Tactics and Targets: Labor Protest and State Response in an Authoritarian Country

Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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Graduate Program in Sociology

The Ohio State University

2023

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Abstract

Repression has long been regarded as the main response to state-facing contentious. Although recent studies point that repression may vary by regime types and state-level concerns regarding international reputation, few analyses to date have analyzed how movement dynamics and movement targets alter state responses specifically. In this article, I draw on computational methods to analyze over 10,000 episodes of labor protests in mainland China and advance the literature in key regards. First, I interrogate how protest strategies affect the state's responses, from active coercion to accommodation and even tolerance. Second, my analyses differentiate between private and state-connected targets, and whether this matters for if and how the state intervenes. Results in these regards are clear: distinct tactics have unique ramifications and symbolic meanings that influence state responses. Furthermore, such effects are moderated by who precisely activists are targeting. This research, I conclude, offers important insights into the resilience of authoritarian regimes, the diverse ways highly bureaucratic governments manage social unrest, and the varying routes to achieving movement outcomes whether in authoritarian or democratic contexts.

Dedication

To everyone who have supported my journey, thank you.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Eric Schoon, Vincent Roscigno, Mike Vuolo, Andrew Martin, and my fellow cohort members for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Eastern Sociological Society (Philadelphia). This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Studies of social movements in authoritarian contexts have overwhelmingly emphasized the repression-dissent relationship between states and activists (Carey 2009; Davenport 1995; Earl and Soule 2010; Francisco 1995). Although repression continues to be the primary focus of most social movement studies in authoritarian regimes, scholars have begun to recognize that repression, at least in its most severe mode, is not the only effective form of state response (Earl 2011). Scholarship has shown that degrees of state's liberalization, regime type and concerns to international reputation can constrain the use repression, resulting in a variety of softer tactics such as surveillance, censorship, and dis-attention (Moss 2014, Su and He 2010, Schedler 2013).

Despite these contributions on the dynamic relations between states and activists, relatively few studies have analyzed how internal movement dynamics, such as movement targets and movement tactics, matter for state response. First, much of the early theorizing regarding the selection of tactical repertoires by social movement actors tended to assume that the state is the primary target of grievances (Aminzade et al 2001). Yet as more recent research has revealed, movements with labor, environmental and anti-business aims have increasingly targeted private companies, market organizations and other institutional entities (Martin and Dixon 2020; King and Pearce 2010; Walker et al 2008). This is important in authoritarian contexts given that: (1) authoritarian states

supervise all spheres of society, and that (2) such movements have the potential to disrupt social order and trigger movements against the state. How do authoritarian states, as a third or higher party, involve themselves in the relationship between activists and movement targets when the target is not explicitly the state? Will the state exert coercion out of fear of escalation or will it, instead, support activists to show benevolence in an effort to maintain legitimacy?

Secondly, as Jasper (2004) argues, most social movement scholarship has been dominated by structural explanations, thus overlooking the choices that political actors may face in particular contexts. From a micro-lens, government response and popular dissent are outcomes of interactions between strategic players who anticipate one another's decisions. Not only do activists adjust actions depending on policy context and state actions, a state's choice of potential responses is also based on a careful evaluation of movement targets, available resources, the state's position and standings, and the consequences that their actions might bring. Activists choose one type of tactic over the other because they believe that the strategy is more effective or has a larger chance to influence those in power. This compels research to look at how movement strategies, with its own political ramifications and expressive utilities, can influence the actions of state political agents.

To address such dynamics, I explore a unique dataset covering more than 10,000 episodes of labor protests in mainland China that occurred between 2011 and 2019. I ask specifically whether and how government responses vary based on protest strategies and movement targets? My research reveals that tactical variations in labor unrest have a

significant impact on the response of local state agents. Protest strategies such as demonstrations and road blockades that escalate future unrest or disrupt public spaces are more likely to lead to state repression. Strikes are more likely to result in state accommodation due to the economic and political pressure they exert on the state. Furthermore, the effect of these strategies is influenced by target. Strike increases state accommodation mainly because it puts state-related entities at risk, whereas the effect of demonstrations and blockades is significant on private entities. Additionally, my findings suggest that contrary to popular assumptions, the prevailing response from the state is more likely to be one of tolerance or non-intervention rather than active repression.

Although regional cases like China's labor protests are imbedded within their own political and social contexts, the data used for this study are extraordinarily rich relative to the size of the protests, regions, industries, targets and state responses, which provides valuable experience for understanding movements in both authoritarian contexts and other liberal Western states. As recent police violence in Western democracies shows, authoritarianism is not only a national-level regime characteristic, but can operate at different levels, including in the sub-national arenas (Chen and Moss 2018). Democratic states are also capable to act in an authoritarian fashion when necessary, as in the case of racial/ethnic apartheid regimes or in actions taken against racial minorities and immigrants. Understanding these realities thus requires an inspection of how authoritarianism works within different contexts and power relations.

Chapter 2. Social Movements in Authoritarian Regimes

The literature on social movements in authoritarian regimes has shed light on several important dynamics, such as how regime types and concerns about legitimacy can influence state responses. However, a sampling issue exists in the literature where the state is frequently treated as the only primary target. This section addresses two critical considerations. Firstly, I discuss scholarship on movement targets and explains why it is crucial to understanding movement outcomes and state responses. Secondly, I theorize three potential responses that authoritarian states may have when faced with social movements, each with its unique advantages and disadvantages.

Movement Targets and State Response

Early theorizing regarding the state actors' reaction to dissent tended to assume (implicitly or explicitly) that all non-democratic regimes rule through harsh coercion. Implicit in this research is the notion of a static relationship that treats state and contentious actions in a manner consistent with a stimulus-response model. The idea was so widely accepted that it has been termed "the Law of Coercive Responsiveness" (Davenport 2007). More recently, as the number of authoritarian regimes incorporating

democratic practices into their governing strategies has increased, especially in the post‐Cold War era, scholars have extended this line of inquiry further, arguing that regime's degree of liberalization and its repressive capacity matters for understanding the dynamics of contentious politics (Chen and Moss 2018).

Recent research has unpacked a variety of non‐democratic regime types and how degrees of openness and liberation may affect propensities to protest, and the range state responses from harsher coercion to the less intrusive and "softer" tactics that monitor, undermine, and neutralize opponents (Bishara 2015, Earl 2011). For example, more liberalized and open regimes will allow certain types of dissent and/or moderate protests. They tend to constrain the use of repression for fear of backlash and international condemnation (Moss 2014, Su and He 2010, Schedler 2013). It is also the case that some authoritarian regimes employ softer tactics such as surveillance, censorship, and dis-attention or try to undermine opponents by actively sponsoring government‐organized non‐government organizations (GONGOs) to manage dissent (Bishara 2015, Robertson 2010). In addition, scholars also point to the fact that regimes are comprised of varying levels of power holders and elites who compete for power and resources, thus demonstrating different attitudes to challengers (Mertha 2009, Kandil 2016).

