U.S. Military in Communication with China: The Role of Chinese Language Training Programs in Shaping Future Capabilities

Dissertation

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By

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Abstract

The U.S.-China relationship is "*the*" most consequential bilateral relationship in the world. As the U.S. and China engage, even if both sides do not see eye-to-eye on all issues, it is extremely important to find areas of cooperation that are able to have a positive influence on the world. In its role as a superpower, the U.S. is constantly taking on problems that are global in nature, and there is an increasing need for China to play a greater role in addressing global issues.

There is an undeniable element of asymmetry in the U.S.-China relationship where the Chinese seem to have the upper hand when it comes to trade, educational exchanges, and ultimately, the amount of information flow from one country to the other. This asymmetry can never be overcome by quantity. The only alternative is for the U.S. to focus on quality. This focus on quality will result in the need to develop individuals who are trained to understand, appreciate, and interact with Chinese counterparts at an advanced level. Constructive and stable military-to-military ties between our two countries is vital to our relationship's success and could be the key to alleviating some of the asymmetry in the relationship. This means that the U.S. military needs the vision to develop many of its operators and leaders not only to possess "expertise" in their respective military career fields, but also to be able to function with "expertise" in Chinese language and culture while practicing their individual careers.

The preponderance of our Chinese language-trained military members serve in the "intelligence community," but there is a group of military members known as Foreign Area Officers (FAO) whose focus is developing language and cultural expertise that might ultimately aid in national security efforts through direct engagement with Chinese counterparts.

The Department of Defense (DoD) wants these FAOs to function as our "experts" and to conduct the necessary face-to-face interactions with Chinese counterparts. Currently, the DoD focuses on a form of assessment created by the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, called the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). This test is used worldwide, throughout government agencies, and is the only official measurement for a member's language proficiency in listening and reading. This project shows how the DLPT focuses on "proficiency" without the ability to capture what a member can "do" using the language. Ultimately the DLPT drives the foreign language program in the DoD since all goals, decisions, and projections are based upon DLPT results.

This project draws heavily upon the author's personal experiences and those of other military members, in order to make the case that the U.S. military needs to shift from "proficiency" to "expertise" with our FAO force in order to be truly effective. The concept of a "3rd space" is introduced and operating in the "3rd space" is recommended as the goal for our FAOs in the U.S. military. Furthermore, crucial to this concept is the fact that the ability to operate in the "3rd space" is evidence of "expertise" and that "domain" is the key concept for developing this "expertise."

Currently, FAO accession does not occur until the seven to twelve-year point in an officer's career. This project aims to show that we not only lose the opportunity for the FAO to deliberately practice Chinese for the seven to twelve years prior to accession, but also lose the opportunity to utilize the officer during his/her approximate three and a half years training needed to become a FAO.

The experiences of the author as an Air Force pilot, coupled with graduate studies and the research in this project, have created the concern for lack of an effective China FAO program. This project proposes a new concept for FAOs, involving a deliberate pipeline, a career-long language developmental focus, and the crucial concept of linking military specialties to the language. If implemented and managed properly, this course of action will be more cost-effective and will produce FAOs able to operate with language, regional expertise, and culture skills which have previously not been attained.

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Dr. Xiaobin Jian is the reason I came to the Ohio State University to pursue my doctorate. While there were other outstanding programs available to me, during my decision-making process, it was his willingness to correspond with me (while I was deployed overseas), patiently and readily answer all of my questions that made me quickly realize I was interacting with an educator who truly cared. Both Dr. Jian's teaching style; and his insight into how to train students to achieve high levels of Chinese, and to encourage them to pursue expertise in their domain, is second to none. Dr. Jian has always exceeded my expectations of how and what a professor should be.

Dr. Marjorie Chan is an amazing individual. She has the unique ability to always make a person feel better just by interacting with them. Her personality and positive outlook on life and learning is infectious. Every class, conference, or activity that I participated in with Dr. Chan was a true pleasure. I am grateful for her encouragement and guidance throughout my journey at the Ohio State University.

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Vita

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CHAPTER 1: U.S. AND CHINA: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY-TO-MILTARY INTERACTIONS

In the first decades of the 21st Century, the U.S. has been the sole superpower. However, China is steadily emerging as a superpower. For this and other reasons, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship will continue to increase in importance and influence in the foreseeable future. Often, unknowingly, Americans feel China's influence in their daily lives. China is America's second largest trading partner whose cheaper goods allows us to enjoy a lower cost of living. This trade relationship is extremely significant because the greatest number of imports into the U.S. are from China, while our exports to China rank third. This imbalance gives the U.S. the most dramatic trade deficit among all its partners. (U.S. Census Bureau 2016) This highlights an important feature prevalent in the growing relationship between the U.S. and China—asymmetry.

1.1 The asymmetry predicament

Asymmetry in our relationship with China is not only found in the trade imbalance. In fact, an even greater asymmetry is found within educational exchanges between the U.S. and China. The data behind these educational exchanges show patterns and trends that can give us a glimpse at our country's preparedness to engage China in the foreseeable future. The Institute of International Education's (IIE) website captures this data from a program entitled, "Project Atlas," which was started in 2001 in an effort to

follow the worldwide migration trends of millions of international students. (Project Atlas 2016) Both the U.S. and China have national agencies that are part of "Project Atlas" which report their own data as well as use the combined inputs of the global community participating in this project, in order to be better informed as decisions are made regarding international educational efforts. According to data from the IIE's "Open Doors Report," in the 2014 to 2015 academic year in higher-level education (beyond high school), the Chinese had 304,040 international students enrolled in programs in the U.S. (Project Atlas: United States 2016) From data reported by the China Scholarship Council and captured by IIE on their website, the 2014 data only shows 24,203 U.S. students studying in China in higher-level education programs. (Project Atlas: China 2016) The asymmetry in this relationship is clearly evident. Some may argue that this is simply a reflection of the population discrepancy between the U.S. and China. Nonetheless, the numbers still reflect a potential pool of future "experts" that more fully understand the opposing country in this important bilateral relationship. In addition, we need to more thoroughly understand the impact of these numbers by noticing the quality and type of education that each side is pursuing. From the Chinese side, 41% of their students are studying at the undergraduate level while 39.6% are studying at the graduate level. (Project Atlas: United States 2016) This means that approximately 80% of the Chinese students reported plan to obtain undergraduate and graduate degrees from U.S. institutions. The Chinese students are earning these degrees at U.S. institutions completely in a "foreign" language and competing with their American schoolmates. This reflects a level of expertise in their target language that should not be overlooked, nor matched by the American students in China.

On the U.S. side, the IIE's website is careful to point out that "many U.S. students study abroad for only a semester or other short-term sessions, though some do attain full degrees abroad." (Project Atlas: United States 2016) It seems apparent that the predominant trend for U.S. students studying in China is not to obtain a degree there, but rather to supplement their U.S.-based education with limited exposure in Chinese programs. The pool of "experts" that the U.S. may draw from in the future to negotiate with China seems extremely limited as compared to the Chinese equivalent. China is the top-sending country for international students in the U.S. for six years in a row now, displaying double-digit percentage increases in this number for eight years running. (Project Atlas: United States 2016) The Obama administration had some awareness of this asymmetry and showed its growing concern by launching two programs in direct response to this issue.

In November 2009, President Obama announced his "100,000 Strong" initiative. This initiative set the goal to send 100,000 American students to study in China by 2014. (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015, 1) In July 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the "100,000 Strong" goal had been met. (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015, 1) According to data from the IIE's website, reported by the China Scholarship Council, a total of 117,100 students from America studied in China during this time period. (Project Atlas: China 2016) Considering that only 18,650 American students were in China in 2009 and 24,203 students were reported in 2014, the overall annual participation of American students seems to be up nearly 30% from where we started. This is progress; however, it still does not redress the asymmetry we face in our relationships with China.

To further address this asymmetry, President Obama announced a new "1 Million

Strong" initiative on September 25, 2015. (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015, 1) This initiative focuses on Chinese language education in the United States with a goal to "bring the total number of stateside learners of Mandarin Chinese to 1 million by the year 2020." (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015, 1) This goal appears to be very lofty, and perhaps not even attainable. At the time President Obama announced the "1 Million Strong" initiative, it was estimated that approximately 200,000 American students were studying Chinese in the primary and secondary education systems. (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015, 1) Therefore, this goal is looking for a 400% increase in the number of American students studying Chinese by 2020. This high aspiration, makes it clear that great importance is being placed upon our relationship with China and we have some serious catching-up to do. Making this goal a reality, requires transformational changes within our current education system. However, reaching this goal would not even allow our number of Mandarin Chinese learners to equal 1% of the 300 to 400 million Chinese that are estimated to be studying English in schools across China. (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015, 1) To rule out the obvious fact that China simply has more people than the U.S., we need to view these numbers in terms of total population. If we use the reasonable estimates of 1.38 billion people for China's population and 324 million for the U.S. population we arrive at the following proportions: In China, approximately 22% to 29% of the population is studying English; In the U.S., if the "1 Million Strong" initiative becomes a reality, there will be approximately 0.3% of the population studying Mandarin Chinese. This numerical asymmetry is staggering. Despite any successful initiatives, it will not be overcome.

We need not be discouraged by the unsurmountable numbers that we face. As President Obama stated, "if our countries are going to do more together around the world,

then speaking each other's language, truly understanding each other, is a good place to start." (Allen-Ebrahimian 2015, 1) We definitely need to start with learning the language, but "truly understanding each other" means that it is necessary to understand the culture as well. The asymmetry we see between our two countries will never be overcome with numbers. Considering again that a 400% increase in our Mandarin language student pool will not even equal 1% of our Chinese counterparts who are studying English, we will not bridge this asymmetry gap with quantity, we can only overcome this asymmetry with quality. When I refer to quality, it simply means that we must develop a pool of "experts" in the U.S. that are able to function and do their jobs in culturally appropriate ways, using the language of our Chinese counterparts. The world needs a U.S. and China that are able to work together.

1.2 The military's role

Constructive and stable military-to-military ties between our two countries could be the linchpin to our relationship's success. This means that the U.S. military needs the vision to develop many of its operators and leaders to not only possess expertise in their respective military career fields, but also be able to function with "expertise" in Chinese language and culture while practicing their individual careers. If this becomes a reality, the "U.S. military in communication with China" can assume a whole new meaning, one which leads to direct and deliberate conversations and exchanges among our military members that will promote peace and security between the two most influential nations in our world and time.

In its role as a superpower, the U.S. is constantly reacting to problems worldwide. From issues ranging from terrorism to climate change, the U.S. is bearing the heaviest

burdens in trying to combat or solve problems that are ultimately global in nature. As the burden becomes too heavy to sustain, there is an increasing urgency to engage the emerging power, China, to do its part in addressing global issues.

In September 2014, National Security Adviser Susan Rice met with China's President Xi Jinping and other top leaders in Beijing. She relayed that "President Obama firmly believes that the U.S.-China relationship is *one of the most* consequential bilateral relationships in the world and that there is virtually no problem of global significance that can be better resolved when the United States and China are working together at the same table." (Staff Writer 2014, 1) This message underestimates the power of this particular bilateral relationship: In every expert's opinion, the U.S.-China relationship is "*the*" most consequential bilateral relationship in the world. As the U.S. and China engage, even if both sides don't see eye-to-eye on all issues, it is extremely important to find areas of cooperation that are able to have a positive influence on the world. Secretary of State John Kerry went to Beijing in 2016 and met with Foreign Minister Wang Yi where he pointed out these new levels of cooperation have already resulted in successes in counterterrorism, climate change, and combatting the Ebola virus, to name a few. Secretary Kerry pointed out two issues in particular that still require greater cooperation between the U.S. and China: the nuclear threat of North Korea and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. As Kerry continued his speech he explained that the U.S.'s "enduring interests of open access to the shared domains of sea, air, space, and cyberspace are further amplified by the fact that the Asia-Pacific will be the economic center of trade for the foreseeable future and that continued prosperity is tied to the peaceful rise of China as an economic and military power." (Kerry 2016, 1)

In order to advance these enduring interests while making the Asia-Pacific a stable and secure region for trade, the U.S. military will have inevitable and increasing engagements with Chinese counterparts ranging from cooperative meetings and maneuvers to tension-filled expressions of positions on the respective national interests. The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is one of the nine combatant commands under the U.S. military's organization and is geographically the focal point for engagement with China's military. USPACOM's strategy with regard to China is as follows:

> "The U.S. continues to welcome a prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in global affairs, but China's growing military capabilities coupled with its lack of transparency is concerning. Therefore, the United States and China must continue to pursue a more transparent, enduring, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship by maintaining a consistent and meaningful dialogue to prevent miscommunication or miscalculation. We see opportunities for cooperation in areas such as humanitarian relief and disaster response, counter-piracy efforts, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), military medicine, and maritime safety. Such opportunities will enhance our bilateral relationship with China as we work toward common goals, candidly address our differences, and demonstrate mutual commitment to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States believes that a strong U.S.-China partnership is essential for peace, prosperity, and both regional and global security." (USPACOM n.d.)

USPACOM's strategy towards China was likely influenced by President Obama's "Rebalance" in the Asia-Pacific region that was initiated in 2011. Basically, the "Rebalance" was an effort by the U.S. to focus on and strengthen relationships, while modernizing and setting priorities for security concerns in the region. This strategy is not exclusively a military one, nor is it a purely American one either. In 2015, the Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter explained that the "Rebalance" was essentially a way for the U.S. to help keep a security system in the Asia-Pacific region, but was also careful to point out that this system was one of "inclusiveness" that draws upon several countries including

China. (USPACOM 2015, 2) Secretary Carter further explained that the U.S. invites China to participate in military exercises, and that we do indeed have military ties with China and hope to continue to strengthen these ties. (USPACOM 2015, 2) As Secretary Carter described the security system that the "Rebalance" hopes to provide, he pointed out that this is "not a hegemonic system, but a system in which everybody wins and everybody participates." (USPACOM 2015, 2)

In November of the same year, the USPACOM Commander, Admiral Harry B. Harris gave a speech at the Stanford Center in Beijing where he outlined some of the principles behind the "Rebalance" and elaborated on the importance of USPACOM's strategy. (Harry B. Harris 2015) Admiral Harris explained that the "Rebalance" is focused on four main areas—political, diplomatic, military, and economic. He outlined the following facts: 5 of the 7 U.S. defense treaty allies (Australia, Thailand, Philippines, Japan, and South Korea) fall within USPACOM, 7 out of the 10 largest standing armies in the world are found in the region, 5 nations operating in the region possess nuclear weapons, 3 of the world's largest economies and 5 of the smallest economies are found here, and many projections indicate that 70 percent of the world's population will be located within this region by the middle of this century. (Harry B. Harris 2015, 2) Admiral Harris commands a force of almost 400,000 military and civilian personnel which includes about 60 percent of the U.S. naval forces that he must effectively manage within the "military" portion of the "Rebalance." In his own words, "the implications for the world's food, energy, and infrastructure requirements make the current rules-based international order essential to maintaining peace and prosperity." (Harry B. Harris 2015, 2) He further emphasized the "rules-based international order" by saying, "the persistent

presence of U.S. joint military forces throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific for the last 70 years has safeguarded the rules-based international order…a system that continues to benefit all nations—including China—by setting the condition for stability, economic prosperity, and peace." (Harry B. Harris 2015, 2) In an effort to guarantee this stability, prosperity and peace, Admiral Harris agreed with his Chinese counterparts that we need to emphasize "cooperation over confrontation" and he concluded that "sustained people-to-people contact is one of the best ways we can avoid misunderstanding and military miscalculation." (Harry B. Harris 2015, 3-4) As the "people-to-people" contact was highlighted in the U.S.-China military relationship, Admiral Harris pointed out that, at the time of his speech, 33 separate military exchanges were planned in the following two-week timespan involving "4-stars to cadets."[1] (Harry B. Harris 2015, 3)

1.3 Current state of military-to-military interactions

With USPACOM's strategy emphasizing areas of cooperation with the Chinese such as humanitarian relief and disaster response, counter-piracy efforts, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, NEOs, military medicine, and maritime safety, it seems logical that "people-to-people" contacts should see the most increase in numbers as far as military engagements in these particular areas are concerned. In fact, the area of humanitarian relief and disaster response has already seen slow but significant gains over the past decade. The U.S. military and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) have reached their 11th iteration of the annual Disaster Management Exchange (DME). (Stanfill 2016) Started in 2005, this exchange is sponsored by the U.S. Army Pacific and

[1] The 4-stars to cadets comment simply means exchanges with China occur at the highest and lowest levels in the military ("4-star" meaning a General, and "cadet" meaning a trainee not yet commissioned in the officer corps)

rotates between the U.S. and China as host country, expanding in scope and significance each year. (Kershner, China, US Disaster Management Exchange 2015, 1) For example, the DME's 10th iteration in 2015 involved the following American agencies and its Chinese equivalents: U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, the Hawaii Army National Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Marines, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, and the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou. (Kershner, Disaster Management Exchange 2015 Successfully Concluded in Hainan China 2015, 1) The DME currently has three phases which include expert academic discussion, a tabletop exchange, and a practical field exchange. All phases ideally involve U.S. and Chinese personnel working "shoulder-to-shoulder"[2] whether it involves helicopter rescue missions, or setting up makeshift medical treatment facilities. The DME may be an example of one of the most successful and enduring exercises, and these types of military-to-military contacts between the U.S. and China are becoming more common.

Kedar Pavgi, a writer for *Defense One*, points out that everything from "low-level exercises to Presidential and 4-star visits have been steadily increasing since 2010 and are on pace to reach historic highs." (Pavgi 2015, 1) The importance of these contacts should not be underestimated because every contact helps form relationships and bolster understanding that, ultimately, can help prevent serious miscalculations that could lead to misunderstandings and even war. It should be noted, however, that these contacts have been suspended seven different times since the early 1990s, with some of the most

[2] The term "shoulder-to-shoulder" has been commonly used throughout my military career to relate to and describe experiences working with military members of a partner nation.

notable incidents being the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of a PLA Navy fighter jet and a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft near Hainan in 2001, and time periods when the U.S. participated in arms sales to Taiwan. (Churhman 2015, 1) Despite the past suspensions of military ties, Major General Yao Yuzhu, the director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations at the PLA's Academy of Military Science, points out that a "stable" U.S.-China military-to-military relationship has been in place since September 2011; she feels that this stabilization shows the importance that both Washington and Beijing put on constructive and stable military-to-military ties. (Churhman 2015, 2) Pavgi's graphical representation of the significant U.S.-China military-to-military contacts since 1995 shows this recent trend and is reproduced in Figure 1: (Pavgi 2015, 2)



Figure 1: U.S.-China Mil-to-Mil Contacts

Pavgi's numbers, however, may actually underestimate the number of contacts, since Chinese Major General Yao pointed out that all planned exchange programs were completed, with more than 60 events in 2014 alone. (Churhman 2015, 1) Despite the

increasing number of military-to-military contacts, there are still some who feel these contacts need to be improved. For example, Joseph Prueher, a retired admiral who led PACOM and served as an ambassador to China, views the military-to-military relationships as relatively top heavy. (Pavgi 2015, 2) Prueher's argument is that the preponderance of exchanges seems to involve senior U.S. and Chinese officials and that the lower-level bonds have not yet developed like they should. Prueher makes the astute observation that: "In countries where you have a depth of military-to-military relationships, you have junior officers who have grown up together, they have known each other for 15 years, they have been to schools together, they've grown up with personal relationships that enhance the straight military relationships. And of course, in China, these personal relationships transcend any sort of formal agreements you might have. These personal relationships are more important than the formal agreements. But, we don't have the amalgam that holds it together at the lower level." (Pavgi 2015, 2) Additionally, the quality of the top-level contacts has been criticized as well for the "revolving door" nature of U.S. military leadership.[3] Ralph Jodice, a retired Air Force Lieutenant General and former Defense Attaché to China from 2004 to 2007, explained how the Chinese might view our military-to-military relationships with regard to our constant changing of personnel. Jodice explains that the Chinese view relationships essentially at three levels: "*pengyou*, *hao pengyou*, and *lao pengyou* — friend, good friend and old friend. The first time a U.S. official visited, they were a *pengyou*; the second time they were *hao pengyou*, and the third time they were *lao pengyou*. The

[3] "Revolving door" simply refers to the concept that U.S. military commanders and leaders tend to stay in their positions for only 2 to 3 years before moving on to a new and different assignment.

Chinese officials would say that one needed to become an old friend before substantive policy change could happen." (Pavgi 2015, 3) Jodice continues by saying, "but then they would turn to the PACOM commander and say, 'You normally only serve as the PACOM commander for maybe 2 years, maybe 3 years, and we might only see you once or twice, so it's difficult to become old friends'." (Pavgi 2015, 3) This anecdote is very telling about how our military is overlooking something cultural with our mil-to-mil contacts with China. With the increasing number of contacts, the American military must be prepared to overcome the serious challenges that Chinese language and cultural will present.

As previously mentioned, the DME between the U.S. and Chinese has seen several iterations and might be considered a model of successful interaction between the two militaries. With the evolution of the DME, while serving as the Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, General Vincent K. Brooks, commented that the 2014 iteration of the DME would add a practical field exchange for the first time. Brooks made the statement that "in doing so, we added a new dimension to the exchanges, and that is that our soldiers get to see each other and learn from each other face-to-face and shoulder-to-shoulder." (Staff 2015, 2) Later, as the 2015 iteration of the DME kicked off in Hainan, China, General Brooks's counterpart, General Hu Fenlin, the Commanding General of the Guangzhou Military Region, commented that "I have every reason to believe that with practical exchanges and cooperation between Guangzhou Military Region and [U.S. Army Pacific] that we are able to join hands, to write a new chapter for the new model of our military-to-military relationship and also to inject positive elements into the new model of our major country relationship." (Staff 2015, 1) This new model

clearly involves an increase in the "face-to-face" and "shoulder-to-shoulder" interactions that both sides' military members would encounter. Trying to envision what this new model of interaction would look like, with U.S. and Chinese soldiers communicating back and forth during a "practical field exchange," I found reporting on the 2015 DME explaining that "improvised sign language and sketches on paper supplemented the interpreters who worked diligently to be everywhere at once." (Kershner, Disaster Management Exchange 2015 Successfully Concluded in Hainan China 2015, 2) The interpreters that are utilized during these exercises are provided by both sides and have included both military and civilian support.

USARPAC's public affairs office was contacted via email regarding how interpreters were used during the DMEs and whether or not military members were ever directly engaging with their counterparts using their own acquired language expertise during the event. The message I received from USARPAC's Public Affairs Team Chief contained a written response from a U.S. Army soldier who acted as an interpreter in all DME events since 2013. This soldier's unique experiences and personal impressions shed some light on how the U.S. military tries to overcome the language and cultural barriers found in the DME exercises. He explained that the majority of the members making up the "linguist support team" used during the DMEs are heritage speakers. (Goemaere 2016) This means our military is leveraging the language and cultural skills that have already been developed by soldiers who were raised in "Chinese" homes, instead of starting from scratch with a soldier that has no Chinese language or cultural experience. It was pointed out, however, that these heritage speakers have mandatory language training in both English and Chinese at the Hawaii Language Center which is

managed by the military's Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), but funded by other agencies. (Goemaere 2016) By way of example and with regard to the number of interpreters necessary to support these events, during the 2013 DME, the USARPAC provided four military interpreters/translators to augment three contracted civilian interpreters to make up the linguist support team. (Goemaere 2016) With the information provided by Public Affairs, it is reasonable to assume that the 2014, 2015, and 2016 DMEs utilized similarly-sized linguist support teams primarily made up of military soldiers acting in the interpreter/translator role. (Goemaere 2016) All information obtained from Public Affairs seems to indicate that the U.S. soldiers participating and interacting with Chinese counterparts during actual DME events do not possess their own developed Chinese language and cultural abilities, and are unable to communicate effectively on their own without the aid of the linguist support team providing interpretation. Therefore, it should be extremely reasonable to conclude that military members who were performing the helicopter rescue missions or setting up medical facilities and providing medical care (those working "shoulder-to-shoulder") during the DME do not possess Chinese language expertise at a level to interact with the Chinese without the aid of an interpreter. This, however, is not the case with many of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers attending these events. The information provided by USARPAC's Public Affairs office explained that the majority of the PLA officers, especially the ones who graduated from colleges or universities were able to read and write English with no difficulties. Furthermore, some of these PLA officers were identified as possessing a "fairly good" knowledge of both the English language and our military operations. (Goemaere 2016) The PLA, of course, still brought their own

team of interpreters/translators, despite many of their officers possessing these English language skills. It appears that the U.S. military's solution to overcome the language and cultural barriers during DMEs is to rely on interpreters or to use English with Chinese counterparts, rather than to develop and send soldiers/participants who possess their own Chinese language abilities coupled with their own domain specific military specialty showcased during the event. As previously mentioned, the DME appears to be a strong model for U.S.-China military interactions, but there are several more engagements occurring between our militaries outside of the disaster management realm.

In May 2014, the PRC sent 22 officers, led by Major General Han Xing, the Deputy Commandant of the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Command College, to Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph where the group toured U.S. Air Force squadrons responsible for pilot instructor training and introduction to fighter fundamentals pipelines. Eric Chan, the China Country Director for the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs, explained: "the goal of this visit was to promote transparency and increase mutual understanding between our respective service centers of learning." Chan further explains, "it is the goal of both our air forces to enhance practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest, using exchanges of this type to foster greater understanding." Finally, Chan sheds light on the mutual benefit to both countries as he explains, "we welcome the Chinese Air Force Command College to future visits, just as the Chinese air force welcomes our Air War College on their annual visits to China." (Goetz 2015, 2) These types of military educational exchanges are one tool the DoD is using to promote greater understanding between our two militaries. Since the U.S. and Chinese do not operate as allies, outside of these types of exchanges and

interactions, the potential for conflict exists in the event of unplanned or inadvertent military encounters. Therefore, a critical need exists to bolster the communication and understanding between our two countries to prevent unintended consequences.

One of the most likely scenarios for unplanned encounters between our two countries exists in the maritime environment. Therefore, the U.S. and China found it necessary to develop the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). Essentially, CUES provides standards for communication, safety procedures, and maneuvering instructions for naval ships and aircraft for both countries. (Cunningham, Stethem Joins with People's Liberation Army-Navy PLA(N) to Conduct Exercise 2015, 1) CUES is quite significant because it was not only endorsed by the U.S. and China's Naval leaders during the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014, but also included 19 other countries as they sought to "establish the region's first code of conduct for unplanned encounters between military ships and aircraft in international waters." (Cunningham, Stethem Joins with People's Liberation Army-Navy PLA(N) to Conduct Exercise 2015, 1) In November 2014, several months after the Naval Symposium, concepts found in CUES were further solidified at the highest level during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit where Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping reached two significant agreements "designed to avert military confrontations in Asia." (Staff 2014, 1) The first of these agreements involves a process and procedure to notify each other of major activities, such as those involving military exercises; and the second one, is an agreement involving the rules of behavior for encounters at sea and in the air. (Staff 2014, 1) With these types of agreements and procedures now in place between the U.S. and China, the opportunity for further engagement and dialogue between our militaries seems to be expanding.

