches helped resettled Kosovar refugees (Davis and Condren 1999). In Dayton, College Hill Community Church helped resettle a refugee family. They supplied an apartment and filled it with furniture, food, and clothing. They also provided transportation until the family became established (DeBrosse 1998). While efforts such as these are good, they are not long-term offerings that could support future refugee flows, and tend to cluster around well-publicized—but not highly politicized—refugee crises.¹⁸

A similar pattern develops with ethnic social groups. These groups help resettle refugees from their own ethnic groups during crises. In Buffalo, the Burmese Community Support Center helps refugees from Burma after they've timed out of

¹⁸ Considerations of the politics of refugee resettlement could fill a separate dissertation. For now, it is likely sufficient to note that we don't treat all refugee flows the same, even if they receive a comparable amount of news coverage. The reception of Bosnian refugees in the 1990s was much warmer than the reception of Latin American children or Syrian refugees in the 2010s, for example

assistance from their VOLAG (Buffalo News 2013b). Similarly, the Liberian Mutual Assistance Association helped Liberian refugees in Buffalo become self-sufficient (Buffalo News 1996). In Cleveland, the Serbian Orthodox churches sponsored Serbian refugees (Breckenridge 1998), while the International Christian Orthodox Charities supported Bosnian refugees (Miller 1999a). Finally, in Detroit, the Chaldean Community Foundation helps resettle Chaldean refugees. They also have a free medical and mental health clinic (Watson 2014).

All of these services are provided by local non-profits and churches, and they all help fill essential gaps left by VOLAGS and government service providers. But even as important and necessary as these efforts are, there are still populations that are lacking service. If non-Hispanic immigrants go to Cincinnati, for example, they will have a hard time finding translators and services, because nearly all of the services discussed in the newspaper target Latinos. Even Catholic Charities, a national VOLAG, has trouble providing services to some refugees in Cincinnati because they do not have people to provide them. This became obvious when they received Kosovar refugees who spoke Serbian and Albanian and could find no one to translate. They ultimately contacted a Bosnian refugee, who muddled through a translation in Bosnian, which is linguistically related to—but not the same as—Serbian (Kaufman 1999).

Many of these issues result from the fact that refugee resettlement is decentralized, but local governments do little to support it. While local organizations step in and provide necessary services, the coverage is piecemeal. There is not consistent support for refugees; it varies based on whether an ethnic social group or church decides

to participate in resettlement efforts, which consequently varies over time and depending on the refugee group in question. In this setting, it is difficult to determine what services are actually being provided and how much support refugees actually receive. It is subsequently very hard to consider how these services affect the context of reception.

FEDERALIZATION AND SERVICE PROVISION IN EDUCATION

The final challenge Rust Belt cities face in providing services to immigrants is a result of the process of decentralization and federalization in the education system. As with welfare and refugee resettlement, local education is largely controlled and funded by the local government. These schools thus face the same funding issues that city governments and law enforcement face, and must support an equally diverse population of students. However, they also have to deal with the fact that education standards are federalized. While the federal government only provides a share of school funding, they get to set standards that must be met for schools to receive financial support. This became an issue in the early 2000s. During George W. Bush's presidency, Congress passed the No Child Left Behind Act, which changed federal education standards. In order to receive funding, schools had to have certain test scores or show a certain amount of improvement in test scores from year to year. This put schools that served refugee and immigrant populations in a tough spot. There were no exceptions for immigrant students; they were judged by the same metric as native English speakers. Because of their language difficulties, schools with large immigrant populations were constantly under pressure to improve students' test scores quickly. This was an issue in every city but

Flint (Gutierrez 2003; Kranz 2004; Mrozowski 2006; Ott 2009a; Ott 2009b; Simon 2000; Simon 2010).

This new method of ranking schools caused particular problems for School 45 in Buffalo. Buffalo has a large number of international students, who cluster into one or two schools. School 45, on the city's West Side, is one of these schools. In 1998, nearly half of its students were foreign-born English language learners. The students spoke 28 different languages, but teachers and aides only spoke nine of them (Simon 1998). By 2002, School 45 had students from 42 countries speaking 32 different languages (Simon 2002). In 2009, 10% of Buffalo Public School students were ESL speakers, and they spoke 65 different languages at home (Simon 2009). The school district had trouble accommodating all these students, and this wasn't the first time this had been a problem. In the early 2000s, surges of refugees had led to district-wide ESL teacher shortages (Simon 2001).

School 45 ended up on a list of "persistently lowest-achieving" schools due to poor scores on reading and writing assessments. This put the school's funding in jeopardy. Administrators argued that the low scores were a function of the fact that 60% of the students are new English Language learners (Simon 2010), but this made little difference. In 2010, outside auditors came and evaluated Buffalo's schools. They lambasted the district's ESL programs, calling them "inconsistent" and "inadequate" (Pasciack 2010). These issues were not resolved. In 2013, Lafayette High School, which houses the district's ESL program for high school students, was in such dire straits that the district tried to find outside organizations to come in and diagnose the problems and

come up with solutions (Truong 2013). In the previous school year (2011-2012), over 65% of Lafayette's students were enrolled in ESL classes. Like at School 45, Lafayette's administrators believed that the number of languages being spoken in each classroom, as well as the spotty education history of immigrant and refugee students, contributed to the school's difficulties (Truong 2013). Lafayette subsequently faced pressures to close.

Cleveland also has struggled to adequately serve its immigrant student population, which is smaller than Buffalo's. In 2001, the district had 266 ESL teachers devoted to 3,200 ESL students, the majority of whom spoke Spanish (Townsend 2001). By 2009, the district was beset by an ESL teacher shortage. At Lincoln-West High School, home to the district's high school ESL program, approximately 33% of the students spoke little-to-no English, but were only served by 10 ESL instructors (Ott 2009a). The languages spoken by students had multiplied, so that actual teachers did not speak some of the languages the students speak. Although there are 14 aides to help cover more languages, some communication still occurred through pictures and pantomime (Ott 2009a).

Buffalo and Cleveland's public schools both have multiple forces working against them. In both cities, educational service provision is complicated by the diversity of the immigrant population. Although ESL accommodations are generally tricky, they are no doubt more complicated in these situations due to the variety of languages spoken and the challenges that immigrants and refugees face. These cities are also dealing with federalized education standards, which put pressure on these schools to improve their test scores, without taking account of the challenges these schools face. These standards disregard both the progress these schools make in teaching ESL students, and their long

histories of servicing immigrant populations. The one-size fits all approach the federal government adopts in education hurts immigrant children and efforts to resettle them, and creates complications beyond those that arise when poor districts have to provide specialized services.

CIVIL SOCIETY STEPS UP

Rust Belt cities face multiple challenges in providing services to immigrants and refugees. This then complicates their efforts to improve their context of reception. It is not the case, however, that these cities are trying to improve their immigrant services and context of reception and are failing. Rather, it seems that they simply are not trying. As the last chapter demonstrated, they have not done much—excepting, of course, Chicago and Detroit—to make their cities more welcoming by adding immigrant-friendly policies to their municipal codes. And as this chapter has demonstrated, aside from ESL provisions in public schools, these cities are largely doing the bare minimum. The result is that many of the areas in which immigrants have needs are untouched by the local government. This does not mean that those needs are unmet, however. As the discussion of refugee service provision suggests, VOLAGS, churches, and ethnic social groups have provided many services to both refugees and economic migrants. In Rust Belt cities, then, the *civil society*—or individuals and community organizations that provide services—are essential to immigrant incorporation. The civil society’s efforts are particularly focused on two very important needs: healthcare and language acquisition.

The most important service the civil society provides is healthcare. Immigrants often have a difficult time accessing healthcare due to language barriers. If they do not speak English, and the doctor does not speak their language, they either have to find an interpreter or improvise. Often times, this means relying on a child or family member for translation, which raises privacy concerns (Endoll-Kirk 2007). This is an issue in all six Rust Belt cities.¹⁹

Local organizations have come up with several adaptations. In Akron, Summa Health System started holding special days where refugees could come in and get service with translators and culturally-competent doctors. They also hired a doctor fluent in Nepali to serve the Nepalese population, which is one of the largest refugee groups in the area (Powell 2011). Later, they moved the doctor that spoke Nepali to a clinic closer to the neighborhood that houses the majority of the Nepalese population to help improve access (Akron Beacon Journal 2014).

In Buffalo, churches worked with compassionate doctors to organize health clinics in poor neighborhoods with large refugee populations (Davis 2003). Buffalo has also benefited greatly from the work of Dr. Myron Glick, who founded the Jericho Road Community Health Center with the intention of helping poor residents and refugees. The reception desk has a message that reads “Jericho Road Community Health Center serves all patients regardless of ability to pay. Discounts for services are offered, depending on family size and income” (Sommer 2014). This message is translated into the 12

¹⁹ The only relevant article from Flint addresses the Genesee County Free Medical Center’s issue with finding translators and having to rely on family members, friends, or other patients in their absence (Endoll-Kirk 2007).

languages²⁰ most often spoken at the clinic. Over half of the patients do not speak English. The clinic also partners with VIVE to provide healthcare to asylum seekers awaiting resettlement in Canada, and offers a wide array of social services to help refugees adjust to the US. These include mentoring programs for pregnant refugees experiencing their first pregnancy in the US and after-school programs for refugee children (Sommer 2014). There is a similar, though much smaller, clinic in Detroit, operated by Dr. Elena Perry-Thornton. Her clinic has staff members that are fluent in Arabic, Spanish, and English and that are passable in Portuguese and Italian. They also offer classes and assistance to immigrants (Hupp 2003).

Hospitals in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton and Detroit have all provided interpreters and use over-the-phone translation services in case of emergency (Bates-Rudd 2000; Keilman 2000; Leingang 2004; Cincinnati Enquirer 2007). In Cleveland, doctors also tried to learn more about the cultures of the people they serve to help remove obstacles to healthcare (Spector 1999b). In Cincinnati, one hospital also has offered a childbirth class in Spanish, and has hosted a Hispanic Health fair, which provided health screenings and information on health services (Cincinnati Enquirer 2007; Leingang 2004). Local organizations have also opened health centers (Mezger 2002) and held health fairs for Latinos in Cleveland (Spector 2000), and have established free or low cost health clinics with Spanish interpreters in Dayton (Mosier 2003; Kissell 2004; Tedford 2004b) and Detroit (Lewis 2003).

