

A Dissertation

entitled

ASHCAN: Nazis, Generals and Bureaucrats as Guests at the Palace Hotel,

Mondorf les Bains, Luxembourg, May-August 1945

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Doctor of Philosophy Degree in History

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In the closing days of World War II the Allied Armies overran Germany. German government officials and local leaders, all Nazi Party members, left the people remaining in their cities and villages to deal with their new occupiers. The Allies needed to restore services, such as power, and make sure the people could be fed and sheltered. They also needed to round up German prisoners of war and suspected war criminals. Securing prisoners of war did not represent much of a problem, other than the sheer numbers of prisoners. Often, however, the war criminals proved difficult to locate. By the time the war ended on May 8 1945, many suspected war criminals had been captured by the Allies. The Allies started setting up special camps to house these men.

One of these camps, named ASHCAN, first began in Spa, Belgium and later changed locations to the Palace Hotel in Mondorf les Bains, Luxembourg. This prison, known officially as Central Continental Prisoner of War Enclosure 32, held high value Nazis officials, government leaders and general staff officers. At this camp the interrogation team collected biographical information as well as information regarding how the Nazi government functioned. After about two months the Shuster Commission, a

scholarly panel of men attempting to construct a history of the Third Reich, arrived at the camp, also gathered information. Neither the local interrogators nor the Shuster Commission attempted to gather information implicating any of these men in war crimes, instead focusing more on learning background information about what they did during the war. While a tremendous opportunity presented itself at ASHCAN, the International Military Tribunal did not question these men. Once the International Military Tribunal looked over the interrogations conducted at the camp, they declared the information as useless.

In this dissertation, the author investigates ASHCAN to determine the failings of the camp. It describes who the Americans incarcerated at ASCHAN, how they lived, the treatment they received, and the interrogations they received. Further, this dissertation explains why the IMT did not participate more in the camp, and why the camp is, in general, viewed as a failure.

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List of Abbreviations

AGWAR	Adjutant General War Department
CA	Civil Affairs
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CCPWE	Central Continental Prisoner of War Enclosure
CROWCASS	Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects
CSDIC	Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center
DIC	Detailed Interrogation Center
DP	Displaced Person
DPX	Displaced Persons Executive
EAC	European Advisory Commission
EDS	Evaluation and Dissemination Section (G-2)
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
G-1	Personnel Section of a divisional or high staff
G-2	Intelligence section
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MG	Military Government
MMLA	<i>Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative</i>
OMGUS	Office of Military Government (U.S.)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PWE	Prisoner of War Enclosure
RAMP	Recovered Allied Military Personnel
SA	<i>Sturmabteilung</i>
SCAEF	Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SS	Schutzstaffel
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USFET	United States Forces, European Theater

Chapter One

Introduction

The end of World War II created a number of difficulties for the Allies. The United States became the first Allied country to occupy part of Germany in September 1944 when U.S. troops captured Roetgen. They soon discovered most of the Nazi leaders had fled, and no one seemed to be in charge, leaving the civilian population on its own. Behind the advancing Allied armies came Civil Affairs units to administer the villages and towns in occupied Germany. The Civil Affairs units began making sure the population had shelter, food and the restoration of power and water as soon as civilians could be found capable of doing the repairs or Army engineers had the time. The Americans were also concerned about civil unrest and the fear of Nazi Werewolf units terrorizing the towns, a concern that never really became an issue. Such activities in the area around Roetgen, and later Aachen, were the first American experience in controlling a part of Germany and remained the only examples for quite a while.

Beginning in March 1945, and reaching a flood stage by early April, the American forces occupied large parts of western and central Germany. When these areas came under American control, the military needed to set up Civil Affairs detachments to run the cities and deal with an increasing number of German soldiers who surrendered and needed to put in prison camps. They also dealt with roads choked by German refugees fleeing to the west to escape Russian forces. The Americans and the British also began looking for suspected war criminals. Many of the war criminals tried to hide among the refugees and surrendered as soldiers in hopes of escaping at a later time. Anglo-American forces started rounding up any local Nazis who may not have fled and

making sure none remained in any position of authority. Civil Affairs detachments looked over lists provided by the Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects (CROWCASS) to see if any suspected war criminals survived among the civilian population. The Allies searched for war criminals everywhere in occupied Germany.

Once the Americans and British began catching the high value Nazis, they needed a place to house and interrogate them. At first, these prisoners were placed around army or army group headquarters. Eventually, the Allies decided to segregate these men so they could be interrogated. The Americans set up a camp at Spa, Belgium, intended to hold most of the leading Nazis, bureaucrats and military leaders, which they named ASHCAN. The British established another camp, codenamed DU.S.TBIN, in Versailles, France. The inmates assigned to this camp were industrialists and scientists. Although there does not appear to be a clear reason for the naming of these camps, it appears to be soldiers' humor to lessen the importance of these men. By mid-May the British and Americans moved these camps. A new DU.S.TBIN began in Frankfurt and ASHCAN moved to Mondorf les Bains, Luxembourg.

ASCHAN opened at Mondorf on May 21, 1945. The prisoners from Spa came there and many new inmates arrived as the Allies captured more suspected war criminals. Shortly after the opening, Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering arrived at the camp. After him followed a procession of men caught at various places under different circumstances. The largest single influx of men into the camp came on May 24, when the British arrested Admiral Karl Doenitz' government in Flensburg and moved many of these men to ASHCAN, while some military officers went to another camp in Oberusal, Germany. At

any given time between late May and early August 1945, the camp held approximately fifty prisoners. In ASHCAN the American high command selected a great location to interrogate these men. Mondorf was out of the way and quiet, thereby providing, it was hoped, optimal conditions for army interrogators from the 6824 Direct Interrogation Center (DIC) to interrogate and debrief these men. The Allied governments did not have a good understanding of how the Third Reich ruled, and with many of the surviving leaders in one place, Mondorf provided a way to answer questions about Nazi rule. The men of the 6824 DIC not only interrogated these men, but they also acted as interpreters and hosts as other groups with interest in these prisoners came to interrogate them.

ASHCAN could have served an even more important purpose in that if the International Military Tribunal (IMT) had used it to interrogate these men in preparation for the trials at Nuremberg. However, due to a great deal of political foot dragging and petty squabbles among the British, American, Soviet and French officials, the IMT was unprepared to interrogate these men until the end of August after they had been moved from ASHCAN to Nuremberg. The men assigned to the IMT considered the information gathered at Mondorf useless because the interrogators mostly asked background questions about the men or focused on the specific roles of the internees in the operation of the Nazi government. During the summer, the Allies also uncovered the huge caches of documents the Germans hid in mines and caves before the war ended. Therefore, the focus of the IMT trial changed from the earlier plan of using a large number of witnesses to one that used documents signed by the men in prison, as well as a handful of key corroborative witnesses at the trial. This led to the IMT not putting the majority of the men interrogated at ASHCAN on the witness stand at the Nuremberg Trials.

The purpose of this dissertation is to two-fold. One purpose is to understand why the IMT interrogators did not use the information gathered at ASHCAN and believed it to be worthless. Looking at the evidence, the author will explain the reasons for the failure of the camp in relation to the IMT. The reasons lie in many areas, from the staff of the camp to the failure of the IMT to begin its work in the immediate aftermath of the war. There are a number of things that the camp did poorly, interrogations at the top of the list, but why? The Americans held the top officials of a failed government that had just been defeated in a war Hitler started nearly six years before. ASHCAN, poorly organized and run, had not been given a clear mission by legal authorities who later prosecuted the prisoners because the group tasked with trying these prisoners did not yet exist. President Truman did not appoint Justice Robert H. Jackson as the Representative of the United States and Chief of Counsel for the war crimes tribunal until May 2, 1945. Due to the late start on a war crimes tribunal, Justice Jackson did not put his group together quickly enough to interrogate these prisoners while they stayed at Mondorf. Because of its perceived failure by the IMT and later historians of the Nuremberg Trials, ASHCAN became a footnote in the history of the postwar period.

A second purpose of this dissertation is to explore what ASHCAN did successfully. Interrogations at the prison provided the Allies with significant background information on these men. The interrogations also provided a better understanding of how the government of the Third Reich functioned. Therefore, it helped develop the historical records from the men who actually ran the Third Reich. The camp also succeeded in providing a place for these men to recover, regain their health, and hopefully relax to an extent that they would cooperate with authorities. For instance, Goering lost weight and

overcame his drug addiction to paracodin, and Robert Ley recovered from the wounds of his attempted suicide. Also, perhaps the greatest success, it kept these prisoners secluded and out of the limelight for a full two months.

In this dissertation, the author describes in more detail than on any previously published document, the establishment of this camp and how it operated, thereby demonstrating what the camp did successfully, and what it did poorly. The camp and its success or failure can only be determined by evidence provided by people who actually spent time at the camp. These men create a clearer picture of the processes of the camp, and how it operated. The man in charge, Colonel Burton C. Andrus, a career military man, followed his charges from Mondorf to Nuremberg to serve as their jailer there. When he finally wrote about his experiences in 1969, he concentrated mostly on the time during the trials, with about a quarter of his book, *I Was the Nuremberg Jailer*, discussing his time at ASHCAN. The officer in charge of the intelligence aspects of the camp when it started, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Van Cleve, never wrote publicly about his experiences at the camp, even though he drafted several papers for his use and the military regarding his experiences at various locations..

Research for this project required travel to several archives. The first archive researched was the United States Army Educational and Historical Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, which contains the Burton C. Andrus Collection. Although, the collection of Andrus' papers contained his entire military and postwar career, there is not much documentation of his time at Mondorf. The log book for the camp is there and drafts that Andrus prepared while getting his memoirs ready, but not any day to day paperwork.

The National Archives in College Park, Maryland has various collections of materials in different files pertaining to ASHCAN. Here one can find a number of many messages between the camp and its superiors, as well as most of the daily and weekly rosters of the camp. Some of the day to day business of the camp can also be found here. The most important find was a number of Interrogation Reports from ASHCAN that show the types of questions and answers the prisoners gave while at Mondorf. A visit to the nearby University of Maryland Archives looking for information for the U.S. Provost Marshal for the European Theater at the time of ASHCAN, General Reckord, yielded no results at all. Most of the information available in this collection dealt with figures on the number of German prisoners held at the different prisoner of war camps on a weekly basis.

The papers of Thomas C. Van Cleve are kept in the archives at Bowdoin College in Maine where he taught history for many years. Van Cleve kept nearly every piece of paper with his name on it. The records include travel orders, promotions, transfers, and papers he wrote regarding various aspects of his work in military intelligence. There is, however, no mention of his time at Mondorf. In a book published about his career by a former colleague at Bowdoin, the editor speculates that Van Cleve did not write about ASHCAN because he thought the information was classified.

The George Naumann Shuster Collection of papers at the University of Notre Dame Archives includes some materials related to ASHCAN. Shuster led a commission of historians to ASHCAN in July and August 1945 to interview the prisoners held at Mondorf for historical purposes. His papers include a number of Interrogation Reports by Shuster and his team while they were at the camp.

The papers of Oron J. Hale, a University of Virginia Professor of History before and after the war, and also a member of the Shuster Commission, likewise contain a number of interviews he did with the men held at AHSCAN. Another member of the Shuster Commission, John Brown Mason, Professor of Economics at Stanford University, left no record of the commission in his papers, which are housed at the Hoover Institute.

The information from these archives added to the information on ASHCAN, but there remained a number of significant holes in the history of the camp. Two books and an unpublished manuscript proved essential in putting the material of this study together. The first book, *I Was the Nuremberg Jailer*, by Burton C. Andrus., former camp commandant at ASHCAN and the Nuremberg prison, provided details and about what occurred while Mondorf was open. Generally, the book provides information and offers his impressions on the various prisoners under his care. He tends to focus on incidents that paint the prisoners in a bad light and does not focus on the prison in particular.

The most useful information about the camp came from the memoirs of John Dolibois. Dolibois joined the U. S. Army during World War II, and after training at Camp Ritchie, served as an interrogator at ASHCAN. His book, published in 1989, includes many details on the running of the camp and humanizes the prisoners, unlike the book by Andrus. Both Andrus' book and Dolibois' autobiography are more anecdotal rather than a historian's attempt to tell the history of ACHCAN.

Probably the most interesting information about ASHCAN and analysis of the camp came from an unpublished manuscript written by Major Ken Hechler. Hechler spent three weeks at ACHCAN in late July and early AugU.S.t 1945 as a member of the

Shuster Commission. His manuscript offers invaluable insight into how the camp functioned from the standpoint of interrogation. Of these three works, only Hechler's manuscript describes the camp from the perspective of an Intelligence officer. Hechler analyzed the intelligence gathering aspects of the camp better than the other sources for this study, and his insights proved indispensable in writing about ASHCAN.

The rest of the information for this dissertation came from a variety of other sources. There were some newspaper accounts, as well portions of books written about the Nuremberg Trials, such as the book by Ann and John Tusa that included some discussion about ASHCAN. These outside sources generally offered little new information, but usually served as sources to corroborate information. Many sources taken together served to provide this history of the camp and an understanding of what occurred there in the summer of 1945, and why ASHCAN has previously been designated as a failure by members of the IMT and historians of the Nuremberg Trials, and relegated to little known footnotes in the history of the Nuremberg Trials.

Historiography Essay

There is a large body of work available on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. There are also a number of valuable works on the period just before World War II ended and the Allied occupation began. One of the most recent works on this period is Ian Kershaw's *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944-1945*,¹ which provides a new perspective of the end of the war in Germany and touches on a variety of topics related to my dissertation. Kershaw analyzes the final months of the war and describes how the Nazis kept their state from disintegrating right

¹ Ian Kershaw, *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944-1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

until the last minute. The book also provides information on many of the prisoners at ASHCAN, such as Hermann Goering, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Albert Speer, and their roles in the final months.

Giles MacDonogh's *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation* gives a different perspective of Allied occupation after the war.² It presents the occupation as a dark episode in U. S. – German relations, demonstrating instances of abuse by the Allied authorities toward both the German military and civilian population, but the book offers a great deal of information on the people of Germany after the war, even though it does not discuss the high value prisoners before the Allied powers moved them to Nuremberg.

Richard Bessel has written a more balanced account of the postwar occupation in *Germany 1945: From War to Peace*.³ This book covers Germany's defeat and the beginning of the occupation by Allied troops. It explains the occupation very well, but Bessel spends almost no time on the war criminals, with only a few pages concerning the war crimes trials and no mention of ASHCAN.

An outstanding account of the postwar occupation from the American perspective is Earl Ziemke's *The U. S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*.⁴ This work describes the organization and implementation of all military activities aimed at occupying and pacifying Germany after the war. Ziemke covers a wide range of topics on the U.S. occupation area, with the focus on administering Germany after the war. While

² Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation* (New York: Basic Books, 2007).

³ Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945: From War to Peace* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009).

⁴ Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History United States Army, 1975).

he does not write about ASHCAN specifically, he writes about Allied efforts to apprehend war criminals and describes the numerous plans and organizations involved in the apprehension of these Nazis. The book is balanced, pointing out problems as well as successes by the Allies in the initial occupation of Germany. The book ends at about the point where civilian organizations have taken over the administration of occupied Germany.

While there are no books that deal exclusively with the imprisonment of high value Nazis at ASHCAN, there are several that have chapters dedicated to this topic. Colonel Burton C. Andrus, the commandant of the camp, writes about it in *I Was the Nuremberg Jailer*, his account of his time running ASHCAN and subsequently the Nuremberg jail.⁵ His accounts of both prisons emphasized his strictness and correctness in dealing with the prisoners, and he demonizes most of the prisoners. This book, while useful, is more about Andrus' self-aggrandizement, than anything else. However, for research purposes, it is the first time that anyone wrote an account of more than a few pages about the ASHCAN, and his book does include the experiences of the officer in charge of the camp.

Another autobiography that deals extensively with ASHCAN is *Pattern of Circles: An Ambassador's Story* by John Dolibois.⁶ Dolibois served at ASHCAN as one of the interrogators so he dealt with the prisoners at ASHCAN on a daily basis, and certainly more than Andrus got to know some of them. Dolibois gives the best published account of how the camp ran. He also provides an excellent insight into the interrogation

⁵ Burton C. Andrus, *I Was the Nuremberg Jailer* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969).

⁶ John Dolibois. *Pattern of Circles: An Ambassador's Story* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989).

process at the camp, including many details of the life the prisoners led while at the camp. Although his book provided important insights about the camp, the book is anecdotal rather than analytical in its discussion of the prison.

Numerous other books provide an inside look both at the jail in Nuremberg and the prison at Spandau where seven Nazis convicted at Nuremberg served time their sentences. Douglas Kelley's *22 Cells in Nuremberg*,⁷ written in 1947, provides an insider's look at the war criminals. However, Kelley spends his entire book talking about being the psychiatrist and the IQ and Rorschach tests he gave the prisoners, and he fails to tell much about the individuals and what they said. It also does not provide much of a look at the operation of the prison. Much like Andrus' book, this book is more about Kelley than anything else. Other, better, insiders' books about Nuremberg prison have come out over the last twenty years, such as Leon Goldensohn's *The Nuremberg Interviews*⁸ and G.M. Gilbert's *Nuremberg Diary*.⁹ Both of these books provide much better sketches of the war criminals than does Kelley. Goldensohn and Gilbert both played similar roles at Nuremberg as Kelly, but these works are a great deal more insightful, concentrating more on the prisoners and less about IQ and Rorschach tests performed on the men.

Other books about Allied prisons for high valued Nazis have different insight on the high value Nazis in prison. The first book of this type is Jack Fishman's *The Seven*

⁷ Douglas M. Kelley, *22 Cells In Nuremberg: A Psychiatrist Examines the Nazi Criminals* (New York: Greenberg, 1947).

⁸ Leon Goldensohn, *The Nuremberg Interviews: an American Psychiatrist's Conversations with the Defendants and Witnesses*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2005).

⁹ G.M. Gilbert, *Nuremberg Diary* (New York: New American Library, 1947).

Men of Spandau.¹⁰ Fishman, a British reporter, wrote the story of life at Spandau Prison for these men. His account is mildly sensational and promises to tell the reader what these Nazis will do when they get out of prison. He wrote the book with the cooperation of the prisoners' families, but the book only tries to take pity on these men and their families.

A much better account of Spandau Prison is Albert Speer's *Spandau: The Secret Diaries*, which he wrote ostensibly while in prison.¹¹ The book has an interesting combination of various reflections on his time in the Nazi hierarchy and his day-to-day life in the camp, including how he kept busy and some of the petty squabbles among the men in the prison. However, Speer continues a process he started at Nuremberg and tries to show himself as the repentant Nazi. In many ways, much of this book is simply propaganda promoting Speer, propaganda that several years later fell apart under the scrutiny of Gitta Sereny.¹²

Another book written about Spandau takes a completely different approach. Norman W. Goda's *Tales From Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War* shows how the seven prisoners at Spandau became pawns in the Cold War disputes between the West and the Soviet Union.¹³ Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this book is the decision making process that went into the early release of some of these prisoners for health reasons. The Four Powers that ran the camp did not want anyone dying in the prison for fear it would become some type of Neo-Nazi shrine.

¹⁰ Jack Fishman, *The Seven Men of Spandau* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1954).

¹¹ Albert Speer, *Spandau: the Secret Diaries* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1976).

¹² Gitta Sereny, *Albert Speer: His Battle with the Truth* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

¹³ Norman W. Goda, *Tales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

The final aspect of the historiography for this dissertation is within the context of the International Military Tribunal Trial that began in November 1945. There are several good accounts of the trials. Most, however, are restricted to the trial and do not provide much background where information on ASHCAN could be found.

Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg by Whitney R. Harris is very specific to the trial.¹⁴ The book provides some background information on the Nazi regime but moves immediately into the trial. It gives a good account of the trial and how the prosecutors proved each of the indictments. Harris wrote the book with the cooperation of Justice Robert Jackson and Robert Storey. There is a distinct bias in that very little is made of the witness stand confrontations between Jackson and Goering. Goering usually gets credit for outdueling Jackson on the stand by other authors such as Telford Taylor. However, this book makes no attempt to deal with the evidence process.

One of the best accounts of the trial is Ann and John Tusa's *The Nuremberg Trial*.¹⁵ This account of the Nuremberg Trials covers the full range and scope of the trial, including information about the capture of some of the inmates, and even spends about four pages on ASHCAN. This book provides a very solid overview of the trial. This is a very good one volume account of the entire proceedings and a very good starting point for someone wanting to learn about the trial.

Another outstanding account of the trials is Bradley F. Smith's *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg*.¹⁶ This is the first of two outstanding books Smith wrote on the trials. He provides an authoritative account of the process of developing the tribunal in

¹⁴ Whitney R. Harris, *Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1995).

¹⁵ Ann Tusa and John Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2010).

¹⁶ Bradley F. Smith, *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

the first place. Smith spent a great deal of time explaining how the judges reached their verdicts on each defendant. While it contains nothing about the interrogations, the book provides a thorough understanding of the process at Nuremberg.

Another very good account is *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials* by Telford Taylor.¹⁷ Taylor, an associate prosecutor at the IMT trial, became lead prosecutor of the subsequent Trials that took place from 1947 through 1949. This book provides a true insider's account of the entire process, from the beginning of the American prosecution team to the final verdicts in October 1946. Taylor gives his evaluation of most members of the prosecution teams of each country. He does not pull many punches and is extremely critical of Justice Jackson. For example, he points out the numerous problems when the Jackson made the mistake of incorrectly identifying Gustav Krupp, but wanting to try his son Alfred with the exact same crimes as an expedience, something the other Allied powers would not stand for. His account describes not just the course of the trial, but Taylor offers a great deal of insight into the entire process.

Eugene Davidson's *The Trial of the Germans: Nuremberg 1945-1946* is another excellent study of the trial.¹⁸ This work focuses on the defendants more than earlier accounts. He provides a biography of each defendant and goes into detail regarding the charges against each man. Davidson's account provides a clear understanding of each defendant's sentence.

¹⁷ Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).

¹⁸ Eugene Davidson, *The Trial of the Germans: Nuremberg: 1945-1946* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1966).

The final book that deserves mention is Richard Overy's *Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945*.¹⁹ Overy does not discuss the actual trials but rather focuses on the interrogations of the prisoners. He provides an overview of the imprisonment of these men before they went to trial, offering information about the various prisons where the defendants stayed before they arrived at Nuremberg and after. However, Overy concentrates almost exclusively on interrogations performed by the Office of U.S. Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality at Nuremberg. The book contains several very long passages from interrogations at Nuremberg, but it pays almost no attention to interrogations performed anywhere else, such as ASHCAN. The book yields interesting information, but Overy concentrates on a handful of the war criminals and spends no time on other Nazis. The book is useful but seems incomplete.

The Nuremberg Trials is the focus of many of these works. Most studies of postwar internees and trials do not mention ASHCAN. When the camp is mentioned, it is authors or historians describing the failure of the camp because it did not provide prosecutable evidence for the IMT trials. This work differs because it acknowledges that ASHCAN did not provide evidence for the trials, but performed another mission. ASHCAN provided information on the background of the defendants and their roles in the government of the Third Reich. It also prepared these men for the trials by giving them an opportunity to regain their health while putting them in a relaxed and cooperative mood that would later help the prosecution prepare its cases. The sheer amount of time these men spent being interrogated made them more cooperative by the time they did face tougher questioning by the IMT. ASHCAN has not received much scholarly attention.

¹⁹ Richard Overy, *Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945* (New York: Viking, 2001).

For example, neither of the excellent works by Bradley F. Smith mention ASHCAN or Mondorf in their indexes. The camp became a footnote in most histories on the postwar period and IMT trials. This dissertation will shed more light on the time spent in custody by top Nazis leaders before some of them appeared in the docket at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

Outline

The following outline of the chapters and appendices provides the framework on which the thesis is defended. Each chapter provides material important to understanding the operation of the camp and the successes and failures that occurred while explaining why some aspects of the camp worked and others did not. Chapter Two is devoted to the conditions prevailing in Germany at the end of the war and into the beginnings of the American occupation. This chapter deals with the refugee issues, Displaced Persons, concentration camp survivors, former Allied prisoners of war and German prisoners of war. It also deals with the creation of American military government, attempts at De-Nazification, the capture of high value prisoners, and the creation of the International Military Tribunal. This chapter sets up the broad context in which ASHCAN is located. The chapter demonstrates how the Allies reacted to the sever strains put on their manpower and resources in the hectic atmosphere of the postwar period, while showing the lack of preparation for postwar justice when the fighting ended. ASHCAN's successes and failures can only be assessed through placing it within this broader context of postwar Europe.

The next chapter, Chapter Three, describes life in ASHCAN, providing a look at how the Americans prepared ASHCAN for its prisoners in terms of the modifications to

the hotel and the regulations governing the camp. It also provides information on the American staff at the camp and their qualifications. An important aspect of this chapter is the relationships and antagonisms that developed between all factions, guards, interrogators, prisoners, Nazis, military leaders, and German bureaucrats. At the beginning of the camp, the Americans seemed to think the Germans represented a single block who got along and had the same beliefs; however, they shortly found out that many factions existed between the various groups of Germans. Also, disagreements in procedures and purposes led to problems between the guards and the interrogators.

Chapter Four describes the camp after it became part of U.S.FET (United States Forces European Theater), and the routine the camp developed over two months. Also, the author explains the arrival and work of the Shuster Commission, which is the first serious attempt by the U.S. Army Historical Division to compile detailed histories of the Nazi era using military and civilian professionals gathered together because of their expertise on Germany. A very important aspect of this chapter is the discovery of the prison by media outlets, destroying the quiet and sheltering aspects of the camp and eventually helping bring about its demise as the IMT finally appeared ready to begin the prosecution of the inmates.

The fifth chapter looks at the interrogation methods used by various groups and the types of information they tried to collect. This ranges from the largely biographical information and understanding of the Nazi government by the interrogators assigned to ASHCAN, to the Shuster Commission, which sought much of the same information, but in a much more detailed form, and finally, the interrogators for the IMT, who tried to

gather evidence with which to prosecute these prisoners. The contrast of the different type of interviews helps to explain the common conception of Mondorf as a failure.

Chapter Seven provides conclusions derived from the evidence gathered in the previous chapters. In it, the author reiterates the two purposes of this dissertation. It provides conclusions about why the IMT thought ASHCAN was a failure. It also explains why ASHCAN was not a complete failure, highlighting its successes in some of its missions.

Two appendices follow the main text. Appendix A provides biographical outlines of all of the high value prisoners at ASHCAN. Included in these outlines are the impressions of the prisoners provided by the Mondorf interrogators which provide interesting views of the Nazi and German elite. Appendix B describes the fate of the prisoners at Mondorf who faced Allied justice. Included are the charges brought against them and their sentences.

Chapter Two

The End of the War and its Aftermath

The spring of 1945 was a heady time for the Allied armies with the end of the war in sight. In early March the United States Army managed to seize a bridge across the Rhine River at Remagen that opened the floodgates for the armies in the west to pour into Germany. On April 16 the armies of the Soviet Union launched a three-pronged assault centered on Berlin, under the leadership of Marshals Zhukov in the center, Rokossovsky in the north and Konev in the south, that ultimately led to the capture of Berlin. On May 1 came the announcement (on German radio) that Hitler had died “at the head of the heroic defenders of the Reich capital.”²⁰ Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Hitler’s designated successor, was unable to reach Berlin. Doenitz chose to start his new government in the northern naval base at Flensburg. By May 8 the Western Allies forced this new Government to sign a surrender in Rheims, France, where General Eisenhower had his headquarters. The next day a similar event took place in Berlin where the Germans formally surrendered to Soviet forces. About two weeks later, British soldiers arrested everyone at Doenitz’ headquarters and brought to its final end Hitler’s Thousand Year Reich.

All decisions made on U.S., British and French policy came through the headquarters of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). SHAEF implemented all of the decisions on postwar occupation, often taking its lead from civilian governmental decisions. Once SHAEF issued these orders, the individual armies often implemented the decisions in different ways, but achieving essentially the same

²⁰ Quoted in Ian Kershaw. *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 346.

result. “While SHAEF existed the British and American efforts in military government were combined. The British established a training school in England similar to ours in Charlottesville, Virginia. The latter school had already furnished the American contingent of the military government organizations in Sicily and Italy.”²¹ Before the end of the war the Allies drew up plans for the occupation of Germany, but they did not know how long Germany could hold out. No one knew whether the rumors of a National Redoubt in Bavaria were true or not. Would German citizens cooperate with Allied soldiers as essentially a replacement for their now defeated Government? All of the countries liberated by the Allies since the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944 resisted Hitler, and the Allies did not have a difficult time finding local civilians capable of running the cities. However, Germany was different. The Allies decided to pursue a course of “denazification,” refusing at first to use anyone with a Nazi past. The Allies did not have enough of their own Civil Affairs units available to run all of the villages, towns, and cities they occupied. While both the United States and England trained personnel specifically to serve as administrators, the need for these men outweighed their availability. The U.S. estimated it needed to train 12,000 officers and men for Civil Affairs duty and in the end this still did not prove to be enough men. This often left the duty to combat officers untrained for the position or at best holding an Army Field Manual (FM 27) describing how to administer an area.

Although the Western Allies knew about the concentration camps, they did not really see one for themselves until April 11, 1945 when US forces reached Buchenwald. Close to the same time the British forces liberated Bergen-Belsen, a concentration camp

²¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1948), 433.

near Celle, in northwestern Germany. A typhus epidemic raged in this camp, and many of the survivors left died within a few weeks of their liberation. Other liberated people in poor condition included millions of slave laborers brought to Germany to work in factories during the war, who suffered from poor health and malnutrition.

The refugee crisis included more than the plight of concentration camp survivors and foreign slave labor. This issue came in two forms, civilians left homeless by the incessant Allied bombings and those Germans fleeing to the west to escape the advancing Soviet armies. Many of these refugees were women, children and old people, who fled toward western German cities already without enough room for their own civilian populations, which exacerbated the shelter and food crises facing the western Allies.

Large numbers of prisoners of war presented another serious issue, not just a problem regarding the millions of Germans soldiers and SS troops surrendering, but also the thousands of Allied soldiers in German custody until the end of the war. In the case of western Allied prisoners, repatriation of other western Allied prisoners merely involved turning them over to the appropriate country. However, liberating soldiers from the Soviet Union proved a major problem. No immediate mechanism existed to return them to the Soviet Union, and many simply did not want to go back. Additionally, the Allies had the problem that while Soviet prisoners of war could still be housed in the prison until their return, they could not be locked up because they were no longer prisoners. Many refused to follow the orders of the Allies and at night would sometimes travel in gangs attacking German civilians, stealing, raping, and, in some cases, killing them.

The other side of the coin was German prisoners of war. As the war ended, Allied armies rounded up millions of Germans in uniform. Overcrowding became a problem,

and this resulted in many prisoners imprisoned for days in open fields with guards and a couple of strands of barb wire to keep them in place. To save on rations, General Dwight Eisenhower requested a redesignation of German POWs to 'disarmed enemy forces.' This would allow the Allies to provide a smaller daily ration to these prisoners than required by the Geneva Convention. The Combined Chiefs of Staff permitted this change in March 1945, before the vast number of German prisoners overwhelmed Allied resources. The Allies compiled lists of tens of thousands of Germans wanted for war crimes and checked all POWs very closely, with special focus on SS soldiers and police. Anyone in a Waffen SS uniform immediately came under suspicion, but the Allies screened all captured soldiers looking for these men. Allied forces also looked for leading Nazi officials, including Hitler, in spite of radio reports of his death, and those implicated in specific war crimes, such as the Malmedy Massacre, which left many American officials with a thirst for revenge. The Allies wanted to capture as many high value Nazis, those who played important roles in the Third Reich, as possible. As the Allied armies rolled into Germany, the lists of suspected war criminals grew into the hundreds of thousands.

Some of the high value Nazis proved easy to capture. For instance, Goering did not present much of a challenge. Almost happy to get away from the SS, he made a quick agreement for his surrender with the Americans. American troops arrested Franz von Papen on his estate. Hjalmar Schacht would be liberated from a concentration camp and then imprisoned. At first, these men stayed at the headquarters of the unit or Army Group that captured them. By the middle of May SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) decided that they should be mostly housed in one central location.

At first, the Allies held some of them at Spa, Belgium. Shortly thereafter, SHAEF G-2 (military Intelligence) decided they should be moved to a larger facility, the Palace Hotel and Casino at Mondorf les Bains, Luxembourg. Approximately fifty high value Nazi officers and government officials were interned here until they were transferred to Nuremberg, Germany in August 1945 for the International Military Tribunal (IMT) trial.

These high value Nazis posed another problem for the Allies in the spring of 1945; Allied leaders had not yet agreed about what to do with them. In the fall of 1944, US leaders had begun to discuss how to try the Nazis for the crimes they committed. However, since at first President Roosevelt agreed with Churchill's idea of "executive justice" for the Nazi leaders that also found favor with both Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill, it was an uphill struggle. Churchill used the term, "executive justice" as a euphemism for summary executions. When the war ended in May, the Allied powers had not made a final decision regarding these prisoners. It was the middle of summer before the formation of the U.S. team for the International Military Tribunal. The British were slightly behind the Americans with the Soviets and French even further behind. This proved costly in terms of both time and opportunity as the victorious powers started to prepare for the first of the Nuremberg Trials.

Creation of Military Government in Germany

At the end of the First World War, the United States Army occupying Germany did not receive proper training for occupation duty. In the years between the wars, the army did very little to change this situation because most in the military could not imagine U.S. involvement in another European war. However, in 1940, the Army War College produced two documents, FM 27-10, *The Rules of Land Warfare*, and FM 27-5,

Military Government in an attempt to provide American forces with some basic rules should this event occur again. These manuals “would eventually be regarded as the Old and New Testaments of American military government.”²² When war seemed imminent, the idea of creating a unit within the military to deal with issues of military government “seemed to them too remote and too vague to justify diverting officers who were needed to train the expanding army.”²³

In February 1944, the Civil Affairs units became a division, the European Civil Affairs Division, with a force of about eight thousand men. The first company was put under the control of the U.S. First Army to assist in France. Civil Affairs trained units to help in any of the liberated countries, although Germany presented the biggest possible challenge. In the liberated countries, the Americans could rely on help from local officials to run various aspects of administration, but in Germany, since most of the officials had ties to the Nazis, these officials could not be used to help run operations. In early September 1944, the first units actually arrived in Germany, first in Roetgen outside of Aachen, and then Aachen itself.

Putting a military government in territories made perfect sense as units captured territory, but military authorities had not determined how soon American civilian authorities would replace the military units. General Eisenhower did not wish to administer Germany any longer than necessary. In the fall of 1944 a few more issues came up including, 1) a revised handbook for military personnel about governing Germany and 2) Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, and his desire for

²² Earl Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History United States Army, 1975), 4.

²³ *Ibid*, 5.

severe economic sanctions against Germany to prevent the country from becoming a strong industrial power again. The military manual that came out was not harsh enough on the Germans during occupation, at least in the minds of Morgenthau and Roosevelt. At almost the same time, Morgenthau began to insert himself into postwar planning with his demand to reduce Germany to farmland that only allowed for subsistence living by the German people. This plan carried the day for a brief time with Roosevelt and even got approval from Winston Churchill at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. However, eventually Roosevelt, while still wanting tough control in Germany, came to realize that Morgenthau had “pulled a boner” with his plans for Postwar Germany.²⁴ The squabble over how to administer Germany would not be only an American issue, but also of great concern for Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.

A working policy for the units in military government came by cable from SHAEF on November 9, 1944. This document gave units in the field seven missions to fulfill:

1. Imposition of the will of the Allies upon occupied Germany.
2. Care, control, and repatriation of displaced United Nations nationals and minimum care necessary to control enemy refugees and Displaced Persons.
3. Apprehension of war criminals.
4. Elimination of Nazism-fascism, German militarism, the Nazi hierarchy, and their collaborators.
5. Restoration and maintenance of law and order, as far as the military situation permits.
6. Protection of United Nations property, control of certain properties, and conservation of German foreign exchange assets.
7. Preservation and establishment of suitable administration to the extent required to accomplish the above directives.²⁵

²⁴ Ibid, 105-106.

²⁵ Ibid, 108.

These objectives did not include any attempt to improve the lot of the local population. Roosevelt clearly believed that all of Germany should be punished, which explains his initial embrace of Morgenthau's plan for postwar Germany.

Once Civil Affairs Division (CAD) personnel arrived in German cities and villages, their functions included anything necessary to keep the village or city viable. They had to register all German civilians and make decisions about whom they could put in various jobs. This was a complicated process that involved determining the degree someone had been involved in the Nazi government. CAD personnel needed to discern whether they were ardent Nazis or just someone who needed party membership to remain in his job. They tried to sort this out, often with the help of the local clergy, which the CAD considered to be above politics.

De-Nazification

A primary concern of Americans as they entered Germany and occupied towns would be "De-Nazification." Simply put, the Americans wanted no Germans with links to the Nazi Party in any governmental position. However, nearly every member of German society who worked in any government job belonged to the Nazi Party. Certainly, community leaders and officials all had Nazi affiliations, although many protested they became party members simply to obtain employment and advance in their careers. While viewed by the Nazis as a method to incorporate the party into all facets of German society, as W. Friedmann states in *The Allied Military Government of Germany*, "[i]f the Nazi regime had intended to make things as complicated as possible for the allies, it

could not have chosen a better method.”²⁶ The Nazi government allowed some political dissenters to stay in plain sight with restrictions on their behavior, while others were sent to concentration camps. There were few bureaucrats in villages, towns and cities who had no party affiliation, and these individuals usually did not have the qualifications necessary for the important jobs.

The Americans sought to determine the degree of party affiliation among Germans through the use of the *Fragebogen* (questionnaires). “A deceptively simple-looking questionnaire, the *Fragebogen* required the respondent to list all his memberships in National Socialist and military organizations and to supply a variety of other information concerning his salary, associations, and employment back to the pre-Hitler period.”²⁷ Through a series of routine questions, the Allies tried to figure out who had party affiliations and each respondent’s degree of involvement with the Nazi Party.. Anyone seeking employment in occupied areas had to fill out one of these questionnaires. Even most of the prisoners held at “ASHCAN” were required to fill out this deceptively simple questionnaire.

Since Allied bombing devastated many German cities and towns, infrastructure such as waterlines and power plants were not operational. Plant managers and city officials frequently fled when the allied forces entered a town for fear of arrest or death. In some cases, local military officials ordered the evacuation of the town. In such cases, there was no one able to fix damaged infrastructure. Members of CAD often found themselves in situations requiring improvisation. Allied planning had counted on towns

²⁶ W. Friedmann, *The Allied Military Government of Germany* (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1974), 112.

²⁷ Ziemke, 147.

being able to take care of themselves. However, the devastation of the Allied bombing of many German towns left them with few working facilities, often many fewer buildings than needed to house what remained of the local population and, of those buildings, American military personnel regularly took the best buildings. The CAD did not expect food to be a problem for the civilian population, not expected to be a problem, quickly became one because in many cases local civilian and military stores of food had been looted, and there was not enough food to get people through the coming winter of 1945-46. The harvest of 1945 was poor due to a lack of people available to tend and harvest crops, which put a great strain on the Allies in staving off starvation among Germany's civilian population. In the aftermath of the surrender, SHAEF set the maximum daily food ration at 1550 calories for most people, but rations of around 1,000 calories were more the norm. Indispensable people, such as railroad workers and miners, were entitled to as much as 2,000 calories a day although this still fell well below what they needed to maintain their health.²⁸

Initial steps in the De-Nazification process involved grouping people into one of five categories: 1) Major offenders, 2) Offenders, 3) Lesser Offenders, 4) Followers, and 5) Persons exonerated. Occupation authorities automatically arrested persons in the first group and sent them to detention camps. Those in the second category were generally used as common laborers. It was continually a gray area to determine who fell into what category. As time went on and CAD found a reliable group of German civilian for local administration and the De-Nazification courts, the Americans delegated the entire process to the Germans. De-Nazification troubled military government personnel and many

²⁸Ibid, 273-274.

thought that “if they made a completely clean sweep of the party members, they were going to have to run the country with old men until the next generation grew up.”²⁹ Part of the distinction issues would be cleared up when the Americans introduced the *Fragebogen*. People who were party members before 1933 would be in the major offenders group, party members who joined between 1933 and 1937 generally became part of the second, but, in 1937, the Nazis made it law that all civil servants had to become members of the party. Party membership that began after 1937 often did not preclude someone from a position in the occupied communities because it had been necessary for employment during the years of the Third Reich.

During the initial stages of occupation, the Allies feared that the Germans would create some type of National Redoubt in the mountains and keep fighting the Allied armies as guerillas for years to come. This did not happen, but the Allies also feared resistance by the local population and the German use of “Werwolf, allegedly spontaneous, Nazi-sponsored, German Guerilla and underground resistance organization”³⁰ started by Himmler late in the war. The one and only known success of these groups came with the assassination of Franz Oppenhof, the American installed Oberbuergemeister of Aachen. This single incident sufficed to keep the Allies more vigilant and suspicious of the local population.

While the Allies were not sure exactly what to expect of the German population in occupied areas, the reality turned out to be mostly quiet and orderly people doing the work the Allies told them to perform. The western Allies did not have many problems with the German population. German civilians generally presented no difficulty for the

²⁹ Ibid, 380-381.

³⁰ Ibid, 184.

victors. During the initial occupation phase in and around Aachen, almost no disturbances involving the German population occurred. Any problems that existed, such as occasional sniping, could easily be explained away as the work of German soldiers still in the vicinity.³¹

Displaced Persons (DPs)

One situation that the Allies knew would create issues and tax the resources of the armies was that of Displaced Persons (DPs). These included the remnants of foreign workers brought into Germany, mostly involuntarily, from the occupied countries to work in factories and farms during the war. The Allies estimated over five million DPs from throughout Germany, but they were not sure when this would happen. According to Ziemke's research, in January 1945 the Americans only had 29 DPs on hand, Poles who at this point still had no way to get home. Germany had done an excellent job of keeping foreign workers, a terrible but invaluable asset to the German war effort, out of Allied hands, by moving them with the German armies as they retreated, not unlike the way in which the Nazis tried to remove the able bodied from concentration camps in the east when the Soviets marched into Germany beginning in January 1945. However, in March 1945, once the western forces crossed the Rhine, they encountered more and more displaced foreign nationals. By the end of March, the number of DPs swelled to 145,000 within the Allied bridgehead across the Rhine. Displaced Persons strained the Allies' resources, because they had to be fed, housed and controlled, and kept out of harm's way as much as possible once in Allied hands.

