Transjordanian State-Building and the Palestinian Problem:

How Tribal Values and Symbols Became the Bedrock of Jordanian Nationalism

Thesis

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Abstract

My thesis explores how modern Jordan came to be defined by a tribal heritage common to several states in the region, owing to the unique political exigencies faced by the country's leaders during both the British Mandate (1921-1946) and the post-independence era (1946-present). I argue that regional political objectives of colonial authorities and key leadership personalities were major driving forces of the progressive decision to preserve tribal elements in Jordanian society during the British Mandate. In the post-independence era, I maintain that Jordan resorted to its tribal heritage that continued to retain a privileged place in society in crafting a nationalism that centered on the original inhabitants of Transjordan

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Chapter 1: Nationalist Foundations During the Colonial Era (1920-1948)

Introduction

In April of 2014, Human Rights Watch issued a report in which they skewered Jordanian authorities for refusing to admit Palestinian refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War, the majority of whom carried Jordanian papers. The Head of Jordan's Hashemite Royal Court justified the policy on the grounds that a further influx of Palestinians carried the potential to upset a delicate demographic balance and engender domestic instability. Indeed, many Transjordanian nationalists are of the persuasion that "demography will be the Trojan horse allowing Palestinians to strip [Transjordanians] of everything." These fears were augmented by the prospects of further democratic reform in the context of the Jordanian Arab Spring, which reform threatened to empower the kingdom's Palestinian majority at the expense of its Transjordanian counterpart. Today King Abdullah finds himself in the unenviable position of meeting pro-democratic demands stemming from the Palestinian community and liberal segments of the Transjordanian population, while simultaneously placating a traditional tribal bastion of support that feels increasingly marginalized.

This thesis explores how Jordanian nationalism came to be defined by a tribal heritage common to several states in the region, owing to the unique political exigencies faced by the country's leaders during both the British Mandate (1921-1946) and the post-independence era (1946-present). I begin my argument by summarizing outcomes in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine in which tribal heritages were marginalized during the colonial era. I consequently turn to an analysis of the British Mandate in Transjordan. I argue that regional political objectives of

colonial authorities and the leadership personalities of Emir Abdullah and General Glubb were major driving forces of the progressive decision to preserve tribal elements in Jordanian society I analyze how these elements were subsumed under the state through active recruitment to the military, the subsidization of agriculture, and the ordering of tribal law. The success of this project can be explained in terms of a timely world depression, generous incentives issued by London, and adroit personal diplomacy exercised by Emir Abdullah and General Glubb. On Independence Day, Jordan was developed in the manner of a modern state but retained a tribal orientation.

My analysis then turns to the post-independence era. I propose that King Abdullah initially developed a nationalism inclusive of Palestinians in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War and Jordan's annexation of the West Bank. I proceed to make the case that conflict between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian monarchy, culminating in the events of Black September, prompted Jordan's leaders to redefine Jordanian nationalism in a manner exclusive of Palestinians. In this process of redefinition, Jordan resorted to its tribal heritage that was enshrined during the colonial era and continued to retain a privileged place in society. A survey of Jordan's sociolinguistic landscape, including dialectical code-switching and ethnolinguistic labels, illuminates this transformation. I conclude with a treatment of modern developments, including the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Abu Odeh episode, and the Arab Spring, which reflected and reinforced deep ethnic cleavages within Jordanian society.

In this thesis, I draw extensively from secondary sources and endeavor to bring my argument on Jordanian nationalism full circle, beginning with the colonial era. The multi-disciplinary approach of my thesis reflects both my academic training and the multi-disciplinary

pursuits of Transjordanian elites. In the process of national consolidation, they drew from various domains including custom, language, and law.

Historical & Theoretical Foundations

In April of 1921, Britain established Abdullah bin Hussein as Emir of Transjordan, a land east of the Jordan River falling under the British Mandate pursuant to the Sykes-Pikot agreement. After the 1925 addition of Ma'an and Aqaba (Due-Gunderson),[1] the emirate encompassed much of the modern state of Jordan. As Middle East expert Joseph Massad notes, "There was no country, territory, people, or nationalist movement called Transjordan or Transjordanians prior to the establishment of the nation-state."[2] Prior to 1921, Transjordan belonged to several Ottoman regional administrations, including ones in southern Syria, Palestine, and northern Hijaz. The vast majority of Transjordanians, including settled and nomadic, were organized around the tribe. The northern-most settled tribes had some experience with Ottoman administration and paid taxes to the empire, while the southern Bedouin tribes experienced very little, if any, interference. The Bedouin tribes played a vital role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans led by Sharif al-Hussein and gained military experience that could serve as a threat to unwelcome encroachments of central government. British General John Glubb, who played a pivotal role in Jordan's colonial era and early history post-independence, noted that Transjordan at its inception was "wild and unwanted. . . out of hand and without a government."[3]

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[1] Due-Gunderson, N. (2017, January 09). *Nationalism in Jordan: King, tribe, or country? Part one.*
[2] Massad, J. A. (2001). *Colonial effects: The making of national identity in Jordan.* New York: Columbia University Press, p. 27.
[3] Massad, p. 143.

The year 1946 marked the end of the British Mandate in Jordan and the formal beginning of Jordanian independence. By this time Jordan had many attributes characteristic of the modern nation-state including a strong army, central government, clearly defined borders, welfare mechanisms, and an efficient system of tax collection.[4] Yet the experience of Jordan stood in contrast to that of neighboring states in which the tribes were coerced and marginalized by central rule and did not factor large in the state nationalisms that emerged. The British Mandate transformed tribal life in Transjordan but tribal systems continued to exert a powerful influence in society post-independence. This was so thoroughly the case that Jordan would resort to its tribal heritage when domestic and international events prompted its leaders to articulate a Jordanian nationalism exclusive of Palestinians.

Benedict Anderson defined the nation as "an imagined political community."[5] A nation is imagined in the sense that nationals in their lifetime will only meet a small minority of their counterparts, "yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."[6] As Ernest Gellner added, "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist."[7] National consolidation serves political elites by giving them an ideological basis for exercising authority over a population. National consolidation necessarily involves selection by which certain cultural and historical features of a population are elevated while others are discarded or marginalized. It consists of packaging these features in an emotionally compelling narrative, complete with images and symbols, in the interest of said imagined political community. Preexistent features like tribal elements may be adopted or

[4] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*. London: I.B. Tauris, p. 2.
[5] Anderson, B. R. (2016). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso, p. 5-6.
[6] Anderson, B. R., p. 5.
[7] Anderson, B. R., p. 6.

eradicated according to their utility in this process that takes place at a particular moment in history with particular political and practical imperatives. Jordanian history vividly illustrates in pedagogic fashion the inventive quality of nationalism due to the rapidity with which it evolved. Like other nationalisms, it sprung out of a specific political environment and was designed to meet the emergent needs of the ruling elites.

Tribalism as an ordering principle is frequently juxtaposed with modern state nationalism. Tribalism is based on kinship and is generally viewed as incompatible with the latter on the grounds of its parochialism. Tribalism also enshrines no principle of territorial integrity, an essential prerequisite of modern nation-states. In the case of the Bedouins of Transjordan, the tribe was not rooted in the land of Transjordan itself. Bedouin nomads were accustomed to seasonal migrations into Iraq and Saudi Arabia in search of new pastures. The fact that Jordanian rulers drew from tribal elements, albeit ones transformed by the colonial era, underscores the creative and contrived quality of nationalism.

Jordan's use of tribalist idioms in its nationalism contrasts with the bases of nationalisms of its neighbors who likewise possessed a tribal orientation at the dawn of the 20th century. Yoav Alo recounts the anomalous status of Jordan's colonial era as follows:

 The preservation, with modifications, of tribal codes and conventions [in Transjordan] as well as the basic structure of the social order seemed to have further eased the otherwise difficult transition. From this point of view, the situation of Transjordan stands in marked contrast to the experiences of other newly created Middle Eastern states, such as Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, where the common result was the coercive and violent

subjugation of the tribes accompanied by their political, economic, and cultural marginalization.[8]

This marginalization was reflected in regional nationalisms that made no mention of a tribal heritage. Regional nationalisms drew from linguistics, geography, and history in establishing their uniqueness. In Saudi Arabia, religious ideology lay at the foundation of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. In Iraq, nationalist rhetoric drew largely on the Mesopotamian origins of the various ethnic groups that historically inhabited the land and was bolstered by Arab nationalism. In similar fashion, Syrian nationalism has featured some form of Arab nationalism throughout its history, alternating between local and supranational varieties. Palestinian nationalism for its part evolved in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and centered on the recent struggle against Zionism rather than ancient heritage.

As I will elaborate in this paper, the privileged place conferred by Jordan's colonial administration on the tribes owed to conscious decisions shaped by immediate political considerations not some inevitable tide of history. A salient feature of the state nationalism that emerged from this foundation is a Bedouin imprint which I will elaborate on later in this thesis drawing from the writings of Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah*. The Bedouin gave Jordanians a sense of common ancestry exclusive of Palestinians, conveyed a sense of authenticity, ancestral purity, and connection to the land and desert.

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[8] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process: Mandatory Transjordan, 1921-46. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37*(2), 213-240, p. 235.

Regional Political Aspirations of Mandate Authorities

I begin my assessment of Jordan's unique colonial outcome by arguing that key colonial authorities had little motivation to dismantle the fabric of Transjordanian society. This was especially true toward the beginning of the British Mandate but offers explanatory power for the preservation of tribal elements through the entirety of Jordan's colonial era. Similarly, evidence that Emir Abdullah and General Glubb were comfortable in a tribal environment informs analysis of their persistent choice to operate within existing tribal frameworks.

In the post-World War I era, Britain's primary objective in the Middle East was the success of the Zionist project.[9] Britain determined that Transjordan would be excluded from a Jewish state and intended that a regime in the region legitimated under Hashemite Arab nationalism would absorb a great deal of Palestinian and Arab opposition. Administration of the territory would simultaneously keep chaos from bleeding into Israel and avoid a French takeover of the land.[10] There was no clear objective for what the newly promulgated Arab state would look like. Some form of indirect rule was in order given Britain's ambivalent attitude toward Transjordan and determination to make only a minimal investment in the country. Britain initially planned to rule the country through a collection of local governments that had developed in the post-World War I period led by a miniscule British contingent.[11] The initial arrangement foundered as the local governments were unable or unwilling to prevent raids into the Hawran and curb the activities of Syrian exiles that had taken up refuge in Transjordan. This lack of oversight incensed the French, and British officers on the ground were constantly requesting

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[9] Massad, p. 27.
[10] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 20-21.
[11] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 35.

backup from the Palestinian Mandate.[12] The Bedouin were particularly distrustful of the British given their view that the Skypes-Pikot agreement violated promises made to the Arabs in exchange for their rebellion against the Ottomans during World War I.[13] This tentative balance paved the way for the arrival of Abdullah in 1921 and the British ultimately fulfilled their strategy of indirect rule through the establishment of an emirate. An emirate promised to outsource the burden of state administration, which the British were loath to shoulder independently, and to legitimate the state's existence in a way that British indirect rule alone could not.

Britain's determination to rule Transjordan primarily through indirect means meant that Transjordan was unlikely to experience radical changes that would immediately and drastically upset the fabric of society. At Transjordan's inception, the whole of the country was organized in tribal terms. Choosing to operate within existing structures necessarily meant that tribal structures would be leveraged and manipulated but not altogether eradicated as this would require an enormous outlay of effort and resources. The British were also suspicious of Arab nationalism. If Transjordanian nationalism developed at the expense of tribes, the new state might frustrate Britain's regional aspirations, which depended from the outset on Britain's ability to maintain a governing presence in Transjordan. It follows that the emphasis during the Mandate Period lay in state-building rather than nationalization; it was not until a later date in Jordanian history that political elites innovated a new nationalism that drew from tribal elements in response to domestic and international challenges.

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[12] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 35.
[13] Browning, N. (2013). *I am Bedu: the changing Bedouin in a changing world*. University of Arkansas, p. 17.

Emir Abdullah similarly harbored political ambitions that lay outside of Transjordan. After the French seizure of Syria that deposed his brother Faisal from his throne in Damascus and Faisal's 1921 appointment by the British as King of Iraq, Abdullah was left to regroup with hopes of reclaiming Syria for himself under the Hashemite banner.[14] Abdullah initially saw Transjordan, a small underdeveloped country with a relatively modest history as no more than a base from which to amass support. Abdullah's Arab nationalist allies that had served the Faisali state before its overthrow shared his aspirations of using Transjordan as a tool to reclaim Syria from the French. Abdullah set out to develop support among the tribes of Transjordan for this express purpose and paid little attention to the administration of the country, especially during the early years of his emirate. Abdullah made a concerted effort to court Bedouin tribes which were highly militarized and as a result had effective control over the population.[15] The Bedouin tribes would be his natural allies in any future armed struggled to reclaim Syria. Abdullah removed the Bedouin tribes from the administration of the central government and administered them himself and by the Department of Tribal Administration headed up by his cousin and confidant Emir Shakir bin Zayd.[16] This arrangement enabled Abdullah to deal with issues pertaining to the Bedouins on an ad hoc basis taking into account the personalities and preferences of sheikhs, whose favor was critical to securing tribal allegiance. It was also a reflection of his inability at the time to impose central rule on the Bedouins even if it were desirable due to their military empowerment.

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[14] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*. See pages 1-3 for a complete of the country on the eve of King Abdullah's arrival.

[15] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 41.

[16] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 41.

By the same token, Abdullah himself was naturally comfortable with the Bedouin lifestyle due to his personality and background in the Hijaz. Observers note that he preferred horses over luxury cars, was equally comfortable in a palace as a tent, participated in tribal games and was highly proficient in the personal diplomacy characteristic of tribal politics.[17] However, over time both the British and Abdullah developed an increased stake in the political success of Transjordan due to domestic and regional developments and the dwindling prospects of Abdullah reclaiming Syria. This evolution would lead to a concerted effort to centrally govern the whole of the country in the manner of a modern state.

General John Glubb was deployed in 1930 to head up Jordan's Desert Patrol, whose task was to stop the cross-border raids that threatened Britain's colonial enterprises in the region. Glubb played an outsized role in the Transjordanian state-building process and successfully subsumed the Bedouin under the state. Before his commissioning to Jordan, Glubb had spent time working with Iraq's Bedouin population and was an Arabophile, especially with respect to the nomadic tribes. Glubb was a staunch proponent of operating through local institutions rather than dismantling them. In a 1935 article published in *The Near East and India* magazine, he distilled his policy toward the tribes into four operational principles that illustrate his basic orientation. "Indeed, I would have the following principles painted in golden letters on the wall of the office of every administrator of warlike tribes: 1) humanity and sympathy; 2) light taxation and lucrative employment; 3) subsidies to shaykhs; and 4) stick to tribal law."[18] Glubb's focus was on material development, and believed that neither democracy nor Western culture was essential to the modernization project.

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[17] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 42.
[18] Massad, 112.

[T]he present preeminence enjoyed by the West lies principally in the material field: in

mechanics, technology, manufacturing, and similar activities. . . The West, on the other

hand does not enjoy any generally admitted preeminence in morals. . . Western

democracy . . . is also by no means universally accepted as the best method of conducting

the affairs of every nation. . . [I]t is always risky to transfer the customs of one nation

bodily to another, without regard to local conditions. In a country where the masses are

entirely ignorant of the world at large, and where everybody (even the rulers) are lacking

in experience, unexpected results may ensue from the application of what, in England,

would be regarded as the most elementary human rights. . . [19]

Britain's ongoing preference to limit expenditures and the decision of Emir Abdullah and

General Glubb to operate within existing structures meant that the tribal system would emerge

from the state-building process transformed but well intact.