²⁰ The 12 languages are Amharic (Ethiopia), Arabic, Burmese, French, Karen (Myanmar), Karenni (a member of the Karen language family), Nepali, Somali, Spanish, Swahili, Tigrinya (Eritrea/Ethiopia), and Vietnamese (Sommer 2014).

Ethnic organizations also help provide healthcare to new immigrants. Some organizations specifically serve Asian and Arabic populations. In Cleveland, MetroHealth Asia Plaza Health Center is a popular destination for Asian immigrants. They have doctors that speak Cantonese, Mandarin, and English. They also produce brochures and pamphlets in Chinese (Lou 2001). In Akron, ASIA (Asian Services in Action, Inc) has provided translators in 12 different languages to people needing healthcare or legal assistance (Chancellor 2000). In Detroit, ACCESS provides healthcare services specifically tailored to Arab-Americans and Muslims. They take culture into consideration when providing services (Moore 2003; Morris 2004).

The other set of services that the civil society provides support English language learning for both adults and children. Churches and other religious organizations provide many of the ESL classes in Rust Belt cities. This includes ESL classes at the Unitarian Universalist Church of Akron (Jenkins 2014); the Response to Love Center in Buffalo, which is run by Felician nuns (Nucheren 2015); Grace United Methodist Church in Cincinnati (Wolff 1999), and St. John's United Church of Christ in Dayton (Beyerlein 1998; Ali 1999; Katz 2009). Su Casa Hispanic Ministry in Cincinnati, which provides computer and cultural competency classes (Curnutte 2009) and the Golden Acres Ministrant Center in Dayton, which provides a health center, provide ESL classes as well. In Cleveland, El Barrio, part of the West Side Ecumenical Ministry, offered a summer ESL program for children (Smith 2011a), while in Detroit, People of the Book Lutheran Outreach (POBLO) has sent volunteers to visit stay-at-home immigrant mothers so they can practice English (Chessler 2000). All of these examples demonstrate that the civil

society fills essential gaps in service provisions and that it plays a significant role in immigrant incorporation.

CONCLUSION

The examples presented in this chapter make a few things clear. First, Rust Belt cities—as communities—*are* trying to help immigrants and refugees assimilate and are trying to create a positive context of reception. There are several service organizations and individuals in these cities that provide services to immigrants and refugees. In some cases, like with VOLAGS, churches that sponsor refugees, and Dr. Myron Glick’s health center in Buffalo, these organizations have likely made a tremendous impact on immigrants’ lives, and have made living in these cities easier. But at the same time, Rust Belt cities—as governments—are doing very little. While decentralization and the characteristics of the immigrant populations in these cities present challenges, these cities’ governments do not seem to provide many services that could help immigrants, even when there’s a public health or safety reason to do so, like with healthcare. If these cities are pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies (and most of them are), this seems like a missed opportunity.

Second, it seems that though these organizations are trying to be accommodating, they cannot serve everyone. The populations are so diverse that there are certainly people who lack access to many services. This makes it more likely that refugees and immigrants that lack accommodations will seek to move to cities that have more

members of their ethnic communities and better services²¹ (Singer and Wilson 2006). This takes away the advantage that Rust Belt cities get by resettling so many refugees. Although these cities do not attract immigrants organically, they have immigrants essentially delivered to their doorsteps every year. If they cannot provide services to keep those immigrants in the community, they lose out. Providing services to their diverse refugee and immigrant populations would thus help with immigrant-driven revitalization efforts. If they were successful enough, it could also make these cities the targets of secondary migration, where refugees settled in other cities voluntarily move to the Rust Belt to join other members of their ethnic group and access these better services that make integration easier.

Finally, many of these services target refugees, which is logical given their needs. However, this leaves economic migrants underserved. Given these cities' interests in having migrants help with economic growth, having more programs that helped immigrants start and grow businesses would probably be useful. Some groups in the Rust Belt do provide programs like these, like members of the WE Global Network, an organization that promotes immigrant driven revitalization strategies. This is another place, however, where local governments could do more. Small steps, like providing

²¹ This is a feedback mechanism. Bigger refugee populations mean that more established refugees can help provide services to newer ones. It is, of course, easier to get better translation services and cultural adaption training when your city has an existing population of immigrants that speak your language and know your culture. In this way, moving to where co-ethnics are makes sense. When there are no established refugee destinations, however, like when a refugee flow is from a new area, there is an opportunity for a city to establish itself as a destination for the new group.

counselors to help with business permits or providing lots from the land bank as space for business incubators could make a difference, and would not necessarily cost a lot. These are also services that governments are uniquely positioned to provide. They could be doing more to further their revitalization efforts.

While these examples make some issues clear, they also raise questions about immigrant-driven revitalization strategies in the Rust Belt. Though it is often Rust Belt city governments that push immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, Rust Belt governments seem to do very little to help improve their local context of reception. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, they have not done much—excepting, of course, Chicago and Detroit—to change their municipal codes through immigrant-friendly policymaking. This chapter demonstrates that they are also leaving most immigrant service provision—another factor that could shape the context of reception—to local non-governmental organizations.

This is an interesting choice for cities that are trying to attract immigrants as a way of revitalizing. If the way to attract immigrants is to improve the context of reception, and the way to improve the context of reception is to make the area more welcoming and supportive of immigrants, staying out of both immigrant service provision and policymaking means not actively participating in the revitalization effort. This is slightly different from revitalization strategies that have been pursued in the past. Although industry-driven revitalization strategies often relied on public-private partnerships (Atkins et al. 2011; Logan and Molotch 1987), they still generally had a heavy *public* component. This is clearly not the case with these revitalization strategies.

This is also a risky choice. Although all revitalization efforts have some risk involved, relying on disjointed social organizations to create a welcoming context of reception seems particularly fraught. There are two reasons for this. First, because immigrant services providers in Rust Belt cities face so many challenges, it seems highly unlikely that every need and every (or even most) immigrant groups would be served if all the individual service providers were left to their own devices. They would be much more effective if someone was coordinating their efforts, or at least monitoring their efforts and creating policies to fill in the gaps. Second, we know that voluntary organizations have difficulty meeting their goals, and that their ability to do so depends on their resources (Skogan 1988). There is always a question about whether voluntary organizations will be able to meet their goals and stay in existence.

All of these issues raise serious questions about what these city governments are actually doing to attract immigrants, and whether they are truly dedicated to these strategies. Although they face challenges, their general lack of effort suggests that either they do not know what actually affects immigrant settlement patterns, or that they do not care to actively support these revitalization strategies. Either scenario bodes ill for these strategies.

Chapter 4: The Federalization of Local Institutions

At this point, we've discussed two challenges to immigrant-driven revitalization strategies—the shortcomings of Rust Belt cities' municipal codes and the complicated nature of refugee and immigrant service provision in these areas. Although these cities do face significant and legitimate challenges in service provision due to decentralization and the characteristics of their immigrant populations, both of the issues discussed so far are heavily influenced by government inaction. These city governments are not taking all of the steps that they could take to improve their contexts of reception.

The final challenge is different. In this chapter, we will explore two cases where local governments and agencies have actually been quite proactive, but have been undermined by federal enforcement efforts. Specifically, we will examine how changes in federal laws have drawn local law enforcement agencies into the federal immigration structure and complicated driver's license provisions at Departments of Motor Vehicles. These changes have essentially federalized actions and services that were previously the province of state and local organizations and agencies. This has undermined local efforts at immigration policymaking and raises questions about the efficacy of local immigration policymaking and immigrant-driven renewal efforts.

To explore this final challenge, this chapter examines how federal law and policy intrude on local immigration policymaking efforts. First, I discuss the changes in federal

law that let local governments engage in immigration policymaking, a process that is sometimes referred to as a “devolution” of immigration policymaking and control (Provine and Varsanyi 2012). I then address the changes that shifted this relationship again, resulting in increasing federalization, and discuss how this affects our understanding of the context of reception. Next, I provide two examples of how federalization affects local communities. The first is related to the provision of driver’s licenses and other forms of identification, which have been complicated by the REAL ID Act and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The second example examines the federalization of person-to-person policing interactions and how this has affected Dayton’s efforts at pro-immigrant policymaking. I then conclude with a discussion of how federalization affects immigrant-driven revitalization efforts.

THE DEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION POLICYMAKING

As I discussed in Chapter 1, cities have only been able to participate in immigration policymaking for about two decades. This ability was granted by three federal policies enacted in 1996: the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). These three pieces of legislation were drafted partially in response to California’s Proposition 187—also known as the Save Our State (SOS) initiative—which sought to block undocumented immigrants in the state from accessing public services, such as education and healthcare (Varsanyi 2010b). Proposition 187 also included a

provision to make cooperation with federal immigration enforcement officials compulsory for all local law enforcement agencies. This was meant to end the common practice of noncooperation, in which local agencies refused to provide federal agencies with information regarding arrestees' and detainees' immigration statuses (Mitnik and Halpern-Finnerty 2010).

Proposition 187 was passed by California's voters in November 1994, but was immediately challenged for preempting the federal government's authority over immigration. It never went into full effect, but many of the blocked portions were replicated by the 1996 bills (Varsanyi 2010a). PRWORA, also known as welfare reform, cut funding to a number of public social services, severely restricted *legal* immigrants' access to those services, and gave states control over other social services. This allowed states to contract or expand the services provided to immigrants within their borders (Graefe et al. 2008). The other two laws—the AEDPA and the IIRIRA—expanded the powers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), making it easier to detain and deport immigrants. They also expanded the list of deportable offenses (Welch 2003). In addition, they increased local law enforcement agencies' participation in federal immigration enforcement. Under the guise of anti-terrorism efforts,²² the AEDPA gave local law enforcement officers the ability to arrest noncitizen felons who had previously been deported (Varsanyi 2010a). The IIRIRA created the 287(g) program, an optional

²² The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing were used as justification for a number of anti-immigrant anti-terrorism policies (Welch 2003). This happened despite the fact that the Oklahoma City bombing was carried out by native-born American citizens.

initiative that takes local law enforcement officers and deputizes them as ICE agents who can interview detainees and begin deportation procedures from local booking. Both the AEDPA and the IIRIRA also outlawed local policies prohibiting public employees from sharing information on residents' immigration status with federal immigration agents (Carlberg 2009; Mitnik and Halpern-Finerty 2010).

