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The teacher as expert: A theoretical and historical examination

Welker, Robert Paul, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1988

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**THE TEACHER AS EXPERT:
A THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL EXAMINATION
DISSERTATION**

**Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University**

By

Robert Paul Welker, B.A., B.S., M.A.

*** * * * ***

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bernard Mehl", is written over a horizontal line.

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To Marilyn, Sonia, Joseph, John and Susan

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation seeks to examine the phenomenon of expertise, especially as it relates to the understanding of the teaching craft. Many publications have either decried or celebrated the emergence of the expert as it applies to specific fields such as politics and medicine and as it applies to social affairs generally. Here expertise becomes the basis for examining the practice of teaching. We look at two central questions. How appropriate is the conception of the teacher as an expert? What advantages or disadvantages does expertise present for teachers and the public they serve?

At the outset an important distinction needs to be made in regards to the meaning of the word, "expertise." In this work, expertise is conceived primarily as a sociological phenomenon rather than simply as a technical or scientific accomplishment. This means that expertise concerns human relations and moral and civic responsibilities as much as the accumulation of technical knowledge and skill. This has implications for our consideration of the expert who has become such a central and indispensable figure in western culture. An expert is more than a person who knows, he has become one central focus of power and authority in our interactions with one another.

Ultimately and unavoidably, these understandings have had great bearing on how people have come to understand the field of education. Like other occupations, educators have continually asserted their particular competence in a specialized area of knowledge. They have repeatedly debated over the technical skills required of the teacher's craft. Even more crucially, they have been concerned with the moral and social responsibilities of the teacher in the modern age. The question of whether regular classroom teachers should assert themselves as educational experts has rarely been faced in direct fashion until very recently. Nonetheless, as we shall see by examining the thought of a variety of educational leaders, the issues of expertise have been consistently raised. This dissertation will argue that despite its many obvious advantages, the idea of the teacher as expert has certain limitations. It can be asserted only at some damage to a more public, inclusive, and moral understanding of a teacher's practice.

Toward an Understanding Expertise

Before examining the connection between expertise and education, it is first important to come to a fuller understanding of the place of experts in contemporary life. While many have considered expertise in their examination of technology, Daniel Bell has perhaps provided the most exhaustive and direct analysis of expertise in his dispassionate description of the "postindustrial" society.¹ In searching for a point by which to judge the character of modern knowledge, Bell arbitrarily suggests the year of 1788.

On that date the third edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica was published. For the first time the editors of the work found it necessary to rely on specialists for information rather than on one or two men who took the "whole of human knowledge for their province."² It became evident from that point, notes Bell, that knowledge had become fragmented and that no one would be able to master all the relevant information that one needed. In a famous dictum, Francis Bacon had once asserted that knowledge was power. Bell adds that in the postindustrial age, it has also become a type of property.³ As the economy shifts from the production of products to the production of services, more and more people rely on knowledge to make their living. Knowledge becomes part of the "social overhead investment of society."⁴

Most people know about the prominence of expertise in far less abstract and apocalyptic terms. It arises simply and naturally out of common experience, and out of the need to make sense of an ever-more complex technical world. This dissertation will be concerned with a particular type of expert, the professional educator, yet experts abound in all areas of contemporary life. The reliance on them seems part of the very fabric of modern existence. The mechanic, the electrician, the small appliance repair person, and even the person who might style our hair or train our dog, can be considered experts.

John Kenneth Galbreath points out, that in this general sense, experts are not extraordinary.⁵ They are neither necessarily malicious nor beneficent. They are not geniuses nor are they myopic specialists who have

sacrificed common sense for a narrow view of the world. They simply are very useful people who have acquired a special knowledge which is not widely shared, and which has allowed them to provide a service. It is this special knowledge which governs the patterns of dependence which mark expert relations. Typically, we find ourselves deferring to experts because they know and we do not. Just as typically, we might be hard pressed to provide good and substantial reasons upon which to base our trust. As Thomas Haskell has understood the matter, we pride ourselves on our reasonableness and our independence and yet defer to experts with at times as little grounds as the believer who defers to the Biblical account of creation.⁶

This should not mean, in any sense, that the modern reliance on experts lacks all rational explanation. It's just that in the rush of current events few have the time or the training to check on expert decisions. Bell's asserts that the very tenor of life has changed in the modern age, that lives have become more complex, and that common sense and common knowledge cannot solve all our problems. The economy is marked by an unprecedented division of labor and technical knowledge has exploded fantastically. Theodore Caplow traces such an explosion through the number of specializations that have grown in the academic disciplines and in the labor force overall.⁷ Bell notes the growth in library acquisitions and the vast increase in the number of publications that serve such specialties.⁸ Others have noted the exponential increase in information, particularly in the sciences. In any case, the growth indicates on the larger scale a greater

breadth of human knowledge. On the individual level, it indicates a narrowing of perspective and the need to depend on those who have confined their vision to a particular area of concern.

All of this might be more understandable and less overwhelming if the nature of interpersonal relations weren't so affected. For example, it seems impossible not to recognize the ironic obscurity and mystery which has attended the increase in technical knowledge and the growth in specialization.⁹ Jobs have become so specifically defined that it becomes difficult for people to tell others exactly what they do.¹⁰ It is more difficult for workers to understand or take responsibility for a larger product, and it is more difficult for people to see themselves affecting the huge bureaucracies which mark modern life. Finally and perhaps most symbolically, most people have only the most cursory understanding of the technical innovations and conveniences which they use each day and which bring them such comfort and ease. In a recent poll, not one in ten could describe anything about how telephones work. Fewer still understood the operation of televisions.¹¹

This very incomprehensibility, of course, gives experts their reason for service, and provides them with a means of livelihood. Yet the long-understood values of independence and self-reliance are affected as well. Expertise helps make self-sufficiency something of an archaic virtue. Paul Goodman once described the modern dependence on technology by pointing to the helplessness of most people in matters of simple repair. Technology which adds such depth of understanding to our existence, which allows us to

see in farthest space and into the microscopic depths of organic life can also carry with it a form of incipient blindness. The dependence on expert services gives access to care which is beyond personal ability. Yet a certain disability is always implied. As C. S. Lewis once put it, "If I pay you to carry me, I am not therefore a strong man."¹²

The Ambiguous Limits of Expertise

It may be too easy to criticize technological dependence and too easy to blame the expert. As will become evident throughout this study, these matters are never easy to decide. Many times dependence is justified. Some philosophers have noted that expertise has drastically changed the very nature of intelligence.¹³ If intelligence formally meant the ability of people to pull on personal resources, experience, imagination and ingenuity to deal with the unexpected, intelligence now includes the judgement necessary to know when to consult the appropriate experts. The matter has moral repercussions. The person who attempts to repair a television without adequate knowledge is simply being foolish. The person who attempts to minister to the health of a vulnerable patient without adequate knowledge is being morally irresponsible.¹⁴

Nonetheless many have begun to question whether relations built around expertise are always appropriate or kept within reasonable limits. The dependency on experts hints at a lack of participation on the part of the wider public, as well as a passivity that might be as much a result of public indolence and apathy as the widespread intrusions of professional care.

When the matter calls for active public involvement or when the credentials of the expert become a mask for special privilege, then expertise appears more of a problem than a solution. An expertise that relies on technical explanation might overlook the moral and public nature of problems, substituting a technical strategy in the place of political or communal intervention.

This has caused more controversy in some fields than others. Politics has been one area in particular where the reliance on experts has received widespread attention. B. Bruce-Briggs, Ralph Lapp and others have explored the idea of a "new class."¹⁵ Here the predominance of experts is commonly regarded as a threat to the democratic idea of public accountability. To depend more on an elite class of specialists is to trust less in the ability of public to make governmental decisions. Zbigniew Brzezinski responds with a more hopeful conception. In his description of an expert-guided "technetronic society," the experts take over the management of social and political affairs.¹⁵ The wider populace meanwhile is afforded the opportunity to cultivate more leisurely, cultural pursuits. Brzezinski's description follows the familiar historic pattern of technocratic thinking. The basic concepts underlying the technocratic conceptions of government we owe primarily to the French philosophers, St. Simon and his disciple, Auguste Comte. Yet it is in the United States that technocratic conceptions of government have received a wide public hearing.¹⁷ This reflects the ambivalent attitude of Americans toward technology and toward the control and efficiency it promises in all aspects of human affairs.

Medicine has been another area in which the phenomenon of expertise has raised perplexing problems. Medical knowledge is commonly crowned as the ultimate glory of technical expertise. Yet it is easy to forget how recent have been most of the technical innovations which have served to promote medicine as the prototype of all professions. Now that place of preeminence is being questioned.¹⁸ It is pointed out that many of the benefits of modern existence--increased life expectancy and elimination of many life-threatening illnesses--have come less as the result of medical intervention than as the result of modern sewage and water treatment techniques and a higher standard of living.¹⁹ Issues surrounding the monopoly of the medical profession have arisen particularly as it affects the ability of non-traditional healers to practice, and as it affects the ability of patients to assume a more active role in their own treatment.

Again these issues are never easy to decide in general. If there is one case in which patients have sacrificed their autonomy for a dubious cure, there are other cases in which a willful individualism has stood in the way of competent treatment. In Anatomy of an Illness, for example, Norman Cousins celebrates medical partnerships as a way to break down the authoritarian relationships that sometimes exist between expert doctors and passive patients. It was a partnership with a sensitive and caring doctor that allowed Cousins to find a personal cure for his debilitating illness.²⁰ He criticizes the docility of patients who want to be "fixed up like a car." Yet what of those illnesses which need the technique of the doctor and require

their disinterested care? A few years later, Susan Sontag described her battle with cancer.²¹ She was an unusually enterprising and intellectually gifted patient, yet she found herself contemplating her guilt over being afflicted with the disease. Her will had been sapped by a kind of self-blame growing out of the idea that cancer was a moral and spiritual judgement on her character. She found that taking personal responsibility for her illness only prevented her from seeking adequate help. Her subsequent book laments the public disposition to turn all medical ailments into types of moral judgements, and therefore deny the afflicted the will to seek competent technical care.

Even malpractice suits which indicate the general disposition of the public to question the heightened pretensions of professional competence seem to carry a dual message. Some observers have understood malpractice suits to be another aspect of an increased public mistrust of the expert which began in the sixties with student demonstrations in the colleges and with greater consumer activism.²² Yet a closer look at the malpractice crisis, particularly as it affected the medical profession, reveals that most suits occurred in precisely those areas in which technical knowledge was the most recent and therefore the most tentative.²³ Still the public demanded treatment. All malpractice suits, whether merited or not, point out that people continue to rely on experts. They provide *prima facie* evidence that responsibility and blame are located elsewhere. Far from indicating a revived sense of public self-reliance, the great increase in malpractice claims may indicate a greater expectation of experts and the increased disposition of

the public to have its burgeoning need for comfort and satisfaction indulged.

Expertise and Education

These matters do not become easier to resolve within the field of education, although they may be more crucial. Expertise and education are integrally connected. Universalized schooling has been seen as instrumental in providing the common person a more secure sense of her own competence. Schooling indicates, on the one hand, an abiding faith in education as the means to equality of opportunity and as a means to weaken and even destroy the practice of privilege. On the other hand, schools act as those sorting agencies which select those destined for different occupations and for those elite professions which have gained great status in modern life. In this latter sense, schools are the breeding grounds of the expert, the places in which specialists gain that rarified knowledge which sets them apart from the common layperson and which provides them social wealth and power. In this way, schools may serve less to destroy classes of professional elites than to create them.

Schools, themselves, have increasingly become the locus of expertise. This dissertation will center on the practice and status of the ordinary classroom teacher, but it is important to note that as the schools have become more centralized there has been a corresponding growth in specialization. Much of that growth has occurred in administration. According to the Digest of Educational Statistics, in 1920 there was one supervisor for every 31 teachers. By 1930, that number had increased to a

supervisor for every 22 teachers. And by 1974 the number had increased to one for every 16 teachers.²⁴ Joel Spring points that this expansion not only reflects the growth in the field of administration as a profession, but reflects the growth in the number of people to whom the teacher must answer.²⁵ Expertise, in this sense, indicates not only particular competence but a sense of authority, power and control.

Recent evidence suggests that teachers also are increasingly opting for specialism. The original specialties in teaching occurred as schools became segregated by age and grade and as junior high and high school teachers became responsible for a specific subject matter. But the modern growth in specialty is more narrow and seemingly more connected to the search for professional status.²⁶ The major development has occurred in the area of special education--teaching of the mentally retarded, the physically handicapped, the emotionally disturbed and learning disabled. Also specialties have arisen in reading and math as schools have moved to meet the needs of disadvantaged learners through remedial instruction. Early childhood education and bilingual education claim two other group of specialists, and a smaller number of teachers have been working especially with the gifted. Stephen Kerr notes that in a period of sixteen years preceding 1980, the number of students opting for specialties rather than regular classroom teaching increased 1,000 percent.²⁷ In comparison to the number of classroom teachers, the number of teaching specialists is still small, but the drastic increase indicates that a movement is afoot which can not simply be explained by the entitlement programs which encouraged the

growth of specialisms over that timeframe.²⁸

The movement suggests that teachers have begun in earnest to follow the path which has led to the growth of professionalism in other occupations. The process involves the claim by a body of specialists to competence and exclusive jurisdiction over a certain field. The growth in speciality is one way an occupation can begin to assert their restricted right to practice and begin to claim for themselves the appropriate economic and social rewards befitting an exclusive profession. Kerr points to statistics which indicate already that the average salaries for educational specialists exceed that of the regular classroom teacher. He points also to more disturbing evidence which indicates that generalists are concerned with the encroachment of specialists upon their territory and fear the specialists' power to determine where a child should be placed or what education is appropriate.²⁹

While these latter issues may be significant, they are not the direct concern of this dissertation. I believe that more significant questions are raised by the effect of specialty on how the practice of teaching is conceived. These concerns arise out the limits of expertise discussed above. For if specialty wins for teachers the public regard and economic standing it has historically lacked, it might do so at the risk of falling into the same traps of technological dependency and public apathy that has been associated with expert relations in other fields. Teaching also might come to be seen in more technical ways rather than as a field particularly dependent on decisions made about the social ends of education. Especially in the United States where the faith in a publicly-controlled education resembles something like a

national church, the questions of whether the professions are self-serving, whether social problems can be solved through technical means, and whether public participation can be nurtured and preserved gain more importance.

Expertise and the Reform Movement

These kinds of questions now appear timely. They have recently received added emphasis from the wide-spread public criticism that has surrounded education. Despite the public outcry it isn't clear that the current criticism indicates on the part of the general adult community a more urgent need to take part in the educational process. The burdens of two-income and one-parent families stand in the way of such an eventuality. And the current criticism surrounding the schools appears likely to reinforce the belief in specialists and schools as agents especially capable of assuming educational responsibility. Professional educators have taken the urgent and apocalyptic tone of many of the reports criticizing the school and used it as a catalyst for reform in the profession. In this way, educational criticism might be seen as symbolically akin to the rationale for all expert intervention. "We are a nation at risk" began the report of the National Commission on Excellence. "If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war."³⁰ One reasonable and typically modern way to deal with such a massive and overwhelming threat is to rely on more expert assistance.

Increasingly the teacher has become the center of the reform movement. Many reports have pointed out that it will take a more elite teacher corps to solve the problems of the school systems. The two most influential of the reports have been Tomorrow's Teachers: A Report of the Holmes Group published in April, 1986, and A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century, published the following month.²⁸ The reports included different participants. Tomorrow's Teachers was the work of a group of deans of education colleges who adopted the name of the Holmes Group in honor of Henry W. Holmes, an early reformer in education. A Nation Prepared was sponsored by the Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy and included leaders of the major teacher's unions as well as a variety of professional and business leaders. Neither group included classroom teachers in their working group although their major recommendations center on the position of the teacher in the academic community.

Basically the recommendations of the two reports are similar and are justified in similar ways. Both reports wish to increase the prestige and the autonomy of the classroom teacher by making it a more exclusive profession. Each would abolish undergraduate education programs in favor of graduate teacher training, and each would apply more stringent and uniform standards for entering the profession. The Carnegie report urges the development of a professional standards board, while the Holmes Group emphasizes the creation and implementation of a series of tests for

perspective teachers. Both groups recommend that teaching become more specialized through the adoption of a more differentiated ranking within the corps of teachers. In the Holmes Group's more elaborated recommendation, the teaching corps would be formed by an hierarchical structure which would include the career professional, the professional teacher, and the instructor. Each position would have its separate responsibilities and be charged by a particular type of license that would give the higher levels of the occupation more professional responsibility and power.³²

The direction and intention of the reports are clear. Teachers need to be more professional, they need to be better trained, they need to be equipped with the latest tactics that have been proven to be effective in the schools, and they need to be empowered with the responsibility to employ what they know. In this pursuit after more technical power, after more autonomy and after more public respect and social status, teachers will follow the path of other elite professions. Teachers will become more like doctors.³³ They will assert their control of a well-defined knowledge base that will not only demonstrate their technical abilities, but will pluck for them the same rose of economic benefit that doctors plucked out of the nettle of social criticism which engulfed the medical profession at the turn of the century.

Again this line of thinking raises many questions pertinent to our investigation. The implicit assumption in the reform reports is that teaching is to be founded on a more scientific, more expert basis. The beguiling promise of expertise is that the same standardized and calculated methods which worked to harness natural forces can be used to mold and direct

human potential, including the human potential of both teachers and students.³⁴ A prime question which the very conception of the teacher as expert raises is whether there exists in the immense research on teaching anything resembling a science or giving evidence to the idea that there is one best way to practice. The question ultimately reflects on whether teachers can or should be considered full professionals in the sense in which the term has come to be understood in the twentieth century.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the issue of the moral nature of a teacher's practice is raised. This is an issue which has particularly affected historical thinking about the role of teachers and thus will be a particular issue in this dissertation. In this question, the appropriateness of conceiving the teacher as an expert gains a more practical context. It is not altogether clear that the transition of teachers to the role of expert, "specialist in charge of education," can be as smooth as the transition doctors have made to the role of expert, "specialists in charge of health." First there is the obvious need for parents to be integrally involved in the education of their children. Secondly, it is not clear that teachers can ever be like doctors in the social responsibilities of their role. Both doctors and teachers have strong historical connections to religion and to the priesthood. This connection served to imbue the two roles with certain moral constraints which indicated that character and moral bearing were as important to being a doctor and teacher as was technical skill. For many reasons, doctors now have difficulty holding moral concerns at the forefront of their practice. And, it might be said that for the more technical medical specialties, it is

possible to consider quality of service without giving much thought to moral considerations whatsoever.³⁵ We expect of the surgeon more a steady hand than a kind heart; it has become questionable whether a good doctor necessarily has to be a good person. The matter appears more problematic when considering the character of the teacher. It is hoped that the theoretical and historical investigation of this dissertation might yield additional insight into the issue.

Nature of the Study

We can turn now to elaborate more clearly on the particular perimeters of this examination of expertise and teaching. Immediately it might be noted the huge nature of this issue. It could easily take a much fuller exposition by an author who examines more carefully the place of the expert in the modern world, the technical intrusion of expertise in such matters as testing and programmed learning, and the historical record of the schools in adopting technocratic solutions to political and moral problems. In the work Raymond Callahan, Randall Collins, and David Tyack some of that work has already been done.³⁶

This dissertation takes a more personal and more eclectic approach. As briefly noted above it is generally built around seeking insights about the effects of an educational expertise through an analysis of the thoughts and writings of some of our most prevalent educational thinkers. This search is not a simple matter, because few educational theorists have taken expertise as a direct concern. Nonetheless the issues of expertise are raised--the

political and public nature of schooling, the monopoly of education, and the professionalization of teaching--this is where we seek to be enlightened.

The second chapter begins the examination with an analysis of expertise as it was conceived in the progressive era. David Tyack has noted that the progressive education movement contained different strands, and this chapter attempts to review two of the strands in the thought of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley and George S. Counts. Cubberley led a group of educators whom Tyack refers to as administrative progressives. Counts was a leading social reconstructionist. Both thinkers had different ideas about the practice of teaching, particularly in regards to the place of technical knowledge and social obligation in informing a teacher's duties. In the conflict of their different views, we face for the first time some of the issues surrounding expertise.

The next chapter examines expertise as an aspect of professionalism. The two most prominent sociological studies of teaching have been written by Willard Waller and Daniel Lortie, both of which will be analyzed in this chapter. Lortie, worried about the development of a technical subculture, advocates a more exclusive profession. Waller, worried about the restriction of a teacher's role in a highly structured institution, advocates a more open concept of a teacher's practice. In many ways it is possible to see Lortie as a proponent of the teacher expert and Waller as an opponent. Questions are raised about each of their views.

The fourth chapter examines the origins and thought of many of the leaders of the "romantic" movement in education. Focusing on the thought of

several of the modern romantics and particularly Ivan Illich, the idea of the teacher as expert is directly confronted, particularly because it has seemed so diametrically opposed to the romantic view of the teaching practice.

Nonetheless as the examination of Illich hopes to make clear, the romantic idea of individualism is in many ways consistent with the idea of individualism which underlies expertise. This suggests that theoretically the positions of those approving or disapproving of a more scientific and exclusive teaching profession might not be that far apart.

The final two chapter brings the discussion into the modern era with a brief review of some the current debate about the liberal and the technical in the practice of teachers. The recent work of Philip Jackson and Alan Tom will be analyzed. These thinkers, along with many others with a more radical and socially-conscious perspective, have begun to question the concept of expertise most directly. Their ideas follow in many ways the thought of theorists previously examined in the dissertation. Yet they attempt to move beyond the past, to understand the practice of teaching in a more interactive and interdependent manner. Their ideas suggests ways to overcome the excessively technical and dominant conception of the teacher as expert.

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9. Caplow points out that the very word, "mystery," originally referred to membership in a craft and guild and the types of secret understandings such membership implied. Now he notes "the mutual incomprehensibility of occupational languages, the increasingly rigid organization of occupational interest groups, and the barrier between working environments combine to create a situation for which there is no close historic parallel, when habits, customs and standards of a neighbor's occupational world may be no more familiar than those of the Australian aborigines." See Caplow, The Sociology of Work, 23.
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31. The Holmes Group, Tomorrow's Teachers, (East Lansing, Michigan: The Holmes Group, 1986); and The Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1986).
32. For summaries of the recommendations of the two reports see The Holmes Group, Tomorrow's Teachers, 4; and The Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, A Nation Prepared, 3.
33. The medical metaphor is an explicit part of both reports occurring in reference to the greater status and pay of doctors as well as to the "clinical" studies and school sites that would act like "teaching hospitals." The Holmes Report with its added emphasis on the professionalization process is more explicit about the metaphor. The Carnegie Report follows A Nation At Risk in connecting economic decline with poor performance in school. This emphasis mutes somewhat the medical metaphor, but it cannot be forgotten that the Carnegie Foundation had funded the report by Abraham Flexner that had led to the reform of medical education. For explicit references see The Holmes Group, Tomorrow's Teachers, 8, 12, 56, 67; and The Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, A Nation Prepared, 7, 58, 76.
34. This view is consistent with the ideas of scientific management expressed by Fredrich Taylor. For a good analysis of the effect and reach of such ideas see Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).
35. Wendy Carlton, "In Our Professional Opinion...": The Primacy of Clinical Judgement Over Professional Skills (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978).
36. See Raymond Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Randall Collins, The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification (New York: Academic Press, 1979); and David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, Managers of Virtue: Public School Leadership in America, 1820-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

CHAPTER II

EXPERTISE IN PROGRESSIVE THOUGHT

The modern belief in the expert has its origins in the nineteenth century. It is closely tied to the rise of the professions and the increasing credibility of the sciences. It also depended, in a certain sense, on economic prosperity. As per capita income rose, vast numbers of people became able to provide a service to earn a living rather than being involved in the production of food. Until the end of the nineteenth century, such people would not even have been called experts with all the word now implies, nor would they have been given the special credibility and trust experts are now afforded.¹ Such trust was consistent with the increasing reliance on technology as a way of promoting progress and as a way of organizing a new more efficient world. The enthusiasm and respect for the accomplishments of technology changed occupational conceptions and reoriented conceptions about ways to survive and succeed. As one exuberant writer put the matter, "Knowledge has become power. The first and most important industry of this new civilization is to cultivate brains."²

Occupational distinctions drawn along formalized lines indicate an increasing reliance on institutions and organizations as mediators to service. Experts require not only specialized training to set them apart from the lay public, but special places where they might practice. Schools, hospitals,

courtrooms, and even professional baseball parks became increasingly identified in the nineteenth century as locuses of professional authority and competence.³ The emergence of the expert went hand in hand with the emergence of professional organizations meant to protect and manage the interest of the new occupational elites.⁴ As always these shifts in social structure were marked by shifts in language. Professionals began to share special words, and old words took on new meanings to indicate the reliance of the public on experts. Citizens became "clients" in a dependent relation to their professional patrons, and a "layman," who once was subservient to the church, was now understood to be subservient to all those with special knowledge and training. An amateur, once commended as someone who did something for the love of it, now came to be known as someone who lacked the knowledge and skill to perform adequately.⁵ In this way inferiority of skill could not be easily overcome by superiority of motive and character.

