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Effort for Payment in Organizations:

Rewards, Labor Markets, and Interpersonal Citizenship Behaviors

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Abstract

Previous research has suggested that effort level – in the form of willingness to help – can be affected by the presence of a reward and type of reward being offered (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). Reward types generally fall into two primary categories: social exchanges, which are friendly and non-contractual, and economic exchanges, which are typically defined by monetary exchanges and are contractual in nature. Interpersonal citizenship behaviors (ICBs) are a proxy for effort in the current study, as they are defined by employees helping one another with work- or personal-related matters in the workplace (Williams & Anderson, 1991). The main purpose of the current study was to investigate the effect of type of reward (social vs. monetary vs. mixed vs. no reward) on willingness to engage in ICBs within in-group supervisor-supervisee relationships. Results showed that there was an overall significant effect of reward type on willingness to engage in ICBs. Post-hoc tests revealed that the monetary condition was significantly higher than the control condition. Furthermore, the control condition yielded the lowest ICB score, and the three reward conditions had very similar means, suggesting that the presence of any type of reward may have been slightly more influential in eliciting effort than the absence of a reward. Moreover, in contrast to previous research that suggested that mixed rewards are perceived as monetary and not social (Heyman & Ariely, 2004), results showed that participants viewed social and mixed rewards similarly, but viewed monetary and mixed rewards significantly differently. Overall, the findings suggest that exchange marketplaces seem to be more complex when they occur in the workplace.

Chapter I

Review of the Literature

Traditionally, individual performance in the workplace is evaluated relative to the accomplishment of specific tasks or any other activities that relate to the technical core of an organization (Borman & Motowildo, 1997). However, in addition to task performance, researchers have also emphasized the importance of other dimensions of performance, such as contextual performance (Borman & Motowildo, 1997; Coleman & Borman, 2000), or organizational citizenship behavior (OCB; Organ, 1988). Organ, Podsakoff, and MacKenzie (2006) argue that, as organizations become less vertical and work structures become increasingly integrated and team-oriented, citizenship behaviors may be critical in terms of maximizing organizational effectiveness. Specifically, behaviors involving cooperation, flexibility, and affiliation are becoming recognized as vital to the success of proactive organizations in today's business environment (Taylor, Kluemper, & Mossholder, 2010). Interpersonal citizenship behavior (ICB) is one dimension of OCB that occurs when employees assist other employees – regardless of status – with work-related tasks or personal issues that go beyond contractual obligations (Bowler & Brass, 2006; Coleman & Borman, 2000; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002; Williams & Anderson, 1991).

ICBs should be of obvious interest to managers, as organizational objectives are often malleable and can only be accomplished through employees' willingness to adapt. Additionally, group performance could be maximized through employee flexibility in this

regard (Podsakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 1997). Using the construct's traditional definition, ICBs go beyond the scope of contractual job requirements (Organ, 1988), suggesting that it may be difficult to foster ICBs through a formal requirement or procedure. Yet it is possible that less formal approaches to motivate employees could lead to greater ICBs and effort in general. For example, research on social exchange theory suggests that the nature of supervisor-subordinate relationships has the potential to lead to greater occurrences of ICBs (Cardona, Lawrence, & Bentler, 2004; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Additionally, leader-member exchange (LMX) theory purports that supervisors yield greater effort from employees with whom they share in-group relationships relative to those in out-group relationships (Graen & Cashman, 1975). It appears that in-group supervisor-subordinate relationships are characterized by friendly social exchanges that foster ICBs from both parties (Ilies, Nahrgang, & Moregeson 2007; Wayne & Green, 1993)

Assuming supervisors have the ability to foster ICBs through the use of social exchanges, it is worth questioning whether there are optimal forms of exchanges that could potentially be utilized by supervisors. Heyman and Ariely (2004) contend that two factors that need to be considered with regards to maximizing effort are both the nature and magnitude of the exchange being offered. The purpose of the current study is to explore employees' willingness to engage in ICBs in exchange for monetary rewards, social rewards, and rewards that combine elements of both conditions.

It is necessary to review the nature of interpersonal relationships, which will be explored in the context of Fiske's (1992) relational theory. Furthermore, because supervisor-subordinate relationships are the primary focus of the study, theory on

interpersonal relationships in the workplace is also important to consider. For the purposes of this study, LMX theory serves as the theoretical framework in which interpersonal exchanges are made. OCBs and ICBs are also examined, as it is necessary to highlight the interpersonal component of these behaviors. Finally, type of reward is explored to further emphasize the influence of exchange marketplace on effort, and thus willingness to engage in ICBs.

Social Exchange Theory

Blau (1964) discusses the nature of social exchanges as a matter of cost-benefit analysis; all social relationships require individuals to undergo a subjective evaluation of the costs and benefits involved in a given relationship. Costs refer to negative elements of the relationship, such as time and effort, whereas benefits refer to the rewards attained from the relationship, such as receiving money or acceptance. Central to social exchange theory is the norm of reciprocity, which explains that there is an obligatory component to social exchanges (Gouldner, 1960). In such exchanges, individuals incur obligations to repay benefits so that the exchanges taking place are mutually beneficial (Wayne & Green, 1993).

Blau (1964) explains that we tend to operate out of two primary marketplaces involving either social or economic (i.e., monetary) exchanges. Social exchanges can be thought of as egalitarian transactions that are not sensitive to the magnitude of compensation involved. These exchanges rely heavily on trust and are based on an implied sense of obligation to reciprocate with one another. Examples of social exchanges include helping a friend rearrange his house furniture or preparing dinner for a significant other. The crux of social exchanges is that they generally do not involve

monetary transactions, and that the obligation of individual parties to reciprocate is not contractually established. Rather, exchanges come in the form of gifts, favors, or any other non-monetary transactions based on unspecified obligations (e.g., compliments, showing deference to someone). Monetary exchanges differ in that they are contingent on reciprocity and explicitly involve monetary or contractual transactions (Blau, 1964). There are no subtleties associated with these exchanges regarding the expectations of those involved. Instead, transactions are based on contractual obligations typically involving the exchange of monetary rewards for various forms of effort. Examples of monetary exchanges include receiving financial compensation for helping a friend rearrange his house furniture, or charging a fee after preparing a meal for another individual.

Relational Theory

One theory that explores the nature of exchanges in interpersonal relationships is Fiske's (1992) relational theory. Fiske purports that there are four forms of social relationships that fall under the social and economic exchange umbrella: communal sharing (CS), authority ranking (AR), equality matching (EM), and market pricing (MP). CS refers to instances in which individuals in a community or group collectively put forth effort and have rewards distributed in a way that best reflects the advancement of the group. An important characteristic of CS is that group needs transcend individual needs. Group members in CS relationships display a tacit acceptance of this fundamental principle. An example might include a friend bringing a meal to a family reunion and sharing it with every attendee, regardless of financial status, age, or other extraneous characteristics.

AR relationships are those in which a clear hierarchy of superiority is established and accepted. For example, the relationship between a mother and her son is a social relationship in which one member has clear superiority over another. A mother can freely give orders to her son, but the son cannot give orders to his mother. However, both parties benefit from the relationship (i.e., a mother provides for her son). Thus, the hierarchy within the relationship is accepted and embraced by both parties.

In EM relationships, group members recognize and adhere to a balance of social exchanges. The relationship is founded on the idea that rewards will never be lopsided in any one member's favor (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). Although EM relationships are marked by an awareness of exchanges that are necessary to restore balance, they typically do not involve socially meaningful ratios. In other words, the magnitude of favors being exchanged is not calculated and thus there is no official basis for comparison. An example of this type of relationship could include a wife who cooks dinner for her husband every night in exchange for the husband's willingness to wash dishes afterward.

Finally, in MP relationships, socially meaningful ratios are central to all exchanges made by any participating members. These relationships are founded on cost-benefit analyses involving prices, wages, or any contractual obligations held between the involved parties. Most relationships involving money, such as the relationship between a renter and his landlord, are classified under the MP label.

Heyman and Ariely (2004) discuss the influence that relational models can have on individual effort in the context of labor markets. The authors explain that in economic markets, effort exerted is dependent on formal reciprocity; MP relationships are characterized by economic market exchanges. In social markets, effort is influenced by

altruism, which renders the amount of compensation involved irrelevant. Unlike MP relationships, CS, AR, and EM relationships occur in social marketplaces. The authors surveyed over 600 students, asking participants to rate the likelihood that other students would be willing to load a sofa into a van in exchange for various forms of compensation. Ratings of others were used in order to mitigate the desirability to respond favorably to the request. Three forms of payment (money, candy, and monetized candy) and two different levels of payment (low and medium) were included in the design. As hypothesized, the authors found that expected willingness to help was higher in social markets – or, the candy condition – than in economic markets in which the reward was a small monetary payment of equal market value to the candy. Once the level of payment went from low to medium, there were no significant differences between social and monetary rewards. The control condition – which did not feature a reward – yielded a significantly higher expected willingness to help than the low monetary reward condition, but similar to the low social reward condition.

Moreover, Heyman and Ariely (2004) found that mixed markets – a market that is characterized by both social and monetary exchanges – more closely resemble economic markets than social markets. In their study, mixed markets were simulated by offering subjects the same reward used in the social market condition with the caveat that the market price of the candy was explicitly stated. The social reward was "monetized," thus creating a mixed-market condition. The results of their study found monetized candy to follow a pattern similar to the cash (or monetary) condition. The authors provide further evidence for their theory by replicating this study but substituting perceived willingness

to help with actual effort in the form of participation in a repetitive computer activity. Indeed, their results followed a similar pattern to the first study.

