The Indirect Effects of Mediation: A Dynamic Model of Mediation and Conflict

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

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2016

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Abstract

The existing literature on conflict management through mediation tends to rely on static models that measure the characteristics of a conflict once, at the onset, and assume that they do not change over time. Yet our qualitative knowledge suggests that the severity of a conflict fluctuates based on the cooperative or conflictual actions of belligerents during the conflict. Moreover, mediators monitor conflicts and decide to intervene based on changes that occur after conflict onset. I build on these intuitions to create a dynamic model of mediation into ongoing disputes. I argue that mediation has an indirect effect on settlement, specifically through its ability to increase cooperative behavior. These indirect causal pathways are ignored in traditional models of conflict, leading scholars to base their conclusions on only the direct effect of mediation. To test my argument, I create weekly event data for 43 conflicts from 1991 to 2008 that capture the timing of mediation and the ebb and flow of conflict severity. I use a marginal structural model to account for both the direct and indirect effect of mediation. The empirical findings demonstrate that the indirect effect of mediation is a primary component of its effectiveness as a tool of conflict resolution.

Acknowledgments

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

xi

Chapter 1: Introduction

On February 11, 2015, a mediation team led by the leaders of Russia, Germany, and France arrived in Minsk, Belarus, to broker a ceasefire between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatists.[1] The previous mediation effort, carried out in September, had managed to secure a ceasefire agreement, only to have it collapse entirely when fighting intensified in the months that followed. After 16 hours of talks that stretched late into the night, the international mediation team produced an accord signed by the principal belligerents. "It was not the best night of my life," said Russian President Vladimir Putin as he emerged from the negotiation room on Thursday morning. "But it's a good morning because, despite all the difficulties of the negotiation process, we have managed to agree on the main issues." The Second Minsk Accord called for a ceasefire to begin at midnight, the withdrawal of heavy weapons beyond a 15-mile buffer zone, and a call for formal talks on holding elections. Yet this accord, like its predecessor, was short-lived. Violence escalated in the months following the Minsk agreement until the last reminants of the ceasefire fell apart. As fighting dragged on into 2016, foreign policymakers across Europe once again called for a new round of mediation.

From the earliest days of the field, scholars of International Relations have been interested in the causes of violent conflict and how to mitigate it. Over the last two decades,

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[1]"Russian pundit says Minsk talks offer Ukraine ceasefire, but no peace." *The Moscow Times*. February 12, 2015.

1

there has been a renewed interest in the ways in which states and international organizations act as third parties to international conflict.[2] When faced with a civil war in Ukraine, an international crisis between North and South Korea, or the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, world leaders and international organizations have at their disposal a varied and imposing set of policy instruments, including economic sanctions, mediation, peace-keeping, and military interventions of all shapes and sizes. Armed with this array of tools for conflict management, foreign policymakers must decide when and where to apply pressure and in what amount. The ultimate decision to intervene within a conflict rests on two kinds of questions. The first relate to political considerations made by the third party itself. These are questions of whether the public will countenance a particular intervention, whether parliament will agree to fund the enterprise, or whether the initiative will have sufficient international support. The second kind of question relates to the effectiveness of the proposed policy. Will the policy work? In the parlance of political science: Will this policy increase the probability of conflict resolution?

The question of effectiveness—will it work?—is undeniably central to any reasoned debate over whether to implement a policy. To make an informed choice, policymakers must have an understanding of how a particular policy will impact the conflict environment. Will mediation increase cooperation between belligerents and put the conflict on a path toward settlement? Will military intervention trigger an escalation spiral that leads to a protracted dispute? Answering these questions empirically is a task that falls naturally into the domain of political science. However, the scholarship within International Relations

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[2]Prior to this realignment the IR literature was dominated by systemic theories of great power politics, which tended to talk about war only in a very broad, abstract sense. For example, Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics argues that certain configurations of polarity are more or less conflictual.

has remained equivocal about questions of policy effectiveness. For a wide range of policy instruments, the empirical findings are ambiguous.

To be sure, the scholarship has continued to innovate theoretically and empirically over the last decade, building upon and refining existing hypotheses, gathering new and better data, and expanding the set of methods and models used for testing arguments. But despite this undeniable progress, the current literature has yet to produce definitive answers to the "does it work?" question. Instead, we are faced with a discordant set of empirical results. Consider the literature on conflict management through mediation. The success of mediation hinges on factors like the type of mediator (Svensson, 2007; Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth, 2008), mediation strategy (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Möller et al., 2007; DeRouen and Bercovitch, 2012), whether the mediator is biased or unbiased (Fisher, 1995; Wehr, 1979; Melin, 2011; Kydd, 2003; Svensson, 2009), or whether mediators choose to intervene in hard to resolve cases (Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Gartner, 2011). Many of these studies are persuasive, but the results are often countervailing. Wallensteen and Svensson's review of the literature is incisive: "the research field has generated important insights, but no comprehensive framework that could explain empirical results from systematic studies."[3]

Why has a comprehensive framework remained so elusive? One explanation is that the subject-matter are inherently complex, which has stymied any attempt to generalize. There is some merit to this view. Conflict processes are multidimensional phenomena with an array of moving parts. That said, complexity does not rule out the presence of systematic, generalizable patterns of behavior. The fact that systematic patterns are lacking within the

[3]Wallensteen and Svensson (2014, 319)

3

field of conflict management is troubling. Another possibility is that scholars have not identified the correct theory of conflict. However, the current literature has a highly-developed understanding of conflict as crisis bargaining, which offers a persuasive account of the conflict process. Furthermore, there is nothing mysterious about the function of policy instruments themselves. Qualitative scholars have described myriad ways in which these policies can influence the conflict environment. Drawing on these insights, most quantitative work starts from a solid theoretical foundation grounded in real-world experience and the intuitions of Thomas Schelling.[4] In summary, the lack of a comprehensive framework does not appear to be the result of a theoretical deficit.

I claim that the problem stems from how we map our theories onto empirical tests. In many ways, our understanding of how a policy functions within a conflict does not match how we study it. To address this issue, this dissertation attempts to better align 1) our conceptual understanding of conflict processes and policy effectiveness, 2) our statistical model of the same, and 3) the data used to proxy for these latent quantities.

To begin, I identify a series of missteps taken by the current literature. At its core, these problems originate from a misspecification of the underlying theory of conflict. The way scholars conceptualize conflict, I argue, does not match our practical understanding about how conflicts unfold over time. The problem is that the existing scholarship tends to rely on what I refer to as a "static approach" to the study of conflict. In this approach, conflicts are conceptualized as a function of static characteristics, such as whether the belligerents differ in terms of ethnicity, or whether they share a common geographic border. In many cases, dynamic properties of conflict (e.g. the use of violence over time) are collapsed into static quantities (e.g. the highest level of violence used in the entire conflict). The idea that

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[4]There is a truism in the bargaining literature: If you think you have an original idea, chances are that Thomas Schelling has written at least a paragraph about it somewhere.

conflicts are a bargaining process—a view that is central to bargaining theory—is lost in this conception.

At an empirical level, the static approach employs data that measure the characteristics of a conflict once—and then assumes that these factors do not change over time.[5] The static approach pervades all aspects of the study of conflict, including the causes of conflict (Bennett and Stam, 2004), escalation within conflict (Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, 1993), and dispute termination (Kreutz, 2010). As I will show, even studies that specifically address the duration of conflict (e.g. Bennett and Stam, 1996; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, 2004) fall within this static conception.

I am certainly not the first scholar to draw attention to the limitations of the static approach within political science. Consider Tilly (1985, 717): "since collective action is dynamic, and since its outcomes depend very strongly on the course of interaction, static models that simply match behavior to group characteristics or outcome to group behavior represent the entire process poorly." More recently, the conflict processes literature has critiqued the tendency to model only the static features of conflict.[6] However, while the literature on conflict processes has made considerable advances in terms of our understanding of the internal progression of conflict, it has largely been confined to its longitudinal study. As a result, this literature tends to consider one or two cases at a time with a focus on identifying the system of interactions between belligerents. It is fair to say that this is not the preferred domain of studying policy interventions. Aside from a few exceptions, the study of third-party interventions has largely taken place within a static, cross-sectional

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[5]Some scholars use the term "structural," rather than static. I use both terms interchangeably. In the static view, the unit of analysis is the conflict. In the dynamic view, the unit of analysis is the conflict at a particular point in time, e.g. conflict-month, conflict-week, etc.

[6]The pioneering work of Azar (1980) deserves mention as well as Shellman's (2006) more recent work on government-dissident interactions.

context.[7] As a result, the bulk of existing research examines the effectiveness of a policy within a sample of "frozen" conflicts where the relevant predictors of settlement are fixed in time. While this static view has been useful for understanding the structural determinants of conflict outcomes, it offers an incomplete view of the process of moving from war to peace. My goal is to build upon these existing critiques in an effort to examine some of the overlooked repercussions of the static approach within the study of third-party intervention.

1.1 The Argument

The core of my argument turns on what is notably absent from the static approach— the interaction between a policy and the dynamic conflict environment. Within a dynamic view of conflict, policy instruments are likely to impact the conflict space, changing the overall trajectory of the conflict. Therefore, when we study policy effectiveness, we need a theory of conflict to go along with our theory of intervention. Toward this aim, I create a framework for studying the effect of a policy within a changing conflict environment.[8] The framework illustrates an alternative causal model of the effectiveness of policy treatments. The causal logic of this framework is generalizable to different types of policy interventions, but I motivate the framework using the example of third-party mediation. Therefore, in what follows, the conceptual discussion centers on mediation in particular.[9]

The theoretical framework that I develop is built around three questions: What factors influence the "natural progression" of a conflict? Why do mediators choose to intervene? What are the mechanisms through which mediation impacts the conflict?

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[7]For a statement of this point and an exception to the rule, see Schrodt and Gerner (2004, 311).

[8]The theory is informal in the game-theoretic sense.

[9]As such, the empirical investigation of mediation serves as a proof of concept for the underlying framework that I develop. To be sure, the model is not definitive as it currently stands, but I will argue that it is far better than the existing approach.

1.1.1 The Natural Progression of Conflict

I begin from a theory of the natural progression of a conflict. By "natural," I refer to factors relating to the principal belligerents in a conflict, setting aside the involvement of third-parties. I outline a theory of the progression of conflict that combines ideas from bargaining theory and the conflict processes literature in an attempt to build upon and synthesize insights from the two literatures. The basic formulation is an information game, where bargainers use costly signals to reveal information and locate a mutually acceptable settlement.

In the classic bargaining view, the behavior of actors is wholly endogenous to bargaining considerations "all the way down." For example, a cruise missile strike is interpreted as a byproduct of information asymmetry in the latent bargaining space. This top-down view of conflict—where behavior is treated as epiphenomenal to information asymmetries—is adopted by most empirical work in the bargaining vein. What is notably missing from the application of these models is a proxy for the latent bargaining space. Drawing on the conflict processes literature, I propose that the behavior of actors is an expression of the latent bargaining context—the incentives, private information, and capabilities of the belligerents. I leverage the top-down view of conflict—where information asymmetries are mapped onto behavior—to capture the ebb and flow of the bargaining context. In other words, I propose using behavior as a proxy for the latent bargaining space.

More specifically, my model of conflict emphasizes what belligerents do to each other—the wide variety of conflictual and cooperative actions taken by the conflict actors themselves. Examples of these interactions include: 1) overt uses of force, such as military mobilizations or airstrikes; 2) diplomatic exchanges, such as threats or promises; and 3)

cooperative actions, such as signing a ceasefire or withdrawing military forces. In aggregate, these interactions constitute the degree of *conflict severity*. I conceptualize conflict severity as a summary of the virulence of a conflict at any given moment in time. It can be thought of as a core diagnostic of the 'health' of a conflict, much like the blood pressure of a sick patient. Conflict severity ebbs and flows as the conflict progresses; as such, it serves as a dynamic risk factor for conflict settlement.

1.1.2 Theory of Intervention

The second component of my model relates to the assignment process, or what many scholars term the "selection" process.[10] It is readily apparent that the decision to intervene is non-random. We expect that a policy instrument is more (or less) likely to be used in certain situations compared to others. The prevailing intuition is that third parties tend to use policy instruments—like mediation, peacekeeping, and sanctions—in tough, intractable cases. I largely agree with this logic, but I disagree with how it has been put into practice. Non-random assignment has been treated as a problem of confounding variables, mostly related to variables that proxy for conflict severity. The dominant approach has been to "control" or adjust for conflict severity in some fashion. The logic here is that a covariate cannot be a confounder "within a stratum that is internally homogenous with respect to the covariate" (Greenland, Robins, and Pearl, 1999, 35). While the practice of adjusting for confounding variables appears unproblematic within a purely static model of conflict, its deficiencies quickly become apparent when we transition to a dynamic view.

My critique hinges on the distinction between confounding and intervening variables. Within a static conception of conflict, factors can be either confounding or intervening variables, but not both. However, within a dynamic model where interventions take place

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[10]See Fortna (2004*a*,*b*).

over time, there is good reason to believe that causal relationships can change. I argue that the same dynamic factors that predict mediation can also be affected by mediation once it takes place. In other words, I treat the decision to engage in mediation and its subsequent effect on the progression of conflict as two distinct causal processes. In the first, mediators choose to intervene in a conflict based on a dynamic assessment of conflict severity. Therefore, in regard to the non-random decision to intervene, conflict severity functions as a confounding variable for the effect of mediation. In the second process, mediators engage with belligerents, which decreases the level of conflict severity. In this way, conflict severity also functions as an intervening variable for the effect of mediation. To better understand the rationale behind this two-stage causal relationship, we need to consider the causal mechanisms of mediation.

1.1.3 Causal Mechanisms

Broadly speaking, there are two types of causal mechanisms through which mediation interacts with the bargaining environment. The first are "top-down" mechanisms in which mediation influences the minds of policymakers. For example, a prominent theory of *Information Provision* holds that mediators provide information to elite decision-makers about the capabilities and intentions of their adversaries, thereby helping preferences to converge.[11] The idea is that mediation matters at the margins in regard to the informational environment. It is understood that mediators do not provide anything close to perfect information to policymakers—i.e. information which could conceivably end the conflict outright. However, compared to conflicts without mediation, mediated conflicts exhibit a higher quality and/or quantity of information available to bargainers.

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[11]See Beardsley (2008).

A second top-down mechanism is what I call *Cooperative Signaling*, where mediation provides a way for elite decision-makers to signal their willingness to work toward settlement. Mediators operate at the consent of the bargainers, so accepting an offer of mediation can be used as a signal of cooperative intent. Moreover, mediation is a cooperative act whereby both sides engage in non-violent deliberation to resolve their differences. The symbolic act of cooperation creates the potential for a positive feedback loop, where cooperation engenders additional cooperation, and so on.[12]

The third type of top-down mechanism involves the ability of mediation to decrease the transaction costs of bargaining. Mediation can make bargaining less costly, either by holding negotiations at a neutral location, or by meeting in secret, which lessens the audience costs associated with more public bargaining. While secret negotiations do not obviate the challenges of securing a final, public settlement, they do allow bargainers to suggest terms or proposals that might be untenable in a more public context.[13]

The top-down mechanisms assume that mediation works by influencing the minds of policymakers, which then trickles down to improve the level of cooperation on the ground. Yet conflicts can often spiral out of the control of policymakers. In its most basic sense, this loss of control is a function of the inherent unpredictability of war.[14] It can also be caused by "translation error" wherein the preferences of leaders are imperfectly mapped onto the actions of their subordinates on the ground.[15] To some degree, translation error is present in all conflicts, but, in an extreme case, high levels of error can make it incredibly

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[12]Much has been written on conflict spirals, but far less on the idea of cooperation spirals. The literature on reciprocity comes the closest. See Keohane (1986).

[13]The secret Oslo negotiations between the PLO and Israel in 1993 are a notable example. The negotiations ultimately failed to produce a public settlement. For more on the Oslo negotiations, see Heikal (1996).

[14]Clausewitz (1976).

[15]Via a game of telephone-like logic.

difficult for leaders to de-escalate a conflict, even when they would prefer to do so.[16] In the Bosnian War, for example, Serbia's lack of control over their Bosnian Serb proxies made it difficult for Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate a settlement. To the extent that elites have trouble reining in their subordinates, I contend that mediation can be a valuable tool to help elites reassert control over the conflict space. Mediation serves as a potent symbol to lower-level actors of the larger, political context of the conflict. In this sense, it helps to reassert the primacy of the actors involved in mediation—i.e. elites—as the key power brokers as opposed to local forces and groups. In this way, mediation may work from the "bottom-up" by serving as a signal to subordinate actors of the bargaining dynamics at the heart of the conflict.

These mechanisms are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Mediation can trigger either one, a combination, or none of these mechanisms. For example, the classic 'bargainer's dilemma' outlined by Greig (2005) specifies a situation where actors are reluctant come to the bargaining table for fear of looking weak to both their domestic population and the other side. In this case, mediation can provide diplomatic cover for the reluctant party, making it seem like concessions or a peace proposal was an idea proposed by third parties. This situation involves a hybrid of transaction costs and information provision, where mediators both facilitate information exchange between belligerents and lower the costs of negotiation.

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[16]Translation error can also occur because subordinates lack incentives to carry out the wishes of their superiors. For example, one of the strange lessons from Cold War nuclear deterrence was that it was strictly irrational for, say, a US sailor on a nuclear-armed submarine to launch a second strike if the entire United States had been destroyed by a Soviet sneak attack. Unwilling to rely on irrational notions like revenge to guarantee a second strike, the US (and their Soviet counterparts) went to great lengths to ensure the automaticity of their second strike response. Training drills with "false" orders for a strike were a common way to test a soldier's willingness to press the button.

1.1.4 Putting it all together

What are the observable implications of these mechanisms? I propose using conflict severity as a proxy for the latent bargaining space. Within this context, I argue that each of the aforementioned causal mechanisms share a common observable implication: *Mediation increases cooperation between belligerents*. In the top-down and bottom-up mechanisms described above, the level of conflict severity functions as an intervening variable for the effect of mediation. Mediation works by reducing the degree of conflict severity, which, in turn, increases the probability of settlement. As such, I argue that the logic of indirect effects is a more faithful rendering of our theoretical and practical understanding of how mediation works.

The potential for mediation to work through an indirect causal pathway has been overlooked in the current research, which assumes a single causal pathway, or direct effect, of mediation. The conventional understanding is that mediation improves the bargaining space—the configuration of information asymmetries, capabilities, and incentives. Perhaps because the bargaining space is latent, the default approach has been to test the direct effect of mediation on the outcome being studied. This represents something of a missed opportunity as the underlying logic of the causal mechanisms is indirect: Mediation influences the bargaining space which influences conflict settlement. If mediation influences settlement through an indirect pathway, it poses a major challenge to the way that the current empirical literature treats conflict severity. As previously mentioned, the current approach treats factors related to conflict severity as confounding variables. However, if an indirect pathway exists, then conflict severity is not strictly a confounder for the effect of policy instruments like mediation; it is better understood as both a confounding and an intervening variable.

The scenario where a dynamic factor functions as both a confounder and an intervening variable is known in the field of epidemiology as "time-varying confounding."[17] In epidemiology, the use of a medical treatment is often non-random because doctors treat patients based on the severity of their condition. Furthermore, medical treatments often directly impact the risk of death while also triggering indirect effects such as decreasing blood pressure or increasing heart rate. To the extent that these indirect effects also impact the risk of death, the treatment in question has an indirect effect on mortality. I argue that mediation has similar indirect effects. What I attempt to show is that conflict severity is a time-varying confounder for the effect of mediation.

My conceptual framework implies a distinct causal model, which I compare to the standard causal logic. Figure 1.1 illustrates the distinction between the standard model and my dynamic model of time-varying confounding.

1.2   Research Design

My conceptual framework represents an alternative causal model, which captures the interaction between mediation and the conflict environment. To account for the confounding and intervening effect of conflict severity, I use a marginal structural model (MSM) with inverse probability of treatment weights (Robins, Greenland, and Hu, 1999). MSMs are widely used in the current epidemiological scholarship (Howe et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2012; Lukowsky et al., 2013; Lertdumrongluk et al., 2014) as well as clinical psychology (VanderWeele et al., 2011). If my argument is correct and mediation does work through an indirect causal pathway, then the standard causal logic inadvertently subsumes the indirect effect of mediation by adjusting for variables related to conflict severity. As such,

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[17]This scenario is distinct from causal mediation analysis, which proceeds from the assumption that the causal mediator is exogenous. See Bind et al. (2016).

Figure 1.1. A comparison of a static and dynamic model.
In both models depicted above, A is Conflict Severity; B is a time-invariant factor, e.g. whether a conflict actor is a member of the P5; T is the treatment, Mediation; O is the outcome, which is settlement of the conflict. Subscripts denote time-points in the dynamic model. The unbroken black arrows linking nodes represent direct (unmitigated) causal pathways. The dashed arrows represent traditional confounding. The red dotted arrow from T_1 to A_2 in the dynamic model represents time-varying confounding.

we should observe a larger, beneficial effect of mediation on the probability of dispute settlement in the marginal structural model compared to the standard causal logic.

To test this observable implication, I create an original dataset of weekly, directed-dyad events for 43 conflicts from 1991 to 2008. I generate these event data from thousands of news articles using the TABARI text processing software developed by Schrodt (2011). I systematically aggregate these events to create time-varying measures of third-party mediation and conflict severity. I then merge these event data with existing time-invariant data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project in order to consider the effect of both static and dynamic covariates.

In the empirical chapters of the dissertation, I present systematic evidence of an indirect pathway between mediation and conflict settlement. The data analysis demonstrates that conflict severity functions as a time-varying confounder in regard to mediation's effect. The findings reveal that the positive effect of mediation is underestimated using the standard causal logic, which removes a major component of mediation's effectiveness by treating conflict severity as a confounder. The substantive impact of a single mediation attempt is a 2% increase in the probability of settlement. The benefit of additional mediation attempts increases to around 10% at 10 mediation attempts in a week, after which the increase is negligible.

I supplement the cross-sectional analysis with a case study of the Yugoslav Wars. The case study allows me to test the more fine-grained observable implications of my conceptual framework. Specifically, I examine whether the causal mechanisms of mediation actually appear in practice. My case study design combines qualitative and quantitative components. The qualitative component involves descriptive analysis of the case in order to establish the bargaining context faced by belligerents and assess the role of mediators within the conflict. I contrast my theory of conflict and mediation with the views of notable observers and scholars, especially in regard to the received wisdom that mediation was largely a "failure" in each war.

The quantitative component involves analysis of original time series data of the Bosnian War (1992-1995) to test the relationship between mediation and conflict severity. The empirical results demonstrate that mediation increases the level of cooperation between belligerents, as the causal mechanisms imply. There is some evidence to suggest that this effect is reciprocal, which implies a positive feedback loop between mediation and cooperation. The analysis further reveals that mediation changes the overall trajectory of the conflict,

helping to slow patterns of escalation and encourage patterns of cooperation. These findings corroborate the results of the cross-sectional analysis and increase our confidence in the existence of an indirect causal pathway.

These findings have important implications for how we study a broad class of policy instruments, including peacekeeping missions, arms embargoes, military intervention, and sanctions regimes. There is good reason to believe that these policies function, at least in part, by impacting the level of conflict severity on the ground. In this regard, the causal logic of indirect effects more closely resembles our theoretical understanding of how policy instruments work. At the very least, this framework deserves consideration as an alternative causal model in the study of policy instruments writ large.

1.3   Limitations and Qualifications

Conflicts are complex phenomena and it goes without saying that I do not capture all of its moving parts. Given my focus on a single policy instrument, several components of conflict are notably absent from the model. The most obvious omission is in regard to the interaction between multiple policy instruments. The potential for interaction between treatments is a thorny empirical problem. The common practice of assuming independence between treatments, often implicitly, is clearly untenable. Consider that the explanatory variables in the study of sanctions are often the "control" variables in the study of mediation, and vice versa. In other words, theory explicitly tells us that both sanctions and mediation stand in need of an assignment process, but these additional treatments usually end up on the right-hand-side of the equation along with a host of other "controls" of dubious exogeneity.

My model subsumes the effect of other interventions within the overall level of conflict severity. I do not consider interactions between mediation and other types of interventions in the cross-sectional research design. I recognize that this omission is inherently unsatisfying. However, I believe there is considerable value in bracketing this complexity and focusing narrowly on one policy instrument. The study of policy instruments must start from a solid foundation from which to build in complexity. In my view, scholars are too quick to add in conceptual complexity without a firm understanding of the fundamental features of a dynamic conflict environment. In this vein, one goal of this dissertation is to lay the groundwork for future research. The framework I develop can incorporate multiple policy interventions down the line. The biggest barrier to the incorporation of multiple interventions is a lack of data. The models required to capture additional complexity are data hungry. Furthermore, as I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, the relevant quantity is actually the number of failures in the data, not, as it has been portrayed, the number of total observations.

I also bracket variation within the conduct of mediation. The current literature includes a litany of distinctions between mediation strategy (facilitation, formulation, manipulation), mediator bias, and type of mediation actor (international organization vs. regional organization vs. state). These distinctions are plausible sources of variation in mediation's effect on conflict, but my view is that it is pointless to test these distinctions without first getting the underlying model of mediation and conflict right. If my argument is correct, the current approach to testing mediation leads to inaccurate estimates of the average treatment effect, so we have good reason to doubt the results of these studies. Rather than trying to adjudicate between the large set of derivative, second-order theories, I leave the task of testing for treatment variation to future research.

17

My conceptual framework is built around a broad, inclusive conception of mediation. That is, I specify observable implications that are present regardless of the strategy used by mediators, the degree of perceived mediator bias, or the type of organization spearheading the mediation mission.[18] In this way, I theorize and test for what I believe are the generalizable effects of mediation. I think it is important to recognize that there are diminishing returns and, in some cases, dangers to building in greater conceptual variation and specificity, especially when we do not have a firm understanding of the underlying conflict process. In the worst case, we risk creating an ad hoc theory of mediation's effectiveness based on random correlation structures in the data.

As scholars, we need to be precise about what we expect mediation to do within the context of a conflict. I view the progression of conflict as predominantly a function of the internal bargaining context. To this end, I argue that mediators have a limited ability to change the underlying structure of a conflict. In other words, mediators operate at the margins. In this vein, we should not expect mediation to be a panacea for conflict, but neither should we expect it to be the main cause of continued conflict. Instead, I suggest revising our expectations concerning what an individual mediation attempt can achieve. As noted earlier, I show that mediation increases the probability of settlement by around 2%. It would be a mistake to conclude that mediation is unimportant or ineffective. Small increases in the probability of settlement are important in producing peace, especially within the context of an iterated game. If I play the lottery a hundred times, I would prefer to play with a 12% chance of winning rather than a 10% chance. In the long-run, that small increase in probability will pay large dividends.

[18]Schrodt and Gerner (2004, 312-3) make a similar argument in regard to mediation strategy.

1.4 The Purpose of This Dissertation

This dissertation attempts to move us closer to a comprehensive model of the interaction between conflict and third-party intervention, thereby helping us better understand whether policy instruments like mediation actually work. To view this as a strictly empirical exercise is to miss the point. Research is a synthesis of theory and empirical testing. A central goal of the dissertation is to get scholars to pay more attention to mapping their theories onto empirical tests. Research design is vital to the practice of political science, but it is often given short-shrift in the discipline. The predominant focus of scholarly criticism and peer review centers on a scholar's theoretical contributions. The precedence of theory is useful up to a point, but it needs to be paired with an equally rigorous analysis of the back-end material: the empirical tests. Theories mean little if they are not rigorously evaluated. When it comes to the current modal approach to quantitative analysis in political science, a lot tends to get swept under the rug when it comes to testing our theories in practice. Too often the practice of mapping theory onto empirics boils down to the choice of a model based on the dependent variable. There is little thought given to the data generating process as a whole; we simply select a model off-the-shelf that others have used before. The choices made in regard to testing theory are essential to ensuring that our research design actually speaks to the theory in question, but they receive comparatively little scrutiny from fellow practitioners.

The lack of critical oversight in data analysis has led to a number of bad habits, many of which are well-documented (Achen, 2002; Ray, 2003; Schrodt, 2014; Braumoeller and Sartori, 2004). Yet it is important to understand that these criticisms of data analysis are

not just about the weeds—the procedural errors and technical oversights made in data analysis. The big-picture point is that bad habits arise because of an inattention to the intersection of theory and empirics. In practice, we tend to overlook basic questions, such as whether fundamental features of the model—e.g. the orthogonality of the right-hand-side variables—match our theoretical intuitions about the way variables interact. The result is that studies are often predicated on implicit assumptions that are never grounded in theory, and are sometime even contrary to the theory being espoused. Therefore, it is not so much that we have made an error in our algebraic calculations, but that we have failed to grasp that the underlying problem involves attention to causality as well as algebra. As a result, we end up neglecting the map between our theory and the causal structure of our model.

1.5 Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 examines the limitations of the current scholarship on conflict mediation, with a specific focus on the static approach to conflict. Whenever it is applied, the static conception of conflict causes problems for inference. Many of these problems are the result of using static data to proxy for dynamic quantities. However, not all of these problems can be solved by simply switching to time-varying data. I show how the static conception is like a set of horse-blinders; it closes off several important avenues for endogeneity between key factors in the conflict process. As a result, the transition toward a dynamic approach must be theoretical as well as empirical.

Chapter 3 presents my conceptual framework and considers the potential for indirect pathways between mediation and conflict settlement. I begin by outlining a theory of conflict built upon bargaining theory and the conflict processes literature. Next, I explore the

assignment process in which mediators decide to intervene. I critique the "selection" litera-ture and its narrow focus on conflict severity as a confounding variable. This is followed by a discussion of the causal mechanisms of mediation, which underscores how the potential for mediation to function via an indirect causal pathway has been overlooked. I conclude the chapter by exploring how conflict severity can potentially function as a time-varying confounder for the effect of mediation.

Chapter 4 explains my research design and describes the data used in the analysis. I outline the statistical model used in the large-N analysis, discuss its properties, and present the observable implications of my argument vis-à-vis the conventional wisdom. I focus on how to test the argument within the context of a cohort study, where observations are recorded each conflict-week. Next, I discuss the original event dataset created for the project, describe the static and dynamic covariates used in the analysis, and present relevant summary statistics.

Chapter 5 features the large-N quantitative analysis in support of my claim that me-diation has an indirect effect on conflict settlement. I begin by constructing a baseline estimate using the standard causal logic. I juxtapose those findings with the results from the marginal structural model, which estimates the effect of mediation in the presence of time-varying confounding. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the limitations of this analysis, which motivates the empirical investigation in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6 examines the causal mechanisms of mediation in more detail through a qual-itative and quantitative analysis of the Yugoslav Wars. The qualitative section involves descriptive analysis of the progression of each conflict. The purpose of this analysis is not to test hypotheses, but rather to develop a sense of the bargaining context and the role of mediators as conflict managers. I argue that it is difficult to judge mediation as a success,

or a failure, from the available evidence, and I explain the different ways in which scholars can be misled. In the quantitative section, I conduct a time series analysis of the Bosnian War to test several fine-grained observable implications of my argument, specifically in regard to causal mechanisms. I find strong evidence to support my argument that mediation increases cooperation. The results also indicate that mediation helps to change the overall trajectory of the conflict, accelerating patterns of cooperation and decelerating conflict spirals. Taken together, these two findings provide considerable support for the underlying causal mechanisms.

Chapter 7 summarizes the main conclusions from the analysis and explores avenues for further research. The last chapter is followed by two appendices, which feature additional discussion of the event data and further robustness checks.

Chapter 2: The Limitations of the Static Approach

In this chapter, I explain the different ways in which the existing static approach to conflict jeopardizes our ability to draw accurate inferences from the data. The chapter is organized in three sections. First, I present a brief overview of the state of mediation research in order to motivate the problem. Second, I define the static approach to conflict and discuss its conceptual and empirical components. Third, I explain the consequences of the static approach, which range from conceptual limitations, where theory does not match the data structure used in the analysis, to severe barriers to causal inference. I explain how these problems occur within studies that are not normally thought of as static, such as those that model the duration of a dispute.

2.1   The State of Mediation Research

Mediation is broadly understood as "a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law" (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, 13). The goal of conflict mediation is to help belligerents resolve their differences and reach a settlement. While it is certainly not viewed as a panacea for conflict, the consensus among policymakers is that mediation improves the chance of peaceful settlement. As UN

23

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon puts it, "Mediation is one of the most effective methods of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts."[19]

Within the academic study of mediation, scholars are more qualified in their opinion of mediation. After decades of empirical work, the literature on conflict management through mediation has revealed a litany of conditions and limitations to mediation's effectiveness. In broad strokes, we can group the literature into two opposing views: the pro-mediation camp, which argues that mediation is largely beneficial (Dixon, 1996; Regan and Stam, 2000; Beardsley et al., 2006; Asal et al., 2007; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Frazier and Dixon, 2006), and the pessimistic, or null camp, which asserts a null or negative effect (Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006; Schrodt and Gerner, 2004; Beardsley, 2008, 2011a).

Contestation between these camps seems to hinge on a patchwork of countervailing and contradictory results, which, upon careful reflection, appear to be highly contingent on the data used in the study, the factors selected for model specification, and the causal structure of the proposed model. Within the hard sciences we often observe a winnowing process toward greater understanding of a phenomenon over time.[20] Yet, rather than paring down or refining our understanding of mediation, the mediation literature has produced a set of results that fall well short of being definitive. The conclusions of a recent survey of the literature (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014) can be characterized as cautiously optimistic.

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[19]See the foreword of the UN's Guidance for Effective Mediation handbook, which was issued as an annex to the report of the Secretary-General on *Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution* (A/66/811, 25 June 2012).

[20]Albeit with switch-backs and false-starts.

On balance, the authors argue that mediation appears to have a net positive effect, however, "there remain many unanswered questions" (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014, 323).[21]

My hunch is that the lack of conclusive findings is the result of testing for effectiveness within a static conception of conflict, which overlooks many of the temporal dimensions of conflict. In particular, the current approach neglects the dynamic interaction between mediation and conflict. As a result, scholars have developed only a partial understanding of mediation's effect on conflict processes. To illustrate the consequences of what I call the "static approach," I begin by examining 1) what the approach entails, and 2) how it is put into practice.

2.2   What is the Static Approach?

By "static approach," I refer to a set of conceptual and empirical choices made by scholars, which, either implicitly or explicitly, omit the progression of conflict. On the one hand, the empirical choices revolve around the type of data structure used by researchers to test their theories. On the other, the conceptual choices center on the time-invariant quality of the theoretical model proposed by scholars. Because the conceptual and empirical domain are connected, these choices often bleed into one another. In what follows, I use "static approach," "static data," and "static model" to refer to related concepts. The distinction is slight: "static approach" refers to both the conceptual and empirical dimensions, while "static data" relates more narrowly to empirical choices and "static model" to conceptual choices regarding the causal logic of the model.

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[21]Also, Wallensteen and Svensson (2014, 315): "We claim that the overall body of literature that now exists on international mediation provides credible evidence of its effectiveness, although the particular conditions under which mediation is effective are still debated."

In the static approach, the probability of conflict settlement is a function of fixed conflict characteristics, such as the number of actors involved in a conflict, or whether the conflict actors are enduring rivals. Static factors are sometimes referred to as "structural," but the meaning is the same. Static models exclusively rely on data measured at the start of the dispute, such as whether the conflict actors were a member of an international organization, or data that represent a summary statistic of the entire time-period of the dispute, such as the total number of fatalities. The most influential datasets in the study of war—including the Correlates of War, International Crisis Behavior, and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo—are composed of static covariates.

There is nothing inherently wrong with using structural factors to predict conflict outcomes. The existing literature has demonstrated that static factors are important predictors of conflict outcomes and these results are consistent with some of our basic intuitions about conflict. We have good reason to believe, for example, that the total number of actors involved in a conflict will impact the duration of the dispute. The rationale here is that, as the number of actors increases, it becomes harder to find a point on the demand curve that will satisfy the preferences of the entire set of actors. Moreover, the preferences of actors are not strictly fixed over time, which means that preferences can "cycle" and change the underlying demand set.[22] Preference cycling presumably compounds as the number of actors increases, which makes it harder for the actors to maintain their agreement upon the demand set itself, let alone their agreement on a single point on the demand curve.

However, acknowledging that static factors are important is not the same as assuming they are the *only* factors that matter. The most severe limitation of a static model of conflict

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[22]This problem can be ameliorated via a "structure induced equilibrium," see Shepsle (1979); Riker (1980).

is that it assumes that dynamic factors have no influence on the probability of dispute settlement. The substance of conflict consists of dynamic interactions between belligerents, including overt uses of force such as military mobilizations or airstrikes; diplomatic exchanges such as threats or promises; and policy interventions such as mediation. In short, we leave out most of the actual substance of conflict when we focus exclusively on static factors. As such, while our theories conceive of conflict as a bargaining process, the process of conflict is left out of most research.

As a result, we have developed a partial understanding of conflict. As Shellman (2008, 465) observes: "although we have learned from the structural approach that characteristics of the state such as regime type, the economy, terrain, capabilities, and demographics like population and ethnicity are correlated with the level of political conflict we observe *across countries*, the approach has not taught us much about conflict processes as they unfold *over time within specific countries*" [italics in original]. A notable exception to this critique is the conflict processes literature, which deserves credit for drawing attention to the dynamic character of conflict (Azar, 1980). However, to date, there has not been an effort to apply the insights from the conflict processes literature to the large-N study of policy interventions. One reason is that the longitudinal view of conflict does not easily translate to the cross-sectional context. As a consequence, the study of third-party intervention has largely occurred within a static, cross-sectional context. This is true within the field of mediation research (Beardsley, 2008), peacekeeping (Fortna, 2004*a*,*b*), and sanctions (Miers and Morgan, 2002), among others.[23]

One argument for the static approach is that the model is parsimonious. Parsimony is rightly privileged when building models. Therefore, the burden of proof rests on whether

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[23]The sanctions data consist of individual "episodes" with static covariates. See Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990).

the temporal dimension matters for our analysis of conflict. To justify a less parsimonious model, there must be severe consequences of the current approximation. The current approach must simplify reality in a way that creates problems for our research. It is on these grounds that I position my critique. I will argue that the existing static model jeopardizes our ability to draw accurate inferences from the data. In particular, I explore how static data create problems for testing the effectiveness of a policy. I explain these problems in the next section.

2.3   The Consequences of the Static Approach

I assume that most scholars find something inherently unsatisfying about the static approach. Intuitively, there is a sense that it oversimplifies and glosses over important aspects of conflict. Yet, this oversimplification, by itself, is not grounds for dismissal. Scholarship requires simplifying assumptions when conducting research. And I am well-aware that research involves trade-offs. Such a thing as an 'ideal' model or an 'ideal' data proxy does not exist. Instead, we make do with 'good enough' models and 'reasonable' (and hopefully 'defensible') proxies. It is simply not practical, for instance, to build a new dataset to answer each research question. And while a newfangled model might better fit some aspect of the data generating process, its diagnostics are often less well-developed than the standard model. In short, scholars engage in a fair amount of triage when it comes to the practice of research. What is less appreciated, I contend, is how these choices effect the results of our empirical investigation. There are many plausible model specifications to choose from, with varying levels of conceptual and theoretical specificity; and yet, why did we choose this particular one? In a sense, scholars need a research design rubric to better inform these

choices. A major component of that rubric is answering: What is the inferential cost of using these static data?

The consequences of a static approach range from conceptual limitations to severe barriers to our ability to conduct valid causal inference. The best way to understand the main conceptual limitation is to present a few examples. Consider three of the most commonly encountered data structures within the literature: In the first, the unit of analysis is the conflict itself. Each conflict is represented with a single row of data, such as the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data. In the second, the unit of analysis is the conflict-year, such as the Uppsala/PRIO data on civil conflict. And third, a few datasets feature the conflict-month as the unit of analysis, such as Regan, Frank, and Aydin's (2009) data on diplomatic interventions and civil war. Each of the aforementioned datasets lack time-varying covariates.[24] As such, they cannot be used to test hypotheses related to the internal dynamics of conflict.

The conflict processes literature has criticized this conceptual limitation for a while now. What I want to highlight are some of the more subtle consequences of the static approach. I focus my critique on three circumstances: 1) where static proxies are used to stand in for dynamic factors, 2) where the treatment is dynamic, but the other covariates are static, and 3) where the duration of the conflict is modeled but the covariates remain static. In the context of these circumstances, I discuss five issues with the static approach:

1. static data proxies and analytic ambiguity,

2. the lack of a time-varying cause,

3. immortal time bias,

[24]To reiterate, this means that the covariates are identical across conflict-year, conflict-month, etc. Usually, things like contiguity, ethnic-dimension, power asymmetry, enduring rivalry, level of violence, and so on.

4. treating time as a nuisance,

5. confusion over confounding vs. intervening variables.

In the following sections, I explain how these issues can jeopardize our ability to draw accurate inferences of treatment effectiveness.

2.3.1   Static Data Proxies and Analytic Ambiguity

In the conflict literature, it is quite common for dynamic factors like casualties or violence to be collapsed into static quantities. For example, Regan and Stam (2000) use the sum of fatalities over the course of the dispute as a measure of the severity of the conflict. There are clearly practical considerations behind this choice. The practice of collapsing dynamic quantities into static variables is often driven by a lack of reliable time-varying data. We often lack reliable estimates of the number of fatalities in, say, a given week of a conflict, but estimates may exist of the total number killed in a longer time-frame.[25] Yet, this longer time-frame tends to be the duration of the entire conflict, which makes these measures time-invariant. Another common approach is to record the highest level of a time-varying quantity. This is the approach adopted in the ICB dataset, which records the highest level of violence reached during the conflict on a five point scale. Greig (2005, 256) combines these two practices by proxying for the severity of a conflict with "a term that incorporates measures of the highest level of hostility experienced during the dispute and the total number of military fatalities in the dispute."

Several issues arise when a dynamic factor or set of factors are reduced to static proxies. The first is that we mask temporal variation in the application of treatment, which, in practice, could create different versions of the treatment. Consider, for example, two conflicts,

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[25]In regard to the reliability of casualty data, see Gohdes and Price (2012) and Lacina and Gleditsch (2013) for a rejoinder.

A and B, that each last 100 days and suppose our explanatory variable is the highest level of violence. In conflict A, the highest level of violence occurs on Day 1 of the conflict and the rest of the conflict experiences a strong downward trend toward more and more cooperation. In conflict B, the highest level of violence occurs at Day 99 of the conflict, and the preceding period features gradually escalating conflictual relations, which reach their peak at the occurrence of settlement. These two circumstances appear identical with static data yet they look very different in practice.

The same logic applies to the standard set of policy instruments. It is quite common in the conflict management literature to collapse multiple instances of a policy, such as mediation, peacekeeping, or military intervention, into a single static proxy indicating whether the policy was used at any point during the conflict. Consider, again, two conflicts, A and B, that each last 100 days. In conflict A, mediation occurs on Day 1 of the conflict and is not repeated. In conflict B, mediation occurs at Day 99 of the conflict and not before. Again, these two cases are treated the same in a static model, which gives equal weight to the Day 1 and Day 99 treatment.

There is a sense in which treatment scenarios A and B represent different analytic quantities. The goal, presumably, is to estimate an average treatment effect of mediation, but what does the coefficient on the 'mediation' variable refer to analytically? We want it to say something about the average treatment effect of mediation, irrespective of the timing of its application. Yet, to make this inference we are forced to assume that the timing of treatment is randomized in the sample, which would only occur via a happy accident. So if we cannot assume that the timing is randomized, then the relevant analytical quantity is something very abstract, such as: some conflicts "experience" treatment and others do not. It is clear that this is not the quantity that we want to be capturing with our research design.

31

As we can see, there is good reason to doubt whether we can usefully generalize based on the estimate from the static model. Our definition of the analytical concept becomes very tenuous. Perhaps more worrying is the case where both treatments in A and B have a positive effect on the outcome. In this case, if we reflect upon the underlying temporal dynamics, we are led to radically different explanations of the causal mechanisms at work. In conflict A, mediation occurs on Day 1, which suggests that mediators lay the groundwork for settlement, or that they foster positive conflict resolution techniques at the outset, which then influences the entire trajectory of the conflict. On the other hand, in conflict B, the final settlement appears to be a function of a long-term trend of increasing conflict severity, in which one side eventually forces the other, at the tip of a spear, to back down. This suggests that mediation on Day 99, while technically preceding settlement, has a procedural or pro forma rationale. In this event, mediators are simply putting the terms of the settlement in the diplomatic vernacular. Rather than being a cause of settlement, mediation happens to co-vary with the underlying causal force: conflict dynamics.

By treating mediation as a static measure, we end up estimating a coefficient that potentially represents an assortment of different analytical quantities. In the worst case, the coefficient is an artifact of the vagaries of the sample. For example, if a particular sample includes a large number of cases where mediation is used early in the crisis, the results might contradict other studies were the timing of mediation is more randomly distributed. Of course, I recognize that we have to draw the line somewhere in terms of conceptual variation. Any proxy we choose will gloss over and oversimplify certain aspects of the underlying analytic quantity. And, admittedly, I outlined several conceptual limitations of my own design in Chapter 1. That said, my view is that the analytic ambiguity created by

the static conception renders it effectively useless for testing our theories. It simply does not provide enough traction onto the analytic concepts we want to test.

In a sense, my critique is related to the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) invoked in the matching literature. SUTVA states that the potential outcome is stable for any unit after treatment. SUTVA can be violated if 1) there are different versions of the treatment, and 2) there is interference between units, i.e. treatment of one unit in some way affects the probability of another unit being treated (Rubin, 1990, 282). In essence, I am arguing that temporal variation in a policy implies different versions of the treatment. In this case, the resultant coefficient estimate does not speak to the theoretical concept in question.

Another problem lurks beneath the surface: By collapsing dynamic explanatory and control variables into static proxies, we tend to assume away the potential for covariance between mediation and the state of the conflict. Theoretically, it may be reasonable to assume that a binary indicator of mediation is orthogonal to a binary indicator of conflict severity, but the same cannot be said for dynamic measures of mediation and conflict severity over time. Thus, the practice of using static proxies shuts off potential avenues for theorizing. As a result, we tend to gloss over potential interactions because the proxies used are so watered down.

2.3.2 The Lack of a Time-Varying Cause

Within the field of third-party intervention, an increasingly popular unit of analysis is the initiation of treatment, which is often repeated during a single conflict. Consider Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth's (2008) study of the effectiveness of global vs. regional IOs, whose unit of analysis is the peaceful settlement attempt, either a mediation effort or bilateral talks. In this case, there are usually multiple observations within a conflict

that vary overtime, but the time gap between observations is non-uniform. Several prominent datasets that code for mediation use this unit of analysis, the most prominent being Hensel's (2001) Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) and Bercovitch's (2004) International Conflict Management (ICM) data. A typical quantitative analysis using these data will compare mediation-related attempts to other types of conflict management attempts (e.g. fact-finding, sanctions, etc). While data sources like ICOW and ICM record characteristics related to the conflict, these covariates are static; e.g. the presence of ethnic rivalries. In particular, factors related to conflict severity are almost always static or aggregate metrics, such as the presence of an enduring rivalry, or the total number of fatalities.

By specifying the unit of analysis as the conflict management attempt, we effectively divorce treatment assignment (the realization of the conflict management attempt) from the dynamic character of conflict. Consider the data generating process behind the creation of these data. Conflict management attempts do not fall out of the sky. Each attempt in the dataset is "realized" via an assignment process that is a function of the conflict process. It stands to reason that the decision to intervene is based on monitoring the conflict over a period of time; third parties are likely to examine patterns of behavior, trends of conflict and cooperation. Yet, in this data structure, conflict management attempts have nothing to systematically co-vary with overtime; they are purely a function of structural, time-invariant characteristics. In other words, this literature allows for temporal variation in the treatment relative to the overall length of the conflict, but not in regard to covariates related to the assignment equation.

Even if some factors vary over time in the data, this unit of analysis pushes researchers to adopt a static model. Imagine a scenario where the dataset included time-varying covariates measuring conflict severity, but the unit of analysis remained the same. The data

structure pigeonholes the researcher into a static model of conflict because the lag times of within-subject observations are not uniform. As such, building lags into the model is a non-trivial problem. If we were to implement a one-period lag in the model, the lag would capture a non-standard period of time between each conflict management attempt. In this case, a certain lag might represent 1 week in elapsed time while another represents several months. As a result, in this data structure an individual mediation attempt simply appears with a set of exogenously given covariates and a record of the outcome. The temporal connection between observations is lost.

This issue is not only a function of the data structure. For example, Regan and Stam (2000) consider the effect of mediation on the probability of settlement within a conflict-month. Regan and Stam's (2000) study was seminal because it was one of the first to treat mediation as a time-varying quantity. However, what is notably absent from Regan and Stam's model is the potential for other time-varying factors to influence the decision to mediate.[26] In fact, most scholars assume that the non-random decision to intervene is based on structural factors. For example, an influential work by Gartner (2011, 385) predicts mediation in the assignment equation using time-invariant factors such as dispute issue and dyadic power differences. Even studies that focus exclusively on the determinants of mediation tend to examine only static factors related to mediation (Greig, 2015). This state of affairs applies to the larger literature on third-party interventions (Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012). My point is that the addition of time-varying treatments is not a sufficient solution to this problem. A time-varying treatment stands in need of a time-varying cause.

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[26]The authors readily acknowledge this. Regan and Stam (2000, 251): "Unlike the mediation timing data, which vary from observation to observation, the fatality data are the sum of fatalities over the course of the dispute. These data limitations preclude our being able to distinguish the precise effect of fatalities, in that we would obviously expect fatalities and the duration of disputes to be highly correlated."

2.3.3 Immortal Time Bias

The static approach extends to the use of event history models in political science. In most empirical work in political science, the only substantive difference between an event history model and a traditional regression model is the addition of a time-counter capturing duration; the covariates are still time-invariant. Many people find this puzzling at first as we tend to associate event history models with the ideas of "dynamics" and "time." However, there is nothing in the specification of a hazard model that requires time-varying covariates for identification. The inferential strategy of an event history model is to compare the ratio of failures to survival across different time points. To see how this is the case, consider the hazard function of the standard Cox model below,

$$h_i(t) = exp(\beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \cdots + \beta_k x_{ki}) h_0(t), \tag{2.1}$$

where subscript i denotes an individual case and $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard. Notice that estimation of the covariates does not involve a time variable, which is clear if we rearrange the model in terms of log hazard ratios:

$$log\left[\frac{h_i(t)}{h_0(t)}\right] = \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \cdots + \beta_k x_{ki}, \tag{2.2}$$

As we can see, the effect of time is distinct from the effect of the covariates. Time-invariant covariates function without a problem in this set-up. In an informal sense, the model starts from time-zero and compares the number of failures to those still surviving at each time period going forward. This information is used to estimate the instantaneous hazard, or the hazard of failure as the length of a time period approaches zero. In effect, the model "controls" for the duration of a dispute by comparing the risk of failure across time periods. In this set-up, the event history approach is analogous to any standard regression

model that adjusts for the duration of a dispute via splines or other similar methods. Both types of model provide an estimate of whether the covariates increase (or decrease) the instantaneous risk of conflict settlement.

This strategy of controlling for duration while using time-invariant covariates inadvertently creates a major barrier to inference. Problems arise when scholars rely on time-invariant covariates to investigate the effectiveness of what is actually a time-varying treatment. In other words, the treatment enters the model as a time-invariant quantity, typically as a binary indicator, but it occurs in practice at a particular time point within the context of the entire conflict. This seemingly minor difference between the way the variable enters the model and how it occurs in practice may seem innocuous, but it creates the problem of "immortal time" that prohibits the accurate estimation of the treatment effect.

"Immortal time" refers to the period of time between the start of the observation and the initiation of treatment (Suissa, 2008; Anderson, Cain, and Gelber, 1983; Buyse and Piedbois, 1996). This time-period is extremely relevant as most policy interventions are rarely present at the onset of a conflict. The pre-treatment period is "immortal" in the sense that the outcome under study could not have occurred *by definition*, otherwise the "treated" case would become a "control." As Suissa (2008, 493) explains, "While a subject is not truly immortal during this time span, the subject necessarily had to remain event free until start of exposure to be classified as exposed." As a consequence, treating this pre-treatment period as part of the duration of the "treated" case will artificially inflate the relationship between the treatment and the length of a dispute. To put this in more concrete terms, treating mediation as time-invariant while controlling for the duration of conflict will artificially inflate the association between mediation and longer disputes.

As an example of how a failure to account for this problem can lead to inaccurate inferences, Redelmeier and Singh (2001) find that Oscar winners live longer than their less successful peers. The rejoinder by Sylvestre, Huszti, and Hanley (2006) explains that the issue here is that "Oscar winner" is treated a time-invariant covariate—individuals are either always Oscar winners or always non-winners. In effect, this specification treats the time until an individual wins an Oscar as immortal time because a person has to be alive to win an Oscar.[27]

In epidemiology, immortal time bias is often the result of survivor treatment selection bias. As Hoover and Glesby (1996) explains, "Unlike patients in a randomized, clinical trial, patients in an observational study choose if and when to begin treatment. Patients who live longer have more opportunities to select treatment; those who die earlier may be untreated by default." Survivor treatment selection bias is also likely in the domain of conflict studies. First and foremost, policy instruments like mediation are not randomly assigned. Second, conflicts that last longer will simply have more opportunities for treatment.

Immortal time bias is ubiquitous in epidemiology and pharmacology (Suissa, 2008). It frequently results in major empirical findings being overturned after further analysis. It is important to understand that the problem is caused by the use of static covariates to stand in for dynamic quantities. Anytime scholars use time-invariant data to capture a time-varying treatment there is the potential for immortal time bias. While duration models have become more and more popular in the discipline, the potential for immortal time bias has not been addressed. The implication is that the current literature has systematically underestimated the positive effect of policy interventions studied in this manner.

[27]Posthumous Oscars were not counted in the initial study.

Fortunately, the solution is relatively straightforward. We remove the bias by classifying the subject as unexposed during the pre-treatment period. In other words, the solution is to define the treatment based on how it functions in practice—as a time-varying quantity. If the treatment is allowed to vary over time, then the pre-treatment span functions as a "control," rather than a "treated" time period where survival is guaranteed.

A related problem can occur with extremely short conflicts. Potential mediators may be limited by a logistical inability to intervene at all, or intervene fully, when a conflict is quickly resolved. A mediation mission must be planned and organized before it is carried out, so conflicts that are extremely short may not last long enough to actually experience a full-fledged mediation mission. These extremely short conflicts are automatically assigned to the untreated group, but it was never possible for them to receive the treatment condition. This problem is caused by heterogeneity in the underlying data generating process, not a problem with specification, so it can arise even when we specify a time-varying treatment. In essence, we have created a group of control cases that fail for reasons unrelated to the condition under study. The solution is to consider conflicts after enough time has elapsed so that they are at risk of the treatment condition. How much time must elapse for the conflict to be "at risk" should be determined by familiarity with the treatment condition under study.

Taking all of this into consideration, it seems clear that time-varying covariates are a necessary addition to the study of conflict. This data structure is certainly not new to social science writ large. Time series cross-sectional (TSCS) data are one of the most

common data structures in economics.[28] And within political science, time series cross-sectional data are frequently used in the sub-field of comparative politics. Yet, in most studies, "time" tends to get treated as a nuisance both empirically and conceptually. How the process unfolds over time is not of substantive interest. The next section discusses how treating time as a nuisance can cause problems.

2.3.4 Time as a Nuisance

In one sense, immortal time bias is caused by how scholars operationalize the treatment under study. The remedy is to specify time-varying treatments. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that immortal time bias is fundamentally a data problem and leave it at that. Immortal time bias arises because of an inattention to the dynamic character of the process being studied. I claim that this inattention will not be solved by simply using time-varying data. To see how this is the case, consider that political science has used time series cross-sectional data for decades. And yet despite the use of these data, the dynamic character of the process being studied is almost always overlooked. In other words, we can still be trapped in a static mindset while using dynamic data.