In June, 2015, Defense Secretary Ash Carter invited General Fan Changlong, the Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, to the Pentagon for a meeting. Officials summarized the meeting and reported that Secretary Carter "stressed his commitment to developing a sustained and substantive U.S.-China military-to-military relationship based on a shared desire to deepen practical, concrete cooperation in areas of mutual interest." (DoD News, Defense Media Activity 2015, 1) Furthermore, the day after the Pentagon visit, the U.S.-China Army-to-Army Dialogue Mechanism framework document was signed, thus opening "a new channel for leaders in the two armies to raise and discuss issues of mutual concern." (DoD News, Defense Media Activity 2015, 1) Clearly, great emphasis has been placed on the military-to-military relationship and the key to this relationship seems to be based upon cooperation. Cooperation, however, in the military context, does not seem possible without doing things together.

As we delve further into mil-to-mil contacts with the Chinese, an organization that seems to be at the forefront is the U.S. 7th Fleet. The U.S. 7th Fleet is a forward deployed Navy organization headquartered in Japan that falls under the U.S. Pacific Fleet within the USPACOM organizational structure. The 7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy's largest numbered fleet and has the responsibility to interact with 35 other maritime nations with the intent to "build maritime partnerships that foster maritime security, promote stability, and prevent conflict." (Blake 2016, 2) By way of example, in April, 2015, the 7th Fleet sent its flagship, the USS Blue Ridge, to China to participate in meetings between senior navy leaders from the U.S. and PLA navies. These leaders met onboard the Chinese ship "Mount Jinggang" that was docked at the PLAN's South Sea Fleet Headquarters in Zhanjiang. These meetings are referred to as "staff talks," and "the intent of the staff

talks is to increase theater security cooperation through the facilitation of bilateral and multilateral military exchanges and dialogue." (Karsten 2015, 1) Furthermore, this type of visit "provides a meeting place for partnered navies' subject matter experts to meet and discuss different aspects of their mission objectives and their responsibilities." (Karsten 2015, 1) A Theatre Security Cooperation Officer in attendance is reported as saying, "this is the first time we've been able to bring the Blue Ridge into Zhanjiang and have the 7th Fleet Commander meet with the South Fleet Commander to discuss our operations in a shared domain." (Karsten 2015, 1) This officer went on to express that, "it was great because not only were the commanders talking, but the staffs were able to sit down and talk one-on-one on a variety of topics." (Karsten 2015, 1) This type of interaction is intriguing because it highlights the very important point that I am trying to advocate for, having "subject matter experts," or experts in their occupational area, able to directly engage with their Chinese counterparts in conversations and discussions. However, it doesn't appear that our subject matter experts participating in these types of meetings had conversed without the aid of an interpreter. These experts do not appear to have the Chinese language ability necessary to use Chinese themselves to discuss the topics with their Chinese counterparts. I contacted the 7th Fleet Public Affairs Office to clarify this point, and in turn, I received a response from a Theater Security Cooperation Officer familiar with these types of engagements. The Security Cooperation Officer explained that "while in country, we utilize local interpreters that are approved and contracted through the U.S. Embassy or the local U.S. Consulate." (7th Fleet Public Affairs Officer 2016) The officer specifically mentioned that we do have officers with language ability present, but they do not use them in an official interpreter capacity. (7th Fleet Public

Affairs Officer 2016) This comment means that when the Commander of the 7th Fleet is involved in meetings in China, contracted Department of State interpreters will be used. It should go without saying that the "locals" the Embassy or Consulate staffs contract in China will be vetted to ensure reliability and security. However, the Security Cooperation Officer elaborated by saying that the Naval Attachés living in China will be present for all of the 7th Fleet Commander's engagements to "facilitate conversation and translation with their language capabilities." (7th Fleet Public Affairs Officer 2016) I would surmise that the presence of our military, Chinese-language-trained Attachés, is a safeguard to ensure proper transmission of the 7th Fleet Commander's messages.

As we look up the chain of command, to a position even higher than the 7th Fleet Commander, the Chief of Naval Operations also requires an interpreter to converse with his counterpart in China. To facilitate the meeting between the two Naval leaders, in August 2015, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson connected with the Commander of the PLA Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli, using their first-ever video teleconference (VTC) together. Two months later in October, the VTC was utilized again between the two admirals discussing "ongoing engagements between the two navies." (Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs 2015, 1) These "ongoing engagements" clearly involved the U.S. 7th Fleet and other organizations in PACOM that routinely host or visit PLA counterparts, and hold events and exercises. These events and exercises involve increasing interaction and cooperation between both militaries in an effort to promote relations and mutual understanding between our two countries. There are several examples that might show the importance that the U.S-China military relationship plays not only among military members but among the two countries as a

whole.

For example, in November, 2015, a 7th Fleet ship, the USS Stethem, a guided-missile destroyer, went to Shanghai for a port visit. While there, the sailors and marines of the U.S. ship, accompanied by PLAN counterparts stationed in Shanghai, visited the 103-year old Shanghai School for the Blind. (Cunningham, Stethem Sailors Reach Out in Shanghai 2015, 1) This visit included an opportunity to perform community service in China while at the same time allowing U.S. service members an opportunity to visit and become better acquainted with their counterparts in China. This kind of visit transcends beyond the military sphere because a portion of the civilian sector and community were directly served by both militaries. Although the community service event may seem somewhat distant from a military naval operation, the USS Stethem did leave the port a couple of days later to rendezvous with the PLAN guided-missile frigate Xuzhou to practice CUES and conduct a search-and-rescue (SAR) exercise. (Cunningham, Stethem Joins with People's Liberation Army-Navy PLA(N) to Conduct Exercise 2015, 2)

The USS Stethem's 2015 visit and community service event seemed successful enough to warrant a return visit by the 7th Fleet's USS Blue Ridge and crew in May 2016. During the May visit, the Blue Ridge's 900 members took part, once again, in a community service project for Shanghai's School for the Blind. Additionally, during this visit, several USS Blue Ridge sailors competed in an inter-navy basketball game with sailors from the PLAN's Lanzhou destroyer, Xi'an, and participated in subsequent mutual ship tours. (Dunagan 2016, 1)

Also in May, 2016, at the Shanghai Naval Garrison Headquarters, Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, the 7th Fleet Commander, and his staff met with Rear Admiral Wang Hai,

the Deputy Commander of the PLAN, and his staff, engaging in a roundtable discussion with topics ranging from freedom of navigation to concerns about tensions in the South China Sea. Vice Admiral Aucoin stated: "It gives us the ability to meet our counterparts, to make relationships, and I think that's so important." He went on to comment that this type of engagement "will help us work together closely and instill more trust, which I think is important in this time and age." From the Chinese side, Admiral Wang is reported to say, "the 'navy to navy' relationship is an important aspect of 'nation-to-nation relations'." Admiral Wang further states, "through these engagements our U.S. colleagues have already got a better understanding of China and both our sailors have made new friends." Admiral Wang concludes his remarks by saying, "both navies need to work together to promote the friendship between both peoples and militaries" and "I believe our friendship will remain for a very long time." (Blake 2016, 1) Less than two months after this meeting the U.S. and Chinese navies would have an amazing opportunity to work together once again, but on a much larger scale.

The Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise, hosted by the U.S. and held in and around the Hawaiian Islands, is the world's largest international maritime exercise. RIMPAC is described as "a unique training opportunity that helps participants foster and sustain the cooperative relationships that are critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world's oceans." RIMPAC began in 1971 and is now a biennial exercise with its 25th iteration held in 2016. (Commander, U.S. Third Fleet Public Affairs 2016, 1) During RIMPAC 2016, 26 nations, 45 ships, 5 submarines, 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel were included in the exercise. (U.S. Third Fleet Public Affairs 2016, 1) The PRC attended the 2016 exercise, but actually made their first RIMPAC

appearance in 2014. *Xinhua* news agency called China's participation "a positive signal for building trust between China and the United States." (Tiezzi 2014, 1) In 2014, the Chinese sent four ships, the Haikou (a missile destroyer), the Yueyang (a missile frigate), the Qiandaohu (a supply ship), and the Peace Ark (a hospital ship) to the exercise. Additionally, 1,100 Chinese officers and soldiers, including a diving squad and a commando unit attended RIMPAC 2014. *Xinhua* described their contingent and participation in the exercise as an "historic moment, both for U.S.-China cooperation and for China's military itself." (Tiezzi 2014, 1) The Chinese footprint in RIMPAC 2016 would be even larger as their five PLAN vessels, the Henshui, Peace Ark, Xian, Gaoyouhu, and Changdao set sail with two U.S. ships, the USS Stockdale and the USS William P. Lawrence from the Western Pacific Ocean to Pearl Harbor. (Commander, U.S. Third Fleet Public Affairs 2016, 1) In an exercise of this immense scale, there are abundant opportunities for U.S. military members and their counterparts in China to interact, converse, and learn from and with each other. However, the U.S. military tends to rely primarily on interpreters to facilitate the discussions and interactions, and lacks military members with Chinese language and cultural ability among those attending the exercises as participants.

I tried to validate this claim even further as I reached out to USPACOM Public Affairs for explanations regarding the U.S. military in communication with China. The USPACOM public affairs officer (PAO) explained that "different engagements with the Chinese will require different interpretation requirements." The determination for interpretation requirements basically comes down to whether or not the engagement is considered to be an "official US-PRC forum or dialogue." If the engagement falls into

this category, then it "will require precise interpretation." With this requirement in mind, the process now involves the Department of State contracting professional interpreters for the event. According to the PAO, "this is to ensure every theme, word and message is communicated precisely." I do not intend to speak for the PAO, but since the Department of State takes the lead on finding these interpreters, it seems reasonable to conclude that the primary interpreters are not sought out from among Department of Defense members. Perhaps, there are no "qualified" or "trained" military members for this role even when it is a military-to-military event. The PAO did explain, however, that military officers such as Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and Regional Affairs Strategists (RAS) "will utilize their language skills during planning meetings, side bar discussions, and other coordination." Additionally, the PAO explained that due to legal restrictions, day-to-day coordination with China is only allowed to happen through the Defense Attaché Office staff at the embassy or consulate.[4] The military members that work as attachés typically fall under the category of a FAO or RAS as well. It is very interesting to point out that via his e-mail, the PAO wrote, "it should be noted that in many cases the points of contact the attachés work with all speak very good English." Perhaps, our language trained members do not feel the necessity to speak Chinese in their coordination with their Chinese counterparts. Finally, the PAO explained that the other category of engagements, such as official visits or exercise support do not require State Department interpreters. During those events, "we will utilize military members who have

[4] This legal restriction refers to Public Law 106-65, dated Oct 5, 1999. Known as the National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2000, section 1201 contains limitations on military-to-military exchanges and contacts with the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

documented minimum proficiency in Chinese to perform interpreter services." (USPACOM Public Affairs Communication and Outreach 2016) Therefore, using these explanations from the PAO at USPACOM, it appears that our method of operation is to rely on interpreters, military or civilian, to facilitate our military-to-military interactions with the Chinese.

1.4 Future outlook and preparedness

Eric Sayers, a Defense Policy Advisor to a Congressman on the House Armed Services Committee wrote an article in 2012, published by the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled "Cultivating Tomorrow's Asia Hands." Sayers makes the case that the U.S. "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific region has focused on the "rhetoric and resources" surrounding the effort but that "we need a successful rebalancing of our human capital to the Asia-Pacific region to posture the United States for success." (Sayers 2012, 1) I agree with Sayer's main point regarding the Asia-Pacific region and feel that it is directly applicable to our military's outlook and preparedness when it comes to our communication with Chinese counterparts. He further points out that there has been over a decade of intense focus on the Middle East and "if we want to shape a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Asia-Pacific, we will need to cultivate a new generation of Asia experts that have spent considerable time in the region learning its political, economic, cultural, historical, and geographic contours, building language skills, and expanding personal relationships." (Sayers 2012, 1) If we want to influence the Asia-Pacific, and more specifically, China, we need to focus on human capital and cultivate experts. The experts that I envision, who will have the ability to form the most influential and lasting relationships, are officers in the U.S. military. If we are able to

cultivate a "new generation" of China experts that understands not only their military jobs, but how to do those jobs while utilizing the Chinese language in a culturally appropriate manner, then and only then, will we reach the full potential of our human capital, as they seek to personally interact with their Chinese counterparts in our inevitable and increasingly frequent interactions in the future.

If we continue with the mentality that interpreter-facilitated communications are "sufficient" in our interactions with Chinese counterparts, we will face an asymmetry that continues to expand with no recourse; this will clearly place ourselves at a huge disadvantage with U.S.-China relations. If the goal is to alleviate the asymmetry we currently face, and ameliorate the seemingly steady one-way flow of information from the U.S. to China, we must take the time to develop a new generation of military officer that is willing to learn about, understand, and possess the capability to form common ground with his/her Chinese counterpart within their shared domain-specific area of expertise. It does not appear that the U.S. military currently seeks out or trains members with domain-specific knowledge *combined with* Chinese language expertise to attend the exercises, visits, and meetings (as previously described) as an actual participant. The military participants that predominately engage with the Chinese seem to be selected solely based upon their "domain-specific" knowledge, a critical capability during any event or exercise, but lack the Chinese language and cultural "expertise" necessary to converse with their counterpart without resorting to English or the aid of an interpreter. It seems that language and cultural expertise might eventually be viewed as a critical capability, that must be coupled with the member's domain-specific knowledge, if we want to somehow bridge the asymmetry gap that we face with the Chinese.

In this study, "domain specific" is defined as "a restricted range of social interactions within a culture, bound by commonly shared knowledge and motivated by identifiable and shareable goals," while "expertise" may be defined to be "characteristics, skills, and knowledge that distinguish experts from novices and less experienced professionals." (Zeng, Demonstrating and Evaluating Expertise in Communicating in Chinese as a Foreign Language 2015, 28-29)

There are those who oppose increased engagement with China and would rather have a strategy of containment with limited interaction. However, we cannot afford to tackle the world's problems alone, and the Chinese are the only logical choice if we actually want to find solutions and resolve difficult problems that plague the entire world. Shirley A. Kan, a specialist in Asian Security Affairs, writing for the Congressional Research Service explains that "proponents of military exchanges with the PRC point out that contacts with the PLA cannot be expected to equal contacts with allies in transparency, reciprocity, and consistency. They argue that the mil-to-mil contacts nonetheless promote U.S. interests and allow the U.S. military to gain insights into the PLA, including its top leadership, that no other bilateral contacts provide." (Kan 2014, 21-22) The promotion of our interests and our insights into the PLA could also be drastically improved if we could rely on military members that were able to interact with their Chinese counterparts on their own without the aid of an interpreter. This is not to say that every military member needs to know Chinese, but we need to be smart about who learns Chinese and how they actually *use* it and how we actually use them.

CHAPTER 2: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES FOR CHINESE LANGUAGE TRAINING

The DoD's budget for fiscal year 2016 was just over 580 billion dollars. This figure represents 522 billion allocated towards baseline expenditures with an additional 59 billion dollars added for overseas contingency operations funding. (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO 2017, 3) The United States budget constitutes the largest defense spending in the world. With such an amazing amount of spending on defense, great resources are clearly at our leaders' disposal. Some may think our best resources are represented by high-tech stealth fighter and bomber technology, a feared nuclear arsenal, or even power-projection through the most advanced aircraft carriers in the world. No matter how advanced our technology may become, however, our best military resource will always be the *people*. Command and control make a military function and are critical concepts for those who lead and make the decisions. In war, we have information that is gathered and disseminated in a manner that facilitates the opportunity for people to make decisions and act. Our goal is to have people in place that act wisely upon the information they use. Training and experience are the factors that enhance, and guarantee a return on the investment into, our human capital in the military. As of 2016, the active duty forces in the U.S. military totaled 1,301,444 personnel. This number breaks down into 475,400 army soldiers, 324,557 navy sailors,

317,883 air force airmen, and 183,604 marines. (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/CFO 2017, 7) As we compare our personnel numbers and expenditures to the Chinese military's 1.25 million active duty personnel and an official defense budget of 144 billion dollars, the asymmetry predicament identified in Chapter 1 now seems to have a glimmer of hope for reversal in an area that has yet to be overcome by the Chinese. (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2016, 78,107) We actually exceed the Chinese in the amount of money we spend and slightly edge them out in the number of people we develop in our active duty forces. However, we need to wisely develop certain personnel within our military to be poised and ready to understand Chinese counterparts in such a way that the information flow to China might eventually have a comparable flow back to the U.S. Furthermore, to increase information flow from China to the U.S., the development of our people needs to be such that they can directly engage with their Chinese counterparts, having meaningful discussions and negotiations in such a manner that both sides fully understand the cultural and social nuances inherent in this basic form of communication.

2.1 Who the US military trains in Chinese

Considering the importance of the U.S.-China relationship, the U.S. cannot solely rely on English to communicate with, observe, and understand the Chinese. Decisions have been made within the DoD to train individuals in the Chinese language, thus positioning our military for collection and engagement. The preponderance of our Chinese language-trained military members will serve in the "intelligence community" (IC). The rationale behind the focus on the IC comes from the fact that China is not an ally of the U.S. and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 puts

legal limitations on military-to-military exchanges and contacts with the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Specifically, the law does not allow exchange or contact with the Chinese that would result in "inappropriate exposure" in the following twelve areas: (1) force projection operations, (2) nuclear operations, (3) advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations, (4) advanced logistical operations, (5) chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction, (6) surveillance and reconnaissance operations, (7) joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare, (8) military space operations, (9) other advanced capabilities of the armed forces, (10) arms sales or military-related technology transfers, (11) release of classified or restricted information, and (12) access to a Department of Defense laboratory. (106th Congress 1999, Section 1201) With these limitations in mind, coupled with the concept of national security, it follows that the Chinese military would be interested in gathering any information related to these twelve restricted areas while we prevent and deny any access. Efforts to collect and deny information take tremendous resources and cannot be overlooked or underestimated in their importance. The members that are trained for the IC should possess high Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR)[5] skill levels in order to be effective in their jobs. However, the focus of their training is to develop passive language abilities; they are not really trained to perform at the level of personal communication that direct engagement with the Chinese military will afford. The law does, however, provide exceptions, allowing opportunities for direct engagement with the Chinese because exchanges and contact when the military-to-military

[5] Interagency Language Roundtable skill levels are used throughout the U.S. government as the standard when determining a member's language proficiency and are found in Appendices A-C for the skills of listening, reading, and speaking respectively.

relationship applies to search-and-rescue, or humanitarian operations or exercises are allowed. (106th Congress 1999, Section 1201) Chapter 1 above provided several examples of these "legal" and growing interactions with the Chinese. Therefore, as we engage with the Chinese, we need trained members working outside of the passive or clandestine intelligence mindset to take advantage of every direct engagement opportunity we have with the Chinese. This then leaves us with the military members known as Foreign Area Officers (FAO) as the focus for developing language and cultural expertise that might ultimately aid in national security efforts through direct engagement with Chinese counterparts. Although the way that FAOs are currently utilized is not optimal for engagements during actual contact and exchanges within U.S-China military operations and exercises, it is still a starting point to better understand who the military might view as its "experts." These are the members possessing the skills and knowledge necessary to better communicate with the Chinese. The current number of FAOs that we train each year is quite small when compared to the rest of language trained members in the DoD. The primary source for language training within the military is at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California. Although DLIFLC is not the only source for language-enabled military members, it is the largest and currently trains 3,500 resident students in 17 languages and dialects annually. (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 2017, 7) The number of FAO accessions for 2015 was 215 officers throughout the DoD.[6] If every FAO were trained at

[6] The 215 accessions are made up of 55 in the Army, 42 in the Navy, 88 in the Air Force, and 30 in the Marine Corps. These numbers were taken from the FY15 annual reports on the FAO program that each service produced and provided to the Defense Language National Security and Education Office.

DLIFLC, only six percent of the language training was dedicated to that community. Since only 12 FAOs were assessed for the China region in 2015, not even one percent of those trained at DLIFLC will be available for direct engagement with the Chinese.[7]

Within the officer corps, the FAOs are our experts who have a specific regional and language focus. The term, FAO, is used in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, whereas, in the Air Force, the term FAO has been replaced with International Affairs Specialists (IAS), with two sub-groups known as Regional Affairs Strategists (RAS) and Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS). Only the RAS is required to know the language for the region he/she is assigned and thus can be considered equivalent to an Army, Navy, or Marine Corps FAO. Even though the Air Force uses different terminology, here we will refer to the entire group as FAOs. A Department of Defense instruction defines FAOs as "Commissioned officers who possess a broad range of military skills and experiences; qualification in their primary military occupational specialty and/or designator; graduate-level or equivalent education focusing on, but not limited to, the historical, political, diplomatic, military/security, cultural, sociological, scientific, economic, and geographic factors of specific foreign countries and regions; in-country/regional experience involving significant interaction with host nationals and host-nation entities in the foreign countries or regions in which they specialize; and proficiency in one or more of the predominant languages in their regions of expertise (with the goal of attaining professional-level proficiency)." (USD (P&R) 2007, 2) I

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[7] The China region FAOs accessed in 2015 are made up of 7 in the Army, 0 in the Navy, 3 in the Air Force, and 2 in the Marine Corps. These numbers are taken from each service's FY15 annual report on the FAO program found in the bibliography section of this work.

provide the definition of the FAO to not only clarify the expectations and goals for these officers, but to also show that meeting these requirements involves a great deal of investment in both time and money for the military. In fact, once a FAO is identified to serve in the China region and enters the pipeline, it will typically take three years or more to train that officer for the job. For the language training aspect, there is approximately one and a half years required at the DLIFLC, and then an additional minimum six months in-country time required to further bolster the candidate's language and cultural understanding. (USD (P&R) 2005, 4) If the FAO is an Army or Navy officer, then his/her program requires a one-year in-country immersion, so the developmental time is even longer. (DLIFLC 2016, 2) In addition to the language training, an advanced academic degree will typically take no less than one year for FAO candidates. Basically, the FAO candidates without language skill or an applicable advanced academic degree are taken out of their primary military specialty for three years or more just to become "qualified" to serve as a China-region FAO.

There are essentially two ways the DoD approaches FAO development. The first is referred to as a single-track approach, and the second would be considered a dual-track approach. The single-track approach is the method of management that the Army and Navy utilize, while the Air Force and Marine Corps have elected to use the dual-track approach.

The single-track approach allows officers sufficient time to develop their military specialties, typically between eight and twelve years of commissioned service, before they are considered for accession into the FAO community. (United States Navy 2016, 8) For example, in 2015, the Navy accessed 42 new FAOs (none for Chinese) with the

following communities, or military specialties represented: aviation, submarine, surface warfare, intelligence, civil engineering, supply, limited duty officers, and the medical corps. At this eight to twelve-year point in their career, the Navy would then begin deliberately developing and training the FAO. Once an officer becomes a FAO, under the single-track approach, he/she no longer has requirements to sustain his/her previous military specialty and solely focuses on being a FAO with that as the new and separate specialty throughout the remainder of a career. (United States Navy 2016, 9) The Army, using the single-track approach, is very similar to the process used by the Navy, but reports that FAO accession for the Army is targeted between an officer's sixth and eighth years of service. (United States Army 2016, 3) Once again, this time period allows the officer to become fully qualified in his/her military specialty before leaving it and pursuing the FAO track for the remainder of a career.

The Air Force and the Marine Corps follow the dual-track approach for FAO management. The dual-track means that once accessed into the FAO community, officers will then alternate between their primary career field and FAO assignments. These two services tend to like this approach because it allows their officers to remain current in their military specialty. For the Air Force, officers are typically selected to become a FAO at their seven to ten-year point in their military career. (United States Air Force 2016, 8) Once again, this seems to guarantee the officers have had sufficient time to become fully qualified in their military specialties before leaving it for an extended period of time due to FAO training and perhaps a follow-on assignment not related to the primary career field. For the Marine Corps, officers with three to eleven years of service are eligible to apply for the FAO track. (United States Marine Corps 2016, 1) With at

least three years of service in the Marine Corps, a FAO candidate typically has served at least one operational tour under this construct giving him/her some experience with the military specialty before entering training.

Regardless of the single-track or dual-track approach to FAO development, the requirements to become a FAO are essentially the same for all of the services. There are typically three things that a FAO must have to be qualified—an advanced academic degree, language proficiency, and in-country time. For example, the Navy considers a "fully-qualified" FAO to have accomplished the following: a political-military related Master's degree or waiver, completion of the Joint FAO course Phase 1, foreign language proficiency in a major language of their assigned region documented by a minimum of "2" in two of the three ILR modalities (L-listening, R-reading, S-speaking), and finally, in-theater duty experience of 1 year (can be waived to minimum of six months) in the region of specialty. (United States Navy 2016, 7-8)

According to military regulations, the FAO should have language abilities at the professional level, which equates to ILR skill levels of 3 for listening and reading and a "goal" of 3 for speaking to be qualified for the job. (USD (P&R) 2005, 4) However, time and experience has proven that it is extremely difficult to get FAOs to the L3/R3/S3 levels of language proficiency. Reality has dictated that L3/R3/S3 become the "goal," instead of the "standard," for FAOs, and the graduation requirements from DLIFLC's basic course of L2/R2/S1+ as the level to become qualified for FAO service. Furthermore, once a FAO leaves DLIFLC, the oral proficiency interview (OPI) seems to be a difficult metric for the services to track and enforce. For example, in the 2015 FAO report by the Air Force it was explained that, "the Air Force requires all RAS officers to

test in the OPI annually in order to capture the force's ability to engage, but lacks manpower to track and enforce this requirement." (United States Air Force 2016, 29) Ultimately, once a FAO is out of the initial training and achieved the L2/R2/S1+ graduation requirement from DLIFLC, subsequent qualification seems to be based primarily upon officers' scores on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) as the primary metric for proving language skill, and for qualifying for foreign language incentive pay (DLPT only tests listening and reading modalities). Although the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) is the assessment tool used to show the officer's speaking ability, none of the services' 2015 annual reports on FAO management were able to show a complete reporting on OPI scores that indicated the speaking levels of the current FAO inventories.

Without going into great detail regarding the ILR scale, it should be obvious that the abilities of a L2/R2/S1+ FAO are much different than those described for a L3/R3/S3 FAO (Appendices A-C contain these descriptions). For example, when assessing military members' language abilities, a FAO with a 1+ level in speaking would have a skill level description based upon elementary proficiency. To put things into perspective, a FAO with a 1+ level in his/her Chinese speaking would "have little understanding of the social conventions of conversation" and "frequently has to repeat utterances to be understood by the general public." (Interagency Language Roundtable n.d., 2) Performing at this low level of proficiency means that the FAO cannot discuss things at an expert or professional level in Chinese with a Chinese counterpart. The minimum proficiency requirements do not seem to match the level that a FAO, or an expert in the region, would be expected to operate at. From the Air Force perspective, these FAOs

"will typically serve as Major Command (MAJCOM), Combatant Command (COCOM), and Headquarters Air Force staff officers, country desk officers, arms control specialists, foreign liaison officers, political advisers, security assistance officers, and attachés; where their unique combination of professional military skills, regional expertise, and foreign language proficiency are required." (SAF/IAPA 2010, 3-4) These positions are extremely important and we should not take for granted the need for the FAO's ability to participate in immediate and meaningful discussions with their Chinese counterparts. Although the minimum requirements for accession to a FAO position may not seem to be at a level conducive to such meaningful discussions with Chinese counterparts, the FAO community serving in the Chinese region may have skill levels above the minimum required. This warrants further investigation.

