National Security Policy Complexity:

An Analysis of U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Program Effects on Political Terror

Dissertation

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Abstract

This dissertation examined whether participation in US Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) programs leads to reductions in a regime's willingness to inflict political terror such as extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment. Two objectives framed the research: first, to identify structural factors that give rise to political terror, and second, to assess the efficacy of non-kinetic US intervention policies in allied nations.

Though DSC programs are widely studied, the programs have been primarily evaluated in output terms such as dollars (Foreign Military Sales), the number of foreign officers trained (International Military Education and Training), and the number and cost of engagement events (National Guard State Partnership Program; SPP). To advance knowledge on DSC programs in outcome terms, this research started by recreating the key components of Poe and Tate (1990, 1994) causal frameworks on personal integrity rights. The initial objectives were to confirm or refute predictor variable results and to determine if the Poe and Tate-derived Political Terror Scale (PTS) was an appropriate measure to evaluate the efficaciousness of DSC programs.

Next, the research expanded to include both a 167-country global time-sensitive cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis and a 46-country regional TSCS analysis using the US Geographic Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibilities (AORs) as its country-by-country delineation. Data collection began by creating the Rebuilding Failed and Weak

States Dataset (RFWS Dataset) which included extensive data on a myriad of variables theorized to influence political terror. The RFWS Dataset covered 20 years from 1993-2012 plus four years 1989-1992 for variable lag effects. The PTS and the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (FSI) were the dependent variables since they represent globally respected indices of political terror and human rights abuses.

Results validated the extant literature's conclusions that the three structural factor variables 1) levels of democratization, 2) economic growth, and 3) recent civil and international war experiences continue to be the most reliable political terror predictors. Results from 12 regression models also showed DSC program influence as consistently weak, and at best, inconsistently statistically significant. Though senior US leaders frequently boast of DSC program intervention successes, this research found no consistent empirical evidence to support their positive pronouncements. *Effective and efficient delivery of DSC intervention **outputs** do not necessarily correspond to similarly effective and efficient political terror **outcomes***.

Also included was an exploratory review of over 400 SPP program archives. System Dynamics non-linear modeling and simulation techniques was used to create a conceptual model that illustrated the adaptive capacity of a State Partnership Program.

Results further showed that there is a strong possibility that investments in training foreign military officers may lead to the desirable effect of a lower likelihood of political terror. The dissertation's overarching recommendation is that senior US leaders need significantly more data collection on the specific nature of various DSC programs. Armed with new, robust datasets, DSC programs can be analyzed, evaluated, and

improved not solely based on easily quantifiable outputs, but rather, based on verifiable outcomes that influence the democracy-strengthening behavioral outcomes of our partner nations.

Dedication

Dedicated to my late father Rudolph L. Hightower, Sr., who taught me the most

important lesson of my life, how to be a good father…

…and to four brave young Americans killed serving in a Defense Security Cooperation
operation:

Acknowledgments

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Fields of Study

Major Field: Graduate Program in Public Policy and Management

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Chapter 1: Causes of Political Terror Worldwide

In early 2011 in the tiny Kingdom of Bahrain, a Middle Eastern country 3.5 times the size of Washington, D.C., pro-democracy protesters took to the streets to strike out against the autocratic, multi-generational rule of the Al Khalifa Family. In a matter of months, the protests were "violently broken up by government forces [and] dozens of protesters were killed and hundreds were jailed" (Taylor, 2015). The term "Arab Spring" (Alhassan, 2012) may have led to political upheavals and regime change in other Arab nations but not in Bahrain. The lack of a 'democratization wave' (Huntington, 1991) in Bahrain laid bare the deep societal and economic cleavages in that small, Persian Gulf kingdom.

In late November 2013, in the central square of Kyiv, Ukraine, the security forces of the government of President Viktor Yanukovych launched an armed assault to quell pro-democracy protestors[1] seeking closer engagement with the European Union. The violent crackdown led to nine people going to the hospital. Moreover, instead of dissuading the "EuroMaidan" protesters from continuing their anti-government street protests, the political violence catalyzed even more of the citizenry to join the protests. The endemic class and political cleavages that exists in post-Soviet Ukrainian society led to even more determination and outrage amongst the citizenry (Burgsdorff, 2015). Subsequently, the peaceful EuroMaidan pro-democracy

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[1] On the night of 30 November 2013 at 04:00, armed with batons, stun grenades, and tear gas, Berkut special police units attacked and dispersed all protesters from Maidan Nezalezhnosti. Wikipedia accessed 20 December 2016.

protests strained the patience of the pro-Russia Yanukovych, which then led to the

horrific violence of 18 February 2014 where government forces allegedly gunned

down 88 citizens. In the cover of darkness, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych

fled the country in disgrace (Booth and Englund, 2014).

In the summer of 2016, Ethiopia, the "model" country for development on the

African Continent (Zenawi, 2011), the majority Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups

staged massive protests to have more inclusion into the governmental and civil

society power structures[2]. Historic ethnic cleavages led to significant differences in

access to government jobs, economic opportunities, and participation in the political

process. The Oromo and Amharic citizens felt marginalized and took to the streets to

vent their frustrations. Ethiopia's government, controlled by the minority Tigray

ethnic group, sensing the protests stemmed from treasonous desires for autonomy,

used their control of police and military forces to squash the protests. The

government's repressive actions whether some say justified or not, did lead to the

massive imprisonment, the deaths of hundreds of citizens, and widespread

condemnation by the United Nations and other supra-national human rights

organizations[3] .

These three examples illustrate a pervasive and destructive phenomenon:

governments, even those popularly elected, will sometimes violently engage in

political terror to repress their own people.

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[2] Why US must stop enabling Ethiopia over Oromo. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2017, from
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/09/africa/ethiopia-oromo-protest/index.html
[3] Ethiopia: Civil Society Groups Urge the International Community to Address Killing of Oromo Protesters.
(2016, January 14). *States News Service*. Retrieved March 16, 2017, from http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-
439947044.html?refid=easy_hf

Political Terror and Human Rights Abuse

The term "political terror" refers to violations of physical or personal integrity rights of individual citizens carried out by a state (or its agents), including abuses such as extrajudicial killing, torture or similar physical abuse, disappearances, and political imprisonment (Gibney and Wood, 2008). The exercise of political terror runs counter to the basic premise that an essential obligation of governance is the protection of the citizenry by the government. In modern Western liberal democracies, this obligation extends to all citizens regardless of individual characteristics and political leanings. According to McCormick and Mitchell (1988), "governments organize police forces and armies to protect their citizens…" (p. 476). Similarly, civil-military relations scholar Isaiah Wilson states that "a broader notion of national security that includes the state's responsibility to provide security for its citizens implies more rights, not less" (Wilson quoted in Brysk and Gershon, 2005: p. 9). Yet, even democracies engage in repressive violence against their citizens. As McCormick and Mitchell point out, "…governments also kill, torture, and imprison their citizens. This dark side of government knows no geographic, economic, ideological, or political boundary." (p. 476).

There is a general global pattern in the exercise of state-sponsored violence against citizens: regime elites obtain power, often through an "election", consolidate power through executive edicts and constitutional changes, and then resist relinquishing power through the exercise of political terror against a dissenting

populace.[4] This pattern highlights that political terror is a behavioral action often initiated by a small group of individuals in positions of power within a country's civilian and military apparatus. While political elites are the agents of violence, decision-making takes place in a context.

The principal cause of such political terror most typically stems from deeply rooted cleavage between the ruling party in the government and opposition groups. These cleavages are based on race, ethnicity, language, region, religion, or some other historically constructed division between groups. Socio-economic gaps between groups often heighten the sense of disparity and marginalization. Ruling parties that feel their base of power weakening often point to historically rooted cleavages as a threat to the stability of the regime (Posner, 2007). The combination of longstanding cleavages and the weakening of a ruling party's grip on power then drives government leaders to proclaim the defense of the population and enshrinement of law and order to employ the full range of state power -- law enforcement, paramilitary forces, or even the military – to suppress dissent.

Causes of Cleavages

Intra-national cleavages in ethnicity, political access, and economic conditions are at the core of state-sponsored violence (Leebaw, 2011).   These cleavages lead to situations wherein government and its massively weaponized security forces were pitted against protesting or otherwise oppositional citizens[5]. Within the established borders of their country, government leaders often justify

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[4] Examples include the stories of Adolf Hitler in Germany, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the Kim dynasty in North Korea, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Vladimir Putin in Russia, the House of Suad in Saudia Arabia, among many others.
[5] Ukrainian Police-Abuse Protests Come to the Capital. (2013, July 17). *States News Service*. Retrieved March 16, 2017, from http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-337309423.html?refid=easy_hf

repressive actions by claiming that they, as sovereign leaders, have the monopoly on

the use of force and have the right and obligation to control police, paramilitary, and

military forces. In the larger geopolitical arena, governments provide self-

preservation explanations to justify state-sponsored violence and characterize any

interference in internal matters by an outside power as a threat to their sovereignty.

Still, neighboring countries and regional and global powers often have an interest in

the conduct of independent governments around the globe. Sometimes these interests

are strategic. For example, internal conflicts in one country can spill across a border

into a neighboring country (Matinuddin, 2009). Other times these interests are moral.

For example, multilateral organizations like the United Nations serve the mission of

promoting peace around the globe[6].

Whether the impetus is strategic, moral, or both, other countries and

multilateral organizations face the challenge of selecting the most efficacious means

of other preventing governments from doing harm to their own people. Over the

course of decades and regardless of presidential administrations, the United States has

traditionally identified peace and stability, adherence to human rights norms, and the

promotion of democracy worldwide as vital national interests and pillars of its foreign

policy and national security efforts.

> The US Department of Defense went so far in their Directive 3000.05
> Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
> (SSTR) Operations[7] as to put stabilization efforts on same level as
> combat ops. This DoD policy stated that, "…Stability operations are a
> core U.S. military mission…They shall be given priority comparable

[6] Chapter I. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2017, from http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html
[7] United States Department of Defense. (n.d.). Retrieved May 16, 2016 from
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf

to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning…[DoD] shall support indigenous persons or groups – political, religious, educational, and media – promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, who oppose extremism and the murder of civilians" (DoD 3000.05, 2005).

Successive US presidential administrations are 'on the record' in implementing concrete policies and actions to support the prevention of the murder of civilians and endorse post-conflict nation building in accordance to democratic consolidation principles. In April 1991, President George H.W. Bush initiated Operation Provide Comfort establishing and enforcing No-Fly zones to restrict Saddam Hussein's violent post-Desert Storm actions to suppress the Iraqi Kurds (Rudd, 2004). Eight years later, NATO began a massive bombing against Serbia to prevent 'ethnic cleansing' to deter Belgrade from launching more offensives against Kosovo Albanians. President Bill Clinton justified the air and cruise missile strikes saying, "We and our NATO allies have taken this action after extensive and repeated efforts to obtain a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo"[8]. In a stunning reversal of his 2000 declarations that the US will "absolutely not" engage in "some kind of nation-building corps", by the end of his second term President George W. Bush had fully embraced the concept of nation-building and initiated national security policies that promoted nation-building and democracy worldwide[9]. Similarly, in his attempt to prevent Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from dropping using chemical weapons on

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[8] *NATO attack on Yugoslavia begins*. CNN.com. 24 March 1999.
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/24/kosovo.strikes/
Accessed 02 March 2017
[9] *Bush a convert to nation building*. Washington Times. Monday, 07 April 2008.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/apr/7/bush-a-convert-to-nation-building/
Accessed 02 March 2017

his own people, possibly the most vicious method of state-sponsored violence, President Obama famously stated, "We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus."[10]

In addition to a multiple of US Commanders-in-Chief, a multitude of leaders from around the world have also sought to prevent regimes from exacting violence upon their citizens. The great challenge for leaders of modern liberal democracies is to determine what collection of soft and hard policy methods are most efficacious in lowering political terror. The international community, as stakeholders in maintaining global peace and security, rely on a range of methods to promote constitutionally directed, non-violent civilian control of the military. A principal goal is to establish a professional military accountable to a constitutional civilian democratic system with civilian control of the military. To achieve this goal, the US implements a varied toolbox of policies and programs to promote peaceful civilian control of the military. At one end of the continuum are 'hard power" interventions to equip foreign militaries through suppling weapons, combat, and intelligence training. The intent of this engagement strategy is to create a capable and professional fighting force oriented towards balancing the need to maintain peace and security while respecting the rule of law and the individual human rights.

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[10] *The three key words of Obama's 'red line' on Syria*. Blake Hounshell. ForeignPolicy.com. 25 April 2013.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/25/the-three-key-words-of-obamas-red-line-on-syria/
Accessed 02 March 2017

At the other end of the foreign engagement continuum are more "soft power" interventions where the U.S. provides training and programs designed to support civilian-military relations within a partner country. These soft power approaches also integrate the host country's military into multilateral military operations to reinforce interoperability and to promote democratic norms.

Some of these "soft power" programs are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and the State Partnership Program (SPP). The FMS program, through loans, special financing, and grants, provides modern military equipment to partner nations. Additionally, FMS provides training to foreign militaries to use the equipment received through the program. The IMET program provides graduate-level leadership training to officers from partner nations. IMET builds military-to-military and civilian-to-military relationships that have proven to last for entire professional lifetimes. The State Partnership Program is a uniquely structure foreign engagement that pairs a US state's National Guard with the military and civilian leadership of partner nations. SPP activities can range from community building events like renovating elementary schools to pilot-to-pilot training operations to high-level discussions with civilian Ministry of Defense officials.

This dissertation examines state-sponsored political violence with two research objectives: first, to identify the factors that give rise to political terror; and second to assess the efficacy of 'soft power' U.S. military and non-military programs designed to reduce the likelihood of political terror in countries around the globe. Specifically, with regard to the second objective, this dissertation assesses the impact

of a relatively unexamined US Defense Security Cooperation program in various countries around the globe over the two decades of 1991-2012.

Problem Statement

Both historical and current events confirm that regimes do harm to their own people. The problem of this political terror against citizens is not limited to Bahrain, Ukraine, or Ethiopia.

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)[11], from 1989 to 2015, there were 918 instances of "one-sided conflict" across the globe. The UCDP defines these "one-sided conflict as "the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year (extrajudicial killings in government facilities are excluded)". The average number of state violence events was nearly 33 conflicts per year (average of 32.78 conflicts) over the last three decades. Figure 1. shows the number of fatalities caused by government armed conflicts against citizens (the 1994 Rwandan Genocide caused 800,000 to 1 million deaths[12] and spiked the numbers outside the graph parameters).

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[11] Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (n.d.). Retrieved February 4, 2016, from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/
[12] Data from the Surf Survivor's Fund. Accessed 20 October, 2016. http://survivors-fund.org.uk/resources/rwandan-history/statistics/

Figure 1. One-sided Violence Fatalities 1989-2015. Copyright UCDP 2016

Figure 2. Scope of One-sided Violence by number of actors and region 1989-2015. Copyright UCDP 2016.

The behavior over time graph (Figure 2.) confirms that nation states' willingness to repress their own people transcends both time and region. The cleavages existing between a government with the power to direct lethal force, and a section of the population protesting the regime's policies or actions, can be great. The impetus for this dissertation was to investigate the factors that most influence political terror and human rights abuses.

This research focuses on specific types of political repression conducted by governments around the globe against their people. This state-sponsored violence exists on extensive continuum of actions defined in the existing literature as political terror.

Based off an analysis US State Department and Amnesty International reports, these repressive governmental actions make up the foundations of the Political Terror Scale. The PTS uses the following "five level coding scheme" (Figure 3.):

Level	Interpretation
1	Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
2	There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3	There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
4	Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
5	Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Figure 3. Political Terror Scale Five Level Coding Scheme[13]

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) categorical coding scheme allowed this dissertation's quantitative analysis to examine if US policies can influence a government's level of repressive actions and relate those actions to the cumulative participation in US engagement activities.

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[13] Political Terror Scale website, accesses 03 January 2017.
http://politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html#PTS-Levels

McCormick and Mitchell's (1997) work went even further than the PTS in describing state-sponsored terror as a sort of "entrepreneurial repression" where police forces act independently to use their coercive powers corruptly in their personal interest." (p. 510).

Such political terror reaches a scale where the United States and/or the international community must react. The international community, generally through United Nations resolutions, presents a unified front to put pressure on governments engaging in violence and human rights abuses of their own people. These resolutions, unless the UN troops unanimously pass and support, are rarely effective in changing the behaviors of determined, politically and militarily entrenched government leaders (Muravchik, 2006; Tryggestad, 2009).

The international community reaction can range from measured, if not impotent, responses when the nation conducting state-sponsored violence has powerful influence in world affairs and in the global economy. For example, China and Saudi Arabia are afforded a blind-eye by the international even though their human rights and political repression records would theoretically demand International Community intervention[14]. If no intervention passes, then repressive regimes are emboldened and the conditions for future state-sponsored violence exacerbates.

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[14] UNWATCH, January 2, 2017, Accessed February 10, 2017 from https://www.unwatch.org/farce-u-n-s-2017-membership-human-rights-council/

In weak, failed, and collapsed states, the need for international community intervention is even more immediate (Rotberg, 2003, 2010)[15]. In such states, the regime's focus on political and physical survival supplants any concerns for intervention strategies such as worldwide condemnation or economic sanctions. It is in these fragile states that the cleavages that lead to political terror can 'force the hand' of the US and international community to act.

When state violence and conflict percolate in weakened, failing, and failed states, US national security policy and decision makers are convinced that such states become tinderboxes for national and regional conflicts that will require immediate U.S. involvement. The reigning thought is that escalating state-sponsored violence leads to failed states:

> "Weak and failed states pose a serious security challenge for the United States and the international community. They can become breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking in humans and narcotics, organized crime, and humanitarian catastrophes…If the U.S. Government is going to meet these threats, we must adapt our national security architecture." John E. Herbst, Coordinator, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, FM 3-07, p 129.

Escalating political violence that does not result in a failed or collapse state can still lead to tragic consequences that are less than civil war. This quasi-conflict

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[15] Robert I. Rotberg defines the conditions of nation-states on a continuum as: "*Strong states* unquestionably control their territories and deliver a full range and a high quality of political goods to their citizens. They perform well according to indicators like GDP per capita, the UNDP Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House's Freedom of the World Report. *Weak states* include a broad continuum of states that are: inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks; and a mixture of the two. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions that have not yet, or not yet thoroughly, become overtly violent. *Failed states* are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed re-volts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state. A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. Political goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. A *collapsed state* exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen."

condition of becoming a continuing simmering state with the potentially violent state

action referred to as a "Frozen Conflict". Examples of potential for unchecked

political terror are the Frozen Conflicts in Moldova, Armenia, and Nagorno-

Karabakh. In these nations, there are no massively scaled, centrally coordinated

military operations ongoing, but nonetheless, repressive actions of government forces

continue against an indigenous separatist population seeking autonomy. In addition,

while there is no US commitment of active duty, military combat troop to any of

these three nations, the US consistently shows its commitment to improving partner

nation security and preventing political terror by running State Partnership Program

engagement activities for two of these countries via the North Carolina and Kansas

National Guards, respectively[16].

As the world's most multi-dimensional superpower, the US embraces and

implements such national security policies to promote stability, liberalism, and

democracy. In written directives and in public statements, senior US officials promote

a Whole-of-Government approach to intervention programs designed to promote

peace and stability worldwide. In the words of the US Department of Defense:

> "Participation in such teams shall be open to representatives from other U.S.
> Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces,
> International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector with
> relevant skills and expertise. 4.6. Assistance and advice shall be provided to
> and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and
> Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities."
> (DoD, 2003)

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[16] "State Partnership Program Strengthens Security and Diplomacy." *U.S. Department of State*. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web. 17 Mar. 2017. <https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2017/03/08/en/state-partnership-program-strengthens-security-and-diplomacy>.

US policymakers take these concrete steps to formulate policies that reduce the likelihood of escalating violence leading to a failed state, and to increase the likelihood that engagement programs will lead to peaceful, positive, intra-state conflict resolution.

When diplomatic pressure and United Nations resolutions fail to persuade leaders to stop inflicting violence upon its citizens, the UN employs economic sanctions. Economic sanctions range on a continuum from asset freezes on individuals to massive block outs from financing which affects a nation's entire economy. However, the efficacy of sanctions in stemming political terror is a wildly debated topic in academia and throughout the halls of governments' worldwide (Miyagawa, 1992; Drury, 2005).

When sanctions do not lead to the changes sought by the international community, military invention becomes a likely option. Like sanctions, military intervention activities also have a wide range of "hard-power" options. Military combat operations range from non-kinetic options such as no-fly zones, to the full range of violent combat operations, including cruise missile attacks, weapons-free Rules of Engagement (RoE), preemptive air strikes, and the deployment of ground combat troops.

Defense Security Cooperation Programs (DSC)

Military strategist and policymakers have also designed and implemented a host of non-combat related interventions directly focused on positively influencing the behaviors of foreign partner regimes. These non-combat engagements range from typical military-to-military events, to military to civilian events, and to civilian-to-

civilian events. The scope of the novel interventions can range from unit-level enlisted troops exchanging training tactics, to senior military leaders hosting conferences for foreign dignitaries, to national level exchanges between Cabinet Secretaries and Parliamentary Ministers.

US national security policies include novel nation-building interventions under the umbrella policy Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) Programs, and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Today, national security is framed in such varied ways that protection from direct troops crossing the border incursions are not a major concern of policymakers but rather, a whole host of other threat mechanism have elevated themselves to policy high-priorities, i.e. cyber-attacks, terrorism, critical infrastructure attacks, disease epidemics, and food and water security (Lee, 2008; Fullbrook, 2010; Richards, 2014).

US national security policymaking created the framework from which this research on Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) derives program outcomes. The security challenges to U.S. policymakers of post-conflict fragile states is in the forefront of national security debates and the effectiveness of DSC programs directly affects success of U.S. diplomacy, defense, and development initiatives (Marquis, 2006). Such non-traditional national security policies will thus continue to be vital instruments for promoting US national interests.

Engaging with foreign partners covers a wide swath of activities, not the least of which are US Defense Security Cooperation programs, are an integral component of the US Whole-of-Government approach. DSC programs are consequently

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considered vital to US National Security (Williamson and Moroney, 2002; Fisher, 2004; Foster, 2010).

According to U.S. political and military leaders, these military-civilian, military-military, and civilian-civilian engagements inherent in DSC programs can lead to mutually-beneficial, sustained, proactive, and comprehensive trust and relationship building events that will, over time, minimize or even prevent local or regional conflicts, and/or avert conflict escalation.

Paradoxically, DSC programs represent a public policy strategy wherein successful implementation leads to elimination of the need for the policies themselves. With this in mind, and through a myriad of programs, products, and services, the US security cooperation strategy strives for sustainability and foreign partner ownership of its security. The primary objective of DSC programs is to develop an effective security environment that eliminates the very need for the DSC programs[17].

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[17] Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton statement that the State Partnership Program is so effective at nation-building that it will no longer be needed.

DSCA Vision:

"Enable a whole-of-government effort to build and maintain networks of relationships that achieve U.S. national security goals."

Figure 4. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency homepage. Source: DSCA

The rationale for DSC program interventions stem from the belief in being proactive rather than just reactive in our relationships with foreign nations. Whereas the 'why' to engage in nation-building activities may have been settled, the 'how' to intervene remains a constant challenge to US Whole-of-Government policymakers.

The establishment and growth of a specialized DoD agency dedicated to engagements with foreign partners is concrete evidence that the DoD views capacity building as a valuable means to prevent future armed conflicts. Likewise, the DSCA shows that its investment strategy is tailored to preventative activities by employing a myriad of programs designed to build cooperation, interoperability of military forces, to emphasize and increase peaceful civilian control of the military (Figure 4.).

DSC programs analyzed in this research include the FMS, the IMET, and the primary unit of analysis, the US National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). SPP is a novel approach to proactively engaging foreign partners and to developing and maintaining long-term relationships with current and future civilian and military leadership.

DSC Program Outcomes

The management of Defense Security Cooperation programs is studied extensively. The outputs in terms of dollar values of the Foreign Military Sales program are reported annually and analyzed over time. Similarly, the numbers of foreign officers enrolled in the International Military Education and Training is regularly evaluated. The management of the State Partnership Program has also been reviewed in-depth by US Government organizations and their findings repeatedly point to a lack of data available on SPP deployments and a lack of objective, systemic data analysis on the outcomes of the program (CRS, 2008).

Missing in the evaluation of US DSC Programs is systematic, empirical investigation into efficacy of DSC Programs outcomes, not outputs, as they relate to partner nations' state-sponsored terror levels and the willingness of countries to

engage in human rights abuses against its own citizenry. This remains a problem because in an era of rampant national debt, the US Government needs accurate and testable program evaluation data to determine which programs should continue being funded. If specific DSC programs are not positively affecting the democratic behaviors of partner nations, then those programs become leading candidates for elimination.

Theory and Research Design

Overarching theory: As participation in US Defense Security Cooperation Programs, specifically the State Partnership Program, increase in years of participation over time, there should be a measureable outcome captured in partner nations having a lower willingness to inflict state-sponsored violence upon its citizenry, as measured by the index specifically designed to reflect levels and trends in political terror. More specifically, long-term participation in a DSC program with the unique structuration and adaptive capacity of the US National Guard should move the needle in reducing political terror in partner nations embracing the principles of a Western liberal democracy.

Research Questions

A gap in knowledge and action inspired the dissertation research questions. The research questions were formulated primarily to examine if DSC program outputs actually connect to national security behavioral outcomes.

Using multi-analytical methods, this dissertation seeks to tell a story for each of the four research questions related to formulating, implementing, and evaluating complex, non-traditional national security policies and programs.

RQ1. The first research question seeks to determine what we know about the causes and precursor factors that lead to political terror. A significant body of research in the 1980s and 1990s focused on a multitude of variables theorized to influence the levels of political terror and human rights abuses in countries worldwide. These studies generally found commonality in that the level of democracy present, as measured by Freedom House and Polity IV scores, was a strong predictor of the willingness of a regime to conduct repression actions upon its citizenry. Additionally, the participation in international and/or civil wars was a strong precursory factor in political terror levels.

To begin this research on political terror, regression models were crafted and run to determine if these same variables had consistent results when extended for the 20-year period from the early 1990s to 2012. This led to the first of four research questions: have the precursor factors found in earlier research, specifically the Poe and Tate studies, remained relevant and accurate indicators of a regime's politically repressive behavior.

RQ2. The second research question builds upon the idea that external actors, including the US, are continually implementing intervention programs to try to prevent political terror by mitigating the underlying causes. Using both soft and hard power intervention options, external actors are attempting to promote democratic ideals, prevent or end civil and international wars, and foster peaceful and fair civilian control of the military.

This constant quest for effective intervention programs leads to the second research question of whether the US National Guard's State Partnership Program has

any influence on the democratization principle of eliminating political terror and human rights abuses.

The results of political terror extend beyond the human costs of injury and death. State-sponsored violence leads to the perception amongst the citizenry that their government is illegitimate and incapable of adopting democratic consolidation principles (Robinson, 2010; Leebaw, 2011). Any trust and credibility that the people had in their leaders and in their political institutions is destroyed by the wanton and excessive use of state-sponsored violence (Leebaw, 2011).

RQ3. There is incredible diversity in political, military, historic, and cultural histories of nations and these differences may influence the willingness of governments to conduct state-sponsored violence. Cleavages among nations in the same geographical space can lead to similar levels of regime repression of citizens. Therefore, research question three asks if regional commonality affects whether DSC programs influence state-sponsored violence.

Is there a regional effect to the influencers of political terror and human rights abuses? Embedded in research question three is the inquiry into whether there are regional differences in the US Government's design and selection of engagement programs and policies directed at eliminating the arbitrary or self-interested use of excessive force against civilians in partner nations.

RQ4. Lastly, this dissertation's final research question sought to investigate whether the very same intervention programs and polices implemented to increase effective civilian control of the military and to reduce political terror may have led to negative unintended consequences.

The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency conceptualizes, designs, and implements programs to affect a change in behavior of partner nations. These changes can include increasing military readiness and interoperability, increasing the adoption of the principle of civilian control of the military, improving the response to natural disasters, and reducing political repression against innocent civilians. DoD "The Department of Defense shall develop greater means to help build other countries' security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere" (DoD 3000.05, 2005).

Concurrent with DoD's desire to assist partner nations "ensure security in their own lands" is the danger that a partnered regime may be so concerned with self-preservation that they use that exact DoD training and equipping to inflict excessive violence upon their people. National security complexity further muddles the fact that popular and effective DSC programs can lead to unexpected, negative, and/or unintended consequences.

Where the primary research question seeks to determine if DSC programs have any influence on levels of political terror in partner nations, this research question seeks to examine if our engagement programs meant to build the foundations of democracy and instill its values and principles, are actually and unintendedly enabling regimes intent on inflicting state-sponsored violence and human rights violations. The challenge for US national security policymakers crafting non-combat foreign intervention strategies is to ensure that as we train and equip our foreign militaries partners today, that those partner regimes do not become the very dictators, warlords, and Mujahedeen that our armed forces must fight in the future. Our foreign

military capacity building policies and programs need to need to contribute to long-term democratic consolidation and the lessening of political terror.

Research Design

The research used a quantitative methodological approach to investigate possible DSC program outcomes. Connecting the statistical significance of DSC Programs, including the State Partnership Program (SPP), with worldwide indices of political terror may confirm or refute the pronouncements that SPP correlates to democratization principles.

The dissertation is a summative evaluation study that followed the framework of the program logic model described by Knowlton and Phillips (2013). The research design begins with the former state of political repression trends by US partner nations. Then, the investigation examines the gap between the current desired state of affairs and the former measured state of affairs. Finally, the study analyzes factors that may have influenced the gap between these two states of affairs.

Analysis of the effectiveness of Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) programs primarily uses qualitative research methods, specifically qualitative assessments, surveys, and content analysis (Marquis et al, 2006). Such methods can yield insights into important factors concerning security cooperation and building trust in relationships. However, other research methods, specifically qualitative methods, may provide new and more realistic descriptions of the challenges of civilian-to-military interagency cooperation (Roberts, 2010). While quantitative data analysis results may be inconclusive due to confounding variables and other research design errors, a qualitative research project can identify personal relationships and

levels of trust that may indicate a policy intervention is sufficiently beneficial to keep in place.

Global Analysis

The research design begins with a global cross-national longitudinal study of 167 countries similar to the design of other political terror and human rights studies (Carleton and Stohl, 1987; Poe and Tate, 1994; McCormick and Mitchell, 1999; Cingranelli and Richards, 1999; Finkel et al, 2006).

The data collection efforts of this research began with the creation of the Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset (RFWS Dataset; Appendix X). The Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset collected extensive data on countries throughout the world to provide a foundation to study a myriad of variables and relationships theorized to influence levels of democratization.

The RFWS Dataset built for this dissertation covers the 20 years from 1993 to 2012 plus the three years 1989-1992 to examine lag effects for several World Bank-derived variables. A multitude of dependent variables were included in the initial RFWS Dataset but the two dependent variables selected to best represent the purpose of the dissertation were the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Fragile States Index (FSI) described in Chapter Three.

Regional Analysis

The quantitative portion of this dissertation is two-fold. The RFWS Dataset categorizes and compares data and hypothesis results using the US Geographic Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibilities at the time of the founding of the State Partnership Program as a regional framework. The US Department of Defense

managed its worldwide responsibilities via Geographic Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) that operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional military focus.

Dissertation Roadmap

This dissertation's first chapter serves as a summary of the research project and describes this inquiry's underlying rationale.

Chapter Two investigates public policy and management concepts posited to influence public organizations' capabilities to foster democratic principles and connect them to the theories of human rights, peacefulness, and political terror. This chapter begins with a survey of the literature on political terror and human rights abuses analyzed in cross-national, longitudinal studies.

The research also seeks to explore and possibly contribute to theories on democratization (Huntington, 1993; Kohn, 1997; Schiff, 1995), on political terror and human rights (Poe and Tate, 1994; McCormick and Mitchell, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Carlton and Stohl, 1995), and on the US Whole-of-Government approach to National Security programming (DoD, State).

This research is laid out first by describing and discussing the complexity of modern US National Security policy and management in terms of both traditional and non-traditional approaches to national security. Next, the research funneled down to a specific component of non-traditional US National Security, Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) Programs.

Defense Security Cooperation Programs represent an incredibly wide range of policies and programs designed to support US national interests in a manner no less

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impactful than direct combat missions (DoD Dir 3000.05, 2005). Of the myriad of

DSC programs, this dissertation focused on one unique and innovative program, the

US National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). In order to avoid research

'tunnel vision', the research also investigated two other DSC programs related to

direct, interpersonal relations and between US Military members and their foreign

contemporaries, and related the programs to partner nations behaviors. As stated

earlier, the additional two programs were the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program

and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program.

The specific objective of this dissertation was to examine whether US public

policy interventions, namely Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) Programs,

correlate, influence, or "moves the needle" so to speak, on a country's human rights

trends, peacefulness, or political terror levels. The underlining rationale was that DSC

policies and programs should contribute to measurable reductions in state-sponsored

violence and armed conflict.

The research investigated how the United States uses its DSC programs to

promote the non-combat uses of its deployable military personnel for a broad range of

missions in support of national interests abroad. This dissertation sought to do as all

dissertations do, to identify, explain, and analyze what is either missing, wrong, or

can be improved upon on in a particular topic, in this case US National Security

policy (Desai, 2016).

Chapter Three describes the dataset and methods used to answer the research

questions. The chapter begins with the examination and extension of the Poe and

Tate (1994) study that sought to identify variables that influenced a country's level

that they repressed their own people by violating personal integrity rights. Next, the chapter analyzes new variables suggested to have a correlation to state-sponsored terror and human rights abuses.

Chapter Four present findings and results of the quantitative analysis. The analysis of DSC programs is the primary focus of this research and is an effort to discover if such US foreign engagement strategies such as US National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) from 1993-2012, correlate to trends in political terror in partner countries.

Chapter Five presents the expectations and discoveries of the research and investigates two specific SPP partnerships: the Ohio National Guard-Hungary SPP and the California National Guard-Ukraine SPP. These two cases were examined to determine if the widespread qualitative endorsements of SPP's effectiveness and efficiency issued by foreign leadership and US could be confirmed or refuted.

Chapter Five also presents a discussion of the organizational frameworks that may influence effectiveness of DSC programs. The structuration concept of adaptive capacity (Staber and Sydow, 2002; Leebaw, 2011) are examined and modeled using system dynamics modeling.

The dissertation ends with a discussion of research limitations and policy recommendations on for improving Defense Security Cooperation program efficaciousness.

