

REBEL MOTIVATIONS DURING THE SOCIAL WAR AND REASONS FOR  
THEIR ACTIONS AFTER ITS END

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By

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY  
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## ABSTRACT

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Modern scholarship has fiercely contested the motivations of Italian rebels during the Social War. Generally speaking, three camps have formed concerning this issue: those who strictly follow the sources in arguing that the allies fought against Rome to obtain full citizenship under her rule, those who believe the rebels sought independence rather than citizenship, and those who believe that rebel actions were inspired by differing motivations. By building upon the scholarship of Dart and Salmon, I believe we will see that many of the allies were willing to fight against the empire for a place of privilege within it. Many Italians were unsatisfied with the vague promises the Romans made at the conclusion of the Social War and continued to fight in Rome's civil wars with the aim of gaining true political equality.

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## Introduction

After the Hannibalic War, Italian peoples generally believed that further integration with Rome was desirable for political, social, and economic reasons. These attitudes did not change during the Social War, and concessions to the allies strengthened the loyalties of communities which did not rebel while weakening the position of those who had. Initial concessions proved to be sufficient incentive for many rebels to come back to the Roman fold. However, some rebels continued to resist. This latter group did not consist of extreme separatists as modern scholars have sometimes labeled them. Instead, the remaining rebels were more concerned with how much political power they would actually have in Rome and were wary of surrendering before their rights were clearly defined. The failed census of 89, the suspiciously low census of 86, and the ongoing controversy into which voting blocs to distribute the newly enfranchised Italians until a *senatus consultum* in 86 finally determined their placement, all serve as evidence that the *Lex Iulia* of 90 and *Lex Plautia Papiria* of 89 alone could not secure Italian equality with Rome.<sup>1</sup> I believe this ambiguity in allied legal status explains why some rebels continued to fight and even raise new forces up to 87, and any Italian violence against Rome after 86 was not directed against Rome itself but was instead participation in the civil wars between Marius and Sulla.

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<sup>1</sup> All dates are B.C.E. unless otherwise indicated.

As Rome grew in power it became increasingly important for Italians to integrate with Rome for a variety of political, social, and economic reasons. Rome's expansion generally helped bring about these changes as the peoples of the Mediterranean largely came to view Italians and Romans as one and the same people.<sup>2</sup> Keaveney and Sherwin-White argue that the allies' merits entitled them to full Roman citizenship and that their material interests required it.<sup>3</sup>

From the foundation of the city, Rome had offered its citizenship to others for numerous reasons. Rome's legendary founder had offered citizenship to the outcasts of other communities as a means of quickly establishing a large citizen body. Likewise, Rome expanded its citizen base during periods of military necessity such as after the Battle of Cannae in 216 or as a reward to allied communities for acts of extreme loyalty. Manumitted slaves were also automatically enrolled as citizens in the Roman tribal assemblies; interestingly, Rome was the only ancient state to do this.

The Hannibalic War marks a significant step in the evolution of Roman and Italian attitudes towards citizenship. In the aftermath of the Hannibalic War, old attitudes in which Rome was merely the foremost of several important Italian cities largely gave way to new attitudes in which Rome was the undisputed master of all Italy. When other important cities, such as Capua, defected from Rome during the Hannibalic War their subsequent defeat marked the end of their ambitions for Italian primacy.

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<sup>2</sup> Keaveney 1987: 6.

<sup>3</sup> Keaveney 1987: 6; Sherwin-White 1973: 143.

Whether it was the seasonal cattle raids of Celt-Iberians in the west or the clash of phalanxes between Alexander's successors in the east, most ancient Mediterranean peoples were in a near-constant state of war. Mercenaries tended to be expensive and only owed loyalty to a ruler's treasure, while citizen levies were both cheaper and had a vested interest in the security of their state. More citizens meant more inexpensive yet more highly motivated soldiers. Rome's willingness to periodically expand its citizen body and treat its allies generously gave it a long-term advantage over its rivals in matters of conquest and stability.

### **Rome's Relationship to its Allies before the Hannibalic War**

The settlement of the Latin War brought three methods for consolidating Roman territory: partial incorporation of foreign states, planting new colonies with Roman citizenship, and planting new colonies without Roman citizenship.<sup>4</sup> Under this structure, Rome controlled nearly all of peninsular Italy by 266. However, throughout the republican period, the ratio of Roman citizens to allies varied radically. In 343, Roman citizens were outnumbered by allies by about three to one, but by 338 citizens outnumbered the allies by more than two to one. However, by 264 the allies again outnumbered citizens by more than two to one, and this ratio was more or less maintained until the end of the Social War.<sup>5</sup> Using figures for Roman and allied military forces given by Polybius, Afzelius adds an additional twenty percent in making his calculations for the

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<sup>4</sup> Toynbee, Vol. 1, 1965: 139.

<sup>5</sup> Toynbee, Vol. 1, 1965: 140-3.

total populations.<sup>6</sup> Toynbee believes Afzelius is merely speculating, and we should discount the additional twenty percent.<sup>7</sup>

Rome's Italian allies were divided into two groups: the Latins whose alliance with Rome was less formal yet highly favorable due to their shared culture, language, and religion; and the *socii* who were bound by formal treaties yet granted domestic autonomy.<sup>8</sup> Rome tenaciously conquered the Italian peninsula from 341-266 and offered its subject peoples generous terms.<sup>9</sup> Though this led to significant foreign policy achievements, the generosity which Rome had once extended to its allies was not fully appreciated until the abuses of Roman magistrates in the late republic began to be felt in earnest.<sup>10</sup> By then, Roman officials were far less generous in offering extensions of citizenship.

Before the Hannibalic War, many of Rome's allies were content with their legal status within the Roman system of governance. Some allies even refused offers of Roman citizenship prior to Hannibal crossing the Alps. For instance, the Hernican city-states of Aletrium, Verulae, and Ferentinum were offered Roman citizenship when the rest of the Hernici rebelled in 307-6, but all three cities chose to retain their prior allied status when offered this reward for their loyalty.<sup>11</sup> Even as late as during the Hannibalic War itself,

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<sup>6</sup> Afzelius, 1942: 101, 133-5, 140-1, 144, 147, 153; Polybius 2.23-4.

<sup>7</sup> Toynbee, Vol. 1, 1965: 425, 428, 480. The ratios given above reflect Toynbee's estimations.

<sup>8</sup> Keaveney 1987: 3.

<sup>9</sup> Toynbee 1970: 13.

<sup>10</sup> Toynbee 1970: 13.

<sup>11</sup> Toynbee 1970: 14.



the Praenestines refused an offer of Roman citizenship as a reward for their valor.<sup>12</sup> As David explains, choosing a Roman identity also meant devaluing a local identity, and not all peoples felt that the benefits of Roman citizenship were worth surrendering local autonomy.<sup>13</sup> The loyal Hernicans' reaction should hardly seem surprising given Rome's attitude towards its Italian allies during the early republic.

Rome was greatly concerned for its reputation among the allies during the early republic and tended not to meddle in local affairs unless security was at stake. For instance, when Rome dispatched a garrison to its allies at Rhegium in the midst of the war with Pyrrhus, the garrison commander, Decius, eventually decided to imitate the example of the Mamertines in neighboring Messana by seizing the city for himself. Outraged by this treachery, Rome sent another army to retake the city and restored it to the original inhabitants. The survivors of the treacherous garrison were publicly beaten and executed at Rome. "[T]he object of inflicting this punishment was to restore, so far as possible, the good name of Rome among the allies."<sup>14</sup> Perhaps it is no coincidence that Rhegium remained loyal to Rome throughout the Hannibalic War even after the majority of southern Italy rebelled.<sup>15</sup>

Rome did not ask for wealth from its Italian allies but instead asked for a certain number of soldiers from each community as tribute when war came. Roman allies were

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<sup>12</sup> Liv. 23.17.7-20.

<sup>13</sup> David 1997: 5; Cic. *Balb.* 21.

<sup>14</sup> Polybius 1.7.

<sup>15</sup> Liv. 23.30, 24.1-3.

customarily treated as comrades when armies were mobilized. The position of the *socii extraordinarii* as Roman authorities' bodyguards displayed the Romans' trust in the allies both in terms of martial prowess and loyalty. Furthermore, allied troops ate for free in the Roman camp while citizens' food was deducted from their pay, and allies received an equal portion of loot with the Romans.<sup>16</sup> In short, there were numerous military, political, and financial advantages in being allied to Rome and few disadvantages before the Hannibalic War.

### **The Hannibalic War and its aftermath**

The benefits of full Roman citizenship would not become apparent to many Italians until after Hannibal's campaign through Italy. The Hannibalic War had done much to disrupt the status quo. As during previous rebellions against Rome, those who defected to Hannibal found little common cause outside of their animosity towards Rome and failed to mutually support each other. Those who remained loyal to Rome suffered no such disadvantages, and some allied communities went to extreme lengths to preserve Rome. However, such was the scale of the defections, the duration of the war, and the general loss of life that certain forces drove the peoples of Italy to homogenize in ways that could not have been possible before. Some of these forces were the punitive actions of Roman officials against secessionist allies while other contributing factors were more benign.

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<sup>16</sup> Toynbee Vol. 2, 1965: 107.

After the war ended in 201, Rome became distrustful of its allies and launched several investigations into southern Italy and even loyal Etruria for conspiracies to assist Hannibal.<sup>17</sup> The appointment of a dictator to oversee these investigations suggested that even the rights of Roman citizens would be suspended in suspected parties as Rome sought to punish everyone who had betrayed her.<sup>18</sup> The Bruttians and Lucanians had about half of their lands confiscated at the end of the Hannibalic War while the Picentini were deprived of their city entirely, and these peoples were further humiliated by being forced into noncombatant roles in the Roman army.<sup>19</sup>

Though the communities which defected to Hannibal were immediately made allies again upon their surrender, a rift had grown between them and Rome. Roman officials after the Hannibalic War began to guard the status of citizenship with jealousy contrary to policy as late as 214.<sup>20</sup> David is right to argue that distrust and economic upheaval caused by subsequent land confiscations had a direct link to the Social War, though it should also be remembered that it would be more than a century before the latter conflict erupted.<sup>21</sup>

Nevertheless, the foundation for the Social War had been laid as many rival communities with separate traditions and varying ambitions were replaced by

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<sup>17</sup> Liv. 28.10.4, 29.36.10-2, 30.26.12, 30.24.

<sup>18</sup> David 1997: 66.

<sup>19</sup> Toynbee, Vol. 2, 1965: 119-20; Strabo 5.4.13.

<sup>20</sup> Toynbee, Vol. 2, 1965: 111.

<sup>21</sup> David 1997: 66-8.

communities that looked increasingly to Rome as their cultural and political head. Large areas of land were repopulated due to both casualties in the war itself and subsequent mass enslavements of rebel communities. The cultural and political landscape of Italy had reached a watershed.

Though Rome and her faithful allies were the immediate beneficiaries of this process, former ethnic and social distinctions became increasingly blurred as new colonies were founded, old colonies repopulated, lands confiscated, and new roads built to turn nearly the entire peninsula into one vast Italian network. The end result was a greater cultural and political homogeneity in Italy overall with Rome as the undisputed master.<sup>22</sup> David argues that by the outbreak of the Social War the ethnic and cultural distinctions in Italy had all but disappeared.<sup>23</sup> This position is perhaps too extreme since Oscan was still the principle language of central and southern Italy at the outbreak of the Social War.<sup>24</sup> Clearly, many differences remained between various Italian peoples during the first century, and these distinctions were often highly localized. However, such distinctions did not prevent peoples from also viewing themselves in more regional, if not inclusive, identities as well.

Despite numerous differences, a new Italian and Roman identity grew out of the generations between the Hannibalic War and the Social War in which the two groups

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<sup>22</sup> David 1997: 70-2.

<sup>23</sup> David 1997: 140.

<sup>24</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 191.

became less distinguishable, and allegiances to local civic authorities gradually weakened.<sup>25</sup> The fact that the allies shared military service with the Romans also played no small part in creating a single unified Italian culture.<sup>26</sup> Allied soldiers trained at Rome would have come to see the city as the capital of their “country”, not unlike citizens of modern nation-states, in addition to learning its language and culture.<sup>27</sup>

Unlike during previous centuries, in the 180s and 170s B.C., Italians and Latins increasingly sought citizen rights at Rome, as individuals, families, and whole communities. In 187, a number of Latin cities complained to the Senate that many of their own citizens had been illegitimately acting as Roman citizens. The subsequent investigation found that 12,000 Latins had been falsely added to the Roman census. Livy does not say why these 12,000 Latins were not allowed *ius migrationis*, the right to retain one’s level of citizenship even while living in other locations, but this falsification was clearly depriving allied cities of their manpower as well as their financial base.<sup>28</sup>

There were ways which individuals might legally gain Roman citizenship for themselves and their families even if Roman officials were reluctant to offer citizenship on a larger scale after the Hannibalic War. Families might sell a son into slavery, have the owner free the slave, and thus gain Roman citizenship for the son automatically.<sup>29</sup> Or

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<sup>25</sup> David 1997: 146.

<sup>26</sup> Toynbee, Vol. 2, 1965: 110.

<sup>27</sup> Toynbee, Vol. 2, 1965: 110.

<sup>28</sup> Dart 2014: 49; Liv. 39.3.4-6.

