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THE OTHER SIDE OF BROADCASTING: A HISTORY OF THE
CHALLENGERS TO THE USE OF THE AIRWAVES

The Ohio State University

PH.D.

1979

University
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THE OTHER SIDE OF BROADCASTING: A HISTORY OF THE
CHALLENGERS TO THE USE OF THE AIRWAVES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1979

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to tell a history of American broadcasting through the eyes and activities of the opposition to commercial broadcasting. The United States is almost alone in the world in giving exclusive rights to broadcast over limited channels to private individuals for profit. That has engendered considerable opposition by groups who feel left out of the process or unrepresented in their philosophies through broadcasting. While some have produced written missives directed at broadcasting, the records of activities of many have remained scattered, unpublished, and occasionally existing only in memories of the participants.

Through the use of oral history, of business records, of archives' collections, newsletters, my personal involvement and other sources of information, I have compiled a record of the sundry activities of opposition groups to commercial broadcasting, who due to their own divergence of ideas could not themselves have formed a united front. Scholars concerned with pressure groups and public policy, and members of the public who want to know the total range of opposition and public opinions that has already accumulated toward

broadcasting will have that record.

Since the opposing groups failed to alter the nature of American broadcasting, its history of activities and concerns should provide an understanding about the cause of the failure. Failure, of course, is not only due to internal weakness, but also results from the strength of the opponent. Some responsibility for failure, however, rests with divisions within the groups challenging broadcasting, which set groups and individuals with the same general concerns against one another.

Competition among commercial broadcasters has always been planned competition. The nature of the Communications Act and Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt's goal toward business, and especially toward broadcasting, was to assure its financial success by limited competition. Profit, not public access or promotion of ideas, was the cornerstone of the structure. The opponents to the structure have been idea-oriented, which has resulted in endless discussions among themselves. The broadcasters, with little to fear from one another's minimum competition, and with no flame of passion to promote one philosophy or another, have been able to concentrate on holding up the bulwark of commercial broadcasting as an idea in itself. Their passionless approach, which reflected Herbert Hoover's "idea-less" goal for

broadcasting, provided a model to design public television schedules in the image of commercial broadcasting.

I. DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 1920's

College Stations

NBC, in its first three full years of broadcasting, published brochures on its progress in educating the American public. In a 1927 brochure the network president predicted that NBC would become a "true University of the Air."¹ He revealed plans for concerts by Walter Damrosch in 1928 which were anticipated to reach 25-million students once the network equipped schools with radios.

Cities Service had shown the effectiveness of concerts in 1927 and 1928. Not only did the company advertise its gasoline, but like most radio sponsors in the late 1920's it sold shares of its common stock over radio. "Sales amounting to 2000 shares of stock were made in one city as a result of our radio advertising."²

NBC and Cities Service executives were proud of the effect symphony concerts had on young people. Cities Service was able to compile a mailing list of 10,000 from responses, enabling the company to write even to young people about the importance and benefits of buying stock. "While it is true that many of the letters praising the Cities Service concerts were written by

young people and others not in a position to buy our securities or products, yet a large number are promising prospects for the future."³

The title of the 1929 brochure of NBC's president set the tone commercial broadcasting used as a defense against all critics for the next five decades. It was called The Listener Makes Broadcasting. Whatever is on the air is only on, said Merlin Aylesworth, because it is what the American people want. In that era before electronic ratings, the network claimed its programming was determined by the "more than 2 million letters" NBC received in 1928.⁴

CBS, in its first full year of broadcasting in 1928, was less moved by public response. Its chief news commentator H.V. Kaltenborn actively supported Herbert Hoover and opposed Al Smith over the air. Kaltenborn received many violent letters. Voting increased by 6-million over the 1924 elections, and Hoover won by 6-million votes. Kaltenborn liked to attribute the increased voting to radio and his influence. In 1931 he supported Hoover's opposition to a veterans' bonus, voicing his personal opposition, as well. "I had twenty-two letters threatening me with instant death if I continued to say what I had been

saying."⁵ CBS apparently felt that letters were at least an indication that people were listening.

It was initially assumed that broadcasting would save lives rather than result in threats upon life. The Radio Act of 1912 was designed to require radio equipment on ships that could broadcast in Morse code, and license operators and experimental land stations for equipment research. Philadelphia's St. Joseph's College in 1912 received the first license from the Department of Commerce for station 3XJ. Licensing began exactly four months after the sinking of the Titanic on April 14, the event which precipitated the regulation.

Electrical engineering departments of universities had been active in building receivers and transmitters from the time Guglielmo Marconi invented broadcasting in 1895. The following year Tulane and Wittenberg began broadcasting in code. In 1897 the University of Nebraska and University of Arkansas began, followed by Cornell in 1906, and Pennsylvania State, the Ohio State University, Massachusetts Polytechnical and the University of Wisconsin in 1909. The University of Wisconsin began broadcasting music over 9XM in 1917, speech in February of 1919, and a regular schedule in March of 1920. Thirty-six educational institutions received regular licenses from Herbert Hoover's newly established Radio Division of the

Department of Commerce in 1921, half of which managed to retain their AM licenses. Of the additional 166 AM licenses issued to educational institutions thereafter, 145 will lose their licenses, mainly to commercial stations during the next fifteen years.⁶

Commercial interest in broadcasting started twenty years after educational institutions began broadcasting. Only with the active assistance of the federal government were commercial stations able to overtake and virtually eliminate educational stations from the air. In 1916 Westinghouse built 8XK in Pittsburgh. Its first music broadcasts began in November of 1919, and it broadcast the Harding-Cox election returns one year later. Its purpose was to promote the sale of Westinghouse radios, and to discourage the learning process of building one's own.⁷ So education and commercialization were at odds in broadcasting from the very beginning. Many firms built stations just to sell their own product. "An automobile sales agency would get a license to broadcast music simply because their name would be on the air."⁸ AT&T, a monopoly in its own field, envisioned selling commercial time on an all-comers basis to other firms, a process its New York station WJAF began on August 28, 1922.

Since educators had access to broadcasting on their campuses, they became the first and most persistent critics of commercial broadcasting. When Levering Tyson heard the Harding-Cox election returns from Pittsburgh, he became enthused about radio's potential and organized a radio committee at Columbia University. But President Nicholas Murray Butler considered radio to be a faddish gadget. He told Tyson, "Don't bother about that....this won't amount to anything."⁹ After AT&T established WEAF, the station's managers approached Columbia about broadcasting educational programs. No one on the faculty would participate because they felt it was not in keeping with their status.

Foundations were frustrated in their efforts to get educators involved in radio. Executives of the Payne Fund of Cleveland established a radio council in 1921. They "visited the U.S. Bureau of Education and proposed national programs for the public schools."¹⁰ U.S. Commissioner of Education J.J. Tigert was not even interested in the offer of research, as he opposed federal direction for education.

Corporate foundations failed to make a liaison with educational associations. Sears Roebuck's agricultural foundation hired an agronomist who developed programs during school hours for broadcast on WLS,

Chicago in 1924. Ben Darrow worked with the Cook County school board in developing these talks. He organized the NEA committee on radio education at its Indianapolis convention in June of 1925, and published the American Radio Teacher progress reports. The committee got no NEA support. In 1927 the National Education Association officers showed such little interest as to report that, "The NEA has no committee to work out a definite project for schools."¹¹

Educational institutions with their own stations formulated policies for use. In 1920 the Montclair, New Jersey Board of Education began transmitting the most logical type of education course. The course taught radio construction and radio license classes.¹² In 1921 the Ohio State University involved thirty-three departments in developing non-credit extension courses for WPAO.¹³ Tufts College started modern language classes in the spring of 1922.¹⁴ In the fall of 1925 Sam Pickard developed the College of the Air for Kansas State Agricultural College, offering both college courses and courses for high school credit.¹⁵

Public school districts generally had to rely on the auspices of commercial stations. The Oakland Public Schools' broadcasts on General Electric's KGO in 1922 led to the Standard School Broadcast in

history and science of NBC's California network.¹⁶ The New York City school system started broadcasts in 1923. The extension division of the Massachusetts Department of Education began 21 extension courses in the fall of 1923 over WBJ. Material was provided to students paying an enrollment fee for such subjects as psychology, real estate law, music, home economics, writing and amateur radio. By the end of the 1920's 4530 students had enrolled from 34 states, Canada and England.¹⁷

Social service organizations focused on commercial radio in the 1920's with the initial purpose of using it. In 1924 the Child Study Association of America began a series of 15-minute talks to parents over WEAF. WOV, New York provided time for a weekly program by the NAACP on black culture. The Julius Rosenwald Fund of New York purchased radios from GE to give to black schools in the South.

The question remained as to whether specific cultural programs had any listeners. So in 1925 C.F. Glass did the first listener research for Ohio State's WPAO, and began a monthly program schedule the following year. Iowa's WOI research found that 21% of Iowa farms had radios by 1926 and 50% by 1930. WOI's book club was designed to use radio to promote reading by selling the books that were discussed.¹⁸

The instant popularity of radio changed the relationship between commercial stations and educators. The Lynds found that 12% of Muncie, Indiana families had radios by 1925, in spite of the \$100 price tag. Radio was changing the people's habits. "Sundays I take the boy to Sunday School and come straight home and tune in."¹⁹ The parents' habits proved more influential on youth than their guidance. As families listened together to programs aimed at children, serious listening waned. The College of Fine Arts musical education programs in Syracuse on GE's WGY that began in 1926 ceased in 1929 when the station aimed all commercial programs at listeners. WKBH, LaCrosse instituted the first sponsored Kiddies Hour in 1926. The following year Philadelphia's WCAU began to wean this new market away from educators with Horn and Hardart's Children's Hour.

By 1929 the educators who had originally been approached by commercial stations and foundations became concerned. In December of 1929 Levering Tyson, John Russell and 13 others formed a radio advisory committee on adult education for the Adult Education Association. In January 1930 they met with the representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corp. They found that in the 2½-years of the new Federal Radio Commission's operations, educational stations had been

reduced to 63. But Russell, who represented the Carnegie Corp., said there ought to be fewer than that, since they did not give good service.²⁰ J.J. Tigert's reaction to the trend in 1929 was a sudden awakening. "Recent decisions of the Federal Radio Commission handicap educational stations by daylight broadcasts, division of time, and undesirable wave lengths....The Oakland experiment however shows, unexpectedly enough, that art and arithmetic are among the subjects which lend themselves most readily."²¹ Tigert had become president of the University of Florida, and obtained a license to broadcast statewide from Gainesville in 1929. Educational certificates were given for completion of 43 courses. But the Commission ordered WRUF off the air at sunset so that Denver's commercial KOA could blanket Florida in the evening on that wave length.

As the Federal Radio Commission's regulations got tougher, almost half of the remaining educational stations ceased. Dr. I. Keith Tyler, whose career began with the Oakland schools' radio-development program at this time, felt institutions could not keep up with the costs of FRC requirements, especially with the Depression. "The Commission kept demanding that equipment be improved. To get \$10,000 a year for your radio station was really

something."²² The Ohio State University provided \$17,000 for WEAU, but as anyone then could challenge a licensee's wave length simply by requesting the same frequency for himself, "Educational people had to send people down to Washington to defend their licenses."²³ Ohio's Attorney for the Public Utilities Commission, 1929-1932, and then Attorney General John Bricker repeatedly appeared before the FRC to save the University's station. It got the new call letters WOSU in 1933, but a daytime-only frequency, shared with 3 other stations, including a 50,000 watt Dallas-Fort Worth station, which could then send its commercial programs into central Ohio in the evening.

Allocation of broadcast frequencies was regulated by law. From 1910, the Wireless Act, to mid-1927 when the Radio Act established the Federal Radio Commission, the Secretary of Commerce issued licenses. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 added other communications areas to the Commission's authority, but did not change the radio portion of the act from 1927, nor were the members of the Commission changed. The FRC became the FCC. A later chairman of the Commission, Newton Minow, stated, "The demand for strong regulation came, not from government, but from those persons who wanted to operate broadcasting stations and to manufacture broadcasting equipment."²⁴

Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce 1921-1929, did not like to inject the government into private spheres, but he liked to encourage private cooperation. Radio manufacturers General Electric and Westinghouse prepared to offer the public two frequencies on their sets in 1920. That left Hoover with the problem of splitting times of day, or days of week, among various local applicants for these frequencies, and of putting stations at distant localities with weak signals on the same frequency at the same time. He also had to consider the fact that AM signals travel farther when the sun goes down. So when Intercity Radio Co. of New York City wanted its 3-month license renewed in 1921, Hoover denied renewal as its signal would interfere with others.²⁵

Hoover initiated an action which he subsequently always followed when faced with a crisis. He called a conference of businessmen. The 2-part Conference for the Voluntary Control of Radio in 1922 involving radio manufacturers and engineers took place in Washington D.C. February 27-March 2 and April 17-19. To Hoover's surprise, the manufacturers wanted to give him much more power than he sought.

Although the broadcast industry in the late 1970's sees consumer groups' challenges to commercials on

children's programs as its prime threat, the first group to want the federal government to prevent the commercialization of broadcasting was the broadcasters. GE and Westinghouse owned both radio stations and RCA, from which NBC was established. These manufacturers and other conference members in 1922 were concerned that commercials on radio would deter the sale of sets.²⁶ AT&T, the third owner of RCA, and a non-manufacturer, had not yet initiated commercials over its New York City station. It did in late August. Hoover stated, "It is inconceivable that we should allow so great a possibility for service, for news, for entertainment, for education, and for vital commercial purposes to be drowned in advertising chatter."²⁷ So the Conference report expressed the principle: "It is recommended that direct advertising in radio broadcasting service will be absolutely prohibited."²⁸

Hoover also wanted to make sure he had the authority to prohibit licenses. The conferees wanted federal involvement, and reported: "It is recommended that radio broadcasting service be permitted to develop naturally under close supervision."²⁹ The supervision was to take the form of a bill to give Herbert Hoover that authority. On June 9 Representative Wallace White of Maine, Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and

Fisheries Committee, introduced H.R. 11964 for that purpose.³⁰

The best understanding of the minds of private broadcasters can be gained by reading the major recommendation of the conference. Four classes of stations were to be licensed. Private stations would be strictly local in nature, broadcasting no more than 50 miles. Educators and other groups could present programs over them at no charge. Thus the stations would have the benefit of free programming, and the audience would buy sets and parts. Tell stations would have a similar distance. Individuals could buy time for messages on tell stations for such things as birth announcements. (The government-owned stations of the Bahamas, for example, connect the islanders by still scheduling time for this service). University and municipal stations could have a 250-mile range. Class 1 stations would be owned by the federal government and broadcast for 600 miles.³¹

When responsibility is thrust upon a public servant, he will often seek more power. In February of 1923 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld Hoover's authority to deny Intercity Radio Co. a license.³² Hoover then called a second radio conference on March 23, 1923. He hoped it would achieve greater unanimity of self-regulation by the industry. Interests not represented at the first conference began to experiment with

new frequencies, which manufacturers were not willing to provide sets for, but which the audience could build. Hoover felt he could get broadcasters to recognize the manufacturers' interests. Private broadcasters did not like the 50-mile limit suggested at the first conference. They felt a few major interests were trying to set the standards for all.

Hoover, never a fan of free enterprise to the point where competition became destructive, preferred what Murray Rothbard calls cartelizing. In regard to farm policy Hoover, explained Rothbard, began with a "typical Hooverian round of attempted voluntary persuasion" until it became "clear that the cartelizing program could not work unless there were compulsory restriction on production; there were simply too many farmers for voluntary exhortation to have any effect."³³ He then used regulations to bring competitors "under federal organization and control" in various fields of endeavor when he was President.³⁴ Historians have not examined his technique in the field of radio, but at the 1923 Conference he suggested that if private stations wanted to be licensed for higher power, they must show that they are presenting original, live programs, and not just playing phonograph records. The "local-live" category is still a part of program

logs which stations are required to keep of their daily scheduling for the FCC.³⁵

If cartelizing was the aim of Hoover and the larger interests at the 1923 Conference, it was quickly diverted when the House of Representatives passed a resolution based on the recommendation of Congressman White, chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, that the Federal Trade Commission investigate the patent monopoly of manufacturers.³⁶ The FTC reported in December that Hoover had no authority to issue licenses to whom he favored. RCA, which had a monopoly on radio parts manufacturing, had representatives testify at House hearings on the Radio Bill that since radio was in such a state of flux, only general language should be used. Clarence Dill, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, would not report the bill in 1923.³⁷

Different bills were reported by the House and Senate in 1924. The Senate bill was very general, but did state that the air was public property. In May the House undertook the task of combining the bills.³⁸ But at the third radio conference in October Hoover reversed his emphasis on local private stations and advocated nationwide programs.³⁹ He also disagreed with RCA that radio was still unsettled, saying,

"Radio has passed from the field of an adventure to that of a public utility."⁴⁰ In December he withdrew his support from a general-language radio bill, stating in a letter to White:

It has been found possible by indirect advertising to turn broadcasting to highly profitable use. If this were misused, we would be confronted with the fact that service more advantageous to the listeners would be crowded out for advertising purposes....The basis of regulation and the fundamental policies to be followed must be finally declared by Congress, not left to an administrative officer....Entertainment and amusement have ceased to be its principal purposes.⁴¹

Individuals at the third Conference such as Louis Caldwell, who later played an important role in decisions of the FCC, continued to press the industry position for an elastic law, contending that radio was "progressing and changing at so rapid a pace."⁴²

When Hoover called the fourth Radio Conference for November 9-11, 1925, it included a wide spectrum of viewpoints. Held at the Chamber of Commerce Building in Washington D.C., the Conference had educational input from Levering Tyson and C.M. Jansky, representing academic and engineering fields in unofficial capacities. T.A. Craven, who would be instrumental in the FCC, represented the Navy; Edwin Armstrong, who would develop FM as a boon to educators, represented inventors' concerns;

David Sarnoff, President of RCA, among others, represented commercial interests.⁴³

There is good reason why some writers have praised Herbert Hoover as a forerunner of subsequent critics and challengers of commercial interests in broadcasting. At the 1925 Conference Hoover said:

Radio is not to be considered merely as a business carried on for private gain, for private advancement, or for the entertainment of the curious. It is to be considered as a public concern, imposed with a public trust, and to be considered primarily from the standpoint of public interest.⁴⁴

But Hoover's divergent positions have left lack of clarity in writings on broadcasting, and interpretations of Hoover by general historians have resulted in Eugene Lyons and Walter Lippmann seeing him as an innovator of progressive bureaucratic government, and Richard Hofstadter and William A. Williams calling him a proponent of laissez faire; Carl Degler and John Knox seeing him as indecisive, introspective and friendless, and Will Irwin and Herbert Corey calling him decisive, combative, with devoted friends; while Rothbard showed his acts were cruel and fascist, and Donald Liss how compassionate Hoover's actions often were.⁴⁵

It is possible to see Hoover as an advocate of big business whose actions set American broadcasting apart from all other broadcasting systems in the world in a

totally commercial mold with little government involvement. He opened the fourth Conference by declaring how fortunate Americans were in that broadcasting was not supported by a tax on the listeners. To support it by sponsors who want no views on life presented except consumption, has provided, "Greater variety of programs and excellence in service free of cost to the listener. This decision has avoided the pitfalls of political, religious, and social conflicts in the use of free speech."⁴⁶ With only two educators attending amid a bevy of commercial broadcasters, the Conference reversed the recommendation for the legal prohibition of advertising by the first Conference, and proclaimed, "As any announcement or program if improperly presented will create ill will, there seems no necessity for any specific regulation in regard to form of announcements in connection with such paid or any other program."⁴⁷

Hoover received a legal blow in 1926. Hoover had issued broadcast restrictions on a renewed license for Zenith's Chicago station. Zenith sued, and the District Court of the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the 1912 Radio Act only permitted the Secretary of Commerce to issue licenses on request, with no right to deny or restrict.⁴⁸ But the court threatened to

adjudicate rights to frequencies if Congress did not act. Hoover began issuing licenses to all comers. Stations began transmitting on the same frequencies at the same time, making it difficult to distinguish a program in daytime, and impossible at night. Some communities demanded silent nights of their own stations so people could pick up a distant station of similar frequency. Between July, 1926 and February, 1927 radio set sales dropped 12½% from the previous period. Major manufacturers and broadcasters once again demanded federal regulation.

On December 5, 1925 Chairman White had introduced H.R. 5589 specifying that Hoover had the authority to refuse licenses. At the hearings, Congressman Edwin Davis of Tennessee challenged Hoover's one-man dictatorship, which could enable large companies to "unlawfully monopolize radio communication."⁴⁹ But it passed on March 15, 1926. It specified that sponsored programs must be announced as such, and that the government could not censor them.⁵⁰ No educators made a case at the hearings.⁵¹

The White bill incorporated most of the recommendations of the radio conferences. It included a reference to classes of stations. Congressman Davis asked Solicitor Davis of the Department of Commerce to

give his interpretation of that language, which the Congressman wanted on the record. Solicitor Davis said, "Now, I take it that under that the department could set up a class of church stations, it could set up a class of educational stations, and make due provisions for them."⁵² Each state was to be given a station in the interest of "agricultural and educational institutions, which want the right to broadcast during certain hours of the week."⁵³ But there was no concept of regular educational broadcasts presented by the institutions, just the random broadcasting of agricultural quotations and bulletins a few hours per day. All these provisions were eliminated by the conference committee in July, 1926.

During the years that Congress debated the Radio Act, conference committees were necessary because the Senate bills each year differed so radically from the House bills that the two houses did not even pass the conference committee reports until the spring of 1927. Senator Dill disliked Hoover, and wanted a Radio Commission to issue licenses. He held up appointments of Commissioners Belkows, Caldwell and Dillon, whom Hoover had recommended.⁵⁴

The issue of censorship could determine who would control the airwaves. If a provision introduced on the

Senate floor to make broadcasting facilities "deemed a common carrier" had been part of the bill, free access to the airwaves would have had to be provided by stations to all members of the public. Any group could then have purchased time to present its views or programming. The groups which this dissertation focuses on would undoubtedly not come into being if concerned people were not excluded from influence in broadcasting. But Senator Dill got the provision removed from the bill, saying:

When we recall that broadcasting today is purely voluntary, and the listener-in pays nothing for it, that the broadcaster gives it for the purpose of building up his reputation, it seemed unwise to put the broadcaster under the hampering control of being a common carrier and compelled to accept anything and everything that was offered him so long as the price was paid.⁵⁵

He called the bill a compromise, in that the ownership could censor and not the government, but owners must get a license.⁵⁶ However, he also was concerned that political opponents should be given equal time, and required stations to not censor political candidates.⁵⁷ Senator Pittman of Nevada said the bill implied that Dill was an agent of the commercial broadcasters.⁵⁸

2. Federal Radio Commission

The apparent premise for educational radio shown by the backgrounds of the first members selected to the Federal Radio Commission did not develop. Retired Admiral W.H.G. Bullard and Colonel John Dillon represented the military's interest in broadcasting. Bullard died in late 1927. Orestes Caldwell had an engineering and journalism background. He subsequently wrote a journal for the broadcasting industry on engineering, and served as engineer for commercial interests. Sam Pickard and Henry Bellets seemed to represent education's interests. Pickard had established radio extension courses in Kansas; Bellets was an assistant professor, though more recently general manager of WCCO, Minneapolis. But after their service in setting up regulations that gave commercial stations the universities' frequencies, they both went on to become vice presidents of CBS, Pickard later buying a station and Bellets later doing public relations for General Mills.

Most members of the FRC and FCC profited considerably with jobs in commercial broadcasting after their stints in government, if they had ruled in their future employers' interest. E.M. Webster (FCC 1947-1956), and T.A.M. Craven (1937-44, 1956-63), who had also served as FCC chief engineer in the 1930's,

making recommendations favorable to major commercial interests, went on to station engineering jobs, Craven with the Cowles stations of Iowa in 1944. They maintained that the Federal Radio Commission had not acted hastily in its engineering decisions, which stripped the universities of frequencies, but with considerable and proper thought. Orestes Caldwell, who did the engineering realignments for the FRC, described his "experience during the emergency" quite differently. He had to do all the work of frequency reassigning at home. The Commission had no staff, no money, no desks, and initially received no salaries. The pressures put on the commissioners were tremendous in 1927.⁵⁹

Although the next group of Federal Radio commissioners included Judge Ira Robinson of West Virginia, of populist leanings, most of the members followed in the footsteps of the first group. Radio equipment manufacturer Harold LaFount was especially hostile to educators. He went on to become a commercial broadcasting executive and official with Bulova Watch. Chairman Eugene Sykes, who remained to become the first FCC chairman in 1934, later established a law firm to serve commercial broadcasters.

Commercial broadcasters got a scare with Franklin Roosevelt's appointees. George Payne (1934-43) had written "The Child in Human Progress", and supported

educators. Frank McHinch, Chairman (1937-39) attacked lewdness in network programming. James Fly, Chairman (1939-44) so angered commercial broadcasters with his network inquiry, the antitrust suit breaking up NBC, and the decision to strip stations of editorializing, for their criticism of Roosevelt, that they had the Congress investigate him, and pressured him from office.

Subsequent chairmen came from very different backgrounds than McHinch and Fly, who came from the Federal Power Commission and TVA, respectively. Taking over Payne's seat in 1944 was E.K. Jett, broadcaster and subsequently vice president of channel 2, Baltimore. Fly was followed by Paul Porter as chairman, who had been principal lawyer for CBS from 1937-42. The FCC's lawyer, Charles Denny, followed Porter as chairman. He went on to become vice president of RCA in 1961. Jett then became chairman, followed by Wayne Coy in 1947, director of WINA, who would leave in 1952 to become Time-Life's TV consultant and buy his own station. Harry Truman quite clearly had a different idea than Roosevelt of the men who should govern regulatory commissions, since Roosevelt preferred men who made government service a career. Business needed regulation when Roosevelt took office, and he frequently elevated state commissioners to federal positions.

Truman's last chairman, however, was instrumental in obtaining frequencies for educational television in 1952. Paul Walker had originally been a Roosevelt appointee in 1934, after having been a crusading public utilities commissioner in Oklahoma. Eisenhower replaced him as chairman with pre-industry Ohio public utilities commissioner George McCannaughey, followed in 1957 by Chairman John Deerfer, who left in the midst of a bribery scandal.

Kennedy restored the tradition of the 1930's crusading chairmen with Newton Minow and E. William Henry. Carter appointed Minow president of the public broadcasting network in 1978. But the Nixon years restored conservative chairmen, Dean Burch and Richard Wiley. The crusade for minority representation of the 1960's came to fruition in the Nixon years of the 1970's, with the tradition established of appointing a black man and a white woman to each seven member commission. Nixon appointed Benjamin Hooks and Charlotte Reid, and they were followed by Tyrene Brown and Margita White. The most recent trend of the FCC has been the consideration of the views of a set of minority groups before making major decisions.

The Federal Radio Commission had no interest in the problems of disadvantaged stations or non-commercial broadcasters' input. Acting on its position that the

greatest number of people must be reached, the FCC required that all stations achieve 100% modulation, a technically unnecessary but costly proposition for educational stations.⁶⁰ Antioch College abandoned its license in 1929 due to the newly demanded equipment expenses, as did other college stations. Then the Commission established a 3-month license renewal period, which meant that all licenses were challengable before the Commission every 3 months. Washington lawyers were needed on a permanent basis to defend licenses.

Members of the Federal Radio Commission were technically correct in saying they never took away an educational station's license. They just made it impossible for those stations to retain them. Requiring that they be on the air a certain length of time and share frequencies with commercial stations, or lose more assigned hours to their commercial partner if they could not fill the assigned times, caused educators like those with the Massachusetts extension program to be reduced in broadcast time to the noon hour. Commissioner Robinson concluded:

The men who were members of the Commission at that time now see the error. But licenses, which had been granted, came under the expectancy of renewal, and more stations were allowed under license than there properly were channels for.⁶¹

When Robinson served as commissioner in 1928 and 1929 he found that the educational stations were giving up their licenses without much of a fight. He was one of the few individuals speaking up for special considerations. He criticized the shared time rulings:

I do not speak for the Commission; I am in the minority. Time after time I have said I do not see why it is that the educational stations have the limited assignments given them. There is an answer to that. You have not had the means to build a station that will give you a high place in the arrangement under the present plan of allocation.⁶²

Other Federal Radio Commissioners certainly did not share Robinson's views. Henry Bellows said, "Broadcasting is not for a class or group."⁶³ He contended that his view that each program be for everyone was simply the expression of the law, which required broadcasting stations to serve the public interest. Bellows disliked special stations:

I may as well confess that I do not know what education is.... One cannot decently lecture to a family in its own living room.⁶⁴

The commercial interests were to be attacked through other agencies of the government. The Interstate Commerce Commission's investigation of communications' patents led to the Attorney General's suit against RCA. In 1931 the Supreme Court found it

guilty of monopolistic practices. The Radio Act required the FRC to not grant license renewals to any company found guilty of violating antitrust laws. But the FRC did not cancel the licenses of RCA-NBC stations.

The success of the suit provided the spark that inspired a groundswell of organizations to take aim at commercial broadcasting's control of the airwaves, and of the FRC, as well. The multiplication of these challengers, their aims and tactics, is the focus of this study. In 1931 they came to life.

The National Congress of the Parent-Teacher Association in its convention proposed that 15% of all frequencies allocated be to educational stations. In December, 1931 the organizations that had come together to form the National Committee on Education by Radio (NCEAR) got the Fess Bill introduced into Congress with the 15% frequency allocation provision as its feature. Although the bill failed, various educational groups and other critics of commercial control of the airwaves had begun a unity of effort in NCEAR. Its president was Joy Morgan, editor of the NEA Journal. In addition to the National Education Association, NCEAR included the National Council of State Superintendents, National Association of State Universities, Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, Jesuit Education Association, American Council on Education, National

Catholic Education Association, National University Extension Association, and Association of College and University Broadcasters, which had organized in 1926 but had taken no role in the bill to establish the FCC.

Commissioner Harold LaFount became concerned at the challenge of these groups to the FCC's relationship with commercial broadcasters. He demanded that university stations broadcast at least twelve hours a day, the FCC's definition of full time, stating:

Even if the Radio Act did not so require, ordinary fairness and plain justice dictate that educators make full use of the facilities they already have assigned to them before demanding more.⁶⁵

His concept became the position the FCC always brought up in subsequent hearings with educators whenever they sought allocations in new broadcasting developments.

The challenge to the broadcasting industry's authority to sell whatever it wished was linked to expectations of groups to have access to the airwaves. David Sarnoff promised that sustaining time would be available on NBC to educative organizations if "classes of stations" was eliminated from the Radio bill. In 1930 William Paley appeared before the Senate Commerce Committee to inform it that 75% of CBS time went to public service and just 10% to advertising.⁶⁶ The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the

commercial stations' trade association founded in 1924, had no mention of advertising in its Code of Ethics for stations in 1925.

With the lack of emphasis on advertising in broadcasters' public statements, the FRC struck a blow that incited challengers-to-advertising. In August, 1928 the FRC took away WCAW's license and put four other stations on shorter-term licenses. Of WCAW the Commission wrote: "This station is one which exists chiefly for the purpose of deriving an income from the sale of advertising."⁶⁷

Thus, a basis for challenging broadcasters was established. Adrian Kelly, who chaired the National Food Products Protective Committee, was concerned that cigarette companies were advertising smoking as a cure for obesity. With the PTA, Child Welfare Association, and groups of doctors, they petitioned the FRC to revoke the licenses of any stations carrying commercials for Lucky Strike cigarettes, which were cited as the worst offender, for "a conscienceless attack upon public health." The FRC turned down the petition, stating it lacked authority.⁶⁸ The groups then turned their efforts to lobbying Congress.

The First Radio Conference on Advertising in 1929

did not improve the image of commercial broadcasting, but made it clear that advertising agencies already controlled program content.⁶⁹ The challenging groups sought to limit commercials to station breaks to eliminate advertiser control. To scrub the image of products, the NAB Code of 1929 spelled out advertising practice ethics. The concept of Brand 'X' was introduced to prevent attacks by advertisers against advertisers.⁷⁰

NBC hoped to dispel the view that commercials should only be allowed at station breaks. It commissioned a study by J. David Houser in 1931. He found that 46% of the public objected to commercials that interrupted a program's content. But 63% of the public found network practices less objectionable than local stations. So the war of statistics between networks and challengers began in 1931.⁷¹

I. Notes

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II. TEACHING GROUPS

Committees of the 1930's

The shock of the FCC's pro-industry stance produced a host of organizations between 1929 and 1931 to challenge the commercial stations' output. In 1929 the Chicago Federation of Labor attempted to get a clear channel for WCFL to present labor's ideas, but the FCC only gave it a shared-time frequency. Some groups urged other agencies of government to become involved in radio:

The first network program of the Children's Bureau in the Department of Labor...was called "Your Child" and was a series of talks giving the latest information on child welfare.¹

The program ran from May, 1929 to May, 1936.

Secretary of Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur on May 24, 1929 conducted the Radio Education Conference in his office in Washington to discuss the plight of educators in being eliminated from broadcasting. John Elmwood, vice president of NBC, saw no need for concern. He said the Walter Damrosch concerts served 3 to 8-million pupils. FCC member Ira Robinson, who had been a public school teacher, maintained the

concerts were only suited for college.² It was decided that Commissioner of Education William Cooper should establish a governmental Advisory Committee on Education by Radio to meet on June 13 in Chicago with all interested parties.

