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LIMITED WAR AND THE HOME FRONT:
OHIO DURING THE KOREAN WAR

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Steven Philip Gietschier, B.S.F.S., M.A.

* * * * *


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1977

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INTRODUCTION
AMERICA AND THE KOREAN WAR

But, it is probably safe to say that the middle of the twentieth century finds the citizens of the United States, despite all that good luck and good management have done for them, more conscious of tragedy and anxiety than Americans have ever been before. The year 1950 brought a special deepening of their anxiety. The cold war turned hot in Korea, and the possibility of World War III--with its threat of unimaginable destruction--became, for the first time for many people, a reality.

--American Civil Liberties Union, Security and Freedom: the Great Challenge.
Thirtieth Annual Report, 1951.

The Korean War jolted a bewildered America. For Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins and his wife, news of the North Korean invasion interrupted a weekend spent at their cottage retreat in Maryland. The general was roused early by a call from Washington. He dressed hurriedly, downed a cup of coffee, and was headed for the door when his wife's question stopped him short. She asked, "Does this again mean war?" Collins had no answer. Unlike World War II, Korea was not expected. There was no Pearl Harbor, no "Day of Infamy" call to arms, no immediate pronouncement of righteous, unswerving war goals. The news of the attack came not through special radio broadcasts disrupting the calm of a Sunday afternoon but quietly, in abbreviated stories in the Sunday newspapers. The horrors of this war and its meaning would sneak up on America over time. Its early events, indeed its entire course, confused Americans and frustrated more than galvanized them. Gladys Collins's question revealed this confusion. She was asking in effect, if the Land of the Morning Calm would be the place where America's future would be decided.¹

¹J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston, 1969), p. 4. Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 25, 1950, p. 1.

That query never received a satisfactory answer. The Truman administration's decision to respond quickly to the invasion but to wage a limited war was an idea so new and different to the American experience that many people were left unsatisfied and querulous. Truman's announcement that Korea was not a war but a police action did more to confuse than define the issue. The invasion, in the opinion of one historian, "created a true political crisis for the Truman administration. It had to enlist popular support for a distant, costly, and seemingly minor conflict and at the same time take care not to provoke the Soviet Union into escalating that conflict into a world war."² Truman had to persuade his countrymen that Korea was a vital and important conflict paradoxically requiring only a limited American response.

The administration's strategy in Korea was inextricably bound to the entire foreign policy of Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In their view, the postwar world was a bipolar one in which the United States and the Soviet Union could not continue to be allies. The administration acted in foreign affairs under the theory expounded by diplomat George Kennan in his anonymously-published article, "The Sources of

²Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism (Chicago, 1971), p. 61.

Soviet Conduct." Kennan argued that capitalism and Socialism were innately antagonistic. He postulated that the Soviet Union maintained a belief in "the basic badness of capitalism" and "in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in its destruction." Furthermore, he stressed that the Kremlin had no timetable for the destruction of the West: "Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal." Kennan posited, and Acheson agreed, that the Soviet threat must be contained by a combination of military, political, and economic pressures. The basic defense policy of the administration still was based on air atomic striking power, but containment accepted military force as only one of a number of tools at the nation's disposal. Victory over communism would come, Truman and Acheson seemed to say, not through any military conquest but when the American system, or civilization, would prevail over the Soviet system.³ Speaking in December, 1950, at the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, the President warned his audience of the critical

³Kennan's article, originally published in Foreign Affairs, July, 1947, pp. 566-82, is reprinted in Walter LaFeber (ed.), America in the Cold War: Twenty Years of Revolution and Response, 1947-1967 (Paper; New York, 1969), pp. 35-48. See also David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York, 1964), pp. xii-xiii.

struggle in which the United Nations was engaged:

No matter how the immediate situation may develop, we must remember that the fighting in Korea is but one part of the tremendous struggle of our time--the struggle between freedom and communist imperialism. This struggle engages all our national life, ⁴ all our institutions, all our resources.

However well-suited to the realities of the postwar world containment was (and that, of course, is another question entirely), this policy flew in the face of the traditional American philosophy of war and peace. This rubric decreed that international problems must be solved just as domestic problems were, without the use of force. The natural state for society is peace, and war is its complete aberration: it is not, and cannot morally be, simply a continuation of politics by other means. Thus, the American view, really the classically liberal view, is that war can be fought only as a righteous crusade using maximum force to effect a quick result and a rapid return to peace. The decision to go to war can, therefore, be moral only when total victory is the goal and total war the strategy.⁵

⁴Harry S. Truman, "Report to the Nation," Proceedings of the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth (Raleigh, N.C., 1951), pp. 49-52, quoted in Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History, ed. Robert H. Bremner (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), III, 183.

⁵Rees, pp. x-xii.

The Korean War was the first American war which did not fit this framework. It was fought mainly to stop aggression, and, despite the brief interval when a total victory seemed possible, between the Inchon landing and the intervention of the Chinese, it was clearly a limited war. The destruction of the Korean people and their land was truly horrible, but it is not accurate to argue, as Howard Zinn does, that the Korean War ("saving lives in the future by destroying lives in the present") was nothing more than another example in a long series of American depredations "justified by vague speculation about preventing some possible conflagration in the future." Korea was intended consciously to be fundamentally different: a war fought by a major nuclear power using less than total force, within a confined area, and with objectives short of complete destruction and unconditional surrender. It was a concept painfully born.⁶

The administration's policy, even before Korea, generated among the American people restlessness, frustration, and hostility. Diplomatic historian Selig Adler wrote that "like all compromise policies, containment was open to attack from hotheads who wanted to do more and soreheads who wanted to do less." Many deplored the

⁶Ibid., p. xi. Howard Zinn, Postwar America: 1945-1971 (Indianapolis, 1973), p. 15. Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 2.

possibility of a prolonged struggle against communism and were loath to support the inevitable adjuncts, programs of economic and military assistance. They were tired of the twenty year struggle to end the depression, combat the Axis, and rehabilitate Europe. The prospect of higher taxes, more soldiering, and renewed governmental control of the economy aggravated this discontent. Political analyst Samuel Lubell wrote that the Korean War began when it was very hard "to balance the interests of business, farmers, and workers with one another and with those of the unorganized public."⁷

By the time the Korean War began and President Truman decided that there was indeed a substitute for victory, opponents of this policy had come to believe that containment was not only the wrong approach but that it was a criminal scheme concocted by pro-communists in the government. The North Korean invasion merely augmented their revulsion for the government's foreign policy. These foes of containment and supporters of traditional midwest isolationism, including Ohio Senators Robert Taft and John Bricker, had come to believe that

⁷Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (London, 1957), p. 399. Samuel Lubell, "Is America Going Isolationist Again?" Saturday Evening Post, July 7, 1952, pp. 19ff. Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade--and After: America, 1945-1960 (Paper; New York, 1960), pp. 115-17.

the United States had fallen victim to a group of near-traitorous leaders whose ultimate goal was the creation of a Soviet America. Historian Eric Goldman has called this doctrine the "great conspiracy" theory. As he explains it, the theory began in 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt and his New Dealers took control of the government and attempted to communize it from within. They destroyed the nation's free economic institutions, manipulated the tax structure, and stifled private enterprise in a mass of bureaucracy. With the advent of World War II, Roosevelt and his cronies began to alter American foreign policy drastically. They first painted a picture of the Soviet Union as a peace-loving democracy; then, at the close of the war, they engineered the sell-out of Eastern Europe. Finally, during the Truman years, the plotters continued by extending deficit spending and high taxes and by championing a strong executive, social legislation, and the increased influence of the military in the government.⁸

The great conspiracy theory got its biggest boost from the tumultuous events of 1949 and early 1950. Within a few short months, China fell, the Soviet Union exploded its atomic bomb far ahead of all predictions, and Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury. How these things could have happened except through treachery and subversion the

⁸Goldman, p. 122.

isolationists did not want to explore. Korea's becoming a battlefield was further grounds for recriminations and attacks upon the government in general and Truman and Acheson in particular.⁹

The most serious attack on the Truman-Acheson policy came from General Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the United Nations forces in Korea. Fought out across the thousands of miles between Washington and Tokyo, the Truman-MacArthur conflict centered on the issue of civilian control of the military. But the argument itself between the President and his general concerned MacArthur's public advocacy of an absolutist position despite repeated orders to refrain from doing so. When Truman fired him, he not only re-asserted civilian supremacy; he also insured that the war would continue to be prosecuted within the restrictions of the containment policy.

This study is an investigation of how the patterns of American life, both personal and institutional, were changed, if at all, by the Korean War. The limitations of the American commitment in Korea meant that the war imposed peculiar and uneven pressures upon individuals and organizations throughout American society. These pressures

⁹Ibid., pp. 112-15. See also Rees, pp. 55-58.

varied greatly because the Truman administration sought to limit popular participation in the war as carefully as it restricted the nation's military commitment. Continuing the emphasis on Europe in their foreign policy, Truman and his government sought to control carefully the extent to which all resources were consigned to Korea.¹⁰ Americans as well as the rest of the world had to understand that Korea was not the United States' choice for Armageddon. Simultaneous with the stresses produced by the war, the American involvement created certain opportunities within American society. To give just one example, pressures imposed upon industry to conform to the government's plans for mobilization went hand-in-hand with opportunities to expand production, diversify, and increase sales within the parameters of the mobilization. This study deals with these opportunities as well as with the war's pressures upon society.

History is a problem-solving discipline. This study does not purport to be a complete account of United States history during the three years of the Korean War. Primarily, this work has been shaped by the contradictory nature of the evidence and data which I have sought to examine. On the one hand, the search for materials could have been unending if I had decided to investigate every

¹⁰Rees, p. xiii.

nook and cranny in pursuit of historical truth. On the other hand, specific investigations of institutions or persons were repeatedly frustrated by the paucity of available records. The evidence of the recent past is often restricted, sketchy, or simply not there. Paradoxically, while the possible areas for study seemed limitless, the extant data with which historical questions can be answered were all too finite.

The most important boundary placed around this dissertation was the decision to confine it to Ohio. I do not attempt to argue that Ohio is an exact microcosm of the nation and that the developments within the state can simply be extrapolated to the national scene. But, in many ways, Ohio tends to be a representative area because of its diversity--rural and urban, agricultural and industrial, neither East nor West, politically mixed--so that an investigation of Ohio and no other state involves no serious distortions. I hope I have been careful to note the instances in which the Ohio experience was different from the rest of the nation.

The study is composed of six extended essays and a conclusion. Overall, the thesis of these essays is that the Korean War ushered in a series of new relationships and practices which changed the patterns of American life and reshaped the contours of American society. This was

no subtle development. The United States had striven to achieve unconditional surrender in World War II, and when that objective was realized, Americans anticipated a return to a less anxious existence. The Cold War, containment, and Korea destroyed that hope and created a new America in which military and diplomatic considerations took precedence over domestic concerns. So complete was this reversal of traditional priorities that in subsequent years, social programs have often had to be draped with robes of national security and preparedness to gain respectability.

Central to this transformation was the administration's re-assessment of American foreign policy, as it emerged in the document called NSC 68, calling for a substantial increase in military spending. After the tumultuous events of 1949, President Truman ordered a top-level study by the Departments of State and Defense of United States foreign and defense policy. The paper which emerged from this study and was forwarded to the National Security Council was called NSC 68. Its basic conclusion was that postwar power relationships had created a fundamental shift in global politics, fraught with long-range tensions and dangers. NSC 68 pressed for a substantial boost in Western rearmament with the United States leading the way. Security was to become the dominant element in

the budget, and previous restrictions on spending were to be cast aside.¹¹

The Council of Economic Advisers took part in determining the cost of implementing NSC 68, and CEA member Leon Keyserling argued that the nation's economy could endure the required increase in defense spending without inflation simply by expanding the nation's productive capacity. Still, while Edward Flash, another CEA member, argued that "there emerged before Korea a common foundation of information and shared understanding of issues," Congress took no action on these recommendations before the war. Only with the wartime mobilization were the provisions of NSC 68 implemented. Military spending rose from \$13.1 billion in fiscal 1950 to \$44.2 billion in fiscal 1952, and expansionary defense spending was institutionalized.¹²

Liberals who supported mobilization and the jump in defense spending undoubtedly believed that sustained social progress and increased military security could proceed concurrently. Yet, as the pacifist A. J. Muste

¹¹Lawrence S. Wittner, Cold War America: From Hiroshima to Watergate (Paper; New York, 1974), pp. 70-71. A paraphrase of NSC 68 is printed in Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York, 1966), pp. 306-08.

¹²Edward S. Flash, Jr., Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers (New York, 1965), pp. 36-38, 39. Wittner, pp. 71, 79.

observed in 1950, "Riding these two horses going in opposite directions does not work." Muste's complaint that money is always put first into armaments and that there never seems to be enough left over for social change was borne out by the Korean experience. Especially after the Chinese entered the war in December, 1950, and after the 1950 elections reduced Democratic majorities in Congress, the Fair Deal was shelved. National health insurance proposals went to a commission for study, revision of the Taft-Hartley law was never completed, and a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission was not established. Truman's 1951 State of the Union message dwelled on foreign policy and defense issues, with social welfare programs receiving scant attention. NSC 68 had correctly predicted that security must come first, and all other items were accommodated to it.¹³

One historian, Arthur Ekirch, has written persuasively that individual liberty and traditional liberalism are in decline, the victims of the garrison state and the permanent war economy. Ekirch argues that after World War II liberals lost their fear of a large central government and adopted a militant internationalism to combat isolationism. Economic liberties retreated in

¹³A. J. Muste, "Korea: Spark to Set a World Afire?" The Essays of A. J. Muste, ed. Nat Hentoff (Indianapolis, 1967), p. 348. Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York, 1973), pp. 441, 442, 444-46. Phillips, p. 308.

the face of big government, defense contracts, and the abandonment of public works for armaments. Civil liberties suffered as well from the quest for total loyalty and the attempt to place the welfare of the government ahead of the welfare of its people. The thesis of this study is that the Korean War cemented these changes in place.¹⁴

¹⁴ Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Decline of American Liberalism (Paper; New York, 1967), preface, chaps. 17, 18.

CHAPTER I
LIMITED WAR, LIMITED ACCORD:
OHIO ENCOUNTERS KOREA

We are embarked on a voyage at this moment in which a continued failure of understanding and judgment may wreck the greatest adventure in freedom the human race has ever known. . . . If the present trend continues it seems to me obvious that the President will become a complete dictator in the entire field of foreign policy and thereby acquire power to force upon Congress all kinds of domestic policies which must necessarily follow.

--Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans. 1951.

The Korean War began on Sunday, June 25, 1950. For reasons which are still the subject of speculation, seven infantry divisions and support units from the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea crossed the military demarcation line near the 38th Parallel, thereby initiating a massive invasion of the Republic of (South) Korea. The attack, launched against an insufficiently equipped border defense, enjoyed immediate success. Within three days, North Korean forces had advanced substantially along the entire 150-mile front and captured Seoul, South Korea's capital, thirty miles below the Parallel.¹

¹David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York, 1964), pp. 3, 5. Rees's book is the best and most comprehensive study of the war; he covers military, diplomatic, and political developments thoroughly and analytically. On the question of North Korea's intentions and motives and the possibility that South Korea may have provoked the attack, see Lloyd C. Gardner, "Truman Era Foreign Policy: Recent Historical Trends," The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972 ed. Richard S. Kirkendall (Columbia, Missouri, 1974), pp. 47-74.

Word of the attack reached Washington, D. C., at 8:00 P.M., Saturday, June 24.² Secretary of State Dean Acheson telephoned the news to President Harry Truman, who was spending the weekend in Independence, Missouri. The President scheduled a conference with his top-level advisers for Sunday evening at Blair House and returned to Washington. Acheson arranged an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council for Sunday afternoon. Truman and his advisers agreed after Sunday dinner that North Korea was guilty of aggression which the United States must act to counter. Accordingly, the President authorized sending United States arms and equipment from Japan to South Korea. He ordered General Douglas MacArthur, commander of allied forces in the Far East, to use air and naval power to evacuate U.S. nationals, and he dispatched the Seventh Fleet from the Philippines to Japan. At a second Blair House conference on June 26, MacArthur was authorized to use air and naval forces to aid South Korea below the Parallel, and the Seventh

²The day begins in Korea before it begins in Washington. Time in Korea is fourteen hours ahead of Washington (EST) and thirteen hours ahead (EDT). Thus, when the invasion began at 4:00 A.M., June 25, in Korea, it was 3:00 P.M., June 24, in Washington.

Fleet was rerouted to a position between Formosa and the Chinese mainland.³

The Security Council, with the Soviet delegate absent, passed an American-drafted resolution calling for a cease-fire and North Korean withdrawal. Two days later, the Council adopted a second United States resolution recommending that member states furnish assistance to South Korea so as to repel the attack and restore peace to the area. MacArthur visited Korea on June 29 and ordered United States bombing missions north of 38°. The National Security Council persuaded the President that air and naval forces alone would be unable to stop the invasion and that ground troops should be employed. All four American divisions in Japan were sent to Korea, starting on July 1, and a blockade of North Korea was implemented. A third Security Council resolution created a unified United Nations Command, and Truman named MacArthur Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.⁴

³Rees, pp. 4, 21-23. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), pp. 331-34. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), pp. 402-08.

⁴Rees, pp. 21-22, 24-27, 35-37. Truman, pp. 334-44. Acheson, pp. 404-05, 409-13.

Americans struggled to understand these alarming events. Ohio newspapers editorialized about the rapid developments and the confusion of the situation, posing a series of questions for their readers to consider: was the North Korean attack an isolated incident or part of a global showdown? Was it a feint, designed to distract America's attention from Berlin or Iran or some other potential troublespot? To what extent was the Soviet Union behind the invasion? In addition, Ohioans had to deal with the contradictions of the early days of the war: General MacArthur ordered bombing north of 38° prior to National Security Council authorization to do so; President Truman committed United States ground forces without Congressional approval when he had steadfastly refused troops in China despite congressional clamoring; Secretary Acheson counseled a policy of active resistance when just five months before he had seemingly written Korea out of the United States's defensive perimeter.⁵

⁵See, for example, Cincinnati Enquirer, July 5, 1950, p. 4, and Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 27, 1950, p. 12. Acheson's speech, delivered to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, delimited the geographic area which the United States would defend. He drew a line extending from the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines to describe the defense perimeter. Areas outside this line, including Korea, would have to rely on the United Nations and self-defense. The speech has been variously interpreted as either a blatant American withdrawal which invited the North Korean attack or a realistic assessment of the limits of American power in the wake of the bipartisan military retrenchment after World War II.

Ohio's Republican senior senator, Robert Taft, captured the inherent frustrations of his constituents in his ambivalent response to the first days of the war. Taft's biographer notes that the senator did not anticipate the war or know immediately how to react to it. Indeed, like many Americans who had supported the GOP version of isolation before World War II and who hoped that V-J Day could mark a return to that policy, Taft was reluctantly educating himself on many new foreign policy realities when the North Koreans attacked in 1950. Thus, Taft's Senate speech on June 28 revealed a "yes, but" approach to the war. He forthrightly branded North Korea's actions as aggression and approved Truman's quick response, saying he would vote for a congressional resolution in support of the dispatch of air and naval forces. Yet, in the same speech, Taft denounced the administration for dividing Korea in the first place and for committing United States forces without congressional approval. He also called upon Acheson to resign since the President's new policy marked, in Taft's view, a complete repudiation of Acheson's position.⁶

⁶James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston, 1972), pp. 452-54, 474, 485. Plain Dealer, June 29, 1950, p. 1.

Taft would later reflect again on these uncertain days in a slim volume discussing foreign policy, prepared as a prelude to the 1952 election. The debate over how the United States shall go to war, he wrote, "was brought to an issue by the intervention of the President in the Korean War without even telling Congress what he was doing for several weeks. . . . I do not think that the American people have ever faced a more serious constitutional issue or one which in the end may present a greater threat to their freedom." He added, "Because of the importance of Korea, however, there should have been no question that the situation demanded all-out arms aid to provide the South Koreans with a complete defense against attack from the north." But such assistance should have proceeded only after Congress had approved: "My conclusion . . . is that in the case of Korea, where a war was already under way, we had no right to send troops to a nation, with whom we had no treaty, to defend it against attack by another nation, no matter how unprincipled that aggression might be, unless the whole matter was submitted to Congress and a declaration of war or some other direct authority obtained."⁷

Other Ohioans besides Senator Taft, including several who were moved to write to the President, offered

⁷Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Garden City, New York, 1951), pp. 22-23, 103, 33.

their own explanations and prescriptions for the war. The Plain Dealer indicted the Soviet Union for starting the war and claimed a moral responsibility for the United States to protect the independence of South Korea. Since a defeat would threaten Japan, argued the editors, North Korea should be eliminated "and Korea united as Russia itself asserted it should be." Some popular sentiment also favored a total effort by the United States. One person from Dayton suggested to Truman that the Air Force lay down a fifty-mile wide atomic curtain between North and South Korea. Another Ohioan argued for all-out war, a declaration of war against Russia, before "it is too late." More prudently perhaps, the Cincinnati Enquirer cautioned against any total war in Korea. Such a commitment would be reckless given the immensely greater threat from other attacks in regions with far more strategic value.⁸

Questions about the causes of the war, its constitutionality, objectives, and strategy would continue throughout the war. In the war's opening weeks and months,

⁸Plain Dealer, June 26, 1950, p. 14. Walter Becker to Harry S. Truman, July 3, 1950, OFFICIAL FILE (hereafter OF) 471B, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library. James Macdonald to Harry S. Truman, June 28, 1950, OF 471B, Truman Papers. Enquirer, July 11, 1950, p. 4.

one fear overrode all of these issues: that an all-out war was imminent and that a direct attack on the United States should be anticipated. Meeting this threat was the assigned task of a revitalized civil defense establishment.⁹

During most of the Truman administration, civil defense was not much more than a minor concern. Following World War II, Secretary of War Robert Patterson had created a special board under Major General Harold Bull to study the future of civil defense. The board's report in 1947 recommended the establishment of a distinct civil defense agency, separate from the Army, under the new Secretary of Defense, but no such action ensued. In 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal created an Office of Civil Defense Planning and asked for another recommendation. The Hopley Report called for a National Office of Civil Defense but with basic responsibilities transferred to the states and local communities. Truman rejected the need for a separate agency and put civil defense under the National Security Resources Board, one of the agencies created by the 1947 National Security Act. NSRB's Civil Defense Administration was made responsible for warning systems, camouflage of industrial

⁹See, for example, the fear that Cleveland was a Soviet target, Plain Dealer, July 2, 1950, p. 18A.

plants, evacuation, fire control, and other emergency measures.¹⁰

NSRB officials took the position that civil defense policy should be made at the state level rather than at the municipal or county level. The national Conference of Mayors argued that civil defense was a federal responsibility. City leaders protested the high-handed recommendations and directives from state officials to build air-raid shelters and to implement other policies, all at local expense. Even when Congress voted \$31.7 million to the CDA for local civil defense in 1951, the Conference called the appropriation grossly inadequate.¹¹

Ohio government officials quickly agreed upon the need for an Ohio civil defense effort and for state-local cooperation. State Senator Joseph Bartunek (Dem.-25th), Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee in the Ohio Senate, wrote a series of three articles in which he explained the purpose of the Ohio Defense Corps, created

¹⁰Neal Fitzsimons, "Brief History of American Civil Defense," Who Speaks for Civil Defense?, ed. Eugene P. Wigner (New York, 1968), pp. 33, 35, 36.

¹¹Blake McKelvey, The Emergence of Metropolitan America, 1915-1966 (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1968), p. 155.

in 1949 to supplement the Ohio National Guard. Governor Frank Lausche reorganized Ohio's civil defense at a special four-hour cabinet meeting on July 6. He asked State Adjutant-General Leo Kreber to set up civil defense on a statewide basis, and he encouraged cities and counties to begin their programs as well.¹²

Despite this high-level planning and enthusiasm, the actual implementation of a functioning civil defense system in Ohio took many months. Kreber organized a civil defense section in his department and divided the state into five districts, each with its own commander. He named Lieutenant Colonel William Warner executive director of Ohio civil defense. Lausche signed and filed with the secretary of state a set of regulations, with the force of law, concerning the organization of civil defense. Yet, by the end of 1950, not much more than this skeletal structure existed. In August, the Ohio Fire Defense Advisory Committee met with Warner, but could do no more than discuss general problems. Although representatives of Ohio transportation firms also pledged their support to any civil defense plan for evacuation and dispersal of people, no plan emerged. A series of statewide meetings of all civil defense officials was held to coordinate local and state efforts

¹²Plain Dealer, July 6, 1950, p. 1; July 7, 1950, p. 1; July 8, 1950, p. 2. Enquirer, July 7, 1950, p. 14.

and encourage the recruiting of volunteers, but two problems slowed this effort: fixing the division of responsibility between local and state government and deciding who would finance the whole program. In December, Governor Lausche urged civil defense units to speed up their work and asked that strained jurisdictional relationships be repaired. Not until June, 1951, though, was civil defense adequately funded. House Bill 672 appropriated \$5 million for civil defense, \$3 million of which was earmarked to be spent by Kreber if matched by local money.¹³

City and county civil defense units generally suffered the same nagging deficiencies in coordination, financing, and concrete planning. In Toledo, for example, Mayor Michael DiSalle, serving as the only municipal representative on the governor's civilian defense advisory council, was perfectly positioned to comment on the lack of federal/state/local cooperation. He reported to Toledo City Council in September that financing was still indefinite, and his calls for volunteers drew a very meager response. DiSalle argued,

¹³Enquirer, July 8, 1950, p. 1; July 22, 1950, p. 6. Plain Dealer, July 27, 1950, p. 7; August 10, 1950, p. 3; August 11, 1950, p. 4; September 6, 1950, pp. 1, 22; December 3, 1950, p. 1; May 8, 1951, p. 5. Toledo Blade, August 3, 1950, p. 10. Youngstown Vindicator, September 24, 1950, p. A-27. Columbus Dispatch, October 10, 1950, p. 12A. Ohio, General Assembly, Bulletin, 99th General Assembly of Ohio, 1951-1952, p. 403.

as did the Conference of Mayors, that the expense of civil defense was a constitutional responsibility of the Federal government. Speaking in favor of a council resolution to support the conference's position, DiSalle said:

The cost of Civilian Defense on this new type of warfare may run into millions of dollars for a city like Toledo. Not only are we unable to take care of it, but . . . I don't know of any city in Ohio that would be able to stand that kind of an expenditure. Civilian Defense seems to me to be an essential part of the conduct of war¹⁴

Toledo established a Civil Disaster and Defense Committee and a twenty-member advisory committee, but municipal funding for civil defense itself was slight. In July, 1951, the city council still found it imperative to petition Congress to approve the 1952 CDA budget to supplement local appropriations.¹⁵

In other cities the situation was much the same. A Columbus ordinance establishing a department

¹⁴Toledo, Ohio, Toledo City Journal: Official Publication of the City of Toledo, Ohio, Containing a Record of Council Proceedings, All Legislation Enacted by the City Council, Reports of the Commission of Publicity and Efficiency, Together with Legal Notices of Divisions, Departments and Agencies of the City Government, XXXV (October 21, 1950), 1055.

¹⁵Ibid., (August 12, 1950), 758; (September 16, 1950), 870; (October 14, 1950), 1039; (December 30, 1950), 1354; XXXVI (May 26, 1951), 589; (July 7, 1951), 794, 780-81. Blade, August 17, 1950, p. 29.

of civil defense with a dollar-a-year man as director and the responsibility to "provide a defense for the people against enemy action and other disasters" transferred only \$5000 from the city's public health budget to do this. Other Ohio cities followed similar paths. Canton's city council reported having no money to hire a director. Akron's mayor demanded federal-state coordination before he would act. Youngstown's civil defense council received a \$1000 appropriation to operate during the last quarter of 1950. A statewide survey in March, 1951, found that only four of twenty-five Ohio cities could respond well in an emergency and that only Athens had an air raid warning system.¹⁶

Troops sent directly from the United States reinforced the four American divisions already in Korea starting on July 31. Air strikes against the North on July 2-4 destroyed the North Korean air force so that it was never again a factor. Yet by the time Lieutenant-General Walton Walker took control of the American forces in Korea (EUSAK) on July 13, the United States was clearly fighting a defensive war from a rapidly deteriorating position.

¹⁶ Columbus, Ohio, The City Bulletin; Official Publication of the City of Columbus, XXXV (October 7, 1950), 513-14; (November 25, 1950), 618. Plain Dealer, March 3, 1951, p. 1; March 9, 1951, pp. 13, 3. Akron Beacon Journal, June 30, 1950, p. 29. Vindicator, September 30, 1950, p. 1.

The North Koreans had first attacked the United States position on July 5, and had made steady and even alarming progress. The major city of Taejon, in central South Korea, fell to the Communists on July 20, and a major U.S. counter-offensive against Chinju failed in early August. By the end of August, Walker had withdrawn his troops into a position known as the Pusan Perimeter, as he employed masterful defensive strategy to buy time at the expense of territory. To observers at home, though, the American forces looked beaten, having endured the worst series of defeats and reverses in American military history. The United Nations command was undersupplied, short on experienced manpower, and uncertain of exactly why their terrible ordeal had to be endured.¹⁷

The horrors of the war were brought home to Americans with new immediacy thanks to the increasing use of television and the rapidity with which war news could be delivered to the home front. One Ohio newspaper commented that television helped people see that this war was for real and not a diversion or minor skirmish. "Televised films," observed the Plain Dealer, "have made it possible for Americans safe at home to look more closely at war than civilians normally do." Besides, both the newspapers and radio reported battle news

¹⁷Rees, chap. 3, especially pp. 36-41, 44-45, 52-54.

"while the smoke hovers over the fields, and in the movies and on television we see the action but a few hours after it took place."¹⁸

As Ohioans followed the retreat of American forces into the Pusan Perimeter, they felt unsure of where this war would take them. The North Korean drive south, so close to a complete success, might well have ended the war as quickly as it had begun. United Nations forces might well have evacuated the peninsula and handed over all of Korea. If, as many people surmised, the Soviet Union was behind the invasion, a United Nations defeat might not mark the end of hostilities but only the first step in a wider attempt to conquer. No one could say for sure. On the other hand, if South Korea did not fall, the war aims of the United Nations were nearly just as uncertain. From the beginning, there had been a great deal of confusion and honest disagreement over how this war should end. Originally, the Truman administration sought to insure that it would be a limited war. Regardless of Soviet intentions, Truman's early use of the term "police action" and his insistence on operating under the auspices of the United Nations, even if after the fact, were intended to demonstrate concretely to the

¹⁸Plain Dealer, August 12, 1950, p. 8; September 8, 1950, p. 10.

Soviets that the United States sought no wider war. Of course, with the American retreat to Pusan often resembling a rout, it did not look as if Truman would decide the course of the war.

In the face of this frightening insecurity, Ohioans tried other ways besides civil defense to prepare for a larger war and to educate themselves to the harsh realities of the existing situation. Governor Lausche and General Kreber, for example, announced a five-day radiological institute to be held at Ohio State University in October. Professors of chemistry and physics from all around the state were invited to discuss ways to combat the effects of atomic rays. The information exchanged was made available to the public. A Toledo restaurant, in tones reminiscent of the World War I decision to rename sauerkraut liberty cabbage, announced that its "Russian Sandwich" made with Russian dressing would hereafter become a "Pyramid Sandwich" with Thousand Island dressing. Clevelanders, on Armistice Day, 1950, paused not only to honor the war dead of World War I but also to consider the possibility of another global conflict. The Ohio Women's Christian Temperance Union sought to do its share, too. In October, Esther Madsen, president of the OWCTU, announced a campaign to raise

\$3000 to send a truck load of fruit juice to the men in service as a substitute for beer.¹⁹

The rapid retreat of American forces created the first wave of a massive Korean refugee problem. In fact, by the end of the three-year war, Korea would be pounded by American bombs and ravaged by the ever-changing front as no land ever had before. The American casualty total was tragic enough, 142,000 killed and wounded, but of all the war dead, 84 per cent were Korean civilians. With the number of registered refugees as high as 2.9 million by June, 1951, several American relief agencies inaugurated a major program of assistance. Ten organizations, members of the larger American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, banded together to form American Relief for Korea, Incorporated. ARK was designed to coordinate a widescale effort to collect clothing and other supplies for Korean refugees. It solicited the participation of many organizations, including several in Ohio. The Columbus YWCA, for example, adopted a collection program as a Lenten project in 1951.²⁰

¹⁹Vindicator, September 27, 1950, p. 4. Blade, August 7, 1950, p. 12. Plain Dealer, November 11, 1950, p. 1; October 28, 1950, p. 7.

²⁰Lawrence S. Wittner, Cold War America: From Hiroshima to Watergate (Paper; New York, 1974), pp. 78-79. U.S., Congress, House, H.J.R. 281, June 30, 1951, Box 32, File: American Relief for Korea, John M. Vorys Papers, Ohio Historical Society. Minutes, Board of Directors, Columbus YWCA, February 3, 1951, Box 3, Records of the Columbus YWCA, Ohio Historical Society.

The ARK relief effort received its biggest boost from a congressional resolution authorizing the President to set aside one month as a period for intensified voluntary contributions. Although Utah Republican Wallace Bennett sponsored the resolution in the Senate, it was the House sponsor, Ohio's Twelfth District Congressman, John Vorys, who was most intimately involved in promoting ARK's cause. After the joint resolution passed both houses of Congress, the President signed and issued a proclamation on August 31, 1951.²¹

Not all Ohioans demonstrated the altruism evident in the ARK program. A number of families of servicemen in Korea were victimized by unscrupulous business practitioners, including a fraudulent real estate scheme. Caught by the shortage of low-rent housing in Columbus, several people contracted with a certain agency at the very reasonable fee of five dollars for the promise "to see the house tomorrow." When tomorrow came, they found the agency closed up and the agents gone. The Columbus Better Business Bureau exposed a similar fraud: a group of door-to-door "volunteers," completely lacking credentials, were caught soliciting contributions to be used ostensibly for purchasing various equipment for VA hospitals. The volunteers,

²¹"The Ark-o-gram," I (July 23, 1951), 1; John Vorys to Palmer Bevis (copy), August 7, 1951; Palmer Bevis to Vorys (telegram), August 30, 1951, all in Box 32, File: American Relief for Korea, Vorys Papers.

representing no one but themselves, used photographs of languishing, wounded veterans to support their cause.²²

With the fate of the United Nations police action hanging in the balance and American troops clustered desparately near Pusan, young Ohioans returned to school for the Fall, 1950 term. Like so many other institutions and persons, schools and students had to make their own accomodations to the war. Colleges and universities confronted shifting enrollments and the need for curricular adjustments. Primary and secondary school systems made their own special arrangements as well, and all schools faced the intensified threat to academic freedom posed by the possible presence of communists in the classroom.²³

Ohio school officials desired to show that they could make a contribution to the war effort. The Columbus school system circulated in every school a freedom scroll which could be signed by students and faculty alike. The scrolls, part of the "Crusade for Freedom" campaign headed by Cincinnati Charles Taft,

²²Columbus Citizen, January 10, 1951, n.p.; Ohio State Journal, February 15, 1951, n.p., both clippings in the scrapbooks of the Columbus Better Business Bureau.

²³On academic freedom, see Chapter IV.

were destined to be delivered to the site of the Freedom Bell in Berlin. Columbus schools also received from the local Civil Defense office instructions on how to conduct atom bomb drills. The pamphlet instructed teachers to assemble students in corridors and seat them on the floor, away from windows and outside walls, in order to get the best possible protection. The Cleveland Board of Education introduced a similar civil defense program and also pledged to toughen the system's entire physical education program, especially the training given to high school boys. In Rocky River, a Cleveland suburb, a teachers' committee recommended changes in the curriculum to reflect the increased need to understand world problems. The committee proposed a series of changes, from studying simple definitions of communism and democracy in Grades One through Three, to high school classes on awareness of the psychology of propaganda, all geared to enable students to interpret the "significant facts about the Korean War and its relationship to the present world tensions."²⁴

The most noticeable change on the campuses of Ohio's colleges in September, 1950, was a sudden drop in enrollments. Across the state, the total student population dropped by about 15,000 to 115,000. This decline was attributed to the end of the "veterans' bulge," caused

²⁴Dispatch, October 5, 1950, p. 3. Plain Dealer, December 5, 1950, pp. 1, 9; October 29, 1950, p. 8-A.

by World War II vets who started school under the G.I. Bill, the lure of good jobs as the economy picked up, and the reinstitution of the draft. Kent State's enrollment dropped 4 per cent in September, 1950, and Ohio State, which declined to report an exact enrollment figure, lost an estimated 2,600 students in Winter Quarter (January), 1951.²⁵

Many colleges revised curricula and adapted schedules to adjust to the war situation. Kenyon College, in Gambier, made graduation possible in three years instead of four by adopting a program of four quarters of eleven weeks each. New students could be admitted each quarter, and continuous attendance was possible. Kenyon's president, Gordon Keith Chalmers, in announcing these changes, said that "the object of the liberal arts college must now be to think war, be ready to wage it, and yet remain a democracy." The faculty at Oberlin College, reversing a stand it took in 1949, voted 105 to 30 to seek an ROTC unit. In Berea, Baldwin-Wallace College announced a 15-year development program of \$6,000,000, including the construction of a new library and new dormitories.

²⁵Plain Dealer, August 30, 1950, p. 1; September 3, 1950, p. 1; September 28, 1950, p. 22; January 31, 1951, p. 9.

President John Knight said the program would help the college mobilize its Christian ideals for defense.²⁶

The war prompted Ohio State University's president, Howard Bevis, to establish a war emergency steering and coordinating committee made up of the three university vice-presidents and the Assistant to the President. This group was responsible for coordinating the activities of five other new committees set up to deal with the war emergency.²⁷ A special civil defense committee recommended that the university make its hospital available to the state civil defense organization. It also published a series of bulletins, including one on dealing with a nuclear attack, and

²⁶ Ibid., January 24, 1951, p. 15; March 4, 1951, p. 15-B; November 9, 1950, p. 5; January 27, 1951, pp. 1, 3.

²⁷ Howard Bevis to OSU faculty (memo), January 16, 1951; Assistant to the President Norval Luxon to Harlan Hatcher (memo), January 19, 1951, both in Box 2, File: Mobilization, 1950, 1951, Executive Assistant to the President Norval Neil Luxon Papers, RG 4/c, The Ohio State University Archives, Columbus. The five committees were the Committee on Undergraduate Programs, the Committee on Research and Graduate Training, the Committee on the Healing Arts, the Armed Forces Commanding Officers Committee, and the Housing Council.

it offered a special course in First Aid for all university personnel.²⁸

A significant development at Ohio State came in the ROTC organizations. In September, 1950, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force wrote Bevis to ask him to help increase the production of Air Force graduates by working to eliminate scheduling conflicts between ROTC and other requirements. Ohio State made the necessary changes. In addition, the Board of Trustees, upon recommendation of the Faculty Council, created an autonomous Department of Air Science in 1951, separating it from the Department of Military Science. The ROTC courses themselves were accelerated for those students trying to graduate in three years, and as a result the number of Air Force and Army

²⁸James E. Pollard, The Bevis Administration, 1940-1956, Part 2, The Post-War Years and the Emergence of the Greater University, 1945-1956, Vol. VIII of History of The Ohio State University (9 vols.; Columbus, 1920-1976), p. 40. Bevis to General Leo Kreber (copy), March 30, 1951; "You and the A-Bomb," Committee on Civil Defense, The Ohio State University, CD Bulletin No. 1, January, 1951; Donald P. Cottrell, Dean, College of Education, to all deans and office heads (memo), August 13, 1951, all in Box 12, File Civil Defense, 1951, 1954, 1955, Howard L. Bevis Papers, RG 3/h, The Ohio State University Archives.

commissions conferred at each commencement increased dramatically.²⁹

For the thousands of students on Ohio's college campuses, the greatest change came through reinstitution of the military draft. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 to draft men during World War II was allowed to expire in March, 1947. The draft apparatus was put on standby since the government believed that voluntary enlistments could maintain a total military strength of 2,000,000 men. Only one year later, President Truman was forced to report only 1,400,000 men in the armed forces. Fear of the draft, it seems, was the military's best recruiter. Amidst calls for a program of universal military training, Congress enacted the Selective Service Act of 1948.³⁰ This law represented the second peacetime conscription in American history, and the basic structure for drafting men which it established remained in force

²⁹Harold Stuart to Bevis, September 15, 1950; Hatcher to Stuart, September 27, 1950, both in Box 3, File: Air Science, 1950, 1951, Bevis Papers. Ohio State University, Board of Trustees, Record of Proceedings of the Board of Trustees of The Ohio State University, September 4, 1951 (Columbus, 1952), p. 58. Merwin Potter, Professor of Air Science and Tactics, to Bevis, January 29, 1951, Box 3, File: Air Science, 1950, 1951, Bevis Papers. "4,740 in ROTC," Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (October 15, 1951), 27.

³⁰Public Law 759, 80th Congress.

until it was replaced by a lottery system during the Vietnam War.³¹

The 1948 Selective Service Act created a system for the registration and induction of young men quite similar to the system used during World War II. The chief difference was the term of service: twenty-one months of active service (later amended to twenty-four months or twenty-one including service in Korea) as opposed to induction for the duration. Inductees were also obligated to the reserves for five years after their discharge. Exemptions from service were granted to ministers, divinity students, conscientious objectors, sole surviving sons of families who had lost one or more children in World War II, and most importantly, veterans of World War II. This last exemption caused a manpower shortage at the beginning of the Korean War, eventually led to a widened age bracket of 18½ to 35 years (up from 26 years), and insured that the early war was fought mainly by reserves called up for the emergency or veterans who had remained in service.³²

³¹Robert Liston, Greeting: You Are Hereby Ordered for Induction . . . The Draft in America (New York, 1970), pp. 45-46.

³²Ibid., pp. 49-50. John L. Rafuse, "United States Experience with Volunteer and Conscript Forces," Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, November, 1970, II (Washington, 1971), pp. III-1-29--III-1-34 [sic], quoted in Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History, ed. Robert H. Bremner (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), III, 191.

The 1948 draft law ran for two years and was about to expire when North Korea invaded. Congress extended the law for fifteen days and then again to July 9, 1951.³³ The 1950 law amended the 1948 system to provide for a draft of doctors, dentists, and veterinarians, and it set up the student deferment program. The doctor's draft, designed to encourage enlistments, was very effective. The student deferment program applied to both high school and college students. A high school student doing satisfactory work would be deferred until he finished high school or reached twenty years of age, whichever came first. A college student could likewise be deferred until the end of his current academic year. For college students, local boards were supposed to use class standing and results from the new Selective Service College Qualification Test to help decide who should be called. Four such tests were held in early 1951, and 63 per cent of those taking them received a grade of at least 70 per cent, increasing their chances for deferment.³⁴

When the army resumed its inductions with a draft call of 50,000 for September, 1950, Ohio received

³³Public Law 572, 81st Congress, and Public Law 599, 81st Congress.