Chapter 2: The Likelihood of Political Terror – Theory/Literature Review

The literature on political terror demonstrates that the likelihood that a group of political elites resorting to violence to suppress opposition is conditioned by larger structural forces. Most notably, recent experience with civil or international wars, a limited or non-existent history of democratic governance, and low economic growth and high economic inequality, create conditions that are favorable to the exercise of political terror. Conversely, multiple cross-national studies have shown that countries with the absence of military conflict, a deep history of democratic governance, and moderate economic growth and limited economic inequality, are less likely to inflict political terror on their citizens (Poe and Tate, 1994; McCormick and Mitchell, 1988).

Any potential external intervention to mitigate ongoing political terror or lessen the likelihood that it occurs in the first place takes place within this context. Foreign governments operating bilaterally or in coordination with other foreign entities can utilize an array of defense, diplomatic, and development tools to inhibit the rise of political terror.

Foreign governments have more non-kinetic options before terror occurs. One relatively unexamined, proactive approach is to develop connections between foreign actors and civilian and military elites within a country to promote a professional ethos and commitment to the principals of democratic governance. This approach seeks to influence the behavioral inclinations of elites away from violence and towards less repressive tactics to address domestic dissent by building a multiplicity of civilian-to-

civilian, military-to-military, and military-to-civilian connections. Foreign actors can promote nonviolence and a commitment to protecting the citizenry through this web of connections.

This chapter presents the theoretical framework and supporting literature for investigating the primary research questions that guide this dissertation – what gives rise to political terror in a given nation and what influence do intervention programs from foreign governments have on the likelihood of political terror. Specifically, this dissertation investigates the impact of a nontraditional U.S. Defense Department Program – the State Partnership Program – on the likelihood of political terror in different countries over time. This inquiry seeks to examine the outcomes of national security policies programs and not simply program outputs. The dissertation also investigates whether the impact of such programs differs across regions of the globe and whether there are unintended consequences from intervention programs.

This chapter is divided into three sections beyond this introduction. The first section presents the overarching theoretical framework in brief. The basic premise of the framework is that the effectiveness of kinetic and non-kinetic interventions designed to mitigate political terror is influenced by exogenous conflict, democratization, and economic conditions in each country. The second section draws on the extant literature to lay out these arguments in more detail and distill testable hypotheses for the relative impact of exogenous factors and specific types of foreign interventions. The third section concludes the chapter by summarizing the arguments and presenting all the hypotheses together.

Integrated Framework Explaining the Likelihood of Political Terror

Summary

Political terror is a function of external forces and internal individual actions. Political elites make the decision to exercise or not exercise violence against the citizenry in response to events happening in real time, but that decision-making takes place in a larger structural context. A basic operating assumption is that political elites seek to maintain their hold on power, regardless of the means by which they acquired it (e.g. elections, coup). In an effort to retain power, the likelihood that political elites opt to pursue violence to suppress dissent is, in part, based on their perception about threats to their reign. As introduced in the first chapter, conflict between the rulers and the ruled is often born of pre-existing ethnic, social, religious, or ideological cleavages. These divisions are often rooted in history or larger economic or political forces outside the control of anyone individual actor. Foreign interventions to prevent or mitigate political terror typically target the behavior of actors that are potential or actual participants in the conflict. The combination of exogenous structural forces and foreign intervention targeting individual actors, notably political elites, serves as the theoretical framework that guides the inquiry.

Past research demonstrates that three exogenous structural factors – current armed conflict, historical and current experience with democratic governance, and economic growth and development – influence political terror levels in particular countries (in particular, see Poe and Tate, 1994). Given that political terror originates from militaristic actions and tendencies of ruling elites to resist giving up power, it is not surprising that regime participation in inter and intra-state warfare leads to a

bleed-over effect. Regime leaders and their subordinate police and military commanders conditioned to unlimited warfare to protect the state can develop an ingrained willingness to exact 'any means necessary' to secure power and maintain regime and/or state survival (Przeworski, 1991). The impact of recent or immediate experience with armed conflict can be mitigated by past and current experience with democratic governance. History has shown that the physical security rights of citizens are trampled upon in democracies and all other governance types[18]. Regimes of all types have 'blood on their hands' from their willingness to repress dissent. Regime elites are less likely to engage in violence to suppress dissent when they make decisions in an institutional system where they are accountable for their actions through free and fair elections and an adherence to the rule of law (Przeworski, 1991). Economic conditions influence the likelihood of political terror by exacerbating or minimizing the severity of cleavages between the governing elite and the citizenry. When a country's economy is growing and wealth is evenly dispersed, cleavages between groups are less pronounced and the basis for conflict is dampened. On the other hand, economic stagnancy or significant disparity between groups sows the seeds for unrest and ultimately political terror. Taken together, as Figure 5 depicts, recent or current experience with armed conflict increases the likelihood of political terror, while a history of robust democratic governance and a growing economy where wealth is shared lowers the likelihood of political terror.

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[18] Authoritarian regimes throughout the world have suppressed peaceful protests. Similarly, the Civil Rights Era in the US presented a multitude of cases wherein the police and military forces of a democratic regime were directed by their civilian leaders to conducted extreme violence against protesting citizens.

Figure 5. Structural Factors Influencing the Level of Political Terror Worldwide.

To counter state-sponsored violence, a wide range of external defense, diplomatic, and development actors – public agencies, private corporations, NGOs, nation-states, and supranational organizations – have devised and implemented a host of intervention programs and policies. There is an extensive body of research on the specific outputs from US diplomatic, development, and defense actors seeking to lessen political terror, but there is less systematic research on the long-term outcomes of the intervention policies of these actors.

Specifically related to defense interventions, most of the research that does exist focuses on traditional "kinetic" approaches, ostensibly the exercise of military

force by a foreign government or a supranational organization (e.g. United Nations peacekeeping forces) directly combat the instigators of political terror. Conventional military operations can deescalate violence, but they do little to address the root causes. Consequently, defense actors have sometimes turned to non-traditional, non-kinetic approaches, notably providing military training to military forces and civilian officials, proffering arms and other tactical equipment to foreign forces, and building interpersonal relationships via interorganizational engagements across countries. The outcome goals of all three of these non-kinetic interventions is to professionalize foreign military leaders and civilian elected officials, orient them to their duties, roles and responsibilities within a democratic system, and create the lasting connections that build interoperability and collaboration. These interventions are designed to create opportunities for conversation rather than combat between a foreign government or supranational organization and an indigenous government on the brink or in the midst of a campaign of political terror. As Figure 6 indicates, all three of these non-traditional, non-kinetic interventions are designed to decrease the level of political terror in a target country.

Figure 6. "Whole-of-Government" Interventions Influencing Political Terror.

Integrated Framework Explaining the Likelihood of Political Terror: Factors

This section presents the two components of the integrated framework explaining the likelihood of political terror in any given country in detail. The first portion of the section reviews the literature on exogenous structural factors and the second portion of the section reviews the literature on non-traditional, non-kinetic defense interventions. The political terror and human rights research emanated from research of the 1990s, most notably the *Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis* (1994) study by Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate. Testable hypotheses are presented throughout.

Exogenous Structural Factors

The modern literature on human rights abuses, personal integrity rights violations and political terrors have consistently identified similar correlates on the likelihood that governments will repress its citizens. In Poe and Tate's seminal 153-country cross-national study seeking to explain variations in governmental repression of human rights, data analysis results showed that democracy and participation in civil or international war had "substantively important and statistically significant effects on repression" (Poe and Tate, 1994: p.853).

Poe and Tate also found that economic development and population size had "modest effects", leftist regimes had "some support", and population growth, British cultural influence, military control, or economic growth had no effect on levels of repression (1994; p.853). In their subsequent study with Linda Camp Keith, Poe and Tate confirmed their 1994 arguments that the most influential factor on increasing a government's willingness to engage in state-sponsored terror was whether the country was, or recently was, engaged in civil and/or international wars. Also very influential in political terror level was the level of democracy and freedom present in a country, as measured by Freedom House scores and/or Polity IV values (Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999).

Poe, Tate, and Keith built upon earlier research by using a longer time span from 1976 to 1993. Their 1999 findings were consistent that participation in civil and international wars was a strong predictor of a willingness to use the most repressive methods against its citizenry. Other variables that maintained their statistical significance reported in the 1994 study included the past levels of repression,

democracy, population size, and economic development. However, contrary to their earlier study, the longer research timespan indicated that British colonial influence and leftist regimes had relatively fewer abuse of than other countries did (Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999).

Later research challenged the concept that there was a linear and negative relationship between democracy and human rights violations (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004). Davenport and Armstrong argued that Poe and Tate's findings on the linkage of democracy and political terror were not linear across all levels of democracy. In a study of the even longer time span of 1976 to 1996, they found that "below a certain level, democracy has no impact on human rights violations, but above this level democracy influences repression in a negative and roughly linear manner" (2004; p. 538).

Early studies of political repression and human rights violations also showed that economic conditions, mostly in terms of GDP per capita, had only moderate or even mixed results in influencing different dimensions of human rights abuses (McCormick and Mitchell, 1988). In their seminal study, *Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations*, McCormick and Mitchell deviated from other studies that attempted to link the presence or absence of human rights abuses to US foreign policies, developmental aid, and national security priorities. McCormick and Mitchell engaged in a two-prong research approach to 1) "develop a new measure with which to compare human rights conditions on a much wider basis than has been done previously" and 2) to "develop and test several alternate hypotheses that might

account for this variation in global human rights conditions." (McCormick and Mitchell, 1988; p. 477).

Several of these seminal cross-national studies on human rights abuses and political terror analyzed cultural influence, specifically whether a history of British colonization affected the willingness of state actors to engage in political terror.

Recent or Current Armed Conflict (Civil and International War)

Both Poe and Tate (1994, 1999) studies found very strong support for the hypotheses correlating civil wars to internationally respected measurements of human rights abuses, and/or political terror. In their 1994 study, Poe and Tate concluded that:

> "…variables identifying countries that were participants in both kinds of wars [civil and international] were found to have statistically significant impacts on national respect for the personal integrity of citizens in each of the four sets of analyses, with civil war participation having a somewhat larger impact than participation in international war (Poe & Tate, 1994; p. 866)."

Cleavages leading to civil protests, rebellion, revolution, and civil war can catalyze a regime's violent repression of their people. Countries engaged in civil wars, either actively or repeatedly, inherently have the willingness to conduct state-sponsored violence against a wide swath of their own citizenry. Further, such violent repression may precede, or even cause the civil war, or may follow the formal end of a civil war.

Similarly, participation in international war provides a regime with the means, though not the motive, to conduct repressive actions within their sovereign borders. The hypothesis associated with this variable is that if partner nations are engaged or have recently been engaged in civil or international wars, then the regime is more

likely to use its recent militaristic expertise to use political terror as a method to hold onto power, all other things equal.

Since civil wars and/or international wars have repeatedly shown to have significant influence on leaders to exact violence upon a segment of its own population, US and international interventions are formulated and implemented to stem this proven causal factor of political terror (Poe and Tate, 1994).

Hypothesis H1: *Recent experience with war (civil and international) increases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

Historical Experience with Democratic Governance

Multiple studies from the 1980s to 2000s reported that a country's increasing level of democracy was a powerful indicator of a lowering of state-sponsored violence (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999; Davenport, 1999; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Henderson, 1991; McCormick and Mitchell, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and Smith, 1999). Increasing democratization foundations, specifically freedom of the press and transparency, supports the hypothesis that if the level of democracy is high, then the trend in political violence to likely to lessen over time, all other things being equal.

Ever-increasing transparency caused in part by the 'invention' of the Internet, the worldwide broadcasting of the 24/7 news cycle, and the creation of social media, will continue to spotlight governmental responses to peaceful protests and thus lead to lower political terror scores.

Later research challenged the concept that there was a linear and negative relationship between democracy and human rights violations (Davenport and

Armstrong, 2004). Davenport and Armstrong argued that Poe and Tate findings on the linkage of democracy and political terror were replicated but that the influence was not linear across all levels of democracy. In a study of the even longer time span of 1976 to 1996, Davenport and Armstrong found that "below a certain level, democracy has no impact on human rights violations, but above this level democracy influences repression in a negative and roughly linear manner" (2004; p. 538). The hypothesis proven was that as democracy levels increased, levels of political terror decreased.

In this dissertation, democracy as a 'structural factor' begins with the perceived legitimacy a populace has, or does not have, in its ruling government. When the legitimacy of the regime is in question, and the peaceful transition to a successive government is not respected or accomplished, the potential for dissent is likely to increased and so too is the likelihood of state-sponsored violent suppression. The lack of publicly perceived legitimacy and the failures to adhere to liberal democratic principles cause fractions within political parties and tensions between branches of government. In his seminal work *The Perils of Presidentialism*, Linz posited, "Parties and coalitions may publicly split because of such antagonisms and frustrations. They can also lead to intrigues, as when a still-prominent former president works behind the scenes to influence the next succession or to undercut the incumbent's policies or leadership of the party" (Linz, 1990).

The perceived illegitimacy of the regime can also lead a liberal democracy to devolve into an illiberal democracy. Such illiberal democracies characteristically have no civilian control of the military, little to no checks and balances between branches

of government, a lack of the rule or law, a biased or corrupt judiciary, and no protections against human rights abuses. In such an illiberal democracy, the negative consequences engaging in political terror may be deemed as worth it in the power calculus of ruling elites. These ruling elites' calculations are focused on the short-term view of keeping their power now instead of trusting in the democratic institutions that make election "losers and winners" (Przeworski, 1991) and the ability to 'live to fight [for their cause] another day'.

These US goals are accomplished by a using a plethora of foreign engagement strategies including people-to-people cultural exchanges, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, and a vast number of collective security alliances (Table 1.).

Type of Intervention	Intervention Name	Objectives
People-to-People Cultural Exchanges[19]	The Fulbright Program	The Fulbright Program is the flagship international educational exchange program sponsored by the U.S. government and is designed to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.
	Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI)	Provide outstanding young leaders from Sub-Saharan Africa with the opportunity to hone their skills at a U.S. higher education institution with support for professional development after they return home. Institutes focus on leadership and skills development in one of three tracks: **Business and Entrepreneurship, Civic Leadership,** or **Public Management.**
Trade Agreements[20]	North American Free Trade Agreement	The NAFTA objectives are to: (a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties; (b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; (c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; (d) provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each Party's territory; (e) create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes; and (f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.
Collective Security Alliances[21]	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and each of them will assist the attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.
	Southeast Asia Treaty	Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties would endanger its own peace and safety and each will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Table 1. Sample of US interventions in support of national interests.

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[19] US Department of State Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs website. Accessed 12 March 2017. https://eca.state.gov/programs-initiatives

[20] Office of the US Trade Representative website. Accessed 05 February 2017. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta

[21] US Department of State website. Accessed 05 February 2017. https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/

Hypothesis H2: *Long-term experience with freedom and democratic*

principles decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other

things being equal.

Economic Growth and Inequality

Economic growth as a 'structural factor' that may influence political terror

and repression is a 'chicken-and-egg' proposition. Since the late 1950s, scholars have

repeatedly debated whether economic development, measured in terms of GDP or per

capita income, is a prerequisite for democracy or is democracy a prerequisite for

economic development (Lipset, 1959; O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Przeworski &

Limongi, 1997; Robinson, 2006). The seminal article on the topic, Lipset's *Some*

Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,

has "…generated the largest body of research on any topic in comparative politics."

(Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; p.155).

The actual results from cross-national longitudinal studies showed that

economic variables, measured by either Gross National Income (GNI) or by Gross

National Product (GNP), had little to no statistical significance on the willingness of

governments to engage in state-sponsored violence (Poe and Tate, 1994, 1999;

McCormick and Mitchell, 1997).

Early studies of political repression and human rights violations also showed

economic conditions, mostly in terms of GDP per capita, had only moderate or even

mixed results in influencing different dimensions of human rights abuses

(McCormick and Mitchell, 1988). In their study, *Economic and Political*

Explanations of Human Rights Violations, McCormick and Mitchell deviated from

other studies that attempted to link the presence or absence of human rights abuses to US foreign policies, developmental aid, and national security priorities. McCormick and Mitchell engaged in a two-prong research approach to 1) "develop a new measure with which to compare human rights conditions on a much wider basis than has been done previously" and 2) to "develop and test several alternate hypotheses that might account for this variation in global human rights conditions." (McCormick and Mitchell, 1988: p. 477)

The nature of national income, whether agrarian or industrial, is also a contested component of the debate on economic development's influence on the level of democracy and the likelihood of political terror. In Robinson's *Economic Development and Democracy*, he argues, "An important determinant of the trade-off between democracy and repression is the source of the income of the elite…social and political turbulence may be more damaging to physical and human capital owners, who have to rely on cooperation in the workplace and in the trading process. This will make landowners more willing to use force to preserve the regime that they prefer." (Robinson, 2006; p.509).

Daron Acemoglu et al (2015) provided a strong, empirically based counter-argument to Lipset's idea that economic development is a "prerequisite" for democracy. In their MIT working paper *Democracy Does Cause Growth*, they "…provide evidence that democracy has a significant and robust positive effect on GDP per capita." (Acemoglu et al.; 2015; p.1).

Hypothesis H3: *Consistent economic growth decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

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Summarizing the structural factors most influencing political terror, research results have consistently suggested that the prevention or termination of involvement in civil or international wars is the leading influence for lessening political terror and human rights abuses (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999). The democratic peace concept (Maoz and Russett, 1993) suggests that democracies rarely clash with each other. Relatedly, it would be logical to suggest that intervention programs and policies designed to lower the levels of state-sponsored violence should seek to increase democratic principles, namely the civilian control of the military to prevent or terminate civil and international wars. Regimes with lower involvement in the inherent violence associated with any level of warfare should have measurably reduced levels of political terror.

Non-Traditional, Non-Kinetic Defense Interventions

The 2003 Iraq War vividly and violently showed the leadership of the US Government that single sourced solutions to reconstruction and stabilization of post-conflict states was virtually impossible. Learning this lesson well, the US instituted a unique approach that integrated the efforts of the diplomatic corps (State) with defense forces (DoD) and development workers (USAID). This "3D" approach to foreign engagement quickly morphed in a Whole-of-Government that added the expertise of all department and agencies including the US Agriculture Department (USDA), Commerce, Treasury, and others. Recognizing that the challenges of successful nation building involved even more component parts, the concept of Whole-of-Society was established. The Whole-of-Society approach added industry,

religious organizations, academia, and cultural entities to the formula the US employs to assist and to rebuild failed and weak post-conflict states.

The range of US national security interests is immense (US National Security Strategy, 2014) and likewise, the inventory of non-traditional national security policies and programs is immense.

Traditional US national security approaches are those commonly known to policymakers and the lay public alike. These approaches include kinetic combat operations, restrictive military operations such as blockades and no-fly zones, and intelligence collection operations. A defining characteristic of these traditional approaches is that they have a fixed period, whether that period is short-term, mid-term, or long-term.

Conversely, non-traditional national security approaches, which also require exhaustive work from US policymakers, are open-ended strategies that protect the national interests of the US. The US electrical grid, K-12 education system, national food and water distribution networks, and cyber information networks are often cited as a vital and vulnerable component of national security. Non-combat foreign engagements represent another non-traditional national security arena that adds to US policymaking complexity.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the conflicts in Libya and Syria have shown that military actions alone are inappropriate solutions to complex nation building (Kagan, 2013). In *Exporting Security*, Derek S. Reveron uses the Kosovo example to emphasize that, "Combat operations have taught the military that lethality cannot solve security problems. Instead, training and equipping indigenous forces to

protect and control their territory is essential for long-term stability" (Reveron, 2010: p. 10).

Exemplifying Reveron's ideas, General David Petraeus, the former CIA Director and U.S. Army Commander widely credited with creating the surge that led to definitive momentum change in the Iraq War, clearly saw the limitations of depending solely on a military force for building free, democratic societies. As an 'early adopter' of the 'Three D's" approach to foreign engagement (Diplomacy, Defense, and Development) and the Whole-of-Society approach to counter-insurgencies or nation-building, General Petraeus famously said "You don't kill or capture your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency, which is what faces Afghanistan…it takes a comprehensive approach, and not just military but civil-military."[22]

At a Stanley Foundation Conference on improving cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation, Brian Finlay, Senior Associate at The Stimson Center noted that there were widespread discussions and recommendations for the Whole-of-Government the Whole-of Society approaches to foreign engagement[23]. A recommendation to strengthen the comprehensiveness of interagency US Smart Power by expanding the circle of nuclear non-proliferation participants stated:

> "…[Participants need to come from] the US State, Defense, and Energy departments to also include the USAID, the departments of Agriculture and Homeland security, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Defense University, the FBI, and others."[24]

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[22] PBS Frontine interview, 29 January 2011.
[23] The Stanley Foundation website. Assessed 5 April 2017.
https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=711
[24] n.d

Organizationally, the U.S. Department of Defense went so far as to codify this

need for the comprehensive, novel interventions, including security cooperation, with

the publication of their *Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and*

Reconstruction Operations Instruction 3000.05, stating that:

> "Integrated civilian and military efforts are keys to successful stability
> operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the
> Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S.
> Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global
> and regional international organizations, U.S. and foreign nongovernmental
> organizations, and private sector individuals and for-profit companies" (U.S.
> DoD).

Defense Cooperation Engagement Programs

The examination and analysis of political terror has become a key topic of 20th and 21st Century national security complexity. This research focuses not solely on the presence of state-sponsored terror, but on the decisions of US political leadership to intervene. Through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, intervention programs currently range from military-to-military and military-to-civilian personal engagements, to training and equipping foreign partners worldwide. These programs promote civilian control of the military, build unit interoperability with US forces, and may represent a means to reduce a government's repression of their own people.

The US Department of Defense executes its forward deployed nation-building plans in a variety of ways using its civilian, active duty, and Reserve components. Additionally, DoD uses the US National Guard extensively for nation-building activities and for military-to-military and military-to-civilian training events. The National Guard's structural and personnel characteristics make it a unique and substantial foreign intervention tool.

Military-to-Military Engagements

Military-to-military engagements are the cornerstone of Defense Security Cooperation programs. The training of Foreign Service members is conducted to build interoperability between allied militaries. The vast majority of State Partnership Program events are military-to-military engagements. In addition to training on military tactics, techniques, and procedures, the mil-mil engagements are used to provide military personnel to assist in community development and nation-building activities (Figure 7.).

Figure 7. Air Force Msgt Alberto Murietta, civil engineer operations noncommissioned officer with 161st Civil Engineer Squadron, helps two soldiers from the Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion fix a pipe on their Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit at Illisky Training Center during preparation for Steppe Eagle 16. Steppe Eagle is one of many opportunities members of the Arizona National Guard use to grow their relationship with Kazakhstan as part of the State Partnership Program. (U.S. Army photo by Maj. Chris Brautigam, USARCENT Public Affairs) (Photo Credit: Maj. Christopher Brautigam)

Military-to-Civilian/Civilian-to-Military Engagements

Military-to-civilian and civilian-to-military engagements are typically high-level discussions that result in training documents and plans being crafted. In the State Partnership Programs, typical mil-civ events consist of the Adjutant General of a state National Guard either hosts senior elected or appointed government officials from partner nations, or travels to the partner nation (Figure 8.).

Figure 8. COLUMBUS, Ohio — Former Serbian Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac (left), and former Ohio National Guard Adjutant General Maj. Gen. Gregory L. Wayt, arrive at Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base Dec. 2 during a visit through the National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program (SPP). The Ohio National Guard and the Serbian armed forces have been partnered since September 2006.(Ohio National Guard photo) by 2nd Lt. Kim Snow)

Civilian-to-Civilian Engagements

Civilian-to-civilian in the context of Defense Security Cooperation programs are typically in support of national security objectives. The civilian leaders involved in such engagements include high-level US Department of Defense officials and their foreign counterparts in partner nations' Ministry of Defense. Additionally, a plethora of diplomacy professionals are intimately involved in the formulation and implementation of DSC intervention programs. US Embassy personnel regularly interact with foreign nationals.

Senior civilian US Government officials meet with senior foreign civilians at symposiums and conferences to discuss specific warfighting disciplines, create

strategies for funding equipment and training, and design interoperable exercises and personnel exchanges (Figure 9.).

Figure 9. COLUMBUS, Ohio — A joint US and Serbian delegation stands in front of the Ohio National Guard state headquarters building in Northwest Columbus, 19 Oct 2011. Dissertation author pictured second row furthest right. (Ohio National Guard photo by Todd Cramer)(Released).

The US Department of Defense also views such foreign engagement activities as vital national security tools. In their Directive 3000.05, DoD categorically proclaimed the efficaciousness of military-civilian training events in nation-building stating that:

"Military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool. The Department of Defense shall continue to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams. Their functions shall include ensuring security, developing local governance structures, promoting bottom-up economic activity, rebuilding infrastructure, and building indigenous capacity for such tasks." 4.7. The Department of Defense shall develop greater means to help build other countries' security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere (DoD 3000.05, 2005).

The National Guard and its State Partnership Program

The oldest of the US armed forces, the US National Guard began as the Massachusetts militia in 1636 and fought in every military engagement in the nation's history. Composed of 'citizen-soldiers and airmen', Guard members currently serve as full-fledged members of the United States military for normally one weekend per month plus a two-week annual period. During the remainder of the year, National Guardsmen are civilian members of their communities and work in fields as varied as licensed plumbers, certified accountants, teachers, engineers, college students, etc.[25]

This inherent duality of 'civilians who are in the military' makes the National Guard's unique organizational design a useful addition to the Defense Security Cooperation program toolbox. Guard members bring to reconstruction and stability operations both a plethora of relevant and current professions and trades combined with their own military training and equipment. In nation-building environments ranging from permissive to semi-permissive to non-permissive, Guard members are trained and qualified to serve effectively. On top of that, all Guard members are

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[25] US National Guard official website. Assessed 04 June 2015. http://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/How-We-Began/

trained to operate a gun.

In 1993, the US National Guard and the US European Command capitalized on the Guard's unique organizational design and the emergent need for nation building and democracy strengthening in post-Soviet Republics by creating the State Partnership Program (SPP)[26]. The National Guard's State Partnership Program provides unique partnership capacity-building capabilities to combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors through partnerships between U.S. states, territories and the District of Columbia and foreign countries (Figure 10.).

Through SPP, Guard members are afforded the opportunity to deploy outside the US, work hand-in-hand with foreign militaries, and experience foreign cultures and traditions. These deployments build social and political capital with civilian and military personnel in partner nations. Additionally, the SPP person-to-person exchanges lead to planning and infrastructure improvements in addition to information and technology sharing. Over time, the collective experiences in these SPP deployments add to the adaptive capacity of the National Guard and make it uniquely qualified and skillfully diverse enough to participate in the entire myriad of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization missions designed to build partner capacity and reduce political terror.

This depth and breadth of the National Guard's commitment to Defense Security Cooperation program success is illustrated in the goal of SPP to support U.S. national interests and security cooperation goals by using state National Guards to

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[26] US European Command official website. Assessed 30 April 2016. http://www.eucom.mil/mission/partnership-programs/eucom-state-partnership-program

engage partner nations via military, socio-political and economic partnering missions.

Looking to build democratic consolidation principles including lessening political

terror, the SPP goals specifically state that the objective of the program is to link to

"designated partner countries to promote access, enhance military capabilities,

improve interoperability, and enhance the principles of responsible governance."[27]

The initial 22 Central and Eastern European counties that were partnered with

individual state National Guards included:

Albania	Georgia	Montenegro
Armenia	Hungary	Poland
Azerbaijan	Kosovo	Romania
Bosnia	Latvia	Serbia
Bulgaria	Lithuania	Slovakia
Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Moldova	Ukraine
Estonia		

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[27] US European Command official website. Assessed 30 April 2016. http://www.eucom.mil/mission/partnership-programs/eucom-state-partnership-program

State Partnership Program

70 State Partnerships

USEUCOM - 22
Albania / New Jersey (2001)
Armenia / Kansas (2002)
Azerbaijan / Oklahoma (2002)
Bosnia / Maryland (2003)
Bulgaria / Tennessee (1993)
Croatia / Minnesota / (1996)
Czech Republic / Texas, Neb (1993)
Estonia / Maryland (1993)
Georgia / Georgia (1994)
Hungary / Ohio (1993)
Kosovo / Iowa (2011)
Latvia / Michigan (1993)
Lithuania / Pennsylvania (1993)
Macedonia / Vermont (1993)
Moldova / North Carolina (1996)
Montenegro / Maine (2006)
Poland / Illinois (1993)
Romania / Alabama (1993)
Serbia / Ohio (2005)
Slovakia / Indiana (1993)
Slovenia / Colorado (1993)
Ukraine / California (1993)

USNORTHCOM - 1
Bahamas / Rhode Island (2005)

USPACOM - 8
Bangladesh / Oregon (2008)
Cambodia / Idaho (2009)
Indonesia / Hawaii (2006)
Mongolia / Alaska (2003)
Philippines / Hawaii, Guam (2000)
Thailand / Washington (2002)
Tonga / Nevada (2014)
Vietnam / Oregon (2012)

USCENTCOM - 5
Kazakhstan / Arizona (1993)
Jordan / Colorado (2004)
Kyrgyzstan / Montana (1996)
Tajikistan / Virginia (2003)
Uzbekistan / Mississippi (2012)

USSOUTHCOM - 22
Belize / Louisiana (1996)
Bolivia / Mississippi (1999)
Chile / Texas (2008)
Colombia / South Carolina (2012)
Costa Rica / New Mexico (2006)
Dominican Rep. / Puerto Rico (2003)
Ecuador / Kentucky (1996)
El Salvador/ New Hampshire (2000)
Guatemala / Arkansas (2002)
Guyana / Florida (2003)
Haiti / Louisiana (2011)
Honduras / Puerto Rico (1998)
Jamaica / District of Columbia (1999)
Nicaragua / Wisconsin (2003)
Panama / Missouri (1996)
Paraguay / Massachusetts (2001)
Peru / West Virginia (1996)
RSS / Florida, Virgin Is. (2006)
Suriname / South Dakota (2006)
Trinidad-Tobago / Delaware (2004)
Uruguay / Connecticut (2000)
Venezuela / Florida / (1998)

USAFRICOM - 12
Benin / North Dakota (2014)
Botswana / North Carolina (2008)
Djibouti / Kentucky (2015)
Ghana / North Dakota (2004)
Kenya / Massachusetts (2015)
Liberia / Michigan (2009)
Morocco / Utah (2003)
Nigeria / California (2006)
Senegal / Vermont (2008)
South Africa / New York (2003)
Togo / North Dakota (2014)
Tunisia / Wyoming (2004)

1 JUL 2015

Figure 10. Map of State Partnership Programs with host countries, US states, and program origination year. (US National Guard SPP webpage)

Defense Security Cooperation Efficaciousness

Currently, the senior-most foreign military and civilian decision makers who have previously and are currently participating in the program view the State Partnership Program in glowing terms. The following illustrates the level of endorsement of the security cooperation program:

> "…Multiply that by 22 all around Europe and you can see the bang for the buck here is really quite significant.[SPP] is a very powerful tool. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders."
> - Admiral James Stavridis, Former USEUCOM Commander

Retired US Navy Admiral Stavridis' glowing praise of SPP is not unique. There is evidence of a significant quantitative knowledge gap between security cooperation stakeholders and government policy evaluators. National Guard leadership and foreign partners continually state these qualitative outcomes of SPP. Conversely, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have concluded that SPP needs far more quantitative data collection and analysis to properly assess program efficiency and effectiveness. The measurable outcomes, not merely public budgeting line item outputs, on democratic consolidation principles such as reducing political terror in partner nations, are needed to assess SPP program effectiveness.

Though the program is wildly popular, there remains a disconnection between leadership's pronouncements and a testable, measurable program evaluation.

Until most recently, SPP effectiveness as has been qualitatively evaluated and the results consistently associated with the value of trust-building and strengthening relationships with foreign partners (NGAUS, 2016). Evaluation metrics included outputs related to the number of foreign engagement missions, the numbers of individual troops participating in SPP events, and the dollars spent in implementing the SPP annually. The evaluation of program effectiveness has not broached the broader concept of the whether the program affects long-term outcomes on democratic consolidation and political terror.

Countering the possibly biased qualitative assessment of stakeholders, the official US Government's assessments of security cooperation programs in general, and of SPP, in particular, offer much more tempered endorsements of such programs:

Many State Partnership Program stakeholders, including State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and combatant command officials, cited benefits to the program, but the program lacks a comprehensive oversight framework that includes clear program goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress against those goals, which limits the Department of Defense's (DOD) and Congress' ability to assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources…[28] (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012)

In addition to reviewing the management, oversight, performance indicators, and data collection efforts of the State Partnership Program, the Congressional Research Service challenged the bias of SPP stakeholders in reporting the usefulness of the program in the eyes of the Chief of Mission in many US Embassies. CRS reported that:

"Of the 62 embassies surveyed, 41 responded. All but one respondent agreed, "SPP was valuable in helping meet [the] Post's goals and objectives."…To date, however, written assessments of SPP have been limited in scope and focused on "outputs"—for example, the number and type of events conducted with partner nations—rather than on "outcomes," such as improvements in specified capabilities of a partner nation or the impact on specific defense reform initiatives of a partner nation…"[29]

The CRS report illustrated that there is a significant quantitative knowledge gap between SPP stakeholders and government policy evaluators (Kapp and Serafino, 2011). The rationale for this dissertation is to determine if outcomes can be extrapolated from these SPP outputs.

A significant challenge to researchers examining State Partnership Programs was the lack of consistent, year-by-year, multi-state data collection on specific deployment events. However, Congress codified SPP in the fiscal year 2014 National

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[28] GAO-12-548, 'State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners'. Released 15 May 2012,
[29] *The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress.* Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serafino, 15 August 2011, page 16.

Defense Authorization Act. This law required 1) the defense secretary and the secretary of state to review each program in the SPP, 2) the DoD to become the administrator of the program, and 3) data collection and reporting on SPP events to be standardized and expanded (NGAUS, 2015)[30].

Not until the US Department of Defense and its National Guard Bureau published the FY2015 Annual Report to Congress were comprehensive data available for examining the exact type of SPP deployments the annual number of SPP deployments, and the exact dollars expended on each SPP activity. For FY2015, as reported by the NGB and the geographic Combatant Commands the total funding outlay for SPP was $12, 398, 169 for 779 SPP events worldwide (DoD, 2016). This average per SPP event of $15, 915 is difficult to compare to other public organizations conducting similar military professionalization and nation-building missions. Building a historical database of these financial outputs can lead to significant outcome-driven future research. At this point, however, outcomes of SPP as an effective intervention remain in the qualitative opinions of engaged stakeholders.

