A CAUSAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC STABILITY IN CHILE

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Art

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1969

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In 1952 Carlos Ibanez was elected President of Chile. A former military commander, and dictator of the country during the Depression, and now elected at a time when Chileans were again suffering from a stagnating economy, Ibanez appeared the perfect candidate to brush aside constitutional proscriptions and rule in the sweeping fashion that circumstances seemed to dictate. Instead, during his six-year term, Ibanez was a model of propriety. Near the end of his term, in a moment of candor Ibanez revealed to the American political scientist, K. H. Silvert that

> if I had believed in the existence of a necessity strong enough to break the Constitution I would have been able to do it with the acquiescence of the major part of the citizenry, because - to speak with crude frankness - that is just what broad national sectors expected of me. Nevertheless, in obedience to firm conviction and my cool appreciation of what is fitting for the republic, I have maintained the action of the Government within the respect which is owed to the Constitution and the laws.[1]

This and similar incidents point to the uniqueness of Chile among Latin American countries. In a continent where constitutions are unobserved and tossed aside with impunity, where the military coup is a normal method of succession, and where political

[1]As quoted in Albert O. Hirschman, Journies Toward Progress (Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1963), p. 193.

instability reaches epidemic proportions, Chile stands in marked contrast.[2] Since World War II, seventeen of the 20 Latin American countries have had successful military coups. During this century Chile has had only one brief period of military control, during the Depression, and for the past thirty-seven years, constitutional succession has been unbroken. In their study of the Chilean presidency, Gray and Kirwin conclude that "elected presidents have been the rule, revealing a strong adherence to constitutional methods and a significant degree of constitutional stability."[3] Elected presidents served for eighty-eight per cent of the 150 years covered in their study.[4] During this time there have been sixty-five changes in the presidency, and of these 75 per cent

[2]For an attempt to deal theoretically with instability in Latin America, see Merle Kling, "A Theory of Power and Political Instability," in Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1968), PP. 76-93. Less general, but with valuable hypotheses and attempts at quantification is Ernest A . Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," American Political Science Review (December, 1968). Another effort to deal with this subject in the Latin American context is Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968). An enumeration of instable events for the entire world can be found in Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution (September, 1966), and Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton University: Center of International Studies, 1967).

[3]Richard B. Gray and Frederick R. Kirwin, "Presidential Succession in Chile: 1817-1966," Journal of Inter-American Studies (January. 1969), p. 147.

[4]Ibid.

were stable changes, i.e., were "peaceful, non-forced, and constitutional."[5] Since 1932, there have been ten constiutional changes in the presidency with no interruptions.[6]

In the past twenty years, revolutions, insurrections. or guerrilla warfare have occurred in seven Latin American countries: Cuba, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuala, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.[7] Again Chile has a clear record. In fact since 1935, Chile is the only country in Latin America to have an unblemished record of adherence to constitutional norms.[8]

In addition to political stability, Chile is also characterized by democratic political institutions. Just how extensive democracy is in Chile is a controversial subject which we will investigate further, but there is suffrage for all literate Chileans, a party system with several stable parties, freedom of speech and press, and extensive organization of interest groups. Again these characteristics indicate that Chile occupies an unusual position among Latin American countries. Only Costa Rica and Uruguay have comparably democratic governments.[9]

As an example of democratic stability among unstable, nondemocratic

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[5]Ibid., p. 149.

[6]Ibid., p. 158, Appendix B.

[7]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 3.

[8]Needler, p. 85.

[9]Based on evaluations of Latin American specialists in the United States as reported in Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Measuring Democratic Change in Latin America," Journal of Politics (February, 1967), pp. 129-166.

nations, Chile offers some unusual opportunities for investigation. Most explanations of democratic stability have been derived from European and Anglo-American nations, but the applicability of such explanations for other areas of the world remains unestablished. Thus, Chile may be used to see if such explanations are also relevant in the context of an "underdeveloped" nation. On the other hand, investigations of Chile may point to new variables that examination of either European or Anglo-American nations has not revealed.

In addition to the obvious relevance a study of Chile has for the question of political stability, the country may also be considered in relation to the problem of political development. Throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America the political problems which accompany modernization are of major consequence. Certainly one of the most fundamental questions is whether or not a country can be modernized by evolutionary, constitutional, nonviolent political processes or if the task requires an abrupt, revolutionary, violent break with the past.

Although our own purposes will lead us to examine the question of democratic stability rather than political development, it is obvious that the two problems are closely related. For a government to propose any policy of modernization, it is assuming that it will be able to govern. It expects to remain in power for some specifiable, predictable period, it expects its policies to be obeyed, and it expects political demands to be articulated through channels in such a way that will allow

them to be considered and acted upon by the government. For any policy of modernization this seems a minumum prerequisite for success, and to achieve less would immediately doom any proposal, no matter how ingenius. In other words, political development assumes the existence of political stability, so to speak about the problems of political development, one is indirectly dealing with the problem of political stability.

The Chilean approach to modernization has been constitutional and nonviolent, so it again offers opportunities for the researcher. It is a developing nation, it is following an evolutionary policy of modernization, and it is doing so with a stable democratic political system. The conjunction of these events in Chile provides an excellent opportunity to increase our knowledge about both political development and democratic stability.

This thesis will be a four-step effort to take advantage of some of these research potentialities: (1) Democratic stability will be defined, (2) Four explanations of democratic stability will be examined, (3) Several case studies of democratic stability in Chile will be evaluated, and (4) A causal model of democratic stability based on our examination of the theoretical literature and the case studies of Chile will be proposed and operationalized.

DEFINITION OF MAJOR CONCEPTS

Our use of the term "democracy" is restricted to two areas, the

method provided to gain a policy-making office, and the manner in which that office is executed. Three features characterize the democratic method of gaining a policy-making office: (1) Policy-makers are selected at popular elections held at regular intervals. (2) Political equality is provided for all adults. This means that ideally each adult should have a vote, and that each vote should count equally. (3) Popular control of elected officials is effective. This means that (a) one set of decision-makers can be turned out of office at elections and another set installed, and that there is a free choice among alternatives; (b) that candidates are free to run for office, and they and their supporters are free to press their claims publicly, to put forward alternative policies, to criticize the present decision-makers and also other candidates -- in other words. there is "a competitive bidding for votes," which further entails a range of political freedoms among which are freedoms of speech, assembly, and organization which must be guaranteed if popular control is to be effective.[10]

In the execution of his office, an incumbent must conform to legal norms. Within the legal framework he is free to make or administer policies. Additionally, citizens may bring pressures to bear within the legally allowed limits to influence decisions. This suggests an important distinction in a democracy between the selection of political office-holders and the control of policy. Policy-makers are

[10]Henry B. Mayo, Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 61-64.

controlled directly by the electorate in the sense that they hold their positions only so long as a majority of the voters continue to vote for them. On the other hand, the control of policy is only indirect. A representative may not violate legal norms in his decision-making, but within that legal framework he is free to make policy, and his constituency only indirectly influences him as he faces the requirement of submitting to reelection.

When we refer to democracy or democratic norms, then, we will be considering the choice of policy-makers through elections, the provisions that make elections an effective method of popular control, and the adherence of policy-makers to legally-proscribed norms.

With this elaboration of our meaning of democracy, we can stipulate the meaning of stability. In the sense we will use the term, a political system which operates consistently over a specified period of time according to the pattern outlined by its legal norms is stable. By our definition of democracy, we can therefore stipulate two conditions which determine stability in a democracy. First, attempts to gain a policy-making position through utilization of the electoral process is stable behavior. Efforts to gain such positions through methods which do not rely on the electoral method, such as military takeovers, coups, revolutions, or conspiracies are therefore unstable in a democracy. Second, stability in a democracy is shown by the behavior of political incumbents. Performance of political policy-

making roles must therefore conform to legal norms. The policy-makers must adhere to constitutional arrangements of power and they must submit to the electorate to maintain their positions. Action by incumbents which violates such legal norms is unstable.

With these two categories in mind, judgments of the stability of a democratic political system can be diagrammed on a four-cell matrix.

	Means of Gaining Office	Execution of Office
Stable		
Unstable		

A system may be characterized by both adherence to democratic norms in gaining political control, and in execution of political roles. It may be stable in one and unstable in the other, or it could be unstable in both.

We will consider the way Chile fits this matrix as we examine case studies of the country. As well, the definitions will be elaborated and operationalized to be used for testing propositions derived in the final chapter.

In the next chapter, we will look at four explanations of democratic stability, each focusing on a different variable, so that the importance of institutional, economic, social, and psychological variables

for democratic stability will be assessed. In Chapter three, explanations of stability in Chile will be evaluated and in the final chapter, a causal model based on a synthesis of the major variables pointed to in Chapter two will be proposed, and the relevance of the model to Chile will be judged.

CHAPTER TWO: GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

The purpose of this chapter is to examine four explanations of democratic stability. Each explanation points to a different variable. so the chapter will consist of evaluations of (1) the effect of political institutions upon the stability of the political system, (2) the importance of economic variables for democratic stability. (3) the effect of social values upon democratic stability, and (4) the importance of a psychological variable, relative deprivation, for democratic stability.

The chapter does not attempt to be a comprehensive review of all relevant literature. Rather we will focus on what we consider to be some of the most prominent and representative works on the subject. Therefore, we will consider Samuel P. Huntington's work on political institutionalization. Seymour Martin Lipset's arguments on economic factors will be evaluated, and Talcott Parsons, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba will be considered for their arguments on the importance of values. Finally, Ted Gurr's work with psychological variables will be examined.

I. The Effect of Institutionalization upon Democratic Stability

> Thesis: Given rapid social and economic change, political stability is a function of the level of institutionalization of political organizations.

