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**STRATEGIC SELF-PRESENTATION AND SELF-ESTEEM: COMPENSATORY
SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND COMPENSATORY SELF-PROTECTION**

DISSERTATION

**Presented in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University**

By

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*** * * * ***

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ABSTRACT

Four studies investigated the self-presentation strategies used by those high and low in self-esteem to navigate a negative public image, using methodologies adapted from Baumeister and his colleagues (Baumeister, 1982; Baumeister & Jones, 1978). Three of four studies failed to replicate the compensatory self-enhancement effect for participants at any level of self-esteem. One study revealed compensatory self-enhancement, more favorable self-presentation after a negative public image than after a positive image on traits unrelated to the public image, among those very high in self-esteem. In addition, this study also revealed compensatory self-protection, the denial of negative traits unrelated to a public image, among participants at all levels of self-esteem. The relative reliability of the compensatory enhancement effect is discussed as well as the importance of distinguishing between favorable self-presentation designed to identify with positive characteristics and to deny the presence of negative characteristics.

Dedicated to my mentors in psychology:
Sheila Burns, Steve Platt, and Robert Arkin

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INTRODUCTION

Theorists from many branches of psychology have argued that humans have a fundamental desire to feel good about themselves (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956; Becker, 1973; James, 1890; Rogers, 1959; Rosenberg, 1965). A great deal of theoretical work in personality and social psychology has focused on various mechanisms by which people either seek to increase their positive feelings about themselves (e.g., Steele, 1988) or portray themselves positively to others (e.g., Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980).

In the interpersonal domain, theorists in psychology and sociology interested in this motive have often focused on the strategies individuals use to create desired impressions in others. Some have focused on the functional aspect of self-presentation in facilitating social interaction (e.g., Goffman, 1959) or gaining material rewards (e.g., Jones, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). While others have emphasized how self-presentation helps individual create desired identities (e.g., Rosenberg, 1979; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), or noted the pervasive impact of the motive to present oneself strategically on a wide variety of social behaviors (e.g., Baumeister, 1982b). Most have maintained, in one way or another, that the primary motive behind the vast majority of self-presentation is to present a favorable image of the self, whether it be to gain a specific goal or, more generally, elicit a favorable evaluation (Leary & Kowalski, 1990).

A clear example of the motive to present a favorable image manifest in an acquaintanceship context was demonstrated by Baumeister and Jones (1978) and termed “compensatory self-enhancement.” These investigators demonstrated that individuals, when faced with a negative public image, present themselves more positively on dimensions unrelated to that image. More specifically, they found that participants who anticipated meeting a new activity partner rated themselves particularly positively on personality traits unrelated to a public, negative description of their personality. This shift in the dimension of positive self-presentation demonstrates that people take into account the knowledge of their audience when making favorable self-presentations. It also, however, illustrates that most people are motivated to restore or create a positive public impression in response to interpersonal setbacks. Presenting such an image, in turn, most likely serves not only to foster a positive public impression, but also a more positive private self-evaluation, whether it is through intrapsychic processes (e.g., Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981) or reflected self-appraisals (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934).

Most investigators have found compensatory self-enhancement only among those high in self-esteem (Baumeister, 1982a; Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, & Gerrard, 1999; Brown & Smart, 1991). For example, Baumeister (1982) found that, after receiving feedback indicating that they were self-centered, only those high in self-esteem were more likely to describe themselves to a partner more positively on personality traits unrelated to being self-centered (e.g., creative). Furthermore, only those high in self-esteem also went on to behave in ways contradictory to the personality profile (i.e., more

cooperatively) on a subsequent task. These findings are an indication that those high in self-esteem are more likely to cope with setbacks with a direct attempt to reestablish a positive image in the eyes of others. They are also consistent with the general idea that the positive self-evaluations those high in self-esteem possess are more likely to generalize to their self-portrayals to others.

Self-Presentation Styles and Self-Esteem

More generally, many have argued that those low and high in self-esteem differ in the strategies they use to present themselves to others (e.g., Arkin, 1981; Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). The self-presentation style of those high in self-esteem has been characterized as risky, confident, and self-aggrandizing while the style of those low in self-esteem has been described as cautious, conservative and self-protective (Arkin, 1981; Baumeister et al., 1989). Indeed, in addition to being more likely to engage in compensatory self-enhancement, those high in self-esteem are also more likely than those low in self-esteem to make self-serving attributions in public (Schlenker, Weigold, & Hallam, 1990) and seek self-enhancing social comparison information after threat (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Wood, Giordano-Beech, Taylor, Michela, & al, 1994). High self-esteem participants' stronger tendency to engage in compensatory self-enhancement can also be understood as an example of their more acquisitive, self-enhancing self-presentation style. The absence of compensatory self-enhancement for those low in self-esteem is also representative of their cautious, self-protective self-presentation style. Low self-esteem individuals may be less likely to engage in compensatory self-enhancement because doing so represents a self-

presentation risk; if they present themselves positively on other dimensions, they risk disconfirming that positive portrayal when they interact with their audience.

Those low in self-esteem, in fact, have shown a similar risk-averse pattern in studies of decision making (for a review, see Larrick, 1993). For example, those low in self-esteem make fewer risky decisions than those high in self-esteem when faced with a choice between a risky gamble (e.g., a 50% chance of winning \$20) and a safe choice (e.g., a sure gain of \$10) with the equivalent expected value (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992). Furthermore, the risk-averse tendencies of those low in self-esteem disappeared when the outcome of each of the gambles was withheld and the gamblers could not determine if their choices were successful. Based on these findings, Josephs and his colleagues argue that those low in self-esteem are particularly motivated to avoid discovering their bad decisions, which represents a threat to their self-esteem. It is likely that many social situations calling for positive self-presentation, especially those involving potential future interaction with the audience, pose a similar threat to those low in self-esteem. While they may desire approval and positive outcomes, the threat of disapproval or disappointment looms large and makes them cautious in their self-presentation as well.

The Self-Enhancement Motive and Low Self-Esteem

When trying to understand why those low in self-esteem are less likely to engage in compensatory self-enhancement, it is important to keep in mind that participants with “low self-esteem” in the typical study are likely, in absolute terms, to have moderately positive self-evaluations. Their self-protective self-presentation style likely reflects a

desire to protect the esteem that they already have rather than covering up an overly negative self-evaluation. Examination of the self-esteem scores of those low in self-esteem often reveals a positive self-evaluation, but one that is less extreme and, perhaps, conflicted. For example, in a review of a variety of studies in which self-esteem was assessed, Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton (1989) argued that the scores of those low in self-esteem, especially in college populations, are typically moderately positive in terms of the scales that are used to measure self-esteem. In many studies, those described as having low self-esteem typically have scores above the midpoint of the scales used (indicating self-evaluations that are, on average, positive), but below the median of the populations sampled (Baumeister et al., 1989). Consistent with this argument, the self-ratings of those low in self-esteem in the compensatory self-enhancement studies are also moderately positive, rather than negative (see Baumeister, 1982a; Boney-McCoy et al., 1999; Brown & Smart, 1991).¹

Furthermore, those low and high in self-esteem do not differ in their desire for success, but do differ in whether they expect to succeed (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981). In a study in which success and failure feedback were administered, those low and high in self-esteem differed dramatically in their predictions of their future performance (high SEs became optimistic and low SEs pessimistic after failure), but no difference were found in their reports of how successful they would like to be in the future (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1981). Similarly, when assessing current affective and cognitive responses

¹ For the sake of consistency with the current literature, even though in an absolute sense they have moderately positive self-evaluations, I will refer to individuals in the bottom half of the self-esteem distribution as having low self-esteem (low SEs).

to failure, those low and high in self-esteem differed strongly in the degree to which they thought failure feedback was descriptive of them, but their mood state was equally negative, suggesting similar affective responses to failure (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987).

Furthermore, studies have demonstrated that those low in self-esteem will seek self-enhancing options but only by indirect means. For example, Brown and his colleagues found that those low in self-esteem displayed in-group favoritism only with groups with whom they were not directly involved, while those high in self-esteem displayed such favoritism only when they were directly involved with a group (Brown, Collins, & Schmidt, 1988). These studies have primarily focused on uncovering a desire for self-enhancement among those low in self-esteem, but have not addressed how low self-esteem individuals' desire for positive evaluations expresses itself in interpersonal contexts.

Thus, while those low in self-esteem do appear to struggle with low expectations about their performance and their self-evaluations are not wholly positive, there is evidence suggesting that they have self-evaluations that are generally positive, desire positive outcomes, and will take safe opportunities to bolster their self-esteem. It seems likely that this motive for positive self-evaluation on the part of those low in self-esteem also manifests itself in situations that involve self-presentation.

Few, however, have explicitly studied the self-presentation strategies of those low in self-esteem. For example, although Brown and his colleagues' (1988) assessed the degree to which subjects identified with the successful performance of a group, the

ratings participants made were relatively private (i.e., only read by the experimenter) and were not likely to be reflective of their styles of self-presentation. Those low in self-esteem are typically characterized as having a cautious self-presentation style that involves withdrawal and avoidance of evaluative situations (Arkin, 1981; Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989), but given the current evidence of the desire for self-enhancement among those typically described as low in self-esteem, it may be that they will engage in certain types of active and strategic self-presentation that are consistent with their self-protective orientation.

Low Self-Esteem and Navigating Threatening Interpersonal Situations

Although the literature on compensatory self-enhancement indicates that those high in self-esteem are more likely to cope with interpersonal setbacks by presenting themselves favorably, there is some evidence that those low in self-esteem, when faced with a threat to self-esteem, will also engage in public self-presentation that bolsters their image, at least in indirect ways. For example, those low in self-esteem will rate the source of a negative evaluation less positively in public but not in private, while those high in self-esteem show the reverse pattern (Baumgardner, Kaufman, & Levy, 1989). This finding is consistent with the self-protective style of those low in self-esteem in that rating a source less positively avoids characterizing the self, but also demonstrates that those low in self-esteem do not necessarily simply “roll over” in circumstances requiring self-presentation and accept negative feedback (i.e., they are motivated to refute it if given the opportunity to do so without being self-aggrandizing).

Those low in self-esteem may also be motivated to present themselves favorably in public situations, but their strategies for doing so are likely to differ from those employed by those high in self-esteem. In the terms of Higgins' Regulatory-Focus Theory (Higgins, 1999), those high in self-esteem maintain a promotion focus in their self-presentation behavior in which they are motivated by the presence or absence of positive outcomes (i.e., social approval). Toward that end, they portray themselves positively to others in order to secure approval (e.g., compensatory self-enhancement). Those low in self-esteem, on the other hand, maintain a prevention focus in which they are more sensitive to the presence or absence of negative outcomes (i.e., social disapproval). Their self-presentation strategies are more likely to be aimed at avoiding disapproval.

Consistent with this analysis, some have drawn the distinction between two basic types of favorable self-presentation: attributive and repudiative (Roth, Snyder, & Pace, 1986). Attributive self-presentation involves crediting the self with positive characteristics, while repudiative self-presentation is the denying of negative characteristics. In light of this distinction, it is interesting to note that the experimental paradigm typically used to investigate compensatory self-enhancement, typically obscures whether participants are engaging in attributive or repudiative self-presentation.

Participants in a compensatory self-enhancement study are usually asked to rate themselves on bipolar scales that are anchored with positive and negative trait words (e.g., sincere-insincere) that are ostensibly shown to a partner (e.g., Baumeister, 1982a; Baumeister & Jones, 1978). Because of the nature of the bipolar scales, attributive and

repudiative self-presentation are linked in a reciprocal fashion; when affirming one possesses a positive trait, one is also denying the related negative trait. Participants in these studies may be motivated to deny negative traits, but some (e.g., those low in self-esteem) may not be comfortable with also claiming they have the opposite positive trait. The result may be a response in the neutral portion of the scale for low self-esteem participants, resulting in the typical compensatory self-enhancement bolstering observed in those high in self-esteem, but obscuring their motivation to avoid disapproval in those low in self-esteem.

If, however, participants were faced with a situation in which they were asked only about the degree to which they possessed negative characteristics, those low in self-esteem would be in a position in which the self-protective and self-enhancing response would be the same; they would be able to deny undesirable traits on unrelated items and, thus, present the favorable (or at least, non-negative) face that they presumably desire to present to their audience. If the compensatory self-enhancement paradigm were adapted in this way to provide an opportunity for repudiative self-presentation, it would allow for compensatory self-protection, and those low in self-esteem would be able to engage in favorable self-presentation but with less risk. In addition, if participants also completed the typical measures of attributive self-presentation (e.g., self-ratings of related and unrelated desirable qualities), such a design could also allow for the assessment of compensatory self-enhancement.

Socially Desirable Responding and Self-Presentation

The current design also allows for the investigation of some key issues relevant to the literature on socially desirable responding and self-presentation. For nearly as long as psychologists have been developing measures of personality, psychopathology, and attitudes, they have been concerned about the degree to which self-presentation motivations bias self-report measures. The chief concern has been to understand how socially desirable responding (SDR) affects self-reports and develop techniques to deal with the problem (for reviews, see DeMaio, 1984; Nederhof, 1985; and Paulhus, 1991). The most popular and convenient approach has to been develop and use SDR questionnaires, like the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlow, 1960), which are designed to assess response styles in order to determine if such styles influence participants' responses.

In recent years, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1984, 1991) has become a very popular instrument for measuring SDR because it distinguishes between two types of SDR that have both plagued and intrigued researchers: self-deceptive enhancement and impression management. According to Paulhus (1991), self-deceptive enhancement is "an honest but overly positive self-presentation), while impression management is "[favorable] self-presentation tailored to an audience" (Paulhus, 1991). Little empirical work has been done to determine what kind of self-presentation behavior the two BIDR subscales predict. Of particular interest to the current discussion, because of its relation to self-presentation to audiences, is the degree to which the impression management (IM) scale predicts attributive and

repudiative self-presentation differentially. Current measures of socially desirable responding, including the IM scale of the BIDR, do not distinguish between attributive and repudiative self-presentation. The current paradigm, which is designed to distinguish between attributive and repudiative self-presentation, provides an opportunity to discriminate between the types of favorable self-presentation the IM scale predicts and how it may interact with self-esteem.

Given the nature of the IM scale and our predictions for self-esteem, there are two plausible predictions for how the IM scale would predict self-presentation in the current paradigm designed to assess both compensatory self-enhancement and compensatory self-protection. First, the IM scale could combine with self-esteem in a straightforward “additive” way to predict compensatory self-enhancement such that high self-esteem/high impression management participants would be the most likely to engage in compensatory self-enhancement. That is, those high in self-esteem and high in impression management would be the most likely to be motivated to compensate for failure feedback by presenting themselves most positively. Schneider and Turkat (1975) reported such a finding among those high in self-esteem and high on the Marlowe-Crowne scale. They did not, however, in the selection of their dependent measures, distinguish between those that were related to the administered feedback and those that were unrelated, which makes it difficult to determine if participants were trying to refute the feedback or bolster on unrelated dimensions.

Alternatively, the IM scale may predict compensatory self-protection more than compensatory self-enhancement. That is, the IM scale may be most likely to predict the

denial of negative characteristics in the face of failure rather the claiming of positive characteristics. Examination of the IM scale reveals that the items are about socially undesirable behaviors (e.g., swearing, gossiping, littering) and, thus, seems more likely to measure repudiative self-presentation rather than attributive (for a copy of the BIDR, see Appendix J). For example, participants who complete the IM scale get points for strongly denying items like “I sometimes tell lies if I have to.” This, by definition, is repudiative self-presentation and suggests that the IM scale is more likely to assess this type of favorable impression management. If the IM scale taps repudiative self-presentation and the link between low self-esteem and repudiative self-presentation is also born out, the IM scale and self-esteem could interact in an altogether different way: those low in self-esteem who are high in impression management may be the most likely to engage in compensatory self-protection.

In addition to exploring the hypotheses related to the IM scale, the following experiments were designed to test the primary hypothesis that both low and high self-esteem participants would also compensate for failure experience by engaging in more favorable self-presentation. Low self-esteem participants, however, were predicted to only engage in favorable repudiative self-presentation only, while high self-esteem participants were predicted to favor attributive self-presentation.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that there is no reason to think that those high in self-esteem would not also take advantage of opportunities for repudiative self-presentation. While the aforementioned literature suggests their propensity for direct and favorable self-presentation, it has not typically distinguished between these types of

favorable self-presentation. The literature does, however emphasize that those high in self-esteem appear to have a strong motive to present themselves favorably (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1989), and engaging in repudiative self-presentation is another way to do so.

PILOT STUDIES

In the beginning stages of this research project, pilot studies were conducted in order to determine if the procedures were effective for testing the hypotheses regarding self-presentation style and self-esteem. The following sections briefly describe the procedures and results for these preliminary studies in order to provide context for the procedures used in the final studies.

Pilot Study 1: Using “Integrative Orientation” Feedback

The first pilot study was run using a modified version of Baumeister and Jones’ (1981) paradigm. The main modification was in the type of feedback given to participants; whereas Baumeister and Jones (1981) administered a bogus personality profile to each participant, bogus test scores were administered for a novel personality trait called “integrative orientation (IO).” A similar type of feedback was used by Brown and Smart (1991) in a study that found compensatory self-enhancement among those high in self-esteem.

Method

Sixty-five participants (33 men and 32 women) from introductory psychology classes completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965) and the

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991) prior to the experiment as a part of another study (for a copy of both measures, see Appendix J). One participant was dropped because she expressed strong suspicion about the cover story. Participants agreed to participate in a study of acquaintanceship and expected to interact with a stranger while working on a problem-solving task. Prior to meeting their partner, participants received positive (a score in the 94th percentile), negative (a score in the 42nd percentile) or no feedback about their performance on a test of IO. Participants who received feedback were told that their scores were shown to their upcoming partner, that IO was a personality dimension associated with “creative problem solving and the ability to process and integrate verbal information independent of a person’s overall intellectual ability,” and that IO is important to success in the task.