³⁴Rafuse, quoted in Bremner, 191. Liston, p. 50. U.S., Selective Service System, Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1951 to the Congress of the United States pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service Act as Amended, January 3, 1952, pp. 6, 7, 18-21.

a call for 2850 men, divided among the state's 127 local boards. Like the rest of the states, Ohio had not drafted any men since January, 1949, but local boards had continued to register men, and the machinery to induct them was in place. To meet the September call, local boards called 6000 men for pre-induction physicals, expecting a substantial rejection rate. Drafting began with the oldest first. After several weeks of chaos because of increased enlistments and overburdening paperwork, the draft began to function as intended, and Ohio met its series of monthly quotas. By June, 1951, when the 1950 law expired, Ohio had supplied 35,844 men.³⁵

In June, 1951, Congress renewed the draft by enacting the Universal Military Training and Service Act.³⁶ The UMT concept, a controversial issue, was adopted in name at a time when nothing could possibly be done to implement it in fact, and it has never since been revived. The 1951 law, in addition, reclassified as 1-A married men with no children, reprocessed some previous rejectees, established the first program of alternative service for conscientious

³⁵Selective Service, Annual Report, 1952, pp. 61, 62. Enquirer, July 29, 1950, p. 8; July 15, 1950, p. 5. Beacon Journal, June 30, 1950, p. 8. Plain Dealer, August 18, 1950, p. 3.

³⁶Public Law 51, 82d Congress.

objectors, and provided for the induction of men at 18½ years of age.³⁷

Unlike other institutions and organizations, the Ohio General Assembly did not have the opportunity to respond immediately to the war crisis. The General Assembly operates on a biennium, and until 1957 regular legislative sessions were scheduled only in the first year of each two-year period, *i.e.*, in the odd-numbered years. Since Governor Lausche did not call a special session in 1950, the General Assembly was able to deal with the war only when the 1951 session convened.³⁸

Not surprisingly, several of the bills and resolutions introduced by legislators dealt with the need for increased patriotism and vigilance

³⁷Russell Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York, 1967), p. 500. Selective Service, Annual Report, 1952, pp. 39, 1-4. The alternative service program for conscientious objectors is discussed in Chapter V, *infra*.

³⁸It is extremely difficult for scholars to research the Ohio General Assembly. The legislature does not publish a verbatim transcript of its proceedings. The Journal of the House and of the Senate are summaries of each day's activities. The Bulletin traces each bill through the legislative process, but again only in summary fashion. Both sources are particularly poor in explaining how a bill has been amended. There are no official records whatever of committee meetings, making it impossible to explain how committees dealt with various bills. Finally, unless copies of the original bills themselves can be located, it is often impossible to determine from the Journal or the Bulletin exactly what a bill or resolution was intended to accomplish.

against subversion. In the House, there were bills to combat subversive forces within the state government (H.B. 11), to provide for the dismissal of public employees who advocated the overthrow of the government (H.B. 20), and to define the crime of sedition (H.B. 351). Less sensational bills for creating a holiday known as Citizenship Day (H.B. 203), for providing military training in high schools (H.B. 163), and for insuring that students received adequate background in American history and government (H.B. 248) were also introduced, but none of these proposals became law. The only laws enacted concerning subversion had to do with the creation of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission. House Joint Resolution 21, adopted in March, 1951, created a joint committee "to study the desirability of establishing a subversive activities commission in Ohio and to recommend legislation."³⁹ The joint committee was funded, and, when its report recommended the creation of the commission, that, too, was approved.⁴⁰

Another area of legislative concern was civil defense, including military protection for the state, and the status of civilians called to the armed services

³⁹General Assembly, Bulletin, 1951-1952, p. 444.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 88, 140. An excellent source for comparing Ohio's experience with subversion to that of other states is Walter Gellhorn (ed.), The States and Subversion (Ithaca, 1952). The work of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission is discussed in Chapters III and IV, infra.

during the war. S.B. 16 was enacted to protect the jobs and seniority of teachers in the service.⁴¹ Another law extended to 1953 the 1947 statute that allowed public employees who had withdrawn their deposits from the state retirement system upon entering military service to restore their benefits by re-investing their premiums when they were discharged.⁴² Still another law extended veterans' credit and gave preference in civil service hiring to veterans of Korea.⁴³ One legislator proposed a commission to study paying a bonus to Korean veterans.⁴⁴ There were also five separate proposals to construct armories at various points across the state, but none of these was approved.⁴⁵

The General Assembly fought its most prolonged and controversial battle over the attempt to pass a fair employment practices law. As in World War II, fair employment practices legislation was perceived by its supporters as vital to remove hypocrisy from the American

⁴¹Ohio, General Code, Annotated (Baldwin, 1951), sec. 4842-10a.

⁴²Ibid., sec. 486-47.

⁴³Ibid., secs. 486-10, 486-13.

⁴⁴S.B. 162.

⁴⁵S.B. 84, S.B. 244, S.B. 312, H.B. 296, H.B. 409.

war effort. How, they argued, could the nation fight for democracy abroad while democracy was denied at home?

FEPC had first entered the American lexicon prior to U.S. intervention in World War II.⁴⁶ Pressured by black Americans and others demanding equal employment opportunity, and cognizant of the manpower shortages surrounding mobilization, President Franklin Roosevelt used his executive war powers to establish the Committee on Fair Employment Practices in 1941. Designed to improve the employment situation for minorities, including job openings, training, and promotion, FEPC was strictly a wartime agency. At the war's end, Congress not only refused to continue FEPC but also enacted the Russell Amendment, denying to the President the power to fund executive agencies whose budgets had not specifically been approved by Congress. In the postwar years, the quest to achieve a permanent FEPC went unfulfilled.⁴⁷

President Truman attempted to make FEPC part of the Fair Deal, but as with other liberal planks in the Truman program, the President's rhetorical support was

⁴⁶See Louis Ruchames, Race, Jobs, and Politics: The Story of FEPC (New York, 1953).

⁴⁷Paul Norgren and Samuel E. Hill, Toward Fair Employment (New York, 1964), p. v.

not matched by the executive action needed to make FEPC a reality. Especially after the start of the Korean War, when black leaders pressured Truman much as they had Roosevelt in 1941, FEPC and other domestic issues took a back seat to foreign affairs. Truman's 1951 budget message, for example, contained a recommendation for FEPC, but the budget itself omitted any request for appropriations to operate the agency.⁴⁸

It is uncertain whether the President could have persuaded Congress to pass an FEPC statute. Perhaps Truman's limited response to black demands was all that could reasonably be expected. As the United States mobilized to meet aggression in Korea, agitation increased for a new wartime FEPC. Supporters even organized a Fair Employment Day on June 25, 1951, the tenth anniversary of FDR's World War II executive order. The President responded by issuing E.O. 10308, creating the Committee on Government Contracts Compliance, and by attempting to circumvent the Russell Amendment. The order established an eleven-person committee to examine the extent to which government agencies enforced the requirement that government contracts not discriminate against workers

⁴⁸Barton J. Bernstein, "The Ambiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and Civil Rights," Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Paper; Chicago, 1970), pp. 271-76, 293-301. William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration (Columbus, 1970), pp. 178-79, 184-85.

and to suggest improvements in this regulation. The committee, in essence a study group, had no enforcement power.⁴⁹

Failure to achieve a Federal FEPC undoubtedly spurred civil rights advocates to urge similar laws at the state and municipal level. In Ohio, an FEPC bill had first been introduced in the General Assembly in 1945, without success. The Ohio Committee for Fair Employment Practice Legislation, a coalition of civil, religious, welfare, and labor organizations, renewed this effort every two years. Understandably, the issue of job inequality and the drive for FEP laws were central to the black protest movement. As sociologists Paul Norgren and Samuel Hill explain,

Negro workers, when employed, commonly occupy the heaviest, dirtiest, most menial, lowest-paid, and generally least desirable jobs. They are unemployed more than twice as often as white workers and for longer periods of time. As the combined consequence of low-paid employment and frequent joblessness, the average Negro family's income is barely more than half that of the average white family.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Berman, pp. 188-89, 192. Morroe Berger, Racial Equality and the Law: The Role of Law in the Reduction of Discrimination in the United States (Paris, 1954), p. 44. Michael I. Sovern, Legal Restraints on Racial Discrimination in Employment (New York, 1966), p. 254. Norgren and Hill, p. 160. On the general question of Truman's relations with Congress, see Richard Neustadt, "From FDR to Truman: Congress and the Fair Deal," Public Policy, V (1954), 351-81.

⁵⁰ John Hemphill Bowman, "Fair Employment Practice Legislation: An Evaluation of the Ohio Experience, 1959-1964," (unpublished Master's thesis, Ohio State University, 1965), p. 71. Norgren and Hill, p. 4.

The foregoing analysis, written in 1964, is an apt description also of the situation in Ohio during the Korean War. In Cincinnati, blacks in 1952 comprised 10.6% of the population and 18.7% of the labor force, but they held only 7.9% of the jobs. In 1950, 22.3% of the men and 11.3% of the women claiming unemployment compensation in Cincinnati were black. Job discrimination in top management and administrative positions was nearly universal. Job orders issued to employment agencies were themselves overwhelmingly discriminatory. In Ohio as a whole, a 1953 study of job openings reported to the Ohio State Employment Service revealed nine of every ten in Columbus and Toledo and 50% in other cities to be restricted by race or creed. Unrestricted jobs were generally unskilled or in domestic service.⁵¹

As FEP bills failed to pass the General Assembly--and, in fact, failed in most cases to get out of committee in 1945, 1947, and 1949--supporters of this legislation turned increasingly to the municipal level for action. In many cases, attempts to pass local FEP laws were successful, especially in northeastern Ohio cities where the support of the United Steelworkers of America was often decisive. By 1951, thirteen Ohio cities (Akron,

⁵¹Alfred Kuhn, Racial Discrimination in Employment in the Cincinnati Area (Cincinnati, 1952), pp. 5, 6, 17, 55. Berger, p. 51.

Campbell, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Girard, Hubbard, Lorain, Lowellville, Niles, Steubenville, Struthers, Warren, and Youngstown) had enacted FEP laws although the jurisdiction and enforcement clauses of these ordinances varied greatly. Nine of the thirteen laws were adopted in 1950 and 1951, the boom years for municipal FEP.⁵²

Cleveland tried a voluntary FEP program before adopting a compulsory law. The city's Chamber of Commerce suggested the Cooperative Employment Practices Plan in 1949 as a substitute for a proposed mandatory ordinance. Council enacted the compulsory plan in 1950 after it was generally agreed that the voluntary approach simply had failed to work. The ordinance was administered by the Community Relations Board, which was empowered to offer education and technical assistance, to adjust complaints, and to hold public hearings leading to possible prosecution.⁵³

Adoption of the Cleveland law and similar laws in other cities spurred renewal of the struggle for a state FEP law in 1951. The Ohio Committee's campaign actually began in 1950 when it supported a slate of

⁵²Bowman, p. 73. Berger, p. 64. Ruchames, p. 165. Stanley Hugh Smith, Freedom to Work (New York, 1955), pp. 76-78.

⁵³Norgren and Hill, p. 227. Berger, pp. 58, 63. Charles S. Rhyne and Brice W. Rhyne, Civil Rights Ordinances, Report No. 148, National Institute of Municipal Law (Washington, 1963), pp. 49-54.

legislative candidates favorable to FEP. The Committee's flyers did not enumerate the reasons why the law was needed. To committee members the need was self-evident. It was left to Governor Lausche to explain why the legislature must pass an FEP law. Citing the courage and bravery of black troops in Korea, Lausche said, "It is just wrong to say you can fight and die, but for a chance to work you stand in a different category."⁵⁴

Four FEP bills were introduced in the Ninety-Ninth General Assembly,⁵⁵ but only one was reported out of committee: H.B. 15, sponsored by Republican Representative William Burton of Cleveland, son of Supreme Court Justice Harold Burton. The Burton bill, modeled on the Cleveland ordinance, passed the House 101-19, on June 1. As introduced, it would have created a division of fair employment within the Department of Industrial Relations, with a director appointed by the governor. A Community Relations Board with the power to recommend prosecution would be established in each county to deal with complaints as they were received by the state director. The Burton bill, weaker than the other

⁵⁴Rally flyer, Ohio Committee for Fair Employment Practice Legislation, September 29, 1950, Box 17, File: Incoming Mail--1950, Industrial Relations, Records of the Columbus Urban League, Ohio Historical Society. Plain Dealer, November 3, 1950, p. 2.

⁵⁵S.B. 26, H.B. 7, H.B. 15, and H.B. 49.

proposals, was designed to preserve local administrative autonomy in the hope that the omission of a strong state commission could overcome the rural opposition to FEP.⁵⁶

In the Senate, H.B. 15 ran up against committee delays and pressure for adjournment and never came to a vote on its merits. A final day's effort to dispense with committee consideration and the required third reading of the bill could muster only a 13-13 vote.⁵⁷ Whatever the political maneuvering was which prevented the passage or even the full consideration of the Burton bill, the General Assembly's failure to accept the arguments of FEP proponents stands as a symbol of the limited commitment which Ohioans were willing to make to the Korean War. FEP had failed before, and the war situation did not change that. The issue of fair employment practices simply did not compel action in 1951 as it had in 1941.

While Ohioans considered with trepidation the changes which this war had brought to their lives, General MacArthur displayed no such hesitancy to plan the future. Well before most Ohioans understood the

⁵⁶General Assembly, Bulletin, 1951-1952, p. 170. Plain Dealer, May 2, 1951, p. 11; June 2, 1951, pp. 1, 5.

⁵⁷Ohio, General Assembly, Journal of the Senate of the Ninety-Ninth General Assembly, (CXXIV) June 19, 1951, pp. 1062-63.

nature of the government's commitment in Korea, MacArthur had already decided that there would be no American surrender of the Korean peninsula. As early as June 29, 1950, when the Supreme Allied Commander visited Korea, he conceived an offensive strategy to counter the rapid North Korean advance. The master stroke of this strategy was a massive amphibious landing at Inchon, a port city in the far northwestern section of South Korea. When the landing was accomplished on September 16, General Walker was able to begin his own offensive, and the North Koreans began a hasty, mass retreat. Seoul was retaken on September 27, and the government of President Syngman Rhee restored. By the end of the month, the North Korean forces had regrouped north of the Parallel, and the United Nations was forced to ask itself whether the end of the war was near.⁵⁸

The Truman administration had openly sought to confine the Korean War's potential for global confrontation and to design for the country an essentially new path in foreign and defense policy. The President was convinced, too, that limited mobilization would be sufficient to accomplish his goals. Senator Robert Taft gave this limited war only begrudging approval, and his

⁵⁸Rees, chap. 5, especially pp. 77, 80-83, 85-88, 90-92, 94.

constituents followed this lead implicitly, revealing by their conduct during the war's early months their own confusion over Truman's policy. Their slow response, for example, to the call for an adequate system of civil defense showed their reluctance to accept the possibility that another world war might well occur. At the same time, other responses to the war, including the swift changes evident in school curricula, indicated that at least some Ohioans saw Korea as the place where the final battle line against communism might indeed be drawn. In either case, a limited war was difficult to comprehend. As the war progressed from the shocking defeats of the first weeks through the smashing victory at Inchon, many Ohioans questioned seriously whether Truman's course of action was the correct one.

CHAPTER II

PRICES, PREPAREDNESS, AND PRODUCTION:

MOBILIZING OHIO'S ECONOMY

My policy will be to make as much man power and material available for defense purposes as is consistent with the fulfillment of the essential obligations of the state.

--Governor Frank Lausche, Cleveland
Plain Dealer, January 1, 1951.

When President Truman and his advisers decided to wage a limited war in Korea, they also began planning to effect a partial mobilization of the economy. Operating under the conclusions expressed in NSC 68 (see Introduction, pp. 12-13, supra), the administration reasoned that the American economy could withstand both improved military preparedness and continued domestic progress without any serious distortion. President Truman's initial economic decisions reflected this view. His speech to the nation on July 19, 1950, called for a partial defense mobilization. He did not request authority to impose wage and price controls, nor did he adopt Bernard Baruch's suggestion to bring the entire economy under government control. As Truman later wrote in his Memoirs, he "urged legislation to authorize the establishment of priorities and allocations of materials to prevent hoarding and requisitioning of necessary supplies." He also asked for power to "raise taxes and to restrict consumer credit."¹

¹Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York, 1973), pp. 416-17. Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 16, 1950, p. 1; July 20, 1950, pp. 1, 8. Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years (Paper; New York, 1970), p. 224. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), p. 348.

The Defense Production Act, the legislative result of Truman's request, created the structure under which the expanding economy could meet both domestic and military needs. The act established the system of priorities for allocating materials and boosting productive capacity which the President wanted. Congress also granted him authority to control consumer credit, mortgage terms, and commodity speculation. What had once been planned as a tax reduction became a tax increase to cover enlarged defense expenditures without cutting the domestic side of the Fair Deal. Yet, the character of these plans was drastically altered by United Nations success in Korea and by the sudden entrance of the Chinese into the war. By the end of 1950, Truman had declared a complete national emergency. He had asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to increase further the size of the armed forces. An excess profit tax was enacted, wage and price controls were planned, and the national emergency proclamation enabled Truman to exercise special powers to iron out difficulties in the system for procuring military goods. With these changes, partial or not,

the Fair Deal was permanently, if tacitly, shelved. Despite NSC 68, guns had begun to squeeze out butter.²

Economic mobilization began as the United Nations Command prepared for the Inchon landing. MacArthur's victory leading to the recapture of Seoul presented an opportunity for the American officials opposed to limiting the war to make their case. Really, a campaign to conquer all of Korea had always been an active policy option. On July 13, General MacArthur had informed Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins that he intended to occupy all of Korea. In August, the United States representative at the United Nations told the Security Council that elections should be held throughout the whole country. President Truman himself encouraged these sentiments by proclaiming that Koreans had a right to be free and united. As the Inchon landing approached, the Joint Chiefs and the National Security Council issued orders to MacArthur to cross the Parallel in order to destroy the North Korean army. Truman endorsed this directive in his own message to MacArthur on September 15, and Secretary of State Acheson completed this transformation

²Edward S. Flash, Jr., Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers (New York, 1965), pp. 42-43. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, "Chronology of Economic Mobilization," Monthly Business Review (hereafter MBR), March 1, 1951, pp. 6-7. Truman, pp. 390, 419-28.

in United Nations policy by developing a new General Assembly resolution which abandoned the return of status quo ante as an objective and substituted a vague endorsement of an advance north to the Yalu River border between North Korea and China. Following these new directives, South Korean troops crossed the Parallel on October 1, and American troops did so on October 7. Truman's September 15 message allowed MacArthur to operate north of 38° if there was no indication of threatened retaliation by Soviet or Chinese forces. No ground operations should occur north of the Parallel if such an attack were likely to cause either China or the Soviets to enter the war.³

The Korean War caught the American economy on the upswing. The recession of 1948-49 had been primarily an inventory recession during which the economy had slowed down while excessive inventories were liquidated and new production declined. By mid-1949, liquidation had proceeded far enough to allow new production to resume, led by residential construction and automobiles. In 1950, the national economy was performing near capacity. Economic analysts reported a renewed attitude of confidence in industrial activity and consumer markets. New orders for durable goods far exceeded shipments. Inventories were

³David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York, 1964), pp. 98-102, 104, 108, 99-100.

actually too small. Wholesale price levels were steady, and the national consumer price index rose only 2 per cent during the first half of 1950. Residential construction and automobile production were headed toward record years. By the outbreak of the war, business inventories as a whole had recovered from their slight slump, and surpluses had begun to accumulate.⁴

Not surprisingly, Ohio's economy experienced this same inventory recession and strong, rapid recovery. Ohio's reflection of national economic trends was a function of the state's own economic composition, a remarkable balance between agriculture and industry, putting Ohio among the leading states in both categories. In fact, the principal difference between Ohio and the national economy was the state's slightly higher percentage of workers employed in manufacturing, 15.0 per cent versus 9.9 per cent nationally. This favorable balance between farm and factory can be seen in the excellent economic statistics which both segments produced. Ohio ranked fourth among all states in the value of manufactured goods produced in 1950, and eighth in cash income to farmers. The value of manufacturing goods per Ohio

⁴Wilfred Lewis, Jr., Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recessions (Washington, 1962), p. 120. "Industrial Retrospect," MBR, December 1, 1950, p. 1. "Business Inventories at the Start of the Korean War," MBR, September 1, 1950, pp. 5, 9.

manufacturing employee in 1947 was \$5323 compared to a national average of \$5206. Ohio's farm land yielded an average \$43.52 per acre in 1949 compared to \$24.64 per acre for the whole country.⁵

Ohio's agricultural segment included 22,000,000 acres divided among 220,000 farm units. Three-quarters of these farms were full-time operations, the remainder contributing only five per cent of the volume of agricultural products coming to market. Corn had the highest value of all crops grown, and thirty per cent of Ohio's cropland was planted in a corn, small grain, and hay rotation. Almost all farms produced some corn, but the largest corn acreage was in the western half of the state, including a few producers of popcorn in Wyandot County. Most counties in Ohio had many types of farming, with this diversity contributing to the state's economic stability and agricultural strength. Certain areas, of course, were especially strong in the production of a particular crop: Wood, Seneca, Wayne, and Hancock Counties in wheat, the northwest in oats, Lawrence County in orchard fruit, and the northeast in potatoes.⁶

⁵Ohio, Development and Publicity Commission, Ohio: An Empire Within an Empire (2d Edition; Columbus, 1950), p. 5. "Ohio Cross Sections (I): Northwestern Ohio: Three Economic Areas Including 22 Counties," MBR, October 1, 1950, p. 8.

⁶Empire within an Empire, pp. 5, 8, 13, 17, 22.

Ohio's varied agricultural output was matched by a strong, diversified industrial economy. More than twice as many Ohioans were engaged in manufacturing as in any other occupational category. These workers contributed to Ohio's extraordinary predominance in a wide variety of products: first among all states in machine tools, rubber, ceramics, sporting goods, nuts and bolts, and dentures; second in steel products and motor vehicles; third in paints; fourth in chemicals, aviation, and men's clothing. Ohio's industrial production was aided by its geographic location. Columbus, the capital city, was the approximate center of a circle including seventy-five per cent of the industrial activity of the United States. Ohio served as a corridor for both east-west and north-south shipping. Its steel mills attracted coal from the south and iron ore from the north. Moreover, industrial activity was further variegated by Ohio's use of farm products as raw materials in the production of such items as powdered milk, milled grain, cheese, soap, and wine.⁷

Thus, just like the national economy, Ohio rebounded in late 1949 and early 1950 from the inventory recession. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's

⁷Empire with an Empire, pp. 29, 3, 8. John Gunther, Inside U.S.A. (Rev. Ed.; New York, 1951), p. 465. Grace Goulder, This Is Ohio (Rev. Ed.; Cleveland, 1965), p. 100.

continual economic analyses of the Fourth District (all of Ohio, nineteen counties in western Pennsylvania, the panhandle of West Virginia, and fifty-six counties in eastern Kentucky) and of Ohio itself documented the importance of construction to this recovery. Credit agencies liberalized financial terms in July, 1949, and a building boom began in September with the value of new construction contracts jumping 50 per cent over August. October set a record for any single month, and contract values for the first quarter of 1950 increased 122 per cent over the same period in 1949. By way of contrast, the production of automobile tires rose 17 per cent during the same period.⁸

Despite its significance, construction was only one phase of Ohio's economic upturn. Manufacturing employment showed a steady gain throughout this period, new business incorporations increased, and claims for Ohio unemployment insurance dropped dramatically. Ohio's rubber workers worked six or seven days a week, demands for flat glass, especially for automobiles, strengthened, and Fourth District steel mills set a record for steel ingot production in 1949. In all, many District producers were working at or near their theoretical capacities. Consumer demand for durable goods was unprecedented.

⁸"The Business Situation," MBR, June 1, 1950, pp. 5-6.

A downward trend in farm income was slowing, and throughout the District, upward pressure on prices was mounting.⁹

With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Ohio consumers, recalling the shortages and rationing during World War II, took immediate action to acquire those goods which they believed would again be in short supply. Quite naturally, this scare buying tactic precipitated artificial shortages and heightened the possibility of a severe wartime inflation. The race to hoard began with the same household items which were hard to find during the war: sugar, flour, soap, hosiery, to name obvious examples. Retail stores across the state saw their shelves emptied of these commodities. In Tiffin, stores resorted to rationing sugar as demand for it outraced shipments. Cleveland grocers experienced this same stampede for sugar and soap. Grocery store officials protested that there was no real shortage of any food items and that supplies could readily be replenished, but consumers continued to maintain this artificial situation and extended it to other commodities. Ohio liquor stores skyrocketed in July, 1950, to a level 60 per cent higher than one year before. The Director of State Liquor

⁹Ibid., pp. 5, 7-8. "Farm Income Prospects," MBR, December 1, 1950, p. 6. "Industrial Retrospect," MBR, December 1, 1950, pp. 1-4, 8-12.

sales warned customers that resale of liquor was illegal, but Ohioans, fearful of a shortage, spent nearly three million dollars for liquor during the first eight days of July, an increase of more than \$1.1 million over the same period in 1949. Bread prices jumped a penny per twenty-ounce loaf, too, despite a more than adequate supply and the lifting of acreage restrictions on wheat. Wholesale and retail prices of milk also increased; in Youngstown the wholesale price went up fifty cents per hundred pounds and the retail price to 17 cents a quart. In Toledo and Cleveland, the retail price reached 20 cents later in the year. These increases compare with a 13 per cent jump in the national wholesale food price index during the first five weeks of the war and a 2.3 per cent rise in the national consumer price index in July. In Marysville, a small town near Columbus, the state agriculture department filed affidavits against a meat packing firm, a meat market, and two restaurants on the charge of selling horsemeat as beef.¹⁰

Suppliers' affirmation of adequate provisions did not dissuade the hoarders. On the contrary, the early

¹⁰Plain Dealer, July 2, 1950, p. 1; July 11, 1950, p. 9; July 16, 1950, p. 1; July 8, 1950, p. 1; July 19, 1950, p. 1; July 12, 1950, p. 8; June 28, 1950, p. 22; July 21, 1950, p. 5; July 28, 1950, p. 6; August 22, 1950, p. 7; December 28, 1950, p. 1. Cincinnati Enquirer, July 19, 1950, p. 14. Toledo Blade, August 7, 1950, p. 18. Matusow, p. 223.

weeks of the war saw a more general move by consumers to buy a wide range of goods which they believed might become scarce during a general mobilization. Department stores reported sensational sales of hosiery, linens, furniture, and appliances, especially televisions and radios which both sold in greater numbers in September, 1950, than they had in any previous month. Car production accelerated throughout the year, as did sales, and finished 27 per cent higher than 1949. Delivery dates backed up three to six months, and used car sales also rose. Fortuitously, the German company, Volkswagen, chose July, 1950, as the time to introduce its automobile to the United States at a trade fair in Chicago. The Volkswagen sedan averaged 34 miles per gallon, ran at a peak speed of 62 miles per hour, and sold for \$1280. Registration of automobile titles in Toledo reflected a record sales pace in July. Some car dealers reported calls at 1 a.m. from potential customers, and tire stores experienced their own artificial shortage.¹¹

New construction had sparked the economic recovery in mid-1949 and now added considerably to the inflationary pressure. The construction boom had actually passed its crest by July but not because of any slackening in demand;

¹¹"Department Store Trade in 1950: A Year of Sharp Fluctuations," MBR, January 1, 1951, p. 1. "Industrial Retrospect," MBR, December 1, 1950, pp. 10-11. Plain Dealer, July 9, 1950, p. 12-B; July 17, 1950, p. 2. Blade, August 5, 1950, p. 7. Enquirer, July 20, 1950, p. 4; July 1, 1950, p. 4.

contractors were running short of men and materials. In northeast Ohio, masons and carpenters were so scarce that builders resorted to pirating workers by offering them wage rates double the union scale. Banks, too, played a role in this precipitous expansion. In the Fourth District, loans--especially commercial, industrial, and agricultural--jumped 19 per cent in 1950 over the 1949 total. New peaks were also reached in installment loans for durable goods and mortgages, and Fourth District statistics showed that 63 per cent of the scare buying wave was financed through credit.¹²

The move by consumers to hoard in anticipation of shortages and to buy while prices remained low caused the inflation which these consumers feared. Nationally, wholesale prices rose 11 per cent in the second half of 1950, and consumer prices rose 5 per cent. National income velocity, a measurement of how quickly money changes hands, increased 12 per cent between June, 1950, and March, 1951. Gasoline in Ohio went up one-half cent a gallon in July, the major rubber companies raised prices about 5 per cent, and wholesale food prices jumped 13 per cent in five weeks. Despite persistent announcements that there were no shortages and that hoarding was

¹²"Residential Construction," MBR, September 1, 1950, pp. 1-2. "Banking Review, 1950," MBR, January 1, 1951, p. 3. "Recent Banking Trends," MBR, July 1, 1950, p. 9. "Trends in Credit Sales and Collections," MBR, July 1, 1951, p. 5.

unpatriotic, the threat of a general war took a sharp toll on the economy.¹³

Ohio Attorney General Herbert Duffy acted under the state's anti-trust law to investigate whether producers and distributors were taking advantage of the war situation to force through sharp price increases. Duffy sent questionnaires to Better Business Bureaus and other organizations around the state and established an official investigative team, but the evidence of inflation in Ohio was really part of a national problem deserving federal attention. The government counterpunched mainly through its power to regulate fiscal and monetary policy. In August, the Federal Reserve Board, controller of the nation's money supply, raised its rediscount rates, thus making it more expensive for member banks to borrow from the FRB. Congress acted on President Truman's request to increase personal and corporate income taxes in September, and the FRB continued to restrict the expansion of consumer credit by reinstating Regulation W, under authority granted by Defense Production Act. Regulation W was designed to restrain inflationary pressures and to facilitate the diversion of material and manpower to defense purposes

¹³Ralph E. Freeman, "Postwar Monetary Policy," Postwar Economic Trends in the United States, ed. Ralph E. Freeman (New York, 1960), p. 68. Bert G. Hickman, Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy (Washington, 1960), p. 380. Plain Dealer, July 29, 1950, p. 1; July 19, 1950, p. 7; July 18, 1950, p. 8; August 1, 1950, p. 3. Matusow, pp. 222-23. Akron Beacon Journal, November 1, 1950, p. 25.

by making the terms for consumer installment loans more difficult. For example, automobile loans of \$5000 or less now required a down payment of one-third the total amount and a maximum maturity period of twenty-one months. Installment loans for home appliances now were limited to eighteen months with a 15 per cent down payment. President Truman, also under DPA authority, announced the creation of the Economic Stabilization Agency with its component parts, the Office of Price Stabilization and the Wage Stabilization Board, but a program of wage and price controls was not implemented.¹⁴

While the government moved to control inflation, the United Nations advance north of the 38th Parallel proceeded with stunning rapidity. Two days after United States soldiers crossed the Parallel, MacArthur's orders of September 15 were superseded by a new Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to continue north so long as chances for success seemed reasonable. While MacArthur flew to Wake Island to meet with Truman, his troops captured Pyongyang on October 19. MacArthur's plan to win all of North Korea involved another controversial and successful

¹⁴Blade, August 29, 1950, p. 1. Plain Dealer, August 30, 1950, p. 5. "Chronology of Economic Mobilization," MBR, March 3, 1951, pp. 6-7. "Announcements," MBR, October 1, 1950, p. 11.

amphibious landing, this time at Wonsan, on the eastern coast. From Wonsan and Pyongyang, the United Nations Command drove further north against little opposition. Some American troops actually made it to the Yalu River on November 21, but North Korea was never occupied. Instead, what MacArthur was to call "an entirely new war" began when the People's Republic of China decided to oppose the UN advance north of 38° with a massive infusion of ground troops.¹⁵

Chinese forces had first entered Korea on October 14 following General Assembly approval of Acheson's resolution favoring a united Korea, despite the United States' diligent efforts to exclude them. Once the Chinese intervention was detected, the United States continued to appraise incorrectly its importance and potential. As historian David Rees has analyzed the Chinese decision, the government of the People's Republic perceived the United Nations advance to be a direct threat to China as well as Korea. The United States, on the other hand, discounted serious retaliation by the Chinese because it expected to be taken at its word vis-a-vis its objectives which specifically rejected any attack against China.¹⁶

¹⁵Rees, chaps. 6 and 8, especially pp. 104, 108, 123-25, 128, and 137, and p. 157.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 109-14.

Chinese troops first engaged South Koreans en masse on October 25 in a battle which halted the major United Nations advance. Unaware, because of faulty intelligence, of the aggregate strength of the Chinese in Korea, 300,000 by November 15, MacArthur ordered the march to the Yalu continued, while predicting Christmas dinner at home for his troops. But it was not to be. The American offensive was stopped cold on the banks of the Chongchon River in central North Korea. It was as devastating a defeat as the Inchon landing had been a victory, and it turned out to be MacArthur's last great battle. The Chinese forced a United Nations retreat, very nearly a rout, all along the line, and Pyongyang was evacuated on December 5. By Christmas Day, the Chinese had occupied all of North Korea. American troops did not eat Christmas dinner at home; they spent the day instead south of 38° as part of the big "bug out," as it was called, waiting for the Chinese attempt to unite Korea.¹⁷

United Nations success at Inchon and the march into North Korea helped to stem the inflationary tide and end the scare buying wave in Ohio as nationally. Retail sales in the state dropped 2 per cent in September,

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 129-31, 155-66.

a month when a gain usually occurs, and continued down through November. Wholesale trade declined during this period, and stocks and inventories grew. Panic buying of food and other non-durable commodities slowed markedly by the end of August, and a decline in durable goods followed in September. Certainly, the re-institution of Regulation W in September had helped to dampen demand for household appliances and other hard goods, but in many cases, stores had already been imposing installment loan terms nearly as restrictive as those required by Regulation W. Most probably, the decrease in sales was only partially due to Regulation W; a massive, late November blizzard, paralyzing Ohio for days, had some additional effect, but events in Korea were undoubtedly the major influence upon retail trade.¹⁸

The Chinese intervention in late November re-invigorated the scare-buying inflation with alarming haste and intensity. The greatest spurt occurred in January, 1951, and as earlier, this inflation was caused by increasing demand despite an adequate supply of goods. Expenditures for both durables and non-durables rose, as did sales by manufacturers and wholesalers. Inventories increased as well. Nationally, wholesale prices rose 5 per cent from November through January. In Ohio, food

¹⁸Columbus Dispatch, October 30, 1950, p. 6-A. Hickman, p. 83. "Department Store Trade in 1950: A Year of Sharp Fluctuations," MBR, January 1, 1951, pp. 7-8.

prices continued their upward trend, and state officials began to act and speak as if a prolonged war-born inflation was imminent. Senator John Bricker warned the Ohio Savings and Loan League that governments had been destroyed by inflation before and the United States could be, too. The Savings and Loan League passed a resolution urging all levels of government to reduce expenditures and encouraging league members to further their efforts to attract savings. Governor Lausche, re-elected in November, 1950, cancelled his inaugural address and all attendant festivities to show his concern for the international situation and took the oath in his office.¹⁹

In Washington, the Chinese attack turned the economic debate from the question of whether to impose direct economic controls to how they would be imposed. The passage of the Defense Production Act, the federal tax increase, and the re-imposition of Regulation W had all been accomplished without any declaration of national emergency. The 1950 Midyear Report of the Council of Economic Advisers had urged a partial mobilization with only voluntary restraints. Truman's July 19 mobilization speech had suggested the possibility of price controls but not wage controls. Many Ohioans

¹⁹Hickman, pp. 83, 85. Plain Dealer, January 4, 1951, p. 8; December 28, 1950, pp. 1, 2. Complete Proceedings, Sixty-Second Annual Convention of the Ohio Savings and Loan League, October, 1950, pp. 31-32, 80.

endorsed this moderate stance and warned against undue economic restraint. The president of the Timken Roller Bearing Company, William Umstattd, feared that the Defense Production Act would be an irreversible step toward nationalization. Senator Taft disapproved of mandatory controls, and Charles White, president of Republic Steel, urged that no controls except those absolutely necessary be imposed. "It would be ironical," he said, "if this nation were to find itself with the controlled type of government that we are trying to spare other nations." Some critics complained that the President purposely put off any decision on wage and price controls until after the 1950 elections, and others objected to the authority delegated to the President in the DPA. Senator Bricker, for example, counted 103 separate and distinct grants of power to the President. "If ever there was a time for American citizens to be alerted to the danger because of encroaching government," he warned, "it is at this very hour, under the claim of emergency or whatever it might be."²⁰

The impact of China's entrance into the Korean War changed this situation entirely. President Truman declared a national emergency in December. Defense appropriations for fiscal 1951 jumped from thirteen

²⁰Flash, p. 40. Plain Dealer, July 20, 1950, p. 1; July 19, 1950, p. 3; July 21, 1950, p. 34; July 28, 1950, p. 4. See letters to Congressman John Vorys, Box 21, File: Price Controls, John M. Vorys Papers, Ohio Historical Society. Ohio Savings League Proceedings, p. 31.

billion to nearly fifty billion dollars, and plans for the budget for fiscal 1952 had to be completely redrawn before they could be presented to Congress. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board further restricted consumer credit, and the president acted to institute a system of wage and price controls. The FRB actually moved in September and then again in mid-October to control credit available for residential construction. The September announcement tightened terms for VA-insured and FHA-guaranteed loans, and the October rule, called Regulation X, increased minimum down payments and shortened the maximum length for mortgages on new one- and two-family homes financed by government-insured or government-guaranteed loans. President Truman moved closer to wage and price controls by appointing heads of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Economic Stabilization Agency, both created by the Defense Production Act, and for the ESA's subordinate pacts, the Office of Price Stabilization and the Wage Stabilization Board.²¹

The critical position in this hierarchy and the most difficult spot to fill was the Director of Price Stabilization. Business Week magazine reported that thirty people refused this job before Toledo's mayor,

²¹Plain Dealer, December 17, 1950, p. 22-A. Flash, pp. 62, 50-51. Hamby, pp. 446-47.

Michael DiSalle, accepted the President's offer. Probably many of those who refused did so because the job seemed too difficult to do well. Alan Valentine, who had been appointed to head the Economic Stabilization Agency on September 9, believed in voluntary methods and persuasion to combat inflation. Both DiSalle and Charles E. Wilson of General Electric, Director of ODM, supported mandatory controls, but it was clearly DiSalle's role to announce this position and make it stick. Valentine, for one, did not approve and resigned in January. In addition, DiSalle had to decide when and how to freeze prices and had to insure that his orders were enforced. The difficult question was whether to institute a simple, general freeze on prices, regardless of the disruptions of the previous several months, or to attempt a complex freeze supposedly based on equitability. DiSalle chose the latter course. Through December, 1950, no industry had been restrained by wage and price controls except the auto industry. All others had been free either to boost prices opportunistically in anticipation of a freeze or to exercise restraint. DiSalle decided not to penalize those choosing the latter course of action or to reward those doing the former by imposing a simple freeze or roll back to pre-Korean levels. Instead, his order of January 26 announced a temporary thirty-day freeze to be followed by a complicated attempt to restore

pre-Korean cost-price relationships at whatever level was necessary. Most prices would be rolled back in time, but some would be rolled forward or increased to restore proper profit situations.²²

Simultaneous with the price freeze decision, DiSalle also had to oversee the establishment of regional and district OPS offices. Ohio was included in Region VI, along with Kentucky and Michigan. Headquarters were in Cleveland, state headquarters were in Cincinnati, Detroit, and Louisville, and smaller district offices were located in Toledo, Columbus, and other cities. Former OPA lawyer Sydney Hesse, appointed acting regional director, announced in early February that OPS would soon begin to check prices and investigate consumer complaints. By March, eleven individuals and concerns in Cleveland were under scrutiny by national OPS enforcers, but a public meeting sponsored by the regional office as a forum for complaints attracted only twenty-six people. DiSalle explained in Rocky River, Ohio, that his goal was "to reach a plateau of economic stability which will stop the pressure for increased wages," and he told an Akron Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner in March, 1951, that prices of twenty-eight commodities had already levelled off. The long-range OPS policy, under which a plethora of

²²"Expendable Man Isn't Scared," Business Week, February 17, 1951, p. 42. Matusow, pp. 225-27. Flash, pp. 64, 70-72, 74.

regulations was painstakingly developed and refined, prohibited any industry from raising prices if current profits were 85 per cent or more of the average of the best three years from 1946 to 1949. Actually, therefore, it was the margin between cost and selling price which was frozen and not prices themselves. Profits were not exactly guaranteed either since the computation of current profits had to be concluded before taxes were figured, and corporate taxes rose during the war.²³

Price controls remained in effect for more than two years, yet during this same period average wholesale prices declined, and many goods sold at retail far below their ceiling prices. The consumer price index in 1951 rose only 2.6 per cent, far below the 8 per cent hike for the first six months of the war. In the Fourth District, wholesale prices reached an all-time high in March, 1951, and softened quite a bit thereafter. One might well ask where the inflation went and whether price controls were really necessary. Economists have decided that, nearly simultaneous with the price freeze, consumer spending fell off dramatically. Shortages simply had not materialized, as had been anticipated, and scare buying ended. Panic buying of durable goods can last for

²³Plain Dealer, January 29, 1951, p. 3; January 3, 1953, pp. 1, 4; January 28, 1951, p. 1; February 1, 1951, pp. 1, 6; March 11, 1951, p. 18-A; March 27, 1951, p. 4; February 24, 1951, p. 5; March 17, 1951, p. 7; April 22, 1951, p. 1; April 23, 1951, p. 14.

only a limited time, since a family might buy one car or one refrigerator, for instance, but probably not another very soon again. Food hoarding must also be a short-term phenomenon since consumers probably will not stock more than several months' supply of any commodity. Once it became clear that goods would remain available at reasonable prices, the incentive to buy forward disappeared. The complex system of price controls which DiSalle tried to engineer, together with new taxes and Federal Reserve policies, may well have been too intricate for the actual task at hand, but the most thorough analyst of the Korean war economy argues that controls were still effective in influencing consumer expectations and in compartmentalizing the economy so that price pressures could be isolated and relaxed demand allowed to take its maximum effect.²⁴

Despite the downturn of consumer spending and a corresponding growth in distributors' inventories, the economy did not stagnate. According to economist Bert Hickman, defense spending for contracts as part of the war mobilization replaced the business lost in consumer goods, and prices and production of durable goods

²⁴Hickman, pp. 91-98, 380. Matusow, p. 228. "Industrial Summary of 1951," MBR, December 1, 1951, p. 2.

remained stable. Conditions in the Fourth District reflected this development exactly: sales of non-durable goods, autos, and appliances sagged in 1951, yet heavy industry as a whole operated above listed capacity. Steel production, for example, exceeded capacity in fifty-four of the sixty-five weeks between September, 1950, and November 30, 1951. Steel capacity itself increased nearly three million tons in the Fourth District during 1951. The backlog in machine tool orders, standing at five months in June, 1950, skyrocketed to twenty-two months by October, 1951. Throughout the district, wherever materials were in adequate supply and production was not hindered by allocations controls, defense-related output more than offset the decline in production of civilian type goods.²⁵

Expansion in the production of defense goods was encouraged by the Defense Production Act. Specifically, the law empowered the President to establish allocation procedures for the regular procurement of critical materials, to construct some industrial facilities where needed, and to extend to business long-term loans at low interest and allow accelerated amortization of outlays for plants and equipment. The influx of new defense spending into an expanding economy overcame the sag in

²⁵Hickman, p. 93. "Industrial Summary of 1951," MBR, December 1, 1951, pp. 1-3.

consumer expenditures and kept the boom going, pushing many economic indicators to record levels. The key to this ongoing drive was the government's decision to sponsor not a general war mobilization but a permanent increase in total industrial productive capacity. As ODM head Charles Wilson explained this policy, it was designed to meet the threat posed by a long list of Communist aggressions, not just to react to the Korean situation. Wilson stated that the administration had decided to seek a \$150 billion military build-up over three years rather than a more precipitous expansion geared only toward Korea. In line with this graduated approach, the government sought to find a balance between spending to produce weapons in the present and spending to boost productive capacity for the future. "We are," Wilson said, "expanding the production of our basic metals, particularly steel and aluminum, so that, in due course, we can provide for military goods largely from the new production."²⁶

Ohio manufacturers quickly took advantage of wartime conditions to increase their own business. Even before passage of the Defense Production Act, many

²⁶Harold G. Vatter, The United States Economy in the 1950's: An Economic History (New York, 1963), p. 78. Charles E. Wilson, "Mobilizing for Defense," The Age of Danger: Major Speeches on American Problems, ed. Harold F. Harding (New York, 1952), pp. 281-83.