Although the work of Samuel P. Huntington is not specifically directed to democratic governments, it is relevant for understanding democratic stability. He suggests that in an environment of social and economic modernization the political institutions which were developed under more traditional circumstances may prove inadequate to handle the increased political participation of newly politicized social forces. This in turn effects political stability. In the same sense the questions Huntington raises about stability in developing societies are also relevant to ask of democracies in general. In both cases a major question is this: What characteristics of political institutions enable a political system to govern when a large number of heterogenous social forces are allowed, or demand, access to the political system? The answer to this question is relevant not only to modernizing nations, but democracies, and especially democracies which are undergoing transition from a traditional to modernized society.

As noted, Huntington views political stability from the context of social and economic modernization. On the one hand, in such a context, a society is characterized by rapid urbanization and industrialization, literacy rates increase, mass media is available in the form of radio and newspapers. On the other hand, the political system must maintain order and stability in the midst of such change. Given this situation, one must ask what characteristics of political institutions will

enhance their capacity to govern?

In asking this question, Huntington rejects the notion that social and economic development lead necessarily to political development. In fact, the result may be political decay. Social and economic modernization creates new social groups and alters the relationship between traditional groups. This in turn causes significant impact upon the political system: political consciousness is heightened, more groups participate in political activity, and political demands increase.[1] Such changes

> undermine traditional sources of political authority and traditional political institutions; they enormously complicate the problems of creating new bases of political association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and effectiveness.[2]

It is likely, therefore, that a frequent byproduct of social and economic development will be the weakening or destruction of a political system. And when such changes occur in a democratic context, i.e., where political participation is the encouraged norm, the challenge to the political system may be even more severe.

Whether or not a political system can continue to govern under such circumstances is, according to Huntington, dependent upon the level of institutionalization of political organizations. Institutionalization is defined as the "process by which organizations and

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[1]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 5.

[2]Ibid.

procedures acquire value and stability."[3] Institutionalization is important because in a situation where there are a multitude of social groups with diverse needs and objectives, political institutions act to arbitrate the vast array of demands that will arise. If these political organizations are institutionalized, i.e., recognized by the different groups as valuable procedures to arbitrate demands, then harmony can be achieved through these organizations. Demands will be channelled through them, and as decisions are reached the various groups will abide by them.

Of course in a situation where the strength, size, or position of social groups changes, then the institutions which were adequate before may no longer suffice. Whether or not this occurs will depend on the level of institutionalization of political organizations. The level of institutionalization is based on the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of the organization being considered.

Adaptability refers to the capacity of an institution to adjust to new situations. Huntington suggests these measures of adaptability: (1) It can be measured simply by noting the chronological age of an organization, which assumes that the older an organization, the greater the likelihood that it has faced new circumstances and adjusted to them. (2) It can be measured by generational age - the number of times the leadership of the organization has changed. It is very likely that the

[3] Ibid., p. 12.

first generational change is the most difficult, since a procedure for succession has not been tested or institutionalized. But as this task is performed repeatedly, the adaptability of the organization is more clearly demonstrated. (3) The capacity of an organization to make functional changes is also an indicator of adaptability. For example, a party organized as an electoral organization and transformed into a governing organization demonstrates its adaptability.[4]

Complexity of an organization also shows its level of institutionalization.

> The greater the number and variety of subunits the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members. In addition, an organization which has many purposes is better able to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than an organization which has only one purpose.[5]

The measures one might use to determine complexity are not enumerated by Huntington. He points to obvious cases, such as traditional primitive systems, where there is really no differentiation between political and other social sectors, which lack the complexity of a modern political bureaucracy.[6] But to judge and compare more modern nations presents a greater challenge. For example, is a presidential-congressional system as in Chile more complex than a cabinet-parliamentary system as in Great Britain? Or, is a federal system of government as

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[4]Ibid., p. 17

[5]Ibid., p. 18.

[6]Ibid.

in the United States more likely to be stable and institutionalized than a unitary form, such as in Australia? Unfortunately, Huntington only deals with obvious cases, and serious doubt remains about whether - beyond the obvious extremes - complexity can be determined, or if in fact it has any meaning for stability.

The third measure of institutionalization is autonomy. Huntington states that political organizations must be more than simply "expressions of the interests of particular social groups."[7] By the nature of its task, the political institution must harmonize interests of diverse social forces, and in order to do that, it must be free from the dominance of a given group. This seems obviously important, but again Huntington fails to provide adequate measures to show that an organization possesses autonomy.[8]

Finally, an organization should possess coherence, i.e., consensus. To agree on organizational objectives and rules, to be willing to place organizational goals above individual goals, and to demonstrate unity and discipline is vital for organizational stability. Samuel Stouffer showed that in the United States consensus is much more likely to exist among the elite,[9] and there may actually be very little consensus, except on the most general principles, overall.[10]

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[7] Ibid., p. 20.

[8] Ibid., pp. 20-22.

[9] Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955).

[10] Ibid.

But if the political organization is to bring many different social groups together for ordered, regularized activity, then it is readily apparent why consensus is needed to assure stability.

For a political system to be stable, then, Huntington argues that the political institutions must be adaptable to new situations, they must be complex, autonomous from any particular social group and they must possess inner coherence and consensus. By knowing the level of institutionalization based on these four indices, then one should be able to predict the stability of the political institutions.

Huntington has pointed to a very important variable for democratic stability. As noted before, the indices of institutionalization are not presented clearly,and left as they are could not be used to effectively measure institutional levels. We will return to this problem in the final chapter, however, because it does not seem insurmountable, and because institutionalization as a variable does appear important in understanding stability.

II. The Effect of Economic Variables upon Stability

> Thesis: "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy."[11]

Huntington is sharply critical of those who regard political stability as dependent simply upon economic or social development.[12]

[11]Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review (March, 1958), p. 75.

[12]Huntington, pp. 39-56.

Such a viewpoint has been common, however, in governmental communities, and in academic circles.[13] Both former secretaries of Defense and State in the United States, McNamara and Rusk, advocated what Huntington calls the "Poverty thesis," that economic backwardness and political instability are closely related. Secretary McNamara stated that "there can...be no question but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness."[14] In the lower levels of the United States government, for example in the AID program, a similar viewpoint is also prevalent.[15]

Seymour Martin Lipset has also suggested a close relationship between economic development and democratic stability, by hypothesizing that well-to-do nations are more likely to be stable democracies. To test the hypothesis he categorizes countries as either more or less democratic, depending on whether or not they have had uninterrupted political democracy[16] since World War I, and whether a major communist or fascist party (gaining twenty per cent or more of the vote) was

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[13]Survey data indicating the extent of such attitudes are found in Robert Packenham, "Developmental Doctrines in Foreign Aid." World Politics (February, 1966), pp. 194-235.

[14]Huntington, p. 41.

[15]Packenham, op. cit.

[16]"Political Democracy" is defined by Lipset, op. cit.,"as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office.", p. 71.

active during that same period.[17] Economic indices used were wealth. industrialization, urbanization, and education. Specifically measures were based on per capita income, the number of person per motor vehicle, the number of persons per physicians, and the number of radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons. Lipset concludes that "in each case, the average wealth, degree of industrialization, urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries..."[18] He does not, however, suggest that economic variables alone explain democratic stability. In fact, he argues that institutional factors and social values are also vital.

This analysis is not without difficulties however. In presenting a causal statement, at a minimum the author must demonstrate a temporal relationship between the factors. Lipset does not show that economic development precedes democratic stability in time. In fact, by suggesting that other factors, such as the legitimacy and effectiveness of the political system, also enter into the relationship the issue is left very much in doubt. In other words, it can be asked, does the effectiveness of the political system promote economic development, or is it the other way around? Lipset claims that economic growth "is a requisite of," "sustains," or is the basis from which democratic

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[17] A weaker criteria is used to categorize Latin American countries. It is based on "whether a given country has had a history of more or less free elections for most of the post-World War I period." pp. 73-74.

[18] Ibid., p. 75.

stability emerges, but does not show that the former precedes the latter in time. From his data we can only assume that they occur simultaneously, since the data for each variable is gathered during roughly the same period.

Lipset does suggest several important reasons why economic well-being may be an important condition to sustain democratic stability. Interestingly enough, these justifications are actually of social rather than economic import. First, those in the lower strata who experience economic progress may moderate their demands, adopt a long range, gradualist view of politics, and "enlarge their involvement in an integrated national culture as distinct from an isolated lower class one..."[19] In a slightly different sense, economic expansion aids the middle and upper classes also. They more easily accept democratic norms when the system satisfies them economically. They are less likely to view politics as a matter of all or nothing, and more likely to accept changes in leadership as being less consequential. Finally, the presence of intervening organizations which develop through economic growth act as sources of countervailing power by broadening access to politics.[20]

There is a cliche that could well paraphrase Lipset's conception of the role economic wellbeing plays in aiding democratic stability:

[19]Ibid., p. 83.

[20]Ibid., p. 84.

"it isn't the money, but what the money brings you that is important." The stabilizing role of economic variables is indirect: it reduces tension within the political system, and it aids in showing the effectiveness of the system. But to imply from Lipset's data a clearcut causal relationship between economic growth and democratic stability is unfounded.

III. The Role of Values in Creating Democratic Stability

> Thesis: A stable democracy is fostered by a pattern of values that views the citizen not only as a participant in the democratic system, but as a subject and non-political actor as well.[21]

Both Huntington and Lipset agree that the presence of certain values within the society contributes to stability. By understanding first the role of values generally, and second, attempting to determine a general pattern of values appropriate for a democratic system, it will be more readily apparent why values are judged to be important factors in the development of stable democracies.