Although the efficacy of US DSC programs is difficult to assess in relation to political terror and/or human rights abuse trends, senior US civilian and military leaders tout the qualitative successes of the program. General (retired) John F. Kelly, formerly the USSOUTHCOM Commander and Secretary of Homeland Security, and

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[30] National Guard Association of the United States website. Assessed 23 September 2016.
https://www.ngaus.org/issues-advocacy/priorities-issues/expand-state-partnership-program

as of this writing the White House Chief of Staff, expressed strong confidence in the

efficaciousness of SPP:

> We rely on the National Guard's State Partnership Program… [to]
> provide long-term mentorship to our partner nations to advance
> democratic principles and values and to encourage subordination of
> the military to civilian authority. (DoD, 2014)

According to the private National Guard of the United States Association

(NGUSA):

> The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is one of the
> most innovative low-cost security cooperation tools available to the
> United States…In addition to military-to-military engagements; SPP
> leverages the whole-of-society relations and capabilities to facilitate
> broader interagency and whole-of-government engagements.

Though policymaker support for DSC programs is strong and pronouncements

of great success are common, there is a counter-argument to its success. There are

obvious real-world events that challenge the efficaciousness of DSC programs in

building stabilization and/or stemming the use of state security forces to violently

suppress political dissent or for soldiers to attack the government. These counter

arguments are usually in real world news headlines from around the world. [31]

The effectiveness of the US National Guard in implementation the SPP

program can be framed in the theory of diversity versus specialization in improving

individual and organizational performance. Professor Scott E. Page formulated the

concept that a group of diverse professionals are more effective in an organization

then a collection of highly specialized experts (Page, 2008). In his books, *The*

Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and

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[31] *Venezuela quells attack on military base, two killed.* Girish Gupta, Alexandra Ulmer, Reuters, 06 August 2017.

Societies (2008) and *Diversity and Complexity (Primers in Complex Systems)(2010),* Professor Page reveals that progress and innovation may depend less on lone thinkers with enormous IQs than on diverse people working together and capitalizing on their individuality. In Page's own words, "collective ability equals individual ability plus diversity" (2008, p. xiv). Efficient divisions of labor keep the requirement for finding, training, and achieving proficiency at a minimum (Spector, 2006).

In this structure, the National Guard deploys servicemembers, whether licensed civilian plumbers, engineers, or architects, who have attained professional qualifications without Guard funding. This innovative economic saving can serve as justification that the State Partnership Program is a cost-effective means of workforce development.

Behemoth US federal organizations have the earned or unearned reputation of being slow to change, slow to adapt, and slow to innovate (Denning, 2012; Atkinson et all, 2017). Conversely, multitudes of examples confirm the counterintuitive high speed of federal organizations referred to by Rainey and Steinbauer as "galloping elephants" (Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999). Brakow (1980) describes this point in his analysis of why and how the US Coast Guard (USCG) can adapt so rapidly and can learn over time. He goes on to list the following "key ideas and concepts" that make the USCG so adaptable (p. 14-15):

- The dual-role strategy [military and law enforcement];
- The multi-mission concept;
- The opportunities and threats faced by the structure;
- The patterns of centralization and decentralization;
- The development of human resources;
- The development of physical resources;
- The development of political resources.

One can argue that the US National Guard mimics many of the same organizational design, characteristics, and duality of the Coast Guard. These two national security entities are indeed complex and diverse. Year-to-year mission successes confirm that both the National Guard and USCG produce neither chaos nor randomness (Page, 2011: p.253). These two military organizations have the slack necessary to fulfill a wide variety of missions in widely disparate operational environments.

Mark Granovetter famously describes the loose-coupled organizational slack necessary for effectively implementing public policy in his seminal work *The Strength of Weak Ties* (Granovetter, 1979). Granovetter's "fragment of a theory" acknowledges that the strength of ties ignores their content and that it remains unknown whether the strength of ties and the degree of specialization (p.1378).

> "Most intuitive notions of the "strength" of ties of an interpersonal tie should be satisfied but the following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services that characterize the tie." (p.1361)

If indeed the National Guard's State Partnership Program is as effective and efficient as is claimed by senior US civilian and military leadership, then a suggestion for such strong performance is that the National Guard's organizational slack and adaptive capacity contributes to its level of flexibility and resilience.

Hypothesis H4: *Long-term experience with the State Partnership Program (SPP) decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

International Military Education and Training

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency also manages the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program[32]. The IMET program focuses on training the military leaders of partner nations to create a better understanding of US military tactics, techniques, and procedures. Concurrently, the IMET program objectives are to:

- Impart skills and knowledge that help participating countries develop new capabilities and better utilize their existing resources;
- Provide training and education that augments the capabilities of participant nations' military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S., NATO and regional coalition forces.
- Establish a rapport between the U.S. military and the country's military to build alliances for the future

The DSCA clearly states the relevance to political terror by clearly stating its goals to "Expose foreign military and civilian personnel to the important roles democratic values and internationally recognized human rights can play in governance and military operations."[33] The importance of this DSC program to US national interest is codified in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) Section C2.1.6.3.2 which states:

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[32] SAMM**:** C2.1.1.1. Security Cooperation Organization (SCO). Section 515(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, authorizes the President to assign U.S. military personnel overseas to manage security assistance (SA) programs administered by the Department of Defense (DoD). The generic term SCO encompasses all DoD elements, regardless of actual title, located in a foreign country to carry out security cooperation (SC) and SA management functions under the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. The SCO also manages DoD security cooperation (SC) programs under the guidance of the Combatant Command (CCMD). http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-2

[33] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency official International Military Education and Training official website. Assessed 23 August 2013. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/international-military-education-training-imet

"Under E-IMET, foreign civilians are trained in managing and administering military establishments and budgets, in promoting civilian control of the military, and in creating and maintaining effective military justice systems and military codes of conduct, in accordance with internationally recognized human rights."

Hypothesis H5: *Long-term participation in the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) decreases political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

Foreign Military Sales

Key to the United States National Security strategy is the sale of defense articles and services to partner countries and organizations deemed reliable partners in the US' national interests. Through legislation, especially the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the US President authorizes the direct sale and financing, the US State Department selects which countries receive equipment and services, and the US Department of Defense implements the program[34].

The Foreign Military Sales Program uses two mechanisms to affect the transfer of US military hardware to foreign partner nations: non-repayable grants and direct loans[35]. The 'big questions' for US national interests related to FMS and the principles of democratization that the US explicitly promotes is whether the sophisticated US military hardware transferred to partner nations is used to violently oppress their own people or to conduct military operations outside the international law and US rules of engagement.

Examples of such a quandary are often headline news, i.e. the Saudi-led

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[34] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency official Foreign Military Sales website. Accessed 26 September 2013. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-sales-fms
[35] n.d.

coalition's use of US military hardware used to bomb a funeral procession in Yemen causing the deaths of over 150 people[36]

Hypothesis H6: *As the number of years of U.S. foreign military sales increases, the likelihood of political terror in a particular country decreases, all other things being equal.*

Summary

As pillars of US National Security, Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) programs and other novel interventions should clearly move the needle in affecting change in the behaviors of leaders in partner nations. Instead of simply recording DSC program output data, measurable and testable *outcomes* should also emanate from the costly investments in the DSC programs each year.

As the number of years of participation in nation-building activities, and the number of events continues to climb, there remain questions on efficacy of deploying our men and women in uniform. Output data continues to be compiled and then compared with financial goals. What remains missing is an analysis of what are the measurable *outcomes* of decades long outputs of US military engagement events with foreign partners. The long-term interactions in military-to-military and military-to-civilian programs should advance the causes of democracy in general, and more specifically, lower political terror. The structural factors and inventions illustrated in Figure 11. capture the interconnectivity of these factors and the level of political terror. Together, the two dissertation research streams provide the independent

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[36] Article: Yemen's rebel funeral hall attack 'kills scores' (2016, October 09). Retrieved April 24, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37598413

variables used in the data analysis models in subsequent dissertation chapters.
The quest for insight on the outcomes of DSC programs leads to this dissertation's
primary inquiry: Does participation in high adaptive capacity DSC programs over
time lead to a measurable reduction in partner nations' willingness to inflict political
terror upon its citizenry?

Chapter Three describes the methodology used to examine whether three
specific DSC programs actually influence civilian political leaders to use their control
of the military in ways that measurably reduce political terror as reported by the
Political Terror Scale (PTS). The primary unit-of-analysis was the cumulative years
of participation in the National Guard's State Partnership Program. These DSC
programs were analyzed against the Political Terror Scale scores to determine if there
were measurable output changes in foreign partner nations.

Figure 11. Structural Factors and US Interventions Affecting Political Terror

Chapter 3: Data and Methods

The objective of this chapter is to describe the data collection, data analysis, and variable operationalization used to test the research questions stated in Chapter Two. The variables posited to influence the levels of political terror in partner nations are analyzed in Chapter Four using 12 models; six models with a global focus and six models with a regional focus.

Sample and Procedures

The analysis of Defense Security Cooperation programs is the primary focus of this research. As such, the primary data analysis objective was to discover if such US foreign engagement strategies such as US National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP), correlate to trends in political repression and human rights abuses in partner countries.

The design methodology is a cross-national longitudinal study that mimics the methodology of the leading researchers on political terror and human rights (Poe and Tate, 1994, 1999; McCormick and Mitchell, 1999; Cingranelli and Richards, 1999).

Specifically, this dissertation research first extends the Poe and Tate (1994; 1999) analysis on the repression of human rights from 1976-1993 to a newer time 20-year period 1993-2012. Additionally, the number of countries examined in this study increases from Poe and Tate's 150 countries to 167.

Next, new military expenditure-related variables were added to the Poe and Tate framework. The annualized variables 'total military expenditures' and 'military

expenditures as a percentage of GDP' were both hypothesized to have significant statistical influence on a regime's willingness to engage in political terror. Regimes with militaristic tendencies combined with substantial modern military inventories are thought to use such power to maintain regime survival, often at all costs. Several studies supported the hypothesis that the more a regime is militaristic, the more likely there could be violent repression of human rights and protest dissent (Poe and Tate, 1994, 1999; McCormick and Mitchell, 1988; Carlton and Stohl, 1985).

After military expenditure variables were added to the Poe and Tate framework, Defense Security Cooperation variables were added to the models. These DSC variables included the dissertation's primary unit of analysis, the State Partnership Program (SPP), and two other DSC programs, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs.

Global Analysis of DSC Programs

As stated in Chapter One, the research began with a global analysis of political terror. The rationale for this new global cross-national longitudinal study was that the influence of US national security interventions aimed at reducing a nation's willingness to inflict violence upon their citizens should first seek to replicate and expand the extant literature's conclusions on relevant predictor variables. Once the results of the 1994 Poe and Tate framework were either validated or refuted, military expenditure variables were added to the models to discern influences of military spending on a regime's preference for engaging in political terror. Lastly, US Defense Security Cooperation Agency intervention variables were added to the models to examine the primary objectives of this research, whether US DSC programs influence outcomes in partner nations.

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Regional Analysis of DSC Programs

A regionally focused analysis of DSC programs was conducted to determine if shared or closely shared historical references and language and cultural traditions had influence on regime's political terror behaviors. To ensure the regionally-focused analysis was relevant to US national security discussions, the dissertation used the US Unified Command Plan Geographic Combatant Commander delineation of Areas of Responsibility (AOR).

The US Department of Defense manages all of the domestically and internationally based forces and assigns worldwide responsibilities via this comprehensive Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP categorizes military responsibilities between three functional commanders and six geographic commanders (CCDRs)[37]. Within the UCP, the world is separated into strictly defined AORs (Figure 12.). Each of the following AORs is assigned to a Geographic Combatant Commander[38] organization with clearly defined borders, military operations, and foreign engagement strategies:

> USAFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.
> USCENTCOM: U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL.
> USEUCOM: U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.
> USNORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO.
> USPACOM: U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI.
> USSOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL.

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[37] Joint Pub 1 *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Pg II-11: The President, through SecDef and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes combatant (unified) commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands.
[38]

Figure 12. US Geographic Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibility Map

According to their stated mission objectives, the two essential tasks of Geographic Combatant Commands are 1) war planning and fighting and 2) military engagement programs.

US European Command (USEUCOM)

The US European Command, established in 1952, with the purpose of meeting the growing challenges of the Soviet Union by providing unified command and authority over all U.S. forces in Europe[39].

For the regional analysis, this dissertation only used data from the countries in the US European Command (USEUCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The selection of

[39] USEUCOM official website. Assessed 13 October 2015. http://www.eucom.mil/

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USEUCOM was neither random nor biased. The rationale for selecting USEUCOM was that in 1993 this particular Geographic Combatant Commander organization was the original creator of the State Partnership Program (SPP). Importantly, SPP is the primary Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) program for this investigation into the possible influence of US interventions on political terror.

USEUCOM is also unique in that during the majority of the 1993-2012 period under examine in this dissertation, the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (Figure 13.) encompassed countries from three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa. As of the writing of this dissertation, the USEUCOM AOR has changed and two newer COCOMs, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and US Africa Command (USAFRICOM), now have responsibility for US engagement in countries previously in the USEUCOM AOR. Figure X shows the countries currently in the USEUCOM AOR.

USEUCOM supports US national interests by fostering democracy through direct engagement with military and civilian leadership[40]. National War College professor Dr. Cynthia Watson observed that USEUCOM's mission combined kinetic military operations with non-kinetic military partnering and interagency partnering.

Engagement and bilateral cooperation program activities actively promote the democratic ideals, specifically freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom to assemble. Transparency and high visibility of regime actions ensure that potential political terror actions of partner nations are virtually impossible to conceal. This aids USEUCOM success in its democracy-strengthening mission in support of US national

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[40] N.d

interests. This democracy-building effort connects to the dissertation's hypothesis that political terror and human rights abuses can decrease when partner nations actively participate in direct DSC engagement programs and activities.

Figure 13. Map of the current USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

Methodology

Specifically, this dissertation used ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis in a collection of 12 models to determine the statistical significance between a country's Political Terror Scale (PTS) scores or Fragile States Index (FSI) indicators and the set of the model's independent variables[41].

The modeling process began with examining influence of predictor variables on dependent variables as characterized by the standard linear regression formula $y = X\beta + \varepsilon$, where *y is the* dependent variables PTS or FSI, where x' is the vector of independent variables and control variables, where β is the vector of regression coefficients estimated, and where ε is the error. The resulting models provided fixed effect results. However, the "between" and "within" effects of the RFWS Dataset

Bell and Jones (2015) make a compelling argument for random effect (RE) modeling over fixed effect (FE) modeling or panel data and time-sensitive cross-sectional (TSCS) data. In the hierarchical dataset of this dissertation research, 20 level 1 "country-year" nesting within the higher level 2 country, with further nesting within the level 3 COCOM Region. This structure suggests that RE modeling would be more appropriate than FE modeling for capturing "between and within" effects.

This dissertation's research design is situated between FE and RE modeling. The 12 models derived from the TSCS Rebuilding Failed and Weak State dataset were first run using simple FE modeling. Once the reference years dropped, 1993 for PTS

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[41] The OLS regression results are presented in this chapter while the ologit results are presented in Appendix B.

models and 2006 for FSI models, dummy variables were inserted for each of the remaining 19 PTS and 5 FSI model- years.

More than simple FE modeling but not as significant as extensive RE modeling confirmed with Monte Carlo simulations to observe individual parameter effects derived from thousands of possible simulation runs.

The Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset

The data collection efforts of this research began with the creation of the Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset. The final version of the RFWS Dataset included 59 columns and 4007 rows in a spreadsheet designed to present a myriad of variables related to global democratization, economic development, and US policy interventions (RFWS Dataset; Appendix A).

The Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset's collection of data on 167 countries from 1989 to 2012 provides the foundation for this inquiry on the influence US interventions on political terror and for future related research. The RFWS Dataset categorizes and compares global data using World Bank data and their associated set of countries. The analysis integrates the World Bank data with the US Geographic Combatant Commander AOR regional delineation that provides an analytical foundation for this dissertation.

The design of the RFWS Dataset allowed for a maximum of 134,435 data points (167 countries x 23 years (20 study years plus 3 years for lagged variables) x 35 variables).

The basic unit in each row of the Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset is a "USCOCOM-country-year" for countries that do not have a State Partnership Program

and "USCOCOM-State SPP/country code-year" for those countries that did have a SPP in that particular year. As Figure X shows, line item examples in the RFWS Dataset are "AFRICOM-Albania-2012" and "AFRICOM-North Carolina/Botswana-2012", respectively

The original RFWS included five potential dependent variables: the Political Terror Scale (PTS), the Global Peace Index (GPI), the Fragile States Index (FSI), the Human Development Index (HDI), and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). To focus the data analysis on models most tightly aligned with tests of the dissertation's hypotheses, the number of dependent variables was filtered down to two; the PTS mean score and the total FSI score.

The original RFWS Dataset included 37 independent variables separated into three categories:

1. Poe and Tate (1994) Framework variables
2. US Interventions (including Defense Security Cooperation programs)
3. Military Expenditure variables

A review of the RFWS Dataset correlation matrices (Appendix X) allowed the removal of several variables. The final 12 data analysis models included a maximum of 18 independent variables distributed as:

- Seven Poe and Tate Framework variables for testing hypotheses H1-H3;
- Nine Defense Security Cooperation variables for testing hypotheses H4-H6;
- Two Military Expenditure variables meant to examine the influence of federal spending outputs on political terror outcomes.

The verification methods for data entry into the RFWS Dataset include multiple peer reviews and checksum strategies.

Study Measures

Political Terror Scale (PTS)

The primary dependent variable, in this research is the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS represents "the most respected indices" for measuring human rights, peacefulness, and political terror (Wood and Gibney, 2010, p. 372). Unlike any other political terror index, the PTS scores were available for the entire research period 1992 to 2012.

The modern literature on human right abuses and state-sanctioned political terror began with the work of Noam Chomsky (1978), Richard Gastil (1980), John McCamant (1981), Christopher Mitchell (1986), and David Carleton and Michael Stohl et al (1984, 1985, 1986, 1988). As discussed in Chapter Two, the work of Carleton and Stohl, Poe and Tate (1994) provided a definition of political terror and crafted a method to categorize personal integrity rights abuse levels based on US State Department and Amnesty International human rights reports from 1976 to 1994. Poe and Tate collected annual data on human rights violations for 153 countries over an eight-year period, and, using a cross-sectional, time-series design sought to construct a universally applicable metric for analyzing state-sponsored terror and human rights abuses.

The personal integrity rights and human rights literature of the mid-1980 to mid-1990s fostered more efforts to craft a metric that could accurately evaluate political terror levels across countries and across increasingly longer time periods. This academic 'street fight' in analyzing and creating an appropriate metric for cross-national, long-term comparison of political terror and Human Rights abuses was 'fought' primarily between three renowned research duos, Poe and Tate (1994), McCormick and Mitchell (1999),

and Cingranelli and Richards (1994).

Poe and Tate (1994), and later Poe, Tate, and Smith (1999) used a methodology that combined both State Department and Amnesty International reports of human rights abuses to analyze personal integrity rights. McCormick and Mitchell (1997), on the other hand, sought to disaggregate two key determinants they believed defined political terror, imprisonment and torture. They believed that combining a country's record of torture and imprisonment would lead to an inappropriately designed index to evaluate political terror and would lead to "information loss and missed analytical opportunities (Mitchell and McCormick, 1997, p. 511).

Poe and Tate counter-argued that McCormick and Mitchell's idea of disaggregation the dual dimensions of torture and politically-motivated imprisonment in the analysis of political terror as still stemming from Carleton and Stohl's (1985) singular dimension that both components represent the exact same thing. Poe and Tate further argued that regime survival influence dictates when political terror occurs since "regime's willingness to repress its citizens when they are considered a threat" (Poe and Tate, 1994, p. 855).

Poe and Tate built upon their previous research and by using their previous methodology created the Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS is "a composite index composed of a five-point ordinal scale, based on Freedom House's coding rules…wherein: A score of 1 was a country "under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned…and torture is rare or exceptional." By contrast, a score of 5 is a country where "the terrors of [level 4] have been expanded to the whole population" (McCormick and Mitchell, 1988, p. 515).

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Concurrently, yet separately from the Poe and Tate study, Cingranelli and Richards (1994) developed a more nuanced, global cross-national longitudinal index for categorizing and measuring human rights abuses worldwide. Cingranelli and Richards posited that the PTS was lacking in its scope of independent variables, number of countries analyzed, and limitations for practitioners' use. The researchers created their own metric, the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, based upon standards-based quantitative information. The CIRI Dataset was specifically designed to test theories about the causes and consequences of human rights violations, and "…to estimate the human rights effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid, military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention" (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014 online).

In their 2010 essay describing the CIRI project and responding to criticism and comparisons of the CIRI Dataset to the Political Terror Scale (PTS), Cingranelli and Richards explained that the CIRI is "government human rights practices, can be disaggregated, is more transparent in its construction, and is more replicable because of the transparency of our coding rules. Furthermore, unlike the PTS, the unidimensionality of the CIRI index has been demonstrated empirically. For these reasons, the CIRI index is a more valid index of physical integrity rights" (2010, p.395).

The analytical results between these varied research frameworks were far more consistent with each other than the recurring arguments pitting one index or research conceptualization over another.

Regardless of the dimensionality argument surrounding what constitutes 'political terror', the methodological rigor put into the development of the Political Terror Scale

make it an appropriate dependent variable for this dissertation research on whether US national security policies have any measurable influence on state-sponsored repression and human rights abuses (Cingranelli and Richards, 2008).

Since this research was focused on US non-combat national security policies, evaluation of the policies, decisions, and actions of US national security leaders decisions required using an internationally respect, long-term metric of political repression

The PTS emanated from Poe and Tate studies (1994, 1999) that were "…the first to document the impact of involvement in violent conflicts, in both the international and domestic arenas, on levels of repression around the world" (Poe and Tate, 1994, p. 866).

As stated in Chapter 1, the PTS measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level "terror scale" with 1 being the best and 5 being the worst.

Initial tests of data looked for collinearity between each independent variable, and looked again between the independent variables and the factors that go into the algorithms that are used for Amnesty International's and the Department of State's reports. The Poe and Tate data and its derived PTS scale serve as an accepted measurement because it captures the major components of the Stohl et al, Poe and Sirirangsi (1993,1994 datasets),2) the coding rules in Gastil (1980) and 3) the human rights data-gathering methods of McCormick and Mitchell (1988, 1989).

Fragile States Index (FSI; formerly the Failed States Index)

The second dependent variable used in both the global and regional analysis was the total score from the Fragile States Index, formerly titled the Failed States Index. The Fund for Peace created the FSI as a relatively recent international index that incorporates data from 23 indicators across X number categories. The Fragile States Index is based on the conflict assessment framework known as "CAST". "The methodology uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators, relies on public source data, and produces quantifiable results."[42]

Similar to this study's Chapter One discussion on the effects of cleavages, the Fund for Peace describes intra-state conflicts as leading objectives for the creation of the specific FSI indicators and the total FSI scoring. According to the Fund for Peace website[43]:

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[42] Fund for Peace official website. Accessed 22 October 2014. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/

Based on CAST's comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.

2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase.

3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data. These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source is checked by the others.

[43] N.d.

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"Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects."

Though the PTS and/or FSI indices do not directly align with each DSC program or State Partnership Program goals, there is strong commonality in that both the indices and the US intervention programs seek to influence regime behavior away from violent repression.

<div align="center">Poe and Tate Framework – Armed Conflict</div>

International War (INTLwar) and Civil War (CIVwar). Hypothesis H1: *Recent experience with armed conflict (civil war and international war) increases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

Countries engaged in international and/or civil wars, either actively or repeatedly, inherently have the willingness to conduct state-sponsored violence against a wide swath of their own citizenry. Further, such violent repression may precede, or even cause the international or civil war, or may follow the formal end of such a war. The highly-respected Uppsala University's Conflict Data Program (UCDP) was used to capture civil war and international war data. The UCDP has collected data since 1946 and:

"…has recorded ongoing violent conflicts since the 1970s. The data provided is one of the most accurate and well-used data-sources on global armed conflicts and its definition of armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied." [44]

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[44] The Uppsala University Conflict Data Program website. Accessed 09 Oct 2015.
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/

Poe and Tate Framework – Experience with Democracy

Freedom House Score (FHtotal). Hypothesis H2: *Long-term experience with freedom and democratic principles decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

The Freedom House *Freedom in the World* annual report measures the degree of democratic freedoms in 195 nations and significant disputed territories around the world. The associated FH scores assess the current state of civil and political rights on a scale from 1 - most free to 7 - least free (Freedom in the World, 2017, p. 2). Currently, states where the average for political and civil liberties is rated as from 1.0 to 2.5 are considered as "free"; states with values from 3.0 to 5.5 are considered as "partly free"; and those with values between 5.5 and 7.0 as not free".[45]

Though bias was alleged in early Freedom House analyses, the FH scores since the mid-1990s were increasing respected for a lack of bias. Because the FH scores are so widely used, Poe & Tate (1994) included Freedom House scores as a democracy predictor variable in all of their models. "The Freedom House scores during that period were not as universally well-regarded, especially in the developing world, as the FH score are today" (McCamant, 1981; p132). Although sample bias and interpretive bias affected the FH scores used in the original Poe and Tate analyses, the studies' still yielded results that were consistent with other respected measures of democratization,

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45 Freedom House's Freedom in the World. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world Accessed June 2013.

namely the Vandhoven measures and Polity IV[46] scores. In the years since the original

Poe and Tate study, Freedom House's methodology and algorithms have undergone

significant change and now, the FH scores have a high degree of credibility among

researchers, international organizations, and governments (Sussman, 2009).

Unlike in the Poe and Tate study (1994), this research does not invert the

Freedom House seven-point ordinal scale. Poe and Tate sought to create a research

design that allowed more democratic countries to have larger scores. Such variable

operationalization is neither needed nor appropriate for this research since the Freedom

House score trends similarly with both dependent variables and the analysis herein

showed that in both in the PTS and the FSI the lower the score, the better the country's

performance.

<div align="center">Poe and Tate Framework – Economic Development</div>

Economic Growth. Hypothesis H3: *Consistent economic growth decreases the*

likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.

The second economic variable under investigation, Economic Growth, uses

World Bank data and was measured as the annual percentage of GDP growth for

each country in each year from 1989 to 2012. The Poe and Tate study (1994) found

in its four sets of analyses economic standing to be weakly negative as it related to

regime likelihood to engage in abuse of personal integrity rights. This dissertation,

however, sought to extend the variable over a wider number of countries and for a

substantially longer period to challenge Poe and Tate results.

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[46] *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013*, Monty G. Marshall, Director, Ted Robert Gurr, Founder, University of Maryland (Emeritus). http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm accessed 23 June 2016.

Gross National Income - Atlas method (GNI). The GNI was a second economic variable using World Bank as the source, and that was included in the Poe and Tate studies (1994, 1999). In this study, the assumption is that economics affect both a people's likelihood to rebel and a regimes' likelihood to repress. As Reveron suggests, "The underlying assumption of this approach is clear. If national governments cannot create economic opportunities and improve their citizens' lives, then they are susceptible to recruitment by organized crime or terrorist organizations" (Reveron 2010; 103). If this hypothesis does ring true, then economic variables can be assumed to be relevant components for a study on political terror.

Specifically, the GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, the World Bank uses a special "Atlas method " of conversion.[47]

Controls

Population Total Size - World Bank, logged (POPtotal). The latest available population data from the World Bank dataset was used for each country-year. Similar to

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[47] World Bank Atlas method – detailed methodology website. Accessed 12 May 2014. https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378832-the-world-bank-atlas-method-detailed-methodology

the methodology used in Poe and Tate studies, the total population value was logged to smooth the reporting of regression results.

Total Population was included in the Poe and Tate 1994 study and was found to have a statistically significant relationship to the repression of personal integrity rights. The research conducted herewith sought to determine if such results were consistent for a wider range of countries and for the period 1993-2012.

The ensuing hypothesis was that in larger population nations, SPP engagements have less impact and influence on a nation's indicators of human rights, peacefulness, and political terror.

British Cultural Influence (BRITinfl). Poe and Tate (1994) found that British Cultural Influence had no effects on the levels of state-sponsored violence and levels of repression.

Military Expenditures Total (MILEXPtot) and Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP (MILEXPgdp). The research assumption used to include this spending variable was that as total annual military expenditures and military expenditures as a percentage of GDP rises, overall militarization in a country rises. Concurrently, the willingness of regimes to use their modernized military to repress the citizenry rises.

Defense Security Cooperation Variables – State Partnership Program (SPP)

Cumulative Years Participating in SPP (SPPcuml). Hypothesis H4: *Long-term experience with the State Partnership Program (SPP) decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

The SPPcuml variable represents a country's total number of years of SPP participation from 1993-2012. Hypothesis: Countries with higher number of years of

continuous participation in SPP will inherently have less willingness to conduct state-sponsored violence against its people.

Participating in SPP for 1-4 years (SPP14). The SPP14 variable is a dummy variable representing whether a country participated in the State Partnership Program for any portion of the calendar years 1993 to 1996. Partial year participation was included to stay consistent with other variable time period even though the US Government's fiscal year goes from 01 October to 30 September.

Participating in SPP for 5-8 years (SPP58). The SPP58 variable represents a country's participation in SPP for any portion of the calendar years 1997 to 2000.

Participating in SPP for 9-12 years (SPP912). The SPP912 variable represents a country's participation in SPP for any portion of the calendar years 2001 to 2004.

Participating in SPP for 13-16 years (SPP1316). The SPP1316 variable represents a country's participation in SPP for any portion of the calendar years 2005 to 2008.

Participating in SPP for 17-20 years (SPP1720). The SPP1720 variable represents a country's participation in SPP for any portion of the calendar years 2009 to 2012.

Defense Security Cooperation Variables – Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

Foreign Military Sales per year, lagged 3 years (FMS).

Hypothesis H5: *Long-term participation in the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) decreases political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

Key to the United States National Security strategy is the sale of defense articles and services to partner countries and organizations deemed reliable partners in the US' national interests. Through legislation, especially the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),

the US President authorizes the direct sale and financing, the US State Department selects which countries receive equipment and services, and the US Department of Defense implements the program[48].

The Foreign Military Sales Program uses two mechanisms to affect the transfer of US military hardware to foreign partner nations: non-repayable grants and direct loans[49]. The 'big questions' for US national interests related to FMS and the principles of democratization that the US explicitly promotes is whether the sophisticated US military hardware transferred to partner nations is used to violently oppress their own people or to conduct military operations outside the international law and US rules of engagement.

Examples of such a quandary are often headline news, i.e. the Saudi-led coalition's use of US military hardware used to bomb a funeral procession in Yemen causing the deaths of over 150 people[50]

Defense Security Cooperation Variables – International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Total International Military Education and Training Program Funding/Year, lagged 3 years (IMETlagged). Hypothesis H6: *As the number of years of U.S. foreign military sales increases, the likelihood of political terror in a particular country decreases, all other things being equal.*

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) also manages the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The IMET program

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[48] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency official Foreign Military Sales website. Accessed 26 September 2013. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-sales-fms
[49] n.d.
[50] Article: Yemen's rebel funeral hall attack 'kills scores' (2016, October 09). Retrieved April 24, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37598413

focuses on training the military leaders of partner nations to create a better understanding of US military tactics, techniques, and procedures. Concurrently, IMET program objectives:

- Impart skills and knowledge that help participating countries develop new capabilities and better utilize their existing resources;
- Provide training and education that augments the capabilities of participant nations' military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with US, NATO and regional coalition forces.
- Establish a rapport between the U.S. military and the country's military to build alliances for the future

The DSCA clearly states the relevance to political terror by equivocatingly stating, "Expose foreign military and civilian personnel to the important roles democratic values and internationally recognized human rights can play in governance and military operations."[51] The IMET data came from US State Department and DSCA databases.

Total Number of IMET Participants/Year, lagged 3 years (IMETpartcpnts). The total number of foreign officers completing the IMET courses is lagged to account for influences that may occur years after officers returned to their home countries.

Data Analysis Limitations

The data within the RFWS Dataset was subject to regression problems. The following discussion explains why the analysis does not have these regression problems, or, if the problems are present, how they were addressed to ensure regression results were still valid.

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[51] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency official International Military Education and Training official website. Assessed 23 August 2013. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/international-military-education-training-imet

Lags

The Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) programs Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) were lagged to account for two issues: 1) to avoid endogeneity in regression results, and 2) to account for logical times delays between when DSC programs are implemented and when the consequences of those actions are measurable. The nature of the DSC programs suggest that any possible effects would not show until after completion of military equipment sales in the case of FMS, and after attendance at Western military post-graduate institutions in the case of IMET. This research assumption can be tested in future research by operationalizing the FMS and IMET variables with three-year lags.

Multicollinearity

The multiple regression models used in this dissertation include between seven and 13 predictor variables and therefore, the issue of multicollinearity is addressed.

The five predictor variables that mimic the Poe and Tate (1994, 1999) studies do not have multicollinearity problems. The two military expenditure variables 'total military expenditures' and 'military expenditures as a percentage of GDP' expectedly have a linear relationship that can predict the trend of each other with a significant degree of accuracy. It is expected that the military expenditure variables would have collinearity problems with the military-focused DSC intervention variables. However, this is not the case since funding for the DSC intervention variables comes from the US opposed to the host nation.

With little multicollinearity present in the dissertation models, the results for both the bundle of predictor variables and individual predictor variables on the outcome variables PTS and FSI are assumed valid.

Initially, three dependent variables were selected. The three dependent variables, Political Terror Scale, Fragile States Index, and Human Development Index, netted 18 models for examination. The initial creation of correlation matrices netted results that led to dropping the HDI.

Subsequent correlation matrices used all 18 independent predictor variables in the Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset. The final set of 13 predictor variables was selected after analyzing multiple correlation tables for multicollinearity.

<div align="center">Observations</div>

To increase validity in the statistical models used to examine US interventions on political terror, high numbers of observations were included in each other the 12 data analysis models. In the six global analysis models, the number of observations ranged from an $n = 1,363$ for FSI total score to n = 4,006 for the dummy variables Civil War, International War, and the five SPP participation year ranges. In the six regional analysis models, the number of observations ranged from an $n = 363$ for FSI total score to n = 1,054 for the dummy variables Civil War, International War, and the five SPP participation year ranges.

The substantial number of observations supports the assumption of strong robustness in the regression results and minimal affect that outliers slewed either the regional data analysis or the global data analysis[52].

Endogeneity and Autocorrelation

This dissertation minimizes the prevalence of endogeneity by eliminating measurement errors and by lagging independent variables for three years. Dependent variables mean Political Terror Scale score (PTSmean) and the total Fragile States Index score (FSItotal) were both lagged one year to control for autocorrelation. In addition, the omitted variables were either not valid for the 1992-2012 period or were found in previous research to have little to no consistency in statistical significance.