Ohio firms had won defense contracts. These awards went not only to large firms but to small businesses as well. In fact, the government took pains to assure that small businesses would receive a fair share of defense work. At a conference in Cleveland between 600 small businessmen and officials from many government agencies, the government announced that, in the case of a tie on a bid between a large firm and small one, the small one would automatically be awarded the contract. Willys-Overland was a typical example of a business able to capture several profitable government contracts. In July, 1950, the U.S. Ordnance Department gave Willys a contract for \$22,291,330 to produce 8350 Army jeeps. Willys received another one million dollars in March, 1951, to produce axles, brakes, pickup trucks, and more jeeps. The company established second shifts at all of its plants and promised third shifts for the future. By March, Willys's payroll and employment totals had reached their highest levels since the end of World War II.²⁷

Other companies converted civilian production facilities to wartime use or took the wraps off plants which had been dormant since World War II. The Cleveland Cadillac plant which built bombers in World War II started building tanks under a \$110 million order in

²⁷Plain Dealer, September 19, 1950, p. 6; March 22, 1951, p. 3; July 19, 1950, p. 5; March 24, 1951, p. 14. Enquirer, July 6, 1950, p. 20.

August, 1950, boosted by another \$106 million in January, 1951. The Ravenna Arsenal, a Firestone subsidiary, built in 1942 to produce shells and bombs, was rehabilitated by a construction company, and two shifts of nine hundred workers each were hired to resume production. Toledo Scale developed a dual purpose plant to produce electrical components for armored vehicles. This plant did subcontracting work only, for arms producers which received defense contracts during war and peace, and the plant was easily convertible to non-armament production. There were also some plants which produced nothing but war material: the Ferro Corporation's plant in Bedford, Ohio, employed one supervisor and a trio of three-man shifts to manufacture a monthly quota of one million tons of napalm.²⁸

The greatest expansion occurring in any Ohio industry was the tremendous increase in steel capacity and production. The Fourth District contained 47 per cent of the United States's steel making capacity in 1950, and steel corporations in the region sought to boost this share still further. The government consistently demanded more steel, even threatening to

²⁸Plain Dealer, January 17, 1951, pp. 1, 7; December 27, 1950, p. 1; May 17, 1951, pp. 1, 6; September 24, 1951, p. 1. "Plant That's Ready for Peace or War," Business Week, February 23, 1952, pp. 94, 98.

compete directly with private producers. In response, steel firms, including those in Ohio, commenced the most rapid tonnage expansion program in their history. Using the tax breaks of the Defense Production Act, these companies began new construction projects designed to boost national collective capacity to 115 million tons per year by January, 1953, up from 100 million tons in 1950. Republic Steel led the way with a \$75 million program to increase its net output 35 per cent by early 1952. Republic's president, Charles White, said, "The entire program was made possible because of the fact that Congress has recently passed laws permitting accelerated tax depreciation on facilities used in the production of defense materials." Jones & Laughlin announced its own \$28 million expansion, financed entirely by General Motors and paid off by regular shipments of automotive steel until 1966. Youngstown Sheet and Tube initiated several separate expansions in 1950, as well.²⁹

A more intimate relationship between the government and private capital existed in the rubber industry, the

²⁹"Finished Steel Consumption," MBR, March 3, 1950, p. 6. "Steel Expansion," MBR, February 1, 1951, pp. 1-2. "Republic Expands Steel Capacity," Business Week, November 25, 1950, p. 24. Plain Dealer, November 17, 1950, pp. 1, 8; December 8, 1950, pp. 1, 10. Dispatch, October 18, 1950, p. B-13.

first industry to be brought completely under defense controls. After the outbreak of the war, rubber products were subject to heavy buying, stockpiling, and shortages. Prices for natural rubber rose at the fixed limit of two cents per pound each day in June. The surge to buy automobile tires was the strongest since 1941. Consumers apparently feared rationing, and many bought new tires without trading in their old ones. Rubber company officials averred that there was no shortage and no need to hoard, but at the same time, increasing costs for crude rubber forced the companies to raise their prices. Consumers took these increases as evidence that there was indeed a shortage.³⁰

The government acted on the assumption that the temporary shortage and war represented serious threats to the nation's supply of natural crude rubber. Early in July, the administration re-opened the first three of the synthetic rubber plants built by the government during World War II. In August, the Commerce Department ordered a cut in the use of rubber for civilian purposes. The debate over the use of the synthetic plants was whether they should be sold to private corporations or retained by the government and leased to private operators.

³⁰ "The Role of Rubber, Wool, Burlap and Tin," MBR, July 1, 1951, p. 2. Beacon Journal, June 28, 1950, p. 1. Plain Dealer, July 1, 1950, p. 1; July 5, 1950, p. 10; July 17, 1950, p. 5. Enquirer, July 6, 1950, p. 20; July 19, 1950, p. 21.

John Collyer, president of Goodrich, urged the government to sell the plants. He claimed that continuation of the government's monopoly could not create the competition necessary to boost production. Truman decided that national security dictated continued government ownership despite this protest. Goodyear's chairman of the board, P. W. Litchfield, not only backed the government's position but argued forcefully that supplies of rubber were reaching dangerously low levels and that further debate was not productive. The government retained the plants and in December, 1950, under authority of the Defense Production Act, became the sole buyer and distributor of synthetic rubber as well as the sole importer and distributor of natural rubber. All of the synthetic plants, including those in Ohio, were re-activated, and annual synthetic production increased from 525 million tons to 920 million tons per year. Consumption of rubber set a record in 1950, and by September, 1951, only 35 per cent of the rubber used in the United States was natural. The government's principal restriction on the use of rubber was strict control on new and replacement automobile tires. Meanwhile, the rapid

increase in synthetic rubber stocks allowed the government to develop a strategic stockpile of unknown size.³¹

The war also forced the government to re-evaluate its entire housing program in the light of military needs. Rent control, which had become almost a matter of local option, was extended on an emergency basis during the first months of the war. The other half of the government's housing program, the construction of public housing under the Housing Act of 1949, was also re-examined. This law, one of whose original sponsors had been Senator Taft, committed the federal government to alleviate the severe shortage of reasonably-priced housing by constructing 810,000 units of public housing over a six-year period. The government began to reconsider whether the resources intended for this project should be re-directed to defense (see Chapter VI, pp. 316-17, infra).

³¹Enquirer, July 8, 1950, p. 1. Blade, August 26, 1950, p. 5. Beacon Journal, June 25, 1950, pp. 7B, 12A. "Goodyear Expands Abroad," Business Week, July 29, 1950, p. 23. Plain Dealer, December 29, 1950, pp. 1, 2. "Industrial Retrospect," MBR, December 1, 1950, p. 4. "Industrial Summary of 1951," MBR, December 1, 1951, pp. 4, 8. On the construction of the synthetic plants during World War II, see Richard Polenber, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Paper; Philadelphia, 1972), pp. 14-18.

³²Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform During the Truman Administration (Columbia, Mo., 1966), pp. 117, 122-23, 105.

Federal rent control, a creation of World War II and the Office of Price Administration, had suffered a speckled career during the postwar years. Wartime controls actually had ended for twenty-five days in 1946 when Truman vetoed a price control bill which would have allowed a 20 per cent increase across the board in rents and house prices. The veto left the economy with no price controls until Congress, with an angry public up in arms over soaring prices demanding action, passed a new controls bill which restored the ceiling on rents. Over the next three years, the fate of rent control was bounced back and forth between those who rejected federal interference in housing as unwarranted and counterproductive and those who saw controls as the best way to provide reasonable housing for those people unable to afford either uncontrolled rents or the cost of a home of their own.³³

Truman himself was a staunch defender of continued rent controls. When he lifted most price controls in November, 1946, he maintained controls on rent. As each session of Congress debated the entire federal housing program, the President urged the extension of strong rent control provisions against the wishes of a strong real estate lobby and its supporters in Congress. In both 1947 and 1948, the Eightieth Congress passed and sent

³³Ibid., p. 47.

to the White House severely weakened rent control bills. The 1947 law, which Truman signed reluctantly, provided for a 15 per cent increase in rents if the landlord and the tenant both agreed. It also ended the authority of the federal Housing Expeditor to institute criminal proceeding against violators. In 1948, Congress extended this law for one year and added a provision to create local decontrol boards with the power to end controls in local areas. Truman signed this bill, too, as the best offer that Congress would make.³⁴

The Democratic victory in the 1948 elections provided the impetus for a new rent control bill more to the President's liking. The 15 per cent increase was abolished, the Housing Expeditor's powers were partially restored, and controls were extended to cover residence hotels and trailers. In 1950, Truman again called for a renewal. Congress agreed, but, as it had cut the President's 1949 request for a two-year extension to fifteen months, it reduced this renewal from one year to six months. Even Truman admitted in 1950 that this would be the final extension. The 1950 law called for the abolition of controls on December 31, 1950, except when an incorporated village, town, or city formally

³⁴Ibid., pp. 54, 65-66, 77.

declared that further control was necessitated by a shortage of rental housing.³⁵

After the outbreak of war, rent control was given two additional reprieves, each for ninety days. The National Security Resources Board authorized the first stop-gap measure, and Congress provided a final, three-month control law to give local communities a last opportunity to pass their own wartime measures.³⁶

During the recovery from the inventory recession of 1949, employment had lagged behind the growth of the labor force. Unemployment peaked in January, 1950, and still stood at 5 per cent when the war began. Thereafter, unemployment dropped steadily throughout the war, except for periods of labor unrest, and wartime employment peaked at more than sixty-two million jobs. In Ohio, employment during the war increased by 340,000 jobs or 12 per cent. The first months of fighting saw strong gains in employment, and even shortages of skilled workers in particular trades or areas across the state. Cleveland reported its lowest labor reservoir in two years and no unemployment of skilled workers. Toledo statistics showed 6400 persons hired from mid-May to

³⁵Ibid., pp. 105-06, 121-22. Public Law 574, 81st Congress, copy in Box 23, File: Rent Control in Upper Arlington, Vorys Papers.

³⁶Davies, pp. 122-23.

mid-July, and Warren, Ohio, had a thousand new jobs in the same period. In Youngstown, the labor shortage was so severe that some workers sought early retirement, knowing that they could find a new job easily and draw both a salary and a pension. The only restraint on these employment surges were temporary lay-offs because of scarcity of materials, especially steel and aluminum.³⁷

The first year of the war was actually a time of substantial job opportunity. Handicapped persons, blacks, old people, and women--four groups of job seekers usually not actively recruited--all found jobs in substantial numbers. A Youngstown firm, for example, the Commercial Shearing and Stamping Company, resumed its World War II practice of conducting classes to train women welders. The plant scheduled both a refresher course for veteran "Rosies" and beginner classes for newcomers. The General Assembly passed legislation, which Lausche signed, to suspend three sections of the Ohio General Code which restricted the working conditions

³⁷Hickman, pp. 76-77. Wayne David Lammie, "Unemployment in the Truman Administration: Political, Economic and Social Aspects" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), pp. 80-81. Herbert Agar, The Price of Power: America since 1945 (Chicago, 1957), p. 132. "Employment Trends in Ohio," MBR, August 1, 1953, p. 1. "Industrial Retrospect," MBR, December 1, 1950, p. 1. Plain Dealer, August 1, 1950, pp. 1, 7; August 15, 1950, p. 3. Blade, August 15, 1950, p. 1. Youngstown Vindicator, September 4, 1950, p. 30; September 18, 1950, p. 16.

and hours of women and children. Workers already gainfully employed were able to shop for new jobs easily, and the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce reported a promising outlook for June graduates in 1951. The Plain Dealer called graduates' chances for a job "a lead pipe cinch."³⁸

During the first year of the Korean War, the government struggled to raise production for both civilian and military needs and to restrain inflation. In the Fourth District and in Ohio, economic legislation and regulation combined to foster an extremely healthy war economy. The government's decision to increase industrial capacity as well as produce needed armaments limited production in many industries. Still, the diversion of resources to boost capacity did not severely curtail any phase of the wartime boom. Steel production in 1950 set a record as did the production of automobiles and tires. Sale of consumer durables reached record heights in each of the first three quarters of 1950, and Fourth District construction also set a new record for the year. In 1951, industry continued to operate at

³⁸Plain Dealer, December 7, 1950, pp. 1, 12; October 9, 1950, p. 6; May 7, 1951, p. 24. Ohio, General Assembly, Bulletin, 99th General Assembly of Ohio, 1951-1952, p. 93.

near-capacity as military needs replaced a slackening civilian demand.³⁹

Many corporations operating in Ohio reported sales figures and profits which accurately reflect this expansionary cycle. Armco Steel enjoyed its biggest year ever in 1950, with profits 25 per cent above 1949. Inland Steel recorded \$459 million in sales, 16 per cent above the previous high. Goodyear sales, too, hit an all-time peak in 1950. Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Republic Steel, Standard Oil of Ohio, and General Tire all followed this trend, reaching record or near-record levels of sales and profits. In 1951, the story was much the same. Firestone achieved record profits in the first half of the year, Republic Steel set an earnings record for the same period, and Goodyear became the first rubber company to exceed the one billion dollar mark for annual sales, up 30 per cent over 1950 because of the military preparedness program.⁴⁰

The year 1951 began darkly for the United Nations forces in Korea. The retreat which had begun on the

³⁹"Industrial Retrospect," MBR, December 1, 1950, pp. 1-4, 8-12. "Industrial Summary of 1951," MBR, December 1, 1951, pp. 1-4, 8-11.

⁴⁰"Armco's Jubilee," Newsweek, July 24, 1950, p. 57. Plain Dealer, February 1, 1951, p. 14; February 20, 1951, p. 17; February 3, 1951, p. 10; February 6, 1951, p. 16; February 14, 1951, p. 16; July 3, 1951, p. 11; August 1, 1951, p. 16; February 19, 1952, p. 17.

Chongchon continued well south of the Parallel. Seoul was again evacuated and left to the North Koreans for the second time. At the height of this crisis, General Walker, the hero of the Pusan defense, was killed in a jeep accident. He was immediately replaced by Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway, who arrived in Korea to find morale and intelligence at an incredible low. Ridgway toured the battlefield and told his troops that they were in Korea to stay.⁴¹

MacArthur began a series of communications with Washington which provided the President with the ammunition necessary to recall his field commander. Truman and MacArthur again found themselves on opposite sides of the argument over the future of the war. Despite the administration's earlier indecision regarding the aims of the war, Truman and his staff now decided once again that Korea was to be a limited conflict. Truman notified MacArthur that he could expect no reinforcements and that Korea would not become a major war. MacArthur was ordered to defend his position in Korea, to retreat slowly, if necessary, and to regard Japan as his primary strategic responsibility. MacArthur reacted to these orders with emphatic outrage. He did not accept the administration's reverting to a limited war, and he was

⁴¹Rees, pp. 171-77.

incensed that the Joint Chiefs would turn down his request to lift the restrictions on the Yalu to allow bombing in China.⁴²

MacArthur presented the President with an untenable choice between two essentially undesirable alternatives: either allow a fuller prosecution of the war with victory as its objective or he, MacArthur, would be forced to preside over the complete destruction of the Eighth Army. To the general, there was no middle ground. In contrast, Ridgway found no difficulty in adhering to the President's policy. He initiated actions along the front to solidify the United Nations position and to begin a war of attrition. The Army advanced to a more defensible position, and troop morale was remarkably restored.⁴³

Truman recalled MacArthur on April 11, 1951, and named Ridgway to replace him. Whatever the merits of the argument between the President and the general, Truman believed that he could not countenance what is perceived to be open defiance from a field commander. He acted, after consulting senior aides and officials, when MacArthur consistently refused to refrain from debating the issues between them in public, notably in

⁴²Ibid., pp. 178-80.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 181-95.

a celebrated letter to House minority leader Joseph Martin. MacArthur accepted the news of his recall calmly and prepared to return to the United States with quiet dispatch.⁴⁴

The Truman administration's decision to pursue a partial mobilization in 1950 involved a two-fold gamble. On the one hand, the President hoped that his deliberate actions short of preparation for total war would convince the enemy that he was sincere in his desire to limit the war to Korea. On the other hand, Truman also desired to preserve and extend the progress of the Fair Deal while simultaneously boosting military preparedness substantially. Neither gamble was really a success. The enemy took his cue more from activity in the war zone than from Truman's speeches. When MacArthur advanced north of the Parallel, China's government felt genuinely threatened and decided to intervene, thereby widening the war. The Fair Deal did not survive either. Economic reactions to the war, especially by consumers, prompted a more complete structure of controls than Truman had proposed. The two scare-buying waves led to complex

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 205-220. The Truman-MacArthur controversy has been the subject of a voluminous amount of literature, both popular and scholarly. The outstanding study of these events is John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).

wage and price controls, and the Chinese entry heightened pressures to concentrate on military needs.

In Ohio, the government's mobilization helped to push the economy into a very prosperous situation. Industrial firms raised their productive capacity and won a good number of defense contracts. Once the inflationary spurts abated, workers found jobs to be plentiful and incomes rising, with prices holding relatively steady. Despite some rather traditional protests from industrial leaders about government interference in the economy, Ohio's economy was able not only to contribute to the war effort but to be rewarded handsomely for that contribution.

CHAPTER III

WAGES, POLITICS, AND SECURITY:

OHIO LABOR AND THE IMPACT OF KOREA

There is enough room within the CIO movement to differ about many subjects, many ideas, questions of reform within the CIO, economic, social, and trade union policy--yes, plenty of room, plenty of room, but there is no room within the CIO for Communism.

--Philip Murray, Proceedings of the Eleventh Constitutional Convention of the CIO, 1949.

Among modern American presidents, Harry Truman experienced a unique relationship with the American labor movement. This close association stemmed in part from Truman's general sympathy for the goals and aspirations of organized labor. But more important was the growing attention paid by labor, especially the CIO, to politics. In the years following World War II, the leadership of the CIO recognized that economic and social progress for its members could not continue unless labor participated fully in the political arena. Not surprisingly, this involvement included very close ties to the national Democratic Party and the Truman administration.

The Korean War subjected this alliance between organized labor and the Democrats to severe tests. In Ohio, the resulting strain was manifested in at least three ways. Like other economic interest groups, organized labor had to pursue its objectives within the confines of the administration's partial mobilization and anti-inflation programs. Conflict here was almost inevitable. In addition, labor's virulent opposition to the Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947, led the Ohio

labor movement to support a political candidate of dubious qualifications so intensely that the campaign backfired into a huge electoral defeat. Finally, the CIO, anxious to conform to the demands of the anti-communist crusade, expelled several strong unions accused of Communist-domination. In Ohio particularly, the expulsion of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America led to a series of sharp local disputes during the war which tended to sacrifice worker solidarity to the quest for absolute loyalty.

One historian of the relationship between labor and politics argues that a new "dichotomy in the national constituency developed during the postwar years." According to this analyst, Congress tended to be composed of members who represented business, middle-class, and agricultural segments of American society. The president, on the other hand, "has increasingly owed his election to, and tends to represent the interests of, the urban laborer." In the light of recent political results, this argument is less than attractive, but as a description of the distribution of political power during the Truman administration, it can be useful. Especially in the light of Truman's

legislative battles with the Eightieth Congress, the idea of agrarian and business conservatives in Congress opposing a president anxious to please urban workers has a certain seductive power.¹

President Truman wrote in his memoirs that the problem of labor unrest during the period of postwar reconversion was "one of the most difficult and persistent of all the domestic problems" he had to face as President. The economic problems of reconversion were hazardous enough, but the intricacies of postwar labor-management relations involved Truman with a strong interest group, the CIO, on the verge of fashioning itself into a major political force. Organized labor had seen the New Deal encourage industrial unionism and give labor a voice in government. The CIO especially realized that its members' interests could be substantively advanced through involvement in partisan politics, and starting in 1936, the CIO became an important part of the New Deal coalition.²

During and after World War II, organized labor participated in government more fully than ever before and willingly sacrificed some of its own goals as a contribution to the war effort. In particular, labor

¹K. Alton Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley: A Question of Mandate (Lexington, 1966), pp. v-vi, 1-6.

²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y., 1955), p. 495. David M. Oshinsky, Senator Joseph McCarthy and the American Labor Movement (Columbia, Mo., 1976), p. 100.

leaders accepted appointments to many wartime economic agencies, and in exchange, the CIO adopted a no-strike pledge for the duration. After V-J Day, Truman urged both labor and management to return to peaceful collective bargaining and allow reconversion to occur without undue unrest. Labor, seeing high wartime wages disappear and price controls expire, was in no mood to cooperate. Fearful of being caught in a wage-price squeeze, unions initiated a series of strikes basically over the issue of higher wages. Truman's impatience with these strikes, which he considered unpatriotic, especially his loud disputes with John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of America, damaged the Democratic-labor coalition. More importantly, the President's attitude reinforced the hostility of Congress to the real power of the mature CIO.³

The culmination of this confrontation was the Taft-Hartley Act, passed over the President's veto, in June, 1947.⁴ Historian Alton Lee has commented on the curiosity that the Taft-Hartley law, one of the most complicated statutes Congress ever enacted, became so well-known, at least by name, to so many people.

³Lee, pp. 12-19, 22-48. Oshinsky, pp. 100-101, 61-63.

⁴For a detailed description of the law's provisions, see Lee, pp. 75-77.

Regardless of its particular provisions, "Taft-Hartley" became a household word, perceived by union members as well as other people to be a symbol, more meaningful than the act itself. Indeed, they were right, for the passage of Taft-Hartley indicated that the government would no longer play an active role in favor of unions but would instead act as an umpire between labor and management in support of the public interest.⁵

Truman vetoed the bill after Congress passed it, but Congress overrode the veto handily. The pressures on the President were enormous, as evidenced by the amount of mail received by the White House. When he announced his veto, Truman was trying to heal the wounds in the Democratic-labor alliance after a stormy reconversion period. But labor leaders had learned to be wary of the President, some of whose actions during the postwar years were decidedly anti-labor. Moreover, the labor movement had come to see that its success in the political arena would depend on dealing with both

⁵Ibid., pp. 1-2, 9-10.

sides of the dichotomy, the antagonism of the business and agrarian Congress as well as the sympathetic President.⁶

In sharp contrast to labor's cooperative spirit during World War II, the first months of the Korean War saw a pronounced attempt by organized labor to seek and win major wage increases in anticipation of the imposition of wage and price controls. The United Rubber Workers, for example, a union of great importance to Ohio's economy, signed a new contract with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company in October, 1950. The union won a 9 to 11 cents per hour wage increase and a modified union shop clause under which employees had to remain union members for the length of the contract, which lasted until July, 1952. IUE, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (the non-Communist successor to UE), first scheduled and then called off a nationwide strike against General Electric. The union, prominent in Ohio, settled for generous terms, including a 10 cents per hour wage increase, additional holidays, and an improved pension plan. Other companies doing business in Ohio signed

⁶Ibid., pp. 79, 80-81, 104-05.

similar contracts with unions representing their employees. Allis-Chalmers in Norwood agreed to a five-year pact with IUE, including a cost-of-living adjustment clause and other benefits. Willys-Overland, Ohio Bell, and Sohio (Standard Oil of Ohio) all announced comparable agreements. Nationwide, the wage increases granted by nearly major manufacturing industry pushed average hourly earnings up 7 per cent in the second half of 1950.⁷

The United Steelworkers of America, perhaps the most influential union in Ohio, also sought to gain wage increases before the government had the chance to regulate wages. Unlike the corporations which employed its members, the Steelworkers did not anticipate that they would be able to improve their economic position once the economy was mobilized. Thus, the 1950 annual conference of the Steelworkers' District 27, representing 32,000 central Ohio workers, demanded substantial wage increases before the expiration of the current contracts. The conference's resolution, charging that the steel industry had profited enormously from the first weeks

⁷Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 28, 1950, p. 1; July 11, 1950, p. 3; September 22, 1950, p. 3; November 30, 1950, pp. 1, 16. Youngstown Vindicator, September 2, 1950, p. 1; September 15, 1950, p. 1. Herbert R. Northrup, Boulwarism: The Labor Relations Policies of the General Electric Company, Their Implications for Public Policy and Management Action (Ann Arbor, 1964), p. 53. Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years (Paper; New York, 1970), p. 225.

of the war, demanded that these profits be distributed. Steelworkers did win such raises in 1950. Timken Roller Bearing workers, for example, voted to accept a 10 per cent wage increase, averaging about 16 cents per hour. Republic Steel granted its employees a 16 cent raise and also raised steel prices \$5.50 a ton. By the end of the year, Steelworkers had girded themselves for the wage control decision. The Plain Dealer complained that wages were racing ahead of prices, but if that were so, it was just what the union wanted.⁸

In the midst of this jockeying for positions of economic advantage, Ohioans joined other Americans to vote in the 1950 off-year elections. For the nation as a whole, the election almost served as a referendum on the administration's decisions during the first weeks of the war. But in Ohio, the key race, for the Senate seat held by Robert Taft, presented labor with an opportunity to punish one of the sponsors of the hated Taft-Hartley law.

Political analyst Samuel Lubell, in his study of the 1950 election, pointed to the limited war commitment as a key issue. The administration was being attacked

⁸Plain Dealer, September 25, 1950, p. 9; September 30, 1950, p. 3; August 29, 1950, p. 23; November 13, 1950, p. 1; December 1, 1950, pp. 1, 7; October 10, 1950, p. 14.

both by those who were reluctant to engage the United States in any new foreign adventures and urged withdrawal from Korea and by those who favored a total war effort, not a limited one. Lubell saw these views expressed at the polls. According to his analysis, the war broke out when Americans were simply tired of expending huge sums of money for any purpose. They had already seen the national deficit swell to lift the country out of the depression, to beat back the fascist challenge during World War II, and to reconstruct postwar Europe. Few were willing to do more and add to an already heavy tax burden. Moreover, businessmen wished to avoid inflation and renewed government controls, and veterans certainly did not relish returning to war. On the other hand, with the nation stuck somewhere between peace and all-out war, many people thought that the Russians should be shown that America was prepared to draw the line. An elderly Ohio couple told Lubell that "when Malik and Vishinsky say those things about us in the United Nations, someone ought to go up to them and slap their faces! . . . It's time we got back to the American way of living."⁹

⁹Samuel Lubell, "Is America Going Isolationist Again?" Saturday Evening Post, June 7, 1952, and Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York, 1956), p. 166, both referred to and quoted in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), pp. 152, 219.

The Senate race in Ohio pitted Republican incumbent Robert Taft against Democratic State Auditor Joseph Ferguson. The war issue played a role in the election, but the decisive factor in Taft's victory was a backlash from the campaign of organized labor to defeat him. Labor's tactics were so intense, so inexorable, and so unfair in its particulars that the effort became an issue in itself. Thousands of workers ignored their leaders' call, refused to work for Ferguson, and declined to vote for him in November.

After Taft's initial "yes, but" approach to the war (see Chapter I, pp. 21-22, supra) he continued to equivocate on the issue. He voted for the September tax increase and for the Defense Production Act; but he opposed the excess profits tax proposal, opposed granting wage and price control authority to Truman, and called for a substantial decrease in domestic expenditures to keep the budget balanced. Throughout the campaign, Taft continued to thump the administration for reacting with restraint to a situation caused by its own mistakes. "There is no alternative except to support the war," he said, "but certainly we can point out that it has resulted from a bungling of the Democratic administration."¹⁰

¹⁰James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston, 1972), pp. 454-55.

Ferguson, a seasoned candidate who had been elected Auditor four times, stood squarely behind the administration, but weakened what could have been a true clash on the issues by his own ineptitude as a candidate. Despite his previous electoral success, this campaign showed Ferguson to be woefully lacking in experience and knowledge, an easy target for caricature and ridicule. The campaign quickly turned nasty, and Ferguson contributed his share of the dirt. He argued that Taft's ambivalence on the war was treasonous and that the Senator was playing politics as usual while American blood was flowing in Korea.¹¹

Labor's campaign to defeat Taft quickly distinguished itself for tactlessness and overkill.¹² John L. Lewis set the tone for labor's attack in August when he urged Ohio's miners to prevent Taft from entering the mines to address the workers. The United Labor League of Ohio, labor's political organization, produced two pamphlets full of such excess and untruth that no thinking voter could have taken them seriously.

The Speaker's Handbook was a 218-page compilation of

¹¹Ibid., pp. 456-58, 466-67.

¹²For an analysis of the role played by the CIO's Political Action Committee in the Ferguson campaign, see Fay Calkins, The CIO and the Democratic Party (Chicago, 1952), pp. 12-36.

Taft's votes and comments over the years, edited and expurgated so as to put the senator in the worst possible light. The booklet included, for example, Taft's vote against a sixty-five cent minimum wage, a key tenet of labor's platform, but omitted his vote for a seventy-five cent minimum wage in 1949. The other publication, a comic book called "The Robert Alphonso Taft Story: It's On the Record," was even more outrageous. The plot of the comic book involved the attempt of a Taft campaign worker, J. Phineas Moneybags, to make a film highlighting the accomplishments of Taft's career and the disadvantages of Ferguson. Slowly, as Moneybags cut out the unfavorable facts about Taft--his private school education, inherited wealth, and all sorts of political remarks--the reader saw that nothing about Taft will survive. Indeed, at the end of the film, only a picture of Ferguson and his family remains, nothing detrimental having been discovered about him.¹³

Both candidates helped to turn the campaign into a brawl. For his part, Taft tried to link the CIO with the Communist Party, a partisan charge, but one widely held to be true by Republicans. Ferguson and the unions outdid this easily by accusing Taft of pro-communism. Adding to Ferguson's charge of treason, labor likened Taft's voting record to that of New York Congressman

¹³Patterson, pp. 458-61.

Vito Marcantonio, who generally voted the Party line. Ferguson's forces also circulated a photograph of Taft in the company of Earl Browder, former head of the American Communist Party. The photo had in fact been taken in 1936 when Taft had debated Browder before the American Youth Congress.¹⁴

Taft won a tremendous victory in November, amassing more votes than any other Republican office-seeker had in the history of the state. He carried 84 of Ohio's 88 counties and achieved a plurality of better than 400,000, the second largest in any Ohio senatorial election. 1950 was a Republican year, to be sure, as the GOP picked up key Senate seats in California and Illinois, but Taft won because of an anti-labor backlash. Estimates gave him a remarkable 40 per cent of the labor vote statewide.¹⁵

When the Truman administration decided to control wages and prices in January, 1951, the administrative machinery to enforce that decision was already in place (see Chapter II, pp. 76-78, *supra*). The Economic Stabilization Agency had authority over both prices and wages, but controls were implemented by two subsidiary

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 465-68.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 468-71.

agencies, the Office of Price Stabilization and the Wage Stabilization Board. The original WSB included nine members, three each from labor, management, and the public, with one of the public members serving as Chairman. The board had authority under the Defense Production Act to set maximum limits on wages and to recommend solutions for non-wage issues in labor disputes. Wage rulings were legally enforceable; non-wage recommendations were not, but in practice, the board's proposals stood.¹⁶

Early in 1951 the labor representatives on the board resigned in protest. Their objection was two-fold: on the one hand, they opposed the decision by OPS chief DiSalle to freeze profit margins rather than prices themselves (see Chapter II, pp. 78-79, supra) on the other, they also objected to their own board's policy to limit wage increases to 10 per cent above the levels of January 15, 1950. The labor members had insisted on 12 per cent.¹⁷

Labor rejoined the wage stabilization effort in April, 1951, when the board was reconstituted with

¹⁶Alonzo Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York, 1973), pp. 447, 449-50. Plain Dealer, December 1, 1950, pp. 1, 8. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership (Paper; New York, 1968), p. 14.

¹⁷Hamby, pp. 449-50. Plain Dealer, February 17, 1951, p. 8; March 1, 1951, p. 1.

seventeen new members. This time the board included four members each from labor, management, agriculture, and the public, with ODM head Charles Wilson as chairman. The new board was supposed to advise the President directly, and labor joined willingly. But the seven-week dispute and the collapse of the first wage board seriously jeopardized this attempt at cooperation between government and labor. Government was obviously unwilling to court labor by offering advantageous wage decisions contrary to the public interest. Labor leaders, on the other hand, realized that government would not be its partner and that the fractured relationship, symbolized by the passage of Taft-Hartley, would not soon be repaired.¹⁸

The major test for the new Wage Stabilization Board came in late 1951 when the Steelworkers' contract with basic steel came up for renewal (see Chapter VI, pp. 285-92, infra). In an attempt to settle this dispute, the board recommended not only a wage increase but also that a union shop clause be added to the contract. This time Wilson resigned in protest, and the dispute led to a national crisis. When Congress renewed the Defense Production Act in June, 1952, the board lost

¹⁸Plain Dealer, April 6, 1951, p. 1.

its power to intervene in labor disputes. Wage controls themselves ended on February 6, 1953.¹⁹

The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act had signalled an end to the cozy New Deal friendship between organized labor and the government and a blow to labor's emergence as a major interest group. The failure to defeat Senator Taft in 1950 and to mould the WSB to its liking continued this trend by showing unions that involvement in politics would not automatically bring favorable results. The final step in this declining relationship was in part a self-inflicted wound, coming when labor decided to join the anti-communist crusade by cleaning its own house of disloyalty and the threat of subversion. Labor's quest for security, prompted by Cold War tensions and continued during the Korean War, weakened its own bargaining power and failed to dissuade the government from its own investigations of the labor movement.

Ironically, the outbreak of the Korean War did not serve as a catharsis for those Americans who accepted the tenets of the great conspiracy theory (see Introduction, pp. 7-9, supra). On first

¹⁹Ibid., June 29, 1952, pp. 1, 8; July 31, 1952, pp. 1, 5; February 7, 1953, pp. 1, 4, 12.

glance, it might seem logical and reasonable that the Truman administration's vigorous response to the North Korean invasion should have quieted those critics who had persistently carped about the government's softness toward communism. Truman's decision to oppose aggression actively in a distant place with little strategic value might have rebutted the view that the Fair Dealers were preparing to surrender the United States to the Soviet Union. Such was not the case. The start of the war only temporarily deflected the attacks of the critics, who, in February, 1950, had found a new spokesman in Senator Joseph McCarthy. After the initial weeks of the war, as the President struggled to manage its scope and explain his position, McCarthy and his compatriots redoubled their charges. The administration's posture actually had caused the attack of the North Koreans, they said. Instead of giving Truman high marks for entering the war, McCarthy and other believers in the great conspiracy condemned the President and Acheson for earlier writing off Korea. The war, they argued, was the result of American weakness, not a sign of anti-communist resolve.²⁰

²⁰Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York, 1966), p. 389. Hamby, p. 409.

In addition, the start of the war did nothing to alleviate fears of a domestic communist threat. The great conspiracy theorists, after all, argued that the United States was imperiled more from subversion than invasion. Regardless of how the administration conducted its foreign policy, the danger of communism from within America persisted. Not surprisingly, vigilance against this menace remained active after June, 1950, and efforts to combat the threat of subversion received strong support. In Ohio, wariness about the possibility of subversion centered on the state's industrial plants where communist disruption was believed most likely to occur. In particular, attention focused on those plants where workers had been organized by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE). This union, accused of communist-domination, had been expelled from the CIO in 1949 and had, by the start of the war, lost many of its members to its anti-communist replacement, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE-CIO). Nevertheless, the war prompted IUE to continue its crusade. Moreover, the government of Ohio, motivated to do its share to help the federal government prevent subversion, created the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission with the hope that investigation and exposure would prove

to be effective weapons in the battle to prevent domestic communist turmoil.²¹

Just exactly how America's economic security and well-being were threatened by the presence of communist influence in trade unions was a question which received many answers. Few would agree with Hubert Humphrey's extreme opinion that "the Communist infiltration of the CIO was a direct threat to the survival of all of our country's democratic institutions." Scholar Max Kampelman's assessment, a bit vague, accused the Marxists of trying "to convert unions into political organizations so that they can be used as instruments for producing revolutionary change." But given the small number of actual domestic communists, the possibility for such change seems remote. More realistic was the charge that even a small group of highly dedicated Communists could infiltrate institutions, including industrial plants, successfully enough to commit espionage and sabotage.²²

²¹The most thorough analysis of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission is Frederick C. Thayer, Jr., "The Ohio Un-American Activities Commission" (unpublished Master's thesis, The Ohio State University, 1954).

²²Max M. Kampelman, The Communist Party vs. The C.I.O.: A Study in Power Politics (New York, 1957), pp. vii-viii, x. Robert K. Carr, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950 (Ithaca, 1952), pp. ix-x.

It was not clear either how an investigation by Ohio, in which almost inevitably stale and outdated evidence would be paraded before the public, could possibly prevent such damage. The Ohio Un-American Activities Commission, or OUAC, was specifically charged to investigate "Communist-domination of industrial groups, particularly in those areas and plants engaged in war work, with emphasis on those plants or industries in which the workers are represented or controlled by or show allegiance to those unions expelled by the CIO or the AFL" ²³ The commission somehow hoped that exposure of Communist leadership would drive union members out of these unions into their anti-communist replacements. There did not seem to be any better way.

The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers was founded in 1936. As the name implies, this industrial union was actually a federation of locals from three related industries. ²⁴ Unlike other CIO unions,

²³Ohio, General Assembly, Un-American Activities Commission, Report of the Un-American Activities Commission, State of Ohio, 1951-1952, Part I, pp. 11-12. Thayer, p. 59.

²⁴An industrial union or local is one in which the workers are organized across the entire shop floor, regardless of the level of skill they possess or the individual tasks they perform. A craft union, on the other hand, generally organizes skilled workers within a specific craft, such as carpenters or sheet metal workers, regardless of where they work. The CIO was created because of the need for industrial unionism which the AFL opposed actively and in spirit.

such as the Steelworkers, in which organizing was financed in part from outside sources and coordinated by the CIO-established Organizing Committees, UE represented a true rank-and-file union, born as a coalition of pre-existing locals which shared similar problems and saw advantages in unity.

During the 1930s, these industries experienced tremendous growth and technological change which enhanced the need for organizing workers along industrial lines, different from those traditionally allowed by the AFL. Scattered attempts by the AFL to organize workers in radio plants during the 1920s had never amounted to much. Rigid jurisdictional lines between different skilled crafts, each with its own union, made effective organizing in huge plants impossible, and the AFL really did not much care to organize workers whose job descriptions called for something different from the traditional skills of a craftsman. Yet, job security in a huge factory, the quest for higher wages, and the desire for a regular procedure to solve grievances were problems which almost demanded a union. In 1933, one of the first unions in a radio plant was founded at the Philco factory in Camden, New Jersey. Philco had suddenly announced a temporary increase to a ten-hour day to recover time lost on the Fourth of July holiday, and 350 workers, with no other alternative method of

protest, began a spontaneous strike. Surprisingly, the company negotiated with this group and signed an agreement three days later providing for an eight-hour day, a forty-hour week, time-and-a-half for overtime, a thirty cent per hour raise, a grievance procedure, and recognition of seniority.²⁵ In other radio and electrical factories, locals were organized under similar circumstances under the protection of sec. 7(a) of the National Recovery Act. With the Philco local, they banded together in December, 1933, into the Radio and Allied Trades National Council and elected Carey to head the group.²⁶

The Philco local and five others applied for and received charters from the AFL as Federal Labor Unions. Officials of these locals believed that the AFL could eventually be convinced to charter a new international union after it had chartered all the separate locals. In other plants, the workers were

²⁵The newest interpretation of the early years of UE is Ronald L. Filippelli, "UE: The Formative Years, 1933-1937," Labor History, 17 (Summer, 1976), 351-71. An older account, which differs from Filippelli in some details, is Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement, 1935-1941 (Cambridge, 1960), chap. 5, "The Electrical and Radio Manufacturing Industries," 239-65. On the Philco strike, see Filippelli, 351-54 and Galenson, pp. 239-40.

²⁶Galenson, p. 240.

more skeptical of the AFL. They argued that the new locals should remain independent, band together into their own international, and then compel the AFL to charter this fait accompli. The AFL clearly disapproved of the independents and indicated that a charter might be offered to a council composed of federal locals alone, but when the independent locals withdrew from the National Council to test the AFL, a new charter did not result.²⁷

Simultaneous with these developments in electrical and radio factories, workers in machine shops were also organizing. In 1935, the Machine Tool and Foundry Workers, with 10,000 members, joined with the independent electrical unions who had moved away from the federal radio locals to form the National Federation of Metal and Allied Unions. Their own request for an AFL charter was rebuffed by Ohioan John Frey, head of the AFL's Metal Trades Department.²⁸

James Carey, the leader of the radio locals, decided to press the federal unions' case for a charter at the AFL's 1935 convention in Atlantic City, but his proposal never reached the floor. This was the convention at which industrial groups within several AFL unions,

²⁷Filippelli, 354-57. Galenson, pp. 240-41.

²⁸James J. Matles and James Higgins, Them and Us: Struggles of a Rank-and-File Union (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974), p. 24. Kampelman, p. 122. Philippelli, 357-59.

led by John L. Lewis, forced the AFL to set up the Committee of Industrial Organizations. Carey's plan was brushed aside in the turmoil, and the AFL Executive Council suggested instead a merger between the federal locals and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. This union offered Carey's group Class B membership status, and the proposal was rejected.²⁹ Carey resumed talks with the independent electrical workers, and in March, 1936, they formed the United Electrical and Radio Workers of America. Carey was elected President, and Julius Emspak from the independent GE local at Schenectady was elected Secretary-Treasurer.³⁰ The AFL expelled all the federal locals and revoked their charters when the union was formed, and UERWA passed a resolution to affiliate with the CIO, now the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

²⁹Class B membership allowed unorganized workers in utilities and manufacturing plants to join the IBEW at a lower admission fee and pay a lower per capita tax (dues). Class B members did not participate in death and pension benefits and did not possess equal voting rights at conventions. See History and Structure of the IBEW (no city, n.d.), pp. 10-11, an IBEW pamphlet.

³⁰Filippelli, 359-65. Matles and Higgins, p. 44.