Nevertheless, and despite divergences, repression continues to be the primary locus of most social movement studies in authoritarian regimes. The reason why attention to outright repression is so dominant, however, is due in no small part to the cases selected in prior studies. As Walker et al. (2008) point out, social movement theories

have focused almost exclusively on the state as the central target of movement activism (Schurman 2004, Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004). This state-centric focus is especially prominent in authoritarian countries. Movements often turn to the state because of its capacity to make changes or because the state itself is in need of change. However, contentious actions in these countries are not always politically driven. Protests launched by grassroots organizations or international NGOs in authoritarian contexts have articulated issues around economy, environment, or civil appeals (Bishara 2018, Robertson and Teitelbaum 2011, Yew 2016, Vu 2017). These movements have targeted a range of non-state objects from cooperate behaviors, sales products, and foreign investments to other market and institutional entities.

This discussion, however, does not imply that the state is absent from the contentious scenarios, especially in countries with strong government institutions and significant institutional capacity to regulate the political context and control resources. In such cases, states intervene not only because movements have the potential to disrupt social order or trigger movements against the state, but also because they supervise all spheres of society to amplify control and authority. In other words, states intervene not solely because the action is beneficial or necessary, but because they can. Thus, states in authoritarian contexts play an influential role in all aspects of social life and are actively involved in mediating and resolving conflicts. But how do authoritarian states, as a third or higher party, involve themselves in the relationship between activists and movement targets? When the target is not explicitly the state, will the state still exert coercion out of fear of escalation or will it, instead, support activists to show benevolence in an effort to

maintain legitimacy? In the following section, I theorize three responses that state may choose to enact when contentious actions occur under their supervision, each with its own costs and benefits.

Theorizing State Response: Accommodation/Repression/Tolerance

Theorization on legitimacy offers important insight to explain government response to protests in authoritarian contexts. Legitimacy has long been recognized as fundamental to organizational stability, resilience, and successful governance (Schoon 2015, Schoon, et al. 2020, Rise and Stollenwerk 2018, Walker and McCarthy 2010, Wimmer 2014). In particular, many scholars have emphasized legitimacy as a process that motivates organization or individual's compliance to publicly shared expectations (Johnson and Ridgeway 2006; Schoon 2022). Social order is legitimate if actions are oriented to certain determinate norms or rules (Weber 1978[1924]).

As Chen and Moss (2018) summarize, contemporary authoritarian regimes have incorporated liberal and democratic features to foster stability and bolster international reputation, but this also increases opportunities for activists to capitalize on regimes' discursive commitments to reform and democracy. Elites' failures to live up to their promises may provoke future protests that severely damage their credibility and produce defections (Almeida 2003; Trejo 2012). These obligations to legitimacy require the state to accommodate protestors during movements. Accommodation is thus when government authorities give convenience to movement, take actions to assist activists in achieving

their goals, or leverage their political or legal power. This can include offering legal counseling services or having local leaders endorse a successful resolution. When state-related entities are of target, accommodation also involves states actively participating in negotiations with protestors to meet their demands. Recent research increasingly accounts for the fact that states have institutional capacity for facilitation, instituting policy changes, expressing support, and offering concession to quell moderate protests. Regime leaders who became aware of the danger of being isolated from society may foster institutional channels to absorb conflicts or help grievance airing (Huang, Boranbay-Akan and Huang 2016; King et al 2013, 2014; Lee and Zhang 2013).

Table 1. Concptualizing State Response

			Benefit	Cost
State Response	Active	***Accommodation***	• Build state's legitimacy	• Encourage future protests
		Repression	• End turmoil swiftly • Deterring future occurrence	• Undermine state's legitimacy • Less sensitive to popular demands
	Non-Active	***Tolerance***	• Avoid potential dillemas • Avoid cost when lack of resource	• Signal weakness in state capacity

Table 1 Conceptualizing State Response

Accommodating activists carries short-term costs connected with the economic or political resources needed to provide assistance, but it is likely to end the current challenge and gain popular support by showing an image of a responsible government. However, supporting activists can trigger more contentious behaviors. With each successive mobilization, more and more people will join in because their expectations

that the collective action will succeed have been substantiated by previous events. In the long term, accommodation has the potential to encourage future challenges by increasing potential challengers' estimate of the likelihood of success (Laba 1991, Rasler 1996).

In another scenario, state may choose to response with overwhelming force, either through violent acts that exert physical harm to the targets, or nonviolent acts that restrain personal liberty or impose economic penalties. A strategy of repression tries to shape the preferences of activists by imposing costs on their behavior and reducing their expectation for future success.

Repressive responses can end the turmoil swiftly while deterring future occurrence by lowering potential challengers' estimates of the likelihood of success (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, Oberschall 1973, Tilly 1979). However, the deterrent effect happens at the cost of a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of a large and important portion of the general population. Exposure to what people believed to be illegitimate repression is likely to make them disillusioned with the established order and easily recruited for future mass actions (Opp 1994). As Dimitrov (2008) argues, one of the keys to a resilient authoritarian regime is to be responsive to the public. Regimes collapse when their people stop bringing grievances to the state because they do not believe that the state can be accountable to address their issues. This argument points out the importance of accountability politics where citizens expect state to respond on its social commitment. Prior literature often points out that authoritarian governments confronted by contentious challenges face the choice of responding with repression or compromise (Goldstein and Tilly 2001). But as discussed above, the choice between the two strategies may cause

serious unintended consequences. Regimes can sometimes win – at least in the short term – either through compromises or through overwhelming forces, though each choice nonetheless implies future risks (Byman 2016). In occasions when the state is unsure about the potential consequences that they might bring through active engagement, tolerance through non-intervention or silence can be the last resolution to avoid making decisions in situations of dilemma and uncertainty. By withdrawing from the public sphere, the state leaves an unregulated space for protestors to execute their strategies, which in turn, empowers activists by enlarging their reach to the audience and increases the likelihood of successful outcomes. Tolerance thus produces the effect of passive enabling. It is passive in the sense that the space was created without states intentionally supporting the activists, but in effect it provides a field of action that enable protestors to mobilize without external constraint.

However, state inaction is not without cost. Failure to be present at the conflict scene may suggest a failure in the states' governmentality, as the occurrence of movements per se challenges the social order maintained by the state. Non-action and ignoring might signal weakness in state capacity, or at least, create a non-responsive and irresponsible impression among the citizens.