The results of the Heyman and Ariely (2004) studies have important implications for incentive-based rewards in a variety of settings. Perhaps the most important finding is that offering a low-value monetary reward in exchange for a given favor might diminish the effort put forth by individual(s) receiving a reward, thus reducing the usefulness of the reward. Instead, garnering maximum effort from individuals might be optimized if a non-monetary social reward is used. In addition, simply mentioning the market value of an otherwise social reward could bring about awareness of the type of exchange an individual is operating out of, and this could also reduce the level of effort exerted on a given task.

Based on the fundamental nature of most employment contracts, it may appear that supervisor-supervisee relationships fall under the economic market category. Companies are contractually obligated to pay employees for their services, and because supervisors are sometimes responsible for hiring their supervisees, there may be instances in which employees view the supervisor-subordinate relationship as an economic exchange relationship. However, because supervisors are often not directly involved with the hiring of subordinates, it is likely that the supervisor-subordinate relationship is generally perceived as a social exchange relationship by both parties..

However, there are also a number of elements in the employer-employee relationship that represent social market norms (Wayne & Green, 1993). First, the supervisee may view the financial and contractual components of his or her position as part of the organization's expectations, as opposed to the supervisor's expectations. With

this perspective, the supervisor-supervisee dyad is not based on monetary norms. Rather, it would fall under the AR relational model; a supervisor can give orders to a supervisee, and a supervisee carries out these obligations with a clear understanding of the parameters of authority. It is the organization that has established a work contract with the employee, and so the supervisor's relationship with the supervisee may be separate from labor contracts typical of economic markets.

LMX Theory

Wayne and Green (1993) suggest that exchanges occurring in supervisor-supervisee relationships can fall under both social and economic markets. According to LMX theory, there are two primary groups of exchanges that occur between supervisors and supervisees: in-group and out-group exchanges (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen, 1976; Graen & Cashman, 1975). In-group exchanges are marked by trust, interpersonal relationships, and support, whereas out-group exchanges are based on the fulfillment of formal work contract obligations. A meta-analysis by Gerstner and Day (1997) highlighted the myriad positive outcomes of LMX relationships, including job performance, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment. Further, Settoon, Bennett, and Liden (1996) investigated the relationship between leader-member exchange and employee reciprocity. The authors found significant positive relationships between quality of exchange and both interpersonal citizenship behaviors and in-role behaviors. A meta-analysis by Ilies et al. (2007) further supports this claim, finding a moderately strong relationship between LMX and citizenship behaviors directed toward individuals and the organization. As predicted by the authors, individual-targeted behaviors had a stronger correlation with LMX than organization-directed behaviors. Wayne and Green

(1993) argue that in-group and out-group exchanges are analogous to social and monetary exchanges, respectively. The authors hypothesized that LMX would be positively related to two dimensions of Organ's (1988) conception of OCB – compliance and altruism. Their research supports the notion that LMX is positively related to altruism, though they did not find a significant relationship between LMX and compliance. Intuitively, this makes sense; altruism is defined by discretionary behaviors that are intended to help other employees, whereas compliance is an impersonal dimension of OCB. Thus, an important takeaway from their study is that in-group supervisor-subordinate dyads can yield greater ICBs while remaining independent of other dimensions of OCB.

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

It has been argued that factors unrelated to motivation in the workplace – including work-life balance, fringe benefits, and hierarchical status – are unlikely to enhance job performance (Herzberg, 1968). However, social exchange theory supports the possibility that positive exchanges can lead to additional effort which can indirectly lead to greater job performance. One such way is through OCBs, or voluntary helping behaviors that are not officially enforced by one's company – nor are they objectively tied to rewards – but which serve to aid the organization (Coleman & Borman, 2000; Organ, 1988; Organ, 1997). While OCB was originally defined by two dimensions – altruism and compliance – Organ (1988) asserts that the compliance dimension is comprised of various subdimensions, including courtesy, civic virtue, conscientiousness, and sportsmanship. Courtesy is characterized by politeness and consideration for the needs of others in the workplace. Civic virtue refers to employees' willingness to become actively involved in the organization and to promote the organization's wellbeing.

Conscientiousness is defined as a willingness to go beyond minimal requirements and adhere to organizational policies and practices. Lastly, sportsmanship refers to tolerance of unexpected or unfavorable circumstances without a proclivity to complain.

Lambert (2000) suggested that OCB is a non-traditional component of job performance that may be encouraged through social exchange efforts. The author states that, "workers may feel obligated to exert extra "effort" in return for "extra" benefits" (p. 801). Indeed, it was found that perceptions of benefit usefulness – including that of fringe benefits and work-life balance efforts – were positively related to an interpersonal component within OCB (referred to by the author as 'interpersonal helping')., .

Cardona et al. (2004) differentiate between three exchange relationships employees can have with their organizations: monetary exchanges, work exchanges, and social exchanges. Monetary exchanges are based on perceptions of rewards provided by organizations, such as salary and hierarchical status. Work exchanges are defined by perceptions of job characteristics in terms of intrinsic value, such as whether a job helps an employee develop professionally or satisfies one's curiosity. Finally, social exchanges are characterized by the organizations' affective support for an employee. For example, an employee would have positive perceptions of the social exchange relationship if the organization tended to his or her emotional needs. The authors found that both work and social contracts were significantly related to OCBs, suggesting that relational factors can influence employees' willingness to engage in extra-role behaviors.

Interpersonal Citizenship Behaviors

Williams and Anderson (1991) further distinguish the dimensions of OCB from in-role activities. The authors conducted a factor analysis and found empirical support for

two primary dimensions of OCB: behaviors that benefit the organization (OCBO; e.g., "attendance at work is above the norm") and behaviors that benefit a specific individual within the organization (OCBI; e.g., "goes out of way to help new employees", p. 606). The items that comprise OCBO were derived from Organ's (1988) interpretation of compliance – or, courtesy, civic virtue, conscientiousness, and sportsmanship – while OCBI is based on the altruism dimension. Their research also provides additional support for the idea that dimensions of OCB are distinct from in-role behaviors.. Coleman and Borman (2000) explain that ICBs are extra-role behaviors that benefit other employees in the organization through cooperative and facilitative efforts. They occur in situations where employees assist one another in such a way that individual or group job performance is enhanced.

Settoon and Mossholder (2002) suggest that there are two primary forms of ICB: person-focused ICB and task-focused ICB. Person-focused ICBs occur when employees help one another with personal issues, and include actions such as showing concern for a coworker and complimenting an employee when he or she succeeds. On the other hand, task-focused ICBs surround job-related issues, such as helping a coworker with a challenging assignment, offering job advice, or providing job knowledge to help solve a problem. The authors add that both person- and task-focused ICB fall under Organ's (1988) definition of altruism, or that which Williams and Anderson (1991) refer to as OCBI.

A key factor that distinguishes ICBs from the broader OCB construct is that ICBs involve doing a favor for a specific recipient as opposed to the organization as a whole. It has been suggested that employees consciously choose to engage in individual

dimensions of OCB as opposed to demonstrating all facets of this construct (Organ, 1997; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002). It is possible for an employee to perform a wide range of ICBs without engaging in other forms of OCB. An individual might dislike his organization, but he could have a number of friends that he is willing to help on a regular basis (Bowler & Brass, 2006). Of course, this does not preclude the employee's ICBs from positively influencing the organization – it simply means that a fellow worker or group of workers is the target recipient of the behavior as opposed to the organization as a whole.

Social ties have been explored in the context of ICBs, and research has shown that strength of friendship is strongly related to both engaging in and receiving ICBs (Bowler & Brass, 2006). Without strong ties, it is unlikely that individuals will perform ICBs for one another. This type of exchange closely resembles an EM relationship in that the individuals involved are willing to do favors for one another without contractual obligations. Instead, their willingness to help one another is based on friendship and an unspoken agreement that the behavior will eventually be reciprocated in one way or another. The authors also found that asymmetrical influence is related to ICB performance. In a supervisor-supervisee dyad, the more influential individual (i.e., supervisor) is likely to report having received ICBs, but is unlikely to provide them to a less influential individual (i.e., supervisee). In contrast, the supervisee is likely to offer ICBs to a more influential employee, but is unlikely to receive ICBs from that individual. This type of exchange is similar to an AR relationship, where the individuals involved are of different statuses, but both members accept that there is a hierarchy in place where uneven exchanges take place.

ICBs are of much use to organizations, as research has identified positive relationships between ICBs and group performance (Podsakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 1997), as well as individual task performance (Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009). ICBs have also been linked to financial measures of organizational performance such as increased revenue and lower cost percentages (Walz & Niehoff, 1996). In a meta-analysis by Podsakoff et al. (2009), it was found that OCBs are significantly related to proximal measures of organizational performance, including individual and group productivity, efficiency, and cost reduction. While the authors found the same correlates for both OCBO and OCBI, they were unwilling to conclude that these dimensions have *the same effects*. Interestingly, an empirical review by Podsakoff et al. (2000) found that ICBs have a stronger relationship with organizational performance than other forms of citizenship behaviors. The logic behind these findings is that ICBs facilitate the accomplishment of individual or group tasks or serve to aid coworkers in the completion of work, which ultimately enhances organizational performance from a holistic perspective. Bowler and Brass (2006) stress that organizations need to consider ways to transfer ICBs to and from the right employees and directly acknowledge that the nature of social relationships within an organization can result in varying levels of ICBs.