To illustrate how this occurs in practice, we need to first understand how political scientists account for the temporal dimension of time series cross-sectional data. In two widely cited pieces (Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998) Beck and Katz explain how past scholars have ignored the time-varying component to these data structures, failing to account for the time series nature of the data. Beck and Katz point out that many existing studies use dyad-year as the unit of analysis (Russett, Oneal, and Davis, 1998), but fail to account for the temporality of the data structure. With data structures like country-year or

[28]See Adolph, Butler, and Wilson (2005) for an overview of types of estimators used for TSCS data. A TSCS example in economics is Garrett (1998), who analyzes the role of political and labor market variables in determining economic policies for fourteen OECD countries, observed annually, from 1966 to 1990.

dyad-year, the observations are correlated over time. For example, a country's GDP in 1950 is not independent of its GDP in 1949, and treating them as independent will understate the degree of uncertainty in the data. If autocorrelation is left unmodeled, the standard errors of the model will be systematically biased downward. Beck and Katz advocate for the use of splines and time-counters to fix this problem.

It is fair to say that Beck and Katz solution treats time as a nuisance. By nuisance I mean that the temporality of the data generating process is not of substantive interest to the scholar. Therefore, the goal is simply to remove the bias caused by autocorrelation in the data. There is nothing inherently wrong with treating time as a nuisance in this manner, but it does not problematize the dynamic nature of the data generating process. In many studies, the dynamics of the data generating process are not integral to the theory being tested. Democratic peace theory, for example, is concerned with testing the probability of war in a set of democratic dyads compared to a set of mixed or authoritarian dyads. A process like democratic transition—where a country moves from an authoritarian regime to a robust democracy—is not typically studied with this data structure. The most common hypothesis is simply that a static character of a dyad—shared democracy—correlates with the probability of war.

TSCS data make a lot of sense if we have a theory that says the effect of our treatment changes over time. This kind of process can be captured by a time-varying coefficient model, which are not widely used in the discipline.[29] The logic of time-varying coefficients may map onto a relevant hypothesis. For example, we might imagine a hypothesis concerning the emergence of democratic norms, where the effect of democratic institutions

[29]See Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1998). This model should not be confused with the idea that a treatment interacts with time via an interaction term (Regan and Stam, 2000). In that case, the treatment may interact with time but the underlying parameter value is fixed. In contrast, the idea of time-varying coefficients is that the treatment parameter actually changes over time.

actually changes over time as more people buy into the normative value of democracy (Cederman and Rao, 2001).[30] In any case, time-varying coefficient models are incredibly rare in political science. So, by themselves, they do not provide a cogent explanation for the use of time series cross-sectional data. If time plays no theoretical role in the data generating process under study, why are TSCS data preferred over cross-sectional data?

I think the main reason is sample size. A dirty secret of applied statistics is that time series cross-sectional data are often used to vastly increase the sample size being studied. Cederman and Rao (2001), for example, examine 1,974 MIDs from 1837 to 1992, which when converted into the dyad-year format yields 52,276 observations—a 26-fold increase in the number of observations compared to raw data.[31] It is well-known that a large sample size makes it easier for variables to achieve statistical significance. As Braumoeller and Sartori (2004, 140) note, "A data set with 50,000 observations, for example, permits us to uncover even the most minute relationships among variables and demonstrate that they are unlikely to have occurred by chance. Such relationships may, however, provide only very weak support for the theory under consideration." This occurs because p-values are a function of the sample size. Unless the effect of the variable is exactly zero, then a large sample size will render almost any variable statistically significant. This is true of any statistical test of significance that divides the standardized difference of two quantities by

[30]However, one complaint with time-varying coefficient models is that they can be interpreted as the byproduct of a deficiency in the operationalization of the concept. If the democracy coefficient changes over time, then perhaps the concept of democracy is not adequately captured by the data being used. It seems reasonable to wonder whether the way democracy is operationalized is masking underlying changes in the concept itself.

[31]This increase is also due to splitting conflicts into multiple dyads, but I will set this issue aside for now.

a reciprocal function of the sample size, which is to say: pretty much all test statistics. As sample size increases, so will the value of the test statistic.[32]

What is less well-known, however, is the way in which sample size relates to the properties of logit and hazard models, two types of models that are prevalent in conflict studies. The conventional wisdom in political science is that a larger sample size allows for a larger number of independent variables to be included in the analysis, as the degrees of freedom increases with the number of observations. However, while this logic is pervasive across the discipline, the conventional wisdom within political science turns out to be incorrect. Two influential works in applied epidemiology (Peduzzi et al., 1995, 1996) show that, for logit models and hazard models, the relevant quantity is not the number of subject-years, but rather the number of events, or failures that occur. It turns out that the accuracy and precision of the model is not based on the number of dyad-years, but the number of binary outcomes—wars, MIDs, crises, etc—that occur. Moreover, the same rationale applies to the power of statistical tests, which depend not on the size of the sample in this case, but rather on the number of failure events. As Biau, Kernéis, and Porcher (2008, 2285-6) explain, "In a cohort study of patients treated for soft tissue sarcoma with various treatments, such as surgery, radiotherapy, chemotherapy, etc, the power to detect the effect of chemotherapy on survival will depend on the number of patients who die, not on the total number of patients in the cohort." Simulation studies have been conducted to determine the threshold for the number of events per variable (EPV) required to maintain the desirable properties of the model. The estimated EPV threshold is less than 10 (Peduzzi et al., 1996). That is, for every 10 failures in the data, one independent variable can be included on the right-hand-side. The implication, if it is not clear already, is that the effective sample size

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[32]This point is well-illustrated by the biostatistician, Allen Fleishman, in several excellent blog posts. See http://allenfleishmanbiostatistics.com/Articles/

of the 50,000 dyad-year data set has now drastically shrunk with severe consequences for the number of right-hand-side variables in our models.

The consequences of failing to follow the rule of 10 EPV are not trivial. Peduzzi et al. (1996, 1373) report that, "For EPV values less than 10, however, the regression coefficients were biased in both positive and negative directions; the large sample variance estimates from the logistic model both overestimated and underestimated the sample variance of the regression coefficients; the 90% confidence limits about the estimated values did not have proper coverage; the Wald statistic was conservative under the null hypothesis; and paradoxical associations (significance in the wrong direction) were increased." These results are important for political scientists to take seriously. Most scholars that use dyad-year data also rely on logit or hazard models to estimate the probability of war or another binary outcome.[33] These results suggest that adopting dyad-year data does not necessarily justify the inclusion of a bevy of control variables. In fact, these additional control variables may undermine the properties of the model if they lead to an EPV greater than 10.

This said, subsequent epidemiological research has shown that the rule of 10 EPV may be slightly conservative (Vittinghoff and McCulloch, 2007). In any case, adjudicating the exact threshold for EPV is not my primary concern here. My issue is with using a large sample size to justify the inclusion of a bevy of controls. What is the rationale behind including these control variables in the first place? The simple answer is that we are obsessed with the idea of confounding variables. To return to an earlier example, consider that the entire history of the democratic peace theory debate has revolved around critics alleging that omitted variables account for the observed effect of democracy, such as capitalism (Gartzke, 2007), the Cold War (Farber and Gowa, 1997), or a host of alternative

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[33]For example, almost any study published using the MIDs data (Gochman and Maoz, 1984) falls into this category.

confounders. Confounding variables are common causes of the treatment and outcome, so the logic is that some alternative factor correlates with democracy and is causally related to the outcome. To account for these alternative explanations for the democratic peace, scholars have resorted to a kitchen-sink approach to data analysis, where any potential confounder is thrown into the regression. The inferential logic goes something like this: "If the treatment effect can survive this barrage of control variables, then whatever is left over must be the truth."

This kitchen-sink approach has been widely ridiculed by political methodologists (Achen, 2002; Schrodt, 2014; Braumoeller and Sartori, 2004). I think it is fair to say that, when pressed, most political scientists would shake their head and bemoan this kind of data analysis. But, at the same time, whether we realize it or not, most scholars tacitly accept some version of the inferential logic described above, where a treatment must be subjected to a barrage of controls. My hunch is that part of the reason this logic has remained unproblematized is due to an implicit reliance on a static conception of conflict. Within a static conflict, the idea of common causes makes a lot of sense. However, it is important to realize that confounding is not the only possible causal relationship between two explanatory variables. To illustrate how the current scholarship goes awry, we need to examine the logic of confounding variables and how it relates to the study of policy intervention.

2.3.5 Confounding Variables

In much of the literature, the non-random decision to intervene has become synonymous with the terms "selection" and "selection bias." According to Gartner (2011): "The next step [in the study of mediation] is to control, theoretically and statistically, for selection's influence." This logic was introduced by Fortna (2004*a*,*b*), who popularized the idea that peacekeepers "selected" into tough, intractable cases. The implication was that

scholars were underestimating the true effect of peacekeeping by ignoring the factors that influenced the decision of peacekeepers to intervene. As such, any vanilla test of peacekeeping was set up to fail: It was as if doctors had given a drug to a group of very sick people and compared the results to a pool of healthy individuals—regardless of whether the drug worked, the control group of healthy individuals would outperform the treated group of sick patients. Based on this rationale, Fortna argued that the severity of the conflict was a confounder for the effect of peacekeeping—a common cause of the treatment and the outcome in question.[34] To correct for confounding, Fortna adjusted for several observable measures of conflict toughness in the model.

What followed was a massive influx of articles on the "selection problem" related to different types of policy interventions. Scholars were quick to point out myriad factors that were related to the assignment process, and they concluded that these factors must be confounders for the treatment in question.[35] The reasoning was simple: If confounders related to selection could all be identified and controlled for, then we would finally be able to uncover the true causal effect of our treatments.

The popularity of this logic has conditioned us to assume that factors related to "conflict severity" are confounding variables for the effect of policy instruments. Unfortunately, this logic has become so ingrained that we have lost sight of the fact that confounding is a *theoretical* concept with no definitive empirical test.[36] To illustrate this point, Ray (2003, 4) outlines a scenario where we observe that X is correlated with Y. If X has no true causal

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[34] See Greenland, Robins, and Pearl (1999) and Pearl (2011) for an overview of the types of confounding.

[35] In regard to mediation, Gartner (2011, 381) is paradigmatic of this point when he notes that "the literature has largely focused on demonstrating the existence and importance of selection effects. The next step is to control, theoretically and statistically, for selection's influence and to estimate more accurately the process effects of different aspects of mediation."

[36] See Pearl (2011); Heckman and Robb (1986).

Z as a confounding variable.   Z as an intervening variable.

Figure 2.1. Confounding vs. Intervening Diagram

effect on Y, then the inclusion of a *confounding* variable, Z, will remove or diminish the association between X and Y, thereby supporting the conclusion that X has no effect on Y. But if X has a true causal effect on Y, then the inclusion of an *intervening* variable, Z, will remove or diminish the association between X and Y, thereby supporting the conclusion that X and Y are causally related. Because we cannot 'know' whether X has a true causal effect on Y, there is no way to distinguish between these two scenarios given the observable data: Either Z is a confounder or Z is an intervening variable. To adjudicate between these scenarios, Blalock (1964) points out that we must engage in "interpretation." In other words, the most important question is whether the concept of confounding matches our theory about the interplay between conflict severity and mediation.

This logic illustrates why "controlling" for variables without theorizing their relationship makes little sense; the impact of these variables on the regression can render opposite conclusions depending on whether the variable is a confounding or an intervening variable. In theoretically ambiguous cases, it is often better to err on the side of omission rather than

inclusion, a point made thirty years ago by Achen (1986) when he showed that most factors which are strongly correlated with treatment assignment but not the outcome are better left out of the regression because their inclusion can actually lead to greater inconsistency in the results.[37] This is often because factors are treated as confounders simply because they are strongly correlated with the *treatment*, yet it often turns out that they do not, in fact, impact the outcome. The fact that these variables only serve to increase inconsistency is yet another rationale behind Achen's (2002) preference for stripped down models and his well-known (but not implemented) "rule-of-three."

The payoff from this distinction between confounding and intervening variables becomes evident when we move from a static to a dynamic model of conflict. Within a static model, conflict severity can function as either a confounding variable or an intervening variable, but not both. Yet, when we transition to a dynamic model of conflict, the causal relationship between mediation and conflict severity has the potential to change over time. If this is the case, then the standard causal logic has gone about testing for mediation's effectiveness in the wrong way. If conflict severity is an intervening variable, then adjusting for it on the right-hand-side will actually remove the indirect effect of mediation. Thus, there are major empirical stakes for these theoretical choices. Once we start to think through the interaction between treatment and conflict dynamics, the conceptual design-space expands, and so with it our causal model of third-party intervention.

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[37] Achen (1986) shows that the inconsistency of the estimator is a function of the covariance of the errors of the assignment and outcome equation divided by the unexplained variance. As long as the numerator is non-zero, then the better we predict assignment (i.e. the lower the unexplained variance), the greater the inconsistency.

2.4 Wrap-up

This chapter has explored some of the costs of our reliance on a static approach to conflict. Whenever it is applied, the static approach causes problems for inference. Many of these problems are the result of using static data to proxy for dynamic quantities. However, not all of these problems can be solved by simply switching to time-varying data. The static conception closes off several important avenues for endogeneity between key factors in the conflict process. Therefore, the transition toward a dynamic approach must be theoretical as well as empirical. In the next chapter, I build a conceptual framework for thinking about the interaction between mediation and an ongoing conflict.

Chapter 3: Toward A Dynamic Approach to Conflict and Mediation

A static model of conflict cannot capture the interaction between a policy instrument and the conflict environment. As a result, we have developed only a partial understanding of mediation and its impact. The limitations of the current scholarship offer a compelling rationale for transitioning to a more dynamic view. What does a dynamic model of conflict look like? Two prominent schools of thought provide some groundwork for thinking about dynamics: 1) rationalist models of strategic bargaining, and 2) action-reaction models of conflict processes. In this chapter, I review the two literatures, synthesize their insights into conflict dynamics, and build a model for studying the effectiveness of mediation.

3.1 Thinking about Conflict Dynamics

3.1.1 The Rationalist View

The rationalist literature has a long history of using simple games to model a wide variety of strategic scenarios. Early work in political science explored the heuristic value of prisoner's dilemma, stag-hunt, and chicken, in which players make a discrete choice (e.g. to defect or cooperate) with the payoffs based on the choices of their counterparts.[38] By definition, one-shot games represent a static strategic scenario, where players make a

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[38] In IR, seminal work in this genre was done by Jervis (1978) and Axelrod (1984).

single move and the game is over.[39] An influential article by Fearon (1995) conceptualizes war as a one-shot lottery in which players pay to have a chance at winning the spoils.

The lottery analogy offers an apt illustration of the bargaining puzzle of war: If war is ex post inefficient, then why do wars occur in practice? Bargainers would be better off reaching a mutual settlement without paying the buy-in costs of the lottery. Fearon's answer was that information asymmetries and commitment problems create inefficiency. These two elements form the conceptual foundation of any bargaining model.[40] Information problems arise because bargainers have access to private information such as their reservation value for accepting a particular settlement. In the coordination phase of bargaining, both actors may desire a Pareto superior agreement to end a dispute but they each fear paying too dearly in a settlement. Thus, a lengthy process of calibration can result where both sides exchange costly signals to communicate their capabilities and intentions. The information problem is made especially acute because both parties have incentives to misrepresent their private information to achieve a more favorable bargaining outcome (Schelling, 1966).

Uncertainty as a result of information asymmetry is a prominent explanation of conflict between states (Blainey, 1988; De Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). The vast majority of game theoretic work on the informational explanation for bargaining breakdown is built upon the assumption that both actors would reach a settlement if there was perfect information (Rubinstein, 1982). In practice, some degree of private information obfuscates the bargaining environment. Bargainers face a risk-reward tradeoff (Powell, 1996, 2006) such that high reward offers (e.g. a low bid) are also more likely to risk bargaining breakdown. The crisis bargaining model can be likened to bartering with a car salesman. Both the buyer and the

[39]One-shot games are applicable to a number of strategic situations in international relations, including arms racing, bandwagoning, and brinkmanship.

[40]In most cases, one element is held fixed and the goal of the analysis is to derive the equilibrium solutions to variation in the other element.

salesman are unaware of the other sides 'true' reservation value for buying and selling the car, thus a lengthy process of offers and counter-offers results.

The second major barrier to settlement are commitment problems.[41] Commitment problems occur because bargainers face the problem of committing to uphold an agreement in the future. The anarchic international system makes commitment problems especially acute because there is no enforcer to guarantee that a deal struck between two bargainers will be upheld should incentives arise in the future that encourage cheating. Solutions to this problem involve creating a "public, long-term forum" which lengthens the shadow the future and makes agreements between bargainers public knowledge (Simmons and Martin, 2002).

Within this framework, one-shot games like Fearon's costly lottery condense the progression of conflict into a single roll of the dice. Admittedly, Fearon's use of the lottery analogy is intended to showcase a time-invariant point: War, as a whole, is ex post inefficient. Yet within Fearon's argument are the kernels of a larger point about inefficiency within the entire conflict process. One way to frame the costly lottery is that the 'cost' of a ticket is a function of what goes on during the conduct of a war. Wars are more or less costly, we might assume, depending on the relative severity of signals. Conflict actors have some degree of control over the inefficiency of a conflict. As a result, the risk-reward trade-off exists for each costly signal sent by an actor. For example, for each cruise missile fired, the sender transmits information about capabilities and resolve at the cost of the cruise missile. Yet, both parties would prefer to broker a deal prior to the cruise missile strike. In sum, the inefficiency puzzle applies not only to the overall inefficiency of the war, but also to each interaction between the conflict actors.

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[41]Fearon outlined a third barrier to settlement—bargaining indivisibilities—but Powell (2006) convincingly argues that intractability can be subsumed under the analytic concept of commitment problems.

The one-shot lottery implies that there is a single draw to determine the end of game—e.g. either the coin lands head and you win, or tails and you lose. But if we consider the progression of conflict, then the more useful analogy is a series of draws for a jackpot. The 'repeated draws' analogy illustrates the dilemma that actors face when deciding whether to continue a conflict, or accept a deal. At any point, either actor can concede and accept an agreement that "splits" the winnings in favor of the other side. To try for a better distribution of the spoils, actors can choose to continue the conflict by either maintaining the status-quo or escalating the conflict via the use of costly signals. These signals could encourage the other side to capitulate, or they could trigger a response. In the latter case, the severity of the conflict has the potential to escalate as each side ups the ante. Escalation spirals resemble drug addiction in this way—once the body becomes conditioned to a certain level of the drug, an increasingly larger dose is required to elicit the same effect.

Whether we envision repeated draws for a lottery or another similar scenario, it is clear that the progression of conflict has a clear analog to repeated play. This notion of playing an iterated game has a long history in the rationalist scholarship. Seminal work by Schelling (1969) derives simple models to explain the dynamics of neighborhood segregation. Schelling showed how a parsimonious tipping point model could produce high levels of racial segregation, even if each household was highly tolerant of different races. These tipping-point models follow a falling domino-like logic, where one household leaving the neighborhood set off a chain reaction that leads to racial segregation. Within international relations, Axelrod (1984) famously showed how iterating the game of prisoners' dilemma can change the optimal strategy and equilibrium outcome. If we iterate one-shot games, we

end up with a rough approximation of a dynamic process. For example, we might characterize the set of Cold War-era arms control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game.

Later work conceptualized the outbreak of conflict, not as an endpoint or 'breakdown,' but rather as a continuation of bargaining by other means.[42] In an influential piece, Pillar (1983) refers to conflict as a *bargaining process*, which opened the flood gates for dynamic bargaining theories of war. Much of applied scholarship (Fortna, 2008; Beardsley, 2011*a*) is not wedded to a single formal model of conflict per se. Rather, the analysis takes place within the bargaining framework for thinking about conflict. Pillar (1983), for example, does not provide a formal model of negotiations, but he thinks through the strategic situations confronted by belligerents within the context of bargaining theory. For applied work in international conflict, this generalized 'bargaining framework' has arguably been the most influential facet of bargaining theory.

What are the dynamic components of conflict within the bargaining framework? In models that focus on information asymmetry, the process of warfighting is viewed as an essential tool for signaling capabilities and intentions. For example, Werner (1998) argues that fighting reveals the balance of power between adversaries which makes an agreement based around this power differential more tenable. Similarly, Filson and Werner (2002, 2004) contend that costly signaling during conflict helps the expectations of both actors converge, leading to a greater chance of settlement. And Smith and Stam (2004) argue that more battles fought during a war translates into a greater amount of information revealed to disputants. Of course, fighting is not the only means of signaling. As Slantchev (2003) points out, the literal process of bargaining at the negotiating table is an important source

[42]To turn a phrase from Clausewitz.

of information. Cooperative actions such as public promises or ceasefire agreements can also serve as meaningful signals. Taken as a whole, the bargaining system operates like a feedback loop. The actions of belligerents are both a function of the given structure of the bargaining space at time t and a subsequent cause of the updated bargaining space at time $t+1$.

3.1.2 The Conflict Processes Literature

The second school of thought conceives of conflict as a dynamic action-reaction process. The origins of this approach date back to Richardson's (1960) pioneering work on the relationship between war onset, relative power imbalances, and arms racing behavior.[43] Richardson's model had a number of variations, but his most influential permutation was based around the idea of "mutual fear," where country A increases its arms expenditures at a rate proportional to country B's spending. The structure of the model was a system of two differential equations:

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = ay - mx + r \tag{3.1}$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt} = bx - ny + s, \tag{3.2}$$

where x and y reflect the amount of money spent on arms by country A and B; constants a and b measure mutual fear; constants m and n reflect the domestic level constraints, or "internal breaks," to further arms expenditures; and r and s reflect the degree of persistent distrust, if positive, or good will, if negative. By varying the starting values of each quantity, the model can be used to examine a number of different equilibrium outcomes. Richardson

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[43]Incidentally, the book received a scathing review from Etzioni (1962) in the American Journal of Sociology, including the choice remark, "Richardson just is not as potent a mathematician and statistician as one would like him to be." Etzioni's (1962) criticisms are of the same variety that I levy in Chapter 2, i.e. quibbling over the mapping between theory, model building, and data. However, in retrospect, Etzioni's criticisms largely miss the mark as Richardson's model is better understood as a speculative and theory-building effort rather than a definitive, full-fledged account.

believed his model could be generalized to apply to any kind of strategic interaction. He argued for collapsing behavior into "a single variable, its outward attitude of threatening or cooperating" (13).

While later work diverges significantly from Richardson's early model, scholars in this school conceive of conflict as an *action-reaction* process between two or more belligerents.[44] This approach models the system of interactions between belligerents with the goal of uncovering the nature, or directionality, of this systematic behavior. This often boils down to answering the question of *who is responding to whom*, as in Goldstein and Freeman's (1990) model of reciprocity between Chinese, Soviet, and US behavior, and McGinnis and Williams's (2001) model of US-Soviet interactions.

In general, this literature does not outline a formal theory of interaction per se. Instead, it conceives of a set of potential ways in which actors might respond to one another. Two relationships are prominent: reciprocity and inverse-response. Reciprocity is simply a tit-for-tat response to the behavior of antagonists. Inverse-response involves responding with the inverse of the antagonists behavior, i.e. responding to conflict with cooperation, and cooperation with conflict. The rationale of inverse response may reflect the desire to "break the cycle," attempt a show of force, or signal pacific intentions. Testing for these relationships is well-suited to time series analysis, where Granger causality tests and impulse response functions can provide a focused assessment of the dynamic interactions in a particular case.[45]

The conflict processes literature arose in conjunction with the advent of event data in international relations. Event data provided the means to model behavior. The first

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[44]For example: Schrodt and Gerner's (2004) study of mediation in the Balkans; Shellman's (2006) study of government-dissident interactions; and Crescenzi and Enterline's (2001) work on interstate interactions.

[45]More on these tests in Chapter 6.

forays into event data were made by McClelland's (1976) World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) and Azar's (1980) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). These projects relied on human coders to collect and parse news stories for events. This manual approach using human coders was slowly replaced by automated coding starting with the Kansas Event Data Set (KEDS) (Schrodt, Davis, and Weddle, 1994). Increases in computing power made it possible to write programs that could parse large sets of text files and extract events. The most common sources were Reuters Newswires and Agence France Presse articles from Lexis-Nexis. This automated approach obviated the problem of intercoder reliability because, unlike human coders, the text processing program applied the same coding rules to each article. Of course, this precision was of little value if the results were inaccurate. To increase this accuracy, Schrodt's team created the TABARI program that dramatically improved the correspondence between human coded events and machine codings.[46] Most recently, the DARPA funded Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) software has been used to parse RSS newsfeeds in order to predict conflicts in close to real-time (O'Brien, 2013).

Following Richardson's (1960) call to collapse behavior into "a single variable, its outward attitude of threatening or cooperating," most researchers process events based on a scale of relative conflict and cooperation. Goldstein's (1992) eponymous scale was one of the first widely-used methods of aggregation. Other methods include constructing counts based on whether an event represents material conflict/cooperation or verbal conflict/cooperation (Duval and Thompson, 1980), or calculating count ratios (Jenkins and

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[46]This was followed by a variety of propriety software (King and Lowe, 2003). TABARI—Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions—has recently been superseded by Petrarch. See `https://openeventdata.github.io/`

Bond, 2001). Goldstein's work has been extremely influential in this genre, including studies of reciprocity in Bosnia (Pevehouse and Goldstein, 1999), analysis of strategic response patterns in Kosovo (Pevehouse and Goldstein, 1999), and the relationship between bilateral reciprocity and international cooperation in the Middle East (Goldstein et al., 2001). Like the wider conflict processes literature, these studies use vector autoregressions to examine the time series properties of event data within individual cases.

3.1.3 "Never the twain shall meet"

Both the conflict processes and rationalist literature have important things to say about the progression of conflict. However, to date, the two literatures seem to be separated by a "never the twain shall meet" mentality. The reasons for this divide are unclear. Perhaps the conflict processes school was seen as overly inductive and atheoretical by bargaining proponents, while bargaining theory was seen as too narrow, rigid, and formalistic by scholars of conflict processes. In any case, there is a marked disconnect between the two literatures. In terms of design, scholars who apply bargaining theory tend to use cross-sectional models, while scholars in the conflict processes vein gravitate toward time series analysis of an individual case.[47] Whatever the reason, the idea emerged of a trade-off between generalizability on the one hand and the temporal dimensions of conflict on the other. In this view, scholars had to choose either a time-invariant, but generalizable approach to the study of policy effectiveness in a cross-section of conflicts, or choose a dynamic approach that considers how conflict processes unfold over time within a specific conflict.

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[47]See Wallensteen and Svensson (2014, 323) for bargaining theory and Schrodt and Gerner (2004, 311) for conflict processes.

This trade-off represents a false dichotomy. We can faithfully capture the dynamic interactions of belligerents within a generalizable context. The trick is to find a comprehensive model of the entire data generating process, rather than a facet of that process. This requires stepping outside of our discipline and thinking about conflict processes from the perspective of epidemiology. In many ways, the study of mediation and conflict is closely related to the study of disease treatment. Epidemiologists examine whether medical treatments are effective at improving the risk of death.[48] Like political scientists, they tend to model observational data; doctors often monitor patients over time and decide to administer a drug based on the severity of their condition. If we apply the epidemiological analogy to political science, conflicts are like sick patients who are at risk for a particular event. In epidemiology, the event is usually death, or a worsening of the patient's condition. In the domain of international conflict, the event is settlement of the conflict.[49]

I am certainly not the first scholar to invoke the analogy between disease processes and conflict.[50] Within international relations, there is a large literature on survival analysis, including both methodological (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004) and applied work (Bennett and Stam, 1996). However, my contention in Chapter 2 was that much of the applied research got the underlying model wrong in several ways, either by omitting time-varying treatments, omitting time-varying covariates related to treatment assignment, or by misspecifying the relationship between the policy instrument and the outcome event as a direct causal effect. To put the problem more succinctly, the existing literature tends to

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[48]Among other 'failure' types, such as disease onset, symptom progression, and symptom profile.

[49]Generally speaking. A number of binary 'outcome' indicators are also used, e.g. conflict recurrence, dispute escalation, etc.

[50]Earlier work in political science incorporated insights from epidemiology to shed light on a different issue: the contagion of conflict (Houweling and Siccama, 1985).

fix a single issue, in isolation, without addressing any of the others. For example, Gart-ner (2011) adjusts for non-random assignment, but considers only static determinants of treatment in the assignment equation. And Regan and Stam (2000) treat mediation as a time-varying quantity, but there is no assignment process to speak of. Therefore, the way forward requires merging each of these issues into a single theoretical framework.

The epidemiological perspective offers valuable insight into the study of policy effec-tiveness. Epidemiology identifies three interlocking components of the data generating process: 1) the natural progression of the disease, 2) the decision by the doctor to use a treatment, and 3) the mechanisms through which the treatment affects the disease. Epi-demiologists posit that each component cannot be considered in isolation if the goal is to tease out the treatment effect. If we transpose these factors into the domain of mediation, we must answer three questions: First, what factors influence the natural progression of a conflict? Second, why do mediators choose to intervene? Third, what are the mechanisms through which mediation impacts the conflict? In the next section, I build a conceptual framework around these three questions.

3.2 My Model

3.2.1 The Progression of Conflict

It is quite common to hear doctors remark that a disease like the flu must simply "run its course." Indeed, anyone who has been sick with the flu can appreciate the idea of a natural progression to disease. For epidemiologists, the natural progression of a disease serves a baseline, of sorts, from which to judge the effectiveness of a treatment. Without under-standing how a disease process develops and evolves when it is left untreated, it is difficult to rigorously estimate the effect of the treatment vis-à-vis fluctuations within the normal

disease progression. Researchers must separate the effect of the treatment from natural changes in the underlying disease process. In the same vein, our analysis of mediation's effectiveness must begin from a model of the progression of conflict.

What factors influence the progression of conflict? I argue that the most influential factors are conflictual and cooperative interactions between belligerents. In aggregate, these interactions constitute the level of *conflict severity* at any given point in time. Conflict severity can be thought of like the blood pressure of a patient. It serves as both an indicator of the overall health of the conflict and a risk factor for settlement.[51]

There is a strong rationale for including a dynamic measure of conflict severity in our models of conflict. For one, a host of IR concepts have observable implications within this context. The concept of escalation, for example, implies that conflict severity has a tendency to function within a feedback loop, where conflictual actions engender increasingly more conflictual reactions, and so on. In the context of arms race behavior, for instance, military spending by one country may trigger increased spending by another great power. Feedback loops are powerful in part because they can emerge organically whenever decision-making tends toward reciprocity strategies. It is not my intention to test the ontological basis of feedback loops—e.g. in the conflict processes vein—but rather to point out that they are possible, perhaps even likely to occur, within this context.

My view is that the progression of conflict resembles an iterated lottery game, like Powerball, where every draw has a low probability of winning. In this case, settlement is the realization of a stochastic data generating process. The probability of settlement fluctuates depending on changing covariate profile of a conflict, but it is likely to be low at any individual time point. Throughout the conflict, both sides have the option to accept an

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[51]In various forms, conflict severity is a prevalent concept in the conflict processes literature (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990; Shellman, 2006; Crescenzi and Enterline, 2001).

agreement that splits the winnings in favor of the other side. To try for a better distribution of the spoils, actors can choose to continue the conflict by either maintaining the status-quo or escalating the conflict via the use of costly signals. The goal of escalation is to persuade the other side to agree to a more favorable deal. Costly signals can demonstrate resolve, promise future costs, and help build a reputation for toughness. These signals could push the other side over the edge—to agree to better terms—or trigger a response. If both sides engage in conflictual actions, the severity of the conflict can escalate. In the opposite vein, if both sides exchange cooperative signals, it could trigger a reinforcing pattern of cooperation, leading up to a negotiated settlement.

We can imagine a number of different conflict trajectories that produce a settlement. For example, we might expect a pattern of increasing cooperation before both sides agree to a mutual settlement. Or, we might observe an escalation of conflictual behavior until one side 'wins' the conflict, and forces the other side to accept unfavorable terms. In other words, conflicts can end via a number of trajectories; my goal is to determine whether mediation has an effect on those trajectories.[52]

Most bargaining models assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that the behavior of actors is wholly endogenous to bargaining considerations "all the way down." For example, President Clinton sending an aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait is interpreted as a byproduct of information asymmetry in the latent bargaining space: Clinton was trying

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[52]I do not consider competing risks, such as negotiated vs. imposed settlement. To give away my hand, I will admit here in a footnote that there are good reasons to suspect that competing risks matter. However, the choice to omit competing risks was based on data limitations. I simply do not have enough failure events in my dataset to tease out differences related to competing risks. With an expanded dataset, I can imagine an entire article of things to say about conflict trajectories and competing risks. The idea would be to identity discrete patterns that were associated with a particular failure, and then determine which policy instrument was best suited to changing a particular trajectory, or which helped to realize a particular outcome within a particular trajectory, etc.

to signal China of the intentions of the United States. This top-down view of conflict—where behavior is treated as epiphenomenal to the bargaining space—is adopted by most empirical work in the bargaining vein. Surprisingly, this top-down view is rarely leveraged to test our theories about explanatory variables of interest. The reason, I would guess, is that the bargaining space is a latent quantity. As a result, scholars test the direct effect of a policy on the outcome, reasoning that the policy's effect on the bargaining space will translate into an effect on the outcome.

In my view, this represents something of a missed opportunity, and a potential source of misspecification. I propose we leverage the top-down view of conflict—where information asymmetries are mapped onto behavior—to test the theorized relationship between mediation and the bargaining space. Using conflict severity as a proxy for the latent bargaining space opens up a number of avenues for exploring the interaction between mediation and the conflict environment. First, mediators have something to monitor over time when deciding to intervene. Second, our time-varying treatment has something to interact with. In short, the intuition that mediation reacts to—and impacts—the conflict environment can be tested empirically.

Endogenizing these elements does not imply that the behavior of actors is a perfect proxy of the bargaining space. Conflict is both a tangible contest between actors on the ground and a latent bargaining process. "The difficulty," as Wagner (2000) puts it, "is in understanding the relation between the two." In practice, there is good reason to suspect that the relationship is complicated. For example, it seems likely that foreign policymakers have less control over the conflict environment as conflicts become more severe.[53] However, the "fit" between latent factor and proxy does not need to be perfect in order to test the

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[53]This is a testable proposition, which merits future investigation.

effectiveness of the treatment.[54] Behavior need only be some function of the bargaining environment—the incentives, private information, and capabilities of the belligerents. To the extent that it is a function, then mediation will have effects on the bargaining space which are translated into behavior. More to the point, bargaining theory provides a cogent rationale for why we might think that behavior is influenced by the bargaining space.

3.2.2 The Sequence of Mediation

The preceding section presents a classic bargaining view of the progression conflict in which belligerents exchange information over time and attempt to locate a mutually acceptable settlement. Drawing on the conflict processes view, I treat conflict severity as a proxy for the latent bargaining space. Absent any form of outside intervention, the ebb and flow of conflict severity can be thought of as the "natural" progression of conflict. However, in practice, belligerents are rarely left to their own devices. Like doctors prescribing a drug to a sick patient, third parties decide to "treat" some conflicts with mediation. With this logic in mind, how should we account for the non-random decision to intervene?

The extant literature treats non-random assignment as a confounding variable problem. As such, it adjusts for conflict severity either on the right-hand-side of the equation, or via a separate assignment equation. In Chapter 2, I argued that this practice oversimplifies and delimits the data generating process. The solution is to look at the entire generating process

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[54]To belabor the point, we need only assume the existence of a map between the data proxies and the underlying latent factors. We don't have to assume that this mapping is perfect. An imperfect mapping does not introduce "bias" into the model. Another way to put this is that a statistical quantity like substantive significance is a property of the data; it is unrelated to the latent factors. It makes no sense to talk about the substantive effect of a proxy variable on a latent factor like 'cooperation,' or 'the bargaining context.' Substantive significance relates to the effect of the proxy within the context of the given data and the statistical model. By the same token, it makes no sense to argue that the latent factor / proxy relationship is "biased" in a statistical sense. All of this is to say, again, that using conflict severity as a proxy for the bargaining space does not bias the *statistical model*.

holistically. From the perspective of a dynamic model of conflict, the causal relationship between mediation and conflict severity has the potential to change over time.

In my model, there are two distinct causal relationships between conflict severity and mediation. In the first, mediators decide to intervene in a conflict based on a dynamic assessment of conflict severity. This mirrors the conventional wisdom, which argues that mediators intervene in tough to resolve conflicts. In the second process, mediators intervene and influence the level of conflict severity, which, in turn, impacts the probability of settlement. In this case, conflict severity functions as an intervening variable. This implies a distinct assignment equation—to predict the decision to intervene—and an outcome equation—to estimate the effect of mediation. In this case, conflict severity is not strictly a confounder for the effect of mediation; it also functions as an intervening variable in the post-treatment period.

Thus, my argument is that the causal logic flips depending on whether the conflict is pre- or post-treatment. This implies that mediation has an indirect effect on settlement, specifically through its ability to increase cooperative behavior. By treating this relationship as a confounding variable problem, the existing literature underestimates the effect of mediation by adjusting for conflict severity. In essence, the indirect effect of mediation gets incorrectly attributed to conflict severity.

In the next section, I describe the inner workings of the model in more detail. There are two types of causal mechanisms to consider. The first consists of how conflict severity could potentially influence the decision to intervene. On the flip side, the second relate to how mediation could potentially influence conflict severity.

Causal Mechanisms: The Assignment Process

Conflict severity influences the decision to intervene. But in what direction? Much of the conventional wisdom argues that mediators intervene in relatively violent, hard-to-resolve cases. Why might high levels of conflict severity influence the decision to intervene? First, conflicts with high levels of violence may be more likely to generate public outcry, which may prompt a third party to push for mediation either unilaterally or via a regional or international organization. Second, a third party may worry about deleterious side effects of high levels of conflict severity impacting their own state—e.g. via disrupting trade or generating refugee flows. For third parties with close geographic proximity, there may even be the potential for conflict contagion or other negative externalities (Beardsley, 2011*b*; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). Lastly, third parties may genuinely harbor a desire to help belligerents end conflicts—e.g. cases where the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter takes part in mediating conflicts.

The conventional wisdom also happens to be my view of the assignment process. However, there are also strong arguments for the presence of countervailing pressures. For example, mediators are known to operate at the consent of belligerents, so the acceptance of mediation may signal an underlying willingness to resolve the conflict. This cross-pressure could create a correlation between mediation and what we might call "amenable-to-resolution" conflicts, rather than tough, intractable cases. On the flip side, belligerents may reject mediation because no mutually acceptable settlement exists. The Rwandan Patriotic Front's (RPF) military campaign across Rwanda in the midst of the genocide is a prime example of a case where mediation was rejected because there was no mutually

acceptable settlement.[55] Consent, therefore, may imply that mediation is used in "easy" cases; that is, cases where there is a higher baseline probability of success.

The third possibility is that the assignment process is orthogonal to the level of conflict and cooperation. The implications of this scenario are ambiguous. On the one hand, we might imagine a situation in which mediation has some negative and some positive effects with the net result being a wash. Or we might imagine that mediators are unfazed by fluctuations in conflict severity; the assignment process might be entirely determined by static, structural factors.

In sum, there are three testable hypotheses in regard to the relationship between conflict severity and mediation: 1) a positive relationship, where mediators are more likely to intervene in high conflict environments, 2) a negative relationship, where increasing conflict severity makes mediators less likely to intervene, or 3) a null relationship, where the two factors are largely unrelated to one another. What's important here is not so much picking a horse, but rather that each hypothesis relates to the ebb and flow of conflict severity. Without a dynamic measure of conflict severity, we are left with a poor approximation of the assignment process.

Causal Mechanisms: The Outcome Process

In the second process, mediators engage with conflict actors on the ground, which influences the progression toward settlement. How do mediators impact the conflict? Much of the conventional wisdom stipulates top-down causal mechanisms in which mediation influences the minds of policymakers. A prominent theory of *Information Provision* holds that

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[55]Revisionist accounts of the Rwandan genocide by Davenport and Stam (2006) argue that Kagame may have also rejected mediation.

mediators provide information to elite decision-makers about the capabilities and intentions of their adversaries, thereby helping preferences to converge (Beardsley, 2008). The idea is that mediation matters at the margins; it is understood that mediators do not provide anything close to perfect information to policymakers—i.e. information which could conceivably end the conflict outright. In fact, in many cases, mediators face major challenges when trying to convince belligerents of the veracity of their "outside" information.

An alternative top-down mechanism stipulates that elite decision-makers can use mediation to signal their willingness to work toward settlement. Mediators operate at the consent of the bargainers, so accepting an offer of mediation can be used as a signal of cooperative intent. The signaling value of mediation is easier to appreciate when we reflect on the fact that mediation occurs multiple times during the course of conflict. One often reads about a "flurry of diplomatic activity" in the context of mediation, a phrase that accurately reflects the large number of mediation attempts that take place during many conflicts. The conflict in Bosnia in the 1990s, for example, featured dozens of mediation attempts by Lord Carrington, Lord Owen, and Cyrus Vance. Therefore, it may be less about the content of the information revealed by mediators and more that mediation itself serves as a symbol of dispute resolution. Mediation constitutes a cooperative act whereby both sides engage in non-violent bargaining to resolve their differences. This symbolic act of cooperation creates the potential for locking belligerents into a positive feedback loop, where cooperation engenders additional cooperation.

These top-down mechanisms assume that mediation works by influencing the minds of policymakers at the top, which then trickles down to improve the level of cooperation on the ground. Yet conflicts have a tendency to spiral out of the control of policymakers. The unpredictable dimension of conflict is perhaps best captured by Bethman-Hollweg's

remark in the lead-up to World War I: "When the iron dice begin to roll, may God help us."
Furthermore, the bargaining analogy of war as a costly lottery captures the intuition that, to
a certain degree, policymakers place themselves at the mercy of events on the ground when
going to war. Therefore, even if mediators succeed in changing the minds of policymakers,
there is no guarantee that the orders and preferences from leaders at the top will be perfectly
translated to their proxies on the ground.

The potential for translation error is compounded by the fact that conflicts are often
fought by a collection of loosely affiliated groups. Throughout the Yugoslav Wars in the
1990s, for example, paramilitary leaders like Vojislav Šešelj operated in semi-autonomy
from Slobodan Milošević and Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadžić. Many groups
like the White Eagles carried out atrocities at Voćin, Višgrad, Gacko, and numerous other
towns, which made it more difficult to de-escalate the conflict.[56] While unleashing these
forces may be expedient for leaders, they interject unpredictability into the conflict space.

Violence is a common trigger of this shift away from a pure bargaining scenario. Con-
sider the Beslan Hostage crisis, part of the long-standing dispute between Chechen sep-
aratists and the Russian government: After seizing the school at Beslan on September
1, 2004, Chechen rebels demanded a Russian withdrawal from Chechnya. The Russians
refused to negotiate. What unfolded in the conflict space—nearly two hundred children
killed—gave Russian policymakers little choice but to escalate the use of force in Chech-
nya. The enormity of the attack actually angered local Chechen support for the rebels, the

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[56]Mueller (2000, 43) describes these groups as "well-armed thugs and bullies" who were "encouraged by, and working under the rough constraints set out by, official security services."

exact opposite of what the rebel leaders were trying to achieve.[57] In this case, actions meant to bolster a bargaining position spiraled out of control with unintended consequences.

The potential for events in the conflict space to change the stakes and character of the conflict can also be the result of non-violent actions. Consider the prelude to the Franco-Prussian War where a wave of French nationalist sentiment in the early stages of the July Crisis made it increasingly hard for Napoleon III to avert a war. While it was clearly Bismarck's aim to stoke the fires of nationalism through the release of the Ems Telegram, there is also little doubt that French policymakers contributed to the national outrage. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a rousing speech before the Legislature announcing that "France would go to war sooner than allow a Hohenzollern to rule at Madrid" (Aronson, 1970). Emile Ollivier, the new cabinet minister, made a public pronouncement that Prussia had "slammed the door" in France's face (Aronson, 1970, 82). These actions led to an outpouring of opinion pieces in French newspapers that called for war and provoked nationalist outrage (Oncken, 1928, 168). The actions by French policymakers may have been calculated to strengthen France's bargaining position for a negotiated settlement, but they also served to precipitate a conflict where the stakes were much higher. Napoleon III's hold on power was so weak that he could not back down from the crisis or his regime would be overthrown (Wawro, 2005, 27). In short, what may have started as a signaling effort on the part of France was undermined by events in the conflict space changing the character of the conflict.

If conflicts have a tendency to spiral out of the control of policymakers, then mediation may improve the chance of settlement by influencing conflict severity at the local level.

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[57] There is some debate over who ordered the attack. Doku Umarov was leader at the time, although he denied involvement. The Russians formally implicated a Chechen warlord with ties to Umarov, Shamil Basaylev, as the mastermind of the attack.

Mediation may work from the "bottom-up" by serving as a signal to local actors on the ground of the bargaining dynamics at the heart of the conflict. Actors on the ground often need a reminder that conflict is politics by other means. In fact, the signaling value of mediation may be more important for local actors on the ground than diplomats at the bargaining table because the latter are constantly reminded of the latent bargaining space by their practices. Local actors, in contrast, have an up close and personal view of the more visceral qualities of conflict: the death of friends and loved ones, the destruction of homes and property, and the ethnic and racial hatred that often accompanies it. Violence and atrocities can spark a desire for revenge and retribution that is at odds with rational decision-making. For local actors on the ground, mediation serves as a potent symbol of the larger political context of the conflict.

In both the top-down and bottom-up mechanisms described above, the level of conflict severity functions as an intervening variable for the effect of mediation. Mediation works by reducing the level of conflict severity, which, in turn, increases the probability of settlement. If this is the case, then mediation has an indirect effect on conflict settlement. I contend that this indirect causal pathway between mediation and settlement is a more faithful rendering of our theoretical and practical understanding of how mediation functions within the conflict space. If mediation influences settlement through an indirect pathway, it poses a major challenge to the way that the current empirical literature treats conflict severity. Conflict severity is not strictly a confounder for the effect of policy instruments like mediation; it is better understood as both a confounding and an intervening variable. In the next section, I explore the dual nature of conflict severity and compare the standard causal logic to my dynamic view.

3.2.3 Time-Varying Confounding

The situation in which a variable is both a confounder and an intervening variable is known as *time-varying confounding*.[58] A covariate is a time-varying confounder for the effect of a treatment under three conditions (Robins, 1986; Mark and Robins, 1993; Young et al., 2010):

1. past covariate values predict treatment,

2. past treatment history affects the current covariate value,

3. current covariate values independently predict the outcome.

More concretely, time-varying confounding implies that: 1) past conflict severity values predict mediation, 2) the use of mediation influences current levels of conflict severity, and 3) current levels of conflict severity predict settlement. Figure 3.1 illustrates my dynamic model, which treats conflict severity as a time-varying confounder. In the model, conflict severity predicts the occurrence of mediation but mediation subsequently influences the level of conflict severity.

Within political science, time-varying confounding represents a new causal model of the interaction between a policy and the conflict environment. In terms of its ability to capture key features of the data generating process, the causal logic of time-varying confounding is a notable upgrade from the standard model for testing the effectiveness of a policy like mediation. In my view, the logic of indirect effects more closely aligns to our theoretical understanding of these phenomena.

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[58]This issue is distinct from time-varying coefficients, where the parameters themselves vary with respect to time. See Cox (1972) and more recently, Martinussen and Scheike (2007).

Figure 3.1. *A* is Conflict Severity; *B* is a time-invariant factor, e.g. whether a conflict actor is a member of the P5; *T* is the treatment, Mediation; *O* is the outcome, which is settlement of the conflict. Subscripts denote time-points. The unbroken black arrows linking nodes represent direct (unmitigated) causal pathways. The dashed arrows represent traditional confounding. The red dotted arrow from T_1 to A_2 in the dynamic model represents time-varying confounding.

Time-varying confounding is notably distinct from causal mediation analysis. A 'causal mediation' model specifies that a treatment, or another variable, acts as a mediator, in the statistical sense, for a hypothesized causal effect. For example, a conference paper by Quinn et al. (2015) argues that mediation is a mediator for the effect of a set of static covariates found in the ICB dataset. For a more sophisticated example, a recent article by Bind et al. (2016) addresses estimation in the presence of a time-varying mediator and a time-varying treatment. This model assumes that the treatment is exogenous, and that the treatment effect is mediated, in the statistical sense, through a third variable. In contrast, time-varying confounding specifies that a variable related to the treatment—but not the treatment itself—is a confounding and intervening variable. It is easy to get these models confused in practice, especially given the semantic usage of mediation as a diplomatic

practice and mediation as a causal relationship. This double-meaning gets cumbersome when describing the causal structure of the model, but the underlying causal logics are notably different.

How do we model time-varying confounding? If we draw upon precedent, then the most common method to deal with a typical confounding variable is to stratify based on the confounder. However, Condition 2 implies that the variable is also a mediator, in the statistical sense, for the effect of past treatment on the outcome. The problem with adjusting for an intervening variable is that we capture only the direct effect of the treatment and ignore the indirect effect. However, we cannot simply omit the intervening variable because of Conditions 1 and 3, which indicate that the variable is also a confounder. In short, the problem with time-varying confounding is that neither adjusting for the covariate nor omitting it is the correct option. A different approach is required to capture the effect of time-varying treatments, which is the subject of the next chapter.

3.3 Wrap-up

In a static model, the issue of temporal ordering of the treatment and potential confounders is swept under the rug as a set of unstated assumptions of the research methodology. By adjusting for conflict severity, we implicitly assume that causality is unidirectional. That is, we assume that mediation does not influence conflict severity in a later time-period. If we transition to a dynamic model, we are forced to consider the potential for endogeneity between these factors.

In this chapter, I have outlined a dynamic model of mediation and conflict. What is unique about this model is that the relationship between mediation and conflict severity changes depending on whether we are in the pre- or post-treatment period. As a whole,

the model is intended as a synthesis of the rationalist and conflict processes literature. In regard to the former, the model is broadly rationalist in theory. In regard to the latter, I emphasize the importance of conflictual and cooperative interactions as a driver of conflict progression. In the next chapter, I discuss my research design for comparing my model to the standard static approach.

Chapter 4: Research Design and Data

In this chapter, I describe the research design for testing my theory of mediation and conflict. The chapter unfolds in two major sections: In the first, I outline the statistical model used in the large-N analysis, discuss its properties, and present the observable implications of my argument vis-à-vis the conventional wisdom. I focus on how to test the argument within the context of a cohort study, where observations are recorded each conflict-week. I defer the issue of within-subject testing to Chapter 6, which features a case study of mediation efforts in the Yugoslav Wars and additional quantitative analysis of the causal mechanisms of mediation and conflict severity. In the second section, I discuss the original event dataset created for the project, describe the static and dynamic covariates used in the analysis, and present relevant summary statistics.

4.1   Statistical Model

The preceding chapter introduced my theoretical model of conflict in which conflict severity functioned first as a confounding variable and then as an intervening variable for the effect of mediation on the outcome. The next step is to translate the theory into a statistical model. Unfortunately, the logic of time-varying confounding does not fit neatly

within the standard set of quantitative models used in political science.[59] My solution is to turn, again, to epidemiology.

To capture the logic of time-varying confounding, I employ a marginal structural model (MSM) with inverse probability of treatment weights. MSMs are widely used in the current epidemiological scholarship (Howe et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2012; Lukowsky et al., 2013; Lertdumrongluk et al., 2014) as well as clinical psychology (VanderWeele et al., 2011). To my knowledge, MSMs have not been used in political science, so it is worthwhile to discuss the model's properties.

MSMs were developed the context of survival analysis where subjects are studied over time, often called cohort studies by epidemiologists and panel studies by political scientists (Robins, 1986, 2000; Hernán, Brumback, and Robins, 2002). Subjects are monitored at regular intervals until failure occurs or the study ends and surviving subjects are considered censored. The generalized data generating process is characterized as follows: We draw a random sample of size n from the population and take repeated measurements at J time periods where $j = 1, 2, 3, ..., J$ for each unit $i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n$.[60] At each time period, we record the treatment variable T_{ij} and time-varying confounders X_{ij}. We define treatment history up to time j as $\overline{T_{ij}}$ and covariate history up to time j as $\overline{X_{ij}}$. The dependent variable Y_{ij} depicts whether the outcome event (failure) occurred at time J.

In the potential outcomes framework, we would like to compare the probability of $T_j = 1$ to $T_j = 0$, but we observe subject i as either treated $t_j = 1$ or untreated $t_j = 0$.[61] To address

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[59]There are two options available within the context of the standard set of models: adjusting for conflict severity on the right-hand-side, or creating a separate assignment equation. The latter is preferable from a statistical standpoint. However, both deal only with the confounding effect of conflict severity.

[60]I use Imai and Ratkovic's (Forthcoming) notational scheme.

[61]As per convention, uppercase letters denote a random variable whereas lowercase letters denote a particular realization of the random variable.

this limitation, the Neyman (1923) framework is based around the idea of counterfactuals. Robins (2000) generalizes this framework to the field of longitudinal analysis by creating the idea of counterfactual survival time, which is defined as the failure time that would have occurred if the conflict had not been treated at time t. An MSM models the marginal distribution of counterfactual survival times associated with each treatment history.[62]

The MSM is estimated via a two-stage process. First, inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) are constructed based on the inverse of the conditional probability of treatment, given past treatment history and covariates values up to and including the first week of treatment. The inverse probability of treatment weight for subject i is:

$$w_i(\bar{t}_J, \overline{X}_{iJ}(\bar{t}_{J-1})) = \prod_{j=1}^{J} \frac{1}{f(T_{ij} = t_{ij} | \overline{T}_{i,j-1} = \bar{t}_{j-1}, \overline{X}_{ij}(\bar{t}_{j-1}))}, \tag{4.1}$$

where parameters with bars over them (e.g. $\overline{T}_{ij}$) represent treatment *history* for unit i up to time J, and $f(\cdots)$ is the logistic conditional probability mass function. Robins (2000) shows that IPTWs can be used to consistently estimate the marginal mean of any potential outcome for any treatment history.

In practice, the weights are not approximately normal, so the literature recommends constructing stabilized weights:

$$sw_i(\bar{t}_J, \overline{X}_{iJ}(\bar{t}_{J-1})) = \prod_{j=1}^{J} \frac{f(T_{ij} = t_{ij} | \overline{X}_{ij}(0))}{f(T_{ij} = t_{ij} | \overline{T}_{i,j-1} = \bar{t}_{j-1}, \overline{X}_{ij}(\bar{t}_{j-1}))} \tag{4.2}$$

where the numerator is the probability of treatment given the baseline covariates. These stabilized weights are preferable due to their smaller variance, and yield 95% confidence intervals that are narrower and have better coverage rates than the unstabilized version (Hernán, Brumback, and Robins, 2000).

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[62]Hence the name.

In effect, weighting based on the IPTW creates a pseudo-population that is balanced on the time-varying confounders. Each subject contributes z copies of itself to the new population, with z being equal to their weight (Li, Evans, and Hser, 2010).

The second stage of the process involves estimating the final model with weights. With a binary failure variable, a weighted pooled logistic regression of treatment history without time-varying confounders is used to estimate the conditional probability of the outcome, $\mathbb{E}(Y|\overline{T})$. Cubic splines and a time-counter are included to capture the time-dependency in the data. A pooled logistic regression is used because a Cox model cannot be fitted with time-varying weights using standard statistical packages. The logit model is equivalent to a Cox model if the hazard of treatment in a given time period is small (D'Agostino et al., 1990). This assumption is commonly invoked with monthly patient data and it seems reasonable with weekly conflict data, although it may strain credulity with yearly data.