These three policies contributed to the partial devolution of immigration policymaking and control from the federal government to local jurisdictions (Provine and Varsanyi 2012). They gave local governments and law enforcement agencies the option to make their own policies and participate in immigration enforcement, which never had happened before. They also laid the groundwork for future federal policy changes that further increased the role of local law enforcement agencies in federal immigration control efforts. In this way, the seeds of federalization were planted in the devolution of immigration control.

THE FEDERALIZATION OF LOCAL ENFORCEMENT

The period of pure devolution was fairly short-lived. The new policies that led to federalization arose following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when anti-immigrant and anti-terrorist rhetoric was particularly effective. Drawing on the prevalent anti-immigrant sentiment of the period, the Department of Justice (DOJ) took advantage of provisions in the IIRIRA and AEDPA to institute new policies that increased local involvement in federal immigration enforcement. The 1996 laws changed the regulations

on what could be entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, the system that local police agencies use to check for outstanding warrants. Since the mid-1970s, the INS had maintained that local police did not have the authority to arrest individuals solely on immigration charges, and thus kept the FBI from adding such information to the NCIC. The 1996 laws changed that, allowing the FBI to add information on previously deported felons. In the post-9/11 period, the INS took advantage of this change and created the NCIC Immigration Violators File (IVF), which not only included information about previously deported felons, but also included records relating to “absconders,” or people with active deportation or removal orders, and people who were subject to the NSEERS program,²³ but who failed to register (Waslin 2010). Due to these changes, local police could now detain anyone flagged by the IVF on the grounds of an immigration violation (Gladstein et al. 2005; Waslin 2010).²⁴

Along with these changes to federal immigration policy, the federal government also changed laws about acceptable identification as an additional “anti-terrorism”

²³ NSEERS, or the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, was a program that required people entering the United States from certain countries—almost exclusively in the Middle East—to register with ICE. It also required men over the age of 16 who had come from those countries and been in the United States since before 2002 to register with ICE. It was implemented as an anti-terrorism measure in 2002. The program has not been used since 2003. President Barrack Obama officially dismantled the program before he left office.

²⁴ These immigration files are full of errors and have been exempted from the Privacy Act, which requires that records be accurate and up-to-date. Subsequently, checks against the IVF return a number of false hits. Between 2002 and 2004, 42% of the hits were false positives (Gladstein et al. 2005).

measure. This change came via the REAL ID²⁵ Act of 2005, which changed the standards of what counts as acceptable identification for official purposes.²⁶ In order for state-issued IDs to meet federal standards, they had to include certain pieces of information, and people seeking IDs had to provide certain documentation. This included proof of legal status. This barred many immigrants from obtaining IDs and driver's licenses.

In addition to the changes to the NCIC and identification standards, ICE (which replaced the INS when the national security agencies were restructured following 9/11) implemented a number of changes that increased federal access to foreign-born individuals being held in state and local jails and prisons. Aside from encouraging more communities to sign 287(g) MOAs, ICE expanded the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and started the Secure Communities program. CAP is the latest iteration of a program that has been around since the mid-1980s.²⁷ Under CAP, prisons and jails submit lists of foreign-born detainees to ICE, which then sends agents to interview and begin deportation procedures on eligible detainees (Guttin 2010). This program is similar to

²⁵ This is not an acronym, but is always in all-caps, possibly because Capitalization Makes Things Look More Important and Official.

²⁶ There are currently three “official purposes” that require the use of a federally approved ID: boarding commercial flights, entering federal buildings, and entering nuclear power plants. Most people just need federally approved ID for flying.

²⁷ The first CAP-like program originated in 1986 as the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP). It was followed by the Institutional Hearing Program (IHP) in 1988 and the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) in 1997. The current CAP was the result of the merger of the ACAP and IRP after INS was restructured as ICE. All of these programs aimed to deport immigrants before they were sentenced for a crime or before they completed their sentences (Guttin 2010).

287(g) in that inmates and detainees are interviewed for possible deportation from local jails, but differs in that CAP sends ICE agents for the interviews, while 287(g) uses local officers who have been deputized for this purpose.

The other significant change came when Secure Communities was implemented in 2008. This program connects the NCIC to ICE's immigration databases. When a name is run through the NCIC, it is also run through ICE's database. If the individual is in the country illegally or can be removed under the provisions of the IIRIRA or AEDPA, ICE is alerted to the individual's presence and can place a deportation hold on that individual (Pedroza 2013). Like the IVF, Secure Communities resulted in increased local immigration enforcement. However, unlike the IVF, which was limited to NSEERS violators and individuals with existing deportation orders, Secure Communities applies to all immigrants who could potentially be deported, even if the deportation order is not already in place. Its goal is detection as much as detention, and thus casts a much wider net than the other programs. It is also compulsory, unlike 287(g) and CAP. Local police departments cannot keep the immigration checks from being run and alerting ICE to an immigrant's presence, though they can refuse to execute the ICE hold (Pedroza 2013). Because of this change, local law enforcement agencies are now forced to be part of the federal immigration enforcement structure. This is different from the other changes, which gave local governments the option of participating in immigration enforcement and policymaking.

Because of these changes, particularly Secure Communities, local police are now involved in immigration enforcement by default. In the course of their day-to-day

interactions and responsibilities, they are feeding people into the immigration enforcement structure. This has essentially federalized person-to-person policing interactions. This is a significant change, because for the first time, local police are directly involved in the enforcement of federal laws. It is also significant in that it is involving the local criminal justice system in the enforcement of non-criminal offenses. Immigration violations are not criminal offenses, despite what popular rhetoric suggests, but are rather administrative or civil offenses. They are comparable to driving with expired license plate tags. Involving *local law enforcement* agencies in the enforcement of *federal civil laws* is thus a substantial change, and not one that has gone unnoticed.

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO FEDERALIZATION

Local police have expressed concern over these changes. They are particularly concerned about the Secure Communities program and their increasing role in immigration enforcement. This became obvious at a 2009 Police Foundation conference on Secure Communities, where law enforcement personnel from across the country almost uniformly condemned the program (Khashu 2009). They expressed three primary concerns. First, Secure Communities is expensive. Police departments are not always repaid, or repaid adequately, for executing ICE holds. These costs then fall on the local department. Second, officers felt that immigration enforcement distracts from other work, like solving crimes. Finally, and most importantly, attendees felt that Secure Communities damages the police's relationship with the immigrant community, who are

less likely to trust the police when they also seem like immigration agents (Khashu 2009).

The last of these reasons—that engaging in immigration enforcement will damage the relationship between the police and the immigrant community—is really important. Professional norms dictate that police should strive to improve local policing (Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007), so any actions that create public safety issues or that hinder the police’s ability to do their jobs go against professional standards. Because participating in immigration enforcement is potentially detrimental to local policing, some police departments have tried to limit the effects of federal immigration enforcement efforts in their local communities.

While the majority of local law enforcement agencies have not made immigrant-specific policies, some agencies have tried to engage in “permissive” immigration policymaking (Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007; Lewis et al. 2012; Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005). Such efforts try to limit the effects of federal immigration enforcement in three ways. First, they try to run as few IDs as possible through the NCIC and ICE databases to keep immigrants off ICE’s radar. Second, they avoid asking victims and witnesses to crime about their immigration status so that the agency has no immigration information to share with ICE. This is a type of noncooperation policy, and is related to those discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, they refuse to execute ICE holds unless the individual is a wanted criminal.

There are some questions about how effective these efforts can be. Although the first two responses—running fewer names and refusing to ask victims and witnesses of

crime about their immigration status—are completely up to the local police, they really do not have control over the third—only holding serious criminals. The reason for this is that most local police do not run their own jails, but rather share with other agencies in the county or region. Because background checks occur at booking—at the jail—the local police department policy regarding immigrants is no longer in play. If the jail has a more restrictive policy, like if they participate in the 287(g) program or do not limit their ICE holds to serious offenders, the local policy no longer matters (Coleman 2012).

This is often the case. There is no reason for jails to have a less restrictive policy. The officers at the jail do not need to maintain relationships with the community, so jails often have more restrictive policies than the local police departments, and there is nothing the local police can do to change that. Secure Communities is meant to be a nationwide immigration enforcement policy, and the system is designed in a way that supports that aim. It would be very difficult for local police to change this, and as a result, local law enforcement agencies have limited control over how big their role in federal immigration enforcement actually is.

FEDERALIZATION AND THE CONTEXT OF RECEPTION

Because of these changes, local governments and police departments are quite constrained in their immigration policymaking efforts. These changes affect the context of reception. Our earlier discussion of the context of reception focused on three possible responses: active encouragement, where the city works to welcome immigrants and ease their integration; exclusion, where the government tries to discourage immigration by

erecting barriers to integration; and passive acceptance, where they do nothing to either encourage or discourage immigration. Figure 4 (page 49) outlines the types of policies that fall into each category. There are no types of policies that count as passive acceptance, because making a policy would change the context of reception in one way or the other; it would either encourage or discourage immigration. The federalization of immigration enforcement changes this last option.

Because of the way the US immigration system is structured, taking the middle path—not actively encouraging or discouraging immigration—means two very different things depending on whether one is considering efforts made by the city or local law enforcement efforts. For city governments, not taking action maintains the status quo and results in little governmental intrusion on immigrants’ day-to-day lives. The same is not true for law enforcement agencies. Because of federalization, law enforcement agencies that refrain from making immigration policy will end up participating in increased immigration enforcement over time, which can discourage immigration. While passive, such an approach is not really acceptance.

The differences in practical outcomes between city efforts and law enforcement customs suggests that our existing context of reception typology is insufficient. To remedy this, I propose a new typology that separates city and local law enforcement efforts. This typology is presented in Figure 5. The city efforts can still be classified according to Portes and Rumbaut’s (2006) typology—as active encouragement, passive acceptance, and exclusion. The law enforcement practices can also be classified into three categories. Criminal justice scholars already sometimes refer to “permissive” and




Table 5. City and Law Enforcement Immigration Policy Typology

“restrictive” immigration policies (see Lewis and Ramakrishnan 2007; Lewis et al. 2012; Ramakrishnan and Lewis 2005). These are quite similar to active encouragement and exclusion, and so I will use them here. *Permissive* policies and practices parallel active encouragement policies and are those that seek to limit local immigration enforcement and deportation efforts, essentially creating safe havens from deportation for all but serious offenders. *Restrictive* policies are similar to exclusionary policies, and are meant to make the locality as inhospitable to immigrants as possible by raising the threat of detection and deportation.²⁸

The final category are the middle-path policies that result from local agencies taking no action. Because federalization has changed the meaning of such inaction, I have labeled these policies *passive federalism*. In the case of passive federalism, officers are participating in federal immigration efforts by default, but do not do anything to limit or exacerbate the effects of federal programs. This occurs primarily through Secure Communities and CAP.