2.1.1 Army China FAOs

In 2015, the Army's FAO inventory totaled 1,248 officers with 888 positions to fill. However, of the 1,248 officers in the inventory, only 749 were available, either due to training, being newly accessed, or those on medical or legal hold. (United States Army 2016, 15) Out of the entire inventory, the Army had 67 FAOs assigned to the China region, with 41 billets to fill, but only 38 were considered "trained." (United States Army 2016, 9) Projections for FAO numbers do not seem to reflect any major deviations from the 2015 numbers all the way through 2021. (United States Army 2016, 15) Therefore, for the China region FAOs, the current inventory, with approximately equal accessions offsetting the attrition, should give us a good assessment of the program for the foreseeable future.

The Army reported 81 DLPT scores that reflect the FAOs' language ability assigned to the China region. According to the 2015 report, there were a total of 45 qualified (greater than or equal to L2/R2) Chinese language DLPT scores on record (42 qualified in Mandarin, 2 qualified in Cantonese, and 1 qualified in Amoy). The total number of qualifying scores that reached the DoD goal for a L3/R3 level are 10 in Mandarin, 1 in Amoy, and 1 in Cantonese. Additionally, the report indicated that within the FAO community, 31 Mandarin scores were below the L2/R2 level and 5 Cantonese scores were below the L2/R2 level. (United States Army 2016, 31-33) Since the number of test scores exceeds the number of China FAOs in the inventory, the discrepancy can likely be attributed to the fact that some FAOs test in more than one Chinese language. Therefore, out of the 81 reported scores for Chinese language, only 15 percent of the Army's China region FAOs would be able to operate at the professional level (L3/R3) that the DoD prescribes for its experts. In terms of overall scores, 56 percent would be "qualified" to perform FAO duties with regard to language while the remaining 44 percent are FAOs, but fail to achieve the minimum language proficiency.

2.1.2 Navy China FAOs

In 2015, the Navy had a FAO inventory of 331 officers, with approximately 289 available to fill 371 positions. (United States Navy 2016, 2,6) The Navy projects its full operating capacity to be at 405 FAOs with approximately 346 officers available by 2021. (United States Navy 2016, 18) According to the report, the Navy had 19 qualified FAOs assigned to the China region with 10 positions to fill. (United States Navy 2016, 10,27)

The Navy recorded a total of 26 DLPT scores for its China-region FAOs. There were a total of 21 qualified (at least a L2/R2) Chinese scores (16 Mandarin, 3 Cantonese,

and 2 Amoy) and 5 scores below the L2/R2 level. Of the 26 total scores, 7 scores reached the DoD target for professional level (L3/R3) with 4 in Mandarin, 2 in Amoy, and 1 in Cantonese, giving them 27 percent of China FAOs operating at the goal level. (United States Navy 2016, 12) In summary, the scores reflect 81 percent of the Navy's China FAOs operating at the qualified level, with 19 percent of the FAOs testing below the qualified level.

2.1.3 Air Force China FAOs

In 2015, the Air Force had a FAO inventory of 451 officers, with approximately 195 available to fill 321 positions. (United States Air Force 2016, 28) The Air Force projects approximately 637 FAOs (738 total would be needed to fill all positions) with approximately 277 available to fill 321 positions by 2021. (United States Air Force 2016, 28) The number of available FAOs will always be quite low compared to the number in the inventory because of the dual-track approach to FAO development in the Air Force. Since Air Force FAOs alternate between FAO assignments and their military specialty, it would seem reasonable to have no more than half of them available for FAO assignments at any given time. According to the report, the Air Force had 23 FAOs assigned to the China region with 8 positions to fill. (United States Air Force 2016, 23) Once again, not all 23 FAOs will be available to fill the positions because of the dual-track development.

In the report, the Air Force recorded a total of 36 DLPT scores for FAOs testing in Chinese. There were a total of 34 qualified (at least a L2/R2) Chinese scores (30 Mandarin and 4 Cantonese) and 2 scores below the L2/R2 level for the China FAOs. Of the 34 qualified scores, 5 reached the DoD target for professional level (L3/R3), with 4 in Mandarin and 1 in Cantonese, equating to 14 percent of Air Force China FAOs' scores at

the goal level. (United States Air Force 2016, 16) In total, the scores reflect 94 percent of the Air Force's China FAOs operating at the qualified level, with 6 percent of the FAOs testing below the qualified level.

2.1.4 Marine Corps China FAOs

In 2015, the Marine Corps had a FAO inventory of 354 active duty officers and 51 reserve component officers. Within the active duty FAO community, only 48 FAOs were available to fill 115 positions. (United States Marine Corps 2016, Enclosure 2) The Marine Corps projects to have approximately 456 active duty FAOs with only 87 available to fill the 115 positions by 2021. (United States Marine Corps 2016, Enclosure 2) Much like the Air Force, the dual-track for FAO development in the Marine Corps means approximately half of the FAO inventory will be serving outside of the FAO assignments at any given time in order to maintain their primary military specialty. The Marine Corps assigned 39 FAOs to the Northeast Asia specialty (China included) with approximately 8 positions to fill. (United States Marine Corps 2016, 7, Enclosure 1)

In the report, the Marine Corps recorded a total of 25 DLPT scores for FAOs testing in Chinese. There were a total of 20 qualified (at least a L2/R2) Chinese scores (17 Mandarin, 2 Cantonese, and 1 Amoy) and 5 scores below the L2/R2 level for those FAOs testing. Of the 20 qualified scores, 7 reached the DoD target for professional level (L3/R3), with 6 in Mandarin and 1 in Cantonese, equating to 28 percent of Marine FAOs' Chinese scores at the goal level. (United States Marine Corps 2016, 5, Enclosure 1) In total, the scores reflect 80 percent of the Marine's FAOs operating at the qualified level, with 20 percent of the FAOs testing below the qualified level.

2.1.5 Summary of FAOs' Chinese language ability in the DoD

The table below, designated as Figure 2, summarizes the Chinese language abilities of FAOs throughout the DoD represented by DLPT scores as reported by their respective branch of service for fiscal year 2015. The table is broken down by branch of service and languages tested among China FAOs throughout the DoD, with the percentages of scores meeting the DoD goal for professional level proficiency (ILR score of L3/R3), scores at or above the qualified level (L2/R2) but less than the goal of L3/R3, and unqualified scores (ILR score below L2/R2). This table should help the reader get a better understanding of our FAOs' current posture to directly engage Chinese counterparts with respect to language ability.

Branch	Language (Total Tests)	>= L3/R3 (Goal)	>= L2/R2 (Minimum)	< R2/L2 (Below Min)
Army	Mandarin (73)	14%	44%	42%
	Cantonese (7)	14%	15%	71%
	Amoy (1)	100%	100%	0%
Navy	Mandarin (21)	19%	57%	24%
	Cantonese (3)	33%	67%	0%
	Amoy (2)	100%	100%	0%
Air Force	Mandarin (32)	13%	81%	6%
	Cantonese (4)	25%	75%	0%
	Amoy (0)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Marine Corps	Mandarin (22)	27%	50%	23%
	Cantonese (2)	50%	50%	0%
	Amoy (1)	0%	100%	0%
Total DoD	Mandarin (148)	16%	55%	29%
	Cantonese (16)	25%	44%	31%
	Amoy (4)	75%	25%	0%

Figure 2: China FAO DLPT Scores

2.2 Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC)

DLIFLC traces its roots back to the U.S. entry into World War II. The humble beginnings of this now premier foreign language center, started in 1941 at the Fourth U.S. Army Intelligence School in San Francisco, California with only four instructors and sixty students learning Japanese. Approximately one year after its inception, the school

would take on the new title of the Military Intelligence Service Language School with subsequent moves to two different locations in Minnesota attributed to military necessity and student population growth. (DLIFLC 2017, World War II) In 1946, the school would be moved back again to California, where it still resides today in Monterey. At that time, it took on the new title of the Army Language School. The Army Language school was then postured to face the challenges of the Cold War and Korean War developing "a national reputation for excellence in foreign language education" and boasts to have led the way with "the audiolingual method and the application of educational technology such as the language laboratory." (DLIFLC 2017, Army Language School) In 1963, the government sought to consolidate its foreign language training into one new program called the Defense Foreign Language Program and established a Defense Language Institute (DLI) with its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and two branches, the DLI West Coast Branch, formerly the Army Language School, and the DLI East Coast Branch, formerly the foreign language department at the Naval Intelligence School. (DLIFLC 2017, DLIFLC) DLI would face restructuring again in 1974, with the headquarters and all of the resident language training programs consolidated at the Monterey location (the DLI West Coast Branch) under the new name of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) and a small foreign language training program remaining in Washington D.C. under DLIFLC's purview known as the Defense Language Institute-Washington Office (DLI-W). (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 2017, 5) To summarize the history and capacity of DLIFLC, it is reported that the center "provides resident instruction in 17 languages at the Presidio of Monterey, California, with the capacity to instruct another 65 languages in Washington, D.C., graduating more

than 220,000 linguists since 1941." (Bray 2017, 3)

Whenever there is a language need in the military, DLIFLC will be involved in the process in some way or another. The responsibility to not only train members in the foreign language, but also to develop the assessments to determine proficiency, falls squarely under the DLIFLC. In the U.S. military, as an officer is selected to take the job most related to requiring foreign language, that of a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), he/she is "traditionally" sent to the DLIFLC in Monterey California for language training. This training is the norm and seems to be required because rarely does a four-year college background result in satisfying the goal for a FAO's language proficiency requirement. Furthermore, by the time a FAO is selected, he/she has had several years of focusing on a military specialty without using the foreign language, with inevitable language decay as the result. DLIFLC's mission is listed as, "Our mission is to provide culturally based foreign language education, training, evaluation and sustainment to enhance the security of the nation." (DLIFLC 2016) Although the goals and learning outcomes for DLIFLC are further explained in Chapter 3, it is necessary here to emphasize that the key goal for DLIFLC falls under its graduation requirement for proficiency levels evaluated through the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) of Listening-2, Reading-2, and Speaking-1+ from the basic course. This means that our FAOs graduating from DLIFLC are only expected to have "limited working proficiency" in their listening and reading abilities and "elementary proficiency" in their speaking ability (ILR descriptions found in Appendices A-C). Although DLIFLC, "continually reviews developments in the field of instructional methodology and incorporates into its educational programs those features that are designed to produce the very best linguists

for our country," perhaps the standard that is set is for L2/R2/S1+ is attainable in the 64-week Mandarin Chinese course, but may not produce an individual able to "do" all of the functions desirable for a FAO, and nowhere near the level that an "expert" in his/her field would need to discuss matters in Chinese. (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 2017, 9)

Although it has been shown that FAO training typically involves three major milestones: the language training, in country time, and an advanced academic degree, not all FAOs that are accessed will have to go through every aspect of the training. For example, if an officer with language proficiency above the DLIFLC graduation requirement of L2/R2/S1+ were accessed, he/she does not necessarily have to attend foreign language training. These types of accessions can save the military a great deal of time and money, considering the training will typically take over 3 years for FAOs targeted to operate in China. The Marine Corps has two types of pipelines for FAO accession, the study track, which will involve the full time, incorporating all three requirements, and the experience track, which recruits officers who may already meet language, education, or regional experience requirements through their own personal experiences. (United States Marine Corps 2016, 1-2) The Air Force uses the same concept for its two pipelines for FAO accession, but calls it "deliberate development" for the track requiring the complete training, and "direct utilization" for the track where certain training elements may be eliminated due to the officer's previous experiences, resulting in qualifying levels for language, education, or regional time. (United States Air Force 2016, 4-5) The Army and Navy both consider previous experiences with foreign language, advanced academic degrees, and in-country time during their accession process

as well. Although DLIFLC is ultimately the DoD's primary choice for language training, other sources that may provide an officer with language education, exposure, or even training to a high proficiency warrant further study.

2.3 Service Academies

An officer may earn a commission and enter the military through a service academy. Although the United States Coast Guard has a service academy and is part of the DoD, they do not currently develop nor request FAOs, so this section will focus on the other three service academies—the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Air Force Academy. At the United States Military Academy (West Point), "The Department of Foreign Languages' mission is to educate, train, and inspire cadets to develop foreign language, cross-cultural, and regional competencies which enhance their service as officers in the United States Army." (United States Military Academy Department of Foreign Languages 2016) At the United States Naval Academy, the goals of The Languages and Cultures Department are to teach midshipmen to "communicate effectively in a foreign language and interact in culturally appropriate ways with native speakers of that language; acquire insight into the heritage, cultural values and practices of the foreign country or countries studied; develop disposition and cognitive strategies for lifelong studying of other languages and cultures." (United States Naval Academy Languages and Cultures Department 2016) Finally, at the United States Air Force Academy the Department of Foreign Languages' goal is "to develop leaders of character with global perspective through world class language and culture education." (Department of Foreign Languages 2016)

As a previous faculty member at the United States Air Force Academy, I taught

Chinese and helped work towards our foreign language program goals as they applied to language education and student assessment. Foreign language study is mandatory regardless of a student's academic degree at the Academy. When students arrive at the Academy, they must rank order their language preference based upon the eight languages offered (Spanish, Portuguese, German, French, Japanese, Russian, Arabic, and Chinese). It is a core requirement to complete at least four semesters of one of these foreign languages (three semesters if the student has a technical major). Since Chinese cannot be a student's major at the Academy, we definitely encouraged those with the aptitude for the language to make it their minor. The goal was set for a target of 25 percent of cadets minoring in the foreign language to test at or above the L1+/R1+ (elementary proficiency, plus) level based upon the ILR scale (Appendices A-C). The department chose to use the Defense Language Proficiency Test in Chinese-Mandarin (very low range test) for listening and reading as the measuring stick reflecting student achievement. The very low range test was designed to test students up to the 1+ level. Therefore, if a student achieved the 1+ level, they were afforded the opportunity to take the lower range test, which is designed to test a student up to the 3 level on the ILR scale (general professional proficiency). By way of example, in 2015, the Air Force Academy had 845 graduates with 230 of them minoring in foreign language. Of the 230 foreign language minors, only 18 cadets minored in Chinese. Of the 18 Chinese minors, 5 of them were able to test at or above the L1+/R1+ level, slightly exceeding the departmental goal with a 28 percent success rate. Although both the Military Academy and the Naval Academy offer Chinese as a major, the proficiency level of their cadets cannot be expected to be dramatically higher than the Air Force Academy, with very few ever achieving a proficiency level

equaled to the graduation requirement a future FAO candidate would have at the DLIFLC (L2/R2/S1+).

Since all of the services require officers to develop a primary military specialty before FAO consideration, none of the service academies are direct pipelines for the FAO communities. The service academies come with a five-year active-duty service commitment upon graduation/commission and may lose several officers with language skills before they are even considered for a FAO opportunity. The experience that officer candidates get through Chinese language training at the service academies can definitely make them more prepared to fill the FAO role later in a career. In the rare case, a graduate of a service academy may have developed language skills that already meet the qualification level for a FAO, but it may be hard to sustain a high level of proficiency while focusing on a military specialty without any direct requirement to maintain or enhance the language skills after graduation. Therefore, the language training programs offered by the service academies appear to be language education and awareness programs giving officers only elementary level skills in the foreign language. There is hope for future development only if the officer were selected to become a FAO, or if the officer simply decided to pursue further study for personal reasons. The Air Force does, however, have a supplemental program, known as the Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP) which is designed to "sustain, enhance and posture for utilization the existing language skills and talents of Airmen." (Air Force Culture and Language Center 2017) This program is not mandatory for those graduating with high levels of language, but simply is an opportunity for those Airmen to apply for and pursue further language development. LEAP does have several participants that may eventually serve as FAOs or

serve in language coded billets, but the program is filled by volunteers who apply for the program. It needs to be emphasized, however, that language acquisition is not simply an accumulative process that allows a learner pick up right where he/she left off when extended breaks between utilization occur. An officer that graduates from a service academy with a L1+/R1+ level in Chinese proficiency could not expect to enter FAO training at the seven to twelve-year point in his/her career and still have the previous proficiency level to build upon at that time. Language attrition, and the expression "if you don't use it, you lose it," are very real concepts when it comes to second language maintenance. Of course, the service academies are not the only way for a candidate to receive Chinese language education and enter the U.S. military as an officer. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program is the largest commissioning source for the U.S. military and involves study and earning degrees at civilian institutions throughout the country.

2.4 Civilian Institutions and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)

There are two basic degree-granting programs that officer candidates may pursue as an option for entering the U.S. military—a service academy or ROTC.[8] ROTC represents the largest commissioning source for active duty officers in the U.S. military. For example, Army ROTC reports show that approximately 60 percent of active duty Army Second Lieutenants were accessed through ROTC programs. (U.S. Army 2017) The Army ROTC program is quite large and is available at 273 host schools across the

[8] Officer Candidate School (OCS) or Officer Training School (OTS) are other commissioning sources for the U.S. military, but candidates already have a bachelor's degree before applying for these programs and represent low-cost alternatives for DoD officer accessions.

country. (U.S. Army 2017) The other two services' ROTC programs are a bit smaller in scope, but still have approximately 155 colleges and universities functioning as host units for the Navy and 145 for the Air Force. (U.S. Air Force ROTC 2017) (NROTC 2017) With thousands of ROTC students attending these colleges and universities annually, the military has an opportunity to leverage the Chinese language programs offered by several of the participating civilian institutions. Government funding for the institutions and students alike has become the catalyst to provide initiatives and programs that help develop the language capabilities of future officers. Although the bulk of the funding for ROTC cadets comes through scholarships offered by each of their respective services, the Defense Language and National Security Education Office will subsidize a substantial portion when it comes to a cadet's or midshipmen's language pursuits.

In 2012, the National Security Education Program (NSEP) office was merged with the Defense Language Office (DLO) to form what is known today as the Defense Language and National Security Education Office (DLNSEO). (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 1) Under the DLNSEO umbrella, NSEP manages two initiatives that directly relate to future officers, Project Global Officer and The Language Flagship. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 1)

2.4.1 Project Global Officer

Through DLNSEO, an initiative known as Project Global Officer (GO) provides grants to colleges and universities across the country focusing on the institutions with large ROTC student enrollments. These institutions are then expected to provide language and culture training to ROTC students that includes both domestic and overseas programs with the ultimate goal that they "will provide students with the tools and

resources required to achieve a minimum ILR Level 1 proficiency over a series of language-learning interventions." (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 68) This program is not necessarily designed to produce foreign language majors and experts, but rather "to improve the language skills, regional expertise, and intercultural communication skills of ROTC students," or in other words, enable future officers to bring these skills into the active duty military forces upon graduation. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 3) Since its inception in 2007, Project GO boasts to have supported critical language study for over 3,500 ROTC students, with the five-year span of 2011-2015 supporting 2,646 of those students, thus showing the growth of the program to where it now appears to have somewhat stabilized with enrollment numbers. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 63,67) All of the services, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps participate in Project GO. According to Project Go's official website, 24 institutions currently administer programs with the following 15 institutions offering programs in Chinese: Boston University, Duke University, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Georgia Institute of Technology, Indiana University, Norwich University, San Diego State University, Texas A&M University, The Citadel, University of Kansas, University of Mississippi, University of Montana, University of North Georgia, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and Worcester Polytechnic Institute. (Project GO 2017, Programs)

Project GO continues to improve and progress as students are encouraged to achieve the minimum proficiency goal of ILR Level 1 in the three modalities of listening, reading, and speaking. The following objectives are essentially the plan of attack for helping ROTC students reach the goal: "enhancing year-long language study programs

for Project GO students; supporting extended overseas study for Project GO students; maintaining and synchronizing a network of domestic and overseas language programs open to all ROTC students nationwide; Assisting Senior Military Colleges (SMC)[9] in internationalizing the experience of their ROTC students; and creating opportunities for ROTC students to receive cross-cultural exposure through curricular enhancements." (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 63-64) Since Chinese is one of the critical languages that Project GO focuses on, many cadets and midshipmen are able to take advantage of this funding through an application process and pursue developing Chinese language and cultural skills that might prove beneficial to the military in their future service. For example, in 2015, 1,200 ROTC students applied for Project GO with 530 selected, resulting in a 41% acceptance rate. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 63) Of the 530 participants selected, 25%, or 131 studied Chinese. Of these 131 students studying Chinese, 99 of them participated in an overseas experience, with 91 of them going to China, and 8 of them going to Taiwan. The remaining 32 students, therefore, had domestic-based learning experiences with their Chinese study. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 67) In order to further understand Project GO's value with regard to producing future officers with Chinese language and cultural capabilities, it is worth looking at the proficiency levels achieved by the Chinese language students participating in this program.

An expectation for Project GO participants studying Chinese is to complete the

[9] There are six SMCs in the U.S. Five of the six SMCs are currently participating in project GO (Norwich University, Texas A&M University, The Citadel, University of North Georgia, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute). Virginia Military Institute is the only SMC not participating.

equivalent of four semesters of the language, including a study abroad for eight weeks or longer. After the students have completed these requirements, assessments based upon the ILR scale (found in Appendices A-C) are utilized to determine progress. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 64) However, as previously, mentioned, not all students studying Chinese will meet all of these expectations since, only 99 out of 131 participants studying Chinese had the overseas experience in 2015. However, DLNSEO did report the language scores for midshipmen and cadets that completed at least the four semesters of language training in 2015. For the Chinese language participants, approximately 87 scores were reported for the listening and reading modalities. The Project GO students were administered the Flagship Online Listening and Reading Proficiency Test (based upon the ILR scale) after they had completed at least the four semesters of Chinese. Figure 3, below, summarizes the results for the 87 Chinese language participants: (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 65)

ILR Level Achieved	Listening	Reading
<ILR 1	39%	22%
ILR 1	33%	45%
ILR 1+	23%	28%
ILR 2	5%	5%

Figure 3: Project GO Chinese Language Participant Results

DLNSEO's report did mention 302 Project GO students were evaluated by Oral Proficiency Interview in 2015 after completing at least the four semesters of study, however, it did not break the data out by language. DLNSEO reported that 96% of the OPI scores met or exceeded the ILR level 1 goal with 55% of the speaking scores at an ILR level 1+ or better. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 64) Assuming this OPI data is a valid reflection of the Chinese language participants, when compared to their 61% success rate in listening and 78% success rate in reading, it seems that perhaps Project GO helps students develop their speaking modality best. However, comparing the validity of OPI testing to the listening and reading testing, although all three are based upon the ILR scale, could be problematic. Suffice it to say, with the ILR level 1 as Project GO's target, the program does not appear to be developing future officers with the ability to engage Chinese counterparts at a professional level upon completion. It is interesting to note, however, based upon the 2015 data, that 55% of Project GO Chinese participants meet or exceed the FAO's minimum requirement for speaking at ILR level 1+, and 5% would meet the FAO requirement for listening and reading modalities. Once again, Project GO will not produce officers with the abilities

equivalent to the language abilities FAOs achieve through their DLIFLC experience. However, Project GO is only one of the language initiatives funded by DLNSEO that future officers have access to. There is, in fact, another program available to ROTC students that aim to help them achieve a much higher level of proficiency.

2.4.2 The Language Flagship/ROTC Flagship Scholarships

The Language Flagship, funded by DLNSEO, "currently sponsors 26 programs at 21 universities in Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Korean, Persian, Portuguese, Russian, Swahili, Turkish and Urdu." Furthermore, the goal for the program is "to graduate students from an array of majors with an exit proficiency of an ILR 3 proficiency in one of the Language Flagship's target languages." (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 25) The Language Flagship is a program built around a vision for the entire nation and not necessarily just future officers who will serve in the military. For example, The Language Flagship is described as "not only to graduate students at a professionally proficient level of language but also to 'push the model' down to elementary, middle, and high schools" with these efforts described as "vital to our capacity to educate citizenry prepared to address the nation's well-being in the 21st century." (The Language Flagship 2017, 1) The DoD definitely can reap some of the benefits this type of program provides when officer candidates apply for and complete all of the requirements. The lofty goal of ILR 3 is the same as the DoD's vision for all of its FAOs, and graduates of the Language Flagship program may already enter the service with language proficiency higher than the majority of those currently serving as FAOs. The biggest discriminators between a Language Flagship graduate and a current FAO would be the advanced academic degree which only the FAO requires, and more importantly, experience within a military

specialty. Although the Language Flagship program participants are targeted for government service once they have demonstrated their abilities in a critical language, only a small number will enter the armed services. The Language Flagship program utilizes Domestic Flagship Programs and Overseas Flagships Centers with funding provided by DLNSEO. The domestic programs essentially leverage civilian institutions' language programs that are then coupled with the overseas portion that "provide directed language instruction, direct enrollment opportunities and professional internship experiences that foster the attainment of professional-level language proficiency during an overseas Capstone experience." (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 23) The Capstone experience, often viewed as the fifth-year of study seems to be where this program gets the most bang for the buck. Since most ROTC scholarships are 4-year programs (sometimes 5 years for certain technical majors), the fifth year is not covered by the ROTC funding. Therefore, the opportunity to utilize the Language Flagship initiative for future military officers comes through earning a ROTC Language Flagship scholarship where DLNSEO covers the funding for the fifth year and the military services allow the officers to assume their commissions one-year later than normal. Currently, it appears that only the Army and the Air Force are on board with the ROTC Flagship Scholarships that extend the cadets to the fifth year, or Capstone portion of the program. DLNSEO's 2015 report does acknowledge that they have "on-going discussions with the Naval Service Training Command to expand their participation in the ROTC Flagship program." (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 26)

There seems to be solid enrollment numbers in The Language Flagship as a whole

with 1,012 undergraduates in 2015. However, only those participants that achieve an ILR level 2 or above by the fourth year will typically be selected for the Capstone portion of the program involving a year abroad at an Overseas Flagship Center. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 25) To get a better idea of how many students participate in the full extent of this program, the 2015 report shows that 111 students were tested before and after the Capstone experience in the speaking modality, while 109 were assessed in the listening and reading modalities. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 27) The number of the ROTC students participating in the entire 5-year program, of course, will only represent a very small portion of those tested. The ROTC Flagship initiative more or less combines the concepts of Project GO (previously described) and the ideas of The Language Flagship allowing future officers the opportunity to graduate with language proficiency much higher than previously anticipated. Since cadets participating in this program would graduate typically one year later than their peers, it seems that enrollment numbers with this initiative are quite low.

