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RHETORIC OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY MAKING: THE "IDEOLOGY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT" AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK OF BRAZIL DURING 1956 - 1958

The Ohio State University PH.D. 1985

RHETORIC OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING: THE "IDEOLOGY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT" AND ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK OF BRAZIL DURING 1956 - 1958

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

John Michael Lopez, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1985

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To Shelley, whose venturesome

spirit makes our odyssey possible

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CHAPTER I

LATIN AMERICAN DISCOURSE AND A RHETORIC OF BRAZILIAN POLICY-MAKING

National Development in Latin America

In the Third World no public policy issue is marked by greater urgency than that of national development. For the author, this present inquiry began when he casually observed that, in Latin America, national development is a kind of superordinate topic for political communication. Regardless of the immediate subject at hand--be it communist subversion, land reform, literacy, infant mortality, per capita income, the arts or the armed forces--explicit or implicit in the conversation operates some notion of a collective future for which Latin Americans strive and with which they judge and mark their position to the rest of the world.

The author feels that no comparable issue exists in western industrialized nations whose sense of "nationhood" is already clearly defined and accepted, with periodic revisions, as a given.[1] Furthermore, as a genre of discourse, the author would argue that historical experience distinguishes Latin American talk about development from the kind of talk which occurred in former Asian and African colonies in the Third World. While many of them were colonies as late as the mid-twentieth century most Latin American nations won their independence in the early nineteenth century. As a consequence, when

Latin Americans talk about development, they enter into a conversation which has engaged parents, grandparents and great grandparents before them. The natural impulse of every generation to scrutinize the chinks between the talk and reality of their forebearers (the "do as I say not as I do" adage) is amplified in Latin America by the region's historical failure to achieve "progress," and by the present jarring incongruity between the ideals, models, laws of the nation, and the institutions and practices which constitute the day-to-day experience of its citizens.

Reflect for a moment on the historical experience of Latin America. With colonization, there was transplanted in the new world a part of the Middle Ages--a Catholic, corporate, Iberic, patrimonial and feudal society. For three hundred years, Spain jealously cloistered its dominions from the intellectual and social developments of Protestant Europe. With independence (1810-1825) came an opening to the political ideals and models of a world which the liberals admired and emulated. Most states adopted constitutions patterned after the United States. The constitutions embodied ideals and forms of political action entirely foreign to the historical experience of the colonies such as separation of powers, federalism, states rights, bicameralism, etc. Although the liberals wanted the free exercise of political rights which had been denied them by imperial Spain, they instituted, after the Iberic tradition of exclusionary (rather than participatory) government, policies which consolidated power and authority in themselves.

It is unfortunate that the institutions and laws imported by the fathers of Latin American independence did not root firmly in the new republics. The ideals of the French Revolution--liberty, equality and fraternity--were plants of an entirely different cultural climate and did not thrive in the colonies. However, those imports which survived did so in forms which upset the "ecological balance" holding in tension individual and group roles in society.

It would be possible in general terms to analyze Latin American political and economic systems in terms of the unexpected products of the intrusion of European or North American positivism, populism, communism, fascism and free enterprise liberalism.[2] Each could be scrutinized for the progressive development of a "split personality" characteristic of Latin America which is derived from the fact that the theories, models and forms of governance do not fit the exigencies of actual practice. For example, the proverbial political instability of the region (since independence twenty Latin American republics have had no fewer than 190 constitutions) might be explained as attempts to reconstitute government charters alternately to reflect more adequately national institutions and practices, and to emulate the values and ideals of those developed nations which served as models.

Portuguese Experience

In contrast to the rest of Latin America there were few early shifts in Brazilian dogma or direction that constituted dramatic change. Brazil was transformed effortlessly from colony to empire with

the unexpected arrival of the royal house of Braganza in 1808. In 1821 while many of their Spanish neighbors were fighting to expel the crown from their lands Brazilians rallied in defense of their native monarch Dom Pedro I (1822-1831) against the intrusive meddling from Portugal.

The benevolent rule of Dom Pedro II (1841-1889) is noteworthy for its economic and social anamolies. Dom Pedro was a monarch with republican sentiments; he ruled a rural agricultural society in which he banned slave trade (1850) and yet tolerated slavery (until 1888). The ability to harmonize conflicting elements, to bend principles to match the exigency of the situation was to Gilberto Freyre the genius of Brazilians by which they subdued a wilderness, and through which practice they have built a peaceful progressive society.[3] Perhaps the Brazilian assimilation of eclecticism, which encouraged the uncritical synthesis of religious and philosophical ideals, permitted the juxtaposition of contradictories in personal and national experience.

In the mid-nineteenth century, however, positivism, a philosophical doctrine which stressed the efficacy of exact sciences to promote material development significantly shaped the military elite's expectation for change that must certainly follow the aging Dom Pedro II. The army was a significant force in establishing the First Republic (1889-1930). Throughout the First Republic European theories of racial and climactic determinism drew attention to the ways in which Brazil differed from the developed nations, and created, in the elite, an uneasiness regarding nationhood that required clarification. In the Second Republic (1945-1964) economic and sociological

theories of national development created a similar need for discourse.

Recognition of a separation between ideals and practice and of a divorce between the model of governance and the actual political, economic and social conditions provoked Octavio Paz in his book, El laberinto de la soledad, to say:

> The liberal and democratic ideology, far from expressing our concrete historical situation, obscures it. The political lie installed itself almost constitutionally among our countries. The moral damage has been incalculable and reaches into deep layers of our character. Lies are something we move in with ease. During more than one hundred years we have suffered regimes of brute force, which were at the service of feudal oligarchies, but utilized the language of liberty.[4]

The pervasive perception of the existence of planes of thought and of action which only remotely coincide constitutes a fundamental characteristic of Latin American experience.[5] Such dualism creates ambiguity about the national situation. Ambiguity forms a backdrop for the discussion of national issues. Consequently, discussions of individual questions in public policy, consciously or otherwise, become a means of meeting the need to clear up, reconcile, explain and remedy the intrusive and intuitive fact of Latin American underachievement and underdevelopment.

Economic Nationalism in Brazil

Getulio Vargas, the most important figure in modern Brazil, seized power on November 3, 1930. In the coup d'etat which ended the First Republic Vargas was supported by state militias of Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais, which opposed the installation of a president from Sao Paulo in contravention to an agreement

between the three states governing the succession of the chief executives. Getulio Vargas emerged as a political strongman who, with the support of the army, forcefully acted to quell social and political disorder which attended the economic crisis brought on by the depression collapse of foreign markets.

Getulio Vargas' term as supreme executive of Brazil spans twenty-four years and can be more appropriately referred to as an era (1930-1954). During this period Vargas continuously ruled Brazil with the exception of five years during which General Eurico Dutra served as President (1945-1951). Vargas was government caretaker from 1930-1934. In 1934 he was elected by constituent assembly to a four-year term of office under provisions of the Constitution of 1934. On November 10, 1937, Vargas forestalled, by military coup, the election which was destined to replace him. From 1937 to 1945 he ruled Brazil extra-constitutionally in the authoritarian Estado Novo. Although deposed by the army in 1945 to make way for Brazilian "redemocratization," Vargas returned to power briefly as a popularly elected president in 1951. Vargas ended his final and tempestuous term of office by committing suicide on August 24, 1954. It was during the second half of the long Vargas era that economic nationalism emerged in a deliberate policy of industrialization.

During the First Republic coffee had been the primary source of national income. However, combined with the depression collapse of world demand for coffee the Brazilian coffee valorization policy produced "spontaneous" growth in domestic industries. In the second half of the Vargas era this "spontaneous" development became a

deliberate policy of import-substitution industrialization. Government security needs during World War II prompted the creation of a national steel industry at Volta Redonda. The model community which was constructed at Volta Redonda represented the government's attempt to reshape Brazil through social as well as economic policy. The controversy over Petrobras, the national petroleum industry, in Vargas' final term significantly contributed to public disorder which may have led to his untimely death.

Brazilian Policy-Making, 1946-1964

Between 1946 and 1964, Brazilian chief executives struggled to chart a clear course in national development policy. Profound political and economic change complicated their task. The Constitution of 1946 reopened democracy after a sixteen-year lapse. The participation of new groups and individuals in the polity, especially in the direct popular election of the President, resulted in new sources of power which destabilized political processes. The rise of populism was marked by a corresponding concern over the prosecution of "true" democracy. This opening in political participation was accompanied by dramatic economic change. From the late nineteen forties until the early half of the nineteen sixties, the Brazilian economy changed substantially. Agriculture's share in the gross domestic product decreased from 27 percent in 1947 to 22 percent in 1961, while industry's share increased from 21 percent to 34 percent.[6] Meanwhile growth in gross national product averaged 6 percent a year, three times that of other Latin American countries.

During this period, foreign exchange problems and domestic inflation frequently interrupted prosperity and created an overwhelming public anxiety regarding the issue of "national development." In addressing this issue, Brazilian presidents had to arbitrate between groups, classes and regions over the equitable division of anticipated benefits resulting from "development." Also policies which attempted to protect "national interest" were frequently seen as incompatible with capitalism, and, therefore, within the cold war climate which gripped the west in the 50's and 60's, communist-inspired.

From 1951 to 1964 five presidents attempted to wrest control of national policy within difficult and complex circumstances. Each one faced internecine party strife, an unruly press, bureaucratic and administrative inertia, unrest among civil servants, workers or students, leftist agitation, restive military, resistance of powerful regional groups, and a constitutional deadlock between legislative and executive branches of government. Of the five administrations, four were cut short and the chief executives failed to complete their five-year term of office. Getulio Vargas (1951-1954) committed suicide on August 24, 1954 upon receiving a manifesto signed by thirty generals demanding that he resign. In the malaise which followed caretaker President Joao Cafe Filho was deposed on November 22, 1955. Janio Quadros (January 31 - August 24, 1961) abruptly quit. Quadros' resignation thrust the presidency upon Vice President Joao Goulart, a man about whom the military had profound reservations because of his associations with organized labor. The political and economic malaise of the Goulart administration ended when he was deposed by military coup, April 2, 1964.

Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1956-1961), unlike Vargas, Quadros and Goulart, completed his term of office. Furthermore, national development policy during his tenure was remarkably coherent and effective. By most objective standards his policies and administration achieved herculean goals for economic growth. Among them, he realized in concrete and steel the utopian dream of generations of Brazilians for the new inland capital, Brasilia. Brazil experienced unparalleled economic growth during his administration.

> Industrial production grew 80 percent; steel, 100 percent; mechanical industries, 123 percent; transportation equipment, 600 percent . . . . The rates [of growth] during the Kubitschek administration were nothing short of spectacular.[7]

Nevertheless, few Brazilian Presidents assumed office under less auspicious circumstances than did Juscelino Kubitschek. His election and his installation in the Catete Palace were followed by a military countercoup and rebellion. Opposition parties worked strenuously to decertify the election because allegedly illegal communist votes led to Kubitschek's slim margin of victory. The military was deeply divided over the true nature of Kubitschek's election. Many called it "false democracy" while others referred to it as genuine and "legal" by constitutional process.

Approaches to the Kubitschek Administration

Given such circumstances and considering the dismal failures of other nations and administrations to promote a coherent and effective policy of national development, the Kubitschek government stands apart as worthy of study. Many fine scholarly investigations

have made "tracks" into the history, economic conditions, and public administration of the era, each of which offers a partial explanation of the success of the Kubitschek era. Often I found myself walking in the steps of very able searchers who preceded me. As a rhetorical critic, however, I found myself attracted to the idea that national development policy-making which aims at significant structural change could be profitably linked to the idea that language-directed perceptions mediate social continuity and change. As a consequence I selected as my point of entry into the historical narratives of the era the function and role of the "ideology of national development."

"Ideology of National Development"

The "ideology of national development" could be regarded as an intellectual doctrine, as a vocabulary of motives, and as a social movement. In public discourse it marked the emergence of a Brazilian national identity which focused attention on economic determinates of development.[8] Helio Jaguaribe gives an insightful historical analysis in his essay entitled "The Dynamics of Brazilian Nationalism." He states:

> [T]his new awareness was shown both in the actions of its leaders and in the expansion and steady sophistication of economic and social studies. Brazil now realized that she was an underdeveloped country, that her structure was in transition, and still bearing the stigmata of semi-colonialism. Alongside this growth of economic sophistication there arose a desire to plan things properly, a will to adopt rapid, but soundly conceived, measures to overcome this underdevelopment by a policy of systematic and concentrated investment in the infrastructure and in basic industries. This was the moment of birth of conscious Brazilian nationalism.

> The period from 1945 to 1960 constitutes a remarkable leap forward in the joint evolution of the nation and of the national self-awareness. From the traditional, naive outlook which typified the Dutra government (1945-1951) to the acute awareness and firm deliberation shown by the second Vargas government (1951-1954) in reshaping the structure of Brazilian society, and to the decisive and systematic approach of the Kubitschek government (1955-1961), was after all but a few years' span. Nevertheless, in this very brief period the country did more to develop an understanding of itself and to bring about a planned and effective change in its own structure than in the whole of its previous history.[9]

From Jaguaribe's account we can infer that the "ideology of national development" was associated with the emergence of "realizations," "desires," and "consciousness" promoting the "decisive and systematic approach of the Kubitschek government to . . . planned and effective change." This study proceeds on the assumption that the "ideology of national development" might be a fruitful place to find language-directed perceptions mediating social continuity and change. It also proceeds on the hunch that those language-directed perceptions might be seen in action while examining the policy-making process which aimed at "planned . . . effective change." However, with what or whom was the "ideology of national development" associated.

ISEB

The "ideology of national development" was commonly viewed as the intellectual product of a semi-official public policy institute, the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (ISEB). ISEB was also the most significant scholarly source of national development theory during the Kubitschek era.

ISEB was a self-governing unit under the Ministry of Education. Frank Bonilla remarked that "the desire to bring the knowledge of

social science systematically to bear on the analysis of Brazil's present situation and prospects for growth in perhaps ISEB's most notable contribution."[10] The Institute was comprised of seven faculty and offered a year-long graduate-level course.[11] Bonilla continues:

> ISEB . . . unquestionably shaped the thinking of a substantial number of importantly placed Brazilians through its extensive publications, course, and public lectures. [The] course . . . primarily open to middle government functionaries and military officers covers five major fields: economics, sociology, political science, history and philosophy.[12]

Herminio Martins corroborates Bonilla's assessment of the strategic position which ISEB occupied in the intellectual and social movement called "desenvolvimentismo" ("developmentalism"), or "nacionalismo desenvolvimentista" ("developmental nationalism").[13] Like Jaguaribe, Martins locates the full flower of this movement with the Kubitschek administration.

> The intellectual gestation period of the movement can be traced back to the late forties and early fifties. Its theoretical and ideological endeavours [sic], although appearing in print from 1953, came to fruition mainly during and after the Kubitschek Presidency (1956-1961). The systematic thinking through the whole problematic structure of Brazilian development stemmed basically from the same reading of the national situation as the Kubitschek economic policy of rapid industrialization "at all costs" and operational time-compression ("fifty years of progress in five.")[14]

Finally, in their own documents ISEBianos confess the object of their scholarly effort to apply "the categories and data of these sciences to the analysis and critical understanding of Brazilian reality"[15] was the "elaboration of an ideology of our development. Contributing the formulation of this ideology we believe ourselves to be partially completing the common work of liberating Brazil."[16]

President Kubitschek's policy actions and messages are a likely place to catch the operations of language-directed perceptions mediating social continuity and change. Martins' statement cited above joins "Kubitschek's economic policy" with the national development movement which ISEB significantly shaped. Who was this man and what were his major policies?

President Kubitschek

Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira trained as a physician in his home state of Minas Gerais. Upon graduation from medical school he received a medical appointment as captain in the Minas Gerais State Military Police. In 1932, he was part of the Pro-Vargas military force which suppressed the Sao Paulo uprising. It was while serving out his military commission that Kubitschek began his political career. He attracted the attention of Benedito Valedares, whom Vargas installed as federal governor in Minas Gerais. Valedares in turn appointed Kubitschek delegate to the Constituent Assembly of 1934. He served as federal congressman through 1937. In 1940 Valedares named Kubitschek mayor of Belo Horizonte, the capital of Minas Gerais. While mayor Kubitschek developed the luxurious Pampulha section of the city with the assistance of the young architect, Oscar Niemeyer. Oscar Niemeyer and Lucio Costa later did most of the architectural work for Brasilia. In 1950 Kubitschek won governorship of Minas Gerais campaigning on what he called the "Binomino"--his promise to improve energy and transportation sectors of the state economy by building dams and roads.

In January 1955, five months after the death of Getulio Vargas, Kubitschek became presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Party and the Brazilian Labor Party (PSD and PTB). To many military groups and the right wing National Democratic Union (UDN) Kubitschek represented a continuance of the Vargas regime which had dominated Brazil since 1930. Kubitschek campaigned in the face of military opposition and scandalmongering. He enthusiastically and optimistically hailed Brazil's destiny for national greatness. He campaigned on a five-point program for national development called the Programa de Metas, which in addition to public works in energy and transportation sectors, proposed government projects in education, food production and communication. Although the new inland capital, Brasilia, was not initially part of the national development program (and not announced publicly until December 31, 1956) he later referred to it as a "meta-synthesis," that in which the thirty targets of the Programa de Metas culminated.[17]

Two other policy initiatives of the Kubitschek regime are noteworthy. In 1958 Kubitschek announced Operation Pan America. The OPA might be interpreted as a hemispheric self-help program designed to attract international funds needed to finance Kubitschek's ambitious national development projects. The OPA was a significant precursor to Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. The second policy initiative which Kubitschek initiated in 1959 was a North East regional development agency, the Superintendency for the Development of the North East, or SUDENE. This regional planning and development agency initially may have been the price Kubitschek had to pay to induce the

substantial block of Northeastern states in the legislature to cooperate with his program of national development. However, a major drought in 1958 and other factors combined to give SUDENE a significant life of its own. Within all of these initiatives Kubitschek viewed his role in policy-making as popularizer of ideas. In his autobiographical account, Por Que Construi Brasilia, Kubitschek states:

> One of the characteristics of my style of government was always that of legitimizing (fazer sancionar), by popular sentiment, my political initiatives. I threw out an idea, but before implementing it, I went preaching it throughout the country, until all the population understood and approved of it. I acted in this manner with the "Programa de Metas," with the "Politica de Desenvolvimento," with the "Movimento de Pacificacao Nacional" and finally I was repeating this technique in the initiation of the "Operacao Pan-Americano."[18]

Objects for Research and Possible Findings

Jaguaribe, Martins and Bonilla observed the coincidence of a significant shift in policy action, a broad-based social and intellectual movement, and the role of a public policy institute, ISEB, in creating "Ideology of national development." Kubitschek confesses his own role in national policy-making was the creation of general understanding and acceptance. The concurrence of these parties in policy-making accounts for the objects of this project announced in the title "The 'Ideology of National Development' and President Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira's administration of Brazil." The selection of ISEB, as chief source for development theory of the era and President Kubitschek, the chief executive and popularizer of development programs, suggests that this project will explore policy-making

links which may have existed between them. The discovery of any such ties would present the historical value of this project. An analysis of their interrelationships in policy-making, to the degree it informs the persuasion and consensus necessary at all levels of the political process, would yield the rhetorical significance of this study. However, the value of this project for communication theory lies in testing and refining a model of large-scale social symbolizing. This project contributes a case study which, combined with others, might ultimately result in communication-based theories guiding public policy research.

Description: "Rhetoric of . . . Policy-Making"

This study is a response to a challenge which William R. Brown presented in a recently published article, "The History of Public Address in an Age of Information."[19] In the article Brown redefines the object of rhetorical criticism formerly called "The History of American Public Address" to accommodate the current "generalization-emphasizing version of 'information'"[20] which is dominant in modern social science. To that purpose Brown suggests that new historical critical models be devised that utilize "communication dynamics [which] inform the ordering of materials and the inferences drawn from them."[21] This can be accomplished by a

> . . . version of communication as the true engine of history. That is to say, the way in which the past will be made usable lies in seeing that, within broad physical constraints, models of human symbol-sharing can best account for what appear to be the intrusive, intuitive (and therefore "stubborn") "facts" of events contributing to continuity and change in human affairs. . . . [S]uch

> a conception of information-age, public-address history will increasingly become an observational science akin to that of communication theory by seeking generalizations about the substance and process of human communications, across time and unique situations.[22]

On the basis of generalizations derived from such studies Brown foresees the emergence of a new wave of communication historians and social critics whose collective efforts would result in "policy studies analogous to economic policy research . . . [in which] our writers begin to point strategies and consequences of intervention into large-scale social symbolizing."[23] I consider the "Rhetoric of National Development Policy: The 'Ideologia de desenvolvimento nacional' and Kubitschek Administration: 1956-1958," a case study contributing to that end.

Brown's communication-based version of history features the integration of event and context under the rubric of shared-symbol-as-social-dynamic. Within communication-based versions of history are two types of studies. Brown makes a distinction between substance-stressing narratives of communication history and process-stressing ones. Substance-stressing narratives feature social continuity and change under the aegis of reified symbols. In regard to a history of reification Brown states:

> three points require emphasis. First, traces of hypostatized need must be detected in the discourse itself and, as much as possible, process explanations be inferred from them . . . . Next, the historian will keep the inquiring eye on human action in two senses: that of reification, obviously, but also on that behavior itself prompted by any reality-created-by-the-name.[24]

Process-stressing narratives "not only . . . illumine the sequence of events under study but also . . . test and validate, revise, or

discard the interpretation-generating model."[25] Where does this project fit in Brown's schemata of communication-based history?

In the first section of this chapter I suggested that policy-making behavior might be interpreted as emanating from a hypostatized need to clear up, reconcile and remedy the "national situation" vis a vis other nations held as model. One might, therefore, essay to chart policy action in Latin America by featuring the persistence and variations of reified name, "national development." An endeavor of this nature would conform to Brown's substance-stressing historical narrative--"[P]ublic address historians could . . . take as their province a history of reified symbols."[26] Along with "narrative accounts of reified abstractions like 'honor' in the ante-bellum South"[27] one might give attention to the various reifications of "development" in Latin America. There exists in Thomas Skidmore's Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought an excellent parallel in intellectual history to the kind of substance-stressing communication study of reified symbol and social continuity and change.[28] For sake of illustration, here follows a short review.

Thomas Skidmore's excellent monograph describes Brazilian racial ideology between 1889 and 1914. Prior to 1888, the year in which slaves were emancipated, race was relatively unemphasized in Brazilian discourse. Presumably, "servitude" not "negritude" was the criteria by which emancipationists selectively perceived and judged Brazil. However, in 1889, with the fall of the empire and the founding of the First Republic the Brazilian elite needed new

ideologies which could clarify ambiguities resulting from the deposition of monarchy and slavery. Along with republicanism and positivism (from which originated Brazil's "Order and Progress" motto) there immigrated to Brazil European theories of racial determinism. While accepting the ideology of white supremacy clarified the role which former slaves were to occupy in the new social "Order," it challenged the Brazilian elite to examine their own racial heritage. Was Brazil's racially mixed society indeed doomed to "inferiority," incapable of progress, modernization or personhood? Here Skidmore's analysis of a wide range of elite communications reveals an amazing language-mediate selective perception of the ambiguous national situation which is a close parallel to those occasions when the "half empty" glass of water is suddenly seen as "half full." In this monograph Skidmore isolates what he calls the "whitening" concept. Mulattoes and other mixed groups were seen by the elite as being steadily assimilated through "natural selection" into a culturally superior and physically white Brazil until the nation emerges "pure and beautiful as in the Old World."[29]

The black-to-white "whitening" perception is an outstanding example of the agency of language to shape cultural, social and political events. To modern eyes, race relation in Brazil 1889-1914 is seen as one sequel in the long series of social repressions. The most charitable modern interpretation of the "whitening concept" is to view it as a quaint and curious form of "self-deception." These modern attitudes toward race relations, however, obscure an important point which distinguishes the communication historian from the

intellectual historian. The communication historian does not permit the immediacy of the criterion--skin color--by which "underdevelopment" was reified to detract his attention from behavior, "created-by-the-name." The point is that in our own day a less salient, less immediate criterion, say Samuel Huntington's "institutionalization," likewise "deceives" by heightening some aspects of the national situation over others and reveals opportunities for organization and action not realized in "national development" defined by other criteria. The grist for the communication historian's mill is the reifications of "development" in terms of successive ideological criteria.

This project, however, is not a public address history which stresses various reifications of "national development." Rather this study stresses the process by which an intellectual version of "national development" gained ascendency in conjunction with Kubitschek's symbol strategies to facilitate policy-making. In order to reveal the strategic nature of large-scale symbolizing I attempt to conceptualize and integrate "needs cycles," "power cycles" and "attention-switching" mechanisms which underlie the Brazilian policy-making process and perhaps explain some of the distinctive features and accomplishments of the Kubitschek era.[30] Consequently, this study more readily conforms to Brown's description of a process study which, in his words, "not only . . . illumine the sequence of events under study but also . . . test and validate, revise, or discard the interpretation-generating model."[31]

Research Question

The question guiding this research project is: Can Brazilian national development policy-making of the Kubitschek era be modeled in ways which reveal language-directed perceptions mediating social continuity and change?

Plan and Data

Chapter II is a retrospective literature survey of English sources which features Latin America, mass media and national development. This chapter is significant to the research question by revealing some of the contexts and forces which have, in the past, shifted attention to various reifications of "development" guiding North American research in Latin America. This chapter spans fifty years of research and actively reviews over one hundred articles, texts and reports.

Chapter III of this project surveys prominent sources on policy-making during the Kubitschek era with the purpose of discovering first, what were the significant figures, events, and issues of Brazilian policy-making, and second, how policy agents organized themselves. The object of this chapter is to discover the individuals and groups whose statements in some way lead or follow behavior relevant to policy-making. Primary sources for this chapter are Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930-1964, An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), and John D. Wirth, The Politics of Brazilian

Development, 1931-1954 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970).

Chapter IV of this project adopts Brown's model found in the unpublished article "Toward a Complementary Version of Rhetorical Vision Theory" to Brazilian policy-making. The object of this chapter is to model agents and agencies discovered in Chapter III in terms of roles derived from Brown's theory of "ideology as communication process." Assuming that "the creation and communication of ideology proceed together" one can demonstrate that the creation and communication of national development policy during an era distinguished by prominent ideological activity likewise 'proceeded together.'" Of particular significance to this project are the roles which ISEB and Kubitschek occupied in the elaboration of both policy and ideology. For historical information on ISEB I am indebted to a series of articles published by Nelson Werneck Sodre jointly entitled "Historia do ISEB" which appeared in the journal Temas de Ciencias Humanas in 1977 and 1978.[32] For a synthesis of ISEBiano thought I found helpful the book by Caio Navarro de Toledo ISEB: Fabrica de ideologias, 2nd. ed. (Sao Paulo, Editora Atica, 1978). Wherever possible I used original articles and texts (of which I possess many) published by ISEB. [33] Among them Helio Jaguaribe's Condicoes Institutionais do Desenvolvimento (Rio: ISEB, 1958) was particularly useful in isolating the substantive content of ISEB's "ideology of national development."

Chapter V employs the Brown-adopted model to analyze a speech which Kubitschek gave May 26, 1956. The speech and communications surrounding it characterize large scale social symbolizing of the first four months of the Kubitschek administration. The communication model of national policy-making informs language strategies of various groups and individuals struggling to shape the "national situation" in ways condusive to their own interests. The speech illustrates the operation of administrative strategies which arose in tandem with creation and acceptance of new roles entailed in technocratic government planning. Considered in terms of the first half of the Kubitschek administration the speech and model reveal the contervailing ideas, roles and groups which the ideology of national development held in dynamic tension until mid-1958. The tensions creating and constraining opportunities for policy action are, in the Brown-adopted model, keyed to periodic reverses in communication trends. Hundreds of hours were spent in reading and translating Kubitschek's speeches in search of the message and accompanying events which encapsulated Kubitschek's symbol strategies on a scale broad enough to characterize his administration. Kubitschek's speeches have been compiled by year and published by the Departamento de Imprensa Nacional under the title Discursos. I made use of Kubitschek's autobiographies, wherever possible, to context events.[34] Particularly helpful was Albert O. Hirschman's case study of the Brazilian North East, found in his book Journeys Toward Progress, Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963). Celso

Lafer, Octavio Ianni, and Jorge Gustavo da Costa were helpful in assessments of government planning and public work projects during the Kubitschek years.[35]

Chapter VI is an evaluation of model strengths and weaknesses in relation to tasks to reveal communication strategies which parallel the policy-making process and to discover language-directed perceptions mediating social continuity and change. The chapter attempts to validate, revise or discard the interpretation-generating model which is anticipated in Chapters II and III, formulated in Chapter IV and tested in Chapter V. The chapter includes a summary of findings and suggestions for future research.

Translations from Portuguese texts are my own unless indicated otherwise. The ISEB-Kubitschek collaboration in national development policy ended in 1958. In 1958 a dispute on development strategy caused a schism in the Institute. Also in that year the term "national development" disappeared from Kubitschek's public speeches. Consequently this study features the "ideology of national development" from 1956 to 1958 and not through 1961, which would constitute the entire administration of President Juscelino Kubitschek.

ENDNOTES

[1]Louis K. Harris and Victor Alba, The Political Culture and Behavior of Latin America (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1974), p. 104. "Latin American nationalism is not of the European variety, which is an aggressive affirmation of an already existent and complete nationhood . . . . It is a psychological, emotionalized attitude born out of the lack of nationhood. In Europe, the right wing is nationalistic and the left wing less so. In Latin America nationalism is leftist because it entails changes which are unavoidable in order to form nations from what, up to now have been territories only."

[2]Ibid., pp. 40-51.

[3]Gilberto Freyre, Order and Progress, edited and translated by Rod W. Horton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1920.)

[4]Octavio Paz, El laberinto de la soledad, 2nd. ed. (Mexico: Fundo de Cultural Economica, 1959), pp. 110-111. Cited in Albert O. Hirschman, "Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America" in Latin American Issues--Essays and Comments edited by Albert O. Hirschman (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 3-42.

[5]Howard J. Wiarda, "Political Culture and National Development: In Search of a Model for Latin America," Latin American Research Review 13 (Winter 1978): 261-266.

[6]Werner Baer, Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1965), p. 1.

[7]E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 335.

[8]See E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, A Historical Survey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

[9]Helio Jaguaribe, "The Dynamics of Brazilian Nationalism" in Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 167, 168.

[10]Frank Bonilla, "A National Ideology for Development: Brazil" in Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development edited by K. H. Silvert (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 238, 239.

[11]The executive director was Roland Corbisier. Chairman of the philosophy department was Alvaro Vieira Pinto. Chairman of the history department was Candido Antonio Mendes de Almeida. Also in history was Nelson Werneck Sodre. The political science department was chaired by Helio Jaguaribe Gomes de Mattos. Alberto Guerreiro Ramos occupied the chair of the sociology department. Ewaldo Correa Lima was chairman of the economics department.

[12]Bonilla, "Ideology," p. 238.

[13]Herminio Martins, "Ideology and Development: 'Developmental Nationalism' in Brazil" in Latin American Sociological Studies edited by Paul Halmos, Review Monograph 11 (Keele: Keele University, 1967), p. 153.

[14]Ibid., p. 154.

[15]Decreto 37608 in the July 14 1955 Diario Oficial cited in K. H. Silvert, editor Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 235. This is the founding decree of ISEB.

[16]Introducao aos Problemas Brasileiros (Rio: ISEB, 1956), p. 1. This statement of purpose was found in the introduction of ISEB's first text, published in the first quarter of 1956.

[17]Juscelino Kubitschek, Por Que Construi Brasilia (Rio: Bloch Editores, 1975), p. 42.

[18]Ibid., p. 160.

[19]William R. Brown, "The History of Public Address in An Age of Information" Central States Speech Journal (Winter 1982), p. 234.

[20]Ibid., pp. 227, 228.

[21]Ibid., p. 228.

[22]Ibid., p. 229.

[23]Ibid., p. 234.

[24]Ibid., p. 232.

[25]Ibid., p. 234.

[26]Ibid., p. 230.

[27]Ibid., p. 231.

[28]Thomas E. Skidmore, Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

[29]Ibid., p. 37.

[30]For this project I adopt to the service of Brazilian policy-making a model which Brown devised to narrate the history of race relations in the United States. Brown describes the integrated working of three communication subsystems, "needs," "power" and "attention-switching" in the course of societal change and development. Periodic reversals in communication trends governed by these sub-systems prevent vicious cycles which otherwise would result in the disintegration of meaning, organization and motivation by which societies sustain themselves and adopt to change.
William R. Brown, "Toward a Complementary Version of Rhetorical Vision Theory," unpublished paper, circa 1981.

[31]Brown, History, p. 234.

[32]Nelson Werneck Sodre, "Historia do ISEB: 1. Formacao" I no. 1 (1977), pp. 101-119; "Historia do ISEB: 2. Crise" I no. 2 (1977), pp. 119-143; "Historia do ISEB: 3. Fechamento" I No. 4 (1978), pp. 69-91.

[33]See Bibliography of ISEB Sources.

[34]Juscelino Kubitschek, Por Que Construi Brasilia (Rio: Bloch, 1975). Juscelino Kubitschek, Meu Caminho para Brasilia 3 volumes: A Experiencia da Humildade 1974, A Escala Politica, 1976, Cinquenta Anos em Cinco, 1978 (Rio: Bloch Editores).

[35]Jorge Gustavo da Costa, Planejamento Governamental a Experiencia Brasileira (Rio: Fundacao Getulio Vargas, 1971). Octavio Ianni, Estado e Planejamento Economico no Brasil (Rio: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1971). Celso Lafer, "The Planning Process and the Political System in Brazil: A Study of Kubitschek's Target Plan--1956-1961." Cornell University Ph.D., 1970.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES COMMUNICATION RESEARCH OF "DEVELOPMENT" IN LATIN AMERICA

A search of communication journals and dissertation abstracts reveals little information under headings "Latin America" or "policy communication." Conversely, social science reference sources cite an overwhelming plethora of information on "national development," much of which features roles of communication in Latin American national development. In this "famine" or "feast" predicament I chose, as my survey strategy, to begin with journalism as the most likely ancestor to present day communication scholars interested in Latin American national development. From journalism, mass media and communication theory I move to political science, rural sociology and policy science only as necessary to chart the origins of development theory appearing in journalism and communication sources. Wherever possible I attempt to identify some of the contexts and forces which have, in the past, shifted attention to various reifications of "development" guiding United States research in Latin America. A project of this magnitude is admittedly speculative. The likelihood of some mis-emphasis in the narration of research trends exists, but should be credited to the particular sequence of discovery implied by the research strategy and not to any deliberate oversight.

United States Communication Studies in Latin America: 1931 through 1970

Journalistic Perspective: the Ethics and Institutions of Democracy

From the beginning, United States journalists have noted a clash of journalistic ethics and the Latin temperament and have exhibited a Yankee preoccupation with technology, technique and growth.[1] Underlying most of the usually descriptive early articles and reports was a commitment to constitutional guarantees for personal liberty and freedom of the press.[2] Generally, these democratic motives became more explicit following the advent of World War II when a free press was regarded as a safeguard for democracy.[3] Since democracy and political development were regarded as synonymous, the media was regarded as exerting a beneficient developmental or democratic influence in Latin American nations. This abiding journalistic perspective complemented the prevailing political science paradigm guiding early comparative politics. Political scientists used a "formal-legal" criterion to measure political development by comparing constitutions, laws and government organs. Concurrently, journalists wrote about the exercise of constitutional provisions for a free press.[4]

Sociological Perspective: Media Systems and Modernization

Before 1950, journalists who assessed newspapers and political systems in Latin America tacitly linked communication with development.

In the mid 1950's while communication science was maturing within the United States, sociology and political science shaped a field of discourse in which communication was a prime mover in the process of national development.[5]

In 1958 Daniel Lerner published The Passing of Traditional Society; Modernizing the Middle East.[6] In it he links media systems and a historic pattern of Western European modernization.

> . . . increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has increased media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic and political participation.[7]

He asserted that predominant communication systems act as an organon for other broad sectors of national life. Combining these two premises, he arrived at a typology by which stages of development could be identified and measured. In traditional or underdeveloped nations an oral system of communication predominates while in modern states a media system is dominant. Oral systems are exclusively face-to-face and person-agent networks with no intervening media channels. Media systems include print and other technically developed channels of communication such as newspapers, radio, cinema and television. Across society oral and media communication systems tend to organize different kinds of social organization identified with traditional and modern nation types, as follows:

Table 1

	oral [traditional]	media [modern]
socio-economic	rural-agricultural	urban-industrial
cultural	illiterate	literate
political	designative	electoral

Daniel Lerner's grand theory of communication and development suggested two levels of inquiry which were subsequently refined by political scientists. On the level of national systems Lerner suggested there was a statistically significant correlation between types of media systems and other broad demographic variables such as literacy, urbanization, education and political participation. This suggested fertile ground for statistical characterization between regions.[8] It also provided a convenient "handle" for political scientists attempting to chart mass political behavior in newly developed countries.[9]

On the individual level, the second area of inquiry, Lerner describes the process of modernization as a deeply personal affair which requires a change in national personality from "old" ways of thinking and acting to "new" ones. On this level, media exposure functions to facilitate the psychological transformation of traditional peasants. For example, in a formerly isolated Turkish village, film and radio opened new worlds of information and presented new models for life. The media provided alternatives to tradition-bound life-ways and freed receivers to identify, if they so chose, with broader national or international patterns of life. An expectation of progress, a propensity for growth, an openness to change were all characteristics of the "psychic mobility" which Lerner held was the first step toward modernity. Lerner implied these characteristics were engendered by media exposure.

Political scientists who were attracted by the power of new media, especially radio, to elicit participation from greater segments

of populations in national economic and political life became concerned with problems attending the "personality" transformation of masses. They wished to understand the psychological processes by which individuals react to new pictures of what life can be in order to avoid xenophobic nationalism and to foster leadership which could set responsible standards of conduct for the citizenry. This concern resulted in studies of national personality and political culture.[10]

In summation, while very few articles were published within the field of communication during the 1950's Daniel Lerner and subsequent sociologists and political scientists identified the communication system of developing countries as "both index and agent of change in a total social system."[11]

Foreign Policy Imperative: Modernization and Political Development

On January 1, 1959 the United States hegemony over the Americas was shattered by the Cuban revolution. The threat to American security imposed by the existence of a Soviet satellite a mere ninety miles off the Florida coast made Latin America a premiere region for United States foreign policy action in the early 1960's. In an attempt to block further Communist encroachment in the hemisphere, President Kennedy imposed a program of accelerated social and economic development. This program, called the "Alliance for Progress," he presented before Congress and representatives of Latin American governments on March 31, 1961. One area of the Alliance, the United States Agency for International Development (AID), had an annual budget of approximately

700 million dollars for 1963 and 1964.[12] The circumstance and funds, in part, account for the burgeoning of communication-oriented studies in Latin America in the 1960's.

The communication studies of the 1960's can be grouped roughly into two overlapping groups. First, there were numerous articles which consciously refined and tested the Lerner hypothesis that communication served as an "index and agent" of national development. Second, there was a group of articles which transferred communication research rationales developed in the United States--i.e., media effects, functions, information-seeking, and the two-step-flow paradigms of societal communication--to a Latin American setting. Studies of the second type are distinguished from the first by the absence of any formal theoretical link between communication and development. However, in varying degrees they approach problems of national development suggested by other disciplines. For example, political scientist Samuel Huntington regarded the progression from traditionalism to modernization as "the best framework for analyzing Latin American politics."[13] Three of four major research interests which Huntington identified were easily coopted by communication researchers. They included mass mobilization, in which communications exerts significant influence, elite broadening, which among other things entails the diffusion and flow of information, and the development of institutions including the media industry.[14]

Communication Studies Attacking Development Problems

Taking the second of these two groups first, I would like to proceed by listing some of the assumptions which function as a context

for the articles that have a developmentalist framework and follow with questions which apparently guided research. For sake of readability I will reserve full bibliographic information of articles to the endnotes.