³¹Ibid, 142-144.

In planning for DPs, the Displaced Persons Executive (DPX) was in a gray area because the armies were not in a position to order these people around but the Allied armies were the first to encounter them. The Allies hoped that, at the very least, the foreign nationals working on German farms would stay where they found enjoyed access to both food and shelter. Unfortunately for the Allies, when liberated Displaced Persons often merely packed up and headed for home, creating even more transportation problems, because they joined the refugees fleeing west to avoid the Russians as the Allied armies continued to drive east.

Housing for Displaced Persons generally came in three distinct types. The first of these was the casern camp, usually a former military compound with large buildings available for multiple uses. The second type, barracks camps, had previously held foreign workers or former concentration camp prisoners. A third type, dwelling-house, often involved occupying an entire village and forcing out the former residents. Of course, being housed in a building did not necessarily mean the building was intact. Often partially destroyed buildings would be used to house DPs and the structures often without running water and electricity. Although the Americans provided most DP housing in one of the above types, nearly any space available from open fields to old castles could hold Displaced Persons on at least a temporary basis.³² Some army or UNRRA personnel simply used entire villages or parts of a larger town or city to house Displaced Persons.³³ This created a temporary solution to housing DPs at the expense of the local German population.

³² Ibid, 46.

³³ Ibid, 43-44.

Supplying these impromptu camps proved to be a nightmare. Provisions such as bedding, blankets, clothes, food, medical care and any service which the DPs might need had to be organized. Securing these provisions at first came at the expense of the local German population. Once the Americans exhausted local resources, the military stepped in to close the gap and provide these essentials. The military received help from groups such as the Red Cross to provide items for the DPs, but resources remained strained from the beginning and it took over a year before things came under firm control. Many of these problems ended when DPs returned their home countries. The reduction in numbers alleviated the situation and by the time the first year ended, the challenge that remained involved mostly concentration camp survivors who could not be easily repatriated and the German civilian population rather than DPs.

In the camps the “reception process began with registration, then shifted immediately to delousing, medical inspection, the first meal, and finally giving out soap, blankets, and cooking and eating utensils.”³⁴ The Americans expected Germans to provide food. Priorities in food dispersal placed the DPs above the German population. This supported the American idea that if anyone should be made to suffer in the postwar climate, it should be the Germans. The amount of food each DP received varied from place to place. The meals themselves came strictly on the basis of availability. The same thing was often served at each meal. Staples in their diet at this time included split-pea soup, as well as cabbage soup.³⁵

The sheer number of DPs encountered in April and May 1945 meant that not nearly enough trained people, either soldiers from the CAD or workers from UNRRA,

³⁴ Ibid, 49.

³⁵ Ibid, 50.

could be found to handle the volume of people. The Allied armies reassigned many soldiers and some more specialized individuals such as doctors to special units to deal immediately with the influx of DPs. Soldiers taught from the lessons learned in Italy, found crowd control as their first responsibility. Allied soldiers rounded up Displaced Persons into camps and then, ideally using military equipment or trains, sent on their way home.

Although the camps segregated males and females, there were still some problems. Mark Wyman quotes Bernard Warrach, UNRRA Team I welfare officer: “There was a tremendous disorder. It was a shambles. They had defecated all over. There were incredible scenes of people fornicating in the dorms... At the start we just and dished out C rations, talking with the people.”³⁶

As Oliver J. Frederickson points out:

The maintenance of law and order among Displaced Persons was a difficult task. Many of the DPs expressed their joy at liberation by indulging in wild and unauthorized shooting, or in immediate and widespread looting of German homes, stores, and warehouses. Numerous armed robberies and other felonies were attributed to them. Stringent control measures were instituted, but outbreaks of lawlessness continued to be a recurring cause of concern to the military authorities for a long time to come. Tactical troops were occasionally used to restore order. It is probable that wartime Allied propaganda inciting the DPs to commit acts of sabotage against the Germans was partly instrumental in creating an atmosphere of lawlessness after their liberation. However, the expected acts of revenge on a large scale against the Germans did not materialize.³⁷

³⁶ Mark Wyman, *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-51* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 38.

³⁷ Oliver J. Frederickson, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953* (Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953), 73-74.

The DP issue created “an avalanche of problems for the war-weakened liberated countries and spreading disease, typhus in particular, across Europe.”³⁸ The Allies successfully curbed the spread of typhus with the development and use of DDT. DDT ‘dustings’ became a constant source of irritation for DPs. “Dusting greeted them upon their arrival, was repeated in succeeding months, and continued until every nook and cranny of their living areas, clothing, and bodies were very familiar with DDT powder.”³⁹

Since the Americans knew DPs would need a great deal of help to recover and return home, they formed the Displaced Persons Executive (DPX). “In creating the DPX, SHAEF conferred on Displaced Persons a distinctive status in the occupation and established an administration that was separate to some extent from both military government and the tactical commands.”⁴⁰ It also went a long way to work on the second commitment of military government as outlined in C551 of the “care, control and repatriation” of Displaced Persons. SHAEF created overall policy for the American, British and French in the handling of DPs, although implementation varied from ally to ally.

The Allies knew they had to address what would eventually become a huge number of refugees, but the Allies also did not wish to tie up military personnel and resources while still fighting a war. They expected help from the United Nations Relief

³⁸ Ziemke, 167.

³⁹ Wyman, 50.

⁴⁰ Ziemke, 168.

and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)⁴¹ to develop camps for DPs until they could be repatriated.

The Allies made an agreement with UNRRA in November, 1944 that all of the material needs of DPs would be the responsibility of SHAEF including food, shelter, clothing, healthcare and sanitation. Another aspect under the auspices of SHAEF would be maintaining control over the DPs. Once the military secured and organized DP camps after the war, personnel of UNRRA and the *Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative* (MMLA), groups of women from the London area organized by the Free French, carried out the staffing and administration of the DP camps.

It cost money to take care of Displaced Persons. At first the chief military officer in the area approved all costs, and the American military paid these costs. As time went on and local German administrators were placed in position, the cost of taking care of the DPs transferred to the Germans, although still with oversight from the local Allied military authorities. An odd aspect of the problems of Displaced Persons was that it strengthened early contact between the military authorities and the German people. This early need for some degree of cooperation between the Germans and their Allied occupiers began the process of creating a degree of trust between the two groups. As DPs came into camps, the Allies needed to search for possible war criminals. Coordination between military and German civilian officials, as set up by the Americans, actually helped ease tensions between the two groups. The U.S. military quickly developed a working relationship with German civilians.

⁴¹ Ibid, 166.

Showing forethought, some charitable groups in the allied countries held clothing drives to provide clothing for the DPs. Another source of clothing, Allied military uniforms would be dyed blue to differentiate them from clothing for military and civilian use. As Mark Wyman points out, many DPs wore greatly mismatched clothes in the immediate postwar period.⁴²

The DPX repatriated as many Displaced Persons as possible using the resources of SHAEF. In this the DPX relied on military commanders with the use of military equipment, such as trucks returning from forward areas after dropping off supplies that then filled up with DPs and stopped at designated assembly points. Once assembled, they were given help to find their way home. Some had to walk although the Allies did try to find transportation, or at least set up fixed points where ship or rail transportation was available. Through May and June 1945, a quick reduction occurred as most DPs from western European countries returned home. By the end of October, the DPX's efforts reduced the majority of the 2,230,000 DPs held by the US 12th and 6th Army Groups to 474,000. Of these, 224,000 could not be returned and therefore considered unrepatriatable, such as Yugoslavians who had no intention of returning to their countries under Communist domination. Other nationalities from the east, such as Poles, slowly returned home, but the trips home to areas controlled by the Soviets were a slow process.⁴³

Concentration Camp Survivors

The Soviets found the first concentration camps in the east. The Russians allowed the publication of pictures in 1944 a month after they liberated Majdanek, near Lublin in

⁴² Wyman, 78.

⁴³ Fredericksen, 75.

southeastern Poland. However, the Soviets did not inform their Allies of an even larger camp at Auschwitz until after V-E Day.⁴⁴ As the Soviets pushed further west into Germany, the Nazis started a new tactic with concentration camp victims: they would shoot as many as they could, leave the dead and dying behind, and move the rest of the camp population west with them. In rare cases, they moved by rail, but for the most part these victims of Hitler's savage regime had to walk. They walked as long as they could, with some dropping dead during the walk. Others, too exhausted to move, were killed by the guards at the end of the line. Gregor Dallas remarked that: "There was a constant sound of rifle shots at the back of the columns."⁴⁵ Dallas estimates the total number of camp inmates sent on these marches at around 750,000, and the estimate of deaths on these marches is between 250,000 and 375,000. Those who survived the march found themselves at new concentration camps so that the western Allies discovered a mixed population of inmates at the camps when they liberated in the spring of 1945.

The Allies knew that they would encounter Nazi concentration camps, but until April 1945 the British and Americans did not find any camps. The Soviets had already liberated several camps, but the full horror of these camps had not yet been seen in the west. The Allies in the west encountered a wide variety of situations when they liberated concentration camps. In some cases, the Allies would come upon a camp just after the guards fled. Sometimes the guards just ran off, and sometimes they tried to kill as many people as possible before they left. The western Allies encountered a number of unique situations. The United States Fourth Armored Division liberated Buchenwald on April 11, 1945. As they approached the camp, they saw prisoners marching in formation with

⁴⁴ Gregor Dallas, *1945: The War that Never Ended* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 255-256.

⁴⁵*Ibid*, 477.

whatever weapons they could find. They marched in nationality groups heading east. The division turned these survivors back to the camp and upon arrival in the camp found former Communist inmates carrying weapons, guarding the camp, protecting those inside from any harm from the outside. Even in this camp, however, the Jews in the 'little camp' were kept at arm's length by the guards.⁴⁶

At Buchenwald, the camp commander, SS Standartenführer Hermann Pister, insisted that he had done nothing wrong. He brought together some of the more significant prisoners and told them:

Since I have been in command of this camp the condition of the prisoners has been better, and I did what I could to get decent food; I forbade ill treatment. If there have been executions, it was only on orders from Berlin. I have nothing to fear from the American command to whom I shall present this camp in its present state.⁴⁷

Here we see an early example of the German officers' mantra that they were just following orders.

Dachau proved a much different experience. While the SS guards started preparations to move the inmates, they had not finished when the U.S. 45th Infantry Division arrived on April 29, 1945. Any guard who thought of fighting was either killed or forced to surrender. The next day, three trucks filled with food and medical equipment arrived at the camp. An American military government unit took control of the camp. With a couple of days two evacuation hospitals moved in. These soldiers learned from earlier mistakes about giving the survivors too much food, which often killed them because their bodies could not handle the shock. The soldiers gradually raised the calorie

⁴⁶ Ziemke, 237-238.

⁴⁷ C. Bourdit, "Concentration Camps" 2 January 1945, NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 1328, 4.

intake of the former prisoners, first doubling the 600 calories they received as inmates to 1200 and within a couple of weeks doubling that again to 2400 calories.⁴⁸

Another example of a completely different circumstance involved the small camp found at Thecla, liberated by elements of the U.S. 69th Infantry Division on April 19, 1945. The day before this, the German guards at the camp tried to eliminate as many of those remaining in the camp as possible. They forced three hundred people into a wooden barracks, then set it on fire, the guards shot anyone running away from the barracks. The division used the local townspeople to bury the dead just outside of Leipzig's most exclusive cemetery, with survivors and even some Germans laying flowers on the coffins during services.⁴⁹

Perhaps the worst situation of all occurred at Bergen-Belsen, liberated by the British army. Taking Bergen-Belsen came as a result of an agreement between the British and Heinrich Himmler, which allowed most of the SS guards to leave. The British entered the camp on April 15, 1945. They found 13,000 unburied bodies among 60,000 inmates, all in terrible condition. The first British medical help arrived "with only aspirin and opium, and no surgical instruments and anesthetics."⁵⁰ The mishandled response to conditions in this camp resulted in the deaths of many more prisoners, some of whom might have been saved. Due to the conditions of the camp, the British burned it to the ground using flame throwing tanks. The British relocated those still alive to a DP camp at Belsen.

⁴⁸ Ziemke, 252.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 245.

⁵⁰ Ben Shepard, *After Daybreak: The Liberation of Bergen-Belsen, 1945* (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 4.

The Jews who survived concentration camps presented other issues for the Allies as the war ended. There were many sub groups among the Jews based on nationality and economic concerns. The Allies thought of the Jews as a single group but there were many differences between the Jews. Most of the Jews left in Germany had been camp survivors from eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary, or among the 15,000 or so German Jews who survived the war, mostly because they had non-Jewish spouses. These groups often found themselves squabbling over all matters. German Jews often looked down on the eastern European Jews as uneducated. On the other hand, eastern European Jews did not like the German Jews, “who spoke ‘the Language of the murderers.’”⁵¹ Nearly all of the eastern European Jew survivors needed special medical attention. Other issues of this sort appeared from time to time. At first, the Allies categorized all Jews in the camps as DPs. However, this posed problems because Jews often ended up in quarters with nationalities that had no love for the Jews, which often included groups that had assisted the Germans in their persecution of the Jewish people in Europe. “Incidents between Jews and other eastern Europeans occurred frequently. There was violence against the Jews, often designed to break up religious celebrations and, in one example, Polish DPs demolished the Jewish prayer house in the camp, destroyed the Torah, and shot at the rabbi.”⁵²

Bavaria contained the largest single concentration of surviving Jews in Germany after the war, many eastern Europeans Jews who became involved in the black market. This occurred because they had no source of income and had to rely on Jewish relief organizations that often sent them items that had a high value on the black market. In

⁵¹ Richard Bessel, *Germany, 1945: From War to Peace* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 266.

⁵² *Ibid*, 266.

reality, probably no more Jews operated in the black market than any other group of displaced people, but their involvement fed into the old stereotypes spread by Nazi propaganda.⁵³

Non-German Jews often faced the reality of having no place left to call home. In many cases Poland and other Eastern European countries did not want them back. Most of these became fixtures in the DP camps as the Red Cross and several Jewish organizations looked for a place to settle survivors. Many of them ultimately chose the United States, Canada or Palestine to settle in once relatives or sponsorship could be found. As Richard Bessel writes: “Sheltering in overcrowded, often unsanitary camps, their movements restricted, determined to leave Germany but unable or unwilling to return to eastern Europe, the Jewish DPs were among the most profoundly uprooted and traumatized people in a continent full of uprooted and traumatized human beings.”⁵⁴

Surprisingly, some Jews in Germany began to re-form communities. Even before the war ended, British authorities allowed Jews in Cologne to hold services at the end of April. By summer, several other communities also began holding services again. The Jews of Germany proved a resilient group, coming out of hiding, from concentration camps or those who dealt with the public humiliation and ridicule of being German Jews because they had non-Jewish spouses. They rebounded fairly fast from the ordeal, although the emotional scars never went away.⁵⁵

A quick solution to getting Jews out of the DP camps and on to their new lives might have been letting them go to Palestine. The government of Great Britain realized

⁵³ Ibid, 268-269.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 267.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

they could no longer support a vast colonial empire. The British controlled mandate of Palestine already had serious problems, and sending thousands of European Jews promised to make matters worse. Therefore, British officials opposed moving Jews from the DP camps to Palestine.

Recover Allied Military Personnel (RAMPS)

RAMP's, Recovered Allied Military Personnel, referred to Allied prisoners of war liberated from German POW camps. Although the numbers are hard to determine, most such POW's remained in Germany until the German surrender, including citizens of Allied countries who had served in the German Army, either by choice or coercion. In many cases, these soldiers came from nations defeated early in the war who the Germans kept as laborers. As the Americans liberated the RAMPs, they wanted to send them home as soon as possible. As much as anything else, they strained the resources of the American armies because as Allied military personnel they received the same ration as a U. S. Army private, 3,000 calories a day. Of course, as in all matters, the Allies expected the German civilian population to shoulder the burden of feeding all other people displaced by the war. "Local German officials were told how much food was needed and that if they did not provide it, the military would step in and take what was needed from stores, warehouses, or any place else it could be found."⁵⁶

Near the end of the war, as Germany found itself in a tighter and tighter vise between the British and Americans to the West and the Soviets to the East, Germany moved Allied prisoners with them lest they turn around and fight against them again. Negotiations between the United States and Great Britain and Germany led to a standfast

⁵⁶ Ziemke, 203.

order. On April 22 the German government “agreed to leave all prisoners in camps upon retreat of the German forces, and the United States and British Governments guaranteed that no prisoners recovered under the agreement would be returned to active duty.”⁵⁷ This greatly accelerated the recovery of RAMPs by the Western Allies. Within a week of this order, the U.S. Third Army recovered over 15,000 American prisoners, and even liberated a camp containing over 100,000 prisoners alone on April 29, 1945.⁵⁸

Removing these soldiers from the frontlines was not a priority for the Americans, and usually only empty supply trucks heading back to camp moved them to the rear. Once the war ended, moving these men to the rear became a higher priority, and they were flown out on planes heading to the rear, as many as 30,000 a day. Nearly all American prisoners had been repatriated by the end of May. When they flew back to France or England, they were given thorough medical examinations, from which the army Chief Surgeon reported that thirty percent of the men brought back suffered from moderate to severe malnutrition.⁵⁹

The former POWs of other Allied nations, such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, received treatment according to the agreed upon requirements by the Allied nations. Agreements between these countries increased the speed at which they were to return to their daily calorie intake, clothing, and all other details. With the exception of former Soviet POWs, the U.S. provided the same caloric intake as recovered American prisoners. Soviet prisoners were by agreement, put in a separate group containing all Soviet citizens liberated in Germany, whether POW, forced

⁵⁷ Fredericksen, 81.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

laborer, or Soviets who had served in the German Army. An agreement signed by the Big Three at Yalta the previous February guaranteed this special treatment.

Polish prisoners also presented unique problems. In the summer of 1945, it became Allied policy to only repatriate Poles who lived west of the Curzon Line and only if the prisoner wanted to return. In 1946 there were still approximately 25,000 former Polish POWs under the care of the Western Allies. After July of that year, these former soldiers received their final military pay, lost their status as former soldiers, and officially became Displaced Persons.⁶⁰

SHAEF reported 168,746 British prisoners, 931,000 French, 60,000 Belgians, and over 400,000 Soviet POWs returned in the months after the war. Many of the forces from Western Europe went home when their governments requested their return from American or British care. The Poles and approximately 2,700 Yugoslavs remained in Allied hands after August 1946. All other Allied prisoners had been returned.⁶¹

Soviet Prisoners of War

Soviet prisoners of war liberated by the Western Allies created numerous problems. Often in terrible physical condition because the Nazis considered people of Slavic origin inferior, they received minimal rations and medical treatment and the Nazis left them to slowly starve to death with little clothing or shelter regardless of the time of year. They often proved difficult to handle because the American and British commands could not place restrictions on their movements.

Until the fall of 1944, the Soviets refused to acknowledge that Russians had served in the German military. These soldiers usually joined the German Army because it

⁶⁰ Ibid, 82.

⁶¹ Ibid.

provided them a good way to escape the terrible conditions in German POW camps that held Soviet soldiers. The Soviet government did not want these men classified as soldiers, but as “liberated Soviet citizens.” This status was impossible in the eyes of the SHAEF Provost Marshal, General Reckord. He concluded that since the men became prisoners wearing German uniforms, SHAEF could not turn these men over to the Soviets without violating the Geneva Convention. The Soviets demanded food rations equal to the ration of DPs, rather than the usual ration for prisoners of war. If SHAEF agreed to this ration would have placed an almost impossible burden on the Western Allies to feed all of these people. The war virtually destroyed many agricultural fields in Germany, and nearly all of the food to feed POWs came from German Army stockpiles or German civilian supplies. SHAEF expected the German civilians to survive off what they had the best they could. The United States and Great Britain could not insure an adequate food supply to everyone in occupied Germany, and really did not believe it was only their problem. A protocol signed on February 11, 1945 at Yalta finalized an agreement that formalized the return of all Soviet citizens to Russia after the war. This agreement led to later problems and Soviet claims of brutality at the hands of American and British army soldiers.

Soviet prisoners caused other problems in Western Europe. Soviet military officers inspected a camp in Muleanne, France. The inspectors made a long list of complaints about the conditions of the camp. The report included complaints about shortages of mess kits, blankets, overcoats, shoes, food, and doctors. While there, the visiting Soviet Colonel Stukalov organized the soldiers into regular military units, personally selecting the officers and non-commissioned officers. He intended to report to

Moscow that “Russian POWs are not so well treated as Germans.”⁶² An army follow up report dated a month later showed changes made in response to Soviet complaints. To that end, the Army reported that all Russians now had blankets and overcoats. The inspectors found three Russian doctors in the camp, but the soldiers preferred to see foreign doctors. This report also stated that many of the prisoners did not want to return to Russia. “Before the Russian officers arrived, 1500 of them, or about 35 %, signed a petition not to go back to Russia. Since then there were wide fluctuations of attitude, with changes of opinion, discussions, arguments and fights. Estimates as to those who do not want to go, ranged from 20% to 75%”⁶³ The report stated the Soviet officers made the Russians less willing to listen to orders from American guards.⁶⁴ American soldiers guarded the camp with clubs at night. Due to the poor discipline in the camp, the soldiers became less willing to work with complaints that they worked slowly and “frequently do as much harm as good.”⁶⁵

German Prisoners of War

The sudden and surprising speed of the Allied advances into Germany in the spring of 1945 and the German collapse caught everyone off-guard. The Allies anticipated the war would last considerably longer and did not make adequate plans for the flood of German prisoners of war encountered in April and May. The planners for this event anticipated 900,000 POWs by the end of June. The reality was much different. By the middle of April they already had 1.3 million prisoners with another 600,000 by the

⁶² Colonel P.C. Holland, “Visit of Russian Officers to PW Camp at Muleanne (near Le Mans)”, 26 October 1944, NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 13, 2.

⁶³ Colonel P.C. Holland, “Russians at PW Enclosure 13, Muleanne, near Le Mans”, 23 November 1944, NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 13,3.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 2.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 3.

end of the month. The revised planning allowed for another 600,000 by the end of May.⁶⁶ By May 8 the number of German prisoners held in Western Europe totaled over four million.⁶⁷ When the Americans first started taking in larger numbers of POWs, the men “in good health were retained in Advance Section to be employed as laborers; the rest were evacuated to other Communications Zone sections in the rear and from there to the United Kingdom or the United States.”⁶⁸

Many problems emerged from suddenly having over four million prisoners under the care of occupying forces, beginning with feeding this large of a group. The various conventions on prisoners of war set a requirement that these soldiers would be fed the same amount of food as soldiers in the victorious armies of equivalent rank. However, the European Advisory Commission (EAC) proposed a new classification for German POWs. The EAC originated out of a conference between the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France and the United States in November 1, 1943. They created it to start planning for the postwar period. The new category was “disarmed German troops.” Using this new category, the EAC required the Germans to feed these men, but German resources could not feed the civilian population, let alone approximately four million former soldiers.⁶⁹

This tremendous influx of enemy prisoners also required housing. Here, overall, the Allies failed in their efforts to house adequately German prisoners. For example, the 12th Army Group set up enclosures (all POW camps were designated Prisoner of War Enclosure) to hold 50,000 men each. While space in an open field could be found,

⁶⁶ Ziemke, 240.

⁶⁷ Fredericksen, 89.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 89.

⁶⁹ Ziemke, 241.

sheltering the prisoners from the elements proved more difficult. These camps usually began with strands of barbed wire marking the perimeter of the enclosure, but housing was to be built by the prisoners. This led to serious consequences for the health of these prisoners. In a report on April 15, Lt. Col. F. Van Wyck Mason wrote about conditions at a camp at Bad Kreuznach, west of the Rhine.

They certainly were not coddled there. They slept on the bare ground with whatever covering they had brought with them. They got two “C” rations a day and that was all. There was a separate enclosure for officers where they were so tightly packed they barely had room to lie down, and more trucks kept coming up every day.⁷⁰

The atrocious conditions for many German POWs led SHAEF to make the decision to process them out of the German army and return them to civilian life rather than further strain resources by building better facilities.

By the end of June, the Allies decided to process and discharge all former Wehrmacht soldiers. According to Ziemke: “the attitude of the armies was ‘to discharge as many as possible as fast as possible without a great deal of attention to categories.’”⁷¹ The only men kept would be suspected war criminals, security suspects, and soldiers from the area of the Soviet Zone. The procedure varied a little but generally consisted of first checking the man for SS blood type tattoos, conducting a cursory medical exam by German doctors, or filling out questionnaires to check automatic arrest categories or men with skills still needed by the Allies. After completion of this process, they received a slip of paper with either an ‘A’ for automatic arrest, a ‘B’ for automatic discharge, and a ‘C’ meant that they would still be held by the Allies. Finally, the German soldiers released

⁷⁰Ibid, 242-243.

⁷¹ Ibid, 293.

had to complete a P-4 form which required name, names of relatives, and residence. After this, they received a discharge form and told how they were expected to act, and then sent on their way, often catching rides on military vehicles or even former German vehicles in the direction of home.⁷²

Preparations for War Crimes Trials

With all of the confusion and last minute planning as the Allied armies rolling into Germany, another pressing problem emerged at the end of the war: war crimes trials. On October 30, 1943 leaders of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China concluded a conference on the war in Moscow, announcing four separate declarations regarding the war. The first three of these announcements concerned Allied expectations for the unconditional surrender of Germany to end the war, the second concerned fascism in Italy, and the third declared the March 1938 annexation of Austria by Germany null and void. In the fourth announcement at the close of the meeting, the Statement on Atrocities, the U.S, Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed that Germany would be held accountable for the atrocities committed on foreign soil and “the case of German criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the government of the Allies.”⁷³ In this announcement there was no clear indication of just how justice would be meted out, and the final decisions were not made until several months after the war in Europe concluded.

During this time, most officials focused on ending the war; they did not focus on what would happen after the war ended. Any thought of trials seemed to be a decision

⁷² Ibid, 294.

⁷³ Avalon Project at Yale Law School, “The Moscow Conference; October 1943: Statement on Atrocities”, <http://libguides.mcneese.edu/content.php?pid=174213&sid=1492215> (accessed November 4, 2014).

that could wait for the end of the war. Stalin and Churchill seemed content with summary execution for perceived war criminals, and President Roosevelt also appeared in favor of summary executions. The idea of a trial appeared to be problematic After D-Day and the successful landings in France, the idea of figuring out a plan for the punishment of war criminals took on new importance for some officials in the War Department, Justice Department, and State Department. The U.S. alone began to formulate a plan, viewing the decision for summary executions as nothing more than an act of expediency and not necessarily fair victors' justice. The Soviets indicated their preference for trials instead of executions. The Soviets began war crimes trials of their own in late 1943 in areas liberated from the Nazis, and they had already put Germans and Russian collaborators on trial in Kharkov. In 1943 and 1944 the views of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau influenced the President. Morgenthau supported the idea of summary executions and he also believed that Germany should be returned to an agrarian economy, incapable of ever producing the weapons to fight a war again.⁷⁴

The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, strongly opposed Morgenthau's ideas, and he argued that a trial would "demonstrate the abhorrence which the world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our determination to extirpate it and all its fruits forever."⁷⁵ Stimson decided that the War Department should develop a plan for a postwar tribunal, and he gave the assignment to Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy. McCloy moved the issue through his departments and ultimately gave the responsibility to the head of the Special Projects Branch, Colonel Murray C. Bernays, an attorney from

⁷⁴ Bradley F. Smith, *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 25.

⁷⁵ Henry L. Stimson in *Stimson to Henry Morgenthau*, September 5, 1944. "Papers of Stimson," Quoted in *Ibid.*

New York City. Bernays did not have a clear idea of the extent of Nazi atrocities, and therefore his plan “deferred action until after the war was over, thus sparing American men from reprisals.”⁷⁶ By September 15, 1944, he produced a document, “Trial of the European War Criminals,” which created the template, even after a multitude of revisions that provided the basic process by which the war crimes trials were held. Among the problems arising with this document was a clear confrontation with Morgenthau and his desire for summary executions, which at this time the President, seemed to support.

At this point in time, President Roosevelt seemed enamored with Morgenthau’s ideas and even took him to the Quebec Conference in September 1944. Morgenthau brought his plan for postwar Germany with him and showed it to Churchill. Churchill, knowing that he would need financial help from America after the war and since the plan was in line with his interest in summary executions, endorsed the plan, and Morgenthau’s ideas became the accepted choice with Roosevelt and Churchill. Morgenthau’s action made it easy for Stimson to find a new ally in the form of Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State, who did not appreciate Morgenthau’s meddling in foreign affairs.

Fortunately, news of Morgenthau’s plan leaked to the press and created an immediate stir. Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Propaganda Minister, had a field day announcing the plan to the German people. The publicity about the plan created a new worry for the Americans and an old one for the British, fear of German reprisals against captured British and American soldiers. Therefore, the President decided to create distance between himself and this plan. According to Bradley F. Smith, “he admitted that a

⁷⁶ Ibid, 27.

‘serious mistake’ had been made at Quebec but, marshalling all his disingenuous charm, he also claimed not to remember ever having signed the Morgenthau memo.”⁷⁷

By January 1945 the War and State Departments presented a united front regarding postwar trials. They worked together trying to refine a plan acceptable to all. However, new groups found their way in to the process. On April 29, new President Harry Truman appointed Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson to lead the U.S. war crimes prosecution team. Jackson wielded a powerful influence in Washington. He exerted his will within the American group organizing the trials and also did his best to bully the British and particularly the Soviets, whom he distrusted.

In May, men from the British Ministry of Justice and the U.S. team led by Jackson met in San Francisco during the United Nations convention. By May 18 in England, a British Cabinet Committee, recommended acceptance in principle of the U.S. plan to hold war crimes trials. Quibbling in London increased when the Americans, British, French, and Soviets met to complete a plan. Using the American draft as the main framework, by the middle of June, the other powers agreed to a trial of the major war criminals. The group from the United States clearly was the driving force in the negotiations, but they created a great deal of resentment and ill will over the course of just two months. As Smith writes:

The danger signs, tough, were all ignored, The British had been compelled to make a quick reversal, the French were floundering in helpless confusion, and the Soviets – from Stalin’s remark about ‘legality’ to Molotov’s observations on Paulus – were showing that war crimes could be as difficult as any one of the Great Powers chose to make it. The Americans, however, held the initiative, and they chose to continue full speed ahead.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ibid, 31.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 45

The problem with progress toward a war crimes trial was that it was moving too slowly. By the end of June, the war had been over for nearly two months. Although most of the men to be put on trial had already been arrested, men such as Hitler remained on the lists of possible defendants. The Allies did not yet have confirmation of Hitler's death, and they did not know the whereabouts of some other potential defendants such as Grand Admiral Erich Raeder. With the legal teams not firmly established, careful and meticulous interrogations of those who would stand trial had not started, wasting valuable time. The impact of this delay may have changed the course of the trial. The ongoing interrogations of the suspects did not yield prosecutable information, but huge caches of German government and military documents had been found in mines and caves, which changed the focus of the trial to one relying more on documentary evidence than witnesses. The Allies found many of these documents when the British closed the Flensburg government, Frank attempted suicide without destroying his thirty-six volume journal of the administration of Poland, and another large cache discovered at Berchtesgaden. Colonel Robert Storey, in charge of evidence gathering for the American prosecution team, and a couple assistants, "scurried from one place to another scanning and collecting documents."⁷⁹

The June 1945 London Conference refined the exact charges to be used at the trials, and Nuremberg had already been selected as the perfect location. Nuremberg had the best courtroom and jail facilities then available in Germany, and the fact that Nuremberg held deep symbolic meaning to the Nazi party added a nice touch. However,

⁷⁹ Robert E. Conot, *Justice at Nuremberg* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 37.

quibbling over the details continued until just before trial, even though the basic trial document was agreed to in mid-August.

During the June conference in London, the Four Powers, the U.S., Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France agreed on a basic trial formula, and the next major issue became exactly who would be put on trial. To decide who should be tried, the British took a fairly practical approach; they sought to “choose a few obvious candidates and try them quickly...⁸⁰” On June 21, the British presented a list of ten men to be tried: Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, Robert Ley, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Julius Streicher, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, all obvious choices. Perhaps the least known at the time would have been Kaltenbrunner, who had been Himmler’s right hand man. Although he certainly would have faced trial at some point, his appearance at Nuremberg would be as a replacement for Himmler. The Soviets demanded the inclusion of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder and Hans Fritzsche from the Ministry of Propaganda and host of the program on German radio, “Hans Fritzsche Speaks.” These men were the most significant Nazi officials the Russians had in their own custody, and therefore were a priority for the Soviets to put on trial. Fritzsche’s role was much like Kaltenbrunner, as a substitute for Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister. His presence seemed to be based on the fact that the Soviets held him, and not because of a strong evidence of war crimes against him. In fact, until this time no one even tried to make a case to put Fritzsche on trial. Perhaps the most curious aspect of this was that his boss, Otto Dietrich, the Reich press chief, was not even put on trial. Most of the important Nazis moved west at the end of the

⁸⁰ Ann Tusa and John Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2010), 92.

war as part of the Flensburg government. Fritzsche appeared at Nuremberg more to increase the value of the few Soviet prisoners, rather than clear evidence of guilt. Sidney Alderman, an attorney who appeared before Justice Jackson in the Supreme Court, became Jackson's "first assistant" at Nuremberg, dealt with the Soviets at several points in the negotiations.⁸¹ He wrote that:

You can successfully negotiate with the Soviet Union if your ultimate ends are the same. There will always be difficulties as to language and as to concepts. There will always be differences as to procedure. But on a mission like ours, where the ultimate aims are not in conflict, all these difficulties are readily overcome. They are skillful negotiators and can be extremely cooperative.⁸²

Two days later, on June 23, another meeting added six more names to the list. This included Arthur Seyss-Inguart, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Walter Funk, Albert Speer, and Hjalmar Schacht. The British thought it would be a good idea to add Baldur von Schirach, former head of the Hitler Jugend. Eventually, Walter Funk, Fritz Sauckel, Franz von Papen, Walter von Neurath, and Gustav Krupp would be added to the trial defendants. Problems abounded on this final list. Trying Bormann in absentia was not a popular decision among some of the prosecution team because a conviction in this way created issues of due process and justice. Francis Biddle, the American judge at Nuremberg, argued that the case against Bormann should be dropped, at least until he could actually stand trial.⁸³ One person on the list who did not stand trial at the first trial was Gustav Krupp, head of the large armaments concern in Germany. He was left off the list due to an incredible series of blunders, mostly on the part of the US staff, and Robert

⁸¹ Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 46.

⁸² Sidney Alderman, "Negotiating on War Crimes" in Raymond Bennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians* (New York: World Peace Foundation, 1951), 97-98.

⁸³ Taylor, 569.

Jackson in particular. The Americans wanted him on trial, but he was too sick. Jackson then wanted to indict his son, Alfried, but wanted to do so using basically the same evidence.

In the end, these men, without Krupp due to his health and without Ley who had committed suicide in custody, were put on trial by the International Military Tribunal. The IMT started slowly. They could not decide on whom to put on trial until well into the summer. ASCHAN had operated for over a month at this point. Without a trial procedure being worked out, a firm list of defendants, and a group of lawyers and translators available to deal with these men, the IMT wasted valuable time. They wasted the opportunity they once had at Mondorf les Bains.

Conclusion

The end of the war came much faster than expected. A war that in September 1944 looked as if it could be over by Christmas moved into the new year with no real idea about how long the Germans would hold out. Plans would be made and revised, estimates changed, and expectations moved back and forth as the spring wore on. Then, suddenly, the end came. All the preparations the Allied made regarding the war could be put into effect, but certainly none of them in the way planned.

Particularly in the last month of the war, needs changed rapidly: concentration camps were liberated, refugees wanted to go home, Allied military prisoners of war had been freed. Controlling and caring for this mass of people constituted an unbelievable undertaking, testing the limits of supplies and patience among the Allies as never before. Uprooted people, larger numbers than expected both in terms of DPs, RAMPs, and

German refugees trying to get away from the Russians nearly overwhelmed the western Allies.

Through all of this, new missions emerged. In 1943 the Allies made clear their intention to punish those Nazis accused of war crimes. Apprehending these men and women became a principal goal as special units sorted through this mass of humanity looking for potential war criminals. Once caught, these men first found themselves prisoners of the local army groups, but as time went on they would be consolidated into a handful of camps. Camps such as Prisoner of War Enclosure 32 at Mondorf les Bains became the destination for many former German and Nazi leaders. The problem remained what to do with them. The mechanism for the war crimes trials had not been agreed on, much less operational. These men sat in their cells, occasionally getting outside or being interrogated on specific questions. Unfortunately, much valuable time that could have been used to help prosecute these men would be lost due to a lack of timely preparation by the Allies.

Chapter Three

Life in ASHCAN

The capture of war criminals was very important as the Allied armies overran areas formerly held by the Germans. While exactly what the Allies (Great Britain, The United States, the Soviet Union and France) would do with the war criminals was still not definitively known, they were certain to face some kind of justice from the British, Soviets and Americans. The Allies decided to round these men up and place them in detention centers for leading Nazis, politicians and soldiers, as well as scientists and industrialists. The two most important such camps were codenamed ASHCAN, which would hold high value government, Nazi political leaders, and the men who ran OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces), which would be run by the United States, and DUSTBIN, for scientists and industrialists, which would be run by the British Army. The two countries disagreed about jurisdictions and who would be in charge of what aspect of postwar Germany until they solved most of these issues through mutual agreements. However, the plan to run each of these camps under an unified Allied command structure did not work well, so they would be separated. Initially, ASHCAN began in Spa, Belgium, and DUSTBIN started at Versailles, France. Later, these facilities moved to Mondorf les Bains, Luxembourg and the Kranzberg Castle, outside of Frankfurt, Germany, respectively. Another facility started after the war at Oberusal, where the United States Army Historical Division began work on a series of studies about the conduct of the war from the German perspective.

The Allies, working with Jewish organization and the liberated countries, prepared several lists of names of suspected war criminals. As the war ended, and the

Allied armies overran new territory unearthing more war crimes committed by the Germans, this list expanded to very large proportions. The Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects (CROWCASS) started at this time to coordinate the lists of suspected war criminals. This list grew as the Allied armies discovered more incidences of possible war crimes.

ASHCAN

Construction of the new ASHCAN began in the middle of May, with much to do to make the camp secure. Security issues predominated, especially to protect the camp from outside attack should some group of fanatics try to free the prisoners or should people from liberated countries attack the camp seeking revenge. Additional precautions would insure the prisoners did not try to escape or attempt suicide.

On May 17, 1945, Lt. Colonel R.B. MacLeod and Major W.D. David inspected ASHCAN.⁸⁴ The new home for AHSCAN would be Mondorf les Bains, Luxembourg, an out of the way town about twenty kilometers from Luxembourg City, a location more suitable for the needs of the United States. The overall purpose was to ensure minimal attention to Mondorf. Only minimal accommodations would be provided, rations fell within the limits allotted for each POWs rank category, and nothing about the facility would invite undue publicity.

The specific location chosen for ASHCAN, the Palace Hotel in Mondorf, was an older, somewhat rundown hotel originally used by Americans troops as temporary, comfortable billets for U.S. troops. Once SHAEF decided to move ASHCAN, they relocated troops elsewhere and put changes in place to make the hotel a prison. The

⁸⁴ M.B. David, "Inspection of "ASHCAN", NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6.

Palace Hotel seemed an ideal location; it was set back about 150 yards from the main road, and the American troops erected a fence about eleven feet high made of square wire mesh that originally would have been used for landing mats. The grounds also contained several trees in front of the hotel, except along the main driveway, that would partially obscure the view. One problem with the layout of the hotel was that the dining rooms and one of the lounge rooms were visible from the road because it had large windows making it easy for passersby on the road to see into the rooms.

The Americans removed the original furniture and replaced it with a standard military issue folding canvas cot, two military blankets, a wash basin with only cold water, and a straight back chair. They made the table for the wash basin flimsy so it would collapse under the weight of a man to prevent possible suicides. The windows had bars and wire netting to prevent escape attempts, and the window glass was removed and replaced with either burlap or Plexiglas. The Americans used a couple of buildings near the camp to house men assigned to the camp, such as the interrogators, medical personnel and guards. A stockade behind the hotel held approximately 600 German POWs. A group of prisoners from the PW camp behind the hotel, known as the PW Labor Cadre, maintained the camp, staffed the kitchen, gave haircuts to the higher value prisoners and kept the place clean. In the early stages these men also helped perform the modifications to the camp to make it more secure. Another building became known as the “Von Annex” because it held mostly political figures such as Franz von Papen and Schwerin von Krosigk.

Major David’s report listed the guards in the camp as members of the 391st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion. It was common in the immediate aftermath of the war to use

units such as anti-aircraft and artillery units as guards at Prisoner of War facilities because their primary functioned was no longer necessary. The soldiers of this unit manned fifteen separate guard posts established in and around the hotel. While the guards served under the command of the battalion commanding officer, Lt. Colonel Richard W. Owen, the camp itself did not yet have a commandant to supervise it.

The report pointed out that the guards and the two interrogators from G-2 (Military Intelligence), Captain Herbert Sensenig and 1st Lieutenant Malcolm Hilty, at ASHCAN had no clear guidelines for running the camp. At this time point the camp contained only seven high value prisoners for which the camp was made: Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Reichsleiter Walter Buch, Oberbürgermeister Karl Stroelin, Reichsminister Wilhelm Frick, Reichskommissar der Nederlands Arthur Seyss-Inguart, and Keitel's aide, Lt. Colonel Ernst John von Freyend. Stroelin and von Freyend did not stay at the camp very long before being moved elsewhere.

At the time of the inspection, the prisoners stayed only in the Palace Hotel, although they later gained access to some of the grounds. Whenever they left their room, a guard accompanied them and the prisoners could not communicate with each other. They were given regular rations for prisoners of war, and a German doctor and dentist tended to their possible medical needs.