After receiving feedback, participants completed questionnaires to be read by their partner, ostensibly to give their partner a chance to get to know them better before they met to play the game. On the first page, they rated themselves on twenty randomly-ordered desirable traits, ten of which were pre-tested to be related to IO (*intellectual, clever, imaginative, agreeable, articulate, bright, well-read, rational, cultured, & perceptive*) and ten of which were unrelated to IO (*active, tolerant, appreciative, open, relaxed, energetic, creative, lively, forgiving, & tender*).² On the next page, they rated

² Thirty-eight participants read a description of IO and rated the likelihood that a person who is low in IO would have each of 82 traits on a seven point scale (3 = A person low in IO would DEFINITELY have this trait; 0 = I cannot tell, this trait is unrelated to IO; -3 = A person low in IO would DEFINITELY NOT have this trait). Mean ratings ranged from -2.21 to 1.95. Desirable and undesirable traits with mean ratings near the extremes of the scale (> 1.0 and < -1.0) were selected as traits related to IO. Similarly, items with mean ratings near 0 (between -.45 and .45) were selected as items unrelated to IO.

themselves on twenty undesirable traits, ten of which were pre-tested to be related to IO (*illogical, unsystematic, scatter-brained, inaccurate, self-concerned, unwise, unmethodical, noninquisitive, absent-minded, & critical*) and ten of which that were unrelated to IO (*old-fashioned, inattentive, rigid, apprehensive, hurried, detached, worried, indifferent, ordinary, & secretive*). All ratings were made on a ten-point Likert-type scale with the zero point removed (*-5 = extremely non-descriptive of me; -3 = somewhat non-descriptive of me; -1 = slightly non-descriptive of me; 1 = slightly descriptive of me; 3 = somewhat descriptive of me; and 5 = extremely descriptive of me*). The zero point was removed from the scale to keep participants from using the zero point as a means of indicating that the trait did not apply to them or withdrawing from rating themselves on the trait. Afterward, participants completed several measures consistent with the cover story, which included a rating of their satisfaction with their scores (*-3 = very dissatisfied; 0 = neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 3 = very satisfied*) in order to assess the impact of the manipulation. Last, participants were given an opportunity to write their comments about the study and were thoroughly debriefed.

Results

In addition to investigating compensatory self-enhancement and compensatory self-protection, the current line of research also provided an opportunity to use a regression approach to studying the degree to which such self-presentation strategies are associated with a variety of levels of self-esteem. By including a quadratic effect (e.g.,

the square of the self-esteem scores) and its interaction with profile condition, we can determine, not only if self-esteem predicts the dependent measures at low, moderate, and high levels of self-esteem, but also if any observed interactions differ at any of these levels.³ Treating self-esteem as a continuous variable is an approach with more statistical power because it retains more information about the underlying continuum of scores (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002), and is an approach particularly suited to the current purposes because it can, for example differentiate the self-presentation styles observed among those with wholly positive self-evaluations (e.g., those very high in self-esteem) and those who have self-evaluations that are moderately positive on the underlying continuum (e.g., those “low” and moderate in self-esteem).

Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to determine whether scores on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire moderated the impact of type of feedback (i.e., low score, high score, or no score) on self-presentation.⁴ Following standard procedures (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983), feedback condition was dummy coded across two variables, such that the no feedback condition was coded “0” in both variables to act as the baseline condition (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). In the first step of the analyses, self-esteem scores and the two feedback variables were entered first to test for main effects, and the product of the self-esteem term each of the two feedback terms was entered next to test for interaction effects. Last, the quadratic component of the self-

³ For the reader who is more familiar with ANOVA than regression analyses, assessing the quadratic effect is analogous to doing a tertiary split on the predictor variable and looking for effects at each of the three levels: low, moderate and high.

esteem effect (i.e. the square of self-esteem scores) and the product of this component and each of the feedback condition were entered to test for the interaction of the two. In the steps in which interaction terms were added to the equation, two interaction terms (i.e., one for each condition term) were created and added to the equation in a separate step and the overall change in variance accounted for was inspected to determine if the overall interaction was statistically significant. To simplify interpretability of the regression analysis, self-esteem scores were standardized prior to analysis (Aiken & West, 1991).

Manipulation check. As expected, analyses of participants' satisfaction with their feedback in the negative and positive score conditions yielded a main effect of type of feedback ($\beta = .83, t = 9.56, p < .001$). Participants who received low scores were less satisfied with their feedback ($M = -1.60; sd = .28$) and those who received high scores ($M = 2.06; sd = .27$). No other effects were statistically significant.

Measures of self-presentation. The scale of participants' responses to the items in the dependent measure questionnaire was transformed to set the lowest rating (i.e., "extremely un-descriptive of me") to zero and to remove the gap between ratings of "-1" and "1" (i.e., $-5 = 0; -4 = 1; -3 = 2; -2 = 3; -1 = 4; 1 = 5; 2 = 6; 3 = 7; 4 = 8; 5 = 9$) in order to provide a continuous scale for the dependent measures. Indexes of each type of self-presentation item (desirable unrelated, desirable related, undesirable unrelated, and undesirable related) were computed by taking an average of all items of each type.

⁴ Because the sample size in Experimental 1 was relatively small (i.e., $N = 51$) and statistical power was low for conducting analyses of three-way interactions, the moderating impact of socially desirable responding on self-esteem and profile condition were not explored.

Analyses of desirable unrelated, undesirable unrelated, and desirable related items yielded no main effects and no interactions. Thus, no evidence for compensatory self-enhancement or compensatory self-protection was observed. Analyses of undesirable related items revealed only an effect for the quadratic self-esteem term ($\beta = -.58$, $t = -2.12$, $p = .04$), such that those very high in self-esteem were particularly likely to deny they possessed undesirable traits related to IO (see Figure 1 for an illustration of this effect).

Figure 1: Self-ratings on undesirable IO related traits as a function of Rosenberg self-esteem scores.

Conclusions

Although it is unclear why participants did not exhibit compensatory self-enhancement or self-protection in this first pilot study, anecdotal evidence suggests that the changes made to Baumeister's paradigm might have generated more concern among participants about their integrative orientation scores and their performance on the problem-solving task rather than generating the intended concern about self-presentation to their partner. Examination of participants' open-ended comments indicated that many were concerned about the nature of the upcoming problem-solving task. In addition, most questions asked during the experimental sessions were also about the upcoming problem-solving task; participants most frequently wanted to know what the task was, when they would learn more about it, and whether their score on the game would be calculated with their partner's score.

The unexpected curvilinear effect of self-esteem on undesirable IO related items may also reflect this preoccupation with IO and the up coming task. Those very high in self-esteem may have denied these traits in a very extreme way because of their intense concern about their own performance and out of a concern for their partner's impression of them on this dimension.

Participants' comments and null findings with regard to the compensatory self-enhancement effect, an existing (and replicated) finding in the literature, prompted a redesign of the study to make it closer to the original paradigm in an attempt to replicate the original compensatory self-enhancement effect and test the current hypotheses.

Pilot Study 2: A First Attempt at Using Personality Profiles

In the second pilot study, I attempted to replicate Baumeister and Jones' (1981; see also Baumeister, 1982) methods in order to create an experimental situation that focused participants more on the upcoming interpersonal interaction and that maximized the likelihood of replicating the compensatory self-enhancement effect among high self-esteem participants. In this experiment, bogus personality profiles were administered instead of integrative orientation scores and the activity that participants anticipated was described as a game, rather than a problem-solving task. In addition, only the two conditions necessary to observe the compensatory self-enhancement effect (positive and negative feedback) were included.

Method

The procedures for the second pilot study attempted to follow the Baumeister and Jones (1981; see also Baumeister, 1982) procedure closely. Fifty-six students (29 men and 27 women) participated; six were dropped from analyses because they expressed suspicion regarding the cover story. All participants were given a similar cover story as the one used in Pilot Study 1, except that no mention was made of integrative orientation. Instead, participants were reminded that they had completed pre-screening questionnaires earlier in the quarter and informed that one of these questionnaires was part of a personality assessment tool called the "Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile." As in Pilot Study 1, participants were told that some would have a partner that would read their profile before they met.

Each participant was given either a positive or negative personality profile that consisted of a brief summary of his or her personality. The summaries were fashioned after those used in the Baumeister and Jones (1981) experiment and were written in such a way as to be very plausible to the participant and mentioned both positive and negative attributes to further heighten their realism. The profiles incorporated the traits described by Baumeister (1982), but included fewer of them in order to simplify the pre-testing of related and unrelated traits.

Participants in the *positive profile condition* read the following profile:

The respondent's profile indicates that her personality is stable and has several dominant patterns. [Participant's name] has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships, and she has a great deal of social sensitivity. Several factors suggest that she may tend to misunderstand some of her own feelings and motivations, so that her self-concept is inaccurate on several points. Compared with the average college freshman in this sample, [participant's name] is mature emotionally. The profile also suggests cooperative tendencies, which leads her to avoid exploiting the good will of others. Material things are very important to her, but only to the degree they let her be generous or live a more productive life. [Participant's name] is a fairly confident person, despite normal moments of insecurity. The profile also suggests that she is intellectually curious and interested in developing her knowledge and intellectual skills.

Participants in the *negative profile condition* received this profile:

The respondent's profile indicates that his personality is stable and has several dominant patterns. Although [participant's name] has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships, he is often insensitive to others out of feelings of insecurity. Several factors suggest that he may tend to misunderstand some of his own feelings and motivations, so that his self-concept is inaccurate on several points. Compared with the average college freshman in this sample, [participant's name] is mature emotionally. The profile also suggests competitive tendencies, which leads him to exploit the good will of others at times. Material things are very important to him as an end in themselves. [Participant's name] can be a self-centered person and may tend to cling to material things as a source of personal gratification and as an emotional crutch. The profile suggests, however that he is intellectually curious and interested in developing his knowledge and intellectual skills.

Appropriate personal pronouns were used for male and female participants, and the surname and the last four digits of each participant's social security number of each were printed on the top of each profile.

As in the Pilot Study 1, after receiving feedback, participants completed questionnaires to be read by their partner. On the first page, they rated themselves on ten randomly-ordered desirable traits, five of which were pre-tested to be related to both the positive and negative personality profiles (*cooperative, generous, giving, sensitive, & secure*) and five unrelated to both profiles (*creative, informal, humorous, playful, & quick*).⁵ On the next page, they rated themselves on ten undesirable traits, five of which were pre-tested to be related to both profiles (*insensitive, inconsiderate, exploitative, unsympathetic, & greedy*) and five that were unrelated to the profiles (*impractical, nosey, unartistic, solemn, & scatterbrained*). All ratings were made on the same scales used in the Pilot Study 1. Next, participants completed the same satisfaction measure, were given an opportunity to make comments, and were thoroughly debriefed.

Results

Using the same analytic approach used in Pilot Study 1, each variable was submitted to a hierarchical logistic regression analysis using the same predictors used in the previous linear regression analyses (i.e., self-esteem, profile condition, SE x

⁵ Twenty participants each read either the positive or negative profile and rated the likelihood that the person described in the profile would have each of 84 traits on a seven point scale (3 = The person would DEFINITELY have this trait; 0 = I cannot tell, this trait is unrelated to the profile; -3 = The person would DEFINITELY NOT have this trait). Desirable and undesirable traits with mean ratings near the extremes

condition, SE^2 , and $SE^2 \times$ condition). In this case, however, because profile condition was a two-level categorical variable only one variable was needed for this analysis; and it was effects coded: -1 for positive profile and +1 for negative profile.

Manipulation check. As expected, analyses of participants' satisfaction with their profiles in the negative and positive profile conditions yielded a main effect of type of profile ($\beta = -.61$, $t = -5.26$, $p < .001$). Inspections of the means indicated that the manipulation, on average, was successful in creating slight dissatisfaction with the negative profile ($M = -0.16$; $sd = 0.23$) and moderate level of satisfaction with the positive profile ($M = 1.68$; $sd = 0.26$). No other effects were statistically significant.

Measures of self-presentation. Analyses did not reveal any evidence of bolstering on unrelated items after a negative profile on either desirable or undesirable items. No effects for self-esteem on any of the four types of items, but effects for the type of profile on both sets of undesirable items were observed. Contrary to the predicted bolstering, participants indicated undesirable unrelated traits ($\beta = .27$, $t = 1.96$, $p = .056$) were rejected less after a negative profile than after a positive profile (see Table 1 for means in each condition). In addition, participants also rated undesirable related traits ($\beta = .33$, $t = 2.44$, $p = .02$) as more descriptive of them after negative feedback.. No other effects were statistically significant.

of the scale (> 1.4 and < -1.4) on *both* profiles were selected as traits related to the profiles. Similarly, items with mean ratings near 0 (between $-.6$ and $.6$) were selected as items unrelated to the profiles.

Dependent Variable	Condition	Mean	SD	N
undesirable unrelated items	positive profile	3.08	1.05	22
	negative profile	3.68	1.09	28
	<i>Total</i>	<i>3.41</i>	<i>1.10</i>	<i>50</i>
undesirable related items	positive profile	1.81	1.43	22
	negative profile	2.91	1.76	28
	<i>Total</i>	<i>2.43</i>	<i>1.70</i>	<i>50</i>
desirable unrelated items	positive profile	7.10	1.00	22
	negative profile	6.92	0.82	28
	<i>Total</i>	<i>7.00</i>	<i>0.90</i>	<i>50</i>
desirable related items	positive profile	7.32	0.92	22
	negative profile	6.97	1.27	28
	<i>Total</i>	<i>7.12</i>	<i>1.13</i>	<i>50</i>

Note: Higher numbers (5 through 9) indicate the traits are rated as descriptive and lower numbers (4 through 0) indicate the traits are non-descriptive.

Table 1: Self-presentation ratings as a function of type of feedback for four types of self-presentation items, Pilot Study 2.

Conclusion

Again, no evidence of compensatory self-enhancement or compensatory self-protection was observed; participants did not take the opportunity to bolster on either desirable or undesirable unrelated items after negative feedback. Contrary to expectations, negative feedback seemed to inspire the opposite pattern of self-presentation on undesirable unrelated items; regardless of their level of self-esteem, participants portrayed themselves more negatively on unrelated undesirable items after receiving a negative profile than after a positive profile. To an even greater degree, participants also portrayed themselves more negatively on related negative items. It

appears that participants felt compelled to incorporate the negative personality feedback they received into their self-presentation, and this generalized to domains that were unrelated to the traits mentioned in the profile as well.

Although these findings are inconsistent with both Baumeister and Jones (1981) and Baumeister (1982), a closer look at the differences between the personality profiles used in the current study and the ones used by Baumeister may explain the disparity between current findings and those uncovered by Baumeister. While the personality profiles used here were fashioned after those used by Baumeister, special attention was paid to constructing a negative profile that would be believable in order to minimize suspicion of its bogus nature. The unfortunate result, however, was that the negative profile used in the current study may have been considerably less negative than the one used by Baumeister and, consequently, more believable.

For example, compare the text of the negative personality profile used by Baumeister and Jones (1981) listed below and the text of the profile used in the current study (see p. 22):

The respondent's profile indicates that his personality has several dominant patterns. Although Bill has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships, he lacks social sensitivity. Several factors suggest obsessional tendencies, which may interfere with concentration. The profile also suggests that he may tend to misunderstand some of his own feelings and motivations, so that his self-concept is inaccurate on several points. Material things are very important to him as an end in themselves. Bill appears to be a rather selfish person who clings to material things as a source of personal gratification and as an emotional crutch. He is able to show genuine warmth on occasion, however, his interpersonal relationships probably tend to be shallow. Compared with the average college freshman in this sample, Bill is not quite mature emotionally.

Although many of the same traits are mentioned in the two profiles, the Baumeister profile is more pointed and somewhat more severe and global in its pronouncements. While the feedback used here says that the respondent “is often insensitive to others,” the original profile states flatly that the respondent “lacks social sensitivity.” Likewise, while the current profile suggests that the individual “can be a self-centered person,” Baumeister’s profile asserts without qualification that he is “a rather selfish person.”

A mild negative personality profile of this kind may have been more believable to participants, resulting in more internalization of the negative traits, which in turn may have generalized to all types of undesirable traits. If participants internalized the negative traits in the profile, it may have induced them to focus on other negative aspects of their personality, spurring negative self-presentation on the unrelated dimensions also. Internalizing the feedback may have induced participants into feeling humble about their weaknesses and, as a result, they may have felt compelled to present themselves consistently with their self-concept and the feedback their partner had read. Consistent with this notion, participants in the negative feedback condition indicated little or no dissatisfaction with the profiles, suggesting some acceptance of the feedback.

Another potential problem that may have reduced the likelihood that participants engaged in compensatory self-enhancement is the set of unrelated undesirable traits used as dependent measures. While these traits were carefully pre-tested to be not associated with the traits in either profile, care was also taken to choose items that were not too negative in order to avoid a set of items that participants did not endorse at all. In retrospect, the resulting set of traits (i.e., impractical, nosey, unartistic, solemn, &

scatterbrained) may have been comprised of traits that were overall too neutral on dimension of social desirability and lacked the potency necessary to serve as dimensions for repudiative self-presentation.

The next study also endeavored to follow the methods of Baumeister and Jones (1981) and Baumeister (1982) more closely, but incorporated a negative personality profile that included more unqualified negative personality descriptions and also a new set of self-presentation items. With these deficiencies remedied, the methods of the following study allowed for a better opportunity to replicate and extend the findings of Baumeister and Jones (1981) and Baumeister (1982).

EXPERIMENT 1

Study Overview

Participants pre-tested on measures of self-esteem and socially desirable responding participated in a study of acquaintanceship and friendship patterns in which they expected to meet a stranger of the same sex and play a psychological game. Prior to meeting their partner, under the guise of simulating a more realistic acquaintanceship situation, participants received a positive or negative personality profile, which they believed would also be read by their upcoming partner. After receiving feedback, participants completed questionnaires to be read by their partner on which they first rated themselves on desirable traits both related and unrelated to the profile and then on undesirable traits also either related or unrelated to the profile.

Methods

Fifty-five participants (36 men and 19 women) were recruited for a study about personality and received course credit for their participation. Three participants were excluded from analysis because they expressed strong suspicion about the cover story and/or guessed the hypothesis. One additional participant was excluded for failing to follow directions.