Assuming mass media confronts underdeveloped nations with new information and new life patterns and that these images possess some latent modernizing virtue, what are they? How useful are these images in fostering international understanding and cooperation?[15] Supposing mass media exposure of Latin American opinion leaders and journalistic elite is strategic to the circulation of information and the spread of modern values, what is the media use of these groups?[16] Within those groups what factors correlate with modern values?[17] What factors influence the Latin American journalist?[18] And more broadly, what institutions foster and support the professionalization of journalists and the modernization of mass media in Latin America?[19]

Presuming media systems evolve together with their social and political settings (from traditional to modern participational structures), what relationships, if any, exist between a free press and other demographic and political variables?[20] Assuming media exposure facilitates the adoption of modern attitudes and practices, what media do different groups attend which might facilitate communication strategies?[21] During political crises, what are the functions of the mass media in modernizing transitional countries?[22] Presuming literacy and education facilitate national development and these attitudes and skills can be transmitted through radio and television,

what programs and technologies are available in executing a public policy of national development.[23]

Studies Positing Communication-Generated Development Processes

During the 1960's many communication research tools and designs which had been developed in the United States were directed toward Latin America. In the articles I have cited above there was no grand theory which subsumed both the process of national development and the process, effects, uses and functions of the mass media. Consequently, the underlying problems which these articles addressed were exogenous to the theories guiding research questions and designs. A second group of articles during this decade tested and refined Daniel Lerner's hypothesis that communication served as the "index and agent" of national development.

That mass communication is an agent for modernization was the consensus of several articles. Paul J. Deutschmann attempted a "snap shot" of the inexorable "world-wide communications revolution" by studying the shift of media systems in a small Andean village in Colombia.[24] His research hypothesis was that

> certain prior characteristics of individuals . . . prepare them to receive mass communications, and that upon receiving mass messages certain changes in knowledge, beliefs, aspirations and behavior occur.[25]

The antecedents or predisposing variables were those suggested by Daniel Lerner; they included "education level (literacy and years of school), family size, and age." Consequent or possible "effects" variables included knowledge and adoption of agricultural and medical innovations, aspirations for children and political knowledge.

Deutschmann concluded that peasants with high media exposure correlated with both predisposing variables and consequent modernizing practices and attitudes.

Everett M. Rogers explored the same hypothesis with greater conceptual candor and clarity in his study of five Colombian peasant communities. His conclusions described mass media as a causal nexus between antecedent and consequent variables. He states:

> Of five antecedent variables studied, cosmopoliteness, measured by the number of trips to urban centers, and functional literacy were most highly related to mass media exposure . . . , years of education and social status were consistently positively related . . . , age was consistently negatively related.
>
> Among the consequent variables, empathy, agricultural innovativeness, home innovativeness, political knowledge and educational aspirations for children were most highly related to mass media . . . .
>
> Thus we have seen that mass media exposure leads to certain consequences, generally indicating modernization . . . .[26]

Rogers defined modernization as the adoption of certain psychological virtues tending toward greater social and economic participation, i.e., "empathy, innovativeness, political knowledge, achievement motivation, and educational and occupational aspirations."[27] While Rogers did not allude to his previous research in diffusion of innovation, it is obvious that he regarded the adoption process and social change process as identical.[28] Rather than analyze media audiences according to stages of adoption (i.e., interest, trial, evaluation, and adoption), Rogers focused his efforts on the construction of tests and measures of media exposure and national personality traits of modernity.

A study by F. B. Waisenen and Jerome T. Durlak which sampled the entire country of Costa Rica attempted a conceptual and methodological refinement of the cognitive precursors to national development. Their hypothesis stated:

> The greater the use of mass media channels and the more favorable the evaluation of these channels as sources of information, the greater the likelihood of a 'modern' view of the world. [The modern view was conceived as] self-perceived innovativeness, attitude toward risktaking, commitment to planning (and inversely related to fatalism), perception of national life conditions, educational aspiration levels for children, and readiness to accept new ideas (or adopt innovations, with attitude toward family planning as an indicator).[29]

The authors of this article dissent somewhat from Deutschmann and Rogers in their relative emphasis upon features in Lerner's paradigm for development. The article concludes that literacy and formal education may be a more significant initial determinant to psychological modernism. With "a certain amount of schooling, a point of social-psychological mobilization (or attitudinal 'take off') may occur."[30] However, after reaching the initial ignition stage, mass media functions to direct attitude changes toward modernity.

The three preceding articles were published successively from 1964 to 1967. They illustrate a progressive testing and ratification of the Lerner hypothesis. Media exposure and modernization were tested in one village, in five villages, and in an entire country. Treated with growing statistical determinance, media exposure moved from merely correlating with modernity to causing it. Together the articles represent one effort to link mass media and development under the aegis of grand theory. A second effort of the 1960's was

directed toward the integration of communication into political science theories of political development. A masterful but unfortunately solitary work in this vein was Communications and Political Development edited by Lucian W. Pye.[31] Frequently the points of integration between communication and political science were at levels of theory and analysis which were commonplace wisdom for which there was no need nor ability to test and verify.

The Passing of a Dominant Paradigm: Political Realities and Heuristic Value

In the late 1950's and early 1960's there were optimism and high hopes regarding the impact of mass communications in fostering development. However, by 1966 the millions of dollars spent in the Alliance for Progress resulted in a dismal lack of progress defined by any standard. Between 1961 and 1966 six of fourteen democratic republics in Latin America were replaced by military regimes. American military intervention in Santo Domingo (1965) and covert CIA involvement in the coup which killed Chilean President Salvador Allende (1973) had a disastrous effect upon Latin American perceptions of United States' motives in the region. Within the United States social scientists who formerly had been secure in charting the course of world development were perplexed and confounded by domestic strife surrounding the civil rights and anti-war movements. Consequently the late 1960's and early 1970's witnessed an erosion of the dominant United States model of communication and development.

The dominant United States model of communication and national development was based on the assumption, first identified by Daniel

Lerner, that media systems and mass media were the "index and agent" to modernization. In the late 1960's and early 1970's two realizations promoted the demise of this model. First, it was discovered that media-generated mass mobilization can have a disastrous effect on economic progress and political stability. Then it was discovered that the model did not recognize significant message and situation variables in the diffusion of agricultural innovations.

In 1957, Daniel Lerner optimistically described mass yearnings for greater economic and political participation as a "revolution of rising expectations." In a subsequent edition of his book The Passing of Traditional Society, he describes the unmet and increasingly persistent demands of the masses as a potential "revolution of rising frustration."[32] The function of the media to create demands for products and services associated with developed economies had several deleterious effects in developing countries. It contributed to greater social division and conflict between the thin stratum which could afford to live the modern lifestyle of "conspicuous consumption" and those strata which could not. A "want"/"get" imbalance aggravated the political demands of newly franchised masses, making them susceptible to the "transitional" disease of communism. Insistence of upper and middle classes upon modeling consumption styles of their counterparts in modern states aggravated already imbalanced national consumption/savings ratios and promoted inflation. As more national income was spent on consumption, less was devoted to investments which ultimately could break dependence upon foreign suppliers of consumer goods. An unwillingness to curtail

consumption and greater demand for foreign imports in the developing country than demand for their exports abroad created indemic inflation. In Latin America in the early 1960's inflation militated against social cohesiveness between classes. Political demands of the masses were greater than national economic or political systems would or could deliver. Facing runaway social mobilization, the Army in six of fourteen democratic nations in Latin America produced coups to preserve political order (all in the name of liberal democratic values). Consequently, among political scientists the formerly optimistic appraisals of the bottom-up pressure of social mobilization to promote development was tempered by the necessity of institution building.[33]

In 1966, John McNelly published an optimistic survey of research on communication and modernization in Latin America.[34] In it he organized research findings around four common sense propositions. One of the propositions--"the . . . [media] must contain content relevant to modernization"--inadvertently revealed a "blind spot" in the dominant communication model. The weight of research up to that time had been directed at measuring the growing media availability, use and consequent modernizing effects. McNelly's survey revealed a woeful lack of emphasis on content of media and its relevance to modernization.[35] Perhaps the beneficent modernizing influence of media content was assumed as self-evident so long as researchers focused their efforts on identifying and measuring a constellation of "modern" attitudes for which it was impossible to observe direct referents in media content. However, when the object

of research was the adoption of specific agricultural practices, "relevant content" became salient, as is evident in a set of articles by John Fett.

In 1972, John Fett analyzed the content of newspapers in the Brazilian agricultural state of Rio Grande do Sul. He found that while an ample amount of space was devoted to agricultural news, only a small proportion of the information was directly serviceable for farmers in the circulation region.[36] He suggested that journalistic education might solve this problem. In 1975, Fett expanded his concept of "situational relevance" of information to include "infrastructural factors [which] set the parameters in which an individual can make decisions and act."[37] Fett, in this article, studied the information-seeking behavior of farmers in relation to the latitude of real choices in marketing their crops. The data support the hypothesis that farmers "seek more market information for the product that they sell in the less restrictive market than they do for the product they sell in the more restrictive market."[38] Fett's conclusion marks a radical departure from previous research which somehow assumed that communication was in itself a sufficient and necessary cause for the adoption of new or modern attitudes and practices. As he put it:

> The value of information as an aid to development cannot accurately be judged through measures of sources or channels or number of receivers. For that matter, content measures alone also give no true measure of value.
>
> Information value is a function of the latitude of decision making open to a farmer in a particular situation and how well the message addresses itself to carrying out particular courses of action in that

> situation . . . . Where opportunities do not exist, communication alone can do little to make them. Where situational factors do not permit a choice of action, most peasant farmers (rationally) seek little information.[39]

Furthermore, Fett's emphasis upon the role of communication and decision making within the framework of determining structures signals the influence of Latin American theories which presently characterize the continuing debate on communication and development.

Latin American and United States Studies on Communication and Development: 1970 to the Present

Field hydrologists frequently look for physical signs to indicate peak water levels of flooding rivers or streams. The ebb and flow of intellectual movements can likewise be charted by certain physical landmarks. The 1964 publication of Wilbur Schramm's Mass Media and National Development marks a zenith of confidence and optimism regarding the modernizing influence of the mass media.[40] A consciously retrospective book (published in 1976) by Schramm and Daniel Lerner entitled Communication and Change: Ten Years Later clearly indicates a lapse of theory in the intervening decade.[41] In the following passage, Everett Rogers expressed well the consensus:

> We then thought we knew what development was, how to measure it, and what caused it . . . .
>
> Now in 1976, we look backward . . . . Government officials in most developing countries have indeed heeded our advice and sought to utilize mass media for development purposes.
>
> But little real development has occurred by just about any standard.[42]

From the late 1960's to the present, concepts of communication and

development have shifted from dominant United States models to alternative South American paradigms implying new and different roles for communication in development.

Latin American Criticism: "Who is to Blame?"

Daniel Lerner posited a worldwide historical pattern in which nations evolve through progressive stages from underdeveloped or traditional societies to developed and modern states.[43] Political scientists like W. W. Rostow and C. E. Black followed with similar stages of their own.[44] The patterns and stages suggested by these theorists presumed a universal, linear and dualistic model of development which viewed "traditional" segments of the populace inhabiting the rural agricultural regions as historically more archaic and less advanced; urban and industrial populaces were seen as imaging the nation's future. The central problem of national development entailed "catching up" backward populaces by cultivating understanding, motivation and skills which served as prerequisites to wider economic and political participation. Communication theorists saw their role in the modernization process as the disseminators of modern ideas.[45]

When, however, the best efforts of social scientists and technical advisors failed to achieve a desired effect, the model frequently attributed blame for that failure to the receivers of media messages including stubborn intransigent peasants and an emergent leadership wavering between modern practices and traditional values. In identifying these groups with the term "traditional,"

policy-makers and social scientists implicitly blamed them for the failure of development programs. Latin Americans researching the diffusion of agricultural innovations, particularly in Brazil, were first to perceive and criticize model "blindness" to situational constraints resulting from peasant decision-making.[46] The simple fact is that farmers infrequently adopted innovations when they did not own or control the land, or when there were adverse market, price, transportation, storage and credit conditions. Realization of this fact challenged the efficacy of communication to promote development.[47] Model "blindness" to infrastructural conditions created the suspicion that it likewise "missed" determining social relations which constrain communication behavior and adoption. Did the statistically aggregate groups (i.e. modernizing early adopters and tradition laggards) correspond to "real social groups in the sense of people characterized by certain specific mutual relations"?[48] If the impact of communication on the diffusion of innovations is limited by contextual features, in what way could it be said that socio-economic structures control both communication and change?[49] Regardless of the answers to these questions, they acted as pivots to shift blame for persistent underdevelopment from individuals to systems at each extension of decision-making environment: contextual, infrastructural, socio-economic and political-ideological.

Latin American Criticism: "United States Paradigms Good for Whom?"

Persistent underdevelopment in Latin America, seemingly impervious to all plans and projects to foment progress, was an embarrassing

fact which compelled explanation. Who or what was responsible for this social blight? As I noted above, Latin American researchers criticized research paradigms which attributed blame to individuals and other factors wholly within national borders. In Latin America, they emphasized, there existed structural constraints on decision-making which limited both the ability of agents to modernize their lives and nation and their responsibility for failure in development plans and projects. Furthermore, Latin American researchers claimed that social science research paradigms originating in the United States did not merely obfuscate the root causes of regional underdevelopment; in some ways they perpetuated it.

Communication research appropriate for United States conditions did not fit the very different social, economic, political and cultural setting in Latin America. When the "information" and "development benefits" gap widened (between the privileged modernizing sector and the traditional masses) in emerging nations, despite assiduous efforts to narrow the chasm, even United States researchers began to join the criticism. One observer noted:

> One of the serious errors in communication research has been the way we have gone about testing overseas generalizations based on research in the U. S. Several years of elated reports and journal articles were devoted to proving that the same generalizations applied overseas. It was only when we began to submit these generalizations to the acid test of usefulness that we found we did not have a body of useful knowledge for the development goals at hand.[50]

Perhaps communication research worked in the United States because it had evolved there and served its societal character, After all,

as P.T. Myren noted:

> What kind of society hosted these remarkable scientific experiments and advancements? Was it one burdened by poverty, afflicted by social conflict, and shaken by instability? Not at all. It was basically a prosperous, content, peaceful, and stable society . . . . It was also a society where individuality was predominant over collectivism, competition was more determinant than cooperation, and economic and technological wisdom were more important than cultural growth, social justice, and spiritual enhancement. Finally, it was a society on the brink of becoming the world's mightiest and most influential economic empire.[51]

This cultural heritage, Luis Ramiro Beltran asserted, results in a paradigmatic blindness in both eyes, an inability to perceive underlying assumptions and values of United States social science, and an insensitivity to the historical and cultural distinctions of Latin America which demands the service of another kind of science.[52]

For example, underlying the diffusion model of innovations were development assumptions which were compatible to United States historical experience. "Communication . . . can generate development . . . . [I]ncreased production and consumption of goods and services constitute the essence of development . . . . [T]he key to increased productivity is technological innovation . . . ."[53] In Latin America such assumptions masked possible consideration of the influence of socio-economic and political conditions on the goals, management, and ultimate success of development projects. They missed the issues of fair distribution of benefits and penalties associated with innovations. Seldom was technology evaluated to assess its technical quality, timeliness, cultural and social compatibility before being introduced into Latin American settings. Development

projects based on these assumptions soon demonstrated oversights costly to groups and to whole national economies.[54]

Latin American critics charged that United States communication research was essentially a science of adjustment, a tool to conform individuals to the status quo.[55] Mass media research focused on receivers' reponse to messages and not on source behavior.[56] In anti-propaganda studies during the second World War and in subsequent public relations, advertising and marketing campaigns, the patrons of communication research were those who held the political and economic power. How could communication research and Latin American media industries foster, as prelude to wider economic and political participation, more egalitarian values and relations when the power-holding elites were averse to such fundamental alteration of society?[57] It was obvious to critics that the structural constraints peculiar to Latin America and the exigencies of national development demanded the creation of new sciences, new research and new roles for communication and development.

New Sciences: Radicalism or Research?

The movement from United States' paradigms of communication and development to Latin American ones is a shift from empirically defined, methodologically rigorous social science to a more problematic, analytically intensive human science; from ostensibly objective scientific researchers to politically committed scientists. Luis Ramiro Beltran said:

> . . . the new approach stems from understanding communication integrally and dynamically as a process

> in which all components deserve comparable and undislocated attention. It also stems from the conviction that such a process is inextricably interwoven with the structure of total society and, particularly, with the economic determinants of this structure. Furthermore, it perceives communication activity in Latin America as being just as conditioned by U.S. communication interests as the overall social system of the region is dependent economically, culturally, and politically on this particular country.[58]

In this new science devoted to understanding regional and national realities, the concept of "ideology" functions to integrate communication with economic, political and social structures. Borrowing heavily from Marx and Mannheim, Latin Americans have attempted to craft sciences which can help them see their own existential situation and develop a project for national self-transformation.[59]

Among Latin American social scientists there is a consensus that there can be no such thing as ideologically free or politically neutral research. Most scientists are committed to political involvement in the service of societal change; some could be called "reform-minded," and others, "revolution-inclined." Some assume science to be in service of politics and therefore do not distinguish between scientific and political acts. Others contend that science and politics are related but different and that the "scientist should not disguise his militant convictions in scientific garment."[60] Confusion regarding the self-governing norms of science in Latin America led Luis Ramiro Beltran to contrast the suitability and reliability of United States and Latin American paradigms. On this topic he said:

> Latin American communication researchers may face the dilemma of having to choose between ideologically conservative and methodologically rigorous research on one hand and rigorous radicalism on the other.[61]

The question to which Beltran alludes is yet unresolved. Do the "new" sciences guiding Latin American efforts to find equitable and enduring development constitute genuine research or mere radicalism?

Many Latin American researchers focused their efforts on detecting the deep ideological meanings underlying apparently innocuous content formats like comic strips and soap operas. Others focused upon the United States' domination of Latin America's "culture industry" including popular magazines, advertising, television programming, school texts, news agencies, etc. They seemed driven to uncover a conspiracy of information and images which forcibly penetrated Latin American society, distorted national self-perception (and thus national potency) and legitimized an unjust and unequal concentration of power in the hands of anti-development and anti-national minorities. Viewed from this perspective, the mass media industry of Latin America was an instrument perpetrating regional underdevelopment, not a tool to remedy it.

Some United States researchers were likewise drawn to consider communication in the context of development problems. In the mid and late 1970's there were, notably, several symposiums and articles in the Journal of Communication on cultural dependency and international news networks.[62] The editorial introduction to the 1975 symposium affirms the centrality of communication to "cultural

dependency." It stated in part:

> The focus of the Winter 1974 symposium was the unequal flow of information and entertainment products around the world. The principal issue that emerged was that of a type of unequal power relationship which is neither mainly military nor just economic or political (although it may reflect all of these), but primarily communicational. That relationship creates what might be called "cultural dependencies"--countries deeply under the influence of values and images either totally extraneous to them or not representative of the needs of their majorities. Elizabeth de Cardona wrote that: "Cultural dependency means that the people of our countries have to brush their teeth three times a day even if they don't have anything to eat."[63]

Some of the articles such as Patricia Fagen's "Media in Allende's Chile," I read with genuine historical and scholarly interest for the development questions it posed. Others such as "Plaza Sesamo: 'Neutral' Language or 'Cultural Assault'?" by Rose Goldsen and Azriel Bibliowicz proved wearisome because of its caviling illustrations and polemical conclusions. That the Spanish language version of Sesame Street could not represent equally the linguistic and cultural diversity of Latin American nations does not, to me, warrant the charge that the programs "expose the continent's children to a massive cultural assault whose consequences are incalculable."[64]

The articles to which I have referred above fall roughly into an orientation toward Latin American development which political scientists call "dependencia" research.[65] While the theory of dependency (in many instances) provides a plausible explanation for conditions in Latin America, it is not easily adopted to empirical measurement and testing. The implicitly marxist stance of much of the literature makes such "experiments" far too violent and costly.

Conclusion

This chapter charts some of the contexts and forces which, in the past, have shifted attention to various reifications of "development" guiding United States research in Latin America. Prior to World War II journalists and political scientists judged Latin American "development" on the basis of ethnocentric comparisons featuring technique, institutions and laws. Following World War II United States researchers stressed universal and unilinear models of social and political development. Following the Cuban revolution attention was focused on Latin America by United States security needs. The dismal failure of the "Alliance for Progress" to improve political stability and the growth of liberal democratic values and economic prosperity disillusioned both United States and Latin American social scientists. Since then Hispanic critics have drawn attention to the poor "fit" of United States research paradigms, as cultural artifacts unsuitable to the economic, political and social realities of Latin America.

Recent articles in the Latin American Research Review state that in the last two decades political research in Latin America has been dominated by a developmentalist framework and approach.[66] The articles contribute insight into trends in development theory guiding research. These trends, I believe, carry significant implications for the role of communication in the process of social continuity and change which is called "national development." During the early to mid-1960's men like Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, W. W. Rostow, Karl

Deutsch and Samuel Huntington posited universal and unilinear models of social and political change constituting "development."[67] They employed Talcott Parsons' sociological theory of "structure-functionalism" in their attempts to chart out "patterns," "processes," and "stages" from "traditional" to "modern" societies.[68] Parsons' grand theory of societal permanence and change was based on a biologic metaphor of "organism."[69] This metaphor became the basis for systems theories of social dynamics.[70] "Organism" is a composite of interdependent subsystems capable of change within the ambit of potentiality entailed in two dynamics: first, homeostasis governs the preservation of institutional or sectorial boundaries comprising social systems, and second, transmissions occur across these boundaries. The first dynamic stresses continuity, the second features change. Within Parsons' system and those political scientists I have listed above who elaborated upon it, there is an information-stressing notion of communication in "development." "Communication" equals "information-substance" in terms of supports and demands which are circulated and exchanged across boundaries. Transmissions of "information-substance" are charted as they work their way "up" the political system and as authoritative resource and value allocations work their way "down."

Those theorists of social continuity and change, among whom we can include Daniel Lerner, were optimistic. Their models were neat and simple, but by and large naive and ethnocentric. When Latin American history failed to conform to their a priori frameworks, development theorists and social scientists began to look for

alternative explanations. With the failure of John F. Kennedy's hemispheric development program, the "Alliance for Progress" and the wretching social crises which afflicted United States' society from 1965 on--the "Dominican Invasion, Viet Nam, cities in flame and institutions under attack, Nixon, the student movement, etc."[71] optimism was replaced by disillusionment. There arose a new emphasis on "conflict theories" and "structuralist" interpretations of Latin America. Attention was drawn to the constraints on socio-political change rooted in economic power relationships. "Development" was seen as dependent upon dramatic change in national structures, for example, the redistribution of land or other factors of production. "Communication" was alternately viewed as a tool for the perpetration of unjust power relationships, or for their overthrow.

Emerging out of this too brief survey of the progressive reifications of "development" and corresponding role for "communication" is my own hypothesis that "communication" might serve not merely as a contributing factor to "national development" but as a master or controlling variable. In this conviction I am encouraged by Albert O. Hirschman's "possibilism."[72] Hirschman responds to the current pessimism in development theory which features "obstacles." The pessimism is rooted in past failures. Attempts at surmounting obstacles had failed, by both revolutionary and reformist means; hence national development is an impossibility. According to Hirschman this pessimistic analysis is caused by a crisis of imagination, by an inability to conjure intermediate or alternative "futures" in which potential for change in existing structures, including formerly perceived

"obstacles," is exploited. Managing perceptions of "obstacles" and the "possible" is, for Hirschman, the key to successful policy implementation. He states this in an article entitled "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and Quasi-Vanishing Act,"

> Finally, and most important, while our exercise points to many ways in which obtacles can be made into assets or lived with or turned, it says nothing about the ability to perceive these possibilities on the part of the policy makers in developing countries. If their ability is strictly limited, as is often the case, then this very limitation emerges as a super obstacle, which commands and conditions the existence and seriousness of the more conventional obstacles, and it can now be told that the survey here presented was really aimed at loosening the grip of this central difficulty. (emphasis mine)[73]

It is my hunch that a discursive exploration of communication strategies employed by the Kubitschek government in promoting national development policy will likewise "loosen the grip of this central difficulty" through revealing dynamics by which language-directed perceptions (including perceptions of the "possible") mediate social continuity and change.

ENDNOTES

[1]"Latin temperament, growing pains of a comparatively youthful press, underdeveloped commercial and industrial facilities, illiteracy, lack of instructive journalistic literature--these are among the handicaps of South American journalism . . . alliance to party, creed, and purpose adds vilification to the South American press and hinders progressiveness." J. Edward Gerald, "Journalism in South America: 1933," Journalism Quarterly 8 (October 1933): 302; "Moreover, objectivity is not an Argentinian trait nor a Latin." Ralph O. Nafzinger, ed., "The Foreign Press," Journalism Quarterly 17 (December 1940): 376; "A large number of lithotypes, retogravure services, faster and neater printing presses have been purchased by several leading South American newspapers . . . ." B. Cohen, "South American Journalism in 1931," Journalism Quarterly 8 (September 1931): 429.

[2]". . . unhindered freedom is to be found only as an exception, for everywhere the wishes of the authorities in control of the government are carried out." Ibid., p. 430; "The bondage of the press to political parties has shown no appreciable improvement." J. Edward Gerald, "Journalism in South America: 1933," Journalism Quarterly 10 (October 1933): 302.

[3]"The characteristic process by which a dictator rids himself of a free press is in its last stage today in Argentina." Joseph F. Kane, "The Totalitarian Pattern in Peron's Press Campaign," Journalism Quarterly 28 (Spring 1951): 237.

[4]"Today, however, the government seems intent upon observing the seventh article of the Federal Constitution which provides that writing and publishing on all subjects is inviolable, that no law nor authority can establish prior censorship, and that freedom of the press has no other limitation except respect for private life, morality, and the public peace." Alfonso Argudin, "Mexican Press is Attaining Influence and Stability," Journalism Quarterly 24 (June 1947): 138. See also Simon Hochberger, "IAPA [the Inter-American Press Association] and the Search for Freedom," Journalism Quarterly 34 (Winter 1957): 80-85.

[5]In the 1950's there was an amazing paucity of articles on mass media in Latin America. Three of five articles which appeared in the decade were written by Marvin Alinsky. His earliest article, "Radio's Role in Mexico: A First-Hand Survey" is significant as the

first cogent discussion of national development through public education by radio. Journalism Quarterly 31 (Winter 1954): 66-72. Citizenship training through media institutions was a theme largely ignored until the 1964 publication of Wilbur Schramm's Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964). Alinsky was one of the first to integrate descriptions of regional media systems with political, social and economic conditions. See his "The Mass Media in Central America," Journalism Quarterly 32 (Fall 1955): 479-486. See also Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "The Press of Uruguay: Historical Setting, Political Shadings," Journalism Quarterly 29 (Fall 1952): 437-446.

[6]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society; Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958).

[7]Ibid., p. 46.

[8]For Latin American treatment see Paul J. Deutschmann and John T. McNelly, "Characteristics of Latin American Countries," The American Behavioral Scientist 8 (September 1964): 25-29.

[9]See article by Karl W. Deutsch, "Social mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961): 430. "Social mobilization" was a statistically refined concept to reveal the erosion of "major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments . . . [permitting the adoption of the new]." Phillips Cutright tested the reliability of "social mobilization" for 77 nations against indicies of education, economic status, communication systems, urbanization, etc., and concluded that ". . .communication and not economic development, urbanization or education best accounts for the political development of a nation" in "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," American Sociological Review 28 (April 1963): 260.

[10]For representative works on national personality and political culture see respectively, Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). A representative statement of this concern can be found in the forward of Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 13. "In most new countries there is the massive problem of trying to awaken the bulk of the people to new ideas and to the potentialities of new techniques, without at the same time producing crippling tension and deep psychological frustration and anxieties."

[11]Daniel Lerner, "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," Behavioral Science 2 (October 1957): 266-275.

[12]J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 200, 203. The purposes of the "Alliance" which influenced communication research in the region included: the improvement and strengthening of democratic institutions (See for example Mary A. Gardner, "The Inter-American Press Association: A Brief History," Journalism Quarterly 42 (Summer 1965): 547-556 and J. Laurence Doy, "How CIESPAL Seeks to Improve Latin American Journalism," Journalism Quarterly 43 (Autumn 1966): 526-530; the acceleration of economic and social development (See F. B. Waisanen and Jerome T. Durlak, "Mass Media Use, Information Source Evaluation and Perceptions of Self and Nation," Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (Fall 1967): 398-406.); the encouragement of agrarian reform (See Everett M. Rogers, "Mass Media Exposure and Modernization among Colombian Peasants," Public Opinion Quarterly 29 (Winter 1965): 614-625.); and the stimulation of private enterprise (See Waisanen and Lassey study cited in John T. McNelly, "Mass Communication and the Climate for Modernization in Latin America," Journal of Inter-American Studies 8 (1966): 355.

[13]Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[14]The fourth major research interest which Huntington identified was interest articulation, i.e. the input function of political parties and interest groups in the political systems.

[15]See John C. Merrill, "The Image of the United States in Ten Mexican Dailies," Journalism Quarterly 39 (Spring 1962): 203-209; Wayne Wolfe, "Images of the United States in the Latin American Press," Journalism Quarterly 41 (Winter 1964): 79-86; Paul R. Hoopes, "Content Analysis in Three Argentine Dailies," Journalism Quarterly 42 (Autumn 1966): 534-537.

[16]Paul Deutschmann, John McNelly and Huber Ellingsworth, "Mass Media Use by Sub Elites in 11 Latin American Countries," Journalism Quarterly 38 (Autumn 1961): 460-472; Huber Ellingsworth, "Broadcast Use by a Latin American Professional and Technical Group," Journal of Broadcasting 7 (Spring 1963): 173-181.; and Huber W. Ellingsworth and Paul J. Deutschmann, "Book Readership by a Sub-elite Latin American Group," Journal of Communication 14 (December 1964): 238-244.

[17]J. Laurence Doy, "The Latin American Journalist: A Tentative Profile," Journalism Quarterly 45 (Autumn 1968): 509-515.

[18]Jack McLeod and Ramona R. Rush, "Professionalization of Latin American and U.S. Journalists," and "Professionalization of Latin American and U.S. Journalists: Part II," Journalism Quarterly 46 (Autumn and Winter 1969): 583-591 and 784-789.

[19]Mary A. Gardner, "The Inter-American Press Association: A Brief History," Journalism Quarterly 42 (Summer 1965): 547-556; and J. Laurence Doy, "How CIESPAL Seeks to Improve Latin American Journalism," Journalism Quarterly 43 (Autumn 1966): 525-530.

[20]Raymond B. Nixon, "Factors Related to Freedom in National Press Systems," Journalism Quarterly 37 (Winter 1960): 13-28; Mary A. Gardner, "The Press of Honduras: A Portrait of Five Dailies," Journalism Quarterly 40 (Winter 1963): 75-82. For relationship of regional press to national systems see Marvin Alinsky and Paul R. Hoopes, "Argentina's Provincial Dailies Reflect Neutralism of Mass Media in Country's Political Crisis," Journalism Quarterly 45 (Spring 1968): 95-98.

[21]R. Vincent Farace, "Local News Channel Preferences in Puerto Rico," Journalism Quarterly 45 (Winter 1968): 692-697. The study investigates the media use of food consumers, producers and retailers indexed to age, education and income.

[22]Jonathan P. Lane, "Functions of the Mass Media in Brazil's 1964 Crisis," Journalism Quarterly 44 (Summer 1967): 297-306.

[23]Daniel T. Lowry, "Broadcast's Expanding Social Role in Mexico," Journalism Quarterly 46 (Summer 1969): 332-336.

[24]Paul J. Deutschmann, "The Mass Media in an Underdeveloped Village," Journalism Quarterly 40 (Winter 1963): 27-35.

[25]Ibid., p. 28.

[26]Everett M. Rogers, "Mass Media Exposure and Modernization among Colombian Peasants," Public Opinion Quarterly 29 (Winter 1965): 624-625.

[27]Ibid.

[28]See Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962). Rogers' model was widely used by rural sociologists and agricultural economists in attempts to upgrade

agricultural practices in third world nations.

[29]F. B. Waisanen and Jerome T. Durlak, "Mass Media Use, Information Source Evaluation, and Perceptions of Self and Nation," Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (Fall 1967): 400-401.

[30]Ibid., p. 406. Significantly the analogy of "take off" point in national development was borrowed from Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Rostow pointed 5 stages to national development: (a) traditional society, (b) the preconditions for take off, (c) take off, (d) the drive for maturity, and (e) high mass consumption. See pp. 4-12.

[31]Lucian Pye, ed., Communication and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Research Council, chaired by Gabriel A. Almond.

[32]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. vii.

[33]With reference to Latin America see Samuel A. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[34]John T. McNelly, "Mass Media and the Climate for Modernization in Latin America," Journal of Inter-American Studies 8 (1966): 345-347. He concludes by saying the studies reviewed support the proposition that mass communication not merely accompanies economic, political and social change but potentially exerts creative force "to accelerate all aspects of development," p. 357.

[35]The modernizing content of the media is obviously self-evident, he states. "Systematic content analysis of the mass media in Latin America are scarce, but even a casual reader of Latin American newspapers can note the remarkable proportion of news stories dealing with plans for housing projects, dams, industries, new schools and government reorganization and other aspects of modernization . . . . Much of the content in the other media . . . is obviously designed to inform or persuade people about various kinds of modernization." Ibid., p. 347.

[36]John Fett, "Content and Situational Relevance of Agricultural News in Brazilian Papers," Journalism Quarterly 49 (Autumn 1972): 505-511.

[37]John Fett, "Situational Factors and Peasants' Search for Market Information," Journalism Quarterly 52 (Autumn 1975): 429-435.

[38]Ibid., p. 433.

[39]Ibid., p. 435.

[40]Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the Developing Countries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

[41]Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner, eds., Communication and Change: Ten Years Later (Honolulu: University of Hawaii East-West Press, 1976). As the title suggests, the book includes a retrospective critique of a text jointly edited by the authors ten years earlier. See Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, eds., Communication and Change in Developing Countries (Honolulu: East-West Press, 1967).

[42]Everett Rogers, "New Perspectives on Communication and Development: Overview," Communication Research 3 (April 1976): 99.

[43]". . . Increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has increased media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wide economic and political participation." Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society; Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958), p. 46.

[44]Rostow, perhaps the best known, postulated five stages: (a) traditional society, (b) the preconditions for take off, (c) take off, (d) the drive for maturity, and (e) high mass consumption. See Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 4-12. Though Mr. Black was more aware of cultural differences between countries, listing seven patterns for modernization, he maintained all nation-states pass through four stages: (a) traditional society challenged by modernity, (b) the consolidation of modernizing leadership, (c) economic and social transformation and (d) the integration of a modern society. See Cyril Edwin Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 67, 28.

[45]For example, "Development is a type of social change in which new ideas are introduced into a social system in order to produce higher per capita incomes and levels of living through more modern production methods and improved social organization" in Everett M. Rogers and L. Svenning, 'Modernization Among Peasants," The Impact of Communications (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

[46]In Guaracai, a municipio of Sao Paulo, Echeverria Martins found farmers who owned land adopted innovations more than renters and sharecroppers. Echeverria Martins, Difusao de novas praticas agricolas e adocao por pequenos agricultores no municipio de Guaracai (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Piracicaba Report, 1967).

In Timbauba and Esmeraldas in north-east Brazil Dias Bordenave and Fonseca demonstrated that socio-economic conditions were more significant than psychological factors in the search for instrumental information and subsequent adoption of innovations. J. Diaz Bordenave, "The Search for Instrumental Information Among Farmers in the Brazilian Northeast" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966); L. Fonseca, "Information Patterns and Practice adoption among Brazilian Farmers" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966).

Often external constraints are internalized when coercive structures penetrate minds and hearts. In Cajamarca, Peru, Mejia confirmed a hypothesis that tenant farmers most likely to profit from land reform were negative to the change. Mejia concluded that dependent individuals frequently do not establish horizontal communications, finding more security in the maintenance of relations to power holders on top (the patron). P. Mejia, MA Thesis from Universidad Agravia de La Molina, Lima, Peru. See also G. Quesada, "Patron-dependence, Communication Behavior, and the Modernization Process" (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University). All the above sources cited in Juan Diaz Bordenave, "Communication of Agricultural Innovations in Latin America; the Need for New Models," Communication Research 3 (April 1976).

[47]"Communication is a complementary factor to modernization and development . . . it can have little effect unless structural changes come first to initiate the development process." J. E. Grunig, "Communication and the Economic Decision-Making Processes of Colombian Peasants," Economic Development and Cultural Change 19 (July 1971): 597.

[48]The entire quote follows: "It would not be difficult to show that hundreds of projects were carried out without at all considering the question whether the individuals, from whom the researchers took their samples, formed real social groups in the sense of people characterized by certain specific mutual relations," in E. W. Hofstee, "Development and Rural Social Structure," Sociologia Ruralis 8 (1968): 243.

[49]"The role and effect of communication is dictated by the larger structure . . . . The manner and rate with which new technology is adopted cannot be interpreted independently from the social and economic system where that technology is introduced." H. Feltehausen, "Conceptual Limits of Development Communications Theory," paper presented at Association for Education in Journalism, Columbia, S.C., 1971, pp. 5, 7.

[50]P. T. Myren, "Comments on the Beltran and Colle Papers," in Cornell-CIAT International Symposium on Communication Strategies for Rural Development (Ithica, NY: Cornell University, Institute for International Agriculture, 1974), p. 47. See also F. J. Marceau, "Communication and Development: A Reconsideration," Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (_____1972): 235-245 and Peter Golding, "Media Role in National Development: Critique of a Theoretical Orthodoxy," Journal of Communication 24 (Summer 1974): 39-53.

[51]Luis Ramiro Beltran, "Alien Premises, Objects, and Methods in Latin American Communication Research," Communication Research 3 (April 1976): 115.

[52]"Research is a form of social control, although we often tend to rationalize our intentions in terms of classification, increased knowledge, informed decision-making, better understanding, and so on. We should at least be prepared to look at the possibility that social science is just another unit in the service of the politico-economic system, be it capitalist or socialist." J. D. Halloran, Mass Media and Society: The Challenge of Research (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1974), p. 13.

[53]Beltran, "Alien," p. 111.

[54]An excellent example of such unforeseen consequences was the Green Revolution which attempted to industrialize agricultural production in Mexico and elsewhere. Not only did land utilization and mechaization factors displace the rural farmers, but the importation of machinery, chemicals, etc., necessary to maintain operation reversed, and exhausted initial benefits from exportation of crops. See L. R. Beltran, "La revolucion verde y el desarrollo rural latino americano," Desarrollo Rural en las Americas 3 (_____1971).

[55]Beltran, "Alien," p. 115.

[56]M. Zires de Janba, "Mass Communication in the Context of Development with Special Reference to Latin America" (Research paper for Diploma in International and National Development, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of Social Studies, 1971), cited in Beltran.

[57]Elite-mass relations in Latin America frequently have been cited as a primary cause of regional underdevelopment. See Helio Jaguaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 431.

"Latin American societies remained underdeveloped from their independence to the first decades of the twentieth century because they became dualistic societies in which the optionization of the elite's aims was not compatible with the basic interest of the mass, thus preventing the social integration of the concerned countries and establishing in them a social regime (that is, a combined regime of values, participation, power, and property) that was not amenable to their national development."

[58]Beltran, "Alien," p. 127.

[59]Speaking in 1976 of the preponderance of communication research which carried the "made in USA" imprint, Juan Dias Bordenave said, "Latin American communication scholars must overcome their mental compulsion to perceive their own reality through foreign concepts and ideologies, and they must learn to look at the communication and adoption of innovations from their own perspective." See "Communication of Agricultural Innovations in Latin America, The Need for New Models," Communication Research 3 (April 1976): 145.

[60]Beltran, "Alien," p. 128.

[61]Luis Ramiro Beltran, "Research Ideologies in Conflict," Journal of Communication 25 (Spring 1975): 187-193.

[62]Symposium entitled "Cultural Exchange--or Invasion?," Journal of Communication 24 (Winter 1974): 89-117; Symposium entitled "Forms of Cultural Dependency," Journal of Communication 25 (Spring 1975): 121-200.

[63]"Forms of Cultural Dependency: A Symposium," Journal of Communication 25 (Spring 1975): 121.