The Tribes Vis-à-Vis Expanding Central Authority

The success of the Transjordanian state-building project during the British Mandate is

why the country's tribal character on independence day is of great analytical value. Prior to this

state-building project, tribalism had been the norm in this part of the world for millennia. In

short, the greater the expanse of central administration, the more we are able to identify Jordan as

an outlier for preserving its tribal heritage. In this section, I analyze how colonial authorities

innovated policies across agriculture, the military, and law that enshrined the tribe as the chief

unit of social and political organization. The conscious decision to preserve and privilege the

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[19] Massad, 114.

tribe in this process is best understood against the backdrop of the regional aspirations of colonial authorities and the personalities of Emir Abdullah and General Glubb. This decision can also partially explain why state-building in Jordan was so successful since measures to disband the tribes would likely have been met with great opposition. Similarly, generous incentives from London and a world depression help explain both the wide scope and peaceful character of Transjordanian state-building. Jordan's development and tribal orientation on Independence Day taken together distinguish Jordan from its neighbors and illuminate the subsequent development of Jordanian nationalism.

In 1924, Britain assumed direct administration of Transjordan for a myriad of reasons.[20] By this time, Britain was beholden to the Mandate Commission of the League of Nations and wanted to evidence progress in developing the country in preparation for independence. Transjordan had also become more strategic as a buffer against Saudi expansionism, which threatened to undermine Transjordanian independence and its strategic value in the Zionist project. Abdullah's favoritism and laissez-faire mentality toward Bedouin affairs and the increasing demands of the government on the settled tribes were contributing factors in the Balqa' Revolt of 1923, which required the mobilization of British armored vehicles to put down. Nonetheless, Britain would continue to respect preexisting social structures. The tribe was codified as the basic administrative unit of a variety of administrative functions ranging from tax collection to the distribution of social services and elections to the Legislative Council starting in 1929.[21] Mukhtars, typically tribal sheikhs and notables, were appointed to aid the central administration in carrying out these functions. In the realm of law enforcement, the government

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[20] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 220-223.
[21] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 221.

relied on collective responsibility and held entire tribes responsible for crimes committed by tribal members. The effectiveness of this approach depended on Abdullah and the government's ability to secure the cooperation of sheikhs and mukhtars, upon whom they conferred special status and offered incentives including handsome commissions for successful execution of their duties.[22] In short, this method of rule during the mid to late-20s not only guaranteed the preservation of chieftaincies, a key feature of tribal organization, but strengthened them.[23]

Another watershed moment during the British Mandate was the promulgation of the first Transjordanian constitution in 1928 known as the Organic Law. The constitution created Jordan's first democratic institution, the Legislative Council, and elections were held for the first time in 1929. The government drew up constituencies that highly corresponded to traditional tribal divisions. [24] This system further strengthened the tribal system by enshrining the privileged status of sheikhs and notables and giving them a platform to exert influence.[25] Abdullah's personal diplomacy played a vital role in all successful functioning of the Jordanian state. He connected with key tribal decisionmakers, ensuring they felt their needs were being addressed, and assuaged any residual fears they might have felt toward foreign interference, in general, and British interference, in particular, after their unforthright behavior in the wake of World War I. The government supported measures to increase its reach with powerful incentives. Like sheikhs and mukhtars, the government compensated elected representatives with handsome salaries in addition to the social status afforded by participation in the process.

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[22] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p.221-222.
[23] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p.221-222.
[24] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p.223.
[25] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p.223.

The government further integrated tribes into the fabric of the state through active recruitment to the military. This process transformed aspects of Bedouin life while enshrining others in a way that preserved elements of tribal organization. In the early 1920s, the British formed a local Transjordan military under its command consisting of no more than a couple thousand men recruited from the local population. This force, however, failed to bring a stop to cross-border raids that had characterized Bedouin tribal lifestyle for centuries.[26] This failure prompted the government to take measures to exert greater control over the desert. In 1929, British authorities proclaimed the Law of Supervising the Bedouin which restricted traditional seasonal migrations into Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria and officially identified Bedouin with the nation-state in which they took up the majority of their residence.[27] This measure was supported by the Tribal Control Board (TCB) under the auspices of the Arab Legion and a tribal shakyh nominated by Abdullah. The intention was to prevent raids and enforce limits on seasonal migration through fines, prison sentences, and confiscation of property.[28] When Ikhwan raids into Transjordan intensified and the TCB could not stop the raids themselves or Transjordanian Bedouin retaliation, [29] the British disbanded the Board and deployed General Pasha General Glubb to head up a Desert Patrol of soldiers recruited on a voluntary basis from the Bedouin populations themselves. The Desert Patrol was ultimately a major success not only for stopping raids and ensuring that Bedouins stayed within the confines of Transjordan but through incorporation of them under central administration in unprecedented fashion. On the success of the Desert Patrol Alon remarks, "Within a few years General Glubb and his men not only had

[26] Hiatt, J. (1984). State Formation and the Encapsulation of Nomads: Local change and continuity among recently sedentarized Bedouin in Jordan. *Nomadic Peoples,* (15), 1-11, p. 6.
[27] Browning, p. 41.
[28] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 225.
[29] The Ikhwan were Bedouin tribes serving in the Saudi military under Ibn Saudi.

managed to put a halt to raiding but had also subjected the nomadic tribes to the rule of the

central government and expanded the reach of the administration to the desert."[30] The success of

recruiting Bedouin to the Desert Patrol owed to a myriad of factors the most paramount of which

was economic crisis. During 1929 to 1936, Transjordan endured successive years of drought and

locust attacks, and felt the full effects of the world depression.[31] While all of Transjordan

suffered, the Bedouin were hit especially hard. Extreme weather ravaged sheep and camel stocks

and many Bedouin compensated for their losses by selling what remained leading to a further

diminishment in numbers.[32] The world depression caused demand and prices of livestock to

plummet. The Bedouin resorted to the Desert Patrol as part of the Arab Legion as a means of

survival. The government paid soldiers of the Desert Patrol invaluable cash stipends on which

many families depended and provided food and grain assistance.[33]

Bedouin recruitment to the Arab Legion transformed tribal systems in a major way. For

the first time, the Bedouin themselves took a leading role in enforcing limitations on seasonal

migrations beyond Transjordanian borders, ensuring the end of nomadic patterns that had been in

place for centuries. The military gave Bedouins an ideological stake in the success of

Transjordan. Whereas Bedouins involved in raids were accustomed to abandoning the mission if

the going got tough, Bedouins in the military were socialized to fight on ideological grounds in

service of the state. The Arab Legion also weakened the tribal institution of the chieftaincy and

tribal alliances. While sheikhs continued to enjoy privileged status as tribal representatives, the

military basis of their authority eroded as they lost the capacity to mount an armed challenge to

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[30] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 224.
[31] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p.223
[32] Hiatt, p. 6.
[33] Hiatt, p. 6-7.

the state with the growth of the Arab Legion. [34] In like fashion, tribal confederacies, which were an integral part of tribal military culture, lost their raison d'être. The Balqa' alliance of settled tribes disintegrated while the two nomadic confederacies of Transjordan—the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaytat—experienced unprecedented infighting and jockeying for power that would have been inconceivable had the confederacies been filling an actual military function. [35] On the other hand, recruitment to the Arab Legion enshrined the tribe as the primary mode of organization in Transjordan largely because it took place without modifying the tribe as the chief administrative unit of the state and mode of social organization. The aspects of tribal life that the military did erode were incompatible with the demands of a modern nation-state and would inevitably decline with the increased integration of the tribes. There was nothing inevitable, however, about General General Glubb and Abdullah conscious choice to operate within preexisting tribal structures. Once the Arab Legion through cooptation had neutralized any independent military threat from the Bedouins, this decision can clearly be identified as a tactical choice rather than a reflection of the balance of power on the ground.

Another process that transformed but also enshrined aspects of tribal life was the promotion of agriculture. The British began in 1927 to privatize land, particularly among the settled tribes, and settling land title disputes. [36] Land reform was undertaken in tandem with the promotion of agriculture as successful agriculture entails property rights and state security against trespassing, thievery, and vandalism. A major accelerating factor of the program took place in the early 1930s when Zionist pressure was brought to bear on the British to allow Jewish

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[34] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p.229
[35] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 229.
[36] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 125.

migration into Transjordan.[37] Zionists argued that Transjordan was in a state of stagnation and

that Jewish settlements would contribute to development in the country. Britain was wary of the

conflict between Palestinians and Jews bleeding into Transjordan and responded by injecting

more resources into the country, especially in the domain of agriculture. Government incentives

were generously extended to encourage participation in the program. In late 1933, the British

gave Transjordan £38,000 in loans to buy seeds and in 1935 awarded Transjordan a £50,000

grant to purchase more seeds and to expand the Land Department, a main objective of which was

ongoing land reform.[38] The development of agriculture affected all the tribes of Transjordan but

was especially remarkable among the Bedouin who historically despised the art. Like

recruitment to the Arab Legion, the proper backdrop for understanding the success of the

Transjordan government's agricultural policy are generous incentives coupled with great

economic hardship.

Title reform, a prerequisite for agricultural advancement, was another major source of

change to the tribal system. Jordanian land expert Michael Fischbach described title reform as

"the most significant and intrusive state policy ever carried out in Transjordan." [39] Prior to the

policy change, sheikhs were the sole arbitrators of land ownership and handled land ownership

rights and annual redistributions. In the north of the country among settled tribes, the Land

Department assumed these functions. Nonetheless, sheikhs continued to play a role in arbitrating

land disputes and so their privileged role was not wholly undermined by this arrangement. In the

south of the country among the formerly nomadic tribes, General Glubb and sheikhs were the

primary arbiters of land control and the promotion of agriculture in these areas preserved the

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[37] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 113.
[38] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 114.
[39] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 126.

tradition of sheikhly leadership on all affairs of paramount importance.[40] The adoption of

agriculture, in like manner as recruitment to the Arab Legion, forever changed the

Transjordanian Bedouin. The precarious nomadic lifestyle gave way to a more secure

agricultural one. This ongoing security and increased state integration weakened the existentialist

necessity of tribal unity and solidarity. However, among both Bedouins and settled tribes that

had long taken up agriculture, the tribe remained the main social and political force in society

even as an increasing number of functions were subsumed under the central government.

After the Palestinian Rebellion in 1936, and General Glubb's observation of support for

the rebels among Transjordanian sheikhs, the British government took exceptional measures to

secure the loyalty of the tribes. The British issued grants to General Glubb and Abdullah to be

distributed to tribal sheikhs in exchange for their loyalty, a system of subsidization that

continued in practice for several years.[41] With the same intent, the British government sponsored

road development projects worth £19,000 and increased welfare to thousands of families

impoverished by the effects of the world depression to the tune of £6,000.[42] The British knew

they could not take the cooperation of the tribes for granted. Tribes had proven willing to revolt

in the past and loyalty to the project of Transjordan could not be understood apart from the

material and social benefits accompanying changes to society. The British response in

Transjordan to the Palestinian Rebellion is one of myriad examples of why Transjordanian state-

building progressed with minimal levels of violence. The government under the leadership of

Abdullah and General Glubb had a profound knowledge of the people under its rule. It operated

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[40] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 128.
[41] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 115.
[42] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 115.

within existing frameworks and offered material benefits to offset the backlash that major changes to society were likely to engender.

Finally, General Glubb viewed law as a major domain by which he could extend central authority over the tribes. Customary law, a collection of legal traditions practiced by Transjordanian tribes, was widely accepted by both settled and nomadic tribes. In 1936, General Glubb authored a law establishing tribal courts under central administration that litigated customary law throughout the country.[43] Among non-nomadic tribes, who had a history of being under central legal administration, the courts were reserved for certain legal claims that were considered "tribal," such as violations of honor, blood money, or refugee status for culprits.[44] The courts themselves were judged exclusively by tribal chiefs. The central government reserved the right to impose modest fines and prison sentences, a provision that was scarcely utilized in practice but nonetheless advanced the concept of central state legal authority especially among the Bedouin.

Jordan on Independence Day

Jordan on its day of independence exhibited the irony of a country developed in the manner of a modern state with a tribal orientation. As noted, Transjordan's experience during the colonial era differed dramatically from those of its neighbors due to the country's unique political circumstances and differences in human agencies instrumental in the state-building process.

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[43] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 227.
[44] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 227.

On the 22nd of March, 1946, London formally granted independence to Transjordan, although British officers continued to serve in the country, and the country was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan by this time had experienced considerable development, but the tribal system that had dominated the country upon Abdullah's arrival in 1921 continued to flourish. Yoav Alon aptly captures the state of Transjordan on the eve of independence.

> Even as the central administration grew stronger and tribal society weakened, many aspects of tribal life prevailed and were harnessed and encouraged by the central government: it allowed tribes and their shaykhs to retain some of their autonomy while appropriating for itself many of the tribes' values and political behavior. Tribes, though much less tribal confederacies, remained the main form of social and political organization. Customary law and conflict-resolution mechanisms were modified and granted official recognition. As a demonstration of personal autonomy, almost every adult continued to carry a weapon. And the culture and ethos of the country was mainly tribal, embodied in no less a figure than Abdullah himself, who cultivated the image of a Bedouin par excellence.[45]

It is noteworthy that the process of state-building during the mandate did not coincide with the development of nationalism. As previously stated, the British were wary of Arab nationalism and saw it as a threat to their objectives for the mandate while Abdullah was personally inclined to operate within the existing tribal system. The state interacted with the tribes on a patron-client basis and tribes were encouraged to see themselves as members of one country but not one nation as more local forms of community continued to prevail. This system would change with the introduction of Palestinians into the country in the post-World War II era. After attempts at

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[45] Alon, Y. The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process, p. 234.

integration failed, the Jordanian state would evolve to promote a Jordanian nationalism exclusive of Palestinians. This nationalism was based on membership in a tribe and tribal values and symbols, especially those of the Bedouin. It was the British Mandate that subsumed tribal organization under the state and conferred on tribes a special status in society. As a result, the colonial era is the proper backdrop for understanding the evolution of the tribal Jordanian nationalism that prevails to this day.

Chapter 2: The Evolution of Jordanian Nationalism (1948-1993)

The Early Evolution of Jordanian Nationalism

In this section I argue that demographic changes pursuant to the Arab-Israeli War drove the monarchy to articulate a nationalism that was inclusive of Palestinians and made no emphasis of Jordan's tribal heritage. The attempt at integration illustrates the constructivist character of nationalism and its deployment in the service of political elites, while its failure demonstrates that nationalism is the subject to political exigencies that evolve over time. I argue that the growth of the PLO and the aftermath of the 1967 War led to Black September. This event forever altered the political calculus on which Jordanian nationalism was originally constructed and led to wholesale changes in Jordanian society.