The experimental procedures were based closely upon the procedures used by Baumeister and Jones (1981) and Baumeister (1982) and are described in detail in Appendix A. Participants were run in groups of two to four. On arrival, participants were asked to fill out a brief questionnaire for another researcher, which contained the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965) and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). Upon completion of the questionnaires, participants were thanked and the questionnaires were removed from the room, ostensibly to be taken to the office of the other researcher. Participants were then introduced to the main experimenter and reminded of the description of the experiment. They were informed that they would meet another participant later on in the study with whom they would play a psychological game that involved a complex mixture of cooperation and competition. Under the guise of simulating more natural acquaintanceship conditions in which people have different amounts of information about each other prior to meeting, participants were informed that, prior to the game, some participants would be asked to share information about themselves with their partner via questionnaire.

Personality Feedback

Participants were informed that, among the questionnaires administered in the prescreening session, they completed a portion of a personality assessment tool called the Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile (BJPP). They also learned that, in some conditions, their partner would read a personality profile that is based on their responses to the BJPP, before they meet.

After all participants were settled into private cubicles, each participant was given a personalized personality profile in a sealed envelope with a fictitious name and address of a psychology publisher printed on the outside. Each profile had the participant's last name and last four digits of their social security number printed at the top and used the participant's name in the text (and the appropriate gender pronouns) throughout the text. The experimenter (or his assistant) explained that, although neither the experimenter nor the assistant had seen the profile, they had given a copy of the profile to their partner in order to help him (or her) to get to know the participant a little better. They also explained that funding regulations required that they also give a copy of the profile to each participant and that they were free to read it while they waited for some questionnaires (for an example of each type of profile used, see Appendix B).

Participants in the *positive profile* condition were given a profile that describes them as predominantly cooperative, good-natured, and non-materialistic. The text of this profile read as follows:

The respondent's profile indicates that his personality is stable and has several dominant patterns. [*Participant's name*] has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships and his profile suggests strong cooperative tendencies, which stem from his frequent concerns about the welfare of other people in his life and lead him to reciprocate others' good will. [*Participant's name*] appears to possess few materialistic inclinations. He values material things, but only insofar as they enable him to express his good nature and enjoyment of life. Compared with the average college freshman in this sample, he displays normal levels of intellectual curiosity and emotional maturity. The profile also suggests that, like everyone else, [*participant's name*] occasionally experiences feelings of insecurity. Because his self-concept is inaccurate on several points, he is sometimes unaware of his strong points from which he can draw self-confidence.

Participants in the *negative profile* condition were given a profile that describes them as predominantly competitive, exploitative, and materialistic. The text of this profile read as follows:

The respondent's profile indicates that her personality is stable and has several dominant patterns. Although [*participant's name*] has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships, her profile suggests strong competitive tendencies, which lead her to exploit the good will of others at times to achieve her goals. [*Participant's name*] also appears to possess materialistic inclinations. She highly values material things and may tend to cling to them as a source of personal gratification and as an emotional crutch. Compared with the average college freshman in this sample, she displays normal levels of intellectual curiosity and emotional maturity. The profile also suggests, however, that [*participant's name*] is a rather self-centered person and, although she is not often aware of it because her self-concept is inaccurate on several points, her behavior is frequently guided by feelings of insecurity.

Dependent measures

After reading their profile, participants completed a questionnaire containing the dependent measures. They were each instructed that the questionnaire was designed to allow them to tell their partner about many different aspects of their personality (to see complete copies of all dependent measures, see Appendix D). The first page of the questionnaire contained measures of attributive self-presentation, which consisted of eleven socially desirable personality traits taken from Anderson's list of personality trait words (Anderson, 1968). Five of the traits had been, prior to the experiment, pre-tested to be related to the traits mentioned in both the positive and negative personality profiles (*generous, sympathetic, soft-hearted, giving, & accommodating*) and six traits were pre-tested to be unrelated to the profiles (*non-conforming, imaginative, inventive, strong, playful, & courageous*; for a full description of the pre-testing, see Appendix C).

Participants rated themselves on each trait on a ten-point Likert-type scale with the zero point removed (*-5 = extremely non-descriptive of me; -3 = somewhat non-descriptive of me; -1 = slightly non-descriptive of me; 1 = slightly descriptive of me; 3 = somewhat descriptive of me; and 5 = extremely descriptive of me*). The zero point was removed from the scale to keep participants from using the zero point as a way of indicating that the trait did not apply to them or withdrawing from rating themselves on the trait.

On the second page, participants completed measures of repudiative self-presentation, in which they used the same scale to rate themselves on eleven undesirable personality traits (Anderson, 1968). Five of the traits had also been pre-tested to be related to the traits mentioned in the personality profiles (*exploitative, self-centered, greedy, manipulative, & egotistical*) and six traits were pre-tested to be unrelated to the profiles (*flaky, unoriginal, uncreative, predictable, boring, & compulsive*). On the last page, participants were asked to list any other traits they wished their partner to know about. This open-ended measure was included for exploratory purposes and was designed to solicit other trait dimensions participants might choose for self-presentation purposes in the experimental situation and as an additional open-ended measure of self-presentation. Participants were presented with two columns of ten blanks; the heading of the first column read “Traits that describe me well” and the heading of the second read “Traits that do not describe me well” (for a copy of the measure, see Appendix D).

Next, participants completed two items designed to assess the success of the feedback manipulation: “How satisfied were you with your BJPP personality profile?” (*-3 = very dissatisfied; 3 = very satisfied*) and “As you think about your partner before

you meet, what kind of impression do you think your partner has of you?” (-3 = *very negative impression*; 3 = *very positive impression*). In addition, they completed exploratory measures designed to assess their confidence in their ability to convey a positive image to their partner, their confidence in their ability to perform well on the task, and their general thoughts and comments about anything interesting or strange about the study (see Appendix E). Last, each participant was informed that the experiment had ended and was instructed to read the debriefing sheet (see Appendix F for debriefing sheet). Afterward, the experimenter or the assistant discussed the main points of the debriefing with each participant, tore up the personality profile in front of them to emphasize its bogus nature, and thanked them for their participation (for debriefing script, see Appendix A).

Results

Again, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to determine whether self-esteem moderated the impact of type of profile (i.e., a positive or negative personality profile) on self-presentation. In addition, the curvilinear effect of self-esteem (and its interaction with profile condition) was entered into each equation to explore the degree to which compensatory self-presentation strategies are associated with certain portions of the self-esteem distribution (e.g., those with very low or very high self-esteem).⁶

⁶ Because the sample size in Experimental 1 was relatively small (i.e., $N = 51$) and statistical power was particularly low for conducting analyses of three-way interactions, the moderating impact of socially desirable responding on self-esteem and profile condition were not explored.

Following standard procedures (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983), self-esteem scores and profile condition were entered first to test for main effects, and the product of the two was entered next to test for interaction effects. Last, the quadratic component of the self-esteem effect (i.e. the square of self-esteem scores) and the product of this component and profile condition were entered to test for the interaction of the two. To simplify interpretability of the regression analysis, self-esteem scores were standardized prior to analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). Profile condition was effects coded: -1 for positive profile and +1 for negative profile. Interactions involving linear effects were plotted using the predicted means for each profile condition at levels of self-esteem one standard deviation above and below the mean of the self-esteem scale for high and low self-esteem participants, respectively. For interactions involving the curvilinear effects of self-esteem, means were plotted at five points along the self-esteem continuum: the mean and .625, and 1.25 standard deviations above and below the mean.

These particular values were chosen because the distribution of self-esteem scores in general (and in this sample) was negatively skewed and plotting points above 1.25 SD would represent participants outside the scores observed in the sample. For this sample, the mean self-esteem score was 54.4 with a standard deviation of 6.7 and a skew of -.87, while the range of scores ran from 35 to 65. As illustrated in Figure 2, plotting a point at 1.25 SD above the mean in this sample focuses comparisons at a very high level of self-esteem without tapping the most extreme scores and without exceeding the observed scores. In addition, plotting 1.25 below the mean focuses comparisons those low in self-esteem, but not those extremely low who may have a truly negative self-evaluation.

Figure 2: Distribution of standardized self-esteem scores- Experiment 1.

All analyses were conducted and all graphs constructed in this manner, unless otherwise specified. In the course of using this analytic approach, one additional participant's data (SE score = 31; negative profile condition) was removed from analysis because their data were consistently observed to be outliers and influential data points (e.g., extreme Cook's Distance values > 1 Pedhazur, 1997).

Manipulation checks.

As expected, analyses of participants' perceptions of their partner's impression yielded a main effect of profile condition ($\beta = -.62$, $t = -5.16$, $p < .001$). On average,

participants in the negative profile condition believed their partner had a moderately negative impression of them ($M = -.73$; $sd = 1.20$) and those in the positive profile condition believed their partner had a moderately positive impression ($M = 1.00$; $sd = 1.07$). No other effects were statistically significant.

Similarly, analyses of participants' ratings of their satisfaction with their personality profile also yielded a main effect of profile condition ($\beta = -.64$, $t = -5.55$, $p < .001$). As expected, participants in the negative profile condition were less satisfied with their profile ($M = -1.05$; $sd = 1.36$) than those in the positive profile condition ($M = 1.41$; $sd = 1.53$). No other effects were statistically significant.

Measures of self-presentation

As in the pilot studies, the scale of participants' responses to the items in dependent measure questionnaire was transformed to set the lowest rating (i.e., "extremely unresponsive of me") to zero and to remove the gap between ratings of "-1" and "1" (i.e., $-5 = 0$; $-4 = 1$; $-3 = 2$; $-2 = 3$; $-1 = 4$; $1 = 5$; $2 = 6$; $3 = 7$; $4 = 8$; $5 = 9$) in order to provide a continuous scale for the dependent measures. Indexes of each type of self-presentation item (desirable unrelated, desirable related, undesirable unrelated, and undesirable related) were computed by taking an average of all items of each type.

As in previous studies (e.g., Baumeister, 1982a; Baumeister & Jones, 1978), evidence for compensatory self-presentation is observed when participants present themselves more favorably on desirable items unrelated to the personality profiles after receiving a negative profile, than after receiving a positive profile. This type of compensation on desirable unrelated items represents compensatory self-enhancement, while indicating that undesirable unrelated items are less descriptive after negative

feedback represents compensatory self-protection. Because participants' self-presentation should be influenced (and perhaps constrained) by the personality profiles their partners will ostensibly read, profile condition should either have no effect or an effect in the direction of the type of profile administered on items related to the profile.

Analyses of desirable unrelated items yielded no main effects, no interaction with the linear SE term, but an interaction between the quadratic SE term and profile condition ($\beta = .61, t = 2.97, p = .01$; see Figure 3 for predicted means). The simple effects for profile condition for those very high (+1.25 SD), very low (-1.25 SD) and moderate (at the mean) in self-esteem were probed using standard procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991). Analyses indicated that those very low in self-esteem rated the items equally between conditions ($\beta = -.05, t = -.21, p = .84$), but those moderate in self-esteem rated themselves more negatively after the negative profile ($\beta = -.45, t = -2.53, p = .02$) and the reverse for those very high in self-esteem ($\beta = .57, t = 2.02, p = .05$). As illustrated in Figure 3, those very high in self-esteem appear to have engaged in compensatory self-enhancement, while those moderate in self-esteem appear to have generalized the negative personality profile into their self-presentation to their partner on unrelated personality dimensions.

Figure 3: Self-presentation on desirable unrelated items as a function of self-esteem and type of personality profile- Experiment 1.

Analyses of undesirable unrelated items revealed a main effect of profile condition ($\beta = -.31, t = -2.22, p = .03$). Participants receiving a negative profile rated undesirable unrelated items as less self-descriptive ($M = 2.19, sd = .95$) than those receiving a positive profile ($M = 2.71, sd = .98$); no other effects were statistically significant. This main effect is consistent with the prediction that participants low in self-esteem would engage in repudiative self-presentation in order to compensate for the negative image the negative personality profile was likely to elicit in their partner. Thus, while those low and moderate in self-esteem were uncomfortable engaging in compensatory self-enhancement, they were willing to engage in compensatory self-protection. Meanwhile, those high in self-esteem engaged in both.

Analyses of desirable related and undesirable related items revealed no statistically significant effects.

Open-ended questions. Participants' responses on the open-ended trait listing measure were classified as either desirable or undesirable and either related or unrelated to the personality profile by an independent rater. Among the unrelated traits listed, frequency counts were tallied for four different types of responses: desirable descriptive traits, desirable non-descriptive traits, undesirable descriptive traits, and undesirable non-descriptive traits. Because participants listed very few undesirable descriptive traits ($M = .12$) and desirable non-descriptive traits ($M = .08$), analyses were conducted only on the number of desirable descriptive ($M = 1.84$) and undesirable non-descriptive traits ($M = 1.00$) participants listed.

Analyses of the number of undesirable non-descriptive traits listed revealed no main effects, but there was an interaction between the quadratic self-esteem term and profile condition, ($\beta = -.45, t = -2.19, p = .03$). The simple effects tests (Aiken & West, 1991) at $-1.25, 0$, and 1.25 standard deviations indicated that more traits listed in the negative profile condition for those very low ($\beta = .52, t = 2.01, p = .05$) and moderate in self-esteem ($\beta = .4, t = 2.62, p = .01$), but the reverse for those very high in self-esteem ($\beta = -.53, t = -1.85, p = .07$). As Figure 4 illustrates, those moderate to low in self-esteem, consistent with their ratings on undesirable unrelated items, compensate for the negative profile by listing more undesirable traits that did not describe them. Those very high in self-esteem, however, were more likely to list non-descriptive traits after a positive profile and reduced the number they listed after a negative profile.

Analyses of the number of desirable descriptive traits listed indicated no main effects or interactions.

Figure 4: Number of undesirable non-descriptive traits listed as a function of self-esteem and type of personality profile- Experiment 1.

To further explore the ways in which participants may be engaging in compensatory self-enhancement or compensatory self-protection, these open-ended responses were also clustered into synonym groups. An independent coder, blind to hypotheses, examined all traits listed in the descriptive and non-descriptive lists separately and grouped responses that had similar meaning. For each group, each participant was coded “1” if he or she mentioned the trait or a synonym one or more times. In doing so, the coder identified five categories of descriptive items that were listed with some frequency, two of which were clearly unrelated to the profiles, one that

had an ambiguous relationship to the feedback, and one that was clearly related to the feedback. The two categories clearly unrelated to the profiles were easy-going (e.g., easy-going, laidback; *total mentions* = 15) and funny (e.g., funny, good-humored, easily-amused; *total mentions* = 10), the one category clearly related to the feedback was caring (e.g., helpful, comforting, loving; *total mentions* = 10), and the one with an ambiguous relationship to the feedback was intelligent (e.g., smart, intellectual, rational; *total mentions* = 10). Two categories of non-descriptive traits were identified; the first, self-focused (e.g., egotistical, selfish, self-centered; *total mentions* = 10) was clearly related to the feedback, while the second, mean (e.g., rude, spiteful, discriminating; *total mentions* = 12), was ambiguously related to the feedback. Each category variable was submitted to a hierarchical logistic regression analysis using the same predictors used in the previous linear regression analyses (i.e., self-esteem, profile condition, SE x condition, SE², and SE² x condition).

Analyses of the “funny,” “easy-going” and “caring” variables revealed no statistically significant effects.

The trait of intelligence was related to the profiles because both types described the participant as being intellectually curious and, as such, remains a trait constant across profile condition. As such, intelligence and its synonyms are traits that participants may wish to use to bolster in their self-presentation. Analyses of the “intelligent” variable indicated no main effects, but did reveal an interaction between the linear self-esteem term and condition, ($B = -2.53, p = .04$). No other effects were statistically significant.

The simple effects for profile condition for those high (+1.0 SD) and low (-1.0 SD) in self-esteem were probed using a procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991) adapted for use with linear regression. Analyses indicated two effects at marginal levels of statistical significance; those low in self-esteem listed that they were not intelligent more frequently after the negative profile ($B = 8.22, p = .06$), but those high in self-esteem listed this more frequently after the positive profile ($B = -1.88, p = .10$).

Inspection of the frequencies of intelligence mentions in the upper and lower halves of the self-esteem distribution indicated that three low self-esteem participants listed intelligence after a negative profile, but none did so after a positive profile; two high self-esteem participants listed intelligence after a negative profile, and four did so after a positive profile. Although these analyses should be treated with caution because of the relatively low frequency of responses generated by participants, they are consistent with the general pattern observed in the total number of unrelated undesirable traits listed and with the idea that low (and moderate) self-esteem participants are engaging in compensatory self-presentation while high self-esteem participants are being modest after negative feedback and putting forth a more positive image after positive feedback.

Analyses of the “self-focused” variable yielded no effects.

Analyses of the “mean” variable revealed a main effect of self-esteem ($B = .49, p = .04$), such that those high in self-esteem were more likely to indicate they were not mean. In addition, a main effect of profile condition was observed ($B = .55, p = .01$), such that participants who had received a negative profile were more likely to list they were not mean (10 mentions) than those who received a positive profile (2 mentions).

Discussion regarding the “mean” variable during the coding process suggested that it could be interpreted as either a related or an unrelated factor. The traits in this category of participants’ responses (e.g., mean, discriminating, spiteful, cold-hearted) suggest a motive to willfully hurt others. If the personality description in the negative profile, which included being exploitative to achieve one’s goals and being self-centered but unaware, were interpreted by participants as bad behavior that is unintentional, then listing “mean” should be considered a trait unrelated to the profile. If, on the other hand, the participants interpreted the malevolence described in the profile as intentional, then they should be considered traits related to the profile.

In order to investigate the degree to which participants viewed the profile as describing intentionally or unintentionally bad behavior, additional data was collected. Seventeen students were asked to imagine that they had received the profile from a psychologist who had assessed their personality and then read a copy of the negative profile. Afterward, these participants rated the degree to which the personality profile described them as

a person who intentionally behaves badly toward others (e.g., is malicious, mean, or spiteful) or a person who behaves badly towards other unintentionally (e.g., doesn’t take others’ feeling into account, doesn’t think about how his or her behavior affects others).

Participants were asked to circle one of the following phrases that best described the level of intentionality described in the profile: very unintentional, mostly unintentional, somewhat unintentional, somewhat intentional, mostly intentional, very intentional.

Of the seventeen participants, fifteen indicated that the profile described their behavior as unintentional to some degree, while only two indicated the description described intentionally bad behavior. Thus, it seems likely that many, if not most, participants in the negative profile condition perceived that the profile described them as more self-absorbed and inattentive to other people, rather than malicious. It also seems likely then that the participants in the negative condition that indicated that they weren't mean in the open-ended measure perceived that they were listing an unrelated trait, rather than directly refuting the profile, and, thus, were engaging in compensatory self-protection.