Selection Bias

The dataset avoided selection bias in the global analysis by using 167 countries. Countries not included were primarily those with very small populations and small island nations. The regional analysis avoided selection bias by including all countries officially listed in the US European Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). In the qualitative portion of the research, the selection of State Partnership Programs for Ukraine and for Hungary were selected since both programs were original components of the program, were in effect for the entire 20-year data collection period, and represented vastly different outcomes.

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[52] Coutney Taylor, 28 August 2017. ThoughtCo website. Accessed 02 September 2017.
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-robustness-in-statistics-3126323

Extraneous Variables

Population Growth (annual %) World Bank. Population Growth was omitted in the global and regional models because although one could assume that as population increases, SPP engagements have less impact and influence on a nation's indicators of political terror, the Poe and Tate studies (1994, 1999) showed that population growth had no statistical significance abuse of personal integrity rights.

Leftist Government. Poe and Tate reported inconsistent result on the influence of leftist governments to levels of political terror. State Department reports of repression leftist governments appeared to have more serious and numerous personal integrity rights than other governments. The researchers found no such correlation when they used Amnesty International data (Poe and Tate, 1994). This inconsistency, and a different conceptualization of what makes a leftist government, validated the variable's omission from this research.

Military Control. Due to the small sample size of countries under direct military control during the study period, this variable was omitted from the 12 analyzed models. Further justification for omission from this study is that the Poe and Tate studies found no evidence that military control had a statistically significant influence on the level of regime repression (Poe and Tate, 1994, 1999).

Summary

While Chapter Three focused on the methodological design of the dissertation's analyses, Chapter Four presents the specific models and findings of the quantitative regression analysis.

Using regression analysis, Chapter Four analyzes the previously theorized causal indicators of political terror (armed conflict, democracy, and economic development). Subsequently, data in the Rebuilding Failed and Weak States dataset is used to evaluate whether the specific novel Defense Security Cooperation programs IMET, FMS, and SPP 'move the needle' towards reducing political terror in partner nations.

Chapter 4: Findings

This chapter reports the results and findings of the analysis described in Chapter Three.

Using 12 regression models, the findings cover the three structural factors affecting the level of political terror and three US Defense Security Cooperation program interventions designed to increase democratization in partner nations.

The overall results of regression analysis showed that the influence of the State Partnership Program (SPP) and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program on political terror, as measured by the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Fragile States Index (FSI), were consistently weak, and at best, only slightly statistically significant during the 20-year period under examination. Conversely, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program funding showed consistently strong significance across six of the eight models that included that predictor variable.

Though senior US military and civilian leaders can boast of State Partnership Program successes and 'bang for the buck', these mixed empirical results did not provide support for their highly positive pronouncements. ***Effective and efficient delivery of DSC intervention outputs does not necessarily correspond to similarly effective and efficient partner nation outcome behaviors***.

Research Question 1

The global analysis extended the number of countries for an additional 20 years and confirmed Poe and Tate (1994, 1999) results on causes of political terror. The dissertation results were strictly consistent with the Poe and Tate model framework throughout the period from 1993 to 2012 in both the global context (167 countries) and the regional context (46 USEUCOM countries). The models herein confirmed that participation in civil wars strongly correlates to high (worst) political terror scores and continued to be the predictor variable most consistently theorized to cause regimes to have the willingness to inflict political terror upon their citizenry.

The extension of the Poe and Tate framework also illustrated that the predictor variables international war, level of democracy, and economic development (GNI) showed significant influence on political terror. Adding new military expenditure variables to the Poe & Tate model framework showed that while total military spending had consistent influence across most models, the military spending as a percent of GDP variable showed inconsistent influence on political terror.

Research Question 2

Did US Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) Program novel interventions show a discernable effect on political terror over time? The DSC program results were inconsistent across the 12 data analysis models, except for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program funding. .

The State Partnership Program (SPP) variables, analyzed as the primary intervention policy of the research, showed inconsistent statistical significance to levels of political terror. Based on data available from 1993 to 2012, the hypothesis that participation in SPP has influence on a nation's political terror levels over time was

rejected. Similarly, participation in SPP was not conclusive in the models with the Fragile States Index as the dependent variable. The cumulative years of SPP variable showed inconsistent results in both the two global analysis models and in the two regional analysis models in which it was included. The SPP variables that sought to examine effects in four-year increments, namely SPP_{14}, SPP_{58}, SPP_{912}, SPP_{1316}, and SPP_{1720}, also showed inconsistent results in both global and regional analytical models. Of note, the analysis showed that the SPP_{14} and SPP1720 variables showed the most reliable levels of statistical significance (Table 17). This result could indicate that during the initial and later years of SPP implementation, partner nations embrace and adhere to less repressive means for quelling public dissent.

Research Question 3

Are there regional effects that influence political terror levels? Whether using as the dependent variable the Political Terror Scale (PTS) for 20 years or the Fragile States Index (FSI) for six years, the regional analytical results showed more statistical significance than the global analysis. As expected, regional commonality influences a regime's willingness to conduct political terror upon its citizens.

Research Question 4

Are there negative unintended and/or unexpected consequences of DSC interventions with respect to levels of political terror? The regression models showed that there were no unexpected, counter-intuitive results. The DSC variable Foreign Military Sales (FMS) showed only a slight correlation in the regional analysis but none in the global analysis models.

The DSC predictor variable IMET funding, however, did show a consistent statistically significant correlation to political terror levels over time. The results showed that the two International Military Education and Training variables showed a significant correlation to the study's dependent variables.

The following tables provide the dissertation summary statistics and each of the 12 specific models.

Univariate Analysis

Variable	N	mean	min	max	SD	CV
PTSmean	3769	2.547	1	5	1.118	0.439
FSI total	1363	71.62	16.8	114.93	23.563	0.329
Fhtotal	3786	3.651	1	7	1.998	0.547
GNI (Ln)	3568	7.827	4.382	11.826	1.682	0.215
Economic Growth	3729	3.815	-64.047	106.28	6.479	1.698
British Influence	3992	0.313	0	1	0.463	1.483
International War Participation	4006	0.029	0	1	0.168	5.792
Civil War	4006	0.175	0	1	0.38	2.17
Population size (Ln)	3917	15.944	10.254	21.024	1.693	0.106
Total Military spending (Ln)	3546	0.07	-6.76	3.579	1.033	14.831
Total Military spending % GDP (Ln)	3229	0.635	-3.355	4.634	0.771	1.215
SPP Cumulative Years participation	3998	1.521	0	20	3.848	2.529
SPP Year 1-4 participation	4006	0.192	0	1	0.394	2.054
SPP Year 5-8 participation	4006	0.131	0	1	0.338	2.575
SPP Year 9-12 participation	4006	0.078	0	1	0.268	3.435
SPP Year 13-16 participation	4006	0.039	0	1	0.193	4.985
SPP Year 17-20 participation	4006	0.015	0	1	0.123	7.977
FMS (lagged 3 years, Ln)	1945	8.692	0	16.166	3.01	0.346
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	2030	5.787	1.099	8.515	1.136	0.196
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	2015	3.449	0	7.499	1.333	0.386

Table 2.   Summary Statistics for Variables covering 167 Global Analysis Countries.

Variable	N	mean	min	max	SD	CV
PTSmean	942	1.757	1	5	0.852	0.485
FSI total	363	51.074	16.8	93.5	21.753	0.426
Fhtotal	990	1.976	1	6.5	1.383	0.7
GNI (Ln)	979	9.231	5.737	11.826	1.324	0.143
Economic Growth	1015	2.965	-30.9	88.958	5.86	1.976
British Influence	1040	0.092	0	1	0.29	3.137
International War Participation	1054	0.026	0	1	0.158	6.17
Civil War	1054	0.098	0	1	0.297	3.04
Population size (Ln)	1040	15.628	10.254	18.817	1.66	0.106
Total Military spending (Ln)	945	0.292	-2.833	2.871	0.78	2.668
Total Military spending % GDP (Ln)	937	0.579	-2.052	2.695	0.623	1.076
SPP Cumulative Years participation	1046	3.201	0	20	5.548	1.733
SPP Year 1-4 participation	1054	0.336	0	1	0.473	1.407
SPP Year 5-8 participation	1054	0.254	0	1	0.436	1.713
SPP Year 9-12 participation	1054	0.176	0	1	0.381	2.168
SPP Year 13-16 participation	1054	0.107	0	1	0.31	2.887
SPP Year 17-20 participation	1054	0.050	0	1	0.219	4.348
FMS (lagged 3 years, Ln)	647	9.704	0	15.153	2.527	0.26
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	426	6.254	2.079	8.515	1.259	0.201
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	427	3.775	0	6.297	1.271	0.337

Table 3. Summary Statistics for Variables covering 46 US European Command Countries.

Models

Model 1 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Global Analysis, 167
Countries, 1993-2012

As a general replication of the Poe and Tate model framework, Model 1 sought to
confirm or refute Poe & Tate analysis of variables that had statistical significance by
extending the study period from 1993 to 2012. Dependent variable was Political Terror
Scale mean (PTSmean) from 1993-2012 for all 167 countries under examination.

Model 1 extended the general framework of Poe and Tate for an additional 20
years and supported their hypotheses in a global context. The regression showed overall,
that the Poe and Tate results held very firm.

Model 1 equation:

$$PTSmean = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence +$$
$$\alpha_5 InternationalWar + \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \sum_{i=1994}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables		PTSMEAN
Freedom House (total)		0.18 (0.007)***
GNI (Ln)		-0.179 (0.008)***
Economic Growth		-0.003 (0.002)*
British Influence		0.047 (0.024)**
International War		0.208 (0.065)***
Civil War		0.95 (0.033)***
Population size (Ln)		0.17 (0.007)***
Dummy1994		0.061 (0.059)
Dummy1995		-0.017 (0.059)
Dummy1996		-0.099 (0.059)
Dummy1997		-0.043 (0.058)
Dummy1998		0.1 (0.058)*
Dummy1999		0.089 (0.058)
Dummy2000		-0.029 (0.058)
Dummy2001		0.05 (0.058)
Dummy2002		0.178 (0.058)***
Dummy2003		0.186 (0.058)***
Dummy2004		0.21 (0.058)***
Dummy2005		0.278 (0.058)***
Dummy2006		0.309 (0.058)***
Dummy2007		0.35 (0.058)***
Dummy2008		0.293 (0.057)***
Dummy2009		0.277 (0.057)***
Dummy2010		0.266 (0.058)***
Dummy2011		0.221 (0.058)***
Dummy2012		0.197 (0.058)***
_cons		0.228 (0.141)
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p <0.1$		

Table 4. Regression Results for Model 1.

Model 2 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Regional Analysis,

46 Countries,1993-2012

Model 2 mimics Model 1 but uses a specific regional context, the 46 countries of the USEUCOM Geographic Combatant Command.   Within this sample are the original 22 countries of the State Partnership Program. Model 2 sought to confirm or refute Poe & Tate analysis of variables that had statistical significance by extending time period from 1993 to 2012. The Dependent Variable was the Political Terror Scale mean (PTSmean) from 1993-2012 for the 46 counties in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility.

Model 2 regression results were consistent with the global analysis results except that the Civil War variable showed an even stronger support to Poe and Tate's conclusions that recent experience or participation in civil war is the strongest predictor variable for a likeliness of increases in political terror.

Model 2 equation:

$$PTSmean = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence +$$
$$\alpha_5 InternationalWar + \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \sum_{i=1994}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables		PTSMEAN
Freedom House (total)		0.196 (0.019)***
GNI (Ln)		-0.178 (0.020)***
Economic Growth		-0.002 (0.003)
British Influence		0.036 (0.052)
International War		0.214 (0.103)**
Civil War		1.106 (0.069)***
Population size (Ln)		0.106 (0.011)***
Dummy1994		0.027 (0.087)
Dummy1995		0.024 (0.086)
Dummy1996		-0.038 (0.086)
Dummy1997		0.103 (0.084)
Dummy1998		0.196 (0.084)**
Dummy1999		0.222 (0.084)***
Dummy2000		0.076 (0.085)
Dummy2001		0.221 (0.084)***
Dummy2002		0.393 (0.083)***
Dummy2003		0.254 (0.083)***
Dummy2004		0.385 (0.083)***
Dummy2005		0.386 (0.083)***
Dummy2006		0.401 (0.084)***
Dummy2007		0.503 (0.083)***
Dummy2008		0.376 (0.082)***
Dummy2009		0.371 (0.084)***
Dummy2010		0.254 (0.081)***
Dummy2011		0.265 (0.082)***
Dummy2012		0.141 (0.081)*
_cons		1.021 (0.261)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p<0.1$		

Table 5. Regression Results for Model 2.

Model 3 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Global Analysis,
167 Countries, 2006-2012

Model 3 sought to confirm or refute Poe & Tate analysis of variables that had
statistical significance from 2006-2012 by using the Fragile States Index total score as the
dependent variable for all 167 countries under examination.

Because there were only six years to collect FSI data, the number of FSI
observations is far fewer than the Poe & Tate framework. The Model 3 regression results
for the Freedom House variable and the Gross National Income variable showed
statistical significance consistent with variables in Model 2, except for the International
War variable results. Although this model's International War variable showed little
correlation, the participation in civil wars was again the most statistically significant
variable.

Model 3 equation:

$$FSItotal = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence +$$
$$\alpha_5 InternationalWar + \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \sum_{i=2007}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables		FSI total
Freedom House (total)		4.324 (0.172)***
GNI (Ln)		-9.067 (0.205)***
Economic Growth		0.021 (0.061)
British Influence		0.747 (0.595)
International War		-2.968 (1.649)*
Civil War		9.789 (0.827)***
Population size (Ln)		-0.397 (0.188)**
Dummy2007		1.884 (0.929)**
Dummy2008		4.261 (0.936)***
Dummy2009		4.426 (0.990)***
Dummy2010		4.006 (0.941)***
Dummy2011		4.15 (0.942)***
Dummy2012		4.478 (0.961)***
_cons		132.051 (3.765)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p <0.1$		

Table 6. Regression Results for Model 3.

Model 4 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Regional Analysis,
46 Countries, 2006-2012

Model 4 sought to confirm or refute Poe & Tate analysis of variables that had statistical significance by extending time period from 1993 to 2012 for a set of regionally-similar countries. Dependent variable was the Fragile States Index Total (FSItotal) from 2006-2012 for from 1993-2012 for the 46 counties in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility.

In this model with FSI as the dependent variable, all predictor variables show statistical significance except for the Economic Growth and Population Size variables. The FSI regional analysis showed strong correlation to most variables in the model. Contrary to the other models, British Cultural Influence showed strong statistical significance. The Civil War variable again showed to be the most statistically significant predictor variable in the model.

Comparing the regional analytical results to the global analytical results clearly show an increased magnitude in statistical significance for each predictor variable.

Model 4 equation:

$$FSItotal = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar + \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \sum_{i=2007}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables	FSItotal
Freedom House (total)	2.070 (0.479)***
GNI (Ln)	-15.237 (0.606)***
Economic Growth	-0.160 (0.128)
British Influence	7.032 (1.590)***
International War	-5.323 (2.833)*
Civil War	23.350 (1.783)***
Population size (Ln)	-0.419 (0.330)
Dummy2007	2.834 (1.494)*
Dummy2008	4.464 (1.559)***
Dummy2009	3.809 (2.033)*
Dummy2010	4.322 (1.565)***
Dummy2011	4.078 (1.559)***
Dummy2012	2.110 (1.647)
_cons	194.865 (7.881)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p<0.1$	

Table 7. Regression Results for Model 4.

Model 5 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Global Analysis,
SPP Cumulative

Model 5 is the first of the 12 models to include the two military expenditure
variables and the Defense Security Cooperation variables. This model sought to confirm
or refute Poe & Tate analysis of variables that had statistical significance by extending
study period from 1993 to 2012. Dependent variable was Political Terror Scale mean
(PTSmean) from 1993-2012 for all 167 countries under examination. Military spending
variables were included in this model to examine any possible effects that a foreign
partner nation's military expenditures had on the willingness of regimes to inflict state-
violence upon their citizens. The model also sought to determine if the cumulative
number of years of a country participating in SPP had an influence on its Political Terror
Scale trend over the research period.

The Civil War variable was statistically significant in all models.

Both military expenditure variables showed strong statistical significance but the
polarity of their dependency was reversed.

Of the three DSC programs tested, only the IMET program variables showed any
statistical significance. This result may indicate presence of a counter-intuitive
explanation that suggests that training partner nations' officer corps in advanced tactics,
techniques, and procedures, and with modern weaponry make may these officer more
likely to employ the harshest methods to suppress dissent and protect regime survival.
The seriousness of this negative unintended consequence of DSC interventions suggests
future research is needed to answer the question of whether the US is enabling the

military officer corps of partner nations to become more efficient at following the orders of their civilian leadership to violently repress their own people?

Poe & Tate framework results held firm except for the lack of correlation with the International War variable. The Civil War variable again showed the strongest statistical significance. The military expenditure variables showed statistical significance. The SPP years variables showed strong statistical significance at the 17-20 years of participation window. This result would indicate that long-term participation in SPP does indeed lead to an outcome of lowering the willingness of a regime to violently repress its own people.

Model 5 equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
PTSmean = {} & \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar + {} \\
& + \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} CumulitiveYearsSPP + {} \\
& + \alpha_{11} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{12} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) + \alpha_{13} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=1994}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears
\end{aligned}
$$

Variables	Political Terror Scale (PTS)[a]
Freedom House (total)	0.198 (0.015)***
GNI (Ln)	-0.206 (0.022)***
Economic Growth	-0.019 (0.004)***
British Influence	-0.068 (0.042)
International War	0.139 (0.102)
Civil War	0.722 (0.051)***
Population size (Ln)	0.247 (0.016)***
Total Military spending (Ln)	0.131 (0.032)***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)	-0.146 (0.034)***
SPP Cumulative Years participation	-0.007 (0.004)*
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-0.012 (0.009)
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-0.140 (0.029)***
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.162 (0.025)***
Dummy1994	0.076 (0.100)
Dummy1995	0.02 (0.102)
Dummy1996	-0.207 (0.102)**
Dummy1997	-0.099 (0.101)
Dummy1998	0.119 (0.103)
Dummy1999	0.02 (0.099)
Dummy2000	-0.058 (0.099)
Dummy2001	0.014 (0.096)
Dummy2002	-0.005 (0.098)
Dummy2003	0.044 (0.095)
Dummy2004	0.194 (0.095)**
Dummy2005	0.197 (0.094)**
Dummy2006	0.357 (0.099)***
Dummy2007	0.425 (0.101)***
Dummy2008	0.329 (0.099)***
Dummy2009	0.29 (0.101)***
Dummy2010	0.418 (0.098)***
Dummy2011	0.327 (0.100)***
Dummy2012	0.278 (0.104)***
_cons	-0.159 (0.309)
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p<0.1$	

Table 8. Regression Results for Model 5.

Model 6 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Global Analysis, SPP various Years

Model 6 mimicked Model 5 except that the SPP participation under examination was not cumulative years of SPP participation but rather, whether the dummy variables for each of five 4-year period could discern whether a particular level of SPP participation maturity could influence partner nations' PTS trends.

Poe and Tate framework predictor variables model with the FSI as the dependent variable were consistent with results from those using the PTS as dependent variable.

Both Military Expenditure variables showed strong significance.

Of the Defense Security Cooperation program variables in Model 6, the SPP 17-20 years range and both the IMET variables showed strong significance.

Model 6 equation:

$$PTSmean = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar +$$
$$+ \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} SPP_{1-4} + \alpha_{11} SPP_{5-8} +$$
$$+ \alpha_{12} SPP_{9-12} + \alpha_{13} SPP_{13-16} + \alpha_{14} SPP_{17-20} + \alpha_{15} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{16} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) +$$
$$+ \alpha_{17} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=1994}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables	Political Terror Scale (PTS)[a]
Freedom House (total)	0.2 (0.015)***
GNI (Ln)	-0.202 (0.022)***
Economic Growth	-0.02 (0.004)***
British Influence	-0.055 (0.041)
International War	0.123 (0.102)
Civil War	0.73 (0.052)***
Population size (Ln)	0.253 (0.015)***
Total Military spending (Ln)	0.128 (0.032)***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)	-0.139 (0.035)***
SPP Year 1-4 participation	0.069 (0.062)
SPP Year 5-8 participation	0.039 (0.060)
SPP Year 9-12 participation	0.04 (0.066)
SPP Year 13-16 participation	0.009 (0.079)
SPP Year 17-20 participation	-0.233 (0.094)**
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-0.011 (0.009)
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-0.145 (0.029)***
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.160 (0.025)***
Dummy1994	0.077 (0.100)
Dummy1995	0.023 (0.102)
Dummy1996	-0.208 (0.102)**
Dummy1997	-0.107 (0.101)
Dummy1998	0.105 (0.103)
Dummy1999	0 (0.100)
Dummy2000	-0.084 (0.100)
Dummy2001	-0.018 (0.097)
Dummy2002	-0.044 (0.099)
Dummy2003	-0.001 (0.096)
Dummy2004	0.144 (0.097)
Dummy2005	0.153 (0.095)
Dummy2006	0.304 (0.100)***
Dummy2007	0.375 (0.102)***
Dummy2008	0.276 (0.101)***
Dummy2009	0.272 (0.102)***
Dummy2010	0.4 (0.098)***
Dummy2011	0.303 (0.099)***
Dummy2012	0.266 (0.105)**
_cons	-0.266 (0.309)
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p <0.1$	

Table 9. Regression Results for Model 6.

Model 7 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Global Analysis,
SPP Cumulative Years

Model 7 sought to confirm or refute the hypothesis that in a global analysis, that

the cumulative number of years that a DSC intervention such as SPP is implemented, the

better (lower) the outcome score will be when a country is rated according to an

internationally respected, macro-level index that measures regime performance in

building a stable, political terror-free society. The Model 7 dependent variable was the

Fragile States Index from 2006-2012 for all 167 countries under examination.

Poe and Tate framework predictor variables model with the FSI as the dependent

variable were consistent with results from those using the PTS as dependent variable.

The Military Expenditures variable Total Spending (logged) showed very strong

statistical significance and the variable Military Spending as a percentage of GDP

showed moderate statistical significance.

Neither the SPP cumulative years variable nor the FMS variables showed

statistical significance. The IMET spending variable showed strong significance.

Model 7 equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
FSItotal = & \ \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar + \\
& + \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} CumulitiveYearsSPP + \\
& + \alpha_{11} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{12} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) + \alpha_{13} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=2007}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears
\end{aligned}
$$

Variables		Fragile States Index (Total)
Freedom House (total)		4.442 (0.364)***
GNI (Ln)		-9.025 (0.518)***
Economic Growth		-0.046 (0.091)
British Influence		-0.192 (0.933)
International War		-1.534 (2.207)
Civil War		8.161 (1.243)***
Population size (Ln)		0.725 (0.366)**
Total Military spending (Ln)		2.334 (0.715)***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)		-1.195 (0.789)
SPP Cumulative Years participation		0.078 (0.080)
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)		-0.199 (0.221)
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)		-1.763 (0.663)***
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)		0.836 (0.502)*
Dummy2007		0.632 (1.332)
Dummy2008		2.797 (1.324)**
Dummy2009		2.011 (1.464)
Dummy2010		2.804 (1.303)***
Dummy2011		2.694 (1.342)**
Dummy2012		2.999 (1.426)**
_cons		127.006 (7.837)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p<0.1$		

Table 10. Regression Results for Model 7.

Model 8 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Global Analysis,
SPP Various Years

Model 8 sought to determine if, in a global sense, a specific range of years of

participation in SPP have influence on a nation's FSI total score and thus correspond to a

lesser likelihood that regimes will use state-sponsored violence against its citizens. The

Model 8 Dependent variable was the Fragile States Index from 2006-2012 for all 167

countries under examination. The SPP variables covered five time periods: 1-4 years, 5-8

years, 9-12 years, 13-16 years, and 17-20 years.

Poe and Tate framework predictor variables model with the FSI as the dependent

variable were consistent with results from those using the PTS as dependent variable.

The Military Expenditures variable Total Spending (logged) showed very strong

statistical significance and the variable Military Spending as a percentage of GDP

showed no statistical significance.

The SPP 9-12 and 13-16 years variables showed moderate statistical significance.

The IMET spending variable showed strong significance, once again indicating there may

be a phenomenon occurring wherein spending on training foreign military officers may

decrease human rights abuses in a partner nation.

Model 8 equation:

$$FSItotal = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar +$$
$$+ \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} SPP_{1-4} + \alpha_{11} SPP_{5-8} +$$
$$+ \alpha_{12} SPP_{9-12} + \alpha_{13} SPP_{13-16} + \alpha_{14} SPP_{17-20} + \alpha_{15} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{16} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) +$$
$$+ \alpha_{17} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=1994}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables	Fragile States Index (Total)
Freedom House (total)	4.375 (0.365)***
GNI (Ln)	-8.904 (0.520)***
Economic Growth	-0.072 (0.092)
British Influence	-0.026 (0.922)
International War	-1.867 (2.213)
Civil War	8.413 (1.252)***
Population size (Ln)	0.759 (0.356)**
Total Military spending (Ln)	2.266 (0.719)***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)	-1.036 (0.809)
SPP Year 1-4 participation	0.601 (1.232)
SPP Year 5-8 participation	1.576 (1.118)
SPP Year 9-12 participation	2.724 (1.275)**
SPP Year 13-16 participation	2.202 (1.254)*
SPP Year 17-20 participation	-0.238 (1.518)
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-0.177 (0.221)
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-1.772 (0.644)***
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.709 (0.500)
Dummy2007	0.582 (1.335)
Dummy2008	2.551 (1.331)*
Dummy2009	2.265 (1.476)
Dummy2010	3.096 (1.316)**
Dummy2011	2.896 (1.348)**
Dummy2012	3.166 (1.448)**
_cons	125.567 (7.865)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p<0.1$	

Table 11. Regression Results for Model 8.

Model 9 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Regional Analysis,
SPP Cumulative Years

Model 9 replicates Model 5 but uses a specific regional context, the 46 countries

of the USEUCOM Geographic Combatant Command.   This sample includes the original

22 countries first used to implement the State Partnership Program. Model 9 sought to

confirm or refute the hypothesis that there is a regional effect to interventions designed to

influence behaviors of regime leadership. The Dependent Variable was the Political

Terror Scale mean (PTSmean) from 1993-2012 for the 46 counties in the USEUCOM

Area of Responsibility. The SPP cumulative years variable was used as the test if the

DSC intervention influenced political terror trends over time.

The analysis showed no statistical significance of cumulative years of SPP as a

predictor variable of FSI total scores and IMET continuing to be a strong influence on

political terror scores over time.

Model 9 equation:

$$PTSmean = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar +$$
$$+ \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} CumulitiveYearsSPP +$$
$$+ \alpha_{11} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{12} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) + \alpha_{13} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=1994}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables	Political Terror Scale (PTS)[a]
Freedom House (total)	0.218 (0.040)***
GNI (Ln)	-0.306 (0.054)***
Economic Growth	-0.028 (0.006)***
British Influence	0.249 (0.172)
International War	0.167 (0.109)
Civil War	0.749 (0.112)***
Population size (Ln)	0.190 (0.028)***
Total Military spending (Ln)	0.182 (0.061)***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)	0.014 (0.061)
SPP Cumulative Years participation	0.004 (0.006)
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.028 (0.015)*
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-0.108 (0.041)***
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.074 (0.035)**
Dummy1994	0.122 (0.180)
Dummy1995	0.186 (0.205)
Dummy1996	-0.107 (0.192)
Dummy1997	0.125 (0.181)
Dummy1998	0.159 (0.168)
Dummy1999	0.112 (0.154)
Dummy2000	-0.040 (0.160)
Dummy2001	0.142 (0.155)
Dummy2002	0.161 (0.147)
Dummy2003	0.052 (0.144)
Dummy2004	0.349 (0.144)**
Dummy2005	0.428 (0.147)***
Dummy2006	0.509 (0.148)***
Dummy2007	0.707 (0.153)***
Dummy2008	0.409 (0.156)***
Dummy2009	0.135 (0.168)
Dummy2010	0.350 (0.158)**
Dummy2011	0.374 (0.163)**
Dummy2012	0.167 (0.167)
_cons	1.025 (0.767)
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p <0.1$	

Table 12. Regression Results for Model 9.

Model 10 – PTS Mean, Regional Analysis, SPP various Years

Similar to Model 9, Model 10 also specific regional context, the 46 countries of

the USEUCOM Geographic Combatant Command. The Dependent Variable was again

the Political Terror Scale mean (PTSmean) from 1993-2012 for the 46 countries in the

USEUCOM Area of Responsibility. However, in this model, the SPP various years

variables were used as the test if the DSC intervention influenced political terror trends

over time. The model sought to discern if regional commonality mattered and if a certain

period of SPP participation years mattered when analyzing political terror trends.

Poe and Tate variables stayed statistically significant.

The Total Military Spending variable showed strong significance while the

Military Spending as a percentage of GDP variable did not.

Of the DSC variables, the SPP 1-4, 5-8, and 9-12 years ranges and both IMET

variables showed strong statistical significance. This model's results provided the

strongest argument that regional commonality matters.

Model 10 equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
PTSmean = {} & \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar + \\
& + \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} SPP_{1-4} + \alpha_{11} SPP_{5-8} + \\
& + \alpha_{12} SPP_{9-12} + \alpha_{13} SPP_{13-16} + \alpha_{14} SPP_{17-20} + \alpha_{15} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{16} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) + \\
& + \alpha_{17} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=1994}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears
\end{aligned}
$$

Variables	Political Terror Scale (PTS)[a]
Freedom House (total)	0.232 (0.041)***
GNI (Ln)	-0.342 (0.056)***
Economic Growth	-0.028 (0.006)***
British Influence	0.068 (0.179)
International War	0.191 (0.109)*
Civil War	0.644 (0.115)***
Population size (Ln)	0.173 (0.028)***
Total Military spending (Ln)	0.132 (0.062)**
Military spending % GDP (Ln)	0.043 (0.061)
SPP Year 1-4 participation	-0.510 (0.175)***
SPP Year 5-8 participation	-0.273 (0.117)**
SPP Year 9-12 participation	-0.225 (0.112)**
SPP Year 13-16 participation	-0.116 (0.121)
SPP Year 17-20 participation	-0.070 (0.126)
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.013 (0.015)
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-0.094 (0.040)**
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.080 (0.035)**
Dummy1994	0.133 (0.178)
Dummy1995	0.193 (0.202)
Dummy1996	-0.010 (0.192)
Dummy1997	0.156 (0.179)
Dummy1998	0.238 (0.168)
Dummy1999	0.201 (0.156)
Dummy2000	0.072 (0.164)
Dummy2001	0.239 (0.161)
Dummy2002	0.259 (0.152)*
Dummy2003	0.187 (0.150)
Dummy2004	0.490 (0.152)***
Dummy2005	0.505 (0.154)***
Dummy2006	0.589 (0.154)***
Dummy2007	0.770 (0.159)***
Dummy2008	0.482 (0.164)***
Dummy2009	0.196 (0.171)
Dummy2010	0.406 (0.159)**
Dummy2011	0.435 (0.162)***
Dummy2012	0.244 (0.165)
_cons	1.686 (0.798)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p<0.1$	

Table 13. Regression Results for Model 10.

Model 11 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Regional Analysis,
SPP Cumulative Years

Model 11 replicates Model 9 but uses a different Dependent Variable. Within this

sample set are the original 22 countries first used to implement the State Partnership

Program. Model 11 also sought to confirm or refute the hypothesis that there is a regional

effect to interventions designed to influence behaviors of regime leadership. The

Dependent Variable was the Fragile States Index total score for the 46 counties in the

USEUCOM Area of Responsibility. The SPP cumulative years variable was again used

as the test DSC intervention to examine any influence on political terror trends over time.

Poe and Tate framework showed consistent significance.

Military Expenditures variable showed significance.

The cumulative years of participation in SPP for countries in the same region

shows a statistically significant, desirable inverse relationship with FSI total scores.

IMET participation and funding showed statistical significance and add to the

argument that IMET funding may reduce state-sponsored violence.

FMS variable showed little significance.

Model 11 equation:

$$FSItotal = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar +$$
$$+ \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} CumulitiveYearsSPP +$$
$$+ \alpha_{11} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{12} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) + \alpha_{13} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=2007}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables	Fragile States Index (Total)
Freedom House (total)	3.691 (0.744)***
GNI (Ln)	-14.617 (1.051)***
Economic Growth	-0.098 (0.100)
British Influence	-0.571 (5.611)
International War	-7.251 (1.989)***
Civil War	15.306 (2.297)***
Population size (Ln)	-1.318 (0.543)**
Total Military spending (Ln)	-4.425 (1.036)***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)	1.888 (1.053)*
SPP Cumulative Years participation	-0.257 (0.113)**
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.430 (0.347)
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-2.044 (1.210)*
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	1.748 (0.646)***
Dummy2007	2.314 (1.468)
Dummy2008	4.575 (1.652)***
Dummy2009	4.322 (2.144)**
Dummy2010	4.607 (1.744)***
Dummy2011	5.042 (1.845)***
Dummy2012	3.655 (2.005)*
_cons	205.061 (14.680)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p<0.1$	

Table 14. Regression Results for Model 11.

Model 12 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Regional Analysis, SPP Various Years

Model 12 replicates Model 11 but uses a different range of SPP participation years. The Dependent Variable was again the Fragile States Index total score for the 46 counties in the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility.

The participation in SPP for14 and 5-8 years in countries in the same region showed statistically significance.

Both Foreign Military Sales and IMET participation and funding showed statistical significance and add to the argument that region matters in the level of state-sponsored violence.