Type of Reward

One area of social exchange theory that has received less attention is the possibility that supervisor-supervisee relationships can operate out of both economic and social markets. On the basis of Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research, it would seem possible to diminish employees' willingness to exert additional effort given exchanges that are inconsistent with relationship type. In other words, it is possible that an exchange

involving either social or monetary rewards could evoke an inconsistent market relationship. For example, a supervisor may require help with a project that is beyond the scope of the subordinate's responsibilities. Without additional assistance, the supervisor may have to stay at work later than expected in order to complete the project. The supervisor may be aware that their relationship is friendly and altruistic in nature, and therefore asks for the subordinate's assistance as a favor, knowing it will likely be fulfilled as there is a mutual understanding of the nature of their relationship. The subordinate may respond by assisting the supervisor with a maximum level of effort. However, if the supervisor was to persuade the subordinate to work on the basis of overtime pay (or any other monetary reward), the subordinate may temporarily perceive that their relationship operates out of an economic market. Based on Heyman and Ariely's (2004) theory, the supervisor could potentially yield less effort from the subordinate because a non-optimal exchange was utilized. Had the supervisor chosen a reward that was consistent with their relationship, the subordinate may have had a greater willingness to help.

This is just one of many possible scenarios in which a supervisor might solicit help from an employee in exchange for either a social or monetary reward. A different situation might involve a supervisor asking a subordinate to complete an assignment for an absent employee, and in exchange offering to pick up coffee or lunch as a friendly gesture. Alternatively, the supervisor could offer a monetary incentive, or monetize a social reward by mentioning the cost of the coffee or lunch. Employees are sometimes incentivized to work unusually long hours by being offered a meal paid for by the company. Another example could involve an employee who is given permission to use a

company credit card with the caveat that he or she can only spend a certain amount of money. In other organizations, supervisors may simply ask employees to stay late to work on a project as a favor, knowing the nature of their relationship allows for such requests. In sum, there are a plethora of hypothetical scenarios involving labor markets and supervisor-subordinate exchanges that could result in inconsistent levels of effort on the part of the subordinate.

Level of Reward

Heyman and Ariely (2004) also explore the influence of market level on effort. Their research suggests that low-value economic rewards can yield less effort than low-value social rewards, while medium-value economic and social rewards are not significantly different in terms of prompted effort. While undoubtedly an important finding, the authors never go into detail when defining level of value, nor do they indicate what scale of measurement these categories fall under. In other words, low and medium are subjective, and so it is difficult to determine how the authors would define a low- or medium-value reward in other scenarios. Moreover, perceptions of level of value are likely to vary depending on the individual. The current study does not focus on different levels, but rather a subjective view of low-value monetary, social, and mixed-market rewards in the workplace. The following section presents the rationale and specific hypotheses of the current study.

Chapter II

Rationale and Hypotheses

Given the evolving setting in which modern organizations function, less tangible components of performance are becoming increasingly necessary for organizations to consider (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). One intriguing aspect of ICBs is that they are naturally occurring instances of employees helping other employees beyond traditional expectations (Coleman & Borman. 2006). ICBs have been evaluated in terms of organizational effectiveness, and they have been shown to positively influence individual and group performance (Podsakoff et al., 1997; Podsakoff et al., 2000) as well as financial measures of organizational success (Walz & Niehoff, 1996).

Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) presents an interesting perspective from which ICBs can be viewed. The author states that people tend to operate out of two different labor markets: social and economic markets. Generally speaking, social exchanges are those that explain our need for interpersonal relationships and are marked by friendliness and altruism. Conversely, economic exchanges are individualistic in nature, as they are contingent on material compensation and have a contractual nature that is absent in social exchanges.

ICBs are analogous to the exchanges described by Blau in that they are defined by individuals' willingness to exert effort relative to the interpersonal relationships they perceive themselves to be in. Heyman and Ariely (2004) provide empirical evidence for the notion that social and economic exchanges can significantly influence individual

effort. In supervisor-subordinate relationships, subordinates' willingness to engage in ICBs could vary depending on the type of reward being offered, as well as whether a reward is being offered at all.

The current study explores the effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs within in-group supervisor-supervisee relationships. Reward types include social exchanges, monetary exchanges, and mixed-market exchanges. Heyman and Ariely (2004) hypothesized that monetizing social rewards (i.e., using mixed-market rewards) would effectively turn social exchanges into monetary exchanges. Their studies confirmed this hypothesis: mixed-market rewards influenced effort in a pattern similar to that of monetary rewards.

In the context of social exchange theory, ICBs can be viewed as a form of social exchange, and it follows that a transaction involving a social reward will be perceived as consistent with this behavior. In contrast, a supervisor offering a monetary reward is likely to cue an inconsistent marketplace in light of the subordinate's exchange. Thus, it is likely that social rewards offered by supervisors in exchange for ICBs would be viewed as favorable relative to monetary rewards.

Hypothesis 1: There will be a main effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs.

Hypothesis 1a: Willingness to engage in ICBs will be significantly greater in response to social rewards than in both the monetary reward and mixed-market reward conditions.

Hypothesis 1b: There will be no difference in willingness to engage in ICBs between the monetary reward and mixed-market reward conditions.

It is worthwhile to consider whether rewards are truly influencing willingness to engage in ICBs, or if individuals would be just as likely to engage in ICBs without being offered a reward. As a result, a control condition was included in the present study. However, no formal hypotheses were specified regarding the control condition; therefore, exploratory analyses were run to investigate any differences between the control condition and the three experimental conditions.

Chapter III

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited through a posting on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website, which is an online marketplace that connects requesters offering payment for completion of human intelligence tasks (HITs) and workers willing to complete these specific tasks for a predetermined fee. Participants had to be located in the United States in order to be eligible to participate, as it can be argued that there is an ethnocentric nature to the scenarios (i.e., there are American restaurants listed as benchmarks). MTurk allows for participants to be paid through Amazon as opposed to the researcher directly compensating participants. Barger, Behrend, Sharek, and Sinar (2011) suggest that offering participants $0.75 seems reasonable for a 30-minute study. Given that it is expected that the current study would last approximately 15 minutes, participants were offered $0.50 for completion of the survey. A power analysis performed using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed that to detect a medium effect size, having power set at .80, and using an alpha level of. 05, a sample size of 180 participants was needed. The initial data set consisted of 284 responses. However, participants with incomplete survey submissions, missing IDs, and/or incorrect quality check responses were not paid and were discarded. This resulted in a sample size of 226. Moreover, participants had to respond accurately to a manipulation check item to be

included in the analysis. Five participants failed the main manipulation check item and were discarded, which resulted in a final sample size of 221.

Participants had a mean age of 31.52 years (SD = 11.05 years), with 54% identifying as male and 46% identifying as female. Approximately 48% of the participants had a bachelor's degree or higher. Regarding employment status, 96% of the participants had previously been employed at some point, and 73% were employed at the time of data collection. Collectively, the average work experience of the sample was 10.46 years (SD = 9.68 years).

Materials and Measures

Reward scenarios. Similar to Heyman and Ariely's (2004) methodology, participants were to read a hypothetical scenario and then indicate a level of willingness to help. The scenario portrayed a supervisor who offers a subordinate (the participant) a reward in exchange for his or her assistance with a small, tedious assignment. In the social condition, the reward consisted of a free lunch provided by a supervisor. For the monetary condition, the reward included a monetary incentive in the form of overtime pay. The mixed-market reward consisted of a monetized lunch provided by a supervisor. Finally, the control condition did not feature a reward. Otherwise, all four conditions included identical scenarios, which can be found in Appendix A.

Manipulation checks. Two manipulation checks were developed to ensure that the manipulation had its intended effect. The first manipulation check was developed to ensure that participants carefully read the scenario, and it consisted of one item. Participants were discarded if they failed this item. For the second manipulation check, three items about the reward scenario were included that asked participants to rate the

extent of their agreement or disagreement with each item, using a 1-5 response scale. These items were used to provide additional information about the manipulation but were not used to discard participants. Please refer to Appendix B for the two manipulation checks.

Measures. Participants were required to complete a 6-item scale measuring individuals' willingness to engage in ICBs (please see Appendix C). Items were derived from Williams and Anderson's (1991) interpretation of ICB (referred to as OCB-I in their study), which had an alpha of .88. The authors ran a factor analysis and identified seven items that loaded onto the ICB factor. However, not all items in their analysis were applicable to the current study (e.g., "Goes out of way to help new employees"), and therefore, items were adapted to fit in the context of the included scenarios. Because the hypothetical scenarios featured a cost/benefit analysis that was likely to be perceived as more beneficial than costly in all four conditions, it seemed that responses would lean toward the agreement side of the ICB scale. It was therefore necessary to include a scale that would allow for greater response discrimination. Consequently, items were scored on a 7-point response format, which allowed for a more precise distinction in participants' willingness to engage in ICBs. Overall, six items were used to form an aggregate ICB scale, which was found to be internally consistent, with an alpha of .88.

In addition to the ICB items, four items measuring willingness to engage in OCBs were included for exploratory purposes (please see Appendix C). Similar to the ICB scale, the OCB items were derived from Williams and Anderson's (1991) interpretation of OCBO. In their study, the OCBO scale was found to be internally consistent, with an alpha of .75. The scale in the current study contained one item on conscientiousness, one

on sportsmanship, and two measuring civic virtue, as these were the only dimensions that were applicable to the scenarios within the current study. As was the case with the ICB scale, OCB items were scored on a 7-point scale to further differentiate what were presumed to be agreeable responses.

Although four OCB items were originally included in the study, only two items were retained for this study: "I would stay late in order to maintain order within the organization" and "I would stay late in order to ensure that the organization completes all necessary projects." According to Organ's (1997) conception of OCBs, these two items would fall under the civic virtue dimension, whereas the excluded items (i.e., "I would help but complain about staying after to help my supervisor" and "I would complete the assignment as quickly as possible") measure sportsmanship and conscientiousness, respectively. The conscientiousness item appeared to be unfit due to the vagueness of its wording, as it does not specify that completing an assignment quickly will result in poor work, and therefore, it cannot be concluded that responding affirmatively would result in unfavorable consequences for the organization. Moreover, upon further review, the sportsmanship item was also deemed inappropriate–given that vocally complaining about an assignment could result in tangible negative outcomes, it is possible that participants may view this particular behavior as egregious, even in a hypothetical context. These two items also had low corrected item-total correlations of .05 and -.07, respectively, and were therefore excluded from the OCB scale. The two civic virtue items had adequate corrected item-total correlations of .30 for "I would stay late in order to maintain order within the organization" and .52 for "I would stay late in order to ensure that the

organization completes all necessary projects." Hence, only the two civic virtue items were retained. The final OCB scale was internally consistent, with alpha = .79.