Clyde Kluckhohn defines values as

> conceptions, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action.[22]

They are, then, normative judgments of what is desirable. As Parsons

[21]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), pp. 337-339.

[22]Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientation," in Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 395.

points out, values are first a part of the culture, and secondly, to a greater or lesser degree, a part of individuals within the society.[23] Further, values deal with the most general level of desirability, not with a specific situation, or as a means of differentiation.

Another term, which may be regarded as link between abstract values andan actual, concrete situation, is the concept, "orientation." Parson uses this term to refer to a person's appraisal of a "situation." This appraisal contains cognitive, affective, and evaluative elements, which are directed not only at values but motivation as well.[24] From the standpoint of values, however, a person's orientation in a given situation will lead him to determine standards of acceptability, which "narrow the range of cognitions..., the range of objects wanted, sorting 'appropriate' from 'inappropriate' goal objects; and narrow the number of alternatives, sorting 'moral' from 'immoral' courses of action."[25] If we consider values as the most generalized conceptions of what is desirable, then apply this conception to a specific situation, the concept of orientation suggests that these generalized values would lead a person to restrict his cognitions of the situation, restrict himself to appropriate goals, and cause him to

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[23]Talcott Parsons, Social Structure and Personality (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 194.

[24]Toward a General Theory of Action, pp. 67-76.

[25]Ibid., p. 68.

choose moral courses of action, based upon his values.

By applying Parson's conceptualization to a specifically political situation, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba develop the concept of political culture. For them, this term is simply a specialized useage of orienation, and refers to internalized cognitions, feelings and evaluations of the political system held by the population.[26] They argue that the population is oriented toward four levels of the political system: the "general" political system, input objects, output objects, and the "self" as a political actor.[27] By measuring these orientations, they suggest that they can then make meaningful statements about the political culture.

In The Civic Culture, it is concluded that a definite pattern of political orientations, i.e., a certain political culture, does aid in the creation and maintenance of stable and effective democracies.[28] To answer the question, "is there a democratic political culture - a pattern of political attitudes that fosters democratic stability...", Almond and Verba suggest a mixture of what they refer to as participant, subject, and parochial cultures. In such a culture, called appropriately enough the civic culture,

> many individuals are active in politics, but there are also many who take the more passive role of subject. More important, even among those performing the active

[26] Civic Culture, p. 13.

[27] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[28] Ibid., chapter 8.

> political role of the citizen, the roles of subject and parochial have not been displaced. The participant role has been added to the subject and parochial roles. This means that the active citizen maintains his traditional nonpolitical ties, as well as his more passive political role as subject... The parochial and subject orientations modify the intensity of the individual's political involvement and activity.[29]

In relating this political orientation to a specific situation, values in a stable democracy would direct the citizen to be oriented toward the "input" institutions of the political system by making demands, and participating in the democratic process. But this is not enough. They should also be positively oriented toward the output functions of the system, willing to accept decisions and abide by them as they are passed down. Furthermore, the political system should be kept in proper perspective, and traditional loyalties to the family, the church, and the local community should not be forgotten.

IV. The Role of Psychological Variables in Promoting Democratic Stability

> Thesis: "A psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one form or another."[30]

Ted Gurr has suggested that there are generally two different models that attempt to explain the relationship between psychological

[29] Ibid., p. 339.

[30] Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review (December, 1968), p. 1104.

perceptions and conditions of instability. The first "implicitly or explicitly regards civil strife as a calculated response to objective social conditions,"[31] and the second, which he espouses, views it as a response to perceived conditions.

As we saw earlier with Huntington, Gurr does not specifically restrict his model to democratic nations. His objective is to predict and measure instability cross-nationally, so his scope is more general than our own. But his own conception of "civil strife," although suited to study any political system, does conform closely to our own view of nondemocratic, destabilizing behavior. For this reason his model is particularly valuable for inclusion in this study.

Several terms are introduced in Gurr's work. The central concept and independent variable, "relative deprivation," is defined as

> actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amount of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep).[32]

Relative deprivation effects instability in the following way: the response to relative deprivation is anger or discontent, which in turn motivates aggression directed toward the perceived cause of deprivation.

In Gurr's model, relative deprivation is a necessary but not

[31]Ted Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton University: Center of International Studies, 1967), p. 1.

[32]"A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," p. 1104.

sufficient cause of politically destabilizing behavior. Four intervening variables act to either intensify or reduce the relationship. First, the coercive potential of the political regime generally tends to reduce the likelihood of action. When the coercive potential of the regime is low, Gurr hypothesizes, the likelihood of civil strife is also low, which is also the case if the coercive potential of the regime is high. The greatest likelihood of destabilizing activity will be found when the coercive potential of the regime is in the middle range.[33]

A second intervening variable is institutionalization, which Gurr defines as the "extent to which societal structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/or personnel, and are stable and persisting."[34] A high level of institutionalization, as Huntington would agree, reduces the likelihood of instability since it provides more channels to influence the political system and allows nonviolent means for expressing frustration in political parties, unions, etc.

Gurr argues that a third variable, "social facilitation," acts to increase the likelihood of instability. This concept includes both "the availability of common experiences and beliefs that sanction responses to anger"[35] and opportunities to interact with other dis-

[33]Gurr and Ruttenberg, p. 11.

[34]Gurr, p. 1107.

[35]Gurr and Ruttenberg, p. 13.

contented citizens, in addition to structural factors that improve the ability to make aggressive responses and be protected from retribution. This concept would therefore include such characteristics within a country as isolation of working classes in mining camps.[36]

A final intervening variable is legitimacy, the popular support which a regime possesses. The magnitude of civil strife is inversely proportionate to the level of legitimacy. Because a regime has legitimacy citizens are more likely to comply with policy directives in hopes of gaining symbolic as well as actual rewards, and they are more likely to regard deprivation as justifiable.

Although Gurr is convinced that it is a psychological variable, relative deprivation, which leads to instability, he is forced to rely mainly on indirect indices to test his hypothesis. Most of these measures actually show the social, economic, and political conditions in a society. For example, relative deprivation is inferred from short term trade levels, inflation trends, GNP, measures of religious cleavages and educational variations. The assumption which underlies this inference is that social conditions as viewed by individuals form the basis from which they derive their own ratio of value expectations

[36]Evidence to support this argument can be found in Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1963), pp. 100-107; and in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Miners and Agrarian Radicalism," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Greenwhich, Conn., Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 235-348.

to value capabilities. The important thing to keep in mind is that responses need not be rational evaluations of social conditions, but are instead evaluated through the perceptual framework of an individual, rationally or not.

V. A Final Note on a Synthesis of Variables

> Thesis: Behavior which conforms to democratic norms is a function of a psychological variable, relative deprivation, with institutional, economic, and social variables acting as intervening variables to either increase or reduce the relationship.

We will conclude this chapter by considering a major implication of Gurr's work, i.e., that the variables pointed to in this chapter can be synthesized into a single model. Such a synthesis will occupy us extensively in the final chapter. At this point we will simply indicate the feasibility of such an approach.

The introduction of a psychological variable like relative deprivation lets us return to the obvious point that all behavior is finally and fundamentally individual behavior. As Gurr shows, other factors become relevant as they are perceived, considered, and acted upon by individuals. By formulating the problem of democratic stability with this in mind, our major concern is to identify those elements that are most important when an individual decides whether or not to conform to democratic norms of behavior. Each of the authors we have examined in this chapter contribute to that task.

First and most basically, we are directed by Gurr to consider the effects of relative deprivation upon individual behavior. If a person has rising expectations on the one hand, and a pessimistic appraisal of what he can actually achieve on the other, it is likely that the result will be frustration, anger, and perhaps aggressive behavior. And as Lipset reminds us, it is likely that in viewing the goods and conditions of his life, the individual will very likely take the economic situation into account. Economic wellbeing increases the tolerance of all classes, and the democratic processes are given legitimacy. On the other hand, a poor record of economic performance gives added intensity to the struggle for scarce resources, so that classes are more likely to reject the idea of universal political participation.

In addition, as Parsons has demonstrated, cultural values come into play, causing an individual to select or rule out some behavior, depending on the pattern of values brought to a situation. Especially if democratic values of participation are accompanied by a subject orientation - stressing obedience to the law - and an apolitical orientation which emphasizes nonpolitical avenues of expression, then the likelihood of democratic stability is increased. The absence of such a mixed political culture would, according to Almond and Verba, increase the likelihood of destabilizing behavior.

Finally, as we learn from Huntington, the level of institutionaliza-

tion must also be taken into account. If an individual or group regards political organizations as being effective procedures, as measured by their level of institutionalization, they are more likely to channel their political demands through them, thereby reducing the appeal of destabilizing behavior, and increasing the likelihood of democratic stability.

We will leave this synthesis in its rather tentative condition for the time being and return to it in the final chapter. Now we will turn to several case studies of democratic stability in Chile to see if in a concrete situation, those who have studied the Chilean political system agree with the authors we have just examined as to the causes of stability.

CHAPTER THREE: DEMOCRATIC STABILITY IN CHILE

In this chapter we will move from the abstract and theoretical to specific evaluations of democratic stability in Chile. Two general explanations will be considered: (1) The works of three authors - Fredrick B. Pike, James Petras, and Maurice Zeitlin - contend that a combination of political, social, and economic factors have allowed a small ruling class in Chile to dominate the political system and maintain stability by satisfying the demands of those few who participate in the system and excluding those who are not satisfied. (2) K. H. Silvert and John J. Johnson contend that stability has been maintained because political institutions and social factors have permitted political participation by all social groups.