Chapter 3. Explaining Governmental Responses to Contentious Actions

Protest Tactics

Governments respond selectively to different sorts of groups, and to different sorts of actions (Tilly 1978). Tactical differences in the forms and goals of social movement have a major impact on various movement outcomes. The decision over strategies reflects not only what activists consider as most effective to the outcomes, but also the collective identities and tastes of the protest, as well as a strategic sense of how the social world works. Some scholars have demonstrated how movement tactics are not only instrumental, but also expressive and performative (Jasper 1998, Doherty and Hayes 2018; Schoon and Beck 2021). Each strategy conveys activists' understanding of what is legitimate and appropriate conduct that reflects ideological and moral positions. These expressive meanings operate within a cultural context that is shared with the states. Therefore, states respond not only to the forms of protest strategy, but also to the meanings and significance that various actions convey.

Previous studies often measure tactics in a dichotomous way, for example, between violent and nonviolent actions. Piven and Cloward (1977, 1991) also distinguish between normative (e.g., signing petitions, attending peaceful demonstrations) and non-

normative forms of collective action (e.g., riots, sabotage). Among non-violent actions, Sharp (1973) distinguishes protests that are mainly symbolic (e.g., demonstrations) from actions that impose sanctions on the target (e.g., sit-ins, and civil disobedience). Other scholars distinguish actions that are moderate but not militant (Barnes & Kaase 1979) and those that reflect activism but not radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley 2009).

Despite these theoretical efforts to distinguish protest strategies, Franklin (2009) points out that previous literature tends to use protest event or protest group as the basic unit of analysis. These analyses aggregate together all of a group's contentious challenges over an extended period, making it difficult to "compare across separate challenges, each with its own distinct tactics and outcomes" (Franklin 2009, p.703). This drawback may be due to the lack of abundant data to conduct statistical analysis, leading scholars to focus on the few large contentious challenges rather than the sporadic and discrete protests that happened across a country. To address these issues, this paper extends the study of contentious actions, offering a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of different contentious tactics.

Among non-violent actions, strikes are often credited as the most widely used strategy in achieving changes for the working class (Moody 2013). The effect of strikes is threefold, with both economic and political ramifications. First, strikes directly influence normal production routines and disrupt revenue flows to employers (Sharp 1985). Firms bear huge economic pressures when faced with long-term, large-scale strikes. In certain authoritarian contexts where local governments are assessed based on tax revenues and economic growth, strike also poses threat to the political achievement of local authorities.

Secondly, in the case of political strikes, where protestors focus on government policies or policy reforms rather than wages and working conditions, strikes directly challenge the decision and authority of the state (Kelly 2015). In a more democratic context, as Hamman et al. (2016) show, strikes may have demonstrable electoral effects in influencing voters' behavior. Liberal governments thus might grant concessions in the face of widespread public protests in anticipation of potential backlash (Hamman et al. 2013).

In the context of China, it is important to take into account the socialist principles that underpin the state. While strikes highlight the inherent conflict between employers and employees, they also foster class awareness and rally support for workers (Hodder et al. 2017). Strikes position protesters as workers seeking fair compensation, rather than simply rebels with discontent. This identity formation speaks directly to the state's official stance of representing and safeguarding workers' rights, and any attempt to forcefully quell strikes could result in a significant loss of legitimacy than any other authoritarian context. Given the economic and political impact of strikes, the cost of repression is hard to ignore, and it is plausible to hypothesize that:

H1: The state is more likely to accommodate protests that incorporate strikes compared to those that do not.

Wage campaigners for non-strike forms of action have been criticized by some writers as an undesirable and unnecessary abandonment of labor’s most effective weapon (Moody, 2013). However, their symbolic influence is not trivial for influencing the perception of the public on the issues. Demonstrations are not spontaneous gatherings but

organized behaviors, usually involves multiple actors and sometimes alliances between organizations. Demonstrations are generally staged in public to spread awareness among a larger audience. Scholars have argued that the success of collective actions depends on mobilizing the public to perceive a current situation as illegitimate and endorse future collective action (Thomas and Louis 2014). Thus, non-violent normative actions have been credited for shaping public opinions on policy change, influencing the broader community, and turning bystanders into sympathizers (Burstein 2003; Louis 2009; Simon & Klandermans 2001; Wright 2009).

DeNardo (1985, p.35) argued that in democratic contexts, demonstrations can serve as a source of strength for opposition movements due to their mobilization potential, as "there always seems to be power in numbers." The presence of a large number of participants sends a powerful message of broad support for the challengers' goals, which can influence governmental leaders (Lohmann 1993). However, in authoritarian contexts, the mobilization potential of demonstrations may operate differently because elites tend to view threats as an important factor in their decision-making when facing collective actions (Earl and Soule 2006), and some scholars have noted that the perceived threat associated with high participation could increase repression (Lichbach and Gurr 1981). Thus, mobilizing a broad audience through demonstrations can pose a significant political threat to the regime. Furthermore, the normative frames conveyed by demonstrations may reveal the contradictions between the front and backstage behavior of the state, which can downplay the integrity of the discursive frames of the state (Bail 2015; Thomas and Louis 2014). Therefore, the logic

of numbers conveyed in demonstrations could have a converse effect in authoritarian contexts than in democratic contexts. The larger the event and the more successful it is in revealing discrepancies, the greater the perceived threat by the elite. Unlike strikes, without economic influence to balance the cost of suppressing demonstration, it is likely that:

H2: The state is more inclined to repress labor protests that involve demonstrations compared to those that do not.

Sit-ins, road blockings, and street occupying are perhaps the most confrontational tactics used in labor protests. With the goal of disrupting the on-goings at the protested site, protestors gather conspicuously in a visible space and refuse to move until their demands are met. On one hand, the disruptive nature of sit-ins and blockades breaks the normal functioning of society, which tends to elicit a quick resolution through the use of force by the state. On the other hand, the visibility and uncooperative nature of confrontational strategies render any use of force illegitimate in the eyes of the public. As Sharp (1973) argues, sit-ins and blockings deliberately invite authorities to take violent action, rendering "the violence of the opponent's repression to be exposed in the worst possible light", thereby making "shifts in opinion and then to shifts in power relationships favorable to the nonviolent group (p.657)". This generates two competing hypotheses:

H3a: In order to maintain public image, the state is more likely to accommodate protests that use confrontational strategies compared to those that do not.

H3b: Due to their disruptive intention on public order, the state is more likely to repress protests that use confrontational strategies compared to those that do not.