Two additional items that measured participants' fear of retribution and their perceived expectation to help as a result of contractual obligations were also included for exploratory purposes (please see Appendix C). These two factors do not fall under the definition of ICB, which is widely accepted as a voluntary, extra-role behavior that exceeds contractual expectations (Bowler & Brass, 2006; Coleman & Borman, 2000; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002; Williams & Anderson, 1991). Therefore, these items were included to examine if people may want to help because they were either afraid of retribution or felt contractually obligated to do so, and to investigate if reward type had an effect on either factor. Quality checks were also added to ensure that participants carefully read the items. Specifically, one item that simply asked participants to select *Agree* was included twice in the survey. Finally, participants were asked to respond to several demographic items, such as age and gender (please see Appendix D for a list of all demographic items).

Procedure

Approval for the study was granted by Xavier University's Institutional Review Board (please see Appendix E). Participants remained anonymous throughout the data collection process, and Amazon did not have access to their survey data. A link to the survey was made available to participants through the MTurk website (please see Appendix F for the MTurk interface). The survey operated via SurveyGizmo.com and took approximately 15 minutes to complete, but participants were given 30 minutes in total. Once participants clicked on the survey link, they were directed to the informed

consent form (please see Appendix G). After agreeing to participate, they were randomly assigned to one of four different conditions representing social, monetary, and mixed-market reward conditions, as well as a control condition. After reading the scenario, participants had to complete the primary measures of the study, complete the manipulation check and quality check items, and respond to a few demographic items. Finally, once participants submitted their responses, a debriefing form was provided at the end of the survey (please see Appendix H).

Chapter IV

Results

Manipulation Checks

In order to gauge the effectiveness of the scenario manipulations, participants were required to answer four items regarding the reward scenario with which they were provided. The first item asked participants to select the reward with which they were presented, and as previously mentioned, five participants were discarded for answering this item incorrectly. The next set of three items were included to provide additional information regarding the scenario, and they measured the extent to which participants agreed or disagreed that they were offered a monetary reward, a social reward, or that they were not offered a reward. A one-way between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to investigate the effect of condition on these three manipulation check items. In regards to the monetary item ("Your supervisor offered you a monetary incentive to help"), there was a significant main effect of type of reward on level of agreement with this item, $F(3, 217) = 70.44$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .49$ (see Table 1). Post-hoc comparisons were made using Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) procedure; this was a logical choice as it allows for comparisons among groups with unequal sample sizes (Howell, 2012). It was found that participants in the monetary condition ($M = 4.78$, $SD = 0.57$) were significantly more likely to agree with this statement than those in the social ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.42$), mixed ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.15$), and control ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 1.26$) conditions, $p < .001$ (see Table 2 for means and

Table 1

One-Way Between-Subjects ANOVA Results for Manipulation Check Items

Source	*df*	*SS*	*MS*	*F*	*p*	η^2
			Monetary			
Between groups	3	260.77	86.92	70.44	< .001	.49
Within groups	217	267.77	1.23			
Total	220	528.54				
			Social			
Between groups	3	144.33	48.11	36.10	< .001	.33
Within groups	217	289.22	1.33			
Total	220	433.55				
			Control			
Between groups	3	264.11	88.04	93.61	< .001	.56
Within groups	217	204.08	0.94			
Total	220	468.19				

standard deviations by condition). Therefore, it seems that the manipulation of the monetary condition was effective.

The second manipulation item ("Your supervisor offered you a social incentive to help") yielded a significant main effect for type of reward on this item, $F(3, 217) = 36.10$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .33$ (see Table 1). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that whereas participants in the social condition ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.96$) were significantly more likely to agree with this item than those in the monetary ($M = 2.15$, $SD = 1.25$) and control ($M = 2.29$, $SD = 1.18$) conditions, $p < .001$, there was no significant difference between the social and mixed ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.17$) conditions, $p = .443$. These findings seem to imply that participants viewed mixed rewards similar to social incentives, which diverges from past research suggesting that mixed rewards are perceived as monetary incentives (Heyman & Ariely, 2004).

Lastly, the third manipulation item ("Your supervisor did not offer you an incentive to help") produced another significant main effect, $F(3, 217) = 93.61$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .56$ (see Table 1). Post-hoc comparisons showed that the control condition ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.03$) was significantly higher than the monetary ($M = 1.36$, $SD = .90$), social ($M = 1.79$, $SD = 1.20$), and mixed ($M = 1.39$, $SD = 0.74$) conditions, $p < .001$, suggesting that the control condition seems to have served its intended purpose (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations for Manipulation Check Items by Reward Condition

	Monetary		
Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Control	52	1.98	1.26
Monetary	67	4.78	0.57
Mixed	54	3.81	1.15
Social	48	3.44	1.55
	Social		
Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Control	52	2.29	1.18
Monetary	67	2.15	1.25
Mixed	54	3.74	1.17
Social	48	3.92	0.96
	Control		
Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Control	52	4.04	1.03
Monetary	67	1.36	0.90
Mixed	54	1.39	0.74
Social	48	1.79	1.20

Note. A 1-5 response format was used.

ICBs

Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs. This hypothesis was tested using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. The hypothesis was supported, as there was a significant main effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs, $F(3, 217) = 2.79$, $p = .042$, $\eta^2 = .04$. The ANOVA results are shown in Table 3.

Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey's HSD procedure unveiled a significant difference between the monetary ($M = 5.67$, $SD = 0.88$) and control ($M = 5.20$, $SD = 1.04$) conditions, $p = .046$. Interestingly, the monetary, social ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 0.93$), and mixed ($M = 5.64$, $SD = 1.03$) conditions yielded strikingly similar responses to one another regarding ICBs. Hence, the presence of a reward may have had a greater influence on willingness to engage in ICBs than no reward. Hypothesis 1a, which predicted that willingness to engage in ICBs would be significantly greater in response to social rewards than in both the monetary reward and mixed-market reward conditions, was not supported. Further, Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that there would be no difference in willingness to engage in ICBs between monetary and mixed conditions, was supported. Means and standard deviations for all conditions are shown in Table 4.

Table 3

One-Way Between-Subjects ANOVA Results for ICBs by Reward Condition

Source	*df*	*SS*	*MS*	*F*	*p*	η^2
Between groups	3	7.80	2.60	2.79	.042	.04
Within groups	217	202.38	0.93			
Total	220	210.18				

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations for ICBs by Reward Condition

Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Control	52	5.20	1.04
Monetary	67	5.67	0.88
Mixed	54	5.64	1.03
Social	48	5.60	0.93

Note. A 1-7 response format was used.

OCBs

Although no hypotheses were developed regarding OCBs, the effect of reward condition on OCBs was examined for exploratory purposes. Specifically, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was used to investigate the effect of reward condition on OCBs. Results did not reveal a significant main effect of condition on OCBs, $F(3,217) = 1.67$, $p = .174$, $\eta^2 = .02$ (please see Table 5 for the ANOVA results and Table 6 for means and standard deviations by condition).

Additional Factors

Finally, as previously mentioned, two additional items measuring fear of retribution and perceived obligation to help were included for exploratory purposes. A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of reward type on each item. Results did not yield a significant main effect of reward condition on either fear of retribution $F(3,217) = 2.32$, $p = .076$, $\eta^2 = .03$, or perceived obligation to help, $F(3,217) = .20$, $p = .897$, $\eta^2 = .00$ (see Table 7). Therefore, reward type did not significantly influence either fear of retribution or perceived obligation to help. Moreover, the pattern of means for fear of retribution suggests that, on average, participants seemed to slightly disagree that they would help because of fear of retribution. Along similar lines, the pattern of means for perceived obligation to help suggests that, on average, participants neither agreed nor disagreed that they would help because they felt they were contractually obligated to do so. Please see Table 8 for means and standard deviations by reward condition.

Table 5

One-Way Between-Subjects ANOVA Results for OCBs by Reward Condition

Source	*df*	*SS*	*MS*	*F*	*p*	η^2
Between groups	3	8.39	2.80	1.67	.174	.02
Within groups	217	362.76	1.67			
Total	220	371.15				

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations for OCBs by Reward Condition

Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Control	52	5.01	1.23
Monetary	67	4.87	1.38
Mixed	54	5.02	1.30
Social	48	4.51	1.22

Note. A 1-7 response format was used.

Table 7

One-Way Between-Subjects ANOVA Results for Additional Factors by Reward Condition

Source	*df*	*SS*	*MS*	*F*	*p*	η^2
	Fear of Retribution					
Between groups	3	19.55	6.52	2.32	.076	.03
Within groups	217	608.64	2.81			
Total	220	628.19				
	Perceived Obligation to Help					
Between groups	3	1.60	0.53	0.20	.897	.00
Within groups	217	581.44	2.68			
Total	220	583.04				

Table 8

Means and Standard Deviations for Additional Factors by Reward Condition

	Fear of Retribution		
Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Control	52	3.48	1.71
Monetary	67	3.04	1.67
Mixed	54	2.65	1.57
Social	48	3.23	1.75
	Perceived Obligation to Help		
Condition	*N*	*M*	*SD*
Control	52	4.31	1.59
Monetary	67	4.18	1.61
Mixed	54	4.41	1.71
Social	48	4.27	1.63

Note. A 1-7 response format was used.