[64]Rose Goldsen and Azriel Bibliowicz, "Plaza Sesamo: 'Neutral' Language or 'Cultural Assault'?," Journal of Communication 26 (Spring 1976): 124-125. See also Patricia Fagen, "Media in Allende's Chile," Journal of Communication 24 (Winter 1974): 59-69. Fagen documents government attempts to assist Allende's program of far-reaching social change and the conservative mass media campaign which was prelude to the Chilean revolution in which Allende was murdered. She concludes that Constitutional liberties of free speech and free press undercut Allende's attempt at social change. In the military coup which followed Chile lost prospects of reform and lost freedom. "Among the first arrested, and among those possibly dead, are large numbers of journalists, broadcasters, writers, artists and media workers whose only crime, it seems, was attempting to support the legally elected government . . . . Is this the necessary

fact of any country which, like Chile, attempts to achieve fundamental change without destroying constitutional guarantees, basic liberties, and freedom of expression?" For another provoking article on the problems of attempting to mold the media, in this case, television, in the national interest see Neil P. Hurley, "Chilean Television: A Case Study of Political Communication," Journalism Quarterly 51 (Winter 1974): 683-689.

[65]Raymond D. Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes toward Precision of the Concept and Argument," International Organization 31 (1978): 55. Dependency theory is defined as a "set of questions, a perspective on questions, and a concomitant orientation to knowledge about them."

[66]John D. Martz, "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a Region," Latin American Research Review 6 (Spring 1971): 73-99. See also Howard J. Wiarda, "Political Culture and National Development: In Search of a Model for Latin America," Latin American Research Review 13 (Winter 1978): 261-266.

[67]Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics--A Development Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966); Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

[68]Talcott Parsons, et al., eds., Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

[69]Max Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Cultural Examination (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1961), pp. 323, 325.

[70]Ervin Laszlo, Introduction to Systems Philosophy: Toward a New Paradigm of Contemporary Thought (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1972).

[71]Wiarda, "Political Culture," p. 261.

[72]Albert O. Hirschman, ed., A Bias for Hope, Essays in Development in Latin America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 327.

[73]Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," in Bias, p. 327.

CHAPTER III

PROMINENT AGENTS AND AGENCIES IN BRAZILIAN POLICY-MAKING

The object of this project is development rhetoric, that is, the "Talk" which attended the creation, promotion and enactment of development policy between 1956 and 1958 in Brazil. The research question implies first, that a communication model of Brazilian policy-making can be derived which, second, would reveal symbol strategies paralleling the policy-making process that, third, warrant the premise that language-directed perceptions mediate social continuity and change. The communication model devised in Chapter Four is properly called a "Rhetoric of Policy-Making" because it stresses the rhetorical tradition that human beings often must rely upon one another symbolically in order to act toward the future. The communication model is required to identify significant agents in policy-making and the forces which propelled the process in terms of this symbolic interdependence. Consequently, an attempt must be made at uncovering some of the perceptions framing the language and behavior of participants, particularly those perceptions which directed attention toward important events, figures and issues and those which might explain the communication behavior of participants. This chapter attempts to get inside the discourse of the period and to understand the motives and behavior in the

policy-making process by answering two questions: What events, figures and issues were prominent forces in policy-making of the period? How did agents organize themselves in shaping policies?

Prominent Events, Figures and Issues in Brazilian Policy-Making

John Wirth published a monograph study of policy-making during the long Vargas era of Brazilian history, 1930-1954. The book, Politics of Brazilian Development, consists of three case studies in areas of foreign trade, national steel industry and petroleum industry. Wirth professed no a priori analytic framework as to how these descriptions to industrialize were taken. Within that historical frame he attempted to answer the questions: "Who identified problems and goals? Who could enforce his point of view, i.e. who controlled the policy-making machinery? How did policy-makers perceive their opportunities and constraints?"[1] However, in the introduction he summarizes his principal findings under six headings. They include foreign capital, perception and analysis of balance of payments problems, patrimonial state, Army, Vargas presidency and nationalism. A brief summary of these topics permits us to identify events, figures and issues which propelled Brazilian policy-making immediately preceding and extending through the Kubitschek administration.

Foreign Capital

The availability and terms of foreign capital significantly shaped the range of Brazilian policy options. Capital arrangements

were a by-product of international geo-political conditions. Capital was available at favorable terms when Brazil was the object of German-American rivalry. Brazil, as an ally of the United States in World War II (in fact the only South American country to send troops into that conflict) and as a supplier of strategic war materials, enjoyed ready assistance and credit for a national steel industry at Volta Redonda. After World War II, however, United States foreign policy priority was shifted to Western Europe by the economic reconstruction of European economies and the cold war. Since Brazil and all of Latin America were safely within the United States' sphere of influence, they were treated with relative neglect.

Brazilian petroleum policy emerged out of credit and financing arrangements which strongly contrasted with conditions fomenting Brazil's steel plants. United States oil conglomerates did not offer financing and technical assistance at terms that permitted a modicum of national control. Mexican seizure of the oil industry in 1938 gave United States investors a strong aversion to "nationalist" control of their assets, and the 1940's and 1950's agreements with Venezuela had given international oil companies reasonable expectations of favorable terms. Consequently Petrobras, the Brazilian state-run petroleum extraction and refining conglomerate begun during the final Vargas term (1951-1954), was financed by the Brazilian government which channeled large sums of money into the project, an enormous cost in such a capital-short economy.

Perceptions and Analysis of Balance of Payment Problems

The 1930 collapse of the world coffee market left the Brazilian economy in shambles. The price of coffee fell from 40 cents to 8 cents per pound.[2] The export of coffee had accounted for 75 per cent of earnings from foreign trade. Revenues from exports financed imports of processed and manufactured goods which Brazil did not make. The Brazilian government reacted to this balance of payments crisis by coffee price supports and exchange devaluations. The policies were adopted to protect the income of coffee growers, the most powerful political group of the First Republic. These policies tended to redistribute the losses of the coffee sector across society through inflation. To finance the coffee valorization program the government simply printed more money.[3] Consequently, although the country's capacity to import diminished, the internal level of demand--the means of the coffee growers to pay for consumption needs--was sustained, as follows. Without dollar revenues coffee growers lost the ability to import consumer items. Coffee growers were paid in cruzeiros through government programs and cruzeiros had been devalued in dollar values by 400 percent. The growers could, however, buy products made in Brazil. These conditions initiated the appearance of a new dynamic center in the Brazilian economy--industries which produced commodities for the internal market. For a decade import substitution industries flourished in Brazil as an unforeseen and unconscious consequence of exchange and trade policies which attempted to maximize receipts of coffee trade. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, however, some

prominent Brazilians began to realize that old mercantilist trade patterns--the exportation of raw and unfinished products and the importation of manufactured goods--was no longer viable. Rapid growth of the domestic economy focused attention on the fact that export revenues plus foreign credits were insufficient income to purchase a satisfactory level of imports.

President Getulio Vargas in 1951 began a coordinated investment policy designed not merely to cope with foreign exchange and balance of payments problems but to solve them. Faced with growing balance of payment deficits and rising inflation midway through his administration, Vargas stumbled from moderately conservative fiscal and monetary policies designed to win critical assistance from the International Monetary Fund and fell into radical policies calculated to garner support in a political crisis brought on by inflation. In this setting the substitution of domestic for imported oil by Petrobras was not merely a rational investment to ease the present and future strain of imbalanced trade and capital flows. Petrobras became a premiere object of nationalist rhetoric drumming support for boldly restructuring the economy.

Patrimonial State

> Government policy-makers drew upon old Iberian traditions of patrimonialism, as updated by corporation in the 1930's, and as revamped by the mystique of technocracy in the 1950's. This was a harmonious model of action, in which ministers, administrators, and interest groups were related functionally, both formally and informally, to a central, legitimizing power focus, the presidency.
>
> . . . During Vargas' second tenure [1950-1954], the role of experts, managers, and administrators, in short, the post

> war technocrats, was added, vastly strengthening presidential powers.
>
> [Interest group, Army, ministerial] initiatives were muted or modified by an inability to command sufficient resources . . . . [I]n a capital short economy they could not develop independently of the large resources that only the state could command . . . . This focused attention on the presidency.[4]

Army and Getulio Vargas

Getulio Vargas was no newcomer to Catete Palace. His first administration from 1930 to 1945 spanned an era of Latin American history known for political strongmen backed by the military. The Army

> allowed Vargas to take power in 1930 as a provisional president, grudgingly let him move from discretionary to constitutional government in 1934, then joined him and in fact, pressured him into setting up an authoritarian regime (the Estado Novo) in 1937, and finally terminated his long first presidency with a coup d'etat in 1945.[5]

By contemporary standards Vargas' long first term was not unusually corrupt. It certainly was not violent. Nevertheless, the Vargas years were not free from political chicanery. He extended his tenure by anti-democratic, illegal and unconstitutional acts. Consequently, when he resumed office in 1951, many of his opponents thought his appeals for economic and social reforms were merely a means to achieve and prolong personal power. Radical nationalists on the left and right were suspicious of Vargas' new "nationalist" colors, remembering how he appeared to support Communist and the fascist Integralist parties only to destroy them when they no longer served his purpose. The centrist middle class and military regarded Vargas' populist style with some misgivings, remembering

he had, in 1937, engineered a revolution to extend his tenure of office in the authoritarian Estado Novo. In 1950 Vargas won his only democratic election. His administration, however, was disrupted by a controversy over a "national" solution to foreign dependence upon petroleum. The Petrobras debate proved that Vargas' ad hoc personalist and contingent style of governance had reached the limits of political usefulness.

Nationalist policy, as it emerged from the Petrobras debates, meant the exclusion of foreign capital and control in the exploitation of strategic national resources. In addition to the anti-American sentiment implicit in attacks on trans-national oil "Trusts," many other features of this Brazilian solution looked like significant departures from free enterprise capitalism and democracy. Since few Brazilian entrepreneurs were willing to risk private capital in the exploration, extraction and refining of oil--all capital intensive ventures--economic technicians advised the use of state capital. Furthermore, they advised that a project of this magnitude required national planning and state administrative control. To many opponents and proponents of Petrobras these secondary features of the "nationalist" policy resembled economic engineering and central administrative control of Russian five-year plans.

Toward the end of Vargas' second term, it became apparent that the Petrobras project was likely to join the wreckage of other grandiose building projects of previous administrations, in a sea of bureaucratic inertia. Vargas had other political crises to face. A series of scandals, culminating in the attempted assassination

of Carlos Lacerda, the editor of the opposition newspaper, the Tribuna da Imprensa, prompted army generals to demand Vargas' resignation.

About 4:00 a.m. on August 24, in an emergency cabinet meeting, Vargas agreed to take a leave of absence and turn power over to the Vice-President. Four and one-half hours later he committed suicide, shooting himself in the heart. A typed suicide note, which was broadcast on radio throughout the nation, became an extremely important political manifesto. In several ways it probably encouraged currents of popular and elite opinion favorable to the continuation of Vargas programs and policies, which under Kubitschek became a broad-based movement called "national developmentalism."

The cryptic note contained the economic nationalists' diagnosis of the root causes for all of Brazil's ills. The note declared that national weakness and personal suffering emanated from a poor economy. "International groups and their domestic allies" obstructed attempts to develop economic strength, social reforms and political independence. Vargas stated:

> I wished to create a national liberty by developing our riches through Petrobras, and no sooner had we begun when a wave of agitation was raised . . . . They do not wish the workers to be free. They do not wish the people to be independent.[6]

The Vargas suicide provided a stimulus for Brazilian intelligencia to identify, define and remedy national problems. The suicide note raised popular expectations that Petrobras and other technical governmental plans and projects were part of the solution. Throughout the following eighteen months until Kubitschek's installation, the

suicide set the stage for acrimonious campaigning and a serious split in the military.

In the years succeeding Vargas' death politicians closely watched the military. Politicians who were in or out of office feared their opponents would gain military support, instigate a coup and violate the 1946 Constitution on the grounds that such action was necessary to preserve or achieve its noblest ideal. Juscelino Kubitschek observed that, "In Brazil one is elected by the people, but one governs with one's eyes turned to the armed forces."[7]

Nationalism

From the 1940's to the 1964 military takeover which closed the doors to political participation, vigorous debates on development policy focused on nationalism and formulas for economic growth. Brazilians were highly aware of a web of influence, power and initiative which permeated the constitutional status of national sovereignty. The policy objective of economic nationalism was to achieve sufficient economic autonomy to insure independence from extranational forces beyond their control. However, different groups and personalities interpreted foreign presence differently. And "not all Brazilians who were comfortable with economic nationalism looked upon nationalism and its postwar political aspects with equanimity."[8]

Getulio Vargas and to a lesser degree Juscelino Kubitschek, were essentially conservative modernizing leaders who rarely used nationalism for political mobilization. Rather, "economic nationalism was a way of relating group interests to chosen priorities without upsetting the basic social structure."[9] However, in the second half

of both administrations when inflation strengthened the demands of the masses, the populist appeal of the more radical forms of nationalism created significant influence.

Thomas Skidmore in Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, An Experiment in Democracy, identifies three formulas for economic growth which comprised the debate on development strategy.[10] The principal formulas include: neo-liberal, developmental-nationalist and radical-nationalist.[11]

Neo-Liberal Formula for Development

The neo-liberal formula respected the international price mechanism as the best guide to Brazil's "natural, inevitable, and unavoidable economic role under the inexorable law of comparative advantage."[12] Consequently Brazil's fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies should follow orthodox principles of central-banking practices in more industrialized countries. Budgets should be balanced, and national money supply tightly controlled. Foreign capital should be welcomed and government-imposed limitations on the international movement of capital, currency and goods discouraged. This view was espoused by many import merchants centered around Rio de Janeiro. This formula provided natural ground for political parties opposing Vargas and Kubitschek. The identification of democracy and capitalism with the neo-liberal formula gave party spokesmen the opportunity to woo the middle class and to label government programs as anti-democratic or communistic. When political expedience warranted it, however, support for this formula did not prevent party leaders from attacking the government in the language

of radical nationalists--"the government is 'selling out' to foreign trusts."

Developmental-Nationalist Formula for Development

The second formula was developmentalist-nationalism. Proponents of this formula began with the assumption

> that Brazil faced an imperative need to industrialize, but . . . the spontaneous forces which had achieved industrialization in the North Atlantic world were inadequate to Brazil. To pass . . . from an agrarian economy to a modern industrial economy required a new strategy of development.[13]

Those elements which the neo-liberal formula assumed provoked national growth--the international price mechanism and free mobility of the factors of production--actually tended to hobble Brazil's future as an industrial power. Consequently, the developmentalist-nationalism strategy aimed at the creation of a mixed economy. The private sector would be given tax credit and exchange incentives for investments in priority areas. Through autarcies and mixed public-private enterprises the State would break infrastructural bottlenecks of energy, transportation and other such areas where the private sector lacked the will or resources to venture. Foreign capital, carefully regulated by Brazilian authorities, could play an important role.

Associated with this view was the National Confederation of Industries representing the industrial center of the states of Sao Paulo and to a lesser degree Minas Gerais. The army, which had initiated the State-directed industrial effort of Volta Redonda in a wartime effort to strengthen national security, supported developmentalist-nationalism. The United Nations Commission for Latin America, ECLA, formulated the broad

theoretical style of this approach while the development policy research institute, ISEB, crafted its application to the realities of the Brazilian condition.

Radical Nationalist Formula for Development

The third formula was radical nationalism. "[T]he radical nationalist position was based on the assumption that the existing economic and social structure was 'exploitive' and demanded radical change."[14] Brazilian underdevelopment was the product of a conspiratorial alliance between foreign investors supported by capitalist governments of the industrialized world, and their Brazilian allies which "sell out" national interests for personal profit. The conspiracy relegated Brazil to an inferior role as a supplier of primary products "whose prices were kept at minimum level" and as consumers of finished goods "whose prices were set at an exorbitant level by monopolistic corporations."[15] Thus any industrialization program based on assumed cooperation of developed countries was doomed to failure. Radical nationalists such as the UNE, the National Student Union, identified sectors tied to the export-import trade and Brazilians employed in foreign firms as aiding and abetting the economic underdevelopment of Brazil. Radical nationalists were long on criticism of Brazil's economic and social malaise, but short on specific policy recommendations.

Skidmore cautions that these three formulas are best regarded as analytic positions advanced by writers and propagandists and not easily identifiable positions taken by large groups of Brazilians.

Until its polarization in 1958, ISEB administrators, faculty and contributors were tolerant toward many theories promoting national development. This diversity of means and unity of purpose permitted the contributions of marxist Nelson Werneck Sodre, structuralist Celso Furtado and neo-liberal Roberto Campos within ISEB.

Organization of Policy-Making Agents

In 1968 Nathaniel Leff published Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964. His description of Brazilian policy-making contrasts with other commonly expressed scenarios.[16] Previous studies of the political process in Brazil are based upon interest group and class conflict models of political action. The interest group model usually employed by Latin American area specialists working out of the United States operated as follows: through political organization (i.e. parties or lobbies) groups with compatible interests combine influence; through various means (i.e. votes, campaign donations, etc.) they pressure politicians to mediate their needs in policy-making on those matters touching their special interest. Leff contended that his case studies of policy output disclaimed the validity of the interest group model of political action. Major economic policy decisions were largely unaffected by groups with vital interests at stake. For example, coffee planters, traditionally assumed to possess substantial political power, were unable to block the steady increase in export taxes between 1954 and 1962, an increase from 23 to 55 percent of revenue. Private sector industrialists--hypothetically the new power elite

of the 40's, 50's, and 60's--could not block the entrance of foreign competitors, nor compete with them for government credit assistance. Leff argues that another model based on a system of patronage politics better accounts for policy-making in Brazil.

Brazilian Political Culture

The "politica de clientela" or patronage politics was one of several elements of the Brazilian political culture which was highly developed under Vargas and used by Kubitschek. Paternalism, clientelism and populism were three pillars by which relations were organized within the political system and between the political system and society at large.

> Paternalism was personalism applied to class relations. Political life was represented as "revolving around the figure of a leader from whom all blessings flow." The national leader is a magnified version of the local boss (patrao, coronel), who makes the decisions and distributes the benefits . . . . The clientela is the natural complement, the machinery which distributes the benefits from on high and mobilizes support, mostly electoral, from below.
>
> . . . [P]opulism . . . is the appeal, demagogic if you will, of the leader, often fundamentally conservative . . . , directly to the people . . . , appealing to deep-seated popular emotions and unexpressed demands.[17]

Paternalism, clientelism and populism pervaded the Brazilian political system. Many political scientists and anthropologists working from a variety of frameworks have identified the relations of patronage and clientage.[18] From below, they selectively directed perceptions of the public's opportunities to meet needs and, from above they channeled the politicians' exercise of power. However, clientelism and its counterparts are more than cultural traits which characterize

Brazilian politics. They are forms of social organization entailing inclusive, reciprocal and complementary relations between policy actors.

Brazilian Career Structure

Perhaps a most useful means of getting at the inclusive, reciprocal and complementary relations in a political system is to examine the process of building a career. It should not be surprising that policy-making in Brazil and elsewhere reflects the ways by which politicians and other significant actors in the system succeed.

Anthony Leeds provides a useful and scholarly analysis in an American Anthropologist article entitled "Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: an Evolutionary Model and Case History."[19] Social mobility and career growth in Brazil involve the cultivation of a "vast network of mutual, personalized obligation." Young aspirants intent upon the projection (projecao) of themselves into one or several career areas and upon receiving public recognition of a desirable name (nome) must launch careers (trampolin) through progressive levels of notoriety involving personal contacts. Brazilian society, following old Iberic traditions of exclusatory rather than participatory modes of public life, makes entrance at each level dependent upon the confirmation of group membership. Groups exclude mediocre careerists. Leading members are usually persons of great skill "as indicated by such terms of admiration, almost endearment as furador ('one who worms his way in'), cavador (burrower'), absorvante ('sops things up'), paraguendista ('serendipitist by intention'), etc."

At some point in his career development the careerist surrounds himself "with a tactical corps of supporters or aids . . . called in Brazil a rotary or ingrejinha ("little church").

> Such ingrejinhas are especially useful if the members have journalistic or other communication connections--as they so often do. They are carriers of information, transmitters of cues, promoters and boosters of the master careerist to whom they are attached. He reciprocates in a typically complementary relationship by using his influence to get them jobs, to advance their careers . . . .
>
> . . . the ingrejinha is in fact a mutual career promotion, web of mutual obligations, between a person with greater projecao or with greater nome in his career, on the one hand, and his supporters, on the other.
>
> When a man has reached a certain point in his career marked by the possession of desirable contacts, of a certain nome (name) in his area or areas, and maybe an ingrejinha, he may be asked to join a panelinha ["group of insiders"] . . . .
>
> The number of panelinhas in a city or state is proportional to the level of its economic, political or social advancement. Thus, states like Piaui and Maranhao probably have only one or two; Bahia several; Minas Gerais a number; Sao Paulo a great many.
>
> . . . A panelinha characteristically consists of a customs official, an insurance man, a lawyer or two, a businessman, an accountant, a municipal, state or federal deputy, and a banker with his bank.
>
> Each panelinha maintains its internal relations . . . by certain very simple potential sanctions. . . . Since the panela in the locality is also a clique concerned with mutual protection--its members are virtually immune from the law . . . [Defectors lose their protection]. The banker who leaves loses the business and deposits of his panela members--and sometimes the combined assets of a panela may amount to eight or ten billion, or more cruzieros . . . .
>
> Similarly, the deputy depends on the panela for his election . . .--he is their man. Yet, in turn, they depend on him because he supplies the links with the government which are so necessary to the resolution of a host of problems defined by the panela members.

> This is particularly true when there is a question of links reaching upward to the politico-administrative cupola, since every panela has its ties with the judicial-political hierarchy up to the president who is the keystone of the whole structure. [emphasis mine]
>
> . . . Looked at from the point of view of the career, it can be seen that the career passes, ideally, through a hierarchy of panelinhas, mainly identified with the municipio, state and federal levels. As a man grows in connections, activities, experience and wealth, and contracts more vertical relationships upwards and more supporters behind him, his career tends to reach the next higher level panelinha. From the career point of view, he gradually universalizes or nationalizes himself (ele se univeraliza) in the sense that his name, his influence, and his activities become geographically national in scope. That is, his projecao becomes increasingly broad in socio-geographic range.[20]

From the perspective of an aspiring politician, the achievement of a successful career requires the painstaking construction of clientage networks at municipal, state and federal levels. The more resources at his disposal, the more clients he can accumulate and the more support he can mobilize. Consequently, the accumulation and discretionary control of state resources is the secret to career success. Leff discovered that within this context relatively little significance is attributed to policy formulation and great emphasis is placed on policy implementation. Clientela politicians usually aim at limited and individual modifications of established policy, for example, "attaining individual government loans for their political clients--within the framework of an already determined budget and allocational criteria."[21] Leff argues that the emphasis upon policy implementation and de-emphasis upon policy formulation is a by-product of the clientela system. He illustrates this fact by contrasting, as ideal types, the clientela and group politicians.

Consider the communication channels which orient the clientela and the group of party politicians. The group or party politicians "receive communications both of technical data and ideological perspectives from the interest group or socioeconomic class for whom they speak." Frequently he is a member of groups which he represents. By contrast, the clientela politician receives a welter of often contradictory claims and perspectives. "[In] absence of orienting views and data from broader social groups [clientela] politicians are much more open to influence by messages from within the political class itself."[22] Because he is free from group ties which determine his career, because the broad policy directions matter little compared to the opportunities policies provide for patronage, the clientela politician is more open to economic doctrine and can be more ideologically directed in policy formulation than a group or party politician. This, Leff contends, is the internal dynamic operating in Brazilian policy-making, 1947-1964.

Factors Directing Policy Formulation

According to Leff, policy-making in Brazil takes place in a political structure which insulates it from partisan pressures. In the Brazilian system actors in the same "interest group" directly "compete for preferential treatment and personal favors at the level of policy implementation rather than aggregate their demands at the level of policy formulation."[23] This "clientelistic style" of political action is usually viewed as detrimental to policy-making.

However, Leff claims it gave the president and technical advisors a "substantial degree of autonomy" to determine policy according to technical and national considerations.

> This autonomy in economic policy-making grew, as we noted, from a system of clientelistic politics which neutralizes many of the pressures from interest groups and socio-economic classes. Clientelistic politics made possible policy action based on elite opinion, which in postwar Brazil followed a modernizing economic ideology. With the availability of the tecnicos, in turn, these ideas could take effective programmatic form. These features of national economic policy-making . . . induced the political elite to take a modernizing approach and cope reasonably well with the country's economic problems. . . .[24]

If group pressures do not influence policy-making, what factors do in fact determine it? In the previous quote Leff identified three factors which "induced the political elite to . . . cope reasonably well with the country's economic problems": tecnico, elite opinion, and modernizing economic ideology.

Tecnico

The rise of the tecnico is embedded in Brazilian economic history. The 1930 collapse of the international coffee markets severely damaged the Brazilian economy. Intuitive and common sense approaches to economic policy were no longer equal to the task of solving Brazil's problems. In the 1930's the Brazilian civil service, Departamento Administrativo do Servico Publico (DASP), was founded. In DASP, unlike other civil bureaucracies, civil servants were promoted on the basis of examination and merit. By the late 1940's and early 1950's top administrators had distinguished themselves with reputations for technical competence, integrity and honesty. In

contrast to common perceptions of government venality engendered by patronage politics, the actions of tecnicos were generally regarded as motivated by objective analysis and national interest.

Within the government tecnicos possessed a virtual monopoly on knowledge regarding economic policy. Nothing in the training, experience or motivation of clientela politicians urged them to develop any independent expertise. However, this monopoly apparently posed no threat to the politicians. Tecnicos had no base for political power. Initially the term "tecnico" carried with it the pejorative connotation of "tool." Generally the programs which tecnicos advised and administered were viewed as extensions of the political power of the politicians who sponsored them.

The general conditions for tecnico influence on policy-making could be sketched as follows: a) a generalized need to solve pressing economic problems like inflation and recurring balance of payment deficits; b) a general paucity of knowledge regarding economic analysis; c) the unwillingness or inability of politicians to develop their own expertise in economic policy; d) the tendency to delegate policy formulation, with significant autonomy to apolitical technical experts; 3) significant consensus among technical experts on economic analysis; and f) privileged channels of communication which tecnicos used in molding presidential, elite and public opinion regarding development policy. As presidential advisors they had significant influence on the President (and the President was the single most powerful factor in policy decision-making).

> As a clientelistic politician . . . the President has not usually had strong personal direction in economic policy, and he was usually oriented by elite opinion's judgment of the "objective needs" of the situation.[25]

As administrators of the day-to-day operations of programs they influenced long term policy formation. Several of the more influential tecnicos with journalistic connections influenced public and elite opinion through newspapers.

> The more prominent tecnicos are also important nationalist ideologues and take a leading role in feeding into the political communications process their views on the country's economic problems.[26]

It is to that communications process and the elite and public opinion which it cultivates that we now turn our attention.

Public Opinion and Communications Systems

Shielded from broad-based external pressures, policy-makers were oriented "by doctrine and by 'public opinion'" which Leff described as "mainly views and information circulating among the political elite itself."[27] Tecnicos, as we have seen, were the principal source of economic doctrine in policy-making. Public opinion, however, was determined by a communications system in which the President and leading newspapers of Rio de Janeiro were the most identifiable sources of views and information. "The President has this position because of his other sources of power, which make his orientations particularly important."[28] Newspapers, however, were "accorded special respect because of their tradition of political independence and broad perspective on national issues."[29] Because of the inadequacies of Brazilian political parties and the

individual-stressing versus group-stressing concerns of legislators, the newspapers probably were the "most authentic political expression" of public opinion. For legislators geographically and professionally isolated from their constituencies by long residence in the capital city of Rio de Janeiro, newspapers provided contact with the broader society which they represented. However, at the "heart of the communication process" were more diffused "interpersonal contacts, which may be organized through cliques, clubs or around particular occupations and institutions" for which the message sources are less identifiable.[30]

One source of elite opinion which Leff overlooks and which may have significantly influenced interpersonal channels of elite opinion is ISEB. The Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros was a social science institute sponsored by the Ministry of Education devoted to graduate level research. Its objectives were

> . . . the study, teaching and dissemination of the social sciences, especially sociology, history, economics and political science, with the special objective of applying the categories and data of these sciences to the analysis and critical understanding of Brazilian reality with a view to the elaboration of theoretical instruments that will permit the stimulation and promotion of national development.[31]

Writing in 1963 Frank Bonilla stated:

> ISEB has in the last six years unquestionably shaped the thinking of a substantial number of importantly placed Brazilians through its extensive publications, courses and public lectures.[32]

Thomas Skidmore states: "The hundreds of younger Brazilians who attended the one-year course at the Institute [ISEB] were profoundly influenced by the 'developmentalist' mystic."[33] Who were

ISEB students and what places of importance did they occupy?

> The students were drawn mainly from the middle level ranks of the bureaucratic and technocratic organizations of the State and returned to their posts after the completion of the course. ISEB also carried out extension work, summer courses, public lectures, etc., in the capital and a number of provincial centres [sic], although it remained basically an intellectual elite operation.[34]

Furthermore, among ISEB faculty and administrators were presidential advisors, ministers of State, top level civil service administrators and leading journalistic intelligencia.[35] Speaking with that kind of authority, it is easy to see how ISEB might be a powerful voice articulating the economic doctrine which influenced public opinion and guided development policy.

Modernizing Economic Ideology

The third factor which Leff argued influenced decision-making in economic policy was a "modernizing economic ideology." Unlike previous policy framworks which attempted to recapture the past (such as the golden age of coffee) or merely cope with the present (for example, inflation) economic nationalism imparted a strong future orientation.[36] In policy-making, ideology functioned to identify national priorities and to invest the State with the authority and the ability to act. By pervading elite and public opinion, the ideology functioned to limit conflict in determining policies and to legitimize their execution. To get at the substantive content of this "modernizing economic ideology" it is wise to consider its images of the future and its scenarios of the past. Together those "visions" impart values governing the selection of ends and means

in the pursuit of development.

For the future:

> at the heart of the vision is a smooth-running, highly productive, industrial apparatus whose control lies within the nation and whose product is primarily divided according to some equitable arrangement among Brazilians themselves.[37]

Scenarios of the past stressed the danger of depending upon the world economy for supply of most manufactured goods. Frequent references are made to the 1930 collapse of the world coffee prices as an example of the perilous dependence of national income upon foreign forces. The shortages caused by shipping difficulties during World War II were cited as proof of the unreliable supply of strategic and essential foreign goods. The creation of national industries was viewed as the solution to the problem of economic dependence. Other historical and cultural causes were sketched for structural bottlenecks, sectorial lags and regional disequilibria which characterized the backward state of the Brazilian economy and the private sector's inability to surmount them. Consequently the State was seen as the coordinating and dynamizing element to direct development through public and private sector collaboration.

Helio Jaguaribe, a Brazilian political scientist who has written extensively on Latin America, states that Latin American ideologies governing policy-making are comprised of an implicit model of development and a regime of motivation.[38] Leff confirms this observation in Brazil noting that

> ideology's economic views have been virtually uncontested in Brazil since at least the early 1950's . . . . It has had almost no competition as an interpretation of Brazilian reality and the possibility for action.[39]

The inability of coffee growers and industrialists to formulate rival ideologies limited their ability to influence policy-making. For example, Leff states of the coffee growers:

> The fazendeiros never adopted their political style and technique to the new age, particularly as regards mobilization of support among the intelligencia and elite opinion. In particular, they never related their claims to anything broader than the traditional importance of coffee in the economy. In the context of modernizing Brazilian ideology, however, this was something everyone wanted to forget; indeed its modification was one of the central goals of Brazilian economic policy.[40]

Industrialists attempted to associate their position with the ideology of national development and to demonstrate a coincidence between their interests and the country as a whole, but had little success influencing policy. The formula, "private interests in service of national good," which frequently is employed by individuals and interest groups within the United States, has little credibility in Brazil. According to Leff, "Brazilian political culture takes an organic view of society and politics . . . [in which] efforts by private interests to influence public policy are considered inherently 'corrupt'."[41] The most effective means for influencing government policy, and one not used by industrialists or other interest groups, was to create a rival, competing ideology of national development whose doctrines and goals coincide with their own interests. As a consequence,

> . . . ideological consensus greatly reduced the political conflict surrounding the resolution of economic policy issues--both within the government and as between the

> government and private groups. Because of the ideology's integrating effects, even functional and regional groups which were not benefiting directly from allocational policies, and which may have had conflicting interests, accepted the legitimacy of government decision.[42]

Conclusion

John Wirth in Politics of Brazilian Development surveys policy-making of the long Vargas era, 1930-1954, in an attempt to answer three questions: Who identified problems and goals? Who controlled policy-making machinery? How did policy-makers perceive their opportunities and contraints? At the risk of condensing beyond that point required by balanced historical understanding let me summarize Wirth's findings in the form of responses to those questions. Getulio Vargas, pressured increasingly by public perception of national emergency regarding inflation and shortages of foreign exchange charted, under the tutelage of technical experts, economic policy aimed at national autonomy. Initially, using patterns of political action entailed in the "patrimonial state," Vargas controlled State resources distributed through policies, though not the direction of policy processes. Eventually Vargas' inability to adjust to more open, conflictual, direction-stressing modes of policy-making led to social disorder and military coup. "Nationalist" policy was caught in crossfire between old political power centers and emerging ones. Debates over the nature and direction of change associated with policies were variously labeled "communist" and "democratic." Policy-making constraints and opportunities were first realized to be determined by economic dependence upon world economic

cycles. Realization of national dependence led to a determination to become more autonomous, as evidenced by policy shifts from export promotion to import substitution industrialization. The creation of basic industries in steel production and petroleum extraction-refining received impetus from import substitution industrialization strategy for national economic autonomy.

Nathaniel Leff's Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964 is a macro-analysis which treats government decision-making as though it were one period. He attempts to "follow the main currents rather than the ebb and flow of day-to-day events toward some general conclusions on economic policy-making and development in Brazil."[43] Some of Leff's "main currents" have been criticized as unwarranted generalizations.[44] Nevertheless, for purposes of this project Leff provides some valuable insights into how agents organize themselves in shaping policies. The inclusive, reciprocal and complementary nature of Brazilian political culture was demonstrated in the "politica de clientela" which distinguishes policy-making in Brazil from other nations. Anthony Leeds' description of Brazilian career structure revealed the interdependencies which pervaded political structures from lowest to highest levels. Leff argues that the structural characteristics of the Brazilian political system entailed in the "politica de clientela" provided opportunity for the significant influence of technical experts in economic policies. Technical experts, by virtue of their ideologic communication to the President, to the political elite, and to the media, significantly influenced the formulation

of policy according to technical and national considerations.

The objective of Chapter Three was to discover the individuals and groups whose statements in some way lead or follow behavior relevant to policy-making. Leeds, Wirth and Leff stress the centrality of the presidency in Brazilian political culture in the determination of national policy. Leff sketches some of the communication dynamics by which technical experts with ideologic propagations influence the President and policy-making process at large. Chapter Four will examine evidences which suggest that ISEB tecnicos may have worked together with President Kubitschek in patterns suggested by Leff. At this point, however, it is sufficient to suggest that the "ideology of national development" exerted significant influence in Kubitschek's policy-making. In evaluating the quantifiable outcomes in terms of national economic growth Leff concludes:

> The autonomy in economic policy-making grew, as we noted, from a system of clientelistic politics . . . . Clientelistic politics made possible policy action based on elite opinion, which in post war Brazil followed a modernizing economic ideology . . . . These features of national economic policy-making . . . induced the political elite to take a modernizing approach and cope reasonably well with the country's economic problems . . . .
>
> This is not to say that the economic policy of Brazil is free from irrationalities . . . . We have noted cases, principally export policy, where Brazilian economic policy was not well conceived from the viewpoint of promoting economic development.
>
> . . . The point is, however, that these sources of possible irrationalities are <u>ideational</u> rather than political.[45] [emphasis Leff's]

The formulation of a communication model of Brazilian policy-making by which the impact of ideas on social and political behavior follows in Chapter Four.

ENDNOTES

[1]John D. Wirth, The Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 2.

[2]On coffee policy and import substitution industrialization see Celso Furtado, Desenvolvimento e Subdesenvolvimento (Rio: Fundo de Cultura, 1961), pp. 157-185.

[3]Valorization refers to government programs which stockpile some commodity, in this instance coffee, in order to support high international price.

[4]Wirth, Development, pp. 4, 5.

[5]Ibid., p. 9.

[6]The full text of the suicide note can be found in Appendix A of John F. Dulles, Vargas of Brazil, A Political Biography (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967).

[7]John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, Political Military Crisis 1955-1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. XIV.

[8]Wirth, Development, p. 221.

[9]Ibid., p. 8.

[10]Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford Press, 1967), pp. 87-90.

[11]Ibid., pp. 87-91.

[12]Ibid., p. 88.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 89.

[15]Ibid., p. 89, 90.

[16]The scenarios usually employed in analyses of Brazilian policy-making included: selfish elite and comic opera. In the former, "Old or new elite control the machinery of government for their own purposes, standing in the way of policies that would jeopardize their own privileges, to the detriment of the country as a whole." In Brazil coffee planters or industrialists are often cast as oligarchies constraining progressive policy-making. The "comic opera" scenario assumes that "for political reasons, the policy-making environment is unstable and chaotic, and it prevents purposeful action." Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964 (New York: John Wiley, 1968), pp. 1, 2.

[17]David G. Epstein, Brasilia, Plan and Reality, A Study of Planned and Spontaneous Urban Settlement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 37.

[18]Wagley cites the dependence of lower class peoples, both rural and urban, as the patrao or the pervasive feature of Brazilian society. Economic relations assumed a sense of noblesse oblige paternalism on the part of the employer, and a sense of loyalty on the part of the employee. Patrao characteristics likewise characterized relations of debtor-creditor and political boss-client. Charles Wagley, "The Brazilian Revolution: Social Change Since 1930," in Social Change in Latin America, ed: Richard N. Adams and others (New York: Harper and Row, 1960). Pearse suggests that patrao-patron relations characterize urban social structure. Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro," in Urbanization in Latin America, ed: Philip Houser (New York: International Document Service, 1961). Frank presents a comprehensive model of Brazilian political economy from international dependence on the United States and other foreign powers through decreasing levels of power and influence to the lowliest peasant in the countryside. Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies in Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

[19]Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Model and Case History," American Anthropologist 66 (December 1964): 1321-1347.

[20]Ibid., pp. 1336-1339.

[21]Leff, Policy-Making, p. 120.

[22]Ibid., p. 121.

[23]Review of Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), in American Political Science Review 63 (1969): 544, by Alfred Stepan.

[24]Leff, Policy-Making, p. 180.

[25]Ibid., p. 151.

[26]Ibid., p. 152.

[27]Ibid., p. 4.

[28]Ibid., p. 134.

[29]Ibid., p. 135.

[30]Ibid., p. 133.

[31]Decreto 370608, 14 July 1955, Diario Oficial 15 July 1955. Cited in Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development, ed: Kalman H. Silvert (New York: Random House, 1963),p. 235.

[32]Frank Bonilla, "A National Ideology for Development: Brazil" in Expectant Peoples, pp. 232-264. Quotation is cited from p. 238.

[33]Skidmore, p. 170. Caio Navarro de Toledo expands Skidmore's observation significantly. "ISEB's courses, lectures and seminars attracted people from the Armed Forces, the National Security Council, the National Congress, Ministers of State, along with industrial empresarios, labor leaders, state parliamentarians, university professors and students, liberal arts professionals, and civil service employees. Many of the students who attended the one year graduate program were on scholarships from the respective group or department, attending ISEB full time." Caio Navarro de Toledo, ISEB: Fabrica de Ideologias, 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Editora Critica, 1978), pp. 185, 186.

[34]Herminio Martins, "Ideology and Development: 'Developmental Nationalism' in Brazil," in Latin American Sociological Studies, ed: Paul Halmos, Sociological Review Monograph 11 (Keele: Keele University, 1967), p. 154. In regard to this assertion, note what Thomas Skidmore states about the following intellectuals, all of

whom except Celso Furtado were chief faculty and administrators of ISEB. Celso Furtado, however, was a frequent collaborator with ISEB in conferences and publications. "It is impossible to understand the influence of the 'developmentalist' intellectuals unless one realizes that many of their number were also influential in actually shaping government policies after 1951, especially in the sphere of economic policy. Social science administrators such as Celso Furtado, Romulo de Almeida, Ewaldo Correia Lima, Roberto Campos, and Helio Jaguaribe were engaged not only in spelling out a rationale for rapid industrialization but also in planning and administering parts of the government role in the process." Skidmore, Politics, p. 380.