The Chicago conference was an attempt to reach a meeting of minds between educators and networks. Educators were represented by Levering Tyson, John L. Clifton, Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction, W.W. Charters of the Ohio State University Bureau of Educational Research, Ira Robinson, and George Zelmer of the University of Virginia. The chairmen of NBC and CBS, Merlin Aylesworth and William Paley, represented networks. Paley offered five hours a week to the educators. The committee concluded on June 18 that, "It is the opinion of the Conference that no change in the plans of any of these broadcasters is called for."³

The committee recommended more research on the part of educators. W.W. Charters suggested the Carnegie Corp., the J.C. Penney Fund, and Congresswoman Frances Payne Bolton of the Payne Fund of Cleveland be contacted. Ben Darrow had joined the Payne Fund staff in 1927 and succeeded in directing its interest to funding The Ohio School of the Air broadcasts in 1929. Darrow became schoolmaster of the programs, which were produced at the Ohio State University. The Payne Fund would move

to New York City in June, 1929 with Armstrong Perry as director. The Payne, Penney and Carnegie Funds then set out to underwrite the establishment of a radio section in the Office of Education of the Department of Interior. The radio section's goal was to, "Let school people know what educational programs were available, watch radio experiments and...get the networks to cooperate in educational ventures."⁴

The Chicago committee received a year's funding. Penney provided \$2000, Carnegie Corp. of New York \$20,000, and H.M. Clymer, Chairman of the Payne Fund, offered \$2000 of its resources for the committee's research. W. W. Charters, director of the Bureau of Educational Research at Ohio State University, chaired the executive and research committees. He emphasized vocational education presentations by broadcasting as the most immediate way of measuring results. Sessions on November 6 sought to involve classroom teachers in a cooperative project. Seventy-seven of the 627 broadcasting licenses were still held by educational institutions at the end of 1929, 50% more than would exist in 1935. Eighty-nine of the 535 stations licensed on June 30, 1926 had been educational. The committee recommended coordination to establish a "Radio University for National Education." The networks and powerful commercial stations were to

be involved to send programs around the world.⁵

In December, 1929 John Russell of the Carnegie Corp., Levering Tyson, and thirteen other people formed the Advisory Committee for Adult Education as a subsidiary of the American Association for Adult Education, which had been organized in 1926 under Rockefeller Foundation auspices. A meeting with the Rockefeller and Carnegie funders in January, 1930 resulted in the establishment of the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education (NACRE). On April 30 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and Russell offered funds for three years.⁶

Levering Tyson believed he had accomplished the ultimate goal of the Chicago conference by establishing NACRE as an example of industry and educator cooperation. He became director, Robert Millikan, the president of California Institute of Technology, became NACRE president, and Norman Davis of New York City became Chairman of the Board. When the organizational structure of NACRE was set up on July 30, 1930 it had sixty members, including college presidents. Charters served as Director of Educational Research, but the foundations' representatives were in many key roles. Morse Cartwright of the American Association for Adult Education sat on the executive committee. Other members of NACRE

included James McDonald, president of the Foreign Policy Association, another Rockefeller-established group, Frederick Keppel, President of the Carnegie Corp. of New York, and Frank Sewell, president of Bell Laboratories, which was a funder of C.I.T.⁷

On August 8, 1930 Tyson wrote to the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities. He sought its support, explaining that NACRE wished to cooperate with the commercial broadcasters for educational broadcasts.⁸ He had stressed that theme on June 30 at the first Institute for Education by Radio, which W.W. Charters established to bring everyone interested in educational broadcasts together at the Ohio State University for an annual meeting. The Institute, funded by the Payne Fund, had been initially designed as a prelude to the National Education Association convention in Columbus, to try to get that body to support radio education.

The result of the Institute and the NEA convention was surprising. The teachers came out strongly in support of educational radio, reversing the indifferent stand of the body in the 1920's. Joy Elmer Morgan, editor of the NEA Journal, and others called upon Commissioner of Education William Cooper to convene a second Chicago conference on October 13, 1930. The growing dimensions of radio, and the leadership taken

by government officials and professors, had given teachers a new perspective.

The second Chicago conference was vastly different from the first one. The commercial broadcasters, having assumed the issue of educational programs was solved with the establishment of NACRE, did not send representatives. The National Electric Light Association, of which Merlin Aylesworth had been president, was under indictment, and Aylesworth's reputation was questioned in the press. A minister at the conference, Gross Alexander of Los Angeles, who had organized Pacific-Western Broadcasting Federation, denounced Aylesworth's involvement in NACRE and NELA, which he contended NACRE, "Consciously or unconsciously is aiding to perpetuate." Alexander tied in Dr. Millikan's past career as an engineer with Western Electric to NACRE:

I have some letters here from Dr. Millikan which strongly suggest to me that the National Advisory Council on Radio in Education is a creature of the financial interests. It would act as a buffer, a go-between, a camouflage.⁹

Commissioner Cooper, who felt NACRE's leadership was discredited, indicated his displeasure with NACRE's cooperative approach, and offered to spearhead a bill that would require the FCC to set aside 15% of radio

frequencies for educational stations. The NEA and National Congress of the PTA backed that idea, and Senator Simeon Fess of Ohio submitted S5589, the Fess Bill, on January 8, 1931. Cooper pointed out the need for the act, citing the loss of 23 educational stations between January 1 and August 1, 1930, while others were put on shared-time frequencies with commercial stations.¹⁰

Participants at the conference decided to form their own organization, the first media-challenge group specifically designed to fight commercial broadcasting. On December 30, 1930 they established the National Committee on Education by Radio in Washington D.C. Joy Elmer Morgan, editor of the NEA Journal, was Chairman. Armstrong Perry, a writer on education by radio, provided \$1000 of Payne Fund money and served as director of the service bureau to help educational institutions get broadcasting licenses. Tracy Tyler, Columbia University professor, was hired to edit its weekly publication, Education By Radio. R.C. Higgy, director of WEAQ, Ohio State University, and John L. Clifton were among the founding members, as was Charles A. Robinson of St. Louis University and the Jesuit Education Association.

NCEA took a highly moral tone in its opposition to commercial broadcasting. Joy Elmer Morgan explained

to educators:

You will discover that the advertising agency is taking the place of the mother, the father, the teacher, the pastor, the priest, in determining the attitudes of children.¹¹

Morgan succeeded in persuading nine major educational organizations to designate NCER as their broadcasting lobbyist: Jesuit Education Association, National Catholic Education Association, National Education Association, National University Extension Association, National Council of State Superintendents, National Association of State University Presidents, Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, American Council on Education, and the Association of College and University Broadcasting Stations, which had been established in 1926, and became the National Association of Educational Broadcasters in 1934.

The religious input for promoting the group's goals was strong. The Reverend M.J. Ahern, S.J., who would actively lobby for NCER's education bills, told educators:

If you purge the air of all the deleterious programs for children, you still don't do away with the bad effects of such things on children's minds. I think we have always got to look to the education of the parent.¹²

Ahern suggested time-blocks of programs for different age levels, a concept which was adopted by networks in

the 1970's in the Family Hour programs. The year 1931 thus initiated both an attack on commercial ownership of radio frequencies, and the moral abuse of those frequencies in regard to children's programs.

New sources for children's programs began to evolve in 1931. In April Grace Abbott, Chief of the U.S. Children's Bureau, began producing "Adventuring for Childhood". NCCM began to develop the idea of regional radio councils. Initially these were to be listening groups to monitor commercial programming. The most prominent one, established by Laura Haines and a group of YWCA women in March, 1934, was the Rocky Mountain Radio Council. A grant from the Denver Adult Education Council enabled it to switch from merely listening to preparing and producing their own scripts, such as accounts of pioneers for children's time-periods on local stations.¹³

Legal changes began to go NCCM's way, too. On January 29, 1931 it defended KOAC, an educational station in Oregon which was operating under twelve hours daily on 550 frequency. KTFI, a commercial Idaho station, wanted the FRC to give it those unused hours to broadcast into Oregon on 550. The hours were saved for KOAC's use.¹⁴ In May, 1931 Joy Elmer Morgan took further pleasure in an announcement by FRC

attorney Louis Caldwell, who was chairman of the ABA's Standing committee on committees. He said the ABA was reviewing the Radio Act for possible changes. Morgan made a timely statement, "There is not any reason why in 1935 or in 1933, if we wanted to, we shouldn't have an utterly new deal."¹⁵ Supreme Court decisions of April 27 and May 25, 1931 upheld the Radio Act's clause that the airwaves are to be used in the public interest, which gave NCCER an additional weight in pressing for such decisions by the FRC.

The interests which had put together NACRE were becoming increasingly concerned by the activities of NCCER and legal developments. The first national assembly of NACRE was called for May 21, 1931 at the New School for Social Research. Ben Darrow and Walter Damrosch were there, and Tyson, Wilbur and Charters. Sionie Gruenberg, who became a leading critic of commercial broadcasting's approach to children's programming, was still at this stage working with the broadcasters. Judith Waller, vice president and general manager of CBS's Chicago station and a promoter of the network's American School of the Air approach to education played a role. But CBS's most prominent advocate was its new vice president, the former FRC member Dr. Henry Bellows. Denouncing the legal developments of 1931 and NCCER, he said, "I do not

believe that a greater disaster could possibly befall the cause of education through radio than a legal decree of divorce between education and commercial broadcasting.¹⁶ The networks became concerned that some frequencies might be set aside for education.

There was a positive side to NACRE's first assembly. Inspired by the opening address "Radio in Historical Perspective" by Columbia University historian James T. Shotwell, NACRE sought out professional groups to prepare scripts for network presentation in those fields. Shotwell told the assembly:

It is not so incongruous as it may seem for a historian to discuss as recent a phenomenon as radio. History, properly conceived, is not confined to events of the distant past....The ancient Greeks...were concerned with the analysis of events taking place around them....Thucydides specifically says that the proper theme for history is the Athens of his day. He is bewildered by the perspectives of the past and thinks them much less important....The nineteenth century...began to regard the time perspective as the chief element in the definition of history. Today I regard the analysis of a movement as recent as radio...a proper subject for historical treatment....It is the clue, I think, to the drift of civilization....In radio alone we have in our control forces for change, for the modification of society, of human life and thought, that far outdistance the powers wielded by the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs, the Romanoffs.¹⁷

Shotwell's ideas heralded the position that many educators and historians took during the Great

Depression. In 1934 the American Historical Association's Commission on Social Studies issued this definition:

The program of social science instruction should provide for a realistic study of the life, institutions, and culture of contemporary America....It cannot omit study of the inefficiencies, the corruptions, the tensions, the conflicts, the contradictions and the injustices of the age.¹⁸

The Joint Radio Committee of the American Historical Association began writing programs in 1934 for the time-periods NACAE obtained from the networks for educational programming. The approach to broadcasting history was contained in an AHA report:

Historical-mindedness in the public is not a matter of gazing backward; it is the intelligent habit of thinking about present affairs in the light of the past from which they developed....Far from making people conservative and irresponsible to change, might presumably make them less resistant.¹⁹

The second assembly of NACAE in 1932 continued the same dichotomy of themes as the first. There was the attack on educational broadcasting stations by a member of the FRC, and pleas for more public education through broadcasting made by intellectuals. The FRC's Harold LaFount contended that "broad"-casting means programs must be for everyone, for "people of many classes and conditions in life, and, speaking in a strictly physical sense, a broadcasting station cannot discriminate so as to furnish signals to one

listener and not to another."²⁰ He said university-owned stations discriminated against the "public", since people did not want to be educated. Frequencies were thus kept out of public use. He concluded with the curious statement that in Europe, no university holds a broadcasting license. (Of course, in Europe stations were owned by the government).

The trend toward greater government broadcasting activity was developing in North America in 1932, threatening private ownership of the airwaves. The Bennett Committee, established by the Canadian parliament, voted with but one dissenter to adopt a report establishing Canadian Broadcasting Company control of programs. By April, 1934 the government company had acquired its first six stations from private hands. In January, 1934 the Ohio Emergency Junior Radio College began broadcasting over WOSU and other Ohio educational stations with funds from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. In the first six months 1700 people enrolled for courses in finance, psychology, literature, science, history, French and Spanish. 100 people attended final examinations at the end of the broadcasting quarter and 55 passed. The University of Iowa received a grant to begin shorthand and botany courses on its TV station W9XX in 1934.²¹

With increased government funding, only three educationally-owned stations in 1934 were still selling commercial time as a source of support, WNUF (Florida), WJTL, and WHAZ.²²

At NACBB's second assembly, Robert S. Lynd had expressed what broadcasting's approach to consumer education should be. Instead of teaching people how to spend money, broadcasting should teach them how not to spend it. He concluded, "We need to be taught to ask the federal government why the consumer is the member nobody knows in Washington."²³

The public found a spokesman in Washington in 1932 in Senator Couzens who introduced a resolution requiring the FRC to report to Congress researched answers to the following questions: Should the government own the stations? How much advertising should there be on the networks? Does advertising vary according to a station's wattage? How can advertising be limited? What is the networks' income? Would only indirect advertising be a possibility?²⁴

The commissioners felt that the simplest way to obtain the information requested was to ask the advertising agencies for the answers. Fifty-one agencies wrote responses to the FRC, each letter emphasizing that it would not be a good idea to

eliminate advertising from broadcasting. Chairman Charles Saltzman included the replies with his cover letter to Congress as evidence against government ownership of the airwaves.²⁵

The inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt in March, 1933 brought increased governmental organization of broadcasting. In the autumn, Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper set up an interdepartmental committee to coordinate all broadcasting in which the government was engaged. The committee recommended that communications of non-broadcasting nature under the ICC be placed with broadcasting under a new Federal Communications Commission. On February 6, 1934, Roosevelt sent his message to Congress.²⁶

The introduction of the Federal Communications Act provided a new opportunity for educators to redress the injustices suffered under the FRC. Group members of NCEA were ready with lobbying efforts. The National Catholic Educational Association and the Jesuit Education Association, with Father John Harney of the Paulist Fathers, who owned WLWL, New York approached Democratic Senator Robert Wagner with a proposal. A similar amendment was suggested to Republican Senator Dr. Henry Hatfield of West Virginia by the American Farm Bureau, the National Grange, and 4-H

at NCEM's request. The Wagner-Hatfield Amendment of April, 1934 would have required the new FCC to allocate 25% of radio frequencies for educational stations.²⁷

William Paley explained to Senator Clarence Dill's committee that the amendment was unneeded, since most of CBS's program time was non-sponsored sustaining, and therefore available for educational programming. The statement caused concern to Senator Dill, who felt that if the new 'nonprofit' stations allocated frequencies could also sell commercials, as could all stations in 1934, the competition would destroy commercial stations which were barely surviving, with so much sustaining time. Dill asked if the educators were to be granted frequencies, how many other frequencies should be reserved just "to the Catholics...to the Jews....Yes, and probably the infidels would want something." Senator Logan of Kentucky added, "And to the Hindus... Yes, there is a national association of atheists. They perhaps would want them part of the time."²⁸ The National Association of Broadcasters lobbied every senator, and the amendment was defeated, 42 to 23.²⁹

The first week in May, 1934 NCEM sponsored a National Conference on The Use of Radio as a Cultural Agency in a Democracy. Tracy Tyler and Arthur Crane, president of the University of Wyoming and ACE were

major forces in the Washington D.C. conference. OSU's F.L. Lumley and Mrs. M.E. Pulk, founders of the Ohio Radio Education Association, other state groups, engineers and child welfare experts were present to urge the government to at least establish a permanent federal committee on radio education: "Wholesome needs and desires of listeners should govern character" of programs, and the government must promote "wholesome broadcasts for youth."

The impressionable, defenseless minds of children and youth must be protected against insidious, degenerative influences.⁵⁰

Since the Mill Bill to replace the FRC with the FCC said essentially the same things as the Radio Act, which the radio industry had been quite satisfied with, the senators had no powerful interest groups to tell them what to do, and were thus perplexed when the bill came for a vote in June, 1934. Congressmen did not understand, either. Democrat Schuyler Bland of Virginia complained:

The Senate has undertaken to repeal the Radio Act of 1927....They do the useless or futile thing, so far as radio is concerned, of repealing the law and then reenacting the same law. Now the question might arise, What difference does it make?...I mean no reflection on the distinguished gentlemen of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee but they conceded themselves upon this floor one week ago that they knew nothing about radio.

Republican Louis McFadden of Pennsylvania could not understand why Roosevelt sent the bill to the wrong committee, requesting its consideration:

The Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House had never had jurisdiction over the question of radio. The Merchant Marine, Radio, and Fisheries Committee had, and has grown up with the growth of radio in the United States.

After the Senate approved the bill 58 to 40, Congressman Frederick Lehlbach of New Jersey said:

We have been called rubber stamps... repealing the existing radio law on the recommendation of the Senate without a single Member of the House who knows any thing about radio giving the slightest consideration to it.

The House passed the bill.³¹

One new provision of the Federal Communications Act required the new commission to hold hearings on the conflict between educators and commercial broadcasters and report to Congress by February 1, 1935. The hearings were held from October 1, 1934 to December 1, and the report of FCC Chairman Anning Prall issued on January 22. "Deke" Aylesworth gave the networks' view at the hearings, claiming educators did not accept the time offered, and what was used was straight lecture. So the FCC report said, "Presenting educational programs in an attractive manner" was something educators must learn. It continued:

That at this time no fixed percentages of radio broadcast facilities be allocated by statute to particular types or kinds of non-profit radio programs or to persons identified with particular types or kinds of non-profit activities.³²

NACRE officials were pleased with the results of the FCC hearings. NACRE expanded its contacts with professional organizations to produce seventeen series played mainly in 7:00-7:15 and 7:30-7:45 sustaining time-periods of networks. The AF of L provided "American Labor and the Nation," the ABA wrote "The Lawyer and the Public," and other groups wrote "Coping with Crime," "Vocational Guidance," and "Psychology Today."

If that sounds like "very dull stuff," this was the conclusion of Thomas Reed, Chairman of the American Political Science Association, who undertook a study for NACRE in 1936. He felt that the attitude toward the public of the groups which were writing these programs was to "give 'em a college education whether they want it or not." Reed's Committee on Civil Education of NACRE included Charles Beard and Charles Merriam of the AHA's Commission on Social Studies. Their report of NACRE's relations and problems with networks, Four Years of Network Broadcasting, issued in 1936 caused a sensation. It was introduced at the

Institute for Education by Radio in Columbus, Ohio. NBC officials succeeded in suppressing it from being published in the Institute's Yearbook.³³

OSU professor and younger brother of Tracy, I. Keith Tyler, said radio educators he was associated with were suspicious of NACRE educators, "Unwittingly being patsies of the organization, but Levering Tyson did not suppress that article about Four Years of Network Broadcasting. He was as disillusioned as anybody" by 1936. Tyler felt the NACRE educators' problem was "they just couldn't turn down all this good money" that networks provided for their projects and services.³⁴

Tyson had NACRE publish Four Years of Network Broadcasting. He then resigned, bringing an end to NACRE in 1937. The study relates the creating and first meeting of the Civil Education Committee of NACRE in the Carnegie Corp. offices, November 27, 1931. William Hard of NBC insisted the programs must be ready by February 1, 1932. Charles Beard and George Counts met on December 12 to begin writing them.³⁵

In February a new NBC vice president informed Beard and Counts that the 8:00-8:30 time slot had been sold to a sponsor for an entertainment program, but 7:15-7:45 was available, though local stations could

drop network sustaining shows at that time for sponsored local shows. The program "You and Your Government" focused on prominent speakers and was designed for 11-12 grade. Manuals were prepared, and a staff of 19 was utilized. But the only funds were \$7500 from a wealthy woman to use for expenses, so no one got paid. Then NBC cut the show to 15 minutes.³⁶

The Joint Radio Committee of the AHA decided to try drama programming on taxes. Tyson wanted assurances it would not suffer the fate of "You and Your Government". NBC Vice President Richard Patterson wrote him a letter:

I assure you heartily that even in the difficult times...the National Broadcasting Company will... eliminate the chance of a repetition of this recent incident.³⁷

The programs were prepared, and in December, 1932 NBC sold the 8:00-8:30 time slot to a sponsor, and the Kmo Crime Club went on the air instead.

In 1933 and 1934 NBC further downgraded education. It eliminated the vice president for education position, and sent NACME to deal with the vice president for programming. In April, 1934, NBC's southeastern stations substituted Gillette's Gene & Glenn for "You and Your Government", so speakers had to talk

in a different time slot for that area. When NBC got local stations to grant it $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours of network entertainment programming after October, 1935, instead of just 3 hours, local stations would no longer carry network sustaining programs in the remaining half-hour of evening prime time between 7 and 11. So NACRE's shows were being sent out to only a handful of stations which could not find sponsors for local programs in that optional half-hour remaining. As the General Manager of WCAE explained:

Our thirty minutes per night falls 7:30 to 8 P.M., and it's not nearly sufficient time to begin to take care of the amount of business which is practically thrust upon us...by ...advertisers.³⁸

By February of 1936 even the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast stations had dropped the show.

With the increase in commercials and the elimination of sustaining programs by the mid-1930's, the question arose as to what the new FCC would do. It noted in its first report, issued in early 1936:

In the past fiscal year there has been a notable increase in complaints to the Commission....The broadcasting of false, fraudulent, and misleading advertising in various guises has been the chief source of complaint.³⁹

The commissioners proved they had inherited the mantle

of the FCC; they recommended that the Federal Trade Commission do something about the problem.

As a result of the FCC's decision to let other government agencies discipline broadcasters for commercial content, the Federal Trade Commission was given the power to put itself in controversial positions, especially by the late 1970's. In March of 1938, House Interstate Commerce Committee Chairman Clarence Lea and Senator Burton Wheeler agreed on the Lea bill to give the FTC civil and criminal authority over misleading advertising in broadcasting; so the FCC would not have to punish anyone.

Since many complaints in the 1930's were against liquor advertising, the Distilled Spirits Institute decided to take the initiative and ban liquor commercials after January 1, 1937. There was no need then for Congress to consider the Alcohol Advertising bill of 1938.⁴⁰ NBC's 1939 Advertising Code forbidding liquor commercials was anticlimactic, as was the new NAB Code, patterned after it.⁴¹

Congress did not take seriously a 1950 bill to ban cigarette commercials. Chain-smoker Edward R. Murrow told the Radio-Television News Directors Conference in Chicago on October 15, 1958 of his

problems in presenting the issue:

I did two half-hour programs dealing with cigarette smoking and lung cancer. Both the medical profession and the tobacco industry cooperated in a rather wary fashion. But in the end of the day they were both reasonably content.⁴²

After the Surgeon General's report on the linkage of cancer and cigarettes in 1965, events developed quickly. John Banzhaf, a New York lawyer, submitted a Fairness Doctrine complaint to the FCC in 1969 asking that it require WCBS, New York to carry anti-smoking commercials of his Action on Smoking and Health Committee to balance the cigarette commercials.⁴³ Banzhaf appeared before the Pastore committee in the Senate in December, 1969. Like the liquor industry, the cigarette industry decided to withdraw from the field, but sought a federal law to make sure everyone complied equally. Although the NAB Code of 1969 suggested a voluntary phase-out of commercials by September 1973, sponsors had decided to cease advertisement by the autumn of 1970. The federal bill, which television supported, actually extended the withdrawal period for commercials to 1971. Five months after the advertising ceased, the FCC ruled on June 2, 1971 that cigarettes and health were a public issue, and that WCBS would have to carry the other viewpoint, that of anti-smoking groups' announcements.

When the issue is between two commercial groups, the FCC sometimes does act. The increasing dominance of prime time by the networks since the mid-1930's culminated with local stations and syndicators getting the FCC to institute the prime time access rule of 1971. Networks could not send out programs between 7:00 and 8:00 P.M. Though the FCC said it was a rule to benefit viewers, its design was only to favor one set of businessmen over another. Networks laid off thousands of employees in the autumn of 1971 as a result of the loss of income from these two rulings.⁴⁴

NCEM had a longer life than NACRE. It continued actively working through committees of the federal government until Pearl Harbor. Commissioner of Education J.W. Studebaker on May 15, 1935 established the 40-member Federal Radio Education Committee and the Radio Division in the Office of Education. In connection with the FRFC an Educational Radio Project Advisory Committee was set up with Sidonie Gruenberg of the Child Study Association of America, Edward R. Murrow, Educational Talks Director, CBS, Franklin Dunham, NBC vice-president of education, and William Boutwell. Ben Darrow's assistant Cline Koen of OSU began research for the Radio Division.⁴⁵

In January 1936 the Radio Division began coordinating broadcasting activities of other agencies. With the WPA's radio director an Adult Education Program for the New York City Board of Education was established. Within a year 4800 people were registered for classes in shorthand, dictation and other studies. City-owned WNYC was utilized. At the University of Wisconsin's station the National Youth Administration established the Radio Study Groups project in 1936. NYA workers in Ohio were filling 35% of the airtime of the Ohio Emergency Radio Junior College for just \$6700. NYA and Radio Division established the Appalachian health project.⁴⁶

The FARC began a script writing and distribution project, Federal Radio Script Exchange, in 1937. Scripts included those of the Federal Theater Project's Radio Division, directed by Leslie Roberts. "Pioneers of Science" and 16 Shakespearian plays broadcast on New York City stations were its first projects in 1936. It was also concerned about unemployed variety performers, and produced a musical program on NBC called "Professional Parade".⁴⁷

An increasing number of groups became involved in the 1930's in trying to get the government involved in radio programming. In 1937 in Seattle the Washington Federation of Labor, CIO, and National Grange urged

Congress to broadcast its sessions. Senator Pittman introduced a resolution which failed.⁴⁸

The American Council on Education in 1936 called for the first National Conference on Educational Broadcasting, which NCEA actively organized. It initiated educators activities in securing educational FM frequencies. A second National Conference on Educational Broadcasting was held on November 29, 1937. Fifty CCC workers and workers with WPA participated in the second conference in Chicago.

The NAB began to worry about private ownership of the airwaves with so much government activity. On May 1, 1936 Broadcasting magazine said groups like WPA and CCC should keep out of broadcasting.⁴⁹

In July, 1939 the Office of Education and its Radio Division were transferred to the Federal Security Agency. FSA had released a film called "The Fight for Life", which the AMA and ADA maintained was a promotion for socialized medicine. Newspaper columns began associating it with the Office of Education.⁵⁰ Also in 1939, the Radio Division had produced a program predicting an oil shortage if an energy bill did not pass. The attorney for the Petroleum Association of America denounced the program as an attempt by the government to control the oil industry. Congressman

Everett Dirksen called all government radio broadcasts "clap trap and tommy rot." WPA funds for use in radio were cut off. All funds were withdrawn from the Federal Theater Radio Division. CBS cancelled the Department of Interior's "What Price America?" and refused the Office of Education's "United We Stand." NBC cut the time of "The Farm and Home Hour," and shifted "The World Is Yours" to a less favorable time. The Radio Division ceased at the end of 1939, and public broadcasting went silent.⁵¹

2. School Broadcasts

The remaining college stations in the 1930's became the principal source of sequenced education. The Wisconsin School of the Air, and College of the Air over WHA began in 1931. In 1929 the Payne Fund was willing to sponsor network school broadcasts. Although "NBC and CBS [agreed and] approached the American Association of School Administrators, the school superintendents turned it down. They didn't think it was really that important."⁵² CBS initiated The American School of the Air, two fifteen-minute broadcasts of weekly series each afternoon, in the fall of 1929. WLW, an independent commercial station, broadcast over NBC's Blue Network The Nation's School of the Air from 1937-1939. The CBS broadcasts were carried by some station's into the late 1940's. But the model for the network and each of the college station's programming was The Ohio School of the Air.

Ben Darrow was instrumental in beginning The Ohio School of the Air. He had attended the Ohio State University. His work as a YMCA rural worker led him to Sears' agricultural division and the development of his Chicago broadcasts. In 1928 he got Payne Fund officials interested in a school of the air idea. When the NAA rejected the proposal at its Minneapolis

meeting that year, Darrow turned to John L. Clifton, Director of the State Department of Education of Ohio.⁵³ Clifton got the Ohio legislature to add \$20,000 to the Payne Fund's participating money for the Ohio State University to develop programs to be broadcast initially over WEAU, Columbus, and WLW, Cincinnati. The first broadcast was January 7, 1929, with Darrow as on-the-air schoolmaster.

Darrow saw radio education as more-encompassing than classroom work. He felt politics to be a part of a student's education. In January he broadcast the inaugurations of Ohio Governor Myers Cooper and President Herbert Hoover. From a Washington D.C. studio he frequently broadcast politicians. Prominent writers read their poems and stories. Vachel Lindsay, Edwin Markham, Louis Guiterman and Carl Sandburg were guest readers. Ohio Attorney General John Bricker explained state government.

It was Darrow's friendship and support for Bricker in his bid to be governor in 1936 that brought hard times to The Ohio School of the Air. Darrow and Bricker were conservative Republicans. Democratic Governor Martin Davey sought Darrow's public support and a contribution to his reelection, which Darrow refused. After reelection, Davey got the legislature to cut off

funds for the broadcasts in the spring of 1937. WLW continued them on its own till funds were restored when Davey left office two years later. Darrow had left to develop a program for WBBM, Buffalo. The broadcasts resumed over WOSU and continued until 1962, with Margaret Tyler, wife of I. Keith Tyler, as supervisor from 1945 on.⁵⁴ Davey's antagonism to the broadcasts stirred the Ohio Education Association and the Ohio PTA into supporting the idea of radio education. Their appeals to Davey to restore funds fell on deaf ears.

Darrow and his associates with The Ohio School of the Air continued their attempts to change governmental and education bodies' attitudes toward radio education. A conference at the Ohio State House on Listening Schools was provided on November 22 and 23, 1929 for legislators. Dr. Edgar Dale, who became a leading expert on media education's effects on youth through his Payne Fund research and as editor of the Ohio State University's Bureau of Educational Research's News Letter in the 1930's, participated in this conference. The following summer at the first OSU Radio Institute, the State Advisory Committee on the Ohio School of the Air was established for teachers, to have them prepare annual evaluations of the broadcasts, to determine future scheduling.

The fall schedule for 1929 included courses in Nature Study, French, Chemistry, Geography, Current Events, History, Physics, Health, Art, the Mound Builders, and student performances of Shakespeare.⁵⁵ The popularity of the broadcasts with classroom teachers led the legislature to increase funding to \$46,000 for the 1930-1931 school year.⁵⁶ But the Depression's toll on state funds resulted in a considerable cut in funding for the 1932-1933 year.

The Depression cut into the networks' school broadcast time. NBC reduced its Music Appreciation hour to fifteen minutes for the 1933-1934 school year, and conducted no public school broadcasts from 1934-1937. Judith Waller, NBC Education Director for the Central Division at WMAQ, Chicago had difficulty explaining NBC's position at educational conferences. The polio epidemic in the fall of 1937 enabled her to resume school broadcasting with the Chicago Radio Council, when the public schools delayed opening for several weeks.⁵⁷

The Ohio School of the Air inspired extensive research in radio education. Darrow's survey of English teachers in the fall of 1931 determined a majority preferred dramatizations for their classes, and wanted the broadcasts to include objective questions.⁵⁸

Cline Keen received his Ph.D. degree for making a collection of the surveys.⁵⁹ The Ohio State University's English Department began a series of thirty-minute radio dramas in January, 1929.⁶⁰ Alice Sells, of the OSU Department of Adult Education began writing twenty-minute radio dramaloges for WEAU in May, 1930. Although she contended that the best responses to her programs on stealing and lying came from children, she cited the approval of parents and teachers to the shows, in letters relating such comments as, "One little boy, of Presbyterian upbringing, who listened to the third dramalog in this group, talked for a week about 'the children God punished'." Alice Sells received her Master's degree for a collection of her scripts and listeners' letters.⁶¹

Darrow was not as concerned as many parents were with the need for moral lessons and the increasing concern of groups by the mid-1930's with advertising and violence on networks' children's programs. Before leaving The Ohio School of the Air he stated his position: "I have been trying to prevent a somewhat bitter campaign against advertising in children's programs."⁶² He wanted to know what children wished to hear, in order to make educational programs more appealing.