Chapter V

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to explore the influence of rewards on effort in the workplace, as well as the nature of mixed-market rewards relative to social and monetary incentives. Heyman and Ariely (2004) suggested that not offering an incentive, as well as offering a social incentive, can yield a greater willingness to help than monetary and mixed-market incentives in a social setting. Furthermore, Heyman and Ariely concluded that mixed-market rewards are effectively the same as monetary rewards in terms of eliciting effort.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be a significant main effect of reward type on willingness to engage in ICBs, and this hypothesis was supported. Although a significant main effect was found for type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs, there were no significant differences among reward types. Thus, Hypothesis 1a ("Willingness to engage in ICBs will be significantly greater in response to social rewards than in both the monetary and mixed-market reward conditions") was not supported, whereas Hypothesis 1b ("There will be no difference in willingness to engage in ICBs between the monetary reward and mixed-market reward conditions") was supported. Although Hypothesis 1b was supported and there was no significant difference in ICBs, it is important to mention that monetary and mixed rewards were viewed significantly differently and not similarly. The reasoning behind Hypothesis 1b was that monetary and mixed-market conditions would have similar ICB scores due to participants

having similar perceptions of the two rewards. This was based on Heyman and Ariely (2004)'s research which found similar results for the monetary and mixed-market reward conditions, concluding that they were viewed similarly. However, in the current study, those in the monetary condition were significantly more likely to view their rewards as monetary compared to participants in the mixed-market condition, and therefore, Hypothesis 1b appears to have been supported for reasons that are separate from our original understanding of perceptions of rewards. Moreover, results showed that there was no significant difference between perceptions of social and mixed rewards. These findings suggest that mixed rewards are more complex than previously assumed, and that depending on the context, they could be viewed as either more social or monetary in nature.

The largest difference in ICBs was found when comparing the monetary condition to the control condition. Interestingly enough, the monetary group reported a greater willingness to engage in ICBs than the control group. The social, monetary, and mixed conditions had very similar ICB means, all of which fell between *Slightly Agree* and *Agree*, and fell closer toward the latter benchmark. Hence, the results of this study failed to provide conclusive evidence that type of reward influences willingness to engage in ICBs in the workplace. On the other hand, the ICB mean for the control condition was closer to *Agree*. Although only one experimental condition yielded a significantly greater ICB mean than the control condition, a subjective interpretation of these results would suggest that rewards of any type were slightly more effective than offering no reward.

The aforementioned findings are in contrast to Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research, which found that social rewards of low value elicited greater effort than

monetary and mixed-market rewards. Moreover, their research found that a control condition in which no reward was offered elicited greater effort than monetary and mixed-market rewards. In contrast, the current study found an opposite relationship for the monetary-control comparison.

There are a few possible explanations for these differences in the findings. One possibility is that there are contextual differences between the current study and Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research. Because the scenario in the current study simulated a work setting, responses may have been altered relative to the more social setting in the original study. According to Fiske's (1992) relational theory, supervisor-subordinate exchanges can occur within a social marketplace, as this is an example of an authority ranking relationship. Additionally, Wayne and Green (1993) characterized the supervisor-subordinate relationship as one that occurs within a social marketplace given an in-group relationship between the parties. Whereas the scenario in the current study explicitly outlined an in-group relationship, it is possible that the overarching context of a work setting may have influenced willingness to engage in ICBs. In other words, when it comes to ICBs, it may be difficult to entirely separate one's work context from relationships – whether in-group or out-group – because these behaviors are occurring specifically within a work setting. With this understanding, the influence of type of reward may have been less potent.

Although the only significant difference between the control group and the three reward conditions occurred in the monetary comparison, the pattern of means suggests that willingness to engage in ICBs was lowest in the control condition, and that the three reward condition means were very similar. Without being offered a reward, employees

may be less likely to lend their supervisors a hand than they would if presented with an incentive. Although this conclusion may appear intuitive to some, it runs in contrast to Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research. Ultimately, this may give credit to the notion that a work context can foster an appreciation for rewards that may be less prevalent in general social settings.

Another explanation for the absence of significant differences among reward types involves perceptions of level of value. Heyman and Ariely (2004) observed that offering monetary and mixed-market rewards results in increased effort as level of value increases. In the current study, level of value was not manipulated; instead, it was assumed on a purely subjective basis that the rewards being offered were of low value. It is possible that participants evaluated the incentives as medium-value rewards, or similar to the rewards offered in the Heyman and Ariely (2004) study that resulted in non-significant differences among reward types.

For exploratory purposes, OCBs, as defined by Williams and Anderson (1991) were also examined in relation to reward type. It was worthwhile to explore individual dimensions of OCBs relative to ICBs, as any differences in scores could potentially add to a theoretical understanding of how these constructs relate to one another. Unfortunately, the items measuring two out of three OCB dimensions – conscientiousness and sportsmanship – resulted in low item-total correlations and were discarded. The remaining dimension – civic virtue – was explored relative to reward type, but there were no significant differences among conditions. Thus, apart from the finding that civic virtue is not influenced by reward type, no other conclusions regarding the influence of rewards on OCB can be made given the present findings.

Finally, two items measuring additional factors that may have influenced participants' willingness to help were explored in relation to reward types. It was found that neither perceived obligation to help nor fear of retribution changed across conditions, and so it is concluded that the additional factors did not have an influence on reward type. The pattern of means for fear of retribution illustrates that participants seemed to slightly disagree that fear of retribution was a driver for their willingness to help. Moreover, the pattern of means for perceived obligation to help indicates that participants neither agreed nor disagreed that they would help because they felt obligated to do so. Overall, the aforementioned patterns suggest that it does not appear that these two factors were important considerations in deciding to help.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Theoretical implications. The present findings have a couple of theoretical implications for research on effort and rewards. One implication is that mixed-market rewards are not as clear-cut as originally believed. In Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research, it was found that monetary and mixed-market rewards essentially acted as the same type of reward. However, the current study found that social and mixed-market rewards were viewed similarly, whereas monetary and mixed-market rewards differed significantly from each other. Heyman and Ariely (2004) suggest that participants are not necessarily aware of the social or monetary aspects of rewards. Rather, participants' interpretation of monetary and social features may be implicit, and their behavior follows according to a more subconscious judgment. The findings in the current study do not refute this notion, but instead promote an interesting viewpoint from which to understand effort in response to mixed-market rewards. Monetizing social incentives may influence

effort differently in certain scenarios, yet these rewards may be viewed as social incentives regardless.

Another implication is that it appears that offering rewards – regardless of type – may elicit a willingness to help one's supervisor. Although the only statistically significant difference was between the control and monetary groups, the three reward conditions (i.e., monetary, social, and mixed) had very similar means. Even though ICBs are defined as extra-role, non-contractual behaviors (Bowler & Brass, 2006; Coleman & Borman, 2000; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002; Williams & Anderson, 1991) and should theoretically fall within the social marketplace (Wayne & Green, 1993), it is possible that employees do not view themselves within a purely social or monetary marketplace when they are at work, thus negating any potential differences in effort across rewards. Overall, the nature of social and monetary marketplaces appears to differ in work settings from that of more general social settings. The overriding influence of work context on the effect of reward type on effort is a notable finding that runs in contrast to Heyman and Ariely's (2004) results.

Practical implications. One practical implication of the aforementioned findings is that supervisors might be able to benefit from the use of rewards when eliciting ICBs from subordinates. As previously mentioned, although the only significant difference was found when comparing the monetary and control conditions, the pattern of means suggested that willingness to engage in ICBs was lowest in the control condition, and that the three reward condition means were strikingly similar. This implies that employees may be less likely to help their supervisors if they were not offered a reward than if they were offered some sort of incentive to help. Although this seems intuitive, Heyman and

Ariely's (2004) research suggests that social rewards should have a greater influence on effort than monetary and mixed-market rewards. Further, when considering the affable nature of in-group supervisor-subordinate relationships from a subjective point of view, it might appear unusual for a supervisor to offer a subordinate a monetary reward for a friendly favor. It seems that in the context of work, the influence of reward type on effort is mitigated, implying that supervisors may consider using a range of incentives as opposed to one specific reward type.

From a broader standpoint, it may be worthwhile for organizations to consider the benefits of fostering a work environment in which in-group relationships are common. Although the results of this study do not conclusively support the benefits of offering various rewards in exchange for ICBs, it could be inferred that employees were willing to help their supervisors in the context of a positive interpersonal relationship. With regards to ICBs, past research has supported the notion that in-group relationships and ICBs are significantly correlated (Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996), and the present findings highlight that in-group subordinates showed a relatively strong willingness to do a favor for their supervisors. Prior research has also shown that members of out-group dyads are less willing to help compared to members of in-group dyads (Graen & Cashman, 1975). Therefore, these results also emphasize the importance of in-group relationships. However, it is important to mention that out-group relationships were not measured in the current study, and therefore, it is not known if responses would have been different if an out-group relationship was described.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

The current study has a few limitations that should be mentioned. First, participants read hypothetical scenarios and provided hypothetical answers in response to these scenarios. One could argue that estimating participants' willingness to help through a questionnaire is not a realistic measure of willingness to engage in ICBs. Ostensibly, the study might have greater external validity if it were to gauge *actual* effort through participation in an applied task as opposed to filling out a survey. However, Heyman and Ariely (2004) found similar results when measuring participants' exerted effort and perceptions of willingness to help – as is the case in the current study. Therefore, it is believed that the present methodology adequately gauged participants' willingness to help. Nonetheless, future research may benefit from the use of effort simulations, or scales that measure ratings of others, as these methods would provide additional perspectives on employees' willingness to help relative to incentives.

It is also necessary to highlight the unequal sample sizes among conditions. For example, the monetary condition had the highest number of responses, consisting of 67 participants, whereas the next highest group was the mixed condition, consisting of 54 responses. Initially, 284 survey responses were collected, but that number was reduced to 221 after incomplete submissions, and failed quality and manipulation checks were taken into consideration. These omissions, along with the random assignment procedure, may have resulted in disproportionate sample sizes across conditions. However, because these differences were most likely due to the random assignment procedure and these aforementioned omissions from the study, they were ultimately deemed unsubstantial.