In 1937, the machinists joined UERWA to form UERMWA. The UE trio was complete.³¹

Communism intruded on this relationship almost from the very beginning. The machinists, led by James Matles, named UE's Director of Organization, were affiliated with the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), a federation of unions founded by the Communist Party. Matles's group left TUUL in 1935 when it was disbanded and rejoined the AFL's International Association of Machinists. The start of the CIO and the birth of UE presented the Communists with a new avenue of attack far superior to TUUL. Thus, the machinists joined the new union.³²

James Carey, who was to lead the anti-communist forces within UE, was aware of the charge of communist infiltration even before the start of UE. The leader of the independent electrical locals, Julius Emspak, had, like Matles, begun his career in TUUL. Carey brushed aside the communist threat during merger talks with the independents in 1935. He preferred to think that the people who accused the labor movement of accepting communism were simply anti-union fanatics opposed to all

³¹Galenson, pp. 244-45. Filippelli, 368-70.

³²David J. Saposs, Communism in American Unions (New York, 1959), pp. 9-11, 15, 124.

unions as well as to Carey's own liberal, active, social philosophy. Yet, at the first UE convention in 1936, a split developed between the independents and federal locals over several convention resolutions. In political terms, this split was clearly a division between left and right within the union.³³

Communist influence was a problem for the CIO as a whole, too. In AFL unions, Communist penetration generally went no further than the lowest levels of control. In part, the party's failure can be attributed to the AFL's lack of enthusiasm in acquiring new members or new staff people. The CIO suffered from no such apathy; on the contrary, it was hard-pressed to recruit personnel with enough vitality and experience to take on the tremendous job of organizing thousands of industrial workers who in some cases were literally begging for a union. The Communists frequently had these qualities, and they were hired on in sufficient numbers to allow the Party to drop its dual union strategy.³⁴ The precise extent of Communist influence in the CIO is difficult to gauge because the Party's strategy included secrecy and concealment. John L. Lewis was more than

³³Filippelli, 361, 365-66. Saposs, p. 122. Calling Carey's group the right wing of UE should not suggest that it was allied with the American right wing at all. It is rather a convenient descriptive for political differences within UE.

³⁴Saposs, pp. ix, 119, 120, 124.

willing to accept Communists, and his self-deception was made all the more palatable by the radical-liberal disguise which most Communists donned. In addition, non-Communists in the labor movement automatically branded all charges of Communist influence as "reckless" or "smears," thereby playing into the hands of the Communists' desire to conceal their identity and true strength. Kampelman argues that at the height of their influence, "Communists had obtained positions of trust, responsibility, and authority giving them complete or partial control in at least 40 per cent of the CIO unions, including . . . the United Electrical Workers."³⁵

It is the nature and kind of this "control" and the purposes to which it was put that are really of interest. The Communists relied on minority control. Particularly in the case of the UE, the Party members took control of the union machinery, including the international office, the executive board, and the union newspaper, as well as the leadership of several locals. Communists did not outnumber the rank-and-file nor even influence the views of many union members. Domination of the union's bureaucracy meant that the Party could use the union as a mouthpiece for the promulgation and dissemination of political resolutions

³⁵Kampelman, pp. 16, 18-19, 4.

and policies favored by the Party. For example, the Communist Party of the United States opposed the New Deal until the birth of the CIO. The labor alliance then led to a political alliance as the Party joined with liberals to support FDR in a united front against Fascism. Then, when Hitler negotiated the Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviet Union, Communist officials broke with FDR, ceased their attack on Fascism, and condemned the war against Germany as imperialism. UE's political stance changed whenever the Party's did.³⁶

James Carey observed these transformations as president of a growing, powerful union. By the end of 1937, UE had acquired 137,000 members in 275 locals. The first UE convention in March, 1936, approved a plan to complete the organization of the giant plants in the electrical and radio industries, including the GM Frigidaire plant in Dayton, Ohio. Each of these plants contained a company union, set up by management to dissuade workers from any further union activity. These company unions were so successful that only a few workers in each plant were UE members at the time of the first convention. Nevertheless, within a few years, most of these plants had capitulated to UE's

³⁶Galenson, p. 255. Transcript, Robert N. Elsner, Sr., Oral History Interview 14-25-1, Ohio Historical Society, p. 27.

organizing drive. By 1947, UE represented 600,000 employees in 1375 plants.³⁷

GM Frigidaire proved to be a particularly tough nut for the union to crack. It was the last of the major pieces in UE's organizational plan to fall into place. General Motors actually had five electrical plants, four of these located in Ohio. The Frigidaire plant in Dayton employed ten thousand workers to produce refrigerators, and the workers had organized a small, independent union aided by Kermit Kirkendall of the Metal Workers. This union sent delegates to UE's founding convention and received a charter as Local 801. Still, by 1938, only one GM shop, with 500 workers, had gained recognition from the company. In Dayton, Kirkendall's organizing efforts ran up against strong opposition from every AFL union in the city as well as, Matles says, a carefully constructed system of "community control," including the use of company spies and employee informants. Nor did it help that AFL literature, especially from the IAM, accused UE organizer Ernest deMaio of being a Communist. What finally turned the tide, according to Matles, was the use of a carefully

³⁷ "How We Got Here . . . History of the IUE," IUE News, Special Issue, 1964, n.p. Matles and Higgins, pp. 61, 54. Northrup, p. 18.

selected group of five organizers and the general economic upturn in 1938.³⁸

Carey resisted the charge of Communist infiltration until 1939 when he split with Matles and Emspak over the Hitler-Stalin pact, which he opposed and they approved. Then, when Hitler broke the pact by invading the Soviet Union and the left-wing faction flip-flopped again to support the war against Germany, Carey and his followers were convinced that the charges were true. As a result, he organized a small opposition group later known as UE Members for Democratic Action (UEMDA), designed to recapture the administrative offices of the union. Carey's chance came in 1941 when a Pittsburgh local inquired of the president whether a local could bar from union office Nazis, Fascists, and Communists. Carey answered that a local could properly do this, but the Executive Board overruled him, 9-2, and the 1941 convention endorsed this decision, 792-373. Carey refused to acquiesce, and the convention then removed him from the presidency

³⁸Matles and Higgins, pp. 35, 55, 62, 123-27. Elsner Transcript, pp. 20-21.

in favor of Albert Fitzgerald of the Lynn, Massachusetts, local.³⁹

The end of World War II cleared the way for a renewed conflict between left and right in the CIO unions. The political and philosophical battles resumed, and, in addition, the differences between the factions influenced the course of collective bargaining. In the UE especially, workers were able to learn very quickly after V-J Day how the political stance of their leadership could adversely affect their own economic well-being. At the end of 1945, the United Auto Workers (UAW) prepared to strike General Motors. A conference of all GM union leaders called upon UE, with 30,000 members working for GM, to join the strike. The UE leadership, still clinging to the World War II no-strike policy, refused to go along, and this reluctance alienated many UE members. They voted to strike and, belatedly, the leadership agreed to walk out on January 15, 1946. According to one critic of the UE, himself a socialist, the leadership's initial dissent from UAW policy put the Communist Party in disrepute with many workers and forced an end to the no-strike pledge.⁴⁰

³⁹Saposs, pp. 121-22, 147. Matles and Higgins, pp. 130-34. Kampelman, p. 124.

⁴⁰Art Preis, Labor's Giant Step: Twenty Years of the CIO (New York, 1964), pp. 269-70.

Still, the new Party line did not include complete UE solidarity with the UAW. UE struck GE and Westinghouse as well as GM on January 15, but UE leaders kept their own counsel and settled their strike separately. Matles agreed to an 18.5 cents per hour raise at GM after one month. Since the strike had been violent and production had been stopped, both sides called this a union victory. But, 18.5 cents was far below what the union had originally sought, and the settlement came without UAW president Walter Reuther's knowledge. Then, too, Matles also caved in on many local issues, special, specific grievances affecting workers in particular locals, including Local 801 at Frigidaire, apparently because UE's treasury was running perilously low.⁴¹

The end of the war meant, too, that the CIO itself could deal openly with the communist problem. But there was still a reluctance to act here. Philip Murray, President of the CIO since 1940, simply was not ready to embrace the idea that the UE leadership was less than acceptable. Despite his fervent Catholicism and staunch anti-communism, Murray in 1946 was more worried that a fight over communism would split the

⁴¹Preis, pp. 276, 279. Northrup, p. 20. The settlement at Frigidaire is discussed in Transcript, Wasley M. Steinhilber, Oral History Interview 14-32-1, Ohio Historical Society, pp. 14-18.

the labor movement, open the way to AFL raiding, and possibly destroy the CIO federation. When the CIO's 1946 convention, at Murray's insistence, passed a Special Statement of Policy repudiating the Communist Party and resolutions curbing the right of state and local CIO councils to dissent from national CIO policy, Murray's doubts seemed to have been resolved. But the special statements were not opposed by the Communists; in fact, they passed unanimously. The Communists within the CIO might have been disturbed with the turn of events at this convention, but they could take consolation in the firm control they still maintained within several individual unions.⁴²

James Carey could take comfort in the 1946 convention's anti-Communist resolutions, but the real fight was still within his own union. Carey rallied his followers in the wake of the convention, and formally organized UEMDA. The group began to publish its own newspaper, The Real UE. The union's executive board and the 1947 UE convention both condemned these dissidents and called upon the group to disband as a dual

⁴²James C. Foster, The Union Politic: The CIO Political Action Committee (Columbia, Mo., 1975), pp. 82-83. Kampelman, p. 37. Final Proceedings of the Eighth Constitutional Convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, Atlantic City, New Jersey, November 18-22, 1946, pp. 58, 111-13. James R. Prickett, "Some Aspects of the Communist Controversy in the CIO," Science & Society: An Independent Journal of Marxism, XXXIII (Summer-Fall, 1969), 302. Saposs, p. 192.

organization, but Carey did not comply. UEMDA organized a national ticket which was easily defeated at the UE convention, but, at the local level, they were somewhat more successful. Several locals elected dissident slates of officers, including Local 601 (Westinghouse East Pittsburgh) and Local 801 in Dayton, but in the main, Emspak and Matles remained firmly in control.⁴³

Carey and his right-wing allies were struggling to evict left-wingers from local offices, but since the Communists still easily controlled the national apparatus, the opponents seemed locked in a stalemate. The dissidents were unable to secure the one big victory which could be used to persuade either the national CIO or the UE rank-and-file to throw off the yoke of communist domination. Ironically, it was not an internecine local battle but a violent strike which UE lost that gave the right wing its opportunity. This strike was called by UE Local 768 in Dayton, Ohio, against the Univis Lens Company.

Univis Lens was a small company which manufactured multifocal, ophthalmic lenses used in eyeglasses, bomb

⁴³Prickett, 301-02. Saposs, pp. 155-56. Preis, pp. 335-37, 339. Franklin J. Anderson, "Union Wreckers at the Switch," Plain Talk, April, 1947, p. 22. Kampelman, pp. 65-66.

sights, and binoculars. The company grossed \$4,000,000 in 1947 and employed 800 workers, half of them women. Throughout World War II, the plant's workers remained unorganized, but in 1946, UE began an intensive campaign to bring Univis into their union. The National Labor Relations Board scheduled a certification election in October, 1946, but there were so many challenged ballots cast that neither UE nor the Univis Workers Independent Union, a company creation, was declared the winner. While the NLRB was investigating the validity of these challenges, UE members within the plant struck in an effort to force recognition. The NLRB ruled the challenges valid and scheduled a new election, and the company and the union negotiated an end to the strike, pending the outcome of the election. On January 29, 1947, UE won the second election. The Univis workers became a bargaining unit in Amalgamated Local 768, and a contract was concluded on June 13, to continue until April 30, 1948.⁴⁴

Negotiations to renew the contract in 1948 led to a strike on May 5. Importantly, only about half of the employees were union members since Univis was not a

⁴⁴U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Univis Lens Co. Strike, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, pp. 2-3, 5-6. An amalgamated local is one in which workers from several different plants are members, with each plant bargaining separately. Generally, in an amalgamated local, no one plant is large enough to operate alone; they band together to form one large local able to afford the necessary expenses. Univis became one of about thirty bargaining units in Local 768.

union shop, and even within the union, the vote to strike was very close. In addition, the company argued that it was no longer legally bound to bargain with the union since no UE officials had signed the new Taft-Hartley Act's non-Communist affidavit. Section 9(h) of this law required this affidavit to be executed in order for a union to keep its certification.⁴⁵

These conditions, taken together, combined to create a potential for violence which was realized before May was over. Univis strikers solicited assistance on the picket line from other bargaining units in Local 768 and from other UE locals in Dayton. The company reacted by circulating a petition, eventually signed by forty-four per cent of the employees, calling for a decertification election. Frequent clashes on the picket line led the company to seek a restraining order limiting pickets from interfering with those who wanted to return to work. The union assembled over three hundred pickets in defiance, and only seven employees got inside the gates despite the presence of many Dayton police.⁴⁶

The NLRB ordered a new election for July 23, and this time UE lost, 272-302. The company ordered all

⁴⁵Univis Hearings, pp. 3-4, 6-8.

⁴⁶Univis Hearings, pp. 9-13. Transcript, Leothar W. Wornstaff, Oral History Interview 14-23-1, Ohio Historical Society, pp. 36-38.

employees back to work with a raise, but the union filed charges to have the election set aside because of coercion of employees by the company, and the picket line remained in place. The Dayton police opened a corridor in the line on July 26, and 230 production workers and 150 salaried employees returned to work. In the skirmish, five UE officials were beaten and arrested. When the UE announced a call for 2500 pickets to violate the injunction, Ohio's Governor Thomas Herbert came to Dayton to mediate the dispute. Herbert negotiated a settlement which called for an eleven cent raise and the firing of several workers for violations of the injunction. Two of the three UE negotiators approved this package, but the third, Chief Steward Leothar Wornstaff, walked out in protest. Although the negotiators had told Herbert that they had authority to conclude a settlement without taking it back to the membership, Wornstaff persuaded them to reject the compromise. Unavis officials, fearful of a massive confrontation at the plant, called off work for the next day, and Governor Herbert called in the Ohio National Guard. Order was slowly restored, and Wornstaff negotiated a new settlement with the governor. Only eleven workers were fired, and all of their cases were to be heard by an arbitrator. This ended the strike. The NLRB set aside the election of July 23,

but, in a third election, in 1949, the union lost again and was decertified.⁴⁷

The conduct of the union during this strike and the publicity resulting from it led directly to the advantage Carey had been seeking. The UE leadership in Ohio was exposed as a coterie of Communists whose policies at the bargaining table could easily work to the detriment of the rank-and-file. For the first few weeks of the dispute, the officials of the Univis bargaining unit and Local 768 managed the strike and sought to bring pressure upon the company at the bargaining table. When the company resorted to the decertification petition, UE officials, realizing their poor position, switched their tactics to exploit the possibility of violence and charges of police brutality. During June and July, the strike committee was run in fact by the national leadership of UE and by Gus Hall of the Communist Party. Their secret strategy, set at late night meetings after the regular meetings of Local 768 had adjourned, apparently called for provocative tactics and an abandonment of the real issues. Chief Steward Wornstaff was the only member of

⁴⁷Univis Hearings, pp. 13-22, 82-85. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Communist Activities in the Dayton, Ohio, Area, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, Part 1, 6848-6849. In the matter of the Univis Lens Company, Employer and Dwight Ludwig, Petitioner and UE, Local 768, CIO, Union, 82 NLRB No. 155 (1949) and 83 NLRB No. 176 (1949). Wornstaff Transcript, 14-23-2, p. 6.

the strike committee not a UE left-winger. He testified about this arrangement which he discovered after being warned by James Carey and by the judge who had issued the injunctions that he was unwittingly involved in a sinister situation worth investigating. Wornstaff's discovery and the UEMDA's assertion that the strike was Communist-controlled led to extensive publicity which put the left-wing on the defensive. A special subcommittee of the United States Senate conducted three days of sensational hearings on the strike and its violence. When Wornstaff walked out of the mediation talks and submarined the governor's proposed solution, he was protesting the UE's decision to sacrifice workers' jobs and surrender on the issues in the face of increasing community pressure against the left-wing.⁴⁸

The Univis Lens strike marked the beginning of the end for UE as a CIO union. The strike itself was a failure and the decertification election another important defeat. The decision of UE leaders not to sign the Taft-Hartley non-Communist affidavit added to the union's difficulties. Although the officers argued that their refusal to sign was based on the principle that a union should not be restricted in choosing its leaders, this

⁴⁸ Dayton Hearings, Part 1, 6843-6850.

position worked to the union's disadvantage. Even if Local 768 had won the last election at Univis Lens, the local would not have been certified unless its officials complied with 9(h). Some other UE locals left the union because of their leaders' refusal to sign the affidavit. UE's new weakness was apparent at the bargaining table, too. In 1948, GE offered the union a meager eight per cent wage increase over two years with a wage re-opener in 1949, and UE accepted it almost intact. In 1949, UE could manage no additional increase. In other contract talks, UE fared just as poorly. Of 158 local wage agreements negotiated in 1949, only three provided for a ten to fifteen cent hourly increase. Seventy-seven included no increase at all. During 1948 as well, the extent of Communist influence in UE was the subject of dramatic hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor during which the Party membership of UE officials was exposed. Finally, the UE leaders' endorsement of Henry Wallace while the rank-and-file supported Harry Truman made it impossible for the CIO to avoid facing the issue squarely.⁴⁹

⁴⁹83 NLRB No. 176 (1949). Saposs, pp. 167-68. Northrup, pp. 51-52. Albert Epstein and Nathaniel Goldfinger, "Communist Tactics in American Unions," Labor and Nation, VI (Fall, 1950), 42. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Investigation of Communist Infiltration of UERMWA, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948. Foster, pp. 90-93.

In 1946, Philip Murray, president of the CIO, had moved reluctantly yet firmly against Communism. He feared that public discussion might cause a divisive split in the CIO over the Communist issue, and he gambled to forestall that rupture by speaking out forcefully against the Communists. In 1949, he moved swiftly and decisively against UE, again because of Communism. But by 1949, the extent of Communist influence was no longer a mystery; the possibility of Communist damage to the labor movement was no longer just speculation, and lack of action might have caused disunity. The rising tensions of the Cold War had led to open conflict within many CIO unions. At the same time, Murray had moved to ally the CIO with the Democratic Party, and he had to be sure that the CIO could not be attacked further as an organization harboring subversives. The fight over communism weakened the UE and partially destroyed its effectiveness as a bargainer, but when the CIO moved to expel UE at its 1949 convention, the primary reason for that expulsion was political. Carey's group had not succeeded in wresting internal control from the left, so expulsion was the logical course. How well the UE functioned as a maturing union could have been debated for days, but there was no hesitation or

doubt in the CIO resolution which expelled the union:

We can no longer tolerate within the family of CIO the Communist Party masquerading as a labor union. . . . So long as the agents of the Communist Party in the labor movement enjoy the benefits of affiliation with the CIO, they will continue to carry on this betrayal [of the workers] under the protection of the good name of the CIO. . . . There is no place in the CIO for any organization whose leaders pervert its certificate of affiliation into an instrument that would betray the American workers into totalitarian bondage.

Specific charges against the union included its denunciation of the Marshall Plan, its criticism of the Atlantic Pact, its support of the Progressive Party, and its verbal battles with the CIO and Murray on many different issues. The UE's chief crime was its Communist ties, pure and simple.⁵⁰

To replace UE, the CIO immediately chartered a new union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (IUE-CIO), and James Carey was soon elected president. An administrative committee of twelve had actually been planning this transfer of authority for several months, and the transition itself was rather smooth. Immediately, right-wing factions in UE locals across the country began to

⁵⁰Foster, pp. 88-89. Kampelman, pp. 59, 159. Prickett, 319-20. 1949 Proceedings of the Eleventh Constitutional Convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, Cleveland, Ohio, October 31-November 4, 1949, pp. 302-04.

dissaffiliate from UE and join IUE. The campaign to convert the GM electrical locals focused on Local 801 in Dayton. Local 801 voted overwhelmingly to disaffiliate on November 6, 1949, and it received an IUE charter, but UE still held the contract with General Motors. The NLRB ruled that new elections could best determine union representation. IUE won this election at 801 on March 6, by a seven-to-one ratio and won by similar margins in the other four GM electrical plants.⁵¹

The GM victory was the first triumph for the new union among the electrical giants, and it was symptomatic of the general success which IUE enjoyed. Within ten days of the first IUE convention, 68 locals with 200,000 members received new charters. IUE won 55 of the first 66 elections, and Carey reported to the 1950 CIO convention that IUE had won the bargaining rights for 276,557 workers. Other unions, too, took members away from UE, which, despite fair treatment from the NLRB and the courts, lost ground continually to IUE.

⁵¹1949 CIO Proceedings, pp. 359, 483-87. Steinhilber Transcript, 14-32-3, pp. 2-3. Dayton Journal Herald, January 17, 1950, n.p., clipping in Scrapbooks, Records of the Ohio AFL-CIO, Ohio Historical Society. In the matter of General Motors Corporation, Frigidaire Division, Employer, and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, C.I.O., Petitioner, 88 NLRB No. 112 (1950). Labor Journal (Columbus), March 7, 1950, p. 1.

By 1959, UE's membership had fallen from a peak of 500,000 to perhaps less than 100,000.⁵²

The Korean War did not have any apparent effect on this massive transfer of allegiance from UE to IUE. The heavy involvement of the plants represented by UE and IUE in defense production certainly could have motivated workers to switch unions, but this seems not to have been the case. In fact, once the initial rush to IUE slowed, the continuing struggle between the two unions grew to resemble a traditional jurisdictional dispute with each union claiming that it was the better union for workers to join. As time went on, the communist issue had less appeal on its merits and served rather as a club for the IUE and others to wield as indiscriminately as they pleased. Many Ohioans did not believe that the rapid rise of the IUE had ended the Communist threat to organized labor. Especially after the war began, these people were anxious to use the power of government to investigate and insure that the Communists were identified and their influence nullified. If this process weakened the non-communist labor movement,

⁵²"How We Got Here . . . History of the IUE." Labor Journal, May 2, 1950, p. 1. Saposs, pp. 204, 210, 262.

these people argued, that would be a small price to pay for acquiring security.

The first call to investigate communism in Ohio unions after the CIO had expelled UE came from Cincinnati. Over six Sundays in February and March of 1950, the Cincinnati Enquirer published a series of articles by James Ratliff in which sensational charges were lodged and for which banner headlines were written. Such headlines as "Communists Mark 12 City Plants for Sabotage!" and "Commies Control Two Big Cincinnati Unions" apparently justified the front page space this series occupied. Ratliff's long suit was sensationalism, but he was woefully short of names. His claim to veracity was not helped, either, by his accusation in the third article that fair employment practices legislation in Ohio was sponsored by Communists. The Enquirer was pressured increasingly to disclose names. The paper, wary of libel charges, urged its readers to demand an investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee, since public airing of Ratliff's charges would prevent any libel suits. In July, HUAC did investigate these charges, calling fourteen witnesses over four days. The chief accusers were Martha and John Edmiston, a wife-and-husband team of informers, who testified about John Edmiston's work for the FBI in 1940-41 and together named seventy Communists.

Several other witnesses, accused of Communist ties, took the Fifth Amendment, but the testimony of Ratliff's key source, Cecil Scott, has never been released to the public, perhaps because it was judged too unreliable.⁵³

The Enquirer editorially congratulated the committee for its work which upheld Ratliff's articles as "factual as a blueprint," and Ratliff and the newspaper both pressed for further investigations. Ohio's Attorney General, Herbert Duffy, added his voice to these requests by asking Governor Frank Lausche to authorize a probe of Communist activity in Ohio, leading to the prosecution of subversives under a 1919 law against criminal syndicalism. Duffy was greatly concerned that Ohio's industrial sector was open to potential communist sabotage, but Lausche preferred to rely on the FBI and current law to deal with the problem.⁵⁴

Ohio's General Assembly disagreed with the governor and, on March 7, 1951, passed House Joint Resolution 21 creating the Joint Anti-Subversive Investigating Committee.

⁵³Cincinnati Enquirer, February 5, 12, 19, 26, and March 5, 12, 1950. Carr, pp. 366-67. The entire episode is analyzed fairly and completely in James A. Maxwell, "Cincinnati's Phantom Reds," The Reporter, September 26, 1950, pp. 28-31. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings Regarding Communist Activities in the Cincinnati, Ohio, Area, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, Part I, 2661-2833.

⁵⁴Cincinnati Enquirer, July 15, 1950, p. 4. Harvey Matusow, False Witness (New York, 1955), p. 53. Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 2, 1950, pp. 1, 9; August 3, 1950, p. 6. Toledo Blade, August 3, 1950, p. 13; August 10, 1950, p. 3.

This ten-member committee was authorized to study and analyze the problem of subversion in Ohio and was directed to report back to the legislature by May 10 with a recommendation to establish a permanent anti-subversive commission. The resolution creating the joint committee was a direct result of the HUAC hearings on Cincinnati. Seven of the ten committee members approved the joint committee's report calling for an Ohio Un-American Activities Commission. This recommendation became Senate Bill 358 which passed both houses easily and was signed by Governor Lausche on June 1. The three dissenters from the recommendations in committee's report were all Democrats. Their minority opinion argued that enough information on subversion was already known, that a new commission would be useless and wasteful, and that the legislature should concern itself with laws, not exposure. Once the governor signed the bill, though, all three lawmakers became active and cooperative members of OUAC.⁵⁵

The legislature charged the commission with the examination of three primary fields of inquiry--

⁵⁵Ohio, General Assembly, Bulletin, 99th General Assembly of Ohio, 1951-1952, Regular Session, p. 158. Thayer, pp. 14-15, 19-20. General Assembly, Bulletin, p. 140. Plain Dealer, May 11, 1951, pp. 1, 6; May 29, 1951, p. 6.

industrial groups, youth movements, and membership in groups on the U.S. Attorney General's subversive list, especially the Communist Party--but in practice, it was the Party's known membership which determined the extent of the probe. Thus, the commission's investigation of industrial groups amounted to little more than a repetitive tour over the same ground that several Congressional committees had already covered. OUAC discovered that "Communist Party concentration in this vital [electrical] industry is manifest through the United Electrical Workers Union," and that the UE "still speaks for the workers in many of our important electrical plants." The commission's report admitted that "Ohio's experience with the UE is not unique. It merely adds to the volumes of evidence and testimony presented to other committees and boards, all identifying the United Electrical Workers Union as the willing tool of the Communist Party in our defense industry." The implication was that further investigation was essential. The second report of the commission, issued in 1954, listed the plant-by-plant triumphs of anti-communist unions over UE, but also included those plants where UE had won recent elections. The report concluded "that additional education is going to be necessary before the workers of these plants are convinced that they should repudiate a Communist

dominated union and dissolve their partnership with the enemies of the United States."⁵⁶

In one case, at least, OUAC's investigation of a particular plant seems to have contributed in part to the ouster of the UE local there. John Janowitz testified before OUAC and the federal Subversive Activities Control Board about his work at Reliance Electrical Engineering Company in Euclid, Ohio. He testified that he had been urged by the president of UE Local 705 and by the FBI to accept a job as a UE staff organizer in order to fight Communism from within. He took the staff job, joined the Party in 1943, and continued this activity until he was expelled for testifying before SACB in February, 1952. Janowitz's credible and reasoned testimony included a detailed account of the intermingling of UE and Party policy in Cleveland. He freely named the UE officials who were also Party members. He discussed the role of the Communist caucus at the 1949 Ohio CIO convention, and he revealed UE's plans for infiltrating IUE. Janowitz claimed that Party members working in defense plants in Ohio could be a danger to the United States

⁵⁶OUAC Report, 1951-1952, I, 11-12, 20-21. Thayer, p. 22. Ohio, General Assembly, OUAC Report of the Un-American Activities Commission, State of Ohio, 1953-1954, pp. 15-17.

in time of war, and he challenged company officials, who hired these workers, and the union's rank-and-file to rid themselves of this menace.⁵⁷

Janowitz's appearance before OUAC, coming just after he had revealed his double life before SACB, caused a near-riot at the hearing. A sizeable UE delegation appeared as observers and punctuated his testimony with outbursts defending their union and accusing the commission of union-busting and witch-hunting. No UE official, though, accepted the commission's invitation to refute Janowitz's testimony under oath. The Plain Dealer lauded his appearance and reported that a unit of production employees at a small electrical plant in Bedford, Ohio, voted to secede from UE and affiliate with IUE as a direct result of his testimony. Three weeks later, IUE won an NLRB election at Reliance, and James Carey credited this victory to Janowitz.⁵⁸

Whether or not Carey's attribution was accurate, it is true that IUE's appeal to workers solely on the issue of Communist domination was becoming less effective. By 1952, IUE victories were occurring less frequently than during the first surge in 1950, with each local election

⁵⁷ OUAC Report, 1951-1952, II, 127-30, 132-49.

⁵⁸ Thayer, pp. 61-62. OUAC Report, 1951-1952, I, 21. Plain Dealer, March 6, 1952, p. 10.

considered an important battle. Jacob Clayman, Secretary-Treasurer of the Ohio CIO Council, admitted frankly that the CIO was puzzled as to how it could speed the demise of UE. William Donovan, a district director of the United Steelworkers in Cleveland, told the Joint Committee that the Taft-Hartley law forbade any local from expelling a member except for non-payment of dues, so that Communist members could not easily be removed, and that many companies apparently preferred to bargain with a weakened UE instead of a growing IUE. Donovan urged the federal government to stop letting contracts to UE-organized plants and to repeal the Taft-Hartley law, to make expulsion possible, and he asked the legislature to make OUAC permanent. Clayman had denied the need for a permanent anti-subversive agency, but the dilemma was obvious: union leaders could not admit the enormity of the problem and then assert that the government should ignore it.⁵⁹

IUE's only alternative was to challenge UE repeatedly and to fight each local battle with all the weapons at its disposal. At the General Electric plant in Tiffin, Ohio, for example, the struggle consumed six years and three separate NLRB election campaigns. UE won

⁵⁹Thayer, pp. 70-71, 74-75. Ohio, General Assembly, Joint Anti-Subversive Investigating Committee, Testimony of William F. Donovan, April 17, 1951, pp. 8-10.

the 1950 election, ordered by the NLRB for all GE plants, in a run-off with IUE after the first ballot had eliminated an AFL challenger. The tally was 345-328.⁶⁰ In 1952, IUE's first petition for an election was denied; a second request was successful, but again UE won the election, 265-206.⁶¹

The supporters of IUE decided to pull out all the stops in 1955. With the election set for September 8, Sidney Isaacs, a former FBI man and the counsel for OUAC, addressed a public meeting at the American Legion Hall on the topic, "The Communist Threat in Northern Ohio." The Tiffin Chamber of Commerce proclaimed September 4-10 Freedom Week in Tiffin and urged all "loyal Americans to express their protest against the presence of Communists in our city by displaying the American flag" Tiffin's Catholic monsignor warned his parishioners that they would be excommunicated if they voted for UE. The established union responded with its own, less flamboyant campaign. Its ads stressed UE's accomplishments for its

⁶⁰In the matter of General Electric Company, Employer and Petitioner and IUE; UE; et al., 89 NLRB No. 120 (1950). Tiffin Advertiser-Tribune, April 27, 1950, p. 1; May 26, 1950, pp. 1, 4; June 7, 1950, p. 1; June 16, 1950, pp. 1, 4.

⁶¹General Electric Company (Tiffin Plant of the Fractional Horsepower Motor Department) and IUE, CIO, Petitioner, 99 NLRB No. 35 (1952) and 100 NLRB No. 215 (1952). Advertiser-Tribune, May 19, 1952, p. 1; October 2, 1952, p. 1; November 13, 1952, p. 1.

members and its contributions to the community, such as its support of the Tiffin Children's Center. Veterans in the UE spoke out for the union and its resistance to speed-ups and rate cuts by the company. This time, though, IUE won, 422-270. Police broke up a minor clash between members of both factions at a bar on election night.⁶²

The Korean War itself had very little effect on labor's struggle against communism in Ohio. There was no industrial sabotage, no evidence of espionage, and not one strike motivated by a desire to stop the production of war materiel. The UE national office opposed the war and demanded an early truce, but so did many other Americans. UE locals or officials who supported Party policy on the war generally did not weaken their position at the bargaining table by doing so. The CIO had expelled the UE and branded it a poor union because of its advocacy of Soviet foreign policy, but in reality UE was not a weak union until it began losing members to IUE. Thereafter, workers in both unions paid for this division.

⁶² Advertiser-Tribune, August 31, 1955, pp. 1, 7; September 6, 1955, p. 12; September 7, 1955, p. 9; September 9, 1955, pp. 1, 4. Transcript, Dorothy Burch, Oral History Interview 14-20-1, Ohio Historical Society, pp. 25-27.

The attempt of the state of Ohio to hasten UE's demise by launching its own security investigations did not pay off. Once the first big switch of locals from UE to IUE ended, the conflict between the two unions hinged mostly on traditional trade union issues and vigorous, vituperative infighting. Little could be accomplished among the workers by debating the merits of anti-Communism.⁶³

Local battles between UE and IUE were the culmination of the struggle within the CIO to cleanse itself of any taint of subversion. By joining the anti-communist crusade, the CIO's leadership had risked weakening the labor movement in the hope that the government would refrain from acting on its own against communism in labor organizations. Neither hope was realized: expelling the communist-dominated unions did hurt the movement, and the government was not dissuaded from continuing its own investigations. In Ohio, for example, IUE and UE collided in many plants where the welfare of the workers, including the quest for higher wages, took a back seat to the contest for political control. Then, despite the CIO's house-cleaning, the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission re-investigated the entire controversy with no discernable good results.

⁶³"UE Policy: for the members . . . by the members . . .," UE Steward, October, 1953, p. 13. Saposs, p. 212. Thayer, p. 72.

The CIO's decision to give in to Cold War pressures and move against member unions was the final step in the weakening friendship between government and organized labor. Beginning with the New Deal's advocacy of industrial unionism, labor had come to rely on support from a sympathetic President against the opposition of an antagonistic Congress. The passage of Taft-Hartley signified a shift in the balance of national power and the start of a new relationship between government and labor. The inability of labor to elect Joseph Ferguson in 1950 and to hammer out a wage stabilization policy favorable to its interests were further indications that labor's political victories would not be automatic. With the damage done by the crusade against communism, the labor movement realized fully that the partnership was over and that in its mature years, it often would have to fight the government in order to achieve its goals.

CHAPTER IV
LOYALTY AND THE UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT OHIO STATE

Anyone who is not or never has been a Communist can respond with a good, resounding 'No,' and skip the fifth amendment's protection provisions. . . . The action by President Bevis in the case of Prof. Darling is no transgression of academic freedom, and anyone who says it is is an addlepat ass.
--Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 8, 1953.

Academic freedom, although difficult to define precisely, embodies a tradition or set of traditions intimately connected to the purposes of all but the most rigidly dogmatic universities. Any restriction upon academic freedom must, by definition, interfere with the university's goal to stand as a center of independent thought. Academic freedom is not a constitutionally protected right or liberty, but it represents the commitment of the university to the relentless search for truth and is, therefore, a cornerstone upon which the university rests.¹

Most American universities, especially of the public type, allow academic freedom only within certain boundaries. These institutions can proclaim their dedication to truth, but they cannot escape their own culture. Their quest for truth is limited, sometimes even defined, by the complex collection of attitudes and beliefs which we call the American way of life. The university is free, but it must do its part to

¹The limits and problems of academic freedom in the 1950s are crisply described in Robert E. Cushman, Civil Liberties in the United States: A Guide to Current Problems and Experience (Ithaca, 1956), pp. 70-91.

preserve and protect the heritage which that tradition implies. The awareness that this patriotic legacy must be transmitted to students is supported, as one scholar notes, by the public university's dependence upon the state legislature for funding and by the simple realization that a publicly-owned institution should be responsible to that public.² But, in a more subtle sense, all educational institutions, including universities, transmit the tenets of the American tradition, and consciously or not, that is what they do best. Despite the schools' stated devotion to learning as their primary goal, universities and other schools do nothing better than produce graduates conditioned to accept the American culture, for better or worse, with very little hesitation.

Academic freedom is intended to be a liberal tradition, intertwined with education's oft-expressed purpose to liberate the minds of students to explore new ideas. The American way of life, on the other hand, is a conservative nexus, involving respect for our heritage and fear of any change in the status quo.³

²Ibid., pp. 71-72.

³Certainly, it can be argued that the American culture was not always conservative and was, at one time, truly radical. The argument here is that our traditions, as transmitted in the schools of twentieth century America, are indeed conservative.

Fortunately, in normal times, both traditions peacefully co-exist with only an occasional incident or flare-up. But there is an inherent tension between them which is exacerbated in times of crisis, such as a war. Then, the contradiction between the two traditions is revealed. Yet, when American society undertakes total mobilization, such as during World War I or II, academic freedom can be made nearly totally obeisant to patriotism as universities contribute to the war effort. Academic freedom's staunchest supporters accept and even welcome this development. Only during times of uncertainty or during a limited war, such as the Korean War, when citizens' responsibilities are unclear, is the conflict between these two ideas intensified by the battle to discover how far the one must move to accommodate the other. This situation can cause a continual conflict, never permanently resolved, often doing great harm to both traditions and to the universities where they do battle.

At The Ohio State University, in Columbus, the postwar tension between the principle of academic freedom and the commitment to instill the patriotic tradition was evident as early as 1946. By the end of the Korean War, confusion, fear, and self-righteousness had combined to create an atmosphere in which academic freedom was subordinated to patriotism. Two incidents stand out as

key events in this conflict: once when the Board of Trustees restricted the appearance of outside speakers on campus and again when a professor who had been called to testify before Congress was dismissed for claiming constitutional protection against self-incrimination.

Like most public institutions, Ohio State does not cling to any outspoken tradition of academic freedom. Perhaps because of the campus's proximity to the Ohio General Assembly, located just three miles from the main campus, and certainly because of the university's dependence upon the penurious legislature for funding, Ohio State has, over the years, generally reflected its land grant beginnings. In the spirit of the Morrill Act, the university has tended to emphasize the practical arts over the humanities and to cultivate a functional and patriotic approach to education. As early as 1883, the Ohio State Board of Trustees dismissed the university's president, Walter Scott, because "he promulgated unsound and dangerous doctrines of political economy," including the Henry Georgian ideas that "capital was robbery" and "dividends were theft." If, in the ensuing years, the spectacular incidents were few, still the general atmosphere at Ohio State never truly promoted unfettered inquiry.⁴

⁴Alexis Cope, 1870-1910, ed. T. C. Mendenhall, Vol. I of History of The Ohio State University (9 vols.; Columbus, 1920-1976), p. 79.

In the years after World War II, the Ohio State administration responded to the anxieties of the Cold War and Korea with a series of policy decisions restricting the exercise of academic freedom. The university, led by its Board of Trustees and President Howard Bevis, passed a series of resolutions to regulate political discussion on campus, the appearance of outside speakers, and the right of faculty members to exercise controversial constitutional rights. Overall, these measures demonstrated the Trustees' decision to harness academic free speech in the name of national security and their belief that the unrestrained exchange of ideas must be at least partially curtailed during times of national crisis.

Senator John Bricker, a conservative Ohio Republican and Ohio State Trustee, was the first official publicly to express concern about subversion on the Columbus campus. His December, 1946 speech accusing the university of harboring communists led to an investigation of campus groups for leftist ties and to the introduction of a university loyalty oath. The trustees of the Ohio Historical Society, which owned and occupied a building on the campus, dismissed

one employee of the museum for disloyalty.⁵ At the same time, the university Trustees decided, for several reasons, to forbid the use of campus facilities to all candidates for public office and later, to their surrogates. When the Board first passed this resolution, on April 22, 1946, its announced purpose was to prevent the overcrowding of an already crowded postwar campus.⁶ And in truth, the 1946 rule was simply the formalization of an existing, de facto policy. That the Board had something more in mind than the over-utilization of facilities was evident in its passage of a follow-up resolution in 1947. This time, on a motion by Board member Brigadier General Carlton Dargusch, the former Deputy Director of Selective Service, the Trustees warned the teaching staff that, although it was their right to teach objectively in controversial areas, they were required to maintain "complete impartiality of opinion in classroom discussion."⁷

⁵James E. Pollard, The Bevis Administration, 1940-1956, Part 2, The Post-War Years and the Emergence of the Greater University, 1945-1956, Vol. VIII of History of The Ohio State University (9 vols., Columbus, 1920-1976), pp. 158-60.

⁶Ohio State University, Board of Trustees, Record of Proceedings of the Board of Trustees of The Ohio State University, April 22, 1946 (Columbus, 1946), p. 310.

⁷Pollard, pp. 126-29. Trustees, Proceedings, January 6, 1947, pp. 275-76.

Protests against these resolutions arose intermittently, especially when their provisions seemed to be enforced unequally. Paul Robeson and Henry Wallace were both barred during the 1948 Presidential campaign, although Norman Thomas was allowed to speak, as were two Republican officials, Senator Wayne Morse (Ore.) and Congressman John Vorys (Ohio). Petitions by faculty members, students, and the student newspaper, The Lantern, led to the rule's reconsideration, but the Board re-affirmed and expanded its stance to include all campus political meetings, even if no candidate were set to appear. Only in 1950 did the Board amend its rules to permit one campus meeting per party per year, an opportunity only the Republicans seized.⁸

This was the situation on the campus in 1951 when the Representative Assembly of Graduate Students in Education organized the sixth Boyd H. Bode Conference on Education, an annual convocation in honor of a prominent emeritus professor of education at Ohio State. To address the conference on the theme, "Frontiers in Educational Theory," the Bode Conference Committee

⁸ Trustees, Proceedings, May 10, 1948, p. 308, and July 7, 1950, pp. 42-43.

invited Harold Rugg, himself a retired education professor at Columbia University. Rugg's three appearances on July 10 and 11, consisting of two lectures and a question-and-answer session, threw the campus community into unprecedented turmoil, and the Board of Trustees soon determined once again that the tradition of academic freedom must be drastically curtailed to demonstrate their commitment to loyalty and national security.