In April, 1933 Barrow sent interview forms to teachers in ten schools to enable them to learn the children's interests. He found this Ohio survey compared to a New York survey's results on children. The 664 children liked to hear about a trip around the world, explorers, football and earthquakes. Interest in violence and murder was fairly low among 6 and 7 year olds, but reached a peak among 10 and 11 year olds. Crime Clues, a network show, was the favorite of 5th and 6th grade children, but children from the 1st through 4th grades preferred Little Orphan Annie, Old Man Sunshine and the Singing Lady, with Crime Clues tenth among 1st graders, and rising to fourth by the 4th grade. 7th and 8th graders preferred adult shows like Eddie Cantor, Lowell Thomas and Amos 'n' Andy, with Crime Clues dropping to sixth. The interest in violence seemed to represent a learning phase, but critical groups to network programming and other media would focus on such programs as a plague in the 1930's.⁶³

When The Ohio School of the Air resumed broadcasting in 1939 after state funds were restored, it only had WO SU as an outlet. It initiated the first children's newscast, Newspaper of the Air, in 1940 with Don Davis and Olive Haynes. The Ohio Historical Society produced "Once Upon a Time in Ohio". Programs were broadcast 1:30-2:00 daily.⁶⁴

The national coverage which WLW had provided The Ohio School of the Air in the early 1930's increased its influence. Although the broadcasts were made over only one station in the early 1930's, WLW of Cincinnati, WLW had an unusual feature. When the FCC began reassignments of frequencies, WLW was given 700 kc along with Dartmouth College's station. On November 11, 1928 it received the frequency as one of the forty clear channels authorized by the FCC at 25,000 watts, to reach rural areas. That controversial decision, which cut down the possibility of numerous stations and severely limited competition by giving just forty stations exclusive national control of their frequencies was followed by another decision a year later approving the unauthorized increases in power to 50,000 watts of fourteen of these stations. WLW had increased its power to 50,000 watts on October 29, 1928, before the clear channel decision. It had become a Blue Network affiliate station in July, 1927, and its new audience in 1928 enabled it to increase advertising rates to \$600 an hour. The following year, Caldwell explained for the FCC its decision to allow the unauthorized increases in power by commercial stations, in a letter of November, 1929, stating that they, "had fine service records from the beginning, and were felt to deserve best possible power."⁶⁵

With the uncertainty of a new FCC's position toward the forty clear channels, the Clear Channels Group (CCG) formed in May, 1934. WLW secured Duke Patrick, the FCC's attorney as its attorney. In May WLW then got approval to increase its power to 500,000 watts, which brought its signal into almost every American community with the same clarity as local stations. In 1935 it joined the new Mutual network. CBS, NBC, and their clear channel affiliates came to look upon WLW as different from them—a network in itself.

Attacks on WLW began from all sides. Commissioner George Payne urged blocking the applications of fifteen other clear channel stations that sought 500,000 watts in 1936, to compete with WLW's increasing advertising coups. On June 13, 1938 Senator Burton Wheeler introduced Senate Resolution 294 to forbid 500,000 watt assignments. The National Association of Broadcasters at its convention in November agreed with Commissioner Craven to adopt a resolution against WLW's power.⁶⁶

As Chief Engineer of the FCC, Craven had written the controversial report defending the 50,000 watt high power and the existence of the other clear channel stations in a 1936 FCC study. He had written there was, "Insufficient data to recommend radical change," but also that 36% of the population depended at night on clear channels for programming. He

indicated witnesses at his hearings rejected the need for any FCC requirement for educational programs.⁶⁷ In spite of Craven's defense of the clear channels, his statistics showed 143 cities with over 25,000 people had no radio station, 471 cities of 10,000-25,000 people had none, and 15,616 cities under 10,000 had no station. Craven said it was determined that cities under 10,000 could not support a station. The Engineering Department utilized for these conclusions NACRE Information Series number 5 (July, 1936), the research of the Director and Assistant Director of Engineering for CBS, the Directors of Radio Transmission for the AT&T, RCA's chief engineer, NBC's director of Research and Development, and the vice president of Stromberg-Carlson.⁶⁸

NCRE quickly attacked the report. Its director, S. Howard Evans, questioned the competency of the engineers. Dr. Arthur Crane of NCRE and the American Council on Education (ACE) used the hearings to request FM frequencies for education. Commissioner of Education Stuebaker and WHA officials speaking for NAB college stations were allowed to introduce a similar request.⁶⁹ So while the CCG was defending itself and attacking its big sister WLW, with its national coverage of The Ohio School of the Air,

educators had become sufficiently organized to get new demands before the FCC.

Subsequent hearings made the position of the large affiliates of networks more precarious. J.M. DeWitt, Jr., speaking for the CCG justified the existence of the 50,000 watt group by claiming that large cities' stations were not adversely affected by clear channel stations from elsewhere because of too much fading of distant signals.⁷⁰ Yet a sympathetic group to CCG, the Committee of The National Economic and Social Planning Association had to use the same conclusions of fading to justify the elimination of WLW's superpower:

Experience with WLW indicated also that at certain phases of the sunspot cycle when radio transmission conditions degenerate, a power of 500 kw does a job that is no better than that done by a 50 kw station when conditions are more favorable.⁷¹

The CCG and other opponents of WLW and its owner, inventor Powel Crosley, Jr., succeeded with the congressional resolution to reduce its power to 50,000 watts in March, 1939. However, the new FCC Chairman that year, James L. Fly, began his attack on the networks' monopolies, resulting in the forced sale by U.S. Supreme Court order in 1943 of NBC's Blue Network, which would become ABC. Fly attacked the CCG until it created sufficient congressional pressure against him to force his resignation in 1944.

These attacks on monopoly and the conservative reaction from the Congress fit the changing development of the New Deal. Its second phase during the unemployment resurgence of the late 1930's created an anti-big business feeling among New Dealers. They no longer saw a fascist, business-government coalition as the Depression's solution. Yale professor Thurman Arnold became head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and instituted a large number of suits against monopolies. Educational broadcasters reaped large reward from this trend of the times.

The educators planned a two-prong attack. While NCEA sought to take from the commercial broadcasters what they had, its associate ACE sought to get educational broadcasters what they lacked. S. Howard Evans prepared a paper for Senator Wheeler's broadcast hearings in 1936. It proposed new legislation prohibiting newspaper ownership of stations, requiring the networks to obtain licenses as networks, and establishing a patent pool to break radio manufacturers' influence on the industry and government's decisions toward it.⁷² ACE in December brought together the American Association for Adult Education, the American Farm Bureau, the Jewish Welfare Board, the National Congress of the PTA, the National Catholic Education Association, and the Women's National Radio Committee

for the First National Conference on Educational
Broadcasting.⁷³

3. FM Education

FM broadcasting became technically feasible in 1936, and gave groups new hope for challenging the existing structure of broadcasting. In the spring George Zook, director of the American Council on Education, which was a member of NCER, proposed that a first national conference on Educational Broadcasting be held in December in Washington D.C. The principle goal would be to press the FCC for FM frequencies.⁷⁴

Squabbling among commercial stations enabled Dr. John Studebaker, U.S. Office of Education, to introduce a proposal for educational shortwave frequencies to the FCC. The Commission was holding hearings in June, 1936 because regional and local stations were angry about the advertising power of 50,000 watt clear channel stations. They wanted an end to clear channels. More stations would come into being, and shortwave frequencies might replace the clear channels' distances.⁷⁵

The FCC held hearings on the new FM technology in August. NCER asked the FCC to give all of the FM channels that might be created to the educators.⁷⁶ But one educator, I. Keith Tyler, realized the FCC would want more in the way of statistics to support such requests, and at the First National Conference he proposed evaluating school broadcasts in existence.⁷⁷

Sometimes a group's interest in broadcasting matters was developed by another organization involved in broadcasting research. That was the case with public school superintendents, who in the late 1930's were not involved in broadcasting, even though high school hobby clubs in the 1920's had been instrumental in radio's formation. In order to revive an interest by public schools in radio broadcasting, the Bureau of Educational Research at the Ohio State University devised the project called Evaluation of School Broadcasting, with W.W. Charters chairing the Advisory Committee.

The director of the project was I. Keith Tyler, who had come to the university in 1935. He felt that it was one thing for university people to be interested in broadcasting, but how could that interest affect children if it was not promoted among public school people. Tyler had worked with curriculum design for the Oakland Public Schools, and had conducted a study there of the effects of radio listening on school children. His older brother Tracy was executive secretary of the National Committee on Education by Radio, 1931-1936. Tracy then became researcher for the General Education Board.

Having secured a grant of \$69,000 from the General Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1937,

the Bureau undertook seventy studies across the nation. Most of the studies were designed to help schools utilize radio in the classroom. Tyler felt the main result of the project was the development of a sense of unity among school superintendents, and staff development, since "This became the nucleus of the groups which later developed our FM educational stations, like Detroit, Cleveland and St. Louis."⁷⁸

The research studies were published in pamphlets by the Bureau, initially free and eventually at small cost to the schools participating as funds began to run out. Some were reprinted by the Federal Radio Education Committee and the National Association of Broadcasters.

The NAB reprinted study one by associate director of the project Norman Woelfel to indicate its commitment to opposing fascism. Woelfel had begun to stress the value of educational radio for teaching democratic principles as the war approached. Since the project continued to the end of 1942, some of the studies were developed to show federal officials the morale-building capacities of educational radio.

In study one U.S. Commissioner of Education John W. Studebaker indicated his own attitude toward education by writing that, "The student who missed hearing Chamberlain or Hitler because he was forced by an inflexible school program to conjugate German

verbs...was deprived of some real education."⁷⁹

Both Tyler and Woelfel became increasingly concerned that radio must promote democratic "ideals which merit every sacrifice."⁸⁰ Woelfel studied the development of "The Free Company," a group of writers who organized to provide programs to promote the war effort nearly a year before Pearl Harbor. It consisted of Norman Corwin, Marc Connelly, William Saroyan, Sherwood Anderson, Maxwell Anderson, Orson Welles, Stephen Vincent Benet, George M. Cohan and Archibald MacLeish. Broadcasts began on February 23, 1941. Woelfel made no effort to distinguish the means of persuasion from those used in axis countries, but wrote, "It was Fascist content that forged the German, Japanese, and Italian mind—not the educational engineering techniques which were used to communicate that content."⁸¹

Dr. Tyler explained thirty-six years later that with the nation committed to defeat fascism it was necessary to create an understanding in the people. He felt that propaganda is a misused term in America, since education involves persuasion, even the persuading of someone to make choices, and that when "the cause was worthy," there is a necessity for broadcasting to promote it.⁸²

Most of the studies of Evaluation of School Broadcasts were designed to help teachers and administrators understand radio and better understand children and youth of the radio age. Seerley Reid reported on a study undertaken for the Evaluation by nine Rochester, N.Y. high schools. The first phase was to use radio to try to improve students' speech. In the second phase, an attempt was made to change students' out-of-class listening habits to get them to listen to the NBC Symphony, Chicago Round Table and The World Is Yours. No change occurred as a result of teachers' efforts, though students did begin to listen to news commentators more in 1940.⁸³

The Bureau's researchers wanted to discover the nature of music tastes to see if new tastes could be developed. The favorite programs of Rochester's 16-year olds were Lucky Strike Hit Parade, Kay Kyser and Glenn Miller. Students listened regularly to 20 programs a week, with no difference in choice related to I.Q. or sex of students.⁸⁴

G.D. Wiebe conducted a survey of 100 Zanesville, Ohio mothers. He found that their favorite programs were Lucky Strike Hit Parade, Kay Kyser and Glenn Miller.⁸⁵ But Wiebe discovered an interesting facet of these listening habits. Due to a dispute over a new,

high performance fee schedule of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), the networks stopped playing all the popular ASCAP songs during the early months of 1941. But the Zanesville mothers still listened to the music programs because they liked the orchestras. Wiebe concluded that a particular type of popular music is not welded to public taste.

Fredaie Martin found that to be true in searching for non-ASCAP songs to record in 1941. He decided to do an upbeat version of Tchaikovsky's Piano Concerto in B flat minor, which became his best-selling theme song, "Tonight We Love."⁸⁶

So the Bureau's researchers had uncovered a key to understanding and changing music tastes. As school superintendents who participated in the Evaluation would begin to apply for the new experimental FM licenses for their districts, this knowledge could have been put to use. But it was never utilized.

Howard Rowland and Frederick Wyatt undertook the task of listening to all of the children's programs on radio for the Evaluation. During the week of March 24, 1941 Rowland listened to fifty broadcasts of twenty programs—serials and evening shows. Thirty murders and fifteen attempted murders were committed on the broadcasts. The methods involved guns, hammers, occult

powders, stabbings, drownings, stranglings and a poison hand. In one episode of these 1941 programs drug peddlers were caught smuggling "reefers" in from Mexico. When Howland completed all his research in 1942, after the United States had entered the war, he came to a conclusion about these programs that would surprise the critics of televised violence in the 1970's. He wrote, "The time is past when we can afford the use of radio programs as a means for the vicarious experience of sadism and aggression, for these emotions must be turned against our immediate enemies."⁸⁷

Frederick Wyatt interpreted The Lone Ranger program as religious symbolism. Like the knights of the Holy Grail, the Lone Ranger dedicated himself to destroying evil simply because it was evil. Since the channels of law and order were ineffective in dealing with evil, the Lone Ranger took it upon himself to do what sheriffs could not do. Wyatt felt the purpose and popularity of children's adventure shows lay in their ability to give children daydreams of power which they lacked in actuality.⁸⁸

Technical studies comprised the bulk of the Evaluation. J. Robert Miles undertook a study of the

NBC educational program *The World Is Yours* for the teaching of science in the classroom. One finding was that the programs seemed to be promotional devices for the petroleum industry, the glass industry and others.⁸⁹

During 1940 and 1941 Seerley Reid evaluated the twenty-six 15-minute programs of the CBS American School of the Air, which ran for an hour and a half each afternoon. He found that most involved just a rattling off of a series of facts. *Americans At Work* was a series which promoted industries and their products, and would list strings of facts, such as 30,000 Americans were at work in these jobs.⁹⁰

Reid and Daniel Day updated Cline Koen's 1936 study for the U.S. Office of Education that had found of 82,297 schools only 14 radio sets for every 100 schools. Since the networks used their school broadcasts as a public relations gambit to justify their monopoly of the airwaves, the Koen study would seem to render these broadcasts ineffective. Reid and Day found that 54% of Ohio's schools had radios and 11% had central sound systems. But they found that only 6% of Ohio's schools used the Ohio School of the Air or the NBC and CBS programs.⁹¹

The CBS Teachers Manual for the American School of the Air for the 1940-1941 school year broadcasts stated,

"An estimated 200,000 teachers now use the programs weekly, in classes totalling 8,000,000 pupils." On January 8, 1941 Variety reprinted as fact that statement of the CBS public relations department. The New York Times, giving the impression that it was reporting researched fact, and not wanting to be too copyish, printed on February 23, 1941, "Nearly 10,000,000 boys and girls in approximately 200,000 classrooms" use the American School of the Air.⁹²

There was much disagreement about statements by CBS. A 1941 study conducted of NEA principals showed, "Not more than one-third of 1% of secondary teachers of the country listened to the Frontiers of Democracy broadcasts during 1939-1940."⁹³ Charges were made at various educational broadcasting conferences that Dr. Frank Stanton, then CBS Research Director, had conducted a survey of American School of the Air listening in 1938 and suppressed it, substituting inflated figures. The intent was to indicate that CBS was adequately filling the educators' needs, and that the new FM channels need not be set aside for education.

It is unclear whether such a study ever existed and the news media misled. Norman Ginsburg indicated that "a thorough check in both our Corporate section and also in our CBS News Division Special Projects area" failed to uncover such a study.⁹⁴ That could be,

because CBS has been notoriously lax in record-keeping and has even lost most of its tapes and transcriptions of old programs. It could also be that such a study was a myth.

School superintendents and other educators did get reserved FM channels in 1938. Twenty-five were assigned to education. It took only a few FCC hearings to achieve, and "nobody really opposed it." President Bevis of the Ohio State University spoke at the hearings for the universities, at one point asking of Dr. Tyler for the right information, "Is that right, Keith?" An FCC commissioner asked, "Has Dr. Tyler been sworn in?" The FCC knew the strong motivations of broadcast educators, and since FM seemed to hold little promise, Dr. Tyler felt the networks figured, "This'll take the educators off our back."⁹⁵

The Cleveland Board of Education applied for its license. WBOE became the first FM educational frequency in 1938. The schools were equipped to receive programs. Zenith's sets were for FM reception of the frequencies the FCC designated. WBOE broadcast on 41.5.

During World War II FCC engineers recommended changing FM frequencies to the current ones. That would mean more hearings, and would make existing sets obsolete. The 1945 FCC hearings showed that the networks

had neither been beneficent nor indifferent to the granting of reserved frequencies to education. In fact, existing AM stations did not want anyone except themselves to get the new FM frequencies.

Dr. Frank Stanton, then CBS vice president and general manager, and Paul Weston, executive vice president testified at the FCC hearings on FM broadcasting. Dr. Stanton had received his Ph.D. in psychology from the Ohio State University in 1935. His research provided a basis for the use of the audiometer attached to radio sets as a means of determining the ratings of programs. So his ideas on listening habits would have weight.

It was the idea of CBS that commercial AM stations should be allowed to broadcast the same network program simultaneously on FM. Since there were no FM sponsors and insufficient programming, it was contended that AM stations should be allowed to build up a network audience on FM. "No sales argument for buying an FM set can compare with the argument that one hundred million dollars worth of AM radio programs go with it."⁹⁶ CBS felt that the audience loved the existing programs so much that no new programs could induce the people to turn on an FM set. "Separate programming...would penalize the public."⁹⁷

CBS was especially upset that the FCC has listened to educational groups and reserved channels for them. But these new hearing provided a chance to correct that error, since it would be very bad for commercial FM broadcasters "if the Commission reserves 20 of FM's 90 frequencies for these late-comers."⁹⁸ Of course, educators were actually the first-comers, as in the case of AM. The reason indicated for the networks' lack of interest in FM in 1938 was that AT&T's phone lines could not carry more than a limited number of cycles of sound until after World War II.

There was no consideration of AM-FM sets at the hearing. It was the CBS contention that because of better FM sound quality, "We will have no AM sets because there will be no need....AM transmitters will go off the air as quickly as FM set sales reach a high enough level of saturation."⁹⁹

The National Education Association and the U.S. Office of Education countered the network arguments by noting that the promises of networks to provide time for education had never been kept. They asked for 15 reserved channels on the new FM band, state linkage of stations, and two TV channels. As proof of educators' interest, they pointed to the existing

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FM stations operated by the school boards of Cleveland, New York, San Francisco and Chicago. The University of Illinois at Urbana also had one, and on January 1, 1945 the 500 watt FM of the University of Kentucky began.¹⁰⁰

An FCC report of 1945 indicated the Commission has wanted to correct past oversights. It had already considered what the educators' arguments would be, and had decided to set aside 20 frequencies on the new FM band before the hearings began.¹⁰¹ But the networks' position did lead the FCC to specify that the educators would have to support the stations. No commercials could be sold. Later the FCC would make it possible for more local noncommercial stations on these channels by allowing applications for small, 10-watt stations.

II. Notes

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- ³Ibid., p. 65.
- ⁴C. Friedrich & J. Sayre, Studies in the Control of Radio, series 3, p. 69.
- ⁵Report of the Advisory Committee on Education by Radio (Washington D.C., 1930), pp. 8, 30.
- ⁶NACRE, First Annual, p. 4.
- ⁷Ibid., p. 3.
- ⁸Institute, Yearbook III (1932), p. 15.
- ⁹NACRE, First Annual, pp. 110, 121.
- ¹⁰Institute, Yearbook II (1931), pp. 4, 6.
- ¹¹Ohio School of the Air Courier (April, 1930), p. 29.
- ¹²Ibid., p. 36.
- ¹³Frank Hill, Tune In For Education (New York, 1942), a NCEA publication, p. 82.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 31.
- ¹⁵NACRE, First Annual, p. 147.
- ¹⁶Institute, Yearbook II (1931), p. 7.
- ¹⁷NACRE, First Annual, pp. 15-16, 18.
- ¹⁸Courier (1934), no. 1, p. 16.

- ¹⁹NACRE, Fourth Annual (1934), p. 202.
- ²⁰NACRE, Second Annual (1932), p. 165.
- ²¹Institute, Yearbook V (1934), p. 156.
- ²²Ibid., p. 297.
- ²³NACRE, Second Annual, p. 287.
- ²⁴U.S. Congressional Record, Jan. 7, 1932, p. 1412.
- ²⁵Commercial Radio Advertising, document 137 (June 9, 1932). Letter of the Chairman of the Federal Radio Commission in response to Senate resolution 129, 72d Congress, 1st session.
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- ³¹U.S. Congressional Record, June 9, 1934, 73d Cong., 2d session, pp. 10988-10995.
- ³²Institute, Yearbook VI (1935), p. 226.
- ³³Tyler, interview.
- ³⁴Ibid.
- ³⁵Committee on Civic Education of NACRE, Four Years of Network Broadcasting (New York, 1937), p. 2.

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³⁸Ibid., p. 54.

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III. CHILDREN'S PROGRAMMING GROUPS

Challengers of the 1930's

Teacher groups had lamented the lack of educational content in commercial broadcasting, but new groups in the 1930's complained about what the programs contained. A primary focus of opposition to commercial broadcasting has come from groups concerned with children's programming. These groups began to take an interest in broadcasting in the early 1930's, as detective programs started to appear. Not surprisingly, wealthy parents were the initiators of the studies which began in the Depression era. The PTA of Fox Meadow School in Scarsdale, New York in 1933 made the first study of programs directed at children. The Child Study Association also sent out questionnaires in 1933, and Russell Williams did a survey for the newly established Society for the Improvement of Children's Programs in Chicago. As broadcasters turned their attention to children as listeners, so did parents and psychologists.

Women were the most upset by the violence directed at children on programs. In New York, programs for children had increased from three in 1928 to fifty-two in 1934. Alma Ernst, founder of the Radio Committee for

the PTA Scarsdale study found children having nightmares about the programs. Sidonie Gruenberg, founder of the National Council for Radio in Education of the Child Study Association, in May of 1933 got the Progressive Education Association and the American Library Association to join with her in protesting the types of programs directed at children. In 1934 she began to tie together in protests the relationship of children-snaring mail-in box top advertising to that particular type of program, the "Gun-barking melodramas that scare children."¹ The Association of University Women in 1933 passed resolutions condemning, "Unnatural over-stimulation and thrills" of such programs as "Skippy" and "Little Orphan Annie". Sponsors modified the shows.²

Magazines found the violence on children's radio programs to be a new source of controversy. An article in The Nation (April 5, 1933) supported the Scarsdale research. "Write to the sponsors of the program and tell them why you object," urged C.S. Littledale in Parents Magazine (May 1933).³ Forty-five years later new groups (and some of the original ones) would contend they were initiating a "wholly new" tactic of approaching sponsors to get them to drop advertising from violent television programs. Each

year magazines maintain they have discovered a new phenomenon—violent programs. And each year broadcasters will respond that they have heard the public and are eliminating violence. On July 5, 1933 the National Association of Broadcasters announced in the New York Times "A New Deal for Youth". Dramas of children's classics would be presented instead of violent detective stories.

Protests mounted throughout 1933. The Illinois PTA met with Judith Waller, NBC director for the Central Division and General Manager of WMAQ, Chicago to discuss objectionable programs, but no agreement was reached. The Elementary Education Department of Columbia University got parents to issue a statement denouncing violent programs.⁴ In March, 1933 the Literary Digest published, "Mothers Fighting the Radio Bogies." Arthur Mann was exploring the detrimental effect in Scribner's Magazine in his October, 1934 article, "Children's Crime Programs."

The themes of the titles of articles denouncing radio violence seemed to escalate along with the programs. "Terrorism on the Radio" was the title of a May, 1935 article by Thomas Henry in the NEA Journal. Newsweek (November 8, 1939) carried an article called "Radio Gore." Thomas Henry protested not only fictional

violence, but the sensational way radio covered the Lindbergh kidnapping. The coverage led to an American Bar Association ban in 1937 of broadcasting trials.

The 1933-1934 period saw the rise in dramatic bank robberies across the nation by John Dillinger, Pretty Boy Floyd, Baby Face Nelson and Bonnie Parker and Clyde Barrow. FBI agents, who killed Floyd, Nelson and Dillinger in 1934, and the police, were eager to promote law enforcement activities over radio.

NBC-Blue network's "Warden Lawes" of Sing Sing was the first crime show based on true stories in 1934. In 1935 CBS joined the trend with "Gang Busters". New York Police Commissioner Lewis Valentine made a speech on the opening program. The new Mutual network introduced "Famous Jury Trials" in 1936. Scheduling of violent shows increased during the next ten years.

J. Edgar Hoover was active in promoting "The FBI in Peace and War" on CBS in 1946, and the new ABC network then presented "This Is Your FBI".

In the fall of 1948, the last major radio season, and the first television season, radio networks presented forty crime programs, some of which would become television staples, such as "Danger", and "The FBI". Even "Policewoman" was a mid-forties radio drama in that pre-liberated era. From the initial,

classic "Sherlock Holmes" program on NBC-Red Network's broadcast from WJZ on January 18, 1931, and the fall of 1931's "Bulldog Drummond", "The Shadow", "Fu Manchu" and "Charlie Chan", which Standard Oil of New Jersey and Chiang Kai-Shek were promoting to contrast a positive Chinese image with that of the evil Fu Manchu, blossomed a vast array of radio heroes and villains.

Radio created new, violent heroes and villains for children. The Lone Ranger arrived in 1934, Mr. Keen in 1937, The Green Hornet in 1938, Jimmy Valentine in 1940, Dick Carter in 1944, along with Mutual's other Saturday afternoon crime programs for children, Mr. District Attorney and Sam Spade in 1946. There was an array of CBS programs called Crime Doctor, Crime Photographer, etc. in 1946, The Fatman in 1947, Philip Marlowe and Suspense on CBS in 1948, and the Falcon and the Lone Wolf on Mutual—these last three being transferred to television.⁵ Television was not the instigator of violent drama, nor did government agencies in the 1930's and 1940's see crime drama as harmful. It supposedly promoted the cause of law and order.

In 1935 Sidonie Gruenberg emphasized the positive aspects of the involvement of Children's Programming Groups. She felt that parents could show their concern by reviewing programs and making suggestions for change

to broadcasters, that would result in special standards being established for children:

The most hopeful development for the radio is suggested by what happened in the field of children's literature. This situation is the outcome of years of patient study on the part of groups of parents, in cooperation with various specialists. These groups had set themselves the task of examining all the books that were offered by the publishers with an eye to serving children's needs. In this process, they began by recording their likes and dislikes, but ended by developing judgments that the publishers are glad to respect.⁶

Unlike the publishers, broadcasters were unwilling to work with parent councils on content. Radio programs were devised and written by advertising agencies, and the networks were just beginning to acquire a total line of sponsored programs by the mid-1930's, so were not willing to challenge agency standards.

The Ohio State University and the Payne Fund of Cleveland were central to the initial research on the effects of violence on children. A series of twelve studies of motion pictures and youth had begun in 1929 under Payne Fund and Motion Picture Research Council sponsorship, and would continue through 1935, bringing in the new concerns of the challenging groups to broadcasting.

Dr. Edgar Dale was the central figure in the motion picture research. He grew up in North Dakota,

received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago, and having made some educational films, came to OSU in 1929 as assistant professor and an associate in the Bureau of Educational Research. He and the Bureau's director, W.W. Charters, would be most instrumental in showing the influence of modern media on youth. As part of the series, Dale published, How to Appreciate Motion Pictures in 1933, and Charters wrote, Motion Pictures and Youth. Dale began The News Letter for the B.E.R. in 1935, which tracked the progress of media and educators, using a grant from Mrs. Frances Payne Bolton.

During the period of the motion picture research, Dale found the crime content remained constant in films. He wrote, "It would be best to avoid them entirely as a form of unsupervised entertainment for children."⁷ Other researchers for the series showed a group of children three crime movies a week for twenty weeks, with the conclusion that that amount per week, "Is about as disturbing to sleep patterns as sitting up till midnight or...drinking of two cups of coffee in the evening."⁸

Some researchers in the series were interested in other values. W.S. Dysinger and Christian Nucknick attached a galvanometer and a pneumocardiograph to

elementary school children and showed them the erotic film, "The Feast of Ishtar." The emotional response of the children to the erotic scenes was zero, but it became quite high during scenes of danger.⁹ Another study on frequent theatre attendance by some children, determined that the "Movie children averaged lower deportment records, do on the average poorer work.... The movie group contained nearly twice as many retarded pupils and half as many accelerated pupils as the non-movie children." The 100 movie children attended five times a week, compared to 100 non-movie children, who generally went to two movies a month. Charters concluded, "There is a positive relationship between truancy and delinquency and frequent movie attendance."¹⁰

In view of the extent of the Dale-Charters' research, it would seem unnecessary that so much additional research on violence and children would be undertaken in the next forty years, particularly the hundreds of similar studies on television violence. But, as Dale recently explained, "the television industry would always raise the question of more recent data."¹¹ Dale does not advocate "repression of crime movies," but rather "supervision of parents." He continues to feel the same way "about certain crime shows on television" and believes their adverse effect "has been documented again and again with the material

on violence." Still active fifty years after he began the initial studies on violence and children, Dale was attempting to get "the ^House Committee on Communication [to release] a devastating report prepared on TV violence which...the Committee was sitting on." Dale revealed that his introductory studies in the field were instituted not only because of Mrs. Bolton's interest, but were "related to ideas of Jane Addams who was interested in the film."¹²

As nationally prominent figures entered the attack on media content, Franklin Roosevelt informed the NAB during its 1937 convention that he would accept a new Radio Code by NAB instead of increased regulation. Critics were angry at Roosevelt for his failure to take on the industry. At the Second National Conference on Educational Broadcasting held in December, 1937, liberal news commentator Raymond Gram Swing told the audience:

My criticism of the radio is that it doesn't present a balanced picture of a healthy civilization. Obviously that is either the result of broadcasting, or it is the fault of the civilization itself.¹³

Swing asked the educators if they would want the civilization they heard on radio to survive. President Roosevelt's new chairman of the FCC in 1937, Frank McWinch, did not.

The year 1938 brought a series of attacks on commercial broadcasting. McNinch required all commissioners to participate in broadcasting decisions, instead of dividing tasks among different areas of communication. He held up hundreds of license renewals and took away ten licenses from stations that had carried Eugene O'Neill's play, "Beyond the Horizon". In response to 400 letters received by the FCC about an Adam and Eve sketch on NBC's "The Charlie McCarthy Show", he had Mae West, a participant in the sketch, banned from radio in 1938. Her films had inspired The Legion of Decency's establishment in 1934, and strict enforcement of the Motion Picture Code that year.¹⁴

NBC President David Sarnoff responded to attacks on radio in a broadcast on April 28, 1938:

Our American system of broadcasting... is privately owned because private ownership is one of our national doctrines. It is privately supported, through commercial sponsorship of a portion of its program hours, and at no cost to the listener, because ours is a free economic system. No special laws had to be passed to bring these things about.¹⁵

On November 12 McNinch replied to the broadcast in his own broadcast, pointing out how radio programs harm children.

New groups were ready for special laws to govern broadcasting content in 1938. Administrators of the

Boy Scouts of America denounced the broadcasters. In November the Federal Council of Churches of Christ began what would become an extensive involvement with broadcast criticism with the publication of Broadcasting and the Public. It offered to assist citizen's groups to produce programs.

On November 13, the government initiated its study of monopoly in broadcasting, which resulted in partially dismantling NBC. By December, even CBS vice president Henry Bellows supported adoption of a strict NAB Code at the convention, that contained the same provisions as those which designated materials forbidden to be sent through the mails. Violence continued unabated on radio, as the issue of sex diverted attention from it, and seemingly produced a cooperative attitude by broadcasters. In effect they prohibited sex for the sake of salvaging violence.

The broadcasters got an idea of the type of programs for which they might lose their licenses at a meeting in 1938 with commissioners Eugene Sykes and George Payne, who listed programs, including those involving:

"Cliff-hanger kid shows"
 "Solicitation of funds"
 "Too many phonograph records"
 "Programs offending religious
 or racial groups"¹⁶

McNinch denounced the use of the word syphilis,

advertising contraceptives, and any educational information relating to sex. He told the NAB in 1938:

I am neither a purist nor a prude, though I have had some questions asked me indicating that I was both—and then some! Not at all! I am just an average American citizen....I have a family, a wife and five children.... I believe a typical American family. Some programs are not welcomed. They subtly and sometimes boldly suggest to young people things that I wonder if any of you think it proper to suggest to young minds in their plastic and formative stage.¹⁷

On January 24, 1939 President Roosevelt wrote a letter to Senator Burton Wheeler, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, suggesting, "New legislation is also needed to lay down clear congressional policies on the substantive side.... I very much hope that your committee" will do it.¹⁸ What broadcasters had most liked about the Communications Act was its indefinite, flexible nature. Wheeler opposed Roosevelt's suggestion to cut the FCC to three members. In September 1939 Roosevelt appointed James Fly, who proved to be the FCC's most active chairman for regulation of the industry. Fly pressed the monopoly investigation to the point of angering the networks into trying to get Congress to remove him. By June of 1940 New Hampshire Republican Senator Charles Tobey, who wanted to see the monopoly investigation widened, proposed a law forbidding anyone to "unduly influence

any public official," in order to counteract the networks' lobbying efforts of the Senate committee.¹⁹

Sparked by the two National Conferences on Educational Broadcasting, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the United Parents Association and the National Society of New England Women met in April 1939 in New York with advertisers of children's programs. The groups demanded that children's programs be reviewed by them. Both sponsors and networks began to seek ways of involving and of redirecting the women's groups and the government into broadcast areas other than the commercial foundation of the industry. The networks thought that by showing their dedication to other goals of women's groups, demands for reviewing network children's shows might be blunted. NBC-Blue Network offered to broadcast the U.S. Office of Education series, Gallery of American Women. CBS accepted the award of the Women's National Radio Committee for the WPA series, Americans All-Immigrants All. General Mills in 1941 gave \$4000 to the University of Iowa for research in children's programs.