[35]In the order in which they are listed above let me identify prominent positions these men occupied within ISEB and the administration. Celso Furtado was a chief collaborator with ISEB conferences and publications. He was director of Kubitschek's agency to promote development in North East Brazil, SUDENE. Romulo de Almeida was chief of staff for President Vargas' Economic Advisory Staff and a leading influence in IBESP, a Vargas administration organization which was the forerunner of ISEB. In 1958 he became Minister of Labor. Ewaldo Correia Lima occupied the chair of the Economics Department of ISEB. Roberto Campos was president of BNDE, the Brazilian National Development Bank during Kubitschek's administration. He served on the ISEB Board of Directors. Helio Jaguaribe was chair of the Political Science Department of ISEB. He was advisor to President Kubitschek and probably a project administrator for government steel operations in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul.

[36]Not included in Skidmore's quotation was Candido Mendes de Almeida, chairman of the History Department of ISEB and project administrator for Kubitschek's railroad improvement project. Also excluded was Col. Nelson Werneck Sodre, a nationalist army officer with marxist inclinations. He was a member of the History Department. He was a literary critic, military historian and newspaper polemicist who significantly shaped public opinion toward radical nationalism. After the 1958 schism within ISEB, he became the chairman of the Political Science Department. Finally, Lucas Lopes, on the Advisory Board of ISEB, was Finance Minister, 1958-1961.

[37]"Today, Brazilian nationalism is as much preoccupied with the possibilities of the future as it used to be absorbed in tracing its roots in the past . . . . [Nationalists] agitate for and predict a promising future, to which development is the key." E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil, A Historical Survey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 128.

[38]Bonilla, "Ideology," p. 240.

[39]Leff, Policy-Making, p. 141.

[40]Ibid., p. 29.

[41]Ibid., p. 113.

[42]Ibid., p. 143.

[43]Ibid., p. 6.

[44]Review by Werner Baer, "Industrialization and Policy-Making in Brazil," Economic Development and Cultural Change 19 (April 1971), pp. 473-482. Baer doesn't find Leff very convincing. He cites some of Leff's judgments as questionable, and as unaccountable since the book is based on anonymous personal interviews with government officials and businessmen. Contrastly, Alfred Stepan in "Book Review: Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil," Political Science Review 63 (1969), pp. 544-545, states "this reviewer feels that more than any other recent book on Brazil, Leff has opened up new areas for research and forced a re-evaluation of some basic hypotheses." p. 545.

[45]Leff, Policy-Making, pp. 180, 181.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNICATION MODEL OF BRAZILIAN POLICY-MAKING

Chapter Four attributes to President Kubitschek, (1956-1961), ISEB and the "ideology of national development" roles in Brazilian policy-making which Wirth first identified in the administration of President Getulio Vargas (1930-1954) and to which Leff (1947-1964) refers anonymously as "President," "tecnicos" and "modernizing economic ideology." Chapter Four argues that the ISEB-Kubitschek cooperation in policy-making might be profitably viewed in terms of dialectic-rhetoric participation in the common topoi of the social sciences. In that regard, the "ideology of national development" might be viewed as a "place" for the "perception, discovery and explanation" of Brazilian "underdevelopment."[1] Evidence suggests that ISEB designed the "ideology" to function as "place" in two senses--as both "instrument and situation." I argue that the "ideology of national development" was designed to function as "the instrument with which the rhetor thinks and the realm in and about which he thinks."[2] Proceeding on that premise I sketch the substantive content of the ideology of national development as deriving from topoi of economics and sociology and as functioning to direct attention to the structural interrelatedness of "national situation" vis a vis "development." I cite Albert O. Hirschman for the primacy of the "possible" as a master topoi for policy action in developing

countries.[3] Hirschman, however, gives no direction by which policy scientists can understand how various perceptions of the "possible" arise. The communication model of Brazilian policy-making which I develop in part of this chapter is presented as addressing this need.

Part two of Chapter Four adopts Brown's theory of "ideology as communication process" to Brazilian policy-making.[4] Presuming "ideology" directs social and political behavior by constraining perceptions of the "possible," communication dynamics can be demonstrated to underlie both "ideologizing" and "policy-making." Phrased as a question this assertion becomes the focus point of Chapter Two. Assuming that "the creation and communication of ideology proceed together," can one demonstrate that "the creation and communication of national development policy during an era distinguished by prominent ideological activity likewise 'proceeded together'?"[5] The model should account for the action of significant agents and agencies identified in historical narratives in ways which reveal symbol strategies paralleling the policy-making process. The model presented in this chapter is, with some slight modification, identical to one which Brown developed to guide a communications history of race relations in the United States.[6]

ISEB and Kubitschek Policies

Special circumstances of the Kubitschek administration attribute notable influence to the President and to ISEB in policy-making. The president's power in determining policy in Brazil was, as we have

seen, derived from a political culture which insulated him from general programmatic demands from below and legitimized his autonomous decision-making. ISEB's significance is derived from the direct influence it exerted over the president and indirect influence over "public opinion." The general picture which emerges from these circumstances is that Institute theorists acted as dialecticians, making "determinate and indeterminate situation."[7] Through social sciences they attempted to discover the real proportions governing Brazilian national development. They formulated general policy strategies as well as concrete means for policy administration. President Kubitschek acted as rhetorician. He moved to discover, within and without ISEB formulations, the suasory propositions for the success of his policies and programs.

Nelson Werneck Sodre has written a history of ISEB.[8] To my knowledge he is the only Institute member to write a sustained history of the organization beginning with its inception in 1955, through its schism in 1958 to its demise in 1964. Colonel Sodre, a Marxist army officer, literary critic, military historian and newspaper polemicist was invited to join IBESP (the Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Politica, ISEB's para-official predecessor) in the first quarter of 1954. He identified his fellow Institute members as advisors, bureaucrats and civil servants in the Vargas regime.[9] In the interregnum comprising Vargas' uncompleted term of office, ISEBianos were attracted to the candidate Juscelino Kubitschek. They became his supporters and advisors during the tempestuous presidential campaign. "National developmentalism"

policy emerged from a collaboration between ISEB and Kubitschek. ISEB elaborated an "ideology of development"; the President transformed it into concrete policy. The association was, for a time, a happy one and Kubitschek became a spokesperson for ISEB. Ultimately the association became perilous because it exposed the Institute and its scientific work to partisan politics.

Evidence from a variety of sources corroborates Sodre's testimony. Roland Corbisier, the Institute director, offered to place ISEB at Kubitschek's disposal the second quarter of 1954.[10] During the campaign Kubitschek circulated a "National Plan for Development" which was drafted for him by a group of young technocrats on whom he relied for advice.[11] Immediately after his election in November, 1955, Kubitschek retired to a friend's fazenda for a brief rest. Days were spent studying and debating a development plan created for him by ISEB associate Lucas Lopes and a group of economic advisors.[12] This "National Plan" Kubitschek subsequently published in a volume entitled Diretrizes Gerais do Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico. The title of the book makes a covert reference to one of ISEB's master concepts. The sociological method by which opportunities for development were revealed within the historical processes of underdeveloped nations was called the "linha de diretriz geral" or the "line of general direction."

In the first quarter 1956 edition of its journal, ISEB published an article entitled "Meaning and Perspective of the Kubitschek Government." The article correctly predicted several significant

Kubitschek policy acts.[13] On December 6, 7, and 8th, 1956, the Tribuna da Imprensa published a series of articles attacking ISEB. The first article entitled "Totalitarian Infiltration in Key Posts" attributed to ISEB the following statement: "Our plan is the infiltration, slowly and surely, of the administration until we control the key posts. Then we will transform the country."[14] Also in December, 1956, Kubitschek delivered the commencement address to the first graduation class of ISEB's one year graduate institute. Ciao Navarro de Toledo, in referring to Kubitschek's remarks and those of Minister of Education Clovis Salgado on the same occasion, stated that there was no doubt regarding the government's intention to use ISEB in the formulation of Kubitschek's policy, the Programa de Metas.[15] In the third quarter of 1958, Manchete, the Brazilian equivalent of Life magazine, published an article on ISEB which opened with these statements:

> In an old two-storied mansion, the ninth one as you go up or down the silent Rua das Palmeiros . . . eight men meet and study, research, debate and elaborate formulas. They constitute a laboratory of ideas. They have decisively influenced the destiny of the country in the last two years, and in the next months promise to influence much more . . . .[16]

One factor contributing to ISEB's dialectical role in policy-making was the perceived role of intellectuals in formulating an "ideology of national development." The "ideology of national development" was ISEB's scientific contribution to the task of directing historical forces toward national development.

Social Science Research and National Development

ISEB was established on July 14, 1955 by executive decree. It was set up as an independent unit of the Ministry of Education. It possessed "full administration autonomy and full liberty of research, opinion, and teaching." Its objectives were:

> . . . the study, teaching, and dissemination of the social sciences, especially sociology, history, economics, and political science, with the special objective of applying the categories and data of these sciences to the analysis and critical understanding of Brazilian reality with a view to the elaboration of theoretical instruments that will permit the stimulation and promotion of national development.[17]

Frank Bonilla remarks that:

> . . . ISEB is important and perhaps unique in being an officially sponsored institute for the research and study of [national] development . . . . The desire to bring the knowledge of social science systematically to bear on . . . prospects for growth is perhaps ISEB's most notable contribution and reflects strongly . . . imaginative and serious effort.[18]

Herminio Martins, in referring to ISEB's scholarly efforts spanning the August 24, 1954 suicide of President Getulio Vargas to military coup March 31, 1964, states:

> It is doubtful whether this sustained voluntary mobilization of the social-technical and humanistic intelligencia and its concentration over a decade on thinking afresh about economic, political and cultural issues has any close counterparts, certainly not with the same quantum of synchronous and converging intellectual effort. The distinction and quality of a fair portion of its work are impressive.[19]

The ISEB attempt to elicit the "categories and data" of social science for the analysis and ultimate solution of a public policy question is noteworthy for its timing as well as for the magnitude of the

attempt. ISEB predates attempts in the United States to integrate social science and public policy. President Kennedy's and President Johnson's reliance upon Harvard and the Brookings Institute for the New Frontier and Great Society social programs did not occur until the mid-1960's. But how can such public policy institutes be seen as providing a dialectic for national programs?

Dialectic and Policy Invention

Following Richard Weaver I concur that " . . . dialectic is epistemological and logical; it is concerned with discriminating into categories and knowing definitions . . . ."[20] However, in labeling, as I have, ISEB's activities as dialectical I mean to imply more than the analysis which logically precedes policy-making. It is discourse grounded in the realm of idea and action, aimed at determining fundamental policy terms. Weaver states:

> . . . there is a branch of dialectic which contributes to "choice or avoidance," and it is within this that rhetoric is regularly found. Generally speaking, this is a rhetoric involving questions of policy, and the dialectic which precedes it will determine . . . terms which are subject to the contingency of evaluation.[21]

The terms to which Weaver refers may include "equality," "security" or "freedom." The term which ISEB attempted to elucidate was "development." The theoretical instrument through which development was defined and revealed was, according to ISEB theorists, the "ideology of national development." The introduction to ISEB's first book, Introducao aos Problemas Brasileiros, published during the first quarter of 1956, explicitly states the dialectical function of ideology.

> They [lectures given during 1955 which comprise the volume] represent the first contribution of ISEB to the urgent struggle through which the Brazilian intelligencia attempts to foster an awakening of national reality . . . . In this task, for which ISEB was created, the indispensable presupposition appears to us to be the elaboration of an ideology of our development. Contributing to the formulation of this ideology we believe ourselves to be partially completing the common work of liberating Brazil.[22]

Ideology: Marx and Mannheim

Notice the commonplaces of "ideology" in the quotation cited above. Through some comprehensive and explanatory theory about human experience and the external world, ideology fosters an awakening to "national reality." Ideology facilitates the "liberation" of Brazil, presumably by setting out, in general and abstract terms, a program of social and political organization. The program entails "struggle." In the struggle "ideology" functions to recruit agents and to persuade them to greater commitment. Finally, notice the special leadership role conferred on the "Brazilian Intelligencia."[23]

All of the above senses of the word "ideology" are usually perceived as encrusted with Orthodox Marxism. It is erroneous to assume, however, that ISEB used a marxist concept of ideology in promoting national development. Though many ISEB theorists were sympathetic to Marx, most had reference to Karl Mannheim when they used ideology.[24] Mannheim was a German sociologist of the tradition of Comte and Hegel. And although "deeply influenced by Karl Marx . . . he deviated from Marxism in asserting that a better society might be achieved by non-revolutionary means."[25] Mannheim emphasized conscious political

action over materialistic determinism, especially in the construction of a sociology of knowledge to guide national consciousness and action. He envisioned a classless class of intellectuals capable of thinking independently and in the national interest by virtue of its freedom from class affiliation. This appears to be precisely the role which ISEB ascribed to itself. Vieira Pinto synthesized statements of many Institute intellectuals when he wrote:

> the ideology ought to arise from the mediation of a group of sociologists, economists and political scientists, who, superceding the restricted plane of their respective specialties, would be able to rise up to philosophical thought, through means of the comprehension of the real categories which configure the historical process and accompany the project of modifying the fundamental structures of the nation . . . . [26]

In classical Marxism ideologies arise out of the inner workings of social formation as classes define their interests. ISEB, while discarding the class-conflict model, retained the dynamic function of ideologies in societal change. The difference between ISEB's ideology and others was that its "ideology of national development" was a non-sectarian (or in the Marxist sense, a non-ideological) ideology, and thus above suspicion. "This vision of a small elite of superior minds rising above the myths of ordinary society seemed to some . . . to put Mannheim closer to Plato than to Marx . . . ."[27] In formulating an "ideology of national development," ISEB intellectuals saw themselves transcending, through the dialectic of social science, class interests, and academic disciplines to comprehend "national reality" on a plane reminiscent of the philosopher kings of Plato's Republic.

Ideology: Topoi of Ends and Means

As conceived by ISEB, the ideology of national development acted as (a) an essential instrument for the discovery of development policy and (b) a realm in which policy agents think and act, i.e., ideology surfaces a mode of thought that awakens the populace to the "real" causes of underdevelopment and motivates them to fight for national "liberation." Rhetorical theorists have traditionally considered these the roles of topoi in the inventional stages of public discourse. Karl Wallace identified the function of topoi to direct attention "to sources of information and argument and to modes of perception, interpretation, and judgment."[28] Classical topoi were instruments for searching the nature of problematic issues and for the discovery of both substance and structure in persuasive discourse. Richard McKeon notes that Giambatista Vico, Gottfried Leibniz and Francis Bacon transformed topics from sterile formulary receptacles of the familiar to "places for perception, discovery, and explanation of the unknown."[29] Considering this tradition and that balanced understanding of discourse requires a coherence of event and context, Scott Consigny argues that "topic functions both as instrument and situation; the instrument <u>with</u> <u>which</u> the rhetor thinks and the realm in and <u>about</u> <u>which</u> he thinks." (emphasis mine)[30]

<u>Rhetorical Analysis of Public Policy</u>

The study of topical invention poses for all who seriously investigate it the dilemma of creativity. Topical systems usually fall into two groups. There are high level abstractions which baffle

imagination; there are accessible commonplace forms and stock phrases which stifle imagination.[31] For pedagogical purposes most rhetorical treatments aim at what Aristotle called common topics--those which possessed universal applicability. In everyday practice, however, most discourse is based on special topics--those which have a limited range of applicability and are attached to specific classes of things. Aristotle stated:

> . . . Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument; comparatively few on the common or general kind . . . . The better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one's science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered.[32]

Apparently, Aristotle attributed the proper domain of rhetorical pedagogy as the study of universal topics. He nevertheless recognized that, outside the classroom, there is an inevitable movement from "pure" to "applied" rhetoric and dialectic which make extensive use of topics derived from policy sciences.[33] The distinction between pure and applied rhetoric entails some implications for the rhetorical analysis and criticism of public policy-making. To the degree policies are formulated by topics peculiar to policy sciences, and to the degree these same topics are utilized in public discourse which accompanies policy-making, rhetorical analysis and criticism must apprehend the categories of those sciences.

Topoi of Economics

Historically considered, ISEB's ideology grew out of an analysis of Latin American economies developed by the United Nations' Economic Commission on Latin America. The ECLA diagnosis revealed that intermittent economic growth in Latin America was induced by trade relations with industrialized nations. The ECLA aggressively advocated import substitution industrialization through state programming. The opening paragraph of Economic Development of Latin American and Its Principal Problems by ECLA director Raul Prebisch became a manifesto for economic nationalists in Brazil and elsewhere.

> In Latin America, reality is undermining the outdated schema of the international division of labor . . . . Under that schema, the specific task that fell to Latin America, as part of the periphery of the world economic system, was that of producing food and raw materials for the great industrial countries. There was no place within it for the industrialization of the new countries. It is, nevertheless, being forced upon them by events. Two world wars in a single generation and a great economic crisis between them have shown the Latin American countries their opportunities, clearly pointing the way to industrial activity.[34]

The ECLA doctrine, as it came to be known, stood in opposition to the orthodox comparative-advantages theory of international trade. Under that model, nations traded products which utilized their comparatively abundant factors of production. For example, Brazil, with temperate climate, and resources of land and labor grows coffee more cheaply than can the United States. Conversely, the United States, with capital, technology, skilled labor, abundant intermediate factors like steel, electricity, rubber and plastic makes cars more cheaply. When Brazil and the United States trade coffee for cars both utilize national resources efficiently and both are better off than they would

be producing their own cars or coffee. Not so, said Prebisch! Fundamental assymetrics between the industrialized center and the agricultural periphery work to increase the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries.

Argument of Unequal Gains

Essentially, two lines of argument support his proposition, one asserting unequal gains from trade and, another, uneven demand for trade. Both arguments provided new perspectives on the perennial problem that Latin American economists have in balancing their terms of trade. The argument of unequal gains proceeds as follows. Comparative-advantages commerce results in increasing deterioration in terms of trade between nations exchanging primary products (i.e., coffee) and manufactured goods (i.e., cars) because,

1. Productivity in manufacturing increases faster than productivity in agriculture.
2. Higher productivity should result in lower prices since items are made with increased ease and decreased cost, however
3. In industrialist countries, prices do not fall in proportion to increased productivity because trade unions act to return much of the productivity gains to the worker and because industries organize oligarchies to defend prices.
4. Since developing countries lack the political and organizational strength to intervene in the international market to support their own products, their prices tend to fall in relation to prices for manufactured products.

Simply stated, industrial nations make more and get more for what they make while agricultural nations make less and receive less.

Argument of Uneven Demand

The second line of argument features uneven demand for industrial and agricultural products. Beginning with the observation that as household income rises, the percentage spent on food decreases, Prebisch predicted that developing countries whose primary exports are agricultural would (as world per capital income increases) receive smaller and smaller slices of the growing world economic pie. This trend also would exert a pernicious influence on flows disadvantageous to the trade balance of the developing country. Using the coffee and automobile illustration introduced above, the argument operates as follows: as income grows in the United States, demand for coffee (Brazil's export) grows modestly. As income grows in Brazil demand for cars (the United States' export) grows dramatically. The most fundamental law of economics, the law of supply and demand, destined Latin American countries to sell their exports in a buyer's market and to buy their imports in a seller's market.

ISEB theorists accepted the ECLA premise that agricultural export economics were not viable. Some evidence suggests that government planning and programming techniques developed by the ECLA were adopted by prominent ISEB tecnicos who influenced Kubitschek's policy, the Programa de Metas.[35] However, ISEB theorists went beyond the ECLA arguments in an attempt to apprehend the "real categories which configure historical processes" and which might direct the

transformation of society.

Topoi of Sociology

ISEB scholars attempted to identify Brazil's national situation within the context of present historical conditions characterizing underdeveloped countries. ISEB employed a macro-sociological frame of analysis to conceptualize national systems in relation to global historical trends. In the current epic, global processes were directed by the dominant culture of western industrialized democracies. Through time national development was conceived of passing through determinate phases culminating in self-sustained economic growth, effective control of national decision centers, rational and dependable institutions, greater social participation and integration throughout national systems. In colonial and semi-colonial stages, however, the imbalance of economic power endemic to mercantilist trade fosters social relations within national subsystems--i.e. the economy, polity, society and culture--that act as structural obstacles to the attainment of national development.

According to ISEB analyses Brazil had already passed through colonial and semi-colonial structure types. (Colonial and semi-colonial structure types were marked with national structures which were oriented toward external authorities and burdened by irrational and unproductive social organization). The 1930 collapse of the international coffee market permitted Brazil to enter a transitional phase characterized by "an energetic and accentuated propensity toward development, hindered, however, by some strangulation points."[36] The

strangulation points consisted of or were caused by national structures held over from previous stages, i.e. old forms of organization or old values.

Among the strangulation point choking future growth within Brazil's economy was a foreign exchange crisis. The crisis, its conditions and causes, were a product of processes, organization and values attending trade patterns imposed in colonial and semi-colonial phases of Brazilian history. The crisis was in part due to

> the fact that the production of basic goods and services like electric energy, transportation, steel, etc., is inferior to the necessities of consumption [and by] the fact that an unsatisfactory rate of savings results in undercapitalization.[37]

The crisis is aggravated by inflation which is caused by national inability to produce goods and services to meet national consumption needs.

Within society, conceived as a national subsystem, parasitism obstructs national cohesion and democratization. Parasitism exists under the guise of maintaining class privileges. In the private sector parasitism frequently attacked foreign investment and defended meagerly productive enterprises, excluding healthy competition under the pretense of defending national principles. In the public sector, political payoffs and indirect subsidy of the middle class enlarged civil and military services well beyond the public interests in effective administration. The swollen bureaucracy resulted in general laziness and extremely poor service.

Structural obstacles inhibiting development of Brazil's polity were the Cartorial State and clientelism. The origins of these

structures are rooted in the economic history of Brazil. In the "semi-colonial period," 1850-1930, two classes functioned in the productive process of the nation. On the one hand there was the dominant class comprised of the senhores de engenho (plantation owners) and merchants. On the other was the dominated campesino (peasant) who, as the slaves before him, was fixed to the land. Gradually and as a mere by-product of urbanization, a middle class emerged. The middle class was not, as in European experience, attached to a rival power center focused on the new productive enterprise of industrialization. Estranged from the productive processes of the nation, the middle class found employment in the public sector in the military and civil service. Since Brazil had minimal needs for such services, they received, in effect, a public dole, a salary in exchange for slight contribution to the economy. Having no other purpose than to preserve its own privileges, the middle class became bureaucratic paper shufflers. The designation "Cartorial State" implies this employment; cartorio meaning "archive, civil registry or notary office."[38] In the administrative system of the colonial era royal officers known as "Cartorios fiscais" collected the duties destined for the crown in exchange for a share of the revenue. Hence, the essence of the Cartorial State consisted in that state which is constituted, as its first priority, in maintaining or assuring the status quo and thereby preserving the privileged position of its functionaries.

The "politica de clientela" also arises as a form of political action based in the social and economic relations of semi-colonial

Brazil.

> Out of this structure type, in which we have a dominant latifundia-merchant class, a dominated campesino class and a marginal middle class arises and configures the political process determined by the appropriate real conditions of this environment, the politica de clientela. Round about the fazendas, constituted as the economic and political nucleus of Brazilian life, were organized patron-client relationships between those factors dependent upon the production of that fazenda . . . and the proprietor of the land. These clientela relationships composed articulated ganglia, in a form similar to a pyramid, according to pacts of mutual advantage.[39]

With the assumption of republican institutions and the federal system, this preexisting social and economic pattern assumed a political dimension in which regional oligarchies manipulated government policies through respective clientelas. Between the dominant and dependent class this relationship materialized in an exchange of votes for employment in the public sector. Consequently, the Cartorial State was a product of the politica de clientela. The Cartorial State was also the instrument through which the politica de clientela was exercised and preserved.

Brazil's culture, considered both as a consequence of other national structures and as possessing the genetic meanings which determine them, was subject to alienation. Alienation occurs when comprehensions of the world are skewed by concepts more properly relegated to another time and place.

> This concept of alienation involves, for example in the economic area, the defence of the theses of economic liberalism which were adequate for England in manchesterian policy, but are inappropriate for a country at the stage of development which is required to hold in check the economic superiority of fully developed nations in order to create a space for the development of its own industrialization.[40]

According to ISEB analysis Brazil needed policies to expand and integrate industrialization, to functionalize the Cartorial State, to create a new social pact, and to disclose Brazilian reality. These, ISEB theorized, could be accomplished through ideologic education and organization. Through ideologic propagation, functional leadership would arise and a nationwide mobilization would occur in modernizing sectors of all social classes. New leadership and mass support probably would exert enough pressure to reform the Cartorial State, the last bastion of the old latifundia-merchant class. Ideology would organize, from the central value of national development, administrative strategies depoliticizing policy planning in "national interest" and coordinating government action. Finally, it would organize a new social pact allocating the benefits of development among social sectors and creating societally functional regimes of participation.

ISEB argued that "ideology" was not a relativist construct which was effective merely because it was attractive. They argued it was a historically and pragmatically valid "sociology of knowledge" to inform and dynamize societal change and development. Because it complied with the values (democratic, capitalist) and ends (national autonomy and endogeny) of the reigning historical epic, it was authentic. Because industrialization served the class interests of practically all sectors of society it was representative of the nation as a whole.

Topoi of the Possible

I have an observation to make in light of the foregoing discussion of the ISEB analysis of problems and prospects for national development. ISEB replaced historical with historicist notions of development. In so doing ISEB effected a "paradigm switch" which not only reinterpreted Brazilian underdevelopment as caused by extranational forces, it widened the spectrum of possible policy actions by stressing the creativity and indeterminancy of historical processes.[41] A notion of "substantial reality" granted formal validity for insights into economy-wide structural interrelatedness.[42] Also State acts in technologic planning and strategic intervention entailed a new concept of time. Through State action it became possible to compress formerly time-laden historical stages and literally "leap eras" in the pursuit of development.[43] This conception was manifest in Kubitschek's campaign slogan promising "50 years progress in 5."

Among common or universal topics Aristotle gave primacy to an investigation of "possible-impossible." Albert O. Hirschman, social critic, and economic advisor to national and international economic policy agencies in Latin America likewise stressed the primacy of this topic. He states: ". . . the fundamental bent of my writings has been to widen the limits of what is or is perceived to be possible."[44] Stressing the creative indeterminancy of social and political transformation potentially enables policy-makers "to bring out the uniqueness of a certain occurrence and to perceive an entirely new way of turning a historical corner."[45]

Traits of Hirschman's "possibilism" include: a conscious naivete to socio-political realities which are widely regarded to deter change, the function of ideology and government plans to make creative linkages shaping perceptions and garnering support, the constant revision of ends to available means, and the integrity of non-projected futures.[46] Objective conditions under which widening the range of possible action are likely to occur include: increased pressure on policy-makers to act (i.e. in Brazil's case, a widespread perception of dilemma), the availability of untried policy instruments (i.e. ECLA-inspired state direct "programming" of the economy), a shift of power relations between classes (i.e. the 1946 constitutional provision for direct election of the president), and better communications (i.e. the role of ISEB in fostering consensus of opinion regarding national development.)[47]

The master topic of economic policy-making in developing countries is, according to Hirschman, the ability of policy agents to perceive possibilities for development. He recognizes that "[i]f this ability is strictly limited, as is often the case, this very limitation emerges as a super obstacle, which commands and conditions the existence and seriousness of more conventional obstacles [i.e. infant mortality, literacy, etc.]"[48] to national development. Hirschman offers little assistance in explaining how these conceptions of "possible/impossible" on which policy-making so much depends appear and disappear. That is the problem to which we now turn in developing a communication model of national development rhetoric.

Communication Model of Brazilian Policy-Making

To this point I have argued for distinguishable roles in Brazilian development policy-making. Social science theory created by ISEB acted as dialectic to make determinate an indeterminate situation--i.e. Brazilian reality vis a vis national development. President Juscelino Kubitschek acted as rhetorician in his public discourse adjusting perceptions in ways favorable for the acceptance and implementation of development policy. I have argued that rhetorical analysis of policy rhetoric should include an investigation of topoi of policy science which serve as common places for both dialectic and rhetoric of policy-making. On the assumption that ISEB's "ideology of national development" functioned as designed, to reveal Brazilian reality and to invent development policy, I have explored some of the topics which policy science contributed to "available means" of persuasion in this historical era. Now I wish to consider an analytic framework by which the communication dynamics of ideology and policy-making can be revealed.

Brown has demonstrated that "the creation and communication of ideology proceed together."[49] Assuming the validity of that statement, can one demonstrate that "the creation and communication of national development policy during an era distinguished by prominent ideological activity likewise 'proceeded together'"?

When Brown states that the "creation and communication of ideology proceed together" he means that ideologies are created as

functions of the symbol properties of abstraction, reification and transcendence. He means that the growth and demise of ideologies are governed by the communication processes accompanying symbol-use and symbol-sharing. Consider briefly the symbol properties of abstraction, reification, and transcendence. Symbol-users ascribe names by which they order experience and attribute complex interpretative relationships to the world. The ascription of symbols necessarily abstracts from the totality of experience--blinding symbol-users to some aspects of reality as it calls attention to others. Sharers of symbols act together in ways which reify "interpersonal roles, status and hierarchy" and at the same time they "negotiate and ratify their relationships."[50] Thus across society, among and between groups and individuals, symbol-sharing both creates and expresses identity, need, motive and belief.

Brown notes that ideologies "flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious cycles [unreversed trends], and decline when it fails to do so."[51] Periodic system compensating shifts and reversals of communication are necessary to preserve the integrity of ideology. Since ideologies are relatively parsimonious ascriptions of reality which comprehensively order the understanding of "the way the world is and how everything fits in" they inadvertently delete some aspects of complex social reality while featuring others. Growing consciousness of an incomplete "fit" between the concept-ideas and "the way the world is" contributes to the creation of a rival, equally parsimonious, ideology which resolves former contradictions. Cued to the propensity of language to preserve fragments

of experience in an organic whole the new ideology transcends the old in a revised significance conferring a social pact that holds in tension "countervailing ideas, roles, and groups" and preserves perceptions of both change and continuity.[52]

Brown argues that strategic moments exist in the process of periodic adjustment of ideology to reality and of social transactions to "the way the world is." He suggests that the exploitation of these opportunities might possibly lead to the "founding of communication policy studies analogous to economic policy research--especially where, true to their rhetorical heritage, our writers begin to posit strategies and consequences of intervention into large scale social symbolizing."[53] Following Brown's suggestion, can a model be devised which would reveal communication interventions at strategic moments in the Brazilian policy process? A first step toward that end consists in describing communication subprocesses which Brown calls the need cycle, the power cycle, and the attention switching cycle.

Demonstration of Brown's Model

As a vehicle for presenting the model, let me assume the classroom manner of a former economics professor whose lectures consisted of demonstrations bound by simplifying pre-conditions. That the hypothetical "proofs" were conducted under such tightly controlled situations as to be patently unrealistic did not deter him from his conviction that they, nonetheless, illustrated and clarified certain fundamental dynamics of mass economic behavior.

With a similar faith, my present objective is to identify, with Brown, the three subprocesses by which parties in communication process organize themselves, and by which perceptions are selectively directed. The perspective I am about to present stands in contrast to others in which it is assumed that language represents objects and actions in their totality and that conceptions of "self," "other," "motive," "status" and "hierarchy" are independent and stable realities.

Demonstration 1

Imagine a static and vacuous world in which only two people exist. The two share a common language. They are, to this moment, strangers. They are amnesiacs. Upon meeting, each depends absolutely on the other to define and clarify the relations and positions each will occupy in the new society. In communication they negotiate identities of "self," "other" as well as an overarching conception of how each party fits into the way things are. An observer of their communication interaction would note, over time, patterns of behavior occurring along with words like "husband-wife," "ruler-subject," "aggressor-victim" in overarching constructs called "family," "monarchy," or "jungle." Furthermore, this observer might note that, in each situation, language imparts radically different motives to similar actions (with words like "love," "homage," and "rape.")

From Demonstration 1 one can deduce that language behavior reveals reciprocal, complementary and comprehensive social relations. As social organizer, language can be viewed statically in terms of

"status" and "hierarchy," or it can be actionally considered in terms of "motive."

Demonstration 2

Imagine a static and vacuous world in which only two people exist. The two share a common language. They are, to this moment, strangers. They are not amnesiacs. As a product of their own experience, they bring to the initial meeting certain expectancies with regard to "self," "other," and the overarching conception of how each party fits into the way things are. Upon their first meeting each depends upon the other to define roles in this new society, but not absolutely. They are not absolutely dependent because each has a past by which he "knows" himself. However, to the degree that this new world or their own expectancies require it, each must rely on the other to mediate his or her goals. The goals include the whole spectrum of needs from food to identity. An observer can choose to interpret their communication behavior as not "beginning from scratch" but as ratifying the expectations either has regarding "self," "other" and the overarching conception of how each fits in the way things are. Implicit to such behavior is the human drive to "see things as they really are" and, hence, to remove any "gaps" between conception-expectancies and day-to-day experience.

From Demonstration 2 one can deduce how two of Brown's subprocesses derive their name. To the degree that either party senses "gaps" between his or her concept-expectancies and experience, and wherever personal goals require the cooperation of others,

communication behavior is attributable to a hypostatized need for an appropriate response from others who are perceived as possessing the power to mediate it.

Demonstration 3

Imagine a static and vacuous world in which only two groups exist. The two share a common language. Within each group members are entirely homogeneous with essentially similar occupational experience, lifestyles, values, concept-expectancies and language use. Between groups, however, marked differences exist. The only social distinction made by each group is that of membership. Only the group determines who may or may not become a member, assume its joint identity and acquire privileged access to the group's product or service. Furthermore, assume that each group controls a necessary commodity or service for the sustenance of the new society. However, each group's control over its commodity or service is constrained by the need for the commodity or service which is controlled by the other group. Survival in this new society requires mutual interdependence. An observer notes that both groups have significance-conferring language constructs which provide a kind of "home" for the way of life each group requires. After opening interchange between groups, the observer chooses to note that communication between them (which occurs with behavior required by interdependence) is cyclical. He notes that, while much remains the same in the significance-conferring constructs of each group, subtle changes in language occur. Communications emphasizing the essentially competitive

nature of group transaction follows or precedes one emphasizing the essentially complementary nature of group transaction. The trends in communications seem to be keyed to the property of language to selectively direct attention of the group in ways which change perceptions of "self," "other" and "motives" for the action which engages both parties. To the variableness of language-mediated perceptions which operates as a social dynamic, Brown assigns the name of the attention-switching cycle.

Demonstration 4

Imagine a vacuous world in which four people exist. All share a common language. Individual behavior, social order, public action and ideology all change while remaining continuous. To the degree that individuals act together in this world they participate in significance-conferring language constructs. The constructs, called ideologies, legitimize social order and sanction public action in society involving separate and joint perceptions and behavior of individuals and groups. Assume this new world in which the individuals find themselves is sufficiently plastic to insure that all possible arrangements of groups and individuals constitute viable economic, social and political organization. Assume that for the predominant arrangement of individuals and groups at a given time there exists a significance-conferring ideology which legitimizes alliances, hierarchy, status and roles between and within groups, and between individuals and groups.

Brown notes that the convergence and divergence of individual and group interests (rhetorically conceived as the product of individual or group-stressing versions of identity) seems to coincide with broad shifts in some fundamental and common language categories. Each system compensating "attention shift" not only transcends predecessors in its ascription of "the way the world is," it likewise legitimizes fundamental and reciprocal power relations regarding "how each individual or group fits in."

Model Dynamics in Policy-Making

"Gaps" between concept-expectancies governing social, political and economic organizations and common sense reality occur frequently in Latin America. This recurring hiatus and the corresponding desire to achieve closure on an ambiguous "national situation" characterizes Latin American political communication and policy-making. Social conflict, political instability, poor economic achievement in comparison to the industrialized West drives Latin Americans to adopt "comprehensive" national solutions. Failure of ambitious government programs prompts introspective and self-conscious appraisals of ideologically governed policy-making.[54] Because they are so frequently called into question, ideologies occupy a prominent role in Latin American policy-making. Albert Hirschman has noted:

> The search of Latin Americans for the cause of their continent's economic backwardness has focused successively on a number of possible explanations: on the supposed intrinsic defects of the Latin American character, on imperialist exploitation and on being subjected to false economic doctrines, on the lack of purposeful action by the state or alternately on

> excessive and arbitrary state intervention, on the deadening rigidity of the social and economic structure inherited from the Spanish Conquest, or on a combination of these factors. Everyone of these positions then leads naturally and logically to the espousal of certain policies and positions over a wide range of social and economic issues: in other words, each determines a "system" is part of an ideology.[55]

The ill-fit between most ideologies directing government attempts at economic, social and political organization and the social/cultural milieu of Latin America has, in the opinion of some Latin Americanists, contributed to the political instability of the region.[56] Certainly, these traits make "national development" a category of public discourse distinct from public policy-making of other countries whose sense of nationhood is already clearly defined and accepted, with periodic revisions, as a given.

Needs Cycles

Having conceived the dynamics of Brown's theory through hypothetical demonstrations, I now wish to model communication dynamics which underlie vicious cycles leading to the emergence or decline of symbolically construed versions of "possible" policy acts.[57]

Following Demonstrations 1 and 2 and considering the endemic and intrusive fact of "underdevelopment" which pervades Latin American discourse I model a "need" system for policy agents. When policy agents have internalized a "need" for development and find it being withheld or challenged, the need becomes more urgent, more advocacy is directed toward others perceived as possessing the power to meet the need, and more attention is directed toward



Figure 1. Policy Agent Need System[53]

communications through which relevant power holders may respond. Without responses from those with the power to meet the need a vicious cycle ensues: increased urgency leads to more advocacy and greater attentiveness to relevant others, leading to greater urgency and so on. When others with power do respond appropriately, urgency is diminished, advocacy and open channeled behavior subside. Without periodic responses from appropriate sources of power the misfit between "development" and everyday experience can lead to breakdown and atrophy of concept-expectancies associated with "development,"

"self" and "others" which form the fabric of societal interaction.

The need cycle can also be schematized in ways which reveal communication dynamics peculiar to Brazilian political culture. Those involved in "doing" politics are guided by role expectations derived from national institutions, cultural mores, comprising the "politica de clientela." Following Demonstrations 1 and 2 and in consideration of the ways Brazilian policy-makers organize themselves the need system could be modeled as follows:



Figure 2. Policy-maker Need System

Politicians survive and succeed by aggregating a heterogenous network of alliances and agreement. Loose party structures facilitate highly personal and particular interactions. Politicians are attentive to appeals from groups and individuals which can provide supports for career growth (i.e. votes). At the same time they are attentive to power holders above, especially the President, who can supply a currency of patronage opportunities (i.e. civil service jobs, public works projects, manipulation of exchange and trade mechanisms, etc). The politician is dependent upon those both above and below him in the political system, as they are upon him. The "power" which each agent or group has in selecting a shared future is determined by directions and degrees of dependency at any given moment in each issue. Brown states: "When human beings have to rely upon one another symbolically in order to act toward the future, their 'power' is their 'share' of the choice-making on which others have to depend."[59] Significantly, Brown's concept of "ideology as communication process" subsumes both the "mythic" ordering of social reality and the structural determinates of power.[60]

Power Cycles

Politicians act to define and remedy the endemic and intrusive fact of underdevelopment. Those acts are perceived to entail change or continuity in social order as they move to distribute benefits of development among various groups. However, assuming that groups and "collective mind" are ontologically as real as individuals--one

might say that groups or institutions, acting through a variety of agents, formulate policies which promote social continuity/change while they define and negotiate their interests. In this sense the driving force in policy-making is not individual politicians themselves, but the groups which they represent, respect or fear. Following Brown's suggestion that ". . . power shares of 'groups' may be profitably transposed to 'roles' while schematizing the overall societal act of future-choosing . . . ," I have modeled the power cycle for Brazilian development policy-making.[61]



Figure 3. Power Cycle of Policy Agents

When a development crisis reveals or compels contradictory interests throughout society some groups, if they can mount a substantial threat to public welfare, attempt to compel the government and other sectors to comply with their demands. The greater the social disorder this action creates, the greater likelihood that police and military institutions will be called upon to assert the government's, or as in the case of military coups, their own, rightful monopoly of force. The more social disorder entailing competing claims to equality, justice, fairness, liberty, etc., the greater revision of values the church makes in defending or attacking present or proposed regimes of power. The greater the pressure of social conflict, the greater use or threatened use of government force; the greater the value clarification by figures representing national conscience, the more the government is pressured to act in the adjustment/preservation of order. Without strategic intervention which can resolve contradiction of interests across society, and preserve consonance between government, military and church, in Brown's terminology, "a system-breaking revolution" results.[62]

Brown calls this strategic intervention an attention switch. Policy agents (conceived as masses, classes or elites) are open or closed to government acts to meet the development crises in compliance with rhetorically created conceptions of group/individual interests. Periodic system-balancing attention shifts manipulate these conceptions of group/individual interest (i.e. identity) to effect perceptions of complementary or competitive relations among major institutions in the national power cycle.