<sup>29</sup> Liv. 41.8.6-12.

citizens may have legally adopted noncitizens who had no intention of leaving their own communities.<sup>30</sup> However, these methods of gaining citizenship were merely taking advantage of loopholes in Roman law, and officials attempted to correct the inequitable distribution of manpower in 177 and 173 by returning Latins to their native communities and forbidding the manumission of slaves with the intent of changing their civic status.<sup>31</sup>

These measures, however, were only short-term solutions which did nothing to address the root causes of the increasingly unequal relationship between Rome and its allies. Issues concerning Italian manpower and citizen status were critical during this particular period from 264 to 146 primarily because Rome was in a near-constant state of war across the whole Mediterranean. Soldiers died, became disabled, grew too old, or were otherwise unable to continue in their duties, and Rome's armies needed to be replenished from a reliable recruitment pool. Old treaties with individual cities in which certain quantities of soldiers were conscripted for military duty did not reflect the current capabilities of those allied cities. Due to the massive redistribution of population after the Hannibalic War, some cities were hard pressed to meet their quotas while other cities could have easily provided more soldiers than their treaties required.

By claiming Roman citizenship, a person may have advantages in negotiating contracts, conducting business activities, or taking a share of public distributions. But more importantly in this time period, Roman citizenship or citizenship in more populous

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<sup>30</sup> Liv. 41.8.6-12.

<sup>31</sup> Liv. 41.9.9-12.

Italian communities would lower the odds of seeing military service in wars moving further from Italy in which all but the political elite had a decreasing stake.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, in a political context, if as many as 12,000 individuals were able to fraudulently act as citizens out of a body of a little over 250,000 male citizens, these impersonators would have been a significant enough portion to potentially sway voting outcomes in the assemblies, assuming direct political participation was one of their goals at this time.<sup>33</sup>

The two assemblies with the greatest power in the late republic were the *Comitia Centuriata* and the *Comitia Tributa*. The *Comitia Centuriata* largely voted on the election of senior magistrates and was divided into 193 voting blocs called centuries. Assignment to a century was based on wealth, and the number of voters in each individual century would vary widely. Each century had a single vote which was determined by a majority of those present while voting was taking place. The centuries subdivided the five Roman property classes. The censors placed all citizens into one of these five classes, except the poorest who were lumped together into one century as *infra classem* with a single vote. Seventy of the centuries belonged to the first property class while eighteen belonged to the equestrians. Voting continued from the first century to the last only until the required ninety-seven affirmative votes had been secured. This meant that the voting highly favored the upper property classes. However, competition among the elite was fierce, and they frequently sought the support of the lower centuries. The commoners' votes might

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<sup>32</sup> Dart 2014: 50.

<sup>33</sup> Dart 2014: 50-1.

not always be needed, but when elections were close they could ultimately decide the outcome. With this in mind, even a few illegal votes could theoretically alter the outcome of an election.

Wiseman argues “[a]fter Marius’ reform [as consul in 107 B.C., when he recruited men *infra classem*], the enrolment in the classes was thus no longer a civic duty, vital to the military or financial security of the state, but almost solely a privilege” since the only remaining function of the classes was to determine the order in which citizens voted.<sup>34</sup> He also believes it seems likely that the censors of the late republic would not wish to make their duties any more difficult by forcing immigrant citizens or *proletarii* to enroll in the *centuriata* since they were unlikely to vote.<sup>35</sup> However, we shall see that at least some of the allies who fought against Rome in the Social War were very interested in taking full advantage of their citizen rights at the polls.

According to Botsford, perhaps it should not surprise us that later Roman writers such as Gellius, citing Laelius Felix, (NA 15.27) sometimes confuse the *Comitia Tributa* with the *Comitia Curiata*, but even republican and Augustan writers such as Cicero, Sallust, and Livy were not always precise when distinguishing these two assemblies.<sup>36</sup> However, the differences between these assemblies were minimized over time and may

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<sup>34</sup> Wiseman 1969: 60.

<sup>35</sup> Wiseman 1969: 60-1.

<sup>36</sup> Botsford 1904: 21-6.



be considered the same for our purposes.<sup>37</sup> Here the voters were initially distributed not by wealth but by location. Membership in a tribe depended upon owning property in a given area; but, once established, tribal allotment became hereditary and would not change unless a censor noticed or was informed that a specific assignment was no longer appropriate. By the late republic, there were four urban tribes and thirty-one rural tribes. Like the centuries, each tribe was given a single vote determined by a majority of those present at the time of voting, and voting stopped once a majority had been reached in the assembly. Because voters in the rural tribes had to travel long distances to reach Rome, lower turnout ensured that each individual vote was worth more than the thousands who voted in the four urban tribes. This assembly elected junior magistrates as well as the tribunes of the plebs, and also voted on legislation.

### **The Gracchi and Drusi**

It was not just Italians who recognized the need for the allies to have a closer kinship with Rome; at least a few notable Romans began to think along the same lines as well. Tiberius Gracchus was traveling through Etruria watching foreign slaves work the fields as he pondered the situation of Rome's landless poor, and his speeches concerning agrarian reform referred not just to the Italian countryside but to those poor soldiers who fought and died for Italy.<sup>38</sup> Though Tiberius' legislation was not specifically aimed at aiding the allies, Plutarch's choice to include terminology such as Ἰταλία in Tiberius'

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<sup>37</sup> Botsford 1904: 21-6.

<sup>38</sup> Plut. *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 8-9.

speech suggests that he had the allies in mind and not just Roman citizens. Of course, this term may come from one or more of Plutarch's sources, such as a speech of Tiberius Gracchus which may have still been extant in his day, and need not be an invention of the biographer. Likewise, after Marius defeated the Cimbri in 101 he was declared the "savior of Italy", signifying greater Italian unity than in previous generations.<sup>39</sup> Granted, Plutarch was writing well after the lives of the Gracchi and Marius, and he may well be projecting later views of relationships between Rome and its Italian allies onto his subjects through the usage of such language, but Italians and Roman magistrates certainly benefited from mutual support and courted the favor of one another in the late republic. It seems unlikely that savvy Roman orators desiring Italian support in this day would have missed the opportunity to leverage this sort of inclusive language.

As Rome annexed territory from its neighbors, varying portions of conquered lands became *ager publicus*. Over time, the wealthy took larger portions of land than they were legally allowed to. This created class friction not only between the rich and increasingly landless poor but also between citizens and noncitizens. Though *ager publicus* gave the Roman state a continuous source of revenue, the Gracchan land commissioners were believed to heavily favor Roman citizens rather than act as neutral arbiters when disputes arose between citizens and non-citizens who might both claim portions of the land in question. In other instances, Roman magistrates clearly abused the

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<sup>39</sup> Tweedie 2011: 583; Val. Max. 3.8.4; Cic. *Cat.* 4.1; Plut. *Mar.* 39.4.

allies in the years leading up to the Social War through arbitrary brute force.<sup>40</sup> However, it should also be remembered that such abuses were not condoned; and, in 149, a special court was established to deal with these complaints. Yet such measures also made both Italians and provincials even more reliant on the judgments of Roman aristocrats.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, Roman magistrates mistreating allies not only challenged local elites but harmed the commoners as well.<sup>42</sup> Rather than rising up against their Roman masters in a bid for independence, the allies decided that becoming full citizens and working within the system would be the best way to gain power with the increasingly centralized authority at Rome.<sup>43</sup>

In the case of the Gracchan land commission, judgments favoring Roman citizens over the allies would consequently displace other Italians who might possess the land.<sup>44</sup> Those allies who were negatively impacted by the land commission sought out Scipio Aemilianus for redress, again indicating that the allies preferred to work within the Roman political system to solve their problems.<sup>45</sup> Much to the allies' chagrin, Scipio's choice of arbiters, the consul Tuditanus, ultimately shirked this difficult responsibility,

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<sup>40</sup> Aul. Gell. 10.3.3.

<sup>41</sup> David 1997:143; Aul. Gell. 10.3.3; Liv. 29.8.6-9, 29.16.4-22, 42.3.

<sup>42</sup> Dart 2014: 56; Aul. Gell. 10.3.5.

<sup>43</sup> David 1997: 141.

<sup>44</sup> Dart 2014: 51-2; App. *B.C.* 1.18-9; Cic. *De re publica* 3.41; Sallust *Jug.* 42.1.

<sup>45</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.19.

preferring to fight the Illyrians instead.<sup>46</sup> However, Fulvius Flaccus would soon take up the allied cause.

After Tiberius Gracchus' death in 133, Fulvius Flaccus was the first consul to "urge the Italians to seek to obtain Roman citizenship and emerge from the condition of subjects to take part in the government of the empire."<sup>47</sup> Flaccus was on the Gracchan land commission and was in a unique position in the Roman government to recognize the Italians' plight.<sup>48</sup> Flaccus would have seen the inequity between Roman citizens and the allies in disputes over land allotments, and granting the Italians citizenship could be seen as a way of allowing the commission to continue redistributing land without opposition from the newly enfranchised Italians.<sup>49</sup>

Reception to Flaccus' proposal to extend citizenship to the allies was mixed.<sup>50</sup> Valerius Maximus states that Flaccus added that any Italian wishing to retain their native citizenship with the right of appeal to the Roman people may do so.<sup>51</sup> Though many communities would opt for Roman citizenship, some might have chosen to retain their former citizenship, probably because these groups still had previously established terms

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<sup>46</sup> App. B.C. 1.19.

<sup>47</sup> App. B.C. 1.34.

<sup>48</sup> Dart 2014: 54.

<sup>49</sup> Dart 2014: 54-5.

<sup>50</sup> App. B.C. 1.21.

<sup>51</sup> Val. Max. 9.5.1.

with Rome which were still favorable at this time. Nevertheless, they could take advantage of *ius provocationis*.<sup>52</sup>

In 126, the tribune, M. Iunius Pennus, expelled all non-Romans from the city, possibly anticipating that these resident aliens would seek to assist Flaccus' election.<sup>53</sup> Even if these resident aliens could not vote they could still influence their Roman associates. For instance, Cicero's letter to Brutus mentions an orator, L. Papirius of Fregellae, who eloquently defended the Latin colonies in a speech delivered to the Senate.<sup>54</sup> When Flaccus' proposal to give the allies citizenship was rejected by the Senate in 125, the town of Fregellae responded by openly revolting against Rome.

This revolt was a turning point, as Fregellae was not just an Italian community full of malcontents, but originally a Latin colony.<sup>55</sup> Latin colonies almost uniformly remained loyal to Rome in times of rebellion. Out of all the communities to rebel against Rome during the Social War, Venusia was the only Latin colony to join the rebels. Furthermore, Fregellae's citizens had been noted for extreme loyalty to Rome, as they opposed Hannibal's advance through Italy by burning bridges across the Liris in 212.<sup>56</sup> Fregellae's spontaneous rebellion in 125 says much about the level of discontent its citizens must have felt. After the rebellion, the town was consequently razed by a Roman

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<sup>52</sup> Val. Max. 9.5.1.

<sup>53</sup> Cic. *Off.* 3.47.

<sup>54</sup> Cic. *Brut.* 170.

<sup>55</sup> Liv. 8.22.

<sup>56</sup> Liv. 26.9.

army under the praetor, Lucius Opimius, who would later oppose Gaius Gracchus' political ambitions. However, putting down this rebellion would prove ineffective as both more Roman aristocrats became willing to support the allied cause, and more allied communities became increasingly discontent.

Though the Gracchan land commission may have hurt noncitizens, Appian claims that the allies were more interested in citizenship than the land from *ager publicus*.<sup>57</sup> As we will see below, issues concerning land and citizenship may be more closely linked than Appian would have us believe. Full Roman citizenship would likely have been seen as a way to alleviate the allies' material concerns.

Though their critics may lump the Gracchi brothers together as demagogues taking advantage of the allies' sentiments, according to Plutarch, the Gracchi brothers had very distinct personalities.<sup>58</sup> However, they shared similar goals and proved popular with the people. Plutarch attributes the failure of their individual political careers to their age difference of nine years preventing them from achieving prominence at the same time.<sup>59</sup> Otherwise, the two could have combined their efforts, proving to be an irresistible force.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.21.

<sup>58</sup> Plut., *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 2.

<sup>59</sup> Plut., *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 3.

<sup>60</sup> Plut., *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 3.

Like his brother, Gaius had a close working relationship with the allies both on the land commission and in his later building projects.<sup>61</sup> With such connections, it is easy to see how a jealous Senate later accused Gaius of encouraging the allies at Fregellae to revolt.<sup>62</sup>

Gaius was able to clear himself of charges of encouraging the allies at Fregellae to revolt. Nevertheless, even though at this point, Gaius had accomplished little on their behalf, Italian supporters flooded Rome during his campaign for the tribunate.<sup>63</sup> Once in office, his reform program included a bill which would have given the allies the same voting rights as Roman citizens.<sup>64</sup> After his reelection as tribune, Gaius offered an extension of Roman citizenship a second time, but in this effort his foil, Livius Drusus the Elder, instead proposed that Latins should not be beaten with rods even as a part of military discipline.<sup>65</sup> Though the Italians could not vote during Gaius Gracchus' tribunate, oligarchic elements in the Senate felt threatened enough by their presence at Rome to have the consul, Fannius, expel noncitizen Italians from the city during the voting process for Gaius' reelection bid.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> App. B.C. 1.23; Plut., *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 27-8.

<sup>62</sup> Plut., *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 24.

<sup>63</sup> Plut., *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 24.

<sup>64</sup> Plut., *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 26.

<sup>65</sup> App. B.C. 1.23; Plut. *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 29-30.

<sup>66</sup> App. B.C. 1.23; Plut. *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 33.