The conclusions of this report are interesting. While David concluded that no fraternization occurred and that the prisoners received regular rations and had rooms furnished in a minimal manner. However, he had concerns. Major David recommended that a meeting be held to deal with four primary concerns: 1) what division has primary

responsibility for the camp, 2) what responsibility does the immediate military Communications Zone have for the camp, 3) who is in charge (the position of camp commandant was not yet filled) and to whom does he report, and 4) is the present location considered suitable in the light the possibilities of undesired publicity? The latter concern included the possible perception of the hotel. At first glance, it looked like plush accommodations for men suspected of war crimes. The hotel, a stone structure, had “Palace Hotel” chiseled in stone between the third and fourth floor windows in eighteen inch letters. Therefore, the outside appearance of the hotel and grounds might give the impression the prisoners lived in luxurious surroundings. However, within the hotel most of the carpeting was frayed and in need of replacement and the better furniture had been taken out, but no one without access to the hotel could see these aspects. His second concern was that he believed that the local populace already knew who was at the hotel and what its use would be in the immediate future. Since the local population was not restricted in their movements, as would be the case in occupied Germany, the location of the camp which allowed the people “to gaze into the inclusure (sic) at will, unquestionably will bring its grief.”⁸⁵ He also thought that the local people appeared to understand the purpose of the camp. Therefore, it would not be long before newspapermen figured out what went on there, draw their own conclusions and report these based on what they can see from outside of the fence and what the local people tell them because they would not be allowed onto the grounds. MacLeod expressed concern that the local town major is already thinking about creating a one thousand person rest

⁸⁵ David, “Inspection of ASHCAN”, 3.

camp approximately 2,000 yards from the hotel. He predicted that if this happened, “undesirable results are likely to follow.”⁸⁶

This report, completed on May 17, 1945, provides the only real contemporaneous description of the camp, and it also foreshadows problems that would trouble the camp during its entire three month existence. David’s conclusions pointed out legitimate concerns about the camp. In time, the United States Army addressed many of his concerns. Unfortunately, some of his concerns came true.

Major David completed his report on May 17, 1945. Colonel Burton C. Andrus became commandant of Prisoner of War Enclosure 32 on the same day. Andrus was in theater already and had experience as a prison camp commandant. He had joined the army in 1917 as part of the cavalry. During the First World War, he was commandant of a prison at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia. By his own account, he took over a poorly run camp, which according to him “was run not by the jailers but by a convicts’ ‘kangaroo court’ ruled by a man who boasted he had committed four murders.”⁸⁷ He took this camp over and returned military discipline to the operation. After that he served in a variety of positions in the army, and after coming to Europe in 1944, he became an observer in Patton’s Third Army. He enjoyed his time as an observer and greatly admired General George S. Patton, who it appears he tried to mimic. Andrus was all spit and polish with an acute attention to detail. He wore rimless glasses, kept his uniform fully pressed and carried a riding crop with him. The end of the war meant that combat observers were not needed anymore, so his new assignment became ASHCAN.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 4.

⁸⁷ Burton C. Andrus, *I was the Nuremberg Jailer* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1969), 15.

When he arrived, he took note of the needs of the enclosure, such as the need to clear the brush around the hotel, create an alarm system on the fence, and construct guard towers, camouflaged netting, and the installation of both telephone lines and a backup radio system. He requested three ambulances that could be used to transport prisoners from ASHCAN to other camps as well as to the nearby airport, A-97. He wanted the guards rearmed because as an anti-aircraft battalion they were not well armed with personal weapons. He requested new uniforms for the guards, along with white belts and painted helmet liners. The camp had four main structures: the hotel, the so-called 'Von Annex' (a small building where the career politicians such as Papen, Krosigk, and Horthy stayed), another camp for the prison labor force, and a small building used to represent a separate camp for interrogations. Although most interrogations occurred at the hotel, this small satellite camp created the illusion that the prisoners went to another camp about fifty miles away, presumably inside Germany. To give this impression to the prisoners the ambulance drove around in circles for a while before arriving at this other camp located in Dalheim, a mere three and a half miles from Mondorf. According to Andrus, this camp completely fooled the German prisoners and used different personnel from the hotel camp such as British troops as guards, and allowed a change of pace for questioning these prisoners.⁸⁸ In reality this camp was a less than four miles from the hotel. Andrus further wrote they wanted to "give our prisoners the impression that they were leaving Luxembourg for Germany; that they would be free of the 'harsh' Americans, miles away from Mondorf and the Palace Hotel."⁸⁹ Under the guidance of Captain 'Woody' Wood,

⁸⁸ Burton C. Andrus. United States Army Center for Military History, "Notes on Prison at Mondorf" Burton C. Andrus Collection, Box 46, Folder 33.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 58.

they wired for sound a German looking house filled with German furnishings, placing small microphones which recorded directly onto ordinary records, in hidden and inconspicuous places. They also wired the area immediately around the house in case the prisoners talked while taking a walk. They built an extra room onto the house only accessible from outside. This is where the imagined trips to Germany came into existence. They prepared this facility to give the impression of a German home.

The guards brought Germans to this location in small groups. Hermann Goering actually helped the Allied cause by telling the other prisoners: “We are at a house I know! It is near Heidelberg. I recognize the décor on the walls.”⁹⁰ It was hoped this supposedly out of the way location would increase their talking and by eavesdropping the British and Americans could learn more about the Nazis and the war. However, listening gave the Allies no new information. Ken Hechler wrote in 1947 that he thought the Germans were suspicious of this setup and did not divulge any information because they suspected listening devices were in use. “I am convinced from remarks among the prisoners that they were suspicious of the wiring.”⁹¹ The prison labor force consisted of German soldiers in the camp for general PWs located directly behind the hotel. These prisoners staffed the hotel.⁹²

The camp at Dalheim had one feature that the rest the other buildings of ASHCAN did not it was wired for sound. One complaint about the camp was that the “gains”, a nickname the prisoners acquired based on a daily report of prisoner arrivals and departures sent to SHAEF, did have opportunities to talk to each other. Naturally, it

⁹⁰ Andrus, *Nuremberg Jailer*, 59.

⁹¹ Ken Hechler, *The Enemy Side of the Hill*, (unpublished), 24.

⁹² Hechler, 24.

was presumed they spoke to each other to get their stories together to present a fairly united front to the Allies. In retrospect, given how many of these individuals disliked their fellow captives, the possibilities of organizing a common story seem ludicrous now. The man who first raised the alarm about this, according to Andrus, was a Czech General-Judge Ecer, a member of the United Nations War Crimes Committee (UNWCC) sent to the camp on behalf of the group preparing for the War Crimes Tribunal.⁹³ His report criticized the amount of unsupervised time the inmates spent with one another, suggesting they could be working on a common strategy.

Colonel Andrus took himself and his new role at ASCHAN very seriously. He had very specific rules for dealing with the prisoners. For example, he never spoke to them in English even though several of his charges understood English, especially General Erich von Boetticher, who had served at the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. as Military Attaché, and Dr. Hans Borchers, Consul General at the German Consulate in New York City. He clearly had great antipathy for these men, finding it difficult in his memoirs to make any kind remarks about any of them.

After the Nuremberg Trials, TIME magazine described him in its issue of October 28, 1946, in an article on the end of the trials. Several hours before the scheduled execution of the war criminals, Goering managed to commit suicide with a cyanide capsule. The magazine asked how it could have happened and directly blamed Andrus stating: “It happened because the Army had placed in charge of the prison a pompous, unimaginative, and thoroughly unlikeable officer who wasn’t up to the job...” who

⁹³ Andrus. *Nuremberg Jailer*, 57.

planned “every last detail of the prisoners life.”⁹⁴ TIME was not the only source that did not think much of the colonel. Telford Taylor, an assistant prosecutor at Nuremberg, described him as a “meticulous, go-by-the-book regular officer, stocky and pompous, usually seen under a bright green helmet carrying a riding crop.”⁹⁵

Perhaps the most scathing description of Andrus came from Major Ken Hechler, one of the interrogators sent as part of the Shuster Commission by the Army Historical Division, to have recognized experts in German history and economics interrogate the prisoners, to Mondorf in July 1945. Hechler previously knew Andrus and described him as “not particularly competent for the job,” and a “man who had a little mind and exercised his command through many petty demonstrations of ‘I am the boss now.’”⁹⁶ He continued to say Andrus promised the commission the cooperation of the inmates by such tactics as taking “away their pillow and mattresses if he wanted to have them talk,” and “ordered that only spoons, and no knives and forks be used by the prisoners in the mess hall – which was anathema to his group, inasmuch as this was a common practice among German criminals.”⁹⁷

In a letter to his wife on May 21 1945, Andrus recounted an incident that happened on the May 20, 1945 when a group of 176 displaced persons from Luxembourg arrived in town after being held at Dachau by the Nazis.⁹⁸ Prince Charles of Luxembourg, who was only 17, represented his mother, the Grand Duchess. He escorted this group to Mondorf and prevented a larger incident by his presence when the townspeople and the

⁹⁴ Cited in , Nuremberg Jailer, 14-15

⁹⁵ Telford Taylor. *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 230.

⁹⁶ Hechler, 22.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 22.

⁹⁸ Burton C. Andrus, Letter to Wife, Burton C. Andrus Collection 5-21-45.

survivors of Dachau became aware of who was staying at the Palace Hotel. The young prince had been at Dachau helping to nurse his countrymen back to health. They knew who was in ASHCAN because “if you walked to the top of the road skirting the Palace Hotel grounds, and then climbed about ten feet up the bank next to the road, you could get a clear view of the terrace, the grounds and the entrance to the hotel.”⁹⁹ A meeting between those in charge of the DPs, Andrus, and a couple other officers from ASHCAN, helped to calm the incident. According to Andrus, the prince’s presence prevented a small riot from breaking out. Even though Andrus also writes about this incident in his memoir, there is no entry of this incident in the camp Visitor and Incident Log.¹⁰⁰

By May 30, 1945, Andrus created the “Rules and Regulations Governing PWE #32”, which provided the guidelines for acceptable rules and conditions operating the camp. The orders listed items deemed unacceptable for the prisoners to have in their possession, which included any type of glass, chinaware, mirrors, luggage, and food. Additionally, they could not carry medals or ribbons with sharp edges, although at first other such pieces may have been allowed. If they wore glasses, these stayed in a room called the salon and could only be used when reading in this room under the direct supervision of a guard.¹⁰¹

Colonel Andrus also placed restrictions on the movement of the prisoners in the camp. They could not enter the parts of the hotel where other common prisoners of war stayed, nor could groups talk to each other except within the confines of their jobs.

⁹⁹ John Dolibois, *Pattern of Circles: An Ambassador’s Story* (Kent, OH: Ken State University Press, 1989), 98-99.

¹⁰⁰ Andrus, *Nuremberg Jailer*, 26-27.

¹⁰¹ Burton C. Andrus. Regarding the Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for the Reception of Prisoners. Burton C. Andrus Collections, Box 33, Folder 70.

Within the hotel, the prisoners could not leave their rooms between 2200 hours and 0700 hours each day. Initially, the prisoners of general officer rank shared an orderly. There was one orderly for every six officers. Prisoners such as those in the 'von' annex could not have a valet. Prison guards circulated in the hotel and checked the rooms every half hour. The men shared a common toilet with only one prisoner allowed to use it at a time. Hot water was available for bathing only on Saturdays, with cold water the rest of the week. The food ration for these PW's was the same as for any POW. The Labor Cadre served meals in the dining room precisely at 0700, 1200 and 1800 hours each day. If any prisoner felt sick, he could report to sick call from 0800 to 1000 hours daily.

Colonel Andrus insisted on full military courtesy. As the commanding officer of the camp, he required that the prisoners salute him as he passed. The prisoners could go outside at various times of the day. They could exercise outside for an hour after breakfast and for half an hour after dinner. This particular freedom backfired on Andrus because this exercise time outside allowed people from Mondorf to see who was in the camp if they were on top of a hill across the street from the hotel. In the event of an attempt to escape, the guards had orders to shoot on sight.

Any request to the commandant or any other personnel in the camp had to be submitted in writing, and these requests went directly to Andrus. He also received requests intended for other military personnel. Because of the high rank many of these officials and military achieved, they sometimes tried to make requests directly to General Dwight Eisenhower or someone else at SHAEF.

Several other announcements from SHAEF made it clear that no one went to ASHCAN without the permission of Supreme Headquarters. For example, an outgoing

message sent from SHAEF to Twenty-first Army Group stated that: "Prisoners will be selected for ASHCAN by this headquarters. No others will be sent. Accommodation 100. Army Groups may submit names for consideration."¹⁰² This did not end all confusion concerning the camp. Frequent messages requested permission to send people to Mondorf and to try to ascertain if certain individuals were at the camp.

Every prisoner who moved in or out of ASHCAN did so under orders from SHAEF. As the Allies captured these men, they would be interrogated initially on a local or divisional level and then moved up the ranks until arriving at the headquarters of one of the army groups. At any point along this path they could be ordered to ASHCAN. The same day that Colonel Andrus became commandant the daily report showed a total of nine prisoners. Of these nine listed three were aides or orderlies, two Field Marshals, Walter Keitel and Albert Kesselring, and four politicians: Walter Buch, Wilhelm Frick, Arthur Seyss-Inguart and Karl Stroelin. SHAEF kept track of the daily movement in and out of the camp. (A complete list including short biographies of each of the ASHCAN prisoners is in Appendix A). Each day ASHCAN sent a report to Supreme Headquarters showing daily 'gains' and 'losses,' a 'gain' a prisoner new to the camp and a 'loss' someone who left. These reports made it very easy to check on who was held at the camp at a given moment although in the immediate postwar period there was still a great deal of confusion. For instance, several messages from SHAEF to Mondorf inquired to see if it held certain Nazis.

The guards, under the direction of Captain Hubert Biddle of the 391st AAA Battalion, developed a quick procedure to process new inmates. First the "gain" saw the

¹⁰² "Memo from SCAEF to Twenty One Army Group" NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 26-5-45.

G-2 officer, and then went to a bathroom and stripped to get examined by a doctor, while the guards went through their clothing. After that came brief interrogation, followed by assignment to a room. Bags were searched and allowable items given back to the prisoners while the rest of their belongings went into storage rooms. Potential weapons and vials of poison would generally be found during this preliminary period.¹⁰³

Hans Frank, former administrator of the Reich Protectorate in Poland, came to the camp a couple of weeks after a suicide attempt. He arrived in a pair of pajamas. As a result of this, the daily gains and losses report stated that he arrived “with 4 SIW [self-inflicted wounds], on neck, left wrist, left forearm, mid abdomen. Type wound – lacerations. Date inflicted – 30 April 1945.”¹⁰⁴

Two days after Frank’s arrival, the most significant former Nazi held at Mondorf arrived, former Reichsmarschal Hermann Goering. He negotiated his surrender on May 9, 1945 with his wife, daughter and aides at his side. When he surrendered to Brigadier General Robert J. Stack of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division, he claimed that Hitler had condemned him to death and his own loyal Luftwaffe troops kept SS units ordered to take him prisoner at bay. Goering’s mistake was offering to take over for Hitler once Hitler announced that he intended to stay in Berlin until the end. Goering cabled to say he assumed Hitler wanted him to take over and the Führer’s response was to remove his titles and rank and ordered the SS to arrest him. Once in American custody, he told his captors to “guard him well,” and he joked with the officers and men in charge of him.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Dolibois, 89-90.

¹⁰⁴ “Commandant Special Detention Center to SHAEF” NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 19 May 1945.

¹⁰⁵ “Fraternization Report”, NARA, RG331, Entry 2, Box 111.

General Stack treated him well at 36th Division headquarters, dining privately with Goering. Goering became the star captive immediately, and he attracted much media attention. He was put up in a castle the first night and once settled into his room, bathed, put on a gray uniform and came down to pose for pictures with his captors. He asked the cameramen to hurry “because I am hungry and want to eat.” The next day the Americans moved him to 36th Division headquarters. His behavior after his capture and the publicity surrounding him angered General Eisenhower and eventually the army moved him to Mondorf.

Upon Goering’s arrival at ASHCAN on May 20, 1945, Colonel Andrus took an immediate dislike to him, as he did with nearly all of his high value prisoners. At ASHCAN Goering was in poor physical condition, weighing about 270 pounds and having an addiction to paracodin. The army sent a number of his pills to the FBI in Washington, D.C. for analysis. Confirmed as paracodin, they recommended against abrupt withdrawal, warning that “abrupt withdrawal will produce severe nervous symptoms and physical distress, which can be effectively handled by a physician...”¹⁰⁶ Goering brought literally thousands of these pills with him to Mondorf. The first five days in the camp he received twenty pills in the morning and another twenty in the evening. Beginning on May 26, the camp doctor slowly lessened his dosage, although there would be a few exceptions such as on days he appeared sick. As a result of the limited food at the camp, Goering also lost weight. According to John Dolibois, one of the interrogators at the camp, his condition was first treated by a German doctor, Ludwig Pfluecker, until Captain William J. Miller of the United States Army took over his

¹⁰⁶ FBI. “Memorandum Laboratory Report”, 21 June 1945, NARA, RG 65 of FBI.

treatment. He also wrote that Goering “took great pride in cooperating in this endeavor.” Losing weight restored much of Goering’s health and “[h]is vanity was being aroused. He fancied himself as the hero of the Luftwaffe again, the highly decorated ace of the famous Richthofen Squadron of World War I.¹⁰⁷ By the time Goering moved to Nuremberg to stand trial in August, 1945, he was in the best physical shape he had been in years.

On May 21, 1945 a number of politicians arrived. This included former Chancellor and Ambassador to Austria and Turkey, Franz von Papen; Richard Walther Darré, former Reichsminister of Food and Agriculture; Hungarian Admiral Nicolaus Horthy, former Regent of Hungary; and also one of Horthy’s servants, who soon moved on to another prison camp. While Darré stayed in the hotel, Papen and Horthy were put in the ‘Von Annex’ which held politicians. Both Papen and Horthy complained to their jailers about the condition of their prison, believing they deserved better accommodations as government officials. These two men both drafted letters to General Eisenhower complaining about their treatment. In his book Andrus writes about Horthy having an issue that required medical attention; however, Horthy says in his memoir that he just faked the condition to be difficult. Darré generally proved to be very cooperative, even drafting a paper on how German agriculture could recover from the war.

The busiest day for arrivals was May 24, with twenty-three new prisoners. The day before British soldiers went into the quarters of Doenitz’ government on a naval base in Flensburg, Germany, and arrested the entire group. While never taken seriously by the Allies, his government served the purpose as an official body to accept surrender and to tell German units still in the field to surrender. To highlight the degree of confusion still

¹⁰⁷ Dolibois, 88.

surrounding ASHCAN after it opened, the camp log notes a call from May 22: “There are 27 new arrivals for you tomorrow at about 1400 hours. We don’t know who they are. They may not be suitable for you, in which case they will be withdrawn. Prisoners are from Northern Germany OKW.”¹⁰⁸ Nearly everyone from this OKW group ended up at ASHCAN. Many members of Doenitz’ new government were there, as well as a number of Nazis hoping to find a place in this new government. Those brought to ASHCAN included Doenitz, General Alfred Jodl, who signed the surrender documents at Rheims on May 8, leading officials such as Dr. Karl Brandt, Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front, who brought in the slave laborers, Schwerin von Krosigk, who was Doenitz’ Foreign Minister, and Albert Speer, former Minister of Armaments. In his memoir, Speer remarked that on arrival “[f]rom outside we had been able to see Goering and the other former members of the leadership pacing back and forth.”¹⁰⁹ He also remarked that “It was a ghostly experience to find all those who at the end had scattered like chaff in the wind reassembled here.”¹¹⁰ The daily list provides a good way to track the influx of prisoners at ASHCAN. Speer moved around a great deal spending only two weeks at Mondorf, but mostly he stayed at DUSTBIN, the sister camp of ASHCAN set up outside Frankfurt to hold the scientists and industrialists. Speer stayed at ASHCAN for only two weeks, because he was in demand to report on the effects of Allied bombing and the state of their industry.

On May 26, as described in the daily gains and losses report, a retired Reichsminister, Alfred Rosenberg, arrived at the camp. Rosenberg had a number of titles

¹⁰⁸ ASHCAN Log, USCMH, Burton C. Andrus Collection, 4.

¹⁰⁹ Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1970), 502.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

under the Nazi regime. The first weekly roster at ASHCAN described Rosenberg as “Reichsminister for the Occupied Territories in the East, Reichsleiter of NSDAP, Plenipotentiary for the Philosophic Education of Party, Chief of Foreign Policy Department of NSDAP.”¹¹¹ In addition to these positions he also wrote the 1930 book, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, a significant work in Nazi Party circles before Hitler came to power.

On May 28, the former Consul General from New York, Hans Borchers, Dr. Walther Funk, former President of the Reichsbank, and Dr. Hans Lammers, former Chief of the Reich Chancellery, arrived. Interest in these men varied for the allies. The FBI sent several lists of questions for Borchers, trying to learn more about German espionage in the United States during the war. Dr. Funk was of interest because as head of the Reichsbank he allowed the deposits of money and gold teeth from the concentration camps. Lammers served as a witness at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and would be subsequently tried in 1949 and sentenced to prison.

Six days later, another group of prisoners arrived: Franz Schwarz, a former SS official, Franz Xavier Schwarz, former, national treasurer for the Nazi Party, and Walter Warlimont, General de Artillerie. Warlimont, the former Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, had been wounded in the explosion during the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler. His wife was a member of the American Busch family, the family that owned the Anheuser-Busch Brewery empire.

Julius Streicher, the publisher of the *Der Stürmer*, an Anti-Semitic newspaper and *Gauleiter* of Franconia, arrived in camp on June fourth. Universally hated by all other at

¹¹¹ Weekly Roster 1, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6. 6-2-45.

the camp, his mere arrival caused a disturbance his first day when the military officers in the prison, led by Doenitz, refused to sit at the same table with him.

After about a week, General George Lindemann came to the camp. He had been the last general in charge of defending Denmark. Doenitz put him in charge of dismantling the Nazi organization in Denmark. His arrest by the allies came on June 6, 1945, and he eventually ended up at Mondorf. Final arrivals came in the next few weeks. In the middle of June, Joachim von Ribbentrop, former Foreign Minister, General Johannes Blaskowitz, Franz von Epp, former Reichstatthalter in Bavaria, Erwin Krauss, NSKK Korps Führer. Among others in the camp was Lieutenant General Friedrich von Boetticher (one of the few prisoners that Andrus liked), who was military attaché to the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. until Germany declared war on the United States in December 1941. In his post in Washington, he became acquainted with most of the generals who played a leading role in defeating Germany during World War II. He was of keen interest to the FBI who thought he could also provide information on German espionage attempts in the US before and during the war.

In all, thirteen men accused in the International Military Tribunal (IMT) spent time in the immediate postwar period at Mondorf. These men were certainly high on the list of priorities for the allies when they rounded up suspected war criminals. Most of the other prisoners stood trial at a later time and were kept both as potential war criminals and witnesses who could testify against the major war criminals. The allies cast a wide net in the spring of 1945 in an effort to round up war criminals and did a reasonably good job. Part of the reason for the wide net was a degree of ignorance on the part of the allies regarding the true nature of the activities of these men during the war. Nearly all of these

men faced some kind of justice. If they escaped the IMT and other allied war criminal trials, they often ended up on trial in the postwar world, whether turned over to another country for prosecution, or tried by courts in West Germany after the war.

As already mentioned, ASHCAN sent SHAEF a daily list of gains and losses at the prison. While these reports gave SHAEF a list of new internees at the camp as well as those moved elsewhere, a master list of the inmates still needed to be maintained. Starting on June 2, 1945, the camp provided a weekly list of inmates at ASHCAN. The growth in interest in these prisoners is shown by the ever increasing length of the Weekly Roster. Initially sent in duplicate to fifteen different departments, by the last week in the camp the roster went to over thirty different departments. In most cases, these various departments received two copies of the roster although some intelligence sections of the army asked for over thirty copies. These rosters listed each prisoner's name and former rank or title, and also his serial number. The list included a 'Remarks' column noting interrogations of the prisoners and who organized the questions asked. Early in its existence not much occurred at ASHCAN regarding interrogations. The FBI interrogated the inmates most frequently in late May into June. After that came questionnaires from the Evaluation and Dissemination Section (EDS). These questionnaires were transmitted to the camp using regular channels and one of the three interrogators assigned to the camp then interviewed the prisoner. The Soviets also visited the camp on numerous occasions to interview prisoners. By the third week interrogations occurred for nearly all of the inmates on a regular basis. Other government organizations sent inquiries about the Nazis. The Department of Agriculture sought out Richard Walter Darre for advice on how to rebuild German agriculture after the devastation of the war. In the middle of July,

the Shuster Commission arrived to conduct historical interviews with the former Nazi leadership.

The inmates served other purposes. One of the more interesting examples was Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Theodor Morell. In the immediate aftermath of the war he held court in Flensburg willing to say nearly anything about Hitler. He gave interview after interview, angering SHAEF leadership. Three different stories in the *New York Times* involved Dr. Morell. It is easy to understand any confusion over his name since each article, printed in a six day period, spells his name Morell, Morrell, or Morel. In the first article Morell, said to be recovering from a stroke, claimed that he "has kept the German leader's flagging energy at a high pitch throughout the war with hypodermic injections of glucose, vitamins and caffeine (sic)." He also described tremors in Hitler's left arm and leg and told the reporter that he did not believe Hitler committed suicide.¹¹² A May 24 article in the *New York Times* claimed that according to Russian intelligence based on interviews with Hitler's personal staff, "Hitler dies on May 1 as the result of a 'mercy killing' by a Dr. Morel, who gave him an injection that killed and then, with an aide of Hitler's adjutant, buried the body in Hitler's underground headquarters" and further stated "Hitler was mad and half-paralyzed with pain when Dr. Morel gave him the injection."¹¹³ With information such as this, it is easy to see why SHAEF wanted him apprehended. They identified him as Dr. Moreno and asked ASHCAN to question Dr. Karl Brandt, former Reich Commissioner for Sanitation and Health, regarding who this man was. One of the ASHCAN interrogators, Captain John Dolibois, questioned Brandt. Dolibois later wrote that Brandt regarded Morell as "a charlatan, a quack of the highest

¹¹² Tania Long, "Doctor Describes Hitler Injections", *New York Times*, May 22 1945, 5.

¹¹³ "Says Hitler Died in Mercy Killing, *New York Times*, May 24, 1945, 12.

order, who had ingratiated himself to Martin Bormann, director of the party chancellery and Hitler's secretary", and that Morell was "totally incompetent," using strychnine and atropine to medicate Hitler.¹¹⁴ SHAEF ordered his arrest. The allies held Morell for a time and then released him. He never faced any charges from the allies and died in 1948.

Complaints from the internees started as soon as ASHCAN started to fill up. Until their arrival at Mondorf, many of these men received very courteous treatment and comfortable accommodations. The first home for ASCHAN was the Chateau de Lesbioles, located in Spa, Belgium. Those interned at Spa kept their luggage, adjutants, and personal assistants. These amenities did not exist at Mondorf. Although generally considered the most comfortable of the prisons for high value military and political leaders of the former Third Reich, the Palace Hotel was a considerable step down from the treatment they expected from the allies in captivity.

However, the move to ASHCAN signaled the end of a plush life for these 'gains.' They complained about many different aspects of their treatment, from the food, to their accommodations, to a lack of respect and questions of status. Colonel Andrus seldom offered any relief along these lines. Franz von Papen complained about his status almost as soon as he arrived at the camp, demanding to know if his status was as a prisoner of war or a civilian prisoner, which would influence treatment under the Hague Conventions. According to Papen, when he first confronted Andrus shortly after the colonel's arrival as commandant regarding his status and that of former Regent of Hungary, Nicolaus Horthy, the colonel told him that: "I have no idea who is shut up here.

¹¹⁴ Dolibois, 108.

I know nothing about a head of state. I am responsible for the guards and nothing else concerns me.”¹¹⁵

The prisoners attempted to write anyone they thought could change their circumstances. They drafted letters to Winston Churchill and President Harry Truman, but most often they wrote to General Eisenhower. They wrote for two reasons: first Eisenhower stood the best chance of changing their immediate circumstances, and, second, they blamed General Eisenhower for their circumstances. For example, in a letter to Eisenhower, Wilhelm Keitel wrote that while he did exactly as Eisenhower instructed him in signing the surrender papers, the general had betrayed that trust by having him arrested and taking away his personal adjutant, batman, and 500 pounds of luggage Eisenhower said he could take with him. The guards confiscated his luggage and his aides sent to other prisons. Additionally, he complained that: “I am treated here in Mondorf as if I were in a camp for ordinary criminals.” He gives several reasons he believed he was being mistreated at ASHCAN according to the Geneva Conventions regarding a prisoner of war of his rank concluding with: “I cannot hide the fact that my honour as a soldier has been grievously damaged when my marshal’s baton and the decorations from two wars were taken from me.” This letter received no reply from the general.¹¹⁶

Another letter, in a similar vein, came from Grand Admiral Doenitz and another from Field Marshal Kesselring. All of these letters complained that the treatment they received was not equal to their rank. Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering also wrote letters complaining about the indignities he suffered that were beneath his position. These letters

¹¹⁵ Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, (New York: E.P. Dutton Company, 1953), 542.

¹¹⁶ Andrus, 41-43.

came to Eisenhower's attention at a bad time. Many newspapers in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union complained bitterly about the special attention they claimed these former Nazis received. Press reports and photographs of the press conferences Goering held in the immediate aftermath of his capture led to a great deal of criticism regarding how SHAEF in general and Eisenhower in particular handled the captured German leaders. The *New York Times* printed Eisenhower's statement regarding the treatment of former Nazis on May 16, 1945. Eisenhower said that: "Drastic measures have been set in motion to assure termination of these errors forthwith" concerning the easy treatment of German generals and leaders.¹¹⁷

Colonel Andrus proposed to SHAEF that he hold a meeting with his prisoners. He suggested he would discourage them from writing letters in the meeting by explaining that "the complainee does not feel that he is being treated in accordance with exalted position he has held. As a matter of fact it would not matter what they got they would still cry for more."¹¹⁸ The solution in this matter as a suggestion of a form letter written to each man as follows: "On behalf of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force receipt is acknowledged of your letter of ____ May, 1945."¹¹⁹ However, the Allies decided against the form letter. Andrus finally did hold a meeting and attempted to slow down the flow of letters coming from the camp. He told the Prisoners:

Whereas I do not desire to stand in the way of you writing letters concerning alleged theft of property or other violations of human rights, writing letters about the inconveniences or lack of convenience or about your opinions as the indignity or deference due you is fruitless and apt to only disgust those in authority. Since, as you know, I am subject to frequent inspections by representatives of the highest authority some

¹¹⁷ "Gen. Eisenhower's Statement", *New York Times*, May 15 1945, 18.

¹¹⁸ B.C. Andrus to Colonel Bogart, NARA, RG331, Entry 11 Box 6, May 25, 1945.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 5-30-45.

charges have been made as a result of these inspections. The letters you have written have not yet reached these authorities, but are still on their way through subordinate channels.

The commandant, his superiors, the Allied Governments, and the public of the nations of the world, are not unmindful of the atrocities committed by the German government, its soldiers, and its civil officials. Appeals for added comfort by the perpetrators and parties to these conditions will tend only to accentuate any contempt in which they are already held. Therefore it is my duty to suggest that all refrain from writing letters borne solely of personal vanity.¹²⁰

This speech seemed to succeed in putting an end to the flow of letters regarding the personal indignities suffered by the prisoners.

Concrete plans for the prosecution of any of these men did not exist at the time most of them arrived at camp. Many did not understand why they were at a prison camp. Some arrived after horrific ordeals at the hands of the Nazis before the war ended or a fear of their American or British captors. Some complained of being beaten in custody. Apparently in an attempt to protect themselves, many arrived in camp with items that quickly got confiscated. Andrus wrote that:

We found suicide weapons sewn into uniforms and concealed in the heels of shoes. Razor blades had been fixed with adhesive tape to the soles of men's feet. We took away all scissors, razors, nail-files, shoelaces and neckties. We seized all hose supports, suspenders, braces, watches, sharp instruments; steel shod shoes were removed; long pins carrying ribbons, insignia of rank or decorations were confiscated. We also took away all batons, walking-sticks and canes.¹²¹

The successful suicides of Himmler and Konrad Henlein, Gauleiter of the Sudetenland, as well as the unsuccessful suicide attempt of Robert Ley, led to more restrictions. Metal bars came to ASHCAN to prevent suicide or escape. All items mentioned by Andrus remained out of their hands. Turning the hotel into a prison

¹²⁰ Dolibois, 95.

¹²¹ Andrus, *Nuremberg Jailer*, 29.

included knocking out all of the windows. Part of this was for the metal bars, but suicide using the broken glass was also a concern. The prisoners in the camp considered these precautions ridiculous. The large amount of broken glass in the hotel and the precaution of removing the windows led to the Nazis ironically naming these precautions “Kristallnacht,” after their 1938 attack on Jews throughout Germany.¹²²

At the end of Andrus’ first week at ASHCAN, one of the new arrivals, General d’Artillerie Friedrich von Boetticher asked Colonel Andrus for a meeting. Until United States involvement in the war began, Boetticher had been German Military Attaché in Washington, D.C. He knew many American generals, such as George Patton and Douglas MacArthur. Boetticher seemed willing to do anything that the American leadership at the camp asked of him. Boetticher told Andrus he had suggestions for the prisoners while in the camp. He said that his ideas were his alone, and according to Andrus, said that “he was not fearful of any of the prominent military or civil personnel committing suicide, but that he was fearful of some of them losing their minds.”¹²³ He proposed that the inmates have some form of mental activity to relieve the hours of boredom of just sitting around the hotel. Boetticher suggested he could give English and history lessons to his fellow inmates. The history lessons would stress the traditionally close relationship between America and Germany, including a close relationship between George Washington and Prussia’s Frederick II. He also proposed access to newspapers, more tobacco products and an additional blanket be provided for these men. He also suggested that a small room be provided so that the prisoners could talk among themselves or have

¹²² Dolibois, 93.

¹²³ Burton C Andrus, “Recommendation by Internee (Boetticher, Friedrich, 31G 350019), “ 31 Mat 1945, NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 1-4.

small group discussions. The only one of these suggestions that Andrus recommended was some kind of instruction for the prisoners, although he thought that it should be done by U.S. Personnel.¹²⁴

Prisoners often felt they still had a contribution to make to Germany. Many thought they would eventually return to an active role in German affairs with the war over and once the allied occupation ended. Richard Walther Darre, former Reichsminister of Food and Agriculture, wrote a paper suggesting how Germany could deal with its current food crisis. Darre, a member of the Nazi Party since 1930, and held his post as Reichsminister from 1933- 1942 until he had a falling out with Himmler over policy. Major Ivo Giannini of the U.S. Army compiled the report on Darre's recommendations. His report included an initial assessment of Darre as "a highly intelligent individual and has a vast amount of knowledge on a multitude of subjects." Giannini's assessment concludes that Darre may be "attempting to whitewash his political activities in the Nazi Party," but in the opinion of the interrogators "it is felt that the man is sincere in his desire to assist the Allies and thereby his own people..."¹²⁵

Giannini included Darre's introduction in the report, which emphasized the need to enact its proposed policies quickly before it was too late for the fall 1945 harvest. Darre included a history of farming and food production under the Third Reich and noted that the whole apparatus of the Reich Food Estate must be redone, but that the present system must stay intact for the 1945 harvest. He first proposed putting everyone in his administration back to work in their former jobs. He continued with suggestions about

¹²⁴ Ibid, 3.

¹²⁵ Ivo Giannini, "A Plan for the Reconstruction of a Normal Food Economy in Germany by Richard Walter Darre," 28 June 1945, NARA, UD279-B, Box 1331, 1-5.

which people should be placed in charge of the new apparatus. Darre concluded that “if the food question is attacked properly it can become not only a vehicle for the rapid reconstruction of one sphere of German economic life, but can exert favorable influence on others as well.” His proposals did not become part of German farming in the postwar era. Everyone mentioned in his report was excluded from this type of work because of their Nazi past. Denazification did not allow these former members of the Agricultural Ministry to work for the Allies. His document does convey a certain naiveté about the circumstances of Germany at the end of the war and a presumption of a future for him after the occupation ends.

Colonel Andrus encountered a number of small problems at Prisoner of War Enclosure 32, for example the difficulty procuring basic essentials to operate the camp efficiently. On May 23 he wrote a note to SHAEF requesting a file cabinet from Oise Intermediate Section, under which ASHCAN belonged in the chain of command. This item was eventually supplied, but it required the signature of a supply officer who certified that the file cabinet was in fact required by the unit and was part of the unit’s basic equipment.¹²⁶

Another such incident concerned a typewriter. Andrus’ repeated request for a typewriter for making the necessary reports from the camp went unheeded. This situation resolved itself in a more immediate manner for the colonel. When General von Boetticher came to the camp, he brought a Royal typewriter with him. Boetticher purchased this typewriter while he lived in Washington, D.C. and ordered it special from the manufacturer and “it featured extra keys that made at one stroke letters with diacritical

¹²⁶ B.C. Andrus, “Procurement of File Cabinet,” NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 23 May 1945.

umlauts and the special double *s* common in German.”¹²⁷ Andrus took the typewriter after Boetticher’s reluctant permission with the proviso that it would be returned. When Boetticher requested it back, he was told that it would remain in Andrus’ office and it would not be returned. While these incidents seem small and unimportant, they do illustrate the difficulties of the time and the pettiness that Colonel Andrus often displayed both at Mondorf and later in Nuremberg.

After approximately a week of new arrivals filling the camp, the men running the camp under Colonel Andrus settled into a routine. All of the American officers and men took up their posts at the camp. Andrus was in overall charge of the camp, seeing to its security and safety. Under his control were the men of the 391st AAA Battalion, who under his command would guard the camp. Unfortunately for the efficiency of the camp, Andrus’ disdain for the prisoners and cartoonish military deportment made it difficult for the guards to show any respect for the prisoners as well, leaving them sometimes not in a very cooperative mood for interrogation.

Overall G-2 intelligence functions were in the hands of Colonel Tim Bogart, an Oise Military District G-2 officer. At Mondorf, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Van Cleve, a professor of Medieval Studies at Bowdoin College in Maine before the Second World War, controlled G-2 functions. He had worked in World War I in intelligence. After the war he returned to Bowdoin, but when the next war began he applied to rejoin and would be restored to his previous rank. Five other interrogators served at the camp. Captain Herbert Sensenig, a professor of German at Dartmouth College in civilian life, ran the day to day affairs at the camp for G-2. Lieutenant Malcolm Hilty graduated from

¹²⁷ Alfred M. Beck, *Hitler’s Ambivalent Attaché: Lt. Gen. Friedrich von Boetticher in America, 1933-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 211.

Carnegie Tech and before the war performed as an opera tenor in Germany during which time he sang for several high level Nazis. He went through intelligence training at Camp Ritchie back in the United States. Another graduate of Camp Ritchie, Lieutenant John Dolibois, emigrated from Luxembourg when he was ten. He grew up in the United States and went to college at Miami University in Ohio majoring in German. He served in a hybrid capacity in the camp in that while he came to interrogate the prisoners, circumstances led him to function more as a welfare officer for the prisoners, in which capacity he while casually tried to get information out of the prisoners by commiserating with them after their interrogations. His knowledge of the indigenous language of Luxembourg also came in handy at the prison. Other interrogators included Captain Kurt R. Wilhelm and Lieutenant John G. Ziegler. Enlisted support staff at the camp included a number of men who helped prepare for the interrogations and type up reports.

Arriving at Mondorf proved a shocking experience for Lieutenant John Dolibois. He left Luxembourg as a ten year old boy with his father to stay with his sister in Akron, Ohio. The first time he went back was during the war. Upon his assignment to ASHCAN, the first person he came face to face with was Hermann Goering. In an astonishing exchange, Goering assumed he was the new welfare officer, and Dolibois played along. After discussing his encounter with Goering with Captain Herbert Sensenig, it was decided to continue that role in the camp, using the alias of Lt. Gillen.

An important characteristic of this G-2 staff of interrogators was their inexperience. Training at Camp Ritchie in Maryland and knowledge of the German language did not necessarily make for a good interrogator. Camp Ritchie was the location for the Army's intelligence school. Here men like Dolibois and Hilty were taught field

interrogation to work with units near the front lines and gather immediate intelligence. These men, other than Colonel Van Cleve, lacked any real experience in military intelligence, or knowledge of contemporary German history. According to Dolibois: “It seemed that every Nazi ever mentioned in the news during the late thirties and early forties was here under one roof in little Luxembourg.”¹²⁸ Headquarters provided these men with questions to ask the prisoners, but that was it. It was nearly impossible to go into more depth and ask questions to draw out better answers because these men did not possess the necessary background knowledge. Lack of knowledge regarding the history of the Third Reich and all manner of military tactics and strategy doomed these interrogations from the start from ever yielding significant and useable information. As Ken Hechler, a member of the Shuster Commission who arrived at ASHCAN in July stated: “At Mondorf, approximately eight officer interrogators worked out a meager program of interrogations in advance ..., but the planning of their subjects was poor. They did not have a very clear grasp of military operations and strategy, and they tended to ask the same type of questions which they had asked as G-2 specialists during active operations.”¹²⁹

Personnel was one of the biggest concerns for Colonel Andrus at Mondorf. As stated earlier, the 391st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion provided the guard cadre at the camp. On June 11 Andrus wrote to SHAEF that he had received oral orders from Colonel Fountain to temporarily reassign four officers and 158 men from the 391st AAA to Metz for thirty days of temporary duty. In this message, he noted that other members of the

¹²⁸ Dolibois, 91.

¹²⁹ Hechler, 20-21.

391st were already on temporary duty.¹³⁰ On June 12 he wrote a letter describing his personnel issues. He explained that the battalion already had three officers and 61 men absent on oral orders. He had just received the orders for the 158 men to move to Metz, as well as an officer and seven mechanics. This would leave him with a total of 20 officers and 186 men.¹³¹ Constant staffing of guards and other support personnel required a “daily detail of 19 officers and 209 enlisted men, or 23 more enlisted men than will be left here.”¹³² If these transfers occurred, minimum staffing requirements would be unobtainable. SHAEF rescinded the oral order moving men to Metz.