After creating the IPTWs, the following pooled weighted logistic regression is estimated:

$$\mathbf{Pr}(failure) = \mathbf{logit}(\beta_0, \beta_1 \overline{T}_{ij}, \beta_2 C_{ij}, \beta_3 S_{ij}) \tag{4.3}$$

where $\overline{T}_{ij}$ is the treatment history, C denotes a time-counter, and S is a series of cubic splines to capture time-dependency.

A key assumption of the MSM method is *sequential ignorability*, in which treatment assignment of subject i at time j is independent of the counterfactual failure time, conditional on the treatment and covariate history of the subject up to time j. This is also known as the assumption of no unmeasured confounding; we assume that we have adjusted for all variables that impact treatment assignment at each measurement occasion and which are directly or indirectly associated with the outcome in question. This same assumption

is essential to standard statistical models dealing with time-invariant treatments. The advantage of MSMs is that they account for time-varying confounding, making them less restrictive than standard models which implicitly rely on an assumption of no time-varying confounding. If sequential ignorability is valid, then the decision to intervene in a crisis is independent of the survival time that would have occurred *if the crisis had never experienced treatment*.[63]

4.1.1 Observable Implications

To test my hypothesis concerning the indirect effects of mediation, I compare estimates from an unweighted model, which treats conflict severity as a confounder (in the fashion of the conventional wisdom), and the weighted MSM, which treats conflict severity as a time-varying confounder. If conflict severity is strictly a confounder, then both models will produce similar results. However, if conflict severity is a time-varying confounder, then we should observe a larger, positive effect of mediation in the weighted model compared

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[63]To reiterate: The model does not address the potential for unobservables. Strictly speaking, the desirable properties of any naive model fall apart when there is correlation between unobservables in the assignment and outcome equation. Note that it is the potential for correlation between the error terms *in the abstract* that produces inconsistent estimates, not the omission of a set of observable factors. For example, Achen (1986, 22) argues that some degree of correlation is expected in observational studies because "the complete set of factors that influence assignment can never be measured, nor can all the variables that cause the outcome variable. Many if not most of those unobserved quantities affect both assignment and outcomes." Achen's point is that any observational study suffers from this deficiency. This is not how much of political science has interpreted this critique. Most scholarship interprets the issue of non-random assignment as an omitted variable problem, in which we can reasonably approximate the assignment process with a set of observable quantities. There are deep questions over whether this is adequate, but it is essentially the approach I adopt here. In the early stages of the project, I considered a number of models to deal with unobservables, including various limited and full information models using instrumental variables. The lack of a strong instrument made these models difficult to defend. It seemed to me like the cure was worse than the disease. For more on this point, see Baser (2009) and Brandt and Schneider (2007).

to the unweighted model.[64] That is, mediation should correlate with shorter conflicts in the MSM. The difference in effect size represents the indirect effect mediation, which is captured by the MSM but "subsumed" by conflict severity in the unweighted model.

Observable Implication: Mediation will have a larger, positive effect on conflict settlement in the MSM compared to the unweighted model.

It would be ideal to replicate other studies in order to compare my model to the standard causal logic. However, this is simply not possible as existing studies use static data. What I end up doing is comparing my model to a dynamic baseline, which incorporates time-varying measures of mediation and conflict severity. I see this as a more sophisticated baseline than what is currently estimated in the mediation literature, insofar as I treat mediation and conflict severity as dynamic quantities. This avoids many of the problems described in Chapter 2, such as immortal time bias. In my view, this comparison to a dynamic baseline model is a tougher test of my theory, as I am, in effect, testing my theory against a more nuanced data generating process.

To test my model versus the conventional wisdom requires time-varying measures of mediation and conflict severity. When I began the project, these metrics were not available within International Relations. My solution was to create event data for a sample of conflicts and then use the events to construct dynamic measures of mediation and conflict severity. Event data are widely used in the conflict processes literature, but only in regard to a few cases at a time. In essence, my idea was to create time series cross-sectional data

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[64]To be clear, this is what I expect to find within the context of a cross-sectional research design, which attempts to estimate the average treatment effect of mediation within a sample of conflicts. To preview Chapter 6, my theory of indirect effects has additional observable implications within the context of a single case. If we transition from a cross-section to a single case, then time series analysis of the data allows for more direct testing of the underlying causal mechanisms of mediation and conflict severity. In Chapter 6, I test two more fine-grained, within-case observable implications of the causal mechanisms.

that captured key dimensions of the conflict process. This would allow me to test my model within a larger, cross-section of cases in order to critique the conventional wisdom.

Over the past two years, I have undertaken a major data collection effort to create these data. The project was supported by funds from the Smith Richardson Foundation Dissertation Fellowship and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies. With this support, I hired a small team of undergraduate research assistants, who worked on a variety of data collection tasks, including downloading news articles, conducting qualitative research into individual cases, and improving the actor dictionaries used to code the events. The end result is an original event dataset of 43 international crises from 1991 to 2008 with the unit of analysis as the crisis-week. These data are presented in detail in the next section. In what follows, I discuss the choice of unit of analysis, the cases in the sample, static covariates, and the event data created for the analysis.

4.2 Data

4.2.1 Unit of Analysis

The choice of unit of analysis should be based on knowledge of the underlying data generating process and the treatment condition being studied. In this regard, we face several relevant questions: How do conflict actors and third parties think about conflicts? Do leaders make decisions based on what happened in the past month? Do third parties decide to intervene based on what happened in the past week? In the past day?

When a field like comparative politics uses the country-year as the unit of analysis, it makes sense analytically because the phenomena being studied—such as modernization or democratic transition—typically unfold over long time-scales. However, the same cannot be said of conflict processes. As noted earlier, a large number of conflicts last less than

a year, which renders most conflict-year data effectively time-invariant. Furthermore, it is extremely rare for even large-scale wars to last more than five years. And while it is true that civil wars and insurgencies have a tendency to proceed over a longer time-scale (Brandt et al., 2008), they also tend to experience periods of low-intensity conflict, or "lulls" in the fighting. The FARC-led insurgency in Columbia, for example, has existed in some form since 1962, but the group has been passive for long stretches of time during that tenure. Thus, it seems more appropriate to treat FARC activity as segmented into episodes or individual crises, rather than characterize the entire time period as one long conflict. In general, most conflicts exhibit considerable variance over relatively short time frames, and we end up ignoring this variance by using country-year as the unit of analysis.

At the other end of the spectrum, I think it is reasonable to assume that conflict actors and third parties do not make decisions based on the conflict-day. The conflict-day is simply too short a time period to be very informative. However, the conflict-month and the conflict-week deserve serious consideration.[65] Military reports including those disseminated by the U.S. Military and NATO often include data aggregated at both the monthly and weekly level.[66] Thus, there is good reason to believe that foreign policymakers are presented with data in this form, and perhaps make their decisions accordingly.

In my estimation, there is no reason to use monthly data if weekly data is available. For one, any trend that occurs in monthly data will be present in a model of weekly data with four lag terms.[67] Likewise, the conflict-month has the potential to mask a good deal of variation, especially in regard to the effect of policy instruments. For example, let's assume

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[65]Quarterly data is prevalent in economics, but far less common in IR.

[66]See United States Department of Defense (2013) and Livingston and O'Hanlon (2013).

[67]The same cannot be said for the conflict-day, due to the irregular number of days in a month and the cumbersome nature of 30+ lag terms.

that mediation does, in fact, increase cooperation within a conflict. If mediation occurs on January 1st, and is not repeated, then the effect of mediation is assumed to be constant from January 1st through January 31st. With conflict-month data, the effect of mediation will be attributed to the average increase in cooperation over the entire month of January. But suppose that the effect of mediation attenuates overtime. In that case, the latter part of the month will receive less of the treatment. If mediation is effective within a period of a week or two, but no longer, then its impact will be underestimated if data from the entire month is used to test its effectiveness.

I recommend the conflict-week as the unit of analysis. I assume that, on average, most mediation events take a week to play out and then another week for their effect to kick in. This intuition can be captured by a lagged term with conflict-week data, but will be ignored with conflict-month as the unit of analysis. In sum, the conflict-week satisfies the Goldilocks principle of being neither too long, nor too short.

An alternative approach is to use the conflict management event as the unit of analysis. Several prominent datasets that code for mediation adopt this approach, the most prominent being Hensel's (2001) Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) and Bercovitch's (2004) International Conflict Management (ICM) data. Most studies using these data compare mediation to alternative conflict management efforts (i.e. the occurrence of fact-finding, or sanctions, etc). While this design has the advantage of being able to compare mediation to other conflict management techniques, the choice of the management attempt as the unit of analysis comes at a severe cost. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, this approach divorces the treatment from the underlying ebb and flow of conflict severity. Second, the approach excludes conflicts where no conflict management technique has taken place, thereby introducing the

potential for sample selection bias.[68] If factors correlated with the use of conflict manage-
ment techniques also impact the outcome of the conflict, then the estimates of the effect
of mediation (as well as other techniques) may be biased. The direction of bias is difficult
to determine without an understanding of the assignment process through which mediators
decide to intervene. Beardsley (2011*a*, 195), for example, argues that unmediated cases,
excluded from these datasets, will likely occur during periods with fewer major barriers to
peace, which will cause researchers to underestimate the effect of mediation. This argu-
ment is plausible, but the bigger issue is that it is impossible to fully test this proposition
without considering cases where no conflict management attempts were made.

On a related point, there is also a small literature that tests the effectiveness of mediation
within a sample of low-intensity conflicts, coded as fewer than 25 battle-related deaths per
year (Greig, 2015).[69] In my estimation, there is simply no cogent reason to restrict the
sample based on the severity of the conflict. If there is variation within conflict severity
and we have a hypothesis that the effect of mediation varies based on the level of conflict
severity, then we can test that intuition using the full sample of high- and low-intensity
conflicts. For example, we could simply incorporate an interaction term, or we might
compare predicted probabilities across two scenarios: 1) mediation within a high-severity
conflict, and 2) mediation within a low-severity conflict. Within a non-linear model such
as a probit or logit, the predicted probabilities are a function of the entire covariate profile.
In short, there is no methodological reason to restrict the sample.

[68]See Heckman (1979).

[69]Most studies use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006)
distinguish between high- and low-intensity conflicts. They find that strategies that push the parties towards a
settlement appear more effective in high-intensity conflicts, but less effective in low-intensity conflicts where
procedural strategies seem more optimal.

In a cynical view, this type of research has a "slice and dice" quality, where researchers cut up the data in an effort to drum up results. That said, I suspect that most researchers do not fully understand the severe consequences of artificially restricting the sample. The rationale frequently invoked is that the results only apply to this particular sample, e.g. low-intensity conflicts, so many scholars see no reason to object to the practice. As such, the prevailing sentiment is that restricting the sample simply inhibits our ability to generalize the results out-of-sample.[70] What is overlooked is that whenever we restrict the sample based on a criterion—even one motivated by a "theoretical" rationale—we inadvertently create the potential for sample selection bias.[71]

Sample selection bias arises in cases when the sample is censored due to a selection rule. In Heckman's (1974) classic example, a researcher is interested in estimating the effect of education on women's wages, but only observes the censored sample of women who choose to work. Heckman proposed, for the sake of argument, that more educated women are also more likely to choose to work. If this is the case, then the sample consists of a disproportionately large number of educated women compared to the overall population. The unbalanced nature of the sample is not the "selection problem" per se (Sartori, 2003). Instead, selection bias is caused by the presence of *unobservable factors* that influence 1) a woman's decision to work, and 2) observed wages. In short, the theory of sample selection implies a separate equation—the selection equation—in addition to the outcome

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[70]For example, I have heard scholars argue that they have the entire population of cases. This belies a misunderstanding of the statistical usage of the term population, which is a hypothetical construct used to justify a given sampling distribution.

[71]Sample selection was a major problem in much of the early work on mediation. Scholars tended to study only a censored sample of cases where mediation was used and omitted cases where it was not. See Beardsley (2011a, 195) for critiques of this work.

equation.[72] Heckman proposed that intelligence was an unobservable factor that influenced both equations; intelligence increases the probability of choosing to work and also increases wages. If this is the case, then in the sample of highly-educated women, women with low-levels of education will be unusually intelligent. In this case, a researcher who regresses education on wages will underestimate the effect of education. What is so troubling about this scenario is that, in principle, the unobserved factors could be anything, and their effects could be unidirectional or countervailing.[73]

The issue of sample selection underscores how important a random sampling procedure is to valid causal inference.[74] Recall that random sampling is distinct from randomization.[75] The latter relates to the orthogonality of the treatment. The former relates to the properties of the sampling distribution. By collecting a random sample, we justify our reliance upon a given sampling distribution. As Chow (1996, 29) puts it, "The sampling distribution is the bridge between a sample statistic and its corresponding population parameter." The sample may still be "unbalanced" within the random sample (e.g. we observe a disproportionate number of low-severity conflicts); however, random sampling helps to ensure that this unbalance is not due to a "procedural artifact" of the sampling process (Chow, 1996, 73). We need only to adjust for "natural" unbalances to ensure an accurate treatment effect. Because procedural artifacts can bias even a reasonable research design

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[72]The two most common methods to address sample selection are the use of instrumental variables–i.e. factors correlated with treatment, but not the outcome—or the practice of making assumptions about the degree of correlation between the two equations—i.e. constructing bounds. See Sartori (2003).

[73]The definition of "unobservable" is often glossed over in political science, which tends to think about the selection problem as one of omitted observable factors. However, Heckman's point is that it is the potential for correlation between the error terms *in the abstract* that produces inconsistent estimates, not the omission of the observable factors.

[74]Note that the sampling procedure is not the same as covariate balance. We can gather a random sample that is incredibly unbalanced.

[75]In IR, we frequently have access to a random sample, but randomization is rare. In most experimental science, the opposite is true.

(ala Heckman's example), there is no reason to make our lives more difficult by introducing an artificial selection rule.

Part of the reason confusion persists about these issues is that the term "selection" is used to refer to two different issues: 1) sample selection, and 2) non-random assignment of treatment. The former is the "correct" context for the term, as originated in econometrics. Achen (1986) remains one of the best explanations of the statistical commonalities and conceptual differences between these two issues. The conceptual distinction hinges on a fundamentally different data generating process. The statistical commonality is that both issues result in violations of the assumption of uncorrelated errors, i.e. $cov(\varepsilon_i, \varepsilon_j) = 0, \forall i \neq j$.

In summary, I adopt the conflict-week as my unit of analysis. The conflict week represents a happy medium between conflict-month and conflict-day. Using this unit of analysis also helps to avoid the problem of sample selection bias caused by specifying the conflict management attempt as the relevant observation. Lastly, as discussed above, it is important to allow for variation within conflict severity. Restricting the sample based on the severity of the conflict is unnecessary to test our theories and, in the worst case, a potential barrier to inference.

4.2.2 Cases

The sample consists of 43 crises featured in the International Crisis Behavior dataset from 1991 to 2008. The cases are listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The ICB identifies a crisis based on whether a state experiences the following three conditions: 1) a threat to one or more basic values, 2) the awareness of finite time for response to the value threatened, and 3) a heighted probability of involvement in military hostilities. I use ICB cases rather than cases from the PRIO or COW datasets because I am interested in comparing cases

with variation in conflict severity and the ICB data includes cases of interstate war, civil war, and "lower-level" disputes (including a few non-violent crises). The 1991 start date was intentionally selected to remove the Cold War as a confounding factor in the decision to intervene. While many empirical studies include a dummy variable to capture the Cold War, my concern is that the ebb and flow of US-Soviet relations during the Cold War cannot be adequately captured by such a blunt measure, so I restrict my analysis to post-Cold War cases.

The ICB dataset features a total of 60 international crises from 1991 to 2008, but I omit 17 cases from my dataset because they differ from the rest of the sample in two important ways. First, I exclude conflicts that were shorter than 14 days. In these cases, the likelihood of mediation in a given week may be delimited by a logistical inability of mediators to intervene. Most of these very short crises are characterized by only a handful of discrete events and appear to be international "incidents" rather than crises. Second, four cases—Cameroon-Nigeria III, Ghana-Togo Border, Sleeping Dog Hill, and Liberia-Sierra Leone—were omitted because of a large number of non-events (i.e. gaps) in the processed event data. While some crises genuinely experience a lull in activity for a week or more, research into these cases revealed that the gaps were due to a lack of news coverage during these time periods. The fact that three of these cases occur in Africa is strongly suggestive of systematic bias in newspaper coverage. Fortunately, omission of these cases will not bias my results unless mediation functions in a fundamentally different way in these cases. It would be incorrect to include these cases as any bias in newspaper coverage would affect the assignment equation, generating biased estimates of the weights.

Table 4.1. Cases Overview - Part 1

Name	Side A	Side B	Duration (Days)
YUGOSLAVIA I: CROATIA-SLOVENIA (1991)	Croatia, Slovenia	Serbia, Yugoslavian Military	193
FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ZAIRE (1991)	Zaire	Belgium, France	43
NAGORNYY-KARABAKH (1991)	Georgia	Russia	262
YUGOSLAVIA II: BOSNIA (1992)	Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats	Bosnian Serbs	1352
IRAQ NO-FLY ZONE (1992)	Iraq	UK, US, France	22
GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA (1992)	Georgia	Russia, Abkhazian Rebels	380
NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR I (1993	North Korea	South Korea, US	600
OPERATION ACCOUNTABILITY (1993)	Israel	Lebanon, Syria, Hezbollah	21
HAITI MILITARY REGIME (1994)	U.S.	Haiti Junta	77
IRAQ TROOP DEPLOYMENT-KUWAIT (1994)	Iraq	US, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait	35
ECUADOR-PERU V (1995)	Ecuador	Peru	52
TAIWAN STRAIT IV (1995)	Taiwan	China	307
NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE (1996)	North Korea	South Korea	102
ZAIRE CIVIL WAR (1996)	Zaire	Rwanda	221
UNSCOM I (1997)	Iraq	U.S.	102
CYPRUS-TURKEY MISSILE CRISIS (1998)	Turkey	Cyprus	339
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA (1998)	Ethiopia	Eritrea	950
INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR TESTS (1998)	India	Pakistan	30
DRC CIVIL WAR (1998)	DRC	Zaire	1461
UNSCOM II OPERATION DESERT FOX (1998)	Iraq	UK, US	50
KOSOVO (1999)	Kosovo Liberation Forces	Serbia, FRY	109
KASHMIR IV KARGIL (1999)	India	Pakistan	56
EAST TIMOR II (1999)	Indonesia	East Timor Rebels	45

Table 4.2. Cases Overview - Part 2

Name	Side A	Side B	Duration (Days)
INDIAN PARLIAMENT ATTACK (2001)	India	Pakistan	31
KALUCHAK (2002)	India	Pakistan	156
MYANMAR-THAILAND (2002)	Myanmar	Thailand	152
PANKISI GORGE (2002)	Georgia	Russia	72
IRAQ REGIME CHANGE (2002)	Iraq	US, UK	230
NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR II (2002)	North Korea	US	460
IRAN NUCLEAR I (2003)	Iran	France, UK, Germany	522
HAIFA SUICIDE BOMBING (2003)	Israel	Syria	59
DRC-RWANDA (2004)	DRC	Rwanda	202
SOUTH OSSETIA-ABKHAZIA (2004)	Georgia	Russia	148
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA II (2005)	Ethiopia	Eritrea	99
CHAD-SUDAN I (2005)	Chad	Sudan	52
IRAN NUCLEAR II (2006)	Iran	France, UK, US	694
CHAD-SUDAN II (2006)	Chad	Sudan	199
NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR III (2006)	North Korea	US	517
ISRAEL-LEBANON WAR II (2006)	Israel	Lebanon	59
ETHIOPIA INVASION SOMALIA (2006)	Ethiopia	Somalia	86
CHAD-SUDAN III (2007)	Chad	Sudan	18
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA III (2007)	Ethiopia	Eritrea	85
CHAD-SUDAN IV (2007)	Chad	Sudan	220

Mean Duration = 201.8 Days; Median Duration = 99 Days.

4.2.3 Static Data

In the first stage of the MSM, I include the following static variables that are likely to impact the baseline probability of mediation: *Ethnic Conflict* is a $0, 1$ variable that reflects the presence or absence of an ethnic component to the conflict. Ethnic conflicts are known to be particularly intractable, which may increase the probability of mediation. *P5* is a $0, 1$ variable that measures whether a conflict actor is one of the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council. Mediation, especially by the United Nations, may be more likely to occur if a member of the conflict is also a member of the P5. *US Involvement* records whether the United States was a conflict actor. The United States is a unique actor when it comes to international conflict, and it stands to reason that the probability of mediation may be affected by US involvement in a conflict. Lastly, *Number of Actors* is a count of how many actors were considered principal belligerents in the conflict. This does not include third-party actors involved with interventions. Given the problem of time-inconsistent preferences, conflicts with large numbers of actors can be especially difficult to resolve on their own, which may prompt outside mediation.

The dependent variable is settlement of the conflict, which is a $0, 1$ indicator of whether settlement occurred at the end of the crisis-week. The outcome variable does not distinguish between how the conflict was settled (e.g. negotiated settlement vs. tacit agreement). This limitation is a function of the sample size being considered; it is not possible to account for multiple settlement types (competing risks) with only 43 outcome events.[76]

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[76]Separation is the biggest issue, especially in regard to static covariates in the model.

4.2.4 Event Data Construction

To accompany the time-invariant variables, I construct dynamic measures of mediation and conflict severity using event data.[77] The following list outlines my procedure for event data construction:

1. Download Agence France Presse (AFP), New York Times (NYT), and Associated Press (AP) articles related to each conflict. Search terms are based on permutations of country and relevant actor names.

2. Transform the raw text into a machine readable format.

3. Construct unique actor dictionaries for each conflict that identify the relevant actors including: members of the government and the military, non-state actors such as rebel or terrorist groups, and third-party actors who are involved in the conflict. These conflict-specific dictionaries are merged with existing global dictionaries from the CAMEO project to account for outside actors (Schrodt, Gerner, and Yilmaz, 2009).

4. Parse the processed text using TABARI software (Schrodt, 2011).

5. Construct weekly event data using the "events" R package (Lowe, 2012).

The three news sources were selected based on their coverage of the 1991-2008 period on Lexis-Nexis and the strength of their international reporting. In an exploratory first round of data collection I used AFP articles only, but I found a large number of gaps in coverage, especially for crises in Africa. Therefore, I expanded the source text to include AFP, NYT, and AP for the second round of data processing.[78] I exclude articles that exhibit greater than 75% similarity with another article as this high level of similarity is likely a case where the NYT ran an AP story, or vice versa. To deal with the likely scenario where multiple sources report on the same event, I restrict each event type to occur once a day in processing, which is the convention used in the event data literature. In this regard, it

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[77]For an overview of more recent innovations in event data construction and applied research, see Schrodt (2012).

[78]The AP sources also included "AP International" articles, according to Lexis-Nexis.

is important to understand that the event codings are broad classifications (e.g. "Employ aerial weapons") rather than discrete actions (e.g. "an airstrike"). The idea of repeated events within a single day makes sense with the latter but less so with the former. On balance, the one-a-day restriction is preferable to over-counting events.

The search strings for each conflict featured liberal use of OR statements. My philosophy was to cast as wide of a net as possible because unrelated articles would be eliminated at the actor aggregation stage. The string used for the Zaire 1996 crisis is featured below.

```
Zaire OR Zairean OR Mobutu OR Rwanda OR Rwandan OR "South Kivu" OR
"North Kivu" OR Ngabo OR Interahamwe OR Banyamulenge OR
"Zaire civil war" OR "Zaire conflict" OR ADFL OR Mdima
```

The raw text was transformed into machine readable format via two python programs, LexisNexis.filter.py and PoliNER.py.[79] LexisNexis.filter.py cleaned, formatted, and split the text into machine readable chunks. PoliNER.py compared the unparsed text to the actor dictionaries and produced a printout of frequently used nouns that did not appear in the existing actor dictionaries. These printout were one resource used by my RA team to improve the quality of the actor dictionaries. The RAs would research the nouns that frequently appeared and determine whether they merited inclusion in the dictionaries.

I create a unique actor dictionary for each conflict. Each dictionary was structured in two parts. The conflict-specific, or "unique," portion of the dictionary includes codes for members of government and the military, non-state actors such as rebel or terrorist groups, and third-party actors who are involved in the conflict. Each dictionary also features a "general" portion of code that includes the TABARI project's world-wide actor dictionary,

[79]Copyright (c) 2014 Philip A. Schrodt and Copyright (c) 2011 Philip A. Schrodt, respectively. I augment both programs to suit my project.

94

CountryInfo.actors, a non-state actor dictionary, IntMilitGroups.actors, and a NGO and IGO dictionary, IGONGO.actors. These additional actor codes were included to identify unrelated events, establish third-party connections, and remove undirected events.

I parse the entire article rather than only the lead sentence, as is sometimes done in the event data literature. The reason is largely due to a lack of event coverage when using only the lead sentence of a news story. Often, I found that the lead sentence of a news article did not even contain an event, or that the event featured only one actor, such as "Bosnian rebels engaged in high stakes shootout." The relevant question is "with whom?" but that information came later in the body of the piece. By parsing the entire article, I was able to extract far more events and a greater variance of event types. However, there is a tradeoff between using the lead vs. the entire article. The main problem with using the entire article is that the body of a piece can feature discussion of events that took place weeks, months, or even years ago. This is unlikely to occur when using only the lead sentence. The TABARI parser has some ability to code events in the past, such as "a drone strike occurred on December 23rd," or "yesterday, the UN arrived to mediate the conflict," but the parser is far from perfect. As such, there is some concern that we end up picking up past events when using the entire article. In the end, I chose to parse the entire news article as the coverage was abysmal when only the lead sentence was used. The one-a-day event restriction also helps to limit the coding of past events, at least to the extent that past events overlap with what is currently going on.

After parsing the text using the TABARI software, the raw event data consist of 1) a dateline, 2) a directed dyad (Side A $\rightarrow$ Side B), 3) an event code, and 4) a short description of the event, based on the verb dictionary. The Bosnian conflict, for example, features 377,025 total events. A brief excerpt is depicted below.

```
920604 SER BOS 172 BARRED

920604 SER BOS 195 AIRSPACE ATTACKS ON BOSNIAN

920604 SER UNO 163 SLAPPED SANCTIONS

920604 SER BOS 040 DISCUSS

920604 BOS SER 040 DISCUSS

920604 USA UNO 043 HEADQUARTERS TO

920604 SER UNKNOWN 0874 TROOPS LEAVE

920604 UNO BOS 042 ARRIVED IN SARAJEVO

920604 BOS UNO 043 ARRIVED IN SARAJEVO

920604 SERGOV SERGOV 020 ASKED SERBIAN TO

920604 SERUAF UNO 111 SERB JEERED U.N.

920604 SER CRO 190 CLASHES BETWEEN SERBS AND CROATS

920604 CRO SER 190 CLASHES BETWEEN SERBS AND CROATS
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Each actor is represented by a three letter code, such as SER for Serbia and BOS for Bosnia. Some actors are further distinguished by additional codes, such as GOV for government-related, PTY for party within government, SEP for separatists, UAF for militants, REB for rebels, and so on. I made it a priority to capture the activities of non-state actors in each conflict. Toward this end, I created a PRO and ANT suffix for the REB coding to distinguish between pro-government non-state actors (PROREB) and anti-government non-state actors (ANTREB). These classifications helped to differentiate sub-national actors into the appropriate side of the conflict. For example, SER, SERGOV, SERPTY, SERUAF, SERPROREB, etc, are all collapsed into Side A.

Some events are excluded because they are not relevant to the crisis, e.g. USA UNO 043 in the list above. Other events feature an UNKNOWN code, which means that TABARI

could not determine the identity of the actor. It is sometimes possible to go back to the raw text and determine the UNKNOWN actor via context, but this is simply not feasible with hundreds of thousands of events. Furthermore, many of the UNKNOWN codes turned out to be duplicates of identified events within the same day, which are restricted by my one-a-day processing. Because of ambiguity, I exclude events with UNKNOWN actors.

Since I created these data, a major event data source was released to the public. The Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS), created via funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Office of Naval Research (ONR), is now available on the Harvard Dataverse with coverage for the years 1995 to 2015.[80] Ideally, I would have liked to compare my event data to the ICEWS coded events as a sort of intercoder reliability check. However, creating analogous measures of conflict severity and mediation from the ICEWS data turns out to be quite involved, and I have not had time to complete this project.

Given the vast resources available to the ICEWS project, I suspect that the ICEWS dataset is better than mine. At the very least, my data can be used as a point of comparison for meta analysis of event data in the style of Schrodt and Gerner (1994). That said, I believe that my data has one major advantage over the ICEWS project: unique actor dictionaries. Each conflict in my dataset has a unique actor dictionary created specifically for the case in question. In contrast, the ICEWS events are parsed using a highly-refined master dictionary that includes every potential actor in the world. When I began my project, I started out using an analogous master dictionary. However, I quickly realized that the master dictionary missed key actors in the text, especially in the body of a news article. The reason was that once an actor has been mentioned in an article, the journalist often

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[80]https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/icews

defaults to the last name of the actor. For example, after the first mention of "Bill Clinton," most journalists write "Clinton" for the remainder of the article. Within the context of the article, we know that this refers to Bill Clinton. However, when a machine coder parses hundreds of thousands of articles over a long time-frame and wide geographic scope, there is no guarantee that "Clinton" refers to Bill and not George Clinton, the funk musician, or Clinton Portis, the retired football player. As such, a master dictionary cannot feature the code "Clinton" because the actor is ambiguous. Instead, they code for

```
BILL_CLINTON_
```

or other permutations such as

```
PRESIDENT_CLINTON_
```

As a result, master dictionaries end up coding a lot of UNKNOWN actors in regard to actions that take place within the body of a news article. These events cannot be attributed to a specific actor so they are "lost" for all intents and purposes. I use a combination of tailored news articles and unique actor dictionaries to circumvent this problem to a certain degree. First, I download news articles using relevant actor names, places, and the time-frame of the conflict (plus/minus three months on either side). This delimits the temporal and geographic context of the news articles, which means that textual references to "Clinton" likely refers to either to Bill Clinton circa 1992, rather than George Clinton, the U.S. Vice President, circa 1812. Second, I parse the news articles using a dictionary created specifically for the conflict. This enables me to include codes like "Clinton," "Milosevic," "Putin," etc, to capture specific actors within the body of a news article.

Now this obviously does not work for every actor within every conflict. For example, it is impossible to feature a "Kim" code for a conflict between North and South Korea as the

Kim surname represents about 20% of the Korean population. But for most other conflicts, at least within a narrowly circumscribed time-frame, codes like "Clinton" clearly refer to Bill Clinton rather than George Clinton. The fact that the data are dyadic also helps weed out misattributed codes. When Clinton is paired with an actor from Bosnia, for example, then the event is likely to be relevant. However, if Clinton is paired with an actor from the National Football League, then it is likely to be miss-coded and/or unrelated. These events are dropped by default via my actor aggregation procedure.

4.2.5 Conflict Severity

What metrics should we use to proxy for conflict severity? An intuitive choice is casualty data—the number of dead or wounded in a conflict. The problem with casualty data is that the most reliable counts are only available in yearly measures (e.g. the PRIO casualty dataset), and so are of limited use as a time-varying covariate. Moreover, casualty data in general is notoriously unreliable (Gohdes and Price, 2012).[81] Crisis actors have clear incentives to exaggerate or under-report the number of killed or wounded to suit their own political goals. Conflicting accounts are commonplace, as are casualty numbers that are clearly rounded off or approximated. The Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis in 1998 is a good example of the problems with casualty data. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) dataset reports dozens of incidents coded as "heavy fighting" between the two states' respective armies, yet almost all months in 1998 are coded with zero fatalities due to a lack of official casualty counts.[82] While it is possible that no one died in these skirmishes, anyone with knowledge of the crisis would consider this an unreasonable conclusion. In

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[81]c.f. Lacina and Gleditsch (2013).

[82]For more information, see Raleigh et al. (2010). ACLED is restricted to developing states, thus it was not considered as a data source for this project.

short, casualty data is either not sufficiently granular, or not of a sufficiently high quality to serve as a proxy for conflict severity.

Instead, I create two different proxies for conflict severity using event data. For the first, I score each event based on the established CAMEO scale, which ranges from -10 (most conflictual) to 10 (most cooperative).[83] I collapse these individual scores into a single, undirected mean score per week, which is intended to capture the average level of conflict severity.

For the second measure, I create event counts grouped into four categories (Schrodt and Gerner, 2004): Material Cooperation, Verbal Cooperation, Material Conflict, and Verbal Conflict. Material Cooperation includes events like signing a ceasefire agreement, providing economic aid, or demobilizing armed forces. Verbal Cooperation includes expressing the intent to cooperate, making a verbal appeal to settle a dispute, or offering a public statement of support for an actor. Material Conflict includes events such as mobilizing armed forces, expelling peacekeepers, or using a form of violence against an actor. Verbal Conflict includes threatening violent action, demanding policy change, and accusing an actor of wrong-doing. While no single event score is perfect, the combination of event counts and the CAMEO Mean offers a compelling summary of the overall level of conflict severity. Baseline measures of the two proxies are created using data from the month before a crisis began. Summary statistics for conflict severity are depicted in Table 4.3.

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[83] See Schrodt and Gerner (2004) for a discussion of the CAMEO scale. Available at http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/cameo.dir/CAMEO.SCALE.txt

Table 4.3. Conflict Severity Summary Statistics

		Full Sample	
Variable	Form	Mean	Std
CAMEO Mean	Continuous	-0.41710	(2.28144)
Mat. Conf.	Count	16.59184	(36.48149)
Verb. Conf.	Count	14.81952	(24.87613)
Mat. Coop.	Count	4.70982	(9.86931)
Verb. Coop.	Count	31.24681	(49.89189)

Statistics calculated per week.

4.2.6 Mediation

To capture mediation, I construct a count of the number of times mediation was initiated by third-party actors per week. This measure does not distinguish between types of mediators (e.g. international organizations, regional organizations, states, or non-state actors) or mediation strategy (e.g. facilitation, formulation, or manipulation). I personalize the list of potential mediators for each conflict. It is important to underscore that these mediation events are initiated by third-party actors, so these events are not part of the conflict severity scores.

Mediation events are coded based on the CAMEO Verb Dictionary (Schrodt, Gerner, and Yilmaz, 2009). The dictionary features seven codes related to the practice of mediation, shown in Table 4.4.[84] I count only the 045 code as a mediation event, which I believe best represents what most knowledgeable observers would consider mediation. Code 045 includes phrases such as:

---

[84]The entire list of verbs used to code these categories can be found at http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/cameo.dir/CAMEO.Manual.1.1b3.pdf.

Table 4.4. Mediation codes

Code	CAMEO Score	Label
040:	[1.0]	Consult, not specified below
041:	[1.0]	Discuss by telephone
042:	[1.9]	Make a visit
043:	[2.8]	Host a visit
044:	[2.5]	Meet at a third location
045:	[5.0]	Mediate
046:	[7.0]	Engage in negotiation

```
ACT_ - * AS INTERMEDIARY +  [045]

ARRIV_ * TO_ HELP RESOLVE CRISIS  [045]

BEGAN_ - * MEDIAT MISSION  [045]

BROKER - * TALKS WITH_ +  [045]

