Patterns of Bureaucracy in Intercollegiate Athletic Departments

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Claudio M Rocha, M.A.

Graduate Program in the College of Education and Human Ecology

The Ohio State University

2010

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Packianathan Chelladurai, Advisor

Professor Sarah Fields

Professor Brian Turner

Copyright by
Claudio M Rocha
2010

ABSTRACT

The theoretical argument of the current research is that athletic departments have been effective in attaining their conflicting goals mainly because they have become highly effective in managing institutional rules. Neo-institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), loose coupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and patterns of bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1954) form the theoretical cornerstone of the current research. Sport management investigations about goals and processes of intercollegiate athletics (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000) offer an unique opportunity to investigate these sociological theories of management in sport contexts. The initial endeavor of the current research was to explore and describe relationships between intercollegiate athletics goals and processes and coaches' perceptions about how institutional rules have been negotiated inside athletic departments (patterns of bureaucracy). To attain this aim, first, I proposed a scale to measure different patterns of bureaucracy in athletic departments and tested its psychometric properties. Then, I investigated the structural relationships among intercollegiate athletics goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy.

I received back 382 questionnaires from Division I coaches (response rate of 38.2%), 326 from Division II (32.6%), and 359 from Division III (35.9%). From these questionnaires some had to be eliminated due to either the irresponsible nature of the responses. A final sample of 907 ($n_{\text{divI}} = 322$; $n_{\text{divII}} = 277$; $n_{\text{divIII}} = 308$) was used to test the hypotheses. For controlling for non-response error, late respondents were compared

to early respondents. Late respondents did not differ from early respondent in any variable for all three divisions. Initial confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) showed acceptable fit indexes, but some items did not load sufficiently high in their constructs. After some refining, the new proposed bureaucracy scale presented good psychometric properties, as did the goals and processes scales. Multiple-group CFA indicated fully measurement invariance for bureaucracy and goals scales, and partial measurement invariance for processes scale.

Single-group structural equation modeling (SEM) analyses showed that the correlation between developmental and performance goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($r_{\text{divI}} = .654$; $r_{\text{divII}} = .660$; $r_{\text{divIII}} = .582$). The regression coefficient of developmental processes on developmental goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .924$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .909$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .853$). Also, the regression coefficient of performance processes on performance goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .902$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .780$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .933$). For all three divisions, developmental process was a significant predictor of all three types of bureaucracy: mock bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = -.313$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = -.392$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = -.406$), representative bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .289$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .414$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .411$) and discordant bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .226$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .331$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .282$). Multiple-group SEM analyses showed that structural relationships among goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy were invariant among all three groups of coaches. Implications for theory and practice of these results were discussed.

Dedication

Dedicated to my beloved wife, Thais, and my two amazing kids, Nathan and Julie.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I would like to thank Dr. Chella, my advisor. It has been a great pleasure to interact with him during classes and personal meetings. Dr. Chella is the most known name in Sport Management around the world. Despite this fact, he is always available to talk and help his students in all matters. I learnt much more than sport management and research methods from him. I learnt how to treat people with respect, attention, and love. I learnt dignity. Thank you, Dr. Chella.

I thank Dr. Brian Turner, Dr. Sarah Fields, and Dr. Andrew Martin for being part of my committee. I really enjoyed the courses I took from you. Beyond classes, the insights you professors gave me during my candidacy exam and dissertation proposal were extremely helpful. Thank you all for being always so prompt to help.

I would like to thank two people who have supported me when I needed the most. Dr. Gary Stonner and Dr. Li-Shu Wang, I will never forget the opportunity you gave me to learn about true experimental designs and cancer research. It was a great privilege to be a student research assistant in your lab. Thank you for all your flexibility and support.

I would like to thank all the professors from whom I took courses at The Ohio State University. It was a pleasure to take courses in departments as diverse as sociology, psychology, communication, and statistics.

I also thank all the American college coaches who patiently responded my almost endless requests to fill out the questionnaires. I learnt from you why the United States of America is an athletic potency.

I have a special thank to CAPES (Brazil) and Fulbright Commission (US) for the financial support I have had. I would never be able to accomplish the dream of studying in an American university without this scholarship. I hope I can return this investment in many ways. Also in Brazil, I would like to thank my former advisor, Dr. Valdir Barbanti, who opened the doors of the academia to me. Dr. Barbanti supported me not only during my masters' studies, but also during my many attempts to get a scholarship to come to the US.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Ronaldo and Vera Rocha, and my parents in law, Zilton and Celina Neves, for all support I have received. We have missed you and you have missed us (mainly the kids) for long four years. However, not even in one moment, you have complained about the distance. Your support has been much felt and appreciated. It has delivered a great deal of strength to us. Thank you.

VITA

- 1991..... B.S. Physical Education, Faculdade
Dom Bosco, Brasilia-DF, Brazil
- 1995..... B.S Business Administration,
University of Brasilia (UnB), Brazil
- 2001 M.A. Biodynamic of Human
Movement, University of Sao Paulo
(USP), Brazil
- 2006-present..... Fulbright Scholar, The
Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

- Rocha, C. M., & Turner, B. A. (2008). Organizational effectiveness of athletic departments and coaches' extra-role behaviors. *Journal of Issues in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1*, 124-144.
- Rocha, C. M., & Barbanti, V. J. (2006). An analysis of teh confrontations in the first sequence of game actions in Brazilian volleyball. *Journal of Human Movement Studies, 50*, 259-272.
- Rocha, C. M., & Barbanti, V. J. (2004). Analysis of the factors that influence attack actions in high level men's volleyball. *Brazilian Journal of Physical Education and Sport, 18*(4), 303-314.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Education and Human Ecology

Specialization: Sport Management

Cognate: Sociology

Minor: Research Methods in Human Resources Development

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract.....	ii
Dedication.....	iv
Acknowledgments.....	v
Vita.....	vii
Table of Contents.....	ix
List of Tables.....	xii
List of Figures.....	xv

Chapters:

	Page
1. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of the problem	3
Gouldner's Patterns of Bureaucracy	10
Internal Coordination of Activities in Athletic Departments	11
Moving beyond rules violation	12
Purpose of the Study	13
Conceptual Framework and Research Hypotheses	14
Constitutive Definitions of Terms	21
Intercollegiate athletic goals	21
Intercollegiate athletic processes	21
Patterns of bureaucracy	22
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....	23
Decoupling and institutionalism	23
Loose coupling and institutionalism – the example of bureaucracy	35
Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems	39
Decoupling as an adaptive process.....	48
Summary of Decoupling and Institutionalism	49
Institutional Rules of Intercollegiate Athletics	50
Who dictates the rules – The NCAA role in the intercollegiate athletics..	51
Amateurism	55

Eligibility	59
Recruitment.....	63
Gender Equity	67
Summary for Institutional Rules of Intercollegiate Athletics	70
Intercollegiate Athletics Goals and Processes	72
Organizational goals	72
Stakeholders – who really counts?	75
Coaches as key stakeholders	78
From goals to processes.....	79
3. METHODOLOGY	82
Research design	82
Operational definition of the variables.....	82
Threats to internal and external validity in correlational research.....	85
Bureaucracy – Scale development	87
Content-related validity	87
Data collection	88
Procedures.....	89
Sample	90
Data analysis	92
Measurement model – overall fit	93
Measurement model – Construct-related validity	93
Convergent validity	94
Discriminant validity	94
Reliability.....	95
Measurement invariance	95
Single-group structural model analyses.....	98
Multiple-group structural model analyses	100
4. RESULTS	102
Sample characteristics	102
Measurement model – Single-group CFA.....	106
Discriminant validity	115
Measurement model – multiple-group CFA.....	119
Structural model – Single-group SEM.....	129
Summary of the results for single-group SEM.....	145
Structural model – multiple-group SEM.....	147
5. DISCUSSION	151

Sample characteristics and non-response error	152
Validity and reliability of the scales	154
Measurement invariance of the scales.....	156
Alternative models	158
Structural relationships among constructs.....	159
A special note about mock bureaucracy.....	169
Limitations and recommendations for future studies.....	173
Conclusion.....	174
APPENDICES.....	177
Appendix A – Goals and processes items (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000).....	177
Appendix B – Bureaucracy Items	182
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	185
ENDNOTES.....	196

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 4.1 Demographic characteristics of the samples	103
Table 4.2 Comparing early to late respondents to control for non-response error in demographics	104
Table 4.3 Comparing early to late respondents to control for non-response error in the mean of first-order factors	105
Table 4.4 Initial fit measures for calibration sample (all scales by division)	107
Table 4.5 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the GOALS scale, for calibration sample	108
Table 4.6 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the PROCESSES scale, for calibration sample	109
Table 4.7 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the BUREAUCRACY scale, for calibration sample	110
Table 4.8 Fit measures for the measurement model (validation sample)	111

Table 4.9 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the GOALS scale, for validation sample	112
Table 4.10 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the PROCESSES scale, for validation sample	113
Table 4.11 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the BUREAUCRACY scale, for validation sample	114
Table 4.12 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and correlations for factors in DIVISION I.....	116
Table 4.13 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and correlations for factors in DIVISION II	117
Table 4.14 Means (M), standard deviations (SD), and correlations for factors in DIVISION III	118
Table 4.15 Summary of fit statistics for measurement invariance of first-order factor model of bureaucracy scale.....	122
Table 4.16 Summary of fit statistics for measurement invariance of second-order factor model of goals scale	126
Table 4.17 Summary of fit statistics for measurement invariance of second-order factor model of processes scale	128

Table 4.18 Fit measures for comparing three alternative models in all three NCAA divisions	129
Table 4.19 Maximum likelihood point estimates (λ and β), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), and t-values for Division I	133
Table 4.20 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), z-statistic, and p-values for Division I	136
Table 4.21 Maximum likelihood point estimates (λ and β), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), and t-values for Division II	138
Table 4.22 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), z-statistic, and p-values for Division II	140
Table 4.23 Maximum likelihood point estimates (λ and β), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), and t-values for Division III	142
Table 4.24 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), z-statistic, and p-values for Division III	145
Table 4.25 Summary of fit statistics for structural invariance of regression weights	149
Table 4.26 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), z-statistic, and p-values for the whole sample (constrained model)	150
Table 5.1 Summary of results of the hypotheses	168
Table 5.2 Summary of results of the indirect effects	169
Table 5.2 Frequency, percent, and cumulative percent of reponses for mock bureaucracy items	171

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1.1 Structural model showing hypotheses	19
Figure 3.1 Alternative models of structural relationships among latent variables	99
Figure 4.1 First-order confirmatory factor analysis model for bureaucracy scale	120
Figure 4.2 Second-order confirmatory factor analysis model for goals scale	123
Figure 4.3 Second-order confirmatory factor analysis model for processes scale	124
Figure 4.4 Fully mediated structural model	131
Figure 4.5 Path coefficients between factors for division I coaches	134
Figure 4.6 Path coefficients between factors for division II coaches	139
Figure 4.7 Path coefficients between factors for division III coaches	143

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Athletic departments of universities and colleges are among the most important sport organizations in the country. Athletic directors of large universities manage huge and increasing budgets. Historically, investments in college sport have been soaring decade after decade. According to Padilla and Baumer (1994), in the early 1970s, the typical college sport programs had an annual budget of about \$1 million. In the mid-1990s, a typical major university had an athletic department's budget varying between \$15 and \$20 million per year. Nowadays, typical major universities have a budget of, at least, \$70 millions per year, while the largest ones have a budget of over \$100 millions a year (Department of Education, 2008).

This amazing growth in college sports' finances seems to have brought some changes in its "raison d'être". Moving from equitable sport opportunities as a complementary educational resource for all students to pursuit of athletic excellence and entertainment, college athletics are argued to be increasingly detached from the educational mission of universities (Baxter, Margavio, & Lambert, 1996; Duderstadt, 2000; Zimbalist, 1999). In this scenario, college athletes have been accused of not being students any more (Sperber, 1990). Coaches and administrators have been painted as mercenaries (Benford, 2007). Athletic excellence and academic performance have been

treated as “competing values” inside universities (Baxter, et al., 1996; Putler & Wolfe, 1999).

Many alternatives have been proposed to keep college sport as an integral part of higher education. Regulatory bodies have been empowered to propose and enforce thousands of rules, most of which to control the athletic drives of coaches and administrators while enforcing academic targets for student athletes. Scholars have become reformists and written a lot about necessary changes in college sports (Duderstadt, 2000; Sperber, 2001). Voices have risen against the exacerbated commercialism and lack of amateurism in college athletics (Knight Foundation, 2001). The sport management literature seems to be saturated with criticisms and suggestions of reforms for college athletics (e.g., Benford, 2007; Sperber, 2000).

Although some authors did assert that athletic programs have failed in achieving some of their goals, mainly educational goals (Sperber, 1990; Telander, 1996), many of the criticisms against the current state of college athletics are not on the accomplishment of *goals*. Rather, the bitterest criticisms are about the *processes* used to accomplish the goals. Zimbalist (1999) depicts the problem in a very direct manner:

With big bucks dangling before their eyes, many NCAA schools find the temptations of success too alluring to worry about the rules. Schools cheat. They cheat by arranging to help their prospective athletes pass standardized tests. They cheat by providing illegal payments to their recruits. They cheat by setting up special rinky-dink curricula so their athletes can stay qualified. And when one school cheats, others feel compelled to do the same. (p. 4)

Zimbalist's idea represented in this passage is not different from many other authors who have frantically argued for college sports' reforms (e.g, Chu, 1989; Sperber, 1990; Telander, 1996). All seem to raise the same point, book after book: The processes schools have used to attain athletic and commercial objectives of athletic programs have violated institutional rules. Moreover, as noted in the last phrase of Zimbalist's statement, these violations seem to be extremely widespread all over the field of intercollegiate athletics.

On the other hand, there is research evidence to show that college athletic departments are effective in achieving their goals. A brief look into athletic departments' missions makes clear that they have to deal with objectives as diverse as athletic excellence, academic achievement, gender and ethnicity diversity, entertainment, and revenue generation¹. Current television deals have shown that college athletics have no problem in producing athletic excellence and quality entertainment (Duderstadt, 2000). Previous researches have also shown that gender and ethnicity diversity has been considered as an important matter for managers of college athletics (Elliott & Mason, 2001; Fink, Pastore, & Riemer, 2001). Meanwhile, empirical assessments have shown that college athletic departments have been very effective in their objective of revenue generation (Goff, 2000; Padilla & Baumer, 1994). Even in the most critical and criticized aspect of the academic achievement of student-athletes, researches have indicated that athletic departments have been somewhat effective (Rishe, 2003; Robst & Keil, 2000).

Statement of the problem

Therefore, two issues are in dire need of investigation in order to better understand the administration of intercollegiate athletics in America. First, a discussion

about institutional rules and how athletic department personnel have been managing these rules is crucial to understand the effectiveness of college athletic departments. Second, a discussion about goals and processes of intercollegiate athletics might explain why and how some practices (such as bending the rules) have become widespread in the field of college athletics.

The theoretical argument of the current research is that athletic departments have been effective in attaining their conflicting goals mainly because they have become highly effective in managing institutional rules. The term “institutional rule” often sounds a little redundant, as sociologists have defined *institutions* as “shared rules” that define categories of social actors and their adequate activities (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). In a broad scope, institutional theory have highlighted the importance of values, norms, rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions for the decision making process in modern organizations (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio & Powel, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Barley and Tolbert (1997) proposed that these institutional elements “provide blueprints for organizing by specifying the forms and procedures an organization of a particular type should adopt if it is to be seen as a member-in-good-standing of its class” (p. 93-94). The focus of this research was exclusively on institutional *rules*, leaving values, norms, and beliefs for future investigations. For the sake of operational definition, institutional rule will be considered any NCAA, conference, or university rule to which managers, coaches, athletes, and other athletic personnel are expected to abide by.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that institutional rules are responsible for formal structures adopted by organizations. Organizational formal structures provide

organizations with legitimacy on the terms of key external regulatory bodies, such as the state and professional associations. The problem with institutional rules occurs when these rules conflict with the technical imperatives of daily internal activities. Usually, to survive, organizations should balance external institutional pressures to comply with all rules and keep legitimacy with internal technical needs. When this situation of conflict arises, Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that formal structures become “rationalized myths”. By rationalized myths they meant that organizations have created a rational strategy to respond to highly institutionalized environments by loosely decoupling formal structures and internal technical activities. They argued that a loose coupling would be a very efficient way organizations have been using to buffer the internal technical needs from institutional rules. Basically, the idea is that organizations need to keep an external appearance of good citizens, who follow all the rules, while actually some rules are bent to promote internal technical efficiency.

As noted by Orton and Weick (1990), support for Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) thesis about loose coupling between formal structures dictated by institutional rules and technical activities has been found in studies in very diverse environments, such as hospitals (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1983), courts (Hagan, Hewitt, & Alwin, 1979), prisons (Thomas, 1984), nursing homes (Lopez, 2007), casinos (Sallaz, 2002), and educational organizations (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Firestone, 1985). Therefore, the current research intends to investigate if loose coupling has been a strategy adopted by college athletic managers to deal with institutional rules. Athletic managers may keep an appearance of conformity with the institutional rules while they empower their employees, mainly coaches, to act in order to attain some of the goals of athletic departments. There are in

the literature some anecdotal evidences to support this assumption. For example, Richard Phelps, former head coach of Notre Dame's men's basketball has once asserted:

You decide the job you want to take. You decide who you want to recruit – the type of person. You decide who you want to have surrounded that program as far as alumni, boosters, and friends. And *you also decide what you want to do with the NCAA rules*. (Quoted from Sperber, 1990, p. 156, emphasis added)

A specific example about how athletic managers have been dealing with institutional rules comes from the way they deal with the NCAA rule that bars student-athletes from devoting more than four hours per day or 20 hours per week to their sport (NCAA, 2008, bylaw 17.1.6.1). Zimbalist (1999) called this rule a “farce”. By the same token, Benford (2007) presented empirical data showing that, from athletic directors to athletes, everybody inside athletic departments agree the NCAA 20-hour rule is universally ignored. A loose coupling between the expected structure, respecting the limit of 20 hours of practices, and the actual practices in athletic departments seems to guarantee their effectiveness to attain some of their organizational goals, such as athletic excellence and the quality of entertainment for general public.

The example of loose coupling in schools is very useful to explain how similar strategies can lead athletic departments to effectively attain athletic goals. Meyer and Rowan (1978) noted the extensive loose coupling of institutional rules and technical activities in schools. They offered an explanation based on the fact that the large-scale educational bureaucracies frequently leave instruction uncontrolled. To these authors, schools have very tightly organized rituals of classifications for their curricula, students, and teachers. These elements are institutionalized in the legal systems of the society.

However, schools exert a very loose control on their instructional activities. In their words, “attempts to tightly link the prescriptions of the central theory of education to the activities of instruction would create conflict and inconsistency and discredit and devalue the meaning of ritual classifications in society” (p. 80).

Athletic departments exist primarily to formalize and control athletic practices. Like schools, athletic departments have tightly organized rituals of classifications. They are separated in associations, divisions, and conferences, according to their different characteristics and interests. Colleges are supposed to accomplish a long list of requirements to take part in the most visible and wealthiest divisions and conferences. For example, to aspire membership in the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision (formerly Division IA), a university must: sponsor at least 14 varsity sports; play at least 60% of its games against other IA opponents; have a football stadium with a capacity of at least 30,000; and experience an average football attendance of over 17,000 in each of the previous four years (Zimbalist, 1999).

Interestingly, at the same time (and as noted in the school’s analysis of Meyer and Rowan, 1978), regulatory bodies and athletic departments exert a very loose control on technical primary activities – athletic practices. If practices were to be tightly guided by institutional rules, the athletic excellence could not be reached. Consequently, it could create discredit and devalue the meaning of the ritual classifications in society. This process happens because the structural elements of intercollegiate athletics are also highly institutionalized in the society. To keep the meaning of the ritual classification, the society needs to perceive that Division I schools are athletically superior to Division II schools, which in turn are supposed to perform athletically better than Division III

schools. This is similar to societal perceptions that a graduate student has superior academic skills when compared to an undergraduate student, who in turn should show superior knowledge when compared to a high school student.

To keep the meaning of the ritual classifications, organizations need to maintain their legitimacy via compliance with institutional rules. Loose coupling is a compelling and effective way to keep legitimacy, while technical activities go on smoothly. Institutional rules cannot be simply ignored by teachers, coaches, or athletic managers. As Scott (2001) noted, schools receive legitimacy to the extent to which their objectives are aligned to cultural values, such as socialization and education, and the extent to which they align their structures and processes to institutionalized paradigms of operation determined for educational organizations. Therefore, reinforcing of institutional rules and structures lend legitimacy to schools. The same is true for athletic departments. The extent to which their goals are consistent with institutionalized paradigms of college sport operation (such as academic achievement and equal opportunities) determines the legitimacy of these organizations. Thus, institutional rules lend legitimacy to athletic departments. If these rules hinder the achievement of practical objectives, then a solution other than simply and openly breaking them should be found. The loose coupling between structural rules and technical activities renders this service. By loose coupling institutional structures and actual activities, athletic departments guarantee legitimacy at the same time as they prepare student-athletes for performing athletically at the highest level.

However, schools and athletic departments are somewhat different. Athletic departments are organizations hosted and supported by other larger organizations – the

universities. Consequently, while schools have basically one paramount goal – instruction; athletic departments have two paramount but conflicting goals: one related to its own reason for existence – athletic performance, and another to attend to its host institution interests – academic achievement (Baxter, et al., 1996). Considering that institutional rules are mainly concerned in promoting academic achievement (to keep the legitimacy of college athletics), loose coupling can be useful to buffer institutional rules and attain *athletic goals*. However, an alternative strategy must be drawn to accomplish *academic goals*. Following the line of thought expressed in institutionalism literature, this research expects the achievement of academic goals to be highly dependent on a tight coupling between rules and actions. By the same token, the attainment of athletic goals is expected to be highly dependent on a loose coupling between rules and actions.

In this sense, athletic departments are pluralistic organizations where different degrees of decoupling between rules and actions need to be constantly negotiated in order to attain competing goals. Negotiations about what rules should be fully followed and what should be only partially followed (or even completely ignored) are supposed to be common in athletic departments. These negotiations are, in fact, also present in other fields. As noted earlier, different levels of coupling between rules and technical routines have been investigated in other settings (Lopez, 2007; Sallaz, 2002; Thomas, 1984). Gouldner's (1954) *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* has been recognized as the first and the most important analysis about how different degrees of coupling between rules and actual activities could be an effective strategy to attain organizational goals in highly institutionalized environments (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006a, 2006b).

Gouldner's Patterns of Bureaucracy

In Gouldner's (1954) analysis, organizations where managers and employees agree on the compliance of institutional rules have been called "representative" bureaucracies; while organizations where managers and employees negotiate "adaptations" of rules (loose coupling) have been called "mock" bureaucracies. As noted by Hallett and Ventresca (2006b), "the loose coupling associated with mock bureaucracy is a far cry from the *tight coupling* that had been a presumed characteristic of bureaucracy prior to the emergence of new institutionalism" (p. 221, emphasis in the original). Yet, a third pattern of bureaucracy can arise inside organizations when managers and employees disagree about compliance of rules. If rules are enforced², a tight coupling between rules and technical activities is present and a pattern of "punishment-centered" bureaucracy arises³ (Gouldner, 1954). Hereinafter, I am going to call this pattern "discordant" bureaucracy, because non-compliance with enforced rules will not necessarily result in punishment.

In any organization all three patterns of bureaucracy are expected to be presented in different proportions (Gouldner, 1954). Hallett and Ventresca (2006b) proposed that social relationships determine the proportion of each pattern inside organizations. Meyer and Rowan (2001) noted that how closely people are inspected by their supervisors also influences the type of bureaucracy. As employees and supervisors actively negotiate different couplings between institutional rules and local practices, different patterns of bureaucracy arise. Therefore, workers' perceptions about negotiations involving institutional rules and their bureaucratic orientation are highly dependent on each other.

And ultimately, the bureaucratic orientation of workers is highly dependent on the organization's bureaucratic climate.

Internal Coordination of Activities in Athletic Departments

Meyer and Rowan (2001) noted that instruction in institutionalized educational systems is less closely inspected or coordinated than key activities in other organizations such as armies or businesses. Social relationships in athletic departments are somewhat different from other bureaucratic organizations. In fact, athletic practices usually happen in isolated fields, courts, or swimming pools over coaches' command. In this sense, coaching is highly similar to instruction, as athletic practices are activities conducted by coaches almost in isolation from peers and supervisors. They work directly with athletes and their coaching staff. But, in their essential activities, they have rare contacts with supervisors and no contact whatsoever with coaches of other sports. This isolation is based on the logic of confidence: Coaches know what is supposed to be done (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). This process empowers coaches, who basically determine what rules they want to follow and what they do not want to follow.

Naturally, the process is not so simple. Coaches cannot simply break rules and pursue their own interests. There has to be an agreement about which rules should be completely followed and which should be only partially followed. The lack of inspection by managers and athletic directors is part of the game (Burawoy, 1979). Supervisors loosely control the job of coaches because this strategy permits the organization to achieve some goals that would not be achieved if they closely inspected and enforced total rule compliance.

Given the autonomy of coaches to conduct their work, their personal perceptions about institutional rules are fundamental to describe patterns of bureaucracy inside athletic departments. The legendary coach Bear Bryant, of University of Alabama, linked the autonomy of coaches with their dealings with rules: “When the cheating starts, look to the head coach. He’s the chairman of the board” (quoted from Knight Foundation, 2001, p. 25). The Knight Foundation Report (2001) simply summed up this idea asserting that the coaches “set the tone”. In empirical investigations, coaches have been described as “the most important contributor to overall effectiveness” of athletic departments (MacLean & Chelladurai, 1995, p. 195). Trail and Chelladurai (2002) considered coaches as one the most influential stakeholders in college athletic departments. These authors asserted that coaches’ opinions have a central importance to assess goals and processes of athletic departments. In this fashion, coaches’ perceptions about what kind of coupling between institutional rules and actual activities is present in their athletic departments have a great potential to represent the bureaucratic orientation of these organizations.

Moving beyond rules violation

Trail and Chelladurai (2000) proposed that any attempt to understand intercollegiate athletics should move beyond a mere discussion of which rules are being violated and which are being followed. They argued that rules violations (different degrees of coupling) are manifestations of different goals held and processes adopted by different stakeholders of college athletics. Hence, the expectation of the current research was that how coaches perceive the importance their athletic departments place on different goals and how frequent their athletic departments engage in different processes should be highly correlated with coaches’ perceptions about different patterns of

bureaucracy (degrees of coupling between rules and daily activities)⁴. Trail and Chelladurai (2000) divided intercollegiate athletics goals and process in two categories: developmental goals/processes and performance goals/processes. Developmental goals/processes are related to academic achievement and social/cultural/physical well being of student athletes, while performance goals/processes are related to athletic achievement and financial performance.

Previous research has shown that developmental and performance orientations are somewhat competing values inside athletic departments (Baxter, et al., 1996; Putler & Wolfe, 1999; Rocha & Turner, 2008). Moreover, colleges that violated institutional rules tend to perform better athletically and financially (Padilla & Baumer, 1994). Therefore, different perceptions of the importance of goals and appropriateness of processes of college athletics are likely to be linked to different bureaucratic patterns. For example, in athletic departments that emphasize performance goals and processes, coaches are likely to perceive more frequently the presence of mock bureaucracy. On the other hand, in athletic departments that emphasize developmental goals and processes, coaches are likely to perceive the presence of representative bureaucracy more frequently.

Purpose of the Study

Coming back to the initial argument that athletic departments have effectively attained their athletic goals via loose coupling between rules and actual activities, the current research was set to investigate the relationships between intercollegiate goals and processes, on the one hand, and patterns of bureaucracy, on the other. In this sense, this initial research endeavor was to explore and describe relationships between intercollegiate athletics goals and processes and coaches' perceptions of how institutional

rules have been negotiated inside athletic departments (patterns of bureaucracy). To attain this aim, the specific purposes of this research were:

- (a) to propose and test the psychometric properties of a scale created to measure different patterns of bureaucracy in athletic departments;
- (b) to explore and describe the structural relationships among intercollegiate athletics goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy in all three NCAA divisions; and
- (c) to compare three different populations of coaches, based on their NCAA division membership, regarding the structural relationships among intercollegiate athletics goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy.

A comparison among the three NCAA divisions was used to explore Meyer and Rowan's (1977) perception that loose coupling between institutional form and actual activities would be very widespread in highly institutionalized settings.

Conceptual Framework and Research Hypotheses

The conceptual framework of the current study focuses on the relationships between different patterns of bureaucracy prevalent in intercollegiate athletics (representative bureaucracy, mock bureaucracy, and discordant bureaucracy) and coaches' perceptions of goals and processes of intercollegiate athletics. A causal relationship is expected between different goals held and processes adopted by athletic departments, and the three patterns of bureaucracy. To investigate these causal relationships, I proposed a model where the relationship between the importance of goals and bureaucracy was expected to be mediated by how frequent athletic department engage in certain processes.

Past research has shown that loose coupling between institutional rules and practical activities (mock bureaucracy) is an efficient way to attain organizational goals that are hindered by these rules (Lopez, 2007; Sallaz, 2002). Furthermore, the attainment of organizational goals that are closely related to institutional rules depends on a tight coupling between these rules and actual activities (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006b). Different degrees of coupling as a strategy to attain different goals was not investigated in the intercollegiate athletics yet. Nevertheless, some characteristics of college athletics seem to indicate that different couplings might represent a good administrative strategy to attain different goals—i.e., academic and athletic goals. First, the highly institutionalized environment of intercollegiate athletics counts mainly on rules created to protect student-athletes *academic achievement*. Second, a well reported competition between academic achievement and athletic performance (Baxter, et al., 1996; Cunningham, 2002; Putler & Wolfe, 1999; Rocha & Turner, 2008) seems to claim for alternative strategies to attain athletic goals.

The current research is the first attempt to relate intercollegiate athletic goals/processes and different patterns of bureaucracy practiced in intercollegiate athletics. This research proposed to investigate if coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place on certain goals and how frequently athletic departments engage in certain processes could cause different patterns of bureaucracy.

Regarding the relationship between goals and processes, Trail and Chelladurai (2002) asserted that it would be “highly unlikely that individuals would first choose a process and then the goals associated with that process” (p. 296). People and organizations tend to have objectives, and then to select appropriate processes to attain

these objectives. Following this logic, I hypothesized coaches' perceptions about the importance their athletic departments place on certain goals would be an antecedent of how frequent athletic departments engage in certain process. Following Trail and Chelladurai (2000) distinction between developmental and performance goals/processes, I proposed hypotheses the two first hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place on developmental goals will be positively related to how frequently athletic departments engage in developmental processes.

Hypothesis 2: Coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place on performance goals will be positively related to how frequently athletic departments engage in performance processes.

The categorization of goals and processes proposed by Trail and Chelladurai (2000) was based on the well-reported competing nature of the criteria used to measure organizational effectiveness of athletic departments (Baxter, et al., 1996; Putler & Wolfe, 1999). Cunningham (2002) noticed that two areas – athletic achievement and academic performance – have been consistently mentioned in the literature as the top priorities among different stakeholders of intercollegiate athletics. Putler and Wolfe (1999) presented a similar result, where athletic performance and academic achievement of student athletes were found to be competing values inside athletic departments. According to Baxter et al (1996), “some schools maximize status and financial resources

from athletics, whereas other schools concentrate more on academics” (p. 58). Both Baxter et al. and Putler and Wolfe seem to be very assertive about schools with different orientations regarding their athletic programs. Baxter and colleagues have asserted, regarding their athletic performance, schools could be separated in two distinct groups: one oriented toward winning and profit, and the other oriented toward education and amateur values of sport (Baxter & Lambert, 1991; Baxter, et al., 1996).

Therefore, based on the loose coupling theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and Gouldner’s (1954) three patterns of bureaucracy, coaches’ perceptions about how frequent athletic departments engage in different processes would cause different degrees of coupling between institutional rules and daily activities (different patterns of bureaucracy) in athletic departments. Basically, development processes were expected to be positively correlated with the following of the rules, while performance processes were expected to be positively correlated with the bending of the rules. Being more specific, coaches’ perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in developmental processes were hypothesized to be negatively related to mock bureaucracy and positively related to representative and discordant bureaucracy. By the same token, coaches’ perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in performance processes were supposed to be positively related to mock bureaucracy and negatively related to representative and discordant bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 3: Coaches’ perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in developmental processes are negatively related to mock bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 4: Coaches' perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in developmental processes are positively related to representative bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 5: Coaches' perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in developmental processes are positively related to discordant bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 6: Coaches' perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in performance processes are positively related to mock bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 7: Coaches' perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in performance processes are negatively related to representative bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 8: Coaches' perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in performance processes are negatively related to discordant bureaucracy.

It must be noted that I am hypothesizing that representative bureaucracy (where parties agree and rules are followed) and discordant bureaucracy (where parties disagree, but rules are still followed) are both positively related to how frequent athletic departments engage in developmental processes, and negatively related to how frequently athletic departments engage in performance processes. It was intuitive to believe that when a school prioritized developmental processes either representative or discordant pattern of bureaucracy would arise. The rules, which are mainly concerned about academic achievement of student-athletes, would be followed either by agreement or

enforcement (H4 and H5). On the other hand when a school prioritized performance processes, neither representative nor discordant bureaucracy were expected to arise (H7 and H8). The rules would be bended, in such a way that performance processes could be conducted. In other words, a pattern of mock bureaucracy would arise (H6).

Figure 1.1 summarizes these nine hypotheses.

Figure 1.1 Structural model showing hypotheses

As I mentioned elsewhere, a comparison among universities with different NCAA membership would be a reasonable way to verify Meyer and Rowan's (1977) assumption that loose coupling between institutional formal structures and actual activities (different patterns of bureaucracy) is widespread in highly institutionalized environments.

Cunningham and Ashley (2001) observed that, in segmenting member colleges into three divisions, the NCAA created distinct and clear contrasts among divisions. Other authors also pointed out that athletic departments of Divisions I, II, and III are different in many aspects (DeSchraver & Jensen, 2002; Fink, Pastore, & Riemer, 2003; Geist & Pastore, 2002; Turner & Chelladurai, 2005). Turner and Chelladurai (2005) stated that colleges

from different divisions emphasize athletics differently and, consequently, use different strategies to manage their priorities. Division I colleges generally show a drive for national prominence and acknowledge the importance of athletics to the entertainment value for the community (Fink, et al., 2003). To Cunningham and Ashley (2001), the most prominent distinction between Division I and other division's colleges is in revenue generation, inasmuch as Division I colleges have profitable football and men's basketball programs. DeSchrive and Jensen (2002) supported that idea affirming that Division II football programs generate very little, if any, revenue from sources such as media fees, advertisement, and sponsorship.