Discussion

Consistent with finding that high self-esteem participants are more likely to engage in compensatory self-enhancement, those very high in self-esteem responded to a negative public image by identifying with desirable traits unrelated to this negative image.⁷ Also consistent with Baumeister's (1982) findings, those low to moderate in self-esteem appeared to generalize the content of the negative profile to their self-

⁷ Baumeister (1982) used a median split to classify participants as low and high in self-esteem and found compensatory self-enhancement among the upper half of his sample. It is unclear, however, why compensatory self-enhancement was restricted to those very high in self-esteem in the current study. One possibility is that Baumeister's sample had a higher overall level of self-esteem and/or the upper portion of his sample's distribution had more extreme scores. Because Baumeister (1982) did not report any information about his participants' self-esteem scores, this possibility cannot be investigated.

presentation on unrelated desirable traits and rated themselves lower. Those low and moderate in self-esteem, however, did show evidence of bolstering on desirable unrelated qualities in terms of the number of times they mentioned traits relating to intelligence in the open-ended measure; those low and moderate in self-esteem were more likely to list that they were intelligent after receiving a negative profile (while those high in self-esteem showed a trend toward the reverse pattern). While these analyses should be interpreted with caution because there were few mentions overall, the low and moderate self-esteem findings are consistent with the idea that these individuals are, in fact, motivated to engage in positive and acquisitive self-presentation. Mentioning intelligence after the negative profile is a potentially interesting case of compensatory self-enhancement, in that all participants in both conditions had received (and their partners had ostensibly seen) profiles stating that they displayed “normal levels of intellectual curiosity.” Perhaps, one of the conditions in which those with low and moderate self-esteem are more likely to engage in compensatory self-enhancement is when they already have a positive public image on an unrelated dimension and they have “permission” to identify with that trait or characteristic.

Evidence for compensatory self-protection was clear and compelling; participants at all levels of self-esteem presented themselves to their partner less negatively on unrelated undesirable traits after receiving a negative profile than after receiving a positive profile. In addition, those low and moderate in self-esteem showed the same tendencies in the number of undesirable traits they listed as non-descriptive in the open-ended self-presentation measure. Last, participants at all levels of self-esteem listed that

they were not mean more frequently after receiving a negative profile. These findings are also consistent with the idea that individuals typically classified as low in self-esteem are motivated to engage in direct attempts to improve their public image. Furthermore, they are consistent with the characterization of individuals low in self-esteem as having a self-protective self-presentation style (Arkin, 1981; Baumeister et al., 1989). In this study, those low and moderate in self-esteem who faced a negative public image preferred to engage in a self-presentation strategy that focused on minimizing other potentially negative impressions their partner may have rather than fostering other more positive ones. These findings bolster and extend the current literature on compensatory self-enhancement and demonstrate that the distinction between repudiative and attributive self-presentation is a useful one in this context. Moreover, this study is the first to demonstrate that those low and moderate in self-esteem also engage in active, strategic self-presentation designed to foster a more favorable public image.

A notable exception to the preceding characterization of Experiment 1's findings was also observed. Participants high in self-esteem did not engage in compensatory self-enhancement on the open-ended measure either in terms of the frequency of desirable descriptive traits listed or in the specific traits mentioned (e.g., easygoing, intelligent, funny). In fact, those high in self-esteem listed intelligence fewer times in the negative profile condition. This lack of consistency between the trait ratings and the open-ended measure is puzzling and inconsistent with the aforementioned literature characterizing the self-presentation style of those high in self-esteem as risky, confident, and self-aggrandizing (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1989). It may be that traits that high self-esteem

individuals would typically use to bolster were already included in the self-ratings questionnaire, and, as a result, they felt they had already compensated for the negative profile. On the other hand, those very high in self-esteem may have felt compelled to be more modest on the trait of intelligence because they were under the impression that their partner already viewed them positively on this dimension (e.g., intellectually curious). It is also important to keep in mind that the open-ended measure used in Experiment 1 was exploratory and no studies on compensatory self-presentation have used such a measure. It may be that free response measures are not sensitive enough to pick up the compensatory enhancement effect, particularly after participants have been exposed to other dependent measures. If so, the degree to which the basic effect generalizes to other forms of self-presentation should be questioned.

Limitations

A clear limitation of the design of the current study is that it masks whether the effects due to type of profile presented are the result of the negative profile or the positive profile. For example, the compensatory self-enhancement observed among those very high in self-esteem may be the result of modesty in self-presentation after receiving a positive profile rather than compensation after a negative profile. The current study was designed to explore the nature of compensatory self-presentation among those low, moderate and high in self-esteem in an efficient design as possible and, as such, did not include a control condition to aid in making this distinction. In the original study, Baumeister and Jones (1978) included a condition in which the profiles were administered to participants in a confidential fashion and found that these participants,

instead of bolstering, rated themselves less positively on unrelated items. Given these findings, it is unlikely that the compensatory self-enhancement observed in the current study is the result of modesty in the positive profile condition, but incorporating a condition in which the profiles are administered confidentially would allow for confirmation of this reasoning and could shed similar light on the compensatory self-enhancement observed as well.

Furthermore, including different types of control conditions could also advance our understanding of the intrapsychic and interpersonal processes underlying compensatory self-enhancement and self-protection. Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1985) have argued that, although Baumeister's paradigm is designed to demonstrate how self-presentation is affected by a negative public image, the private self-concepts of participants may also be influenced. The fact that all dependent measures in the current study are completed publicly makes it impossible to know the degree to which participants' bolstering after a negative profile reflects a shift in public self-portrayal or a change in private self-evaluation. Indeed, some empirical support exists for the idea that public feedback can influence private self-conceptions. One study found that participants who received public, negative feedback on a social sensitivity test rated themselves more favorably on traits unrelated to social sensitivity in a private and anonymous questionnaire, but did not do so if the feedback was administered privately (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). Because participants' ratings in this study were anonymous (and, ostensibly, to be sent to a researcher at another university), it is highly unlikely the bolstering observed after public feedback was motivated by impression management

concerns, but rather was, as Greenberg and Pyszczynski argue, an attempt by participants to make themselves feel better. Furthermore, it suggests that Baumeister and Jones' (1978) finding could be motivated similarly, rather than the image maintenance explanation that they focus on.

If the current pattern of findings emerges in a study using Baumeister's paradigm under conditions in which self-ratings are private, then this suggests a dramatically different interpretation of the basic compensatory self-enhancement effect; namely, the compensatory enhancement observed in previous studies was not aimed at presenting a positive image to others, but instead aimed at shoring up feelings of self-worth. Likewise, if participants also engage in compensatory self-protection when they do not expect others will see their ratings, then it suggests that they are denying these negative attributes to reduce the negativity of their private self-evaluation. If on the other hand, these effects are not observed when ratings are private, it more definitively demonstrates that the current effects (and those of Baumeister) are motivated by participants' desire to present a favorable image to their partner.

EXPERIMENT 2

In order to confirm the current interpretation of the findings of Experiment 1 and to explore the motivations behind the compensatory self-presentation effects observed in the study, Experiment 2 was designed to be a replication of Experiment 1 with two new control conditions added. These control conditions were identical to the negative profile condition in every respect except: 1) participants' self-ratings were either made privately, or 2) participants' profiles were administered in a confidential fashion. Thus, four conditions were included in Experiment 2: a positive profile condition, a negative profile condition, a private ratings condition, and a confidential profile condition.

It was predicted that the basic findings of Experiment 1 would be replicated in the positive and negative profile conditions and, because it was believed that these processes are motivated by impression management concerns, that neither compensatory self-enhancement nor self-protection would occur in either of the control conditions. If either compensatory self-enhancement or self-protection were to occur in the private ratings condition, it clearly suggests that these processes are aimed at bolstering one's self-esteem rather than garnering the esteem of others. If either compensatory self-enhancement or self-protection occurs in the confidential profile condition, it suggests that these processes are also aimed at bolstering self-esteem, but through the affirmation of others. Thus, the incorporation will afford opportunity to not only demonstrate that the

effects observed in Experiment 1 were the result of bolstering in the negative profile condition, but also shed light on the motivation behind the bolstering.

Methods

One hundred and fifty four participants (87 men and 67 women) were recruited for a study about personality and received course credit for their participation. Ten participants were excluded from the analyses because they expressed strong suspicion about the cover story. Four additional participants were excluded for failing to follow directions.

Experimental Conditions

Procedures in the positive and negative profile conditions were identical to procedures for Experiment 1. The confidential profile condition and private ratings condition also followed the same procedures as the negative feedback condition but used procedures that were altered to achieve their specific aims (for a complete script for all conditions, see Appendix G). In the private rating condition, after participants had a chance to read their profile (which they expected their partner to read), the experimenter or his assistant entered the cubicle and presented the same dependent measure questionnaire used in the other conditions. He or she explained that as a part of the study, researchers were amassing a database of responses to the questionnaire. The participant was told not to put his or her name on the questionnaire and to place it in an envelope with several other questionnaires that was to stay in the room. Upon the completion of

the questionnaire, the rest of the procedure was performed as in the positive and negative profile conditions.

The confidential profile condition was administered in the same fashion as the original study (Baumeister & Jones, 1978). Each participant was informed when the experimenter administered the personality profile that Dr. Arkin would be correlating the factor scores in the profile with responses that the participants made later in the session, but that he was really only interested in how “numbers relate to numbers.” Each participant was also informed that, because the requirements of the funding agency supporting the research, the experimenter was required to give a copy of the profile to the participant. At this point, the experimenter gave the profile to the participant and informed him or her that it was the only copy of the profile that was created, that the experimenters had not seen it, and that it was the participant’s to keep. The profile used in this condition was identical to the profile used in the negative profile condition, but all mentions of the participant’s first name were replaced with the appropriate pronouns.

Dependent Measures

In order to increase the variety of unrelated personality dimensions that participants could respond to in the self-ratings questionnaires, two additional unrelated items (i.e. “humorous” and “absent-minded”) were taken from the pre-testing for Experiment 1 and were added to the list of desirable and undesirable self-presentation items, respectively (for a copy of the dependent measures, see Appendix I). In addition, the open-ended self-presentation measure was changed in an attempt to get a better measure of participants’ primary preference for repudiative or attributive self-

presentation. Rather than listing as many descriptive and non-descriptive traits as they wished, participants were now asked to list one new trait that was not previously listed that either described them or did not describe them. Next, participants were asked to indicate if the trait they listed was either descriptive or non-descriptive and rate how desirable or undesirable the trait was (for a copy of the measure, see Appendix I).

Results and Discussion

Analyses and the plotting of predicted means were conducted using a hierarchical regression approach similar to that used in Experiment 1. Because the current design is asymmetrical in terms of the types of profiles administered, two sets of analyses were conducted for each set of measures. First, the positive profile and negative profile conditions (the replication conditions) were analyzed separately to determine the degree to which the effects observed in Experiment 1 were replicated. Next, the three conditions involving negative feedback (i.e., negative profile, confidential profile, and private ratings) were analyzed to investigate the degree to which the control conditions differed from the effects observed in the negative profile condition.

Following standard procedures for testing interactions using regression (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 1983), analyses for the replication conditions were conducted in the same fashion as in Experiment 1: standardized self-esteem scores and profile condition were entered to test for main effects, the product of the two was entered next to test for interaction effects, and, last, the quadratic component of the self-esteem effect and the product of this component and profile condition were entered to test for

this interaction. Again, profile condition was effects coded: -1 for positive profile and +1 for negative profile. Self-esteem scores in this sample had a similar mean ($M = 54.03$), somewhat more variability ($sd = 8.7$), and a similar skew ($skew = -.82$).

In analyses of the three negative feedback conditions, however, profile condition was dummy coded across two variables, such that the negative profile condition was coded "0" in both variables to act as the baseline condition (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). In the steps in which interaction terms were added to the equation, two interaction terms (i.e., one for each condition term) were created and added to the equation in a separate step and the overall change in variance accounted for was inspected to determine if the overall interaction was statistically significant.

Manipulation checks.

Partner's impression. As observed in Experiment 1, analyses of participants' perceptions of their partner's impression in the replication conditions yielded a main effect of profile condition ($\beta = -.70$, $t = -7.69$, $p < .001$) and a main effect of self-esteem ($\beta = .18$, $t = 2.01$, $p = .05$). On average, participants in the negative profile condition believed their partner had a moderately negative impression of them ($M = -.65$; $sd = 1.81$) and those in the positive profile condition believed their partner had a moderately positive impression ($M = 1.27$; $sd = .84$). In addition, the higher the participant's self-esteem the more positive the impression they believed their partner to have. No other effects were statistically significant.

In the three negative feedback conditions, analyses of participants' ratings of their partners' impression also revealed an overall main effect for profile condition (R^2 change

= .072, $F(2, 102) = 3.98$, $p = .02$) which was qualified by an interaction between profile condition and the quadratic self-esteem term (R^2 change = .25, $F(3, 96) = 12.12$, $p < .001$). No other effects were statistically significant.

In order to interpret the nature of the interaction, the simple effects for profile condition for those very high (+1.25 SD), moderate (at the mean) and very low (-1.25 SD) in self-esteem were probed using procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991) adapted for probing interactions between categorical variables and higher order continuous predictors. As illustrated in Figure 5, participants very high in self-esteem in the negative profile condition believed their partner had a much more negative impression of them, than in the confidential profile condition ($\beta = 3.30$, $t = .76$, $p = .001$) and the private ratings condition (although at a marginal level of statistical significance; $\beta = .39$, $t = 1.89$, $p = .06$). Among those moderate in self-esteem, however, no effects were observed in the confidential profile condition ($\beta = -.16$, $t = -.61$, $p = .54$), but the opposite pattern was observed among those in the private ratings condition who believed their partner had a more negative impression ($\beta = -.33$, $t = -2.46$, $p = .02$). Among those very low in self-esteem there were no differences between the comparison conditions and the negative profile condition.

Figure 5: Ratings of partner's impression of participant as a function of self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

This pattern of findings may suggest a failure of the manipulations to affect all but high self-esteem participants' perceptions of their partners' attitudes in the intended way. If the manipulations had worked as intended, participants would have anticipated that their partners would have had a negative impression of them in the negative profile and private ratings condition, but less so in the confidential profile condition (because no one else had seen the profile) and the positive profile condition (because the description was more favorable). While a pattern approximating these predictions was observed for those very high in self-esteem, those low and moderate in self-esteem did not seem to be aware that their partner in the negative profile condition had a negative impression of them, but instead reported relatively neutral impressions. Although, on average, all participants indicated that their partner was likely to have a more positive impression of them in the

positive profile condition than in the negative profile condition, those very low in self-esteem did not seem to differentiate between their partner's likely impression in any of the negative feedback conditions. In addition, participants moderate in self-esteem inexplicably reported that their partner had a significantly less negative impression of them in the negative profile condition than in private ratings condition, even though their partners had ostensibly seen the same profile in both conditions.

Satisfaction with profile. Analyses of participants' ratings of their satisfaction with their personality profile in the replication conditions yielded a main effect of profile condition ($\beta = -.75, t = -8.79, p < .001$) and a main effect of self-esteem ($\beta = .179, t = 2.10, p = .04$). As expected, participants in the negative profile condition were less satisfied with their profile ($M = -.76; sd = 1.50$) than those in the positive profile condition ($M = 1.78; sd = 1.06$). No other effects were statistically significant.

In the three negative feedback conditions, analyses of satisfaction with the profile also revealed an interaction between profile condition and the quadratic self-esteem term ($R^2 \text{ change} = .12, F(3, 96) = 4.56, p < .01$). No other effects were statistically significant. Probing of the simple effects (at $-1.25, 0$, and 1.25 SDs on the self-esteem scale) yielded no differences between the negative profile condition and the other two conditions at very low and moderate self-esteem. Probing of the effects at very low and very high self-esteem yielded the same pattern uncovered with ratings of partners' impressions; at very high self-esteem, those in the negative profile condition were much less satisfied with the profile, than those in the confidential profile condition ($\beta = .45, t = 1.98, p = .05$) and the private ratings condition (although at a marginal level of statistical significance; $\beta = .42, t = 1.66, p = .10$). Thus, as seen in Figure 6, the negative feedback conditions, on average, elicited more dissatisfaction than the positive profile condition, but those very high in self-esteem were, for some reason, especially dissatisfied with the profile in the negative profile condition, when it was negative, public, and their partner read their self-ratings.

Overall, this pattern of findings is consistent with the expectation that all participants would be less satisfied with the negative profiles than with the positive profiles.

Figure 6: Ratings of satisfaction with personality profile as a function of self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

In sum, the manipulation checks revealed that participants were, as expected, more dissatisfied with the negative profile than the positive profile, but also that most participants were unclear about the kind of impression their partner would have of them given the type of profile they received and whether their partner was to see it. A better manipulation check question mentioning more details of the situation (e.g., “Given the information in your personality profile, what kind of impression do think he or she has of you?”) may have more accurately assessed participants’ perceptions of the manipulations on their partner’s perceptions.

It may also be, however, that the manipulation was successful, but that assessing

the impact of the profile is simply a difficult task in this paradigm, because it must be measured after participants have engaged in self-presentation. For example, the relatively neutral ratings for all but those very high in self-esteem may reflect a hope that their partner would pay more attention to their self-presentation than the content of the profile. Regardless of the cause, one should interpret these findings with caution.

Measures of self-presentation

In the same manner as in Experiment 1, the scale of participants' responses to the dependent measures was transformed. Likewise, indexes of the mean ratings on each type of self-presentation item (desirable unrelated, desirable related, undesirable unrelated, and undesirable related) were also computed.