Boren argues that Gaius Gracchus hurt the allies while on the land commission but sought their support for reelection by offering citizenship.<sup>67</sup> However, Salmon notes that though Italians may have been politically slighted by the Senate's rejection of Gaius Gracchus' proposal to extend citizenship to the allies, they were not harmed materially then.<sup>68</sup> Also, the Italians do not appear to have been harmed by the land commission after Gaius' death in 121.<sup>69</sup> On the contrary, twenty years later, Saturninus' agrarian bill in 100 was said to have been to the Italians' benefit.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, Italians must have watched the struggle for control of the Roman law courts between the equestrians and senators with increased anxiety since the judgments rendered there now impacted the allies far more than before the Hannibalic War when Rome displayed less interest in the allies' local affairs.<sup>71</sup> The allies may have viewed senatorial jurists as insular elitists, but they would have seen the equestrians as economic rivals.<sup>72</sup>

While Livius Drusus is usually portrayed as pawn of the Senate, Boren argues that Drusus was more sympathetic to the allies than Plutarch and the other ancient writers would have us believe.<sup>73</sup> Though Plutarch would have us believe that Drusus was simply attempting to outdo Gaius Gracchus in demagoguery, Boren believes that Drusus, instead, provided carefully considered responses to the increasingly wild proposals of

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<sup>67</sup> Boren 1956: 30.

<sup>68</sup> Salmon 1962: 111.

<sup>69</sup> Salmon 1962: 111; App. *B.C.* 1.27.

<sup>70</sup> Salmon 1962: 111; App. *B.C.* 1.29.

<sup>71</sup> Salmon 1962: 111.

<sup>72</sup> Salmon 1962: 112.

<sup>73</sup> Boren 1956: 27.



Gaius.<sup>74</sup> He concludes by saying that Drusus' success was based on the Romans' desire to follow the Senate so long as it considered their needs.<sup>75</sup> Drusus' son of the same name later made such a concentrated effort to help the allies because of his father's sympathetic view of the allies.<sup>76</sup> In contrast, Boren believes the people distrusted Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus and doubted their sincerity.<sup>77</sup> Perhaps that is why so few were willing to help Gaius and Flaccus when their deaths were imminent.

Though Boren's theory is plausible, it is also highly speculative. Plutarch takes the time to stress Drusus' good character, which may leave one to wonder why Drusus is then so willing to undermine Gaius even at the peril of the state itself.<sup>78</sup> Appian's account of Drusus the Elder's tribunate is not as detailed and merely informs us of his role in countering Gaius' legislation at the urging of the Senate.<sup>79</sup> Ultimately, we cannot conclude with any certainty that Drusus' counter-proposals to Gaius were even enacted once passed.<sup>80</sup> The Gracchi, by contrast, were honored with statues after their deaths, which indicates that they were not as distrusted by the people as Boren may have us think, at least posthumously.

Despite the prominence of Gaius and Flaccus and the number of their followers who were killed alongside them, they appear to have had little support from the general

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<sup>74</sup> Boren 1956: 31.

<sup>75</sup> Boren 1956: 33.

<sup>76</sup> Boren 1956: 27.

<sup>77</sup> Boren 1956: 33.

<sup>78</sup> Plut. *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 30.

<sup>79</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.23.

<sup>80</sup> Boren 1956: 31.

populace of Rome when death was upon them. Lucius Opimius, who destroyed Fregellae in 125 as a praetor, as consul in 121 (and using the ambiguous mandate of the first *senatus consultum ultimum*) executed Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus with 3,000 of their followers.<sup>81</sup> The consul of the following year, C. Papirius Carbo, acquitted Opimius on charges of murder. Any hope the allies had for enfranchisement was thrown into the Tiber for the time being.

Scholars such as Gabba believe that Italian motivations for seeking citizenship were initially tied to the agrarian reforms of the Gracchi brothers, but under the consulship of Drusus the Elder the motivations turned to pure political advantage.<sup>82</sup> Likewise, Sherwin-White argues that though Fulvius Flaccus, Livius Drusus, and Gaius Gracchus all proposed extending Italian rights, the agrarian question vanishes after 125 and cannot be the cause for allied agitation in the 90s.<sup>83</sup>

However, Tweedie argues that land reform was still a central issue up to the Social War itself.<sup>84</sup> Ancient sources neglect Drusus the Younger's agrarian legislation which, of course, could alter modern perceptions of what the issues were.<sup>85</sup> Drusus the Younger may have agitated for land reform in 91 because of an influx of veterans returning to Italy in 93 which needed to be settled.<sup>86</sup> These 50,000 Roman and allied

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<sup>81</sup> Plut. *Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus* 35-8.

<sup>82</sup> Gabba 1976: 74.

<sup>83</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 142.

<sup>84</sup> Tweedie 2011: 574.

<sup>85</sup> Tweedie 2011: 574.

<sup>86</sup> Tweedie 2011: 577-8.

veterans would have remained unsettled in Italy for about eighteen months and could have served as an important constituency to any bills Drusus sought to pass.<sup>87</sup> Tweedie believes that Drusus' legislation was designed to break the gridlock between allied claims over *ager publicus* and the legions' need for an enlarged recruitment pool. However, as with other legislative projects Drusus supported, in trying to negotiate between the competing interests, Drusus only angered those he sought to help.<sup>88</sup>

Between 100 and 90, Italian agitation at Rome grew more intense. In 95, the Romans responded with the passage of the *Lex Licinia Mucia*, which expelled Italians falsely claiming Roman citizenship from Rome. Cicero states that the purpose of the law was not to permanently expel non-Romans from the city but to prevent noncitizens from falsely acting as citizens.<sup>89</sup> Salmon argues that this law turned Italian elites against Rome, doing more to cause the Social War than Drusus the Younger's murder.<sup>90</sup> However, Dart argues that the *Lex Licinia Mucia* was simply a continuation of previous policy, while conceding that the allies in 95 had an extreme desire for citizenship whereas in 125 they merely sought personal advantage under the Gracchan land commission.<sup>91</sup>

It was expected that anyone who proposed legislation such as Drusus' would gain a host of new fiercely loyal clients for the long term.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, the Gracchi were accused

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<sup>87</sup> Tweedie 2011: 577-9.

<sup>88</sup> Tweedie 2011: 584.

<sup>89</sup> Cic. *Off.* 3.47.

<sup>90</sup> Salmon 1962: 114.

<sup>91</sup> Dart 2014: 64.

<sup>92</sup> Dart 2014: 65.

of attempting to establish tyrannies through popular appeal. The Roman “constitution”, in its ideal form at least, was a careful balance between monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. Recognizing that the oligarchic elements of society had grown indifferent to the plight of the common folk had led reformers such as the Gracchi, Fulvius Flaccus, and Drusus the Younger to attempt to tilt the scales in favor of the democratic elements of society. However, popular leaders always bring the threat of tyranny through the masses or are at least readily accused of such. In order to avoid a radical transition in which the roles of oppressor and oppressed are not simply reversed, the changes must be moderate with concessions made by all parties. Further incorporating the allies as new citizens would help bring balance to the competing elements of Roman society provided that the legal mechanisms for accomplishing this would not overcompensate for existing deficiencies. The greatest difficulty in incorporating new citizens en masse into the voting tribes was how to distribute them. If the majority fell into a few rural tribes they could vote as a bloc, but even if they were more evenly distributed they could still potentially outnumber existing citizens at the polls by a significant margin, thus tipping the balance of power in favor of their patrons like Drusus.<sup>93</sup>

The Livian tradition is largely negative towards Drusus the Younger.<sup>94</sup> This is reflected in Florus, who may lead the reader to believe the relationship between Drusus

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<sup>93</sup> Dart 2014: 67.

<sup>94</sup> Tweedie 2011: 575; Liv. *Per.* 70-1.

and the allies was complex, but who ultimately judges the tribune to be self-serving.<sup>95</sup> However, Diodorus Siculus and Velleius Paterculus describe Drusus in a more positive light.<sup>96</sup> Though Velleius believed the Italians' desire for citizenship to be just, he still believed Drusus was using the allies' cause to pass his legislation.<sup>97</sup> On the contrary, Appian believed that Drusus' other legislation was meant to pave the way for his citizenship reform.<sup>98</sup> In Appian's version, it is significant that the Italians approached Drusus for aid rather than the reverse.<sup>99</sup>

Drusus' tribunate in 91 adopted new platforms in order to achieve conservative goals such as changing control of the courts from the equestrians back to the Senate.<sup>100</sup> Indeed, after Gaius Gracchus initially changed control of the courts from the Senate to the equestrians, the new body proved just as corruptible as the former.<sup>101</sup> By Drusus' tribunate, bribery was supposedly such a common offense among both the equestrians and senators that they were irritated that he wanted to make bribe-taking a crime.<sup>102</sup>

Salmon argues that Italian business interests in the provinces could be particularly damaged by the ill-will of the courts.<sup>103</sup> Worse still, Italians were forced largely to be

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<sup>95</sup> Flor. 2.5.4, 2.6.3, 2.5.1.

<sup>96</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.10.1; Vell. Pat. 2.13.1, 2.13.3, 2.14.3.

<sup>97</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.15.2, 2.14.1.

<sup>98</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.35.

<sup>99</sup> Tweedie 2011: 576; App. *B.C.* 1.35.

<sup>100</sup> Dart 2014: 73.

<sup>101</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.22.

<sup>102</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.35.

<sup>103</sup> Salmon 1962: 112.

spectators in the strife between political rivals at Rome.<sup>104</sup> Italian *negotiatores* in the provinces would have seen Roman equestrians as competitors in their business ventures, meaning that these equestrian-run courts could do much to harm them.<sup>105</sup> For this reason, some Italians were much more concerned for control of the courts than agrarian laws since agrarian laws were easier to circumvent than judicial laws.<sup>106</sup> Nevertheless, Drusus pushed forward with land reform. Consequently, the Senate was angered by Drusus' proposals to distribute land and grain even though the laws were meant to gather support for court reforms.<sup>107</sup> Drusus also sought to establish a number of colonies to secure the support of the Roman people.<sup>108</sup>

Drusus was successful in passing some of his measures, but at the expense of alienating important segments of Roman society. Granting citizenship to Italian allies was consistent with Drusus' policy of attempting to appease those who might oppose his legislation.<sup>109</sup> Though enfranchised Italians would take time to integrate into the Roman voting system, they could still be of long term benefit to the one who enfranchised them in future elections.<sup>110</sup>

Quintus Poppaedi Silo, a leading Marsic noble of considerable military experience and one of the Social War's chief generals for Italica, probably first lobbied

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<sup>104</sup> Salmon 1962: 112.

<sup>105</sup> Salmon 1962: 112.

<sup>106</sup> Salmon 1962: 115.

<sup>107</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.13

<sup>108</sup> App. B.C. 1.35.

<sup>109</sup> Dart 2014: 75.

<sup>110</sup> Dart 2014: 75.

Drusus for Italian enfranchisement in early 91.<sup>111</sup> The ties between leading Roman families and Italian elites were deep and complex.<sup>112</sup> Drusus may not only have had ties to Silo but also Campania and Picenum.<sup>113</sup> As such, Silo would be a natural leader in the Italian's final attempts to gain citizenship through peaceful means and as a military leader in the following conflict.

Silo had a following of some 10,000 men who saw Roman citizenship as a way of alleviating their individual problems. They allegedly had taken an oath that should they acquire Roman citizenship they would consider Rome their country and support Drusus.<sup>114</sup> Though it is possible that this oath was fabricated by Drusus' enemies, it is clear that there was some sort of mutual understanding between Drusus and the Italians, given their mutual support.<sup>115</sup> Drusus' knowledge of an assassination attempt upon the consuls during the annual Latin Festival raised suspicion that he was colluding with the Italians even though Drusus warned the consuls of the plot.<sup>116</sup>

After Drusus' measures were annulled by the Senate, the allies began agitating for revolt.<sup>117</sup> Drusus did not veto the Senate's decision to annul his legislation but warned that their actions would lose them the courts.<sup>118</sup> Drusus recognized that the Senate's

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<sup>111</sup> Dart 2014: 76-7.

<sup>112</sup> Tweedie 2011: 576.

<sup>113</sup> Tweedie 2011: 583.

<sup>114</sup> Dart 2014: 77.

<sup>115</sup> Dart 2014: 80-1.

<sup>116</sup> Dart 2014: 81-3.

<sup>117</sup> Liv. *Per.* 71.

<sup>118</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.10.3.

response would have consequences, but even he did not realize how far the allies' response would go. Tensions flared between all parties, but violence was not yet a foregone conclusion.

Silo led a group of 10,000 armed men to Rome at the summons of the tribunes, probably directed by Drusus. Silo was stopped by Gaius Domitius who convinced him that the Senate was in favor of granting the Italians citizenship and would likely give it if Silo proceeded peacefully. This encounter on the road convinced Silo to desist.<sup>119</sup> The meeting was likely prior to Drusus' death given the conciliatory nature of the meeting.<sup>120</sup> Dart further states that though the chronology is imprecise, it is likely that Drusus was still alive when his reforms were annulled.<sup>121</sup> Various allegations were leveled against Drusus' laws in order to justify their annulment.

By the time Drusus' laws were annulled, the situation at Rome had grown tense. One of Drusus' clients had attempted to publicly strangle the consul Philippus for interrupting Drusus during a speech.<sup>122</sup> Many of the allies were also beginning to turn violent. At the Picentine theater, an Italian comedian was killed by the crowd for commenting on the status of noncitizens while another actor was barely able to mollify them, narrowly avoiding the same fate himself.<sup>123</sup> In another example of Italian unrest, a

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<sup>119</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.13.

<sup>120</sup> Dart 2014: 87.

<sup>121</sup> Dart 2014: 88-91.

<sup>122</sup> Val. Max. 9.5.2; Flor. 2.5.8.