Another crisis came on June 22. This time SHAEF ordered the entire battalion rotated out with the intention of sending them home or to other assignments. Andrus sent an urgent plea that there would be no one left watching the camp if these orders went through. On June 24 the colonel received written orders from General Omar Bradley that the unit remained on indefinite temporary assignment at ASHCAN.

Andrus and Guard Unit vs. Interrogators

The G-2 interrogators wanted to keep prisoner morale high. If a “gain” was reasonably happy and comfortable, then the work of the interrogators would go much easier. If, however, constant petty issues existed between the American guards and the prisoners, the prisoners would be less likely to open up during interrogations, instead often using the forum of the interview to complain about conditions in the camp. Even as late as July, this remained true. Ken Hechler wrote that “Goering frequently tried to get off the subject and talk about the way in which Col. Andrus was abusing him through

¹³⁰ Andrus, “Untitled,” NARA, RG331 Entry 11, BOX 6, 11-6-45.

¹³¹ Andrus, “Employment of Personnel.” NARA, RG331 Entry 11 Box 6, 12 June 1945.

¹³² Ibid.

petty indignities.”¹³³ Dolibois later wrote “Colonel Andrus and the guard element of the detention center didn’t agree with ‘special favors’ and ‘sympathetic treatment. These problems would plague us on and on.”¹³⁴

Friction emerged between the men of the 391st guarding the prisoners and the interrogators from G-2 in charge of supervising the prisoners and extracting information. This tension existed for a number of reasons but primarily because the interrogators wanted these men fairly comfortable and at ease in order to get more information from them. Meanwhile, the guards attempted to make their own jobs as easy as possible and usually showed a great deal of disrespect in their interactions with the prisoners. An example of this is Major Hechler’s recollection of how the guards would call for someone to bring Goering down so he could be interviewed. According to Hechler, calls of “Send up Fat Stuff to Major Hechler” would be repeated by guards throughout the building.¹³⁵ Hechler suspected this was done for his benefit but wrote that no one ever referred to Goering by name. Another such example, the use of aliases for the interrogators at the camp, was an obvious source of irritation, and Hechler pointed out that at one point one of the prisoners exclaimed: “Why does this man who calls himself Captain Hamilton try to fool me? I know that your real name is Major Hechler, but what is the reason for all the other officers having these fake names?”¹³⁶ In fact, according to Hechler the use of aliases was a common practice for wartime interrogators in case the tide of battle changed and the enemy captured the interrogator, but, with the end of hostilities, it was not known why this was standard operating procedure at Mondorf.

¹³³ Hechler, 49.

¹³⁴ Dolibois, 88.

¹³⁵ Hechler, 48.

¹³⁶ Hechler, 21.

Colonel Andrus did not help gain the cooperation of the prisoners. His insistence that the former officers and politicians rise when he entered the room, his insistence on speaking to them through an interpreter even though many of them spoke excellent English, and his Martinet appearance, with the shiny helmet and riding crop, made it difficult for many of the prisoners to take him seriously and led to many jokes behind his back. Even Dolibois remarked that the prisoners “started playing games. They treated us all with the same deference Colonel Andrus demanded, knowing it would make us uncomfortable. For instance, if I walked into the building while they were sitting on the veranda, they would all rise in unison, stand at rigid attention, and chant ‘Guten Morgen Herr Leutnant!’”¹³⁷ He also admits that “[s]ometimes it was difficult to keep from joining the high-ranking Nazis in their covert laughter.”¹³⁸

It took a visit from the theater Provost Marshall Milton Reckord to straighten some issues out. Reckord eased tensions a bit by giving the prisoners a third blanket, mattresses and pillows as well as providing them with more clothing because some were in little more than rags. For example, Hans Frank still wore pajamas because he came to the camp from the infirmary after his suicide attempt. Prisoners also gained access to newspapers, books, a chess set and checkers and could listen to Armed Forces radio at specified times.¹³⁹ Many of these changes had been originally requested in General Boetticher’s recommendations to Andrus. Mattresses and blankets were part of another game Colonel Andrus played to establish his authority. He would take these items away from prisoners as penalties for violation of his rules.

¹³⁷ Dolibois, 94.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

There was still a need to define command and control over the prison and the prisoners. The interrogators asked Colonel Van Cleve to intercede with Colonel Andrus on their behalf. The guards and Andrus made it difficult for the interrogators to get any good results from the prisoners because of the constant minor irritations. The disagreements finally led to a message from SHAEF dated June 23 that Van Cleve was relieved of command retroactive to June 13. The message also contained a list of 18 men from 6824 DIC (MIS) (military intelligence) who would be assigned to Prisoner of War Enclosure 32 on a permanent basis. The message explained that this “was not recommended earlier as Colonel VAN CLEVE represented this matter to have been his responsibility and to have been properly cleared.”¹⁴⁰ It is unclear whether the clash between military intelligence and the guards at ASHCAN led to Van Cleve’s dismissal or whether it was the handling of his men.

A letter dated June 15, 1945 attempted to clear up confusion in the camp. This letter came from Brigadier General T. J. Davis, and it confirmed that the G-2 section at ASHCAN was under the authority of the camp commandant and must follow his instructions “to operate this camp as a military establishment will be conformed with by attached G-2 personnel.” It also stated that the “Commandant will assist the G-2 personnel in any manner compatible with the means at his disposal and subject to orders and regulations under which he must operate.” The letter clearly spelled out that “[t]he G-2 Section is concerned only with the search for intelligence and is specifically charged with answering expeditiously questionnaires submitted by Supreme Headquarters or agencies authorized by Supreme Headquarters to submit questionnaires direct.” Finally,

¹⁴⁰ Andrus, Cable to SHAEF, NARA, RG331, Entry, 11 Box 6, 6-23-45.

this letter reaffirms that the commandant can refuse admittance to the camp by anyone without authorization from Supreme Headquarters.¹⁴¹

The above letter spelled out very clearly the responsibilities of the intelligence group at Mondorf. Moreover, the letter demanded that the camp commandant aid the intelligence section in any way possible. While the orders were directed at G-2, the overall tone of the letter demanded cooperation between the two groups with the hope of obtaining more positive results at ASHCAN.

Prisoner Health

One consideration for the men imprisoned at Mondorf was their health. The last thing the Allies wanted was for these men to die in custody. They dealt with issues from the beginning, such as Goering's obesity and addiction and Frank's recovery from his attempted suicide. Colonel Andrus felt good about the progress both of these men made under his care. Even though comfort was not a major concern for the Americans regarding conditions at Mondorf, ASHCAN was probably the most comfortable of all of the camps for high value prisoners. In spite of the complaints about the camp by those imprisoned there, Mondorf was nearly a country club compared with other facilities.

Admiral Horthy was a chronic complainer about the conditions in the camp. The former Regent of Hungary was 78 years old when taken into custody. Since he stayed at the "Von Annex," he was able to use some of his own bed linen while the others slept under army blankets and wore extra clothing. By his description, his "food was mainly cold and unpalatable; it made me feel sick." He described an incident in which he left the dining room to return to his room, and he fainted. "The perturbation of the camp doctor

¹⁴¹ Brigadier General T.J Davis, "Duties and Responsibilities of G-2 Officer at ASHCAN," NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 15 June 1945.

and the camp Commandant, who came rushing up, was so great that I decided to exploit my indisposition. I stayed in bed for two days, and after that conditions improved materially.”¹⁴² The following day Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Van Cleve sent a letter to SHAEF regarding Horthy’s illness and included the report of Dr. Daniel Rosen, who treated Horthy. Van Cleve’s report stated that while “this report does not necessarily indicate an alarming condition, the medical officer feels that progressive deterioration and death are possible in view of the prisoners’ (sic) advanced age (he is 78) and his rather desperate mental state.” Van Cleve reports that:

The British and American officers in charge of the ‘Annex’ feel quite definitely that Horthy is showing marked signs of deterioration, both physically and mentally. He is deeply chagrined at the rigorous treatment he is receiving and feels that by no standard can he be adjudged guilty of any crime. He regards himself as the only living man sufficiently well-informed on conditions in Hungary to give positive guidance to its rehabilitation. It is this that he refers to when he describes his present condition as ‘a matter of the soul.’¹⁴³

In Dr. Rosen’s report of the incident he writes that “except for evidence of some weight loss, found no evidence of any pathological process which may have explained this incident.” He concludes that the patient does not “require any special consideration at this time, but I feel that the patient is brooding over his present status, and considering his age and background, may develop an acute melancholia and deteriorate more rapidly.” He suggested an increase in Horthy’s sugar ration. Horthy died in 1957 at age 89.¹⁴⁴

Many of the prisoners were in their sixties and seventies when they came to ASHCAN. As mentioned previously, the Allies feared that any of these men would die

¹⁴² Admiral Nicolaus Horthy, *Memoirs* (New York: Robert Speller & Sons Publishers, 1957), p. 246.

¹⁴³ Thomas C. Van Cleve, “Illness of Admiral Horthy”, NARA, RG331 Entry 11 Box 6, 15 June 1945.

¹⁴⁴ Daniel Rosen, “Report on Condition of Admiral Horthy,” NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 15 June 1945.

under their care. Therefore, a number of these men saw doctors frequently to deal with what was usually a pre-existing condition. Hermann Goering, due to his weight and addiction to paracodin, was regularly monitored by doctors. The same was true for Hans Frank due to his attempted suicide in captivity before arriving at the camp. While Frank recovered from his injuries and appeared to get better, he became concerned about former Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and took his concerns to Colonel Andrus. Frank was concerned because Ribbentrop seemed deeply depressed. Andrus received a report from one prison officer who wrote that:

Internee von Ribbentrop, 31G 35002, seems very much depressed and always sits by himself. He observes all American personnel rather closely whenever they are in the vicinity. In order to find out what might be his trouble, I had Sergeant Bock converse with him; I find that he is very much concerned with the forthcoming War Crimes trials. He appears depressed and dejected and very rarely smiles, as he formerly did on his arrival here. It is my opinion that he is not dangerous in any way... but we will continue to observe him at all times.¹⁴⁵

Frank later asked if he could room with Ribbentrop so he could care for him, but Andrus denied the request. Additionally, Ribbentrop was not highly regarded by his peers in the camp. They thought that he was not very bright and merely one of Hitler's lackeys. After Hitler's suicide, Ribbentrop stayed around Flensburg hoping to be used by the new government, but Schwerin von Krosigk became foreign minister instead with no task given to Ribbentrop.

Others among the sick included Field Marshall Albert Kesselring who had a heart murmur but required no medical treatment. A final inmate with medical issues was Franz Xavier Schwarz, former Treasurer of the Nazi Party. He was 69 years old at Mondorf and

¹⁴⁵ Andrus, *Nuremberg Jailer*, 28-29.

suffered from heart irregularities requiring medicine and a doctor's supervision. He died while still in Allied custody two years later.¹⁴⁶

The Prison Communities

The prison at ASHCAN was a community unto itself. The guards had a limited number of people to watch, including the prisoners in the hotel, in the "Von Annex," and in the larger camp behind the hotel that held approximately 600 men. The interrogators were housed at smaller European pension hotels less than a mile from the camp. Access to the camp was very secure, and only those cleared by SHAEF had access to the camp and anyone inside. In this rather insular world, the camp developed its own peculiarities. One of these peculiarities was nicknames. Nicknames came from the guards, the interrogators, and the Germans in the larger camp that worked in the hotel and annex. The interrogators called the former Nazis 'PW', 'internees', and in official reports, 'subject.' Another common nickname was 'gain,' after the daily report. The guards showed little respect for the inmates, calling men such as Goering 'fatso.' As time went on Julius Streicher and Robert Ley became inseparable, earning them the nickname "the Bobbsey Twins," after the lead characters in popular children's' book series in America. A final nickname came from the German prison laborers who referred to the group as "*die Bonzen*," literally, the 'big shots.' They meant this in a derisive tone as most of these prisoners resented these former high ranking Nazis and what they did to Germany.¹⁴⁷ Colonel Andrus described one example. One evening Hermann Goering complained about the food in the camp when he said to the German PW serving the food that his

¹⁴⁶ Clint L. Miller, "Medical Report on PWs with Serious Illness," NARA, Rg331, Entry 11, Box 6, 3 June 1945.

¹⁴⁷ Dolibois, 98.

“‘food isn’t as good as I fed to my dogs.’ The POW turned on him and replied: ‘Well, if that’s the case, you fed your dogs better than you fed any of us who served under you in the Luftwaffe.’”¹⁴⁸

The prisoners developed, or perhaps continued, their own social circles. Although reasonably free to move about the hotel during meals and the periods in the morning and evening they had for exercise, their social circles divided into three distinct groups, with a few people who never fit well into any group. The first group was the high ranking military officers, which included Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, General Alfred Jodl, General d’ Artillerie Walter Warlimont (married to heiress of Busch breweries in America), as well as Generals Erich von Boetticher, Johannes Blaskowitz, and Admirals Karl Doenitz and Gerhard Wagner. These men interacted almost exclusively with each other, although Doenitz often tried to speak for the group as the leader of the German government. The admirals stayed especially close within this group. Another sub group comprised Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring, who spent as much time as possible in deck chairs on the veranda outside the hotel sunning themselves in the warm spring and summer weather.

A second group, the career governmental bureaucrats and statesmen, included men like former Chancellor Franz von Papen, Otto Meissner, former president of the Reichschancellory, Hans Heinrich Lammers, former Reichsminister and Chief of the Chancellery, Graf Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, a former Finance Minister and Doenitz’ Foreign Minister, and the only non-German of the group, Admiral Nicolaus Horthy, former Regent of Hungary. These men mostly failed to understand why they were even in

¹⁴⁸ Andrus, *Nuremburg Jailer*, 40.

prison. As a group they felt they had merely worked for their country. In many ways, these men proved the most difficult in camp. Many of them wrote letters complaining of their incarceration and violations of international law. Most of this group stayed at camp more as material witnesses, with only Papen being tried at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg starting in November 1945.

The final group, the Nazi Party members, was the “alte Kämpfer,” old fighters who supported Hitler in the twenties. This group included Hans Frank, Alfred Rosenberg, Wilhelm Frick, Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inguart, Robert Ley, and Julius Streicher. Rosenberg and Streicher, who played key roles in spreading anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, and all carried out the brutal policies that defined Nazi leadership and occupation of conquered lands. This group kept largely to themselves because the other two groups found them difficult to be around.

Julius Streicher, in particular, found life in the prison very lonely. The only other prisoner who talked to him at all was Robert Ley. Streicher published *Der Stürmer*, the anti-Semitic and pornographic weekly magazine that encouraged hatred and brutality toward the Jews and other so-called inferior groups. His presence was so repugnant that on arrival at the camp the others refused to eat with him. Andrus wrote that:

Doenitz and several others immediately moved their chairs and refused point-blank to sit with him. They told me they considered Streicher Germany’s No 1 criminal. I told them: ‘The Wehrmacht and the Navy no longer exist, neither does your state. There are no discussions. You will therefore eat with anybody I place at your table.’¹⁴⁹

In the camp, Streicher had a private room on the floor below where the rest of them stayed. According to Hechler, Julius Streicher’s “homosexual tendencies and vile

¹⁴⁹ Andrus, 39.

vulgarity caused the other prisoners to insist that he be given a private room in which to indulge his fancies.”¹⁵⁰

One prisoner who more or less fit into all of these categories but welcome in none of them was Hermann Goering. While not a high ranking officer in the army during World War I, he was the highest ranking leader in the Third Reich under Hitler, the title of Reichsmarschal created just for him. However, everyone within the group of career officers rejected him. Within the Third Reich he was a leading bureaucrat, having become part of the government as a Minister without Portfolio when Hitler formed his government in January 1933. He was not, however, a career bureaucrat and politician. He certainly did not fit in with the other bureaucrats who came from the Prussian tradition of landed members of the old *Junker*, who viewed government service as a noble and at least theoretically, non-political position. He was one of the ‘Alte Kämpfer,’ a Nazi from the early twenties who had been with Hitler at the Beer Hall Putsch in November 1923 and all other significant Nazi events. Within the prison, he remained an outsider. No group claimed him and nearly everyone resented him after twelve years of the Nazi regime. This rejection did not deter Goering. As his health improved with his weight loss and reduced dependency on paracodin, his old swagger and cockiness returned. He thought he was in charge of, and spokesman for, the group of German leaders held at ASHCAN.

In the early days of the camp, these men ate the same ration as any Prisoner of War, that of a United States Army private. This was the same ration any PW in Europe received at the end of the war. The total volume of this food ration and the vast number

¹⁵⁰ Hechler, 24.

of German prisoners held by the Allies put a severe supply strain on the victorious countries, particularly the United States, which also helped Great Britain and France supply their rations. The fact that the majority of the prisoners at Mondorf were not soldiers added to issues about the rations because so many former bureaucrats demanded their rights and privileges under the Geneva Convention. The Allies solved this problem in July at the Potsdam Conference when they reclassified everyone as disarmed German prisoners and reduced the ration to about 1600 calories a day.

Once Colonel Andrus took over as Commandant of Central Continental Prisoner of War Enclosure 32, SHAEF sent out announcements concerning this facility, as well as its twin facility DUSTBIN, which had been moved from Versailles to Frankfurt. During the third week of May several announcements came from SHAEF regarding the establishment of both ASHCAN, which would hold High Value Nazis, and DUSTBIN, which held leading scientists and industrialists. The stated purpose of the camps was to “facilitate special interrogation in a convenient location of important individuals who are of special intelligence interest.” One announcement gave three categories for prisoners committed to Mondorf:

- a. Civilians of high political status such as VON PAPEN.
- b. High ranking Nazi personalities of Counter Intelligence interest.
- c. High ranking Military and Naval officers of Operational Intelligence interest in connection with the war with Japan or for research purposes.

It also stated that these locations may be moved if the records and archives of German ministries are found.¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ F. Bogart, “Establishment of Special Detention Centers for Suspects and Important German Personages,” NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 25 June 1945.

ASHCAN became a frequently inspected facility. Everyone wanted to see Mondorf and try to get a glimpse of the prisoners or even talk to them. Among the first to arrive at ASHCAN to inspect the camp was General Thrasher, commanding general of the Oise Intermediate Section, who held direct authority of the camp. Thrasher saw the whole of the camp and upon conclusion of the inspection told Colonel Andrus that there were too many men guarding the camp and the personnel needs of the district made it necessary to cut the number of men guarding the camp. Andrus protested this move and argued that other considerations made it necessary in Andrus' mind to keep a fairly large guard force. In a message to Colonel Bogart about the inspection by General Thrasher, Andrus told Bogart that he justified the use of a larger force due to outside threats.

Though none of these things can be considered highly likely, all are possibilities that might jeopardize our success, Therefore we must provide sufficient force, and show of force, to preclude any of the following occurrences:

- a. Effort at a mass prison break by the internees aided and abetted by the 140 man prisoner of war labor detachment.
- b. Effort from the outside either by Germans or German sympathizers to effect, by force, a liberation of any of the prominent internees.
- c. Effort by Allies from the outside to effect an entry of the stockade for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon their archenemies confined or for the purpose of liberating them from lynching.
- d. Effort from the outside to compromise the security of this institution or to accomplish the purpose listed in b. above by stealth.
- e. Special supervision to prevent suicide or other overt acts (three such were under close guard upon the recommendation of the surgeon at the time of inspection).¹⁵²

The General evidently felt this justified the current guard staffing, although as has been seen it did not prevent other attempts to reduce the number of guards at the facility.

¹⁵² Andrus, "Inspection by General Thrasher, Commanding General, Oise Intermediate Section." NARA, RG 331, Entry 11, Box 6, 29 May 1945.

Overall, the general seemed pleased. Andrus wrote Bogart that the general “upon departure remarked, ‘I like the way you’re doing it.’”¹⁵³

Another inspection occurred on June 1. General Reckord, Provost Marshal for the European Theatre, toured the camp and then met with Colonels Andrus and Van Cleve along with staff members. The general ordered some changes such as replacing the glass in windows (this took over a month to complete), and an increase in the number of blankets, mattresses, and pillows provided for the prisoners. The general ordered that fifty extra cots be obtained for the prisoners as a reserve, classes in English be provided, and personal items such as shoe laces, eye glasses, belts, neckties, and watch crystals be returned to the men. He also ordered that the prisoners have access to tobacco and other supplies if they were available from the PX. Perhaps most important for Andrus, the general assured him that the guard staffing levels would not be changed.¹⁵⁴

On June 6, 1945, General William “Wild Bill” Donovan inspected the camp with a party of 12 men. Donovan headed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the war and was now cooperating with Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, who would be the lead prosecutor for the United States for the yet to be determined war crimes trials. Donovan’s inspection allowed him to see how the prisoners lived in the ‘Big House,’ the hotel, and he observed an interrogation. He met the members of the interrogation team and “had a chance to observe the deportment of the prisoners at undisturbed recreation, their deportment toward the commandant when approached, and towards the investigators during questioning.”¹⁵⁵ Donovan did tell Andrus he would have a list of

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Andrus to Bogart, NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 1 June 1945.

¹⁵⁵ Andrus to Bogart, NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 7 June 1945.

prisoners and questions for them which he wanted the interrogators to ask the prisoners. The report did not include any recommendations by General Donovan.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, SHAEF was in overall charge of all activities by military personnel. General Eisenhower did not want to administer Germany after the war. He viewed the administration of Germany, once everything was secure, not as a SHAEF but a civilian function. Certainly a military presence continued, but plans were made to create a new military administration that would work with civilian authorities. The Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff made these plans for after all military operations ceased. Instead of an Allied operation, the new headquarters became USFET (United States Forces European Theater). This new organization ran all U.S. military functions in Europe. The end of SHAEF and start of USFET occurred on July 14, 1945. General Eisenhower took command of USFET and merged all of the separate entities of United States forces in Europe under one administration. Ostensibly confined to Germany, this new organization, however, also spread through Great Britain, France, Belgium, Norway and Austria, controlling all American military units in these areas. The last part of the American forces in Europe to fall under direct control of USFET was the 12th Army Group on July 25, 1945. This gave USFET command of all U.S. military forces in Europe.

This change in command also tore apart Allied agencies started under Eisenhower at SHAEF. British and American offices dealing with the same issues often stayed close to one another. Fears over this restructuring resonated throughout the intelligence community and ASHCAN in particular. While Americans staffed Mondorf, it remained under overall command of SHAEF, giving it a bit of British and French influence. The

most outward influence of the Allies included the staffing of the Dalheim camp by British guards. Several cables and messages came from SHAEF to ASHCAN describing how the change would affect the camp. The intelligence aspects of the camp simply passed from SHAEF G-2 to USFET G-2. USFET G-2 became responsible for the following:

1. Selection of personnel to be committed therein.
2. Intelligence control including all interrogation of inmates.
3. Passing on all applications to interrogate individuals therein.
4. For rendering certain reports which at present are:
 - a. Weekly cable to Combined Chiefs of Staff/British Chiefs of Staff
 - b. Weekly roster of inmates.
 - c. For insuring that the appropriate U.S., British and other authorized Allied agencies interested will have equal facilities in connection with the intelligence exploitation of ASHCAN, and will receive copies of all reports resulting from this exploitation.¹⁵⁶

In reality, other than new routings for some materials, not much changed. The prison at Mondorf still answered to the same groups as before only now they were part of USFET and not SHAEF.

Through the first two months of the camp, Prisoner of War Enclosure 32 at Mondorf les Bains, Luxembourg experienced many changes adapting to the realities of postwar Europe and changes within the command structure of the military. The camp faced pressures from many different offices of both military and civilian governments. Once the camp settled into a routine and issues over command and other responsibilities straightened out, the use of the camp as a stockade for these high value prisoners took on a life of its own. The interrogators received lists of questions from G-2 and other military services. The limited knowledge of the interrogators often made good follow up

¹⁵⁶ "Responsibilities for Conduct of ASHCAN upon Termination of Supreme Headquarters, AEF," NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 23 June 1945.

questions impossible. The questions supplied tended to be about how agencies or military operations ran and not many questions tried to hold anyone responsible for certain crimes or actions.

At this date, there were still no interrogations coming from members of the IMT. ASHCAN provided a good location to begin to create cases against these men, but the opportunity was not exploited at this point because the IMT was not completely organized and running. Many days the work of the interrogators was as a guide and interpreter as other groups came in to interrogate these men, most commonly the Soviets or the FBI. The Allies were squandering a great opportunity at the camp, but they did not seem to realize it.

Chapter Four

Publicity

Through late June and early July ASHCAN settled into a fairly quiet routine. Many of the prisoners got interrogated on a regular basis. The interrogators had a variety of roles in the camp. Some days they might interview prisoners from questionnaires provided to the camp by G-2 or some outside service. They still had to respond to immediate questions that USFET would ask, giving Mondorf a short list of questions for one or several prisoners. When not interrogating prisoners, Major Giannini, who took over after Van Cleve's reassignment prepared his Interrogation Reports for G-2 at USFET. Other days the camp hosted groups sent to interrogate the prisoners from outside agencies, such as the FBI or the Strategic Bombing Survey. The interrogators acted as hosts, escorting groups through the camp and working as interpreters. There was a quiet tedium about the work at hand.

However, by the third week in July the pace changed at ASHCAN. The arrival, almost simultaneously, of both the press and the Shuster Commission, added many new duties for those already at Mondorf. Mondorf les Bains became a frequent part of the byline in newspapers. The secret was out. How would the camp and the inmates deal with this new publicity?

ASHCAN and the Press

One of the main advantages of Mondorf les Bains as the site for ASHCAN was its location. Located approximately 20 miles from Luxembourg City, the small resort town did not attract a great deal of attention. When Major David wrote his report about the camp as the Allies got it ready for the arrival of its prisoners, he had concerns about

security. As previously mentioned, he warned that because it was located in the middle of a town where there were no restrictions on the movement of the civilians, a reporter would probably soon discover the purpose of the camp and report its existence in the press. He also mentioned that the name and look of the hotel would make it appear that these Nazis resided in the lap of luxury.¹⁵⁷ Lieutenant Dolibois also noted that it was easy for the local citizens to view into the grounds of the camp from a nearby hill, something that would certainly be of interest to a reporter.¹⁵⁸

SHAEF prohibited interviews and photographs with the prisoners by the press. On May 24 1945 a dispatch went to the Twelfth and Twenty First Army Groups stating:

Press interviews with PW's, members of disarmed German forces and detained German officials is subject.

Responsible commanders will insure that personal interviews with, or photographs of, subject personnel are not permitted. This does not prohibit written or photographic press coverage of PW establishments or PW's as a group, depicting living and working conditions and methods of control, subject to limitations imposed by military security and the applicable Geneva Convention.¹⁵⁹

To reemphasize this message, General Eisenhower sent a memo to the same personnel four days later, stating that “[u]nder no circumstances will the press or other visitors be admitted to ASHCAN or DUSTBIN.”¹⁶⁰ These two messages appeared to do the job in that the existence of the camp did not become common knowledge to the public until the third week in July.

¹⁵⁷ Major M. Davis, “Inspection of ‘ASHCAN,’” NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Dolibois, 98-99.

¹⁵⁹ SCAEF to Twelfth Army Gp, Twenty First Army Gp, Com Zone ETOUSA, 24 May 1945. NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6.

¹⁶⁰ Eisenhower to COM ZONE 28 May 1945, RG331 Entry 11 Box 6.

After the initial reporting on the arrests of war criminals in the European theatre, news in the United States concentrated mostly on the war against Japan. News coverage about the Nazis frequently reported when one or another got captured. Most other reports appeared to focus on excesses of the Nazis, such as the tremendous amount of art looted. Although other excesses of the regime came to light, there seemed almost no interest in the current state of the war criminals. It appeared the press ban worked and no real news came out about the various prisons holding the leading Nazis stayed in the first few weeks after the end of the war in Europe.

This situation changed for a few days in the middle of June. On June 17 1945 an Associated Press (AP) article appearing in the *New York Times*, this article began with “American interrogation officers said today Reich Marshal Hermann Goering had told them...” and then went on to detail various claims of planned German actions during the war.¹⁶¹ This article appeared to show a leak at ASHCAN, because that was the only place Goering stayed after May 15 1945. The same day a message went to SHAEF from AGWAR (Adjutant General War Department) stating that information from Hermann Goering had been disclosed.¹⁶² However, the person who leaked this information was never discovered.

Except for this one incident the security and secrecy at Mondorf remained intact until the third week in July when a reporter from a newspaper in Paris arrived in Mondorf. The newspaper carried an article, “It Pays to Be a Nazi,” which described

¹⁶¹ Associated Press, “Goering Says Japan Got Jet Blueprint.” *New York Times*, June 17, 1945, 2.

¹⁶² AGWAR to SHAEF. NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 6.

Mondorf as a luxurious setting for the former leaders of the Third Reich.¹⁶³ Next a reporter from the *Chicago Daily News* appeared. On July 16 1945 enough reporters had found Mondorf that Andrus called them together, and told them: “We stand for no mollicoddling here. These men are in jail. We have certain rules and these rules are obeyed.”¹⁶⁴ He then described the typical day of the inmates, including their diet and schedule. He also paraded the reporters through the hotel so they could see the accommodations and realize that the Nazis did not live in the lap of luxury at the Palace Hotel. While the reporters could and did speak with the American soldiers at the camp, the inmates remained off limits. Reporters could see the facilities but the prisoners remained out of sight.

USFET and the other authorities viewed the arrival of reporters as a crisis. This proved especially true of the Shuster Commission of historians who arrived at ASHCAN to interview the former Nazis. According to Ken Hechler, a member of the Shuster Commission, a reporter from the AP arrived on July 22 1945. The next morning, he sat at the breakfast table with Colonel Andrus and the members of the commission. The Commission did not desire any publicity and sitting with a reporter created a real problem. How the reporter found out about ASHCAN was the subject of a great deal of conjecture. Hechler believed Andrus led him to the commission because the colonel “had reached the point in life when he felt publicity, if not ability, might serve to gain him his star...”¹⁶⁵ Others suspected

¹⁶³ Andrus, *Nuremberg Jailer*, 51.

¹⁶⁴ Quoted in Ann Tusa and John Tusa, *The Nuremberg Trial*, (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2010), 44.

¹⁶⁵ Hechler, 63.

Hechler. One of the creators of the commission, Dr. Walter L. Wright, had known Hechler for a long time and wrote to Dr. Shuster that:

I suspect I detect the journalistic hand of Hechler in this AP story. Since I have known Hechler since his undergraduate days, I am aware of his strong journalistic itch. That tendency toward publicity at all costs was one thing which made me question the wisdom of his assignment to the mission. As he did not participate in our briefing sessions here, he may not understand the spirit of the directions we tried to get across. To restrain Hechler from seeking more publicity will require, I suspect, more than a delicate hint.¹⁶⁶

In spite of Dr. Wright's suspicions, Hechler wrote that Dr. Shuster never spoke to him about the matter.¹⁶⁷

Over the next few days the press became a part of daily life at ASHCAN. While unable to interview the war criminals, they received a great deal of information about them from the prison guards and officers. Colonel Andrus did not spend much time with reporters other than the meeting on 16 July, but other officers were happy to participate. For instance, Captain Herbert Biddle, an officer in the 391st AAA Battalion, seemed always available to talk about the inmates. He would tell reporters how messy some of the inmates, such as Ribbentrop, were and that the situation was bad enough that Biddle felt the need to discipline him, or as he said to a reporter: "Ribbentrop is sometimes lackadaisical in this respect, and I have to had him on the carpet for it several times."¹⁶⁸ Biddle offered other insights as well: a) about Streicher that "Doenitz and several others refused to eat with, saying they considered him Germany's worst criminal," b) while all of the rooms were equipped with the same furnishings, Goering's room had a larger chair

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 65.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 65.

¹⁶⁸ Captain Herbert Biddle, quoted in "Ribbentrop, in Prison-Hotel, Scolded for Untidiness; Goering shunned." *The Boston Globe*. July 22, 1945, D7.

because Goering “is so heavy he broke his other chair,” c) Goering is universally “shunned” by the other inmates, and d) Dr. Robert Ley is “snubbed” by most of the internees.¹⁶⁹

Before the reporters arrived at ASHCAN, the inmates saw a film showing footage of Buchenwald Concentration Camp after its liberation. This film was part of a much larger project under the guidance of Hollywood film director Billy Wilder, which SHAEF announced on June 21 1945. The idea was to make a film of the highest possible production values and show it in movie houses to German audiences as soon as possible. The central idea of the film was to “drive home the feeling of responsibility to all Germans.”¹⁷⁰ The prisoners of ASHCAN had to watch parts of this film, which later became “Nazi Murder Mills.”

When the prisoners saw the film, Andrus had Captain Biddle stand at the best possible vantage point to watch and record the reactions of the inmates. He introduced the film by telling the prisoners:

You are about to see a certain motion picture showing specific instances of prisoners by the Germans. You know about these things and I have no doubt many of you participated in them. We are showing them to you, not to inform you of what you already know, but to impress on you the fact that we know of it, too. Be informed that the considerate treatment you receive here is not because you merit it, but because anything less would be unbecoming to us.¹⁷¹

Biddle duly noted the responses of many of the prisoners to the film, which then quickly appeared in the press such as an AP article of July 22, noted various reactions. Sergeant Arthur Michaels also provided the correspondent with some examples. Hans Frank

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ SHAEF Main from McClure to Lawton 21 June 1945, \ NARA, RG331, Entry 11, Box 13.

¹⁷¹ Andrus, *Nuremberg Jailer*, 54.

“crammed a handkerchief in his mouth and gagged,” Ribbentrop “bowed his head and walked straight from the showing to the dining room,” Streicher “sat on the edge of his chair, clasping and unclasping his hands,” Kesselring “was white as a sheet when the picture ended,” Goering commented “[t]hat’s the type of film we used to show to our Russian prisoners,” and, Doenitz commented “[i]f this is American justice, why don’t they shoot me now?”¹⁷²

Another section of the same article mentioned the lectures given by the inmates to each other to help pass the time. Examples cited included Ley’s talk about reconstructing Germany based on private enterprise and capital, a far cry from his opinions during the regime, Ernst von Freyend on breeding fish, Schwerin von Krosigk on Shakespeare, and Riecke, former agriculture minister on weeds and methods of fighting them. The last example and according to the article the most popular lecture was given by Walter Funk on the significance of paper money when it first appeared in the economy.¹⁷³

The July 28 1945 edition of the *New York Times* included an AP article entitled “Cowering Goering Has Heart Attack.”¹⁷⁴ The article stated that Goering had a heart attack during an electrical storm the previous night and questioned whether he would be ready to stand trial. It quoted his American surgeon, Captain Clint L. Miller, saying that no one could be sure how a man under the tension experienced by Goering would react. The captain said that “Goering is so emotionally unstable you never can tell about this

¹⁷² “Nazi Leaders Cringe at War Horror Films,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 23 July, 1945, 9.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ AP. “Cowering Goering Has Heart Attack,” *The New York Times*, July 28, 1945, 3.

type.”¹⁷⁵ The doctor expounded more on Goering’s instability and Colonel Andrus spoke about his health issues since arriving at Mondorf, including his addiction to paracodin.

The next day an article appeared from AP saying that Goering would definitely stand trial regardless of physical condition.¹⁷⁶ Captain Miller then gave details of other illnesses suffered by the war criminals. Ribbentrop had “Neuritis of the left side of his neck, face and head”, Frank, who arrived at camp with self-inflicted wounds, was still recovering from them. Kesselring had a “chronic gall bladder condition” and a “heart lesion.” Otto Meissner had “Chronic colitis, which he claimed to have contracted while serving in the northeastern Mediterranean,” and Franz Xaver Schwarz “had chronic myocarditis, he is very inactive and won’t get any better,” Ernst von Freyend, an aide to Keitel, was “recovering from shrapnel wounds of the buttocks and thigh,” Vice Admiral Buerkner was diabetic and used insulin, which he brought with him, Rosenberg had “a sprained ankle but is recovering. He slipped on a rock and twisted it while walking in the yard.”¹⁷⁷

On July 31, the *Daily Boston Globe* featured an article on the prisoners at Mondorf. The headline the paper chose for the article was “Streicher in Tears When Yank Jew Shows Kindness.”¹⁷⁸ The article relates how at the time of his capture Streicher claimed that an African-American soldier knocked him down, kicked and spat on him. After he moved to another camp he said that “I was placed in a clean room. An American came in with a pitcher of cocoa and some crackers. He set them down on the little table and stepped back and said, ‘This is from me to you, Mr. Streicher – I am a Jew.’ I broke

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Goering’s Illness Held No Trial Bar.” *The New York Times*, July 29, 1945, 14.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ “Streicher in Tears When Tank Jew Shows Kindness,” *Daily Boston Globe*, July 31, 1945, 4.

down and cried, that was the most severe punishment I have ever received. I am wrong. I have always said there were no good Jews, but that boy proved I am wrong.” There is also a description of Hans Frank stating that “he shifts between hysteria and scorn, constantly crying out in his anguish that ‘I am a criminal!’”

Another article on the same day in the *New York Times* repeats some of the same information about Streicher and Frank, adding even more details.¹⁷⁹ The article begins with “the supposed iron men who built and bossed the German military machine are going to pieces morally and physically as they wait behind barbed wire for their war crimes trials.” Overall this article rehashed older news about ASHCAN. For example, the article says that Keitel wrote to complain to Eisenhower when his Field Marshal’s baton was taken from him and Doenitz wrote to complain about the indignity when the Americans took mugshots of the prisoners. This article includes a quote from Dr. Bohuslav Ecer, the Czech official with the UNWWC (United Nations War Crimes Commission), who wrote a scathing review of the camp that Colonel Andrus cited as part of the reason the camp closed. The article included a brief conversation between Ecer and Ribbentrop with Ecer telling him “The greatest diplomatic success you ever had was foisting German champagne off on the French. Ribbentrop reportedly shrugged and told Ecer “I know it is a joke, but German champagne was really good.”

The newspaper accounts from Mondorf continued into August. By this time everyone knew that the camp would soon close. An AP article in the *Chicago Daily Tribune* on August 9, 1945 gave reactions from the Nazi leadership when they found out

¹⁷⁹ “Nazi Chiefs Crack in Wait for Trials,” *The New York Times*, July 31, 1945, 6.

that the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.¹⁸⁰ Doenitz' reaction was to say that "I am not surprised you succeeded. We were afraid you would do it sooner and use it against Germany." Goering considered it "A mighty accomplishment. I don't want anything to do with this world. I am leaving this world." The reaction attributed to Ribbentrop was "Good heavens – this means the revolution of everything. No one would be so stupid as to start a war now." The last reaction quoted came from Kesselring. In 1940 he commanded the Luftwaffe forces that bombed London during the blitz. His reaction was more analytical stating that the atomic bomb opened up "an as yet unsurveyable era in aerial technique and tactics."

An article on August 14 by *New York Times* reporter Kathleen McLaughlin reported on the flight from Mondorf that included the last of the war criminals being moved to Nuremberg with Colonel Andrus accompanying his high value prisoners including Goering. Goering reportedly told his fellow prisoners when they crossed the Rhine to "Take your last look."¹⁸¹

Under the rules of the camp, reporters did not have access to the prisoners for interviews. To compensate for this, ASHCAN held daily press conferences, usually led by Captain Biddle, although sometimes Colonel Andrus made an appearance also. The quotes attributed to the prisoners came from these briefings. Interestingly, when Andrus wrote his book in 1969, he used many of these same quotes and incidences.

¹⁸⁰ "Doenitz Feared U.S. Would Hurl Atom Bomb on Germany," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, August 9, 1945, 2.

¹⁸¹ Kathleen McLaughlin. "Goering Enlivens Nuremberg Flight," *The New York Times*, August 14, 1945, 13.

Some of the prisoners, as mentioned in the previous newspaper article, went to Nuremberg by air. Others went by truck, stopping at Oberusal, to drop off some military leaders at the interrogation compound there. This would later be the site of the Army's Historical Division history of the war from the German perspective. The impetus for this project came from Major Ken Hechler while he was on the Shuster Commission at ASHCAN. On 10 August Lieutenant John Dolibois was part of a column of six ambulances, the preferred method of prisoner travel from ASHCAN to Wiesbaden and then Oberusal with the some of the column going on to Nuremberg. The truck he rode in contained Doenitz, Schwerin von Krosigk, Kesselring, Buerker, Wegener, and Warlimont. He remembered:

As the convoy moved from Luxembourg across the Moselle into Germany, near Trier, the nervous chatter of my passengers came to an abrupt end. Through the rear window of the ambulance they could see what their glorious Third Reich now looked like. A large portion of Trier lay in total ruin, in some areas rubble hadn't been cleared off the streets. Our vehicles snaked through passages just wide enough for one at a time.

For the high-ranking Nazis in our ambulances this was the first look at the condition of their country, the destruction that was the aftermath of Hitler's determination to "fight to the last man." They were shocked, speechless; one sobbed unashamedly. The rest of the journey went on in silence.¹⁸²

With the prisoners gone from Mondorf, the camp closed. At least for the first two months, Central Continental Prisoner of War Enclosure 32 served one of its purposes very well. The Allies wanted a site that would be out of the way and quiet in an attempt to get as much information as possible from the inmates. Until the last weeks at Mondorf the anonymity of the camp succeeded. Whether or not

¹⁸² Dolibois, 133.

it performed its function as an interrogation center remained to be seen and is the topic of some debate.

Print media was not done with ASHCAN after it closed. Around the time the International War Tribunal started, the camp appeared in the press again. There were accounts by soldiers who worked as guards at the camp as well as an article in *Life Magazine* written by John Kenneth Galbreath, who was at the camp in June conducting interviews connected with the work of the Allied Air Forces the Strategic Bombing Survey.