The early historical movement to identify the teacher as an expert faced this question: how could teaching be advanced as an occupation requiring specific technical abilities without losing its moral and religious foundation. As expertise became solidly established as the basis for other professions, teachers sought to ground their craft in the authority of science without losing the sentimental, nourishing language and energy of the true amateur. This latter focus was indicative of the close connection of teaching with the ministry and with a generalized Protestantism that was part of the common school movement and the evangelical zeal with which it was pursued. The self-image of the nineteenth century educational leader was born more of the

church than the laboratory. Most of the educational crusaders of the common school movement had fluid careers; few had picked education as a lifelong profession. Almost all, like Horace Mann who led them, were deeply religious men and very talented amateurs.⁶

This understanding was consistent with the popular view of the teacher. From the beginning, teaching was seen as a type of calling. Early normal schools emphasized the passion and focus of this calling even as they asserted, consistent to the trends of the time, that education was based on scientific principles.⁷ Normal schools provided opportunities to a class of people who had limited chance for advanced education and for professional opportunities elsewhere. Women began to dominate the field, especially in the elementary fields, not only because of lack of other career opportunities but because many saw the female as more morally upright and constant. Teaching itself, fueled by the enthusiasm over Pestalozzian methods, was seen as a maternal and motherly occupation. In the words of Joel Spring, the school marm became the heroine of the common school movement.⁸

By the beginning of the twentieth century, this scenario had changed considerably. The forces of industrialism and urbanization put great pressures on the schools to educate children for life in the modern world. Cities, overwhelmed by the population rush from the rural areas, were also overwhelmed by the vast numbers of immigrants who had come from eastern Europe. Community leaders called out to the schools to be organized on a more efficient and standardized basis even as reformers surveyed the conditions of life in the slums with justified horror. Businessmen, impressed

with the efficiency movement based on the ideas of Frederick Taylor, called on a new type of school system which would do a better job of preparing workers. Similarly, psychologists, buoyed by the work of Edward Thorndike and G. Stanley Hall, felt that education could be put on a more scientific basis. Thorndike believed with many progressives that technological expertise held the key to the future. The remedy for America's educational ills, Thorndike wrote, was for the common man to refuse to think beyond his limited field and to learn to consult the expert, whether the matter be medicine, education, or government.⁹

Though progressives generally believed in the power of technology as means to improve the world, as a term, progressivism defies exact definition. It meant different things to different people and seemed full of contradiction and paradox. For example, the aims of religion and science can be seen as diametrically opposed. Still science and religion at times merged in the progressive era to form a powerful animating force for human betterment. While the progressive era brought a more insistent claim and reliance on the image of the formally trained and technically competent expert, the educational leaders who emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century had not abandoned totally the evangelical spirit of the common school movement. Many of the new educational leaders were sons of protestant clergyman.¹⁰ Edward Thorndike, Leonard Ayers, Sydney Pressey, William Kilpatrick, Paul Monroë, Lewis Terman and Bruce Payne were among this group. Others, like Charles Judd and G. Stanley Hall, had planned to become ministers before turning to psychology. Religious as well

as scientific and business metaphors were common in describing the craft.

Celebrating the teacher in 1898, John Dewey wrote, "The teacher is the true minister of God and the usher of the true kingdom of God."¹¹

Nonetheless a new attitude had found its way into education. The men who assumed leadership positions in the new field made education a lifelong career. Emphasizing the scientific character of education, they attempted to rescue education from the vicissitudes of politics and from the arbitrariness of moral concerns. Education, they argued, needed a centralized leadership armed with an objective expertise. Rather than talking about the "evils" to be scourged and overcome by the school, they talked increasingly about the "problems" to be solved by experts.¹² This change in perspective entailed in some ways a change in how progressives came to think about the place of educational institutions in a democracy. And it raised at the same time a vexing theoretical and practical problem. The conception of a teacher as an expert seemed to hold great promise. If the teachers and other educational leaders became experts, then it appeared more likely that the schools could become that credible social force needed to produce a more perfect and harmonious society. Yet expertise seemed to allow an element of elitism to enter the craft. If the experts ruled, then it seemed that democratic rule by the people would suffer as a result.

Historically, this dilemma was not new. When Plato and Comte had suggested rule by a knowledgeable elite, they had abandoned all pretense to democratic government as a consequence. Comte believed that citizens in a technocratic society should come to trust governmental experts in the same

way that patients obey their doctor. The progressive allegiance to democratic reform made the matter more difficult. On the one hand, the progressives wanted to revitalize government by the people. On the other hand, their belief in the efficiency and effectiveness of the expert resulted in the effort to keep politics distant and to create institutional systems which would separate the people from the very processes which might most affect them. Samuel Haber points out that many times these dual efforts might not only be seen within the same social movement, but within the same political formula and even within the same men.¹³ The way these efforts were alloyed and eventually resolved in the thinking of the major leaders in the progressive movement presents an opportunity to judge the appropriateness of expertise to education. Particularly in the life and thinking of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley and George S. Counts, we face for the first time the problems which might arise when the belief in expertise is connected with a belief in the socially and personally empowering nature of education.

Ellwood Cubberley: The Professional Elite

Ellwood Cubberley's life and career lay at the heart of the movement to create a new breed of expert educational managers. In 1898, he was offered a professorship in the Department of Education at the Stanford University after short service as a geologist and as superintendent of schools in San Diego. He was given the Stanford post with the understanding that unless the department quickly became academically respectful, it would soon be disbanded.¹⁴ Cubberley had never had an education course, nevertheless he

had in mind a dozen courses he might teach in school administration, school problems and organization, and educational history. The available literature in the field of education was very thin, but Cubberley persevered, eventually writing his own history of education that for many years assumed the place of educational dogma. Here the beginning years and development of education were extolled as noble efforts to overcome the forces of industrialism, urbanization, and immigration that had engulfed and changed nineteenth century America. Early educational leaders were celebrated as "public men of large vision" who were faithful not only to their Protestant upbringing but to the demands of a society that required state-supported and managed education.

Cubberley approached the history of education with a partisan view. He wished not only to "make the Department of Education at Stanford famous," but also to promote the idea of common schooling, small-town virtues, and the social evolution of educational progress.¹⁵ Part of that evolution entailed the easy mingling of pietism with science. Cubberley, a trained physical scientist, found the ideal of science so compelling that the carry over to the field of education seemed natural and crucial. Even the religious objections that had so marked intellectual debate in the nineteenth century did not stand in the way. "I believe firmly in God and the Principles of the Christian religion," Cubberley once affirmed. "I am in the strongest sense a harmonizer of Religion and Science; there is no conflict in my mind between the two."¹⁶

Such assurance soon showed itself as the mark of the man. In his first year at Stanford, Cubberley not only headed the education department but taught five courses and delivered over 77 addresses. He never seemed to doubt publically his own competence despite his lack of educational training. He endeavored to make formal education required in the specialized areas he came to favor: vocational guidance, school hygiene, statistics, educational psychology, methods of teaching, and many others. By the time he had retired from Stanford in 1933, he had written 16 books, innumerable articles, and edited one of the most influential series of books on education of his day. Through shrewd investment, he had also amassed a considerable personal fortune that enabled him to personally finance an education building on Stanford's campus. In the true Jeffersonian fashion, he not only donated the money for the building, but also designed it, and served as its first librarian.

Despite these remarkable achievements, Cubberley is now noted as much for what he believed and represented as for what he accomplished. In his study of the progressive era, Cremins gives Cubberley but a few lines and that to criticize him for his ethnocentric views of east European immigrants.¹⁷ Many modern historians use Cubberley, not as a definitive source, but as a way to point out how not to do historical writing.¹⁸ Scholars reviewing his other written work have assessed that his most notable scholarly achievement was not original, but a collection of edited writings which might still serve useful to professors doing a survey course on educational thought.¹⁹ This appears to echo an early assessment of Cubberley's powers of scholarship made by E. L. Thorndike who had served

on the graduate committee approving Cubberley's doctoral dissertation, a document that had been written in whirlwind fashion during a span of three months. "Cubberley is a good man," Thorndike noted, "but not a good scholar."²⁰

It would be wrong, however, on the basis of these assessments to dismiss the significance of Cubberley's career. If Cubberley was not original, his thought did resonate with some of the deepest currents of American opinion, and his assured sense of such opinion was enough to give it added weight and momentum. In this regard, the most notable achievement of Cubberley's distinguished career was his contribution to the creation of school administration as a specialized field and profession. This contribution was firmly grounded in the belief in the expert. Cubberley was convinced, with a firmness that made believers of his students and colleagues, that education should be controlled by experts employing the latest techniques in scientific management. Not everyone could be an expert and Cubberley promoted a rigorous selection process that required both service in the schools and extended educational training. Business provided the model by which schools could be efficiently run, and Cubberley's works abounded with metaphors connected with the world of commerce. He also appealed to the physician as that model by which the new education professional should be publically measured. He complained that "while a good superintendent of schools takes about as good a thorough preparation for his work as does a physician or surgeon for his, and is about as competent in his professional field as is a physician or surgeon in his, the public does not understand

this.²¹

The public also did not always understand that in the complex world of school administration, educational affairs might best be left to the technically competent. Cubberley repeatedly criticized school board members who might sacrifice "educational efficiency for political expediency." Cubberley distrusted the practice of electing school board members through the ward system, preferring instead city-large elections that would produce "better men" and eliminate the "inevitable representation" from the poorer wards.²² Cubberley, certainly, did not want to disenfranchise the public entirely in the running of the schools, but he shared the progressive belief that in the complexity of modern industrial life, politics had little place. School board members in his eyes were "upright citizens" who were "more or less successful in their different lines of work," but they just had to realize their role. "The chief trouble with them [school board members]," he wrote, "is not their honesty or general intelligence or their willingness to serve, but rather that they know so little about what constitutes good school administration that they are likely to think that, because they have children in the schools, they know all about how schools should be conducted."²³

Few criticized such views at the time. The belief in the expert entailed a belief in a mode of governance that placed confidence and governmental power in a credentialed few. While this was not easily reconciled with a belief in democracy, the appeal to a curious mixture of scientific, medical, and business metaphors allowed many progressive thinkers to sidestep theoretical problems. For example, an early supporter of expertise, Nicoholas

Murray Butler of Columbia University commented that it was as foolish to speak of "the democratization of the treatment of appendicitis" as to speak of "the democratization of schools.... The fundamental confusion is this: Democracy is a principle of government; the schools belong to the administration; and a democracy is as much entitled as a monarchy to have its business well done."²⁴

In a similar fashion, Cubberley celebrated the democratic origins and focus of public education, but argued that power ought to rest firmly in the hands of a knowledgeable elite. This allowed for a coherent conception of school administration, but it also permitted lines of argument which now appear more troublesome. For example, Cubberley praised the plurality and breadth of the American character but warned that unless "the docile, illiterate, and unmotivated immigrants from Eastern Europe were quickly assimilated they would dilute tremendously our national stock, and corrupt our city life."²⁵ He found school teachers notable for their commitment and practical knowledge, but felt that they should not be included in the process of determining school policies. Finally, he lambasted politically-based selection processes, but he worked to establish a networking system that assured good employment opportunities for his "boys," the graduate students who trained under him.²⁶ It is important to note that in this latter effort, Cubberley did not labor alone. He competed and collaborated with other educators also keenly interested in establishing educational administration as a field, especially George D. Strayer and Nicolaus Englehardt at Teachers College Columbia and Charles Judd at the University of Chicago. Apparently

Cubberley's influence was particularly effective. After visiting Cubberley in Palo Alto, an educator once commented that "Cubberley had an educational Tammany Hall that made the Strayer-Engelhardt Tammany Hall in New York look very weak."²⁷

Cubberley was a man much celebrated and revered in his time. His biographers spend a major portion of their book detailing the many honors and recognitions given him upon his retirement. His financial success was so notable that a prominent business journal dispatched an investigator to write an article on his investment strategies. Cubberley was a loyal man, full of good will in interpersonal relations, a man who apparently fostered such sentiments in others. Upon assuming his first superintendency one of his graduate students wrote that "the thing which will mean most to me will be Dad Cubberley's estimate of my work. I don't care what other people say--if Dad Cubberley says I've done a good job, I'll consider myself a success."²⁸

Nonetheless it might be asked how many of Cubberley's prejudices so noticeable to modern observers might have escaped mention at the time. David Tyack has explained that many of Cubberley's opinions simply echoed the thought of most educators of his day, becoming invisible simply by being commonplace. Also they appeared to be supported by scientific evidence and research, a research that by virtue of its claims to objectivity seemed to escape the subjective pitfalls of moral and philosophical debate. In this context, it is important to note that Cubberley never considered himself a philosopher, nor was he much interested in the social issues which

dominated the thought of other progressives. Indeed in the hundred books which he edited for his series on education, not one book was on a philosophical topic. As late as 1933, Cubberley did not include John Dewey in his list on the twenty most influential men in the evolution of education as a field.²⁹ Conversely, he found great merit in the work of such people as Lewis Terman whose work on intelligence testing promised to make scientific the inevitable sorting process of the schools, and in the work of Franklin Bobbitt, whose work in categorizing efficient instructional practices promised to make more scientific the work of the average school teacher.

Like many progressive educational leaders, Cubberley believed that the public school represented the chief lever of social progress. For this reason alone, the conception of education as a science and educators as pedagogical experts seemed particularly appealing. This led Cubberley to regard efficiency and competency as the primary considerations when constructing a school system. For many progressives, the language of science implied that facts were distinct from values and that managers and social engineers could realize their main interests of increasing effectiveness and productivity without necessarily dealing with such social and moral matters as the morale and character of their employees. Neither in his writings on school administration nor in his position as education department chairman, did Cubberley ever seem to adopt such a detached and uncaring position toward subordinates. Nonetheless, educational problems were regarded as matters of administrative strategy and logistics rather than delimmias which called for reflection about the moral ends of schooling. He viewed school structure

hierarchically, and cautioned young superintendents to act prudently lest they get too involved personally with the female teachers who would doubtless be under their care.³⁰ The distance between superintendents and teachers was created by the differences in their technical skills and abilities and was to be maintained in a properly functioning district by the well differentiated and articulated duties of bureaucratic office.

By far, Cubberley's most theoretical and philosophical work appeared in 1913 under the title, The Changing Character of Education. In this he set forth those ideas which he was to follow the rest of his career. Cubberley believed that the custodial duties of the state were likely to increase as the need for more standardization and control became more apparent. "Each year," he wrote, "the child is coming to belong more and more to the state and less and less to the parent."³¹ This observation reflected Cubberley's belief in the powers of efficient managers as well as an implicit distrust in the abilities of the common person to govern. Cubberley expressed no dismay in the fact that while America was founded on the idea of equality, class divisions were unavoidable and necessary.³² This was only in keeping with the natural differences in ability to be found in individuals, differences which were reflected in both the practice and structure of the schools. "One bright child may easily be worth more to the national life than thousands of those of low mentality," Cubberley explained.³³ It was precisely such differences in intellectual ability which for Cubberley and many other progressives appeared to make expert rule both necessary and admirable.

The Emerging Critique

Cubberley's belief in an intellectual elite can be understood as a doctrine of government. Belief in the expert answers the question of who should rule by pointing to the advantages of technical competence and formalized training. The expert who has benefited from these advantages seems like the reasonable choice for leadership, especially if the matter under consideration is technically complicated. This view, so fundamental to the view of school administrative held by Cubberley and others, later found explicit political expression in the technocratic movement led by Thorstein Veblen and Harold Scott. Conceived in the twenties and gaining some prominence and notriety in the thirties, the movement was based on what William E. Akins has called the "engineering myth."³⁴ The myth was no more than the belief in the expert as social engineer. It was conceived out of the idea that the same principles of engineering which had achieved success in the industrial world could also be used to mangage social affairs. The myth had special appeal to progressives who believed that, freed from tradition, modern man could begin to consciously shape the social environment according to disinterested and rational principles. The myth also honored the increased complexity of affairs and the administrative expertise needed to manage the ever-growing bureaucracies of the twentieth century. The technocratic belief in the rule by experts inevitably ran afoul of more democratic concepts of government. Yet it was able to gain credibility by tying the American faith in the powers of technology to the utopian dream of widespread abundance and leisure.

Many progressives shared this dream, and yet attachment to the concept of expert rule was by no means uniform and unproblematic. While most educational reformers called for a new type of teacher training and for a new type of educator, they differed considerably over just what this new educator might look like. This debate rarely revolved around any specific discussion of the plus or minuses of expertise. More common was a concern over the particular technical and moral capabilities required of the teacher and whether matters of character or matters of technical competency were more important in determining the able practitioner. From very early in the history of the profession, this type of debate had raged with the combatants usually finding some common ground in the belief that the modern teacher needed to command more public respect and authority. Yet this summit of mutual concern was reached in the progressive era by very different routes. The progressive who was allied more forthrightly to the idea of education as science could allow that teachers also needed to be upright and moral citizens. The progressive who believed in education as an artistic or moral occupation could allow that teachers still needed to receive the very best in technical training.

Differences became more difficult to resolve when progressives began to look more closely at the responsibilities the educator might have to the broader social order. Here the hierarchical school structure recommended by Cubberley, Strayer, and Judd was found by some to have dubious relevance for the democratic needs of the emerging pluralistic society. The question arose of how school systems might serve as models for institutions which

allowed for more public participation. This concern was made manifest in the view of the teacher. The emphasis on the teacher as an efficient employee and an able technician in the classroom did not necessarily lead to the idea that a teacher's expertise made her politically and socially a more responsible professional. Researchers like Franklin Bobbitt and W.W. Charters believed in true Taylorian fashion that they could identify those distinct teacher practices that marked the labor of an able teacher. They also believed that those practices were universally applicable and therefore could be inculcated in all teachers as part of a more scientific teacher education program. Yet this very view imposed on teachers a more standardized conception of proper instructional technique and tied them more dependently to the teacher educators who now had true scientific knowledge of what worked in the classroom.³⁵

In a similar fashion, the idea of the teacher as expert specialist with particular pedagogical knowledge and training did not always lead to the view that the teacher should have more responsibility for making educationally-relevant decisions in the bureaucracy of the school. As we have seen in Cubberley's view of school administration, effectiveness was best managed by a structure in which people had distinct jobs with distinct responsibilities and duties. Curriculum decisions were put in the hands of the school administrator rather than the person who was to implement those decisions. The model here was drawn from business. The administrator was the manager and the teacher was the employee. The chain of command was from the top down, and it was apparent in the view of the pioneers of

school administration that administrators enjoyed their position of dominance on account of their superior intellectual grasp of curricular issues. In the most drastic implication of this conception, teachers had to do little thinking themselves, they just had to employ the standardized techniques which researchers had found effective and which principals now appropriately demanded.

Some thinkers looking across the social landscape of technological development were disturbed by such a conception and considered the emergence of the specialist and dominance of science with a more critical eye. Most notably, both William James and John Dewey found the conception of education as science wanting. Their reluctance to endorse totally a scientifically-managed conception of education could not be easily dismissed because both men had played a huge role in the progressive effort to break free from the formalistic thinking which had dominated ideas about school instruction at the turn of the century. Both men also emphasized what was a central tenet of progressivism--that men and women could rationally and reasonably act upon the world to change things for the better. Nonetheless, James, who was a teacher of Thorndike and who had established the first psychological laboratory in the United States, believed that psychology could never offer anything in the way of predictive certainty and that teachers would need to rely on their own best instincts and intuitions to practice effectively. Teaching, according to James, was an art rather than a science and, though he looked forward to the day when "genuises" and "superior men and women" worked for the schools, he also allowed that "to know

psychology...is absolutely no guarantee that we shall be good teachers."³⁶

Similarly Dewey wrote that if he had to choose between considering education as a science or as an art, he would have to choose the latter.³⁷ Yet in typical fashion he saw no necessary conflict between the two and sought to see where they merged. Dewey conceived of science not as a decided body of facts, knowledge, and skills to be imposed uniformly on all teachers but as a habit of mind and as a way to interact intelligently with a changing educational environment. In this way, Dewey's idea of an educational science emphasized the original and unique contributions of the practicing teacher and had nothing of the passivity associated with rule from above. Dewey cautioned that if science was prized only for its prestige value, rather than as a means of interacting intelligently with the world, then it would be destructive to the practice of teaching itself.³⁸

Dewey's emphasis on the democratic nature of science as a mode of inquiry rather than as a means of dogmatically solving human problems directly confronted a fundamental difficulty of expert rule. Expert rule could conceivably work to divide the world into two groups--those with knowledge to serve and those in the need of service. The docility of the latter was of special concern to those who cherished a more active and empowered citizenry. It was precisely this docility which some begin to see as the mark of an implicit contradiction in expert relations. Science and technology were seen as the most powerful expressions of human freedom and activity, and yet expert service hinted at a passivity in the person being served. On the one hand if educators could become pedagogical experts they might better

serve their students. On the other hand if expertise ruled the people being governed might take a less active role in educational affairs.

George S. Counts, Social Critic

The social reconstructionists were a group of educators who took such questions to heart. Their number included Harold Rugg, Jesse Newlon, Goodwin Watson, John L. Childs, William H. Kilpatrick, and Boyd Bode.³⁹ Vitally concerned with the role of education in the formation of a new society, these educators shared with the educational administrators the belief that schools needed to be revamped to meet the needs of a more complex, industrialized society. They differed, however, in the depth of their social concern over the economic inequalities which the industrial order had made apparent. They also differed by their heightened sensitivity to the moral and political issues raised in determining educational policy. The educators who tended to narrow their concerns to the operation of school systems or classrooms had less patience with abstract moral and theoretical concerns and came to view the idea of an elite class of educational experts more favorably. This seemed like an unavoidable occupational duty made more critical by the tremendous pressures put on constructing the institution of the school in the early twentieth century. Yet it also resulted in a view where the school was substantially cut off from the larger social and political context and the moral and cultural questions which might underlie it. It was just these connections which the social reconstructionists, in their aim to use the school as an agent of social change, wanted to emphasize.

Leading the social reconstructionists was George S. Counts. In contrast to Ellwood P. Cubberley, George S. Counts made his mark as a thinker and as an educator by his interest in social causes. He is best known now for his famous essay, "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?", but he was also considered the father of comparative education, was active in the political arena, and was an early president of the American Federation of Teachers. Like Cubberley, he had a long career, but unlike Cubberley it was a career which seemed more determined by the momentum of political events than a concern over the administrative details of managing a modern school system. It is important to note in this context that Count's career was greatly affected by the Great Depression and the glaring inequalities which became more significant as the result of it.

From the beginning, Counts had an interest in sociology and cultural studies. He entered the graduate school at the University of Chicago in 1913 after work as a high school teacher of mathematics and as a high school principal. Counts' wish to study sociology at Chicago was affected by Charles Judd, who convinced him to stay in education and investigate social issues through the study of pedagogy. Judd, like Cubberley, was one of the central figures in the creation of education as a professional field based on quantitative and scientific principles. Judd's major field was psychology, and he had been director of psychological laboratory at Yale before being made director of the School of Education at Chicago in 1909. His appointment to the post was indicative of the national move to make education more scientific.

As Judd's student, Counts was introduced to the empirical procedures which used survey and quantification techniques. Later he was to adopt a style of analysis which was more historical and cultural. While Counts' first publications retained some of the empirical flavor of his earlier training, his later writings tried to capture complicated matters within a broader, more general sweep. This became a constant concern of many who worked with Counts, because the nuance and detail of meaning captured in close historical analysis became lost in the oversimplification of his panoramic view. Charles A. Beard, a long-time friend and associate of Counts, warned him in particular to separate history from social philosophy, to make a distinction "between facts empirically established and aspirations deliberately chosen."⁴⁰

For Counts this was not easy to do. He was very enamored by the type of critical analysis which sought to examine the immense social changes of the modern age. This drew him to such historians as H. G. Wells and to such classic social commentators as Alexis DeTocqueville. Concerned with the movement of pastoral and rural America into the industrial age, Counts was convinced that the new age required more centralized and well-managed institutional structures which, nonetheless, still had to serve democratic purposes. He was particularly sensitive to the close connection of educational structures to the cultural values of the surrounding community. "The historical record," Counts wrote, "shows that education is always a function of time, place, and circumstance... it inevitably reflects... the experiences, the condition, and the hopes and fears, and aspirations of a particular people

or cultural group at a particular point in history."⁴¹ He believed that the structure of education was a matter of choice, and consequently it remained within the power of a people to shape the institution which would in turn shape "with overwhelming power the character and destiny of a people."

This firm conviction placed Counts directly within the mainstream of progressive educational thought. After he left Chicago in 1916, he served in schools of education at five different colleges before beginning his long career at Teachers College, Columbia in 1927. There Counts joined a stellar faculty which included Paul Monroe, George Strayer, I. L. Kandel, Edward Reisner, Harold Rugg, William Heard Kilpatrick, and Edward Thorndike. He was soon to be involved in the study of Russian schooling and society that apparently did much to reemphasize his belief that institutions must be consciously formed to serve democratic values and purposes.