The decision to invite Harold Rugg to Columbus was almost bound to cause controversy. A nationally prominent, progressive educator and an intellectual compatriot of John Dewey, Rugg was the author of numerous textbooks, many of which had been subsequently dropped by various school systems for being too "leftist." In addition, Rugg had become a frequent target of Allen Zoll, whose chosen profession it was to alert America to dangerous books and subversive individuals. Zoll at various times headed organizations called the National Council for American Education, the Conference of American Small Business Organizations, and American

Patriots, Inc., the last of these having itself been labelled as subversive by the Attorney-General.⁹

In the weeks after Rugg's talks, as his appearance on the OSU campus became a matter of great controversy and bitterness, not much attention was paid to what he actually had said. His remarks had been neither recorded nor taken down by a stenographer. What remains today of the three sessions are a very sketchy set of notes of unknown origin and the contemporaneous recollections of several students who were present. In addition, there exists a transcript of a radio interview given by Rugg at Ohio State on July 15. Even taken together, these sources give a varied and choppy account of Rugg's addresses. He seems to have focused on two points: first, that the postwar world, with its increasing complexities, demanded a new effort from

⁹Pollard, p. 140. Edward N. Saveth, "What to Do About 'Dangerous' Textbooks," Commentary (January, 1952), p. 100. Vinton McVicker, "Is OSU Heading for Another Witch Hunt?" Cleveland Press, July 21, 1951. "What's Really Back of OSU Gag Rule?" (editorial), Cleveland Press, September 15, 1951. [Citations to newspapers in this chapter differ in two ways from the form used in other chapters. First, page numbers generally are not given. The Bevis Papers at Ohio State (see note 10) are a particularly rich source of newspaper clippings, but most of these do not include the page number. Second, I have endeavored to include authors' names, headlines, and article titles because the newspapers were active participants in the events described in this chapter, and their contributions should be fully referenced.]

the schools to use history to teach about current problems, and second, that a new social order was possible through the application of new, advanced knowledge of human behavior. Clearly, Rugg was not satisfied with the way schools were studying contemporary problems. More often than not, he said, the fault lay with parents who simply did not understand what their schools were trying to accomplish. He explained on the radio:

I think one of the tragic lags in our society is the lag of understanding of the parents and the citizens generally of what the newer schools are trying to do in our times. There has been a great gap. And I think it is partly caused by the fact that while we've been trying to learn how to build a good school, we have not, perhaps, given enough energy to bringing parents in on it.

Then, in what was soon regarded as his most outrageous utterance, Rugg argued that his hopes for America and its schools were not being realized and suggested that another depression would be necessary to awaken people to the real need for further social and economic change.¹⁰

¹⁰Notes, Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, L-R, Howard L. Bevis Papers, RG 3/h, The Ohio State University Archives, Columbus, Ohio. Statements of Students, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers. Radio Transcript, July 15, 1951, Box 37, File: Rugg, Harold O. (1st of 2), Papers of the College of Education, Office of the Dean, RG 16/a, The Ohio State University Archives.

The ammunition for what was soon to be known as the "Rugg controversy" was probably supplied by Colonel William Warner, executive director of Ohio Civil Defense, on leave from his position as Professor of Industrial Arts Education at Ohio State. Warner's reputation as a scholar and educator was questionable. One former OSU professor noted that colleagues dubbed him "The Professor of Whittling." Others have remembered that he was once called on the carpet for repeatedly refusing to allow members of a graduate committee to read his students' dissertations and that he probably did not get a pay raise during the whole postwar era.¹¹ Perhaps Warner felt more accomplished in his self-appointed role as Ohio State's resident Red hunter, the avocation which occupied much of his time both before and after his appointment as Ohio's Civil Defense chief. There is no direct evidence linking Warner with either Allen Zoll or with the

¹¹"War Against the Schools" (editorial), Akron Beacon Journal, September 11, 1951. Letter to author from Dudley Williams, former Physics professor, Ohio State, April 9, 1975. Interview with Harold Fawcett, former Education professor, Ohio State, April 4, 1975. Letter to author from Harvey Mansfield, Sr., former Political Science professor, Ohio State, April 8, 1975. I solicited the opinions, by questionnaire and letter, from a number of professors and administrators who played prominent roles in these controversies. Generally, the persons I chose to contact were members of faculty committees which became involved in either the Rugg or Darling problems.

Wolfe family, prominent in Columbus business and politics. The Wolfes published the two newspapers, the Columbus Dispatch and the Ohio State Journal, whose editorial policies fueled the Rugg controversy's flames. Nevertheless, these connections received wide credence on campus. Warner was in fact the frequent antagonist of H. Gordon Hullfish, the Education professor who served as adviser to the Bode committee and was partly responsible for the invitation to Rugg. Moreover, simultaneous with the September meeting of the Board of Trustees at which the Rugg matter was considered, Warner had arranged a special anti-communist program at the Columbus Rotary Club. Without the consent of any other members of the program committee, Warner substituted reporter Frank Hughes for the previously scheduled speaker. Hughes, who worked for the Chicago Tribune, spoke about leftist propaganda in American schools, centering his criticism on the Citizenship Education Project, sponsored by Teachers' College at Columbia University.¹²

¹²Letter to author from Harold Burt, former Psychology professor, Ohio State, April 3, 1975. Letter to author from Grant Stahly, former Microbiology professor, Ohio State, March 25, 1975. Interview with Harold Fawcett, former Education professor, Ohio State, April 4, 1975. Lowell Bridwell, "Warner Acted Alone in Blast on Educators," Columbus Citizen, September 13, 1951. Memo, William Warner to Rotary Club, September 10, 1951, Box 37, File: Rugg, Harold O. (1st of 2), Education Papers. "Rotary Told of Leftist School Cult," Citizen, September 10, 1951.

Without a doubt, the two conservative Columbus newspapers, the Dispatch and the Journal, were ready to make Rugg's campus appearance a cause célèbre. Professor Hullfish, in his introductory remarks before Rugg's speech of July 10, referred to the controversy already present on the campus. On the next day, Rugg himself displayed the news clippings about the first talk.¹³ These stories focused, not surprisingly, on his call for a new depression. The Dispatch quoted Rugg as saying, "I hope for a depression, but I don't think it will materialize in the near future. Only under the stress and strain of nationwide unemployment can the people be brought up short to ask why." In addition, these newspapers noted that Rugg had predicted an increase in the extent of the public control of production. They also made sure to show the alleged intellectual connection between the controversial Rugg and the faculty in the College of Education.¹⁴ By way of contrast, the other Columbus daily, the Citizen,

¹³Notes, Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, L-R, Bevis Papers.

¹⁴Dean Jauchius, "Educator Tells OSU Meeting He's Hoping for Depression," Columbus Dispatch, July 11, 1951, pp. 1, 4. "Dr. Rugg Cites Two Teacher Problems," Ohio State Journal, July 12, 1951. Jauchius, "Rugg Is Praised by OSU Dean As Campus Conference Ends," Dispatch, July 12, 1951, pp. 1, 4.

covered only the second day of the Bode Conference. Its story included Rugg's prediction of increased public control of the economy, but it also quoted Hullfish on his sharp philosophical differences with Rugg.¹⁵

Much more vituperative and accusatory than these news stories was the flurry of editorials and letters to the editor which followed in the aftermath of the Rugg visit. These items detailed the two-fold case against Harold Rugg: first, that Rugg himself was a socialist or perhaps a communist and certainly unfit to address a college audience; second, that Rugg's invitation could be attributed to a conspiracy within the College of Education, which influenced the Bode committee to invite him to indoctrinate the future teachers of Ohio's youth. The Journal seethed editorially that public funds had been expended to bring to OSU "the Marxian doctrinaire of school textbook fame," and the Dispatch complained that "people who will teach hundreds of thousands of Ohio youngsters in the years to come are being indoctrinated with the subversive political ideas advocated by a notorious and discredited propagandist"¹⁶ Those persons who accused

¹⁵"TVA Exemplifies American Way of Life, Rugg Asserts," Citizen, July 12, 1951, p. 3.

¹⁶"Dr. Rugg and His New Social Order" (editorial), Journal, July 28, 1951, p. 4. "Campus Probe in Order" (editorial), Dispatch, July 17, 1951.

the College of Education of harboring a "Rugg cult," dedicated to furthering his ideas, demanded an investigation of the college by the newly-created Ohio Un-American Activities Commission. That the evidence of this conspiracy would be hard to uncover, as the often anonymous accusers admitted, was simply proof of its sinister existence.¹⁷

Rumors and suspicions persisted that Colonel Warner had masterminded the entire anti-Rugg campaign and that he was responsible for the anonymous letters and the editorials. Certainly, this was the opinion held by many OSU faculty members. There is no hard evidence connecting Warner with the effort to besmirch Rugg and to discredit the College of Education. Yet, a careful examination of the entire episode leaves the inescapable conclusion that someone did engineer the whole effort. The letters to the editor of the Journal began appearing on July 11, only one day after the Bode Conference. These writers had to be aware of Rugg's reputation from some outside source since the only news story announcing Rugg's invitation was a very simple, non-inflammatory publicity release in the Journal

¹⁷"Investigation Called For" (editorial), Journal, July 16, 1951. "Rugg Episode Calls for Thorough Stock Taking" (editorial), Journal, August 31, 1951. Anonymous letter to editor, Dispatch, July 15, 1951. "Of All People, Why Rugg?" (editorial), Journal, July 11, 1951.

of July 4. Then too, the flood of editorials and letters to the editor overpowered by far the limited news coverage given to Rugg and strongly suggests the influence of especially interested persons.¹⁸

University President Howard Bevis at first responded to the charges against Rugg and Ohio State by appealing to the tradition of academic freedom, asserting that the university must allow wide latitude of expression. In late July, Bevis elucidated his position further and implicitly refuted the charge of a conspiracy within the Education faculty. In a letter to a member of the Board of Trustees, Bevis wrote that the Bode Conference had been organized by graduate students, that Hullfish had played an advisory role only, and that Rugg had been invited because the graduate student committee had selected him. Bevis added that he thought the invitation showed poor judgment and that he disagreed with much of what Rugg supposedly had said, but, "within the bounds of loyalty to the Government,

¹⁸Letter to author from Paul Varg, former History professor, Ohio State, April 11, 1975. Letter from Dudley Williams, former Physics professor, Ohio State, April 9, 1975. Letters to editor, Journal, July 11, 1951, p. 4. "Educators Set OSU Conference," Journal, July 4, 1951, p. 2. For a summary of the case supporting collusion, see Ohio C.I.O. Council, Keep Them Free (Columbus, n.d.).

considerable latitude of expression must be allowed on a university campus."¹⁹

If the attack upon Rugg's appearance had included nothing more than the virulent reactions published in the Columbus newspapers, President Bevis's public stand might well have ended the incident. What happened instead during the weeks following the Bode Conference was a growing interest in the Rugg invitation by members of the Board of Trustees and by Governor Frank Lausche, whose concern kept the controversy alive. Once the governor got involved, Bevis and the Board were quick to announce an investigation of the entire matter. As Bevis explained his changing views to General Dargusch, now the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, the invitation to Harold Rugg was "a minor issue. The underlying and major issue is the curricular content and teaching approach in courses given to prospective teachers. . . . It concerns, as I sense it, the economic, social, and political predilections, if any, which manifest themselves in the courses and the teaching."²⁰

¹⁹Jauchius, "Rugg Is Praised . . .," Dispatch, July 12, 1951, p. 4. Bevis to Robert Black (copy), July 23, 1951, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

²⁰Benjamin Fine, "Education in Review: Issue of Academic Freedom Is Raised Again, This Time at Ohio State University," New York Times, October 28, 1951. "OSU's Trustees Plan Rugg Probe," Journal, July 19, 1951. Bevis to Dargusch, July 21, 1951, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

Yet, the result of this investigation, which took better than a month to conclude, had very little to do with curricular content and teaching approach. Instead, at the September meeting of the Board at Gibraltar Island, Ohio, the Trustees passed a resolution commanding the President to establish procedures, "under which all proposed invitations to speakers appearing on the University campus or under University auspices, shall be submitted to his office for clearance ten days prior to the extension of the actual invitation by the individual, department or College concerned." This resolution, which came to be known as the Speaker's Rule, was accompanied by a statement in which the Board condemned the Rugg invitation as "not in accord with the traditions and objectives of the Ohio State University. . . . The function of a University," the statement concluded, "is teaching, not indoctrination. The University must not be used as an agency of un-American propaganda."²¹ Thus it was that the original concern of President Bevis for preserving the widest latitude in matters of free speech on campus was

²¹Minutes, Board of Trustees, September 4, 1951, typed copy, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers. "Campus Speakers: President Must Clear Them," Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (October 15, 1951), 5.

subordinated to the Board's desire to insulate the university from indoctrination and propaganda, the presence of which was to be a presidential determination.²²

The furor set off by the announcement of this policy far surpassed the original uproar over Rugg's appearance. The sustained outburst of opposition caught Bevis and the Board completely by surprise. The controversy over academic freedom which the Board had sought to stifle mushroomed as protests to the resolution, now dubbed the "gag rule," rose from inside and outside the campus.²³ In addition, the implementation of the rule by the President soon became both an intolerable administrative burden and a severe interference with the normal course of education on the campus. Critics of the rule, including faculty members, church leaders, civic and professional groups, and private citizens, accused the Board of repressing freedom in the name of defending it. They argued that the issues at stake in the country at large could be met only by discussing

²²It would be foolish to assume that each member of the Board of Trustees reacted exactly the same to the Rugg crisis, but the Board always met in secret, published abbreviated proceedings, and spoke in public with one voice.

²³Letter to author from Robert Patton, former Economics professor, Ohio State, March 28, 1975.

them openly, and they rejected the Trustees' implicit assumption that college students could not grapple successfully with controversial ideas. Perhaps the most strident objection to the rule came from the Cleveland Press:

In their [the Board's] apparent determination to play star chamber censors to a great public education institution, they ignored the earnest wishes of most of the faculty. . . . The greatest danger, of course, is the strong possibility that these first tragic repressions will snowball. When you start monkeying with people's freedom to think and act, you get intellectual zombies in a terrible hurry. Everybody votes Ja.²⁴

Although many faculty members made known their opposition to the rule as soon as it was announced, the full extent of faculty disapproval did not emerge until Bevis began to implement its provisions. Initially, when debate over the rule was still just a matter of principle (because classes were in recess until the end of September), protest seems to have come most frequently from the disciplines in the humanities, for example, the Colleges of Arts and Sciences, Education, and Law. Soon, though, these faculty members were

²⁴"Gag at Ohio State" (editorial), Toledo Blade, n.d.; "Let Us Hear" (editorial), Ohio State Lantern, n.d.; Letter of Walter McCaslin, Jr., to editor, Ohio State University Monthly, "Book Burning Next?" (editorial), Cleveland Press, n.d., all in Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (November 15, 1951), 8, 9, 10, 15. There are several files of correspondence and reactions to the rule in Boxes 45 and 46 of the Bevis Papers.

joined by other colleagues as the full burden of the rule was realized. As implemented by President Bevis, the rule called for every sponsor of every invited speaker to fill out and file with the President a detailed questionnaire prior to the issuance of any invitation. This form included spaces to list the sponsoring organization, describe the character of the meeting, and supply biographical data on the proposed speaker as well as "any pertinent information affecting the desirability of his appearance as a speaker on the campus." Each form had then to be co-signed by the appropriate dean and filed ten days in advance of the proposed appearance.²⁵

It soon became apparent across the campus that the speaker's rule had become an administrative and intellectual nightmare. In the three weeks after the rule's adoption, Bevis had to rule on 138 separate requests, each one demanding, in effect its own security investigation. This process was not only a physical impossibility, but required the President to rule on

²⁵Letter to author from Robert Patton, former Economics professor, Ohio State, March 28, 1975. Letter to author from Harold Burt, former Psychology professor, Ohio State, April 3, 1975. Sample questionnaire; Bevis to Dean Donald Cottrell, College of Education (copy), September 24, 1951, both in Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

the fitness of individuals about whom he often knew very little. In addition, there were several activities scheduled at the university, such as the annual Institute for Education by Radio-Television and the opening of new health education and medical facilities which, with their huge casts of participants, put an intolerable strain on this haphazardly constructed system.²⁶ More serious than the bureaucratic problem was the startling decision by groups and individuals alike to avoid coming to Columbus or, in the case of Ohio State faculty, to rescind invitations rather than subject guests to the rule. The 1952 meeting of the American Physical Society, a gathering of 800 physicists originally set for Columbus, was moved to Chicago, and the Art Section of the Ohio Education Association switched its conference to Canton. One prospective speaker, a psychologist, explained quite clearly why he would not submit to the screening process. He said that an unfavorable result would be highly undesirable, but even a satisfactory clearance would

²⁶ "Campus Speakers" Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (October 15, 1951), 5. Interview with Harold Fawcett, former Education professor, Ohio State, April 4, 1975. I. Keith Tyler, Director, Office of Radio Communication, to Bevis, October 10, 1951, Box 47, File: Speaker Rule Clearances, Bevis Papers. Dean Charles Doan, College of Medicine, to Bevis, October 11, 1951, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

tie him to the views of the Board, with which he disagreed.²⁷

The speaker's rule did far more than cause bureaucratic inconvenience and a decrease in the number of guest speakers on campus. In fact, when Bevis declined to approve a proposed speaker, the inescapable implication was that the individual was subversive. This was exactly the case when Bevis refused to allow Dr. Cecil Hinshaw, a Quaker and a pacifist, to address the student chapter of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Since Hinshaw's record bore no trace of subversion and in fact he was staunchly anti-communist, Bevis's decision reflected very poorly on his reputation.²⁸ Apparently, the rule could be as bad as its most vocal critics feared. When Bevis consistently refused to reveal his reasons for banning Hinshaw, other invitations to him were cancelled, and

²⁷"Screening Rule: Issue Becomes National," Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (November 15, 1951), 6-7. Manuel Barkan, Professor of Fine Arts, to Bevis, November 2, 1951; Oscar Adams, Professor of Psychology, to Bevis, November 7, 1951, both in Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, A-D, Bevis Papers.

²⁸Hinshaw request, n.d.; Bevis to Wilbur Held, faculty adviser, Fellowship of Reconciliation (copy), September 29, 1951, both in Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, E-K, Bevis Papers. Jack Fullen, "Letter from Home: Background On Screening," Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (November 15, 1951), 1.

his reputation was injured. Bevis's silence on the matter became an issue in itself and aroused much speculation. Hinshaw's repeated requests that Bevis explain the ban went unfulfilled, and Hinshaw left Columbus unsatisfied and vexed. Only in his personal correspondence did Bevis discuss his position, writing that neither Hinshaw's pacifism nor his Quakerism had caused the ban, but rather his public insistence on the right to counsel violation of the draft law. Bevis believed that such a position, if expressed on campus, could have subjected Ohio State to indictment.²⁹

Faced with a barrage of criticism which grew during the first weeks of the rule's application, President Bevis made an administrative adjustment to reduce his own staff's investigatory responsibilities. But the Board, Bevis, and the governor all stood firm in defense of the basic policy. General Dargusch argued that the rule really had nothing to do with academic freedom but was merely a way to prevent Ohio State from being used by "those who would subvert our people and destroy our institutions by force or other unconstitutional means or to those who lend aid, comfort and assistance to such persons." Senator Bricker agreed

²⁹Citizen, October 5, 1951. Hinshaw letter to editor, Citizen, October 22, 1951. Bevis to William Greeley (copy), January 1, 1952, Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, E-K, Bevis Papers.

with Dargusch, saying that the Board sought to insure that the university not be used as an instrument of propaganda. Governor Lausche, in part responsible for the Trustees' initial concern over Rugg, refused to tamper with the rule and asserted simply that "someone has to assume the responsibility of seeing to it that those who want to overthrow our Government are not allowed to speak at the university."³⁰

Faculty opposition to the speaker's rule was at first sporadic, disorganized, and limited to certain departments.³¹ Yet, as more faculty members came to see that the rule would hamper their own activities and would not be confined to the rooting out of subversives, the faculty began to organize opposition to the Trustees' position. The Planning Committee of the Faculty of the College of Education called a meeting of the entire Education faculty at which a resolution was passed expressing concern that the Board had infringed upon the traditional principle of faculty responsibility for academic freedom. The resolution urged the Faculty

³⁰"Campus Speakers . . .," Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (October 15, 1951), 5. Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 27, 1951, pp. 1, 4. Citizen, October 4, 1951; October 16, 1951.

³¹For an example of faculty support of the rule, see J. F. Haskins, Professor of Physics, to Bevis, n.d., Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . ., Bevis Papers.

Council and the Conference Committee of the Teaching Staff to seek redress of this grievance.³²

As these two faculty groups began to consider how best to deal with the crisis, at least one member of the Board suggested to Bevis that the rule needed further interpretation and clarification.³³ Simultaneously, Academic Affairs Vice-President Frederic Heimberger recommended to Bevis a list of faculty members who could be called upon to work out a modus vivendi with the Trustees. These two developments were without doubt inspired in part by the growing array of faculty opposition. At the same time, the Trustees may well have been influenced by the moderation of both the Faculty Council and the Conference Committee. Neither body demanded a completely unrestricted approach to the speaker question. The resolution passed by both groups admitted that fundamental freedoms were subject to abuse and that indoctrination could be a problem. But the faculty felt aggrieved that the Board of Trustees had not demonstrated enough confidence in them to let

³²Memo, Planning Committee, College of Education, to Education Faculty, September 27, 1951, Box 37, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence . . . (confidential), Education Papers. Education Faculty resolution, October 2, 1951, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

³³Robert Gorman to Bevis, October 11, 1951, Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, E-K, Bevis Papers.

them handle the situation, as they had done traditionally.

Moreover, the resolution attacked the new rule's bureaucratic requirements which virtually ruled out the appearance of any speaker on short notice.³⁴

The faculty-passed resolution established a basis for compromise between the existing Speaker's Rule and no rule at all. Even before the Faculty Council approved the resolution on October 9, a group of faculty members and several Trustees held an informal meeting. Although some Board members accepted the evidence of a subversive conspiracy within the Education faculty and some faculty members resented even the slightest administrative intrusion into academic freedoms, the moderate stance expressed in the resolution allowed this small group to begin to seek a solution to the problem which was paralyzing education on the campus.³⁵

Once members of the Board of Trustees learned firsthand the true depth of faculty feeling on the issue, the Board itself began a tortuous formal effort to

³⁴Heimberger to Bevis, October 5, 1951, Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, E-K, Bevis Papers. Conference Committee to Bevis, October 4, 1951, Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, A-D, Bevis Papers. Minutes, Faculty Council, Ohio State University, October 9, 1951, pp. 2-9.

³⁵Pollard, p. 146.

extricate itself from its position. There was some speculation that the abandonment of Columbus by professional societies and conference groups had had a severely adverse effect on the city's hotel and restaurant trade, and that this development influenced the Trustees. More important perhaps was the Board's perception that it had over-reacted in September and that Ohio State was being severely criticized in the national media, including the New York Times.³⁶ Whatever the reasons, the Board met at Wooster, Ohio, on October 15 and proceeded to begin modifying its rule. Although the only substantive change was the suspension of the ten-day clearance provision, the Board agreed to meet with the new, formally established Faculty Council Committee, the successor to the informal faculty group. At the same time, the Trustees issued a new clarifying statement, designed "to encourage the fullest academic freedom consistent with national security."³⁷ Still, though, the Speaker's Rule stood firm, and, as General

³⁶Milt Widder, "Sights and Sounds," Cleveland Press, November 17, 1951. New York Times, October 27, 28, 30, 1951.

³⁷Minutes, Board of Trustees, October 15, 1951, typed copy, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers. Plain Dealer, October 16, 1951, p. 10.

Dargusch said, "The president of Ohio State still has the final say about campus speakers."³⁸

The Faculty Council Committee, consisting of five members and two alternates, met with four Trustees on two occasions, October 26 and November 16. At the first session, the Board members asked the faculty committee for a statement of principles and procedures which would embrace the faculty position and still preserve the Board's intentions. At the second meeting, the committee delivered such a statement, which indicted the Trustees for placing "restrictions on freedom of discussion and investigation. By such rules imposed on the Faculty there is a danger of indoctrination by exclusion of unpopular ideas." The committee recommended that the issue be resolved in favor of free discussion, but they also proposed that the decision to invite speakers whose views might be contrary to the overall well-being of the university be made by the inviting faculty member in consultation with his colleagues, his chairman, his dean, and the President, if necessary.³⁹

³⁸Lantern, October 16, 1951.

³⁹Pollard, pp. 148-49. Faculty Council Committee Statement, November 19, 1951, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

Had the Board accepted the committee's position without alteration, the tradition of academic freedom at Ohio State would have been more than completely vindicated. The rule would have been revoked, the Board would have lost face, and even the traditional, pre-Rugg restraints would have been jeopardized. But this was not to be. Instead, the Trustees took the first official faculty proposal under advisement and, in the interim, approved additional interpretations of the rule. These changes, announced by Bevis on November 8 after he had consulted with Dargusch, granted permission for faculty members to invite any speaker to a class, without Presidential clearance, relying only on a professor's own judgment; they also provided that off-campus organizations and professional societies could meet without any clearance procedure as long as they accepted responsibility for their own speakers. The Board approved these interpretations on November 12.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Bevis to Dargusch (memo), November 6, 1951, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers. Announcement of Interpretations, November 8, 1951, Box 11, File: Speaker's Rule Controversy, Papers of the College of Arts and Sciences, Office of the Dean, RG 24/a, The Ohio State University Archives. Minutes, Board of Trustees, November 12, 1951, typed copy, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

Neither the first meeting between the Board and the Faculty Committee nor the November interpretations entirely quelled opposition to the Speaker's Rule. The Ohio State chapter of the American Association of University Professors voted to oppose the rule, and the national AAUP threatened an official censure. The Graduate School Council refused to approve the interpretations, voting instead to support the Faculty Committee in its continuing talks with the Trustees. In a special referendum, Ohio State students voted 2986 to 637 to oppose the rule, and Dean Donald Cottrell of the College of Education wrote that the faculty's fight had not yet been won. Finally, the Education Faculty adopted a statement which sought to counteract the conspiracy charge and to re-state their principles and motives, so sharply impugned by the local press.⁴¹

Final action on the Rugg controversy was taken by the Board of Trustees at its December 10 meeting.

⁴¹George Eckelberry, "Academic Freedom at Ohio State University," Journal of Higher Education, XXII (December, 1951), 497-98. Citizen, November 7, 1951. Dean N. Paul Hudson, Graduate School, to Bevis, November 12, 1951, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers. "OSU Students Vote Against Gag," Plain Dealer, November 16, 1951, p. 1. Cottrell to Benjamin Fine, November 12, 1951, Box 25, File: Fine, Dr. Benjamin, Education Papers. Faculty, College of Education, "A Statement," Educational Research Bulletin, XXX (December 12, 1951), 1-6.

After intensive private consultations involving Bevis, Board members, and members of the Faculty Committee, a detailed response to the November 16 faculty proposal was worked out to the parties' mutual satisfaction. On December 13, Bevis announced an extensive, three-part revision of the policy on outside speakers. Responsibility for inviting speakers and determining their fitness was to rest with the faculty. When a speaker's fitness was questionable, a decision on the invitation would be made through the consultation process detailed in the faculty proposal. In addition, a Committee of Evaluation was to be established to report annually on the operation of the new procedure. The Board had approved these changes on December 10, and the Faculty Council agreed on the 11th.⁴²

The controversy surrounding the invitation and appearance of Harold Rugg at Ohio State was an intense, protracted struggle which aroused passions and divided the university community. The ferocity of the dispute and its protracted resolution lend support to the contention that times of anxiety expose a fundamental

⁴²James Fullington, Faculty Council Committee, to Bevis, December 7, 1951, Box 45, File: Rugg . . . Correspondence, E-K, Bevis Papers. Minutes, Board of Trustees, December 10, 1951, typed copy, Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers. Minutes, Faculty Council, December 11, 1951, pp. 26-32.

antagonism between the tradition of academic freedom and the demands of patriotism and national security. In the furor, Rugg's identity and even what he actually said were quickly transcended by this larger issue. Both sides realized that they were arguing over principles by which the university should be run. So vociferous was this battle and so basic the issue it raised that neither side ever acknowledged defeat. The Board of Trustees never completely revoked or repealed its September 4 resolution. In each month, October, November, and December, the Board clearly labelled its actions as "interpretations." Just before the December Board meeting, at least one Trustee still insisted that Rugg had been invited surreptitiously, that the invitation had violated a longstanding, unwritten policy, and that the Speaker's Rule had done nothing more than formalize that policy.⁴³

On the other side, the faculty never totally assented to the December compromise. One member of the Faculty Committee argued strongly that the Board never admitted that the rule was wrong in principle but adjusted it simply to improve its workability. Another committee member thought that the compromise fell substantially short of the committee proposal, that

⁴³Statement of Robert Gorman, Board of Trustees, December 6, 1951, Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (January 15, 1952), 33-34.

at least some faculty members were still unhappy, but that its real effect "was to break down moral support for opposition to the clearance rule."⁴⁴

Between these two groups stood President Bevis, in a position so difficult to defend that he could not possibly emerge unscathed. After his initial defense of academic freedom, Bevis kept his own views to himself and seemed to do the Board's bidding. He incurred the faculty's wrath for not representing them as well as he could have, especially in public. But in Bevis's defense, it must be said that he was confronted by very powerful people who ultimately controlled the purse strings of the university. It is doubtful that he could have remained as President had he opposed the Trustees, and even then, their course might not have been altered. However important the free discussion of ideas was to Bevis and the Trustees, in 1951, with Americans on the battlefield in Korea, controversy

⁴⁴Letter to author from Dudley Williams, former Physics professor, Ohio State, April 9, 1975. Dean Jefferson Fordham, College of Law, to Gorman, February 2, 1952, Box 26, File: Gorman, Robert N., Education Papers.

even remotely connected with security could not be tolerated.⁴⁵

For several years thereafter, the Committee of Evaluation, established by the Board of Trustees in December, 1951, made a diligent effort to assess the effects of the Trustees' actions on academic freedom. Each year, the Faculty Council elected the committee, which solicited faculty opinion by means of a questionnaire and reported its findings to the President. The results of these surveys strongly suggest that even by 1952 the controversy had pretty much waned. Responses to that year's survey indicated that no speaker had been banned during the year. Apparently, the procedures worked out in December had been effective in preventing any further incidents over the suitability of campus speakers. This does not mean, though, that speech was completely unfettered at Ohio State. Some faculty members commented that no incidents had arisen because no

⁴⁵On Bevis's attitude see letter to author from Harvey Mansfield, Sr., former Political Science professor, Ohio State, April 8, 1975; letter to author from Harold Burt, former Psychology professor, Ohio State, April 3, 1975; letter to author from Grant Stahly, former Microbiology professor, Ohio State, March 25, 1975; and Rod Peattie, Professor of Geography, to Bevis, n.d., Box 45, File: Prof. Rugg, Official Correspondence . . . , Bevis Papers.

controversial speakers had even been approached to come to campus. Another wanted a prominent liberal to be invited, presumably by someone else, simply to test the new rules. But in general, the 1952 report exposed little dissatisfaction and revealed a general consensus that Ohio State had returned, albeit over a rocky road, to the pre-Rugg status quo, potentially unstable but calm.⁴⁶

The purpose of the Speaker's Rule, of course, was to prevent subversives from being invited onto the campus. What it could not do was to guard against the threat of subversion from within, a possibility which confronted the administration in 1953 in the case of Byron Darling, Associate Professor of Physics and Astronomy. In testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (the Velde Committee) in March, 1953, Darling had refused to answer questions about his alleged connections with the Communist Party, claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. For his reticence, Darling was immediately suspended by President Bevis and, within two months, was stripped of tenure and dismissed by the Board of Trustees.

⁴⁶Report on the Speaker Rule, 1952, Box 11, File: Speaker's Rule Controversy, Arts and Sciences Papers.

Once again, the two traditions collided. But by this time, a little more than one year after the Rugg incident, protection of national security had become more critical, the quest for unquestioned loyalty more absolute, and Darling's cause, whatever its merits, found little support within the university.

Byron Darling had begun his association with Ohio State in 1947. After a graduate education begun at the University of Illinois and the University of Wisconsin, he had earned his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1939. He was employed as an instructor at Michigan State, Pennsylvania State, Wisconsin, and Yale, sometimes working on military projects, before being hired by Ohio State as an assistant professor. At all of these institutions, Darling's intellectual reputation was close to outstanding. His grades were superb, and his advisers thought him to be a physicist of bright promise. While still a student, he had already begun to make substantive contributions to the field of molecular physics. The only blot on this record was a comment from the department chairman at Michigan State who noted that Darling "was a bit irresponsible in looking after [administrative] details that must be attended to by any staff member." At Ohio State, Darling continued to excel, as well as to do

military work. He was employed on an Air Force project studying ozone molecules and was invited to attend an Air Force conference held in Toronto in 1949. All the while, his reputation as a physicist grew. By one estimate, he was the one member of the department who had the potential to win a Nobel Prize.⁴⁷

Coupled with Darling's excellent record as a physicist was the commonly held opinion that his loyalty was unquestionable. None of his colleagues at Ohio State or at any of the other institutions where he had been employed were aware of any hint of subversive activities. Many, in fact, believed him to be politically disinterested. After Darling left Michigan State College in 1941, the Physics chairman there had received a letter from two students about Darling's "communistic leanings," but no follow-up investigation ever occurred.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Bevis memo on Darling's vita, n.d., Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers. Exhibit 4, Letters Concerning Byron T. Darling, presented at the Darling hearing before President Bevis, April 4, 1953, Box 20, File: Darling . . . Hearing Transcripts, Bevis Papers. "The Story Behind . . . A Darkened Door," Ohio State University Monthly, LXIV (April 15, 1953), 7.

⁴⁸Exhibit 4, Box 20, File: Darling . . . Hearing Transcripts, Bevis Papers. Lloyd Emmons, Chairman, Physics Department, Michigan State College, to Dudley Williams, Chairman, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Ohio State, March 24, 1953; James Denison, administrative assistant to President Hannah, Michigan State, to Bevis, March 23, 1953, both in Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers.

Darling was summoned to appear before HUAC in Washington, D. C., on March 12, 1953. When he refused to cooperate with the committee during a closed session, he was subpoenaed for an open hearing on March 13. Here, Darling was interrogated extensively about his government work, his colleagues and acquaintances, and about the standard allegations that he was or had been a member of the Communist Party, that he had received compensation from the Party, that he had used the assumed name of Springer, and that he had transmitted information to agents of the Soviet Union. In response, Darling claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege 100 times, and refused to answer an inquiry about whether two other OSU professors, Dudley Williams and Harald Nielsen, were Party members. Darling was never informed why he had been summoned, who his accusers were, or what charges, if any, had been raised against him.⁴⁹

When word of Darling's refusal to answer the committee's questions reached Ohio State, President Bevis suspended him from all further duties pending a complete study of his HUAC appearance. In a further communication eleven days later, Bevis called an administrative hearing for April 2 and explained Darling's suspension. Bevis reminded Darling that he had, on

⁴⁹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings, Communist Methods of Infiltration (Education--Part 2), 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, pp. 129-54.

August 19, 1948, signed the university loyalty oath as a condition of employment. The adoption of this oath by the Board of Trustees "clearly implies that every employee should, as a condition of continued employment, conduct himself so that he shall be able to testify on such matters without fear of self-incrimination." Bevis argued that Darling's continued employment was now in jeopardy because he had refused to answer HUAC's inquiries. He continued:

Your refusal to answer these questions raises serious doubt as to your fitness to hold the position you occupy. Doubt is raised as to your ability to answer these questions truthfully without self-incrimination. Doubt is raised as to your moral integrity. Doubt is cast upon the loyalty of your colleagues and the integrity of the University itself. There is also serious implication of gross insubordination to the University policy and of conduct inimical to the best interests of the University.⁵⁰

Bevis thus established the narrow ground upon which the administrative hearing and his own subsequent recommendation to the Trustees would be based. Darling's conduct before HUAC was the issue, not his alleged disloyalty.

Between the time of Darling's appearance before HUAC and the hearing before President Bevis, the Ohio

⁵⁰ Bevis to Darling (copy), March 13, 1953, Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers. Bevis to Darling (copy), March 24, 1953, Box 20, File: Darling, Statements and Actions, Bevis Papers.

State faculty, working through the Conference Committee of the Teaching Staff and the campus chapter of the American Association of University Professors, actively entered into the Darling case. The critical faculty decision was accepting Bevis's contention that Darling's candor was the issue. Unlike its conduct during the Rugg incident, which had included a dynamic defense of academic freedom, the faculty now adopted a cautious, guarded position. They did not investigate at all the question of Darling's loyalty, nor did they utilize the fact that there was no evidence that Darling had engaged in any potentially subversive activity during his stay at Ohio State. Instead, both faculty groups sought only to insure that faculty members were present at the hearing and that the tenure rules were respected.

Soon after his return from Washington, Darling appeared before the Conference Committee, at which time he delivered a statement and answered questions about the position he had taken. After this meeting, the committee, together with the Executive Committee of the local AAUP chapter, issued a "Statement of Principles" expressing their concern for orderly process and, at the same time, indicating that Darling's conduct probably fell outside defensible standards. The statement

recognized that Darling had been thrust into an extremely difficult situation when he was confronted by a committee whose procedures often seemed less than fair. Nevertheless, this confrontation should not have been avoided. It went on:

No witness has a legal right to invoke this protection [the Fifth Amendment] in order to avoid embarrassment, personal inconvenience, or a violation of his own ethical standards. . . . Situations of this kind may well pose moral problems for witnesses, but no institution can furnish help or protection in dealing with them. The decision to be guided by one's own moral principles rather than by the law is a private decision and involves private acceptance of its consequences.⁵¹

The "Statement of Principles" was submitted to President Bevis. In a separate action, the Ohio State AAUP chapter passed its own resolution, urging Darling to procure adequate counsel, and they endorsed the national AAUP position that use of the Fifth Amendment was not, in and of itself, justifiable cause for dismissal. They admitted, though, that refusal to testify fully could well be construed, as Bevis had already indicated it would be, as a demonstrative lack of moral integrity.⁵²

⁵¹Conference Committee of the Teaching Staff and Executive Committee, Ohio State AAUP chapter, "Statement of Principle," March 27, 1953, Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers.

⁵²John Cooper, President, Ohio State AAUP chapter, and Erwin Frey, Vice-Chairman, Conference Committee, to Bevis, March 28, 1953; Cooper to Bevis, March 31, 1953, both in Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers.

The hearing called by President Bevis was an administrative procedure designed to provide him with sufficient information to make a recommendation to the Board of Trustees. Besides Darling, those invited on April 2 included the three vice-presidents of the university, the Assistant to the President, three faculty representatives chosen by Bevis, and a technician who recorded the hearing. The short session was devoted entirely to the question of whether the hearing should be continued so that Professor Darling could obtain counsel. Darling argued that he had been trying to do so, but had been unsure that counsel was necessary until March 31 when he had attended the AAUP meeting. He asked for a week or ten days. Bevis replied that Darling had already had enough time to obtain counsel and argued against a continuance. After a short consultation with the others present, Bevis announced a forty-eight-hour continuance which everyone accepted.⁵³

The hearing resumed on April 4 with all the same participants plus attorney Joseph Forer, who had represented Darling before HUAC, and Professor James Harris of the Physics Department, the faculty's own representative.

⁵³ Transcript of Closed Hearing of the Case of Byron Thorwell Darling, Associate Professor of Physics and Astronomy, The Ohio State University, Before President Howard L. Bevis, The Ohio State University, April 2 and 4, 1953, pp. 2-16, Box 20, File: Darling . . . Statements and Addresses, Bevis Papers.

The hearing centered almost solely around President Bevis's important question, "What is your explanation of your refusal to answer the questions which were put to you when you were present in the House Un-American Activities Committee?" In Darling's answer to this question, Bevis expected Darling to confront directly the possibility that his conduct had violated the university's tenure rules in three ways: gross insubordination, immorality, or behavior clearly inimical to the best interests of the university. Bevis's dilemma was to attempt to balance the protection of his institution's good name with the procedural protection due a faculty member under the tenure system. Thus, the basic issue in the Darling case was whether Ohio State could dismiss a tenured faculty member who had used the Fifth Amendment to protect himself from possible self-incrimination.⁵⁴

Darling's defense consisted of three parts: a statement read by him, a presentation of witnesses, and a summary statement by his attorney. In the fifteen page statement, Darling himself began to refute the case against him. He asserted that, in the abstract, "a claim of the Fifth Amendment is not, and can not be,

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 17-19. Robert E. Summer (ed.), Freedom and Loyalty in Our Colleges, Vol. 26, No. 2 of The Reference Shelf (New York, 1954), pp. 122-23.

a proper basis for finding immorality, gross insubordination, [or] conduct clearly inimical to the best interests of the University," and that, in his particular case, "the assertion of the Fifth Amendment warrants no such finding."⁵⁵

To hold the exercise of a legal right, such as the Fifth Amendment privilege, to be immoral or insubordinate, would conflict, Darling said, with the university's rules. Since the university's loyalty oath included a provision to support and defend the Constitution, how could one's use of that Constitution be judged immoral? "The attitude that there is something wrong in utilizing the Constitution," Darling went on, "is inconsistent with the oath; it is not [as Bevis had written] implied by it." The Board of Trustees required an oath to the whole Constitution, he said, not just part of it. After this explication of the legal rightness behind a use of the Fifth Amendment, Darling proceeded to explain why he, in the instant case, had exercised the privilege. He began by categorically denying all of the allegations raised by HUAC's questions. He was not and had never been a member of the Communist Party or any organization associated with it, he knew of no Communist Party on campus, and he had never violated the university's loyalty oath. Then, Darling proceeded to the heart of

⁵⁵Transcript of Closed Hearing, p. 22.

the matter and answered President Bevis's question. "Though I was innocent," he said, "I felt that I was in a position of undeserved danger if I answered the questions." Obviously, the Velde Committee had called Darling because of some information it had received. Given the committee's questions, Darling faced this dilemma:

I could not, as apparently the Committee wanted me to, testify that I am or was a Communist, or disloyal, or had done anything wrong. Such testimony would have been completely false. But if I testified to the truth, then I ran the risk of being charged, and even convicted, of perjury on the basis of evidence in the Committee's possession, which evidence was either false, or capable of being falsely interpreted.⁵⁶

Darling reminded those present that they were not living in ordinary times, but in an era of agitation when accusations were often taken as facts, when professional informers often spoke out recklessly, and when innocent people could be tried and ruined by a charge of perjury. Darling concluded his statement by revealing hints of the evidence which HUAC had revealed to him in the closed session, and he denied their veracity.⁵⁷

The chief witness appearing on Darling's behalf was Professor Dudley Williams, the chairman of the Department of Physics and Astronomy. It must have been

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 22-31.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 31-34.

an act of tremendous courage for this man, whose name had already been linked to Darling's by HUAC, to speak in his colleague's defense. Despite the risks inherent in such a course, Williams did appear and read a statement from his faculty, testifying to Darling's competence and loyalty. In addition, Williams introduced supporting letters solicited from Darling's former employees and from several Ohio State graduate students, one of whom also testified.⁵⁸

Summarizing the case for Professor Darling, attorney Joseph Forer emphasized again that the professor claimed the privilege not because he was guilty but because he feared a charge of perjury. Forer related the story of Joseph Weinberg, another scientist and a friend of Darling's, who had undergone a four-year ordeal and seen his career ruined by this same type of circumstance, a false accusation by HUAC and a fight to disprove it. Finally, Forer explained Darling's refusal to deny that Williams and Nielsen, his colleagues, were communists. Perhaps this was a mistake, Forer said, but it certainly was not immorality. In addition, even answering "No" to such a question could and did suggest to members of the committee that Darling somehow

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 34-53.

should be suspect. "I mean," he said, "you can't win under those circumstances."⁵⁹

Based on the evidence presented at this hearing, Bevis recommended to the Trustees that Darling be discharged, and the Board quickly agreed, by unanimous vote. In his recommendation to the Trustees, Bevis accused Darling of lack of candor and moral integrity, as well as gross insubordination to university policy. Bevis reasoned that Darling was perfectly free to use the Fifth Amendment as an individual but that such action, even if completely legal, meant that Darling had failed in his duty to the university. Bevis argued that Darling's use of the privilege because of his fear of conviction for perjury should have been qualified by his obligation to Ohio State. Darling's conduct therefore inflicted inevitable injury upon the university and his colleagues, leading Bevis to conclude that he was unfit to hold his position any longer. The vice-presidents and the three official faculty observers concurred in this judgment.⁶⁰

The statement issued by the Board of Trustees accompanying its vote to fire Darling completely denied

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 54-66.