Different levels of emphasis in athletics seem to have influence on other aspects of athletic departments' life. Investigating ethical aspects, Baxter et al. (1996) showed that successful Division I schools were more likely than others to violate the NCAA rules. Regarding social performance, Fink et al. (2003) found that diversity management strategies contributed much more to the variance in organizational effectiveness in Division III than they did in Division I. Given those differences among divisions, it is likely that athletic departments from different divisions face different pressures to perform athletically well and, consequently, engage in different strategies to manage these pressures. Therefore, the structural relationships between goals and processes, and processes and patterns of bureaucracy were expected to be distinct among the three NCAA divisions. If this hypothesis is disconfirmed, then Meyer and Rowan's (1977) assumption that loose coupling between structure and actual activities is found in distinct institutionalized environments gains importance.

Hypothesis 9: Structural relationships among goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy are non invariant among the three NCAA divisions.

Constitutive Definitions of Terms

The constitutive definitions of terms are presented below. The operational definition of the variables will be presented later when the methodology of the study will be discussed.

Intercollegiate athletic goals

Etzioni (1964) defined organizational goal as “a desired state of affairs which the organization attempts to realize” (p. 6). Trail and Chelladurai (2000) proposed that intercollegiate athletic goals could be divided in developmental goals (goals related to academic achievement, social, and moral development of students) and performance goals (goals related to winning, entertainment, and program visibility). In this sense, intercollegiate athletic *developmental goals* will be defined hereinafter as a set of purposes athletic departments are expected to achieve that are related to academic achievement, social, and moral development of students. Likewise, intercollegiate athletic *performance goals* will be defined hereinafter as a set of purposes athletic departments related to winning, entertainment, and program visibility.

Intercollegiate athletic processes

Processes have been understood in the literature as any procedure organizations use to transform inputs into outputs (Steers, 1975; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). Trail and Chelladurai (2000) also separated intercollegiate athletic processes into (a) developmental processes (process related to control of admissions, academic eligibility, and career development) and (b) performance processes (processes related to attracting

athletes, and promoting the program). Therefore, intercollegiate athletic *developmental process* is defined as a set of procedures athletic departments are expected to execute that are related to admission, academic eligibility, and career development of students.

Similarly, intercollegiate athletic *performance process* is defined as a set of procedures athletic departments are expected to carry on that are related to attracting athletes and promoting the program.

Patterns of bureaucracy

The three patterns of bureaucracy used in this study follow the definition offered by Gouldner (1954). Gouldner has defined different patterns of bureaucracy based on how managers and employees dealt with institutional pressures to carry on the necessary procedures to have their work done. Bureaucracy as an institution has assumed three different forms. Gouldner's (1954) three patterns of bureaucracy are: (1) *representative bureaucracy* – where rules are enforced by managers and obeyed by workers; there is an agreement about the importance of the rules for achieving organizational goals; (2) *mock bureaucracy* – where rules are neither enforced by managers nor followed by workers, because violation allows both a measure of status improvement; there is an agreement about the lack of importance of rules for achieving organizational goals; and (3) *discordant bureaucracy* (or in Gouldner's terms, punishment-centered bureaucracy) – where rules are enforced by managers and evaded by workers; there is a disagreement about the importance of rules for achieving organizational goals.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The aim of this chapter is to present a review of literature pertaining to the variables included in this study, namely (a) loose coupling and patterns of bureaucracy, (b) intercollegiate athletic rules, and (c) intercollegiate athletic goals and processes. As long as possible, the interconnections among the variables will also be discussed during this review of literature.

Decoupling and institutionalism

The concepts of decoupling and institutionalism are closely related (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006a). Therefore, in order to understand decoupling, a brief conceptualization about the current state of affairs of institutionalism is mandatory. As noted by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), institution has different meanings in different disciplines. These authors mentioned Young's (1986) definition as a pattern definition for recent work in sociology. For Young (1986), social institutions represent "recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles" (p. 107). Zucker (1983) added that institution formation is "a phenomenological process by which certain relationships and actions come to be taken for granted" (p. 2), as well as a combination of circumstances where shared perceptions delineate what has meaning and what is

acceptable in organizations or societies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Barley and Tolbert (1997) define institutions as “shared rules and typifications that identify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships” (p.96). In their seminal paper, Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that institutionalization involves “the process by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take a rulelike status in social thought and action” (p. 341).

Scott (2001) defined institutions as social structures composed of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements, which provide stability and signification to social life (p. 48). Scott proposed that regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive systems should be understood as the “three pillars of institutions”. The regulative pillar is composed by coercive mechanisms and it basically assumes that institutions constrain and regularize organizational behavior. Rules, laws, and sanctions are indicators of regulative systems (Scott, 2001). The normative pillar is composed by normative rules that impose constraints on social behavior. At the same time, normative rules empower social actions, inasmuch as they confer rights, responsibilities, privileges, duties, and mandates (Scott, 2001). Certification and accreditation are good examples of normative rules. The cultural-cognitive pillar is composed by shared conceptions that represent the nature of social world. Through mimetic mechanisms, organizations in the same field, industry, or environment share common beliefs and logics of action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001).

Institutional theory have highlighted the importance of values, norms, rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions for the decision making process in modern organizations (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan,

1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Barley and Tolbert (1997) asserted these cultural elements “provide blueprints for organizing by specifying the forms and procedures an organization of a particular type should adopt if it is to be seen as a member-in-good-standing of its class” (p. 93-94).

At this point, it seems interesting to make a brief distinction between “the old” and “the new” institutionalism. Although the points of distinction can be as numerous as those described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Scott (2001) summarized those differences asserting that “attention to cognitive frames and cultural frameworks rather than to normative systems is one of the major criteria defining neoinstitutionalism theory in sociology” (p. 39). However, even more important is the fact that the regulative and normative focus of the old institutionalism is fundamental to understand institutionalism as a whole and it is neither denied nor replaced by the cultural-cognitive focus of the new institutionalism (Scott, 2001).

DiMaggio and Powell (1991) consider Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) article the seminal paper for the new institutionalism. The most basic idea behind Meyer and Rowan’s proposal is that institutionalized services, products, policies, and programs work as persuasive myths, and organizations use these myths with ceremony and formality. Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that institutional pressures are responsible for formal structures adopted by organizations. Organizations adopt “rationalized myths”, which provide them with legitimacy on the terms of key external regulatory bodies, such as the state, state agencies, and professional associations. However, many of these institutional pressures collide with technical internal activities. Thus, to survive, organizations should balance external institutional pressures and internal technical needs. Meyer and Rowan

(1977) proposed, then, a rational strategy to respond to highly institutionalized environments: a loose coupling (or decoupling) between formal structures and internal technical activities. They argued that a loose coupling would be a very efficient way organizations have been using to buffer the internal technical needs from institutional rules.

Based on Meyer and Rowan's arguments, three important concepts should be light up before discussing loose coupling: institutional rules, formal structure of organizations, and technical activities of organizations. Institutional rules are classifications constructed in societies as typifications or interpretations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Such rules can be merely taken for granted or can be supported by laws or public opinion (Starbuck, 1976). March and Olsen (1984) asserted that institutional rules are not a matter of choice, but rather they represent "rules of appropriateness", which are learned through education, socialization, and conventions. The most striking consequence of institutional rules is the homogeneity of practices (technical activities) and structures in organizations, such as corporations, schools, states, and labor market (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).

For Meyer and Rowan (1977), a precise distinction must be made between technical activities and formal structure of an organization. Technical activities are actual day-to-day work actions. They represent the way things are actually made. The formal structure of an organization encompasses not only the composition of offices, departments, and programs, but also practices and policies through which organizational goals should be reached. Rational formal structure has been considered "the most effective way" to arrange and control the complex relationships among distinct parts of

the organization. This postulate came originally from Max Weber's (1947) theory about how centralized states have brought the emergence of bureaucracy as the most efficient way to administrate organizations.

Therefore, until the early 60s, dominate organizational theories asserting that the arrangement and control of activities are crucial dimensions for success. Once more, these theories have their basis on Weber's bureaucratic concepts: the more the formal structure is controlled and rigidly followed, the more successful an organization should be. Basically, technical daily activities must be in conformity with the formal structure. However, empirical researches started to show the existence of big gaps between the formal structure and technical activities in successful organizations (March & Olsen, 1976; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1976). Thus, Meyer and Rowan (1977) conclude that organizations are usually loosely coupled: "structural elements are only loosely linked to each other and to activities, rules are often violated, decisions are often unimplemented, or if implemented have uncertain consequences, [...], and evaluation of inspection systems are subverted or rendered so vague as to provide little coordination" (p. 343).

Meyer and Rowan proposed an alternative to Weber's formal structure, which they called "rationalized formal structure". In this rationalized formal structure, the policies, programs, and procedures of contemporary organizations are dictated by culture, by the views of important stakeholders, by public opinion, by social prestige, and by the laws. These elements of this new rationalized and impersonal formal structure are manifestations of powerful institutional rules, which work as rationalized myths. Using

Meyer and Rowan's (1977) line of thought, once institutionalized, rationalized formal structures become a myth with powerful organizational capacity.

Insofar as rationalized institutional myths become widespread in domains (or fields) of activity, organizations start to become alike to each other through these myths. In fact, neo institutionalists have argued that organizational structures and practices are products of the social environment in which they are inserted (Scott, 2001; Zucker, 1977). At this stage, neo institutional researchers started to be concerned about how rationalized structures and practices have been so well disseminated all around fields and industries (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). The most cited consequence of institutional diffusion has been homogeneity or isomorphism in structure, culture, and outputs among organizations that take part in the same industry. Neo institutionalists assume that isomorphism is consequence of institutional pressures, which push actors to act in a contagion-like process (Brint & Karabel, 1991; DiMaggio & Powel, 1983).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed that regulatory bodies, such as the state and professions, became the great diffusers of institutional rules during the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, highly structured organizational fields offer a frame in which organizations tend to behave very alike to each other; mainly because the regulatory bodies widespread institutional ways to deal with uncertainty and constraint (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983).

The institutionalist perspective of diffusion extends previous approaches, inasmuch as it considers not only competing organizations, but also structural equivalent actors (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983). The ecological approach of Hannan and Freeman

(1977), for example, focused exclusively on competition among organizations as a means to diffuse organizational practices. Based on this ecological perspective, organizations should show similarities, because such similarities are characteristics of the survivors in a natural-selection process (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). However, institutionalists extended this notion when they proposed that structural equivalent actors also showed isomorphic behaviors. Structural equivalent actors are organizations that hold the same position in a network structure, that is, they have ties of the same kind to the same set of other organizations, even if they themselves are not connected and do not compete against each other (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983).

In some fields, organizations do not directly compete against one another, but they are structural equivalent actors. Universities are a classical example of structural equivalent actors. They all have regulatory bodies – the state, the department of education, among others – and hold similar positions in a network structure. However, some of them do not compete with others for the same kind of resource. For example, Harvard University is not competing against University of Toledo for the same students or for the same research grants. Both are universities and are in the same industry, but they definitely do not compete for the same kind of resources. Using an ecological perspective, they are not supposed to present isomorphic behaviors, inasmuch as they do not compete one against another. However, they do present similarities (e.g., classes structures, grade systems, research practices, and so on) that could not be explained by competitive pressures. Institutional pressures explain those similarities.

Thinking about organizations that are embedded into larger ones, the institutional pressures seem to be still more useful to explain any isomorphic structures that arise.

Athletic departments are good examples of organizations that are embedded into larger organizations. Athletic departments have been described as very isomorphic organizations in their structures (Cunningham & Ashley, 2001; Danylchuk & Chelladurai, 1999). Once more, ecological approaches seem not to be enough to investigate this kind of organization. Like universities, some athletic departments do not compete against others for the same kind of resources. For example, Ohio State, University of Michigan, and Penn State, all of them have similar models of athletic departments, which compete for same resources, and have a very intense intra-cluster interaction (Oliver, 1988). Isomorphic structures among these athletic departments are expected and could easily be explained by ecological perspectives only. However, in this field of activity (intercollegiate athletics) there are others organizations with very similar structures, which are not competing with those above-mentioned for the same resources. For instance, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton's athletic departments are in the same field and below the same regulatory institution – National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)⁵. Nevertheless, the former group does not compete with the second one for the same resources. The former group has a large amount of money employed in scholarships to attract the most athletic students around the country. The latter group does not offer any kind of scholarship for their student-athletes; instead it uses its academic prestige to attract them. Hence, if isomorphic internal structures and processes are found among all of them, competing arguments from ecological approaches seem to be not a plausible explanation.

According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), three are the sources of institutional isomorphic behaviors: coerciveness, mimicry, or normative pressures. It is noteworthy

that these three sources correspond to those three pillars of institutionalism proposed by Scott (2001): regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. Coercive isomorphism arises from the search for legitimacy. “Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Meyer and Rowan (1977) recognized that the consequence of this kind of pressures is that organizations are increasingly isomorphic within given fields and organized around “rituals of conformity” to wider institutions. Coming back to the case of athletic departments to make a point, these organizations suffer institutional pressures from a regulatory institution (e.g., NCAA), from the host university, and from the society as a whole; all of them could be considered the “wider institutions” of athletic departments. All of them exert coercive pressures on athletic departments, which should present certain structure to reach institutional patterns. Inasmuch as the legitimacy of these organizations depends on the compliance with those pressures, they tend to show isomorphic forms of administration. Hence, coercive pressures from powerful institutions could explain, through rituals of conformity, the isomorphic administrative structures and behaviors of organizations.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that, beyond coercive forces, isomorphism could be an answer to environmental uncertainties through mimicry. “When environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other organizations” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 151). They added that models could be disseminated either unintentionally (indirectly through employee turnover, or directly through consulting firms) or intentionally (organizations model themselves based on

other organizations in their field that they perceived as successful). In athletic departments, neither the use of consulting firms nor the transfer of administrative personnel seems to be so widespread. However, the turnover among coaches and coaching staff could diffuse some practices in these organizations. Intentional mimetic isomorphism, yet, seems to be responsible for the most part of the isomorphic behaviors among athletic departments. Whenever a change is perceived to bring a competitive advantage to one athletic department over others, it tends to be largely and rapidly spread. For example, some practices such as scholarship grants to attract the best athletes (not necessarily the best students), professional coaches, coaching staffs, among others were quickly widespread among athletic departments as soon as they were introduced (Benford, 2007).

Finally, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed that isomorphism could also be consequence of normative pressures, mainly from professionalization. They proposed two professional normative pressures as the main sources of isomorphism in this category: (1) formal education and legitimation produced by university specialists; and (2) professional networks. “Such mechanisms create a pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and disposition that may override variation in tradition and control that might otherwise shape organizational behavior” (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983, p. 152). Although no researches were found about this topic in sport settings, individuals who attain the positions of athletic managers seem to be very alike in background. Almost all of them are respected by their former athletic careers. As noted by Ostfield (2006), it is very desirable that sport managers have “the pedigree of having been a

ballplayer” (p. 137). Similar backgrounds are expected for coaches, who are also very frequently venerated by their former athletic careers. Naturally, an athletic career is not formal education. However, in the case of athletic department workers (mainly athletic managers and coaches), a former athletic career seems to represent the legitimating process by which they enter in their sport management careers.

Isomorphism is a key concept for the new institutionalism arguments, inasmuch as Meyer and Rowan (1977) recognized that, independent of their productive efficiency, organizations in highly institutionalized environments that become isomorphic with these environments gain legitimacy and resources to stay alive. They called this process “sagacious conformity”. Nevertheless, Meyer and Rowan warned that this sagacious conformity or isomorphism is useful only in highly institutionalized environments. Even in highly institutionalized environments, isomorphism with institutional rules can create some problems, such as conflicts between ceremonial rules and technical activities and demands for efficiency. Good examples are a bus company, which must keep certain routes even with few passengers available, and a university, which must keep some departments disregarding the number of enrollments (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). To be consistent with my previously explored example, I would say that athletic departments also face the same kind of conflict when they are obliged to maintain some sports, which are neither generating revenue nor attracting students’ interest.

To sum up, legitimacy asks for isomorphism with institutional environments, which in turn leads to ceremonial rules, which in turn conflict with the logic of efficiency. Legitimacy has been defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially

constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). To solve conflicts between institutional rules and efficiency, Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed two interconnected instruments: decoupling⁶ and the logic of confidence. By decoupling, Meyer and Rowan (1978) mean that “the structure is disconnected from technical (work) activity, and activity is disconnected from its effects” (p.79). This definition is largely accepted in the institutionalism literature (Brint & Karabel, 1991; March & Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1976) and I would say that it is specifically what neo institutionalists want to mean by decoupling. Decoupling permits organizations to keep legitimated formal structures, whereas their work daily activities vary depending on practical necessities. Discussing the process of decoupling is my main objective in this paper/response.

As noted by Scott (2001), Parsons (1960) was the first to refer to loose coupling processes inside modern organizations. Parsons proposed that organizations have tended to become specialized into three quite distinct layers: the technical layer, which focuses on production; the managerial layer, which focuses on control and coordination of activities; and the institutional layer, which focuses on compliance of social norms and conventions. In approaching the points of interaction among these three layers, Parsons (1960) noted that they were characterized by “a qualitative break in the simple continuity of line authority [...] because the functions at each level are qualitatively different” (p. 65-66). Scott (2001) proposed that Parsons’ discussion about the relationship among organization layers had anticipated the concept of loosely coupling or decoupling by authors who came later, such as Weick (1976) and Meyer and Rowan (1977).

However, other scholars have proposed that ideas of loose coupling between structure and technical core activities are even more ancient. Hallet and Ventresca (2006a), for example, have proposed that the concept of loose coupling was present since Gouldner's (1954) descriptions of different patterns of bureaucracy. Using bureaucracy as a good example of institution, I will describe next how the literature has reported loose coupling as an important strategy to deal with institutional pressures.

Loose coupling and institutionalism – the example of bureaucracy

I have been discussing the importance of loose coupling between formal structures and actual technical activities as a powerful mean to buffer the hindrance effects of institutional rules, while keeping a façade of “good citizen” organization. At this point, I would like to explore a specific example of institution, instead of talking about institutions in a general sense, what can help me to make my point about the importance of loose coupling in highly institutionalized environments. Bureaucracy has been recognized as one of the most important institutions that emerged in modern social movements (Braverman, 1974; Gouldner, 1954). Hallet and Ventresca (2006a) presented bureaucracy as “the premier institution in the organizational sociology” (p. 912). Therefore, bureaucracy represents a perfect example of institution, in order to better understand the relationship between loose coupling and institutional pressures.

The potential of the loose coupling concept for understanding institutional processes and the means by which bureaucracy form has been explored in some previous researches (e.g., Hallett & Ventresca, 2006a, 2006b). Hallet and Ventresca (2006a) scrutinized Gouldner's (1954) classical work – *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* – to discuss how couplings develop and what they can tell about the development of new

institutional forms. Gouldner's (1954) research described the relationships and conflicts between employees and managers of a gypsum factory, mainly after the passing of an old general manager and the arrival of a new one. The analytical value of *Patterns*, for a better understanding of the coupling process and institutional formation, is clear when someone looks at how external pressures (with the new general manager's arrival) collided with the prior local order⁶ (DiMaggio, 1988; Gouldner, 1954; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006a). Hallett and Ventresca (2006a) noted that, from this collision, employees and managers negotiated different couplings between institutional environment pressures and technical practices. They added that different degrees of coupling gave birth to different patterns of bureaucracy in the mine.

From this point, two aspects could be explored further. First, when a collision between institutional pressures and internal technical activities arise, employees and managers actively negotiate different degrees of coupling to keep the production going. As pointed by Orton and Weick (1990), loose coupling is not an organizational feature. Rather, it is a process. People actively and diligently negotiate loose coupling and rules bending on shop floors, offices, stores, and schools. Therefore, a better understanding about processes involved in the production would be very useful to understand loose coupling strategies to form institutions.

Second, Gouldner found not only one pattern, but, in fact, three different patterns of bureaucracy as a consequence of how managers and employees dealt with institutional pressures to have their work done. Bureaucracy as an institution has assumed three different forms. Gouldner's (1954) three patterns of bureaucracy are: (1) representative bureaucracy – where rules are enforced by managers and obeyed by workers, because

conformance allows both a measure of status improvement; (2) mock bureaucracy – where rules are neither enforced by managers nor followed by workers, because violation allows both a measure of status improvement; and (3) punishment-centered bureaucracy – where rules are enforced by managers and evaded by workers, because conformance allows managers a measure of status improvement and workers a measures of status loss (the opposite is true for violations). Hallett and Ventresca (2006a) infer that a tight coupling between institutional rules and technical practices generated a punishment-centered bureaucracy. Meanwhile, a loose coupling between institutional rules and technical practices generated a mock bureaucracy. Regarding representative bureaucracy, they assume it emerges out of a tight coupling between institutional rules and technical practices, however it is not imposed by anyone; rather it arises from a mutual agreement between managers and workers.

Some previous studies have shown this relationship between different degrees of coupling and patterns of bureaucracy, in different organizational contexts. Sallaz (2002) found loose coupling between formal rules and actual practices in a casino in Nevada. He suggested that the “house’s rules” were constantly bended, in order to allow dealers to make tips, in detriment of the security of players. Lopez (2007) found a similar pattern in nursing homes, where managers were always vague about how much time aides needed to accomplish certain duties. This vagueness gave aides autonomy to bend official rules and have all their duties done. Lopez (2007) mentioned that management interventions against bending rules were so symbolic, that it created a kind of mock bureaucracy (in Gouldner’s style) inside the nursing homes he investigated. Therefore, managers do not

mind about the enforcement of official rules, inasmuch as a loose coupling between these rules and actual internal practices created surplus labor and profits for their organizations.

Sallaz (2009) described a South African casino, where managers used technology (e.g., shuffling machines), video and audio surveillance, and prohibition of tips to deskill dealers and, consequently, impose a despotic labor regime. All institutional rules must be strictly followed. This created a tight coupling between rules and practices. In this setting, the author described that a pattern of punishment-centered bureaucracy aroused, because no agreement between managers and workers was present and rules were enforced from the top to the bottom. Gouldner (1954) described a similar pattern of bureaucracy when he discussed the non-absenteeism rules in the gypsum factory after the introduction of the new manager. The rule of non-absenteeism (among many others) started to be enforced, regardless workers' agreement, and the consequences of its non-conformance would be termination.

As the examples above show, a loose (or tight) coupling between technical activities and institutional rules determines the type of bureaucracy present inside organizations. Naturally, none organization can be completely characterized as a mock, a representative, or a punishment-centered bureaucracy. All three patterns coexist in all kinds of organization (Gouldner, 1954). However, in some organizations, departments, or offices one or another pattern tends to be dominant (Lopez, 2007; Sallaz, 2002). The more institutional rules need to be buffered in order to conduct technical activities and achieve organizational goals and purposes, the more a loose coupling between the formal structure and practical activities tends to arise.

As noted by Orton and Weick (1990), support for Meyer and Rowan's (1977) thesis about decoupling between formal structures dictated by institutional rules and technical activities has been found in studies in very diverse environments, such as hospitals (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1983), courts (Hagan, et al., 1979), prisons (Thomas, 1984), nursing homes (Lopez, 2007), casinos (Sallaz, 2002), and educational organizations (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Firestone, 1985). In the next section, I will explore the process of decoupling in educational settings to extend the discussion about the mechanisms by which decoupling occurs.

Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems

Weick (1976) was the first one to recognize educational organization as loosely coupled systems. People in educational settings have realized that rational practices, such as division of labor, specified areas of discretion, authority of the office, job descriptions, and consistency evaluation and reward system, describe only part of the actual procedures that happen in schools, community colleges, colleges, and universities. To Weick, the other much larger part of the actual procedures would be explained by loose coupling mechanisms between technical core activities and the authority of office, which dictates the rules. This author provided a very interesting definition of loose coupling. To him, loose coupling “intends to convey the image that coupled events are responsive, *but* that each event also preserves its own identity and some evidence of its physical or logical separateness” (Weick, 1976, p. 3, emphasis in the original). He argued that since the most relevant elements in schools are students, teachers, and principals, among other actors, it might be significant that the available room these actors have to act is highly dependent on how loosely coupled the system is. Weick did not go much further, because

as a pioneer in discussing loosely coupling inside educational organizations (and organizations as a whole) he realized that conventional organizational scholars have still understood decoupling as a “sin or something to be apologized for” (p. 6). However, this seminal paper opened the doors for future and important discussions about loose coupling and institutionalism inside educational settings, such as Meyer and Rowan (1978) and Firestone’s (1985) studies.

As Meyer and Rowan (1978) have noticed, what led Weick to apply the loosely coupled term to educational organizations was a great deal of evidence that schools miss “close internal coordination”, mainly of the content and form of what is supposed to be their foremost activity – instruction. Meyer and Rowan (1978) offered an explanation of the origin of large-scale educational bureaucracies that frequently leave instruction uncontrolled. To these authors, schools have very tightly organized rituals of classifications for their curricula, students, and teachers. These elements are institutionalized in the legal systems of the society. However, at the meantime, schools exert a very loose control on their instructional activities or outputs. Meyer and Rowan’s (1978) explanation for this phenomenon is that “attempts to tightly link the prescriptions of the central theory of education to the activities of instruction would create conflict and inconsistency and discredit and devalue the meaning of ritual classifications in society” (p. 80).

Searching solutions for avoiding inconstancy and discredit, educators have been consistently decoupling the ritual structure from instructional activities. Lack of internal control and “the logic of confidence” represent two very important mechanisms by which this decoupling occurs (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). Regulatory bodies have proposed the

rules and assumed that what happens on at a school level conforms to these rules, however they avoid inspecting schools so close because they know they could find out inconsistencies and ineffectiveness. If that is the case, regulatory bodies should assume responsibility for this and educational settings would lose legitimacy. Nonetheless, keeping the fashion of loose coupling, the school system have worked fine, obtained high levels of community and state support, and maximized the meaning of the ritual categories of teachers and graduates.

The argument of Meyer and Rowan (1978) stands on the assumption that education is highly institutionalized in our society. However, beyond decoupling by lack of internal control and by the logic of confidence, highly institutionalized organizations must rely on the good faith of their participants. Meyer and Rowan (1977) put this way: Participants of institutionalized organizations should not only support a ceremonial façade, but also make things happen behind the scenes. Despite the inappropriateness of the structure, committed participants keep technical activities running fluently and prevent public humiliation or shame (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This seems the case of schools. Teachers and instructors seem to act in good faith when they bend institutional rules “to keep things going”.

Institutional rules cannot be simply ignored by teachers, instructors, and managers. As Scott (2001) noted, schools receive legitimacy the extent to which their objectives are aligned to cultural values, such as socialization and education, and the extent to which they align their structures and processes to institutionalized paradigms of operation determined for educational organizations. Therefore, institutional rules and structures lend legitimacy to schools. If those rules hinder the achievement of practical

objectives, then a solution other than breaking them should be found. The loose coupling between structural rules and technical activities renders this service. By loose coupling institutional structures and actual activities, schools guarantee legitimacy at the same time they can instruct students. However, this process is generally achieved if the pattern of control is properly set up for this, the logic of confidence is present, and the participants act in good faith.

A better description about the pattern of control in educational organizations would be helpful to understand loose coupling in schools. To Meyer and Rowan (1978), educational organizations lack coordination and control over the technical activity (instruction) in many different ways. These authors have asserted that “neither teaching nor its outputs in student socialization is subject to serious organizational evaluation and inspection” (p. 81). In addition to that, they affirmed that curricula and teaching procedures are usually informal guidelines, rather than detailed formal policies. Finally, they suggested that the vast majority of educational administrators have little authority over the methods teachers use or what they teach. They concluded that evidences show that “educational organizations only marginally control their central instructional functions” (p. 83).

The fact that educational administrators have little authority over instruction is very convenient for them too. They are not mere “victims” of the process of loose coupling. They are active and important actors, whose actions (or lack of it) determine if loose coupling between institutional rules and daily activities can be established. If managers have power to hire and fire, they have power to control internal activities, but they actually choose not doing so. Once managers decide to loose couple, they are also

using the logic of confidence and good faith (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), inasmuch as the accomplishment of their duties and objectives also depend on the attainment of the technical work. Principals and teachers depend on each other to have their jobs done. The agreement between principals and teachers about loose-coupled structures inside schools could create what Gouldner (1954) has called “mock bureaucracy”.

Although evidences appear to indicate loose control in instruction, Meyer and Rowan (1978) noticed that other areas, such as scheduling, credentialing of teacher, and assignment of students to classes, are tightly controlled inside American schools. They added that the tight control schools maintain over the formal classification systems is fundamental for understanding education as an institution. Tight control of the structure comes from the fact that schools obtain information about what education really is from institutional rules. These rules determine “the ritual classifications” of teachers, students, curricula, and type of school (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). The structure is then tightly coupled.

Meyer and Rowan (1978) summarize how schools are organized saying that their specific technical activities, mainly instruction, appear to be loosely controlled, while their “ritual of classifications” are tightly controlled, closed inspected, and precisely specified. By “ritual of classifications” they mean that students, teachers, and topics of curricula are all strictly determined. For example, teachers are classified in elementary teacher, high-school teachers, and college teachers. Elementary schools teachers are not expected (nor allowed) to teach college-level mathematics. By the same token, the curricula of elementary schools are supposed to cover nothing beyond basic formation for

kids from kindergarten to the sixth grade. The structure is rigid enough to guarantee that classes of quantum physics will not occur in elementary schools.

This organizational pattern of schools – where tightly controlled structures are associated with loosely controlled technical activities – seems to be present in other settings. Coming back to my example of athletic departments, I would say that these organizations also have very tight “ritual of classifications”. The division of NCAA schools in divisions emphasizes a tight ritual of classification. Division I, II, and III schools have very strict and sharply different rules about their roles regarding scholarship, recruitment, and eligibility, to mention just few. These rules determine if a school is a Division I or a Division III institution. The ritual of classification is tightly coupled. However, similarly to what has happened in schools, the specific activity of athletic departments – athletic participation as part of the educational process – seems to be loosely controlled.

The most common idea in organizational research that might be used to explain the loose control over instruction is the concept of “goal displacement” (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). This concept foresees that organizations change their control systems from core technical activities (instruction) to those outputs for which they are judged by (ritual of classification). The fact that schools *do* allocate the vast majority of their resources to instruction suggests that they are conducting resources to their main goals but are not carefully controlling or evaluating the consequences of these allocations. Once more, all this process seems to happen in a ritual of confidence and good faith (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1978).

Meyer and Rowan's (1978) major conclusion is that educational organizations' formal structures (their ritual classifications) are decoupled from technical daily activities. Basically, this decoupling maintains the legitimacy of educational institutions. Meyer and Rowan has considered some reasons why schools' managers have avoided closely inspecting the internal processes of their schools and promoting loose coupling between structure and technical core activities. First, the avoidance of close inspection (mainly in tandem with manifestations of confidence and trust) can boost commitment, complicity, and satisfaction of teachers. These authors have called this process "the myth of teacher professionalism and autonomy" (p. 99). Second, much of the value of education has little correlation with the efficiency of instruction. As noted by Meyer and Rowan (1978):

If education is viewed as a ceremonial enactment of the rituals of schooling, the quality of schooling can be seen to lie in its *costs*: spectacular buildings, expensive teachers in excessive number (a low student-teacher ratio), and elaborate and expensive topics [...]. To the state, the accrediting agencies, the community, and the participants themselves, costs of these kinds index the quality and meaning of a school (p. 99, emphasis in the original).

Third, decoupling harbors the ritual of classification from ambivalences arising in technical activities. For example, due to the level of students, state and federal programs frequently need to be adapted to specific and unique local situations. Fourth, decoupling permits educational organizations to adapt to contradictory and conflicting institutional rules. Contradictory and conflicting institutional rules exist inside schools because they are plural organizations (Udy, 1971). In this sense, useful rules for goal-accomplishment

in some parts of the organization can be very harmful in others. A smart way to manage these incompatibilities is to give autonomy for subunits and keep them away from each other (Meyer & Rowan, 1978).

Decoupling is a compelling and effective way to keep legitimacy, while technical activities go on smoothly. Meyer and Rowan (1978) practically illustrated why decoupling is such a good process to maintain the effectiveness of schools:

When the behavior of teachers and students is uninspected or located in isolated classrooms, the state, the community, and administrators are presented with little evidence of ineffectiveness, conflict, or inconstancy. And the teacher and student are free to work out the practicalities of their own unique relationship little disturbed by the larger social interpretation of which activity is appropriate to a given category. [...] The decoupling of the internal structure of education is therefore a successful strategy for maintaining support in a pluralistic environment. (p. 101)

As noted by Firestone (1985), schools are promising settings for studying decoupling because teaching is characterized as an occupation that permits appreciable autonomy. Studying 111 public schools, Firestone found that these schools could be grouped in two clusters: one with loosely coupled organizations (basically formed by secondary schools), and the other with tightly coupled organizations (formed almost by elementary schools). He looked at the differences in training, gender composition, sized, and specialization between secondary and elementary schools to explain the differences in coupling patterns between those two clusters. After finding no differences in any of the above-mentioned variables, Firestone (1985) came back to the institutional perspective.

That is, schools are supposed to be governed by institutionalized rules that determine their structures and legitimize behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Firestone's (1985) empirical results added important information to Meyer and Rowan's (1978) theoretical perspective about decoupling process in schools. Different patterns of coupling in different levels (elementary vs. secondary) represent an outstanding contribution. This fact seems to highlight the importance of schools principals and administrators in the process of loose coupling. Depending on the institutional pressures, principals can negotiate different degrees of autonomy with their teachers. Instead of simply assuming principals do not influence instruction, Firestone proposed that principals must administrate a range of loose couplings so that teachers act in effective ways. Following Firestone (1985) line of thought, I would say that athletic departments in different divisions (or even in different conferences) should suffer different institutional pressures. Therefore, I would expect to find different patterns of coupling between structure and technical activities inside athletics in different divisions and conferences.

Never forgetting the logic of confidence and good faith of their participants, American educational organizations have reached an astonishing success and have satisfied a large range of internal and external stakeholders through decoupling strategies (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Firestone, 1985; Meyer & Rowan, 1978). As previously mentioned by Weick (1976), decoupling is not a mortal sin organizations have committed. On the contrary, it should be faced as an authentic administrative strategy for pluralistic organizations reach their multiple goals.

Decoupling as an adaptive process

Originally decoupling was proposed as an adaptive and rational process by which organizations could buffer the functional technical core from institutional pressures in highly institutionalized environments (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Yet, organizations have decoupled their structures to protect their core units. In this sense, definitely decoupling was conceived as an adaptation to environmental and institutional pressures. However, as noted by Scott (2001), “later analysts did not deny that some organizational responses [such as decoupling] to institutional stimuli may be shallow and cynical. [...] But, just as institutional processes assume many forms and ride on varied carriers, so organizations exhibit a wide repertory of responses” (p. 209). Therefore, instead of merely assuming that decoupling automatically happens, Scott proposed that it should be treated as an empirical question: “When and under what conditions do organizations adopt requisite structures but then fail to carry out the associated activities?” (p. 173).