From early in his career Counts was a critic of schools which served simply to benefit the affluent and socially powerful. In a series of publications in the twenties, he used some of the quantitative techniques he had learned at Chicago to detail the selective character of American high schools, the undemocratic character of secondary curriculums, and the dominant class character of boards of education.⁴² In each of these critiques, Count indicated a dissatisfaction with the view that education could simply be considered scientifically and objectively as if political and moral decisions did not constitute a most fundamental part of school decisions. In his classic study, The Social Composition of Boards of Education, he particularly noted that the conception of administration formed by Cubberley

and others had lost sight of more fundamental purposes by so emphasizing productivity and efficiency.⁴³ Count was sensitive to findings which indicated that people who composed school boards did not represent the working class and thus threatened to impose upon the public a particular view of the purposes and direction of education. He argued that the public could not trust its destiny to a particular sectarian view since "the whole of wisdom resides in no single class or group."⁴⁴

The reference to wisdom indicated in Counts' view that the knowledge needed to run the schools was not to be found in simple technical competence. He frequently noted the conservative nature of school systems which served the economic and social interests of the powerful while failing to take into account the complexities of an increasingly diverse and pluralistic society. This indicated that teachers as well as the wider public needed to take a more active role in shaping the policy of the modern school. While the complex school systems of the twentieth century relied on administrative expertise, superintendents also needed to make full use of the talents, knowledge, and abilities of the teaching staff. "The first purpose of any policy of school administration," Counts was to later note, "should be the growth of the teacher in courage, power, and refinement."⁴⁵

This belief in the creative powers of teachers and their place in the control and function of the school directly conflicted with the top down approach of many leaders in school administration. Counts argued that "teaching has become largely a matter of following instructions received from some official not immediately responsible for the work with children." He

advocated a new kind of teacher training institution which would emphasize liberal studies, where the "most profound questions of national policy" would be debated, and where "attention devoted to purely technical preparation would assume extremely modest proportions." Count never applied himself to the details of how to improve classroom practice nor to the details of how a school might involve teachers more directly in matters of policy. Rather he contented himself with the thought that if teachers were given the right type of training, "they would in all probability demand proper conditions of work."⁴⁶

It is difficult to say how much Counts' view of the purposes of schooling and the cultural duties of teaching were swayed by his rigorous examination of the Russian society and its system of education. No doubt, like Dewey and other progressives, he was much taken by the idea of engineering a new social order. The Russian revolution seemed to offer a great opportunity for studying such an effort. For years he was the foremost authority on Russian culture having achieved his expertise most notably through a long tour of the Soviet mainland in a Model A Ford he had shipped to Leningrad expressly for that purpose. He later joked that upon arriving at Teachers College he wished to become involved in international education, but the world had already been divided among other scholars, leaving him no choice but to study the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Counts applied himself assiduously, soon mastering the Russian language and availing himself of everything in print about Russian culture and history. Later friends and associates remember him spending time every day pouring over the copy of

Pravda, the Soviet newspaper he received from Moscow.⁴⁷

Certainly Counts had socialistic leanings. Unlike Cubberley, he felt that any class-based society was a travesty of human potential and freedom. He believed that the economic system of the modern industrial world needed to be reoriented away from capitalism to a more collectivist organization. The choice, Counts felt, was not between capitalism and collectivism, but between a collectivism which might honor traditional American beliefs in freedom and equality and a collectivism which might end in slavery and totalitarianism. The tremendous power of technology not only made some type of integrative economy mandatory, but also mandated that schools, and teachers in particular, be forthright and intentional in teaching democratic values and attitudes.⁴⁸

Count argued exuberantly through the thirties for his particular view of social organization. In some ways he was as dogmatic about asserting the need for a more planned and administrative order as Cubberley was for creating a special breed of educational administrators. In this regard, both men were products of their time and the widespread belief in the powers of the human spirit to shape a more harmonious social order. The intentionality of Counts' reconstructionist views as much as their collectivist orientation became a lasting legacy of his career. If he had a broader, more generous understanding of the active role of teachers and the wider public in shaping educational policy, he also argued bluntly that the schools should be indoctrinators of a particular set of values and beliefs.⁴⁹

Here some of the intricate problems which specialization and expertise present for a democratic society can be found in the spirit and thought of a single educational thinker. While arguing at many points in his career that the educational system had come under the unilateral and single-minded control of business and commercial interests which might subject the young to subtle forms of propaganda and indoctrination, Counts had little trouble advocating indoctrination of his own sort. He criticized teachers for being so socially unconcerned and progressives for being so afraid of "the bogies of imposition and indoctrination."⁵⁰ Pointing out that many progressives who resisted the manipulative implications of imposition were nonetheless intent on inculcating "democratic sentiments," Counts advocated that educators should be more deliberate and specific about the values they wanted to impose upon the young. He regarded as foolish the sacred progressive notions of a child-centered school, of a school substantially cut off from the pressures and responsibilities of the adult world, and of a conception of education which was passive, value neutral, and fundamentally unconcerned with the direction it should take in guiding the developing child.⁵¹

Throughout his career, Counts was the center of controversy and conflict. Typically, he discussed the problems of educational responsibility in the most direct and charged terms, in this case employing the word "indoctrination," when other terms might have been less inflammatory and when in many other writings he had used the word perjoratively to suggest the unjustified suppression of human choice and potential. Still, especially in the thirties, he did not wish to shy away from the real moral and political

issues when he saw the world at such a crisis point and when he felt the alternatives were catastrophic. It is reasonable to suggest that Counts was moved by his experience in Russia in this matter, since there he saw the fascinating spectacle of a people embarking on intentional plans to change an entire social structure. By 1932 when he wrote "Dare the School Build a New Social Order?," Counts knew of the dark, suppressive side of such efforts. Yet he, like so many progressives, felt that if the direction of the Russian experiment had become perverted, the idea of consciously planning for a more just and classless state was not. In this way the responsibilities would always fall to an enlightened few who were to be the representatives of the people in constructing and ruling the new order. His thinking followed the same line as Cubberley in suggesting the rationale for dependence on a specialized expertise--the problems of social affairs had become immense and required the direct supervision and management by the expert.

Counts' criticism of progressivism embroiled him in bitter controversy within the movement. Some educators like Harold Rugg and Jesse Newlon agreed substantially with his reconstructionist views and with the responsibilities of educators in involving themselves with social change.⁵² Others like Franklin Bobbitt, Henry W. Holmes, and even Counts' teacher, Charles Judd, focused on the lack of specificity in his writings.⁵³ They complained quite accurately that Counts provided no detail in describing a teacher's role in matters of politics and school policy, in describing the real administrative nature of democratic collectivism, and, perhaps most critically, in describing the appropriate methodology to be employed in the

classroom. These thinkers and others, who championed children's rights, were uncomfortable with the advocacy of willful indoctrination and with the attack on value neutrality. Their plea for individualism and for a more scientific education merged at this point in promoting a school system which was basically secular, impartial, and morally neutral.

Counts wished to show not only the hypocrisy of such thinking by pointing out that a non-impositional school was impossible, but also the foolishness of such thinking by indicating the likely social consequences of a society which failed to inculcate right sentiments in the young. His sensitivity to the plight of those whom the school system did not serve--minorities, women, and the poor--as well as his developing understanding of the threat of outside imperialists powers, such as the Soviet Union and Germany, only made the matter more crucial.⁵⁴ Counts shared with progressives the view that the responsibility for education was increasingly falling on the institution of the schools and falling within the special jurisdiction of the professionals who served it. Yet he differed from them in the belief that the schools were the only or even the primary educational agency in society.

The irony in this debate is that the critics of Counts views on imposition were working in the name of science to promote the schools as the exclusive educational institution, and in this way to promote the rule of the expert in educational matters. Here the concept of the child-centered school, the school cut off from political and social events, and the school run according scientific principles all acted as a type of cloak to the real movement to make

education a more restricted enterprise run by professionals who knew best. In the case of Cubberley and Judd and other educational administrators, the experts knew best how to manage the school system. In the case of Bobbitt and Charters and other educational researchers, the experts knew which methodologies worked best in the classroom. Finally in the case of those advocating the child-centered school, the teachers knew best the special and sacred nature of the child and ironically how much the forced imposition of adult beliefs might injure the child's development. In any case the responsibilities of the professional educator were justified by the appeal to science and value neutrality. The authority of the professional expert was based on objective knowledge which was not widely shared and was free from the subjective imposition of personal values.

Still Counts failed to provide details of what the concepts of imposition, democratic collectivism, and empowered teachers actually meant. Without those details, it was possible that the imposition of democratic values might be as oppressive as the imposition of those less noble. In his later writings Counts, ever sensitive to the winds of political change, became less concerned with questions of economic equality and more concerned with civil rights and the protection of democratic processes. In some ways this represented a turn to the right as Counts warned repeatedly about the Soviet menace to American interests. A great irony of Counts' career was that he was repeatedly labeled a fellow-traveler and yet in his years as president of the American Federation of Teachers, he led the effort to rid the union of communists. This change in political orientation, if it was a real change,

adds to the failure of describing the precise political processes which might provide for a more democratic and representative school system and thus provide some break to expert power. In Counts' career, the plurality of different political voices extended not only to different social groups but to the changes a person might undergo in a lifetime of service. This suggested the need to describe in more detail those institutional structures which might allow the different voices to be heard.

Conclusion

Counts was fond of describing professional educators not as politicians but as statesmen. In this way he wished to advocate a notion of professionalism which had a fundamental regard for the input of others and which went beyond self-interest to serve the democratic mission of the schools. Counts was not afraid of the advent of specialists and a more scientific and systematic expertise. He wrote that only "through the services of the expert can a democracy make full use of the advance of relevant knowledge and thus introduce into its operations the highest possible degree of rationality and sanity."⁵⁵ Yet it was unclear what institutional and social organizations might provide a structure to insure that expertise and the rule by the expert would fall within its appropriate bounds.

The call for educational statesmen honored the side of the progressive movement which appealed to both Cubberley and Counts. The movement into the industrial age required a more systematic means of education run by competent professionals. The rule of science and technology seemed to

promise the means for creating a more efficient and harmonious order. Yet hard questions were also raised. Could schools also insure a concept of profession and provide an institutional structure sensitive to the social needs of the community? Counts was critical of Cubberley's answer to that question, because it provided an hierarchical view of educational administration which seemed to disenfranchise different political groups and which seemed to relegate teachers to positions of subservience. In this way, Count's critique might be seen as an argument against the excesses of a presumably objective expertise which is cut off from larger questions of political and social purpose and which suggests docility in the people it is meant to serve.

Yet Counts did not provide an alternative system. The structure of the present school system with all its fault is due to the administrators who concentrated so intently on the logistical matters necessary to insure its construction. Subsequent laments on the conservative nature of that school system as provided immediately by Counts and other progressives and later by such critics as Raymond Callahan, needed also to reflect on the tremendous pressures put on the school system in the twentieth century to educate all students for life in the modern age. As even a quick perusal of Callahan's The Cult of Efficiency reveals, the modern school was formed under constant pressure and criticism.⁵⁶ The progressive belief in the ability of science to reconstruct a new social order was borne not only out of a wondrous faith in the miracles of technology, but also out of the dynamic of an age which presented enormously difficult problems and demanded

answers. Both Counts and Cubberley believed in this way what Eliot Friedson later described as the model of expert relations. Here the problem/answer approach to social affairs is reflected in the personal interaction of a client with a professional. The client becomes besieged by problems which appear beyond personal means and which require the help of an expert for solution.⁵⁷

If such a description appeared reasonable in such technical matters as engineering and even in a technical view of medical care, it did not always appear appropriate in matters of education. Counts' contribution to the debate over the structure and policy of the schools was to point out that educational policy was a moral and social matter. It was left to the decisions of a privileged class only at the peril of the wider public who had legitimate interests in the school and thus legitimate interest in how society might be shaped. Still the point was not to rid the school system of those uniquely talented and educated individuals who served it, but to provide for an understanding of an educational profession which might honor an educator's special knowledge while at the same time allowing for public input and interaction. It is to the understanding of a teacher as a professional that we now turn.

CHAPTER NOTES

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CHAPTER III

MORAL AUTHORITY AND TECHNICAL COMPETENCE: THE TEACHER AS PROFESSIONAL

When Ralph Hartshook applied to be schoolmaster of Flat Creek, Indiana, he found that there had been no other applicants. The job was his, but on second thought he wasn't sure that he wanted it. He felt that he had landed in a "den of wild beasts," full of ignorant parents and muscular youths who he would no doubt have to fight and "lick" if he was to win respect. The last schoolmaster had been beaten by Bud Means, a brawny pupil whose father, since he paid the most taxes, was allowed to run the school as he saw fit. It was he who had conducted the job interview and gauged the merit of Ralph Hartshook's skills.

Want to be a school-master, do you? Well, what would *you* do in Flat Crick deestrick, I'd like to know....you see, we a'n't none of your saft sort in these diggin's. It takes a *man* to boss this deestrick. Howsumdever, ef you think you kin trust your hide in Flat Crick school-house I han'n't got no 'bjection. But ef you git licked, don't come on us. Flat Crick don't pay no 'nsurance, you bet.¹

The main character in this novel by Edward Eggleston seems a long way from the educational statesmen recommended by George Counts or from the subservient though efficient and well-trained pedagogues described by Ellwood Cubberley. Yet the description in many ways captures some of the persistent dilemmas of the teacher. Underpaid and ill-trained, devoid of the

public respect normally afforded other professionals, the teacher plies his trade in environments that seem as hostile and as unwelcoming as the students whom he is supposed to teach. Discipline, administrative chores, or merely surviving the day appear to be the goals of many teachers.²

Eggleston's early description of a nineteenth century teacher surviving by wit and pluck in the backwoods of Indiana has been followed by a mountain of literature, both creative and scholarly, seeking to describe just what a teacher does.³ Explicit in the literature are the questions which have traditionally impinged upon the teaching occupation. Just what are the skills that a teacher needs? What is the proper training for a teacher? How can you tell the good teacher from the incompetent? How does the culture of a school affect a teacher's performance? Finally, can the teacher be considered a true professional?

It is this last question which most impinges upon the social and epistemological consequences of expertise for the everyday teacher. For if the ideological differences between Cubberley and Counts ultimately revolved around an educator's wider social responsibilities, the question of professionalism ultimately revolves around the quality of a teacher's status and relationships within the everyday environment of the school. Faced with the historical lack of respect given teachers, many argue now for a more elite and selective profession based on the arcane knowledge of the expert.⁴ Yet this involves a certain understanding of a teacher's practice as it is conducted in the morally-charged institution of the school. When set

against that institutional frame, the spectre of expertise raises the most disturbing difficulties.

Professionalism and Expertise

In the twentieth century the push towards the professionalism of teaching closely followed the push towards more expertise. Many educators followed the lead of medicine in attempts to define scientifically the specific knowledge which controlled the craft. As we have seen, Cubberley's attempt to professionalize the field of school administration was conceived in part upon the belief that science could provide that objective knowledge with which to run the schools. Teachers, likewise, could begin to point with pride to the new knowledge on which to base their practice. Advances in pedagogy following Pestalozzi and then Herbart gave teachers a more sound theoretical base for their instruction even while improvements in curricular materials and the creation of courses of study helped make teaching more systematic and uniform.⁵ Later, studies by W.W. Charters and Franklin Bobbitt sought to indicate the discrete elements of instruction which marked the behavior of the effective teacher.

In the movement to professionalize education, few innovations were met with more enthusiasm than the intelligence tests designed by Lewis Terman. Faced with the unenviable task of sorting vast numbers of new students into appropriate curricular tracks, educational administrators and teachers could point out that the task could now be done with scientific objectivity and

technical efficiency. Originally constructed to differentiate among army inductees during the First World War, the intelligence tests soon became the predominate strategy by which students might be differentiated in urban schools. By 1932, three fourths of 150 large cities used intelligence tests in the assignment of pupils.⁶ Terman exclaimed enthusiastically that the "importance of this new psychological tool for the improvement of school administration has been recognized everywhere with a promptness which is hardly less than amazing."⁷ His fervor was echoed by classroom teachers who found that they could more easily account for the achievement levels of students by assessing their intellectual differences. As one teacher commented, "Tests have thrown floods of light on problems that have hitherto baffled me. I have felt my way in darkness as to what should be done in many cases. Now I proceed with more light."⁸

The testing movement was not celebrated by everyone. George Counts and Charles Beard both thought the movement undemocratic and mean-spirited.⁹ In a series of forceful and widely-read articles, Walter Lippman castigated the idea claiming that it was stupid and contemptible to classify anyone as uneducable.¹⁰ John Dewey, while recognizing the merit of the tests as classificatory device, nonetheless argued that it had reprehensible social implications. Every person had potentials which a genuine democratic education might reveal, but which a misuse of tests might deny.¹¹ The potential misuse of intelligence tests became an issue for such groups as Chicago Federation of Labor whose members argued that "the

'alleged mental levels,' representing natural ability.... correspond in the most startling way to the social levels of the groups named. It is as though the relative social positions of each group are determined by an irresistible natural law."¹²

The latter objection now appears particularly insightful, given the historical research that has been done on how intelligence tests were used to explain racial differences and classify whole groups of people into inferior curricular tracks.¹³ Yet testing within the schools in some way mirrored the movement in society at large for a more differentiated social structure, one marked by differences in mental ability and subsequent differences in occupational status. Since psychologists had claimed to discover a high correlation between IQ scores and occupation in the intelligence testing done on Army recruits, it appeared reasonable to suggest that IQ separated the professionals from the working class.¹⁴ This reaffirmed the growing idea that the elite social and economic status afforded professionals was justified more by pure intellectual ability than by character and moral worth. Professionals were beginning to define themselves more by their expert knowledge than by their attitudes of service or self-abnegation. The amateur was distinct from the expert and the profession from the craft by the reliance on a systematic and theoretical brand of knowledge understandable only to an elect few.

This understanding of a profession was a long time developing. Burton Bledstein goes so far as to suggest that the attitudes and values guiding the

new occupational elites constituted a culture of professionalism.¹⁵ To become a professional meant that one could make a living from one's services by claiming exclusive jurisdiction over a special domain of knowledge.

Accountants, lawyers, police officers, social workers, engineers, and now educators asserted their understandings of a defined discipline which could not easily be obtained or comprehended by the unlicensed and untrained layperson. Tradition and common sense took a backseat. People, more free from the occupational choices of their forebearers, were also less likely to rely on traditional techniques and tactics in the practice of their new vocations. Where the craftsperson might advance knowledge by trial and error, the professional saw knowledge as a scholarly activity that allowed him to penetrate beyond the confusion of immediate experience. The professional seemed to possess a more imperial command over natural and social forces, demonstrating a mystifying ability to grasp and isolate the important variables in determining the solution to any problem. He could adopt an attitude of critical scrutiny and control toward the knowledge he had received and could determine in what direction such knowledge should lead.

This, in many ways, represented a distinct change in the way different professions had formally been viewed. The most prevalent and influential example lay not in education but in the field of medicine. In the nineteenth century the doctor's connection to the priest was just as close as his connection to the scientist.¹⁶ Doctors were expected to be gentlemen, and

their mode of dress and their behavior was ascribed out of a gentlemanly code based on chivalry, dignity, and proper decorum.¹⁷ Lacking many of the tools, medicines, and techniques we have now come to expect, the doctor relied upon the healing hand and the consoling touch as much as the effective palliative. Especially in the United States which has repeatedly demonstrated what Richard Hofstadter has called a "Jacksonian dislike for the overcultivated mind," doctors failed to adopt a strict monopoly over what counted as professional practice until well into the twentieth century. Before the germ theory established itself as a clearly superior basis for understanding health practice, conventional medicine competed with hydrotherapy, homeopathy, and even Christian Science for the public imagination. During the nineteenth century many licensing laws were repealed in order to give free movement to the many competing ideas of health care. As one state senator put the matter, "A people accustomed to governing themselves and boasting of their intelligence are impatient of restraint. They want no protection but freedom of inquiry and freedom of action."⁹ Commenting on the wisdom of such ideas, one historian of medicine commented, "Thus did the democratic American of the day declare his unalienable rights to life, liberty, and quackery."¹⁸

Such thinking soon changed. The fact that such words as "quack," "montebank," and "charlatan" now so invidiously describe incompetent medical practitioners testifies to the success of the medical community to assert a monopoly over health care. The distinctions play most tellingly on

what the doctor supposedly knows and how he is trained, rather than on the kind of personal and intimate relationship he might be able to establish with the patient.¹⁹ In the anonymous context of the hospital and under the care of specialists, the patient learned that ability which some have seen as a mark of expert relations--the ability to put faith in the stranger.²⁰ Of course, credentials and other symbols of competence were engaged to help build client confidence. The credential indicated that a certain standard of intellectual achievement had been attained as proved by completion of properly accredited training. In this way the growth of the schools, and particularly the growth of universities as places for professional training, have been an indispensable part of the professionalization process.²¹

It was only natural that teachers looking upon the success of the doctors would attempt to follow their lead. There were certain similarities. Like doctors, teachers, too, had a close connection to the ministry. And like doctors and other professionals who began to adopt their modern status in the nineteenth century, the teacher found a special place to practice. The beginnings were austere. The proverbial and primitive one-room school house hardly represented the dignified quarters of a working professional. Yet, it did more clearly indicate that education was a specialized practice, in some ways cut off from the community by the particular activities that were reserved for a specific location. The graded school which arose in the middle of the nineteenth century based on a German model further indicated teaching's differentiated status.²² Buildings now were constructed with

smaller rooms, and more teachers were required who had a more specific academic intent. Responsibilities became narrowly focused. Such focus became represented in the voluntary associations of teachers as they formed in the nineteenth century. The National Education Association, though its membership was unstable and its effect on school legislation appears to have been negligible, slowly began to reorganize and accomodate better the various interests of its members.²³ The association's newly formed departments in art education, elementary education, secondary education, music instruction, and kindergarten allowed teachers to serve their immediate needs while at the same time belonging to a larger national organization.

We have previously noted some of the work of educational administrators in the professionalization effort. They worked to centralize the common school, called for more standardized schooling practices and demanded tougher and more consistent certification requirements which even in the face of a persistent teacher shortage helped improve the quality of teaching training. By the 1920's the normal schools which had been the institution specifically charged with the training of teachers were clearly being replaced by four year colleges.²⁴ Educators worked diligently to systematize understandings of effective practice. Studies of teaching had come to so dominate educational thinking in the years between 1890-1930 that there is even reason to doubt that the work done by such thinkers as John Dewey, George Counts, and Boyde Bode considered actual research. In the Ten Years of Educational Research compiled by Walter Monroe and his

colleagues covering 1918-1927, 3,650 items are listed with not one work by Dewey mentioned and just one work about his ideas.²⁵ The great bulk of the work was done by administrative experts employing quantificative techniques. Raymond Callahan points out that it was just this type of accumulation of facts and figures which served to cloak the efforts of the progressive educators in the mantle of science, frame their claims to professionalism in the language of esoteric and specialized knowledge, and protect their efforts from the challenges of laypeople.²⁶

And yet few would argue that the occupation of teaching ever reached the status of the more prestigious professions. One reason has already been mentioned--the increasing feminization of teaching which occurred particularly in the years following the Civil War. Williard Elsbree has documented in his history, The American Teacher, the extent of this movement and some of the social and philosophical reasons which fueled it.²⁷ One reason rested on the persistent notion that the teacher more than any other professional needed to be a paradigm of moral virtue. This put the teacher squarely within the power of principals, superintendents, school boards, and the surrounding community, all of whom saw the teacher as the student's window to the world, a glass which needed to be kept spotlessly clean.

Administrators aided in this perception for several reasons. Most practically they favored women teachers because they could pay females less for their services.²⁸ This allowed for a more frugal educational budget at a

time when the schools were particularly beset by financial problems. Secondly, they believed that women, by their inherent moral faculties, actually made better teachers than men. They appeared to be better employees, because they seemed more docile, passive, and less likely to leave the professions for a higher paying job. These latter beliefs had the most muting effect on the public recognition of teaching as a profession and showed one irony in the early efforts of administrators to promote a hierarchical perception of schooling. If women teachers by their natural faculties were thought to be better teachers with easier access to the heart of the child, they were also thought to lack the intellect needed to make curricular decisions within the school. Matters of reason, logic, and objective judgement were thought to be male, while matters of sentiment, heart, and empathy were thought to be female. Expertise seemed a crucial element in professional life, but it also tended to be seen as a male quality in an occupation dominated by females.²⁹

Still a more complete explanation of the reasons why teachers have not risen to the level of full professionals needs to be given. It perhaps lies more deeply hidden within the dynamics of teaching, within the structure of the institution where it takes place, and within the character of the relationships which frame its practice. It is important to mention that current calls for a more professionalized occupation many times evoke once again the image of medicine. The famous Flexner report on medical practice in the United States is frequently cited. Published by the Carnegie

Commission for the Advancement of Teaching in 1911, this report documented the research by Alexander Flexner and began a process of professional control and standardization that did much to promote doctors to their present state of prominence.³⁰ References to this process further hold out hope for teachers to follow the same path toward prestige and economic reward. Yet Flexner himself later wrote another report, this time on education, which called into question the possibility of it ever reaching the scholarly levels needed to support a full and distinct profession.³¹ This represents in many ways the ambiguity of teaching's status and indicates that all claims to professionalism might be rhetorical unless they are based on a firmer understanding of what goes on in the lives of teachers as they attempt to practice their craft. Many researchers have now turned to further examination of classroom practice in the institution of the school, yet the two researchers most frequently cited remain Willard Waller and Daniel Lortie. An examination of their studies reveals many of the troubling issues surrounding the concept of teacher as expert professional.

Willard Waller: The Teacher as Human Being

One of the ironies of school teaching is its anonymous character. While teachers are public servants who have remained persistently in the public eye, the actual character of their work, the conditions under which it takes place, and the effects those conditions have on the personality of the teacher have remained relatively hidden. The public, historically interested in the

character of the teacher as an ideal moral type, has had less interest in the character of the teacher as a human being. Teachers sensitive to the criticisms of reformers and irritated by the public's tendency to view school teaching as part-time work, frequently rebut that the critic has little idea about what it is like to teach in the schools. The schools themselves, with their cellular architecture and institutional distance from adult activity, may have added to this ignorance. TheodoreSizer has remarked that teachers practice the one profession in which there is no easy access to a phone. The point seems trivial until one considers the hardships involved in making one's living amongst adolescents with little collegial contact among other teachers or with little contact with adults in the outside world.