⁶⁰Bevis Recommendation to the Board of Trustees in the Case of Professor Byron T. Darling, April 7, 1953, Box 20, File: Darling . . . Hearing Transcripts, Bevis Papers.

the teacher's argument that a fear of conviction for perjury justified his silence. "If the statement that he was not a Communist were true," the Board expounded simplistically, "he had nothing to fear from anything, including an indictment for perjury." The Trustees concurred in Bevis's report, saying that "Darling's refusal to answer was a clear cut evasion of his responsibility as a university professor and citizen."⁶¹

Ohio's newspapers unanimously approved Bevis's recommendation and the Board's decision to fire Darling. In contrast to the Rugg incident, when a substantial number of newspapers rebuked the Trustees and urged reconsideration of the Speaker's Rule, in 1953 no newspaper defended Darling's use of the Fifth Amendment while employed by Ohio State. After Darling testified before HUAC, the Youngstown Vindicator criticized the utility of the Congressional inquiry into higher education, but asserted that professors called to testify would forfeit their right to teach if they refused to answer. The Cincinnati Enquirer averred that "the questions of the Committee . . . certainly did not infringe upon either academic freedom This instance

⁶¹Minutes, Board of Trustees, April 20, 1953, typed copy; Statement of Robert Gorman, Chairman, Board of Trustees, April 20, 1953, both in Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers.

illustrates that 'academic freedom' has something in common with most of the catch-phrases so dear to the hearts of Moscovied men the world over."⁶²

Once the Trustees dismissed Darling, newspaper editorials continued to back the university's stance. Darling was condemned for embarrassing Ohio State and for inflicting injury upon it. They upheld as legitimate the Committee's investigation of subversion in education. The Dayton Journal Herald asserted that "academic freedom does not give faculty members the right to be members of the Communist party" and the Plain Dealer agreed that "anyone who is not or never has been a Communist can respond with a good, resounding 'No,' and skip the fifth amendment's protective provisions."⁶³ In sum, Ohio's newspapers reinforced the stand of Bevis and the Trustees and worked to make any opposition to their decision much more difficult.

⁶²"Professor Darling's Suspension" (editorial), Youngstown Vindicator, March 14, 1953. "Speaking of Academic Freedom" (editorial), Cincinnati Enquirer, March 16, 1953.

⁶³"Why He Was Fired" (editorial), Beacon Journal, April 9, 1953. "Appropriate Recommendation" (editorial), Enquirer, April 12, 1953. "University Board Fulfills Its Obligation of Trust" (editorial), Journal, April 22, 1953. "Universities and Communism" (editorial), Dayton Journal Herald, April 6, 1953. "Inimical to the University" (editorial), Plain Dealer, April 8, 1953, p. 16.

Darling protested to the Trustees that the reasons advanced for his dismissal represented a circumvention of the tenure rules. He argued that within those rules, gross insubordination referred to the violation of an order from a superior, and that immorality meant sexual immorality. Since the charges advanced by Bevis were, in his view, unsubstantiated and invalid, Darling argued for one year's notice or one year's pay. The Board turned him down.⁶⁴

Others on the faculty shared Darling's belief that the charges of insubordination and immorality were unfair. But few denied that Darling's conduct had been inimical to the university or that he should not have been fired for this reason. The Conference Committee of the Teaching Staff, for example, resolved that faculty representatives to hearings such as the Darling hearing should be elected by the faculty but acknowledged that the decision to recommend dismissal was within the President's jurisdiction.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Darling to Board of Trustees, April 18, 1953, Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers.

⁶⁵H. Gordon Hullfish to Bevis, April 10, 1953; Paul Varg, Chairman, Conference Committee of the Teaching Staff, to Bevis, April 16, 1953; David Spitz, Department of Political Science, dissent to Varg letter, April 16, 1953, all in Box 20, File: Darling . . . Dismissal Case, Bevis Papers. Professor Spitz's dissent from the report of the Conference Committee detailed his objection to the procedures and standards used during the entire controversy.

In June, 1953, ex-professor Darling and his wife, Barbara, who resigned her secretarial job in the Romance Languages Department when her husband was fired, appeared before a special HUAC hearing held in Columbus. Both husband and wife again refused to answer a series of questions about alleged connections between them and the Communist Party. Unlike the earlier HUAC hearings in Washington, the Darlings were this time confronted by two accusers, a pair of ex-communist informers, named Bella Dodd and Bereniece Baldwin. Baldwin, in particular, testified about Barbara Darling's alleged Communist ties in Detroit in 1944, recalling one series of conversations in which Mrs. Darling had allegedly asked about getting open memberships in the Communist Party for herself and her husband. Baldwin said that this request was turned down, Party officials declaring that secret memberships would be more valuable.

If this accusation had been the only evidence with which HUAC could finger Byron Darling, then he could indeed have spoken out without fear of perjury. The Baldwin testimony certainly did not indict him because, up until 1946, Barbara Darling had been Mrs. Barbara Springer.⁶⁶

⁶⁶U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings, Investigation of Communist Activities in the Columbus, Ohio, Area, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, pp. 1739-1837.

HUAC might well have been dealing with a case of mistaken identity since, at the Washington hearing, Darling was asked if he had ever used Springer as an alias. Perhaps Barbara Darling's first husband was a more logical target for the committee than was her second. But of course, Byron Darling had no way of knowing in March just what evidence HUAC did possess. The inaccurate testimony of Bereniece Baldwin might have been only one item in a much larger dossier. Since Darling did not necessarily know all of the accusations made against him, he felt he could not, even during this second hearing, respond to those charges which were made public in the Dodd and Baldwin testimony.

The ironic aftermath of the Darling affair did not strike Ohio State until 1956. The American Association of University Professors placed the administration on probation for denying to Darling "a decision reached after due consideration of all factors relevant to his fitness to continue in his post, . . ." in essence, for procedural shortcomings. Despite heated protests from Bevis, the Trustees, and many faculty members, the AAUP concluded that:

Foreseeable harm [to OSU] was not found to be present on the basis of analysis of his [Darling's] motivation or of actual effects upon the University or his colleagues, but resided, in substance, in deductions from a supposed state of public opinion in relation to his act⁶⁷

The tension between the tradition of academic freedom and the American patriotic tradition is inherent. The argument raised here is that this tension is exacerbated most severely, not during a total national mobilization, but in times of uncertainty and anxiety. During the early years of the Cold War and especially during the Korean War, national goals were blurred and no one could be certain to avoid charges of subversion. As Senator Joseph McCarthy progressed from an attack on the State Department, a relatively easy target, to the Army and General George Marshall, the defense of freedom and personal rights became a precarious task.

Inevitably, this hysteria and confusion carried over into the university where the two traditions collided. The incidents at Ohio State demonstrated how rough the conflict could be. In the first case, the

⁶⁷ American Association of University Professors, "Academic Freedom and National Security," section (m), "The Ohio State University," draft copy, Box 4, File: American Association of University Professors, 1950-1956, Bevis Papers. The complete correspondence on the AAUP action is in Box 4, File: Darling . . . AAUP and Related Correspondence, Bevis Papers.

invitation to Harold Rugg in 1951 unleashed a torrent of protest to which the Board of Trustees over-reacted. Their defense of the patriotic tradition was so excessive and unreasonable that the strong faculty reaction which did occur was almost a certainty. In the Darling case, on the other hand, the Trustees, at least as adamant to do their duty, faced a less vocal faculty opposition. The conflict was still there, as we have seen, but mostly on procedural grounds. The persistence of Cold War tensions and the extended denouement in Korea had helped to preserve the crisis atmosphere and to institutionalize the eternal vigilance of the anti-communist crusade. Academic freedom remained alive in theory, but advocacy of its practice had become not only fruitless but hazardous as well.

CHAPTER V

ENDURING THE LIMITED WAR:

OHIO AFTER MACARTHUR'S DISMISSAL

But, in the first half of 1951, as retreat switched into advance and as, after the initial Chinese offensive, extensive combat gave way to discretionary stalemate, divisiveness replaced cohesion and the confusion of urgency became the confusion of competing values, different interpretations, and varying institutional interests.

--Edward S. Flash, Jr., Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers, 1965.

For Ohioans as well as the rest of the nation, the events surrounding the recall of General MacArthur were a turning point in their opinions and reactions to the Korean War. Before MacArthur's return, public opposition to the war was divided between those who favored withdrawal and those who advocated pushing the war wherever it might go. MacArthur's firing changed that. As his replacement, General Matthew Ridgway, successfully executed Truman's limited war strategy, supporters of alternative policies found it increasingly difficult to impugn the administration. Dissent over the war's direction gave way to malaise over its length. At the same time, the debate over the renewal of the Defense Production Act served to cement in place the economic side of the limited war commitment. Over the next two years, the anxieties and fears of the war's first months gave way to frustration and quiet desperation as the war dragged on. Ohioans could no longer hope to prevent a limited war; they had to decide now how to act within its confines.

General MacArthur's return to the United States after being recalled from his command by President Truman unleashed a torrent of protest against the administration and its war policy. A million people, including the Japanese Emperor, bade farewell to MacArthur in Tokyo, and many thousands more greeted him at Pearl Harbor, San Francisco, and then, Washington, where he addressed a joint session of Congress. His speech, ending with the famous refrain, "Old Soldiers never die, they just fade away," provoked tears from many listeners and moved some Congressmen to assert the general's divinity and express fears for the welfare of the country. MacArthur flew to New York where he was lauded with the biggest ticker tape parade in that city's history. It was hard to believe that this tremendous reception was being accorded a cashiered soldier, not one returning in triumph.¹

Ohioans greeted MacArthur's firing with the same expressions of outrage as the rest of the country. Senator Bricker's office received about ten thousand letters and telegrams, only eight or ten of which favored the President's decision. Senator Taft and several Ohio Congressmen reported similar ratios in their

¹David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York, 1964), pp. 221-29.

own mail. One Columbus restaurateur began collecting signatures on a petition to impeach Truman and quickly amassed five hundred names. A member of the Portage County Selective Service Board resigned to protest the firing, and, in June, the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the War Veterans Republican Club of Columbus cheered their guest speaker, Senator Joseph McCarthy, when he denounced the President's decision. "They," he said, "who coddled and protected Communists at home were willing to start a war to prove they were anti-Communist, but they now say we dare not win that war."² Members of the Ohio General Assembly introduced three resolutions dealing with the MacArthur controversy. One of these disapproved of the President for "dismissing the country's mainstay against communism in the East." The second commended Truman for his courageous action. The third resolution, the only one to pass, invited the general to address a joint session of the legislature.³

MacArthur declined the legislature's offer and accepted instead a civic invitation from Cleveland.

²Bricker to Robert Beightler (copy), April 26, 1951, Box 90, File: 1951 Personal, John Bricker Papers, Ohio Historical Society. Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 13, 1951, pp. 8, 12; June 3, 1951, p. 11-B.

³Ohio, General Assembly, Bulletin, 99th General Assembly of Ohio, 1951-1952, pp. 428, 447.

The city fathers had first asked MacArthur in 1947, while he was still in Japan, and they renewed their request in April to hear the general speak on any subject of his own choosing. MacArthur accepted in August and arrived in September to still another tumultuous welcome. Some 250,000 people watched the fourteen-mile parade, and at Public Hall that night, the audience cheered the general for two full minutes before he began to speak. His address, billed as nonpartisan and nonpolitical, lasted thirty-five minutes and was interrupted by applause thirty-one times. After the speech, Cleveland's mayor, Thomas Burke, presented MacArthur the keys to the city.⁴

MacArthur's oration was a subtle yet thorough criticism of the entire course of American history during the postwar years. It was a clarion call for the people, "in which the soul of liberty is still living and vibrant," to rise up and save the republic from leaders who had dissipated American military strength, failed to comprehend the crucial challenge confronting America, and threatened to allow the United States to drift into totalitarianism. MacArthur began by analyzing the postwar world and the Allies' attempt to deal with it. He declared that the total military

⁴Plain Dealer, April 12, 1951, p. 1; August 14, 1951, pp. 1, 5; September 7, 1951, pp. 1, 7.

victory achieved in World War II led to "a peace in which ethics and morality based upon truth and justice would thereafter fashion the universal code." America's task, "to consolidate the victory into a truly enduring peace for all of the human race," had been neglected by political and military leaders who demobilized the country's military might and left the world "exposed and vulnerable to an international communism whose long-published plan had been to await just such a favorable opportunity to establish dominion over the free nations." The United Nations, created to maintain the peace, was increasingly unable to do its job because of structural deficiencies and the lack of a "dynamic sense of responsibility . . . within its ranks capable of rallying the forces of good throughout the world"⁵

The bulk of the speech consisted of a systematic description of the one bright spot in this period of general failure, Japan. Without mentioning his own well-known leadership of the Occupation, MacArthur praised the Japanese, who had "lifted themselves from the ashes of defeat and started to build a new nation--a nation dedicated to the pursuit of new concepts and new ideals, fashioned from a blend between the best of their

⁵The speech was printed in its entirety in the Plain Dealer, September 7, 1951, pp. 8-9.

own ancient culture and those high precepts of ethics and morals which have been the great pillars supporting America's origin and growth." Japan was becoming, in MacArthur's view, everything that America had been and should still be. Under an enlightened constitution, Japan was developing local autonomy to balance centralized authority, a free enterprise system born of the abolition of land tenure, a sound labor movement, universal suffrage, free education, women's rights, a new court system, a frugal government, and an economy headed toward stability and self-sufficiency.⁶

In contrast to the bright promise of this new Japan, MacArthur saw the United States working at cross purposes to the principles of the Founding Fathers. The federal government, he said, had engineered a persistent centralization of power at the expense of the states. The State Department was expanding its authority to such an extent that it was "rapidly assuming the character of a prime ministry notwithstanding that its secretary is an appointed official, neither chosen by nor answerable directly to the people." Most importantly, MacArthur decried the "violent manner in which exception is taken to the citizen's voice when raised in criticism of those who exercise the political power."⁷

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

According to the general, "the issues which today confront the nation are clearly defined and so fundamental as to directly involve the very survival of the republic." The choice was there to be made: between religion and atheism, between state socialism and "our heritage of liberty and freedom," between freedom and servitude. "I have been encouraged to believe," he concluded, "that our citizens will not complacently tolerate further incursions against their cherished liberties and will move to correct this drift away from truly representative government."⁸

The uproar surrounding MacArthur's recall, leading directly to Congressional hearings on the administration's foreign policy and to his tour to Cleveland and other cities, climaxed a year-long period of citizen hostility to the conduct of the Korean War. From the very beginning, a significant portion of the American people had dissented from this war and opposed in thought, if not in action, the administration's war policy and objectives. Unlike the Vietnam War, two decades hence, this opposition was less vocal and based mostly in the American Right; but, as with Vietnam,

⁸Ibid.

opponents of the government were divided between those who favored withdrawal from Korea and those who advocated escalation and the pursuit of a total military victory.

Immediately after Truman responded unhesitatingly to the North Korean attack, the overwhelming majority of Americans approved the President's decision to aid South Korea. Support for the war remained high throughout the summer and fall of 1950, perhaps because people thought the war would be a short one. Truman's resolve represented, for many people, a new stand, an end to the irresolution of the preceding years. Most critics of the war during these early weeks did not call for withdrawal; they argued instead that the government should support the prosecution of the war without restraint. Mail to the President from Ohio supported total mobilization and rapid shipments of ammunition and supplies to Korea. Presidential aide Kenneth Hechler wrote in an office memo in early August that letters to the White House urged wage and price controls, an important part of a total mobilization, far more frequently than they dealt with the war itself. Those who did write about foreign policy called for the resignation of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the personification

of the vacillation and weakness which to them Truman's decision to intervene clearly repudiated.⁹

Support for the war declined drastically when the Chinese intervened. The Plain Dealer, which earlier had approved the decision to cross the 38th Parallel and unify Korea, argued later that the Chinese presence might lead to an American defeat: "Under these circumstances, the important question is not whether we are going to get out of Korea, but when and how." The Scripps-Howard newspaper chain reported that Congressional offices were inundated with mail demanding immediate withdrawal. Senator Taft had five people opening this mail, and they were two days behind. Congressman John Vorys of Columbus saw the same sentiments expressed in his mail. His constituents urged abandoning Korea and defending the home front. Mrs. Robert Miller, who opposed "sending our men to fight the battles of the whole world," wrote, "I believe in a large standing army, navy and sufficient air force to protect our country and

⁹ John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York, 1972), p. 51. Herbert Agar, The Price of Power: America since 1945 (Chicago, 1957), p. 117. Mr. and Mrs. W. E. Beers to Harry S. Truman (telegram), July 18, 1950, OFFICIAL FILE (hereafter OF) 471B, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library. Bern H. Andrews to Truman, July 14, 1950, OF 471B, Truman Papers. Memorandum, Kenneth W. Hechler to George Elsey, August 2, 1950, Radio Address on Korea--July 19, 1950 folder, George M. Elsey Papers, Truman Library. On Acheson, see, for example, Frank A. Boland to Truman, July 11, 1950, and John V. Birkel to Truman, July 11, 1950, both in OF 471B, Truman Papers.

possessions at all times." Another woman argued that "our own people should come first, . . . Why should America police, support, and play nurse maid to the whole world. . . ?" The secretary of the Independent Theater Owners of Ohio requested his members to hold up showing a government-endorsed documentary called Why Korea? He appealed that the film should be postponed until the government agreed to sponsor a companion film, Why We Should Get Out of Korea.¹⁰

Following China's intervention, public approval for the war dropped precipitously from 77 per cent to around 50 per cent. Thereafter, support for the war hardly changed at all, and from early 1951 to the summer of 1953, public opinion polls remained rather steady. According to one analyst, "the Chinese intervention seemed to shake from the support ranks those who were tenuous and those who felt that they could support a short war, but not a long one." Despite the dismissal of MacArthur, the vagaries of peace talks, the 1952 election, and the ever-rising casualty figures, this hard core of support remained generally stable.¹¹

¹⁰Plain Dealer, August 22, 1950, p. 12; January 5, 1951, p. 10; January 26, 1951, p. 5. Columbus Citizen, January 19, 1951, n.p., clipping in Box 33, File: Korean War and Foreign Affairs, John M. Vorys Papers, Ohio Historical Society. Mrs. Robert Miller to Truman (carbon to Vorys), January 22, 1951, and Mrs. Robert Nance to Vorys, January 19, 1951, both in Box 33, File: Korean War and Foreign Affairs, Vorys Papers.

¹¹Mueller, pp. 51-52.

Public opinion figures aside, in the months preceding MacArthur's ouster, Ohioans and other Americans who opposed the war struggled to decide how to end the war. China's retaliation prompted many people to believe that Korea had been a mistake, but they disagreed on how to correct it. The Plain Dealer, for example, supported withdrawal, but concluded that, if the war must be fought, restrictions on bombing in Manchuria and on Chiang Kai-shek's troops must be lifted. Others were more definite, one woman writing her Congressman that the war should be ended at the parallel where it began to avoid wasting troops in a bottomless pit. Even Senator Bricker could offer no real solution:

I am convinced that we cannot fight a land war in the Orient, and certainly not in the Orient and in Europe. The Korean decision on the part of the President was a terrible blunder. He assumed the responsibility without consulting Congress and against the advice of his military leaders. The debacle has been a terrible one.¹²

MacArthur's firing provided one final outlet for the frustrations of those favoring a wider war, but it did not change the government's policy. Truman had correctly predicted that the outburst for MacArthur

¹²Plain Dealer, February 1, 1951, p. 8. Mrs. W. H. Fairfield to Vorys, March 4, 1951, Box 33, File: Korean Situation--Since Form Letter, Vorys Papers. John Bricker to Frank Wellings (copy), January 12, 1951, Box 90, File: 1951 Personal, Bricker Papers.

would subside and that the pendulum would swing back to him. Indeed, it was impossible to determine whether the crowds turning out to see the general were agreeing with his views on Korea or simply thanking him for a lifetime of service to his country. As the Congressional hearings proceeded without vindicating MacArthur, Ridgway in Korea proved that a limited war could be waged successfully. Observers have called Truman's decision a necessary re-assertion of civilian control of the military. Just as important was the fact that Ridgway's conduct enabled the government to cement the limited war commitment in place. The United Nations did not again try to unify all of Korea.¹³

Shortly after MacArthur's recall, the Chinese began their greatest offensive of the war. In April and again in May, the Chinese attempted to destroy the United Nations Command and occupy all of Korea, despite earlier failures by the North Koreans and the United Nations to do so. The first assault involved 700,000 Communist troops against 420,000 United Nations soldiers under the direction of the new field commander, Lieutenant General James Van Fleet. United Nations forces gave ground

¹³Rees, pp. 229, 256-57.

retreating from the line KANSAS which had been established by Ridgway, to the line NO NAME, just south of the Parallel but still north of Seoul. There the defense held, and the Chinese were forced to begin a retreat. In May, a second offensive began, and again the United Nations resisted successfully. The Chinese took an estimated 90,000 casualties during one week alone as they attempted to defeat a modern, well-equipped, determined army using old-fashioned infantry strategy and superiority of numbers. China now had to admit that there would be no unification of Korea on its terms either. By June, 1951, there were serious hints that peace talks could soon begin.¹⁴

Thus, the first year of the war had witnessed three separate efforts to conquer Korea. All three--North Korean, United Nations, and Chinese--had failed. All sides now tacitly agreed that the war now would be limited, a military conflict with a political solution. On the homefront, this realization that the war could be neither won nor lost ended one period of anxious frustration and began another one. There would be no third world war, no inexorable Communist advance from Korea to other vulnerable sections of the Free World.

¹⁴Ibid., chap. 14, especially pp. 243-55, 261-63.

Korea would not lead to Armageddon, but neither would it be the scene of an American victory. As a result, the urgency of the mobilization could be relaxed, and the necessity to sacrifice for the war effort lessened significantly. On the other hand, a new set of questions now puzzled Americans: How does a limited war end? How do we know when we have achieved our objectives? What contributions and sacrifices will a limited war require?

Many Ohioans were, by early 1951, willing to abandon Korea and perhaps all overseas commitments and to concentrate defense efforts only on the home front. Not everyone accepted this position, of course, but, as the war went on, the consensus grew in favor of a effective civil defense, at least. The state government had initiated a coordinated program of statewide civil defense (see Chapter I, pp. 23-29, supra) and that commitment grew stronger. In addition, Ohio's cities, which had generally fumbled their civil defense plans during the war's first year, attacked the problem with new resolve and provided financing adequate to do the job.

Part of the state's civil defense program was the publication of a series of pamphlets dealing with

various civil defense matters. One such pamphlet, Industrial Security, was produced jointly by the Adjutant General and the Ohio Industrial Commission in 1951. Its foreword contained the warning that the state's industries faced a crisis "more grave than any other in history. If we are to survive," it went on, "it will be due to our great industrial resources which must be protected and used to the utmost." This manual was intended to help protect all industry from any disaster "because of the necessity for maintaining full production in all defense plants as well as in all those producing essential civilian goods."¹⁵

The text of Industrial Security focused on how plants could be organized to deal with subversion, espionage, sabotage, and military action. The booklet schooled plant managers on how to act during an emergency, how to begin rehabilitation measures, and how to conduct a plant protection survey report. Specific instructions covered such topics as warning systems, first aid, rescues, employee security investigations, visitors, camouflage, contamination, and evacuation.¹⁶

Columbus was one city which made substantial progress after a slow start in developing an adequate

¹⁵Ohio, Adjutant General's Department and Industrial Commission, Industrial Security, Civil Defense Information Bulletin No. 6-1 (Columbus, 1951), p. 3.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 1-66.

civil defense. After the national Civil Defense Administration announced that Columbus was one of eighty-five American cities considered to be a critical target area, the city government steadily increased its financial and personnel stake in civil defense. Early in 1951, the city council appropriated \$2000 to send both the director and the executive administrator of the civil defense division to attend a two-week CD school in London. In May, the city raised the salaries of all civil defense personnel to make them commensurate with other city divisions. The most significant step forward came in 1952 when Columbus united with other municipalities in Franklin County and the county itself to form a county civil defense. City-county cooperation had been legalized by the General Assembly in 1951. The council appropriated nearly \$50,000 for its share of this organization's budget in 1952 and another \$35,000 in early 1953. By the time the war ended, Columbus, like many other Ohio cities, had established a sound organizational framework and was training a core of volunteers in essential services.¹⁷

¹⁷Columbus Dispatch, October 16, 1950, p. A-19. Columbus, Ohio, The City Bulletin: Official Publication of the City of Columbus, XXXVI (March 20, 1951), 21-22; (May 12, 1951), 276; XXXVII (March 1, 1952), 138-39; (March 8, 1952), 159; XXXVIII (March 3, 1953), 137. Ohio, General Code, Annotated (Baldwin, 1952), sec. 5295-1. "Civil Defense Budgets: Up or Down?" Ohio Cities and Villages, I (May, 1953), 78.

In Toledo, the story was much the same: a stronger organization and increased funding after a slow beginning. For 1952, the Toledo city council appropriated \$52,683 for equipment and supplies for civil defense, in addition to salaries. The civil defense committee participated in several activities including a local television show on which a Geiger counter was demonstrated, and organized a city skywatching campaign.¹⁸

The most effective civil defense organization in Ohio was probably the Cleveland-Cuyahoga County program. From the beginning of the war, Cleveland's Mayor Burke had worked to coordinate city and county activities. One hundred civic leaders from greater Cleveland met in July, 1950, to set up an executive committee; funding was set in September and a director named in early December. Also in December, the civil mobilization arm of CD was put into operation. This group coordinated all volunteer activity including

¹⁸ Toledo, Ohio, Toledo City Journal: Official Publication of the City of Toledo, Ohio, Containing a Record of Council Proceedings, All Legislation Enacted by the City Council, Reports of the Commission of Publicity and Efficiency, Together with Legal Notices of Divisions, Departments and Agencies of the City Government, XXXVII (March 8, 1952), 306; (June 14, 1952), 781-83; (August 2, 1952), 984.

Red Cross, canteens, day care centers, and victory gardens.¹⁹

The Cuyahoga County Mayors Association approved a temporary budget of \$56,000 for civil defense in early 1951. Three times this amount was promised once the county organization was totally formed. Cleveland signed up 6000 volunteers in March, but the program's director, Ellsworth Augustus, urged more involvement by city hall to get the effort moving even faster. Mayor Burke agreed with this viewpoint and created a municipal office of civil defense. A county organization made progress as well. Cleveland joined this structure and provided most of its funding. By the war's end, despite public disinterest in specific civil defense activities, the county had a permanent, solid structure in operation.²⁰

As the war lengthened, Ohio's educational institutions continued to deal with the problems it posed for them and to adapt their programs and operations

¹⁹Plain Dealer, July 15, 1950, p. 1; July 22, 1950, p. 1; September 19, 1950, p. 1; December 6, 1950, p. 5; December 7, 1950, p. 5.

²⁰Ibid., February 17, 1951, p. 2; March 30, 1951, p. 1; April 8, 1951, pp. 1, 18; May 8, 1951, p. 19; January 26, 1952, pp. 1, 9; February 19, 1952, p. 20; February 1, 1953, p. 10-A; September 8, 1951, p. 11.

to the war situation. Many educational officials seemed to agree with Ohio State University's president, Howard Bevis, who said at his school's 1951 commencement that the Korean War might not explode into global war, but that it seemed "destined to be of long duration--perhaps a lifetime--in which our strength must be both real and manifest." Colleges and high schools alike worked to create the strength to which Bevis referred. A suburban high school near Cleveland introduced a military orientation course for second semester seniors. The course was viewed as a possible solution to the problems of maladjustment in youths entering the armed services. The Cleveland School Board offered its pupils "dog tags" on a voluntary basis as a means of identification as well as a show of patriotism. Oberlin College altered its basic curriculum for the first time in twenty-one years, including in these changes an increase in the freshman social science requirement from one to two semesters and the addition of extra courses on the Soviet Union. Ohio State accelerated its programs to aid the service-bound: freshmen were allowed to enter in Summer Quarter, instead of the Fall, and the Medical and Dental Schools

pressed the use of their facilities to allow more students to graduate more quickly.²¹

Ohio colleges also adjusted their ROTC programs to produce more officers more quickly and developed special rules for veterans becoming students. At Western Reserve University, freshmen who did not sign up for Air Force ROTC in Fall semester were allowed to enroll during the Spring semester and make up the Fall course during the summer. Ohio State established a separate Department of Air Science, and, in 1952, AFROTC students who were otherwise qualified were commissioned without attending summer camp. Veterans' Administration officials in Cleveland predicted a sharp upsurge in Korean veterans attending college if peace came. They anticipated job shortages as a result of defense adjustments, pushing veterans into school. Congress had extended G.I. Bill benefits to veterans of Korea in 1952. That same year, Baldwin-Wallace College

²¹James E. Pollard, The Bevis Administration, 1940-1956, Part 2, The Post-War Years and the Emergence of the Greater University, 1945-1956, Vol. VIII of History of The Ohio State University (9 vols.; Columbus, 1920-1976), p. 208. Plain Dealer, October 17, 1951, pp. 1, 12; September 3, 1952, pp. 1, 6; April 15, 1951, p. 17-A. Howard Bevis to Time, Inc., Cleveland (telegram), February 24, 1951, and Bevis, memo to self, n.d., both in Box 46, File: Selective Service, 1950-1952, 1954-1955, Howard L. Bevis Papers, RG 3/h, The Ohio State University Archives, Columbus.

appointed a new assistant director of admissions for veterans' counseling, and President John Knight announced an easy payment tuition plan allowing monthly payments of tuition to coincide with monthly G.I. Bill benefit checks.²²

The Korean War's most dramatic effect upon Ohio colleges and universities was a marked decline in enrollments which led to financial difficulties and a search for outside financial assistance. Student enrollments dropped 10 to 15 per cent in 1951 and 5 to 10 per cent in 1952. The decline was attributed to various factors: the graduation of students who were veterans of World War II, the draft, a surplus of good jobs at high wages, and the low birth rates in 1933 and 1934. The enrollment slump reduced income and forced several schools to cut faculty jobs. Toledo University, for example, failed to renew fourteen contracts in 1951. Wittenberg University dropped ten faculty and neglected to replace five others. The downward trend was especially

²²Plain Dealer, November 26, 1951, p. 9; April 3, 1953, pp. 1, 7; August 16, 1952, p. 5. Colonel Merwin Potter, Professor of Air Science, to Harlan Hatcher, July 25, 1951, Box 1, File: Air Science 1951, 1952, Executive Assistant to the President Norval Neil Luxon Papers, RG 4/c, The Ohio State University Archives. Potter to Bevis, February 15, 1952, Box 3, File: Air Science, 1952-1953, Bevis Papers. R. Freeman Butts and Lawrence A. Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (New York, 1953), pp. 582-83.

hard on private institutions, and losses were even greater than anticipated when Korean veterans failed to enroll in college at the expected rate.²³

To counteract the loss of revenue which this enrollment pattern entailed, Ohio colleges turned increasingly to outside sources for funding. Part of these funds came from the government, both local and federal. The University of Akron asked the city council for \$95,000 in 1951 when a fund-raising drive failed to supply the dollars needed for faculty raises. The federal government aided colleges by developing an extensive program of grants to promote basic research and to train personnel in fields important to national security, including the sciences, engineering, medicine, and agriculture.²⁴

Another innovative approach to the funding problem was the colleges' appeal to American business and industry. Despite attacks on colleges as seedbeds of communism and subversion, there seems to have been no reluctance by corporations to contribute to them.

²³Plain Dealer, August 19, 1951, pp. 1, 13; August 26, 1951, pp. 1, 8; August 24, 1952, pp. 1, 10A; October 18, 1952, pp. 1, 7; April 28, 1951, p. 9. "Enrollment Down Only 10%," Ohio State University Monthly, XLIII (November 15, 1951), 19.

²⁴Plain Dealer, November 10, 1951, p. 15.
Butts & Cremin, p. 583.

The Council for Financial Aid to Education found that, by 1956, 275 firms were investing almost \$29 million annually in higher education. For their money, according to one historian, businesses earned a sympathetic ear from university presidents, the establishment of more business and engineering schools, and a close relationship between top corporate officials and college administrators. A typical example of this symbiotic relationship was Fenn College in Cleveland. Fenn was a private institution, supported by voluntary contributions, which received increasing amounts of money from Cleveland business and industry. In 1951, 115 firms contributed \$125,000 to it, with which Fenn was able to begin a co-operative educational plan to provide graduates who possessed technical business talents and fresh leadership potential.²⁵

Nineteen other Ohio colleges and universities united to form the Ohio Foundation of Independent Colleges to solicit similar industrial support. The foundation sought joint financial gifts from corporations. Sixty per cent of the money was to be divided equally among the members with the remainder allotted according to enrollment totals. Many of these schools were

²⁵Lawrence S. Wittner, Cold War America: From Hiroshima to Watergate (Paper; New York, 1974), p. 124. Plain Dealer, October 16, 1952, p. 14.

operating in the red, caught between rising costs, shrinking dollar value on their endorsements, and falling enrollment. Early contributors to the foundation included Firestone, which gave \$25,000, and Sohio, which established twenty scholarships for children of its employees to attend any member school in the belief that "the future of our democratic society, as well as of industry itself, requires that everyone, including our corporations, come to the aid of our privately endowed educational institutions in these critical times." The foundation raised \$230,000 in its first year from 100 businesses and corporations. Member institutions reported using the money to raise salaries, balance budgets, and provide scholarships.²⁶

A good indication of how the reduction in wartime tensions affected the changed mood on the home front is the way the military draft operated. With the war clearly limited, the Army found that it could not possibly use all the men which Selective Service was empowered to induct (see Chapter I, pp. 40-44, supra). A complicated process of selection, deferment, and

²⁶Plain Dealer, August 7, 1951, pp. 1, 5; January 15, 1952, pp. 1, 5; May 21, 1952, p. 2; November 18, 1952, p. 18; November 16, 1952, p. 23-A.

rejection ensued, with many individuals and groups scrambling not to volunteer to do their patriotic duty but to convince draft authorities that they should not be called. Newspapers in Cleveland and Cincinnati publicized the names of draft-age members of the Cleveland Indians and Cincinnati Reds baseball teams, hoping that they would not be called. Congresswoman Frances Bolton argued that local boards were sparing men involved in factory work and placing an unfair burden upon farm labor. The college student deferment program led to confusion, resentment, and the criticism that it was inequitable. Indeed, the program deferred those smart enough or rich enough to attend college and exposed the poor and those pursuing trades to the draft. Local boards added to this discrimination by establishing their own criteria for the deferment of college students, class standing and Selective Service test results being guidelines only. Proponents of the college deferment program argued correctly that students were being deferred only and not exempted, but the injustice still stood. In addition, local boards were empowered to grant occupational deferments to "any registrant whose activity in study is found to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest," categories which were interpreted

to include medical students, dentistry students, and other graduate students.²⁷

The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 also renewed the practice of alternative service for conscientious objectors. During World War II, conscientious objectors could perform alternative service in Civilian Public Service camps, but curiously, this provision was omitted from the 1948 draft law. Conscientious objectors were exempt from any obligation at all. Under the 1951 law, COs were now required to perform twenty-four months of civilian work, generally in a hospital or other non-profit, humanitarian institution. The regulations to enforce this provision were not executed until July, 1952, but Ohioans showed no reluctance to claim conscientious objector status. Even before the war, Ohio had been the scene of a

²⁷John L. Rafuse, "United States Experience with Volunteer and Conscript Forces," Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force, November, 1970, II (Washington, 1971), pp. III-1-29--III-1-34 [sic], quoted in Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History, ed. Robert H. Brenner (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), III, 192. Plain Dealer, July 9, 1950, p. B-1; April 7, 1951, p. 1; March 19, 1951, p. 12; April 8, 1951, p. 1. Cincinnati Enquirer, July 22, 1950, p. 12. Laura L. Howe to Vorys, June 6, 1951, Box 32, File: Deferment of Students, Vorys Papers. U.S., Selective Service System, Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1951 to the Congress of the United States pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service Act as Amended, January 3, 1952, pp. 7, 18-20.

court case on the draft when Larry Gara, Dean of Men at Bluffton College, a Mennonite school, was convicted of advising a divinity student to stand fast in his refusal even to register for the draft. Gara appealed this conviction and was supported by the American Civil Liberties Union, which claimed that Gara's conviction violated his freedom of speech since there was no clear and present danger resulting from his counsel. The U.S. Supreme Court let the conviction stand on a 4-4 vote. Gara had already been released after serving six months of an eighteen month sentence. Other court cases developed out of the complex regulations governing the granting of CO status. One man claimed that his local board failed to afford him an adequate opportunity to seek a CO deferment. Another registrant argued that he withdrew a claim for CO status when an FBI man misled him to believe that he could get a 4-D deferment as a minister. Other cases turned on technicalities which reveal how difficult it was to administer this law fairly. James Relyea had to prove to his local board's satisfaction that he had adopted his pacifist ideas before he had been classified 1-A. Another CO claimant argued unsuccessfully that he should be granted

CO status even though he believed in self-defense because, in his view, the Bible outlawed war but condoned self-defense.²⁸

When the rules for alternative service were announced, Ohio had 1242 COs registered. Progress in assigning COs to acceptable alternative service projects was rather slow. By the end of 1952, only 473 projects had been approved and 385 COs assigned to them nationwide. In Ohio, 120 COs were assigned to 50 institutions. Most of these jobs were two-year stints in hospitals, and most were at least 100 miles from the registrant's home, as the rules required.²⁹

The 1951 draft law was due to expire on June 30, 1953. Before that date, Congress debated two significant changes in the law: drafting fathers and extending the term of service to longer than twenty-four months. Both suggestions faced vehement opposition; the fatherhood

²⁸On conscientious objection and alternative service during World War II, see Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960 (New York, 1969), pp. 70-84. U.S., Selective Service System, "Selective Service Chronology," Selective Service, July, 1952, p. 1. American Civil Liberties Union, Security and Freedom: the Great Challenge, Thirtieth Annual Report (New York, 1951), p. 36. Toledo Blade, October 24, 1950, p. 2. Plain Dealer, October 24, 1950, p. 2; April 24, 1951, p. 11; February 24, 1952, p. 19-A; February 20, 1952, p. 2.

²⁹Plain Dealer, February 13, 1952, p. 8; December 26, 1952, p. 1; January 6, 1953, p. 8.

deferment was amended, but the longer term was not adopted when the draft law was extended for two additional years.³⁰

The Ohio Un-American Activities Commission also took an interest in higher education. One of the three primary fields of interest for the Commission was the presence and effectiveness of Communist youth movements in schools and on campuses. The Commission made a very limited inquiry into education, but this probe was sufficient to cause OUAC to recommend legislation to deal with subversion in the educational system. OUAC centered its efforts on two institutions only, Ohio State University and Antioch College, and questioned only seven witnesses.³¹

The three witnesses from Ohio State included a graduate student in zoology, his wife, and an instructor in fine arts. All three refused repeatedly to answer the Commission's questions, and all three severed their connections with Ohio State in the wake of their appearances. Marston Hamlin had been on the fine arts

³⁰See Box 39, File: Selective Service, Vorys Papers. Selective Service, Annual Report, 1953, p. 3.

³¹Ohio, General Assembly, Un-American Activities Commission, Report of the Un-American Activities Commission, State of Ohio, 1951-1952, Part I, p. 12; Part II, pp. 99-126, 308-78.

teaching staff for two years. In his opening statement to the commission, he affirmed his opposition to violent overthrow of the government and asserted his intention to refuse to answer "any questions concerning such alleged activity, or alleged participation in activity regarding unlawful alteration of our Constitutional Governments, or alleged knowledge of persons having such unlawful acts as their objective, on the basis of Constitutional safeguards protecting me from bearing witness against myself." Hamlin was questioned about his opinions of the Communist Party, about whether he was a Party member in Franklin County, Ohio, and about alleged Communist Party activities while he worked for Sperry Gyroscope during World War II. In all, Hamlin declined to answer fifty-three questions.³²

The Commission also subpoenaed graduate teaching assistant George Pappas and his wife, Bernice. Pappas was questioned about his own alleged activities in the Franklin County Communist Party, and he refused to answer sixty-four times. His wife, who had resigned her position as a laboratory technician for an OSU bacteriology research

³²Verbatim transcript, "Meeting of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission, held in the House of Representatives Committee Room, State Capitol Building, Columbus, Ohio, on Tuesday, May 20, 1952, at ten o'clock a.m., Chairman Gordon Renner, presiding," pp. 1557-78, copy in Box 1, File: Faculty Cases (Freedom, Tenure, etc.), 1951-1952-1953, Bevis Papers. Pollard, pp. 156-57.

project a week before she was called to testify, also refused to answer a series of similar questions. Ohio State's president, Howard Bevis, suspended both Hamlin and Pappas immediately after their appearances before the commission. Bevis reviewed both cases, interviewed both men, and decided unilaterally that neither should be offered a university contract again.³³

Antioch College in Yellow Springs was the only other institution investigated by OUAC. Antioch had received considerable publicity over a long period of time as a "breeding ground" for communism. A commission witness, Harvey Matusow, had testified both before the commission and before a Senate committee that half of Antioch's one thousand students supported the Communist line and were organized into youth groups such as the Labor Youth League. Antioch's president, Douglas McGregor, appeared before the commission to refute Matusow's allegations. McGregor testified that Antioch was a liberal and democratic college where there was a concern "to keep as much of a free market place for ideas . . . as we have kept in our economic system over

³³Transcript, OUAC meeting, May 20, 1952, pp. 1518-48, 1579-90; Bevis announcement, n.d.; Bevis to Hamlin (copy), June 2, 1952; Bevis to Hamlin (copy), June 5, 1952, all in Box 1, File: Faculty Cases (Freedom, Tenure, etc.), 1951-1952-1953, Bevis Papers. Pollard, pp. 156-57.

the years." He admitted that "we have some people on the campus whom some people would regard as unduly liberal," and he also conceded that Antioch did sanction a campus chapter of the Young Progressive Alliance, generally thought to be a Communist-front organization. McGregor argued forcefully that nothing at Antioch was subversive. He maintained that an active subversive could not hide on a campus and that he, himself, would not ever knowingly hire a Communist for the faculty. McGregor also forcefully defended the free interchange of ideas on a campus: "I make a sharp distinction myself between the realm of ideas and the realm of action in these affairs." He believed that young people never take an idea at face value and accept it and swallow it. To support this viewpoint, he related the circumstances surrounding the appearance of a known fellow traveler before a student meeting at Antioch. During the question period, the speaker was severely taken to task. Antioch always made it a practice to expose students not only to the views of an invited guest but also to those of people present with opposing views. He concluded, "It is my personal judgment that Antioch is in no sense Communist-ridden, Communist-dominated, and it is one of

the healthiest organizations democratically speaking that is to be found around these parts."³⁴

The commission witness who accused Antioch of harboring subversives was himself a controversial figure. Harvey Matusow was a professional informer who at various times testified for the Ohio Commission, the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Subversive Activities Control Board, the trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and other suspected Communists in New York, and many other proceedings. Matusow had joined the American Communist Party in 1947, and after a quick disillusionment, became a secret agent for the FBI. The information Matusow gathered in his investigations had great value for many government agencies, and Matusow soon found that he could support himself rather well by testifying before these bodies in exchange for expenses. In 1951, Matusow learned about OUAC from James Ratliff, the Cincinnati Enquirer reporter who had written a series of stories about Communist subversion in Cincinnati (see Chapter III, pp. 144-45, supra). Matusow decided to seek employment with the commission,

³⁴Plain Dealer, August 16, 1952, p. 7. OUAC Report, 1951-1952, Part II, pp. 343-64.

and chief counsel Stanley Isaacs hired him as an investigator with a salary of \$300 a month plus expenses.³⁵

Matusow served the commission as an investigator, an agent provocateur, and a witness. He worked in Dayton, infiltrated a group called the Dayton Women for Peace, probed into communism at Antioch, and, by his own admission, worked with the leadership of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, District 7, in their quest to woo union members from their predecessor union, the pro-communist UE. In his testimony before the commission, Matusow exposed Communist influence in both industry and education. He particularly detailed the use communists made of folksongs. He related how some folksingers, such as the Weavers, a group which had been banned from performing at the Ohio State Fair in 1951, subtly changed lyrics in traditional folksongs to promote their left-wing message. Their version of the standard song, "Clementine," changed the words to "Oh, my darling Clementine, be a shrewd one, join the union, be a smart one, Clementine." The Weavers, according to Matusow, were noted for appearing at

³⁵Wittner, p. 92. David A. Shannon, The Decline of American Communism: A History of the Communist Party of the United States since 1945 (New York, 1959), p. 201. Harvey Matusow, False Witness (New York, 1955), pp. 53-54.