Russian Impressions of ASHCAN

As the news of ASHCAN became common knowledge in the West, the Soviets contributed to the atmosphere of the moment. Newspaper coverage also showed what the Soviet Union thought of how the Americans treated their Nazi prisoners. The public relations disaster suffered by Eisenhower due to the soft treatment of Goering when he was taken into custody left Eisenhower embarrassed and allowed the Soviets to accuse the United States of coddling these prisoners. A United Press article in the *New York Times* on May 22 1945 decried their treatment saying that the prisoners “were being treated ‘politely’ when ‘they should have been shackled’.” A Soviet radio commentator, identified as Mr. Yermasheff, questioned why the Americans wasted time on these men. The article quotes Yermasheff as saying: “Only later on has it been declared that they and also their ‘Fuehrer,’ Doenitz, and his clique will be treated as they deserve. But they should not be ‘treated as they deserve,’ but put against the wall. There is no

reason to treat them with kid gloves.”¹⁸³ This article showed Soviet frustration with the British and American governments for allowing the Flensburg government to continue, although the next day the British arrested Doenitz’ group.

Once reporters discovered ASHCAN, the Soviet press quickly jumped in to complain about the lenient treatment of Nazi prisoners. Soviet interrogations of prisoners at ASHCAN were a common occurrence, so they certainly knew the circumstances of the prisoners. However, on 23 July, a Moscow radio report claimed that Goering, Ribbentrop, and Doenitz were “resting in luxury in a Luxembourg palace,” where they were ‘growing even fatter and more insolent’.”¹⁸⁴ The radio address went on:

This animal preserve for Hitler’s breed is in picturesque environs far from inquisitive eyes. There the notorious war criminals, Goering, Doenitz Ribbentrop and others of their ilk are resting in luxury after their bout of sanguinary carnage... Nothing but the finest vintages and the finest foods will do for them. After so much hard work these poor fellows must be allowed to rest and the latest model automobiles are theirs to drive around the grounds. The only thing that they are denied are newspapers, so as not to spoil their mood or appetite with some slighting remark about their august presence.”¹⁸⁵

The *New York Times* article about the Soviet radio report ends with a denial of this treatment by Andrus.

The first reported interrogations by the Soviets occurred during the week of June 22 1945. Certainly by the time the press discovered Mondorf, the Soviets had a good idea of how the place ran. An article on 24 July 1945 noted that Goering was afraid to be interviewed by the Soviets, stating that Goering: “leaped up and cried: ‘The Russians!

¹⁸³ “Moscow Demands Action on Criminals,” *The New York Times*. 23 May, 1945, 3.

¹⁸⁴ “Moscow Says Nazis Are Being Coddled,” *The New York Times*. July 24, 1945, 8.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

They are here. I won't see them. I won't talk to them'."¹⁸⁶ The article continued on to say that the Soviets interviewed Goering for two days and included Colonel Andrus' comments regarding the previous day's article about how the Russians thought the Nazis were treated at Mondorf. "None of them has had a drop of wine since they've been here... None of them has stepped foot outside the stockade and won't until higher levels ask for their transfer. The only food they get is that prescribed for prisoners of war by military regulations."¹⁸⁷

Another interesting aspect of this article is what actually happened. Goering had concerns about seeing the Soviets, even though this was not the first time he saw them. In this case, in spite of all of his fears, things went well. Major Hechler of the Shuster Commission was in an adjoining room during part of Goering's interrogation. Hechler's account is as follows:

I was quite busily at work in the room next to where the interrogation was going on, but could not help but overhear the loud and heated tones of the Russian interrogators. I couldn't distinguish what he was saying, but it was interrupted by repeatedly by chuckles from the Russians. Soon Goering's voice rose, and the chuckles rose to roars of laughter. For about two hours the noise of guffaws echoed down the halls, and then the Russians came out slapping each other on the back. They went to see Goering again that afternoon and repeated the performance. Shortly thereafter they left Mondorf, thoroughly happy, and there were fifty sighs of relief – forty from the internees and ten from the interrogators.¹⁸⁸

A few days later Hechler interviewed Goering again. The first thing he said to Goering was: "You certainly had those visitors going strong yesterday." Goering took a swaggering hitch at his pants, peeked around the room as though to make sure Col.

¹⁸⁶ "Goering Frightened by Russians' Visit," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1945, 5.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ Hechler, 73.

Andrus was not listening at the keyhole, cupped one hand and whispered to me in a confidential tone: ‘Say, I really had those Russkis rolling in the aisles, didn’t I?’ He laughed uproariously, and a happy smile rarely left his face during the interview.”¹⁸⁹

Guard Accounts

Once men of the 391st AAA Battalion started rotating home, some of them gave interviews to various local newspapers. The *Chicago Daily Tribune* in January 1946 published two articles by E. R. Noderer about conditions at Mondorf as told by former guard Sergeant Robert Bock. The two articles described some of the men in the camp, most notably Goering. The article is somewhat confusing in that Bock is described as “the man who weaned the former reichmarshal (sic) from his precious paracodin pills,” and describes Bock as the Goering’s former “warden.”¹⁹⁰

In another article, Noderer writes that according to Bock, “the Russians were not to know that Ribbentrop was a prisoner.” In the article Bock also recounts how Goering was afraid of interrogations by the Russians.¹⁹¹ Bock describes how when the Russians came to interrogate the Germans, only the German military leaders were made available to them. It appears that Bock was building up own importance even though he was just a guard..

Another account of this nature appeared in the *Boston Globe* in October 1946. George R. O’Connell of South Boston wrote two articles recounting his adventures at Mondorf. As in the articles featuring Sergeant Bock, these articles relate stories about the

¹⁸⁹Ibid, 73-74.

¹⁹⁰ E.R. Noderer, “Goering Weaned of Dope by U.S.; He takes Credit,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 25, 1946,12.

¹⁹¹ E.R. Noderer, “U.S. Hides Nazi War Criminals from Red Quiz,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*. January 27, 1946, 12.

silly things the Nazis did while in prison. Like Bock, O'Connell lampoons Goring and writes about how afraid of everything Ribbentrop seemed to be. One difference in the tenor of his second article is the kind words about Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. He also writes that: "one of the outstanding characteristics of the group – with the exception of Von Papen – was an utter lack of religious manifestation."¹⁹² Overall, O'Connell's account seems more balanced than Bock's since because he tries to convey his impressions of some of the Nazis with whom he came into contact.

The Shuster Commission

As the war ended, the Allies arrested and detained as many Nazi political and military leaders as they could find, however, they did not take all of them into custody. Some, particularly military officers retired or relieved during the war, such as Generals Franz Halder and Hermann Hoth, remained on their property under the watchful eyes of the Allies, but not imprisoned. The total surrender of Germany and the complete collapse of civilian government left the Allies as the authorities in charge of all aspects of German life. Due to arrests for possible war crimes, the Allies had in their possession nearly all of the surviving leading figures of the Third Reich. The victorious forces had unprecedented access to and control over their defeated foes.

The opportunity this opened up was not lost on the Allies. The Allies held many of the leaders of the Third Reich and had a unique opportunity to interview and interrogate these men in order to better understand Hitler's Reich. However, this situation does not seem to have been anticipated so the Allies were slow to react to the opportunity. At ASHCAN the interrogators were graduates of counter-intelligence school

¹⁹² George O'Connell, "Helped Top Nazi Up Stairs with Nicely Aimed Boot," *Boston Globe*, October 7, 1946, 13.

at Camp Ritchie, but their primary qualification for posting to Mondorf was the ability to speak German. With the exception of Lieutenant Colonel Van Cleve, none of these men had previous experience in interrogation, and they had little knowledge of the Third Reich government, the Nazi Party or the military aspects of the war. Therefore, they were not in a position to derive the most benefit from their interrogations of the German prisoners at ASHCN. They received questionnaires from G-2, EDS or another organization and simply asked the prisoners the questions on the list. They did not ask follow up questions because they did not possess the necessary background knowledge.

The United States Army and the Historical Division of the Army realized this situation and tried to organize a better way to interrogate these prisoners. The original idea belonged to Dr. Troyer S. Anderson of Swarthmore College, who had joined the Historical Branch of the army and was assigned to work under Undersecretary of State Robert P. Patterson. On 18 May 1945 he drafted a memo to Patterson demonstrating that it was important to interview leading German officials to gather information of historical significance. Patterson liked the idea and immediately began to put together a committee to handle this assignment. According to Ken Hechler, Patterson “pointed out that because of the character of the Nazi government and the circumstances of its demise ‘much of this information can never be reconstructed from paper records’; that ‘before long the majority of these prisoners will either be placed beyond reach of interrogation or so widely dispersed that it will be very difficult to interview them...’”¹⁹³ Patterson also feared development of a ‘party line’ among the surviving officials that would make it more difficult to gather information.

¹⁹³ Hechler, 10.

Patterson envisaged three lines of questioning:

1. Information on the inside history of the Nazi government
2. Information on industrial mobilization and related topics
3. Information about military operations¹⁹⁴

The next large issue concerning the formation of this committee was who would lead it and who the members would be. The first suggestion to lead the committee was professor Carlton J.H Hayes of Columbia University. He turned down the offer, but suggested Professor George N. Shuster, president of Hunter College in Manhattan, instead. When he agreed the Shuster Commission was born.

In a letter from Troyer to Shuster, the purpose of the commission became clear:

A short time ago it occurred to us in the Historical Branch that a unique opportunity to enrich our knowledge of the history of our times exists in the fact that numerous former German officials, both civilian and military, are now our prisoners of war. These men have information about the inner history of the Nazi regime which, under the best of circumstances, could never be fully recaptured from documents... if, however, we can tap the memories of leading participants, we can minimize this imperfection and shed light on many things which, otherwise, may remain forever obscure... Of course we realize that there are some disadvantages in immediate interrogation, that some men, for instance, will lie to us because fearful of their personal fate. However, after making due allowances for these difficulties, we feel something can be learned from immediate interviews which the historical world cannot afford to miss.¹⁹⁵

By the middle of June the rest of the committee came together. Most of the committee consisting of highly respected academics from various fields. First was Dr. Frank Graham, Professor of Economics at Princeton, who looked at both the war economy and industrialization during the war, and Lieutenant Colonel J.J Scanlon of the

¹⁹⁴ Hechler, 10.

¹⁹⁵ Thomas E. Blantz, *George N. Shuster: On the Side of Truth* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 206.

Army Service Forces material Division. Next was Lieutenant Colonel Oron J. Hale, who before serving in the military was Professor of History at the University of Virginia, researching Nazi internal politics and strategic operations. Another member was Dr. John Brown Mason of Stanford University, who looked at the Nazi courts. Among other things, Shuster looked into the relationship between religion and the Third Reich during the war. Also sent along was Major Ken Hechler, a university professor in civilian life but during the war he worked for the Historical Division, primarily as a writer. He went along because no one else was available, although his immediate superior, Major Franklin Ferriss, doubted that Hechler was equal to the task.

The group arrived in Paris to meet with Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, Theater Historian and then with Colonel Cole before they left for Frankfurt on 10 July. They spent about a week at USFET headquarters in the former I.G. Farben Building. Here they spent time looking over interrogation reports and looking into the backgrounds of the men they were going to interrogate. Interestingly, much of this information must have been compiled by the group working at ASHCAN.

On July 17, the Shuster Commission arrived at Mondorf, staying at a large house within easy walking distance of ASHCAN. They bunked two to a room; Colonels Scanlon and Hale were together, Hechler and Dr. Mason shared a room, as did Drs. Shuster and Graham. They began their interrogation on July 18 and July 23, they came downstairs to breakfast to find themselves in the company of Colonel Andrus and a reporter, George Tucker, from the Associated Press. The reporter represented a serious problem for the Shuster Commission. When the commission was formed, their activities

were supposed to be kept out of the papers until they had an idea as to their success or failure. The reporter ended that idea.

The members of the commission met at their house that morning to decide on a course of action. Shuster thought they should be open, but brief with the reporter. Colonel Hale disagreed because, as a member of G-2, he would violate his orders by talking to a reporter. Hale wanted the reporter sent back to Paris to deal with G-2 at USFET. However, Shuster won the argument, and as a group they met briefly with Tucker and described their roles. Tucker assured them that his report would be cleared through the War Department, and the issue was put to rest. Shuster wrote of the incident in his autobiography. "I concluded at the time, and have had ample opportunity to corroborate the opinion since, that the intelligence branch of the service (to which we were attached) is the least satisfactorily equipped to withstand the assaults of the newsgathering services."¹⁹⁶

On July 25, Tucker's article identified the members of the commission and quoted Shuster as saying:

These reports thoroughly covered military questions, but to broaden its information the War Department invited a number of historians who knew the German question, and who spoke the language, to select a number of important aspects of it and try to determine what really went on inside Germany before and during the war. My field is in foreign relations.¹⁹⁷

Shuster went on to say he hoped they could complete their work in ninety days. This article was the only newspaper story to appear about the Shuster Commission while they were in Europe.

¹⁹⁶ George N. Shuster. *The Ground I Have Walked On*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), 235-236.

¹⁹⁷ George Tucker, "Historians Abroad to Question Nazis," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1945, 4.

At ASHCAN the Shuster Commission had access to dozens of men who could provide important answers for their work. The commission remained at Mondorf until the end of the first week in August. Rumors were rampant that the camp would close and many of these men moved to either Oberusal, where most of the military leaders stayed, or on to Nuremberg, the site of the future International Military Tribunal Trials. The commission remained in Germany until the end of November 1945. Shuster also conducted interviews with members of the German clergy, trying to understand the relationship between various churches and the Third Reich. Immediately after finishing his work in Germany, he went to the Vatican, where he discussed the possibility of doing research on the topic in the Vatican Archives. He met privately with Pope Pius XII, and the pontiff offered him access to the files. Shuster declined saying he did not have sufficient time to do this properly. The pope left the offer open to him but said he would have to reconsider should someone else be sent to do the work.¹⁹⁸ Shuster and Hale would both later spend time as Governor General in Bavaria, Hale originally was the aide of Shuster in this capacity but when Dr. Shuster left to go back to the United States, the job went to Hale.

It is interesting to note that once Mondorf, and for that matter the Shuster Commission was exposed in the media, there was not a frenzy to report stories. The day Andrus sat down with reporters after they discovered the camp, there were sixteen reporters in the room. Press coverage became very matter of fact after the initial discovery. Occasional articles appeared, but no real excitement came out about the camp. ASHCAN maintained a fairly anonymous existence for its first two months of existence.

¹⁹⁸ Blantz, 211.

By the time Mondorf became known to the press, outside forces, most notably the progress toward the IMT at Nuremberg signaled the end was near for ASHCAN. The Shuster Commission remained at Mondorf until a few days before the camp closed.

In the November 22, 1945 issue of *Life Magazine*, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote an article about his experiences at ASHCAN. The article, “The ‘Cure’ at Mondorf Spa,” was about Galbraith’s visit to the camp.¹⁹⁹ Although he does not provide a great deal of information to the reader, he should have dispelled the fears of anyone who thought the prisoners at Mondorf were coddled. In writing about the security of the camp, he recounts a line from one of the gate guards: “To get in here, you have to have a pass from God and someone has to verify the signature.” He mentions how Julius Streicher would walk around the grounds at the hotel and every once in a while he would turn around and give his best Hitler salute. Apparently the guards thought he did this to reenact reviewing troops during his glory days. He wrote about the prisoners:

As might be expected, the prisoners were not a very engaging group of people, but the cumulative effect of seeing them at close range was not so much anger or dislike as a kind of disgusted weariness with the whole crew. I began to think of the war-criminal trials more and more as a kind of sanitary measure. The generals and admirals had managed to retain a slight dignity but the politicians didn’t even have that.²⁰⁰

He wrote that of the group Robert Ley looked worst of all and among the military officers Keitel had deteriorated the most. There was nothing especially informative about the article, but Galbraith did succeed in making these former enemies seem frail and beaten.

The final print media piece about the camp came from *Time Magazine*. On 2 July, 1945 Colonel H. G. Green sent a message to G-2 concerning the taking of a photograph

¹⁹⁹ John Kenneth Galbraith. “The ‘Cure’ at Mondorf Spa,” *Life Magazine*, 22 November, 1945, 18.

²⁰⁰ Galbreath, *Life Magazine*.

of the inmates of ASHCAN. The original note, dated 30 May, 1945 asked for approval to take a picture of the inmates:

There is now being accumulated at 'ASHCAN' a unique collection of individuals. With the exception of HITLER and HIMMLER, now deceased, the contents of 'ASHCAN' will ultimately represent all sections of the Nazi Hierarchy which have been responsible for World War II. There is, thus, an opportunity of preserving a permanent record of some of the most infamous characters in history and it is proposed that at the appropriate time a group photograph should be taken of the prisoners of 'ASHCAN'. Such a photograph would be of considerable historical interest and it is felt would be a valuable addition to the archives of the War Office and US War Department. At a suitable time, moreover, it could be released to the world press in order that the widest publicity should be given to the fact that these notorious persons were in custody awaiting whilst awaiting such disposal as is being prepared for them.

2. It is, therefore, requested that approval be granted for the taking of such a photograph at the appropriate time.²⁰¹

The author of this original note, Colonel Green, passed the message on that the idea had the approval of G-2.

So the camp prepared their prisoners for a group shot in front of the Palace Hotel. The guards and interrogators assembled the inmates. In the center of the front row sat Goering. Most of the high ranking officers moved to the back row for the photo. Lieutenant Dolibois had the assignment of putting the group together and nearly accidentally appeared in the picture. An AP photographer took the picture and it appeared in print in the December 23 1945 issue of *Time Magazine*.

ASHCAN closed On August 12, 1945 and the hotel eventually resumed its original purpose. The Palace Hotel was torn down in 1988.

²⁰¹ H.G. Green. Photographing of ASHCAN Inmates, RG331 Entry 11 Box 6.

Chapter Five

Methods and Interrogations

The G-2 officer in charge of Prisoner of War Enclosure 32 was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Van Cleve. He served in military intelligence in the First World War. As previously mentioned, between the wars he was Professor of Medieval Studies at Bowdoin College in Maine. When the United States became involved in the Second World War, he applied to have his commission reinstated and serve in military intelligence again. After a brief stint with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), he returned to active duty in the army on 14 November, 1942.²⁰²

He arrived in continental Europe in July 1944, and immediately began working on the interrogation of enemy prisoners. He was part of the 2692 Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center (CSDIC), an idea of British origin that centralized the location of interrogation centers to coordinate the most immediate and effective means of interrogation for captured German officers and men. When he came to France, he left his second in command, Major Ivo Giannini, in charge of things in Italy, but Giannini soon joined him in France.

Shortly after his arrival, he had to find a location for a new interrogation center.²⁰³ After a conference in October 1944, the U.S. decided to open its own CSDIC. A message from SHAEF said that:

²⁰² "Separation Qualification Record, Thomas C. Van Cleve Papers, Bowdoin College, Papers of Thomas C. Van Cleve.

²⁰³ John D. Davis, ed., *Thomas C. Van Cleve: Observations and Experiences of a Military Intelligence in Two World Wars*. (Potts Point Books, 2005), 308.

American CSDIC to be wholly manned and operated by American Personnel, centrally located in the American area to obtain long-range intelligence for SHAEF, for such special interrogation as may be necessary for Army Groups or other requirements, and to select for CPM Branch, Washington, D.C.²⁰⁴

It would be renamed Detailed Interrogation Center, to differentiate it from its British counterpart. The new center was absorbed into Military Intelligence Service, Eastern Theater of Operations United States Army (MIS, ETOUSA). G-2, SHAEF had priority for all interrogation projects at this center. Van Cleve was charged with finding a location for this, and it had to meet certain standards:

It must be secure from possible enemy attack. Or from danger of falling into enemy hands in the event of a sudden reverse. One hundred miles from the immediate area of fighting has generally been regarded as a reasonably safe distance.

It must be isolated – so located as to arouse the minimum of curiosity, therefore off the main traffic routes.

It must afford adequate housing space for from 150 to 200 prisoners of war, suitable office accommodations for the various sections, and quarters for officers and enlisted personnel, together with potential recreation centers. Such a unit as this must so establish itself as to insure its complete self-sufficiency.

Finally, it must be so located as to afford reasonably dependable contact with the G-2 headquarters which it serves while, at the same time, within easy reach of the main P/W cages from which prisoners are to be selected.²⁰⁵

By late October, Van Cleve chose the small village of Revin, France, within easy distance of both the Belgium and Luxembourg borders, for their new camp. At the beginning of November the unit 2692 CSDIC ceased to exist, when it became the 6824 DIC (MIS) (6824 Detailed Interrogation Center Military Intelligence Service). The staff of the previous unit was absorbed directly into the new designation, with all necessary intelligence functions combined in this one organization.

²⁰⁴ As quoted in Davis, 309.

²⁰⁵ Quoted in Davis, 310.

The timing of the new camp could not have been better. Larger numbers of German officers were surrendering and now the army had a place to interrogate them fairly close to the front lines. Interrogations could occur very quickly after their surrender while all of the details remained fresh in their minds. Here they had access to all pertinent military information. They received lists of prisoners from all of Allied armies as well as Engineering, the Signal Corps and other services. They could read all of the reports from all British and American agencies including the OSS.²⁰⁶

With the liberation of Western European countries and success against the Germans, the end of the war almost seemed near. Interrogations now began to include more information than just that of use to the military. “The focus of interrogation began to move away from exclusively tactical concerns and toward economic, topographical studies, post-war planning, civilian intelligence, and advanced technical information... at no period in the previous development of the American Detailed Interrogation Center were the various military and semi-military agencies more active in supplying units with questionnaires or ‘briefs,’ directing the interrogation into clearly defined channels and tending to eliminate irrelevant, obsolete or repetitious information.”²⁰⁷ G-2, ETOUSA added a Technical Liaison Branch for technical intelligence. Colonel Van Cleve prepared a letter with suggestions concerning how the 6824 DIC could better utilize the technical intelligence available to it.

The DIC capabilities in Technical Intelligence are: (1) The DIC exists for high level detailed interrogation. Its officers are trained and in many cases skilled in extracting useful information from prisoners of war. (2) DIC officers can, if properly briefed by technical experts, interrogate successfully on many highly technical subjects. (3) Interrogation officers

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 311-312.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, 312.

are not all scientists or technicians, but they are intelligent men and capable of comprehending essentials of technical or scientific briefings. (4) The range of technical interrogations conducted by DIC personnel includes Signal Intelligence, Ordnance Intelligence, Engineering Intelligence, and Medical Intelligence.

The essential for obtaining the maximum useful information from DIC Technical Intelligence are: (1) A full recognition by all technical services of the existence and capabilities of DIC (2) A willingness to supply DIC promptly and fully with briefings as to the detailed intelligence desired. (3) A willingness to send, when needed, a technical expert to guide and direct the interrogation of a prisoner of war who is capable of giving detailed technical information. (4) A representative agent in G-2 should insure that at all times technical intelligence is brought to the attention of all interested sections and agencies. (5) The assurance that all high level technical prisoners of war are sent speedily to DIC for interrogation.

Nevertheless, there are weaknesses in the existing system: (1) Lack of knowledge – often complete ignorance among technical sections of the potentialities of DIC for technical interrogating. (2) Failure of some agencies to understand that information obtained from prisoners can be of the highest value. (3) Tendency of some technical sections to rely on the British to supply them with technical installations. (4) Failure to maintain connections and continuous liaison between the Technical Intelligence Sections and DIC.

There are steps that can be taken to overcome these weaknesses or shortcomings. (1) When technical intelligence is desired, the DIC should be queried directly. There should be clear indication of what information is desired, and there should be differentiation between high priority and low priority needs. (2) The DIC must be kept up to date on new technical developments. (3) New useful information, when made available, must be supplied to the DIC Library.²⁰⁸

The demand for coordination and cooperation between the technical services and those attempting to interrogate prisoners of war seemed fraught with difficulties. It would often prove impossible to successfully coordinate between the technical experts and interrogators. Would an interrogator fully realize when he needed help? How could an interrogator ask follow up questions without waiting a day or two before one of the technical experts was available to write new questions or even join the interrogation?

²⁰⁸ Van Cleve in Ibid, 312-3213.

This new system needed time and experience to become effective, so the idea of quickly interrogating men on their technical expertise proved unworkable.

This notion no doubt applied to ASHCAN. The crux of this idea was the interrogators, even if not intimately informed about the topic at hand, they could be given background information and questions from technical experts and, as intelligent men be able to adequately question people that are expert in a subject area. If one applies this idea to Mondorf, interrogators with minimal firsthand knowledge of Nazi Germany or military tactics, should be able to get solid answers from the prisoners in their care. This assumed a great deal of talent among the interrogators. However, at Mondorf, while the interrogators were reasonably intelligent and fluent in German, they knew little about the history and personalities of Nazi Germany making it nearly impossible for them to formulate sufficient follow up questions and offer anything to the interrogations beyond simply reading the questions. ASHCAN interrogators sorely lacked the background training needed for the job they tried to perform.

Lieutenant Colonel Van Cleve commanded the 6824 DIC. When ASHCAN opened it came under his purview. Van Cleve and after his reassignment, Major Giannini, wrote all of the Detailed Interrogation Reports that came out of ASHCAN. The other interrogators usually just asked questions posed by SHAEF on a specific topic that required an immediate response back. Of the interrogators, Captain Sensenig, Lieutenant Hilty and Lieutenant Dolibois all worked for Van Cleve in Revin before moving on to ASHCAN.

However, at ASHCAN follow up questions and interrogations did not often occur. The camp usually relied on Dolibois approaching an inmate a few hours after his

interrogation in his capacity as Welfare Officer and check to see how they felt afterwards and if they had anything else to add to the information they provided during the interrogation. This tactic hardly qualified as 'expert' interrogation and the flaws of this relatively new method of interrogation truly came out in the interrogations at Mondorf. Although Van Cleve did not write about his experiences at Mondorf, John Davis, the editor of *Thomas C. Van Cleve: Observations and Experiences of a Military Intelligence Officer in Two World Wars* and a colleague of Van Cleve's at Bowdoin College, did write that Van Cleve would sometimes talk about interrogating the leading Nazi officials, mentioning the likes of Goering, Ribbentrop, Streicher and Keitel. Davis wrote that: "According to Van Cleve's account, the results of these interrogations were held in highest secrecy and, as far as he knew, were never made public. However, all pertinent and incriminating aspects obtained during these interview sessions were introduced during the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials."²⁰⁹

The interrogation questions came from a variety of sources. Often there would be a cable from SHAEF asking them to ask a few questions of someone such as Keitel and report back an answer. Other times, such as the earlier mentioned inquiry about Dr. Morell, there would be a quick cable asking that one of the prisoners assist in identifying someone who the Allies came in contact with but were unsure of their role if any. Most of the questions sent to Mondorf were questionnaires prepared by counter intelligence or some other group from back at G-2. In most cases, either Van Cleve or Major Giannini interrogated the prisoners for these questions. Once they completed the interrogation, within a week they would type up a Detailed Interrogation Report and send this on G-2.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 322.

These reports were still very early in the aftermath of the war while the Allies tried to understand better the nature of Nazi rule and who ran specific agencies and departments. G-2 did not necessarily generate these reports to gather information to prosecute the prisoners, but for the purpose of understanding both the men and the regime.

A Detailed Interrogation Report consisted of several parts. The heading would be the name of the subject and the source of the subject. For example, a report on an interrogation of Frick was named “Information About Bohemia and Moravia” referencing the source of the questions as SHAEF CI – Brief 5 June, 45.²¹⁰ There would then be an index of the report. This named the source of the information. It would contain the Preamble next, usually consisting of the interrogator’s opinion concerning the veracity of the witness or give an outline biography of the subject. If the Preamble did not contain biographical information that would be the next part of the report. After that the report noted the subjects covered in the report and a summary of the answers given by the prisoner. It is important to note that when these reports went to G-2, they almost always did not contain an actual transcript of the interview because the transcripts usually stayed with the interrogator. The actual transcripts are a relative rarity today, most often found in the papers of individual interrogators rather than in the National Archives. The layout of these reports remained nearly uniform throughout. The Shuster Commission and the Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality used a similar method.

There was a layered effect to the interrogations carried out by the three groups. The interrogations conducted by ASHCAN personnel were mostly organizational and

²¹⁰ Thomas C. Van Cleve, “Detailed Interrogation Report: Information About Bohemia and Moravia,” 16 Jun 1945, NARA, RG475, Box 1328, 1.

biographical. There was no attempt to get the prisoners to confess to anything. At Mondorf, they wanted the prisoners as comfortable as possible so they would speak freely. The objective of the Shuster Commission was largely the same. The commission attempted to gather information of a historical nature from these men while they were still concentrated in one place and while they were still available. The tenor of the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel at Nuremberg was much difference. This office sought information on war crimes and the interrogation process was more intense.

Getting these prisoners to speak was not very difficult. Many of them took pride in what they accomplished during the Third Reich. Others were anxious to talk so they could attempt to implicate other in various activities. All the way through the interrogation process, the prisoners generally spoke quite willingly. Early in his assignment at ASHCAN, Lieutenant John Dolibois remarked: "It was easy to initiate an interrogation with most of the internees. 'I sent for you today because we have received a request from an agency for more information about a specific incident. Can you enlighten me?' This question would serve me as an opener. Invariably, the interview would then lead into personalities. Most of the time I would end up with more information than I originally asked for or needed."²¹¹

Major Hechler of the Shuster Commission wrote the following about prisoners' willingness to talk:

Above all, the prisoners were in a relatively good frame of mind when they were confronted by the Shuster Commission. They had as yet gotten no wind of war crimes trials; they were comparatively comfortable, and although they suffered minor annoyances, their general morale was high. They appeared eager to talk, and responded quickly to anyone who displayed an understanding attitude toward their plight. They resented sympathy, of course, but they respected

²¹¹ Dolibois, 105.

intelligent discussion. They were starved for news of the outside world, and they were stimulated by its receipt. They did not react well to over-friendliness, but they reacted extremely well to a frank, precise approach. They were particularly interested in the historical approach toward what they had experienced.

Colonel John H. Amen, Chief of the Interrogation Division for the Office of U.S.

Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, also commented about their willingness to talk:

The outstanding characteristic of them all was that they were willing and eager to talk instead of being like the corresponding people in this country who think that the best way to get along is to keep their mouths shut and let the lawyer do the talking for them. These defendants talked by the hour and by the day and by the night; they would go back to jail at night and write pages and pages of additional material which they felt was helpful to their case. It never ended. I don't think there was any exception to that at all. The questioning, of course, was done primarily through interpreters and covered all possible fields of Nazi aggression, all fields of violations on international law, of concentration camps and everything which later became the basis of the evidence used at the trial.

²¹²

The interrogators generally had cooperative prisoners even after the move to Nuremberg and the handing down of the indictments. The interrogation process now needs to be reviewed. The following pages will detail many interrogations done by members of the 6824 DIC at Mondorf from May to August 1945. The purpose is to look at the types of information sought by the group running ASHCAN. After this, a smaller sample of interrogations carried out by the Shuster Commission and finally the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality will be examined. The interrogations will demonstrate distinct differences in how each of these agencies handled the Nazi war criminals in their attempts to gather information and evidence.

²¹² John H. Amen and Owen Bombard, *The Reminiscences of John H. Amen* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 13-14.

Detailed Interrogation Reports at ASHCAN

The Detailed Interrogation Reports at Mondorf represented an attempt by the Allies to gain information and background on these men. As explained, lists of questions went to ASHCAN from the 6824 DIC for the interrogators to ask the prisoners. Using the newer model of DIC methods, G-2 believed that using intelligent although not expert men who spoke fluent German to interrogate these men could yield effective results without the presence of an expert directly involved in the interrogation. This method posed several potential problems, most of which manifested themselves in the process. At ASHCAN the interrogators by and large could not ask follow up questions because they had little background knowledge to draw on. The only officers possibly capable of this would have been Colonel Van Cleve or Major Giannini, but their knowledge of the language and experience in interrogations still did not give them all of the tools necessary to successfully conduct tough and productive interrogations.

Another problem at Mondorf was the personnel in general. The officers who worked as interrogators and interpreters did not have much experience. Most of them trained at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, where they took courses to learn how to interrogate. However, most did not go into the field until after the Normandy invasion and their experience mostly consisted of debriefing soldiers shortly after their capture. Prisoners of the relative importance and supposed intellect of the Nazi leadership sent to ASHCAN certainly seemed to be beyond their range of expertise. They had to rely on the questions from the DIC. Their method of follow up interrogation after a session generally consisted of Lieutenant Dolibois visiting the prisoners in their rooms as the 'welfare officer' and seeing how they were and asking if there was something else they wished the interrogator

to know. This was hardly the follow up method with experts that the DIC expected.

Major Hechler, commenting on the personnel at ASHCAN, wrote:

At Mondorf, approximately eight officer interrogators worked out a meager program of interrogations in advance of the arrival of the Shuster Commission, but the planning of their subjects was poor. They did not have a very clear grasp of military operations and strategy, and they tended to emphasize the same type of questions which they had asked as G-2 specialists during active operations. Apparently Camp Ritchie had instilled these specialists with some basic rules which these men followed like automatons. For instance, all of the officer interrogators masqueraded under assumed names at Mondorf. I can see some point in interrogators having assumed names during military operations, lest they later be captured and tortured by the enemy, but what did they have to be afraid of in July 1945? Were they afraid that Goering and his clique would be acquitted at Nuremberg and later send out agents to “get” these nasty interrogators? I know that this boy scout stuff made a bad impression on the PW’s, for one day one of them blurted out: “Why does this man who calls himself Captain Hamilton try to fool me? I know your real name is Major Hechler, but what is the reason for all the other officers having these fake names?”²¹³

Clearly a more experienced intelligence officer, such as Ken Hechler could see the incompetence at ASHCAN. Lack of experience and knowledge of the intelligence information they tried to gather may have made it impossible for these men to succeed in their mission. Also, the questions asked at ASHCAN by the staff made no attempt to pin guilt on anyone; they merely tried to gather information. The information gather at ASHCAN was not entirely useless, the biographies gathered by the interrogators and questions about how the Nazi government operated, were of some significance. However, these same types of questions were often asked again by either the Shuster Commission or the IMT interrogators.

²¹³ Hechler, 20-21.

Shuster Commission Interrogations

The problems of knowledge and experience did not exist for the Shuster Commission. All but one of these men spoke decent German, and most were experts in their fields. The knowledge base of men such as Shuster, Mason, Hale, Scanlon, and Hechler made them equal to the task of working with the prisoners of Mondorf. Plus, in at least one case, Dr. Shuster and Franz von Papen, the men were previously acquainted. The Shuster Commission operated under the authority of the War Historical Division. Again their mission was not to try to establish guilt, but to understand and analyze the processes of the Nazi regime. In this way they hoped to produce a detailed understanding of the Third Reich, one which may be of use at a trial, but the commission did not seek to establish guilt. Hechler wrote that they also had the advantage of arriving when the prisoners had mostly only been exposed to the in house interrogators. As Hechler wrote:

The Shuster Commission was fortunate to arrive at a time before these prisoners had been given a very thorough interrogation. G-2 interrogators had not done much more than assemble simple biographical data and ask some introductory questions. The Shuster Commission confronted these prisoners with a planned, intelligent battery of questions derived from long experience in the fields in which the prisoners had specialized. In addition, the Shuster Commission could follow up with additional questions on the basis of the answers by the PWs in a way which the ordinary G-2 interrogator without the background would not have been able to do.²¹⁴

An additional advantage was perhaps the best aspect of these prisoners in that all of them wanted to talk. As previously addressed, there was no issue getting these prisoners to talk, often implicating themselves by accident or a colleague deliberately. The war was over but some of these men still had old scores to settle with each other, and

²¹⁴ Hechler, 25.

perhaps overstating someone else's role in actions or events could still get them in trouble. Again though, the Shuster Commission did not present itself as a body for the Nazis to be afraid of. In some ways the commission must have flattered these men. The Shuster Commission was, after all, a group of experts hurried over from the United States to understand how these men ran their country.

The Office of U.S. Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality

By the time the guests at ASHCAN were transferred to Nuremberg, the Office of U.S. Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality arrived in Nuremberg and prepared to conduct interrogations designed to provide material the International Military Tribunal could use to prosecute some of these men. The job of interrogating these men fell to a team of lawyers and military officers assembled and led by Colonel John H. Amen. Amen was a tough as nails New York prosecutor who brought criminals and corrupt officials to trial on a regular basis in New York. He had a tough, but well-earned reputation. He viewed the interrogations performed at ASHCAN as useless to the prosecution. Fortunately, in the month preceding his arrival, the Allies uncovered miles of government, party, and military records concerning the Third Reich, which could be used to build cases against the war criminals. By this time, the prosecution had decided not to call many witnesses, but instead the IMT wanted to convict mainly on the basis of documentary evidence. This kept the need for witnesses who might try to use the witness stand to praise or justify the Nazi cause, much as Hitler did at his own trial in Munich after the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, to a minimum. The questions asked by Amen and his team sought to determine guilt and were much tougher than anything asked by either the ASHCAN interrogators or the Shuster Commission.

By the time the Allies moved the prisoners at ASHCAN to Nuremberg, the charges against them were coming into focus. While still not officially written, it was clear that charges of participating in a conspiracy for crimes against peace, planning, initiating and waging aggressive war, war crimes committed during the wars, and crimes against humanity would be the charges under which the defendants at the International Military Tribunal could be indicted. On 19 October 1945, Major Airey Naeve read the charges to each of the defendants at Nuremberg, with the exception of Raeder and Fritzsche, who were still in Soviet custody.

The charges were as follows:

1. All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding May 8 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy;²¹⁵
2. All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, initiation,

²¹⁵ Avalon Project at Yale Law School. "Nuremberg Trial Proceeding Vol.1, Indictment: Count One." <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count1.asp> (accessed April 15, 2015).

and waging of wars of aggression, which were also war in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances;²¹⁶

3. All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8 May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas;²¹⁷
4. All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of years preceding 8 May 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1 September 1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High Seas.²¹⁸

These indictments gave Colonel Amen and his team guidelines to use for their questioning of the defendants during interrogations. The interrogators at ASHCAN, under the guidance of the 6824 DIC, and the Shuster Commission never asked questions that would obviously tie the prisoners to these crimes in the IMT indictment.

The Interrogations

The following pages contain examples of interrogations done with the thirteen men at ASHCAN who stood trial before the International Military Tribunal beginning in November 1945. These examples are not meant to represent the complete questioning of those war criminals during the period between their internments in ASHCAN until the

²¹⁶ Avalon Project at Yale Law School, "Nuremberg Trial Proceeding Vol 1, Count Two," <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count2.asp>, (Accessed April 15, 2015).

²¹⁷ Avalon Project at Yale Law School, "Nuremberg Trial Proceeding, Vol 1, Indictment Count Three," <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count3.asp>, (accessed April 15, 2015).

²¹⁸ Avalon Project At Yale Law School, "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol 1 Indictment Count Four." <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count4.asp>, (accessed April 15 2015).

start of the IMT trials, but rather to convey the tone of the questions. The questions by the ASHCAN interrogators posed no threat to these men at all. The questions from the Shuster Commission also contained no threat to these men, but the interpreters' expert knowledge allowed them commission to ask more detailed questions. By the time that Amen's group began asking questions, new topics, such as concentration camps, the Commando Order, the Commissar Order, plans for waging and conducting aggressive war, and other issues concerning their possible guilt begin to arise. Surprisingly, even after these men received their indictments in October, most were still quite willing to talk without their lawyers.

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz

Colonel Van Cleve and Major Giannini carried out the majority of the interrogations at ASHCAN, but in certain instances someone with more specific knowledge of the operations and branch of service discussed conducted the interview. Such was the case on August 8, 1945 when Naval Lieutenant J. Torrance Rugh interrogated Grand Admiral Doenitz. Rugh was among those assigned to the camp but he dealt exclusively with naval officers and looked after the interests of the United States Navy regarding the prisoners at Mondorf. On this day, Rugh's questions concerned the D-Day landings. This report gave an indication of the type of information Doenitz supplied at ASHCAN. Rugh said Doenitz sometimes seemed evasive in his answers, but nothing really incriminating came out at this time.

Among many topics, Doenitz admitted he had no idea about the Mulberry harbors built by the British. He also stated that the British and Americans did not give away their invasion beaches by their aerial reconnaissance missions, that German radar could not

reach the English coast, and that Allied gun fire demoralized some troops, had no effect on the Coastal Artillery, and was effective against troop reserves and supply efforts.

Doenitz also remarked about how little naval strength was available on the French coast and that the mission in April 1944 when German E-Boats attacked the Allied invasion practice exercises at Slapton Sands was a complete accident.

The Shuster Commission questioned Doenitz on a wide variety of topics just like Rugh at ASHCAN. Dr. Shuster posed a number of questions to Doenitz on July 21, 1945 at ASHCAN regarding the role of the Navy and the Nazi Party. During this interview Doenitz commented on the separation between these groups, stating that a naval officer could not be a member of the Party. They also were not subject to justice in the Nazi Party Court but could face similar charges before the Kriegsgericht. Men in the Navy could not be in the SS either. According to him, there were no disputes between the Party and Navy men.²¹⁹

In an interrogation on the following day, Doenitz answered questions regarding the end of the war. In this interrogation, Doenitz provided information to the effect that war production had all but ceased due to bombing, attempts to relieve Berlin failed, and those armies then tried to move toward the west. All units facing the Russians were either in disorderly retreats or being overwhelmed by superior Soviet forces, and civilian refugees all moved west. The Allied air forces destroyed most of the German surface fleet, the air force did not have many planes left and most of those could not move because they had no fuel. Doenitz had hoped to continue fighting in the east to allow as many civilians as possible to move towards the west. He felt that immediate surrender

²¹⁹ George Shuster, "Interrogation of Grand Admiral Doenitz, 21 July 1945: 1400 Hours." Archives of the University of Notre Dame (hereafter cited as UNDA), CHSU 17, Karl Doenitz, 1.

“would have meant that I sacrificed the armies as well as the civilian population which was fleeing to the west, to the Russians.”²²⁰

Again we see no real attempt in these interrogations to implicate Doenitz in any war crimes, but the purpose remained merely to gather information on the various parts of the Third Reich in which Doenitz was expert. This followed the basic guidelines for all the interrogations of the Shuster Commission.