Remarkably, until Willard Waller published his Sociology of Teaching in 1932, there had been no major studies of the teaching profession.³² Waller, himself a secondary French and Latin teacher for six years and by all accounts an exciting and dynamic college teacher, seemed the perfect person to begin the task. His father had been a superintendent of schools in several midwestern districts. There the many fights with the local school boards had sensitized the son to the tenuous and turbulent life of a professional educator. The father had also invested in his son a keen sense of industry and a deep commitment to strong moral positions. Waller's idealism, his enthusiastic interest in the human lives of the people he studied, and his dramatic flair for the humorous if slightly cynical comment make it difficult to read his studies without wanting to know more about the man who wrote

them.³³

This inclination appears fitting. Waller's scholarly manner was always to write out of personal insight and observation. Yet his research was by no means lacking in rigor. He spent huge amounts of time gathering observations, reading widely, and encouraging students to write natural histories of contemporary life, some of which eventually found their way into his works. Later in his career Waller was to be involved in controversies over the increasing statistical character of sociology, and he was to be refused appointment to the graduate faculty at Columbia University, presumably because he was thought to be uninterested in quantification.

In part this was true. From early in his career Waller had abandoned the statistical procedures of his teacher, Stuart Rice, to adopt a more qualitative approach. Waller seemed to be less dogmatic about the issue of methodology than many of his colleagues. He argued that science had its place but that the belief that science alone led to perception was as fallacious as the unthinking allegiance to the more artistic and intuitive approach he favored. Of central importance in both methodologies was not merely the gathering of data, but one's involvement and consideration of it. He wrote that

The essence of scientific method, quite simply, is to try to see how data arrange themselves into causal configurations. Scientific problems are solved by collecting data and by 'thinking about them all the time.' We need to look at strange things until, by the appearance of known configurations, they seem familiar, and to

look at familiar things until we see novel configurations which make them appear strange.³⁴

In this way the emphasis fell less on the means by which data was gathered than the ideas which the data might be able to generate. Insight rather than quantification, he argued, was the touchstone of the scientific method.

These disputes are important to note because it places Waller within the context of a narrowing group of sociologists who were dubious about the merits of science in defining the legitimate scholarly activity of their profession. It also reflected not just upon the method behind Waller's observations, but upon their purpose and substance. From the beginning, Waller's interests lay with examining the teacher as a whole person caught up in the complex maze of social interactions which make up the school. He pictured the teacher as someone who had to come to terms with what Robert Merton later called a "role set." The expectations built around this role helped create the teacher and imposed upon her a certain sense of responsibility towards duty, even helped prescribe a certain stereotypical type of behavior. Waller was not deterministic in this regard, nor was he a structuralist who focused resolutely on the strength of the institution and on the functions it promoted. He saw the relationship between the conforming forces of the institution and the creative forces of the individual working both ways. Still he was always most interested in the adaptation a teacher had to make to the peculiar social situation of the school. School represented a complex culture, bound as it was by the pressures of the community, the expectations of the parents, and the responses of the students. The "social

insight" into this culture separated the experienced teacher from the inexperienced, and created the differences in wisdom between the two. This was not so much a matter of technical expertise as development of personality and character. "If a teacher is to grow," Waller wrote, "it must be in as much social grace as in professional skill."³⁵

Unfortunately such growth was not always positive and liberating. A consistent theme in Waller's analysis is the rigid moral influence of the community on the creative life of the teacher. Some of this writing appears dated given the more anonymous and less restrictive environments in which many teachers work today. Much of the research Waller did on the school was completed in rural midwestern towns where a muscular righteousness might have been more likely to assert its strength. He describes teaching less as an occupation than a status and a position which "places one neatly in the world."³⁶ Teachers were expected to be paragons of virtue, exhibiting by their lack of vices that character which they were meant to model for their pupils. Teachers found themselves in tenuous and ambiguous positions, both because they had to continually monitor their own behavior and because the effect of their efforts on others both in the classroom and without was so difficult to gauge. Rarely was it perfectly clear to the public whether a teacher had succeeded or failed in his work. Yet neither could it be clear to the teacher what effect he had on the surrounding community since all spontaneous behavior appeared to cease once the teacher entered the scene. "A teacher," Waller notes, "could not know what others were like because

they were not like that when the teacher was watching them."³⁷ The effect of such uncertainty was to throw the teacher back on herself in a kind of ambiguous and isolated situation made worse by the fact that teachers at the time had little power by which to fight an arbitrary and unfair dismissal.³⁸

Of course, such situations were full of ironies and inconsistencies and small though cumulative miseries. These never seemed to escape Waller's penetrating gaze. In a delightful turn of phrase, Waller described the schools as "museums of virtue," since it was in them that teachers were to inculcate those "nearly out of print ideals" which the "majority of adults more or less frankly disavow themselves, but want others to practice."³⁹ The school was both isolated and given an impossible mission: that of preparing the child for the real and imperfect world and at the same time protecting the child from it. Teachers themselves were judged by their intellectual facility, but were destined to teach always one step below the level they found most intriguing and stimulating.⁴⁰ Finally, married teachers were preferred, but mores were so restrictive that there were indications that it was "not exactly good form" to go about the courtship needed to get married. The restrictive situation was worse for women teachers who Waller described as our "vestal virgins."⁴¹

The dilemmas of the teacher did not cease once the classroom door was closed. "Teaching makes the teacher," Waller noted. "Teaching is a boomerang that never fails to come back to the hand that threw it."⁴² Occupational roles attract certain types of people, but just as importantly,

occupations tend to shape the person practicing them. Waller was cognizant of the continual pressures concentrated on the teacher in his daily interactions with students. Dignity and a certain social distance had to be maintained, control and discipline had to be enforced, and teaching had to be accomplished within the particular bounds set by the interests and abilities of students. Living within a universe of adolescents, teachers had to speak with deadly seriousness of examinations, grades, credits, promotions, demerits, scolding, school rituals, and making good.⁴³ In short, teachers had to cultivate the ability to speak with children about childish things, while at the same time keeping the position of adult who in all cases still had to carry an adult message into children's lives. Waller was particularly sensitive to the toll such a struggle might take on the creative and intellectual capacities of the teacher, especially since the easiest and least bothersome means of practicing the craft was simply to fall into the habits and ruts already provided by the institution of the school.

Waller was never too sanguine on the possibility of teaching attracting the finest minds. The public standing of teaching, the low pay, and the lack of opportunity for advancement all seemed to mediate against such an eventuality. Some evidence showed that the students entering teaching were not as academically gifted, and Waller cited his own observations of students gaining certification only as an "insurance policy" against the failure to find more satisfying work. Nonetheless, Waller wondered if merely raising the salary of teachers would be the real answer for attracting better people. He

questioned whether we had in fact "over-rationalized" our ideas of occupational choice and whether the reasons people entered the field were more intuitive or simply more connected with the desire to escape from "soil" and trials of the world into the safe confines of the school.⁴⁴ Besides, he saw the effect of the culture of the school as far more important in determining excellent practice. Waller's portraits of school life conveyed the moral complexity of the institution and the strong and complex character needed to manage it.

In all of his many vignettes of classroom life, most of which came from interviews conducted by Waller or his students, the focus rests squarely on the teacher as a human being. The fact that schools were run with a monotonous regularity, that communities tended to see teachers in stereotypical ways, or that teachers themselves found it necessary to adopt certain poses as a means of interacting more effectively with students--all tended to deny the teacher as a full human character complete with adult needs, including the need to grow spiritually and intellectually. Waller was aware of the many suggestions existing even at the time that the occupation needed to become more professionalized, needed to adopt tougher standards for entering the craft, and needed to increase the amount of schooling required of the beginning teacher. He was not resolutely opposed to such ideas, but he doubted whether such efforts might necessarily lead to an increase in the social standing of the teacher. The teacher lacked prestige, he felt, because the community failed to see them as ordinary people, a fault

partly caused by a narrow social and intellectual training that tended to isolate them from the rest of the community and perhaps to destroy some of their essential qualities as human beings.⁴⁵ He proposed another solution. "Perhaps what will do the teacher the most good," he wrote, "will be for him to have an opportunity to take leave of his profession, both during his training and after he has begun to practice his trade, and to mingle with his fellow men as an equal."⁴⁶

This proposal, so opposed to the considered opinion of the time, was typical of Waller's thinking and typical of the enthralling nature of his personality. He was known in his classes for considering the opposite course, for attempting to see things in a contrary way if for no other purpose than to break free of the restrictive modes of conventional thought. Students at times felt this to be a device for freeing them up and for pushing them to overcome their quiet exteriors as they became more critical and analytical thinkers. Yet it was no mere pedagogical strategy. Waller shared with his contemporary and idol, Thorstein Veblen, a disconcerting capacity to see beneath the surface of appearances, to explicate the hidden logic of ordinary poses and uncover hidden reasons for human action. He had a tendency toward iconoclastic views, toward cynicism, and toward advancing even violent and shocking positions. Yet this indicated more than a manipulative and idiosyncratic nature; it indicated a strong moral interest. In the words of Everett Hughes, who was a classmate with Waller at the University of Chicago, it was a mistake to confuse Waller's "sardonic

detachment" for a "misanthropic attitude" when it actually revealed a "deep attachment to the human race....not to one race or breed, but to the whole species."⁴⁷

Waller liked to consider himself a "disturber of the peace" and friends described him as "prone to challenge stuffed shirts in high places." He was an idealist who could not help but feel a sense of personal injury when men and institutions did not live up to his ideals and the world appeared different from his hopes for it. Despite the hard hitting and dismal realism of his writings, there was a touch of romanticism in Waller, a kind of deep faith in the human potential if it might just discard the excess baggage of ego, vanity, role-playing, and institutional restraint.

Perhaps it was not surprising, then, that Waller could not believe that teaching might be reformed merely by the teacher donning the more prestigious dress of a full professional. Such a move might yield more prestige but at the price of further isolating the teacher from the real world and the everyday fellowship of common people. From Waller's viewpoint, a larger threat to the school was its own structure, the very tendency of an institution to become inflexible, mechanized, and dogmatic. The damaging effect this might have on the creative spirit of teachers and students was at issue. While institutions provided the necessary organizational structure to sustain an idea, they could also kill an idea by encapsulating it into routine or by making it a habit.⁴⁸

In Waller's view the opportunities, indeed the pressures, for both students and teachers to fall into ruts were legion. Given the responsibility to evaluate students, teachers could adopt a static, safe, mimetic, and even juvenile conception of what counted as a good performance. Given the responsibility to control classes, teachers could easily confuse punishment with discipline and enforce drill and habit rather than participation. Given the responsibility to cover a package of material within a certain timeframe and within a certain social structure, teachers could fall prey to the clock and to the dull routine of recitation that rarely changed from year to year or class to class. Finally, given the responsibility to always know and "wax unenthusiastic over any subject under the sun," teachers could fall prey to a didactic attitude that made learning by teachers and students almost an impossibility.⁴⁹

It was in this latter criticism that Waller confronted most directly the problems of expertise and rule by the expert. For if the teacher was the expert authority with the responsibility to know, it might soon become inconceivable that the teacher too had to grow, that the teacher was given to doubt and ambiguity, and that the teacher might be trying to learn as well. Waller's analysis more than once gives hint to the Socratic irony of teaching, to the idea that one's personal standing as a teacher was achieved by being a good learner and yet one's social status as a teacher was achieved by being thought to be full of knowledge and therefore beyond learning. The stereotype of the completely-formed teacher is given great play by Waller,

not just because of the unreasonable demands of a community, but because that stereotype can be absorbed by the teacher himself. The teacher can fall prey to the pressure of a teacherish domination and subordination in which one's authority can be kept secure by constantly seeking opportunities to pour out one's great knowledge into others.⁵⁰ The conforming silence of students is one liability to this stereotype. A more subtle liability is that the teacher can lose the learner's attitude and lose the exciting possibility of being able to learn from one's students.

Waller's final recommendations argue against teachers being thought of as an exclusive and elite class. Given the pressures of the school, the need to keep control and keep one's job, teachers could find great solace in one another's company. They might find strength in numbers and in the collective wall of resistance this could provide against the unreasonable demands of administrators, parents, and students. Yet as comforting and even as necessary as such associations were, they also might only further separate teachers from the communion with their students and from the rest of the adult world. Waller worried that the teacher's ties to his primary group (his fellow teachers), might take precedence over his obligations to the secondary group (his own students).⁵¹ The success of the teaching act resulted from the tearing down of walls rather than the building up of them. And while students as well as teachers can erect walls which make learning less possible, Waller thought that the wall of teacher domination, made more firm by an exclusive status, was doubly damaging.

At its barricade fell the development of creative imagination. The schools, he argued needed more freedom and spontaneity if the personalities of both the teacher and the student were to be developed and renewed.

It was in this latter context that Waller presented his most striking suggestions. He wondered seriously about the invigorating effect of inviting the most competent leaders of the adult community who were not teachers into repeated and meaningful contact with the young. He thought that schooling might be aided by larger numbers of people entering teaching on their way to another occupation.⁵² The pool of people in this latter group had been limited by the increased standards of the profession. But he suggested that perhaps the vigor of these people might more than make up for their lack of training in educational technique. By these last suggestions, Waller meant no disrespect to teachers who, despite his criticisms he both loved and respected. Rather, as always, he wished to point out that teachers were adults too, that they needed association with other adults as well as their assistance and creative energy. Waller was aware of the importance of creating licensing requirements for a profession. They helped protect the public as well as helped to create the exclusiveness needed for elite status. Yet he was sensitive to the stultifying effects of an overly structured and static environment on the development of personality. In his consideration of the formalistic and bureaucratic context of the school, the screens of a more exclusive professionalism seemed only to be part of the problem.

Daniel Lortie: The Teacher as Expert Professional

The world had undergone great changes in the time between the publication of Waller's work and the work of Dan Lortie. The United States had emerged from the Second World War as a dominant force in world affairs. The threat of nuclear annihilation, the pace of technical achievement, and the growing and more evident interdependence of the economic market made the world seem like a far more complex place in which to live. The schools seemed to be in a constant state of crisis. Waller wrote at a time when the progressive dream of an open child-centered environment appeared to be a real possibility. But the progressive movement had floundered upon the criticism of being too permissive, a fault which seemed particularly grievous in an environment dominated by the Cold War and an increasingly competitive international economy. Accountability had become a watch word of educational practice by the time Lortie had finished his study. Teachers, facing more pressures than ever before and responsible for mellorating more social problems, would need to be professionally accountable for providing productive and efficient service.

Accountability was a concept adopted from the world of bureaucracy.⁵³ Its application to the schools indicated some of the changes which the schools had undergone in the forty-three years after the publication of Waller's work. A major change was the great consolidation of school districts and the increasing bureaucratization of the schools. Between the 1940's and the

mid-1970's, the number of school districts had decreased from 101,000 to 16,300, a decrease of 80%.⁵⁴ This centralization had resulted in a more complex administrative structure and a greatly increased number of administrative staff. The schools had adopted new specialisms in teacher evaluation, curriculum coordination, and special education. The distance between the average school teacher and the leaders of a school district had dramatically increased.

This had many repercussions. One was the search for a means to insure the adequate performance of tasks in each compartment of a burgeoning bureaucracy. John Goodlad notes that the search for accountability had roots in the public demand that professionals provide the services for which they were contracted.⁵⁵ Accountability also predisposed a particularly instrumental and scientific understanding of practice.⁵⁶ In this view experience could be fragmented into component parts, each with certain measurable tasks. Accountability supposed that results were best obtained in a bureaucracy when each compartment of a system was held responsible to perform its obligations in a predictable, controlled, and productive manner. Experts were needed to guide this process, if only because they had a broader, more theoretical understanding of the whole system, an understanding which eclipsed the knowledge of common people.

Accountability was very much on Lortie's mind as he wrote his sociology of teaching in 1975.⁵⁷ Like Waller he was interested in uncovering some of the common dilemmas, uncertainties, and pressures put on the

school teacher in the context of the school. Surprisingly, many of those factors had not changed much, and Lortie frequently cites Waller approvingly for his insightful exposition of the hardships of teaching. What had changed from Lortie's perspective was the opportunities now available for the teacher to assume the status of a full professional. These opportunities needed to be examined in Lortie's view precisely because the pressures put on schools and upon teachers were likely to increase in the coming years. Outside groups were likely to propose alternative educational practices and seek to pressure teachers to implement those practices in the classroom. As education became more centralized, state control of education might be increased by the imposition of more uniform state standards. In each of these cases, teachers would become functionaries of outside groups unless they pressed for a more powerful education profession.⁵⁸

It is important to note that Lortie had a particular understanding of the traits of a full profession. In earlier writings he had argued that teaching was only a "semi-profession" since it lacked arcane knowledge and the autonomous control of classroom practice which such exclusive knowledge might bring.⁵⁹ Lortie followed in this understanding the thought of such sociologists as Amitai Etzioni, William J. Goode and Harold L. Wilensky, each of whom had devised their own lists of traits needed if occupations were to deserve the title. Controversy in the sociology of the professions generally revolved around which traits were more important, not around whether the trait approach was the most helpful way of understanding professional

development.⁶⁰ Most followed Etzioni's dictum that the "basis of professional authority was knowledge."⁶¹ Goode would add the view that the knowledge had to be of such a type that the misuse of it would lead to the harm of the client.⁶² Wilensky would add that the knowledge had to be systematically developed and protected by professional organization.⁶³ Lortie would posit that the knowledge had to be basically scarce, secretive, and beyond the understanding of those who might like to impinge on professional control--the public or outside school officials. Each of these theorists were influenced in different ways by an examination of the most powerful professions, medicine and law. These were the professions which Lortie had studied and written on prior to turning to teaching. In many ways it is possible to understand Lortie's account of teaching as an examination of the factors which might prevent teachers from assuming a comparable social position.

It is fair to say that Lortie gives a fairly dreary, though objective, account of a teacher's practice. His purpose was to understand the "ethos" of the occupation--the "special combination of orientations and sentiments which prevail among teachers."⁶⁴ In some ways, he conducted his study similarly to Waller's by relying on long interviews as well as statistical study. Yet he lacked Waller's narrative and dramatic gift of exposition, and he did not refer to personal observation. Beyond collegiate teaching, it does not appear that Lortie had ever worked in the schools. It also should be said that the method of personal analysis which Waller used had long fallen into

disfavor among academic sociologists, a change which might have attributed to the diminution of Waller's importance in the history of sociology.⁶⁵ At any rate, beyond his suggestions and commentary on his data, Lortie adopts a far more reserved position, gone is the Dreiser-like exposition of the ironies of school life.

Still the ironies exist. Like Waller, Lortie uses teacher interviews and historical accounts to point out teaching's "special but shadowed" position in the family of occupations. Lortie notes the particular "assumption" operating in the schools that "citizens have the obligation and capacity to support and rule them," and adds that "one rarely hears anyone put forth an alternative ideology of authority in school affairs."⁶⁶ While Lortie mentions that the normative demands put on teachers by the surrounding community still exist, the most obvious constraints put on the occupation are internal. Here is the greatest irony of all. The complaints of teachers about the indignities heaped upon the craft have to be balanced with an understanding that the sentiments and values expressed by teachers do nothing to counteract such indignity. Implicit in Lortie's account is the view that the ethos of the occupation is what most stands in the way of progress. He describes teachers as conservative, individualistic, and present-oriented. Each of these are examined in such a way as to show how the characteristic is actually a hindrance to the professionalization of teaching.

The conservative orientation of teaching begins with the eased entry into the craft.⁶⁷ Lortie notes that the profession is not highly selective, and that

many people enter teaching having made the decision late in their schooling, or even after having pursued another occupation. Where Waller might have looked upon this favorably since it allowed greater connection with the many and varied strengths of the adult community, Lortie points out that the "heterogeneity of entry patterns indicates that teaching is not....standardized by selected criteria for admission." Even further, "the motivations, orientations, and interests candidates bring are not systematically assessed to eliminate those whose characteristics fail to fit a particular model."⁶⁸ In this way, teaching differs from the more exclusive occupations. Gone is the shared ordeal of having survived a similar type of rigorous training, and gone as well is the sense of participation in a particular and well-developed professional subculture complete with a common understanding of the characteristics of a good teacher.

Lortie notes, in this regard, that it is not possible to identify a single teacher personality.⁶⁹ The teachers he interviewed frequently point to prevalent and inspiring teachers in their lives. Yet from those descriptions, it is impossible to select a single type of teacher who would seem to personify the ideal teacher type. In Lortie's view, this all leads to a conservative orientation since teachers lacking a strong and mutual identification with a common background are less likely to form concerted efforts to break with the past.⁷⁰ Eased entry into teaching encourages people who might have only a "limited interest in the occupational affairs of teaching." One cannot expect "people who choose teaching because it makes limited demands on their time

to invest the effort needed to change either the context or the conduct of classroom teaching."⁷¹

The individualistic aspect of teaching likewise stands as an obstacle to change. Teacher individualism, in many ways, is connected with the "egg-crate" structure of the school and with the isolated nature of most school teaching. Waller, of course, was centrally concerned with the isolation of teaching because it separated the teachers from the adult community. Lortie draws a different moral. He points out that the teachers he interviewed were loath to adopt teaching strategies *carte blanche*, and spoke disparagingly of imitating another's practice. Teachers commonly spoke disapprovingly of the training they had received, criticized "Mickey Mouse" education courses, and complained that methods courses were too theoretical and idealistic to be of practical benefit in the classroom. The criterion for classroom success was to be judged by the individual teacher based on a "pragmatism of a highly personalized sort." This added to the common prevailing view that teachers learned most by teaching, that teachers were largely self-made, and that effective practice was idiosyncratic. Despite talk about team-teaching, collegial relations were minimal. Teaching was conceived as an individualistic rather than collective enterprise.⁷²

This understanding was more consistent with an artistic rather than scientific understanding of occupational practice. Yet it operated against the idea of a shared technical culture. In Lortie's view, this had a negative

effect on the development of teaching as a profession, since professional recognition presumed that the members of an occupation possessed collective knowledge not available to a layperson. When describing the qualities of a good teacher, the people Lortie interviewed consistently favored interpersonal skills rather than pedagogical knowledge.⁷³ This might have honored the highly personalized context of teaching, but it hardly pointed to a shared understanding of "commonly held, empirically derived, and rigorously grounded practices and principles of pedagogy."⁷⁴ Teachers, Lortie concluded, do not know how "to think about productivity as a collective matter." Lacking a jointly-held conception of pedagogical knowledge, teachers were less likely to work together to govern and control the profession.

Of course, change would also be unlikely if teachers failed to articulate future goals and failed to identify just how the mutually held understandings about the occupation might progress. Lortie found that teachers tended to be present-minded and, therefore, unconcerned with such matters.⁷⁵ In part, this was caused by the structure of teaching as a career. Lortie notes the "front-loaded" character of teacher salaries in which one's initial pay is fairly high in relation to the ultimate earning potential of the occupation. Pay was also undifferentiated by grade or talent. Indeed, teaching was relatively careerless since advancement in the occupation could occur only by leaving the classroom for administrative work or for another job. Women teachers talked more frequently of leaving for family reasons, and men more frequently of leaving due to financial pressures. In Lortie's view this

subtly depreciated the importance of teaching. Younger teachers did not see older teachers as models of emulation and were more likely to look to administration for the pattern of occupational advancement. Most teachers caught up in the tensions of day to day teaching worried about such mundane matters as overwhelming clerical duties, interruptions in class, and administrative and parental support. They failed to consider deeply the status of the occupation and how it could be changed. Lortie found little concern about a teacher's limitation in ensuring predictable results and little "preoccupation with deficiencies in the technical culture of the teaching occupation."⁷⁷

Again, in Lortie's view, this orientation seemed directly related to the prevailing ethos of the occupation. It was precisely this ethos which time and again prevented the occupation from being based on expert knowledge and what he called a "shared technical culture." He found that people entered the craft mostly for reasons of service rather than for money or for the advantages of work schedule. Many teachers identified their purpose in moral ways and talked about influencing students to be better citizens, stronger individuals, and decent, caring human beings. Many teachers had adopted an egalitarian sentiment which carried the burden of trying to reach every student. Others talked about instilling a love of learning.⁷⁸ As noble as such aspirations were, Lortie pointed out the difficulty in trying to attain such goals and the difficulty in evaluation. Lacking ways to judge such affective outcomes, with few witnesses to observe one's work, teachers

continually faced the uncertainty of not knowing whether they had done a good job. Lortie pointed out how this could lead to frustration, anger, and lack of satisfaction.⁷⁹ In a particularly dismal summary, he described the teachers' craft as "marked by the absence of concrete models for emulation, unclear lines of influence, multiple and controversial criteria, ambiguity about assessment timing, and instability in product."⁸⁰

Expertise, in Lortie's view, was the answer to most of these problems. More systematic and relevant knowledge might aid teachers in overcoming the endemic uncertainties of their occupation. With a firmer more collective and shared sense of pedagogical principles, teachers could operate with more assurance and confidently demand more control over educational decision making. By defining teaching in less moral and inherently ambiguous ways, teachers might come to favor outcomes which were more measurable and based on the arcane knowledge teachers possessed. Finally, if teachers shared a more rigorous and selective initiation process, their might be more collegiality in the profession and a sense of mutual responsibility for regulating its practice.

The differences between this perspective and that of Waller could hardly be greater. If Waller wanted to open the profession up to a more pluralistic and eclectic understanding of effective practice, Lortie wanted to make the occupation more exclusive and closed to only those who might have received a uniform type of training. If Waller wanted to eliminate the barriers of artificial and institutional authority that might separate teachers from

students and the adult community, Lortie wished to emphasize the rare and scarce nature of teacher knowledge and, therefore, emphasize the authoritative differences between teachers and the average layperson. Finally, if Waller emphasized, however, ironically the moral basis of a teacher's practice and the development of personality and personal relations in teaching, Lortie wished to emphasize the technical aspect of teaching. He would discount the reliance on moral understandings and human relations since they failed to provide the sense of mystery and scarcity necessary for a full profession.