Self-ratings on desirable unrelated items. Analyses of desirable unrelated items in the replication conditions yielded a main effect for self-esteem ($\beta = .31, t = 2.59, p = .01$) that was qualified by an interaction between the linear SE term and profile condition ($\beta = .30, t = 2.51, p = .01$). No other effects were statistically significant. The simple effects for profile condition for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) in self-esteem were probed and indicated that those low in self-esteem described themselves less positively in the negative profile condition than in the positive profile condition ($\beta = -.58, t = -2.64, p = .01$), but no differences between conditions for those high in self-esteem ($\beta = .16, t = 1.04, p = .30$). As can be seen in Figure 7, the negative profile appears to have induced those low in self-esteem to present themselves less positively on desirable traits unrelated to the profile, while type of profile received had no effect on those high in self-esteem. Thus, the compensatory self-enhancement observed for those very high in self-esteem

observed in Experiment 1 was not replicated, but the pattern observed in those low in self-esteem, in which they generalized the negative feedback into their self-presentation, was demonstrated again.

Figure 7: Self-presentation on desirable unrelated items as a function of self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

Analyses of ratings on desirable unrelated items for the three negative feedback conditions revealed only a main effect for self-esteem, such that more positive ratings

were associated with higher levels of self-esteem ($\beta = .30, t = 3.05, p = .003$; for predicted means, see Figure 7). No other effects were statistically significant.⁸

Self-ratings on undesirable unrelated items. Analyses of undesirable unrelated items in the two replication conditions yielded a main effect for self-esteem ($\beta = -.36, t = -2.12, p = .003$) and a main effect for profile condition ($\beta = .28, t = 2.32, p = .02$) that was qualified by an interaction between the linear SE term and profile condition ($\beta = -.23, t = 1.97, p = .05$). No other effects were statistically significant. The simple effects for profile condition for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) in self-esteem were probed, and analyses indicated an effect similar to that observed on desirable unrelated items; those low in self-esteem described themselves more negatively in the negative profile condition than in the positive profile condition ($\beta = .57, t = 2.61, p = .01$), and there were no differences between conditions for those high in self-esteem ($\beta = -.01, t = -.61, p = .95$). As illustrated in Figure 8, the negative profile appears to have induced those low in self-esteem to present themselves more negatively on undesirable traits unrelated to the profile. Thus, the compensatory self-protection effect observed in Experiment 1 was also not replicated. In fact, the main effect observed in Experiment 2 was in the opposite direction at that observed in Experiment 1; instead of compensating for the negative public image by denying they possessed negative traits, participants in the negative

⁸ Additional simple effects tests aimed at exploring the degree to which the negative profile condition differed from the control conditions for those very low in self-esteem revealed that, at -1.25 SD, self-ratings in the private ratings condition were less negative than in the negative profile condition ($\beta = .47, t = 2.03, p = .05$), but there was no difference in the confidential profile condition ($\beta = .36, t = 1.62, p = .11$).

profile condition, in this study, seemed to take the feedback at face value and rated themselves more negatively.

Figure 8: Self-presentation on undesirable unrelated items as a function of self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

In the three negative feedback conditions, analyses of the undesirable unrelated items revealed a main effect for self-esteem ($\beta = -.62$, $t = -2.55$, $p = .01$), which was qualified by an effect for the quadratic self-esteem term ($\beta = .91$, $t = 2.94$, $p < .01$), which, in turn, was qualified by an interaction between profile condition and the quadratic self-esteem term (R^2 change = .09, $F(3, 96) = 3.33$, $p = .02$). No other effects were statistically significant.

Probing of the simple effects at -1.25, 0, and 1.25 SDs on the self-esteem scale yielded no differences between the negative profile condition and the other two conditions at moderate and very high self-esteem. As illustrated in Figure 9, participants very low in self-esteem in the negative profile condition, however, rated themselves more negatively than those in the private ratings condition ($\beta = -.57, t = -2.42, p = .02$) and the confidential profile condition (although at a marginal level of statistical significance; $\beta = .40, t = 1.76, p = .08$). Thus, in this analysis, it appears that the more negative self-presentation by those very low in self-esteem in the negative condition was motivated by self-presentation concerns; those very low in self-esteem did not present themselves as negatively if their self-ratings were private or if their personality profile was confidential.

Figure 9: Self-presentation on undesirable unrelated items as a function of self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

Self-ratings on desirable related items. Analyses of desirable related items in the replication conditions yielded no main effects, but did yield an interaction between the linear SE term and profile condition ($\beta = .30, t = 2.41, p = .02$). No other effects were statistically significant. The simple effects for profile condition for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1. SD) in self-esteem were probed, and analyses indicated a pattern similar to that observed with the two unrelated measures; those low in self-esteem described themselves less positively in the negative profile condition than in the positive profile condition ($\beta = -.48, t = -2.10, p = .04$), but there were no differences between conditions for those high in self-esteem ($\beta = -.05, t = -.21, p = .84$). As can be seen in Figure 10, those low in self-esteem appear to have incorporated the negative feedback into their self-presentation in the negative condition. Thus, it appears that those low in self-esteem have incorporated the feedback into their self-presentation on the desirable traits related to the feedback as well.

Figure 10: Self-presentation on desirable related items as a function of self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

Analyses of ratings on desirable related items for the three negative feedback conditions revealed only that, on average, ratings in the confidential profile condition ($M = 6.55$; $sd = 1.42$) were significantly less positive than those in the negative profile condition ($M = 7.13$; $sd = .95$; $\beta = -.23$, $t = -2.04$, $p = .04$). The mean ratings in the private ratings condition did not differ ($M = 7.11$; $sd = 1.21$). No other effects were statistically significant. The meaning of this finding is also unclear; if participants' self-presentation on related items was primarily influenced by the profile their partner ostensibly read, then we would have expected more positive ratings in the confidential condition, rather than the private ratings condition.

Self-ratings on undesirable related items. Analyses of ratings on undesirable related items for the replication conditions revealed only a main effect for profile condition (at marginally statistically significant level; $\beta = .23$, $t = 1.91$, $p = .06$). There were no statistically significant effects in analyzing undesirable related items in the three negative feedback conditions, but inspections of the means suggested that comparisons of all four conditions would more clearly illuminate the nature of the differences. A one-way analysis of variance using all four levels of profile type, revealed a statistically significant effect, $F(3,138) = 3.43$, $p = .02$. Post hoc comparisons using Fisher's LSD indicated that participants in the confidential profile condition ($M = 3.51$; $sd = 1.83$, $p = .01$) and the private ratings condition ($M = 3.58$; $sd = 1.86$, $p = .01$) rated themselves more negatively than the positive profile condition ($M = 2.42$; $sd = 1.55$). A similar pattern emerged for the negative profile condition ($M = 3.09$; $sd = 1.68$), but it was again marginally statistically significant ($p = .10$). Thus, it appears that the negative profile induced more negative self-presentation on the traits mentioned in the profile in the conditions using negative feedback, but there was a tendency for this to be the case more in the confidential profile condition and the private ratings condition than the negative profile condition.

In summary, these analyses indicate a tendency for those low in self-esteem to present themselves more negatively in the negative profile condition than the positive profile condition, but not more negatively than the control conditions. Two exceptions to this overall pattern were observed: 1) on undesirable unrelated items, participants in the negative condition also rated themselves more negatively than the control conditions, and

2) only a main effect for profile condition was observed on undesirable related items. Neither the compensatory self-enhancement nor the compensatory self-protection effects observed in Experiment 1 were replicated.

Socially desirable responding analyses. Additional analyses were conducted using the impression management and self-deceptive enhancement subscales of the BIDR to investigate the possibility that the interactions between self-esteem and profile condition were moderated by the tendency to engage in socially desirable responding. Given the failure to replicate the basic compensatory self-enhancement and self-protection findings in Experiment 1, these analyses are now of less importance, but still are of exploratory value.

Although the size of this sample is larger than that of Experiment 1 (e.g., $N_{exp1} = 55$ vs. $N_{exp2} = 71$ in the replication conditions), the statistical power necessary to conduct analyses of three-way interactions is still likely to be low (e.g., in ANOVA terms, the replication conditions in Experiment 2 would have approximately 9 participants per cell in an analysis of a three-way interaction if they were distributed equally across conditions). Given that regression analyses offer more statistical power because they retain the continuous nature of the individual difference predictors and that the hypotheses regarding impression management were exploratory in nature, analyses investigating the interaction of each of the BIDR subscales and self-esteem on the self-ratings measures were conducted. These analyses, however, should be interpreted with caution.

These analyses used the same approach outlined by Aiken and West (1991) that was followed for the analyses of two-way interactions, but additional terms were added to account for the main effects of each of socially desirable responding subscales, its interaction with profile condition, its interaction with self-esteem, and last the interaction between all three variables. Because the lower order effects of self-esteem and its interaction with condition have already been discussed above, only those effects involving the BIDR subscales will be discussed.

Replication conditions. Analyses of the replication conditions using the impression management subscale revealed impression management effects on one of the four measures: desirable unrelated items. This analysis yielded only a three-way interaction between impression management, self-esteem, and profile condition ($\beta = -.34$, $t = -2.43$, $p = .02$). No other impression management effects were statistically significant. The simple effects of each control condition were probed at for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1. SD) in self-esteem at both levels of impression management, high (+1 SD) and low (-1. SD). These analyses revealed an effect of profile condition for participants high in self-esteem and low in impression management ($\beta = .53$, $t = 2.39$, $p = .02$), but not for those low in self-esteem and low in impression management ($\beta = -.60$, $t = -1.51$, $p = .14$). No condition effects emerged for those high in impression management at either level of self-esteem.

As illustrated in Figure 11, those high in self-esteem and low in impression management rated themselves less positively on desirable unrelated items in the positive profile condition than the negative profile condition, while a tendency toward the reverse

was true for those high in self-esteem and high in impression management. While the pattern observed for those high in self-esteem and low in impression management appears to be consistent with compensatory self-enhancement, inspection of the predicted means of the other conditions suggests that the effect is due to lower ratings in the positive profile condition, rather than bolstering in the negative profile condition. The meaning of this effect is unclear, but may reflect a motivation to present oneself modestly for those with high self-esteem and low impression management tendencies after receiving a positive profile.

Figure 11: Self-presentation on desirable unrelated items as a function of impression management, self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

Analyses of the replication conditions using the self-deceptive enhancement subscale revealed no statistically significant main effects or interactions associated with the subscale on any of the self-rating dependent measures.

Negative feedback conditions. Analyses using the impression management subscale on the negative feedback conditions yielded three-way interactions on three of the variables: desirable unrelated, undesirable unrelated, and desirable related items (each with a unique and difficult-to-interpret pattern of its own).

The three-way interaction between impression management, self-esteem, and profile condition on desirable unrelated items ($R = .66$, $R^2 \text{ change} = .29$, $F(2, 92) = 23.63$, $p < .001$) was probed for simple effects of each control condition for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1. SD) in self-esteem at both levels of impression management, high (+1 SD) and low (-1. SD). These analyses revealed an effect of profile condition for only participants in the private condition who were low in self-esteem and high in impression management ($\beta = .53$, $t = 2.39$, $p = .02$), but not for those high in self-esteem and high in impression management ($\beta = -.60$, $t = -1.51$, $p = .14$). No condition effects for either control condition emerged for those low in impression management at either level of self-esteem .

As illustrated in Figure 11 (on an earlier page), those low in self-esteem and high in impression management rated themselves more positively in the confidential profile condition than the negative profile condition. While the interactions in the replication condition analyses were primarily related to differences among low impression management participants, this interaction is associated with differences among high

impression participants. For unclear reasons, only those high in impression management but low in self-esteem, rated themselves more positively in the private ratings condition, than the negative feedback condition. This pattern is especially curious because one might expect participants to feel free to be more positive in the confidential profile condition because they wouldn't expect their partner to see their profile, but among this subgroup it was the private rating condition that showed this pattern.

The three-way interaction between impression management, self-esteem, and profile condition on undesirable unrelated items ($R^2\text{change} = .09$, $F(2, 92) = 5.42$, $p = .01$) was also probed for simple effects of each control condition at each level of self-esteem and impression management. These analyses revealed an effect of profile condition for only participants in the private ratings condition who were low in self-esteem and high in impression management ($\beta = -.94$, $t = 2.47$, $p = .01$), but not for those high in self-esteem and high in impression management ($\beta = .11$, $t = .58$, $p = .56$). No condition effects for either control condition emerged for those low in impression management at either level of self-esteem. As illustrated in Figure 12, similar to the pattern observed on desirable unrelated items, those low in self-esteem and high in impression management rated themselves less negatively in the private ratings condition than the negative profile condition while this was not the case for those low in impression management. Again, this is a curious and unexpected pattern that might have been expected in the confidential profile condition.

Figure 12: Self-presentation on undesirable unrelated items as a function of impression management, self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

The three-way interaction between impression management, self-esteem, and profile condition on desirable related items ($R^2\text{change} = .06$, $F(2, 92) = 3.35$, $p = .04$) was also probed for simple effects of each control condition at each level of self-esteem and impression management. These analyses revealed an effect of profile condition for participants in the confidential profile condition for those high in self-esteem and high in impression management ($\beta = -.54$, $t = -2.67$, $p = .01$), but not for those low in self-esteem and high in impression management ($\beta = .17$, $t = .73$, $p = .47$). No effects for either level of self-esteem emerged for those low in impression management. As illustrated in Figure 13, those high in self-esteem and high in impression management rated themselves less positively in the confidential profile condition than the negative profile condition while a weaker version of this pattern was observed for those low in impression management. Again, this is an effect that is difficult to interpret; it is unclear why those high in impression management and high in self-esteem would rate themselves less positively in the confidential profile condition.

Figure 13: Self-presentation on desirable related items as a function of impression management, self-esteem and experimental condition- Experiment 2.

Analyses of the negative feedback conditions using the self-deceptive enhancement subscale revealed no statistically significant main effects or interactions associated with the subscale on any of the self-rating dependent measures.

In summary, analyses investigating the degree to which socially desirable responding moderated the self-esteem X profile condition interactions yielded little that was clearly interpretable. Given the highly interpersonal nature of the experimental situation, it is interesting to note, however, that the self-deceptive enhancement subscale yielded no significant effects, while the impression management subscale did offer yield some findings, albeit confusing ones. In general, this is consistent with Paulhus' (1991) contention that the impression management subscale is oriented toward socially desirable responding in the interpersonal domain while self-deceptive enhancement measures more intrapsychic processes.

Open-ended self-presentation measure. Participants' responses on the open-ended measure of self-presentation were limited to one trait in Experiment 2, and each participant was asked to classify his or her trait as descriptive or non-descriptive and to rate the degree to which it was desirable, undesirable, or neutral (for a copy of the measure, see Appendix I). In addition, an independent coder, using the same coding scheme used in Experiment 1, coded each trait as either related or unrelated to the feedback. Of the 122 participants that listed a trait, 115 listed a trait that was descriptive of them. Likewise, participants also listed very few undesirable and neutral traits; of the 115 descriptive traits listed, only thirteen undesirable traits and five neutral traits were listed and the number of traits listed did not differ as a function of self-esteem. Because

so few listed traits that were non-descriptive, undesirable, and/or neutral, analyses focused only on participants who listed descriptive traits (for a complete summary of the types of traits listed, see Table 2).

Frequency of Descriptive Traits Listed					
Self-esteem Tertiary Split		undesirable traits	neutral traits	desirable traits*	Total
Low SEs	unrelated	4	2	20	26
	related	0	0	11	11
	<i>Low SE Total</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>31</i>	37
Mod SEs	unrelated	4	2	31	37
	related	1	0	10	11
	<i>Mod SE Total</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>41</i>	48
High SEs	unrelated	4	1	20	25
	related	0	0	5	5
	<i>High SE Total</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>25</i>	30
	<i>Total</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>97</i>	115

Frequency of Non-Descriptive Traits Listed					
Self-esteem Tertiary Split		undesirable traits	neutral traits	desirable traits	Total
Low SEs	unrelated	1	0	0	1
	related	1	0	0	1
	<i>Low SE Total</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	2
Mod SEs	unrelated	1	0	0	1
	related	1	0	0	1
	<i>Mod SE Total</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	2
High SEs	unrelated	0	1	1	1
	related	1	0	0	1
	<i>High SE Total</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	3
	<i>Total</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	7

* Note: Analyses focused on the frequencies of listed traits that were descriptive and desirable—the area of the table that is shaded.

Table 2: Frequency of traits mentioned in open-ended measure of self-presentation as a function of self-esteem, desirability, and relatedness to personality profile- Experiment 2.

As in Experiment 1, a logistic regression approach was used to analyze the proportion of related, descriptive traits participants chose to list. In these analyses, the same predictors used in the previous analyses were entered in to the equation hierarchically (i.e., self-esteem, profile condition, SE x condition, SE², and SE² x condition). Because this measure was new, these analyses were exploratory in nature and liberty was taken to report effects that were of marginal statistical significance ($p < .10$).

In the replication conditions, analyses of the frequencies of related traits listed among descriptive desirable traits yielded a main effect of self-esteem (at a marginally statistically significant level; $B = .67, p = .07$) that was qualified by an interaction between self-esteem between the linear term of self-esteem and profile condition (at a marginally statistically significant level; $B = -.91, p = .08$). Although the statistical test of this interaction indicated an effect of questionable reliability, the simple effects were probed based on a priori theoretical predictions that self-esteem and profile condition should interact to affect participants' self-presentation strategy. The simple effects for profile condition for those high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) in self-esteem were probed using a logistic regression adaptation of procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991). As illustrated in the first two columns of data in Table 3, those low in self-esteem listed a higher than average proportion of related traits ($B = 1.58, p = .03$) in the negative profile condition, while the proportion listed by those high in self-esteem did not differ across condition ($B = -.24, p = .79$).

In the three negative feedback conditions, analyses of the frequencies of the same set of traits also yielded a main effect of self-esteem ($B = -1.64, p = .05$) that was also

qualified by an interaction with self-esteem and both profile condition terms (at marginally statistically significant levels; $B_{\text{private}} = 1.72, p = .06$; $B_{\text{confid}} = -1.67, p = .06$). Probing of the simple effects of profile condition at low and high self-esteem revealed that both the private ratings condition ($B_{\text{private}} = -2.31, p = .07$) and the confidential profile condition ($B_{\text{confid}} = -2.16, p = .08$) were different from the negative profile condition for low self-esteem participants at a marginally statistically significant level, but not for high self-esteem participants ($B_{\text{private}} = 1.14, p = .27$; $B_{\text{confid}} = 1.18, p = .25$). As illustrated in Table 3, low self-esteem participants in the negative condition listed 5 related traits and 4 unrelated traits while participants in all other condition listed at least twice as many unrelated traits as related traits.