The ROTC Flagship initiative was launched in 2011, and the Air Force supported the program starting in 2012. Between 2012 and 2015, the Air Force only awarded 22 total scholarships for cadets studying Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian, Russian, Swahili, and Turkish. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 26) Assuming there was an equal distribution among the languages studied, only a few Air Force ROTC students completed the Capstone course for Chinese under this initiative during that four-year span. The numbers for the Army appear to be similar, considering only 11 language scholarships to ROTC students studying Arabic, Chinese, and Russian were awarded in 2015. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 26)

The following 12 schools are the options available to cadets who want to study Chinese with an ROTC Flagship scholarship: Arizona State University, Brigham Young University, Hunter College, Indiana University, San Francisco State University, University of Hawaii – Manoa, University of Minnesota, University of Mississippi, University of North Georgia[10], University of Oregon, University of Rhode Island, and Western Kentucky University. (The Language Flagship 2017, 2)

Despite the low enrollment numbers in the ROTC Flagship, it is still worth investigating the performance of all students that take part in The Language Flagship to understand the proficiency that might be achieved by an officer candidate who takes part in the full program. Analyzing the 2011 to 2015 undergraduate participants' assessment scores in the three modalities of listening, reading, and speaking in Chinese after the Capstone year can give us better insight into what the ROTC Flagship might have to offer the U.S. military. Since the ROTC Flagship was initiated in 2011, this five-year time span will include scores by the ROTC cadets that participated and were assessed after their Capstone portion of the program. Figure 4 below summarizes the 127 Chinese participants' scores for listening and reading during the years 2011-2015: (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 127-128)

[10] University of North Georgia is only available to Army ROTC cadets.

ILR Level Achieved	Listening Percentage (Number)	Reading Percentage (Number)
ILR 2	26% (33)	24.4% (31)
ILR 2+	39.4% (50)	44.1% (56)
ILR 3	31.5% (40)	25.2% (32)
ILR 3+	3.1% (4)	6.3% (8)

Figure 4: Chinese Flagship Undergraduate 2011-2015 Post-Capstone Results-Listening and Reading

Although the Chinese scores presented here are based upon the ILR standards broadly taken, the tests that Flagship students take and the DLPT that FAOs take are not the same test. The Language Flagship tests are developed by American Councils For International Education and the levels of their tests range from 0+ to a 3+ in the ILR scale. (American Councils For International Education 2017, 1) Unfortunately, the speaking scores for Chinese language participants were not available based upon an ILR scale for the whole 5-year time span, but were captured using oral proficiency interviews (OPI) based upon the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) scale. The speaking results for Chinese presented in the DNLSEO report were taken from 172 undergraduates' OPI scores after completing the Capstone portion of the program from 2011 to 2015. The results for speaking proficiency based upon the ACTFL scale are presented below in Figure 5: (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 125)

ACTFL Level Achieved	Speaking Percentage (Number)
Advanced Low	1.2% (2)
Advanced Mid	30.2% (52)
Advanced High	46.5% (80)
Superior	22.1% (38)

Figure 5: Chinese Flagship Undergraduate 2011-2015 Post-Capstone Results-Speaking

Although Chapter 3 of this project discusses assessments in more detail and provides further insight into comparing ILR and ACTFL scales, it is often accepted to see the Advanced Low to Advanced High ACTFL scores equate to the 2 to 2+ range on the ILR scale. Additionally, the Superior level on the ACTFL scale could be viewed as a level 3 or higher on the ILR scale. For the Chinese speaking scores under current consideration, it seems that every student who tested in speaking upon completion of The Language Flagship Capstone portion of the program exceeds the minimum requirement to act as a FAO (speaking ILR level 1+ is requirement for DLIFLC graduation). The results of this program with the listening and reading modalities are similar, since 100% of those tested had an ILR level 2 or better. The most impressive statistic that The Language Flagship seems to show is that 34.6% of the listening scores and 31.5% of the reading scores represent individuals that can act at the DoD goal level of an ILR 3 when the current FAO force only has 16% of its members testing at that level (shown previously in Figure

2). These are results that could have impact for the U.S. military and the language capabilities of our officer corps. There are two major factors, however, that currently limit the U.S. military from capitalizing on this program—a very small number of ROTC Flagship Scholarship participants and this initiative is not a pipeline for FAO accession. Even if newly commissioned officers completed the 5-year program, they would not be accessed into the FAO community until much later in the career because the focus after commissioning is put upon learning a "new" military occupational specialty. Air Force ROTC graduates completing this program would be required to serve a 4-year active duty service commitment. (U.S. Air Force ROTC 2017) The Army ROTC program requires a five-year active duty service commitment for its graduates. (U.S. Army 2017) Even though participants of the 5-year program would owe a one-year active duty service commitment for the one extra year of schooling, it would not extend them beyond their ROTC commitment time because the payback is served concurrently with the other commitment. The length of time these officers must serve definitely will result in some of these language-trained officers leaving the military before their eligibility window for FAO accession even exists. Other than the requirement for ROTC Flagship graduates to take the DLPT after becoming an officer, no program is in place to mandate these officers to maintain or improve their language abilities. There are programs available to incentivize the officer to maintain the language, such as a foreign language proficiency bonus (FLPB), which could pay up to $500 a month for Chinese if the member scored a L3/R3/S3 based upon the DLPT and OPI for assessment. (USD (P&R) 2013, 8) This incentive pay, however, may not even be a factor for the language maintenance if the officers become engrossed in developing primary military specialties that do not require

foreign language ability. Their primary jobs and those demands can overwhelm the great time investment that studying and using language at a high level would require for maintenance, let alone any type of progression.

2.5 Olmsted Foundation

Since the requirements to become a FAO requires an advanced academic degree, language proficiency, and in-country time, the Olmsted Foundation Scholarship is the premier opportunity to develop the future FAO. In fact, for the Air Force, officers who complete the Olmsted Scholar Program are certified as a Regional Area Strategists (equivalent to a FAO) upon completion of their studies. (United States Air Force 2016, 7) In the other branches of service, Olmsted Scholars are extremely competitive in the FAO selection process. Since, 1959, the Olmsted program has provided funding for over 600 military officers pursuing graduate education overseas. This program is described as "a fully-funded, two-and-a half to three-year graduate study program for military officers at a foreign university and taught in a foreign language." (The Olmsted Foundation 2017, 1) Graduates of the service academies or ROTC that participated in Chinese language programs or other officers that have developed a reasonable level of proficiency may be interested in pursuing the Olmsted program to bolster their language ability and have a true cultural experience while immersed in their studies and living overseas. The Olmsted Foundation shared their data for this project and extracted the information that was directly applicable to officers studying Chinese. From 1981 to 2016, 45 officers went to China for graduate study with 2 of the officers earning Ph.Ds. and 28 of them earning Master's Degrees from Chinese institutions. Additionally, 12 Officers went to Taiwan between 1976 and 2017 with 7 of them earning Master's Degrees. Finally, 2

officers were sent to Singapore with 2 Master's degrees earned. (Stratton 2016) The 59 Olmsted Scholars that have studied overseas using Chinese to earn degrees and complete their studies represent "doing" something in the language. These officers were not simply studying the language, but were pursuing expertise in a certain field of study, living amongst the people, and using their language to live and communicate. Although the DLPT scores for these individuals are not readily available, the validation of their language and cultural abilities should be seen in accomplishing a graduate degree in the target language. Not all of these officers would serve as FAOs, but the level of expertise that they brought back to active duty after this type of experience seems unmatched with the other programs offered for officers developing Chinese skills. In order to qualify for the Olmsted Scholarships, "candidates must be active duty officers in the US Armed Forces and be within 3-11 years of total active federal military service. They must also demonstrate outstanding performance and serve primarily in operational career fields." (The Olmsted Foundation 2017, 1) Unfortunately, the number of officers attending this program is very low, and it cannot be used as a primary pipeline for FAO accessions. However, those FAOs that come from this program definitely experience a more robust training experience before serving in their new role.

2.6 The costs of training proficient Chinese-speaking personnel—An investment

The price tag associated with training a FAO is definitely high. Since all FAOs must be trained in language, earn an advanced academic degree, and experience in-country life for at least six months, the cost to accomplish these three tasks gives a reasonable estimate towards the total cost of producing a basic-level trained FAO. Despite the different services often assigning different costs to the same training largely

due to who or what organization actually pays the bills, the fact remains that the cost is essentially the same to train a FAO in the DoD. The Army, as the lead agency with the language training aspect conducted at the DLIFLC, estimates that training a FAO in Mandarin Chinese during the 64-week basic course costs $280,824 per graduate. (United States Army 2016, 14) Additionally, for the Army, the graduate-level education for FAOs in 2015 averaged out to $26,003 per officer. (United States Army 2016, 14) Finally, for the Army, the in-region training costs for FAOs averages out to be $47,600 per FAO throughout their training. (United States Army 2016, 14) It should be clear that the cost to train a China FAO to reach a 3/3/3 level will far exceed the initial price-tag of $354,427, since that only seems to guarantee a FAO at the L2/R2/S1+ level. The L3/R3/S3 levels are something the DoD envisions for its FAOs, but the implementation of the current programs and the reality of results still challenge these goals.

2.7 Summary

The U.S. military exceeds the Chinese in the amount of money spent on defense and slightly edge them out in the number of active duty forces that are employed. This situation provides an opportunity where the U.S. can properly manage specific programs to combat the asymmetry that has plagued its relationship with China. Understanding the Chinese through direct engagement, while in the context of their language and culture, is critical to the U.S. military if efforts to increase information flow from China to the U.S. are to succeed. Although the U.S. military invests the greatest amount of resources to the IC when it comes to its relationship with China, there is still a critical need to develop military members who directly engage with their Chinese counterparts. These members must be prepared to have meaningful face-to-face discussions and negotiations and form

relationships with the Chinese as a path beyond the IC that promotes national security and contributes to the two most influential nations in the world today leading the international community.

The U.S. military's frequency and number of engagements with the Chinese seem to be increasing. The DoD has recognized the need to have a FAO cadre ready to meet the challenges and opportunities with Chinese engagement acting as our "experts" for the region. The four branches of service, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have all been tasked with developing FAOs. As a whole, according to 2015 FAO reports, there are approximately 67 Chinese-linked FAO positions across all of the services.[11] These positions reflect the current "need" for the DoD when it comes to U.S. military members directly engaging with the Chinese. Analyzing the overall projections for FAO positions through 2021 seems to indicate that the DoD does not plan to significantly increase the number of FAO positions, but may need to increase the number of FAOs available to fill those positions. Considering all foreign languages, the Army reported that it required 1,294 FAOs in 2015, with an end strength of 1,227 FAOs towards the requirement. The Army projects that it will need 1,254 FAOs by 2021, a slight decrease, with a prediction to have 1,210 in its inventory (United States Army 2016, 15) For the Navy, the requirement for FAOs was listed at 352 in 2016 and expected to increase to 405 by 2021. The Navy predicts to have a FAO inventory matching the requirements starting in fiscal year 2018. (United States Navy 2016, 18) The Air Force required 738 FAOs in 2015 and projects the same requirement through 2021, predicting to increase the

[11] The 67 China FAO positions were explained previously in this Chapter and include 41 positions in the Army, 10 in the Navy, 8 in the Air Force, and 8 in the Marine Corps.

FAO inventory of 451 in 2015 to 637 by 2021. (United States Air Force 2016, 28) Finally, the Marine Corps set the requirement for total of 115 FAOs in 2015 with the same requirement through 2021. The Marine corps had 48 FAOs available in 2015 with a prediction to have 87 available by 2021. (United States Marine Corps 2016, Enclosure 2) With regard to Chinese specifically, the four branches of service seem to be filling their FAO needs in terms of quantity, but the quality, or documented skill levels may still be an area requiring significant improvement.

For Chinese language and cultural training, military members that may someday become FAOs have pre-commissioning options available such as attending service academies or ROTC. Furthermore, ROTC cadets/midshipmen have access to programs such as Project Global Officer and The Language Flagship which are training programs in civilian institutions that graduate officers with certain ILR levels of Chinese proficiency. However, none of these schools or programs are currently designed to be a pipeline for FAOs. Officers will not be considered for FAO accession until they have experience and demonstrated ability in their military specialty, typically occurring around the seven to twelve-year point in a career. Therefore, by the time officers with previous experience in Chinese have the opportunity to apply for the FAO community, language attrition has taken its toll. If officers are not able to meet the ILR skill level of L2/R2/S1+ , as determined by taking the DLPT, language training is required.

Under the purview of the Army, the DLIFLC is the primary organization tasked with training these officers in Chinese and meeting the minimum FAO language requirement, coincidentally, the same graduation requirement for the DLIFLC's 64-week basic Chinese language course. The time and money commitment in getting a FAO to

the minimum standards involving language training, in-country time, and an advanced language degree takes approximately three and a half years with an approximate $354,427 price tag. The completion of these requirements typically only guarantees a FAO with the L2/R2/S1+ proficiency levels even though the DoD goal is for FAOs working at the professional level with L3/R3/S3 levels as described by the ILR scale (See Appendices A-C for descriptions). Chinese language training and FAO abilities are assessed throughout the DoD by proficiency testing using the DLPT. As shown in this chapter above, the most current metrics show the results of our current training programs and Chinese FAO abilities with 71% of the China FAOs' DLPT scores meeting the minimum standards of L2/R2, and 29% falling below this mark. Only 16% are able to operate at or above the goal of L3/R3 that the DoD envisions for its FAOs.[12]

[12] The speaking component of these scores are not listed because of the problems the services have getting FAO OPI scores, tracking, and reporting these numbers.

CHAPTER 3: GOALS AND ASSESSMENT IN MILITARY LANGUAGE PROGRAMS

When a foreign language training program is developed, goals must be attached to the program to give it direction and purpose. Although there may be different goals for different programs, most teachers and designers will seek a way to validate their students' learning with regard to accomplishing their specific goals. Typically, the concept of assessment, comprised of tests and evaluations, will play the crucial role of validation and provide the measuring stick for success or failure in a program. When we refer to an individual's foreign language ability, specifically one's Chinese language ability for the purpose of this research, it is often more complex than simply giving the individual a test and then assigning a subsequent rating or grade to determine his/her ability. In fact, since language is absolutely a social concept, it would seem imperative to evaluate the individual doing something "social" with the language in order to understand his/her language ability. In other words, it seems far more important for a test to predict what an individual can "do" in the language and culture rather than what an individual may know about some specific aspects of it. Therefore, in order to truly evaluate an individual's language ability, some kind of "event," the act of doing something in the language and culture, should take place. What exactly needs to take place during this "event" should be determined by the individual's domain-specific area of expertise. "Domain specific"

will be defined as "a restricted range of social interactions within a culture, bound by commonly shared knowledge and motivated by identifiable and shareable goals," while "expertise" may be defined to be "characteristics, skills, and knowledge that distinguish experts from novices and less experienced professionals." (Zeng, Demonstrating and Evaluating Expertise in Communicating in Chinese as a Foreign Language 2015, 28-29) The concept of an individual's domain-specific area of expertise is directly applicable to the military. We would hope, no matter the career field of an enlisted member or officer in the U.S. military, that he/she will become an "expert" at his/her job, or in other words develop a domain-specific area of expertise. This is the expectation for all military members. Whether they become pilots or cooks in the military, they should strive to become an expert in their domain-specific area. In order to evaluate our military members' abilities within their assigned occupational areas, evaluations requiring the member to perform their job and display expertise through "doing" is the military approach to validating combat readiness and guarantees of our security. When it comes to language, however, our history seems to tell a different story. While we should be focusing on the development and assessment of "expertise" while doing something in the language, it seems that we have focused on the concept of building and assessing "proficiency" in the language as its own entity instead.

3.1 Historical background on foreign language testing in the U.S.

Foreign language testing in the U.S. was not built upon a foundation of having students doing something in the language, rather it was simply learning about a language. As David Barnwell points out, the Inaugural meeting of the Modern Language Association (MLA) took place in 1883, and the language learning goals were primarily

literary and philological, thus resulting in a language testing mindset that "students were expected to *know about* the language rather than *know* the language." (Barnwell 1996, 3-4) (italics mine) Perhaps the difficulty in travel and inaccessibility to foreign countries contributed to the mindset of simply learning about other languages because very little practical application of using the language was available. However, as the world changed and the need to engage with foreigners was on the rise, the concept of testing would need to adapt to the increasing number of students. In 1915, Frederick Kelly developed the first multiple-choice test, in contrast to the prevailing creation of a response format, and his new format "came to define an entire educational system and set the United States apart from Europe." (Barnwell 1996, 9-10) Kelly's new format had a tremendous impact on the U.S. military because the multiple-choice test was ideal for the Army's Alpha (for literate candidates) and Beta (for illiterates of those with limited English) tests as it sought to classify its hundreds of thousands of recruits and place them into occupational areas of service where their specific talents would be to the Army's best advantage. (Barnwell 1996, 9) Although the Alpha and Beta tests were not foreign language tests, the multiple-choice format still found a solid footing in language testing. In fact, during the 1920's, as many as fifty tests were published for foreign languages, but still very little auditory and almost no oral testing was addressed. (Barnwell 1996, 54) The emphasis was still on reading for foreign language testing throughout the 1920's, 30's, and 40's until the very real needs of World War II brought about change.

The U.S. military saw its first real emergency need for language development and communicating with counterparts during WWII. Reacting to this emergency need, the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) was developed and involved 140,000

personnel with 12,000 soldiers assigned to the Division of Foreign Area and Language Studies. (Barnwell 1996, 80) Chinese was one of the languages of interest for the ASTP during the war. Over 500 language courses were offered at various civilian institutions contracted to support the war effort, and the emphasis was on oral communication, something very new to the foreign language classrooms of the time. (Barnwell 1996, 80-82) As one observer during the time noted, "the Army was keen on continual assessment and re-sectioning, and indeed men were promoted or demoted on the basis of their test scores." (Barnwell 1996, 81) Although testing played a critical role in the language programs, ultimately the military only saw utility in those who could be trained to an "expert" or "competent" level. An expert was defined as one that "can both comprehend and speak the language as well as a person with the same amount of formal schooling should speak his mother tongue." (Barnwell 1996, 83) By contrast, a "competent" military member would be one who "can readily comprehend the language as spoken by one adult native to another and can speak the language well enough to be intelligible to natives on non-technical subjects of military importance." (Barnwell 1996, 83) It seemed that the military was on the right track when identifying "expertise" within the language learning endeavor. Walter Kaulfers, in 1944, when reviewing the kinds of language tests demanded by the Army explained, "the nature of the individual test items should be such as to *provide specific, recognizable evidence of the examinee's readiness to perform in a life-situation*, where lack of ability to understand and speak *extemporaneously* might be a serious handicap to safety and comfort, or to the effective execution of military responsibilities." (Barnwell 1996, 83) The concepts that Kaulfers described seemed to be headed in the direction of making the examinee demonstrate, perform, and even do

something in the language to validate practical abilities. However, these definitions would not last beyond the war as the military and other government agencies turned away from the ideas of "expertise" and "competency," and instead, focused on proficiency ratings with numerical values when categorizing members' foreign language abilities.

In 1952, the National Mobilization and Manpower Act, required the Civil Service Commission to develop a register of government employees with foreign language backgrounds. (Herzog n.d., 1) This requirement ultimately revealed a major problem in the government because there really was no way of assessing its members' foreign language ability other than taking them at their word. Government agencies would have to develop ways to assess foreign language ability. In 1956, the Secretary of State mandated that the language ability of its Foreign Service Officers had to be verified by tests. (Herzog n.d., 1) The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) was in a unique situation since Foreign Service Officers needed to speak a certain language when doing their jobs, and the ability to speak had to be tested, not just the understanding of the grammar or vocabulary. The FSI job requirements, coupled with the 1956 State Department mandate ultimately resulted in the creation and use of the FSI Oral Interview with its full implementation in 1958. (Barnwell 1996, 136) A decade later, in 1968, the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) was established in order to increase cooperation in language teaching among U.S. federal agencies. Four years later, in 1972, the ILR formed a testing subcommittee in order to align the federal agencies with foreign language testing efforts as well. (Barnwell 1996, 124) The ILR used the Foreign Service Institute's oral interview rating scale to create a six-level scale ranging from 0 to 5 with accompanying paragraph-long descriptions for foreign language proficiency. These scales and

descriptions would be used to define a member's "proficiency" using modalities such as listening, reading, and speaking; this would ultimately become the standard for all government agencies by the 1980's. (Herzog n.d., 1) Appendices A, B, and C contain the ILR skill level descriptions for listening, reading, and speaking respectively, that are in use today and can be referenced when a skill level is mentioned in this study. Although the ILR scale is used by federal government agencies, the American council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) in collaboration with the Educational Testing Service (ETS) drew its inspiration for the widely used ACTFL/ETS scale seen today from the FSI Oral Interview and ultimately the ILR scale. ACTFL and ETS did not want to directly adopt the ILR scale because they felt the mechanism had "relative insensitivity in the lower range of student competence. (Barnwell 1996, 145) A 1979 study performed by ETS, although on a small scale, showed that no high school students in its study could reach an FSI 1 level, or in today's terminology, speaking-level 1. (Barnwell 1996, 145) This meant that for the academic purposes of ACTFL/ETS a new scale would be created with an expanded lower range scale and a compressed higher range scale as compared to the ILR standards. Figure 6 below shows the comparison of the ILR and ACTFL/ETS skill levels.

<table>
<tr><td>ILR</td><td colspan="2">0</td><td>0+</td><td colspan="2">1</td><td>1+</td><td>2</td><td>2+</td><td>3</td><td>3+</td><td>4</td><td>4+</td><td>5</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">ACTFL/ETS</td><td colspan="3">Novice</td><td colspan="3">Intermediate</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="2">Advanced</td><td colspan="5" rowspan="2">Superior</td></tr>
<tr><td>low</td><td>mid</td><td>high</td><td>low</td><td>mid</td><td>high</td></tr>
</table>

Figure 6: ILR and ACTFL/ETS Comparison

Although ACTFL/ETS scales exist for listening, speaking, reading, writing, and culture, the only modality for which a test was designed is the speaking, since they were unable to come up with any standardized format for measuring the other modalities. (Barnwell 1996, 171) The U.S. military does use an Oral Proficiency Interview based upon the ILR scale, but additionally designed tests to specifically incorporate the reading and listening modalities.

Using the ILR scale, the U.S. military found a convenient way to manage and quantify its language training. Essentially, this scale could be used in a variety of ways such as setting goals and minimum requirements, while at the same time using the numerical rating in a systematic way to assign difficulty levels to training materials used in curricula. The organization within the military that became the most familiar with the ILR scale is the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC).

3.2 DoD's goals for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (LREC)

Essentially, all things "language" related within the DoD fall under the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)). On May 10, 2004, The USD (P&R) was directed to appoint a DoD Senior Language Authority (SLA). The DoD also directed the secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to all appoint SLA's at the General/Flag Officer or Senior Executive Service or equivalent

level to represent their respective organizations. (Department of Defense 2005, 2) These SLA's are "responsible for assessing the organizations language needs, tracking language assets assigned to the organization and identifying emerging policy requirements." (Department of Defense 2005, 2) When all of these SLA's come together, along with three other appointees from the Under Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller, Policy and Intelligence), the Defense Foreign Language Steering Committee (DFLSC) is formed. (Department of Defense 2005, 2) The DFLSC provides "senior level guidance in the language transformation effort and future development of the Department's language capabilities." (Department of Defense 2005, 2) Clearly, this organizational structure was developed at such a high level of oversight and responsibility because language was indeed taking on a new role within the DoD.

By 2005, the Cold War had been over for some time and the U.S. military found itself firmly entrenched in a new type of warfare in the Middle East due to terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001. We found out very quickly that our military members' language abilities were insufficient to meet the language needs of our time. The U.S. military establishment came to the realization that "the technological revolution of the 1990's requires much greater language capability than the stereotyped activities of Cold War opponents" and furthermore, "higher level of language skill and greater language capacity is needed to build the internal relationships required for coalition/multi-national operations, peacekeeping, and civil/military affairs." (Department of Defense 2005, 10-11) Under this context, the DoD published its, "Defense Language Transformation Roadmap," and established the following four goals for language management in the military: 1) Create foundational language and regional expertise; 2) Create the capacity

to surge; 3) Establish a cadre of language professionals possessing an ILR proficiency level of 3/3/3 in reading/listening/speaking; and 4) Establish a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of military personnel with language skills and Foreign Area Officers (FAO's). (Department of Defense 2005, 4,8,10,13) Not all of the goals in the "Roadmap" were attained to a satisfactory level, but an even more-directed focus was placed upon areas needing improvement when it was supplemented by a new document six years later entitled, "Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (2011-2016)." (Department of Defense 2011) Subsequently, the DoD published the implementation plan for the current strategy that is still in effect in 2017. (OUSD (P&R) and DLNSEO 2014) For the purpose of enabling military members to communicate with our Chinese counterparts within their domain-specific expertise during exercises and engagements, we can focus on the original goal in 2005 calling for a cadre of language professionals possessing an ILR proficiency level of 3/3/3. Although a 3/3/3 does not a guarantee that the military member will perform at the culturally acceptable and appropriate level as judged by their Chinese counterpart, it is still a good starting point when identifying individuals that might participate.

It seems that the military is somewhat aware of this deficiency as it outlined one the goals for its FAO's in the DoD's 2014 "Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities" as the following: "Increase the percentage of fully qualified[13] Foreign Area Officers…from 9.3% in FY12 to 12% by the end of FY18." (OUSD (P&R) and DLNSEO 2014, 10) Although this goal is for all FAO's, we can still assume that the Chinese-region FAO's are represented by the basic implication

[13] Fully qualified includes possessing the ILR 3/3/3 level for listening/reading/speaking.

found in this goal that to obtain a 3/3/3 level is proving to be quite difficult for the U.S. military member. As we saw in Chapter 2, as of 2015, only 16% of the current Chinese-speaking FAO inventory report scores at the L3/R3, or fully qualified level. This means that the 12% goal for fully-qualified FAOs by FY18 was already met by 2015 with the China region FAOs. However, it is clear that the desire is to have all FAOs at the L3/R3/S3 level. Without going into great detail, the DoD directives also regulate that the military must "provide for language and regional expertise sustainment and refresher training programs to be provided throughout the lifecycle career of the FAO." (USD (P&R) 2005, 4) This regulation has been in effect since 2005, and clearly comes with a price-tag in addition to the initial training for a FAO, yet is still not proving to be effective; considering the fact that the goal was set to have only 12% of the FAO's at a fully qualified level by FY18. Perhaps one of the difficulties for FAO's being trained at DLIFLC could be rooted in the DoD admission that "DLIFLC curricula are largely built to produce signal intelligence specialists in resident courses." (Department of Defense 2005, 11) Perhaps the concept of a "one-size-fits-all" course will not satisfy the very demanding requirements of the FAO who needs to truly "communicate" with his/her counterpart. Suffice it to say that we have many options and resources available in the U.S. military to accommodate new and different ways of recruiting, training, and developing future FAO's. However, for now, it appears the DILFLC is the primary language-training ground for FAOs.