Lortie believed that his view was forward-looking and progressive, especially insofar as it concerned the advancement of teachers. Remarkably, by focusing so resolutely on the ethos of teaching, his account contained hardly any mention of what actually occurred in the classroom or how relationships with students might shape a teacher's practice. He never mentioned how teaching conceived as a full profession might better serve students or the interests of the community. He posed as a teacher advocate by pushing for a more resolute professionalism and yet came close to "blaming the victim" by indicating that the very sentiments and values of teachers also stood in the way of their own development.

In his final comments, Lortie referred once again to the issue of accountability. He noted that while teachers had begun to adopt a more "militant" posture in their associations with teacher unions and in their demands for better pay and work conditions, those demands might also have

a backlash affect. The public viewing the teacher as someone who was relatively well-paid and who wanted to be honored with more dignity and control in daily practice, might also come to expect higher levels of teacher competence.⁸¹ Here, as elsewhere, the call for teacher expertise presented itself as an argument against ambiguity. Teachers required expertise to eliminate the endemic uncertainties associated with their practice. The public demanded expertise to eliminate those ambiguities and patterns of befuddlement associated with modern social problems or with merely making one's way in a complex world. Lortie pointed out that increasingly the schools have been pinpointed as social problems themselves. The demand for expertise arose from the possibility that the people who sought authority in the schools might not know what they were doing. For this reason, Lortie argued, teachers needed to adopt the posture of a full profession and assert that they are in control.

Conclusion

As this chapter has tried to argue, it is possible to see the modern quest for professionalism as an assertion of expertise. When Cubberley and others sought professional status for the field of school administration, they also sought a way to distinguish the occupation intellectually from others. Such distinction gave authority to the members of the occupation and allowed them to exert certain rights of practice in the operation of the schools. If teachers were to exert similar prerogatives in the classroom, it seemed

reasonable that they too would have to assert control of a knowledge base that went beyond the understandings of the common layperson.

Both Lortie and Waller were aware of the many historical factors which might stand in the way of such an eventuality, not the least of which was the moral context and aims of the teaching practice. It was precisely this context as it was represented in the close ties between the community and the school which moved Waller to note the constraining influence of rigid moral belief. Waller did not wish to deny teaching's moral basis, but he did wish to show how incapacitating an artificial and overexuberant moral authority might be to the development of personality. Waller hardly mentions the technical subculture which Lortie finds so central to the development of the profession. In his view, teachers and teaching practices suffer when they are isolated from the actual context of the real world and from the commerce with ordinary human beings and normal experience.

Lortie's description, couched as it is in the familiar language of modern sociology and in the language of institutional function and responsibility, seems more sophisticated than Waller's. The community has largely disappeared in his account and what remains is the shadow and dream of professional prerogative and competence. The influence of teaching's moral basis and purpose takes a backseat in his analysis because one suspects that, in his view, moral values and beliefs lack compelling force. His arguments for a shared technical memory are one-sided in this regard, but appeared so credible to the many reviewers of his book that hardly anyone questioned

just what was meant by the term.⁸² Thus, Lortie could call for more collegiality on the basis of technical competence, and yet not feel compelled to indicate just what such competence might entail. His argument seemed totally in keeping with the most modern expectation of professional authority.

This point seems important to press for several reasons. First, it might not be easy to specify the specific technical content of a teacher's expertise. Joseph Featherstone, the one reviewer who sought to analyze Lortie's book in the historical context of Waller's work, notes that the profession of teaching is "so complex and our modes of knowing about it so limited, that it is difficult to believe that any emerging paradigms of technical knowledge will be anything but scientific mumbo jumbo."⁸³ Several years earlier, Philip Jackson's account of school teaching, Life in Classrooms, had reached much the same conclusion. Noting the disparity between learning theory and teaching practice, Jackson had argued that technological understandings of teaching were simplistic and failed to account for the many contingencies which prevailed in classroom experience.⁸⁴ His observations of teaching had convinced him that teaching was such an opportunistic and unpredictable process that any scientific or technical conception of the craft was likely to be limited and mechanical. A more artistic and intuitive sense of the craft could not be discounted.

Given the complexity of his work, the teacher must learn to tolerate a high degree of uncertainty and ambiguity. He must be content with doing not what he *knows* is right, but what he *thinks* or *feels*

is the most appropriate action in a particular situation. In short, he must play it by ear.⁸⁵

The positions of Jackson and Featherstone suggest that Lortie's analysis might be ideological. Jackson holds that it would be silly to discount the impact of science on teaching, but it would be equally silly to suggest that scientific understandings can account for the give and take, the ambiguities, and the vicissitudes of classroom experience. Lortie wishes that the profession would impose a more standardized understanding of a common teacher type. He suggests that teachers adopt the special esoteric language of experts as a mark of their arcane knowledge. He recommends that teachers adopt a collegiality which might determine the perimeters of effective and recommended practice. One can sympathize with these positions precisely because of the many pressures put on teachers, and the lack of collegiality and interest they exhibit towards understanding the principles underlying their work. Yet one can also understand Waller's view that standardization has its dark side, and that one puts on the straight jacket of social conformity at the risk of sacrificing the zest and creativity that makes good teaching a vital act. Given the public nature of a teacher's practice (teachers are unique in that they have to practice their occupation in a crowd), it seems just as reasonable to suggest that the lack of special language is an asset rather than a liability. At the very least, the idea of imposing what David Tyack has called the "one best system" on admission practices seems premature and self-serving if there is little universal agreement on what counts as good teaching.

One cannot help but note in this matter how little Lortie listened and approved of the comments of the people he interviewed. They pointed consistently to the importance of human relations in teaching and the importance of teaching's moral consequences. Notable by its omission is the trait of service in Lortie's catalogue of characteristics which might most define a profession. While the sincerity of this trait has recently been questioned by radical commentators, many early sociologists saw it as a main factor in the professional character.⁸⁶ The attitude of service indicated that one practiced for the benefit of others rather than for personal gain. This separated the professional from other workers and indicated that in some ways they had escaped the excesses of a materialistic and capitalistic culture which sought to evaluate every act according the harsh tests of least cost and most efficiency. As ambiguous as the element of service is and as uncertain as moral rewards might be, it was these characteristics which loomed the strongest in the people Lortie interviewed.

Finally, it must be said that the very nature of professions have come under intense scrutiny since Lortie wrote his work. While recent proposals for making the occupation of teaching more selective have followed many of Lortie's suggestions, other commentators on schooling have raised the issue of whether the idea of a professional expert might not be wholly inappropriate to a teacher's trade. This tradition has a long history which sees professional practice in a more critical light, questions the credibility of scientific expertise, and tends to understand the professionalization process as

a political strategy. A fuller understanding of the expertise and education will need to make some note of that tradition.

CHAPTER NOTES

1. Edward Eggleston, The Hoosier Schoolmaster (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1889), 37,39.
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3. See especially TheodoreSizer, Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American High School (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984); John I. Goodlad, A Place Called School (New York: McGraw Hill, 1984); Robert L. Hampel, The Last Little Citadel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986); Ken Macrorie, 20 Teachers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Larry Cuban, How Teachers Taught (New York: Longman, 1984); and Philip Jackson, The Practice of Teaching (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986).
4. See especially The Holmes Group, Tomorrow's Teachers (East Lansing, Michigan, The Holmes Group, 1986); and The Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century (New York: The Carnegie Corporation, 1986).
5. Willard S. Elsbree, The American Teacher (New York: American Book Company, 1939), 395-426.
6. David B. Tyack, The One Best System (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 208.
7. Ibid., 207.
8. Ibid., 210.
9. Lawrence J. Dennis, "George S. Counts and Charles A. Beard: Collaborators for Change" (Unpublished manuscript, 1988).
10. Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 190.
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12. Tyack, One Best System, 215.
13. Ibid., 208-214. See also Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

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20. Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 22.
21. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism, 287-300.
22. Elsbree, The American Teacher, 192-198.
23. Ibid., 499-510.
24. Joel Spring, The American School 1642-1985 (New York: Longman, 1986), 249-252.
25. Statistics cited in David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, Managers of Virtue (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 154.
26. Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
27. Elsbree, The American Teacher, 199-208.
28. Ibid., 428.
29. Spring, The American School 1642-1985, 136-138.

30. Alexander Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada (New York: Carnegie Foundation, Bulletin no. 4, 1910). For a discussion of the repercussions of the Flexner report see Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, 161-166.
31. Alexander Flexner, Universities: American, English, German (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), 96-103.
32. Willard Waller, The Sociology of Teaching (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1932).
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35. Waller, The Sociology of Teaching, 30.
36. Ibid., 28.
37. Ibid., 49.
38. Ibid., 63-66.
39. Ibid., 34.
40. Ibid., 40-41.
41. Ibid., 45.
42. Ibid., 375.
43. Ibid., 59-60.
44. Ibid., 378.
45. Ibid., 64.
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49. Ibid., 391.
50. Ibid., 444-445.
51. Ibid., 444.
52. Ibid., 454.
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55. John I. Goodlad, "An Ecological Version of Accountability," Theory Into Practice 18, no. 5 (December, 1979): 308.
56. C. A. Bowers, "The Ideological-Historical Context of an Educational Metaphor," Theory Into Practice 18, no. 5 (December, 1979): 316-322.
57. Daniel C. Lortie, Schoolteacher: A Sociological Study, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
58. Ibid., 214-244.
59. See especially, Daniel C. Lortie, "Laymen to Lawmen: Law School, Careers, and Socialization," Harvard Educational Review 29, no. 4 (Fall, 1959): 352-359; ---, "The Teacher's Shame: Anger and the Normative Commitments of Classroom Teachers," School Review 75, no. 2 (Summer, 1967): 155-171; and ---, "The Balance of Control and Autonomy in Elementary School Teaching," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., The Semi-Professions and Their Organization (New York: Free Press, 1969), 1-53.
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61. Amitai Etzioni, Preface to The Semi-Professions and Their Organization, Amitai Etzioni ed., (New York: Free Press, 1969), viii.
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63. Harold L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?," The American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 2 (September, 1964): 137-158.

64. Lortie, Schoolteacher, viii.
65. Other thinkers have commented critically on Waller's fall from respectability. See Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), 50-55.
66. Lortie, Schoolteacher, 22.
67. Ibid., 17-18.
68. Ibid., 39.
69. Ibid., 41.
70. Ibid., 53-54.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., 67-81.
73. Ibid., 39-40, 76-79, 133.
74. Ibid., 79.
75. Ibid., 181-186.
76. Ibid., 99-100.
77. Ibid., 184.
78. Ibid., 109-132.
79. Ibid., 159-160.
80. Ibid., 136.
81. Ibid., 222.
82. Most reviewers were very favorable to Lortie's positions. See especially Ronald G. Corwin, Social Forces 54, (June, 1976): 948 and Elizabeth G. Cohen, American Journal of Sociology 81, (March, 1976): 1226. Corwin does criticize Lortie for his failure to appreciate the differences between teaching and other occupations. Cohen remarks that Lortie's recommendations on the selective recruitment of teachers are worrisome, because they imply some sort of ideological test.

83. Joseph Featherstone, What Schools Can Do (New York: Liveright, 1976), 160.
84. Philip W. Jackson, Life in Classrooms (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston Inc., 1968), 163-169.
85. Ibid., 167.
86. Thomas L. Haskell, "Professionalism Versus Capitalism: R.H. Tawney, Emile Durkheim, and C.S. Peirce on the Disinterestedness of Professional Communities," in Thomas L. Haskell ed., The Authority of Experts (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 180-225.

CHAPTER IV

THE TEACHER AS EXPERT AUTHORITY: THE ROMANTIC CRITIQUE

Daniel Lortie's vision of a more exclusive teaching profession responded in part to a group of educators and social critics who emerged in the sixties and seventies and took the limits of expert authority and competence most to heart. The critics were called romantics because of their ideological ties to Jean Jacques Rousseau and his belief in the natural goodness of humans and the perverting influence of artificial institutions. The romantics included among others Paul Goodman, Jonathan Kozol, Herbert Kohl, John Holt, Edgar Z. Freidenberg, and Ivan Illich. Many of the romantics were teachers or former teachers, and many had taught disadvantaged students. They shared in this way a personal sense of outrage about the lack of educational opportunities provided large segments of the population. They also shared a disdain for modern industrial life which they considered racist, repressive, and overly-mechanized. The school in their view was a conservative institution. To support the school meant to support a system which perpetuated the power of the elite classes.

To understand the romantics fully, it is necessary to place them in proper historical perspective. The modern critics, like many romantics of the past, saw themselves as rebels. Such is the disposition of a movement

which would place individual development and the primacy of emotional and subjective expression above all rationalized systems and beyond all traditions. Yet it reveals an intrinsic arrogance. The modern romantics did not suddenly, like Athena, appear full blown upon the educational scene. They descended from a long line of political and literary thinkers which stretched from Jefferson and Jackson to the modern day populists, from Thoreau and Emerson to Henry Miller and Kurt Vonnegut. Jack Williams has pointed out that the modern romantics had ties to the American tradition of rugged individualism.¹ This tradition celebrated such values as self-sufficiency and independence, stressing the equal competence of the common human being. While such beliefs have frequently resulted in strains of anti-intellectualism in the American character, they also have prevailed as the vital elements in an enduring belief in the frontier spirit and the immediate utilitarian motive.² In the best sense they were part and parcel of the democratic faith that no special group might mediate between the truth and the common person.

The romantics also were part of a tradition of thinkers who looked dubiously and even fearfully on the effects of industrial and technical development upon the American scene. Thomas Jefferson's belief in a universal education system was based not just on political analysis--the need for an educated electorate in a republic, but also on the belief that yeoman farmers were "the chosen people of God." Jefferson believed, with many others, that direct contact with nature yielded industriousness and freedom,

while involvement in manufacture and commerce yielded dependence and subservience. Jefferson presaged what would become a motif in anti-technological literature, that technology perverted or discarded more organic understandings of a human's relationship with nature and undercut the vital basis of human morality.⁴ Later when Emerson and Thoreau looked upon the changing American countryside dotted by factories and dissected by road and rail, they would wonder whether "we ride the railroad or the railroad rides us." Their fear and disdain for the restrictive order of technical development was part of their romantic belief that science and objective rationality failed as a means of apprehending reality.⁵ By ignoring the poetic, emotional, and non-quantifiable dimensions of life, science might begin to constrain the human imagination in systems which were as destructive of the organic nature of the human psyche as they were of the natural environment.

The argument against technology revealed the love of the romantics for unviolated nature. Romantics have traditionally stressed the need for self-discovery, because it indicated that life's pure and simple beauty could unfold naturally, unimpeded by the artificial and impositional forces of civilization. They have honored what was unpredictable and spontaneous rather than what was systematic and controlled. "Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist," Emerson wrote.⁶ For this reason romantics distrusted formalized educational systems, believing them damaging to the natural development of human beings and their need to explore personal

understandings of the world. Romantics would complain that school systems too often would sacrifice the personal nature of learning for the need to adequately train students in the manners, morals, and knowledge suited to particular institutions and traditions.

Nonetheless, romantics did find their way into schools and into discussions over educational theory. Hofstadter points out that in setting up a potential conflict between the needs of the child with the imperatives of the social order, child-centered progressives at the turn of the century were implicitly romantic.⁷ Likewise, Waller showed romantic leanings by so placing the development of the individual personality against the molding influences of the institution. Modern romantics, like their predecessors, saw a great conflict between the individual and society. The conflict in the sixties and seventies became a central way to understand the "generation gap" and the youth movement, a movement whose advocacy of a "counter-culture" lay directly in the romantic tradition. In the schools, the romantic movement led to an increasing concern with the primacy of student interest and to the concern over choice and relevancy in the curriculum.

On the larger social front, the modern romantic movement led to an increasing dissatisfaction with the rational, organized, and formal character of contemporary society. Theodore Roszak identified the counter culture as a struggle against "technocratic totalitarianism."⁸ The revolt against planning and order became one facet of the romantic's celebration of personal awareness. The spontaneous and playful character of much of the youth

culture contrasted starkly with the imperatives for efficiency, co-ordination, and rationalization in industrial life. Experts became one focus of youthful alienation since in Roszak's words, "in a technocracy everything aspires to become purely technical, the subject of professional attention."⁹ Experts, especially as they were connected with what many youth believed to be the misguided policies of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, became symbols of the evils connected with cold, dispassionate rationality. In the personage of Robert MacNamara, such images were frightening; in the personage of Spiro Agnew they were merely laughable. More generally, the expert emerged as the modern authoritarian who, because of his possession of the "facts," stood in the way of the truth of emotional expression. The expert was the inhibited man in the grey flannel suit living the disconnected and ultimately unsatisfied life in suburban America.

This stereotypical picture might have been harmless and even pathetic, if the more serious romantic thinkers did not come to identify the expert as a real source of power and influence. Indeed, as a brief examination of some of the major thinkers of the romantic movement reveals, expertise came to be seen as another means by which professionals might assert the dominance of a technical rationality. This had, according to the romantics, a particularly negative impact on the schools where students were molded and shaped for their slots in a prejudiced society. The process seemed doubly unjust; it worked socially to protect the interest and status of the professionals even as it worked to fit others into social positions much less

affluent and much less powerful.

Paul Goodman and Edgar Freidenberg

Paul Goodman might be considered the modern spiritual father of the romantic critics. Goodman, a poet and an anarchist, wrote on a variety of political, social, and civic topics, but some of his most notable work was on the nature of adolescence and on the condition of the schools.¹⁰ Like any anarchist he prized freedom more than social organization. His fondness for decentralized governmental and institutional structures grew naturally out of his critiques of the modern bureaucracy. In his view, one of the most inefficient and dehumanizing bureaucracies was the public school. He disparagingly referred to education officials as "school monks." In this way, he lampooned the unimaginative character of educators who had such control over schooling but lacked any creative or intelligent sense about the varied needs of youth growing up in the modern industrialized society.¹¹

Goodman was a sophisticated thinker, well grounded in philosophy and the social sciences. He frequently identified himself as an Aristotelian.¹² By this he meant to point out his belief in the existence of a basic and knowable human nature which is brought to fruition by the entire social community, the polis. Education was a social concern, the concern of the wider adult community, not the province for a special group with a monopoly over certain credentials and skills. Yet society had lost its intelligibility. Schools were part of a social system which thwarted the best and most courageous

aspects of human life. It made growing up impossible.

Our abundant society is at present simply deficient in many of the most elementary objective opportunities and worth-while goals that could make growing up possible. It is lacking in enough man's work. It is lacking in honest public speech, and people are not taken seriously. It is lacking in the opportunity to be useful. It thwarts aptitude and creates stupidity. It corrupts ingenuous patriotism. It corrupts the fine arts. It shackles science. It dampens animal ardor. It discourages the religious convictions of Justification and Vocation and it dims the sense that there is a Creation. It has no Honor. It has no Community.¹³

Goodman shared John Dewey's belief in the need for all of life to be educational without his fundamental and positive faith in life's possibilities. He also did not share Dewey's belief in the institution of the school to make learning meaningful by forming more lively, intimate connections with the everyday social world. He believed that "on the whole education must be voluntary rather than compulsory because no growth to freedom occurs except by intrinsic motivation."¹⁴ This led Goodman to oppose the rigid and doctrinaire character of schools which he felt denied the spontaneous disposition and intelligence of youth. It led him to see the intervention of the schools and teachers as impositional. He wrote that the "school system as a whole, with its increasingly set curriculum, stricter grading, incredible amounts of testing, is already a vast machine to shape acceptable responses."¹⁵

Not surprisingly, Goodman opposed any education which did not directly serve the child's search for identity and a sense of vocation. He opposed the technical innovations which some educators had seized upon as assertions of

their expert authority and technical control. Programmed instruction, for example, had recently grown out of the work of B. F. Skinner. It promised to take the guess work out of instruction by delivering a proven curriculum that produced measurable and observable results. Following the principles of operant conditioning, programmed instruction depended on the student use of a machine which delivered the learner by small successive steps and immediate reward to the desired educational end. For the supporters of programmed instruction, the method promised to make education a real science by bringing actual consistency and control to classroom behavior.¹⁶

In Goodman's view, programmed instruction simply closed "the window [of schools] a little tighter" and rigidified "the present departmentalization and dogma."¹⁷ He agreed that programmed instruction might be beneficial for remedial students who had lost all confidence, but for others it was simply restricting. It was fundamentally lacking in the idea that "a student would if possible strike out on an unknown path."¹⁸ Programmed instruction also typified the worst confusion about the ends and means of education since it tended to define learning to the level most amenable to expert control. This involved a type of reductionism, "erroneously reducing the concept of animals and human beings in order to make them machine operable."¹⁹ Gone was any sense of intrinsic motivation, emotional appeal, or inward intellect that might promote free and contrary thinking.

In Goodman's view, programmed instruction simply took the conforming tendencies of the school another step. It seemed inconsistent with the

democratic aims of education, since it tended to deny personal responsibility. This implied a criticism of expertise, if expertise indicated an unreasonable dependence on the thinking and knowledge of others. Goodman ironically noted that after years of squelching spontaneous behavior and training for docility we suddenly upon commencement expect students to show great reserves of initiative, to find jobs, to select a life companion, to undertake original artistic and scientific projects and to vote for public officers.²⁰ Goodman advocated increased educational support, but not support to the public schools, which he felt were too bureaucratic and authoritarian to do the job properly.

This line of reasoning led Goodman and in turn other romantic critics to increasingly reject the school as the only place of learning and the teacher as the legitimate educational authority. Edgar Z. Freidenberg followed Goodman in pointing out the absurdity of growing up in America. In The Vanishing Adolescent, he defined adolescence not just as a physical process but also as a social process which led to "clear and stable self-identification."²¹ Implicit in this definition was Freidenberg's belief in the sanctity of individual experience and search for meaning. More explicit was Freidenberg's belief that adolescence embodied the conflict between the individual and society.²² Freidenberg did not mean that youth needed to be a state of perpetual revolt against society; he meant that society had to set those secure cultural expectations against which youths might measure themselves and come to a more confident understanding of who they were.

Henry J. Perkinson points out that Freidenberg was more a disciple of Rousseau than an Aristotelian like Goodman.²³ The point is important. Goodman believed that schools prevented students from coming to understand the nature of things; they provided obstacles to students understanding the truth about the world and their place in it. For this reason, Goodman favored decentralizing education in storefront stores, in small alternative settings, in order that the students might come in closer contact with reality. Freidenberg, on the other hand, felt that meaning rather than truth was at issue. The schools failed in his analysis because they sought not to help the student in her search for personal meaning, rather they sought to inculcate "pliability to the demands and expectations of other persons."²⁴ The pedagogical experts in the schools failed in his view not because they necessarily lorded over students with a punitive and overbearing authority, but rather because they treated students as "problems in social integration."²⁵

The school's bland nature and its concentration on social adjustment revealed its basic lack of respect for individuality and human dignity. The solution, according to Freidenberg, was not just one type of school, but rather smaller more diverse schools, "each serving a specialized rather than mass clientele."²⁶ He felt that children in this way might be able to go to schools that were relevant for their own subjective being and search for personal clarity and commitment.

Friedenberg and Goodman penned their descriptions about the perils of

adolescence in a modern technological society in the late fifties and early sixties. This type of critique gained more momentum in the sixties and early seventies in the youth culture movement, in the concern over civil rights, and in the demonstrations against the Viet Nam War. Freidenberg's Rousseauian view, which emphasized the search for meaning over the search for truth, gained increasing credence. Yet Goodman appeared to be the better known. The romantic critics who followed were mainly educators who taught in urban schools and found the experience to be representative of the conditions which Goodman and Freidenberg had described.

Jonathon Kozol, Herbert Kohl, and John Holt

When Jonathon Kozol and Herbert Kohl were roommates as undergraduates at Harvard, they never expected that they would become critics of the schools, and writers of some of the most searching and poignant education books of the day. Kozol found himself teaching in the Boston Public Schools in the academic year, 1963-64. A truly gripping account of the year is found in his book, Death at an Early Age: The Destruction of the Hearts and Minds of Negro Children in the Boston Public Schools.²⁷ Kozol had been without any teacher training, and was only hired for a year as part of a program to stave off integration by upgrading segregated schools. The school he described was mired in bureaucracy and punctuated by blatant acts of racism. His book stands as a type of personal testament against an educational system which stood in the way of the aspirations of its students.

Far from being able to learn from expert practitioners in the classroom, he felt that he had to unlearn many of the destructive sentiments and practices he observed in the day to day operation of the school.²⁸ Like many romantics, he believed that reform of the school was not possible since it was constructed to serve an unjust society.

Kozol's friend, Herbert Kohl, taught in Harlem and like Kozol turned notes and papers he had gathered during the year into a stunning book.²⁹ Much of his book is filled with the truly remarkable writings of his students. The rest is a description of Kohl's attempts to get through the year in ways which he felt honored the creativity, intelligence, and intrinsic good will of his class. The type of lesson planning and preparation techniques he had learned at Teachers College, Columbia, he found of little use. In the vagaries of the classroom, the notion of expertise as constructed out of a rational system of planning and control did not work.