Self-Esteem Median Split		positive profile	negative profile	private ratings	confidential profile	Total
Low SEs	unrelated	10	4	8	12	34
	related	2	5	4	6	17
	<i>Low SE Total</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>51</i>
High SEs	unrelated	15	11	9	8	43
	related	3	3	3	3	12
	<i>High SE Total</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>55</i>

Table 3: Frequency of descriptive desirable traits mentioned in open-ended measure of self-presentation as a function of self-esteem, profile condition, and relatedness to personality profile- Experiment 2.

It seems likely that the tendency for most participants to list unrelated items is a reflection of the instructions that emphasized that they list another trait, rather than a

motivation to engage in compensatory self-enhancement. Given that those low in self-esteem in the negative profile condition were engaging in less favorable self-presentation, it is curious that they would also be more likely to try to refute the negative profile by listing related traits. This shift to listing related traits may indicate an attempt to refute the negative image conveyed in the profile. Baumeister (1982b) found a similar finding on behavioral measures among those high in self-esteem, in which they engaged in more cooperative behavior in a prisoner's dilemma game after the measures of self-presentation. It seems unlikely, given their more typical self-protective self-presentation style, that those low in self-esteem would attempt to directly refute the feedback, and it may be that they perceived the related traits that they listed (e.g., caring, friendly) were sufficiently different that they would not be contradictory to the personality profile.

Summary and Conclusions

Experiment 2 failed to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 in two key ways. First, no evidence of compensatory self-enhancement among high self-esteem participants (or any other participants) emerged on the self-rating or the open-ended measures of self-presentation. Specifically, self-ratings on desirable unrelated items showed no differences between the negative and positive profile conditions for those high in self-esteem. Although high self-esteem participants consistently listed more desirable unrelated personality traits, than related traits on the open-ended measure, this did not differ as a function of the type of profile they received, the confidentiality of that profile, or whether they completed the measures in privacy. The vast majority of participants,

regardless of experimental condition, also listed a desirable unrelated trait on the open-ended measure. Rather than indicating a tendency to engage in compensatory self-enhancement, it most likely reflects participants' tendency to follow the instructions to list a new trait on the measure. A pattern of data similar to compensatory self-enhancement was, however, observed among high self-esteem participants who were low in impression management on the desirable unrelated self-rating items, but this effect is likely to be the result of less positive self-presentation in the positive profile condition, rather than increased positivity in the negative profile condition. Additional analyses revealed that this less positive self-presentation in the positive condition was only true for those high-self esteem participants who were also low in impression management, suggesting perhaps that this unusual effect may not be motivated by self-presentation concerns.

Secondly, no evidence of compensatory self-protection emerged on either the self-ratings or the open-ended measure. In fact, a main effect of profile condition in the opposite direction was observed on the self-ratings on undesirable unrelated items in the replication conditions: on average, participants rated undesirable unrelated items as more descriptive in the negative profile condition. The predominance of descriptive desirable traits rather than non-descriptive undesirable traits listed on the open-ended measure in Experiment 2 suggests that, even among those low and moderate in self-esteem, when constrained to choose between attributive and repudiative self-presentation, people prefer to list positive characteristics (attributive self-presentation) that describe them rather than negative characteristics that do not (repudiative self-presentation). Consistent with this

observation, McGuire and McGuire (1996) report a similar bias toward more frequent listing of both descriptive characteristics and favorable characteristics in a study in which they gave participants an opportunity to list all four types of traits (McGuire & McGuire, 1996).

The predominant finding in Experiment 2, however, was that the self-presentation of low self-esteem participants became less favorable when they received a negative public profile and their self-ratings were to be read by their partner. This was true on both desirable and undesirable unrelated traits and desirable related traits. This effect was also observed in Experiment 1 on desirable unrelated items and by Baumeister (1982) and indicates a tendency for negative feedback on specific dimensions to generalize to self-presentation in other domains for those low in self-esteem.

On the surface, these findings appear to be consistent with a number of findings indicating that those low in self-esteem are more likely to generalize negative feedback to their global self-evaluation and to evaluations on other abilities (e.g., Brown & Dutton, 1995; Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989; Sanbonmatsu, Harpster, Akimoto, & Moulin, 1994). Those very low in self-esteem in Experiment 2, however, did not rate themselves more negatively on either undesirable or desirable unrelated items when their self-ratings were done privately. It appears then that these negative ratings did not generalize to their self-evaluations, but rather was motivated by self-presentation concerns. The nature of these concerns, however, is unclear. One possible explanation may be that participants very low in self-esteem were particularly motivated to present an image that was consistently negative across domains because they did not expect their partners to

distinguish between related and unrelated traits and that they would have a generally negative view of them after reading the profile. In this case, these participants would have felt no need to do so the private ratings condition, because their self-ratings were not to be seen by their partner.

The exception to this tendency among those low in self-esteem to engage in less favorable self-presentation in the negative profile condition was observed on the traits they listed on the open-ended measure in all conditions. While they may have presented themselves less favorably in the self-ratings, the vast majority of low self-esteem participants (and all others) listed a desirable descriptive personality trait. Those low in self-esteem in the negative profile condition were also, however, more likely to list a related trait than all other participants. The motivation behind this shift to listing traits that were related to the profile is also unclear. On one hand, it may be that those low in self-esteem perceived the traits they listed to be sufficiently unrelated to the negative personality profile, but it may also be that those low in self-esteem are less sophisticated in their self-presentation strategies when under threat. When the threat of a negative public image looms, they may find it more difficult to focus on domains unrelated to the negative image they fear and find themselves engaging in self-presentation strategies that are less convincing in light of their audience's knowledge.

Equally unclear are the reasons why Experiment 2 failed to replicate the basic findings of Experiment 1. An examination of the ways in which the positive and negative profile conditions differed between Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., the research assistants used, the quarter they were conducted, the minor differences in the dependent measures

and procedures) offer nothing that could be interpreted as a critical difference that could have changed the situation in Experiment 2 substantially enough to reverse the compensatory self-protection effect or nullify the motivation of high self-esteem participant to engage in compensatory self-enhancement.

The manipulation checks, however, revealed a failure among those low in self-esteem to distinguish between how their partner might perceive them differently in the different experimental conditions, which may indicate problems with how the independent variables were manipulated. Given that those very low in self-esteem did, however, adjust their self-presentation in the private ratings condition when compared to the negative profile condition, the failure may have been in the ability of the manipulation check questions to pick up on the differences in participants' perceptions between conditions. Additional items that asked them about their partner's likely impression of them, but also reminded them of the personality profile that their partner saw may have been more successful at distinguishing between participants' general expectations about how new people may perceive them and how their partner in the experimental situation would be likely to perceive them. In any case, the pattern of findings on the manipulation checks suggest that at least some low self-esteem participants had perceived the experimental situation in some of the conditions differently than was intended.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Although the results of Experiment 1 were promising, demonstrating compensatory self-enhancement among those very high in self-esteem and compensatory self-protection among participants at all levels of self-esteem, they were not replicated in Experiment 2. Furthermore, two pilot studies attempting to replicate Baumeister's basic compensatory self-enhancement effect also failed. In all, three of four studies, all using dependent measures empirically-derived to be related and unrelated to the administered feedback, did not find evidence of compensatory self-enhancement. While there were plausible explanations for the failure to replicate the compensatory self-enhancement effect in the two pilot studies, the failure to replicate the effect in Experiment 2 after having found it using the same methods in Experiment 1, is puzzling, to say the least.

At the outset of this research project, there were many reasons to believe that a successful replication of Baumeister's finding that high self-esteem individuals are more likely to engage in compensatory self-enhancement would be relatively easy. Aside from a vast amount of theory suggesting that most people, and especially those high in self-esteem, are motivated to present themselves favorably in interpersonal situations, the finding had been replicated twice using different conceptualizations of threat and self-presentation. Furthermore, a more powerful statistical approach in the form of regression

analysis using more precisely designed dependent measures was to be taken to study this common-sense finding. The best possible spin on the results, however, was that two carefully run replication studies were conducted (Experiments 1 and 2) and only one replicated the finding. The combined (and mixed) findings of these two studies highlight both the questionable validity of the current paradigm to study the compensatory enhancement effect and the value of drawing the distinction between attributive and repudiative self-presentation when investigating the self-presentation styles of those high and low in self-esteem.

Compensatory self-enhancement: A reliable effect?

Given a failure to replicate in three of four studies, it is important to consider the possibility that one or both of Baumeister's demonstrations of the compensatory self-enhancement effect are chance findings (i.e., the result of type 1 error). There are several reasons, in hindsight, to question the validity of Baumeister's compensatory self-enhancement studies. First, both studies used fairly complex designs but had small samples of participants ($N = 10$ per cell in Baumeister & Jones, 1978; $N \leq 6$ per cell in Baumeister, 1982). If an effect is robust and the effect size is large, samples of this size could be sufficient. If, however, an effect is small to moderate in size, samples of this proportion would likely lack the statistical power to detect the effect (Cohen, 1988). Given the small sample size of these investigations, especially Baumeister (1982), the likelihood that the null hypothesis is actually true in these studies should not be dismissed.

In the context of questioning the validity of previous findings, it is also important to note that Baumeister's two compensatory self-enhancement studies report different patterns of findings using a *very* similar methodology. In Baumeister and Jones (1978), a main effect for profile condition was observed, demonstrating that all participants were engaging in compensatory self-enhancement. The authors indicated further that, although they intended to use self-esteem as a covariate, correlations between self-esteem and the dependent measures were low, and the results of their analysis of variance were very similar with or without self-esteem entered as a covariate (Baumeister & Jones, 1978, p. 612). Baumeister (1982), on the other hand, found no main effect for type of profile and failed to replicate Baumeister and Jones (1978), but instead reported an interaction between profile favorability, publicity of profile, level of self-esteem and type of item, indicating that only those high in self-esteem who received a public, negative profile bolstered on unrelated items (i.e., engaged in compensatory self-enhancement). It would appear then that Baumeister's own studies are inconsistent in two important respects: the relationship of self-esteem to compensatory self-enhancement and the degree to which all participants engaged in compensatory self-enhancement.

One possibility is that the true effect is the one observed in the second study (Baumeister, 1982), that high self-esteem individuals are the ones that engage in compensatory self-enhancement, and replicated by subsequent investigators (Boney-McCoy et al., 1999; Brown & Smart, 1991). It is conceivable that the first study (Baumeister & Jones, 1978), by chance, collected a sample that had higher than normal self-esteem and, as a result, everyone in their sample exhibited compensatory self-

enhancement because they were mostly high in self-esteem, and also potentially nullifying the impact of self-esteem on their interaction analyses. On the other hand, their relatively large sample size of 90 participants makes it seem unlikely that they would have had such an unusually skewed sample, but there could have been a failure of random assignment in their key conditions. It seems more likely, however, that the results of the study with the smallest cell sizes (Baumeister, 1982), was due to chance.

An additional factor suggesting that this study may be of questionable validity is that Baumeister (1982) has the only study that has found the compensatory self-enhancement effect among those high in self-esteem in an interpersonally oriented context. While Baumeister's studies were explicitly and purposefully designed to put participants in a situation in which they would be presenting information about themselves to a peer, the studies conducted by Brown and Smart (1991) and Boney-McCoy, Gibbons, and Gerard (1999) had participants provide information about themselves in a relatively private manner and to an experimenter only. Brown and Smart (1991) told participants that they would get feedback on an intelligence-type test and then complete some personality measures, which in fact were the dependent measures. Similarly, Boney-McCoy, Gibbons and Gerard (1999) asked participants questions about their sexual behavior and then also instructed participants to complete some measures of personality, which were the dependent measures. Although it would be difficult to argue that participants' responses were not influenced by concerns about presenting themselves favorably to the experimenter, the situation in these two experiments are not cases in which the participants were anticipating an interaction with another person who read their

personality ratings. It may, for example, be that the anticipated interaction created in the current paradigm creates a more intense interpersonal situation and that self-esteem has a weaker impact than the situational forces on self-presentation in these types of situations.

Compensatory self-enhancement: Necessary conditions?

While there are good reasons to think that the effects in one or both of Baumeister's studies are questionable, it is possible that the findings are genuine but difficult to obtain. It may be that replicating the compensatory self-enhancement effect depends on the presence of certain situational factors or certain methodological procedures that have not been well articulated in the methods sections in the extant literature. Although Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to attempt to replicate the methods used by Baumeister and Jones (1978) and Baumeister (1982) as closely as possible, there may have been certain styles of conduct, types of information, or methodological practices that these investigators incorporated into their procedures that were taken for granted and not reported in their research reports.

For example, it seems likely that participants need to clearly perceive that there are important interpersonal consequences at stake in the situation for them to engage in strategic self-presentation. For participants to make the effort to present themselves positively to someone, they must care about making a good impression with their target and feel that there are positive interpersonal consequences for creating a good impression and/or negative consequences for creating a bad impression. For example, the experimenters or some aspect of the experimental situation in the original studies may have subtly highlighted to participants that their upcoming partners were fellow

classmates they may see again, or focused participants on the novelty of meeting someone new they really did not know at all. Likewise, it may be that Baumeister's participant population, Princeton students, may have been more likely to be concerned about creating a good impression with their partner. In Experiments 1 and 2, however, these aspects of the situation were not specifically emphasized, nor were participants given details about the nature of their upcoming interaction. As described in Baumeister and Jones (1978), they were simply told that they would later be playing a psychological game with their partner that "involves a complex mixture of cooperation and competition." As a result, the situation in the current studies may have not reliably created sufficient motivation for participants to engage in compensatory self-presentation.

Although simply interacting with an unfamiliar person typically induces people to be attentive to general impression management concerns (e.g., Leary, Nezlek, Downs, Radford-Davenport, & al, 1994; Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995), it may be that compensatory self-enhancement tends to occur in situations in which individuals feel that they have important interpersonal outcomes at stake. Baumeister's approach to conducting the studies may have implicitly or explicitly included encouragement to build a good relationship with their partner or mention of the negative consequences of having a bad relationship with one's partner. Brown and Smart (1991) and Boney-McCoy, Gibbons and Gerard (1999) may have also incorporated this into their methods by having participants present themselves to an important other- the experimenter.

The degree to which people will engage in compensatory self-enhancement is also likely to hinge upon whether participants feel their self-presentation efforts will be

effective in shifting the focus of their audience from the negative public image to other domains that matter to the audience. In the case of the current experimental paradigm, the more participants perceived that presenting themselves favorably on the unrelated traits would be helpful to them in their upcoming interaction with their partner, the more likely they should have engaged in compensatory self-enhancement. Baumeister's methods may have referred to the upcoming psychological game in ways that may have directly or indirectly suggested the utility of a favorable self-presentation. Because the description of the game in Experiments 1 and 2 was so brief, participants were left to speculate on their own as to what kind of image may be helpful to them in their upcoming interaction with their partner. As a result, there may have been increased variability in the degree to which participants perceived that identifying with the desirable unrelated traits and rejecting the undesirable unrelated traits would be useful.

Certain features of Baumeister's procedures may also inhibit the likelihood that the compensatory self-enhancement is observed. For example, a portion of the personality profile administered in both Baumeister's studies and Experiments 1 and 2 informed the participant that his or her "self-concept is inaccurate on several points." While this phrase is probably effective in making the profile seem more plausible to the participant, it may also serve to undermine the likelihood that participants will feel their self-presentation to their audience will be effective. The phrase may have served as a subtle induction of uncertainty that could have caused some participants to question how they will come across to their partner when making their personality ratings. It may have also served to, in the mind of participants, undermine the credibility of their self-

presentation by giving them the impression that their partner may not believe their portrayal of their own personality because their self-knowledge is inaccurate.

The current paradigm also relies on participants to distinguish between traits that are related and those that are unrelated to the feedback when completing the dependent measures, which may also make it difficult for participants to reliably engage in compensatory self-presentation. The studies conducted by Brown and Smart (1991) and Boney-McCoy, Gibbons and Gerard (1999) all used personality traits as dependent measures, but administered negative feedback that may have been more clearly unrelated to the dependent measures for their participants (e.g., highlighting unsafe practices, intelligence-type test scores). The current paradigm, on the other hand, gives feedback on global personality dimensions and trusts that participants will jump at the opportunity to bolster on other global personality dimensions that are less related to the feedback than others. Even though pre-testing suggests that participants can draw this distinction when asked to do so, it may be that they have difficulty doing so spontaneously when the personality profile is presented as their own. It may be that some participants viewed the dependent measure items as a type of test in which they tried to accurately portray their profile to their partner, but in general felt uneasy about trying to bolster on traits that were unrelated, because they either did not draw that distinction or were under the impression that the profile conveyed a clear global evaluation of them that would be difficult to counter.

One possible explanation for the failure to replicate in Experiment 2 is that these aspects of the current paradigm may have interacted with subtle aspects of the situation

that varied between Experiment 1 and 2. For example, if the experimenters conveyed less enthusiasm about setting up the “meetings” between participants when administering Experiment 2, which may have subtly reduced the participants’ own motivation to find ways to engage in strategic self-presentation and notice the difference between the related and unrelated traits. While this possibility is conceivable, the failure to replicate remains a mystery and many questions about the reliability of the effect and the effectiveness of this particular paradigm remain as well.

Self-presentation styles and self-esteem

Despite the questionable validity of the current studies and those of Baumeister, investigating the self-presentation styles of those low and high in self-esteem remains an important topic of research. While our understanding of a wide variety of cognitive (e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Campbell, 1990; Dodgson & Wood, 1998) and motivational (e.g., Josephs et al., 1992; McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984; Steele, 1988) processes associated with low and high in self-esteem has expanded dramatically in the past three decades, our understanding of the self-presentation strategies associated with self-esteem has lagged comparatively.

Arkin (1981) and Baumeister et al., (1989) both provide excellent reviews of evidence suggesting those low in self-esteem may have self-protective self-presentation styles, but few studies have shown those low in self-esteem to actively engage in a specific self-protective self-presentation strategy (for a notable exception, see Tice, 1991). Most empirical work on self-presentation and self-esteem has been focused on the

strategies of those high in self-esteem, with the self-protective nature of those low in self-esteem being inferred from the absence of an effect observed among those high in self-esteem (for a review, see Baumeister et al., 1989; Schlenker et al., 1990). Although they were not replicated, the compensatory self-protection findings of Experiment 1 indicate that those low and moderate in self-esteem will, in fact, actively engage in strategic self-presentation, rather than simply going along with the situation or withdrawing from it.