Prior to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the population of Jordan was 375,000 and the population of the West Bank was 425,000.[46] Due to the war itself and the forced expulsion of Palestinians from Israel in the war's wake, about 360,000 Palestinians entered the West Bank and 110,000 entered Jordan.[47] King Abdullah viewed the influx of Palestinians into Jordan and the vacuum of leadership on the West Bank as an opportunity to expand his kingdom. In April of 1950, he formally annexed the West Bank, a move that nearly tripled the population of Jordan and created a strong imperative for Jordanian nationalism. After annexation, King Abdullah moved to integrate Palestinians into the kingdom by extending them full citizenship, a measure unique to Jordan among Arab states that took in Palestinian refugees. This measure was part of

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[46] Massad, p. 222.
[47] Massad, p. 222.

King Abdullah's general policy of fully assimilating Palestinians into the kingdom and laid "a formal political basis for the *unity of the two banks*."[48]

King Hussein, who succeeded his father in 1952, built on this egalitarian foundation. King Hussein fostered a hybrid Jordanian nationalism that drew from indigenous and Palestinian elements. According to Middle East Expert Laurie Brand, this nationalism featured four pillars: association with the monarchy; commitment to and expression of Arabism; commitment to Palestine; and the unity of the two peoples.[49] The intention of the first pillar was to legitimate Hashemite rule by promoting "the monarchy in general and the king in particular as the symbol of Jordan." To this end, King Hussein's picture was plastered throughout offices, homes, and shops throughout the country, and patriotic songs and dances hailing the praises of the king were aired by Jordanian media. Whereas King Abdullah's ideological right to rule Transjordan during the mandate stemmed in large part from this Hashemite legacy, it was after Jordanian independence that the monarchy began to leverage this fact as a unifying force of the Jordanian nation itself. The aim of the second pillar was to portray Jordan as a home to all Arabs and foster Arab unity, which was especially important to the Hashemites owing to the fact that they themselves were alien to the land. It featured an emphasis on the Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein, periodic appeals to Arab values, and an international policy of integration with Arab states and mediation in Arab politics.

The third and fourth pillars of nationalism directly related to the Palestinian constituency in Jordan. The third pillar, a commitment to Palestine, involved Jordan's "deep involvement in the Palestine problem as one of the most basic elements of its identity." The Jordanian monarchy

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[48] Brand, L. (1995). Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24(4), p. 47.
[49] Brand, L. (1995). Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity, p. 50-52.

framed itself as the representative of the Palestinian people, and drew from the legitimacy afforded it by its acceptance and assimilation of Palestinian refugees. Jordan installed Palestinian symbols on currency issued in 1959, including the Haram al-Sharif and Bethlehem, in a bid to subsume them under Jordanian protection.[50] Textbooks hailed the Hashemite monarchs as the "strongest and often the sole protectors of the Palestinian people" into the 70s. Finally, the fourth pillar, unity of the two peoples, featured "the notion of Palestinians and Transjordanians as two branches of the same family. . . a hallmark of official speeches and media presentations."[51] Textbooks affirmed that King Hussein "led a constitutional monarchy, unifying the Palestinian and Jordanian people."[52]

Aside from extending citizenship to all Palestinians, Jordan substantiated its inclusive nationalism through a myriad of actions that concretely affected the social, political, and economic life of Palestinians in Jordan. In an effort not to eradicate a Palestinian sense of self but to crystallize it in Jordanian terms, the monarchy moved to unify the two banks and erase potential sources of Palestinian opposition. With this aim in mind, the monarchy dissolved Palestinian bodies in the West Bank that had formed during the British Mandate in Palestine and had continued to operate during the war.[53] Local organizations were barred from fulfilling administrative functions such as collecting taxes and granting licenses. These functions were assumed by Jordanian military government until a civil administration was established that subordinated local governors to Amman. The Jordanian army, better known as the Arab Legion, disbanded the Palestinian irregular forces (al-Jihad al-Moqaddas) in order to forestall a potential

[50]Nanes, Stefanie. Nanes, S. (2010). Hashemitism, Jordanian National Identity, and the Abu Odeh Episode. *The Arab Studies Journal, 18*(1), p. 167.
[51]Nanes, p. 166.
[52]Nanes, p. 167.
[53] Mishal, S. (1978). *West Bank/ East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967*. New Haven: Connecticut: Yale University Press, p. 5.

rival for authority.[54] In addition, the size of parliament was doubled from thirty to sixty seats, allocating equal representation to both banks, and Palestinian elites were appointed to senior posts in government.[55] Further integrative measures included the fusion of West Bank and East Bank legal systems and the promulgation of the dinar as the sole operative currency in the kingdom on September 1, 1950. Finally, the Ministry of Social Welfare was established in 1951 in order to address the economic hardships of West Bankers.[56] The ministry provided loans and material assistance to needy families and worked to improve labor conditions. Due to successful unity measures and unfavorable postwar political and economic conditions in the West Bank, many Palestinians moved to the East Bank, thereby increasing the heterogeneity of the East Bank whereas the West Bank remained homogeneous.[57]

In the years after annexation, Jordanian nationalism was distinctly ideofocal.[58] While its ethnofocal counterpart is based on objective belonging to a purported organic community, ideofocal nationalism is based instead on the subjective thoughts and aims of its constituents. For states whose general principle of nation-building is ideofocal, failure to create or maintain a supraethnic nationalism is a recipe for instability, and almost always creates secessionist pressures. Secessionism is particularly likely when members of the disaffected ethnicity are geographically concentrated like the Palestinians of the West Bank. Shain and Sherman write, "In ideofocal authoritarian states, a pan-ethnic vision is invoked to erase previous ethnonational/tribal loyalties of indigenous peoples included in the geopolitical boundaries of the

[54] Mishal, p. 5-6.
[55] Mishal, p. 8.
[56] Mishal, p. 7.
[57] Mishal, p. 9.
[58] Shain, Y. and Sherman, M. (1998). Dynamics of Disintegration: Diaspora, Secession and the Paradox of Nation-States. *Nations and Nationalism*, 4(3), p. 331-332.

state. "[59] As previously mentioned, national commitment to the Palestinian cause was fundamental to Jordan's pan-ethnic vision whereby expression of Palestinian loyalty and group consciousness were permissible only to the extent that they were channeled through Jordanian institutions. After annexation, the Jordanian state apparatus sought to erase or co-opt Palestinian outlets whose loyalties might supersede those of the state and whose operations were not chastened by the four pillars of nationalism. Notwithstanding, Palestinian loyalists who rejected the formula of Jordanian nationalism posed an existential threat to the state that was both carefully and successfully managed well into the 60s.

The Regime's Successful Management of Nationalist Threats from 1948 to 1967

Not everybody was on board with Jordan's fledgling nationalist project. Palestinian opposition groups headquartered in the West Bank had a set of revolutionary interests very different from the monarchy's, whose primary imperative was the consolidation of power in the recently expanded kingdom. The East Bank and the West Bank routinely bickered over management of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestinian refugees, and political organization. Amman kept the peace using a combination of coercion, concession, and compromise, while underlying factors stabilized the relationship.

In *West Bank/East Bank*, Shaul Mishal addresses the question of why Palestinians did not create a state in the West Bank from 1948-1967—a survey evidencing the many political factors that influenced the success of Jordan's nationalist project. During this period, tension between

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[59]Shain and Sherman, p. 346.

Palestinian opposition groups headquartered in the West Bank and the Jordanian government played out on a number of domestic and foreign policy issues.[60] These issues ranged from Israel, Palestinian refugees and Britain, to political organization, representation, and freedom of expression.[61] On the issue of Israel, the opposition objected to the General Armistice Agreement at Rhodes, which provided for the transfer of 144 square miles of territory to Israel. Moreover, the opposition resented King Abdullah's efforts to reach a peace treaty with Israel, which ultimately led to his assassination at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on July 20, 1951. King Abdullah's open-handed policy toward the Palestinian refugees, whereby he granted them citizenship upon request and sought to integrate them into the kingdom, was strongly opposed by the majority of Palestinian political parties and many refugees themselves. Many Palestinians believed this policy would undermine the demand for repatriation, which apart from its own perceived merits would weaken the essence of Israel as a Jewish state. By the same token, the Arab Legion, operating under British command, engendered unanimous hostility among Palestinian political parties by implementing policies inconsistent with their socialist, pan-Arabist, or pan-Islamist aims. Criticisms varying by opposition party held that Britain restricted the activities of the Arab Legion toward Israel in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and drove the alarming lassitude in mobilizing against Israel in the war's wake. Moreover, Britain was viewed as a co-conspirator in the events of the Nakba, and its ongoing presence was perceived as "the symbol of the Arab world's political, economic, and social inferiority."[62]

As it pertains to political organization and political representation, opposition parties

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[60] These opposition groups included Hajj Amin al-Hussein (former Mufti of Jerusalem) and his supporters, the communists, Ba'thists, the Qaqmiyyun al-'arab (nationalists), and the Al-Tahrir Party (pan-Islamist faction).
[61] Mishal, p. 23-46.
[62] Mishal, p. 34.

objected primarily to Amman's broad authority to circumscribe their activities. While the

Jordanian government gave West Bankers equal representation in parliament and appointed

many Palestinians to prominent positions in government, Amman retained the authority to

arbitrarily restrict civil rights and disband political parties judged not to serve the public interest.

The Political Parties Law of 1954 and corollary amendments of 1955 permitted the government

to outlaw political parties without explanation or opportunity for appeal. The Jordanian

government effectively used this policy to bar the Ba'th and Al-Tahrir parties from contesting

seats in parliament. Moreover, in July of 1952, West Bank critics signed a memorandum in

which they charged that Amman favored East Bankers over West Bankers for military and public

office. Finally, the opposition objected to limits on freedom of expression. For example, from

1949-1953 a number of West Bank newspapers were closed down for criticizing the government.

Finally, the Law on Sermons and Guidance in Mosques, which required written permission from

a Muslim judge for religious sermons and instruction, aroused criticism as a presumptive means

of censorship.[63]

Despite outspoken opposition from Palestinian opposition groups,[64] national unity was

maintained from 1948-1967 due to a number of stabilizing factors. Firstly, many Palestinians on

the East and West Banks, who constituted a large segment of the middle and upper classes of

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[63] Mishal, p. 39.

[64] The most tumultuous years during this time were the years 1957-1961, during which Nasser's brand of pan-Arabism reached its zenith. Syria and Egypt formed the unitary United Arab Republic (UAR) on February 1, 1958, whereas Jordan and Iraq formed the confederal Arab Federation of Jordan and Iraq. Egypt and Syria would serve as "ideological inspiration and material support" for the Palestinian opposition, and even encouraged them to openly resist the regime. The Jordanian Revolutionary Council in Damascus, whose chief aim was the downfall of the Jordanian regime, was formed by a number of exiled Palestinian opposition leaders with the cooperation of Syrian military intelligence. From 1958-1960, three attempts were made to overthrow the regime with the backing of Egypt and Syria. After the UAR dissolved in 1961 and relations between Jordan and its Egyptian and Syrian neighbors thawed, conflict between the regime and the Palestinian opposition subsided to a great extent. See Mishal 47-52.

Jordanian society, supported the regime and cultivated a strong sense of Jordanian nationalism. This allegiance to Amman was strengthened by their broad inclusion into society.[65] In addition, other factors mitigated conflict between Palestinians and the central government. For example, the West Bank's precarious geopolitical status made secession undesirable because it would have weakened Palestinians vis-a-vis Israel and opened up the possibility of occupation.[66] By the same token, Amman's "monopoly of both military power and foreign economic aid" compounded this weakness, increasing West Bank dependency on Amman." The ideal of Arab unity, which both sides shared, similarly discouraged further fragmentation of the Arab world.[67] There was the idea among many Palestinians that "the redemption of Palestine" could only take place with the cooperation of Jordan and other Arab powers.

Tactical harmony also contributed to national unity. Following annexation, the political ambitions of Amman and the Palestinian opposition rarely coincided.[68] While Amman set out to gain the loyalty of Palestinians and to integrate the West Bank into the kingdom, the desire to regain the entire territory of Palestine "became the central dream of many Palestinians." However, recognition on the part of the Palestinian opposition that its current relationship with Amman was a temporary one "paradoxically contributed to [its] persistence." The Palestinians afforded Amman a "conditional legitimacy" whereby their level of cooperation was a function of Amman's policy toward issues of Palestinian interest. This flexible approach helps explain Palestinian manipulation of self-expression, whereby Palestinians identified on pan-Arab, pan-Islamic, Palestinian, or Jordanian terms to the extent that each one suited their immediate aims.[69]

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[65] Brand, L. (1995). Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity, p. 48-50.
[66] Mishal, p. 14-15.
[67] Mishal, p. 14-15.
[68] See Mishal 112-120 for a detailed recapitulation of these factors.
[69] Mishal describes this practice as "floating identity."

In addition, Amman publicly maintained its commitment to the Palestinian cause, and defended itself against Palestinian criticisms by appealing to a difference in tactical approaches rather than overarching objectives. Explicit publicization of the long-term Palestinian desire to separate from Amman or of Amman's long-term contentment with the status quo would have eroded the bases on which stability rested.

Coercion was another implement used by the regime to maintain national unity during this period. Despite democratic reforms that obtained until the imposition of martial law in 1957, Jordan remained an autocratic state whose "limited plurality and accountability afford[ed] them greater freedom of action in dealing coercively with challenges to their sovereign authority relative to liberal regimes."[70] This "coercive latitude" is what enabled Amman to integrate Palestinians into Jordan and reinforce an inclusive nationalism through restructuring of the political and legal system, the extension of citizenship to refugees, and the appointment of loyal Palestinians to government posts. Similarly, this same latitude was manifest by laws limiting freedom of speech and the activity of political parties aimed at circumscribing the power and influence of Palestinian opposition groups. In sum, this latitude was exercised on one hand to incorporate Palestinians into the state as a general rule but to marginalize Palestinians on the other hand who were not sympathetic to the policies of the regime.

Amman mitigated conflict not only through coercion but also by making concessions to redress grievances of the opposition.[71] For example, Palestinian opposition to the Baghdad Pact successfully persuaded the king not to join despite the economic subsidies and military training it promised.[72] As Mishal writes, this instance, which featured an about-turn on the part of the king,

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[70]Shain and Sherman, p. 18.
[71]See Mishal 56-73 for a more detailed elaboration of these concessions.
[72]This opposition was incited by Gamal Abdel Nasser on the grounds that the alliance was an affront to pan-Arab

"reflected the increased ability of the opposition parties to bargain with and to gain concessions from Amman." A further example includes the king's dismissal of General Glubb and dozens of senior British officers on March 1, 1956, a concession to opposition groups that had long ridiculed Jordan's pro-Western orientation. Similarly, King Hussein's decision not to interfere with the elections of 1956, which brought the opposition parties to power under the leadership of socialist Sulayman al-Nabulsi, evidenced his occasional willingness to concede real power to keep the regime intact. Moreover, Amman ultimately acknowledged the need for a "Palestinian entity," despite consistently opposing the idea when it was floated by Iraq and Egypt in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and later acquiesced to the establishment of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) in May of 1964 at the first Arab summit conference. Finally, economic planning beginning in the year 1962 entailed the equal distribution of resources between the West Bank and East Bank to redress criticisms that the regime favored the latter over the former.

The Evolution of an Independent Palestinian Nationalism

Many Palestinians bought into the Jordanian nationalist rhetoric being issued from the throne that was supported by policies of inclusion and identified as fully Jordanian. They did not actively participate in the Palestinian resistance toward Israel and were content to let the Jordanian state advocate on their behalf. However, there were also many Palestinians inside Jordan who did not want the Hashemites to represent their cause and preferred instead some form of independent Palestinian representation. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, growth in the Palestinian nationalist movement derailed Jordan's nationalist project and led to a new era in

unity.