HELD - * TALKS WITH + HELP DEFUSE CRISIS  [045]
```

In the TABARI dictionary syntax, the underscore sign in the verb ACT_ signifies that ACT, ACT<u>ED</u>, ACT<u>S</u>, etc, are all acceptable verb forms. The * symbol signifies that the verb must be paired with the following phrase. Lastly, the + symbol means that a conflict actor must appear after the phrase. The following example text is coded as a mediation event: "The UN Secretary General acted as intermediary between the DRC and Rwanda."

I purposely exclude lower-level diplomatic activity such as bilateral phone calls or public appeals to resolve the crisis, which I judge to be below the threshold of mediation. These include codes 040 and 041, where third parties talk with conflict actors on the telephone and codes 042 through 044, where a third party either visits a conflict actor, hosts a visit,

or meets with a conflict actor at a third location. The problem with these lower-level codes is that they capture actions that are far more ambiguous than the 045 codings.[85] It is often unclear how engaged the third parties are in contributing to crisis abatement when they simply visit with a conflict actor, or discuss the conflict over the phone. Moreover, if this sort of lower-level diplomatic activity precedes or coincides with activity that matches a full-fledged mediation event, then it will be captured with the 045 code. In other words, there is a very low risk of inadvertently excluding actual cases of mediation when we exclude lower-level diplomatic events. And by setting the bar higher, we guard against counting events that are unrelated to mediation. In sum, I am much more confident that the 045 codes actually represent mediation activity, so I treat Code 045 as the primary mediation event of interest.[86]

The 046 category is somewhat misleading as we might assume at first glance that it represents the "highest" level of mediation. However, the 046 code captures events related to negotiation, which is a distinct analytic quantity in the CAMEO scheme. The code appears most frequently in the form of bilateral negotiations between the two primary conflict actors. The use of the 046 coding is problematic for third-party mediation because it also includes verbs related to trade negotiations, which are rare between conflict actors but much more common between conflict actors and third parties. Therefore, the 046 coding has the

[85]Another prominent example is Schrodt and Gerner (2004, 312), who define mediation as an occurrence of cooperative behavior between a third party and the belligerents. Using the WEIS coding scheme, they include event codes ranging from Yielding to demands, Making a comment, Expressing approval, Making a promise, and Agreeing to a request. In my estimation, these actions are too broad to have much traction on the concept of mediation. In fact, as Schrodt and Gerner (2004, 312) readily admit, many of these actions are "not a sufficient condition for mediation," although they are "probably a necessary condition."

[86]At first glance, it might seem that these low to medium level diplomatic events might correspond to a facilitative mediation strategy (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996), but this turns out to be a false equivalency when we examine the dictionary used to code these categories in more detail. The CAMEO verb dictionary is simply not fine-grained enough to reliably differentiate between mediation strategy. In any case, facilitation, formulation, and manipulation would fall closer to the 045 coding than the lower-level events.

unfortunate potential to capture events unrelated to conflict management because it may code instances of third-party trade negotiations. For this reason, I do not include 046 in the mediation count. Summary statistics for the mediation count are depicted in Table 4.5. Mediation occurs, at least once, in 34 out of 43 conflicts. If these data were static, we might worry about the relative lack of "control" cases. However, in this case, mediation is a time-varying quantity, so even "treated" crises contribute "control" observations. In fact, out of 2000 total conflict-weeks in the dataset, only 271 are "treated" with mediation.

Table 4.5. Mediation Summary Statistics

		Full Sample
Variable	Form	Mean (Std)
Mediation 045	Count	0.385204 (1.287448)

Statistics calculated per week.

4.3 Conflict Graphs

I conclude the chapter with ten conflict graphs of the CAMEO Mean and Mediation Events. The graphs are presented to give the reader a better sense of variation within the data. A few general insights are worth mentioning. First, the event data reveal that there is substantial variation in conflict severity overtime. These data illustrate the limitations of using a static measure such as "the highest level of violence" to characterize a dynamic conflict process. There is a clear ebb and flow of conflict severity overtime. Settlement is often preceded by an upward trend in cooperative behavior, but there are also cases where conflictual behavior seems to be on the rise before settlement. This speaks to the

discussion in Chapter 3 concerning the different "trajectories" that can potentially produce settlement. Second, mediation takes place at multiple time points throughout most crises. It is common for several weeks to feature a sharp uptick or "flurry" of mediation events. In the next chapter, I conduct a large-N analysis using these data.

Figure 4.1. Bosnia

Figure 4.2. Kaluchak

Figure 4.3. Taiwan Strait

Figure 4.4. Kosovo

Figure 4.5. DRC 1998-2002

Figure 4.6. Ethiopia-Eritrea I

Figure 4.7. Iran I

Figure 4.8. Nagorno-Karabakh

Figure 4.9. North Korea I

Figure 4.10. Zaire 1996

Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis

This chapter presents the large-N quantitative analysis to support my claim that mediation has an indirect effect on conflict settlement. The chapter unfolds as follows: First, I discuss the baseline models used for comparison and present the results from these models. Second, I walk through the first stage of the MSM, which involves estimating the inverse probability of treatment weights. Third, I estimate the second stage of the MSM using these weights, which produces an estimate of the effect of mediation in the presence of time-varying confounding. The MSM results are compared to the baseline model. I conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this analysis, which motivates the subsequent empirical investigation in Chapter 6.

5.1   Establishing the Baseline

To investigate the potential for indirect effects, I first model the baseline effect of mediation using the standard causal logic.[87] To recap, the standard causal logic assumes a direct effect of mediation on the outcome and conflict severity is treated as a confounder for this direct effect. My baseline model incorporates an additional temporal dimension by using time-varying measures of mediation and conflict severity. As such, it avoids the problem of immortal time bias which will depress the effectiveness of the treatment in question.

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[87]All statistical analyses were performed using Stata version 13.1 (Stata Corp., College Station, TX).

Within epidemiology, the most common practice is to construct a baseline estimate using either a Cox model or a pooled logistic regression. The semiparametric Cox model does not restrict the hazard function to a particular functional form, which makes it an attractive choice for a baseline model. The advantage of the pooled logit model is its direct comparison to the MSM, which is a pooled logit model fitted with inverse probability of treatment weights. The unweighted pooled logit model is fitted with splines to account for time-dependency in the data.

5.1.1 Baseline Estimates

I fit both baseline models for comparison. The general structure of the baseline model is as follows:

$$\mathbf{Pr}(failure) = \mathbf{f}(\beta_1 \overline{M}_{ij}, \beta_2 \overline{C}_{ij}, \beta_3 B_i, \beta_4 T_{ij}) \tag{5.1}$$

where $\overline{M}_{ij}$ is mediation history, $\overline{C}_{ij}$ is conflict severity history, B_i are baseline covariates, and T_{ij} are time-dependency terms.[88]

The results are presented in Table 5.1. As expected, the logit and Cox model estimates are very similar. While log odds and hazard ratios are different analytic quantities, their general interpretation is the same: estimates > 1 increase the risk of settlement while estimates < 1 decrease the risk.[89] In both models, the dynamic covariates are important predictors of settlement. An increase in both the CAMEO Mean and Verbal Cooperation correlates with a greater risk of settlement. Lagged Material Conflict correlates with a decrease in the risk of settlement in the pooled logit, although the estimate does not reach statistical significance in the Cox model. In addition, it appears that the state of conflict

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[88]There is no constant in the Cox model. The logit model also includes a time-counter and a series of cubic splines.

[89]Note that, in the context of conflict resolution, increasing the risk of settlement is a positive outcome.

severity before the conflict breaks out is also an important predictor of the duration of conflict. Higher baseline levels of Material Conflict lead to longer conflicts on average while higher baseline of Material Cooperation coincide with shorter conflicts. Baseline Verbal Cooperation is also statistically significant and slightly decreases the risk of settlement. This is suggestive of a logic of "broken promises" where actors verbally pledge to cooperate but then defect, which engenders animosity and distrust that prolongs the ensuing conflict.

The most important result from the baseline models is that mediation has no effect on conflict settlement. In both models, the estimated odds and hazard ratios are very close to 1 and are not statistically significant. This result is consistent with our expectations that adjusting for conflict severity removes the indirect effect of mediation. To provide a definitive test of this intuition, we must compare the baseline results to the MSM.

5.2 Marginal Structural Model

5.2.1 First Stage - Predicting Mediation

The first stage of the MSM involves constructing the IPTWs. The denominator of the IPTWs is analogous to an assignment equation that predicts the decision to intervene with mediation. Table 5.2 compares the results across multiple model specifications. Logit models predict the initiation of mediation and OLS models predict the number of mediation events in the first week of mediation. Model 1 includes current and lagged covariates. Model 2 includes a CAMEO Mean second order term and Model 3 includes a Material Conflict second order term.

Table 5.1. Baseline Model Comparison

Variable	Logit		Cox Model	
	Odds Ratio	**Std. Err.**	**Haz. Ratio**	**Std. Err.**
Time-varying Covariates				
Mediation	0.990695	0.134739	0.994835	0.160177
CAMEO Mean	1.176380*	0.074287	1.174913*	0.076346
Material Conflict	1.003414	0.019017	1.004698	0.016474
Verbal Conflict	0.959573	0.026552	0.962013	0.025716
Material Cooperation	1.000095	0.038768	1.017660	0.036630
Verbal Cooperation	1.039040**	0.010411	1.029165**	0.010590
Lagged Covariates				
Mediation	1.016683	0.124045	0.949647	0.163408
CAMEO Mean	0.887889	0.062617	0.889207	0.064179
Material Conflict	0.970441*	0.014125	0.976540	0.018160
Verbal Conflict	1.002452	0.023890	1.005319	0.025041
Material Cooperation	1.026628	0.034359	1.016039	0.043382
Verbal Cooperation	1.004826	0.009624	1.003321	0.012474
Baseline Covariates				
CAMEO Mean	0.720940	0.202283	0.728677	0.142936
Material Conflict	0.964664[†]	0.019665	0.967783*	0.016024
Verbal Conflict	1.009948	0.011741	1.002334	0.007626
Material Cooperation	1.280014*	0.139870	1.297655**	0.108526
Verbal Cooperation	0.984949*	0.006462	0.986257**	0.004774
Ethnic Conflict	0.576781	0.359254	0.514308	0.261046
P5	0.702091	0.385331	0.712253	0.286840
USA Actor	0.560722	0.425658	0.681627	0.355182
Number of Actors	0.862592	0.085449	0.903315	0.078549
Time-Dependency Variables				
Time Counter	3.766021*	3.115825		
spline1	1.057129*	0.032903		
spline2	0.994023*	0.003398		
spline3	1.000189	0.000189		
spline4	0.999987	0.000015		
Intercept	0.000309**	0.001003		

N= 1568; $**$ = 1%, $*$ = 5%, and † = 10%. Robust standard errors. Efron method used for ties.

Table 5.2. Predicting Mediation

Variable	Logit 1 Odds Ratio	Logit 2 Odds Ratio	Logit 3 Odds Ratio	OLS 1 Coefficient	OLS 2 Coefficient	OLS 3 Coefficient
Time-varying Covariates						
CAMEO Mean	1.038193	1.003935	1.064141	0.014330	0.011823	0.020944
Material Conflict	1.016162	1.025100	1.050479	0.006524**	0.006906**	0.015720**
Verbal Conflict	0.920170*	0.907073*	0.915922**	-0.014471**	-0.015205**	-0.015970**
Material Cooperation	1.013948	1.016636	1.010162	-0.000536	-0.000379	0.000234
Verbal Cooperation	1.045691**	1.044546**	1.042201*	0.006884**	0.006838**	0.000234*
CAMEO Mean^2		0.973561	0.999800		-0.001326	
Material Conflict^2						-0.000038*
Lagged Covariates						
CAMEO Mean	1.143640	1.136090	1.141754	0.007820	0.004077	0.011320
Material Conflict	1.088121**	1.097300**	1.075345*	0.008296**	0.008327**	0.009277*
Verbal Conflict	0.992984	0.994006	0.990746	0.001349	0.001110	0.000785
Material Cooperation	0.748915*	0.718566**	0.751873*	-0.020352**	-0.020975**	-0.021059**
Verbal Cooperation	0.997199	0.995535	0.996535	-0.001423	-0.001307	-0.002481
CAMEO Mean^2		1.136090	1.000115		-0.002412	
Material Conflict^2						0.000018
Pse/Adj R^2	0.2511	0.2660	0.2550	0.1538	0.1511	0.1603

N= 390; ∗∗ = 1%, ∗ = 5%, and † = 10%. Robust standard errors. Baseline and time dependency estimates not shown. Robust standard errors.

Figure 5.1. Predicting Mediation - Logit Model 1

Figure 5.1 depicts the estimates from Logit Model 1 predicting mediation using data up to and including the first week of mediation in a conflict. This model is used to construct the denominator for the inverse probability of treatment weights. Several results are noteworthy. First, mediators are actually less likely to become involved when conflict actors engage in Verbal Conflict. Conversely, mediators are more likely to intervene when conflict actors engage in Verbal Cooperation. These two results indicate that mediators are not solely reacting to material factors when deciding whether to intervene—what actors are saying to one another also matters. These results remind us that mediators operate by consent. It could be that a high level of verbal conflict is proxying for the actors' willingness to consent to third-party mediation.

That said, material factors are clearly influential when we examine the effect of lagged variables on the probability of mediation. Lagged Material Conflict is positively related to mediation, which supports the conventional wisdom that mediators intervene in high severity conflicts. Furthermore, lagged Material Cooperation decreases the probability of mediation, which is consistent with the expectation that conflicts which are less severe, or are already "on their way" to settlement are less likely to receive mediation. There is modest evidence for an inverted U-shape relationship between conflict severity and mediation—a situation where mediators intervene in medium severity conflicts but avoid extremely low or high severity conflicts—but these second order terms have very little substantive significance. The fact that these results match well with the conventional wisdom suggests that the event data represent a valid proxy for conflict severity.

Figure 5.2. Predicting Mediation - OLS Model 1

Figure 5.2 depicts the estimates from OLS Model 1, which predicts the number of mediation events in the first week that mediation is used. The results are directionally consistent with the logit results. We observe that contemporaneous Material Conflict is a predictor of the number of mediation events, which suggests that mediators are more likely to intervene in conflicts that are more severe. And Verbal Cooperation is also an important determinant of mediation. As in the logit model, lagged Material Conflict and Cooperation have a positive and negative effect, respectively.

The results offer minimal support for an inverted U-shape relationship between conflict severity and mediation. The first order terms in Models 1 and 2 are positive (OR > 1) and the second order terms are negative (OR < 1), which suggests an inverted U-shape functional form. However, only the CAMEO Mean second order term is significant in OLS Model 3. Figure 5.3 presents predicted probabilities and marginal effects across different levels of Material Conflict for OLS Model 3.[90]

What is immediately clear from Figure 5.3(a) is the very weak substantive significance of the second order polynomial. The inverted U-shape relationship is not observable in the range of 0 to 40 events of Material Conflict, which includes the lower 90% of the distribution of material conflict. Instead, we observe that the predicted probability of mediation increases as we increase Material Conflict. However, the influence of the second order term can be observed when computing the marginal effects. Marginal effects capture the effect of a given change in Material Conflict on the conditional mean of mediation. We can see from Figure 5.3(b) that the marginal effect decreases with more Material Conflict. In other words, each additional event of Material Conflict has less influence on the probability of

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[90]Computing predicted probabilities and marginal effects in this fashion is not quite kosher as the CAMEO Mean should change depending based on the level of Material Conflict, but it remains fixed at the observed values during these calculations. However, if we estimate the model without the CAMEO Mean, the predicted probabilities and marginal effects are almost identical.

(a) Adjusted Predictions   (b) Marginal Effects

Figure 5.3. Comparing the impact of Material Conflict on mediation using Model OLS 3. All other variables held at observed values.

mediation. Therefore, it is not that mediators avoid conflicts with high levels of material conflict, but rather that higher levels of Material Conflict appear to have less influence on their overall decision to intervene.

5.2.2 Weights

I use the Logit 1 model to estimate stabilized and unstabilized weights for comparison. Figure 5.4 shows the box plot comparison and Table 5.3 compares the numerical results. The distribution of the unstabilized weights is right skewed with a mean of 20.24 and range from (1.007, 188.844). In contrast, the stabilized weights are symmetrical with a mean of 1.026 and range from (0.1737, 3.293). The stabilized weights are clearly preferable as they increase the efficiency of the analysis and prevent outliers from contributing an overabundance of observations to the pseudo-population (Hernán, Brumback, and Robins, 2000, 565).

119

(a) Stabilized Weights   (b) Unstabilized Weights

Figure 5.4. Comparing stabilized and unstabilized weights.

Table 5.3. Weight Estimates

Percentiles	Stabilized	Unstabilized
1%	0.2495	1.0255
5%	0.2495	1.1474
10%	0.4583	1.5061
25%	0.7445	4.7493
50%	0.9215	14.5397
75%	1.2917	16.5021
90%	1.4804	33.6667
99%	3.2936	188.8440

5.2.3 Second Stage - Predicting Settlement

The second stage estimates the effect of mediation on conflict settlement after weighting the data.[91] Table 5.4 depicts the estimates from the MSM. After adjusting for time-varying

[91] No observations are censored in the data. Censored can be dealt with fairly easily. See Fewell et al. (2004) for a discussion of censoring in an MSM.

Table 5.4. MSM Results

Variable	Odds Ratio	Std. Error
Mediation	1.276376[*]	(0.152117)
Time Counter	3.860095[*]	(2.159056)
spline1	1.063421[*]	(0.027298)
spline2	0.993152[*]	(0.002951)
spline3	1.000308	(0.000232)
spline4	0.999980	(0.000022)
Intercept	0.000354[**]	(0.000757)

N=1568; $**$ = 1%, $*$ = 5%. Robust standard errors.

confounding, mediation increases the probability of settlement and the coefficient is significant at the .05 level. To illustrate the substantive significance of mediation, Figure 5.5 depicts the predicted probabilities of settlement over additional applications of mediation.[92] The predicted probability of settlement increases with additional applications of mediation, which suggests that a surge of mediation may be an effective tool of conflict management. The positive impact of mediation is statistically undistinguishable from zero once we get above 15 mediation events in a week.[93]

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[92] Other covariates held at observed values.

[93] A technical aside: The confidence intervals do not account for the weighting error in the first stage. These errors should carry through and impact our confidence in the second stage estimates. However, the solution to error propagation is non-trivial. The most promising solution that I have considered was to construct bootstrapped confidence intervals via replication of the entire MSM procedure several thousand times. However, I could not justify the repeated random sampling (with replacement) from the longitudinal data that would need to occur in order to generate the pseudo-population. With these data, a bootstrap procedure would construct an artificial "conflict trajectory" where each time period is independent. Yet observations are correlated by conflict and each individual time period is intimately connected to its past. Because observations are correlated by conflict, the idea of independent resampling seems inappropriate. Very recently, I came across an article on a "moving block" bootstrap procedure (Ju, 2015) that could be adapted to this issue, but, as yet, I have not implemented this procedure.

Figure 5.5. Predicted probabilities of conflict settlement with additional mediation events.

5.3 Discussion

The clear disparity between the MSM and the baseline model is consistent with my argument that mediation has an indirect effect on settlement. We observe a larger, positive effect of mediation in the MSM compared to the baseline model. As such, the results strongly support the idea that conflict severity functions as a time-varying confounder. Mediation has no effect in the unweighted model, which adjusts for multiple measures of conflict severity along with other baseline characteristics. The baseline result is consistent with the more skeptical view of third-party mediation, which tends to report either a null or negative effect. However, the comparison of the baseline model to the MSM suggests that the null finding is an artifact of an incomplete causal model. In effect, the static causal

logic removes a major component of mediation's total effect on the outcome by adjusting for conflict severity.

A few remarks are warranted concerning what I did *not* find in the data analysis.[94] First, there was no evidence of a cumulative effect of mediation in either the baseline or MSM models. When included in the MSM, cumulative terms increased the hazard, but were statistically insignificant. Second, there was no evidence of a lagged effect of mediation in the MSM. This was true for a one-week lag as well as a series of longer lag lengths meant to capture "near-term" treatment history. Third, there was no superficial evidence of mediation interacting with time, although I did not perform the exhaustive battery of tests necessary to rule out an interaction (Greene, 2010).[95] These insignificant results could be due to the relatively small number of failures included in my dataset. It could well be that increasing the number of failures will produce a statistically significant effect. However, I suspect that the weighting procedure has something to do with the insignificance of these factors. By constructing inverse probability of treatment weights, we create a pseudopopulation that is balanced on the time-varying confounders, but it would seem that the underlying temporal sequence of each conflict is somewhat obscured in the pseudopopulation. If I am correct in this assessment, then it will be hard to pick up lagged or cumulative effects of mediation within this context.

5.4   The Next Step: Causal Mechanisms

My central argument is that mediation influences the outcome of a conflict indirectly via its impact on conflict severity. This chapter has used a marginal structural model (MSM)

[94]See Appendix A for additional discussion of the baseline model.

[95]Testing hypotheses related to interaction terms in a non-linear model is quite involved. See also, Ai and Norton (2003).

to demonstrate the empirical basis for this proposition. The MSM analysis is a critical component of the argument, so it is important to recap the inferential strategy of the MSM. We have reasoned based on the following inferential logic: If an indirect pathway exists, then we should observe a difference between the effect of mediation in the baseline model and its effect in the MSM. More specifically, we expect to observe a larger, positive effect in the MSM compared to the baseline model. This difference in effect size occurs because the baseline model adjusts for conflict severity, which, by its specification on the right-hand-side of the equation, subsumes, or captures, the indirect effects of mediation.

As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the empirical results are consistent with these expectations. While these results are encouraging, it is important to recognize the limitations of the MSM analysis in regard to testing the theory I have laid out. These results demonstrate that a macro-level pattern in the data is consistent with the theory. But the MSM framework is notably silent regarding an important component of the argument: It does not provide direct evidence of the causal mechanisms of mediation.

We reason that mediation decreases conflict severity by comparing the results from two models, but we do not directly test the proposition. It is not possible to directly test the proposition because conflict severity does not even enter into the post-treatment portion of the MSM. In the MSM, we create a model of the initiation of mediation and then assume that conflict severity is an intervening variable in the post-treatment period. One way to think about it is that the MSM "black boxes" the post-treatment interaction between mediation and conflict severity. Of course, conflict severity is missing from the post-treatment period by design. I purposely exclude conflict severity in order to avoid adjusting for an intervening variable. Recall that my theory stipulates that the causal arrow points from conflict severity to mediation in regard to the initiation of mediation, but then the causal

124

arrow flips after mediation is used and points from mediation to conflict severity. In this way, conflict severity is first a confounder and then an intervening variable. Therefore, the model is consistent with the theory, but as such, it is unable to directly test the theory. We rely on a comparison with the baseline model to infer that the conflict severity functions as a time-varying confounder.

What if we relax these assumptions? What if we believe that conflict severity continues to be confounding variable in the post-treatment period? Perhaps we think, quite reasonably, that the assignment process resembles the post-treatment process? These questions could have major consequences for the theory. If conflict severity functions as a confounder both pre- and post-treatment, then my theory of indirect effects is on shaky ground. One potential scenario is that the confounding effect of conflict severity vastly outweighs any concomitant intervening effect. If this is the case then the baseline model may represent the better choice overall because, while it ignores the issue of indirect effects, it adjusts for the "predominant" source of bias, which is confounding. Essentially, this line of questioning raises the issue of post-treatment endogeneity. There is the potential that mediation and conflict severity are endogenous with the causal arrow simultaneously pointing in both directions. Unfortunately, we cannot answer these questions using either the standard causal model or the model of time-varying confounding.[96] These models take the causal structure of the variables as given, so they cannot be leveraged to test the relationship between mediation and conflict severity directly. And, of course, a model where the causal arrow points both ways is unidentified.

[96] In principle, there are many causal models, but only two that map onto our understanding of non-random assignment and post-treatment effects. A third model is vaguely plausible, where conflict severity is an intervening variable but not a confounding variable. However, this model does not account for the assignment process, which strains credulity given our knowledge of the mediation process. However, it may be reasonable for other factors related to conflict so it is important to keep it in mind. For more on this third causal logic, see Bind et al. (2016) for a model of indirect effects with an exogenous treatment.

The inability of the MSM to directly test this aspect of the theory presents us with a fundamental question. What is the reasoned basis for accepting one model over another? The answer is neither obvious nor settled within political science. What I have described above is the standard strategy of statistical inference found in almost any large-N quantitative analysis in political science. In this domain, the reasoned basis for choosing a model rests on the macro-level observable implications of the argument within a sample of cases. Yet the ubiquity of the strategy does not mean we should be satisfied with the results as they stand. While the results from the MSM are encouraging, they leave us with a series of unanswered questions regarding the post-treatment interaction between mediation and conflict severity. What does the post-treatment interaction look like? Does mediation cause conflict severity? Does conflict severity cause mediation? Does the causal arrow point both ways? It would strike a major blow to my theory if the "black box" operates in a manner inconsistent with the causal mechanisms of mediation. On the other hand, if what goes on inside the "black box" closely resembles the causal mechanisms of mediation, then it would corroborate the results of the MSM and further increase our confidence in the existence of an indirect causal pathway of mediation. Unfortunately, we cannot examine the black box of the post-treatment process within the confines of a cross-sectional analysis where our models take a given causal structure a priori. Therefore, to answer these questions, the next chapter presents an empirical strategy to open up the proverbial black box.

126

Chapter 6: Looking Inside the Black Box

The goal of the statistical analysis in the previous chapter was to approximate an experimental context in order to derive an average treatment effect of mediation. The MSM was used to create a pseudo-population that was balanced in regard to potential sources of time-varying confounding. A perfectly executed experimental design will produce an unbiased average treatment effect.[97] However, the results from observational studies rest on much shakier ground. With observational research designs we can only approximate an experiment via a set of assumptions. The results are valid to the extent that the model captures, in fact, the key dimensions of the data generating process.

Two dimensions are particularly important to testing policy effectiveness: 1) the assignment process, and 2) the post-treatment process. In regard to the former, the assignment equation allows us to test, to a certain degree, the causal relationship between conflict severity and the decision to intervene. Using the data, we can estimate whether conflictual

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[97]Experimental results say nothing about the causal mechanisms that produce the effect without further analysis. We can determine whether there is an effect, but not necessarily why there is an effect. The former criterion is considered sufficient to demonstrate the safety of a new drug or treatment; the latter is a bonus, but not required. The reason is that the causal process is often incredibly complex; for example: neurochemical interactions. But the lack of knowledge regarding causal mechanisms can be problematic. Consider the drug Zoloft which was approved by the FDA after passing a battery of experimental tests. After several years on the market, it was observed that Zoloft and other serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs) led to an increase in suicide rates among patients younger than 18 years old (Gunnell and Ashby, 2004). Because drug manufacturers did not understand the mechanisms through which SSRIs worked (and still don't), they were not able to foresee the negative interaction of SSRIs with the neurochemical make-up of younger children.

behavior increases or decreases the probability of mediation. In comparison, the post-treatment process is simply an assumption within this framework. We assume that conflict severity functions as an intervening variable in the post-treatment period. We cannot test the assumption within the context of the MSM. The model takes the causal structure of the post-treatment process as given.

In a sense, my research design ends up "black boxing" the post-treatment period by assuming conflict severity functions as an intervening variable. A lot rests on the validity of this assumption. For one, this feature, more than any other, differentiates the model from the standard causal logic. And second, the logic of indirect effects is the foundation of my theoretical argument. As such, the stakes are high, but how can we test this logic more directly?

What we need is an approach to modeling dynamic systems that does not treat the causal structure of the model as given, a priori. In other words, the inferential challenge of testing for endogeneity is that "theory provides hypotheses but not enough knowledge about the structural (causal) relationships" (McGinnis and Williams, 2001, 145). My strategy is to move down a level of analysis to focus on a single case. This allows me to leverage the time series properties of the data to examine the interaction between mediation and conflict severity. The goal is to be *as agnostic as possible* in regard to testing the relationship between mediation and conflict severity. Of course, causality cannot be established exclusively via inductive methods.[98] But we can adopt a sort of 'bounded agnosticism' with time series analysis, which enables us to relax some of the more restrictive assumptions of the cross-sectional model. By 'letting the data speak' in regard to the time series properties of the data, we can provide a more direct test of whether the theoretical causal mechanisms of

[98]See David Hume.

mediation actually appear in practice. In effect, the idea is to open up the black box of the post-treatment period and observe the relationship between mediation and conflict severity.

To conduct this investigation, I examine the Yugoslav Wars from 1990 to 1995. The 1990 to 1995 time period includes the brief conflict in Slovenia, the war between Croatia and Serbia, and the protracted conflict in Bosnia. Although the conflicts are nominally distinct and differ on a number of dimensions, they occur, more or less, one after the other and involve the same set of principal actors.[99] This period is analytically valuable because it is characterized by a high degree of variance in terms of conflict severity. At one end of the spectrum, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia represent tough, intractable cases with high levels of conflictual behavior, yet vary considerably in their duration. If we can observe the causal mechanisms of mediation at work in these tough cases, which represent a less than ideal environment for mediation, then it will increase our confidence in the substantive value of mediation. In contrast, the war in Slovenia represents the opposite end of the spectrum—an extremely short war with few casualties—which provides a useful counterpoint to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia.

This chapter is divided into two sections: qualitative and quantitative, each with different analytic purposes. The qualitative section centers on the role of mediators as conflict managers during the Yugoslav Wars. The purpose of this section is not to test hypotheses, but rather to give the reader a better sense of the bargaining environment and the interplay between mediators and belligerents. I contrast my theory of conflict and mediation with the views of notable observers and scholars of the conflict, especially in regard to the received wisdom that mediation was largely a 'failure' in the Yugoslav Wars. I argue that it is difficult to judge mediation as either a success or a failure from the available evidence, and

[99]I omit the subsequent conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia, which occur several years later in 1999 and 2001.

I explain the different ways in which scholars can be misled. I argue that the rubrics used to judge mediation are predicated upon a static view of conflict that ignores the interaction between conflict severity and mediation over time. In essence, the lesson from this section is that the static approach pervades both the quantitative and qualitative study of policy instruments.

In the quantitative section, I present a strategy for testing the more fine-grained observable implication of mediation within a single case. I conduct a time series analysis of the Bosnian War to test the causal relationship between mediation and conflict severity. From an empirical standpoint, the war in Bosnia is ideal for quantitative analysis because it features one of the longest post-treatment periods in the dataset: 194 weeks. This large number of time units helps to justify the asymptotic properties of the model.[100] Most conflicts in the dataset are unsuitable for time series analysis because they have fewer than 65 time units in the post-treatment period. Mediation occurs early in the overall timeline of the Bosnian War (week 2). As a consequence, the "black box" used by the MSM plays a major role in the trajectory of the Bosnian conflict. In other words, there is a great deal at stake in this case if the black box assumption is wrong.

6.1   Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: A Qualitative View

In this section, I argue that qualitative scholars make the same mistakes as their quantitative brethren: they adopt a static approach to conflict. As such, it is easy to be lured into outcome-based reasoning and lose sight of mediation's effect within the process of conflict. In what follows, I present a critique of the qualitative rubric used to judge mediation's effectiveness in the Yugoslav Wars. In brief, my argument is that most rubrics tend to divorce

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[100]The Jan Box-Steffensmeier 'rule-of-thumb' lower-bound is more than 65 time units, although other experts advocate for more than 100 time units.

mediation from the underlying conflict process, much like the static approach does within quantitative research.

6.1.1 Analytic Groundwork

What do we mean by effective mediation? What does it mean to say that mediation failed, or succeeded, within a single case? Answering these questions requires the creation of a rubric upon which to judge a mediation effort.[101] There is considerable room for debate over how to specify this rubric. A useful point of departure is Saadia Touval's *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars* (2002), which represents one of the most influential academic studies of mediation from a qualitative perspective. I use the book as a reference point because it synthesizes many of the criticisms of mediation levied by diplomats, reporters, and other knowledgeable observers.

Touval's rubric consists of a number of criteria that are worth unpacking in detail. The first is that mediation must achieve its stated goals: "By effective mediation, I mean that the mediation effort accomplished its proclaimed purpose, and did so in a timely manner before fighting exacted many casualties, caused a massive flow of refugees or produced a major change in circumstances" (2). The "proclaimed purpose" of a mediation effort almost always includes an explicit statement regarding the goal of ending the conflict quickly and peacefully. The questions are 1) whether this statement by mediators is an ostensible goal, and 2) whether it is reasonable to use it as a realistic benchmark for their effectiveness. In regard to the first question, I think it is self-evident that the proclaimed purpose of mediation is not meant as a proximate and realistic goal, but rather as an aspirational statement; mediators have no illusions that their mission will end the conflict outright. In fact, mediators exhibit an acute awareness of the difficulty of brokering a comprehensive

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[101]I use mediation "effort," "event" and "attempt" interchangeably.

settlement, especially in the near-term. After all, they observe first-hand the challenges of negotiating a political resolution between violent combatants.

In regard to the second question, I contend that it is unreasonable to judge mediation based on whether it ended a conflict. Even the conventional wisdom regarding the efficacy of NATO airstrikes fails based on this rubric. Figure 6.1 depicts NATO military activity in Bosnia. The figure shows that NATO was active for some time in Bosnia. Should earlier airstrikes count as "failed" attempts? If we judge NATO based on Touval's rubric, then most airstrikes "failed" miserably. The same can be said for almost any policy intervention that takes place prior to conflict settlement.

Figure 6.1. NATO activity in Bosnia

The issue here is that there are an infinite number of mediation efforts that can possibly occur in a conflict, but only one that can achieve the "goal" of ending the conflict. If we judge each mediation effort based on Touval's criteria, we will almost always find that the vast majority of mediation attempts are "ineffective." Furthermore, conflicts that last longer will have more opportunities for treatment, as longer conflicts will tend to experience a large number of "failed" treatments.[102]

The second component of Touval's rubric involves equating the success and failure of mediation with the duration of the crisis and the severity of the conflict. Touval (2002, 171) writes, "The [mediation] attempts in 1991 to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the conflict were a total failure. The seven months it took to bring about a ceasefire in Croatia, and the three and a half years needed to produce a settlement in Bosnia are hardly examples of effective mediation. While the tortuous process of mediation was taking place, close to 200,000 people were killed and approximately two million were displaced from their homes and turned into refugees." While there is no denying the length and brutality of the Yugoslav Wars, it is misleading to attribute these aggregate outcomes to a failure of mediation. By all accounts, the Yugoslav Wars were especially virulent and difficult to resolve for a number of reasons, including ethnic and religious differences, weak political institutions, an asymmetry in military capabilities, and radical nationalist fervor. The conflicts featured widespread cases of ethnic cleansing, rape, and internment in concentration camps. On balance, it is fair to say that the Yugoslav Wars were more severe than the average conflict. Thus, it is possible that the underlying bargaining context of the Yugoslav Wars is responsible for the virulence of the conflict and its duration. This is the essence of the "selection" argument made by Fortna and many others. Therefore, we

[102]Chapter 2 examined this issue in the context of "survivor treatment selection bias."

should be careful not to conflate the severity of the conflict with the success or failure of mediation.

The third criterion links success to binding agreements: "a successful mediation effort was one that produced an agreement between the disputants and managed to bind the parties to its terms *for several years*" (Touval, 2002, 2) [emphasis added]. This viewpoint overlooks the potential for changes in the bargaining context to overwhelm the putative effect of mediation. The circumstances facing belligerents are likely to change over time, which could shift the incentives to renege on the agreement. This could happen due to an exogenous shock—e.g. one side receives a shipment of arms from a third party, which bolsters their capabilities—or, from an internal change in the bargaining space—e.g. negotiations break down between belligerents, leading them to turn to the battlefield to improve their bargaining position. Therefore, a long-term agreement is not necessarily a sign of successful mediation (and vice versa). Moreover, this criterion presumes that the effect of mediation persists for months or even years. As discussed in Chapter 3, it seems more reasonable to believe that the effect of mediation will diminish over time. The simple reason is that changes in the bargaining context will swamp the effect of a given mediation attempt.

One might argue more narrowly that mediators proposed the wrong set of terms to belligerents. In other words, they picked the wrong deal to end the conflict, and, in this sense, mediation was "poorly implemented." There is some merit to this argument, but it is difficult to identify "poor implementation" in practice. The problem with the argument is that it assumes that belligerents have overlapping reservation values at the time of the mediation proposal, which may often not be the case. In other words, if the private information of both sides were known to mediators, it is still possible that there is no deal that mutually satisfies the demand set of each party. If no mutual agreement is possible, then costly signaling

will continue until both sides calibrate their reservation values. The strongest evidence for this point is that the eventual settlement in Bosnia closely resembled earlier proposals from mediators. In other words, the bargainers came to the position outlined by mediators, rather than mediators coming to the belligerents. The earlier proposals stipulated a roughly 51/49 percent split of the territory, which closely resembled the distribution of the final deal, except for the fact that the Bosnian Serbs received 49 instead of 51 percent.[103]

On a related point, some scholars argue that mediators succeeded because they wielded a particular kind of leverage, or failed because they used carrots when they should have used sticks (Burg, 2005). This view of effectiveness conflates mediation with the tools of coercive diplomacy. The carrots and sticks offered by mediators are part of the content of a deal; they are not the causal mechanisms of mediation. It is critical to understand from a scholarly standpoint that the content of a settlement proposal is not a generalizable feature of mediation. Our task as scholars is to tease out the generalizable aspects of mediation to determine whether it is effective. By confusing the content of a proposal made by mediators with the causal mechanisms of mediation, we risk creating an ad hoc theory of mediation's effectiveness.

In a broad sense, most of the problems with the existing qualitative rubric stem from the inherent challenge of testing the effectiveness of a policy instrument based on a single case. But it would be a grave mistake to conclude that causal inference cannot proceed in a single case, or that we must relegate causal inference to the cross-sectional context. To be sure, there are some issues of causal inference that are more easily accounted for in the cross-sectional context—the issue of non-random assignment being perhaps the most notable. Yet the limitations of a single-case design are not fatal flaws. As it stands, the main

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[103]Bennett (1995); Woodward (1995).

issue with the existing scholarship is that it does not take into account variation within the conflict process. If we ignore the variation within conflict severity, then we are easily mislead concerning the success or failure of mediation.

6.1.2 A Process View of Effectiveness

Much of the criticism of mediation relies upon a flawed rubric that sets mediation up for failure. Critics tend to attribute negative outcomes within the conflict to a failure of mediation while at the same time ignoring or discounting the role of the underlying bargaining context in shaping the trajectory of the conflict. In other words, critics tend to divorce mediation from the bargaining context.[104] The tendency is to fault mediators for not engineering an adequate solution based on post hoc knowledge about outcomes. The onus is put on mediators to solve the underlying problems of conflict; the belligerents and the bargaining context are noticeably absent from the equation.

So where does this leave us? I advocate for a process view of the effectiveness of mediation. A process view situates effectiveness within the context of the conflict.[105] What do we expect mediation to do within a conflict? To answer the question, we need to examine the causal mechanisms of mediation. Causal mechanisms have observable implications within the conflict itself, as well as those commonly tested in regard to conflict settlement. Every mechanism of mediation shares the same basic logic—mediators increase the level

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[104]For example, Burg (2005, 184) writes, "The intractability of conflict and the efficacy of mediator efforts constitute quite distinct analytical issues."

[105]For a related view of "performance," see Gutner and Thompson (2010), who distinguish between "the outcomes produced and the process—the effort, efficiency and skill—by which goals are pursued by an individual or organization." The authors take aim at scholars who continually lambaste IOs for poor performance by looking only at outcome-level indicators and ignoring the underlying bargaining context. The authors use "process" to mean execution of a function, i.e. actions related to the standard operating procedure undertaken by an IO. Part of the story with "process" amounts to asking: Does the IO perform its desired functions *within this context*? I take Gutner and Thompson (2010) as a call for more attention to medium-range theorizing where we explore smaller-scale observable implications and then test them accordingly.

of cooperation in the conflict space. Thus, if we reflect upon the set of causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter 3, then we are left with the following observable implication: *Mediation increases the level of cooperation between belligerents.*

Moreover, I contend that this increase in cooperation is a relatively short-term effect. Whatever impact mediation has on a conflict is not time-invariant. The effect of mediation dissipates over time as events on the ground swamp the marginal influence of the mediation effort. In a way this logic resembles the work of Baum and Groeling (2010), who find that elites can influence public perceptions in the short-term, but eventually "reality reasserts itself" as events on the ground erode the effect of elite propaganda over time. Consider a situation where belligerents meet with mediators, thus sending a signal of their willingness to cooperate. This cooperative act has the potential to engender more cooperation, triggering a mutually reinforcing pattern of positive behavior. But if one side decides to use this time to launch a surprise offensive into enemy territory, then whatever positive signal was sent by mediation will be overshadowed by this turn of events. In this case, the behavior of belligerents subsumes the effect of mediation on the bargaining context. The question of how short this short-term effect will last—e.g. a week, two weeks, a month—is largely an empirical matter. I have no firm priors beyond the belief that anything beyond three months seems too long. Ultimately, the question of how short is short-term must be settled empirically.

In sum, I posit the following hypothesis of mediation's effect within a single case:

Hypothesis 1. *Mediation increases the level of cooperation between belligerents in the short-term.*

A short-term increase in cooperation is the most realistic and, most importantly, *generalizable* observable implication that we can derive from the causal mechanisms of mediation that are found in the literature. Anything beyond this expects mediation to do far more than its causal mechanisms stipulate. For example, we cannot expect mediators to reveal information that *immediately* produces a political settlement.[106] Nor can we expect the signaling value of mediation to trump the inherent political divisions that triggered the conflict. In short, the causal mechanisms of mediation imply modest levers of power; they are not mechanisms that drastically alter the conflict environment. As scholars, we need to come to terms with just how modest the effect of mediation really is. We all want our favorite policy instrument to be vitally important, but the reality is that the progression conflict is mostly a function of the actions of belligerents. We should be satisfied if mediation marginally improves the level of cooperation *in the short term*. That is enough, in my view, for mediation to be deemed a "successful" tool of conflict management.

In addition, I argue that the principal tool of mediation is the ceasefire. The goal of a ceasefire is to reverse the cycle of violence and place the conflict on the path to settlement. In this sense, mediation has the potential to change the overall momentum of the conflict, either by slowing patterns of escalation or catalyzing patterns of cooperation. Moreover, what many observers consider "failed" ceasefires—where one or more actors violates the terms—are not necessarily indicative of a failure of mediation. Violations of a ceasefire may also reflect the fact that the probability of political settlement is low at almost any time point during a conflict. In my view, the resumption of hostilities is largely a function of

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[106]It has been argued that this occurred in one particular case, Kashmir III, between Pakistan and India. President Bush sends Robert Gates, Richard Haass, and John Kelly to warn President Khan and General Berg that Pakistan would be defeated by India in the ensuing war. At the same time, the US warns Prime Minister Singh and General Sundarji that Pakistan might use nuclear weapons in desperation if escalation continued. See Beardsley (2008, 276).

the underlying bargaining context rather than a deficiency of mediation. This means that mediators may be able to decelerate the conflict even in a case where the ceasefire failed to hold. The idea that ceasefires are the realization of a successful mediation attempt suggests a second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2. *Mediation changes the trajectory of the conflict.*

Putting this all together leaves us with a set of guidelines for the analysis of the Yugoslav Wars. First, I expect the trajectory of the conflict to be primarily a function of changes in the internal bargaining environment. Third parties may certainly influence the bargaining space, but mediators, by and large, are only minor players in this regard. They do not have the power to dramatically influence the bargaining context faced by belligerents. Furthermore, when mediation does correlate with major changes in the bargaining environment, we should be careful not to conflate the causal mechanisms of mediation with the contents of a deal proposed by mediators. These proposals often involve other policy instruments, such as peacekeeping forces, observer missions, economic sanctions, and arms embargoes, which are analytically distinct from the generalizable features of mediation.

Second, we should think about the effectiveness of mediation in regard to whether it produced an increase in cooperation between belligerents. Ceasefires are a potential realization of mediation functioning properly, but they are not necessarily indicative of a net increase in cooperation. It is important to parse whether ceasefires actually produced a change in the behavior of belligerents on the ground.

Third, we should take care to remember that mediation interacts with a changing conflict environment. Therefore, an increase in conflict severity is not necessarily caused by

a failure of mediation. In the same vein, an increase in cooperation is not necessarily indicative of a successful mediation attempt. To get at effectiveness, we must examine the systematic patterns of interaction between mediation and conflict severity.

Taken as a whole, these guidelines showcase how difficult it is to determine whether mediation was effective. In the next section, I discuss the background of the wars in Yugoslavia and the progression of the subsequent conflicts. The goal is not to provide definitive evidence that mediation had a favorable impact, but rather to demonstrate how difficult it is to disentangle mediation from the bargaining context. In the subsequent quantitative section, I present a way to get at the micro-level observable implications of mediation.

6.2 Origins of the Yugoslav Wars - Irreconcilable Differences

The breakup of Yugoslavia triggered a series of conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.[107] These conflicts varied in terms of severity and degree of intractability but they shared a number of common elements. Each arose in the same turbulent political climate infused with ethnic nationalism and self-determination where political entrepreneurs seized upon ethnic identity to supplant the multiethnic, communist identity of the failing Yugoslav federation. Once the overarching construct of the Yugoslav federation was called into question, it was not long before different ethnic groups claimed sovereign control over the same territory. Opportunistic politicians cast these territorial disputes in existential terms, as if the very survival of a particular minority group was a stake, a characterization that became a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy once violence broke out.

Ethno-nationalist movements have a long and storied history in the Balkans. In 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by Gavrillo Princip, a Bosnian

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[107]In what follows, I refer to Bosnia-Herzegovina as Bosnia.

Serb, which provided the spark that lit the fires of World War One. Princip was a member of the Black Hand, a secret society devoted to establishing Serb control over the Southern Slavic regions controlled by Austria-Hungary. In the aftermath of the assassination, anti-Serb sentiment boiled over to produce massive rioting and looting in Sarajevo. Ethnic divisions in the Balkans, particularly between Serbs and Croats, were further exacerbated during the Second World War. After their conquest of Yugoslavia, the Third Reich established a quasi-independent puppet state controlled by the Ustasa, a local fascist organization dedicated to the racial purity of Croats. Yugoslav partisans waged a hard-fought campaign of guerrilla warfare against Nazi and Ustasa forces. The Nazis responded with one of the most brutal counterinsurgency campaigns in history, which was facilitated by the Ustasa militias. The atrocities committed by the Ustasa regime, including the widespread murder of hundreds of thousands of Serbs, gypsies, Jews, and anti-Ustasa Croats, cast a long shadow over the post-war era and beyond.[108]

The partisan resistance during the war was organized under the banner of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia. The group's charismatic leader, Josip Tito Broz, would emerge as the ruler of post-war Yugoslavia. Tito was keenly aware of Yugoslavia's ethnic wounds and worked to transcend these divisions by promoting a multiethnic "Yugoslav" identity. Nation-building centered on the partisan's slogan used during the war: "Brotherhood through unity."[109] Yet Yugoslavia's federal system located considerable power in the republics as a gesture to the importance of national identities. The federal state consisted of six republics—Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Slovenia—each governed by their own independent communist party.

[108] Bennett (1995); Woodward (1995).

[109] Bennett (1995).