After Roosevelt transferred the Federal Radio Education Committee to the Federal Security Agency in 1939, the NAB offered to fund a study by FRAC of children's programs. Influential in the research were

M.M. Beville, Jr., Research Manager of NBC and Sterling Fisher of CBS, as well as educators who did research. Selecting Chicago, Newark, St. Louis and Zanesville, Ohio as representative samples, researchers found Gang Busters was the favorite program of youth of all ages and both sexes in 1941. In Newark, 754 high school students were asked what they learned the most from of the various radio shows, and "30.5% mentioned Gang Busters." This industry-funded government study stated:

Apparently these programs give the children some satisfactions that are not being supplied by home or school....Teachers would do well to listen to..."Gang Buster" to find out what their pupils appreciate and think about.²⁰

Networks argued in 1940 that programs such as Quiz Kids, Dr. I.Q., and Information, Please were the right way to approach education by radio.²¹ In the face of the overall offensive begun by networks in 1939, educators and Chicago broadcasters attending the Third Annual Public School Broadcasting Conference could only conclude that in order to produce better programs themselves they should listen to network shows, such as NBC-Blue Network's "Da Vinci" drama and its discussion of flying, which included such things as airplane-engine sound effects.²²

Network programs contrasted considerably with the moral approach of the programs produced by broadcasting's critics. The Utah Congress of Parents and Teachers, in cooperation with the Utah State Department of Public Instruction, wrote its own series of children's programs, which were broadcast by the University of Utah Extension Division in 1939. Program titles and plots included:

"Bob Disobeys Orders—He Takes the Car Without Permission"

(The problem: it is two weeks before he is of legal age for obtaining a license)

"Jimmy Gives the Basement a Lick and a Promise"

(The problem of how to get the adolescent to assume his share of the responsibility for home tasks without constant nagging by adults)

"Lillian Doesn't Care How She Looks"

(Lillian becomes careless and untidy because her parents do not know how to help her)²³

The National Congress of Parents and Teachers was inspired to get the Blue Network to broadcast a series it devised called "Wings for the Martins". The Martins are PTA members, and titles and plots included:

"Children Are Persons"

(What shall the Martins do with Jimmy to get him interested in school so that he won't run away again)

"Let's Give Them Books"
(Books used during a measles'
quarantine)

"No Fun At Home"
(What fun there is in a family
chorus).²⁴

2. World War II and After

As war approached in 1941, networks sought the services of prominent individuals to promote America's involvement in the violence of war. Archibald MacLeish discussed air raids and other topics on "This Is War". There were live broadcasts from the war zones. The war's onset could not have the government denouncing violence on radio, so the critics of violent programs were stifled. The PTA indicated its concern about the broadcast of a bombing raid over Germany.²⁵

The networks had more accurate methods than listener diaries to show public support of their programming in 1941. Frank Stanton and Paul Lazarsfeld installed program analyzers for CBS.²⁶ Stanton had initiated research in the use of audiometers attached to sets in his work for a Ph.D. degree at OSU in 1935. Most listeners were eager to help him. He said, "I was refused in one per cent of the homes in Columbus and two and a half per cent in Dayton."²⁷ Stanton found that people surveyed by weekly memory methods had underestimated their use of radio by two hours and thirty-five minutes—valuable time when it came to networks establishing their advertising rates.²⁸ CBS hired Stanton as research Director. By 1946 he had become network president, and later was President of

CBS, Inc. and Vice Chairman of the Board.

Both CBS and NBC felt the criticism of the FCC when that body issued its monopoly study Report on Chain Broadcasting on May 2, 1941. The study, instituted by McNinch, with Commissioners Thad Brown, Paul Walker and Frederick Thompson on the research committee, was highly critical of the two networks, and their monopolistic contracts with stations. It praised Mutual's contracts with stations (Mutual had urged that the study be made) and stated: "This commission should exercise powers in the spirit of the Sherman Act."²⁹ It recommended giving stations the right to reject network programs and the right to receive advanced information on broadcasts. Networks could continue to own some stations, but could not establish additional clear channel 50,000 watt stations and NBC would have to sell its Red or Blue Network. The last ruling was accomplished by a provision in the report stating the FCC would not renew licenses of stations that had contracts with an organization owning more than one network.³⁰

In 1941 the NAB broke its tradition of having the FCC chairman speak at its convention. Fly responded by saying that radio's management, "reminds me of a dead mackerel in the moonlight which both

shines and stinks." Broadcasters pressured Congress to try to force Roosevelt to remove Fly. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in 1940 had reported, "Attempts by Congressmen to utilize their official positions as an excuse for special pleading are made with some degree of frequency."³¹ The committee lawyer for the House members' attack on Fly was a young man eager to protect the interests of broadcasters against government encroachment, John J. Sirica.

Although Fly left the FCC in 1944, broadcasters found themselves under attack from a new challenging group, the CIO, and its new division, the Political Action Committee, headed by Sidney Hillman. Labor organizing had generally been shunned or received hostile comments over stations. At WLW in Cincinnati, in May, 1935, Editorial Director Jack Ries issued a memorandum to announcers, "No reference to strikes, to include student strikes and school walk outs—is to be made on any news broadcast on this station."³²

CIO-PAC's programs were refused by stations and networks. The CIO attempted to obtain the new FM station licenses that were designated as educational frequencies. In 1943 the CIO challenged the license of WHAC, Columbus, Ohio for having refused CIO speakers

from purchasing time. Commissioner Ray Wakefield wrote a decision for the FCC, stating that any ban on the sale of time in discussion of controversial issues was not in the public interest.³³

Stations had proven to be so biased in their editorials that in 1941 in the *Mayflower* Decision involving WAAB, Boston, they led the FCC in banning editorials altogether. On June 1, 1949 the FCC restored the right to editorialize, with the provision of the Fairness Doctrine added, to provide time for opposing views. That was expanded further in a decision of July 25, 1963, that said a station must provide a transcript to anyone it criticizes and free time for a reply. The Supreme Court's *Red Lion* decision of 1969 forced WGBH to give time to reply to an individual under personal attack by the station's editorials.

In 1946 the FCC issued a Blue Book of what it considered to be rules and suggestions of good practice. Service in the interest of the community was to be a prerequisite for license renewal. This would be expanded upon, so that by February 17, 1961 for license renewal the FCC required a statement on the amount of broadcast time spent on area needs and interest, community expression, service descriptions for minorities in the area, controversial issues covered, educational programs carried, types of programs and the nature of

prior review of programs by management before broadcast.³⁴

The FCC's revival of free-swinging news and editorials on stations in 1949 produced such abuses in the next few years as those of G.A. Richards, President of KMPG-Los Angeles, WGAN-Cleveland and WJW-Detroit. Richards would telephone his newsmen and order them to read from news stories only the parts that he liked. He required news stories to be read about Henry Wallace always to associate Wallace with Communists. Richards died before the FCC could reach a decision on complaints against him.³⁵ Broadcasts of the one-sided hearing against Alger Hiss by the House Un-American Activities Committee promoted the reputation of a young congressman, Richard Nixon. Congress provided further imbalance in broadcasts by agreeing to the NAB's request to enact legislation in 1959 excluding newscasts from the equal time provisions of the Fairness Doctrine.

The late 1950's produced scandals in the television industry and the FCC, and saw the rise of the Civil Rights movement. These factors led Kennedy to appoint Newton Minow as FCC Chairman to promote social consciousness, which reactivated children's advocacy groups. The year 1959 included a strong blow against the images of the networks. The highest rated television program of the period was Twenty-One, an NBC quiz

program. CBS had The \$64,000 Question and The \$64,000 Challenge. A study done in 1955 had shown that 73% of 885 randomly selected women in Columbus, Ohio closely watched The \$64,000 Question during that first season of the show. Eighty-four percent of women watching could identify the sponsor, Revlon.³⁶ The show was controlled by McCann-Erikson Advertising Agency. Agencies had carried their influence from radio into television. In 1959 contestants on Twenty-One and other programs told New York City prosecutors that the programs were rigged and the answers given in advance. When network executives proclaimed innocence and ignorance, the FCC urged the networks to take control of programs. Robert Montgomery revealed the perjured testimony which the executives made to the FCC:

The rigging of the shows was widely known and discussed in every studio in town while they were on. It would have been an innocent broadcaster indeed who did not know in those days that quiz shows were crooked.³⁷

Montgomery's own production influence in broadcasting began to wane with his dissents from network policy.

The 1955 Columbus study of 885 women showed that 55% paid close attention to Matinee Theatre on NBC, with 52% identifying the sponsors. This daily program often showed dramas of classics and other serious themes. When NBC decided to replace it with quiz

shows, host John Conte asked listeners to help keep it on the air on a non-sponsored basis, sending in contributions to pay for the network's time charges. Listeners sent in enough money to pay for the broadcasts for the next year, but NBC considered that that approach to sponsorship would institute a bad precedent. The program was cancelled, and John Conte was barred from television.

The Columbus study showed who controlled viewing in households. In the evenings, wives continued to dominate program selection, as they obviously did during the day. The program selected in households was made on this basis: At 7 P.M.: Wife's choice, 37%; husband's, 17%; child's 20%. At 8:30 P.M.: Wife's choice, 45%; husband's, 14%; child's, 5%. At 9 P.M.: Wife's choice, 49%; husband's, 10%; child's, 4%. Networks began to gear all programs primarily to women aged 18 to 49, since they controlled viewing and spendable income.³⁸

In 1960 Fred Silverman, after researching all of ABC's television programs of the 1950's for his Master's degree in Communications at Ohio State University, concluded that ABC would not remain an also-ran network if they were to change their children-oriented cowboy programs to ones of a light comedy situation type, but of a less-sophisticated

nature than CBS comedies. By the late 1960's he had become chief programmer for CBS, and fifteen years after his thesis, put his ideas into effect as ABC's vice president for programming. The new schedule would put ABC far ahead of the other networks in ratings. In June, 1978, Silverman would become president of NBC. In order to counteract his achievement at ABC of attracting children and youth to light comedy in the 8 P.M. viewing period called the Family Hour—he introduced tales of violence into the Family Hour in February, 1979: Supertrain, a princess stalked by assassins; The Eagle Has Landed film, Churchill stalked by Nazis. CBS capitalized on Producer Norman Lear's lawsuit, which brought a ruling in November 1976 that the Family Hour concept violated the 1st Amendment, and introduced hard-core violence for children into the Family Hour: The White Shadow, an attempted rape of a high school counselor by a student; Spider-Man, college students used by sinister businessman; White Lightning film, a convict who sought vengeance on killers and trapped bootleggers in the South. The pressure for high ratings forced networks to return to violence, as indicated by these programs from a one-week period.³⁹

The rating system was under attack by the

government in 1960. Oren Harris' Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight reported, "The rating services do not use quota sampling methods."⁴⁰ Thus, preferences of minority groups could be wholly excluded. The Civil Rights Movement, which developed in the 1950's, was beginning to make its considerations felt by government.

The Reverend Everett Parker threw the weight of the United Church of Christ to the assistance of the Reverend Robert Smith and Aaron Henry in their challenge to the license renewal of WLBT-TV, Jackson, Mississippi in 1962, for the station's exclusion of blacks. Although the FCC renewed the license, the Supreme Court subsequently ordered the FCC to consider community representation in stations as a factor in determining license renewals.⁴¹

The House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight in 1959 investigated radio's practice of "payola", the acceptance of bribes by disc jockeys from record companies seeking to get their records played. Major record companies were owned by the television networks. Inadvertently, it was discovered that FCC Chairman John Dierfer had accepted free trips from broadcaster George Storer. Dierfer resigned in March, 1960. FCC Commissioner Richard Mack had died in an asylum in 1958 after his trial for accepting a bribe from lawyer Thurman Whiteside to vote favorably for a Miami firm's license

request. Whiteside committee suicide. Political Scientist Grant McConnell claimed the problem of influence resulted from the vagueness of authority in the Communications Act;

The assertion of unlimited discretion in the disposal of public resources according to the personal tastes and power needs of the administrators. Here was a trackless wilderness in which men in office unlearned in reading the signs upon the land itself and ungifted with the sense of moral direction wandered before the pressures of all the winds that blew.⁴²

The numerous scandals of broadcasting in the late 1950's created a desire on the part of networks to establish a favorable public image. The success of quiz shows in the mid-1950's had led to the demise of documentaries. CBS had cancelled See It Now in 1958. Host Edward R. Murrow resigned from CBS in February, 1961 after 27 years there, doubting the network's sincerity of restoring quality journalism. Dr. Frank Stanton announced the idea of CBS Reports at the OSU Radio Institute in 1959. In May, 1961 the new documentary host for CBS, Howard K. Smith, did a program on CBS Reports called "Who Speaks for Birmingham", about the violent tactics of Sheriff 'Bull' Connor in suppressing black rights. Smith used a quotation by Edmund Burke that CBS executives claimed would offend white people in Birmingham. They ordered

the quotation removed over Smith's protests, and fired Smith.⁴³

The campaign of John F. Kennedy in 1960 placed civil rights on the level of national dialogue. No radio station since the 1949 restoration of editorial rights had chosen to use them to endorse a presidential candidate. WJLA, New York endorsed Kennedy on October 27, 1960.⁴⁴ Although the televised debates between Kennedy and Nixon are often credited with influencing the vote, the first Gallup Poll after the nominations had Kennedy equal to Nixon, just as the actual results were. Kennedy actually lead slightly in that poll, but George Gallup threw out the sample of blacks for an error. These Gallup findings were acquired before the debates.⁴⁵

Kennedy appointed lawyer Newton Minow as FCC chairman. Minow attempted to restore an adversary role of the FCC to broadcasters by proclaiming at the 1961 NAB convention that television was a "vast wasteland." He established the FCC Office of Complaints and Compliance for public input about station practices and broadcasts. William Ray would head the office until 1978.

People interested in children's programming saw Minow's stance as a new opening for their input. In Boston the Foundation for Character Education was established in 1962 to examine network programs for children. Sponsors who appeared before the FCC at

hearings in 1961 went overboard in their willingness to correct past abuses. A spokesman for Procter & Gamble said the company reviews scripts in advance of programs it sponsors, and has strict guidelines:

There will be no material that might give offense either directly, or by inference, to any organized minority group, lodge, or other organizations, institutions, residents of any state or section of the country, or a commercial organization of any sort....political organizations, fraternal organizations, college and school groups, labor groups, industrial businesses and professional organizations, religious orders, civil clubs, memorial and patriotic societies, philanthropic and reform societies, athletic organizations, women's groups, etc. which are in good standing.⁴⁶

Congress was not enthusiastic about Minow's support for minority groups. John Bell Williams of Mississippi, the opponent of Rev. Smith in the race that led Smith to ask the FCC to allow him as a black to buy time on WLBT-TV, complained about FCC involvement. Williams was second in seniority on the communication committee, and his friend, Chairman Harris of Arkansas, denounced Minow for trying to make WLBT, Jackson sell Smith time to speak. He said the FCC should not get involved in social issues.⁴⁷

Research on parents' contribution to their children's viewing habits was disappointing in 1963. A study by Peter Clarke found that 40% of parents

sampled had watched television programs because their teenage children had recommended them. As for teachers' influence, a study found that the better a child has been educated by the school in his verbal skills, the more susceptible the child is to television commercials' slogans.⁴⁸ As with studies on the effects of television violence, these results will undoubtedly be challenged.

The efforts of broadcasting to involve children in the process of consumerism as a means to satisfaction would become the primary focus of many children's programming groups in their criticism of networks. The Public Affairs Committee, with Sidonie Gruenberg, Telford Taylor, Erik Barnouw and Oscar Handlin directing it in 1965 published a pamphlet for parents called "Your Child and Money". It warned of the bad effects on children of the "buy, buy, buy" syndrome of television.⁴⁹ So concerned were the networks in keeping the sponsorship-image of television in the public mind, that when the Public Television Act was suggested in 1967 to create and fund PBS, congressional lobbyists for the networks—Alfred Beckman of ABC, Scoop Russell and Peter Kenney of NBC, and Theodore Koop of CBS—tried to get the congressional bill defeated. They got an amendment introduced that would have prohibited PBS from carrying any entertainment programs.⁵⁰

In 1967 ITT attempted to purchase ABC. A rash of new broadcasting critics joined the fight to prevent that from happening. The ACLU entered the attack. In January, 1968 the FCC forbid the merger. But many organisations saw the need to curtail unrestricted network power. The AFL-CIO published "How To Control Air Pollution". Thomas Moeving formed the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting in 1968. It would attract former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson to be its chairman. Twenty people took control of WNDT-TV, New York while the station was on the air in 1968, to demand that the station have more responsive programming for all groups in the community. A citizen's group in Boston challenged the license of WHDH-TV for unresponsive programming to all community groups. The FCC gave the license to the challengers. That decision led the NAB to get senators to introduce bill S.2004 in 1969. The bill was intended to prohibit anyone from filing a competing application for a license. Only if a station license was already lost could someone else then apply for it. The concern of the Congress for preventing competitors to existing licenses was not simply a desire to help business constituents. In 1965 a report showed that nine senators and fourteen congressmen had direct or family-relative ownership interest in broadcasting

stations, as had the President of the United States that year.⁵¹

In January, 1968 Action for Children's Television (ACT) was formed in response to violence in the society and on television. It would become a major thorn in the side of networks and of congressmen in their desire to protect the broadcasters from ACT's petitions to the FCC and FTC. Four women organized ACT in Newton Center, Massachusetts. Evelyn Parson was a reporter for the Manchester Guardian. Peggy Charren had been an organizer of charity Book Fairs in Chicago. Joann Spire was an art designer. Judith Chalfen worked in Boston.⁵²

In the fall of 1969 ACT members appeared before Senator Pastore's committee, which was monitoring the progress of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence's study of media. Its report was issued in November. ACT fit the mood of the time, and began to attract prominent supporters. Hyman Goldin, executive secretary of the Carnegie Commission, advised on grants. Albert Aramer of FCC gave legal advice on how to challenge local broadcasters. George Heineman, a creator of Ding-Dong School in 1952 advised on children's shows. Scott Ward Harr of the National

Institute of Mental Health advised on the effects of advertising on children.⁵³

Children's groups and government revived the spirit of the late 1930's in the year 1970, with both launching attacks on commercial broadcasting. In April, 1970 ACT submitted a petition to the FCC asking it to, "Require stations to devote a minimum of 14 hours weekly to children's programming."⁵⁴ It asked that performers on children's programs be prohibited from mentioning the products advertised. The FCC had just issued its Prime Time Access Rule, which was to go into effect September 1, 1971. Networks would be deprived of their first half-hour of evening programming in the Top 50 markets. They would be limited to three hours, 8-11 P.M. (EST). Local stations could use the extra time to develop their own community service or children's programs. Syndicated quiz show producers, who urged the ruling on the basis of antitrust concepts, would eventually benefit most. Newsmen like Fred Friendly of CBS, who hoped to see an hour of network news, opposed the ruling, which would end that possibility. The motion picture industry and Ronald Reagan opposed it, as did FCC Chairman Dean Burch. Networks were required to divest financial interests in independent programs by September of 1970. That ruling reversed the 1960 demand of the FCC

that networks take over programs from advertising agencies. Hollywood would become the major producer for television.⁵⁵

ACT's participation in the White House Conference on Children, and ACT's calling of a National Symposium for October, 1970 led to new challenges to commercial broadcasting.⁵⁶ ACT began an analysis of local television programs for children, publishing its own books to expose them. The program-type, which appeared on many stations as an educationally-promoted program for very young children, was Romper Room. F. Earle Barcus analyzed the program on WENT, Bangor, Maine for ACT during a week in March, 1971. It began with the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer. Counting toy play, the commercial content of the program was 9 to 47%. The sponsor was a toy company. The program hostess, "Urges children at home to join in the play, which is sometimes not possible without having the toy."⁵⁷ The hostess would give the name of publishers of the children's stories she read. Barcus contended, "It is therefore difficult not to conclude, on the basis of data of this study, that a major purpose of the program is to promote its toy products."⁵⁸

Romper Room began to decline as a program around the country due to this and other attacks. The FCC, however, denied Robert Scott's petition for equal time to that used on Romper Room, KTVU, San Francisco for prayer.

He wished to speak to children about atheism. William B. Ray's ruling was complex. Ray added that a station cannot bar atheism shows if it carries religious programs; however, equal time did not apply, since an "exclusion feature" allows the licensee to determine what subjects are controversial, and therefore entitled to equal time.⁵⁹ The success of Sesame Street on PBS also led to the decline of Romper Room, although WMAA, Jackson, Mississippi's educational station, banned Sesame Street for showing integration of black and white children.⁶⁰

The NAB in 1970 issued Guidelines of Toy Commercials, to be added to the NAB Code. A 1972 insert to the Code stated:

Effective January 1, 1973 the amount of non-program matter time as well as the number of program interruptions are to be cut back in weekend programs designed primarily for children. Commercials reduced from 16 to 12 minutes.⁶¹

Program hosts were prohibited from endorsing products.

The revision in the NAB Code was brought about by an ACT petition to the FCC in January, 1971. It asked that all commercials be banned from children's programs. FCC economist Alan Pearce recommended the FCC rule against the petition, in his study issued in July, 1972, stating that the networks would lose \$56-million in income. The FCC issued its decision on October 31, 1974.

It held that the advertising was vital to the networks.⁶²

ACT had begun to publish its own journal in late 1970. Articles had such titles as, "Violence on Children's TV is Hazardous to Health." Senator Pastore held another set of hearings in May, 1972. It led Parade to seek a national consensus by publishing a questionnaire in its magazine.⁶³ Of the 25,000 replies filled out and sent in by parents, F. Earle Barcus chose 1453 at random to analyse for ACT. Nearly 94% were filled out by mothers; 6% by fathers. Two-thirds of the families replying had 2-6 year old children, who watched television three or more hours a day. This was up considerably from a 1954 study, in which a Yale group found children's programs to contain the most violence on television.⁶⁴ In 1967 a high water mark in television violence was considered to have been reached, according to George Gerbner, dean of The Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania. Then ACT was organized. In March, 1977 he testified at new hearings before the House Subcommittee on Communications that network violence had reached a new peak. John Schneider of CBS contended that he counted a decrease. He and other presidents, Frederick Pierce of ABC and Robert Howard of NBC, were challenged by Representative Henry Waxman of California, "It's an insult for you to come here and

tell us you're doing something."⁶⁵ A year later the PTA held regional hearings on violence and sex on television, and its national executive William Young began approaching firms such as Sears, which agreed not to sponsor programs that contained these elements.⁶⁶

Sponsors were the key to children's television. In 1954 regional clinics had been held for promotion directors to share information about their stations' children's programs. Barbara Haddox, WBNS-TV, Columbus, Ohio stated:

Our cowboy, the Wrangler Dick Lubel, has introduced various new Western film shows through his appearance at grocery and drug outlets....Here a blending of behavior patterns and love of the wild and woolly west is combined in a unique manner.⁶⁷

In just a few years of operation, local stations across the country, just like local schools, seemed to have acquired a striking similarity in format and content. Franklin Sisson, WOOD-TV, Grand Rapids related his station's children's programming at the clinic:

We are fortunate in having in our town Dick Tillstrom, brother of Burr Tillstrom, and a guy we feel is equally adept in manipulating hand puppets. We are not doing a Kukla, Fran and Ollie with him, however. We teamed him up with our cowboy for a fifteen minute show twice a week, put the two of them on adjoining ranches and called them "Westward Ho Ho".⁶⁸

It was not until May 2, 1977 that the Ohio NEA became concerned with the effects of drug advertising on children. It had a bill introduced in the legislature to ban over-the-counter drug commercials on television during children's viewing hours. The inspiration came from ACT, which in April had asked the FTC to ban all commercials on children's programs as taking unfair advantage of children, and causing dental health problems from the sugared cereals. New FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk said it was "inherently unfair."⁶⁹ Advertising agencies sued in U.S. District Court, and got Pertschuk disqualified from participating in FTC regional hearings, which began in January, 1979, and from voting on a final decision due to his stated bias. Congressmen in 1978 had threatened to eliminate the FTC's budget if it went ahead with the hearings. However, the Communications chairman in the House, Rep. Lionel Van Deerlin, had begun to rewrite the Communications Act, and held hearings in 1979 on numerous changes of his own, including a spectrum fee on commercial networks.

The Carnegie Commission, which got PBS established and funded in 1967, had a spectrum fee in mind, also. In its second report, issued January 30, 1979, it

proposed that this fee be used as a new source of funding of public television stations throughout the country, to be issued through a new establishment, the Public Telecommunications Trust, which would replace the Corporation for Public Broadcasting—a congressionally-funded body that has purchased British Broadcasting Corporation programs for PBS, in disregard of PBS's desire to produce locally. Van Deerlin is, "Not entirely sold that another layer [of structure] is going to meet the problems." Hearings on this proposal for major change in broadcasting, that would also greatly increase funding of PBS children's programming, will begin in 1979.⁷⁰

In 1978 Action for Children's Television became a household phrase. On March 18, "ACT members in more than 100 cities will....[begin] distribution of red and white 'TV reminder tags' to be hung directly from the family set."⁷¹ They were given out in supermarkets and libraries, and they contained advice of how parents could aid children's viewing habits. Support for the plan came from John Ryor, president of the National Education Association, who urged the need for parents' "supervision of their children's viewing."

From April 30 to May 2 ACT held its 10th Anniversary Symposium for its 11,000 members at the Kennedy

Center in Washington D.C. It used the meeting to extend its concern upward in age level, with the theme "TV Role Models and Young Adolescents". Sears, Roebuck and the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation funded the symposium, which attracted speakers David Halberstam and FCC Chairman Charles Ferris, Marie Thomas and Ossie Davis; and panelists Nicholas Johnson, Stan Freberg, Ellen Goodman, and executives of ABC, 20th Century Fox, Warner's and IBM.⁷²

The week following the symposium, the FCC began accepting comments on an ACT petition before it to eliminate commercials on children's programs. ACT received support from new groups seeking to extend the petition's implications beyond what ACT had envisioned. The Washington Association for Television and Children (WATCH) asked the FCC to write a new definition of children's programs that will "reflect the reality of children's TV watching."⁷³ The idea that WATCH was approaching was defined in a petition to the FCC in February by another new group, the Council on Children's Media and Merchandising (CCMM). CCMM asked the FCC to change its definition of children's programming "from shows produced for children to shows viewed by significant numbers of children."⁷⁴ A ruling by the FTC or FCC against commercials on

children's television would then eliminate virtually all commercials on television.

CCMh was founded and funded by real estate investor Robert Choate, until he received a Ford Foundation grant for it. He was distressed on hearing of advertising agency research centers that used children to test reaction to toys before they were marketed. Choate came to feel that the centers and commercials made "children into secret agents of big business in the home. . . I felt somebody had to do something about it."⁷⁵

Michael Pertschuk held many similar views to Choate's. He was counsel for the Senate Commerce Committee for thirteen years till his appointment as FTC Chairman on April 21, 1977. Pertschuk contends, "There is no such thing as 'children's television'. We know that the national TV audience is made up of millions of children at virtually any hour. So our concern is...at advertising that children watch."⁷⁶ On February 7, 1977 the FTC had ordered Hudson Pharmaceuticals to stop advertising 'Spider-man' vitamins, since the cartoon character was a come-on to children. The FTC said, "Advertising of multiple vitamin supplements to children is in itself an unfair practice."⁷⁷ Pertschuk was desirous, when he became chairman, to use the ACT petition on television

to extend this ruling to all advertising directed at children.

At the FTC's San Francisco hearing on ACT's petition to ban all commercials directed at pre-school children and all sugar-related commercials at pre-teen children, Henry Snyder of the Consumers Union spoke in support on January 15, 1979. He pointed out that children under seven have no consumer knowledge. Wartella, Ward and Wackman's study supported that position. They questioned 600 kindergarten through sixth grade students:

When asked, "Do commercials always tell the truth?" 50 per cent of the kindergarteners said they do. Sixth graders were skeptical. But among the third graders only 12 per cent thought ads were always truthful.... What the parents tell kindergarten-age children about a product seen on TV has the most influence. ("I drink milk because my mommy says it will make me strong.")⁷⁸

The researchers received a National Science Foundation grant to continue their work, for developing methods of teaching young children how to understand television commercials.

In what proved to be the most effective attack on commercial television to try to change the content affecting children, the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting did two studies. In the Summer of 1976 and the Spring of 1977 NCCB rated every series

according to the number of violent incidents in shows. It listed in order, the most violent shows, and sponsors of shows with the highest violence rating. It made available to the public the addresses of sponsors, and urged people to write them to drop sponsorship of violent programs. The three most violent programs in the first report did not make the Fall Schedule. Five of the top 6 most violent, and 19 of the top 26 in the second report were canceled within a year of the second's publication.⁷⁹

NCCB's studies inspired community studies throughout the country. Mrs. Florence Melton of Columbus funded OSU Department of Sociology's study in the fall of 1976, in which students rated violent acts on programs. A national awareness of the detrimental effects of commercial television on children was in progress.⁸⁰

III. Notes

¹Harrison Summers, Radio Censorship (New York, 1939), p. 37.

²Ibid., p. 26.

³Azriel Eisenberg, Children and Radio Programs (New York, 1936), p. 19.

⁴Charlene Aext, "Thriller" Drama of American Radio Networks, unpublished M.A. thesis (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1949), p. 35.

⁵Ibid., pp. 11, 15-16.

⁶Sidonie Gruenberg, Radio and Children (New York, 1935), p. 20.

⁷Edgar Dale, How to Appreciate Motion Pictures (New York, 1933), p. 125.

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⁹In ibid., p. 26.

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IV. MORALITY GROUPS

Violence

Many groups concerned with moral issues involving media had simple origins. The Lansing Committee for Children's Television began in 1972 when Mrs. Amanda Wallner of Lansing, Michigan wrote ~~to~~ a Letter-to-the-Editor column of the local newspaper. Readers agreed with her complaint about the quality of after-school programs from children. Some critics met with her to form LCCT, which employed researchers at Michigan State University to conduct a community survey. Other critics formed Citizens United for Better Broadcasting to hold conferences with the local television management. The groups used the survey, which indicated dissatisfaction, to ask the FCC to deny license renewal. WJIM agreed to the groups' requests for community-produced and oriented programs.¹

Local and national citizens' groups have mainly focused on the issue of violence on television. Dr. George Gerbner's "Violence Profile" is a tool used for the criticism developed at the University of Pennsylvania in 1967. It involves counting every incident on a program that results in damage, even for

comedy effect, such as cartoon violence that leaves cartoon characters uninjured. The most evident effect of the survey was to stir networks to establish their own "Violence Profiles". CBS began in 1973. CBS excludes "Humorous Violence" and "Accidents" from its count. Dr. Gerbner questioned network studies, asking how "accidents" could occur accidentally in scripts that plan them as acts of violence.²

Further criticism of CBS developed in 1978, when it appeared that the network suppressed one of its own studies on violence. William Belson of the London School of Economics was employed to do a six-year study of 1565 teenage boys in London. When it was about to be published as Television Violence and the Adolescent Boy, CBS Vice President Dr. David Blank dismissed the study as "nothing of consequence." It had been commissioned by Dr. Joseph Klapper, CBS Director of Social Research with a \$290,000 grant. The boys were paid £2 each to relate episodes they recalled from programs aired during the 1960's. A BBC panel had rated sixty-eight series by types of violence in episodes. The boys were divided into groups of low and high violence watchers, and questioned about their behavior during six-months of continued watching of these programs. Most high-violence watchers performed violent acts during

that time. Twelve percent of the high-violence watchers committed ten acts of cruel violence or damage to property during the period. Family-size, father's education and home locations differed among those boys. The boys were interested in crime and western violence, rather than cartoon or comedy slapstick, though they professed not to approve of violence. Belson concluded that "the degree to which boys engage in violence of a serious kind" is promoted subconsciously by long-term viewing of realistic violence.³

Reaction to research on the effects of televised violence on children differs by nation. Monica Sims, director of children's programs for the BBC dismissed the Belson study. She said if researchers are to blame teenage acts of violence on television, "they must also give credit to television for inspiring children to behave thoughtfully."⁴ The French response to studies of violence was to make a dot appear on the screen before violent scenes as a warning to parents. In 1975 FCC Chairman Richard Wiley announced his support of the French system.⁵

After many sessions with network executives in the spring of 1975, Wiley got the new 40-year old president of CBS, Arthur Taylor, to devise a plan called "The Family Viewing Hour," which all networks

accepted. No programs of violence or mature themes were to be shown during the initial hour of evening programming, beginning in the fall, 1975. Taylor was personally concerned, as he had young children. He had no previous broadcasting experience, and CBS had just lost its chief programmer, Fred Silverman, to ABC. Silverman used the idea to develop shows with trendy themes for young adolescents, making ABC the dominant network, while CBS lost ratings, revenue and prestige. In October, 1976, a year after the introduction of The Family Viewing Hour, the CBS owner William Paley fired Arthur Taylor for the effect that plan had on the network.⁶ Taylor attempted to develop a network of his own the following October, but prominent broadcasting personalities declined to be associated with him.⁷

When federal judge Warren Ferguson in November, 1976 accepted Norman Lear's contention that The Family Viewing Hour was unconstitutional restraint of speech, the networks did not further pursue a legal defense of it. Technically, Ferguson ruled that Wiley had coerced the networks, in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act that restrains federal agencies. The facts belied Ferguson's statement for his ruling. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting Chairman Nicholas Johnson, a former FCC member and long-time opponent of violence, filed a friend of the court

brief against The Family Viewing Hour, because it had been devised in secret by networks and Wiley "to give the appearance that something was being done to get the heat off them" from citizens groups. Action for Children's Television joined NCCB in the filing of a brief against the network's Family Viewing Hour, agreeing with Johnson's contention that it was devised "behind closed doors and the public, or anybody with an interest in the matter, had no opportunity to be heard."⁸ It appeared that challenging groups were more concerned with public input to media than the issues themselves.