<sup>123</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.12.



native of Asculum, T. Betucius Barrus, championed allied rights by delivering a speech in Rome against Servilius Caepio.<sup>124</sup> Now the allies not only sought out Romans to champion their cause but, as indicated earlier with Silo, they began to advocate for themselves as well.<sup>125</sup>

It is unclear from the sources who actually murdered Drusus at his home. Appian believes that the Etruscans and Umbrians were responsible, while other sources remain vague.<sup>126</sup> But what is evident is that Drusus' policy of giving every faction something to gain and something to lose agitated all parties to varying degrees. For instance, though the Etruscans and Umbrians had largely escaped any negative consequences from the Gracchan land commission, Drusus' agrarian law would have made them the most likely to suffer.<sup>127</sup> After Drusus died, the Etruscans and Umbrians appeared content.<sup>128</sup>

Though Dart believes the Etruscans and Umbrians would not have had a reason to be in Rome after Drusus' legislation had been annulled, Gabba argues that some Etruscans and Umbrians who were already adversely affected by his legislation may have harbored some resentment towards him.<sup>129</sup> Tweedie believes that both Philippus and Drusus attempted to leverage wider Italian support to back their causes.<sup>130</sup> It appears that

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<sup>124</sup> Cic. *Brut.* 46.

<sup>125</sup> Dart 2014: 92.

<sup>126</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.36; Vell. *Pat.* 2.14; Liv. *Per.* 71; Cic. *Mil.* 16; Flor. 2.6.

<sup>127</sup> Salmon 1962: 117-8.

<sup>128</sup> Salmon 1962: 117-8.

<sup>129</sup> Dart 2014: 93; Gabba 1976: 73.

<sup>130</sup> Tweedie 2011: 587.

while Drusus had made enemies of northern and southern Italians, central Italians remained supportive.<sup>131</sup>

Though the date of Drusus' murder is also uncertain, what does seem clear is that it was after his laws were annulled but before he reached the end of his tribunate.<sup>132</sup> This would place his murder sometime between September 20<sup>th</sup> and December 10<sup>th</sup> of 91.<sup>133</sup> Like those of Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus, Drusus' murder once again squashed the allies' hopes for citizenship through legislation. However, the Gracchi and Flaccus were murdered for generally trying to court popular support, while Drusus' murder was a direct result of championing allied enfranchisement.

## **The Social War**

### Italian Motivations

Drusus' murder was a severe blow to the cause of Italian enfranchisement, but the murders at Asculum which were to follow can at least retrospectively be seen as the spark that ignited the Social War. These latter murders, which will be explained in greater detail below, occurred at the peak of allied frustrations with Rome. Similarly tense episodes, which fell just short of violent death, also occurred just prior to these murders. The Romans did not recognize the degree of discontent among the allies up to the murders of all the Romans at Asculum. Picenum, Samnium, Lucania, Campania, and

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<sup>131</sup> Tweedie 2011: 589.

<sup>132</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.37.

<sup>133</sup> Dart 2014: 95.

Marsica were the most dissatisfied regions and received visits by Roman magistrates.<sup>134</sup> However, Rome simply expected the allies to accept whatever decisions the Romans made.<sup>135</sup>

Hoping to quell any rebellious sentiments in the area, the praetor, Q. Servilius, went to Asculum to investigate the rising tensions in the city. Servilius treated the local population poorly and probably expected his presence to terrify them into submission.<sup>136</sup> Instead, they killed him and his legate Fonteius.

The sources are divided on whether the Roman magistrates were murdered because of their mistreatment of their allies or because Servilius had discovered a plot to rebel against Roman hegemony. Diodorus believes it was because the allies feared the threats which Servilius made at Asculum, while Appian and Livy claim that it was because Servilius had discovered the preparations for rebellion.<sup>137</sup> Whatever the case, all of the Romans in Asculum were murdered. When the Senate denied Asculum's delegation any empathy in response to the murders, the allies' options quickly dwindled.

Even after Drusus' death and the murders at Asculum, the allies were not fully committed to rebellion.<sup>138</sup> Though the allies had likely been preparing to rebel for some time, it was only the Senate's harsh response to the murders at Asculum which finally

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<sup>134</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.38; Liv. *Per.* 72-3; Diod. Sic. 37.13.

<sup>135</sup> Dart 2014: 99.

<sup>136</sup> Dart 2014: 100; App. *B.C.* 1.38; Diod. Sic. 37.13.

<sup>137</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.38; Diod. Sic. 37.13; Liv. *Per.* 71.

<sup>138</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.39.

pushed the allies to war.<sup>139</sup> Though the citizens at Asculum were fully prepared to fight against Rome, their envoy to the Senate after the murders suggests that war was still not the only option under consideration.

The sources agree that the allies felt an increasing desire for citizenship during the late republic, a sentiment which certain Roman politicians tapped into for various reasons as has previously been discussed. Certainly, later writers viewed the allies as the more sympathetic characters in this narrative. As Velleius Paterculus states, “Their fortune was as cruel as their cause was most just, for they sought citizenship in the state whose power they were defending by their arms”.<sup>140</sup> Velleius continues “every year and in every war they were furnishing a double number of men, both of cavalry and of infantry, and yet were not admitted to the rights of citizens in the state which, through their efforts, had reached so high a position that it could look down upon men of the same race and blood as foreigners and aliens”.<sup>141</sup> It is worth noting that, as a Campanian, Velleius had his own biases, and this certainly would have colored his interpretation of the Italian’s plight. In Florus’ analysis of the Social War, he concludes “though we call this war a war against allies, in order to diminish its abhorrence, if we are truthful, it was a war against citizens”.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Dart 2014: 95-7.

<sup>140</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.15.2.

<sup>141</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.15.2.

<sup>142</sup> Flor. 2.18.1.

The sources compress the chronology of events in the rebel uprisings during the Social War. Though the ancient sources list entire peoples rebelling, certain individual cities did not. For instance, Pinna, an important city in Vestini, resisted the rebels, and remained famously loyal to Rome.<sup>143</sup> Nevertheless, we might reasonably expect that when entire peoples are listed as having taken part in the rebellion that a majority of communities were involved.

Livy, Diodorus, and Appian attempt to list the peoples who rebelled against Rome during the Social War. Salmon claims that there were a total of twelve peoples who rebelled.<sup>144</sup> Livy lists seven: the Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Samnites, and Lucani. Diodorus mentions five peoples: the Samnites, Asculani, Lucani, Picentes, and Nolani. Appian lists the insurgent peoples as the Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Marrucini, Picentes, Frentani, Hirpini, Pompeiani, Venusini, Iapygii, Lucani, and Samnites. Salmon says that the Asculani are probably the same people as the Picentes while the Nolani should be equated with the Pompeiani; he explains that Diodorus calls them the Nolani because Nola remained under that group's control the longest, but Pompeiani more accurately describes where the rebellion in Campania broke out.<sup>145</sup> Nola itself was not part of the rebel league, but was captured by the rebels. Appian's list contains all the peoples that Livy and Diodorus include, so the only question which remains is whether or

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<sup>143</sup> *Ad. Heren.* 2.28.

<sup>144</sup> Salmon 1958: 159-61.

<sup>145</sup> Salmon 1958: 159-61.

not Appian's list is complete.<sup>146</sup> Rebel coinage variously depicts different numbers of soldiers swearing an oath over a sacrificial animal, but these vague images cannot be used to definitively demonstrate the number of rebel peoples at any one time since we do not know who exactly each soldier is supposed to represent.<sup>147</sup>

Salmon argues that southern Italians were much more invested in provincial trade than Etruscans or Umbrians, which may have contributed to the latter groups' reluctance to take up arms against Rome.<sup>148</sup> Economic incentives or the lack thereof would help explain why certain communities may have been quicker to rebel than others. However, Sherwin-White observes that the greatest support for the Social War did not come from the sea ports but from Italy's central highlands which were not directly involved in provincial trade.<sup>149</sup> There does not appear to be a class division within individual communities, as there was in the Hannibalic War.<sup>150</sup> In the previous conflict, the wealthy elites of individual communities tended to support Rome while the commoners favored Hannibal. Sherwin-White believes that the lack of class division during the Social War indicates that any material concerns were secondary to political needs.<sup>151</sup> Whatever material concerns may have influenced some communities to rebel or remain loyal at the

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<sup>146</sup> Salmon 1958: 161-2.

<sup>147</sup> Salmon 1958: 162-4; for examples of rebel coins see E. A. Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic* (London 1952), nos. 617-24, 634.

<sup>148</sup> Salmon 1962: 117.

<sup>149</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 142.

<sup>150</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 135.

<sup>151</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 135.

outbreak of the Social War were ultimately subsumed by the desire for greater political equality as more and more communities joined the rebellion.

Those who seek to portray the Social War as a conflict for independence are keen to stress the cultural differences between Rome and her subject peoples. However, Salmon notes that though the Samnites were primarily an Oscan-speaking culture the Marsi were heavily latinized by 91.<sup>152</sup> This signifies that cultural differences likely did not play a large role in the outbreak of the Social War. However, the Marsi were such a prominent rebel group that Romans first identified this conflict as the Marsic War. The secessionists declaring Corfinium to be a city where all Italians may be equal signifies their desire was indeed equality.<sup>153</sup>

Venusia is the only example of a Latin colony rebelling against Rome during the Social War. Earlier, Salmon argued that this was due to its Oscan influence.<sup>154</sup> However, Dart believes that Venusia may have defected because it was cut off from Roman support.<sup>155</sup> The city had a history of displaying loyalty to Rome on previous occasions. Indeed, Venusia served as a major base of operations for Roman commanders during the Hannibalic War. The rebel army under Vidacilius laid siege to a number of other loyal cities, killed the leading Roman citizens, and conscripted captured Romans and slaves

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<sup>152</sup> Salmon 1962: 118.

<sup>153</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 137; Strabo 5.4.2.

<sup>154</sup> Salmon 1958: 167-8.

<sup>155</sup> Dart 2014: 132.

into his army, which may have convinced Venusia to defect.<sup>156</sup> Little mercy may have been shown to Venusia otherwise.

In the epitome of Book 46 of Livy, Q. Poppaedi Silo is described as the “*dux et auctor eius rei*”.<sup>157</sup> Florus and Strabo also support this statement.<sup>158</sup> According to Plutarch, “they [the rebels] were not only strong in arms and men, but also had generals whose daring and ability were amazing and made them a match for the Romans.”<sup>159</sup> The rebels had detailed knowledge of and experience with Roman military practices.<sup>160</sup>

At the behest of the tribune Q. Varius Severus Hybrida, the Romans preoccupied themselves with establishing a court for the prosecution of those who incited the Italians to revolt in 90 just as the rebels declared their intentions. Despite some opposition in the Senate, enough equestrians supported the courts to ensure their establishment.<sup>161</sup> The actual crimes investigated by these courts appear to amount to little more than association with Drusus or advocating for concessions being made to the allies.<sup>162</sup> This may have served as a flimsy pretext for politicians to prosecute their Roman aristocratic rivals.<sup>163</sup> Those of Drusus’ supporters who were prosecuted included Aemilius Scaurus, C. Cotta, Calpurnius Bestia, Mummius Achaicus, L. Mummius, Q. Pompeius, and M. Antonius. In

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<sup>156</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.42.

<sup>157</sup> Liv. *Per.* 76.

<sup>158</sup> Flor. 1.6.10-1; Strabo 5.4.2.

<sup>159</sup> Plut. *Mar.* 32.

<sup>160</sup> *Ad Heren.* 4.9.

<sup>161</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.37; Val. Max. 8.6.4.

<sup>162</sup> Dart 2014: 105.

<sup>163</sup> Dart 2014: 105; Cic. *Brut.* 89; Cic. *De or.* 1.25.



a moment of irony, Varius was also convicted in 90 or 89 and was exiled like the others.<sup>164</sup>

### The Formation of “Italia”

Even as the Roman elite used the courts to drag each other down, reports of new cities rebelling reached Rome every day.<sup>165</sup> Pobjoy states that though modern historians give relatively little attention to the impact of the rebel state of “Italia” on the Roman world, ancient writers saw it as the most important event up to that time.<sup>166</sup> Indeed, few crises since the war with Hannibal can compare in magnitude as an existential threat to the Roman state.

Gabba argues that the Italians knew that their ability to directly participate in Roman politics was limited by geographic circumstances, and that the Social War started as an aristocratic bid for independence from Rome rather than a popular uprising.<sup>167</sup> Local aristocrats would naturally lead their communities given their position of prominence and myriad connections, but independence is not what they sought. Such a claim is not supported by any of the ancient sources, which universally agree that Italian motivations for participating in the war were to gain Roman citizenship, something local aristocrats would benefit from far more than their communities at large. Sherwin-White claims a middle ground by stating that rebel motivations during the Social War were

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<sup>164</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.37; Cic. *Brut.* 89; Val. Max. 3.7.8.

<sup>165</sup> Asconius 73-4.

<sup>166</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 187; Diod. Sic. 37.1-2; Vell. Pat. 2.15.3.

<sup>167</sup> Gabba 1976: 74-5.

mixed: some desired citizenship while others, particularly the Samnites, sought complete independence.<sup>168</sup> Dart, however, effectively argues that the allies sought full Roman citizenship, and at least some of the allies intended to use their voting rights once enfranchised.<sup>169</sup>

Understanding the motivations of the rebels during the Social War has been a divisive topic among modern scholars. The brief explanations offered by the sources have understandably left many unanswered questions for later generations to grapple with. This has made it very easy for modern readers to incorrectly associate the Social War with independence movements.