Cracks in the federation began to emerge after Tito's death in 1980. Of particular note was the recessionary climate of the 1980s, which played a major role in exacerbating the latent tensions between the republics. Slovenia and Croatia, with strong industrial sectors and Westernized economies, weathered the economic downturn far better than their neighbors. Slovenia had full employment during the 1980s and Croatia experienced only single-digit unemployment rates. In contrast, the unemployment rate in Kosovo reached 50 percent, 27 in Macedonia, and 23 in Bosnia and Serbia.[110] The inequalities between the republics bred resentment from the Serbs in particular, who believed they were not getting their fair share. The issue of economic redistribution was further heightened by the deterioration and eventual collapse of the USSR. Yugoslavia found itself at an economic crossroads regarding whether to continue with a centralized, planned economy or pivot toward more decentralized, free-market policies. The latter approach, favored by Slovenia and Croatia, meant less money for the federal government in Belgrade. The politics of redistribution also impacted the Yugoslav army, which relied heavily on funding from Slovenia and Croatia. Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, warned that the economic consequences of Slovenia and Croatia leaving the federation would be severe: "The economic problems, the unemployment, the casting of people out into the streets would be so enormous that a social explosion would be inevitable."[111]

The economic divisions between the republics were compounded by an increasingly antagonistic ethno-nationalist rhetoric, which pitted each ethnic group against the respective "Other." Politicians in Serbia and Croatia perpetuated the idea that self-determination was tied to the existential security of their respective ethnic group. The result was that the

[110]For more the austerity of the 1980s and 1990s, see Woodward (1995, 50-57).

[111]"Yugoslav Premier in Plea to Republics." *The New York Times*. June 24, 1991.

ensuing conflicts took on the character of "a set of zero-sum struggles," where each side fought tooth and nail for every square yard of territory (Burg, 2005). The consequences of surrender were unthinkable when faced with the prospect of annihilation. When war finally broke out, the conduct of the belligerents served to only reinforce this narrative. Accusations of human rights abuses, including genocide and ethnic cleansing, were levied at all sides, although against Serbian forces and their allies to a greater extent.

The intensity of ethno-nationalist movements was not uniformly distributed across the six republics of Yugoslavia. In republics with large, concentrated minority populations—such as Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia—the irredentist campaigns of minority groups took on a more violent tenor. These campaigns were backed with the force of arms and large numbers, a fact not lost on the majority groups in power. In Bosnia, these tensions were compounded by the tripartite ethnic division between Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), which meant that both Serb and Croat minorities represented a challenge to the unitary Bosnian state. Slovenia was the notable exception with a small ethnic minority population compared to its fellow republics.

The elections held throughout Yugoslavia in 1990 marked an inflection point in the trajectory toward conflict as nationalist politicians won decisive victories in each republic.[112] The collapse of communism in the USSR created a legitimacy crisis for communist parties and the twin narratives of ethnic identity and self-determination were readily available to fill the ideological vacuum. Political appeals to ethnic nationalism eroded the last vestiges of common interest and common purpose that was vital to the functioning of the multiethnic state. The result was that "the emerging party systems institutionalized and reinforced ethnic divisions" (Burg, 2005, 192). In Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)

[112]For information on the 1990 election, see Dawisha and Parrott (1997).

came to power with promises to enact exclusionary policies favoring ethnic Croats, which alienated and antagonized the Serb minority. In Serbia, the Socialist Party led by Slobodan Milosevic beat out a number of other nationalist parties to win a strong parliamentary majority. The Serbian nationalist platform was openly irredentist, largely due to the large Serbian minority populations in Croatia and Bosnia. In Bosnia, the election featured a three way race between the Bosnian branch of the Croatian HDZ, the nationalist Bosnian-Serb party led by Radovan Karadzic, and the Muslim-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA) led by Alija Izetbegovic. The elections were decided along ethnic lines with Izetbegovic's SDA winning a plurality of the vote.

The nationalization of political parties throughout the republics had spillover effects at the federal level. In January 1990, the republics met for the 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The Slovenians and Croatians, worried about Serbia's domination of the Yugoslav military (JNA) and its growing influence at the federal level, attempted to shift power back to the republics and away from the federal government, but their proposals were voted down by Serbia's voting bloc. Milosevic had spent the better part of the late 1980s orchestrating a power shift in Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, replacing each government with his supporters. By 1989, he had control over four out of eight votes in Yugoslavia's federal council. After being voted down, the Slovene and Croat delegations walked out of the assembly in protest, which marked the end of the Yugoslavian Communist Party. The last remnants of the federal structure were further delegitimized when Serbia blocked the succession of Stjepan Mesic, a Croat, to the federal presidency. This left Borisav Jovic, a Serb, in control of the rotating presidential system, which had been in place since Tito's death. The failure of power transition stripped the Federal Council of its last semblance of impartiality. The Yugoslav government was seen as a de facto representative

144

of Serbian interests. Without the Federal Council or the League of Communists, there was little left institutionally to hold Yugoslavia together. In a last gasp attempt at reconciliation, the newly elected leaders met for a series of meetings over the course of the first six months of 1991.[113] But the republic presidents, whose political power was vested in their ethnic constituencies, failed to reach an agreement on the fate of the Yugoslav federation.

The sequence of events that led up to war in Yugoslavia is reminiscent of the prelude to the Franco-Prussian war. In a narrow sense, both conflicts were wars of unification. The Franco-Prussian War was orchestrated by Otto von Bismarck as a tool for German unification, to consolidate Greater Prussia into the modern German state. In the same vein, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were orchestrated by Slobodan Milosevic as a tool for Serbian unification, to finally realize the dream of a Greater Serbia. While neither Bismarck nor Milosevic were the sole cause of hostilities, there were arguably its chief architects. Bismarck and Milosevic both seized upon the power of nationalist propaganda, which they deftly wielded to antagonize and provoke the other side, drawing out the extremists and marginalizing the appeals of the moderates. Milosevic, like Bismarck, manipulated the media to raise the decibel of nationalist rhetoric to a fever pitch. As Bennett (1995, 126) describes it, "the Serbian media were baiting the Croat public."

Much like Napoleon III in 1870, the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, played into Milosevic's hand. Tudjman was a polarizing figure and ultra-nationalist in his own right. After fighting for the partisans in the Second World War, Tudjman pursued a side career as an amateur historian of the conflict. His books offered a revisionist account of the war that prompted many to accuse him of being an apologist for the Ustasa regime.[114] His most

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[113]The Yu-summits in January-March and the Summit of Six in March-June.

[114]Bennett (1995, 128).

145

famous work, *Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy*, argues that the death toll at the Jasendvac concentration camp was inflated. Tudjman's anti-communist and radical nationalist HDZ party resurrected the Ustasa chessboard flag as an emblem, stirring up ethnic tensions from the war. When Tudjman's HDZ won the majority of seats in the spring of 1990, the Serbian media perpetuated the narrative that the Ustasas had returned to power in Croatia. Tudjman's response was to further escalate nationalist rhetoric and exclude the Serbian Democratic party from the governing coalition.[115] This war of words soon escalated to fighting in the streets between Croat police and Serb militias. Much like 1870, the tensions had risen to the point where all that remained was a spark to set off the powder keg.

What does this brief sketch of the background of Yugoslavia tell us about the bargaining context at the outbreak of war? For one, the principal belligerents were separated by major economic, ethnic, and historical cleavages, which combined to create structural divides between the bargainers. Each ethnic group had different goals and different directions for their future. Mistrust, worst-case scenario thinking, and existential fears were commonplace. Diplomacy, in this context, seems unlikely to engineer simple solutions, quick fixes, or enduring agreements.

6.2.1 The War in Slovenia

In July 1990, the newly elected governments in Slovenia and Croatia declared their sovereignty and right of secession.[116] Leaders from the two countries put forth a proposal to restructure Yugoslavia as a confederation of sovereign states, with separate militaries and economies, rather than a federation of republics. To deter independence, the federal

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[115]Woodward (1995, 119).

[116]The war in Slovenia is combined with the war in Croatia in my dataset and the ICB's.

government dispatched additional JNA troops to Slovenia, but the show of force failed. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991.[117] "Life in Yugoslavia was life in a pressure cooker," explained Lojze Peterle, the Slovenian prime minister. "The outside world was afraid to take the lid off in case it exploded. But we have decided to take the lid off - because, if not, we shall all be boiled alive."[118]

To cement their declaration of independence, Slovenia moved to take control of its borders with Austria and Italy. As the Slovenians took down the Yugoslav flag and raised their own, the world watched to see whether the Yugoslav military would react. At the time, the issue of who controlled the JNA remained in some doubt as Serbia continued to block the ascension of Stjepan Mesic, the Croatian representative, as chair of the rotating presidency. Yet even with the constitutional authority of the presidency up in the air, the Yugoslav Parliament ordered the JNA to reassert control over Yugoslavia's borders.[119] Fighting quickly broke out between Slovenian militia forces and the Yugoslav military.[120]

To the surprise of many observers, the Slovenians, facing off against the Yugoslav army backed with tanks and an air force, waged a highly effective guerrilla campaign.[121] They succeeded by outmaneuvering the JNA forces, surrounding their armored columns in the streets, and eventually forcing them to surrender. The casualties were few in number and decidedly one-sided. After ten days of fierce combat, the JNA had lost thirty-nine troops

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[117]"Ceasefire hopes fade: Yugoslav crisis far from over." *Agence France Presse*. July 10, 1991.

[118]"Slovenia and Croatia secede; Defence chief issues warning of intervention by Yugoslav army." *The Independent (London)*. June 26, 1991.

[119]"The government and all other Yugoslav institutions including the security organs and the Yugoslav People's Army have the duty to take all measures necessary to prevent the re-drawing of Yugoslavia and any changes in its borders." Quoted in "Slovenia and Croatia secede."

[120]"Tank force deployed in Yugoslavia." *St. Petersburg Times (Florida)*. July 4, 1991.

[121]"Peace pact reached in the Balkans." *Toronto Star*. July 8, 1991.

compared to four deaths for the Slovenian irregulars.[122] "I was stunned that the federal army were so poorly organised," said Danilo Slivik, a Slovene journalist.[123] "They just came in tanks without food and water. When the tanks were surrounded the soldiers became thirsty and hungry." The performance of the JNA was so embarrassing that the Slovene minister of defense, Janez Jansa, bragged that all he had to do was blow up a single bridge to end the war.[124]

The European Community (EC) responded to the crisis by dispatching a team of mediators composed of foreign ministers from Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The EC "troika" called for a ceasefire and began negotiations to bring it about. On June 28, the day after the JNA moved against Slovenia, the EC team met with leaders of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia to facilitate dialogue with Prime Minister Markovic. They passed along Markovic's proposal to end the crisis, which involved freezing any movement toward independence, demobilizing the JNA, and seating Stjepan Mesic as president. After a series of false starts and aborted proposals, the negotiations eventually culminated in the Brioni Agreement, signed on July 7, which imposed a ceasefire, called for a three-month moratorium on secessionist attempts by the republics, and made plans for further peace talks in August.[125] In the long-run, neither Croatia nor Slovenia would adhere to the moratorium, but the ceasefire held. On July 18, the federal government ordered the JNA withdrawal from Slovenia, which marked the de facto end of the conflict.[126]

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[122]"Slovenian Peace Pact Negotiated; Rival Ethnic Groups Continue Fighting In Eastern Croatia." *The Washington Post*. July 8, 1991.

[123]"Bitter blood on the road to war." *The Sunday Times (London)*. June 30, 1991.

[124]Woodward (1995, 166-67).

[125]"Peace pact reached in the Balkans." *Toronto Star*. July 8, 1991.

[126]"Yugoslav leaders pull federal army out of Slovenia." *The Guardian (London)*. July 19, 1991.

From the outset, the EC troika adopted a pragmatic approach to crisis management. The mediators did not attempt to solve the larger issues at stake concerning the right of self-determination or the legality of the secessionist claims. Instead, they dogmatically pursued the more limited objective of a ceasefire. "The main objective has been to try to reverse the escalation of violence and change it into a peaceful dialogue," said the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek. It was clear that mediators had no illusions about how difficult a political settlement would be. "There is a very difficult way ahead," van den Broek remarked.[127]

Contrary to the Dutch Foreign Minister's guarded predictions, the war in Slovenia ended after only 10 days of fighting. The ceasefire brokered by the EC troika held until the Yugoslav military withdrew. While the violence had stopped, the larger political issues concerning self-determination and the fate of the rest of Yugoslavia were unresolved. It is interesting to note that the Brioni Agreement, which called for a freeze of secessionist activities, was clearly violated by Slovenia and yet the Yugoslav government went ahead with the withdrawal from Slovenia. In effect, the withdrawal was sufficient for both sides to tacitly agree to end the conflict.

Why was the war in Slovenia so short compared to the subsequent conflicts? The explanation for the timely end to the war is fairly straightforward. At the outset of the war, both sides had clearly incompatible bargaining positions. As Milan Kucan, Slovenia's president, said at the outbreak of the war: "We have been trying to negotiate with the federal government for months and nobody has listened. Why should we talk to them now?" It turned out that the political questions of Slovenian sovereignty and the legality of secession were largely settled on the battlefield, not the bargaining table. It is possible

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[127]"Slovenian Peace Pact Negotiated."

that the Yugoslav government set out with the goal of pacifying the Slovenian militias, but these ostensible goals were quickly revised when they ran into fierce resistance from partisan forces. It is telling that the JNA commanders began the war talking about how "All resistance will be crushed," but they ended it talking about how the JNA "found itself in an impossible situation."[128] The effect of the JNA's poor showing on the battlefield was compounded by the fact that Serbia had little interest in opposing Slovenia's secession in the first place. There were very few Serbs in Slovenia, so the Serbian bloc within the federal government lacked any incentive to try to prolong the war.

In sum, the war came to a tacit conclusion because neither Slovenia nor Serbia had an incentive to continue fighting. The Slovenians had achieved their goal of independence while the Yugoslav government radically revised their bargaining position after 10 days of fighting. The war is notable for being a case where the EC mediation team met their goal of an expedient ceasefire. The speedy resolution to the war and the absence of a formal political settlement reveal a number of important insights for thinking about the subsequent war in Croatia. First, the war in Slovenia ended largely because of a clear resolution on the battlefield. Second, mediators failed to orchestrate a formal political solution to the conflict, yet the fighting ended regardless. As it turned out, the ceasefire was enough to get both sides to limp toward an informal resolution. In the subsequent conflicts, the track record of ceasefires will diminish considerably, but we need to disentangle whether that is due to a failure of mediation, or to the bargaining context faced by belligerents.

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[128]JNA General Konrad Kolsek: "Battle Starts in Slovenia Yugoslavian Army Hits Border Stations." *St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri).* June 28, 1991.; Yugoslav Defense Minister Kadijevic. Woodward (1995, 167).

6.2.2 The War in Croatia

Unlike Slovenia, Croatia was home to a large Serbian minority, most of which was located in the eastern regions near Serbia and Bosnia. If Croatia declared their independence, there was little question that the Croatian government would face a challenge to its territorial integrity. In fact, Serbia had repeatedly warned Croatia that it would annex the ethnic Serb regions of Croatia in the event of secession. Tensions had been steadily building since Tudjman was elected in May 1990. According to EC representative Lord Carrington, ethnic Serbs reacted "in part because the Croatian constitution contained inadequate provisions to safeguard their position and also because it rekindled memories of wartime atrocities." In August 1990, Serbs around Knin launched an uprising against Croatian rule and demanded autonomy for their proclaimed new territory, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina.[129] Tudjman refused to consider the demands of Serb minorities and declared the new territory illegal. When Croatia attempted to retake Knin using paramilitary forces, the JNA stepped in to block the operation. At this point, the JNA could claim little pretense of neutrality. In fact, most of the Croatians in the JNA had already defected in protest.

As the war in Slovenia was coming to a close, violence was escalating in Croatia. On the morning of July 7, as the Brioni Agreement was being signed, a nine-hour gun battle broke out in the town of Tenja in eastern Croatia between Croatian national guard forces and a Serbian militia.[130] As that point, fighting between Croats and Serbs had already killed over 400 people in Croatia, most in attacks between Serb gunmen and Croat police forces.[131] In September 1991, JNA forces openly moved into Croat territory. Fighting

[129]Bennett (1995, 130).

[130]"Slovenian Peace Pact Negotiated."

[131]Woodward (1995, 160-69).

escalated over the next several months as local Serb militias backed by the JNA seized nearly a third of Croatian territory. On December 19, 1991, the SAO Krajina proclaimed itself the autonomous Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Once the conflict was underway, the bargaining environment was complicated by having a two-tiered system of actors. Forces in the self-styled independent Serbian Republic of Krajina were under the influence of Serbia, but not directly subordinate to their interests. While Serbia was pulling the strings of the JNA and the local Serb militias, this use of proxies made it hard to distinguish between the local Serb bargaining position and Belgrade's view. This system eventually caused complications for Milosevic as the local Serb forces often adopted more extreme positions than their patrons in Belgrade. As a consequence, Milosevic often had to cajole these local proxy forces before arriving at the bargaining table.

Fresh off the successful ceasefire in Slovenia, Lord Carrington was tasked with mediating the ensuing conflict in Croatia. As in Slovenia, the EC's strategy was to first achieve a ceasefire and then proceed to political negotiations. Yet the EC had considerable trouble clearing this first hurdle. As Carrington (1992, 1) acknowledged in the fall of 1992: "There is no doubt that the lack of an effective ceasefire greatly complicated the task." The EC attempts at a ceasefire were stymied time and time again by the Serbian-backed rebels. With a clear edge in military power, the Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia understood that a ceasefire would only benefit the Croatians. It was simply an exercise in futility to try and convince the rebels to halt their advance as more and more territory fell into their hands. Thus, Lord Carrington's failure to broker a durable ceasefire was largely a function of the intractable bargaining environment he faced. The fact that Serbian rebels had clear incentives to keep

fighting was not lost on the EC's team. As Carrington (1992, 4) put it, "Responsibility rests upon those who are engaged in the fighting and the leaders who are encouraging them."

Critics of mediation point to the EC's lack of leverage over the principal belligerents as a reason for the EC's ineffectiveness.[132] However, it is not a settled question as to the amount of leverage necessary to broker a settlement. In other words, we must assess the potential impact of leverage in relation to the overall bargaining context. The counterfactual invoked here is: If mediators had more leverage, then they could have orchestrated a settlement. Yet it is hard to imagine any form of leverage short of a major military intervention that could have altered the bargaining environment enough to dissuade the belligerents from fighting. Furthermore, most levers constitute other forms of intervention, such as sanctions or arms embargoes. Therefore, even if the counterfactual was true, we run into the problem of conflating mediation with the effect (or lack thereof) of a secondary intervention.

On October 8, 1991, the UN Secretary General sent former US secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. The UN mission involved separate negotiations with the belligerents, but these efforts were directly coordinated with the EC. Vance was dispatched partly in response to Carrington's string of failed efforts. There was also a concern that the EC was not viewed as an impartial mediator. Earlier in the year, Milosevic had rejected the EC's offer of good offices and accused them of taking sides.[133] However, it seems likely Milosevic's accusation of impartiality was largely a ploy to hinder the EC's efforts. The reality was that Milosevic had no desire for an expedient political resolution of the conflict. The elusive political settlement envisioned by commentators at the time was to consist of a set of overarching rules and procedures for facilitating an orderly and

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[132]Woodward (1995, 175-6): "The EC also had little leverage over Slovenia and Croatia to convince them to remain within Yugoslavia or even participate in negotiations about its future because they already had assurances of economic assistance if they left."

[133]Woodward (1995, 179).

non-violent breakup of Yugoslavia. Yet because of the large Serbian diaspora in Croatia and Bosnia, Belgrade desperately wanted to avoid creating a set of universal rules and procedures that might jeopardize their plans to annex Serb majority territory elsewhere. The Serbs wanted piecemeal deals and de facto settlements. It was no accident that the war in Slovenia ended without an overarching political agreement. Once Slovenia won a decisive military victory, Serbia had every reason to impede any large-scale political settlement concerning the legitimacy of future secessionist movements. After all, they had designs to facilitate their own self-determination movements in neighboring Croatia and Bosnia.

In late November 1991, UN mediator Cyrus Vance successfully brokered a ceasefire between the two sides and began discussions for a UN monitoring mission to keep the peace. The plan called for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to the Krajina region and established four UN Protected Areas. These agreements were understood to be of "an interim nature and will not pre-judge the outcome of political negotiations."[134] In other words, the Vance plan acknowledged that the current status quo agreement did little to resolve the political disagreements at the center of the dispute. It was a sort of stop-gap measure, which attempted to put both parties on the pathway toward a political resolution. Critics point out that the Vance plan failed to resolve any of the underlying grievances, but this was not lost on mediators. From the start the EC and UN teams were well-aware that there was a good chance that hostilities would resume in the near or long-term. Carrington (1992, 3) writes, "the Croatian government is obviously impatient to regain control of this territory. These pressures will doubtless augment and will lead to an increase in tension— and possibly even to a resumption of the conflict."

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[134]Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991) S/23280.

Why did Vance succeed when Carrington failed? The answer, again, centers on a change in the bargaining context. Burg (2005, 196) argues that the Vance agreement was the result of a "hurting stalemate" between Serb and Croatian forces; however, this perspective does not quite square with events on the ground. The reality was that only one side of the conflict was hurting in any meaningful sense—Croatia. Against Serb forces backed by the former Yugoslav military, the Croatians were at a severe military disadvantage and they knew it. What the ceasefire gave Croatia was time to rebuild their army. On the other side, the Serbs had largely accomplished their goal of capturing the Serb-majority territory along Croatia's border. There was simply no reason for the Serbs to continue fighting for additional territory, especially considering their sights were set on Serb-majority regions in Bosnia. Thus, rather than ending in a hurting stalemate, the war in Croatia ended because there was a clear victor on the battlefield. The ceasefire brokered by Cyrus Vance was successful because both sides had strong incentives to halt the fighting.

The war in Croatia demonstrates the importance of the bargaining context to the achievement of a ceasefire and a settlement. It is evident that mediation operates within the ebb and flow of bargaining dynamics. Therefore, we must be careful not to dismiss violated ceasefires as a failure of mediation. At the same time, it is not clear whether successful ceasefires and tacit agreements are driven by mediation or underlying changes in the bargaining context. The relative weight of these two factors is not clear from the historical record.

6.2.3 The War in Bosnia

The ceasefire between Croatia and Serbia was followed by a referendum on Bosnian independence in late February 1992. Bosnia was the most diverse republic in Yugoslavia,

consisting of 17 percent Croat, 31 percent Serb, and 44 percent Muslim.[135] The results of the referendum favored independence, but the vote was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs. Following the referendum, Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, announced that over 70 percent of Bosnian territory belonged to the newly created Serb republic, the Republika Srpska.

The war began in April as Bosnian Serb forces, backed by the JNA, attacked Sarajevo. Over the next several months, Bosnian Serb forces captured a wide swath of territory in Eastern Bosnia. The plans for the invasion had begun as early as August 1991 when the JNA began providing arms to the Bosnian-Serb militias while at the same time disarming Bosnia's national guard.[136] In many ways, Bosnia was a casualty of the earlier wars in Slovenia and Croatia. Once Croatia and Slovenia announced their independence, Bosnia had little choice but to declare independence or remain in the rump Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs.

From the outset, the Bosnian Serbs held a major military advantage. Before the war, Yugoslavia was a net exporter of armaments and its weapons factories were all located in Serbia and Montenegro.[137] In addition, the military balance favored the Serbs thanks in part to actions taken by the international community. On September 25, 1991, the UNSC banned arms sales to Yugoslavia. The unintended consequence of the arms embargo was a massive military advantage to the Serbs, who inherited the JNA and its weapons.

The mediation efforts during the Bosnian war can be broken down into five major episodes: 1) EC mediation from February to August 1992; 2) the joint UN/EC mediation

[135]See "Ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina population, by municipalities and settlements," 1991 Census. Number 234.

[136]Zimmerman (1994, 78).

[137]Bennett (1995, 176).

team led by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen from September 1992 to June 1993; 3) the subsequent Stolenberg/Owen delegation from July 1993 to January 1994; 4) the U.S. mediation effort led by Charles Redman from January to April 1994; and 5) the final negotiations that produced the Dayton Accords in November 1995. I examine the role of mediators in each episode and the bargaining context faced at each juncture.

EC Delegation (February to August 1992)

Fresh off the ceasefire that ended the conflict in Croatia, an EC mediation team led by Lord Peter Carrington and Jose Cutileiro, a Portuguese diplomat, transitioned to the Bosnian conflict. The initial position of the EC was a policy of partitioning Bosnia along largely ethnic lines. The mediators' objective was to facilitate dialogue toward an agreement based around the idea of partition.

Carrington, as chair of the EC-sponsored Conference on Yugoslavia, arrived in Sarajevo in early February to meet with the leaders of the three main political parties.[138] These talks continued in March under the oversight of Ambassador Cutileiro. The principal point of contention for the Bosnian Serbs was that they did not view the Bosnian Declaration of Independence as constitutional and were opposed to being part of a Muslim-controlled unitary state. Surprisingly, while the Bosnian Croats had voted for independence with the Muslims, they ended up loosely aligning with the Serbs during the EC negotiations. The reason was that both the Croats and Serbs supported the creation of a confederation where power was largely vested in the autonomous states. The Muslims, however, opposed the idea of partition and stood firm in their desire for a strong unitary state. As Carrington (1992, 2) recounts, "There was thus a major gap to be bridged, and any agreement reached was therefore likely to be fragile."

[138]For an insider account, see Carrington (1992).

157

The culmination of these negotiations was the March 18 Statement of Principles, which outlined the main parameters for future negotiation.[139] The Statement was based around two main points. First, it was agreed that the resulting political structure would retain some degree of autonomy for the constituent political units. And second, the political borders of these would not be based solely on ethnic lines, which was simply not feasible given the multiethnic nature of Bosnia.

Despite the promise of the March 18 Statement of Principles, the agreement was ultimately rejected by the Muslim Democratic Action Party (SDA) later that month.[140] President Izetbegovic claimed that he had been cajoled into accepting the agreement by EC mediators and reasserted his insistence on a unitary state. The intransigence of Izetbegovic's bargaining position began to turn the Bosnian Croats against their Muslim allies. The inevitability of Muslim dominance in a unitary Bosnian government changed the political calculations of the Bosnian Croats, who began to view partition as their only hope for political autonomy. Izetbegovic did not help matters by repeatedly refusing to take part in negotiations, much to the frustration of the EC team. As Carrington (1992, 2) saw it, "The Muslims have the most to lose by the partition of Bosnia and, in my view, the most to gain by participating fully in the political negotiations." Unfortunately, political negotiations were deadlocked over the issue of a partition. It became increasingly clear that the only way to reach a compromise was through movement on the battlefield.

There is little doubt that the Bosnian Serb's substantial superiority in military firepower was a recurring barrier to achieving a settlement based on the terms set out by mediators. Based on the military balance, the Bosnian Serbs had ample reason to believe that

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[139]For more on the negotiations, see Atiyas (1995); Carrington (1992).

[140]Atiyas (1995, 192).

they could get a better deal on the battlefield. On the other hand, Izetbegovic's intransigence concerning partition is somewhat puzzling given that the Bosnian Muslims faced a clear military disadvantage. In an interview, Lord Carrington recalled a conversation in which he informed the Bosnian President in no uncertain terms that the Bosnian Serbs had overwhelming military superiority. "How can you resist?" Carrington asked bluntly. "If we surrender, we'll all be killed," Izetbegovic answered.[141] In a way, the extreme power asymmetry meant that Bosnian Muslims had nowhere to go but up if the bargaining context changed. Izetbegovic may have reasoned that he had to simply hold out against the Bosnian Serbs to improve his position. He was gambling that one of two things might happen. Either 1) the International Community would intervene militarily, or 2) his military capabilities would improve. As Ante Nevjestic, a professor in Sarajevo, put it, "We need weapons to fight back or we need military intervention. I am very surprised that is still necessary to have to explain this."[142] Of course, a third option was also possible: military defeat and forced capitulation.

On April 6, the US and the EC formally recognized Bosnia's independence. Ostensibly, recognition was an attempt to halt the fighting by providing international backing for Bosnia's right of secession. But recognition also had a potential downside. By removing the issue of recognition from the bargaining table, the EC team lost a means of leverage over the Bosnian Muslims. Carrington had previously campaigned against the EC's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and his attitude had not changed in regard to Bosnia. "From the outset, the prospect of recognition had been the one real instrument to keep the parties

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[141] BBC Documentary *The Death of Yugoslavia* (2:52:13) based on the book by Silber and Little (1996).

[142] "In Sarajevo, a Peace Plan Brings Only More War." *The Washington Post*. August 29, 1992.

engaged in the negotiating process," Carrington lamented. His belief was that the EC had essentially given away a bargaining chip for free.

Yet the peace process seemed to move forward later that month as the three Bosnian leaders agreed to a ceasefire and met with the EC mediation team in Lisbon to continue negotiations. Unfortunately, the attempt to restart the peace process was short-lived as violence relapsed in early May. Each side blamed the other. Irfan Ajanovic, a member of the Muslim delegation at Lisbon, said on May 29, "Nothing can be agreed and signed here. The war still being on in Bosnia and the cease-fire being not respected. One cannot come to terms in an atmosphere of pressure by force." Mate Boban, the Croatian delegation head, remarked, "The things have once again taken a turn for the worse. There is going to be still more of war now. The Muslims are mistaken to leave." And Radovan Karadzic, the chief Serb representative at Lisbon, blamed the Muslims for the failure at Lisbon: "The Muslims were only looking for a reason to sabotage these negotiations. Obviously, they have also opted for war."[143] The final blow to peaceful negotiations came on May 4 when the Yugoslav army apprehended President Izetbegovic as he returned to the Sarajevo airport from the Lisbon talks.[144] Although Izetbegovic was eventually returned unharmed, the hostage taking represented a breach of decorum that further obscured the already fine line between the bargaining table and war.

As the fighting escalated between Muslim and Serb forces in May, the incompatible bargaining positions between the Muslims and Croats began to spill out onto the battlefield. In June 1992 several Bosnian Croats factions turned on their Muslim counterparts. By January 1993, an all-out war had broken out between the Muslims and Croats. There is no

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[143]"Tripartite Government Discussed at Lisbon Talks, Then SDA Withdraws." *BBC News*. May 29, 1992.

[144]"Fighting rages as army holds Bosnia leader, Truce fails." *Reuters*. May 4, 1992.

question that the tripartite divisions within Bosnia added an additional layer of bargaining complexity to an already intractable conflict. It quickly became apparent that the same proxy-patron system that characterized Milosevic's relationship with the Bosnian Serbs was playing out with Tudjman's regime in Zagreb and the Bosnian Croats. As negotiations moved forward, the question of who belonged at the negotiating table—the Serbs or the Bosnian Serbs, the Croats or the Bosnian Croats—added a new wrinkle to the diplomatic efforts.

Without a doubt, the intractability of the bargaining environment was the most important impediment to a successful ceasefire during this period. "I do not think there is much object in brokering another ceasefire unless there is a radical change in circumstances," Carrington said. "You would be talking to the same people who ignored what was agreed last time."[145] However, while the EC's efforts during this first stage of the conflict did not result in a durable ceasefire, they did succeed in brokering several agreements that may have decreased the level of conflict severity in the short-term. For example, on July 17, leaders from the three camps agreed to place their heavy weapons under the control of the UN.[146] They also agreed to create a "committee in the field" to oversee human rights violations. And at the London Peace Conference in late August, Bosnian Serb leaders agreed to lift the siege of Sarajevo and numerous other cities, close detention camps, and give their heavy armaments to the UN for supervision.[147] Yet whether these agreements had a net positive effect on cooperation would remain a lingering question throughout the war. In the volatile conflict environment, it was almost impossible to assess whether the small-scale

[145]"Carrington in Threat to Pull-Out of Ceasefire Talks." *The Herald (Glasgow)*. July 24, 1992.

[146]Atiyas (1995, 192).

[147]"In Sarajevo, a Peace Plan Brings Only More War."

diplomatic agreements like those borne out of the London Peace Conference translated into less overall violence on the ground.

EC/UN Delegation (September 1992 to June 1993)

On August 25, 1992, Lord Carrington resigned as the EC's special envoy to Yugoslavia and British Prime Minister John Major nominated Lord David Owen as his replacement.[148] This transition marked the second phase of mediation, which was characterized by a joint effort between the UN and the EC. The UN envoy Cyrus Vance had worked in tandem with the EC toward the end of war in Croatia, but this collaboration was far more coordinated. Vance and Owen joined forces and embarked upon a major diplomatic effort "crisscrossing the former Yugoslavia, threatening and cajoling devious politicians into accepting the regularly violated ceasefires" (Rogel, 1998, 63). Their diplomatic tour produced what became known as the Vance-Owen plan, which served as a framework for a larger political settlement. The plan called for a decentralized state partitioned into 10 semi-autonomous provinces.[149] "The fundamental premise of this map is that Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain a sovereign, independent, multi-ethnic state," Vance explained. "The map does not accept the results of 'ethnic cleansing' and is designed to reverse it. It strikes a fair balance in the allocation of land, natural and industrial resources."[150] Yet the idea of what constituted a "fair balance" largely depended on what side you were on. One potential roadblock was that the map allocated roughly 43 percent of the territory to the Bosnian Serbs, who at that point held over 70 percent of the territory. While all three parties signed the agreement, the Bosnian Serb signature was contingent on a vote by the Bosnian Serb

[148]"Carrington resigns as EC's Yugoslav envoy." *Irish Times*. August 26, 1992.

[149]"Bosnia Peace Talks End in Failure; Mediators to Seek Tough U.N. Intervention." *The Washington Post*. January 31, 1993.

[150]"Bosnia Peace Talks End in Failure."

assembly. Milosevic, satisfied with the terms of the deal, lobbied hard for the plan, but he failed to convince the Bosnian Serbs, who voted it down in the assembly.[151] In the end, only the Bosnian Croats approved of the Vance-Owen plan in its entirety. The Muslims also objected to the map and refused to sign a military pact with the Bosnian Serbs.[152]

The Vance-Owen plan also came under fire from the Clinton Administration, who argued it was unfair to Bosnia's Muslims. President Clinton, who came into office in January 1993, had been highly critical of the Bush Administration's response in Bosnia. On the campaign trail, Clinton had accused the Bush Administration of "turning its back on violations of basic human rights."[153] Yet while Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued that the Vance-Owen plan was a capitulation to Serbian interests, the Clinton Administration, like its predecessor, was hesitant to use force to improve the bargaining position of Bosnia's Muslims.

Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (July 1993 to January 1994)

The next major diplomatic initiative was carried out by Lord Owen and Vance's replacement, Thorvald Stoltenberg of Norway.[154] In late July, Owen and Stoltenberg submitted an internal draft of a plan to create a "Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina."[155]

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[151] BBC Documentary *The Death of Yugoslavia* (03:34:50) based on the book by Silber and Little (1996).

[152] "Bosnia Peace Talks End in Failure."

[153] Zimmermann (1996, 221).

[154] As the UN secretary-general's special representative, Stoltenberg assumed the dual role as head of the UNPROFOR mission and the UN mediation delegation. Stoltenberg's appointment at UNPROFOR ruffled feathers within the organization as the Norwegian promptly demoted the current hierarchy and installed his compatriot, General Vic Eide, as his deputy. "Near mutiny' sparks walkout at U.N. force." *The Toronto Star*. December 3, 1993. Stoltenberg arrived at a time when UN forces increasingly found themselves in the line of fire. As of July 1993 peacekeeping forces had sustained 548 casualties and 51 deaths in the Balkans. "Unless Situation Improves, U.N. Should Quit Bosnia, Mediator Says." *The New York Times*. July 14, 1993. While UNPROFOR would remain in Bosnia, Stoltenberg faced with what was described as a "virtual mutiny" within the organization and eventually stepped down as head of the UN force in December 1993.

[155] "Bosnia Mediators Propose Three Ethnically Drawn Republics." *The Washington Post*. July 30, 1993.

The plan advocated for three-way federation to be partitioned along largely ethnic lines, much in the same vein as earlier deals proposed by the Serbs and Croats. The plan's description of "three constituent peoples: the Muslims, Serbs and Croats" signaled a major transition from the earlier Vance-Owen plan, which called for division along non-ethnic lines.[156] Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, referred to the document as "pretty close to our plan," much to the consternation of mediators, who realized that this endorsement would not be taken well by the Muslims.[157] Yet the EC/UN team remained cautiously optimistic. "There's no doubt that there's been a better atmosphere between all three parties than at any other time since I've been involved in the negotiations," Owen said, before adding, "Whether they will reach agreement is a separate question."[158]

The final version of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan called for the partition of Bosnia into three republics. The Bosnian Serbs would receive roughly 52 percent of the territory, the Croats 18 percent, and the Muslims 30 percent. The Bosnian Serbs held well over 52 percent of the territory at this point, but Radovan Karadzic claimed that the plan would only need "minor corrections" to secure his approval.[159] Unfortunately, these minor corrections turned out to be major stumbling blocks. The revisions included the removal of a clause that would inhibit any of the three republics from pulling out of the union. The revised language stipulated the right of each union to hold a referendum on whether to leave the union or remain. There was little doubt that the Croats and Serbs would vote to leave the union and merge with Serbia and Croatia, a result that was unacceptable to the Bosnian Muslims. President Izetbegovic expressed his disapproval of the partition plan to a crowd

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[156]"Bosnia Mediators Propose."

[157]"Wrong Man In The Wrong Place; Who is Alijah Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia, and why has he signed over his multi-cultural country to partition?" *The Guardian (London).* August 2, 1993.

[158]"Bosnia Mediators Propose."

[159]"Bosnia Mediators Propose."

in Sarajevo, "We have found ourselves, we the Bosnian people, between a cruel enemy and a hypocritical friend, that Englishman [Lord Owen] who likes to speak of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, not Bosnians."[160]

Throughout August and September, the Owen-Stoltenberg team held sporadic talks with belligerents in Geneva. These negotiations were hamstrung by the Bosnian Muslim's demands for more land and a secure outlet to the Adriatic Sea.[161] Speaking from Geneva via Sarajevo radio, Izetbegovic explained his refusal to agree to the Owen-Stoltenberg deal, "We are trying to preserve a large piece of Bosnia for our nation. The aim of the aggression was not to destroy Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state but to exterminate the Muslim people."[162] Realizing that these public appeals by bargainers served to tie their hands in subsequent negotiations, Owen and Stoltenberg orchestrated a round of secret talks in Geneva. Late night negotiations between Izetbegovic and Momcilo Krajisnik, a Bosnian Serb leader, led to a promising ceasefire declaration and several smaller steps aimed at trust-building.[163] But hopes were quickly dashed when the Bosnian delegation claimed to have been pressured to sign the deal and walked back from the agreement once it was made public.

As fighting continued throughout November and December, the Owen-Stoltenbeg team became increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for peace. When asked about a ceasefire agreement signed in December, Owen remarked, "Quite frankly, we're unconvinced the ceasefire is serious. We're making an appeal to the political leaders to make sure this

[160]"Wrong Man In The Wrong Place."

[161]"Bosnians Reportedly on Brink of Signing New Peace Agreement." *The Washington Post.* September 17, 1993.

[162]"Wrong Man in the Wrong Place."

[163]"Bosnians Reportedly on Brink."

is not another one of the joke ceasefires to come out of Bosnia and Herzegovina."[164] In a statement later that month, Owen said, "I think we are making progress. It is painfully slow and demoralizing at times. You fight over every village."[165] By January, diplomacy had all but ground to a halt. "We cannot seem to break the deadlock," said Owen. "They will fight, in my judgement."[166]

US Mediation, Charles Redman (January to April 1994)

The next mediation episode followed in the wake of the February 5 shelling of a market in Sarajevo by Serb forces, which killed 68 people.[167] In response, the US special envoy, Charles Redman, launched a major effort to broker an agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. The goal was to unite the two sides in order to put pressure on the Serbs. "Getting the Muslims and Croats to agree would certainly simplify things quite a bit," a State Department official remarked.[168] On February 15, Redman met with Izetbegovic with the goal of clarifying the Muslim bargaining position. Redman then traveled to Zagreb to discuss a possible ceasefire in the town of Mostar, where a contingent of Muslims troops were under heavy artillery fire from Croatian forces.[169] After a series of meetings on February 22, Tudjman agreed to the ceasefire and this good faith effort served as the catalyst for widening the scope of negotiations.

[164]"Mediators get truce extended until Jan. 15; But little optimism ceasefire will hold." *The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec)*. December 24, 1993.

[165]"Why Owen, the Balkan Peacemaker, Soldiers On." *The New York Times*. December 29, 1993.

[166]"Serb-Croat pact signals new battle for Bosnia." *The Independent (London)*. January 20, 1994.

[167]"Muslims and Croats agree to federation; member states would be divided along ethnic lines." *The Philadelphia Inquirer*. March 2, 1994.

[168]"White House Seeking Croat-Muslim Accord; Move Might Pressure Serbs, U.S. Aides Say." *The Washington Post*. February 21, 1994.

[169]"US pushes non-ethnic Bosnian deal." *The Guardian (London)*. February 22, 1994

The US objective was to follow up the ceasefire with additional confidence boosting measures, including a withdrawal of heavy weapons, UN patrols of the ceasefire lines, and the creation of a joint military commission. On March 2nd, a formal Croat-Muslim Accord was struck in Washington, creating a loose confederation between the two groups.[170] "A rapprochement between the Croats and Muslims is important as a first step," said Stephen Walker, a former State Department official. "But the administration must be prepared to have a plan for compelling Serbs to cooperate."[171]

Getting the Serbs to agree to a ceasefire was complicated by Washington's lack of influence in Belgrade. Both Croatia and Bosnia's Muslims had designs to pivot to the West after the war, so they were relatively amenable to US diplomacy, but Serbia had no such intentions. Fortunately, as the Croat-Muslim Accord was being finalized in Washington, the Russian special envoy, Vitaly Churkin, was applying pressure to the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. In February, Churkin has engineered the removal of Serb heavy weapons from the outskirts of Sarajevo in exchange for Russian peacekeepers in the city. By March, the Russian diplomat had his sights set on the demilitarization of the Tuzla airport, which was surrounded by Serb forces. The outcome of these efforts was an agreement to allow a UN humanitarian airlift to the Muslim Tuzla region.[172]

US pressure on the Croat-Muslim side and Russian pressure on the Serbs, while uncoordinated, signaled a major shift in policy by the two countries, who had up until this point largely remained on the periphery. But the diplomatic leverage of these two superpowers was not enough to solve the bargaining divisions between the principal belligerents. At that

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[170]"Clinton hails Bosnia pact with Croatia." *Evening Standard (London)*. March 2, 1994.

[171]"Muslims and Croats agree to federation."

[172]"At Russian Urging, Serbs Agree to Let Airport Open." *Los Angeles Times*. March 02, 1994

point, the Bosnian Serbs controlled over 70% of Bosnia.[173] They saw little reason to budge

from their position in the face of Bosnian Muslims demands for more than 51% of the ter-

ritory, which they viewed as unreasonable. "We're not prepared to go beyond 51 percent

for the Muslims, which is the position we have agreed with the Europeans and that Bosnian

President Alija Izetbegovic had indicated last year would be acceptable," said a Bosnian

Serb official.[174] On March 10, the Bosnian Serbs flatly dismissed the idea of joining the

proposed Croat-Muslim federation.[175] Izetbegovic also rejected such a plan, calling a joint

Serb-Croat-Muslim federation "unrealistic."

Yet the diplomatic efforts of Redman and Churkin may have persuaded a few Bosnian

Serbs to agree to a compromise, much like the "bottom-up" causal mechanism suggests.

In late March, a Serb faction within the Bosnian parliament backed the idea of a federal

state, much to the chagrin of Karadzic.[176] This split followed on the heels of the Muslim-

Croat agreement, which may have encouraged the faction to support a diplomatic solution.

Unfortunately, the shift in sentiment was short-lived, as Bosnian-Serb forces attacked the

Muslim-held city of Gorazde.[177] As the last remnants of a ceasefire collapsed, the US

diplomatic efforts ground to halt. "Right now, we're treading water," said a US official.[178]

"The situation has changed because of Serb advances," Redman said. "They are going to

have to be dealt with."[179]

[173]"Muslims and Croats agree to federation."

[174]"U.S. Peace Effort in Bosnia Withers Under Serb Attack." *The New York Times*. April 6, 1994s

[175]"Serbs reject US Federation Plan." *Courier-Mail*. March 11, 1994.

[176]"Serbs split on state blow to Bosnian plan." *Courier-Mail*. March 29, 1994.

[177]"U.S. Peace Effort in Bosnia Withers."

[178]"U.S. Peace Effort in Bosnia Withers."

[179]"NATO bombs Serbs in Gorazde." *The Guardian (London)*. April 11, 1994.

The Dayton Accords (November 1995)

Violence continued to escalate from 1994 into early 1995 with a series of atrocities at Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa. The ability of Belgrade and Zagreb to control their proxy forces deteriorated in the face of the ethnic cleansing and rampant human rights abuse. "Things had reached such a point that nobody could assert rational control," Milosevic reflected.[180] With the humanitarian situation at an all-time low, the Americans redoubled their diplomatic efforts to reach an accord. This "all-out push for peace" coincided with a considerable increase in fighting on the ground (Rogel, 1998, 68). A surge of NATO air strikes under the auspices of Operation Deliberate Force weakened the Serbian position and dominated the news headlines. However, what received less attention were a series of counteroffensives by Croat and Muslim forces. In early August, a major Croat offensive against Serbs in Croatia's Krajina region succeeded in taking back much of the territory they had lost in 1991. At the same time, a joint Croat-Muslim offensive in Bosnia began to roll back the Bosnian Serb position considerably. When the Bosnian Serbs counterattacked, the Croat-Muslim forces mounted a robust defense and successfully held onto much of their gains.

The success of NATO air strikes and the Croat-Muslim ground campaigns changed the calculus of Bosnian Serb leaders. This shift in the conventional balance created an incentive for the Serbs to agree to a compromise deal based around the parameters outlined in earlier proposals. In early November, Milosevic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjman met in Dayton, Ohio for what would be the final round of peace talks.[181] Notably, the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders were held out of the talks in an attempt to remedy the problem

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[180]BBC Documentary *The Death of Yugoslavia* (04:06:00).

[181]"Principal players in Balkans." *St. Petersburg Times (Florida)*. November 1, 1995.

of two-tiered negotiation. The strategy of the US delegation, led by Richard Holbrooke, was to strengthen the existing Croat-Muslim pact and weaken the Bosnian Serb leadership, many of whom faced charges of war crimes.[182] The hope was that a new Bosnian Serb leadership would be more amenable to existing proposals.

At the outset of negotiations, US mediators managed to secure a series of small confidence building measures designed to encourage cooperation, including the release of US reporter David Rohde, who had been captured by the Bosnian Serbs.[183] "I think some thanks should go to President Milosevic for having intervened with the Bosnian Serbs to have him released," said US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns. On November 14, the Serbs agreed to return land to Croatia. "For the first time in this conflict an issue has been solved by signature and not by a bullet," remarked Peter Galbraith, the US ambassador to Croatia.[184] Back in Belgrade, Milosevic convinced Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic to agree to a "quiet departure." And despite an 11th hour impasse over the distribution of territory, the three sides finally agreed to a comprehensive peace accord on November 22.[185] On December 14, the formal agreement was officially signed in Paris.

6.2.4 Lessons Learned. What Do These Conflicts Tell Us?

The conflicts in Yugoslavia offer a number of insights into many of the larger issues at play in the study of mediation. Many critics argue that mediators proposed certain deals or took certain actions that were misguided, or even outright suboptimal. Even in the most optimistic assessment, mediation is seen as ineffective. These criticisms are unconvincing.

[182]"Clinton Seeks to Shore Up Muslim-Croat Federation." *The New York Times*. November 3, 1995.

[183]"Bosnian Serbs Free Reporter After Pressure; U.S. Credits Milosevic In American's Release." *The Washington Post*. November 9, 1995.

[184]"Serbs return land to Croatia in peace breakthrough." *The Australian*. November 14, 1995.

[185]"Bosnia peace accord signed." *The Herald (Glasgow)*. November 22, 1995.

To date, the main problem with the existing analysis has been a reliance upon a rubric that divorces mediation from the underlying bargaining context. The wars in Yugoslav from 1991 to 1995 reveal the inherent problem with judging the effectiveness of mediation by looking at outcomes like the duration of the conflict, the number of casualties, or the stability of ceasefires and political settlements. These quantities are, first and foremost, a function of the bargaining context.

In this regard, the short war in Slovenia serves as an important counterpoint to the conflicts that follow. The war is notable for how quickly it was resolved and for being a case where mediation appears to have been an unqualified success. After only 10 days of fighting, EC mediators successfully brokered a ceasefire that held for three months until JNA troops withdrew. Admittedly, the war in Slovenia is overshadowed the virulence of the subsequent conflicts. Perhaps for this reason, many observers tend to gloss over or discount the effect of mediation in Slovenia. What do we make of this assessment?