Furthermore, the dual nature of confrontational strategies presents a dilemma for states as they weigh the potential costs and benefits of taking action. Dealing with these strategies can introduce ambiguity and uncertainty, making it difficult for states to make a clear decision in the moment. Therefore:

H3c: The state is more likely to tolerate protests that incorporate confrontational tactics, as opposed to those that do not.

Protest Targets: Private Entity vs. State-related Entity

Movement tactics cannot be reduced to their purely instrumental effects. Even though forms of action may be similar, the preferences and understandings embedded in them, the political significations given to them, and the public spaces occupied by them may be highly divergent depending on whether they are targeting at state-related entity or private entity.

Targets are important because different targets have particular strengths or weakness that can affect state responding to the challenges in authoritarian context. As Walker et al. (2008) discuss, different institutional targets have varying degree of openness to influence, vulnerability to nonparticipation, and vulnerability to delegitimation. These differences can either aid them in responding to challenges or become opportunities to be exploited by actors in order to promote their cause (Jasper 2006; Jasper and Poulsen 1993). State-related entities such as public service

organizations, public educational institutions, or state-owned companies resemble to certain extent state authority, and might be more likely to receive backup from other state institutions such as the police system. Perceptions to threat also varies across types of entities. For example, for private companies, damage to their public image may mean loss in shareholder's confidence or market performance, but for state-related entities, changing public perceptions implies distrust to state capacities, or signals weakness in state function. Entities with more pluralistic structures, goals, and viewpoints are less vulnerable to persistence pressure on public image, while those with a narrower range of settings are subject to their specific challengers.

Although the paper's earlier expectations center on the effect of a single strategy or claim that gains governmental attention, it is important to acknowledge a range of possible combinations between movements target and protest strategies when modeling social movement dynamics. As discussed above, state response to labor protests can be based on three factors: the fear of backlash due to damage to legitimacy, the fear of encouraging future occurrence, and the fear of harm done to economic progress or political achievement. Each tactic may have its own effect when labor protests are targeting distinct entities.

Because the strength of demonstration and confrontational tactics are related to the influence that it can produce, state-related entities facing such protests face more risks in terms of public perception. They became more vulnerable targets also because protests may spill over from the labor fields and escalate into accusation and distrust on

government. These effects generate two competing hypotheses based on state consideration on fear of backlash or fear of encouraging future occurrence.

H4a: When the target is a state-related entity, the state is more likely to accommodate labor protests that use demonstrations or confrontational tactics compared to those that do not for fear of damage on public image.

H4b: When the target is a state-related entity, the state is more likely to repress labor protests that use demonstration, sit-ins or blocking when targets at state-related entities for fear of stimulating future unrests.

The strength of strike is about the damage it creates in disrupting the function of daily operations. While private entities might be burdened from the economic loss, state-related entities confront more urgencies in the halting of public services such as transportation and schools, and large state-owned enterprise might suffer more than small private firms. Therefore:

H5: When the target is a state-related entity, the state is more likely to accommodate labor protests that use strikes compared to those that do not for fear of economic loss and political pressure.

Chapter 4. Context, Data and Methods

China's Labor Protests in the Twenty-First Century

The frequent occurrence of labor protests in mainland China provides abundant data for exploring these hypotheses, and its unique state-labor relation exemplifies the dilemma of state response to popular dissents in an authoritarian regime. Over the past forty years, China has relaxed its state control over private investment and encouraged foreign trade in coastal cities. By taking such a capitalist path of development, the socialist country has laid down its responsibility of taking care of the working class. As a result, a host of labor protests revolving around wage arrears, working conditions, breach of contract, injuries, and loss of pension have fueled the grievances among workers in both state-owned enterprise and foreign-invested factories (Lee 2007). At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, there were an estimated 30,000 strikes and protests in China each year (Yu 2010). The number of labor disputes cases has increased 17 times from 48,121 in 1996 to 828,714 in 2016 (Zhang 2019).

As a state publicly committed to socialist principles, the legitimacy of the Chinese government relies on the broad ideology of socialism and the primacy of the working-class, but these ideas are also shared and expressed by workers' labor protests when they

are appealing to the government and media. The communist party's official ideology and public commitment to "safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of workers" provide Chinese workers with ready-made language and legitimate ideological claims that the state cannot easily rebut (O'brien and Li 2006). Labor protests proposed a moral dilemma that constrained the state's ability to take action, forcing authorities to be cautious about the circumstances to use repression or to make concessions to meet protestors' demands; direct forces from the state cannot undercut labor protests without damaging its own legitimacy, while excessive support to workers would hinder local economic development and trigger more protests.

In the Chinese context, labor protestors often ask for economic compensation for overtime fees, pension, housing, layoff, and social securities that are owed by the companies. (Chen and Tang 2013; Chen 2009). Nevertheless, the state inevitably gets involved in the conflicts because workers often lack the power to pressure their employers. As Martin and Dixon (2020) pointed out, "the expanding influence of the state into all spheres of society provided a forum for claims-making and ensured that the state was the final arbiter of many disputes." This is especially true in China, given the paternalistic nature the government, which supervise all aspects of social life, ranging from welfare program to business interventions, citizenship education, community building, and poverty alleviation (Fairbrother 2013; Heberer and Göbel 2011; Mok and Qian 2019). Paternalist regimes combine "strong discipline and authority with fatherly benevolence" (Farh and Cheng 2000). Its authoritarian component refers to elites' behaviors that assert authority and control, whereas benevolence indicate concerns for

subordinates' personal well-being (Pellegrini and Scandura 2008). While the extent to which this relationship is benevolent is often questioned, paternalism essentially forms a mutual obligation between the authorities and citizens: elites are responsible and responsive to those under their care, in return they expect loyalty and deference.

For example, in O'Brien's observation of "rightful resistance" on protests in rural China against local governments, peasants frame their claims around Communist Party policies, state laws, and values of central leadership to defy local elites and officials who ignore or abuse these laws and policies. Rather than stay under the radar and avoid higher officials, rightful resisters seek attention from higher authorities and take advantage of the official ideology to reduce their own vulnerability and make their actions more palatable to high officialdom (O'Brien 2006). These strong rhetorical idioms or narratives that workers and peasants have used aim at eliciting particular responses from their targets (Lee 2007). It essentially points to the obligation of accountability of government to explain the discordant situations.

The paternalistic nature of the Chinese state adds another layer to the already complex interaction between state and activists. Legitimacy is now constituted of not only the state's socialist promises, but also its moral duty to concern its citizens, which are widely recognized in the society. These dilemmas and obligations suggest that government response and popular dissent are outcomes of interactions between strategic players who anticipate one another's responsibilities and the consequences their own decision might bring. The balance between support and discipline is not only the key to understand China's own political stability, but also opens a new perspective to

understand the resilience of authoritarian regimes and diverse methods of handling social unrests within a multi-level government system.