Communist Party meetings and rallies and using their popularity to raise money for the Party. They would integrate their best-selling popular songs, such as "On Top of Old Smokey," with songs of the Spanish Civil War, for example, and generally ended their program with "So Long, It's Been Good to Know You," written by a member of the Party, Woody Guthrie. Three years later, Matusow admitted in his book, False Witness, that his entire career as an expert on communism was undertaken in pursuit of money and fame. He had deliberately lied, often did not more investigating besides reading old newspapers, and learned how to release his "findings" a little at a time to create sensational headlines and boost his own reputation.³⁶

Matusow's fabrications notwithstanding, the Ohio Commission proceeded with its hearings, and in 1953 it made recommendations to the General Assembly. The legislature enacted some of these suggestions, making Ohio the only state to create a subversive activities agency which actually succeeded in getting its program onto the statute books.³⁷ Senate Bill 38,

³⁶Matusow, pp. 55-60, 78-86. OUAC Report, 1951-1952, Part II, 99-126. Wittner, p. 92. UE News, March 14, 1955, p. 2.

³⁷Frederick C. Thayer, Jr. "The Ohio Un-American Activities Commission" (unpublished Master's thesis, The Ohio State University, 1954), p. 7.

technically not a commission recommendation, was adopted in July; it provided that teachers and other "public employees who belong to an organization which advocates the overthrow of our form of government by force, violence, or other unlawful means" shall be dismissed after a proper hearing.³⁸ House Bill 575, also enacted in July, made the refusal of a state employee to testify concerning his being a communist prima facie evidence that he is a communist in any hearing on the question of his fitness for employment.³⁹

The major piece of anti-subversive legislation, H.B. 308, prohibited any individual from performing any of the standard litany of subversive acts: committing any act intended to overthrow or alter the government by revolution, force, or violence; advocating that any other individual do so; conspiring to commit such an act; participating in any way in a subversive organization, or destroying the records of such an organization. These acts were punishable by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars, a prison term of not more than twenty years, or both. The law also created the office of Special Assistant Attorney General to investigate

³⁸ Ohio, General Assembly, Bulletin, 100th General Assembly of Ohio, 1953-1954, p. 14.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 321. This bill became Section 143.271 of the Ohio Revised Code.

subversive activities and deliver his findings to county prosecuting attorneys and grand juries. The House passed this bill 119-2, and the Senate concurred by a 21-11 vote, but Governor Lausche used his veto. He objected to the provision which gave prosecuting authority to county grand juries and courts of common pleas, likening the position of these grand juries to that of the "people's courts" in Communist nations. The legislature speedily overrode the veto in August, and the bill became law.⁴⁰

The 100th General Assembly dealt with other matters pertaining to the war besides the anti-subversion laws and the resolutions about MacArthur. As in 1951, there was a sheaf of bills which generally got no further than the committee stage: proposals to create an Ohio war orphans scholarship fund, to build armories in Newark, Ashtabula, Springfield, and Cleveland, to award diplomas to Korean veterans who were inducted prior to their graduation, to name a few.⁴¹ The 1951 suspension of regulations governing the hours for employing women and children was renewed for two more years. Civil defense

⁴⁰Ohio, Revised Code, Annotated (Baldwin, 1953), secs. 2921.21 through 2921.27, inclusive, and sec. 2921.99. General Assembly, Bulletin, 1953-1954, p. 244. Dispatch, June 30, 1953, p. 1.

⁴¹S.B. 203, H.B. 160, H.B. 194, H.B. 262, H.B. 677, H.B. 678.

law was amended to allow neighboring counties to form regional organizations, but once again, the legislature failed to enact fair employment practices legislation.⁴²

Supporters of FEP legislation in 1953 saw their prospects for passage as brighter than ever, but they wound up instead with another bitter defeat (see Chapter I, pp. 46-53, supra). They were heartened early when the state Republican Party endorsed such a law in its 1952 platform, as the Democrats already had, and again in the heat of the debate when a major opponent, the Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, withdrew its opposition. In addition, the proponents of FEP sought to minimize the objections of rural legislators (fearful of seeing urban work patterns forced upon their regions), had defeated the bill in the past by uniting behind the Burton bill, H.B. 23, instead of three other bills considered to be stronger. The Burton bill, as it had in 1951, called for a state director of fair employment, not a commission, empowered only to refer complaints of discrimination to local boards in their county of origin.⁴³

⁴²S.B. 160, S.B. 138.

⁴³Plain Dealer, July 31, 1952, p. 2. News Bulletin No. 1, Ohio Committee for Fair Employment Practice Legislation, December 18, 1952, Box 17, File: FEPC 1953 [third of three], Records of the Columbus Urban League, Ohio Historical Society.

The House and the Senate decided to hold joint hearings on the four FEP proposals. The Retail Merchants' switch left two powerful groups in opposition, the Ohio Chamber of Commerce and the Ohio Manufacturers Association. Even their witnesses admitted the existence of discrimination in employment. The House committee reported H.B. 23 on April 21, and the full House approved the bill, 75-52, on May 12. Most of the opposition came from smaller communities; all 52 votes against were Republican. In the Senate, the Commerce and Labor Committee voted 5-4 against recommending the bill for passage, effectively killing the proposal. A motion to relieve the committee of its responsibility so that the whole Senate could vote on the bill was tabled, 19-13. Newspaper editorials castigated the Republican leadership for reneging on their platform promise and failing to support this very mild bill.⁴⁴

A final blow to the forces for FEP in 1953 was Senate Joint Resolution 22, sponsored by Senator Tom Moorehead (Rep.-15th & 16th). As introduced, the resolution called for a state referendum on whether the

⁴⁴News Bulletin No. 3, March 12, 1953; News Bulletin No. 10, April 3, 1953; News Bulletin No. 11, April 10, 1953; News Bulletin No. 18, June 11, 1953; newspaper editorial reprints, June 12, 1953, all in Box 17, File: FEPC 1953 [first of three], Columbus Urban League Records. General Assembly, Bulletin, 1953-1954, p. 159. Plain Dealer, May 13, 1953, pp. 1, 9.

legislature should be empowered to enact legislation to eliminate unfair employment practices. Obviously, the legislature already possessed this power. FEP proponents regarded the resolution as useless and cynical. They opposed it, and the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee defeated it, 4-1.⁴⁵

One matter which concerned both the General Assembly and Ohio's judicial system was the censorship of motion pictures and newsreels. Ohio had had a law providing for the censoring of motion pictures since 1913. The atmosphere of the Korean War helped to create conditions which led to the law's being severely tested and eventually discarded. The censorship law was originally intended to safeguard the public against obscenity and other breaches in morality, and it ran aground when it was used to ban films because they allegedly undermined confidence in the government or when they explored defects in the American way of life.

The censorship law, passed by the legislature upon recommendation by Governor James Cox, had established

⁴⁵Ohio, General Assembly, Journal of the Senate of the One Hundredth General Assembly, CXXV, March 17, 1953, p. 231. News Bulletin No. 19, June 22, 1953; News Bulletin No. 20, June 27, 1953, both in Box 17, File: FEPC 1953 [first of three]; and News Bulletin No. 21, July 8, 1953, Box 17, File: FEPC 1953 [third of three], Columbus Urban League Records.

a salaried, three-member Board of Censors within the state Industrial Commission. Later, this board, charged with the actual responsibility of examining and censoring all films to be publicly exhibited in Ohio, was replaced by the non-salaried Advisory Board of Censorship in the Department of Education. The director of this department received the authority to censor, but the actual work was done by state civil servants. The constitutionality of the law was challenged quickly by the Mutual Film Corporation as a violation of freedom of the press, but the United States Supreme Court ruled the law valid because motion pictures, it said, were entertainment and not part of the press. Motion picture censorship was, in effect, permitted in its broadest application, and Ohio used the decision to review every commercial film. In 1950, for example, Ohio accepted 1901 motion pictures for review. Six were rejected in their entirety, and eliminations were ordered in 123 others.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Patricia B. Gatherum, "Film Censorship in Ohio: A Study in Symbolism" (unpublished seminar paper, Department of History, Ohio State University, 1974), pp. 3-4, 5, 7. Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). Ohio, Department of Education, Annual Report of Clyde Hissong, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, to Frank J. Lausche, Governor of Ohio, For the School Year Beginning July 1, 1950 and Ending June 30, 1951, 1951, p. 6.

Given the atmosphere surrounding the Korean War, it was not surprising that the film censorship board rejected entirely the motion picture version of Richard Wright's novel, Native Son, and the crime thriller, M, starring Peter Lorre. The official certificate of rejection for Native Son condemned the film for contributing "to racial misunderstanding, presenting situations undesirable to the mutual interests of both races." What Native Son actually presented were scenes of violence, profane dialogue, and an inferred interracial relationship. The board chose to regard this as against the public interest "in undermining confidence that justice can be carried out" and for presenting "racial frictions at a time when all groups should be united against everything that is subversive." M was rejected "on account of being harmful."⁴⁷

The producers of both films initiated court action against the bans and challenged the constitutionality of the statute again. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the rejections and the law.⁴⁸ The United States Supreme Court had recently reversed its 1915 position on film censorship, and on appeal, it

⁴⁷Gatherum, pp. 9-10. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education of the State of Ohio, Division of Film Censorship, Hissong. Supt., 159 Ohio St. 315 (1953).

⁴⁸New York Times, October 13, 1953, p. 1.

reversed the Ohio decision on M and voided the law.⁴⁹ The Ohio statute could be truly repealed only by the Ohio court itself, and legal technicalities allowed the court to refrain from doing this. The law, in fact, remained part of the Ohio Revised Code, but, in a later series of cases, the Ohio court ruled any censoring order to be unreasonable and unlawful.⁵⁰ The legislature had attempted to abolish the censorship board in 1953, but the bill died in committee. Another bill, to outlaw any censorship of newsreels, did become law, and after the 1954 court decisions, film censorship in Ohio died out.⁵¹

Peace talks began in Korea on July 8, 1951.

During the Congressional hearings following the recall

⁴⁹The U.S. Supreme Court reversed its stand in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). It reversed the ban on M in Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).

⁵⁰Censorship was virtually abolished with the decisions in these three cases, decided together: R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Education of the State of Ohio, Division of Film Censorship; Capitol Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Education of the State of Ohio, Division of Film Censorship; R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Education of the State of Ohio, Division of Film Censorship, 162 Ohio St. 265 (1954).

⁵¹General Assembly, Bulletin, 1953-1954, pp. 5, 102.

of General MacArthur, Secretary Acheson carefully laid out once again the administration's war aims. He clearly differentiated between the long-range objective of Korean unification and the immediate goal of restoring peace and ending aggression. He asserted that if a cease-fire were arranged near the Parallel, American purposes would be accomplished. The Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Jacob Malik, responded to this new and definitive stance in June. He also supported an attempt to arrange a cease-fire and a mutual withdrawal of forces from near 38°. Previous Communist demands, including the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before any talks could begin, were abandoned. Ridgway suggested a meeting to discuss a cease-fire, Kim Il Sung replied favorably, and representatives of both sides met for the first time at Kaesong, three miles south of the Parallel.⁵²

The talks were to drag on for two full years, but by the spring of 1952, all of the agenda items leading to an armistice were settled except one, how to repatriate prisoners of war. This was accomplished despite a rocky beginning which included a dispute over the presence of Western newsmen at Kaesong, a disagreement over the composition of the agenda itself,

⁵²Rees, pp. 262-63, 284-85.

and many other incidents. The talks were moved to Panmunjom in October, and discussion of the individual agenda items were remanded to subdelegations. Chief among these items was the debate over where to locate a military demarcation line as a basic condition of the cease-fire. The Communists gave up on their demand for a demarcation line at 38° and agreed with the United Nations proposal for a truce based on the firing line. The question remained as to where the firing line actually was. The United Nations sought to set a cease-fire based on the contact line at the time the armistice was signed. The Communists, knowing full well that this proposal would allow the Eighth Army to keep up its pressure, countered with an offer for an immediate cease-fire, which the UN rejected in order to agree on all other agenda items before stopping the fighting.⁵³

The critical decision then made by the United States was to end offensive military operations before negotiating an armistice. General Van Fleet had led very successful advances between August and October while talks were recessed. Ridgway ordered this offensive stopped in November when the UN made a new, gambling proposal to end the war; use the current contact line as a demarcation line if an armistice were signed in

⁵³Ibid., chap. 16, especially pp. 289-98.

thirty days. The effect of this proposal was to effect a de facto cease-fire for a month, and the Communists agreed to it. But no general agreement was signed in December. Instead the Communists dug in furiously and constructed a defensive network superior to anything seen on the Western Front during World War I. Ground fighting thereafter consisted mostly of skirmishes between two stalemated armies. The United Nations had lost its ability to use military pressure as a diplomatic weapon. The key tenet of fighting a limited war, that it was an extension of politics, was forgotten as the decision to gamble was made. The belligerents were condemned to an elongated war because of it, and their citizens were forced to endure all of the terrible consequences.⁵⁴

During the last two years of the war, Ohioans had to adjust to the pressures and opportunities of an extended, yet limited war. As peace talks dragged on without much hint of resolution, Ohioans faced the possibility that limited war and partial mobilization might become permanent parts of their lives. Confusion over the war's purpose and differences over its strategy were replaced by a struggle to deal successfully with

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 299-309.

this new reality. Ohioans did manage, for example, to finance a suitable civil defense organization. But in many other areas, such as college financing, the military draft, and the attempt to deal with threats of subversion, conflict between competing interests was more certain. The limited war in Korea, demanding a different kind of contribution from the populace, changed substantially the way in which these problems were handled. As the war continued, Ohioans participated in evolving new approaches to old problems, tempering their solutions with the realization that foreign policy issues were permanently intruding upon domestic concerns.

CHAPTER VI

STRETCHING OUT THE WARTIME ECONOMY:

OHIO'S ROAD TO PERMANENT MOBILIZATION

I felt that it was imperative that the power to allocate and establish production for scarce materials should be continued during the defense build-up, in order to prevent ruinous, run-away bidding for these materials, which would increase inflation and might paralyze the armament program, . . . In order to extend these necessary powers I had to vote for the Defense Production Act. As you know, I tried in every way to eliminate the burdensome controls on prices, wages, and rents, but without success. . . . Both Taft and Bricker voted as I did, for the same reasons.
--Congressman John Vorys, July 31, 1952.

As peace negotiations began in Korea, in July, 1951, the United States Congress was debating a renewal of the Defense Production Act, the basic statute supporting the wartime mobilization. Just as the controversy over the recall of General MacArthur and the subsequent Congressional hearings provided a full opportunity to debate the military and political aspects of the limited war commitment, so did the consideration of an extension for the Defense Production Act allow a complete discussion of the economic ramifications of the limited war policy. Admittedly, the passage of DPA in 1950 had been accomplished in some haste. Its reconsideration permitted a less hurried debate over mobilization. By the end of 1951, as the peace talks moved to Panmunjom and as subdelegations took up the individual agenda items, the economic policies essential to the limited war had been redefined and re-affirmed. The administration had implemented and sought to operate a complete system of wage and price controls, instituted a new system of materials allocations, and most importantly, decided to "stretch out" the mobilization process, thereby deepening and broadening the influence of national defense considerations over the economy.

Mail to Ohio Congressman John Vorys (Rep.-12th) reflected the controversy surrounding mobilization of the economy. President Truman's deliberate, low-key request, on July 19, 1950, for a partial mobilization did not arouse anything close to unanimous support for his proposals. It was actually Bernard Baruch's insistent call for total mobilization, including a total price freeze, which galvanized the Congress into clamoring for and legislating controls. But even the Chinese entrance into the war did not end the debate over the exact extent or form of the mobilization. Some of Vorys's constituents endorsed Baruch's call for total controls. When the government first acted to control the residential housing boom by placing a limit on the number of public housing units to be constructed during the second half of 1950 and by reducing by 50 per cent the amount of insurance the FHA could authorize, these two measures predating the issuance of Regulation X, one letter to Vorys concluded that all wages and prices should now be controlled. "Certainly," said the writer, "if the emergency is as critical as these measures infer, then it is logical that a total control program should be enacted for our entire economy."¹

¹Allen J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics in the Truman Years (Paper; New York, 1970), p. 224. Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform During the Truman Administration (Columbia, Mo., 1966), pp. 130-31. Emerson C. Wollam to Vorys, July 27, 1950, Box 21, File: Controls (1), John M. Vorys Papers, Ohio Historical Society.

Dozens of other constituents opposed the proposed controls bill for promoting a socialistic welfare state and for delegating unnecessary authority to the President. Predictably, other complaints came from special interest representatives who felt oppressed by the regulation of their particular industry. Robert Glick, for example, a Columbus furniture entrepreneur, protested the government's amending Regulation W, controlling installment credit, without first consulting businessmen and industrial leaders directly concerned with the regulation.²

After the scare buying waves, more than a few Ohioans called for a repeal of Regulation W, governing installment credit, because they believed the threat of inflation had passed. In fact, inflationary pressures had abated after the second scare buying wave ended in March, 1951, and the growth of loans, which could be used to finance further inflation, also moderated. In the Federal Reserve System's Fourth District, durable goods sales continued to rise spectacularly until the second quarter of 1951 when a decline set in. Yet, inventories of such goods as radios, televisions, and furniture rose during the boom and continued to rise

²Letters opposing the passage of H.R. 9176, the Defense Production Act, are in Box 21, File: Controls (1), Vorys Papers. Robert A. Glick to Vorys, October 30, 1950, Box 21, File: Controls on Installment Buying, Vorys Papers.

during the slump, indicating that consumers' rush to buy in anticipation of shortages was met by an increase in civilian output.³

Ohioans argued that Regulation W imposed an unnecessary hardship upon them. One of Congressman Vorys's constituents telegraphed a straight-forward complaint that, "We claim to have no class distinction, yet Regulation W, with its restrictions, prevents me, an average citizen, from buying the things I need and can pay for under the old American way." The government chose not to repeal the regulation, but the FRB did liberalize its terms in September, 1951. Regardless of the inventory accumulation of durable goods, the Fed saw Regulation W as an essential part of a general policy which was not going to be withdrawn. Besides, in the Fourth District the moderation in the growth of outstanding loans which could refuel inflation was less than it was for the nation as a whole.⁴

³Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, "Credit Restraint--Its Necessity and Impact," Monthly Business Review (hereafter MBR), September 1, 1951, pp. 1, 4. "Physical Volume of Department Store Trade," MBR, May 1, 1951, p. 10. "Trade Inventories and Sales," MBR, August 1, 1951, pp. 1-2, 9.

⁴R. J. Zipfel to Vorys (telegram), July 9, 1951, Box 32, File: Regulation W, Vorys Papers. "Credit Restraint--Its Necessity and Impact," MBR, September 1, 1951, pp. 10, 4.

The Defense Production Act itself suffered similar criticism when its extension was considered. Ohio Congressman Thomas Jenkins of Ironton (Rep.-10th), serving his fourteenth consecutive term, attacked the administration's entire economic approach. In a series of four speeches in the House, Jenkins indicted Truman for spending and wasting too much money above and beyond what was legitimately needed for defense. Jenkins condemned the foreign aid program, excessive defense spending, and the government's failure to realize that it was itself the primary cause of inflation. Senator Bricker, too, argued that the DPA was an inflationary law because its elaborate system of controls served as a Trojan horse to let socialism and higher prices in. Opponents of extending controls were particularly upset that President Truman requested more power than he possessed under the 1950 act. Truman had asked for authority for the government to build and operate its own industrial plants, to upgrade existing plants, and to install new processes where necessary. Congressman Vorys, who eventually voted in favor of renewal, criticized the President for misusing his authority and for attempting to blame Congress for inflation. "I was reluctant to give additional powers to the President in the 1951 act," he wrote. "Prices

cannot be held down merely by passing a law, contrary to the general belief. . . . The President has so far lacked the wisdom and courage to use his powers effectively, but he has the shrewdness to attempt to blame it all on Congress, . . ." The bill which emerged from Congress did not grant the extra authority Truman wanted. In addition, the law relaxed credit restrictions on residential construction and the sale of durable goods, cut the authority of Price Stabilization Director DiSalle to roll back food prices, and granted a 20 per cent increase to landlords subject to rent control. Still, the basic provisions of the law, providing for the allocation of materials to defense purposes and for wage and price controls, remained intact.⁵

The 1951 controls bill was enacted primarily because a majority in Congress believed that mobilization had to be continued even though some part of the whole program might be distasteful to each of them. As important as the controls which the law continued was the inauguration of a new system of allocations and priorities. Early in the war,

⁵Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 16, 1951, p. 14; June 21, 1951, p. 11; July 22, 1951, p. 8; July 28, 1951, pp. 1-2. Vorys to Robert Rankin (copy), August 8, 1951, Box 32, File: Controls, 82d Congress (1951), Vorys Papers.

Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, an Ohioan, created the National Production Authority within his department as the agency responsible for controlling and allocating scarce materials. The NPA functioned much like the World War II War Production Board; its primary purpose was to establish a priority system to insure that the defense effort quickly got what resources it needed. Thus, the NPA's construction order prohibited construction of new buildings and projects unless they were first approved as either essential to the defense effort itself or because they increased the nation's productive capacity for defense. Under this order, the NPA severely curtailed a Columbus school construction program by allowing work to start on only one school at a time.⁶

NPA's original priorities program developed snags because of its monstrous complexities and was replaced in July, 1951, by the Controlled Materials Plan. CMP, as it was known, was a quantitative allocations program linked directly to production scheduling. The plan governed the distribution of part of the nation's supply of steel, copper, and aluminum

⁶Orin C. Rogers, et al., "The Effect of Government Controls on Savings and Loans--A Panel," Ohio Savings and Loan Record, March, 1951, p. 23. Columbus Citizen, May 18, 1951, p. 20. Columbus Dispatch, June 9, 1951, n.p.

and was designed to assure fulfillment of definite production plans. Simply put, CMP relied on its Requirements Committee to balance needs against supplies. Requirements for production were channelled up the chain from sub-contractor to prime contractor to contracting agency to the committee, and allocations decisions were then passed down the same chain. CMP was very important for the Fourth District because of its production of steel, tanks, planes, and a huge sub-contracting business in machinery.⁷

Shortly after the renewal of the Defense Production Act, the administration decided to "stretch out" the entire mobilization process. With negotiations proceeding at Panmunjom and defense production experiencing delays and complications, the basic question for the administration as it planned military programs for the fiscal year 1953 was "whether or not the target dates for achieving the force levels determined in December, 1950, should be reaffirmed or revised to allow for extension into the future."⁸

⁷"The Controlled Materials Plan," MBR, May 1, 1951, pp. 1, 5-9.

⁸Edward S. Flash, Jr., Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers (New York, 1965), p. 91.

The President announced on December 28, 1950, that he would cut the defense budget and take force level goals for 1954 back to 1955 and, in some cases, to 1956. Although NSC-68, the secret document which served as a blueprint for mobilization, mandated rapid attainment of a strong defense position, production difficulties and the continued threat of inflation led the administration to stretch out this process. The intensity with which mobilization was pursued thus slowed, but the possibility of a longer, more permanent mobilization increased dramatically.⁹

One major Ohio enterprise which suffered because of the allocation requirements of mobilization was the construction of the Ohio Turnpike. Behind the delay was the government's control of steel which restricted road building and forced Ohio turnpike authorities to stress their road's contributions to national defense and to seek foreign steel to meet their needs.

The Ohio General Assembly had authorized the creation of the Ohio Turnpike Commission in 1949 and had empowered it to construct a modern express highway system. The legislature asserted that there was

⁹Ibid., pp. 91-94.

"a necessity for developing means for building as quickly as possible expressways of high capacity to move the constantly increasing automobile, bus and truck traffic swiftly . . ." with safety and without congestion.¹⁰ The General Assembly was acting on a widely-held belief that a national expressway system could help solve problems of traffic congestion, urban decay, and unemployment. In November, 1951, Governor Lausche approved the location of the commission's first project, the Ohio Turnpike, a 241-mile road across northern Ohio.¹¹

Construction of the opening sections of the turnpike was held up by litigation over the constitutionality of the project's legislation and by the requirement that the two hundred thousand tons of steel and other controlled metals be allocated by the federal government. The legal difficulties involved the consistent refusal of the State Auditor, Joseph Ferguson, to accept the law's validity. In 1949, he refused to certify the expenditure of \$600,000 to allow the State Director of Highways to make engineering and

¹⁰ Ohio, Turnpike Commission, The Ohio Turnpike Story (Berea, Ohio, 1969), p. 1.

¹¹ Mark H. Rose, "Express Highway Politics, 1939-1956" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), pp. 1-3. The Ohio Turnpike Story, p. 1.

other studies. The courts approved this expense, but in 1950, Ferguson balked again, this time by refusing to honor vouchers for payments due the consulting engineering firms. Later that year Ferguson refused to act a third time, by failing to reimburse the expenses of two firms actually chosen to do the studies. Ferguson argued that he merely wanted to insure that the turnpike was legal, but the Plain Dealer berated him as "Ohio's narrowest-gauge obstructionist." The Ohio Supreme Court ruled for the Director of Highways and against the Auditor and upheld the constitutionality of the Turnpike Act itself.¹²

The resolution of these litigations left only the steel problem between the planning and execution of the turnpike. Governor Lausche and Ohio Turnpike Commission Chairman James Shocknessy briefed Secretary of Commerce Sawyer on the need for the steel. Sawyer in turn promised to present the case to NPA where the decision would actually be made. Lausche argued that the decision to withhold steel from roads was unwise and short-sighted. Highways, he said, were as important

¹²Ohio, Turnpike Commission, First Annual Report, July 14, 1950, pp. 2-3. Ohio, Turnpike Commission, Second Annual Report, January 31, 1951, pp. 1-7. Ohio, Turnpike Commission, Third Annual Report, January 31, 1952, p. 1. Plain Dealer, March 23, 1951, p. 12.

to the nation's defense program as machine tools, the production of which was actually encouraged. Lausche also conferred with officials of U.S. Steel and discovered that the build-up of steel capacity would allow steel to be diverted to non-military purposes perhaps as early as the third quarter of 1952. Ohio also actively sought out steel from Germany, Japan, and other foreign producers.¹³

The official indication that the steel problem was solved came on July 29, 1952, when the Turnpike Commission delivered \$326,000,000 face amount of State of Ohio bonds to a group of 411 investors. Bonds could not legally be sold until construction was an imminent possibility. Ground was broken in October for the Cuyahoga River Bridge in Summit County, and by the end of 1953, work was authorized on 237 of the road's 241 miles. The first section of the turnpike opened on December 1, 1954, and the whole road opened in October, 1955.¹⁴

The rapid economic expansion which had boosted so many economic indicators during the first year of

¹³Plain Dealer, January 24, 1952, p. 10; January 13, 1952, p. 22-A; February 1, 1952, p. 4. Turnpike Commission, Third Annual Report, p. 1.

¹⁴Ohio, Turnpike Commission, 1952 Annual Report, January 31, 1953, pp. 2, 9-10. Ohio, Turnpike Commission, 1953 Annual Report, January 15, 1954, p. 2. The Ohio Turnpike Story, p. 2.

the war to levels never before reached continued apace throughout 1952. Despite a long strike in the basic steel industry (see pp. 285-92 , infra) industrial production in the United States as a whole and in the Fourth District was virtually the same as in 1951. Output of civilian goods declined, as it had since about the middle of 1951, but increased production of military goods continued to pick up the slack. Ohio contractors won 7 per cent of all prime military contracts through December, 1952. Industrial workers were still in short supply; those employed worked longer weeks at higher wages than in 1951. Unemployment for the whole economy was at its lowest level since VJ Day.¹⁵

The steel, rubber, and machine tool industries continued to expand and kept Ohio's economy strong. Nationally, steel was beset by two minor work stoppages and the big strike which deprived the industry of an estimated eighteen million tons of ingots. Despite the long strike, steel fabricating and processing kept going because heavy inventories had been accumulated. National capacity increased 8.5 million tons in 1952, and fourth quarter production, after the strike, challenged the previous record. Rubber achieved another milestone year as government control of the industry

¹⁵"Industrial Highlights of 1952," MBR, December 1, 1952, pp. 1-2.

gradually slackened. Supplies of both natural and synthetic rubber showed steady improvement and actually set a new record, 8 per cent above 1951. Consumption of rubber dropped a bit throughout the country, and both industry and the government were able to stockpile supplies. The price of natural rubber declined 50 per cent from its Korean high, in part because of a slackened demand for automobile tires, especially replacement tires. The production and shipment of machine tools also increased. The enormous backlog of orders in the Fourth District dropped from twenty-four months in September, 1951 to eleven months in October, 1952. The stretch-out decision caused new orders to fall off and existing orders to be cancelled.¹⁶

The construction industry, so important to the initial phases of this expansion, was also affected by the steel strike. The physical volume of all new construction in 1952 declined from 1951, but a 4 per cent increase in costs pushed the dollar volume of new construction above the 1951 level. The value of residential construction in the Fourth District, for example, rose 11 per cent over 1950's records even though physical volume dropped 4 per cent. Non-residential construction, except for new schools, declined markedly

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 2-4, 8-9.

because of a reduction in industrial expansion, but this indicator still enjoyed its second to best year ever. This decline was more pronounced in the Fourth District than in the United States as a whole because of the concentration of basic industry in Ohio which meant that industrial expansion occurred during the early months of the war.¹⁷

Throughout 1951, wage and price controls remained intact, but the severe inflationary pressures collapsed after the first quarter of 1951. Bank loans, which financed a large portion of each of the two scare buying waves, began to be channelled toward defense efforts instead. Business loans to steel, metal fabricating, and machinery firms showed a greater percentage increase in the Fourth District than in any other Federal Reserve district in 1951. These loans financed both the actual production of war materiel as well as plant and equipment expansion. The Fourth District also showed an increase in mortgage lending from commercial banks, contrary to the national trend, because of the continued influx of workers into the District and their rising prosperity. Outstanding consumer credit shrank moderately because of a slowdown in sales and the steady repayment of existing loans. The privately-held

¹⁷"Construction Activity in 1952: Fourth District," MBR, February 1, 1953, pp. 1-4.

money supply hit an all-time high in 1951, and so did time deposits (savings account balances) in the Fourth District. Consumers simply had stopped buying goods at high prices.¹⁸

In 1952, many credit restraints were relaxed or even eliminated. As a result, consumer loans rose sharply, especially for purchases of real estate, autos, and other household items. Business loans showed a steady, slower rise over 1951 totals. The expansion of all bank loans continued at a slower rate than either 1950 or 1951, so that bank credit contributed minimally to a very gradual increase in consumer prices.¹⁹

The general structure of price controls, as announced by Director of Price Stabilization Michael DiSalle was re-affirmed during the summer of 1951, albeit with some administrative changes. Despite the complexity of the controls measures, apparently too intricate for the actual job at hand, and widespread discontent with the entire program, Congress continued the controls as part of the Defense Production Act of 1951. Once the controls bill extension became law, the debate over their necessity and their extent switched into a

¹⁸"Banking Review--1951," MBR, January 1, 1952, pp. 1-6.

¹⁹"Banking Review--1952," MBR, January 1, 1953, pp. 1-3.

consideration of the special cases, inequities, and anomalies which their application produced.²⁰

Because virtually the entire price economy was subject to DiSalle's authority, OPS offices were forced to deal with minutiae and detail in literally thousands of cases. When controls were still new, the Cleveland Indians baseball team, for example, had had a proposed increase in ticket prices halted by administrative procedures. The club had filed an application to increase prices of 1952 tickets on September 18, 1951. The required twenty-day waiting period had passed without incident, and the club had understood that its application had been tacitly approved. Officials had ordered their tickets printed in October, at a cost of \$16,000, and were stunned to receive a subsequent request from the OPS national office for additional information. How, asked the club, could the price hike be denied and the team saddled with the expense of reprinting a season's supply of tickets? In another case, OPS sued the Randall Park race track for treble damages resulting from an unauthorized increase in parking fees of \$15,947. In 1950 and 1951, the track had a large area of free parking and charged fifty cents for valet parking. OPS sued when track officials

²⁰Plain Dealer, June 26, 1952, p. 12; June 30, 1951, pp. 1, 7; August 1, 1951, p. 14.

charged every car twenty-five cents to enter in 1952 and an additional fifty cents for the valet services, despite the track's decision to drop the valet charge to fifty cents total after eight days of complaints.²¹

OPS regarded the control of food prices as its most important problem, perhaps because of the key role food had played in the two scare buying waves. Quite understandably, then, the administration of equitable food price controls proved a constant headache for the government. An early difficulty cropped up when OPS tried to stabilize the price of potatoes. At the start of the war, potatoes were being overproduced. The government dumped the surplus overseas, lowered the parity price, and then dropped the support altogether in order to bring production down to an acceptable level. After the outbreak of fighting, prices rose, and a shortage resulted particularly when a need developed for synthetic rubber, the production of which required alcohol made from potatoes. OPS attempted to deal with the scarcity by working for "a more equitable distribution"

²¹James W. Cannon, Regional Counsel, OPS, to Jesse B. Messitte, Division Counsel, Fuel, Services. Export-Import Division, OPS (memo, copy to DiSalle), November 14, 1951, Box 281, File: Region VI, Louisville, Ky., Michael V. DiSalle Papers, Ohio Historical Society. Plain Dealer, January 23, 1953, pp. 1, 5.

and by moving with injunctions against over-ceiling prices and black market sales. In northeast Ohio, charges were brought against dealers for selling seed potatoes as food. The shortage was real, and many Ohioans did without potatoes and potato chips in early 1952. Chip-making firms simply stopped producing because potatoes were not available at prices that would be profitable. OPS finally took price controls off white potatoes, and consumers could buy the now-adequate supply at higher prices.²²

Other food products might also have been in short supply if the government had adopted the radical idea of freezing all farm prices even if the products were selling below parity. Farmers warned that setting a price ceiling lower than parity would discourage production, create shortages, and foster black market operations. For most commodities this prediction did not come true. OPS did not freeze prices at parity; it tried to freeze the parity index itself, with only a once-a-year adjustment, but Congress did not accept even this small alteration.²³

Except for livestock farmers, agriculture remained in a sound position during the war. Fourth District

²²Matusow, pp. 228, 130-31. Plain Dealer, July 5, 1950, p. 16; May 28, 1952, pp. 10, 18; May 30, 1952, p. 6; May 6, 1952, pp. 1, 8.

²³Matusow, pp. 228-29.

agricultural data substantiated the national farm trends in 1951, including a record for gross income because of higher prices and greater production. 1952 pushed this figure even higher, but at the same time, farm spending also set a record. Prices received by farmers dropped 3 per cent in 1952, and inflation cut their profits even further.

Thus, farmers found themselves caught in an inflationary position, earning good prices but paying more for the goods they had to buy. All crops provided a good return during the war, but livestock, especially cattle, proved to be less profitable, leading to a severe beef shortage for consumers.²⁴

The great Korean War beef shortage was blamed squarely on the OPS policy for dealing with a 15 per cent rise in the price of beef at retail during the first eight months of the war. Since beef was selling above parity, DiSalle could legally have frozen its price at the farm. He chose instead to freeze prices at the processor's level, so that, if cattle prices rose, slaughterers would have to absorb these increases and

²⁴"Sighting Down the Furrow," Ohio Farm Bureau News, February, 1951, p. 5. Herschel D. Newsom et al., "How Can We Stop Rising Prices?" The Age of Danger: Major Speeches on American Problems, ed. Harold F. Harding (New York, 1952), pp. 289-90. "Agriculture During 1951," MBR, December 1, 1951, pp. 5-6. "Agriculture During 1952," MBR, December 1, 1952, p. 5.

refrain from passing them on. OPS hoped that processors would refuse to bid competitively against one another and thereby preserve their own profit margins. Rapidly rising consumer demand prevented this restraint, and slaughterers soon found themselves caught in a untenable position between the rising price they had to pay and the frozen price at which they could sell. As a result, they simply and drastically curtailed production.²⁵

As the shortage worsened, the Plain Dealer editorialized sarcastically about the efficiency of this government regulation:

We are really surprised that the great minds in Washington have achieved such startling success by producing a beef shortage in such a short time. . . . Not only are cattle receipts down, but the meat packers are caught in a price squeeze.²⁶

The president of the Retail Meat Dealers Association of Cleveland complained that packers were taking a fifteen-to-twenty dollar loss on every animal they slaughtered and were forced to ration their meat sales. They demanded of retailers, for example, that they buy more expensive "cuts" of meat and not whole carcasses. The cost of this procedure was, of course, passed on to consumers.²⁷

²⁵Matusow, pp. 230, 232-33.

²⁶Plain Dealer, June 7, 1951, p. 14.

²⁷Ibid., April 26, 1951, pp. 1, 8.

DiSalle reacted boldly to the shortage by placing a ceiling on live cattle prices. He announced a 10 per cent roll back to restore processors' profits and promised two more rollbacks, for August 1 and October 1, 1951, to reach pre-Korean consumer price levels. Cattlemen warned that rollbacks would cause supplies of livestock to dry up, and this is exactly what happened. Livestock producers virtually struck, and Chicago slaughtering fell to less than half its normal total. Farm lobbyists worked hard to include a prohibition on rollbacks in the 1951 Defense Production Act, and the bill which Truman signed did include amendments which accomplished this. Ironically, the farmers' success in Washington led to disaster at the market. Cattle feeders bought heavily in anticipation of the end of rollbacks, and the resulting overexpansion brought prices down below parity by early 1953.²⁸

In Ohio, the beef shortage led to the discovery of a dual scandal: unsupervised slaughtering without proper government inspection and the sale of horsemeat as a substitute for beef. A Plain Dealer investigation found that unsupervised killing of animals was the rule, not the exception, in the twenty-one slaughterhouses

²⁸Matusow, pp. 233-38. Plain Dealer, April 29, 1951, p. 1; April 30, 1951, p. 14.

governed by the Cleveland city code. Contrary to the law which required inspection at the time of slaughter, these plants regularly had their meat inspected one day later. This "cold inspection," as it was called, was easily open to abuse and might be particularly attractive to unscrupulous slaughterers anxious to cash in on the high value of cattle in 1951. The horsemeat racket, a simpler crime, involved the substitution of cheap, available horsemeat for expensive or scarce beef without informing the customer.²⁹

The inspection scandal led to a major investigation, especially in northeast Ohio. Slaughterhouses were temporarily closed, and inspectors resigned in embarrassment. Suburban officials found their own inspection systems to be woefully inadequate. Cleveland Mayor Burke interviewed all of his city's inspectors and put an end to cold inspection. Suburban mayors drafted similar legislative proposals and sent them to all surrounding villages and municipalities. By May, 1951, the Plain Dealer reported that all the abuses it had uncovered had been rectified: new inspectors were hired, better training started, and stricter control of inspection stamps instituted.³⁰

²⁹Plain Dealer, May 9, 1951, pp. 1, 5.

³⁰Ibid., May 10, 1951, pp. 1, 10; May 11, 1951, pp. 1, 13; May 14, 1951, pp. 1, 13; May 12, 1951, pp. 1, 5; May 19, 1951, p. 3; May 23, 1951, p. 8.

Both of these scandals forced local government to act to correct situations brought on by federal policies. Columbus City Council appropriated an additional \$5000 to its meat inspection fund. The Ohio General Assembly enacted legislation to control completely the slaughtering, processing, and sale of horsemeat. Persons charged with the illegal sale of horsemeat had their slaughtering permits revoked and were subject to indictment. One rather sensational case involved the officials of the Kay Brand Packing Company in Findlay. Indictments were brought against operators of the company, its secretary-treasurer, and a state inspector who had bought \$20,000 of stock in the company. The trial of Joseph Kirchner, one of the operators, included testimony about the fabulous profits possible in the horsemeat business. Horsemeat could be bought for ten to fourteen cents per pound. Kay Brand would ship 30,000 pounds or more a week to retailers in Cleveland and realized \$8000 profits on each truck.³¹

The jury found Kirchner guilty on 29 of 30 counts of illegal use of horsemeat and 28 of 30 counts

³¹Columbus, Ohio, The City Bulletin: Official Publication of the City of Columbus, XXXVI (September 22, 1951), 518. Ohio, General Code (Baldwin, 1951), secs. 1177-83 through 1177-96. Plain Dealer, February 2, 1952, pp. 1, 4; February 14, 1952, pp. 1, 2; March 1, 1952, pp. 1, 4; May 9, 1952, p. 1.

of bribery. He was sentenced to a total of 7 years in prison and \$5800 in fines, but the conviction was later overturned on appeal when a relative of the prosecutor was found to have been on the jury.³²

Inspection irregularities and horsemeat fraud disappeared when beef prices came down. In Ohio, wholesale prices for beef dropped 16 per cent in 1952, and retail prices fell almost 5 per cent. When food prices were totally decontrolled in 1953, meat sales soared. One Columbus supermarket manager, afraid of a possible import quota, put 7000 pounds of New Zealand beef on sale at 39 cents per pound in February, 1953. The line at his door formed on Sunday morning at 6 a.m., and he stayed open from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 at night. The 1953 General Assembly, reacting to the scandals and revelations, stiffened penalties for the fraudulent use of horsemeat.³³

The difficulties inherent in administering a fair and complete system of price controls were matched by

³²Plain Dealer, May 20, 1952, p. 1; May 22, 1952, p. 1; January 31, 1953, p. 1.