In the process of demonstrating that those low in self-esteem will engage in strategic self-presentation, Experiment 1 also demonstrated that distinguishing between repudiative and attributive styles is useful when assessing self-presentation in experimental contexts. Specifically, separately assessing self-presentation on desirable and undesirable attributes showed that low self-esteem participants were motivated to actively present a favorable image of themselves. This effect had gone unnoticed in previous studies demonstrating compensatory self-enhancement among those high in self-esteem (Baumeister, 1982a; Boney-McCoy et al., 1999; Brown & Smart, 1991).

Additionally, Experiment 1 (and to some degree, Experiment 2) showed the value of using a regression approach that takes into account higher order effects when using trait self-esteem as a predictor. Although many self-esteem researchers opt to use median splits or to remove a portion of the middle of the self-esteem distribution when comparing those high and low in self-esteem, the analytic strategy that incorporated the quadratic self-esteem term used in these studies shows that a regression approach can profitably assess the effects of self-esteem (and its interaction with other variables) at a different level of the variable. For example, analyses of the desirable unrelated traits in

Experiment 1 revealed compensatory self-enhancement only among those very high in self-esteem that would have gone unnoticed if a median split or if the upper and lower 40 percent of the distribution were used for the analyses. Furthermore, this approach allows the investigator to probe for effects at any point along the self-esteem distribution when an interaction is observed, so that not only those low and high in self-esteem can be examined, but those with moderate levels of self-esteem as well.

Future directions

Given that those low in self-esteem do seem to be motivated to garner positive evaluations from others, more empirical work still needs to be done to understand the self-presentation strategies they use to do so, including the degree to which low self-esteem individuals engage in repudiative self-presentation. In addition, little is known about the effectiveness of this strategy relative to other strategies. For example, if those low in self-esteem are typically more likely to use a repudiative self-presentation style in general, it suggests another worthwhile area of research. For example, using a repudiative self-presentation style may contribute to the dissatisfaction low self-esteem participants experience in their close interpersonal relationships. Indeed, the tendency for those low in self-esteem to underestimate their partner's love for them (Murray, Holmes, Griffin, Bellavia, & Rose, 2001) and to respond to threat by doubting their partner's feelings toward them (Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998) may be perpetuated by the kinds of self-images that those low in self-esteem present to their partners. If those low in self-esteem are more worried about the potentially negative view their partner may have of them, and, as a result, more frequently try to downplay

any perceived weaknesses, this may further contribute to the relationship insecurities by creating communication that is more focused on their potential weaknesses rather than their strengths.

At a more basic level, the degree to which those low and moderate in self-esteem engage in repudiative self-presentation in more naturalistic situations is still an open, empirical question. It is likely that conversational norms guide people to more frequently discuss the attributes they possess than traits they do not possess, so the relative frequency of repudiative self-presentation may be low (as seen in open-ended response in Experiment 2). In spite of this, those low in self-esteem may depart from this norm more frequently than those high in self-esteem. The relative frequency of repudiative self-presentation, as an impression management tactic, has not been studied, however, nor have investigators attempted to identify conditions under which repudiative self-presentation is more likely to occur. Future studies may want to focus on both how self-esteem is related to the use of repudiative and attributive strategies, but also the relative frequency of their use in more naturalistic settings.

It may be profitable to conduct studies that focused on the degree to which those low and high in self-esteem engage in repudiative and attributive self-presentation outside of circumstances involving a threat to their public identity. Exploring the relationship between self-esteem and both types of self-presentation among acquaintances under less threatening conditions could illuminate both the degree to which those low in self-esteem are likely to use repudiative self-presentation as a means of garnering approval and the domains on which they are most likely to do so.

For example, a simpler exploratory study could be done in which groups of participants are told that they will get acquainted with another research participant and then play a game that requires good rapport with their partner in order to perform well and achieve a monetary reward. Participants could then complete questionnaires with open-ended questions and self-ratings (like the ones used in the current research) for their partner. Both desirable and undesirable items in a variety of domains could be included and the self-presentation of those high and low in self-esteem could be compared to either those of other participants who were not expecting to show their questionnaires to another participant, or to their own prior self-ratings made under more private conditions.

Such an approach could yield valuable information about, not only the types of traits on which those low and moderate in self-esteem will present themselves favorably, but also about the degree to which participants at all levels of self-esteem engage in repudiative self-presentation when their audience has little or no information about them. Varying the type of interaction participants expect and the instructions about the importance of knowing their partner (e.g., an accurate impression set vs. a good rapport set) could also yield important information about the conditions under which participants would be motivated to present a favorable image to their partner as well, and perhaps, in the end yield a better set of procedures for studying compensatory self-enhancement and self-protection and the relationship between these strategic self-presentation strategies and self-esteem.

In conclusion, although there is reason to question the validity of the compensatory enhancement effect in general, continued research will shed important light on how trait self-esteem is related to the self-enhancement motive, and how this motive is expressed through various styles of self-presentation. In doing so, a more complete picture of the interpersonal and intrapsychic processes of those low and moderate in self-esteem will be painted, and a more complete general understanding of how all individuals seek positive evaluations from others will be advanced.

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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL SCRIPT- EXPERIMENT 1

Main directions (delivered by experimenter):

I am a researcher here at OSU and collaborate with Dr. Robert Arkin of the Psychology Department on this study. We know this fulfills part of a class requirement for you, but we appreciate you being here. You can't do research in the social sciences without people who are willing to participate, so thanks a lot for coming. As said on the website, today's study is about personality. In addition to studying personality, we are conducting some important research on interpersonal interactions and friendship patterns. It's obvious to everyone that friends act differently toward each other than acquaintances, but this research is designed in part to try to understand why this is the case. On the one hand, this could be because friends have emotional bonds with each other and acquaintances do not. On the other hand, it could be because friends know more about each other. The way we are going to go about studying this in this experiment is by actually pairing you up with someone of the same sex whom you have never met before, having you meet and then play a game. I have another session running down the hall and, you will either meet someone from this session or the other one.

Actually, I should ask at this point. Do any of you know each other? OK. Here's how it will work. First, my assistant and I will separate you into different rooms because we need to use this room to give other participants instructions. Once you are in your rooms, we'll have you fill out some questionnaires about yourself to share with your partner before you meet. After you and your partner have read about each other, you will meet to play the game, which is designed to create an interaction, which will involve a complex mixture of cooperation & competition.

One thing to keep in mind, however, is that people in everyday life don't always have exactly equal amounts of information about each other, and to mirror that in the lab, we are using some unequal exchanges. Some of you will be asked to fill out questionnaires of different lengths about yourself for your partner before you meet, while some of you will not. The last thing you need to know is about the questionnaires you completed at the beginning of the quarter. Do you remember prescreening? You volunteered to fill out questionnaires for a little credit and to be eligible for future studies. This is actually how you became eligible for this study. (Did everyone here fill out prescreening?)

One of the questionnaires you filled out was a portion of a personality assessment tool called the Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile. Maybe some of you have heard of it? One of the things I am doing in this study is using these personality profiles to initialize impressions between partners. So, some of you will have a partner that will read a summary of your personality that Dr. Arkin has already prepared before the two of

you meet. Keep in mind, however, that you've only filled out a portion of the BJPP and if your partner reads your profile before you meet, they will only learn about a few specific dimension of your personality. Thank you very much in advance for your participation in this important research. My assistant will set each of you up in a room and retrieve your personality profiles while I go check on the next group of participants. I will be back in a moment to assist in matching you with a partner and beginning the games.

In Cubicle Instructions (by experimenter or assistant):

OK. Go ahead and have a seat. Can I get your last name to make sure that I get the right profile for you? (*Record info. on data sheet.*) I'll be right back.

Like Mr. Hermann [I] mentioned before, here is a copy of your personality profile and the factor clusters that Dr. Arkin computed [*SHOW ENVELOPE*]. Just so you know, neither I nor my assistant has looked at your or anybody else's profiles. In order to get things started for the experiment, I just gave the other copy to your partner and he [she] is looking it over to get an idea of what you are like. Now, the ethics committee of the agency that's funding this research requires that if we use this information we have to give a copy to the persons themselves, so this is your copy. Take a moment to look it over and I'll be back in a minute.

[*RETURNS TO CUBICLE*] After you fill out this questionnaire, we'll take it to your partner. It's designed to allow you to tell your partner about many different aspects of your personality. After your partner looks over it and you get a chance to look over theirs, we'll explain the game. Crack the door when you are done filling it out.

[*RETURNS TO CUBICLE AND PICKS UP QUESTIONNAIRE*] Thanks for filling these out, I'm going to take these to your partner. Your partner needs a bit more time though. While you are waiting for you're his/her information, please fill out this last questionnaire about your impressions of the study so far while you wait. Like it says at the top, only the experimenter will see this one. Crack the door when you are done.

[*RETURNS TO CUBICLE*] I have some news for you. You actually won't be meeting someone and playing a game today. This sheet has some important information about the study. I need you to take a moment and read through it. I'll be back in a minute to see if you have any questions.

Debriefing:

Did you get the chance to read the sheet? So you know you won't be meeting anyone today? There are a couple of things I want to make sure you know though, OK? I just wanted to make sure you know that the profile you read was predetermined. It had nothing to do with how you filled out prescreening questionnaires. Some people got positive profiles while others got negative ones. We actually flipped a coin to decide which one you got. Here's something I like to do just to make sure people know what I mean. Some people don't like to read the sheet ☺ [*TEAR UP THE PROFILE SHEET*]. Also, I wanted to make sure that you know that none of the questionnaires that you filled out here or this paper with the scores were shown to anyone. Actually, there isn't even another copy of it.

Do you have any questions about the experiment? Oh, one last thing. I hope you don't mind me asking this of you. It's really important that everyone who comes into this study thinks that they are actually going to be meeting someone and that the profile they get is real. Would you mind not talking about this study with any other students until the quarter is over? Actually, I should ask you. Did you think you were going to meet someone? Were you under the impression that they saw your scores? Do you have any other questions? Please don't hesitate to email or call Mr. Hermann if you have any more questions about this study.

APPENDIX B: Personality Profiles

POSITIVE PROFILE

Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile [©]

Winter 2002 SC1-456

Computer-assisted personality assessment

Participant #: 213 Surname: Arkin
Digit code: 9099

Summary of personality assessment

The respondent's profile indicates that his personality is stable and has several dominant patterns. Robert has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships and his profile suggests strong cooperative tendencies, which stem from his frequent concerns about the welfare of other people in his life and lead him to reciprocate others' good will. Robert appears to possess few materialistic inclinations. He values material things, but only insofar as they enable him to express his good nature and enjoyment of life. Compared with the average college freshmen in this sample, he displays normal levels of intellectual curiosity and emotional maturity. The profile also suggests that, like everyone else, Robert occasionally experiences feelings of insecurity. Because his self-concept is inaccurate on several points, he is sometimes unaware of his strong points from which he can draw self-confidence.

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	<i>X</i> Score	<i>SD</i>	<i>Y</i> Score	<i>SD</i>	<i>LG</i> Score	<i>SD</i>
Factor 1A	10	2.5	19	6.1	11	5.3
Factor 1B:	7	3.8	16	5.2	11	3.2
Factor 1C	11	4.1	21	5.8	19	5.0

NEGATIVE PROFILE

Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile °

Winter 2002 SC1-456

Computer-assisted personality assessment

Participant #: 213 Surname: Hermann

Digit code: 0749

Summary of personality assessment

The respondent's profile indicates that his personality is stable and has several dominant patterns. Although Tony has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships, his profile suggests strong competitive tendencies, which lead him to exploit the good will of others at times to achieve his goals. Tony also appears to possess materialistic inclinations. He highly values material things and may tend to cling to them as a source of personal gratification and as an emotional crutch. Compared with the average college freshman in this sample, he displays normal levels of intellectual curiosity and emotional maturity. The profile also suggests, however, that Tony is a rather self-centered person and, although he is not often aware of it because his self-concept is inaccurate on several points, his behavior is frequently guided by feelings of insecurity.

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For Staff Use Only (Form 32r):

	<i>X</i> Score	<i>SD</i>	<i>Y</i> Score	<i>SD</i>	<i>LG</i> Score	<i>SD</i>
Factor 1A:	10	2.5	19	6.1	11	5.3
Factor 1B:	7	3.8	16	5.2	11	3.2
Factor 1C:	11	4.1	21	5.8	19	5.0

APPENDIX C: Self-Rating Items Pre-Testing

Items for each self-presentation questionnaire were taken from Anderson's trait ratings (Anderson, 1965) and a more recently published set of trait ratings (Hampson, Goldberg, & John, 1987).⁹ Prior to pre-testing, sixty-six traits, approximately one half desirable and one half undesirable, were chosen for their apparent relevance (or irrelevance) to both personality profiles. The undesirable traits were chosen to be relatively moderate in average ratings on (e.g., for the items from Anderson's list, average ratings were less than 3, but greater than 1.2 on a scale from 0 to 6) in order to avoid having undesirable traits that would not be endorsed to any degree. An additional 45 items from all points on the social desirability continuum were added to create a final set of 111 items. Thirty-two participants read either the positive profile ($N = 17$) or the negative profile ($N = 15$) and rated the likelihood that the person described in the profile would have each trait. A bipolar scale was used for the ratings with the following labels:

- 3 = The person would DEFINITELY have this trait.
- 2 = The person would PROBABLY have this trait.
- 1 = The person MIGHT have this trait.
- 0 = I cannot tell, this trait is unrelated to the personality profile.
- 1 = The person MIGHT NOT have this trait.
- 2 = The person would PROBABLY NOT have this trait.
- 3 = The person would DEFINITELY NOT have this trait.

⁹ Two traits not in either publication, were also included; "exploitative" was included because it was specifically mentioned in the negative profile, and "flaky" was included because it was frequently listed an unrelated trait in other pre-testing.

The final set of desirable and undesirable items related to the profiles were chosen for their extreme ratings on the for both profiles. For example, “self-centered” was chosen because it had a mean rating of 2.87 for the negative profile and a mean rating of –2.00 for the positive profile; likewise “generous” was chosen for it’s mean rating of –1.33 for the negative profile and a mean rating of 2.47 for the positive profile. The unrelated desirable and undesirable items were selected from those with mean ratings closest to zero for both profiles. For example, the mean ratings for “boring” and “strong” were near zero at -.55 and -.40, respectively (see Table 4 for mean ratings for each of the items used as dependent measures).

	Traits RELATED to profile	POS profile ratings	NEG profile ratings	Anderson ratings	Hampson et. al ratings	Traits UNRELATED to profile	POS profile ratings	NEG profile ratings	Anderson ratings	Hampson et. al ratings
Undesirable Items	self-centered	-2.00	2.87	0.96		boring	-0.47	0.07	0.97	
	greedy	-1.76	2.27	0.72		compulsive	-0.12	0.60	2.05	
	egotistical	-1.47	2.80	1.16		unoriginal	-0.65	0.33	2.07	
	manipulative	-1.47	2.33		3.34	uncreative	-0.41	0.27		3.31
	exploitative	-1.27	1.85			predictable	0.29	0.13		4.60
						flaky	-0.44	0.46		
mean		-1.59	2.42				-0.30	0.31		
Desirable Items	generous	2.47	-1.33	4.59		inventive	0.65	0.60	4.53	
	sympathetic	2.35	-1.14	4.59		imaginative	0.65	-0.07	4.92	
	soft-hearted	2.25	-1.00	3.87		courageous	0.41	0.27	4.71	
	giving	2.41	-1.60		7.25	nonconforming	-0.59	-0.08	3.69	
	accommodating	2.12	-1.00		6.57	playful	0.59	0.27		6.17
						strong	0.35	0.33		7.11
mean		2.32	-1.22				0.34	0.22		

Note: Anderson's (1965) likeability ratings were made using a scale with the following anchors: 0 = "least favorable or desirable", 6= "most favorable or desirable." Hampson et al.'s (1987) social desirability ratings were made using a scale with the following anchors: 1 = "extremely desirable", 5 = "neutral", and 9 = "extremely undesirable."

Table 4: Mean pre-testing and likeability ratings for trait words to be used in self-presentation questionnaires

APPENDIX D: Dependent Measures- Experiment 1

DESIRABLE ITEMS:

Personal Attributes Questionnaire *TO BE SHARED WITH INTERACTION PARTNER*

Name: _____

In order to give your partner more information about the kind of person you are, please rate the degree to which the following personal characteristics describe you. Please circle one number for each characteristic to make your responses.

	extremely undescriptive of me		somewhat undescriptive of me		slightly undescriptive of me		slightly descriptive of me		somewhat descriptive of me		extremely descriptive of me
generous	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
non-conforming	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
imaginative	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
sympathetic	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
inventive	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
soft-hearted	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
strong	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
giving	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
playful	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
courageous	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
accommodating	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5

UNDESIRABLE ITEMS:

Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Part 2) *TO BE SHARED WITH INTERACTION PARTNER*

In order to give your partner more information about the kind of person you are, please rate the degree to which the following personal characteristics describe you. Please circle one number for each characteristic to make your responses.

	extremely undescriptive of me		somewhat undescriptive of me		slightly undescriptive of me		slightly descriptive of me		somewhat descriptive of me		extremely descriptive of me
exploitative	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
uncreative	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
predictable	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
self-centered	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
greedy	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
boring	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
manipulative	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
compulsive	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
egotistical	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
flaky	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5
unoriginal	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1		1	2	3	4	5

OPEN-ENDED TRAIT LISTING

Please list below any other traits that you would like your partner to know about. There may have be some traits that were not on the other questionnaires that you feel he or she should know.

Please list some that describe you well and some that do not describe you well.

Traits that describe me well	Traits that do not describe me well
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

APPENDIX E: Manipulation Checks- Experiment 1

Name: _____ Last 4 digits of SS #: _____

Date: _____ Time of experiment: _____

THIS PACKET WILL ONLY BE READ BY THE EXPERIMENTER. IT WILL NOT BE SHOWN TO YOUR PARTNER

How well do you expect to do on the upcoming game? (Circle one.)