I had to react intuitively and immediately, as anyone in a classroom must. There is never time to plot every tactic. A child's responses are unpredictable, those of groups of children even more so, unless through being brutalized and bullied they are made predictable. When a teacher claims he knows exactly what will happen in his class, exactly how the children will behave and function, he is either lying or brutal.³⁰

Kozol's students, like so many students today, continually faced problems of crime, drug abuse, and broken homes. This made education a daily adventure. Nonetheless, Kohl did not believe that the teacher could make excuses for the failure of a student to learn. To the contrary he felt that the teacher needed to find "the right words or the right thing to teach,"

rather than believing that all learning problems "lie in the heart of the child."³¹ The refusal to not make excuses put the teacher under tremendous pressure, especially if, as Kohl would have it, no preselected or systematic techniques would work everyday and serve student needs. The emphasis necessarily begins to fall on the dimensions of a teacher's character and strength of commitment rather than on his expert technical skill. Foremost a teacher had to be honest about mistakes and weaknesses:

he must be able to say that he is wrong or sorry, that he hadn't anticipated the results of his remark and regretted them or hadn't understood what a child meant. It is the teacher's struggle to be moral that excites his pupils; it is honesty not rightness that moves children.³²

Teachers had to control their fear that if they acted honestly that the class would get out of hand. He had to observe the effect he was having on the class and be able to act accordingly. Rather than leading the class, this meant that the teacher had to be able to be led by the class as he gauged their response. "I have found," Kohl wrote, "one of the most valuable qualities a teacher can have is the ability to perceive and build upon the needs of his pupils' struggle to articulate through their every reaction."³³ This meant that the teacher, far from possessing the answers beforehand, constantly needed to be in the act of learning. This took incredible energy and integrity since even the students were far more comfortable with the routine which came through mindless exercises and dull and secure homework assignments. Instructional planning in Kohl's view did not mean keeping ahead of the student; it meant being engaged and excited about

learning oneself. "How can the children be expected to be alert, curious and excited," he inquired, "when the teacher is so often bored?"³⁴

John Holt agreed with Kohl, that the teacher is ultimately responsible in the classroom. "The idea that any nice, sympathetic woman can without further thought, teach children to "understand" arithmetic is just plain foolish," he wrote.³⁵ He was later to note that it was just as foolish to believe that a teacher with a Ph'D in mathematics might be able to teach. What were the qualities that a teacher needed?³⁶ Like Kohl, his writings reveal qualities which seem inconsistent with the idea that the teacher needs to be the dominant expert authority.

According to Holt, teacher dominance of any type had many drawbacks. It stood in the way of the natural independence, intelligence, and creativity of the child. Holt expressed firmly the Rousseauian belief in the innate goodness of the human character. "Human beings are born intelligent," he wrote. "We are by nature question-asking, answer-making, problem-solving animals, and we are *extremely* good at it, above all when we are little."³⁷ When teachers are obsessed with the need to have the answers and to pass on their understandings to children, these qualities become stunted. Children learn to play the game of "guess what is on the teacher's mind."³⁸ It tends to put the focus in the learning situation on the teacher when it should be on the student. Holt insightfully notes that even student teachers fall into this trap when they observe the class of their expert mentor. They watch the teacher rather than the students and thereby lose the crucial opportunity to

see how students are acting and reacting in the classroom environment.³⁹

The dominant teacher also might start to believe that learning comes only as a result of her teaching. It is possible to fall into the belief that all teaching produces learning. This might encourage the teacher to always focus on her performance, rather than asking what things are being done which might hinder or help learning. Ironically, this might be even more of a trap for the highly innovative teacher who is so full of clever teaching ideas that she cannot wait to try them on the class. Holt notes that "the inventors of clever teaching ideas tend to think that if one good teaching idea helps to make learning happen, a hundred good ideas will make a hundred times as much learning happen."⁴⁰ Actually the learning ideas might prevent learning since they impose themselves unnaturally upon the classroom situation. He tells of a time in which he had come up with a new way of teaching a class, but soon found that the idea had taken over.

Instead of a forty-year old human being in a room full of ten-year old human beings I was now a scientist in a room full of laboratory animals. I was no longer in the class to talk about things that interested me, or them, or enjoy what I and they were doing, but to try something out on them.⁴⁰

The teacher, rather than being so protective and self-centered, needed to trust the students more and to be confident enough to treat classroom challenges as opportunities to learn rather than threats to authority or personal worth. Holt began teaching at the age of thirty, and he prized his experience since it taught him not to be afraid of the world. Like Waller, Kohl, and Kozol, Holt speaks about the fear he found in the school. Teachers

feared losing control, and students feared getting the wrong answer. Fear caused dependence. For Kozol, Kohl, and Holt, this revealed the ultimate trouble with the idea of the teacher as expert authority. The student began to depend on the teacher for the answer. In one of his most insightful passages, Holt talks about a student whose dependence and fear had reached such a point that she deliberately said the wrong answer. She knew that to be correct and personally knowledgeable entailed a risk. It was much easier to be wrong and constantly bewildered, always depending on the teacher for guidance.⁴²

Ivan Illich and Deschooling

Ivan Illich took the thought of the romantic critics to its logical limits. He was at once the most apocalyptic and impractical of the romantic critics and yet was also the most penetrating. Unlike the other thinkers, he was not a teacher. A former Roman Catholic priest, Illich had resigned his priestly office in protest over what he thought to be the authoritarian and dogmatic policies of the church. He had served as a priest in poor sections of New York City and had done church work in Puerto Rico and in Cuernavaca, Mexico. In both places Illich believed that the church adopted policies primarily to increase the dependence of the poor upon church authorities. Some of Illich's early writings against the church carry a protestant sound to them. He dismissed the notion that the priest should stand as the intermediary between someone and their god.⁴³

This anti-clerical position could easily be applied to the school. In his book, Deschooling Society, Illich advances the idea that the teacher also should not stand between the child and learning.⁴⁴ Likewise the school should not stand between the young and the more organic educational opportunities of the wider adult world. Like the church, Illich thought that the school was an institution which preserved the authority of the officials in charge.⁴⁵ He argued vehemently that schools should be abolished and teaching deprofessionalized. These startling conclusions actually only represented the logical conclusion of romantic ideas about the natural goodness of the child taken to their extreme. Like Goodman and Freidenberg, Illich believed the school to be an ill-fitted institution for introducing children into the modern world.⁴⁶ Like Kozol, Kohl and Holt, he believed that schools unfairly discriminated against the poor, and were run in an authoritarian manner. Illich's contribution was to understand these critiques in light of a wider social criticism. In his view, schools represented one element of a technological and ordered world where opportunities had been curtailed through a new type of institutionalized poverty. The best thing to do was to get rid of the present system and begin with something more in keeping with human agency and dignity.⁴⁷

Illich's work, even more than the other romantic critics, can easily be seen as a critique against the excesses of expertise. Deschooling Society was only one of a number of books Illich was to write criticizing the "disabling professions."⁴⁸ In Illich's view, professionals adopt licensing and

credentialing standards in order to protect their best interests. As schooling requirements become stricter, the knowledge over which professionals have control becomes more artificially scarce.⁴⁹ The price of schooling, as well as the artificial barriers of institutional evaluations and prepackaged curriculums, make it difficult for many people to become licensed. Others learn to depend on experts since schools have taught them to depend on the help of others rather than being self-reliant. Illich calls institutionalized poverty that type of poverty effected by a credentialled and schooled society. Especially in poor countries and among the impoverished, people learn to judge wealth and competence by the number of years in school even though for them extended schooling is not a feasible economic and social possibility.⁴⁹

Part of Illich's critique against expertise is bound up in debunking the ability of educational experts to adequately and efficiently train students.⁵⁰ Most learning, Illich points out, occurs outside of school. In school, students are forced to take courses which might have little relevance to their needs. Illich points out that much of what students learn is negative, part of a "hidden curriculum" which teaches students patient reliance on a credentialled class of experts. Schools teach students that learning takes place only at one time, in one place, in the care of a special person. They teach that learning is a dull, passive affair which occurs in curricular patterns already prescribed by school officials. Finally, they teach that the young are a sparate group, who must be excluded from the varied activities of adult life. In the worst sense, childhood comes to be regarded as a type of

affliction to be mediated and treated by compulsory education.⁵¹

Despite his call for the end of public schooling, Illich is not a total anarchist. He is not against all institutions and all technology, and he is not against a firm sense of craft grounded in the everyday reality and events of individual lives. Jack Williams quite rightly points out that even Illich found formalized education so necessary to modern life that his proposals for alternative educational institutions tend to replace one system for another.⁵² Yet plainly Illich argues against the immense bureaucratic structures of the schools, and against the idea that credentials might replace competence as an element of social legitimacy. Too often, Illich argues, professions so define the problem that it becomes amenable only to their service. He offers as characteristic example the instance of the medical profession taking over the duties of the traditional midwife and, thereby, transforming birth into a clinical event complete with the need for doctors, for specialized medicines and procedures, and for hospitals. By this transference not only do doctors acquire more power, but also expectations of treatment are raised to make births brought about without medical treatment an abnormality.⁵³ The process can work in education. When schooling credentials become required, then the schools can protect their position of dominance and authority.

Illich's solution to technological subservience is the creation of new types of education systems. In the place of more schooling, Illich calls for an end to all formalized instruction which takes place without the consent of the learner. In the place of more stringent controls to make teaching more of an

exclusive and prestigious profession, he proposes learning webs which would allow anyone with a qualified skill to teach it to anyone who might want to learn. At one point, Illich recommends learning centers which might be operated like skill co-operatives. People would be able to use types of educational vouchers to purchase the learning that they most need. In all of his suggestions, Illich's major concern is access.⁵⁴ He wished to destroy the monopoly of the school on the goods and services of education, so that more people might benefit. Illich even believes that schools have control over the tools of the learning--the laboratories, the machines, the equipment on which and in which people might practice their skills. For this reason, he suggests that some incentives be given to businesses and industries to open their shops and factories to those students who might one day become their employees.⁵⁵

Illich's final chapter in Deschooling Society gives a more philosophical and metaphorical account of the evils of expertise. He describes two mythical creatures, Prometheus and Epimetheus, whose characters he believes match with the possibilities now placed before humankind. Prometheus represents the search for order, control, and predictability associated with technocratic thinking. Illich argues that this worldview leads to increased expectations built upon technical innovation. Yet technical abundance is a trap because it leads to physical pollution and degradation and psychological servitude. In contrast, the Epimethian character suggests a life lived in balance with natural need. In the place of a life built around

expectation and probability, there would be a life built around hope and possibility. The Epimethian world suggests a faith in human goodness, a faith in people not products. In such a world, Illich hopes human needs would not be artificially turned into technical problems, and human wants would not be turned into commodities.⁵⁶

Conclusion

Taken together the romantic critics offered a thorough-going analysis of the idea of teacher as expert. Honoring the learning capacity and competence of the individual, the romantics rankled against suggestions of control by a knowledgable elite. Sensitive to the limitations of a technical worldview, the romantics celebrated the emotional, moral, and nonquantifiable side of life. Romantics, like Paul Goodman and Edgar Z. Freidenberg, believed that schools had stopped serving the interests of the adolescent, failing to honor their intrinsic need for self-fulfillment and vocation. While Goodman and Freidenberg did not present identical positions in this regard, both would argue against the idea of the school as the sole repository of educational authority. Both argued that there was more than one way to educate and more than one type of educator. No special group should presume to claim sole jurisdiction over the type of pedagogical knowledge needed to teach.

The criticisms of Jonathon Kozol, Herbert Kohl, and John Holt were notable by examining the limits of educational authority in the classroom. Each of them also were sensitive to the social and political responsibility of

the school, especially since they believed that the school was educating for an unjust social order. The point has wide repercussions. Education affects the mind, and therefore the quality of free choice in the political and social world. Total control over all the architecture of education might yield total domination.⁵⁷ The romantics believed that power had fallen into the hands of educators who served a social order that denied opportunity to the underprivileged. One does not have to agree with their social assessment to note the threat of an educational monopoly.

The insights of Kohl, Kozol, and Holt about classroom life may have been their most lasting contributions. Beyond the social criticism, all three critics have written further on education and have added to our understanding of the dynamics of classroom life. All warn in words reminiscent of Waller against self-satisfied teachers who believe that their superior knowledge will protect them against the unexpected. More critically, teachers, in their view, rely on qualities not usually associated with a scientific assessment of knowledge. It would be simplistic to say that teaching is not a highly complex occupation which doesn't require a great deal of skill and knowledge to perform adequately. Yet the romantics seem to suggest that those skills must be constantly formed and reformed in the act of teaching, and that those skills cannot discount the importance of human compassion and concern for others. In their view, the image of the self-securing professional whose attainment of knowledge yields increased social status is particularly antithetical to the teacher's practice. The teacher's knowledge

has value only insofar as it is given away. The teacher's authority and status has justification only insofar as the social and epistemological distance between the teacher and student is dissolved. The teacher's knowledge can never be scarce; it must be shared and generously broadcast.

The romantic critique of the traditional school had several spinoffs. Kozol and Kohl later became involved in the free school movement. Holt became an advocate of home schooling. These schooling alternatives indicated a different type of student/teacher relationship which many believed was less authoritarian and more built around the intrinsic interests of the child. The free schools were designed to bridge the gap between the world and the child and to build sources of self-sufficiency and initiative in the student. In this way, dependence on "those who know better" might be lessened. Teachers were expected less to play the role of educational authority than to be "real people" who made mistakes and who might also learn from the student. As George Dennison, a central figure in the movement, explained, "We made much of freedom of choice and freedom of movement; and of reality of encounter between teachers and students; and of the continuum of persons by which we understand that parents, teachers, friends, neighbors, the life of the streets, form all one substance in the experience of the child."⁵⁸

Many associated closely with the free school movement later ironically criticised the stringency of an anti-authoritarian position. They argued that students living in a world which made little coherent sense needed more

structure and direction. If all adult intervention were withheld, students might lose a critical opportunity to gain a more secure sense of themselves within the social order. Kozol himself was later to criticize such non-directive and non-impositional forms of education since they affirmed no commitment upon the part of the teachers and nourished no sense of social concern in the students.⁵⁹ In this critique, Kozol advanced the same argument for teacher intervention and involvement advocated by George S. Counts. In response to the refusal of teachers to take a more impositional role in the classroom Kozol asked, "What loyalties can be constructed on the groundwork of desertion?"⁶⁰ The question cuts on more than one front, for one by one the romantics had abandoned the public school. What was to become of the millions of students who could not afford a private "open" school or whose parents might not be able to educate them at home? What had even happened to the students whom romantics had once taught in the public school? Years after Herbert Kohl had written his book about the thirty-six children he had taught in Harlem, many had dropped out. One of the children remarked, "Mr. Kohl one good year isn't enough..."⁶¹

Of course, the most erstwhile and direct opponent of the public school was Ivan Illich. In reviewing his work one finds a trenchant critique against the disabling power of knowledgeable elites, and it is in that context that his argument against the school should be understood. It cannot be forgotten that Illich was a former priest whose mission was grounded in serving the unfortunate and the disenfranchised populations of Latin

America. It is perhaps too easy to forget the tremendous investment in energy and resources public education represents, resources that developing countries and impoverished people can scarcely afford. Here, according to Illich, the increased expectations of the school harmed the poor in two ways. First, the message might be sent that education is a type of treatment administered in politically neutral settings by credentialed experts. This might only cause attitudes of psychological impotence, further exacerbating feelings of dependence and inadequacy. Second, the message might be sent that education can only occur in certain settings, under certain conditions. Here education and schooling emerge as synonyms, with schooling requiring great sources of financial wealth. It soon becomes evident to poor that extended schooling is out of their reach.

In this and other ways, Illich's analysis shocks us into recognition that the form in which education is conducted carries a heavy message. In some senses, Illich believed that the school should be abandoned not because it was working ineffectively, but because it was working well to prepare people for the subservience and deference necessary in a world run by experts. Illich no doubt overreacted to the power of experts, and later sociological work has pointed out that experts might be as much victims of the bureaucratic order as lay people.⁶² Nonetheless, a Deweyian message might be found in the stridency of Illich's argument. Schools which wish to prepare students for an active, intelligent, and participatory role in social affairs should not treat them as passive learners in the classroom. More than a little truth resides

in the romantic belief that all learning is something that students have to do themselves; it is not something that should be done to them.

Illich's radical proposal received a good deal of criticism, some of it well deserved. Certainly the proposal to abolish schools took the argument for individual liberty to lengths which even other romantics were not willing to go. Neil Postman, who had also written against the authoritarian teacher, believed that Illich himself was a type of authoritarian.⁶³ He meant that Illich tried to force all within his particular conception of a just social order. It might be authoritarian and even mean-spirited to remove the opportunity for schooling from the millions of people who depend upon it daily. Also it might be authoritarian in another sense to turn over the direction of schools so intently to the interests of the young. Illich, like the other romantics, conceived of a utopian order in which students learned where, when, and how they liked. Yet as Arthur Pearl has noted, to learn what one likes is also to learn prejudices.⁶⁴ The romantics wrote as if the wisdom and experience of the teacher, and the history and traditions out of which she operates should mean nothing to the child. In this sense the romantics were both antitraditional and ahistorical. The romantics' affirmations of the inviolable nature of the child made it easier to give up on the school and to discount the past and present efforts made by many to make the school a more humane and inclusive place to learn.

This raises a significant philosophical issue. The romantics and Illich in particular suggest in their arguments a certain view of the autonomous

individual which grew out of their Rousseauian belief that children were basically born good. This faith leads them to be particularly sensitive to the perverting forces of outside social influences, but it also leads them to see the individual and society in perpetual conflict. The individual comes to be understood as an event of birth rather than as the creation of social and historical forces which might be embodied in the teacher.

While this view of the individual tends to promote a sense of heightened freedom, it is generally freedom conceived in its negative aspect. Freedom becomes defined as the area in which individuals are protected from the restrictions and manipulations of outside authority.⁶⁵ In this way the thought of romantic critics closely parallels the thought of classical liberal thinkers whose understanding of the fallibility of human opinion led them to reject all uniform and authoritative answers to human problems. This view would argue against experts having the one best answer to educational problems and would argue against the imposition of expert authority.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the view provides no alternative and justified reason for the intervention of schools and teachers into the lives of students. All authority, whether expert or not, seems to fall before the demands of individual choice.

As we have seen in the thought of Illich, the unqualified celebration of the autonomous individual leaves little ground on which to base a school. This conclusion, despite Illich's profound radicalism, actually might reflect conservative tendencies. Illich's call for the end of public education closely follows the thinking of more conservative thinkers who likewise believe that

the school can no longer justify its monopoly over education. In Milton Friedman's view, the schools should be abolished because only when the market pressures are brought to bear on the inadequacies of schooling will education be improved.⁶⁷ And ironically, Myron Lieberman, long a staunch defender of a more exclusive and autonomous teaching profession, has also recently argued for discontinuing publically-supported schools.⁶⁸ In Lieberman's view, the bureaucratic nature of public education not only interferes with student and parental choice, but also acts as a barrier to a more accountable teaching profession. Schools which have formed a more active relationship to private industry, what Lieberman refers to as entrepreneurial schools, will relieve the need of professional educators to be subjected to overbearing state regulation. According to Lieberman, the professional standing of the teacher would be enhanced rather than negated by curtailing public education.

This indicates the final irony in the theory of the romantics. For if they rejected schools precisely because of their repugnance of a materialistic and self-serving capitalistic order, many now advocate a similar abolishment of schools precisely because it will make them more susceptible to the entrepreneurial spirit of profit, competition, and personal reward. Lieberman's idea is that competition among individual schools will lead to a greater emphasis on developing the technical skills necessary to teach more effectively. Other thinkers have similarly attributed the development of modern professions as an expression of liberal individuality. The growth of

modern professions, according to Larsen occurred, as individuals were able to appropriate for themselves the knowledge necessary to practice in a free and open market.⁶⁹ Knowledge became a type of private property, like all properties more valuable as it became more scarce. Illich would like to make knowledge more accessible and shared, but in some ways the basis of his thought might result in some of the very excesses he is attempting to fight. The idea of an autonomous individuality, advanced by Illich and other romantics, contains within it no necessary barrier to the acquisitive self-interest which they deplore.

CHAPTER NOTES

1. Normand R. Bernier and Jack E. Williams, Beyond Belief: Ideological Foundations of American Education (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Printice-Hall, 1973), 158-162.
2. Merle Curti, "Intellectuals and Other People," American Historical Review 60, (January, 1955): 259-282.
3. John F. Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America, 1776-1900 (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 16-17.
4. Robert Pirsig, Zen Buddhism and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), 60-72.
5. Bernier and Williams, Beyond Belief, 169-174.
6. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selected Prose and Poetry (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1950), 168.
7. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 362-368.
8. Theodore Roszak, Making of a Counter Culture (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968), xiii.
9. Ibid., 7.
10. See especially Paul Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (New York: Vintage Books, 1960) and ---, Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).
11. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars, 8-12.
12. For a discussion of this point see Henry J. Perkinson, Two Hundred Years of American Educational Thought (New York: David McKay Company, 1976), 284.
13. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, 12.
14. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars, 61.

15. Ibid., 87.
16. Goodman particularly notes the article by Lauren Resnick, "Programmed Instruction of Complex Skills," Harvard Educational Review 33, no. 3 (Fall, 1963): 439-471.
17. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars, 87.
18. Ibid., 86.
19. Ibid., 90.
20. Ibid., 87-88.
21. Edgar Z. Friedenberg, The Vanishing Adolescent (New York: Dell Publishing, 1959), 17.
22. Ibid., 32-35.
23. Perkinson, Two Hundred Years of Educational Thought, 289.
24. Friedenberg, The Vanishing Adolescent, 92-95.
25. Ibid., 91, 133-138.
26. Edgar Z. Freidenberg, Coming of Age in America (New York: Random House, 1965), 250.
27. Jonathon Kozol, Death at an Early Age, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).
28. Ibid., 111-112. Most notable to Kozol was not just the explicitly racist and sometimes violent actions of his peers, but the advice for the teacher to not become involved with students in any personal way.
29. Herbert Kohl, 36 Children (New York: New American Library, 1967).
30. Ibid., 24.
31. Ibid., 29.
32. Ibid., 26.
33. Ibid., 42.
34. Ibid., 52.
35. John Holt, How Children Fail (New York: Delacorte Press, 1982), 145.

36. Ibid., 145-146.
37. Ibid., 189.
38. Ibid., 26-27.
39. Ibid., 34.
40. Ibid., 162.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 109.
43. For a brief biographical sketch of Illich as well as a good analysis of his work and the work of Paulo Friere see John L. Elias, Conscientization and Deschooling (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976).
44. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971).
45. Ibid., 10, 29.
46. Ibid., 26-28.
47. Ibid., 49-51.
48. Ivan Illich, "Disabling Professions" in Disabling Professions (Boston: Marion Boyars, 1979), 16-19.
49. Illich, Deschooling Society, 6-9.
50. Ibid., 12-13.
51. Ibid., 26-30.
52. Bernier and Williams, Beyond Belief, 160.
53. Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976).
54. Illich, Deschooling Society, 75-77.
55. Ibid., 83-85.
56. Ibid., 105-115.

57. This point is made by Cremins in comparing the American education situation with that of Germany under Adolph Hitler or with that of the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. See Lawrence A. Cremin, The Genius of American Education (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 15-17.
58. Quoted in Perkinson, Two Hundred Years of American Educational Thought, 300.
59. Jonathon Kozol, The Night Is Dark and I Am Far from Home (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 95-105.
60. Ibid., 114.
61. Quoted in Perkinson, Two Hundred Years of American Educational Thought, 299.
62. See Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner (New York: Basic Books, 1983); and Charles Derber, ed., Professionals as Workers: Mental Labor in Advanced Capitalism (Boston: G.K. Hall and Company, 1982).
63. Neil Postman, "My Ivan Illich Problem," in Alan Gartner, Colin Greer, and Frank Riessman ed., After Deschooling. What? (New York: Harper Row, 1973), 137-147.
64. Arthur Pearl, "The Case for Schooling America," in Reissman ed., After Deschooling. What?, 112-117.
65. For a description of "negative freedom," see Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 118-172.
66. This line of argument has been taken in particularly by Perkinson. See Henry J. Perkinson, The Possibilities of Error (New York: David McKay Company, 1971); and Ronald M. Swartz, Henry J. Perkinson, and Stephenie G. Edgerton eds., Knowledge and Fallibilism: Essays on Improving Education (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
67. Milton J. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
68. See Myron Lieberman, Beyond Public Education (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986). Lieberman's career has undergone several changes. In the fifties, he was a strong proponent of teacher unions and collective bargaining. He also argued that education reform depended on the development of a strong educational elite. More recently he has opposed collective bargaining and has argued that unions do not represent the best interest of teachers or education. Like Friedman, he now seems to argue for more market control of education as a way of eliminating

incompetence and insuring accountability. His initial opinions in support of unions were delivered in Myron Lieberman, Education as a Profession (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1956); and ---, The Future of Public Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). For his latest position see Beyond Public Education above, and Myron Lieberman, "Eggs That I Have Laid: Teacher Bargaining Reconsidered," Phi Delta Kappan 60, no. 6 (February, 1979): 415-419.

69. Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 9-18.

CHAPTER V

THE MODERN CRITIQUE

The romantic critics brought into sharper focus issues critical to the consideration of the teacher as an expert. The question of expertise in education did not just center on the technical abilities of the teacher, although this was a significant issue; it centered on the proper conceptual limits of a teacher's practice. The romantics' repugnance of the technical order merged with their belief in the sanctity of the individual to form a powerful criticism of authoritarian structures. Yet this sense of individualism resulted in a line of thought that discounted the authority of the teacher, no matter if that authority resulted from an assertion of expertise or an assertion of the teacher's broader moral and cultural responsibilities. The romantic idea of an inviolable individualism seemed to imply that the teacher had to be morally neutral in regards to any interference in the life of the child. Freedom, conceived only in this negative aspect, could provide a strong argument against the authoritarian excesses of the expert teacher; it could not provide a strong argument for forming the type of community upon which to build a school.