Federalization and passive federalization have limited local pro-immigration policymaking efforts, and in some cases have directly stymied immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. They have also contributed to a negative context of reception. This is quite clear when one considers the effects of federalization on policing practices

²⁸ In the new typology in Figure 5, alternate IDs and Welcoming City policies are both listed twice, under both city and law enforcement policies. This is because both of these policies are designed to affect both city services and law enforcement practices. REAL ID, however, is just listed under law enforcement side because it is primarily designed to increase immigration enforcement. It could, in theory, affect other service provisions, but that is not the goal, and has not been a significant outcome of the policy.

and attempts to provide identification for immigrants. As I will demonstrate as I explain these two cases below, this is a significant challenge to cities looking to attract and successfully integrate immigrants.

CASE 1: IDENTIFICATION TROUBLES

The first example of how federalization efforts affects local pro-immigrant policymaking efforts comes from attempts to provide identification for immigrants. As I discussed previously, attempts to confirm an immigrant's identity can expose an immigrant to ICE and funnel them into the deportation process, which has led some cities, like Chicago, to make provisions for alternative identification that keep immigrants out of the system. That is not the only reason to provide for alternative identification, however. Sometimes it is the more practical public safety concern of determining who can legally drive. Do local police accept foreign driver's licenses? Can states issue licenses to undocumented immigrants? These are questions that local and state governments face, and that they largely had control over before the REAL ID Act created federal license standards.

The pre-REAL ID system was not perfect. There was significant confusion over what forms of ID were acceptable. For example, in the early 2000s, the Dayton Police Department faced accusations of racial profiling (Tedford 2002). In their investigation into these accusations, the department discovered that part of the problem was that police were arresting a disproportionate number of immigrants for driving without acceptable driver's licenses. This was mostly due to confusion. Many people were arrested for

driving without a license when, in reality, they were driving with a foreign license. Others were arrested for having expired licenses, when really they were just being misinterpreted. On an English license, *exp.* means *expired*, but on a Spanish license, it is short for *expedido*, or *issued on* (Tedford 2002). This situation was fraught with confusion.

In the pre-REAL ID Act period, Dayton had some freedom to deal with this situation in their own way. They came up with two solutions. First, they started training officers on how to read foreign licenses. Second, they implied that they would accept all foreign driver's licenses (Tedford 2002). This was not an officially codified policy, but it was sufficient at the time. This solution was short-lived, however. In the post-9/11 era, people needed ID for more than just driving. If an individual encountered the police and did not have identification, the police would hold them until they could establish their identity. This often meant contacting the different federal agencies.

This exposed immigrants to deportation if they were to contact police but could not provide valid identification (Tedford 2004a). As a result, immigrants without IDs stayed away from the police, which caused a different problem. Because immigrants did not have IDs, they also could not open bank accounts. This resulted in immigrants storing large amounts of money at home, which made them targets of robberies. But, because they could not safely contact the police, these crimes were going unsolved (Tedford 2004a). It was a significant public safety issue.

In response to these concerns, the City Council pushed for consular IDs to be accepted universally in Dayton. As discussed in Chapter 2, consular IDs are

identification cards issued by a consulate to their citizens living abroad. They have nothing to do with legal status. They just give a picture of the person and an address to help establish who the person is. The Council moved to accept the Mexican *matricula consular* and the Guatemalan consular ID. This change would affect the police and all other public service agencies (Bebbington 2005). Again, Dayton officials were able to engage in pro-immigrant policymaking and problem-solving because they had control over local identification standards.

Dayton was less successful in later attempts to provide identification to immigrants. Dayton tried to change their identification policies again as part of the Welcome Dayton plan (Smith 2011b). The plan's authors felt that the consular IDs were not providing enough coverage and that too many immigrants still did not have acceptable identification. As a solution, they proposed a municipal ID card. This card would be available to anyone living in Dayton. Like a consular ID, it would not signal legality, but it would provide identification for individuals who would not have any otherwise (Smith 2011b). Although this ID card was not subject to the REAL ID Act, which only applies to state-issued IDs, the rhetoric that supported the act doomed this effort. The municipal ID card plan faced pushback from people who feared that providing identification to undocumented immigrants would open the country to terrorist attacks. Because of these fears, this part of the Welcome Dayton plan was never implemented.

While Dayton's early immigrant identification provisions were mostly successful, they came before the REAL ID Act passed. After it was enacted, they had trouble

engaging in pro-immigrant policymaking, even though their actions were not directly subject to the act. Efforts that were subject to REAL ID Act restrictions faced enormous challenges that blocked their execution. The clearest case of this occurred in the state of New York.

In 2007, then-Governor Eliot Spitzer announced a plan to provide driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants. Like the efforts in Dayton, this plan was a response to a problem. Spitzer felt that it would be safer if undocumented immigrants had driver's licenses. This would both encourage them to follow the rules of the road, and provide the government with records on previously unknown people. In an op-ed published in New York's major newspapers, Spitzer argued that his policy was a public safety measure, saying

We all recognize that bringing 1 million people into our system will increase New York's chances of catching terrorists and criminals and will make all New Yorkers safer. At the end of the day, this is not an immigration issue. It is a pragmatic response to the public safety issues raised by the number of undocumented immigrants living in our communities and driving on our roads...We're not talking about bringing more people into the country; we're talking about being practical about the ones who are already here. The fact is that there are 1 million undocumented immigrants in New York, and until the federal government reforms our immigration laws, they aren't going anywhere. (Spitzer 2007).

In this op-ed, Spitzer makes the case for his ID plan, which required undocumented immigrants to show 4 forms of valid ID before they could get a license, by laying out the reasons for his measure—safety—and confronting the expected challenge—that this plan would lead to increased immigration.

In spite of Spitzer's well-reasoned argument, the response was immediate, severe, and negative. Across the state, county clerks, who are responsible for issuing driver's licenses, signaled their intention to defy the order. Local governments passed resolutions decrying the plan, and the majority of New Yorkers disapproved (Buffalo News 2007). Of particular concern was that the new driver's licenses would not meet the REAL ID standards, so residents would need passports to enter federal buildings and get on planes (Zremski and Precious 2007).

Spitzer eventually worked out a different plan, which called for three different driver's licenses. One would be REAL ID compliant, one would be REAL ID compliant and would allow residents to cross the Canadian border without a passport, and one would bear a stamp making it invalid for federal ID, but acceptable for driving (Precious 2007). This plan was also torn apart for being too complicated and for creating a second-class ID that would essentially label its owner as undocumented as US citizens moved to the REAL ID compliant licenses (Precious 2007). This plan was eventually scrapped as well. Spitzer resigned from office five months later amidst a prostitution scandal, and never worked out a license plan.

In both Dayton and New York, plans to solve practical problems—too many residents lacking identification and too many undocumented, uninsured drivers—were foiled by a more restrictive federal policy. This is a problem for cities trying to improve their local context of reception. If federal policy and rhetoric go against local efforts, those local efforts will most likely fail. As the case of Dayton’s municipal IDs demonstrates, it does not matter whether the local policy is directly affected by the federal policy or not. The federal position wins out.

There is one other example that reinforces the primacy of federal positions, and it stems from complications surrounding the REAL ID Act and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA. REAL ID Act compliance happens on two levels. First, states had to produce ID cards that met REAL ID standards, meaning that they had to include all of the federally-required information. Second, local BMVs and DMVs have to judge whether an individual’s documents allow them to receive identification. Because the REAL ID Act requires that ID holders be legal residents, DMV and BMV employees have to determine whether immigrants’ paperwork indicates that they are in the country legally. This became an issue when the Obama administration implemented DACA in 2012. DACA provides some immigrants with temporary work permits and a deferral on deportation, but does not grant them full legal status. It applies to young undocumented immigrants who were brought to the US as children.

Because DACA provides some privileges previously reserved for legal residents, but does not grant full legal status, there was confusion over whether these immigrants were eligible for driver's licenses. Each state's attorney general was left to interpret the law. The question was whether DACA paperwork was REAL ID compliant. In Ohio, which already required proof of legal status to acquire a license before the REAL ID Act passed, the issue was settled fairly quickly, but still resulted in confusion. Before Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine announced his decision, there was mass chaos. Some BMVs were providing licenses to DACA recipients, while others were not (O'Malley 2013a; O'Malley 2013b; O'Malley 2013c). Ultimately, DeWine decided that DACA recipients should be granted temporary licenses, and the issue was resolved (Borchardt 2013; Ewinger 2013).

The situation was more complicated in Michigan. Unlike Ohio, which had consistently only granted licenses to legal residents, Michigan had gone back and forth over whether undocumented immigrants could receive driver's licenses. In 1995, Attorney General Frank Kelley said that Michigan should provide licenses for all immigrants (Heinlein 2007). This was the policy until 2007, when Attorney General Mike Cox determined that they could not issue such licenses. Thus, the state stopped granting licenses to first-time applicants unless they could prove that they were legal US residents (Greenwood 2008). When DACA was implemented, Secretary of State Ruth Johnson decided that DACA recipients did not have legal status and thus could not receive licenses in Michigan, due to

Michigan's existing policy (Daniels 2012a). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Michigan sued the state to try to reverse this decision (Daniels 2012b). Johnson changed the policy in early February 2013, after the Obama administration clarified that DACA recipients essentially, though not technically, had legal status and should be afforded the same rights as legal residents (Daniels 2013).

While these examples are a little different than the examples from Dayton and New York—DACA is a pro-immigrant federal policy, while REAL ID blocked pro-immigrant local policies—all of these cases demonstrate the importance of federalization. Local governments are subject to the whims of the federal government, and thus have to adapt as federal policy shifts. It makes it hard for local governments to enact policies that do not align with national rhetoric.