Jordanian nationalist history.

Issa Al-Shuaibi traces the evolution of Palestinian entity-consciousness following the events of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. After a failed attempt to establish an independent Palestinian political entity, which coincided with Jordan's annexation of the West Bank, the development of Palestinian nationalism "seemed to lack a material basis,"[73] and pan-Arab consciousness tended to overshadow a distinctly Palestinian one. For Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, "Palestine came to mean no more than a house, an orchard and memories of infancy." [74] In 1958, development took place with the emergence of Fateh, which Al-Shuaibi attributes to Palestinian-Israeli skirmishes in Gaza during the years 1956-1957. In the fourth issue of the magazine *Filastinuna*, which was published in Beirut anonymously by Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir, Fateh called for the establishment of a distinctly Palestinian entity to represent the Palestinian people: "We Arabs of Palestine still have a part of our usurped homeland, and this part can serve as a base for the liberation of our homeland. . ."[75] Later issues explicitly called for the end of Arab tutelage, and asserted that this tutelage amounted to robbery "of our freedom to act on behalf of our homeland."[76] While these early ideas resisted the prevailing pan-Arab current of the time, two events created space for "Palestinianism" to grow: the recession of pan-Arab unity, illustrated by the dissolution of the UAR in 1961, and Algerian independence of 1962, each of which strengthened the impetus for the emergence of a distinct Palestinian entity.[77]

The growth begun by the Fateh movement in Palestinian entity-consciousness culminated

[73]Al-Shuaibi, Issa (1979). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part I. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *9*(1), p. 78.
[74]Al-Shuaibi, p. 79.
[75] Al-Shuaibi, p. 81.
[76]Al-Shuaibi, p. 82.
[77]Al-Shuaibi, p. 82.

in the foundation of the PLO in May of 1964.[78] Al-Shuaibi asserts that the foundation of the PLO "heralded the start of an important and fundamental stage in the political life of the Palestinian people." From its foundation, the PLO played a decisive role in changes affecting the political and legal status of Palestinians, and made Palestinians a principal party to the Arab-Israeli conflict for the first time. From the outset, Jordan harbored reservations about the establishment of a Palestinian entity. As a result, the closing statements of the Arab summit in Cairo in January of 1964, which centered on the Palestinian issue, made no explicit mention of any such entity. Ahmad Shuqairy, the Palestinian representative at the Arab league, attributed this omission to Jordan's insistence that the words "Palestinian entity" should not appear in the resolution, and that "determining their future" should only come after "liberation of their homeland."[79] Jordan's singular opposition to the Palestinian entity was consistent with its unique aspiration among Arab states to represent the Palestinian people, whose loyalty was essential to maintenance of Jordanian authority over the West Bank and all Palestinian residents of the kingdom.

The conference effectively gave Shuqairy a mandate to make connections and study the best way to proceed with political organization of the Palestinian people. In May of that year, Shuqairi convened the Palestinian National Conference in Jerusalem. At the conference, which was attended by hundreds of prominent Palestinians, Shuqairy outlined his designs for a Palestinian entity that was from then on known as the PLO. At the second annual Arab summit in Alexandria in September of the same year, Jordan joined every other Arab country by formally recognizing the PLO with the written understanding that it would not violate the sovereignty of

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[78]Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 9(2), p. 50.

[79]Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II, p. 52.

Jordan or the Gaza Strip in keeping with Article 24 of the Charter.[80] Jordan ultimately assessed that momentum behind Palestinian nationalism was inexorable and that a Palestinian entity, which had become synonymous with the PLO, was from that point forward a threat to be managed. While skirmishes broke out in the following years between Jordan and rogue members of the Palestinian resistance it was the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 that brought matters to a head.

The Polarization of Jordanian Ethnic Politics

The outcome of the Arab-Israeli War dealt a devastating blow to Pan-Arabism. Israel assumed military control of the West Bank while Palestinians retained their Jordanian citizenship. Just as the dissolution of the United Arab Republic paved the way for the emergence of the PLO, the defeat of the Arab coalition and the humiliation of Jordan paved the way for Palestinians play to a more active role in their conflict with Israel. In this process, the Palestinian nationalist movement clashed with Jordanian sovereignty culminating in a bloody civil war in 1970—infamously known as Black September—whose aftermath engendered wholesale changes in Jordanian state and society.

Jordan's loss of the West Bank notably diminished its prestige in the Arab world and weakened its claim against the PLO to speak and act on behalf of the Palestinian cause.[81] According to Jordan expert Iris Fruchter-Ronen, the PLO ultimately transferred headquarters from the West Bank to the East Bank due to lack of organization and planning on the former, a dearth of popular support, and an Israeli stick-and-carrot policy.[82] In the words of prominent

[80]Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II, p. 54.
[81]Nanes, p. 168.
[82] Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity. *Civil Wars*, *10*(3). p. 245.

Palestinian Abu Odeh, "After the devastating war, Jordanian authorities were in no position to prevent the landless Palestinians from organizing and carrying weapons in order to resist the Israeli occupation."[83] From the standpoint of the monarchy, PLO activities in Jordan were problematic for a myriad of reasons, not least of which was the immediate threat to Jordanian sovereignty and the impact of Israeli retaliation on Jordanian soil for PLO-sponsored attacks.

Fruchter-Ronin offers a detailed account of the Karameh Operation, which was one such episode of retaliation that had huge implications for Jordanian nationalism.[84] By early 1968, Palestinian organizations had consolidated strength in the Jordan Valley and were periodically launching cross-border raids into Israel. In March of 1968, Israel retaliated by raiding the Jordanian town of Karameh with some 15,000 IDF forces. After taking control of the town, Israel sought a cease-fire due to the intense fighting but later withdrew after Jordan refused to settle. The Arab force consisted of just a few hundred Palestinians and an estimated 15,000 Jordanian soldiers, the vast majority of whom were of Transjordanian origin. After the cessation of hostilities, however, both sides moved to craft political mythologies that sought to disparage the role of the other side and claim victory exclusively for themselves.[85] According to Dr. Andrew Terril, the Palestinian version of the story in particular was "exaggerated, fraught with romanticism, falsified, filled with distorted descriptions, and frequently inconsistent. . ."[86] This episode served to expose and exacerbate ethnic cleavages already present within Jordanian society, and demonstrated the extent to which the divide between Transjordanian and Palestinian

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[83] Barari, p. 233.
[84] Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, p. 244-248.
[85] Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, p. 246.
[86] Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, p. 247.

nationalism had expanded in the aftermath of the June War.

After the Karameh Operation, the PRM (Palestinian Resistance Movement) consolidated authority in large refugees camps in the north such as Wahadat, Al-Husn, and Jerash, and to a lesser extent in the smaller southern camps of Tufilah, Shubaq, and Karak.[87] By 1969, the PRM had effectively developed a state within a state, particularly at the Wahadat and Husseini refugee camps, which came to be known as independent republics in popular discourse. Within the camps, the PRM "provided welfare and educational services to Palestinians in addition to having their own headquarters, offices, militias, and recruiting offices."[88] In addition, some organizations utilized slogans that called for the complete abolition of Jordanian authority over Palestinian elements within the country. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was responsible for two of the most influential of these, "No authority above that of the resistance," and "All authority to the resistance."[89] These slogans constituted a blatant violation of the original understanding that had been reached between Amman and the PLO whereby the latter would conduct its operations without violating the sovereignty of Jordan or any other Arab state. While they did not represent the broader stance of the PRM, these slogans unnerved the monarchy and brought to light the worst of Jordanian fears.

Tension boiled over in September of 1970 despite a series of abortive agreements and memorandums of understanding between Amman and the PRM that aimed to remedy the issue of waning Jordanian sovereignty and increasing clashes between the Jordanian military and Palestinian militias. On September 1, the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)

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[87] Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, p. 247.

[88] Gallets B (2015). "Black September and Identity Construction in Jordan," *Journal of Georgetown University-Qatar. Middle Eastern Studies Student Association*, *2015*(1), p. 203.

[89] Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II, p. 68.

carried out a failed assassination plot of King Hussein. During the following week, the PFLP

hijacked four airplanes and landed three of them at Dawson's Field, a desert airstrip near Zarqa,

and later destroyed them on Jordanian soil after passengers had been evacuated. While the

hijacking was intended to bring attention to the Palestinian cause vis-a-vis Israel, it functioned as

a source of great international humiliation for the Hashemite monarchy. According to Arabist

Barbara Gallets, this episode functioned as the last straw that prompted King Hussein to take

action in order to eradicate the problem posed by the PRM.[90] King Hussein's retaliation, which

began on the 16th of September, featured a bombing campaign against the Wahadat and Husseini

refugee camps. After eleven days of intense fighting and some 3,400 Palestinian casualties,

international pressure forced Jordan to sign the Cairo Agreement on the 27th of September. While

the agreement entailed that Jordan recognize the right for the PLO to operate inside Jordan, the

king continued his campaign to drive it out entirely. Fighting would resume in March of 1971,

and on the 18th of July, 2,000 besieged fedayeen surrendered in the northern town of Aljoun and

much of the PLO leadership was exiled to Lebanon.

The Diminishment of Palestinian Influence in Jordan

Black September is the most important event in Jordanian history. In the words of Middle

East expert Hassan A. Barari, Black September was the "most formative episode that has

determined much of [Transjordanian-Palestinian] subsequent bilateral relations."[91] It led to

transformations in Jordanian state and society that persist to the present day. Notwithstanding the

fact that the majority of East Bank Palestinians remained loyal or neutral to the Jordanian state

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[90] Gallets, p. 3.
[91] Barari, p. 232.

and many Palestinians in the Jordanian military fought loyally against the fedayeen, [92] the determination was made that Palestinians simply could not be trusted. Palestinian loyalty could never rival that of native Transjordanians, who harbored neither dual loyalties nor extraterritorial ambitions. King Hussein spearheaded a "cleansing" of Palestinians from the public sphere.[93] As Jordan expert Stefanie Nanes documents, "[Palestinians] were removed from their jobs in universities and the civil service," producing "a public sector that is seen as the exclusive preserve of Transjordanians."[94]

On October 28, 1970, King Hussein appointed Wasfi al-Tal as Prime Minister, a post al-Tal had occupied in 1962 and 1965.[95] Al-Tal, who was reputed as a staunch loyalist to the regime, had previously advised the king to clamp down on the PRM prior to the outbreak of full-fledged war. Under PM al-Tall's leadership, a policy of *Transjordanization* was implemented, whose aim was to "radically diminish the political influence of the Palestinians in Jordan." This policy featured the removal of Palestinians from university and bureaucratic posts.[96] In particular, the government fired large numbers of Palestinians from domains traditionally dominated by Palestinians, such as health, education, and tourism, and replaced them with loyal Transjordanians.[97] In addition, the Jordanian security services witnessed a similar ethnic purge.[98] Finally, newspapers supportive of, or operated by, Palestinians were disbanded, and pro-government newspapers *al-Urdun* and *al-Rai* were established with Transjordanian editors.[99] Fruchter-Ronin notes that "the maneuvers of al-Tal in this direction were in complete opposition

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[92] Nanes, p. 167.
[93] Nanes, p. 168.
[94] Nanes, p. 169.
[95] For a more detailed account of PM al-Tal's tenure, see Gallets, p. 3-5.
[96] Nanes, p. 168-169.
[97] Gallets. p. 4.
[98] After 1970, Transjordanian public opinion of the Mukhabarat was favorable.
[99] Gallets, p. 4.

to the traditional posture of the King, who aspired for integration between the two banks."[100] On November 28, 1971, Al-Tal was assassinated by members of the Black September Organization in the lobby of the Sheraton Cairo Hotel while attending an Arab League summit in Egypt due to his anti-Palestinian policies, a crime that evidenced intense hostility between Palestinians and Transjordanians.[101]

Jordanian history also evolved to reflect and reinforce a new nationalism. As previously mentioned, textbooks in Jordan prior to 1970 emphasized Arab and ethnic unity between Jordan's Palestinian and Transjordanian populations. After 1970, however, textbooks began to emphasize a unique Jordanian nationalism based on territory. Fruchter-Ronin, who conducted a review of Jordanian textbooks from 1964 to 1994, attributes these changes to Black September and its aftermath:

> The changes in the narrative manifested in the school textbooks in the course of these years were influenced by the political, ideological and national needs of Jordanian regime in this period and especially in the light of the Palestinian component in the Jordanian society that presented not only a national-ideological, but also a physical and existential challenge to the integrity of the kingdom. . . [T]he school textbooks reflect an attempt on part of the Jordanian regime to forge a national Arab and Jordanian-Palestinian identity up to the end of the 1960s whereas since the beginning of the 1970s, the emphasis is placed on a separate Jordanian territorial identity.[102]

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[100] Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2008). Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, p. 255.

[101] Major newspaper outlets reported at the time that one of the murderers knelt down and lapped blood flowing across the floor. Al-Tal's last words were reportedly "They've killed me. Murderers, they believe only in fire and destruction." See Shair 240 for a detailed account of the assassination.

[102] Fruchter-Ronen, I. (2013) The Palestinian Issue as Constructed in Jordanian School Textbooks, 1964–94: Changes in the National Narrative. *Middle Eastern Studies*. 49(2). 280-295.

Jordan took up after Egypt by emphasizing Jordan's geographical landscape in an attempt to "historize the nation-state territory."[103] This effort consisted of promoting historical sites such as Petra, Jerash, and Amman's amphitheater as "symbols of national continuity" and identifying the Jordanian burial sites of early Arab Islamic leaders.[104] This process notably excluded Palestinians whose history lies West of the Jordan River. Unlike Transjordanians, Palestinians could make no historical claim to the land of Transjordan. Territory, tribal values and symbols, and language would come to constitute the core of a new Jordanian nationalism.

As previously discussed, both de jure and de facto equality between Jordanians and Palestinians and Jordanian representation of the Palestinian cause were key pillars of Jordanian nationalism prior to Black September. Jordan would not formally renounce all rights to the West Bank until 1988,[105] but the process of reconstructing Jordanian nationalism began immediately after the war. In both the original development of Jordanian nationalism and its reconstruction, the process was supported by respectively inclusive and exclusive state policies toward Palestinians.

The Construction of a Tribal-Based Nationalism

In the preceding section, I analyzed Jordan's demotion of Palestinian elements within society in its deconstruction of an old nationalism. Here I analyze Jordan's elevation of tribal

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[103] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 128.
[104] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 128.
[105] In 1974, the Palestinian Liberation Organization was recognized as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" by the Seventh Arab League Summit Conference in Rabat, Morocco, dealing yet another blow to Jordanian attempts to represent the Palestinian cause. After the 1987 Intifada in the West Bank, which flagrantly demonstrated Jordan's lack of control over the Palestinian population, King Hussein withdrew all Jordanian claims to the territory. This move was especially difficult to finalize because it left the Palestinians on the East Bank who had long been a part of the assimilationist project in a precarious state with distinct centers of power making claims on them. In short, Jordan acknowledged that unity of the two banks was no longer possible moving forward which highly complicated the possibility of fully integrating Jordanians of Palestinian descent into the state once more.

elements within society in its construction of a new one. I argue that Jordanian elites co-opted elements of its Transjordanian base expressed in terms of a tribal heritage left intact by the colonial era. This action was undertaken to underscore the evolved distinction between Jordanians and Palestinians and create a solid ideational foundation on which the Jordanian nation-state could rest.