Data and Methods

Given that there are no official statistics on the number of worker protests in China, this study uses an unofficial dataset called Strike Map collected by China Labour Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong based NGO that promotes workers' right and supports workers' movements in China. The Strike Map collects incidents that are published in the public domain, usually posted on Weibo (Chinese social media) and occasionally in the official media as well. It records the date, location, industry, population, protest demands, protest strategies, government reactions, and other detailed information on more than 10,000 workers' collective actions in China dating back to 2011. While the data are not a strict sampling of all labor protests in China and the representativeness is unknown, Strike Map is currently the only publicly accessible database on labor protests in China.

Because Strike Map is event-based with only few variables and some of them are not clearly constructed, I rely on computational text analysis to extract data from the event database to construct my own variables. I draw on labor protests that occurred between September 2011 to December 2019 in the mainland China from Strike Map (N=12,238). Data availability precludes this research from including observations before 2011. To avoid the influence of the Covid-19 pandemic on protest occurrence and movement dynamics, I do not include incidence beyond 2019. In terms of missing data, I

exclude 329 protest events that do not have information on participant population. I also exclude 5 protests that happened in multiple cities. I refilled missing data points (4 cases) with the information provided in the archives of the original social media posts.

While media reports have long been used by social movement scholars to construct datasets, they are usually biased by media selection (Earl et al. 2004), which means that certain events are more likely to be reported by the media. For instances, events that exhibited more contentious repertories and higher levels of participants might be more likely to be reported in the public domain. Of particular difficulty for collecting social movement data in China is that while official newspapers barely mention any popular unrests, social media platforms are often censored based on the political inclination of the posts (King et al. 2014). In this case, politically oriented labor protests might be underrepresented in the data. In addition, because incidents have varied over the years, readers should still caution against comparing the effects over an extended period of time, even though time is controlled for the analysis.

Outcome of Interest: Government Responses

The dependent variable, Government responses, measures whether the government respond to labor protest with (1) Accommodation (2) Repression or (3) Tolerance. Based on the description in the Strike Map dataset, Accommodation refers to actions lead by government authorities to help the protestors meet their demands and leverage worker's power during negotiation. This includes the presence of police as backups to help

workers confront company representatives, community officials providing legal counselling services, and local leaders pledging to supervise the transaction with companies or vouching for a successful solution. Repression is measured as the application by governmental agents of violent or nonviolent sanctions against protestors. This includes both violent acts meant to do physical harm to the targets and nonviolent acts that restrain a target's freedom of action, including arrests, detentions, or imposing economic penalties. Tolerance is coded when the state is not present to take practical action. Tolerance or non-intervention can be either due to the fact that the government is unaware of the event or that the state does not want to intervene the situation.

To account for variation in the terms used to describe government responses to protests, I created a Python dictionary to parse out all the unique words from the description of government action and recode them to the three categories. For example, "Mediation" and "Negotiation" are actions when state tries to build connections between companies and protestors to assist workers' bargaining, hence coded as "Accommodation". "Beaten", "Arrested", and "Threaten" has been used to characterize harsh actions from the government, hence coded as "Repression".

Since both repression and negotiation almost always involves police, police presence itself cannot indicate the attitude of the state. Hence, I exclude cases that record only "police presence" but with no further actions. Excluding police presence enables the three attributes of the dependent variables to be distinctive from each other, representing distinctive reactions from the government. The final dataset used for analysis contains 10, 252 observations. The analysis is conducted in multinomial logistic regression model. For

robustness tests, I also ran models with police as an independent category and results show no significant difference in major findings.

Predictors: Tactics and Target

Tactics are measured according to the form of contention utilized in a challenge. Forms of contention were measured using several dummy variables extracted from the section "actions taken involve" in the original dataset. The reason to use several dummy variables rather than one categorical variable that contains different tactics is because a single event could combine several forms of strategies, separating them can test the effect of each strategy. In the Chinese context, violent contentions are nearly absent; labor protests often adopt non-violent tactics such as Demonstration, Sit-in, Blocking, Suicide, Strike. The transport strikes recorded in the original dataset was merged into strike because they accounted for the same protest strategy, but only in the transportation industries launched by bus drivers and taxi drivers. In addition, suicide threats are a unique strategy that have historically been used in China to raise public attention and demand moral obligation.

I constructed the protest target by differentiating what kind of enterprise or workplace the protestors are situated in. Target is coded as a nominal variable consisting of 1) Domestic private entities, such as private companies and private institutions. 2) State-related entities, including state-owned enterprises, public services sections such as the public transportation systems, public educational institutions, or other government

related sections. 3) Domestic joint ventures that involve stake holdings from both the private and state. And lastly 4) Foreign invested enterprises.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

	Frequency		Frequency
Government Responses		**Target**	
Accommodation	848 (9.13%)	Private entities	5931 (75.45%)
Repression	743 (8.00%)	State-related entities	1194 (15.19%)
Tolerance	7697 (82.87%)	Foreign Invested Enterprises	609 (7.75%)
		Domestic Joint Ventures	127 (1.62%)
Protest Strategies		**Participant Size**	
Demonstration	5060 (54.48%)	1-100 persons	7214 (80.11%)
Strike	2402 (25.86%)	100-1000 persons	1538 (17.8%)
Sit-in	2436 (26.23%)	1000-10000 persons	247 (2.74%)
Blocking	793 (8.54%)	10000+ persons	6 (0.07%)
Suicide threat	246 (2.65%)	**Industry**	
		Construction	3180 (34.24%)
Protest Demands		Education	387 (4.17%)
Economical	7612 (81.96%)	Manufacturing	2470 (26.59%)
Political	1202 (12.94%)	Mining	256 (2.76%)
Regulatory	944 (10.16%)	Retail	284 (3.06%)
		Services	1088 (11.71%)
		Transportation	1368 (14.73%)
		Other	255 (2.75%)

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables

Controls

In addition to my key independent variables, I also control for population size of the protest, protest claims, and industrial type of the working unit as control variables. Due to the lack of exact numbers of protest participants in the original dataset, the Population Size is recorded as categorical variable with four levels: (1) 1-100 People (2)100-1000

people (3) 1000-10000 people (4) more than 10000 people. The first category is set as reference because it has the largest number of observations.