It is fair to say that EC mediators were, in a sense, pushing on an open door with their diplomatic efforts. Both sides had little to gain by abrogating the initial ceasefire that became a de facto end to the conflict. Our instinct may be to write off the effect of mediation in the Slovenia case and instead attribute the success of the ceasefire and political settlement to the favorable bargaining context. This rationale rests on a fundamental premise: It assumes that durable ceasefires and political settlements are largely a function of the bargaining context. I largely agree with this assessment. But it is worthwhile to point out that most observers proceed from the opposite premise in regard to subsequent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. Critics assume that the lack of a durable ceasefires or political settlement was indicative of a failure of mediation. What finally succeeded in ending the conflict in Bosnia? According to most experts, it was NATO intervention, not diplomacy.

Yet presumably NATO airstrikes altered the bargaining context, giving Serbia an incentive to agree to a compromise. Therefore, no matter how we try and cut it, we come back to the same basic fact: Settlement is largely driven by changes in the bargaining context.

If we overlook the importance of the underlying bargaining context, we risk conflating the success or failure of mediation with changes in the level of conflict severity. Very severe conflicts will be judged as mediation failures, and less severe conflicts as successes. If we discount the bargaining context of each conflict, we end up dismissing the success of mediation in Slovenia as a trivial success, and scoring the mediation attempts in subsequent conflicts as monumental failures. Another way to think about it is that even within a single case we face the problem of non-random assignment. If we ignore the fact that mediators are more likely to intervene in high severity conflicts, then we will systematically underestimate mediation's effect.

6.2.5 Bargaining Dynamics and the Mechanisms of Mediation

As scholars, we need to be more precise about what we expect mediation to do within the context of a conflict. The first step is to situate the role of mediation within our theory of conflict. The Yugoslav Wars closely resemble an information game, where bargainers use costly signals to reveal information and locate a mutually acceptable settlement. If information asymmetries exist to the extent that belligerents are engaging in a full-scale war, then we cannot expect a single mediation attempt to drastically change this level of information asymmetry. In other words, the effect of mediation occurs at the margins. From a bargaining standpoint, the impact of any individual mediation event will likely be small. Yet almost any action short of dropping a nuclear bomb will have a relatively small

effect on the probability of settlement.[186] From an academic standpoint, what matters is not so much the size of the effect but whether the effect is positive. In causal inference terms, what matters is whether there is a marginal difference between the probability of settlement with mediation and without.[187]

The challenge for scholars is that it is difficult to assess whether mediation increased the probability of settlement within a single case. In the cross-sectional context, we simply compare across cases with different levels of conflict severity. The approach is not as straightforward with only a single case. Part of the challenge is that, as Bennett (1995, 52) explains, "while the intensity of the [Bosnian] war waxed and waned, the fighting never fully stopped." Numerous forces within the conflict environment were in a state of flux, including the level of conflict severity between the warring sides; the repeated efforts by mediators to resolve the conflict; and NATO airstrikes that helped shift the balance of power. Within this turbulent conflict environment, how do we judge whether mediation increased the probability of settlement?

Testing the effectiveness of a policy instrument amounts to asking whether mediation had an effect within the bargaining context. To do this, we must set our sights on determining whether the causal mechanisms of mediation were present in this case. In other words, we need to consider not only the macro-level observable implications of the theory—an increase in the probability of settlement—but also the more fine-grained observable implications of the causal mechanisms at work. In other words, the way forward requires being

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[186]c.f. Pape (1993), who argues that the bargaining impact of dropping nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was smaller than the effect of Russia's defeat of Japan's Kwantung Army.

[187]In addition, a small increase in probability can add up when we think about conflict as a succession of dice rolls or draws for the lottery jackpot. On each roll or draw, the overall probability of settlement is extremely small, with or without mediation. A single mediation attempt may only slightly increase the probability of settlement on each roll. Yet even a small change in probability can add up if the game is played over and over.

more precise about what we expect mediation to do. My argument is that mediation works by influencing the level of conflict severity on the ground. Specifically, I hypothesize that mediation increases the level of cooperation between belligerents.

How can we determine whether mediation increases the level of cooperation? One idea is to leverage our knowledge of ceasefires. Brokering a ceasefire has the potential to increase the level of cooperation between belligerents. In this sense, a ceasefire has the potential to increase the probability of settlement. However, while this line of investigation is promising, it would be a mistake to, say, count the number of ceasefires to determine whether mediation worked. The main reason is that many ceasefires are "ceasefires in name only." They may be agreed to by both parties, but that is no guarantee that there is any change in the actual level of fighting. The Bosnian War features many instances where violence may have actually increased after ceasefires were signed. At other times, belligerent claimed violations when, in fact, there seemed to be widespread adherence to the ceasefire as a whole. The problem is that it is difficult to determine the degree to which ceasefires decreased (or increased) the level of conflict severity. Belligerents may have incentives to lie and claim violations where none occurred. Or belligerents may adhere to ceasefires in some regions, while violence continues unabated in other regions. In other circumstances, an increase in cooperation in a certain geographic area may be overshadowed by major events, such as cases of ethnic cleansing or the hostage taking of the Izetbegovic during the Bosnian War. These events may grab the attention of observers while obscuring the net positive effect of the ceasefire.

For the aforementioned reasons, it is simply not practical to rely on the existing rubric for testing whether mediation improves the level of conflict severity. However, time series methods are well-suited to the task of examining the interaction between mediation and

conflict severity. My strategy is to examine 1) whether mediation is related to conflict severity, and then 2) whether that relationship is positive or negative.

6.3   Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: A Time Series Approach

The goal of examining an individual case rather than a cross-section of cases is to test the directional relationship between mediation and conflict severity. The idea is to be as agnostic as possible concerning the causal relationship between these two variables. If we suspect that mediation and conflict severity are fully endogenous—with the causal arrow pointing both directions—then we would like to be able to estimate the following equations:

$$\text{Mediation}_t = \text{Conflict Severity}_t + \text{Conflict Severity}_{t-1} + \text{Mediation}_{t-1} \qquad (6.1)$$

$$\text{Conflict Severity}_t = \text{Mediation}_t + \text{Conflict Severity}_{t-1} + \text{Mediation}_{t-1} \qquad (6.2)$$

Unfortunately, these equations are unidentified unless we place restrictions on the contemporaneous causal relationship between mediation and conflict severity. However, placing restrictions on these equations puts the cart before the horse if our goal is to test the directionality of the relationship.

One way to circumnavigate this problem is by setting aside for a moment the contemporaneous relationships and focusing instead on the lagged relationships between the

variables. This leaves us with the following equations:

$$\text{Mediation}_t = \text{Conflict Severity}_{t-1} + ... + \text{Conflict Severity}_{t-l} +$$

$$\text{Mediation}_{t-1} + ... + \text{Mediation}_{t-l} \tag{6.3a}$$

$$\text{Conflict Severity}_t = \text{Conflict Severity}_{t-1} + ... + \text{Conflict Severity}_{t-l} +$$

$$\text{Mediation}_{t-1} + ... + \text{Mediation}_{t-l} \tag{6.3b}$$

where l is the lag order of the model, e.g. $1, 2, 3, ..., l$.

It is straightforward to model these simultaneous equations using a vector autoregression (VAR) (Sims, 1980; Sims, Stock, and Watson, 1990). The VAR model allows each time series to be affected by lags of itself as well as lags of the other variables in the model. My strategy is to estimate a reduced-form VAR without any a priori restrictions on the lagged relationships between variables. I then perform a series of diagnostic tests on the reduced-form VAR to uncover the particular structural model that best characterizes the dynamic system.

Within the time series context, we can tease out the relationship between multiple lagged variables in a system using Granger causality tests. Granger causality is a way to test whether one variables "causes" another in a limited sense. Granger causality is a time series notion of causality where one series is said to Granger cause another series if the lagged values of one series improve the ability to predict current values of the other series (Granger, 1969). It is important to understand that Granger causality is not "true" causality because it is always possible that an omitted variable is the true cause of observed behavior pattern. This is another way of saying that causality is not something we can test for statistically. We establish causality from theory; it cannot be identified without invoking assumptions. For example, when we place x on the right hand side of a model, we are

assuming that x is orthogonal to the other causes of y. This limitation of Granger causality, therefore, is similar to any statistical model.

To understand the logic behind Granger causality, we need to understand its origins. Granger causality was devised as a way to account for the idea that causes should precede effects. This notion seems like commonsense, but if apply it to time series data we quickly run into trouble. Consider a graduate student who plays tennis.[188] Tennis is tiring, so after a round of tennis, the graduate student drinks a beer. With T = tennis and B = beer, we can plot a sample of the graduate student's weekly tennis and beer routine in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2. Timeline A

T ⟹ B ⟹ T ⟹ B ⟹ T ⟹ B

Figure 6.2 seems to indicate that tennis causes beer—the student drinks a beer after each time he plays tennis. But what if we were to observe a random sample of this routine, say, the middle portion of the week? Figure 6.3 depicts this slice of the data generating process. In Figure 6.3, beer appears to precede tennis in the sequence. If we happened to observe this slice of the data instead of the first one, we might be led to believe that beer drinking causes tennis, not the other way around.

Figure 6.3. Timeline B

B ⟹ T ⟹ B ⟹ T

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
[188]The structure of this example is derived from John Cochrane, who apparently cribbed it from George Akerlof.

177

In International Relations, the phenomena under study are not so well-understood as a graduate student's drinking habits. In that case, both Figure 6.2 and 6.3 represent plausible samples of the data generating process. The problem is that tennis and beer are recurring events so the cyclical nature of their relationship makes it difficult to tease out whether T causes B or B causes T. One solution is to find an unexpected T and check to see whether an unexpected B follows it. Therefore, we can say that tennis Granger causes beer consumption if an unexpected tennis event forecasts the occurrence of drinking beer. More formally, we can define Granger causality as: x_t Granger causes y_t if x_t helps to forecast y_t given past values of y_t.

Granger causality is an indication of the directional relationship between two or more variables, i.e. whether one variable tends to precede or follow another in a sequence. In essence, it provides a way to look at time series data and assess whether a particular variable is related to a future realization of another variable. Therefore, the concept of Granger causality offers a systematic method to test the directional relationship between mediation and conflict severity.[189]

One limitation of the reduced-form VAR used to test for Granger causality is that it does not tell us about the substantive relationship between the variables, such as whether mediation increases or decreases conflict severity. Within a traditional regression context, we could simply interpret the coefficients, but the VAR is a system of equations which means we have to consider the entire system to understand the substantive effect. To do this, I estimate a structural VAR based on the Cholesky decomposition of the residuals. From the structural model, I construct orthogonalized impulse response functions, which depict a 12 week in-sample forecast of the effect of a hypothetical one standard deviation

[189] In practice, this is established with an F-test of a set of parameters in a reduced-form VAR model.

shock of one series on the behavior of another series. This shock, or impulse, is simply a one standard deviation increase in the variable in question and the effect of this shock is the response. In essence, the idea is to shock one of the variables and then observe how the system responds. When used in tandem with Granger causality tests, impulse response functions give us a way to tease out the systematic relationship between variables while being as agnostic as possible concerning the underlying causal relationship.

6.3.1 Hypotheses

My argument rests on two hypotheses. The first captures the intuition of indirect effects, where mediation changes the underlying level of conflict severity.

Hypothesis 1. *Mediation increases the level of cooperation between belligerents in the short-term.*

What do I expect to find if the hypothesis is correct? A summary of the observable implications of the Granger causality tests are presented in Table 6.1 with each Scenario being a potential outcome of the test. My primary expectation is that mediation will Granger cause conflict severity, as depicted in Scenario A of Table 6.1. This result would lend credence to the assumption that mediation influences the level of conflict severity in the post-treatment period. In contrast, Scenario B, where conflict severity Granger causes mediation but not vice versa, would cast doubt on the idea of indirect effects. Scenario B is weakly suggestive of the traditional causal logic, where mediators are primarily reactive to the conflict environment. Moreover, a lack of Granger causality in either direction, Scenario C, would suggest a null relationship, which would also undermine my argument.

However, Scenario D, a situation where conflict severity and mediation both Granger cause each other, is not necessarily inconsistent with my argument. The reason is that

Table 6.1. Observable implications and Granger causality

Scenario	Directionality			Consistent with argument?
A	Mediation	$\implies$	Conflict Severity	☑
B	Mediation	$\impliedby$	Conflict Severity	☒
C	Mediation	$\not\impliedby\not\implies$	Conflict Severity	☒
D	Mediation	$\iff$	Conflict Severity	☐

Granger causality is an indication of causal directionality but not the direction of effect. This is why Scenario B is only weakly suggestive of the traditional causal logic. Scenario B tells us that Conflict Severity appears to influence mediation, but it does not tell us whether the effect is positive or negative. The same logic holds for Scenario D. Bilateral directionality does not tell us whether mediation increases or decreases conflict severity, and the same is true for the opposite relationship. To fill in this gap we need to pair the Granger causality results with the impulse response functions, which give us an idea about the direction of effects. In other words, teasing out the implications of Scenario D requires a degree of cross-validation between the Granger causality results and the impulse response functions. By cross-validation I mean simply examining both sets of results in tandem, using a branching tree logic. In the event of either Scenario A or D, I expect that the impulse response functions (IRFs) will indicate that a shock to mediation leads to more cooperation. If the IRFs indicate a negative relationship, my argument is in trouble. This would indicate that mediation actually leads to more conflictual behavior.

However, my argument is still on solid ground if the IRFs show that a shock to conflict severity (more cooperation) leads to more mediation, and vice versa. In this case, it would

appear that conflict severity and mediation are endogenous in the post-treatment period, but in a manner that is fully consistent with my argument. This scenario implies a positive feedback loop where mediation engenders more cooperation, more cooperation leads to more mediation, and so on. As theorized, this logic inverts the pre-treatment assignment process, where mediators tend to intervene in high conflict environments. In the post-treatment phase of the conflict, mediation begets cooperation, and vice versa.

The last facet of the hypothesis relates to the duration of mediation's effect on cooperation. As discussed earlier, I have no firm priors on how long we should expect the positive effect of mediation to last, but three months seems like a reasonable upper-bound. To answer this question empirically, it is straightforward to examine how long a shock to mediation persists in the conflict system. I estimate the IRFs over 3 months to determine when the shock reverts to the mean.

The second hypothesis relates to the potential for mediation to reverse the cycle of violence and place the conflict on the path to settlement.

Hypothesis 2. *Mediation changes the trajectory of the conflict.*

I test the hypothesis by modeling the second derivative of the system with respect to time. The first derivative—the change in the system over time—represents the back and forth exchange of conflictual or cooperative behavior. In this capacity, the first derivative serves as an indicator of the trajectory of the system. Consequently, the second derivative represents the change in momentum of the conflict system. Hypothesis 2 proposes that mediation influences the underlying pattern of conflictual and cooperative behavior. The idea is that mediation accelerates patterns of cooperation and decelerates patterns of conflict. This proposition can be examined by testing whether mediation Granger causes conflict severity within a second derivative system.

It is worthwhile to note that these two hypotheses are mutually reinforcing; their joint validity is greater than the sum of its parts. To see why this is the case it is helpful to understand the limitations of the hypotheses in isolation. For Hypothesis 1, there is the possibility that an increase in cooperation following mediation is simply performative. Because the very act of taking part in mediation involves a number of cooperative acts, such as meeting for talks or expressing the intention to cooperate, there exists the possibility that any increase in observed cooperation could be superficial rather than substantive. Belligerents could simply be "going through the motions" rather than engaging in meaningful cooperative actions. Support for Hypothesis 2 helps to address this possibility as it suggests that mediation actually changes the trajectory of the conflict. In contrast to the idea of a superficial change, support for Hypothesis 2 suggests that mediation has a profound effect on the underlying pattern of conflict. Yet the limitation of Hypothesis 2 is that it does not tell us whether mediation specifically decelerates or accelerates patterns of cooperation, only that it changes the momentum of the system. Fortunately, support for Hypothesis 1 indicates that mediation leads to a net increase in cooperation, which lends considerable support to the idea that mediation accelerates patterns of cooperation. In sum, joint support for these two hypotheses would be a strong indicator of the validity of the theory.

6.3.2 Data

The goal of the VAR analysis is to model the relationship between mediation and conflict severity after the first instance of mediation.[190] I proxy for conflict severity using the undirected CAMEO Mean, which captures interactions between Bosnian Croats, Bosnian

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[190]Including pre-treatment data in the analysis would artificially weaken the relationship between mediation and conflict severity as the constant zeros that occur prior to mediation would be juxtaposed with varying levels of conflict severity. Even if mediation did have an effect on conflict severity post-treatment, the lack of an effect pre-treatment would attenuate the relationship.

Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims. The vast majority of mediation events are initiated by the EC, UN, Russia, and the United States.

Figure 6.4 depicts the undirected CAMEO Mean and Mediation Events between 1992 to 1995. As we can see from Figure 6.4, conflict severity exhibits considerable variance overtime. The CAMEO Mean ranges from -6.79 to 1.80 with a standard deviation of 1.5. The mediation events match up well with the qualitative account of the conflict. The EC delegation activity in early 1992, for example, is clearly depicted in the event data. The largest spike in mediation events matches the January to April 1994 US mediation led by Charles Redman, which overlapped with European diplomatic efforts in late April. The flurry of events in the beginning of 1995 coincides with what Rogel (1998, 68) calls the "all-out push for peace" by EC, UN, and US mediators. Lastly, the dramatic increase in mediation events prior to settlement coincides with what we know of the Dayton Accords in the lead-up to the Paris Treaty.

I also include a measure of NATO military activity in the endogenous portion of the VAR. Observers credit NATO intervention for getting the Serbs to agree to settle the conflict. Given that NATO activity shifted the military balance, it is likely to be a key factor in understanding violence dynamics on the ground. Both qualitative and quantitative studies have examined the influence of NATO activity on the behavior of Serbia throughout the Yugoslav Wars.[191] From the unprocessed event data, I create a time series of NATO activity that counts the number of military actions recorded per week. These events are disaggregated from the CAMEO Mean, which reflects the local dynamics between Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims, but not NATO activity.

[191] Woodward (1995); Bennett (1995); Pevehouse and Goldstein (1999).

Figure 6.4. Bosnia 1992 - 1995

Figure 6.5. NATO activity - Levels and Differences

184

Figure 6.5 presents the levels and first differences of NATO activity. Most qualitative accounts of the crisis stress the importance of NATO activity in August and September of 1995, but the data show that NATO was active at numerous junctures in the conflict. The early blips of activity correspond to the imposition of the no fly zone, which restricted the movement of Serbian aircraft in theory but was not widely enforced until early 1994. The first military clash in NATO's history took place on February 28, 1994 when NATO F-16 fighters shot down four Serbian jets near Banja lake.[192] On April 10, 1994, NATO provided close air support for UN commanders near Gorazde. Throughout this period, NATO launched numerous air strikes at the behest of the United Nations. NATO's role expanded with Operation Deliberate Force, a massive bombing campaign carried out from August 30 to September 20, 1995.

Table 6.2 illustrates the event types that are included in the NATO military activity metric. Prior to 1994, the events consist primarily of "Impose blockade, restrict movement." After 1994, the events mainly correspond to "Employ aerial weapons."

6.3.3 Time Series Properties of the Data

Before conducting the Granger causality tests I examine the time series properties of the data. An accurate diagnosis of these properties is vital to the validity of the subsequent tests. The first question involves whether to estimate the VAR in levels or first differences. In large part, the choice between estimating the VAR in levels or differences hinges on whether the data generating process contains a unit root. A unit root process is characterized by a stochastic trend in the data, which indicates that the time series is nonstationary. As Granger and Newbold (1974) demonstrate, the inferential problem of using data with

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[192]"Conflict in the Balkans; NATO craft down 4 Serb warplanes attacking Bosnia." *The New York Times*. March 1, 1994.

Table 6.2. NATO military activity

Code	CAMEO Score	Label
190:	[-10.0]	Use conventional military force, not specified below
191:	[-9.5]	Impose blockade, restrict movement
192:	[-9.5]	Occupy territory
193:	[-10.0]	Fight with small arms and light weapons
194:	[-10.0]	Fight with artillery and tanks
195:	[-10.0]	Employ aerial weapons
196:	[-9.5]	Violate ceasefire

unit roots is that any observed relationship between two or more time series can be caused by correlation between the common stochastic trend in both series. In other words, rather than a substantive relationship between the time series, we will likely observe a spurious association caused by low-frequency movement common to both series. When a unit root process is suspected, the most common solution is to difference the series, which removes the stochastic trend and transforms the data into a stationary process if the roots of the characteristic equation lie inside the unit circle.

Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests do not indicate the presence of a unit root (Table 6.3). However, a visual inspection of each of the time series suggests the potential for nonstationarity. It is important to remember that the pre-testing procedures used to test for unit roots have low power and tend to fail to reject the null of a unit root too frequently. Figure 6.6 depicts the differenced series for comparison.

One potential issue with the level data is that mediation and NATO activity are counts, which implies that they are not normally distributed. As we might expect, Jarque–Bera

Table 6.3. Unit Root Tests

Variable	Dickey-Fuller	Phillips-Perron
Mediation	0.000	0.000
CAMEO Mean	0.000	0.000
NATO attacks	0.000	0.000

H_0: Unit Root present. Lag 1 estimates presented. Results consistent out to eight lags.

tests rejects the assumption of normality for all three series. Fortunately, normality of the errors is not necessary for testing Granger causality or creating impulse response functions (Lütkepohl, 2011, 13).[193] Therefore, the count nature of these data is not a barrier to inference.

Another possibility is cointegration, where two variables share a common low-frequency trend.[194] This common trend leads to a rubber band-like relationship between the two variables where a divergence in one factor will be pulled back into alignment by the other. The Johansen test for cointegration between the CAMEO Mean and Mediation does not suggest any long-run relationship between the two variables. However, this test is not definitive given that the normality assumption is used when constructing the likelihood function of the Johansen test and the count variables under consideration clearly violate this assumption. This said, I see little reason to suspect cointegration from a theoretical standpoint. Cointegration makes sense when talking about factors like wages and unemployment which exhibit relatively stable equilibrium behavior in the long-run. In contrast,

[193]Lütkepohl (2011, 13): "nonnormality is not a necessary condition for validity of many statistical procedures related to VAR."

[194]For more on cointegration and error correction models in political science, see Durr (1992); Murray (1994).

Figure 6.6. First Differences

conflicts are relatively short-term phenomena. The idea of a long-run equilibrium does not match the reality of most conflicts, which—aside from a few outliers—usually end at some point. The simple fact that conflicts end suggests that a focus on modeling the short-run dynamics of the system makes the most sense.

Not all scholars agree that differencing is the best option for dealing with low-frequency movement in the time series. Christopher Sims, who popularized the VAR methodology in econometrics, argues that multiple time series should not be differenced, even when tests suggest a unit root (Sims, 1980; Sims, Stock, and Watson, 1990). Sims' reasoning is that differencing results in a loss of information, and some of that information may be

of substantive interest to the analyst.[195] In other words, differencing is a blunt instrument, which may in the worst case, "throw out the baby with the bath," as Friedman (1988, 230) memorably remarked. Sims' perspective is supported by simulation studies which show that the VAR in levels outperforms the VAR in differences under certain conditions, even with nonstationary variables (Ramaswamy and Sløk, 1998; Ibrahim, 2006).

In sum, by taking the first difference we risk over-differencing the times series. One way to address this is to fractionally difference the series (Baillie and King, 1996). I estimate the fractional order of integration using Robinson's D procedure (Robinson, 1995). Table 6.4 presents the results. Mediation and the CAMEO Mean have an estimated fractional order of integration in the range of $0 < d < .5$, which indicates that the time series are long-memoried processes with finite—rather than infinite—variance (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith, 1998, 667). The NATO activity series is slightly above that range at .52, but not enough to cause concern. All three series exhibit a high degree of persistence between distant observations.[196] In other words, the effect of a shock tends to linger in the conflict system.

Table 6.4. Fractional Integration

Variable	Robinson's D	p-value
Mediation	.2156742	0.0010
CAMEO Mean	.3175372	0.0000
NATO attacks	.5212028	0.0000

[195] As Friedman (1988, 231) explains, "The process of obtaining serially uncorrelated residuals may in effect simply eliminate the permanent components, leaving the analyst to study the relation among the stochastic components of his series, which may be pure noise, when what is of economic interest is the relation between the permanent components he has discarded in the process of seeking to satisfy mechanical statistical tests."

[196] Barkoulas and Baum (1996).

There is also a valid concern that the levels data are a mix of stationary and non-stationary series. If some or all of the time series are non-stationary, then the Wald test statistics used to test for Granger causality do not follow their usual asymptotic chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis. The best option in this case is to estimate a lag-augmented VAR (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995), which is appropriate for situations such as this one where the stationarity of some or all of the series is in question, but differencing the series is also incorrect. To recover the appropriate asymptotics, I perform the following procedure outlined in Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to generate a lag-augmented VAR.

1. Test the time series for their order of integration, which we will call m.

2. Set-up the VAR in levels with p lags and make sure the model is well-specified. Specifically, I ensure that there is no statistically significant autocorrelation at lags 1-12 and that the model satisfies the stability condition.

3. Add m additional lags to the model from Step 2.

4. Test for Granger causality by conducting Wald tests of the p lags, but not the m lags. The Wald test statistics will be asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null.

The lag-augmented model has the advantage of also serving as a guard against a spurious result; adding additional lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side helps to remove left-over autocorrelation in the residuals, which is one cause of spurious correlation.[197]

Lastly, it is important to not lose sight of the fact that the choice of levels vs. differences is a theoretical consideration as well as an empirical matter.[198] Levels and first differences

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[197]Another option is to estimate a Fully-Modified VAR (Phillips, 1995) advocated by Freeman et al. (1998). Yamada and Toda (1998) show that the lag-augmented VAR is preferable in small samples.

[198]For an excellent discussion of some of the pitfalls of unit root tests, see Cochrane (1991).

represent different quantities of interest. Levels data is arguably a more naturally interpretable quantity, especially in regard to the interpretation of impulse response functions. First differences reflect the rate of change or momentum of the system, a quantity which does not map onto the observable implications of my hypotheses. However, as discussed previously, the change in momentum with respect to time is a more promising analytical quantity. I have argued that mediation helps to nudge conflicts out of violence spirals. As Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek remarked during the conflict in Croatia, "The main objective has been to try to reverse the escalation of violence and change it into a peaceful dialogue."[199] One way to map this intuition onto the data is to determine whether mediation leads to a change in the momentum of the system. In this view, mediation acts as a catalyst, either by accelerating the progression to cooperation or decelerating the escalation of conflict. Therefore, I also consider a model of the change in momentum of the system.

6.3.4 Granger Causality

In sum, there are four potential ways that variables can enter the VAR: Levels, First Differences, Fractionally Differenced, and Δ Momentum. A fifth specification, the Lag-Augmented model, is appropriate if the underlying process is a mixture of stationary and nonstationary variables. Tests for lag order across different time series specifications supported the use of a 1-2 week lag model as a baseline to use for comparison. The Lag-Augmented model necessarily features an additional lag for the third week but the Granger causality test is performed on the first two lags.

[199]"Slovenian Peace Pact Negotiated."

Table 6.5. Granger causality across model types

Directionality			P-values				
			Level	Differenced	Lag-Aug	Frac Diff	Δ Momentum
Mediation	⟹	CAMEO Mean	0.007	0.040	0.017	0.013	0.024
Mediation	⟹	NATO	0.745	0.012	0.980	0.279	0.013
CAMEO Mean	⟹	Mediation	0.012	0.335	0.092	0.025	0.216
CAMEO Mean	⟹	NATO	0.409	0.188	0.218	0.169	0.402
NATO	⟹	CAMEO Mean	0.349	0.231	0.258	0.352	0.191
NATO	⟹	Mediation	0.000	0.353	0.080	0.210	0.438

Results from F-tests using a 1-2 week lag model.

In terms of diagnostics, all estimated models satisfy the stability condition, which indicates that the data are covariance stationary.[200] In general, the autocorrelation tests of the residuals are extremely good. With the exception of some unmodeled autocorrelation at lag 8 ($p - value = 0.046$) in the Lag-Augmented model, the residuals show no evidence of autocorrelation out to 12 lags. The autocorrelation at lag 8 could be captured by including an additional term in the model, but this correction would be ad hoc and ultimately unnecessary as the violation is trivial.

Table 6.5 presents the Granger causality results. What is consistent across all model specifications is that Mediation Granger causes the CAMEO Mean. This is broadly consistent with Scenario A in Table 6.1. In the levels model, we also observe a bidirectional relationship (Mediation $\rightleftarrows$ CAMEO Mean) which is consistent with Scenario D. Overall, these results are encouraging, but we need to consider the IRFs in the next section to definitively test Hypothesis 1.

The Granger causality results for the change in momentum, or acceleration, of the system are presented in the last column of Table 6.5. Changes in momentum are particularly important considering the goal of shifting a conflict system out of a pattern of escalation and into a pattern of cooperation. The results shows that Mediation Granger causes both the CAMEO Mean and NATO attacks, and this directionality is not reciprocated. These results demonstrate that mediation is a major factor in regard to changes in the momentum of the system, which offers strong support for Hypothesis 2.

6.3.5 Impulse Response Functions

In order to identify the structural model, I specify the following ordering of contemporaneous effects: Mediation $\rightarrow$ Conflict Severity $\rightarrow$ NATO activity. This implies that the

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[200]Lütkepohl (2005, 25).

Mediation affects the other two series contemporaneously and with a 1 and 2 week lag; Conflict Severity affects NATO activity contemporaneously and with a 1 and 2 week lag while affecting the Mediation series with a 1 and 2 week lag; and NATO activity affects the other two series with a 1 and 2 week lag. I follow Sims (1980) and compare the results with the alternative orderings of the structural model. I find that the main substantive results are not sensitive to ordering.

Figure 6.7 depicts the orthogonalized impulse response functions from the three statistically significant Granger causality results in the levels model. The IRFs depict a 12 month in-sample forecast of the effect of a hypothetical one standard deviation shock of one series on the behavior of another series. This shock can be likened to a flurry of mediation events, an increase in cooperation, or a surge of attacks by NATO.[201]

Figure 6.7(a) shows that Mediation increases the CAMEO Mean, which means that conflicts are more cooperative following a surge of mediation events. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1, which states that mediation has a positive effect on cooperation. The result reinforces the decision to not treat conflict severity as a confounding variable in the cross-sectional analysis.

Figure 6.7(b) shows that increases in cooperation engender more mediation. While endogeneity is bidirectional, the relationship does not compromise the results from the marginal structural model. The IRF results show that the assignment model is not the same as the model of mediation in the post-treatment period. In the pre-treatment phase of the conflict, mediators tended to select into conflicts with high levels of material conflict while avoiding conflicts with high levels of cooperation. In the post-treatment phase, more

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[201]Confidence intervals constructed via normal approximation. Delta method.

(a) Mediation → CAMEO Mean

(b) CAMEO Mean → Mediation

(c) NATO → Mediation

Figure 6.7. Impulse Response Functions for Levels Model

195

cooperation leads to more mediation while more conflict leads mediators to decrease their activity. This corresponds to the flip in causality that my theory predicts.

Figure 6.7(c) shows that mediation also increases two weeks after an surge in NATO attacks. This makes intuitive sense given our knowledge of the conflict. In the wake of increased NATO pressure, mediators stepped in orchestrate a settlement with the hope that NATO attacks had changed the bargaining calculus of the belligerents.

These results also speak to the duration of mediation's effect. None of the impulses last longer than six weeks after the shock. This is consistent with the expectation that mediation has a relatively short-term impact on conflict. Like a medical drug, mediation's effect dissipates over time.

6.4 Wrap-up

What have we learned from this examination of the Bosnian case? This analysis helps to shed light on the post-treatment "black box." The results demonstrate that endogeneity between mediation and conflict severity does not undermine the results from the marginal structural model. In fact, the Granger causality tests and impulse response functions offer strong support for my theory. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are both supported by the data analysis, which indicates that mediation increases cooperation and changes the momentum of the conflict. In conjunction with the empirical findings in Chapter 5, these results provide strong evidence that mediation has an indirect effect on conflict settlement.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

"Because of the success of science, there is a kind of a pseudo-science. Social science is an example of a science which is not a science. They follow the forms. You gather data, you do so and so forth, but they don't get any laws, they haven't found out anything. They haven't got anywhere—yet."
— Richard Feynman, BBC Interview 1981

7.1   What have we learned?

Scholars have been searching for the effect of mediation in the wrong places. We have been testing for mediation's effect on a conflict rather than its effect within a conflict. To move forward, I recommend shifting our focus toward the interaction between mediation and the conflict environment. Doing so opens up a number of promising directions for research. For one, this shifts our attention to the decision to intervene with mediation and its subsequent effect on conflict settlement. I have proposed a framework for thinking about the interplay between mediation and conflict dynamics. This model builds upon our current understanding of bargaining theory and conflict processes while at the same time offering important refinements to how we conceive of mediation's dynamic function within the conflict space.

The model treats conflict severity as a time-varying confounder for the effect of mediation. In this case, conflict severity is a confounder during the assignment process and an intervening variable in the post-treatment period. As a consequence, in order to capture the total effect of mediation, we must account for the potential for indirect effects. I argue that

the logic of indirect effects is a more faithful rendering of our theoretical understanding of how mediation works. Causal mechanisms like *Information Provision* and *Cooperative Signaling* impact the level of conflict severity, which suggests an indirect causal logic.

This analysis offers strong evidence of indirect effects. I show that mediation has the potential to increase cooperation and change the trajectory of a conflict. In sum, there is a sound theoretical and empirical rationale for the logic of indirect effects. A major implication of these findings is that the benefits of mediation are currently undersold by political scientists. The findings suggest that the standard causal logic removes the indirect effect of mediation by treating conflict severity as a confounding variable. As a result, the null or even negative findings in the current literature have the potential to flip to positive results.

7.2 Where are we going?

My framework represents an alternative causal model of the effectiveness of policy instruments. The model does not capture every feature of the data generating process, but the empirical chapters of the dissertation have shown that it is a clear improvement to the existing static approach. As a result, the findings have important implications for how we study policy instruments more generally. The potential for indirect effects is not confined to mediation; in fact, the same reasoning applies to a wide range of policy instruments, including peacekeeping, arms embargoes, military intervention, and sanctions regimes. Furthermore, our theories regarding how these policy instruments work also seem to be more closely in line with the idea of indirect effects. As a result, testing only the direct effects of a policy has the potential to lead researchers to erroneous conclusions regarding its effectiveness. Future research is needed to determine whether other types of interventions work through

similar indirect pathways. At the very least, this framework deserves consideration as a competing model in the study of policy interventions.

As scholars, we can only approximate an experiment via a set of assumptions. While most assumptions are not testable using the data, this does not mean we should give up on trying to defend them *all the way down*, especially in regard to the causal relationship between 1) a policy treatment, 2) the factors that predict treatment, and 3) the underlying conflict process. These factors are the meat and potatoes of any research design related to policy effectiveness. This study has considered two dimensions of the data generating process, namely treatment assignment and the potential for indirect effects, but many alternatives exist. The point is not so much whether my logic of indirect effects holds for all policy treatments, but rather that the door seems to be wide open to innovation here. The complexity inherent in the data generating process is extraordinary. You need only pick up a qualitative account of mediation, such as Christopher Bennett's extremely engaging *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse*, to discover the wealth of causal mechanisms at work in regard to fairly basic relationships between mediation, conflict severity, and peace. It is readily apparent that there is some sort of relationship between these factors, and while we cannot say with certainty what that relationship is, I think it is safe to say that it is neither one-dimensional, nor time-invariant. These factors, therefore, deserve a place in our models.

As I have cautioned, we handicap our research by ignoring these dimensions of policy effectiveness. In essence, my argument is that theory matters "all the way down" in regard to research design. In this regard, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on the causal logic of our models. These topics have been relegated to the domain of "empirical matters," but they are actually intimately connected with "theory," or what the hard sciences would refer

to as "hypotheses." To date, the existing literature has focused narrowly on testing hypotheses related to variation within treatment. The result has been a proliferation of second-order theories concerning mediation strategy, biased mediators, and types of mediators. In effect, this scholarship puts the cart before the horse; it addresses variation within treatment but leaves out the underlying variation between a policy and the conflict environment. We cannot arrive at accurate estimates of these second-order issues without a firm understanding of first-order components of the data generating process, such as mediation, conflict severity, and time. To move forward, the emphasis of applied work needs to start by addressing the nature and directionality of the causal relationship between the foundational components of our model. Only when these first-order components are well-understood can we address questions related to variation within treatment.

What is the practical value of MSMs for future applied research? As political scientists, we want to select a causal model that best represents the data generating process being studied. In the field of conflict processes, the MSM is a promising choice.[202] MSMs can represent a variety of alternative causal relationships of treatment interaction within a conflict process. Most valuably, they can capture the non-random aspect of a policy while also addressing the potential for time-varying confounding by a single factor or set of factors. MSMs are not inherently better or worse than other models, they are simply different. I have argued that the logic of indirect effects does a better job mapping onto our theories of mediation, but this is not necessarily true for all types of policy instruments. Sanctions, for example, could be a strong contender for an intervention whose effect is primarily direct, especially if the model does not include variables that reflect the economic

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[202] I also think that the way time series analysis is wielded in this dissertation, as a sort of in-depth robustness check, merits consideration within the set of commonly-used model diagnostics, to appear at least within the technical appendices of a study of policy intervention.

climate. In one sense, we can always tell ourselves a plausible story about either direct or indirect effects, so it is important to provide a cogent rationale for the causal logic of our model. At the very least, MSMs are a way to jumpstart that conversation within the discipline, much like sample selection models were a decade ago.

Going forward, the only barrier is the amount of available data. The best way to answer these questions empirically is to keep collecting longitudinal data on international conflict. The dramatic increase in machine coded event data is encouraging in this regard. ICEWS represents a promising step forward in terms of quality and quantity (O'Brien, 2010, 2013). Machine learning methods have been much heralded within science writ large, but simulation studies have shown that machine learning methods require even more data than traditional techniques (van der Ploeg, Austin, and Steyerberg, 2014). Political scientists should be wary about machine learning "miracle cures" in this regard. If we want to add complexity to our theories of international conflict, then the requisite models will be data hungry.

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Appendix A: Baseline Model Robustness Checks

This appendix includes additional discussion of the baseline model created for the analysis. The primary evidence for my argument rests on a comparison between the results from the baseline model and the marginal structural model. I contend that we should observe a larger, positive effect of mediation in the weighted model compared to the unweighted model. The reason is that adjusting for conflict severity subsumes the effect of mediation in the baseline model.

One potential concern is that the null finding from the baseline model is based on the event type used to code for mediation. CAMEO features seven codes related to mediation, depicted in Table A.1. As discussed in Chapter 4, I use the 045 code to construct mediation event counts. My rationale is that these lower-level events set the bar too low for what constitutes "mediation." The relevant concern, however, is that the baseline findings are a function of the 045 code used to proxy for mediation. If the alternative codes are valid proxies, then this would result in an unfair comparison between the baseline model and the marginal structural model.

To address this concern, I present the estimates of mediation's effect in the baseline model across different mediation event types. Figure A.1 depicts the estimated hazard ratios of four different mediation types across models with baseline covariates, baseline and current covariates, and baseline, current, and lagged covariates. "Mediation 1" corresponds to CAMEO codes 040 and 041, "Mediation 2-4" to codes 042, 043, and 044, "Mediation

Table A.1. Mediation codes

Code	CAMEO Score	Label
040:	[1.0]	Consult, not specified below
041:	[1.0]	Discuss by telephone
042:	[1.9]	Make a visit
043:	[2.8]	Host a visit
044:	[2.5]	Meet at a third location
045:	[5.0]	Mediate
046:	[7.0]	Engage in negotiation

5" to 045, and "Mediation 6" to 046. We observe minor variations in the estimates as well as larger confidence intervals for the combined models. However, none of the estimates are statistically significant.

Another possibility is that the null finding is a function of the conflict severity proxies. Figure A.2 presents the estimated hazard ratios of Mediation 5 and Cumulative Mediation 5 when we vary the conflict severity scores. Neither mediation nor cumulative mediation has a statistically significant effect across variations in the conflict severity proxies.

Lastly, Figure A.3 compares mediation types and their lags across the different conflict severity proxies. Again, the mediation results fail to achieve statistical significance across every model permutation.

In conclusion, I find no evidence to suggest that the baseline null finding is a function of either the CAMEO mediation type, the conflict severity scores used as controls, or the potential for lagged and cumulative effects. The null finding from the baseline model is extremely robust to alternative specifications.

Figure A.1. Mediation type estimates across baseline, current, and time-varying variables

Figure A.2. Mediation 5 and Cumulative Mediation 5 across Conflict Severity scores

Figure A.3. Mediation type estimates across Conflict Severity scores

Appendix B: Conflict Dictionaries

This appendix presents the unique portion of each conflict dictionary used to create the event data.

Codes

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##################################################################

#NAGORNYY-KARABAKH (1991)


#ARMENIA


LEVON_TER-PETROSSIAN_ [ARMGOV]; President of Aremenia

LEVON_TER-PETROSYAN_ [ARMGOV];

VASGUEN_SARKISSIAN_ [ARMGOV]; ARM defence minister

VAZGEN_SARGSYAN_ [ARMGOV]; another spelling ^

ARMENIAN_ARMED_FORCES_ [ARMMIL];

ARMED_FORCES_OF_ARMENIA_ [ARMMIL]


#Russia
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BORIS_YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV]; president

YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV];

SAPOSHNIKOV_ [RUSGOV]; Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, Soviet Minister of

Defense [August 23, 1991-December 21, 1991]

YEVGENY_SHAPOSHNIKOV_ [RUSGOV];

ANDREI_KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia

[December 26, 1991-January 6, 1996]

ANDREY_KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV];

#AZERBAIJAN

AYAZ_MUTALLIBOV_ [AZEGOV]; president of AZE August 1991-March 1992

AYAZ_MUTALIBOV_ [AZEGOV];

ELSHIBEY_ [AZEGOV]; Abulfaz Elshibey, President of Azerbaijan,

[June 16, 1992-September 1, 1993]

ELCHIBEY_ [AZEGOV];

ABULFAZ_ELCHIBEY_ [AZEGOV];

ABULFAZ_ELSHIBEY_ [AZEGOV];

RAGUIM_GAZYEV_ [AZEGOV]; defence minister

POPULAR_FRONT_ [AZEPTY]; the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party, an

opposition party in Azerbaijan [1992-present]

APFP_ [AZEPTY];

PFA_ [AZEPTY];

ABULFAZ_ELCHIBEY_ [AZEPTY]; leader of of the PFA

AHMET_KARACA_ [AZEGOV];

AYEZ_MUTALIBOV_ [AZEGOV]; alternate spelling of AYAZ in Core

AZERI_ [AZE];

AZERIS_ [AZE];

SPECIAL_PURPOSE_POLICE_UNIT_ [AZEMIL]; forcibly deported Armenians

living in region of Shahumyan

OMON_ [AZEMIL];

#Nagorno-Karabakh

NAGORNO_KARABAKH_DEFENSE_ARMY_ [NAGMIL];

NKR_DEFENSE_ARMY_ [NAGMIL];

ROBERT_KOCHARYAN_ [NAGMIL]; former President of Armenia and first

commander in Chief of the defense army

SERZH_SARGSYAN_ [NAGMIL]; current president of Armenia and founder

of the defense army

VAZGEN_SARGYSAN_ [NAGMIL]; Armenian defense minister at time and

found of the defense army

MONTE_MELKONIAN_ [NAGMIL]; founder

SAMVEL_BABAYAN_ [NAGMIL]; founder

FEDAYEEN_ [ARMANTREB]; detachments of Armenian volunteers who

resisted dependence, volunteer militia

TATUL_KRPEYAN_ [ARMANTREB]; leader of one of the groups of Fedayeen

#Third Parties

CSCE_ [IGOEURSCE]; Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[July 1973-January 1, 1996]

CONFERENCE_ON_SECURITY_AND_COOPERATION_IN_EUROPE_ [IGOEURSCE];

EC_ [IGOEUREEC]; The European Commission, the governing body of the
European Union [1958-present]

OSCE_ [IGOEUR]; group which failed in bringing about mediation in
conflict

ORGANIZATION_FOR_SECURITY_AND_COOPERATION_IN_EUROPE_ [IGOEUR];

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO]; passed two resolutions calling for
cease fire

NURSULTAN_NAZARBAYEV_ [KAZGOV]; President and first to attempt
mediation, alongside Yeltsin

JAMES_BAKER_ [USAGOV]; visited both protagonists in search of peace
deal

SECRETARY_OF_STATE_BAKER_ [USAGOV]

GORBACHEV_ [USRGOV]; acting president of USSR

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#IRAQ NO-FLY ZONE (1992)

#Iraq

ABDUL_AMIR_AL-ANBARI_ [IRQGOV]; permanent representative at the UN

AL-ANBARI_ [IRQGOV];

SADDAM_HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV];

HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV];

MUHAMMAD_SAEED_AL-SAHHAF_ [IRQGOV]; foreign minister

AL_SAHHAF_ [IRQGOV];

#UK

SIR_JOHN_MAJOR_ [GBRGOV]; prime minister

JOHN_MAJOR_ [GBRGOV];

DOUGLAS_HURD_ [GBRGOV]; foreign minister

HURD_ [GBRGOV];

#France

FRANCOIS_MITTERRAND_ [FRAGOV]; President of France

MITTERRAND_ [FRAGOV];

RONALD_DUMAS_ [FRAGOV]; foreign minister

DUMAS_ [FRAGOV];

#USA

GEORGE_HW_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

PRESIDENT_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

JAMES_BAKER_ [USAGOV]; foreign minister

LAWRENCE_EAGLEBURGER_ [USAGOV]; foreign minister

EAGLEBURGER_ [USAGOV];

#Third Parties

BORIS_YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV]; President

YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV];

ANDREY_KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV]; foreign minister

FAHD_BIN_ABDULAZIZ_AL_SAUD_ [SAUGOV]; king of Saudi Arabia

KING_FAHD_ [SAUGOV];

KING_HASSAN_ [MARGOV]; king of morocco issued a strong warning

against the west's dangerous policy toward iraq

GULF_COOPERATION_COUNCIL_ [IGOPGSGCC]; accepted enforcement of

no-fly zone over Iraq on 8-9 Sept.

GCC_ [IGOPGSGCC];

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#GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA (1992)

#Georgia and pro-Georgian groups

SHEVARDNADZE_ [GEOGOV]; blamed Russia for supplying arms to

separatists - Russia denied claims

pro-SHEVARDNADZE_ [GEOGOV];

EDUARD_SHEVARDNADZE_ [GEOGOV];

TENGIZ_SIGNA_ [GEOGOV]; Prime Minister of Geogria called the

conflict a crisis in relations rather than a state of war

SIGNA_ [GEOGOV];

DEFENCE_MINISTER_GEORGI_KARKARASHVILI_ [GEOGOV];

GEORGI_KARKARASHVILI_ [GEOGOV] ; defense minister and military

commander

GEORGIAN_ARMY_ [GEOMIL];

SHARTAVA_ [GEOGOV]; Georgian minister in Abkhazia that was killed

by separatists

GEORGIAN_STATE_COUNCIL_ [GEOGOV];

GEORGIA_PARLIAMENT_ [GEOGOV];

GEORGIAN_NATIONAL_GUARD_ [GEOMIL];

GENO_ADAMIA_ [GEOMIL]; military commander killed during conflict

DAVID_TEVZADZE_ [GEOMIL]; Georgian lieutenant general

GUJAR_KURASHILI_ [GEOMIL]; former general

MKHEDRIONI_ [GEOPTY]; parliamentary group and politcal organization

JABA_IOSELIANI_ [GEOGOV]; leader of Mkhedrioni

DZHABA_IOSELIANI_ [GEOGOV];

UKRANIAN_NATIONAL_ASSEMBLY_ [UKRGOV]; formed a unit called "argo"

to fight on the georgia side against separatists

UNA-UNSO_ [UKRGOV];

ARGO_ [GEOPROREB];

#Russian and anti-Georgian groups

ANDRE_KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV];

KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV];

BORIS_PASTUKOV_ [RUSGOV];

RUSSIAN_DEFENSE_MINISTER_PAVEL_GRACHEV_ [RUSGOV];

GRACHEV_ [RUSGOV];

PAVEL_GRACHEV_ [RUSGOV]; Russian Defense Min

YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV];

BORIS_YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV] ;

KREMLIN_ [RUSGOV];

CHERNOMYRDIN_ [RUSGOV]; Russian Prime Minister

PASTUKHOV_ [RUSGOV]; Russian deputy for minister

ANDREY_KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV]; Russian Foreign Minister

KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV];

SUPREME_SOVIET_OF_THE_RUSSIAN_FEDERATION_ [RUSGOV]; denounced

Georgia's resort to violence