Black September not only further developed Palestinian entity consciousness at the expense of pan-Arab nationalisms but led the Transjordanian tribes of Jordan to see themselves as members of one nation in opposition to a separate Palestinian nation that did not share the same rights to the land. In the words of Joseph Massad, "The Palestinians, who came to be identified as 'other' by the Jordanian regime and its allies, were instrumental in helping the formation of a Jordanian national self opposed to that other, wherein, for the new exclusivist nationalists, citizenship and nationality were no longer to be conflated as one." As Fruchter-Ronen asserts, "Indeed, the events of 1970-71 had a vast impact on the formation of the perception among [Transjordanians] that Palestinianship is a distinct autonomous nationality, and as a result, that [Transjordanianship] too is a distinct independent nationality." In sum, Jordanian nationalism after Black September morphed from an ideofocal to an ethnofocal one, whereby the state came to identify with, and represent, the interests of the Transjordanian population, which was increasingly treated as a single ethnicity despite its historical diversity.

In its effort to develop a Jordanian nationalism independent of Palestinians, the monarchy resorted to the tribes of Transjordan who had been loyal to the state for decades and had no extraterritorial ambitions. To this end, King Hussein would take measures to more deeply integrate Bedouins in the social life of the country. Bedouins represented about half of the original Transjordanian tribes. While they constituted the fighting arm of the state, they did not

participate fully in social life owing in part to special Bedouin laws tracing back to the colonial

era. In 1976, the government did away with these laws in favor of common Jordanian law in an

attempt to "unify the entire kingdom under a single Jordanian national identity."[106] The intent

behind this measure was not only to increase Bedouin participation in Jordanian social life but to

unify Jordan's disparate tribes. According to Middle East expert Yoav Alon,

> The abolition of the tribal courts in 1976 served this purpose. It was designed to
>
> break down the official barrier between those tribes considered by the (colonial)
>
> law to be 'Bedouin' and the rest of the tribes. It was a way to create a general,
>
> unified, and hopefully unifying, tribal identity as part of the newly-constructed
>
> national identity.[107]

While the marginalization of Jordanians of Palestinian descent in society continued, King

Hussein would leave no doubt to the public about his pro-tribal position.[108] In 1984-1985, the

Jordanian parliament debated the informal continuation of tribal law even after its official

abolition and a number of journalists published anti-tribal articles. In an open letter, King

Hussein addressed the issue:

> [Journalists have been] launching attacks on our social institutions and their
>
> customs and values. I have not been happy about this attack. Most recently, I have
>
> noticed that some articles have been directed against the tribal life, its norms and
>
> traditions. This is most regrettable because it harms a dear sector of our society. I
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> would like to repeat to you what I told a meeting of tribal heads recently, that 'I
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> am al-Hussein from Hashem and Quraish, the noblest Arab tribe of Mecca, which

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[106] Browning, p. 42.

[107] Alon, Y. (2009). *The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state*, p. 156-157.

[108] Layne, L. (1989). The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan. *American Ethnologist, 16*(1), p. 24-39.

was honored by God and into which was born the Arab Prophet Mohammad.'

Therefore, whatever harms our tribes in Jordan is considered harmful to us, as this

has been the case all along, and it will continue so forever.

In bolstering Jordan's tribal nationalism, King Hussein appealed to his own tribal pedigree as a descendant of the prophet Muhammad on which the Hashemite right to rule had historically been based. By this time, tribal affiliations had been subsumed thoroughly under the authority of the Jordanian state. While they are traditionally seen as an impediment to nationalism, Jordan's unique history created the only modern state in the Middle East in which they are part and parcel of the nation it exists to serve.

While this exclusive Jordanian nationalism included all the tribes of Jordan it would assume a distinctly Bedouin character.[109] Jordanian television, which debuted in 1968 and became highly popular among commoners, began to air an increasing number of programs documenting the Bedouin-dominated military and soap operas portraying Bedouin social life. Meanwhile, radio airwaves became dominated by songs extolling the king and the military and showcasing Bedouin songs for public consumption. At the sartorial level, King Hussein began to don the red-and-white shmagh with greater frequency after 1970 and an image of him clad with the garment appeared on Jordanian currency and postage stamps. This garment was originally chosen by General Glubb for Bedouin soldiers of the Transjordanian army during the colonial era. Palestinians seeking to emphasize their affiliation with the Jordanian state would follow the king's lead, while those who wanted to assert an independent consciousness would wear its black-and-white counterpart that the Palestinian colonial era established as a symbol of Palestinian resistance. Yasir Suleiman notes firsthand that some male students at the University

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[109] See Massad 250-252 for a complete discussion of the Bedouin-dominated Jordanian nationalism that emerged.

of Jordan in the early 1970s began donning the red-and-white shmagh as evidence of anti-Palestinian credentials and were often assumed to be working for the Mukhabarat.[110]

Following the internal changes of the 1970s, Jordan asserted a Bedouin image of itself internationally during the 1980s. Tourist campaigns were crafted that portrayed Bedouins and Petra as the true representatives of modern Jordan.[111] This presentation had the dual effect of promoting the tourist industry inside Jordan on one hand while addressing international claims that Jordan was a Palestinian state due to the majority of its population hailing from Palestinian backgrounds. Finally, mansaf, a traditionally Bedouin dish (albeit with a modified recipe), was cooked with increasing frequency among all Jordanians and today is widely regarded as Jordan's national dish. In the context of these other changes, this development can be interpreted as but one further example of the Bedouinnization of Jordanian nationalism.

In his seminal work *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*, Massad provides a scholarly account of how the law and military were leveraged as instruments of nationalization throughout Jordan's history beginning in the colonial era. For example, the 1928 Law of Nationality retroactively defined what it meant to be Transjordanian, a designation that locals eventually adopted as a fait accompli. Law was similarly used to nationalize Palestinian refugees after the 1948 War, a move that tripled Jordan's national population. The third most notable leveraging of law occurred in 1976 when Amman abolished Bedouin tribal law in an effort to unify Jordan's disparate tribal heritage. This move was part of a larger policy to incorporate Bedouins in the body-politic of the state. Up until that point, Bedouins dominated the military but were not integrated in Jordanian society. The military, on the other hand, was

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[110] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 120.
[111] Massad, p. 74.

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responsible for subsuming the Bedouin under the state. In the process, General Glubb

transformed Bedouin dress, music, and food. Jordanian nationalists, Massad argues, enshrined

these artificial features as a traditional national heritage. Unaware to them, the basis of Jordanian

nationalism is not native production but colonial importation. According to Massad, Jordan is

"proof of colonialism's perpetual victory over the colonized."[112]

While Massad's analysis is insightful, his conclusion is overstated. By framing Jordanian

history as a colonial victory, he downplays the dynamic events that transpired in the post-

independence era that made "colonial effects" of relevance to the nationalizing project. The

animating force of Jordanian history was not colonialism, but the debate over who should

represent Palestinians in their struggle against Israel. The monarchy's progressive loss in this

debate is what led Jordan to innovate a nationalism exclusive of Palestinians. In that process,

Jordan drew on a wide host of markers characteristic of Transjordanians. For example, a pillar of

Jordanian nationalism is being able to trace your ancestry to a tribe, something that

Transjordanians could do prior to the British mandate. Massad in peculiar fashion attributes

Petra's status as a symbol of Jordanian nationalism to the continuation of a colonial tradition:

> The use of Petra as a logo for the Jordanian nation-state, however, is not a post-
>
> independence nationalist invention but rather a colonial one. It was the British Mandatory
>
> authorities who transformed Petra into the national spectacle that it has become today.
>
> Postcolonial Jordan was simply continuing a colonial, not a national tradition.[113]

Massad uncharacteristically does not elaborate. The fact is that Petra is a wonder of the world

and a symbol that any nation-state in its possession could reasonably be expected to

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[112] Massad, p. 278.
[113] Massad, p. 75.

traditionalize with or without a colonial legacy. Any role the colonial era played in this process was negligible.

Even though mansaf has rice and is eaten with yogurt, it still bears resemblance to the Bedouin original. Nor is mansaf, bagpipes, or the red-and-white shmagh the essence of Jordanian nationalism today. As I will elaborate on below, there are centuries-old reasons why a Bedouin heritage would be seized upon by modern nationalists. I will also look at changes in speech patterns that reflected changes in Jordanian nationalist thought that have no origin in Jordan's colonial era. This evidences that Jordanian nationalists drew upon, and would have drawn upon, anything to distinguish them from Palestinians. The distinct colonial forms they adopted are the form not the substance of Jordanian nationalism. They were adopted as a matter of convenience, but to describe them as a colonial victory is a tremendous overstatement. They do not serve a colonial or imperial agenda; they represent a free and uncoerced choice; and they have much to do with universal things--like food, music, and clothing--that have no origin in the colonial country.

In his final remarks, Massad asserts that "Jordanian national identity. . . seems to have a better idea of what it is not than of what it actually is."[114] What it is not, of course, is Palestinian. It seems Massad would agree that Jordanian nationalism was chiefly a reaction to domestic and international political developments pursuant to Palestinian entry into the kingdom in the post-colonial era. Massad's conclusion that Jordanian nationalism is flimsy may have to do with his emphasis on superficial colonial-effected symbols like dress, food, and music, while discounting more stable features like tribal heritage, geography, and speech. Notwithstanding, the fact is that Jordanian nationalism has more to do with the creativity employed by the monarchy and key

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[114] Massad, p. 275.

political actors to meet the needs of an evolving political community than it does a colonial legacy that would have faded into the margins under a different set of circumstances.

The Grassroots Appeal of a Bedouin Image

As I alluded to in the introduction of this thesis, national consolidation involves the packaging of select cultural and historical traits into an emotionally compelling narrative, complete with images and symbols, in the interest of creating an imagined political community. Here I analyze the centrality of the Bedouin in this process in the Jordanian case. Bedouin influence was strong among native Jordanians at the country's inception hence Bedouin appeals offer a compelling sense of rootedness in the history and land of Jordan exclusive of Palestinians. The Bedouin, to Ibn Khaldun and many Jordanian nationalists, are ancient sociological forebears, racially pure-bred and possessing meritorious qualities like courage and masculinity. Jordan's particular political context post-Black September and these perceptions illuminate the elite decision to dress Jordanian nationalism in this fashion.

Nationalism is an inventive process whose effectiveness depends on its intellectual and emotive assimilation. Anthropologist Liisa Malkki documents the tendency in modernist nationalist discourse to link people to place through the use of earthy metaphors and rhetoric emphasizing natural processes underlying such connections.[115] Thinking in these organic terms, which can take a variety of forms, including "roots, trees, origins, ancestries, racial lines, autochthonism, evolutions, developments, or any number of other familiar, essentializing images,"[116] injects persuasive power into nationalist discourses. It gives the nation a sense of

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[115] Malkki, L. H. (1997). National Geographic. *Culture, Power, Place,* 52-74
[116] Malkii, p. 57.

preexistence and eternality that strengths both its believability and its ability to create social cohesion in society. As the history outlined above clearly demonstrates, the Jordanian nation would seem to fail when analyzed in these terms given the recency of its development. This failure, however, is not unique to Jordan. It was not until modern times that people who previously identified at more local modes of organization began to see themselves as members of a community, the majority of whose members they had never met. It follows that although the Jordanian nation is more obviously contrived than many of its world counterparts, the process of nationalism itself is a distinctly modern phenomenon. The recency of Jordan's nationalism, like that of every other nation-state, has not stopped proponents of Jordanian nationalism from making the natural historical appeals outlined by Malkki. In the next paragraph I discuss how the Bedouin manifestation of tribalism fulfills this criteria and has other persuasive appeal building on insights contained in Ibn Khaldoun's *Muqaddimah.* Aside from the dominance of formerly Bedouin tribes in the highly visible Jordanian military, this analysis may shed some light on why Jordanian nationalism borrowed much of its symbolism from the Bedouin instead of the settled tribes.

The Bedouin historically practiced a highly nomadic lifestyle and so the natural historical appeals made by Jordanian nationalists are based not on territory but on genealogy. In other words, Jordanian nationalists cannot say that they always inhabited the land of modern Jordan but they can say that they share a sociological history tracing back to the archetypical Bedouin. This is because, as Ibn Khaldun highlights, Bedouins are prior to sedentary people and belong to an earlier stage of social evolution.[117] Both the settled tribes of Jordan at the time of the

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[117] Khaldun, I. (1958). The Muqaddamah. New York: Pantheon Books. See ch. 2 for Khaldun's treatment of the Bedouin.

country's founding and recently de-Bedouinized ones share this commonality. According to

Jordan scholar Andrew Shyrock, Jordan experienced a rise in the demand for tribal histories

post-1970,[118] corresponding with the redefinition of Jordanian nationalism in tribal terms. Many

of these histories were written by local Bedouin and published by the Ministry of Culture,

underscoring the Jordanian government's role in promoting their circulation. What all these

narratives shared was the belief that true Jordanians shared a common tribal descent of some

kind. Shryock's dialogue with tribes in the context of conflicting tribal genealogies revealed

there was no place for Palestinians in this process. Palestinians did not inhabit the land of

Transjordan nor the Jordanian desert with nearly the same density and have no immediate

grounds for crafting tribal narratives. My own family history plays out this distinction. My

father's side of the family is of Transjordanian origins and has a book published post-1970

outlining the history of the clan while no such literature exists for my mother's Palestinian side

of the family even though they have inhabited Jordan since the 50s. It bears emphasis that a

genealogical past understood in tribal terms does not distinguish Jordan from its neighbors; all

Arabs whose ancestors inhabited the desert in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia where

the Bedouin used to roam as late as the 20th century do share this genealogy. Jordanian

nationalists, however, had the primary political need to distinguish themselves from Palestinians.

In addition, it was Jordan's unique colonial experience that preserved intact many features of

Bedouin and tribal life which made Jordanian nationalism much more persuasive to Jordanians

and enabled Jordan to distinguish itself not only from Palestinians but other countries in the

region whose colonial eras produced very different outcomes. Jordan's history doubly features

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[118] Shryock, A. (2008). *Nationalism and the genealogical imagination: Oral history and textual authority in tribal Jordan*. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press.

constructivism both in the preservation of a tribal societal foundation and in its co-optation by elites for reasons of political expedience.

The Bedouin also had nationalist appeal for a number of reasons apart from the historical lineage and the arborescent imagery of Jordanians having sprung from a Bedouin root. Bedouins today are often regarded as the pure-blooded people of Jordan.[119] Khaldun observed the following:

> Purity of lineage is found only among the savage Arabs of the desert and other such people. Generations of (Arabs) grew up in the desert. Eventually, they become confirmed in their character and natural qualities. No member of any other nation was disposed to share their conditions. No member of any other race felt attracted to them.[120]

While all Jordanian tribes are at least a generation removed from this history, both groups can identify with their ancestors maintaining a high degree of homogeneity and being historically excluded by other peoples that did not practice their lifestyle.[121] Khaldun also notes that the Bedouins are closer to being good than sedentary people and more disposed to courage. This is due to the absence of pleasures and luxuries in the desert on one hand and the need to fight and be self-reliant on the other. Settled tribes, on the other hand, outsource their security and courage to the government and focus instead on pursuing luxury and comfort instead of self-preservation. Today all of Jordan's tribes are settled, but they can still find special appeal in this ancestral

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[119] Toftlund, C. (2018, August 13). *Bedouins – the backbone of Jordanian culture*.
[120] Khaldun ch. 2.
[121] Khaldun ch. 2.

legacy and aspire to practice these values in a modern context in the same manner as nationals of other nations.[122]

The Echo of Nationalist Changes in the Sociolinguistic Domain

Nationalist changes stemming from the events that culminated in Black September echoed into the sociolinguistic domain. Novel speech patterns and an ethnolinguistic label surfaced to reinforce the emergent distinction between a Transjordanian in-group and a Palestinian out-group. A salient feature of Jordanian Arabic, namely the [g] pronunciation of the letter qāf, went from being a local dialectic feature with no nationalist implications to a national ethnic marker. The function of the Arabic letter qāf as a hierarchizing and boundary-setting agent in Jordan mirrors its effect in other Arab societies.