If networks' plans, in consultation with FCC, for reducing violence on television were considered suspect by citizens groups, the question remained as to who should determine programming. "We are the public," said Grace Baisinger, national director of the PTA, in announcing that the PTA would devise the means for determining program standards. In August, 1977, with a new television season approaching that had no legal support to sustain The Family Viewing Hour, Grace Baisinger added the television set to the family unit, proclaiming that "TV has become just another member of the family."⁹ A year-long series of regional workshops was planned to accumulate public testimony

on violence. State PTA's were urged to involve members in the project. At the inauguration of Ohio PTA President Lois Overbeck in October, Ohio State University President Harold Enarson told the members they could improve their children's college entrance examination scores "simply by trading televisions for books."¹⁰ Ohio newspapers were inundated with letters supporting Enarson and the PTA, after publication of the speech and related articles.¹¹

In February, 1978 the PTA announced which programs its national membership found most offensive for violence. Three of the top six programs listed, presented women in professional, aggressive roles, Charlie's Angels, Police Woman and The Bionic Woman, as did the program rated third poorest in quality—Maude. One basis for inclusion on the PTA's "Poor Quality" list was "stereotyping of women." To serve as a guide to networks and parents, a list of shows that members found to make a "positive contribution to the quality of life in America" was published. Five of those top eight programs contained women as housewives and mothers of large families: Little House on the Prairie (3 children), Eight is Enough (8 children), The Fitzpatricks (4 children), The Waltons and Mulligan's Stew (7 children). Donny & Marie of the large Osmond Family was among the top

eight shows. The other two shows of the top 8 had lonely, aggressive male heroes, Rafferty and Grizzly Adams.¹²

The American Medical Association in the summer of 1977 conducted a poll of its membership. Half of the doctors listed television violence as a cause of children being brought for treatment. Doctors cited injuries from imitating actions seen, heightened aggression, "epileptic seizures and nightmares." Doctors recommended that viewers complain to sponsors and refuse to buy their products.¹³

The AMA added its weight to the actions of other groups, which had initiated a dialog with sponsors to urge them to drop violent programs. Although major sponsors began to inform networks of decisions to withdraw from various programs, alternative choices did not prove the influence of citizens groups. General Mills chose to sponsor "21 Hours at Munich", in which Israeli athletes are shot and blown up, because General Mills' media director said, "I think the theme is strongly antiviolence."¹⁴ He rejected the alternative docudrama "Nightmare in Badham County", about murder and violence done to women prisoners on a Southern prison farm. Southerners found the latter program offensive, as opposed to favorable critical

response to the former, leaving the suspicion that sales losses or gains, rather than antipathy to violence, still determined choices.

The statements by doctors that television violence caused a rash of effects on children led to new attempts to develop legal concepts of televised violence. In September, 1977 Miami attorney Ellis Rubin raised the defense that his 14-year old client was intoxicated from having watched violent programs prior to murdering an elderly neighbor. Judge Paul Baker insisted that expert witnesses either link "TV violence to a homicide or any other crime," or not discuss it.¹⁵ None could, and the jury convicted the boy of premeditated murder.

In December, 1977 San Francisco attorney Marvin Lewis attempted to link the viewing of "Born Innocent", an ABC movie in 1974, by four girls whom he claimed imitated the rape scene of a girl by other girls to the actual bottle-rape of an 8-year old girl by the four on a beach. The U.S. Supreme Court allowed the girl's mother to sue ABC, but the trial judge insisted Lewis prove ABC had intended to inspire violence, which he could not.¹⁶

In Birmingham a 14-year old boy shot his younger brother dead the morning after watching "Dirty Harry" on television. In New York City a 4-year old boy, who was trying to fly after seeing the movie "Superman",

leaped from his 7th floor apartment window. After watching "Roots" in February, 1977, Jesse Coulter drove from Detroit to a Cincinnati home for unwed mothers, where he had given up rights to his son in 1957. He held eight hostages with his shotgun throughout the day, demanding to see his son.¹⁷

Since even quality programs of social intent such as "Roots" were being linked to violent motivations, television producers became very anxious about censorship. In late August, 1977 David Wolper, producer of "Roots", and four producers of action series held a public conference to explain their aim of using the NAB to establish meetings between them and groups like the PTA and AFA. They claimed to be ready to have continual open dialogs with citizens groups. David Gerber, producer of Police Woman, said, "We feel we have lost the violence battle. We feel the networks have thrown in the towel because of their own fears of FCC licensing authority, congressional investigations, pressure groups and pressure from advertising."¹⁸

At the meeting Frank Price, president of television productions for Universal Studios, offered to educate opposing groups on the history of what he considered their misguided concepts:

The dime novels of the 1890s were attacked because children were reading about Western outlaws, and so they would all turn into them. You go back to Euripides, who was driven out of Athens for corrupting the youth with his plays. Somehow various well-meaning groups have a fear that the depiction of one thing or another is going to corrupt society.¹⁹

Wolper offered his theory by recalling that "in Roots I kept saying the slaves have to be hit with whips, because that's really what happened. And the more violence there is...people will feel the horror of what it was."²⁰

2. Sex

The fall, 1977 television season showed ABC had eliminated its most-criticized violent programs—The Bionic Woman, Most Wanted and The Streets of San Francisco. CBS President Robert Wussler said, "Because of the public pressure and because of the things various social critics have been saying to us, we felt this was the time to cut back."²¹ ABC Television president Robert Howard said, "We're saying, 'Enough of that (violence).... We're going to try new avenues.'"²²

The new avenue seemed to be sex. ABC was the only network in September, 1977 to seize upon the idea, however, by introducing Soap, Operation Petticoat, The Love Boat, Redd Foxx, the first full season of Three's Company and the second year of Charlie's Angels. With ABC ratings dominant as a result of the success of The Family Viewing Hour programs, Fred Silverman was able to utilize a theory he developed in his 1960 Master's thesis at Ohio State University that ABC could not experiment and risk what audience they had, until:

Both audiences and billings are on a par with the 'big two'. Then the researcher believes that new programming concepts, forms, and personalities should be introduced to the schedule—more 'special' entertainment and public affairs programming, more drama, more comedy, more variety.²³

Silverman's new "forms" seemed to be Soap and The Love

Boat.

The turning to sexual themes brought forth a wave of new media morality groups. Before Soap was aired, the Los Angeles Catholic archdiocese newspaper editorialized, "Soap is a desecration of morality and of the Catholic religion."²⁴ After ABC made alterations in the scripts, the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights said it was still unacceptable. Several weeks before the show aired, the Southern Baptist Convention passed a resolution urging that ABC eliminate the program. The Convention's Christian Life Commission mailed 50,000 kits called "Help for Television Viewing" to its pastors and lay leaders. The kits contained moral questions viewers should ask of themselves after having viewed any program.²⁵

Southern Baptists formed a coalition with other groups to pressure seventeen stations to exclude Soap before it had appeared. The U.S. Catholic Conference got 47 stations to broadcast Soap one hour later than the network aired it. The Rev. William Fore, communications director of the National Council of Churches, urged members to organize anti-Soap action groups in all cities. The Rev. Everett Parker, director of the United Church of Christ's media actions, called Soap "a deliberate effort to break down any resistance to whatever the industry wants to put into prime time."²⁶

A 16-hour moral training course called "Television Awareness Training" that contained film clips of televised sex and violence was prepared for church and civic groups by the American Lutheran Church, the Church of the Brethren and the United Methodist Church for fall, 1977 meetings. All these actions came before viewers had seen Soap.

The Rev. Donald Wildmon, a United Methodist Church minister in Southaven, Mississippi, was ready for the new sex programming in advance. He gave up his ministry in the summer, 1977, and organized the National Federation of Decency. Through a newsletter he gathered 10,000 subscribers during the fall television season. His aim was to use his subscribers to pressure sponsors to drop sexy programs. He claimed, "Advertisers listen because they don't want to be hit where it hurts: in the pocket book."²⁷

By the fall of 1978 NFD was picketing Sears' headquarters and 35 Sears stores around the nation. Sears dropped sponsorship of Three's Company and Charlie's Angels in September, 1978. Although Sears denied NFD was the cause of the withdrawal, the company had developed an Episode Caution List for all programs it sponsored. Wiley Brooks of Sears said, "We withdrew our participation in 'Three's Company' primarily because the show deals with one basic joke—a continual sexual

innuendo."²⁸ In November, 1978 Wildmon held a rally at ABC headquarters to initiate a month-long boycott of the network for its showing of "excessive and gratuitous sex."²⁹

In November, 1977 Fred Silverman told the Hollywood Radio and Television Society his view of the new morality groups protesting ABC's new schedule:

Implicit in much of their criticism is the notion that television's primary role is to lift the public to some higher level of aesthetic appreciation. We're certainly not going to apologize for what we're presenting to the American public. I believe television is providing quality across the board. From Eight is Enough to The Love Boat, there's something for everyone.³⁰

The networks were shocked in December, 1977 when the A.C. Nielsen rating company reported 200,000 less households were watching evening programming that fall than had viewed the previous season.³¹ Could it be the increasing criticism of the programs by morality groups, or the fact that less violence attracted less viewers?

Sexual themes did not produce a decline in ABC's ratings. When Newsweek printed its February 20, 1978 critical expose "Sex and TV," with a cover photograph of Suzanne Somers' mostly-bare breasts, the cover did for Three's Company what Time magazine's November 22, 1976 cover photograph of Charlie's Angels with Farrah Fawcett-Majors' bare nipple did the previous season

for that show—made it the number one rated program. The other networks began to develop sex themes. NBC's chief programmer Paul Klein said, "If ABC is doing kiddie porn, NBC will give the audience adult porn." Producer Martin Manulis was fired by the network from "James at 15" because of low ratings. He claimed that in order to increase ratings "Paul Klein of NBC dictated some storylines, including James losing his virginity."³² CBS developed for its fall, 1978 schedule three new programs primarily devoted to showing beautiful young women in very little clothing—Flying High, The American Girls and WAMP in Cincinnati.

The spring, 1978 brought a heartening legal victory to the morality groups in a radio issue. The issue involved indecent language. On the afternoon of October 30, 1973 WBAI, New York, a noncommercial station of the community-oriented Pacifica Foundation, broadcast an album skit by George Carlin called "Seven Dirty Words You Won't Hear on Radio." Carlin used the words "shit," "fuck," "cocksucker," "motherfucker" and others.³³ A father complained to the FCC that his young son was with him in his automobile when the album was aired. The FCC was unaware that the man had been an official of Morality in Media, an organization established by Jesuit Father Morton Hill, who was

focusing his attention on WBAI and other liberal media. On February 14, 1975 the FCC held WBAI in violation of the Communications Act by broadcasting "indecent" words. A Court of Appeals overturned the ruling on the grounds that the Communications Act denied the FCC the right of censorship, and because FCC decisions had always had the agency set itself outside the realm of ruling on television network programs. In 1977 Father Hill set up the National Obscenity Law Center to aid U.S. Attorneys in prosecutions. The FCC appealed the WBAI ruling to the Supreme Court in 1977. In 1978 the court ruled that there are "indecent" words, which may not be broadcast during hours that children might hear them.

3. TV-Addiction

Although ABC led networks in programming of school sports, their popularity brought new charges of mindlessness in media. The N.C.A.A. negotiated a \$118-million contract with ABC for 1978 through 1981, providing at least 116 team appearances per season, as compared to 82 football appearances in the past. After the contract signing, attacks on the promotion of school sports began. Dr. Ralph Nelson of the Mayo Clinic said team sports are both demoralizing to students who are excluded, and they deemphasize good physical fitness for all students, sacrificing healthful exercise for the sake of winning:

It might be helpful if people rotated positions on teams and made sure everyone played, but this may mean downplaying the idea of winning for the sake of physical fitness.³⁴

Seeing the evidence that even schools were misusing television to promote their team products rather than knowledge, Marie Winn contended that television in any form is detrimental and addictive to children. All television creates uncritical, passive recipients, Marie Winn held in The Plug-In Drug: Television, Children and the Family (New York, 1977). She cited the decline in verbal scores on the College Entrance examinations as an example of the decline in comprehension of the language, as children become mere

receptive tools of media.

The College Board was concerned with the decline in S.A.T. scores, and reported the conclusions of an advisory panel in the fall, 1977. The educators noted the sharpest drop in scores occurred between 1972 and 1975, and continued to decline. They stated that 16-year olds had watched 15,000 hours of television, and that "an unquestionably considerable amount of time at the set used to go into homework and into reading and writing."³⁵

Information on the negligible effects of learning from television was mounting. A four-year study by psychologist Hilde Himmelweit and colleagues at the Nuffield Foundation for the BBC concluded:

Children's Information Programs... do not improve the viewers' knowledge relative to that of the controls...much of what is offered on children's television is already known to children of the age group.... Many of these programs fail to break new ground, and their level is often too low for even the younger children in our sample.³⁶

The study was conducted with children who had television sets in their homes for the first time, so no previous knowledge had been gained from television.

Nat Rutstein agreed with arguments that reported passive addiction of television on children, but held there was negative learning. He had university students

observe and interview pre-school television viewers in their homes. "Love—American Style" was a popular choice of viewers. A sample of the reports Rutstein received described a 5-year old boy:

He giggled and curled up in the chair. He seemed to accept the plots without question. When I asked him if he understood the meaning of divorce and wife swapping, he answered that of course he did, that he wasn't a boy anymore.³⁷

Cultural theorists supported Rutstein's observations, but saw the effects as the inevitable result of mass culture. Mass culture was the obvious outcome of "political democracy and popular education" in the 1800's. Gilbert Seldes wrote that mass passivity exists when media define the acceptable ideas, and mass culture creates "the mood of consent." Dwight MacDonald directed his thoughts to the apparent quick social maturing of children, noting that it was not the awareness of society it seemed to be. He explained:

The homogenizing effects of kitsch also blurs age lines....TV programs such as 'The Lone Ranger' and 'Captain Video' are by no means enjoyed only by children. On the other hand, children have access to such grown-up media as the movies, radio and TV....This merging of the child and grown-up audience means: (1) infantile regression of the latter, who, unable to cope with the strains and complexities of modern life, escape via Kitsch (which in turn, confirms and enhances their infantilism);

(2) 'overstimulation' of the former, who grow up too fast. Or, as Max Horkheimer well puts it: 'Development has ceased to exist. The child is grown up as soon as he can walk, and the grown-up in principle, always remains the same.'³⁸

Marshall McLuhan stood at the opposite pole of other cultural critics. His books were published by a subsidiary of RCA, and widely promoted in the 1960's on NBC television specials. He held that schools were like 18th century factories, and that "learning, the educational process, has long been associated only with the glum."³⁹ Television did not allow for fragmented learning or fragmented lives. Minorities entered everyone's home through television, though they could be kept out of schools and neighborhoods through zoning. If the contest is between schools and television, McLuhan advocated that the schools should go, since the two forces asked children to live in separate worlds, creating split personalities and disruptive children. He considered television to be the best educator:

The "child" is an invention of the seventeenth century; he did not exist in, say, Shakespeare's day. He had, up until that time, been merged in the adult world.... Today's television child is attuned to up-to-the-minute "adult" news— inflation, rioting, war, taxes, crime, bathing beauties—and is bewildered when he enters the nineteenth-century environment

that still characterizes the educational establishment, where information is scarce but ordered and structured by fragmented, classified patterns, subjects, and schedules.⁴⁰

Children were asked their reactions to school and television by the Foundation For Child Development. Twenty-five percent of the 2,200 children questioned were frightened by television crime and western programs. Those who watched four hours a day, which was termed addiction, were more generally fearful, according to the study's director Nicholas Zill, psychologist with Temple University's Institute for Survey Research. The school was also a fearful place. The children were ages 7 through 10. Two-thirds worried about tests, and felt ashamed whenever they made mistakes in class. Between two-thirds and three-fourths said their mothers urged them to be "one of the best students in the class."⁴¹

Newsweek magazine's 1977 feature story "What TV Does To Kids" solicited children's reactions. The comments from elementary school children confirmed McLuhan's contrast of the excitement television presented to children versus other outlets. Selected comments were:

"I'd rather watch TV than play outside because it's boring outside. They always have the same rides, like swings and things."

"It bugs me when someone is watching

with me. If your friend is bored, you have to go out or make conversation."

"Sometimes when I watch an exciting show, I don't blink my eyes once."

"Television is perfect to tune out the rest of the world."⁴²

Most of the children interviewed were viewers from the end of school to the 11 o'clock news. The value of The Family Viewing Hour was called into question by the results of the A.C. Nielsen Co. survey, which "found that 10.5 million youngsters under the age of 12 were still hooked to the tube after 9 p.m."⁴³

The Ladies Home Journal survey of 1977 confirmed the late viewing of elementary school children. Charlie's Angels was then shown at 10 p.m., but of 1000 children questioned, schoolgirls replied they would most like to be Farrah Fawcett-Majors: "She received twice as many votes as runner-up Marie Osmond and almost four times as many as third-place Lindsay Wagner."⁴⁴ Less preferred choices Osmond, Wagner, Tennille and Cher had television programs in The Family Viewing Hour. Boys' choice of who they wished to be seemed to confirm the early maturing effects of television. Lee Majors was favored, for reasons as expressed by one 11-year old boy, "I'd sure like to come home to Farrah Fawcett-Majors every night."⁴⁵

Dwight Macdonald's theory of kitsch and the merging of the "matured" child and "childish" adult was evident in the ratings of late evening Charlie's Angels, which not only had a large aged 7 to 12 audience, but was the seventh-favored program among college graduates. The show's producer Rick Husky explained:

What we're talking about is a B exploitation movie, not even a B. We understood that we needed to exploit the sexuality of the three girls, and that's an obvious reason for its success.⁴⁶

Executive producer Leonara Goldberg explained, "We love to get them wet, because they look so good in clinging clothes."⁴⁷

Thirty hours a week was the average television viewing time of girls in The Ladies Home Journal survey. Although interviewers in some fourth-grade classrooms received unanimous reactions from the 9-year old girls of their desire to be Farrah Fawcett-Majors, the reactions received to questions about school were filled with anxiety and shame. The three most stated comments among total girls interviewed were: "I would like to do better in school...try to be nicer...be a good girl."⁴⁸

During February, 1977 the Columbus, Ohio public schools were closed due to fuel cutbacks. WBNS-TV (CBS)

provided four hours of daily school programming taught by Columbus teachers. The "School Without Schools" project involved a weekly session with students to test them on televised material. "Most quiz scores were good," said Buckeye Junior High School principal Larry Metz.⁴⁹ Teachers wore costumes for literature presentations, presented film montages for history, recruited teenagers to dress as the Fonz and as other television characters for composition courses. The children viewing it reacted as they did to other television programs, with comments such as that of a third grade boy, "It's less boring than real school."⁵⁰

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V. PUBLIC BROADCASTERS

Public Choice

Having television stations in every city that would teach children basic education and positive values was the goal of media groups organized in the early 1950's. The first station devoted to educational programs was WOI-TV. Iowa State College received a commercial license for WOI in 1950. It appeared that television would follow the same sequence as radio, with educators and businessmen competing for commercial licenses. Television experimentation began as did radio developments at the colleges. The first experimental educational station was W9AA at the University of Iowa in 1932. Channel 1 was used by Kansas State College until the FCC eliminated that frequency at the end of the 1940's.

Fearing the same fate would meet college television stations as met the radio stations, Wilbur Schramm invited 30 educational broadcasters to Monticello, Illinois in the summer, 1949 to a University of Illinois and Rockefeller Foundation seminar to make plans for television. In the fall the FCC rejected the idea of educational television channels.

The National Association of Educational Broadcasters, with headquarters at the University of Illinois, attempted in 1950 to get the U.S. Office of Education to intervene with FCC commissioners. Only FCC Commissioner Frieda Hennock seemed willing to hold hearings on educational television. The NAEB began a fund-raising drive for more research and legal expenses. Mrs. Clara Logan of the Southern California Association for Better Radio and Television brought her research (the earliest study of violence on commercial television) to FCC Chairman Wayne Coy. Coy was unimpressed. He felt educators would not provide better broadcasting for children than commercial stations, since only 27 FM educational stations existed in 1948. In August, 1948 Coy attempted to eliminate the unused reserved FM educational frequencies.

Clara Logan discussed the study "What Our Children See" at the Institute for Education by Radio at the Ohio State University in 1950. The first phase of the study conducted during a week of November, 1949 in Los Angeles recorded 91 murders on the 6 to 9 p.m. television programs. The study said, "There were crooked judges, crooked sheriffs, crooked juries." In response to that depiction of the law in TV films, Los Angeles station managers, with prompting from

SCABAT letters, screened programs for faults. The second phase of the study, conducted during a week in spring, 1950, found only 18 murders, and reported that content had changed to "stupid sheriffs, crooked bank officials, false arrest by bungling officers."¹

When SCABAT approached producers of offending television programs, the producers said the sponsors controlled the air. Clara Logan urged members of her Association and the Institute for Education by Radio to develop a tactic for violent shows that would later (1977) be utilized against sponsors of sexual-content shows. Mrs. Logan, however, advocated rewarding good sponsors, rather than attacking offending ones:

Support the sponsors of good programs, let the president of the company hear from us, buy the products when we can, when we go to the store tell the manager that we are buying certain products because of the television program.²

Frieda Hennock spoke at the OSU Institute on May 4, 1950. She rejected efforts by citizens groups urging her to support a plan to delay license renewals of offending stations. Hennock declared that "by withholding a few licenses we would not insure better broadcasting." She felt a public choice was needed; that educational stations were the answer. She hoped educators would be more alert than they had been about

radio licensing, saying, "The healthiest thing for American broadcasting would be for educators and editors to be right in the thick of it."³

The contrast between the desired positive atmosphere for children advocated by children's welfare groups, and commercial television's violent programming continued to increase. The Bicentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950, urged: "For every child—a fair chance for a healthy personality."⁴ The NAAB's survey of 564 hours of television programming on New York City stations during a week in early 1951 found that stations showed 57 hours of crime programs. Most university professors and school officials were slow in proposing solutions. The factor which provided opportunity for organizing educators was the license freeze. After licensing 109 television stations, the FCC on September 30, 1948 stopped issuing licenses until April 14, 1952 in order to determine how to rearrange proposed station locations to best blanket the country.

The principal organizer of educators in support of educational television frequencies was I. Keith Tyler, Ohio State University professor who led the fight for FM educational frequencies. On October 16, 1950 he named and organized the Joint Committee on Educational Television. It united the diverse activities

of the NAAB, NEA, American Council on Education, Association of State Universities, Association of Land Grant Colleges, Association for Education by Radio and Television and the Council of Chief State School Officers. Tyler urged the leaders of these groups to activate their membership in support of educational frequencies. Frieda Hennock suggested to Tyler he get former FCC counsel Telford Taylor to present the JCET proposals to the commission. Tyler had to inform Taylor that "we won't guarantee to pay you a nickle."⁵ Taylor agreed to serve as counsel.

Seeking funds for JCET's effort was Tyler's initial problem. From Belmont Parley of NEA and from ACE he obtained \$3500. The Association of Atomic Scientists, "whose conscience had bothered them about Hiroshima," gave Tyler its mailing list, from which he was able to solicit \$42,000.⁶ Tyler predicted educators would get 150 stations, one-fifth of the licenses.

At the 1950 FCC hearings Taylor requested 168 VHF frequencies in the largest cities be reserved for education. JCET brought forth 71 witnesses in support of the proposal. Each witness was careful to state the stations should be noncommercial, so as not to arouse the networks. CBS opposed the idea, though it was willing to let some UHF channels be used for education. More

than just educators spoke for JCET's position. George Meany, Adlai Stevenson and an AEA spokesman supported it. The FCC third notice, March, 1951 recognized the principle of reserved educational frequencies, suggesting 209 stations might be possible. In April the Ford Foundation established the Fund for Adult Education to back the efforts of JCET with grants. A petition by the Federal Bar Association stating that all seekers of licenses must compete on an equal basis with no reserved frequencies was rejected by the FCC in June.

Wayne Coy left the FCC in early 1952. President Harry Truman appointed Commissioner Paul Walker to the chairmanship. Walker was one of Franklin Roosevelt's original appointees to the FCC in 1934. After having worked his way through the University of Chicago, Walker became a high school teacher and principal. Having obtained a law degree, he served as public service commissioner in Oklahoma until his appointment to the FCC. Tyler decided to concentrate on obtaining Walker's full support of JCET's plan. As JCET knew it had former New York Democratic lawyer Frieda Hennock's support, it decided the best tactic was to ignore her, as her strong views on everything were not popular with other commissioners, and JCET "didn't want to antagonize others."⁷ Walker led the commission to promulgate the

FCC Sixth Report and Order in April, 1952. It not only gave one-sixth of VHF stations to educators, but also 172 UHF stations, for a total of 258. Fifteen more were later added.

Walker warned educators to get their station on the air in one year (an impossible task), or the reserved channels might be withdrawn. Hennock reiterated the plea, stating that "the reservations for education cannot be held forever."⁸ Walker's main motive for advocating educational television seemed to be the expected shortage of classroom teachers for the 1950's to meet the needs of the post-war baby boom. In a speech to the Annual Education Conference in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on October 2, 1952, Walker explained:

American educators need all the help they can get....300,000 classrooms are needed immediately in our elementary and high schools. And because of the increase in population, another 300,000 will be needed by 1958.⁹

Walker left the FCC in May, 1953. On May 12 Charles Tobey, New Hampshire Republican and new chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, assured JOET that it need not take seriously Walker's warning to use the channels within one year or lose them. The first noncommercial station, KUHT-Houston, went on the air May 25. On October 26 Commissioner Edward Webster threatened that the FCC will not allow the reserved channels to

be "inefficiently used indefinitely."¹⁰ No threats were made concerning the commercial channels, even though commercial UHF stations were failing for lack of advertising and surrendering licenses. Many commercial UHF channels would remain unused after three decades of the allocations.

In October, 1952 the Fund for Adult Education established the National Citizens Committee for Educational Television. It established the Educational Television and Radio Center at NAB headquarters in Urbana to prepare films for educational television. The Ford Foundation offered \$8.5-million per year to the stations. As Ford Foundation and its FAE subsidiary became dominant in funding, its control of the national organs of educational television increased. The first program produced under a Ford grant was a promotion of free enterprise economy called "People Under Communism." In 1955 Ford moved the film production center to Ann Arbor, Michigan. In 1956 Ford took over complete funding of JCET. When New York City acquired an educational channel in 1961, Ford moved the production center to New York to become National Educational Television (NET).

The blossoming of individual educational stations stemmed from a meeting in the St. Louis City Hall on

January 7, 1952. Raymond Wittcott, President of the Adult Education Council of St. Louis had urged Mayor Joseph Darst to apply for a station for the city. Darst established the Mayor's Committee on Educational Television.¹¹ JCEA was represented at the January meeting, along with representatives of 28 cities. In addition to planning for licenses, they discussed the cost of establishing a network among them.¹²

The St. Louis station eventually was funded by business and public contributions, and established under an independent citizens' committee headed by a life insurance company director. St. Louis University gave the land for the tower to KETC-St. Louis, which went on the air September 24, 1954, with community-service programs, in-service instructional programs for public schools and college credit courses—standard fare of early ETV stations. Second grade spelling and other courses offered only to schools in narrowcasts formed KETC's daytime programming by 1956, after the city schools received a \$95,000 grant from FAE the previous year.¹³ In April, 1955 the Ohio legislature passed a law allowing school boards to donate funds to their regional educational station.¹⁴ As Charles Siepman viewed the mounting teacher shortage in the 1950's in his book for Ford's Fund for the Advancement of Education, television seemed the answer to the school

crisis.

One problem that plagued many educational stations was their relegation to UHF. A study of Lansing, Michigan homes in January, 1955 found that 84.8% had television sets. Smaller surrounding towns had like percentages. Only 20% of all television sets in the study had UHF.¹⁵ Educators got congressional support for a bill introduced July 10, 1962 requiring that all sets manufactured be All-Channel. The FCC supported the bill in 1963, the year it was approved.

A second problem facing educational stations was obtaining an inexpensive method to create a network. Filmed programs were sent about by mail, as AT&T line charges cost too much. In the 1950's the FCC placed in docket proposal 14744 to tie five stations together by cable. The FCC also suggested microwave relays, but it acted on none of its suggestions. Congress provided the first federal funds to educational stations in PL 87-447 on May 1, 1962, but the \$1.5-million issued the following May permitted that only 15% of the money could be used for connecting any two stations.

An experiment to expand the range of educational stations was proposed by the Midwest Council in Airborne Television Instruction, which organized in 1960 with personnel from ETV stations in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

OSU President Novice Fawcett served as the Council president. Ford Foundation provided a \$4.5-million grant. School superintendents throughout the six states were asked to participate.¹⁶

The Stratovision Project of NCATL was centered at Prudue University from 1961 to 1967. A DC-6B had an antenna attached to its belly to transmit taped programs to special antennas given to schools. UHF channels 72 and 76 were used for the morning broadcasts of instructional programs for children. Schools could tape the programs on video recorders sent by the Council if they wished to present them at other times. The plane flew a ten mile figure-8 above northeastern Indiana at 32,000 feet and broadcast on line of sight. Since weather was no factor at that height, the broadcasts' "reliability was greater than the schools itself," some of which would close for snow, according to project programmer I. Keith Tyler. When Ford Foundation lost interest in it, "it finally became too expensive to keep the plane up."¹⁷

The Ford Foundation in 1966 began to devote funds for a satellite project for NET. It was not until 1978 that TV stations began receiving PBS programs via WESTAR I and II, and 1979 that campus and school radio stations received National Public Radio via satellite.¹⁸

Four programs plus stereo can be broadcast from PBS to ETV stations for their selection. The three unused programs can be taped for later use. NPA satellite transmission is similar for its 217 member stations, but it constructed 16 terminals for the stations to send local programs back to NPA for later use, or to be transmitted on a regional basis only.

2. A Fourth Network

The Ford foundation idea to fund a satellite for ETV broadcasts apparently was a motivation for James Killian of M.I.T. to get the Carnegie Corp. of New York to establish the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television in 1965. Killian, a former director of AT&T, voiced opposition to the use of a satellite rather than telephone lines to connect ETV stations.¹⁹ Killian became chairman of the Carnegie Commission, and vice chairman of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which the report of the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television in 1967 recommended that the Congress create and publicly fund, as an overseer of a proposed public broadcasting service network for educational stations.

The germ of the idea sprung from a conference of the NAAB and the U.S. Office of Education in December, 1964. Instead of instructional programs, which stations could continue at will, "public television includes all that is not at the moment appropriate or available for support by advertising."²⁰ The Carnegie Commission proposed to change the content, funding and structure of educational television. Like the BBC, CPB became financed by government, but was independent of federal control and politics. The Carnegie Commission's distinguished panel chosen from education and industry influenced congressional

enactment. Commission members included James B. Conant, Lee DuBridge of C.I.T., business leaders Joseph McConnell of Reynolds Metals, Edward Land, Oveta Culp Hobby and labor leader Leonard Woodcock. It proposed as CPB chairman Frank Pace, board chairman of General Dynamics, and as CPB directors Millian, John D. Rockefeller III, Mrs. Hobby, and board members from Teleprompter and RCA. Congress enacted the Public Broadcasting Act in 1967 with little debate and with general support from all quarters. Ford Foundation continued to fund stations and programs until Congress granted CPB \$60-million for four years in 1969. Ford disbanded its Public Broadcast Laboratory that year, and subsequently all activities in the field.

CPB in 1969 began taking over programs developed by the Ford Foundation at WNET. As a researcher at WNET-New York in 1966, Joan Ganz Cooney developed the idea of Children's Television Workshop to use television as a Head Start on learning for all 3 to 5 year old children. In 1967 Commissioner of Education Harold Howe provided funds along with OEO funds to develop the first series, Sesame Street. WNET completed its evolution in 1968. When CPB emerged full-funded in 1969 it had waiting for it those programs from WNET which would establish CPB's reputation, Sesame Street and Misterogers Neighborhood.²¹

Public affairs programs became a point of controversy in 1970. PBS had established programs from staff ideas with funds from parent CPB. Commentator Sandy Vanocur was hired from NBC. Commercial network commentators were under attack by the Nixon administration after they questioned statements in a Nixon speech broadcast November 3, 1969. New FCC Chairman Dean Burch, former chairman of Goldwater for President in 1964, demanded transcripts of commentators' statements. In early 1970 Vice President Spiro Agnew attacked commentators in a Des Moines speech. In a subsequent speech on May 22 in Houston he attacked Washington Post editorials, which had criticized President Nixon. The Washington Post owned WPLG-TV, Miami and WJAT, Jacksonville. Bebe Rebozo's business partner, W. Sloan McCrea, challenged the license renewal of WPLG in 1970. Other Nixon associates sought the license of WJAT. William Porter reported the White House tapes showed "the president himself was directly involved."²²

On November 25 Charles Colson wrote a memo to H. R. Maldeman recounting his meetings with CBS and ABC executives in the pursuit of commentators' transcripts and reporters' notes. Of CBS Vice Chairman Frank Stanton Colson wrote, "Stanton for all his bluster is the most insecure of all....almost obsequious."²³ In 1971 Agnew attacked Vanocur. Clay Whitehead, director

of the new White House Office on Telecommunications Policy demanded that PBS drop public affairs programming. On June 30, 1972 Nixon vetoed CPB's next two year's funds of \$65-million. He later granted \$35-million. CPB President John Macy resigned in August. Nixon appointed Henry Loomis of the U.S. Information Agency to the post.