CASE 2: POLICING PROBLEMS IN DAYTON

Dayton provides the second example of how federalization has interfered with local attempts at immigration policymaking. Dayton has a long history of local immigration policymaking, but their efforts are almost always undercut by federal laws, both directly and indirectly. Their early attempts at providing alternative identification were a rare success; their later struggles with establishing municipal IDs are more representative. This pattern has existed for almost two decades.

Both their successes and first failures occurred in the early 2000s, when Dayton's police were accused of racial profiling. The police investigated this claim and found three issues: miscommunication, cultural misunderstandings, and confusion over identification (Tedford 2002). The investigation uncovered the source of these problems. As discussed before, the ID issues were due to confusion over how to read Spanish driver's licenses and whether or not they were acceptable. The miscommunication issues were due to language barriers. Police were unable to communicate when they encountered immigrants at crime scenes, emergencies, and on the streets (Tedford 2002). This resulted in significant confusion.

The cultural misunderstandings mostly stemmed from traffic stops. In some parts of Latin America, it is customary for drivers to jump out of the car and run back to the police to pay the fine when they are pulled over for a driving infraction. If drivers do that in the United States, it is perceived as a threat, so simple traffic stops were escalating very quickly. People were getting arrested mostly over cultural misunderstandings (Tedford 2002).

The police responded to these problems with four solutions (Tedford 2002). They handed out a "Speedy Spanish for Police Personnel" booklet and taught a basic Spanish course to help with the miscommunication issues. To solve the traffic stop issue, they began offering a basic Latin American culture course and did outreach with the Latin American community on proper American traffic stop protocol (Tedford 2002).

These efforts alleviated some of these issues, but any strides they made in improving immigrant-police relations were quickly undone by the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks. After the attacks, several officers started trying to enforce immigration laws by using the information on previously deported felons that the 1996 acts added to the NCIC. These officers started to target “foreign-looking” people in the hope that they were potentially deportable (Tedford 2002). This was not an official policy in Dayton, but enough officers were doing it that it was re-awakening concerns about racial profiling. It also prompted Montgomery County Public Defender Glen Dewar to send a letter to all the police chiefs in the county. In the letter, Dewar argued that officers have “no legal authority or jurisdiction to seize a person in order to question the person about citizenship or residency status” (Tedford 2002), which suggests that the officers were violating federal law. It is unclear whether Dewar’s letter helped. Dayton’s police were still facing accusations of racial profiling in 2011, when the city was researching the Welcome Dayton plan (Sullivan 2011).

This is an example of how federal policies affected local policing and pro-immigrant efforts indirectly. Although there was no policy at the federal or local level directing officers to enforce immigration laws, the changes to the NCIC resulting from the 1996 statutes still shaped local behaviors. As with REAL ID and Dayton’s efforts at establishing a municipal ID, unrelated federal policy stymied local efforts to improve the context of reception.

This was the first time that Dayton’s efforts were thwarted by federal policy, but it was certainly not the last. Since December 2009, Dayton’s police have been trying to improve their relationship with the immigrant community, but have faced many challenges. This effort began when Police Chief Richard Biehl sent a memo to all

officers forbidding them from asking crime witnesses and victims about their immigration status. At the time, he said that “we must protect this community and in doing so make sure all citizens, documented or undocumented, who are victims or witnesses to crimes feel they can talk to the police. It is our duty to protect and serve everyone within city limits” (Sullivan 2010). Biehl later expanded on his argument, saying “assistance and cooperation from immigrant communities is especially important when an immigrant, whether documented or undocumented, is the victim of or witness to a crime. These persons must be encouraged to file reports and come forward with information” (Smith 2010). In the following years, he also argued that it was a public safety issue to have a population that was afraid of the police, saying that “it helps facilitate an investigation when the victims and witnesses are not worried that if they cooperate with police, they could be deported. If you really want crime to grow, have a community too fearful to speak to the police” (Page 2012).

Biehl’s memo was met by resistance from the police union. Union president Randy Beane came out against the order immediately, claiming that it asked officers to ignore federal immigration laws. In a statement, Beane said, “we believe that anyone in this country should be legal or in the process of becoming legal. In this age of terrorism, it is our duty to make sure someone is legally living within this country” (Sullivan 2010). He also suggested that some officers planned to ignore the order. He made another statement the next day, saying “we don’t believe it is unreasonable to ask immigration status. No matter what the status is, we’re not denying service. We’re not trying to make a social statement with this. We’re just trying to do our jobs. We need to kick butt and

take names in the city. Once the city is cleaned up, then bring on the social programs” (Smith 2010).

Beane’s comments highlight some important issues. First, Beane and the other officers misunderstood federal immigration law. At the time that Chief Biehl sent his memo, Montgomery County (where Dayton is located) was not enrolled in Secure Communities, so there was no structure in place, other than the immigration file in the NCIC, to allow them to participate in immigration enforcement. Even if Secure Communities had been in place, it does not require police to check every potential immigrant for immigration violations. Beane and the officers who intended to defy Biehl’s order seriously misinterpreted the law and their obligations. Second, this misunderstanding, which was in part triggered by the data in the NCIC, is another example of federal policies indirectly interfering with local attempts to improve the context of reception. Because the officers did act on their misinterpretation, Dayton continued to have issues with racial profiling (Sullivan 2011), which sabotaged Biehl’s pro-immigrant efforts.

The tension between local pro-immigrant policymaking and federal immigration enforcement came up again when the city announced the Welcome Dayton plan, which reinforced the police department’s commitment to focusing on criminal offenders, not immigration violators (Dayton Human Relations Council 2015). This plan attracted some attention from people who were afraid that by not rigorously enforcing federal immigration law, Dayton would attract undocumented immigrants (Kelley 2011a). Terry Magyar, an opponent of the plan and a representative of the Ohio Jobs and Justice PAC,

added that the city should reject the plan because local law enforcement agencies “shouldn’t be making immigration decisions” (Kelley 2011b). Magyar apparently did not notice the irony in this, as enforcing immigration law is also “making immigration decisions.”

While the plan faced some pushback, Dayton’s City Council proceeded to adopt it. City officials were then left to defend the plan. The mayor, Gary Leitzell, released a statement responding to the fears of Magyar and others. In it, he said

This is not about harboring illegal immigrants or drawing illegal immigrants into Dayton. We understand that there are problems with people entering the U.S. illegally. The Welcome Dayton plan leaves federal immigration law enforcement to the feds, and instead focuses on making our community one that treats all people kindly, fairly, and humanely. If you are an illegal immigrant, you will be subjected to the same federal laws as everyone else. (Kelley 2011b)

Like Eliot Spitzer did when defending his driver’s license plan, Mayor Leitzell tries to assuage fears about the potential negative effects of this proposal—that it could theoretically attract undocumented immigrants—by focusing on the expected positive outcomes.

In 2012, Chief Biehl was called upon again to defend the plan. While clarifying the police’s role in federal immigration enforcement, he said that “our emphasis is on solving serious and violent crime, not enforcing federal immigration laws” (Page 2012). But at the same time, he mirrored Mayor Leitzell by emphasizing that federal

immigration law is still in effect in Dayton. Taken together, Chief Biehl and Mayor Leitzell's statements emphasize the tricky nature of local immigration policing. With one breath, they claim that they are limiting their role in immigration enforcement and that they are leaving it to the federal government, but with the next breath they claim that they are still engaging in enforcement.

While vague and seemingly contradictory, their statements accurately reflect the nature of local immigration enforcement. It is entirely possible for the police to both limit their role in enforcement and engage in it. This is possible because federalization changed the nature of doing nothing. While the Dayton police might be trying to engage in permissive practices by limiting immigration enforcement to criminals, they operate in a county that engages in passive federalism. The county still participates in Secure Communities, so any time the police book someone into the local jail, they are feeding them into the federal enforcement system. Because the Dayton police do not run the county jail, their policy of only participating in immigration enforcement when the suspect is a serious criminal does not matter. The Dayton police have no control over whether the jail engages in permissive practices or passive federalism, and they have no control over whether the jail executes ICE holds. Dayton's effort to limit enforcement is quite possibly in vain.

There is some evidence that this is indeed the case. ICE releases annual Interoperability Statistics, which provide data on the number of people removed or

returned²⁹ through the Secure Communities program by county. Removal and return rates (hereafter, removal rates) can give an indication of immigration enforcement activity in a county, and location quotients of those rates can give a sense of how that level of enforcement compares to other areas.

Location quotients allow us to see whether something is more concentrated in a subarea than it is in the area as a whole. In this case, the location quotient is determining whether removals are more concentrated in some counties than they are nationally. The location quotient is calculated like this:

$$\text{Location Quotient} = \frac{\text{County Removal Rate}}{\text{Removal Rate in All Mid to Large Sized Counties}}$$

This tells us whether the rate of deportation in a county is higher or lower than the national average. Location quotients that fall above 1 represent removal rates higher than the national average, while location quotients below 1 represent smaller than average removal and return rates.

The removal rates used in the location quotient formula are calculated following this formula:

$$\text{Removal \& Return Rate} = \frac{\text{\# of Removals \& Returns}}{\left(\frac{\text{\# of Foreign Born}}{1000} \right)}$$

²⁹ Removals and returns are the technical terms for deportations. ICE reports them together, but they are two separate processes. *Removals* occur when someone is forcibly removed from the country. *Returns* happen when immigrants voluntarily repatriate after being caught by ICE. Not all immigration violators are given the option to return. If, however, an immigrant does return voluntarily, they have a much easier time reentering legally in the future (Waslin 2013).

This weights the number of people being deported by the potentially deportable population so that we can tell whether immigrants are being disproportionately removed or returned. To calculate this rate, one needs the number of foreign born residents in each county. I retrieved this data from the ACS 1-Year samples, which only cover areas with at least 65,000 people.³⁰ Approximately 830 counties had over 65,000 people each year. If the county participated in Secure Communities for the whole year and had over 65,000 people, it was included in the calculation of the national return rate used in denominator of the location quotient. All US counties were enrolled by 2013.

Table 7 displays the location quotients of the removal rates for the 16 Rust Belt cities' home counties. As Table 7 displays, with the exception of Hamilton County (Cincinnati) and Mahoning County (Youngstown),³¹ all of the Rust Belt counties deport immigrants at a significantly lower clip than other counties with populations over 65,000.

³⁰ The counties with fewer than 65,000 people are incredibly rural. For example, Hancock County, Ohio, the rural county where I grew up, had 75,773 people in 2013. Including even more rural areas would likely skew the removal and return rates, so it is reasonable to exclude such counties.