One of the most striking linguistic changes that accompanied the redefinition of Jordanian nationalism is the phenomenon of code-switching. Code-switching consists in modifying speech patterns to serve a social function. According to American linguist Carol Mysers-Scotton, the variety of code-switching can involve "different languages, dialects, or even styles of the same language."[123] Scholars of linguistics commonly cite identifying with a particular social group, harmonizing with the formality of topical conversations, and the possibilities afforded self-expression as practical motivations.[124] In my analysis of Jordan, the

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[122] Examples of modern nations deriving their spiritual essence from past eras abound. Japan comes to mind in which many national values—like courage, honor, and loyalty— are embodied in the prototypical samurai and are regarded as important elements of what it means to be Japanese despite their thoroughly transformed expression in a modern society.

[123] Almhaurat, A.S. *Code-switching from the Jordanian Bedouin Dialect to the Jordanian Urban Dialect, in Amman: A Sociolinguistic Study.* (Unpublished master's thesis). Middle East University, Beirut, Lebanon, p. 3.

[124] Almhaurat, see p. 16-18.

term code-switching will refer exclusively to alternating between dialectic features of spoken Arabic as this is the space where nationalist tension has manifested.

In this section, I argue that code-switching to the native Jordanian [g] pronunciation of the letter qāf took place as part of the nationalizing process post-Black September. However, it is noteworthy that code-switching from native Jordanian dialects to urban varieties routinely takes place in cities like Amman. For example, a study conducted by Al-Wer evidenced that a large number of native Jordanian women code-switch to the glottal stop pronunciation of the qāf characteristic of an urban variety of Palestinian Arabic .[125] The study began in 1998 and looked at three generations, the first of whom was born outside the city, the second of whom was either born in the city or brought there as children, and the third of whom was born in the city. The author found that native Jordanian women of the first generation infrequently code-switched to the glottal stop (5/48 tokens), whereas native Jordanian of the second generation predominantly did so (65/74), and native Jordanian women of the third generation universally articulated the glottal stop. In her commentary of the results, Al-Wer notes that urban dialectic features characteristic of cities like Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo were attractive as a symbol of cosmopolitanism and modernity.[126] While this was true for both men and women, only women adopted the symbol due to their marginalized economic and political status: "We can say that deprived of power in public life women in Amman were forced to accumulate symbols of power and influence, such as speaking in a certain way, as the only way to assert status."[127] Middle East expert Abdullah Almhairat similarly gathered survey data on code-switching by native Jordanians to the urban dialect in Amman. He found that native Jordanians regularly code-switch

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[125] Al-Wer, E. (2011). The Lifecycle of Qaf in Jordan. *Langage et Societe*, 138(4), p. 67-69.
[126] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 70.
[127] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 70.

to the broader urban variety in the presence of colleagues or superiors, such as teachers, bosses, and doctors.[128] A majority of male and female respondents agreed that prestige, dialectic flexibility, ease of communication, the relationship of speakers, the subject of conversation, and gender all factor in as inputs that influences the speaker's decision whether to code-switch and the *extent* to which code-switching takes place.[129]

Deciphering language change in the context of society is the most important challenge of sociolinguistics.[130] The aforementioned data evidences that code-switching in Jordan is neither unidirectional nor unicausal. The urban variety of Arabic in city centers like Amman, which draws both from Palestinian and native Jordanian elements,[131] has retained a certain attractiveness as a symbol of business, entertainment, and cosmopolitanism. Code-switching to the urban variety, however, most notable among Jordanian women, is not a function of definitional changes in Jordanian nationalism. As Jordanian linguistics expert Yasir Suleiman expounds, "[Code-switching to the urban dialect] is not a conceptual problem, since it is the male ethos and its values that are criterial in characterizing nation-state formation in the Middle East. In effect, this boils down to saying that while female code-switching in Jordan is socially significant, it is however more or less bereft of any potent ethnic and political connotations. . ."[132] The following critical analysis evidences that the best explanation code-switching to the [g] pronunciation of the qāf is nationalism, which supports the general thesis of this paper that a Jordanian nationalism was restructured that places a premium on native features, including speech patterns characteristic of the tribes.

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[128] Almhaurat, p. 48-49.
[129] Almhaurat, p. 55-57.
[130] Al-Wer, E. (2013). Sociolinguistics. J. Owens (Ed.). Handbook of Arabic Linguistics. OUP.
[131] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 66.
[132] Suleiman, Y. (1999). *Language and Society in the Middle East and North Africa*. London: Curzon Press. p. 25.

According to Al-Wer, who bases her position on Bergsträsser's *Atlas* of 1915, the earliest known source on the linguistic features of East Bank Jordanian Arabic, and data collected from Sult, Ajloun and Kerak, we can conclude that all traditional Jordanian dialects feature the [g] pronunciation of qāf.[133] Palestinian male speakers in Jordan code-switching to this variant has been an empirical fact for decades. In the study cited above, Al-Wer found that Palestinian men of the first generation code-switched to the [g] variant infrequently (7/52 tokens), whereas members of the second generation did so in 50% of cases, and members of the third generation exhibited "innovative and complex" speech patterns.[134] This data revealed "an association of the use of [g] with male speech generally," and that "urban Palestinian men sometimes abandon the glottal stop in favour of [g],"[135] confirming what analysts inside and outside of Jordan have independently observed. This phenomenon is unique both for how widespread it has become and for how narrow it is in scope from a purely linguistic standpoint, and warrants a context-specific, i.e., a sociolinguistic, explanation.

Jordanian analysts commonly elaborate sex-based explanations for code-switching to the [g] by non-native Jordanians.[136] The glottal stop is a softer sound, while the [g] is widely regarded by Jordanians as a more masculine articulation.[137] In my conversations with Jordanians, this is the explanation most regularly cited. Reinforcing this notion may be the writings of renowned 14th-century Arab historiographer, Ibn Khaldun. Khaldun denoted the Bedouin pronunciation as a "distinguishing mark" of the speech of the Bedouins wherever they resided.[138]

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[133] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 62.
[134] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 69.
[135] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 71.
[136] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 103.
[137] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East,* p. 103.
[138] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East,* p. 99.

In the same context, as I will expand on later in this paper, Khaldun lionized the traditionally masculine attributes of the Bedouin like bravery, toughness, and courage and contrasted the Bedouin with their emasculated settled counterparts. Whether its roots lies in the premodern era or it is the result of modern attitudes, however, masculinity is an inadequate explanation when the greater reality of Jordanian politics is brought to bear.

Chronology and context are insurmountable obstacles to the traditional sex-based explanation. There is no evidence that a surge in knowledge of the masculine connotations of the Bedouin pronunciation occurred after 1970. After the exodus of 1948, Palestinians had resided in Jordan for decades. Nor has the consistent phenomenon of code-switching in this manner been observed in any other Arab country with a considerable [g]-pronouncing population. The counterargument can be made that Jordan is unique among its neighbors due to the fact that the [g] pronunciation is a universal feature of native Jordanian dialects. This might explain the social pressure to speak in a masculine manner experienced by Palestinians in Jordan unlike in Lebanon and Syria where a large number of native speakers, especially in urban centers, pronounce the qāf as a glottal stop. This argument may be plausible on the surface but fails both chronologically and contextually. In addition, as other scholars have affirmed, there is nothing intrinsically "softer" or more "feminine" about the glottal stop variant of the qāf vis-à-vis its [g] counterpart.[139]

Suleiman documents that Palestinians on the West Bank prior to 1970 rarely ever code-switched to the [g] sound in the presence of Jordanian males.[140] Even Palestinians from rural backgrounds where the qāf was pronounced as a [k] who wished to hide their lower class

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[139] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 71.
[140] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 112-114.

background would code-switch to the Arabic classical pronunciation of the letter or the glottal stop characteristic of urban Palestinian Arabic. As Suleiman recalls, the [g] was perceived as a clumsy and "ugly" variant.[141] A marked change, however, occurred after the events of Black September: "I recall how some of my Palestinian male friends started to use [g] in speaking with Jordanians. This was particularly noticeable in routine exchanges between the Fallahi students and the soldiers who operated the Sports City (al-Madina al-Riyadiyya) checkpoint between the town centre and the university."[142] Suleiman goes on to recount that his brother, who was 11 at the time of the civil war, suddenly began to use the [g] in public despite having no familial connection to this variety. Suleiman cites "solidarity with the in-group, and the desire to integrate with it, or be assimilated" as driving factors of the code-switching phenomenon. According to Suleiman, this national dichotomy came as a direct result of state clashes with Palestinian rebel groups, who had attempted to use Jordan as a base to fulfill their own national aspirations, thereby delineating two distinct Arab nations in the process. The delineation was accompanied by a growing imbalance in power between the two nations. It situated the native Jordanian variety as the "target of speech convergence for the Palestinians," and the letter qāf more generally as the "universal audible marker of national identities in Jordan."

Al-Wer expands on the sociopolitical changes that triggered this linguistic phenomenon. She argues that after Black September and the subsequent promotion of native Jordanians in the bureaucracy and civil service, awareness of a Jordanian ethnicity distinct from a Palestinian one developed, from which emerged "an association between the use of local linguistic features,

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[141] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 112-114.
[142] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*. See p. 115.

local identity and political power." [143] As for why this trend only affected male speech patterns, she explains:

> Women were totally excluded from the domains in which the use of the local linguistic features, such as [g], became a symbol of an individual's claim to power. As men increasingly used [g], this variant became associated with male speech, which explains the tendency seen by Palestinian men in the first and second generations to use this variant.

In this light, the association of masculinity with the [g] pronunciation is a derivative of sociopolitical change rather than an explanatory factor.

The usage of the qāf as a boundary marker signifying social status is not unique to Jordan. As referenced above, the letter for centuries differentiated the Bedouin from their settler counterparts. There is also a wealth of literature documenting the qāf's role in this regard among speech communities in the modern Arab world.[144] For example, the late Haim Blanc remarked that in Baghdad the [g] pronunciation by Muslims was a prestigious variant and the classical [q] pronunciation by Christians and Jews was stigmatized.[145] In Bahrain, a similar pattern has been observed whereby the prestigious variant [g] is characteristic of Sunni speech whereas the stigmatized [q] is spoken by Shi'ites.[146] Finally, in Tunisia the classical [q] pronunciation is the prestigious urban variant, while the stigmatized variant [g] is common to rural or semi-nomadic communities.[147] The Qāf is convenient as an index of social stratification because its

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[143] Al-Wer, E. (2011), p. 71
[144] See p. 99-100 for a more in-depth discussion of this phenomenon.
[145] Blanc, H. (1964). *Communal Dialects in Baghdad Cambridge*. MA: Harvard University Press.
[146] Holes, C (1983). Patterns of Communal Language Variation in Bahrain. *Language in Society*, *12* (4), *433-457*.
[147] Jabeur, M. (1987). *A Sociolinguistic Study in Tunisia*: *Rades* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom.

pronunciation has varied greatly among Arab speech communities in the past, and Arab speakers can adopt any pronunciation of the Qāf with relative ease. In short, Jordan's history vis-à-vis the famous letter follows a long tradition in the Arab world that is marked by hierarchy and social class. Aside from the incidence of code-switching to the Bedouin Qāf, additional cases evidence the far-reaching effects of nationalist political changes in the sociolinguistic domain. These cases substantiate my argument concerning the Bedouin Qāf and situate themselves against the backdrop of Black September.

The emergence and widespread adoption of the ethnolinguistic label *Beljiki* for Palestinians took place circa 1970.[148] This label was one of the many tools through which Jordanian nationalism was crystalized in Transjordanian terms. Arab sociologist Bud Khleif defined ethnolinguistic labels as "stereotypes deliberately manufactured to enhance a sense of collective identity, to express stratification, to support an ideology that buttresses socioeconomic and socio-political interests, to signal identity and membership, to exorcise the group—so to speak—from an assumed filth or pollution, to prevent boundary transgression."[149] These ethnolinguistic labels "refer directly to position and hierarchy."[150] An examination of the label *Beljiki* demonstrate that it is the rule rather than exception among its kind. Suleiman cites several folk explanations for the term drawn from the work of Paul Lalor. These include the assertion that Palestinians are not originally from the region and come from Europe; that Palestinians are of mixed race like many Belgians (contrasting them with racially "purer" Transjordanians); that Jordanians look down on Palestinians like the French look down on Belgians; that the term is derived from the acronym BLJ (min barra li-juwwa), translated as "from the outside to within;"

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[148] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 116.
[149] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 116.
[150] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 116.

and finally the assertion that the term was coined by then-Head of the Jordanian intelligence community Muhammad Rasoul Kaylani as a code word that kept confidential his references to Palestinians.[151] All of these explanations speak to the emergence of a national hierarchy within Jordan in which Palestinians perceived as being alien to the land find themselves firmly planted at the bottom. They more broadly underline the rapidity with which nationalist definitions can evolve. To reiterate a point made by Laurie Brand, Jordanian nationalism post-1950 was defined by inclusion and the "hallmark of official speeches and media presentations… was the notion of Palestinians and Transjordanians as two branches of the same family."[152] Due to an evolved political status quo, Palestinians went from being viewed as members of the same family as Transjordanians to outsiders originating in a foreign continent without access to the privileges pursuant to full membership in the Jordanian nation.[153]

Other manifestations in the sociolinguistic domain substantiate the general thesis of this paper. On the 30th of November 1974, following the Arab League's recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, King Hussein delivered a speech in which he described Palestinians in Jordan as muhājirīn ("immigrants") and the Transjordanians as the anṣār ("those who provide aid").[154] This language was immediately seized upon by Transjordanian nationalists to brand Palestinians as outsiders. Adnan Abu-Odeh, who served for years as a high-level Jordanian governmental official and as Jordan's permanent representative to the United Nations from 1992 to 1995,

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[151] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 117.
Other folk explanations cited have to do with Belgian refugees in the First and Second World Wars mirroring Palestinians who entered Jordan after wars with Israel in 1948 and 1967 and the assertion that Beljiki is a corruption of Bolshevik, a label used against Palestinian guerrilla groups by the Jordanian regime during Black September.
[152] Brand, L. (1995). Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity, p. 46-61.
[153] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 117.
[154] These are clear references to Islamic history when Muhammad's followers sought refuge in Medina. See Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 129.

observed that Transjordanians in the late 80s would employ the term ana ibn al-balad (I am a true son of the country) for help with "getting a job, a scholarship, or medical treatment abroad."[155] The term was designed to strengthen the individual's credentials as a full member of the Jordanian nation. The slogan "Jordan for Jordanians" has been utilized for decades by critics of the government and Transjordanian nationalists who fear that their privileged status in Jordan is being eroded by a Palestinian majority. It is clear from a myriad of examples that both code-switching and other linguistic devices have been heavily utilized to reflect and reinforce ethnic tension present in Jordanian society in the post-1970 era.