Demands claimed in the protests are categorized into three dummy variables: economic compensation, political demands, and demands that claims for regulation change at workplace. A set of python dictionaries containing keywords of these categories are created to allow matching between the descriptions in the observations with those key words. Economic Demands record claims or disputes that ask for monetary compensation on wages, overtime work, welfare/social security, and housing. Political Demands record claims that ask for union formation, property rights, ownership rights, equal status, and opposition or claims regarding institutional policy at the social level. Regulatory Demands record claims that ask for regulatory change at the organizational level, refusing or demanding changes on management, working condition, and personnel changes.

Industry is recorded also as nominal variable, including construction, education, manufacturing, mining, retail, service and transportation sectors. Manufacturing sector is set as the reference group because most of the migrant workers work in this sector, and it is the most frequent sector where protests took place. Year records the exact year in which protest occurs. It controls for the uneven pattern of protest occurrence due to either recording bias or social change. However, even though the time variable is controlled, readers should still caution against comparing the effects over an extended period because the data is not a strict sample of all the labor protests in China, and incidents have varied over the years. Finally, data on GDP growth were combined and calculated

from the National Statistics Yearbook of China. gdpgrow records the percentage of GDP difference comparing 2019 to 2011 based on the provinces where the protests occur.

Limitations:

One limitation from the data is that multiple incidents of a larger event may be recorded as independent, leading to a potential correlation between incidents of protest, particularly when they occur simultaneously in the same location. However, given the political context in China, this is unlikely as protests typically lack a clear organizational structure or a leading organizer. Protests are instead sporadic and fragmented, initiated by individual workers. However, it could be argued that even when protests are not organized by the same group, there may be a diffusion effect where activists imitate successful incidents that are nearby, or a path dependency where officials in the same district follow existing solutions or previous decisions when facing new protests, both of which would lead to potential correlation among the incidents. To account for these possibilities, robust standard errors are adjusted based on region clustering. Date clustering and combined date and location clustering were also considered but did not result in significant changes from location clustering (results available upon request).

Chapter 5. Results

Effects of Protest Tactics

Table 3 presents the result of main effects of protest strategies from the multinomial logistical regression models. Model 1 uses tolerance as reference category and compares the effects of protest tactics on accommodation and repression versus tolerance. Models 2 and 3 use accommodation and repression as reference groups accordingly. Figures 1 to 3 show the predicated probabilities of state accommodation, repression and tolerance.

The results indicate that tactical variations in labor unrest have a significant impact on the decision-making of local state agents. First, the effect of strike supports hypothesis H1. Despite of the economic threats strike poses while halting production and public services, local state still maintains excessive tolerance to such behavior. When protestors strike, the odds of state accommodating protests is 37.9 % higher compared to tolerance, while the odds of state taking repressive action is 25.5% lower ($p<0.05$). When repression is set as reference category, we see that strike significantly ($p<0.05$) increase the odds of both state accommodation (85.1%) and tolerance (34.3%). Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, the predicted probability of state accommodation increases from 0.08 to

0.11 when strikes are used. These findings suggest that strike is still the most powerful and effective weapon of working class.

Table 3. Multinomial Logistics Regression on Government Responses to Labor Protests (truncated)

Independent variables	**M1 (Tolerance as reference)**		**M2 (Accommodation as reference)**		**M3 (Repression as reference)**	
	Accommodation	Repression	Tolerance	Repression	Accommodation	Tolerance
Demonstration	0.944	1.920***	1.059	2.034***	0.492***	0.521***
	(0.104)	(0.346)	(0.117)	(0.319)	(0.077)	(0.094)
Strike	1.379*	0.745*	0.725*	0.540***	1.851***	1.343*
	(0.181)	(0.102)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.318)	(0.185)
Sit-in	0.701*	0.748*	1.426*	1.067	0.937	1.337*
	(0.098)	(0.092)	(0.199)	(0.158)	(0.138)	(0.164)
Blocking	1.232	2.513***	0.812	2.039***	0.490***	0.398***
	(0.244)	(0.568)	(0.161)	(0.305)	(0.073)	(0.090)
Suicide threat	1.848**	2.344***	0.541**	1.268	0.788	0.427***
	(0.364)	(0.522)	(0.107)	(0.359)	(0.223)	(0.095)
Target (ref: Private Entities)						
Non-domestic companies	1.462*	1.340**	0.684*	0.916	1.092	0.746**
	(0.263)	(0.146)	(0.123)	(0.204)	(0.243)	(0.081)
Domestic joint venture	1.617*	0.839	0.618*	0.519	1.928	1.192
	(0.323)	(0.273)	(0.123)	(0.187)	(0.696)	(0.388)
State-related entities	0.884	0.869	1.131	0.983	1.017	1.151
	(0.130)	(0.148)	(0.166)	(0.227)	(0.235)	(0.195)
Constant	0.063***	0.048***	15.873***	0.763	1.310	20.793***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(4.198)	(0.358)	(0.615)	(6.404)
Observations	7,668	7,668	7,668	7,668	7,668	7,668

Reported in Odds Ratio, standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3 Multinomial Logistic Regression on Government Responses to Labor Protests (truncated)

Turning to demonstration. The odds of taking repressive action compared to tolerance is 92.0% higher when protestors use demonstration, controlling for all other

variables ($p<0.001$). Compared to accommodation, the odd of repression is 103.4% higher when demonstration is used. This finding supports the hypothesis (H2) that demonstrations will increase the probability of state repression. Figure 2 further supports this result by showing an increase in the predicted probability of state repression from 0.04 to 0.08 when workers incorporate demonstrations into their protest strategies. Additionally, as shown in Figure 1, the difference between the effect of those using demonstration and those that do not is marginal and insignificant, which suggest that whether using demonstration or not does not alter the state response of providing accommodation. The effect of demonstrations lies in their potential to mobilize and influence a broader audience, which poses a clear political threat to the state. Because of the significant effect of demonstrations on state coercion, the state faces fewer dilemmas when deciding to take action. Thus, as demonstrated in Figure 3, workers' usage of demonstrations does not affect the predicted probability of the state choosing nonaction or tolerance.



Figure 1 Predicted Probability of State Accommodation

Sit-ins are more likely to lead to state tolerance. Model 1 shows that compared to tolerance, the odds of states making accommodating and repressive action both decreases, by 30% and 25.2% respectively ($p<0.05$). When accommodation or repression is set as reference group, the odds of tolerance increase by 42.6% and 33.7% respectively ($p<0.05$). In addition, the predicted probability of state tolerance will increase from 0.84 to 0.88 when workers utilize sit-ins compared to those didn't. The result on sit-ins partially supports hypothesis H3c. When confronting with confrontational tactics that are symbolically provocative, state seems to face the dilemma of prioritizing public image or maintaining social stability, which results in their non-active tolerance in order to avoiding uncertainty.