Although decoupling seems to be primarily an adaptive response to institutional pressures, it is definitely not the only possible response. Scott (2001) emphasize that whenever an organization faces institutional demands, it respond “strategically either by decoupling their structures from their operations or by seeking to defend themselves in some manner from the pressures experience” (p. 152). Oliver (1991) proposed five general strategies by which organizations could deal with institutional pressures: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Decoupling is an example of avoidance strategy, when organizations avoid conforming to institutional requirements by creating an appearance of conformity. In this sense, by definition, decoupling avoids conforming to institutional pressures though adaptation. This is not

true for other strategies. In defiance, for example, organizations not only resist to institutional pressure but do so in an openly and public manner (Oliver, 1991). There is no attempt to adapt in defiance; there is only confrontation.

Understanding decoupling as an adaptive and strategic solution to deal with institutional pressures, some scholars have investigated the phenomenon empirically. Westphal and Zajac (1998) investigated if firms that adopt long-term CEO compensation plans have superior legitimacy when compared to firms that do not adopt such plans. They found that plan adoptions (whether or not the plans were used) implied in increased legitimacy with stockholders and increased market stock prices. Bastedo (2004) analyzed remedial education policies in Massachusetts during the 90s. He found that board staff decoupled remedial education from performance evaluation by redefining who a remedial student was, and then by concealing remedial education data from its annual report to the state's high schools. Therefore, the board could make a credible claim that the number of remedial students has decreased, whereas ensuring that the media and lawmakers would not be able to gather data that would undermine that claim. In this sense, Bastedo argued that decoupling was not simply an adaptation to external pressures, but rather a strategic adaptive choice.

Summary of Decoupling and Institutionalism

As I have mentioned before, decoupling is a very appealing strategy to deal with institutional pressures, mainly among pluralistic organizations. To make my point, I took the example of schools, which have been largely studied by institutional scholars (Firestone, 1985; Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Weick, 1976). Schools have to deal with a large array of diverse and competing demands. In this sense, schools have been a fertile ground

for studying institutional pressures and strategies to cope with it. However, schools are not the only pluralistic organizations in the world, which means that decoupling strategies (merely adaptive or more than that) could be present in other organizations beyond schools. Thus, my conclusion is that researchers investigating other plural organizations (such as athletic departments) might consider the neo institutionalism and decoupling theories to better understand administrative processes. Possibly, in other settings, institutional rules have also been decoupled from technical activities as a means to accomplish organizational goals. Empirical investigations are in demand.

Institutional Rules of Intercollegiate Athletics

To talk about different patterns of bureaucracy and decoupling between institutional rules and technical activities in intercollegiate athletics, a discussion about intercollegiate athletic rules is mandatory. What kind of rules athletic managers are exposed to? What has the sport management literature reported about intercollegiate athletic rules compliance? What is the relationship between rules compliance and effectiveness? This part of this review of literature tries to shed some light on these questions.

I have organized this discussion in topics. First, I talk about the apex institution of American intercollegiate athletics: the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA has the power of proposing and enforcing rules to all its members. To understand institutional rules, it is very useful to understand who regulates American intercollegiate athletics. Second, I discuss the four cited themes in intercollegiate athletics literature, when the topic of interest is rules: amateurism, recruiting, eligibility, and gender equity. These are popular themes because they represent common problems

universities need to cope with. Rules regarding amateurism, recruiting, and eligibility are present in the NCAA operating bylaws. Gender equity in intercollegiate athletics has been enforced since Title IX enactment in 1972, or to be more precise, since 1975, after the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) had reviewed Title IX and provided specific regulations for applying its text to intercollegiate athletics.

Who dictates the rules – The NCAA role in the intercollegiate athletics

The NCAA was initially created with the objective of controlling the abuses that happened in intercollegiate football during late 1800s and early 1900s (Caughron, 2001; Koch & Leonard, 1978). The NCAA has been described as a hybrid of legislative, executive, and judicial bodies (Ponticello, 1991). Otto (2005) noticed that, as a result of its growth in power, the NCAA has evolved from a mere legislative organization to an organization that not only propose the rules but also enforce the compliance of these rules and punish the violators. Therefore, since ever, the NCAA has been a regulatory association, which rules and monitors athletic competition among universities (Baxter, et al., 1996). Interestingly, the NCAA power and legitimacy have been granted by the same schools, which are the target of controlling and punishment. Some scholars have proposed that university athletic programs in America form an inter-organizational network, which needs some form of governance to establish and enforce rules in order to solve conflicts (O'Rourke & Chelladurai, 2006; Stern, 1979). Stern (1979) asserted that in 1952, member schools granted the NCAA the regulatory power, which has allowed it to control intercollegiate athletics through imposition of rules and sanctions for non-compliance with these rules. O'Rourke and Chelladurai (2001) recognized the NCAA as

the “apex body” of the intercollegiate network, with the authority to propose and enforce its rules among members.

Still more ironic is the fact that the very same institutions that empower the NCAA to regulate their competition have been constantly breaking its rules (Benford, 2007; Frey, 1994). Higher education institutions to legitimate athletic practices and competition among universities created the NCAA. However, as noted by Beyer and Hannan (2000), “the enormous popularity of college sports offered benefits to institutions that they could not afford to resist” (p. 107). Therefore, they were in dire of an institution to legitimate college sport. This institution should, above all, legitimate sport while preserving the main objective of the host institutions: Education. As consequence, educational host institutions have created the NCAA. This regulatory association has set the rules for college sport in such a way that athletes keep their role as higher education students. The consequence is that the vast majority of NCAA rules are basically concerned in keeping athletics “under control”, while promoting academic achievement of student athletes.

However, from the moment that the objective of college sports moved from extended educational opportunities to marketing exploitation, the NCAA rules have created a dilemma (Sperber, 1990; Zimbalist, 1999). If athletes needed to be students at the same time, they could not be wholly exploited as a marketing tool. The institution that was created to regulate intercollegiate athletics is now preventing host institutions to explore all its marketing potential. The literature has described that, nowadays, college sports have been understood above all as a marketing strategy (Benford, 2007; Sperber, 2000). Therefore, the solution to solve this dilemma has been to bend the NCAA rules.

This way the façade of higher education has been still kept, while students have been wholly exploited for marketing purposes. Athletes must at least pretend to be students. This representation justifies the maintenance of sport inside higher education settings.

However the NCAA is not a mere puppet in the hands of colleges' administrators. On the contrary, nowadays, the NCAA seems to be its own interests in keeping a loose coupling between rules and actual activities. For a long time, the NCAA has not only served the interest of its member schools, but also served its own interests. Member schools have been accepting the NCAA because it legitimates their practices, and sells one of their most valuable products: college sport. For example, legitimating college sport, the NCAA has arranged its multi-billion dollars contracts with television nets. CBS has been paying \$6.2 billion for an 11-year contract to broadcast Division I men's basketball tournament. American universities have been paid \$780,000 for each win in this tournament. As result, as noted by Knight Foundation (2001), schools and conferences have prostrated themselves to win and get on TV. And even more important, schools and conferences have prostrated themselves to the NCAA will.

With all its power, the NCAA has been compared to mafias (Rogers, 2008) and cartels (Zimbalist, 1999). Zimbalist's comparison between the NCAA and a cartel is interestingly useful to understand the current role of the NCAA in the college sport scenario. He quotes Gary Becker, Nobel Prize-winning economist from the University of Chicago, who asserted: "An association of companies that limits payments to employees and punishes violators would be usually consider a labor cartel. Why should the restrictions on competition for athletes among [...] the members of the NCAA be any different?" (Zimbalist, 1999, p.20). The idea of understanding the NCAA as a cartel

makes a lot of sense to me. Cartels are formed to benefit their members. Cartels usually try to restrict output, in such a way that it raises its price, or place restrictions on inputs, to lower their prices. As noted by Zimbalist:

While cartels thus succeed in raising the profitability of their members at the expense of consumers, each member of a cartel can become even more profitable by cheating on the cartel's rules (provided, of course, the majority of other schools don't cheat, which would negate the profit-promoting intent of cartel). All cartels have problems policing their members. The NCAA is no exception. (Zimbalist, 1999, p. 23)

As in a cartel, member universities could not withdraw from the NCAA without seriously jeopardizing its athletic program (Otto & Stippich, 2008). Member universities had better either be acquiescent and play by the NCAA rules or cheat but not be caught. Even judicially, it has been tremendously hard to face the NCAA power. Member colleges clearly understand this power. For example, in 1983, the University of Nevada suspended Jerry Tarkanian, its basketball coach, after the NCAA found that he violated its rules. In fact, the NCAA threatened to ban this university from its competitions if the coach had not been punished. Tarkanian filed a lawsuit against the NCAA alleging that the punishment from the university and the NCAA investigation had violated his right to due process (*NCAA v. Tarkanian*, 488 U.S. 179, 1988). The results of this process have empowered the NCAA for years. The Supreme Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 1983 litigation (Otto & Stippich, 2008). Therefore, the Court dismissed the lawsuit filed by Jerry Tarkanian. The power of the cartel has been guaranteed.

Even recognizing that the American intercollegiate system has been corrupted, the NCAA rules are good rules to promote education of athletes. Therefore, a discussion of NCAA rules is worthy. The purposes of the NCAA clearly detach three main topics, which are supposed to be ruled and controlled by this association: amateurism, eligibility, and recruitment. For example, in the NCAA Division I Manual, the NCAA lists its purposes. Its purpose number three reads: “To encourage its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship, and amateurism” (NCAA, 2008, p. 1). Additionally, recruitment has also been a point of concern for the NCAA. Article 13 in the NCAA operating bylaws is completely devoted to rule recruitment. Moreover, in sport management literature, eligibility has been usually analyzed in tandem with recruitment (Staurowsky & Ridpath, 2005). Not surprisingly, the vast majority of criticisms against college sports have focused on these very same three aspects: amateurism, eligibility, and recruitment (Benford, 2007; Sperber, 2001; Zimbalist, 1999). In this sense, in the following sections I will focus on these three aspects to discuss institutional rules of intercollegiate athletics.

Amateurism

By definition intercollegiate sport is supposed to be amateur. Amateurism necessarily implies no remuneration, which is the most basic difference between amateur and professional sports. The NCAA manual draws a “clear line of demarcation” (bylaw 12.01.2) between amateur/college sport and professional sport. Amateur/college athletes must not receive any kind of payment for athletic participation. Amateur athletic departments must provide their players no more than “actual and necessary expenses for participation on the team” (NCAA, 2008, bylaw 12.02.4, p. 61).

The biggest paradox of amateurism in college athletics comes from the fact that the NCAA allows student-athletes to receive scholarships or grants-in-aid (bylaw 15.01). Benefits of athletic scholarship range from free academic tuition and fees to housing, books, medical care, tutoring, and counseling (Sperber, 2001). In this sense, some scholars have considered the fact that university athletes are amateurs and their athletic scholarships do not represent payment for playing sports as a myth (Benford, 2007; Sperber, 2001). To make his point, Sperber (2001) pointed that athletic scholarships should be understood as a form of payment, inasmuch as these grants are based not on educational aptitude, but on athletic talent. By the same token, Zimbalist (1999) noticed that full financial scholarships go to the best athletes, not to the best students. This author also presented some examples of how different the opportunities exist for athletes and non-athletes, regarding chances to be granted with a scholarship. At Duke University, student-athletes were much more likely to be granted a scholarship than a “normal” student. For example, during the academic year of 1993-94, Duke awarded \$4 million to its 550 student-athletes, and only \$400,000 in academic merit grants for its 5,900 other undergraduate students. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill awarded about \$3.2 million to its 690 athletes, while only \$636,000 in academic merit scholarships was awarded to the rest of its 15,000 undergraduates (Zimbalist, 1999).

Another point of controversy regarding the amateur status of college student-athletes is related to additional awards and benefits. The NCAA Manual has preached that a benefit is permissible for athletes if this benefit is equally available for all other students, athletically gifted or not (bylaw 16.11). If additional benefits are only available for athletes, these should be considered a form of payment for their work. According to

Sperber (2001), “every big-time athletic program constantly breaks the ‘no extra benefit rule’ by giving athletes special dormitories and dining facilities, special academic advisors and tutors, and a variety of other privileges unavailable and/or forbidden to the school’s regular students” (p. 150). The problem of the bylaw 16.11 of the NCAA manual seems to be on the fact that a benefit is *permissible* for athletes (if this benefit is equally available for all other students). This permissibility creates room for a lot of well-reported abuses (Shulman & Bowen, 2001; Sperber, 1990). Moreover, availability is also a very subjective concept.

Due to these extra benefits and full-ride scholarships, student-athletes have been identified by different (and sometimes pejorative) expressions, such as “unpaid professionals” (Zimbalist, 1999) and “exploited mercenaries” (Svare, 2004). Amateurism seems to have become a mock characteristic of college athletics. Student-athletes are considered professionals by the above-mentioned authors, inasmuch as they are paid for their athletic performance and they devote the largest part of their time to improve their abilities (like any other professional athlete). However, this is not the whole story. Knight Foundation (2001) has reported that about a third of former professional football players asserted that they had received illicit monetary payment while in college. This fact is even more serious because it represents not only a conceptual misunderstanding about what scholarship and other benefits mean, but also a complete misbelieve in all of amateurism premises (by athletes who have received the money and by those who have paid).

However, the NCAA rules still try to keep the amateurism myth alive controlling for what and how much athletes should received (as discussed above) and how much of

their time should be devoted to their sport practices. NCAA rules enforce that student-athletes are prohibited to devote more than four hours per day or 20 hours per week to their sport (NCAA, 2008, bylaw 17.1.6.1). However, as noted by Benford (2007), the NCAA 20-hour rule is universally ignored. This fact seems to be no surprise to anyone. Knight Foundation (2001) has reported that college student-athletes are not amateurs and they devote much more than 20 hours to their athletic practices:

As soon as they arrive on campus, they are immersed in the demands of their sports. Flagrant violation of the NCAA's rule restricting the time athletes must spend on their sport to 20 hours a week is openly acknowledged. The loophole most used is that of so-called "voluntary" workouts that don't count toward the time limit. (Knight Foundation, 2001, p.16)

In my opinion, one of the best quotations about "amateurism" in college sport came from Isiah Thomas, former Indiana University and Detroit Pistons basketball player:

When you go college, you're not a student-athlete but an athlete-student. Your main purpose is not to be an Einstein but a ballplayer, to generate some money, put people in the stands. Eight to 10 hours of your day are filled with basketball, football. The rest of your time, you've got to motivate yourself to make sure you get something back. (Quoted from Sperber, 2001; p. 147-48)

Based on the facts described in the literature, amateurism in college athletics seems to be a myth (Sperber, 1990). As an example, Benford (2007) presented empirical data showing that, from athletic directors to athletes, everybody inside athletic departments agree the NCAA 20-hour rule is universally ignored. Therefore, rules have

constantly bended to allow people inside athletic departments to reach their goals. Using neo-institutional theories, one can say that a loose coupling between the expected structure, respecting the limit of 20 hours of practices, and the actual activities developed in athletic departments seems to guarantee their effectiveness to attain some of their organizational goals, such as athletic excellence and the quality of entertainment for general public.

Eligibility

The NCAA rules of eligibility are increasingly precise about initial and once-on-campus requirements. These rules are worth some analyses and discussion. As noted by Mondello and Abernethy (2000), “from the moment universities began sponsoring intercollegiate athletics, administrators have debated what academic standards, if any, should be implemented to correct the dubious reputation that college athletes are not serious students” (p.128).

Basically, eligibility rules exist to mediate the well-reported competition between athletic and academic performances in intercollegiate athletics (Baxter, et al., 1996; Rishe, 2003; Smart & Wolfe, 2000; Wolfe, Hoeber, & Babiak, 2002). Baxter et al (1996) noted that more athletically successful schools are more likely than less successful athletic schools to be sanctioned by NCAA penalties. They found that this phenomenon is based on the existence of competing values inside university athletic departments: one oriented primarily toward winning and profit, and the other oriented more toward education. Using Baxter et al’s premises, Wolfe et al. (2002) associated “value oriented toward education” with compliance with NCAA rules: “There are competing conceptions of legitimate conduct in intercollegiate athletics: one oriented toward winning and profit,

the other toward education and compliance with NCAA rules” (p.149). These NCAA rules are fundamentally eligibility rules, which propose minimal academic requirements for accessing and keeping the status of student-athlete in higher education institutions.

In the current initial academic eligibility rules (NCAA, 2008, bylaw 14.3), the NCAA considers a combination of high school GPA and SAT scores to determine whether a qualifier is eligible or not for athletic participation. Moreover, the NCAA lists a series of “core courses”, from which qualifiers must have taken at least 16, in order to have their GPA accepted as valid. Once-on-campus academic eligibility rules depend on the year the student-athlete. By the end of the sophomore year, an athlete must attain a cumulative GPA of 90% of the minimum required by his/her institution to graduate. By the end of the junior year, it raises to 95%. And by the end of the senior year, it raises to 100%. While the 90/95 rule does not mention a specific GPA, the benchmark of 2.0 standard for graduation used by most colleges and universities is frequently used as the 100% mark (Staurowsky & Ridpath, 2005). Therefore, students must have a 1.6 GPA by the end of the first year of enrollment, a 1.8 GPA by the end of the second, and a 1.9 by the end of the senior year and beyond, in order to keep their eligibility. Furthermore, student-athletes must graduate in five years.

Naturally, eligibility rules have their critics and defenders in the literature. Staurowsky and Ridpath (2005), for example, have defended the minimum GPA as a form of preserving academic values among athletes. These authors have proposed that a minimum 2.0 cumulative GPA reaffirms the promise of higher education institutions to educating athletes. Using legal arguments, Staurowsky and Ridpath (2005) asserted that even when the judicial system fails to condemn institutions that do not honor their duty to

educate athletes, the society is still claiming for universities to educate athletes in agreement with their written academic missions. To these authors, the minimum GPA rule supports the fact that universities should have a duty to educate athletes.

However, some athletes have sued their institutions for breaching the duty of educating them (e.g., *Jackson v. Drake University*; *Jones v. Williams*; and *Ross v. Creighton University*), and have lost their actions. *Ross v. Creighton* is the classical example of how universities definitely do not have any commitment with athletes' education. Ross attended Creighton from 1978 to 1982 and got 96 of 128 credits necessary to graduate. Although he had got 75% of total credits to graduate, when he left the institution he had language skills of a fourth grader and the reading abilities of a seventh grader (Chandler, 2000). Ross lost this lawsuit. Therefore, it is not outrageous to affirm that, from a legal standpoint, institutions of higher education have no duty to educate their athletes. Naturally, legal decisions do not eliminate the social and moral obligations of all actors involved in intercollegiate athletics. Staurowsky and Ridpath (2005) argued that faculty members have the duty and moral obligation of educating athletes, though. I would add that not only faculty members have the duty of educating athletes, but also athletic managers, coaches, and coaching staff have the moral obligation to allow athletes to graduate.

Initial eligibility is another point of criticism in the literature. The NCAA has very specific rules about core courses in high school, as a way to control initial eligibility of student-athletes in college. Zimbalist (1999) reported the NCAA created an administrative monster in order to evaluate the legitimacy of high school classes. This author major criticism is that the NCAA is an association of colleges, not of high schools,

and it has done almost nothing to evaluate the quality of university courses. Zimbalist (1999) mentioned the example of coach Jerry Tarkanian, who took his basketball team on a 16-day summer cruise and granted them with six hours of course credit for studying “Contemporary Issues in Social Welfare”. He emphasizes that this is just one example among many, many others.

Other authors share the same opinion about eligibility and the quality of the curriculum. Benford (2007) has pointed the existence of a hidden or “phony jock curriculum”, whose only purpose has been to keep athletes barely eligible. Funk (1991) has suggested that athletic departments have an army of people just prepared to keep athletes eligible. This author asserted that the single most important task of academic advisors is to keep players eligible. Zimbalist (1999) concluded his criticism asserting: “Eligibility, as defined by the NCAA, is almost entirely a matter of joining the club. Once you’re in, the system protects you” (p. 35).

Chandler (2000) noticed that academic support staff has been so important to keep athletes’ eligibility that head coaches are taking “their” academic people with them when they accept a position at a new university. Academic support staff personnel are now part of the coaching staff. A coach has, in his staff, assistant coaches, physical trainers, nutritionists, and... academic support staff. This author still detached another important point: the placement of academic support staff and compliance officers inside athletic departments (under its authority) produces flagrant conflict of interest that raises an appearance of impropriety. Single (1989) added that conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety exist because academic support programs are basically direct to maintain the eligibility of student-athletes instead of foster their education.

Chandler (2000) has suggested that the administrative control athletic departments exert over academic support staff should be removed and located where it rightly belongs, under the academic side of universities. The separation of athletics from academic advising and tutoring would greatly reduce (if not eliminate) the appearance of impropriety, insofar as it will locate the academic control of student athletes on the academic side of the universities. Chandler added that the compliance officers should never be part of athletic departments. On the contrary, they would work either directly for the NCAA or for a school's conference. Compliance officers should be assigned to a college for a period of time, then, changed. "At some point the outside auditor must be from the outside" (Chandler, 2000, p. 141).

Recruitment

According to the NCAA (2008, bylaw 13.02.11), a prospective student-athlete or recruit is someone who starts class for the ninth grade and has interest in playing intercollegiate sports (Lawrence, Kaburakis, & Merckx, 2008). Recruiting is "any solicitation of a prospective student-athlete [...] by an institutional staff member [...] for the purpose of securing the prospective student-athlete's enrollment and ultimate participation in the institution's intercollegiate athletics program" (NCAA, 2008, bylaw 13.02.12, p. 79). The NCAA has previewed and ruled in details recruiting forms that vary from telephone calls, to official and unofficial visits. Details presented in these rules are so extensive that only the official visit, for example, is controlled by over 300 bylaws (Lawrence, et al., 2008).

Official visit rules are a very interesting case to understand the recruitment process as a whole. Official visit is a visit of a prospective student-athlete financed totally

or partially by a university (NCAA, 2008, bylaw 13.02.15.1). From a legal point of view, it is important to mention that many prospective athletes are minors at the time of their official visits (Lawrence, et al., 2008). Therefore, recruiting institutions should owe a duty of care to them. However, when this risk is deemed unforeseeable and reasonable, the recruiting university should be excused from liability (e.g., *Chudasama v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville*). From the point of view of the NCAA rules, official visit bylaws restrict from the type of transportation the recruit can use until the amount of money student-host receive (NCAA, 2008, bylaws 13.5 and 13.6). Nevertheless, it is critical to understand the differences between violations of law and violations of the NCAA rules. Giving t-shirts or a fancy transportation during an official visit violate NCAA rules. The NCAA can punish the host institution accordingly. Nonetheless, when a minor recruit gets hurt in an official visit, the host university can be legally sued, usually by negligence (Champion, 2005).

Although very rich in details, the NCAA recruiting rules seem to be frequently violated by athletic departments' staff and mainly by coaches, who are always avid to get the best athletes for their teams. The media has often reported allegations of recruits being attracted by parties, alcohol, drugs, and sex (e.g., Anderson & Dohrmann, 2004), which frequently violates both NCAA rules and law. The cinema industry has also shown the multiple violations that occur during recruiting process. Two examples are *He got game* (by Spike Lee) and a documentary entitled *Hoop Dreams*.

Academic papers have also described a great number of irregularities in the recruitment process (Lawrence, et al., 2008). A historical investigation about NCAA violations has shown that recruiting violations are the most common in intercollegiate

athletics (Mahony, Fink, & Pastore, 1999). Dixon and colleagues have investigated rule violations in intercollegiate athletics as a consequence of coaches' perceptions of unfairness (Dixon, Turner, Miller, Harrison, & Pace, 2004; Dixon, Turner, Pastore, & Mahony, 2003). Coaches in those studies have suggested that inequalities in opportunities for recruiting might trigger rule violations (Dixon, et al., 2003).

Beyond all irregularities regarding the recruitment process per se, the academic level of the recruit has been indulgently ignored. As noted by a compliance officer of University of Minnesota, recruiting and admitting "academically ill-prepared student athletes is totally legal by NCAA rules" and supported by coaches' arguments (Kihl, 2007, p. 291). In fact, coaches have been constantly pressuring university staff to admit good athletes whatever their academic backgrounds are. College coaches have emphasized athletic results above all (Bowen & Levin, 2003; Zimbalist, 1999). Thus, that pressure makes sense inasmuch as the relationship between recruiting and team performance has been frequently assumed to be highly positive (Langlett, 2003). Problems with recruiting are so intrinsically related to coaches' activities that the Knight Foundation (2001) asserted: "Unquestionably, recruiting is the bane of many a coach's existence. It is time-consuming, expensive, and fosters a skewed sense of expectations and priorities on the part of the recruited athlete" (p. 32).

The practice of admitting "ill-prepared" recruits has created the "dumb jock" stereotype for student-athletes (Benford, 2007; Kihl, Richardson, & Campisi, 2008). The media has explored this situation in articles, charges and cartoons, which can be found in any major newspaper in the country. The case of African-American recruits seems to be even more critical. Sperber (2001) has asserted that schools with big time athletic

programs have systematically recruited black athletes much more intensively than they have done regular black students. He added that the “black gladiators” (the way he refers to African-American student-athletes) has been constantly supported by scholarships sources that were supposed to go academically gifted minorities. Kihl et al (2008) have highlighted the consequences of this awry recruitment process. “The African-American players are publicly ridiculed and stereotyped – the only reason for this special admit into higher education was for their labor and entertainment purposes” (Kihl et al., 2008, p. 288).

Beyond any race or gender specification, young people with athletic abilities have been recruited to feed a very corrupted system. Benford (2007), quoting Pius Kamau, a commentator on National Public Radio, asserted:

Colleges that recruit young men with the expressed objective of educating them have no such intention. Colleges rob athletes: first, by not educating them; and second, by not sharing with them the portion of the money they bring into college budgets. The substitute is liquor and easy sex. (Benford, 2007, p. 15)

Therefore, the most important problem with recruiting seems to be a complete absence of academic consideration when athletes are being selected.

This situation seems to be very similar to those schools in the Ivy League, where schools do not offer athletic scholarships. Bowen and Levin (2003), who studied the Ivy League sport programs, asserted that recruiting is even more important for these schools. Bowen and Levin (2003) reported that even schools such as Harvard and Yale have been (slightly) lowering their academic requirements to have better athletes. This point

reinforces the argument that initial eligibility should be controlled in tandem with recruitment (Bowen & Levin, 2003; Sperber, 2001).

Gender Equity

Regarding my discussion about how rules have been dealt by athletic managers and coaches, one additional point, which is not touched in the NCAA rules, will be discussed: gender equity. As noted by Elliott and Mason (2001), the NCAA has not used its power to enforce rules to require gender equity compliance. Different laws and amendments have ruled gender equity in sport and in the society as a whole: the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, states Equal Rights Amendments, and the Title IX. For my discussion about intercollegiate athletic rules, Title IX is particularly interesting. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 reads: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance” (20 U.S.C, § 1681). Title IX has been considered as the most important step in gender equity in sports and athletics (Elliott & Mason, 2001; Weistart, 1998) .As shown in Fields (2003), changing the law is almost always a very important initial step to change the culture. Fields described how the enactment of the Title IX, which was initially concerned in equalizing opportunities inside classrooms, created conditions to equal opportunities in sport practice. Fields (2003) described the *Hoover v. Meiklejohn* case, where a sixteen-year-old girl sued the Colorado High School Activities Association for her exclusion from the soccer team. Since her victory the way equal sport opportunities for women are understood in the US has substantially changed (Fields, 2003). This is an example how a change in law can lead to a change in culture.

Although not perfect, the American sport system (at least the “amateur” sport system) has been constantly fighting against gender discrimination. The number of lawsuits and the amount of academic work involving gender equity in sport is a proof of how the culture has changed since early 70s, when the Title IX was enacted.

Elliott and Mason (2001) asserted that a major issue in regard to the application of Title IX in sport settings has been the wording of the law. One of the most controversial points is the meaning of the phrase “receiving federal financial assistance”. Until 1988, courts had been using two different approaches to interpret this point (Elliott & Mason, 2001). In the narrow approach, only those specific university programs that receive federal funding are required to be Title IX compliant. For example, in *Grove City College v. Bell*, the Supreme Court used the narrow approach to reach a verdict. In the broad approach, if any university program receives federal funding then all university programs are required to be Title IX compliant. In *Haffer v. Temple University*, the district court used the broad approach. In 1988, the Civil Rights Restoration Act adopted the broad approach and affirmed that Title IX must be interpreted this way.

Compliance with Title IX in intercollegiate athletics does not require participation on athletics to be at a 50-50 male-female ratio (Champion, 2005). The effective accommodation test mentions three possible means (also called “safe harbors”) for an athletic department to prove compliance with Title IX (Champion, 2005; Elliott & Mason, 2001): (1) substantial proportionality based on the percentage of undergraduate enrolled and the percentage of student-athlete by gender; (2) history of continuing practice of program expansion for the underrepresented gender; and (3) accommodation of interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender. Law literature has brought some

examples of universities that have been trying to use the “safe harbors” to eliminate women’s sport and not be punished for that. For example, in *Cohen v. Brown*, this university has demoted women’s gymnastics and volleyball teams from university-funded to donor-funded varsity status, at the same time, it also demoted men’s water polo and golf. After being judged by three different courts, the last district court determined that Brown did violate Title IX, inasmuch as it was not able to prove any of the three safe harbors. Champion (2005) argued that *Cohen* “began the cry of gender equity and the stipulation that universities must comply with Title IX by accommodating fully and effectively female athlete’s interests and abilities under an intermediate scrutiny test” (p. 595).

Analyzing the relationship between the NCAA and gender equity, it is worth to remember that after the above-mentioned case *Tarkanian v. NCAA*, the NCAA has been not considered a state actor. It is equally noteworthy that the NCAA is not even required to comply with Title IX requirements (Champion, 2005). Even considering that the NCAA does receive dues from its members, which in turn receive federal financial, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this institution is not subject to the requirements of Title IX (*NCAA v. Smith*). It seems that the NCAA increases its power lawsuit after lawsuit. However, if has not been legally required, I would say that it would be at least morally desired that the NCAA supported gender equity.

Unfortunately, as noted by Elliott and Mason (2001), the NCAA has not used its power to enforce rules to require Title IX compliance. However, these same authors have proposed three suggestions for the NCAA showing its support to gender equity. First, decrease the number of football scholarship and limit the total team size (both from 85 to

75). Second, create a spending limit for revenue sports (reduce expenditures with hotels, restaurants, etc.). Third, apply the most severe NCAA sanction to those that do not comply with Title IX: forbid them to compete. Despite the fact that all three are interesting suggestions, I doubt the NCAA would dare to mess with “big guys” and actually support any of these. Gender equity does not seem to be a topic of interest for the NCAA because revenue-generating sports are male – football and men’s basketball. These are the sport with the largest number of scholarships, the ones that spend the most with hotels and restaurants, and the ones that are not willing to change.

Considering the increasing number of lawsuits against universities based on Title IX, I would say that rules related to gender equity have been broken. Along with my discussion related to amateurism, recruiting, and eligibility, the review of literature of gender equity in intercollegiate athletics added to my initial argument about a decoupling between rules and actual practices. Once more, the degree of decoupling seems to be highly correlated to the kind of objectives the organization has prioritized. If entertainment and revenue generation are on the top of the list of priorities in intercollegiate athletics, then gender equity rules are hurdles that must be transposed. On the other hand, if the objectives of equal opportunities and extended educational experience are considered, then there are no reasons for bending gender equity rules.

Summary for Institutional Rules of Intercollegiate Athletics

I have started the discussion about institutional rules and technical activities in intercollegiate athletics posing some questions. After the review of literature, these questions got some answers. The review of literature showed that athletic managers are exposed to NCAA rules and to broad laws as well. The sport management literature

reported that the compliance of both rules and laws has been achieved in different proportions, depending on how managers and coaches understand the goals of intercollegiate athletics. The relationship between rules compliance and effectiveness is not straightforward. However, some studies have shown that institutions that violate NCAA rules have more chances to perform better athletically and financially (Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Putler & Wolfe, 1999). Once more, the kind of goals an institution pursues seems to be correlated with processes they use to comply or not with rules

The four most popular themes in the literature, when the topic is rules compliance, were explored in this part of my review. As I have mentioned elsewhere, these are popular themes because they represent common problems universities need to cope with. The review of literature showed that rules and laws regarding amateurism, recruiting, eligibility, and gender equity have been constantly “adapted” by athletic managers.

Although legally “adaptations” can sound totally negative, administratively they are necessarily to achieve contradictory goals. Therefore, instead of simply pointing fingers to athletic administrators and coaches, the current study is trying to understand the strategies that have been used by sport managers to achieve competing goals. In this sense, the next section of the review of the literature will discuss goals and processes of intercollegiate athletics. A better understand about how different stakeholders see the current goals and processes of intercollegiate athletics is equally mandatory to explain decoupling between rules and actual activities and, consequently, different patterns of bureaucracy.

Intercollegiate Athletics Goals and Processes

Official goals of intercollegiate athletic departments are stated in these organizations missions. A quick search in the web sites of different athletic departments around the country reveals a striking similitude among their missions. Terms such as “educational opportunities”, “ethical standards”, and “community identity” (or similar terms) are always present in stated goals of athletic departments. However, as noted by Trail and Chelladurai (2000), those are only “stated” goals. Actual goals and processes used to attain these goals tend to vary among athletic departments and their constituencies (Baxter, et al., 1996)..

In this part of the review, I will explore literature past descriptions about organizational goals and the difficult of defining them, the importance of different stakeholders for determining actual goals of organizations, and the specific goals of intercollegiate athletics.

Organizational goals

The study of organizational goals had its more fertile time during the 60s. At this time, sociologists and organizational psychologists tried to define and establish boundaries for the concept of organizational goals. Etzioni (1964) defined organizational goal as “a desire state of affairs which the organization attempts to realize” (p. 6). For Cartwright and Zander (1960), an organizational goal is a group goal and it “specifies a preferred state for the group as an entity and guides collective action toward achieving it” (p. 349). Still considering organizations as a special case of groups, Cartwright and Zander (1968) proposed a very interesting distinction among (a) the goal of individuals in

groups, (b) the goals of individuals for a group, and (c) the goal of a group. Usually, only the latter, the goal of a group, is stated in organizations' missions.