Adoption of the Bedouin Qāf by Palestinian speakers was not merely a grassroots function of nationalist changes that took place in other arenas in society. The Jordanian state played an active role in promoting the [g] pronunciation to explicitly identify it with the evolving Jordanian nation. This was accomplished through the manipulation of mass media, namely radio and television. Jordanian television was founded in black-and-white in 1968 in the throes of rapidly accelerating inter-ethnic conflict between Transjordanians and Palestinians. After 1970, programs portraying Bedouin life, exalting the military, and hailing the king dominated broadcasts on both radio and television. [156] As it relates to the socio-linguistic domain, speakers on official state media spoke with the Bedouin accent, which powerfully reinforced the [g] pronunciation as distinctly Jordanian. Mudar Zahran, outspoken Palestinian critic of the Jordanian state, laments the "official imposition of a Bedouin image on the country, and even Bedouin accents on state television."[157] According to research conducted by Ipsos and the BBC,

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[155] Suleiman, Y. (2004). *A war of words: Language and conflict in the Middle East*, p. 129.
[156] Massad, J. A. (2001). *Colonial effects: The making of national identity in Jordan*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 250.
[157] Zahran, M. (2012). Jordan is Palestinian. *Middle East Quarterly*. Winter, 2012.
Mudar Zahran is a Jordanian-Palestinian currently living in exile in the UK. He was charged in 2014 for criticizing Jordan's treatment of the Palestinian population in an explosive article published in The Jerusalem Post. Zahran is

more than 80% of Jordanians rely on television as their primary source for news.[158] Jordanian

television is a major player in the socialization process and serves to inform the values and

norms of Jordanian citizens. The norm that is most relevant to this paper is the [g] pronunciation

as a symbol of Jordanian nationalism that distinguishes the in-group from the out-group in

Jordanian society.

The mechanism by which the Bedouin Qāf is promoted on Jordanian television is not

entirely straightforward. There is evidence, however, that the Jordanian state has taken an

aggressive stance on media of all kinds originating in the country. In 2018, Jordan ranked 132

out of 180 countries in the World Freedom Press Index published by Reporters without

Borders.[159] The report named the government's blocking hundreds of websites since 2013,

issuing gag orders through the media commission, prosecuting journalists on false pretenses of

terrorism, and passing a 2015 cyber-crime law that subjected objectionable online articles and

posts on social networks to jail time. It was not until 2007 that Jordan's first independent

television channel gained a license. It is plausible that the Bedouin accent on Jordanian television

is a top-down imposition, a non-starter that all speakers who wish to appear on state media must

conform to. In practice, the example of Samira Tewfik suggests that coercive means are often not

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the antithesis of most Jordanian intellectuals who are wary to approach the idea of ethnic politics in society for fear of the personal consequences that are likely to follow. Zahran regularly lambasts the Jordanian state from abroad and has been accused of exaggerating the plight of Palestinians in Jordan, as well as Palestinian opposition to the monarchy.

[158] See Jordan's Media Landscape.

[159] See Reporters without Borders. The full justification behind Jordan's low rating: "Jordan's media take care to observe the red lines set by the authorities. Journalists are subject to close surveillance by the intelligence services and must be affiliated [with] the state-controlled Jordanian Press Association. The authorities have stepped up control, especially over the Internet, since 2012, when the press and publications law was overhauled. Hundreds of websites have been blocked since 2013 on the grounds that they have no license. Under the 2015 cyber-crime law, articles published in online newspapers and posts by citizen-journalists on social networks can be punishable by jail sentences and can constitute grounds for pre-trial detention. Security grounds are often used to prosecute and sometimes jail journalists under an extremely vague terrorism law. Gag orders issued by the media commission restrict the public debate and limit journalists' access to information on sensitive issues. Jordan participated in the Saudi-led diplomatic offensive against Qatar in 2017, closing Al Jazeera's Amman bureau."

required. Samira was a Lebanese national who by the late 1960s had achieved limited

commercial success in her home country competing with the likes of Fairouz, Sabah, and Wadi

al-Safi. Samira was hired by Jordanian state media in the late 1960s and became synonymous

with the evolving genre of Jordanian nationalist music. Samira documented in a 1998 interview

the training she received in the Bedouin dialect that was designed to give her music an East

Jordanian flavor.[160] Appearing on Jordanian state media is a massive opportunity for any

Jordanian to advance his or her career, and it is unlikely that anyone in a position to do so would

take issue with a request to speak in the Bedouin variety. In addition, most Jordanians have

internalized the Bedouin [g] pronunciation as a distinctly Jordanian feature due to successful

nationalizing efforts by the state within and without the linguistic domain. Earlier in this section,

I noted that Palestinians would code-switch to the [g] in the presence of military officers, police,

and other official state representatives without any coercion. Given Jordanian media's

dominance by the state, television and radio are two natural settings in which code-switching

offers the social advantages of being identified with the ethnic group in power.

　　Roya TV offers a unique vantage point into Jordan's sociolinguistic scene. Roya TV is a

private television station founded in 2011 and is known for producing many of Jordan's most

popular entertainment programs. As a casual consumer of the channel for years, I noticed that the

vast majority of speakers employ the Bedouin [g] and one is hard-pressed to identify a male

speaker pronouncing the Qāf as a glottal stop.[161] Recently I examined a number of original Roya

TV programs which confirmed my initial impression. It is an open question why speakers on a

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[160] Suleiman, Y. (1999). *Language and Society in the Middle East and North Africa*. London: Curzon Press. p. 36.
[161] This applies to Roya TV's original Jordanian programs, not re-airings of Syrian and Lebanese dramas in which speakers retain their native Qāf pronunciation or original Jordanian programs featuring Syrian and Lebanese actors. The tension surrounding the Qāf applies only to Jordanian nationals.

private channel code-switch almost uniformly absent the direct constraints of the Jordanian state. This phenomenon, however, likely owes to my earlier suggestion that Jordanian television and radio, both private or public, are perceived by the population as being in cahoots with the Jordanian state. The media historically was under the total control of government for so long that Jordanians are hard-pressed not to make this association. To this day the state has full discretion in granting television rights and practices censorship of content published in any format and on any platform. I speculate that pressure is exerted in private on stations like Roya TV, as we observed in the case of Samira Tewfik, to create and promote native content in the Bedouin accent. This pressure is likely met with little pushback given evidence that most Jordanians have internalized both the Bedouin Qāf as a nationalist symbol and the media as a nationalist arena. On balance, the nationalizing process in its entirety post-Black September unfolded with relatively little opposition. I attribute this achievement to the state's adept control of the socialization process by way of textbooks, laws, state media, censorship, and speeches issued by the monarchy. In this light, the reproduction of nationalist narratives on Roya TV demonstrates the success of the nationalizing process during the last five decades.

In sum, the monarchy post-Black September identified an interest in underscoring divisions between Palestinians and native Transjordanians. Instead of glossing over the linguistic differences between Transjordanians and Palestinians, a unique speech pattern emerged that functioned to underscore them, as well as an ethnolinguistic label that branded them as outsiders. While these changes were linguistically small, they were symbolically large. Nonetheless, Arabic spoken by Transjordanians and Palestinians bore much in common. This may have been a motivation for the state to supplement nationalized linguistic differences with history, values, and symbols. In short, Jordanian nationalism from its outset has been inextricably linked to the

interests of the state. As the interests of the state evolved, so too did the definitional criteria of a true Jordanian. In this process, Arabic went from being a definitional feature of the Jordanian nation within the confines of the state to a source of division. Jordan's history evidences that the smallest of details like the pronunciation of a single letter and traditionally more grandiose domains like history are all subject to manipulation and can take on great significance in the nationalizing process.

In countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, a challenge lies in assessing where people stand with respect to theories of nationalism clearly articulated by elites and how people's perceptions affect the way they utilize their language. In Jordan, the opposite challenge is present of arriving at a clear theory of nationalism in words based on evident policies, perceptions and linguistic choices readily observable. I have argued that present-day Jordanian nationalism is based on the values and symbols of the original Transjordanian population which it exists to serve. Myriad state policies evidence this fact as well as myriad changes in society that took place after Black September, both linguistic and otherwise. Due to the kingdom's majority Palestinian population, the monarchy is existentially compelled to preach unity at the rhetorical level and downplay ethnic tensions while cleavages in the state, military, and society speak louder than words.

The Crystallization of a New Status Quo (1970-1993)

The aftermath of the civil war brought seminal changes to the Jordanian state and society, but it did not end the monarchy's quest to regain control of the West Bank and reincorporate West Bank Palestinians into the kingdom. The momentum of an independent Palestinian representation, however, could not be forestalled. The king reluctantly conceded this fact by

disengaging from the West Bank in 1988 in the midst of the First Intifada. The signing of the

Oslo Accords in 1993 cemented a new reality, whereby the monarchy lost its capacity to speak

authoritatively on Palestinian issues and Transjordanians gained a special status as the regime's

most loyal bastion of support.

 After the June War, Amman continued to pay salaries and pensions to civil servants in the

West Bank and to sponsor various educational endowments benefiting Palestinians. In addition,

during a radio broadcast on March 15, 1972, King Hussein proposed a United Arab Kingdom

that would feature two federal districts: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and a Palestinian

district, which would include the West Bank region formerly under control by the Jordanian

authorities.[162] Under this proposal, the two sides would enjoy autonomy except on military,

foreign, and security affairs, which would be governed centrally by Amman. The plan was

immediately rejected by Israel, the Arab states, and most notably, the PLO. The PLO considered

this proposal for a territorial settlement deeply inadequate and resented the notion of King

Hussein regaining authority over the Palestinian people, whose campaign in Black September

had "gravely affected" the resistance movement.[163] Increasing Palestinian nationalism at the

expense of Jordanian nationalism was also evidenced by the Palestinian response to the deaths of

high-level PLO officials killed during an Israeli raid on Lebanon in April of 1973. At the funeral

in Beirut, Palestinian attendees raised the Palestinian flag rather than its Jordanian counterpart, a

move unprecedented before the events of Black September, even in the immediate years

following the June War after which Jordanian control over the West Bank had already been

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[162] Barari, p. 240.
[163] Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part III. *Journal of Palestine Studies*,
  9(2). p. 101.

surrendered.[164]

After the October War of 1973, the Palestinian nationalist movement found itself in the unusual position of having to offer a realistic definition of what it wanted with respect to the Palestinian territories given the real possibility of a political settlement.[165] Echoing bitterness toward the Jordanian regime in the aftermath of Black September, the PLO published in mid-February of 1974 a series of articles and principles on the Palestinian position, which clarified that a return to Jordanian sovereignty in the territories was a non-starter.[166] Aside from expelling Israel from the occupied territories, stated objectives included "prevent[ing] the Jordanian regime from returning to those territories to perform its historical role of obliterating the independent national existence of the Palestinian people." In the event that Israel would withdraw, the alternative to "Jordanian tutelage" was Palestinian national sovereignty under the PLO. This posture marks a radical shift in the PLO's interim position with respect to the Palestinian territories. After the June War, the PLO viewed the establishment of some kind of Palestinian state as an "imperialist-Zionist conspiracy" aimed at eliminating the grander regional objectives of the PRM,[167] and favored the interim restoration of authority to the Jordanian government. By 1974, however, the PLO was openly committed, in principle, to establishing some form of interim Palestinian government over the territories rather than cede them back to the king.

On October 28, 1974, the Arab League Summit in Rabat declared the PLO the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," dealing a huge blow to Jordanian claims.[168]

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[164] Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part III, p. 103.

[165] See Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part III, p. 104-124 for a detailed discussion of this process.

[166] Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part III, p. 107.

[167] Al-Shuaibi (1980). The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part III, p. 105.

[168] See "Seventh Arab League Summit Conference: Resolution on Palestine." *The Question of Palestine*. *United Nations*.

In 1981, Israel's Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon popularized the slogan "Jordan is Palestine,"

as an alternative to providing the Palestinians with their own state.[169] This statement from an

Israeli official expressed the Palestinian fear that subsumption under the monarchy undermined

their nationalist cause. During the next decade, it was the PLO's staunch commitment to

preventing King Hussein from representing Palestine that proved to be decisive. As political

scientist Hassan A. Barari recounts, "Time and again, Jordan sought to speak for the Palestinians

at the expense of the [PLO]. However, to the chagrin of the Jordanian monarchy, the PLO won

the battle over representing the Palestinians."[170] After the outbreak of the intifada in 1987, which

"further emasculated Jordan's influence in the West Bank,"[171] King Hussein formally revoked

Jordanian claims to the West Bank. He notably asserted that "Jordan is not Palestine." This pithy

statement crystallized in words a sharp de facto divide between Palestinians and Transjordanians

post-Black September, and signaled the removal of Palestinians from Jordanian nationalist

rhetoric. The king could now openly assert what Jordan had become--a modern state that existed

to serve a distinct Jordanian nation understood in terms of tribal values and symbols and

consisting of those original inhabitants of Jordan prior to the mass influx of Palestinian refugees.

     In the period between this revocation and the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993, two

schools of thought with respect to Palestinian statehood prevailed among the Jordanian elite.[172]

The first school opposed the establishment of the Palestinian state, believed that it would pose a

security threat to Jordan, and favored an active Jordanian role in West Bank politics. The second

view, on the other hand, viewed the independent Palestinian state as a positive development for

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[169] Layne, L. (1989) "Tribalism": National Representations of Tribal Life In Jordan. *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, 16*(2), p. 190.
[170] Barari, p. 231.
[171] Barari, p. 234.
[172] Barari, p. 234-236.

Jordan that would put to rest, once and for all, the notion of Jordan as the "alternative homeland" to Palestinians.[173] While the king decidedly favored the first school of thought from 1988-1993, the signing of the Oslo Accords prompted him to change his mind, and he began to openly favor the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In short, the Oslo Accords sounded the death knell of Jordanian claims not only to the West Bank but to represent the Palestinian people. By this point, Jordanian and Palestinian nationalisms had crystallized such that no attempt to hybridize the two could be entertained. As Stefanie Nanes explains, "Whereas the [unification] of Jordan and central Palestine in 1949 and 1950. . . was legitimated politically by appeals to Hashemite Arab nationalism and was effected through juridical measures, the [separation] of the West Bank from the East Bank in 1988 was carried out by appeals to regionally based Palestinian and Jordanian nationalisms."[174] It followed in the minds of many Transjordanians that East Bank Palestinians should make no claims to equal inclusion in Jordanian society given the presence of an independent Palestinian entity headquartered on the other side of the river. Moreover, under these precarious circumstances the prospects of an empowered Palestinian majority of questionable loyalty posed an existential threat to the Jordanian regime.

[173] Barari, p. 235.
[174] Nanes, p. 169.

Chapter 3: The Present-Day Fault Lines of Jordanian Ethnic Politics (1989-Present)

Modern Developments (1989-Present)

I analyze recent developments in Jordanian politics and society that evidenced and reinforced longstanding ethnic cleavages and conflict. Jordan's political system since its opening in 1989 has favored the tribes, whereas survey data from the turn of the century and the Abu Odeh episode illuminate both the fractured status quo and its historical precursors. Today refugees and the economy are the chief issues in Jordanian society. Underlying nationalist tensions carry the potential to boil over as discontent mounts and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process stagnates.