The reduction in CPB funds in 1972 affected all educational television and radio stations, since they were depending for much of their support on CPB. A reduced 5-year CPB grant for the news staff of WOSU radio forced the station to suspend some consumer affairs programming by 1977. Stations had to rely more on traditional methods of fund raising. KPTC-TV in 1975 offered free movie tickets, which promoted a theatre's film, in return for donations, technically violating the principle of noncommercial television.

Although television executives had complained in a White House meeting of June 22, 1972 that PBS was bent on a policy to compete with commercial networks, it was not their complaints but Nixon's dislike of PBS programs that seemed the basis for his veto of CPB funds 8 days later. "The Great American Dream Machine," with segments ridiculing business, junk foods, FBI surveillance of the public, and PBS

documentaries, such as "The Banks and the Poor," "Castro's Cuba," and "Who Invited Us?" on U.S. foreign intervention were unpopular at the White House. "The Great American Dream Machine" was cancelled by CBS. Loomis eliminated "Black Journal" and "Bill Moyers' Journal," claiming lack of funds.²⁴

President Richard Nixon had no sympathy for commercial networks. In May, 1970 Dean Burch promulgated an FCC ruling forbidding network ownership of any new programs. NBC owned 68% of its prime time programs, CBS 73% and ABC 86%. In September, 1971 Nixon supported FCC proposals to limit network reruns to 13 weeks. On April 14, 1972 the Justice Department instituted an antitrust suit against the networks to force them to surrender financial interests in their programs.²⁵ In June, the Supreme Court, with new Nixon appointees, upheld the government's right to obtain reporters' notes. As Nixon's presidency neared its end, a 5-year funding bill for CBS was approved in July, 1974. The antitrust suit was dismissed in October.

Conservative political media groups were inspired by the Nixon actions. Accuracy in Media formed, and in September, 1972 attacked an NBC documentary, which showed corporate managers being fired before their 65th birthday to prevent them from receiving pensions.²⁶

The American Farm Bureau Federation denounced a PBS documentary, "A Day Without Sunshine," January, 1976 on the plight of migrant workers in Florida.²⁷

In June, 1977 the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting was established. The expectation was that it would request greater funding with the issuance of its report in 1979. ETV stations affected by the Nixon funding-squeeze had become increasingly aware of their desire and need for large CPB grants. They became cautious programmers. On September 30, 1977 PBS had a "Black perspective on the news" program rejected by most affiliates which carried the series. The series, developed by black producers at WHYY-Philadelphia, found its program on Nazi and ku klux Klan leaders had been banned after protests to stations by the American Jewish Congress. Philadelphia mothers threatened to stop supporting Sesame Street after the Black Perspective program aired there.²⁸ Other Jewish organizations were inspired to focus on media after the success of the television protest. In March, 1978 the Jewish Defense League attempted to prevent "The Palestinians," a film produced by Vanessa Redgrave, from being considered for a documentary Academy Award.

Henry Loomis, Nixon's appointee to CPB, lost influence to Lawrence Grossman, PBS president, in

October, 1977. President Carter submitted a new 5-year funding bill for CPB on October 7, for the period 1979-1984. CPB would receive \$1-billion, with most of it designated for national rather than local station production. PBS would have sole production authority, without interference from parent CPB.

Some congressmen saw the bill's implications as a prelude to the Orwell social concept of "1984". The bill did have a feature to promote individual expression. Noncommercial stations, an increasing number of which were beginning to be founded as individually-owned community-minded stations, would be given the right to editorialize.²⁹ Many stations might use that to promote Ralph Nader-type investigations.

The new Carnegie Commission, which started its analysis of CPB in 1977, was chaired by William McGill, president of Columbia University. Its goals included studying better funding methods, the means to meet needs of broader and of minority audiences, and how to determine "what constitutes 'success' in a publicly supported system of radio and television."³⁰ Were \$1-billion of public funds to be spent on public television for five years, the last question was important to answer, with surveys showing just 1%

of Americans' television viewing time devoted to public television.

William McGill was aware that citizens media groups were setting their focus on public television as a new area of attack. He admitted at the start of Carnegie II hearings that CPB was under "pluralistic pressures" from many diverse groups. He felt public television should meet the expectations of pressure groups without losing sight of national goals. He seemed to suggest that PBS should have an overall goal similar to the commercial networks, but excluding any lowbrow programs or commercials, when he stated that "the real question here is 'What is the public?'"³¹ When the Commission issued its conclusions on January 30, 1979, it raised Carter's request by another \$200-million, but asked Congress to obtain that additional amount not from public funds but from a spectrum fee imposed upon commercial broadcasters. It would be collected by a new Public Television Communications Trust, which was to manage all public broadcasting funds.

V. Notes

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VI. THE YOUNG AND THE RESTLESS

Congress—The People's Voice

Congressional reaction to television programming has often been negative, since committee investigations of media are generally inspired by mounting complaints from citizens groups. Senator Estes Kefauver's crime investigation of 1951 turned attention to the effects of television on juvenile delinquency, when Democrats regained congressional control in 1954. Regaining committee chairmanship, Kefauver continued investigations through 1957 with the Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency of the Judiciary Committee. He was inspired by the NAAB's surveys of violence on commercial television (1951-1953), which had been designed to get the FCC to grant educational frequencies. The NAAB study of children's variety programs in New York and New Haven during the week of May 15, 1952 refuted claims by television executives that the media taught law and order through violent programming: "In New York only 9 percent of the violent acts and threats in such programs were in the context."¹

Senator Kefauver was not a denunciator of television. In 1951 he wanted to allow the networks

to sell commercial sponsorship of the committee hearings.² The report of his subcommittee investigations (1954-1955) was tentative in regard to television's effects on juvenile delinquency. It said television might be harmful. Experts in psychology and sociology from Columbia University differed in their testimony before the committee. Psychologist Ralph Banay said crime programs affect disturbed adolescents.³ Paul Lazarfeld felt that almost nothing was known of the effects of television on children.⁴ Kefauver noted in 1957 that as a result of his report, television "is already making efforts to improve its programs so that a more beneficial diet will be presented to the child."⁵ He saw no need for government regulation in the area of programming.

A series of attacks on television violence in 1959 and 1960 led to Senator Thomas Dodd establishing more subcommittee hearings on television and juvenile delinquency in 1961. In March, 1959 Margaret Mead argued in "How TV Violence Affects Your Child," that violence was fun only when it is "palpably fiction, fantasy and unreal....The violence on the screen is no longer an escape, but a prescription for murder.... The practice of the networks in representing crime or in depicting fiction as if it were real life" is the source of televised violence being transferred into

behavior.⁶

Dr. Frank Stanton countered Dr. Mead's concern in his keynote address to the 29th annual OSU Institute for Education by Radio:

Television reflects the values of the society it serves; it cannot create them....OSS proposes to begin this fall a continuing field study of television and the American people to see if we cannot bring more factual knowledge to our programming.⁷

Stanton felt the more a program appeared to be factual, the better it was.

In July, 1960 the Conference of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency recommended the establishment of a National Commission on Television. The Council reviewed the Summary Report of the Conference on the Impact of Motion Pictures and Television on Youth, which held that observed tendencies toward violence in young children were reinforced by media violence.⁸

The first Dodd Committee hearings were held a year after the NCCD conference. It appeared that a strong report might result from the hearings. Dodd, however, appointed the son of a Metromedia owner to the staff. The staff report was never published.

The report of Dodd's 1963-1964 hearings was published. It stated that television was "becoming a school for violence."⁹ The strong stand of the report led to citizens establishing the National Association

for Better Radio and Television in 1964.

In 1969 Ladd urged the National Institute of Mental Health to conduct studies on violence. R.H. Liebert and R.A. Baron of NIMH had 5 to 9 year old children watch "The Untouchables". The children displayed more aggression in random play after watching the show than did children who watched nonviolent programs. Steven Chaffee and Jack McLeod found the family, not the programs, mattered. permissive families had less aggressive children, who chose to watch less violence than children of families who protected them but let them use the television set as their main outlet on life.

Violence throughout the nation in the late 1960's led to the establishment of four national commissions. Black rioting in Watts, 1966, Newark and Detroit, 1967, led to the establishment of the Kerner Commission. Arrested looters were interviewed. Only 8% of the Detroit rioters had learned of the riot from television, and 17% heard of its occurrence on radio. The majority joined the rioting when they heard of it from others on the street. Resentment for white people was expressed by 27% of the rioters.¹⁰

After the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator Robert F. Kennedy, the (Milton) Eisenhower Commission was established to delve into the

causes of American violence. It held hearings in October, 1968. Speakers at the hearings such as Dr. Bradford Greenberg of Michigan State University warned that the urban poor watched television. The commission's report noted that the American culture had always been violent.¹¹ It held that negative role models for pre-adolescent children of low-income groups were depicted on television. Nearly half of the poor children thought the world they saw on television was true. It did not go beyond the contentions of Dr. Joseph Alapper, CBS vice president, who held that televised violence might or might not have bad effects on children with certain personality maladjustments.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey on July 9, 1968 took a strong stand on violence and television:

It has spread the message of rioting and looting...has literally served as a catalyst to promote even more trouble....If the media are going to broadcast the emotional appeals of the Stokely Carmichaels and other agitators, it is like throwing gasoline on the flames. I have discovered even in my campaign that Negro youth particularly likes to get on television. Half of the jumping, pushing and shoving that goes on in a campaign is the desire on the part of the youngster in the ghetto to have some publicity, to see his picture on television.¹²

Humphrey became a victim of a response to rioting, when he was teargassed by the Chicago police in August, 1968. The Chicago riots at the Democratic Convention led

to the creation of the Walker Commission. Its report pointed out that demonstrators had utilized the presence of television cameras to promote an image of repression. The phrase, "The whole world is watching," was chanted by people being beaten by the Chicago police.¹³

Hearings on violent television programs by the Senate Subcommittee on Communications in 1969 led to a request by Chairman John Pastore that the United States Surgeon General establish a commission to determine "what harmful effect, if any, these programs have on children."¹⁴ Pastore wanted effects, if any, established scientifically, in the manner in which the Surgeon General had determined the harmful effects of cigarette smoking.

The commission's vice chairman Eli Rubinstein, a clinical psychologist, directed staff research. Network consultants participated with commission members in reviewing past literature and overseeing 23 research projects and 40 technical papers. The commission took for granted the idea that children would imitate actions shown on television. It was interested in whether or not television could instigate violence. Violence was defined as "inflicting of harm...or of damage to property."¹⁵ The definition was similar to that of the Riot Control Act of 1968, popularly known

as the Rap Brown Act, since it was passed after Brown was accused of instigating a riot by making a speech in Annapolis, Maryland. The commission's concern seemed similar to that of the three previous commissions on violence. Its conclusion was stronger: "Television violence can instigate an increase in aggressive acts" in children predisposed to aggressive behavior.¹⁶

Media dismissed the commission's report as too mild to matter. Jack Gould's front page reaction in the New York Times (January 11, 1972) was entitled, "TV Violence Held Unharmful to Youth." Broadcasting magazine's analysis (January 17) headlined the story: "Violence on air and in life: no clear link." The Washington Evening Star (January 18) captioned its account: "TV Violence Study Called Whitewash." Michael Mitney's analysis for The National Observer (January 29) summarized it best in the title: "TV Gets a Slap, Not a Wallop, for Violence."

Senator Pastore held hearings on the Surgeon General's report in March, 1972. Interest was high. The hearings were published.¹⁷ Two years later he began more hearings on the subject of violence and television. He was the only member of his subcommittee present.

In 1976 Lionel Van Deerlin, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Communications held hearings on

violence and television. Expectations of results were not high. Dr. Alan Pearce, staff economist for the subcommittee, considered it was natural to love violence:

There is a human preoccupation with watching violence. We are drawn to it irresistably. Ask any policeman about the crowds that gather when there's an auto accident or a fire. Yes, it's hypocritical to condemn violence in public and then go home, shut the front door and switch on a crime drama. But that's what we do all the time.¹⁸

An initial finding of the subcommittee was that "the presence of violence on television continues to be at a level that is a cause for concern and remedial action." Some of the staff suggestions were the establishment of "a repository for studies of TV violence" in the Library of Congress, a "prescreening of violent shows by local network affiliates," the possibility of an industry-developed rating system of shows, and use of "electronic locking devices to prevent children from watching unsuitable programs." With an array of suggestions before him, Van Deerlin decided to rewrite the 1934 Communications Act. By mid-July, 1979 Van Deerlin gave up his attempt to rewrite the act, citing congressmen's fear of broadcasters in the 1980 elections. After extensive hearings Van Deerlin said, "We just don't have any clear

thrust in the direction of diversity. Anyone who doesn't like the programming now is just going to have to live with it."¹⁹

2. Minority Groups

As black consciousness rose in the 1960's, black citizens groups critical of media developed. Black Efforts for Soul in Television (BEST) was formed in 1969. It picketed network stations in December to protest inadequate black programming and hiring practices. Community Broadcasting Boston, a citizens group which consisted mainly of blacks, challenged the license renewal of WHDH in FCC hearings, claiming the station did not serve community needs. The group was granted the WHDH license. The Boston Herald-Traveler, the old licensee, subsequently went out of business.

Black and white citizens groups were combining efforts in 1974. Gilbert Mendelson and Morrisa Young of BEST prepared a report for ACT on the overt and covert messages of television programs in the areas of racial and political concepts.²⁰ It was designed to make viewers more sensitive to that content.

PBS programming for blacks was problematical, as the PBS audience was primarily upper middle class white. As PBS stations attempted to increase black personnel in the mid-1970's the new black employees often felt out of place. WOSU producer Julie Smith said that "under the circumstances my relations with fellow employees is good." She had criticized the lack of black programs,

complaining that "WOSU's Black content could be improved, however WOSU does not have a representative Black audience."²¹

In 1972 President Nixon selected black minister and judge Benjamin Hooks as an FCC commissioner. During the subsequent five years of Hooks' membership, the FCC became increasingly conscious of community groups' concerns at license renewal hearings. Renewal applicants had to delineate service to the community, satisfying 19 different groups chosen by the FCC as representative.

In August, 1977 the U.S. Civil Rights Commission reported that television discriminated against blacks in newsroom employment. It proposed that racial job quotas be used. It had sampled stations in the 1974-1975 program season.²² The two intervening years before the report was issued had brought an increase in black news co-anchormen. WCMH-Columbus made Leon Bibb co-anchor in September, 1976, after an Eastern-based company bought the station. He received many awards from local black community groups. By 1978 the ABC Evening News had a black co-anchor.

In the 1960's cries of Black Power led to whoops for Red Power. In regard to media consciousness, Native American groups protesting television depictions

of Indians preceded the development of black media-protest groups. The Tribal Indian Land Rights Association in 1967 denounced the way Indians were depicted in the new ABC series "Custer". The National Congress of American Indians joined the protest. NCAI called Custer the "Adolph Eichmann" of the 19th century.²³

James Hovis, lawyer for the Yakima tribe, urged all tribes to file for FCC equal time requests on their local ABC affiliate. As petitions were sent to the FCC, ABC considered the cost of defense in possible hearings. Some stations gave on the air discussion time to Indian complaints. ABC discussed the program's content with NCAI at a meeting in California. The network cancelled the series after nine programs.

By 1978 the Navajo reservation's Navajo Community College could boast its own FM station. KNCC began training Indian students in broadcasting skills.²⁴

The Mexican-American community was initially split by age in its protests of broadcast media. When Fresno stations in the fall, 1968 began using the term 'Chicano', which youth groups were promoting, older Mexican-Americans considered the term an insult, as it had once been. The youth also freely used the word 'brown', in organizing such groups as the Brown Berets in Fresno, to imitate the Black Panther Party image.

When Capital Cities Communications bought Triangle's

Fresno, New Haven and Philadelphia television stations, it sought to avoid minority group challenges to the license-transfers. It established a million dollar fund for minority programming. The Philadelphia station set up the Minority Communications Board to give community groups input for program productions. KFSN-Fresno created the Minority Advisory Committee. Chicano members produced the most programs from 1972-1974. Chicano, Indian and black groups with MAC created ethnic broadcast training centers for their youth. In October, 1974 MAC was made an autonomous production company and given a 3-year contract to produce programs for KFSN. CCC's broadcast division president Joseph Daugherty expressed a view different from that of most commercial broadcasters:

The very fact that minorities had the opportunity to present their message from their viewpoint, that can't be judged in rating points. The input we received, in awareness, the sensitivity that all of us who participated received can't be judged that way.²⁵

McGraw-Hill found that it was faced with Chicano demands upon purchasing stations in Bakersfield, San Diego and Denver. It put on Chicanos and Indians to its air staff. In 1975 its stations were nearing 20% minority employment. It set up minority advisory

councils at each station to suggest program ideas. A short series La Raza, which came from council ideas, was purchased by ABC for showing at its affiliates in Mexican-American areas.²⁶ Commercial broadcasting was responding positively to minority groups by the mid-1970's.

3. Community Groups

Cablecasting seemed to many media challenger groups to provide the solution of having time for all views to be presented. In 1971 the FCC required cable companies to have three free access channels that anyone could use to present programs or views. The FCC subsequently reduced the requirement to one channel. By the end of the 1970's, most of the hours on cable companies' free access channel went unused.

Since FCC regulations forbade cable companies from censorship of the free access channel, groups with radical viewpoints saw the channel as an outlet. The Minneapolis Video Collective taped "Wounded Knee Operation" and "Indochina Peace Campaign", two radical activities of 1973, organized by the American Indian Movement (AIM) and IPC, respectively, for cablecast. Feminist views were presented in video-taped programs, such as "Women and Waiting" by Twin Cities Women's Film Collective, and "Women and Madness" by Seattle Video Collective. Datagang of Columbus, Ohio taped women's events for cablecast, such as "Women's Pride Night—December 19, 1974" and "Holly Near at the Cockroach".²⁷ On April 5, 1976 the Public Access Coalition, a nonprofit corporation in Columbus was formed to provide information on videotape equipment for purchase and rental. Anyone

wishing to produce programs for the public access channel on any of the city's 3 cable companies could join.²⁸

Some radical groups in America and England used their own equipment in novel ways. In April, 1978 in Syracuse a group called Lucky Seven began broadcasting a taped "Steve Martin in Concert" and the film "Deep Throat." They broadcast over an unused, unlicensed channel 7. The penalties for unlicensed broadcasting are "fines of up to \$10,000 or one year in jail or both."²⁹ The FCC did not find the broadcasters.

On November 26, 1977 Southern Television's Southampton, England station lost the sound portion of its evening news. In its place, the audience heard:

This is the voice of Asteron. I am an authorized representative of the inter-galactic mission and I have a message for the planet Earth. We are beginning to enter the period of Aquarius and there are many corrections which have to be made by earth people. All your weapons of evil must be destroyed. You only have a short time to learn to live together in peace. You must live together in peace—or leave the galaxy.³⁰

A stunned station spokesman said that "the equipment used would need to be fairly sophisticated and expensive."³¹ Only a group with advanced technical equipment could have overridden Southern's signal.

Cable technology advanced with the initiation of

Warner Communications' QUBE system on December 1, 1977 in Columbus, Ohio. It provided for 30 channels—10 for distant commercial stations' signals, 10 for community programming, and 10 pay-per-program channels which had new and X-rated films, college credit courses, and sports and cultural events. Franklin University offered accounting and anthropology courses, Columbus Technical Institute gave a course in communications, and Capital University presented a child development course. A unique feature of the system was its ability to record viewer responses. A response button on viewers' channel selector was used to elicit viewer-size and reactions to questions put to the audience during various shows.³²

A year after its inception QUBE announced formation of a children's network called Nickelodeon to produce and sell children's programs for the cable industry. Vivian Horner, vice president for education and children's programs, said the motivation was due to an awareness that "young people are really a disenfranchised group in television."³³ Another motivation was the desire to promote Warner Communications' D.C. Comics Division. December, 1978 was the start of Warner's promotion of D.C. Comics hero Superman in a motion picture. A television series for Nickelodeon was planned called "Video Comic Book," featuring other D.C. Comics heroes, including The Flash. A program for

pre-school children called "Pinwheel" and one for adolescents called "Columbus Goes Bananaz" were produced by QUBE.

One motive for the introduction of QUBE was to provide for an X-rated movie channel, which could be cablecast only to homes that requested it. It enabled Warner to become the second cable company in Columbus to provide X-rated films.³⁴ X-rated offerings were increasing the number of cable subscribers throughout the country.

Complaints about X-rated cable programs from media critics were increasing. Jesuit Father Morton Hill of Morality in Media denounced the trend, proclaiming that "the people won't stand for it."³⁵ Manhattan Cable Television in December, 1975 cancelled a sophisticated series for New Yorkers called "Midnight Blue", which discussed sexual themes. It was aired on the free access channel, co-produced by Screw magazine's Al Goldstein. Manhattan Cable could not legally deny access to that channel to anyone requesting available time. The producers, with ACLU support, sued Manhattan Cable. Manhattan Cable restored the show, only to be denounced by Congressman John Murphy, who showed portions of the program at the House Subcommittee on Communications hearings in 1976.

He said it was "clearly obscenity."³⁶ FCC rules and regulations, section 76.251(ii) "Operating Rules" state:

for the public access channels,
such system shall establish rules
requiring first come, nondiscriminatory
access prohibiting...obscene or
indecent matter.

The cable company is left to determine such matter, but it cannot exclude any individual from cablecasting on the free access channel.

Indecent words in free access community broadcasting received a blast from Senator John Pastore when he began hearings on children's television in 1969. The FCC had granted Pacifica a license to build KPFT-FM in Houston at a time when the Pacifica's Los Angeles station KPFA-FM was being criticized for broadcasting a poem called "Jehovah's Child". The poem was of local community interest, since its author, a young woman English professor at a state college in Los Angeles, had been fired for reading it to a class.

Pacifica Foundation was a nonprofit corporation that originated the idea of free access community radio. Pacifist-newsman Lew Hill in 1946 quit his Washington D.C. job to organize pacifists who had been jailed during World War II. The idea was formed

to build a radio station in Berkeley, California. KPFA-FM began to broadcast in April, 1949. Hill's plan was to sell subscriptions to interested listeners in the way magazines were supported. Although anyone could tune in to the political, cultural and intellectual programs of KPFA, Hill thought that enough people were going to appreciate an alternative voice in broadcasting, and therefore support the station's efforts.

Fifteen months after it began, Hill shut down KPFA for lack of funds. He did not wish to continue the station's commercial license if it meant he had to use advertising. Citizens who liked the station organized a meeting at which \$2,300 was raised. They subsequently collected \$30,000. The Fund for Adult Education gave Hill's foundation \$150,000.

Hill got an educational license for KPFB-Berkeley in 1954. Another educational FM license established KPFA-Los Angeles in July, 1959. Pacifica's fourth station, WBAI-New York, began in January, 1960. In 1961 KPFA-Berkeley had 7,500 subscribers at \$12 per year, as well as many large contributors. Its promotion of avant-garde culture brought Lawrence Ferlingetti to read his Beatnik poetry in 1959. Edward Albee's The Zoo Story was broadcast over KPFA in 1963. The play's salty

language brought about many listener-complaints to the FCC. In a license renewal hearing, the FCC renewed WBAI's license, stating:

We recognize that as shown by the complaints here, such provocative programming as here involved may offend some listeners. But this does not mean that those offended have the right, through the Commission's licensing power, to rule such programming off the airwaves. Were this the case, only the wholly inoffensive, the bland, could gain access to the radio microphone or television camera.³⁷

Each pacifica station had a board of directors and full time paid managers to supervise a volunteer staff. Programs were planned, and community groups' programming was not especially solicited. The Vietnam War brought a new focus to the stations. In 1965 a correspondent was sent to Vietnam. Managers and volunteers established democratic decision-making procedures in the late 1960's. A communal emphasis was stressed. Upper middle class listener-contributors dropped off.

In September, 1976 the Board of Directors of WBAI-FM appointed Anna Kosof as station manager. WBAI Program Director Pablo Yoruba Guzman of the Young Lord's Party, a radical puerto Rican group, and other staff members saw her appointment as an attempt to reestablish a bureaucracy. She criticized the concept of a radical commune:

It's a life style. They resist a substantial change as destroying their commune. It's a way of life of the 60's, and they haven't gotten out of it....We are not even serving the white population for Spanish and West Indian.³⁸

She felt that most of the city's minority citizens did not like the radical ideas of the staff. The Board of Directors felt that it better understood the needs of the community. It shut down the station on February 11, 1977 in order to lock out the staff. On February 16 the Board cancelled the station's business telephone, and began making plans for a delayed reorganization.

Wealthy northwesterner Lorenzo Milam decided in the mid-1950's to imitate the Pacifica concept. He established KMMB-Seattle and KBOO-Portland on a listener-supported basis. When CPB instituted National Public Radio, the stations were of required power to receive government support. Milam loaned Jeremy Lansman of St. Louis the funds to establish KMMB there.

After a tornado wiped out a portion of central St. Louis in 1952, business entrepreneurs rebuilt several square blocks into an entertainment center, involving small saloons, Dixieland jazz spots, a theatre for plays, antique shops and other enterprises. It was called Gaslight Square, and Lansman decided to locate KMMB there. KMMB had a commercial FM license,

so initially sold commercial time to area merchants. In the 1960's the volunteer staff chose to live a communal lifestyle at the station, sharing meals and mattresses. In place of commercials, the staff solicited listener contributions. Anyone was welcome to go to the station and speak on the air—the total free access concept. The communal staff scheduled their own air times. Lansman sold the station in the early 1970's.

Lansman and Milam became a center of controversy after filing FCC petition RM-2493 in December, 1974. The petition was designed to create more educational FM frequencies for free access community broadcasters. It urged the FCC to deny license renewals to religious broadcasters, who used educational station licenses, but primarily broadcast religious "propaganda".³⁹

National Religious Broadcasters and the Christian Crusade did not feel they broadcast propaganda. NRB asked its supporters to write to the FCC and denounce the petition. NRB claimed that 27,000 people had already written to the FCC in support of RM-2493, and an overwhelming response was needed to overcome that support. In the summer of 1975 an anonymous flier began circulating among religious groups. It suggested that Madelyn Murray O'Hair was behind the 27,000

supportive letters for RM-2493. A related form letter to the flier asked people to sign it and send it to the FCC. It said:

I personally appreciate and wholeheartedly support the Sunday worship services and other religious programming.... I urge you to see to it that such programming continues.⁴⁰

The FCC received 700,000 letters against RM-2493, and denied the petition on August 1, 1975. The denial was not widely publicized, and letters against RM-2493 continued to arrive at the FCC. Three million more were received in the next 12 months. The community radio concept had been stalled by community members it had not intended to serve.

Older types of educational FM stations began to switch to the community concept of listener-supported radio and community volunteer staffs in the 1960's. WISO-Yellow Springs, Ohio was established at Antioch College in February, 1958 as a college cultural station. It brought in community members to supplement student staff, and began soliciting subscribers. It also received CPB funds. WISO had acquired nearly 1000 annual subscribers at \$20 each by the mid-1970's.⁴¹

In 1975 community access stations were in the process of going on the air in cities throughout America. Random groups of citizens were taking up the commercial broadcasters' challenge that if broadcasting

seemed so easy, let critical citizens groups try running their own stations. The groups were applying for educational FM licenses, even for a few UHF television licenses, and new stations such as WFAO-FM, Free Access Communications in Columbus, Ohio, WAFB, Septchild Radio in Cincinnati, and Sunrise Radio in Lincoln, Nebraska were preparing to broadcast.

Milam and Lansman hoped to get all the new and earlier-established community access stations together for a conference. They planned the National Alternative Radio Conference for June 17-22, 1975. Mike O'Conner of WORT, Back Porch Radio in Madison, Wisconsin offered the use of the station's facilities for the conference. Bill Thomas, educational radio expert in Urbana suggested that a tape exchange be among the topics for discussion. He offered Urbana as a center for free access stations to send tapes for exchange of programs. He compiled a list of existing and pending noncommercial community stations, who were invited to come to Madison. 27 radio stations and one television station were broadcasting. 13 radio and two television stations had applications pending. Seven stations had construction permits from the FCC. An additional 7 were preparing license applications.⁴²

Only 5 of the stations invited were NPR members, but CPB was asked to send representatives who could

discuss how the stations might become NPA members. NPA was dominated by university and school district stations. Lansman thought the free access stations could establish an association of their own.⁴³

Twenty-four of the delegates representing 18 of the stations present in Madison decided to incorporate as the National Federation of Community Broadcasters. They agreed to contribute an average of \$20 a month per group to NFCB. NFCB held a constitutional convention August 1-3, 1975 in Columbia, Missouri. 27 delegates attended. The convention report stated that:

Commercial stations will not be included as official members of the federation.... The overwhelming majority of existing broadcasters, both commercial and so-called public, has clearly failed to meet this obligation....that the full range of opinion in our community finds expression....We present diverse cultural, musical and dramatic offerings, produced locally....through the active participation of men and women of all races, cultures and ages....We get excited on the air—real people, being angry, happy, scared or delighted. We care strongly about the people in our communities and what we broadcast. That is why—at each of our stations and across the country—we work for the growth of vibrant, responsive and human broadcasting.⁴⁴

Standing committees and a Washington office were established. NFCB's Certificate of Incorporation in Delaware stated its motive as "the optimum utilization of educational and charitable resources" for its

stations, to serve as a go-between for its stations and the government, and to develop production centers and a noncommercial, noninstitutional network.⁴⁵

National Public Radio required member stations to have 250 watts ~~AM~~ or 1000 watts ~~FM~~ to belong to the federal network and receive NPR programs and CPB funds. Five full time employees were required, receiving at least federal minimum wage. A station needed an annual income of \$75,000 before it was eligible for federal aid.⁴⁶ NPR had 145 ~~FM~~ and 20 ~~AM~~ members, mainly university and school district stations, plus the Pacifica stations.

NPR stations would have been pleased if all of their stations as a unit had a total income of \$75,000 annually. Many free access stations had licenses limiting their ~~FM~~ output to 10 watts. Stations attending the National Alternative Radio Conference expressed their opinion of CPB in the Resolutions:

The history of the public Broadcasting Act of 1967 shows that....the program was designed to encourage the development of alternative forms of broadcasting. Current Corporation for public Broadcasting (CPB) radio qualifications go against this history....The results are that stations representing the poor, minorities, and diverse communities of interest remain poor, while stations serving the wealthy and educationally elite get federal dollars. Certainly this spends our tax money in a regressive way.⁴⁷

University educational stations, once the challengers to powerful commercial broadcasters, were considered to be a new elite as a result of CPB funding, and new community groups had come forth to challenge their entrenched position and programming.

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VII. CASE STUDY: WFAC-COMMUNITY BROADCASTING

Origin

WFAC-FM, Columbus, Ohio played a leading role at the National Alternative Radio Conference, June 17-22, 1975. Its influence was surprising in that it would not begin broadcasting till one and a half months later on a 10-watt noncommercial license. Its delegation included the only black delegates at the conference. The final resolution of the conference reflected WFAC's presence:

Radio as a profession has traditionally been and continues to be dominated by young white males....We as members of participating radio stations will work toward the elimination of such discrimination based on sex, age, race, or even economic condition.

WFAC Board of Trustee member June Todd offered the conference the use of WFAC as a central telephone exchange for transferring news and other stories between stations, if funds could be found for the project. An analysis of community stations, and WFAC's subsequent rapid decline and demise will provide fruitful insight to the nature of citizens media groups, particularly the new community-access groups of the 1970's.

The idea for a community-access radio station in Columbus was developed by two residents whose heritage represented ethnic groups. Italo-American Ralph DeStefano and Czech-American Fred Andrie came separately to Columbus in the early 1970's. DeStefano, a former Philadelphia policeman, was married to a professor of early childhood education at the Ohio State University. He had experience setting up radio towers in the Orient. Andrie entered commercial broadcasting after receiving an M.A. in the field from Syracuse University. He came to Columbus to teach at Capital University. He also became Fine Arts Editor for WTVN, the city's leading commercial station, where he hosted a cultural discussion program.

After reviewing available frequencies for Columbus in 1972, DeStefano and Andrie decided to apply for noncommercial 91.5 FM, a channel that could broadcast from an inexpensive 10-watt transmitter, to be located in downtown Columbus. The station was to be owned and operated by a Board of Trustees under a nonprofit corporate charter, obtained in the name Columbus Community Educational Broadcasting (CCEB) in December, 1972. DeStefano was Board president and Andrie secretary. Andrie's neighbor Carol Brigham, a West Virginia native and organizer of Appalachian cultural festivals, was vice president. Her friend Don Haefele, an OSU professor of early childhood education and colleague of DeStefano's

wife, agreed to serve as treasurer, providing he was not called upon to assist in development and operation of the station. Brigham's friend June Toda sought a passive role in station affairs. A writer and wife of a wealthy psychiatrist, Toda agreed to donate \$1500 to the development fund, and later added \$1000 for daily operations. She was urged to become a Board member; subsequently, to co-chair the program Committee with Anarle. Through Toda another large contributor was added to the Board—Charlotte Witkind, of the Lazarus Department Store family. A seventh trustee, Lydia Morgan, left Columbus before the station began construction in the spring, 1975.