Warriner (1965) is completely skeptical about stated organizational missions. He asserted that statements of goals must be considered as "fictions", which are "produced by an organization to account for, explain, or rationalize its existence to particular audiences, rather than as valid and reliable indicators of purpose" (p. 141). Following the same line, Perrow (1961) proposed that organizational goals should be separated in two distinct categories: Official goals (which are stated in organizations' missions, public reports, and annual statements), and unofficial goals (which are called operative goals). According to Perrow (1961), *operative goals* are the most relevant to understanding organizational behavior because they are present in important operating policies and the daily actual activities. Both Mohr (1973) and Perrow (1961) perceived that official goals are purposively evasive, vague, and very unrelated to actual activities developed on a daily basis in organizations.

Perrow (1961) also noted that unofficial operative goals might support, ignore, or even subvert official goals. Operative goals can have different relationships with official goals. The idea that operative can even subvert official goals (or written mission statements) seems to be particularly interesting for intercollegiate athletics and for this particular research. When different authors claim for reforms in intercollegiate athletics (Chu, 1989; Sperber, 2000; Zimbalist, 1999), they argue that operative goals and processes related to this goals are subverting official stated goals. Therefore, not surprisingly, other scholars have found what they call competing goals inside college athletics (Baxter, et al., 1996; Putler & Wolfe, 1999). Educational goals and winning

goals (or athletic excellence at all costs) are frequently reported as competing goals in sport management literature. Considering that educational values are always present in mission statements of athletic departments and winning records are not, it is very likely that the above-cited researches have been simply ratifying Perrow's position about the possibility that operative goals may subvert official goals.

Mohr's (1973) criticism about organizational goals, or the goals of an organization as a group, resides on the fact that groups and organizations are abstractions, which do not exist beyond their human participants. Therefore, instead of analyzing the goal of group, scholars should focus on the goals of individuals *in* a group or in the goals of individuals *for* a group (using the terminology proposed by Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Mohr (1973) added that this distinction is important, inasmuch as "an organizational goal must be a *guide to action*" (Mohr, 1973, p. 477, emphasis in the original). Thompson (1967) implies that knowing the goals of "dominant" individuals in an organization, it is possible to infer the goal of the organization. In this sense, Simon (1964) suggested that to understand how people act inside organizations, researchers must take into account a whole set of goals people have in organizations. To define which of those goals could represent "major" or principal goals, one should know the importance of different groups of constituencies in the organization (Simon, 1964).

According to Perrow (1961), operative goals are goals of people in organizations: The operative goals will be shaped by the dominant group, reflecting the imperatives of the particular task area that is most critical, their own background characteristics (distinctive perspectives based upon their training, career lines, and

areas of competence) and the unofficial uses to which they put the organization for their own ends. (Perrow, 1961, p. 856-857)

Therefore, based on the concepts of operative goals and goals of people in organizations, the determination of “dominant” group has a central importance for the discussion about organizational goals. An examination of stakeholder theories can add theoretical soundness to my discussion about organizational goals.

Stakeholders – who really counts?

Although some authors have proposed that organizational goals depend on who has importance inside organizations, the use of stakeholder theory in organizational studies is relatively new. The literature has credited Freeman’s (1984) book “Strategic management: A stakeholder approach” as the start point of this approach. Freeman (1984) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p. 46). Naturally, this is a broad definition that did not escape from criticisms in the literature. However, to define who really counts to an organization is not an easy task.

In an attempt to define who really counts, Mitchell, Agle, and Woods (1997) proposed a theory of stakeholder saliency. By stakeholder saliency, these authors mean the extent to which a stakeholder is powerful, legitimate and urgent in his/her claims. They proposed that classes of stakeholders can be identified by their possession of one, two or all three attributes: power to influence the firm; legitimacy in his/her relationship with the firm; and urgency in his/her claims on the firm. Mitchell et al. (1997) have proposed that, although groups can be identified as stakeholders based on their possessions of power, legitimacy, and urgency, it is the firm’s managers who determine which stakeholders are

salient and will receive management attention. To explain how managers prioritize stakeholder relationships, they create a typology based upon the possession of one, two, or all three of the attributes. They concluded that the salience of a certain stakeholder to the organization is low if one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present, and high if all three attributes are present.

Phillips (2003) criticized Mitchell et al.'s (1997) approach because it considers stakeholders those who have power but have no legitimacy. Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Phillips (2003) proposed that stakeholder theory might render more precise and consistent arguments if the central idea of legitimacy is understood in terms of normative legitimacy and derivative legitimacy. To this author, normative stakeholders are those to whom the organization should have a moral obligation above and beyond that due to other social actors; and derivative stakeholders are those groups whose actions and claims must be taken into account for by managers due to their potential effects upon the organization and its normative stakeholders (Phillips, 2003).

Analyzing my organization of interest – athletic departments, I would say that students could be considered normative stakeholders. Students are those to whom athletic departments has a moral obligation above and beyond that due to other social actors. Nevertheless, coaches are clearly derivative stakeholders. Coaches are those groups whose actions and claims must be taken into account for by managers due to their potential effects upon the organization and upon the normative stakeholders (student-

athletes). The concept of derivative stakeholder encompasses not only the notion of power, but also the indefinite notions of legitimacy, and stresses why powerful stakeholders are important (Phillips, 2003). In fact, Phillips's (2003) criticism regarding the overly broad definitions of stakeholders is comprehensible. He states, "if everyone is a stakeholder of everyone else, little value is added by the theory" (p.28). Using a more strict definition of stakeholder, students and coaches seem to be the most important stakeholders in athletic departments.

Using the stakeholder theory to define the dominant group (as suggested by Perrow, 1961), Phillip's (2003) proposal gives a good point of start. The problem with broad definitions of stakeholders, such as Freeman and Mitchell's above-cited definitions, is that every single group can be considered an important stakeholder and, consequently, the needs of every single group should be take into account when the goals of the organization are defined. Although not completely precise, because one still needs to decide if the objectives of normative or derivative stakeholders will serve as based to define organizational objectives, this proposal is definitely more clear-cut.

An additional point is still discussed in the literature regarding the definition of who really counts to define the goals of an organization. Wolfe and Putler (2002) proposed that an implicit assumption within the stakeholder literature – that priorities within role based stakeholder groups are relatively homogeneous – could not be true. According to these authors, self-interest has provided a natural reason to assume that individuals within a role-based stakeholder group have some objectives. But one problem with this "role primacy approach" has arisen when self-interest does not constitute the primary motivator of individuals' attitudes and priorities. Wolfe and Putler (2002) stated

that the literature on social and political attitudes and their empirical results suggest that role-based self-interest is frequently not a sufficient “binding tie” of stakeholder group priorities. However, the empirical results of their study showed that, for current and prospective students and faculty, the notion that self-interest is unlikely to provide a “binding tie” for a role-based stakeholder group. But, their results for athletic department employees suggested that self-interest, when the conditions are appropriate (e.g., potential negative outcomes are feared), could act to focus the priorities of members of a role-based stakeholder group.

Coaches as key stakeholders

The importance of coaches as key stakeholders in athletic department is well reported in the literature. Coaches have been seen as the managers of the athletic team (Chelladurai, 2005). Moreover, “coaches constitute a strategic and important human resource of the athletic department” (Turner & Chelladurai, 2005, p.194). MacLean and Chelladurai (2005) asserted that “while there are administrative, coaching, and support personnel contributing to organizational effectiveness of collegiate athletic departments, coaches are the most important contributors to overall effectiveness” (MacLean & Chelladurai, 1995, p.195).

Using Phillip’s (2003) definition of derivative stakeholder, coaches seem to compose that group whose actions and claims must be taken into account for by managers when the goals of an organization are going to be defined. Therefore, coaches’ opinions about intercollegiate athletic goals have a central importance to understand this kind of organization. Trail and Chelladurai (2002) considered coaches as one the most influential stakeholders in college athletic departments. These authors asserted that

coaches' opinions have a paramount importance to assess goals and processes of athletic departments.

Previous studies have investigated other stakeholders of intercollegiate athletics. McGuire and Trail (2002) pointed out the perspectives of presidents of universities about goals and processes of intercollegiate athletics. Trail and Chelladurai (2000) explored students and faculty members' perceptions about intercollegiate goals and processes. They noticed that faculty members are salient stakeholders, while students are the prime beneficiaries of universities (Chelladurai, 1987). However, as mentioned elsewhere, Trail and Chelladurai (2000) claimed for an investigation with coaches, who they considered central stakeholders for a whole understanding of intercollegiate goals and processes.

From goals to processes

Early studies have understood organizational goals as dependent variables (Etzioni, 1964; Perrow, 1961). Mohr (1973) was the first to propose that goals could be considered cause of other important organizational variables. In fact, Warriner's (1965) affirmation that the statement of goals in written missions are frequently irrelevant to what actually happens in the organizations indicates that operative goals (in Perrow's terms) and organizational processes are closely linked. Processes are usually defined as internal actions organizations take to achieve their objectives (Steers, 1977).

Previously in sport management literature, goals and processes have been treated indiscriminately. Putler and Wolfe (1999), for example, analyzed priorities and tradeoffs in intercollegiate with no distinction between goals (e.g., winning) and processes (e.g., rule violations). However, advancing intercollegiate athletics literature, Trail and Chelladurai (2000) proposed that goals should be analyzed separately from processes.

They asserted that the importance certain group of stakeholders put in a goal should be understood as cause of the approval of some processes. Said in the other way around, the approval of selected intercollegiate athletics processes is a consequence of the importance the group of stakeholder under investigation accredits to certain goals.

This approach is really interesting inasmuch it takes into account ancient claims (Perrow, 1961; Warriner, 1965) to evade formal objectives expressed in organization's mission statements and focus on actual or operative goals. Moreover, Trail and Chelladurai's (2000) proposal is coherent with the stakeholder theory, which perceives that multiple and salient groups should be investigated if organizational operative goals are going to be wholly understood. The current research is based mainly on Trail and Chelladurai's researches, which have investigated perceptions of the approval of intercollegiate athletic processes as consequence of the importance stakeholders of university athletic departments deposit on different goals.

Trail and Chelladurai (2000) separated goals and processes in two categories: developmental goals/processes and performance goals/processes. Developmental goals/processes are related to academic achievement and social/cultural/physical well being of student athletes, while performance goals/processes are related to athletic achievement and financial performance. This distinction is theoretically very valuable because previous research has shown that developmental and performance orientation are somewhat competing values inside athletic departments (Baxter, et al., 1996; Putler & Wolfe, 1999; Rocha & Turner, 2008).

Considering a better understanding about different patterns of bureaucracy that arise into athletic departments as a major objective of the current research, Trail and

Chelladurai's (2000) perspective seems to be highly relevant. In fact, the approval (and the actual use) of certain processes is logically related to different patterns of bureaucracy. Considering the kind of rules people in athletic department are exposed to, if coaches highly approve the use of performance processes, it is logically expected that patterns of mock bureaucracy should arise. On the contrary, if coaches highly approve the use of developmental processes, a pattern of representative bureaucracy is expected to emerge.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Research design

The current research is a correlational research, inasmuch as it does not manipulate any variable and it has as its major empirical objective to verify the extent to which variables are related to each other and the nature of the relationships among these variables (Ary, Jacobs, Razavieh, & Sorensen, 2006). The basic design for correlational researches has three steps (Ary, et al., 2006). First, the researcher defines the problem and asks the research questions (or proposes the hypotheses) about the relationships among variables of interest. Second, he or she determines how the constructs will be quantified (operational definition of the constructs). Third, he or she selects the sample to represent the population of interest. The statement of the problem, the objectives, and the hypotheses to be tested were described in the first part of this manuscript. Second and third steps will be discussed next.

Operational definition of the variables

The antecedents or predictors (exogenous variables) of the proposed theoretical framework are coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place on certain goals. How frequently athletic departments engage in certain processes works as a mediator (endogenous variable) in the proposed model. Based on previous researches (McGuire & Trail, 2002) and on the needs of the current research, a reduced version of

Trail and Chelladurai's (2000) scales for assessing intercollegiate athletics' goals and processes will be used here. The stem and the anchors for goals and processes scales are distinct. The stem for goals scale asked the participants how much importance their athletic department place on attaining certain goals. Responses for the items in goals scale were based on a seven-point anchored scale, ranging from one (not important at all) to seven (to a great extent). The stem for processes scale asked the participants how frequent their athletic department engages in certain processes. Responses for the items in processes scales were based on a seven-point anchored scale, ranging from one (never) to seven (always). Goals and processes scales are in Appendix A.

Developmental goals. Coach's perception of developmental goals is a second-order latent variable, which was represented by three first-order latent variables, which in turn were indicated by 11 items (manifest variables). The first-order latent variables are: student-athlete academic achievement, student-athlete social/moral citizenship, and student-athlete careers (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000).

Performance goals. Coach's perception of performance goals is also a second-order latent variable, which was represented by three first-order latent variables, which in turn were indicated by 13 items (manifest variables). The first-order latent variables are: university visibility and prestige, winning, and entertainment (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000).

Developmental processes. Coach's perception of developmental processes is a second-order latent variable, which was represented by three first-order latent variables, which in turn were indicated by 13 items (manifest variables). The first-order latent variables are: student-athlete social/moral education, control of academic eligibility and

admissions, and facilitating student-athlete career development (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000).

Performance processes. Coach's perception of performance processes is also a second-order latent variable, which was represented by three first-order latent variables, which in turn were indicated by 11 items (manifest variables). The first-order latent variables are: attracting athletes, marketing process, and media relations (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000).

The consequences or criteria (endogenous variables) of the proposed theoretical framework are patterns of mock, representative, and discordant bureaucracy of athletic departments. The items to measure the patterns of bureaucracy were specially created for this study and are presented in Appendix B. Responses for items in these scales were based on a seven-point anchored scale, ranging from one (never) to seven (always).

Mock bureaucracy. In this study, mock bureaucracy is operationally defined as coaches' perceptions about the frequency of agreement between coaches and their managers about the necessity of bending some institutional rules, in order to achieve certain goals. Mock bureaucracy is a latent variable, which was represented by seven items (manifest variables).

Representative bureaucracy. In this study, representative bureaucracy is operationally defined as coaches' perceptions about frequency of agreement between coaches and their managers about the importance of following institutional rules, in order to achieve certain organizational goals. Representative bureaucracy is a latent variable, which was represented by seven items (manifest variables).

Discordant bureaucracy. In this study, discordant bureaucracy is operationally defined as coaches' perceptions about frequency of disagreement between coaches and their managers about institutional rules compliance and enforcement of these rules from top to bottom. Discordant bureaucracy is a latent variable, which was represented by six items (manifest variables).

Threats to internal and external validity in correlational research

Some of the traditional internal threats usually discussed in experimental and quasi-experimental designs, such as implementation, history, maturation, attitude of subjects, and regression are not applicable to correlational researches in as much as no intervention occurs. Fraenkel and Wallen (2003) listed four main threats for correlational studies: subject characteristics, location, instrumentation, and mortality.

Whenever a correlational study is conducted, there is the possibility that other *subject characteristics* can explain any relationship that is found. In the present research, it is possible that had other stakeholders respond the questionnaire, then the perceptions about goals, processes, and bureaucracy would be different. Considering the importance of coaches to intercollegiate athletics, this research focused exclusively on these stakeholders. Nevertheless, personal characteristics of coaches were controlled. Usually such subject characteristics are controlled via statistical procedures. Variables such as gender, age, tenure, and ethnicity are added to statistical models as control variables (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). This research used this procedure to control for this threat.

When the *location* where the research instrument is administered is different for different subjects, it becomes a threat to internal validity (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). The

instrument of the current research is a web-based questionnaire. Respondent filled out the questionnaire in their personal computer at home, in a shared computer at work, or wherever they could. Therefore, due to the type of technique use for data collection in this research, location is very difficult to be controlled.

Instrumentation is always a matter of concern in surveys and correlational studies, which usually counts on questionnaires to collect data. Beyond the traditional concerns of instrument change (Cook & Campbell, 1979) and instrument decay (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003), the validity of a research instrument is a constant threat. It is noteworthy that instrumentation is a major threat to internal validity that can be controlled by the researcher. Thus, following sections of this manuscript bring further discussion about content-related validity, construct-related validity, and reliability of the questionnaire that were used in the research.

As noted by Fraenkel and Wallen (2003), strictly speaking, *mortality* is not a problem of internal validity in correlational studies, since it is not possible “to lose” subjects. However, Fraenkel and Wallen (2003) understand mortality in correlational studies as those subjects who did not answer the questionnaire. In this sense, “mortality” or non-response error imposes threats to external validity. Non-response error has been constantly mentioned as one of the biggest threats for external validity in surveys and other researches with questionnaires (Dillman, 2000; Fowler, 1993). To control for non-response error, this research use procedures that help obtain a good response rate, namely a pre-notification contact (Kent & Turner, 2002), and follow-up reminders for non-respondents (Dillman, 2000). Beyond this strategy, formal tests for non-response error were conducted through comparisons between early and late respondents in some key

demographic characteristics, according to processes previously discussed in the literature (Miller & Smith, 1983; Turner & Jordan, 2009).

Bureaucracy – Scale development

Since a new instrument to measure patterns of bureaucracy is being proposed, the analysis of content-related validity of this instrument becomes an important step in the current research.

Content-related validity

As noted by Ary et al. (2006), no numerical index exists to indicate content validity. The most common way to obtain content-related validity of an instrument is to consult a panel of judges or experts (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). In order to get experts opinions, I followed the four steps that are consistently proposed by the literature (Ary, et al., 2006; Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003; Rubio, Berg-Weger, Tebb, Lee, & Rauch, 2003). First, I wrote a letter kindly asking the experts help to evaluate a new instrument. Second, I made very clear to them what my target population (intercollegiate coaches) is. Third, I informed them the definitions of the constructs (the three patterns of bureaucracy) that were used to create the items. Fourth, I asked their help to read and evaluate the appropriateness and clarity of my items.

As noted by Rubio et al. (2003), there is no consensus in the literature about the number of experts needed to assess the content-related validity. The literature is very inconclusive and has proposed from two to twenty experts (Grant & Davis, 1997). Naturally, the larger the number of experts, the more information investigators can get. Using good sense, Rubio et al. (2003) proposed that a number between three and ten should be enough to guarantee a valuable analysis of items content. For this study, using

Rubio et al's suggestion, I asked the help of five experts. As the scales to be validated for this study are related to contents of sociology, the experts were selected from sociologists (professors and doctoral students) with experience in institutionalism, loose coupling, and/or bureaucracy research. In addition, I adopted a screening question for selecting the experts. Considering the definitions I used to create the items are based on Gouldner's (1954) *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, I asked potential volunteer judges if they have read this book. For those who have read, I politely requested their participation. After the suggestions of the experts, some items were dropped, some were added, and others were modified. The final scale is in Appendix B.

As the goals and processes scales were already tested and published in scientific journals, the content-related validity of these scales does not need to be investigated again. However, as the target population used in the current research is different from those tested before (students, faculty, and university presidents), a new analysis about construct validity and reliability will be conducted. After discussing data collection procedures in the next section, I am going to discuss *the measurement model*, which includes a discussion about construct validity (convergent and discriminant validity), reliability of the scales, and the overall measurement model fit.

Data collection

Before collecting the data, the approval for conducting this study was granted by the Ohio State University Institutional Review Board. Below I discussed the procedures and sampling methods that were used to collect data.

Procedures

Selectsurvey.net website was used to create the online questionnaire. This software is available for graduate students, staff, and faculty of College of Education and Human Ecology at The Ohio State University. A pre-notification e-mail was sent in the last week of January; that is, one week before the questionnaires were sent out (Kent & Turner, 2002). An introductory letter with an informed consent precedes the questionnaire. The introductory letter informs about the study's objectives, the voluntary nature of this study, and the freedom to skip any question or stop at any point a participant wants. Participants were guaranteed confidentially (Singer, Mathiowetz, & Couper, 1993) and assured that only *group data* would be used for data analysis. The informed consent explicitly read that by completing the questionnaire, the participants were consenting to participate in the study.

The questionnaire was not anonymous. However, only the investigator could link respondents to answers. This information had an utmost importance, because I intended to send follow-up messages to non-respondents two and three weeks after the initial e-mailing. Considering that online questionnaires tend to have low responses rates, any procedure that improves this rate, such as follow-up messages, is desirable (Fox, Melvin, & Kim, 1988; Yammarino, Skinner, & Childers, 1991).

The online questionnaire has four parts: (1) coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place on developmental goals; (2) coaches' perceptions about how frequently athletic departments engage in developmental processes; (3) coaches' perceptions about different patterns of bureaucracy; and (4) Demographic information. Demographic information includes questions about the participants' gender,

age, and ethnicity, and previous year athletic results. Demographic variables were used to describe my sample and to control for non-response error.

Sample

The target population of the current study is the NCAA head coaches. Cunningham and Ashley (2001) observed that, in segmenting member colleges into three divisions, the NCAA created distinct and clear contrasts among divisions. Other authors also pointed out that athletic departments of Divisions I, II, and III are different in many aspects (DeSchraver & Jensen, 2002; Fink, et al., 2003; Geist & Pastore, 2002; Turner & Chelladurai, 2005). Based on these previous studies that pointed out important differences between divisions, I am considering each division as a population of coaches.

College Coaches on Line website was used to select a simple random sample of 1,000 coaches from each Division. After the first sending, 386 (121 from Division I, 127 from Division II, and 138 from Division III) e-mails bounced back due to either invalid addresses or full mailboxes. A new process of simple random was conducted to replace these coaches who were not reachable. After the second sending, 36 (12 from Division I, 14 from Division II, and 10 from Division III) e-mails bounced back. Once more, new coaches were randomly selected to replace those who did not receive the questionnaire. After replacing these 36 e-mails, no e-mails bounced back. Sixteen of the coaches (nine from division I, four from division II, and three from division III) who received the questionnaire declined to take part in the study. They were not replaced.

I received back 382 questionnaires from Division I coaches (response rate of 38.2%), 326 from Division II (32.6%), and 359 from Division III (35.9%). From these questionnaires some had to be eliminated due to either the irresponsible nature of the

responses (e.g., the same response for all items) or a complete absence of responses for all items representing a specific construct. In general, the number of irresponsible responses was low for all three divisions: I eliminated 18 questionnaires from coaches in division I, nine in division II, and 14 in division III. However, a larger number of questionnaires were eliminated because some coaches refused to answer one or more sections that contained items related to how coaches and athletic directors deal with rules (mock, representative, or discordant bureaucracy scale). With no exceptions, coaches responded at least two or more items related to goals and processes scales. A complete lack of response for items in one or more subscales in the bureaucracy scale brought me to eliminate 39 questionnaires from coaches in division I, also 39 from coaches in division II, and 36 in division III.

It was expected that coaches could skip the items in bureaucracy scales. Sociologists have preferred to use participant observation and qualitative techniques to collect and analyze data related to rule compliance (Gouldner, 1954; Lopez, 2006; Sallaz, 2009), under the argument that people would not be willing to acknowledge alternative strategies to deal with rules. In this sense, any attempt of measuring different patterns of bureaucracy quantitatively should expect some of the respondents to leave items questioning about how rules have been dealt without responses. Coaches were free to skip any item, when they do not feel comfortable with it.

The final sample of was composed by 322 coaches from division I, 277 from division II, and 308 from division III. A complete description of these three samples is presented in the results section.

Data analysis

As noted by West (2001), missing data is an ubiquitous problem in social investigations. This research is not an exception. Considering the missing data of the current research are missing at random, missing values were dealt using full information maximum likelihood approach, obtained by the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm (Cai & Lee, 2009). After dealing with missing values, Mplus was used to conduct the following analyses.

This section presents four distinct, although inter-related, steps to analyze the data. First, I discuss the measurement model for each population separately. Using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the overall measurement model fit and individual contributions of items to their assigned factors is presented as a methodological tool to refine the model. After refining the model, I conduct a new CFA to analyze the construct validity (convergent and discriminant validity) and reliability of the scales. Second, I discuss the measurement invariance of the instrument. At this point, a multi-group CFA is conducted to check how factor loadings and intercepts of the measurement model varied among populations. Third, single group structural equation modeling (SEM) is conducted to compare three plausible models to explain the structural relationships among the variables in this study. Fourth, I discuss the structural invariance of the selected model in step three. This step is only justifiable inasmuch as measurement invariance (step 2) exists among the three tested populations. Then, step four checks if the structural relationship among latent variables is the same for all three divisions.

Measurement model – overall fit

Based on the results of three single-group confirmatory factor analyses (one for each division), I evaluated the overall measurement model fit and individual contribution of items to their assigned factors (constructs). As for the measures of model fit, I used the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), standardized root mean square residual (RMS), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and chi-square value divided by degrees of freedom. For CFI and TLI, values higher than .90 are considered to have a close fit (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). For RMSEA, values less than .06 indicate a close fit of the model, values less than .08 indicate a reasonable fit, and values higher than .10 indicate no fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). For RMS, values less than .08 are indicative of close fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). For the value of chi-square divided by degrees of freedom, I follow the “rule of thumb” of 2.0 or less used in social sciences to indicate a good fit (Byrne, 1989). Regarding the individual contributions of items to their assigned factors, Stevens (1996) has suggested that items with factor loadings less than .40 should be eliminated. However, based on Anderson and Gerbing (1988), for this study I used a more stringent rule to drop the items. If an item common variance was not larger than this item unique variance, this item should be dropped from the scale. It means that items should present a factor loading of, at least, .707 on their assigned factors to be part of the scale.

Measurement model – Construct-related validity

Analysis of construct validity is an investigation about how much of the theoretical construct can be explained by the proposed variables (items). According to Ary et al. (2006), convergent and discriminant validity represent two fundamental types

of construct validity. Relationships among items expected to measure the same construct provide a dimension of *convergent validity*, while relationships among items expected to measure different constructs provide a dimension of *discriminant validity* (Ary, et al., 2006). To determine convergent and discriminant validity, structural equation modeling (SEM) technique was used to carry out a CFA.

Convergent validity

According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988), convergent validity is manifested if each item's loading on its proposed latent construct is greater than twice its standard error or, in other words, if the factor loading is significant. According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), convergent validity can be indicated by the average variance extracted (AVE). This measure represents the amount of variance explained by the construct compared to the amount of variance attributed to measurement error. Fornell and Larcker (1981) proposed that if AVE is less than .50, then the variance due to measurement error is larger than the variance explained by the construct, indicating that the validity of the individual indicators and the validity of the construct are questionable. For this research, Fornell and Larcker's (1981) representations of construct convergent validity were followed.

Discriminant validity

To determine discriminant validity, Anderson and Gerbing (1988) suggested that the correlation between pairs of constructs must not be within two standard errors. If the confidence interval for a correlation contains 1.0, then the two constructs lack discriminant validity. Fornell and Larcker (1981) proposed that AVE for each construct could also be used to test discriminant validity. They proposed that if the AVE for a

construct is smaller than the squared correlation between this construct and another construct, then these two constructs lack discriminant validity. Fornell and Larcker's (1981) test is more rigorous and was used as a measure of discriminant validity in this research.

Reliability

Reliability expresses the degree of consistency with which a measuring instrument gauges whatever it is measuring (Ary, et al., 2006). Cronbach's alpha coefficient represents each factor's internal consistency. It was used as a measure of reliability in this research. Nunnally (1978) suggested that reliable factors should present a coefficient alpha equal to .70, at least. Naturally, the higher the coefficient alpha, the more reliable a scale is.

Measurement invariance

Once a comparison between groups is part of the endeavor of this research, tests of measurement invariance have a paramount importance (Byrne & Watkins, 2003; Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993). Measurement invariance represents "the extent to which different items or subtests have equal meaning across groups of examinees" (French & Finch, 2006, p. 379). Multiple-group CFA has been used to test measurement invariance because it provides chi-square statistic and goodness-of-fit indices, which allow comparisons (Ployhart & Oswald, 2004). Measurement invariance of the proposed scales was tested using multiple-group CFA, according to the procedures described by Widaman and Reise (1997) and Chen, Souza, and West (2005).

For first-order factor models, configural, factor loading, intercept, and residual invariance are the most commonly tested forms of measurement invariance (Chen, et al.,

2005). In *configural invariance*, the same item ought to be an indicator of the same latent factor in each group, but the factor loading can be different across groups (Widaman & Reise, 1997). In *factor loading invariance*, the loading of each item on the underlying factor must be the same in both groups (Widaman & Reise, 1997). When this level of invariance is achieved, relationships between the underlying factor and other external variables can be investigated across groups (Chen, et al., 2005). In *intercept variance*, not only factor loadings are constrained to be equal, but also the intercepts of the manifest variables are constrained to be equal across groups (Widaman & Reise, 1997). When this level of invariance is attained, scores from distinct groups have the same factor loading and the same intercept, implying that the factor means can be compared across groups (Chen, et al., 2005). Finally, in testing *residual invariance*, not only factor loadings and intercepts are constrained to be equal, but also the residual associated with each manifest variable is constrained to be equal across groups (Widaman & Reise, 1997). As Chen et al. (2005) noted, measurement invariance of residuals is desirable but not mandatory for testing differences in relationships or mean differences between two or more groups. Residual invariance is rarely achieved in empirical researches and was not used in this study (Chen, et al., 2005).

In this sense, to test the measurement invariance of the Bureaucracy scale (a first-order factor model), a series of three hierarchically nested models were tested. Model 1 tests configural invariance. In this model an unrestricted model in which each group has the same structure was specified. The pattern of free and fixed factor loadings was constrained to be the same for all three groups (Division I, II, and III). Model 1 is the unconstrained model, where all parameters were freely estimated. Model 2 is nested in

Model 1 and tests invariance of factor loadings. In this model all factor loadings were constrained to be the same for all groups. Model 3 is nested in Model 2 and tests invariance of intercepts of manifest variables (items). In this model, in addition to the constraints already placed on factor loadings (Model 2), the intercepts of the manifest variables were also constrained to be the same for all groups.

To test the measurement invariance of the goals and processes scales (second-order factor models), a series of five hierarchical nested models were tested (Chen, et al., 2005). The order of the nested models was slight modified from that proposed by Chen et al. (2005). Model 1 tests configural invariance. Nested in Model 1, Model 2 tests the invariance of first-order factor loadings. Nested in Model 2, Model 3 tests the invariance of intercepts of measured variables. After confirming the invariance of first-order factor analysis model, I moved to test the invariance of the second-order model (Muthen & Muthen, 2009). Nested in Model 3, Model 4 tests the invariance of second-order factor loadings. Nested in Model 4, Model 5 tests the invariance of intercepts of first-order latent variables.

As suggested by Chen et al (2005), each pair of models is nested in this hierarchy because a set of parameters was constrained to be equal across groups in the more restricted model. Three indexes were used to compare the fit between pairs of nested models: the chi-square difference (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bollen, 1989), CFI difference (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002), and RMSEA difference (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Initially, the chi-square difference was used to compare the fit between two hierarchically nested models. If the chi-square difference test is significant, the more restricted model fails the test of measurement invariance across any two groups. However, since chi-square

difference test is affected by non-normality and sample size, difference in goodness-of-fit indexes has been proposed as a complementary way to evaluate measurement invariance (Brannick, 1995; Kelloway, 1995). Cheung and Renosvold (2002) found in simulation studies that, among many good-of-fit indexes, CFI has performed better than other indexes available in SEM software. They proposed that a difference of less than .01 in CFI between two nested models would indicate measurement invariance. Following Hu and Bentler (1998, 1999), I also use the RMSEA difference to compare nested models.

Single-group structural model analyses

Like CFA, the structural relationships among the proposed constructs were investigated using SEM technique. Single-group SEM was conducted to test three alternative models (Figure 3.1), in order to choose the best model to explain the structural relationships among the proposed latent variables. A causal relationship is expected among goals, processes, and the three patterns of bureaucracy. To investigate these causal relationships, three models were proposed (see Figure 1). In models A and B, the relationship between the importance athletic departments place on certain goals and bureaucracy is expected to be mediated by how frequent athletic departments engage in certain processes. Model A is the fully mediated model. Model B is the partially mediated model. In model C, the direct-effects model, goals and processes directly affect the patterns of bureaucracy of athletic departments, without any mediation.

Model A has more degrees of freedom and is nested in model B. Therefore, between models A and B, a formal test of χ^2 difference can be performed to test which of these two models fit the data better. C is the direct-effects model, which represents an alternative model that is not nested either in B or in A. Model C is apparently nested in B.

But, this is this is not a fact, because when one adds a path from goals to process (to transform C in B), one changes the nature of the variables. In B, there are two endogenous variables and one exogenous variable. In C, there is one endogenous variable and two exogenous variables. Model C has fewer degrees of freedom than B and, therefore, can not be considered to be nested in this model. But C is still a valid model for comparison. To compare C to A or B, since no formal test can be conducted, I compared fit indices (CFI, RMSEA confidence intervals, and RMS) between these three models.

Model A – Fully mediated model

Model B – Partially mediated model

Model C – Direct effects model

Figure 3.1 Alternative models of structural relationships among latent variables

Each model was tested in each population. The same parameters and indexes used to evaluate the fit of the measurement model were used to assess the fit of the structural models.

After choosing the model that fits the data the best, the significance of individual paths was analyzed to test the hypotheses from one to nine. At this stage, the relationship between goals and processes (H1 and H2), and the relationship between processes and the three patterns of bureaucracy (H3 to H8) were analyzed.

Multiple-group structural model analyses

Hypothesis 9 proposes that structural relationships among goals and processes, and processes and patterns of bureaucracy are distinct (non invariant) among the three NCAA divisions. In order to test this hypothesis, multiple-group SEM was conducted. First of all, in order to conduct multiple-group SEM, I have to make sure that measurement invariance exists among the three groups. Since this has been the case, I tested six nested models.

Model 1 is the unconstrained model, where all single-headed arrows representing structural relationships (path coefficients) in the model were freely estimated. Model 2 is the constrained model, where these parameters were forced to be equal for all three groups. If the difference between unconstrained and constrained models were significant, then not all structural relationships (parameters) would be invariant across groups (Byrne, 2006). In this sense, three additional models would be tested where constraints of equal parameter among groups were relaxed two-at-time. Byrne (2006) has suggested that these paths could be relaxed either one-at-time or as a set, depending on the objective of the study. Given the nature of the latent variables of the current research, it makes more

sense to relax two or three regression weights at a time. In Model 3, the paths from developmental goals to developmental processes and from performance goals to performance processes were relaxed. A comparison between this model and the unconstrained model allowed me to test if the relationship between goals (coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place in some goals) and processes (coaches' perceptions about how frequent their athletic departments engage in certain processes) had been invariant across all three NCAA divisions.

In Model 4, the equality among path coefficients from *developmental processes* to all three types of bureaucracy was relaxed. Comparing Model 4 with the unconstrained model (Model 1) allowed me to test if the relationship between developmental processes and bureaucracy was invariant among groups. In Model 5, the equality among path coefficients from *performance processes* and all three types of bureaucracy was relaxed. Comparing Model 5 with the unconstrained model (Model 1) allowed me to test if the relationship between performance processes and bureaucracy was invariant among groups.