Another version of a power cycle suggested by Nathaniel Leff is more appropriate to policy-makers within the political system than policy agents without it. While the Brazilian government had little control over the development crises which confronted it, the government (and especially the president) had substantial freedom in the selection of theoretical and technological instruments by which to identify, solve and prioritize the crisis. Thus, in consideration of the "modernizing economic ideology" and following Demonstrations 2, 3, and 4 I model the power cycle for policy-makers.



Figure 4. Policy-makers Power Cycle[63]

Media representations of national crisis heighten public attention to the invention of government policies to cope with crisis. The need for technically sound programs and policies heighten the roles of ISEB and other tecnicos in elaborating themes for national development. The President selectively enacts development themes to raise public support for his administrative programs, and to meet expectations of program success.

Strategic Communication Interventions

The strategic communication intervention which prevents a system break-down (i.e. crisis generating more policy invention, more theorizing, more government action yielding greater public perception of crisis, more presidential acts, etc.) entails the creation of a new identity- and significance-conferring social pact which transcends the present crisis and creates consensus on future means and goals for national development. Brown characterizes the strategic intervention by saying there are correspondences between changes from group-identity constructions to individuated-identity ones and changes in fundamental language categories. He observes that:

> the alternation of individuality-emphasizing identities with collectivity-stressing ones will be facilitated in rhetoric-as-compensatory-to-division by such strategic "anamoly-masking" or "anamoly-featuring" as actualized by tactics of (1) changing back and forth among conceptions of epistemology . . . ; (2) passing not only from one epistemology to another but also among variant modes of axiology and ontology; (3) going from one level of metaphor to another . . . ; and (4) moving between strict and loose construction of any rhetorical vision. . . .[64]

Brown's taxonomy of categorical correspondences to strategic shifts in identity may assist by providing a macro-communication

theory for the impact of ISEB's "ideology of national development" on Brazilian policy-making. So long as individuality-emphasizing versions of development theory predominated Brazilians were responsible and culpable for the sad state of national affairs. When, however, underdevelopment was conceived as a product of regimes of motivation imposed by human organization it was the structure of society that determined underdevelopment and therefore was blameworthy. As the onus of underdevelopment was removed from individuals so was the responsibility for the revision of national structures. So the task of restructuring fell to government. ISEB development theory emphasized a new collectivity-stressing version of Brazilian identity in the dilemma of national development. They were all victims of underdevelopment perpetrated by extra-national forces and agents. ISEB theory created new role expectancies for State technologic planning and programming--a role in which tecnicos figured predominantly. Furthermore, ISEB theory widened the spectrum of perceived possible policy acts by stressing the creativity and indeterminance of historical process. Finally, ISEB theorists speculated on the formal and epistemic validity of the theoretical construction of "national" reality in contrast to the uncritical acceptance of cosmopolitan ways of knowing and doing which, it was believed, alienated Brazilians from themselves and deterred national development.

Brown suggests a grammar of strategic interventions which I have adopted as a critical instrument for a rhetorical analysis of Brazilian development rhetoric.[65]

1. At the level of intrapersonal need cycle there exists the possibility of power responses facilitating or inhibiting attentiveness between significant parties within the policy process.

2. At the level of interpersonal power cycle there exists the possibility of attention shifts which aid or obstruct perceived complementarity of role-functions among significant groups or institutions. These strategic interventions promote or retard consensus/cooperation necessary for policy success.

3. At the level of ideation there exists the possibility of initiating or postponing attention shifts which promotes perceptions of continuous/discontinuous change in the society of which the policies are seen as derivative or anticipatory. Attention shifts can be identified by locating correlations between waxing and waning of rhetoric-as-compensatory-to-division and shifts in fundamental language categories. Attention switches effect gestalt switches in which contradictions of former reality construing ideologies are resolved in others so that there are periodic reversals in dynamic tensions holding together countervailing ideas, roles and groups.[66]

With model in hand and critical instruments ready I would like to turn attention to Kubitschek's policy rhetoric.

Conclusion

In modern statecraft public policy institutes are often seen as the fountainheads of theory directing broad shifts in public policy. In this project ISEB has been identified as the formulator of an "ideology of national development" which significantly influenced Kubitschek policies. However, in characterizing ISEB's ideology as a topoi for both substantive and instrumental features of Kubitschek's policy-making I do not wish to imply that "theorizing" was a necessarily prior or primal factor in policy-making. I argue this point on the nature of the dual roles of developmental

intellectuals in ISEB, and because communication models which I have elaborated do not warrant such interpretation.

Roles normally regarded as distinct in United States' policy-making were joined in ISEB intellectuals. Thomas Skidmore identified prominent "developmentalist" intellectuals noted for their close ties to the planning and administrative functions in the Kubitschek regime. All of the men he cites, with the possible exception of Celso Furtado, were faculty members, administrators, or served on advisory or governing boards of ISEB.[67] Skidmore states:

> It is impossible to understand the influence of the "developmentalist" intellectuals unless one realizes that many of their number were also influential in actually shaping government policies after 1951, especially in the sphere of economic policy. Social science administrators such as Celso Furtado, Romulo de Almeida, Ewaldo Correia Lima, Roberto Campos, and Helio Jaguaribe were engaged not only in spelling out a rationale for rapid industrialization, but also in planning and administering parts of the government roles in this process.[68]

In these men the role of social scientist and planner/administrator were joined. As a consequence, it is impossible to determine in which direction influence flowed, from planning/administering to theorizing or from theorizing to planning/administering. The concurrence of "thinking" and "doing" so often separated in roles of science and industry or academia and politics were joined in ISEB. The dual roles of Institute members colored the "ideology of national development." Frank Bonilla remarks:

> The ideology formulated in part by and, to an important degree, in behalf of the nation's social technicians and economic programmers . . . [was] weighed more with an eye to its usefulness than its mere capacity to charm. The new nationalism is a credo for men of power with a job to do rather than for zealots out to refashion the world.[69]

In Figure 4 I model communication dynamics which link presidential enactments, media representations, government acts and ISEB theorizing. Note that an observer may being at any point in the cycle, stressing first, the communications flowing from ISEB to the president, or second, those from the government to ISEB. Model dynamics account for policy-making less in terms of cause-effect and more in terms of progressive developments.

The communication model of Brazilian policy-making which is elaborated in the second half of this chapter reveals symbol strategies entailed in policy-making. Strategic interventions at intrapersonal need cycle open or close attentiveness to "others" which might be perceived as possessing the power to meet needs. "Others" may or may not make needs-relevant responses. A needs-relevant response not only decreases need salience but clarifies the individual's "identity," "role," "motive" and "attitude" toward "others" in the ambiguous "national situation."

Strategic interventions in the power cycle feature complementarity, or the lack of it, between significant reference groups. The more complementary the relations between perceived power holders, the greater likelihood of significant organization and motivation of the populace in a significance- and identity-conferring social pact. New social pacts transcend the old ones in ways which both

preserve and modify the dynamic tensions between ideas, groups and roles and thereby promote or retard consensus and cooperation necessary for policy success.

ENDNOTES

[1]Topoi interpreted as "places for perception, discovery, and explanation of the unknown" in Richard McKeon, "Creativity and the Commonplace," Philosophy and Rhetoric 6 (Fall 1973): 205. See page 109 which follows.

[2]Topoi interpreted as "instrument and situation; the instrument with which the rhetor thinks and the realm in and about which he thinks" in Scott Consigny, "Rhetoric and Its Situations," Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (Summer 1974): 182. See page 109.

[3]For a summary statement of "possibilism" see Albert O. Hirschman, "Introduction: Political Economics and Possibilism" in A Bias for Hope, Essays on Development in Latin America, ed.: Albert O. Hirschman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-37. See page 119 which follows.

[4]William R. Brown, "Ideology as Communication Process," Quarterly Journal of Speech 64 (April, 1978): 123-140.

[5]Ibid., p. 123.

[6]William R. Brown, "Toward a Complementary Version of Rhetorical-Vision Theory," unpublished paper, circa 1982.

[7]This is a phrase first used by John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964), p. 117.

[8]Nelson Werneck Sodre, "Historia do ISEB: 1. Formacao," Temas de Ciencias Humanas, ser. 1, (1977): 101-123; "Historia do ISEB: 2. Crise," ser. 2, (1977): 119-143; "Historia do ISEB: 3. Fechamento," ser. 4, (1978): 69-91.

[9]Werneck Sodre, "Formacao," p. 105.

[10]Roland Corbisier, Juscelino Kubitschek e a Luta pela Presidencia, uma Campanha Civilista (Sao Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1976), pp. 19, 21. Corbisier met Kubitschek at a party sponsored by Augusto Frederico Schmidt at the home of Irael Klabin. Schmidt and Klabin were on the advisory board of ISEB.

[11]Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 165.

[12]Juscelino Kubitschek, Meu Caminho Para Brasilia, Vol. 2: A Escala Politica (Rio: Bloch Editores, 1976), p. 410.

[13]"Sentido e Perspectivos do Governo Kubitschek," Cadernos do Nosso Tempo (March, 1956): 1-17. For example ISEB correctly predicted the formation and significance of a Development Council to coordinate ministerial implementation of the development plan.

[14]Werneck Sodre, "Formacao," pp. 113, 114.

[15]Caio Navarro de Toledo, ISEB: Fabrica de Ideologias, 2nd edition (Sao Paulo: Editora Atica, 1978), pp. 33,34.

[16]Werneck Sodre, "Crise," pp. 121, 122.

[17]Decreto 37068 of July 14, 1955. Diario Oficial, July 15, 1955. Quoted in Kalman H. Silvert, ed., Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 236.

[18]Frank Bonilla, "A National Ideology for Development: Brazil," in Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development, ed.: Kalman H. Silvert (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 232-264. Quotation which follows cited from 237, 238, 239.

[19]Herminio Martins, "Ideology and Development: 'Developmental Nationalism' in Brazil" in Latin American Sociological Issues, ed.: Paul Halmos (Keele: Keele University, 1967), pp. 153-170. Quotation cited from p. 153.

[20]Richard Weaver, Language is Sermonic; Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric, eds.: Richard L. Johannesen, Renard Strickland and Ralph T. Eubanks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 174.

[21]Ibid., p. 21. See also his discussion of dialectic in Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1970), pp. 15-22, 25, 27-29; Richard M. Weaver, Visions of Order; the Cultural Crisis of Our Time (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), pp. 55-72, 92-112. For Weaver's discussion of the dialectical function of social science in modern society see the essay entitled, "The Cultural Role of Rhetoric" in Language is Sermonic.

[22]Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, Introducao aos Problemas do Brasil (Rio: ISEB, 1956), p. 9.

[23]Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1982 ed., s.v. "Ideology."

[24]Helio Jaguaribe describes ISEB orientation as that of interpreting "Brazil anew in the light of historicism, post-keyesian economics, and Mannheim's sociology," Helio Jaguaribe, "The Dynamics of Brazilian Nationalism" in Obstacles to Change in Latin America, ed.: Claudio Veliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 173.
For specific instances of Mannheim's influence on ISEB see footnotes 17, 19 in Paul Halmos, ed., Sociological Issues, p. 172.

[25]Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1982 ed., s.v. "Ideology."

[26]Alvaro Vieira Pinto, Consciencia e Realidade Nacional, Vol. 1: A Consciencia Ingenua (Rio: ISEB, 1960), p. 49.

[27]Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1982., s.v. "Ideology."

[28]Karl Wallace, "Topoi and the Problem of Invention," Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (December 1972): 387.

[29]Richard McKeon, "Creativity and the Commonplace," Philosophy and Rhetoric 6 (Fall 1973): 205.

[30]Scott Consigny, "Rhetoric and Its Situations," Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (Summer 1974): 182.

[31]McKeon, "Creativity," p. 119. "Places, topics, loci, commonplaces and proper places have had long paradoxical histories since they entered the languages of the West. They were as ambiguous in ordinary Greek as they are in ordinary English and the nature of "place" and "space" was a subject of dispute in the beginnings of Greek physical science. They became terms of art in Greek rhetoric, acquired fixed meanings in Roman rhetoric, and spread, with the widespread use of rhetoric in the development of the arts of practical philosophy, jurisprudence, history, and literature, to commonplace meanings which are frequently at variance with their uses as terms of art."

[32]Rhetoric I:2, 1358a.

[33]In this regard note how frequently within his discussion of political discourse Aristotle bridges into political science and ethics.

For example he introduces political discourse (I:4) by stating "we will mention those points which it is of practical importance to distinguish, their fuller treatment following naturally to political science." Compare Aristotle's discussion of goodness, happiness and their essences in I:5,6,9 to his Nicomachean Ethics I. Compare his discussion of utility I:8 to his Politics III, IV.

[34]Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations, 1950).

[35]According to Octavio Ianni the Programa de Metas embodied the analysis, diagnosis and economic decisions of two previous sources: Juscelino Kubitschek's Diretrizes Gerais do Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico and a joint ECLA and BNDE (National Development Bank of Brazil) report entitled Analise e Projecoes do Desenvolvimento Economico. Octavio Ianni, Estado e Planjamento Economico no Brasil (Rio: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1971), p. 152. The BNDE, ECLA and ISEB sponsored a joint conference on National Developmentalism in 1954.

[36]Helio Jaguaribe, Condicioes Institucionais do Desenvolvimento (Rio: ISEB, 1958), p. 17.

[37]Ibid.

[38]A Portuguese-English Dictionary, 1970 ed., James L. Taylor ed., s.v. "cartorio."

[39]Jaguaribe, Condicioes, p. 21.

[40]Ibid., p. 19.

[41]The term "paradigm" is borrowed from Thomas Kuhn. In the postscript he defines paradigm as, first, a constellation of beliefs, values and techniques shared by a scientific community and, second, puzzle-solutions in which certain models or examples serve as the basis for the solution of remaining puzzles. I use paradigm in his more general sense as the template through which scientists see the world of their research. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 111, 175.

[42]For the concept of "substantial rationality," see Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), p. 58.

[43]For sociological analysis of western macro-time orientations, see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), pp. 196-222.

[44]Albert O. Hirschman, ed., A Bias for Hope, Essays on Development in Latin America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p.28.

[45]Ibid., p. 27.

[46]The best summaries of "possibilism" can be found in this introductory essay, Albert O. Hirschman, "Introduction: Political Economics and Possibilism," A Bias for Hope, Essays on Development in Latin America, ed: Albert O. Hirschman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-37.

[47]These conditions were applied in particular to the role of substitution in government programs. However, they apply equally to the role of theory and ideology in policy-making. For his discussion of substitution see Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 232, 233.

[48]Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," in A Bias for Hope, Essays on Development in Latin America, p. 327.

[49]Brown, "Ideology," p. 123.

[50]Ibid., p. 124.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Brown, "Complementary," p. 17.

[53]William Brown, "The History of Public Address in the Age of Information," Central States Speech Journal (Winter 1982): 234.

[54]Albert O. Hirschman presents an extremely interesting discussion of Latin American policy-making in a section entitled, "Digressions: The Semantics of Problem-Solving" in Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America, pp. 247-249. He notes that Latin American discourse accompanying policy-making "is extraordinarily rich in laudatory and derogatory epithets." The terms are clustered about two value orientations,

the first, a comprehensive ideological approach toward policy-making, the second a remedial realistic approach. In Latin American discourse policies are most often condemned for being remedial, and most often praised for being comprehensive." Hirschman concludes by saying "The 'fundamental' approach of yesterday becomes today's "palliative' or 'piecemeal' approach and a new 'definitive solution' is proposed, only to be similarly downgraded tomorrow." p. 249.

[55]Albert O. Hirschman, "Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America," in Latin American Issues, Essays and Comments, ed: Albert O. Hirschman (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 34, 35.

[56]Culturalist explanations of political behavior feature the distinctive and pervasive characteristics derived from Latin America's Iberian heritage, i.e. patrimonialism-authoritarianism. The corporatist structure of society pervades attempts to encourage more representative and participatory governance. The contradiction between the formation and exercise of power produces an impasse in which there are three basic positions. "On the one hand is the (reformist, liberal, optimistic) argument that while the theory and basic laws of Latin America are viable, it is the practices (and social structure) that are weak and in need of reform. On the other is the conservative, often caudillistic argument that while practices are adequate or 'functional,' it is the theory and the law that must be modified to make them more reflective of reality. Finally, there is the realistic 'culturalist' explanation that simply accepts the disparity between theory and practice and argues that it is normal for Latin Americans to live on two planes that do not converge." Howard J. Wiarda, "Political Culture and National Development: In Search of a Model for Latin America: Latin American Research Review 13 (Winter 1978): 262. For a culturalist perspective of Latin American political instability see Louis K. Harris and Victor Alba, The Political Culture and Behavior of Latin America (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1974), pp. 40-52.

[57]The following models and grammar are, in large measure, adapted from William R. Brown, "Complementary."

[58]The policy agent need cycle is closely modeled after "Actor's Need Cycle" Figure 1 in Brown, "Complementary." My description of need cycle is substantively identical to Brown's description (pp. 17, 18) except I sketch as need animating communication in terms of "development" rather than "equality."

[59]William R. Brown, "Eiconics, Ecodynamics, and Political Communication," paper presented before the Speech Communication Association meeting in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 4 November 1978, p. 4.

[60]Michael Calvin McGee has observed that symbolist concept of "myth" (represented by Ernest Bormann, Kenneth Burke, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and Walter Lippman) and Marxian concept of "ideology" unnecessarily conflict over the notion of "power." "The Marxist asks how the [structural] 'givens' of a human environment impinge on the development of political consciousness; the symbolist asks how the human symbol-using, reality-creating potential impinges on material reality, ordering it normatively, 'mythically.' See Michael Calvin McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology," Quarterly Journal of Speech (February 1980): 3.

[61]Brown, "Complementary."

[62]My Figure 3 is substantively similar to Figure 3 in "Complementary," with my addition of "development crisis." The description which follows is similar to that given by Brown, "Complementary," pp. 22, 23.

[63]Brown illustrates the system breakdown of unreversed trends in political/ideological dynamics in "Ideology," pp. 124, 125.

[64]My Figure 4 is very similar to Brown's Figure 4 in "Complementary." I attribute functions of "empathizing" and "enacting" to particular agents while Brown discusses roles anonymously. My discriptions of Figure 4 draw substantially upon ideas Brown used to describe the cycle dynamics, pp. 24, 25.

[65]Ibid., pp. 37, 38.

[66]Ibid., pp. 21, 25, 27, 28.

[67]Romulo de Almeida was on the ISEB advisory board. During Vargas' final term of office he was chief of Presidential Economic Advisory Staff. He was a leading intellectual light in the Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Politica (1952-1954), a forerunner of ISEB. In 1958 he became Kubitschek's Minister of Labor. Ewaldo Correio Lima was chairman of the economics department of ISEB. Roberto Campos was president of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic Development, BNDE, and chairman of the Development Council. Campos served on ISEB's Executive Board of Directors. Helio Jaguaribe was chairman of the political science department of ISEB and probably project administrator for government steel production projects in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul. Not included in Skidmore's quotation is Candido Mendes de Almeida, chairman of the history department of ISEB and administrator of Kubitschek's railroad improvement project. Also not included is Lucas Lopes, member of the ISEB advisory board and Kubitschek's Finance Minister from 1958 to

1961. Celso Furtado frequently collaborated with ISEB in publications and conferences. In 1959 he became director of the Superintendency for Economic Development in the North East, SUDENE.

[68]Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford Press, 1967), p. 380.

[69]Bonilla, "National," pp. 260-262.

CHAPTER V

MODEL-DIRECTED CRITICISM OF POLICY COMMUNICATIONS AND STRATEGIES

Brown compares the process by which a communication historian investigates events to that used by observational geologists studying fossil remains. From fossil remains the geologist makes inferences regarding climate, population, diet, social groupings, individual history and physiology of the specimen based on current understandings of present ecosystems. The inferences of the communication historian are based on a systems and process analysis which begins with the premise that events and actions can be explained best through approximating symbol-mediated individual and group perceptions of "selves," "others," "needs," "relationship," and "power." In the analysis which follows the author attempts to employ communication process models of Brazilian policy-making to discover how agents, groups, and institutions organize and disorganize themselves in policy-making. The chapter analyzes the text of a letter which appeared in the Correio da Manha defending Church-State cooperation in development projects, and the text of a speech which Kubitschek delivered to bishops of diocese located in North East Brazil. The analysis views the texts in two ways: as expressions of needs, power relations and identity structures, and as attributions of needs, power relations and identity structures.

Following the grammar developed in Chapter IV attributions are evaluated as strategic to the degree they assist or deter organization which facilitates or inhibits Kubitschek's development policy. Throughout the chapter the focus shifts from immediate to mediated audience, from present to future or past events in an attempt to characterize symbol and administrative strategies employed in the speech as representative of Kubitschek's policy rhetoric. Chapter V attempts to illustrate symbol strategies which paralleled the policy-making process.

Background to Communication Events: Agents and Audiences

In the analysis of Kubitschek's speech and the narration of events that surround it the critic's attention should be given to the needs which motivate advocacy and/or open-channeled behavior of the participants. The speech illustrates advocacy of at least four visible parties. They include President Kubitschek, Catholic bishops of Northeastern diocese, administration opponents and tecnicos. Beyond them, however, there are invisible audiences who, though not actually present, are in some ways addressed by the language strategies which these four parties make in attempt to mediate their needs. Among the invisible audiences are subscribers to the Rio de Janeiro daily, Correio da Manha. For example, one might conceive of Kubitschek's speech, which was completely reproduced in the Correio, as addressing the urban middle class which, quantitatively

speaking, represented the most significant factor comprising "public opinion." The urban middle class emerged in tandem with Brazilian industrialization which began in the mid-1930's. It was they who, on the basis of the government's performance, stood to gain or lose much of newly acquired democratic participation and economic prosperity. Another invisible audience was panelinha power brokers at local, regional and federal levels who, with the initiation of a new administration, stood to gain or lose power. Also through the newspapers the President, his critics and the bishops spoke directly to military and church opinion leaders and to broader national audiences about military and church roles in public affairs.

Saturday, May 26, 1956 in Campina Grande, Paraiba, President Juscelino Kubitschek addressed the final session of a week-long conference on regional development. Bishops of the diocese located in the periodically drought-stricken North East convened to discuss the role of church and government in changing unjust socio-economic structures which held so many of their parishioners in abject poverty. The "Encounter" as it was called, was the first of several such meetings sponsored by a newly formed Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos do Brazil. Also present at this conference was CNBB's Secretary General, Dom Helder Camara and the papal nuncio to Brazil, Dom Armado Lombardi. Representatives of several federal ministries whose agencies operated in the North East and tecnicos were also present.

Churchmen and Social Change

What would motivate churchmen to sponsor a conference on regional development? Thomas C. Bruneau maintains that this conference and other acts were an attempt "to shift the nature of its [i.e. Church's] power from maintaining the status quo to supporting social change in order to continue to exercise religious influence."[1] For at this time in the Brazilian North East, Francisco Juliao was forming peasant unions which were threatening the power of the Church. Formerly the Church had been identified with archaic land tenure patterns and power structures, and consequently stood in jeopardy of being swept away with the rising tide of revolution against them.[2] In his book, Catholic Radicals in Brazil, Emmanuel de Kadt narrates the story of a Franciscan priest who in late 1950, published a pastoral letter to his rural land-owning parishioners. In it he warned that the campesino's

> . . .situation is subhuman . . . [and] agitators are reaching the fields. If they act with intelligence they will not even have to invent anything. They merely need to comment on reality, to lay bare the situation in which rural workers live and vegetate. Far be it from us, to do justice moved by fear. Anticipate the revolution. Do from a spirit of Christianity what the directives of the Church indicate. . . .[3]

This fundamental threat to the Church's influence in rural areas aroused social consciousness and awakened Christian responsibility for justice. Forced to confront the unpleasant reality in which millions of their parishioners existed, churchmen began to realize that they had something to say about society and its transformation. A conference document stated:

> Nobody should be surprised to see us involved with problems concerning the temporal order. For man, as a union of body and soul, the relationship between material and spiritual questions is constant.[4]

To the degree that the laity internalized the premise the Church in Brazil ceased narcotizing the masses and started goading them for reform; the Church legitimized change in the name of justice. And to the degree this new role for the Church in public policy was accepted by other parties in the power cycle (as Figure 3 suggests, the populace, military, and government) Kubitschek would have a powerful force in the prosecution of his development policies. Kubitschek's critics, however, attacked Church activism. Consequently, the first issue which Kubitschek addressed in his speech was recent criticisms of the new Church-State cooperation in development projects.

Kubitschek and Legitimacy

In broaching this issue it is significant to note how needs of Administration and Church are joined. The Church needed acceptance of its new activist role in changing "injustices inherent in structures of our political organization and our economic system" in an "evangelistic mission" to rehabilitate and redeem the "downtrodden."[5] Following a raucous election, military disquiet and social disorder, Kubitschek needed to have his programs and leadership legitimized. In Kubitschek's speech these two needs are joined. In the second paragraph Kubitschek was careful to disclaim any impropriety in the bishop's request for his appearance--"the impression occurred to no one, much less to me, that the Catholic Church was

going out of its proper limits." (351)[6] In the third paragraph Kubitschek cited Dom Helder Camara as evidence of the Church's imprimatur upon his presidency as "definitively sacralized by the legitimacy of law and by popular will."(352)

These two issues--Church activism and Kubitschek legitimacy--had been linked in a controversy in which open letters were exchanged in Rio newspapers. The controversy was generated when Kubitschek's critics attempted to close public receptivity to a government-planned Church-sponsored slum urbanization project. Carlos Lacerda, editor of the opposition newspaper, Tribuna da Imprensa, wrote open letters to Kubitschek and Dom Camara attacking the project. The auxiliary archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Helder Camara, published a reply about a week later on April 3 in the Correio da Manha. Before proceeding further in an analysis of Kubitschek's speech I wish to turn attention to the letter in which Dom Camara replied to criticism from Carlos Lacerda.

Carlos Lacerda, Administration Critic

Carlos Lacerda was, for his era, a kind of anti-communist journalistic gadfly of Brazilian presidents. His newspaper criticisms of Kubitschek's predecessor Getulio Vargas made Lacerda the target of an assassination plot which was instigated by the President's chief of security. The attempt misfired and one of Lacerda's companions, a young Air Force officer, Major Rubens Florentino Vaz, was killed. This event precipitated a military ultimatum that Vargas resign. Vargas, with an unerring sense of political drama, climaxed his opposition by

committing suicide on August 24, 1954. Public sentiment for the fallen president forced Lacerda into voluntary exile, from which he wrote the open letters to Kubitschek and Dom Helder Camara.

*Historical Digression: Dom Camara's Letter

Dom Helder Camara's reply to Carlos Lacerda gives exceptional insight into the public controversy surrounding Kubitschek's office and programs. From it a critic can extract a fairly representative account of issues which form a context for Kubitschek's address to the bishops and which constrained his discourse. From Camara's letter we can infer that Lacerda criticised Church-State cooperation. Camara's letter also reveals Lacerda's "essential misgivings" regarding the national situation and popular arguments regarding the illegitimacy of the Kubitschek government. Finally some pastoral counsel which Camara gave Lacerda can be taken broadly as testimony to the power of the press in public affairs.

Alleged Impropriety

From Dom Helder Camara's letter one can deduce Lacerda accused him of improper action on two counts. The first is that of petitioning the government for monies, quite possibly at the price of some "deal." Regarding his solicitation for government assistance in the slum urbanization project, the Cruzada de Sao Sebastino, Camara says:

> We never entered the Government work place to carry political messages, to transmit flattery or solicit personal favors. There are no secret accords, there are no suspicious arrangements nor any like implied compromises.
>
> When we campaign before representatives of the people for money for the people to apply for the good of the people we do not judge ourselves in any way directly or

> indirectly compromised with the Government which does us no favor. [Rather] we help the State carry out its mission regarding social assistance.[7]

Furthermore, Archbishop Camara makes a solemn assertion, before God who sees the purity of his purpose, that no further government monies, with the possible exception of some minor municipal assistance, will be needed to finance the complete urbanization of Rio slums in twelve years. The plan prepared for the Church by the President's economic advisors included a self-financing scheme which tied the new communities to the creation of an industrial park for the city of Rio de Janeiro.

The second and more fundamental accusation which Lacerda levels against the Church is that such social welfare programs deflect the high mission of the Church, whose work consists "'not in the urbanization of the Barrios but in the consciousness of its inhabitants.'" To this charge Archbishop Camara responds that the urbanization project is not the sum total of the Church's action in the favelas. Rather it is an indispensable and necessary first step toward the indoctrination of Christian life. He states:

> . . . housing is anticipated, accompanied and followed by great efforts of both humane and Christian origin. . . . The normal Christian life or simply human [existence] is made difficult if not impossible when it lacks an indispensable minimum of comfort. And besides material and moral misery mutually complement and aggravate each other.
>
> God knows our activity in the favela is basic religion [i.e. catechetical], essentially and profoundly basic religion. What indoctrinates is not convening youths, adolescents, adults for the purpose of understanding answers to the questions of the Catechism. To indoctrinate is to raise a living testimony of Christ and of His interests before the people; it is to create conditions which facilitate or even make possible the practice of virtue; it is to teach how to live like a human creature and a child of God. . . .

The linkage between Christian impulse and technically guided plans provided Kubitschek with a potentially rich base of support for his development program. Additionally such cooperation implied that Kubitschek was, in fact, the legitimate head of the government. This is an issue which, in the organization of his letter, Archbishop Camara tacitly recognized as psychologically, if not logically, prior to the question of Church-State propriety. In the first half of his letter, Archbishop Camara identifies Lacerda's broad historical and institutional characterization of the national situation, and he refutes popular arguments regarding the illegitimacy of Kubitschek's office.

Essential Misgivings

Under a column entitled "Essential Misgiving" Archbishop Camara identifies Lacerda's characterization of the national situation and preferred roles for the Church.

> Your great misgiving is that of seeing "The Oligarchy which dominated Brazil for 25 years . . . put its hand upon the Church as a source of power and control over the masses." In explaining the cause of your alarm your letter depicts the Church--along with the Armed Forces--as a hope of salvation for Democracy in a country without [institutions of] education, justice, political associations or political parties.
>
> To you, the Government now in place is not legitimate: it is a reinstatement of the Oligarchy [effected] November 11 [1955]. Publically represented by the President as a democratic mandate, it subverts Public Power, it retards the process of democratic restoration which you hope the Armed Forces will bring about, and it opens the way for civil war.

The Oligarchy to which Lacerda refers was associated with Getulio Vargas who ruled Brazil undemocratically from 1930 to 1945 and returned

to power in democratic election from 1951 to 1954. Lacerda and other administration critics identified Kubitschek with Vargas not so much because of any anti-democratic sentiment but because he continued several Vargas policies, chose as his advisors key Vargas aides, was supported by the same parties, and even had the same Vice President, Joao Goulart.

The containment of the masses within the constraints of Democratic Order was a genuine concern of many Brazilians. Brazil was in ferment with change, a condition which political scientists call "popular mobilization" which entailed increased pressures for broader public participation in politics. Although Kubitschek did not often indulge in the populist tendency to promise far-ranging social, political and economic reforms on behalf of the one class against another, his predecessor and successors did. When it appeared that both Getulio Vargas and Joao Goulart were building a political base of support among military enlisted men and unions similar to that of the syndicalist regime of Juan Peron of Argentina, the military deposed them. The irreconcilable demands of competing class interests raised by populists and exploited by communists caused many Brazilians to anticipate civil war.

Lacerda contended that the "old anti-democratic Oligarchy" which ruled through Getulio Vargas now reigned through Kubitschek. Its dominion was reinstated on November 11, 1955. On that date War Minister Henrique Lott executed what he called a "preventive counter-coup." Ostensibly it was necessary to obstruct forces which would hinder Kubitschek's installation as President. Lacerda was

not only a participant, he was a major instigator of that dramatic event.

Kubitschek was then president-elect with the inauguration scheduled for January 31. Lacerda, through the Tribuna and his newly formed Brazilian Anti-Communist Crusade, had inflamed public opinion with charges of conspiracy, political intrigue, corruption and Communism. A coup was unlikely, however, because it was opposed by General Lott who was in firm control of the Army. Kubitschek's contender, General Juarez Tavora, also opposed annulling the election results. The opposition party, the Uniao Democratica Nacional, likewise declined support for any military solution.[8] Nevertheless, a coup occurred. It was instigated in a confused tangle of events involving army discipline, military and state jurisdictions, and personal honor. It was instigated by men who did not vote for Kubitschek and were not his supporters. Yet as a testimony to the strident power of Lacerda's voice, who alone called for a forcible reversal of election results, it was called a "preventive counter-coup."

Popular Arguments

Under the column title "The Present Executive Power of the Republic is Legitimate," Archbishop Camara refutes popular arguments regarding the illegitimacy of Kubitschek's office (quite possibly those used by Lacerda himself in an open newspaper letter addressed to Kubitschek). Camara introduces each issue with a question much in the style of a debater who uses the argument of residues. Does

illegitimacy derive from election fraud? No, although fraud exists especially in the interior of the country, "no party has a monopoly on fraud." Does it derive from the fact that Kubitschek received only a plurality and not a majority of popular vote? No, respect for electoral processes moved Lacerda's own candidate General Juarez Tavora to state: "I declare that if Your Excellency [i.e. Kubitschek] had been elected in this same election by a margin of only 8 votes, I would fight for the inauguration and possession." General Tavora knows well, Camara affirms, that the necessity of election by absolute majority required prior Constitutional reform. At this point Archbishop Camara cannot resist a gentle gibe by saying: "It is evident that all this argument applies in full to the President's running mate, the Vice-President, Dr. Joao Goulart." Vice-President Goulart received an absolute majority, but was even more strongly feared by Lacerda and the opposition for his labor union activism while Minister of Labor under Getulio Vargas.

Does illegitimacy come from an illegal interregnum in state government between the November 11, 1955 "counter-coup" and January 31st, 1956 inauguration? No, elections were held on October 3rd, 1955 under a government universally viewed as legal and impartial. Finally, does illegitimacy derive from the President himself?

> Does it come in fact--some will say--from within the person of the President, or his advisors who have turned to corrupt and corrupting Oligarchy [which reigned Brazil] prior to August 24 [1954]?

Here Archbishop Camara counterattacks the argument. He rebuts by saying ". . . when you entered the electoral contest on the side of

the candidacy of Juarez Tavora you implicitly accepted the possibility of victory of [opposing] candidacies . . . ." At this point and one other Archbishop Camara reveals Lacerda's contradictory and inconsistent affirmations of democracy. To invalidate the election returns in which one participated is "to confess an anti-democratic use of elections which for you, in this instance, are valid if the results be to your liking." The second instance, found under a column titled "Strange Manner to be Democratic," regards Lacerda's ambiguous urgings for a military response to the Kubitschek regime.

> You not only consider the current President illegitimate, but declare in all your letters where you place you hope: in a movement of the Armed Forces. In a country without Universities, without parties and without professional organizations they would be, once again, the "conducting agents" of democratic society.
>
> What would you say to those who would infer that [you wish] to reopen preachments of a coup? The possibility of publishing letters directed to me and to the President contradicts your affirmation that liberty of expression in Brazil benefits the "tanks."
>
> The allusion to "tanks" proves, however, my Dear Carlos, that you are passionately swayed: after all do you fear them or desire them? The impression left by your letter is that you desire them if they take to the streets in defense of points of view which coincide with your own.

Pastoral Counsel

At this point Archbishop Camara gives pastoral counsel regarding Lacerda's imbalanced and passionate journalism.

> You, who in person are so quiet, level-headed and responsible, before the keyboard of a typewriter or before a microphone are encumbered and, in short, break all bounds, and are capable of all excesses--too much eulogy when you wish well . . . [and too much vehemence] in attacking when all is not well.

Camara follows by saying that though Lacerda's intentions are good, the consequences are terrible not merely for his "young friends"--an allusion by which Camara probably referred to young military officers like those in the anti-communist Grupo do Sorbonne, men who were in positions capable of carrying "to the logical outcome" the assertions which Lacerda raised--but also and above all, Camara states:

> I'm thinking of venerable women who listen from a distance: good and merciful matrons, incapable of killing a fly and who are overtaken with hate and filled with rancor.

Archbishop Camara cautions, "Be careful Carlos, not to fall into the error of placing your passions above the interest of the nation." To avoid judgment before the eternal seat of Justice, follow Christ's admonition, "'Do not judge lest you be judged yourselves. For in the way you judge, you will be judged; and by your standard of measure, it shall be measured to you.'" (Matthew 7:1,2) The journalist, "with his mission of orienting the public, has to reconcile passages like this of the sacred Scriptures with his professional work."

Taken broadly, Dom Camara's counsel to Lacerda testifies to the power of the Press at this particular point in Brazilian politics. Apparently a lack of truly representative party processes made the Press and not Congress the stage for broadly conceived debate on national policy. Nathaniel Leff attributes considerable influence to Brazilian newspapers in the formation of public and elite opinion culminating in national policy.

> . . . The mass media, and particularly the newspapers, however, played a key role by providing a general framework for discussion [in public opinion] . . . .
>
> By all accounts, the President and the great newspapers of Rio de Janeiro take the dominant role in leading elite opinion. . . . The principal newspapers which take the lead in this process are the Rio de Janeiro Correio da Manha and and O Jornal do Brasil.[9]

The Press was a stage on which Carlos Lacerda, Bishop Camara and President Kubitschek acted out themes generating symbolic interactions conducive to the mediation of their needs.

Lacerda's criticism and Bishop Camara's reply might be interpreted as attempts to open or close public attentiveness to Kubitschek leadership and programs (Figure 1)--particularly to a new Church-State cooperation in development projects (Grammar 1). Symbol strategies entailing the attribution of "Oligarchy," "Catechism," "anti-democratic," and "imbalanced journalism" culminate in preferred roles for Church, State, Army and Press in ways which emphasize competitive or complementary relations among them (Grammar 2).

Symbol and Communication Strategies, an Analysis of Kubitschek's Speech.

Dom Camara's letter suggests some of the obstacles which Kubitschek faced when he was installed as President of Brazil, February 1, 1956. A rancorous election, a disquieting debate on the nature and direction of Brazilian political processes, and a crisis of power among national institutions eroded Kubitschek's ability to govern. In the sixteen months between the Vargas suicide and Kubitschek's succession Brazil suffered two military coups and was governed, successively, by Vice President Joao Cafe Filho, president

of the house of deputies, Carlos Luz, and the president of the senate, Nereu Ramos.

These events transpired against the backdrop of disquieting debate over the nature and direction of Brazilian political processes. The Constitution of 1946 reopened, after a thirty year lapse, democratic processes in Brazil. Suffrage was extended to all literate citizens. Furthermore, the Constitution of 1946 provided for the direct election of the president. These constitutional provisions encouraged populism in Brazilian politics. Presidential contests were largely determined by new urban industrial centers in the states of Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In those states political candidates often won elections by direct appeal to emerging urban masses. These factors set up a deadlock between administrative and legislative branches of the federal government. The two branches represented contradictory interests. The legislature was controlled by clientela politicians from the other 21 Brazilian states. A majority of legislators represented regional interests and power structures which had much to lose and nothing to gain in any populist democratic reforms. The presidency, determined by popular vote and attuned to the demands of the electorate, represented those who had the most to gain in social and economic reform. When it became apparent that Kubitschek would win the election by a plurality, this conflict animated debate on constitutional reform which would require candidates to win a majority of popular votes cast for election to the presidency. This conflict was often expressed in terms of "corruption," "communism," and "democracy." Unfortunately,

Kubitschek's successors did not cope well with this crisis of power. President Janio Quadros abruptly resigned August 25, 1961. President Joao Goulart was deposed by the military on April 2, 1964.[10] In light of this crisis of power, Kubitschek's speech before the bishops addressed fundamental obstacles to his administration in at least three areas. The speech attempted to establish a firm basis for leadership--a claim which Kubitschek made on the basis of both legal right and personal qualities. The speech sought to characterize the disorder of the national situation which could facilitate administrative policy. And finally, the speech attempted to label the exercise of presidential power in ways which enticed the cooperation of agents within and without the executive branch.