³¹ Mahoning County seems to be a bit of an anomaly. Because the newspaper data I have on Youngstown only covers three years and predates Secure Communities by about five years, I can only speculate about what caused the higher removal/return rate in the area. However, in the mid-2000s, the Mahoning County Sheriff's Department and some of the other local law enforcement agencies were spending a significant amount of time on the interstate trying to catch drug runners. Mahoning County contains the junction of several major interstates, including the primary routes from New York City to Chicago and Pittsburgh to Cleveland. Most of the articles about immigration from that three-year period were about major drug and human trafficking busts on the interstate that also snagged undocumented immigrants. If that pattern continued, it could explain the significantly higher deportation rate in this area.

<i>City</i>	<i>County</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
<i>Akron, Ohio</i>	<i>Summit</i>		0.11	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.09
<i>Buffalo, New York</i>	<i>Erie</i>				0.06	0.02	0.03
<i>Chicago, Illinois</i>	<i>Cook</i>					0.04	0.06
<i>Cincinnati, Ohio</i>	<i>Hamilton</i>		0.67	0.87	1.33	1.01	1.00
<i>Cleveland, Ohio</i>	<i>Cuyahoga</i>		0.10	0.15	0.26	0.19	0.18
<i>Dayton, Ohio</i>	<i>Montgomery</i>		0.37	0.42	0.60	0.49	0.46
<i>Detroit, Michigan</i>	<i>Wayne</i>	0.39	0.37	0.42	0.53	0.53	0.52
<i>Flint, Michigan</i>	<i>Genesee</i>			0.24	0.19	0.13	0.18
<i>Gary, Indiana</i>	<i>Lake</i>			0.11	0.40	0.14	0.14
<i>Milwaukee, Wisconsin</i>	<i>Milwaukee</i>			0.41	0.38	0.37	0.36
<i>Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania</i>	<i>Allegheny</i>				0.12	0.05	0.06
<i>Rochester, New York</i>	<i>Monroe</i>			0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
<i>St. Louis, Missouri</i>	<i>St. Louis City</i>					0.54	0.48
<i>South Bend, Indiana</i>	<i>St. Joseph</i>					0.20	0.24
<i>Syracuse, New York</i>	<i>Onondaga</i>				0.23	0.08	0.08
<i>Youngstown, Ohio</i>	<i>Mahoning</i>			0.28	5.14	3.66	8.48

Table 7. Location Quotients of Removal and Return Rates

That being said, there is variation. The three cities in New York—Buffalo, Syracuse, and Rochester—have particularly low removal rates, which suggests a possible state effect. Chicago and Pittsburgh also have particularly low removal rates. In the case of Chicago, this is likely the function of two things. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, Chicago has a number of pro-immigrant policies that limit police participation in federal immigration enforcement. Second, the State of Illinois fought the implementation of Secure Communities in court, and was the last state to activate the program. Subsequently, Chicago’s pro-immigrant policies are backed by higher levels of government, which makes it much more likely that they will be effective. The role of

state governments and state policies is an important topic that future research should address.

Although Chicago and Cook County have notably low removal rates, the same cannot be said about the other areas that have enacted policies limiting police participation in federal enforcement. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, Detroit also has noncooperation and limited enforcement policies. And as this chapter demonstrated, Dayton has also made many efforts on this front. Though both cities are in counties that deport at a rate lower than the national average, their policies have made no difference. Indeed, Montgomery County's removal rate peaked in the years following the implementation of the Welcome Dayton plan, and remain higher than they were before the plan was established. In Wayne County, the removal rate increased slightly after Detroit enacted their Welcoming City ordinance, and has remained at that higher level ever since.

These findings suggest that while these city police might be trying to reduce immigration enforcement, their actions and plans are not having the intended result. The federalization of immigration enforcement has made it very difficult for cities to avoid enforcement, and the system is designed in a way that support this aim. Federal immigration efforts have hampered local pro-immigrant policymaking efforts.

CONCLUSION

These examples make it clear that federalization makes it really difficult for cities to implement plans that go against the wishes of the federal government. This is by

design, but it creates problems for cities that are trying to provide better services for immigrants, and that are trying to attract immigrants as a revitalization strategy. Should they make no policies, passive federalism ensures that they will increase their participation in immigration enforcement, which can discourage immigration. But even if the city police do make permissive policies, the nested nature of the immigration enforcement system makes it likely that they are feeding into a system that still enforces it.

There are two additional takeaways that have to do specifically with immigration enforcement. First, it is really difficult to change local immigration enforcement practices, because they all tie into the federal enforcement structure. Some of the reasons are indirect; as the Dayton case demonstrated, officer overreach drew on misinterpretation of federal policy to undermine pro-immigrant local policymaking. But much of the difficulty is tied directly to the federal immigration structure, which makes it almost impossible for local police departments to limit immigration enforcement. Unless the department creates an explicit policy that limits immigration enforcement and feeds into a system with a comparable goal, as is the case in Chicago and the State of Illinois, the department is still going to participate in federal immigration enforcement. This is problematic if the government is also saying that it is not participating in enforcement. Continued participation could breed mistrust in the immigrant community, and could potentially hamper immigrant-driven revitalization efforts.

Continued participation in federal enforcement is especially concerning given the police's role in the community. Law enforcement is one of the largest government

employers, and is the largest branch of the local government that serves the entire community. As such, the police play an important role in shaping perceptions of community and local government. Law enforcement's treatment of immigrants can shape their assessment of how receptive and welcoming an area is, which in turn could shape the immigrant's likelihood of staying the community or recommending it to others. So law enforcement could play a really important role in immigrant-driven revitalization strategies, and conflicting messaging from them could hamper those programs.

The second important takeaway is that the federal changes have really altered individual policing interactions. These changes have federalized person-to-person policing interactions. The fact that any interaction between a police officer and an immigrant could potentially lead to deportation, and that there is essentially no way for local police to avoid this, has taken away local autonomy in policing.

This makes national rhetoric really important. The federal position is the one that actually matters in how immigrants are treated in the United States. These findings demonstrate that the federal position is the one that gets results. If the national response to immigrants remains focused on detention, enforcement, and deportation, it is going to be very difficult for cities to cultivate a welcoming context of reception. This puts their immigrant-driven revitalization strategies in jeopardy.

Chapter 5: Some Conclusions

The preceding chapters should have made it clear that Rust Belt cities face many challenges in implementing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies. They are hampered by their own inaction in formal immigration policymaking. They maintain policies that can undermine their goals, such as those that limit employment to citizens. They have difficulty providing services to their diverse immigrant populations, and leave much of this service provision to non-governmental organizations, who also face the same challenges. They are stymied by federal policies, both those that decentralize and those that federalize. In short, it is very difficult for these cities to successfully enact immigrant-driven revitalization strategies.

This is perhaps particularly clear if we consider the effect of these challenges on the context of reception. If we consider each immigration response separately—the official policies found in the municipal code, the integration efforts and service provisions of the city, the service provisions of the civil society, and the city’s law enforcement practices—we could perhaps classify each city’s efforts using the typology presented in Figure 5. However, if we try to classify the city as a whole, taking all of these facets into account, the task becomes much difficult. The challenges these cities face make it very difficult for them to adopt a consistent position towards immigrants.

Let's consider each city in turn. Akron resettles a disproportionately large number of refugees, and has a very active VOLAG that supports them. This would suggest that civil society is engaging in active encouragement. The city government, however, seems to be engaging in passive acceptance. They have created no laws that provide support for immigrants, and maintain old policies that could discourage immigration. There is no indication in the newspaper data that the city is providing additional services, suggesting passive acceptance. There is also no indication in newspaper data or in the ICE data that the police are engaging in any permissive or restrictive policymaking, suggesting that they are also engaging in passive federalism. There's a disjuncture, then, between how the civil society approaches immigration and how the local government approaches it.

This is almost identical to the situation in Buffalo. Like Akron, Buffalo has very active VOLAGS, which provide a ton of services for immigrants and refugees in the area. Otherwise, the city and the police have made very few efforts to encourage immigration. The only possible exception is the school district, which works diligently to aid ESL students, though these efforts often fall short.

Cincinnati is a different case. Cincinnati does not have particularly active VOLAGS, though they do receive some refugees. Most of the services are focused on Latino immigrants, who tend to be labor migrants, not refugees. Cincinnati's police and city government also do very little to aid in immigration. The thing that makes Cincinnati interesting, however, is that the city has an office dedicated to pursuing an immigrant-driven revitalization strategy. They are simply not following through. So, in

this case, while the actions of the city government, civil society, and law enforcement all suggest passive acceptance and passive federalism, the words of the city leaders suggest active encouragement.

Cleveland is also a confusing case. While there are organizations dedicated to pursuing immigrant-driven revitalization strategies in Cleveland, this is not happening through the VOLAGS, which aren't particularly active in the area, nor the city government, which has done very little to help immigrants. In this way, Cleveland is actually very consistent. The only city that is perhaps more consistent is Flint, which has done absolutely nothing in any direction regarding immigration.

Dayton and Detroit are perhaps the most complicated cases. Both cities have “Welcoming” plans. Dayton has the most developed plan, which was written by the city commission, but never codified. Detroit has a lengthy provision in its municipal code that lays out the benefits of immigrants and how they are to be treated within the city. In the case of both Dayton and Detroit, neither have actually accomplished much beyond this. Dayton has absolutely no official policies that could help immigrants, and has actually implemented very little of its Welcome Dayton plan. For the parts of the plan that Dayton has tried to implement, such as those dealing with limiting immigration enforcement to serious criminals, they have faced obstacles caused by federalization, which has drastically hindered the success of those efforts. Detroit, on the other hand, has done very little outside of passing that policy—they do not seem to be engaging in immigration service provision and the ICE data suggests that their new efforts to limit enforcement are not making a big impact. In both of these cases, then, the cities claims

make it seem like they are engaging in active encouragement, when in reality, they are engaging in passive acceptance or passive federalism.

It is of course, not entirely these cities' fault that their efforts are inconsistent. Decentralization has saddled them with more financial responsibilities, while federalization has reduced their autonomy. On top of this, trying to attract immigrants is a complicated plan, especially given the lack of resources and natural draws that these cities have. Given all of these considerations, it seems unlikely that these cities will be able to successfully implement these plans.