There are many prominent examples in both ancient and modern history of rebels seeking freedom from their oppressors through violent means. Mythologized in modern fiction and popular topics from more recent history such as the American Revolution and French Revolution, it is difficult for many to imagine rebels desiring little outside of independence or regime change. Such cultural influences invariably color our own biases, and no scholar is immune to the *zeitgeist* of his or her own age. Though previous scholars such as Mommsen and Mouritsen have also argued that Italia was a regional independence movement, Pobjoy is the most recent scholar to do so, and perhaps most forceful.<sup>170</sup> Arguments such as Pobjoy's may seem very appealing because they align

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<sup>168</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 144-6.

<sup>169</sup> Dart 2014: 214.

<sup>170</sup> Mommsen, Vol. 3, 1894: 505; Mouritsen 1998: 23–38.

with sentiments modern readers can easily identify with, but the topic is far more nuanced than Pobjoy's treatment.

Pobjoy stresses that the creation of the state of "Italia" was a bid for independence from Rome.<sup>171</sup> Pobjoy believes that we should not take the stated motives for the Social War at face value because of the pro-Roman bias of many classical authors.<sup>172</sup> But I believe Pobjoy places too much emphasis on the possible biases of these writers. Roman writers may have ultimately favored their empire over all other states as most people throughout most times tend to favor their homelands, but they were far from uncritical of either their predecessors or contemporaries.

Indeed, when the Caledonian chieftain Calgacus famously claims "*auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*" it should be remembered that these words were put into the Briton's mouth by Tacitus.<sup>173</sup> Classical writers were capable of self-critique and frequently did so in more damning terms than modern commentators. Furthermore, many of our most important sources for Roman history are actually Greek writers. Certainly this paper would hardly be possible without the contributions of Appian and Plutarch, while the likes of Strabo and Polybius are no less appreciated for the value of their perspectives. Modern scholars

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<sup>171</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 189.

<sup>172</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 190.

<sup>173</sup> Tac. Ag. 30.

should be critical of the ancient sources, but the burden of proof lies upon their shoulders when the sources are in agreement.

Moreover, Pobjoy argues that rebels who set up their own government and afflicted massive casualties in battle could not then expect to be fully incorporated into the Roman state.<sup>174</sup> He adds that fighting for a position of privilege within the Roman Empire while simultaneously jeopardizing the security which made the empire possible was irrational.<sup>175</sup> These arguments are contingent upon perspectives which I am not convinced the participants in the Social War held.

This first point hinges upon how permanent “Italia’s” government was meant to be. Diodorus suggests that “Italia’s” government was meant to mimic Rome’s by applying titles such as *consul* and *praetor* as a direct analogue to the Roman state.<sup>176</sup> Other sources variously describe rebel leaders as *praetor*, *dux*, *στρατηγοί*, and *αὐτοκράτορες*.<sup>177</sup> Cicero describes Scato as *dux Marsorum* which is too vague to positively identify a magistracy of any sort.<sup>178</sup> Modern scholars tend to agree that there is too little evidence in the sources to say much about “Italia’s” political structure, though “Italia’s” two supreme military commanders were Q. Poppaedi Silo and C. Papius Mutilus.

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<sup>174</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 190.

<sup>175</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 190-1.

<sup>176</sup> Dart 2014: 110-1; Diod. Sic. 37.2.

<sup>177</sup> Dart 2014: 110-1; Eut. 5.32; App. B.C. 1.40; Vell. Pat. 2.16.1.

<sup>178</sup> Cic., *Phil.* 12.27.

Sherwin-White states that the political structure of “Italia” bore similarities to the Roman government but was more correctly a critique of it.<sup>179</sup> Though possessing magistrates, a senate, and a generally federal outlook, there is no indication that local autonomy was abolished nor is there direct evidence for a primary assembly of citizens.<sup>180</sup> This could support Pobjoy’s view that “Italia” was intended to function as a permanent state, but Dart argues that “Italia” was only a loose confederation constructed for the sole purpose of conducting its war against Rome.<sup>181</sup> “Italia” existed to do little more than organize and pay soldiers because Italian rebels had no intention of creating a more complex and permanent government.<sup>182</sup> The rebels, therefore, fully intended to integrate with the Roman state.<sup>183</sup>

To Pobjoy’s second point, rationality does not always govern one’s actions in something as violent and emotional as war. On the contrary, pride, ambition, revenge, and a host of other irrational motivations frequently play a crucial role in armed conflict. The rebels who fought in the Social War may have been unaware of the peril in which they put the empire, at least at first. Or perhaps they were fully aware of the risks but felt that their demands were worth it. At any rate, Marius, Sulla, and many others in both the immediate aftermath of the Social War and in subsequent generations would prove just as willing to jeopardize the security of the empire for a position of privilege within it.

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<sup>179</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 147.

<sup>180</sup> Sherwin-White 1973: 147.

<sup>181</sup> Dart 2014: 113.

<sup>182</sup> Dart 2014: 113.

<sup>183</sup> Dart 2014: 113.

Pobjoy further points to rebel negotiations with Mithridates VI of Pontus as evidence of “Italia’s” desire for independence, but he admits that these talks did not take place until 88, after the major battles of the war had been resolved.<sup>184</sup> Instead, these negotiations may have been a last desperate maneuver by rebel commanders fearing for their individual fates in the face of defeat. As I see it, these negotiations with Pontus were meant to prolong the war only until the rebels could secure better terms for their surrender. Though an ultimate Roman victory may have seemed certain by this point, the post-war relationship between Rome and the allies was far from decided.

Should the rebels have surrendered before they had secured all of the rights they believed they deserved, the much slower political mechanisms of the republic may have ensured that the allies’ concerns were never fully addressed. The rebels knew they needed to fight to expedite the political concessions which they felt were long overdue. Surrendering prematurely would have likely pushed back issues relating to Italian enfranchisement, and even after the Social War ended, precisely defining the new citizens’ political rights remained a contentious issue for years to come.

Pobjoy also argues that just because Rome offered citizenship to loyal communities during the course of the war, that we should not take that to mean that the Italians fought with the aim of gaining Roman citizenship in mind.<sup>185</sup> This argument only addresses the *Lex Iulia* issued in 90 while neglecting subsequent legislation such as the

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<sup>184</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 192-3.

<sup>185</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 193-6.

*Lex Plautia Papiria* in 89 which did offer citizenship to communities which surrendered in a timely manner. (Both of these laws will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.) After the Social War ended, the Romans then used ongoing issues concerning enfranchisement to gain Italian support in their own factional strife. Some rebel forces may never have laid down their arms even after the war's conclusion; by the mid-eighties, these rebels now fought under the banners of Marius, Sulla, and whoever else promised to advance their cause. Citizenship was a critical issue to the allies in the decades both before and after the Social War. It hardly stands to reason that the allies would not want this citizenship during the war itself when considering Roman responses to the rebellion.

To summarize my refutation of Pobjoy's arguments, though some scholars view rebel cries for *libertas* as a desire for separation from Rome, *libertas* was a complex idea which did not necessarily exclude *suffragium* and *provocatio* in relation to Rome. Italian desires for citizenship and freedom should be viewed as they are listed in the sources: as a linked pair rather than separate or contradictory goals.<sup>186</sup> Indeed, gaining the legal protections of full citizenship was a means of obtaining the freedom Italians desired.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> Dart 2014: 38; Strabo 5.4.2.

<sup>187</sup> Dart 2014: 38.

### Roman Overtures and Rebel Responses

As the outbreak of conflict with allies in Italy loomed, the quaestor in Cisalpine Gaul, Q. Sertorius, oversaw the recruitment of soldiers and collection of arms.<sup>188</sup> These recruits consisted of both loyal allied Italians and Roman citizens.<sup>189</sup> Appian claims that both rebel and Roman forces each recruited 100,000 infantry and cavalry per side at the outset of hostilities.<sup>190</sup> Significant numbers of allied auxiliaries also served Rome during the war.<sup>191</sup> Several legates were assigned to the consuls' provinces within Italy, and the consuls went from territory to territory to oversee the war effort.<sup>192</sup>

Initial rebel targets were loyal Latin colonies in the south. These attacks were designed to convince other cities to either join the rebellion or surrender. However, communities with Latin and Roman rights remained loyal during the initial wave of rebellion. Pinna became famous for its intense loyalty to Rome despite brutal murders at the hands of the rebels during the siege of their city.<sup>193</sup> Similarly, Alba Fucens became famous for loyalty to Rome under pressure.<sup>194</sup>

Dart argues that insurgent offensives remained close to rebel territory with the strategy of hoping to gain political advantage in negotiations through a long drawn out

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<sup>188</sup> Plut. *Sert.* 4.1.

<sup>189</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.39.

<sup>190</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.39.

<sup>191</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.42.

<sup>192</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.40.

<sup>193</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.19; Val. Max. 5.4.7.

<sup>194</sup> *Ad. Heren.* 2.28.



conflict.<sup>195</sup> The strategy was to bog down the Romans in a costly war which would force concessions.<sup>196</sup> The rebel forces' desire to see loyalist defections seems to support this theory.<sup>197</sup> Indeed, the threat of further defections in Etruria and Umbria is what eventually saw the Romans grant concessions to the allies.

As more allies either rebelled or were rumored to be preparing for rebellion, the Romans believed making concessions to both loyal allies and repentant rebels would alleviate their situation. Regarding a meeting between the Roman consul, Pompeius Strabo, and the rebel commander, P. Vettius Scato, in 89, Cicero later summarized "the allies were not seeking to deprive us of our citizenship, but to be admitted to it themselves".<sup>198</sup> Dart notes that even if Scato only represented the views of his native people, the Marsi, their influence over the other rebels was no doubt significant.<sup>199</sup> That certain rebel groups both joined the war and surrendered at different points may signify varying goals for each of the communities involved, but certainly the most contentious issue was not land rights or other economic incentives but enfranchisement and voting rights.

Nola was an early target for the rebels. This city had famously withstood Hannibal's assault, but in 90, rebel forces captured it.<sup>200</sup> The Praetor, L. Postumius and

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<sup>195</sup> Dart 2014: 127.

<sup>196</sup> Dart 2014: 127.

<sup>197</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.42.

<sup>198</sup> Cic., *Phil.* 12.27.

<sup>199</sup> Dart 2014: 28.

<sup>200</sup> Liv. *Per.* 72; App. *B.C.* 1.42.

2,000 of his troops were captured by Papius Mutilus. When Mutilus offered the prisoners a chance to defect the common soldiers accepted, but Postumius and the officers refused. The leniency Mutilus offered to loyalist prisoners of war suggests that neither he nor the Samnites under his command were bitter separatists.<sup>201</sup> Some, like the Roman officers who refused to convert, were firm in their convictions, but others could be persuaded to change sides, at least if they were put under sufficient pressure.

Interestingly, Capua remained loyal to Rome during the Social War.<sup>202</sup> Capua had previously been a rebel stronghold during the Hannibalic War, but, in defeat the city once considered second only to Rome in power was significantly reduced in status due to mass enslavement and resettlement at the war's conclusion. Whatever ambitions Capua once had for Italian primacy were now extinguished in its new population.

In 90, the rebel general, Vidacilius, persuaded the Latin colony of Venusia to defect. The city had previously displayed loyalty to Rome on multiple occasions, so suggesting that its defection was due to Samnite influence is doubtful. More likely, the colony defected because Vidacilius' army laid siege to a number of neighboring cities, killed the leading Roman citizens, and conscripted captured Romans and slaves into his

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<sup>201</sup> Dart 2014: 129.

<sup>202</sup> Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.3.3.

army, isolating Venusia from Roman support.<sup>203</sup> Given this perhaps surprising defection, the loyalties of almost anyone in the war could be called into question.

The Marsic rebel discussed above, Q. Poppaedi Silo, used the false pretense of defecting back to the Romans as the means of leading the Roman commander, Q. Servilius Caepio, into an ambush where he and his soldiers were killed.<sup>204</sup> Though this was nothing short of a lie on Silo's part, the premise does suggest that rebels who defected back to the Roman cause might expect leniency, if not amnesty. Dart's argument that the rebels who chose not to surrender between 90 and 88 did so because of fear of harsh punishments does not seem well supported by the willingness of both sides to seek out and use defectors and their displays of leniency upon capitulation.<sup>205</sup> However, after a number of reversals for the rebels in the latter part of 90, a number of Italian commanders opted to commit suicide rather than surrender.<sup>206</sup>

Though Appian makes no mention of a revolt in the northern parts of Italy in 90, both Livy and Orosius state that a battle was fought against the Etruscans and another against the Umbrians.<sup>207</sup> Appian suggests that the *Lex Iulia*, which granted citizenship to loyal allied communities, was passed amidst fears that Rome would be completely surrounded by enemies, and was intended to prevent such a revolt.<sup>208</sup> However, our other

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<sup>203</sup> Dart 2014: 132; App. *B.C.* 1.42.

<sup>204</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.44.

<sup>205</sup> Dart 2014: 190.

<sup>206</sup> Liv. *Per.* 73; App. *B.C.* 1.47-8.

<sup>207</sup> Liv. *Per.* 75; Oros. 5.18.17.

<sup>208</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.49-50.

sources make it seem as if the law was in response to a revolt on the part of the Etruscans and Umbrians.<sup>209</sup> In either case, the *Lex Iulia* was crafted out of military and political necessity.<sup>210</sup> A rebellion in those regions was likely underway or about to be. Appian confirms that a rebel army was sent north in the winter of 90/89 to aid or incite rebellion there.<sup>211</sup> Minor rebellions likely occurred in Etruria and Umbria because Roman forces felt compelled to go there.<sup>212</sup> Were the threat of rebellion in Etruria and Umbria not serious, the Romans would not have committed forces there which might have otherwise been deployed in actively contested regions of Italy. Additionally, Florus claims that the city of Oriculum in Umbria was destroyed and Faesulae in Etruria was sacked by Rome during the Social War.<sup>213</sup>

The *Lex Iulia* suggests that though not all allied communities rebelled by 90, many allied communities were sympathetic to the rebel cause, since the law's passage only came after many defections and the threat of further defections.<sup>214</sup> However, the rebels' initial successes were short-lived, and a number of rebel leaders were either killed or had committed suicide by the end of 90.<sup>215</sup> A combination of these rebel setbacks and waning support for the war forced them to relocate their capitol from Corfinium to

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<sup>209</sup> Liv. *Per.* 75; Oros. 5.18.7.