Model 12 equation:

$$FSItotal = \alpha_1 FHtotal + \alpha_2 \ln(GNI) + \alpha_3 EconGrowth + \alpha_4 BritInfluence + \alpha_5 InternationalWar +$$
$$+ \alpha_6 CivilWar + \alpha_7 \ln(PopulationSize) + \alpha_8 \ln(MilitaryTotal) + \alpha_9 \ln(MilExp) + \alpha_{10} SPP_{1-4} + \alpha_{11} SPP_{5-8} +$$
$$+ \alpha_{12} SPP_{9-12} + \alpha_{13} SPP_{13-16} + \alpha_{14} SPP_{17-20} + \alpha_{15} \ln(FMS\_lag_3) + \alpha_{16} \ln(IMETFunding\_lag_3) +$$
$$+ \alpha_{17} \ln(IMETParticipants\_lag_3) + \sum_{i=2007}^{2012} \alpha_i DummyYears$$

Variables	Fragile States Index (Total)
Freedom House (total)	3.239 (0.792)***
GNI (Ln)	-14.318 (1.006)***
Economic Growth	-0.099 (0.096)
British Influence	3.806 (5.445)
International War	-7.157 (2.007)***
Civil War	17.224 (2.281)***
Population size (Ln)	-0.980 (0.518)*
Total Military spending (Ln)	-3.473 (1.007)***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)	1.415 (1.007)
SPP Year 1-4 participation	16.734 (3.837)***
SPP Year 5-8 participation	4.223 (2.539)*
SPP Year 9-12 participation	1.232 (2.546)
SPP Year 13-16 participation	1.164 (2.115)
SPP Year 17-20 participation	-1.317 (2.314)
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)	0.874 (0.356)**
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)	-2.545 (1.147)**
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)	1.652 (0.612)***
Dummy2007	3.047 (1.420)**
Dummy2008	4.939 (1.594)***
Dummy2009	5.933 (2.169)***
Dummy2010	6.297 (1.792)***
Dummy2011	6.571 (1.824)***
Dummy2012	4.910 (1.968)**
_cons	192.991 (14.468)***
*** is $p<0.01$, ** is $p<0.05$, * is $p <0.1$	

Table 15. Regression Results for Model 12.

Variable-by-Variable Findings (Table 5.)

The following variable-by-variable findings are illustrated in Table 17 below.

Freedom House Score total. This dissertation confidently incorporated FH scores into its model of political terror and, similar the Poe and Tate results (1994, 1999), FH scores were found to have strong statistical significance to both the PTS and FSI dependent variables in all 12 models.

Gross National Income (GNI). Gross National Income (Atlas method). In this research project, the GNI showed strong statistical significance to the PTS. The results indicated that as national per capita income increases, there was less likelihood that a government will engage in political terror.

Economic Growth as a Percentage of GDP. Analytical results showed strong statistical significance in only half of the cases. These results somewhat support the hypothesis that if economic stability and freedom grows in a country, then there is less likelihood that the regime will resort to political terror and human rights abusive methods to address political dissent.

British Cultural Influence. Poe and Tate (1994) found that British Cultural Influence had no effects in most models in this research. This dissertation also found little or no support for the hypotheses correlating a historic imperialistic linkage to the British Empire with modern day use of repressive governance methods. The results were consistent in both the global and regional contexts.

International War. The dissertation provides moderate support for Poe and Tate conclusions correlating international war to internationally respected measurements of human rights abuses and/or political terror (1994, 1999).

Civil War. Recent experience with or current participation in civil war is the most reliable predictor variable for both the Political Terror Scale and the Fragile States Index scores. Statistical significance was very high in all 12 analytical models. Similar to Poe and Tate results, this dissertation provided very strong support for the hypotheses correlating civil wars to internationally respected measurements of human rights abuses, peacefulness, and/or political terror. The regression results validate the hypothesis that governments with recent experience in using their military forces for state survival are more likely to engage in the highest levels of political terror.

Population Total Size (World Bank; logged). Total population size mimicked Poe and Tate (1994) conclusions that there is a statistically significant influence on the repression of personal integrity rights.

Military Spending Total. The total military spending predictor variable showed strong results across most of the 12 models. It remained inconclusive whether the hypothesis is true that the higher the total military spending for personnel, training, and equipment, the more likely a regime is to use their military and security forces to engage in political terror.

Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP. The military expenditures had little statistical significance in most of the 12 models under investigation.

Cumulative Years Participating in SPP. The cumulative number of years of SPP participation had inconsistent statistical significance to the PTS in almost all global analysis models. In the regional context, the SPPcuml variable showed little moderate statistical significance. The hypothesis that as SPP participation years

increases the likelihood of political terror decreases cannot be confidently assumed to be true.

Participating in SPP for 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-16, and 17-20 years. The four-year range of SPP participation showed mixed results with some of the SPP time increment variables demonstrating significance in a handful of the models.

Foreign Military Sales, lagged 3yrs. The FMS variable did not show consistent statistical significance across the 12 models.

International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) Total Funding/Year, lagged 3 years). The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's IMET program had surprisingly strong results. In the global and regional models with PTS as the dependent variable, there was strong statistical significance between IMET participation and reductions in political terror levels. For example, Model 10 showed that 'for every $1 million dollars spent in IMET funding there is a positive impact of a PTSmean *decrease* after 3 years of .094 points in the PTS score value.

IMET Participants, lagged 3yrs. This variable showed mixed results across the 12 models and as such, its influence is difficult to ascertain with confidence.

	Model 1 PTS Global	Model 2 PTS Region	Model 3 FSI Global	Model 4 FSI Region	Model 5 PTS Global	Model 6 PTS Global	Model 7 FSI Global	Model 8 FSI Global	Model 9 PTS Region	Model 10 PTS Region	Model 11 FSI Region	Model 12 FSI Region
Freedom House (total)	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
GNI (Ln)	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
Economic Growth	*				***	***			***	***		***
British Influence	**		*	***								
International War	***			*						*	***	***
Civil War	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
Population size (Ln)	***	***	**		***	***	***	**	***	***	**	*
Total Military spending (Ln)					***	***	***	***	***	**	***	***
Military spending % GDP (Ln)					***	***					*	
SPP Cumulative Years participation					*						**	
SPP Year 1-4 participation										***		***
SPP Year 5-8 participation								**		**		*
SPP Year 9-12 participation								**		**		
SPP Year 13-16 participation								*				
SPP Year 17-20 participation						**						
Foreign Military Sales (lagged 3 years, Ln)									*	**	*	**
IMET Funding (lagged 3 years, Ln)					***	***	***	***	***	**	*	**
IMET Participants (lagged 3 years, Ln)					***	***	*		**	**	***	***

*** is p<0.01 ** is p<0.05, * is p <0.1

Table 16. Variable-by-Variable Findings across all 12 Models.

Hypothesis-by-Hypothesis Findings

Hypothesis H1: *Recent experience with war (civil and international) increases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

Analysis of the Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset confirmed Poe and Tate's results that engaging in civil and international wars is the strongest predictors of political terror. The null hypothesis for this variable can be rejected.

Hypothesis H2: *Long-term experience with freedom and democratic principles decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

This dissertation confirmed Poe and Tate's results that experience with democracy, as measured by Freedom House scores, is a strong predictor of the lack of political terror. The null hypothesis for this variable can be rejected.

Hypothesis H3: *Consistent economic growth decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

Poe and Tate results on the influence of economic growth on political terror were confirmed. The null hypothesis for this variable can be rejected.

Hypothesis H4: *Long-term experience with the State Partnership Program (SPP) decreases the likelihood of political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

The analytical results provided little support to question on whether SPP influences political terror levels over time. The null hypothesis for this variable cannot be rejected.

Hypothesis H5: *Long-term participation in the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) decreases political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal.*

The funding of the IMET program showed the strongest correlation to political terror levels over time than did any other Defense Security Cooperation program variable. Results consistently showed a strong inverse relationship between IMET funding and the Political Terror Scale scores. Results show that 'as we invest more and more into training foreign partner nations' military officers that the likelihood of political terror lessens over time". The null hypothesis for this variable can be rejected.

Hypothesis H6: *As the number of years of U.S. foreign military sales increases, the likelihood of political terror in a particular country decreases, all other things being equal.*

The FMS program results showed inconsistent results. No definitive conclusion can be inferred on the relationship between FMS and political terror over time. The null hypothesis for this variable cannot be rejected.

The results for each of the 12 models are summarized in Table 6 below.

	N (obs)	F-statistics	Adj Rsq	SPPcuml Coeff.	FMS Coeff.	IMETpar Coeff.	IMETfund Coeff.
Model 1 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Global Analysis, 167 Countries, 1993-2012	3462	(242.71)***	0.654	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Model 2 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Regional Analysis, 46 Countries,1993-2012	916	(76.81)***	0.691	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Model 3 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Global Analysis, 167 Countries, 2006-2012	1297	(423.62)***	0.830	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Model 4 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Regional Analysis, 46 Countries, 2006-2012	361	(147.29)***	0.859	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Model 5 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Global Analysis, SPP Cumulative	1207	(72.61)***	0.662	-0.007	-0.012	0.162	-0.140
Model 6 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Global Analysis, SPP various Years	1207	(65.12)***	0.663	N/A	-0.011	0.160	-0.145
Model 7 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Global Analysis, SPP Cumulative Years	531	(98.75)***	0.795	0.078	-0.199	0.836	-1.763
Model 8 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Global Analysis, SPP Various Years	531	(83.82)***	0.796	N/A	-0.177	0.709	-1.772
Model 9 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), Regional Analysis, SPP Cumulative Years	325	(32.68)***	0.763	0.004	0.028	0.074	-0.108
Model 10 – Political Terror Scale Mean (PTSmean), SPP various Years	325	(30.23)***	0.77	N/A	0.013	0.080	-0.094
Model 11 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Regional Analysis, SPP Cumulative Years	176	(76.64)***	0.901	-0.257	0.430	1.748	-2.044
Model 12 – Fragile States Index Total Score (FSItotal), Regional Analysis, SPP Various Years	176	(72.04)***	0.91	N/A	0.874	1.652	-2.545

Table 17. Summary of 12 Models.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

Defense Security Cooperation engagement programs have lofty, admirable, and critical missions and objectives. While there is wisdom and insight in investing billions of dollars on developing personal partnerships, military interoperability, and adherence to Western norms of liberal democratic governance, such federal investments are increasingly tied to measurable outcomes or eliminated. Currently, the DSC programs successes are measured in relatively easy methods that tabulate quantitative outputs. US policymakers need both quantitative and qualitative analysis of specific outcomes of these DSC programs.

This dissertation examined whether participation in US Defense Security Cooperation (DSC) programs leads to reductions in a regime's willingness to inflict political terror such as extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment. Two objectives framed the research: first, to identify structural factors that give rise to political terror, and second, to assess the efficacy of non-kinetic US intervention policies in allied nations.

The specific focus of study is the US National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program and the units of analysis are the SPP partnerships. The research study involves the collection, processing, and analysis of data on the number and types of foreign engagements over time and how participation in SPP influences national trends.

National Security Complexity

The impetus of this research project was twofold. First, the research responds to the call to action from Cingranelli and Richards (1999) that there is a need for systematic, quantitative research linking the activities of national or international actors to improvements in the human rights practices or governments.

Secondly, state violence and conflict percolate in weakened and failed states and therefore, US national security policy and decisionmakers are convinced that such states become tinderboxes for national and regional conflicts that will require immediate interventions:

> "Weak and failed states pose a serious security challenge for the United States and the international community. They can become breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking in humans and narcotics, organized crime, and humanitarian catastrophes…If the U.S. Government is going to meet these threats, we must adapt our national security architecture." John E. Herbst, former Coordinator, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, FM 3-07, p 129.

This research focuses not solely on the presence of state-sponsored terror, but on the decisions of US political leadership to provide intervention programs ranging from military-to-military and military-to-civilian personnel engagements, to training and equipping foreign partners worldwide. These US Defense Security Cooperation programs promote civilian control of the military and build unit interoperability with US forces. As such, empirical analysis may show that over time, these novel DSC interventions may reduce a government's repression of their own people.

Policy analysis and evaluation literature states that in the public policy realm, many studies and publications focus on policy outputs vice outcomes (Moulton, 2010). Contrary to outputs, which are far easy to measure, public policy outcomes are often

difficult to quantify and difficult to evaluate because policy results may be separated by both time and space (Senge, 1990; Richmond, 2011). Importantly, policymakers need to know public program outcomes more than simply knowing program outputs.

This dissertation attempts to bridge this divide and investigate the outcomes of novel national security intervention programs. This research sought to determine if qualitative assessments of vested Defense Security Cooperation program stakeholders could accurately determine a program's effectiveness.

This dissertation journey uncovered ideas that, although not empirically tested herein, have been widely discussed in other literature on alternative views of Western liberal democratization, political terror and human rights, and public policy and management (PPM).

The diametrically opposed forces of power accumulation and power sharing have shown that the civilian control and use of police, paramilitary, and military troops is difficult at best and massively murderous at worst[53]. The 'civilian control of the military' principle has proven to be challenging in even the most democratic of modern nations.

The historic challenge of minimizing political terror while keeping trust between powerful civilian elites and sometimes equally powerful military commanders has always been elusive. Additionally, the civilian and military organizational cultures in every country are incredibly divergent with vastly different vocabularies, job security levels, and commitments to reducing political terror. Bridging this "civilian-military conundrum" in foreign-based reconstruction and stabilization operations is always

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[53] Such violent repression has occurred in the United States, Russia, China, Spain, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Philippines, Ukraine, and dozens of other countries.

difficult (Roberts 2010; 213). And, in any era, one can find real world events that validate the arguments that elites and their military forces will exact vicious state-sponsored terror upon its citizenry.

For example, the political repression of Ukraine's 2010-2014 Viktor Yanukovych regime ended up catalyzing the 2013 Ukrainian EuroMaidan pro-democracy movement even stronger (Figure 14.). Exacerbating an already volatile situation, the Yanukovych government rapidly enacted Draconian laws that severely limited the protesters rights[54]. Those actions, in turn, only made protesters more committed to a total change of government.

The Yanukovych Government's last chance for controlling the streets and forcibly removing the EuroMaidan protestors was a massive crackdown that led to the 18 February gunning down of 88 people.[55] The martyred protestors became known as the "Heaven's Hundreds Heroes" and a federal medal was created to honor the victims of the political killings of the 2013-2014 EuroMaidan (Figure 15.). The killings marked the immediate end of Yanukovych, his government, and his uber-dominate Party of Regions political party's hegemony in Ukrainian politics.[56]

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[54] Dozens are injured as the latest rounds of protests in Kiev turn bloody. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2017, from http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-01-20/dozens-are-injured-latest-rounds-protests-kiev-turn-bloody
[55] Ukraine crisis: Timeline. (2014, November 13). Retrieved April 12, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275
[56] The School of Russian and Asian Studies. Ukraine's Party of Regions:Russian Nationalists or Champions of Ukraine's Minorities? Translation of Party Platform by Jordan BryantIntroduction by Michael Smeltzer and Josh Wilson. http://www.sras.org/ukraine_party_of_regions_part_1. Accessed 04 October 2016.

Figure 14. Dissertation author at the EuroMaidan pro-democracy protest, Kyiv, Ukraine, December 2013.

Figure 15. Order of the Heaven's Hundreds Heroes awarded for "Defending principles of democracy, human rights, and freedom during the EuroMaidan protests.

Security cooperation intervention programs designed to build partner nation democratization capabilities and lower the likelihood of political terror requires novel innovations.

This concept of security cooperation is far from new. Graham Allison, in his famous work on decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis, defined 'a government' as a collection of large organizations that act quasi-independently on specific problems, yet must work together on the most important problems of the nation. Allison noted that very few of the most significant problems government's fall exclusively in the domain of a single organization (1971).

Roberts quotes the late Sergio Viera de Mello, former undersecretary-general and emergency relief coordinator for the United Nations, that "contemporary armed conflict is seldom conducted on a clearly defined battlefield, by conventional armies confronting each other. Today's warfare often takes place in cities and villages, with civilians as the preferred targets, the propagation of terror as the premeditated tactic, and the physical elimination or mass displacement of certain categories of population as the overarching strategy…" (Viera de Mello 1999, quoted in Roberts; see also Roberts 2010: 212).

The arguments and empirical research results on political terror over the past three decades can guide today's international security supranational organizations and the intervention efforts of US national security policymakers.

In such a volatile climate of recurring political terror, with undefined enemies and lack of clearly articulated objectives, the road to peace and is much more likely from organizations designed with innovative public or even public-private hybrid natures (Wise, 2010). Clearly, the boundaries, 'stovepipes', or 'silos' that separate public and

private organizations have shifted (Wise and Moulton, 2010) and therefore, it can be argued that the boundaries that impede cooperation in the complex, dynamic problems of delivering effective and efficient security cooperation and nation-building services needs to be shifted, blurred, or busted entirely.

This boundary blurring and spanning in the security cooperation arena is the primary function of the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DSCA is the central agency that employs a whole-of-government approach to global security cooperation programs and provides funding and efforts across the DoD, Joint Staffs, the State Department, US Geographic Combatant Commands, the armed services, and the private sector.[57] DSCA is responsible for the effective policy, processes, training, and financial management necessary to execute security cooperation within the DoD. In addition, today and into the near future, DSCA will continue to form specialized, adaptive networks for effective collaboration and cooperation.

These networks, organizationally positioned between being a strictly market-driven firm or a strictly bureaucratic hierarchy, must employ a myriad of frameworks, theories, and models to find effective means to create appropriate institutional, economic, and political configurations that build desired public outcomes, not just measurable outputs (Kettl, 1997: 449; Moulton, 2010). Some of these outcomes can come in the form of the US national interest of reductions in foreign partners' political terror and human rights abuses.

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[57] US Defense Security Cooperation Agency webpage. http://www.dsca.mil/about-us/mission-vison-values Accessed 4 November 2015.

The research here seeks to determine if US DSC Programs, specifically the State Partnership Program is an example of a policy that operationalizes the logic model framework linking program outputs to clear outcomes (Wyatt Knowlton and Phillips, 2013). Do DSC programs actually 'move the needle' with respect to foundational principles of liberal Western democracies, namely, the civilian control of the military and the respect for personal integrity rights, vis a vis the lack of human rights abuses and political terror. This study seeks to determine whether the DSCA is meeting its stated goal of being a responsible steward of public funds when analyzed against one specific dependent variable, levels of political terror.

State-sanctioned violence continues throughout the world jeopardizing national, regional, and global security. Moreover, as previously stated, the United States employs a multitude of approaches to foster peace and security for both itself and its foreign partners[58]. Western liberal democracies are founded on, among other things, the principles of civilian control of the military, respect for the human and political rights of citizens, and the ability to protect the populace from external and internal threats (US Constitution).

Democratic consolidation is founded on principles of civilian control of the military, respect for the human and political rights of citizens, and the ability to protect the populace from external and internal threats. Yet, state-sanctioned violence continues throughout the world jeopardizing national, regional, and global security. And, as previously stated, the United States employs a multitude of approaches to foster peace

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[58] US National Security Strategy February 2015. Assessed 14 July 2016.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf

and security for both itself and its foreign partners (Barkley, 2013). Engaging with foreign partners covers a wide swath of activities, not the least of which are United States' Defense Security Cooperation Programs. As an integral component of US Smart Power, DSC programs are vital to US National Security[59].

As it has been since the ratification of the US Constitution in 1788, US National Security policy is governed by those constitutional articles that placed all branches of the military under the jurisdiction of the civilian Congress for declaring war and a civilian President as the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces[60]. A key rationale for the establishment and implementation of Defense Security Cooperation programs emanated from these principles of democratization.

In his essay on civilian control of the military, Richard H. Kohn posited that the society has always faced the governance challenge of how to subordinate the military to political authority and "a society controls those who possess the ultimate power of coercion or physical force" (Kohn, 1997).

Naval Postgraduate School Professor Nancy C. Roberts argued in her examination of the Post-Cold War era civilian-military nexus that "Communities of Practice" (COPs) are emerging as informal mechanisms of coordination among civilian and military organizations" (Roberts, 2010, p. 212). Professor Roberts challenged researchers and practitioners to actively participate in building the inter-organization cooperation frameworks needed to inform and guide organizations. This dissertation takes up Professor Roberts' challenge to investigate traditional organizational design and

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[59] Defense Security Cooperation Agency website. Assessed 04 May 2017. http://www.dsca.mil/strategic-plan-vision-2020/executive-summary
[60] US Constitution Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2, respectively.

emergent concepts, frameworks, and theories that apply, or should apply, to the challenges of reducing political terror.

The extent to which foreign partner nations embrace civilian control of the military is a yardstick for determining cooperation, relationship building, and adherence to reducing political terror. As Kohn theorizes, foreign nations must find the means to assure the obedience of their military to the regime in power and to the overall system of government (Kohn, 1997).

The late Samuel P. Huntington argued in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations,* that the way to minimize authoritarianism and to optimize civilian supremacy in government was to develop an independent, professional military organization (Huntington, 1998). This idea of an autonomous military separated from, yet controlled by an elective civilian politician, serves as 'marching orders' for today's US Defense Security Cooperation engagements with foreign partners. And, as the US remains clearly cognizant of the need for both civilian control of the military and a professionalized military, the resulting adherence to human rights theorized to come from such objective civilian control of the military (Reveron, 2010).

Expectations versus Discovery

Results validated the extant literature's conclusions that the three structural factor variables 1) levels of democratization, 2) economic growth, and 3) recent civil and international war experiences continue to be the most reliable political terror predictors. Results from 12 regression models also showed DSC program influence as consistently weak, and at best, inconsistently statistically significant. Though senior US leaders frequently boast of DSC program intervention successes, this research found no consistent empirical evidence to support their positive pronouncements. *Effective and efficient delivery of DSC intervention **outputs** does not necessarily correspond to similarly effective and efficient political terror **outcomes**.*

This dissertation sought to extend upon Poe and Tate (1994) period of 1980-1987 in studying cross-national variations in personal integrity rights as reported in the Political Terror Scale.

This dissertation expanded the number of countries studied and grouped countries into the same geographic delineation of the US Geographic Combatant Command structure. This categorization investigated if a regional influence or bias affected political terror, peacefulness, and civilian control of the military.

Though DSC programs are widely studied, the programs have been primarily evaluated in output terms such as dollars (Foreign Military Sales), the number of foreign officers trained (International Military Education and Training), and the number and cost of engagement events (National Guard State Partnership Program; SPP). To advance knowledge on DSC programs in outcome terms, this research started by recreating the key components of Poe and Tate (1990, 1994) causal frameworks on personal integrity

rights. The initial objectives were to confirm or refute predictor variable results and to determine if the Poe and Tate-derived Political Terror Scale (PTS) was an appropriate measure to evaluate the efficaciousness of DSC programs.

Next, the research expanded to include both a 167-country global time-sensitive cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis and a 46-country regional TSCS analysis using the US Geographic Combatant Commander Areas of Responsibilities (AORs) as its country-by-country delineation. Data collection began by creating the Rebuilding Failed and Weak States Dataset (RFWS Dataset) that included extensive data on a myriad of variables theorized to influence political terror. The RFWS Dataset covered 20 years from 1993-2012 plus four years 1989-1992 for variable lag effects. The PTS and the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index (FSI) were the dependent variables since they represent globally respected indices of political terror and human rights abuses.

As expected, the initial Model 1 framework variables closely followed Poe and Tate (1994).

A set of 12 models tested 1) the factors that influence political terror, 2) examine the organizational uniqueness and efficaciousness of a particular non-traditional Defense Security Cooperation intervention program, 3) possible regional effects, and 4) possible negative unintended consequences.

As expected, the unique organizational configuration and mission slate for the National Guard created a high level of adaptive capacity and diversity that, in turn, could lead to effective security cooperation relationship-building and measurable impacts to national outcomes. Further, it was expected that the research would discover the presence or absence of correlation, would determine if the mix of SPP events matters, and will

identify, and possibly explain, performance differences between SPP partnerships. If the

research is successful in identifying effective security cooperation programs, then

measurable and testable hypothesis can be developed and new frameworks, theories, and

models built to aid policymakers and practitioners. Results also suggested that

identifying the characteristics of effective DSC programs allows US policymakers to

build models, conduct simulations, and engage in iterative storytelling to test theories and

to discover transferable organizational structure, resourcing, and procedural

commonalities.

Implications for Future US National Security Policy Research

Dissertation results and recommendations can help inform future national security policymaking by illustrating the types of Defense Security Cooperation programs that influence political terror and human rights abuses. The research has shown that continuation of current DSC programs and increasing new SPP partnerships impacts US National Security objectives for non-combat engagement with foreign partners.

Poe and Tate framework variables explain the importance of political repression, personal integrity rights, and democratic consolidation. The results provide insights on targets for US diplomatic efforts, for USAID development funding, and for DSC program engagements.

One of the future research hypotheses could include H6a: *Specific organizational adaptive capacity characteristics inherent in the National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program (SPP) increase the likelihood of SPP reducing political terror in a particular country, all other things being equal*.

The FY2015 Annual Report to Congress on the State Partnership Program is a very significant step forward in facilitating advanced future research.

With much greater data collection by the National Guard Bureau, the total number of SPP events that each partnership engages in over a number of years can be compared to determine if a relationship exists between the quantity of events and the likelihood that countries will violently repress their people.

Future research that delineates between types of SPP events could be a useful guide for US national security policymakers. Differentiation between military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian SPP events will allow program

funding to be targeted in the most efficient and effective ways. The hypothesis

supporting this particular future research would be something like: the particular mix of

deployment events conducted by individual SPP partnerships over time correlates to a

measurable difference in the maximum likelihood of a relationship to human rights,

peacefulness, and political terror indicators.

Case Studies

The dissertation also included qualitative case studies of two specific State

Partnership Program programs. These case studies were not empirically tested research

design components but rather, served as exploratory research to understand the

motivation for SPP stakeholders to consistently state that the efficiency and effectiveness

of the SPP intervention program was so universally high.

The review of over 400 SPP archives netted qualitative assessments on what

recurring characteristics may have led to the wildly positive pronouncements of the

program success by US and foreign stakeholders.

The Hungary-Ohio National Guard and the Ukraine-California National Guard

SPPs were chosen as samples because 1) both programs were in the original group of 22

SPPs, 2) both cases involved countries with a significant history of former-Soviet

governance, and 3) both programs had vastly different results during the 1993-2012

research period.

Subsequently, the exploratory investigation included a simplified bi-variant OLS

regression of the number of years of SPP participation against the 2006-2012 values of

the Fragile States Index (FSI) indicators 'Security Apparatus' (Figures 17 and 19) and

'Legitimacy of the State' (Figures 18 and 20).

The Fragile States Index total score is composed of 21 indicators. Several of these indicators specifically relate to political terror, civilian control of the military and security forces, human rights abuses, and external interventions.

Fragile States Index 'Security Apparatus' indicator is defined as "security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism."[61].

The Security Apparatus indicator is relevant in this dissertation since a government's response to perceived security threats and regime survival fit within the accepted democratic principle of a state's monopoly on the use of force (Owens, 2014).

An objective quantitative analysis can only tell a portion of the story on whether SPP is effective and influential as an intervention program. Qualitative factors matter and may very well have influence on partner nations' likelihood to use political terror tactics.

Once the selection of similar State Partnership program was completed, a qualitative review of the implementation of the two programs was conducted using over 400 archived National Guard Bureau press releases research conducted by actual members of the particular state National Guard under investigation. Finally, a simple bi-variant OLS regression was conducted to determine if the cumulative years of the SPP intervention had any influence on two FSI sub-indicators: Security Apparatus and Legitimacy of the State.

The Legitimacy of the State indicator uses its proprietary algorithms to measure "the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations,

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[61] The Fund for Peace official website. Accessed 23 February 2015. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/c1/

sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies."[62] The Fragile States Index 'Legitimacy of the State' indicator is directly related to the objectives of this research since the frequency and intensity of political terror influences a population's perception of their individual ruling elites and political parties, and the trust in their government institutions' willingness to adhere to democratic principles. This indicator also measures the degree of "representativeness" and transparency in specific countries.

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[62] The Fund for Peace official website. Accessed 23 February 2015. http://fundforpeace.org/indicators/p1

Hungary - Ohio National Guard State Partnership Program

The Hungary-Ohio National Guard State Partnership Program was one of the original programs instituted by USEUCOM in 1993. The program has run uninterrupted since that time. Since 1993, the Hungary-Ohio National Guard SPP was involved in military-to-military, military-to civilian/civilian-to-military, and civilian-to-civilian engagements.

At the beginning of the State Partnership Program, Hungary was emerging from its former-Soviet military culture and structure. In less than two decades, and aided by a myriad of Ohio National Guard bilateral SPP engagements, Hungary became a full member of NATO.

Noteworthy, former Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard Major General Gregory Wayt participated in the SPP with Hungarian counterparts from the time he was a mid-grade officer (Lieutenant Colonel) until the time he was the senior most military member of the Ohio National Guard. The State Partnership Program's importance to the Ohio National Guard was clearly delineated under Maj.Gen. Wayt's leadership and evidenced by the assignment of a fulltime SPP Officer. As Maj.Gen. Wayt stated:

> "Think back 17 years, could anybody have ever imagined that we would be jointly deploying to Afghanistan to train the Afghan National Army in the middle of war?... It's amazing to think how far we've come in this partnership, to a professional army here in Hungary, an army that's well-respected in Europe and in NATO, to partner with them, and to deploy with them to a combat zone in Afghanistan…"This SPP is having an impact not only on the national security of the United States but the national security of these two countries."[63]

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[63] Ohio National Guard archive. Accessed 12 October 2013. http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article-View/Article/586290/ohio-national-guard-and-hungary-graduate-level-state-partnership/

Ohio National Guard SPP deployments included enlisted and officer level training in critical military readiness skill areas. Army Specialists trained Hungarian soldiers in gunnery, tactical communications, orienteering, combat medical services, intelligence, and combat each and rescue.

For several years, the Hungarian military and Ohio National Guard servicemembers operated side-by-side in life and death missions in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The two military forces had trained together for over a decade in SPP events and thus had developed professional and personal trust relationships.

These actions were significant indicators that the Ohio National Guard State Partnership Program with Hungary under Maj.Gen. Wayt's leadership was fully engaged in achieving the stated goals of the SPP (Figure 16.).

Figure 16. Army Maj. Gen. Gregory Wayt, the adjutant general of the Ohio National Guard, awards the Ohio Commendation Medal to Hungarian Defense Forces soldiers who served in a joint unit with the Ohio National Guard members in Afghanistan at Tata, Hungary, on Sept. 15, 2010. A delegation of Ohio National Guard leaders was in Hungary for National Guard State Partnership Program activities. (Photo by SSG Jim Greenhill)

Figure 17. Dependency between SPP Cumulative years participation and FSI Security Apparatus in Hungary.

Figure18. Dependency between SPP Cumulative years participation and FSI Legitimacy of the State in Hungary

Ukraine - California National Guard State Partnership Program

As a country literally squeezed between Russia and Europe, Ukraine is country with a history fraught with conquest and military domination. Covering a wide, mainly savannah land area approximately the same as Texas, Ukraine in the post-Soviet, final decade of the 20th Century endured a plethora of nation-building challenges. Finally independent on 24 August 1991, Ukraine struggled mightily with its transition to a liberal Western democracy.

Though Kyiv, Ukraine is seven time zones and an ocean away from Washington, DC, the implications for US national security interests in the Black Sea region of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war are immense. The US' NATO allies are Black Sea littoral countries and the NATO alliance's Article Five shared-security provisions directly obligate the US to act in the event of widening Black Sea conflict (Binnendijk & Cordero, 2008).

Immediately after Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine, Russia's "Little Green Men"[64] invaded and annexed of Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula and supported the violent separatists who launched open rebellion in eastern Ukraine. Real world events illustrated the link between political terror and the military readiness or partner nations, and the actions of adversarial nations. Clearly violating the Budapest Memorandum, ensconced 21st Century international law, and accepted behaviors, Russia simply instituted Machiavellian principles of conquest to invade its neighbor or incite internal proxies to

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[64] "Little green men" or "Russian invaders"?By Vitaly ShevchenkoBBC Monitoring. 11 March 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154 Accessed 23 June 2016.

foment violent rebellion (Dews, 2016). Life and death consequences result when long-term foreign engagement is lacking (Figure 16).

Given the importance of non-NATO member Ukraine's territorial integrity in a wider view of Black Sea security, the question for US policymakers was "why didn't the US know of, and try to improve, Ukraine's own military ineptitude and readiness?"

The Ukraine-California National Guard State Partnership Program was one of the original programs instituted by USEUCOM in 1993. The program has run uninterrupted since that time.

As stated, for the 20-year period prior to Russian's illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula, the Ukrainian military was woefully underfunded, undermanned, and under trained to face and repel any substantially and modernly trained and equipped military force (Palmer, 2015). The events that transpired in the spring of 2014 also showed that a disjointed, Russian-backed separatist force could 'take on' the Ukrainian military and capture huge, populated land areas in eastern Ukraine (Gressel, 2015).

Though it was always known throughout the US political and intelligence communities that Russia maintained the military might and capacity to overwhelm the Ukrainian military at any time (Jacobson, 2014), the US and the rest of the West were shocked by near total collapse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukraine's civilian government proved that it could not provide a government's primary obligation, the security of the people and the territorial integrity of the state (Jacobsen, 2014).

For this very same 20-year period, the California National Guard - Ukraine SPP was in existence and though bilateral military-to-military and military-to-civilian defense security cooperation engagements were conducted, the 'facts on-the-ground' showed that

a significant sections of Ukrainian military forces in Crimea were either incompetent or treasonous.

Figure 19. Dependency between SPP Cumulative years participation and FSI Security Apparatus in Ukraine.

Figure 20. Dependency between SPP Cumulative years participation and FSI Legitimacy of the State in Ukraine.

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Case Review Summary

During the period 1993-2012 there was a stark difference between the State Partnership Program implemented by the Ohio National Guard and their partner country Hungary, and the California National Guard and their partner country Ukraine. The number and nature of military and civilian leadership engagements squarely put the Ohio National Guard - Hungary SPP performance on a much higher level than that of the California National Guard – Ukraine SPP.

Conversely, the stunning Russian-led takeover of Crimea and the Russian-sponsored invasion into eastern Ukraine (Dews, 2016) showed how woefully underfunded, inadequate and underprepared the Ukrainian military was to face its real world security challenges. Though no US organization is at fault for the Ukrainian Government's decisions, actions, and inactions, the 20-year presence of a State Partnership Program in Ukraine could have better prepared and/or informed Ukrainian political and defense officials of the severity of Ukraine's military readiness problems.

The California National Guard's involvement with Ukraine netted no appreciative or effective deterrence force. The abysmal personnel and materiel readiness levels of the Ukrainian military from 1993 to 2014 were shocking to the world community at large, and specifically to the US Government.

Conversely, the Ohio National Guard SPP with Hungary remains to this day an example of the effectiveness of the intervention program.

Both Ohio National Guard and Hungarian military and civilian participants in the program have testified to the trust building and relationship building success that SPP

promotes. Cooperative operations that are visible to the community have increased

through SPP. Members of State Partnership Programs conducted focused military

training, crisis management, and disaster relief operations.

In addition to discoveries on achievements and failures of two specific SPP

interventions, the research conducted throughout this dissertation-writing process

uncovered that a particular public organizational concept, adaptive capacity, framed the

uniqueness of the State Partnership Program, and contributed to the program's highly

positive reputation.

Adaptive Capacity in Public Organizations

What is adaptive capacity and how does it influence Defense Security

Cooperation programs' potential for influencing political terror in partner nations?