However, once in the hands of the IMT, the questioning changed a great deal. No longer content to know only information regarding the conduct and course of the war, the questions now attempted to implicate the Germans in the war crimes charged by the IMT. For example, on November 3, 1945, Doenitz faced questioning about the Commando Order of October 1945. According to the Interrogation report by Lt. Col. Hinkel, Doenitz said he did not want to answer the question and knew nothing about any Norwegian sailors killed because of that order.²²¹

In an earlier interrogation by Hinkel, Doenitz claimed that he knew concentration camps existed but knew nothing of the conditions. He told Hinkel, “As a matter of fact, it was the case that the whole German people were surprised at the conditions which prevailed in the camps at the end. I got to know about it on the 7th of May through one of your newspapers, the ‘Stars and Stripes.’”²²² Once in the hands of the IMT, the questions became much more uncomfortable for the prisoners as Colonel Amen’s team began making cases against them through tougher interrogation.

²²⁰ George Shuster, “Karl Doenitz: End of War 1945, 22 July, 1945,” UNDA, CHSU 17, 1-5.

²²¹ Lt. Col. T.S. Hinkel, “Interrogation of Karl Doenitz, 3 November 1945,” Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed 4/16/2015).

²²² Lt. Col. Hinkel, “Witness: Doenitz, Karl, 28 Sept. 45, 1030-11,” Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed 4/16/2015).

Hans Frank

Colonel Thomas C. Van Cleve interrogated Hans Frank, former Governor General of Poland, on 12 June 1945. The material covered was the Development of the SS and Himmler. Frank described the SS as having three major divisions in the early days. The first group was the political section which consisted of those members who joined the Nazi Party. The second section was the SA, which originally stood for Sportabteilung, but after the party reorganization of 1925-27 became the Sturmabteilung. The role of the S.A. was to guard the halls against Communists. The final branch, which developed under Himmler, the SS, had as its original mission serving as Hitler's bodyguard.

Frank said the SS became very strong due to its discipline and rules. Members had to obey strictly all orders, take an oath to the SS, get Himmler's permission to marry, and could not have any religious affiliation.

He said Himmler worked his way up through the ranks but by 1936 he controlled the Allgemeine SS, the State police and the SD, who controlled the secret police. By 1939 Himmler held the positions of Führer of the Allgemeine SS, Reichsleiter, Chief of German Police, Reich Kommissar Fur Die Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums (decided policies in occupied territories), and he had the authority to deal with the Jewish problem. Frank also said a bitter rivalry existed between Himmler and Heydrich with many thinking Himmler was behind Heydrich's death.

On July 30, 1945 Dr. Shuster interrogated Hans Frank, who to try hardest of all the Nazis at ASHCAN to deflect all blame for possible war crimes on to other people, usually Himmler. Shuster took a great interest in the relationship between religion and the Nazi Party. On this day, the questions he presented to Frank concerned religions in

Poland while he was in charge. This report essentially describes how Frank rose to power in the Party as legal advisor and then his role as Governor-General of Poland. Frank explained that he gave the same rights to Ukrainians, as well as Poles, giving them their own schools and churches. He claimed to have good relations with the churches under his control.

As Shuster wrote in his Evaluation of Frank's interrogation: "The incidental statements on the church situation among Ukrainians are essentially correct but contain nothing new except what Frank claimed he did on this or that occasion. Obviously, he wished to dissociate himself with Himmler and his work in the Ukraine."²²³ This report deals with a fairly narrow aspect of the Third Reich, but it does provide an excellent example of Frank trying to appear as the benefactor of the people under his control.

The Tribunal indicted Frank on Counts one, three and four of the indictment. Frank served the Third Reich as Governor-General for the Occupied Territories, which meant he administered the part of Poland not incorporated into Germany. He claimed his purposes in Poland were "[t]o represent the Reich and the construction of administration..." to acquire labor he made "a voluntary command to the population," and he claimed that he had an excellent relationship with the 200,000 Poles who worked for his administration.²²⁴ He told the interrogator that Himmler had control over the Jews in Poland. As far as the ghettos were concerned, he denied responsibility for creating

²²³ George Shuster. "Subject: Ukrainians in Poland." UNDA, George Naumann Shuster Papers, CSHU 17, Folder Hans Frank,1.

²²⁴ Lt. Col. Hinkel. "Interrogation Division Summary: Interrogation of Hans Frank, 6 September 1945, p.m., Nuremberg," Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collections, (accessed 4/16/2015),2.

them, but said he tried “to get a legal background and foundation for those things.”²²⁵

Frank said his responsibilities were to run the civil government of Poland. He did not run the economy, and everything else was part of the personal domains of Himmler, Goering, Speer and Dorpmiller. If he did give an order to the police, it could only be carried out with Himmler’s approval. In other words, he had no direct responsibility for any of the atrocities that occurred in Poland. He claimed that he continually argued with Goering about food for the Poles, and he said that Goering “didn’t care whether anybody starves in Europe, the German people ought not to starve.”²²⁶

Hinkel questioned him about a speech he gave in November 1941. He denied he said “at one time it was the plan to bring all the Jews to Poland, but that this plan had been changed, and that instead of using Poland as a place to concentrate the Jews, Poland was to be used only as a camping ground, while the Jews were moved further East.”²²⁷ Frank proved to be a perfect example of those who accepted no responsibility for what they did during the war.

Wilhelm Frick

Colonel Van Cleve interrogated Frick at ASHCAN on June 13 and 14, 1945. The questions for Frick were merely about his role as Minister of the Interior until 1943, a position he lost due to Himmler, but he remained a Minister without Portfolio in the Nazi regime. The questioning focused on the administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, a position he held until from 1943 until the end of the war. In the

²²⁵ Ibid, 2.

²²⁶ Ibid, 1.

²²⁷ Ibid, 2.

interrogation he detailed the administrative structure of the Protectorate, including who led each ministry within the Protectorate, of whom most were Czechs. He detailed the use of paramilitary organizations within the area for training groups all headquartered in Germany.

He also commented on Anti-Nazi underground movements within the Protectorate. He said that opposition movements were common in the area, but Minister of State Karl Frank used the SS and SD to control these groups in a ruthless manner. He added that resistance strengthened among the resistance in the last two years of the war because the Russians dropped small paratroop units behind the lines to carry out sabotage and disrupt supply lines. As was usual at ASHCAN, no difficult or potentially incriminating questions were asked.²²⁸

There are no records of interrogations done with Wilhelm Frick by the Shuster Commission. Research at the National Archives, Shuster's Papers at the University of Notre Dame, or Hale's Papers at the University of Virginia..

On September 6 1945 Thomas Dodd, from Colonel Amen's office interrogated Frick at Nuremberg.²²⁹ Unlike the general questions he faced at ASHCAN, Dodd attempted to pin Frick down on a number of important topics related to proving his guilt during the trial. Frick faced questions regarding his control over internal affairs in the Reich. He admitted knowledge and responsibility for decrees issued by Hitler. He admitted to knowing about the decree of December 16 1941 concerning treatment of Jews and Poles, but insisted Himmler controlled concentration camps. He also admitted

²²⁸ Thomas C. Van Cleve, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Information about Bohemia and Moravia," NARA, RG478, Entry UD278, Box 1328, 1-4.

²²⁹ T. J. Dodd, "Interrogation of Wilhelm Frick, 6 September 1945, A.M. Nuremberg", Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed 4/16/2015).

writing the Führer's state laws in 1933 and drafting the bill reintroducing conscription in Germany. Frick took responsibility for much of what he was accused. Dodd's assessment of Frick included a brief description of the "obvious line of defense: Estrangement between Hitler and Frick, direct contact between Hitler and Himmler, no controlling power, no Authority in the Protectorate... By-passed in many matters..."²³⁰ Frick also claimed he did not have input into many decisions.

Walther Funk

Major Ivo Giannini interviewed Funk at ASHCAN on June 22, 1945, asking Funk about the ministry of Economics which Funk took over for Goering. Funk claimed that he held no real power in the Ministry because all key personnel also worked Goering on the Four Year Plan, so he could not hire or force anyone because they answered to a different and higher authority than that which Funk had. Funk claimed that he had many enemies because he championed private enterprise, and revisited initial tendencies to confiscate Jewish property. In his role as President of the Reichsbank, Funk claimed that he tried to save the economy as the war came to a close by attempting to prevent Gauleiters from raiding supply depots. While it did not come up during this interview, Funk presided over the bank during the great influx of gold and other property seized from Jews and at the concentration camps. He finished the interrogation by saying that in his role as Minister of Economics he kept the German economy from declining. Giannini wrote that Funk maintained that "his work as member of the REICH'S Government was necessary and correct, and that he can offer his cooperation for reconstruction in Germany with a clear

²³⁰ Ibid, 2.

conscience, so that his expert knowledge and his experience a Cabinet member may be put to use.”²³¹

On July 26, 1945 the Shuster Commission, presumably John Brown Mason, interrogated Funk at ASHCAN. The author characterized Funk as follows:

FUNK, an economic journalist, had the greatness of his important positions thrust upon him. After the domineering personality of SCHACHT, weak, insignificant and lazy Funk appears the logical choice in a system whose leaders did not tolerate strong, capable men and competitors near them.

FUNK’s answers to economic question, given readily and unreservedly, are of interest chiefly as coming from the man who in name was one of the most important leaders in German Economy from 1938 to the end.²³²

The questions were all general economic questions, certainly nothing that should cause Funk to be defensive. Perhaps the most interesting part of the interrogation came when Brown asked what were the successes and failures of the Economics Ministry and Reichsbank to which Funk replied that the economy improved continuously until 1942. Food and raw materials improved considerably when incorporating new areas into the Reich, but “armament absorbed most of an increasing share of German production, so that the production of consumer goods decreased considerably and with growing speed.”²³³ Overall, this interrogation concentrated on the effects the war had on the German economy. As can be seen, the Shuster Commission attempted a historical study of the Third Reich, but looking to help in the prosecution of war crimes was not part of its work.

²³¹ Ivo Giannini, “Detailed Interrogation Report: Dr. Walter Funk.” NARA, RG478, UD278, Box 1328, 1-6.

²³² John Brown Mason, “Interrogation of Walter Funk, Reich Minister of Economics, President of the Reichsbank etc., etc., etc., at ASHCAN Interrogation Center, 26 July 1945,” UNDA, CSHU 17, Folder Walter Funk.

²³³ Ibid, 2.

Once he faced questioning at Nuremberg, the interrogations became noticeably more difficult for Funk. In November, H. R. Sackett, of the IMT group, interrogated Funk over many issues. Funk generally admitted his participation in drafting laws in support of the Reich Defense Law of 1935 and admitted “formulating and issuing decree laws eliminating Jews from the economic life of the Reich.”²³⁴ The report also stated “[w]itness was interrogated as to a long list of discriminatory laws pertaining to Jews and admits he knew practically all of them and approved of those passed after he became Minister of Economics.”²³⁵ At the end of the report, Sackett added a note describing Funk’s reactions to this interrogation: “Witness broke down and wept bitterly on several occasions during the interrogation as to the Jewish question. Although he admits responsibility for the Jewish discriminatory laws, he denies any participation in concentration camp activities.”²³⁶ This IMT interrogation actually supported the description of Funk by Brown from the Shuster Commission interrogation.

Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering

On June 10, 1945 Colonel Thomas C. Van Cleve interrogated Hermann Goering on a variety of subjects. These topics ranged from Hitler’s relationships with Bormann and Goebbels, and the early history of the concentration camps, to the Beer Hall Putsch, Night of the Long Knives, and the July 20 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life. Goering claimed that through most of the regime no one had the ability to influence Hitler. However, toward the end Bormann was always at his side and controlled access. “He became known as Hitler’s ‘Mephisto’ and no Gauleiter or Party member could gain audience with

²³⁴ H.R. Sackett. “:Interrogation of Walter Funk, 8 November, 1945, A.M.” Courtesy Of Cornell University Donovan Nuremberg Trails Collection, (accessed 4/16/2015).

²³⁵ Ibid, 1.

²³⁶ Ibid,1.

Hitler without first going through BORMANN.”²³⁷ Goering also insisted that Bormann was the one most to blame for the brutal treatment of the Jews. He said the Beer Hall Putsch came about as the result of Nazi fear that Germany would be divided. The Night of the Long Knives occurred because Röhm did not like the direction of the Party and he wanted to overthrow the Party leadership and assume control using the SA. He believed the July 20 Plot to be poorly executed by the General Staff and said that many innocent people died as a result of the reprisals.

Goering’s final break with Hitler, according to him, resulted from confusion on Hitler’s part. On April 20, Hitler told Goering that he would go the southern Germany. However, on the 23rd Hitler changed his mind. Hitler said he believed peace was necessary, and Goering could negotiate it better than Hitler. Goering made moves to take control, but when Hitler learned of this he ordered Goering’s arrest. As one can see from this most important example, prisoners at Mondorf faced interrogations from the 6824 DIC that touched on many topics, but not in any particular depth.

George Shuster and Lt. Col. Oron J. Hale interrogated Goering together over two days at Mondorf on July 19 & 20, 1945. They spoke to him about a number of issues including Germany’s policy toward England, Hitler’s speeches, his plan for a Mediterranean campaign, German-Russian relations, and the Germany’s declaration of war on the United States.²³⁸ Goering stated that Hitler’s attitude towards England revolved around Austria, the Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor. He stated that Hitler

²³⁷ Thomas C. Van Cleve, “Detailed Interrogation Report: Hermann Goering, 10 June 1945” NARA, RG478, Entry UD278, Box 1328, 3

²³⁸ George Shuster & Oron J. Hale, “Historical Interrogation Commission War Department General Staff G-2 Historical Branch, MID,” 19-20 July, 1945, UNDA, George N. Shuster Papers, CSU 17, Folder Goering, 1.

still wanted some type of agreement with England after France fell, and planned to offer England 12 divisions to use for 'overseas purposes.' Goering voiced his displeasure at this idea. Goering claimed that Hitler prepared all of his speeches by himself and had no assistance at all. He spoke in favor of a campaign led by Germany, Italy and Spain to take over the Mediterranean from England. Goering said that Hitler believed he had to attack Russia before they attacked Germany and that demands made by Molotov in February 1941 supported this fear. Finally, he said that Hitler believed war with the United States was just a matter of time, and argued the election of President Roosevelt to a third term in 1940 proved the point. Goering, as subject of the largest number of interrogations, was unquestionably the most interviewed prisoner due to his high level position in the Third Reich.

On August 28, 1945 Colonel Amen had a day long interrogation session with Goering, touching on subjects such as rearmament, Austria and Czechoslovakia that would be among the charges against him during the IMT. In this interrogation, Goering outlined German plans for taking both Austria and Czechoslovakia, discussed his role as Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan, the occupation of territory for *Lebensraum*, and Hitler's desire to have England as an ally, including again the idea that Hitler would allow England to control a few German divisions to help defend area Hitler felt England could not control, such as India, from an attack by either the Soviets or Japan. Goering stated that Hitler did not understand England and hoped that Ribbentrop's appointment as Foreign Minister would help in this regard. During this discussion Goering told Amen that: Considering that it is 8 years ago... it is almost impossible for me to pin down what

the Fuehrer said in 1937. I can only give the Fuehrer's basic opinion and his trend of thought throughout (sic) many years, but I cannot pin down what was said in 1937."²³⁹

Goering generally took responsibility for what he did but often seemed to not know details. However, he had no illusions about his fate at the hands of the Allies.

Colonel General Alfred Jodl

An interview of Jodl at ASHCAN on July 4, 1945 by Major Giannini sought information on various aspects of OKW and OKH, including the attitudes of the military to these groups.²⁴⁰ The interrogator also sought information regarding the views of the General Staff towards technology and the use of tactics and weapons. He said that they created the OKW to act as a supreme authority over both the army and the air force. He remarked that the General Staff was not opposed to the OKW, but resented the creation of OKH. He said they also wanted the political independence of the army maintained. The General Staff used to look down upon technical experts, but such views changed with the advent of the 100,000 man army. Technical officers in the army moved up the ranks slower than others due to this bias. He said that tactical plans were made to suit the weapons and equipment they had. As with other interrogations at ASHCAN, this interrogation used the usual soft general questions for the prisoners trying to gain more general knowledge of the Third Reich and its army. At this point questions to these men seeking to determine their involvement and the as yet to be decided criminal activities, did not exist, so the interrogations were generally pleasant affairs for the prisoners.

²³⁹ Colonel John H. Amen, "Interrogation of GOERING, HERMANN by Colonel Amen, 28 August 1945, a.m. and p.m.", Courtesy Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, 1.

²⁴⁰ Ivo Giannini. "Detailed Interrogation Report: Generaloberst Alfred Jodl." 4 July, 1945," NARA, RG478, Entry UD278, Box 1328, 1-4.

The Shuster Commission interviewed Jodl on a wide range of topics at ASHCAN. Major Ken Hechler conducted a series of in depth interrogations with German military leaders, with questions ranging from tactics to knowledge of other countries' forces. Hechler also gave them questionnaires to answer when they were not meeting. Hechler had a big advantage in this area since he spent part of the war in the field getting reports from the Americans side of the fighting so he knew the events well, allowing him to ask detailed questions and follow them up immediately, a luxury the interrogators assigned to Mondorf did not have. Some interrogations of Jodl occurred with Keitel, but Hechler believed Jodl to be a much better subject. "I was impressed by his grasp of details..."²⁴¹ Jodl asked Hechler if he could use one of his aides to prepare his answers and Hechler acquiesced, adding another capable source in Major Herbert Buechs. The interrogations ranged over a series of topics such as "Planning the Ardennes Offensive,"²⁴² the "Ardennes Offensive,"²⁴³ and "American Operations, German Defenses, Ruhr Pocket, The Last Days."²⁴⁴ Jodl proved invaluable to Hechler's interrogations, his eye for detail giving Hechler generally very precise answers. However, at this point all these questions regarding planning and waging war were not feared by Jodl as possible war crimes trial information.

In interviews with the IMT Jodl proved to be forthright as he had been in Mondorf. He would identify and provide his knowledge of documents shown him by the

²⁴¹ Hechler, 40.

²⁴² Major Ken Hechler. "An Interview with Genobst Alfred Jodl: Planning the Ardennes Offensive." 26 July, 1945, UNDA, George N. Shuster Papers, CSHU 17, Folder Alfred Jodl, 1-25.

²⁴³ Major Ken Hechler. "An Interview with Genobst Alfred Jodl: Ardennes Offensive." 31 July, 1945, UNDA, George N. Shuster, Papers, Folder Alfred Jodl, 1-27.

²⁴⁴ Major Ken Hechler. AN Interview with Genobst Alfred Jodl: American Operations, German Defenses, Ruhr Pocket The Last Days." UNDA, George N. Shuster Papers, Folder Alfred Jodl, 2 August 1945, 1-17.

interrogators.²⁴⁵ He would provide detailed knowledge of planning operations such as the invasions of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union.²⁴⁶ He described whether there was outside influence on Hitler in planning from people such as Goebbels and described his relationship with Keitel as “a close relationship. Jodl was Chief of Staff of the Army subordinated to Keitel as ‘practically’ Secretary of War.”²⁴⁷ He told Amen he “believed war was lost in the winter 1941-1942. Wrote a memorandum in March or April 1944 – ‘that the war was lost when the defense of the Rhine didn’t succeed.’”²⁴⁸ It appears that Jodl’s answers remained truthful throughout his time in prison.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel

As chief of OKW, Keitel held the responsibility of the overall conduct of the war. At ASHCAN he did not face questioning about planning and waging aggressive war as he would at Nuremberg but rather more general questions regarding his opinion regarding certain operations of the war. For example, in one session, Colonel Van Cleve questioned him on such topics as whether the High Command wanted to see Italy in the war, did the Germans contemplate invading England, was the military opposed or in favor of invading Russia, and similar questions along those lines.²⁴⁹ Keitel said that Germany “had no military interest in Italy’s entry and found that she was no help.”²⁵⁰ He said that they

²⁴⁵ Colonel Amen, “Interrogation Division Summary by Colonel Amen, 15 August 1945.” Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed 4/16/2015)).

²⁴⁶ Lt. Col. Hinkel. Interrogation Division Summary: Interrogation of Jodl, Alfred by Lt. Col. Hinkel, 29 August 1945, A.M., Nurnberg.” Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, Cornell, (accessed 4/16/2015),1.

²⁴⁷ Colonel Amen. Interrogation Division Summary: Interrogation of Jodl, Alfred by Colonel J.H. Amen, 17 August 1945, Nuremberg, a.m.”, Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accesses 4/16/2015), 1.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, 3.

²⁴⁹ General Betts. “Betts to Van Cleve, 19 May 1945,” NARA, RG331, Entry 1, Box 13.1.

²⁵⁰ Thomas C. Van Cleve. “Detailed Interrogation Report: Keitel’s and Kesselring’s Replies to Questions Cabled From Washington, Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed April 16 2015), 2..

considered invading before the defeat of France but were concerned about the British fleet. He said the invasion of Russia was justified because the Russians posed a danger to Germany from Poland. He further commented that the war in Russia was not delayed in the hope the Japanese would declare war on the Soviet Union. These questions did not implicate him in anything, rather just got his opinion.

The Shuster Commission also interrogated Keitel about the conduct of the war. When the Germans learned who came from the Army Historical Division, they usually cooperated quite well. Major Hechler did not appear to trust Keitel to be honest with his answers. After his initial successes interrogating Jodl, he thought he would have the same success with Keitel. However, when they were interrogated together on most topics Jodl typically deferred to Keitel, and the answers usually proved unsatisfactory. Hechler thought that Keitel was ‘watering down’ the answers and when given the next set of question, Hechler asked Keitel to answer by himself, yielding a much better result for Hechler.²⁵¹ Overall, Hechler did not think much of Keitel or his abilities as a leader.

Questions for Keitel became much more difficult when they came from the IMT. They asked Keitel about atrocities against Russian military personnel, but he claimed to know nothing about them.²⁵² He was asked about the Commando order from August 1942, which had ordered the killing of commandos even though they wore a uniform. He stated the order was “Hitler’s conception and his work,” though it was issued either by Jodl or Keitel, but “there was no collaboration by any department within OKW in the

²⁵¹ Ken Hechler, 67.

²⁵² Unknown, “Document Room Interrogation Analysis Witness: Keitel, Date: 27 September 1945, 1620-1710, Nurnberg,” Cornell, 1.

order.”²⁵³ Keitel claimed he did not remember the execution of British Commandos at Stavanger, Norway or their execution in compliance with Hitler’s Commando Order. Keitel went on to incriminate himself in both planning and waging aggressive war. Overall, Keitel did nothing to help himself, and at the same time he seemed to have definite memory issues regarding some of the details of the conduct of the war.

Robert Ley

Major Giannini interrogated Robert Ley at ASHCAN on June 28 and 29, 1945. Primarily Ley was in charge of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) (German Labor Front) from 1940 until the end of the war, furnishing foreign laborers for German industry. Ley said the process would start with a request from Albert Speer through Fritz Sauckel. Individual industries ran the camps that housed the foreign slave labor and all food, housing and supplies came from them. He said the DAF inspected camps and kept additional supplies on hand should they be needed. Ley basically asserted that he led an organization that created the work rules and supervised foreign laborers, but as head of the Labor Front, he was not directly responsible for the conditions in the labor camps. Giannini wrote that Ley blamed “Nazi leaders who, through greed and thirst for power, brought about the internal conditions (concentration camps, etc.) which caused the entire world to hate and despise GERMANY.”²⁵⁴

When the Shuster Commission interrogated Ley, he gave pretty much the same story. Ley told the commission about the elimination of labor unions, and provided

²⁵³ Colonel John H. Amen, Interrogation Division Summary: Interrogation of Wilhelm Keitel and Nikolaus von Falkenhorst by Col. J.H. Amen, 25 October 1945, a.m. Nuremberg,” Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed April 16 2015),1.

²⁵⁴ Major Ivo Giannini. “Dr. Robert Ley, “Reichsorganisationsleiter” and “Fuehrer Der DAF” Outlines Some of the Policies of the DAF, 28 June,1945.” NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 2-4.

details on the creation of the German Labor Front. He provided descriptions of the new laws enacted in the Third Reich once the unions became illegal, as well as providing information about the Strength Through Joy movement. In spite of all of Ley's denials, his interrogator described him as "one of the few top-ranking Nazis who is still unconditionally and unreservedly devoted to Hitler, in whom he sees a Messiah."²⁵⁵ The author also writes that his "statement about the great achievements of the German Labor Front lack corroboration from other sources."²⁵⁶ Ley continued telling the interrogators that he created the rules but could not control the abuses of others.

Robert Ley cooperated with the IMT but still took no blame for most actions. He did, however, admit to his role in the destruction of labor unions in Germany. As the Nazi Party under Hitler and led by Ley decided to eliminate unions in May 1933, he let all Gauleiters know what was about to happen. He told the interrogator: "There may have been a meeting... it was completely secret.... And we had to act... we couldn't tolerate this civil war... in the factories."²⁵⁷ However, Ley refused to admit blame for the fate of foreign workers in Germany. Monigan concluded his report writing "Ley, 'at the end of his work' still is proud of it. It is a great pity that his system has not be (sic) carried over to other countries, he states."²⁵⁸

Franz von Papen

Colonel Van Cleve interviewed Franz von Papen on May 15 1945. This would have been one of the first interrogations carried out at Mondorf, occurring even before

²⁵⁵ "Interrogation of Robert Ley, Leader of the German Labor Front, at ASHCAN Interrogation Center, 22 July 1945." UNDA, George N. Schuster Papers, CSHU 17, Folder Robert Ley, 1.

²⁵⁶ Ibid,1.

²⁵⁷ Major J.J. Monigan, "Interrogation Division Summary Interrogation of Robert Ley, By Major J.J. Monigan, Jr., 6 October 1945, P.M., Nuremberg." Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Collection of Nuremberg Trial Papers, 2.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, 3.

Colonel Andrus took the assignment of camp commandant. Papen was among the first inmates of the camp in Luxembourg, having previously been at the first ASHCAN in Spa, Belgium. According to the Preamble, Van Cleve conducted the meeting as an interview and not as an interrogation. The eleven questions came at the request of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, SHAEF. Over the course of the conversation, Papen discussed many different issues. When asked what he thought were the best sources of political intelligence in the German Foreign Office, he said that useful information depended on the quality of contacts of the ambassador. He used the examples of Great Britain and the United States, saying that the best information regarding these countries came out of Portugal and Sweden. Van Cleve asked Papen for names of the SD agents in the Foreign Office, but Papen claimed all of this type of information went through the Abwehr, which had an office at every embassy. Papen believed that the only good intelligence came from the Foreign missions because SD agents did not understand the larger picture of events.

Van Cleve questioned Papen regarding how Hitler received his information. Papen stated that at first all intelligence came through Ribbentrop's office, but foreign visitors often visited Hitler about foreign affairs, and Hitler usually trusted these sources more than the Foreign Office. The interrogator also asked Papen about Himmler's personal staff, but he claimed to have no knowledge of who was part of this entity. Van Cleve considered Papen a reliable witness, but he "often hides behind the excuse that so much has happened to him that he has forgotten many things.. He is very careful of what

he says, and gives the impression that he anticipates some sort of a trial or court in the future.”²⁵⁹

An interesting interrogation by the Shuster Commission must have been when Dr. Shuster interrogated Papen at the bugged house in Dalheim. It was uncomfortable for Shuster because he knew Papen before the war. Shuster describes Papen as follows:

“Papen can only be understood, it seems to me, if one conceives of the fag-end of an aristocracy anxious to play a part in the drama of the regeneration of mankind. More than any German of his time, he pitted his wits against those of Hitler. The trouble was not merely that Hitler’s were of very much better quality but also that generals and others relied upon by Papen to redress the balance were even more unintelligent than he.”²⁶⁰

Shuster found Papen honest, but he also felt a great deal of pity for him. He wrote:

“When the whole vision had passed before his mind, he began to sob at the realization of his own impotence and ignominy. I sat there knowing that the record downstairs would end in a whimper such as history has often known.”²⁶¹

The IMT indicted Papen on Counts one and two of the indictment. Papen told his interrogator, Christopher Dodd, that he supported Hitler because he believed he was responsible for the government due to his efforts in putting the government together with Hitler as Chancellor. He said that he hoped the Army would act against Hitler after the Night of the Long Knives on 30 June 1934. Of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, he said if Germany could have worked out an agreement over the Polish Corridor, Germany would never have entered into the pact with Russia.

²⁵⁹ Thomas C. Van Cleve. “Report on Franz von Papen.” 15 May 1945, Courtesy of Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, 3.

²⁶⁰ George Shuster. *The Ground I Walked On*, 239.

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, 239.

He said that until the negotiations with Russia, Hitler never thought of dividing Poland or going to war against it. As far as the concentration camps were concerned, Papen claimed no real knowledge of what they did. He knew they existed but that was it. He said he did not know what happened in the camps and that the whole idea of concentration camps was “an invention of dictatorship.”²⁶²

Although Papen was in Austria in the months leading up to the Anschluss, he says that the German government “did not intervene officially, that what interferences there were came from the party or press people.”²⁶³ In essence, Papen claimed that he remained in the Nazi government out of personal responsibility for it, because he helped forge the agreements allowing the formation of the government. As far as the Anschluss was concerned, again he claimed he was not directly involved in the negotiations.

Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ribbentrop became the Nazi Foreign Minister in February 1938, succeeding Neurath. Prior to that, he worked on numerous foreign policy issues for the Third Reich, mostly on those concerning Great Britain. At ASHCAN on July 1, 1945 Major Ivo Giannini interrogated Ribbentrop regarding a number of Nazi foreign policy decisions made before the outbreak of war in September 1939. Regarding Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, Ribbentrop claimed they withdrew because they were not permitted to rearm fast enough, or get the other nations to reduce their arms while

²⁶² Mr. T. J. Dodd, “Interrogation Division Summary: Interrogation of Franz von Papen, 12 October 1945, PM, Nuremberg,” Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed April 15 2015), 4.

²⁶³ Colonel C. Williams, “interrogation Division Summary: Interrogation of Franz von Papen, 13 October 1945, AM., Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trails Collection (accessed April 15 2015).

Germany caught up. He said the 1936 Reoccupation of the Rhineland was a bold move but one he thought was necessary.

The first major event to occur with Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister was the Anschluss. Austria was among the “most pressing German minority problems - - AUSTRIA, SUDETEN, MEMEL, DANZIG, and the Corridor.”²⁶⁴ He reluctantly told Giannini that Chamberlain was bothered by the fact that the Czechs were not consulted at the Munich Conference, and also claimed that the Nazis did not stir up trouble in the rest of Germany before taking the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. Ribbentrop did not try to escape his involvement in these policies, as he would at Nuremberg and he offered plausible answers.

On July 23, 1945, Ribbentrop sat down with the Shuster Commission, most likely Shuster, discussing various matters in an interrogation. When he talked about the role of the cabinet he said that there were not any cabinet meetings. “Information to Hitler was given through reports of the various ministers about their respective resorts (sic). The foreign minister had no general view of the activities of the other departments, - military, economic, internal, etc, - and he had no direct influence on such questions as the persecution of the Jews or the treatment of the church...”²⁶⁵ He claimed to know nothing of “large scale military plans, armaments, or military possibilities.”²⁶⁶ At this point, Ribbentrop clearly tried to remove himself from any direct involvement in decisions. By the time he left ASHCAN, Ribbentrop claimed to have almost no role in foreign policy.

²⁶⁴ Major Ivo Giannini. “Ribbentrop Tells of German Foreign Policy Up To 1 Sep 1939, 1 July 1945,” NARA, RG478, Entry UD278, Box 1328, 3.

²⁶⁵ “Von Ribbentrop, 23 July, 1945: 0930,” Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed April 15 2015), 1.

²⁶⁶ Ibid,2.

Once he arrived in Nuremberg, Ribbentrop faced much more pressure than he did previously. On August 29, 1945, the IMT lawyers interrogated him on a wide variety of topics including his role as German Ambassador to London, Commissioner for Disarmament, and as Foreign Minister. He told Brundage that the Hitler' chief aim was "to restore a free and independent strong Germany, both economically and politically, because he was of the opinion,- - and rightfully, I think, - - that former governments had not succeeded in bringing Germany into a position in which she could stand up, in the long run, without coming into chaotic conditions."²⁶⁷

Ribbentrop claimed he had no role in bringing Hitler to power, other than the fact that "conversations in my house contributed to the fact that later on the Hitler government was formed."²⁶⁸ He claimed to accept responsibility for everything "I have done as German Foreign Minister, "and said of Hitler, "I have been loyal to him to his last day. I have never gone back on him, on the contrary, we sometimes had very divergent views. But I promised him in 1941 that I would keep faith with him. I gave him my word of honor that I would not get into any difficulties. He considered me his closest collaborator... it was sometimes very difficult to keep this promise, and today I am sorry I have given it."²⁶⁹

Alfred Rosenberg

Colonel Van Cleve interrogated Alfred Rosenberg on June 15, 1945 at Mondorf.

Following the generalist nature of interrogations at ASHCAN, Rosenberg received

²⁶⁷ Colonel Brundage. "Interrogation Report Summary Interrogation of von Ribbentrop, Joachim, By Colonel Brundage, 29 August, 1945, a.m.," Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection (accessed April 15 2015),2.

²⁶⁸ Ibid, 2.

²⁶⁹ Ibid, 3.

questions on a variety of subjects. The first subject concerned his role of removing private, usually Jewish, libraries from France and other countries and taking them for protection to various castles in Germany. He also did this with Jewish-owned art objects. The first trainload went to Germany under Luftwaffe guard and Goering inspected the contents taking several pieces for himself. Rosenberg made sure that none of his people did the same thing, although when Hitler saw some of the works, he also took many paintings. In his role as Commissar for Supervision of Intellectual and Ideological Education of the NSDAP, he claimed it was his responsibility to educate party members of the problems the Jewish race caused Germans over the centuries. However, he said his ideas were not used in the public schools.²⁷⁰ As leader of the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP he said the “main duty was to impress and influence people visiting GERMANY as to the improvements and advancements made under National Socialism.”

He claimed that policing the Eastern Territory was strictly under Himmler’s purview, and Sauckel had the responsibility of recruiting foreign labor, in Rosenberg’s eyes, he had no role in any of these activities.

Once again, this interrogation underscores the limiting aspect of these interrogations. Rather than concentrate on a single topic, they tended to cover a wide range of material, leaving out potentially crucial details.

The Shuster Commission interrogated Rosenberg on July 23 at Mondorf. During this interrogation he spoke about his duties as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, with the areas being the Baltic States, the Ukraine and Ruthenia. He claimed the chief of the German Police controlled these territories and he had little real authority.

²⁷⁰ Thomas C. Van Cleve. “Detailed Interrogation Report: Alfred Ernst Rosenberg, 5 June 1945” NARA, RG478, Entry UD278, Box 1328, 3.

Rosenberg spoke about his famous book, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, which he claimed was not national policy or the official Party view, but represented merely his own personal views on race. “He presented his book as a matter of scientific research, and considered it open for the correction of errors.”²⁷¹ He then launched into a short diatribe explaining the revolutionary aspects of Nazism.

Lt. Col. Hinkel interrogated Rosenberg in Nuremberg on September 22, 1945.²⁷² He faced questions concerning the Foreign Office of the Nazi Party, his role as Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and a discussion of the Jewish question. He described two trips he made to London in 1931 and 1933 to “acquaint political persons in England with the aims of the Nazi movement.”²⁷³ He said that in his role in the Eastern Territories he made sure that the laws of these lands were the same as in the Reich. He claimed that he had no involvement with implementation of the Four Year Plan or anything to do with the police. He also claimed he did not write articles in favor of the Anschluss, but he wrote articles “advocating a revision of the Versailles Treaty and asking for more ‘Lebensraum’.”²⁷⁴ Rosenberg admitted he knew about the treatment of the Jews in the Occupied Territories, but he said all decrees came from the police and not him. He insisted that over the years his views changed and he now supported the same rights for Jews before the law as everyone else.

²⁷¹ George N. Shuster. “Interrogation of Rosenberg, 23 July 1945, : 1045,” UNDA, George N. Shuster Papers, CSHU 17, Folder Alfred Rosenberg, 1

²⁷²²⁷² Lt. Col. Hinkel, Interrogation of Rosenberg, Alfred, By Lt. Col. Hinkel, 22 September 1945, p.m., Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed April 15 2015), 2.

²⁷³ Ibid, 2.

²⁷⁴ Ibid, 2.

Arthur Seyss-Inquart

At ASHCAN, Arthur Seyss-Inquart faced questions from Van Cleve on June 15, 1945 on topics concerning the Anschluss and his duties in Holland. At this time he still strongly supported the Anschluss and thought it was best for Austria. He said he wanted to see the Anschluss occur over time, not in the manner in which it occurred, and that he worked with Dollfuss right up until a week before Dollfuss was killed to find agreement. He pushed for the legalization of the Austrian Nazi Party for three reasons: “(a) the Nazis could carry on irresponsible propaganda, (b) they acted as a collecting point for all Austrians dissatisfied with the Fatherland Front, certainly a majority of the population and (c) they placed the idea of ANSCHLUSS in the foreground. This idea had had the almost unanimous Austrian support a decade before.”²⁷⁵ When the Anschluss finally occurred, Seyss-Inquart took control of the Austrian government just long enough to sign the new law. During the rest of the interrogation, he talked about various opposition groups in Holland and how the Nazis treated them while he ran Holland.

Lt. Col. Oron J. Hale interrogated Arthur Seyss-Inquart for the Shuster Commission at ASHCAN on July 25, 1945 regarding matters in Holland. Hale asked about the Niederländische Ost Kompanie, which intended to resettle Dutch farmers in the Ukraine. Seyss-Inquart said the idea met with heavy opposition and was not enacted although some Dutch farmers did volunteer to do this and emigrated east. When asked what Nazi personalities had interest in the Netherlands, he mentioned that Himmler did because of his racial ideas. Himmler could not understand that the Dutch did not think much of his telling them they belonged to a larger German race. He also explained that

²⁷⁵ Thomas C. Van Cleve, “Detailed Interrogation Report: Seyss-Inquart Replies to CI Questionnaire, 15 June 1945,” NARA, RG478, Entry UD278, Box 1328, 3.

former Dutch prisoners of war were put back in camps in 1943 because the Germans feared they would rise up against them. He said that at first the officers and NCOs went to Germany as labor, but they were treated so badly that he stopped it. When asked what the greatest problem of the German occupation of Holland was, he replied that: “The Greatest difficulty, in my opinion, was the conflicting policies of the Reich agencies. They really did not know where to begin with the Dutch problem or how to solve it. There was no agreement on any policy.”²⁷⁶ There were no discussions in this interview regarding his claims he tried to prevent Hitler’s ‘scorched earth’ Policy from being carried out in Holland.

At Nuremberg, most of the questions for Seyss-Inquart involved the Anschluss, and his role in it, a key element of the charges against him at Nuremberg. On October 9, 1945, Thomas J. Dodd, who interrogated him over several days, asked about his time in Poland under Frank and subsequently his assignment to the Netherlands. He told Dodd he had nothing to be ashamed of in either Austria or Poland. He did, however, admit to grave mistakes in the Netherlands. He says he knew of the excesses committed there and “issued orders in Holland forcing the male population between 17 and 40 to work in Germany under threat of death penalty and under inhuman regulations of details.”²⁷⁷ Seyss-Inquart told the truth most of the time. He believed that his efforts to stop Hitler’s destruction of Holland would save him. They did not.

²⁷⁶ Lt. Col. O.J. Hale, “Interrogation of Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 25 July, 1945,” UNDA, George N. Shuster Papers, CSHU 17, Folder Arthur Seyss-Inquart, 4.

²⁷⁷ Thomas J. Dodd. “Interrogation Summary Division: Interrogation of Seyss-Inquart, by Thomas J. Dodd, 9 October 1945, P.M Nurnberg, Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed April 15 2015), 2.

Julius Streicher

Major Giannini interrogated Julius Streicher at ASHCAN from June 21 to the 23, 1945 concerning his career and activities. Streicher's best known achievement was *Der Stürmer*, his anti-Semitic magazine designed to incite people to hate the Jews. He said his speeches helped add thousands to the rolls of the Nazi Party in 1922, and he also claimed to be Hitler's closest friend in the early days of the Party. Streicher said that two thirds of the issues of his magazine were bought by Jews "because they wanted to prevent circulation."²⁷⁸ Streicher insisted that he "was not interested in persecution or torture of Jews, but merely wanted to prevent all racial mixture and any relationships with Jews."²⁷⁹ He said he wanted to "get all Jews out of Europe and have them sent to a land of their own."²⁸⁰ He also said he knew nothing of what occurred in the concentration camps. After he lost power from his dispute before the Party Court, he went to Pleikershof where he confined himself mostly to his farm for the next five years.

John Brown Mason interrogated Streicher for the Shuster Commission, asking him specifically about his case before the Party Court and determined that: "Streicher was obviously not telling the truth concerning his case before the Party Court except ... that Hitler forbade the Party Court to sentence him. Streicher also expounded about race and told Mason: "Race purity is the important thing. Every man has red blood, even the Jew. There is no secret, however, that when a German, a North American, an Englishman, or a person of any other nationality - and there are Indians, Negroes, Chinese, Jews, etc., In America - lies with a Jewess there may be a child born in nine

²⁷⁸ Major Ivo Giannini, "Detailed Interrogation Report: The Career and Activities of Julius Streicher," NARA, RG478, Entry UD278, Box 1328, 4.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, 5.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

months who is no longer pure of race.”²⁸¹ He said that being blond, blue-eyed and fair was the highest form of humanity. Mason asked him about Hitler, and Streicher replied that “he wasn’t a pure Nordic, about 80%. Race is also expressed in character.”²⁸² While you can see that Mason tried to understand Streicher’s ridiculous ideas, he still offered no serious threat to him.

For a man considered terrible enough to be tried by the IMT, there was not much interest in interrogating him at Nuremberg and there are just a handful of Interrogation Reports. Streicher would be difficult to convict at Nuremberg because the only real charges against him were not really charges under the system. Inciting hatred did not really fit into the major categories at the trial, but that was the course the prosecution took with him. The interrogator, Colonel Brundage, reads a quote from a 1942 article in *Der Stürmer* that says: “The German People will not be free of danger from the Jewish plague until the Jewish question is liquidated entirely.”²⁸³ Streicher denies that his use of the word liquidate in any way should be interpreted as killing. The rest of the interrogation just continues with Streicher’s ridiculous rants about Jews. Streicher probably inadvertently helped the prosecution team develop ways to implicate him.