<sup>210</sup> Dart 2014: 144.

<sup>211</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.50.

<sup>212</sup> Dart 2014: 144.

<sup>213</sup> Flor. 2.18.11.

<sup>214</sup> Dart 2014: 146.

<sup>215</sup> Liv. *Per.* 73; App. *B.C.* 1.47-8.

Samnium in 89. Yet even until the end of 89, the rebels still held the important strongholds of Asculum, Corfinium, and Aesernia.

After a long siege, Asculum fell to the Romans in November of 89. The rebel leaders were killed, and the residents' slaves were sold off, but the surviving population was allowed to leave the city with their freedom.<sup>216</sup> The victor of the siege, Pompeius Strabo, was the only general granted an official triumph for a victory in this war. This may have been because the Senate felt certain of victory by 89, and Pompeius' triumph advertised that revenge had been inflicted on the murderers who served as a catalyst for the war.<sup>217</sup>

While we often read of communities deciding to rebel or remain loyal to Rome during the Social War, individual circumstances apparently influenced many to break with the decisions of their home communities. Loyalist forces did not just consist of the Romans themselves nor did they include only members of the communities which were officially loyal to Rome. A certain Minatius Magius who was a native of the Hirpinian city of Aeclanum raised a legion from among the Hirpini in support of the Romans and marched on Herculaneum. This legion helped the Romans capture the city, then helped

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<sup>216</sup> Oros. 5.18.26; Liv. *Per.* 76.

<sup>217</sup> Dart 2014: 158.

Sulla take Pompeii.<sup>218</sup> This illustrates that the issues involved in the Social War were as nuanced as they were complex.

Sulla laid siege to Aeclanum, which held out for reinforcements not from its fellow Hirpinians but from Lucania. The city's leaders asked Sulla for time to consider his terms of surrender, hoping to stall him long enough for reinforcements to arrive, but Sulla saw through this ruse, piled wood against the city walls, and set fire to the pile. Aeclanum surrendered at the sight. Several other towns quickly surrendered to Sulla afterwards. This, in addition to Minatius Magius' pro-Roman forces being raised in the area, indicates that support for the rebellion had weakened among the Hirpini by the summer of 89.<sup>219</sup>

As we have previously seen, Venusia likely joined the rebels due to external pressure, and now the fortunes of war were clearly in Rome's favor. Given that Venusia and Canusium were still wealthy in the days of Augustus, these communities may have surrendered willingly rather than being forcefully subdued during the Roman campaigns in Apulia of 89.<sup>220</sup> If Venusia and Canusium had to be taken by force, their wealth would have likely been confiscated, and their populations reduced through slaughter and enslavement. Pompeius Strabo formally received the surrender of the Marsi, Marruncini,

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<sup>218</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.16.

<sup>219</sup> Dart 2014: 162; App. *B.C.* 1.51.

<sup>220</sup> Dart 2014: 164; Strabo 5.4.11-2, 6.3.9.

and Vestini in 88.<sup>221</sup> Pompeius had won a series of victories in the north while Sulla continued to press on the gains of the previous consul, L. Iulius Caesar, in the south.

The rebels, including Q. Poppaedi Silo, retreated to Samnium and Apulia in 89. After this retreat, Silo was appointed supreme commander out of the five surviving generals. The rebels numbered about 30,000 at this point, but Silo raised an additional 20,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry by manumitting slaves, bringing their total to a little more than 50,000 by 88.<sup>222</sup>

In early 88, Silo retook Bovianum and entered the city in triumphal procession. Sulla had captured this stronghold in 89, and Silo's triumph was just as much about boosting the morale of his soldiers as reasserting rebel control over the fortress.<sup>223</sup> Even in victory the rebel soldiers must not have been overly optimistic at this point. Regaining a city can be an important step in a war effort; but, compared to the previous losses, this victory likely seemed small.

After the victory at Bovianum, Silo crossed the Apennines in an effort to reinforce Apulia. However, Silo was intercepted by a Roman army under the command of Mam. Aemilius Lepidus. Silo was badly defeated and was numbered among some 6,000 rebel dead.<sup>224</sup> The details provided for this battle by Diodorus, Appian, and Livy's summarizer are both garbled and brief, but Teanum, an Apulian city which was likely loyal to Rome

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<sup>221</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.52.

<sup>222</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.2.9-10.

<sup>223</sup> Dart 2014: 168-9.

<sup>224</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.53; Liv. *Per.* 76; Diod. Sic. 37.2.10.

throughout the war, may have served as the Roman base of operations for the attack.<sup>225</sup> According to Appian, Metellus, the proconsul over the legate Lepidus, accepted the surviving rebels into his own army as separate detachments.<sup>226</sup>

### The Resolution of the Conflict between Rome and its Allies

Silo's death was a major blow to the rebel cause. Appian and Livy treat his death in 88 as the end of the war, although Florus treats the fall of Asculum in 89 as the war's end.<sup>227</sup> However, many rebels had not yet surrendered at either of these points, and certain rebel groups may have been continuously under arms from the outbreak of the Social War until the Battle of the Colline Gate in November of 82. Though what event should be viewed as the end of the Social War may be somewhat unclear, what can be said for certain is that the Italians fighting after 87 were now participants in a new round of civil wars between various Roman factions from whom the Italians believed they could benefit, marking a different character from the previous conflict.

The *Lex Iulia*, the first major concession Rome made to the allies during the Social War, enfranchised all loyal Italian allies south of the Po in 90, while the *Lex Plautia Papiria* offered citizenship to rebels who surrendered within sixty days of its passage in 89. The passage of these two laws is insufficient in explaining how the vast

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<sup>225</sup> Dart 2014: 169; Diod. Sic. 37.2.9-10; App. *B.C.* 1.53; Liv. *Per.* 76.

<sup>226</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.53.

<sup>227</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.53; Livy *Per.* 76; Flor. 2.6.10.



majority of Italians gained full citizenship in the Social War's aftermath.<sup>228</sup> The *Lex Pompeia*, *Lex Calpurnia*, a number of other individual treaties with Italian communities, *senatus consulta*, and the censuses of 89, 86, and 70 slowly integrated Italy into the Roman citizen body.<sup>229</sup>

The *Lex Iulia* was passed in the winter of 90/89 either because of a revolution in Etruria and Umbria or because there was about to be one.<sup>230</sup> Scholars tend to agree that since at least 122, magistrates in Latin colonies had been given full citizenship, meaning that most of the leading men would have had the citizenship by 90. These leading men could have held rebellious elements in the Latin colonies in check throughout the Social War.<sup>231</sup> The *Lex Iulia* was far broader in scope than any previous legislation concerning enfranchisement. How broad exactly is still unclear to modern scholarship.

Whether the *Lex Iulia* just applied to Italians or included communities possessing Latin Rights in Cisalpine Gaul and Spain is unclear.<sup>232</sup> As mentioned earlier, allies who gained full Roman citizenship risked losing local autonomy. According to Appian, all loyal allied communities accepted the *Lex Iulia*, even though they were placed into ten new tribes which voted after all the others.<sup>233</sup> Heraclea and Neapolis considered accepting *foederis sui libertatem*, their former legal status as allies with domestic

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<sup>228</sup> Dart 2014: 171-2.

<sup>229</sup> Dart 2014: 172.

<sup>230</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.49-50; Liv. *Per.* 75; Oros. 5.18.7.

<sup>231</sup> Dart 2014: 174; App. *B.C.* 1.42.

<sup>232</sup> Dart 2014: 175; App. *B.C.* 1.49; Cic. *Balb.* 21.

<sup>233</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.49.

autonomy, but ultimately chose full Roman citizenship.<sup>234</sup> Though many allies undoubtedly accepted the terms of the *Lex Iulia* in good faith, there were many allies who remained unsatisfied with its terms. Appian's oversimplification becomes apparent as we learn of subsequent laws and treaties which became necessary to integrate the allies more fully, particularly as Marius and Sulla competed to gain favor with allies who remained uncertain of their true legal standing within the republic.

Although Appian assumes that the *Lex Iulia* was to place the allies into ten new tribes, Velleius states that the allies were to be placed in eight existing tribes.<sup>235</sup> Scholars have tried to reconcile this discrepancy by arguing that Latins would go into existing tribes while other allies would go into the ten new tribes, or that the allies were initially intended to go into ten new tribes but were later incorporated into eight existing tribes. Salmon's interpretation that the ex-rebels and other new citizens would not stand for being enrolled in ten new tribes and were eventually distributed into eight existing tribes seems to be the most correct assessment.<sup>236</sup> Again, this ambiguity in allied legal status during the Social War, and in the years after, undoubtedly caused some rebels to hesitate before accepting the Romans' terms. Indeed, some rebel forces never accepted Rome's terms, yet aligned themselves with Marius in his fight against Sulla in the hopes that Marius would guarantee their rights. These rebel forces were later destroyed by Sulla at the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82.

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<sup>234</sup> Cic. *Balb.* 21.

<sup>235</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.49; Vell. Pat. 2.20.2.

<sup>236</sup> Salmon 1958: 184.

As mentioned earlier, Pobjoy entirely neglects the *Lex Plautia Papiria*, which was possibly Rome's second concession to the allies, in making his argument that Rome's offers of citizenship do not necessarily correspond to rebel desires.<sup>237</sup> Velleius states that "The Romans gradually recovered their strength '*recipiendo in civitatem qui arma aut non ceperant aut deposuerant maturius*'".<sup>238</sup> The citizenship was offered to those who surrendered by a certain date, and at least some took advantage of the opportunity. However, what exact rights and responsibilities would come with this citizenship may have been left intentionally ambiguous at the time so as to convince rebels who might interpret this term generously to surrender quickly while Roman politicians could later impose more restricted forms without having openly lied to the rebels.

Modern scholarship goes to great lengths in its efforts to understand exactly what it is the Romans offered the rebels. Brunt does not believe individual grants of citizenship were taken advantage of under the *Lex Plautia Papiria*, but insists that the rebels would have chosen to remain loyal to their local communities in this life-and-death struggle.<sup>239</sup> However, there are examples to the contrary of pro-Roman forces being raised from rebel communities in the midst of the war.

Brunt further states that the Italians who surrendered to Rome during the Social War had only become *dediticii*, conquered people who were not enslaved, allied, or

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<sup>237</sup> Pobjoy 2000: 193-6.

<sup>238</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.16.4.

<sup>239</sup> Brunt 1965: 95-6.

citizens of Rome, and that they were finally granted full citizenship by the Senate in 87 only to gain their support against Cinna and Marius.<sup>240</sup> If this is true, surrendering rebels would have gained or retained individual freedoms, but would have held none of the political rights many were fighting for in the first place. The Senate also offered citizenship to Samnites, Nolans, and Lucanians still under arms at this time, but negotiations between the Senate and these latter groups broke down.<sup>241</sup>

Salmon argues that initial offers of citizenship in the wake of the Social War essentially equated to *civitas sine suffragio* since the allies were to be allotted to ten new tribes which would vote after all the others.<sup>242</sup> I believe Salmon's interpretation is correct, since voting in the assemblies stopped as soon as a majority had been reached. If a citizen were assigned to a tribe which voted later in the assemblies, he may realistically never vote at all except perhaps when the most divisive issues were at the polls. Marius and Cinna were less scrupulous and promised to grant all of the allies' demands.

The passage of the *Lex Iulia* and subsequent legislation is a major turning point for Italian enfranchisement. The allies seem to have been given exactly what they wanted, even if at the cost of thousands of lives. But in order to understand how well this legislation was implemented, we must next look at relevant census figures both prior to the Social War and in the decades which followed. These figures will play an important

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<sup>240</sup> Brunt 1971: 91.

<sup>241</sup> Brunt 1971: 91.

<sup>242</sup> Salmon 1958: 181.

part in helping us understand why some rebels did not immediately surrender as the Romans offered concessions to the allies.

The failed census of 89 may have contributed to delaying the enrollment of citizens under the *Lex Iulia*. Modern scholars argue that a religious technicality may have been used to prevent the census from being completed. This would not have been the first time Roman officials shirked their responsibilities towards the allies in the late republic, as was the case in allied appeals during the Gracchan land commission. When Cicero claims that there was not a census in 89, we may assume it was because of a breach in augural law which made the accompanying *lustrum* “*parum felix*” as described by Festus.<sup>243</sup> Wiseman adds that the census could not be completed correctly without a *lustrum* since this rite of state renewal required a *lustrum* to conclude it.<sup>244</sup>

Intentional or not, this failure in the census was surely noted by allies keen to take full advantage of their newly promised citizen rights. More importantly, this may also have convinced rebels who might have otherwise laid down their arms in 89 to continue to resist until they were more certain that the Romans would actually follow through on their promises. Dart goes so far to say that some enfranchised allies may have been reluctant to report to a censor within the given period due to the uncertainty of their tribal allotment, or that some simply may not have been able to reach a magistrate within the

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<sup>243</sup> Wiseman 1969: 63-4.