Ivan Illich had taken the romantic thought to its final conclusion in this regard. And while his argument relied too fully on the concept of an

autonomous individuality, his analysis did make clear the significance of human agency in discussions of expertise. Critics like Manfred Stanley soon echoed Illich's concern by raising the question of dignity in regards to technological development.¹ In Stanley's formulation, dignity refers to the ability of people to have a creative or destructive effect on the world that they inhabit, an ability which technological control over natural forces ultimately should have helped. Yet gigantic bureaucratic structures, the division of labor into protected specialties, and the incomprehensibility of expertise have all made dignity a great issue in technological writing.² In the same manner, Illich was sensitive to the position of the impoverished in society. He saw the school as part of a larger structure which did not provide the poor with access to the knowledge necessary to live whole and productive lives. Illich believed that the high economic and social status of professionals represented a new type of exclusive class privilege, clouded by the assertion of technical competence, but built around the advantages of wealth and power nonetheless.

This view of professions gained increasing prevalence in the seventies and eighties to the point that Donald A. Schon claimed that there existed a crisis of confidence in professional knowledge.³ Schon noted that many more people have come to regard expertise with suspicion. Part of that suspicion was grounded in precisely the type of argument that Illich had raised. Some, for example, criticized the growing reliance on the credential as the mediator to expert service.⁴ The point here was not simply the difficulty in finding the expert who was trustworthy, but determining if the credential

had unfairly limited the opportunities of the competent to practice. Randall Collins questioned the selflessness of professionals since they tended to profit so much by their professed altruism.⁵ But in some ways the profitable and exclusionary nature of professional jurisdiction seemed a natural outgrowth of technology itself.⁶ Max Weber had noted long ago that technological development was inseparably bound to the growth in specialties.⁷ This signaled for the romantics the imperturbable and impervious nature of mammoth bureaucracies, but for scores of others, it simply indicated the need to confine their vocational interest to a narrower area. One did not have to be a radical to see the economic benefit of exclusive expert knowledge.

Schon's contribution to this debate, however, went beyond debunking expert motives. He raised the question of whether the mode of technical rationality, upon which expertise had been built, could still so conclusively inform professional practice. The romantics had also questioned technical rationality, but many times their critiques were couched in the hyperbolic celebration of the emotional and even irrational aspects of human judgement. While providing a deeper analysis of the excesses of professional privilege, Illich seemed to offer in response only the most simple espousal of individual liberation.⁷ According to Schon, the more recent critique went much deeper and now reached into the ranks of the experts themselves. Professionals in many fields apparently now questioned whether expert knowledge could suffice to answer the type of ambiguous, changing, and uncertain situations in which they found themselves.⁸ Technical rationality, Schon explained,

was a direct result of the positivist belief that science could provide the answer to social and political problems.⁹ This belief was also grounded in the idea that there was sufficient uniformity between problems in different contexts to justify the application of standard responses. As one writer on the professions explained it:

If every professional problem were in all respects unique, solutions would be at best accidental, and therefore have nothing to do with expert knowledge. What we are suggesting, on the contrary, is that there are sufficient uniformities in problems and in devices for solving them to qualify the solvers as professionals ... professionals apply very general principles, standardized knowledge, to concrete problems...¹⁰

Many professionals, far from celebrating an unmarred confidence in this mode of thinking, pointed to the lagging understandings, the unsuitable remedies, and the professional dilemmas which prevented the ready application of expert knowledge. The series of crisis which plagued modern times--the increased poverty, the deteriorating cities, the pollution of the environment--all seemed to resist the easy "technological fix." As Bruce Watkins and Roy Meader have pointed out, if it was clear that the romantic tendency to advocate the irrational response might lead to disaster, it was also clear that "most of the world's great problems will not have technological answers."¹¹

Similarly, education theorists who did not necessarily share the romantic's ideology now began to argue that the vicissitudes of classroom life resisted the easy technical solution.¹² There seemed to be a new found appreciation of the idiosyncratic nature of learning events, which always were mediated by the personalities and life histories of the participants and

which always were unpredictable enough to confound the application of educational formulas.¹³ More broadly, some now more deeply questioned the ability of schools to solve modern problems and to usher in the new age for which Counts and other progressives had long argued. The traditional disposition to see schools as panaceas for solving social problems had aided the movement to conceive of education as a field requiring greater expertise. Yet as Henry Perkinson now pointed out, the historical effort to use the school to solve the problems of race, urbanization and social mobility had not worked.¹⁴ Driver education, sex education, and drug education programs testified to the enduring nature of the public's faith in school to ameliorate deep-seated social ills. Yet as the incidence of teenage pregnancy and of drug use continued to climb, it became less and less clear that the singular effort of expert educators could ultimately be effective.¹⁵

This skepticism indicated a new appreciation of the embeddedness of expert knowledge, that technical strategy was ultimately more deeply dependent on the situation in which it was used. Jacques Ellul had once characterized technical knowledge by pointing out how it tried to overcome cultural bonds. A good technique, he explained, was one which is not tied to cultural traditions or to the character limitations of the person who employed it.¹⁶ Interestingly, this type of thinking had underlaid much of the research in teaching. Teacher educators believed that general principles of teacher effectiveness existed which could be applied in any situation, regardless of the disposition of the teacher and students.¹⁷ But critics in education and in other fields were coming to doubt this proposition, especially

since little firm evidence existed to tie teacher competence to extended formal training in teacher education programs.¹⁸ On the other hand, on the job training, exactly that type of training which would embed a teacher's knowledge and intelligence in a particular context, seemed to make significant difference in teacher effectiveness.¹⁹

As we have seen, these debates were not totally new. Historically, the belief that technical knowledge could provide the basis for a teacher's professionalism has been used to promote the place of teacher education as a separate and distinct discipline in university settings. The argument was still made, but some modern critics harkened back to James Bryant Conant's view that teacher education should be the domain of the entire university. No teaching of educational strategies could make up for a firm grounding in the academic disciplines, a grounding which not only seated the teacher within the larger frame of culture but which helped exercise that general intelligence and capacity for judgement which was the mark of the good teacher.²⁰

It should not be thought, however, that those who favored more technical understandings of teaching were in full retreat. Despite the limitations pointed out above, it could be reasonably argued that the model of technical rationality had if anything gained increased credibility since the romantics, for a brief moment, stole the educational spotlight. Behaviorism, programmed instruction, performance-based teacher education and the effective school literature all lent credence to the idea that the teacher could be that professional accountable for educational success.²¹ As we have

seen, this understanding of a teacher's practice had a long and enduring history. It was this model of technical rationality which had led to the hierarchical structures recommended by early administrative progressives like Ellwood P. Cubberley. And it was this technical conception of educational practice which had in turn led educators to recommend that technical courses in pedagogy form the foundation of a teacher's training. It led reformers and critics like Daniel Lortie to repeatedly stress the standardized and secure knowledge base of teaching as a basis for grounding the claims of teachers to professional status.

The most influential recent reports advocating reform in teacher education continued the tradition. The writers of the Holmes and Carnegie reports urged the abandonment of undergraduate teacher education and more rigorous testing of prospective and practicing teachers, precisely, it seemed, because of their faith in the model of technical rationality. They argued that the technical skills demanded of the effective practitioner could now be based on secure scientific knowledge:

...the science of education promised by Dewey, Thorndike, and others at the turn of the century, has become more tangible. The behavioral sciences have been turned on the schools themselves, and not just in laboratory simulations. Studies of life in classrooms now make possible some convincing and counter-intuitive conclusions about schooling and pupil achievement...Current literature demonstrates that well-meaning, and well-educated persons will make a number of predictable pedagogical mistakes that will disproportionately harm at risk pupils who traditionally do not do well in school, and who may be unlike their teachers in background and temperament.²²

Thus the modern backdrop for education writers critical of expertise included two horizons. On the right were those thinkers who continued to

see education as a science and teachers as professionals who operated in the context of the technical rationality that Schon had discussed. On the left was the romantic tradition, complete with its celebration of the non-quantifiable side of life--emotions, spontaneity, and intuition. The question of the individual and her relation to society lit the entire scene. In some ways both vistas, the left and the right, saw the society and the individual in perpetual conflict. If the romantic would free the individual from all teacher intervention, the advocates of professionalism would make the individual subject to the increased care and authority of the expert. Like John Dewey, many current critics attempted to find some type of higher synthesis. The question they raised was whether teachers and education might benefit from the advances of technical know-how without violating the organic and contextual nature of human knowledge. What type of educational practice might honor the intellectual and moral capacity of both teachers and the students? Below we conclude our examination of the question of expertise and education by a brief review of the recent thought of Philip Jackson and Alan Tom, two theorists who among others have placed such concerns at the center of their work.

Philip Jackson

Even before Daniel Lortie had penned his influential study of teachers, Philip Jackson had written Life in Classrooms.²³ This work, unlike the work of Willard Waller and Lortie, attempted a more wholistic interpretation of classroom life, describing it from both the position of the student and the

teacher. The change of perspective was important both from a methodological and substantive point of view. Jackson held that the classroom was an incredibly complex place. One aspect of classroom life could not be considered apart from another. Consequently, he refrained from attempting to describe the classroom from one methodological perspective. In his opinion, no one method was sufficient. His book is an amalgam of anecdote, statistical study, interpretative interview and "unquantifiable assertion."²⁴

Jackson's approach allowed him to make insightful observations on how the conditions of the school affect student and teacher performance. The student, he argued, does not just learn directly from the teacher, but rather learns under a certain set of circumstances. The incredible amount of time the young spend in the school (7,000 hours from kindergarten to seventh grade alone), as well as the uniformity and routine of the school environment, act to impress upon them a certain perception and demand from them certain skills.²⁵ Students do not just learn to read and write; they learn to read and write in a crowd.²⁶ Students do not just learn how to behave appropriately; they learn how to behave under constant evaluation and under conditions which provide constant sources of distraction and diversion. Successful students do not just learn the prescribed curriculum; they learn the need to wait and the need to contain their desires until the appropriate moment.²⁷ Patience as much as knowledge is demanded of successful students. Successful students can tolerate mistakes and tolerate intermediate rewards. They learn to defer immediate desires, abandoning

personal plans to take up with the designs of the teacher.²⁸

The teacher's perspective is also shaped by the classroom environment. The classroom is an extremely busy and active place. Jackson noted that teachers engage in as many as 1,000 interpersonal exchanges each day.²⁹ This lended feelings of immediacy, urgency, and spontaneity to classroom life. The teachers whom Jackson interviewed relied on small discrete observations to determine if students were learning or whether they were doing a good job. They tended to dismiss standardized tests as either an irrelevant nuisance or a flawed measure of student potential and accomplishment. Judgements in these matters were better made through personal day to day observations.³⁰ Teachers stressed the informality of their classrooms, the importance of working and having an effect on individual students, and the need to have autonomy in their work.³¹ Autonomy was not seen so much as the desire to be isolated and totally independent as the ability to determine classroom curriculum free from the unrequested invasion of outside administrators.³²

Jackson noted that in the face of the great complexity of the classroom, the teachers he interviewed adopted an extremely simple approach.³³ Their talk was unmarked by a sophisticated vocabulary even as their conceptions of why and how students learn were notable for their simplicitiy and lack of elaboration. Teachers tended toward the intuitive rather than the rational explanation, and they appeared to be so concerned with the immediate events of classroom life that they reflected very little on how classrooms or schools could be changed. While teachers were surprisingly confident and strong

about their opinions on teaching, they rarely if ever turned to evidence beyond personal experience to justify their professional preferences.³⁴

Jackson brought a considerable degree of balance to this description of teachers and students. The romantic critics used many of Jackson's insights to point out the repressive nature of the school environment and to emphasize the "hidden curriculum" which would make students the passive recipients of expert care. Yet advocates of expertise, like Daniel Lortie, could point out the unthinking nature of teachers, to their lack of technical sophistication, and to their indifference to a technical subculture. The elements of conservatism, presentism, and individualism which Lortie found so harmful to the development of teaching as a full profession appeared in Jackson's analysis in the simplicity of the teachers' reflection about pedagogical concerns.

Jackson was tempted by neither of these extremes of interpretation. He recognized the power of the teacher in the classroom, and wondered if that type of authority wasn't after all consistent with what students would face in the real world. His appreciation of the context of teaching led him to ask whether the simplicity which teachers showed toward their craft might be a virtue rather than a vice.³⁵ On the face of it, Jackson admitted that the approach appeared strange. He, too, wished teachers to be more intelligent and considerate of the knowledge which underlay their craft. But the teachers whom he had interviewed were supposedly all experienced and highly recommended educators. If one accepted that fact then the descriptions of teaching as a highly rationalized affair, as a mode of social

engineering, might be wrongheaded.³⁶

In these reflections, Jackson wandered far from the model of technical rationality upon which professional expertise is supposedly built. The knowledge appropriate to the craft, Jackson surmized, had to be more contextual and had to be more responsive to the environment in which the teacher operated. Classrooms were not orderly places; they were characterized by human interactions which were unpredictable in both number and sequence. Jackson noted that a teacher facing such complexity and uncertainty must be intelligent, but it is an intelligence characterized by the ability to improvise, to react, and to think on one's feet. At the very least, the teacher must have a real tolerance for ambiguity.³⁷ In distinction to the quest for probability and predictability which marked the efforts of the hardheaded scientist, the worldview of the teachers seemed touched with an almost semi-mystical belief in the perfectability and ultimate potential of children. This idealism seemed quaint and tender-minded, and perhaps out of place in the austere, rationalized and controlled environment of the school. Yet, Jackson believed, that such idealism might even be considered an anecdote to the "toxic qualities of institutional life." A teacher, "by being less than completely rational and methodical in his dealings with students...may help to soften the impact of the impersonal institution."³⁸ The teacher presented students not with a model of an engineer who had calculated in advance all the answers with great accuracy but with a fallible human being. "In this way," he wrote, "the abstract goals of learning are given a human referent. Students cannot aspire to become a computer or a teaching

machine or a textbook, but they can aspire to become a teacher."³⁹

In his later writings, Jackson has wondered if the model of technical rationality so prevalent in the research on teaching had not begun to be more reflected in classroom life itself. Jackson notes that the practice of teaching is becoming more uniformly mimetic rather than transformative.⁴⁰ By this he means that the idea of education as a product is being stressed more than the idea of education as a process. In the present concern for observable and quantifiable results, for higher test scores, and for competency, the mimetic is ascendent. In this view of learning, memory skills and accurate feedback are essential. Jackson does not mean to discount this approach to a teacher's practice; it seems particularly valuable in math, sciences and perhaps languages. Most research on teaching has, in fact, taken place in these types of classes. The insistence of pedagogical research to break down whole learning processes into manageable units is perhaps very helpful in these disciplines. Yet for some types of learning, this approach seems inappropriate. If only the mimetic approach to teaching is emphasized, a whole range of education which deals mainly with the student's character would be lost.⁴¹

The mimetic approach could also have unseen difficulties. The danger with a research method bent on discovering the secret behind good teaching is that it means "that the researchers will possess that knowledge before teachers themselves will."⁴² This type of epistemic authority might not be abused, but the possibility exists that experts will once again attempt to control the learning situation from the top down. The danger is perhaps just

as great in the classroom. Within the learning situation itself, the mimetic point of view makes the teacher an expert herself. The teacher is expected to have direct control of the subject matter and over the methodological means to get the subject matter across. Jackson describes the students by contrast as doubly ignorant and doubly dependent:

They neither know what the teacher knows, substantively speaking, nor do they know how to teach it in methodological terms. This dual condition of ignorance places them below the teacher, epistemologically no matter where they stand regarding other social attributes and statuses.⁴³

By contrast the relationships between teachers and students in the transformative tradition are not nearly so clear cut. In this tradition, the object is a qualitative change in the person being taught, a metamorphosis in which the student is altered in some fundamental way. Values, traits, character, and attitudes are more the object of transformative teaching. Teachers are not expected to know the answer as much as they are bent on discovering the right questions. The methodology of the teacher who teaches in the transformative mode is completely different. Discussion, argumentation, and demonstration are used rather than didactic lecture. More crucially the ends of the transformative teacher are different. Rather than skills and knowledge, the end of teaching is the change in the character of the student herself. This does not mean that the teacher does not profess to have knowledge; it is just that such a profession is less an accomplishment than a search. The transformative teacher's authority is built less out what is known unequivocally than what is known through constant revision and in constant quest of redefining knowledge through

question and argument.⁴⁴

As always, Jackson's overriding concern in describing the differences between the mimetic and transformative styles of teaching was not to recommend one uniformly over another but to suggest a balance. No teacher operated exclusively in the transformative mode. Indeed, one of the difficulties of the latter description was that it seemed idealistically to discount much of the prosaic and mundane duties which a teacher performed each day just to survive daily in the school. Nonetheless, Jackson argued, the transformative was present, if not in conscious strategy then at least in attitude of those teachers who strived to inspire students to take more personal initiative, to question more, and to gain the ability to voice well-defined and substantive opinions. Jackson noted that it was the rare teacher which left one both intellectually stimulated and morally changed. Nonetheless, this clearly was the ideal of practice which he suggested.⁴⁵

Alan Tom

Perhaps more than any other teacher educator, Alan Tom has made his mark as an incisive critic of the applied-science model of teacher research. More recently he has advocated another metaphor of teaching, teaching as a moral craft.⁴⁶ In his book of that title he attempted to describe an understanding of a teacher's practice which might honor the intelligence necessary to teach without limiting pedagogy to a particular technical understanding. Teaching, he argued, is explicitly a moral enterprise, and therefore requires capacities of commitment, care, and judgement as well as

technical skill.

The trouble with the technical model of teaching, Tom argued, was that it was built on two false premises. The first premise was that there existed one best way of teaching. The research which would attempt to describe universally applicable and universally effective teacher behaviors was founded on this premise.⁴⁷ The second premise was connected to the first and Tom described it as the "billiard-ball hypothesis."⁴⁸ In this understanding of teaching, it was believed that a direct link existed between teacher behavior and student learning. The difficulty with this approach, Tom argued, was that it failed to take in account many of the mediating structures which determine learning.

Tom's analysis of the various attempts to discover an expertise of teaching demonstrated more particularly how the false premises operate. The existing research in teaching effectiveness, he explained, might be put on a continuum whose underlying variable is applicability. On the one end would be those attempts to identify teacher behaviors which might have generic application.⁴⁹ These attempts might include such law-like generalizations as Thorndike's principles of learning and those lists of teacher behaviors which research has shown to have the most beneficial effect on student accomplishment. On the other hand might be that research which attempts to take into account more than one variable in determining effective teacher strategies. Aptitude-treatment research is an example here because it attempts to connect teacher tactics more precisely to the aptitude of students. The difficulty with the generic approach is that it has failed to

produce conclusive evidence that one type of teacher behavior might succeed in all situations. The difficulty with the more context-specific approach is that it becomes impossible to decide and limit which variables might most effect learning.⁵⁰

Tom used as an example the idea that student learning was increased by teachers who used more direct instructional approaches in the classroom. As a generic view of teaching this view was deficient because it failed to take into account differences in subject matter where teacher dominance might be inappropriate. Also some students learn better independently rather than being told what to do. Research which attempted to account for these different variables made some progress by postulating that instructional approaches should vary more with the situation. The direct approach seemed better for math, but not as good for art; it seemed better for reluctant learners, but not as good for self-starters. The difficulty, though, was that the complex of variables which might significantly affect the situation soon became so unwieldy as not to be helpful. One could easily find research recommending the direct approach for reluctant learners of normal emotional development in inner-city middle school social studies classes. Still, it would not be clear one would have identified and allowed for all those variables which might impose themselves on the learning situation.⁵¹

Such difficulties, of course, have not prevented researchers from continuing their search. On the one hand, Tom was sympathetic to this because the history of science was built upon the perseverance of thinkers who have profited from past failure. On the other hand, Tom wanted to

raise theoretical and logical difficulties with the idea that teacher research might ever wholly solve the mystery of human learning. The first point was cultural. He argued that teaching was a social event whose aims, purposes and strategies were intimately connected to the way the educational enterprise was constructed.⁵² The present method of universalized schooling indicated one way that modern people have solved the problem of education. Yet this did not mean that this strategy might change. To use the example of Illich, the community-based educational initiatives he proposed might altogether alter how effectiveness was regarded. If frequent testing now seemed a particularly effective teacher behavior in the restricted environment of the school, it might be less prominent in the informal structures he recommended.

Secondly, Tom argued that teacher effectiveness research necessarily focused on the teacher rather than the student, making the latter into a passive receptacle of teacher treatment.⁵³ As objectionable as that view might be philosophically (a point the romantics made often), Tom argued that such a perspective was also blatantly false. His argument related to the "billiard ball" hypothesis mentioned above. The tendency to see a direct link between teacher action and student reaction failed to take into account how students affected teachers. Recent research pointed out that students develop sophisticated means to manipulate a teacher's responses.⁵⁴ Teachers found themselves constantly changing their behavior to student responses as well as vice versa. In addition, student perception of a teacher's behavior might make all the difference in a learning situation.⁵⁵ Many teachers using an

aggressive approach of Socratic questioning have found that students with a fragile sense of self confidence view such efforts as subversive and destructive rather than as enlightening and invigorating.

Tom noted that it was precisely these difficulties which have now led some researchers to regard the best teachers as those whose "behavior is inherently unstable."⁵⁶ It has become more evident that:

the effective teacher may be the one who is able to conceive of his teaching in purposeful terms, analyze a particular teaching problem, choose a teaching approach that seems appropriate to the problem, attempt the approach, judge the results in relation to the original purpose, and reconsider either the teaching approach or the original purpose.⁵⁷

This description seemed a long way from the search for certain and assured explanations of teacher/student interactions. Indeed, Tom argued that the very plasticity of the teaching situation and the changing dynamics of the classroom "suggest that the before-the-act teaching knowledge desired by teacher effectiveness researchers is not likely to be developed."⁵⁸

In the second part of his argument Tom attempted to provide a model of teaching which differed substantially from the applied-science metaphor suggested by the teacher effectiveness researchers. He likened teaching to a moral craft, and defined the term as "a reflective, diligent, and skillful approach toward the pursuit of desirable ends."⁵⁹ He argued that the normative dimension to his understanding of a teacher's practice was critical not because educators might involve themselves intentionally with moral education, but because education itself was substantially a moral enterprise.⁶⁰ The unavoidable inequality between adults and children and

the unavoidable control the teacher had over the process of learning led him to this conclusion. He also voiced some sympathy with the points of Hannah Arendt that essentially teachers are involved in the process of initiating the child into the world. This obligation was not to be neglected by the facile belief that children were the equals of adults, and that they therefore did not require some substantial degree of assistance and direction.⁶¹

As controversial as such a discussion could be, Tom was plainly more nervous about the concept of teaching as a craft.⁶² He realized that many theorists, Daniel Lortie among them, had pointed with dissatisfaction to the trial and error approach associated with the craft metaphor. The craft analogy supposedly stood in the way of conceiving of teaching as a full profession. It also supposedly implied that teaching was built around an apprenticeship system which, in its need to rely on uncoded traditions and on the direction of a mentor, was implicitly imitative and conservative. A craft in Tom's formulation was far more critical, more reflective, and more concerned with the body of knowledge and insights into practice that could inform reasonable pedagogy. The teacher in his view could not expect to rely on a type of knowledge which would solve problems beforehand, but she should be expected to pursue desirable learning goals skillfully and persistently.⁶³

As Tom noted, metaphors are important tools in describing the practice of teaching. A metaphor provokes the practitioner to pay attention to some aspects of her work more than others and to develop and improve the capacity to practice in different ways.⁶⁴ Tom believed that the metaphor of

a moral craft allowed teachers to profit from craft knowledge in a way which was at once reflective and vigorous without being confining. The normative dimension was critical since the mere act of reflection described by other theorists might be simply conceived as an amoral technical activity. In Tom's own work as a teacher educator, the moral craft metaphor has been used to help students reflect on the context of their teaching as well as the type of problems which they encounter in the classroom.⁶⁵ Pedagogical questions more than answers were just as important in his view. The idea of moral craft allowed perspective teachers to ask not only particular questions about how to teach in certain situations but also how their teaching might contribute to the type of individuals which they wish their students to be.

Finally, the craft metaphor was important politically as a means for teacher educators to question the national direction of reform in teacher education. Tom has been a vocal opponent of the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), an organization which attempts to create and uphold standards that lead to national accreditation. His appreciation of the context of teaching and thus the context of teacher education leads him to believe that the national standards employed by NCATE might be too procedural and technical. Again, the type of questions which the standards provoke are just as important as the answers. In his view, NCATE asks questions which lead to mindless conformity rather than serious reflection. They ask whether a program meets NCATE standards, not if the program is based on a defensible conception of educational quality.

Questions about whether the program helps teacher education students understand the normative dimensions of their practice are never asked. Rather implicit in the NCATE standards is the view that form is more important than content, and even further, that one type of form is the best avenue for preparing teachers.⁶⁶ It is the neglect of moral pedagogical reflection which Tom found repugnant in overly technical conceptions of a teacher's practice. It is the view that there is one best way of structuring teacher education that he finds objectionable in the NCATE standards.

Discussion

It is a truism of history that some things never change. In the arguments pressed by Philip Jackson and Alan Tom one can see many of the concerns which had dominated the thinking of previous educational thinkers. Both Jackson and Tom were sensitive to the type of top-down management of teachers that had been earlier advocated by the administrative progressives and Ellwood Cubberley. Cubberley would be perhaps most impressed with the form that the schools had taken in the latter part of the twentieth century. The type of rationalized administrative structure and consolidated system for which he had worked was now largely in place. Of course, the question still remained of the teacher's position within that structure, and on this issue both Jackson and Tom were most concerned.