Furthermore, the present study only focused on in-group supervisor-subordinate relationships. Given that in-group relationships are defined by trust and affable

relationships, whereas out-group relationships are contractual in nature (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen, 1976; Graen & Cashman, 1975), it may be worthwhile to explore whether effort differs by reward type when comparing in-groups and out-groups. Because the current study focused on ICBs toward supervisors – which are behaviors that are more typical of in-group dyads (Ilies, Nahrgang, & Moregeson 2007; Wayne & Green, 1993) – it was deemed unnecessary to focus on out-group relationships. Yet it is possible that willingness to help significantly differs across reward type for out-group dyads considering the contractual nature of these relationships. Future research should explore ICBs relative to both in-group and out-group relationships, as helping behaviors may manifest differently depending on type of relationship.

Moreover, the current study focused on the supervisor-subordinate relationship, without including other types of relationships present in the workplace. Whereas past research has suggested that in-group supervisor-subordinate dyads fall under the social exchange umbrella (Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996; Ilies et al., 2007), it is possible that – despite Fiske's (1992) relational theory – employees cannot fully separate the contractual nature of work from any positive relationships with supervisors. Although purely speculative, supervisor-subordinate relationships may have contractual elements that distort the essence of social exchanges as they are traditionally defined. Future research may want to focus on the various types of relationships that can occur in the workplace, including those involving subordinates and upper management, colleagues within the same department, and colleagues across departments. Disparities in effort levels across reward types may depend on how closely these dyads resemble genuine

social relationships, and so it would be worthwhile to explore these questions in the future.

Another consideration is that the social reward might differ from the other two rewards in terms of market value. In other words, the market value of a "free lunch" in and of itself cannot be defined by a numerical value. In order to maintain the social nature of the reward, the monetary value is never explicitly mentioned alongside the lunch offer. Whereas the $15 per hour overtime pay (monetary) and $15 lunch (mixed-market) conditions are objectively equivalent in terms of market ratio, the social reward does not have an objectively equivalent value to the other two rewards; instead, the closest benchmark that could be made without specifying monetary value was included (i.e., lunch at an American casual dining restaurant).

The scenarios were outlined this way for two reasons. One, as mentioned, it seemed more practical to present participants with rewards that they could conceivably encounter in the workplace. For example, the monetary condition entails a supervisor using a monetary reward that is a common incentive in the workplace (i.e., the supervisor mentions that the subordinate will be rewarded financially). Alternatively, the supervisor could have provided the subordinate with $15 in cash; however, this was deemed unrealistic in light of practical rewards a supervisor might present to a subordinate. Second, Heyman and Ariely (2004) addressed their rewards in a similar fashion. In other words, the monetary value of one of their social rewards (a Godiva chocolate box) is never explicitly stated to participants in the social reward condition. Instead, it is assumed that the monetary value of the reward can be inferred, perhaps through culturally-acquired knowledge. Therefore, this does not truly represent a limitation of this study

because it is necessary to not include a monetary value in order to ensure the social nature of the reward.

To further complicate matters, the market value of spending time with one's supervisor is never explicitly determined. In other words, employees may perceive a free lunch as a reward, and they might perceive spending time with their friend as an added bonus. With this interpretation, the mixed-market reward could be perceived as the reward with the greatest value, as it contains a $15 gift as well as a quality outing with a friend. Future research could examine people's perceptions of these different rewards by explicitly asking participants about their preferences.

Another interesting future research direction would be to manipulate level of reward offered at work, similar to what Heyman and Ariely (2004) did in their research, or to gauge perceived value of rewards so as to establish a baseline in this context. It is possible that using low-, medium-, and high-value rewards might result in differing ICB scores, and therefore establishing a baseline for value of rewards might further clarify how and why rewards influence effort. In addition, it might be useful to examine people's perceptions of different types of social rewards (e.g., an incentive consisting of a friendly outing versus another consisting of a free lunch) in order to better understand the value of these rewards.

Finally, it is worth noting that the MTurk data collection process was completed in approximately three hours. It could be construed that three hours is an unusually short amount of time to collect reliable data from participants. However, it is believed that the relatively high level of compensation was a key factor that motivated people to

participate in this study at such a fast rate. In addition, MTurk features an expansive pool of active participants, and this naturally expedited the rate at which data was collected.

Conclusions

The current study was conducted in order to examine social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) in the workplace based on a study conducted by Heyman and Ariely (2004). The primary goal of this study was to investigate the effect of reward type on effort in a work setting. Results showed a statistically significant effect for reward type on ICBs, and post-hoc comparisons revealed a statistically significant difference between the monetary and control conditions. However, the control condition yielded the lowest ICB score and the three reward conditions had very similar means, suggesting that the use of rewards may have been slightly more effective in eliciting effort than not using a reward. Furthermore, participants viewed monetary and mixed-market rewards significantly different from one another, whereas perceptions of mixed-market and social rewards were not significantly different from each other, suggesting that these rewards may not always be perceived as monetary (Heyman & Ariely, 2004) and could be viewed as more social in nature in some situations. Overall, the findings suggest that exchange marketplaces may be more complex when they occur in the workplace.

Chapter VI

Summary

Traditionally, individual performance in the workplace is evaluated relative to the accomplishment of specific tasks or any other activities that relate to the technical core of an organization (Borman & Motowildo, 1997). However, in addition to task performance, researchers have also emphasized the importance of other dimensions of performance, such as contextual performance (Coleman & Borman, 2000; Borman & Motowildo, 1997), or organizational citizenship behavior (OCB; Organ, 1988). Organ, Podsakoff, and MacKenzie (2006) argue that, as organizations become less vertical and work structures become increasingly integrated and team-oriented, OCBs may be critical in terms of maximizing organizational effectiveness. Specifically, behaviors involving cooperation, flexibility, and affiliation are becoming recognized as vital to the success of proactive organizations in today's business environment (Taylor, Kluemper, & Mossholder, 2010). Interpersonal citizenship behavior (ICB) is one dimension of OCB that occurs when employees assist other employees – regardless of status – with work-related tasks or personal issues that go beyond contractual obligations (Bowler & Brass, 2006; Coleman & Borman, 2000; Settoon & Mossholder, 2002; Williams & Anderson, 1991).

Using the construct's traditional definition, ICBs go beyond the scope of contractual job requirements (Organ, 1988), suggesting that it may be difficult to foster ICBs through a formal requirement or procedure. Yet it is possible that less formal approaches to motivate employees could lead to greater ICBs and effort in general. For

example, research on social exchange theory suggests that the nature of supervisor-subordinate relationships has the potential to lead to greater occurrences of ICBs (Cardona, Lawrence, & Bentler, 2004; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Additionally, leader-member exchange (LMX) theory purports that supervisors yield greater effort from employees with whom they share in-group relationships relative to those in out-group relationships (Graen & Cashman, 1975). It appears that in-group supervisor-subordinate relationships are characterized by friendly social exchanges that foster ICBs from both parties (Ilies, Nahrgang, & Moregeson 2007; Wayne & Green, 1993).

Assuming supervisors have the ability to foster ICBs through the use of social exchanges, it is worth examining whether there are optimal forms of exchanges that could potentially be utilized by supervisors. Heyman and Ariely (2004) contend that two factors that need to be considered with regards to maximizing effort are both the nature and magnitude of the exchange being offered. The purpose of the current study is to explore employees' willingness to engage in ICBs in exchange for monetary rewards, social rewards, rewards that combine elements of both conditions, and no rewards.

Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) presents an interesting perspective from which ICBs can be viewed. Blau (1964) states that people tend to operate out of two different labor markets: social and economic markets. Generally speaking, social exchanges are those that explain our need for interpersonal relationships and are marked by friendliness and altruism. Conversely, economic exchanges are individualistic in nature, as they are contingent on material compensation and have a contractual nature that is absent in social exchanges. ICBs are analogous to the exchanges described by Blau

(1964) in that they are defined by individuals' willingness to exert effort relative to the interpersonal relationships they perceive themselves to be in. Heyman and Ariely (2004) provide empirical evidence for the notion that social and economic exchanges can significantly influence effort. In supervisor-subordinate relationships, subordinates' willingness to engage in ICBs could vary depending on the type of reward being offered, as well as whether a reward is being offered at all.

The current study explores the effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs within in-group supervisor-supervisee relationships. Reward types include social exchanges, monetary exchanges, and mixed-market exchanges. Heyman and Ariely (2004) hypothesized that monetizing social rewards (i.e., using mixed-market rewards) would effectively turn social exchanges into monetary exchanges. Indeed, their findings showed that mixed-market rewards influenced effort in a pattern similar to that of monetary rewards.

In the context of social exchange theory, ICBs can be viewed as a form of social exchange, and it follows that a transaction involving a social reward should be perceived as consistent with this behavior. In contrast, a supervisor offering a monetary reward is likely to cue an inconsistent marketplace in light of the subordinate's exchange. Thus, it is likely that social rewards offered by supervisors in exchange for ICBs would be viewed as more favorable than monetary rewards.

Hypothesis 1: There will be a main effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs.

Hypothesis 1a: Willingness to engage in ICBs will be significantly greater in response to social rewards than in both the monetary reward and mixed-market reward conditions.

Hypothesis 1b: There will be no difference in willingness to engage in ICBs between the monetary reward and mixed-market reward conditions.