<sup>244</sup> Wiseman 1969: 64.

sixty day period.<sup>245</sup> This may partially explain the low census figure in 86. However, Dart argues that rebels who did not surrender between 90 and 88 could not have done so safely in 87 since they would likely have been executed or enslaved.<sup>246</sup> I do not think that reluctance to report to a praetor or fear for the safety of rebels who failed to surrender in a timely manner are sufficient explanations for why rebels continued to raise new forces up to 87. The only adequate explanation for this continued resistance is linked to the observation that some allies, eager to participate in Roman government, recognized that vague promises of enfranchisement did not actually guarantee anything.

The census of 115 recorded 394,336 citizens while the census of 86 recorded 463,000 citizens.<sup>247</sup> This was an increase of about 68,000 citizens after the Social War. It is possible that the census figure of 86 has been corrupted. The original census figure for 86 may have actually been 963,000 which is 53,000 higher than the number of citizens registered in 70. Casualties during the intervening civil wars may explain the drop in citizens between 86 and 70, however, it is more likely that the original figure of 463,000 for the census of 86 is correct.<sup>248</sup> Still, this figure is much lower than one might expect given how desperate the allies seemed to gain full Roman citizenship.

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<sup>245</sup> Dart 2014: 184-5.

<sup>246</sup> Dart 2014: 190.

<sup>247</sup> *Jer. Chron.* 173.4; *Liv. Per.* 63.

<sup>248</sup> Brunt 1971: 92.

Cicero believes that the censors of 86 were not guilty of any wrong-doing despite the skepticism of modern scholars.<sup>249</sup> Regional instability may explain a lower turnout for the census.<sup>250</sup> Soldiers out on campaign would not have been counted in the census, lowering the figure further.<sup>251</sup>

However, Cicero's need to defend the censors' actions suggests that there must also have been ancient skeptics. Whether the censors had acted correctly or not, it seems highly probable that at least some doubted that the results of the census were authentic by Cicero's day, if not by the time the census itself had been completed. Doubts concerning the legitimacy of the census of 86 may have also made some rebels reluctant to surrender. At the very least, doubts concerning the census could be played upon by savvy Roman magistrates eager to gain Italian support for their own ends.

The next census in 70 counted 910,000 citizens. This increase of 447,000 new citizens cannot be attributed to population growth alone, any more than the low figure of 86 can be explained solely by the devastation of the Social War. Instead, Italians who had previously failed to report to a censor or had previously failed to be reported were at last counted. There is little reason to believe that the census figure of 86 had been corrupted, since Cicero felt the need to respond to allegations of foul play in his day.

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<sup>249</sup> Cic. *Arch.* 5.

<sup>250</sup> Dart 2014: 198.

<sup>251</sup> Cic. *Arch.* 11.

This is an increase of more than half a million over the last figure before the Social War. When taking all of these figures into account, the census of 86 seems suspiciously low.<sup>252</sup> Brunt believes that the censors of 86, L. Marcius Philippus and M. Perperna, may have deliberately botched the census in order to weaken Cinna's position through Italian discontent.<sup>253</sup> The allies expected to be granted the rights they had been promised, and failure to deliver on those promises would reflect very poorly on the head of state. Philippus had previously opposed Drusus the Younger and may still have harbored resentment against the allied cause, but Perperna's political stance is unknown. Brunt, however, is willing to align Perperna with Sulla.<sup>254</sup> The censors may have chosen to invalidate the reports of local magistrates because the lists did not conform to Roman standards.<sup>255</sup>

Sulla, who was elected consul in 88 due to his successful campaigning in the latter part of the Social War, eventually confirmed Italian rights, but did not hold a census during this consulship, his second consulship in 80, nor his dictatorship in 81 during which he was tasked with settling the constitution. He also tried to deprive the communities of Arretium and Volaterrae of their citizenship. The courts responded by striking down Sulla's attempt to nullify their rights.<sup>256</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Dart 2014: 185.

<sup>253</sup> Brunt 1971: 93.

<sup>254</sup> Brunt 1971: 93.

<sup>255</sup> Brunt 1971: 93.

<sup>256</sup> Cic. *Caec.* 95; *Dom.* 79.



Though Sulla missed at least a few opportunities to support allied enfranchisement, other measures slowly increased the number of citizens throughout Italy. The *Lex Calpurnia* authorized individual grants of citizenship to allied soldiers for bravery.<sup>257</sup> Depending on whether it was passed in 90 before the *Lex Iulia* or after in 89, this law may have either served as the foundation for the *Lex Iulia* or closed a loophole in it which prevented allied soldiers from gaining citizenship if their home communities were at war with Rome.<sup>258</sup>

The *Lex Papiria* and *Lex Pompeia* both built on the *Lex Iulia* and should be dated to 89.<sup>259</sup> The consul Cn. Pompeius Strabo passed the *Lex Pompeia*, which confirmed that communities south of the Po had full citizenship while Italian communities to the north had Latin Rights. However, the censors of 65 still debated whether or not those who were north of the Po should be counted as citizens.<sup>260</sup> For many northern Italian communities, having a few elected officials gain Roman citizenship would have been sufficient to voice their concerns. The elites would gain status while the influx of new citizens would remain limited. However, Picenum and Marsicum demanded citizenship for all of their members.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Sisenna fr. 120.

<sup>258</sup> Dart 2014: 180-1.

<sup>259</sup> Dart 2014: 182.

<sup>260</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.9.3.

<sup>261</sup> Dart 2014: 183.

The *Lex Plautia Papiria* reiterated the provisions of the *Lex Iulia*, but it was aimed at communities which were ineligible under the previous law.<sup>262</sup> This law's goal was to further isolate remaining rebels.<sup>263</sup> The end result was that nearly the entire Italian peninsula became a vast network of *coloniae* and *municipia* with full citizen rights.

The new citizens were initially to be placed into ten new tribes which voted after all of the others; a *senatus consultum* in 86 placed them into the existing thirty-one rural tribes, even though opponents of this plan may have feared the allies would have dominated this voting bloc. The Frentani and Marruncini were placed in the Arnensis tribe while the Marsi and Paeligni were grouped into the Sergia. The Samnites were broken up, with the Pentri going into the Votinia tribe, most of the Hirpini being assigned into Galeria, and Aeclanum being placed in Cornelia. Though new citizens could have been registered into these tribal allotments as early as 86, Dart believes that the violence of the 80s and 70s left many unassigned until decades later.<sup>264</sup> Politicians of every faction would use the uncertainty felt by these unassigned allies to their advantage in the coming civil wars.

The principle rivalry we are concerned with in matters of allied enfranchisement is that of Marius and Sulla. In an effort to undermine Sulla, Marius convinced the Tribune of the Plebs, P. Sulpicius Rufus, to write legislation in 88, the *Lex Sulpicia*,

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<sup>262</sup> Cic. *Arch.* 4.

<sup>263</sup> Dart 2014: 183-4.

<sup>264</sup> Dart 2014: 187.

restoring Marius to a position of prominence while undermining his opponents. The command against Mithridates would be transferred from Sulla to Marius, exiles would be recalled, and new citizens and freedmen would be enrolled in the thirty-five existing tribes.<sup>265</sup> Marius intended to use the newly enfranchised Italians for his own ends.<sup>266</sup>

The newly enfranchised citizens would have dominated the thirty-one rural tribes, effectively giving control of the assembly to Marius.<sup>267</sup> This was the same fear opponents of enfranchisement expressed from the beginning.<sup>268</sup> Though the question of whether or not the allies would be fully integrated into Roman politics still hung in the balance, the nature of the debate changed to one of political theater, with various factions championing the allied cause for their own ends and others opposing it as a means of denying their rivals support.

The *Lex Sulpicia* was passed in 88, but with violence in the streets leading up to the vote.<sup>269</sup> Sulla and the other consul, Rufus, attempted to stall the vote, but Sulpicius claimed that the cessation of public business was illegal. The mob killed Rufus' son and Sulla's son-in-law, but the consuls themselves managed to escape. After the *Lex Sulpicia* was passed, Sulla marched on Rome with six legions, forcing Marius, Sulpicius, and their

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<sup>265</sup> Liv. *Per.* 77; Vell. Pat. 2.18.5-6; App. *B.C.* 1.55.

<sup>266</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.55-6.

<sup>267</sup> Dart 2014: 192.

<sup>268</sup> [Sallust], *Ad Caes.* sen 6.1.

<sup>269</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.55.

supporters from the city. Sulpicius was caught and killed while Marius narrowly made his escape to Africa.<sup>270</sup>

Once Sulla had control of Rome, he repealed the *Lex Sulpicia*. Cicero claims that Sulla was able to repeal this law because violence was used in its passage.<sup>271</sup> Whatever legal mechanisms were used or invented to overturn the law, the object was to negate Marius and Sulpicius. However, violence over the issue of enfranchisement was far from over.

Though our attention has largely been on Rome itself since the official conclusion of the Social War, we must now turn our attention back to those rebels who had not surrendered in the immediate aftermath of the war's final battles. Many rebel groups remained active from the war's conclusion in 88 to the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82. However, we shall see that, though there was a continuous cycle of violence perpetuated by many of the same actors in this period, the question of Italian enfranchisement was changing form. In this transitory period, the question would change from whether or not the allies would be enfranchised to who would enfranchise the allies; and, more importantly, claim their support.

Diodorus describes the rebels who continued fighting after Silo's death in 88 as only Samnites, Sabellians, and Lucanians under the command of Lamponius and

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<sup>270</sup> Liv. *Per.* 77; Plut. *Sulla* 8; App. *B.C.* 1.55-6.

<sup>271</sup> Dart 2014: 193; Cic. *Phil.* 8.2.7.

Clepitius.<sup>272</sup> There is some confusion as to the exact identities of the remaining rebel commanders, but Tiberius Clepitius was almost certainly the Cleptius who commanded six hundred Lucanians in 103 while assisting the *propraetor*, L. Licinus Luculus, in suppressing a Sicilian slave revolt.<sup>273</sup> Whoever they were, some rebels clearly did not surrender in 88, and remained under arms well after the war's end.

These rebels still fighting after Silo's death appealed to Mithridates for aid. Some scholars argue that this reflects a general anti-Roman sentiment among the Italians; however, Gabba believes that this appeal only represented the last few extremists.<sup>274</sup> Dart adds that since Mithridates slaughtered both Romans and Italians alike in Asia the rebels must have been desperate to call upon him in the first place.<sup>275</sup> Whether he was unwilling or unable to comply with the rebels' request, Mithridates did not send an expedition to Italy.

L. Cornelius Cinna and Cn. Octavius were elected as the consuls of 87. When Sulla left to fight Mithridates, Cinna began advocating for the newly enfranchised Italians and to recall Marius from exile, despite having pledged to follow Sulla's policies.<sup>276</sup> Octavius opposed Cinna's proposals to enroll the new citizens into the existing tribes.

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<sup>272</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.2.11.

<sup>273</sup> Dart 2014: 194; Diod. Sic. 36.8.1; App. *B.C.* 1.90; Vell. Pat. 2.16, 2.27; Flor. 2.18.6-7.

<sup>274</sup> Gabba 1976: 88.

<sup>275</sup> Dart 2014: 194-5.

<sup>276</sup> Cic. *Phil.* 8.7; Plut. *Sulla*, 10.3-4.

Cinna attempted to rally slaves to his cause, but this failed. He then turned to the newly enfranchised cities of Tibur, Praeneste, and Nola for support.<sup>277</sup>

Cinna was deposed as consul and replaced by L. Merula. Cinna gathered former rebel forces to his cause at Capua and other strongholds.<sup>278</sup> Marius joined Cinna, Sertorius, and Carbo outside of Rome with six thousand Etruscans. They sacked Ostia and attacked many surrounding communities. Only then did the Senate grant citizenship to the allies.<sup>279</sup>

Some scholars believe that this senatorial decree mentioned in the epitome of Book 80 of Livy enfranchised all rebels who subsequently surrendered, and that these Italians were then enrolled in the rural tribes. We should follow this interpretation, firstly because the question of into which tribes to distribute the Italians disappears after 87.<sup>280</sup> From 87 on, the question among the allies then focuses on whether or not they will be allowed to exercise their rights. Secondly, Sulla proves just as willing to work with the Italians as his rivals.<sup>281</sup> All that remained to be settled for the Italians was if their promised rights would be realized, and which Roman faction would ultimately take responsibility for seeing it through. However, as the discussion of the census of 86

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<sup>277</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.65.

<sup>278</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.65-6.

<sup>279</sup> Liv. *Per.* 80.

<sup>280</sup> Dart 2014: 197.

<sup>281</sup> Dart 2014: 197.

shows, this concession still was not enough to convince some rebels to lay down their arms.

Marius' siege of Rome forced the Senate to recall Metellus Pius from operations in Samnium and Apulia and offer the rebels in central and southern Italy reasonable terms. Metellus refused to grant the Italian combatants citizenship, but, upon learning of Metellus' denial, Marius granted them everything they desired.<sup>282</sup> Interestingly, much of the army which sacked Rome consisted of soldiers from former rebel communities.<sup>283</sup>

According to Livy, at this time the "Samnites" took up arms again.<sup>284</sup> This was likely a rebel army which had been active since 88.<sup>285</sup> This army or armies also included some Lucanians, meaning that Livy or his summarizer had been sloppy in applying the term "Samnites".<sup>286</sup>

The force or forces, likely active since the Social War, were commanded by Marcus Lamponius who was a Lucanian, Pontius Telesinus who was a Samnite, and possibly Tiberius Clepitius, also a Lucanian. The first two were prominent commanders during the main fighting of the Social War.<sup>287</sup> No ancient source explains these men's continued resistance while the rest of Italy contented itself to participate in Roman factional conflicts. However, I think it is probable that they were holding out for the most

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<sup>282</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.68.