Possibly the most important starting point in defining adaptive capacity is to

differentiate adaptive capacity from adaptation. Public managers decide between

adaptation, structuring for maximum performance efficiency in current and future

environments, and *adaptive capacity*, structuring for organizational slack to allow

flexibility to perform in unknown environmental conditions (Staber and Sydow, 2002).

The nation-building operations conducted by the State Partnership Program exist

in permissive, semi-permissive, and non-permissive environments. Because of this,

nation-building requires the very flexibility expressed by Staber and Sydow. DSC

organizations must create and maintain high levels of adaptive capacity to be effective in

the mission of building partner nation capacity.

Adaptive capacity describes organization structure and design and relates both

concepts to the ability organizations and human social systems to adapt, learn, and grow

(Gunderson et all, 2014; Senge, 1990). Udo Staber and Jorg Sydow's *Organizational*

Adaptive Capacity: a Structuration Perspective (2002) linked these organizational

adaptive capacity concepts to the interventions seeking to stem political terror. The

characteristics inherent in highly adaptive capacity organizations are found in the popular

State Partnership Program and, as such, may influence the program's effectiveness on

lowering political terror (Figure 21.).

Along with creative decisionmaking and responsive power structures, adaptive

capacity in human social systems is determined by the ability of institutions to learn and

store knowledge (Gunderson et al, 2014). This organizational learning, famously described by Peter Senge (1990), applies directly to State National Guards as they cumulative build knowledge and experience each year of SPP participation.

The value of this combination of accumulation of relevant nation-building knowledge with skillset and operating environment adaptive capacity is crucial for any US public organization in these austere, budget-cutting times. If an organization cannot show its value to legislative budget-cutters, then it has no value.

In *State Partnership Program: enduring in post conflict, fiscally constrained environment,* James Barkley (2013) connected the need for budgetary value with competitive advantage when he posited that SPP had unique adaptive capacity and flexibility that is crucial when competing for limited federal funding. Barkley posited that SPP was also unique in that is financially efficient in integrating military and civilian capacities.

Adaptive Capacity is well studied in the biological sciences as environmental scientists surmise that the adaptive capacity of fauna and flora determine survival in the natural world (Engle and Lemos, 2010). The ability to adapt to changing environmental conditions and to take advantage of temporary or permanent changes to food sources, environmental conditions, and reproductive challenges determine the success of any plant or animal species. Likewise, researchers have theorized that manmade artifacts such as organizations, institutions, and governments must also maintain levels of adaptive capacity that ensure success and growth (Lemos et al, 2007, Diduck, 2010).

The inherently complex and interagency nature of US national security programs and policies requires that those governmental entities tasked with capacity building in

foreign partner nations embrace adaptive capacity over adaptation. Critical in public policy and management is *not* to resource and manage for current and anticipated missions; rather, the idea is to structure the organization so it can endure the necessary resource slack to support unforeseen problems (Staber and Sydow, 2002). "The very strategies that foster allocative efficiency may undermine the organization's ability to prosper under conditions of extreme volatility" (Staber and Sydow, 2002: 409).

The organizational design restraints inherent in traditional bureaucratic perspectives place it squarely at odds with the required dynamism needed by novel intervention programs to become effective adaptive capacity-type organizations. Individuals, especially those in leadership positions within SPP state-level organizations, and the DSC organization as a whole, must be willing to getting away from their comfort zone (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). A certain amount of organizational slack is valuable. Every year, the US National Guard accomplishes this escape from a comfort zone by adapting its organizational design, training variability, state-federal mission duality, and workforce diversity. This maintains the perception that the SPP a novel, highly adaptive intervention that can influence political terror in a wide range of countries.

The examination of over 400 SPP archives led to the discovery of the four recurring characteristics of actual SPP deployment activities. These four characteristics are deployability, entrenchment, multi-disciplinarity, and level of integration.

Deployability: Defense Security Cooperation organization/program personnel can and do deploy on a regular basis to target country. As a member of the military, every State National Guard must maintain short notice, worldwide deployability capabilities. The deployability capability is limited by operational obligations and fiscal

year funding limits. This deployability allows the SPP relationships to continue year-by-year unabated.

Engagement: an organization/program's relationship is firmly established with target country; personnel do not rotate out of organization every 2-3 years; viable career paths include continual service in the same billet.

Multi-disciplinarity: an organization/Program's mission and skillsets includes a wide variety of occupations necessary for rebuilding fail and weak states.

Integration: an organization/program's culture and actions support integrating with foreign country at many vertical levels government and society and at many horizontal levels of development across the country. The nature of deployments is such that both mid-career and senior level military and civilian participants have constant interaction.

These four characteristics can be used in future research to identify and explain efficaciousness differences between individual State Partnership Programs. Understanding the adaptive capacity characteristics of DSC programs will aid national security policymakers in building models and running "what-if" scenarios for future policy implementation.

Figure 21. Conceptual Factors Influencing the Level of Political Terror Worldwide.

Future research needs to evaluate SPP participation in terms of the number and nature of individual SPP deployments, and the qualitative benefits of the program to its stakeholders.

Modeling Adaptive Capacity

Adaptive capacity as a characteristic of effective DSC programs can, with modern computer-driven research tools, be compared to other US interventions. Such modeling techniques will advance knowledge on relative levels of adaptive capacity and public organizational performance and budgetary viability.

Nohrstedt (2015) went so far as to provide variables to include in such future empirical models of adaptive capacity. Nohrstedt stated:

> "The relationship between adaptive capacity and collaborative performance is a central issue within public management research but has rarely been subjected to systematic empirical testing…this article investigates the relationship between three adaptive capacity variables – diversity, interaction, and learning – and outcomes in terms of goal attainment, risk analysis, and public satisfaction with rescue services." (p.718)

In *Global Environmental Change*, Nathan Engle (2011) examined the concept of adaptive capacity within the realm of climate variability and change. He conceptualized a simplified model that is this research on the adaptive capacity of public organizations in terms of resilience and vulnerability. Table 6 presents these determinants (Eakin and Lemos, 2006; Smit et al, 2001; Yohe and Tol, 2002).

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Determinant	Encompasses
Human Capital	Knowledge (scientific, "local", technical, political), education levels, health, individual risk perception, labor
Information & Technology	Communication networks, freedom of expression, technology transfer and data exchange, innovation capacity, early warning systems, technological relevance
Material Resources & Infrastructure	Transport, water infrastructure, buildings, sanitation, energy supply and management, environmental quality
Organization & Social Capital	State-civil society relations, local coping networks, social mobilization, density of institutional relationships
Political Capital	Modes of governance, leadership legitimacy, participation, decentralization, decision and management capacity, sovereignty
Wealth & Financial Capital	Income and wealth distribution, economic marginalization, accessibility and availability of financial instruments (e.g. insurance, credit), fiscal incentives for risk management
Institutions & Entitlements	Informal and formal rules for resource conservation, risk management, regional planning, participation, information dissemination, technological innovation property rights, risk sharing mechanisms

Table 18. Determinants of Adaptive Capacity on Resilience (Eakin and Lemos 2006).

Organizational adaptive capacity is theoretically modeled and explained with a non-linear research tools that capture the dynamics between relationships among variables that increase and/or decreases the sums of organizational adaptive capacity over time. System Dynamics is one such tool for describing and analyzing both tangible and intangible topics, such as a public organization's level of adaptive capacity.

System Dynamics is a non-linear research method that looks at the system as a whole by systematically analyzing causal relationships and information flows between all model elements (Forrester, 1987, 1990; Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Senge, 1990). System dynamics employs simulation techniques to provide behaviour prediction and

foster informed decision-making. It allows the modeler to set manageable research boundaries, to analyze feedback loops, identify structural leverage points, and incorporate time delays. System dynamics' stock and flow structuration and standard icons can be used to describe, explain, track, and evaluation both tangible and intangible accumulations of 'stuff' (Richmond, 2011; Meadows, 2008).

In Figure 22 below, system dynamics modeling is used to develop a conceptual model for adaptive capacity by adopting the framework and determinants used in structuration, resilience, and vulnerability literature (Staber and Sidow, 2002; Eakin and Lemos, 2006).

The conceptual system dynamics model in Figure 22 provides a definitional framework based on adaptive capacity literature. Modeling seeks to find leverage point or areas for policy intervention that will increase the amount of adaptive capacity in the organization.

Policy interventions can affect behavior over time. Using a standard system dynamics "gap adjustment" model we can conduct "what-if" scenario planning to describe and identity-preferred courses of action. In addition, to amplify the informational and decisionmaking powers of stakeholders, system dynamics modeling and simulation can help evaluate various policy options simultaneously instead of sequentially.

The theoretical model below (Figure 23) analyzes the difference, or gap, between an organization's actual adaptive capacity and a target adaptive capacity amount.

In this simplified conceptual model, the "Adaptive Capacity Increasing Rate" is the rate that the "GAP" between the "ACTUAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY LEVEL" and

the "TARGET ADAPTIVE CAPACITY LEVEL" is closed every year. The "Policy Intervention Option C" variable (DSC program) is multiplied to the "Adaptive Capacity Increasing Rate" (.15 or 15% in this simulation) to indicate the effect of DSC intervention policies such as public service projects (i.e. elementary school renovations), direct military-to-military training exchanges, highly publicized civilian-to-civilian leadership meetings, and word-of-mouth (WoM) promotion of successful interactions between SPP Guardmembers and the host country citizenry.

Additional future research using modeling and simulation to inform Defense Security Program decisionmakers on various outcome results may also include via Monte Carlo simulations.

Figure 22. A System Dynamics Conceptual Model of Adaptive Capacity based on Eakin and Lemos (2006).

Figure 23. Gap Adjustment Model with No Policy Interventions Implemented. Adaptive Capacity Increase Rate stays constant at 15% per year for the entire 10-year period.

Research Limitations

The Defense Security Cooperation programs showed mixed quantitative results in influencing the level of democratization and political terror in a partner nation. The pronouncements from senior US civilian and military that the State Partnership Program is such a wildly successful program is not confirmed when analyzing years of participation in SPP with internationally reputable indices of the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Fragile States Index (FSI). Results further showed that there is a strong possibility that investments in training foreign military officers led to the desirable effect of lower political terror over time.

Research limitations included details on the personnel who deploy on SPP engagements and whether their skills and experiences influence the relationships built with foreign partners.

Further, during the research period, there were no objective assessments from foreign partners on the degree of success of the SPP program in terms of democratization outcomes.

There was also a clear lack of data available on the specific nature of typical and atypical SPP deployments is needed to increase validity and verifiability of the research results and allowed creation of models that help implement and evaluate current and future SPP partnerships.

Recommendations

The US National Security Community needs to guard against training persuasive democracy promoting foreign partners who may one day become the warlords or civilian "elected" officials who oppress and terrorize their own people, or who one day become the dictators who the US must engage against in direct combat actions.

Summary

All Defense Security Cooperation programs need to be implemented with a very critical eye on outcome metrics, and not just program outputs. The results of the qualitative review of SPP archives showed a significant long-term trend in relationship building and trust amongst deploying National Guard units and their SPP partners.

The dissertation's overarching recommendation is that senior US leaders need significantly more quantitative data collection on the specific nature of various DSC programs. Armed with new, robust datasets, DSC programs can be analyzed, evaluated, and improved not solely based on easily quantifiable outputs, but rather, based on verifiable outputs that influence the democracy-strengthening behavioral outcomes of our partner nations.

US national security decisionmakers need to create annually updated qualitative datasets that can evaluate new State Partnership Program target countries and can better evaluate the effectiveness current SPP programs. Such an annual index tied to the Political Terror Scale, Fragile States Index. Freedom House scores, or other macro indicators will help US national security leadership avoid the 'friend today, enemy tomorrow' historical phenomenon.

National security policymaking is not a laboratory experiment or a theoretical exercise. It is an applied craft that requires priority setting, systems thinking, "what-if" scenario planning, and dynamic modeling, simulation, and visualization.

Defense Security Cooperation programs are neither a panacea for US foreign engagement success nor a worthless, expensive policy endeavor. Instead, DSC programs are a key component in the hierarchy of national security components that affect political terror (Figure 25) and build relationships that serve in the US national interest.

This dissertation revealed that participation in some DSC programs overtime (SPP and FMS) was not significantly linked to changes in political terror, while another DSC program (IMET) may significantly lower the likelihood of political terror in partner nations.

The US National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program should not be reduced or eliminated, but quite the contrary; the program should be continued and expanded with more standardized and robust data collection, analysis, evaluation, and visualization.

Figure 24. Hierarchy of Dissertation Research. Source: Author.

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Lessons Drawn from the East Asian Model, and the Impact of the Global Economic Crisis. African Business.

Appendix A: Regression Results

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. regress  ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001
                                            dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy2
> 004 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
                                                                dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     3462
-------------+------------------------------           F( 26,  3435) =   252.02
       Model |  2625.9877      26  100.999527           Prob > F      =   0.0000
    Residual |  1376.62878    3435  .400765292          R-squared     =   0.6561
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =   0.6535
       Total |  4002.61648    3461  1.15649133          Root MSE      =   .63306


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .1797032   .0069342    25.92   0.000     .1661076    .1932988
      ln_gni |   -.178653     .00844   -21.17   0.000    -.195201   -.1621049
    econgrwth |  -.0034613   .0018602    -1.86   0.063    -.0071085    .0001859
      britinf |   .0473872   .0236199     2.01   0.045     .0010767    .0936977
      intlwar |   .2083401   .0647623     3.22   0.001     .0813636    .3353166
       civwar |   .9500339    .032515    29.22   0.000     .8862831    1.013785
   ln_popsize |   .1701979   .0070291    24.21   0.000     .1564162    .1839796
    dummy1994 |    .060503   .0594076     1.02   0.309    -.0559749    .1769809
    dummy1995 |  -.0168701   .0587469    -0.29   0.774    -.1320524    .0983122
    dummy1996 |  -.0988595   .0586906    -1.68   0.092    -.2139315    .0162126
    dummy1997 |  -.0428452   .0582958    -0.73   0.462    -.1571432    .0714528
    dummy1998 |   .1003478   .0580928     1.73   0.084    -.0135522    .2142477
    dummy1999 |   .0885561   .0582869     1.52   0.129    -.0257245    .2028367
    dummy2000 |  -.0290982    .058168    -0.50   0.617    -.1431456    .0849491
    dummy2001 |    .050057   .0580135     0.86   0.388    -.0636873    .1638014
    dummy2002 |   .1780257   .0576994     3.09   0.002      .064897    .2911544
    dummy2003 |   .1859316    .057738     3.22   0.001     .0727272    .2991359
    dummy2004 |   .2098052   .0575654     3.64   0.000     .0969393     .322671
    dummy2005 |   .2777946   .0575514     4.83   0.000     .1649561     .390633
    dummy2006 |   .3092071   .0577438     5.35   0.000     .1959915    .4224227
    dummy2007 |   .3502229   .0577037     6.07   0.000      .237086    .4633599
    dummy2008 |   .2930059   .0574549     5.10   0.000     .1803567    .4056551
    dummy2009 |   .2768828   .0574019     4.82   0.000     .1643375    .3894281
    dummy2010 |   .2660003   .0578479     4.60   0.000     .1525806      .37942
    dummy2011 |   .2206583   .0577276     3.82   0.000     .1074743    .3338422
    dummy2012 |   .1971078   .0584602     3.37   0.001     .0824874    .3117281
        _cons |   .2277231   .1414142     1.61   0.107    -.0495414    .5049877
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                                                                         .
. regress  fsitot fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
              dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011 dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1297
-------------+------------------------------           F( 13,  1283) =  487.87
       Model |  596256.352    13  45865.8732           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  120618.957  1283  94.0132168           R-squared     =  0.8317
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8300
       Total |  716875.309  1296  553.144528           Root MSE      =   9.696

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      fsitot |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   4.323657   .1715199    25.21   0.000     3.987167    4.660147
      ln_gni |  -9.067268   .2050029   -44.23   0.000    -9.469446    -8.66509
    econgrwth |   .0213014   .0613778     0.35   0.729    -.0991106    .1417133
     britinf |   .7465324     .59505     1.25   0.210    -.4208455     1.91391
     intlwar |  -2.968445   1.648967    -1.80   0.072    -6.203413     .266524
      civwar |    9.78888   .8272848    11.83   0.000       8.1659    11.41186
  ln_popsize |  -.3965355   .1881474    -2.11   0.035    -.7656458   -.0274252
   dummy2007 |   1.883925   .9285156     2.03   0.043     .0623495    3.705501
   dummy2008 |   4.260838   .9356928     4.55   0.000     2.425183    6.096494
   dummy2009 |   4.426451    .989733     4.47   0.000     2.484779    6.368124
   dummy2010 |   4.005627   .9410231     4.26   0.000     2.159514     5.85174
   dummy2011 |   4.149727   .9417061     4.41   0.000     2.302274     5.99718
   dummy2012 |   4.478093   .9611485     4.66   0.000     2.592498    6.363688
       _cons |   132.0509   3.764805    35.08   0.000      124.665    139.4367
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. regress  ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
             ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd cumyearsspp ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3
                              ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 du
> mmy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003
dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
                                                                     dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1207
-------------+------------------------------           F( 32,  1174) =   74.51
       Model | 801.700074     32  25.0531273           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual | 394.720805   1174  .336218743           R-squared     =  0.6701
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6611
       Total | 1196.42088   1206  .992057113           Root MSE      =  .57984


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     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .1981256   .0147932    13.39   0.000     .1691016    .2271496
      ln_gni |  -.2056179   .0220681    -9.32   0.000    -.2489152   -.1623207
    econgrwth |  -.0194816   .0037747    -5.16   0.000    -.0268874   -.0120757
     britinf |   -.068417   .0415191    -1.65   0.100    -.1498769    .0130429
      intlwar |   .1390541   .1024425     1.36   0.175    -.0619368    .3400449
       civwar |   .7217805   .0514408    14.03   0.000     .6208542    .8227068
  ln_popsize |   .2470294   .0155192    15.92   0.000     .2165809    .2774779
  ln_miltotl |   .1309618     .03165     4.14   0.000     .0688649    .1930588
  ln_milxpnd |  -.1464088   .0342456    -4.28   0.000    -.2135981   -.0792195
 cumyearsspp |  -.0072428   .0043032    -1.68   0.093    -.0156855       .0012
  ln_fmslag3 |  -.0116796   .0088839    -1.31   0.189    -.0291097    .0057505
ln_imetfun~3 |   -.139975   .0289207    -4.84   0.000     -.196717    -.083233
ln_imetpar~3 |   .1624533   .0246115     6.60   0.000     .1141658    .2107409
   dummy1994 |   .0755323   .1000869     0.75   0.451    -.1208369    .2719015
   dummy1995 |   .0198962   .1024058     0.19   0.846    -.1810226     .220815
   dummy1996 |  -.2073006   .1016315    -2.04   0.042    -.4067002    -.007901
   dummy1997 |  -.0992171   .1013231    -0.98   0.328    -.2980116    .0995774
   dummy1998 |   .1189978   .1028497     1.16   0.248    -.0827918    .3207875
   dummy1999 |   .0196431   .0993321     0.20   0.843    -.1752451    .2145313
   dummy2000 |  -.0580072   .0988833    -0.59   0.558     -.252015    .1360005
   dummy2001 |   .0142777   .0963023     0.15   0.882    -.1746663    .2032216
   dummy2002 |  -.0053054   .0979504    -0.05   0.957    -.1974828     .186872
   dummy2003 |   .0439636    .095101     0.46   0.644    -.1426234    .2305505
   dummy2004 |    .193846   .0953547     2.03   0.042     .0067614    .3809306
   dummy2005 |   .1967605   .0935021     2.10   0.036     .0133106    .3802104
   dummy2006 |   .3573058   .0986982     3.62   0.000     .1636611    .5509504
   dummy2007 |   .4250397   .1011433     4.20   0.000     .2265979    .6234815
   dummy2008 |   .3289333   .0989482     3.32   0.001     .1347983    .5230684
   dummy2009 |   .2897429   .1013576     2.86   0.004     .0908807    .4886051
   dummy2010 |   .4179633   .0977944     4.27   0.000     .2260919    .6098346
   dummy2011 |   .3268333    .100026     3.27   0.001     .1305835    .5230831
   dummy2012 |   .2781064   .1042576     2.67   0.008     .0735543    .4826585
       _cons |  -.1592361   .3085132    -0.52   0.606    -.7645348    .4460626
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. regress  ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
  ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd  spp14_dum spp58_dum spp912_dum spp1316_dum spp1720_dum
                                                   ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag
       > 3 ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998
dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006
                                               dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 du
                                               > mmy2010 dummy2011 dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1207
-------------+------------------------------           F( 36,  1170) =   66.56
       Model | 803.905567      36  22.3307102           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual | 392.515311    1170  .335483172           R-squared     =  0.6719
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6618
       Total | 1196.42088    1206  .992057113           Root MSE      =  .57921


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     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .1999044   .0147601    13.54   0.000     .1709451    .2288636
      ln_gni |   -.202142   .0221059    -9.14   0.000    -.2455136   -.1587704
    econgrwth |  -.0204527    .003797    -5.39   0.000    -.0279025    -.013003
      britinf |  -.0554713   .0412679    -1.34   0.179    -.1364386    .0254961
      intlwar |   .1228423   .1024707     1.20   0.231    -.0782045    .3238891
       civwar |   .7295877    .051574    14.15   0.000     .6283998    .8307756
   ln_popsize |   .2529855   .0152894    16.55   0.000     .2229878    .2829831
   ln_miltotl |   .1282061   .0319028     4.02   0.000      .065613    .1907992
   ln_milxpnd |  -.1387982   .0348722    -3.98   0.000    -.2072172   -.0703793
    spp14_dum |   .0686371   .0615828     1.11   0.265    -.0521879    .1894621
    spp58_dum |   .0393902   .0602435     0.65   0.513    -.0788071    .1575875
   spp912_dum |   .0402901   .0655144     0.61   0.539    -.0882487    .1688289
  spp1316_dum |   .0094018   .0794518     0.12   0.906    -.1464822    .1652858
  spp1720_dum |  -.2328802   .0943311    -2.47   0.014    -.4179573   -.0478031
   ln_fmslag3 |  -.0106269   .0089139    -1.19   0.233    -.0281159    .0068621
 ln_imetfun~3 |  -.1447565   .0285571    -5.07   0.000    -.2007854   -.0887277
 ln_imetpar~3 |   .1595786   .0246341     6.48   0.000     .1112466    .2079106
    dummy1994 |   .0766935   .0999651     0.77   0.443    -.1194374    .2728244
    dummy1995 |   .0231354   .1022935     0.23   0.821    -.1775638    .2238347
    dummy1996 |  -.2077199   .1015817    -2.04   0.041    -.4070226   -.0084173
    dummy1997 |  -.1072342   .1012994    -1.06   0.290     -.305983    .0915146
    dummy1998 |   .1054679    .102902     1.02   0.306    -.0964251    .3073609
    dummy1999 |   .0004291   .0996313     0.00   0.997     -.195047    .1959051
    dummy2000 |  -.0838605   .0996751    -0.84   0.400    -.2794224    .1117013
    dummy2001 |  -.0182752   .0972312    -0.19   0.851    -.2090422    .1724919
    dummy2002 |  -.0435262     .09895    -0.44   0.660    -.2376655     .150613
    dummy2003 |  -.0012597   .0964726    -0.01   0.990    -.1905384     .188019
    dummy2004 |   .1443094   .0974913     1.48   0.139    -.0469679    .3355868
    dummy2005 |   .1534272   .0945737     1.62   0.105    -.0321257    .3389802
    dummy2006 |   .3037275    .100058     3.04   0.002     .1074142    .5000407
    dummy2007 |   .3753827   .1020075     3.68   0.000     .1752446    .5755208
    dummy2008 |     .27598   .1008687     2.74   0.006     .0780763    .4738837
    dummy2009 |   .2721092   .1020451     2.67   0.008     .0718975     .472321
    dummy2010 |   .4003634   .0978716     4.09   0.000       .20834    .5923868
    dummy2011 |   .3034009   .0994472     3.05   0.002     .1082861    .4985157
    dummy2012 |   .2655545   .1051516     2.53   0.012     .0592478    .4718613
        _cons |  -.2655851   .3092689    -0.86   0.391    -.8723687    .3411984
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. regress   fsitot fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
            ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd cumyearsspp ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3
                    ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy2007 dummy2008 du
              > mmy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011 dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     531
-------------+------------------------------           F( 19,   511) =  102.71
       Model |  141312.225    19  7437.48552           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  37003.7039   511  72.4142934           R-squared     =  0.7925
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7848
       Total |  178315.929   530  336.445149           Root MSE      =  8.5097


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      fsitot |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   4.442097   .3639181    12.21   0.000     3.727137    5.157056
      ln_gni |   -9.02483   .5180114   -17.42   0.000    -10.04252   -8.007136
    econgrwth |  -.0460517   .0910909    -0.51   0.613    -.2250104     .132907
      britinf |  -.1920571   .9332558    -0.21   0.837    -2.025547    1.641433
      intlwar |  -1.533663   2.206765    -0.69   0.487    -5.869112    2.801786
       civwar |   8.161249   1.243031     6.57   0.000     5.719169    10.60333
   ln_popsize |   .7254982   .3663516     1.98   0.048     .0057575    1.445239
   ln_miltotl |   2.333755   .7154702     3.26   0.001     .9281303     3.73938
   ln_milxpnd |  -1.195099   .7891042    -1.51   0.131    -2.745386     .355189
  cumyearsspp |   .0779494   .0802536     0.97   0.332    -.0797181    .2356169
   ln_fmslag3 |  -.1994722   .2213822    -0.90   0.368    -.6344035    .2354591
ln_imetfun~3 |  -1.762998    .662558    -2.66   0.008    -3.064671   -.4613252
ln_imetpar~3 |   .8356135   .5018816     1.66   0.097    -.1503917    1.821619
   dummy2007 |   .6316891   1.331781     0.47   0.635     -1.98475    3.248128
   dummy2008 |   2.797216   1.323935     2.11   0.035     .1961913    5.398241
   dummy2009 |   2.011266   1.463558     1.37   0.170    -.8640661    4.886598
   dummy2010 |   2.803668    1.30275     2.15   0.032      .244262    5.363074
   dummy2011 |    2.69397   1.341905     2.01   0.045     .0576407    5.330299
   dummy2012 |   2.998545   1.425747     2.10   0.036     .1974981    5.799591
       _cons |   127.0062   7.837081    16.21   0.000     111.6093     142.403
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. regress   fsitot fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
  ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd  spp14_dum spp58_dum spp912_dum spp1316_dum spp1720_dum
                                                ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag
  > 3 ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
                                                dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     531
-------------+------------------------------           F( 23,   507) =   85.70
       Model |  141834.009    23  6166.69606           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  36481.9195   507  71.9564487           R-squared     =  0.7954
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7861
       Total |  178315.929   530  336.445149           Root MSE      =  8.4827


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      fsitot |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   4.374876   .3648448    11.99   0.000     3.658082     5.09167
      ln_gni |  -8.904195   .5199328   -17.13   0.000    -9.925683   -7.882707
    econgrwth |  -.072054   .0923548    -0.78   0.436    -.2534993    .1093912
      britinf |  -.0258957   .9221964    -0.03   0.978    -1.837692    1.785901
      intlwar |    -1.8668   2.212669    -0.84   0.399    -6.213929    2.480328
       civwar |   8.412782    1.25171     6.72   0.000     5.953606    10.87196
   ln_popsize |   .7587071   .3563512     2.13   0.034     .0586003    1.458814
   ln_miltotl |   2.266369   .7191397     3.15   0.002      .853508     3.67923
   ln_milxpnd |  -1.035924   .8085531    -1.28   0.201    -2.624452    .5526027
    spp14_dum |   .6014506    1.23239     0.49   0.626    -1.819768     3.02267
    spp58_dum |   1.575506   1.117929     1.41   0.159    -.6208371    3.771849
   spp912_dum |   2.724411   1.274513     2.14   0.033     .2204343    5.228387
  spp1316_dum |   2.202465   1.254416     1.76   0.080    -.2620294    4.666959
  spp1720_dum |   -.237781   1.518037    -0.16   0.876    -3.220198    2.744636
   ln_fmslag3 |   -.176966   .2214806    -0.80   0.425    -.6120988    .2581668
 ln_imetfun~3 |  -1.772066   .6444248    -2.75   0.006    -3.038138   -.5059943
 ln_imetpar~3 |    .709007   .5004419     1.42   0.157    -.2741882    1.692202
    dummy2007 |   .5818141   1.335185     0.44   0.663    -2.041362     3.20499
    dummy2008 |   2.550606    1.33109     1.92   0.056    -.0645258    5.165738
    dummy2009 |   2.264747   1.475601     1.53   0.125    -.6342982    5.163791
    dummy2010 |   3.096349   1.315563     2.35   0.019     .5117221    5.680976
    dummy2011 |   2.895656   1.348076     2.15   0.032     .2471516    5.544159
    dummy2012 |    3.16594   1.447548     2.19   0.029     .3220089    6.009872
        _cons |    125.567   7.865358    15.96   0.000     110.1143    141.0197
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. regress  ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001
dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy2
> 004 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     916
-------------+------------------------------           F( 26,   889) =   79.59
       Model |  436.643673    26  16.7939874           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  187.592953   889  .211015696           R-squared     =  0.6995
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6907
       Total |  624.236627   915  .682225821           Root MSE      =  .45936

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .1956351   .0193623    10.10   0.000     .1576339    .2336362
      ln_gni |    -.17828    .019812    -9.00   0.000    -.2171639   -.1393962
    econgrwth |  -.0019644   .0029475    -0.67   0.505    -.0077493    .0038205
      britinf |   .0356029   .0522701     0.68   0.496    -.0669842      .13819
      intlwar |   .2143187   .1025691     2.09   0.037     .0130128    .4156246
       civwar |   1.106344   .0693583    15.95   0.000     .9702186    1.242469
   ln_popsize |   .1063503   .0112625     9.44   0.000     .0842461    .1284546
    dummy1994 |   .0268474   .0866978     0.31   0.757    -.1433088    .1970037
    dummy1995 |   .0235025   .0864646     0.27   0.786    -.1461961     .193201
    dummy1996 |  -.0381631   .0861758    -0.44   0.658    -.2072948    .1309687
    dummy1997 |   .1028984   .0844112     1.22   0.223    -.0627701     .268567
    dummy1998 |   .1959941   .0842561     2.33   0.020       .03063    .3613581
    dummy1999 |   .2215082   .0842553     2.63   0.009     .0561457    .3868706
    dummy2000 |   .0759196   .0846625     0.90   0.370    -.0902421    .2420813
    dummy2001 |   .2210733   .0841089     2.63   0.009     .0559981    .3861485
    dummy2002 |    .393292   .0826658     4.76   0.000     .2310491    .5555348
    dummy2003 |   .2537066   .0827126     3.07   0.002     .0913719    .4160413
    dummy2004 |   .3845468   .0829657     4.64   0.000     .2217154    .5473782
    dummy2005 |   .3856211   .0830791     4.64   0.000     .2225672    .5486751
    dummy2006 |   .4009493   .0837382     4.79   0.000     .2366016     .565297
    dummy2007 |   .5029148   .0825674     6.09   0.000     .3408651    .6649645
    dummy2008 |   .3763643    .081894     4.60   0.000     .2156361    .5370925
    dummy2009 |   .3711835   .0836123     4.44   0.000      .207083    .5352841
    dummy2010 |   .2536205   .0813471     3.12   0.002     .0939658    .4132753
    dummy2011 |   .2650214   .0815208     3.25   0.001     .1050257    .4250171
    dummy2012 |    .141309   .0814172     1.74   0.083    -.0184832    .3011013
        _cons |    1.02136   .2611434     3.91   0.000     .5088304    1.533889
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. regress  fsitot fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011 dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     361
-------------+------------------------------          F( 13,   347) =  169.67
       Model |  146351.607    13  11257.8159          Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  23024.5081   347  66.3530493          R-squared     =  0.8641
-------------+------------------------------          Adj R-squared =  0.8590
       Total |  169376.115   360  470.489209          Root MSE      =  8.1457


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      fsitot |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   2.070038   .4794723     4.32   0.000     1.127001    3.013076
      ln_gni |  -15.23743   .6056775   -25.16   0.000    -16.42869   -14.04617
    econgrwth |  -.1603969   .1282773    -1.25   0.212    -.4126957     .091902
      britinf |   7.031656   1.590135     4.42   0.000     3.904139    10.15917
      intlwar |  -5.322865    2.83281    -1.88   0.061     -10.8945    .2487731
       civwar |    23.3495   1.783434    13.09   0.000      19.8418     26.8572
   ln_popsize |  -.4189186   .3299836    -1.27   0.205    -1.067938    .2301011
   dummy2007 |   2.834397   1.494025     1.90   0.059     -.104087     5.77288
   dummy2008 |    4.46401   1.559329     2.86   0.004     1.397083    7.530936
   dummy2009 |   3.809307    2.03339     1.87   0.062    -.1900142    7.808627
   dummy2010 |   4.321682   1.564658     2.76   0.006     1.244275    7.399089
   dummy2011 |   4.078195   1.559271     2.62   0.009     1.011384    7.145006
   dummy2012 |   2.109507   1.647132     1.28   0.201    -1.130111    5.349125
       _cons |   194.8645    7.88101    24.73   0.000     179.3639     210.365
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. regress  ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd cumyearsspp ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3
ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 du
> mmy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003
dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     325
-------------+------------------------------           F( 32,   292) =   33.80
       Model | 158.464931    32  4.95202908            Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual | 42.7781464   292  .146500501            R-squared     =  0.7874
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7641
       Total | 201.243077   324  .621120608            Root MSE      =  .38275