SUPREME_SOVIET_OF_THE_RUSSIAN_SFSR_ [RUSGOV];

ABKHAZIAN_SEPARATISTS_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_SEPARATIST_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZ_SEPARATISTS_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_SEPARATISM_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_REBELS_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_REBEL_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIANS_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_ARMED_FORCES_ [GEOANTREB]; formed to fight for Abkhazia

independence

236

VALERI_BGANBA_ [GEOANTREB]; commander in chief of Armed forces

MIRAB_KISHMARIA_ [GEOANTREB]; minister of defense of armed forces

VLADIMIR_VASILCHENKO_ [GEOANTREB]; chief of staff

CONFEDERATION_OF_MOUNTAIN_PEOPLES_OF_THE_CAUCASUS_ [GEOANTREB];

militarized political organization

CPC_ [GEOANTREB];

MUSA_SHANIBOV_ [GEOANTREB]; president of CPC

SULTAN_SOSNALIYEV_ [GEOANTREB]; leader of CPC

SHAMIL_BASAYEV_ [GEOANTREB]; leader of CPC

BAGRAMYAN_BATTALION_ [GEOANTREB]; battalion formed in Abkhazia

IGOR_GEORGADZE_ [GEOANTREB];

ZVIADISTS_ [GEOANTREB] ; anti-Shevardnadze force

GAMSAKHURDIA_ [GEOANTREB]; head of zviadists

pro-GAMSAKHURDIA_ [GEOANTREB];

ZVIAD_GAMSAKHURDIA_ [GEOANTREB];

GAMSAKHURDIA'S_FORCES_ [GEOANTREB];

LOTI_KOBALIA_ [GEOANTREB];

KOBALIA_ [GEOANTREB];

SERGEI_DBAR_ [GEOANTREB]; separatist leader

VLADIMIR_ARSHBA_ [GEOANTREB] leader of separatist force

VLADISLAV_ARDZINBA_ [GEOANTREB]; leader of separatist forces,

pro-Russia, not Gam's troops but anti gov

ARDZINBA_ [GEOANTREB];

237

#Third Parties

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO]; approved the proposal to send 88 military observers
to Georgia

UNITED_NATIONS_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

BOUTROS_BOUTROS_GHALI [IGOUNO];

BOUTROS_BOUTROS-GHALI [IGOUNO];

BOUTROS_GHALI_ [IGOUNO] ;

BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO] ;

GHALI_ [IGOUNO] ;

EDUARD_BRUNNER_ [IGOUNO]; special UN rep

BRUNNER_ [IGOUNO];

CIS_ [IGOCASCIS]; commonwealth of independent states

GEIDAR_ALIYEV_ [AZEGOV] ;

ALIYEV_ [AZEGOV] ;

LEVON_TER-PETROSSIAN_ [ARMGOV];

TER-PETROSSIAN_ [ARMGOV];

PETROSSIAN_ [ARMGOV];

CSCE_ [IGOEURSCE] ; now OSCE

CONFERENCE_ON_SECURITY_AND_COOPERATION_IN_EUROPE_ [IGOEURSCE];

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#NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR I (1993)

#South Korea


SOUTH_KOREA_ [KOR];

ROK_ [KOR];

REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [KOR];

KIM_YOUNG-SAM_ [KORGOV]; President of South Korea

HAN_SEUNG-SOO_ [KORGOV];Prime Minister of South Korea

HAN_SEUNG-SU_ [KORGOV];

HAN_SEUNG_JU_ [KORGOV]; Korean foreign minister 93-94

HAN_SUNG_JOO [KORGOV];

SONG_YUNG-DAE_ [KORGOV];

SONG_ [KORGOV];

HONG_KOO_ [KORGOV]; prime minister Dec 94-Dec 95

KIM_SAM_HOON [KORGOV]; ambassador to US

NSPA_ [KOR]; National Security Planning Agency, Chief Intelligence

Agency

LEE_HONG_KOO [KORGOV]; Unification Minister

NATIONAL_UNIFICATION_BOARD_ [KOR]; agency working towardw
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reunification of North and South Korea

NUB_ [KOR];

RHEE_ [KOR]; South Korean Defense Minister [c. 1993-1994]

KIM_DAE-JUNG [KORDIS]; SK opposition leader

SONG_YONG-DAE_ [KORGOV]; SK chief negotiator

YOUNG_DUK_ [KOR]; Prime Minister of South Korea [April 29,

1994-December 17, 1994]

#United States

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

ROBERT_GALLUCCI_ [USAGOV];

GALLUCCI_ [USAGOV]; Cheif U.S. crisis negotiator [1994]

WARREN_CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV]; secretary of state

WILLIAM_PERRY_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of Defense

PERRY_ [USAGOV];

WINSTON_LORD [USAGOV];

LORD_ [USAGOV]; Winston Lord, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State

DEE_DEE_MYERS_ [USAGOV]

MYERS_ [USAGOV]; White House Press Secretary

TOM_HUBBARD_ [USAGOV];

HUBBARD_ [USAGOV]; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East

Asian and Pacific Affairs [March 1993-August 1996]

GRAHAM_ [USA]; reverend sent by Clinton to meet with Kim

ANTHONY_LAKE_ [USAGOV]; national seciroty advisor

MICHAEL_MCCURRY_ [USAGOV];

MCCURRY_ [USAGOV]; Mike McCurry, White House Press Secretary
[December 22, 1994-August 4, 1998]

SAM_NUNN_ [USAGOV]; Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee

NUNN_ [USAGOV];

CIA_ [USACIA];

CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_AGENCY_ [USACIA];

#coding for CIA?

WOOLSEY_ [USAGOV]; Robert James Woolsey, Jr. Director of Central
Intelligence, [February 5, 1993-January 10, 1995]

GARY_LUCK_ [USAGOV]; U.S. General and Commander of U.S. Combined
forces Korea [c. 1993-1996]

JAMES_LANEY_ [USAGOV]; U.S. Ambassador to South Korea [October 15,
1993-February 5, 1996]

TARNOFF_ [USAGOV]; Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs [1993-1997]

#North Korea

DPRK_ [PRK];

DEMOCRATIC_PEOPLE'S_REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [PRK];

KIM_IL-SUNG_ [PRKGOV];

IL-SUNG_ [PRKGOV];

KIM_JONG-IL_ [PRKGOV];

KANG_SOK_JU_ [PRKGOV]; NK's foreign minister - played large role in diplomatic talks with US

KANG_SONG_SAN [PRKGOV]; premier of NK

KIM_YONG_NAM_ [PRKGOV]; vice premier NK

KANG_MYONG_DO_ [PRK]; defector, fled to south korea and said NK already produced 5 nuclear weapons

KANG_SOK_JU [PRKGOV]; NK negotiator

LEE_KI-TAEK [PRKDIS]; top opposition leader

#Third Parties

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

NPT_ [IGONPT];

NON-PROLIFERATION_TREATY_ [IGONPT];

IAEA_ [IGOUNOIAE];

INTERNATIONAL_ATOMIC_ENERGY_AGENCY_ [IGOUNOIAE];

HANS_BLIX_ [IGOUNOIAE]; director general of IAEA

BLIX_ [IGOUNOIAE];

DAVID_KYD_ [IGOUNOIAE]; IAEA spokesman

KYD_ [IGOUNOIAE];

HANS_BLIX_ [IGOUNOIAE]; Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency

BLIX_ [IGOUNOIAE];

BOUTROS_BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO]; SECRETARY GENERAL OF UN 1994

BOUTROS_GHALI_ [IGOUNO];

G7_ [IGO]; club of seven leading industrialized democracies

ARF_ [IGOSEAASN]; ASEAN Regional Forum for multilateral dialogue in
the Asia Pacific region [1994-present]

ASEAN_REGIONA_FORUM_ [IGOSEAASN];

BHUTTO_ [PAKGOV]; prime minister of Pakistan - offered to play
bridging role btwn washington and pyongyang

JIMMY_CARTER_ [CARINTMED];

CARTER_ [CARINTMED];

JAPAN_ [JPN];

TOMIICHI_MURAYAMA_ [JPNGOV];

MURAYAMA_ [JPNGOV]; prime minister june 94-jan. 96

MORIHIRO_HOSOKAWA [JPNGOV]

HOSOKAWA_ [JPNGOV]; PM aug. 93-april 94

TSUTOMU_HATA_ [JPNGOV]; deputy PM aug. '93-april 94, PM april
'94-June '94

HATA_ [JPNGOV];

KOJI_KAKIZAWA_ [JPNGOV]; Koji Kakizawa Japanese Minister of Foreign

Affairs [April 28, 1994-June 30, 1994]

KAKIZAWA_ [JPN];

CHINA_ [CHN]; DPRK SOLE MAJOR POWER ALLY

QIAN_QICHEN [CHNGOV]; foreign minister

KONO_ [JPN]; Yohei Kono, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan [c.

1993-1994]

KOREAN_PENINSULA_ENERGY_ DEVELPOMENT_ORGANIZATION_ [IGO]; CODING?

USA JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA

KPEDO_ [IGO];

##

#OPERATION ACCOUNTABILITY (1993)

#Irael

YITZHAK_RABIN_ [ISRGOV]; PM and defense minister at time

RABIN_ [ISRGOV];

PRIME_MINISTER_RABIN_ [ISRGOV];

SHIMON_PERES_ [ISRGOV]; Foreign minister

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PERES_ [ISRGOV];

IDF_ [ISRMIL];

ISRAELI_DEFENSE_FORCES_ [ISRMIL];

EHUD_BARAK_ [ISRMIL]; chief of staff

BARAK_ [ISRMIL];


#Lebanon


RAFIK_HARIRI_ [LBNGOV]; PM at time

HARIRI_ [LBNGOV];

MOHSEN_DALLOUL_ [LBNGOV]; defense minister

DALLOUS_ [LBNGOV];

FARES_BOUEIZ_ [LBNGOV]; defense minister

BOUEIZ_ [LBNGOV];

SOUTH_LEBANON_ARMY_ [LBNMIL]; cooperated with the IDF in the

Lebanese territory during the conflict

SLA_ [LBNMIL];


#Hezbollah and Pro-Palestine Groups


HEZBOLLAH_ [HZBMILORG]; launched rockets against an Israeli village

in june '93
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HIZBULLAH_ [HZBMILORG];

HIZBALLAH_ [HZBMILORG];

HASSAN_NASRALLAH_ [HZBMILORG] ; Secretary-General of Hezbollah
[February 16, 1992-present]

NASRALLAH_ [HZBMILORG];

POPULAR_FRONT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_PALESTINE_GENERAL_COMMAND_
[PFLPGC];

PLFP-GC_ [PLFPGC];

AHMAD_JIBRIL_ [PLFPGC]; leader of the PLFP-GC

JIBRIL_ [PLFPGC];

#Syria

HAFEZ_AL-ASSAD_ [SYRGOV];

ASSAD_ [SYRGOV];

#Third Parties

UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

AMERICA_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

WARREN_CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV]; secretary of state

CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV];

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO];

SECRETARY_GENERAL_BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

UNIFIL_ [IGOUNOPKO]; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNITED_NATIONS_INTERIM_FORCE_IN_LEBANON_ [IGOUNO];

##

#CAMEROON-NIGERIA III (1993)

#Nigeria and Nigerian Dissidents

ABACHA_ [NGAGOV]; seized power in Nov 1993

SANI_ABACHA_ [NGAGOV];

SANI_ABACHATO_ [NGAGOV]; NGA military leader

ABACHATO_ [NGAGOV];

AMINU_SALEH_ [NGAGOV];

IBRAHIM_BABANGIDA_ [NGAMIL];

BABANGIDA_ [NGAMIL];

NLC_ [NGAPTY]; Nigerian Labor Congress, a workers union aiming to
advance the political rights of Nigerian workers [1978-present]

NIGERIAN_LABOR_CONGRESS_ [NGAPTY];

NUPENG_ [NGAPTY]; National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers

NADECO_ [NGAPTY]; National Democratic Coalition

NATIONAL_DEMOCRATIC_COALITION_ [NGAPTY];

OPADOKUN_ [NGAPTY];

PROVISIONAL_RULING_COUNCIL_ [NGAGOV]; Military junta that ruled
Nigeria [1983-1998]

KINGIBE_ [NGAGOV]; Baba Gana Kingibe, Nigerian Minister of Foreign
Affairs [1993-1995]

BABA_GANA_KINGIBE_ [NGAGOV];

RICHARD_AKINJIDE_ [NGAGOV]; former Nigerian Attorney-General and
Minister of Justice

AKINJIDE_ [NGAGOV];

CAMPAIGN_FOR_DEMOCRACY_ [NGADISIGO]; Campaign for Democracy,
Nigeria's first human rights organization [1993-present]

RANSOME-KUTI_ [NGADIS]; Beko Ransome-Kuti, one of the founders of
the campaign for democracy

WOLE_SOYINKA_ [NGADIS]; Nobel Laureate in Literature and prominent

248

critic of the Abacha regime in Nigeria

SOYINKA_ [NGADIS];

ABIOLA_ [NGADIS]; Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola

MKO_ABIOLA_ [NGADIS];

MOSHOOD_ABIOLA_ [NGADIS];

PASCAL_BAFYAU_ [NGAPTY]; President of the Nigerian Labor Congress
[1988-1994]

BAFYAU_ [NGAPTY];

SOCIAL_DEMOCRATIC_PARTY_ [NGAPTY]; SDP, a left-leaning Nigerian
political party [c.1989-c.1993]

GANI_FAWEHINMI_ [NGADIS];

#Cameroon

BIYA_ [CMRGOV]; Paul Biya, President of Cameroon, [November 6,
1982-present]

PAUL_BIYA_ [CMRGOV];

SIMON_ACHIDI_ACHU_ [CMRGOV];

ACHU_ [CMRGOV];

#Third Parties

INTERNATIONAL_COURT_OF_JUSTICE_ [IGOICJ];

ICJ_ [IGOICJ];

OAU_ [IGOAFROAU];

AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

GNASSINGBE_EYADEMA_ [TGOGOV]; Togolese President, involved in

mediation

EYADEMA_ [TGOGOV];

CARRINGTON_ [USAGOV]; US Ambassador to Nigeria

WALTER_CARRINGTON_ [USAGOV];

##

#HAITI MILITARY REGIME (1994)

#Haiti and Anti-Haitian Rebels

ARISTIDE_[HTIGOV]; placed back in power after junta stepped down

PRESIDENT_ARISTIDE_ [HTIGOV];

JEAN-BERTRAND_ARISTRIDE_ [HTIGOV];

EMILE_JONASSAINT_ [HTIGOV]; former president of Haiti

JONASSAINT_ [HTIGOV];

ROBERT_MALVAL_ [HTIGOV];

250

MALVAL_ [HTIGOV]; Haitian PM

JEAN-CLAUDE_DUPERVAL_ [HTIMIL]; interim military chief

RAOUL_CEDRAS_ [HTIGOV]; leader of military junta that ousted

President Aristide from power

CEDRAS_ [HTIGOV]; fled after US invasion

MICHEL_FRANCOIS_ [HTIGOV]; chief of police, fled after US invasion

FRANCOIS_ [HTIGOV];

PHILIPPE_BLAMBY_ [HTIGOV]; chief of staff, fled after US invasion

BLAMBY_ [HITGOV];

#United States and Anti-Haitian Rebel Groups

US_ [USA];

AMERICA_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

PENTAGON_ [USAMIL];

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

CLINTON_ADMINISTRATION_ [USAGOV];

WILLIAM_PERRY_ [USAGOV]; Defense press secretaory

JIMMY_CARTER_ [USAGOVINTMED]; sent by Clinton admin on unofficial

mediation envoy to Haiti

CARTER_ [USAGOVINTMED];

GENERAL_POWELL_ [USAGOVINTMED]; former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent on unofficial envoy

COLIN_POWELL_ [USAGOVINTMED];

POWELL_ [USAGOVINTMED];

SENATOR_NUNN_ [USAGOVINTMED]; chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee sent on unofficial envoy

SAM_NUNN_ [USAGOVINTMED];

NUNN_ [USAGOVINTMED];

WARREN_CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV]; accompanied Aristide home to reassume presidency

STANLEY_SCHRAGER_ [USAGOV]; US embassy spokesman

SCHRAGER_ [USAGOV];

LEON_PANETTA_ [USAGOV]; White House chief of staff

PANETTA_ [USAGOV];

DEE_DEE_MYERS_ [USAGOV]; White House spokeswoman

HUGH_SHELTON_ [USAMIL]; commander of US forces in Haiti

SHETLON_ [USAMIL]; US military spokesman

BARRY_WILLEY_ [USAMIL];

ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV]; secretary of state

SHALIKASHVILI_ [USAMIL]; chairman of the joint chiefs of staff

WILLIAM_GRAY_ [USAGOV]; Clinton's "point man" on Haiti

FRONT_FOR_THE_ADVANCEMENT_AND_PROGRESS_OF_HAITI_ [HTIANTREB]; paramilitary group in Haiti

FRAPH_ [HTIANTREB];

#Third Parties

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

BOUTROS_BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO]; secretary general

BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

##

IRAQ TROOP DEPLOYMENT-KUWAIT (1994)

#USA

WILLIAM_PERRY_ [USAGOV] ; Defense Secretary

PERRY_ [USAGOV] ;

PENTAGON_ [USAGOV] ;

MADELEINE_ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV] ; Ambassador to the UN

ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV] ;

WARREN_CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV] ; Secretary of State

CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV] ;

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV] ; President

CLINTON_ [USAGOV] ;

#Saudi Arabia

SA'UD_AL_FAISAL_ [SAUGOV] ; Foreign Minister

SULTAN_BIN_ABDULAZIZ_ [SAUGOV] ; Defense Minister

#Kuwait

EMIR_JABER_AL_AHMAD_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ; Emir of Kuwait

JABER_AL-AHMAD_AL-JABER_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ;

JABER_AL_AHMAD_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ;

SHEIKH_SAAD_AL-ABDULLAH_AL-SALIM_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ; Prime Minister

SAAD_AL-ABDULLAH_AL-SALIM_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ;

AHMAD_AL-HOUMOUD_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ; Defense Minister

#Iraq

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TAREQ_AZIZ_ [IRQGOV] ; Deputy Prime Minister

AZIZ_ [IRQGOV] ;

SADDAM_HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV] ; President

SADDAM_ [IRQGOV] ;

IZZAT_IBRAHIM_AL-DOURI_ [IRQGOV] ; Ba'athist Official

AL-DOURI_ [IRQGOV] ;

TAHA_YASSIN_RAMADAN_AL-JIZRAWI [IRQGOV] ; Vice President

TAHA_YASSIN_RAMADAN_ [IRQGOV] ;

RAMADAN_ [IRQGOV] ;

ALI_HASSAN_ABD_AL-MAJID_AL-TIKRITI_ [IRQGOV] ; Minister of Defense

ALI_HASSAN_AL-MAJID_ [IRQGOV] ;

BARZAN_IBRAHIM_AL-TIKRITI_ [IRQGOV] ; UN Official


#Third Parties



ANDREI_KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV] ; Foreign Minister

KOZYREV_ [RUSGOV] ;

BORIS_YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV] ; President

YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV] ;

#UNITED KINGDOM

SIR_JOHN_MAJOR_ [GBRGOV] ; Prime Minister

JOHN_MAJOR_ [GBRGOV] ;

FRANCIOS_MITTERRAND_ [FRAGOV] ; President
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MITTERRAND_ [FRAGOV] ;

EDOUARD_BALLADUR_ [FRAGOV] ; Prime Minister

BALLADUR_ [FRAGOV] ;

SULEYMAN_DEMIREL_ [TURGOV] ; President

DEMIREL_ [TURGOV] ;

TANSU_CILLER_ [TURGOV] ; Prime Minister

CILLER_ [TURGOV] ;

ROLF_EKEUS_ [IGOUNO] ; Special Commission on Iraw

EKEUS_ [IGOUNO] ;

VESSELIN_KOFTOV_ [IGOUNO] ; Spokesman for UNICOM

KOFTOV_ [IGOUNO] ;

HUSSEIN_BIN_TALAL_ [JORGOV] ; King of Jordan

SHEIKH_MUHAMMAD_IBN_MUBARAK_IBN_HAMAD_AL_KHALIFAH_ [BHRGOV] ;
Foreign Minister

MUHAMMAD_IBN_MUBARAK_IBN_HAMAD_AL_KHALIFAH_ [BHRGOV] ;

HAMAD_AL_KHALIFAH_ [BHRGOV] ;

SHEIKH_HAMAD_BIN_JASSIM_BIN_JABER_AL_THANI_ [QATGOV] ; Foreign
Minister

HAMAD_BIN_JASSIM_BIN_JABER_AL_THANI_ [QATGOV] ;

JABER_AL_THANI_ [QATGOV] ;

YUSUF_BIN_ALAWI_BIN_ABDULLAH_ [OMNGOV] ; Foreign Minister

RASHID_ABDULLAH_AL_NOAIMI_ [AREGOV] ; Foreign Minister

AMR_MOUSSA_ [EGYGOV] ; Foreign Minister

NABIL_OSMAN_ [EGYGOV] ; Chairman of State Info Service

OSMAN_ [EGYGOV] ;

OTHMAN_ [EGYGOV] ;

HOSNI_MUBARAK_ [EGYGOV] ; President

MUBARAK_ [EGYGOV] ;

FAROUK_AL-SHARAA_ [SYRGOV] ; Foreign Minister

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#ECUADOR-PERU V (1995)

#Ecuador

SIXTO_DURIN_BALLEN_ [ECUGOV]; Ecuadorean President at the time

BALLEN_ [ECUGOV]; Proclaimed a state of emergency the day following

the initial armed clashes (April 10)

NATIONAL_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [ECUGOV];

MARCELO_FERNANDEZ_CORDOBA_ [ECUGOV]; Ecuadorean Deputy Foreign

Minister

CORDOBA_ [ECUGOV]; signed peace declaration 17 Feb with Rio

Declaration Guarantors and Peru's Deputy FM

GALO_LEORO_FRANCO_ [ECUGOV]; Ecuadorean Foreign Minister

FRANCO_ [ECUGOV];

ECUDOREAN_ARMY_ [ECUMIL];

ECUDOREAN_AIR_FORCE_ [ECUMIL];

ECUADOREAN_SPECIAL_FORCES_ [ECUMIL];

FAE_ [ECUMIL]; Air Force

GENERAL_PACO_MONCAYO_ [ECUMIL]; Commander, Theatre of Land Operations

GENERAL_MONCAYO_ [ECUMIL];

MONCAYO_ [ECUMIL];

#Peru

ALBERTO_FUJIMORI_ [PERGOV]; Peru's President during crisis

FUJIMORI_ [PERGOV]; reportedly began to personally direct Peru

militarily operation

EDUARDO_PONCE_VIVANCO_ [PERGOV]; Deputy Foreign Minister of Peru

VIVANCO_ [PERGOV]; signed peace declaration 17 Feb. with Rio

Protocol Guarantors and Ecuadorean Deputy FM

EFRAIM_GOLDENBERG_SCHREIBER_ [PERGOV]; Prime Mister and Foreign

Minister of Peru

SCHREIBER_ [PERGOV];

PERUVIAN_ARMY_ [PERMIL];

PERUVIAN_AIR_FORCE_ [PERMIL];

FAP_ [PERMIL]; Air Force

PERUVIAN_SPECIAL_FORCES_ [PERMIL];

GENERAL_DE_EJÃĽRCITO_NICOLÃĄS_DE_BARI_HERMOZA_RÃƉOS_ [PERMIL];

Commander in Chief - Peru Army

NICOLÃĄS_DE_BARI_HERMOZA_RÃƉOS_ [PERMIL];

GENERAL_DE_BRIGADA_EP_VLADIMIRO_LÃŞPEZ_TRIGOSO_ [PERMIL]; Commander,

5th Jungle Infantry Division

VLADIMIRO_LÃŞPEZ_TRIGOSO_ [PERMIL];

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#TAIWAN STRAIT IV (1995)

#China

JIANG_ZEMIN_ [CHNGOV]; President

ZEMIN_ [CHNGOV];

LI_PENG_ [CHNGOV]; Chinese premier

PENG_ [CHNGOV];

QIAN_QICHEN_ [CHNGOV]; foreign minister

QICHEN_ [CHNGOV];

PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_ARMY_ [CHNMIL]; chinese army

PLA_ [CHNMIL];

WANG_DAOHAN_ [CHNGOV]; President of the Association for Relations

Across the Taiwan Strait [December 16, 1991-December 24, 2005]

LI_DAOYU_ [CHNGOV]; Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the United States [1993-1998]

CHI_HAOTIAN_ [CHN]; Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China [March 1993-March 17, 2003]

TANG_JIAXUAN_ [CHNGOV]; Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China [c. 1993-1998]

JIAN_ [CHNGOV]; Chinese foreign ministry spokesman [c. 1995-1996]

#Taiwan

LEE_TENG-HUI_ [TWNGOV]; President at time of crisis

TENG-HUI_ [TWNGOV];

JASON_HU_ [TWNGOV]; Jason Hu, spokesman for Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui [c. 1995-1996]

HU_ [TWNGOV];

LI_YUAN_ZU_ [TWN]; Vice President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) [May 20, 1990-May 19, 1996]

LIEN_CHAN_ [TWNGOV]; premier of ROC

HSU_LI-TEH_ [TWNGOV]; vice premier of ROC

CHAN_ [TWNGOV];

REPUBLIC_OF_CHINA_ARMED_FORCES_ [TWNMIL]; taiwanese army

DEMOCRATIC_PROGRESSIVE_PARTY_ [TWNPTY]; party in ROC content with

american naval response

DPP_ [TWNPTY];

PENG_MING_MIN_ [TWN]; Democratic Progressive Party presidential

candidate [1996]

SHIH_MING-TEH[TWNGOV]; Chairperson of the Democratic Progressive

Party [July 18, 1994-March 23, 1996]

MING-TEH_ [TWNGOV];

LIN_YANG-KANG_ [TWNGOV]; ran against Lee in election,

unificationist, opposed to US naval response

YANG-KANG_ [TWNGOV];

LIN_YI-HSIUNG_ [TWNGOV]; also ran in 1996 presidential election

DING_MOU-SHIH_ [TWNGOV]; head of the national security council of

taiwan

LI-AN_ [TWNGOV]; Taiwanese presidential candidate, critical of the

Kuomintang [1995-1996]

KMT_ [TWNPTY]; Kuomintang, a center-right political party in Taiwan

[October 10, 1919-present]

KUOMINTANG_ [TWNPTY];

#Third Parties

US_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

AMERICA_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

CLINTON_ [USAGOV]; President

WARREN_ [USAGOV];

ARCHIE_CLEMINS_ [USAMIL]; commander in chief of US navy pacific fleet

CLEMINS_ [USAMIL];

SAMUEL_BERGER_ [USAGOV];

BERGER_ [USAGOV]; deputy national security advisor

DAVID_JOHNSON_ [USAGOV]; Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign affairs
and Spokesman for the United States National Security Council
[1995-1998]

SASSER_ [USAGOV]; US Ambassador to China [February 14, 1996-July 1,
1999]

STAPLETON_ROY_ [USAGOV]; American Ambassador to the People's
Republic of China [1991-1995]

MCCURRY_ [USAGOV]; White House Press Secretary, [December 22,
1994-August 4, 1998

NYE_ [USAGOV]; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs [1994-1995]

LORD_ [USAGOV]; Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State
[1993-1997]

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#NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE (1996)

#North Korea

DPRK_ [PRK];

DEMOCRATIC_PEOPLE'S_REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [PRK];

PEOPLE'S_REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [PRK];

PEOPLES_REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [PRK];

LI_HYONG_CHOL_ [PRKGOV]; official of NK foreign ministry

LEE_KWANG_SOO_ [PRKMIL]; submarine's helmsman who was captured and
gave in to ROK interrogation

KWANG-SOO_ [PRKMIL];

KIM_JONG_IL_ [PRKGOV]; supreme leader of NK

KIM_JONG-IL_ [PRKGOV]; supreme leader of NK

JONG-IL_ [PRKGOV]; supreme leader of NK

JONG_IL_ [PRKGOV]; supreme leader of NK

KPA_ [PRKMIL]; Korean People's Army, the army of North Korea
[February 8, 1948-present]

KOREAN_PEOPLE'S_ARMY_ [PRKMIL]; KPA, the army of North Korea
[February 8, 1948-present]

KOREAN_PEOPLES_ARMY_ [PRKMIL]; KPA, the army of North Korea

[February 8, 1948-present]

#South Korea

ROK_ [KOR];

REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [KOR];

KIM_YOUNG_SAM_ [KORGOV]; President at time

KIM_YOUNG-SAM_ [KORGOV];

YOUNG_SAM_ [KORGOV];

GONG_RO-MYUNG_ [KORGOV]; South Korean minister of foreign affairs

[December 24, 1994-November 7, 1996]

RO-MYUNG_ [KORGOV];

GONG_RO-MYEONG_ [KORGOV]; South Korean minister of foreign affairs

[December 24, 1994-November 7, 1996]

RO-MYEONG_ [KORGOV];

YOO_ [KORGOV]; South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs [November

7, 1996-March 3, 1998]

YOO_CHONG-HA_ [KORGOV]; South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs

[November 7, 1996-March 3, 1998]

CHOI_ [KORGOV]; South Korean consular official for the Russian Far

East assassinated by poison

CHOI_DUK-GUN_ [KORGOV];

#Third Parties

US_ [USA];

USA_ [USA];

AMERICA_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

CLINTON_ [USAGOV]; President

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

MARK_MINTON_ [USAGOV]; State dept. negotiator

MINTON_ [USAGOV];

LORD_ [USAGOV]; Assistant Secretary of State [1993-1997]

WINSTON_LORD_ [USAGOV]; Assistant Secretary of State [1993-1997]

CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of State [January 20, 1993-January

17, 1997]

WARREN_CHRISTOPHER_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of State [January 20,

1993-January 17, 1997]

BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United Nations

[January 1, 1992-December 31, 1996]

BOUTROS_BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United

Nations [January 1, 1992-December 31, 1996]

UNC_ [IGOUNO]; unified command structure for international forces

that support South Korea [June 27, 1950-present]

UNITED_NATIONS_COMMAND_ [IGOUNO]; unified command structure for international forces that support South Korea [June 27, 1950-present]

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ZAIRE CIVIL WAR (1996)

#Zaire and Anti-Rwandan Rebel Groups

MARSHALL_MOBUTU_ [CODGOV];

PRESIDENT_MOBUTU_ [CODGOV];

ZAIREAN_PRESIDENT_MOBUTU_ [CODGOV];

MOBUTU_SESE_SEKO_ [CODGOV];

MOBUTU_ [CODGOV]; Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire [November 24, 1965-May 16, 1997]

KENDO_WA_DONDO_ [CODGOV];

DONDO_ [CODGOV];

KENGO_ [CODGOV]; Leon Kengo Wa Dondo, Prime Minister of Zaire [July 6, 1994-April 2, 1997]

MAVUA_MDIMA_ [CODGOVMIL];

LWASI_NGABO_ [CODGOV]; gov of south kivu, anti Tutsi/Banya

KAMANDA_ [CODGOV]; Kamanda Wa Kamanda, Foreign Minister of Zaire
[December 1996-May 1997]

BIZIMA_KARAHA_ [CODGOV]; Foreign Minister of the Congo under
Laurent Kabila [May 24, 1997-March 15, 1999]

TSHISEKEDI_ [CODGOV]; Etienne Tshisekedi, Prime Minister of Zaire
[April 2, 1997-April 9, 1997]

ETIENNE_TSHISEKEDI_ [CODGOV];

RAPHAEL_GHENDA_ [CODGOV]; Information Minister of Congo [May 22,
1997-c. 1999]

BOGUO_MAKELI_ [CODGOV]; Information Minister for Zaire [c. 1996-1997]

HONORE_NGBANDA_NZAMBO_ [CODGOV]; Zairian peace negotiator on behalf
of Mobutu Sese Seko [1996-1997]

HONORE_NGBANDA_ [CODGOV];

LIKULIA_BOLONGO_ [CODGOV]; Prime Minister of Zaire [April 9,
1997-May 16, 1997]

NORBERT_LIKULIA_BOLONGO_ [CODGOV];

MPR_ [CODGOVPTY]; Popular Movement of the Revolution,
Zairian/Mobutu political party

POPULAR_MOVEMENT_OF_THE_REVOLUTION_ [CODGOVPTY];

PEOPLE'S_MOVEMENT_OF_THE_REVOLUTION_ [CODGOVPTY];

MOBUTU's_PEOPLE'S_MOVEMENT_ [CODGOVPTY];

MOBUTU's_POPULAR_MOVEMENT_ [CODGOVPTY];

HUTU_REBELS_ [RWAANTREBHTU];

HUTU_REFUGEES_ [CODHTUREF];

ARMY_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_RWANDA_ [RWAANTREB];

ALIR_ [RWAANTREB];

INTERAHAMWE_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT]; Hutu paramilitary organization
originally operating in Rwanda, but forced into Congo
[1994-present]

THARCISSE_RENZAHO_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT];

RENZAHO_ [RWAANTREBHTYINT];

BANYAMULENGE_ [CODANTREBTSI]; Tutsi Congolese who ally with ADFL

RWANDAN_PARTRIOTIC_ARMY_ [RWAANTREB]; joined AFDL

RPA_ [RWAANTREB];

UNITA_ [AGOREB]; National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, supported Mobutu Sese Seko in the First Congo War
[1996-1997]

NATIONAL_UNION_FOR_THE_TOTAL_INDEPENDENCE_OF_ANGOLA_ [AGOREB];

SAVIMBI_ [AGOANTREB]; UNITA head

#Rwanda and Anti-COD Rebel Groups

PAUL_KAGAME_ [RWAGOV];

KAGAME_ [RWAGOV]; Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, [March 24,
2000-present]

RPF_ [RWAGOV]; Rwandan Patriotic Front, Rwandan political party and
military organization

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RWANDAN_PATRIOTIC_FRONT_ [RWAGOV];

RWANDAN_DEFENCE_FORCES_ [RWAMIL];

PASTEUR_BIZIMUNGU_ [RWAGOV];

BIZIMUNGU_ [RWAGOV];

#COD - ANTREB

KABILA_ [CODANTREB];

LAURENT-DESIRE_KABILA_ [CODANTREB];

LAURENT_KABILA_ [CODANTREB];

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO_ZAIRE_

[CODANTREB];

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO-ZAIRE_

[CODANTREB];

AFDL_ [CODANTREB];

ADFL_ [CODANTREB];

ADFLC_ [CODANTREB];

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_ [CODANTREB];

KABILA'S_ALLIANCE_ [CODANTREB];

KABILA'S_AFDL_ [CODANTREB];

ZAIREAN_REBEL_ALLIANCE_ [CODANTREB];

REBELS_LOYAL_TO_LAURENT_KABILA_ [CODANTREB];

REBELS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODANTREB];

REBELS_LED_BY_KABILA_ [CODANTREB];

JAMES_KABAREBE_ [CODANTREB]; leader of AFDL, former member of

National Resistance Army in Uganda
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ANDRE_NGANDU_KISSASSE_ [CODANTREB]; ADFL military commander /
assassinated by Kabila's men in Jan 1997

KISSASSE_ [CODANTREB];

ANDRE_KISSASSE_NGANDU_ [CODANTREB];

NGANDU_ [CODANTREB];

NATIONAL_COUNCIL_OF_RESISTANCE_FOR_DEMOCRACY_ [CODANTREB]; Ngandu's
group

CNRD_ [CODANTREB];

REVOLUTIONARY_MOVEMENT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO_ [CODANTREB];

MRLZ_ [CODANTREB];

ANSELME_MASUSU_NINDAGA_ [CODANTREB];

NINDAGA_ [CODANTREB];

DEMOCRATIC_ALLIANCE_OF_THE_PEOPLE_ [CODANTREB];

ADP_ [CODANTREB];

DEOGRATIAS_BUGERA_ [CODANTREB];

DOUGLAS_BUGERA_ [CODANTREB];

SUDAN_PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_ARMY_ [SDNREB]; financed anti-mobutu rebels

SPLA_ [SDNREB];

#Third Parties

ERIK_DERYCKE_ [BELGOV]; Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs
[1995-1999]

ALFRED_NZO_ [ZAFGOV]; South African Minister for Foreign Affairs [1994-1999]

PAHAD_ [ZAFGOV]; Aziz Pahad, South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs [1994-2008]

AZIZ_PAHAD_ [ZAFGOV];

MANDELA_ [ZAFGOV]; Mediates here

BUYOYA_ [BDIGOV]; Burundi President

CHARETTE_ [FRAGOV]; Herve de Charette, French Minister of Foreign Affairs [May 18, 1995-June 2, 1997]

JACQUES_GODFRAIN_ [FRAGOV]; French Minister for Cooperation [1995-1997]

XAVIER_EMMANUELLI_ [FRAGOV]; French Secretary of State for Humanitarian Action [May 18, 1995-June 2, 1997]

LLOYD_AXWORTHY_ [CANGOV]; Foreign Minister of Canada [January 25, 1996-October 16, 2000]

KETUMILE_MASIRE_ [BWAGOV]; President of Botswana [July 13, 1980-March 31, 1998]

MUSEVENI_ [UGAGOV]; UGA president, suspected of supporting ADFL

YOWERI_MUSEVENI_ [UGAGOV];

HOWARD_WOLPE_ [USAGOV]; Presidential Special Envoy to the African Great Lakes Region [c. 1996-1997]

GEORGE_MOOSE_ [USAGOV]; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs [c. 1993-2001]

ROBERT_GRIBBIN_ [USAGOV]; Ambassador to RWA

MALCOLM_RIFKIND_ [GBRGOV]; British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [July 5, 1995-May 2, 1997]

CHRETIEN_ [IGOUNO];

RAYMOND_CHRETIEN_ [IGOUNO];

SAHNOUN_ [IGOUNO]; Mohamed Sahnoun, United Nations Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region [1997]

MOHAMED_SAHNOUN_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations [January 1, 1997-December 31, 2006]

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

GHALI_ [IGOUNO];

BOUTROS-GHALI_ [IGOUNO];

PETER_KESSLER_ [IGOUNOREFHCR]; Spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [c. 1996-1997]

PAUL_STROMBERG_ [IGOUNOREFHCR]; Spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [c. 1996-1997]

MAURICE_BARIL_ [IGOUNO]; Head of the Military Division of Peacekeeping Operations [c. June 1992- c.September 1997]

MICHELE_QUINTAGLIE_ [IGOUNOWFP]; World Food Program spokeswoman [c. 1996-1997]

GRANDI_ [IGOUNOREFHCR]; Filippo Grandi, Field Coordinator for UNHCR and United Nations humanitarian activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [1996-1997]

FILIPPO_GRANDI_ [IGOUNOREFHCR];

MELLO_ [IGOUNO]; Sergio Vieira de Mello, UN Assistant High
Commissioner for Refugees [c. 1998-2001]

UNITED_NATIONS_DEPARTMENT_OF_HUMANITARIAN_AFFAIRS_ [IGOUNO];
desgined to stregthen the UN's response to complex emergencies
and natural disasters [c. December 1991-1998]

OGATA_ [IGOUNOREFHCR]; Sadako Ogata United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees [1991-2001]

SADAKO_OGATO_ [IGOUNOREFHCR];

BONINO_ [IGOEUREEC]; Emma Bonino, Humanitarian Commissioner for the
European Union [c. 1996-1997]

EMMA_BONINO_ [IGOEUREEC];

ALDO_AJELLO_ [IGOEUREEC]; Special Representative of the European
Union for the Great Lakes Region [March 1996-present]

SALIM_AHMED_SALIM_ [IGOAFROAU]; Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity [September 19, 1989-September 17,
2001]

MDM_ [NGO]; Medecins du Monde, an international humanitarian
non-profit that provides emergency and long term medical care
to vulnerable populations

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#UNSCOM I (1997)

#United States

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV] ; President

CLINTON_ [USAGOV] ;

ALBERT_GORE_ [USAGOV] ; Vice President

MICHAEL_MCCURRY_ [USAGOV] ; White House Press Sec.

MCCURRY_ [USAGOV] ;

SANDY_BERGER_ [USAGOV] ; National Security Advisor

BERGER_ [USAGOV] ;

JAMES_ RUBIN_ [USA] ; State Dept. Official

RUBIN_ [USAGOV] ;

CHARLES_DUELFER_ [USAGOV] ;

DUELFER_ [USAGOV] ;

ANTHONY_ZINNI_ [USAGOV]; Commander in Chief of Central Command

ZINNI_ [USAGOV] ;

WILLIAM_COHEN_ [USAGOV] ; Pentagon Chief

COHEN_ [USAGOV] ;

MADELEINE_ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV] ; Secretary of State

BILL_RICHARDSON_ [USAGOV] ; Envoy to Iraq

#Iraq

MOHAMMAD_SAID_AL-SAHHAF_ [IRQGOV] ; Foreign Minister

SADDAM_HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV] ; President

HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV] ;

TAREQ_AZIZ_ [IRQGOV] ; Deputy Prime Minister

AZIZ_ [IRQGOV] ;

NIZAR_HAMDOON_ [IRQGOV] ; Ambassador to the UN

HUSSAM_MOHAMMAD_AMIN_ [IRQMIL] ;

TAHA_YASSIN_RAMADAN_ [IRQGOV] ; Vice President

NIZAR_HAAMER_AL-SAADI_ [IRQGOV] ; ADdvisor to President

MDOUN_ [IRQGOV] ; Ambassador to UN

#Third Parties

SCOTT_RITTER_ [IGOUNO] ;

RITTER_ [IGOUNO] ;

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO] ;

ROLF_EKEUS_ [IGOUNO] ;

ESMAT_ABDEL_MEGUID_ [IGOMEAARL] ; Secretary General of Arab League

DENIS_HALLIDAY_ [IGOUNO] ;

HALLIDAY_ [IGOUNO] ;

RICHARD_BUTLER_ [IGOUNO] ; Chairman of UNSCOM

BUTLER_ [IGOUNO] ;

#UNITED KINGDOM

GEORGE_ROBERTSON_ [GBRGOV] ;

ROBERTSON_ [GBRGOV] ;

JOHN_WESTON_ [GBRGOV] ;

#RUSSIA

BORIS_YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV] ; President

YEVGENY_PRIMAKOV_ [RUSGOV] ; Foreign Minister

PRIMAKOV_ [RUSGOV] ;

VIKTOR_POSUVALYUK_ [RUSGOV] ; Deputy Foreign Minister/Ambassador to

Iraq

POSUVALYUK_ [RUSGOV] ;

IGOR_SERGEYEV_ [RUSGOV] ; Minister of Defense

SERGEYEV_ [RUSGOV] ;

NIKITA_SMIDOVICH_ [RUSGOV] ; Leader of UNSCOM

SMIDOVICH_ [RUSGOV] ;

ANDREI_KOKOSHIN_ [RUSGOV] ;

#KUWAIT

SABAH_IV_ AHMAD_AL-JABER_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ; Foreign Minister

SHEIKH_SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ;

SHEIKH_SABAH_AL-AHMAD_AL-SABAH_ [KWTGOV] ; Foreign Minister

#FRANCE

HUBERT_VEDRINE_ [FRAGOV] ; Minister of Foreign Affairs

VEDRINE_ [FRAGOV] ;

BERTRAND_DUFOURCQ_ [FRAGOV] ; Envoy to Iraq

DUFOURCQ_ [FRAGOV] ;

ALAIN_DEJAMMET_ [FRAGOV] ; Rep. to the UN

#EGYPT

AMR_MUSSA_ [EGYGOV] ; Minister of Foreign Affairs

AMR_MOUSSA_ [EGYGOV] ;

#TURKEY

ISMAIL_CEM_IPEKCI_ [TURGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs

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#CYPRUS-TURKEY MISSILE CRISIS (1998)

#Cyprus

GLAFCOS_CLERIDES_ [CYPGOV];

GLAVKOS_CLERIDES_ [CYPGOV];

PRESIDENT_CLERIDES_ [CYPGOV];

CLERIDES_ [CYPGOV]; Glafcos Cerides, President of Cyprus [February

28, 1993-February 28, 2003]

YIANNAKIS_OMIROU_ [CYPGOV];

OMIROU_ [CYPGOV]; Yiannakis Omirou, Defense Minister of Cyrpus

[c.1993-c.1998]

ALEKOS_MICHAELIDES_ [CYPGOV];

ALECOS_MICHAELIDES_ [CYPGOV];

MICHAELIDES_ [CYPGOV];

YIANNAKIS_CASSOULIDES_ [CYPGOV];

CASSOULIDES_ [CYPGOV];

IOANNIS_KASOULIDIS_ [CYPGOV]; Foreign Minister

KASOULIDIS_ [CYPGOV];

TRNC_ [CYP]; Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a breakaway

region of Cyprus that is only recognized by Turkey

TURKISH_REPUBLIC_OF_NORTHERN_CYPRUS_ [CYP];

RAUF_DENKTASH_ [CYPGOV]; President of Northern Cyprus [November 15,

1983-April 24, 2005]

DENKTASH_ [CYPGOV];

DENKTAS_ [CYPGOV];

CYPRIOT_ARMED_FORCES_ [CYPMIL];

#Turkey

AHMET_MESUT_YILMAZ_ [TURGOV];

YILMAZ_ [TURGOV]; Ahmet Mesut Yilmaz, Prime Minister of Turkey,

[June 30, 1997-January 11, 1999]

ISMAIL_CEM_ [TURGOV]; Minister of Foeign Affairs of Turkey, [June

30, 1997-July 11, 2002]

CEM_ [TURGOV];

ISMAIL_CEM_IPEKCI_ [TURGOV];

TANSU_CILLER_ [TURGOV];

CILLER_ [TURGOV];

SULEYMAN_DEMIREL_ [TURGOV];

DEMIREL_ [TURGOV]; Suleyman Demirel, President of Turkey, [May 16,

1993-May 16, 2000]

TURHAN_TAYAN_ [TURGOV]; defense minister

TAYAN_ [TURGOV];

TURKISH_NAVY_ [TURMIL];

TURKISH_COASTGUARD_ [TURMIL];

#Third Parties

US_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

AMERICA_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

NICHOLAR_BURNS_ [USAGOV]; State Dept. Spokesman

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

ANN_HERCUS_ [IGOUNO]; Chief of UN Mission in Cyprus [1998]

HERCUS_ [IGOUNO];

EU_ [IGOEUREEC];

EUROPEAN_UNION_ [IGOEUREEC];

EUROPEAN_COMMISSION_ [IGOEUREEC]; executive body of the European

Union, [1958-present]

NATO_ [IGOMIL];

RUSSIA_ [RUS];

GEORGY_MURATOV_ [RUSGOV]; Ambassador to Cyprus

MURATOV_ [RUSGOV];

ROSCOORUZHENIYE_ [RUS]; defense contractor who sold the missiles to

Cyprus, said missiles were purely defensive

HELLLENIC_FORCE_IN_CYPRUS_ [GRCMIL]; Greek permanent military force

stationed in Cyprus

ELDYK_ [GRCMIL]; acronym for above forces

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#ETHIOPIA-ERITREA (1998)

#Ethiopia and Anti-Eritrean Rebel Groups

ETHIOPIAN_COUNCIL_OF_MINISTERS_ [ETHGOV];

MELES_ZENAWI_ [ETHGOV]; Prime Minister

MELES_ [ETHGOV];

SEYOUM_MESFIN_ [ETHGOV]; Ethiopian Foreign Minister

MESFIN_ [ETHGOV];

SEYOUM_ [ETHGOV];

SALOME_TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

SELOME_TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

NEGASSO_GIDADA_ [ETHGOV];

TSADKAN_GEBRE-TENSAE_ [ETHGOV];

SAMORA_YUNIS_ [ETHMIL]; Ethiopian General

ERITREAN_NATIONAL_ALLIANCE_ [ERIANTREB]; umbrella group for all

opposition to Eritrean rule, consisting of 10 opposition groups

ENA_ [ERIANTREB];

ALLIANCE_OF_ERITREAN_NATIONAL_FORCE_ [ERIANTREB];

AENF_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_DEMOCRATIC_RESISTANCE_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB]; part of

alliance of eritrean nat'l force

EDRM_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_INITIATIVE_GROUP_ [ERIANTREB]; part of alliance of

eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_SALVATION_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];part of alliance

of eritrean nat'l force

281

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_SALVATION_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_JIHAD_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_JIHAD_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];

EIJM_ [ERIANTREB];

EIJ_ [ERIANTREB];

ERIJ_ [ERIANTREB];

EISM_ [ERIANTREB];

SHAIKH_KHALIL_MOHAMMED_AMER_ [ERIANTREB]; putative leader of ERIJ

ABUL_BARA_HASSAN_SALMAN_ [ERIANTREB]; ERIJ's deputy amir

ERITREAN_PEOPLE'S_CONGRESS_ [ERIANTREB]; military faction of EIJM

ERITREAN_KUNAMAS_DEMOCRATIC_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB]; part of alliance
of eritrean nat'l force

DEMOCRATIC_MOVEMENT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_ERITREAN_KUNAMA_
[ERIANTREB]; part of alliance of eritrean nat'l force

DMLEK_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ERIANTREB]; part of alliance of
eritrean nat'l force

ELF_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_NATIONAL_CONGRESS_ [ERIANTREB]; part of
alliance of eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_REVOLUTION-COUNCIL_ [ERIANTREB]; part of
alliance of eritrean nat'l force

ELF-RC_ [ERIANTREB];

ABDELLA_IDRIS_ [ERIANTREB]; leader of ERDF and ELF-RC

282

ERITREAN_REVOLUTIONARY_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_

ERDF_ [ERIANTREB];

POPULAR_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_ERITREA_ [ERIANTREB];

#Eritrea and Anti-Ethiopian Rebel Groups

ISSAIAS_AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV]; Eritrean President

AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

YEMANE_GHEBREMESKEL_ [ERIGOV]; Spokesman for Eritrean President

YEMANE_ [ERIGOV];

HAILE_WOLDENSAE [ERIGOV]; Eritrean Foreign Minister

MENGISTU_ [ERIMIL]; colonel in eritrean military accued of crimes

against humanity

DEBHAT_EPHREM_ [ERIMIL]; military leader during conflict with

Ethiopia

ERITREAN_PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ERIPTY];

EPLF_ [ERIPTY];

OLF_ [ETHANTREB]; rebel group fighting for Oromo people against

Ethiopian rule, supported by Eritrea government

OROMO_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

MOHAMED_OMAR_OSMAN_ [ETHANTREB] leader of ONLF

DAWUD_IBSA_ [ETHANTREB]; Secretary General of the OLF

DAWUD_IBSA_AYANA_ [ETHANTREB];

ABIYU_GELETA_ [ETHANTREB]; OLF spokesman

OROMO_PEOPLE'S_DEMOCRATIC_ORGANIZATION_ [ETHPTY]; coalition member
of the ruling EPRDF

OROMO_PEOPLE'S_DEMOCRATIC_ORGANISATION_ [ETHPTY];

OPDO_ [ETHPTY];

UNITED_OROMO_PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB]; signed
agreement with OLF March 21 1999

UOPLF_ [ETHANTREB];

GENERAL_WAKO_GUTU_USU_ [ETHANTREB]; leader of UOPLF

WAKO_GUTU_ [ETHANTREB];

ABDI_WARSAMEH_ [ETHANTREB]; leader of OROMO faction

OROMO_PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_ORGANIZATION_ [ETHANTREB]; signed
agreement with OLF March 14 1999

OROMO_PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_ORGANISATION_ [ETHANTREB];

OPLE_ [ETHANTREB];

NATIONAL_FRONT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_OGADEN_ [ETHANTREB]; supported
by Eritrea

ONLF_ [ETHANTREB];

OGADEN_NATIONAL_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTEB];

OGADENI_NATIONAL_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

OMAR_JESS_ [ETHANTREB]; Ogadeni faction leader

ETHIOPIAN_SOMALI_DEMOCRATIC_LEAGUE_ [ETHPTY]; Addis Ababa tried to
influence ONFL to join this group, which is a multi-clan
umbrella party affiliated with EPRDF

MOHAMMED_OMAR_OSMAN_ [ETHANTREB]; leading chairman of ONLF

ETHIOPIAN_SOMALI_DEMOCRATIC_LEAGUE_ [ETHDISPTY]; ETH fed gov tried

to influence ONLF to join this party, but was unsuccessful

AFAR_REVOLUTIONARY_DEMOCRATICE_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

AFAR_REVOLUTIONARY_DEMOCRATIC_UNION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

ARDUF_ [ETHANTREB];

MOHAMOODA_GAAS_ [ETHANTREB]; one of the leaders of the ARDUF,

condemned Eritrean government for attacks on Ethiopia at start

of war

ETHIOPIA_PEOPLE'S_REVOLUTIONARY_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

EPRDF_ [ETHANTREB];

AFAR_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

ALF_ [ETHANTREB];

AFAR_NATIONAL_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

ANLF_ [ETHANTREB];

AFAR_NATIONAL_DEMOCRATIC_PARTY_ [ETHANTREB];

ETHIOPIAN_DEMOCRATIC_PARTY_ [ETHDISPTY];

EDP_ [ETHDISPTY];

ADMASSU_GEBEYEHU_ [ETHPTY]; chairman

HAILU_ARAYA_ [ETHPTY]; vice chairman

LIDETU_AYALEW_ [ETHPTY]; General Secretary

GAMBELA_PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_PARTY_ [ETHPTY];

GPLP_ [ETHPTY];

GAMBELA_PEOPLE'S_DEMOCRATIC_UNITY_PARTY_ [ETHPTY];

GPDUP_ [ETHPTY];

GAMBELA_PEOPLE'S_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_ [ETHPTY]; merge of GPLP and GPDUP

GPDF_ [ETHPTY];

GAMBELA_PEOPLE'S_DEMOCRATIC_CONGRESS_ [ETHPTY]; formed by those

unhappy with GPLP-GPDUP merger

UGOGOMO_ [ETHANTREB]; Afar rebels fighting in ETH

#Somalia and Somalian Rebel groups

SOMALIA_ [SOM];

MOHAMED_FARRAH_AIDID_ [SOMANTREB]; leader of OLF faction in Somali,

some 700 strong

MOHAMED_FARRAH_AIDEED_ [SOMANTREB];

AIDEED_ [SOMANTREB]; acknowledges the presence of about 700 oromors

in Somali region

AIDID_ [SOMANTREB];

AL-ITTIHAD_AL-ISLAMI_ [SOMANTREB]; Islamic group active in Southern

Somalia whose strength and position seems little changed by

Ethiopia-Eritrea War

USC-PM_ [SOMANTREB]; mentioned as allied with Ethiopia

UNITED_SOMALI_CONGRESS-PATRIOTIC_MOVEMENT [SOMANTREB];

OMAR_HASHI_ADAN_ [SOMANTREB]; leader of USC-PM

RAHANWEYN_RESISTANCE_ARMY_ [SOMANTREB]; rebel group in southern

286

somalia mentioned as being in alliance with Ethiopia

RRA_ [SOMANTREB];

COLONEL_SHAAT-GADUUD_ [SOMANTREB]; leader of the RRA

SHAAT-GADUUD [SOMANTREB];

SOMALI_NATIONAL_FRONT_ [SOMANTREB]; Marehan group split between pro
and anti Ethiopian factions

SNF_ [SOMANTREB];

OMAR_HAJJI_MASALE_ [SOMANTREB]; leader of SNF

MOHAMED_SHEIKH_ALI_BURALEH_ [SOMANTREB]; leader of pro-ethiopia
faction of SNF

MOHAMED_HUSSEIN_ [SOMANTREB]; son of Aideed and head of Somali
National Alliance

SOMALI_NATIONAL_ALLIANCE_ [SOMANTREB]; Eritrea and Uganda allegedly
supported this group

SNA_ [SOMANTREB];

USC_ [SOMANTREB]; another acronym used for Somali National alliance

OSMAN_HASSAN_ALI_ [SOMANTREB]; faction leader in Somalia against
Eritrea

MUSA_SUDE_YALLAHOW_ [SOMANTREB]; faction leader in Somalia against
Eritrea

ABDULLAI_YUSUF_AHMED_ [SOMANTREB]; faction leader in Somalia
against Eritrea

SOMALI_NATIONAL_MOVEMENT_ [SOMANTREB];

SNM_ [SOMANTREB];

GENERAL_MOHAMED_HIRSI_MORGAN_ [SOMANTREB]; Kismayu-based faction

leader

MOHAMED_HIRSI_MORGAN_ [SOMANTREB];

#Third Parties

UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

US_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

MADELEINE_ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of State at time, signed

internationally brokered deal effectively ending crisis

ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV];

ANTHONY_LAKE_ [USAGOV]; Whitehouse special envoy present at signing

of Horn peace accord

LAKE_ [USAGOV];

SUSAN_RICE_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of States for African affairs

RICHARD_HOLBROOKE_ [USAGOV]; US ambassador to the UN

HOLBROOKE_[USAGOV];

OAU_ [IGOAFROAU]; w/ backing from UNSC able to reach substantive

agreement on 18 June 2000

ORGANISATION_OF_AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

ORGANIZATION_OF_AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

SALIM_AHMED_SALIM_ [IGOAFROAU]; Secreatry General of the OAU

SALIM_ [IGOAFROAU];

OUYAHIA_ [IGOAFROAU]; OAU mediator, Algerian politician

ABDELAZIZ_BOUTEFLIKA_ [IGOAFROAU]; algerian president and chairman
of OAU

BOUTEFLIKA_ [IGOAFROAU];

UN_ [IGOUNO]; sent 4,200 peacekeeping troops from to patrol border,
arrange exchange of prisoners and supervise return of displaced
persons

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; UN Secretary general, signed internationally
brokered deal effectively ending crisis

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

MOHAMED_SAHNOUN_ [IGOUNO]; UN Secretary General's special envoy for
Africa

SANHOUN_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO]; backed agreement proposed by OAU to
end crisis 18 June 2000

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UNHCR_ [IGOUNO]

UNITED_NATIONS_HIGH_COMMISSIONER_FOR_HUMAN_RIGHTS_ [IGOUNO];

MARY_ROBINSON_ [IGOUNO]; active high commissioner expressed concern
regarding harassment of Eritreans being expelled from Ethiopia

UNMEE_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

PATRICK_CAMMAERT_ [IGOUNO]; Dutch General leading peacekeeping
mission known as UNMEE

CAMMAERT_ [IGOUNO];

WORLD_FOOD_PROGRAM_ [IGOUNOWFP]; active in helping in
Ethiopia/Eritrea crisis

WFP_ [IGOUNOWFP];

CATHERINE_BERTINI [IGOUNOWFP]; Exec. Director of the WFP, appointed
on special envoy to africa by Annan, including Eritrea and
Ethiopia

BERTINI_ [IGOUNOWFP];

RINO_SERRI_ [ITAGOV];

SERRI_ [IGOEUREEC]; EU representative present at signing of peace
between Ethiopia and Eritrea

MUSSA_ [EGYGOV]; Egyptian foreign minister

CONGO_ [COG];

LAURENT_KABILA_ [COGGOV]; President of Congo involved in crisis

DJIBOUTI_ [DJI]; sent delegations early in crisis that were
unsuccessful in mediating conflict

HASSAN_GOULED_APTIDON_ [DJIGOV]; 1st President of Djibouti and
active president during conflict

GOULED_ [DJIGOV];

AFAR_FRONT_POUR_LA_RESTAURATION_DE_I'UNITE_ET_LADEMOCRATIE_
[DJIANTREB]; split it 1994, but one faction remains violent
against current power in DJI 1998

FRUD_ [DJIANTREB];

AHMED_DINI_ [DJIANTREB]; leader of violent FRUD faction

ERITREA-ETHIOPIA_CLAIMS_COMMISSION [IGO];

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#INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR TESTS (1998)

#India conducted nuclear tests - 11 May 1998 triggering crisis for

itself and Pakistan

#Pakistan conducted own test later in the month

#India

ATAL_BIHARI_VAJPAYEE_ [INDGOV]; Indian PM and FM; member of the BJP

VAJPAYEE_ [INDGOV];

LAL_KRISHNA_ADVANI_ [INDGOV]; Indian Home Minister - announced

India would pursue "pro-active" policy towards alleged

Pakistani interference in Kashmir

ADVANI_ [INDGOV];

BHARATIYA_JANATA_PARTY_ [INDPTY]; Hindu Nationalist Party

BJP_ [INDPTY];

ABDUL_KALAM_ [INDGOV]; former President of India, consulted by Vajpayee on nuclear options, also Head of the DRDO and Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister

APJ_ABDUL_KALAM_ [INDGOV];

RAJAGOPALA_CHIDAMBARAM_ [INDGOV]; condensed matter physicist and nuclear scientist, also Chairman of the DAE

R_CHIDAMBARAM_ [INDGOV];

CHINDAMBARAM_ [INDGOV];

INDIAN_DAE_ [INDGOV];

DEPARTMENT_OF_ATOMIC_ENERGY_ [INDGOV];

DAE_ [INDGOV]

INDIAN_ARMY_ [INDMIL]; tested the nuclear weapons at the Pokhran Test Range

INDIAN_AIR_FORCE_ [INDMIL]; flew the bombs from the Chhatrapati Shivaji Int'l Airport to the Jaisalmer army base

58TH_ENGINEER_REGIME_ [INDMIL]; commissioned to prepare test sites as to not be discovered by spying US satellites

CORPS_OF_ENGINEERS_ [INDMIL]; part of Indian army; includes 58th engineer regiment

COLONEL_GOPAL_KAUSHIK_ [INDMIL]; commander of the 58th engineer's

GOPAL_KAUSHIK_ [INDMIL];

KAUSHIK_ [INDMIL];

DEFENSE_RESEARCH_AND_DEVELOPMENT_ORGANISATION_ [INDGOV]; responsible for the development of technology for use by the

military

DRDO_ [INDGOV];

K_SANTHANAM_ [IND]; worker at DRDO, in charge of the test site
preparations

M_VASUDEV_ [IND]; range safety office, responsible for verifying
that all test indicators were normal

BARC_ [IND]; provided scientists and engineers for assisting
assembly, layout, detonation, and obtaining test data

BHABHA_ATOMIC_RESEARCH_CENTER_ [IND];

ANIL_KAKODKAR_ [IND]; director at BARC

SANTINDER_JUMAR_SIKKA_ [IND]; director at BARC

MS_RAMKUMAR_ [IND]; director at BARC

DD_SOOD_ [IND]; Director at BARC

SK_GUPTA_ [IND]; director at BARC

G_GOVINDRAJ_ [IND]; director at BARC

AMD_ [IND]; provided scientists and engineers for assisting
assembly, layout, detonation, and obtaining test data

ATOMIC_MINERALS_DIRECTORATE_FOR_EXPLORATION_AND_RESEARCH_ [IND];

GR_DIKSHITULU_ [IND]; senior research scientist for AMD

#India opposition

CONGRESS_PARTY_ [INDPTY]; criticized the BJP for carrying out tests

SALMAN_KHURSHEED_ [INDGOV]; spokesman for the Congress Party

#Pakistan

NAWAZ_SHARIF_ [PAKGOV]; Pakistani Prime Minister; member of the PLM(N)

SHARIF_ [PAKGOV];

GOHAR_AYUB_KHAN_ [PAKGOV]; Pakistani Foreign Minister

GOHAR_AYUB_ [PAKGOV];

PAKISTAN_MUSLIM_LEAGUE_ [PAKPTY]; came to power in 1998

PAKISTAN_MUSLIM_LEAGUE_(N)_ [PAKPTY];

PLM(N)_ [PAKPTY];

PLM_ [PAKPTY];

PAKISTAN_ATOMIC_ENERGY_COMMISSION_ [PAKGOV]; given the "OK" to carry out nuclear testing by Sharif following India's tests

PAEC_ [PAKGOV];

PERVEZ_HOODBHOY_ [PAKGOV]; one of the Pakistan's leading nuclear physicists

#Third Parties

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV]; US President

CLINTON_ [USAGOV]; urged Sharif of Pakistan not to proceed with tests of its on - imposed sanctions on Pakistan, similar to ones already on India

CHINESE_FOREIGN_MINISTRY_ [CHNGOV]; strongly criticized India for

running the tests

QIAN_QICHEN_ [CHNGOV]; Foreign Finister of China

MASAYOSHI_TAKEMURA_ [JPNGOV]; Minister of Finance - met with Qichen

to discuss and jointly condemn nuclear tests

EUROPEAN_UNION_ [IGOEUREEC]; expressed concern over the situation

EU_ [IGOEUREEC];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; expressed deep regret over tests and called

for maximum restraint from countries in region

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

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#DRC CIVIL WAR (1998)

#CODGOV + RWAANTREB + CODPROREB vs. RWAGOV + CODANTREB

#Zaire/DRC, Pro-Zaire/DRC Rebel Groups, and Anti-Rwandan Rebel Groups

KABILA_ [CODGOV]; Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo [January 17, 2001-present]

JOSEPH_KABILA_ [CODGOV];

LAURENT_KABILA_ [CODGOV]; son of Joseph

LAURENT-DESIRE_KABILA_ [CODGOV]

DOMINIQUE_INONGO_ [CODGOV]; COD minister of information

INONGO_ [CODGOV]

SAKOMBI_INONGO_ [CODGOV];

MUMENGI_ [CODGOV]; Various positions in Kabila gov

DIDIER_MUMENGI_ [CODGOV];

EDDY_KAPEND_ [CODGOV] ;

MWENZE_KONGOLO_ [CODGOV]; COD justice minister

MUGENI_ [CODGOV] ; Mayor loyal to kabila

RUBERWA_ [CODGOV]; Azarias Ruberwa, one of four vice presidents of

the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo [2003-2006]

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO_ZAIRE_

[CODGOVADFL]; coalition of Congolese dissidents that defeated

Sese Seko and brought Kabila to power [October 1996-May 17, 1997]

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO-ZAIRE_

[CODGOVADFL];

AFDL_ [CODGOVADFL];

ADFL_ [CODGOVADFL];

ADFLC_ [CODGOVADFL];

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_ [CODGOVADFL];

KABILA'S_AFDL_ [CODGOVADFL];

KABILA'S_ALLIANCE_ [CODGOV];

ZAIREAN_REBEL_ALLIANCE_ [CODPROREB];

REBELS_LOYAL_TO_LAURENT_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

REBELS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

REBELS_LED_BY_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

FIGHTERS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

MILITANTS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

FORCES_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

FORCES_LED_BY_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

MYUMBA_ [CODMIL]; Maj in army, pro Kabila

MUDENKE_ [CODMIL]; Maj in army, pro Kabila

PRO_KABILA_FAC_ [CODMIL];

PRO-KABILA_FAC_ [CODMIL];

PRO-GOVERNMENT_FAC_TROOPS_ [CODMIL];

FAC_TROOPS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODMIL];

TROOPS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODMIL];

NGUESSO_ [COGGOV]; R of CONGO pres

UDPS_ [CODPTY]; Union for Democracy and Social Progress party

MAI_MAI_ [CODPROREB]; pro-gov militia

PADIRI_ [CODPROREB]; leader of one of the most powerful and
organized Mai Mai groups

DUNIA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of one of the most powerful and
organized Mai Mai groups

MUDUNU_40_ [CODPROREB]; smaller Mai Mai faction

FRONT_DE_RESISTANCE_ET_DE_DEFENSE_DU_KIVU_ [CODPROREB]; same as
Mudundu 40

FRDKI_ [CODPROREB]; same as Mudundo 40

MOUVEMENT_DE_LUTTE_CONTRE_L'AGRESSION_AU_ZAIRE_ [CODPROREB]; small
faction

FORCES_UNIES_DE_RESISTANCE_NATIONALE_CONTRE_L'AGRESSION_DE_LA_REPUBLI
QUE_DEMOCRATIQUE_DU_CONGO_ [CODPROREB]

GEDEON_KYUNGU_MUTUNGA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of Mai mai group

MAI_MAI_GEDEON_ [CODPROREB]; group started by above leader

NATIONAL_FORCES_OF_LIBERATION_ [CODPROREB]; faction of Party for
the Liberation of the Hutu people

FORCES_NATIONALES_DE_LIBERATIONS_ [CODPROREB];

FNL_ [CODPROREB]; National Forces of Liberation, a Hutu Burundian
rebel group [1980-September 2006]

PALIPEHUTU-FNL_ [CODPROREB];

COSSAN_KABURA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of the FNL

AGATHON_RWASA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of the FNL

FDLR_ [RWAANTREBHTU]; Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda, a Rwandan Hutu rebel group in the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo

DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_RWANDA_ [RWAANTREBHTU];

ARMY_FOR_LIBERATION_OF_RWANDA_ [RWAANTREBHTU]; old version of FDLR

#NOTE - LRA is anti-Ugandan here, pro-KABILA

LRA_ [UGAANTREB]; Lord's Resistance Army, a Christian extremist

militant group in Uganda and South Sudan [1987-present]

LORD'S_RESISTANCE_ARMY_ [UGAANTREB];

RWANDAN_HUTU_ [RWAANTREB];

INTERAHAMWE_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT]; Hutu paramilitary organization

originally operating in Rwanda, but forced into Congo

[1994-present]

THARCISSE_RENZAHO_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT]; organized group during civil

war

RENZAHO_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT];

NTIWIRAGABO_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT];

#Rwanda and Anti-/Rwandan DRC Rebel Groups

PAUL_KAGAME_ [RWAGOV];

KAGAME_ [RWAGOV]; Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, [March 24,

2000-present]

RPF_ [RWAGOVPTY]; Kagame's ruling party

MURIGANDE_ [RWAGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs [2002-2008]

INTERAHAMWE_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT]; Hutu paramilitary organization

originally operating in Rwanda, but forced into Congo

[1994-present]

THARCISSE_RENZAHO_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT]; organized group during civil
war

RENZAHO_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT];

NTIWIRAGABO_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT]; another leader of group

BANYAMULENGE_ [CODANTREB]; Tutsi Congolese anti-CODGOV, pro-Rwanda

MLC_ [CODANTREBMLC]; Ugandan-backed Congolese Liberation movement,
anti-Kabila

MOVEMENT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO_ [CODANTREBMLC];

CONGOLESE_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [CODANTREBMLC];

JEAN-PIERRE_BEMBA_ [CODANTREB];

BEMBA_ [CODANTREB];

RCD_ [CODANTREB]; Congolese rebel group [1998-2003] and political
party [2003-present]

ONUSUMBA_ [CODANTREB]; RCD chairman for a time

ALLY_FOR_DEMOCRACY_ [CODANTREB];

RALLY_FOR_CONGOLESE_DEMOCRACY_ [CODANTREB];

RASSEBMLEMENT_CONGOLAIS_POR_LA_DEMOCRATIE_ [CODANTREB];

RCD_ [CODANTREB]; Congolese rebel group [1998-2003] and political
party [2003-present]

ONUSUMBA_ [CODANTREB]; RCD chairman for a time

ERNEST_WAMBA_DIA_WAMBA_ [CODANTREB]; president of RCD

MOBUTU_SESE_SEKO_ [CODANTREB]; member of RCD

Z'AHIDI_NGOMA_ [CODANTREB];

NGOMA_ [CODANTREB]; leader of RCD

LAURENT_NKUNDA_ [CODANTREB];

NKUNDA_ [CODANTREB]; Laurent Nkunda, a general in the armed forces

of the Democratic Republic of Congo [1994-2004]

RCD-GOMA_ [CODANTREB]; faction of RCD

ILUNGA_ [CODANTREB]; leader of RCD-GOMA

WAMBA_ [CODANTREB]; leader of RCD for a time, then RCD-K

WAMBA_DIA_WAMBA_ [CODANTREB];

FORCES_FOR_RENEWAL_ [CODANTREB]; Wamba's breakaway faction

RCD-KISANGANI_ [CODANTREB]; faction of RCD split off by Wamba dia

Wamba

RCD-K_ [CODANTREB];

RCD-LM_ [CODANTREB]; same as RCD-K

RCD-MOVEMENT_FOR_LIBERATION_ [CODANTREB];

RCD-ML_ [CODANTREB];

RCD-MOVEMENT_DE_LIBERATION_ [CODANTREB];

MBUSA_NYAMWISI_ [CODANTREB]; rejected Wamba's leadership so started

RCD-ML

ADOLPHE_ONUSUMBA_ [CODANTREB]; replaced Ilunga as head of Goma

based RCD

ANTI_KABILA_FAC_ [CODANTREB]

ANTI-KABILA_FAC_ [CODANTREB]

REBEL_FAC_TROOPS_ [CODANTREB]

RASHIDI_MUZELEIN_ [CODANTREB] ; bodyguard who killed Laurent Kabila

MUZELEIN_ [CODANTREB];

JAMES_KABAREBE_ [CODANTREB]; leader of AFDL, former member of
National Resistance Army in Uganda

ANDRE_NGANDU_KISSASSE_ [CODANTREB]; ADFL military commander /
assassinated by Kabila's men in Jan 1997

KISSASSE_ [CODANTREB];

ANDRE_KISSASSE_NGANDU_ [CODANTREB];

NGANDU_ [CODANTREB];

ANTI-KABILA_FORCES_ [CODANTREB];

ANTI_KABILA_FORCES_ [CODANTREB];

#Third Parties

MBEKI_ [ZAFGOV]; Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa [June 14,
1999-September 24, 2008]

CHILUBA_ [ZMBGOV]; Zambian President

MUSEVENI_ [UGAGOV]; Ugandan president

MUGABE_ [ZWEGOV];

ROBERT_MUGABE_ [ZWEGOV];

AU_ [IGOAFROAU]; African Union, a union of 54 African states,
formerly the OAU [July 9, 2002-present]

AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

NEPAD_ [IGOAFROAU]; New Partnership for Africa's Development,

promoting economic cooperation between African countries [July

2001-present]

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United Nations [January

1, 1997-December 31, 2006]

MELLO_ [IGOUNO]; Sergio Vieira de Mello, UN Assistant High

Commissioner for Refugees [c. 1998-2001]

MONUC_ [IGOUNOPKO]

KETUMILE_MASIRE_ [INTMED]; former Botswanan president and

facilitator/mediator here

MASIRE_ [INTMED];

NUJOMA_ [IGOSAFSAD];

SADC_ [IGOSAFSAD];

MANDELA_ [ZAF];

al-QADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]; mediator

QADDAFI_ [LBYGOV];

GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV];

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#UNSCOM II OPERATION DESERT FOX

#United States

JAMES_RUBIN_ [USAGOV]; State Dept. Official

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV]; President

CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

ALBERT_GORE_ [USAGOV]; VP

MICHAEL_MCCURRY_ [USAGOV]; Press Secretary

MCCURRY_ [USAGOV];

SANDY_BERGER_ [USAGOV]; National Security Advisor

BERGER_ [USAGOV];

JAMES_ RUBIN_ [USA]; State Dept. official

RUBIN_ [USAGOV];

CHARLES_DUELFER_ [USAGOV]; Advisor to Director of CIA

DUELFER_ [USAGOV] ;

ANTHONY_ZINNI_ [USAGOV]; CIC of Central Command

ZINNI_ [USAGOV];

WILLIAM_COHEN_ [USAGOV] ; Pentagon Chief

COHEN_ [USAGOV];

MADELEINE_ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of State

BILL_RICHARDSON_ [USAGOV];

PETER_BURLEIGH_ [USAGOV]; Permanent Rep. to the UN

#United Kingdom

TONY_BLAIR_ [GBRGOV]; PM

GEORGE_ROBERTSON_ [GBRGOV]; Secretary of State for Defense

ROBERTSON_ [GBRGOV];

JOHN_WESTON_ [GBRGOV]; Ambassador to Iraq

JEREMY_GREENSTOCK_ [GBRGOV]; Permanent representative to the UN

#Iraq

TAREQ_AZIZ_ [IRQGOV]; Deputy PM

TARIQ_AZIZ_ [IRQGOV];

AZIZ_ [IRQGOV];

MOHAMMAD_SAID_AL-SAHHAF_ [IRQGOV]; Foreign Minister

SADDAM_HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV]; President

HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV];

NIZAR_HAMDOON_ [IRQGOV]; Ambassador to the UN

HUSSAM_MOHAMMAD_AMIN_ [IRQMIL];