The very same indexes used to compare the fit between pairs of nested models in multiple-groups CFA were used to compare multiple-group SEM models. I used the chi-square difference (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Bollen, 1989), CFI difference (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002), and RMSEA difference (Hu & Bentler, 1998) to compare the goodness of fit among nested models.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Results are presented in the same order as in the data analysis section. First, a complete description of the sample is provided, along with the analysis for controlling for non-response error. Then, results of single-group factor analyses are presented. At this point, overall measurement model fit, factor loadings, trimming of the original model, construct validity (convergent and discriminant validity) and reliability of the scales are discussed. Next, results from the measurement invariance analysis are presented. Then, single-group structural models are discussed. After choosing the model that fits the data the best, significance of individual paths coefficients are analyzed to discuss hypotheses from one to nine. Finally, results from multi-group structural analyses are presented.

Sample characteristics

The sample demographic characteristics are presented in Table 4.1. Consistent with previous research in intercollegiate athletics, the vast majority of coaches are males and Caucasians (Rocha & Turner, 2008; Turner & Chelladurai, 2005). The sample demographics are also consistent with the population data. The 2007-2008 NCAA report for race and gender reported that 77% of all head coaches in all three divisions are male, while 86.4% are Caucasian (NCAA, 2009). The mean age (and standard deviation) for coaches in all divisions was 44.08 (10.93) years, and the mean (and standard deviation) tenure was 9.39 (8.85) years. To compute the value of means standing in conference,

coaches were asked to indicate their team's position in their conference's standings and the number of teams in their conference during the last three seasons particular coach's team from the total mean number of teams in the conference. This number was, then, divided by the total mean number of teams in the conference in the last three years.

Table 4.1 Demographic characteristics of the samples

	Division I (n=322)			Division II (n=277)			Division III (n=308)		
	n	%		n	%		n	%	
Gender									
Female	88	24.9		69	24.9		105	34.1	
Male	229	71.1		203	73.3		196	63.6	
Not indicated	5	1.6		5	1.8		7	2.3	
Ethnicity									
Asian-American	2	.6		2	.7		2	.6	
African-American	16	5		17	6.1		11	3.6	
Caucasian	286	88.8		235	84.8		278	90.3	
Latino	5	1.6		9	3.2		6	1.9	
Native-American	1	.3		1	.4		1	.3	
Other	4	1.2		5	1.8		2	.6	
Not indicated	8	2.5		8	2.9		8	2.6	
	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	min	max	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	min	max	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	min	max
Age	45.73 (10.03)	26	72	43.66 (10.53)	23	71	42.71 (11.95)	23	83
Tenure	10.44 (8.93)	.42	46	8.05 (8.01)	.42	42	9.48 (9.35)	.42	59
Mean standing in the conference	.63 (.25)	.07	1.00	.65 (.24)	.11	1.00	.64 (.24)	.08	1.00

To control for non-response error, I conducted *t*-tests comparing early to late respondents in key demographic characteristics, as suggested in the literature (Miller & Smith, 1983; Turner & Jordan, 2009). Additionally, I also tested if late respondents differ from early respondents in the time they spent (in minutes) to complete the questionnaire. Table 4.2 shows the results of *t*-tests. Late respondents did not differ from early

Table 4.2 Comparing early to late respondents to control for non-response error in demographics

Division I					
	Means (<i>SD</i>)	<i>t</i>	df	Sig.	Δ mean
Age		-1.043	310	.298	-1.198
Early	45.2 (10.2)				
Late	46.4 (9.7)				
Tenure		.163	312	.871	.166
Early	10.51 (9.0)				
Late	10.34 (8.8)				
Standing		.664	320	.507	.019
Early	.63 (.2)				
Late	.61 (.3)				
Response time		-.247	320	.805	-.153
Early	10.1 (5.2)				
Late	10.2 (5.8)				
Division II					
	Means (<i>SD</i>)	<i>t</i>	df	Sig.	Δ mean
Age		.255	260	.799	.339
Early	43.8 (10.2)				
Late	43.5 (11.0)				
Tenure		-.425	264	.671	-.427
Early	7.9 (8.2)				
Late	8.3 (7.7)				
Standing		.646	275	.519	.019
Early	.66 (.2)				
Late	.64 (.2)				
Response time		.102	275	.919	.066
Early	10.6 (5.2)				
Late	10.6 (5.2)				
Division III					
	Means (<i>SD</i>)	<i>t</i>	df	Sig.	Δ mean
Age		1.416	294	.158	1.952
Early	43.9 (11.8)				
Late	42.0 (11.7)				
Tenure		1.468	294	.143	1.610
Early	10.6 (9.9)				
Late	9.0 (8.4)				
Standing		1.414	306	.158	.039
Early	.66 (.2)				
Late	.62 (.2)				
Response time		1.033	306	.302	.460
Early	9.9 (4.0)				
Late	9.4 (3.7)				

respondents in any variable for all three divisions. It seems that non-response error is not an issue of concern (Dooley & Linder, 2003; Kim & Cunningham, 2005).

Still controlling for non-response error, I compared early to late respondents in the average of their responses for each of the first-order factors. Table 4.3 shows the results of *t*-tests, the *p*-value (sig. in the table) for each of these tests, and the mean difference for the comparisons between early and late respondents. Late respondents did not differ from early respondent in any factor for all three divisions. Once more, it seems that non-response error should not be an issue of concern in this research (Dooley & Linder, 2003; Kim & Cunningham, 2005).

Table 4.3 Comparing early to late respondents to control for non-response error in the mean of first-order factors

	Division I			Division II			Division III		
	<i>t</i>	Sig.	Δ mean	<i>t</i>	Sig.	Δ mean	<i>T</i>	Sig.	Δ mean
AC	-.090	.928	-.008	.641	.522	.082	.993	.321	.115
SC	.563	.574	.065	.376	.707	.051	1.126	.261	.145
CA	1.173	.242	.150	.929	.354	.142	.428	.669	.062
UP	-.196	.844	-.023	1.285	.200	.188	1.621	.106	.237
WI	-1.336	.183	-.213	-.262	.794	-.049	1.528	.128	.219
EN	-1.498	.135	-.211	-.231	.817	-.037	.297	.766	.043
ME	.119	.905	.014	.495	.621	.077	-.089	.929	-.013
AC	-.512	.609	-.040	.338	.736	.042	.814	.416	.093
CD	-.630	.529	-.083	-.161	.872	-.030	.062	.951	.012
AT	-.580	.562	-.086	.617	.538	.112	1.232	.219	.204
MK	-.830	.407	-.137	-1.117	.265	-.201	.387	.699	.053
MR	-1.227	.221	-.186	-.357	.722	-.065	-.573	.567	-.093
MB	-.380	.704	-.040	.668	.505	.087	-.137	.891	-.016
RB	.841	.401	.088	.317	.752	.040	-.339	.735	-.036
DB	.102	.919	.016	-.585	.559	-.087	.640	.523	.102

Note. Negative signs of *t* imply that late respondents had a higher mean than the early respondents.

AC = Academic achievement; SC = Social citizenship; CA = Career of student-athletes; UP = University prestige; WI = Winning; EN = Entertainment.

ME = Moral education; AE = Academic eligibility; CD = Career development of athletes; AT = Attracting athletes; MK = Marketing; MR = Media relations.

MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Measurement model – Single-group CFA

For the initial analysis of the measurement model, I divided my sample in two random sub-samples. I called the first sub-sample calibration sample and the second validation sample. First, I tested the measurement model for my calibration sample, checked the measures of fit and the factor loadings. After refining the model, dropping some items that did not load satisfactorily in their implied constructs, I tested my measurement again, but this time using the validation sample. This process was preferred, instead of the traditional processes of using the same sample in both stages, to avoid a mere data-driven process. Data-driven processes tend to capitalize on chances of finding something that will never be found in other samples (MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992).

The first analyses of goals, processes, and bureaucracy scales for single groups showed fit measures that have a lot of room for improvement. These results are summarized in Table 4.4. At first glance, the results of fit measures seem to be not acceptable. However, since I have used maximum likelihood (ML) estimation, particularly interesting is the value of RMS, which was below .08 for all groups in all scales. Hu and Bentler (1998) recommended the use of RMS as measure of fit for ML estimations, and suggested that models with RMS below .08 have good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Naturally, the other measures of fit should not be ignored. Their values show that the model needed some improvement, mainly due to poor factor loadings of some items.

Table 4.4 Initial fit measures for calibration sample (all scales by division)

	χ^2/df	RMSEA (90% CI)	RMS	CFI	TLI
Goals scale					
Div I	2.35	.080 (.073; .087)	.051	.927	.915
Div II	2.59	.079 (.071; .086)	.048	.929	.923
Div III	2.12	.081 (.074; .088)	.045	.918	.905
Processes scale					
Div I	2.04	.096 (.090; .103)	.075	.834	.806
Div II	1.30	.086 (.079; .093)	.065	.869	.848
Div III	2.02	.085 (.078; .092)	.076	.827	.800
Bureau scale					
Div I	2.14	.090 (.083; .098)	.067	.848	.827
Div II	2.51	.096 (.087; .104)	.073	.833	.810
Div III	1.71	.073 (.065; .081)	.062	.904	.891

Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show the factor loadings (λ) of each item, as well as Cronbach's coefficients (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor, respectively for goals scale, processes scale, and bureaucracy scale. Since one of the major objectives of the current research is to compare the three divisions, the processes of deciding which items should be eliminated is more complex in this research than it usually is when just one sample is being analyzed. When an item presented a factor loading below .707, indicating that this common variance was not larger than its unique variance (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988), for all three groups, this item was dropped. However, some items loaded below .707 for one group but not for the other two, or for two groups but not for the third group. In these cases, the decision of dropping or not an item became much more complex. I analyzed case by case, and item by item, to make sure to just delete items that would not affect the psychometric properties of the scale. After a careful analysis, four items from the goals scale (UP1, UP4, WI1, and WI4), nine items from the processes scale (ME1, AE1, AE3, CD1, CD2, AT2, MK4, MK5, and

MR3), and seven items from bureaucracy scale (MB2, MB3, MB5, RB4, RB5, RB7, and DB5) were dropped. Usually these items loaded below .707 in two or in all three groups.

Table 4.5 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the GOALS scale, for calibration sample

Factor and Variable	Division I			Division II			Division III		
	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE
Academic Achievement		.94	.81		.93	.78		.94	.81
AC1	.843			.851			.877		
AC2	.915			.904			.867		
AC3	.926			.856			.949		
AC4	.904			.922			.902		
Social Citizenship		.89	.70		.89	.69		.90	.71
SC1	.739			.788			.778		
SC2	.876			.840			.879		
SC3	.820			.820			.839		
SC4	.903			.869			.875		
Student Career		.93	.82		.91	.76		.91	.78
CA1	.859			.846			.845		
CA2	.920			.878			.887		
CA3	.931			.897			.910		
University Prestige		.86	.61		.84	.58		.81	.54
UP1	.727			.736			.684		
UP2	.800			.798			.781		
UP3	.847			.814			.776		
UP4	.752			.698			.682		
Winning		.88	.60		.92	.70		.89	.63
WI1	.559			.724			.690		
WI2	.854			.876			.791		
WI3	.937			.911			.854		
WI4	.696			.843			.821		
WI5	.773			.806			.817		
Entertainment		.89	.69		.88	.64		.85	.58
EN1	.825			.841			.823		
EN2	.847			.766			.741		
EN3	.794			.838			.763		
EN4	.847			.762			.719		

Table 4.6 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the PROCESSES scale, for calibration sample

Factor and Variable	Division I			Division II			Division III		
	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE
Moral Education		.80	.51		.85	.60		.82	.54
ME1	.568			.755			.694		
ME2	.718			.713			.748		
ME3	.757			.847			.824		
ME4	.798			.770			.678		
Academic Eligibility		.60	.34		.75	.47		.52	.27
AE1	.515			.611			.549		
AE2	.693			.813			.715		
AE3	.460			.574			.236		
AE4	.623			.715			.457		
Career Development		.87	.57		.87	.57		.83	.52
CD1	.630			.673			.744		
CD2	.806			.729			.565		
CD3	.579			.715			.753		
CD4	.837			.844			.787		
CD5	.877			.807			.732		
Attracting athletes		.68	.54		.74	.52		.59	.44
AT1	.797			.812			.827		
AT2	.404			.498			.176		
AT3	.902			.812			.772		
Marketing		.85	.55		.83	.49		.77	.42
MK1	.826			.842			.810		
MK2	.795			.664			.608		
MK3	.865			.815			.770		
MK4	.517			.490			.435		
MK5	.632			.648			.550		
Media Relations		.75	.59		.78	.61		.73	.56
MR1	.837			.814			.854		
MR2	.884			.895			.894		
MR3	.527			.593			.377		

Table 4.7 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the BUREAUCRACY scale, for calibration sample

Factor and Variable	Division I			Division II			Division III		
	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE
Mock									
Bureaucracy		.78	.36		.81	.40		.79	.37
MB1	.631			.557			.553		
MB2	.431			.528			.440		
MB3	.466			.472			.436		
MB4	.660			.790			.677		
MB5	.470			.446			.533		
MB6	.745			.827			.796		
MB7	.693			.712			.701		
Representative									
Bureaucracy		.74	.37		.76	.36		.80	.42
RB1	.693			.630			.710		
RB2	.714			.856			.889		
RB3	.617			.667			.724		
RB4	.320			.416			.440		
RB5	.250			.211			.382		
RB6	.700			.683			.633		
RB7	.738			.531			.620		
Discordant									
Bureaucracy		.89	.63		.86	.58		.89	.63
DB1	.825			.757			.836		
DB2	.926			.917			.918		
DB3	.739			.771			.778		
DB4	.747			.669			.761		
DB5	.507			.462			.502		
DB6	.946			.912			.908		

After dropping those items, a new CFA, now with the validation sample, was conducted. The results of this new analysis showed that the fit measures improve considerably for all three scales (Table 4.8). The measurement model for the bureaucracy scale fitted the data very well for all three divisions. The chi-square divided by degrees of freedom was less than 2.0 for all three divisions. The test of close fit for RMSEA was not

rejected for all three divisions. The values of RMS were below .08. And the values of CFI and TLI were all above .90. The measurement model for the processes scale also fitted the data very well for all three divisions. The test of close fit for RMSEA was rejected for division I. However, the point estimate for RMSEA (still acceptable) and all other measures of fit indicate that the model fits the data reasonably well. The measurement model for the goals scale fitted the data acceptably. The test of close fit for RMSEA was rejected for divisions I and III. Nevertheless, the confidence intervals for both divisions I and III showed that RMSEA was in the acceptable region. Moreover, all other measures for the goals scales showed a good fit for the model.

Table 4.8 Fit measures for the measurement model (validation sample)

	χ^2/df	RMSEA (90% CI)	RMS	CFI	TLI
Goals scale					
Div I	1.91	.076 (.062; .088)	.042	.953	.943
Div II	1.50	.060 (.044; .076)*	.038	.968	.961
Div III	1.76	.071 (.057; .084)	.049	.949	.938
Processes scale					
Div I	1.94	.077 (.058; .095)	.057	.949	.929
Div II	1.63	.068 (.045; .089)*	.048	.962	.947
Div III	1.33	.047 (.017; .069)*	.047	.976	.966
Bureau scale					
Div I	1.37	.045 (.009; .070)*	.054	.979	.973
Div II	1.75	.074 (.050; .096)*	.065	.951	.939
Div III	1.48	.056 (.030; .079)*	.059	.971	.963

Note. * p value is not significant for test of close fit.

Overall, the measurement model for all three scales fit the data very for all three divisions. Tables 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 show the factor loadings (λ) of each retained item, as well as Cronbach's coefficients (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor, respectively for goals scale, processes scale, and bureaucracy scale.

Table 4.9 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the GOALS scale, for validation sample

Factor and Variable	Division I			Division II			Division III		
	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE
Academic Achievement		.94	.82		.93	.82		.94	.78
AC1	.851			.882			.871		
AC2	.936			.925			.842		
AC3	.919			.866			.941		
AC4	.919			.945			.874		
Social Citizenship		.89	.71		.89	.68		.90	.71
SC1	.746			.801			.776		
SC2	.876			.816			.875		
SC3	.833			.844			.829		
SC4	.915			.833			.892		
Student career		.93	.81		.93	.78		.91	.75
CA1	.845			.855			.791		
CA2	.916			.894			.889		
CA3	.939			.902			.908		
University prestige		.80	.74		.78	.69		.72	.55
UP2	.838			.793			.761		
UP3	.877			.872			.721		
Winning		.88	.73		.89	.76		.86	.67
WI2	.883			.889			.835		
WI3	.956			.936			.926		
WI5	.712			.782			.672		
Entertainment		.89	.70		.88	.61		.85	.63
EN1	.846			.780			.845		
EN2	.863			.754			.770		
EN3	.797			.841			.845		
EN4	.840			.741			.717		

The reliability was satisfactory for all subscales in all three divisions. All factors presented Cronbach's alphas greater than .70. Not all factor loadings are above .707. It is common that, after refining a model, factor loadings change, because the common variance is recalculated based on the retained items only. Nevertheless, all items presented factor loaded much higher than the cutoff point of .40, proposed by Stevens

(1996). Yet, the AVE was greater than .50 for all constructs. Overall, these results showed that the present scales have constructs with considerable convergent validity in all three divisions.

Table 4.10 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the PROCESSES scale, for validation sample

Factor and Variable	Division I			Division II			Division III		
	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE
Moral Education		.81	.61		.81	.61		.78	.62
ME2	.745			.773			.770		
ME3	.722			.763			.843		
ME4	.872			.812			.736		
Academic Eligibility		.74	.64		.74	.59		.74	.53
AE2	.892			.793			.734		
AE4	.698			.743			.718		
Career Development		.79	.62		.82	.60		.78	.58
CD3	.545			.646			.675		
CD4	.848			.875			.759		
CD5	.915			.794			.833		
Attract athletes		.84	.69		.80	.72		.78	.67
AT1	.795			.929			.870		
AT3	.864			.764			.762		
Marketing		.87	.70		.82	.63		.76	.55
MK1	.815			.857			.857		
MK2	.789			.669			.516		
MK3	.894			.846			.798		
Media relations		.86	.78		.86	.80		.87	.81
MR1	.864			.863			.882		
MR2	.906			.921			.914		

Tables 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 display descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, and correlations) for division I, division II, and division III, respectively. These descriptive statistics have a paramount importance to understand how coaches from divisions have responded to the questionnaire. Means and standards deviations can

be compared across divisions. This provides initial information about how coaches have rated different goals and processes across divisions, and how frequently different pattern of bureaucracy have been selected to respond to institutional pressures.

Table 4.11 Factor loadings (λ) for each item, and Cronbach's coefficient (α) and average variance extracted (AVE) for each factor in the BUREAUCRACY scale, for validation sample

Factor and Variable	Division I			Division II			Division III		
	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE	λ	α	AVE
Mock Bureaucracy		.78	.52		.81	.55		.77	.51
MB1	.587			.544			.644		
MB4	.639			.811			.645		
MB6	.843			.867			.792		
MB7	.782			.709			.755		
Representative B.		.78	.52		.79	.54		.82	.56
RB1	.802			.597			.755		
RB2	.773			.969			.900		
RB3	.654			.701			.753		
RB6	.634			.618			.544		
Discordant B.		.92	.68		.89	.64		.92	.72
DB1	.786			.722			.864		
DB2	.917			.928			.924		
DB3	.704			.797			.776		
DB4	.752			.631			.733		
DB6	.942			.897			.927		

Coaches in all three divisions consistently rated developmental goals (academic achievement, social citizenship, and student-athletes careers) and processes (moral education, academic eligibility, and career development) higher than performance goals (university prestige, winning, and entertainment) and processes (attracting athletes, marketing, media relations). Yet, coaches in all three divisions consistently rated mock bureaucracy much lower than they rated representative and discordant bureaucracy. Results of descriptive statistics indicated that athletic departments, according to coaches'

perceptions, have been placing more emphasis on developmental goals and processes than on performance goals and processes. Additionally, coaches have not perceived (or admitted) mock bureaucracy as an option to deal with conflicts between rules and athletic goals.

Discriminant validity

Correlations were also used to establish the discriminant validity of the constructs. To determine discriminant validity, Fornell and Larcker (1981) proposed that AVE for each construct should be larger than the squared correlation between this construct and another construct. Accordingly, I squared each correlation from Tables 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 and compared these squared correlations with the AVE of the two involved constructs. Since all AVE were greater than .50, I just focused on those squared correlations that were larger than .50. For division I, the squared correlations between AC and SC ($r^2 = .52$), AC and CA ($r^2 = .57$), and SC and CA ($r^2 = .64$) were larger than .50. Comparing these values with the AVE for each of these constructs (Table 4.8), none of them failed the test for discriminant validity. For division II, the squared correlations between AC and SC ($r^2 = .63$), AC and CA ($r^2 = .60$), SC and CA ($r^2 = .65$), and CA and CD ($r^2 = .52$) were larger than .50. Comparing these values with the AVE for each of these constructs (Tables 4.8 and 4.9), once more, none of them failed the test for discriminant validity. Finally for division III, only the squared correlations between AC and SC ($r^2 = .55$) and SC and CA ($r^2 = .54$) were larger than .50. Comparing these values with the AVE for each of these constructs (Table 4.8), and again, none of them failed the test for discriminant validity. Although some of the correlations between constructs were quite high, none of the constructs lacks discriminant validity.

Table 4.12 Means (*M*), standard deviations (*SD*), and correlations for factors in DIVISION I

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Correlations														
Factor			AC	SC	CA	UP	WI	EN	ME	AE	CD	AT	MK	MR	MB	RB	DB
AC	6.30	0.84	1														
SC	5.72	1.02	.721**	1													
CA	5.64	1.13	.755**	.798**	1												
UP	5.93	1.02	.544**	.618**	.577**	1											
WI	4.62	1.42	.364**	.443**	.447**	.559**	1										
EN	4.72	1.25	.303**	.426**	.426**	.606**	.667**	1									
ME	5.98	1.04	.494**	.667**	.540**	.468**	.416**	.395**	1								
AE	6.60	0.70	.458**	.379**	.299**	.177**	.150**	.127*	.476**	1							
CD	5.81	1.16	.572**	.699**	.674**	.488**	.477**	.456**	.670**	.444**	1						
AT	5.00	1.31	.387**	.492**	.416**	.546**	.627**	.533**	.473**	.280**	.482**	1					
MK	4.71	1.47	.209**	.309**	.282**	.495**	.600**	.670**	.366**	.170**	.449**	.575**	1				
MR	4.69	1.34	.313**	.435**	.393**	.432**	.515**	.551**	.439**	.209**	.525**	.618**	.595**	1			
MB	2.21	0.94	-.207**	-.231**	-.240**	-.173**	-.125*	-.079	-.249**	-.227**	-.198**	-.103	-.118*	-.151**	1		
RB	6.32	0.92	.178**	.217**	.243**	.110*	.115*	.088	.338**	.288**	.200**	.153**	.136*	.132*	-.344**	1	
DB	6.03	1.39	.158**	.187**	.169**	.139*	.105	.095	.188**	.116*	.179**	.098	.065	.110*	-.128*	.177**	1

Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

AC = Academic achievement; SC = Social citizenship; CA = Career of student-athletes; UP = University prestige; WI = Winning; EN = Entertainment.

ME = Moral education; AE = Academic eligibility; CD = Career development of athletes; AT = Attracting athletes; MK = Marketing; MR = Media relations.

MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Table 4.13 Means (*M*), standard deviations (*SD*), and correlations for factors in DIVISION II

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Correlations														
Factor			AC	SC	CA	UP	WI	EN	ME	AE	CD	AT	MK	MR	MB	RB	DB
AC	5.86	1.04	1														
SC	5.43	1.10	.791**	1													
CA	5.17	1.25	.777**	.803**	1												
UP	5.35	1.20	.594**	.597**	.565**	1											
WI	4.31	1.52	.334**	.425**	.363**	.612**	1										
EN	4.09	1.31	.403**	.480**	.559**	.594**	.649**	1									
ME	5.56	1.28	.600**	.703**	.611**	.472**	.379**	.367**	1								
AE	6.23	1.02	.571**	.493**	.472**	.373**	.164**	.199**	.665**	1							
CD	4.87	1.51	.653**	.675**	.721**	.504**	.353**	.523**	.651**	.470**	1						
AT	4.24	1.48	.327**	.357**	.331**	.452**	.625**	.489**	.479**	.397**	.428**	1					
MK	3.28	1.47	.262**	.286**	.338**	.373**	.529**	.601**	.285**	.141*	.412**	.503**	1				
MR	3.91	1.48	.334**	.407**	.403**	.396**	.466**	.545**	.428**	.291**	.457**	.580**	.667**	1			
MB	2.39	1.07	-.224**	-.242**	-.213**	-.118*	-.032	-.031	-.224**	-.285**	-.141*	-.114	.070	-.033	1		
RB	6.16	1.03	.213**	.187**	.208**	.086	.006	.032	.303**	.416**	.140*	.163**	-.049	.065	-.474**	1	
DB	6.05	1.22	.198**	.214**	.197**	.154*	.104	.102	.246**	.237**	.230**	.127*	.070	.150*	-.250**	.312**	1

Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

AC = Academic achievement; SC = Social citizenship; CA = Career of student-athletes; UP = University prestige; WI = Winning; EN = Entertainment.

ME = Moral education; AE = Academic eligibility; CD = Career development of athletes; AT = Attracting athletes; MK = Marketing; MR = Media relations.

MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Table 4.14 Means (*M*), standard deviations (*SD*), and correlations for factors in DIVISION III

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Correlations														
Factor			AC	SC	CA	UP	WI	EN	ME	AE	CD	AT	MK	MR	MB	RB	DB
AC	5.94	1.00	1														
SC	5.42	1.11	.743**	1													
CA	5.18	1.25	.699**	.737**	1												
UP	5.18	1.17	.550**	.557**	.483**	1											
WI	3.88	1.36	.243**	.270**	.202**	.601**	1										
EN	3.33	1.25	.247**	.373**	.373**	.551**	.569**	1									
ME	5.45	1.32	.431**	.536**	.476**	.420**	.243**	.294**	1								
AE	6.41	0.99	.430**	.411**	.336**	.253**	.173**	.116*	.445**	1							
CD	4.31	1.64	.451**	.524**	.578**	.409**	.262**	.462**	.586**	.403**	1						
AT	4.03	1.44	.280**	.300**	.225**	.437**	.626**	.381**	.315**	.307**	.313**	1					
MK	2.10	1.18	.123*	.148**	.215**	.302**	.381**	.549**	.201**	.093	.344**	.316**	1				
MR	3.06	1.40	.310**	.448**	.433**	.434**	.416**	.603**	.389**	.155**	.520**	.329**	.579**	1			
MB	2.34	0.99	-.254**	-.258**	-.188**	-.109	.036	.026	-.141*	-.162**	-.041	.033	.010	-.088	1		
RB	6.25	0.92	.302**	.286**	.204**	.199**	.045	.080	.289**	.203**	.197**	.025	.071	.144*	-.419**	1	
DB	5.81	1.38	.212**	.253**	.237**	.230**	.087	.122*	.302**	.098	.194**	.095	.061	.165**	-.271**	.411**	1

Note. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

AC = Academic achievement; SC = Social citizenship; CA = Career of student-athletes; UP = University prestige; WI = Winning; EN = Entertainment. ME = Moral education; AE = Academic eligibility; CD = Career development of athletes; AT = Attracting athletes; MK = Marketing; MR = Media relations.

MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Still regarding the descriptive characteristics of the correlations, it is noteworthy that the pattern of correlations was very consistent across all three divisions. As expected, developmental goals correlated high with developmental processes. All correlations between developmental goals and processes were significant at the .01 level. Likewise, performance goals correlated high with performance processes. All correlations between performance goals and processes were significant at the .01 level. Yet, as expected, for all divisions, mock bureaucracy was negative and significantly correlated (at the .01 level) with representative and discordant bureaucracy. Representative bureaucracy was positive and significantly correlated (at the .01 level) with discordant bureaucracy, in all divisions.

Measurement model – multiple-group CFA

After checking that models for single-group confirmatory factor analysis fit the data very well, I proceeded with multiple-group factor analysis to test the measurement invariance of the models. I started testing the measurement invariance of the bureaucracy scale because it is a simple first-order factor model. This model is represented in Figure 4.1 below. As mentioned in the data analysis section, a series of three hierarchically nested models were tested: Model 1 (unconstrained model) tested configural invariance; Model 2 tested the invariance of factor loadings; and Model 3 tested invariance of intercepts of manifest variables (items).

Each pair of models is nested in this hierarchy because a set of parameters was constrained to be equal across groups in the more restricted model. Three indexes were used to compare the fit between pairs of nested models: the chi-square difference (Bollen, 1989), CFI difference (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002), and RMSEA difference (Hu & Bentler, 1998).

Figure 4.1 First-order confirmatory factor analysis model for bureaucracy scale

Table 4.15 presents the results for the first-order measurement invariance for the bureaucracy scale. The chi-square difference test between model 1 and model 2 ($\Delta\chi^2=51.63$, $\Delta df=20$, $p=.001$) was significant, indicating that the more restricted model failed the test of measurement invariance across groups. However, as mentioned before, this test is highly sensitive to non-normality and sample size. Then, many scholars have suggested the use of alternative goodness-of-fit indexes to assess measurement invariance (Chen, et al., 2005; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Hu & Bentler, 1999). The difference in the CFI (.005) was less than .01, the cutoff point suggested by Cheung and Rensvold (2002) to assume measurement invariance between two nested models. Moreover, the point estimates and confidence intervals for RMSEA are basically the same. Following Chen et al. (2005), I am very confident to assume measurement invariance between model 1 and model 2. In other words, factor loadings for the bureaucracy scale were invariant across all three groups of coaches from different NCAA divisions.

The chi-square difference test between model 2 and model 3 ($\Delta\chi^2=36.80$, $\Delta df=26$, $p=.078$) was not significant, indicating that the more restricted model did not fail the test of measurement invariance across groups. In addition to this test, CFI and RMSEA differences corroborated to assume measurement invariance between model 2 and model 3. The difference in the CFI (.002) was almost nil. The point estimates of RMSEA were slightly different. However, the confidence intervals for RMSEA showed a complete overlap between model 2 and 3, indicating that the models are invariant. Thus, factor loadings and intercepts of indicators were invariant across all three groups of coaches for the bureaucracy scale.

Table 4.15 Summary of fit statistics for measurement invariance of first-order factor model of bureaucracy scale

Model	χ^2	df	RMSEA (90% CI)	CFI	Model Comparison	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf
<i>Model 1</i> Configural Invariance	435.03	186	.067 (.058;.075)	.960	---	---	---
<i>Model 2</i> 1st-order factor loadings invariant	486.66	206	.067 (.059;.075)	.955	2 vs. 1	51.63*	20
<i>Model 3</i> 1st-order factor loadings and intercepts of indicators invariant	523.46	232	.064 (.057;.072)	.953	3 vs. 2	36.80	26

Note. * Significant at the .05 level.

The measurement models for goals and processes are second-order confirmatory factor analysis models. These models are represented in figures 4.2 and 4.3 below. They have to be represented as second-order factor models because theoretically the constructs used in this study loaded in higher order constructs. That is, academic achievement, social citizenship, and student-athletes careers loaded in a higher order factor called developmental goals; university prestige, winning, and entertainment represent performance goals. Yet, moral education, academic achievement, and career development loaded in a higher factor called developmental processes; while, attracting athletes, marketing, and media relations represent performance processes.

Therefore, in goals and processes models I have distinct but related factors that are accounted for by one or more underlying higher order factors. In this case, to test for measurement invariance, I must investigate not only the invariance of first-order factor loadings and intercepts of indicators, but also the invariance of second-order factor loadings and intercepts of first-order factors (Chen, et al., 2005).

Figure 4.2 Second-order confirmatory factor analysis model for goals scale

Figure 4.3 Second-order confirmatory factor analysis model for processes scale

Table 4.16 presents the results for the second-order measurement invariance for the goals scale. The chi-square difference test between model 1 and model 2 ($\Delta\chi^2=26.17$, $\Delta df=28$, $p=.564$) was not significant, indicating that the more restricted model did not fail the test of measurement invariance across groups. Additionally, between model 1 and model 2, there is no difference in the CFI values, and the confidence intervals for RMSEA had a big overlap. Thus, the first-order factor loadings were invariant among groups.

The chi-square difference test between model 2 and model 3 ($\Delta\chi^2=280.10$, $\Delta df=40$, $p<.001$) was significant, indicating that the more restricted model failed the test of measurement invariance across groups. However, as mentioned before, this test is highly influenced by sample size. The CFI difference of .01 was exactly the difference suggested by Cheung and Rensvold (2002) to assume measurement invariance between two nested models. Moreover, there is a large overlap between the confidence intervals for RMSEA. Following Chen et al. (2005), the intercepts of indicators can be considered invariant among divisions. Overall, the first-order measurement model for goals scale was invariant among the three divisions.

The differences between models 3, 4 and 5 represent the test for measurement invariance for the second-order factor model. The chi-square difference test between model 3 and model 4 ($\Delta\chi^2=8.31$, $\Delta df=20$, $p=.989$) was not significant, indicating that the more restricted model did not fail the test of measurement invariance across groups. Additionally, between model 3 and model 4, the difference in the CFI values was only .005, and the confidence intervals for RMSEA showed a considerable overlap. Thus, the second-order factor loadings were invariant among groups.

Finally, The chi-square difference test between model 4 and model 5 ($\Delta\chi^2=89.24$, $\Delta df=8$, $p < .001$) was significant, indicating that the more restricted model failed the test of measurement invariance across groups. However, the CFI difference was again only .005, and the confidence intervals for the RMSEA have a large overlap, indicating that the models are invariant. Following Chen et al. (2005), the intercepts of the first-order factors can be considered invariant among divisions. Overall, the second-order measurement model for goals scale was invariant among the three divisions. Using the nested models approach, the results here presented showed that the same measurement model for goals was valid for all three divisions. This result allows future comparisons in the structural relationships.

Table 4.16 Summary of fit statistics for measurement invariance of second-order factor model of goals scale

Model	χ^2	df	RMSEA (90% CI)	CFI	Model Comparison	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf
<i>Model 1</i> Configural Invariance	1263.01	465	.075 (.070;.080)	.949	---	---	---
<i>Model 2</i> 1st-order factor loadings invariant	1289.18	493	.073 (.068;.078)	.949	2 vs. 1	26.17	28
<i>Model 3</i> 1st-order factor loadings and intercepts of indicators invariant	1569.28	533	.076 (.072;.080)	.939	3 vs. 2	280.10*	40
<i>Model 4</i> 1st-order factor loadings, intercepts of indicators, and 2nd-order factor loadings invariant	1577.59	553	.078 (.074;.083)	.934	4 vs. 3	8.31	20
<i>Model 5</i> 1st-order factor loadings, intercepts of indicators, 2nd-order factor loadings, and 1st-order intercepts invariant	1666.83	561	.080 (.076;.085)	.929	5 vs.4	89.24*	8

Note. * Significant at .05 level.