Both of these theorists found themselves adopting George Counts' counteracting belief that schools should not be run by those espousing just one ideological point of view. Jackson and Tom believed that science itself

had become an ideology, an ideology which threatened to dominate the educational scene and which was all the more objectionable since it was not capable of attending to the terrific complexities of a teacher's practice. The ideology of science paid little attention to the teacher's moral and social obligations. In this sense, Jackson and Tom would agree with Counts that these concerns provided compelling reason for centering teacher training around courses which would make future teachers attend most directly to their larger public purpose.

Yet we can also identify some distinct differences in the views these last two theorists express. There exists in Tom and Jackson little of the faith, which was so apparent in both Counts and Cubberley, that the schools were the chief lever of social progress. Particularly in the writing of Counts one gets the breathless impression that at any moment the world might fall or emerge ascendant due to decisions which might be made in the school. Tom and Jackson lack as well the great concern with social injustice so apparent in the romantic critique of public education. In the case of Tom, one discovers an urge to move beyond the critique of the school as a racist, sexist, and class-based institution to provide suggestions of reform which might be more positive and helpful.⁶⁷ In the case of Jackson, one finds such an appreciation of the ambiguities of classroom life that the possibility of the teacher having a great and direct affect on larger social questions appears much less likely. In this way it might be argued that the greater sophistication of Tom and Jackson in understanding the limitations of educational expertise is purchased at a price. For even in the romantic

critique of technical rationality and of the school as a repressive institution there existed an awe of the great power which those two forces were able to exert over the sensibilities and structure of human consciousness. For Tom and Jackson the teacher is neither an expert upon which to foist greater social obligations, nor a savior who might usher in the new age.

But then again there might be surprising benefits to this more reserved and balanced understanding of the teacher's authority. Particularly Tom believes that a more accurate understanding of the teacher's practice as a moral craft will open up practitioners to the type of questions and reflection that will yield clearer, more morally responsible ways of working with students. Jackson, too, finds a redeeming grace in the flexibility, the simplicity, the straightforward and tender-minded good will of teachers.

In this regard it is possible to see the most distinct difference between Jackson and Daniel Lortie as they faced these same teacher characteristics. Where Lortie, in the glaring light of how other professions have reached for success, found only fault and lack of technical accomplishment, Jackson found reason to question whether the technical model was the most appropriate way to describe a teacher's practice. He could ask whether the presumed faults of teachers might ultimately be virtues, and this could in turn lead him to consider the benefit of emotional sensibilities in an impersonal but interdependent environment. There, after all, might be great power in the maligned sentiments of teachers--in humility, in attitudes of service, in the unrelenting faith in the potential of youth, and in the regard for process and commitment over product and quick satisfaction.

It must be noted that the language by which we describe the practice of teaching and the values on which it is built seems terrifically important in this regard. This was a point which Tom in particular stressed, and in this context, Illich's distinction between Epimethian and Promethian man seems less fanciful after all. For if technical understandings of the teaching profession yielded certain expectations and raised particular issues, perhaps non-technical and less exclusive understandings could yield another set of possibilities. The vocabulary of control, predictability, exclusiveness, probability, manufacture, product, power, effectiveness, autonomy, and competency comprise the lexicon of the teacher who would be expert. The emphasis on process, partnership, cooperation, service, flexibility, inclusiveness, participation, empowerment, and interdependence might provide the vocabulary of the educator for the new age.

This perspective would no doubt require new ways to understand how teachers should go about their craft, about the structures in which they work, and about the ways they need to be educated. And it must be said that on this issue both Jackson and Tom were still remarkably incomplete. Hannah Arendt once said that is easier for the modern person to say what he is against than what he is for, and in the writings of Tom and Jackson we still find this disposition.⁶⁸ Both thinkers, more than any other theorists which we have examined in this study, brought the positivistic model of expertise under critical scrutiny. They are against expertise conceived as the claim to a universally applicable technical skill, but what will take its place and on what basis will the new authority of the teacher be founded?

More particularly, what type of structures might be instituted which would allow for the type of flexibility, choice, and sense of participation that expertise seems to discourage?

As a teacher educator Tom, more than Jackson, is more directly concerned with these questions, and he does attempt to describe ways of going about preparing secondary education teachers that will give them the opportunity to reflect more deeply about the moral and social consequences of their work. This seems a great improvement over modes of instruction which would just focus on what works rather than on what the ends of instruction should be. Yet it is a possibility that Tom's instruction in that regard might be as morally neutral as the technical orientation to which he objects. Tom clearly realizes that teaching has a substantial and unavoidable moral component, but he gives very little indication on where a teacher's moral commitment should lie. He commends the reflective teacher, but the reflective teacher might presumably reflect on morally dubious as well as morally ennobling facets of instruction.

Tom and Jackson clearly support more choice in teacher education. This stance is important because if it is true that teacher educators might not yet know enough about how to construct effective programs, it seems important that at least there be room for experimentation. A single set of teacher education standards could be harmful in this regard. Both Tom and Jackson have vociferously opposed the recommendations of the Holmes and Carnegie Reports partly for this reason.⁶⁹ Tom finds a political motive behind the idea that teacher education should follow one type of structure,

while Jackson finds arrogance and misinformation in the view that we at last know what particular strategies effectively and consistently lead to student learning. Both criticize the idea that the teacher should only be understood in terms of the other professions. Jackson pointedly remarks that the very idea that educators should be compared to doctors is degrading to teachers. Again we see Jackson finding virtue where others have found fault, discovering something particularly ennobling in the attitudes and sentiments of the dedicated teacher.

In this sense it perhaps is very important not to discount too quickly the professionalism of teachers merely because they have failed to live up to the modern model of an exclusive occupation built on a secure technical knowledge base. Historically, at least, this view of professions dates only to nineteenth century and some writers point out it is particularly prevalent in the United States and Great Britain.⁷⁰ Professions have a far longer history, and one element not to be forgotten in this tradition is the attitude of service. This quality is scarcely mentioned in either the Holmes or Carnegie reports, presumably because it has been used to denigrate the intellectual qualities of teachers and to justify lower salaries. Nonetheless, in an age which some have described as narcissistic and which seems bent on securing personal advantage over public obligation, the element of service stands out as a very bright jewel indeed. Paul Goodman was one romantic who professed this more traditional view of the professional precisely because it seemed so out of step with the acquisitive society he found so distasteful.⁷¹

This suggests that teachers do themselves a great disservice by looking to others for the vision of what teaching should be. In this respect both Jackson and Tom emphasize the need for teachers to be more thoughtful about their practice and more imaginative in dealing with the particular problems that they face in teaching. Again it seems that the idea of the teacher as expert, dependent on preconceived answers rather than questions, does not provide a good model for how the teacher must consider learning difficulties in the classroom. Donald Schon has recently advocated the idea of the reflective practitioner as a model for how many professionals might cope with the changing and haphazard nature of their practice.⁷² And some educators have seized upon the idea as a way to describe good teaching. Surely this is very similar to the idea of intelligence and active consideration once advocated by Dewey and now advocated by Tom and Jackson. It is reasonable to speculate that even before Dewey, the best teachers engaged in practice that honored the mystery and possibility of learning, never denying the chance for their students to grow simply because it might conflict with a preconceived idea of how learning should proceed. Once again one cannot help but recognize the inferiority complex of teachers as they must borrow from another source an idea that appears so crucial to an understanding of the classroom in the first place.

Looking more closely at themselves and other practitioners would require that teachers pay more attention to the history of their craft and to the individual teachers who have done it well. Both Tom and Jackson recommend both an increased appreciation of the foundations of education

and an increased emphasis on the writings and reflections of fellow teachers. Tom, in particular, saw great merit in the insights offered by Herbert Kohl on how to overcome some of the problems of instruction.⁷³ In this measure it might be said that the romantics made one of their more lasting contributions to teaching. Kohl, Kozol, and Holt all provided detailed descriptions, not just of the evils of the school but also the problems that they encountered as they tried to teach successfully. Until his death, Holt encouraged teachers to publish in his magazine those insights that might help their colleagues. As Tom and Jackson would argue, such suggestions could not be considered answers, but they could be considered guides to practice. In that way they might be one avenue to increasing the knowledge and the collegiality which remain so important to the formation and practice of a profession.

CHAPTER NOTES

1. Manfred Stanley, The Technological Conscience: Survival and Dignity in the Age of Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 69-70.
2. See for example Gregory H. Davis, Technology--Humanism and Nihilism (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), 65-69; Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 6-26; and Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 410-415.
3. Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 3-20.
4. Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 347-349. Nisbet's argument is that the inflated pretensions of social science led to heightened cultural expectations that were unreachable. When the expectations were not fulfilled, rational knowledge itself was called into question.
5. Randall Collins, The Credential Society (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 135-138.
6. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, 326-327.
7. This point is made by Richard Pratte, The Public School Movement (New York: David McKay Company, 1973), 102-104.
8. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, 13-14.
9. Ibid., 30-37.
10. Quoted in Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, 24.
11. Bruce O. Watkins and Roy Meader, Technology and Human Values (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Science Publications, 1977), 125.
12. A. W. Combs, Myths in Education: Beliefs that Hinder Progress and Their Alternatives (Boston: Allyn and Brown, 1979).

13. David Nyberg and Kieran Egan, The Erosion of Education: Socialization and the Schools (New York: Teacher's College Press, 1981), 105-113.
14. Henry J. Perkinson, The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in Education, 1865-1976 (New York: Random House, 1977).
15. The current debate over the effectiveness of sex and drug education curriculums center on the same concerns. Many advocates of the programs argue that teachers need to be better prepared, program objectives need better definition, and course work needs to be instituted throughout the curriculum. Detractors point out that a simple increase in knowledge and information will not change youthful attitudes. Drug abuse and teenage pregnancies rise because factors other than knowledge influence teenage behavior. Both sides generally agree that school programs alone will not work, and that other institutions will also need to get involved. For good discussions of this debate as well as discussions of effectiveness research see Michael S. Goodstadt, "School-based Drug Education in North America: What is Wrong? What Can Be Done?" Journal of School Health 56, no. 7 (September, 1986): 278-281; and Douglas Kirby, "Sexuality Education: A More Realistic View of its Effects," Journal of School Health 55, no. 10 (December, 1985): 421-424.
16. Ellul, Technological Society, 79-147.
17. Nyberg and Egan, The Erosion of Education, 105-108.
18. Richard J. Murnane, "Understanding the Sources of Teaching Competence: Choices, Skills, and the Limits of Training," Teachers College Record 84, no. 3 (Spring, 1983): 564-569.
19. Ibid.
20. C. A. Bowers, "Rethinking Teacher Education: This Time Let's Get It Right," Teachers College Record 84, no. 3 (Spring, 1983): 557-563.
21. Joel Spring, The American School 1642-1985 (New York: Longman, 1986), 319-323.
22. The Holmes Group, Tomorrow's Teachers (East Lansing, Michigan: The Holmes Group, 1986), 52.
23. Phillip W. Jackson, Life in Classrooms (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).
24. Ibid., vii.
25. Ibid., 4-11.

26. Ibid., 17.
27. Ibid., 18.
28. Ibid., 30.
29. Ibid., 11.
30. Ibid., 124-126.
31. Ibid., 126-143.
32. Ibid., 133.
33. Ibid., 143.
34. Ibid., 144-146.
35. Ibid., 149.
36. Ibid., 163-169.
37. Ibid., 149.
38. Ibid., 152.
39. Ibid., 153.
40. Philip W. Jackson, The Practice of Teaching (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986), 131.
41. Ibid., 137-141.
42. Ibid., 140.
43. Ibid., 125.
44. Ibid., 120-126.
45. Ibid., 144-145.
46. Alan Tom, Teaching as A Moral Craft (New York: Longman, 1984).
47. Ibid., 15-36.
48. Ibid., 55.

49. Ibid., 47.
50. Ibid., 43-45.
51. Ibid., 47-51.
52. Ibid., 66-68.
53. Ibid., 56.
54. Ibid., 63.
55. Ibid., 59-60.
56. Ibid., 71.
57. Ibid., 72.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 128.
60. Ibid., 79-97.
61. See Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1961), 173-196.
62. Tom, The Moral Craft of Teaching, 142-143.
63. Ibid., 128.
64. Ibid., 121-125.
65. Ibid., 152-183.
66. Ibid., 184-191.
67. Alan Tom, "Replacing Pedagogical Knowledge with Pedagogical Questions," in John Smyth (ed.), Educating Teachers: Changing the Nature of Pedagogical Knowledge (London: The Falmer Press, 1987), 9.
68. Arendt, Between Past and Future, 27.
69. See Alan R. Tom, "The Holmes Group Report: Its Latent Political Agenda," Teachers College Record 88, no. 3 (Spring, 1987): 430-435; and Philip Jackson, "Facing Our Ignorance," Teachers College Record 88, no. 3 (Spring, 1987): 384-389.

70. Magali Sarfetti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), xviii, 4-8.
71. Paul Goodman, "The New Reformation" in Irving Howe (ed.), Beyond the New Left (New York: McCall, 1970), 86.
72. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, 21-69.
73. Herbert Kohl, On Teaching (New York: Schocken Books, 1976).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The question of expertise raises enduring problems for our understandings of a teacher's practice. As this short study has revealed, these problems can be located in the thought of many who have attempted to describe the role education is to play in the modern age. If H. G. Wells was correct, that our times are in a race between education and disaster, then such considerations may have implications well beyond the confines of a classroom.

It seems clear that in a technological age experts are both unavoidable and needed. While some like Ivan Illich, Myron Lieberman, Milton Friedman and others describe a world free of credentials and licensing requirements, the trust that many put in the competence of the expert needs to be honored by both training and skill. The teacher in particular seems duty-bound to honor that trust. One is reminded of the students of Socrates running to him because they were excited about the possibility of going to hear the great teacher Protagoras. Yet Socrates cautioned them to consider what they were about to do. A person may go to a cobbler, Socrates explained, and at worst the person will wind up with a poor pair of shoes. A poor choice in tailors will yield the consumer only a bad suit of clothes. Yet what mischief will a poor teacher do when the matter in question is the student's very soul?

In the cold and bureaucratic institution of the school, Socrates' lesson seems out of place. Yet the teachers in the studies conducted by Daniel Lortie and Philip Jackson all pointed to moral issues when they described their reasons for teaching. Success was determined less by whether a student received high marks on a test than whether he demonstrated those characteristics that would make him a better person and a better citizen. For Lortie this represented in many ways an exercise in futility. What test might reveal the greater levels of appreciation for literature, for art, or for one's democratic heritage? What objective measure can rate the self-esteem, the confidence, and the dignity of a student who has not only learned to read but has learned that her skill might be used to help change her world and make it a better place? Lacking an objective measure of that which they most valued, teachers could scarcely begin to claim that dimension of ability befitting the expectations of the expert. Nonetheless, in the descriptions of such students, teachers not only find their reason for being, but locate their awesome responsibilities to the larger public.

On what basis must such a responsibility be grounded? We have looked at some answers to that question in the thought of educators from Ellwood Cubberley to Alan Tom, and the debate continues. Many of the most recent studies of teacher effectiveness now try to describe the work of the "expert" teacher in the classroom.¹ It is possible to consider such efforts as another example of a long line of research which began with the time-motion studies of Frederick W. Taylor and then continued in the work of W.W. Charters, Franklin Bobbitt, and Ralph Tyler. Indeed, in some of the recent work the

implication still resides that if the expert teacher's behavior can be described in sufficient detail, then it can be used to generate those general principles on which to base the profession of teaching.² The implications for teacher education are clear. These new-found principles of teaching might be divided into teachable units and transposed into the teachers to be, thus regenerating out of patch cloth that quilt of competence once observed in the vital actions of a teacher at work.

It seems easy to make fun of such conceptions. As in the myth of Frankenstein, the hope resides that out of the disconnected limbs of others life might be regenerated. What the myth neglects of course is the reality of the school itself, and the dynamics of the situation in which teacher and student behavior makes sense. This is not to say that we cannot learn from others or that the context in which everyone teaches is so idiosyncratic that each of us must rely on the existential virtues of pluck, courage, and good fortune to be successful. The stories and descriptions of good teaching tell us enormous volumes about the need to be prepared, the need to have in place specific and understandable learning objectives, the need to gear method to content, and the need to expect the very best that the students can offer. Yet what such descriptions also tell us is that no one method can be successful, and that even in the most well-prepared lesson, contingencies will arise that will subvert our best efforts. Indeed what such descriptions might tell us is that the vocabulary built around success and production is not the only language by which to describe the effective teacher. Included as well must be qualities of perseverance, patience, humor, and good will.

The research into expertise has also yielded another most interesting finding. We now discover that even the most expert teachers lack the ability to describe exactly what they do which provides that opportunity for students to learn.³ This, of course, matches what Jackson discovered in the inability of teachers to articulate with any degree of sophistication the basis for their classroom success. What Jackson attributed to environmental adjustment and Lortie attributed to technical stupidity, many now explain by the concept of tacit knowledge. In fact it is this concept which is used to describe the startling inability of experts in many fields to explain the brilliant strategy which carried the moment. Conceived technically, the concept of tacit knowledge carries with it the great possibility of the treasure chest which if it might only be pried open might display its riches for all to behold. Yet in another sense tacit knowledge indicates that the mystery of learning might be something which is, after all, so organic that it resists our abilities to discern. To encapsulate such treasures in the fabricated confines of a method might turn to worthless dust what otherwise had value only by being alive and whole.

Perhaps it is for this reason that teachers commonly express such great delight and gratitude when, after many futile attempts, the student who has been unable to understand suddenly learns. Gratitude is not the proper response of a technician whose methods have provided the desired and expected result. Yet it is the proper response for the teacher who understands that her best efforts, mediated by the whole history of the student and the whole range of possibility arising out of personal disposition

and institutional restraint, has at last resulted in insight. Certainly, as Lortie and others have pointed out, teaching can be an humiliating profession. Yet it can also be in the best sense a humbling experience. Tacit knowledge, that inexplicable and dark domain of a teacher's craft, approaches in these instances the wisdom of Socrates. One only knows that one does not know.

Such wisdom, of course, also results from the fantastic amount of knowledge which now is available and which necessitates that the range of our understanding must be narrowed to be useful. In calculating what it seems appropriate for teachers to know, it is easy to be staggered. Knowledge of subject matter must be accented by understandings of pedagogy which are appropriate generally and which are specific to subject matter. The teacher must be aware of the types of relationships intrinsic to the school, must be knowledgeable about the legal and political basis of education, and must be familiar with the historical, social, and moral foundations of teaching. Finally, the teacher needs to understand the principles of child development and growth, needs to be familiar with the best understandings of learning theory, and needs to understand the problems of the special learner in the general classroom. Given this description, it becomes difficult to imagine that training or even those exams which might completely promote and measure the competence of the professional teacher.

Also given this amount of description, the suggestions for requiring additional schooling and higher and more rigorous certification standards seems like a reasonable reform. It is also in keeping within the ethic of

service which arises out of the need for technical competence. One might talk about the moral basis of teaching as Alan Tom has done in more than one way. The incompetent teacher, the teacher who has failed to master that minimum proficiency necessary to perform, has failed morally as well.

In some ways what calls such a reasonable argument most into question is not that it is incorrect, but rather that it is substantially correct and yet different implications can be drawn.⁴ Philip Jackson's and Alan Tom's contention that we know very little about what produces learning lies not too far afield from the view that there is too much to know. The argument for extended teacher training carries with it the implication that more schooling will carry discernable benefit in the classroom. So far no studies that I know of reveal such a connection. Also the argument implies that extended training, training which might disconnect liberal arts from professional course work, will allow teachers to incorporate more of the mass of knowledge needed to teach. Yet this proposition implies not only that such a mass of knowledge can be known in an objective way (in the same way, for example, as one might learn the facts about geography), but also suggests that how one learns has no necessary connection to what one learns. Those who argue for teacher training in the context of a liberal arts university provide another argument.⁵ They claim that the spirit of inquiry prevalent in such liberal arts training will better serve students who wish to teach but must be learners themselves if they are to survive in the classroom. If there simply is too much to know, then it may be that what a teacher needs is not some measure of objective knowledge so readily discernable by

objective test, but an open attitude toward reflection, consideration, and pragmatic experimentation. It is just such an attitude which Dewey believed to be the most rewarding dimension of the scientific ethos.

At the very least the contextual nature of schooling and learning indicates that the opportunity for different types of teacher training and schooling programs should not so easily be abandoned in the hopes of a more technically uniform conception. Ellwood Cubberley's dream of a standardized and consolidated public school system running efficiently and consistently represents one part of the modern equation and gives great emphasis to producing a differentiated and well-trained workforce. Yet another part of the American history of the schools has less to do with technical excellence and standardization than with choice and diversity. It arises less out of Jefferson's vision of raking the diamonds from the rubbish than Jackson's vision of the equal competence of the common person and the right of each individual to chart a personal course. In the American context questions of equality and excellence wage a continual battle, but the hope resides that the struggle will reveal possibilities and dimensions which the singular minds of the current experts could not yet foresee.

In this context it is important to keep in mind the traditional right of parents to determine out of their own individual interest that education which they believe best for their own children. It is particularly difficult to know just when to draw the line in this matter which so tenuously balances the public need for a well-prepared work force and an educated citizenry with the right of the individual to assert and create his own standards of

competence. Yet the modern increase in religiously-related schools, operating with staffs with the most minimal backgrounds in teacher training, indicates that many do not see education only as a secular, technical, and amoral function. Beyond that many public schools have attempted to increase parental choice and participation by devising special alternative curricular programs. The recognition that parental involvement is needed for successful schools flies full in the face of an expert model which would connect effectiveness with the passivity and disability of the clients being served.

Of course the primary "clients" are the students themselves. This provides the most important context to our considerations. To conceive of the student as a client or the school as a service institution or the teacher as an expert seems on the one hand to be only a manner of speaking. On the other hand, such language has a metaphorical dimension which suggests that learning is a type of treatment and that schools themselves are the singular agencies meant to oversee the education of the young. To a large degree this is true, but as the romantics were particularly fond of pointing out, education is an activity which requires the participation of the student if it is to have meaning. If the romantics in their repugnance to authority identified only the most meager and malnourished role for the teacher, they did reemphasize distinctions between conditioning and indoctrination on the one hand and education on the other. Education implies freedom, personal responsibility over what one learns and ownership of the knowledge one possesses. Education implicates the ability of the learner, not the ability of

the teacher who has been so able to manipulate events as to promote the desired response in the subject. Even in the regimented and ordered institution of the school, as Waller long ago reminded us, the great charge of the teacher is to so create that learning environment that the personality of the learner himself will be engaged, and he will begin to participate more fully and integrally in what certainly now needs to be a lifelong quest to be educated.

This understanding suggests that the practice of teaching must be grounded in moral understandings as well as technical ability. Alasdair MacIntyre has recently provided a convincing picture of modern society in which the allegiance to individualism has become so central that our understandings of public obligations and of compelling virtue have become malnourished.⁶ He holds up in distinction the concept of practice which he generally defines as that pursuit which provides the actor with both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.⁷ The intrinsic rewards of the teacher include the need to empower the learner to be ultimately independent and free of the teacher's service. In this sense, the service of obligation of the professional educator seems less peripheral than central, and it seems less appropriate that it be thrown into the shadow of increased technical competence. Generally the epistemic authority of the teacher seems justified only as it "self destructs." Usually the intervention of expert service leaves the reason and nature of client dependency untouched. The client remains in unequal and subservient relation; he has not developed the abilities to serve his own needs. In distinction, the teacher whose knowledge has not been

used to make the student less dependent has failed. The point of educational service is to get the student to perform, not to reserve performance for the teacher.

This dissertation has tried to provide an historical and theoretical examination of the appropriateness of expertise for the practice of teaching. While we have looked at what some of the best minds have been able to say about the advantages and disadvantages of the "expert teacher," in the final analysis not much has been decided. The professional educator finds herself perhaps more than any other professional in an ambiguous position. While involved in an enterprise which centers on knowledge both in content and form, the teacher must find a way of involving and including others in much of the very knowledge which provides her the means to livelihood.

It is possible that in this instance we have focused on the wrong question. We have considered whether the idea of the teacher as expert might be advantageous to the practice of teaching. We have not addressed whether teaching might be advantageous to the conception of expertise. It is no doubt too much to ask that doctors, lawyers, and those involved in other service professions adopt a wholly self-abnegating concept of practice. Nonetheless, teachers have much to tell the world about the need to develop capacities for communication, for growth, and for sharing knowledge in the interest of a common good. No doubt teachers too have much to learn about developing the types of institutional arrangements that make learning truly accessible to all elements of the population. Teachers will continue to be the special group most responsible for the education of the young. This seems

unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Yet many of the thinkers examined in this paper have recommended limits. In this matter we must affirm that a public educational system built around exclusive knowledge and exclusive privilege operates at cross purposes. The practice of the teacher, no matter the amount of skill and knowledge involved, requires at the very least this unavoidable connection to both the wisdom and the needs of the common people. To keep that connection alive is critical for the teacher as well as for all who make a living by their special knowledge.

CHAPTER NOTES

1. See for example, David C. Berliner, "In Pursuit of the Expert Pedagogue," Educational Researcher 15, (August/September, 1986): 5-13; and Lee S. Schulman, "Knowledge and Teaching," Harvard Educational Review 57, no. 1 (February, 1987): 1-22.
2. Berliner, "In Pursuit of the Expert Pedagogue", 5-6.
3. Ibid., 7.
4. For a good discussion of the different implications of the new research on teaching see Hugh T. Sockett, "Has Shulman Got the Strategy Right?" Harvard Educational Review 57, no. 2 (May, 1987): 208-219.
5. Susan Reimer Sacks and Eva Foldes Travers, "Teacher Education and the Liberal Arts: The Position of the Consortium for Excellence in Teacher Education," (February, 1987): 5-7.
6. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 1-22. See also Robert N. Bellah, et al. Habits of the Heart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984).
7. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 169-189.

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