The flavor of Kubitschek's appeals is suggested by the headlines and captions which formed the heading for the speech script appearing in the Sunday, May 27th edition of the Correio da Manha.[11] On the front page of the Correio appeared three inch headlines "'I will not release powers nor abdicate prerogatives.'" The second level captions declared "The President of the Republic defines his position." Third level captions reveal what, in the Correio's judgment, were some significant issues of the speech.

> The testing of the nation commingled with the testing of the regime; Assumes political leadership which arises from the fact that he was the candidate elected by the majority parties; Democratic debate within government organs, but final decision belongs to the President; True Presidentialism; Government plans and other measures announced by the President in the Encounter of Bishops from the North East.

Open-Channeled Behavior Keyed to Shift of Attention Regarding the "National Situation"

At every level of administration new leadership poses the rhetorical problem of credibility. In Latin America where legal and institutional mechanisms for the succession of power are not firmly established the problem of credibility is central to political order. Considering the crises which confronted Kubitschek when he assumed office--inflation, restive military, threated civil service strike, student activism, irascible press, deadlocked legislature, inter-ministerial rivalry and regional antagonism--it is not surprising that he devoted much of his speech to adjusting public perceptions regarding the Presidency in ways which might affect open-channeled behavior between significant parties in the policy process.

The first group from which Kubitschek must win an open hearing was his immediate audience, bishops of northeastern diocese. Kubitschek masterfully drew from "rhetorical situations" the means to create identification and introduce a "national" perspective which frequently contrasted with the "particularistic" ones which defined audience expectations and needs. In this instance Kubitschek raised the bishops' expectations for significant government assistance in meeting regional needs affecting their parishes first, by playing off of the bishops' choice of the word "encounter" to name their action at the conference (350). Second, he recognized early and directly the most politically sensitive of the propositions which the bishops had convened to study--"The critical problem regarding the inequality between its [i.e. North East's] standard of living

and that in the south of the country." (352a)

Kubitschek flattered his audience, praising their efforts in the conference. "What an example, and what a pattern for Brazilian public life. How much more noble, patriotic and Christian . . . ." (352a) He symbolically elevated his audience by describing their encounter as a meeting of equals. "[W]e offer to the world a spectacle of mutual respect and perfect collaboration between the Power Spiritual and the Power Temporal . . . . " (351) The bishops and Kubitschek shared alike in the vestiture of high calling and human compassion. One in which the bishops "have attained the still point of wisdom: you are spiritual and practical." (352b) And another in which Kubitschek with deference to the dignity of his office, resolves "all matters by national vision and patriotic objective." After elevating his audience with a metaphoric "meeting of equals," he couched remarks which did not particularly interest or immediately concern them with a reference to their intercessory duties.

> And because you are bishops, priests of God, this occasion resembles an invitation for a government man to make public confession. [And] Besides this . . . to fix some features and fundamental aspects of the political and administrative situations of Brazil.

This was a strategic move in which Kubitschek enticed the audience to sympathetically attend to what he wanted to talk about and to deter for a while in hearing what they wished to hear. Kubitschek began his "confession" by saying:

> I intend, as I said, to come to grips with some vital problems of the Northeast somewhat later. But right now I've no desire to cast today's speech with merely regional significance; within the fabric and mosaic of

> different phases of the national reality there is no such thing as a solely regional problem. (352c)

Kubitschek buttressed his argument for first featuring national concerns over regional ones by citing Rui Barbosa em Hara, favorite son of the North East.

In the first three paragraphs of the speech Kubitschek gained much and gave little in his relationship with the audience. He announced and probably received an initial good response to his personal objectives from the audience:

> I know that the Catholic Church counts for sufficient moral force to decisively influence the creation, in Brazil, of the high state of good faith and disinterested collaboration between men, and can influence that capacity of selfless service to the common good so that these traits would stand preminently for the political maturation not only of our populace--who are perspicuous, clear, understanding and generous like few others in the world--but also for certain leaders who unhappily are not yet educated nor prepared to place private ambitions, personal resentments and deadly envies below the real exigencies of public affairs. (352a)

He recognized, and yet deferred addressing, their concern for government response to the "critical . . . inequality" between the northeastern and southern regions of Brazil.

Kubitschek probably succeeded in opening attentiveness of his immediate audience, bishops of northeastern diocese. He suggested that the institutional role in policy-making process was comparable to the clerical mission and identity. "What an example, and what a pattern for Brazilian public life." Kubitschek labels the Encounter as legitimate Church-State collaboration in an effort to "surmount difficulties which involve and touch us all." The next section of his speech, paragraphs 354 to 368, may be interpreted as remarks

directed at bishop- or newspaper-mediated audiences. Indeed all except one of the headlines, captions and by-lines appearing on the front page of the Correio are drawn from this section, which comprises less than one-third of the text. The President's statement regarding his refusal to "release powers nor abdicate prerogatives" along with sub-captions featuring "political leadership," "presidential decision" and "true presidentialism" would tend to indicate that Kubitschek faced a crisis of credibility. From the model and grammar of rhetorical interventions we assume that attacks on Kubitschek's credibility might affect policy communication several ways.

Open-Channeled Behavior Keyed to Shift of Attention upon "Presidency"

As I interpret Kubitschek's "confessional" I see an attempt to shape perceptions of the office which lower group expectations upon the presidency, and I see an attempt to shift the perceived locus of Presidential motivation from private to public interest. Kubitschek stated that in Brazil there exists the tendency to blame the President of the Republic for all ills "from frost in the coffee plantations to a strike in the bakeries." (354) This alternately results in an "excessive growth of the person of the President to the level of omnipotence . . . [and] his diminution to the degree of annullment and renunciation." (364) While Kubitschek accepts the responsibility which accompanies the power of his office he refuses to be blamed for "the heritage of inflation and high prices." (354) Nor will he permit himself "to be slandered by hate, intrigue,

calumny, the calculated environment of public opinion, the disparagement of . . . intentions and . . . government actions." (355)

To the degree that Kubitschek's identity as President of Brazil was challenged or denied we assume he increased advocacy to others who have the power to confer legitimacy to that office. Consequently in paragraphs 353 through 359 Kubitschek sketches two radically different accounts of the exercise of presidential power. The first, illustrated in column A, Table 2, is a cluster of attributes which Lacerda and other administration critics applied to Kubitschek and his regime. Ironically, column A likewise contains the qualities which Kubitschek attributed to them--"certain leaders who unhappily are not yet educated nor prepared to place private ambitions, personal resentments and deadly envies below the exigencies of public affairs." (352a) The criticism of "personalism" cuts both sides in this controversy. Column B records Kubitschek's version of the exercise of presidential power in his administration. Column B version tends to open attentiveness

Table 2. Two Accounts of the Exercise of Presidential Power

Column A	Column B
egotistical	patriotic with national vision
petty, vengeful reprisals	patient, defers participation in polemic debate
favoritism in decisioning	unimpeachable administrative morality
calculating	spontaneous
wavering, irresolute, hesitant	tenacious, decisive, energetic
closed decisions based on "etiquette"	open decisions based on planning

to presidential acts and motives as animating from "nature," and his colorful, personalist style as sanitized of "private interest" by technocratic planning and programming.

In these paragraphs Kubitschek selects three events from his short tenure to identify his administration with qualities in column B. In paragraph 356 he describes his government as firmly maintaining "the high and unimpeachable level of morality [in decisioning] which I established . . . the very first day" of his administration, February 1, 1956. On that day, following the inauguration of the previous evening, two things occurred which Kubitschek maintained characterized his administration. The President, his ministers and advisors met at the unprecedented hour of 7:00 a.m. for the first cabinet meeting. The first item of business and first administrative decree was the creation of an interministerial Development Council which through technical planning superintended and coordinated the government's national development programs. Kubitschek frequently portrayed his government as possessing an elan characterized as technically-supervised audacity and impatience.

Complementarity of Power Roles in Brazilian Society Mediated by Acts Characterized by "Legality" and "Order"

In paragraph 357 Kubitschek admits that his government, and his efforts to make it an effective power which "plans, realizes and produces" has had "battles" in "political and administrative fronts." In this paragraph he principally discusses the political problem of "disorder . . . in all sectors of the public life of the

country." Kubitschek states:

> Initially, I was confronted with the problem of order, particularly in the episode of Jacare-Acanga,[sic] when I was disposed to act with energy and decision to enforce respect for military hierarchy and discipline.

Here Kubitschek is referring to a vest-pocket revolt of Air Force Major Corinbra Velosa. Reacting to Air Force Minister Vasco Alves Secco's continued support of the Kubitschek administration, Velosa and several other Air Force servicemen seized a series of small landing strips in the interior, in expectation of a major army rebellion against the government. Kubitschek stopped press censorship the first day of his administration, February 1. The February 11th uprising was a newspaper sensation until government troops captured Velosa February 28th. "Military hierarchy and discipline" and "legality" had been the twin issues which motivated Minister of War Henrique Teizera Lott to execute his "preventative coup" in favor of Kubitschek's inauguration. Kubitschek, states Jacare-Acanga, is merely one episode of a generalized spirit of disorder which permeates the country.

> As attentive as I am to certain eternal values like Justice and Liberty, it has always appeared to me that none of these would exist without Order, and that the imposition of Order was the fundamental problem for a Chief of State. Therefore, I decided to restore to this country military order, political order, administrative order, moral order, and order among spirits. By this means my government was immediately made certain with promptness with which I reestablished the principle of authority, public tranquillity, and confidence in legality. (357)

In this paragraph Kubitschek spins a constellation of terms to characterize the exercise of presidential power as decisive, forceful and in national interest. Some of the terms Kubitschek uses

seem to have fairly close historical referents. "Legality" was associated with respect for the electoral provision of the Constitution of 1946 and, more broadly, it was an affirmation of Brazilian democratization. Groups which, in the controversy on military-government jurisdictions and military "discipline," fell out on the side supporting Kubitschek used "Legality" to justify that support. "Order" had a much broader historical referent. The national motto inherited from the Old Republic (1889-1930) was "Order and Progress." Order, military dicipline and respect for hierarchy were terms deeply ingrained in Brazilian history and were frequently used to justify extraordinary actions of the Army or government.

On March 1, the day following the collapse of the vest pocket rebellion, Kubitschek introduced a bill granting "ample and unrestricted amnesty" to all accused of revolutionary activity since November, 1955. Apparently Kubitschek had been charged with clashing with the bill's congressional sponsor, majority leader Viera de Melo, over the proposed amnesty. In his representation of this third event Kubitschek denied any inconsistency or duplicity in his support for the bill and declared his firm support "beginning with the day of the proposal in the house of deputies until the instant of the final vote in the Senate." (358) The source of the President's amnesty proposal was his "own human nature," which contained not even the least "little sentiments of vengeance or . . . petty desire for reprisals."

These three events, the first cabinet meeting, the suppression of the vest-pocket revolt of Jacare-Acanga, and amnesty legislation offer to Kubitschek's audiences an interpretation of Presidential power distinct from the critic's version. The presence of a technocratic planning council sanitizes Kubitschek's colorful, "impatient and audacious" leadership from "private interest" theories of Presidential motive and action. Far from delegitimizing the new regime as Kubitschek's critics might hope, the disorder of the national situation required and elicited from the President strong and decisive leadership to protect Brazilian democracy. Kubitschek's participation in amnesty legislation proves neither personal nor professional weakness, but arises from a wholesome human nature which, excepting a few "uneducated" national leaders, he shares with the mass of Brazilians.

Immediately preceding the climax of this section from which is drawn the Correio headline, "'I will not release . . . nor abdicate any of my constitutional prerogatives and attributions,'" it is interesting to note some covert references to panelinha code of ethics in swapping favors among status-discrepant parties in the word "etiquette." Also it is interesting to observe a reference to a politician's frequently mindless urge "to accomplish" monumentalist and self-aggrandizing public works projects. The President' commitment to national policy distinguishes his programs from these common forms of political interaction. Furthermore, his office is legitimated by Constitutional provision and popular democratic impulse.

In this section of the speech Kubitschek attempted to shift attention from "private interest" concerns which frequently accompany personalistic leadership to his personal "nature" and his commitment to national policy. He attempted to align government acts in ways complementary to military institutional roles in the preservation of national Order through his use of "discipline" and "hierarchy." When he identified his administration with the preservation of "democracy" in Brazil, he resonated needs of the middle class who wished to preserve legal and Constitutional mechanisms for the survival of democratic Order in Brazil.

From the communication model and grammar of inventions suggested in Chapter IV I suggested that policy communications might be interpreted as symbol strategies keyed to facilitating or inhibiting communicative attentiveness among significant parties in the policy process. To this point I have narrated the speech with the purpose of revealing symbol strategies which Kubitschek employed to open immediate or mediated audience attentiveness to his leadership.

Complementarity of Power Roles in Kubitschek Administration Mediated By Acts Characterized as "Planning" and "Democracy"

Presumably Kubitschek also desired to induce a complementarity of role expectations among significant institutions of Church, Middle Class, and Military to diminish conflict or disorientation resulting from divergent perceptions of the national crisis. Beginning with paragraph 360 and extending through 367 the focus of Kubitschek's speech seems to shift from the exercise of presidential

power among major national institutions to an emphasis on presidential action within the executive branch. Apparently "autonomous ministries [and] uncoordinated ministries" within the government posed a genuine obstacle to effective program administration. Kubitschek's task was to attribute rhetorically-construed identities and role expectations to government interactions of the President and his ministers, advisors, and civil service administrators in ways which facilitated policy formation and execution. There were two themes by which Kubitschek disproved his critic's proposition that the administration was rife with strife. The first theme was administrative morality. This theme was linked to the technocratic planning and programming functions of the Development Council. Kubitschek states:

> . . . I reaffirm that my government was constituted with perfect unity, without autonomous ministries or uncoordinated organs. This is because the government has a program of objective planning, basic reform and administrative accomplishments . . . . (360)

In this program of planning, reform and administrative innovation the President (or as I shall argue later, the Development Council) occupies a strategic position. Kubitschek states:

> . . . I give to the ministers of state and to personal advisors a proper autonomy of work and action, but in line with a general program which I elaborate, which is the rightful obligation of my leadership position, to personally orient, and to coordinate each one within the whole . . . . This . . . presidential regime . . . [is] an association of personalities, initiatives and energies, without worrying about priorities, rivalries or intrigues. (367)

The second theme by which Kubitschek discounted the presence of conflict in his administration was "the spirit and form of the democratic

system." (363) Kubitschek advises:

> Do not take as omission or lack of unity and orientation of the Executive Branch the fact that it initiates and makes public both debate and doctrinal divergences in Congress. In truth, such spectacles . . . are but an indication of democratic vitality. (364)
>
> Also do not take as a lack of unity in the government or as division between its members and therefore a lack of command from the Chief that ministers and personal advisors of the President debate in official circles or in public opposing viewpoints . . . . All debates, analyses and criticisms are lawful and even solicited, democratically, from government circles . . . but the one who decides . . . after everyone is heard and everything is pondered is naturally the President of the Republic. (365)

The critic or media representation of conflict within the executive branch are, in the light of these themes, "intrigues" which are spun out by "enemies" who intend to "keep certain circles of the country in a permanent state of disquietude, intranquillity, insecurity fed upon false characterizations of government actions" designed to subvert "public order."

It is probably not by coincidence that Kubitschek subordinates the technical programming function of the Development Council as part of the function of a "true presidential regime" in a Brazilian constitutional democracy. (367) The Development Council was part of an administrative innovation that granted the President almost unchecked power in the formation and prosecution of development policy. The Constitution of 1946 earmarked a percentage of national revenues toward development projects.[12] The Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico had been created during the Vargas term to channel those funds, which were effectively beyond the power of

congressional purse strings. Most of the funds were dispersed to state autarcies or mixed public-private corporations which had been created by executive decree and which were directly and solely responsible to the President. Furthermore, considering the magnitude of Kubitschek's development programs and the dramatic increase of the public sector's portion in the GNP, the Kubitschek Aministration was vulnerable to charges of statism. State programming of the national economy was, to many critics, a significant departure from capitalism and signaled movement toward socialism or communism. However, as long as Kubitschek could focus public attention on military threats to his candidacy, to his succession and possession of the Presidency he could, in defense of the office, wave the banner of democracy.[13]

Power Response Paralleling Regional Needs

Roughly mid-way through his speech Kubitschek returns to the regional concerns of his immediate audience. In doing so, however, he makes what Albert O. Hirschman, critic of Latin American development programs, calls the "strategic linkage" of "Comprehensive Plan."[14] When a program administrator agrees to mediate a particular group's need on condition that the desired policy outcomes comply with a technically-apprised (which, in my view, means rhetorically-construed) vision of national needs, he gains leverage to induce some cooperation and compromise between formerly antagonistic groups. Kubitschek states:

> Only in this way, with an Executive Power thus comprehended and a Presidential regime thus conceptualized, are we able to govern without preconceptions regarding ideas and without limitation regarding national problems. For example, I see the Northeast as Brazil, and only as Brazil. And this will be a valorization of its local and particular problems, because they are lumped together always within the sphere of the national situation and of the general interest. (368)

Regional demands for a "fair share" of government attention and resources had obstructed previous national development programs.[15] Consequently, there was good reason for Kubitschek to anticipate and neutralize sources of regional rivalry in his policy administration.

Regarding the potential of regional rivalry it is interesting to note that in the eight weeks preceding his address before the bishops Kubitschek had delivered speeches in south, central and western Brazil. It may be significant that the government projects which he immediately offered as "two signs of noteworthy goods for the North East" (368) had been announced or duplicated in previous speeches to other regions. The first, in paragraph 370, deals with new exchange and trade regulations facilitating the foreign sale of northeastern products. Kubitschek had announced this change in SUMOC policy, (Superintendency of Money and Credit) on May 14th in his national radio program the "Voice of Brazil." The second initiative, a food storage scheme which allegedly would suppress rising prices, was identical to the program which he announced in Rio Grande do Sul in early April. The duplication of projects indicates, so Kubitschek claimed, evenhandedness. "Yesterday it was in Rio Grande do Sul and Parana; today it will be in the North East . . . . I am President of the entire nation and not whatever

region taken separately." (371)

It occurs to me that these two programs may be an attempt by Kubitschek to make an appropriate power response to bishop-mediated audiences in the North East. To the campesino the priests can say, "The President knows you are hungry. He is building warehouses to insure there will be plenty of food, even in drought." To the thin strata comprising the middle and upper class the bishops can say, "The President knows the unfair constraint past policies have placed on your income. [Most income in the North East was directly tied to export trade] He will change this." Also it will not take members of the local panelinha long to realize that more public work projects, trade regulations and regional commerce translates into more income opportunities since their coteries networked a wide range of commercial, financial and administrative enterprises. All these measures, Kubitschek states, stress the importance of the people of the North East. (371) One gets the impression that it is to the people beyond the bishops he is speaking.

Power Response Paralleling Bishops' Needs

In paragraph 372 Kubitschek directly addresses a proposition which the bishops had debated, "'measures which would productively and humanely fix the Northeasterner in his habitat.'" (373) Emigration of the rural populace from the North East to the Center South accelerated in the 1940's and 50's. Few road and rail connections linked the North East to the Center South region of Brazil. Through them, however, the rural populace began to migrate in

increasing numbers as trucking became more prevalent. The North East was crippled by land tenure patterns inherited from the colonial past. Most campesinos were landless. Work was seasonal and menial. Recurring drought and famine drove waves of refugees to flee their homes. Those who could migrate frequently did so lured by rumors of the economic opportunity and prosperity in the Center South. This trend alarmed the clergy who were in danger of losing their congregations. This condition prompted their discussion of productive and humane measures to fix the northeasterner in his homeland.

In addressing the issue of emigration Kubitschek combined regional interest of both the North East and Center South by calling the Church-State concern for the poor a "war on two fronts" which "in final analysis are intertwined and intermeshed." (372) Through Dom Camara and the CNBB (which sponsored the "Encounter") the Church proposed a slum urbanization project in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The Cruzada de Sao Sebastiao, as the project was called, linked "public housing with the growth of an industrial zone." (373) Kubitschek remarks "[H]ow temporary [considering the problem of emigration] and even counter-productive it would be to urbanize the slums without simultaneously attending to the rural populace." (373) It is likely that Kubitschek's linkage of one Church-State project already in place in the Center South with anticipated projects in the North East probably had the following effects on his immediate audience. It created a sense of solidarity between Center South

clerics who had already assimilated the new Church-State role in public policy and North East clerics who were considering the adoption of that role. In linking the anticipated solution for emigration to a government project already in place the conferees probably experienced some satisfaction at a task already partially accomplished.

To this point in the speech Kubitschek probably evaded audience perceptions of his personal acts as betraying competitive regional interest. Success in this matter may have been keyed to a speech-induced self-disclosure that the bishops were themselves not acting in regional interest but in the national interest even as they met to debate solutions to regional problems. At this point in their interaction we can reasonably assume that Kubitschek and his audience might regard themselves and the setting--the Church-State "encounter" to discuss regional problems--favorably. However, in doing what the bishops had convened to do, that is to discuss problems and explore solutions, differences and divisions surfaced. Kubitschek alluded to this in paragraph 379 where he states:

> The unity of the objectives of this assembly only appears to be broken by having deliberated relative means of "resources to apply in the North East." You justly stress as the fundamental point "the fact of the dangerous inequality in standard of living between the North East and the South."

In using the appearance-reality topic, Kubitschek shifts attention to a point about which the bishops have a common opinion--the injustice of previous government action toward the North East. One consequence of this strategy may have been to raise the question: would Kubitschek's government via administrators and agencies which

operate in this region reverse former injustices which have been institutionalized in federal policy toward the North East?

Shift of Attention Defining Regional Needs: Continuous/Discontinuous Change and Government Economic Planning

This bishops merely reflect the regional preoccupation with government injustices dating back to the 1963 transmission of the capital from Bahia to Rio.[16] Regional militancy increased after 1951 when national income accounting revealed great disparity between the per capita incomes in the North East and Center South. Succeeding economic analyses revealed dynamics that were unfavorable to the North East. The government exchange policies boosted world price and income derived from the coffee trade located in the South. The same exchange policies worked as a disadvantage in the export of northeastern products for which there was less demand. Domestic inflation lowered the purchasing power of northeastern consumers more than that of their counterparts in the Center South. The South had more foreign exchange with which to buy imports directly. However, the consumer in the North East, forced by a scarcity of foreign exchange, had to purchase goods from supplies in the Center South. These circumstances and more made "the fact of the dangerous inequality in standard of living between the North East and the South" a topic of particular interest to the bishops--and a point on which they expressed unanimous concern.

Kubitschek perhaps incurs some danger in admitting a degree of validity to the bishops' perception of past federal injustice to

the North East. Previous administrations tended to ignore the North East, except in drought years or when chartering new constitutions. Usually federal programs in the North East were the last to be initiated in good years, and the first to cease in bad ones. Federal agencies in the North East were famous for their ineptitude at most tasks except that of providing ample clientage "arrangements" and building dams benefiting large landholders. In admitting these faults in federal treatment of the North East, Kubitschek felt a need to disassociate himself and the administration of his programs from the government's and from the programs which preceded him. While validating the concerns of the audience before him, Kubitschek had to represent the climatic, economic and administrative problems in ways which anticipated the policy solutions he advised. In this regard it is instructive to observe in paragraphs 375 through 387 those features of northeastern problems which Kubitschek represented as continuous with the past and others which he represented as discontinuous.

> Now water--will it be that no conclusion can be found for this desperate search for [a solution] to the water problem which the nordestino debates as a malediction without limit in time and space. (377)

The problem of water remained continuous. A huge area of the North East, some 264,000 square miles, comprised what was known as the drought polygon [See Figure 5]. However, the problem of drought was not, as Albert Hirschman observes, so much the problem of dryness (average annual rainfall of 27 inches) as the irregularity of dry spells. Since 1577 major droughts had occurred at intervals



Figure 5. Drought Polygon of the Brazilian North East

varying between five and twenty years. Consequently,

> In the basic structure of its problem, the region is perhaps best compared, not to other arid zones, but to lands where an unpredictable calamity overhangs an otherwise pleasant or at least bearable existence, as in Italy or Japan where people make a living on the fertile slopes of occasionally erupting volcanoes.[17]

Considering the unpredictability of the droughts there was little anyone could do to forestall a crisis. Government-constructed dams, particularly since there was no prior arrangement for irrigation and land use in cultivable basins, had little effect.

What is changing, Kubitschek insists, is the "substance" of the problem. The focus of government programs for the region was shifting from "short term" drought relief to "long term" economic development.[18] The metamorphosis of the problem is revealed in Kubitschek's contention that the North East suffered not only from the lack of water, but from the scarcity of electric energy which had cut short "the dreams of industrialization."[19] (376) "[T]rans-formed minds" were needed to effectively solve the problems of the North East. Of this topic, he said:

> We are going to turn over this old page [of history] and look again at this problem with eyes wide open. What is essential now is the elaboration of the North East Plan, not for bureaucratic briefcases, but made openly, without gaps or weaknesses, at the same time made with scientific vigor and bandeirante impulse. [T]he substance of this problem . . . [entails] a conjunction of synchronic measures . . . . I'm going to suggest . . . that as a first initiative . . . [there be] technical, definitive solutions to food production, water distribution, systematic representation. (378)

It is probably worth noting at this point that the components of the North East Plan to which Kubitschek refers here and in following

paragraphs were not new. Most had been previously proposed and attempted. What was new about this plan was the grand scale in which the "conjunction of synchronic measures" was conceived and executed. Contingent upon the success of the North East Plan or pilot plan was the possibility of a "much greater coordination [in] 1957-1960." (356) This in fact was to occur in the creation of SUDENE, the Superintendency for Economic Development in the North East.

*Digression in Public Administration: Government Planning in Plano do Nordeste and Programa de Metas

The problems of the North East remained the same, and yet changed. The Plano do Nordeste linked problems old and new which had previously been independent of each other. Kubitschek's emphasis on comprehensive planning with a view toward the critical understanding of national reality distinguished his administration from previous government programs in the North East.

Here it is now possible to generalize from strategies of governance of the North East to those which characterized Kubitschek's national administration. The Plano do Nordeste was essentially a regional version of a national plan, the Programa de Metas, which Kubitschek had promoted during his presidential campaign. Kubitschek had campaigned under the slogan "50 years in 5"--five years being the tenure of presidency. After his election and before his inauguration Kubitschek released a list of thirty targets for national economic growth in significant economic sectors like road and rail construction, shipbuilding, oil production, etc. These programs, although still in the incipient stages at this point in his

administration, became the landmark of Kubitschek's presidency and culminated in the creation of the new inland capital of Brasilia.

Actually the Programa de Metas was the fourth national plan prepared for Brazil; the first had been prepared some seventeen years earlier. However, the Programa was the first to gain prominence in public opinion. In Kubitschek's hands the Programa became a significant "instrument of social mobilization." Jorge Gustavo da Costa states in Planejamento Governamental, A Experiencia Brasileira:

> Special attention ought to be made of the President of the Republic's action regarding the Programa de Metas . . . . The Programa de Metas by its political nature, received direct inspiration from President Juscelino Kubitschek. Initially linked to the electoral platform of the candidate, the plan proved to be a valuable political weapon for President Kubitschek, especially because it represented one of the most important symbols of his government. The other equally important symbol, certainly, was the construction of Brasilia.
>
> Broadly conceived, in synthetic form through enumerating thirty targets; wrapped in the symbolism of the capacity to crave and obtain the progress of five decades in five years, offering, in a short time space, at least a perceptible response to some . . . crucial problem of the economy; the Programa de Metas represented a valuable instrument of social mobilization.[20]

Similarly the Plano do Nordeste offered "at least a perceptible response to some . . . crucial problem of the" North East. And like the Programa, the Plano served to mobilize support without raising suspicions of significant dispersion of power among significant agents in the political system. This was because, as Celso Lafer states: "The Plan . . . matched well with conditions of political participation. In fact the Plan included in the actual present life of men, as a real experience, the future in which they believed."[21]

Octavio Ianni noted that the Programa acted as a kind of self-adjusting administrative technique which "rationalized" the continual adjustment of ends and means in government policy. Furthermore, the function of the tecnicos and economic advisors in the planning process tended to "depoliticize" government programs.[22] Assuming that the Plano do Nordeste operated similarly it is reasonable to assume that "tecnicos" may have occupied a significant role in administration strategies to facilitate policy formulation and to solve or by-pass obstacles in program administration. Consequently, it is to the speech and succeeding events we now turn.

Roles of Tecnicos in Mediating Needs Through Economic Planning

In paragraphs 389 and following we can trace the planning process in patterns of administrative action. In his speech before the bishops, Kubitschek recounted two meetings.

> For the first meeting I right away called five ministers of state and thirty directors from federal public organs which act in the North East . . . . I delivered to each a questionnaire, containing objective questions and formulating answers regarding concrete situations of the public service of this region. (390)

Upon receiving replies Kubitschek directed his "advisers [to] pay attention to the questionnaires and to prepare [their] replies." (391) This process, which Kubitschek calls, the "preliminary work of researching the objective elements and schematizing all the material . . . elevated with concrete facts and in-depth studies" (392) entails some significant behind-the-scenes participation of technical advisors. Significantly, some weeks later in an impromptu radio

address Dom Helder Camara discusses the six day meeting at Campina Grande as an "encounter of bishops and tecnicos." Camara's description may give some insight into the nature of the tecnicos' "schematizing" and "coordinating" discourse fixing the "objective" and "concrete facts" of the situation. Camara says bishops and tecnicos met to discuss regional problems. He states:

> . . . and necessarily with the help of the tecnicos. They in fact provided us great assistance. The results were actually long range, because we arrived at a long term plan: a plan which, if God wills, will result in the integration of the North East into the general structure of the country. Because, it is well known that the North East is an underdeveloped region, which is now requiring wide range [i.e. global] planning capable of making possible the investments which tomorrow will permit all that region to join the rhythm of growth and development of the South of the country.[23]

Within the speech Kubitschek himself credits the tecnicos with fulfilling "our hopes for the progress and enrichment of our country" by directing "systematic planning, in conjunction with all the public services." (393) Without planning, he stated, government action was destined to be improvisational and incomplete. I have just described the role of technocrats and the centrality of planning in the Kubitschek administration. However, I intend to do more than restate the commonplace wisdom that developing countries need technical experts to assist in national economic programs. I wish to characterize Kubitschek's policy-making as both substantively and instrumentally derived from social science theory. I want to reveal how social science theory derived from ECLA and ISEB functioned to open up new possibilities for organization and action. Finally, I want to point out that Kubitschek skillfully employed

topics derived from these theory sources to facilitate policy formulation and administration.

Policy-Making, Planning and Development, A Criticism of Kubitschek's Rhetoric

It was not by happenstance that Kubitschek should at this time innovate technical planning in national development and policy-making. The Economic Commission in Latin America had, since 1948, discursively explored the nature of Latin American economies as structured by world trading systems. The ELCA devised the strategy of import substitution industrialization to break dependencies on foreign sources of supply and to create national economic growth patterns based on internal markets rather than foreign ones. Techniques of national economic programming were devised in order to dramatically increase the "rhythm of development" at rates sufficient to "catch up" national economies with the industrialized first world. The ECLA published in 1953, and again in 1955 after its fifth annual conference held in Rio, the pamphlet entitled An Introduction to the Technique of Programming. The pamphlet was a guide to determining medium and long-term, aggregate, sectorial projections for growth in the national industry. The Programa de Metas comprised a list of thirty such growth targets to which Kubitschek had committed his administration. Other contributing sources to the Programa de Metas included joint studies which Brazilian tecnicos conducted with United States and ECLA economists, and an ISEB-inspired program strategy.[24] In Kubitschek's Diretrizes Gerais do Plano de Desenvolvimento Economico, government projects formerly

aimed solely at achieving economic determinates of "development" were conceptually broadened to include concomitant changes in polity, society and culture. The title Diretrizes Gerais suggests that this document was guided by ISEB's historicist interpretation of national reality.

Kubitschek's Programa de Metas and Plano do Nordeste employed planning and programming as tools in large-scale social engineering. They implied the possibility of synchronously constructing parts of national structures (economy, polity, society and culture become analogous to foundations, walls and roof) to be assembled as an intervalidating whole. In theory, at least, a developed national economy could be constructed with a minimum of time and maximum efficiency much like a pre-fab apartment complex, assuming that the dynamic forces which had shaped Brazilian national structures in the past had been identified and could be redirected toward predetermined future goals.

According to the ISEB analysis, the forces which shaped Brazilian national reality were, in root, economic, in trunk and stem, social and political, and in flower, psychological. The substantive content of Kubitschek's policy was economic. The Programa was designed to change Brazil from an external-oriented economy to an internal-oriented economy through import substitution industrialization. It was assumed that changes in the root would transform social and political organization, by replacing parasitism and clientelism with structures derived from national autonomy and endogeny. Instrumental features of Kubitschek's policy-making are comprised of

motivational and organizational strategies designed to by-pass or transform obstacles to effective policy implementation. The creation of the Development Council represented a strategy to by-pass some political and administrative obstacles. This strategy is revealed in an article published in an ISEB journal Cadernos do Nosso Tempo, March, 1956.

The article, entitled "Meaning and Perspectives of the Kubitschek Government," was a criticism of events, social mores and political institutions which promoted or impeded national development and its corresponding awakening of the populace. In the section entitled "Impact of Developmentalism upon the Government Apparatus," the author describes the resistances of existing government structures to programmatic or ideologically-based national policy, especially one presuming change in shares of social or economic power. The author reasons that since Kubitschek lacked sufficient support for a wide-ranging reform of government administrative institutions he had to organize within the inert whole "a functional and dynamic center . . . to assure an indispensable attendance to the government's need of planning."[25] Kubitschek could not have a "dynamic center" at the ministerial level since, to keep his government viable, he had to divide the cabinet posts among groups which supported his election. The article notes that Kubitschek could, however, create another administrative level directly under the presidency comprised of economic advisors which generate technical reports discovering policy objectives and means. The article correctly predicted the formation of the Development Council as a significant factor in the

administration of Kubitschek's policy of national development.

Communication Strategy: Central Planning Features Change for Policy Actors while Maintaining Continuity in Perceived Powershares of Policy Agents

The Development Council was the first permanent central planning organ in Brazil. The Council was comprised of cabinet ministers, the joint chiefs-of-staff, presidents of the Banco do Brasil (primarily involved in fiscal, monetary and exchange policy), and of the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Economico. While some members made proposals for policy formulation, most sanctioned the plans developed by several technical working groups and merely stepped in to administer programs. For all thirty targets of the Programa the Council devised plans enumerating the objective goals to be achieved, the most cost efficient manner of implementation, and the legal and administrative strategies to implement programs.

Perhaps we can now speculate on the sources for the success of the Development Council in coordinating national policy. Approximately 90 percent of the funds for government programs were beyond the power of congressional purse strings.[26] With its creation the locus of power in dispersing funds shifted from the Finance Ministry and DASP to the Development Council and BNDE. The Secretary General of the Council was appointed by the President. The President of the BNDE was the same person as the Secretary General of the Development Council. During the period of the Kubitschek years those posts were filled by prominent ISEB personalities.[27] While the President and Secretary General may have been perceived as a force

to be reckoned with, other tecnicos in the various groups working out goals and means from the "objective" and "concrete facts" were probably perceived as no threat to the power base of clientela-styled ministries. "Power," in their instance, was conceived as managing public works projects. It mattered little whether it was a dam, road or steel mill. The clientela network was diffused enough to "cash in" on any government project in a region. Finally, Presidential decisions may explain the influence of tecnicos in establishing national policy. In his study of Brazilian policy-making, Nathaniel Leff noted that the Presidential decisions were usually oriented by tecnico assessments of the "objective needs" of the situation.[28]

Combined with the global economic analysis which made government planning an indisputable national necessity the Development Council represented a significant innovation in Brazilian administration. Celso Lafer evaluates the Democratic Council "nuclei approach" as a significant factor in the remarkable success of the Programa.[29] Kubitschek employed the same "nuclei approach" in the Plano do Nordeste which he inaugurated in this address before the bishops. The only significant distinction between the central planning councils and technical working groups is the presence of bishops in the ad hoc committees of the Plano do Nordeste. Presumably the bishops acted as moral arbiters in negotiations necessary to coordinate all levels of government activity and private enterprise to foment regional development.

From a "policy rhetoric" perspective the Development Council succeeded in introducing new organization in a decisioning process

in such a way that perceived relative shares of power between potentially competing individuals and groups remained unchanged. The Development Council changed the way the government allocated its resources while maintaining a perceived continuity in relative power shares of individual claimants. At the same time it served to stress the complementarity of formerly competitive groups. Kubitschek stated to the bishops, [If] "this experience [the Plano do Nordeste 1956] is successful . . . a much greater cooperation would be possible within the period 1957-1960." (395) A most powerful incentive to groups and individuals to cooperate with Kubitschek's program was the magnitude of government resources and instruments it proffered: to the individual clientela politician, the one who planned was insignificant; to agency administrators coordination with other groups was inconsequential, so long as greater resources, programs and instruments were placed at their disposal. Consequently, most obstacles to effective program administration--legislative resistance, interministerial rivalry, patronage and bungling--were all addressed and to some measure resolved in the ethic and organization suggested by the central planning agencies of the Kubitschek regime.

Symbol Strategy: Attention Shift of Tomada de Consciencia Promotes Consensus, Motivation of Policy Actors

Kubitschek began the second chapter of the first of a trilogy of autobiographies by stating, "I am a doctor and not a tecnico."[30] Trained as a physician he moved into politics during the Estado Novo as Vargas' functionary. With time he became a prominent governor of Minas Gerais. Though he lacked the economic and engineering

backgrounds of the tecnicos, he possessed shrewd political instincts for promoting their projects. He viewed his role in national policy-making as complementary to their planning. Kubitschek's autobiographies reveal that in early 1956 his speeches featured "planning" and "preaching," "developmentalism" and "disarmament of spirits." Kubitschek states, it was

> not easy to give jolts toward development, confronting so many obstacles . . . . While concrete measures were being planned I spoke to the people . . . . I insistently preached developmentalism, confident that striking forcefully the same theme would awaken the nation to the crossroads which it was about to undertake. Another issue which was never omitted . . . was the possibility of promoting, as quickly as possible, a general disarmament of spirits.[31]

In addressing the two issues, that is, promoting development and settling doubts regarding the legitimacy of his regime, Kubitschek may have recognized that the two issues were related. Successfully enacting the former theme may serve as an antidote to the latter. Brazilian scepticism regarding the actions and intentions of its public leaders is but a variation of a universal opinion that leaders often act according to a secret agenda and always work for their own interest. This dilemma of leadership was first recognized by Aristotle in his topic regarding public and private motives.

> The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness, but in their hearts they prefer their own advantage.[32]

The only effective counterargument, Aristotle notes, is the acceptance of a general perspective which one's opponents have not adopted. This is precisely the function which "developmentalism," once

accepted by the public, served to accomplish in interpreting Kubitschek's leadership, action and programs as in the "national interest."