Again, this choice of authors does not allow a comprehensive survey. A major reason for the selection is that each author deals with contemporary Chile into the 1960's.[1] They are therefore able to consider the effects of modernization upon Chilean stability. In addition, these

[1]Except for this liability, that they do not deal with current situations, several other studies of Chile would be valuable for our purposes. For example, Domingo Amuntequi y Solar, Historia Social de Chile (Editorial Nasciemento, 1932); Luis Galdames, History of Chile (Chapel Hills, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1941); John Reese Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942); and Alberto Edwards Vives. La Fronda Aristocratica (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1959).

works attempt to explain Chilean stability, rather than simply point to various manifestations of that stability. Often such explanations amount to little more than descriptions of particular aspects of the Chilean political system. As an example, in his study of Chilean Marxist parties, Ernst Halperin states that "the stability of the democratic regime in Chile is to be attributed not to economic and sociological factors but to something so completely intangible as mere tradition."[2] He then recounts several high points of this "tradition" which turn out to be simply a brief enumeration of Chilean political history. Other writers have explained Chilean stability by pointing to the achievements of Diego Portales, the famous Chilean statesman who ruled so effectively in the 1830's,[3] to the moderation of the Chilean people, or to other aspects of the Chilean environment. But as Maurice Zeitlin put it: "these confuse noting a syndrome with explanation, much like saying that the reason that someone feels inferior is because he has an inferiority complex."[4]

I. A Democracy for a Few: The PIke-Petras-Zeitlin Thesis

Thesis: "What we have praised in Chile since

[2]Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 27.

[3]See especially, Maximo Soto-Hall, "Prologo," Don Diego Portales (Los Talleres de la Tipografia Nacional de Guatemala, C.A., 1950), pp. xv-xxxvi; Jay Kinsbruner, Diego Portales: Interpretative Essay of the Man and the Times (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967).

[4]Maurice Zeitlin, "The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile," in Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, eds., Latin America: Reform or Revolution (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1968), p.224.

> 1920 has amounted to little more than a system in which a small, privileged class has been gentlemanly in determining, through very limited electoral process, which of its members would rule the country."[5]

The analyses of Frederick B. Pike, Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras are very similar. We will therefore deal with their works simultaneously. Their argument is summarized well in this statement by Maurice Zeitlin:

> Chilean political democracy has rested until the present...on an equilibrium of social forces more or less willing to act toward each other in the political arena on the tacit assumption that each would respect the 'rights' of the others concerning their fundamental interests as they define them.[6]

There are two major characteristics of this arrangement: (1) The political system has been dominated by middle and upper class groups which have been able to cooperate in their political activities. They have respected each other's interests, have found overlapping interests. and middle and upper class values have been very similar, further enhancing cooperation. (2) Lower class sectors in Chile have been politically ineffective. Organizations that might have served their interests have been fragmented, or they have been without organizational representations, and those lower class organizations that have developed have lost their effectiveness by dealing with the middle and upper

[5]Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States: 1880-1962 (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. xxv.

[6]Zeitlin, p. 232.

classes at their points of strength, in broad coalitions and in congress.

In examining the successful coalition of upper and middle class interests and exclusion of the lower classes, the Pike-Zeitlin-Petras thesis points to a general historical trend throughout the twentieth century, which can be especially noted in at least four political events.

First, in a general sense, during this entire century urbanization and industrialization have created new social and economic forces in Chile. But politically, the institutional patterns worked out between upper and middle classes during the early twentieth century have remained, and these two sectors have successfully prevented the entrance of lower class elements into the political system, or entrance has been on terms clearly favorable to the ruling classes. The result has been

> political stability, with power concentrated in the executive...based on the existence of an organizationally fragmented labor movement and a unified and organized ruling class. The fusion of traditional and modern values and the exclusion of the peasantry from effective participation in society contributed to stable elite domination.[7]

This analysis demonstrates the centrality of political institutions, as that of Samuel P. Huntington did in the previous chapter. In a crucial area, however, these authors disagree with Huntington. He

[7]James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 341.

argued that as new social forces are created in developing countries, stability is achieved only if the level of institutionalization is sufficient to meet the increased level of political participation of newly politicized social groups. In reviewing the Chilean case, Pike, Zeitlin, and Petras conclude that stability has been maintained because the upper and middle classes have effectively kept the lower classes out of political activity.

During this century there have been at least four political occurrences that most clearly demonstrate their argument. First, as early as 1920, with the election of Arturo Alessandri to the presidency, the rhetoric of Chilean politics took on a radical tone. But Pike and Petras contend that Alessandri was actually interested in only a slight modicum of social change, which he considered necessary

> to preserve a society similar to the nineteenth-century model. In accepting the presidential nomination of the Liberal Alliance in 1920, Alessandri declared that the social problem had to be solved, "not only for reasons of humanity, but for considerations of economic expediency and for conserving the social order..."[8]

The lower class rhetoric and upper and middle class control of the political system is seen even more clearly in the late 1930's. In 1937, with the introduction of the Popular Front, a coalition of the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties, it appeared that the lower classes had at last effectively entered the political system. Not so, according to the Pike-Zeitlin-Petras thesis. The Popular Front marked

[8]Pike, p. 171.

an important breakthrough only for the middle class and a small portion of the organized working class, but by and large, the lower class was uneffected by the alliance.[9] Petras states that the "middle class-working class Popular Front responsible for the events and policies of the formative years of industrialization and development (1938-1952) represented the middle class and not the lower class."[10] The Radical Party, composed largely of middle class elements, was able to dominate the coalition because of the heterogeniety of working class demands and the fragmentation of working class parties. In addition, the lower class was further restricted during this period since a coalition of conservative and liberal elements remained in control of congress for much of the time. Even the legal reforms initiated under the Popular Front proved much more ephemeral than those who participated in it at the outset would have foreseen. It increased the level of political participation, it aided in the expansion of industry, and pushed forward the level of governmental participation in economic affairs. But these changes were of little value to lower class elements. The upper and middle classes were enriched in status, wealth, and power, whereas

> Popular Front politics weakened the Left, strengthened the Right, and increased the people's distrust of parliamentary politics. Even though an early goal of the

[9]A less pessimistic view of the Popular Front is given in John Reese Stevenson, op. cit, but a major difficulty is that it covers only the early part of the period.

[10]Petras, p. 155.

> Front was the achievement of a more equitable distribution of income, Pike and Bray conclude that actually it was a "regressive redistribution... achieved at the expense of the lower income groups."[11]

A third political event, the accession of Carlos Ibanez to the presidency in 1952, marked the end of the Radical Party's control of the presidency, but for Petras and Pike, the middle class-upper class dominance of the political system continued. Ibanez, himself a former dictator and military leader of the late twenties, had support from the fascistically-inclined Agrarian Labor party. In addition, he was the kind of leader the now well-to-do middle class sought to protect their hard earned advances from lower class incursions. Pike and Petras suggest that this turn of events fits well the contention of Seymour Martin Lipset in Political Man that in times of crisis the middle class is inclined to support an authoritarian leader who will preserve the status quo and create an environment of law and order.[12] In Chile, as a result of Popular Front policies, the middle class had greatly improved its position in society, and the growingunrest of the lower classes was a danger to this newly found wellbeing. So they turned from the Radical Party to the protection of Ibanez, who nearly twenty years before had demonstrated his willingness to bypass constitution and political parties for a cause he espoused. Ibanez "projected an image of authority and capability, and his rightist background assured the middle

[11] Ibid., p. 156.

[12] Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1963), pp. 131-137.

classes that he could deal decisively with the masses."[13] He was the kind of man

> who would initiate a moral regeneration of Chile and sweep away corruption -- one of his campaign symbols was a broom. He was a crisis candidate, the candidate of a modern middle class unable to cope with the economic and social crises looming on the horizon by conventional political methods, and unwilling to adopt radical ones.[14]

So the working class rhetoric of the middle class started in the twenties with Arturo Alessandri and continued through the thirties and forties with the Popular Front was effectively demonstrated to be an illusion with the election of Ibanez. And the more comfortable posture - a coalition of middle and upper class parties with the lower classes excluded - was again assumed in the election of 1958 as the Conservative-Liberal Alliance (now with the Radical Party in the coalition) once again attained the presidency. During this period, the policy of the Jorge Alessandri government aimed at achieving economic stability, more rationally organized administrative functions, improving tax collection, and restricting state functions to more traditional areas. And the weak bargaining position of the working class and its pitiful standard of living continued.[15]

The fourth and final demonstration of the ruling coalition protecting upper and middle class interests occurred in the 1964 election.

[13] Petras, p. 138.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., p. 106.

For Petras, the victory of the Christian Democratic Party and Eduardo Frei in 1964 did not mean victory for the Chilean working classes. The PDC is following a path similar to that taken by the Radicals in the 1940's. Electoral rhetoric suggested far-reaching reform, but once again the post-electoral pattern was different.

> That the PDC was moving to the right was evident not only in Frei's casual mention of the reform program, but in his anti-communist slogans...coupled...with rabid chauvinism, both of which have a strong appeal for petty shopkeepers and the Chilean middle class in general...Business groups that had been uneasy over Frei's reformist demagoguery became his staunchest supporters.[16]

The policy of Frei toward foreign investors, his lack of concern for organized labor, his willingness to accomodate existing elites, and a weakening of his concern for agrarian reform, are all cited by Petras to demonstrate that Christian Democracy is more a continuation of the past, than it is a genuine break with tradition.

For Pike, Petras, and Zeitlin, each of these historical events show the political dominance of a small ruling elite in Chile. Through the use of campaign rhetoric, formation of coalitions to weaken lower class influence, and through better organization, the lower class has had virtually no influence upon the political system.