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     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .2177316   .0402586     5.41   0.000     .1384977    .2969655
      ln_gni |  -.3059657   .0544329    -5.62   0.000    -.4130963   -.1988351
    econgrwth |  -.0284822   .0059321    -4.80   0.000    -.0401573   -.0168071
     britinf |   .2488533   .1724424     1.44   0.150    -.0905343    .5882409
      intlwar |   .1669738    .108601     1.54   0.125     -.046766    .3807137
       civwar |   .7494029   .1118684     6.70   0.000     .5292323    .9695735
   ln_popsize |   .1896479   .0278978     6.80   0.000     .1347417    .2445542
   ln_miltotl |    .182398   .0608151     3.00   0.003     .0627065    .3020894
   ln_milxpnd |   .0135693   .0608727     0.22   0.824    -.1062356    .1333742
  cumyearsspp |   .0043405   .0059817     0.73   0.469    -.0074322    .0161132
   ln_fmslag3 |    .028339   .0145193     1.95   0.052    -.0002368    .0569148
ln_imetfun~3 |  -.1080464   .0405605    -2.66   0.008    -.1878745   -.0282184
ln_imetpar~3 |   .0735579   .0351987     2.09   0.038     .0042825    .1428333
    dummy1994 |    .121512   .1804228     0.67   0.501    -.2335819     .476606
    dummy1995 |   .1857497    .204536     0.91   0.365    -.2168019    .5883014
    dummy1996 |  -.1072485   .1916467    -0.56   0.576    -.4844325    .2699354
    dummy1997 |   .1249009   .1806181     0.69   0.490    -.2305776    .4803793
    dummy1998 |   .1592918   .1684407     0.95   0.345    -.1722199    .4908036
    dummy1999 |   .1124506   .1542906     0.73   0.467     -.191212    .4161132
    dummy2000 |  -.0400571   .1602181    -0.25   0.803    -.3553857    .2752715
    dummy2001 |   .1417324   .1554864     0.91   0.363    -.1642836    .4477485
    dummy2002 |   .1614531   .1467137     1.10   0.272    -.1272973    .4502036
    dummy2003 |   .0520577   .1435012     0.36   0.717      -.23037    .3344855
    dummy2004 |   .3486197   .1439282     2.42   0.016     .0653515    .6318879
    dummy2005 |   .4279169   .1474506     2.90   0.004     .1377162    .7181175
    dummy2006 |   .5087317   .1480979     3.44   0.001      .217257    .8002063
    dummy2007 |   .7074499   .1531486     4.62   0.000     .4060348    1.008865
    dummy2008 |   .4087334   .1563742     2.61   0.009       .10097    .7164968
    dummy2009 |   .1354559   .1684278     0.80   0.422    -.1960305    .4669423
    dummy2010 |   .3496506   .1583198     2.21   0.028     .0380581    .6612432
    dummy2011 |   .3741842   .1630791     2.29   0.022     .0532246    .6951438
    dummy2012 |   .1666918   .1667387     1.00   0.318    -.1614702    .4948538
        _cons |   1.025275   .7674093     1.34   0.183    -.4850794     2.53563
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. regress  ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd  spp14_dum spp58_dum spp912_dum spp1316_dum spp1720_dum
ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag
> 3 ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998
dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006
dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 du
> mmy2010 dummy2011 dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     325
-------------+------------------------------           F( 36,    288) =   31.16
       Model |  160.129581    36  4.44804392           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  41.1134959   288  .142755194           R-squared     =  0.7957
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7702
       Total |  201.243077   324  .621120608           Root MSE      =  .37783

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .2315514   .0407091     5.69   0.000     .1514263    .3116766
      ln_gni |  -.3422399   .0559275    -6.12   0.000    -.4523184   -.2321615
    econgrwth |  -.0277952   .0059057    -4.71   0.000     -.039419   -.0161714
     britinf |    .067724   .1789519     0.38   0.705    -.2844953    .4199434
      intlwar |   .1911185   .1094661     1.75   0.082    -.0243365    .4065734
      civwar |   .6435058   .1149452     5.60   0.000     .4172666    .8697451
  ln_popsize |   .1734764    .027954     6.21   0.000     .1184564    .2284964
  ln_miltotl |   .1315428   .0616045     2.14   0.034     .0102906    .2527949
  ln_milxpnd |   .0428447   .0613357     0.70   0.485    -.0778784    .1635678
   spp14_dum |  -.5103916   .1749578    -2.92   0.004    -.8547496   -.1660336
   spp58_dum |  -.2731644   .1169909    -2.33   0.020    -.5034299   -.0428989
  spp912_dum |  -.2251463   .1121256    -2.01   0.046    -.4458359   -.0044568
 spp1316_dum |  -.1159338   .1209782    -0.96   0.339    -.3540473    .1221797
 spp1720_dum |  -.0704025   .1258507    -0.56   0.576    -.3181063    .1773013
  ln_fmslag3 |    .013444   .0151239     0.89   0.375    -.0163235    .0432114
ln_imetfun~3 |  -.0943369   .0404865    -2.33   0.020    -.1740239   -.0146499
ln_imetpar~3 |   .0800797   .0350009     2.29   0.023     .0111896    .1489698
   dummy1994 |   .1333737   .1781225     0.75   0.455    -.2172131    .4839606
   dummy1995 |   .1930941   .2019354     0.96   0.340    -.2043622    .5905505
   dummy1996 |   -.010336   .1917808    -0.05   0.957    -.3878057    .3671337
   dummy1997 |   .1559194   .1786615     0.87   0.384    -.1957285    .5075672
   dummy1998 |   .2383781   .1683604     1.42   0.158    -.0929947    .5697509
   dummy1999 |   .2013908   .1560853     1.29   0.198    -.1058217    .5086033
   dummy2000 |   .0718551   .1638804     0.44   0.661    -.2507001    .3944103
   dummy2001 |   .2385803   .1607436     1.48   0.139    -.0778008    .5549614
   dummy2002 |    .258887   .1520351     1.70   0.090    -.0403539    .5581279
   dummy2003 |    .186761   .1495801     1.25   0.213    -.1076478    .4811698
   dummy2004 |   .4903328   .1516575     3.23   0.001     .1918351    .7888304
   dummy2005 |   .5047683   .1536392     3.29   0.001     .2023702    .8071664
   dummy2006 |   .5889396   .1539183     3.83   0.000     .2859921     .891887
   dummy2007 |   .7704447   .1592596     4.84   0.000     .4569844    1.083905
   dummy2008 |   .4815208   .1639738     2.94   0.004     .1587819    .8042598
   dummy2009 |   .1963568   .1714841     1.15   0.253    -.1411643    .5338778
   dummy2010 |   .4063892   .1594138     2.55   0.011     .0926253    .7201531
   dummy2011 |   .4354054   .1616051     2.69   0.007     .1173286    .7534823
   dummy2012 |   .2440383   .1650868     1.48   0.140    -.0808912    .5689679
       _cons |     1.6856   .7979924     2.11   0.036     .1149633    3.256237
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```
. regress   fsitot fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd cumyearsspp ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3
ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy2007 dummy2008 du
> mmy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011 dummy2012

      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     176
-------------+------------------------------           F( 19,   156) =   80.21
       Model |  42186.1233    19  2220.32228           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  4318.11969   156  27.6802544           R-squared     =  0.9071
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8958
       Total |   46504.243   175  265.738531           Root MSE      =  5.2612


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      fsitot |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |    3.69088   .7441102     4.96   0.000     2.221048    5.160711
      ln_gni |  -14.61687   1.050839   -13.91   0.000    -16.69258   -12.54117
    econgrwth |  -.0981438   .0995338    -0.99   0.326    -.2947516     .098464
      britinf |  -.5713293   5.610526    -0.10   0.919    -11.65373    10.51107
      intlwar |  -7.251142   1.989263    -3.65   0.000    -11.18051   -3.321774
       civwar |   15.30606   2.296728     6.66   0.000     10.76936    19.84276
   ln_popsize |  -1.318002   .5434687    -2.43   0.016    -2.391509    -.244495
   ln_miltotl |  -4.425423   1.035939    -4.27   0.000    -6.471699   -2.379146
   ln_milxpnd |    1.88772   1.053365     1.79   0.075    -.1929785    3.968419
  cumyearsspp |  -.2569602   .1125512    -2.28   0.024    -.4792811   -.0346393
   ln_fmslag3 |   .4299352   .3468353     1.24   0.217    -.2551643    1.115035
 ln_imetfun~3 |  -2.043804   1.209516    -1.69   0.093    -4.432946     .345338
 ln_imetpar~3 |   1.748393    .646288     2.71   0.008      .471788    3.024997
    dummy2007 |   2.313881   1.467892     1.58   0.117    -.5856282     5.21339
    dummy2008 |   4.575185   1.652242     2.77   0.006     1.311532    7.838839
    dummy2009 |   4.321647   2.144048     2.02   0.046     .0865353    8.556759
    dummy2010 |   4.606595   1.743621     2.64   0.009     1.162442    8.050747
    dummy2011 |   5.041936   1.844891     2.73   0.007     1.397746    8.686127
    dummy2012 |   3.655427   2.004953     1.82   0.070    -.3049324    7.615786
        _cons |   205.0611   14.67957    13.97   0.000     176.0647    234.0575
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. regress   fsitot fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd  spp14_dum spp58_dum spp912_dum spp1316_dum spp1720_dum
ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag
> 3 ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
dummy2012
```

Source	SS	df	MS
Model	42780.4051	23	1860.01761
Residual	3723.83788	152	24.4989334
Total	46504.243	175	265.738531

Number of obs =   176
F(23,   152) =   75.92
Prob > F   = 0.0000
R-squared   = 0.9199
Adj R-squared = 0.9078
Root MSE   = 4.9496

fsitot	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
fhtotal	3.239218	.7915186	4.09	0.000	1.67542	4.803017
ln_gni	-14.31771	1.006222	-14.23	0.000	-16.3057	-12.32973
econgrwth	-.0990985	.095969	-1.03	0.303	-.2887038	.0905068
britinf	3.805852	5.444832	0.70	0.486	-6.951469	14.56317
intlwar	-7.157349	2.007206	-3.57	0.000	-11.12297	-3.191725
civwar	17.22418	2.280665	7.55	0.000	12.71829	21.73008
ln_popsize	-.9800635	.5176779	-1.89	0.060	-2.002837	.0427097
ln_miltotl	-3.473118	1.006517	-3.45	0.001	-5.461687	-1.484549
ln_milxpnd	1.414949	1.006932	1.41	0.162	-.5744398	3.404338
spp14_dum	16.73357	3.837046	4.36	0.000	9.15274	24.3144
spp58_dum	4.223391	2.53917	1.66	0.098	-.7932316	9.240013
spp912_dum	1.231824	2.545505	0.48	0.629	-3.797313	6.260962
spp1316_dum	1.16406	2.114857	0.55	0.583	-3.01425	5.342369
spp1720_dum	-1.316745	2.31375	-0.57	0.570	-5.888007	3.254518
ln_fmslag3	.8738386	.3561027	2.45	0.015	.1702886	1.577389
ln_imetfun~3	-2.544899	1.146646	-2.22	0.028	-4.81032	-.2794785
ln_imetpar~3	1.652399	.6123914	2.70	0.008	.4425011	2.862297
dummy2007	3.04656	1.420035	2.15	0.034	.2410064	5.852114
dummy2008	4.939245	1.5936	3.10	0.002	1.790779	8.087711
dummy2009	5.933043	2.169287	2.74	0.007	1.647195	10.21889
dummy2010	6.29749	1.792327	3.51	0.001	2.7564	9.838579
dummy2011	6.571486	1.824047	3.60	0.000	2.967727	10.17525
dummy2012	4.909703	1.968278	2.49	0.014	1.020988	8.798419
_cons	192.9905	14.4681	13.34	0.000	164.4059	221.575

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Appendix B – Ologit Regression Results (PTS models)

Global Analysis

```
. ologit ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001
dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy2004 d
> ummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
dummy2012
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -7048.6876
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -5502.3048
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -5255.0503
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -5246.0348
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -5246.013
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -5246.013
```

```
Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs   =       3462
                                                LR chi2(26)     =    3605.35
                                                Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood =  -5246.013                     Pseudo R2       =     0.2557
```

ptsmean	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
fhtotal	.5317961	.0213524	24.91	0.000	.4899462	.573646
ln_gni	-.5373401	.0256292	-20.97	0.000	-.5875724	-.4871078
econgrwth	-.010018	.0056707	-1.77	0.077	-.0211323	.0010964
britinf	.1152754	.0685522	1.68	0.093	-.0190845	.2496354
intlwar	.7105734	.1832847	3.88	0.000	.351342	1.069805
civwar	2.539826	.1122685	22.62	0.000	2.319784	2.759868
ln_popsize	.4823216	.0223756	21.56	0.000	.4384663	.5261769
dummy1994	.1968733	.1816844	1.08	0.279	-.1592216	.5529682
dummy1995	-.0529016	.1759529	-0.30	0.764	-.3977629	.2919597
dummy1996	-.2879957	.1785511	-1.61	0.107	-.6379495	.0619581
dummy1997	-.0869256	.1747196	-0.50	0.619	-.4293698	.2555186
dummy1998	.3109344	.1743226	1.78	0.074	-.0307316	.6526005
dummy1999	.3160286	.1710522	1.85	0.065	-.0192276	.6512848
dummy2000	.0120647	.1716743	0.07	0.944	-.3244108	.3485403
dummy2001	.188446	.167422	1.13	0.260	-.1396952	.5165871
dummy2002	.6012275	.1637541	3.67	0.000	.2802752	.9221797
dummy2003	.6336092	.165642	3.83	0.000	.3089569	.9582615
dummy2004	.7411762	.1616706	4.58	0.000	.4243077	1.058045
dummy2005	.9210453	.1650116	5.58	0.000	.5976285	1.244462
dummy2006	1.036012	.1649481	6.28	0.000	.7127195	1.359304
dummy2007	1.172562	.1674023	7.00	0.000	.8444597	1.500665
dummy2008	1.00314	.1670325	6.01	0.000	.6757619	1.330517
dummy2009	.9316822	.1686329	5.52	0.000	.6011678	1.262197
dummy2010	.901222	.1688545	5.34	0.000	.5702733	1.232171
dummy2011	.7741607	.1670788	4.63	0.000	.4466923	1.101629
dummy2012	.7059511	.16772	4.21	0.000	.3772259	1.034676

```
. ologit ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd cumyearsspp ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3
ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy19
> 96 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003
dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
dummy2012

Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -2435.051
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1876.8429
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1772.3361
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1768.3644
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1768.3507
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1768.3507

Ordered logistic regression                    Number of obs   =       1207
                                                LR chi2(32)     =    1333.40
                                                Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -1768.3507                     Pseudo R2       =     0.2738

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .6807726   .0502313    13.55   0.000     .5823211    .7792241
      ln_gni |  -.6927524   .0731014    -9.48   0.000    -.8360286   -.5494762
    econgrwth |  -.0657732   .0129428    -5.08   0.000    -.0911406   -.0404057
      britinf |  -.3302271   .1334129    -2.48   0.013    -.5917116   -.0687427
      intlwar |   .5082875   .3171242     1.60   0.109    -.1132645     1.12984
       civwar |   2.142162   .1853607    11.56   0.000     1.778861    2.505462
   ln_popsize |   .8188481   .0548875    14.92   0.000     .7112706    .9264256
   ln_miltotl |   .4745626   .0995533     4.77   0.000     .2794416    .6696835
   ln_milxpnd |  -.4969073   .1093268    -4.55   0.000    -.7111838   -.2826307
  cumyearsspp |  -.0272004   .0132423    -2.05   0.040    -.0531548   -.0012459
   ln_fmslag3 |  -.0420711   .0278953    -1.51   0.132     -.096745    .0126028
 ln_imetfun~3 |  -.4588302   .0948345    -4.84   0.000    -.6447025   -.2729579
 ln_imetpar~3 |   .5512935   .0818368     6.74   0.000     .3908963    .7116907
    dummy1994 |   .2810396    .335087     0.84   0.402    -.3757188    .9377979
    dummy1995 |  -.0261618   .3264482    -0.08   0.936    -.6659885    .6136649
    dummy1996 |  -.7246907   .3396092    -2.13   0.033    -1.390313   -.0590689
    dummy1997 |  -.1554248   .3273314    -0.47   0.635    -.7969826    .4861331
    dummy1998 |   .4154134   .3355816     1.24   0.216    -.2423145    1.073141
    dummy1999 |   .1606059   .3171115     0.51   0.613    -.4609212    .7821331
    dummy2000 |  -.0456945   .3209107    -0.14   0.887     -.674668     .583279
    dummy2001 |   .0753593    .307563     0.25   0.806    -.5274531    .6781717
    dummy2002 |   .0800122   .3147854     0.25   0.799    -.5369558    .6969802
    dummy2003 |   .2374189   .3041246     0.78   0.435    -.3586544    .8334921
    dummy2004 |   .8525099   .3049792     2.80   0.005     .2547615    1.450258
    dummy2005 |    .832628   .3010756     2.77   0.006     .2425306    1.422725
    dummy2006 |   1.352552   .3152976     4.29   0.000     .7345798    1.970524
    dummy2007 |   1.620001   .3258788     4.97   0.000     .9812902    2.258711
    dummy2008 |   1.189617   .3186232     3.73   0.000     .5651267    1.814107
    dummy2009 |   .9210837   .3229094     2.85   0.004     .2881929    1.553975
    dummy2010 |   1.448273   .3179998     4.55   0.000      .825005    2.071541
    dummy2011 |   1.229437   .3206701     3.83   0.000     .6009352    1.857939
    dummy2012 |   1.105152   .3304776     3.34   0.001     .4574281    1.752877
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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```
. ologit ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd spp14       spp58       spp912      spp1316     spp1720
ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3 ln_
> imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999
dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007
dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010
> dummy2011 dummy2012

Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -2435.051
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1875.6019
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1770.4934
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1766.4673
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1766.4536
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -1766.4536

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs   =       1207
                                                 LR chi2(36)     =    1337.19
                                                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -1766.4536                      Pseudo R2       =     0.2746

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ptsmean |     Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .6878953   .0503513    13.66   0.000     .5892085     .786582
      ln_gni |     -.6855   .0734761    -9.33   0.000    -.8295105   -.5414895
    econgrwth |  -.0696768   .0131956    -5.28   0.000    -.0955397   -.0438139
      britinf |  -.2822184   .1331039    -2.12   0.034    -.5430972   -.0213395
      intlwar |   .4642965   .3180575     1.46   0.144    -.1590848    1.087678
       civwar |   2.153237   .1859427    11.58   0.000     1.788796    2.517678
   ln_popsize |   .8379308   .0544881    15.38   0.000     .7311361    .9447255
   ln_miltotl |   .4680391    .100343     4.66   0.000     .2713705    .6647077
   ln_milxpnd |  -.4823868   .1107579    -4.36   0.000    -.6994683   -.2653053
        spp14 |   .1592304    .189704     0.84   0.401    -.2125826    .5310434
        spp58 |   .0904351   .1817256     0.50   0.619    -.2657406    .4466108
       spp912 |    .038337   .2007881     0.19   0.849    -.3552005    .4318745
      spp1316 |  -.0087384   .2431381    -0.04   0.971    -.4852802    .4678035
      spp1720 |  -.7174398   .2884107    -2.49   0.013    -1.282714   -.1521653
   ln_fmslag3 |  -.0381803   .0281278    -1.36   0.175    -.0933098    .0169492
  ln_imetfun~3 |  -.4770612   .0941774    -5.07   0.000    -.6616456   -.2924768
  ln_imetpar~3 |   .5446895   .0824489     6.61   0.000     .3830926    .7062864
    dummy1994 |   .2912498   .3355249     0.87   0.385     -.366367    .9488666
    dummy1995 |  -.0184151   .3267817    -0.06   0.955    -.6588954    .6220653
    dummy1996 |   -.720851   .3406116    -2.12   0.034    -1.388437   -.0532646
    dummy1997 |  -.1807294   .3279855    -0.55   0.582    -.8235692    .4621103
    dummy1998 |   .3730054   .3364385     1.11   0.268     -.286402    1.032413
    dummy1999 |   .1047362   .3188538     0.33   0.743    -.5202058    .7296782
    dummy2000 |  -.1234766    .323513    -0.38   0.703    -.7575505    .5105973
    dummy2001 |   -.010704   .3111218    -0.03   0.973    -.6204915    .5990835
    dummy2002 |  -.0219617   .3186378    -0.07   0.945    -.6464803    .6025568
    dummy2003 |   .1155982    .308296     0.37   0.708    -.4886507    .7198472
    dummy2004 |   .7147271   .3127187     2.29   0.022     .1018096    1.327645
    dummy2005 |   .7000567   .3048657     2.30   0.022      .102531    1.297582
    dummy2006 |   1.187872   .3199508     3.71   0.000     .5607803    1.814964
    dummy2007 |   1.460618   .3288847     4.44   0.000     .8160153     2.10522
    dummy2008 |    1.02707   .3258662     3.15   0.002     .3883839    1.665756
    dummy2009 |   .8646102   .3261794     2.65   0.008     .2253104     1.50391
    dummy2010 |   1.396472   .3197637     4.37   0.000     .7697468    2.023197
    dummy2011 |   1.147511   .3198892     3.59   0.000     .5205395    1.774482
    dummy2012 |   1.039503   .3356555     3.10   0.002     .3816307    1.697376
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Regional Analysis

```
. ologit ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001
dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy20
> 04 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
dummy2012

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1479.9598
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1201.7923
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1065.2921
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1003.2611
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -999.29777
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -999.17288
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -999.17155
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -999.17155

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs   =        916
                                                LR chi2(26)     =     961.58
                                                Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -999.17155                     Pseudo R2       =     0.3249

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ptsmean |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   .6432202   .0826878     7.78   0.000     .4811552    .8052853
      ln_gni |  -.9808876   .0934295   -10.50   0.000    -1.164006    -.797769
    econgrwth |  -.0101411   .0149081    -0.68   0.496    -.0393605    .0190783
     britinf |   .5071391   .2530925     2.00   0.045     .0110868    1.003191
      intlwar |   .7815987   .3902769     2.00   0.045       .01667    1.546527
       civwar |   3.350795   .3948257     8.49   0.000     2.576951    4.124639
   ln_popsize |   .6286157   .0592927    10.60   0.000      .512404    .7448273
    dummy1994 |   .0216009   .4345915     0.05   0.960    -.8301827    .8733845
    dummy1995 |   .1680754    .439973     0.38   0.702    -.6942558    1.030407
    dummy1996 |  -.0637088   .4214529    -0.15   0.880    -.8897412    .7623236
    dummy1997 |   .6279956    .413216     1.52   0.129    -.1818929    1.437884
    dummy1998 |   1.059806   .3999476     2.65   0.008     .2759234    1.843689
    dummy1999 |   1.124487   .3797633     2.96   0.003     .3801647    1.868809
    dummy2000 |   .5437218   .3801023     1.43   0.153    -.2012651    1.288709
    dummy2001 |   1.079337   .3824726     2.82   0.005     .3297047     1.82897
    dummy2002 |   1.871566   .3674565     5.09   0.000     1.151364    2.591767
    dummy2003 |   1.352024   .3754877     3.60   0.000      .616082    2.087967
    dummy2004 |   2.011765   .3657617     5.50   0.000     1.294885    2.728645
    dummy2005 |   2.013087   .3716304     5.42   0.000     1.284705    2.741469
    dummy2006 |   2.142693   .3743283     5.72   0.000     1.409023    2.876363
    dummy2007 |   2.592781   .3712138     6.98   0.000     1.865216    3.320347
    dummy2008 |   2.145982    .370946     5.79   0.000     1.418941    2.873023
    dummy2009 |   2.074459   .3695324     5.61   0.000     1.350188    2.798729
    dummy2010 |   1.638228   .3636946     4.50   0.000     .9253996    2.351056
    dummy2011 |   1.617757   .3668559     4.41   0.000     .8987328    2.336782
    dummy2012 |    1.08612   .3760112     2.89   0.004     .3491515    1.823088
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```
. ologit ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd cumyearsspp ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3
ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 dum
> my1996 dummy1997 dummy1998 dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003
dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006 dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 dummy2010 dummy2011
dummy2012

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -563.89282
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -457.12149
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -363.92548
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -326.85437
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -324.06638
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -324.00752
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -324.00739
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -324.00739

Ordered logistic regression                    Number of obs   =        325
                                                LR chi2(32)     =     479.77
                                                Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -324.00739                     Pseudo R2       =     0.4254
```

ptsmean	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
fhtotal	1.131912	.2205032	5.13	0.000	.6997337	1.564091
ln_gni	-1.824851	.3176386	-5.75	0.000	-2.447411	-1.202291
econgrwth	-.1404405	.0330114	-4.25	0.000	-.2051416	-.0757394
britinf	.9188296	1.027835	0.89	0.371	-1.095691	2.93335
intlwar	.6697435	.5420931	1.24	0.217	-.3927395	1.732226
civwar	4.080076	.9160681	4.45	0.000	2.284616	5.875537
ln_popsize	1.08613	.1624054	6.69	0.000	.7678214	1.404439
ln_miltotl	1.126522	.3252129	3.46	0.001	.4891166	1.763928
ln_milxpnd	.0364773	.3164092	0.12	0.908	-.5836733	.656628
cumyearsspp	.0112406	.0313311	0.36	0.720	-.0501672	.0726485
ln_fmslag3	.1428983	.0809169	1.77	0.077	-.0156959	.3014925
ln_imetfun~3	-.6600233	.2281459	-2.89	0.004	-1.107181	-.2128655
ln_imetpar~3	.4542592	.1940024	2.34	0.019	.0740215	.834497
dummy1994	1.021808	1.061249	0.96	0.336	-1.058203	3.101818
dummy1995	1.177432	1.150683	1.02	0.306	-1.077864	3.432729
dummy1996	-.3337771	1.145667	-0.29	0.771	-2.579244	1.911689
dummy1997	.9532716	.9870165	0.97	0.334	-.9812453	2.887788
dummy1998	.9839398	.9613786	1.02	0.306	-.9003277	2.868207
dummy1999	.8854934	.8730622	1.01	0.310	-.825677	2.596664
dummy2000	.2663236	.8741568	0.30	0.761	-1.446992	1.979639
dummy2001	1.052942	.8590622	1.23	0.220	-.6307894	2.736673
dummy2002	1.319511	.8265212	1.60	0.110	-.3004408	2.939463
dummy2003	.8592732	.8204095	1.05	0.295	-.7487	2.467246
dummy2004	2.575626	.8173638	3.15	0.002	.9736229	4.17763
dummy2005	2.950918	.8318309	3.55	0.000	1.32056	4.581277
dummy2006	3.506502	.8328	4.21	0.000	1.874244	5.13876
dummy2007	4.508864	.8725246	5.17	0.000	2.798747	6.218981
dummy2008	3.091936	.8841972	3.50	0.000	1.358941	4.824931
dummy2009	1.643351	.9190482	1.79	0.074	-.1579506	3.444652
dummy2010	2.628212	.8773028	3.00	0.003	.9087307	4.347694
dummy2011	2.91778	.915735	3.19	0.001	1.122972	4.712587
dummy2012	1.638607	.9204663	1.78	0.075	-.1654739	3.442688

```
. ologit ptsmean fhtotal  ln_gni econgrwth britinf intlwar civwar  ln_popsize
ln_miltotl ln_milxpnd spp14     spp58     spp912     spp1316     spp1720
ln_fmslag3 ln_imetfundinglag3
>  ln_imetpartpntslag3 dummy1994 dummy1995 dummy1996 dummy1997 dummy1998
dummy1999 dummy2000 dummy2001 dummy2002 dummy2003 dummy2004 dummy2005 dummy2006
dummy2007 dummy2008 dummy2009 du
> mmy2010 dummy2011 dummy2012

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -563.89282
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -457.52585
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -363.12456
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -321.7726
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -317.1358
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -317.04051
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -317.04025
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -317.04025

Ordered logistic regression                    Number of obs   =        325
                                               LR chi2(36)     =     493.71
                                               Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -317.04025                    Pseudo R2       =     0.4378

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ptsmean |     Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     fhtotal |   1.254942   .2303689     5.45   0.000     .8034269    1.706456
      ln_gni |  -2.091232   .3365493    -6.21   0.000    -2.750857   -1.431608
    econgrwth |  -.1382564   .0337632    -4.09   0.000    -.2044311   -.0720816
      britinf |  -.0867786   1.070752    -0.08   0.935    -2.185415    2.011858
      intlwar |    .805157   .5768283     1.40   0.163    -.3254057     1.93572
       civwar |   3.651352   .9336481     3.91   0.000     1.821436    5.481269
   ln_popsize |   1.012028   .1641821     6.16   0.000     .6902372    1.333819
   ln_miltotl |   .8142589   .3383505     2.41   0.016     .1511041    1.477414
   ln_milxpnd |   .2629871   .3339821     0.79   0.431    -.3916059    .9175801
        spp14 |  -3.196679   .9949867    -3.21   0.001    -5.146817   -1.246541
        spp58 |  -1.808858   .6686454    -2.71   0.007    -3.119379   -.4983375
       spp912 |  -1.542946   .6461227    -2.39   0.017    -2.809323   -.2765689
      spp1316 |  -1.050853   .6672862    -1.57   0.115     -2.35871    .2570044
      spp1720 |  -.6955983   .6871299    -1.01   0.311    -2.042348    .6511515
   ln_fmslag3 |    .049317   .0863516     0.57   0.568     -.119929    .2185631
  ln_imetfun~3 |  -.6008387   .2301657    -2.61   0.009    -1.051955   -.1497222
  ln_imetpar~3 |   .5266585   .1960612     2.69   0.007     .1423855    .9109314
    dummy1994 |   1.134434   1.072193     1.06   0.290    -.9670258    3.235894
    dummy1995 |   1.303766   1.176725     1.11   0.268    -1.002572    3.610104
    dummy1996 |    .261693   1.103625     0.24   0.813    -1.901371    2.424757
    dummy1997 |     1.2171   1.012219     1.20   0.229    -.7668114    3.201012
    dummy1998 |   1.660667   1.001713     1.66   0.097    -.3026548     3.62399
    dummy1999 |   1.520776   .9135212     1.66   0.096    -.2696926    3.311245
    dummy2000 |    .984516   .9276964     1.06   0.289    -.8337356    2.802768
    dummy2001 |   1.760048   .9276195     1.90   0.058    -.0580531    3.578149
    dummy2002 |   1.997087   .8977641     2.22   0.026     .2375018    3.756672
    dummy2003 |   1.761048   .8749775     2.01   0.044     .0461237    3.475973
    dummy2004 |   3.539291   .8927226     3.96   0.000     1.789587    5.288995
    dummy2005 |   3.617852   .8878691     4.07   0.000     1.877661    5.358044
    dummy2006 |   4.166064   .8888898     4.69   0.000     2.423872    5.908256
    dummy2007 |   5.122691   .9294461     5.51   0.000      3.30101    6.944372
    dummy2008 |   3.666242   .9418739     3.89   0.000     1.820203    5.512281
    dummy2009 |   2.121703   .9621585     2.21   0.027     .2359065    4.007499
    dummy2010 |   3.076306   .9121884     3.37   0.001     1.288449    4.864162
    dummy2011 |   3.398901   .9345876     3.64   0.000     1.567143    5.230659
    dummy2012 |   2.244193   .9391436     2.39   0.017     .4035058    4.084881
```

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Appendix C - Correlation Matrices