Figure 2 Predicted Probability of State Repression



Figure 3 Predicted Probability of State Tolerance

Compared to sit-ins, blocking is less tolerated by the state. Model 1 and 2 shows that when compared to state accommodation and tolerance, the odds of state taking repressive action is 151.3% and 103.9% higher ($P<0.001$). When repression is set as reference group, the odds of state accommodation and tolerance both decreases, by 51% and 60.2% respectively. Because of its disruptive influence, state seems to prioritize maintain public order and social routine when blockings are present and are more likely to intervene in the form of harsh acts. As figure 3 shows, the predicted probability of state tolerance decreases from 0.86 to 0.78 when blockings are used, while at the same time the predicted probability of repression increase from 0.06 to 0.13.

In the Chinese context, suicide threats have been used as a unique protest strategy to draw public attention, and their effects on government responses are mixed. Compared to state tolerance, the odds of state accommodation and repression both increase by 84.8% and 134.0%, respectively ($p<0.001$). When accommodation or repression is set as the reference category, the odds of tolerance decrease by 45.9% and 57.3%, net of other factors ($p<0.01$). The figures confirm these results. When protestors threaten to commit suicide, the predicted probability of state accommodation increases from 0.08 to 0.14, the predicted probability of state repression increases from 0.06 to 0.12, while the predicted probability of state tolerance decreases from 0.86 to 0.74.

The findings regarding suicide threats may appear unintuitive and contradictory at first glance. However, during emergent moments such as suicide threats, it is plausible to think that the state must first prioritize saving lives by fulfilling the demands of protestors in order to calm down their emotions. The state may initially respond with soft actions

but subsequently charge against the workers' radical behaviors. To validate the result, I revisited all 58 cases in which state reactions are given to suicide threat. For example, in a typical case where both responses were present, police persuaded suicide protestors to come down from a building by helping them negotiate compensation terms with their employers and guaranteeing that their demands would be met. After they were rescued, they were brought to the police station, fined, reeducated, and kept in detention for creating a disturbance in public order. One monitoring letter issued by the police to arrested protestors clearly stated that "petitioners with specific demands should appeal in a correct way that is guided by the law...unlawful acts will be proceeded by law enforcement according to the Public Security Administration Punishments Law."

Finally, it is evident that there is a significant contrast in the estimated probabilities of state intervention and non-intervention. The figures indicate that the predicted probabilities of state accommodation and repression fall within the range of 0.05 to 0.15, while the predicted probability of state tolerance is considerably higher, exceeding 0.75. This suggests that contrary to popular assumptions regarding authoritarian regimes, the prevailing response from the state is more likely to be one of tolerance or non-intervention.

Interactions Between Protest Tactics and Targets

To better present how targets moderate the effects of protest tactics, Figure 4 to 6 shows the predicted probability of state making accommodation, repression and tolerance while

differentiating private and state-related entities (the interaction between suicide threat and target is omitted due to small numbers of interactive cases). First, looking at Figure 4, when private companies are the target, the probability of state accommodation do not differ when protest uses strike, demonstration or blocking. One exception would be the use of sit-ins, which decrease the probability of state accommodation from 0.09 to 0.07. When state-related entities become the target, however, two tactics matters for state response. In particular, using demonstration will lower the probability of state enabling from 0.11 to 0.06, while using strike will double the probability of state accommodation from 0.06 to 0.14. The later finding suggests that it is the economic pressure and political achievement that local states care about when confronting with strike, which supports hypothesis H5.



Figure 4 Predicted Probability of State Accommodation by Targets

Turning to Figure 5 on probability of state repression, we see that when state-related entity becomes the target, the usage of tactics does not matter for state response.

Neither of the tactics will affect the probability of state repression when state-related entity is targeted. This partially suggest hypothesis H4a in the sense that state is more likely to restrain from using force when state-related entity is targeted. Because state-related entities are tightly connected to the government, they became more vulnerable targets for fear of damage on public image that may escalate into accusation and distrust on government. While harsh actions in protests that target private entities would not increase such concern, they became more legit target of repression. As figure 5 shows, when private companies are targeted, demonstration will increase the probability of state repression from 0.05 to 0.07, while blocking will double that probability (from 0.06 to 0.13).



Figure 5 Predicted Probability of State Repression by Targets

For the effect on state tolerance, we see that when state-related entities are targeted, tactic usage of neither strategies would matter for changing the probability of state tolerance. When protests targeted at private entity, the use of sit-ins will increase the

probability of tolerance from 0.84 to 0.88, while the use of blockings will decrease the probability of tolerance from 0.86 to 0.87.

Combining the result from previous section, we see that the effects of tactics are largely moderated by which target the protests is aiming at. Although individually, each tactics seem to have its own effect, when interactions are taken consideration in the model, we see that they only matter for certain type of entities. For example, the previous finding on the effect of strike in increasing state accommodation is mainly because the strategy is effective in putting state-related entity at risk, while the effect of demonstration and blockings in increasing state repression and the effect of sit-ins in increase tolerance is largely situated in targeting private entities. In addition, we see that none of the usage of tactics would alter state tolerance and repression when labor protests are targeted at state-related companies. These results clearly shows that state attitude differs according to the target of protests.



Figure 6 Predicted Probability of State Tolerance by Targets

Chapter 6. Conclusion and Discussion

Authoritarian states facing contentious challenge are caught in various dilemmas in which their actions and attitudes will bring important consequences. Yet, the ways that state agents evaluate the emergency at stake and make strategic moves are less examined. This study sheds light on this question by analyzing how local states in China choose to respond to varying degrees and forms of labor unrests. Using multinomial logistic regression model, the study shows that there is a complex array of factors that affect government responses.

My findings make two important contributions to the existing scholarship. First, this study shows that rather than a unifying array of repressive responses, authoritarian state reacts differently to collective action based on the tactics protestors employ and the demands they express. I argue that this is because different tactics have their own ramifications and symbolic meanings that impact the economic and political consideration of local states. As the findings show, states will use repressive actions when strategies are likely to escalate future unrest, foster greater mobilization potential, or disrupt public spaces, as in the case of demonstration and road-blockings. However, strikes signal different meanings to state. On the one hand, strikes reveal the antagonism in employment relationship, which reminds the state that protestors are workers who are subjected to the protection of a socialist state. On the other hand, strike creates economic turmoil and shutdowns that the state cannot risk prolonging. Thus, strikes introduce both

political and economic pressures that make state more likely to enable workers during the protests.