In evaluating this explanation of Chilean stability, a major problem appears to be shared by each of the three authors. Particularly in the

[16] Ibid., p. 240.

case of Petras, but also with Zeitlin and Pike, there is underlying this argument a highly specific assumption of what is good for the lower class, which in turn dictates criticism and evaluation of all Chilean political behavior. Throughout, there is implicit in the Petras argument an image of the "interests" of the lower class as being best served by mass mobilization of working class members in nonlegal, nonparliamentary, and nonconstitutional action. He criticizes the Frei government for its reaction in quelling such activity, and cites this reaction as proof of the true quality of the PDC, and he also criticizes FRAP, the coalition of Socialist and Communist parties, for its reliance upon "progressive" elements, i.e., the middle and upper classes, and congressional and legal means.[17] With Pike and Zeitlin, the "true interests" of the working classes are less obviously specified, but the assumption that such interests exist nevertheless remains. Logically, this approach proceeds like this: (1) The researcher makes the assumption that Policy A is a "genuine" representation of lower class interests. (2) He compares the policies of various Chilean governments to see how they match Policy A. (3) Since these governmental policies do not satisfy the requirements of Policy A, it can be concluded that these governments do not have the interests of the lower class in mind.

In addition, with this same assumption in mind, the researcher is

[17] Ibid., pp. 245-246.

further led to accept, reject, or ignore data to support his argument, and to interpret data in the same way. For example, when it is assumed that a cooperative effort by upper class and middle class elements keeps Chilean lower class members from having political influence. it becomes difficult to justify such evidence as electoral data that indicates a consistent expansion of the electorate to include more lower class members, and a successful effort to eliminate fraud and coercion during elections, and at least one party considered by Petras to be representing the middle class, the PDC, which has created organizational facilities to articulate lower class demands.

II. An Effective Democracy for All Classes: The Silvert-Johnson Thesis

> Thesis: Stability in Chile is a result of perceptions on the part of all social elements that indicate their needs can be met through institutionally-approved norms of behavior.

Where the argument we just considered saw the middle class giving the lower class only vocal support, K. H. Silvert and John J. Johnson appraise middle class behavior in much different terms. Most fundamentally, they argue that frequent parallels can be found in middle and lower class interests, and that these parallels have resulted in cooperative action. This does not mean that the difficult economic position of a large portion of the Chilean working class, described by Pike and Petras, is rejected by Silvert. In fact, he also contends that all do not share equally in the fruits of economic growth. Silvert estimates that perhaps

> a fifth to a quarter of all Chileans live in what we think of as a modern society: they are educated; they can aspire to higher positions for their children without being unrealistic; they can talk and gather and write and read freely; they can make a fairly wide occupational choice; they have access to government and can be assured of equality before the laws; they can enjoy a wide array of the material fruits of industrial life; they can belong to unions and political parties and pressure groups and professional societies; and they can assume that their vote has some real significance.[18]

But even though resources are inequitably distributed, it cannot be concluded that those who have less have been kept from participating in the political system. Additionally, it is not enough to assume that instability results when a section of the population does not enjoy the same wellbeing as other sectors. Silvert points to other factors in the Chilean political system that must be taken into account. In fact, Silvert's appraisal fits well into the general framework proposed by Ted Gurr that we considered in the last chapter: On the one hand, the environment of Chile is composed of a minority which has most of the accoutrements of modernity, and a considerable majority of the society which does not. This segment of the population is, in Gurr's terminology, in a state of relative deprivation. But the behavior of this group will be destabilizing only if such factors as political institutionalization, and legitimization of the system are appropriate. Silvert considers

[18] K. H. Silvert, "Some Propositions on Chile, in Robert D. Tomasek, ed., Latin American Politics (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 387.

each of these as intervening variables and concludes that they do not favor instability in Chile. There is inequality in the distribution of goods and values in the country, but those who have less than they feel they deserve also feel that they can improve the balance through the existing political system.

Silvert cites the following evidence to show the institutional strength of Chilean political organizations: A congress strong enough to fulfill its constitutional role, the lack of institutional instability for virtually all of this century, lack of election fraud, professionalism of the bureaucracy -- despite its clumsiness and size, the expectation of honesty and modesty in political roles, the generally easy access to information, and impersonalism.[19]

Silvert also contends that institutional capacity is enhanced by consensus existing over virtually the entire political spectrum, about the desirability

> of a larger, much more efficient, more effective educational system; the growth of industrialism; a heightened measure of free international commerce; the incorporation into an effectively democratic national structure of all Chileans; a maintenance of constitutional process; and land reform of a political and social as well as economic cast.[20]

A third indication of the institutional capacity of Chilean political organizations is the attitude of ruling elites towards

[19] Ibid., pp. 388-389.

[20] Ibid., p. 396.

those social sectors which seek to improve their position. Silvert points out that "the nature of the superordinate social groups is at least as important as the nature of the ideology and power available to the lower ones."[21] If these groups tend to act in authoritarian, restrictive ways towards the lower classes, then efforts by the lower classes to gain access to the political system are likely to become genuine crises. If, on the other hand, the upper classes possess values and ideological views that encourage the rightness of broadened electoral participation, they should be able "to blunt the worst edges of class differences as the adjustments of modernization work out."[22] That the middle and upper classes possess the more tolerant, cooperative attitude is, according to Silvert, a major reason for stability in the Chilean system in the face of serious economic difficulties.

Generally speaking, then, the Chilean political system is regarded as legitimate by all segments of the population since each social strata has demonstrated a willingness to obey its decisions and abide by the institutional arrangements provided in it. Although the lower classes generally support Marxist parties or the PDC, their political efforts are channelled into electoral, not revolutionary, activity. And the middle and upper classes have also shown their willingness to support political parties, the congressional-executive system, and the bureaucracy.[23]

[21] Ibid., p. 392.
[22] Ibid., p. 393.
[23] Ibid.

John J. Johnson amplifies the important position of the middle class in Chile. He contends that the "middle groups have...become stabilizers and harmonizers. They have learned the danger of dealing in absolute postulates, and their political experiences have given them a positive psychology as opposed to the negative one so often exhibited by opposition groups."[24] He estimates that this middle sector includes about thirty per cent of the Chilean population, growing out of the rapid urbanization, industrialization and bureaucratization that has occurred since World War I. These increasingly large sectors of the population came to political power through alliances with urban working groups, for whom they were able to provide leadership.[25] Contrary to the Pike-Zeitlin-Petras thesis, however, Johnson argues that the alliance of middle class and working class elements was more than a case of "war making strange bedfellows." At least three factors contributed to a rather broad harmonization of interests between these classes. First, both groups were urban. Second, "both have been, in the vast majority of cases, subject to wage-worker contracts and have drawn salaries."[26] Third, both groups have been unable to succeed independently in the political sphere, but have required support from other sectors. With this common starting point, the middle and working classes have found at least five issues

[24]John J. Johnson, "The Political Role of the Latin American Middle Sectors," in John D. Martz, ed., The Dynamics of Change in Latin America (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 108.

[25]Ibid., p. 105.

[26]Ibid., p. 106.

around which they could form effective political coalitions. They have agreed on the need for mass education, extensive and rapid industrialization, a policy of nationalism, state intervention in the economy, and creation of organized political parties to broaden the political base. The formation of the Popular Front, and the continuation of middle and lower class coalitions since have demonstrated that such combinations provided mutual advantages for each group.

The Silvert-Johnson argument differs from that of Pike, Petras, and Zeitlin at a crucial juncture. The latter writers argue that in the Chilean political system stability has been achieved because the lower class has been effectively kept out of it. Silvert and Johnson contend that if this were true then instability, not stability, would have resulted. Instead, they suggest that stability stems from an institutional arrangement where all sectors can gain representation, and despite inequalities in the distribution of scarce resources, where lower class elements are convinced that their interests can be served.

The major difficulty with the work of both Silvert and Johnson is that they are both tentative in nature. Neither author systematically explores the propositions in their work in a precise fashion. Therefore, although their hypotheses do offer a clear challenge to the Pike-Petras-Zeitlin argument, no satisfactory conclusions can be drawn. One is simply faced with two contradictory explanations of democratic stability

in Chile with no real basis on which to choose between them.

It is to this problem that we will turn in the final chapter. By using some of the analytic tools suggested in the second chapter we will suggest a causal model to evaluate Chilean data in a more precise manner.

CHAPTER FOUR: A CAUSAL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC STABILITY

In this chapter we will suggest a research design to study democratic stability in Chile. This task will include three steps: (1) We will review our definitions of the major terms which will be used in the propositions and suggest additional ones. (2) From the theoretical literature reviewed in Chapter Two, we will deduce a theoretical model of democratic stability, and from the literature of Chile reported in Chapter Three, determine if these propositions appear relevant in the Chilean case. (3) The concepts will be operationalized and we will consider the types of data needed to determine the accuracy of the propositions.