Kubitschek viewed most of his policy "campaigns" as a simultaneous assault on two distinct but mutually interdependent planes of existence.[33] Through his incessant preachments he aimed at a transformation of public mentality regarding Brazilian potentialities for development. His tecnicos aimed at a rapid transformation of realities which would unleash national energies for development. The two planes however, were interdependent. In his retrospective evaluation of his administration's accomplishments, Kubitschek said:

> The success of the Programa de Metas, however, was only possible thanks to a psychological motivation, which I had the ability to create and propagate . . . . [To] me, personally ["fell"] . . . this task ["of collective consciousness raising"] through incessant preachments through the full length of the national territory. . . .[34]

Conversely, as public work projects were completed around the country they were hailed as

> . . . foundation[s] for . . . even better days for Brazilians in the near future . . . . [They] had a highly wholesome psychological effect: [they] dissipated the Brazilian inferiority complex. In those five years, thanks to the indoctrination which I gave . . . the completed projects . . . proved [Brazilians] . . . perfectly capable of constructing ships, automobiles, gigantic dams, tractors, of taming the amazonian forest, and in three and one-half years, of planting a great city [i.e. Brasilia].[35]

Through speeches given all around the country Kubitschek constantly called attention to government plans and accomplishments. (See

Figure 6 for Kubitschek travels preceding May 26th address to bishops). Kubitschek viewed his role in policy-making as a counterpart to technical advisors: they discovered economic objectives and devised administrative strategies; he effected a transformation of public perceptions regarding potentialities for national development which motivated support.

There is independent confirmation for Kubitschek's assertion that public work projects performed an extra-economic role. In his discussion of the Programa de Metas, Octavio Ianni noted:

> The construction and the re-equipment of the railways and, principally, the construction and paving of roadways performed a "magic" effect in the mind [of the rural populace]."

Visible industrial investments, especially "the creation of the automobile industry," were dramatic evidence of the "development." "[T]he construction of the Belen-Brasilia roadway represented a 'physical' demonstration of the government's capacity to effectuate." Roads linking all regions of the nation to the new capital Brasilia appeared to create national integration and solidarity. These accomplishments of the Programa de Metas and Kubitschek's propensity to refer to

> Brasilians in his speeches as "soldiers of development" . . . focusing upon rapid industrialization as an "imperative necessity" . . . effect[ed] a reformation of the self-concept of extensive segments of the urban social classes. To a certain degree, the consciousness regarding the situation and possibilities of the Brazilian society was being reformulated.[36]

The "conspicuous progress" of the Kubitschek programs, in addition to social and political cohesion, stimulated an intellectual movement



Figure 6. Kubitschek's Travels, 3 February-10 May 1956

which Herminio Martins aptly describes:

> The growth euphoria induced by the manifest, indeed conspicuous achievements of the Kubitschek regime led to a kind of generalized ideological effervescence. The humanistic intelligencia did not remain isolated from this nationalist ideological effervescence. A number of literary critics and historians, writers and artists were absorbed in the nationalist and developmental upsurge both reflexively and creatively . . . . A symptom of this involvement may be found in the titles such as "literature and development" (or "national reality," "theatre and development," "culture and development" (or "Brazilian reality" which proliferated at the time). Probably no major phase of culture and society remained apart from this pervasive enthusiasm and concern. A kind of national developmental definition of reality or world perspective, grew up in terms of which every intellectual issue and topic was discussed "under the aspect of (national) development."[37]

In drawing attention to changes in the material and psychological realities of the nation Kubitschek was acting on theory assumptions generated by ISEB social scientists. ISEB scientists, after discursively exploring the underlying logic of present national structures, advised import-substitution industrialization at a sufficient rate to create national economic autonomy in a relatively short time horizon. Kubitschek adopted the Programa de Metas solution. However, Kubitschek also acted as though his mere preachments could affect a dramatically altered view of the national situation. Brazilian and North American observers of the Kubitschek era confirm that there was indeed a change in public perceptions of the national situation. An initial question for a critic of development policy might be "What changed?" and secondly "Was change perceived to be continuous or discontinuous?"

ISEB keyed changes in perception of the "national situation" with the polar states of alienacao and tomada de consciencia. These two conditions offer contrasts in identity and activity. Alienacao is characterized by an individuality-stressing version of identity and passivity. Tomada de Consciencia is characterized by a self-aware group-stressing version of identity and vitality. One ISEB scholar defined alienacao as

> . . . the very generalized absence of a collective project--the lack of will in the collectivity, the state of waking sleep-walking--that gives to the nation the aspect of a geographical place, a topos where things happen, where rather than being made, history, in its most commonplace facets--in government, administration, in personal relations--merely occurs.[38]

The reverse, the tomada de consciencia, is characterized by energetic collective action to shape the future. Albert O. Hirschman was probably describing something like the tomada when he observed the correlation between "public action" and "radical cognitive change." He said:

> . . . public action is often the result of a radical cognitive change, akin to a revelation. Large numbers of people grow up with the feeling that the existing social and political order is not subject to change or that, in any event, they are powerless to bring such change about. The sudden realization (or illumination) that I can act to change society for the better and, moreover, that I can join other like-minded people to this end is in such conditions pleasurable, in fact, intoxicating, in itself. To savor that pleasure, society does not have to be actually changed right away: it is quite enough to act in a variety of ways as though [emphasis his] it were possible to change. Obviously, if no change is achieved, disappointment will set in . . . .[39]

ISEB and to a lesser degree Hirschman seem predominantly interested in correlating psychological states to social or political activism.

Brown's notion of attention switch subsumes the former categories while emphasizing the symbolizing function and communication activity entailed in acquiring perceptual schema and role expectations. While social activism and apathy might roughly correlate with what Brown calls the collectivity-stressing or individuality-stressing states of the attention switching cycle, he goes some steps further by positing corresponding changes between those states, fundamental language categories, and perceptions of continuous or discontinuous change.[40] I have already observed how the notion of technical planning permitted Kubitschek to acquire significantly more control over allocation of government resources without raising the hint of any appreciable diffusion of power to clientela politicians within executive agencies. I now wish to discuss perceptions of continuous or discontinuous change and how they shaped a significant issue which threatened the Kubitschek program.

Until late 1958 Kubitschek enjoyed a broad base of support across the political spectrum. The "Ideology of National Development" attracted and held in suspension a coalition of nationalists with value anchorage from democratic liberalism to marxism. In mid-1958, however, Kubitschek's consensus coalitions began to fail. Inflation, trade and foreign exchange problems returned to haunt the nation. The recurrence of the very problems which Kubitschek's policies were designed to eradicate promoted an anomaly-stressing phase of policy discourse in which attention was directed at "gaps" between policies and the "national situation," or the poor coordination of government action and reality. With this shift of attention

came an emphasis upon liabilities which individuals accrued due to government failures (i.e. a decrease of purchasing power or consumption which attended inflation served as a daily reminder of the "underdeveloped" and dependent status of Brazil in the world economy) and a deemphasis of future shared benefits (i.e., future consumption or employment opportunities derived from "modern" industrial nations). The shift from anomaly-masking to anomaly-stressing and from group-stressing to individual-stressing identity likewise corresponded to perceived locus of group interactions from complementary-stressing interpretations to competitive-stressing ones. Competitive-stressing interpretations of group interactions in Brazilian policy-making were circulated by left-leaning nationalists who perceived moderate attempts to placate foreign lenders of Brazil's credit worthiness as a sell out or "entriguismo." Shortly I shall narrate the events which polarized the national developmentalist movement in Brazil. First, however, I shall attempt to demonstrate a "policy-rhetoric" interpretation of complementary-stressing trends of group interaction accounting for the broad-based consensus of support in the first two years of the Kubitschek Administration.

The speech which Kubitschek gave to the bishops on May 26th was an excellent example of Kubitschek's first critical campaign for "national pacification"--the quieting of doubts regarding his ability or legitimacy to lead the nation. Immediately after his address to the bishops Kubitschek returned to Rio to find student

riots protesting a hike in bus fares had paralyzed the national capital. The Uniao Nacional de Estudantes, a radical nationalist student organization which first came to prominence during national protests regarding foreign capital participation in the State-run petroleum company, Petrobras, led the riots. They perceived the fare hike as imposed by a foreign controlled utility, the Edison Power and Light Company of Rio. Edison Light reportedly forced a fare hike by raising rate charges to electric trollies. Oil, much of it imported, fueled Edison's electrical generating capacity. Kubitschek declared a state of national emergency and called in the Army to contain the disorder. In Kubitschek's speech before the bishops he sounded presidential. His actions in quelling riots in the capital were perceived as acting presidential. By December, 1956, Kubitschek had consolidated his power in the presidency and the campaign for national pacification, and the disarmament of spirits had been successfully concluded.

Throughout the first two years of his administration the ideology of national development was sufficiently malleable to attract adherents with both marxist and liberal-democratic orientation. One factor in attracting marxist support was, in Brown's words, the shifting "from one level of metaphor to another" of the marxist commonplace of conflict over means of production. In the "ideology" attention was drawn to struggle over control of Brazilian national resources and economic autonomy in ways which featured conflict at international rather than intranational class conflict. The "ideology" likewise attracted supporters with liberal-democratic

orientation who correctly perceived Kubitschek program goals for building the nation's industrial infrastructure as expanding opportunities for growth of a capitalist economy. National Developmentalism's stress on the creation of new wealth over the redistribution of the old implicitly santioned the rights of private property and led to inter-class concensus of support for Kubitschek's programs.

Thomas Skidmore remarks that 1958 marks the beginning of a decline in the political and intellectual concensus for Kubitschek policies. The inflation, trade and foreign exchange crisis which began to emerge in 1958 were, in large part, due to massive financing required to fuel Kubitschek's policy of rapid industrialization. While Kubitschek vacillated between instituting a currency stabilization program (and leaving long-term structural bottlenecks to national economic autonomy unresolved) and continuing government policy of rapid industrialization (but thereby losing critical foreign financing without which government programs could not be sustained) three moderate ISEB figures became suspect, from the radical nationalist perspective, of collaborating with extra-national forces to prolong Brazil's dependent status. The resulting competitive-stressing interpretation of group interactions between moderate and radical nationalists produced a schism in ISEB and a polarization in national developmentalist movement. The narration of events follows:

In October, 1958, Lucas Lopes, then newly appointed Finance Minister, and Roberto Campos, president of the National Economic

Development Bank, proposed a currency stabilization program. Though it was not certain that the IMF would have sanctioned a gradualist approach toward fighting inflation, radical nationalists took the opportunity to stress unpopular credit, wage and trade policies as "sell outs" to international capitalists. Lucas Lopes and Roberto Campos had been associated with ISEB in newspaper controversies surrounding the transferal of the Finance portfolio from Jose Maria Alkmin to Lucas Lopes.[41] In December, 1958, Helio Jaguaribe published a book which was intended to ameliorate irrational and counter-productive features of Brazilian nationalism. One unfortunate reference to the State-run petroleum agency, Petrobras, however, alienated radical nationalists who viewed oil as a sacred symbol of national self-determination.[42]

Throughout the Kubitschek administration the new "programming" role of the State had been debated. While most economists favored State coordination and functionalization of the national economy, many disagreed over the preferred rates of growth.[43] However, perhaps the greatest cause of disagreement between economists in 1958 was the link between currency stabilization and "submission" to the IMF. Another factor impelling radical nationalists like Albert Guerreiro Ramos, Roland Corbisier and Alvaro Vieira Pinto to disassociate themselves from Helio Jaguaribe was a threatened confrontation with the radical Nationalist Student Union, UNS, regarding Jaguaribe's statements on Petrobras.[44] In any event, growing public perception of a development crisis and anomaly-stressing attention directed at Kubitschek's policies for which ISEB was perceived as

prime architect stressed and ultimately broke the broad theoretic formulation which had permitted the cooperation of radical and nationalist ideologues. Skidmore states:

> More moderate voices tended to be drowned out in the shrill chorus of political hysteria. The bitter controversy extended to the intellectual circles which had succeeded in constructing a consensus in support of Kubitschek's developmentalist-nationalism. ISEB, the institute where "developmentalist" intellectuals had gathered, was racked by a bitter quarrel between moderates and extreme leftists. The intellectual consensus supporting developmentalist-nationalism collapsed as the language of public discussion deteriorated into abusive polemics. Moderates such as Helio Jaguaribe were labeled "entreguistas" by the left, while the right called them "communo-nationalists." Most significantly, the mutual good faith, on which the very process of democratic discussion rested, was undermined. Disagreement was labeled treason as rational dialogue became steadily more difficult.[45]

It is logical that to the degree that "desenvolvimento nacionalismo" served to create consensus toward his policy objectives Kubitschek employed the words in his speeches. It is equally reasonable to assume that once association with ISEB's "desenvolvimento nacionalismo" became a political liability that Kubitschek would defer promoting the terms and topics it implies. It is significant to note that indexes to annual compilations of Kubitschek's speeches cite fifty-four paragraph references to "national development" in 1956, eighty-one references in 1957, and none in 1958.[46]

ENDNOTES

[1]Thomas C. Bruneau, The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 72.

[2]Emmanuel de Kadt, Catholic Radicals in Brazil (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 72-73.

[3]Ibid., p. 69. Kadt notes that pre-1950 Catholic religion legitimized civil and political patterns of patron dependency. The few are entitled to rule; the many are obligated to follow. See also Rubens Brandao Lopes, "Desenvolvimento e Mudanca Social," and Emmanuel de Kadt, "Religion, the Church, and Social Change in Brazil," in The Politics of Conformity in Latin America, ed: Claudio Veliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 115-136, 194-197.

[4]"Statement of Campina Grande," n. 14, quoted in Bruneau, p. 75.

[5]Ibid.

[6]The figures in parenthesis indicate paragraph numbers of speech which is reproduced in Appendix B.

[7]All succeeding quotes drawn from Dom Camara's letter which I have translated and reproduced in Appendix A.

[8]John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, Politico-Military Crisis, 1955-1964 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), pp. 26-28.

[9]Leff, pp. 133, 134.

[10]For information on the emergence of mass politics in Brazil and the corresponding "contradiction of interests" leading to a crisis of power in the polity, see Celso Furtado, Obstacles to Development, trans. Charles Ekker (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970), pp. 123-125, and Celso Lafer "The Planning Process and the Political System in Brazil: A Study of Kubitschek's Target Plan, 1956-1961" (Cornell University, Ph.D. 1970), pp. 28, 29.

[11]A brief search of microfilm records (comprising not more than four hours) of O Correio da Manha reveals frequent front page citations of President Kubitschek's speeches. Between February 17 and May 27 five of seventeen speeches received front page coverage and were cited in full. I found 3 commentaries on Kubitschek's speeches (on interior pages) and three front page coverages of presidential press conferences for the same period. It's probable that President Kubitschek's speeches received wider newspaper exposure than this limited search reveals. Listed chronologically the speeches, commentaries and interviews follow: Sunday, February 19, page 1. Commentary on Kubitschek's February 17 speech, "Voice of Brazil"; Friday, March 2, page 9. Address to veterans delivered previous day. [full text]; Friday, March 16, front page. Address to Congress. [full text]; Wednesday, March 28, page 6. Commentary on Kubitschek's March 26 speech on "Voice of Brazil"; Saturday, April 7, front page. Press conference; Friday, April 13, front page. Press conference; Friday, April 13, front page. Text of speech broadcast previous day on "Voice of Brazil"; Tuesday, April 24, front page. Commencement address to economists on agro-industrial development delivered previous day. [full text]; Sunday, May 27, front page. Address to North East Bishops on Regional Development delivered previous day. [full text].

[12]Jorge Gustavo da Costa, Planejamento Governamental, A Experiencia Brasileira (Rio: Fundacao Getulio Vargas, 1971), pp. 161-164. Mr. Costa calls this feature of Kubitschek's administration "paragovernamental" in that independent executive agencies possessed virtual fiscal and political autonomy.

[13]The speech makes several oblique references to conspiratorial elements in the military. "No one is able to say that he misses the candidate . . . with bravura and combativeness . . . . [Kubitschek identifies his critics as] precisely the same ones who wanted to take from me by cunning or by force the legitimate power which the people in the polls and the Electoral judges in their verdicts freely confirmed upon me; and are the same ones who wanted to take from the then governor of Minas Gerais basic legal rights to be an ordinary candidate for the Presidency of the Republic." (362) As presidental candidate Kubitschek conducted his campaign in defiance of what was broadly perceived to be a military veto. He turned military opposition to his advantage, calling himself a "civilista" candidate and labeling military intrusion in government affairs undemocratic.

[14]Hirschman devised the topoi of "Comprehensive Plan" and "Ideology" to assist economic advisors in their attempts to get at what Hirschman calls "neglected problems." However, the strategies are equally applicable for politicians like Kubitschek,

because they offer frames of reference which can be manipulated to induce cooperation between divergent groups. See Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress, Studies in Economic Policy-Making in Latin America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 231-235.

[15]Kubitschek's predecessor Getulio Vargas submitted carefully crafted legislation establishing a state-run petroleum extraction and refining monopoly called Petrobras. Petrobras became the object of 22 months of often rancorous debate regarding a nationalist solution to Brazil's economic crisis. The controversy surrounding Petrobras was complex motivationally and substantively. Among the issues which sapped Vargas' political capital were a) government intrusion into the private sector, b) participation of foreign capital in the enterprise, c) the political implications of anti-American nationalist sentiment. Not the least among these was a conflict over the "Equitable" division of the immediate and fabulous riches which Petrobras was alleged to create to competing regions of Brazil. See John D. Wirth, Politics of Brazilian Development, 1930-1954 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970).

[16]Albert Hirschman provides an excellent historical case study of development policy-making. See Chapter One "Brazil's Northeast" in Journeys, pp. 11-92. The chronology chart on pp. 21, 22 is especially helpful.

[17]Ibid., p. 16.

[18]This statement is not explicit in the speech. However, the first federal administrator to shift government from drought protection to regional economic development was banker and economist Romulo de Almeida, Finance Minister under Getulio Vargas. He also created the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico.

[19]The Paulo Alfonso dam project which Kubitschek announces here was made possible by a project he initiated some weeks earlier at the headwaters of the Sao Francisco River. The Tres Maria would regulate discharge and provide a firm power capacity at Paulo Alfonso falls.

[20]Costa, Planejamento, p. 167.

[21]By "conditions of political participation" Lafer means aspects of Brazilian political culture which reveal themselves in populist and clientelist modes of action. See Chapters One and Two of his dissertation "The Planning Process and the Political

System in Brazil," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1970).

Nelson Werneck Sodre and other marxists criticized Kubitschek's programs because they implied no significant changes in capitalist class structure. This criticism is correct. As a strategy for political consensus Kubitschek programs seem to stress the enrichment of all groups and classes through the creation of new wealth, not the redistribution of the old. It is assumed that each group, class or region will receive its proper status within the "developed" nation. See Sodre, pp.

[22]Ianni states that the Programa de Metas used an administrative format which continually adjusted government economic policy to accumulated experience derived from the execution of government programs and projects. Octavio Ianni, Estado e Planejamento Economico no Brasil (Rio: Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1971), p. 152.

[23]"A Igreja Apollo O Plano de Recuperacao do Nordeste Como falou ontem, atraves de 'A Voz do Brasil' d. Helder Camara," Correio da Manha, 7 June 1956, p. 1. The article was the speech text of Camara's radio address of the preceding day.

[24]A joint Brazil-United States commission studied the problems of obstacles or "choke points" in Brazil's economic infra-structures, 1951-1953. A joint BNDE and ECLA studied application of import-substitution industrialization to Brazilian economic dilemma. See BNDE-CEPAL Analysis e Projecoes do Desenvolvimento, (1954).

[25]"Sentido e Perspectivas do Governo Kubitschek," Cadernos do Nosso Tempo 5 (Jan-March., 1956):11. Both Skidmore (Politics, p. 378) and Celso Lafer ("Planning," p. 106) attribute this article to Helio Jaguaribe. Jaguaribe was the leading political theorist of ISEB, and advisor to Kubitschek.

[26]Costa, Planejamento, pp. 164-165. The influence of Congress on the Programa was reduced to yearly budget debates on 10 of 30 target goals. 55% of total funds were already earmarked by Constitutional mandates. Much of the remaining 45% was earmarked by law to regional agencies, i.e. the Sao Francisco Valley Project. Of capital investments channeled through Programa only 8.82% was under traditional administration structure subject to Congressional control. A second factor which greatly assisted in Kubitschek's program administration was the creation of special autarcies and mixed corporations which were empowered to make autonomous in key economic sectors. da Costa, Planejamento, p. 47.

[27]Joint Presidents of the Development Council and the BNDE were, consecutively, ISEB associates Lucas Lopes (1956) and Roberto Campos (1957-1958). The same pattern was reenacted with Celso Furtado, president of both SUDENE and BNDE. (1958-1961).

[28]Leff, p. 151.

[29]Lafer, "Planning," pp. 106-146.

[30]Juscelino Kubitschek, Meu Caminho para Brasilia, Vol. 1: A Experiencia da Humildade (Rio: Bloch Editores, 1974), p. 23.

[31]Juscelino Kubitschek, Meu Caminho para Brasilia, vol. 3: Cinquenta Anos em Cinco (Rio: Bloch Editores, 1978), p. 43.

[32]Rhetoric: II: 3, 15.

[33]Kubitschek was fond of calling significant programs movements or campaigns, i.e. "Movimento de Pacificao Nacional," "Operacao Brasilia," Operacao Pan-Americano." Juscelino Kubitschek, Por Que Constrai Brasilia (Rio: Bloch Editores, 1975), p. 160.

[34]Kubitschek, Por Que, p. 357.

[35]Ibid., p. 365. In the month of May preceding his address before the bishops he approved the Development Council project for the Furnas projects. This hydroelectric project would produce 1,500,000 kw of electricity for Belo Horizonte, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. On May 10 he flew to Salvador, Bahia to inspect oil fields of Petrobras. There he opened a new pipeline which was to carry oil destined for the Mataripe oil refinery. That particular refinery was projected to increase production from 5 to 37 million barrels per year.

[36]Ianni, Estado, pp. 55, 56. In this regard see also Costa who notes, ". . . In truth, the degree of symbolism granted the Programa de Metas was so high that its political character overshadowed attempts to evaluate planning techniques which had been enacted for the first time, and, in terms of administration, inhibited criticism of the Programa which might have been useful for succeeding planning attempts. Planejamento, p. 168.

[37]Herminio Martins, "Ideology and Development: 'Developmental Nationalism' in Brazil," in Latin American Sociological Studies, ed.: Paul Halmos, Sociological Review Monograph II (Keele, Keele University 1967), p. 155.

[38]Oscar Lorenzo Fernandez, "Analise Existencial da Realidade Brasileira," Cadernos do Nosso Tempo no. 4 (April - August, 1955), p. 161.

[39]Albert O. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 89, 90.

[40]The fundamental language categories include conceptions of epistemology, axiology, ontology, levels of metaphor, and rhetorical visions strictly or loosely constructed. Brown, "Complementary," pp. 37, 38.

[41]Werneck Sodre, "2. Crise," p. 120.

[42]Helio Jaguaribe, O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira, (Rio: ISEB, 1958), pp. 7, 52, 53. "[T]he growing equivocation surrounding the problem of nationalism, beyond impeding the adoption of rational and efficient policies, is raising unjustifiable barricades between some of our best men. As a result, it is appropriate to create favorable conditions for the transformation of unthinking radicalism, or equally as dangerous, of anti-social or anti-national adventurism [to well conceived and executed ones.]"

"Thus, for example, what becomes nationalist about the present petroleum policy is not the fact that Petrobras is an enterprise of the Brazilian state, directed by native-born Brazilians, etc. In theory, the nationalist policy of petroleum could be realized through Standard [Oil]; or whatever other enterprise, providing that in the present national situation it was concretely the most efficient form to prospect Brazilian petroleum and to proportion to the national economy the full use and control of such primary products. What becomes nationalist in the present petroleum policy, to the contrary, is the fact that only Petrobras in the conditions of country and the present international state of affairs, possessed the available means to enable us to assure the most efficient petroleum exploration and to proportion to our economy the full use and control of this combustible. To the degree in which the support of Petrobras originates from the circumstance of being a national enterprise or a monopoly of the State of which it is the most effective instrument to attain to our petroleum needs, marks the distinction between the erroneous nationalism of means and the nationalism of ends."

[43]Joao Paulo de Almeida Magalhaes, A Controversia Brasileira sobre o Desenvolvimento Economico, Uma Reformulacao (Rio: Grafica Record Editora, 1966), pp. 20, 22, 25.

[44]Werneck Sodre, "2. Crise," pp. 125, 126.

[45]Skidmore, Politics, p. 180.

[46]Presidencia da Republica, Servico de Documentacao da Presidencia, Discursos, Proferidos no Primeiro Ano do Mandato Presidential, 1956 (Rio: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1958), p. 414; Discursos, 1957, p. 295; Discursos, 1958, p. 524.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The problem of national development came into special prominence in the two decades following World War II. The remarkable ease and speed with which post war reconstruction shaped the face of western Europe engendered optimism regarding the much more complex and protracted task of fomenting development in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The success of the Marshall Plan perhaps deceived policy-makers, politicians, economic advisors and citizenry that their nation's problems of economic, political and social laggardness could be as easily solved. It was an era in which enormous political and intellectual resources were mobilized in the pursuit of economic growth, social welfare and political stability. Some attempts succeeded, some failed. By hemispheric and world standards of economic growth the Kubitschek era succeeded dramatically. As E. Bradford Burns describes:

> In his speeches, he reiterated his belief that economic development was the key to national independence. During his administration, 1956-1961, Brazil experienced unparalleled economic growth. Industrial production grew 80 percent; steel, 100 percent; mechanical industries, 125 percent; electrical and communications industries, 380 percent; transportation equipment, 600 percent. By 1960, industry accounted for over 20 percent of the gross national product. By that time, Brazil manufactured fully half of its heavy-industry needs: machine tools, motors, transformers, mining and transportation equipment, turbines and generators, et al. Although the rates of growth for the 1947-1961 period were impressive, . . . the rates during the Kubitschek administration were nothing short of spectacular.[1]

One explanation for this success was, perhaps, government freedom in formulating economic policy guided by technical considerations. Nathaniel Leff attributes government autonomy in policy-making to the operation of Brazilian political culture and to the emergence of new roles for economic advisors in the policy-making process.

> This autonomy in economic policy-making grew, as we noted, from a system of clientelistic politics which neutralizes many of the pressures from interest groups and socio-economic classes. Clientelistic politics made policy action based on elite opinion, which in postwar Brazil followed a modernizing economic ideology. With the availability of tecnicos, in turn, these ideas could take effective programmatic form. These features of national economic policy-making . . . induced the political elite to take a modernizing approach and cope reasonably well with the country's economic problems. . . .[2]

One of the central threads of this project has been that ISEBianos, in their dual roles as ideologues and advisor/administrators, were prominent forces in government policy shaping change in Brazil. On the assumption that President Kubitschek and ISEB advisors conformed to Leff's broad characterizations, (Chapter III) this project scrutinizes the ways in which they acted together in the policy process, particularly within the ambit of potentiality suggested by the "ideology of national development" (Chapter IV). Borrowing from Brown I create a communication process model of policy-making which represents actions of Kubitschek, ISEB and other significant policy agents in terms of shared-symbol-as-social-dynamic.[3] The model schematizes individual and group interaction in terms of roles which arise in the expression of intrapersonal need and interpersonal or group power (Chapter IV). One of Kubitschek's speeches

is analyzed to test model utility in revealing language-mediated shifts of attention promoting policy consensus. From the speech, taken as a representative sample of the kind of policy rhetoric which characterized his administration, generalizations regarding Kubitschek's symbol and administrative strategies are extracted (Chapter V).

Rhetoric of National Development Policy

The policy-maker's job of determining future action and winning necessary support poses a rhetorical task. He must probe the categories which determine or reveal historical and human processes to find the substance of the policy. He must discover forms for the public expression of the policy. If policy-making stresses an ends-means sequence of determination, then social science may relate to policy discourse as ancient dialectic did to rhetoric in Plato's Republic. However, if, as I suspect usually is the case, means and ends are determined synchronously, that is, policy objectives and policy instruments proceed hand in hand, then social science and policy discourse might be conceived as proceeding from a process of investigation in which the "doable," "preferable" and "sayable" are discovered together.[4]

This project has attempted to develop a rhetoric of development policy. Implicit in this effort has been the assumption that the conception of national development policy and its expression could be linked through topoi. Topoi was a method of search in ancient dialectic and rhetoric which led to the discovery of "doables" and

"sayables" that unleashed potential for change in the material or phenomenal world. The author has employed topoi in two ways. In the historical narratives of Brazilian policy-making this project conceives of the "ideology of national development" as a common topoi for Kubitschek, ISEB, and other significant parties in the policy process. The "ideology" served to direct the attention, actions and speech of actors within the historical narratives. However, in elaborating a communication process model of Brazilian policy-making the author has used topoi in a second sense. The model and grammar of interventions directs the critic's (i.e. the author's) attention in the investigation of the action and discourse in the narrative. At the first level topoi could be considered as drawing upon common opinion of the participants regarding the way things are (i.e. Brazilian political culture), and upon the participants understanding of historical processes (reifications of "national development," or how things-come-to-be). True to my training in rhetoric, the topoi used in the second level, or critical sense are drawn from notions of shared-symbol-as-social-dynamic.

Contributions to Knowledge: Historical Narrative

By what criteria can this use of topoi be evaluated and what contributions to knowledge does it make? In his article, "The History of Public Address in An Age of Information," Brown states:

> [V]alidity of communication information inheres in the integration via human intentionality, of symbolizing creatures with their environment, the communication historian--like the observational geologist--will prize and seek to improve the field's collection of "naturally" occurring

> (i.e., non-"operationalized") fossils of communication events. From them, she or he will reason vigorously toward answers to questions like the following. What aspect of symbolizing lies behind the appearance that symbol users can both organize and disorganize their system of relationships with one another? . . . [W]hat aspect of symbolizing underlies the intuition that symbol-experiencing offers a trade-off between the efficiency of making present the not-here, the not-now, and the not-yet-observed, on the one hand, and the blindering of selective perception, on the other? . . . In such studies historians will seek generalizations that depend upon the similarities (not the repetition) of total communication occurrences across time.[5]

This project attempts a communication history of national development rhetoric accompanying policy-making in which Kubitschek and other agents attempt to adjust themselves to their environment and to each other through symbols. It is the hope of this author that this study might contribute understanding to the dynamics of regional discourse in which Latin American politicians, social scientists and others act together to define and remedy the endemic and intrusive fact of underdevelopment. The specific contributions to knowledge which this project makes follow as responses to the questions which Brown poses.

In policy-making during the first two years of the Kubitschek administration what aspect of symbolizing lay behind the appearance that symbol users can both organize and disorganize their system of relationships with one another? There are two aspects of symbolizing which are evident in the narratives and analyses of this project which contribute knowledge regarding Brazilian policy-making of the period. First, symbol use promoted shifts in the loci of identity out of which policy agents acted and organized themselves. Nationalism, a form of identity rhetoric, motivated joint actions

among groups with widely disparate status and needs. Kalman H. Silvert in his introductory essay "The Strategy of the Study of Nationalism" remarks that, in emerging nations nationalism is a powerful organizing force. Considered as an ideology nationalism entails "those expressed bodies of political thought concerning what the nation was, is, and ought to be, and the means to be employed for seeking national goals and for discriminating between state power and individual rights."[6] In Brazil the "ideology of national development" diagnosed endemic underdevelopment as a product of dependence upon extra-national agents and forces. The "ideology" suggested goals and means by which individuals could enjoy the consumption benefits, social stability and political participation associated with "modern" nation status.[7] Through the "ideology" a program of action and motivations to execute it emerged so that Brazil as a nation could rid itself of economic, social, political and cultural problems attributable to underdevelopment. The "ideology" further functioned to organize change in policy-decisioning with the intrusion of technical advisors; it redefined state power to permit government investment and control in industries formerly in the domain of individual rights to "private enterprise."

The second contribution to knowledge regarding policy-making in the Kubitschek administration features conceptions of power and the selective perception of change. Kubitschek employed the planning process to mediate individual and group needs and to promote consensus regarding change. The technocratic determination of government projects did not threaten the perceived power base of clientela

politicians. Because government projects were determined by technocratic national planning, individuals within or without the clientela network who were predisposed to view government action as serving private interest, frequently saw Kubitschek's programs as serving public interest.

Brown's second question by which this project can contribute to knowledge regarding Brazilian development policy-making is, "[W]hat aspect of symbolizing underlies the intuition that symbol-experiencing offers a trade-off between the efficiency of making present the not-here, the not-now, and the not-yet-observed, on the one hand, and the blindering of selective perception on the other?"[8] The future orientation of the "ideology" frequently masked or blinded its adherents to other policy alternatives, creating consensus and support. At the same time it decreased policy efficiency by obscuring other potentialities for change. Regarding "ideology's" impact on policy-making Nathaniel Leff stated:

> [its] interpretation[s] of Brazilian reality . . . [were] so "self-evident" that they informed Brazilian economic analysis as axioms rather than visa versa. This situation exemplifies some of the difficulties for accurate economic analysis in a milieu where economists are insufficiently differentiated from the intelligentsia and the intelligentsia hold strong ideologic convictions.[9]

One costly mistake of the period was the neglect of exports, particularly coffee, while pursuing rapid industrialization. Government policy-makers deferred promoting coffee sales out of suspicion that reliance on world markets might prejudice the future economic growth of Brazil as it had, according to the "ideology's" narrative, in the past. Also feared was that increased sales might strengthen the

hands of the landed aristocracy which were considered, in "ideology's" narratives, to be reactionary agents of foreign interests which necessarily opposed national autonomy that rapid industrialization would create. Consequently as part of their ideologic orientation government policy-makers tended to conceive of export-promotion and import-substitution industrialization as contradictory policy objectives. In actual fact neglecting revenues from exports contributed to import constraint on economic growth, and helped to prompt further economic crises.[10]

The emphasis of Brown's question however, lies not so much with the relative efficiency of ideologies in featuring some potentials for policy action while masking others. Brown's question asks "[W]hat aspect of symbolizing underlies . . . symbol-experiencing" (emphasis mine).[11] This project reveals that both Kubitschek and ISEBianos attempted to effect a psychological transformation of the Brazilian populace which they called tomada de consciencia. At the individual level the shift from alienacao to tomada de consciencia is represented by change from the first to the second of the following postural statements. "There is no certain knowledge for future events, therefore I need take no forethought, or make plans. The whole world may change next year, utterly beyond my control." "I can with scientific certainty predict and control my future. I can act with others to make plans realities." Kubitschek's speeches function to draw attention to the material and psychological realities of the nation which stressed Brazil's ability to shape futures and fulfill national destiny. The underlying aspect of

symbolizing which served to direct the shift in national attention in policy-making, however, entailed change from a historic to a historicist epistemology following Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In terms of the model dynamics which are described and illustrated in Chapter IV this shift in epistemology promoted redefinitions of "self," "others," "needs" and "relationships" in ways which preserved integrity of policy agents while accommodating change. The shift contributed to complementary power relationships between significant institutions and groups so that both individual and group interest converged in the prosecution of "national development" policy.

Contribution to Knowledge: Model Validation, Revision

As an exercise in process-stressing communication history this project attempts to "not only . . . illumine the sequence of events under study but also . . . [to] test and validate, revise, or discard the interpretation-generating model."[12] The research question directing the project emphasized the creation and testing of an interpretation-generating model. It was

> Can Brazilian national development policy-making of the Kubitschek era be modeled in ways which reveal language-directed perceptions mediating social continuity and change?

Accordingly Chapter III investigated agents and agencies at work in Brazilian policy-making. Chapter IV framed relations between "ideology," President Kubitschek and ISEB in terms derived from rhetorical theory. This chapter also devised a model of communication dynamics in policy-making. Chapter V employed the model to

detect, within an individual speech, symbol and administrative strategies which characterized Kubitschek's policy rhetoric. A major claim of the project, associated with the foregoing section of this chapter on historical contribution to knowledge, was that ISEB's research, teaching, advising and administering culminating in the "ideology of national development" served as an inventional system par excellence in Kubitschek's policy discourse, 1956-1958. To the degree that interpretations of the historical narratives are plausible and are consonant to communication theory regarding the symbolific nature of man, and true to historical evidences the claims stand and the model is validated. In adapting Brown's model for Brazilian policy-making the author revised the notion of interdependence to include more explicit reference to economic and political relationship. The model adaptations made by the author contribute strengths to its interpretation of Latin American discourse. First, public discourse in Latin America is seen as arising out of a need to resolve ambiguity regarding the "national situation." Ambiguity is the product of the cultural experience of dualism--a poor "fit" between the ideals, models and theories of governance and day-to-day experience. The pervasiveness of dualism throughout Latin America and other former colonial regions of the world provides some basis for comparative studies in public discourse. Second, the "rhetoric of national development policy-making" suggests process-oriented explanations for communication trends infusing and in some sense directing national policy-making. Third, as critical instruments, the models of national development

policy-making suggest the times and places where strategic interventions might be made in directing social continuity and change. Fourth, as model the rhetoric of national development policy-making resolves tension between universalist prescriptions and cultural relativism in development theory. The model requires that individuals and groups act according to language-mediated nature. It does not require that "nature," even that governing symbol-use and symbol-sharing, remain constant for purposes of comparison.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this study contributes to knowledge as an attempt at communication history. In such histories the narration of events and the inferences drawn from them are guided by the notion that communication dynamics constitute "the central engine of history." Communication histories stress the integration of events and contexts while revealing those strategic moves contributing to those progressive developments in human knowledge and organization which advance both continuity and change.

ENDNOTES

[1]E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 335.

[2]Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947-1964 (New York: John Wiley, 1968), p. 180.

[3]William R. Brown, "Toward a Complementary Version of Rhetorical Vision Theory," Columbus, Ohio, 1982. (Mimeographed).

[4]Hirschman and Lindblom contrast the rational "end-means" balanced approach to national development with a pragmatic and flexible "means-ends" approach. They characterize this approach toward nation building as "unbalanced" growth based on optimum disorderliness. In this mode of policy-making ends and means are selected synchronously. "All agree that in an important sense a rational problem solver wants what he can get and does not try to get what he wants except after identifying what he wants by examining what he can get." Albert O. Hirschman, Charles E. Lindblom, "Economic Development, Research and Development, and Policy-Making: Some Converging Views," in A Bias for Hope, Essays on Development in Latin America, ed: Albert O. Hirschman (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 77.

[5]William R. Brown, "The History of Public Address in An Age of Information," Central States Speech Journal 32 (Winter 1981): 230.

[6]Kalman H. Silvert, "The Strategy of the Study of Nationalism," in Expectant Peoples, Nationalism and Development, ed: Kalman H. Silvert (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 18.

[7]Herminio Martins refers to the "ideology of national development" as a "generalized medium of discourse and vocabulary of motives for other groups [than tecnicos] such as factions of the industrial bourgeoisie, the urban working class, politicised youth . . . ." Herminio Martins, "Ideology and Development: 'Developmental Nationalism' in Brazil," in Latin American Sociological Studies, ed: Paul Halmos, Sociological Review Monograph 11, (Keele: Keele University, 1967), p. 167.

[8]Brown, "History," p. 230.

[9]Leff, Policy-Making, p. 181.

[10]Ibid., pp. 63-66.

[11]Brown, "History," p. 230.

[12]Ibid., p. 254.

APPENDIX A

NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENCE

Translation of an open letter, in which Dom Helder Camara, auxiliary Bishop of Rio, responds to charges which Carlos Lacerda directed to him in the Tribuna da Imprensa, follows:

The Response of Dom Helder Camara to Sr. Carlos Lacerda

In response to the letter which Carlos Lacerda sent to him from the United States, Dom Helder Camara, Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, wrote a letter which follows in its entirety.

My Dear Friend,

Your letter, which I learned of through the Tribuna da Imprensa on the 26th of this past month, gives me a providential occasion to present to you, to your friends and mine important clarifications regarding my position before the government, [which come] from the Eucharistic Congress for Brazil. I confess that, although without any intentions of changing your viewpoint, and those of your friends, including friends who will be offended by my reply, I felt, having been formally questioned, a moral obligation to speak in order not to sin by omission.

Essential Misgiving

Your great misgiving is that of seeing "The Oligarchy which dominated Brazil for 25 years . . . put its hand upon the Church as a source of power and control over the masses." In explaining the cause of your alarm your letter depicts the Church--along with the Armed Forces--as a hope of salvation for Democracy in a country without [institutions of] education, justice, professional associations or political parties.

To you, the Government now in place is not legitimate: it is a reinstatement of the Oligarchy [effected] November 11 [1955]. Publicly represented by the President as a democratic mandate, it subverts Public Power, it retards the process of democratic restoration which you hope the Armed Forces will bring about, and it opens the way for civil war.