3.3 DLIFLC's Final Learning Objectives (FLOs)

The FLOs are described as "a set of tasks that DLIFLC graduates must be able to perform in their target languages." (Soloman and Price 1999, 29) DLIFLC's command

history explains that the FLOs "were defined for DLIFLC by its most important user agencies in two documents, 'Cryptologic Final Learning Objectives' (published by the National Security Agency/Central Security Service [NSA/CSS] in December 1992) and 'General Intelligence Final Learning Objectives' (published by the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] in September 1993)." (Soloman and Price 1999, 29) Clearly the Intelligence community had a major impact on the objectives for teaching foreign languages at DLIFLC. Essentially there were over 30 FLOs developed that would be divided into the following four categories: proficiency FLOs, performance FLOs, content FLOs, and ancillary FLOs. The proficiency FLOs deal with the language skills of listening, reading, and speaking that still exist today and are assessed using the DLPT for listening and reading and the oral proficiency interview (OPI) for the speaking category. The performance FLOs were broken down into 16 subskills back in the 1990s, but are still found today in the objectives for DLIFLC's courses. The student handbook for The Defense Language Institute-Washington Office, dated 6 June, 2016, lists the following 16 skills that a student should be able to perform as FLOs in the basic course: (1) bio data interview, (2) problem solving (negotiate, determine, explain, resolve), (3) translate, at least in summary, English and target-language interchanges, (4) produce an English summary of a conversation, (5) produce an English summary of a news broadcast, (6) answer content questions about a conversation, (7) answer content questions about a news broadcast, (8) transcribe text in native script, (9) transcribe (single pass) decontextualized numbers, (10) transcribe (single pass) numbers in context, (11) summarize a written target-language text in clear, idiomatic English, (12) answer content questions about a written target-language text, (13) read reasonably legible native

handwriting, (14) translate a target-language text into idiomatic English, (15) translate transcripts, and (16) translate an English text into the target language. (Defense Language Institute Washington Office 2016, 27) Additionally, the content FLOs were originally designed with 8 objectives such as, "the culture of the target language and the history of the target language." (Soloman and Price 1999, 29) Finally, the last category, ancillary FLOs, are described as those objectives that "cover such tasks as using a dictionary or other reference work (easy in some languages, very difficult in others) and recognizing a dialect." (Soloman and Price 1999, 29) It is without a doubt that the goals and objectives still in use today have deep roots in the intelligence community and are geared towards performing tasks in that community. The testing mechanism that DLIFLC has created, the Defense Language Proficiency Test, will undoubtedly evaluate a member's proficiency (listening, reading) in contexts drawing upon the other previously described FLO categories (performance, content, and ancillary) while presenting questions involving the use of authentic materials.

3.4 Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT)

The method of assessment created by DLIFLC, called the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT), is used worldwide throughout government agencies and is now the only official measurement for a member's language proficiency in listening and reading.

Prior to the 1980's, the DLIFLC was using their first and second iterations of DLPT's, known as DLPT I's and II's. These original tests are thought to be based upon a proficiency scale different from the ILR scale because efforts were made from 1981 to 1983 to recalibrate all of these tests in order to match the ILR scale that became the

agreed upon standard for language proficiency used by all government agencies. (McNaughton, Defense Language Institute Annual Command History, 1 January 1986-31 December 1986 1988, 38) These tests were designed to evaluate listening and reading proficiency, but in 1982, the development of the DLPT III, a new generation of tests that now included the speaking modality began. However, due to intense scrutiny and criticism from some of the user agencies, the military leadership terminated the development of any more DLPT III's in 1986 and began work on the next generation of DLPT IV's. (McNaughton, Defense Language Institute Annual Command History, 1 January 1986-31 December 1986 1988, 38-39) The DLPT IV would no longer include the speaking modality and reverted back to the assessment of only listening and reading. One of the reasons behind eliminating the speaking modality in the DLPT was due to the fact that the military services were beginning a new program of foreign language proficiency pay that would be based upon DLPT scores, but the "spoken component was not gradable in the field." (McNaughton, Defense Language Institute Annual Command History, 1 January-31 December 1987 1989, 27) The DLPT IV's incorporated "certain evolutionary changes in the overall format and question types used" with innovations that led to "context-setting 'heads-up' information with each question" as well as "a single generic item type throughout the test to avoid confusion students had often experienced when confronted with several different question formats within a single test." (McNaughton, Defense Language Institute Annual Command History, 1 January-31 December 1987 1989, 27) The development of DLPT IV's would continue and it was hoped to be a solid assessment tool for DLIFLC and the U.S. military as they evaluated military members' language proficiency.

From a high-altitude overview, DLIFLC has three courses to offer for foreign language training, the basic course, the intermediate course, and the advanced course. All three courses exist for Chinese, with the greatest number of students going through the basic course. Each course is a separate military training assignment due to its duration and intensity, so students who take the basic course may not necessarily return to the intermediate or advanced courses unless they show strong aptitude in their language related job and intend to stay in the military for an extended period of time. Considering this context, DLIFLC must show their greatest return on investment out of the basic course and set somewhat lofty goals for language learners who often begin with no experience in their studied language.

In 1987, two years before the first DLPT IV was administered, the basic course graduation standard was set for the first time. This standard was based upon DLPT scores and was set at an ILR level 2 in listening, a level 2 in reading or speaking, depending on the user agency, and Level 1 in the third skill. (McNaughton, Defense Language Institute Annual Command History, 1 January-31 December 1988 1990, 27) Since only the DLPT III's contained a speaking portion, DLIFLC also used an OPI based upon ILR skill levels to determine speaking proficiency. The graduation requirement based upon a DLPT score would clearly influence student and faculty attention towards the test. DLIFLC's command history points out that "the DLPT statistics had been a focus of management attention at least since 1985, when the institute had begun reporting by-language average scores at internal quarterly review and analysis briefings." Furthermore, it is recorded that the Provost at the time, Dr. Ray T. Clifford frequently declared, "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it." (McNaughton, Defense

Language Institute Annual Command History, 1 January-31 December 1988 1990, 27) This mindset clearly shows how the DLPT came to be a, if not "the", central organizing principle within the DLIFLC organization. The DLPT not only influenced all facets of the DLIFLC, but also any military members throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) that would need foreign language proficiency. The 1989 command history of DLIFLC records that "the picture was different in each school, but the goal was the same: increasing student proficiency as measured by the DLPT." (McNaughton, Defense Language Institute Annual Command History, 1 January-31 December 1989 1991, 29)

In 1991, the work began on the Chinese-Mandarin DLPT IV, and one year later in 1992 the test was given a field test, while at the same time increasing the length of the Chinese basic course to 63 weeks. (McNaughton, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Annual Command History, 1 January-31 December 1992 1995, 45) During this same year, the General Officer Steering Committee set a goal for 80 percent of DLIFLC graduates to reach level L2/R2/S2 in their language proficiency (See Appendices A, B, and C for definitions). (Payne 1996, 47) With the majority of DLPT IV's being fielded, the DLIFLC seemed to moving closer and closer to the 80 percent L2/R2/S2 goal for basic course graduates each year, but the goal and graduation standard would change yet again in 2000.

The Provost in 2000, Dr. Ray Clifford, reduced the proficiency requirement goal in speaking from an ILR level 2 to a 1+ for all basic program graduates to "depict more accurately what students could reasonably attain in speaking." Clifford explained that "speaking was a performance skill and would normally lag behind the receptive skills of reading and listening in the time allotted to a basic course." Applying the logic previously

described by Clifford, the new graduation standards for DLIFLC as L2/R2/S1+ for the basic course, L2+/R2+/S2 for the intermediate course, and L3/R3/S2+ for the advanced course were set in 2000 and remain in place today. (Binkley, Payne and Porter, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 1996-2000 2009, 58) DLIFLC's command history recorded the performance of basic course graduates during the years between 1985 and 2000. In Figure 7 below we can see the overall DLIFLC student performance with regard to the 2000 graduation standards of L2/R2/S1+ for DLPT scores as well as the depiction of the percentage of basic course graduates who actually exceeded the standard and reached the intermediate level goal of L2+/R2+/S2: (Binkley, Payne and Porter, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 1996-2000 2009, 59)



Figure 7: DLI Overall DLPT Scores 1985-2000

In 2000, it appears that DLIFLC finally achieved the goal of 80 percent of its basic school graduates achieving the standard which had just been set at the L2/R2/S1+ level.

Although Figure 7 is labeled with the term "Proficiency FLOs," the acronym FLO, meaning Final Learning Objective, and previously described in section 3.3 is simply another way to represent the concept of the DLPT score for a student at the end of the course. In Figure 8, below, the same concepts are depicted with just a focus on the Chinese-Mandarin program at DLIFLC from 1985-2000: (Binkley, Payne and Porter, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 1996-2000 2009, 64)



Figure 8: Chinese-Mandarin Basic Course DLPT Scores 1985-2000

Something very interesting in Figure 8 is the decline in student proficiency between 1991 and 1992. I think this must be due to the fact the DLPT IV was finally implemented in 1992 and students must have seen a drop in their performance ratings. Since the DLPT is the measuring stick for performance and progress at DLIFLC, it seems very apparent that the program was able to adapt and accommodate differences in the new DLPT IV and get the program back on track and eventually reach a very high standard of performance for

the Chinese school graduates.

The DLPT IV would remain in place for quite some time, but would eventually be replaced by a new generation of tests known as the DLPT 5.[14] The reasons behind developing the DLPT 5 were varied but included the desire to have computer-driven and even web-based testing, the need for increased security to prevent testing compromises, and the idea that some tests were overexposed by repeated testing and preparations for the test. Essentially, many examinees were seeing the same test year after year and simply becoming familiar with the tests. In fact, some National Security Agency officials were concerned that DLPT scores of military personnel were no longer reflective of their true level of proficiency. (Binkley, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 2001-2003 2010, 127) For Chinese, the DLPT 5 was introduced in June 2006. (Binkley, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 2006-2007 2013, 191) The DLPT 5 is often thought to be more challenging than the previous generations of tests. One of the most telling examples involving the difficulty of the DLPT 5 was seen when the proficiency scores for the Chinese-Mandarin students at DLIFLC dropped from over 90 percent of its graduates hitting the L2/R2/S1+ proficiency goals to a mere 42 percent success rate when the DLPT 5 was implemented. This came as a significant blow to the Chinese program and subsequently the DLPT 5 was pulled in 2007 and later reintroduced in 2008. (Binkley, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 2006-2007 2013, 191) Perhaps this time period allowed

[14] Arabic numerals and not Roman numerals were used as the designator with the DLPT 5 (Binkley, Payne and Porter, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 1996-2000 2009, 102)

the Chinese program at DLIFLC to adjust curriculum and teaching methods in order to better prepare students for a new level of testing. Whatever course of action DLIFLC took, it seems that scores with the DLPT 5 rebounded as the Chinese department strived to increase its number of graduates reaching the desired levels.

Assessment in foreign language for the military definitely comes at a cost. It was figured that by the end of fiscal year 2007, "the cost to develop the DLPT 5 was more than $24M, and that figure did not include the cost associated with placing the test on the DMDC website or the cost of the content management system that would be needed to move the test to the next level of a computer adaptive test." (Binkley, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center & Presidio of Monterey Command History, 2006-2007 2013, 187) To better understand what the military has invested in when it comes to the DLPT, we now take a closer look at some of the features associated with the Chinese-Mandarin DLPT 5.

The Chinese-Mandarin DLPT 5 was "designed to assess the global language proficiency in reading and listening of native speakers of English who have learned Chinese as a second language, and speakers of other languages with very strong English skills who know Chinese." (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center n.d., 3) The Chinese-Mandarin DLPT 5 assesses only reading and listening ability and has two test formats, the lower-range test and the upper-range test. The lower-range test can determine proficiency levels ranging from a 0+ to a 3 based upon the ILR skill levels found in Appendices A and B. The upper-range test is designed to determine proficiency levels ranging from 3 to 4 based upon the same ILR skill levels. Both the lower-range and upper-range tests for Chinese are multiple choice tests. For the lower-range reading

portion of the test, the student is given 3 hours to answer 60 questions. There are 36 "authentic" Chinese passages written in either simplified or traditional Chinese characters with a maximum of 600 characters per passage. The number of traditional character passages will increase with the skill level difficulty of the passages on a 20 to 50 percent ratio as difficulty transitions from the 1+ to the 3 level. For the listening portion of the test, the student is given 3 hours to answer 60 questions based upon 40 different recordings. Each recording is played once or twice and will not exceed two minutes in length. (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center n.d., 3-4) With regard to the upper-range test, the student is given 3 hours for the reading portion and 3 hours for the listening portion as well. During the reading portion, the student must answer 36 questions based upon 14 passages, not exceeding 800 characters, that are comprised of 50 percent traditional character passages and 50 percent simplified character passages. For the listening portion, the student must answer 36 questions based upon 14 recordings where each recording is played twice and will not exceed 2 minutes and 40 seconds in duration. (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center n.d., 5-6) It should be noted that the DLPT 5 Familiarization Guide makes the disclaimer that "scores do not reflect proficiency in speaking or writing, nor do they reflect examinees' job-related performance or ability to perform specific language-related tasks under special circumstance." (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center n.d., 7)

Perhaps we need to change our mindset to start thinking of language and cultural "expertise" instead of "proficiency" when it comes to our FAO's. If we focus on proficiency standards for our FAOs, the levels that are currently required will not allow them to effectively communicate with Chinese counterparts and we will continue to set

goals based upon standards that fail to guarantee the ability of FAO's to do their job in the Chinese language. The U.S. military needs the vision to develop its FAO's to not only possess expertise in their respective military career fields, but also be able to function with "expertise" in Chinese language and culture while doing the same job. These officers will not function like the current FAO, will not be assessed like the current FAO, and must be identified long before the mid-career point (typically 7-12 years commissioned service) for their development as FAO's. (SAF/IAPA 2010, 8) The pool of this new type of FAO needs to expand in number as well as in capacity. Although meeting the demands of this new vision may seem daunting, considering we are not meeting the requirements of the current one, it is feasible. If we train FAO's with the vision outlined above, with specific details provided in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, our U.S. military establishment will be able to send forth members to participate in direct and deliberate conversations and exchanges with Chinese counterparts. This capacity for daily personal interaction will help promote peace and increase security between the two most influential nations in the world today. As we develop this type of FAO with language expertise at the forefront instead of language proficiency, the assessment for this type of FAO will need to change as well. Ultimately, we may finally come to the realization that the DLPT has never been a valid measurement of what the military, and more importantly, what Chinese counterparts expect our FAOs to "do" in the language.

CHAPTER 4: INTERPRETER/TRANSLATOR FACILITATED ENGAGEMENTS—NEGLECTING THE 3RD SPACE

The U.S. military's conflicts in the Middle East, dating back to the terrorist attacks in 2001 and still through today, have been linguistically challenging to say the least. The U.S. military services severely lack personnel that can understand, speak, read, or write the languages necessary for operating in both Afghanistan and Iraq. It seems that almost every engagement that was required between U.S. personnel and Afghan or Iraqi counterparts has required an interpreter or translator. It is significant that many military members often consider interpreters or translators to be the same thing. Often, if an impromptu conversation were necessary, a "translator" may be requested to assist, when in reality, an "interpreter" would be the appropriate term for the person enabling communication through spoken media, whereas, a "translator" facilitates communication through written media. This is an important distinction. Although both interpreters and translators must be familiar with at least two languages (a source language and a target language) to perform their functions, they possess very different skills. A good interpreter does not necessarily perform as well as a translator and vice versa. This should be an easy concept to grasp: it would be similar to saying that someone who is very good at giving speeches must also be very good at writing books, which is clearly not the case. During our military operations in the Middle East (specifically the tactical

level), the majority of the Afghans or Iraqis that were employed for linguistic purposes performed both roles as interpreters and translators out of sheer necessity. Based upon my own experiences, these interpreters/translators were not really "trained" as interpreter/translators, but simply were native speakers who spoke English at a sufficient level, enabling communication between Afghan and American military personnel. Of course, some were better than others. I personally interacted with more than two dozen Afghan interpreters during my time in Afghanistan, eventually realizing that the "training" they received as interpreters/translators never amounted to more than two or three days of classes offered by the contracting companies that hired them. The goal was to give Afghan interpreters/translators some basics on American culture and try to quickly educate them on their role as an interpreter. Despite this lack of formal training, the efforts and impact of these interpreters/translators should not be underestimated and they proved to be vital to many successes achieved in our operations. As an incentive and ultimately as a form of protection for these interpreters, the U.S. set up a special visa program that allowed many of these interpreters and their family members to relocate to the U.S. after a certain period of faithful service.

An indication of the scale of the program providing interpreters to the American military is the numbers of Afghans and Iraqis participating in the special visa program. It is reported to have "resettled more than 52,000 Afghan and Iraqi interpreters and family members in the United States since 2007." (Bengali 2017, 1) In terms of the costs associated with these visas, a Congressional Budget Office estimated that adding an additional 4,000 visas for Afghan interpreters that were sought under the Obama administration would cost an estimated $446 million dollars over a ten-year span.

(Bengali 2017, 1) Due to the tremendous cost of this program, coupled with the political debate and negotiations swirling around it, President Obama was only able to allocate 1,500 of the original 4,000 special visas requested when he signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. (U.S. Department of State-Bureau of Consular Affairs 2017, 1) Furthermore, it was reported by National Public Radio that a State Department official explained that "more than 15,000 Afghans are currently 'at some stage of the [special visa] application process' and that as of March 5, [2017], only 1,437 visas remain to be given out. (Hersher 2017, 1) Additionally, it should be pointed out that there must be hundreds, if not thousands, of other interpreters that served for only a short period of time and were terminated or quit before they were eligible to apply for the visas. These numbers are provided to show the size of the linguistic support that was necessary for the U.S. military and to show that interpreter/translator-facilitated communication seems to be the norm for American operations. My own experience in Afghanistan supports this observation and sheds some light on how crucial "language" is when operating in the military environment.

4.1 Personal lessons learned from Afghanistan (view from the field)

I served various times throughout my career in Afghanistan, but 9 August 2013 to 7 July 2014 was my longest and most challenging deployment there. During that time, I was the Director of Operations for the 441st Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron, 738th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Air Training Command Afghanistan, 438th Air Expeditionary Wing. During my time in Afghanistan, I spent over 1,300 hours directly "mentoring" Afghan Air Force personnel, including the Kandahar Air Wing's Director of Operations and the operations officers

within the Wing's operational squadrons. The vast majority of my mentoring had to be done using the Dari language, and at times the Pashto language. I do not speak Dari nor Pashto. No member in my entire unit spoke enough Dari or Pashto to perform mentoring without interpreter assistance[15]. Therefore, we had to rely on contracted Afghan men, most in their twenties, who had some college education and a "good" level of English speaking ability to serve as our interpreters. Essentially, my duty was to advise these key officers and airmen on the safe, efficient, and responsible use of Mi-17 and C-208 combat aircraft. Our mission involved a mix of assessing, advising, training, assisting, and equipping our Afghan Air Force partners to meet the needs of their nation's security. As advisors performing these functions, success for our mission in Afghanistan should be judged based upon the extent to which our Afghan counterparts are able to perform the required missions independently, no longer requiring NATO assistance or advice. Furthermore, success requires that our Afghan counterparts are able to equip and train their own military, using their own personnel effectively.

The Afghan air wing that I worked with had the daunting task of supporting two Afghan National Army Corps. By the numbers: during my time in Afghanistan, the Afghans that we assessed, advised, assisted, trained, and equipped performed 1,100 combat missions. During these missions 268 tons of critical cargo was moved, 12,300 passengers were transported, and 724 soldiers wounded or killed in action were taken to a treatment facility or returned home. Although my unit's goals focused on removing all

[15] The one caveat to this statement is we had three assigned Afghan C-208 pilots in the squadron that spoke English at an equivalent level to our interpreters, and thus, training and assistance missions with these airmen were performed all in English.

U.S.[16] personnel from Afghan cockpits and transitioning all mission support functions to a completely Afghan-run process, the great majority of these missions still involved some form of U.S. assistance and advice. For example, missions that were deemed critical, such as Afghan Presidential election support and evacuation of soldiers injured during fierce fighting required me to coordinate 37 AH-64 (U.S. Army helicopter) escort missions for Afghan Mi-17 aircraft into enemy strongholds within Helmand and Zabul provinces. I point this out, because the Afghans did not have the training, personnel, or equipment to provide their own escorts at the level of demand we experienced while operating in our area of responsibility. Therefore, although we wanted U.S. airmen out of the Afghan combat missions, the escort piece for the Afghan Air Force was still in a fledgling phase during my time and a completely Afghan-run mission of this type would still require years of training. All of these missions and our perceived successes all hinged upon effective communication with our Afghan partners. It seemed to me that no matter the quality of equipment we provided or the skill-level of our advisors, mentors, or trainers, the most critical elements that truly make these missions viable are language and culture. Frankly, we Americans, as an advisory force at the tactical level, woefully lacked Afghan language and cultural expertise; thus, we had to rely on interpreters who woefully lacked any military or domain-specific expertise to convey our messages.

Operating at this level of communication placed us firmly in an "imperative" or "declarative" mode of communication as opposed to a "conversational" mode of

[16] This is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission and our unit had airmen from Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom that participated in support-role advising at different periods of time. However, all direct assistance during combat missions was only provided by our US airmen in my unit due to our partner nations' restrictions on the use of their personnel.

communication that we so desperately needed in order to understand the Afghan-appropriate way to operate and provide the foundations for an independent Afghan-run sustainable organization with Afghan-accepted processes and functions.

I did not fill the role as an advisor to the Afghan Air Force without training. I attended the Air Advisor Academy (AAA) in New Jersey for approximately three weeks prior to my deployment. Based upon my own personal experiences, the amount of time spent and emphasis on activities at AAA followed this order: field-craft skills, language training, and region and culture training. The instruction provided at AAA with regard to language and culture was excellent but clearly limited during a 3-week training course that packed in several other areas of training such as insider-threat training, self-protection, and high-threat driving to name a few. In addition to AAA, I attended aircraft-specific training, weapons training, and accomplished several computer-based training modules in my preparation for a one-year deployment. Before I started working with my Afghan counterparts, I felt that I had the tools to appropriately greet them in their language and understand some important facts about their country's geography, religion, food, and history. I did not have the ability by any stretch of the imagination to perform my job, or display my military expertise in a culturally appropriate way using my Afghan counterpart's language. I had to rely on interpreters to facilitate "conversations." During my year, I never encountered any U.S. or NATO personnel that had the ability to perform their job fully using the language in a culturally appropriate way. If Dari or Pashto was necessary, an interpreter would be utilized. Once again, I am convinced that "conversations" that took place using these interpreters were not truly

"conversations." The concept of a conversation needs to be further explained to justify why we were unable to have effective conversations in Afghanistan.

The teaching, research, and experience of Galal Walker and Xiaobin Jian at the Ohio State University has been highly influential on how I have come to define and more fully understand conversation. A conversation is not just two or more people talking. There has to be an agreement to "communicate." Additionally, when a conversation occurs there has to be a recognition of place, audience, roles, time, and script for the parties involved. These five elements are essential if we want a "conversation" to occur. Furthermore, as I interact with my Afghan counterpart I must understand him as an "individual." His "intentions" will define him as an individual. I can only understand his intentions through "meaning," because it is "meaning" that reveals his intentions. In order for me to grasp the meaning, however, I must be aware of the "context," because context enables the meaning. But, I can only be aware of the context if I understand the "culture," because it is culture that provides the context. To get to a level of communication where this type of "conversation" exists requires a level of language and cultural expertise that our general-purpose forces, and even advisors did not possess. The use of an interpreter did not bridge this gap. This does not mean that we were not "helping" our Afghan counterparts, we were simply trying to "mold" them into airmen that performed missions in Afghanistan in a safe and effective manner that satisfied our expectations. Who and what our Afghans were depended on what "we" permitted them to be because we were allowing our culture to dominate and provide the context for our discussions with them. We delivered our messages in English and through the interpreter the message was sent, with the Afghan's response provided back to us in English.

Meanings in our interpreter-facilitated communication were now enabled. These meanings now led to a revelation of the Afghan's intentions, thus defining our Afghan counterparts as the individuals we interacted with. Simply put, we were very accepting and pleased with those Afghans that acted in accordance with our expectations, all which were founded upon an American cultural context. Whether we were aware of it or not, we were trying to mold Afghans into individuals that acted like Americans when encountering the problems we faced in our area of responsibility. It was very difficult for American advisors to recognize Afghan-sustainable solutions because we lacked a sufficiently deep enough cultural understanding for the people we worked with. Since "language is what humans do to access culture," our inability to use our counterpart's language prevented us from truly accessing their culture. (Walker and Jian 2016) The use of an interpreter may be thought of as a way to unlock the language and have access to another's culture, but in fact, all too often, using the interpreter just makes the interlocutors able to have a discussion that functions in the respective comfort of the two cultures.

As we operated in Afghanistan, it is very important to highlight the fact that our NATO advisory force had helped shape the Afghan military into an organization that separated the Army and the Air Force into two independent departments much like the U.S. military. This model works for the U.S., but we have had nearly 70 years (the Air Force officially separating from the Army in 1947) experience operating under this construct. I assume that we advised the Afghans to use this model simply because it works for "us" and we came to the table with vast experience operating under this construct. However, in my opinion, this construct requires a tremendous amount of

education, coordination, communication, and understanding between military branches in order to operate effectively. From my observations of day-to-day operations in Afghanistan, our Afghan counterparts in the Army and Air Force did not ever grasp or really understand the benefits of separating the Army and Air Force, and in fact, the separation proved to be very problematic even among U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps personnel that were advising their respective Afghan counterparts. All too frequently, I received phone calls or emails from our own U.S. Army or U.S. Marine Corps advisors who did not understand why air support from the Afghan Air Force was not being provided to their Afghan Army units. I couldn't really blame our own advisors because their expectations were based upon operating with their own U.S. Air Force and more often than not, any requests that the Afghans could not meet were simply filled by an all-U.S. operation. Frankly, the demand for air support in the Afghan military greatly outweighed the supply available. The demand for air support was only at this level because "we" had given the Afghans this model of operation—we advised to the level of demand we were seeing, because our forces were used to operating with an air component that could meet their demands.

In my Afghan Air Force unit, we had to support two Afghan Army Corps with only one Afghan Air Force Wing that was realistically smaller than most USAF squadrons. The helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that we had at our disposal could only last a certain number of years before a major overall or replacement was necessary. Additionally, during the aircraft's life cycle, there is a very specific number of hours that it can fly before maintenance action must be taken in order to keep it in a safe and operational status. During many of the routine maintenance actions, an aircraft will not

be available for several days, and for certain maintenance, even weeks. This is scheduled maintenance that takes aircraft out of operation, not to mention, the unplanned maintenance that continually pops up when things simply break or combat damage occurs. The maintenance component and the operational components have even been further divided in the U.S. Air Force (different commanders are in charge of flying operations and maintenance), which, once again, is a model that we gave to our Afghans. This model requires an education, communication, and understanding level that our Afghan operators and maintainers had a hard time adapting to. To further complicate things, due to safety concerns with helicopter operations, we always flew missions with a minimum of two helicopters.[17] This meant, if only one helicopter was available, the mission could not be flown. I lay the foundation of the intertwined and various levels of communication that are necessary to perform daily operations in this type of flying squadron in Afghanistan to allow the reader to understand why real "conversations" would be so critical in this environment.