Table 4.17 presents the results for the second-order measurement invariance for the processes scale. The chi-square difference test between model 1 and model 2 ($\Delta\chi^2=67.83$, $\Delta df=18$, $p < .001$) was significant. However, the difference between model 1 and model 2 in the CFI was only .007, and the confidence intervals for RMSEA had a big overlap. Thus, the first-order factor loadings were invariant among groups. In terms of measurement model this is the most important point because it reveals that items in the processes scale loaded equivalently well in their underlying factors across all three division.

Model 3 for full invariance of the intercepts of indicators failed to meet the minimal requirements for model fit. Therefore, I moved on and test partial invariance, as suggested by the literature (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Considering the characteristic of the samples, some factors should be expected to have the intercepts of their indicators not invariant among groups. Basically, indicators for marketing and media relations should be expected to vary in their intercepts among divisions. Therefore, I allowed the intercepts of the indicators of marketing and media relations to vary among groups and tested the invariance of the intercepts of all other indicators. These results are presented in Model 3 (Table 4.17). The chi-square difference test between model 2 and model 3 ($\Delta\chi^2=95.53$, $\Delta df=18$, $p < .001$) was significant. However, the difference between model 2 and model 3 in the CFI was only .01, and the confidence intervals for RMSEA had a big overlap. Thus, the first-order factor loadings were invariant among groups. In terms of measurement model this is the most important point because it reveals that items in the processes scale loaded

equivalently well in their underlying factors across all three division. Partial measurement invariance for intercepts of indicators is tenable.

The chi-square difference test between model 3 and model 4 ($\Delta\chi^2= 131.91$, $\Delta df= 30$, $p < .001$) was significant. However, the difference between model 3 and model 4 in the CFI was only .010, and the confidence intervals for RMSEA had a considerable overlap. Thus, the second-order factor loadings were invariant among groups. Finally, the chi-square difference between model 4 and 5 ($\Delta\chi^2= 1.92$, $\Delta df= 2$, $p = .383$) was not significant, indicating that the more restricted model did not fail the test of measurement invariance across groups. A comparison between models 4 and 5 in their CFI and RMSEA confidence intervals corroborated to this fact. Overall, partial measurement invariance of the processes model is tenable.

Table 4.17 Summary of fit statistics for measurement invariance of second-order factor model of processes scale

Model	χ^2	df	RMSEA (90% CI)	CFI	Model Comparison	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf
<i>Model 1</i> Configural Invariance	505.91	225	.064 (.057;.072)	.959	---	---	---
<i>Model 2</i> 1st-order factor loadings invariant	573.74	243	.067 (.060;.075)	.950	2 vs. 1	67.83*	18
<i>Model 3</i> 1st-order factor loadings and intercepts of indicators invariant	669.27	261	.074 (.067;.078)	.940	3 vs. 2	95.53*	18
<i>Model 4</i> 1st-order factor loadings, intercepts of indicators, and 2nd-order factor loadings invariant	827.91	291	.080 (.073;.085)	.930	4 vs. 3	131.91*	30
<i>Model 5</i> 1st-order factor loadings, intercepts of indicators, 2nd-order factor loadings, and 1st-order intercepts invariant	829.83	293	.080 (.074;.084)	.923	5 vs.4	1.92	2

Note. * Significant at .05 level.

Structural model – Single-group SEM

Single-group SEM was conducted to test the three proposed nested-models (Figure 3.1), in order to choose the best model to explain the structural relationships among the latent variables. In models A and B, the relationship between the importance athletic departments place on certain goals and the patterns of bureaucracy was established to be fully and partially mediated, respectively, by how frequent athletic departments engage in certain processes. Model C is the direct-effects model, where goals and processes affect directly the patterns of bureaucracy of athletic departments, but goals and processes are not related to each other. Table 4.18 presents the fit measures for all three models tested in each group of NCAA coaches.

Table 4.18 Fit measures for comparing three alternative models in all three NCAA divisions

	χ^2	<i>df</i>	χ^2/df	RMSEA (90% CI)	RMS	CFI
Div I						
Model A	2039.13	1056	1.93	.054 (.050; .057)	.062	.915
Model B	2033.64	1050	1.94	.054 (.050; .057)	.062	.915
Model C	1998.83	1047	1.91	.053 (.050; .057)	.060	.918
Div II						
Model A	2131.03	1056	2.01	.061 (.057; .064)	.069	.901
Model B	2120.85	1050	2.02	.061 (.057; .064)	.069	.901
Model C	2097.14	1047	2.00	.060 (.056; .064)	.066	.903
Div III						
Model A	3648.27	1056	1.91	.054 (.051; .058)	.072	.902
Model B	3637.35	1050	1.91	.054 (.051; .058)	.071	.902
Model C	3521.15	1047	1.89	.054 (.050; .057)	.068	.905

Comparing the two nested models, the test of chi-square difference showed that there is no difference between model A and model B in division I ($\Delta\chi^2 = 5.49, \Delta df = 6, p = .483$), division II ($\Delta\chi^2 = 10.18, \Delta df = 6, p = .117$), or division III ($\Delta\chi^2 = 7.72, \Delta df = 6, p = .259$). Additionally, other fit measures (RMSEA, RMS, and CFI) are extremely alike for both models. In the vast majority of comparisons, these fit indices are equal for models A and B. Since no difference in fit indices exists, the model A is preferable because it is more parsimonious.

As discussed in the data analysis section, model C is not nested in either A or B. Therefore, no formal test might be conducted. Comparing the fit indices among the three models they are very alike. Model C seems to fit the data slightly better than the other two. However, the differences in fit indices are so small that would be very difficult to support the acceptance of one model over another. Using the theoretical background, model A seems to be preferable because previous researches have suggested that goals are set a priori, and then processes are selected (Mohr, 1973; Trail & Chelladurai, 2002; Vancouver & Schmitt, 1991). This implies a directional relationship between goals and processes, as that in Model A, instead of a non-directional, as that proposed in Model C. In short, considering the results of previous researches and the results of the current study as well, I selected model A is the most tenable to explain the structural relationships among goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy in intercollegiate athletics. Consequently, the significance of individual regression weights in model A was analyzed to test the hypotheses from one to nine to each population. The complete structural model is illustrated in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 Fully mediated structural model

Since a mediational model was chosen, it is mandatory to test the significance of indirect effects of patterns of bureaucracy on goals, with processes as mediators. Sport management literature has usually taken the traditional causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to test mediational models. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a variable (processes) is a mediator between a predictor (goals) and an outcome (patterns of bureaucracy) if (a) the predictor significantly accounts for variability in the outcome, (b) the predictor significantly accounts for variability in the mediator, (c) the mediator significantly accounts for variability in the outcome when the predictor is controlled, and (d) the effect of the predictor on the outcome decreases significantly (to zero, if considering total mediation) when the mediator and the predictor are entered simultaneously in the model (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998).

However, as noted by Preacher and Hayes (2008), Baron and Kenny's causal steps approach relies on a set of individual tests of path coefficients, instead of testing the actual product of path coefficients, yielding neither point estimate nor standard error of the mediation effect *per se*. Therefore, to test the indirect effects, I applied both product of coefficient and bootstrapping strategies in this research. Using product of coefficients strategy, I determined a point estimate for each of the specific indirect effects, and produced standard errors and confidence intervals to these point estimates. It is noteworthy that the product of coefficient strategy assumes that the product of regression coefficients (from the predictor to a mediator, and from a mediator to the outcome variable) is normally distributed (Sobel, 1982, 1986). The problem with this assumption is that the product of coefficients is generally positively skewed and kurtotic (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). To deal with this problem, I applied bootstrapping,

a nonparametric resampling technique that does not assume normal sampling distribution of the product coefficient (Bollen & Stine, 1990; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008).

Results for division I are shown in Table 4.19 (direct effects), Table 4.20 (indirect effects), and Figure 4.5. Table 4.19 brings the maximum likelihood point estimates (direct effects), confidence intervals, standard errors, and *t*-values. As shown in this table, all second-order factor loadings were quite large and significant for all first-order factors. More interesting to the current research were the behavior of the direct effects between pair of factors and the indirect effects from goals to bureaucracy through processes.

Table 4.19 Maximum likelihood point estimates (λ and β), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (*SE*), and *t*-values for Division I

1st-order on 2nd-order factors			λ	95% CI	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
Academic Achievement	←	Development Goals	.823	.780; .867	.022	36.78
Social Citizenship	←	Development Goals	.960	.936; .985	.013	76.22
Student Careers	←	Development Goals	.913	.883; .943	.015	59.23
University Prestige	←	Performance Goals	.833	.770; .896	.032	25.88
Winning	←	Performance Goals	.808	.753; .863	.028	28.76
Entertainment	←	Performance Goals	.846	.794; .898	.026	32.03
Moral Education	←	Development Processes	.863	.811; .916	.027	32.25
Academic Eligibility	←	Development Processes	.605	.499; .605	.054	11.14
Career Development	←	Development Processes	.959	.924; .993	.018	54.48
Attracting Athletes	←	Performance Processes	.858	.802; .915	.029	29.85
Marketing	←	Performance Processes	.822	.765; .880	.029	27.95
Media Relations	←	Performance Processes	.811	.750; .871	.031	26.24
Regression coefficients			β	95% CI	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>
Development Goals	→	Development Processes	.924	.889; .958	.018	52.52
Performance Goals	→	Performance Processes	.902	.853; .952	.025	35.59
Development Processes	→	Mock Bureaucracy	-.313	-.473; -.153	.082	-3.84
Development Processes	→	Representative Bureau	.289	.132; .447	.080	3.60
Development Processes	→	Discordant Bureaucracy	.226	.076; .375	.076	2.96
Performance Processes	→	Mock Bureaucracy	.072	-.095; .239	.085	0.85
Performance Processes	→	Representative Bureau	.001	-.162; .165	.084	0.02
Performance Processes	→	Discordant Bureaucracy	-.019	-.174; .136	.079	-0.24

Figure 4.5 Path coefficients between factors for division I coaches

Figure 4.5 shows the direct effects (regression weights) between exogenous and endogenous variables and the correlation between exogenous variables. For the sake of neatness, I omitted in this figure the measurement part of the model and the errors in equations. The correlation between developmental goals and performance goals was very large ($r = .654$; $CI = .577; .732$; $SE = .040$; $p < .001$), indicating that the higher the importance an athletic department places on athletic goals, the more this athletic department emphasizes developmental goals as well. In other words, coaches in division I have perceived their athletic departments as organizations that emphasize both goals. The regression weight of developmental processes on developmental goals was very large ($\beta = .924$; $SE = .018$; $t = 52.52$; $p < .001$), supporting hypothesis 1. Likewise, the regression weight of performance processes on performance goals was quite large ($\beta = .902$; $SE = .025$; $t = 35.59$; $p < .001$), supporting hypothesis 2.

The regression weight of mock bureaucracy on developmental processes was of considerable magnitude and a negative sign ($\beta = -.313$; $SE = .082$; $t = -3.837$; $p < .001$). This result strongly supports hypothesis 3, which proposed that mock bureaucracy and developmental processes would be negatively correlated. The regression weight of representative bureaucracy on developmental processes was of noticeable magnitude ($\beta = .289$; $SE = .080$; $t = 3.601$; $p < .001$). This result strongly supports hypothesis 4, which proposed that representative bureaucracy and developmental processes would be positively correlated. Finally, regarding the relationships involving the last type of bureaucracy, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on developmental processes was of significant magnitude ($\beta = .226$; $SE = .076$; $t = 2.964$; $p = .003$). This result strongly supports hypothesis 5, which proposed that discordant bureaucracy and developmental processes would be positively correlated.

The regression weight of mock bureaucracy on performance processes was of negligible magnitude ($\beta = .072$; $SE = .085$; $t = 0.847$; $p = .397$). Although the relationship showed to be positive, the regression weight was not significant, implying a lack of support for hypothesis 6 among division I coaches. The regression weight of representative bureaucracy on performance processes was of magnitude of almost zero ($\beta = .001$; $SE = .084$; $t = 0.017$; $p = .987$), indicating a lack of support for hypothesis 7 among division I coaches. Finally, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on performance processes was of small magnitude and a negative sign ($\beta = -.019$; $SE = .079$; $t = -0.242$; $p = .809$). Although the relationship happened to be negative, the regression weight was not significant, implying a lack of support for hypothesis 8 among division I coaches.

Table 4.20 reports the results for the indirect effects (IND), bias corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (*SE*), *z*-statistic, and *p*-values, for division I. All three indirect effects from developmental goals to the three patterns of bureaucracy through developmental processes were considerably large and significant. The indirect effect from developmental goals to mock bureaucracy was negative (IND = -.289), indicating that the higher the importance division I athletic departments place on academic goals, the less they engage in mock bureaucracy strategies. On the other hand, the indirect effects from developmental goals to representative (IND = .267) and discordant bureaucracy (IND = .209) were positive, evidencing that the higher the importance division I athletic departments place on academic goals, the more they engage in either representative or discordant bureaucracy strategies.

Table 4.20 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (*SE*), *z*-statistic, and *p*-values for Division I

Path	IND	95% CI	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>
DEVG → DEVP → MB	-0.289	-.437; -.142	0.075	-3.84	<.001
DEVG → DEVP → RB	0.267	.053; .482	0.110	2.44	0.015
DEVG → DEVP → DB	0.209	.052; .366	0.080	2.60	0.009
PERG → PERP → MB	0.065	-.072; .202	0.070	0.94	0.350
PERG → PERP → RB	0.001	-.156; .158	0.080	0.02	0.988
PERG → PERP → DB	-0.017	-.181; .146	0.084	-0.21	0.837

Note. DEVG = Developmental Goals; DEVP = Developmental Processes; MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Regarding the indirect effects from performance goals to the patterns of bureaucracy through performance processes, all three were small and not significant for division I. As expected, the sign of the indirect effect from performance goals to mock bureaucracy (IND = .065) was positive and the sign of the indirect effect from

performance goals to discordant bureaucracy ($IND = -.017$) was negative. The indirect effect from performance goals to representative bureaucracy was practically zero ($IND = .001$).

Results for structural equation modeling for division II are shown in Table 4.21 (direct effects), Table 4.22 (indirect effects), and Figure 4.6. Table 4.21 shows the maximum likelihood point estimates (direct effects), confidence intervals, standard errors, and t -values. As for division I, all second-order factor loadings were quite large and significant for all first-order factors also in division II sample.

Figure 4.6 shows the direct effects (regression weights) between exogenous and endogenous variables and the correlation between exogenous variables for division II sample. Once more, I omitted in this figure the measurement part of the model and the error terms.

For the division II sample, the correlation between developmental goals and performance goals was quite large ($r = .660$; $CI = .576; .745$; $SE = .043$; $p < .001$), indicating that the higher the importance an athletic department places on athletic goals, the more this athletic department emphasizes developmental goals as well. That is, coaches in division II have perceived their athletic departments as organizations that emphasize both goals. The regression weight of developmental processes on developmental goals was large ($\beta = .909$; $SE = .022$; $t = 41.58$; $p < .001$), supporting hypothesis 1. Similarly, the regression weight of performance processes on performance goals was also large ($\beta = .780$; $SE = .039$; $t = 20.12$; $p < .001$), supporting hypothesis 2.

Table 4.21 Maximum likelihood point estimates (λ and β), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), and t -values for Division II

1st-order on 2nd-order factors			λ	95% CI	SE	t
Academic Achievement	←	Development Goals	.899	.866; .932	.017	53.05
Social Citizenship	←	Development Goals	.961	.934; .988	.014	69.69
Student Careers	←	Development Goals	.930	.900; .961	.016	59.29
University Prestige	←	Performance Goals	.839	.767; .911	.037	22.78
Winning	←	Performance Goals	.815	.755; .875	.031	26.63
Entertainment	←	Performance Goals	.884	.831; .938	.027	32.66
Moral Education	←	Development Processes	.914	.861; .967	.027	33.71
Academic Eligibility	←	Development Processes	.778	.690; .865	.045	17.45
Career Development	←	Development Processes	.901	.852; .950	.025	36.05
Attracting Athletes	←	Performance Processes	.783	.704; .863	.040	19.38
Marketing	←	Performance Processes	.857	.794; .919	.032	26.95
Media Relations	←	Performance Processes	.885	.826; .943	.030	29.65
Regression coefficients			β	95% CI	SE	t
Development Goals	→	Development Processes	.909	.866; .952	.022	41.58
Performance Goals	→	Performance Processes	.780	.704; .856	.039	20.12
Development Processes	→	Mock Bureaucracy	-.392	-.541; -.242	.076	-5.13
Development Processes	→	Representative Bureau	.414	.265; .563	.076	5.45
Development Processes	→	Discordant Bureaucracy	.331	.185; .476	.074	4.46
Performance Processes	→	Mock Bureaucracy	.195	.036; .354	.081	2.40
Performance Processes	→	Representative Bureau	-.181	-.339; -.025	.081	-2.25
Performance Processes	→	Discordant Bureaucracy	-.043	-.197; .111	.079	-0.55

The regression weight of mock bureaucracy on developmental processes was of respectable magnitude and a negative sign ($\beta = -.392$; $SE = .076$; $t = -5.134$; $p < .001$). This result strongly supports hypothesis 3, which proposed that mock bureaucracy and developmental processes would be negatively correlated. The regression weight of representative bureaucracy on developmental processes had a considerable magnitude ($\beta = .414$; $SE = .076$; $t = 5.448$; $p < .001$). Again, this result firmly supports hypothesis 4, which proposed that representative bureaucracy and developmental processes would be positively correlated. Finally, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on developmental processes was also of significant magnitude ($\beta = .331$; $SE = .074$; $t =$

4.454; $p < .001$). This result strongly supports hypothesis 5, which proposed that discordant bureaucracy and developmental processes would be positively correlated.

Figure 4.6 Path coefficients between factors for division II coaches

The regression weight of mock bureaucracy on performance processes was of significant magnitude ($\beta = .195$; $SE = .081$; $t = 2.399$; $p = .016$). This result shows support for hypothesis 6 among division II coaches. The regression weight of representative bureaucracy on performance processes was of significant magnitude and negative sign ($\beta = -.181$; $SE = .081$; $t = -2.248$; $p = .025$). This result shows support for hypothesis 7 among division II coaches. On the other hand, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on performance processes was of small magnitude and negative sign ($\beta = -.043$; $SE = .079$; $t = -0.549$; $p = .583$). Although the relationship between discordant bureaucracy and performance processes was negative, the regression weight

was not significant, implying a lack of support for hypothesis 8 among division II coaches.

Table 4.22 reports the results for the indirect effects (IND), bias corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (*SE*), *z*-statistic, and *p*-values, for division II. Also in this population, all three indirect effects from developmental goals to the three patterns of bureaucracy through developmental processes were quite large and significant. The indirect effect from developmental goals to mock bureaucracy was negative (IND = -.356), indicating that the higher the importance division II athletic departments place on academic goals, the less they engage in mock bureaucracy strategies. The indirect effects from developmental goals to representative (IND = .377) and discordant bureaucracy (IND = .300) were positive, showing that the higher the importance division II athletic departments place on academic goals, the more they engage in either representative or discordant bureaucracy strategies.

Table 4.22 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (*SE*), *z*-statistic, and *p*-values for Division II

Path	IND	95% CI	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>
DEVG → DEVP → MB	-0.356	-.502; -.210	0.075	-4.77	<.001
DEVG → DEVP → RB	0.377	.227; .526	0.076	4.93	<.001
DEVG → DEVP → DB	0.300	.133; .468	0.086	3.51	<.001
PERG → PERP → MB	0.152	.019; .285	0.068	2.24	0.025
PERG → PERP → RB	-0.141	-.267; -.016	0.064	-2.21	0.027
PERG → PERP → DB	-0.034	-.144; .076	0.056	-0.06	0.549

Note. DEVG = Developmental Goals; DEVP = Developmental Processes; MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

For division II, the indirect effect from performance goals to mock bureaucracy through performance processes was positive and significant (IND = .152), indicating that

the higher the importance division II athletic departments place on performance (athletic) goals, the more they engage in mock bureaucracy. The indirect effect from performance goals to representative bureaucracy was negative and significant ($IND = -.141$), indicating that the higher the importance division II athletic departments place on performance (athletic) goals, the less they engage in representative bureaucracy. As expected, the sign of the indirect effect from performance goals to discordant bureaucracy ($IND = -.034$) was negative. But this effect was not significant for division II.

Division III results, for structural relationships between pairs of constructs, are shown in Table 4.23 (direct effects), Table 4.24 (indirect effects), and Figure 4.7. Table 4.23 shows the maximum likelihood point estimates (direct effects), confidence intervals, standard errors, and t -values for division III. As for divisions I and II, all second-order factor loadings were quite large and significant for all first-order factors also in division III sample. Moreover, the standard errors are small, indicating no reasons for concern in all three divisions.

Figure 4.7 shows the direct effects (regression weights) between exogenous and endogenous variables and the correlation between exogenous variables for division III sample. Again, in this figure, I omitted the measurement part of the model and the error terms, in order to keep it elegant.

For the division III sample, the correlation between developmental goals and performance goals was still quite large ($r = .582$; $CI = .488, .677$; $SE = .048$; $p < .001$), indicating that the higher the importance an athletic department places on athletic goals, the more this athletic department emphasizes developmental goals as well. Coaches in

division III have perceived their athletic departments as organizations that emphasize both goals, as have coaches in divisions I and II. For division III, the regression weight of developmental processes on developmental goals was large ($\beta = .853$; $SE = .031$; $t = 27.35$; $p < .001$), supporting hypothesis 1. Likewise, the regression weight of performance processes on performance goals was also very large ($\beta = .933$; $SE = .045$; $t = 20.67$; $p < .001$), supporting hypothesis 2 in division III.

Table 4.23 Maximum likelihood point estimates (λ and β), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), and t -values for Division III

1st-order on 2nd-order factors			λ	95% CI	SE	t
Academic Achievement	←	Development Goals	.846	.803; .889	.022	38.50
Social Citizenship	←	Development Goals	.936	.903; .936	.017	55.43
Student Careers	←	Development Goals	.874	.832; .916	.021	40.81
University Prestige	←	Performance Goals	.874	.796; .951	.040	22.07
Winning	←	Performance Goals	.756	.684; .828	.037	20.57
Entertainment	←	Performance Goals	.847	.786; .909	.031	26.95
Moral Education	←	Development Processes	.832	.756; .907	.039	21.52
Academic Eligibility	←	Development Processes	.715	.580; .851	.069	10.31
Career Development	←	Development Processes	.864	.796; .931	.034	25.16
Attracting Athletes	←	Performance Processes	.663	.558; .768	.054	12.39
Marketing	←	Performance Processes	.642	.528; .755	.058	11.07
Media Relations	←	Performance Processes	.778	.686; .871	.047	16.49
Regression coefficients			β	95% CI	SE	t
Development Goals	→	Development Processes	.853	.792; .914	.031	27.35
Performance Goals	→	Performance Processes	.933	.845; .933	.045	20.67
Development Processes	→	Mock Bureaucracy	-.406	-.565; -.247	.081	-4.99
Development Processes	→	Representative Bureau	.411	.260; .411	.077	5.34
Development Processes	→	Discordant Bureaucracy	.282	.130; .434	.078	3.63
Performance Processes	→	Mock Bureaucracy	.167	.001; .334	.084	1.97
Performance Processes	→	Representative Bureau	-.084	-.244; .076	.082	-1.03
Performance Processes	→	Discordant Bureaucracy	.028	-.130; .185	.080	0.34

Figure 4.7 Path coefficients between factors for division III coaches

The regression weight of mock bureaucracy on developmental processes was of large magnitude and a negative sign ($\beta = -.406$; $SE = .081$; $t = -4.990$; $p < .001$). This result greatly supports hypothesis 3, which proposed that mock bureaucracy and developmental processes would be negatively correlated. The regression weight of representative bureaucracy on developmental processes had a considerable magnitude ($\beta = .411$; $SE = .077$; $t = 5.340$; $p < .001$). Again, this result firmly supports hypothesis 4, which proposed that representative bureaucracy and developmental processes would be positively correlated. Yet, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on developmental processes was of significant magnitude ($\beta = .282$; $SE = .078$; $t = 3.629$; $p < .001$). This result supports hypothesis 5, which proposed that discordant bureaucracy and developmental processes would be positively correlated.

The regression weight of mock bureaucracy on performance processes was of small but significant magnitude ($\beta = .167$; $SE = .084$; $t = 1.974$; $p = .048$). This result shows support for hypothesis 6 among division III coaches. The regression weight of representative bureaucracy on performance processes was not significant ($\beta = -.084$; $SE = .082$; $t = -1.026$; $p = .305$). Although the negative sign confirmed the direction of the hypothesis, the non-significant value of this regression coefficient did not support hypothesis 7 for division III coaches. Finally, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on performance processes was not significant ($\beta = -.028$; $SE = .080$; $t = -0.344$; $p = .731$), indicating a lack of support for hypothesis 8 among division III coaches.

Table 4.24 reports the results for the indirect effects (IND), bias corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), z -statistic, and p -values, for division III. As in the other two populations, all three indirect effects from developmental goals to the three patterns of bureaucracy through developmental processes were quite large and significant in division III. The indirect effect from developmental goals to mock bureaucracy was negative ($IND = -.346$), indicating that the higher the importance division III athletic departments place on academic goals, the less they engage in mock bureaucracy strategies. The indirect effects from developmental goals to representative ($IND = .350$) and discordant bureaucracy ($IND = .240$) were positive, meaning that the higher the importance division III athletic departments place on academic goals, the more they engage in either representative or discordant bureaucracy strategies.

Regarding the indirect effects from performance goals to the patterns of bureaucracy through performance processes, all three were small and not significant for division III.

Table 4.24 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (*SE*), *z*-statistic, and *p*-values for Division III

Path	IND	95% CI	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>
DEVG → DEVP → MB	-0.346	-.506; -.187	0.081	-4.27	<.001
DEVG → DEVP → RB	0.350	.205; .496	0.074	4.72	<.001
DEVG → DEVP → DB	0.240	.092; .388	0.075	3.19	0.001
PERG → PERP → MB	0.155	-.032; .343	0.096	1.62	0.105
PERG → PERP → RB	-0.078	-.216; .059	0.070	-1.11	0.265
PERG → PERP → DB	0.026	-.122; .174	0.075	0.34	0.732

Note. DEVG = Developmental Goals; DEVP = Developmental Processes; MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Summary of the results for single-group SEM

Overall, the results of single-group SEM showed some general tendencies, which are present in all three populations of coaches. First, the correlation between developmental and performance goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($r_{\text{divI}} = .654$; $r_{\text{divII}} = .660$; $r_{\text{divIII}} = .582$). Second, the regression coefficient of developmental processes on developmental goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .924$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .909$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .853$). Third, also the regression coefficient of performance processes on performance goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .902$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .780$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .933$). Therefore, the structural relationships between intercollegiate goals and processes were seemingly very consistent across divisions.

Particularly interesting for the current research were the findings related to the relationships between processes and types of bureaucracy. In this sense, a fourth pattern was noted across divisions. For all three divisions (as proposed by hypotheses 4, 5, and 6), developmental processes was a significant predictor for all three types of bureaucracy.

More specifically, developmental processes was a negative and significant predictor of mock bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = -.313$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = -.392$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = -.406$), and a positive and significant predictor of representative bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .289$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .414$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .411$) and discordant bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .226$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .331$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .282$).

Regarding the relationship between performance processes and types of bureaucracy, a fifth pattern was noted. For all three divisions, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on performance processes were small and not significant ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = -.019$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = -.043$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .028$). Interestingly, the relationship between discordant bureaucracy and performance processes (hypothesis 8) was negative for divisions I and II (but, contrary to the hypothesis, not for division III).

Other relationships between constructs were particular to one or two populations, but not to all of them. For example, the regression coefficient of mock bureaucracy on performance processes (hypothesis 6) was small, positive, and significant for division II ($\beta_{\text{divII}} = .195$) and division III ($\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .167$), but not significant for division I ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .072$). The positive sign of this relationship was correctly hypothesized for all three divisions. Finally, the regression coefficient of representative bureaucracy on performance processes (hypothesis 8) was small and significant for division II ($\beta_{\text{divII}} = -.181$), but not significant for division I ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .001$) and division III ($\beta_{\text{divIII}} = -.084$). The negative sign of this relationship was correctly hypothesized for divisions II and III, but not for division I. In fact, for division I, the regression coefficient of representative bureaucracy on performance processes was practically zero.

Regarding the results of indirect effects, for all three divisions, all three indirect effects from developmental goals to the three patterns of bureaucracy through

developmental processes were quite large and significant. The indirect effect from developmental goals to mock bureaucracy was always negative ($IND_{divI} = -.289$; $IND_{divII} = -.356$; $IND_{divIII} = -.346$), indicating that the higher the importance athletic departments (disregarding the division) place on academic goals, the less they engage in mock bureaucracy strategies. The indirect effects from developmental goals to representative ($IND_{divI} = .267$; $IND_{divII} = .377$; $IND_{divIII} = .350$) and discordant bureaucracy ($IND_{divI} = .209$; $IND_{divII} = .300$; $IND_{divIII} = .240$) were positive for all three divisions. This result indicates that the higher the importance athletic departments place on academic goals, the more they engage in either representative or discordant bureaucracy strategies.

Results for indirect effects from performance goals to bureaucracy through performance processes were not so uniform across all three divisions. For division I and III, the three indirect effects from performance goals to bureaucracy were small and not significant. For division II, the same indirect effects were small, but they were significant from performance goals to mock ($IND_{divII} = .152$) and representative bureaucracy ($IND_{divII} = -.141$); and not significant to discordant bureaucracy ($IND_{divIII} = -.034$).

Structural model – multiple-group SEM

Multiple-group SEM was conducted to test hypothesis 10, which proposed that structural relationships among goals and processes, and processes and patterns of bureaucracy are distinct (non invariant) among the three NCAA divisions. Once more, the nested models approach was used, this time to test structural invariance between models (Bollen, 1989). Model 1 is the unconstrained model, where all single-headed arrows representing structural relationships (regression weights) in the model were freely

estimated for each group. Model 2 is the constrained model, where these parameters were forced to be equal for all three groups. Table 4.25 shows the summary of fit statistics for structural invariance of regression weights. The results showed that when all regression weights were fixed to be invariant among groups (Model 2), the model still fit the data very well. More important, there is no statistical difference between the unconstrained and the constrained model in the test of chi-square difference. In fact, the other fit measures (RMSEA and CFI) were absolutely the same for both models. This result implies non-support for hypothesis 9. Structural relationships among goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy were invariant among all three groups of coaches.

Had the chi-square difference test between unconstrained and constrained models been significant, then not all structural relationships (parameters) would be invariant across groups. In this case, the additional model comparisons showed in Table 4.25 could show which paths are, and which are not, invariant among three groups. Since the fully constrained model (Model 2) fitted the data equally as well as the unconstrained model, the other comparisons in Table 4.25 serve only to corroborate to the finding that the regression weights are invariant among groups. As shown in the table, relaxing the equality of any regression weights only decreased the chi-square difference between any other model (models 3, 4, and 5) and model 1. Overall, these results completely ratify the structural invariance of all regression weights among all three populations of coaches.

Since structural invariance exists, I used the constrained model to analyze how the indirect effects from goals to patterns of bureaucracy through processes behaved. Using the constrained model I got the same values for the unstandardized regression weights for all three populations and, consequently, the same values for the indirect effects. Table

4.26 shows the results for the indirect effects (IND), bias corrected bootstrapping confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (SE), z-statistic, and p-values, taking the three divisions together.

Table 4.25 Summary of fit statistics for structural invariance of regression weights

Model	χ^2	df	RMSEA (90% CI)	CFI	Model Comparison	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf
<i>Model 1</i> Unconstrained model	6852.27	3316	.059 (.057;.061)	.887	---	---	---
<i>Model 2</i> Constrained model	6863.73	3332	.059 (.057;.061)	.887	2 vs. 1	11.46	16
<i>Model 3</i> Relaxing processes on goals	6859.71	3328	.059 (.057;.061)	.887	3 vs. 1	7.44	12
<i>Model 4</i> Relaxing bureaucracy on developmental processes	6859.72	3326	.059 (.057;.061)	.887	4 vs. 1	7.45	10
<i>Model 5</i> Relaxing bureaucracy on performance processes	6856.54	3326	.059 (.057;.061)	.887	5 vs. 1	4.27	10

As in the analysis for individual populations, all three indirect effects from developmental goals to the three patterns of bureaucracy through developmental processes were quite large and significant when the whole sample is considered. The indirect effect from developmental goals to mock bureaucracy was negative (IND = -.380), indicating that the higher the importance athletic departments place on academic goals, the less they engage in mock bureaucracy strategies. The indirect effects from developmental goals to representative (IND = .440) and discordant bureaucracy (IND = .418) were positive, meaning that the higher the importance athletic departments place on academic goals, the more they engage in either representative or discordant bureaucracy strategies.

Table 4.26 Indirect effects (IND), confidence intervals (CI), standard errors (*SE*), *z*-statistic, and *p*-values for the whole sample (constrained model)

Path	IND	95% CI	<i>SE</i>	<i>z</i>	<i>p</i>
DEVG → DEVP → MB	-.380	-.499; -.269	.058	-6.58	<.001
DEVG → DEVP → RB	.440	.307; .590	.071	6.18	<.001
DEVG → DEVP → DB	.418	.243; .576	.083	5.02	<.001
PERG → PERP → MB	.110	.029; .190	.041	2.70	.007
PERG → PERP → RB	-.087	-.170; -.013	.042	-2.09	.036
PERG → PERP → DB	-.010	-.111; .084	.051	-0.19	.837

Note. DEVG = Developmental Goals; DEVP = Developmental Processes; MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

When the whole sample was used and the regression weights were constrained to be equal across divisions, the indirect effect from performance goals to mock bureaucracy through performance processes was positive and significant (IND = .110), indicating that the higher the importance athletic departments place on performance (athletic) goals, the more they engage in mock bureaucracy. The indirect effect from performance goals to representative bureaucracy was negative and significant (IND = -.087), indicating that the higher the importance athletic departments place on performance (athletic) goals, the less they engage in representative bureaucracy. The indirect effect from performance goals to discordant bureaucracy (IND = -.010) was not significant.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

This research was designed to explore and describe relationships between intercollegiate athletics goals and processes and coaches' perceptions about how institutional rules have been negotiated inside athletic departments (patterns of bureaucracy). To attain this aim, the specific purposes of this research were: (a) to propose and test the psychometric properties of a new scale created to measure different patterns of bureaucracy in athletic departments; (b) to explore and describe the structural relationships among intercollegiate athletics goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy; and (c) to compare the perceptions of three different populations of coaches, based on their NCAA division membership, regarding the structural relationships among intercollegiate athletics goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy.