The trustees set up a nonactive Board of Advisors in 1974 to give status and a representative community image to the station. Members included Msg. Gilbert Schmenk, protestant minister George Whitney, attorney Fred Isaac, liberal State representative Mike Stinziano and conservative businessman Adolf Sommer, who contributed \$500 to the development fund.²

In November, 1974 the trustees held the first open community meeting. They had received FCC authorization to begin construction. The meeting was held in St. Stephen's Episcopal Church near the OSU campus. Posted leaflets on campus announced the meeting, so the original composition of the organizing committees was

people of university backgrounds, students, professors and staff.

The trustees had studied the creation of other community stations. They decided that neither the cultural model of WISO nor the hippie structure of KDNA was adequate to meet the needs of Columbus. Backing for WFAC was obtained from Senior Citizens, the Afro-American Cultural Arts Center, NOW, the Mayor's Office and the Ohio Department of Development. Trustees desired to make the station a usable tool to the whole community, especially minority groups and individuals. Programming for blacks in Columbus consisted of a white-owned AM-FM station, which employed black disc jockeys to play soul music. WFAC's inspiration had developed during the Nixon Administration's repression of the Civil Rights Movement and its elimination of programs such as OAO, which had been seen as beneficial programs by white liberals like the trustees.

The first descriptive paper of COCB stressed the trustees' commitment to the advancement of minority groups:

We will seek to alter the widely accepted concept that radio broadcasting requires complex professional training. To this end, we plan to train individuals and members of interested groups in the use of radio equipment and the preparation of programs.

disadvantaged people who seek training with a view toward entering commercial broadcasting will be given full opportunities. Our proposed station plans to make full use of all resources of the Columbus community. Local performing artists will be encouraged to contribute broadcast material....The cultural expressions of minority groups in Columbus will be made available for broadcast presentation. The latter could include Blacks and Appalachians.³

In depth local news reporting and documentaries were proposed for the station. All types of music were encouraged. Anarle had informed the FCC that afternoon-programming would consist of a magazine format, recordings of varied music interspersed with informative conversation, interviews and local features. Evening programs would be 2-hour blocks of specialized formats, music, comedy, drama, public affairs. Two salaried managers were proposed to supervise the volunteer staff. An operating budget of \$36,000 annually, including \$11,000 for salaries and \$10,000 for equipment was planned. It was to be met by obtaining 1500 subscribers at \$15 each. WFAC never acquired more than \$2500 in its account at any one time. Only 30 subscribers were obtained by the end of 1975. OCOM's descriptive goals conclude with the comment that "in the history of community radio, no station that has come on the air has failed."⁴ WFAC changed history.

A 12-member steering committee was created at the

first community meeting. It consisted of the trustees, accountant Ray Horne, OSU feminists Diane Poulton and Kris Perry, June Todd's 18-year old son Bruce and Brigham's neighbors Carol Houser and Karen Martens.⁵ Poulton was Editor & Director of Communications in OSU's College of Administrative Science. She designed the station's letterhead and wrote the early newsletters. In October, 1977 she became administrator of the State Assembly Reference Bureau's new Women's Information Service. Kris Perry was a straight-A senior at OSU and member of Women's Action Collective. She organized WAC's Women's Broadcasting Group. Carol Houser's husband Dave was an organizer of the Columbus Jazz Society and a host of a WOSU jazz program. Karen Martens' husband was a banker. Bruce Todd served as WAC's first station manager during construction and the first month of broadcasting, till leaving for college.

A 12-member public relations committee was headed by Mike Darfus, a state employee, who provided free printing of station materials. A 15-member construction crew was set up under professional carpenter Mickey Melragon, a friend of Andrie's. Melragon built the control room studio and provided materials for free. Chuck Rapp, a professional house painter, constructed

record shelves and provided other free services. He was Destefano's neighbor, and became a bluegrass music show host at the station. A technical committee was headed by Steve Puffenberger, an OSU technician.

The trustees held a second open organizing meeting on November 18 at St. Stephen's. A mailing list of 85 was compiled from the two meetings. Destefano headed a fund raising committee. Anarle and June Todd co-chaired the program Committee, which would become the primary decision-making body at the station for most activities.

Blacks became involved with WFAO at the November meetings. popular commercial disc jockey Kirk Bishop attended. Steve Stewart offered to develop drama productions. He began an effort to obtain a Bicentennial grant for programs in that area through the Ohio Historical Society and with the assistance of OSU history professors. Kay Lundy was a clerk-typist at Ohio State University. Like most blacks who joined WFAO, she was experienced and educated beyond the job-level from which she earned her income. Lundy had 3-years of college, was a graduate of Minorities Broadcast Training in Youngstown, former co-host of a 4th women's discussion show and co-producer of a Youngstown religious broadcast. Blacks who came to WFAO had been unable to find paying jobs equivalent to their skills.⁶

The first News Letter was issued after the November meetings. It revealed a new development providing WFAA with a potential 20,000 listeners as soon as it went on the air:

Coaxial Communications, Inc. and Warner Cable of Columbus have agreed to carry the broadcast signal of radio station WFAA on cable video channels.⁷

The cable coup was likely to bring many subscribers. Warner's audience was upper middle class, like the kind that supported community stations in other cities. The station's sound never aired on cable, however.

The trustees called two community meetings at St. Stephen's Church in December, on the 9th and 17th, which raised total participation in the station to 130. The station would have 130 active participants the following December of 1975, but only 13 of the original organizers from the November-December meetings became staff members, and just 7 remained in December, 1975. A hundred of the organizers ceased involvement during the 3-month period in early 1975, when the trustees sought a site for the studio, though WFAA would continue to send the News Letter to the original 130, rather than arranging new gatherings.

At the December 9 meeting the participants were informed by Anarle of the need to obtain 100 third class radio engineer's licenses through examination if they wished to operate the studio's control board.

An FCC study guide was provided, and meetings in homes were arranged for study. Participants were urged to take the FCC test in January in Columbus. Only Anarle and Destefano had licenses.

Technicians like Steve Puffenberger were not worried about failing the test. He failed, however, and left the station without a technician of his background. There was no one to install the equipment. WFAC purchased a new control panel, and was given a used transmitter by a New Jersey station. Xavier College, Cincinnati offered a used antenna for transmission of the signal from atop a tower, but required WFAC's staff members Jeff Batten and Chris Lind to climb Xavier's old tower to get the antenna. WFAC only had a consulting engineer from Cincinnati during its construction, and FCC rules required stations broadcasting to obtain an FCC First Class licensed engineer. When only two of the St. Stephen's participants who took the January third-class license test passed, the future looked bleak.

The second News Letter issued in March, 1975 announced, "GOOD NEWS! WFAC now has its studios and offices." A downtown businessman gave the station rent-free, all utilities paid, the whole second floor of a building on State Street that housed a popular restaurant, and was just two blocks from the state Capitol. A Catholic seminary gave the station a portion

of its vacant downtown roller rink to house the transmitter, and adjacent land to build the tower on. WFAC trustees called a general meeting at the new studio for April 1.

The trustees were taking seriously their dedication to involve blacks in major roles at the station. Desterano named 20-year old James Evans as news director. An OSU graduate in December, Evans was completing a broadcasting training program at Career Academy, a trade school. Like other blacks at the station, Evans' paying job was below his training—a State Assembly clerk and messenger. Although staff members liked Evans, the appointment by Desterano made it appear as though community participants on the staff were not to be consulted on important decisions.

Future black staff member Gordon Franklin interviewed Evans for the April edition of an OSU black student newspaper. Evans' comments on his plans for WFAC held portents of future policy conflicts:

It's there. If we don't use this and exploit this and try to make this station a "people's radio station"—and either we are going to do this or not—we can only lose an opportunity. It's up to Blacks to make this work for them.⁹

The goal that Evans had in mind was different from the trustees' image of the station. By December, 1975 the

trustees' contradictory hopes for minorities were clear—if one group was held back at the station then its potential was thwarted, but if one group was allowed dominance then other groups would be left out.

Evans was unable to organize a news staff. After several meetings, staff members no longer came. He declined to contact national sources suggested to him for free tapes.¹⁰ Since Anarle had committed the station to a news effort, he and Pestefano decided to promote Evans out of the position in August and into the role of continuity director, with responsibility for scheduling, checking daily program logs, orienting new staff members and obtaining public service and community-affairs announcements. Pestefano asked Evans to spend most of each day at the station. He accepted the opportunity. Evans' appointment was announced by Pestefano at a general meeting. Pestefano asked in front of Evans if anyone objected, leaving the staff to accept the process of decision-making as well as the appointment, without comment.

In the hectic days of the pre-broadcasting phase of WFAC, some black, ethnic and talent applicants got lost in the shuffle. Lawrence Wade, a perceptive editor from Our Choking Times and writer of some experience, submitted program ideas, but Wade was never contacted by Anarle, who was serving as program director, till

mid-september.¹¹ Pesterano assumed the role of station manager in August when Bruce Todd left for college. He subsequently lost a tape from a local harmonica player, who kept calling about a program. Joanne Lembrowski, a Polish polka expert, approached Anarle about a program, but he did not pursue it.

In June, 1975 Anarle had altered his free access beliefs. He doubted local Nazis could be given access to the airwaves to promote killing Jews. He and Pesterano objected to Bruce Todd's discussion with rabbis, who wished to do an historical program on Judaism. Anarle suggested that radical groups should not have access to teach bomb-making, if such a proposal were made.

Radical groups took no interest in WFAC. In an attempt to obtain national alternative news sources, staff members contacted Liberation News Service and the Alternative Press Syndicate, which served underground newspapers and pacifists. LNS replied that "we'll be looking forward to WFAC subscribing in a few months." APS required a \$25 initiation fee just to be considered for membership.¹² WFAC could not afford membership in the radical organizations, and they refused free assistance to the station, so WFAC remained distinct among free access stations in its lack of new Left news and views.

2. Federal and Foundation Grants

In spite of WFAC's nonradical political image, it received no help from the federal government. NPR informed WFAC that the station was too small to receive public funds and so it must utilize "devotion and enterprise at the local level."¹³ The station was sent the weekly bulletin of CPB, the parent agency of NPR. The bulletin often contained announcements of new administrative positions at CPB, frequently noting that "the salary is in excess of \$35,000 per year." Grants from CPB to member stations were listed, with information as "another grant for \$10,000 has been awarded to KQED(TV) San Francisco" to develop a half-hour show on the topic of "spending" money.¹⁴

WFAC sought assistance from other agencies of the federal government. GSA had donated surplus technical equipment to educational institutions. As WFAC had an educational license, it applied to the surplus program. GSA replied that to qualify "it will be necessary for you to advise us what your federal agency affiliation is."¹⁵ The station had no inside contacts. The station asked the State Department for taped programs on public affairs it had advertised. No tapes were sent, and a reply stated that "our programs are currently under re-evaluation."¹⁶

HEW since 1962 provided grants for transmitter and construction under an annually renewed act for educational stations. When WFAC applied it was informed the program was out of funds until the next fiscal year began July 30, 1975, after WFAC had its tower built and was transmitting a signal. Since Columbus public schools and OSU have educational stations, WFAC had low priority for future requests to HEW under the Noncommercial Educational Broadcasting Facilities Act, which favored stations in localities lacking other public stations.

As WFAC brought minority youth into its free training program, it considered seeking federal funds for that. An administrator of the Urban League informed Pesterano that the station did not have enough money to be considered as a recipient of federal funds. Institutions seeking federal training grants must pay minority trainees one half of at least the minimum wage during training to get the other half from the government. WFAC only had \$2500 in its bank account. Matching funds were required for LEAA juvenile delinquency job training grants, CFB's Minority Training Grant program, which required NPK membership, and CETA training grants. Basic Opportunity Grants were available to poor youth only if the institution belonged to a prominent accrediting agency.¹⁷

In 1975 WFAC made two proposals to produce and broadcast dramatized history programs for the bicentennial. Stewart's proposal, which he developed with officers of the Ohio Historical Society, was rejected by the American Revolutionary Bicentennial Administration. An idea for broadcasting programs about women of the American Revolution was submitted to the OSU Office of Women's Studies, which had received the right to administer 55 federal grants. The proposal was rejected.

WFAC obtained the services of Leodora Gary through the CETA (Comprehensive Employment Training Act) Program. In that program minorities are paid for training at some job. Gary asked that she be allowed to go to WFAC for broadcast training. Though unemployed, she had considerable background and skills. A CETA official told her to stop desiring jobs comparable to her skills and ability, and look for a typing job.¹⁸ She was allowed to work at the station without WFAC having to put up a matching portion of salary. She had come to Columbus with her 4 children and husband, when he got a job—but he subsequently lost it. She had been editing a black community newspaper in Michigan, which she and other blacks founded. Pestefano asked her to develop a monthly Program Guide to send to subscribers.

ne thought sales or advertising in the guide could support the station. She prepared a model. She sold an ad to a black realtor. She and Carol Brigham approached Gold Circle, a discount chain, with a proposal for advertising inserts, but it was rejected. Although a price of just \$292 for 10,000 16-page tabloid size guides per month was obtained, and plans made for writing stories about the station in the guide, Desterano informed Gary that no WFAC funds could be used to print it.¹⁹ As sufficient advertisements were never obtained for an introductory issue, the guide was never printed. In August June Todd appointed Gary to the Program Committee, and Leodora Gary became a talented host of an African and jazz music program, and special events reporter.

WFAC attempted to obtain private grants. The major foundation locally was the Columbus Foundation. The Columbus Foundation rejected two proposals in the summer, 1975, insisting that its board members be given seats on WFAC's Board of Trustees before funds were granted. Desterano rejected the idea, feeling that it was designed to assure a conservative policy at the station.²⁰

Grant proposals were submitted to numerous foundations. Each was geared to the foundation's

chartered goals: proposals for music appreciation programs, advancement of minorities, youth or women, technical education, cultural advancement, construction of training facilities for youth, and proposals specifically for public broadcasting to foundations funding it. Some foundations listed in directories seem to exist only on paper. The postal service returned letters unopened indicating no forwarding address of various foundations, including Phillips(Minneapolis), Roswell, Grace, Kresge and Dumm.

Some private foundations required affiliation with federal agencies for grants. Sears-Roebuck foundation declined to help with a training program for youth at WFAC, claiming it only made grants "through national education agencies."²¹ The Carnegie Hero Fund Commission of Pittsburgh showed the degree to which the foundation directed grant recipients, explaining that "our funds must be applied solely toward our award and operating expenses."²² It suggested that the Carnegie corporation of New York be contacted, since it funded the CPB study and was interested in public broadcasting. Carnegie corporation of New York indicated its determination to dominate grantees, rejecting the proposal and informing WFAC that "we do not make grants for radio and television programming projects unless they are central to our own program interests."²³

Many wealthy foundations rejected WFAC's proposals b, claiming that the foundation did not have any money. The Rockefeller family fund wrote that it only had "limited resources."²⁴ The John and Mary R. Markle Foundation of 50 Rockefeller Plaza wrote that "we are a small foundation."²⁵ The Taconic foundation on Fifth Avenue, New York also replied that it was "a small foundation."²⁶ It enclosed a policy statement to confirm its adherence to guidelines of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which required foundations to spend some of their funds for philanthropic purposes, rather than just serving as tax shelters for families who established them.

Many foundations established by wealthy, conservative families and corporations rejected WFAC proposals with statements about lack of funds. The Howard Heinz Endowment "is limited in its giving."²⁷ The General Electric Foundation "limited its support program."²⁸ The Pfaffinger Foundation "limited our contributions."²⁹ The Edwin W. and Catherine M. Davis Foundation found that "the funds available for distribution are not sufficient."³⁰ The well-endowed Olin Foundation, Inc. professed that "all of our funds are committed for some time."³¹

The Melena Rubinstein Foundation was approached because it specialized in grants for women's projects.

A proposal was made to produce programs for women and to train women in broadcasting. It must have had many requests, since it rejected the proposal by saying that "we are able to support only a limited number."³²

Other foundations seemed to be swamped with demands. The Crown Zellerbach Foundation had "unprecedented demands on our resources," and rejected WFAC's proposal in spite of what was called "the significance of WFAC's activities."³³ The Ellis L. Phillips Foundation was "committed for this fiscal year."³⁴ The Reader's Digest Foundation was worse off, claiming that "this year our expenditures have exceeded our budget."³⁵ The McGregor Fund went further in its deficit planning, making "substantial commitments on its resources over the next several years."³⁶ The Irwin-Sweeney-Miller Foundation cited "economic factors affecting our endowment....we expect that it will be at least two years before we can undertake additional obligations."³⁷

Two foundations set up by wealthy individuals rejected WFAC's proposals on the grounds that they were in such bad straits they could help no one. The Lillia Babbitt Hyde Foundation claimed "inability to be of help to you either at this time or in the foreseeable future."³⁸ The William C. Whitney Foundation of New York indicated the ultimate distress that "we are not in a position to make a grant at this time nor...in the

future."³⁹

Foundations that purported to be national in scope in directories informed WFAC that their grants were limited to certain geographical areas. The Robert Sterling Clark Foundation, Inc. liked the station's "youth involvement project," but said it had to involve New York City youth to get a grant.⁴⁰ WFAC's cultural programs had to be heard in "Pittsburgh and the Western Pennsylvania region" to get a grant from the Hillman Foundation, Inc.⁴¹ The shows had to be heard in "Essex County, New Jersey" to get funds from the Florence and John Schumann Foundation.⁴² New Jersey was eligible for considerable help. The Victoria Foundation, Inc. "focused on urban problems in Northern New Jersey," and could not help WFAC's minority programs.⁴³

Foundations praised WFAC's proposals, but did not send money. The Frederick J. Kennedy Memorial Foundation, Inc. felt of the "youth involvement project, this sounds like a great idea." To get a grant the program would have to be established in "Boston and Southern Pines, North Carolina."⁴⁴ The Cleveland Foundation was limited to "the Greater Cleveland area."⁴⁵ The Louis D. Beaumont Foundation of Cleveland was "a regional foundation" for the northern and central Ohio areas, but they "unfortunately do not include your area."⁴⁶ The George Gund

Foundation of Cleveland wanted to keep up a correspondence, and "welcome an opportunity to learn more about the laudible plans," although "they do not fall within the present program priorities of our foundation."⁴⁷

Foundations in Saint Paul were all located in the First National Bank Building, and had unusual geographical limitations. The Louis W. and Maud Hill Family Foundation gave to the entire "northwestern United States," excluding Ohio.⁴⁸ The Bush Foundation had "regional emphasis," Ohio not being one of its regions.⁴⁹ The Priscoll Foundation rejected a proposal because it only gave to "several narrow geographical areas," not specifying where.⁵⁰

Foundations created by industrial corporations were very parochial in scope. The Corning Glass Works Foundation gave to local projects like WFAC, but only in cities where the company "has manufacturing plants."⁵¹ The American Metal Climax Foundation felt WFAC did not "fall within the scope of Max."⁵² The Bank of America Foundation thought the station's "objectives important," but "outside the scope" of Bank of America.⁵³ The Glenmeade Trust Company directed the few charitable trusts. WFAC projects fell "outside" their scope.⁵⁴

A different area of current foundation interest was often the basis for rejection. The Houston Endowment,

Inc. had "no program" that fit WFAC's needs.⁵⁵ The Mary Louise Curtis Bok Foundation only gave to the Curtis Institute of music.⁵⁶ WFAC's "project lies outside" the Rowland Foundation, Inc. interests.⁵⁷ The New World Foundation especially limited its philanthropic goals, stating that "we do not support art, media or cultural programs."⁵⁸

Some foundations indicated that they liked WFAC's projects so much that they could not give a reason why they were rejecting the proposals. The Raymond John Wean Foundation found WFAC to be a "worthy cause."⁵⁹ WFAC's "youth involvement project....was given careful consideration at the fall meeting of our Contributions Committee," wrote the Allis-Chalmers Foundation in its rejection letter.⁶⁰ The appropriations committee of the Public Welfare Foundation, Inc., met to discuss WFAC's projects, but was "unable to participate."⁶¹ The Cargill Foundation found the WFAC request "worthy of support," but "we are unable to make the grant."⁶²

Some foundations rejected WFAC proposals because they were exactly what those foundations were designed to fund. The Danforth Foundation, which aids the education of youth, rejected a communications education program for youth because "the foundation does not make grants for projects involving the media."⁶³ The CBS

Foundation, Inc., which was designed to give media grants, found that WFAC "falls outside the scope of the normal activities of this foundation."⁶⁴

Three WFAC proposals were rejected because they fit the foundations' aims. A proposal to produce medical and health care information programs for the community was rejected by The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation because "the foundation's primary interest is supporting programs in the areas of medical education and health care delivery."⁶⁵ A proposal for a children's workshop to enable children to produce their own radio programs from their ideas, and develop a sense of self-discipline was "too far outside" the grant Foundation, Inc., interests, which were the "behavioral aspects of child development."⁶⁶ The hope for a grant from the William H. Donner Foundation, Inc. to help WFAC assist minorities working with the station was dashed because the foundation engaged in "assistance for the American Indians."⁶⁷

Large foundations that had funded similar areas to those projected by WFAC sent negative responses. A proposal for extensive programming in the arts, to give disadvantaged residents access to the ideas was rejected by the Rockefeller Foundation because "guidelines of the Arts program are such that support for radio falls beyond the scope."⁶⁸ The Rockefeller

Brothers Fund had interest in radio, but "while the Fund does have interests in the field of communications, its program does not, as a general rule, extend to contributing to community programs."⁶⁹ The most surprising rejection came for a proposal to create a community stations' network, and establish neighborhood remote broadcasting and training facilities throughout the city. The foundation rejecting it was the major promoter of a public broadcast network idea and the main programming center—the Ford Foundation. It rejected the proposal because the Ford Foundation has "no grant program for radio activities and no general budget."⁷⁰

Three foundations liked the ideas so well they asked for additional time to consider them. The National Home Library Foundation wrote that "we shall study your project and if we have any questions we shall be in touch."⁷¹ The Carolyn Foundation enthusiastically "referred your letter to one of our committees for review."⁷² The Robert J. and Helen C. Kleberg Foundation was a part of the King Ranch, Inc., and could provide extensive support when the proposal "was brought to the attention of the directors of the foundation at their next meeting."⁷³ Those three foundations were never heard from again.

3. Community Funding

The Columbus Foundation was approached in a grant proposal prepared by Diane Howe, after the first rejection. Howe was an OSU student permitted to receive credit from the Department of Communications for working as a summer intern at WFAC. Though her proposal was rejected, she developed the first fund raising benefit for the station. She got the Moonshine Cooperative Bar to promote a WFAC benefit for July 17, 1975, with a 75¢ cover charge from customers to go to the station. She induced popular bands like the Red Mountain String Band to donate their services.⁷⁴ The Moonshine was a university-area bar established with the purpose of providing funds for worthy community projects.

The benefit did not bring in much money. The Moonshine contact proved to be important. The owner of the downtown building where WFAC received free space sold it to the restaurant owner in the fall. The new owner demanded rent. In December, 1975 the Moonshine offered WFAC a 2-story house it owned adjacent to the bar at no charge. As the station was broadcasting 24-hours a day by December, it made the move without going off the air. Chris Lind, a sound systems technician who replaced Puffenberger, was able to reconnect all the equipment at the house, while Bill Garner played tapes at the

downtown studio.

Bill Barner and another member of the original committees from the St. Stephen's meetings John Snyder, became the main fund raisers for WFAC. Snyder printed the moonshine Benefit fliers, and on August 1 obtained the use of a party house in a suburban development for a press party to promote the inception of programming on WFAC. No members of the press came, but some early participants in station activities were reunited and contributed \$400. In December Snyder quit his office job to go on unemployment benefits and become the office manager full time at WFAC. He designed the interior of the moonshine house, supplying carpeting and paint for the studios, and initiated a training program for new volunteers at the station.

DeStefano felt some of Snyder's activities impinged on his area of station manager. Snyder obtained extension telephones for the downtown studio to set up an on-the-air telephone for callers to give their views. DeStefano ordered the telephones disposed of, believing that Ohio Bell required its own telephones to be installed before an extension service could be initiated. DeStefano initially rejected a Snyder proposal to broadcast live from a university-area bar because Snyder wanted part of the cover charge to go for his

services. Destefano asked, "why should he get anything. It should all go to the station."⁷⁵

John Snyder proposed printing bumper stickers to exchange for donations and printing charts on how to build and connect home antennas to radios to better receive the 10-watt WFAC signal. These were available at the booth he set up at the Community Harvest festival in October, 1975 in the university-area. On Friday night of the festival WFAC was broadcasting its regular feminist radio talk and music program of Kris Perry and Women's Action Collective. Snyder felt students preferred rock, and to induce their attention to the booth he played a local rock station on the radio at the booth, pretending it was WFAC's programming. June Teod and Carol Brigham strongly criticized Snyder at the next Program Committee meeting for his deception of the public at the festival.⁷⁶

The October 13th Program Committee meeting discovered a deception of the PCC that Snyder had engaged in on orders from James Evans. With Destefano's knowledge, Evans and Snyder rewrote the first month's program logs on new log sheets. When WFAC began programming in early August, the untrained volunteers sleepily recorded the programs and messages the station broadcast onto the written logs—accounts of

announcements and programs. Andrie was worried the FCC would see that as amateurish, and indicated displeasure. Although the FCC rarely requests logs, it sometimes reviews them to see if a station is meeting community needs. Andrie designed blank logs with no typed schedule, enabling announcers to do all the writing themselves while on the air—a formidable task for inexperienced volunteers.

Evans decided to produce new logs for August, 1975 which were neat and flawless. Only his and Destefano's signatures appear on the new program logs, and sometimes no signatures to indicate the on the air announcer at the time of broadcast. He threw away the original logs, thus leaving the station without a record of its actual programming in its first 20 days, since he generally made up names of programs and fictional public service announcements on the new logs, rather than copying the old ones. The station was made to appear on the air longer than it was. Since a related set of operating logs must be signed by a third class engineer, who often is also the announcer, to prove that a licensed person is on the premises at all times, the operating logs (which only contain signatures), do not coincide with the programming that person did—on Evans' new program logs. When Evans made errors on the

August 12 and 13 operating logs during the time he was on the air as the licensed operator, he substituted new unsigned operating logs for these days, since the other engineers' signatures could not be transferred.⁷⁷

At the Program Committee meeting June Todd and Carol Brigham were distressed by the deception and the loss of the historical record of the station's programming, including a record of the first Sam Ward show, August 16, 8-12 p.m. Ward was a blind man with a third class operator's license. He presented an Olives request show, Rock 'n' Roll of the 1950's, with his extensive record collection. It became a popular call-in show. Ward handled the calls and control board himself, having a friend fill in the log. When the friend could not come one Saturday night, Ward was alone in the station. He did the show flawlessly, and thereafter came alone. When he first approached Andrie about doing a show at a general meeting in June, he brought a tape of telephone conversations he had with commercial broadcasters around the nation who rejected his services, telling him they could not trust a blind man around their equipment, even if he had assistance.

DeStefano and Andrie denied any knowledge of Evans' altering of the logs in a debate at the October 13th meeting. It revealed the growing rift between the male and female trustees. Differences of opinion had existed

since the formation of the Board in December 1972, but Brigham and Todd were dependent on the male trustees for knowledge, since they lacked broadcasting experience. As the women gained experience and confidence, the rift increased, as it did between the men and women on other committees.⁷⁸

Brigham enlisted the support of her neighbors Carol Houser and Karen Martens, making them program committee members. Martens and Houser initiated a weekly 3-hour evening program of community affairs. The August 27th program log, which Evans did not get to, is remarkable in its detail in contrast to the more generalized Evans' replacements, and gives an account of the Houser-Martens program that shows the extent of community affairs being broadcast. The show included 15-minute interviews with Gene Weisman of the Ohio Historical Society and LuAnna Airby, a consumer affairs expert. It had book corner with Dick McKee, a section on the problem of women and alcoholism, a recorded children's section for their entertainment, and a public service announcement on the Columbus Tenant's Union.⁷⁹

Martens was engineer for the August 27th program. When she and Houser were shown the control board in July, they were hesitant to touch the dials. They attended WFAC study classes for the FCC third-class license test, but Martens insisted she would never

take the test. She felt Andrie planned to leave her on her own in the studio if she received a license, and she wanted his support and presence as engineer. She and Mouser were housewives, married to successful husbands. She doubted a woman could handle technical equipment or get a license as an engineer. When she took the test at Andrie's insistence and passed, he left her on her own at the controls with no resultant problems. When she left the station, she got herself a paying job.

Miane Howe was afraid to operate the control board, and turned down a chance to have a program of her own, though she was a communications major at college. She continued to write grant proposals. Aware that Borden's of Columbus had "supported many local projects," she submitted a grant proposal. It was rejected.⁸⁰ McDonalds was petitioned for a grant to aid training of youth at the station. It was turned down. The Columbus Community Food Coop, a small group of university-area people who operated a natural foods grocery in the basement of a Methodist student center, was the only local organization to give support, over \$200. The Food Coop, like the Tenant's Union, Moonshine and an underground newspaper The Columbus Freepress were products of the anticapitalist, community people's spirit of the late 1960's and early 1970's, which was partially an

influence on the idea for WFAC and other free access stations. Destefano felt these organizations were too radical. He frequently criticized the prepress, but as they occupied the house that Moonshine was giving to WFAC in December, Destefano arranged a joint meeting of the radio and newspaper staffs, and convinced the prepress staff to move out, stressing the greater community service that the station could provide.

Andrie urged Diane Howe to do a two-hour evening program when her internship ended in August. She was too frightened to come to the first scheduled show. Subsequently she developed an unusual show called Aural Delights, blending music, poetry and other arts, and enjoyed hosting and operating the equipment. She recruited other women for the station.

Leodora Gary initiated the idea of using night clubs as a fund raising source. She convinced the owners of Ivories, a black club, to let WFAC collect a cover charge one night a week when a band performed. That brought in \$20 a week. Bill Garner, in the next month of September, 1975, approached John Denham of the Needles Eye. Garner suggested that since jazz was an art form, WFAC could broadcast it live from the Needles Eye, and collect a cover charge from

patrons entering the jazz room of the club. Penham agreed to pay technical costs of the broadcasts, and Barner offered the services of Jazz City Workshop to perform free once a week. Though a chemist and science writer, Barner played clarinet with the experimental group. Cover charges came to nearly \$80, and a second night was added bringing the station another \$80 and the radio audience of Columbus the first live jazz programming in the progressive mode.

Barner secured recordings of local classical and jazz artists for broadcast on a program he hosted. He got free records for the station from a local juke box company. He wrote to record companies, and got WFAC on their albums' mailing lists, and he got the American Chemical Society to send its popular weekly taped program "men and molecules".

WFAC's main reason for seeking taped programs from varied sources was to get the tape recordings to use at the station for recording shows and events. The station could not afford to buy tapes. Carol Houser got the Ohio Department of Natural Resources to send taped programs on state parks, but the department demanded its tapes be returned. Most program suppliers did not. The American offices of Europe's public broadcasting companies sent tapes of programs promoting

national cultures and music. The Swedish Broadcasting Corporation and Radio Nederland wereluumroep sent taped programs.⁸¹ The National Cotton Council sent weekly tapes of "Cotton in the News", and informed the station of its "cotton hotline" for news updates.⁸²

In October Poncho and Pannie Murray brought an Appalachian flavor to the station. Poncho was a forklift operator at Kroger's. He was an aficionado of bluegrass music, having taped festivals and met most of the artists. He got Pete Hughes, owner of the Bluegrass Palace, to give a grant of \$30 per show, for two nights a week of live bluegrass broadcasts from the club. Columbus has an Appalachian immigrant population, but the music was considered too distinct an art form for commercial stations, and almost none was programmed until the broadcasts began, and Poncho and Pannie started a recorded program, as well. The station's income had grown to \$240 a week.

By early 1976, most of the station's weekly income had been cut off. The programs from the Needles Eye almost did not begin. Destefano neglected to order line connections from the telephone company between the club and the station, so that the program could be carried to the studio and then broadcast. Four days before the first broadcast he asked Anarle to do it.

Anarle refused. Volunteer technician Chris Lind was the only station member who knew to what frequency cycle the telephone connections had to be equalized with the station's equipment. Destefano also did not realize that modulating equipment was needed at the club to send the programs to the station. The station had none. Chris Lind had bought some for personal use, and he lent it, after ordering the telephone lines just in time.

Although the Murrays had agreed to operate Lind's equipment from the Bluegrass Palace, Destefano and Anarle had not arranged for an engineer to sit in the studio during the broadcasts, a boring job no one wished. Destefano's neighbor Chuck Kapp volunteered, as he also liked Bluegrass, and did a record show of his own in that general area.

Kieron Pathak had worked as an intern with a commercial station, till he was let go. He came to WFAC and joined John Snyder in a team effort to coordinate engineers at the Needles Eye site and in the studio during the broadcasts. Pathak and Snyder were upset when the second night of broadcasts was scheduled from the Needles Eye, as they had planned to use that evening to broadcast from a university-area club for personal fees. When Diane Howe volunteered to serve as engineer at the Needles Eye on the second weeknight of broadcasts,

Snyder, who was studio engineer, cut the program off the air before its conclusion. Howe no longer volunteered, but two young black women came to the station and offered to engineer the broadcasts from the Needles Eye. Gladys Wagstaff was a schoolteacher; Coco Curington was an ex-Marine. They asked to do it on a permanent basis at a general meeting. Snyder later called them and told them the idea of the broadcasts was to have alternate hosts and engineers, and rejected their plan as regular hosts. They declined to participate further. Pathak arranged a meeting with Destefano and Andrie to inform them that no one was available to host two weekly shows from the Needles Eye. Destefano cancelled the second broadcast without informing anyone on the programming staff, leaving the entire evening without programs.