Conclusion

Essentially, there were three levels of interrogation that the men went through before the trial. This does not include visits by different groups who also wanted to interrogate these men, for example, the Russians at ASHCAN, the FBI, the U.S. Strategic

²⁸¹ John Brown Mason. “Report of Streicher Interrogation on Afternoon of 19 July, 1945,” UNDA, George N. Shuster Papers, CHSU 17, Folder Julius Streicher, 1.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Colonel Brundage. “Interrogation Division Summary: Interrogation of Streicher, Julius, by Colonel Brundage, 17 October, 1945 AM Nuremberg,” Cornell University Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, (accessed April 15 2015), 2.

bombing Survey and many other groups with interests in one or more of the prisoners for very specific purposes. The three levels of interrogations must be looked at in a different light. The interrogations by the 6824 DIC at ASHCAN attempted to gain general information about these men, and tried to close gaps in Allied the knowledge of the Third Reich. The interrogators were assigned to ASHCAN more for their knowledge of German than any special competence in the areas the Allies wanted to learn about. The questions were very general and the prisoners were usually asked about a wide variety of subjects looking for more general rather than detailed information. ASHCAN fulfilled its designed role as an out of the way location to relax and interrogate these prisoners in order to get as much cooperation as possible.

The Interrogations at Mondorf by the Shuster Commission served a different purpose. The Army Historical Division realized they had a unique opportunity to speak with these men while they were fairly centrally located and before they could scatter around the country or face the justice of the IMT. The division sent a well-regarded team of experts in the various fields of interest and extensively interrogated the prisoners about very specific actions or events in great depth than earlier interrogations.

The Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality also interrogated these men for a different purpose than the others. They looked for evidence that could be used to convict these men when they went to trial. On an Interrogation Division Summary prepared by one of the interrogators, the first heading on the list after identifying the subject of the interrogation was “Persons and organizations implicated.” This division asked the tough questions that the others did not ask for fear their subjects would not cooperate and quit talking. The men of this office were lawyers

interested in convicting these prisoners. Determining guilt was the motivating factor for the Office of the Chief of Counsel. They did their job with a determination that did not exist with the other groups.

Chapter Six

Conclusions

Nuremberg

The interrogation team from the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality began its interrogations in August at Nuremberg. At this point in time, a new reality began for the prisoners. The comparative comforts of ASHCAN gave way to much harsher conditions at Nuremberg. The cells at Nuremberg held one man each. The prisoners were unable to communicate with each other in the part of the prison where those expected to go on trial were held. Security at the Nuremberg Prison was lax when Colonel Andrus arrived, with approximately one guard for every fifty prisoners. This changed immediately under Andrus. The prison had several different sections. The most secure wing held the men everyone expected to stand trial for war crimes. Another wing held material witnesses, men who obviously knew enough to help with the prosecution but not currently considered to face charges. These men had a certain freedom of movement. They did not have to stay in their cells and could communicate freely with each other. Another part of the prison contained women, generally held as potential witnesses, mostly secretaries and minor bureaucrats who may have useful information. There was even another house in Nuremberg used for other witnesses, nicknamed the Witness House, with no restrictions other than to stay in Nuremberg.

On October 19, 1945, Major Airey Naeve went from cell to cell serving the indictments to each of the defendants who would stand trial by the IMT. Naeve, a British officer serving with an almost entirely American staff, headed the Tribunal's secretariat

which dealt specifically with the defendants and their lawyers.²⁸⁴ Of the men indicted, Naeve served all but Hans Fritzsche and Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who were in Soviet custody and had not yet been brought to the prison, and Gustav Krupp, who was served at a hunting lodge in Austria, although eventually it was determined he was too sick to stand trial.

According to Taylor, the indictments came as a severe shock to many of the defendants. The most affected by the indictment was Robert Ley. Dr. G.M. Gilbert, the prison psychologist, wrote that Ley was “posing ‘crucifix-like’ against the cell wall and ‘gesticulating and stuttering in great agitation’.”²⁸⁵

Two days later Ley managed to commit suicide. According to Andrus:

On the evening of 25th October 1945 he was behaving curiously and the sentries were observing him closely. About 8.10 pm the sentinel whose duty it was to watch Ley once more glanced through the cell peep-hole. Only his legs were visible, in the toilet corner. The Guard called, but there was no movement, no answer. With three other hurriedly alerted guards he burst in.

Dr Ley had strangled himself. He had looped his jacket zipper to the water-tank lever and twisted a towel into a noose around his neck. He had stuffed his torn-up drawers into his mouth to stop the noise of his strangulation and the death-rattle from reaching his guards. Nearby he had left a series of notes.²⁸⁶

One note explained that he could not deal with the shame any longer but had been treated well by his captors. Another read:

I have been one of the responsible men. I was with Hitler in the good days, during the fulfilment of our plans and hopes, and I want to be with him in the black days. God led me in whatever I did. He led me up and now lets me fall. I am torturing myself to find the reasons for my downfall, and this is the result of my contemplations:

²⁸⁴ Taylor, 131.

²⁸⁵ Taylor, 133.

²⁸⁶ Andrus, *Nuremberg Jailer*, 88.

We have forsaken God and therefore we were forsaken by God. Anti-Semitism distorted our outlook, and we made grave errors. It is hard to admit mistakes, but the whole existence of our people is in question. We Nazis must have the courage to rid ourselves of our anti-Semitism. We have to declare to youth that it was a mistake. The youth will not believe our opponents. We have to go all the way. We have to meet Jews with open hearts. German People! Reconcile yourselves with the Jew, invite him to make his home with you.

It is unwise to believe it impossible to exterminate anti-Semitism with histrionic trials, no matter how skillfully they are conducted. One cannot stop the excited sea at once, but must let her calm down gradually, otherwise, terrible repercussions will result. A complete reconciliation with the Jews has the priority over any economic or cultural reconstruction.

The outspoken anti-Semites have to become the first fighters for the new idea. They have to show their people the way.²⁸⁷

With Ley's suicide, Andrus changed aspects of the guards' routines. Most importantly, now one guard would constantly watch each prisoner through the viewing opening on each cell door. Andrus wanted to be sure another suicide did not occur.

With the indictments read, Major Naeve began the process of helping prisoners find lawyers. With or without lawyers, the willingness of the prisoners to talk did not change very much after they arrived at Nuremberg. However, the questions most certainly did. Colonel Amen and his men organized many of the potentially incriminating documents that Allies found during the summer. They could now ask about specific, damning documents, many often bearing the signatures of some of the defendants. The International Military Tribunal trial began on November 19, 1945.

Conclusions About ASHCAN

This dissertation had two purposes. One purpose is to understand why the IMT interrogators did not use the information gathered at ASHCAN and believed it to be worthless. The second purpose is to view ASHCAN in terms of what it did well. The

²⁸⁷ *ibid*, 90-91.

camp succeeded in many of its purposes, but these successes are usually buried by the criticism that it did not help the IMT prosecution team very much.

There are numerous reasons why ASHCAN failed to produce viable information that would be of use during the war crimes trials. Indecision, lack of vision, poor training and ineffective use of personnel doomed ASHCAN. The errors occurred everywhere from Washington, D.C., London, SHAEF Headquarters, the headquarters of the 6824 DIC in Revin, France, as well as at ASHCAN. Issues ranged from the indecision regarding war crimes trials versus summary execution, trust in the use of junior military officers with minimal intelligence training beyond their knowledge of the German language, the conduct of the camp, and the slowness in putting together interrogation teams to investigate these men for war crimes.

Although perhaps impossible to fully understand at the time, President Roosevelt's reluctance to make firm decisions regarding war crimes trials until the war ended left the Americans in particular, and the Allies in general, unprepared to deal with these war criminals at the end of the war. Roosevelt first agreed in principle to Churchill and Stalin's preference for summary execution, and then came under the sway of Henry Morgenthau's ridiculous notions about postwar Germany and justice. Even as the War and State Departments began forging plans for war crimes trials, Roosevelt would delay and interfere in the plans for fear that the other leaders would think him soft on punishing the Nazis. Roosevelt first showed support for summary execution while meeting with Churchill at Quebec in September 1944, then changed his mind and somewhat endorsed a trial by January 1945, but he never fully endorsed any one plan, allowing the decision to linger until after his death in April 1945.

After Roosevelt's death, President Truman quickly endorsed the idea of war crimes trials and appointed Justice Jackson to lead the United States delegation. The Soviets had already reversed their course and supported the idea of war crimes trials, but the British, at least officially, held onto the notion of summary execution. Fortunately, the British also had groups working on some type of war crimes trial procedure, so that while the Americans may have been the driving force of the trials idea, the British were ready to provide input at the London Conference in June 1945. This conference helped clear up some differences between the Allies, but it was August before final decisions could be reached. It dragged on even further as they tried to come up with lists of war criminals to be tried, and it was not until early October that these matters were finally sorted out.

ASHCAN closed two months before the Allies worked out the final details on the trials. Although these final agreements came after ASHCAN closed, enough decisions had been made that the prisoners were moved from Mondorf to Nuremberg, and Colonel Amen was ready to begin his work. The Allies wasted a great deal of time deciding on a process for these trials. Meanwhile, the prisoners sat in ASHCAN in fairly comfortable surroundings facing occasional interrogations by the interrogators from the 6824 DIC and whoever else had received permission to interrogate some of these men.

The delays in procedures for the war crimes trials cost valuable time that could have been used to move these men out of ASHCAN. The indecision among the Allies turned Mondorf into little more than a holding pen for the former leaders of Nazi Germany. The idea of setting up ASHCAN was to provide a quiet, out of the way facility, where the prisoners could be interrogated in a setting designed to put these men at ease and hopefully create a situation in which they would talk about their careers

during the Third Reich. ASHCAN did not set out to gather evidence to prove their guilt, but merely to collect background information and discover how the Nazi government functioned. ASHCAN did succeed in providing an out of the way, quiet setting. Perhaps its biggest achievement was keeping the whereabouts of these prisoners unknown for two months.

But ASHCAN created problems, too. As related earlier, when Albert Speer arrived at Mondorf for his brief two- week stay, he was surprised to see many of these prisoners. “From outside we had been able to see Goering and other former members of the leadership of the Third Reich pacing back and forth. The whole hierarchy was there: Ministers, Field Marshals, Reichsleiters, state secretaries, and generals. It was a ghostly experience to find all those who had been scattered like chaff in the wind reassembled here.”²⁸⁸ While the Americans and British succeeded in gathering most of these men in one place, they did not take into account the rivalries that existed between them. Each group of men tended to stick together, military men, Nazis, and Bureaucrats all formed into close cliques, returning to their previous Nazi era circles.

The fact that these men all served the same leader did not mean they all got along. Old rivalries rekindled. In Speer’s brief stay, the military men all showed their dislike of him. Otto Meissner and Hans Lammers still did not get along, because Meissner was certain that Lammers usurped his power. No one liked Streicher, Ley or Goering. The groups were insular and kept together. This physical closeness undoubtedly influenced answers to interrogations as many men would try to make their rivals look bad.

²⁸⁸ Speer, 502.

The rivalries did not just exist among the prisoners, but also between the soldiers who were guard staff and the intelligence sectors of the camp. Colonel Andrus used the guards to carry out his silly rules. Andrus showed no respect for his prisoners and did not object to his guards treating the men in the same manner. Andrus' imperious manner only managed to infuriate his prisoners. The bureaucrats and Nazis did not like his strict military manner, and, at least among the bureaucrats, the lack of the courtesy they thought they should be afforded because of their former positions and the rules of the Geneva Convention. Traditionally, military courtesy did not end with defeat, but, in this case, Andrus took great delight in exaggerating his own importance and belittling these men who outranked him during the war.

While the prisoners did not get along with Andrus and his staff, they did get along well with their G-2 section of the camp. The officers who interrogated these prisoners needed a rapport with the prisoners for the interrogation process. The G-2 officers treated the prisoners with respect and showed a degree of empathy for their circumstances. The interrogators did not always see eye to eye with the guards, and often found themselves laughing with the Germans about the comportment of Colonel Andrus and his guards.

Another rivalry existed between the Guards and the G-2 staff. Even in the first month of the camp, a great deal of friction already developed between these two groups. Andrus' primary concern was the security of the camp, so he took great pains to seal up the camp as much as possible. While the guards showed military courtesy to the G-2 officers, their treatment of the prisoners made the work of the G-2 officers more difficult. G-2 needed relaxed prisoners and Colonel Andrus' rules and procedures made it difficult for the prisoners to let down their guard. Andrus restricted everything, from

communication between the prisoners, to exercise time, to permitted activities. They could, for example, take a book to read from the hotel library, but could do so only under armed escort.

The rivalries between G-2 and Andrus' men reached its peak in the middle of June, when General Betts stepped in. Betts sent cables outlining the functions of both G-1 and G-2 at the camp and emphasized the need for cooperation in order to get as much out of these prisoners as possible. At this time, he also eased a number of the restrictions placed on the prisoners, allowing many of the suggestions that originally came from General von Boetticher regarding activities for the prisoners. He even increased their comfort with additional blankets and access to tobacco and coffee, but the situation is a little muddled. When reading about the changes at the camp made by General Betts, it appears he mostly sided with the G-2 element at the camp. However, at the same time Betts was making these changes, Colonel Van Cleve was reassigned out of the camp, leaving Major Giannini in charge of the G-2 functions at ASHCAN. No documents stating the reason for Van Cleve's reassignment was found in the archives and, as previously mentioned, Van Cleve makes no mention of ASHCAN in his papers. One can only speculate as to why Betts relieved him. The most obvious answer is that Van Cleve brought approximately 12 men to ASHCAN from 6824 DIC headquarters in Revin, France without any authorization and never made an effort to make this official through proper channels. Another possibility exists. About the time that General Betts relieved Van Cleve, the first newspaper report about an interrogation of Goering came out. It is possible that Betts suspected Van Cleve of being the leak and relieved him, but there is no way to prove this assertion.

The biggest failure of ASHCAN was the material collected. The 6824 DIC believed they could work up questions back in Revin and send these questions to the interrogators at ASHCAN. Here the interrogators would then ask the prisoners the questions and write down their replies. G-2 believed that educated interrogators, even though not experts in the matters they questioned the prisoners about, could still obtain solid answers that would help G-2 assemble information regarding biographical information on the prisoners, as well as show G-2 and, in theory, the men of the IMT putting together the cases against some of these prisoners, how the Nazi government worked. The immediate, and most obvious, flaw in this method, was an inability to ask any type of significant follow-up questions. The interrogators could prepare their reports, send them to Revin, and wait for a list of additional questions, but that created a significant delay in learning more about a given topic. At ASHCAN, they substituted follow-up questions with a visit from Lieutenant Dolibois. He would stop by the prisoners' rooms a couple hours after their interrogation, and he asked how they were doing and if there was anything they wanted to add to their earlier interrogation. He generally did get more information from the prisoners, but again, Dolibois was hardly qualified to ask about topics that he did not fully understand.

The interrogators were not trained well enough for the task they were expected to perform. These men really had no business interrogating such high value prisoners. One has to wonder why the Allies did not assemble a team of experts, both civilian and military, to interrogate these men. The ASHCAN interrogators never had a real chance to interrogate these men and get positive results. Even the most qualified of the interrogators, Colonel Van Cleve and Major Giannini, seemed to be overmatched. In the

descriptions of the prisoners and their Interrogation Reports (see Appendix A), when available, the Preamble gave the impressions of what the interrogators thought of these men. In none of these cases were any of them deemed to be deliberately lying. In spite of the fact that it was acknowledged that many of these men tried to withhold answers or answered in an evasive manner, the men were considered at worst ‘somewhat reliable.’ The ASHCAN interrogations failed because the men running the camp were not able to fully exploit the information provided by the prisoners. Therefore, the men at ASHCAN made a good faith effort, but were doomed to failure.

Although the ASHCAN interrogators did not know the history of the Nazi rule of Germany well enough to ask important follow-up questions, the true problem might have been with the so-called experts, who put together the original questions, and their own lack of knowledge. An example of this was an interrogation conducted by Colonel Van Cleve of Kurt Delauge, second in command of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia beginning in May 1943. Delauge was in part responsible for the retaliation against Lidice after the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich, but the interview does not even allude to this atrocity. Van Cleve included in his report Deluege’s assertion that his position was merely supervisory. He was commissioned to improve Czech-German relations and he asserts that relations did improve while he was there.”²⁸⁹ How could these experts put together a questionnaire and not ask him about Lidice? One plausible excuse is that the interrogators did not wish to ask questions that would make the prisoners defensive, but even that do not sound accurate. By the time the IMT trial began, the Allies turned Delauge over to the Czechs, who tried and executed him in December 1945.

²⁸⁹ Thomas C. Van Cleve, “Detailed Interrogation Report: Delauge: Reply to Special CI Questionnaire, 12 June 1945,” NARA, RG478, UD278, Box 1328, 4.

The other side of the spectrum of competence was the Shuster Commission. These men were all qualified in their respective fields. The Army Historical Commission sent men with detailed knowledge of Germany and the information they were seeking to get from the prisoners. Each member of the commission put together his own materials and knew German history, language and culture well enough to ask detailed questions, and ask additional questions that would provide better answers to the original questions. For example, Major Hechler went to interview German military leaders about the conduct of certain operations during the war. Hechler was well qualified for this, having interviewed U.S. personnel about the conduct of many of the same campaigns. Hechler's expertise on these matters allowed him to ask further questions as the Germans answered, or organize new questions to ask the following morning. It does appear likely that the interrogators at ASHCAN and even the Shuster Commission were not allowed to ask tough direct questions that might implicate the prisoners. In both instances, they would ask questions and generally accept the answers they received. The prisoners at Mondorf were in relative comfort and free to talk. Perhaps intelligence feared that asking tough questions would worry the prisoners and their cooperation would end. However, that is not what happened at Nuremberg.

When Colonel Amen and his team began interrogating these prisoners, they had a wealth of documents and other information that came from official German reports. They did ask the tough questions, and kept asking these questions trying to get detailed answers. Not all of the questions were meant to implicate the individuals. Sometimes they would get questions designed to implicate other defendants, something that the top Nazis, in particular, were often quite willing to do. As mentioned previously, ASHCAN,

the Shuster Commission, and the Colonel Amen's group for the IMT, represent a building up of the type of questions the prisoners received. The questions at ASHCAN were generally simple and just asked for information and explanations of the functions the prisoner performed in Nazi Germany. The Shuster Commission asked much more in depth questions. The Shuster Commission members seemed flattering to some of the prisoners, because it was a historical commission looking for answers for posterity. The IMT group represented a completely different undertaking. This group had a great deal of background information and used it to try to get the prisoners to implicate themselves and others in crimes for which they would stand trial.

In the end, ASHCAN undoubtedly seemed like a good idea, but the execution of this idea left much to be desired. Rather than counting on interrogators to ask the questions, they should have brought experts to the camp sooner and used the interrogators strictly as interpreters. This was, in fact, the job the interrogators performed whenever an outside group came in to interrogate the prisoners but did not have German speakers or their own interpreters with them. The prisoners at Mondorf were too valuable a commodity to not send the best possible experts and technicians into the camp to interrogate them. To the members of the IMT interrogation group led by Colonel Amen, the work done at ASHCAN must have seemed completely useless for their purposes. That being said, ASHCAN's mission was not to help the prosecution with their case. Instead, they attempted to gather background information, but the interviews and interrogations carried out by the Shuster Commission included much of the same material, but of a much higher quality. The single greatest accomplishment at ASHCAN is that they did keep the prisoners secure and secluded for approximately two months.

They did not lose a prisoner at ASHCAN to death or suicide and most of the men were in better health when they left Mondorf than when they arrived. They also gathered information of historical value, even if not directly related to the IMT.

So, was ASHCAN a failure as it has been purported previously? Yes, if ASHCAN is only looked at through the lens of Nuremberg interrogators. No, if ASHCAN is put within the broader context of the chaotic aftermath of the end of World War II and its ability to warehouse the high value Nazis, military leaders, and bureaucrats for the two months it took the IMT to figure out what it was going to do with these prisoners.

Appendix A

The Guests

ASHCAN began as a place essentially to hide major figures of the Third Reich and place them in a location where they could be interrogated at will. The intelligence community also sought to give them a quiet and relaxed atmosphere hoping to get as much cooperation as possible from most of the prisoners. Overall, this idea worked well because most of the prisoners seemed to speak freely under interrogation.

One big question left to answer was who to place in Mondorf. American Officials created this camp specifically to deal with high-value Nazis, but who should be considered a high value Nazi? Obviously leading members of government, high ranking military personnel and Nazis in significant positions made this list, but were the Allies always right? Did everyone in ASHCAN actually rate being there on his own 'merits'? The answer is no. For example, Franz Schwarz was the son of Franz Xaver Schwarz, treasurer of the Nazi Party. The son held the title of Chief of German Breweries; however, he was in the prison to take care of his father, who had serious heart issues. There were also several adjutants to the staff officers. Their own personal participation in war crimes was likely minimal, but they served as right hand men of senior officers such as Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl, and during the interrogation process they proved invaluable for helping these men organize their thoughts and answer questionnaires given to their former bosses.

There were some, such as Schwarz the elder, who held seemingly impressive titles, but did they truly know anything? Erwin Krauss, leader of the NSKK (National

Socialists Motor Corps) was part of the Nazi Party and had a membership of over half a million, but should the leader be considered a war criminal?

To start answering these questions, this chapter contains outline sketches of the prisoners in ASHCAN. They are grouped into four separate categories. Each list is alphabetical order rather than perceived importance. The first category is the prisoners at Mondorf put on trial by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Just over half of the men who stood at that trial stayed at the camp. The second group is the military officers, excluding those tried by the IMT. The third group is the politicians and bureaucrats. Finally, the last group consists of the Nazis held at the camp. Appendix A will list the fate of these men, as far as it is known.

Included in the descriptions of these men are the comments from the Preambles of their Interrogation Reports, if they are available, for most of the prisoners. The Preamble contained the interrogators' impressions of the men interviewed. For most of the people in ASHCAN, the comments available about them come from the memoirs of their partners in crime who survived the war, complete with all the wartime jealousies and resentments toward them. The impressions provide an interesting, and perhaps less biased view of these men than generally available. In a few cases, some of these men never faced interrogation at Mondorf or the records available are from sources other than the staff at ASHCAN.

Defendants at the IMT

Lieutenant Colonel Airey Naeve announced the indictments to the defendants in their cells at Nuremberg on October 19 1945. The trial began on 20 November, 1945 and lasted until October 1 1946. The proceedings concluded before October 1, but that is the

date that the judges read the verdicts. Twelve of the defendants stayed at ASHCAN until it closed. Another, Albert Speer, spent approximately two weeks in Mondorf at the end of May through the first week in June, 1945. The following IMT defendants stayed at ASHCAN:

Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz

Doenitz was born in 1891. He joined the Imperial German Navy in time for World War I and became a U-Boat captain until captured by the British in 1918. When he returned to Germany, he stayed in the Navy. During World War II he became a Rear Admiral in the Navy and eventually Commander of the Submarine Fleet. Doenitz and his U-Boat fleet had remarkable success against Allied shipping for the first few years of the war. In January 1943, he became the Commander in Chief of the Navy. He remained in charge of the Navy until Hitler named him his successor in his will on April 29, 1945. He ran the German government from May 2 until May 23 1945, when he and rest of his government were placed under arrest by the British.

He was the subject of frequent interrogation ASHCAN. One of his interrogators summed up his answers to questions as follows:

It was clear on several occasions that DOENITZ on occasion made attempt to avoid direct answers, change the subject, and deceive by indirection. It is felt, however, that most of what is given in this report is probably true.²⁹⁰

Hans Frank

Frank was a Nazi from the very beginning of the party. A member of the Freikorps after the First World War, he joined the German Workers Party in 1919 and so

²⁹⁰ J. Torrance Rugh, Jr. . "Report on Interrogation of P/W Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz." NARA, RG478, Entry UD279-B Box 1331. 6-AUGUST-1945.

was one of its earliest members. During the 1930s he studied law and after passing his exams, started to represent Nazis who ran afoul of the law, which became a full time job.

In 1930 he won election to the Reichstag as a member of the Nazi Party. After Hitler received power, he appointed Frank the Minister of Justice for Bavaria. Frank fell out of favor with Hitler when he opposed the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934, the murder of dissident Nazis and other political Opponents. He lost his post, and the Party named him Minister without Portfolio. However, after Germany invaded Poland in 1939, he went to Poland with for the military occupation. In October, 1939, he became Governor-General of the General Government in occupied Poland, a post he held until January 1945. In Poland he oversaw the creation of the Jewish ghettos and supported using Poles as forced laborers. Also under his nominal control were six concentration camps, including extermination camps such as Treblinka.

On May 3 1945, American troops captured Frank. He claimed he was beaten and attempted suicide arriving at ASHCAN in a pair of pajamas still recovering from his self-inflicted wounds. While in Mondorf, he embraced his long lapsed Catholic faith.

Wilhelm Frick

Wilhelm Frick was another of the “alte Kämpfer” at ASHCAN. He worked for the Munich Police from 1904 to 1924. Frick supported Hitler and the Nazi Party. He used his placement in police circles to quash any bad reports of Nazi behavior and warned Party members if the police were looking for them. He participated in the Beer hall Putsch in November 1923 for which he received a fifteen month sentence, which was suspended enabling him to go back to police work.

In 1933 when Hitler came to power, he became Reich Minister of the Interior, a position he held until 1943. After that, he remained Minister without Portfolio and Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. In captivity, he claimed that he was merely a figurehead, and he denied any wrongdoing..

The Allies arrested him on May 2 1945. He eventually ended up at ASHCAN. He was named a defendant at the IMT trial in 1945. Colonel Thomas Van Cleve, who interrogated Frick on 13 and 14 June 1945 concluded about Frick:

At one time, PW was an ardent follower of HITLER, and thoroughly believed in Nazi Ideology and efforts. But it appears that in the last years, his ardor has cooled considerably. His legal mind does not permit him to sanction the illegal acts of the co-workers and subordinates with which HITLER surrounded himself, and he is 'convinced that the totalitarian form of government is impossible.' PW expressed his desire to see the criminals of the Nazi regime brought to trial and punishment.

Estimate of Reliability: Probably true report.²⁹¹

Walter Funk

Funk was born in 1890. He attended Humboldt University in Berlin and the University of Leipzig, studying law, economics and philosophy. He worked as a journalist, served in the Imperial Army in World War I and in June 1931, joined the Nazi Party. He helped arrange meetings between Hitler and industrialists. Later when the Nazis came to power, Funk became Press Chief in the Ministry of Propaganda, and then Secretary of State in the Propaganda Ministry. In November 1937, Hitler told him he was going to be the next Reich Minister of Economics, once Hitler got rid of Hjalmar Schacht. In February 1938 he got the new post and in January 1939, became President of the Reichsbank, a position he held until the end of the war.

²⁹¹ Thomas C. Van Cleve, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Information About Bohemia and Moravia." NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 16-June 1945, 1.

Funk ran the Reichsbank when the SS first began making deposits of gold stolen from the Jewish population. He said nothing then, nor did he say anything when the SS began depositing gold jewelry and tooth fillings taken from murdered Jews. His time and actions in government led to his indictment on all four counts at the IMT trials. Funk always insisted that he was merely a figurehead and that the illegal activities were the work of those working under him. At Mondorf, his interrogator, Ivo Giannini, wrote the following in His "Estimate of Personality":

FUNK makes the impression of a rather mediocre man who was skillful enough to manoeuvre himself in a leading position (sic). He is very anxious to impress his captors that throughout his tenure in office he kept up a fight against the totalitarian and collectivist tendencies of the radical party leaders.

Apart from his obvious anxiety to save his skin, he appears sincere in his expressed desire to cooperate with us. However, he was only interested in general policies and left the actual work in his ministry and the REICHSBANK to his trained assistants, so that he is unable to answer questions even on important transactions or details.

The information contained in this report is believed to be reliable and, wherever possible, has been checked with other sources.²⁹²

Hermann Goering

Goering, born in 1893, served in the First World War as a pilot, becoming an ace and taking over Manfred von Richthofen's Flying Circus after his death. After the war, he became an early member of the Nazi Party, taking part in the Beer Hall Putsch, helped Hitler come to power in 1933, and created the Gestapo.

He held a number of important posts: Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, President of the Reichstag, Reichsminister of Economics and Aviation and Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. Perhaps most important, after Hess' ill-fated trip to

²⁹² Ivo Giannini. "Detailed Interrogation Report Dr. Walter Funk." NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 26-June 1945, 2.

Scotland in 1941, he became the number two man in Germany and Hitler's designated successor. He was the only man to hold the title of Reichsmarshal.

However, as the war progressed, his importance declined. His Luftwaffe had glaring failures in the Battle of Britain and keeping the Sixth army supplied at Stalingrad. His grip on power and involvement in day to day issues became less. On April 22 1945, Hitler remarked that Goring had a better chance of making peace with the Allies than he did. Notified of this, he met with other officials, such as Hans Lammers, to see if he should take control and sent a telegram to Hitler asking for permission to assume power. Outraged, Hitler ordered his arrest. Protected by Luftwaffe troops from the SS, he surrendered to American troops, eventually ending up at ASHCAN.

In the Preamble of his Interrogation Report of Goering, Thomas C. Van Cleve wrote:

PW GOERING cannot be considered a strictly truthful character when he is discussing personal relations, possessions, etc. and when an investigator asks how his income and fortune was made. At the same time he has been considerably shaken in his bloated belief in his own grandeur. He talks readily and it is believed, reliably on questions about the Nazi state, personalities, the Air Corps, conduct of war, etc. He is a drug addict. He has no memory of details and apparently considered such beneath his dignity.

Estimate of Reliability: Probably true report.²⁹³

Alfred Jodl

Jodl, born in 1890 in Würzburg, Germany, also served in World War I. After being wounded twice, he spent the rest of the war as a staff officer on the Western Front. After the war, he remained in the Reichswehr. During World War II, he reached the position of Chief of the Operations Staff at OKW, working under Field Marshal Keitel.

²⁹³ Thomas C. Van Cleve. "Detailed Interrogation Report Hermann Goering," NARA, RG478 Box 1328, 2.

On 28 October 1942 he signed the famous Commando Order, which ordered the immediate execution of all enemy soldiers caught behind enemy lines, in complete defiance of the Geneva Convention. When the war ended he signed the unconditional surrender at Reims as Doenitz' representative, ending the war.

Along with many others, he went to ASHCAN after the arrest of Doenitz' Flensburg government on May 23 1945, staying in Mondorf until August. Ken Hechler interviewed Jodl at Mondorf while he was with the Shuster Commission in July 1945. He wrote of Jodl that he "was fairly cold, exact, humorless and stiff in posture and personality. I was impressed by his grasp of details..."²⁹⁴

Wilhelm Keitel

Keitel was born in Helmscherode, Germany in 1882. In 1901 he became an officer cadet in the Prussian Army. He served in World War I, and after the war he remained in the Reichswehr. After the Bromberg-Fritsch Affair in 1938, Hitler named him to command the newly created Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). As head of OKW he followed Hitler's orders and planned many of the military operations during the war. He also signed off on the Commissar Order, in which Germans soldiers were to immediately kill all political officers in the Red Army. After 1942 he believed Hitler was a military genius, always supporting whatever Hitler said, and speaking in glowing terms about Hitler as a military commander. Other senior officers did not think highly of Keitel.

²⁹⁴ Ken Hechler, *The Enemy Side of the Hill* unpublished manuscript, 40.

When Hitler committed suicide, Keitel went to Flensburg in the same capacity for Admiral Doenitz, where he was arrested by the British and sent to Mondorf. In August he moved to Nuremberg to stand trial in the IMT trials against the Germans.

Ken Hechler described Keitel as “best known in the German Army as ‘LAKEITEL’ – little lackey, can be considered Hitler’s rubber stamp for the Armed Forces. He has, however, an encyclopedic memory and is very cooperative in giving information which may be considered reliable.”²⁹⁵

Franz von Papen

Papen, born in 1879, trained as an army officer and joined the German General Staff in 1913. That same year, he went to Washington, D.C. as Military Attaché at the German Embassy, where he became involved in intrigues and would be expelled from the United States. After World War I, he became involved with Centre Party politics and, seemingly out of nowhere, he became Chancellor of Germany in 1932. After elections in November 1932 he had to resign. He tried to put together a coalition with the Nazi Party, but that did not work out.

He helped broker the deal between Hitler and Hindenburg that gave Hitler the Chancellorship with Papen as Vice Chancellor. After the Night of the Long Knives in June 1934, Papen became Ambassador to Austria, slowly paving the way for the Anschluss. During World War II, he served as Ambassador to Turkey, leaving in August 1944 when the Turks broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. He remained in

²⁹⁵ Ken Hechler, “Interrogation of Field Marshal WILHELM KEITEL, C in C, OKW, and Colonel General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations Staff, at ASHCAN Interrogation Center, 26 July 1945,” George Naumann Shuster Papers, University of Notre Dame.

Germany on his estate until the end of the war when American soldiers arrested him in April 1945 on his estate. In the Preamble of his Interrogation Report, Van Cleve wrote:

Von Papen has a clear mind, but he often hides behind the excuse that so much has happened to him that he has forgotten many things (which would be of interest to the Allies). He is very careful of what he says, and gives the impression that he anticipates some sort of trial or court in the future.²⁹⁶

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ribbentrop, born 1893, became a well-traveled business man after World War I and in 1928 met Hitler for the first time. Ribbentrop worked for the National Front in 1932, alongside men like Franz von Papen and Otto Meissner to create a new government. He worked in a number of foreign policy areas and in February 1938 succeeded Neurath as Foreign Minister, remaining Foreign Minister until Hitler's death. Ribbentrop said that Hitler wanted to make the policy and expected Ribbentrop to make his decisions reality. Doenitz was among the many who thought that Ribbentrop was incompetent and did not want him to be part of his government. The British Army identified him in Hamburg and placed him under arrest and eventually sent to ASHCAN.

Interrogator Ivo Giannini gave this assessment of Ribbentrop:

He is friendly and talks freely, but is frequently vague and certainly does not give the impression of being a man of sufficient capability to have held the important position he did. He talks English willingly and shows little of his old arrogance. He disclaims ever having been anti-British, but rather the reverse, that he never informed HITLER that the British were a degenerate nation unable to wage a major war. He blames propaganda for this reputation and claims that informed British statesmen know this. He considers himself a true friend of the British and his major thesis is still Anglo-German cooperation against the Russian bear. This report, because of source's frequent vagueness, uncertainty and rather obvious lack of mental fibre, should be read with reservation.

²⁹⁶ Thomas C. Van Cleve, "Report on Franz von Papen: Von Papen Answers Some Political and Intelligence Questions," Cornell University Law Library, Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection,

Source is also very anxious to prove his lack of importance of his position and lack of responsibility.²⁹⁷

Alfred Rosenberg

Rosenberg, born in Reval, Estonia in 1893, and he graduated in 1918 from Technische Hochschule. In November 1918, he left Estonia for Berlin and the following month moved to Munich. He first met Hitler in January, 1919 through Dietrich Eckart, and he joined the Nazi Party at this time. In 1920 he completed his first book and wrote for the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the main Nazi Newspaper. . Rosenberg became Editor in Chief of the paper until it was banned by the Bavarian government after the Beer Hall Putsch. In 1925 the paper started up again.

He became a member of the Reichstag in 1930 and also published his most successful book, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, that year. Rosenberg had a deep seated hatred of the Jews and used this book to expound his theories of race. In 1933 he received the title Reichsleiter Der Partei and became head of the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP. Hitler appointed him to supervise libraries, art objects and museums in France, a job he eventually lost to Goering. In July 1941 he became Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. He remained in his positions until the end of the war.

The British arrested him at Flensburg on 18 May, 1945. They sent him to ASHCAN where he stayed until being moved to Nuremberg to stand trial. His Interrogation Report offered no evaluation of his personality. However, John Dolibois worked as a translator at both Mondorf and Nuremberg and wrote of interviews between Rosenberg and Dr. Douglas Kelley, a psychiatrist and wrote they “spent several hours

²⁹⁷ Ivo Giannini, “Detailed Interrogation Report: Joachim von Ribbentrop.” NARA, RG475, Box 1328, 1 July 1945, 1.

with him, engaging on stupid discussions on ‘race problems.’ We wanted some clarification of his views. He never completed a sentence. He jumped from one confusing thought to another.”²⁹⁸

Arthur Seyss-Inquart

Seyss-Inquart was born in Moravia in 1892. He attended Vienna University studying law. While serving in the Austrian army, he completed his law exams in 1917. He liked the idea of the Anschluss and also the ideas of the Nazi Party. In February 1938, he became Minister of the Interior in Austria under Schuschnigg. On 11 March 1938, President Miklas of Austria named him chancellor. He signed the documents to join Germany. On 1 May 1939, he became Reichsminister without Portfolio in Germany. In September he became second in command to Hans Frank in the General Government. From 29 May 1940, he was Reichskommissar for Holland, a job he held until the end of the war. In Holland he issued all of the decrees that led to the persecution and removal of Jews in the country.

On 7 May, 1945 British soldiers arrested him and he eventually ended up at ASHCAN. He was among the defendants at the IMT trial in Nuremberg.

The impression of Seyss-Inquart by his interpreter Colonel Van Cleve were as follows:

PW is 52 years old and a lawyer by profession. Though born in Moravia and reared in Austro-Hungary, his parents were not Austrian in the strict sense of the word. His father came from EGER in the SUDETEN area and his mother was born in Germany. He has always been for Anschluss with GERMANY, but he favored slow evolutionary process rather than sudden, revolutionary absorption into the REICH. He followed a middle path in AUSTRIA and came to the force there because of the

²⁹⁸ Dolibois, 171.

complete deadlock between the Nazi Party in AUSTRIA and SCHUSCHNIGG. He s calm and perfectly willing to answer for all he has done. It is believed that his information is reasonably reliable.

Estimate of Reliability: Probably true report.²⁹⁹

Julius Streicher

Streicher, born in 1885 in Fleinhausen, attended a teacher's college and taught at village schools from 1904, moving to Nuremberg with bigger schools in 1909. He served in the army during World War I. After the war, he returned to Nuremberg and over the next five years became politically active in right wing groups. Extreme anti-Semitism became the focus of his activity. He began a weekly paper entitled "Deutscher Sozialist," but the paper failed because "the language was 'too fancy and highbrow' for the common people who followed his preaching."³⁰⁰ He started another paper in 1922 and blamed its failure on the publisher who betrayed him after "'being influenced by Jews'".³⁰¹

In 1922 he attended a lecture given by Hitler in Munich, where he "'saw something like a halo around his head.'"³⁰² After this, he began a third paper, "Der Stürmer," which stopped briefly after the Beer Hall Putsch. Once released from prison, he was elected to the Landtag in Bavaria and restarted the paper in 1924.

In 1927 he became Gauleiter of Franconia, a position he held until 1940. In 1940 he went before Nazi Party court after printing slanderous stories about other party members. Hitler forbid a guilty verdict and instead removed him from his positions. He spent the next five years more or less isolated on a farm. The Allies captured him on 22

²⁹⁹ Thomas C. Van Cleve. "Detailed Interrogation Report Seyss-Inquart: Replies to CI Questionnaire." NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 2.

³⁰⁰ Thomas C. Van Cleve. "Detailed Interrogation Report: The Career and Activities of Julius Streicher." NARA, RG 478 ,Box 1328, 1

³⁰¹ Thomas C. Van Cleve, 2.

³⁰² Ibid, 2.

April 1945, after a Jewish American Army Captain recognized him in Bavaria. He ended up at ASHCAN shortly after it opened in Mondorf in May 1945.

Thomas C. Van Cleve, his interrogator, described him as follows in the Preamble of the Interrogation Report:

PW is a fanatical anti-Semite and Nazi, and takes great pride in claiming that he has become a 'martyr for the cause'. His loyalty to HITLER is undying, in spite of the exile into which HITLER ordered him in 1940. He continues to speak against the "Jewish Race" whenever he can find a listener, and remains fanatically steadfast to his ideas and beliefs.

In view of the fact that PW has taken the attitude that he is an "Apostle with a sacred duty to perform", his statements are probably a true account of his convictions and his information reliable as far as it goes. He willingly answers all questions and supports his answers with frequent oaths as to their veracity. But the answers to questions he was not asked, and the information he may still have withheld, will be significant.³⁰³

Military Officers

Colonel General Johannes Blaskowitz

Blaskowitz, born in Paterwalde, East Prussia, Germany in 1883, joined the army in 1901 and served during World War I. He commanded the troops in March 1939 that occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, and for six weeks was military commander of Prague. In September, 1939 he led an army into Poland and captured Warsaw. In June, 1940 he went to France but was quickly put on the inactive list, because, as he said, his anti-Nazi disposition cost his career greatly.. He spent the rest of the war in France. By D-Day he commanded Army Group G and fought against Patton's Third Army when Patton landed at Pas de Calais. On 1 October 1944 he went back on the inactive list, but the army again reinstated him in December 1944 when he again commanded Army Group G. In early April 1945 he became Commander in Chief of the Netherlands where

³⁰³ Ibid, 2.

he remained until he surrendered on 8 May, 1945.³⁰⁴ According to his interrogation report he never joined the Nazi Party.

His interrogator wrote the following about Blaskowitz in the Preamble of the Interrogation Report:

Source may be described as an upright, straight-forward military man. His father was a Protestant pastor in East PRUSSIA and he has a certain antipathy toward the Nazis on religious lines. His career definitely suffered because the Party disapproved of him. He talks freely and it is believed that his information is fairly reliable.³⁰⁵

Vice Admiral Leopold Buerkner

Buerkner, born in 1894, joined the German Imperial Navy in April, 1912, and remained in the Navy during World War I. In 1938 he joined the foreign liaison section of the Abwehr, the military's intelligence service working directly under Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. After World War II, he served briefly Chief of Protocol in Doenitz' government, and he was a member of the large group brought from Flensburg and to Mondorf when the Allies arrested the government.

General Erich Dethleffsen

Erich Dethleffsen, born in Kiel in 1904, joined the Reichswehr in 1923, and remained in the army until 1945. In February 1942, he was wounded on the Eastern Front. Dethleffsen joined OKW after he recovered and spent the rest of the war in Berlin. He also came to ASHCAN when the British arrested Doenitz' government May 23 1945. He was not interrogated while he was at ASHCAN.