In April of 1989, riots broke out in a number of tribal towns and cities across the country considered the heartland of the emergent Jordanian nation as a reaction to IMF-sponsored subsidy reductions as part of a debt restructuring agreement.[175] King Hussein responded by taking a course of political liberalization, reconvening lower-house parliamentary elections in the fall and ending decades of martial law two years later.[176] After the Muslim Brotherhood won a third of parliamentary seats in the 1989 election, the king replaced the block system inherited from the British with the single non-transferable vote system (Sawt Wahid). Under this system, electors vote for one candidate in multi-member districts, and the candidates with the highest vote total wins.[177] This system considerably disadvantages political parties, given that they can

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[175] Brand, L. (1995). Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity, p. 54

[176] Martial law, which was enacted after Jordan's forfeiture of the West Bank in 1967, "banned large public meetings in this nation of three million people, many of them Palestinians, and gave the Government broad powers to restrict freedom of speech and the press and to try ordinary criminal cases in military courts." Ap. (1991, July 8). *Jordanian Cancels Most Martial Law Rules*. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/08/world/jordanian-cancels-most-martial-law-rules.html

[177] Magid, A. (2016, July 25). *Why many Jordanians have little stomach for upcoming elections.*

never be sure how many candidates to run in any district, and was aimed at strengthening

Transjordanian tribes at the expense of the Palestinian opposition.[178] Districts under this system

were also heavily gerrymandered such that tribal areas received disproportionate representation

in parliament.[179] This system would remain in effect until the parliamentary elections of

September, 2016, in which a more democratic system conducive to political parties and

proportionate representation was implemented in the wake of the Arab Spring. Jordan's

democratically deficient experience with political liberalization post-1989 is a direct function of

the shift in state nationalism that occurred after the events Black September. Prior to King

Hussein's declaration of martial law on April 25, 1957, political parties dominated by

Palestinians flourished in a more egalitarian political sphere whereas specific measures for their

disenfranchisement were enacted some three decades later in keeping with a new political status

quo.

While the subject of nationalism in Jordan has historically been taboo, survey data

published by the University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies in the winter of 1995 offers a

rare window into the minds of Jordanians of both Transjordanian and Palestinian origin as it

pertains to the subject of national unity.[180] Among those surveyed, 61.3% and 59.3% of

Transjordanian opinion-makers affirmed respectively "Degree of communal bigotry" and

"Intensity of loyalty to the state" as an impediment to the integration of citizens, in comparison

to just 40.5% and 32% of Palestinian opinion-makers.[181] In addition, 66% of Transjordanian

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[178] Running too many candidates risks not winning any seats at all, while running too few leads to inadequate representation.

[179] For example, a few years ago, the Transjordanian-dominated Kerak Governorate with a population of 243,700 was represented with 10 seats in parliament, while the Palestinian-dominated Zarqa Governorate with a population of 931,000 was represented with only 11.

[180] Frisch, H. (1997). Ethnicity, Territorial Integrity, and Regional Order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel. *Journal of Peace Research*, *34*(3), 257-269.

[181] This compares to 39.1% and 41.1%, respectively, for non-opinion-making Transjordanians and 30% and 22.5%

opinion-makers affirmed "Dual loyalty among Jordanians of Palestinian origin" as an obstacle to national unity.[182] On the other hand, 69.2% and 60.3% of Palestinian opinion-makers affirmed respectively "Concentration of job appointments in the public sector amongst Jordanians" and "Lack of proportionate representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin in government and parliament," as obstacles to national unity.[183] While the percentages in all of these cases are considerably lower among non-elite Jordanians, survey responses reveal a general suspicion of Palestinian loyalty among Transjordanians, as well as a general feeling of disenfranchisement among Palestinians.

A rare episode that offers even greater insight into ethnic politics in Jordan transpired in 1999 during a short-lived period of political liberalization. Abu Odeh, a trusty Jordanian of Palestinian origin who uniquely served in the upper echelons of the Jordanian government,[184] published a book entitled *Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process.* In this work, Abu Odeh detailed the rise of Transjordanian nationalism and the marginalization of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and called for a return to a more inclusive Hashemite identity.[185] In April of 2000, Abu Odeh was ultimately dismissed from his government post as adviser to the king for the controversy his work generated. Transjordanians particularly objected to a number of specific proposals made by Abu Odeh, including the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, calls for electoral and bureaucratic reform, and Abu Odeh's alleged desire to transform Jordan into "an alternative country" for Palestinians.[186]

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for non-opinion-making Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

[182] This compares to 35.4% for non-opinion-making Transjordanians.

[183] This compares to 54.2% and 40.7%, respectively, for non-opinion-making Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

[184] Abu Odeh served as ambassador to the UN, minister and chief of the royal court, member of the upper house of parliament, and political adviser to King Hussein.

[185] Nanes, p. 162.

[186] Nanes, p. 180.

In September of 2000, several months after Abu Odeh's dismissal, Transjordanian elites anonymously wrote a 19-page memo and distributed it to various media outlets entitled, "The Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship, the Issue of Palestinian Refugees, Resettlement and Allegations of Deficient Rights." Clearly intended as a response to Abu Odeh's book, its authors adduced the assassination of King Abdullah I, the establishment of the PLO, and the events of Black September as examples of a "retreat from unity" and equated a more proportional representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin to "[theft] and [seizing] of [Transjordanian] rights on the land."[187] In addition, the memo likened the claims of Palestinians in Jordan to those of Zionists in Israel. While the memo was not published verbatim due to its inflammatory nature, it was discussed by a number of columnists in Jordan. After the outbreak of the Second Intifada in October of 2000, the window for open political expression in Jordan was shut, but the fraught nature of Jordanian ethnic politics became abundantly clear. As Stephanie Nanes wrote, "That such a person [Abu Odeh] could threaten the regime speaks to its brittleness, extreme sensitivity, and the perception of its own weakness."

Under the leadership of King Abdullah, who succeeded his father in 1999, Jordanian ethnic politics have remained fraught. In April of 2014, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report in which they skewered the Jordanian authorities for denying entry to Palestinian refugees from Syria beginning in April of 2012, after which a policy of non-admittance was crystallized in January of 2013.[188] Jordanian Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour justified the policy by asserting that these refugees, many of whom fled Jordan in the wake of Black September, should wait the crisis out in Syria or be permitted to return to their places of origin in Israel or Palestine. By the

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[187] Nanes, p. 183.
[188] Human Rights Watch. (2014, August 7). Not Welcome: Jordan's Treatment of Palestinians Escaping Syria.

same token, HRW reported, "The head of Jordan's Royal Hashemite Court told [us] in May 2013 that the influx of Palestinians would alter Jordan's demographic balance and potentially lead to instability." HRW demanded that "Jordanian authorities rescind the non-admittance policy for Palestinian refugees from Syria and cease all deportations of Palestinian refugees back to Syria. . . Authorities should also halt [the] arbitrary removal of citizenship from Jordanian citizens or descendants of Jordanian citizens who were living in Syria prior to 2011." The government has also continued to implement a more general policy begun in 1988 of arbitrarily revoking the citizenship of a large number of Palestinian-origin residents, most of whom have resided in the kingdom for decades, in a calculated effort to neutralize Palestinian demands for more political representation.[189]

The monarchy has partially managed to mitigate popular unrest stemming from the Palestinian demographic through the use of discourse.[190] Speeches delivered by the throne have underscored that Jordan is not synonymous with Palestine, and that Jordanians in the kingdom of Palestinian origin, regardless of their tenure and legal status, are refugees and sojourners awaiting return to their true homeland. As follows, Jordan can defer addressing the Palestinian issue until the establishment of a Palestinian state. According to this discourse, only after this establishment can the status of the Palestinian diaspora be settled permanently. In the meantime, however, discrimination that circumscribes the rights and privileges of Palestinians, like Jordan's policy toward Palestinian refugees from Syria, is fair game.[191] This discourse is capable of mitigating pressures from the Palestinian community only to the extent that it is internalized by

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[189] Yom, S.L. (2015). The New Landscape of Jordanian Politics: Social Opposition, Fiscal Crisis, and the Arab Spring. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 42(3), 294.
[190] Dlol, S. (2015). *The Palestinian Diaspora in Jordan: A case of Systematic Discrimination* (Unpublished Bachelor's Thesis). Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden, p. 26.
[191] Dlol, p. 37.

the population. As the prospects of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian have dwindled in recent years, many Jordanians of Palestinian origin have rejected the discourse and its implications by adopting a more assimilationist position according to which Palestinians ought to be entitled to the same full rights and privileges as their Transjordanian counterparts.

Many pundits predicted that the wave of Arab uprisings that began in early 2011 would lead, in turn, to the overthrow of the Jordanian regime.[192] The rationale behind this assessment was that a historically disenfranchised Palestinian population would likely take to the streets. Moreover, there was the perception that growing Transjordanian discontentment with the king's handling of the country would be the straw that broke the camel's back. Indeed, both demographics have lamented the widespread notion of rampant corruption and inept management of state resources. During 2011-2012, debate in both communities about whether the king should abdicate the throne in favor of his half-brother Hamzah or his son Crown Prince Hussein was a subject of popular discourse for the first time since 1970-1971.[193] Between January 2011 to August 2013, "Nearly 8,000 protests, marches, and strikes calling for political reforms transpired across Jordan."[194] The irony of Jordan's Arab Spring was that it featured a significant Transjordanian component in al-Hirak. This movement, led primarily by young people from tribal communities, staged a number of protests calling for more democratic change and refused to demonize Jordanians of Palestinian origin.[195] Moreover, it unnerved traditional tribal elders, who still regard the Palestinian diaspora with suspicion and perceive democratic change as inimical to their interests. To date, however, Jordan has once again weathered the

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[192] It is germane to keep in mind that these predictions are not unprecedented. For example, after the signing of the Oslo Accords by Israel and the PLO in 1993, many pundits debated whether it spelled doom for the Jordanian monarchy. See Tal, L. (November/December, 1993). Is Jordan Doomed?
[193] Yom, p. 284.
[194] Yom, p. 285.
[195] Yom, p. 291.

storm and proved the pundits wrong.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, King Abdullah has responded to popular pressures by spearheading a process of national reform. Demands from the Palestinian community and the al-Hirak movement have unfailingly featured reform of the electoral system. The parliamentary elections of September, 2016, debuted a new political system more conducive to political parties. The new system is similar in some ways to the block voting system of the 1989 election, while it also diverges by allowing electors to vote for parties to which a number of seats are proportionally allocated. Many Jordanians, however, are not satisfied with the pace and scope of King Abdullah's reforms. Voter turnout for the parliamentary elections of September was reported at 37%. Turnout was especially low in Palestinian-dominated urban centers, like Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid. Writing in advance of the elections, Harvard journalist Aaron Magid attributed a lack of enthusiasm for upcoming elections to a number of causes.[196] On May 2, 2016, constitutional amendments were quietly ratified that "gave the king absolute power to appoint the head of the paramilitary police force, members of the constitutional court, and the crown prince," whereas before nominees had to be recommended by the prime minister and other ministers of government. There is widespread perception in Jordan that the parliament is merely a rubber stamp for the king's policies and a convenient scapegoat when things run amok. The king retains the power to appoint the prime minister and members of the upper house of parliament, privileges that critics of the regime want democratized. In addition, critics have called for an independent judiciary, constitutional court, and a serious crackdown on corruption because of the squander of precious state resources.

On the flip side, a major cross-section of the Transjordanian population believes that the

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[196] Magid, A. (2016, July 25). Why many Jordanians have little stomach for upcoming elections.

king's reforms have gone too far. While the al-Hirak movement was not marginal by any stretch, the majority of Transjordanians still take a traditional line. In contrast with the al-Hirak movement, rationalists believe that state reforms threaten the essence of Jordan as a Transjordanian state. As one Transjordanian nationalist articulated in 2010, even before the onset of a national democratic reform movement, "The Palestinians are now getting peacefully what they tried to get in the civil war in 1970. They failed then, but are winning now."[197] Since the events of Black September and the wholesale expulsion of Palestinian-origin Jordanians from public life, Palestinians came to dominate the private sector of the economy. Transjordanians fear that increasing economic liberalization ushered in by King Abdullah threatens to widen the gap even further, compelling an increasing number of Transjordanians to seek employment in a realm in which they feel they have little chance of succeeding. By the same token, many Transjordanians fear that democratic political reform will transform Jordan into a de facto Palestinian state. As Curtis Ryan recounts, "The Transjordanian nationalist voice sounds aggrieved and abandoned." Today King Abdullah finds himself tasked with meeting Palestinian and pro-democratic demands, while appeasing tribal loyalists who feel increasingly marginalized despite the historical privilege they have enjoyed.

Conclusion

The British Mandate developed Jordan in the manner of a modern state without forcefully obliterating local institutions leading to a legacy of mutual respect. Prior to his coronation, Jordan's current King Abdullah was educated in Britain and served in the British military in a

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[197] Ryan, Curtis (2010, July 13). "We Are All Jordan"...But Who Is We? Retrieved from
https://merip.org/2010/07/we-are-all-jordan-but-who-is-we/

strong testament to the warm relations between the two countries. This colonial era success owes not only to the regional political objectives of the British Mandate and a timely world depression but more pedagogically to an expert understanding of local populations by key colonial leaders. These leaders made a conscious choice to operate within existing structures in the state-building process and based that decision on a profound understanding of the local people.

Jordan's history post-independence illustrates the constructivism inherent to the nationalist project. After their initial arrival to Jordan as refugees, Palestinians were granted citizenship and encouraged to fully assimilate in marked contrast to their treatment in other Arab countries in which they took up residence. The monarchy owing to the then-current political context believed integrationist measures were in its best interest. A changing political landscape engendered by the Jordanian Civil War radically altered the political calculation of Jordanian elites and led to an about-face in its policies toward Palestinians. The subsequent elevation of tribal values and symbols as the bedrock of Jordanian nationalism clearly illustrates the intentionality and political expedience characteristic of national consolidation. Jordanian nationalism is obviously not the inevitable evolution of a natural process and is the rule not the exception among modern nation-states in view of the theoretical framework I introduced at the beginning of this essay.

Jordan's experience with unity during 1948-1967 also demonstrates that "political communities can find ways to persist even if they are unable to resolve basic conflicts that concern the essence of their existence."[198] However, these unresolved conflicts always carry the potential to boil over, as happened in Jordan in the space created by the Arab defeat of 1967.

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[198] Mishal, p. 120.

Moreover, the perennial question of loyalty enveloping diaspora communities characterized Jordanian politics in the post-1970 era. Finally, the role of historical memory in the reinforcement of communal lines is a subject of ongoing importance in Jordanian society. It was note of that Transjordanian nationalists adduced the assassination of King Abdullah I, the events of Black September, and the signing of the Oslo Accords in their diatribe against Abu Odeh and other Palestinian intellectuals advocating for more inclusion.

Today Palestinians in Jordan comprise the majority of the population but are underrepresented in the Jordanian public sphere, especially in the higher echelons of the military, and reside in heavily gerrymandered electoral districts. This imbalance in resources and privileges was intended to be temporary pending a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that never materialized. Palestinians, however, have amassed more material wealth than their Transjordanian counterparts in an era of economic liberalization. The question of whether Jordanian nationalism should be reworked to incorporate Palestinians after the failure of a two-state solution and simmering ethnic tensions inside Jordan is beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis does evidence, however, both theoretical underpinning and historical precedent for nationalist redefinition undertaken by the monarchy as a tool of self-preservation.

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