In this model we will rely heavily upon the work of Ted Gurr to suggest a way of integrating the relevant variables.[1] To briefly summarize this position, we will contend that people act in a destabilizing manner politically when they feel they are getting less of the things they value than they really deserve, and when they associate this disparity with a failure by the political system. That

[1]The theoretical source of Gurr's argument is found in "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics (January, 1968), pp. 245-278. Tests of the model and further elaboration are also found in "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American Political Science Review (December, 1968), pp. 1104-1124; and with Charles Ruttenberg, The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton University: Center of International Studies, 1967).

which they believe they deserve may be regarded as a goal. According to psychological Frustration-Aggression theory, the result of "interference with some ongoing goal-directed activity" is frustration. which usually produces an emotional reaction, anger, which in turn acts as a drive to aggressive behavior.[2] Psychologists argue that frustration is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for aggression. Other intervening variables act to either increase or reduce the likelihood that frustration of goal-directed behavior will result in aggression. It is in the specification of these intervening variables that the work of Huntington, Lipset, Parsons, and Almond and Verba become relevant. First, institutionalization of political organizations will facilitate access to the political system, thereby reducing the need to resort to destabilizing action to achieve goals. Second, the political culture, which an individual shares through his own values, will either mitigate or enhance the likelihood of aggression, and third, economic considerations influence directly a person's evaluation of his life situation, thereby allowing him to be either more tolerant in his political behavior or encouraging him to choose rash solutions.

The major contention of this model is therefore that the question of stability in a political system can be profitably viewed as a

[2]Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), p. xi. Also see Aubrey J. Yates, Frustration and Conflict (New York: Wiley and Co., 1962).

psychological one. Political actors, either those who hold specific roles within the decision-making apparatus, or those who act upon these decision-makers, are all political participants. And the question that a study of political stability seeks to answer is this: Why does a person act in a manner that contributes to the stability of the political system? And in a democracy, this question becomes increasingly relevant, since access to the system is easier, political participation by all citizens increases, and is an encouraged norm of behavior. But all behavior in a democracy does not contribute to the stability of the political system, only that which conforms to the norms of democracy. So if we are to understand what behavior is stabilizing within a democracy, we must also consider the meaning of democracy.

I. Definition of Concepts

As determined in the first chapter, in referring to democracy. we will be concerned with (1) the selection of policy-makers through elections, (2) the provision of guarantees to make elections an effective method of popular control. The meaning of stability was based on two factors: (1) attempts to gain a policy-making position through submission to the electoral method is defined as stable behavior. Efforts to gain such positions through methods which do not rely on the electoral method, such as military coups or revolutions are unstable in a democracy. (2) Stability of a democracy is judged by adherence of

policy-makers to constitutional norms and action by incumbents which violates such legal norms are unstable.

In assuming that political activity is goal-directed behavior, and subject to frustration when blocked, three other concepts must be defined. (1) The goal toward which an actor is assumed to be directing his activity is referred to as his "value expectation," which we define as "the goods and conditions of the life to which he believes he is justifiably entitled."[3] (2) The amounts of goods and conditions which the political actor feels he is able to get and keep are referred to as his "value capabilities;"[4] and (3) the discrepancy which exists between the goal, the actor's value expectation, and the state of affairs which he is gaining, his value capability, is called relative deprivation.

II. Propositions

A. Hypothesized relationship between independent variable - relative deprivation - and dependent variable - destabilizing behavior.

Frustration-Aggression theory hypothesizes that when goal-directed behavior is frustrated, a necessary ingredient is present for aggressive behavior to occur. Our basic proposition stems from this relationship:

> Proposition I: The occurrence of destabilizing political behavior indicates the presence of relative deprivation among those who resort to such democratic-norm violating behavior.

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[3]Gurr, "A Causal Model...," p. 1104.

[4]Ibid.

This initial proposition requires considerable refinement, however, since frustration in the form of relative deprivation is a necessary. but not sufficient, condition for destabilizing behavior.

B. Intervening Variables

Gurr postulates four intervening variables which work to either increase or reduce the likelihood that relative deprivation will cause destabilizing behavior: the coercive potential of the regime, the legitimacy of the regime, institutionalization of social organizations, and an environment and values that facilitate the actor's destabilizing behavior. In this design, Gurr's intervening variables will be modified to take advantage of the evidence we consideredin Chapter Two.

First, in recalling the relevance of values in a given situation, Parsons contends that values serve to lead a person to not only perceive but select alternative courses of action.[5] Further, Almond and Verba contend that those values most conducive to a stable democracy include a mixed political role of participant, subject, and parochial.[6] Gurr also recognized the importance of values, and he considered their impact in two separate intervening variables, legitimacy and facilitation.

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[5]Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 67-76.

[6]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1963), pp. 337-339.

But in both of these variables the role of the concept, values, is the same, i.e., providing an orientation to a specific situation. In this design we will therefore isolate the effect of values as a single intervening variable, and offer two propositions about this effect:

> Proposition II: The more frequent aggressive behavior has been seen as a response to frustration, the more accepted it becomes as a course of action, and therefore in a given situation, its desirability will increase its likelihood of being perceived and selected as a course of action by a political actor.

This proposition harmonizes well with Parson's suggestions about the function served by values,[7] and it can be made even more specific to apply directly to democratic systems by using the evidence gathered by Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture. They suggest that participant values must be accompanied by subject and apolitical values if a democracy is to be stable. This leads us to our second proposition relating to the intervening character of values:

> Proposition III: When a political actor experiences relative deprivation, if he possesses values which describe his role in a democracy as being not only a participant, but a subject, and in addition if he still retains values which stress nonpolitical responsibilities and rights, the likelihood of obedient political behavior or nonpolitical behavior being chosen as a course of action are increased, thereby reducing the likelihood of destabilizing behavior.

A second intervening variable is institutionalization. Again Gurr includes institutional considerations in two of his intervening variables -- institutionalization and facilitation. Gurr defines

7Parsons, p. 68.

institutionalization as the "extent to which societal structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/or personnel, and are stable and persisting."[8] One part of facilitation he described as the existence of environmental structures that facilitate aggressive behavior.[9] In other words, Gurr points to the two sides of institutionalization. First, as Huntington argues. if a political system has highly institutionalized organizations, characterized by autonomy, coherence, flexibility, and complexity, it can be regarded as having a high level of institutionalization.[10] Such organizations are capable of facilitating political participation, and therefore offer a greater possibility for political demands to be dealt with through legally approved channels.[11] But the same arguments can apply to instability. Destabilizing behavior can also be institutionalized, as the presence of guerilla bands, paramilitary organizations, and other nonlegal movements testify. It would be justifiable to infer from Huntington's arguments that well-organized institutions with aims to disrupt a political system may be regarded as comparably more effective than unorganized anomic behavior, just as highly institutionalized political organizations are more effective than their disorganized cousins. We will therefore suggest two

[8]"A Causal Model...", p. 1105.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Chaning Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 16.

[11]Ibid., p. 10

propositions to argue the role of institutionalization:

> Proposition IV: Although a political actor experiences relative deprivation, the likelihood that he will engage in destabilizing behavior will be reduced if he perceives highly institutionalized political organizations or other social organizations within which he can articulate his political demands.

> Proposition V: The existence of highly institutionalized organizations which encourage the use of destabilizing behavior will facilitate such behavior, and therefore increase its likelihood in a society.

The third intervening variable introduced by Gurr is what he calls "coercive potential," which is defined as the retaliatory capacity of the regime.[12] If a political actor is frustrated, then the likelihood that he will resort to nonlegal behavior is hypothetically influenced by the likelihood that he will be punished. If the police, military, and investigative agencies of the regime are efficient, then it is suggested that destabilizing behavior will be less likely to occur. However, it does not follow that increasing coercive potential is always followed by a reduced likelihood of aggressive behavior. Up to a certain point, apparently, the increase of forces available to the regime only serves to increase frustration, the assumption being that anger intensifies as goals are continually blocked. Therefore, a medium level of retaliatory force will only serve to provoke greater anger and intensify frustration, and therefore does not reduce the likelihood of aggression. Only a high level of coercive potential is sufficiently awesome to mitigate the likelihood

[12]Gurr, "Psychological Factors....", p. 264.

of instability. This final proposition will therefore suggest the influence coercive potential has in the model:

> Proposition VI: The coercive potential of a political regime will serve to reduce the likelihood that a political actor's sense of relative deprivation will cause him to resort to destabilizing behavior. This will occur, however, only if the coercive potential of the state is perceived as extremely high.

This relationship between coercive potential and our initial proposition indicates a different dimension than institutionalization and value considerations. In fact, each intervening variable indicates a factor that a political actor may take into account as he decides a course of behavior. Values provide an orientation which the actor brings into the situation, institutional considerations suggest the meaningfulness of alternatives to nonlegality that may be offered, and calculations of coercive potential give an indication to the actor of the possibility that his resorting to illegality will be successful or not.

To isolate the intervening variables in this way offers an advantage that Gurr's formulation does not have. It suggests a logical sequence of factors that a political actor may face: He brings a prior conception of what is desirable to a situation, he considers the alternate courses of action, and he considers the consequences of his action. As abstracted here, this procedure is probably much more structured and formalized than an actual process of decision-making may be,

but in being so, it is much more likely that all possible factors that an actor considers relevant will be manageable within the research design.

III. Relevance of the Propositions to Chile

In Chapter Three we considered several analyses of democratic stability in Chile. It will now be appropriate to briefly consider if our propositions appear relevant from the point of view of research already done in Chile.