All of these issues have taken on even greater importance with the election of Donald Trump as president. While his first 100 days in office were notably chaotic, there was one constant—a crackdown on immigration. In the first three months of his presidency, Trump twice tried to ban immigration from several Middle Eastern countries, temporarily suspended the refugee program, and lowered the cap on the number of refugees the US will receive. He is also still pursuing his insanely expensive and impractical border wall. Under his administration, ICE has increased raids in Sanctuary Cities, and has started deporting residents covered by DACA, which has not been repealed yet. His Attorney General, Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III, is working to pull federal funding from Sanctuary Cities, a term that is largely undefined, but that could include any cities that do anything to limit immigration enforcement, like refusing to ask crime victims about their status. The federal position on immigration is getting more restrictive.

This is unquestionably bad for Rust Belt cities. If they have any hope of recovering via immigration, they need to be able to attract immigrants, and that is very difficult if they cannot create pro-immigrant policies. The immigrant-driven revitalization strategies in these cities were struggling before Trump, thanks to the challenges these cities face due to federalization and their immigrant populations, resources, and existing policies. His presidency puts them in an even more precarious position.

What makes this perhaps the most frustrating is that the rural counties that surround these cities gave Trump the votes for his victory. Electoral maps show that it was not the voters in urban counties that voted for Trump, but rather the residents in rural counties. This was certainly the case in Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, which were the states that sealed the Electoral College for Trump. The rural residents of these states provided the votes that will possibly kill their cities' revitalization strategies.

Rural voters cannot claim that they did not know that Trump would be anti-immigrant. He proposed few actual policy positions during the campaign, but two of the policies he did discuss at length were the border wall and a Muslim ban. The border wall was probably the defining policy of his campaign, and it is explicitly anti-immigrant. The rural voters in these states also cannot claim that they personally are being negatively affected by immigrants, whether it is through perceptions of increased crime (a narrative with no basis in reality) or fears of lost jobs. The counties that voted for Trump in Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are 83.35% white and 97.9% native-born,

on average (Shrider 2017). These counties have even smaller foreign-born populations than their cities, which, as I discussed in Chapter 1, are quite small.

The effect of these votes extends beyond what voters likely expected when they chose Trump for president. While his campaign promises regarding immigrants were dire, the actions, like suspending the refugee program and lowering the cap on how many refugees the US will accept, will hit the cities of the Rust Belt particularly hard. As I discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the refugee population in the Rust Belt is disproportionately larger, and makes up a significant proportion of the Rust Belt's immigrant population. Efforts to reduce the refugee flow will limit the number of immigrants going to these cities. The one trusty source of immigrants—refugees—is being cut off, which further jeopardizes these revitalization efforts.

There is one other irony in this situation. In many ways, the election of Donald Trump juxtaposes the old factory and business revitalization strategies with the new immigrant- and people-driven strategies. Though one can argue about the motives of Trump voters, the message of Trump—to “Make America Great Again”—and his promises to create manufacturing jobs hearken back to our industrial past. Likewise, his disdain for immigrants and Mexico reads as a condemnation of globalization, which immigrant-driven revitalization strategies depend on. In many ways, then, his election was a challenge to these strategies, which, ironically, are only being pursued because the industry-driven strategies he allegedly champions have failed. What this ultimately means for this region is still to be determined. But, regardless of his efforts, the fate of this region is now tied to immigrants.

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Appendix A: Welcome Dayton Goals and Subgoals

<i>Goals</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
<i>Business and Economic Development</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create an immigrant business district 2. Reduce the barriers to business formation 	<p>Develop East Third Street as an international marketplace for immigrant businesses.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Create a community-wide campaign that supports immigrant businesses
<i>Local Government and Justice System</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase interpretation services Increase immigrant participation in the local 2. government and community 3. Improve the immigrant-police relationship 4. Reduce language barriers in the criminal justice system 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase language service provision 2. Create "immigrant-friendly" law enforcement policies 3. Make it easier for immigrants to participate in policymaking by making participation in community organization and events easier Make it easier for immigrants to access the criminal 4. justice system by making more interpretation provisions 5. Create a municipal ID that all residents can access 6. Educate immigrants about government service agencies, and vice versa

Continued

Table 8. Welcome Dayton Goals and Subgoals

Table 8 Continued

<i>Goals</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
<i>Social and Health Services</i>	
1. Reduce barriers to service access caused by English language difficulties	1. Create a website for immigrants about available health and social services
2. Review local laws to make sure immigrants are not unnecessarily prevented from accessing services	2. Examine language access and cultural competency at healthcare providers and social service agencies Train volunteer interpreters and maintain a list of
	3. volunteer interpreters that healthcare and social service agencies can access
	4. Create a network of service providers who work with immigrants, or would like to work with immigrants
	5. Lobby for immigrant-friendly state and federal laws
	6. Educate immigrants about government service agencies, and vice versa Help the National Conference for Community and
	7. Justice (NCCJ) Ethnic and Cultural Diversity publicize the results of their refugee survey

Continued

Table 8 Continued

<i>Goals</i>	<i>Recommendations</i>
<i>Community, Culture, Arts and Education</i>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Expand ESL and literacy training for adults 2. Encourage all community youth to participate in international community building 3. Promote cross-cultural programming between local cultural and art organizations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create a "Cultural Brokers" program that trains community members about cultural barriers faced by immigrants 2. Create a base of ESL teachers and tutors to expand existing programs 3. Work with Streetpeace and the Peace Academy to involve more local organizations in outreach to school kids 4. Work with Culture Builds Community (CityFolk) to increase immigrant participation 5. Create a World Cup-style soccer tournament to highlight cultural and ethnic diversity in the Dayton metro
Dayton Human Relations Council. 2011. <i>Welcome Dayton: Immigrant Friendly City</i> . Dayton, OH: City of Dayton Human Relations	

Appendix B: Rust Belt Anti-Discrimination Laws

<i>City</i>	<i>Discrimination on the basis of national origin is prohibited</i>	<i>National origin is a protected status in or is covered by</i>
Akron, Ohio	In the classified service (<i>Sec 112</i>); by contractors seeking public contracts (<i>34.03</i>); in housing transactions (<i>139.12</i>); through ethnic intimidation (<i>139.13</i>)	
Buffalo, New York	By the Arts and Cultural Funding Advisory Committee (<i>6-30</i>); by projects funded by the Citizen's Funding Review Committee (<i>6-38</i>); In employment (<i>35-12</i>); at membership clubs (<i>154-4</i>); in joining clubs and organizations (<i>154-6</i>); when renting housing (<i>154-17</i>)	The blockbusting ordinance (<i>154-2</i>)
Chicago, Illinois	During events at Millennium Park (<i>10-36-140</i>); condominium sales (<i>13-72-040</i>); by transportation network providers (<i>9-115-180</i>); in mortgage lending (<i>2-32-450</i> ; <i>2-32-1050</i>); in employment and hiring (<i>2-74-080</i> ; <i>2-160-030</i>); in credit transactions (<i>2-160-060</i>); in public accommodations (<i>2-160-070</i>); in hospital admissions (<i>4-6-170</i>); in ambulance services (<i>4-68-180</i>); when renting and selling housing (<i>Chapter 5-8</i>); when providing taxi services (<i>9-112-180</i>)	The racial profiling ordinance (<i>8-4-086</i>); hate crimes ordinance (<i>8-11-085</i>); government ethics code of conduct guaranteeing equal opportunity (<i>2-156-005</i>); law against committing a crime against another person, their property, or their grave (<i>8-4-020</i>)

Continued

Table 9. Rust Belt Anti-Discrimination Laws

Table 9 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Discrimination on the basis of national origin is prohibited</i>	<i>National origin is a protected status in or is covered by</i>
Cincinnati, Ohio	In restrictive covenants, housing, and employment (914); in hospital admissions (204-15); in employment practices (308-23); by contractors working with the departments of Water Works and sewers (320-3); in the administration of the SBE and LBE programs (323-27); by contractors working with the city (325-9); in places of public accommodation (885-3); through criminal intimidation (908-3)	The environmental justice policy declaring that no group of people "should bear disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects" (1041-1)
Cleveland, Ohio	When deciding which police officers are eligible for higher educational training (135.40); in employment and hiring by contractors (187); in employment and hiring by public contractors (197); in daycare center enrollment (227.09); in hiring, promoting, and firing (663; 667.05), when providing housing (665); admission to karting parks and saucer tracks (691.16); admission to amusement parks (687.05)	Ethnic intimidation statute (623.16); plan to prevent neighborhood decline (313.06); Neighborhood Conservation plan (323.06); Community Development Plan (321.17); policy requiring the Director of Human Resources to generate education programming to encourage fair labor practices (143.02)

Continued

Table 9 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Discrimination on the basis of national origin is prohibited</i>	<i>National origin is a protected status in or is covered by</i>
Dayton, Ohio	In employment, public accommodations, housing, and credit transactions (32); by cable television franchisees (116.45); when providing access to public right-of-ways (95.62); by contractors working for the city (35.36); by people bidding on city contracts in their employment practices (35.16); by employee organizations seeking recognition by the city (33.21)	
Detroit, Michigan	When hiring or employing people for the housing commission (14-5-3); in employment, education, public accommodations, selling or leasing real estate, financing real estate, by contractors to the city (who must also take steps toward affirmative action), through misrepresentation of real estate, and when soliciting, insuring, and giving loans for real estate (27), by colleges (Art 1, Sec 26); in public elementary and secondary schools (2); in providing access to homeless shelters (44-5-2); in police patrols (43-6-6); in the police's secondary employment program (43-2-13); by peddlers, solicitors, and vendors (41-6-6); when hiring people to work for the city (6-406); by franchises (9.5-3-10); when hiring convicted criminals for city positions (13-1-13)	The equal protection clause (Art 1, Sec. 2)

Continued

Table 9 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Discrimination on the basis of national origin is prohibited</i>	<i>National origin is a protected status in or is covered by</i>
Flint, Michigan	In lending (24-99); when representing neighborhood change (24-98.3); by real estate brokers and sales people (24-100); in real estate terms and privileges (24-101); when hiring city employees (4-3-1); in hiring, public accommodations, education, and when renting or leasing housing (2-19.2); in employment by telecommunications systems (15-7); when leasing property (24-98)	The hate crimes statute (1-7.2); equal protection clause (24-98.1)
Gary, Indiana	In selling, leasing, or renting real estate; when providing financial services; in order to engage in blockbusting; in employment; by labor organizations; in apprenticeships; by employment agencies; in public accommodations; by educational institutions (26)	
Milwaukee, Wisconsin	By anyone holding a license, permit, or franchise granted by the city (85-29); by organizations requesting special event permits (103-55.5); in housing (109-41); in employment (109-45); in manufactured homes and manufactured home communities (246.23); by charter schools (330-7); in hiring by the City of Milwaukee (350-203)	The hate crime ordinance (50-15)