In order to attain these goals, I followed a sequence of six methodologically ordered steps. First, I described the sample and controlled for non-response error. Second, single-group CFA was used with the main objective of checking the factor loadings of items in each scale for each population. This initial CFA was used to refine the model. Third, another CFA with a new sample was conducted to test the fit measures of the measurement model, construct validity (convergent and discriminant validity), and reliability of the scales. Fourth, multiple-group CFA was carried out, in order to check the measurement invariance of each scale across all three populations of coaches. Fifth,

single-group SEM was conducted to check the structural relationships among constructs for each population of coaches. At this point, hypotheses 1 to 8 were tested for each population. Sixth, multiple-group SEM was carried out to verify whether or not the structural relationships among constructs were invariant across all three NCAA divisions. I follow this very same order to discuss the results found in this research.

Sample characteristics and non-response error

The sample of this study was mainly composed by Caucasians (88.1%) and males (69.2%). Previous studies in intercollegiate athletics have reported the same tendency in samples of college coaches (Cunningham & Sagas, 2004; Pastore, Goldfine, & Riemer, 1996; Rocha & Turner, 2008; Turner & Chelladurai, 2005). The mean age (and standard deviation) for coaches in all divisions was 44.08 (10.93) years, and the mean (and standard deviation) tenure was 9.39 (8.85) years. These values were all very similar to those previously reported in the literature (Cunningham & Sagas, 2004; Pastore, et al., 1996; Rocha & Turner, 2008; Turner & Chelladurai, 2005).

The average final standing percentile reported here as a demographic measure for coaches was originally proposed by Turner and Chelladurai (2005). These authors used the average final standing as a dependent variable in their multivariate analysis. In addition to that, Turner and Chelladurai used objective and subjective measures of coach performance based on a five-point anchored scale. Turner and Jordan (2009) used the percentage of winning in the last season and over the career, but not the average standing percentile. For this study, I preferred standing percentile over winning percentage because for coaches of many sports (e.g., swimming, track and field, gymnastics, among many others) it is impossible to express how many winnings they had in the last season.

However, for all sports, it is always very easy to remember your final standing in the last seasons. Turner and Jordan (2009) proposed that, in a given season, the population average winning percentage should be 50%. This average should be higher over coaches' whole career, because those coaches with low winning percentage tend to be replaced.

In the current research, I found an average of .64 related to the final standings in the last three seasons. Apparently, this result seems to indicate that more of the victorious coaches responded to the questionnaire than coaches with low winning percentage. However, the final standing percentile does not follow the same rule applied by Turner and Jordan (2009) to estimate the population winning percentage (.50). It is possible that a coach had had less than 50% of winnings and still had reached higher standings in his or her conference. In a conference where two or three teams dominate the rest, a coach with not so high winning percentage can still finish high in the final standing pool. Turner and Chelladurai (2005) did not report the average final standing for coaches in their study. Therefore, a comparison with the results of this study is not possible. Future studies are needed before any conclusion can be drawn about this demographic characteristic of coaches.

Non-response error is one of the major threats in surveys and other researches using questionnaires (Dillman, 2000; Fowler, 1993). Kent, Jordan, and Inoue (2009) reported that roughly 70% of the papers using surveys and sampling procedures in a major sport management journal did not use any procedure for controlling non-response error. To avoid this mistake and control for non-response error, I conducted *t*-tests comparing early to late respondents in key demographic characteristics and in the average of all factors, as suggested in the literature (Miller & Smith, 1983; Turner & Jordan,

2009). Additionally, I also tested if late respondents differ from early respondents in the time they spent (in minutes) to complete the questionnaire. Results showed that late respondents did not differ from early respondent in any variable for all three divisions. It seems that non-response error is not an issue of concern (Dixon & Sagas, 2007; Dooley & Linder, 2003; Kim & Cunningham, 2005).

Validity and reliability of the scales

Three scales were used in this research: intercollegiate goals and processes scale (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000), and bureaucracy scale (created for this study). The content validity of this new bureaucracy scale was confirmed by a panel of experts. The construct validity of all three scales was evaluated via CFA.

Since Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Kaplan (1988), dropping items after an initial CFA has been common practice in social research (Bauer, Stokburger-Sauer, & Exler, 2008; Fromme, Katz, & Rivet, 1997; Kim, Trail, Lim, & Kim, 2009; Seo & Green, 2008). Naturally, after dropping items with low factor loading and refitting the model to the same sample, this model will fit the model better. Therefore, as suggested by MacCallum et al. (1992), to make sure that the modifications in the measurement model would be replicated in other samples, one should test the modified model on a new sample. Thus, to test my measurement model I split the samples of coaches in each division in two sub-samples: A calibration sample (over which I conducted my first CFA and decided about dropping items) and a validation sample (used to test the fit of my “new” measurement model). That is, after modifying the structural model, I tested it on a new sample.

Using the validation sample to test the modified measurement model, all fit measures showed good fit for all three scales in all three populations of coaches. Moreover, the reliability was satisfactory for all subscales in all three divisions. All factors presented Cronbach's alphas greater than .70. Not all factor loadings were above .707. As I have mentioned before, it is common that, after refining a model, factor loadings change, because the common variance is recalculated based on the retained items only. Nevertheless, all items presented factor loaded much higher than the cutoff point of .40, proposed by Stevens (1996). Yet, the AVE was greater than .50 for all constructs. Overall, these results showed that the present scales have constructs with considerable convergent validity in all three divisions. To determine discriminant validity, I used Fornell and Larcker's (1981) measure. The AVE for each construct in all three samples presented a value larger than the squared correlation between this construct and another construct. This result confirmed the discriminant validity of the constructs used in my scales. Goals and processes scales have presented good psychometric properties also in previous studies (McGuire & Trail, 2002; Trail & Chelladurai, 2002). This is the first time that the psychometric properties of the bureaucracy have been tested.

Overall, the reliability and validity of the scales lent support to go on with other procedures to test the hypothesis of the research. Since one of the major objectives of the current study was to compare structural relationships among three different populations (NCAA divisions), the natural next step was to test the measurement invariance of the scales.

Measurement invariance of the scales

Testing for measurement invariance is a fundamental issue if one wants to make group comparisons (Byrne & Watkins, 2003; Reise, et al., 1993; Widaman & Reise, 1997). Measurement invariance represents a test for the equivalence of implied constructs in two or more independent groups to guarantee that the very same constructs are being measured across groups (Chen, et al., 2005). Multiple-group CFA is the most suitable method to check measurement invariance (Byrne & Watkins, 2003). The importance of measurement invariance for the current study comes from the fact that comparisons of statistics, such as regression weights (or path coefficients between constructs), can only be made if the measures of the constructs are invariant across groups.

Trail and Chelladurai (2002) tested the intercollegiate goals and scales for two different populations: faculty members and students. However, due to the objectives of their research, they did not test for measurement invariance of these scales. To my knowledge, this research is the first one to test the measurement invariance of all three scales. Results showed that the measurement of the constructs in the bureaucracy scale (a first-order measurement model) and the goals scales (a second-order measurement model) was fully invariant across all three divisions. In other words, factor loadings and intercepts were invariant, and can be considered equivalent, across all three NCAA divisions for goals and bureaucracy scale.

For processes scale, the full invariance of the intercepts of indicators (Model 3 in that analysis) failed to meet the minimal requirements for model fit. Therefore, I moved on and test partial invariance, as suggested by the literature (Byrne, et al., 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Considering the characteristic of the samples, the

non-invariance of intercepts of some factors would be plausibly sustained by the literature. NCAA divisions are different in aspects related to marketing strategies and revenue generation (Cunningham & Ashley, 2001; DeSchrive & Jensen, 2002; Fink, et al., 2003). The mean of factors related to marketing and media relations should be expected to be non invariant across NCAA divisions. Thus, the intercepts of the indicators of these constructs should be expected to be not invariant among groups. Therefore, I allowed the intercepts of the indicators of marketing and media relations to vary among groups and the invariance of all other indicators. Partial measurement invariance for intercepts of indicators is tenable, and consequently, the whole processes scale was considered as partially invariant.

Partial invariance has not been considered a prohibition to continue with the analysis of structural invariance in social research (Byrne, et al., 1989; Pentz & Chou, 1994; Schaie, Maitland, Willis, & Intrieri, 1998; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). As noted by Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), scalar invariance (or variance of the intercepts) is desirable when one desires to compare means across groups. However, when one wishes to compare structural patterns across groups, metric invariance (or invariance of the factor loadings) is sufficient (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). In this sense, the fact the intercepts of marketing and media relations were allowed to vary across groups, and partial invariance of intercepts were identified in the processes scale, did not create any hindrance to compare the structural relationships across the three investigated populations. Previous empirical researches have found partial measurement invariance and conducted further tests considering the invariance of factor loadings as sufficient (Kilbourne, Grunhagen, &

Foley, 2005; Netemeyer, Brashear-Alejandro, & Boles, 2004; Pentz & Chou, 1994; Schaie, et al., 1998).

The measurement invariance of the three scales is a previous step to analyze the structural invariance of a model. Before that, I had to select a more plausible model to explain the structural relationships among goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy. The single-group SEM was used to compare three alternative models. Results of the single-group SEM analyses are discussed next.

Alternative models

Joreskog and Sorbom (1996) have proposed the structural equation modeling investigations could focus in model confirmation (a single specified model is fit to the available data and the processes stops), model generation (modifications are made in the original model to improve its fit measures), and model comparison (a priori alternative models are compared in their substantive and statistical fit). Since a single model can never be confirmed as a real expression of the reality, many scholars have fiercely advocated for the evaluation and comparison of a priori alternative models (MacCallum, 1986; MacCallum, Wegener, Uchino, & Fabrigar, 1993; Steiger, 1990, 2001).

Sport management scholars have employed the alternative models approach more frequently (Kwon, Trail, & James, 2007; May, Chelladurai, & Trail, 2007; Trail, 2004). This research followed this line and compared three alternative models to explain the structural relationships among intercollegiate goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy in each population of coaches. Two of the alternative models (Model A and Model B) are nested in each other. Comparing the two nested models, the test of chi-square difference showed that there is no difference between these two models. Since no

difference in fit indices exists, the model A is preferable because it is more parsimonious. Model C is an alternative model but it is not nested in either A or B. Therefore, no formal test might be conducted. Comparing the fit indices among the three models they are very much alike. Model C fitted the data slight better than the other two. However, the differences in fit indices are so small that it would be very difficult to support the acceptance of one model over another, only based on the fit measures. A substantive argument should be made in favor of the model C, in order to prefer it over the other two (MacCallum, et al., 1993). Using the theoretical background, model A seems to be preferable, because previous researches have suggested that goals are set a priori, and then processes are selected (Mohr, 1973; Trail & Chelladurai, 2002; Vancouver & Schmitt, 1991). This implies a directional relationship between goals and processes, as that in Model A, instead of a non-directional, as that proposed in Model C.

Were the fit measures of Model C much superior to the other two, an argument for this model could be sustained. However, in the current case the three models fit the data very closely. Results of previous studies lend an important substantive argument for model A over model C. Considering the results of previous researches to the current results, model A was selected as the most tenable to explain the structural relationships among goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy in intercollegiate athletics. Consequently, the significance of individual regression weights in model A was analyzed to test the hypotheses from one to nine to each population.

Structural relationships among constructs

Chelladurai (1985) was the first to mention that athletic goals and educational goals of intercollegiate athletics might be in conflict with one another. All “reformists” of

the intercollegiate athletics have asserted that athletic programs inside universities need urgent modifications. Book after book and article after article, the argument for reforms is always the same: Educational (developmental) goals and processes have been suffocated by performance (athletic) goals and processes (Benford, 2007; Kuga, 1996; Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Sperber, 1990; Telander, 1996; Zimbalist, 1999).

Empirical investigations have corroborated for the perception of competing goals (Baxter, et al., 1996; Padilla & Baumer, 1994; Putler & Wolfe, 1999; Wolfe, et al., 2002) Baxter et al. (1996) established that two “competing conceptions” have regulated intercollegiate athletics: one conception basically oriented toward athletic issues, and another oriented to educational values. Considering six different groups of stakeholders (coaches were not included), Putler and Wolfe (1999) found that athletic goals and educational goals are seen as competing values inside athletic departments. Padilla and Baumer (1994) reported that institutions with NCAA violations tend to have higher athletic and financial performance, while higher graduate rates are associated with lower athletic performance. Padilla and Baumer’s findings seem, once more, to point to the competing nature of performance and developmental goals and processes. Trail and Chelladurai (2002) reported, based on the perceptions of faculty and students, a small positive correlation between performance goals and developmental goals, and a larger negative correlation between performance processes and developmental processes.

The above-mentioned literature seemed to point to a possibly negative correlation between performance and developmental goals of intercollegiate athletics. However, in the current research, for all three divisions, the correlation between performance and developmental goals was large and statistically significant ($r_{\text{divI}} = .654$; $r_{\text{divII}} = .660$; r_{divIII}

= .582). A note of caution is due here. In the current research I did not ask the subjects about their personal opinions about how important a goal is, as did Trail and Chelladurai (2002). Nor did I create fixed scenarios to express “the success” of athletic departments based on the emphasis on either athletic or academic goals, as did Putler and Wolfe (1999). On the contrary, this investigation asked coaches how much importance *the athletic department* placed on attaining a certain goal. Therefore, results of the correlation between developmental and performance goals indicated that the athletic department placed more or less equal importance on both developmental and athletic goals.

Furthermore, checking the mean of the constructs representing developmental goals in this research, I found a pattern similar to that reported in researches with other intercollegiate athletic constituents (McGuire & Trail, 2002; Trail & Chelladurai, 2000). For example, coaches rated all three constructs representing developmental goals close to the up end of the scale: Academic achievement ($M_{\text{divI}} = 6.30$; $M_{\text{divII}} = 5.86$; $M_{\text{divIII}} = 5.94$); social citizenship ($M_{\text{divI}} = 5.72$; $M_{\text{divII}} = 5.43$; $M_{\text{divIII}} = 5.42$); and student-athlete careers ($M_{\text{divI}} = 5.64$; $M_{\text{divII}} = 5.17$; $M_{\text{divIII}} = 5.18$). Trail and Chelladurai (2000) found the same pattern: both students and faculty members rated all developmental goals very close to the up end. McGuire and Trail (2002) reported that presidents of universities also consider academic goals as the top priority of athletic departments, rating items related to academic goals very high. So far, all surveyed intercollegiate athletic constituents have seen academic goals as highly important.

Regarding performance goals, coaches rated university prestige ($M_{\text{divI}} = 5.93$; $M_{\text{divII}} = 5.35$; $M_{\text{divIII}} = 5.18$) as positively as faculty, students, and presidents (McGuire & Trail, 2002; Trail & Chelladurai, 2000), well above the midpoint of the scale. Division I

and division II coaches rated, in average, winning ($M_{\text{divI}} = 4.62$; $M_{\text{divII}} = 4.31$) and entertainment ($M_{\text{divI}} = 4.72$; $M_{\text{divII}} = 4.09$) slight above the midpoint of the scale. This is consistent with the ratings of students (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000) and presidents (McGuire & Trail, 2002). However, in a previous study faculty members rated the goals of winning and entertainment below the midpoint of the scale (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000). Division III coaches followed the pattern of faculty members and rated winning ($M_{\text{divIII}} = 3.88$) and entertainment ($M_{\text{divIII}} = 3.33$) below the midpoint of the scale.

As I mentioned elsewhere, previous studies have used different stems for items created to evaluate intercollegiate athletic goals. Trail and Chelladurai (2000, 2002) asked faculty members and students about their *personal evaluation* of how important certain athletic goals are. McGuire and Trail (2002) asked presidents about how important certain objectives are for their *universities*. In the current research, I asked coaches about how much importance their *athletic department* placed on attaining certain goals. Thus, perceptions of different constituents are being compared and those perceptions are based on different questions. Therefore, to be more precise about my comparison above, I should say that personal perceptions of faculty members and students seem to be similar to perceptions of presidents about what goals are important to their universities and to the perceptions of coaches about what goals have been emphasized by their athletic departments.

Moving to the directional paths, the regression coefficient of developmental processes on developmental goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .924$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .909$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .853$). Likewise, the regression coefficient of performance processes on performance goals was large and significant for all three divisions ($\beta_{\text{divI}} =$

.902; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .780$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .933$). The structural relationships between intercollegiate goals and processes were very consistent across divisions. These results confirmed hypothesis 1 and 2, which proposed that coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place on certain processes would be positively related to how frequent those athletic departments engage in certain processes. These results are consistent with Trail and Chelladurai (2002), who reported large and significant regression coefficients of processes on goals for a sample of faculty members and students combined. They reported a weight of .682 for the regression of developmental processes on developmental goals, and a weight of .866 for the regression of performance processes on performance goals.

Unique to this research is the investigation about the relationships between intercollegiate athletic goals and processes and types of bureaucracy. For all three divisions (as proposed by hypotheses 3, 4, and 5), developmental processes was a significant predictor for all three types of bureaucracy. More specifically, developmental processes was a negative and significant predictor of mock bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = -.313$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = -.392$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = -.406$) and a positive and significant predictor of representative bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .289$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .414$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .411$) and discordant bureaucracy ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .226$; $\beta_{\text{divII}} = .331$; $\beta_{\text{divIII}} = .282$).

Further, for all three divisions, all three indirect effects from developmental goals to the three patterns of bureaucracy through developmental processes were quite large and significant. The indirect effect from developmental goals to mock bureaucracy was negative ($\text{IND}_{\text{divI}} = -.289$; $\text{IND}_{\text{divII}} = -.356$; $\text{IND}_{\text{divIII}} = -.346$), indicating that the higher the importance athletic departments placed on academic goals, the lower they engaged in

mock bureaucracy strategies. The indirect effects from developmental goals to representative ($IND_{divI} = .267$; $IND_{divII} = .377$; $IND_{divIII} = .350$) and discordant bureaucracy ($IND_{divI} = .209$; $IND_{divII} = .300$; $IND_{divIII} = .240$) were positive for all three divisions. This result indicates that the higher the importance athletic departments placed on academic goals, the higher they engaged in either representative or discordant bureaucracy strategies.

As a whole, the results presented in the two previous paragraphs indicate that the level of importance athletic department place on developmental goals can define the type of bureaucracy employed in these athletic departments. The higher the importance of developmental goals in a certain athletic department, the more frequently coaches follow the rules either by agreement with their athletic directors (representative bureaucracy) or by enforcement (discordant bureaucracy). Further, the higher the importance of developmental goals, the less frequent coaches and athletic directors agreed to bend the rules (mock bureaucracy). These results were confirmed in a multiple-group SEM, when all regression weights were constrained to equal across groups and the whole sample was used to estimate the indirect effects.

Using single-group SEM, the results were not as uniform for the relationship between performance processes and types of bureaucracy as they were for the relationship between developmental processes and types of bureaucracy. For all three divisions, the regression weight of discordant bureaucracy on performance processes were small and not significant ($\beta_{divI} = -.019$; $\beta_{divII} = -.043$; $\beta_{divIII} = .028$). The regression coefficient of mock bureaucracy on performance processes was significant for division II ($\beta_{divII} = .195$) and division III ($\beta_{divIII} = .167$), and not significant for division I ($\beta_{divI} =$

.072). Finally, the regression coefficient of representative bureaucracy on performance processes was small and significant for division II ($\beta_{\text{divII}} = -.181$), but not significant for division I ($\beta_{\text{divI}} = .001$) and division III ($\beta_{\text{divIII}} = -.084$).

Results for indirect effects from performance goals to bureaucracy through performance processes were equally not uniform across all three divisions. For all three divisions the indirect effect from performance goals to discordant bureaucracy was non significant. For division II, the indirect effects from performance goals to mock bureaucracy ($\text{IND}_{\text{divII}} = .152$) and to representative bureaucracy ($\text{IND}_{\text{divII}} = -.141$) were small, but significant. For division I and III, the same indirect effects from performance goals to mock bureaucracy ($\text{IND}_{\text{divI}} = .065$; $\text{IND}_{\text{divIII}} = .155$) and to representative bureaucracy ($\text{IND}_{\text{divI}} = .001$; $\text{IND}_{\text{divIII}} = -.078$) were small, but *not* significant. However, it is noteworthy that the magnitude of indirect effect from performance goals to mock bureaucracy was larger in division III (where it was not significant) than in division II (where it was significant). The standard error for this indirect effect in division III was quite large.

When the whole sample was used and the regression weights were constrained to be equal across divisions, in the multiple-group SEM, the indirect effect from performance goals to mock bureaucracy through performance processes was positive and significant ($\text{IND} = .110$), indicating that the higher the importance athletic departments placed on performance goals, the more they engaged in mock bureaucracy. The indirect effect from performance goals to representative bureaucracy was negative and significant ($\text{IND} = -.087$), indicating that the higher the importance athletic departments place on athletic goals, the less they engage in representative bureaucracy. As in the individual

analyses, the indirect effect from performance goals to discordant bureaucracy was not significant in the multiple-group SEM.

Taken as a whole the results of single-group and multiple-group SEM support the loose coupling theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and Gouldner's (1954) three patterns of bureaucracy in intercollegiate athletics. Based on these sociological theories, coaches' perceptions about the importance athletic departments place on different goals and how frequent they engage in different processes should cause different degrees of coupling between institutional rules and daily activities (different patterns of bureaucracy). Basically, development goals and processes were expected to be positively correlated with the following of the rules (representative and discordant bureaucracy), while performance (athletic) goals and processes were expected to be positively correlated with the bending of the rules (mock bureaucracy). Further, negative correlations were expected between developmental goals/processes and mock bureaucracy; and between performance goals/processes and representative and discordant bureaucracy.

The results of the current research matched the theory perfectly when developmental goals and processes were analyzed, either by single-group or by multiple-group analysis. In all three divisions, the more important developmental (academic) goals were for athletic departments, the more they engaged in patterns of representative and discordant bureaucracy, and the less they engaged in patterns of mock bureaucracy (through developmental processes).

However, the current results matched the theory only partially when performance goals and processes were analyzed. In single-group analysis, only for division II the theory was supported regarding the positive relationships between performance goals and

mock bureaucracy, and negative relationships between performance goals and representative bureaucracy. However, this pattern was also found when all samples were combined in a much larger sample, in the multiple-group analysis for the constrained model. This result indicates that the more important performance goals were for athletic departments, the more they engaged in patterns of mock bureaucracy, and the less they engaged in representative bureaucracy.

Table 5.1 shows a summary of what was discussed in the last few paragraphs in terms of which hypotheses were supported and which were not by the results of the current study. The sign in parenthesis in front of each path indicates if the relationship was hypothesized to be negative or positive. Hypothesis 8 was the only one not supported in either individual samples or in the overall sample of coaches. This table also shows that hypothesis 9 was supported. This is an important result to justify the last column of this table, when all three groups of coaches are pooled.

Table 5.2 shows a summary of the above discussion about the indirect effects, indicating which of these effects were significant and which were not. Only the indirect effect from performance goals to discordant bureaucracy was not significant either in one individual sample or in the overall sample. Results of both tables offered considerable support for the loose coupling theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and Gouldner's (1954) three patterns of bureaucracy in intercollegiate athletics.

Table 5.1 Summary of results of the hypotheses

Hypothesis	Division I	Division II	Division III	All divisions
H1				
(+) DEVG → DEVP	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
H2				
(+) PERG → PERP	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
H3				
(-) DEVP → MB	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
H4				
(+) DEVP → RB	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
H5				
(+) DEVP → DB	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
H6				
(+) PERP → MB	Not supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
H7				
(-) PERP → RB	Not supported	Supported	Not supported	Supported
H8				
(-) PERP → DB	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
H9	---	---	---	Supported

Note. DEVG = Developmental Goals; DEVP = Developmental Processes; MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Past research has shown that the attainment of organizational goals that are closely related to institutional rules depends on a tight coupling between these rules and actual activities (Gouldner, 1954; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006b; Sallaz, 2009). This was also the case in intercollegiate athletics. Developmental goals are closely related to institutional rules. As mentioned elsewhere, the vast majority of the NCAA rules are concerned with academic achievement of student-athletes whereas controlling of the athletic drive of coaches and managers. Coherently with the literature, I found that those intercollegiate athletic goals that are closely related to institutional rules did imply on a tight coupling between these rules and actual activities either by agreement between

coaches and athletic directors (representative bureaucracy) or by enforcement (discordant bureaucracy).

Table 5.2 Summary of results of the indirect effects

Indirect effects	Division I	Division II	Division III	All divisions
DEVG → DEVP → MB	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
DEVG → DEVP → RB	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
DEVG → DEVP → DB	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
PERG → PERP → MB	Not significant	Significant	Not significant	Significant
PERG → PERP → RB	Not significant	Significant	Not significant	Significant
PERG → PERP → DB	Not significant	Not significant	Not significant	Not significant

Note. DEVG = Developmental Goals; DEVP = Developmental Processes; MB = Mock Bureaucracy; RB = Representative Bureaucracy; DB = Discordant Bureaucracy.

Previous studies have also shown that loose coupling between institutional rules and practical activities (mock bureaucracy) is an efficient way to attain organizational goals that are hindered by these rules (Gouldner, 1954; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006a; Lopez, 2007; Sallaz, 2002). In this study, performance goals were considered to be “hindered” by institutional rules. In the multiple-group analysis for the constrained model, positive relationships between performance goals and mock bureaucracy matched the results of previous studies; as did the negative relationships between performance goals and representative bureaucracy.

A special note about mock bureaucracy

A point of high concern in the current research was how coaches would respond to questions about bending of rules. Sociologists have preferred to use qualitative strategies to investigate loose coupling and patterns of bureaucracy (Burawoy, 1979; Coburn, 2004; Lopez, 2007; Rubin, 1979; Sallaz, 2009). They argue that people would never acknowledge that some rules are being bended or partially followed. One of the

experts consulted to establish the content validity of the bureaucracy instrument for this study asserted that the items (after his corrections) could represent mock bureaucracy, “if coaches respond them sincerely”.

The mean (and standard deviation) for mock bureaucracy items was 2.21 (0.94) for division I, 2.39 (1.07) for division II, and 2.34 (0.99) for division III coaches (see Tables 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14). These numbers are basically saying that, based on coaches’ perceptions, *on average*, coaches and athletic directors “rarely” or “very rarely” agree in bending some rules to achieve goals. This result was not surprising at all. I knew since the early beginning that saying that rules are bended is not politically correct. I believe that coaches were sincere but politically correct. They did not answer “never” to all items in the mock bureaucracy scale. On average, they said “rarely” or “very rarely” to those items. However, an important percentage of responses was above or equal to “sometimes”.

Table 5.2 dissects the results of mock bureaucracy and shows the frequency, percent, and cumulative percent of each response category for each item in the mock bureaucracy scale. Particularly interesting from this table is the frequency and percent of responses above or equal to the category “sometimes”. In average, the percent of all responses for those four items that were above or equal to “sometimes” was 10.1% for division I, 13.4% for division II, and 12.7% for division III. Although in average coaches have responded that mock bureaucracy is rarely an administrative strategy in their athletic

Table 5.2 Frequency, percent, and cumulative percent of reponses for mock bureaucracy items

Item		MB1			MB4			MB6			MB7		
Response		Freq	%	Cumulative %	Freq	%	Cumulative %	Freq	%	Cumulative %	Freq	%	Cumulative %
Always	Division I	6	1.9	1.9	7	2.2	2.2	5	1.6	1.6	3	.9	.9
Very Frequently		4	1.2	3.1	5	1.6	3.7	7	2.2	3.7	2	.6	1.6
Frequently		9	2.8	5.9	6	1.9	5.6	2	.6	4.3	0	0	1.6
Sometimes		27	8.4	14.3	19	5.9	11.5	15	4.7	9.0	13	4.0	5.6
Rarely		42	13.0	27.6	23	7.1	18.9	18	5.6	15.2	12	3.7	9.3
Very Rarely		56	17.4	45.7	47	14.6	34.2	63	19.6	35.4	74	23.0	32.9
Never		174	54.0	100.0	211	65.5	100.0	205	63.7	100.0	211	65.5	100.0
Always	Division II	5	1.8	1.8	9	3.2	3.2	7	2.5	2.5	0	.0	.0
Very Frequently		9	3.2	5.1	12	4.3	7.9	8	2.9	5.4	4	1.4	1.4
Frequently		12	4.3	9.4	8	2.9	10.8	6	2.2	7.6	4	1.4	2.9
Sometimes		21	7.6	17.0	16	5.8	17.0	14	5.1	12.6	11	4.0	6.9
Rarely		37	13.4	30.7	22	7.9	24.9	20	7.2	20.2	14	5.1	11.9
Very Rarely		40	14.4	45.1	41	14.8	39.7	59	21.3	41.5	65	23.5	35.7
Never		152	54.9	100.0	167	60.3	100.0	161	58.1	100.0	177	63.9	100.0
Always	Division III	5	1.6	1.6	7	2.3	2.3	3	1.0	1.0	4	1.3	1.3
Very Frequently		10	3.2	4.9	12	3.9	6.2	7	2.3	3.2	2	.6	1.9
Frequently		8	2.6	7.5	12	3.9	10.1	4	1.3	4.5	2	.6	2.6
Sometimes		28	9.1	16.6	16	5.2	15.3	22	7.1	11.7	15	4.9	7.5
Rarely		25	8.1	24.7	16	5.2	20.8	20	6.5	18.2	18	5.8	13.3
Very Rarely		49	15.9	40.6	55	17.9	39.0	71	23.1	41.2	60	19.5	33.1
Never		183	59.4	100.0	185	60.1	100.0	179	58.1	100.0	203	65.9	100.0

departments, more than 10% of the coaches assume that bending the rules might be considered a strategy to accomplish goals that are in conflict with institutional rules. It is noteworthy that results of the current study do not indicate that 10% or more coaches are bending rules. It merely shows that when rules and actual goals are conflicting, coaches and athletic directors can consider alternative strategies (in the current case, mock bureaucracy) to accomplish these goals.

Methodologically, the most important point is that the variance of the answers for mock bureaucracy items was sufficient to indicate different correlations between mock bureaucracy and developmental goals and processes, on the one hand, and mock bureaucracy and performance goals and processes, on the other. Considering the controversial nature of the bureaucracy items, structural equation modeling showed up as a very useful technique to analyze the data of the current study. Structural equation modeling (a special case of covariance structure modeling) is a statistical technique that analyzes *the structure of covariances* among manifest variables. Thus, instead of comparing means, I decided to investigate the covariance structure, which allowed me to check how some variables change together to each other.

As shown in the results section, all SEM models fit the data very well, indicating that the relationships expressed in the tested models are tenable. That is, they might be replicated in the population. Therefore, this study showed that it is possible to measure patterns of bureaucracy quantitatively and to analyze the results through SEM. That is an important issue, because even if politically correct answers are expected, the use of anchored scales and SEM techniques can identify very valuable relationships among constructs.

Limitations and recommendations for future studies

As any other, this study also has some limitations. Although it has used a random sample, the response rate was quite low for all three divisions. Strategies for controlling for non-response error were used. However, it just compared late with early respondents. There is no data available for comparing respondents to non-respondents, for example, in the average of the responses for the constructs. Therefore, although controlled, the non-response bias is still a threat to external validity.

Regarding the measurement model, for the processes scale only partial measurement invariance was found for the intercepts of the indicators. Partial invariance has not been considered a prohibition to continue with the analysis of structural invariance in social research (Byrne, et al., 1989; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). However, it would be a methodological limitation if one wished to compare means among groups.

A comparison among the three alternative models did not produce differences large enough to draw definite conclusions about which model should be chosen. Models A and C presented good fit indices and could be considered equally good explanations for the data. Model A was chosen based on logical assumptions, substantive knowledge, and previous research (Trail & Chelladurai, 2002). However, future studies should pay attention for possible non-directional relationships between goals and processes in intercollegiate athletics, as proposed by model C. It is possible that, in intercollegiate athletics, goals are not set a priori, but in conjunction with processes. That is, the selection of goals depends on the processes that are possible to be conducted. Athletic departments hosted by highly academic-oriented institutions can decide not placing so

much effort on athletic goals because they know that the necessary processes for reaching these goals are not an option in their institutions. Future investigations can shed some light on this point.

The current research focused only on coaches' perceptions about goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy. It is possible that other constituents have different perspectives about how much emphasis athletic departments place on certain goals or engage in certain processes. Previous studies have investigated faculty members, students (Trail & Chelladurai, 2002), and presidents of universities (McGuire & Trail, 2002). Definitely, future studies should investigate different stakeholders. I would suggest that the opinion of current and former student-athletes should be heard. I guess that athletes are the most likely constituents to give precise information about the actual goals, processes, and patterns of bureaucracy used in athletic departments.

Future studies can also consider the use of two informants to define how different patterns of bureaucracy arise inside athletic departments. Instead of asking coaches about what happens when they agree or disagree with their managers, both coaches and managers can be asked what procedures taken and the agreement or disagreement of their answers define the pattern of bureaucracy. This procedure can use different pairs of constituents inside athletic departments, but coaches and athletic directors seem to be the most interesting pair to be studied.

Conclusion

This study tested the loose coupling theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and Gouldner's (1954) three patterns of bureaucracy in intercollegiate athletics. Overall, results of the current study confirmed the loose coupling as a strategy to deal with goals

that are not completely compatible with institutional rules. Usually, to survive, organizations should balance external institutional pressures to follow all rules and keep legitimacy with internal technical needs. When a situation of conflict between rules and some technical goals arises, Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that formal structures become “rationalized myths”. Then, a pattern of mock bureaucracy arises (Gouldner, 1954; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006a). Loose coupling between rules and actual activities or, in other words, mock bureaucracy has been studied as alternative to accomplish goals that are not in accord with institutional rules. The results have shown that mock bureaucracy has been used to manage athletic goals. By the same token, tight coupling between rules and actions with agreement between coaches and directors (representative bureaucracy) has been used to manage academic goals. The results for discordant were not conclusive, mainly because no significant correlations were found between performance goals/processes and this kind of bureaucracy.

The multiple-group structural analysis showed that the relationship among goals, processes, and different patterns of bureaucracy have been invariant across all three NCAA divisions. Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) assumption that loose coupling between structures and actual activities can be found in environments with different institutional pressures was confirmed. Although the pressures for attaining athletic goals have been well reported as somewhat different across the three NCAA divisions (Cunningham & Ashley, 2001; DeSchrive & Jensen, 2002; Fink, et al., 2003), the option for different patterns of bureaucracy to administrate different intercollegiate athletics goals did not differ across divisions in the current study. These patterns are dependent on the emphasis these organizations place in different goals and processes.