A. Relevance of Independent Variable - Relative Deprivation

A characteristic of the Chilean society agreed to by each of the Chilean analysts was the existence of sharp inequities in the distribution of goods and conditions of life. For example, Pike and Petras contend that the expanding industrial economy of the 1940's and 1950's greatly increased the standard of living of the middle and upper classes, but that the lower classes were actually in a poorer position.[13] Another evidence of the disparity between classes is shown in the distribution of agricultural land. Data cited or referred to in each study showed an overwhelming concentration of ownership centered among a few landowners. For example, Pike estimates that "9.7 per cent of

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[13] James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 156; Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States: 1880-1962 (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. 273.

agrarian property holders own 86 per cent of the arable land, while 74.6 per cent own 5.2 per cent,"[14] and that in the fertile central valley area there is even greater imbalance. Also, the serious dearth of housing among the lower classes is another indication of the difficult conditions of existence for a sizeable portion of the Chilean population. Silvert, who generally gives a more optimistic account of Chile than the other writers points to the fact that urbanization has transferred the slum areas from the traditional conventillo, or tenement, to the vast shantytowns which have been spawned as workers poured in from the countryside.[15]

These data suggest the presence of at least one ingredient of relative deprivation. However, in addition to inequality of distribution, relative deprivation implies the existence of greater expectations and identification of the political regime as at least partly responsible for the disparity between actual conditions and conditions perceived as deserved. Again, the analysts of Chilean politics agree. Silvert suggests that the movement to the cities by the peasantry represented a desire to improve their lot in life, and Pike also argues that the Chilean working class is less than satisfied. In reference to another American analyst's appraisal of the Chileans as "serene," despite their hard situation, Pike notes

[14]Pike, p. 281.

[15]K. H. Silvert, "Some Propositions on Chile," in Robert D. Tomasek, ed., Latin American Politics (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 391.

that certainly the working class and its reform-minded supporters were less than serene as they established a Socialist Republic in 1930, "flocked to join socialist and communist organizations," and consistently voted for the Marxist-supported candidates for election.[16] A central thesis of Johnson's argument is that the middle class and lower class were able to discover common desires around which they could form coalitions, which again suggests that the lower classes, as well as the more prosperous middle classes were desirous of better things, and very likely felt that they deserved better.

These men also suggest that the Chilean lower classes identified the cause of the discrepancy between their actual capabilities and their expectations as lying at least partially in the political realm. Each writer has pointed to a political solution sought by lower class elements, dating as far back at least from the election of Arturo Alessandri in 1920 to the accession to the presidency of Eduardo Frei and the PDC.

B. Relevance of Dependent Variable - Destabilizing Behavior

We can assume, then, from the Chilean studies that had the concept, relative deprivation, been suggested, the authors we studied would agree that it applied to Chile. There is also agreement in the studies that the dependent variable in our initial proposition - destabilizing

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[16] Pike, p. 281.

behavior - is not present to any significant degree in the country. For example, despite considerable divergence of judgment about the reason, both Petras and Silvert agree that the lower classes have consistently taken the electoral route in expressing their political demands, if they have expressed them at all. Political parties, even the Communists, have conformed to legal norms in their campaigns, except that during the earlier part of this century electoral bribes were extremely common. Once in power, incumbents have also compiled a remarkable record in adhering to legal norms. An excellent example, as we noted earlier, is the president elected in 1952, Carlos Ibanez. Silvert notes that despite widespread popular approval for the old military dictator to push aside the constitution, he adhered to it strictly.[17]

It would appear from these studies of Chile that our initial proposition is not confirmed. These writers argue that there is frustration in the country, but they also say that to a remarkable degree, this frustration has not resulted in nonlegal behavior. But again, despite the fact that the specific model we have outlined was not considered by the authors, a good deal of their evidence indicates that the intervening variables are relevant in the Chilean case.

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[17]K. H. Silvert, "Elections, Parties, and the Law," American University Field Staff (April, 1957), mimeo., p. 17, as quoted in Albert O. Hirschman, Journies Toward Progress (Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), p. 193.

C. Relevance of Intervening Variables in Chile

Each writer is generally agreed that the institutional level among Chilean political organizations is high. For example, Petras and Silvert note the importance of the bureaucracy in providing a stable environment, and Silvert further suggests that it is by and large professional and efficient.[18] Petras contends that leftist organizations have suffered from fragmentation and disorganization, but compared to most Latin American party systems, the political parties of Chile have generally been favorably evaluated; the country has had a fairly strong trade union movement; and has been characterized by considerable associational organization. On the other hand, organizations which advocate illegal norms have had little success. Silvert suggests that the Communist and Socialist parties are not revolutionary in their program, they conform to legal norms, and though lamenting the fact, Petras also agrees.[19]

If past action is any guide, it is most likely that values favoring destabilizing behavior find little support in contemporary Chile. There are few examples of norm-violating behavior to look back upon, and in fact, a strong tradition of legality is present. Pike suggests that respect for legality is so strong that "its citizens...incline to judge us in the United States as politically wild and unruly."[20]

[18]Petras, passim.; and Silvert, p. 397.

[19]Silvert, p. 391.

[20]Pike, p. xx.

He notes a "highly developed sense of decency and fair play," and a respect for freedom of expression and discussion that is perhaps more fundamental than in the United States.[21] Silvert confirms this appraisal.[22] The data cited by these men are not sufficient to infer the existence of a civic culture, where the democratic activist role is tempered by subject and parochial roles, but we can assume a willingness on the part of Chileans to obey the law, and an extensive feeling of apolitical orientation, but also, especially among the lower classes, a rather low level of participation. Much more specific data would be required to make clearer statements about the political culture.

None of the Chilean experts referred directly to the coercive potential of the country. We do gain the impression that Chile has a highly professional army, which has forsaken political aspirations, has successfully met internal as well as external threats, but which is clearly bounded by constitutional norms in its exercise of force. In other words, one gains the impression that the coercive potential of the country is sufficient, but not arbitrary or threatening in its presence. Much more specific research would be needed to clarify this point also.

From this brief appraisal of previous research in Chile, it does

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Silvert, p. 390.

appear that our variables are relevant. Our initial proposition, that relative deprivation is a necessary but not sufficient cause of destabilizing behavior, does seem an important consideration when the three intervening variables - value orientation, institutional alternatives, and the likelihood of retaliation - are enumerated. With this supporting evidence as a beginning point, we will now suggest specific operational measures of our propositions.

IV. Operationalization of Concepts

A. Advantages of Survey Research

Two methods of operationalization suggest themselves. First, survey research could be used to sample the Chilean population. Each of our propositions is in the form of a perceptual conclusion reached by political actors, and thus susceptible to survey measurement. For example, when the coercive potential of a nation is considered, the political actor may not know the size of the army or police force. In fact, he may have misinformation and believe that Chile has an extensive secret police force when there may not actually be such an organization. But since we are dealing with perceptions - perceived deprivations, values, perceived alternatives to illegal behavior, and perceived threats of punishment - survey methods could be effectively employed. In addition to the obvious advantage that this approach comes much closer to directly measuring

the concepts than other methods available, a questionaire has other advantages. For example, such a survey would contribute new data to the field of Chilean research, and would also add information about the larger questions of democratic and political stability. And since most work, such as that by Gurr, has relied on other methods to substantiate the theoretical propositions, the introduction of survey data would add to the weight of any propositions which it helped verify. Obviously, the survey approach also has liabilities. It is expensive, as well as time-consuming, especially if the genuinely representative sample of the Chilean population were the goal.

B. Inference from Aggregate Data

A second method requires making the assumption that relative deprivation can be inferred from data which describes conditions within the society. For example, if we gather data to show inequality in the distribution of wealth, and infer from that evidence the existence of relative deprivation, we are assuming that political actors had in some rough sense an awareness of that general condition and from such information determined their evaluation. This is the assumption made by Gurr, and he is able to develop some remarkably sophisticated measures.[23] The obvious advantage is that the data are already available, and it becomes a matter of applying secondary analysis. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is at least one step further away from the actual decision-making process that

[23]Gurr, "A Causal Model...", pp. 1106-1124.

goes on in a political actor's mind, but at least the assumption that human perceptions in this area are based on an appraisal of conditions within the society does not seem overly unrealistic.

For the rather clearcut reason that it is the only practical alternative available, we will operationalize the concepts in the second manner in this paper. It should be noted that this operationalization does not provide even a crude mathematical relationship between the various concepts in our model. To accomplish that would require much more analytical sophistication than the author presently possesses. However, the goal is to provide some suggestions about the type of quantifiable evidence that could serve to indicate the strength of these concepts in the Chilean case.

C. Operationalization of Value Capabilities

We earlier defined relative deprivation as the discrepancy between value capabilities, the goods and conditions of life which a person sees himself obtaining under existing circumstances, and value expectations, the goods and conditions he desires. These objective economic and political measures can be inferred to describe the value capabilities of a political actor in Chile: (1) Indices of economic capability will include per capita real income and per capita income; the growth rate of per capita income over a specified period; short-run fluctuations in per capita income growth rates; inflation rates over

a specified period of time; and annual wage readjustments over a specified period of time. The rationale for using these indices is based on the assumption that men will view their own economic capabilities at least in part by reference to the output of the society, how that output is expanding, and how that economic expansion is actually increasing the economic position of the consumer. By using per capita real income as one measure, the rate of growth of per capita income as another, and inflation figures as a third, at least some indication is given of the likelihood that an individual can expect his own economic position to vary accordingly. In addition, the measure of short-term fluctations is included on the assumption that evaluations of economic capabilities are effected by short-run changes in growth rates. If, for example, rapid increases in income are followed by declines, appraisal of economic capability will be pessimistic, and on the other hand, a relatively stagnant period followed by rapid growth is likely to raise the expectation of economic advances. (2) Indices of political capability focus on the extent to which the political system is engaged in improving conditions within the society. Indices include the amount of money budgeted by the Chilean national government per capita, the growth rate of the budget per capita over a specified period, the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product represented by the budget of the national government, the percentage of the national budget spent on education,

and housing, and the growth rate of this percentage over a specified period. These indicators are used on the assumption that citizens expect their government to provide for all manner of needs not provided for by the private sector, and that their calculation of the government's ability and willingness to do this can be inferred by the size of its budget in relation to the size of the population, the rate at which the budget is increasing, and its size in comparison to the total GDP. Inclusion of the educational indice is based on the assumption that expenditures on public education "seem to be the single best index of the capability of the government to distribute benefits widely and in a manner that will promote economic development and a more equal distribution of income."[24] Inclusion of public housing expenditures of the government is based on the assumption that it further demonstrates a commitment by the political system to improve the capabilities of the lower classes especially.