Additionally, states can exhibit contradictory actions at the same time when they face the dual imperatives of maintaining both public image and social stability, as exemplified by the effect of sit-ins. This dilemma is also reflected in the effect of suicide-threat as a form of protest, even though the small number of suicide threat in the data makes the result less robust. We see that state's moral obligation compels it to safeguard the citizens in its immediate encountering to workers' suicide attempts, yet at the same time its mission to negate chaos and reduce social influence let local police to punish and reeducate protestors ex post facto.

States are not only fragmented in their organizational units (Clemens and Cook 1999, McDonnell 2017, Morgan and Orloff 2016), but also possess different political missions and cultural images that generate different responses to their citizens' behaviors. Whether implicitly or explicitly, my data indicates that states calibrate their responses to protests in an effort to balance their political images and the public identities that protestors present themselves as when they engage in different movement activities. Hence, support is made when "workers" met "socialist state", but repressions become legitimate when "disrupters" challenge the authority of "paternalistic state". Because each strategy has built its own linkage between state and citizens, my results show the risks treating repression as the unifying method used by authoritarian countries to control popular dissents.

States are restricted in the kind of measures they use in response to protest. Future research should explore how temporal changes of economic and political goals alter states commitments, and how they may be in conflict with the longstanding political images that the regime cultivates. This would be particularly fruitful to explore in contexts where a country is transitioning from liberal or authoritarian system.

A second key contribution of this work is that my analyses highlight the role of targets as moderating how states respond to protestors. When state face less threat to their public image, for example, in protests that target private entity, it chooses to respond with coercive actions in order to prevent future unrests. But when state-related entity became the target, it restrains the use of harsh action for fear of escalating protest to target itself. In another scenario, when strikes are employed to target state-related entities, state shows much more support and tolerance. This suggests that certain tactics are more effective in targeting different entities.

Thus, activists should be cautious about what protest strategies are best suited for the goals they want to achieve and who they are targeting. My results also suggest a dynamic link among movement target, goals, and strategies. However, the capability of how each combination of movement activities affects its target still relies on the specific cultural and political contexts the movement situated in. Since one movement may consist of more than one strategy and multiple demands, further studies are needed to test the combination of two or more strategies with various demands and targets to find the most effective pathways that leads to desired outcomes.

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Appendix A: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Government Responses to Labor Protests

Table 4 Multinomial Logistic Regression on Government Responses to Labor Protests (full model)

Independent variables	**M1 (Tolerance as reference)**		**M2 (Accommodation as reference)**		**M3 (Repression as reference)**	
	Accommodation	Repression	Tolerance	Repression	Accommodation	Tolerance
Demonstration	0.944	1.920***	1.059	2.034***	0.492***	0.521***
	(0.104)	(0.346)	(0.117)	(0.319)	(0.077)	(0.094)
Strike	1.379*	0.745*	0.725*	0.540***	1.851***	1.343*
	(0.181)	(0.102)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.318)	(0.185)
Sit-in	0.701*	0.748*	1.426*	1.067	0.937	1.337*
	(0.098)	(0.092)	(0.199)	(0.158)	(0.138)	(0.164)
Blocking	1.232	2.513***	0.812	2.039***	0.490***	0.398***
	(0.244)	(0.568)	(0.161)	(0.305)	(0.073)	(0.090)
Suicide threat	1.848**	2.344***	0.541**	1.268	0.788	0.427***
	(0.364)	(0.522)	(0.107)	(0.359)	(0.223)	(0.095)
Target (ref: Private Entities)						
Non-domestic companies	1.462*	1.340**	0.684*	0.916	1.092	0.746**
	(0.263)	(0.146)	(0.123)	(0.204)	(0.243)	(0.081)
Domestic joint venture	1.617*	0.839	0.618*	0.519	1.928	1.192

	(0.323)	(0.273)	(0.123)	(0.187)	(0.696)	(0.388)
State-related entities	0.884	0.869	1.131	0.983	1.017	1.151
	(0.130)	(0.148)	(0.166)	(0.227)	(0.235)	(0.195)
Economic demand	1.194	0.669	0.838	0.561***	1.784***	1.494
	(0.245)	(0.150)	(0.172)	(0.090)	(0.285)	(0.335)
Political demand	0.740	1.060	1.352	1.433*	0.698*	0.943
	(0.152)	(0.169)	(0.278)	(0.246)	(0.120)	(0.150)
Regulatory demand	1.381***	0.867	0.724***	0.628**	1.594**	1.154
	(0.128)	(0.143)	(0.067)	(0.110)	(0.280)	(0.191)
Participants (ref:1-100 persons)						
100-1000 persons	1.976***	4.427***	0.506***	2.240***	0.446***	0.226***
	(0.211)	(0.578)	(0.054)	(0.373)	(0.074)	(0.029)
1000-10000 persons	1.545	6.940***	0.647	4.491***	0.223***	0.144***
	(0.410)	(1.280)	(0.172)	(1.194)	(0.059)	(0.027)
10000+ persons	3.540	13.482**	0.282	3.809	0.263	0.074**
	(5.418)	(11.993)	(0.432)	(6.946)	(0.479)	(0.066)
Industry (ref: manufacturing)						
Construction	0.698***	1.186	1.432***	1.698**	0.589**	0.843
	(0.076)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.302)	(0.105)	(0.115)
Education	2.803***	0.181	0.357***	0.065**	15.498**	5.528
	(0.668)	(0.180)	(0.085)	(0.065)	(15.711)	(5.498)
Mining	0.470*	1.081	2.129*	2.301*	0.435*	0.925
	(0.159)	(0.241)	(0.721)	(0.757)	(0.143)	(0.206)
Retail	0.605	0.937	1.653	1.550	0.645	1.067
	(0.276)	(0.282)	(0.754)	(0.784)	(0.326)	(0.321)
Services	1.066	0.510	0.938	0.479	2.088	1.959
	(0.237)	(0.185)	(0.208)	(0.202)	(0.882)	(0.709)
Transportation	1.734***	0.673*	0.577***	0.388***	2.577***	1.486*
	(0.242)	(0.108)	(0.081)	(0.066)	(0.440)	(0.238)
Other	0.783	0.458***	1.277	0.584*	1.711*	2.185***
	(0.136)	(0.085)	(0.223)	(0.134)	(0.392)	(0.406)
Year	1.041	1.052*	0.961	1.011	0.989	0.951*
	(0.066)	(0.024)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.022)

Constant	0.063***	0.048***	15.873***	0.763	1.310	20.793***
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(4.198)	(0.358)	(0.615)	(6.404)
Observations	7,668	7,668	7,668	7,668	7,668	7,668

Reported in Odds Ratio, standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05