During my time in Afghanistan, we used a process that involved an Air Movement Request (AMR) that linked the Army's request or requirements with the Afghan Air Force. For example, if an Afghan soldier were wounded during an operation and it was deemed necessary to evacuate him to a medical facility via helicopter the Army unit would send the request through an Afghan Army representative that worked with the Afghan Air Force to transfer such requests and serve as the link between the two components. AMRs arrived daily to our unit because requests came from two separate

[17] Flying with two helicopters provided a built-in rescue option if one were to crash. It also enables aerial escort capability as one lands to drop off or pick up its necessary payload while the other provides security in the air with its door gunners.

Army Corps that were both commanded by Afghan Generals with equivalent ranks. Operating with this system, it might seem very difficult to decide upon which Corps would be supported if assets were not able to cover both mission requests at the same time. To determine priority, under the guidance of NATO advisors, the Afghan National Army and Air Force agreed on a priority order for missions. Therefore, if the 215th Corps sent a request to pick up wounded soldiers, that mission should trump a mission sent by the 205th Corps to transfer food and firewood for one of their Army units. The priority order did not solve all of the problems, though. For example, if the 215th Corps constantly sent missions higher in priority than the 205th Corps' missions, an unhappy 205th Corps General would certainly raise concern that his unit never received support while his counterpart in the 215th Corps always received support. This was very much the case in Afghanistan. We tried a system to divide the limited flying hours each month between the two Corps and if one Corps were to need hours beyond their own allotted hours, they would have to receive permission from the other Corps' Commander to use some of their hours. We tried to always support the casualty evacuation missions even to the detriment of overflying hours. There comes a time though, when things line up that makes flying a mission unadvisable or even impossible. I will give one example of how lacking language and cultural understanding despite using interpreters and translators greatly hindered an operation in Afghanistan.

As we assisted our Afghans with flying missions (at least one U.S. pilot or aircrew member in the aircraft), we were always concerned about our service member's safety. This meant, if an AMR came in requiring us to fly to a certain location in Afghanistan, we did not simply jump in a maintenance-ready aircraft and fly to the

location. A weather and intelligence assessment of the area we were flying to obviously needed to be performed before attempting any mission. If the weather would not allow us to land and take off from the destination, there was no reason to launch. If the intelligence assessment resulted in a threat level higher than the leadership would accept, we could not go. These were the two main reasons to deny an AMR request. The Army seemed to understand the weather concern without question, but the intelligence assessments tended to receive some push back. However, in time-critical situations with the constant need of translation and interpreters, there often is not enough time to come to a resolution about the situation at hand. I remember one day when the Afghan Air Force officer in charge of receiving AMRs brought one into our office. We had about six interpreters that day, but they did not hang out in the area we were using due to the use of some classified computer systems and conversations. Therefore, a small amount of time was needed to get an interpreter to assist with translating the AMR into English and another interpreter used to facilitate the discussion between the Afghan Major that brought the request and me. Another interpreter was needed to help notify the Afghan aircrew members and begin to plan the mission. The other three interpreters would be used for the other functional representatives that were standing by for a tasking. My Dari was not at the level to read anything on the AMR request except to understand the type of aircraft requested and location coordinates. The interpreter translated the AMR into English and informed me that it was a request to pick up four injured soldiers from a specific location that would require helicopters. I was familiar with the format for this type of mission, and for some reason, the AMR request was lacking information that we needed such as the types of injuries so that the appropriate medical equipment and

expertise would be on board. I advised the Afghan Major to collect the missing information while we continued to plan for the mission. The intel shop quickly came back saying that the coordinates provided were not valid (they used an interpreter with all of their work as well). Therefore, I had to get the interpreter to relay this information back to the Afghan Major who then began making phone calls to the Army component to clarify these points. This back and forth translation continued all the way until our crews launched for the mission. The time that elapsed from notification to the time of take-off was about 1 hour and 30 minutes. The pick-up location was approximately 45 minutes away. Therefore, the four injured soldiers, with our scenario on that day, would be extracted, at best, 2 hours and 15 minutes after notification. To put things in perspective, our U.S. soldiers tended to operate with the concept of a "golden hour." The U.S. policy was such that if a U.S. soldier was injured, the extraction should occur within one hour. This meant that U.S. planning was such that air assets and medical personnel were staged in locations that allowed the extraction to occur in such a short period of time. Our Afghan counterparts do not have the ability to operate within the constraints of a "golden hour," but have seen their U.S. advisors extracted several times with U.S. assets in such a timely manner. This, too, puts an unrealistic expectation into the common Afghan soldier's mind as he defends his country. On the day we received the AMR for the four wounded soldiers, our aircrews brought back two wounded and two dead soldiers. I know this may sound somewhat dramatic, but I definitely think our necessity to use interpreters/translators and our inability to personally communicate and have conversations with our Afghan counterparts directly contributed to our inability to save those two lives on that day in Afghanistan. The ability to have expertise with language

and culture and to operate in a manner equivalent with our own military expertise in that target culture does in fact have life and death consequences.

4.2 Beyond Interpreter-based engagement, shared intentionality

George Bernard Shaw once said, "The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place." So far, this chapter has focused on U.S. military interactions with Afghan counterparts, but the same difficulties we face in Afghanistan are the same ones that we face with our Chinese counterparts and have the potential to occur on an even greater scale. It seems that the U.S. military has accepted interpreter-based engagements to be the norm with our interaction with the Chinese (see Chapter 1 for examples) as it has clearly been the norm with our operations in Afghanistan. Because of the number of military personnel that are involved in operations, it would never be feasible to expect all of them to have the ability to directly engage their Chinese counterparts. However, selecting an appropriate number of officers across an appropriate cross-section of military occupational specialties for development of expertise in the language, coupled with their military expertise could pay huge dividends in our efforts toward more fully understanding the Chinese military through conversation. Officers with language expertise coupled with their military occupational area of expertise would have access to Chinese culture and the abilities to communicate at levels we have yet to experience in the military. These officers would be required to form common ground and ultimately lasting relationships with Chinese counterparts throughout a career to be truly effective. The ability to operate at a level that enables the U.S. military member and his Chinese counterpart to co-construct a type of common ground can be further illuminated by taking a critical look at Michael Tomasello's (2014) "shared intentionality hypothesis."

As human beings, we know something very special and unique exists within us that separates us from the other animals throughout the world. Michael Tomasello's "shared intentionality hypothesis" sheds light on this distinctiveness of humans. Essentially, his revelation is rooted in the concept of "thinking," which separates the human from the others. His theories do not claim that only humans think, but rather, the *way* humans think, or the *way* they evolved into using their current cognitive processes, can explain the language and culture we see throughout the human race.

Tomasello explains, "Thinking involves several key components: (1) the ability to cognitively represent experiences to oneself "offline"; (2) the ability to simulate or make inferences transforming these representations causally, intentionally, and/or logically; and (3) the ability to self-monitor and evaluate how these simulated experiences might lead to specific behavioral outcomes—and so to make a thoughtful behavioral decision." (Tomasello 2014, 4) This "thinking," as Tomasello previously defined, is not inclusive to humans. There are other animals that do exhibit thinking, but Tomasello points out that there are fundamental social differences with humans that "lead to an identifiably different type of thinking, what we may call, for the sake of brevity, *objective-reflective-normative thinking.*" (Tomasello 2014, 4) Ultimately, Tomasello's argument is that the shared intentionality hypothesis is what created this unique objective-reflective-normative thinking only found in humans. (Tomasello 2014, 4) We need to delve a little further into the "objective," reflective," and "normative" aspects to find out why humans are so unique in this type of thinking.

Tomasello argues that "although many animal species can cognitively represent situations and entities at least somewhat abstractly, only humans can conceptualize one

and the same situation or entity under differing, even conflicting, social perspectives (leading ultimately to a sense of "objectivity")." (Tomasello 2014, 4) The key to developing this sense of "objectivity" for humans is rooted in a fundamental social difference, which we now know includes the formation of several social perspectives. For the "reflective" aspect of our unique type of thinking, Tomasello explains, "although many animals also make simple causal and intentional inferences about external events, only humans make socially recursive and self-reflective inferences about others' or their own intentional states." (Tomasello 2014, 4) Once again, a fundamental "social" difference with humans makes this "reflectivity" possible. Finally, for the "normative" aspect of our unique type of thinking, Tomasello explains, "although many animals monitor and evaluate their own actions with respect to instrumental success, only humans self-monitor and evaluate their own thinking with respect to the normative perspectives and standards ("reasons") of others or the group." (Tomasello 2014, 4) Once again, the difference lies in a "social" aspect because only humans are considering "others" or the "group" with their thinking. Clearly, the "social" nature of humans plays a critical role within Tomasello's argument. Identifying the areas where humans and other "thinking" animals are different and articulating how they are different is something I appreciate and find very easy to accept in Tomasello's work. However, there are other important features in Tomasello's work that may be difficult for many to accept and should be addressed.

Tomasello's theories are based upon the fact that cognition and thinking have gone through an evolutionary process of millions of years involving human ancestors; the closest living species to humans being the great apes, with natural selection at the helm.

Additionally, Tomasello supports most of his arguments with extensive empirical research involving great apes and human infants. In Tomasello's own words, "we may then begin our natural history proper by using this theoretical framework to characterize processes of cognition and thinking in modern-day great apes, as representative of humans' evolutionary starting point before they separated from other primates some six million years ago." (Tomasello 2014, 7) The problem that I see with this approach is that Tomasello's empirical evidence that supports his theories is very much based upon the concept that "modern-day" great apes are representative of the evolutionary starting point. To me, this argument seems to be flawed, considering Tomasello goes to great lengths to emphasize that natural selection has been working for six million years to allow the "shared intentionality" to develop in humans. What then did modern-day great apes look like six million years ago? Certainly, similar evolutionary processes have been at work on great apes and their current incarnation may not be the best representative starting point for his argument. Even Tomasello admits this to be a concern when he states, "Most crucial, we do not know how much contemporary great apes have changed from their common ancestor with humans because there are basically no relevant fossils from this era. (Tomasello 2014, 152) Clearly, he acknowledges a "common ancestor," and it should be logical to assume that six million years ago, such an ancestor and the evolutionary starting point that we should focus on, has to be something very different than the great apes we see today. This means that the reader must accept the fact that humans essentially evolved from something like the great apes to fully accept his theories. This is the part of Tomasello's work that some might find troubling. It is not to say that we should doubt evolutionary processes, because there seems to be evidence recorded in

fossilized remains and other scientific, "proof." The point is that Tomasello bases a great deal of his argument on something that appears to have a very shaky foundation. To his credit, however, this is a theoretical framework that he is basing his argument upon.

In addition, there are millions of people who hold strong religious beliefs about the origin of man. In fact, those who believe in the *Bible,* and who believe that God created man in his own image and that Adam was the first man on this earth, may find it extremely problematic to accept that the original human being was a development from lower orders of animal creation, and will argue that anything supporting such claims are simply the "theories of men," and that the true origin of man can only be revealed by God. I do not bring up this point to refute Tomasello's arguments, but rather to acknowledge that the beliefs of many, may cause them to reject his work based upon his theoretical foundations, which is important to address. The importance of this acknowledgement is not to say one perspective is better than the other, but to point out that there may be another way that man developed the "shared intentionality" that Tomasello identifies in humans. Regardless of the origin of man, Tomasello has provided an excellent description of how human communication is unique.

The foundational elements of the shared intentionality hypothesis are clearly social in nature. This is important, because we cannot simply say humans are "smarter" than other animals. With Tomasello's argument, "being smart counts for nothing if it does not lead to acting smart." (Tomasello 2014, 7) This action, or behavior, is what counts in Tomasello's argument, because natural selection will target the *behavior* in the evolutionary process. When we refer to behavior, the concept of "cooperation" is key to understanding the concept of shared intentionality. Tomasello believes that human

culture stems from human cooperation. (Tomasello 2014, 82) Therefore, as a contrast, it would seem logical to assume that competition and individualistic intentions came before this *cooperation* in humans. It is also reasonable to assume that humans were social, but had yet to develop the degree of cooperation that is evident today. Tomasello's argument is that "ecological circumstances" were the driving force to make humans have a more cooperative lifestyle. (Tomasello 2014, 5) To simplify and summarize Tomasello's theory, humans were forced by these circumstances to perform collaborative activities, such as foraging for food, that led to the first of two steps in reaching shared intentionality, that of "joint intentionality." Joint intentionality maybe thought of in terms of "I" and "you" whereas the second and final step, "collective intentionality," brought upon by population growth, large groups competing, large-scale collaborative activity, and essentially the emergence of "culture" led to the concept of a "we." (Tomasello 2014, 5-6) It is important to note that in human communication the concepts of pointing and pantomiming were the precursors to the development of conventional languages that really would come quite late in the whole process. (Tomasello 2008, 2) Within the whole communicative process, I think the glue that holds Tomasello's argument together is his concept of "common ground," or "the joint attentional frame." (Tomasello 2008, 74) Tomasello describes it as follows: "Common ground includes everything we both know (and know that we both know, etc.). from facts about the world, to the way that rational people act in certain situations, to what people typically find salient and interesting." (Tomasello 2008, 74-75) The ability to create the "common ground" is absolutely necessary in human communication, but is very easy to take for granted. What we see in the world today are billions of people separated into large

groups with their own languages and cultures that can't be penetrated by someone from another group without having an awareness and ability to create or participate in a "common ground" much different from his/her own. Tomasello pointed out that humans "have developed linguistic communication that are effective not with all members of their species, as for all other organisms, but only with those who have grown up in their same cultural group." (Tomasello 2008, 214) Tomasello makes a convincing argument that shared intentionality is what makes human thinking and ultimately human communication and language so unique. With an awareness of this "shared intentionality," we are now more prepared to help contemporary human groups establish this key ingredient in cross-lingual and cross-cultural contexts.

In Chapter 2, the focus was placed on describing the Foreign Area Officers (FAO) in the U.S. military that have the need to operate in cross-lingual and cross-cultural contexts. The current requirements outlined by regulation to become a China-region FAO seem to underestimate what it will take to effectively establish the previously described "shared intentionality" required to have effective communication in this cross-lingual and cross-cultural context. At times, however, the counterparts that a FAO may associate with in China could have an English language ability higher than the FAO's Chinese language ability leading to the option to discuss matters in English. Additionally, in some of the FAO's duties, an interpreter may even be necessary to facilitate the requirement to guarantee accurate dissemination of official messages. When a FAO is in China and elects to carry out the conversation with a Chinese counterpart in English, or when an interpreter must be used, it seems to tarnish the image of an "expert" in the region. The methods of training and the accepted levels of proficiency for FAO's are

areas that need to be reassessed.

According to military regulations, the FAO needs to have a minimum of a level 2 in listening and reading, and a minimum level of 1+ in speaking to be qualified for the job. (USD (P&R) 2005, 4) Chapter 2 showed that a FAO with a 1+ level in his/her Chinese speaking would "have little understanding of the social conventions of conversation" and "frequently has to repeat utterances to be understood by the general public" according to the ILR description. (Interagency Language Roundtable n.d., 2) Having an understanding of social conventions seems to be a critical piece of the puzzle if we want to even attempt to establish some form of "common ground" with our Chinese counterpart, let alone, think we are even close to full-fledged shared intentionality. Performing at this low level of proficiency guarantees that a FAO cannot discuss things at an expert or professional level with a Chinese counterpart. The minimum proficiency requirements do not match the level at which a FAO, or an expert in the region, would be expected to operate.

Most of the language and cultural training for FAOs is performed at DLIFLC. DLIFLC's mission is stated clearly: "Our mission is to provide culturally based foreign language education, training, evaluation and sustainment to enhance the security of the nation." (DLIFLC 2016) Although the definition of a FAO includes the word "cultural" and DLIFLC strives to provide "culturally" based foreign language education, my experience leads me to believe that the "cultural" understanding required to allow the learner to establish "common ground" with his/her Chinese counterpart is not found in military training. If fact, the concept that "native speakers" teach Chinese at DLIFLC and that students are studying from authentic Chinese materials does not necessarily

cover the criteria helping one establish the shared intentionality desired in the cross-cultural context. Often, the military that I have observed and participated in throughout my career tends to treat language and culture as separate entities. However, I think language and culture must be connected in the learning process for any reasonable skill level to result.

Galal Walker points out that "there is no way to learn a culture without talking with the folks who live it and create it day by day. Learners must perform the target culture as they perform the target language." (Walker, The Pedagogy of Performing Another Culture 2010, 4) The part of this statement that the military seems to lack is the "performance" aspect when learning and ultimately socializing in the language. The U.S. military needs to understand and adopt the concept that language and culture are inseparable during the learning process. It is more than just talking about cultural concepts. Furthermore, it is should not be assumed that FAO's meeting the requirements of obtaining a graduate-level degree, or even six months to a year in the country, without a deliberate plan to link the culture and language together during training will result in an FAO achieving the cultural awareness that is necessary for shared intentionality in future engagements. The FAO needs ample opportunity to perform the culture, and in turn show knowledge of the language by doing something in the language. This leads us to the "performed culture" approach that I think would be beneficial for the U.S. military to adopt in its Chinese language training programs.

Galal Walker explains that the term, "performed culture," "expresses the idea that communication occurs in culture, that culture can be presented as performable elements, and that the knowledge of a language resides in the performance of the culture (Walker,

The Pedagogy of Performing Another Culture 2010, iii). The "performed culture" approach essentially highlights the fact that the language and the culture have an inseparable relationship. Our military members need to have the opportunity to practice performing the culture during their language training. Scenarios need to be created or provided in which the language learner can physically and socially participate and that can be shown to be real, culturally appropriate exchanges in the Chinese language in a Chinese environment. Language is a social activity and the training and learning need to reflect it as such. The heart of the "performed culture" approach, in my opinion, lies in the idea that culture, much like Tomasello alludes to, is what makes one human group different from the other, and that by establishing a knowledge of the culture, or in other words, having a way to establish "common ground" with one's counterpart is the only way to participate in the social interactions. Ideally, our FAOs and Chinese counterparts will understand each other's unique cultures as they come to the table for discussions. This ideal would allow for a new "common ground" to be established, one that does not have to be American or Chinese. This "common ground" will reflect the respect and understanding that both parties have for each other, thus resulting in a sense of cooperation and purpose that enables shared intentionality in communication at a level we have yet to realize in our engagements with China. This is the vision we need to take when developing a FAO.

4.3 Operating in the 3rd Space

A presentation given by Walker and Jian (2016) entitled "A Chinese Language Pedagogy for the 21st Century: Basic Assumptions" provided the foundation for the concepts involved with "operating in the 3rd space." Essentially, the ability to operate in

the 3rd space means that two parties from different cultures (C^1 and C^2) are aware and knowledgeable of their own and the other's culture and language to the degree that common ground can and has been sufficiently formed. Developing this common ground results in an acceptance of the other, allowing conversation and negotiation to occur in a 3rd space (C^3). Furthermore, crucial to this concept is the ability to operate in the 3rd space is evidence of expertise and that domain is the key concept for developing the expertise. Operating in the 3rd space should be the goal for our FAOs in the U.S. military. To better understand the concept of operating in the 3rd space, Figure 9 is provided below with a subsequent explanation of the key features.



Figure 9: The 3rd Space Model

In Figure 9, the left-hand side lists roles that one may perform in his/her culture ranging from a government representative at the top moving down to a C^2 employee at

the bottom. These roles are provided in English to represent people from an American cultural background for our example. On the right-hand side, the same roles are listed, but they are provided in Chinese to represent the people from the Chinese culture that the American will interact with. The C^1, C^2, and C^3 represent culture 1 (American), culture 2 (Chinese), and culture 3 (the 3rd space) respectively. At the top of the model the term, "common ground," is listed with an arrow pointing down, indicating an increasing level of "common ground" that is formed between C^1 and C^2 participants as the roles go from the top to the bottom. From our model, this would mean that a C2 employee (an American successfully working in China as an employee in a Chinese organization) has formed the greatest degree of common ground with his/her counterparts. The dashed line between C1 and C2 is provided to show that there is an interaction occurring between members of the two cultures. The yellow shaded area represents the influence of C^1, while the blue represents the influence of C^2. Moving from the top to the bottom, the width of the shaded areas expands, not only showing an increasing awareness of one's own culture and its' influence in communication, but an increasing willingness to share one's culture with the counterpart. It should be noted that there is a white area in the model between C^1 and C^2 that represents a void, or empty space of mutual cultural awareness and understanding between the parties involved, being the most extreme at the top. For our model, this suggests that a government representative from C^1 may simply want to pass a prepared message to a representative in C^2 without the intention of having a conversation or negotiation. Often times, this level of communication will be facilitated with an interpreter because neither side possesses the language or cultural ability to pass the message for him/herself. As we travel from the top moving downward

in the model we see that the yellow and blue areas steadily increase until they eventually overlap and form the color green, representing the blending of both cultures. This green, as a blend, now represents the concept of the 3rd space. Those individuals that are able to operate in the green area do not become members of the other culture, but have formed common ground with their counterparts to the degree that they are able to operate in a 3rd culture space in which they can establish and negotiate intentions.

The ability to blend the two cultures in such a manner that allows operation in the 3rd space is contingent upon expertise within a specific domain. This means, however, that the expertise within a specific domain is displayed using the other culture's language. Following our model, government representatives should be experts in domains specific to their areas of government work. However, they do not have that same expertise or ability to perform the same job in the target culture. Thus, they are not able to operate in the 3rd space. The successful C2 employee, on the other hand, must possess expertise in the Chinese language in order to do a domain specific job in the Chinese culture.

Working in another language and culture is a personal engagement for everyone concerned. This chapter included the personal experiences of the author in order convey the immediacy of language and culture interactions and the necessity of conversation as the productive mode of communication. The pertinent questions for the U.S. military, with respect to the model in Figure 9 and operating in the 3rd space, are where is a China FAO currently operating on this model and where would we like him/her to operate? From the current requirements relating to proficiency levels and the reported test scores of current FAOs (see Chapter 2) it should seem apparent that the majority of FAOs are not operating in the 3rd space. Furthermore, the military focus on a FAO's development

of expertise in his/her military specialty is disjointed from his/her language and cultural development in Chinese. The current plan with FAO development does not link the military expertise with the language, which seems to be a critical component if one were to effectively operate in the 3rd space with a desire to participate in conversations and negotiations.

CHAPTER 5: MAKING THE SHIFT FROM PROFICIENCY TO EXPERTISE

This chapter draws not only upon the research involved in the previous four chapters, but also draws heavily upon my own background with over twenty-year's experience in the military. My experience in dealing with foreign language and culture, while seeing first-hand the impact that this critical capability plays in military conflict, is integral in producing this essay where I layout my concerns and recommendations with developing officers ready to engage with the Chinese in the most effective manner possible.

The most current Department of Defense Directive dealing with the "Defense Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Program" explains that "foreign language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities are enduring critical competencies essential to the DoD mission and must be managed to maximize the accession, development, sustainment, enhancement, and employment of these critical skills to the DoD mission." (Department of Defense 2016, 2) Although there are a few military specialties that require and utilize LREC skills, there is no position more important than the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) where these skills are absolutely essential to communicating with Chinese counterparts. The FAO represents one of the only positions in the military where direct interaction, without the aid of an interpreter, is envisioned and ultimately expected. The FAOs operating with Chinese counterparts need

to have capabilities commensurate with the expectation. The best way to ensure that our FAOs are trained properly is to transition our goals away from proficiency (i.e. a general outlook) and towards the concept of expertise (i.e. a specific domain). Furthermore, a direct pipeline for FAOs needs to be developed to select candidates for the track before receiving a commission. This way the development of a FAO will occur throughout the officer's entire career with the ability to link the LREC skills directly to the officer's military specialty. There are programs currently in place that will allow newly accessed officers to graduate with proficiency levels greater than the majority of currently serving FAOs, and thus, give this new officer the opportunity to transform identified proficiency levels into actual expertise coupled with his/her military specialty as a career progresses. This concept of FAO development, if implemented and managed properly, will be more cost-effective and produce FAOs able to operate with LREC skills that have been previously unattainable.

5.1 Determining desirable goals

The goals associated with the DoD's LREC pursuits were previously discussed in Chapter 3 of this work. However, a brief review and look at the recent history behind the current goals will be help clarify the current situation. Due to the exigencies and challenges presented by the September 11, 2001 attack on the U.S., the military found itself involved in conflicts that dealt with people possessing language and culture very different from our own without a cadre of military members possessing the skills required to effectively communicate with them. In response to these challenges, the DoD (2005) published its "Defense Language Transformation Roadmap." This document outlined

four basic goals for the DoD: 1) "create foundational language and regional area expertise," 2) "create the capacity to surge," 3) "establish a cadre of language professionals possessing an interagency roundtable proficiency of 3/3/3 in Reading/Listening/Speaking," and 4) "establish a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of military personnel with language skills and foreign area officers." (Department of Defense 2005, 3,8,10,13) It wouldn't be until February 2011 that the DoD would release the "Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (2011-2016)" with the accompanying vision to "have the required combination of language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities to meet current and projected needs." (Department of Defense 2011, 8) Within this document, the goals for the DoD were further refined to the following three: 1) "identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities, and generate accurate demand signals in support of DoD missions," 2) "build, enhance, and sustain a Total Force with a mix of language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities to meet existing and emerging needs in support of national security objectives," and 3) "strengthen language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities to increase interoperability and to build partner capacity." (Department of Defense 2011, 8) Additionally, approximately one year later, the DoD (2012) released the strategic guidance for the entire organization in a document entitled, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." Although not directly stated, this strategic guidance makes the notion of Chinese language and cultural understanding even more critical to our military's efforts because within the guidance is the explanation that "while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of

necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region." (Department of Defense 2012, 2) This rebalance, or focus on the Asia-Pacific region, clearly involves increased interaction and engagement with the Chinese, since China is the largest and most powerful nation in the Asia-Pacific region[18]. Finally, in January 2014, the document, "Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities" that set the course on how the goals of the strategic plan would be accomplished and measured was released. (OUSD (P&R) and DLNSEO 2014) The implementation plan essentially focused on the three goals set by the strategic plan, but may be viewed using the following simplified terminology: 1) "identify requirements," 2) "improve manpower and personnel," and 3) "strengthen partnerships." (OUSD (P&R) and DLNSEO 2014, 7,8,11) For the purpose of this study, goal two, "improve manpower and personnel," or elaborated upon as, "build, enhance, and sustain a Total Force with a mix of language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities to meet existing and emerging needs in support of national security objectives," is our primary concern. (OUSD (P&R) and DLNSEO 2014, 8) As goals began to be established and finally codified starting with the 2005 roadmap, the concept of LREC skills that our military personnel develop and possess took on a more significant role as these skills were viewed as critical capabilities. In fact, the DoD acknowledges that critical warfighting capabilities "include foreign language proficiency and detailed knowledge of the regions of the world gained through in-depth study and personal experience." (USD (P&R) 2005, 2) The assumption the DoD is making is that those who become our FAOs possess these critical skills (See Chapter 2 for in-depth FAO

[18] It should be noted, that based upon a military culture and mindset that I have experienced throughout my career, many within the DoD would make the claim that the U.S. is the most powerful nation in the Asia-Pacific region despite geography.

description and requirements). A hard look into the assumptions behind the DoD's goal for improving manpower and personnel within the LREC context deserves examination.