-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
Far	Much	Somewhat	No better or	Somewhat	Much	Far
worse than	worse than	worse than	worse than	better than	better than	better than
the average	the average	the average	the average	the average	the average	the average
OSU student	OSU student	OSU student	OSU student	OSU student	OSU student	OSU student

How satisfied were you with your BJPP personality profile? (Circle one.)

-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
Very	Dis	Somewhat	Neither	Somewhat	Satisfied	Very
dissatisfied	satisfied	dissatisfied	satisfied nor	satisfied		satisfied
			dissatisfied			

As you think about your partner before you meet, what kind of impression do you think your partner has of you?

-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
Very	A negative	A somewhat	Neither	A somewhat	A positive	Very
negative	impression	negative	positive nor	positive	impression	positive
impression		impression	negative	impression		impression
			impression			

Please check the box above the phrase below that best describes your thoughts about the kind of impression you will make on your partner.

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Thinking	Thinking	Thinking	Thinking	Thinking	Thinking
a lot about	some about	a little about	a little about	some about	a lot about
whether I will	whether I will	whether I will	whether I will	whether I will	whether I will
make a <u>good</u>	make a <u>good</u>	make a <u>good</u>	make a <u>bad</u>	make a <u>bad</u>	make a <u>bad</u>
impression	impression	impression	impression	impression	impression.

When you meet your partner, to what degree do you feel you will be able to portray a positive image of yourself to your partner? (Circle one.)

1	2	3	4	5
not able at all	a little able	somewhat able	fairly able	very able

How much are you looking forward to meeting your partner?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all			Somewhat			Very much

In this space, feel free to let the experimenter know your impressions of the study. Please to note anything that seemed strange to you, made you feel uncomfortable, or anything else you would like to let the experiment know.

APPENDIX F: Debriefing Sheet

Thank you for participating in our research. Please take several minutes to read through this sheet. It has **IMPORTANT** information about this experiment.

First of all, it's important that we make sure it is clear to you at this point that you will not be participating in a game or getting to know another participant later on in this study. Also, any information you received about your personality profile or filled out in this room was not shown to anyone. Why won't you meet someone? The short answer to that question is that we needed to be sure that you filled out the questionnaires just as you would if you were actually about to meet someone. Please read the rest of this sheet for a more complete answer.

In today's experiment, the experimenter informed you about your score on the Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile. The researchers conducting this project, in addition to being interested in your responses to the questionnaires you completed, are also interested in how people respond to getting feedback on the Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile. In other words, this study was both about how you completed the prescreening questionnaires and your answers to the questions after you received your profile.

Understanding how people respond to both positive and negative feedback is a very important issue in research in the social sciences. In the course of daily life, people find themselves in situations where they receive feedback, both positive and negative, from all sorts of sources: their family, friends, teachers, employers, the government and many others. How individuals respond to both positive and negative feedback can far-reaching and potentially life-changing consequences.

For example, a person who does poorly on an important science exam may decide they are bad at science and avoid the subject for the rest of their lives. If the test is very important, they may also conclude they are not a worthwhile person that could lead to social withdrawal, depression or worse. On the other hand, they may realistically realize that they have no interest in the subject and not spend much more valuable time on it.

On the other hand, a person who receives positive feedback on an important task, may realize they can contribute to society in an important way when they would otherwise have not known that. On the other hand, positive feedback could also lead a person to have unrealistic beliefs in their abilities and take on tasks that they really cannot accomplish.

One important feature of today's experiment that you may not be aware of is that the feedback you received on the Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile was **predetermined**. That is, you were not given a profile that reflected your answers to the questions, but rather some people were RANDOMLY given an arbitrarily positive or negative profile to make sure that both types of feedback were studied in this experiment. **IN OTHER WORDS, YOUR PROFILE DOES NOT REFLECT YOUR PERSONALITY AT ALL.** In fact, please take a moment to imagine that you could have received a profile of another type (e.g., one that said you were self-centered or one that said that you were generous).

Our purpose in giving predetermined profiles is to study how a person's self-presentation is affected by feedback of different kinds. In particular, we hypothesize that some individuals will respond to negative feedback by presenting themselves even more positively, while others will focus on being less negatively. Likewise, we predict that after positive feedback, some people will become very positive, while others will hold back and be modest. It's important to keep in mind that people respond differently to positive and negative information and that different strategies for dealing with such information have different "pro's" and "con's." The way you responded, in no doubt, was probably helpful to you in some ways and less than helpful in others

Again, we appreciate your participation in this research. If you would like more information about this research or have any questions, please do not hesitate to ask the experimenter now or contact us via email or telephone at a later time.

APPENDIX G: Experimental Script- Experiment 2

MAIN DIRECTIONS:

I am a researcher here at OSU and collaborate with Dr. Robert Arkin of the Psychology Department on this study. We know this fulfills part of a class requirement for you, but we appreciate you being here. You can't do research in the social sciences without people who are willing to participate, so thanks a lot for coming.

As said in the email you received, today's study is about personality. In addition to studying personality, we are conducting some important research on interpersonal interactions and friendship patterns.

It's obvious to everyone that friends act differently toward each other than acquaintances, but this research is designed in part to try to understand why this is the case. On the one hand, this could be because friends have emotional bonds with each other and acquaintances do not. On the other hand, it could be because friends know more about each other. The way we are going to go about studying this in this experiment is by actually pairing you up with someone of the same sex whom you have never met before, having you meet and then play a game. I have another session running down the hall and, you will either meet someone from this session or the other one.

Actually, I should ask at this point. Do any of you know each other?

OK. Here's how it will work. First, my assistant and I will separate you into different rooms because we need to use this room to give other participants instructions. Once you are in your rooms, we'll have you fill out some questionnaires about yourself. Some of you will share them with your partner before you meet. After you and your partner have learned about each other, you will meet to play the game, which is designed to create an interaction, which will involve a complex mixture of cooperation & competition.

One thing to keep in mind is that people in everyday life don't always have exactly equal amounts of information about each other, and to mirror that in the lab, we're using some unequal exchanges. Some of you will fill out questionnaires of different lengths about yourself for your partner before you meet, while some of you will not.

The last thing you need to know before we begin is about the questionnaires you completed at the beginning of the quarter. Do you remember prescreening? You volunteered to fill out questionnaires for a little credit and to be eligible for future studies. This is actually how you became eligible for this study. (Did everyone here fill out prescreening questionnaires?)

One of the questionnaires you filled out was a portion of a personality assessment tool called the Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile. Some of you may have actually heard of it....it's fairly famous. One of the things I am doing in this study is using these personality profiles to initialize impressions between partners. So, some of you will have a partner that will read a summary of your personality that Dr. Arkin has already prepared before the two of you meet. Keep in mind, however, that you've only filled out a portion of the BJPP and if your partner reads your profile before you meet, they will only learn about a few specific dimension of your personality.

OK. Thank you very much in advance for your participation in this important research. My assistant will set each of you up in a room and retrieve your personality profiles while I go check on the next group of participants. I will be back in a moment to assist in matching you with a partner and beginning the games.

Administer Regular Public, Private Self-Ratings, or Confidential Profile Condition

REGULAR PUBLIC condition

IN CUBICLE- OK. Go ahead and have a seat. Can I get your last name to make sure that I get the right profile for you? (*Write name and cubicle number on data sheet.*) I'll be right back.

Like we mentioned before, here is a copy of your personality profile and the factor clusters that Dr. Arkin computed [*SHOW ENVELOPE*]. Just so you know, neither I nor my assistant has looked at your or anybody else's profiles. In order to get things started for the experiment, I just gave the other copy to your partner and he [she] is looking it over to get to know a little bit more about you. Now, the ethics committee of the agency that's funding this research requires that if we use this information we have to give a copy to the persons themselves, so this is your copy. Take a moment to look it over and I'll be back in a minute with some questionnaires

[*RETURNS TO CUBICLE*] Get a chance to read that? OK. Please put your name on the top of this questionnaire and fill it out to give to your partner. It is designed to allow you to tell your partner about many different aspects of your personality. There are three pages. Go ahead and fill them out in order. When you are done, I'll come and get it, take yours to your partner and bring theirs to you. After your partner looks over it and you get a chance to look over his (hers), we'll bring you two together and explain the game. Crack the door when you are done filling it out.

[RETURNS TO CUBICLE AND PICKS UP QUESTIONNAIRE] OK, thanks for filling these out, I'm going to go ahead and take these to your partner. In a couple of minutes we'll be ready to start. While you are waiting, please fill out this last questionnaire about your impressions of the study so far while you wait. Like it says at the top, only the experimenter will see this one. Crack the door when you are done.

[RETURNS TO CUBICLE AND BEGINS DEBRIEFING] OK. I have some news for you. You actually won't be meeting someone and playing a game today. This sheet has some important information about the study. I need you to take a moment and read through it. I'll be back in a minute to see if you have any questions.

PRIVATE SELF-RATINGS condition

IN CUBICLE- OK. Go ahead and have a seat. Can I get your last name to make sure that I get the right profile for you? (*Write name and cubicle number on data sheet.*) I'll be right back.

Like we mentioned before, here is a copy of your personality profile and the factor clusters that Dr. Arkin computed [*SHOW ENVELOPE*]. Just so you know, neither I nor my assistant has looked at your or anybody else's profiles. In order to get things started for the experiment, I just gave the other copy to your partner and he [she] is looking it over to get to know a little bit more about you. Now, the ethics committee of the agency that's funding this research requires that if we use this information we have to give a copy to the persons themselves, so this is your copy. Take a moment to look it over and I'll be back in a minute with some questionnaires

[RETURNS TO CUBICLE] **Get a chance to read that? OK. What I have for you next is a questionnaire. In this particular part of the experiment, we are simply collecting the questionnaires from participants in this envelope and compiling a large database of them. Please do not put your name on it. There are three pages. Go ahead and fill them out in order. When you are done, go ahead and put it in the envelope with the rest of them and crack the door to let me know you are finished. I'll come back with one last questionnaire and we'll get things moving.**

[RETURNS TO CUBICLE AND PICKS UP QUESTIONNAIRE] OK, thanks for filling that out. In a couple of minutes we'll be ready to start. While you are waiting, please fill out this last one about your impressions of the study so far while you wait. Like it says at the top, only the experimenter will see this one. Crack the door when you are done.

[RETURNS TO CUBICLE AND BEGINS DEBRIEFING] OK. I have some news for you. You actually won't be meeting someone and playing a game today. This sheet has

some important information about the study. I need you to take a moment and read through it. I'll be back in a minute to see if you have any questions.

CONFIDENTIAL PROFILE condition

IN CUBICLE- OK. Go ahead and have a seat. Can I get your last name to be sure that I get the right profile for you? (*Write name and cubicle number on data sheet.*) I'll be right back.

Like we mentioned before, here is a copy of your personality profile and the factor clusters that were computed [SHOW ENVELOPE]. Just so you know, neither I nor my assistant has looked at your or anybody else's profiles. Dr. Arkin is planning on correlating these cluster scores with responses you make later. He's really only interested in associating numbers with numbers. The ethics committee of the agency that's funding this research requires that if we use this information we have to give a copy to the persons themselves, so this is yours. **Just so you know, only one copy of your profile was made and only one will ever be made.** Take a moment to look it over and I'll be back in a minute with some questionnaires.

[*RETURNS TO CUBICLE*] Get a chance to read that? OK. Please put your name on the top of this questionnaire and fill it out to give to your partner. It is designed to allow you to tell your partner about many different aspects of your personality. There are three pages. Go ahead and fill them out in order. When you are done, I'll come and get it, take yours to your partner and bring theirs to you. After your partner looks over it and you get a chance to look over his (hers), we'll bring you two together and explain the game. Crack the door when you are done filling it out.

[*RETURNS TO CUBICLE AND PICKS UP QUESTIONNAIRE*] OK, thanks for filling these out, I'm going to go ahead and take these to your partner. In a couple of minutes we'll be ready to start. While you are waiting, please fill out this last questionnaire about your impressions of the study so far while you wait. Like it says at the top, only the experimenter will see this one. Crack the door when you are done.

[*RETURNS TO CUBICLE AND BEGINS DEBRIEFING*] OK. I have some news for you. You actually won't be meeting someone and playing a game today. This sheet has some important information about the study. I need you to take a moment and read through it. I'll be back in a minute to see if you have any questions.

DEBRIEFING

Did you get the chance to read the sheet? So you know you won't be meeting anyone today? Do you have any comments or questions about the experiment?
(PAUSE TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY.)

There are a couple of things I want to make sure you know though, OK? I just wanted to make sure you know that the profile you read was predetermined. It had nothing to do with how you filled out prescreening questionnaires. Some people got positive profiles while others got negative ones. We actually flipped a coin to decide which one you got.

Here's something I like to do just to make sure people know what I mean. Some people don't like to read the sheet ☺ [*TEAR UP THE PROFILE SHEET*].

Also, I wanted to make sure that you know that none of the questionnaires that you filled out here or this paper with the scores were shown to anyone. Actually, there isn't even another copy of it. OK? Good. Any questions about the experiment? Any comments?

Oh, one last thing. I hope you don't mind me asking this of you. It's really important that everyone who comes into this study thinks that they are actually going to be meeting someone and that the profile they get is real. Would you mind not talking about this study with any other students until the quarter is over?

Did you think you were going to meet someone? Were you under the impression that they saw your scores? Do you have any other questions? Please don't hesitate to email or call Mr. Hermann if you have any more questions about this study. [*Write response to suspicion question on log sheet*]

APPENDIX H: Confidential Profile

Baumeister-Jones Personality Profile °

Spring 2002 SC1-456

Computer-assisted personality assessment

Participant #: 213 Surname: Smith
Digit code: 9746

Summary of personality assessment

The respondent's profile indicates a stable personality with several dominant patterns. Although the respondent has a normal interest in interpersonal relationships, the profile suggests strong competitive tendencies, which lead him to exploit the good will of others at times to achieve his goals. The respondent also appears to possess materialistic inclinations. He highly values material things and may tend to cling to them as a source of personal gratification and as an emotional crutch. Compared with the average college freshman in this sample, the respondent displays normal levels of intellectual curiosity and emotional maturity. The profile also suggests, however, that he is a rather self-centered person and, although he is not often aware of it because his self-concept is inaccurate on several points, his behavior is frequently guided by feelings of insecurity.

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For Staff Use Only (Form 32r):

	<i>X Score</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Y Score</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>IG Score</i>	<i>SD</i>
Factor 1A:	10	2.5	19	6.1	11	5.3
Factor 1B:	7	3.8	16	5.2	11	3.2
Factor 1C:	11	4.1	21	5.8	19	5.0

APPENDIX I: Dependent Measures- Experiment 2

Personal Attributes Questionnaire

Please rate the degree to which the following personal characteristics describe you. Please circle one number for each characteristic to make your responses.

	extremely undescriptive of me		extremely undescriptive of me	somewhat undescriptive of me		somewhat undescriptive of me		somewhat descriptive of me		somewhat descriptive of me		extremely descriptive of me
generous	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
non-conforming	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
glib	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
sympathetic	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
inventive	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
soft-hearted	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
strong	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
giving	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
playful	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
courageous	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
accommodating	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
humorous	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		

Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PART 2)

Please rate the degree to which the following personal characteristics describe you. Please circle one number for each characteristic to make your responses.

	extremely undescriptive of me			somewhat undescriptive of me		slightly undescriptive of me		slightly descriptive of me		somewhat descriptive of me		extremely descriptive of me
exploitative	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
uncreative	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
predictable	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
self-centered	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
greedy	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
boring	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
manipulative	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
compulsive	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
egotistical	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
fakry	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
unoriginal	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		
absent-minded	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	1	2	3	4	5		

There may be another trait that was not listed other questionnaires that you feel is important in describing your personality. In the blank below, please list one trait. The trait can be EITHER very descriptive of your personality OR very non-descriptive of your personality.

Circle one.

The trait above is descriptive
of my personality

The trait above is NOT descriptive
of my personality

The trait I listed above is:

-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
Very Undesirable	Undesirable	Somewhat Undesirable	Neither Desirable nor Undesirable	Somewhat Desirable	Desirable	Very Desirable

If you would like to explain more about the trait you listed above, please do so briefly in the space below:

APPENDIX J: Individual Difference Measures

Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire

Please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement to each of the 10 statements listed below. You should indicate your agreement and disagreement by placing a number in the blank space preceding each statement. Respond by considering what each question means to you **generally**. The number should be anywhere from 1 to 7, according to the following scale:

- 1 = Strong *Disagreement*
- 2 = Moderate *Disagreement*
- 3 = Slight *Disagreement*
- 4 = Neither Agreement Nor Disagreement
- 5 = Slight *Agreement*
- 6 = Moderate *Agreement*
- 7 = Strong *Agreement*

- _____ 1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
- _____ 2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
- _____ 3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
- _____ 4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
- _____ 5. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.
- _____ 6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
- _____ 7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
- _____ 8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
- _____ 9. I certainly feel useless at times.
- _____ 10. At times I think that I am no good at all.

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding

Using the scale below as a guide, for each statement write a number in the blank to the left to indicate how much you agree with it.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
NOT			SOMEWHAT			VERY
TRUE			TRUE			TRUE

Self-Deceptive Enhancement Subscale

- ___ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
- ___ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
- ___ 3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.
- ___ 4. I have not always been honest with myself.

- ___ 5. I always know why I like things.
- ___ 6. When my emotions are aroused, they bias my thinking.
- ___ 7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
- ___ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.

- ___ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
- ___ 10. It's hard for me to shut of a disturbing thought.
- ___ 11. I never regret my decisions.
- ___ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.

- ___ 13. The reason I vote is that my vote can make a difference.
- ___ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
- ___ 15. I am a completely rational person.
- ___ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism.

- ___ 17. I am very confident of my judgments.
- ___ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
- ___ 19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
- ___ 20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.

Impression Management Subscale

- ___ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
- ___ 22. I never cover up my mistakes.
- ___ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
- ___ 24. I never swear.

- ___ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
- ___ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
- ___ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
- ___ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.

- ___ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
- ___ 30. I always declare everything at customs.
- ___ 31. When I was young, I sometimes stole things.
- ___ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street.

- ___ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
- ___ 34. I have never read sexy books or magazines.
- ___ 35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
- ___ 36. I never take things that don't belong to me.

- ___ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.
- ___ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
- ___ 39. I have some pretty awful habits.
- ___ 40. I don't gossip about other people's business.