It is worthwhile to consider whether rewards are truly influencing willingness to engage in ICBs, or if individuals would be just as likely to engage in ICBs without being offered a reward. As a result, a control condition was included in this study. However, no formal hypotheses were specified regarding the control condition.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited through a posting on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website. Participants were limited to U.S. citizens, as there could be an ethnocentric nature to the scenarios (i.e., American restaurants listed as benchmarks). Individuals were offered $0.50 for participating. The initial data set consisted of 237 responses. Participants with incomplete survey submissions, missing IDs, and/or incorrect quality check responses, and those who did not pass the main manipulation check item were discarded. This resulted in a sample size of 221.

Participants had a mean age of 31 years (SD = 11 years), with 54% males and 46% females. Approximately 48% of the participants had a bachelor's degree or higher. Ninety-six percent had been previously employed, and 73% were employed at the time of data collection. The average work experience of the sample was 11 years (SD = 10 years).

Materials and Measures

Reward scenarios. Similar to Heyman and Ariely's (2004) methodology, participants had to read a hypothetical scenario and then indicate a level of willingness to help. The scenario portrayed a supervisor who offers a subordinate (the participant) a reward in exchange for the subordinate's assistance with a tedious assignment. In the social condition, the reward consisted of a free lunch provided by the supervisor. For the monetary condition, the reward included a monetary incentive in the form of overtime pay. The mixed-market reward consisted of a monetized lunch provided by the supervisor. Finally, the control condition did not feature a reward. Otherwise, all four conditions included identical scenarios (see Appendix A).

Manipulation checks. Four items were developed to ensure that the manipulation had its intended effect. The first item was developed to ensure that participants carefully read the scenario. Participants were discarded if they failed this item. Three additional items about the reward scenario were included that asked participants to rate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with each item, using a 1-5 response scale. These items were used to provide additional information about the manipulation but were not used to discard participants. Please refer to Appendix B for the manipulation check items.

Measures. Participants were required to complete a 6-item scale measuring individuals' willingness to engage in ICBs. Items were derived from Williams and Anderson's (1991) interpretation of ICB (referred to as OCB-I in their study). Items were scored on a 7-point response format. This scale had an alpha of .88. Moreover, participants were asked to respond to four items regarding OCBs. Two items were discarded due to low item-total correlations, and the final OCB scale consisted of two

items and had an alpha of .79. Two additional items that measured participants' fear of retribution and their perceived obligation to help were included for exploratory purposes.. Please see Appendix C for all measures. Two quality checks were also included to ensure that participants were carefully reading the items. Finally, participants had to respond to several demographic items (see Appendix D).

Procedure

Approval for this study was granted by Xavier University's Institutional Review Board (please see Appendix E). A link to the survey was made available to participants through the MTurk website (see Appendix F). By clicking on the survey link, participants were directed to the informed consent form (see Appendix G). After agreeing to participate, they were randomly assigned to one of four different conditions representing social, monetary, mixed-market rewards, as well as a control condition. After reading the scenario, participants had to respond to the measures, the manipulation check items, and the demographic items. Once participants submitted their responses, a debriefing form was provided (see Appendix H).

Results

Manipulation Checks

Participants were required to answer four items regarding the reward scenario with which they were provided. As previously mentioned, the first item asked participants to select the reward with which they were presented, and participants were discarded if they failed this item. The next set of items measured the extent to which participants agreed or disagreed that they were offered a monetary reward, a social reward, or that they were not offered a reward. A one-way between-subjects analysis of

variance (ANOVA) was conducted to investigate the effect of condition on the second set of manipulation check items (see Tables 1 and 2). There was a significant main effect for type of reward on level of agreement with the monetary manipulation check item, $F(3, 217) = 70.44$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .49$. Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey's HSD procedure showed that participants in the monetary condition ($M = 4.78$, $SD = 0.57$) were significantly more likely to agree with this statement than those in the social ($M = 2.75$, $SD = 1.42$), mixed ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.15$), and control ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 1.26$) conditions, $p < .001$. Therefore, it seems that the manipulation of the monetary condition was effective.

There was also a significant main effect of type of reward on the social manipulation check item, $F(3, 217) = 36.10$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .33$. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that whereas participants in the social condition ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 0.96$) were significantly more likely to agree with this item than those in the monetary ($M = 2.15$, $SD = 1.25$) and control ($M = 2.29$, $SD = 1.18$) conditions, there was no significant difference between the social and mixed ($M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.17$) conditions, $p = .443$. These findings seem to imply that participants viewed mixed rewards similar to social incentives.

Finally, there was also a significant main effect of reward type on the control manipulation check item , $F(3, 217) = 93.61$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .56$. Post-hoc comparisons showed that the control condition ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.03$) was significantly higher than the monetary ($M = 1.36$, $SD = 0.90$), social ($M = 1.79$, $SD = 1.20$), and mixed ($M = 1.39$, $SD = 0.74$) conditions, suggesting that the control condition was effective.

ICBs

Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs. This hypothesis was tested using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. The hypothesis was supported, as there was a significant main effect of type of reward on willingness to engage in ICBs, $F(3, 217) = 2.79$, $p = .042$, $\eta^2 = .04$. The ANOVA results are shown in Table 3.

Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey's HSD procedure unveiled a significant difference between the monetary ($M = 5.67$, $SD = 0.88$) and control ($M = 5.20$, $SD = 1.04$) conditions, $p = .046$. Interestingly, the monetary, social ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 0.93$), and mixed ($M = 5.64$, $SD = 1.03$) conditions yielded strikingly similar responses to one another regarding ICBs. Hence, the presence of a reward may have had a greater influence on willingness to engage in ICBs than no reward. Hypothesis 1a, which predicted that willingness to engage in ICBs would be significantly greater in response to social rewards than in both the monetary reward and mixed-market reward conditions, was not supported. Further, Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that there would be no difference in willingness to engage in ICBs between monetary and mixed conditions, was supported. Means and standard deviations for all conditions are shown in Table 4.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to explore the influence of rewards on effort in the workplace. Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be a significant main effect of reward type on willingness to engage in ICBs, and this hypothesis was supported. The only significant difference among reward types occurred in comparing the monetary and control conditions. Thus, Hypothesis 1a was not supported, whereas Hypothesis 1b was

supported. Although the social and mixed conditions did not yield significantly greater ICB scores than the control condition, the pattern of means suggests that the presence of a reward was slightly more effective than offering no reward.

The aforementioned findings are in contrast to Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research, which found that social rewards of low value elicited greater effort than monetary and mixed-market rewards. Moreover, their research found that a control condition in which no reward was offered elicited greater effort than monetary and mixed-market rewards. In contrast, the current study found an opposite relationship for the monetary-control comparison.

One possible explanation for this difference in findings is that there are contextual differences between the current study and Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research. Because the scenario in the current study simulated a work setting, responses may have been altered relative to the more social setting in the original study. According to Fiske's (1992) relational theory, supervisor-subordinate exchanges can occur within a social marketplace, as this is an example of an authority ranking relationship. Additionally, Wayne and Green (1993) characterized the supervisor-subordinate relationship as one that occurs within a social marketplace given an in-group relationship between the parties. Whereas the scenario in the current study explicitly outlined an in-group relationship, it is possible that the overarching context of a work setting may have influenced willingness to engage in ICBs. In other words, it may be difficult to entirely separate one's work context from relationships. Therefore, the influence of type of reward may have been less potent.

Perceptions of reward type were also explored in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the manipulations. Again, there was a difference between the current study and Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research. Specifically, Heyman and Ariely found similar results for the monetary and mixed-market reward conditions, concluding that they were viewed similarly. In the current study, although the monetary and mixed-market reward conditions yielded similar means for willingness to engage in ICBs, results revealed that participants viewed mixed rewards significantly different from monetary rewards and similar to social incentives. These results suggest that mixed rewards are complex in nature, and that depending on the context, they could be viewed as either more social or monetary in nature.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Theoretical implications. The present findings suggest that mixed-market rewards may not be as clear-cut as originally believed. In Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research, it was found that monetary and mixed-market rewards essentially acted as the same type of reward. However, the current study found that social and mixed-market rewards were viewed similarly, whereas monetary and mixed-market rewards were viewed significantly differently. Heyman and Ariely (2004) imply that participants are not necessarily aware of the social or monetary aspects of rewards. Rather, participants' interpretation of monetary and social features may be implicit, and their behavior follows according to a more subconscious judgment. The current findings suggest that monetizing social incentives may influence effort differently in certain scenarios, and that these rewards may be viewed as social incentives in some situations.

It also appears that offering rewards – regardless of type – seems to elicit a willingness to help one's supervisor. Although the only statistically significant difference was between the control and monetary groups, the three reward conditions had similar means. Even though ICBs are defined as extra-role, non-contractual behaviors (Coleman & Borman, 2000; Williams & Anderson, 1991), and should theoretically fall within the social marketplace (Wayne & Green, 1993), it is possible that employees do not view themselves within a purely social or monetary marketplace when they are at work, thus negating any potential differences in effort across rewards. Overall, the nature of social and monetary marketplaces appears to differ in work settings from that of more general social settings.

Practical implications. One practical implication of the present findings is that supervisors might be able to benefit from the use of rewards when eliciting ICBs from subordinates. As previously mentioned, the pattern of means suggests that employees may be less likely to help their supervisors if they were not offered a reward than if they were offered some sort of incentive to help. Heyman and Ariely's (2004) research suggests that social rewards should have a greater influence on effort than monetary and mixed-market rewards. Furthermore, when considering the affable nature of in-group supervisor-subordinate relationships from a subjective point of view, it might appear unusual for a supervisor to offer a subordinate a monetary reward for a friendly favor. It seems that in the context of work, the influence of reward type on effort is mitigated, implying that supervisors may consider using a range of incentives as opposed to one reward type. From a broader standpoint, it may be worthwhile for organizations to consider the benefits of fostering an environment in which in-group relationships are

common. Although the results of this study do not conclusively support the benefits of offering rewards in exchange for ICBs, it could be inferred that employees were willing to help their supervisors in the context of a positive interpersonal relationship. However, out-group relationships were not measured in this study, and therefore, it is not known if responses would have been different if an out-group relationship was described.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

The current study has a few limitations that should be mentioned. First, participants provided answers in response to hypothetical scenarios. One could argue that estimating participants' willingness to help through a questionnaire is not a realistic measure of willingness to engage in ICBs. However, Heyman and Ariely (2004) found similar results when measuring participants' exerted effort and perceptions of willingness to help – as is the case in the current study. Therefore, it is believed that the present methodology adequately gauged participants' willingness to help. Nonetheless, future research may benefit from the use of effort simulations, or scales that measure ratings of others, as these methods would provide additional perspectives on employees' willingness to help.