³³Ibid., December 12, 1952, p. 1; February 9, 1953, p. 1. Ohio, General Assembly, Bulletin, 100th General Assembly of Ohio, 1953-1954, p. 237.

troubles in the wage control program. After labor's representatives left the Wage Stabilization Board in 1951, the prospects for an equitable wage policy were, at best, problematical. The 1952 steel strike and seizure case symbolized the widespread labor unrest prevalent as the war dragged on. During that year, three-and-a-half million workers went on strike, despite cries that labor stoppages would lead directly to American deaths in Korea, as more strikes occurred than in any year since 1946. For the nation as a whole and especially for Ohio, the steel strike represented the most important and least successful attempt of the Wage Stabilization Board to bring labor and management together in support of the mobilization effort.

The national agreement in basic steel expired on January 1, 1952, with the parties locked in stalemate. The union, citing the estimate of OPS economists that the steel industry would earn \$2,600,000,000 before taxes in 1951, a figure \$1,200,000,000 above the standard used by OPS to determine whether industry prices were fair, asked for a wage increase of 15 cents an hour plus other benefits. The industry, aware that the union had won five wage increases since V-J Day, balked at this demand and announced that any raise would have to be accompanied by a commensurate price hike.

Almost from the beginning, as the Plain Dealer pointed out, government policies interfered with any attempt at true collective bargaining. WSB wage increases were generally limited to 8-9 cents an hour, and Economic Stabilizer Roger Putnam announced that any price increase would be limited to whatever would be allowed under the Capehart rule, an 1951 amendment to the Defense Production Act allowing firms to pass on all cost increases incurred during the first year of the war. The price hike would, therefore, be very small.³⁴

President Truman formally entered the controversy on December 22. He asked the union to postpone its strike and the industry to keep production going while he sent the dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board for a non-binding recommendation. Curiously, Truman did not then nor at any time during the entire episode choose to invoke the "cooling-off" period provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. He was severely criticized for this, but, as he explained it, Taft-Hartley had been designed primarily for labor problems during peacetime. WSB was specifically intended to deal with this type of

³⁴ Alan F. Westin (ed.), The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case: Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, The Steel Seizure Decision (New York, 1958), p. 2. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: the Politics of Leadership (Paper; New York, 1968), p. 13. Plain Dealer, December 26, 1951, p. 4; December 18, 1951, pp. 1, 9; December 20, 1951, p. 16; December 16, 1951, p. 14-A. Matusow, p. 236.

situation, and Congress had affirmed this function. A special union convention shelved the strike temporarily, and the Wage Board proposed on March 20 a 17.5 cents per hour raise plus 5.1 additional cents in fringe benefits.³⁵

Actually, this package, which included acceptance of most union non-wage demands as well as offering more money than the union had asked, did not receive a unanimous vote from the board. The public and labor representatives voted for it, but the industry members dissented. The union's executive board approved the package and asserted that it would accept nothing less. A new strike date was set for April 9. Industry leaders denounced the recommendation and claimed that it would add \$12 per ton to the cost of steel. Defense Mobilizer Charles Wilson proposed a price increase to induce a settlement on the wage issue, but the industry wanted even more than he suggested. When OPS suggested a \$2.50-\$4.00 per ton increase and Truman declared that allowances for increased costs would be allowed not as part of the settlement but only after the costs had been incurred, Wilson resigned in protest.³⁶

³⁵Plain Dealer, December 23, 1951, pp. 1, 10; January 5, 1952, p. 3. Westin, pp. 10, 2-6.

³⁶Plain Dealer, March 21, 1952, p. 1; March 22, 1952, pp. 1, 5. Neustadt, pp. 13-15. Alonzo Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York, 1973), pp. 454-55.

Renewed talks between the industry and the union collapsed in early April, and the companies began to bank their furnaces. The government's price offer was far short of industry's request, and industry, in turn, would give the union no more than 16 cents. Two hours before the strike was to begin, Truman seized the mills to keep production going. Again, he neglected Taft-Hartley, and again, the union postponed its strike. Truman ordered Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to effect the seizure, and 90,000 Ohio workers remained on the job.³⁷

Steel industry leaders excoriated the President's decision. Clarence Randall, the president of Inland Steel, lambasted Truman on nationwide television and radio for "discharging a political debt to the C.I.O." Truman, he said, had abused his power beyond every law. He had misled the nation on profits and taxes in the steel industry and on the real cost of the WSB plan. Since Korea, he argued, the cost-of-living had gone up 11 per cent and steel wages had risen 13.5 per cent. Many Ohioans agreed with Randall, some of them writing to Washington to express their outrage. They were upset by the seizure itself as an unwarranted interference in

³⁷Plain Dealer, April 4, 1952, pp. 1, 5; April 9, 1952, p. 1; April 6, 1952, p. 17-A. Neustadt, p. 15.

private enterprise, by the President's continued failure to use the Taft-Hartley Act, and by the Wage Stabilization Board's recommendation that the Steelworkers be granted a union shop as well as a raise in wages. The Plain Dealer, for example, called the seizure an adventure in dictatorship: "We know of nothing in the Constitution . . . authorizing government seizure of a private industry for the purpose of settling a labor dispute." The paper traced this unsavory growth of presidential power back to 1933 in general and particularly to 1947 when then-Attorney General Tom Clark said that no law was needed to allow the President to stop nationwide strikes that might imperil health and safety; the President had this power inherently. "Harry Truman is drunk with inherent power," said the Plain Dealer. "He should be impeached." The Youngstown Vindicator attacked the union shop provision especially. Its editorials accused the President of colluding with Steelworkers' president Philip Murray to force men to join the union in order to keep their jobs. This sentiment was echoed by J. W. Overstreet, president of the National Electric Coil Company in Columbus: "To say that I am disgusted at the way the Administration, particularly President Truman and the Wage Stabilization Board, has handled the steel industry dispute with

Phillip [sic] Murray and his gang is a mild expression of how I feel about the matter."³⁸

Truman did not want the government to operate the mills permanently. In fact, he devised a tactic to make government control unattractive. He ordered Secretary Sawyer to put into effect part of the wage increase and part of the price increase, so that neither side would be totally satisfied, in the hope that bargaining would resume. The President had his supporters, too. Howard Metzenbaum, an attorney for the Steelworkers, wrote that the seizure was intended to prevent a disruption in the defense effort. Why should steel companies receive special treatment because of higher taxes, he asked, when individuals never did? The Columbus C.I.O. Council thanked the President for his courage in the face of "tremendous pressure that was exerted by the powerful steel companies in their drive for tremendous profits." Another Ohioan lauded Truman's action as "a vote of confidence to the common people" against big industry, still another commended him for "living up to your Constitutional responsibilities as

³⁸Westin, pp. 18-20. Plain Dealer, April 10, 1952, pp. 1, 4, 12; April 19, 1952, p. 10. Vindicator, July 16, 1952, n.p. J. W. Overstreet to Vorys, April 14, 1952, Box 35, File: Wage Stabilization, Vorys Papers. For other letters to Washington, pro and con, on the steel seizure case, see: Box 33, File: Labor-Union Shop, and Box 34, File: Steel Seizure, in the Vorys Papers and OFFICIAL FILE 407B, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy," an obvious reference to the inherent powers.³⁹

The steel companies took the government to court. An hour after the President announced the seizure, attorneys for Republic Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube asked a Federal District judge for a temporary injunction to allow for litigation and then for a permanent injunction. After hearing from the government, Judge Alexander Holtzoff denied the motion for the temporary restraining order. Holtzoff said there was considerable doubt whether he could legally enjoin the President. On April 29, Judge David Pine, hearing the case on its merits, granted the permanent injunction and voided the seizure. The union, which had returned to work on April 11, walked out of the mills. The government announced an embargo on shipments of steel for civilian use and appealed the Pine ruling. The Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted an injunction to the government, re-instating the seizure, so that the case could be appealed by both

³⁹Neustadt, pp. 22-23. Plain Dealer, April 18, 1952, p. 3-B. Harry E. Mayfield, President, Columbus C.I.O. Council, to Truman, April 10, 1952; Kay Hancock to Truman, April 10, 1952; Laurence V. Cregan to Truman, April 15, 1952, all in OF 407B, Truman Papers.

sides directly to the Supreme Court. There the judicial battle was resolved. The Court granted certiorari to both sides and stayed Judge Pine's order while the case was pending. On June 2, the Court decided for the companies and voided the seizure by a 6-3 vote. The union struck again.⁴⁰

Seven more weeks passed before the dispute was finally settled. The agreement eventually accepted gave the union slightly less than the Wage Board proposed and the companies slightly more than Wilson had suggested. The contract also included a modified union shop. In Ohio, the strike meant a severe curtailment for steel production and the entire industrial economy. Stockpiles ran out, railroads laid off workers, and the steel expansion program itself faltered. By the middle of July, 100,000 Ohio steelworkers and 50,000 other workers were idle. 45,000 were drawing unemployment compensation. It was August before full production resumed.⁴¹

The beginning of the end for the Korean War was the American election of 1952. The Republican Party,

⁴⁰Westin, pp. 17-18, 26-43, 53-72, 75-76, 80, 88-89, 92-93, 136-69. Plain Dealer, April 10, 1952, pp. 1, 4; April 11, 1952, p. 1; April 30, 1952, p. 1.

⁴¹Plain Dealer, July 25, 1952, p. 1; May 2, 1952, p. 8; June 4, 1952, p. 1; June 11, 1952, p. 8; July 16, 1952, p. 1; August 10, 1952, p. 8-A.

led by General Dwight Eisenhower, captured the Presidency and both houses of Congress. The theme of the Republican campaign was a tripartite indictment of the Truman administration: Korea, communism, and corruption, with the first of these issues quickly establishing primacy over the other two. The election results showed that the Democratic Party's appeal for support based upon a continuation of containment and economic prosperity was soundly trounced by the Republicans who pledged to break the deadlock in Korea without plunging the country into another depression.⁴²

The Democratic strategy in 1952 was essentially a miscalculation. Their adoption of the slogan, "You never had it so good," as the theme of the campaign expressed perfectly their desire to focus voters' attention on the elaborate system of social reforms and progress which the New Deal and Fair Deal represented. The Democrats were successful in allowing the sitting President to retire without the stigma of being chased from office, but neither Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson, the party's candidate, nor Harry Truman, who campaigned actively for the ticket, was able to overcome the popular objection that the prosperity of which they boasted was

⁴²See Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York, 1956) for an analysis of this election.

a wartime prosperity born and sustained by the continuing sacrifice of American lives in Korea.⁴³

The Democrats tried to convince the electorate that a Republican victory would lead to a new depression. "You'll all be selling apples again," was the threat of one Democratic supporter. "But at least it won't be bloody apples" was the Republican reply, a direct assault upon the Democrats' major theme. The minority party hoped to capitalize on the frustrations over the stalemate in Korea and on the alleged corruption and immorality of the incumbent administration. Despite the protestations of Ohioans, the Republican convention rejected the strident partisanship which a campaign by Senator Taft would have produced and settled instead on General Dwight Eisenhower. The simple chant, "We Like Ike," expressed in three words what pages of analysis have later explained: that a majority of voters were willing to place their electoral trust in a soldier's hands because the Korean problem was to them still a soldier's problem. Even the Democrats had long recognized the importance of using military leaders to explain their foreign policy in Korea. The traditional American view of war as a crusade divorced from politics demanded that the conduct of war be left with the professional soldiers

⁴³David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York, 1964), pp. 393-94. Lubell, p. 43.

who could end it most quickly. A successful limited war in Korea had not seemed possible to many Americans until General Matthew Ridgway implemented its strategy in the field and until Joint Chiefs Chairman General Omar Bradley defended it unstintingly against the onslaught of MacArthur's following. In Eisenhower the Republicans now had their own soldier who understood how far he could go in criticizing the government without being labelled a threat to the American political establishment. Without the histrionics of MacArthur, Eisenhower presented himself as a candidate who represented both the military and civilian mentalities and who could extricate the country from the mess created by Washington.⁴⁴

Thus, the 1952 election came down to a contest between two conflicting sets of emotions, dread of an economic downturn versus bitterness over the continuing war in Korea. The latter proved to be more decisive, but what turned the tide for the Republicans was their advocacy of a positive alternative to Democratic containment. They were able to attract voters not only by attacking containment but also by presenting their

⁴⁴Lubell, p. 40. Rees, pp. 397-98. Patterson, pp. 581-82. H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven, 1955), p. 323.

own defense posture, later called massive retaliation, which was firmly in accord with the classical liberal philosophy on war and peace (see Introduction, p. 5, supra). In contrast to containment, Republicans favored using the threat of atomic retaliation to liberate the millions living under Communist domination. Liberation, they argued, could be accomplished without resorting to a series of small wars and uprisings by dynamically employing the threat of the American nuclear arsenal. Potential aggressors would be warned that they would be subject, without hesitation, to such a costly retaliation that they would never choose to attack. The Republicans argued that they would use this strategy to end the Korean war, prevent future war, win quickly any war which might occur, and at the same time, oversee a retrenchment in military spending to eliminate the high taxes and high prices of the Democrats.⁴⁵

Besides voting for President, Ohioans elected a governor and a senator in 1952. In the gubernatorial race, incumbent Democrat Frank Lausche was challenged by Charles Taft, the Senator's brother. Lausche, a conservative Democrat whose electoral success depended on his personal popularity and his ability to attract Republican and independent voters, had won the governor's

⁴⁵Rees, pp. 388-92.

race in 1944, 1948, and 1950. The former mayor of Cleveland amazed both parties with his remarkably steady electoral success.⁴⁶

In Charles Taft, the Republicans nominated the more liberal Taft brother who had made a distinguished mark for himself in Cincinnati civic affairs. A successful candidate for city council on the Charterite ticket (a progressive group of civic reformers), Taft desired to climax his political career by winning the governorship. To supporters of Robert Taft, this candidacy was intolerable. They opposed public-spirited Charlie because he did legal work for the C.I.O., and for his flirtation with FDR in 1936 and his continued alliance with the Charterites. Robert Taft, displeased with his brother's liberalism and worried that two Tafts on the November ballot might hurt both their chances, urged his brother to withdraw, and he remained neutral during the primary. But Charlie stuck to his chosen task and beat the organization's candidate to win the nomination.⁴⁷

In the Senate race, the Democrats selected Michael DiSalle, the former Director of the Office of

⁴⁶James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston, 1972), pp. 273, 276, 278-79, 456-57, 461, 469.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 507-09.

Price Stabilization. A resident of Toledo since 1911, DiSalle had attended Georgetown University Law Center, worked for the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, and served in the Ohio General Assembly before returning to Toledo and city government. He worked as assistant city law director, served on city council from 1942, and held the vice-mayor's job for two terms and the mayor's position from 1948 until he joined OPS in 1951. DiSalle resigned his post on February 15. Truman endorsed his candidacy, but this blessing handicapped his campaign by tying him tightly to an administration which Ohio voters were repudiating.⁴⁸

DiSalle faced a formidable opponent in John Bricker. A veteran campaigner, the incumbent senator had served three terms as governor and ran for Vice-President in 1944 before being elected to the Senate in 1946. Bricker, a strong conservative, became known as a constant thorn in the side of the Truman administration. The Plain Dealer called his first term "distinguished by uncompromising opposition to New Deal socialism at home, bungling and disastrous spending abroad." A recently-published, quantitative analysis of Senate Republicans' voting patterns in the

⁴⁸Biographical information in Box 281, File: Biographical Material, DiSalle Papers. DiSalle to Truman (copy), January 31, 1952, and Truman to DiSalle (copy), February 5, 1952, both in Box 280, File: Resignation Letters, DiSalle Papers.

Eighty-Second Congress places Bricker in or near the "strong conservative" classification in three categories of domestic issues and in the "strong nationalist" classification in foreign policy.⁴⁹

In 1952, Bricker waged a more conservative campaign than did the national ticket, featuring complete hostility to Truman's policies often without any satisfactory alternative. Addressing the Ohio State Republican convention on July 31, Bricker lambasted Truman for continuing to move the country "toward a totalitarian, socialistic and completely controlled economy." Yet, he repeatedly had voted for the Defense Production Act because he supported its channeling of critical materials to defense industries. In a prepared radio script used on Columbus station WVKO in August, Bricker attacked the war policy of the administration. "They [the voters] want to know why we can't have peace and prosperity instead of war and its synthetic prosperity," he said. He denied that he had any real hopes for a successful armistice, calling it "valueless." "The best we could hope for," he added, "in the event of an armistice would be an armed truce." And he attacked the entire basis for the administration's war: "In Korea

⁴⁹Plain Dealer, October 12, 1952, p. 2-A. Gary W. Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress (Knoxville, 1975), pp. 32-40, 250.

the United States has walked into a trap. Acheson and the State Department have not allowed us to win. So we continue today pouring in men and money in a war that has no foreseeable end."⁵⁰

Eisenhower, of course, won an overwhelming victory. He received thirty-three million votes, more than any previous presidential candidate, to Stevenson's twenty-seven million, and beat Stevenson in Ohio by 500,000. The winner carried thirty-nine states and captured a 442-89 majority in the Electoral College. Eisenhower took Ohio by half a million votes, even as conservative Lausche was winning another term as governor by 425,000 votes over liberal Charles Taft. Senator Bricker also won another term, beating DiSalle by 315,000 votes out of 3.5 million cast. DiSalle could not overcome the Plain Dealer's criticism that he was "a bungling price controller" and "a stooge for the Truman crowd."⁵¹

The Eisenhower administration, even before it took office, was able to begin to break the deadlock

⁵⁰Bricker speech before Republican state convention, July 31, 1952, Box 90, File: Press Releases (Speeches) 1952, John W. Bricker Papers, Ohio Historical Society. Prepared Radio Script, August 18, 1952, Box 90, File: 1952 Political, Bricker Papers.

⁵¹Rees, pp. 400-01. Eugene H. Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger, A History of Ohio, ed. and illus. by James H. Rodabaugh (2d ed., Columbus, 1976), p. 379. Ohio, Secretary of State, Ohio Election Statistics, 1951-1952, pp. 14, 208. Plain Dealer, October 12, 1952, p. 2-B.

at Panmunjom. The failure of the American gamble to end the war in December, 1951, had left the negotiators with one agenda item decided, namely, an agreement that the final demarcation line should be based upon the firing line, but the other items on the agenda remained unresolved. Between the end of 1951 and May, 1952, both sides were able to work out two of the three remaining issues. A rather quick agreement came on the proposed draft, "Recommendations to the Governments concerned," the last point on the agenda. A much longer struggle ensued on Item 3, the concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and armistice. The United Nations advocated no build-up of forces after the armistice, rotation of troops within Korea, no airfield construction after the armistice, and the appointment of a commission to inspect throughout Korea and oversee the cease-fire. The Communists countered by rejecting troop rotation and the inspecting commission, by calling for a complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, and by opposing the ban on airfield construction. Gradually, all of these matters were resolved. When the Communists dropped their insistence on Soviet membership on the cease-fire commission and the United Nations ended its insistence on prohibiting airfield rehabilitation, the UN announced that this item had

been settled. That left only one unresolved question, the terms for the repatriation of prisoners.⁵²

The prisoners issue proved so intractable that it alone delayed the end of the war for fourteen months. The basic question which allowed no room for compromise was whether Communist prisoners who did not wish to return home should be forcibly repatriated. The United Nations screened all prisoners to assess their own feelings on repatriation, and declared that about 60 per cent opted to return north. But the other thousands remained a problem. The Communists demanded their return, but the United Nations, even at the risk of prolonging both the war and the incarceration of its own soldiers, did not agree. As the American electorate chose Eisenhower, the deadlock remained.⁵³

Eisenhower the candidate had dramatically announced that he would go to Korea if elected, and Eisenhower the President-elect kept that promise. His visit to the front to view the conditions American soldiers were enduring intensified his desire to end the war quickly with an honorable truce. On the way home Eisenhower listened as John Foster Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford expounded upon the theory of massive retaliation. Dulles and Eisenhower agreed that the

⁵²Rees, chap. 17, especially pp. 310-15, 320.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 315-27.

Communists should be made to understand that the United States would no longer tolerate an indefinite delay in gaining a truce and that continued, useless procrastination might well lead to an enlargement of the war including direct strikes at China. Eisenhower announced on December 14 that the enemy would be confronted by deeds "executed under circumstances of our own choosing," a phrase designed to include the possible use of nuclear weapons.⁵⁴

The change at Panmunjom was slow, but remarkable. As Rees says, "Sometime between March and May the Chinese decided to write off the war." Influenced by the nuclear threat and by the death of Stalin on March 5, the Chinese began to indicate that they wanted the war to end. The two commands arranged an exchange of sick and wounded, and the Chinese suggested that a neutral nation might be employed as a way station to assure the just repatriation of prisoners not wishing to return home. Agreement was reached on June 4 in the face of a threat by the United States to break off talks and resume the war. Basically, the agreed-upon proposal called for the transfer of all prisoners to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission composed entirely of Indian forces in Korea. Sixty days would be allowed for those

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 399, 402-05.

who wished to return home to do so, another ninety days provided for each side to explain to prisoners why they should return home, after which those remaining would be set free. Both sides signed this plan on June 8, 1953.⁵⁵

The last year of the war did not produce, on the surface, any slackening in economic expansion. 1953 was, in fact, the most prosperous year ever for consumers and businesses, except for agriculture. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland reported in December, 1953, that "every major business or economic indicator set a new peacetime record this year." In the Fourth District, this climb to the summit was led by a record tonnage of steel ingots poured, 7 per cent over the previous high in 1951. Auto sales and production chalked up their second best year ever, and total tire production also hit a new high.⁵⁶

War orders and governmental stimulus of the economy declined in 1953, as mobilization was stretched out, but in some ways the government did continue to bolster the economy directly. The most spectacular of

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 405-07, 414-18.

⁵⁶"Industrial Review and Outlook," MBR, December 1, 1953, pp. 1-3.

of these decisions for Ohio was the announcement by the Atomic Energy Commission to construct a uranium processing plant in southern Ohio's Pike County. The AEC's plan, revealed on August 12, 1952, called for \$1.2 billion over a four-year period to build and begin to operate the largest gaseous diffusion plant yet constructed. (The gaseous diffusion process separates fissionable uranium 235 from non-fissionable uranium 238.) For the area around Waverly, Ohio, in Pike County, the project meant an extraordinary influx of people and money and an equally sudden, if short-lived, boost in the region's general economic activity.⁵⁷

The AEC decided that the plant would be operated for the commission by a new subsidiary of a major rubber company. Goodyear won this job and established the Goodyear Atomic Corporation for this purpose. Goodyear received about four million dollars per year to run the plant which itself was tax-exempt. Goodyear's responsibility was to employ four thousand people, some of them from the company's current staff, to work for four years to build the plant and put it into production. After construction, the AEC envisioned an around-the-clock production process,

⁵⁷ Atomic Energy Commission Release N. 441, August 12, 1952, in Ohio #1 folder, Kenneth Hechler Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library. Plain Dealer, August 14, 1952, pp. 1, 5. "Ohio's New Atomic Plant," MBR, March 1, 1953, p. 5.

utilizing water-cooled motors, offering no danger to the surrounding area from nuclear accident.⁵⁸

More significant for Ohio than these changes within Goodyear was the enormous impact the atomic plant had upon the region's economy. The four-county area surrounding the project's 3700 acres was desperately in need of industrial stimulus. The economic activity connected with World War II bypassed the area which suffered substantial out-migration and still had 7 per cent unemployment in 1950. Average family income in the area languished far below state and national standards as a result of both low wage rates and low farm income. The A-plant was destined to change all this. The work force would go up 50 per cent in two years. 96,000 would be needed by January, 1955, only 76,500 of whom could be found locally. Much of this labor would be used to construct all of the facilities for what would be essentially a new small town: homes, roads, schools, and an airport were high on the construction priority list. In fact, the project would require two steam electric

⁵⁸Plain Dealer, September 19, 1952, pp. 1, 24. "What an Atomic Bomb Costs Goodyear," Business Week, October 4, 1952, pp. 108, 110. "Ohio's New Atomic Plant," MBR, March 1, 1953, pp. 5-6.

generating plants at a cost of \$400,000,000 just to supply the power to keep the atomic plant operating.⁵⁹

The aggregate, national economic figures for 1953 actually concealed more than they revealed. Hidden beneath the record-breaking totals and indicators of continued prosperity were more subtle statistics showing the war boom ending and a decline setting in. The national GNP crested at \$372.4 billion in the second quarter of 1953 and dropped 1 per cent in the third quarter. National industrial production peaked in March and was down 5 per cent by October. The Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank reported that durable goods were principally responsible for this national decline, dropping 9 per cent from March to October. Personal income also crested in July and then fell off.⁶⁰

Analysis of the individual segments of the industrial economy revealed this same hidden decline. Steel production in the Fourth District declined to 90 per cent of capacity. Production of machine tools outran new orders, and the fantastic backlog of the

⁵⁹"Ohio's New Atomic Plant," MBR, March 1, 1953, pp. 5-6, 8-12.

⁶⁰"Industrial Review and Outlook," MBR, December 1, 1953, pp. 1-2.

early war months all but disappeared. Auto dealers reported mounting inventories and had new cars on hand at the end of the model year. The sale of major household appliances, slowed by the steel strike, peaked in February and then dropped suddenly. The total decline in sales was 25 per cent.⁶¹

What all of these figures were describing was a recession. Harold Vatter, an economist at Carleton College, later blamed this contraction on two factors: a slowdown or even a downturn in retail sales and reduced military production. "Basically," Vatter wrote, "the cause was atrophy of the stimulus that had been provided by national security expenditures." The real decline in defense purchases from the second quarter of 1953 to the fourth quarter was nearly \$3 billion and had been declining before then. Vatter shows that national security expenditures of the Federal government had jumped sharply in late 1950 and early 1951 and then increased steadily through every quarter until the second quarter of 1952. Truman and Eisenhower both proposed cuts in these appropriations requests, and Congress acceded. The impact of this

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 2-3.

reduction was substantial and clearly played a major role in the recession.⁶²

The federal government not only reduced its direct expenditures for national security production; it also began to decontrol most of the segments of the economy which had been regulated throughout the war. The end of controls had begun with the suspension of Regulation W, controlling consumer credit, in May, 1952, and accelerated when the Defense Production Act was amended in June, 1952. The bill which passed Congress was considerably weaker than what Truman wanted, but he signed it anyway. The President had requested a two-year extension of wage and price controls and got ten months instead. Regulation X, which controlled real estate credit and had been relaxed in March, 1952, was virtually eliminated. The Wage Stabilization Board lost the power to intervene in labor disputes. Certain food prices, including fruits and vegetables were decontrolled, probably because of the earlier fiasco over potatoes.⁶³

The government also began to remove controls from specific industries of vital importance to Ohio,

⁶²Harold G. Vatter, The United States Economy in the 1950's: An Economic History (New York, 1963), pp. 90, 83. Wilfred Lewis, Jr., Federal Fiscal Policy in the Postwar Recessions (Washington, 1962), p. 142.

⁶³Vatter, pp. 89-90. Plain Dealer, June 29, 1952, pp. 1, 8. "Construction: A New Outlook for 1952," MBR, August 1, 1952, p. 1.

beginning with rubber. Rubber prices had played a key role in the 1950-1951 inflation. Spectacular and heavy buying by consumers, who remembered World War II's tire rationing program, had forced prices up sharply and raised the prospect of a genuine shortage. The government reopened the synthetic rubber plants used during World War II and restricted the consumption of natural rubber. In late 1950, the General Services Administration became the sole importer and seller of natural rubber. Since the government also owned the synthetic plants, rubber became the first industry to be brought completely under government control as part of the defense mobilization.⁶⁴

Rubber production spurted upward as the synthetic plants began to operate in early 1951. Consumption set a record in 1950, and the next year's total was almost as great. Production of tires also hit a record level in 1950, but dropped 17 per cent during the first nine months of 1951. The government was able to establish a secret rubber stockpile principally because of a large increase in the production of synthetic rubber. With the supply of natural rubber holding steady, synthetic production had risen from

⁶⁴"The Role of Rubber, Wool, Burlap and Tire,"
MBR, July 1, 1951, pp. 1-2. "Industrial Retrospect,"
MBR, December 1, 1950, p. 4.

37 per cent of the total in the first quarter of 1950 to 65 per cent in the third quarter of 1951. By July, 1951, the world price for rubber was below the GSA price although it was still significantly above pre-Korean levels.⁶⁵

In 1952, the government was able to begin decontrolling the industry. Starting on January 1, the government surrendered its authority to allocate synthetic rubber. All controls on the production of tires were lifted as was the government's monopoly on the purchase of natural rubber. These relaxations were possible because of a steady improvement in the supply of both natural and synthetic rubber. The government completed its stockpile, and demand for tires was slack. The supply of rubber was actually 80 per cent higher in 1952 than it had been a year previous. The government still owned the synthetic plants, but industry officials felt confident that their long-standing request that the government sell these plants would at last be satisfied.⁶⁶

⁶⁵"Industrial Summary of 1951," MBR, December 1, 1951, p. 4. "Industrial Retrospect," MBR, December 1, 1950, p. 8. "The Role of Rubber, Wool, Burlap and Tin," MBR, July 1, 1951, p. 2.

⁶⁶"Industrial Highlights of 1952," MBR, December 1, 1952, p. 4. Plain Dealer, February 24, 1952, p. 1; April 20, 1952, pp. 1, 13. "Government Rubber Monopoly Nears End," MBR, September 1, 1953, p. 5.

The Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Act, signed by President Dwight Eisenhower on August 7, 1953, allowed the federal government to begin to get out of the rubber business. A three-member commission was appointed to oversee the sale of twenty-five of the synthetic plants, five of them in the Fourth District, to private corporations. The law insured that synthetic rubber would be available for defense purposes. It also prevented the development of a domestic monopoly by forcing the commission to choose purchasers who would guarantee that they would sell rubber to small users. The twenty-five plants involved produced 22 per cent of the total synthetic capacity, and buyers had to promise not to put any plant on stand-by for at least three years. Continued, high production of synthetic rubber was further guaranteed when Goodrich introduced, in early 1953, a new speedy process for producing cold rubber. The new process, culminating twelve years of research, cut the time needed for making high quality rubber from 10-12 hours to 15-20 minutes. It also cut in half the size of the complicated plant needed to produce cold rubber and

thus made some of the plants the government was willing to sell obsolete.⁶⁷

The last year of the war also saw the final winding down in the federal program to control apartment rents and the beginning of a permanent adjustment downward in the federal commitment to build public housing (see Chapter II, pp. 88-91, supra). Rent controls were phased out because of the belief that they were no longer needed as part of the defense effort. Public housing construction, ironically, was curtailed so that resources and materials destined for housing could be diverted to defense production.

Several Ohio cities had enacted their own rent control laws as a result of the outbreak of fighting in Korea. Even Senator Bricker, who had been one of the chief spokesmen against any governmental interference in housing, conceded that controls might be needed beyond June, 1951, if the war led to a reduction in new housing construction. The Cincinnati City Council, for example, was one of many cities to extend rent controls,

⁶⁷"Government Rubber Monopoly Nears End," MBR, September 1, 1953, p. 5. Plain Dealer, January 1, 1953, pp. 1, 11. "A Revolution in Rubber," Business Week, January 10, 1953, p. 32. "Life Everlasting," Business Week, January 31, 1953, p. 32.

and the Columbus City Council, by straw poll, had indicated its intention to do so if Congress did not act. On the other hand, the wealthy Columbus suburb of Upper Arlington voted to end controls despite a well-reasoned plea to Congressman Vorys from the business manager of the Columbus Citizen that such an action would be unconscionable. Rental housing in Upper Arlington, it was said, was poorly maintained and at the tenants' expense. Landlords could evict on three days' notice. The entire rental situation could work a great hardship on the families of war veterans being called back into service.⁶⁸

Some other areas in Ohio were designated as "critical defense housing areas" where rent control could be maintained by the federal government after the expiration of the statute. Originally, this designation was used to control the rental housing market in any area which met three criteria: the presence of new or rejuvenated industry, the in-migration of labor, and a shortage of housing. Such an area was the region around Wright-Patterson Field in Dayton

⁶⁸Columbus Dispatch, October 6, 1950, p. 1; October 1, 1950, p. B-1. Cincinnati, Ohio, City Manager, Annual Report of the City Manager for the calendar year 1950, p. 8. Ralph Henderson to Vorys, August 16, 1950, and Vorys to Henderson (copy), September 1, 1950, both in Box 23, File: Rent Control in Upper Arlington, Vorys Papers.

which received this designation in 1951. As the war progressed, business leaders and local government officials saw this tag as an unfair tool of the federal government to prolong rent controls in cities where they were about to expire. Akron protested its designation in 1952 for just this reason. It was named a critical area just one day after it voted rent controls out of existence. Stark County did the very same thing. In 1953, the Sandusky City Council petitioned the federal government to remove its name from the critical list only to be told that a petition was not the proper method for decertification; only a resolution would do.⁶⁹

It would be wrong to assume that opponents of rent control were nothing more than unscrupulous landlords desirous of extorting exorbitant rents from tenants or evicting them. In Cleveland, for example, the number of rental properties available declined by 20,000 between 1940 and 1950. Faced with rising costs and materials, many property owners were forced to dispense with adequate maintenance, thus contributing

⁶⁹"Eager to Build Defense Homes," Ohio Savings and Loan League Record, September, 1951, p. 12. Plain Dealer, October 1, 1952, pp. 1, 5; October 2, 1952, pp. 1, 6. Bricker to Harry Lehrer, President, Erie County Property Owners Association (copy), May 14, 1953, Box 94, File: Rent Control, Bricker Papers.

to the deterioration of neighborhoods, or to sell rental property for owner occupancy. Still, when reports filtered in that some rents nearly tripled upon decontrol, it is easy to see why the advocates of controls persisted.⁷⁰

The restraints placed on residential construction early affected the implementation of the Housing Act of 1949. Spokesmen for Ohio savings and loans institutions, intimately tied to the housing industry, correctly warned that rapid construction was not inflationary, but admitted that it diverted key material--lumber, cement, steel, copper--away from defense production. The Ohio Savings and Loan League resolved to support a curb in government subsidies to construct public housing and to make this curb permanent. The government agreed quickly. Truman cut the number of public housing units to be built during the last half of 1950 to 30,000. Regulation X restricted private construction as well. By 1951, the public housing program had become the defense housing program. Truman urged the continuation of construction when he realized that the law could be used to provide housing for defense workers. Still, the Congress

⁷⁰Plain Dealer, September 4, 1952, p. 10; October 2, 1952, p. 16; October 1, 1952, pp. 1, 2.

limited new units to 50,000 in each of 1951 and 1952. Under President Eisenhower, the number was further reduced to 35,000 units a year.⁷¹

The Eisenhower administration also acted quickly to eliminate most of the other wartime economic controls in advance of their statutory expiration dates. The new President was committed to reducing federal expenditures and eliminating the budget deficits which characterized the Korean War years. His actions on wage and price controls during his first weeks in office showed that he was committed to removing them as well. First to go were wage and salary controls, ended on February 6. In Cleveland, 101 Wage Stabilization Board workers were discharged, and 952 pending wage petitions cancelled. Eisenhower next approved orders abolishing price controls on a wide variety of commodities. Ceilings were eliminated over a six week period, undoubtedly to allow the economy to adjust gradually to the change. The last head of OPS,

⁷¹George Rowland Collins, "Mortgage Lending in a Military Economy," Ohio Savings and Loan Record, November, 1950, p. 88. Complete Proceedings, Sixty-Second Annual Convention of the Ohio Savings and Loan League, October, 1950, p. 80. Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform During the Truman Administration (Columbia, Mo., 1966), pp. 130-32, 137.

Joseph Freehill, predicted that the end of controls would cost the public three billion dollars in the next year. The Plain Dealer protested, however, that most prices were well below established ceilings and that OPS had become little more than a record-keeping bureaucracy. Finally, the government removed limitations on who could purchase steel, aluminum, and copper and on how they may be used. The Controlled Materials Plan of 1951, which restricted these resources, was allowed to expire on June 30, 1953, although the government promised to protect the military's need for metal after that date.⁷²

The mobilization effort begun in 1950 had always been controversial. In the early weeks of the war, Truman had a tough time arguing for even a partial mobilization. Later, he was granted more authority than he had requested. Each year, as the Defense Production Act came up for renewal, Congress and the President battled over the continued need for controls and over the exact form controls should take. As target dates for the military build-up were stretched out

⁷²Lewis, p. 131. Plain Dealer, February 7, 1953, pp. 1, 4, 12; February 26, 1953, pp. 1, 8; March 19, 1953, p. 10; February 14, 1953, pp. 1, 5.

and controls mechanisms abandoned, that controversy remained. Congressman Vorys, who had always voted for controls but objected to the way Truman used his delegated powers, was glad to see Eisenhower drop the scheme. He was ready, he said, to re-impose them if "there is a war or conditions get worse." Senator Bricker, too, was ambivalent. Controls can be junked, he said, except for those which are truly needed to protect our national defense. Still, controversy aside, the mobilization effort accomplished its basic purpose: defense production did expand, so that the war could be prosecuted as the administration intended. Cast aside, though, were the domestic goals of the Fair Deal and the chance that social and economic reform would keep pace with a growing commitment to increase defense spending.⁷³

⁷³Vorys to Eric V. Weber (copy), February 2, 1953, Box 38, File: Controls, Vorys Papers. Bricker to Harry E. Blythe (copy), February 24, 1953, Box 92, File: Defense Production, Bricker Papers.

CONCLUSION

OHIO DURING THE KOREAN WAR

John and Linda live in Omaha
Joey's somewhere on the road
We lost Davie in the Korean war
Still don't know what for
Don't matter anymore
--John Prine, "Hello, In There"

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The Korean War took the lives of nearly fifteen hundred Ohioans. No exact enumeration of Ohio's war dead has ever been compiled, and the accuracy of the figure given here is subject to a number of conditions.¹ It is a measure of how this war has been generally disregarded and forgotten that a precise count of Ohio's casualties has never been made.

Indeed, when the armistice ending the war was finally signed on July 27, 1953, Ohioans were just as dismayed and confused as they had been at the war's beginning. The long delay in ending the fighting, even after the essentials of the armistice agreement

¹Ohio, Adjutant General's Department, Division of Soldiers' Claims--Veterans Affairs, Korean War Era Casualties, 1950 Thru 1958 (Columbus, n.d.). The total number of dead Ohioans listed in this report is 1494. This figure was arrived at by hand-counting all deaths of Ohioans in Korea between June 25, 1950, and July 31, 1953. The statistics depend on the accuracy of Korean bonus applications filed with the state and on these other conditions: no distinction is made between combat and non-combat deaths; any death listed for Korea without giving a date was not included; any death without a place being given was not included regardless of the date; only those deaths occurring in Korea were counted, not those in Japan or at sea; none of the numerous deaths listed for December 31, 1953 were included, despite indications that this date may have been assigned to soldiers missing in action and later declared dead.

were completed on June 8, deprived Ohioans of extracting the meaning which a quick and decisive resolution of the conflict might have provided. In fact, because of the intransigence shown by South Korean president Syngman Rhee over the terms of the armistice, the war's last month saw a final display of resentment and frustration over what had become a completely unpalatable situation. The Plain Dealer put the blame for this postponement squarely on the United Nations:

The world organization has made a sorry spectacle of itself in Korea. It lacked the will to win the war and now, frustrated by one stubborn, embittered old man, it lacks the ability to bring about a truce.²

What Rhee objected to most strenuously was the failure of the United Nations to unite his country and to arrange an armistice preventing the Chinese from remaining south of the Yalu River. Rhee had always opposed a divided Korea and had hinted that he might veto the proposed settlement. Even after the United States tried to placate him with promises of a bilateral security pact and other concessions, he nearly upset the entire armistice plan when he prematurely released most of the anti-communist Korean POWs held by the South Koreans. Only a few thousand prisoners then

²Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 22, 1953, p. 14.

remained to be turned over to the repatriation commission, and the end of the war was in jeopardy. With the question of renewed hostilities hanging in the balance, Peking decided not to repudiate the agreement. Rhee was persuaded with further assurances of military and economic aid to give up his demand for Chinese withdrawal, and the armistice was finally concluded.³

The basic question posed by this study is how the patterns of American life, both personal and institutional, were changed, if at all, by the Korean War. It is clear now that the war's impact was substantial. More than any other event or series of events during the postwar years, Korea changed American society fundamentally by introducing the possibility that future wars might erupt spontaneously and be fought for limited objectives. The entire American approach to war and peace was upset; the classical liberal view that a moral war must be fought expeditiously with total victory as the goal had been rejected by the Korean experience. Korea taught Americans that the normal condition for America would not be peace but preparedness. The persistent threat of

³David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York, 1964), pp. 421-34.

further Communist aggression meant that the United States would have to gird itself to expect the unexpected indefinitely.

The lesson learned during Korea was that swords could not be beaten into plowshares. On the contrary, domestic needs would have to be sacrificed again and again to defense. In Ohio, this radical transformation in priorities repeatedly altered the ways in which Ohioans lived. Civil defense, for example, became a permanent addition to the budget of local governments. The draft begun during Korea, with all of its inequities intact, persisted well into the era of the Vietnam War. And the quest for fair employment practices legislation, unsatisfied in Ohio until 1958 when the legislature established a Civil Rights Commission, blossomed into a wider struggle by black Americans to achieve at home all the rights which Americans defended abroad.⁴ -

Economically, too, Korea wrought permanent change. Defense expenditures rose and became virtually an untouchable part of the federal budget. Colleges and universities sought a solution to their financial difficulties by turning increasingly to the federal government for operating funds and research grants,

⁴The authority of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission is contained in secs. 4112.01 through 4112.08 and sec. 4112.99 of the Ohio Revised Code.

often awarded to professors conducting research on national security matters. The economy itself, its rates of growth, inflation, and employment, came to depend increasingly on military programs. Economist Harold Vatter has noted the development of persistently large military budgets as a powerful discretionary stabilizer within the economy. Both Congress through its appropriations and the President by changing the dispersal rate of appropriated funds could cast significant influence upon the course of the economy.⁵

Most importantly, Ohioans learned to be constantly wary of the Communist threat, domestic as well as foreign. Korea had re-inforced the Great Conspiracy theory, and many Ohioans as well as other Americans came to believe that the greatest danger and challenge facing the United States was the multifaceted threat posed by the Soviet Union. The labor movement and educational institutions are simply two of the more obvious examples in which Ohioans and Americans reacted strongly to the possibility of subversion.

These lessons were sobering, to be sure, and no cause for joy. On the day the war ended, in fact,

⁵Harold G. Vatter, The U.S. Economy in the 1950's: An Economic History (New York, 1963), pp. 72-73.

Clevelanders reacted with a combination of apathy and irritation. Some people complained that the news announcement had interrupted television shows. Others expressed more interest in the results of the Indians' ball game. Most were simply relieved to have the war over. Charles White, president of Republic Steel, thanked Eisenhower for ending the war and promised that his corporation would stand ready to help produce weapons until the Russians truly wanted peace.⁶

⁶Plain Dealer, July 27, 1953, pp. 1, 11.

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