Continued

Table 9 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Discrimination on the basis of national origin is prohibited</i>	<i>National origin is a protected status in or is covered by</i>
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	By contractors seeking public contracts (161.02); by the Pittsburgh Land Bank (174A.06); by the Young Pittsburgh Advisory Commission (178B.01); by cable/telecommunications franchisees (425.19); by the police (621.06); in general (651); in employment (659.2); in housing practices (659.03); in public accommodations (659.04)	
Rochester, New York	When charging for parking (78-17); when making policies or practices that discriminate in general (63-2; 63-1); when providing cable television (4A-18); employing people to work on cable television equipment (4A-22)	The rule forbidding taxicab drivers from using slurs against passengers, pedestrians, or other drivers (108-21)
St. Louis, Missouri	When providing refuse services (11.02.120); when providing cable (8.29.230); when granting loans (5.12.050); for employers covered by memoranda of understanding (3.92.060); by contractors who've signed a public works contract (3.110.100); in employment, provision of housing or realty, public accommodations; and city activities or programming (3.44.080); when appointing Commissioners of the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (3.84.030)	The institutional vandalism and bias crimes ordinance (15.19); the policies regarding redevelopment procedures for Blighted areas (11.06.080); anti-blockbusting ordinance (15.18.170); anti-discrimination in the Affordable Housing Trust Fund requirement (3.59.030)

Continued

Table 9 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Discrimination on the basis of national origin is prohibited</i>	<i>National origin is a protected status in or is covered by</i>
South Bend, Indiana	In education, employment, accommodations, and access to public conveniences (2-127.1); in rentals and real estate loans and by real estate organizations, services, or facilities (2-127; 2-128); in city contracts (2-132); in franchising (Sec 7.7); when administrating the MBE and WBE programs (14.5)	The Human Rights ordinance (2-127)
Syracuse, New York	By employers in hiring, promotion, or retention (50-6)	The affirmative action plan (39)
Youngstown, Ohio	In employment (547.03); public accommodations (547.04); credit transactions (547.06)	The Fair Housing statute (548); the ethnic intimidation/hate crime statute (541.08.0); the anti-workplace bullying ordinance (163.63.a.11); the technology policy prohibiting lewd, obscene, or harassing messages or images (163.65.L.2)

Appendix C: Rust Belt Policies Restricting Employment

<i>City</i>	<i>Language Restriction</i>	<i>Citizenship Restriction</i>
Akron, Ohio		Housing Appeals Board Member (150.04) Commissioner of Deeds (3-27) Special police officer (13-20) Bowling alley or pool/billiards room operator (92-4) ^A Boiler or engine engineer (94-18)
Buffalo, New York		Sidewalk fruit and vegetables vendor (199-3) Newsstand operator (289-3) Licensed plumber (491-2) Receiving public works contracts (96-17) Associate auctioneer (81-1) ^B Licensed auctioneer (81-3)
Chicago, Illinois	<i>Speak English</i>	Licensed plumber (4-332-040)
	Horse-Drawn Carriage Chauffeur (9-108-150)	Stationary engineer or water boiler tender (4-344-030)
	Public Chauffeur (9-104-030)	Horse-drawn carriage operator (7-12-220, 9-108-035)
	<i>Speak and Understand English</i>	
	Desk clerk at Bureau of Fire Prevention (15-4-810)	Pedicab operator (9-110-04)
	Fireguard (15-4-680)	Taxi operator (9-112-100)
	Explosives transporter (15-4-340)	Operator of other public vehicles (9-114-040)
	Receive a certificate of fitness from the Bureau of Fire Prevention (15-4-260)	Transportation network providers (9-115-060)
	Horse-drawn carriage license (9-108-150)	
	Crane operator (4-288-030)	

Table 10. Rust Belt Policies Restricting Employment

Continued

Table 10 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Language Restriction</i>	<i>Citizenship Restriction</i>
Cincinnati, Ohio	<i>Read, Speak, and Write English</i>	Apply for a civil service exam (<i>Rule 05</i>) ^C
	Transportation network driver (<i>407-4-A</i>)	Apply for the classified service (<i>Rule 06</i>) ^A
	Operator of taxicab, tour vehicle, handicapped livery vehicle, pedicab, or animal-driven carriage (<i>408-1</i>)	
	Fireworks operator (<i>1213-17</i>)	
Cleveland, Ohio	<i>Read and Write English</i>	Tow truck operator (<i>677.14</i>)
	Tow truck operator (<i>677A.14</i>)	Armed security guard (<i>670.03</i>)
	Taxicab operator (<i>443.13</i>)	Taxicab license (<i>443.13</i>) ^A
	Sight-seeing car operator (<i>445.06</i>)	Certificate of Qualification for Limited Premises
	<i>Read, Write, and Speak English</i>	Electrical Maintenance (<i>3107.10</i>)
	Armed security guard (<i>670.03</i>)	Limited Certificate of Registration for Refrigeration
	Carriage operator (<i>447.03</i>)	Operator or Fireplace Installer (<i>3107.08</i>)
		Certificate of Registration as a general contractor (<i>3107.08</i>)
		Dance hall operator (<i>690.03</i>)
		Billiards room operator (<i>688.04</i>)

Continued

Table 10 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Language Restriction</i>	<i>Citizenship Restriction</i>
Dayton, Ohio	<i>Speak and Read English</i>	Housing Appeals Board Member (93.07)
	Taxicab driver (115.35)	Director or other city officer (33.41)
	Independent taxicab operator (115.34)	Taxicab driver (115.35) ^D
		Independent Taxicab operator (115.34) ^D
		Special police officer (112.183)
Detroit, Michigan		Nonresidential Building Maintenance Board member (99.14)
	<i>Read, Write, and Speak English</i>	Drive a vehicle for hire (58-2-62) ^E
	Drive a vehicle for hire (58-2-62)	Sightseeing bus operator (58-4-121)
	Horse-drawn carriage driver (58-3-49)	Pedicab or rickshaw operator (58-8-32) ^E
		City officer or employee (2-1-1)
		Seek elected office (2-101)
		Human Resources Department's Civil Service Commission member (6-405)
		Senators and representatives (7)
		Water and Sewage Board member (7-1201)
		Television Service and Installation Board Member (54-2-2)

Continued

Table 10 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Language Restriction</i>	<i>Citizenship Restriction</i>
Flint, Michigan	<i>Read, Speak, and Write English</i>	Receive license for alcoholic liquor sales (6-12)
	Ambulance operator (7-9)	
	<i>Read and Write English</i>	
	Receive a public driver's license (12-221)	
Gary, Indiana	<i>Speak and Write English</i>	Amusement device arcade operator (6-31) Taxicab operator (46-133) ^F Figherfighter (2-833) Police officer (2-1074) Health commissioner (2-908)
	Horse-drawn carriage operator (12-257)	
	<i>Read and Write English</i>	
	Operator of vehicle for hire (46-133) Firefighter (2-833) Police officer (2-1074)	
Milwaukee, Wisconsin	<i>Knowledge of English</i>	Auxiliary police member (312-13)
	Public passenger vehicle operators (81-44.7, 100-54, 100-56)	
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	<i>Read and Speak English</i>	Police officer (181.04) ^G Mechanical amusement device operator (777.07)
	Warm air heating contractor (741.03)	
	Welders (743.03)	
	Power engineers (745.03)	
	Electrical contractors (747.03)	
	General contractor (751.03)	

Continued

Table 10 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Language Restriction</i>	<i>Citizenship Restriction</i>
Rochester, New York		Board of Examiners of Stationary Engineers and Refrigerator Operators member (C-12-34) Taxicab or hack plate operator (108-3; 108-18) ^E
St. Louis, Missouri	<i>Read, Write, and Speak English</i>	Board of Examiners for Mechanical Contractors (25.10.030)
	Fireworks operator (25.06.200)	Stationary engineer (25.03.110.6)
	Ambulance driver/attendant (8.14.130) ^I	Private detective (8.36.030)
	<i>Read and Understand English</i>	Alderman (Charter Article IV Sec 2) ^J
	Valet (17.25.030)	Mayor (Charter Article VII Sec 2) ^J
	<i>Read and Write English</i>	Civil Services Commission member
	Female day and night attendants (12.52.040) ^H	(Charter Art. XVII Sec 6) ^K
		Judge (3.08.080) ^K
South Bend, Indiana	<i>Speak English Fluently</i>	Council Member (2-1)
	Taxicab driver (4-61)	
Syracuse, New York		Common Council member (Sec. 3-105)
		Mayor (Sec. 5-202)
		Bowling alley operator (Sec. 5-31)
		Sidewalk newsstand operator (9.48)

Continued

Table 10 Continued

<i>City</i>	<i>Language Restriction</i>	<i>Citizenship Restriction</i>
	<i>Read, Write, and Speak English</i>	Bowling alley operator (717.05)
Youngstown, Ohio	Operators, employees, and license holders of group homes (1744.07)	Junk dealer, junk gatherer, or secondhand store operator (747.05)
		Pool or billiards hall operator (763.03)
		Soft drink business operator (777.03)
		Taxicab operator (785.25)

^A Individuals must be either a U.S. citizen or intend to become a U.S. citizen.

^B Individuals must be either a U.S. citizen or a legal alien.

^C Individuals must be either a U.S. citizen or have a valid resident card.

^D Individuals must be either a U.S. citizen or have permanent residency or a work authorization from ICE.

^E Individuals must be either a U.S. citizen or have a work authorization from ICE.

^F Individuals must provide information about citizenship, but the policy does not specify that citizenship is necessary for employment/licensure

^G This requirement does not affect resident aliens who were employed as officers when this policy was enacted.

^H "Day and night attendants" are similar to nurses' aides.

^I Individuals must also have character references from two citizens of the United States and St. Louis.

^J Individuals must also have been a citizen for at least 5 years.

^K Individuals must also have been a citizen for at least 2 years.