Moreover, the present study focused on in-group supervisor-subordinate relationships. Given that in-group relationships are defined by trust and affable relationships, whereas out-group relationships are contractual in nature (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen, 1976; Graen & Cashman, 1975), it may be worthwhile to explore whether effort differs by reward type when comparing in-groups and out-groups. Because the current study focused on ICBs toward supervisors – which are behaviors that are more typical of in-group dyads (Ilies, Nahrgang, & Moregeson, 2007; Wayne &

Green, 1993) – it was deemed unnecessary to focus on out-group relationships. However, future research should explore ICBs relative to both in-group and out-group relationships, as other behaviors may manifest differently depending on type of relationship.

Finally, whereas past research has suggested that in-group supervisor-subordinate dyads fall under the social exchange umbrella (Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996; Ilies et al., 2007), it is possible that – despite Fiske's (1992) relational theory – employees cannot fully separate the contractual nature of work from any positive relationships with supervisors. While purely speculative, supervisor-subordinate relationships may have contractual elements that distort the essence of social exchanges as they are traditionally defined. Future research may want to focus on the various types of relationships that can occur in the workplace (e.g., colleagues). Disparities in effort levels across reward types may depend on how closely these dyads resemble genuine social relationships, and so it would be worthwhile to explore these questions in the future.

Conclusions

The current study was conducted in order to examine social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) in the workplace based on a study conducted by Heyman and Ariely (2004). The primary goal of this study was to investigate the effect of reward type on effort in a work setting. Results showed a statistically significant effect for reward type on ICBs, and post-hoc comparisons revealed a statistically significant difference between the monetary and control conditions. However, the control condition yielded the lowest ICB score and the three reward conditions had very similar means, suggesting that the use of rewards may have been slightly more effective in eliciting effort than not using a reward. Furthermore, participants viewed monetary and mixed-market rewards significantly

different from one another, whereas perceptions of mixed-market and social rewards were not significantly different from each other, suggesting that these rewards may not always be perceived as monetary (Heyman & Ariely, 2004) and could be viewed as more social in nature in some situations. Overall, the findings suggest that exchange marketplaces may be more complex when they occur in the workplace.

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Appendix A

Reward Scenarios

You are a wage employee in a non-managerial role in which you work a typical nine-to-five schedule. Over the years you have become close to your supervisor on both a professional and personal level. You share a relationship built on trust and respect, and you have developed a healthy, mutually understood friendship with this individual.

It's shortly after five o'clock on a Friday evening and you are ready to go home for the weekend. As you are getting prepared to leave you hear your supervisor call your name. You soon learn that he has fallen behind on a project. He asks if you would be willing to assist him by completing a menial data entry task – an assignment that would take around 30 minutes by his estimation. He assures you that if you have anything else planned, you can feel free to say no and that he can take care of the task some other time. However, just before you answer, your supervisor proposes…

1.) **Social: Buying you lunch at a casual dining restaurant (e.g., Applebee's, Chilli's, or a local equivalent) the following Monday as an added incentive.**
2.) **Monetary: Giving you an additional hour's worth of overtime pay ($15) as an added incentive.**
3.) **Mixed-Market: Buying you a $15 lunch at a casual dining restaurant (e.g., Applebee's, Chilli's, or a local equivalent) the following Monday as an added incentive.**
4.) **Control: The last sentence in the scenario was eliminated.**

Appendix B

Manipulation Checks

First manipulation check, consisting of one item:

In the scenario you read, what incentive was offered to you?

- No incentive was offered
- A lunch treated by your supervisor
- $15 of overtime pay
- A $15 lunch treated by your supervisor

Second manipulation check, consisting of three items:

Based on the scenario you read, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree

In the scenario you read...

- Your supervisor offered you a monetary incentive to help.
- Your supervisor offered you a social incentive to help.
- Your supervisor did not offer you an incentive to help.

Appendix C

ICBs, OCBs, and Additional Factors Scales

Based on the scenario you read, please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Slightly Disagree
4 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
5 = Slightly Agree
6 = Agree
7 = Strongly Agree

ICBs

I would be willing to stay and complete the assignment
I would be willing to complete the extra task because I appreciate my boss
I would be willing to help my boss in the event that a similar situation arises in the future

I would put forth a great deal of effort in assisting with this project
I would volunteer to help with additional work after completing the assignment
I would help in order to reduce my supervisor's workload

OCBs

I would help but complain about staying after to help my supervisor
I would stay late in order to maintain order within the organization
I would stay late in order to ensure that the organization completes all necessary projects
I would complete the assignment as quickly as possible **(reverse-scored)**

Additional Factors

I would help my supervisor for fear of retribution
I would help my supervisor because I feel that I am obligated to do so

Appendix D

Demographic Items

Age _____

Gender

- Male
- Female

Nationality _____

What country do you live in? _____

Race/Ethnicity

- White or Caucasian
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- Hispanic or Latino
- Other _____

Level of Education

- Below High School
- High School Degree (or equivalent)
- Associate's Degree
- Bachelor's Degree (e.g., BA)
- Graduate Degree (e.g., MBA)
- Doctoral Degree (e.g., PhD)

Have you ever been previously employed?

- Yes
- No

Are you currently employed?

- Yes
- No

If currently employed, do you receive an hourly wage or an annual salary?

- Wage
- Salary

If currently employed, do you work part-time or full-time?

- Part-time
- Full-time

Years of overall work experience (if months, please write the word months): _____

Appendix E

IRB Approval Letter

June 5, 2012

Thomas Geiger
3160 Linwood Ave. Apt. 101
Cincinnati, OH 45208

Dear Mr. Geiger:

Re: Protocol #1168, *Effort for Payment in Organizations: Rewards, Labor Markets, and ICBs*

The IRB has reviewed the revised materials regarding your study, referenced above, and has determined that it meets the criteria for the Exempt from Review category under Federal Regulation 45CFR46. Your protocol is approved as exempt research, and therefore requires no further oversight by the IRB.

If you wish to modify your study, including the addition of data collection sites, it will be necessary to obtain IRB approval prior to implementing the modification. If any adverse events occur, please notify the IRB immediately.

Please contact our office if you have any questions. We wish you success with your project!

Sincerely,

Morell E. Mullins, Jr., Ph.D.
Chair, Institutional Review Board
Xavier University

MEM/sb

c: Dalia Diab, Advisor

Appendix F

MTurk Interface

1. Please enter your unique identifier located on the MTurk Dashboard: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard

Note: Save your unique identifier, as you will be required to enter it once again during the research study.

2. Please click the following link in order to access the current study. After you complete the survey, click the 'Submit' button below.

[Survey Link was included here]

[SUBMIT]

Appendix G

Informed Consent Form

You are being given the opportunity to volunteer to participate in a master's thesis project conducted by Thomas Geiger at Xavier University. The purpose of this study is to investigate perceptions of effort in the workplace.

In this study, you will read a short scenario involving a supervisor who asks for your assistance with a project, and you will answer a few questions corresponding to that scenario. You will also respond to a few demographic items.

There are no known risks associated with this study. Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. Refusal to participate in this study will have no effect on any future services you may be entitled to from Xavier University. You will be paid $0.50 for participating in this study, which should take about 15 minutes to complete. However, please note that if you do not complete all required items or if you do not pass the quality checks, you may not be eligible for compensation. In total, you will be allotted 30 minutes to complete the entire survey. You have to be at least 18 years old to participate in this study.

Although you will be required to enter your MTurk unique worker ID at the end of the survey to receive compensation if eligible, the researchers will not be able to access any identifying information you provided to Amazon or MTurk. Moreover, the researchers will not release any of your survey responses to Amazon or MTurk, and only the researchers conducting this study will have access to your responses. Therefore, your responses will remain anonymous. Finally, no analyses of any kind will be conducted prior to the removal of all MTurk ID numbers from the data set.

If you have any questions at any time during the study, you may contact the principal investigator, Tom Geiger, at geigert1@xavier.edu, or the faculty advisor, Dr. Dalia Diab, at diabd@xavier.edu. Questions about your rights as a research subject should be directed to Xavier University's Institutional Review Board at 513-745-2870.

By clicking "Next," you agree to the following statement: I have been given information about this research study and its risks and benefits and have had the opportunity to ask questions and to have my questions answered to my satisfaction. I freely give my consent to participate in this research project.

Appendix H

Debriefing Form

Thank you for participating in our research project. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of willingness to put forth effort in the context of receiving various types of rewards. Specifically, we will examine the effect of reward type (gift vs. monetary reward vs. monetized gift vs. control) on willingness to engage in interpersonal citizenship behaviors, or willingness to engage in helpful, though non-contractual, behaviors towards another employee at work.

You were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (gift vs. monetary reward vs. monetized gift vs. no gift or monetary reward). The scenarios and rewards included were entirely hypothetical. Please do not discuss the specifics of our study with anyone or distribute this form to any potential participants, as data collection is ongoing. If you have any questions or concerns, or if you would like to inquire about the results of this study, please contact the principal investigator, Tom Geiger, at geigert1@xavier.edu, or the faculty advisor, Dr. Dalia Diab, at diabd@xavier.edu.