The result that the DoD seeks with regard to achieving the goal of "improving manpower and personnel" is described by the following "outcome statement" found within the implementation plan: "DoD personnel possess the appropriate levels of LREC competence needed to achieve mission objectives." (OUSD (P&R) and DLNSEO 2014, 8). This clearly shows that an assumption is made that a "level" of "competence" can be an indicator of a person's ability to achieve an objective. This is an extremely dangerous assumption. Achieving mission objectives requires people "doing" things. However, the only "doing" that is currently involved with a military member proving his/her level of LREC competence comes from a test score. In fact, the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) and the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) are the tests that determine a military member's level of LREC competence. To be fair, however, the FAO program also requires the member to have "graduate-level or equivalent education focusing on, but not limited to, the historical, political, diplomatic, military/security, cultural, sociological, scientific, economic, and geographic factors of specific foreign countries and regions" and "in-country/regional experience involving significant interaction with host nationals and host-nation entities in the foreign countries or regions in which they specialize." (USD (P&R) 2007, 2) Therefore, the assumption made is that a FAO who accomplishes the previously mentioned requirements will then possess the appropriate level of LREC skill (The specifics of FAO development are discussed in Chapter 2). The DoD further breaks down the goal to "improve manpower and personnel" into sub objectives. There are four sub objectives that could be directly related to FAO

development: 1) increasing the percentage of new active duty officer accessions with those identified possessing a foreign language skill from 4.4% in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 to 6.0% by the end of FY2016, 2) initial training at DLIFLC to produce graduates at the 2/2/1+ level to increase from 59% in FY2012 to 65% by the end of FY2016, 3) initial training at DLIFLC to produce graduates at the 2+/2+/2 level to increase from 20.8% in FY2012 to 25% by the end of FY2016, and 4) increase the percentage of fully qualified[19] FAOs from 9.3% in FY2012 to 12% by the end of FY2018. (OUSD (P&R) and DLNSEO 2014, 8-10) The common element found within all of these goals/objectives is a test score. Although the goal to increase the percentage of new active duty officer accessions with people possessing a foreign language skill does not identify specific test scores, undoubtedly a DLPT score will be required once the officer is commissioned to evaluate his/her level of foreign language proficiency. Once again, the underlying assumption with these goals pertaining to LREC capabilities is that a DLPT and/or an OPI score somehow indicates whether or not a person is able to utilize the language to accomplish mission objectives. There are two relevant examples that I will provide to show why the DLPT scores do not necessarily reflect what the military member with LREC skills is able to do.

Since I am an active duty officer in the United States Air Force and have developed Chinese language skills and cultural awareness, both before and during my career, I have been taking DLPT's in Chinese since 1999. I tested almost annually during my career. The years I did not test could be attributed to operational constraints and

[19] A fully qualified FAO will have a 3/3/3 level in listening/reading/speaking, a Master's Degree in a related regional studies program, and a minimum of 6-months in-country time applicable to the language.

fluctuating language policies. There were two factors during my career that motivated me to test in Chinese. The first, incentive pay was often provided by the Air Force to score at or above the 2/2 (listening/reading) level during my time. There were times when incentive pay was available for maintaining Chinese skill regardless of my "job." However, policies fluctuated and at some periods of time, incentive pay was only paid to those members who were coded in a "job" that required the language. Therefore, the second factor that motivated me to test in Chinese was, indeed, when I performed a "job" that required me to have a certain proficiency level in Chinese. For me, that was serving as an instructor at the United States Air Force Academy teaching Mandarin. With regard to the DLPT, I have tested in Cantonese, Mandarin, and Amoy several times throughout my career.

Cantonese was the first Chinese language that I learned. I did not learn Cantonese in a military context. It was during a two-year religious mission to Australia that I developed Cantonese language skills and a cultural understanding and an appreciation for Chinese people. In terms of the DLPT, I routinely would score a 2+/2+ (Listening/Reading) in Cantonese, which is still reflective of my most recent score over 17 years later. I felt very comfortable directly engaging with Cantonese speakers over 17 years ago. I had no problem discussing matters relating to daily life and felt at home discussing religion, which could be viewed as my domain specific area of expertise at the time. I truly felt that I was developing expertise in Cantonese when I had conversations with Chinese people about religion. I was able to explain concepts and alleviate concerns my Chinese counterpart might show. I was able to develop relationships of trust with my Chinese contacts and was able to understand and appreciate a culture very different from

my own. I was beginning to operate in the "3rd space," as described in Chapter 4, and was having conversations with Chinese people using their language while being cognizant and respectful of their culture. However, my ability to use Cantonese outside of the domain specific area of religion was unpracticed, and thus quite limited. I felt very comfortable talking to Chinese people in Cantonese about religion and daily life. Leaving what I considered to be my domain would have proved more difficult. Zhini Zeng (2015), in her dissertation, *Demonstrating and Evaluating Expertise in Communicating in Chinese as a Foreign Language*, draws this conclusion through her research: "superior performance of experts is often domain specific, and the capability to extend their performance beyond a narrow area of expertise is surprisingly limited." (29) Zeng's statement seems to be directly applicable to my experience with Cantonese. I felt I had a domain specific area (a specific religion) that was the focus of my Cantonese language abilities. Beyond that narrow area, I became very limited in my abilities to use Cantonese effectively. Although I possessed LREC skills higher than that required by a FAO (2/2 in listening/reading), my ability to use Cantonese in the military setting would likewise not be immediately transferable. With approximately 17 years now without needing to use Cantonese, nor any deliberate efforts to study Cantonese for progress and improvement, my score still reflects the same rating on the DLPT. However, my ability to use Cantonese to "do things" has greatly diminished. I can no longer hold solid conversations about religion in Cantonese, it has been too long since I had the need to hold such a conversation. My ability to use Cantonese in the military setting would be even worse. However, my LREC capabilities are being categorized at a 2+/2+ level, a rating that exceeds the requirement to act as a FAO (see appendices A through C for

descriptions of ILR levels). My ability to use Amoy is an even more pertinent example of how my test scores are not reflective of the ability to do something with the language. I did not take the Amoy DLPT until much later in my career, and have scored a 2/2+ and a 2/3 for scores that reflect higher than those required by a FAO. I am not able to hold conversations in Amoy. I could not ameliorate nor in any way discuss concerns relating to any matters using Amoy with a Chinese counterpart. I simply have a score reflective of how well I tested, but that score has nothing to do with how I am able to "use" Amoy. My abilities in Mandarin and Cantonese coupled with my experience in taking DLPT's since 1999 clearly influences my ability to take the test. Furthermore, when evaluating "reading" in Amoy, it is the same as reading in Cantonese or Mandarin, since there is essentially only one written register in Chinese.

The second example that shows how test scores are not reflective of what a military member can "do" with his/her LREC skills comes from my observation of an advanced Chinese Mandarin class at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in January 2016. There were a total of six students in the class, and three of them were raised and/or educated in Chinese-speaking environments. The proficiency goal for the course was again based upon a DLPT and OPI score, hoping for each graduate to achieve the 3/3/2+ level (listening/reading/speaking) set by the institution. I observed what appeared to me to be skill levels at or already above the 3/3/2+ description for these three students. I asked one of the native instructors how these members were not considered to be performing at least to a 3/3/3 level already. It was interesting to note that the instructor, and the members themselves, all considered their proficiency to be extremely high, in fact near native, or at least above an ILR 3

description. Their real problem was the inability to "test" to the higher level. It wasn't that they were poor test takers, but the English elements of the questions often gave them trouble as to what was actually being asked of them on the test. I found this situation quite enlightening, almost as if we were training military members in a Chinese program to better understand English. These members would be able to hold true conversations with Chinese counterparts and would have no problem being culturally accepted and understood. Their deficiency seemed to lie in the fact that they struggled to accurately deduce what a question written in English was asking them about the Chinese item on the test. This case is different from my own, where now we actually have someone performing at a much higher level in Chinese than the test result seems to indicate. Depending upon the career field these members were working in, their skill with English and Chinese might be a critical factor on a mission. It should be pointed out, however, that the DLPT for Chinese Mandarin was "designed to assess the global language proficiency in reading and listening of native speakers of English who have learned Chinese as a second language, and speakers of other languages with very strong English skills who know Chinese." (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center n.d., 3) It is likely that the DLPT was not the right assessment tool for the three members with extremely high-levels of Chinese whom I observed; however, whether or not the DLPT was appropriate, the fact remains that the metric involved with DLPT and OPI testing are driving goal setting and defining perceived accomplishments and readiness as they pertain to our LREC skills.

As the DoD currently seeks to meet and exceed goals with regard to military members' LREC skills, we are unknowingly chasing after metrics that cannot guarantee

how effective our FAOs will actually be. It seems that there is an underlying assumption that if we have a certain number of military members' testing at certain levels on DLPTs and/or OPIs, we will then have an easily managed quantity of LREC skill that can be called upon and applied toward myriad mission requirements. Unfortunately, military members who have language skills, especially at the advanced levels where real conversations occur, (as we would expect for FAOs who are given opportunities to directly engage with Chinese counterparts) cannot perform at the same level across all domains.

We need to focus on expertise rather than proficiency levels when it comes to FAO development. FAO development should be geared towards a synthesis of LREC skill and a domain specific area of expertise. Our goals can focus on operational priorities--the requirements and mission accomplishment--as opposed to "levels" when assessing our members. This means a FAO will have his/her military specialty coupled with his/her Chinese LREC skills. It will be critical to make officers' military specialties--whether that be a pilot or an artillery officer--to be linked to their language development immediately at the start of their careers and then continued throughout their careers. Focusing on language proficiency before the FAO earns a commission, we can then identify those with the potential to develop an expertise in the language that involves a future military specialty. This would require the services to focus on finding what mix of military specialties would be optimal for mission accomplishment when it comes to engaging with Chinese counterparts in long-term engagements—conversations and negotiations. The military specialty, or what needs to be done or discussed is the real driving factor in dealing with our Chinese counterparts. Chinese language spoken and

understood at an expert level within these varied military domains by our FAOs will allow members of the U.S. military to begin to operate in the "3rd space." This will finally allow us to depart from a declarative mode of interaction where we are primarily concerned with what we have to say and turn towards understanding our counterparts and why they are saying and doing things the way they are. This type of insight will improve the information flow from China to the U.S. and ultimately help bolster national security through direct engage with the Chinese.

5.2 Changing FAO accession and development

Currently, within the DoD, an officer is not considered for FAO accession until he/she has developed a military specialty. Since, becoming a FAO is a competitive process, with many applicants unsuccessful in that effort, these officers might be considered among the best in their career fields. It needs to be highlighted, once again, that both using a single-track approach for FAO accession (Army and Navy) or the dual-track approach (Air Force and Marine Corps) always allows officers sufficient time to develop their military specialties before switching over to the FAO career or taking a FAO assignment.[20] The question that I have based on my experiences operating in environments where language and culture capacities can be a critical factor is this: Why do the FAO career field or FAO assignment and the military specialty have to be separate and distinct paths?

When we view language as something separated from the military specialty, we are, in essence, losing time. Time is extremely important when it comes to Chinese

[20] See Chapter 2 for details about the single-track and dual-track approach for FAO management

language training. Zeng's (2015) research regarding advanced learners of Chinese language helps us understand that, "Becoming an expert in a language very different from one's own, such as Chinese, is always a lifelong endeavor, requiring many years of deliberate practice." (27) If the military services wait until the seven to twelve-year point in an officer's career to begin training for the FAO track, these officers lose the opportunity to deliberately practice Chinese for the seven to twelve years prior to accession. Furthermore, the services also lose the opportunity to utilize the officers during the approximate three and a half years of training it takes to become a FAO.[21] Worst case scenario, an officer could become a FAO after fifteen and a half years serving in the military without ever using Chinese in his/her job. One of the most problematic assumptions made here is that the language and culture that the officer learns during his/her three and a half years of training will somehow couple with his/her military experience without the many years of practice using the language in the domain that would be required to demonstrate expertise. We cannot afford to lose this deliberate practice time when it comes to developing our experts who will engage with Chinese counterparts. We need to find a way to maximize our training time without sacrificing a military member's occupational specialty. The best way to do this is to "pull" individuals into the military that already possess high proficiency levels of Chinese who are poised and ready to develop expertise in both Chinese and his/her military specialty in unison from the start of a career. We need to build a pipeline for FAO development.

[21] See Chapter 2 for greater detail about the time required for training and the time prior to FAO accession. Although there is some variance in time prior to accession, the seven to twelve-year period seems representative of the time required to develop a military specialty in all of the services.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously said, “Pull the string, and it will follow wherever you wish. Push it, and it will go nowhere at all.” (Dauch and Cox 2012, 79) Although Eisenhower was referring to leadership, his metaphor seems very applicable to FAO development. Pushing a string seems to be the DoD’s current plan of attack with FAO development. Waiting on officers to gain experience in the military by way of their specialty through different assignments and then pushing them into a FAO path seems much less predictable than pulling an officer candidate into the military who already possesses a level higher than what is currently accepted for FAO duties. This gives the military many more options with a more predictable path and ultimately a better return on investment.

In Chapter 2, it was reported that The Language Flagship boasts 100% of its graduates achieving ILR levels for Chinese at or above the current accepted levels for FAOs (2 in listening and reading). In fact, 34.6% of the listening scores and 31.5% of the reading scores from Flagship graduates were at an ILR level 3 for Chinese, when the current FAO force only has 16% of its members testing at that level. Currently this is a 5-year program, and it is offered to ROTC Flagship Scholarship participants, but the program could still be made even more robust by making it an optimal pipeline for FAOs. One of the most important aspects of this program is the Capstone portion involving a year abroad at an Overseas Flagship Center. (Defense Language National Security Education Office 2016, 25) It would be necessary to ensure that this year abroad is not simply “studying” Chinese in a classroom in China. All too often, language immersion programs seem to be nothing more than holding the same type of classes that could be held in an American classroom, but locating them in China. Of course, these programs

would claim that the true immersion occurs when the student eats, shops, plays, and interacts with others in the target culture. However, the actual educational and training opportunities for these future FAOs during such an immersion needs to involve "doing" and "working" in the target culture to put them on the path towards developing expertise. It all comes down to the opportunities that the student is provided to "perform" in the target culture. Zeng's (2015) work on expertise supports this point when she explains: "Effective language learning precisely requires a prolonged experience of performing the language in meaningful contexts." (32) There would be no more meaningful context for these students than actually working in a Chinese organization.

By way of example, a program like The OSU Midwest US-China Flagship[22] is designed so that it "will prepare students to work in China and work with Chinese to achieve shared goals." (The Ohio State University 2017) Those who participate in this 2-year program have the opportunity to work in one of many Chinese businesses and organizations that are relevant to their domains which are in turn the focus of their thesis projects which lead to a Master's Degree. The OSU program is built upon the foundation that "Performance (Doing is knowing) will be emphasized at every stage of learning advanced skills in Chinese language and culture." (The Ohio State University 2017) This type of program would be a great match for future FAOs because it is designed to "insure that students will function well in professional domains in the target culture environment." (The Ohio State University 2017) I have observed graduates of this type of course before, during, and at the completion of the program, and these students demonstrate capacities that are ideal for a FAO.

[22] Although the term "Flagship" is used this is not a DLNSEO funded program.

Of course, candidates for this type of program would already need an established level of language proficiency that could be obtained through undergraduate programs that are found at the schools already participating in the Defense Language and National Security Education Office's (DLNSEO) Language Flagship program. Blending the high-level of language that students are able to achieve in four years during the DLNSEO Flagship programs and replacing the Capstone portion with an OSU-Midwest US-China Flagship-type program (MA degree) will allow the future FAO an opportunity to meet all current FAO requirements (see Chapter 2 for detailed explanation of requirements), except the military experience, prior to beginning the career. The future FAO would be commissioned after his/her undergraduate experience and assigned a military specialty like all other service academy or ROTC cadets and midshipmen. The Second Lieutenant/Ensign would now have a focus for his/her thesis project when entering the two-year's Master's program—something relating to his/her future military specialty. With this model, we would have an officer entering the U.S. military already trained to work with Chinese counterparts and trained with a method that puts him/her on a path towards developing expertise in a military specific domain. Such officers' language sustainment and progress throughout their careers would be deliberately and directly linked to DLIFLC's distance learning and would be tailored to the officer's needs. The type of language learning modules, or language support could come to the officer in various forms, but the focus would always be on the officer's primary military specialty. This ensures that the officer focuses on learning and doing relevant things with the language. All too often in the military, language sustainment and refresher training has the goal of doing well on the DLPT, since this test is currently the only measure that

determines the officer's ability with the language. What is being proposed here not only saves a tremendous amount of time, but also a tremendous amount of money for the U.S. military.

A key component with this proposal is that the officers entering the FAO pipeline will not have to be pushed out of their military specialty to focus on language training, because the two components will be tied to each other. This officer might be viewed as a "language-coded officer" until he/she reaches a point where the rank, position, and experience are compatible with the types of FAO billets that are currently required. Along the timeline of their careers, these "language-coded officers" need to be deliberately developed to the maximum extent possible with their attendance at U.S.-China military engagements and exercises (See Chapter 1 for examples). This is the true training ground for these officers to hone their expertise and receive real-world feedback from Chinese counterparts as they hold conversations and work together as they ultimately operate in "3rd Space" engagements. These officers should attend events like the Disaster Management Exchanges, the Rim of the Pacific exercises, delegation visits, conferences, and any other relevant engagements with the Chinese as much as possible. The junior officers will have the opportunity to engage at the appropriate levels without the need for an interpreter and can begin to form relationships with Chinese counterparts and form a greater understanding of the Chinese military over the episodes of a career. As this new generation of FAOs' careers progress, they will inevitably enter roles with greater responsibility and importance and will carry a level of Chinese language expertise coupled with military domains that we have yet to experience. Constructing this pipeline is not something that will happen overnight, but will take many years and careers to reap

the benefits of cultivating expertise among Chinese FAOs. This type of program will not only directly impact our military effectiveness, but will have second and third-order effects as officers retire or separate and enter U.S. businesses or even other government service where relationships with the Chinese will truly matter.

It was reported in Chapter 2 that the estimated initial price-tag for a FAO is approximately $354,427 and it is built upon the premise of guaranteeing a FAO who tests at the L2/R2/S1+ ILR levels. (United States Army 2016, 14) With the proposed model, these officers would be entering their careers with proficiency levels higher than this, and even more closely related to the L3/R3/S3 levels that the DoD had envisioned for its FAOs. Since it has proven quite difficult for linguists and FAOs to achieve the highest proficiency levels for language in the military, it appears that the DLIFLC may be considering raising the required levels of proficiency for its basic course graduates as a remedy. The most current general catalog explains for the basic course that it "is designed to take the student up to an ILR proficiency Level 2 in listening comprehension, reading comprehension, and a level 1+ speaking ability *with an eventual goal of a L2+, R2+, S2*." (Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 2016, 29) DLIFLC is clearly interested in finding a way to get graduates to a higher proficiency level. Although it may not be directly related, Samuel R. Shearer's (2013) dissertation project, entitled "Modeling Second Language Change Using Skill Retention Theory" supports DLIFLC's goal to raise the basic course standard to L2+/R2+/S2. Shearer's work "analyzed 13 years of Defense Language Institute (DLI data) from over 16,000 military linguists to determine if cognitive-based skill retention theory can adequately explain foreign language change." (Shearer 2013, ii) Shearer's conclusions were such that he

proposed that "linguists must attain a proficiency level of a high 2+ to 3 in listening and reading and a speaking proficiency of 2 to 2+ in order to maintain proficiency as long as possible." (Shearer 2013, 101-102) With the proposed FAO pipeline, DLIFLC would not need to train FAOs in such a short period of time in Chinese (64 weeks) and the higher levels of proficiency could indeed be attained. According to Shearer's conclusion, these officers produced through the FAO pipeline model would be able to maintain proficiency longer and be less susceptible to their foreign language skill attrition. The pipeline model, also avoids long periods of time without using the foreign language since the military specialty should be tied to foreign language maintenance and progression. The "language-coded officer" entering the FAO pipeline would be more involved in engagements with the Chinese and continued training and experiences related to his/her job coupled with the Chinese language. According to Shearer, "continued training, operations, and experience at this high level will proceduralize more L2 skills and make the linguists' proficiency more immune to decay." (Shearer 2013, 102) Edward L. Thorndike (1928), long ago, made the following remark about this problem: "All, or nearly all, learning vanishes if not used." "We all forget most of what we learn, some of it in a few minutes, much of it overnight, and more month by month." Thorndike continues by saying, "keeping up with one's profession consists in not losing knowledge and skill and power as well as in gaining more." (Thorndike, et al. 1928, 149-150) The pipeline model for FAO development, helps officers focus on their profession and language at the same time in a pursuit to gain more and not just accept a status quo.

The DLIFLC may interpret Shearer's conclusions as a call to be more efficient in producing higher levels of language proficiency for its graduates; however, it may not be

the right approach for FAO training. Peter Drucker (1909-2005), a man highly influential with concepts involved in modern management, once said, "efficiency is doing things right; effectiveness is doing the right thing." (McChrystal, et al. 2015, 81) For the case of FAO development, it may be time to take a more "effective" approach instead of focusing on "efficiency." The "efficiency" the military is currently trying to achieve is forced to cause the language learning to occur much later in an officer's career as time becomes more limited and critical. The benefits of the proposed model do not end with higher proficiency levels and less language attrition for future FAOs, but also apply to cost savings as well.

Producing a FAO through the proposed plan would be much more economical. Assuming that the current FAO enters the military through a service academy or an ROTC program and had government funding for his/her undergraduate education. Therefore, the cost savings of the proposed and the current FAO accession programs result in comparing a 2-year Master's Degree program at a civilian institution to the $354,427 price tag associated with meeting minimum standards for today's FAO. In terms of cost, there really isn't much of a debate other than the risk of losing the "language-coded officer" before he/she fills a FAO role. This risk can be mitigated in much the same way that the military tries to retain pilots in the U.S. Air Force after such costly expenditures on their training. A program could be explored to offer these "language-coded officers" a retention bonus at the appropriate time in the career to guarantee the best return on the investment. The lesser cost for developing FAOs through the proposed pipeline concept could be applied to offset a retention bonus and still be a cost saving initiative compared to current FAO developmental costs. To help

commanders better understand the value of these "language-coded officers," and future FAOs, the assessment method cannot stop at a DLPT. It should seem clear that if the government is putting significant investment into people reaching advanced levels of language, then the assessment has to go beyond a DLPT rating and provide assessments that take into account what these officers are expected to do. The primary method of assessment would need to involve an *event*—actually performing or doing something in the language.

5.3 Assessment beyond the DLPT

The ultimate goal of foreign language training in the military context is to link Chinese language and cultural performance directly to the occupational areas of expertise that officers engage in throughout their careers. This would mean we cannot separate language training from those areas of activity that officers attend to in construction of their careers, but rather be mindful of the career-long development of the training in unison with their occupational areas of expertise. We need officers to do something with the language, thus we can link their language and culture education with their military and life experiences. As John Dewey pointed out: "every experience is a moving force, its value can be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward and into." (Dewey, 31) Foreign language training in the military needs to contain learner experiences that move toward and into the officer's own occupational area of expertise. It is not enough to train someone in the language, give them a test, and then assume that the assigned level of "proficiency" can guarantee anything about the individual's ability to "do" something with the language. Furthermore, the U.S. military has made efforts to identify and assess many members throughout the general-purpose forces who may test at certain

levels of proficiency in specific languages. This identification process seems to be treated in such a way as to validate a "storage bank" of language ability in the military for use if the need arises. However, having members on record with levels of proficiency without direct, deliberate, and constant development of those skills is grounded upon the assumption that language ability is a bankable commodity that can be put aside and then retrieved at a later time at full value. Language ability is not a bankable commodity. In fact, a farming metaphor in which a skill is planted and cultivated throughout a long process requiring constant attention is more applicable to actual language ability and utilization.

Patrick McAloon with his research regarding evaluating advanced Chinese language use makes the point that "those who administer the DLPT acknowledge that it is a test of general proficiency, not a test of professional expertise in the target language. With content that covers a 'broad range of content areas,' the DLPT is not designed to assess whether or not an individual would be considered knowledgeable in his/her professional field." (McAloon 2008, 210) McAloon further makes the claim that, "though the DLPT 5 cannot test for it, the ILR proficiency scales themselves refer to domain expertise in their descriptors. The descriptor for ILR level 4 reading proficiency reads, '[subject] can read all styles pertinent to professional needs' and s/he 'can read all materials in his/her field.' In its current iteration, the DLPT would be unable to ascertain if a service member tasked with keeping up with Chinese warplane development is competent to find and/or read Chinese materials on aerospace design or only able to read general newspaper editorials and history texts." (McAloon 2008, 211) If our military member's area of expertise is with aerospace design, then we need that member to be

able to function like an expert in Chinese with regard to aerospace design. This is the type of expertise in language for which we need to strive.

Looking at the history of the DLPT, and relating that to my own experiences taking the tests in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Amoy, often the test seems to only measure one's ability to take the test instead of one's ability to perform and do something in the language. It was Albert Einstein who once said, "Our theories determine what we measure." (McChrystal, et al. 2015, 245) The U.S. military is operating under the theory, or assumption, that a DLPT score defines a military member's readiness to operate in the language, so much so that DLPT performance is what we choose to measure. The reliance on a Chinese language test score is not a sufficient indicator of the level of performance beyond the test.

McAloon's criticism of the DLPT seems to strike a chord with me as an active duty military member when he says, "Imagine how many resources have been spent developing and administering the DLPT only to be able to tell commanders in Iraq that a particular learner of Arabic chose the right multiple choice answers more often than not." (McAloon 2008, 427) Zeng (2015) also gives a similar criticism to tests like the DLPT when she states, "the performances related to proficiency tests, in most cases, are only accurate predictors of one's ability to perform on a test, not of one's success in a future career." (32) We need an assessment tool that is more reflective of the expertise that we hope to develop. Expertise can be assessed, and Zeng (2015) tends to agree when she makes the claim that "Expertise is observable and demonstrable through performances." (32) The types of performances that Zeng (2015) refers to are bound to the concept of culture and further expounded upon by Walker's (2010) explanation of "performed

culture" in that it "expresses the idea that communication occurs in culture, that culture can be presented as performable elements, and that the knowledge of a language resides in the performance of the culture." (iii) Even earlier, Hector Hammerly (1982) locked onto the importance of culture when it comes to second language competence. In fact, he explained that second language competence was actually made of three types of competence, and for those who desired to communicate effectively and in a socially acceptable manner would need to develop "linguistic competence, and communicative competence all within the framework of cultural competence." (Hammerly 1982, 513) Taking a multiple-choice test will not satisfy the need to observe performances within the framework of culture.