<sup>283</sup> Dart 2014: 198.

<sup>284</sup> Liv. *Per.* 80.

<sup>285</sup> Dart 2014: 199.

<sup>286</sup> Dart 2014: 199; App. *B.C.* 1.90; Plut. *Sulla*, 29.

<sup>287</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.41; Vell. Pat. 2.16.1; Flor. 2.18.6-7.

favorable terms possible. They may have been among the rebels to negotiate with Marius in 87, and they certainly were among the younger Marius' supporters in 83.<sup>288</sup>

After Sulla left Italy, according to Diodorus, three generals by the names of Marcus Aponius, Tiberius Clepitius, and Pompeius laid siege to Isae in Bruttium, then took part of the army to simultaneously besiege Rhegium. The governor of Sicily, Gaius Norbanus, repelled the rebels at Rhegium.<sup>289</sup> Diodorus likely garbled the names of these commanders, and they are probably Lamponius, Telesinus, and Clepitius instead.<sup>290</sup> M. Aponius is almost certainly Marcus Lamponius, referred to as such in an earlier passage of Diodorus.<sup>291</sup> Dart believes Pompeius is possibly an error for the surviving Samnite leader Pontius Telesinus, who is referred to as fighting alongside Lamponius by Appian and Velleius.<sup>292</sup> Salmon, however, believes that Pompeius may actually be Papius Mutilus.<sup>293</sup>

Dating the siege of Rhegium is uncertain though some scholars prefer a date of either 88 or 87. Cinna, Carbo, Marius, and his son continued to gather support from the newly enfranchised Italians in order to create an army which could repel Sulla upon his

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<sup>288</sup> Dart 2014: 199.

<sup>289</sup> Diod. Sic. 37.2.13-4.

<sup>290</sup> Dart 2014: 200.

<sup>291</sup> Dart 2014: 200; Diod. Sic. 37.2.13

<sup>292</sup> Dart 2014: 200; App. *B.C.* 1.90; Vell. Pat. 2.16, 2.27.

<sup>293</sup> Salmon 1967: 368-9.



return to Italy. The Italians felt Sulla was hostile to their cause.<sup>294</sup> There may have been as many as 70,000 armed Italians prepared to fight against Sulla by 83.<sup>295</sup>

However, it is generally accepted that both factions had ulterior motives for supporting the Italians and, like politicians of any age who are keenly aware of the fickle nature of public opinion, their positions were somewhat ambiguous. Sulla used an extensive propaganda campaign to undermine Marius' opposition, though we know little about it.<sup>296</sup> Likewise, the Marians had done all that they could to drain the resolve of Sulla's forces in Greece and damage his efforts against Mithridates.<sup>297</sup>

Though Cinna had thus far championed the cause of the newly enfranchised citizens, he had been slow to act.<sup>298</sup> Thus, Italian opposition to Sulla was not insurmountable, and the Italians did not view the two parties all that differently.<sup>299</sup> The *Periochae* of Livy for this period state "*novis civibus senatus consulto suffragium datum est*", demonstrating that as late as 84 Italian suffrage was unequally expressed since at least some new citizens had not yet been given the right to vote before now.<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> App. B.C. 1.82-6.

<sup>295</sup> App. B.C. 1.90; Plut. *Sulla*, 29.

<sup>296</sup> Frier 1971: 585.

<sup>297</sup> Frier 1971: 586.

<sup>298</sup> Frier 1971: 589.

<sup>299</sup> Frier 1971: 589.

<sup>300</sup> Dart 2014: 201; Liv. *Per.* 84.

In 84, Sulla sent letters to the Senate claiming to seek vengeance against Cinna, Carbo, and their supporters, but stating that he had no quarrel with the new citizens.<sup>301</sup> Santangelo notes that Sulla also sought support from various Italian communities which would not interfere with his rise to power in Rome.<sup>302</sup> Many Italian communities in the 80s seem to have intended to negotiate for greater rights within the citizen body, but only threw nominal support behind one faction or the other.<sup>303</sup>

This opportunism on the part of the Italian allies can be seen in their fickleness towards Cinna and Carbo. Carbo wanted to take hostages from all Italian cities to secure their loyalty, but the Senate blocked this measure.<sup>304</sup> However, he and Cinna did raise an army which was prepared to deploy to Illyria where they intended to oppose Sulla.<sup>305</sup> While the army was in transit, Cinna's soldiers murdered him once they realized his intentions.<sup>306</sup> Carbo recalled the men who had crossed to Illyria, but hesitated to return to Rome until the tribunes threatened to strip him of his office should he not return to oversee the election of Cinna's replacement.<sup>307</sup>

Sulla went unopposed through Campania by being careful not to unnecessarily anger former rebel communities.<sup>308</sup> The consul C. Norbanus, a Marian, was defeated near

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<sup>301</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.77.

<sup>302</sup> Santangelo 2007: 73.

<sup>303</sup> Dart 2014: 203.

<sup>304</sup> Liv. *Per.* 84.

<sup>305</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.77.

<sup>306</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.78; Vell. Pat. 2.24; Liv. *Per.* 83.

<sup>307</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.78.

<sup>308</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.25.

Mount Tifata. The other consul, L. Cornelius Scipio Asigenes, then went out to stop Sulla, but his army consisted of newly enfranchised Italians who sought a peaceful outcome. Scipio saw mass defections from his army once Sulla assured the Italians he would not restrict their rights.<sup>309</sup>

The younger Marius was defeated by Sulla at Sacriportus and fled to Praeneste to the east of Rome. Marius was admitted to the city but his army was trapped outside the gates. Sulla captured these soldiers and executed all “Samnites” among them, according to Appian.<sup>310</sup> Plutarch does not tell us what Sulla did with the captives he took at this point; but, upon capturing Praeneste, Sulla executed all of the Marians.<sup>311</sup> Again, the term “Samnites” is probably being loosely applied to the soldiers under Lamponius and Telesinus. Plutarch makes note that there are not only Samnites but also a number of Lucanians present among the forces attacking the city of Rome at the Battle of the Colline Gate.<sup>312</sup>

One of Carbo’s armies, consisting of eight legions under Marcius, went to Praeneste to relieve Marius but was soundly defeated in an ambush. The survivors blamed Marcius for the ambush. One of Marcius’ legions marched back to its home of Ariminum under its own standards without orders, while most of the remaining survivors

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<sup>309</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.85; Liv. *Per.* 85; Plut. *Sulla*, 28.1-2; Cic. *Phil.* 12.27.

<sup>310</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.87; Plut. *Sulla*, 28.4-8.

<sup>311</sup> Plut. *Sulla*, 28.4-8; 32.

<sup>312</sup> Plut. *Sulla*, 29.1.

melted back into their home communities in smaller groups. Marcius returned to Carbo with only seven cohorts.<sup>313</sup>

Lamponius, Telesinus, and a third man named Gutta the Capuan raised an army of 70,000 strong in support of Carbo. Then, Telesinus and Lamponius ravaged Campania.<sup>314</sup> Next, they marched to relieve Marius at Praeneste, but Sulla's forces were already there. Thwarted in their efforts to relieve Marius, Lamponius and Telesinus needed a new objective.

With Pompey's army pursuing Lamponius and Telesinus, the two decided to attack Rome instead of relieving Marius. At dawn, battle began near the Colline Gate.<sup>315</sup> Telesinus and Lamponius defeated Rome's defenders, but they had wasted just enough time for Sulla's forces to arrive by the afternoon.<sup>316</sup> A separate army of Lucanians commanded by Albinovanus deserted and went over to the army of Metellus.<sup>317</sup> Albinovanus fled to the consul Norbanus, murdered some of the consul's lieutenants, and then surrendered to Sulla.

Velleius Paterculus records an interesting scene from the battle in which Telesinus urged his men on by saying "the last day is at hand for the Romans... These wolves that made such ravages upon Italian liberty will never vanish until we have cut

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<sup>313</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.90.

<sup>314</sup> Plut. *Sulla*, 29.1; App. *B.C.* 1.90.

<sup>315</sup> Plut. *Sulla*, 29.

<sup>316</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.90; Plut. *Sulla*, 29.1-8; Vell. Pat. 2.27.1.

<sup>317</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.91.

down the forest that harbors them.”<sup>318</sup> Telesinus was continuously under arms since the height of the Social War. However, now he was at least nominally fighting on behalf of Marius and his supporters. Discerning Telesinus’ motivations during this battle can then be somewhat problematic.

In an effort to clarify Telesinus’ motivation, some have suggested that this speech may have been more specifically directed against Sulla. Perhaps the speech should instead indicate Telesinus’ anger was directed against *those* Romans who had trampled over Italian liberty.<sup>319</sup> It seems unlikely that Telesinus intended to start a new round of rebellions while so enmeshed with the Marians.

Fighting continued until night. Telesinus was found wounded among the casualties. According to Velleius, he had the appearance of a conqueror despite his defeat. Sulla executed him, and had Telesinus’ head and the heads of the other dead officers fixed to spears which he paraded around the walls of Praeneste.<sup>320</sup> Sulla executed the non-Roman prisoners and did not spare Marcius and Carinas “even though they were Romans”.<sup>321</sup> This battle effectively ended the Marian party and ensured the dominance of Sulla.

After the Battle of the Colline Gate, the survivors were captured and executed. Telesinus’ younger brother and Marius killed each other at Praeneste when they realized

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<sup>318</sup> Vell. Pat. 2.27.2.

<sup>319</sup> Dart 2014: 205.

<sup>320</sup> App. B.C. 1.93; Vell. Pat. 2.27.3.

<sup>321</sup> App. B.C. 1.93.

they could not escape the city. After Praeneste was captured, the prisoners were separated into three groups: Roman citizens, “Samnites”, and Praenestines. According to Appian, though Sulla had executed all of the prisoners taken at the Battle of the Colline Gate because they were “mostly Samnites”, in this case he spared the Roman citizens before slaughtering the rest of the prisoners.<sup>322</sup> Lamponius disappeared from history, his fate unknown.<sup>323</sup>

Like Marius and Cinna before him, Sulla’s triumphal entry to Rome saw the annihilation of his enemies. Also like Marius and Cinna, Sulla’s army contained large groups of former rebels. Though our sources sometimes broadly label Sulla’s non-Roman enemies as Samnites, a careful examination shows that other ethnic groups were included. Sulla ruthlessly butchered his enemies, but the slaughter was not indiscriminate.<sup>324</sup> Likewise, he deliberately chose his targets while sparing loyal persons and communities.<sup>325</sup> Though “Samnites” who opposed Sulla were treated harshly, those who supported him might expect him to advance their cause.

The death of Telesinus in 82 marks the end of the last significant group of former rebels to have survived intact beyond 88. Other conflicts such as Spartacus’ slave rebellion may have possibly been abetted by ongoing resentment over the Social War

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<sup>322</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.94.

<sup>323</sup> App. *B.C.* 1.93-4; Vell. Pat. 2.27.4-5; Plut. *Sulla*, 29-30.

<sup>324</sup> Dart 2014: 207; Santangelo 2007: 77.

<sup>325</sup> Dart 2014: 207; Santangelo 2007: 77.

though this was not a direct product of the former conflict.<sup>326</sup> There were many rounds of civil war to follow after the Social War, and lingering issues certainly motivated specific groups to continue fighting. However, the reasons for Italian participation in these conflicts changed over time. By the Census of 70, the allies were at last fully integrated into the Roman political system. The motivations driving Italian participation in Rome's civil wars after 70 certainly bore little if any resemblance to those of 91 or even the mid 80's.

### **Conclusion**

The Roman unification of Italy was a slow, evolutionary process which changed shape numerous times. Before the Hannibalic War, many Italians saw little value in Roman citizenship, and rebellions against Rome took the form of independence movements. After the Hannibalic War, the differences between various Italic peoples became less distinct, and Roman citizenship became much more coveted. Though Hannibal's intention was to break up Roman hegemony, he unintentionally strengthened Rome's grip on Italy in the long-term.

The rebels in the Social War did not seek independence but greater rights which they felt were long overdue. A number of Roman magistrates tapped into these concerns

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<sup>326</sup> Dart 2014: 209.

in the decades prior to the war, and Roman victory in the Social War itself was, ironically, largely due to concessions made to the allies during the war. Florus' grim analysis "though we call this war a war against allies, in order to diminish its abhorrence, if we are truthful, it was a war against citizens" might have been incorrect as far as legal terminology goes, but his poignant sentiments perhaps best summarize the character of the war.<sup>327</sup>

That the distribution of newly enfranchised citizens remained a contentious issue for years after the Social War indicates that many Italians fully intended to utilize their new-found rights.<sup>328</sup> This clearly indicates that the rebels in the Social War were not separatists but desired the same rights enjoyed by their Roman neighbors. Though the motivations behind the Italians' desire for citizenship varied greatly over time, the desire still remained strong across multiple generations from the mid-second century to the 70's. The *Lex Iulia*, the first major concession to the allies, was passed in 90, but the allies were not fully integrated until the census of 70.

Some rebels were hesitant to surrender but ultimately submitted to Rome after the passage of legislation such as the *Lex Iulia* and *Lex Plautia Papiria*. Others were willing to continue to fight and die until they knew for certain where they would stand in

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<sup>327</sup> Flor. 2.18.1.

<sup>328</sup> Dart 2014: 214.



Roman society. The low census of 86 clearly demonstrates that at least some of the allies believed that vague promises of enfranchisement meant little, and they competed for more concrete terms under Marius and Sulla. Eventually, the Romans gave the allies exactly what they wanted through subsequent legislation and censuses, but only after many smaller concessions and vague promises failed to mollify the rebels.

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