This research had no intentions to criticize the option for mock bureaucracy as an administrative tool to manage athletic goals. Athletic managers and coaches have faced multiple and competing goals. Therefore, they have established alternative administrative tools to be efficient in attaining all of them. As well expressed in coaches' responses, they did not see their athletic departments as organizations that merely follow athletic goals. In fact, coaches expressed that their athletic departments place as much importance on academic goals as on athletic goals. Therefore, the option for mock bureaucracy seems to indicate the existence of operational goals whose accomplishment has been hindered by institutional rules.

Although mock bureaucracy has been present in athletic departments, the results of the current study showed that representative bureaucracy (and even discordant bureaucracy) is more likely to be chosen as an administrative strategy than is the former. However, the nature of the goals they are supposed to be attained asks for alternative administrative strategies. This research showed that different patterns of bureaucracy arises in athletic departments as a response to pressures for performing in different and sometimes competing fields equally well.

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Goals and processes items (Trail & Chelladurai, 2000)

Developmental goals

Dear coach, in your opinion, how much importance does your athletic department place on attaining the GOAL of:

– Student-athlete academic achievement (AC)

AC1 – Academic development of student-athletes

AC2 – Academic achievement by student-athletes

AC3 – Academic progress by student-athletes

AC4 – F Academic growth of student-athletes

– Student-athlete social/moral citizenship (SC)

SC1 – Social development of student-athletes

SC2 – Moral development of student-athletes

SC3 – Good citizenship by student-athletes

SC4 – Development of student-athletes into contributing members of society

– Student-athlete careers (CA)

CA1 – Career-goal achievement by student-athletes

CA2 – Career development for student-athletes

CA3 – Student-athlete career growth

Performance goals

Dear coach, in your opinion, how much importance does your athletic department place on attaining the GOAL of:

– University visibility and prestige (UP)

UP1 – Positive national image for the university

UP2 – Prestige for the university

UP3 – Positive public identity for the university

UP4 – Positive media coverage for the university

– Winning (WI)

WI1 – Victories over traditional rivals by the athletic teams

WI2 – National championships won by athletic teams

WI3 – National rankings of the athletic teams

WI4 – Conference championships won by the athletic teams

WI5 – Winning records of the athletic teams

– Entertainment (EN)

EN1 – Statewide entertainment through athletics

EN2 – Entertainment for the local community through athletics

EN3 – National entertainment through athletics

EN4 – Entertainment for the university through athletics

Developmental processes

Dear coach, how frequent your athletic department engages in the PROCESS of:

– Student-athlete moral education (ME)

ME1 – Punishing misbehaviors of student-athletes

ME2 – Requiring coaches to follow strict codes of conduct

ME3 – Establishing rules for student-athletes' behaviors on and off the field

ME4 – Cultivating non-violent behavior by student-athletes

– Control of academic eligibility and admissions (AE)

- AE1 – Requiring student-athletes to earn a specified GPA for the quarter/semester
- AE2 – Requiring progress toward a university degree by student-athletes
- AE3 – Applying regular admission rules for student-athletes
- AE4 – Requiring a minimum number of credits per quarter/semester by student-athletes
- Facilitating student-athletes career development (CD)
- CD1 – Providing tutors for student-athletes
- CD2 – Establishing a leadership training program for student-athletes
- CD3 – Providing academic counselors for student-athletes
- CD4 – Providing career services for student-athletes
- CD5 – Helping student-athletes develop skills required in many jobs

Performance processes

Dear coach, how frequent your athletic department engages in the PROCESS of:

- Attracting athletes (AT)
- AT1 – Scheduling competitions against prestigious schools
- AT2 – Awarding athletic scholarships
- AT3 – Playing nationally ranked teams
- Marketing process
- MK1 – Maintaining existing television/radio contracts
- MK2 – Generating revenue through ticket sale
- MK3 – Developing new television/radio contracts
- MK4 – Selling concession at events
- MK5 – Selling university merchandise

– Media relations (MR)

MR1 – Encouraging the coaches to interact with the media

MR2 – Encouraging the players to interact with the media

MR3 – Adjusting starting times of the athletic events to meet TV requirements

Appendix B – Bureaucracy Items

Dear coach,

Thinking about the reality you face in your athletic department, please rate the statements below based on HOW FREQUENTLY the coaches and the athletic director agree/disagree about the NCAA rules.

Mock bureaucracy (MB)

– Our athletic director and coaches AGREE that:

MB1 – In order to produce competitive teams, coaches have to modify some rules.

MB2 – Some rules prevent the pursuit of athletic excellence.

MB3 – Rules are good, but they do not work in the real world.

MB4 – Partial compliance with rules is the solution to attain some of our athletic goals.

MB5 – Attainment of athletic excellence and full compliance of rules are sometimes in opposition to each other.

MB6 – In the pursuit of athletic goals, it often becomes necessary to comply only partially with rules.

MB7 – Our athletic director and coaches understand that in order to be successful, sometimes coaches have to bend the rules.

Representative bureaucracy (RB)

– Our athletic director and coaches AGREE that:

RB1 – Rules should be 100% followed.

RB2 – Rules must be strictly complied with.

RB3 – Rules should be followed exactly as they are written.

RB4 – Full compliance of rules does not prevent teams from reaching athletic excellence.

RB5 – Rules do not prevent athletic success.

RB6 – A good coach makes sure his/her actions always comply with rules.

RB7 – Coaches must obey all rules completely.

Discordant bureaucracy (DB)

– When our athletic director and coaches DISAGREE with each other about rules:

DB1 – If coaches bend the rules, they will get in trouble for it.

DB2 – Coaches must abide by the director's position about rules.

DB3 – Rules are dictated from top to bottom.

DB4 – Coaches must forcefully obey the rules.

DB5 – Coaches are not allowed to modify rules.

DB6 – Coaches must comply totally with the rules.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1988). Structural equation modeling in practice: A review and recommended two-step approach. *Psychological Bulletin*, 103, 411-423.
- Anderson, K., & Dohrmann, G. (2004). Out of control? *Sports Illustrated*, 100(8), 64-69.
- Ary, D., Jacobs, L. C., Razavieh, A., & Sorensen, C. (2006). *Introduction to research in Education* (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Barley, S. R., & Tolbert, P. S. (1997). Institutionalization and structuration: Studying the linkds between action and institution. *Organization Studies*, 18(1), 93-117.
- Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 1173-1182.
- Bastedo, M. N. (2004). *Strategic decoupling: Building legitimacy in educational policy environments*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, CA.
- Bauer, H. H., Stokburger-Sauer, N. E., & Exler, S. (2008). Brand image and fan loyalty in professional team sport: A refined model and empirical assessment. *Journal of Sport Management*, 22(2), 205-226.
- Baxter, V., & Lambert, C. (1991). Competing rationalities and the politics of interorganizational regulation. *Sociological Perspectives*, 34(2), 183-203.
- Baxter, V., Margavio, A. V., & Lambert, C. (1996). Competition, legitimation, and the regulation of intercollegiate athletics. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 13, 51-64.
- Benford, R. D. (2007). The college sports reform movement: Reframing the "Edutainment" industry. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 48, 1-28.
- Bentler, P. M., & Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit in the analysis of covariance structures. *Psychological Bulletin*, 88(3), 588-606.
- Beyer, J. M., & Hannah, D. R. (2000). The cultural significance of athletics in U.S Higher Education. *Journal of Sport Management*, 14, 105-132.
- Bollen, K. A. (1989). *Structural equation with latent variables*. New York: Wiley.
- Bollen, K. A., & Stine, R. (1990). Direct and indirect effects: Classical bootstrap estimates of variability. *Sociological Methodology*, 20, 115-140.
- Bowen, W. G., & Levin, S. A. (2003). *Reclaiming the game : college sports and educational values*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Brannick, M. T. (1995). Critical comments on applying covariance structure modeling. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 16(3), 201-213.
- Braverman, H. (1974). *Labor and monopoly capital. The degradation of work in the twentieth century*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.
- Brint, S., & Karabel, J. (1991). Institutional origins and transformations: The case of American Community Colleges. In W. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The new institutionalism in organizational analyses* (pp. 337-359). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Burawoy, M. (1979). *Manufacturing consent: Changes in labor process under monopoly capitalism*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Byrne, B. M. (1989). *A primer of LISREL: Basic applications and programming for confirmatory factor analytic models*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

- Byrne, B. M. (2006). *Structural equation modeling with EQS : basic concepts, applications, and programming* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Byrne, B. M., Shavelson, R. J., & Muthen, B. O. (1989). Testing for the equivalence of factor covariance and mean structures: The issue of partial measurement invariance. *Psychological Bulletin*, 105(3), 456-466.
- Byrne, B. M., & Watkins, D. (2003). The issue of measurement invariance revisited. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 34, 155-175.
- Cai, L., & Lee, T. (2009). Covariance structure model fit testing under missing data: An application of the supplemented EM algorithm. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 44, 281-304.
- Cartwright, D., & Zander, A. (1960). Individual motives and group goals: Introduction. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group Dynamics* (2nd ed., pp. 349-365). New York: Harper and Row.
- Cartwright, D., & Zander, A. (1968). Motivation processes in groups. In D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.), *Group Dynamics* (3rd ed., pp. 401-417). New York: Harper and Row.
- Caughron, R. L. (2001). An historical perspective of reform in intercollegiate athletics. *International Sports Journal*, 5(1), 1-16.
- Champion, W. T. (2005). *Sports law : cases, documents, and materials*. New York: Aspen Publishers.
- Chandler, R. (2000). The appearance of impropriety and conflicts of interest within athletics departments. *Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport*, 10(3), 138-142.
- Chelladurai, P. (1985). *Sport management : macro perspectives*. London, Ontario: Sports Dynamics.
- Chelladurai, P. (1987). Multidimensionality and multiple perspectives of organizational effectiveness. *Journal of Sport Management*, 1, 37-47.
- Chelladurai, P. (2005). *Managing organizations for sport and physic activity: a systems perspective* (2nd. ed.). Scottsdale, AZ: Holcomb Hathaway.
- Chen, F. F., Sousa, K. H., & West, S. G. (2005). Testing measurement invariance of second-order factor models. *Structural Equation Modeling*, 12(3), 471-492.
- Cheung, G. W., & Rensvold, R. B. (2002). Evaluating goodness-of-fit indexes for testing measurement invariance. *Structural Equation Modeling*, 9, 233-255.
- Chu, D. (1989). *The character of American higher education and intercollegiate sport*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Coburn, C. E. (2004). Beyond decoupling: Rethinking the relationship between the institutional enviroment and the classroom. *Sociology of Education*, 77(2), 211-244.
- Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). *Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences* (3rd / ed.). Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates.
- Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). *Quasi-experimentation : design & analysis issues for field settings*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Covaleski, M. A., & Dirsmith, M. W. (1983). Budgeting as a means for control and loose coupling. *Accounting, Organizations, and Society*, 8, 323-340.

- Cunningham, G. B. (2002). Examining the relationship among Miles and Snow's strategic types and measures of organizational effectiveness in NCAA Division I Athletic Departments. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 37(2), 159-175.
- Cunningham, G. B., & Ashley, F. B. (2001). Isomorphic tendencies in NCAA athletic departments: The use of competing theories and advancement of theory. *Sport Management Review*, 4(1), 47-63.
- Cunningham, G. B., & Sagas, M. (2004). People make the difference: The influence of the coaching staff's human capital and diversity on team performance. *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 4(3), 3-21.
- Danylchuk, K. E., & Chelladurai, P. (1999). The nature of managerial work in Canadian Intercollegiate Athletics. *Journal of Sport Management*, 13, 148-166.
- Department of Education, U. (2008). Athletic Department Information Retrieved 2008-02-18, from <http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/>
- DeSchraver, T. D., & Jensen, P. E. (2002). Determinants of spectator attendance at NCAA Division II Football contests. *Journal of Sport Management*, 16, 311-330.
- Dillman, D. A. (2000). *Mail and Internet surveys : the tailored design method* (2nd ed.). New York: J. Wiley.
- DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), *Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
- DiMaggio, P. J., & Powel, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48, 147-160.
- DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1991). Introduction. In W. W. Powell & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.), *The new institutionalism in organizational analyses*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Dixon, M. A., & Sagas, M. (2007). The relationship between organizational support, work-family conflict, and the job-life satisfaction of university coaches. *Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport*, 78(3), 236-247.
- Dixon, M. A., Turner, B. A., Miller, L., Harrison, T., & Pace, D. (2004). Coaches' perceptions of rule violations in intercollegiate athletics: An empirical investigation. *Journal of Contemporary Athletics*, 1(3), 257-279.
- Dixon, M. A., Turner, B. A., Pastore, D. L., & Mahony, D. F. (2003). Rule violations in intercollegiate athletics: A qualitative investigation utilizing an organizational justice framework. *Journal of Academic Ethics*, 1, 59-90.
- Dooley, L. M., & Linder, J. R. (2003). The handling of nonresponse error. *Human Resource Development Quarterly*, 14, 99-110.
- Duderstadt, J. J. (2000). *Intercollegiate athletics and the American university : a university president's perspective*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Elliott, S. A., & Mason, D. S. (2001). Gender equity in intercollegiate athletics: An alternative model to achieving Title IX compliance. *Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport*, 11, 1-24.
- Etzioni, A. (1964). *Modern organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Fields, S. K. (2003). Hoover v. Meiklejohn: The equal protection clause, girls, and soccer. *Journal of Sport History*, 30(3), 401-413.

- Fink, J. S., Pastore, D., & Riemer, H. A. (2003). Managing employee diversity: Perceived practices and organizational outcomes in NCAA Division III athletic departments. *Sport Management Review*, 6, 147-168.
- Fink, J. S., Pastore, D. L., & Riemer, H. A. (2001). Do differences make a difference? Managing diversity in Division IA intercollegiate athletics. *Journal of Sport Management*, 15, 10-40.
- Firestone, W. A. (1985). The study of loose coupling: Problems, progress, and prospects. *Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization*, 5, 3-30.
- Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 18, 39-50.
- Fowler, F. J., Jr. (1993). *Survey research methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage publications.
- Fox, R. J., Melvin, R. C., & Kim, J. (1988). Mail survey response rate. A meta-analysis of selected techniques for inducing response. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 52, 467-491.
- Fraenkel, J. R., & Wallen, N. E. (2003). *How to design and evaluate research in education* (5th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
- Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic management: A stakeholder approach*. Boston: Pitman.
- French, B. F., & Finch, W. H. (2006). Confirmatory factor analytic procedures for the determination of measurement invariance. *Structural Equation Modeling*, 13(3), 378-402.
- Frey, J. H. (1994). Deviance of organizational subunits: The case of college athletic departments. *Journal of Sport & Social Issues*, 18(2), 110-122.
- Fromme, K., Katz, E. C., & Rivet, K. (1997). Outcome expectancies and risk taking behavior. *Cognitive Therapy and Research*, 21(4), 421-442.
- Funk, G. D. (1991). *Major violation: The unbalanced priorities in athletics and academics*. Champaign, IL: Leisure.
- Geist, A. L., & Pastore, D. (2002). Leadership - NCAA Division II athletics directors. *Athletics Administration*, 1, 10-13.
- Goff, B. (2000). Effects of university athletics on the university: A review and extension of empirical assessment. *Journal of Sport Management*, 14, 85-104.
- Gouldner, A. (1954). *Patterns of industrial bureaucracy*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Grant, J. S., & Davis, L. L. (1997). Selection and use of content experts for instrument development. *Research in Nursing & Health*, 20(3), 269-274.
- Hagan, J., Hewitt, J. D., & Alwin, D. F. (1979). Ceremonial justice: Crime and punishment in a loosely coupled system. *Social Forces*, 58, 506-527.
- Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1998). *Multivariate data analysis* (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Hallett, T., & Ventresca, M. J. (2006a). How institutions form. Loose coupling as mechanism in Gouldner's Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 49(7), 908-924.
- Hallett, T., & Ventresca, M. J. (2006b). Inhabited institutions: Social interactions and organizational forms in Gouldner's Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. *Theory and Society*, 35, 213-236.

- Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1977). The population ecology of organizations. *Journal of Sociology*, 82, 929-964.
- Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1998). Fit indices in covariance structure modeling: Sensitivity to underparameterized model specification. *Psychological Methods*, 3(4), 424-453.
- Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling*, 6, 1-55.
- Joreskog, K. G., & Sorbom, D. (1996). *LISREL 8 user's reference guide*. Chicago, IL: Scientific Software.
- Kaplan, D. (1988). The impact of specification error on the estimation, testing, and improvement of structural equation models. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 23, 69-86.
- Kelloway, E. K. (1995). Structural equation modelling in perspective. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 16(3), 215-224.
- Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Bolger, N. (1998). Data analysis in psychology. In D. T. Gilbert, S. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (4th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kent, A., Jordan, C., & Inoue, Y. (2009). *Nonresponse in sport management research: A content analysis of the Journal of Sport Management*. Paper presented at the North American Society for Sport Management Conference, Columbia, SC.
- Kent, A., & Turner, B. A. (2002). Increasing response rates among coaches: The role of prenotification methods. *Journal of Sport Management*, 16, 230-238.
- Kihl, L. (2007). Moral codes, moral tensions and hiding behind the rules: A snapshot of athletic administrators' practical morality. *Sport Management Review*, 10, 279-305.
- Kihl, L., Richardson, T., & Campisi, C. (2008). Toward a grounded theory of student-athlete suffering and dealing with academic corruption. *Journal of Sport Management*, 22, 273-302.
- Kilbourne, W., Grunhagen, M., & Foley, J. (2005). A cross-cultural examination of the relationship between materialism and individual values. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 26, 624-641.
- Kim, J., & Cunningham, G. B. (2005). Moderating effects of organizational support on the relationship between work experiences and job satisfaction among university coaches. *International Journal of Sport Psychology*, 36, 50-64.
- Kim, M., Trail, G., Lim, J., & Kim, Y. K. (2009). The role of psychological contract in intention to continue volunteering. *Journal of Sport Management*, 23(5), 549-573.
- Knight Foundation, C. o. I. A. (2001). A call to action. Reconnecting college sports and higher education (pp. 48). Miami, FL: John S and James L. Knight Foundation.
- Koch, J. V., & Leonard, W. M. (1978). The NCAA. A socio-economic analysis: The development of the college sports cartel from social movement to formal organizations. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 37(3), 225-239.
- Kuga, D. J. (1996). Governance of intercollegiate athletics: Perceptions of faculty members. *Journal of Sport Management*, 10, 149-168.

- Kwon, H. H., Trail, G., & James, J. D. (2007). The mediating role of perceived value: Team identification and purchase intention of team-licensed apparel. *Journal of Sport Management*, 21(4), 540-554.
- Langlett, G. (2003). The relationship between recruiting and team performance in Division IA college football. *Journal of Sport Economics*, 4, 240-245.
- Lawrence, H. J., Kaburakis, A., & Merckx, C. (2008). NCAA Division I recruiting: Identifying and mitigating institutional risk associated with the official visit. *Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport*, 18(1), 89-125.
- Lopez, S. H. (2006). Emotional labor and organized emotional care. Conceptualizing nursing home care work. *Work and Occupations*, 33(2), 133-160.
- Lopez, S. H. (2007). Efficiency and the fix revisited: Informal relations and mock routinization in a nonprofit nursing home. *Qualitative Sociology*, 30, 225-247.
- MacCallum, R. C. (1986). Specification searches in covariance structure modeling. *Psychological Bulletin*, 100, 107-120.
- MacCallum, R. C., Roznowski, M., & Necowitz, L. B. (1992). Model modifications in covariance structure analysis: The problem of capitalization on chance. *Psychological Bulletin*, 111(3), 490-504.
- MacCallum, R. C., Wegener, D. T., Uchino, B. N., & Fabrigar, L. R. (1993). The problem of equivalent models in applications of covariance structure analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 114(1), 185-199.
- MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C., & Williams, J. (2004). Confidence limits for the indirect effect: Distribution of the product and resampling methods. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 39(1), 99-128.
- MacLean, J. C., & Chelladurai, P. (1995). Dimensions of coaching performance: development of a scale. *Journal of Sport Management*, 9, 194-207.
- Mahony, D. F., Fink, J. S., & Pastore, D. L. (1999). Ethics in intercollegiate athletics: An examination of NCAA violations and penalties 1952-1997. *Professional Ethics*, 7(2), 53-74.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1976). *Ambiguity and choice in organizations*. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life. *The American Political Science Review*, 78(3), 734-749.
- May, K., Chelladurai, P., & Trail, G. (2007). A model of volunteer retention in youth sport. *Journal of Sport Management*, 21, 151-171.
- McGuire, R., & Trail, G. (2002). Satisfaction and importance of athletic department goals: The views of university presidents. *International Journal of Sport Management*, 3(1), 53-73.
- Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83, 340-363.
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1978). The structure of educational organizations. In J. W. Meyer (Ed.), *Environments and organizations* (pp. 78-109). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (2001). The structure of educational organizations. In J. H. Ballantine & J. Z. Spade (Eds.), *Schools and Society. A sociological approach to education* (pp. 77-87). Stamford, CT: Wadsworth.

- Miller, L. E., & Smith, K. L. (1983). Handling nonresponse issues. *Journal of Extension*, 21(5), 45-50.
- Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. *Academy of Management Review*, 22(4), 853-886.
- Mohr, L. B. (1973). The concept of organizational goals. *The American Political Science Review*, 67, 470-481.
- Mondello, M. J., & Abernethy, A. M. (2000). An historical overview of student-athlete academic eligibility and the future implications of Cureton v. NCAA. *Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal*, 7, 127-150.
- Muthen, L. K., & Muthen, B. O. (2009). *Mplus Statistical analysis with latent variables. User's Guide*. (5th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Muthen & Muthen.
- NCAA. (2008). *2008-09 NCAA Division I Manual*. Indianapolis, IN: NCAA.
- NCAA. (2009). Race and gender demographics (pp. 218). Indianapolis.
- Netemeyer, R. G., Brashear-Alejandro, T., & Boles, J. S. (2004). A cross-national model of job-related outcomes of work role and family role variables: A retail scales context. *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, 32(1), 49-60.
- Nunnally, J. C. (1978). *Psychometric theory* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- O'Rourke, S. M., & Chelladurai, P. (2006). Effectiveness of the National Collegiate Athletic Association: Perceptions of intercollegiate athletic administrators. *International Journal of Sport Management*, 7, 82-101.
- Oliver, C. (1988). The collective strategy framework: An application competing predictions of isomorphism. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 33, 543-561.
- Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responded to institutional pressures. *The Academy of Management Review*, 16(1), 145-179.
- Orton, D. J., & Weick, K. E. (1990). Loosely coupled systems: A reconceptualization. *The Academy of Management Review*, 15(2), 203-223.
- Ostfield, A. (2006). The moneyball approach - basketball and the business side of sport. *Human Resource Management*, 45(1), 136-139.
- Otto, K. A. (2005). Major violations and NCAA 'powerhouse' football programs: What are the Odds of being charged? *Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport*, 15, 39-57.
- Otto, K. A., & Stippich, K. S. (2008). Revisiting Tarkanian: The entwinement and interdependence of the NCAA and State Universities and Colleges 20 years later. *Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport*, 18(2), 243-308.
- Padilla, A., & Baumer, D. (1994). Big-time college sports: Management and economic issues. *Journal of Sport & Social Issues*, 18(2), 123-143.
- Parsons, T. (1960). A sociological approach to the theory of organization. In T. Parsons (Ed.), *Structure and process in modern societies* (pp. 16-58). Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Pastore, D. L., Goldfine, B., & Riemer, H. A. (1996). NCAA college coaches and athletic administrative support. *Journal of Sport Management*, 10, 373-387.
- Pentz, M. A., & Chou, C. P. (1994). Measurement invariance in longitudinal clinical research assuming change from development and intervention. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 62(3), 450-462.
- Perrow, C. (1961). The analysis of goals in complex organizations. *American Sociological Review*, 26(6), 854-866.

- Phillips, R. (2003). Stakeholder legitimacy. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 13(1), 25-41.
- Ployhart, R. E., & Oswald, F. L. (2004). Applications of mean and covariance structure analysis: Integrating correlational and experimental approaches. *Organizational Research Methods*, 7, 27-65.
- Ponticello, B. W. (1991). 'Over' due process: The saga of the NCAA, its members and their representatives. *Lincoln Law Review*, 20, 43-69.
- Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects in simple mediation models. *Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers*, 36(4), 717-731.
- Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior Research Methods*, 40(3), 879-891.
- Putler, D. S., & Wolfe, R. (1999). Perceptions of intercollegiate athletic programs: Priorities and tradeoffs. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 16, 301-325.
- Reise, S. P., Widaman, K. F., & Pugh, R. H. (1993). Confirmatory factor analysis and item response theory: Two approaches for exploring measurement invariance. *Psychological Bulletin*, 114, 522-566.
- Rishe, P. J. (2003). A reexamination of how athletics success impacts graduation rates. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 62(2), 407-427.
- Robst, J., & Keil, J. (2000). The relationship between athletic participation and academic performance: evidence from NCAA Division III. *Applied Economics*, 32, 547-558.
- Rocha, C. M., & Turner, B. A. (2008). Organizational effectiveness of athletic departments and coaches' extra-role behaviors. *Journal of Issues in Intercollegiate Athletics*, 1, 124-144.
- Rogers, C. P. (2008). The quest for number one in college football: The revised Bowl Championship Series, antitrust, and the winner take all syndrome. *Marquette Sports Law Review*, 18, 285-307.
- Rubin, I. S. (1979). Retrenchment, loose structure, and adaptability in the university. *Sociology of Education*, 52, 211-222.
- Rubio, D. M., Berg-Weger, M., Tebb, S. S., Lee, E. S., & Rauch, S. (2003). Objectifying content validity: Conducting a content validity study in social work research. *Social Work Research*, 27(2), 94-104.
- Sallaz, J. J. (2002). The house rules. Autonomy and interests among service workers in the contemporary casino industry. *Work and Occupations*, 29(4), 394-427.
- Sallaz, J. J. (2009). *The labor of luck: Casino Capitalism in the United States and South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schaie, K. W., Maitland, S. B., Willis, S. L., & Intrieri, R. C. (1998). Longitudinal invariance of adult psychometric ability factor structures across 7 years. *Psychology and Aging*, 13(1), 8-20.
- Scott, W. R. (2001). *Institutions and organizations* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Seo, W. J., & Green, B. C. (2008). Development of the motivation scale for sport online consumption. *Journal of Sport Management*, 22(1), 82-109.

- Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New procedures and recommendations. *Psychological Methods*, 7, 422-445.
- Shulman, J. L., & Bowen, W. G. (2001). *The game of life: college sports and educational values*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Simon, H. A. (1964). On the concept of organizational goal. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 9, 1-22.
- Singer, E., Mathiowetz, N., & Couper, M. P. (1993). The impact of privacy and confidentiality concerns on survey participation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 57, 465-482.
- Single, D. (1989). The role of directors of athletics in restoring integrity to intercollegiate sport. In R. E. Lapchick & J. B. Slaughter (Eds.), *The rules of the game: Ethics in college sport* (pp. 151-169). New York: MacMillian.
- Smart, D. L., & Wolfe, R. A. (2000). Examining sustainable competitive advantage in intercollegiate athletics: A resource-based view. *Journal of Sport Management*, 14, 133-153.
- Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equation models. *Sociological Methodology*, 290-312.
- Sobel, M. E. (1986). Some new results on indirect effects and their standard errors in covariance structure models. *Sociological Methodology*, 159-186.
- Sperber, M. A. (1990). *College sports inc. : the athletic department vs [sic] the university* (1st ed.). New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Sperber, M. A. (2000). *Beer and circus : how big-time college sports is crippling undergraduate education* (1st ed.). New York: Henry Holt.
- Sperber, M. A. (2001). College Sports Inc.: The athletic department vs. the university. In A. Yiannakis & M. J. Melnick (Eds.), *Contemporary issues in sociology of sport* (pp. 147-157). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
- Starbuck, W. H. (1976). Organizations and their environments. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (pp. 1069-1123). New York: Rand McNally.
- Staurowsky, E. J., & Ridpath, D. (2005). The case for a minimum 2.0 standard for NCAA Division I athletes. *Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport*, 15, 113-138.
- Steenkamp, J. E. M., & Baumgartner, H. (1998). Assessing measurement invariance in cross-national consumer research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 25, 78-90.
- Steers, R. M. (1975). Problems in the measurement of organizational effectiveness. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 20(4), 546-558.
- Steers, R. M. (1977). *Organizational effectiveness: A behavioral view*. Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear.
- Steiger, J. H. (1990). Structural model evaluation and modification: An interval estimation approach. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 25, 173-180.
- Steiger, J. H. (2001). Driving fast in reverse: The relationship between software development, theory, and education in structural equation modeling. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 96, 331-338.
- Stern, R. N. (1979). The development of an interorganizational control network: The case of intercollegiate athletics. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 24, 242-266.

- Stevens, J. (1996). *Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences* (3rd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 20, 571-610.
- Svare, B. B. (2004). *Reforming sports before the clock runs out: One man's journey through runaway sports culture*. Delmar, NY: Boralice Publishing.
- Telander, R. (1996). *The hundred yard lie : the corruption of college football and what we can do to stop it* (Illini Books ed.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Thomas, J. (1984). Some aspects of negotiated order, loose coupling, and mesostructure in maximum security prisons. *Symbolic Interaction*, 7, 213-231.
- Thompson, J. D. (1967). *Organizations in action*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of organizations: The diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 28, 22-39.
- Trail, G. (2004). Leadership, cohesion, and outcomes in scholastic sports. *international Journal of Sport Management*, 5, 111-132.
- Trail, G., & Chelladurai, P. (2000). Perceptions of goals and processes of intercollegiate athletics: A case study. *Journal of Sport Management*, 14, 154-178.
- Trail, G., & Chelladurai, P. (2002). Perceptions of intercollegiate athletic goals and process: The influence of personal values. *Journal of Sport Management*, 16, 289-310.
- Turner, B. A., & Chelladurai, P. (2005). Organizational and occupational commitment, intention to leave, and perceived performance of intercollegiate coaches. *Journal of Sport Management*, 19, 193-211.
- Turner, B. A., & Jordan, J. S. (2009). *Handling nonresponse error: Examining the utility of techniques suggested by Miller and Smith (1983) in a sport management context*. Paper presented at the North American Society for Sport Management Conference, Columbia, SC.
- Udy, S. H., Jr. (1971). *Working in traditional and modern society*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Vancouver, J. B., & Schmitt, N. W. (1991). An exploratory examination of person-organization fit: Organizational goal congruence. *Personnel Psychology*, 44(2), 333-352.
- Vandenberg, R., & Lance, C. E. (2000). A review and synthesis of the measurement invariance literature: Suggestions, practices, and recommendations for organizational research. *Organizational Research Methods*, 3(1), 4-70.
- Warriner, C. K. (1965). The problem of organizational purpose. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 6, 139-146.
- Weber, M. (1947). *The theory of social and economic organization*. New York: University Press.
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: an outline of interpretative sociology*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 21(1), 1-19.
- Weistart, J. (1998). Title IX and intercollegiate sports: Equal opportunity? *The Brookings Review*, 16, 39-43.

- West, S. G. (2001). New approaches to missing data in psychological research: Introduction to the special section. *Psychological Methods*, 6(4), 315-316.
- Westphal, J. D., & Zajac, E. J. (1998). The symbolic management stockholders: Corporate governance reforms and shareholder reaction. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 39, 367-390.
- Widaman, K. F., & Reise, S. P. (1997). Exploring the measurement invariance of psychological instruments: Applications in the substance domain. In K. J. Bryant, M. Windle & S. G. West (Eds.), *The science of prevention: Methodological advances from alcohol and substance abuse research* (pp. 281-324). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Wolfe, R., Hoeber, L., & Babiak, K. (2002). Perceptions of the effectiveness of sport organizations: The case of intercollegiate athletics. *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 2, 135-156.
- Wolfe, R. A., & Putler, D. S. (2002). How tight are ties the bind stakeholder groups? *Organization Science*, 13(1), 64-80.
- Yammarino, F. J., Skinner, S. J., & Childers, T. L. (1991). Understanding mail survey response behavior. A meta-analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 55(4), 613-639.
- Young, O. R. (1986). International regimes: Toward a new theory of institutions. *World Politics*, 39(1), 104-122.
- Yuchtman, E., & Seashore, S. E. (1967). A system resource approach to organizational effectiveness. *American Sociological Review*, 32(6), 891-903.
- Zimbalist, A. S. (1999). *Unpaid professionals : commercialism and conflict in big-time college sports*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Zucker, L. G. (1977). In the role of institutionalization in cultural persistence. *American Sociological Review*, 42(5), 726-743.
- Zucker, L. G. (1983). Organizations as institutions. In S. B. Bachrach (Ed.), *Research in the sociology of organizations* (Vol. 2, pp. 1-43). Greenwich, CT: JAI.

ENDNOTES

1. In dividing member colleges into three divisions, the NCAA has created contrasts among them. Only Division I colleges count on revenue-generation football and basketball programs. Thus, the missions of Division II and Division III schools do not emphasize the financial aspects of college athletics. Nevertheless, they are still very pluralistic organizations, with multiple and, sometimes, contradictory objectives to be reached.

2. Rules are usually enforced from the top (managers) to the bottom (employees). However, Gouldner (1954) mentioned that the opposite is also possible in punishment-centered bureaucracies.

3. Gouldner's punishment-centered bureaucracy is the pattern of bureaucracy that associates with Weber's (1978) "iron cage" (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006a).

4. To make clear the relationship between (a) different degrees of coupling between rules and activities and (b) prevalent pattern of bureaucracy inside organizations, Hallett and Ventresca (2006b) posed a question: "What is *mock bureaucracy* if not a *loosely coupled* system of indulgency (worker autonomy) dressed in the ceremonial clothes of bureaucratic accountability?" (p. 221, emphases in the original).

5. Although in different conferences, all universities mentioned in this paragraph are part of NCAA Division I. Ohio State, Michigan, and Penn State are with the Big Ten Conference. While Harvard, Yale, and Princeton are Ivy League universities.

6. Decoupling and loose coupling are used interchangeably in Meyer and Rowan (1977). For example on pages 341 and 343, they used the term “loosely coupled” to explain how organizations buffered the effects of institutional rules on technical activities. On pages 356 and 357, they used the terms “decoupling” and “decoupled”, when explaining the same process to solve conflicts between ceremonial rules and efficiency of technical activities. I follow this conceptualization in this paper. However, other authors have differentiated among noncoupled, decoupled, tightly coupled, and loosely coupled systems. Orton and Weick (1990) offered a discussion about the differences in these terms.

7. Gouldner (1954) called the prior local order “the pattern of indulgency”. Terms, such as leniency, flexibility in the application of the rules, second chances, and blind eyes toward misappropriation, were used to describe this pattern of indulgency used by the old general manager. Gouldner asserted that the pattern of indulgency characterized the period before the introduction of a “formal” bureaucracy, which just happened with the arrival of the new general manager.