In keeping with the trustees commitment to provide opportunity for blacks, Andrie scheduled Disco Dave Chandler to do an all-night request program of soul music Sunday evenings. Chandler had no license, and Andrie failed to inform any engineer to be present with Chandler. Staff members volunteered to sit with him. The request program became the most popular on the station. WFAA's signal was strongest in the black sections of Columbus; weakest in upper middle class sections which

traditionally supported community stations elsewhere. The black audience could not financially support the station.

Bogey Riley, who like Chandler was a young unemployed black man, volunteered to do three all-night jazz programs. Todd and Brigham promoted Riley to co-music director with a young Canadian woman Chris Christoffersen, and Chandler to public relations director in early September. Blacks and women were given management opportunities unavailable elsewhere. No salaries were paid, since Destefano insisted all money from the clubs must go into the general fund. Riley made the station a home, sleeping there in the daytime. He and Chandler offered to alternate with Nedora Gary, collecting funds on every other week at Ivories. After their first evening collecting, they gave Destefano \$6, unlike the \$20 which Gary usually collected and turned in.⁸³ The evenings at Ivories ceased as a source of major funding, as Destefano was using Gary full time to collect at the Needles Eye.

Conflict arose between the black and Appalachian cultures at the station. Destefano proposed that Rencho and Fannie Murray be trained during morning hours on the control board before Murray went to work at Arger's. James Evans, who had been appointed continuity director by Destefano, had assumed full

control over scheduling by late August. Evans was eliminating the mixed music concept of Anarle, favoring blocks of one type of music throughout the day. Evans began a 24-hour schedule, but did not have a staff to fill all the hours. He asked Riley and Chandler to continue their all-night programs into the morning hours. When the Murrays arrived with their bluegrass records for training on the control board, Evans and Riley protested to Pestefano that the Murray's music would disrupt the continuity of jazz and soul music in the morning.

Evans was concerned that neither Riley nor Chandler had licenses. He urged them to study the FCC guides and take the tests. They failed. He told them they had to prove the worth of black men and not fool around. Poncho murray offered to drive Riley and Chandler to Detroit to take the test with him. It was offered daily there, and a license issued without a waiting period. murray had been studying for two weeks. He passed the test, but Riley and Chandler failed again.

Evans processed test applications for new volunteers to the station. The FCC provided provisional licenses for one year without a test to anyone that a station's chief engineer certified as fit to operate the board and aware of FCC rules. As the station was desperate for engineers,

every new applicant was asked to submit the FCC \$2 fee for a provisional license. Evans objected, claiming he should extensively train all volunteers. without informing the applicants, trustees, or the chief engineer, he locked up the applications and checks, including those of an audio technician, a WOSU jazz program host, whom Dave Houser wished to have as his partner on a new WFAC show, and the young woman who had served as Bruce Toussaint's assistant at the station, Pam Pollack. When Evans' deception was uncovered in October, he was confronted by Pestefano, Brigham and Haefele in a heated meeting. After the confrontation, Evans offered to assist Leora Gary in collecting cover charges at the Needles Eye. She was the only person left who would broadcast from the club with Snyder and Pathak as overseers, and she left Evans to collect full time. When he left without giving her the collections, she reported it to Pestefano. The following week Pestefano sent Snyder to the club to get the collections from Gary. As she had not completed them, she signed over her monthly welfare check to the station, under pressure from Snyder, to cover the expected take. She was left without an income until Pestefano reimbursed her the amount of her check, less collections.⁸⁴

Evening preparatory classes for the third class FCC license brought an unsolicited station subscription of

\$15 from a grateful trainee, Joe Pittro. The 29 other subscriptions received in 1975 were from staff members rather than listeners. Kapp, Batten, Bruce Todd, Garner, Perry, Christoffersen and her employer Tommy's pizza, Dave Bunge and Greg Immel, a state welfare case worker, were among staff who had been with the station from the St. Stephen's meetings, when most of the subscriptions had been collected. Announcers promoted giveaways of donated gifts in return for subscriptions, but no one called in.

Station volunteers contributed supplies in addition to their time. Bunge gave the station a press negative for printing the stationery. Mike Darfus did free printing. Frank Gabrenya, a writer with a local advertising agency who did a comedy program on the station, gave albums and tables. When Destefano neglected to get broken needle cartridges on the turntables fixed, Poncho Murray bought new ones, and also gave record cases. Grant Hilliker made an album-sized mailbox for the station, when Destefano refused to buy a large box for mail deposits at the new university-area studios. Bill Parks gave recordings of broadcasts he conducted with celebrities and tapes of specialized music from his WOSU programs. Francis Carmedy, a state policeman at the State Office Tower, listened nightly to WFAC

while on duty. he gave a weather and police band radio for the news staff. Dave Reid began hosting a morning show. he was a cab driver, who listened at the terminal with other cabbies. he gave 75 recent albums, volume-control earphones, and a record cleaning set. Chuck Rapp built the control room's platform at the new Moonshine studios.

Although Rapp was Destefano's friend and neighbor, Destefano decided to enforce Evans' rules against him. In August Evans urged at a general meeting that a system of fines be adopted for log errors and for breaking any of a series of rules that Evans proposed, such as forbidding food and drink in the control room, bringing beer or drugs to the station, and coming late to broadcasts. Destefano agreed to enforce the fines, but was nonplussed at having to initiate them against Rapp, who enjoyed beer and cigarettes during his Bluegrass and Country show. In December, Rapp declined to further engineer the Bluegrass palace remotes, leaving the station without a studio engineer for the programs, which left them in doubt.

In December Destefano was bringing pressure on all air staff to become subscribers, and to work two hours a week at office tasks, although there was little to be done in the office. Destefano insisted that the right to broadcast was not a benefit given the station

by volunteers, but a privilege given to volunteers by the station. He entered the control room during broadcasts to demand a \$15 subscription. Dave Johnson, the first volunteer to have passed his license test in February, 1975, ordered Destefano out of the control room. He was a middle-aged unemployed white man, who had fixed the used turntables Destefano had obtained for the station, and shielded the station's tower with steel. His weekly program was an informative look at past music eras, like the big band era. He often volunteered to be studio engineer during Needles Eye remote broadcasts. After the confrontation with Destefano, he left WFAC and refused to return "as long as Ralph was there."⁸⁵

Francis Carmedy felt comfortable with the fact that he and Destefano were middle-aged and shared police backgrounds. Carmedy co-hosted a Saturday morning program. He became distressed about James Evans' Sunday morning program, and began to tape Evans' shows, threatening to send the tapes to the FCC as examples of illegal use of the airwaves. Carmedy was not familiar with the free access and expression concept of broadcasting. Evans played records that promoted black revolution. He held discussions with guests about the evils of white dominance in society. On September 25 his guests were Mel Griffin, former

announcer with WVKO, a soul music station, and its former program director Les Brown, who claimed he was fired from WVKO for urging blacks over the air to register to vote in the November election, which had a black man as Democratic mayoral candidate and black school board candidates. Much of the black staff at WVKO left the white-owned station after Brown was fired. Their attacks with Evans on WVKO's management concerned Destefano and Anurle, as well as Carmedy. FCC rules governing personal attack require that a transcript be sent to the subject and time be given for a rebuttal. Evans claimed he informed WVKO's station manager Bert Charles about the program, and had made a tape of it. WVKO's problems and WFAC's programming for blacks led the latter to become a **popular** station in the black community.⁸⁶

Evans brought in Bob Lewis as co-host of some Sunday morning programs. Lewis was a young black garbage collector, who wanted an all-night music and talk show. Evans agreed to serve as engineer when it was scheduled. When the station moved to its university-area studios in mid-December, Evans stopped coming to the station. Lewis was left at the station without an engineer. Destefano was refusing to give anyone keys to the new studios, so Lewis was often left locked out

at midnight, as well. On Christmas Eve he arrived to do his show, and spent hours outside in a phone booth trying to get staff members to open the station for him. He had obtained a provisional license, but still no key.

As a result of Pestefano's refusal to give the staff keys, the station was off and on the air at random times during 1976 and early 1977, depending on whether or not someone was inside the station to let announcers in. If someone arrived late for a show, or the previous announcer was not there for his show, the station was locked and inaccessible. Pestefano and Anarle refused to drive to the station in response to telephone calls from locked out announcers.

At a Program Committee meeting in early December, Pestefano and Anarle proposed that the station's broadcasting be limited to evening hours, which would have cut everyone's air time to an hour, since a full staff for 24-hours was functioning, with 50 licensed volunteers and new provisional licenses pending. Pestefano and Anarle claimed that the air staff lacked broadcasting skills, and that it could better gain those skills by broadcasting fewer hours. The concentrated effort would force announcers to plan their programs better. Todd and Brigham voted against the proposal, with Diane Howe casting the deciding program

Committee vote against reduction of hours. Destefano and Andrie persistently lost on voting at P.C. meetings, and set about to scuttle the P.C., where they lacked a majority for their ideas.

When Pam Pollack stopped coming to the station in December, the News Letter which she prepared was no longer issued. Her father had provided a source of station funding by giving Destefano a large sum to be paid in weekly wages to Pam to give her the experience. Her father Art Pollack was a businessman who had let the station use his trucks for bringing equipment to the downtown studios in July, 1975. During the exodus of the staff in June, who most went to the National Alternative Radio Conference in Madison, Pam manned the station's office by herself.

Destefano and Bruce Todd made another trip in July. They joined Destefano's wife on a trip to the International Women's Year conference in Mexico City. Since Destefano had experience setting up radio towers, the station was left without his services when the tower was purchased and ready for construction; Andrie delayed buying the tower, which led to its owner raising the price by \$500. For an additional fee the owner agreed to set up the tower at the roller rink site. As the staff was eager to broadcast, it voted

to pay the additional fees rather than wait for Destefano's return. The station was able to begin testing its signal by late July, 1975, and broadcast programs in the first week in August.⁸⁷

The promoter of a free access station in Dayton, whose license was pending, visited WFAC in August to discover funding techniques. The Dayton station was charging tuition to volunteers to take its FCC license study classes. As Ohio had recently established a board to oversee proprietary schools, Dayton's operation was under scrutiny by the board.

Destefano wished to learn what the board's requirements were for establishing a school of broadcasting at the station, if WFAC were to get larger quarters than it had downtown. He felt such a school could support the station from tuition. Requirements were a \$100 fee, \$10,000 surety bond, approval by the building, fire, health and sanitation department, full disclosure of assets and liabilities, of contracts, scholarships and loans offered to students, and courses comprising 450 clock hours per half-year, or three-hours daily.⁸⁸

The requirements for establishing a trade school were beyond WFAC's means, but Destefano asked public relations Director Chandler to find a location for the

station that could meet them. Chandler found an unused A & P store for a reasonable rent. Destefano rejected it for security reasons, stating that since it was in a black section of Columbus the station's equipment would be unsafe there. Chandler resigned as public relations director and John Snyder took over those functions. Snyder advocated raffling a television set as a way to raise funds for the station.

Staff members were asked to sell raffle tickets. A young black man who was a student at Career Academy, the broadcasting school Destefano planned to compete with, volunteered his services at the station. On his first visit to the station, Ernie Yates told Destefano and Andrie that he had arranged a disco dance at Denison University in Granville as a benefit for the station, if WFAC could send a disc jockey to play records at the dance. A volunteer was obtained, and Destefano and Andrie gave Yates 50 raffle tickets on the TV to sell in the station's name. Yates was never heard from again, nor could Destefano locate him. There was no dance scheduled at Denison.⁸⁹

4. Community Programming

As co-chairperson of the Program Committee, June Todd was instrumental in shaping WFAC's initial approach to programming. She proposed that discussion materials be made available to the air staff. She provided a variety of magazines. Journals of widely different viewpoints were sought out for free subscriptions. Human Events, a conservative journal, was obtained for the station by Dave Johnson. John Snyder obtained the liberal Foreign Affairs Newsletter. June Todd included these varying viewpoints on her Monday afternoon discussion program. The other announcers could not obtain access to the magazines. James Evans locked up the magazines. He claimed that the staff sat around and read them in their spare time, and that that was a waste of time.

In November, 1974 the only purpose of the program Committee was to develop program concepts. Bill Garner and Dave Houser worked on music programming, Bruce Todd on youth programs and Chris Christoffersen on children's shows. In the summer of 1975 June Todd and Fred Anarle scheduled a Program Committee meeting at Destefano's house. Destefano thereby became a committee member. June Todd added her son Bruce to the reconstituted committee. Carol Brigham and Diane Howe were the other members chosen. Since most of the members were trustees,

the committee was no longer a generator of creative concepts, but a governing body over programming and air staff.

Anrle and June Todd selected 50 people from among the lists compiled at St. Stephen's church. The 50 were invited to attend a midsummer meeting at the downtown studio to receive air staff assignments. Twenty-nine men and 21 women were invited. A sufficient number came for Anrle to draw up a 4 p.m. to midnight schedule, which included a variety of programs. The air staff did reach 50 by October, 1975.

At a July meeting at Brigham's house, June Todd added Gary to the Program Committee. James Evans was the second black member selected, by virtue of his news director position. Selections to the P.C. were capricious. In early August Anrle informed two staff members who volunteered to serve on the committee and develop program ideas that the committee was closed, and not open to anyone interested in programming. In mid-August he ordered John Snyder to sit apart from the committee at a restaurant meeting, after Evans had invited Snyder to attend. Brigham added her neighbors Karen Martens and Carol Houser to the committee. Anrle added Frank Gabrenya, who had written the WFAC handbook, which stated the initial premise that "the regular Programming Committee is always in need of

eager volunteers." The P.C. decided its membership should be limited to people with "taste", and a Program Committee Review Board of members was established to select days for overseeing the staff's programs by individual P.C. members to improve the quality.⁹⁰

Martens and Mouser resigned from the P.C. in October, citing its lack of effectiveness. By December the P.C. had 15 members, each holding the title of 'manager' or 'director' over some aspect of station activity and with direct authority over subalterns. Snyder, as Office manager, was selected to the P.C. in early December. When June Toda informed Anurle of her pending resignation as co-chairperson, effective at the December 15 meeting, Anurle and Destefano were no longer at a voting disadvantage. At the December 15 meeting Destefano accepted Toda's resignation letter, but he declared that the P.C. had actually been dissolved at the last meeting. Snyder contended that the exclusive concept was ended, and anyone who attended meetings could vote. Anurle said he never liked the idea of a closed committee.

A democratic spirit seemed to be at work. Since the December 15 meeting consisted primarily of office staff—Destefano, Snyder, Anurle, Coco Gurington, who had assumed Evans' public service scheduling role, they

launched an attack on the air staff. Anarle claimed black d.j.'s Disco Dave and Top Cat Ron Hayes were prima donnas who promoted themselves rather than program concepts. Hayes had worked at East Coast commercial stations, and did a Sunday afternoon jazz request show for WFAC that had a large audience. The new P.C. at the meeting voted to begin limiting the concept of free expression for the air staff. A rule was passed that no announcer could say his name more than twice during a program, regardless of the show's length. Penalties for violations were not specified, but the 9 yea voters, most of whom had not been considered to be P.C. members, introduced a new aspect to a free access station. Brigham and Howe fruitlessly objected. With June Todd gone, the P.C. was under Destefano's control. Todd urged other P.C. members to resign from the committee. With fewer P.C. members available for assistance and access to the station, keyless air staff members who could not get in to do their programs began to resign. With Evans no longer doing his Sunday morning show, the station was locked at noon when Ron Hayes was scheduled to broadcast. After several weeks of being locked out, Hayes left in January, 1976 and obtained a paying job at WVKO. Saturday afternoon's popular jazz-rock host Mike

Fitzpatrick left for a job with a local commercial station. The daily early morning host John Goawin left, obtaining a job in South Carolina as a result of his first experience at WFAC. Afternoon jazz host Barney Kuffin got a program on WKO.

The news staff was at odds with Destefano. Josh Loory, a young reporter on the staff, came to the station for news experience. While pursuing a state assemblyman for comments on a breaking news story, Loory was told by Destefano to quit worrying about the news and to type up a letter for him. Loory left, and was hired by local WTVN-TV as a news producer. The news director who had replaced Evans was Dave Sams. He left to become a promotion manager for Pat Boone and Family.

Sams was younger than Evans, but was selected to replace him because of his organizing ability. After Evans became continuity director, an attempt was made to reestablish a news staff in September. Sams attended the organizing meeting. He was ABC's regional news reporter for teen events. He organized a daily schedule of newscasts on WFAC, including a 15-minute 6 p.m. newscast, and recruited a news staff. WFAC news programming began October 1.

OSU female students became WFAC's most effective reporters. Marle Zimmerman obtained an exclusive interview with Lieutenant Governor Dick Celeste in which he outlined his criticism of Governor Jim Rhodes' bond issues on the November ballot that gave tax credits to business. On October 6 she got a scoop in the taping of an interview with Howard Metzenbaum, who announced his candidacy for the U.S. Senate. With WFAC's flexible schedule, complete interviews were often broadcast.⁹¹

OSU student Lisa Metcalf provided lists of aides to state officials to contact for stories. Her mother was an aide to the governor. She brought Glenn Hoady, her former high school teacher, to the station. Hoady involved high school students in the station through Project R.E.A.L., Title III of the Elementary & Secondary Education Act, which he supervised in the South-western City Schools. Students were to receive real life job experiences.

Several 16 year old high school students were given roles on the news staff. Sams brought Becky Murray, Miss Teenage Ohio of 1975, to the station as news coordinator. Phil Golovin was named sports director and sent to cover high school events.

Sams planned elaborate election night coverage for November 4—a city mayoral, council and state bond issue

election. reporters were assigned to campaign headquarters of candidates. Lisa metcalf was sent to the board of elections to call in returns. She experienced being shoved and jostled by aggressive male reporters seeking the handouts of returns.

James Evans criticized the news broadcasts of Sams and the staff, claiming the staff did not gather enough original news. He preempted afternoon and evening programs from October 27 to November 4 to conduct live interviews with all candidates for the school board, city council and mayoral elections.

Co-music Director Chris Christoffersen criticized the 6 p.m. newscast for interlarding with music programming, especially her own rock program from 4 to 7 Tuesdays. She expressed her opinion on the air, receiving calls from her fans who said they listened to the station to hear music without commercials, and news was as bad as commercials. Encouraged by the response, Christoffersen denied Sams and Becky Murray access to the air at 6 p.m. October 7 to do the evening news. Evans consented to her action. As Murray had driven from a distant suburb after school to be there, she left the station never to return. Sams could have taken over, as he was the licensed engineer at the time, having signed the operating log so that Christoffersen

could do her show.⁹² On October 3 she had received a letter from the FCC informing her that "due to the fact that you are not an American citizen, you are ineligible to hold a Commercial license."⁹³

Sams' license was posted on the studio wall in accordance with FCC regulations. When the trustees ordered Evans to meet with them to discuss his approval of Christoffersen's action and his hiding of provisional applications and checks, Sams' license disappeared. Evans later found it behind the control panel where he said it had fallen. When the trustees spoke with Christoffersen, she initially refused to accept station rules, but she was later allowed to begin her children's interview program on October 17 for credit from OSU. Only one other proposal had been made to the station for children's programming. Head Librarian Walker of the Upper Arlington Library proposed reading pre-kindergarten books, but the library did not follow up on the proposal.

Dave Sams was "fired" from the station in late November by Destefano and Andrie, after Brigham told Andrie she heard Sams say "fuck" during a 2 a.m. phone call he made to John Snyder's all-night Friday show. Snyder had the phone conversation over the air. Destefano ordered Sams not to return to the station when

they met the following day. Destefano claimed he acted on authority of the WPAC Programming Policy and Flow Chart. The P.C. had written the new policy in order to protect Sams and others from unauthorized acts like the Christoffersen incident. Since Sams was not broadcasting at the time of his call to Sawyer, and therefore could not be removed from the air, Destefano seemed to have exceeded the new policy guidelines, which contained no provisions for "firing" staff. Destefano cited this paragraph as authority:

The engineer, a licensed operator, is legally responsible for all programming during his logged time. In the case of licensed operator breaking FCC rules, the Program Director, Station Manager or any member of the Board of Trustees has authority to remove him/her from the air immediately if necessary.⁹⁴

Chief Engineer Mark Karraker thought the utterance of one "indecent" word did not violate FCC rules. Sams begged Todd to get him reinstated, claiming he had said "fudge". As support for Sams grew, Anarle claimed Destefano had never ordered Sams from the station, and he was allowed to continue broadcasting. On December 13 Destefano named John Sproat, an unemployed experienced newscaster as news director. Sams laid plans for a 60 minutes-type program, using cab driver Dave Reid's contacts about the city for community stories, and Barb Finkelman's access to community cultural events,

as P.M. coordinator for the OSU Film Arts Society and frequent film reporter for WFAC. Sams, Reid and Finkelman planned their program for February, 1976.

Howard Morris brought popular black G.J. Kirk Bishop to the station for an interview. Morris was a black high school student who came afternoons to the station to get program time. Evans and Chandler told Destefano that a truant officer from Morris' school had warned them about using a high school volunteer during school hours. Destefano told the staff in November to have Morris arrested for trespassing if he returned to the station.

When the news staff complained of broken electric typewriters, Destefano gave the typewriters to two young women who arrived in a van, and told them to get them fixed. They had offered to do typing for the station. They left with the typewriters and did not return. Destefano claimed everyone subverted his authority. At a late August general meeting he broke into tears of depression at seeing his authority criticized.⁹⁵

The WFAC Programming Policy Flow Chart was issued to limit Destefano and Evans' range of actions. The continuity director was limited to "see that all corrections are made properly" on program logs, and

to make public service announcements available to staff.⁹⁶ Evans had issued a continuity report in September giving broad scheduling authority to himself and warned the air staff to "remember fines of twenty-five cents will be imposed for all uncorrected mistakes; the fines will take effect beginning for the Operating Log September 2, 1975 and for the Programming Log September 9, 1975. There will be no exceptions. You have until /next day/.... So be on your guard."⁹⁷ As many staffers were poor, and fines could mount into dollars, the P.C.'s WTAC Programming Policy was issued and left out mention of fines. It was based on a decision of the P.C. at Ivories September 22 stating that "final appealed decisions on fines shall come from the Program Director and Associate program director."⁹⁸ Evans' fines would then be cancelled. He did not like the new restrictions, and accepted a promotion out of the continuity director job and into Director of Training of new volunteers. He did not develop a training program. John Snyder took over the training program role in mid-December, with assistance from a recent OSU engineering graduate, Jeff Burmeister.

Burmeister began the station's only New Left program "movement" in November. He did stories on the Tenant's Union, Free Clinic, and Mark Lane's appearance

in Columbus to discuss the Kennedy assassination. Burmeister drafted engineering diagrams for Destefano to submit to the FCC with a proposal to increase WFAC's power to over 1000 watts. WFAC had to switch to a different educational frequency under the plan, since the increased power would interfere with nearby stations on 91.5. The FCC rejected an earlier request for a lesser power increase on the same frequency. Andrie and Destefano claimed that increase would have caused WYSO's 91.5 signal to interfere with WFAC's 91.5 signal, but not vice versa, and they waived WYSO's interference. FCC engineers disagreed. Andrie also had overlooked the 91.5 license for a 10 watt station held by a college just 10 miles from WFAC's tower. The proposal for a change of frequency was then submitted in November.

Andrie knew of an FCC rule that required commercial stations building new towers to provide space for educational stations' antennas on their towers. At no cost to WFAC the station with its new frequency would get access to the new tower being constructed by Andrie's past employer, WTVN. WOSU was to gain access to WTVN's tower, and get increased power. The new tower height and power would vastly increase WFAC's audience. Destefano forgot that the increased power

on the new frequency would interfere with the signal of the new Dayton free access station, which sought a license on the same frequency WFAC was seeking. The FCC rejected the proposal.⁹⁹

When WFAC folded on April 18, 1977 it gave its license to an experimental learning project called Jefferson Center, who exchanged it with WOSR, a student station at OSU that was seeking a broadcast license on the new channel that WFAC sought. WOSR preferred to have a secure license for 10 watts at 91.5, while Jefferson Center chose to gamble for greater power on the new frequency, not knowing that Dayton had a license on that frequency that would foreclose a chance for a powerful Columbus station.

Chief engineer Mark Karraker was not consulted in the power increase plans. When he left the city for Christmas vacation in December, 1975, Pestefano appointed a second-class licensed engineer Greg DeChant to the chief position, a legally questionable appointment, but DeChant was popular with Pestefano and Snyder for his stand against issuing provisional licenses to new volunteers. In late December he confiscated 15 new licenses, with Andrie's knowledge, including one for former first-class WOSU engineer and program host Bill Parks. Parks had agreed to host programs at WFAC. He was ordered off the air by

DeChant during his first evening of programming. DeChant insisted on extensive training of staff, claiming he understood what proper log-keeping and technical performance was. He had operated the board twice. The second time on November 27th when he did a music program he made 55 errors on three pages of the program log, including writing the wrong hour throughout one hour of programming.¹⁰⁰ Under Evans' system, he would have been fined \$13.75.

Grant Milliker objected to the increased bureaucratizing of the station. He had been adjunct professor of political science at OSU's Mershon Center and was active in many community organizations. He pointed out at a December meeting that the station's purpose was to allow all views from the community to be expressed. His own program, "Who's Running Your Life," expressed the philosophy of community involvement so that others do not control individual freedom. He interviewed supporters of Puerto Rican independence, American Indian movement spokesman Walking Elk, who was supporting the Mohawk's claim to land rights in New York, and local activists. As he was so involved in activities, he frequently asked staff members to broadcast his taped program. He left a tape with Sogey Riley, who gave it to Kris Perry and her

associates to play after their Feminist Radio program concluded its broadcast. Miley left. Perry put the tape on the recorder playing over the air, and she and her colleagues left the station unattended and unlocked, and drove home on a September Friday evening.

Destefano and Anarle chose Perry as one of their daily program directors in December, in a plan designed to eliminate all opposition to them. Station program directors were eliminated and a group of mainly new, inexperienced volunteers to the station were made responsible for each supervising one day of programming, overseeing the air staff, scheduling and checking logs. Most had no licenses. They were appointed on December 10, 1975 after a night's training session conducted by Anarle.¹⁰¹ Their inexperience made them dependent on Destefano and Anarle. The plan had been approved at the December 15 P.C. meeting, after June Todd's resignation.

The previous month Anarle and Destefano forced Laura Wilkison to leave the station. She had been sent to the station in July by Greg Immel, her welfare case worker. She was divorced and had a young child. She volunteered for all activities, getting stores to post fliers for the Moonshine benefit, getting companies to give free food and drinks for the press party. She

became station liaison to WOOL's P.D. Bob Gooding, a black man who gave WFAC duplicate albums his station received. She hosted two all-night music programs, and her sexy voice brought offers to help the station from local businessmen.

Chris Christoffersen accused her of using drugs and attempting to steal money from her purse at her apartment. Andrie and Destefano confronted Wilkison in a long discussion on August 21. She left, but later returned to do her midnight program an hour late. Dave Houser continued his jazz program until she arrived, not knowing of the confrontation. Andrie asked Evans to replace Wilkison as the station's liaison to Gooding. When she insisted on keeping that assignment, Evans denounced her as a drug user, and accused her of program absences. He attempted to reschedule her to a morning program. Dave Houser accused her of being late for her programs. Mike Darius, who had not been given a program by Andrie because it was felt he would do it poorly, was resentful that Wilkison still had her programs. He told Destefano that he, Snyder and Evans were all leaving the station unless Wilkison was fired. No accusations against her were proven.

A P.C. meeting was scheduled at Ivories on September 22 to enable Dave Houser to confront Wilkison on the lateness charge. A decision was reached

to review the first 50 days of program logs to check everyone for lateness and absences.¹⁰

A Summary Report showed that Wilkison was late three times but never absent without approval. Houser was late 12 minutes to one show. Rapp 10 minutes late to one show. Lowe missed a program without notification. Ward late three times for 42 minutes. Riley late twice for 30 minutes. Evans late five times for five hours, 40 minutes, and absent for three. Gary late five times for an hour, and four absences without notice. Chandler late six times. One of Chandler's latenesses cost the station the chance to have its sound broadcast on Coaxial's cable station, as it was just trying to pick up the sound at the time the station was off the air.¹⁰³

The P.C. decided it needed some method for "firing" volunteers. Riley was made an example. He had come increasingly under the influence of Evans, and was demanding that irrelevant programs be removed. He considered Gabrenya's comedy show to be too frivolous. Gabrenya and Christoffersen developed the show in July, writing scripts of comedy skits which staff members performed in biweekly taping sessions at Gabrenya's home. The show involved more effort than any at the station. After the hour program, Gabrenya left the tape for other hosts to select skits from for their programs throughout the week. Riley had a weekly tape

of The Radish Guild in November. He was confronted with that charge and a list of others by Brigham and Toda, and ordered from the station permanently. The Radish Guild expanded into a performing group at local clubs in February, 1976.¹⁰⁴

The Radish Guild lasted longer than WFAC. The station began a fund raising drive July 4, 1976, which raised sufficient money to obtain a better cable to connect transmitter with antenna. It increased "radiated power by 2½ times."¹⁰⁵ power had fallen below the 10 watt authorization.

By the end of 1976 ~~six~~ staff had fallen to 23, and the station was "on the air less than half" the authorized 24-hours a day.¹⁰⁶ The trustees resigned, though Pestefano continued active at the station. Jack Oakes became Board president and Jim Sheets the secretary-treasurer. A benefit was planned for WFAC at the Agora club on April 11, 1977. It brought in less than \$200. On April 19 the station closed for lack of funds. In a last article Pestefano told a reporter that "some outrageously delicious, fantastic talents have been brought out here....Anyone who wants to get on the air can get on."¹⁰⁷ It was published one week after the station closed.

VII. Notes

¹National Alternative Radio Conference, Resolutions (Madison, 1975), p. 3. This chapter is based in part on personal observation. The author attended the general meetings in 1974, served as production manager from May to September, 1975, and program director September through December, 1975.

²WFAC, Letterhead (1975); Don Haelele, comments, Dec. 1975.

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⁴Ibid., p. 3.

⁵CCRB, Steering Committee List, 1974.

⁶Kay Lundy, Resume to WFAC, 1975.

⁷WFAC, News Letter, vol. 1, no. 1 (1974), p. 1.

⁸WFAC News, vol. 1, no. 2 (1975), p. 1.

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CONCLUSION

The case study of community station WFAC forms a striking contrast to the criticisms of commercial broadcasting brought by community groups from 1920 to 1980. The focus at much of the commercial broadcasters was inability to meet varied needs within a society, standardization of programming, sensationalism of content to attract large audiences and attempts to squeeze out noncommercial broadcasting activities.

Commercial broadcasters countered the criticism by challenging the community groups to broadcast, if it seemed so easy. They held that they were meeting public tastes and needs—rating points proved it to them. The insistence of the FCC and the FCC that content not be too specialized, due to the limited number of licenses available, further inhibited refined programming. A general mean was maintained.

When community groups failed to achieve substantial results in negotiations and challenges to commercial broadcasters, community stations were a logical outcome. Applications increased from groups seeking FM and UHF licenses for free access service.

These groups criticized traditional educational stations as too standardized, due to their increased aid from government. This study of the history of community criticism of broadcasting provides a perspective for understanding the conflicts between the public and the industry. The case study shows the pitfalls awaiting community groups seeking to participate in broadcasting.

The major educational radio and television stations underwent a long struggle to bring instructional and cultural programs to the public. The public broadcasting Act of 1967 changed their focus from primarily instructional to mainly cultural broadcasts. Since the programming has represented high culture, or a semblance of it, critics such as Ben Stein have attacked the goal of Carnegie II to increase federal spending on similar programs. These critics charge that the public's money is being spent to benefit only the highly educated and the upper class, who have traditionally supported and attended functions of high culture.

The major educational stations involved with PBS and NPR have launched an attack on the new community stations. They have asked the FCC to

eliminate the 10-watt license in the FM-educational reserve band. Eliminating the 10-watt license would put an end to stations on those frequencies which could not be increased in power because the increase would interfere with others. Stations on frequencies that could be increased beyond 10-watts would be encouraged to join WPM and broadcast its cultural programs.

In 1978 courts continued to sort out the public's interests in broadcasting. Producers of programs deleted from PBS when the network reacted to threats from President Nixon instituted a suit charging First Amendment violations. PBS responded that it was not a government agency and such violations were not applicable. The public access channel provision of the FCC, requiring cable companies to let anyone use their equipment to produce programs on one channel was struck down by a federal court in Missouri in 1978.

Progress continued in the late 1970s for minorities and children. Black businessmen owned two television stations in major cities in 1979, and expressed a goal of presenting programming of interest to blacks. Action for Children's Television revived the interest of university scholars in broadcasting policy, the battleground having shifted from the FCC to the FTC, where scholars were testifying in 1979 on the effects of advertising on children. Responsive commissioners were threatening to ban all commercials from children's

programs. Such a ban would be a gain for challengers as significant as the FM and ETV channel reservations of the 1940s and 1950s.

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