Correlation matrix with PTSMEAN variables Global Analysis

```
             | ptsmean  fhtotal   ln_gni econgr~h  britinf  intlwar   civwar ln_pop~e ln_mil~l ln_mil~d cumyea~p
spp14    spp58    spp912
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
     ptsmean |  1.0000
     fhtotal |  0.5267   1.0000
      ln_gni | -0.4991  -0.4746   1.0000
    econgrwth| -0.0086   0.0540  -0.0763   1.0000
     britinf |  0.0441   0.2515  -0.1487   0.0367   1.0000
     intlwar |  0.1315   0.0824  -0.1239   0.0344   0.0345   1.0000
      civwar |  0.5870   0.2819  -0.3138   0.0020  -0.0102   0.1634   1.0000
   ln_popsize|  0.5608   0.1410  -0.2066   0.0647  -0.0764   0.0426   0.4063   1.0000
   ln_miltotl| -0.0984   0.1782   0.3894   0.0016  -0.0671   0.0462  -0.0171  -0.2328   1.0000
   ln_milxpnd|  0.0783   0.3382   0.0750  -0.0501   0.0875   0.0796   0.1340  -0.0283   0.6640   1.0000
 cumyearsspp| -0.3042  -0.3512   0.3279  -0.0286  -0.2852  -0.0175  -0.2243  -0.2097  -0.0586  -0.1575   1.0000
       spp14 | -0.0168  -0.0838  -0.0338   0.0113  -0.0019  -0.0003  -0.0580  -0.0347  -0.0675  -0.1046  -0.0602
1.0000
       spp58 | -0.0271  -0.0621   0.0085   0.0535  -0.0806   0.0215  -0.0745  -0.0452  -0.0206  -0.1522   0.1730   -
0.0455   1.0000
      spp912 | -0.0939  -0.1186   0.0704   0.0477  -0.1393   0.0286  -0.0996  -0.0970  -0.0041  -0.0547   0.3782   -
0.0576  -0.0817   1.0000
      spp1316| -0.1363  -0.1807   0.1680   0.0726  -0.1359  -0.0258  -0.1065  -0.1005  -0.0371  -0.0252   0.4960   -
0.0328  -0.0570  -0.0626
      spp1720| -0.1867  -0.1868   0.2314  -0.1640  -0.1432  -0.0395  -0.1071  -0.0609  -0.0546  -0.0727   0.5762   -
0.0156  -0.0403  -0.0478
   ln_fmslag3|  0.0542   0.0221   0.4336   0.0180  -0.1024  -0.0230   0.0797   0.3105   0.3985   0.3001   0.0224   -
0.0814  -0.0882   0.0034
ln_imetfun~3 |  0.1102  -0.0746   0.0832   0.0513  -0.1503   0.0336   0.1057   0.2616   0.0467   0.0316   0.3618
0.0399   0.1190   0.1550
ln_imetpar~3 |  0.0725  -0.2047   0.1747   0.0236  -0.1416  -0.0144   0.0523   0.2044   0.0739   0.0116   0.1711
0.0602   0.0324   0.1092
   dummy1994 |  0.0374   0.0524  -0.0577  -0.0738   0.0085  -0.0111   0.0218  -0.0150  -0.0430   0.0064  -0.1350   -
0.0625  -0.0704  -0.0671
   dummy1995 |  0.0170   0.0685  -0.0571   0.0026   0.0358  -0.0093   0.0284  -0.0512   0.0262   0.0291  -0.1307   -
0.0605  -0.0681  -0.0650
   dummy1996 | -0.0201   0.0369  -0.0518   0.0012   0.0234   0.0154   0.0151  -0.0159   0.0348   0.0161  -0.1276   -
0.0168  -0.0689  -0.0657
   dummy1997 | -0.0299   0.0256  -0.0296   0.0029   0.0241  -0.0118   0.0304  -0.0261   0.0377   0.0143  -0.1298   -
0.0344  -0.0577  -0.0678
   dummy1998 |  0.0068   0.0046  -0.0075  -0.0624   0.0018  -0.0355   0.0021   0.0004   0.0495   0.0410  -0.1172   -
0.0326  -0.0288  -0.0664
   dummy1999 | -0.0070   0.0125  -0.0133  -0.0412  -0.0019   0.0104   0.0030   0.0168   0.0523   0.0413  -0.0999   -
0.0091   0.0177  -0.0699
   dummy2000 | -0.0359  -0.0064  -0.0547  -0.0237   0.0020   0.0323  -0.0007  -0.0142   0.0638   0.0438  -0.0732
0.0299   0.0786  -0.0712
   dummy2001 | -0.0150   0.0097  -0.0689  -0.0273  -0.0099  -0.0173  -0.0194   0.0032   0.0118  -0.0144  -0.0477
0.0362  -0.0168   0.0677
   dummy2002 | -0.0216  -0.0276  -0.0299  -0.0454  -0.0220  -0.0141  -0.0402   0.0029   0.0234   0.0070  -0.0141
0.0175   0.0033   0.1060
   dummy2003 | -0.0343  -0.0386  -0.0173   0.0416  -0.0206  -0.0178  -0.0210  -0.0153   0.0165  -0.0191   0.0056
0.0741   0.0186   0.1045
   dummy2004 | -0.0444  -0.0703   0.0096   0.1118  -0.0249  -0.0189  -0.0530  -0.0286  -0.0314  -0.0427   0.0263
0.0966  -0.0082   0.1638
   dummy2005 | -0.0126  -0.0533   0.0058   0.0697  -0.0231  -0.0203  -0.0287   0.0042  -0.0257  -0.0123   0.0355
0.0534   0.0118  -0.0164
   dummy2006 |  0.0021  -0.0462   0.0694   0.1294  -0.0015   0.0052   0.0003  -0.0112   0.0315  -0.0061   0.0787
0.0758   0.0078   0.0031
   dummy2007 |  0.0334  -0.0115   0.0427   0.1406  -0.0029   0.0073   0.0058   0.0117   0.0075   0.0170   0.0895   -
0.0270   0.0621  -0.0063
   dummy2008 |  0.0147  -0.0119   0.0482   0.0326   0.0212   0.0269   0.0083   0.0077  -0.0453  -0.0214   0.0970   -
0.0045   0.0916  -0.0110
   dummy2009 |  0.0247   0.0032   0.0547  -0.1946  -0.0053   0.0066   0.0039   0.0046  -0.0357  -0.0143   0.1423   -
0.0123   0.0852  -0.0075
   dummy2010 |  0.0248  -0.0005   0.0737   0.0303  -0.0092  -0.0208  -0.0208   0.0186  -0.0411  -0.0395   0.1580   -
0.0108   0.0454   0.0194
   dummy2011 | -0.0077  -0.0082   0.0978   0.0042   0.0068   0.0006  -0.0021   0.0122  -0.0409  -0.0561   0.2014   -
0.0359  -0.0128   0.0685
   dummy2012 | -0.0216  -0.0115   0.1047  -0.0350  -0.0227   0.0482   0.0065   0.0373  -0.0228  -0.0150   0.2030   -
0.0056   0.0172   0.0643
                                                                                                      Continue
```

```
Continued
              | spp1316   spp1720  ln_fms~3 ln~glag3 l~tslag3 dum~1994 dum~1995 dum~1996 dum~1997 dum~1998 dum~1999
dum~2000 dum~2001 dum~2002
-------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
     spp1316 |    1.0000
     spp1720 |   -0.0297   1.0000
   ln_fmslag3|    0.0270   0.0519   1.0000
  ln_imetfun~3|    0.1714   0.1796   0.3215   1.0000
  ln_imetpar~3|    0.1131   0.0360   0.3243   0.7408   1.0000
    dummy1994 |   -0.0550  -0.0475  -0.0237  -0.0659   0.0121   1.0000
    dummy1995 |   -0.0533  -0.0460  -0.0320  -0.0749  -0.0016  -0.0418   1.0000
    dummy1996 |   -0.0539  -0.0465  -0.0222  -0.0539   0.0597  -0.0423  -0.0410   1.0000
    dummy1997 |   -0.0556  -0.0480  -0.0107  -0.2087  -0.1671  -0.0437  -0.0423  -0.0427   1.0000
    dummy1998 |   -0.0544  -0.0470  -0.0115  -0.1758  -0.1576  -0.0428  -0.0414  -0.0419  -0.0432   1.0000
    dummy1999 |   -0.0573  -0.0495  -0.0252  -0.1013  -0.1081  -0.0450  -0.0436  -0.0440  -0.0455  -0.0445   1.0000
    dummy2000 |   -0.0584  -0.0504  -0.0628  -0.0401  -0.0785  -0.0459  -0.0444  -0.0449  -0.0463  -0.0454  -0.0477
1.0000
    dummy2001 |   -0.0611  -0.0528  -0.0502  -0.0077  -0.0619  -0.0480  -0.0464  -0.0470  -0.0485  -0.0475  -0.0499  -
0.0509   1.0000
    dummy2002 |   -0.0578  -0.0500  -0.0200   0.0103   0.0822  -0.0454  -0.0440  -0.0445  -0.0459  -0.0449  -0.0473  -
0.0482  -0.0504   1.0000
    dummy2003 |   -0.0616  -0.0532  -0.0368  -0.0001   0.0372  -0.0484  -0.0468  -0.0474  -0.0489  -0.0479  -0.0504  -
0.0513  -0.0537  -0.0508
    dummy2004 |   -0.0626  -0.0541  -0.0370   0.0157   0.0323  -0.0492  -0.0476  -0.0482  -0.0497  -0.0487  -0.0512  -
0.0522  -0.0546  -0.0517
    dummy2005 |    0.1260  -0.0554   0.0291   0.0590   0.0990  -0.0504  -0.0488  -0.0493  -0.0509  -0.0499  -0.0525  -
0.0535  -0.0559  -0.0530
    dummy2006 |    0.1530  -0.0528   0.0661   0.0992   0.0921  -0.0480  -0.0464  -0.0470  -0.0485  -0.0475  -0.0499  -
0.0509  -0.0532  -0.0504
    dummy2007 |    0.1598  -0.0514   0.0629   0.1449   0.1051  -0.0467  -0.0452  -0.0457  -0.0472  -0.0462  -0.0486  -
0.0496  -0.0518  -0.0491
    dummy2008 |    0.1964  -0.0360   0.0127   0.1249   0.0653  -0.0484  -0.0468  -0.0474  -0.0489  -0.0479  -0.0504  -
0.0513  -0.0537  -0.0508
    dummy2009 |   -0.0134   0.1780   0.0366   0.1334   0.0714  -0.0471  -0.0456  -0.0461  -0.0476  -0.0466  -0.0491  -
0.0500  -0.0523  -0.0495
    dummy2010 |    0.0080   0.1756   0.0201   0.0584  -0.0197  -0.0508  -0.0492  -0.0497  -0.0513  -0.0503  -0.0529  -
0.0539  -0.0564  -0.0534
    dummy2011 |    0.0516   0.1756   0.0373   0.0747  -0.0376  -0.0508  -0.0492  -0.0497  -0.0513  -0.0503  -0.0529  -
0.0539  -0.0564  -0.0534
    dummy2012 |    0.0132   0.2548   0.0775   0.0822  -0.0920  -0.0488  -0.0472  -0.0478  -0.0493  -0.0483  -0.0508  -
0.0518  -0.0541  -0.0513

              | dum~2003 dum~2004 dum~2005 dum~2006 dum~2007 dum~2008 dum~2009 dum~2010 dum~2011 dum~2012
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    dummy2003 |    1.0000
    dummy2004 |   -0.0551   1.0000
    dummy2005 |   -0.0564  -0.0574   1.0000
    dummy2006 |   -0.0537  -0.0546  -0.0559   1.0000
    dummy2007 |   -0.0523  -0.0532  -0.0545  -0.0518   1.0000
    dummy2008 |   -0.0541  -0.0551  -0.0564  -0.0537  -0.0523   1.0000
    dummy2009 |   -0.0528  -0.0536  -0.0550  -0.0523  -0.0509  -0.0528   1.0000
    dummy2010 |   -0.0569  -0.0578  -0.0592  -0.0564  -0.0549  -0.0569  -0.0554   1.0000
    dummy2011 |   -0.0569  -0.0578  -0.0592  -0.0564  -0.0549  -0.0569  -0.0554  -0.0597   1.0000
    dummy2012 |   -0.0546  -0.0555  -0.0569  -0.0541  -0.0527  -0.0546  -0.0532  -0.0573  -0.0573   1.0000
```

Table X

Correlation matrix with FSITOTAL variables Global

```
             |   fsitot  fhtotal   ln_gni econgr~h   britinf   intlwar   civwar ln_pop~e ln_mil~l ln_mil~d cumyea~p
spp14    spp58    spp912
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
      fsitot |   1.0000
     fhtotal |   0.6992   1.0000
      ln_gni |  -0.7818  -0.4673   1.0000
    econgrwth |   0.2507   0.2207  -0.2909   1.0000
      britinf |   0.2178   0.2621  -0.2118   0.0826   1.0000
      intlwar |   0.1277   0.1143  -0.1240   0.0824   0.0593   1.0000
       civwar |   0.4111   0.2458  -0.2506   0.1208   0.0574   0.1695   1.0000
   ln_popsize |   0.3659   0.2057  -0.3095   0.1178   0.0516  -0.0355   0.5530   1.0000
   ln_miltotl |  -0.1306   0.2180   0.4320  -0.0268  -0.0549   0.0449  -0.0059  -0.1748   1.0000
   ln_milxpnd |   0.0445   0.3402   0.1636  -0.0025   0.0710   0.0443   0.0769  -0.0069   0.6292   1.0000
  cumyearsspp |  -0.4318  -0.4418   0.3727  -0.2114  -0.3748  -0.0327  -0.3133  -0.3632  -0.0538  -0.1841   1.0000
       spp14 |   0.0543  -0.0055  -0.1193   0.0842   0.0150  -0.0575  -0.0657   0.0004  -0.0633  -0.0824  -0.1707
1.0000
       spp58 |   0.0748   0.0446  -0.0759   0.0685  -0.0224   0.0693  -0.0319  -0.0087  -0.0238  -0.1682  -0.0052  -
0.0337   1.0000
      spp912 |   0.0530   0.0144  -0.0414  -0.0380  -0.0842   0.0687  -0.0728  -0.1017  -0.0295  -0.0809   0.1947  -
0.0376  -0.1034   1.0000
     spp1316 |  -0.2267  -0.2702   0.1767   0.0597  -0.2048  -0.0460  -0.1648  -0.1915  -0.0204  -0.0054   0.4813  -
0.0639  -0.1328  -0.1174
     spp1720 |  -0.3187  -0.2801   0.2941  -0.3023  -0.2156  -0.0649  -0.1645  -0.1226  -0.0555  -0.0922   0.6046  -
0.0360  -0.1017  -0.0913
   ln_fmslag3 |  -0.1457   0.0795   0.3858  -0.0924  -0.0403   0.0386   0.2464   0.2948   0.4903   0.4111  -0.0660  -
0.0904  -0.1087  -0.0632
 ln_imetfun~3 |  -0.1601  -0.1452   0.1899  -0.1068  -0.1073   0.0312   0.1680   0.1514   0.2015   0.0622   0.3025  -
0.0311   0.0997   0.0503
 ln_imetpar~3 |  -0.2238  -0.3201   0.1948  -0.0832  -0.1205  -0.0314   0.0746   0.0530   0.1398  -0.0352   0.1367
0.0140   0.0503   0.0464
    dummy2007 |  -0.0111   0.0022  -0.0178   0.1727   0.0067   0.0049   0.0134  -0.0082   0.0488   0.0615  -0.0314  -
0.0523   0.0337  -0.0315
    dummy2008 |   0.0252   0.0022  -0.0119   0.0032   0.0453   0.0338   0.0176  -0.0155  -0.0393  -0.0034  -0.0270  -
0.0203   0.0708  -0.0390
    dummy2009 |   0.0148   0.0261   0.0013  -0.3492   0.0030   0.0038   0.0105  -0.0195  -0.0240   0.0080   0.0364
0.0043   0.0636  -0.0334
    dummy2010 |   0.0141   0.0219   0.0261  -0.0028  -0.0023  -0.0377  -0.0283   0.0003  -0.0304  -0.0330   0.0456  -
0.0302   0.0077   0.0033
    dummy2011 |  -0.0145   0.0093   0.0662  -0.0437   0.0231  -0.0057   0.0013  -0.0098  -0.0300  -0.0617   0.1029  -
0.0666  -0.0692   0.0740
    dummy2012 |  -0.0238   0.0031   0.0813  -0.1027  -0.0243   0.0656   0.0148   0.0308  -0.0008   0.0079   0.1111  -
0.0220  -0.0275   0.0687


             |  spp1316  spp1720  ln_fms~3 ln~glag3 l~tslag3 dum~2007 dum~2008 dum~2009 dum~2010 dum~2011 dum~2012
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     spp1316 |   1.0000
     spp1720 |  -0.1158   1.0000
   ln_fmslag3 |  -0.0304   0.0229   1.0000
 ln_imetfun~3 |   0.1305   0.1734   0.3276   1.0000
 ln_imetpar~3 |   0.1253   0.0033   0.2489   0.6401   1.0000
    dummy2007 |   0.0911  -0.1250   0.0429   0.1081   0.1202   1.0000
    dummy2008 |   0.1281  -0.1112  -0.0455   0.0625   0.0516  -0.1273   1.0000
    dummy2009 |  -0.0973   0.1199  -0.0027   0.0839   0.0632  -0.1238  -0.1285   1.0000
    dummy2010 |  -0.0810   0.1124  -0.0363  -0.0781  -0.0946  -0.1342  -0.1393  -0.1355   1.0000
    dummy2011 |  -0.0335   0.1124  -0.0066  -0.0458  -0.1249  -0.1342  -0.1393  -0.1355  -0.1469   1.0000
    dummy2012 |  -0.0716   0.2002   0.0652  -0.0232  -0.2137  -0.1285  -0.1334  -0.1297  -0.1406  -0.1406   1.0000
```

Correlation matrix with PTSMEAN variables Regional Analysis

```
             | ptsmean  fhtotal   ln_gni econgr~h  britinf  intlwar   civwar ln_pop~e ln_mil~l ln_mil~d cumyea~p
spp14     spp58   spp912
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------
     ptsmean |  1.0000
     fhtotal |  0.7268   1.0000
      ln_gni | -0.5317  -0.6878   1.0000
    econgrwth |  0.0656   0.2117  -0.2905   1.0000
      britinf | -0.1757  -0.1467   0.0994  -0.0090   1.0000
      intlwar |  0.1821   0.2379  -0.2586  -0.0049  -0.0361   1.0000
       civwar |  0.6071   0.4329  -0.1309   0.0147  -0.0468   0.0377   1.0000
   ln_popsize |  0.4612   0.1448  -0.0131  -0.0198  -0.3635  -0.1590   0.4414   1.0000
   ln_miltotl |  0.4108   0.3210  -0.0795  -0.0087  -0.0325   0.0795   0.3621   0.2676   1.0000
   ln_milxpnd |  0.3965   0.3144  -0.0150   0.0027  -0.2392   0.0101   0.3239   0.3963   0.5862   1.0000
  cumyearsspp | -0.1732  -0.1051  -0.0707  -0.0203  -0.2044  -0.0813  -0.3059  -0.2087  -0.5519  -0.1861   1.0000
        spp14 |  0.0135   0.1249  -0.1718   0.0305  -0.0252   0.2392  -0.0468  -0.0764  -0.0073  -0.0374  -0.1372
1.0000
        spp58 |  0.0080   0.2087  -0.3194   0.1265  -0.0629   0.0762  -0.0835  -0.1256  -0.0257  -0.0955  -0.1039  -
0.0629   1.0000
       spp912 |  0.0365   0.1444  -0.3234   0.1458  -0.0825   0.0558  -0.0976  -0.0950  -0.0662   0.0315   0.1308  -
0.0825  -0.2054   1.0000
      spp1316 | -0.0284  -0.1512   0.0433   0.1963  -0.0725  -0.0662  -0.1045  -0.0606  -0.2028   0.0058   0.3895  -
0.0725  -0.1805  -0.2369
      spp1720 | -0.1668  -0.1418   0.2046  -0.3166  -0.0701  -0.1004  -0.1302  -0.0530  -0.3287  -0.1665   0.6289  -
0.0701  -0.1747  -0.2292
    ln_fmslag3 |  0.2933   0.0500   0.2644  -0.0613  -0.3224  -0.1002   0.3483   0.5901   0.3861   0.4535  -0.2476  -
0.0712  -0.3041  -0.1593
  ln_imetfun~3 |  0.2937   0.1819  -0.2410   0.0318  -0.3505   0.0170   0.2453   0.3157  -0.1296   0.1735   0.4501
0.0076  -0.0525   0.0790
  ln_imetpar~3 |  0.2395   0.0453  -0.1089   0.0497  -0.2098  -0.0086   0.2262   0.2697  -0.0625   0.1675   0.2572
0.0507  -0.1891   0.1141
     dummy1994 | -0.0126  -0.0404   0.0883  -0.0530   0.1132  -0.0338   0.0344   0.0241   0.0990   0.0110  -0.1909  -
0.0236  -0.0587  -0.0770
     dummy1995 |  0.0166  -0.0014   0.0433   0.0284   0.1415  -0.0284   0.0553   0.0343   0.1166   0.0337  -0.1608  -
0.0199  -0.0495  -0.0649
     dummy1996 | -0.0282  -0.0224   0.0375  -0.0067   0.1257  -0.0312   0.0438   0.0393   0.1181   0.0239  -0.1630
0.1257  -0.0543  -0.0712
     dummy1997 |  0.0262  -0.0068   0.0322  -0.0090  -0.0252   0.0556   0.0995   0.0437   0.0996  -0.0246  -0.1898  -
0.0252  -0.0048  -0.0825
     dummy1998 | -0.0329  -0.0611   0.0352   0.0048   0.0867  -0.0405   0.0131   0.0129   0.0505  -0.0512  -0.1820  -
0.0283   0.0857  -0.0925
     dummy1999 | -0.0276  -0.0389  -0.0123  -0.0235  -0.0337   0.0218  -0.0067   0.0460   0.0890  -0.0449  -0.1637  -
0.0337   0.2261  -0.1102
     dummy2000 | -0.0387   0.0198  -0.1079   0.0412  -0.0324   0.0261  -0.0023   0.0120   0.1290   0.0218  -0.0962  -
0.0324   0.3323  -0.1060
     dummy2001 |  0.0479   0.0461  -0.1851  -0.0033  -0.0349   0.0177  -0.0108   0.0302   0.0520   0.0273  -0.0585  -
0.0349  -0.0013   0.2444
     dummy2002 |  0.0431   0.0254  -0.1983   0.0441  -0.0396   0.0039  -0.0251  -0.0041   0.0399   0.0271  -0.0541
0.0451  -0.0603   0.2875
     dummy2003 | -0.0462   0.0115  -0.1377   0.0908   0.0390  -0.0020  -0.0314  -0.0407   0.0186  -0.0116  -0.0396
0.1198  -0.0308   0.2614
     dummy2004 |  0.0174  -0.0248  -0.0726   0.1237   0.0390  -0.0020   0.0148  -0.0411  -0.0471  -0.0344  -0.0083
0.1198  -0.1040   0.3226
     dummy2005 |  0.0178  -0.0507  -0.0292   0.1095  -0.0407   0.0009  -0.0283  -0.0104  -0.0416   0.0058   0.0400
0.0420  -0.0639  -0.0390
     dummy2006 |  0.0245  -0.0062  -0.0115   0.2457   0.0336  -0.0073  -0.0372  -0.0471  -0.0452   0.0135   0.0389
0.0336  -0.0040  -0.0846
     dummy2007 |  0.0890   0.0271   0.0138   0.2197  -0.0418  -0.0020  -0.0314  -0.0133  -0.0361   0.0413   0.0857  -
0.0418   0.0423  -0.1058
     dummy2008 |  0.0259   0.0130   0.0741  -0.0056  -0.0407   0.0601   0.0661  -0.0040  -0.0883   0.0219   0.1249  -
0.0407   0.0109  -0.1329
     dummy2009 |  0.0015   0.0236   0.0910  -0.4832  -0.0407   0.0009  -0.0283  -0.0060  -0.0726   0.0699   0.1456  -
0.0407   0.0109  -0.1016
     dummy2010 | -0.0062   0.0355   0.0724  -0.0561  -0.0428  -0.0047  -0.0343  -0.0131  -0.1034  -0.0279   0.1763  -
0.0428  -0.0350  -0.0500
     dummy2011 | -0.0136   0.0436   0.0887  -0.0323  -0.0438  -0.0073  -0.0372  -0.0185  -0.1123  -0.0610   0.2191  -
0.0438  -0.0741  -0.0259
     dummy2012 | -0.0656   0.0368   0.0945  -0.1636  -0.0449  -0.0099   0.0035  -0.0433  -0.0797  -0.0636   0.2465  -
0.0449  -0.0430  -0.0315


             | spp1316  spp1720  ln_fms~3 ln~glag3 l~tslag3 dum~1994 dum~1995 dum~1996 dum~1997 dum~1998 dum~1999
dum~2000 dum~2001 dum~2002
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------
      spp1316 |  1.0000
      spp1720 | -0.2014   1.0000
    ln_fmslag3 | -0.0155  -0.0254   1.0000
  ln_imetfun~3 |  0.2371   0.2212   0.2016   1.0000
  ln_imetpar~3 |  0.2633   0.0389   0.2275   0.7797   1.0000
     dummy1994 | -0.0677  -0.0655   0.0349  -0.1406  -0.0185   1.0000
     dummy1995 | -0.0570  -0.0552   0.0276  -0.0395   0.0184  -0.0185   1.0000
     dummy1996 | -0.0626  -0.0605   0.0746  -0.0506   0.0431  -0.0203  -0.0171   1.0000
     dummy1997 | -0.0725  -0.0701   0.0085  -0.2567  -0.1975  -0.0236  -0.0199  -0.0218   1.0000
     dummy1998 | -0.0813  -0.0786  -0.0036  -0.2664  -0.2540  -0.0264  -0.0223  -0.0244  -0.0283   1.0000
     dummy1999 | -0.0968  -0.0937  -0.0628  -0.1753  -0.2025  -0.0315  -0.0265  -0.0291  -0.0337  -0.0378   1.0000
     dummy2000 | -0.0931  -0.0901  -0.0776  -0.0396  -0.1305  -0.0303  -0.0255  -0.0280  -0.0324  -0.0364  -0.0433
1.0000
     dummy2001 | -0.1004  -0.0971  -0.0276  -0.0058  -0.0857  -0.0326  -0.0275  -0.0302  -0.0349  -0.0392  -0.0467  -
0.0449   1.0000
```

```
   dummy2002 |   -0.1137  -0.1100  -0.0359  -0.0092   0.0918  -0.0370  -0.0311  -0.0342  -0.0396  -0.0444  -0.0529  -
0.0509   -0.0548    1.0000
   dummy2003 |   -0.1199  -0.1160  -0.0430  -0.0185   0.0343  -0.0390  -0.0329  -0.0360  -0.0418  -0.0468  -0.0558  -
0.0536   -0.0578   -0.0655
   dummy2004 |   -0.1199  -0.1160  -0.0395  -0.0050   0.0668  -0.0390  -0.0329  -0.0360  -0.0418  -0.0468  -0.0558  -
0.0536   -0.0578   -0.0655
   dummy2005 |    0.2900  -0.1130   0.0473   0.0941   0.1536  -0.0380  -0.0320  -0.0351  -0.0407  -0.0456  -0.0543  -
0.0523   -0.0563   -0.0638
   dummy2006 |    0.2871  -0.1218   0.0582   0.1035   0.1571  -0.0409  -0.0345  -0.0378  -0.0438  -0.0492  -0.0586  -
0.0563   -0.0607   -0.0688
   dummy2007 |    0.3109  -0.1160  -0.0004   0.1443   0.1257  -0.0390  -0.0329  -0.0360  -0.0418  -0.0468  -0.0558  -
0.0536   -0.0578   -0.0655
   dummy2008 |    0.3578  -0.1130  -0.0002   0.1424   0.1104  -0.0380  -0.0320  -0.0351  -0.0407  -0.0456  -0.0543  -
0.0523   -0.0563   -0.0638
   dummy2009 |   -0.0829   0.3029   0.0623   0.1226   0.0857  -0.0380  -0.0320  -0.0351  -0.0407  -0.0456  -0.0543  -
0.0523   -0.0563   -0.0638
   dummy2010 |   -0.0905   0.3121   0.0046   0.0689   0.0016  -0.0400  -0.0337  -0.0370  -0.0428  -0.0480  -0.0572  -
0.0550   -0.0593   -0.0671
   dummy2011 |   -0.0624   0.3004  -0.0096   0.0648  -0.0581  -0.0409  -0.0345  -0.0378  -0.0438  -0.0492  -0.0586  -
0.0563   -0.0607   -0.0688
   dummy2012 |   -0.1288   0.3531  -0.0243   0.0436  -0.1356  -0.0419  -0.0353  -0.0387  -0.0449  -0.0503  -0.0599  -
0.0576   -0.0621   -0.0704

              | dum~2003 dum~2004 dum~2005 dum~2006 dum~2007 dum~2008 dum~2009 dum~2010 dum~2011 dum~2012
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   dummy2003 |    1.0000
   dummy2004 |   -0.0691   1.0000
   dummy2005 |   -0.0673  -0.0673   1.0000
   dummy2006 |   -0.0725  -0.0725  -0.0707   1.0000
   dummy2007 |   -0.0691  -0.0691  -0.0673  -0.0725   1.0000
   dummy2008 |   -0.0673  -0.0673  -0.0656  -0.0707  -0.0673   1.0000
   dummy2009 |   -0.0673  -0.0673  -0.0656  -0.0707  -0.0673  -0.0656   1.0000
   dummy2010 |   -0.0708  -0.0708  -0.0690  -0.0744  -0.0708  -0.0690  -0.0690   1.0000
   dummy2011 |   -0.0725  -0.0725  -0.0707  -0.0762  -0.0725  -0.0707  -0.0707  -0.0744   1.0000
   dummy2012 |   -0.0742  -0.0742  -0.0723  -0.0779  -0.0742  -0.0723  -0.0723  -0.0761  -0.0779   1.0000
```

```
             |   fsitot  fhtotal   ln_gni econgr~h   britinf   intlwar   civwar ln_pop~e ln_mil~l ln_mil~d cumyea~p spp14
  spp58   spp912
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    --------------------
      fsitot |   1.0000
     fhtotal |   0.8510   1.0000
      ln_gni |  -0.8629  -0.7371   1.0000
    econgrwth |   0.2634   0.2720  -0.3473   1.0000
      britinf |  -0.0544  -0.0722   0.0676  -0.0132   1.0000
      intlwar |   0.1481   0.1670  -0.2182   0.0355  -0.0175   1.0000
       civwar |   0.3084   0.2869  -0.0203   0.0794  -0.0204   0.0395   1.0000
   ln_popsize |   0.0684   0.0358  -0.0016   0.0237  -0.1928  -0.1507   0.4372   1.0000
   ln_miltotl |   0.1272   0.3140  -0.0299   0.0693   0.0000  -0.0237   0.3193   0.1492   1.0000
    ln_milxpnd |   0.2120   0.3407  -0.0853   0.0969  -0.1408   0.0444   0.2634   0.2555   0.5353   1.0000
  cumyearsspp |  -0.1661  -0.2627  -0.0217  -0.0946  -0.1414  -0.1023  -0.3908  -0.2202  -0.5279  -0.2943   1.0000
        spp14 |   0.2320   0.1179  -0.1510   0.0543  -0.0100  -0.0306  -0.0356  -0.0654  -0.0454  -0.0200  -0.1851
  1.0000
        spp58 |   0.3283   0.4156  -0.2904   0.1965  -0.0263   0.2517  -0.0215  -0.1451   0.1014   0.1236  -0.2959  -
  0.0458   1.0000
       spp912 |   0.3135   0.4156  -0.3353   0.0521  -0.0263   0.2517  -0.0215  -0.1132   0.0393   0.0222  -0.0857  -
  0.0458  -0.1210   1.0000
      spp1316 |  -0.0941  -0.2657  -0.0543   0.2715  -0.0516  -0.1032  -0.1364  -0.0553  -0.1298   0.0045   0.2621  -
  0.0900  -0.2376  -0.2376
      spp1720 |  -0.2560  -0.2490   0.2207  -0.3585  -0.0496  -0.1524  -0.1776  -0.0443  -0.3272  -0.2534   0.6469  -
  0.0864  -0.2284  -0.2284
    ln_fmslag3 |  -0.1423  -0.1181   0.2903  -0.0632  -0.0256  -0.0353   0.4088   0.5358   0.3604   0.3169  -0.3892  -
  0.1133  -0.2388  -0.1500
  ln_imetfun~3 |   0.0308  -0.1119  -0.0439   0.0986  -0.1527  -0.0153   0.3496   0.4761  -0.1953  -0.0154   0.2724  -
  0.0616  -0.2278  -0.1785
  ln_imetpar~3 |  -0.1020  -0.2718   0.1061   0.1074   0.0114  -0.0281   0.1862   0.2596  -0.0379   0.0090   0.0208
  0.0103  -0.2362  -0.1587
     dummy2007 |   0.0087   0.0098  -0.0468   0.2691  -0.0278  -0.0059  -0.0300   0.0021   0.0463   0.0559  -0.0634  -
  0.0485   0.0979  -0.0716
     dummy2008 |   0.0180  -0.0084   0.0501   0.0092  -0.0271   0.0794   0.1162   0.0151  -0.0313   0.0286  -0.0007  -
  0.0472   0.0485  -0.1246
     dummy2009 |  -0.0061   0.0058   0.0767  -0.5401  -0.0271  -0.0018  -0.0258   0.0122  -0.0087   0.0961   0.0299  -
  0.0472   0.0485  -0.0669
     dummy2010 |  -0.0019   0.0204   0.0441  -0.0482  -0.0286  -0.0097  -0.0341   0.0029  -0.0482  -0.0418   0.0656  -
  0.0498  -0.0208   0.0346
     dummy2011 |  -0.0243   0.0307   0.0682  -0.0204  -0.0293  -0.0135  -0.0380  -0.0046  -0.0587  -0.0887   0.1244  -
  0.0511  -0.0806   0.0824
     dummy2012 |  -0.0635   0.0209   0.0759  -0.1720  -0.0300  -0.0171   0.0239  -0.0407  -0.0092  -0.0926   0.1605  -
  0.0523  -0.0315   0.0752

             |  spp1316  spp1720 ln_fms~3 ln~glag3 l~tslag3 dum~2007 dum~2008 dum~2009 dum~2010 dum~2011 dum~2012
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      spp1316 |   1.0000
      spp1720 |  -0.4484   1.0000
    ln_fmslag3 |  -0.0855  -0.1023   1.0000
  ln_imetfun~3 |   0.1994   0.1687   0.3121   1.0000
  ln_imetpar~3 |   0.3146  -0.1016   0.3329   0.6137   1.0000
     dummy2007 |   0.2378  -0.2416  -0.0305   0.1280   0.1238   1.0000
     dummy2008 |   0.2935  -0.2350  -0.0293   0.1293   0.0991  -0.1318   1.0000
     dummy2009 |  -0.2062   0.2333   0.0847   0.0767   0.0557  -0.1318  -0.1282   1.0000
     dummy2010 |  -0.2213   0.2387  -0.0222  -0.0792  -0.0976  -0.1391  -0.1353  -0.1353   1.0000
     dummy2011 |  -0.1925   0.2232  -0.0489  -0.0967  -0.2057  -0.1427  -0.1388  -0.1388  -0.1465   1.0000
     dummy2012 |  -0.2714   0.2805  -0.0768  -0.1598  -0.3458  -0.1463  -0.1423  -0.1423  -0.1502  -0.1541   1.0000
```

Table X Correlation matrix with FSITOTAL variables Regional Analysis

Appendix D: National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program - Sample Archive

COLUMBUS, Ohio -- One week after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised the Ohio National Guard's partnership with the Serbian military, the Ohio Guard hosted a bilateral defense consultation Oct. 18 at its joint force headquarters in northwest Columbus.

"We have this unique relationship between the Serbian military and the Ohio National Guard, which is a real model," Clinton said according to an interview transcript on the state department web site.

Maj. Gen. Gregory L. Wayt, the Ohio adjutant general, hosted Serbian and U.S. defense delegations in the state capitol in part to review the previous year's cooperative events, but mainly to plan for the future. In recent meetings with Serbian officials, including President Boris Tadic and Defense Minister Dragan Sutanovac, Wayt said discussions have centered on moving past familiarization to conduct more small unit exchanges and collaborate in Partnership for Peace exercises.

"Quite frankly, where we all agree is, we want to get more involved in exercises together versus briefings," Wayt said.

The event offered the Serb delegation, led by Dr. Zoran Jeftic, the Serbian state secretary for defense policy, the opportunity to discuss issues and areas of interest for future cooperative events and even to clear up some misunderstandings and misperceptions, Jeftic said. It is a partnership he considers not only successful, but valuable to the Serbian people.

"We worked with Ohio on humanitarian assistance in [the] southern part of Serbia," Jeftic said. "It was a great thing for the citizens of the local community there. And now we are ready to go with some other courses of cooperation. We started with military-to-military cooperation, and today we discussed military-to-civilian and civilian-to-civilian cooperation."

The Ohio National Guard and Serbian military have worked very closely together through the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program – a part of the larger NATO Partnership for Peace program – since they first partnered more than four years ago. In 2011, the Ohio Guard and Serbian military partnership activities will comprise by far the greatest single percentage of activities among the U.S. and Serbia in the Partnership for Peace program, at 44 percent.

"Success is not the number of activities, [although] we have an appropriate number of activities, but what we did and how we established relations," Jeftic said.

Dr. Joseph McMillan, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and leader of the U.S. delegation, applauded Serbian cooperative efforts within the State Partnership Program, especially considering the partners' unique challenges. He also spoke of the "political courage" demonstrated by Serbia at a time when popular support might have waned.

"In the case of Serbia, we have a very different situation than we do with a lot of other state partners who have aspirations to join NATO. Serbia is looking for a way forward working with the west without joining NATO, and this program has some special challenges that some of the other state programs don't face," McMillan said. "Ohio has

managed those very adeptly, and they are tailoring what they do to meet the Serbians' needs very effectively."

Jeftic said the focus for 2011 is the opening of a new base in southern Serbia. The delegation visited Ohio's Camp Ravenna Joint Military Training Center Oct. 18 and has been working closely with an Ohio delegation to gather expertise and knowledge aimed at developing the camp as a base from which the Serbian military can stage and deploy in support of peacekeeping missions.

The final phase in military-to-military cooperation – a joint peacekeeping operation – looms near, Jeftic said.

Since the Ohio National Guard first partnered with Serbia in September 2006, that relationship has grown steadily, despite periods in which larger political issues may have impeded U.S.-Serbian relations, Wayt said.

"The plan we have laid out today for 2011 and beyond will continue to deepen our friendship," he said.[65]

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[65] US National Guard archives. Accessed 03 July 2014. http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/573367/ohio-serbia-continue-cooperation-training/