The type of assessment that we should use for our future FAO's who develop language expertise within their own domain-specific area of expertise in the military is already widely used throughout the military. This type of assessment is often referred to as a "checkride." I am a pilot in the U.S. Air Force and have been qualified throughout my career to fly T-37's, T-44's, T-53's, T-1's, C-130's, and C-208's. In each of these aircraft I had to accomplish, at a minimum, an annual checkride to maintain my qualification to fly. For example, one area of evaluation that is consistent for all of these aircraft is landings. I do take tests to determine my knowledge of rules and regulations, but the Air Force, ultimately concerned with my ability to safely operate the aircraft, would never accept my answering questions as a validation for my ability to land an aircraft. An evaluator takes a flight with me and observes my landings and then provides an appropriate assessment of my ability to operate safely and in accordance with set standards. Every occupational area in the military seems to have its own set of standards

and often has its own version of the checkride. Although the term "checkride" is primarily used for aviation, it is still applicable to any "event" that involves an evaluator observing the actions of another being tested in the context of his/her military speciality. We can assess our FAO's through checkrides that employ an evaluator who is qualified to observe the FAO performing his job in a culturally appropriate manner using the Chinese language and being effective in a social situation that involves Chinese persons. The specifics on what domain-specific areas of expertise need to be coupled with Chinese language would fall upon the Senior Language Authorities in the DoD to determine. The manner of how and who administers the checkrides would be a process that involves commanders, DLIFLC, and might even involve Chinese counterparts in a type of exchange or scheduled engagement. Essentially, the current assessments that we use now for foreign language have somehow put language in isolation as a unique separate skill that can be developed on its own instead of linking language to its "social" roots and developing the ability to do "things" in the language. Those "things" will be different for each military member depending upon his/her own domain-specific area of expertise. Walker, while speaking to Chinese language learners often points out, "you cannot learn a foreign language, you can only learn to *do* things in a foreign language." (Walker, The Pedagogy of Performing Another Culture 2010, 16)

If these new goals for foreign language training and assessment become a reality, the "U.S. military in communication with China" can evolve and create a range of mutual relationships that lead to direct and deliberate conversations and exchanges among our military members. That expanded communication will provide the mutual knowledge that will promote peace and security between the two most influential nations in the world

today.

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Appendix A: ILR Listening Skill Level Descriptions

Listening 0 (No Proficiency) No practical understanding of the spoken language. Understanding is limited to occasional isolated words with essentially no ability to comprehend communication.

Listening 0+ (Memorized Proficiency) Sufficient comprehension to understand a number of memorized utterances in areas of immediate needs. Slight increase in utterance length understood but requires frequent long pauses between understood phrases and repeated requests on the listener's part for repetition. Understands with reasonable accuracy only when this involves short memorized utterances or formulae. Utterances understood are relatively short in length. Misunderstandings arise due to ignoring or inaccurately hearing sounds or word endings (both inflectional and non-inflectional), distorting the original meaning. Can understand only with difficulty even such people as teachers who are used to speaking with non-native speakers. Can understand best those statements where context strongly supports the utterance's meaning. Gets some main ideas.

Listening 1 (Elementary Proficiency) Sufficient comprehension to understand utterances about basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements in areas of immediate need or on very familiar topics, can understand simple questions and answers, simple statements and very simple face- to-face conversations in a standard dialect. These must often be delivered more clearly than normal at a rate slower than normal with frequent repetitions or paraphrase (that is, by a native used to dealing with foreigners). Once learned, these sentences can be varied for similar level vocabulary and grammar and still be understood. In the majority of utterances, misunderstandings arise due to overlooked or misunderstood syntax and other grammatical clues. Comprehension vocabulary inadequate to understand anything but the most elementary needs. Strong interference from the candidate's native language occurs. Little precision in the information understood owing to the tentative state of passive grammar and lack of vocabulary. Comprehension areas include basic needs such as: meals, lodging, transportation, time and simple directions (including both route instructions and orders from customs officials, policemen, etc.). Understands main ideas.

Listening 1+ (Elementary Proficiency, Plus) Sufficient comprehension to understand short conversations about all survival needs and limited social demands. Developing flexibility evident in understanding a range of circumstances beyond immediate survival needs. Shows spontaneity in understanding by speed, although consistency of understanding is uneven. Limited vocabulary range necessitates repetition for understanding. Understands more common time forms and most question forms, some

word order patterns, but miscommunication still occurs with more complex patterns. Cannot sustain understanding of coherent structures in longer utterances or in unfamiliar situations. Understanding of descriptions and the giving of precise information is limited. Aware of basic cohesive features (e.g., pronouns, verb inflections) but many are unreliably understood, especially if less immediate in reference. Understanding is largely limited to a series of short, discrete utterances. Still has to ask for utterances to be repeated. Some ability to understand facts.

Listening 2 (Limited Working Proficiency) Sufficient comprehension to understand conversations on routine social demands and limited job requirements. Able to understand face-to-face speech in a standard dialect, delivered at a normal rate with some repetition and rewording, by a native speaker not used to dealing with foreigners, about everyday topics, common personal and family news, well-known current events and routine office matters through descriptions and narration about current, past and future events; can follow essential points of discussion or speech at an elementary level on topics in his/her special professional field. Only understands occasional words and phrases of statements made in unfavorable conditions, for example through loudspeakers outdoors. Understands factual content. Native language causes less interference in listening comprehension. Able to understand facts; i.e., the lines but not between or beyond the lines.

Listening 2+ (Limited Working Proficiency, Plus) Sufficient comprehension to understand most routine social demands and most conversations on work requirements as well as some discussions on concrete topics related to particular interests and special fields of competence. Often shows remarkable ability and ease of understanding, but under tension or pressure may break down. Candidate may display weakness or deficiency due to inadequate vocabulary base or less than secure knowledge of grammar and syntax. Normally understands general vocabulary with some hesitant understanding of everyday vocabulary still evident. Can sometimes detect emotional overtones. Some ability to understand implications.

Listening 3 (General Professional Proficiency) Able to understand the essentials of all speech in a standard dialect including technical discussions within a special field. Has effective understanding of face-to-face speech, delivered with normal clarity and speed in a standard dialect on general topics and areas of special interest; understands hypothesizing and supported opinions. Has broad enough vocabulary that rarely has to ask for paraphrasing or explanation. Can follow accurately the essentials of conversations between educated native speakers, reasonably clear telephone calls, radio broadcasts, news stories similar to wire service reports, oral reports, some oral technical reports and public addresses on non-technical subjects; can understand without difficulty all forms of standard speech concerning a special professional field. Does not understand native speakers if they speak very quickly or use some slang or dialect. Can often detect emotional overtones. Can understand implications.

Listening 3+ (General Professional Proficiency, Plus) Comprehends most of the content and intent of a variety of forms and styles of speech pertinent to professional

needs, as well as general topics and social conversation. Ability to comprehend many sociolinguistic and cultural references. However, may miss some subtleties and nuances. Increased ability to comprehend unusually complex structures in lengthy utterances and to comprehend many distinctions in language tailored for different audiences. Increased ability to understand native speakers talking quickly, using nonstandard dialect or slang; however, comprehension is not complete. Can discern some relationships among sophisticated listening materials in the context of broad experience. Can follow some unpredictable turns of thought readily, for example, in informal and formal speeches covering editorial, conjectural and literary material in subject matter areas directed to the general listener.

Listening 4 (Advanced Professional Proficiency) Able to understand all forms and styles of speech pertinent to professional needs. Able to understand fully all speech with extensive and precise vocabulary, subtleties and nuances in all standard dialects on any subject relevant to professional needs within the range of his/her experience, including social conversations; all intelligible broadcasts and telephone calls; and many kinds of technical discussions and discourse. Understands language specifically tailored (including persuasion, representation, counseling and negotiating) to different audiences. Able to understand the essentials of speech in some non-standard dialects. Has difficulty in understanding extreme dialect and slang, also in understanding speech in unfavorable conditions, for example through bad loudspeakers outdoors. Can discern relationships among sophisticated listening materials in the context of broad experience. Can follow unpredictable turns of thought readily, for example, in informal and formal speeches covering editorial, conjectural and literary material in any subject matter directed to the general listener.

Listening 4+ (Advanced Professional Proficiency, Plus) Increased ability to understand extremely difficult and abstract speech as well as ability to understand all forms and styles of speech pertinent to professional needs, including social conversations. Increased ability to comprehend native speakers using extreme nonstandard dialects and slang, as well as to understand speech in unfavorable conditions. Strong sensitivity to sociolinguistic and cultural references. Accuracy is close to that of the well-educated native listener but still not equivalent.

Listening 5 (Functionally Native Proficiency) Comprehension equivalent to that of the well-educated native listener. Able to understand fully all forms and styles of speech intelligible to the well-educated native listener, including a number of regional and illiterate dialects, highly colloquial speech and conversations and discourse distorted by marked interference from other noise. Able to understand how natives think as they create discourse. Able to understand extremely difficult and abstract speech.

(Interagency Language Roundtable, ILR Listening Skill Scale, n.d.)

Appendix B: ILR Reading Skill Level Descriptions

R-0: Reading 0 (No Proficiency) No practical ability to read the language. Consistently misunderstands or cannot comprehend at all.

R-0+: Reading 0+ (Memorized Proficiency) Can recognize all the letters in the printed version of an alphabetic system and high-frequency elements of a syllabary or a character system. Able to read some or all of the following: numbers, isolated words and phrases, personal and place names, street signs, office and shop designations. The above often interpreted inaccurately. Unable to read connected prose.

R-1: Reading 1 (Elementary Proficiency) Sufficient comprehension to read very simple connected written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript. Can read either representations of familiar formulaic verbal exchanges or simple language containing only the highest frequency structural patterns and vocabulary, including shared international vocabulary items and cognates (when appropriate). Able to read and understand known language elements that have been recombined in new ways to achieve different meanings at a similar level of simplicity. Texts may include descriptions of persons, places or things: and explanations of geography and government such as those simplified for tourists. Some misunderstandings possible on simple texts. Can get some main ideas and locate prominent items of professional significance in more complex texts. Can identify general subject matter in some authentic texts.

R-1+: Reading 1+ (Elementary Proficiency, Plus) Sufficient comprehension to understand simple discourse in printed form for informative social purposes. Can read material such as announcements of public events, simple prose containing biographical information or narration of events, and straightforward newspaper headlines. Can guess at unfamiliar vocabulary if highly contextualized, but with difficulty in unfamiliar contexts. Can get some main ideas and locate routine information of professional significance in more complex texts. Can follow essential points of written discussion at an elementary level on topics in his/her special professional field. In commonly taught languages, the individual may not control the structure well. For example, basic grammatical relations are often misinterpreted, and temporal reference may rely primarily on lexical items as time indicators. Has some difficulty with the cohesive factors in discourse, such as matching pronouns with referents. May have to read materials several times for understanding.

R-2: Reading 2 (Limited Working Proficiency) Sufficient comprehension to read simple, authentic written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript on subjects within a familiar context. Able to read with some misunderstandings

straightforward, familiar, factual material, but in general insufficiently experienced with the language to draw inferences directly from the linguistic aspects of the text. Can locate and understand the main ideas and details in material written for the general reader. However, persons who have professional knowledge of a subject may be able to summarize or perform sorting and locating tasks with written texts that are well beyond their general proficiency level. The individual can read uncomplicated, but authentic prose on familiar subjects that are normally presented in a predictable sequence which aids the reader in understanding. Texts may include descriptions and narrations in contexts such as news items describing frequently occurring events, simple biographical information, social notices, formulaic business letters, and simple technical material written for the general reader. Generally the prose that can be read by the individual is predominantly in straightforward/high-frequency sentence patterns. The individual does not have a broad active vocabulary (that is, which he/she recognizes immediately on sight), but is able to use contextual and real-world cues to understand the text. Characteristically, however, the individual is quite slow in performing such a process. Is typically able to answer factual questions about authentic texts of the types described above.

R-2+: Reading 2+ (Limited Working Proficiency, Plus) Sufficient comprehension to understand most factual material in non-technical prose as well as some discussions on concrete topics related to special professional interests. Is markedly more proficient at reading materials on a familiar topic. Is able to separate the main ideas and details from lesser ones and uses that distinction to advance understanding. The individual is able to use linguistic context and real-world knowledge to make sensible guesses about unfamiliar material. Has a broad active reading vocabulary. The individual is able to get the gist of main and subsidiary ideas in texts which could only be read thoroughly by persons with much higher proficiencies. Weaknesses include slowness, uncertainty, inability to discern nuance and/or intentionally disguised meaning.

R-3: Reading 3 (General Professional Proficiency) Able to read within a normal range of speed and with almost complete comprehension a variety of authentic prose material on unfamiliar subjects. Reading ability is not dependent on subject matter knowledge, although it is not expected that the individual can comprehend thoroughly subject matter which is highly dependent on cultural knowledge or which is outside his/her general experience and not accompanied by explanation. Text-types include news stories similar to wire service reports or international news items in major periodicals, routine correspondence, general reports, and technical material in his/her professional field; all of these may include hypothesis, argumentation and supported opinions. Misreading rare. Almost always able to interpret material correctly, relate ideas and "read between the lines," (that is, understand the writers' implicit intents in text of the above types). Can get the gist of more sophisticated texts, but may be unable to detect or understand subtlety and nuance. Rarely has to pause over or reread general vocabulary. However, may experience some difficulty with unusually complex structure and low frequency idioms.

R-3+: Reading 3+ (General Professional Proficiency, Plus) Can comprehend a variety of styles and forms pertinent to professional needs. Rarely misinterprets such texts or

rarely experiences difficulty relating ideas or making inferences. Able to comprehend many sociolinguistic and cultural references. However, may miss some nuances and subtleties. Able to comprehend a considerable range of intentionally complex structures, low frequency idioms, and uncommon connotative intentions, however, accuracy is not complete. The individual is typically able to read with facility, understand, and appreciate contemporary expository, technical or literary texts which do not rely heavily on slang and unusual items.

R-4: Reading 4 (Advanced Professional Proficiency) Able to read fluently and accurately all styles and forms of the language pertinent to professional needs. The individual's experience with the written language is extensive enough that he/she is able to relate inferences in the text to real-world knowledge and understand almost all sociolinguistic and cultural references. Able to "read beyond the lines" (that is, to understand the full ramifications of texts as they are situated in the wider cultural, political, or social environment). Able to read and understand the intent of writers' use of nuance and subtlety. The individual can discern relationships among sophisticated written materials in the context of broad experience. Can follow unpredictable turns of thought readily in, for example, editorial, conjectural, and literary texts in any subject matter area directed to the general reader. Can read essentially all materials in his/her special field, including official and professional documents and correspondence. Recognizes all professionally relevant vocabulary known to the educated non-professional native, although may have some difficulty with slang. Can read reasonably legible handwriting without difficulty. Accuracy is often nearly that of a well-educated native reader.

R-4+: Reading 4+ (Advanced Professional Proficiency, Plus) Nearly native ability to read and understand extremely difficult or abstract prose, a very wide variety of vocabulary, idioms, colloquialisms and slang. Strong sensitivity to and understanding of sociolinguistic and cultural references. Little difficulty in reading less than fully legible handwriting. Broad ability to "read beyond the lines" (that is, to understand the full ramifications of texts as they are situated in the wider cultural, political, or social environment) is nearly that of a well-read or well-educated native reader. Accuracy is close to that of the well- educated native reader, but not equivalent.

R-5: Reading 5 (Functionally Native Proficiency) Reading proficiency is functionally equivalent to that of the well-educated native reader. Can read extremely difficult and abstract prose; for example, general legal and technical as well as highly colloquial writings. Able to read literary texts, typically including contemporary avant-garde prose, poetry and theatrical writing. Can read classical/archaic forms of literature with the same degree of facility as the well-educated, but non-specialist native. Reads and understands a wide variety of vocabulary and idioms, colloquialisms, slang, and pertinent cultural references. With varying degrees of difficulty, can read all kinds of handwritten documents. Accuracy of comprehension is equivalent to that of a well-educated native reader. (Interagency Language Roundtable)

(Interagency Language Roundtable, ILR Reading Skill Scale, n.d.)

Appendix C: ILR Speaking Skill Level Descriptions

Speaking 0 (No Proficiency) Unable to function in the spoken language. Oral production is limited to occasional isolated words. Has essentially no communicative ability.

Speaking 0+ (Memorized Proficiency) Able to satisfy immediate needs using rehearsed utterances. Shows little real autonomy of expression, flexibility or spontaneity. Can ask questions or make statements with reasonable accuracy only with memorized utterances or formulae. Attempts at creating speech are usually unsuccessful. **Examples:** The individual's vocabulary is usually limited to areas of immediate survival needs. Most utterances are telegraphic; that is, functors (linking words, markers and the like) are omitted, confused or distorted. An individual can usually differentiate most significant sounds when produced in isolation but, when combined in words or groups of words, errors may be frequent. Even with repetition, communication is severely limited even with people used to dealing with foreigners. Stress, intonation, tone, etc. are usually quite faulty.

Speaking 1 (Elementary Proficiency) Able to satisfy minimum courtesy requirements and maintain very simple face-to-face conversations on familiar topics. A native speaker must often use slowed speech, repetition, paraphrase, or a combination of these to be understood by this individual. Similarly, the native speaker must strain and employ real-world knowledge to understand even simple statements/questions from this individual. This speaker has a functional, but limited proficiency. Misunderstandings are frequent, but the individual is able to ask for help and to verify comprehension of native speech in face-to-face interaction. The individual is unable to produce continuous discourse except with rehearsed material. **Examples:** Structural accuracy is likely to be random or severely limited. Time concepts are vague. Vocabulary is inaccurate, and its range is very narrow. The individual often speaks with great difficulty. By repeating, such speakers can make themselves understood to native speakers who are in regular contact with foreigners but there is little precision in the information conveyed. Needs, experience or training may vary greatly from individual to individual; for example, speakers at this level may have encountered quite different vocabulary areas. However, the individual can typically satisfy predictable, simple, personal and accommodation needs; can generally meet courtesy, introduction, and identification requirements; exchange greetings; elicit and provide, for example, predictable and skeletal biographical information. He/she might give information about business hours, explain routine procedures in a limited way. and

state in a simple manner what actions will be taken. He/she is able to formulate some questions even in languages with complicated question constructions. Almost every utterance may be characterized by structural errors and errors in basic grammatical relations. Vocabulary is extremely limited and characteristically does not include modifiers. Pronunciation, stress, and intonation are generally poor, often heavily influenced by another language. Use of structure and vocabulary is highly imprecise.

Speaking 1+ (Elementary Proficiency, Plus) Can initiate and maintain predictable face-to-face conversations and satisfy limited social demands. He/she may, however, have little understanding of the social conventions of conversation. The interlocutor is generally required to strain and employ real-world knowledge to understand even some simple speech. The speaker at this level may hesitate and may have to change subjects due to lack of language resources. Range and control of the language are limited. Speech largely consists of a series of short, discrete utterances. **Examples:** The individual is able to satisfy most travel and accommodation needs and a limited range of social demands beyond exchange of skeletal biographic information. Speaking ability may extend beyond immediate survival needs. Accuracy in basic grammatical relations is evident, although not consistent. May exhibit the more common forms of verb tenses, for example, but may make frequent errors in formation and selection. While some structures are established, errors occur in more complex patterns. The individual typically cannot sustain coherent structures in longer utterances or unfamiliar situations. Ability to describe and give precise information is limited. Person, space and time references are often used incorrectly. Pronunciation is understandable to natives used to dealing with foreigners. Can combine most significant sounds with reasonable comprehensibility, but has difficulty in producing certain sounds in certain positions or in certain combinations. Speech will usually be labored. Frequently has to repeat utterances to be understood by the general public.

Speaking 2 (Limited Working Proficiency) Able to satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements. Can handle routine work-related interactions that are limited in scope. In more complex and sophisticated work-related tasks, language usage generally disturbs the native speaker. Can handle with confidence, but not with facility, most normal, high-frequency social conversational situations including extensive, but casual conversations about current events, as well as work, family, and autobiographical information. The individual can get the gist of most everyday conversations but has some difficulty understanding native speakers in situations that require specialized or sophisticated knowledge. The individual's utterances are minimally cohesive. Linguistic structure is usually not very elaborate and not thoroughly controlled; errors are frequent. Vocabulary use is appropriate for high- frequency utterances. but unusual or imprecise elsewhere. **Examples:** While these interactions will vary widely from individual to individual, the individual can typically ask and answer predictable questions in the workplace and give straightforward instructions to subordinates. Additionally, the individual can participate in personal and accommodation-type interactions with elaboration and facility; that is, can give and understand complicated, detailed, and extensive directions and make non-routine changes in travel and accommodation arrangements. Simple structures and basic grammatical relations are typically controlled;

however, there are areas of weakness. In the commonly taught languages, these may be simple markings such as plurals, articles, linking words, and negatives or more complex structures such as tense/aspect usage, case morphology. passive constructions, word order, and embedding.

Speaking 2+ (Limited Working Proficiency, Plus) Able to satisfy most work requirements with language usage that is often, but not always, acceptable and effective. The individual shows considerable ability to communicate effectively on topics relating to particular interests and special fields of competence. Often shows a high degree of fluency and ease of speech, yet when under tension or pressure, the ability to use the language effectively may deteriorate. Comprehension of normal native speech is typically nearly complete. The individual may miss cultural and local references and may require a native speaker to adjust to his/her limitations in some ways. Native speakers often perceive the individual's speech to contain awkward or inaccurate phrasing of ideas, mistaken time, space and person references, or to be in some way inappropriate, if not strictly incorrect. **Examples:** Typically the individual can participate in most social, formal, and informal interactions, but limitations either in range of contexts, types of tasks or level of accuracy hinder effectiveness. The individual may be ill at ease with the use of the language either in social interaction or in speaking at length in professional contexts. He/she is generally strong in either structural precision or vocabulary, but not in both. Weakness or unevenness in one of the foregoing, or in pronunciation, occasionally results in miscommunication. Normally controls, but cannot always easily produce general vocabulary. Discourse is often incohesive.

Speaking 3 (General Professional Proficiency) Able to speak the language with sufficient structural accuracy and vocabulary to participate effectively in most formal and informal conversations in practical, social and professional topics. Nevertheless, the individual's limitations generally restrict the professional contexts of language use to matters of shared knowledge and/or international convention. Discourse is cohesive. The individual uses the language acceptably, but with some noticeable imperfections; yet, errors virtually never interfere with understanding and rarely disturb the native speaker. The individual can effectively combine structure and vocabulary to convey his/her meaning accurately. The individual speaks readily and fills pauses suitably. In face-to-face conversation with natives speaking the standard dialect at a normal rate of speech, comprehension is quite complete. Although cultural references, proverbs and the implications of nuances and idiom may not be fully understood, the individual can easily repair the conversation. Pronunciation may be obviously foreign. Individual sounds are accurate: but stress, intonation and pitch control may be faulty. **Examples:** Can typically discuss particular interests and special fields of competence with reasonable ease. Can use the language as part of normal professional duties such as answering objections, clarifying points, justifying decisions, understanding the essence of challenges, stating and defending policy, conducting meetings, delivering briefings, or other extended and elaborate informative monologues. Can reliably elicit information and informed opinion from native speakers. Structural inaccuracy is rarely the major cause of misunderstanding. Use of structural devices is flexible and elaborate. Without searching for words or phrases, the individual uses the language clearly and relatively naturally to elaborate

concepts freely and make ideas easily understandable to native speakers. Errors occur in low-frequency and highly complex structures.

Speaking 3+ (General Professional Proficiency, Plus) Is often able to use the language to satisfy professional needs in a wide range of sophisticated and demanding tasks. **Examples:** Despite obvious strengths, may exhibit some hesitancy, uncertainty, effort or errors which limit the range of language-use tasks that can be reliably performed. Typically there is particular strength in fluency and one or more, but not all, of the following: breadth of lexicon, including low- and medium-frequency items, especially socio-linguistic/cultural references and nuances of close synonyms; structural precision, with sophisticated features that are readily, accurately and appropriately controlled (such as complex modification and embedding in Indo-European languages); discourse competence in a wide range of contexts and tasks, often matching a native speaker's strategic and organizational abilities and expectations. Occasional patterned errors occur in low frequency and highly-complex structures.

Speaking 4 (Advanced Professional Proficiency) Able to use the language fluently and accurately on all levels normally pertinent to professional needs. The individual's language usage and ability to function are fully successful. Organizes discourse well, using appropriate rhetorical speech devices, native cultural references and understanding. Language ability only rarely hinders him/her in performing any task requiring language; yet, the individual would seldom be perceived as a native. Speaks effortlessly and smoothly and is able to use the language with a high degree of effectiveness, reliability and precision for all representational purposes within the range of personal and professional experience and scope of responsibilities. Can serve as an informal interpreter in a range of unpredictable circumstances. Can perform extensive, sophisticated language tasks, encompassing most matters of interest to well- educated native speakers, including tasks which do not bear directly on a professional specialty. **Examples:** Can discuss in detail concepts which are fundamentally different from those of the target culture and make those concepts clear and accessible to the native speaker. Similarly, the individual can understand the details and ramifications of concepts that are culturally or conceptually different from his/her own. Can set the tone of interpersonal official, semi-official and non-professional verbal exchanges with a representative range of native speakers (in a range of varied audiences, purposes, tasks and settings). Can play an effective role among native speakers in such contexts as conferences, lectures and debates on matters of disagreement. Can advocate a position at length, both formally and in chance encounters, using sophisticated verbal strategies. Understands and reliably produces shifts of both subject matter and tone. Can understand native speakers of the standard and other major dialects in essentially any face-to-face interaction.

Speaking 4+ (Advanced Professional Proficiency, Plus) Speaking proficiency is regularly superior in all respects, usually equivalent to that of a well educated, highly articulate native speaker. Language ability does not impede the performance of any language-use task. However, the individual would not necessarily be perceived as culturally native. **Examples:** The individual organizes discourse well. employing functional rhetorical speech devices, native cultural references and understanding.

Effectively applies a native speaker's social and circumstantial knowledge; however, cannot sustain that performance under all circumstances. While the individual has a wide range and control of structure, an occasional nonnative slip may occur. The individual has a sophisticated control of vocabulary and phrasing that is rarely imprecise, yet there are occasional weaknesses in idioms, colloquialisms, pronunciation, cultural reference or there may be an occasional failure to interact in a totally native manner.

Speaking 5 (Functionally Native Proficiency) Speaking proficiency is functionally equivalent to that of a highly articulate well-educated native speaker and reflects the cultural standards of the country where the language is natively spoken. The individual uses the language with complete flexibility and intuition, so that speech on all levels is fully accepted by well-educated native speakers in all of its features, including breadth of vocabulary and idiom, colloquialisms and pertinent cultural references. Pronunciation is typically consistent with that of well-educated native speakers of a non-stigmatized dialect.

(Interagency Language Roundtable, ILR Speaking Skill Scale, n.d.)