The Present Executive Power of the Republic is Legitimate

Your "letter to Juscelino Kubitschek" published in the Tribuna on the 27th of this past month is not up to expectations of your intelligence or to those of the journalistic profession. The Dr. Juscelino Kubitschek--your pardon, Carlos, if I should cause you to be deceived--is the legitimate President of Brazil.

From where would illegitimacy of power of the present Chief of State come? Does it come in fact--some will say--from within the person of the President, or his advisors who have turned to the corrupt and corrupting Oligarchy [which reigned Brazil] prior to August 24 [1954]? But when you entered the electoral contest on the side of the candidacy of Juarez Tavora you implicitly accepted the possibility of victory of candidates opposing your honorable and and our common friend. To deny this would be to confess an anti-democratic use of elections which for you, in this instance, are only valid if the result be to your liking.

The illegitimacy of the current President arises from the circumstance of having been elected in a fraudulent contest and without having an absolute majority? Against this point of view I have the extremely competent testimony of General Juarez Tavora: "I declare that if Your Excellency had been elected in this same election and only by a margin of 8 votes, I would fight for the inauguration and possession." The General knows very well that within the interior, no party has a monopoly on fraud and also knows well the requirement of absolute majority, reasonably considered, presupposes reform of the current Constitution.

Does illegitimacy come from the interregnum of November 11 to the 31st of January? Yet no one can profess ignorance [of the fact] that elections on the third of October, to the glory of President Cafe Filho, are inscribed as among the most free [ever] held in the country and the interregnum in no way alters the results or the recount of votes.

It is evident tnat all this argument applies in full to the President's running mate, the Vice President, Dr. Joao Goulart.

There is no sense and there is no justification to condemn as illegitimate the current Executive Power of the Republic. Look, you know the clear, constant and invariable doctrine of the Church in the face of legitimate authority.

Strange Manner to be Democratic

You not only consider the current President illegitimate, but declare in all your letters where you place your hope: in a movement of the Armed Forces. In a country without universities, without parties and without professional organizations they would be, once again, the "conducting agents" of a democratic society.

What would you say to those who would infer that [you wish] to reopen preachments for a coup. The possibility of publishing letters directed to me and to the President contradicts your affirmation that liberty of expression in Brazil benefits the "tanks."

The allusion to "tanks" proves, however, my Dear Carlos, that you are passionately swayed: after all, do you fear them or desire them? The impression left by your letter is that you desire them if they take to the streets in defense of points of view which coincide with your own.

The Worse, The Better

Be careful, Carlos, not to fall into the error of placing your passions above the interest of the nation: do not grieve if news arrives of judicious action of the government.

Already in absencia you have incrimiated me of evil intent in the examination of political problems. And how difficult to plumb into the intentions and motives of another! God often permits others to judge us erroneously or badly in order to determine if thus our eyes are open to the practical impossibility of judging others.

I'm grieved on behalf of dear friends like yourself, pointed out before the seat of Justice. Our Lord in the Evangelist (St. Matthew 7: 1,2) admonishes: "Do not judge lest you be judged yourselves. For in the way you judge, you will be judged; and by your standard of measure, it shall be measured to you." Remember that the journalist, with his mission of orienting the public, has to reconcile passages like this of the Sacred Scripture with his professional work. One of the outcomes is that of the care with which [one] acts and another one [regards] the boundaries not to cross concerning the human creature, however miserable he may be.

Your responsibility, Carlos, is tremendous. You, who in person are so quiet, level-headed and reasonable, before the keyboard of a typewriter or before a microphone are encumbered and, in short, break all bounds, and are capable of all excesses--too much eulogy when you wish well (have you seen the article about the Franciscan father, who the more friends he has the more he wants to exaggerate?) as in attacking when all is not well. I sincerely believe that the intention is good; but the consequences are terrible. I'm not only thinking of your young friends, who carry to the logical outcome the assertions which you raise, but also and above all I'm thinking of the venerable women who listen from a distance: good and merciful matrons, incapable of killing a fly and who are overtaken with hate and filled with rancor.

But let's return again to your letter, to your misgivings and objections.

Slum and the Mission of the Church

You said :

> To take care of the slums is a high mission which Your Excellency has obtruded, and therefore the Church's

> influence has obtruded into civil society. But the fundamental and permanent mission of the Church, Your Excellency knows and feels better than I, is not able nor ought to be compromised by this momentary social action however important it may be.

In another passage you stressed:

> Thus the Church would be compromising the permanent mission of the Church--which [consists] not in the urbanization of the barrios but in the consciousness of it inhabitants.

For us, Carlos, the urbanization of the favela does not stop with social work. The concern is far from being merely the construction of houses where to relocate the tenants of sub-human barrios of the favelas. The change of housing is anticipated, accompanied and followed by great efforts of both humane and Christian origin.

By the grace of God we are able to work wonders in full measure in the favela--but, unless there is a miracle, the normal Christian life or simply human [existence] is made difficult if not impossible when it lacks an indispensable minimum of comfort. And besides material and moral misery mutually complement and aggravate each other.

God knows our activity in the favela is basic religion [catechetical], essential and profoundly basic religion. What indoctrinates is not convening youths, adolescents, adults, for the purpose of understanding answers to the question of the Catechism. To indoctrinate is to raise a living testimony of Christ and of His interests before the people; it is to create conditions which facilitate or even make possible the practice of virtue; it is to teach how to live like a human creature and child of God; it is to teach the parents to educate the children in Christianity.

If we were to stop on the social plane, we would be involved in "beguiling aspects" of the temporal mission of the Church; [but] we are immersed in doctrine, we live in doctrine: we are within the most pure and essential mission which was confided in us by our Lord Jesus Christ.

It is good to stress that this attitude does not contradict affirmations, apparently diverse and made in various circumstances, regarding our assurance of absolutely respectful treatment of non-Catholic residents of the favelas. We will not be the cause of the slightest constrainment and we will respect all their religious convictions.

Material cares suffocate us? The preoccupation of extracting money from the Government causes us to compromise ourselves with Temporal Power?

I recognize, Carlos, there exists in the present situation, danger of subversion much like that found in corruption or communism. I assure you that the Church will fulfill its mission of being alert

and of crying out at the right time, of taking measures when its apprehensions are seen to be materializing.

Our relations with the Government transpire on a plane of relations between Spiritual Power and Temporal Power with the exclusive purpose of serving the common good. We never entered the Government work place to carry political messages, to transmit flattery or to solicit personal favors. There are no secret accords, there are no suspicious arrangements nor any like implied compromises.

When we campaign before representatives of the people for money for the people to apply for the good of the people we do not judge ourselves in any way directly or indirectly compromised with the Government, which does us no favor. [Rather,] we help the State carry out its mission regarding social assistance.

This is the situation in the instance of the fifty thousand [cruzeiros] we expect [to receive] from the Federal Government and in the other odd [funds] which we possibly will have to request of the Municipal Government. However, in good faith I'm able to announce that excluding these two funds we will be able to leave untouched all public monies. Take note [of the fact] I am coming forward taking full weight of this audacious assertion: God certainly saw the purity of purpose with which we acted which brought us to a plan--[a plan] already examined by qualified men who are above any suspicion--a plan which permits the complete urbanization of the Rio slums in twelve years without a dollar from the National Treasury and without overburdening any particular source of funds. In short, the country will take notice of an authentic "God send" [trouvaille-fr] which will begin to bear fruit within a year and will liberate us again from the real danger of permitting us to get all wrapped up in policies and politicians. God exists, Carlos, and to the measure that we, helped by divine grace, carefully preserve within ourselves humility and charity, He will work miracles on behalf of his servants.

Slums and Agrarian Reform

You say in a certain passage of your letter, "Today as before, and before then I believe there is no solution for the slums while agrarian reform in Brazil is not made."

It's probable that we would be in agreement, depending upon a series of distinctions which to me appear to be indispensable.

To start off all men of fairly good sense see that the favela is a consequence and that . . . .

"Resposta de D. Helder Camara ao Sr. Carlos Lacerda," Correio da Manha, 3 April 1956, p. 3

APPENDIX B

SPEECH TEXT

Translation of a speech delivered May 26, 1956 at Campina Grande, Paraiba at the final session of the "Encounter of North East Bishops" regarding regional problems follows:

Most excellent and most reverend Archbishops and Bishops of the Northeast,

350 Your excellences have chosen and adopted, truly spontaneously, a symbolic name to characterize these few past days in Campina Grande. It's not a meeting, conference nor congress: it is, indeed, an encounter. An encounter of Bishops of the Northeast. An encounter is not an ordinary meeting. An encounter suggests and implies sincere deliberation aimed at tuning hearts and minds; [it implies] discussion animated not by a love of gratuitous or passionate debate but by a desire for understanding which leads to joint action. When an encounter ends, there is no separation, since already done is a profound harmonization capable to direct a lasting collaboration [que soma sem confundir e multiplica sem dispersar].

351 When the Archbishops of the Northeast decided to meet in Campina Grande to study the spiritual and material problems of the region, when they desired to have present representatives of all government bodies from Maranhao to Bahia, and for this reason requested the President of the Republic--who was not able to excuse himself from an invitation, and on such a high appeal--the impression occurred to no one, much less to me, that the Catholic Church was going out of its proper limits. To the contrary, for a long time, I have perceived and felt that this occasion would open yet another chapter of relations, in some respects singular, between the Church and the State in Brazil. We do not have an official religion, that is since the installation of the Republic. Meanwhile, we offer to the world a spectacle of mutual respect and perfect collaboration between the Power Spiritual and the Power Temporal, between the Eternal Church, to which your excellences and practically all Brasilians [ascribe], and the government over which I have the honor to preside, definitively sacralized by the legitimacy of law and by popular will. Moreover, this position conforms to opinions which were expressed with your authority. [There recently appeared] a noble document published in the press of Rio de Janeiro [authored by] that extraordinary figure of bishop and modern apostle, Dom Helder Camara, a father harmonically divided, without conflict,

between a life of contemplation and action.

352 a Once again in our history, the Church now assumes a constructive position, beginning with the pure spirit and going to concrete facts, and this occurs precisely in a region yet underdeveloped despite the valor of its inhabitants, which turns us to the critical problem regarding the inequality between its standard of living and that in the south of the country. What an example, and what a pattern for Brazilian public life. How much more noble, patriotic and Christian [are the participants in their encounter] than those who merely point out inevitable shortcomings and who proclaim possible errors of public power. That's not even including those who applaud the rise and expansion of crises, when not working toward their own advancement. How much better to have done what you are doing: to help to see with realism the serious and grave but not hopeless state of affairs in the national situation; and to assume as Bishops and as men the responsibility which every conscientious Brazilian ought to dedicate himself to, that is that together we confront and surmount the difficulties which involve and touch us all. I know that the Catholic Church counts for sufficient moral force to decisively influence the creation, in Brazil, of the high state of good faith and disinterested collaboration between men, and can influence that capacity of selfless service to the common good so that these traits would stand preeminently for the political maturation not only of our populace--who are perspicuous, clear, understanding and generous like few others in the world--but for certain leaders who unhappily are not yet educated nor prepared to place private ambitions, personal resentments and deadly envies below the real exigencies of public affairs.

352 b I force myself, for this very reason, and with success, to place the office which was bestowed upon me as Chief Executive of the State well safe from individual pettiness, editorial reckonings, particular appetites, regional preoccupations, and of special interests of groups of whatever nature, political or economic. I place before me, always and invariably, a state of mind capable of examining all things from a moral height, clothed with austerity and a sense of human dignity, and likewise able to resolve all matters by national vision and patriotic objective, thus divesting from the chief executive of the country all matters which by happenstance might concern a man of private sensibilities, or of every tendency to egotistically think merely of myself. You yourselves, your Excellences, have attained the still point of wisdom: you are spiritual and practical. And because you are bishops, priests of God, this occasion resembles an invitation for a government man to make public confession. Besides this, in this setting, with this atmosphere, with this exceptional happening, the opportunity is [thrust upon me] at this closing session of the Encounter of Bishops of the Northeast, to fix some features and fundamental aspects of the political and administrative situation of Brazil.

352 c Never will they be able to say that I did not speak clearly and opportunely. They will never be able to say that I did not plan, I did not act, and I was not disposed to act in government interest with tenacity, decisiveness, and energy, as is my custom. I intend, as I said, to come to grips with some vital problems of the Northeast somewhat later. But right now I've no desire to cast today's speech with merely regional significance; within the fabric and mosaic of different phases of the national reality there is no such thing as a solely regional problem. It is with a characterization of the political sphere of Brazil I wish to begin. It seems reasonable that political affairs occupy my attention, yet that these concerns would recede from me in a meeting of ecclesiastical authorities--that I not deal with partisan or factional politics. In this I am justified by the teaching of Rui Barbosa em Hara: politics is always present in any assembly when fixed upon the lofty art of guiding the destinies of men and upon the science of fostering the common good within society.

353 I did not come to Campina Grande to announce miracles, nor to deliver promises which could not possibly be realized. I know that which I am able to do and feel that which I must say.

354 Above all I am aware that the destiny of my government is merged with the rightful destiny of the regime. This I do not proclaim out of vain glory nor to obtain compliance, but rather to stress a fact and characterize responsibilities. It's my wish that both my friends and enemies think about this. I am a man gifted with prudence and patience, but I am not able to agree with anyone's desire to weight, measure and judge a government which has not yet had a duration of four months and has not yet had time to bring to fruition the results of its first initiatives. In this argument I'm not referring to my plans and to my program both as broad-based and long term. I've in mind the emergency measures, government actions with the most immediate and decisive effects, which require several months to generate its consequences benefiting the poor's life condition. I accept the principle that, with whom the power resides, ought to rest to the same proportion the responsibility, above all in a country in which directly and exclusively is thrust upon the President of the Republic the blame of all ills, from frost in coffee plantations to a strike in the bakeries, from that which in fact occurs to that which doesn't exist except in the conjectures or deliriums of his adversaries. I excuse myself, however, from responsibility of a past and completed circumstance which shadowed the inception of my government; for this reason I excuse myself from accepting as my own work or that of my government, the heritage of inflation and high prices, the effects of which are yet felt--I in no way participated and in no way contributed anything to this circumstance. I am, it is true, attempting to confront it with indominable aggressiveness, with resolution I do not exaggerate to call heroic.

355 I will not permit myself to be intimidated before injustice or incomprehension; I will not permit myself to be slandered by hate, intrigue, calumny, the calculated venom of public opinion, the disparagement of my intentions and of my governmental acts. In truth, I have nothing to defend. It is I who would be in the position to accuse if the duty of my office and my human nature did not impede whatever participation in polemic debate, and from which I receive no enjoyment, since such debate merely demonstrates to me a spectacle of tedium and uselessness.

356 Once again I proclaim that the President of the Republic, his ministers, his advisors, with personal confidence continue inflexible in the decisioning to be maintained with intransigent firmness the high and unimpeachable level of morality which I established, from the very first day, to be the level and characteristic of all the public administration during my tenure. That austerity of public funds which I determined early in that first ministerial meeting February 1, as a general rule for all the government is not merely a measure taken against inflation and the high cost of living, it also signifies the expression of a moral principle regarding the conduct of public administration, a principle which my government will bind to its very existence, and apply without wavering or concession of whatever kind, exercising the most rigid vigilance.

357 I am at battle on various political and administrative fronts, multiplying providences and redoubling the efforts of a President of the Republic who works fourteen to sixteen hours a day to make his government an effective power which plans, realizes and produces, and which sustains the public confidence. Initially, I was confronted with the problem of order, particularly in the episode of Jacare-Acanga, when I was disposed to act with energy and decision to enforce respect for military hierarchy and discipline, which are the fundamental tenents of the Armed Forces. But that was merely one episode. For sometime there has been principally a generalized spirit of disorder and subversion in all sectors of the public life of a country. As attentive as I am to certain eternal values like Justice and Liberty, it has always appeared to me that none of these would exist without Order, and that the imposition of Order was the fundamental problem for a Chief of State. Therefore I decided to restore to this country military order, political order, administrative order, moral order and order among spirits. By this means my government was immediately made certain with promptness with which I reestablished the principle of authority, public tranquillity, and confidence in legality.

358 In victory I presented myself as generous and understanding, I prefer to say chivalrous, that is to say with greater understanding and generosity, immune as always to whatever little sentiments of vengeance or to whatever petty desire for reprisals; and from this faithfulness of the President of the Republic to his own human nature

spontaneously arose the proposed amnesty, which was my idea, and presented by my initiative together with Senhor Vieira de Melo, majority leader of the house of Deputies. The concession of amnesty, in terms of Vieira de Melo's project, obviously, represents at the same time the thought of all the government and of the parliamentary forces which support it. It is not accurate that the President of the Republic has altered at any moment his point of view regarding amnesty, nor at any time has he demonstrated himself irresolute, hesitant, or duplicious in light of the project directed at and presented to the house of Delegates by the very same government against its leader. The truth is that I maintained an attitude of unalterable agreement and firm support to the project of amnesty, invariably manifesting this thought and this orientation to the leaders of the majorities in the two houses of the Legislature during the entire process of the transmission of that document in Congress, beginning with the day of the proposal in the house of deputies until the instant of the final vote in the Senate.

359 This is the political and moral definition [of the matter in doubt] of a government man who is becoming more well known and even more proven as administrator. We rely little upon the prescriptions of etiquette or title. For this reason, those who believe that I desire to stay in government merely to realize an administrative program deceive themselves. That would be to mutilate that which I consider the definitive and indisputable hand of destiny which led me, at times through unexpected routes, to the Presidency of the Republic. In truth I have and bring to the government a policy which does not need to be proclaimed abroad, because it is born of deep conviction and firm decision; with this policy I feel disposed to exercise a legitimate position of political leadership, which arises from the fact that I was elected as candidate by the majority parties and from the fact that I am President of the Republic. I am on account of the functions of this office, the chief of the nation, the chief of the government, the chief of State, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. I will not release, under any circumstances, any of the power which the laws bestow to me, nor abdicate in whatever circumstance or under whatever pretext, any of my constitutional prerogatives and attributions.

360 I am executing, I will and shall continue to execute that which has not occurred for some time, a presidential rule under terms of the Brazilian Constitution. In this solemn opportunity I reaffirm that my government was constituted with perfect unity without autonomous ministries or uncoordinated organs. This is because the government has a program of objective planning, basic reform and administrative accomplishments, all of which have partly been implemented in the first few months. This program is naturally that one I presented as candidate during the electoral campaign of 1955. [It was] approved and ratified by the vote of the people. To the ministries and other government organs falls the task of faithfully executing this program, in accord with the form of presidential regime,

and within the legal structure of the country.

361 The intrigues which intend to create rivalries or antagonism between the President and his ministries neither concern nor impress me. This is no more than an enemy tactic used by those whose objective is to keep certain circles of the country in a permanent state of disquietude, intranquillity, insecurity fed upon false characterizations of government actions, upon subversion of public order and upon a collapse of authority, all of which is outside of and far from any appearance of truth or possibility of occurrence at this moment. That which exists in the seat of government, to the contrary of insidious intrigue, is harmony and loyalty.

362 I know well what I am planning and what I am doing. I feel firmly that I have in my hands the command and the direction of the government, in the same firm hands with which I formerly, as candidate, carried the banner of legality to the day of victory. No one is able to say that he misses the candidate of the electoral campaign armed with bravura and combativeness. It is the forms of expression which are at some times different, but I assure the Brazilian people that today's president is the same as yesterday's candidate who knows what he wants and he is aware of his role and responsibilities with the same courage, same pugnacity, same idealism, and with the same faith in his land and his people. Humble before God, but without fear of men, I will remain always attentive, vigilant and intransigent in safeguarding the integrity or dignity of the office which the people conferred upon me and which I fully exercise. But at the same time it is curious, to the point of irony, that those lamenting that I do not exercise overbearing power and those who lament that I exercise too much dictatorial power--are precisely the same ones who wanted to take from me by cunning or by force the legitimate power which the people in the polls and the Electoral judges in their verdicts freely confirmed upon me; and are the same ones who wanted to take from the then governor of Minas Gerais basic legal rights to be an ordinary candidate for the Presidency of the Republic.

363 I desire to exercise the presidential mandate with balance and discretion, without deforming our regime with exhibitions of power which are foreign to it. I respect the spirit and the form of the democratic system under Constitutional terms.

364 Do not take as omission or lack of unity and orientation of the Executive Branch the fact that it initiates and makes public both debates and doctrinal divergences in Congress. In truth, such spectacles, when engaged with ideals and manifestations of public spirit, are but an indication of democratic vitality. We ought not to forget, after all, that the Congress, like the Judiciary, is not a dependent or subordinate branch, likewise remembering that the government cannot be made responsible for everything that happens or is permitted to happen in all sectors of the State; the Executive,

the Legislature, and the Judiciary are harmonic powers, yes, but at the same time independent, following the classic text of the Constitution.

365 Also do not take as a lack of unity in the government or as division between its members, and therefore a lack of command from the chief, that ministers and personal advisors of the President debate in official circles or in public opposing viewpoints, in this instance with the goal of interpreting the government's situation. All debates, analysis and criticism are lawful and even solicited, democratically, from government circles or official meetings but the one who decides, makes final disposition, after everyone is heard and everything pondered is naturally the President of the Republic. What I've said regards debates which are occasioned at official meetings without publicity. When they are public occasions focused upon the problem of discipline or of governmental unity, the truth is that the ministers or high statesmen have lawfully expressed themselves regarding whatever issues or whatever substance in their capacity as private citizens and as authorities, with the assent of the President of the Republic.

366 In an atmosphere like this one, a unified national sounding board, and without testifying again of appreciation and respect to your excellences, Archbishops and Bishops, this opportunity imposes itself naturally upon my spirit as the most adequate that, once and for all, some of the substantive problems of my government and the regime be conceptualized and proclaimed. This declaration was particularly needful to be said and understood, because for a long time we have had exclusively before our eyes the spectacle of a regime deformed in the presidential office. The disfigurement arises from opposite and contradictory causes: observe the excessive growth of the person of the president to the level of omnipotence, observe his diminution to the degree of annulment and renunciation.

367 I believe that my little services to the state and to national democracy will not be illustrative of the proposition I've just described, and that I have already put in practice as a regular, correct and legal function, the presidential system in Brazil. With scrupulous fidelity and a sense of duty I understand and practice the constitutional function of the President of the Republic in this regime. I give to the ministers of state and to personal advisors a proper autonomy of work and action, but in line with a general program which I elaborated, which is the rightful obligation of my leadership position, to personally orient, and to coordinate each one within the whole. I do not transform the presidential will into an authoritarian and capricious imposition, nor do I allow that secret cabinets or mysterious political clubs . . . meet in my name. This is how I conceive the government in a presidential regime. This is how I formed it and directed it, as an association of personalities, initiatives and energies, without worrying about priorities, rivalries or intrigues.

368 Only in this way, with an Executive Power thus comprehended and a presidential regime thus conceptualized, are we able to govern without preconceptions regarding the ideas and without limitations regarding the national problems. For example, I see the Northeast as Brazil, and only as Brazil. And this perspective validates its local and particular problems, because they are lumped together always within the sphere of the national situation and of the general interest. In this respect I wish to offer two typical examples, which at the same time represent two signs of noteworthy good for the Northeast, portenders [messengers] of my government actions for the common good of this region and therefore for the life conditions of its populace.

369 One of them is the most recent deliberation of Sumoc which, upon being announced in my speech on the 14th of this month in "Voice of Brazil" naturally having been first studied by me, and likewise directed, its enactment by the Ministry of the Treasury has already been done with speed, ready for immediate execution.

370 So much so good: this energetic decision by the government in the area of exports was destined to benefit, preferentially, the products of poor states, the products of the North, especially the Northeast. Starting now it will bring greater riches for the economy of this region. Otherwise, without those measures I recommended to Sumoc, Northeast agricultural products would remain strangled, and prisoners within the national territory. Now they will be the object of free and ample movement of exportation, creating new riches for the Northeast and for Brazil in the form of very scarce and highly desired foreign exchange credits for imports. It is in this way using a perfectly adequate conception to better understand and sense the effect of such government action that I classified the Sumoc ruling as an opening of ports, that is to say that certain products, products of poor states like those in the Northeast our ports were "closed" because the ports lacked necessary conditions for exportation. Now from this time forward, these products will be able to be found in merchant ships sailing out to foreign markets.

371 Another initiative of my government benefiting the Northeast, which is being announced here for the first time, speaks truthfully of my assertion that I am president of the entire nation and not whatever region taken separately. In that same speech on the 14th I announced that a solution to a problem with direct implications for supplying the population with food and in ameliorating the cost of living: the immediate construction of silos and warehouses in Rio Grande do Sul, Parana and other [southern] states. I did not forget that I promised the solution of this problem, as part of an emergency program, in speeches I made as a candidate and in my first speech as President of the Republic. Yesterday it was in Rio Grande do Sul and Parana; today it will be in the Northeast. To the Northeasterners, on this memorable and opportune occasion, I now wish to announce, as one of my Government projects in the

Northeast, the installation of a system of warehouses in the region, which I devised as an instrument to combat the costliness of life and speculation. This undertaking impresses itself upon my sensibilities as a strategic resource of inestimable value to serve as an emergency base and help center for Northeasterns in the period of droughts-- a popular defense, in sum, against crop failure, the lack of reserves, the tyranny of prices and market irregularities. This is not merely a promise. I have already recommended to the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works the rapid preparation of the decree, which I will sign as soon as I return to Rio de Janeiro, all of which stresses [the importance] of my first contact with people of the Northeast and particularly with the people of Campina Grande since being elected President of the Republic.

372 This initiative improves the Northeast, in the sense that it grants to it conditions of life which permit the Northeasterner to remain on his own soil without the temptation to emigrate or flee. In this matter I am especially pleased to speak in the name of the government to say to the Church that among all the social projects one sees beginning in our country, there are none more opportune and rich than that of the open war on two fronts which, in the final analysis, are intertwined and intermeshed: the urbanization of Rio slums and giving heed [to the needs of] the rural populace.

373 The slum urbanization projects undertaken by the Church through the Cruzada de Sao Sebastiao, which no longer can be postponed, is already transforming itself into reality. From the beginning we supported and will continue to support the Cruzada, which makes concrete, more than anything, a self-financing plan which consists in linking the solution for the problem of public housing with the growth of an industrial zone that has yet not existed in the capital of the Republic--and this is what pertains most to us at this Encounter of the Northeast--how temporary and even counterproductive it would be to urbanize the slums without simultaneously attending to the rural populace. Without a doubt, Your Excellences phrased the issue in proper terms upon desiring to discuss "measures which productively and humanely fix the Northeasterner in his habitat."

374 It was gratifying to me to come upon this pronouncement by Your Excellences, and upon this linking made by the Church between slums and immigrations; because this was a theme, an issue, a problem which I constantly sustained as Candidate throughout the entire electoral campaign. More than once I affirmed that this problem, from both sociology and human geography, for purposes of practical solution transforms itself into the problem which I characterized as a battle with two fronts; one in the city with the urbanization of the slums, the other in the interior, with the attachment of the rural populace to the soil.

375 Another campaign promise occurs to me now and as I do not renege on promises made, which I faithfully make into commitments, I reaffirm my idea of making a central region of the Northeast another Estado do Sao Paulo. There is nothing arbitrary or fantastic about such a comparison; it was made with thought of the Northeast's capacity for industrialization as a result of a new factor, the extraordinarily radiating source of energy and force which is found in the Paulo Alfonso Dam. I am stimulating private enterprise to establish themselves in the Paulo Alfonso area; it was only yesterday I received in audience [representatives of] aluminum industries, for whom I described a list of advantages of Paulo Alfonso and the excellencies of its industrial park in the near future. We are going to procure, so that the full and ample realization of Paulo Alfonso's industrialization may be made concrete, an equilibric formula between the dynamization of private enterprise and the capacity of State intervention: a formula in which the State will thrust itself as a stimulating and coordinating element, instead of throwing its energies into the field work exhausting resources and absorbing risks.

376 The Northeast has writhed and continues to writhe in anguish because of two privations which fall in full measure upon rural life, devastating it, and fall upon the dreams of industrialization, cutting them short for lack of strength. Everyone has on the tip of his tongue the names of the two distressing privations of the Northeast: water and electric energy. To solve its problem of electricity and as a consequence the problem of industrialization the Northeast can count upon Paulo Alfonso.

377 Now water--will it be that no conclusion can be found for this desperate search for the water problem which the nordestino debates as a malediction without limit in time and space? To my way of looking, this problem is not a government question. It is a problem of pioneer spirit, of regional love, of the wish to confront the phenomenon of droughts, as in a battle without rear guard or without place of refuge. This is not an issue for skeptics and pessimists, one or the other of which has taken to heart the famous thesis of Cincinato Braga, who in 1917, without kidding and in all seriousness presented as solution to the drought problem--merely that the whole Northeastern area should be evacuated.

378 Years have passed, times have changed, mentalities have been transformed. Among public service works against droughts, some magnificent realizations are standing, besides many others which were faulted and erroneous with really disastrous consequences. The dams, those so talked about and discussed dams, for example, represented and yet represent vital contributions, a saving measure for men and lands in regions proclaimed dead in desert aridity in dryness, but it is no longer possible to focus all solutions for short term drought and the long term economic situation of the Northeast in dams. This is not overemphasizing the problems. The classic and sad error of making dams without whatever prior or simultaneous plans for

projects in adjacent lands, or making large scale emergency dam projects without the necessary and unsubstitutable irrigation canals is common knowledge. We are going to turn over this old page and look again at this problem with eyes wide open. What is essential now is the elaboration of the Northeast Plan, not for bureaucratic briefcases, but made openly, without gaps or weaknesses, at the same time made with scientific rigor and bandeirante impulse. It has already been said, proclaimed and established, with good sense, that the substance of this problem does not merely entail hydrolic engineering or agronomy, but rather a conjunction of synchronic measures. As far as I'm concerned, I'm going to suggest and recommend that the first issues addressed by the Plano do Nordeste, be technical, definitive solutions to food production, water distribution, systematic reforestation, the adoption of new elements and modern forms of land cultivation.

379 The unity of the objectives of this assembly only appears to be broken by having deliberated on relative means of "resources to apply in the Northeast." You justly stress as the fundamental point "the fact of the dangerous inequality in standard of living between the Northeast and the South."

380 Once again, and now as Chief of the Government, I feel good about speaking to Brazilians of this region, presenting to them classifications, calling for their help, urging them to make sacrifices, and attending to their right complaints--and I feel content in being able to do it in full measure through figures as representative as those of the Church of Brazil.

381 For example, I sent instructions to the Bank of Brazil directing Cacex and Carteira do Cambio that, having once met general criteria to strengthen import exchange rates, they should give priority attention to regions like the Northeast, including Bahia, which represent large balances on external trade, according to just and balanced considerations. Besides the national interest is served by giving greater resources to those who demonstrate greater capacity to produce foreign exchange credits.

382 Likewise agriculture, by which 74% of the working population of the Northeast make a living--more than twelve and one-half million people--is able and ought to be expanded for internal consumption and for exportation. This is not to mention the rational and integral utilization of moist valleys and many plots of rich soil from Bahia to Maranhao through colonization projects with families naturally from the Northeast.

383 For this reason, also, a program of planned investments in education and health impose themselves in the same way as the program previously mentioned.

384 I wish to admonish that, along with major government resources for the region, there ought also be present the concern to stop the flight of Northeastern capital. In this area there falls to the Church an important role, that of stimulating, through its leaders, the use, within the region, of the capital which was generated as a product of the work and effort of men in the Northeast.

385 In fact, the phenomenon to which I refer, the flight of Northeastern capital, constitutes a motive for an enlightenment, directed by the Church in the Northeast. To the spiritual pastors of this region I appeal to you to influence men of money and vision that they focus their efforts or start new enterprises, using the profits in the development of undertakings which become sources of employment for the regional populations.

386 Supporting, coordinating and executing a program of official action in the Northeast, the government likewise commits itself to stimulate the collaboration among non-government entities, and the cooperation of the private sector. What this will mean is a full cooperative system between the Union, the States, the municipalities and private enterprise business, a system capable of assuring, by coordination of their respective activities, the productivity of labor, the investment of resources likely to generate new riches and to help the Northeasterner be established and to flourish in his own region.

387 Along the line of stimulating capital investment in the Northeast, we are preparing legislation for Congress destined to permit, in the vicinities of dams, large or small, made by public works, the utilization of irrigated lands bordering rivers or humid valleys, that within them technically formulated colonization projects with small property ownership be installed to permit the utilization by the greatest possible number of inhabitants. Through the colonization section and under the technical supervision of I.N.I.C., my government will seek to interest private initiative in activities of this nature, granting them the helps of credit, financing, the importing of indispensable machinery, through tax exemptions on their industrialization and commercialization activities in rural products.

388 During those days when I studied, not only with objectivity but also with love, the problems of the Northeast, I was able to make deductions in favor of the modification of several routine processes which delay funds destined for the Brazilian Northeast, and at times for this reason, make their application ineffective. I am going to give instructions to competent organs that they simplify the bureaucratic exigencies which now disturb satisfactory development of public works in the Northeast. In this manner we will avoid the exaggerated discrimination of funds, the fractionation of resources into a number of very ambitious projects, along with other

inversions, making projects endless and much more expensive.

389 Government cooperation with the Encounter of Northeastern Bishops was not limited to this final and solemn ceremony, to the proceeding of an official committee, to my presence of to this concluding speech. Nor was this collaboration a formal or conventional thing. Two meetings were conducted in the Palacio do Catete, with my presidential presence and with Dom Helder Camara, to coordinate experts and to promote studies to be placed at the disposal of Your Excellences. Upon receiving from Dom Helder Camara the invitation to pronounce the closing address before ecclesiastic authority and authorities of my government, and his request for my participation in the capcity as the President of the Republic in this Encounter of Northeastern Bishops, which [invitation] greatly pleased and honored me, I was immediately taken with enthusiasm and deliberation to in all things help with liberality. I immediately understood the significance, at the same time spiritual and moral, of this attempt. With this Encounter comes yet another new and happy opportunity for collaboration in Brazil between the Church and the State.

390 I immediately put at your disposal, through the intermediary of Dom Helder Camara, all which they judged necessary. For the first meeting I immediately called five ministers of State and thirty directors of important public administration services, in actuality all those responsible for federal public organs which act in the Northeast. On that occasion I felt it necessary that the President of the Government pledge, in the name of the government, a guarantee of prestige and help to the Encounter of Northeastern Bishops. I delivered to each a questionnaire, containing objective questions and formulating answers regarding concrete situations of the public service in that region, and fixed a day and hour when all responses were to be returned. And notwithstanding the very short time constraints not one failed, all punctually sent exemplary replies, generally well-documented and well-formulated.

391 Permit me the immodesty to inform you that the President of the Republic was found equally prompt, efficient and satisfactory by insisting that his advisors pay attention to the questionnaire and prepare replies. At the second meeting, with the same people as the first, I distributed a kind of report prepared in my cabinet in which by means of a brief and sumarizing lecture and after a thorough examination, all the information, suggestions, statements and realizations contained in the questionnaires sent to the President of the Republic by public federal organs with services in the Northeast were coordinated.

392 I am certain that this preliminary work of researching the objective elements and schematizing all the material, thus elevated with concrete facts and in-depth studies, I am certain that this official work, realized in those first two meetings in Catete

Palace, certainly has been a valuable assistance and insubstitutable foundation for conclusions, like those which Your Excellences [also] arrived at regarding creating of a pilot project in 1956, which we were also conceiving, but which in final expression we left to Your Excellences, coming from experience much more in contact with the regional reality and naturally much more accurate, having spent the past few days meeting at the Encounter in Campina Grande. The fact that for the first time in the history of the Republic, in the Palacio do Catete we had preparatory meetings designed to coordinate a joint plan which included the various ministers and all the federal organs which act in a particular region of the country well illustrates the exceptional importance which we attribute to the Encounter of Northeastern Bishops.

393 I asserted in the preliminary meetings, and certainly this assertion likewise applies to Your Excellences, that two necessities be imposed, without delay, in whatever official initiative or realization, without which we always fall upon improvisation, or do a job half-way. First, of most theoretic character and with least compulsion is systematic planning, in conjunction with all public services, examining the Northeastern problems with an adequate technical instrument in conjunction with practical maturity and humane integration of the region. In this sense, with certainty, the self-same economists, which today constitute one of our hopes for the progress and enrichment of our country, will be the first to contribute and to take in account the opportune advice of Your Excellences regarding--"The modern excess of aspiring to reduce all things to economics."

394 The other imperative to which we arrived, less theoretic but more detrimental if it is not taken as a starting point for whatever work of government in the region--and this was the principal objective of our first meeting in Catete--is the urgent necessity of coordination between the various organs which act in the Northeast. A dispersion of resources, principally federal funds, occurs because of a lack of articulation and coordination. A dispersion of forces may occur within a ministry, but with greater frequency occurs between ministries, or between federal state and municipal organs, or public and private enterprise entities. I am going to give an example of a case quite restricted and localized. In the National Department of Works against Droughts, frequent changes of administration, each of which determined changes in plans and orientations has resulted in an excessive number of projects, and gives rise to the over-dispersment of funds and the fractionation of technical resources.

395 I think that we are now sufficiently prepared for the tasks of planning and execution of projects in the Northeast. The object of preparatory meetings in Catete was the investigation and knowledge of elements which would lead Your Excellences to discover and suggest a practical means of realizing, yet in 1956, a pilot

project of coordinating the various organs which act in the Northeast. If this experience proves successful, with the execution of the role of the government, a much greater coordination would be possible within the period 1957-1960. For this purpose I directed inquiries to the ministers of State and directors of federal organs and asked questions to settle in each case the following points: the projects which are underway in the Northeast; the fiscal resources which need be committed for their continuation; the technical and budgetary resources which would be available safeguarding the most essential of the works in progress. To my way of looking at things, the problem in this instance is to discover, within each federal district of the Northeast, some public works already begun or about to begin with these two characteristics: projects capable of establishing and securing Northeasterners who are tempted to migrate; [and projects in which there is] opportunity given to the collaboration of diverse instruments, each of which [contributes] within its specific sphere in terms of its disposable technical and monetary resources. The other imperative which we immediately considered was that of the tendency to emphasize projects possessing favorable conditions for completion; which would be able to be started almost immediately; which would result in outputs capable of assuring the permanent improvement of those rescued from migration; and which would simultaneously contribute toward higher economic and social standards of living for workers.

396 I was to announce a short time before this speech, the pilot project to which we are alluding, and I determined that the time for an offical announcement of this measure [should be] when certain other official acts of major importance have been completed and signed, which already have been prepared and readied for completion. These are not empty promises. With the pilot project we encounter signs that some of the problems will be solved with resources already designated and anticipated. We find within its [The Plano do Nordeste] text objective, concrete and practical recommendations; the solutions are indicated with clarity and good sense. The pilot project does not imply the creation of new state organs, nor does it mean special financing. It requires only and principally initiative, competence, action, the effective utilization of existing resources, a unified command of action. In summation, it requires a mobilization of efforts which will certainly place the government of the Northeast in position to effectively operate in the territories of the Northeast. This obligation now assumed by the public authorities likewise indicates the manner in which the government concretely and decisively apprises the Encounter of Northeastern Bishops.

397 Finally, one of your concerns, Archbishops and Bishops of the Northeast, was the care to "put the northeastern diocese in condition to face religious problems paralleling the economic-social situation of the Northeast."

398 This involves a question within the direct jurisdiction of the Church. Nevertheless it would be lawful for the government to make emphatic its satisfaction upon meeting Brazilian Bishops at work, perfectly aware of their responsibilities before God and before men. This conveys a great peacefulness to the Public Power, to know that the spiritual guides of the Nation hold up a beacon light, attentive to apostolic actions in which not only the clerics--especially the devoted rural priests--but also the Catholic laity, especially through Catholic Action, are enrolled.

399 To the Pope Pius XII, whose personal interest in Brazil I had the joy to prove in a memorable audience with which His Holiness honored me, to this great Pope whose encyclicals and messages are sent not only to the faithful but to all humanity, to the chief of Christendom, it must be a consolation to know that on the forefront of the largest Catholic nation of the world are genuine men of God, who measure up to these difficult times which are upon us. And as citizen and Chief of the Government likewise to me, who salutes and congratulates Your Excellences, personally a God-fearing creature, [what consolation there is to know] of all the service of God's emissaries.

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