³⁰⁴ Ivo Giannini. "Detailed Interrogation Report: Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz." RG478 Box 1328,16 July, 194, 2..

³⁰⁵ Ibid, 2-4.

Lieutenant Colonel Ernst John von Freyend

He was a Lieutenant Colonel and worked as an aide to General Keitel at OKW. He came to ASHCAN with everyone else from Flensburg, but never faced any charges. The Allies released him from custody shortly after he arrived at Nuremberg. Freyend did have the distinction of being the only prisoner in ASHCAN ever placed on reduced rations as punishment for failure to give proper military courtesy to his captors.

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring

Kesselring, born in 1885, joined the Bavarian army in 1904, and served in World War I as a balloon observer. After World War I, he remained in the army until 1933. At that time he became head of the administration department at the Reich Commissariat for Aviation, which organized the German Luftwaffe under the guise of a civilian organization, until Germany started to rearm.

He commanded Luftwaffe units during the invasion of Poland, the West and Russia. In 1942 he became Commander in Chief South which gave him overall command in the Mediterranean, including overall charge of the campaign against the Allies in Italy. By the end of the war he commanded all German forces on in the West. He also helped organize the surrender of all German forces in Italy. He surrendered on May 9 1945. He was an early arrival at ASHCAN, where he remained until moving on the Nuremberg.

Colonel General Georg Lindemann

Lindemann was born in 1884. He served in World War I and remained in the army between the wars. He commanded the 36th Infantry Division in 1940. By the end of the war he was in charge of the defense of Denmark, and he signed the surrender of

German troops in this area. The British placed him under arrest in June 1945 and sent him to ASHCAN. He acted as a witness during the IMT trials.

Captain Walter Luedde-Neurath

Luedde-Neurath was born in Heunigton Germany in 1914. He commanded several ships during World War II, but at the end of the war he served as an aide to Admiral Doenitz. He came to ASHCAN as part of the Flensburg government interned at Mondorf.

General Der Infanterie Hermann Reinecke

Reinecke, born in Wittenberg in 1888, studied with the Cadet Corps and joined the 79th Infantry Regiment in 1905, remaining with that unit through the end of World War I. After the war, he stayed in the army, in positions at the Ministry of Defense. He was a member of the NSFO (Nationalsozialistische Führungsoffiziere). This group promoted Nazi ideas within the army, and he ran the General Office of the Armed Forces at OKW. He held this position until the end of the war. He was part of the Flensburg government brought to ASHCAN.

In the Preamble of the Interrogation Report, Ivo Giannini wrote:

Source is a highly intelligent officer and seems rather anxious to establish the fact that his 'hands are clean'. The information he gives in this report is considered possibly reliable only because it touches slightly on material source may consider self-incriminatory. He was told the information requested was for historical purposes and asked to be as careful and exact as possible.

General WARLIMONT describes Source as a go-between for KEITEL and Party. As Chief of the NSFO it was REINECKE's duty to influence the Officer Corps in National Socialism. He was a stranger in the General Corps and was looked upon by officers more as a Party man than as a soldier.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ Ivo Giannini. "Detailed Interrogation Report: Hermann Reinecke General Der Infanterie," NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 20-21 July, 1945, 2.

Captain Otto Salman

Salman commanded the German submarine U-52 from November 1939 until May 1941. The IMT interrogated him regarding U-Boat tactics and the handling of survivors of ships torpedoed by his U-Boat.³⁰⁷ Otto Salman came to ASHCAN as the personal adjutant to Doenitz. He remained in this capacity, so there was no interest in interrogating him and eventually he was released.

Rear Admiral Gerhard Wagner

Wagner, born in Schwerin in 1898, joined the German Navy in 1916, and served in the German-Italian forces during the Spanish Civil War. During the first part of the Second World War II, he was Naval Attaché in Spain. He later became head of the operation department for the Naval Staff, and he helped negotiate the surrender of German naval forces in Northern Germany before Germany's final surrender. He came to Mondorf at the end of the Flensburg government in May 1945. When ASHCAN closed, he went to Nuremberg as a material witness, testifying during the trial. While at Nuremberg, the Office of Chief of Counsel interrogated him regarding the Commando Order Hitler gave. In his interrogation he told Lt. John B. Martin that he was personally opposed to the order but did pass it on through channels.³⁰⁸

General Der Artillerie Walter Warlimont

Warlimont, born in 1894 in Osnabruck, received a commission in the army in June 1914 after being an officer candidate. He served in an artillery unit during the war

³⁰⁷ Lt. John B. Masrtin, Interrogation of Otto Salman By Lt. (j.g.) John B. Martin, on 2 November 1945 (AM and PM),” Cornell University Law School, William Donovan Nuremberg Trails Collection, 1.

³⁰⁸ Lt. John B. Martin. “Brief of Interrogation of Gerhard Wagner, 29 October, 1945”, Cornell University Law School, William Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, 1.

and afterwards was a member of Freikorps Maerker. Between the wars he served in both administrative positions in the Army and in various artillery units. During the Polish Campaign and in Western Europe in 1940, he served as Jodl's deputy. Beginning in December 1941, he began attending the daily 'War Room' conferences. He steadily rose in rank, ultimately being promoted to General Der Artillerie in April 1944.

Present at the July 20 1944 bomb plot against Hitler, he suffered a concussion. The results of this concussion led to his retirement on 6 September 1944. He was at Flensburg when the Allies arrested the government and removed to ASHCAN at that time.

He proved to be very cooperative and helpful in custody, becoming one of the German leaders of the Historical Division history of the war from the German perspective. As previously mentioned, his wife was an heir to the Busch family breweries. He spent a lot of time in the United States and knew General Donovan personally.

In the Preamble to his Interrogation Report, Ivo Giannini writes the following about Warlimont:

Source has been very cooperative in our behalf. He insists that he has not been in favor of Nazi policies, and cites instances in his career as witness to this fact. He attributes his rise to his present rank to General Field Marshall KEITEL's estimation of his (source's) ability. The I.O making this report can vouch for the fact that KEITEL considered Source one of the ablest officers in his command, having learned this fact from previous personal conversation with KEITEL.

Source suffered a brain concussion in the 20 Jul attempt on Hitler's life, which did not manifest itself until 6 Sept 44 at which time he retired from duty and never returned. He maintained that he used his injury as an excuse not to return to duty, as he was sick of the entire program, and he offers Prof. BUMKE as witness to the truth of this statement.

It is believed that the information contained in this report is a fair account of Source's knowledge and convictions and may be considered reliable.³⁰⁹

German Politicians

Hans Borchers

Borchers, born in Berlin in 1887, went to law school in Heidelberg and Berlin. In 1914 he entered into service with the German Foreign Office. When World War I began, he joined the army but after being wounded, he left the army and returned to the foreign office. In 1923 he opened the German Consulate in Cleveland, Ohio and in April 1933 he became German Consul General at the Consulate in New York City when previous Consul ran afoul of the Nazi Party. According to documents, he joined the Nazi Party in 1936 in order to keep his government job. In the summer of 1941 the Foreign Office ordered him back. He returned to Germany in late July 1941. However, he ended up in Chile, although originally headed to China, and remained there until September 1943 when Chile broke off relations with Germany. On his return to Berlin, he continued to work at the Foreign Ministry, but he also had a propaganda role. He refused to work with the propagandist, and in November 1944, would be removed from his job. He spent the rest of the war in Heidelberg, where he was arrested on May 28 and moved to ASHCAN. At ASHCAN he proved to be a very cooperative witness. The assessment him from the Preamble of his June 22 1945 Interrogation Report describes him as 'a well-educated career diplomat who deplores, it is believed honestly, the whole development that GERMANY underwent since 1933. He has consistently emphasized that he had nothing to do with any German espionage activities in the United States because of the bad affect

³⁰⁹ Ivo Giannini. "Detailed Interrogation Report: General Walter Warlimont" RG478, Box 1328, 2.

such activities invariably had on diplomatic relations. It is believed the following information is reliable.”³¹⁰

Admiral Nicolaus Horthy, Regent of Hungary

Horthy, born in Hungary in 1868, served in the Imperial Austrian Navy in World War I. At the end of World War I the realignment of European states left Hungary without the need for a navy, so Horthy retired. A coup attempt by Hungarian Communists brought him back in to service. The Hungarian National Assembly tried to recreate the Kingdom of Hungary in 1920. The victorious powers of the Triple Entente would never accept the king back on the throne so the government created a regency with Horthy in charge of the country.

When World War II began, Horthy was in a uncertain state. He claims he felt no affection for Hitler’s Germany, but he was much more anti-Communist than anti-Fascist. Under him Hungary participated in the invasion of Yugoslavia, more in a support role at first but ultimately seeking a piece of the country. Horthy became a reluctant ally, but dragged his feet on sending Hungarian Jews to Nazi concentration camps. This and his wavering support of the German war effort as well as Hungarian attempts to seek peace with the Allies before the Soviets could invade resulted in German occupation of Hungary. On 15 October, 1944, the Germans captured Horthy while his son was negotiating with the Soviets. The Germans took Horthy to Bavaria where they imprisoned him in a castle, allowing him to live comfortably. He remained there until arrested by the Allies on 1 May, 1945.

³¹⁰ Thomas C Van Cleve. “Hans Borchers, Former Consul General in New York City Life History and Reply to CI Questionnaire,” 25 June, 1945”, NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 2.

After his arrest, the Allies placed him first at the original ASHCAN in Spa, Belgium, and then moved him to ASHCAN in Luxembourg. There was not much Allied interest in Horthy. A British Army officer interrogated him once about Nazi participation in Hungarian government during the war. When Mondorf closed he went to Nuremberg. On 17 December, 1945, the Allies released him and allowed him to settle with his family in a town in Bavaria, in the American Occupation zone, where the former U.S. Ambassador to Hungary John Montgomery supported him financially. Because of the Communist regime in Hungary, he never returned, and died in 1957 having lived his final years in Portugal.

Otto Meissner

Meissner was born in Bischweiler, Germany in 1880, which is in Alsace-Lorraine so is now in France. He went to law school where he passed his exams in 1902. He joined the army reserves in 1903. In 1907 he went to work for the German State Railway and served in World War I in a railroad unit. In November 1918 he entered the diplomatic service, becoming Charge d'Affaires in the Ukraine. In March 1919 he moved to the Foreign Office, working in the Russian Division because he spoke Russian. In April 1919 he transferred to the Chancellery of the President and became head of the Chancellery in 1920, eventually rising to the title of Staatminister, and he remained in this post until the end of the war, although his power gradually diminished under Hitler. In 1933 he was part of the group, along with Papen, that enabled Hitler to become Chancellor. The Preamble of his Interrogation Report, written by Thomas C. Van Cleve, states the following:

PW is 65 years old, a lawyer and civil servant of the old school. He was for 25 years head of the Praesidial. He is exceptionally well informed,

bitter toward the Nazis, particularly toward Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery. He feels that the latter usurped virtually all the functions of the Praesidial. Accordingly, he is inclined to be cooperative and to discuss freely his experiences under the Nazis.³¹¹

The Nazis

Ernst Bohle

Bohle, born in Bradford, England on July 28 1903, grew up in England and then South Africa before going to Germany for college. He joined the Nazi Party in 1932 and worked in the import-export business and then the automotive industry until 1933. In May, 1933 he became head of the NSDAP/AO, the Nazi Party's foreign organization. He joined the staff of Rudolf Hess, Hitler's Deputy Fuhrer, and was also State Secretary in the Foreign Office.

Dr. Karl Brandt

Brandt, born on 8 January 1904 in Mulhouse, Germany, became a physician in 1928 and joined the Nazi Party in 1932. In 1934, he became part of Hitler's inner social circle at Berchtesgaden, and he traveled with Hitler as his personal physician. Brandt supported the idea of euthanasia and became one of the co-leaders of the T-4 Euthanasia Program, the program that first began the German extermination process by killing the infirm, handicapped, deformed and mentally challenged.

He became Reich Commissioner for Health and Medical Services in 1942 and Reich Commissioner for Sanitation and Health in 1944, controlling the number of beds available for military and civilians in Germany, the production of medical goods, and most significantly, medical research. The Nazi experiments at the concentration camps

³¹¹ Tomas C. Van Cleve. "Detailed Interrogation Report: Development of the Structure of Nazi German Government; Otto Meissner, 10 June 1945" NARA, RG475, BOX 1328, 2.

came under his sphere of control. In the fall of 1944, Hitler relieved him of his duties and he went into semi-retirement. He attributed the loss of his job to “friction with Dr. Morell,” who became Hitler’s personal physician.

In April 1945 he attempted to move his family out of Berlin and was arrested. He stood trial at Goebbels’s villa and stood accused of defeatism. His execution was continuously stayed until finally Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz freed him. He went into Allied custody with the rest of Doenitz’ government at Flensburg on 23 May, 1945.

The impressions of his interrogator was that Brandt “seems reasonably reliable and talks freely. It is believed that most of the information contained in this report may be considered reliable.”³¹²

Walter Buch

Walter Buch, born on 24 October, 1883, was truly an ‘alte Kämpfer’, joining the Nazi Party in 1922 and participating in the Beer Hall Putsch in November 1923. As a leader in the SA, he worked to keep that group together after Hitler went to prison. Buch had another connection to the party; he was the father in law of Martin Bormann. He became the Chief of the Supreme NSDAP Courts, thereby helping make Nazi excesses legal under the law.

According to his interrogation report, Buch regarded himself as an “arbiter of disputes involving party members.” The report states “[i]n view of PW’s long association with the Nazis, his position as Head of the Supreme Party Court, his pea of ignorance respecting both organizations and activities is incredible. A man of intelligence, obviously faithful to the ideology which he served, he masks the proceeding of the

³¹² Thomas C. Van Cleve. “Dr. Karl Brandt: His Career, His Position as Reich Commissioner for Health and Medical Services.” NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 30 June 1945,2.

Partigericht behind the alleged code of honor of the ancient Prussian court.” In the view of Colonel Van Cleve, author of the report, “[i]n general what PW has seen fit to state may be regarded as truthful. What he has omitted is of far greater significance.”³¹³

Kurt Deluege

Deluege, born in Upper Silesia in 1897, joined the German Army in 1916 and fought on the Western Front. In 1921 he became a member of Freikorps Rossbach and a couple years later joined the Nazi Party. He joined the SA in 1926 and the SS in 1930. He became leader of the SA in Berlin, in addition to being Goebbels’ deputy Gauleiter. In 1930 he joined the SS. He became Deputy Protector for Bohemia and Moravia in 1942. After the Czechs killed Reinhard Heydrich in 1942, he helped organize the destruction of the villages of Lidice and Lazaky, which included murdering all the men of the village and the sending the women and children of the villages to concentration camps. In May 1943, Himmler relieved him of his duty for medical reasons. He went home to Lübeck where the British arrested him on in May 1945 and moved him to Mondorf. His interrogator wrote in the Preamble of the Interrogation Report:

PW is 48 Years Old, very nervous and suffering from a weak heart. He is an engineer by profession and claims to have been a hard-working man all his life. His contribution to the Nazi Party was organizational and administrative, but not policy-making. He suffered from congenital syphilis and was close to insanity at the time he was more or less forcibly retired by HIMMLER from his position as Chief of the ORDNUNGSPOLIZEI, May 1943. He took the severe malaria cure for syphilis at this time and retired, under HIMMLER’s orders, from all further participation in political life.

Estimate of Reliability: Possibly true report.³¹⁴

³¹³ Tomas C. Van Cleve, “Special Report on Walter Buch, Reichsleiter and Oberster Parteirichter.” NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 5 June, 1945.2.

³¹⁴ Thomas C. Van Cleve. “Deluege: Reply to Special CI Questionnaire.” NARA, RG478, Box 1328 , 12 June 1945.2.

Richard Walter Darre

Born in Argentina in 1895, his family sent Darre to school in Heidelberg in 1911. He fought for Germany during World War I. After the war he ended up at the University of Halle pursuing a degree in agriculture focused on animal breeding. He received a Ph.D. in 1929. Darre bought into the con of “*Blut und Boden*,” Blood and soil. In 1930 he met Hitler and joined the SS. In June 1942 he became Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture. Disliked by Himmler, by 1942 the Party forced him to resign. He was out of any office for the remainder of the war. The U.S. Army arrested him in 1945. He remained in Allied hands a material witness until 1949 when the Americans indicted him as part of the Ministries Trial.

Erwin Krauss

Erwin Krauss, born in Karlsruhe in 1894, served in the Imperial Army in World War I and joined Freikorps Berlin after the war, and studied mechanical engineering and joined the Nazi Party in 1929, and in 1933 he joined the NSKK, the National Socialist Motor Corps, which trained drivers and provided drivers for German groups such as Organization Todt. He held a seat in the Reichstag from 1936 until the end of the war. He became corps commander of the NSKK in 1942 and held this position until the end of the war.

When the war ended the Allies placed him in ASHCAN. While in Mondorf, no one interrogated him. The Allies eventually freed him and he moved to Freiburg and later Munich after the war.

Friedrich Wilhelm Kritzinger

Kritzinger, born in 1879, studied law before World War I, but he served in the army during the war where he became a prisoner of the French. After the war, he finished his legal studies. He worked in several different ministries at the state and federal level. In 1938 he became Ministerialdirektor to the Reich Chancellery and joined the Nazi Party. In 1942 Lammers made him State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery, a position he held until the end of the war. He left Berlin for Flensburg on April 21 1945. The British arrested him and sent to ASHCAN on 23 May, 1945.

In the Preamble of his Interrogation Report, Ivo Giannini described him in this manner:

Source is a typical example of the faithful German civil-servant. He sympathizes with Nazism in its theoretical form but violently condemns its radical outgrowth. He tries to take all guilt from the German people and blames its leaders for conditions in GERMANY.³¹⁵

At the IMT trials in Nuremberg he served as a witness. When the trials were over the Allies released him.

Hans Heinrich Lammers

Lammers, born in 1879, received a law doctorate in 1904 and became a judge in 1912. He served in World War I, and at the end of the war he returned to his career as a lawyer, joined the German National People's Party, and became an undersecretary in the Reich Ministry of the Interior in 1922. He joined the Nazi Party in 1932 and quickly moved through the ranks, becoming Chief of the Reich Chancellery in 1932. He eventually added the titles of Minister without Portfolio and President of the Reich

³¹⁵ Ivo Giannini. "Detailed Interrogation Report: Friedrich Wilhelm Kritzinger." NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 27 July 1945, 2.

Cabinet. The Nazis arrested him in April 1945, alleging he had a role in Goering's "attempt" to seize power. Lammers avoided death when captured by American forces.

He went to ASHCAN and remained there until moved to Nuremberg. An assessment of Lammers is provided in an Interrogation Report dated 22 July 1945, presumably conducted by Dr. George Shuster, although no author is provided. The report describes him in this manner:

LAMMERS, an old civil servant and expert on constitutional law, was Hitler's mentor in administrative matters and more or less took over the functions of Reich Chancellor after Hitler became the Chief of State. His notes on government, administration, and legislation can therefore be considered as authoritative.³¹⁶

Jakob Nagel

Nagel, born in 1899, served in the Imperial German Army during World War I. In May 1920 he began an apprenticeship as a Postreferent in Karlsruhe, spending his entire career in the German Postal Service. He joined the Nazi Party in 1932 and worked his way up the administrative ladder ultimately being named State Secretary in the Reichspost Ministry. At the end of the war, the British arrested him and sent him to Mondorf. He never faced a trial for war crimes of any sort.

Ivo Giannini wrote in the Preamble of his Interrogation Report:

It is rather difficult to understand why NAGEL had been selected as State Secretary of the REICHSPPOSTMINISTERIUM unless he possesses outstanding technical knowledge or ability. He possibly owes his position to his friendship with OHNESORGE, whose orders he always carried out with great Loyalty. His manners are very subservient and his demeanor in general is that of a middle class German "BEAMTER" or minor executive. His present attitude is one of fear, and he seems overly anxious to impart any and all knowledge he possesses. In view of this, the

³¹⁶ George Shuster, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Hans Heinrich Lammers",: George Naumann Shuster Papers, University of Notre Dame, 22 July 1945, 2.

information he gives is believed to be fairly reliable and probably true. Further interrogation will exploit his technical and general knowledge.³¹⁷

Philipp, Prince of Hesse

Philipp, born in 1896, supported Hitler and his ideas when the Nazi party began making gains in elections. Philipp “joined” the Party in 1930, after meeting Hitler the first time. According to Philipp, after the initial meeting, Hitler told Goering to process his membership in the Party personally, so Philipp never actually signed anything.³¹⁸ During the early years of Hitler’s rise, he often sought out the support of German royalty, and, in particular, the Hohenzollern family, for the Nazi Party. In 1934, Philipp became the Oberpräsident in Kassel. His official position came as a gift since Goering and the Prince knew each other well. When the war began, Philipp helped with the plundering of art for the Nazis.

In the spring of 1943, he began to fall out of favor with Hitler. At the end of April, Hitler put Philipp under virtual house arrest, always keeping him nearby. He moved wherever Hitler moved. Finally, on September 12, 1943 Philipp ended up in the Flossenbürg concentration camp, remaining there until April 15, 1945. After this, the Nazis sent him to Dachau, and from here he moved around a great deal during the last few weeks of the Third Reich. Americans captured him at his last camp on May 4, 1945. After this, he again moved around a lot until finally taken into American custody at Darmstadt. He arrived at ASHCAN on July 6, 1945. The Allies never put him on trial, but he went through a De-Nazification Court in 1947.

³¹⁷ Ivo Giannini, “Detailed Interrogation Report: Jakob Nagel,” NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 2 July 1945, 2.

³¹⁸ Jonathan Petropoulos, *Royals and the Reich* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 106.

Hans Joachim Riecke

Riecke, born in Dresden in 1899, served in the German Army during World War I. After the war, he attended the University of Leipzig, earning a degree in farming in 1925. That year he also joined the Nazi Party, later also joining the SA, rising to the rank of SA-Gruppenfuierer. He became a member of the Prussian Landtag and then a member of the Reichstag in 1933, and later served as chief of agricultural department in the East Ministry. In 1943 Darre relieved him of his duties, but he was then called back when Herbert Backe succeeded Darre at the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture and given the title Acting State Secretary. He joined the Four Year Plan when relieved by Darre and in July 1944 became a State Secretary and lost all other jobs except for working on the Four Year Plan. The Allies arrested him in Flensburg on 23 May 1945 and sent him to ASHCAN.

Once in prison he became something of a repentant Nazi. In his Interrogation Report he is described as follows:

Source now admits that Nazism was a catastrophe (sic) for the German people. An old party member, and a Nazi at heart, he insists that Nazism in its original form was the best for his people but that its outgrowth brought about the happenings of the last few years.

He feels sorry for the 'poor German people' who have suffered much and are continuing to suffer 'innocently' under our non-fraternization policy. He claims that only the men on top are for the war.

He himself takes willingly all responsibility for his share and knows that the Russians could very easily declare him a criminal for all the food and grain which he ordered to be sent back to GERMANY from occupied Russian territories. He is willing to stand trial and expects it. His only hope is that he will not be turned over to the Russians...

The information given in the following report is regarded to be fairly reliable.³¹⁹

³¹⁹ Ivo Giannini, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Hans Joachim Riecke," NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 12 July 1945, 2.

Franz Schwarz

Franz Schwarz was Franz Xaver Schwarz' son. He was in ASHCAN mostly to take care of his father. The son held the title of SS Brigadefuehrer, and he was President of German Breweries. He served no purpose in ASHCAN other than taking care of his father so the interrogators put him to work. They gave him a typewriter and had him type up Julius Streicher's "Bekenntniss" or credo. He was never interrogated or charged.

Franz Xaver Schwarz

Schwarz, born in Günzburg in 1875, served in World War I but did not serve on the front lines after 1916 due to a medical condition. He joined the Nazi Party in 1922, and after the Beer Hall Putsch he raised money to publish Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1933 and eventually gained the title of Reichsleiter. As treasurer of the Nazi Party, he kept it financially viable until the end of the war. Schwarz was a rather colorless man, but he was a true insider. While he may not have known the extent of the Holocaust, he was certainly aware of it, due to the circles in the party in which he traveled.

No one interviewed him at ASHCAN and barely at all. He died in Allied custody in 1948. An interrogation by the U.S. Chief of Council staff barely interrogated him at all, just asking about party dues and who was on the party payroll. His interrogator, Mr. Sackett, wrote that Schwarz "is quite old and somewhat feeble and had to be carried to the interrogation room in a chair. His memory is poor, either intentionally or because of old age and he probably would not make a good witness."³²⁰

³²⁰ Sackett, "Interrogation of Schwarz, Franz Xaver By Mr. Sackett Time 6 November 1945, PM," Cornell University Law Center, William Donovan Nuremberg Trials Collection, 1.

Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk

Krosigk, born in Rathmannsdorf, Germany in 1887, studied law and political science at Halle and Lausanne, and even became a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. He served in World War I and held a number of positions in government after the war, and by 1931 worked in the department in the Finance Ministry that oversaw reparations payments to the Allies.

In 1932 he became Minister of Finance, first appointed by Franz von Papen, retained by his successor Kurt von Schleicher and stayed in his post after Hitler assumed power, remaining there throughout the war. When Hitler committed suicide, he became Leading Minister in Doenitz' new government until the arrest of the government in May 1945.

The Preamble of his Interrogation Report describes him as follows:

PW is 58 years old and has been connected with the German Ministry of Finance since 1920. He has been Minister of Finance since 1932. Admiral DOENITZ appointed him Foreign Minister on 2 May, 1945 because von NEURATH could not be located and he would not have RIBBENTROP. PW is a patriotic and nationalistic German, and he stayed within the government, he claims, in the hope that the violent and revolutionary element in the Nazi Party would eventually lose its grip and disappear. Unfortunately, the reverse happened. He is very tense and grows eloquent in defense, not of the Nazis, but of the positive German action in the crisis of the early thirties. At that time, he claims also, the final act could not yet be known. It is believed that he is reliable.

Estimate of Reliability: Probably true report.³²¹

Franz Seldte

Born in Magdeburg in 1882, Seldte went to work at his family's factory and by 1909 owned and managed the factory. He became a founder of the Deutsche Volkspartei

³²¹ Thomas C. Van Cleve, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk," NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 2 June 1945, 2.

along with Gustav Stresemann in 1918. He also began Stahlhelm in 1918, an organization for veterans of the war to show their dissatisfaction with the peace. He ran this organization until its demise in 1936.

In 1933 Hitler named him Reich Minister for Labor, a position he held until the end of the war. He tried to resign seven different times in protest of Hitler's actions but Hitler never accepted his resignation.

According to the Preamble by Ivo Giannini:

He presents the strange and almost paradoxical picture of a patriotic German who is opposed to aggression and war, of a Prussian who seeks to reconcile and combine discipline and freedom. He is evidently sincere in his desire to assist the Allies in their present tasks in Germany, and can be considered as a reliable source of information, although he naturally attempts to present his own position and attitude in the most favorable light.³²²

The Allies arrested him with the rest of the people at Flensburg on 23 May. He died in Allied hands before ever being arraigned for crimes.

Baron von Steengracht von Moyland

Steengracht, born in 1902, grew up on his father's estate and studied law and national economy at universities in Bonn, Lausanne and Cologne. His mother died and he took over the administration of the family estate in 1930. He joined the Nazi Party and the SA. in 1933.

In 1936 the Nazis offered him a job as Agricultural Attaché in London. He remained in London, until August 1938 when he became Chief of Protocol in the Foreign Office. Once the war began, he headed an advance section of the Foreign Ministry which meant that he followed Hitler in all his travels. He became State Secretary under Ribbentrop in the

³²² Ivo Giannini, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Franz Seldte," NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 8-9 July 1945,2.

Foreign Office in 1943. He was still in this position when he was sent to ASHCAN with the rest of the Flensburg government on 23 May 1945. In the Preamble of the Interrogation Report, Giannini described him as follows:

PW is a German of Dutch descent. Although a party member since 1933 he strongly condemns the outgrowths of National Socialism. Though PW leaves the impression that he is trying to whitewash himself, it is believed that whatever information he gave is probably true.³²³

Karl Stroehlin

Stroelin, born in 1890 in Berlin, was the son of a general in the Imperial German Army. He joined the army and commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant, in 1911. He fought on the Western Front in World War I and resigned his commission in 1920 with the rank of captain.

After the army he entered into public service in Stuttgart, first as a clerk, but eventually winning a seat on the city council. He became an Oberbuehrgermeister in 1933, a position he held until the Nazis arrested him on 25 April, 1945. His arrest came when he negotiated with the French and American Armies to surrender Stuttgart.

He became a party member in 1931 and was an honorary general in the SA. He served as President of the Deutsches Ausland Institut (German Overseas Institute). The Americans arrested him in April 1945 and he ended up at ASHCAN.

In the Preamble to Stroehlin's Interrogation Report, Thomas C. Van Cleve wrote the following:

PW asserts that he has always been very active in international social welfare agencies, and has many letters of commendation regarding this work. He was President of the International Institute for construction of houses and Housing Development (sic), and had worked out an

³²³ Ivo Giannini, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Baron Steengracht von Moyland." RG478 Box 1328, p2.

elaborate program for the protection of cities from air-raids, which he submitted to the International Red Cross at GENEVA.

PW states that his life and public career were in danger because HIMMLER and other Nazi officials constantly investigated and plagued him with suspicion. He was suspected of being sharply opposed to National Socialism, and was mentioned in Allied Nations' news broadcasts as being a member of an opposition government.³²⁴

Wilhelm Stuckart

Stuckart, born in Wiesbaden in 1902, received a degree as Doctor of Law in 1930. In 1933 the Nazis appointed him the mayor of Stettin, and also became a State Secretary in charge of the Educational Division at the Kultusministerium in Berlin. Forced out of these jobs in intra party fighting, he became President of the District Court of Appeals in Darmstadt. He worked in the Ministry of the Interior from 1938 until the end of the war.

He joined the Nazi Party in 1931 and rose to the rank of Obergruppenführer. He stayed active in the NSDAP Administrative Lawyers' Association. He represented Wilhelm Frick at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942. At the end of the war, he became Interior Minister in Doenitz' new government and entered captivity at the arrest of the Flensburg government in May 1945.

Giannini's Interrogation Report of Stuckart included the following description:

Source joined the Nazi Party in 1931, and claims that he was 'practically forced' to become a Nazi in order to keep his position. He appears very anxious to blame all of his Party connections – including his position as STANDARTENFUERER in the SS – on the Nazi system of 'requiring all public servants to join these organizations.'

Source is very cautious and hesitant in answering questions about the Ministry of the Interior or Nazi Party activities. His replies to questions were somewhat evasive and full of excuses about not having reference material and papers to answer questions in detail. Source claimed that his memory was very poor; he was quite ready to find faults in the way he was forced to live in the detention center, and gave the impression of being very vague about detailed

³²⁴ Thomas C. Van Cleve. "Detailed Interrogation Report: Dr. Karl Stroehlin." NARA, RG478 Box 1328, 11-12 June 1945, 2.

information. However, source was able to furnish an answer to most questions concerning organization in the Ministry of the Interior. He was especially evasive when the questions became personal or the answer might 'involve' himself or other people.

Therefore, the information in this report may be considered fairly reliable, as it is general in form and does not involve anyone.³²⁵

Franz Ritter von Epp

Born in Munich in 1888, during World War I he served in a Bavarian unit and after the war he formed Freikorps Epp, part of the forces that crushed the brief Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919. He left the army in 1923, and became active in rightwing politics. He became a Nazi Party member, and a member of the Reichstag in 1928, and in 1933 became Reichsstatthalter of Bavaria, a post he occupied until his arrest in April, 1945. He was implicated by name in a plot to surrender Munich. He was in the hospital with heart issues when the war ended. Informed of his presence by a nurse, the Allies arrested him and placed him in ASHCAN on 15 June.

The Preamble to his Interrogation Report describes him as "a senile bachelor who is completely taken in by the achievements of Nazism in its 'glory' ... The following answers to SHAEF questionnaire 9 Jul 45 are believed to be given to the best of the source's knowledge."³²⁶ To perhaps further underscore his devotion to Nazism, under Allied custody Giannini writes that "von EPP emphasizes that his name was mentioned against his will in connection with the MUNICH uprising and that he had nothing to do with it."³²⁷

Epp died in Allied custody on 31 December, 1946.

³²⁵ Ivo Giannini, "Wilhelm Stuckart and Wilhelm Frick on the Reich Ministry of the Interior." NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 3 August 1945, 2.

³²⁶ Ivo Giannini, "Detailed Interrogation Report: Franz Ritter von Epp., 29 July 1945." RG478 Box 1328, 2.

³²⁷ Giannini, 4.

Paul Wegener

Paul Wegener, born in 1908 in Varel, Germany, joined the Nazi Party in 1930 and the following year joined the S.A. He served as Deputy Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories. He became Gauleiter of Weser-Ems in May 1942. He proposed a reorganization of the Nazi Party in what is known as the Wegener Memorandum, essentially shrinking the size of the party to a core of elite members and using membership in the Hitler Youth as the pathway to party membership. Beginning in July 1944 he ran the administration of the Plenipotentiary for Total War. Arrested after the war, he spent time in prison for civilian deaths in Bremen. There is no record an interrogation of him at ASHCAN.

Werner Zschintzsch

Zschintzsch, born on 26 January 1888 in Rossla am Harz, studied law and passed his professional exam in 1909. He served as an officer during World War I, but not on the front lines. He joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and in 1936 he became State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Science, Education and National Culture, serving in this capacity throughout the war. The Allies arrested him when they imprisoned the Flensburg government in May 1945. Along with most of the rest of these men, he went to ASHCAN.

When interviewed he denied any knowledge of Nazi crimes. In the Preamble of his Interrogation report of 14 July, 1945, the interrogator, Ivo Giannini wrote the following:

Source is a Civil servant who faithfully followed his Nazi leaders. He claims that he was never interested in Politics. Before 1933 he was “DEUTSCHNATIONAL”, but as civil servant could not very well keep out of the Nazi sphere.

He entered the Party in Jul 34, supposedly upon request of SPRENGER, who was GAULEITER at that time. However, remained inactive. About 1935 he joined the NSRB... (National Socialist Jurists' League).

In Mar 1936 he was nominated SS OBERFUEHRER by HIMMLER but held this rank only in an honorary capacity, without any functions.

The information given is regarded as fairly reliable.³²⁸

The Allies never charged him with any war crimes.

The Allies held a large variety of prisoners at ASHCAN. These included generals and field marshals who helped Hitler plan and execute the war. These men also willingly supported orders from Hitler such as the Commando Order. The group also included the most despicable and diehard Nazis in Germany, most of them unrepentant to the end. Politicians who may or may not have actively supported the regime were also held at Mondorf. There are some who may have been held because the Allies did not truly understand their role in the Nazi regime and perceived them to be guilty of crimes. Finally, a small number of men worked as aides and adjutants under some of these men, their greatest sin perhaps being the position they held. The Allies cast a wide net to fill ASHCAN and ended up with a rather diverse collection of prisoners from whom they hoped to gather more detailed information about Hitler's Germany and its crimes.

Appendix B:

³²⁸ Ivo Giannini. "Detailed Interrogation Report: Werner Zschintzsch." NARA, RG478, Box 1328, 8 July 1945 2.

ASHCAN Prisoners Put on Trial by the Allies

Once all of these prisoners left for Nuremberg, the trial process began. All of these men either stood trial or remained in Allied custody until the war crimes trials conducted by the Allies finished. The following list is separated by the trial at which some stood trial, and reveals their fates. The indictments of the trial and the counts of which they were convicted are included.

International Military Tribunal

The charges were as follows:

5. All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding May 8 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy;³²⁹
6. All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also war in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances;³³⁰

³²⁹ Avalon Project at Yale Law School. "Nuremberg Trial Proceeding Vol.1, Indictment: Count One," <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count1.asp> (accessed April 15, 2015).

³³⁰ Avalon Project at Yale Law School, "Nuremberg Trial Proceeding Vol 1, Count Two," <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count2.asp> (Accessed April 15, 2015).

7. All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September 1939 and 8 May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied by the German Armed Forces since 1 September 1939, and in Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas,³³¹
8. All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of years preceding 8 May 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1 September 1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High Seas.³³²

These indictments gave Colonel Amen and his team guidelines to use for their questioning of the defendants during interrogations. The interrogators at ASHCAN, under the guidance of the 6824 DIC and the Shuster Commission, never asked questions that would obviously tie the prisoners to these crimes in the IMT indictment.

Karl Doenitz

Convicted on Counts Two and Three and received a ten-year sentence. He served out his time at Spandau Prison and the Allies released him on October 1, 1956. He died on December 24 1980.³³³

Hans Frank

Convicted on Counts Three, and Four and sentenced to death by hanging. Hanged October 16, 1946.

³³¹ Avalon Project at Yale Law School, "Nuremberg Trial Proceeding, Vol 1, Indictment Count Three," <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count3.asp>, (accessed April 15, 2015).

³³² Avalon Project At Yale Law School, "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol 1 Indictment Count Four." <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count4.asp>, (accessed April 15 2015).

³³³ Peter Padfield, *Dönitz: The Last Führer: Portrait of a Nazi War Leader* (New York" Harper & Row. 1981), 490.

Wilhelm Frick

Convicted on Counts Two, Three, and Four and sentenced to death by Hanging.
Hanged October 16, 1945.

Walther Funk

Convicted on Counts Two, Three, and Four and sentenced to life in Spandau
Prison. Released due to illness on May 16, 1957, and he died on May 31, 1960.³³⁴

Hermann Goering

Convicted on all four counts and sentenced to death by hanging. Goering,
however, managed to cheat the hangman by committing suicide several hours before he
was to hang. He died October 16, 1946.

Alfred Jodl

Convicted on all four counts and sentenced to death by hanging. The Allies
hanged him on October 16, 1946. In 1953, a West German Appeals Court overturned the
verdict and rehabilitated him, returning all confiscated property over to his widow.³³⁵

Wilhelm Keitel

Convicted on all four counts of the indictment and sentenced to death by hanging.
The Allies hanged him on October 16, 1946.

Robert Ley

Indicted on all four counts by the IMT, he committed suicide on October 25 1945.

Franz von Papen

³³⁴ Christian Zentner and Friedemann Bedürftig, eds., *The Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, Vol. 1* (New York: MacMillan, 1991), 310.

³³⁵ *Ibid*, 474.

The IMT indicted him on Counts One and Two, but he was found not guilty. After his release the West German government prosecuted him in 1949. They sentenced him to eight years in a work camp but released him due to time served.

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Convicted on all four counts of the indictment and sentenced to death by hanging. The Allies hanged him on October 16, 1946.

Alfred Rosenberg

Indicted and convicted on all four counts of the indictment, the Allies hanged him on October 16, 1946.

Arthur Seyss-Inquart

Convicted on Counts Two, Three, and Four, the IMT sentenced him to death by hanging. The Allies carried out his sentence on October 16 1946.

Julius Streicher

The IMT indicted Streicher on Counts One and Four, and convicted him on Count Four. Sentenced to death by hanging, the Allies carried out his sentence on October 16, 1946.

Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings

Doctor's Trial

At the completion of the IMT trial in October 1946, the Americans began a new group of trials known as the subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings. The Americans held twelve other trials of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg.

Karl Brandt

At the Doctors Trial, Dr. Karl Brandt stood accused of conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, war crimes, including performing medical experiments, Crimes against humanity and membership in a criminal organization. The court found Brandt guilty of Counts Two, Three, and Four and sentenced him to death by hanging. The Americans hanged him on June 22, 1948.³³⁶

Ministries Trial

The Ministries Trial tried members of Nazi Government ministries accused of war crimes from January 6, 1948 until April 13, 1949. The Americans announced the verdicts on April 13, 1949. The indictments covered eight separate counts. Several ASHCAN prisoners stood before the court in this trial.

Ernst Wilhelm Bohle

Bohle, State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry and head of the Nazi Foreign Organization received a five-year prison sentence. John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany pardoned him on December 21, 1949.

Richard Walther Darré

³³⁶ Ulf Schmidt, *Karl Brandt: The Nazi Doctor* (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), 396.

Darre, former Minister for Food and Agriculture, received a seven-year sentence, but was released in 1950.

Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk

Krosigk received a ten-year sentence, but the Americans released him in 1951.

Hans Heinrich Lammers

Lammers, former state secretary for the Reich Chancellery, received a twenty-year sentence. The Americans reduced his sentence in 1951 to ten years and released him on December 16, 1951.

Otto Meissner

The court acquitted Meissner of all charges against him.

Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland

Moyland, sentenced to seven-year by the court, received a reduction in sentence to five years in December 1949, and the Americans released him in 1950.

Wilhelm Stuckart

Found guilty at the trial, the Americans released him due to the time he already spent in prison.

By the time these men received their sentences, West Germany had formed. Sentence reductions and early release occurred frequently as the Americans sought to placate the new government to support them, rearm, and join NATO.

High Command Trial

At the High Command Trial, German generals and one admiral stood accused of war crimes. The counts were crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and a conspiracy charge, although the tribunal dropped the conspiracy charge.

Johannes Blaskowitz

Blaskowitz committed suicide during the early stages of the trial by throwing himself off of a balcony.

Hermann Reinecke

Reinecke, sentenced to life in prison, was released by the Americans in 1954.

Walter Warlimont

The Americans found him guilty of counts Two and Three and sentenced him to life in prison, which they reduced to eighteen years in 1951 and released him in 1954.

Other Trials

The British held a trial with Albert Kesselring as the main defendant in February 1947. When the trial ended, he received a death sentence. The British held the trial in Venice, Italy, but Italy refused to carry out a death sentence, because Italy no longer had the death penalty. Instead, the British commuted his sentence to life in prison and in October 1952, Kesselring got out of jail and received a pardon from the West German government, and got out of prison in October, 1952.

The Czech government wanted to try those responsible for the massacre at Lidice June 10 1942. The Czechs put Kurt Deluege on trial for this crime and found him guilty. The Czech government hanged him on October 24, 1946.

Most of the remaining prisoners never faced trial and after being held as material witnesses, most eventually gained their freedom. A few such as Franz Xaver Schwarz

and Walter Buch received punishment from West German De-Nazification proceedings beginning in 1949 after the formal establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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