D. Operationalization of Value Expectations

Value capabilities can reasonably be inferred from objective standards, but no such standards exist for value expectations. It seems reasonable to infer that a man will calculate just what he can expect from the economy and the political system by a general impression of its objective performance, but this does not really suggest what he may

[24]Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," American Political Science Review (December, 1968), p. 1136.

desire from the economy or the political system. Rising expectations in developing countries may result from such things as exposure to new ideas or to new ways of life, so to operationalize that level of expectations presents a difficult task. Three measures will be used. (1) Daniel Lerner has argued that literacy has important effects in transforming men's aspirations since they are exposed through literature and newspapers to modernizing pressures.[25] The first measure of value expectations we will use is the per cent of the Chilean population that is literate, and the growth rate of this percentage over a period of time. (2) A second indice that suggests rising expectations is data on education, so we will include the per cent of the Chilean population aged 13-18 in school, and the growth rate of this percentage over a specified period. (3) With Silvert's contention in mind that movement from the countryside to the cities is a demonstration of increased expectations,[26] we will include the percentage of the population which lives in cities, and the growth rate of this percentage over a specified period. The use of these three indexes - literacy rates, schooling levels, and urbanization - must be justified in an indirect way. By assuming that these occurrences expose a person to modern values and expectations, it can be implied that a child's presence in school, the existence of reading and writing skills, or movement to

[25]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 69ff.

[26]Silvert, p. 392.

the city shows awareness of, if not commitment to, the modern sector of the society on the part of the parents. By considering the data in a time sequence, the assumption is strengthened if the percentages tend to increase, since it is likely that parents who were exposed to the three indices were committed to modernization and demonstrated this by exposing their children in increasing numbers to the same source of modernization.

We contend, then, that an indication of relative deprivation in Chile can be gained by examining data about the economic and political capability of the system and by comparing these data with those which suggest the rising expectations of the population.

E. Operationalization of Democratic Stability

Political stability is demonstrated by adherence of both citizens and political incumbents to democratic norms of behavior, which we specified as meaning that political power is gained through elections held on a competitive basis, and that political power is exercised within the limits of constitutional proscriptions. Operationalization of these two indices of stability is much simpler than is that of relative deprivation, since violations of specified democratic norms involve definite physical activity that can be observed and recorded. We will include the following types of behavior as violations of the electoral process: political strikes, riots, localized rebellions, political

assasinations, small-scale terrorism, guerilla wars, civil wars and revolts.[27] The extent of such action may be determined by referring to Chilean newspapers, the Hispanic American Report, and the New York Times. Conformity to constitutional norms can be calculated by determining events where either the president or the congress has overstepped its constitutional authority. In the Chilean case, there are apparently no such events in the past thirty years.[28]

F. Operationalization of Intervening Concepts

In the theoretical model we argued that the relationship between relative deprivation and destabilizing behavior is influenced by three intervening variables - value orientation, institutional alternatives and coercive potential of the regime. The third, coercive potential, is the most easily operationalized, while the first and second present more difficult problems.

First, to genuinely operationalize the Almond-Verba hypothesis that a political culture composed of participant, subject, and parochial values is most conducive to a stable democracy appears impossible to operationalize without survey data. The other proposition, suggesting

[27]As elaborated in Rudolph J. Rummel, "A Field Theory of Social Action With Application to Conflict Within Nations," Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research, 1965, pp. 189-195, and in Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955-1960: Turmiol and Internal Wars," Peace Research Society Papers, III (1965), pp. 159-183.

[28]Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York; Random House, 1968), p. 85.

that past behavior in the nation is a strong influence upon what is regarded as legitimate behavior in the contemporary society, can lead to some assumptions by reference to the Chilean past, but even with such data, it is still necessary to assume present-day values. Until survey data is available to study this aspect of the model, it is likely that we will be forced to rely on an approach similar to that used by Seymour Martin Lipset in The First New Nation where his evaluations were based on impressionistic reports.

We noted earlier that Huntington's measures of institutionalization-adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence - were left in a rather ambiguous state. Because they seemed to make a good deal of intuitive sense, however, we will attempt to suggest several indices of these measures. First, we will assume that associational interest groups and political parties offer the most likely institutional alternatives for political actors to express demands. By concentrating on these two kinds of structures, the problems Huntington leaves us may be reduced. As defined by Almond and Powell, associational interest groups include trade unions, organizations of businessmen or industrialists, ethnic associations, associations organized by religious denominations, and civic groups.[29] By definition, such groups are autonomous, and at least in a formal sense have consensus, since

[29]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 78.

they are represented by a professional staff and orderly procedures of determining policy demands which are expressed through the staff in a coherent form.[30] So if we restrict ourselves to associational interest groups, then some of Huntington's operationalizing problems are eliminated if only by definition. Other aspects of institutionalization are more susceptible to measurement. Adaptability of organizations can be inferred by their age, and by their capacity to solve the problem of succession as demonstrated by generational age. Huntington suggests a further measure of adaptability - the ability to change or increase functions. This seems to be less pertinent since associational interest groups perform a single function, i.e., the "explicit representation of the interests of a particular group."[31] A further measure of institutionalization which gives a more general impression of the institutional level over the entire nation is simply the percentage of the total labor force included in the membership of associational interest groups, and the growth rate of this percentage over a period of time.

The institutional level of political parties may be measured according to their adaptability, autonomy, and coherence. as operationalized in the following way: (1) Adaptability will be judged by the age of parties, their generational age as shown by the number of times the executive leadership in the parties have changed, and func-

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

tional adaptability as shown by the number of times they have changed from electoral parties to governing parties (defined as the party of the chief executive or part of the coalition which elected him and consequently served in his cabinet). (2) Autonomy will be determined by enumerating the number of independent interest groups which seek to influence the policies of the party through formally recognized channels. This approach actually reverses the procedure recommended by Huntington, but the effect is the same since this information does show if a party is completely dependent upon a single institution, or if its support has a broader base. A second measure is to actually determine whether a party is an adjunct of another institution, if such information is available. It seems likely, however, that it will generally be simpler to determine the presence of interest group representatives than the working relationship between groups, which may not be openly acclaimed. (3) Coherence of the party will be judged by the number of publicly recognized factions within the party. If factions are open and publicly recognized it will be assumed that consensus within the party is poor. It can also be reasonably assumed that a party which can solve factional problems within the party and present a united front to the public has greater consensus.

In operationalizing the level of institutionalization of destabilizing organizations, we will restrict ourselves to the organizations which operate contrary to the democratic norms cited earlier. An

ambiguous ideological commitment to revolution will not be regarded as destabilizing, only if that commitment is transformed into actual nonlegal political behavior. If, for example, the parties within FRAP continue to use the electoral process to gain power they are not destabilizing forces. Any parties or organizations which do operate through nondemocratic norms can be judged according to their size. their adaptability (according to the same criteria set down for political parties), and their consensus as determined by the presence of publicly acknowledged factions.

The measure of coercive potential is more amenable to quantification than most of the concepts we have developed. We will use three indices: (1) The number of military personnel per 10,000 adults, and the growth rate of this ratio; (2) The number of internal security force personnel per 10,000 adults, and the growth rate of this ratio; and (3) military loyalty to the civil regime as judged by the number of years since the military has intervened in national politics by dismissing either the president or the congress. The measure in included on the assumption that "if the military's responsiveness to the civil regime is questionable, much or all of its deterrent effect is lost," so destabilizing behavior becomes more likely.[32]

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[32] Gurr and Ruttenberg, p. 78.

The intervening variables present several difficulties in operationalization. The measure of values without survey data appears impossible, except to the extent that conclusions can be drawn from more impressionistic studies. Institutionalization does not seem insurmountable, but if one is to move away from gaining simply a general impression from data such as size of membership in interest groups, or the number of political parties, then an attempt to deal with less quantifiable terms must be made. It is realistic to expect reasonable data about the age of organizations, the extent of factionalization within them, and even enough information to make predictions about autonomy. Such measures probably do not have the force that Huntington would wish, but so long as he is willing to leave his suggestions for measurement in a highly ambiguous state. we will simply have to strike out on our own.

CONCLUSION

One additional note should be made. An effort has been made to keep each concept analytically separate, and separate measurements have actually been suggested for each concept. But in reality, there is a good deal more overlapping and less clearcut separation. With this in mind, it should be noted that the lack of precise indicators for some of the concepts would be less crucial since the more exact measures may well be giving some indication of the status of other

concepts also. For example, we kept the operationalization of value capabilities and value expectations separate, but it is very likely that considerable interaction occurs between them. A person may reasonably base his hopes and desires upon some general evaluation of what he can expect to achieve. The same point could be made in reference to the effect of values. It seems reasonable that values are influenced by the general condition of the society, by its past record of stability, by the performance of the political system, and by other measures we have suggested, so even though we have not specified a definite measure of values, at least some inferences can be made from other data.

The operationalization is not without difficulties. The measures are not direct indices of the concepts, through operationalization a good deal of the richness of the concepts may be lost, and in fact some spurious relationships may be created through overlapping of concepts. But I suppose that to a greater or lesser degree this could be said of all such efforts, and the model is not without advantages. The data we have suggested as relevant is available, and the assumptions and inferences that make the data meaningful have been specified as clearly as possible. Of course, a more precise formulation of the relationship between variables would also be desirable, but that will have to wait for another day.

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