TAHA_YASSIN_RAMADAN_ [IRQGOV]; VP

NIZAR_HAAMER_AL-SAADI_ [IRQGOV];

#Third Parties

UNSCOM_ [IGOUNO];

RICHARD_BUTLER_ [IGOUNO]; Chairman of UNSCOM

BUTLER_ [IGOUNO];

SCOTT_RITTER_ [IGOUNO];

RITTER_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

HAFEZ_AL_ASSAD_ [SYRGOV]; President

MAHMOUD_ZUABI_ [FRAGOV]; PM

HUBERT_VEDRINE_ [FRAGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs

VEDRINE_ [FRAGOV];

BERTRAND_DUFOURCQ_ [FRAGOV];

DUFOURCQ_ [FRAGOV];

ALAIN_DEJAMMET_ [FRAGOV]; Rep. to UN

JACQUES_CHIRAC_ [FRAGOV]; President

LIONEL_JOSPIN [FRAGOV]; PM

AMR_MUSSA_ [EGYGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs

AMR_MOUSSA_ [EGYGOV];

HOSNI_MUBARAK_ [EGYGOV]; President

ISMAIL_CEM_IPEKCI_ [TURGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs

SULEYMAN_DEMIREL_ [TURGOV]; President

MESUT_YILMAZ_ [TURGOV]; PM

BORIS_YELTSIN_ [RUSGOV]; President

YEVGENY_PRIMAKOV_ [RUSGOV]; Foreign Minister

PRIMAKOV_ [RUSGOV];

VIKTOR_POSUVALYUK_ [RUSGOV]; Deputy foreign Minister and Ambassador

to Iraq

POSUVALYUK_ [RUSGOV];

IGOR_SERGEYEV_ [RUSGOV];

SERGEYEV_ [RUSGOV];

NIKITA_SMIDOVICH_ [RUSGOV]; Leader if UNSCOM

SMIDOVICH_ [RUSGOV];

ANDREI_KOKOSHIN_ [RUSGOV]; Secretary of Russian Defenese Council

SERGEY_LAVROV_ [RUSGOV] ; Permanent Rep. to the UN

QIN_HUASUN_ [CHNGOV] ; Permanent Rep. to the UN

JIANG_ZEMIN_ [CHNGOV] ; President

ZHU_RONGJI_ [CHNGOV] ; Premier of China

YASSER_ARAFAT_ [PSEGOV] ; President

ARAFAT_ [PSEGOV] ;

ABU_AMMAR [PSEGOV] ;

PLO_ [PALPLO]; Palestinian Liberation Org.

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#KASHMIR IV KARGIL (1999)

#India

V_P_SINGH_ [INDGOV]; PM of India

VP_SINGH_ [INDGOV];

VISHWANATH_PRATAP_SINGH_ [INDGOV];

PRIME_MINISTER_SINGH_ [INDGOV];

SUNITH_FRANCIS_RODRIGUES_ [INDMIL]; Chief of the Army

FRANCIS_RODRIGUES_ [INDMIL];

GENERAL_SUNDARJI_ [INDMIL];

KRISHNASWAMY_SUNDARJI_ [INDMIL]; warned by those sent by Bush that

Pakistan may resort to nuclear strike

MAULVI_MUHAMMAD_FAROOQ_ [IND]; Kashmir's leading Muslim cleric

killed by unidentified gunmen 21 May 1990

MIWAIZ_MOLVI_FAROOQ_ [IND];

MOLVI_FAROOQ_ [IND];

#PAKISTAN and Anti-India Pakistani Rebel Group

PRESIDENT_KAHN_ [PAKGOV]; was warned by those Bush sent to Pakistan

that they stood no chance against war with India, and would

have no US assistance

GHULAM_ISHAQ_KAHN_ [PAKGOV];

BENAZIR_BHUTTO_ [PAKGOV]; 13 March 1990 Pakistan controlled Kashmir

and promised a "thousand-year war" to support the militants

BHUTTO_ [PAKGOV];

PRIME_MINISTER_BHUTTO_ [PAKGOV];

GENERAL_BEG_ [PAKMIL]; Pakistan's Army chief of staff, ordered
assembly of a few nuclear weapons

MIRZA_ASLAM_BEG_ [PAKMIL];

JAMMU-KASHMIR_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [IMGKASMOS]; April 6th 1990 seized
and killed three Indian hostages

JAMMU_AND_KASHMIR_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [IMGKASMOS];

JAMMU_KASHMIR_LIBERATION_FORNT_ [IMGKASMOS];

JKLF_ [IMGKASMOS];

AMMANULLAH_KHAN_ [IMGKASMOS]; leader of Paksitan-administered
violent faction JKLF

#Third Parties

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

BUSH_ADMINISTRATION_ [USAGOV];

GEORGE_H_W_BUSH_ [USAGOV]; alarmed by growing risk of nuclear war
in area sent deputy director of CIA to Islamabad and Delhi to
work things out

GEORGE_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

PRESIDENT_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

CIA_ [USAGOV];

CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_AGENCY_ [USAGOV];

RICHAR_J_KERR_ [USAGOV]; deputy director of the CIA

RICHARD_KERR_ [USAGOV];

KERR_ [USAGOV];

ROBERT_GATES_ [USAGOV]; deputy national security advisor to former

Pres. Bush

RICHARD_HAASS_ [USAGOV]; National Security Council aide for the

region

HAASS_ [USAGOV];

JOHN_KELLY_ [USAGOV]; Assistant Secretary of State for Near East

and South Asian Affairs

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#EAST TIMOR II (1999)

#Crisis between Indonesia and Australia between 4 Sept-10 Oct 1999

- caused by violence between militia groups in East Timor

#Australia led peacekeeping mission with minor support from 19

other countries

#Indonesia and Pro-Indonesian Militias

BJ_HABIBIE_ [IDNGOV]; President of Indonesia

HABIBIE_ [IDNGOV];

WIRANTO_ [IDNMIL]; Indonesian army general

GENERAL_WIRANTO_ [IDNMIL];

AITARAK_ [IDNPROREB]; anti-Timor independence militia

EURICO_GUTERRES_ [IDNPROREB]; leader of the group at its height

GUTERRES_ [IDNPROREB];

BESI_MERAH_PUTIH_ [IDNPROREB]; anti-Timor independence militia

BMP_ [IDNPROREB];

MANUEL_DE_SOUSA_ [IDNPROREB]; leader of BMP, an East Timorese in
support of Indonesian rule over East Timor

LAKSAUR_ [IDNPROREB]; anti-Timor independence militia

MAHIDI_ IDNPROREB]; anti-Timor independence militia

#Australia

JOHN_HOWARD_ [AUSGOV]; PM of Australia; criticized by both
domestic and Indonesian people for support of Indonesian
government

JOHN_MOORE_ [AUSGOV]; defence minister

INTERNATIONAL_FORCE_FOR_EAST_TIMOR_ [IGO]; Australian led force

formed to address the humanitarian and security crisis in East

Timor {September 20, 1999-Febraury 28, 2000]

INTERFET_ [IGO]; Australian led non-UN peacekeeping force formed to

address the humanitarian and security crisis in East Timor

[September 20 1999-February 28, 2000]

PETER_COSGROVE_ [AUSMIL]; Australian Major General in command on

INTERFET

#Third Parties

ROSS_MOUNTAIN_ [IGOUNO]; Special Representative of the UN

Secretary-General to East Timor [1999]

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UN_ [IGOUNO]; backed INTERFET and was active in peace efforts

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_TRANSITIONAL_ADMINISTRATION_IN_EAST_TIMOR_ [IGOUNO]

UNTAET_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Transitional Administration in

East Timor, an interim civil administration and peacekeeping

mission [1999-2002]

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UNITED_NATIONS_MISSION_IN_EAST_TIMOR_ [IGOUNO];

UNAMET_ [IGOUNO];

BILL_CLINTON_ [USAGOV];

CLINTON_ [USAGOV];


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#INDIAN PARLIAMENT ATTACK (2001)


#India


INDIAN_ARMY_ [INDMIL];

INDIAN_SECURITY_FORCES_ [INDMIL];

INDIAN_NATIONAL_DEMOCRATIC_ALLIANCE_ [INDPTY]; ruling party in

India blamed Pakistani terrorist groups

ATAL_BEHARI_VAJPAYEE_ [INDGOV]; PM

VAJPAYEE_ [INDGOV];

ADVANI_ [INDGOV]; Indian Home Minister

SINGH_ [INDGOV];

GEORGE_FERNANDES_ [INDGOV];

FERNANDES_ [INDGOV];

NIRUPAMA_RAO_ [INDGOV];
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313

#Pakistan

PAKISTAN_ARMY_ [PAKMIL];

INTER-SERVICE_INTELLIGENCE_ [PAKMIL]; India blames them for

supplying and training gunmen

ISI_ [PAKMIL];

INTER-SERVICES_PUBLIC_RELATIONS_ [PAKGOV];

ISPR_ [PAKGOV];

GENERAL_RASHID_QURESHI_ [PAKMIL]; ISPR spokesman, claims that

attack was staged by India

QURESHI_ [PAKMIL];

PARVAZ_MUSHARRAF_ [PAKGOV]; President

MUSHARRAF_ [PAKGOV];

ABDUL_SATTAR_ [PAKGOV];

SATTAR_ [PAKGOV];

AZIZ_AHMED_KHAN_ [PAKGOV];

ASHRAF_JEHANGIR_QAZI_ [PAKGOV]; High Commissioner to India

QAZI_ [PAKGOV];

#Islamist Separatist Groups

LASHKAR_E_TOIBA_ [IMGSASMOS]; blamed by India for coordinating attack

LASHKAR_ [IMGSASMOS];

LIT_ [IMGSASMOS]; blamed by India for coordinating attack

JAISH-E-MOHAMMADALLUH_BATASH_ [IMGSASMOS]; blamed by India for

coordinating attack

JAISH-E-MOHAMMED_ [IMGSASMOS];

JAISH_ [IMGSASMOS];

JEM_ [IMGSASMOS];

#Third Parties

USA_ [USA]

AMERICA_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

PENTAGON_ [USAGOV];

BUSH_ [USAGOV];

GEORGE_W_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

GEORGE_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

POWELL_ [USAGOV];

RUMSFELD_ [USAGOV];

TALIBAN_ [AFGINSTAL];

KARZAI_ [AFGGOV];

BLAIR_ [GBRGOV];

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UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

RUSSIA_ [RUS];


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#Pankisi

#Russia/Chechen


RUSSIA_ [RUS];

SERGEI_IVANOV_ [RUSGOV]; Defense Minister

IVANOV_ [RUSGOV];

VLADMIR_PUTIN_ [RUSGOV];

PUTIN_ [RUSGOV];

BORIS_GRYZLOV_ [RUSGOV]; Minister of Internal Affairs

GRYZLOV_ [RUSGOV];

BORDER_SERVICE_OF_THE_FEDERAL_SECURITY_OF_THE_RUSSIAN_FEDERATION_

[RUSGOV];

BOREDER_SERVICE_OF_RUSSIA_ [RUSGOV];

BORDER_FORCE_OF_RUSSIA_ [RUSGOV];

#Chechen
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CHECHEN_ [RUSCHE];

CHECHEN_REPUBLIC_ [RUSCHE];

CHECHNYA_ [RUSCHE];

CHECHEN_REPUBLIC_OF_ICHKERIA_ [RUSCHE];

ASLAN_MASKHADOV_ [RUSCHEGOV]; President of Chechnya accused by

Putin of reuniting chechen rebel factions

MASKHADOV_ [RUSCHEGOV];

IBN_AL-KHATTAB_ [RUSANTREBCHE]; Chechen rebel leader involved in

crisis, unsure how to code

EMIR_KHATTAB_ [RUSANTREBCHE];

#Georgia

GEORGIA_ [GEO];

EDUARD_SHEVARDNADZE_ [GEOGOV]; President at time of crisis

SHEVARDNADZE_ [GEOGOV];

IKRALI_MENAGARISHVILI_ [GEOGOV]; Foreign Minister

MENAGARISHVILI_ [GEOGOV];

DAVID_TEVZADZE_ [GEOGOV]; Defense Minister

TEVZADZE_ [GEOGOV];

KOBA_NARCHEMASHVILI_ [GEOGOV]; Minister of Internal Affairs

NARCHEMASHVILI_ [GEOGOV];

#Third Parties

AL_QAEDA_ [IMGMOSALQ]; rebels occupied in the Pankisi Gorge

ABU_MUSAB_AL-ZARQAWI_ [IMGMOSALQ]; al-qaeda member moved into the

Pankisi Gorge

ABU_ATIYA_ [IMGMOSALQ]; al-Qaeda leader

USA_ [USA];

US_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

AMERICA_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

COLIN_POWELL_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of STate

POWELL_ [USAGOV];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

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#Iraq Regime Change (2002)

#Iraq

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TARIQ_AZIZ_ [IRQGOV]; PM

AZIZ_ [IRQGOV];

AMER_AL-SAADI_ [IRQGOV] ;

SADDAM_HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV] ; President

SADDAM_ [IRQGOV] ;

UDAI_HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV] ; son of Saddam

QUSAI_HUSSEIN_ [IRQGOV] ; son of Saddam

IZZAT_IBRAHIM_AL-DOURI_ [IRQGOV] ; Ba'athist Official

AL-DOURI_ [IRQGOV] ;

TAHA_YASSIN_RAMADAN_AL-JIZRAWI [IRQGOV] ; VP

TAHA_YASSIN_RAMADAN_ [IRQGOV] ;

RAMADAN_ [IRQGOV] ;

ALI_HASSAN_ABD_AL-MAJID_AL-TIKRITI_ [IRQGOV] ; Minister iof Defence

ALI_HASSAN_AL-MAJID_ [IRQGOV] ;

BARZAN_IBRAHIM_AL-TIKRITI_ [IRQGOV] ; UN Official

HOSSAM_MOHAMMAD_AMIN_ [IRQMIL]; Army General

NAJI_SABRI_AHMAD_AL-HADITHI_ [IRQGOV] ; Foreign Minister

NAJI_SABRI_ [IRQGOV] ;


#UNITED STATES



GEORGE_W_BUSH_ [USAGOV] ; President
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GEORGE_BUSH_ [USAGOV] ;

BUSH_ [USAGOV] ;

COLIN_POWELL_ [USAGOV] ; Secretary of State

DONALD_RUMSFELD_ [USAGOV] ; Defence Seceretary

RUMSFELD_ [USAGOV] ;

ARI_FLEISCHER_ [USAGOV] ; Whitehouse Spokesman

FLEISCHER_ [USAGOV] ;

DICK_CHENEY_ [USAGOV] ; VP

CHENEY_ [USAGOV] ;

JOHN_ASHCROFT_ [USAGOV] ; Attorney General

ASHCROFT_ [USAGOV] ;

CHARLES_DUELFER_ [USAGOV] ;

PAUL_BREMER_ [USAGOV] ;

BREMER_ [USAGOV] ;

JAY_GARNER_ [USAMIL] ;

TOMMY_FRANKS_ [USAMIL] ; Central Comman Chief

PAUL_WOLFOWITZ_ [USAGOV] ; DOD Official

DOUGLAS_FEITH_ [USAGOV] ; DOD Official

RICHARD_MYERS_ [USAMIL] ; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

#UNITED KINGDOM

TONY_BLAIR_ [GBRGOV] ; PM

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JACK_STRAW_ [GBRGOV] ; Foreign Secretary

STRAW_ [GBRGOV] ;

JEREMY_GREENSTOCK_ [GBRGOV] ; Ambassador to Iraq

GREENSTOCK_ [GBRGOV] ;

GEOFF_HOON_ [GBRGOV] ; Defence Secretary


#Third Parties


UNMOVIC_ [IGOUNO] ; UN inspectors for WMD

MOHAMED_ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE] ; Head of UNMOVIC

ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE] ;

HANS_BLIX_ [IGOUNO] ; Head of UNMOVIC

BLIX_ [IGOUNO] ;

HIRO_UEKI_ [IGOUNO] ; UNMOVIC Spokesman

UEKI_ [IGOUNO] ;

DEMETRIUS_PERRICOS_ [IGOUNO] ; Deputy Executive

PERRICOS_ [IGOUNO] ;

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO] ;

SERGEI_LAVROV_ [RUSGOV] ; UN Ambassador

VLADIMIR_PUTIN_ [RUSGOV] ; President

PUTIN_ [RUSGOV] ;

IGOR_IVANOV_ [RUSGOV] ; FM

JACQUES_CHIRAC_ [FRAGOV] ; President
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CHIRAC_ [FRAGOV] ;

GERHARD_SCHRODER_ [DEUGOV] ; Chancellor

JOSE_MARIA_AZNAR_ [ESPGOV] ; PM

BASHAR_AL-ASSAD_ [SYRGOV] ; President

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#NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR II (2002)

#North Korea

KIM_JONG_IL_ [PRKGOV];

KIM_JONG-IL_ [PRKGOV];

KANG_SOK_JU_ [PRKGOV]; Vice Foreign Minister

LI_GUN_ [PRKGOV]; North Korea's Deputy foreign minister

CHOE_ [PRKGOV]; Choe Ryong-hae, North Korean diplomat [c. 2002-2004]

CHOE_RYONG_HAE_ [PRKGOV];

KIM_YONG-IL_ [PRKGOV]; NK negotiator met with US envoy led by colin
powell

KIM_YONG-NAM_ [PRKGOV]; NK parliamentary speaker

#United States

GEORGE_W_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

GEORGE_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

PRESIDENT_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

SCOTT_MCCLELLAN_ [USAGOV]; Whitehouse Press Secretary for George W.

Bush

MCCLELLAN_ [USAGOV];

CIA_ [USACIA];

CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_AGENCY_ [USACIA];

#coding CIA?

TENET_ [USACIA]; George Tenet Director of Central Intelligence

[December 15, 1996-July 11, 2004]

JAMES_KELLY_ [USAGOV]; assistant secretary of state for east Asian

and pacific affairs

KELLY_ [USAGOV]

COLIN_POWELL_ [USAGOV]; US Secretary of State

POWELL_ [USAGOV];

BILL_RICHARDSON_ [USAGOV]; New Mexico Governor and top US

troubleshooter under Clinton

JOHN_BOLTON_ [USAGOV];

BOLTON_ [USAGOV]; undersecretary of state for arms control and

international security affairs 2001-05

ARI_FLEISCHER_ [USAGOV]; White House Press Secretary, [January 20,

2001-July 15, 2003]

FLEISHER_ [USAGOV];

RUMSFELD_ [USAGOV]; US Defence Secretary

WOLFOWITZ_ [USAGOV];

WELDON_ [USAGOV]; Republican member of House of Representative, led

bypartisan delegation of Congress to NK for meetings that went

well

PHILIP_REEKER_ [USAGOV]; State Dept. deputy spokesperson

CARTER_ [USAGOV]; Jimmy Carter, works under own guise as part of US

influence

LUGAR_ [USAGOV]; Richard Lugar, US Senate Foreign Relations

Committee Chairman

#South Korea

SOUTH_KOREA_ [KOR];

ROK_ [KOR];

REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [KOR];

MOO-HYUN_ [KORGOV]; SK President 2003-2008

DAE-JUNG_ [KORGOV]; SK President 1998-2003

YOON_ [KORGOV]; Yoon Young Kwan, Foreign Minister of South Korea

[February 27, 2003-January 15, 2004]

YOUNG_KWAN_ [KORGOV]

JEONG_ [KORGOV]; Jeong Se Hyun, South Korean Unification Minister
[2001-2004]

JEONG_SE_HYUN_ [KORGOV];

LIM_ [KORGOV]; south korean politician, met with NK Kim Jong-il to
present SK's proposal for peace

LIM_DONG_WON_ [KORGOV];

RA_JONG_YIL_ [KORGOV]; South Korean National Security Chief [c.
2002-2004]

HAN_ [KORGOV]; Ambassador to United Stated States

#cannot confirm last name of Han

CHOI_SUNG-HONG_ [KORGOV]; South Korean Foreign Minister [c.
2002-2004]

SOO-HYUK_ [KORGOV]; Lee Soo Hyuk, South Korean Deputy Foreign
Minister and chief South Korean delegate to the six party talks

RHEE_BONG-JO_ [KORGOV]; spokesman from SK delegation

UNIFICATION_MINISTRY_ [KOR];

KIM_JONG-RO_ [KORGOV]; spokesman for unification ministry

#Third Parties

JUNICHIRO_KOIZUMI_ [JPNGOV]; PM of Japan has successful summit with
Kim Jong Il leading to US intervening in sept 2002

YORIKO_KAWAGUCHI_ [JPNGOV]; japan's foreign minister

KAWAGUCHI_ [JPNGOV];

MITOJI_YABUNAKA_ [JPNGOV]; Director-General of the Asian and
Oceanian Affairs Bureau [2002-2005]

JIANG_ [CHNGOV]; PRC president 1993-2003, bush believed one of the
few people to have influence on NK

JIANG_ZEMIN_ [CHNGOV]

LI_ZHAOXING_ [CHNGOV]; Chinese foreign minster 2003-07

LI_ [CHNGOV];

WANG_YI_ [CHNGOV]; Vice Foreign Minister of China [c. 2002-2004]

WANG_ [CHNGOV];

ZHANG_QIYUE_ [CHNGOV]; FM spokeswoman

TANG_ [CHNGOV]; Foreign Minister of China 1998-2003, State
councilor 2003-2008

ALEXANDER_LOSYUKOV [RUSGOV];

LOSYUKOV_ [RUSGOV]; Alexander Losyukov, Russian negotiator at the
six party talks [c. 2002-2004]; deputy foreign minister fo Russia

KEDO [IGO]; consortium of the US, South Korea, Japan and EU,
responsible for providing heavy oil and light water reactors
for NK

KOREAN_PENINSULA_ENERGY_DEVELOPMENT_ORGANIZATION_ [IGO];

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

IAEA [IGOUNOIAE];

INTERNATIONAL_ATOMIC_ENERGY_AGENCY_ [IGOUNOIAE];

MOHAMED_ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE];

ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE]; Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency [December 1, 1997-November
30, 2009]

NPT_ [IGONPT];

NON-PROLIFERATION_TREATY_ [IGONPT];

APEC_ [IGO]; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum for 21 Pacific
Rim economies to promote free trade and economic cooperation
throughout the Asia-Pacific region

ASIA-PACIFIC_ECONOMIC_COOPERATION_ [IGO];

ASIA_PACIFIC_ECONOMIC_COOPERATION_ [IGO];

ARF_ [IGOSEAASN]; ASEAN Regional Forum, formal multilateral
dialogue in the Asia Pacific region [1994-present]

TCOG_ [IGO]; Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, a meeting
between U.S. South Korean, and Japanese diplomats about North
Korea [c. 2003]

JOHN_HOWARD_ [AUS]; PM

ALEXANDER_DOWNER_ [AUS];

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#IRAN NUCLEAR I (2003)

#Iran

IRNA [IRN]; Islamic Republic of Iran

ISLAMIC_REPUBLIC_OF_IRAN [IRN];

HASSAN_ROWHANI_ [IRNGOV]; top Iranian negotiator

ROWHANI_ [IRNGOV];

ROUHANI_ [IRNGOV];

MOHAMMAD_KHATAMI_ [IRNGOV]; Iranian President at time of crisis

KHATAMI_ [IRNGOV];

ALI_AKBAR_SALEHI_[IRNGOV]; Iran's representative at the IAEA at time

AKBAR_SALEHI_ [IRNGOV];

SALEHI_ [IRNGOV];

KAMAL_KHARAZI_ [IRNGOV]; Iran foreign minister at time

KHARAZI_ [IRNGOV];

HAMID_REZA_ASEFI_ [IRNGOV]; Spokesman for Iran foreign ministry

#Germany, France, UK (EU Three)

EU_THREE_ [IGOEUR]; three great powers in EU, including the UK,
France and Germany

UK_ [GBR]; part of crisis between Iran and EU3 as member of EU3

JACK_STRAW [GBRGOV]; foreign minister of UK involved in
negotiations in 2003

STRAW_ [GBRGOV];

TONY_BLAIR [GBRGOV];

BLAIR [GBRGOV];

FRANCE_ [FRA]; part of crisis between Iran and EU3 as member of EU3

DOMINIQUE_DE_VILLEPIN_[FRAGOV]; foreign minister of UK involved in
negotiations in 2003

VILLEPIN_ [FRAGOV];

GERMANY_ [DEU]; part of crisis between Iran and EU3 as member of EU3

JOSCHKA_FISCHER [DEUGOV]; foreign minister of Germany involved in
negotiations in 2003

FISCHER_ [DEUGOV];

GERHARD_SCHRODER_ [DEUGOV]; PM

SCHROEDER_ [DEUGOV];

SCHRODER_ [DEUGOV]

#Third Parties

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

IAEA_ [IGOUNOIAE] ; independent entity that reports to UN on nuclear status of countries

INTERNATIONAL_ATOMIC_ENERGY_AGENCY [IGOUNOIAE];

MOHAMED_ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE]; worked as director general of the IAEA during time of crisis

ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE];

ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE];

EU_ [IGOEUREEC]; calls for surprise nuclear inspections alongside IAEA in 2003 in IRAN

JAVIER_SOLANA_ [IGOEUREEC]; EU foreign policy chief involved in negotiations in 2003

SOLANA_ [IGOEUREEC];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA]; actor involved in negotiations - source of frustration to all parties involved

UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA_ [USA];

COLIN_POWELL_ [USAGOV]; secretary of state during time of crisis

POWELL_ [USAGOV];

RUSSIA_ [RUS]; actor involved in negotiations - involvement viewed favorably by involved parties - took a conciliatory approach that helped ease tensions

ISRAEL_ [ISR]; actor involved in negotiations

G8_ [IGO]; denounced production of economic fuel in Iran as not economical for them - call for complete suspension of Iran's

uranium enrichment program

NPT_ [IGONPT]; not quite an actor, but pertinent institution in

relation to this crisis

NON-PROLIFERATION_TREATY_ [IGONPT];

SADDAM_HUSSEIN_ [IRQ]; decisions made in Iran possibly driven by

springtime war in Iraq

SADDAM_ [IRQ];

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#DRC-RWANDA (2004)

#INTMED is a coding used here for international mediator

#DRC, Pro-DRC Rebel groups, and Anti-Rwandan Rebel Groups

CONGO_ [COD];

DEMOCRATIC_REPUBLIC_OF_THE_CONGO_ [COD];

KABILA_ [CODGOV]; Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo [January 17, 2001-present]

JOSEPH_KABILA_ [CODGOV]; son of Laurent

LAURENT_KABILA_ [CODGOV];

RUBERWA_ [CODGOV]; Azarias Ruberwa, one of four vice presidents of

the transitional government of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo [2003-2006]

NGUESSO_ [COGGOV]; R of CONGO pres

FAC_ [CODMIL]; DRC military

UNION_FOR_DEMOCRACY_AND_SOCIAL_PROGRESS [CODPTY];

UDPS_ [CODPTY]; Union for Democracy and Social Progress party

DOMINIQUE_INONGO_ [CODGOV]; COD minister of information

INONGO_ [CODGOV]

SAKOMBI_INONGO_ [CODGOV];

MUMENGI_ [CODGOV]; Various positions in Kabila gov

DIDIER_MUMENGI_ [CODGOV];

EDDY_KAPEND_ [CODGOV] ; Kabila aide-de-camp

MWENZE_KONGOLO_ [CODGOV]; COD justice minister

MUGENI_ [CODGOV] ; Mayor loyal to kabila

PRO_KABILA_FAC_ [CODMIL];

PRO-KABILA_FAC_ [CODMIL];

PRO-GOVERNMENT_FAC_TROOPS_ [CODMIL];

FAC_TROOPS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODMIL];

TROOPS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODMIL];

KABILA'S_ALLIANCE_ [CODGOV];

ZAIREAN_REBEL_ALLIANCE_ [CODPROREB];

REBELS_LOYAL_TO_LAURENT_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

REBELS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

REBELS_LED_BY_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

FIGHTERS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

MILITANTS_LOYAL_TO_KABILA_ [CODPROREB];

NATIONAL_FORCES_OF_LIBERATION_ [CODPRREB]; faction of Party for the

Liberation of the Hutu people

FORCES_NATIONALES_DE_LIBERATIONS_ [CODPROREB];

FNL_ [CODPROREB]; National Forces of Liberation, a Hutu Burundian

rebel group [1980-September 2006]

PALIPEHUTU-FNL_ [CODPROREB];

COSSAN_KABURA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of the FNL

AGATHON_RWASA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of the FNL

MAI_MAI_ [CODPROREB]; pro-gov militia, made up of many groups

PADIRI_ [CODPROREB]; leader of one of the most powerful and

organized Mai Mai groups

DUNIA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of one of the most powerful and

organized Mai Mai groups

MUDUNU_40_ [CODPROREB]; smaller Mai Mai faction

FRONT_DE_RESISTANCE_ET_DE_DEFENSE_DU_KIVU_ [CODPROREB]; same as

Mudundu 40

FRDKI_ [CODPROREB]; same as Mudundo 40

MOUVEMENT_DE_LUTTE_CONTRE_L'AGRESSION_AU_ZAIRE_ [CODPROREB]; small

faction

FORCES_UNIES_DE_RESISTANCE_NATIONALE_CONTRE_L'AGRESSION_DE_LA_REPUBLI

QUE_DEMOCRATIQUE_DU_CONGO_ [CODPROREB]

GEDEON_KYUNGU_MUTUNGA_ [CODPROREB]; leader of Mai mai group

MAI_MAI_GEDEON_ [CODPROREB]; group started by above leader

EX-FAR_ [RWAANTREB]; Rwandan Hutu ex-FAR fighters

INTERAHAMWE_ [RWAANTREBHTUINT]; Hutu paramilitary organization

originally operating in Rwanda, but forced into Congo

[1994-present]

DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_RWANDA_ [RWAANTREB];

FDLR_ [RWAANTREBHTU]; Democratic Forces for the Liberation of

Rwanda, a Rwandan Hutu rebel group in the eastern Democratic

Republic of Congo

DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_RWANDA_ [RWAANTREBHTU];

FORCES_DEMOCRATIQUES_DE_LIBERATION_DU_RWANDA_ [RWAANTREB];

PAUL_RWARAKABIJE_ [RWAANTREB]; leader of FDLR

ARMY_FOR_LIBERATION_OF_RWANDA_ [RWAANTREBHTU]; old version of FDLR

FORCES_COMBATTANTES_ABACUNGUZI_ [RWAANTREB]; faction of FDLR

recognized as formal armed branch

FOCA_ [RWAANTREB];

#Rwanda, Pro-Rwandan Rebel Groups, and Anti-DRC Rebel groups

RWANDA_ [RWA];

MURIGANDE_ [RWAGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs [2002-2008]

KAGAME_ [RWAGOV]; Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, [March 24,

2000-present]

RPF_ [RWAGOVPTY]; Kagame's ruling party

MLC_ [CODANTREB]; Ugandan-backed Congolese Liberation movement,

anti-Kabila, Ugandan backed

MOVEMENT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO_ [CODANTREB];Ugandan backed

CONGOLESE_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [CODANTREB]; Ugandan backed

JEAN-PIERRE_BEMBA_ [CODANTREB]; former business man turned leader

of MLV

BEMBA_ [CODANTREB];

MALIK_KIJEGE_ [CODANTREB]; named head of MLC military logistics

DIEUDONNE_AMULI_BAHIGWA_ [CODANTREB]; named head of navy for MLC

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO_ZAIRE_

[CODGOVADFL]; coalition of Congolese dissidents that defeated

Mobutu Sese Seko and brought Laurent Kabila to power [October

1996-May 17, 1997]

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_CONGO-ZAIRE_

[CODGOVADFL];

AFDL_ [CODGOVADFL];

ADFL_ [CODGOVADFL];

ADFLC_ [CODGOVADFL];

ALLIANCE_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_ [CODGOVADFL];

KABILA'S_AFDL_ [CODGOVADFL];

ANTI_KABILA_FAC_ [CODANTREB]

ANTI-KABILA_FAC_ [CODANTREB]

335

REBEL_FAC_TROOPS_ [CODANTREB]

ALLY_FOR_DEMOCRACY_ [CODANTREB];

RALLY_FOR_CONGOLESE_DEMOCRACY_ [CODANTREB];

RASSEBMLEMENT_CONGOLAIS_POR_LA_DEMOCRATIE_ [CODANTREB];

RCD_ [CODANTREB]; Congolese rebel group [1998-2003] and political

party [2003-present]

ONUSUMBA_ [CODANTREB]; RCD chairman for a time

ERNEST_WAMBA_DIA_WAMBA_ [CODANTREB]; president of RCD

MOBUTU_SESE_SEKO_ [CODANTREB]; member of RCD

Z'AHIDI_NGOMA_ [CODANTREB];

NGOMA_ [CODANTREB]; leader of RCD

LAURENT_NKUNDA_ [CODANTREB];

NKUNDA_ [CODANTREB]; Laurent Nkunda, a general in the armed forces

of the Democratic Republic of Congo [1994-2004]

RCD-GOMA_ [CODANTREB]; faction of RCD

ILUNGA_ [CODANTREB]; leader of RCD-GOMA

WAMBA_ [CODANTREB]; leader of RCD for a time, then RCD-K

WAMBA_DIA_WAMBA_ [CODANTREB];

FORCES_FOR_RENEWAL_ [CODANTREB]; Wamba's breakaway faction

RCD-KISANGANI_ [CODANTREB]; faction of RCD split off by Wamba dia

Wamba

RCD-K_ [CODANTREB];

RCD-LM_ [CODANTREB]; same as RCD-K

RCD-MOVEMENT_FOR_LIBERATION_ [CODANTREB];

RCD-ML_ [CODANTREB];

RCD-MOVEMENT_DE_LIBERATION_ [CODANTREB];

MBUSA_NYAMWISI_ [CODANTREB]; rejected Wamba's leadership so started

RCD-ML

ADOLPHE_ONUSUMBA_ [CODANTREB]; replaced Ilunga as head of Goma

based RCD

BANYAMULENGE_ [RWAPROREB]; Tutsi Congolese

ALLIED_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_ [UGAANTREB];

ADF_ [UGAANTREB];

JAMIL_MUKULU_ [UGANTREB]; leader of ADF

UGANDA_PEOPLES_DEFENSE_FORCES_ [UGAPROREB];

UPDF_ [UGAPROREB];

LORD'S_RESISTANCE_ARMY_ [UGAANTREB];

LRA_ [UGAANTREB];

JOSEPH_KONY_ [UGAANTREB]; leader of LRA

#Third Parties

AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

AU_ [IGOAFROAU]; African Union, a union of 54 African states,

formerly the OAU [July 9, 2002-present]

OLUSEGUN_OBSANKJO_ [NGAGOV]; Nigerian president and chairman of AU

AU_PEACE_AND_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOAFROAU];

337

OAU_ [IGOAFROAU]; Organization of African Unity

ORGANISATION_OF_AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU]; OAU

ORGANIZATION_OF_AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_STATES_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO]

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United Nations [January

1, 1997-December 31, 2006]

MELLO_ [IGOUNO]; Sergio Vieira de Mello, UN Assistant High

Commissioner for Refugees [c. 1998-2001]

MONUC_ [IGOUNOPKO]

UNITED_NATIONS_ORGANIZATION_MISSION_IN_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_THE_CONGO_

[IGOUNOPKO];

EU_ [IGOEUREEC]

EUROPEAN_UNION_ [IGOEUREEC];

LOUIS_MICHEL_ [IGOEUREEC];

MICHEL_ [IGOEUREEC];

MUSEVENI_ [UGAGOV]; Uganda president

CHILUBA_ [ZMBGOV]; Zambian President

MBEKI_ [ZAFGOV]; Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa [June 14,

1999-September 24, 2008]

MUGABE_ [ZWEGOV];

ROBERT_MUGABE_ [ZWEGOV];

KETUMILE_MASIRE_ [INTMED]; former Botswanan president and

facilitator/mediator here

MASIRE_ [INTMED];

NEPAD_ [IGOAFROAU]; New Partnership for Africa's Development,

promoting economic cooperation between African countries [July

2001-present]

NUJOMA_ [IGOSAFSAD];

SADC_ [IGOSAFSAD];

MANDELA_ [ZAF]; some involvement in mediation, do we need to add

another code here?

AL-QADDAFI_ [LBYGOV];

QADDAFI_ [LBYGOV];

GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV];

OLUSEGUN_OBASANJO_ [NGAGOV]; president of Nigeria and chairman of AU

SOUTH_SUDANESE_REBEL_ARMY_ [SDNANTREB];

SPLA_ [SDNANTREB];

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#SOUTH OSSETIA-ABKHAZIA (2004)

#Russia and Anti-Georgian Rebel Groups (South-Ossetia and Abkhazia)

339

PUTIN_ [RUSGOV];

VLADIMIR_PUTIN_ [RUSGOV];

KREMLIN_ [RUSGOV];

FEDERAL_ASSEMBLY_ [RUSGOV];

RUSSIAN_FEDERAL_ASSEMBLY_ [RUSGOV];

VLADISLAV_ARDZINBA_ [GEOANTREB]; leader of separatist forces,

pro-Russia, not Gam's troops but anti gov

ARDZINBA_ [GEOANTREB];

KHAJIMBA_ [GEOANTREB]; Raul Khajimba Prime Minister of Abkhazia

[April 22, 2003-October 6, 2004]

RAUL_KHAJIMBA_ [GEOANTREB];

BAGAPSH_ [GEOANTREB]; Sergei Bagapsh, candidate in the 2004

Abkhazian presidential election [2004] and Prime Minister of

Abkhazia [February 12, 2005-May 29, 2011]

SERGEI_BAGAPSH_ [GEOANTREB];

ABASHIDZE_ [GEOANTREB]; Aslan Abashidze, leader of the Ajarian

Autonomous Republic [1991-May 5, 2004]

ASLAN_ABASHIDZE_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_SEPARATISTS_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_SEPARATIST_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_SEPARATISM_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_REBELS_ [GEOANTREB];

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ABKHAZIAN_REBEL_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIANS_ [GEOANTREB];

ABKHAZIAN_ [GEOANTREB];

EDUARD_KOKOYTY_ [GEOANTREB] ; SO President

EDUARD_KOKOITY_ [GEOANTREB] ;

KOKOYTY_ [GEOANTREB] ;

KOKOITY_ [GEOANTREB] ;


#Georgia


MIKHAIL_SAAKASHVILI_ [GEOGOV]; President of Georgia [January 25,
2004-November 25, 2007]
SAAKASHVILI_ [GEOGOV];
GEORGI_KHAINDRAVA_ [GEOGOV]; State Minister for Conflict Resolution
of Georgia [c. 2004-2006]
KHAINDRAVA_ [GEOGOV];
GEORGY_KHAINDRAVA_ [GEOGOV]; State Minister for Conflict Resolution
of Georgia [c. 2004-2006]
KAPANADZE_ [GEOMIL];
ZURAB_ZHVANIA_ [GEOGOV]; PM
ZHVANIA_ [GEOGOV];
BARAMIDZE_ [GEOGOV]; Giorgi Baramidze, Minister of Internal Affairs
of Georgia [November 2003-December 2004], Minister of Defense
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341

of Georgia [June 2004-December 2004]

GIORGI_BARAMIDZE_ [GEOGOV];

GURAM_DONADZE_ [GEOGOV] ;

NINO_BURJANADZE_ [GEOGOV];

BURJANADZE_ [GEOGOV];

BENDUKIDZE_ [GEOGOV];

#Third Parties

COLIN_POWELL_ [USAGOV];

POWELL_ [USAGOV];

DONALD_RUMSFELD_ [USAGOV];

RUMSFELD_ [USAGOV];

BIDEN_ [USAGOV];

RICHARD_LUGAR_ [USAGOV];

LUGAR_ [USAGOV];

MEL_MARTINEZ_ [USAGOV];

BUSH_ [USAGOV];

GEORGE_W_BUSH_ [USAGOV];

UN_GENERAL_ASSEMBLY_ [IGOUNO]; Saakashvili made plea to the GA

about the situation

G8_ [IGO]; forum for the governments of the 8 leading

industrialized countries [1998-March 24, 2014]

342

CIS_ [IGOCASCIS]; Commonwealth of Independent States [December 8,

1991-present]

OSCE_ [IGOEURSCE];

CHECHEN_REBELS_ [RUSANTREBCHE]; sieged school in Russia and took

hostages

PETER_SEMNEBY_ [IGOEUREEC];

SEMNEBY_ [IGOEUREEC]; criticized Russia action in Georgia

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#ETHIOPIA-ERITREA II

#Eritrea and Anti-Ethiopian Rebel Groups

ERITREA_ [ERI]

ISSAIAS_AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

YEMANE_GHEBREMESKEL_ [ERIGOV];

YEMANE_ [ERIGOV];

ISSAIAS_ [ERIGOV];

ISSAIAS_AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

ISAIAS_ [ERIGOV];

ISAIAS_AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

HAILE_WOLDENSAE_ [ERIGOV];

OLF_ [ETHANTREB];

OROMO_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

DAWUD_IBSA_ [ETHANTREB]; Secretary General of the OLF

DAWUD_IBSA_AYANA_ [ETHANTREB];

NATIONAL_FRONT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_OGADEN_ [SOMANTREB]; supported

by Eritrea

ONLF_ [SOMANTREB];

OGADEN_NATIONAL_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [SOMANTEB];

MOHAMMED_OMAR_OSMAN_ [SOMANTREB]; leading chairman of ONLF

#Ethiopia and Anti-Eritrean Rebel Groups

ETHIOPIA_ [ETH];

MELES_ZENAWI_ [ETHGOV]; Ethiopian PM

MELES_ [ETHGOV];

SEYOUM_MESFIN_ [ETHGOV];

MESFIN_ [ETHGOV];

SALOME_TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

SELOME_TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

ZENAWI_ [ETHGOV];

CUD_ [ETHPTY]; Ethiopia's main opposition party

COALITION_FOR_UNITY_AND_DEMOCRACY_ [ETHPTY];

BIRTUKAN_MIDEKSA_ [ETHPTY]; leader of CUD

HAILU_SHAWUL_ [ETHPTY]; leader of CUD

ERITREAN_NATIONAL_ALLIANCE_ [ERIANTREB]; umbrella group for all

opposition to Eritrean rule, consisting of 10 opposition groups

ENA_ [ERIANTREB];

ALLIANCE_OF_ERITREAN_NATIONAL_FORCE_ [ERIANTREB];

AENF_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_DEMOCRATIC_RESISTANCE_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB]; part of

alliance of Eritrean nat'l force

EDRM_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_INITIATIVE_GROUP_ [ERIANTREB]; part of alliance of

Eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_SALVATION_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];part of alliance

of Eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_SALVATION_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_JIHAD_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_JIHAD_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];

EIJM_ [ERIANTREB];

EIJ_ [ERIANTREB];

ERIJ_ [ERIANTREB];

EISM_ [ERIANTREB];

SHAIKH_KHALIL_MOHAMMED_AMER_ [ERIANTREB]; putative leader of ERIJ

ABUL_BARA_HASSAN_SALMAN_ [ERIANTREB]; ERIJ's deputy amir

ERITREAN_PEOPLE'S_CONGRESS_ [ERIANTREB]; military faction of EIJM

ERITREAN_KUNAMAS_DEMOCRATIC_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];part of alliance

of Eritrean nat'l force

DEMOCRATIC_MOVEMENT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_ERITREAN_KUNAMA_

[ERIANTREB]; part of alliance of Eritrean nat'l force

DMLEK_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ERIANTREB];part of alliance of Eritrean

nat'l force

ELF_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_NATIONAL_CONGRESS_ [ERIANTREB]; part of

alliance of Eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_REVOLUTION-COUNCIL_ [ERIANTREB]; part of

alliance of Eritrean nat'l force

ELF-RC_ [ERIANTREB];

ABDELLA_IDRIS_ [ERIANTREB]; leader of ERDF and ELF-RC

ERITREAN_REVOLUTIONARY_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_

ERDF_ [ERIANTREB];

POPULAR_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_ERITREA_ [ERIANTREB];

#Third Parties

AIDID_ [SOMGOV];

346

MOHAMED_FARRAH_AIDID_ [SOMGOV]; controlled region in Somalia where OLF was located

UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

US_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

ALBRIGHT_ [USAGOV];

ANTHONY_LAKE_ [USAGOV];

RICHARD_HOLBROOKE_ [USAGOV];

LAKE_ [USAGOV];

HOLBROOKE_[USAGOV];

SUSAN_RICE_ [USAGOV];

NICHOLAS_BURNS_ [USAGOV]; US undersecretary of State for political affairs

BURNS_ [USAGOV];

DONALD_YOMAMOTO_ [USAGOV]; US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs

YOMAMOTO_ [USAGOV];

BOTLON_ [USAGOV]; US Ambassador to the UN

CARLTON_FULTON_ [USAMIL]; former Marine General sent with Frazer sent as council to Eritrea and Ethiopia

JENDAYI_FRAZER_ [USAGOV]; Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, accompanied by Fulton as a council to Eritrea/Ethiopia from the US

OMAR_AL-BESHIR_ [SDNGOV];

AFRICAN_UNION_ [IGOAFR];

AU_ [IGOAFR];

ALPHA_OUMAR_KONARĂĽ [IGOAFR];

KONARĂĽ_ [IGOAFR]; head of AU Commission

OAU_ [IGOAFROAU];

ORGANIZATION_OF_AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

ORGANIZATION_OFAFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

SALIM_AHMED_SALIM_ [IGOAFROAU];

MOHAMED_SAHNOUN_ [IGOUNO]; OAU's Assistant Secretary General

SAHNOUN_ [IGOUNO];

OUYAHIA_ [IGOAFROAU]; OAU mediator, Algerian politician

UN_ [IGOUNO]

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO]; sent japanese envoy oshima on fact

checking tour

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

SECRETARY-GENERAL_KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

UN_MISSION_IN_ETHIOPIA_AND_ERITREA_ [IGOUNO];

UNMEE_ [IGOUNO];

PATRICK_CAMMAERT_ [IGOUNO]; Dutch General leading peacekeeping

mission known as UNMEE

348

CAMMAERT_ [IGOUNO];

JEAN-MARIE_GUEHENNO_ [IGOUNO];

GUEHENNO_ [IGOUNO]; UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping

RADHIR_KUMAR_MEHTA_ [IGOUNO]; Guehenno's advisor

KADHAFI_ [LBYGOV];

SERRI_ [IGOEUREEC]; EU representative present at signing of peace

between Ethiopia and Eritrea

RINO_SERRI_ [IGOEUREEC];

KENZO_OSHIMA_ [JPNGOV]; sent by UNSC as envoy for fact finding tour

in region

OSHIMA_ [JPNGOV];

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#CHAD-SUDAN I (2005)

#Chad, pro-Chad Rebel Groups, and anti-Sudan Rebel Groups

DEBY_ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

IDRISS_DEBY_ [TCDGOV]

IDRISS_DEBY_ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

DEBY_ [TCDGOV]; Idriss Deby Itno, President of Chad [December 2,

1990-present]

AHMAT_ALLAMI_ [TCDGOV]; Chadian Foreign Minister [c. 2005-c.2007]

FUC_ [TCDANTREB]; United Front for Democratic Change, a Chadian
rebel alliance [December 2005-present]

UNITED_FRONT_FOR_DEMOCRATIC_CHANGE_ [TCDANTREB]

SCUD_ [TCDANTREB]; Platform for Change, Unity, and Democracy, a
Chadian rebel group [October 2005-present]

PLATFORM_FOR_CHANGE_UNITY_AND_DEMOCRACY_ [TCDANTREB]

SUDAN_PEOPLE'S_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

SUDAN_PEOPLES_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

SLM_ [SDNANTREB]; Sudan Liberation Movement, a Sudanese rebel group
[2002-present]

SUDAN_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

SUDAN_LIBERATION_ARMY_ [SDNANTREB]

SLA_ [SDNANTREB]

SPLM_ [SDNANTREB]; Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the
political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army [1983-2011]

NUR_ [SDNANTREB]; Abdu Wahid al-Nur, one of the leaders of the
Sudan Liberation Movement [c. 1992-present]

AL-NUR_ [SDNANTREB]

EASTERN_FRONT_ [SDNANTREB]; a coalition of rebel groups operating
in eastern Sudan [c. 2005-present]

MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; Minni Minawi, leader of the largest faction
of the Sudan Liberation Army [2002-2011]

MINNI_MINAWI_ [SDNANTREB]

JEM_ [SDNANTREB]; Justice and Equality Movement, a Sudanese

opposition group [2000-present]

IBRAHIM_ [SDNANTREB]; Khalil Ibrahim, leader of JEM [2000-2012]

JUSTICE_AND_EQUALITY_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

#Sudan, pro-Sudan Rebel Groups, and anti-Chad Rebel Groups

OMAR_AL-BESHIR_ [SDNGOV]; President of Sudan [June 30, 19889-present]

LAM_AKOL_ [SDNGOV]; Foreign Minister of Sudan, [January 20,

2005-October 17, 2007]

AKOL_ [SDNGOV]

TAHA_ [SDNGOV]; Ali Osman Taha, Vice President Of Sudan [January 9,

2005-December 6, 2013]

TURABI_ [SDNPTY]; Secretary General of the Popular Congress Party

[1999-present]

AL-BESHIR_ [SDNGOV]

BESHIR_ [SDNGOV]

AL-BISHIR_ [SDNGOV]

HUSAYN_ [SDNGOV]

ABD_AL-RAHIM_MUHAMMAD_HUSAYN_ [SDNGOV]; Sudanese Interior Minister

JANJAWEED_ [SDNPROREB]; Arab militia operating in eastern Chad,

western Sudan, and Darfur [1987-present]

JANAJAWID_ [SDNPROREB]; #Note, also spelled Janajawid

SSDF_ [SSDMIL]

SOUTH_SUDAN_DEFENSE_FORCES_ [SSDMIL]; militia in South Sudan, had
an uneasy alliance with Sudanese government

UFDC_ [TCDANTREB]

FRONT_UNI_POUR_LE_CHANGEMENT_ [TCDANTREB]; french for United Front
for Democratic Change

RALLY_FOR_DEMOCRACY_AND_LIBERTY_ [TCDANTREB]

RDL_ [TCDANTREB]

RASSEMBLEMENT_POUR_LA_DEMOCRATIE_ET_LA_LIBERTE_ [TCDANTREB]

KARIM_ [TCDANTREB]; Spokesperon for RDL

FDD_ [TCDANTREB]

FORCE_FOR_PROGRESS_AND_DEMOCRACY [TCDANTREB]

FORCE_POUR_LA_DEMOCRATIE_ET_LE_DEVELOPPEMENT_ [TCDANTREB]; french
for FDD

MOVEMENT_FOR_PEACE_RECONSTRUCTION_AND_PROGRESS_ [TCDANTREB];
credited with attack on Chadian military barracks November 2005

MPRD_ [TCDANTREB]

MOUVEMENT_POUR_LA_PAIX_LA_RECONSTRUCTION_ET_LA_DEVELOPPEMENT_
[TCDANTREB]

DJIBRINE_DASSERT_ [TCDANTREB]; leader of MPRD

DASSERT_ [TCDANTREB]

NATIONIAL_RESISTANCE_ALLIANCE_ [TCDANTREB]; many former ANR
combatants joined RDL to fight Chadian govt

ALLIANCE_NATIONALE_DE_LA_RESISTANCE_ [TCDANTREB]

ANR_ [TCDANTREB]

MAHAMAT_NOUR_ABDELKARIM_ [TCDANTREB]; ANR military commander, formed the RDL

ABDELKARIM_ [TCDANTREB]

ABDULLAHI_ABDEL_KARIM_ [TCDANTREB]

MOHANNED_NOUR_ABDELKERIM_ [TCDANTREB]; Chadian rebel leader, president of UFDC

#Third Parties

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United Nations [January 1, 1997-December 31, 2006]

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]

AU_ [IGOAFROAU]; African Union, working for a united and strong Africa, formely called the OAU [July 9, 2002-present]

ZOELLICK_ [USAGOV]; Deputy Secretary of State [February 22, 2005-July 7, 2006]

EGELAND_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator [June 2003-December 2006]

AMIS[IGOAFROAU]; African Union Mission in Sudan, with the goal of performing peacekeeping operations in Darfur [2004-December 31,

2007]

OBASANJO_ [NGAGOV]; Olusegun Mathew Okikola Aremu Obasanjo, President of Nigeria [May 29, 1999-May 29, 2007]; head of AU as well

G8_ [IGO]; Group of Eight, consisting of the eight leading industrialized countries [1998-2014]

KONARE_ [IOGAFROAU]; Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairman of the Commission of the African Union [September 16, 2003-February 1, 2008]

MCCORMACK_ [USAGOV]; Sean McCormack, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs [June 2, 2005-January 20, 2009]

PRONK_ [IGOUNO]; Jan Pronk, UN Special Representative for Sudan [2004-2006]

ARBOUR_ [IGOUNO]; Louise Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [July 1, 2004-August 21, 2008]

HILARY_BENN_ [GBR]; Secretary of State for International Development [October 6, 2003-June 28, 2007]

DJINNIT_ [IGOAFROAU]; Said Djinnit, Comissioner for Peace and Security at the African Union [c. 2006-2007]

UNMIS_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Mission in Sudan [March 24, 2005-July 9, 2011]

OIC_ [NGO]; Organization of the Islamic Conference, first to attempt mediation efforts

LRA_ [UGAANTREB]; Lord's Resistance Army, a Christian fundamentalist militant movement operating in Uganda and South

Sudan

LORD'S_RESISTANCE_ARMY_ [UGAANTREB];

LORDS_RESISTANCE_ARMY_ [UGAANTREB];

LORD'S_RESISTANCE_MOVEMENT_ [UGAANTREB];

KONY_ [UGAANTREB]; Joseph Kony, leader of the LRA [1987-present]

OTTI_ [UGAANTREB]; Vincent Otti, Deputy leader of the LRA [1987-2007]

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#IRAN NUCLEAR II (2006)

#US, UK, and France

UNITED_KINGDOM_ [GBR];

MARGARET_BECKETT_ [GBRGOV]; Foreign Secretary

BECKETT_ [GBRGOV];

BLAIR_ [GBRGOV];

EMYR_JONES_PARRY_ [GBRGOV]; Ambassador to the UN

JOHN_SAWERS_ [GBRGOV]; british diplomat

FRANCE_ [FRA];

PHILIPPE_DOUSTE-BLAZY_ [FRAGOV]; Foreign Minister

DOUSTE-BLAZY_ [FRAGOV];

JEAN-MARC_SABLIERE_ [FRAGOV];

SABLIERE [FRAGOV];

KOUCHNER_ [FRAGOV] ;

LABOULAYE_ [FRAGOV]; Foreign Ministry Director for Political Affairs

US_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA [USA];

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

JOHN_BOLTON_ [USAGOV]; UN representative

BOLTON_ [USAGOV];

SEAN_MCCORMACK_ [USAGOV];

MCCORMACK_ [USAGOV];

GREGORY_SCHULTE_ [USAGOV];

SCHULTE_ [USAGOV];

SCOTT_MCCLELLAN_ [USAGOV]; Whitehouse press secretary for George W.
Bush

MCCLELLAN_ [USAGOV];

DICK_CHENEY_ [USAGOV];

CHENEY_ [USAGOV];

SNOW_ [USA]; Tony Snow, White House Press Secretary

MELISSA_FLEMING_ [USAGOV]; US ambassador to IAEA

#Iran

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SUPREME_NATIONAL_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IRNGOV];

MAHMOUD_AHMADINEJAD [IRNGOV]; President of Iran

AHMADINEJAD_ [IRNGOV];

MOHAMED_ELBARADEI_ [IRNGOV];

ELBARADEI_ [IRNGOV];

ALI_LARIJANI_ [IRNGOV]; Secretary of Supreme Nat'l Security Council

LARIJANI_ [IRNGOV];

MANOUCHEHR_MOTTAKI_ [IRNGOV]; FM

MOTTAKI_ [IRNGOV];

ALI_ASGHAR_SOLTANIEH_ [IRNGOV]; Iran rep. to IAEA

SOLTANIEH_ [IRNGOV];

GHOLAM_REZA_AGHAZADEH_ [IGOUNOIEA]; ???????

AGHAZADEH_ [IRNGOV]; VP of the Atomic Energy Organization

AYATOLLAH_ALI_KHAMENI_ [IRNGOV]; Supreme leader of Iran

ALI_KHAMENI [IRNGOV];

KHAMENEI_ [IRNGOV];

JAVAD_VAIDI_ [IRNGOV]; negotiator

VAIDI_ [IRNGOV];

SAEED_JALILI_ [IRNGOV];

JALILI_ [IRNGOV];

HAMID_REZA_ASEFI_ [IRNGOV];

ATOMIC_ENERGY_ORGANIZATION_ [IRNGOV];

ATOMIC_ENERGY_ORGNAISATION_ [IRNGOV];

ATOMIC_ENERGY_AGENCY_ [IRNGOV];
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MOHAMMAD_SAEEDI_ [IRNGOV] ; deputy head of Irans's atomic energry

organization

MOHAMMAD_SAIDI_ [IRNGOV];

SAEEDI_ [IRNGOV];

SAIDI_ [IRANGOV];

ATOMIC_ENERGY_ORGANIZATION_ [IRNGOV];

AKBAR_HASHEMI_RAFSANJANI_ [IRNGOV];

MOHAMMAD_ALI_HOSSEINI_ [IRNGOV];

ALI_HOSSEINI-TASH_ [IRNGOV];

NCRI_ [IRNDIS]; National Council of Resistance of Iran

NATIONAL_COUNCIL_OF_RESISTANCE_OF_IRAN_ [IRNDIS];

#Third Parties

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

IAEA_ [IGOUNOIAE];

INTERNATIONAL_ATOMIC_ENERGY_AGENCY_ [IGOUNOIAE];

ATOMIC_ENERGY_AGENCY_ [IGOUNOIAE];

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY_ [IGONPT];

NPT_ [IGONPT];

OLLI_HEINONEN_ [IGOUNOIAE]; Deputy Director-General for Safeguards at IAEA

HEINONEN_ [IGOUNOIEA];

KOFFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary General of the UN

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

GHOLAM_REZA_AGHAZADEH_ [IGOUNOIAE];

RUSSIA [RUS];

SERGEY_LAVROV_ [RUSGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs

LAVROV_ [RUSGOV];

SERGEI_KISLYAK_ [RUSGOV]; Deputy FM

KISLYAK_ [RUSGOV];

VITALY_CHURKIN_ [RUSGOV]; Russian Diplomat

CHURKIN_ [RUSGOV];

CHINA_ [CHN];

WANG_GUANGYA [CHNGOV]; Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Foreign Affairs

ISRAEL_ [ISR];

OLMERT_ [ISRGOV];

P-5_ [IGOUNO];

P5_ [IGOUNO];

EU_ [IGOEUREEC];

EU-3_ [IGOEUREEC];

JAVIER_SOLANA [IGOEUREEC]; EU foreign policy chief

SOLANA_ [IGOEUREEC];

MERKEL_ [DEUGOV];

FRANK-WALTER_STEINMEIER_ [DEUGOV]; Foreign Minister

STEINMEIER_ [DEUGOV];

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#CHAD-SUDAN II (2006

#Sudan and anti-Chad Rebel Groups

OMER_AL-BASHIR_ [SDNGOV]; Sudanese president; not the correct

spelling, but appears this way in many articles

GOVERNMENT_OF_NATIONAL_UNITY_ [SDNGOV]

GONU_ [SDNGOV]

GNU_ [SDNGOV]

BEJA_ [SDNPTY]; Large ethnic group in Sudan

RALLY_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_ [TCDANTREB]

RALLY_FOR_DEMOCRACY_AND_LIBERTY_ [TCDANTREB]

RDL_ [TCDANTREB]

PLATFORM_FOR_CHANGE_UNITY_AND_DEMOCRACY_ [TCDANTREB]

#Chad and anti-Sudan Rebel Groups

ZAGHAWA_ [TCDDIS]; ethnic group in Chad and western Sudan; many
rebel groups opposed to Chadian govt demand greater rights

NATIONAL_ASSEMBLY_ [TCDGOV]; govt building attacked by Chadian
rebels that started conflict

SUDAN_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

JUSTICE_AND_EQUALITY_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

Abdel_Wahed_Al-Nur_ [SDNANTREB]; leader of SLM

NUR_ [SDNANTREB]

KHALIL_MOHAMMED_ [SDNANTREB]; leader of JEM in Darfur, proposes
forceful change of govt in Khartoum

MINNI_MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; leader of largest faction of SLA

MINNI_MINAWI_ [SDNANTREB]

SULIMAN_ARCUA_MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; see Minni Minnawi

#Third parties

AFRICAN_UNION_MISSION_IN_SUDAN_ [IGOAFRAFU]; Peacekeeping
operations in Darfur at same time of Chad-Sudan conflict

AU_ [IGOAFROAU]; African Union, working for a united and strong
Africa, formely called the OAU [July 9, 2002-present]

AL-QADHAFI_ [LBYGOV]

GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

QADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

MUAMMAR_GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

MOAMER_KADHAFI_ [LBYGOV]

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#NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR III (2006)

#North Korea

NORTH_KOREA_ [PRK]

DPRK_ [PRK];

DEMOCRATIC_PEOPLE'S_REPUBLIC_OF_KOREA_ [PRK];

KIM_JONG_IL_ [PRKGOV];

KIM_JONG-IL_ [PRKGOV];

KIM_KYE-GWAN_ [PRKGOV]; First Vice Minister of the Ministry of

Foreign affars

KIM_KYE_GWAN_ [PRKGOV]; North Korean First Vice Minister of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs [c. 2010-present]

#United States

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

UNITED_STATES_OF_AMERICA_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

CHRITSOPHER_HILL_ [USAGOV]; assistant secretary of state for east
Asian and pacific affairs

ALEXANDER_VERSHBOW_ [USAGOV]; ambassador to South Korea 2005-08

JOHN_BOLTON_ [USAGOV]; US ambassador

BOLTON_ [USAGOV];

TONY_SNOW_ [USAGOV];

SNOW_ [USAGOV]; Tony Snow, White House Press Secretary, [May 8,
2006-September 14, 2007]

RICHARDSON_ [USAGOV]; governor of New Mexico (2003-11, visited
North Korea hand full of times to talk about the country's
nuclear program

MCCORMACK_ [USAGOV]; Sean McCormack Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs and Department Spokesman [June 2,
2005-January 20, 2009]

MISSILE_DEFENSE_AGENCY_ [USAGIV]; section of Department of Defence
responsible for developing a layered defence against ballistic
missiles

#Third Parties

SOUTH_KOREA_ [KOR];

MOO-HYUN_ [KORGOV]; President of SK 2003-08

KI-MOON_ [KORGOV]; Foreign Minister of SK, shorter after becomes
new UN Secretary General

CHUN_YUNG-WOO_ [KORGOV]; top Secretary of the Foreign Affairs and
Security dept

CHUN_ [KORGOV];

SONG_MIN-SOON_ [KORGOV]; Minister of Foreign Affairs and trade;
national security advisor

SONG_MINSOON_ [KORGOV];

LEE_JONG-SEOK_ [KORGOV]; Unification minister

CHINA_ [CHN];

WANG_GUANYA_ [CHNGOV]; Chinese ambassador

HU_JINTAO_ [CHNGOV]; President of China 2003-13

HU_ [CHNGOV];

WU_ [CHNGOV]; Wu Dawei, Chairman of the Six-Party Talks [c. 2006],
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs [c. 2004-2007], Special
Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs [c. 2006-present]

LI_ZHAOXING_ [CHNGOV]; Chinese foreign minster 2003-07

LI_ [CHNGOV];

JIANG_ [CHNGOV]; Jiang Yu, Deputy Director General, Information
Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's

Republic of China [2006-2012]

JIANG_YU_ [CHNGOV];

WANG_ [CHN]; Wang Guangya, Permanent Representative and Ambassador of China to the United Nations [August 2003-September 2008]

LIU_ [CHNGOV];

LIU_ZHENMIN [CHNGOV]; Chinese ambassador to the UN

QIN_ [CHNGOV]; Qin Gang, Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China [2005-2010]

QIN_GANG_ [CHNGOV];

JAPAN_ [JPN];

OSHIMA_ [JPNGOV]; Japanese ambassador to the UN

KENZO_OSHIMA_ [JPNGOV];

SASAE_ [JPNGOV]; Kenichiro Sasae Deputy Director-General of Asian and Oceania Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representative of Japan durign the six-party talks [c. 2006-2007]

RUSSIA_ [RUS];

ALEXANDER_LOSYUKOV [RUSGOV];

LOSYUKOV_ [RUSGOV]; Alexander Losyukov, Russian negotiator at the six party talks [c. 2002-2004]; deputy foreign minister of Russia

VITALY_CHURKIN_ [RUS]; Russian Ambassador to the United Nations [May 1, 2006-present]

UN_ [IGOUNO]

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

KENZO_OSHIMA_ [IGOUNO]; Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

IAEA_ [IGOUNOIAE];

INTERNATIONAL_ATOMIC_ENERGY_AGENCY_ [IGOUNOIAE];

ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE];

MOHAMED_ELBARADEI_ [IGOUNOIAE];

TOLBA_ [IGOUNOIAE]; led IAEA team of inspectors

NPT_ [IGONPT];

NON-PROLIFERATION_TREATY_ [IGONPT];

KOREAN_PENINSULA_DEVELOPMENT_ORGANISATION_ [IGO]; ended by US in
2005 due to frustration with lack of progress

KOREAN_PENINSULA_DEVELOPMENT_ORGANIZATION_ [IGO]

KEDO_ [IGO];

BDA_ [MAC]; Macao-based bank owned by Delta Asia Financial Group,
forced by US to freeze NK assets and stop dealings with
Pyongyang or risk losing access to US markets

BANCO_DELTA_ASIA_ [MAC];

APEC_ [IGO]; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum for 21 Pacific
Rim economies to promote free trade and economic cooperation
throughout the Asia-Pacific region

ASIA-PACIFIC_ECONOMIC_COOPERATION_ [IGO];

ASIA_PACIFIC_ECONOMIC_COOPERATION_ [IGO];

ARF_ [IGOSEAASN]; ASEAN Regional Forum, formal multilateral

dialogue in the Asia Pacific region [1994-present]

G8_ [IGO]; a forum for the eight leading industrialized countries

[1975-March 24, 2014]

BLAIR_ [GBRGOV];

DOWNER_ [AUSGOV]; Alexander Downer, foreign minister of Australia

SABLIERE_ [FRAGOV]; representative to UN for France

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#ISRAEL-LEBANON WAR II (2006)

#Lebanon

LEBANON_ [LBNGOV];

FUAD_SINIORA_ [LBNGOV];

FOUAD_SANYOURAS_ [LBNGOV];

FUAD_SINYORA_ [LBNGOV];

FOUAD_SANIOURA_ [LBNGOV];

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SINIORA_ [LBNGOV];

SANYOURA_ [LBNGOV];

SINYORA_ [LBNGOV];

JIHAD_AZOUR_ [LBNGOV]; finance minister

TAREK_MITRI_ [LBNGOV];

NABIH_BERRI_ [LBNGOV]; Parliament Speaker, supporter of Hezbollah

AMAL_ [LBNGOV];

MICHEL_MURR_ [LBNGOV];

BERRI_ [LBNGOV];

FAWZI_SALLUKH_ [LBNGOV] ;

MOHAMMED_HUSSEIN_FADLALLAH_ [LBNGOV]; Grand Ayatollah

FADLALLAH_ [LBNGOV];

SAAD_HARIRI_ [LBNGOV];

NOUHAD_MAHMOUD_ [LBNGOV];

HARIRI_ [LBNGOV] ;

ELIAS_MURR_ [LBNGOV];

MURR_ [LBNGOV];

AMIR_HADADI_ [LBNGOV]; supporter of Hezbollah

HADIDI_ [LBNGOV];

#New coding for Hezbollah

HEZBOLLAH_ [HZBMILORG]; launched rockets against an Israeli village

in June '93

HIZBULLAH_ [HZBMILORG];

HIZBALLAH_ [HZBMILORG];
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HASSAN_NASRALLAH_ [HZBMILORG] ; Secretary-General of Hezbollah

[February 16, 1992-present]

NASRALLAH_ [HZBMILORG];

IMAD_MUGHNIYEH_ [HZBMILORG];

#Israel

EHUD_OLMERT_ [ISRGOV];

OLMERT_ [ISRGOV]; Israeli PM

TZIPI_LIVNI_ [ISRGOV]; FM

LIVNI_ [ISRGOV]; FM

AMIR_PERETZ_ [ISRMIL];

PERETZ_ [ISRMIL];

IDF_ [ISRMIL];

ISRAEL_DEFENSE_FORCES_ [ISRMIL];

DAN_GILLERMAN_ [ISRGOV] ;

DAN_HALUTZ_ [ISRMIL] ; Army chief

HALUTZ_ [ISRMIL];

ISRAEL_SECURITY_CABINET_ [ISRMIL];

KAPLINKSKY_ [ISRMIL]; head of Israel defence forces

MOSHE_KAPLINSKY_ [ISRMIL];

UDI_ADAM_ [ISRMIL]; military leader

ELIEZER_SHKEDI_ [ISRMIL];

369

DAVID_BEN_BA'ASHAT_ [ISRMIL];

EHUD_GOLDWASSER_ [ISRMIL]; one of two captured soldiers

ELDAD_REGEV_ [ISRMIL]; one of two captured soldiers

#Third Parties

PALENSTINE_ [PSE];

HAMAS_ [PSEPTY];

MAHMUD_ABBAS_ [PSEGOV];

AHMED_JIBRIL_ [PSEMIL]; supporter of Hezbollah

USA_ [USA]

US_ [USA]

UNITED_STATES_ [USA];

WASHINGTON_ [USA];

CONDOLEEZZA_RICE_ [USAGOV]; Secretary of State visited both
countries attempting to est. cease fire and offer humanitarian
aid

JOHN_BOLTON_ [USAGOV];

BOLTON_ [USAGOV];

DAVID_WELCH_ [USAGOV];

UN_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO];

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

JAN_EGELAND_ [IGOUNO] ; UN Under-secretary General for Humanitarian

Affairs

EGELAND_ [IGOUNO];

UNIFIL_ [IGOUNO];

UNITED_NATIONS_INTERIM_FORCE_IN_LEBANON_ [IGOUNO];

MILOS_STRUGAR_ [IGOUNO]; UNIFIL spokesman

GEIR_PEDERSEN_ [IGOUNO];

TERJE_ROED-LARSEN_ [IGOUNO];

EU_ [IGOEUREEC];

EUROPEAN_UNION_ [IGOEUREEC];

WORLD_BANK_ [IGO];

WB_ [IGO];

LEAGUE_OF_ARAB_STATES_ [IGO]; condemned Israel aggression promoting

UN to protect Lebanon

ARAB_LEAGUE_ [IGO];

ALI_QANSO_ [SYRGOV]; supporter of Hezbollah

QANSO_ [SYRGOV];

QASEM_SOLEIMANI_ [IRNMIL]; supporter of Hezbollah

SOLEIMANI_ [IRNMIL];

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371

#ETHIOPIA INVASION SOMALIA (2006)

#Ethiopia and Somalian Dissidents (violent and non-violent)

MELES_ [ETHGOV]; Prime Minister of Ethiopia [August 23, 1995-August 20, 2012]

MELES_ZENAWI_ [ETHGOV];

ZENAWI_ [ETHGOV];

SEYOUM_MESFIN_ [ETHGOV]; foreign minister

MESFIN_ [ETHGOV];

MENGISTU_ [ETHGOV]; Chairman of the Derg and Head of State of Ethiopia

MENGISTU_HAILE_MARIAM_ [ETHGOV];

SOLOMON_ABEBE_ [ETHGOV]; Ethiopian foreign ministry spokesman [c. 2006]

GABRE_HEARD_ [ETHMIL]; supreme commander of Ethiopian forces in Somalia

SIRAJ_FERGESSA_ [ETHGOV]; Ethiopian Minister of federal affairs

FERGESSA_ [ETHGOV];

KUMA_DEMEKSA_ [ETHGOV]; Ethiopian Defence Minister

DEMEKSA_ [ETHGOV];

BERHAN_HAILU_ [ETHGOV]; Ethiopian Information Minister

HAILU_ [ETHGOV];

CUD_ [ETHPTY]; Coalition for Unity and Democracy, a coalition of

Ethiopian political parties [2004-present]

COALITION_FOR_UNITY_AND_DEOMOCRACY_ [ETHPTY]; CUD, a coalition of

Ethiopian political parties [2004-present], comprised of four

existing Ethiopian parties

ETHIOPIAN_DEMOCRATIC_LEAGUE_ [ETHPTY]; member of CUD

ALL_ETHIOPIAN_UNITY_PARTY_ [ETHPTY]; member of CUD

AEUP_ [ETHPTY]; All Ethiopian Unity Party

UNITED_ETHIOPIAN_DEMOCRATIC_PARTY-MEDHIN_PARTY_ [ETHPTY]; member of

CUD

RAINBOW_ETHIOPIA_MOVEMENT_FOR_DEMOCRACY_AND_SOCIAL_JUSTICE_

[ETHPTY]; member of CUD

HAILU_SHAWEL_ [ETHGOV]; chairman of CUD

BIRTUKAN_MIDEKSA_ [ETHGOV]; 1st Vice Chairperson

MULUNEH_EYUEL_ [ETHGOV]; Secretary of CUD

UEDF_ [ETHPTY]; opposition party

UNITED_ETHIOPIAN_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_ [ETHPTY];

OROMO_NATIONAL_CONGRESS_ [ETHPTY]; member of UEDF

ETHIOPIAN_SOCIAL_DEMOCRATIC_FEDERAL_PARTY_ [ETHPTY]; member of UEDF

SOUTHERN_ETHIOPIA_PEOPLE'S_DEMOCRATIC_COALITION_ [ETHPTY]; member

of UEDF

ALL-AMHARA_PEOPLE'S_ORGANIZATION_ [ETHPTY]; member of UEDF

ETHIOPIAN_DEMOCRATIC_UNITY_PARTY_ [ETHPTY]; member of UEDF

MERERA_GUDINA_ [ETHGOV]; chairman of UEDF

BEYENE_PERTOS_ [ETHGOV]; vice chairman of UEDF

#Somalia Dissidents

UNION_OF_ISLAMIC_COURTS_ [SOMISL]; Islamic Courts Union, rivals of
the Transitional Federal Government [June 6, 2006-December 27,
2006]

UIC_ [SOMISL];

ISLAMIC_COURT_UNION_ [SOMISL]

ICU_ [SOMISL]

SICS_ [SOMISL];

SCIC_ [SOMISL]; another arrangement of courts

SUPREME_ISLAMIC_COUNCIL_ [SOMISL]; rivals of the Transitional
Federal Government [June 6, 2006-December 27, 2006]

COURTS_UNION_ [SOMISL]; Islamic Courts Union, rivals of the
Transitional Federal Government [June 6, 2006-December 27, 2006]

COURTS_ [SOMISL]; Islamic Courts, rivals of the Transitional
Federal Government [June 6, 2006-December 27, 2006]

SHEIKH_AMHED_ [SOMISL]; commander and chief IS Courts

SHARIF_AHMED_ [SOMISL];

SHEIKH_SHARIF_SHEIKH_AHMED_ [SOMISL]; one of the leaders of the
Islamic Courts [2004-2006] and President of Somalia [January
31, 2009-August 20, 2012]

AWEYS_ [SOMISL]; Hassan Dahir Aweys, one of the leaders of the
Islamic Courts Union [2004-December 28, 2006]

HASSAN_DAHIR_AWEYS_ [SOMISL]; one of the leaders of the Islamic

Courts Union [2004-December 28, 2006]

SHEIKH_MOHAMMED_IBRAHIM_BILAL_ [SOMISL]; one of the leaders of the

Islamic Courts in Somalia [2004-2006]

BILAL_ [SOMISL]; one of the leaders of the Islamic Courts in

Somalia [2004-2006]

MUDDEY_ [SOMISL]; spokesman for the Islamic Courts Union [December

2006]

SHEIKH_MUKTAR_ROBOW_ [SOMISL]; Deputy Commander of Islamic Courts

Union [June 6, 2006-December 27, 2006]

YUSUF_MOHAMMED_SAID_INDA'ADE_ [SOMISL]; ICU commander

YUSUF_INDACADE_ [SOMISL];

ABU_MANSUR_ [SOMISL]; military leader of Hizbul Shabaab, the armed

faction of ICU

MANSUR_ [SOMISL]; deputy of Yusuf

FUAD_MOHAMED_QALAD_ [SOMISL]; ICU commander

ADEN_HASHI_FARAH_ [SOMISL]; killed in US air strike on May 1 2008

ADAN_AYROW_ [SOMISL]; military commander of Hizbul Shabaab, the

armed wing of ICU, killed in May 1, 2008 US airstrike

HASSAN_ABDULLAH_HERSI_AL-TURKI_ [SOMISL]; military leader in the ICU

#al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab faction involved in Crisis

ALI_SALEH_NABHAN_ [IMGMOSALQ]; leader of al-Qaeda in Somalia,

killed in navy seal raid in Sept. 2009

ABU_TAHA_AL-SUDAN_ [IMGMOSALQ]; suspected al-Qaeda member in

Somalia, led group of ICU fighters

MOHAMED_IBRAHIM_HAYLE_ [IMGMOSALQ]; al-Qaeda member

MUKHTAR_ABU_ALI_AISHA_ [IMGMOSALQ] al-Qaeda member

ADEN_HASHI_EYROW_ [IMGMOSALQ]; leader of al-Shabab killed May 1

2008 by US air strike

ALLIANCE_FOR_THE_RE-LIBERATION_OF_SOMALIA_ [SOMANTREB]; united with

ICU in Sept. 2007 to oppose Somalia's TFG

ALLIANCE_FOR_THE_RELIBERATION_OF_SOMALIA_ [SOMANTREB];

ARS_ [SOMANTREB];

#Somalia and pro-Somalia Rebel Groups

ABDULLAHI_YUSUF_AHMED_ [SOMGOV]; TFG Pres

ALI_JAMA_ [SOMGOV]; Somali Information Minister [c. 2007]-

President of Puntland from 2001 to 2002

JAMA_ [SOMGOV]; Somali Information Minister [c. 2007]

TRANSITIONAL_FEDERAL_GOVERNMENT_ [SOMGOV];

HUSSEIN_FARRAH_AIDID_ [SOMGOV]; Deputy Prime Minister [2005-May 13,

2007], Minister of the Interior [2005-February 7, 2007],

AIDID_ [SOMGOV];

GEDI_ [SOMGOV]; Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal

Government of Somalia [November 3, 2004-October 29, 2007]

GHEDI_ [SOMGOV]; Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal

Government of Somalia [November 3, 2004-October 29, 2007]

MOHAMED_OMAR_HABEB_ [SOMGOV]; May 2007 names governor and mayor of

Banadir and Mogadishu before being dismissed in July 2008

QEYBDIID_ [SOMMIL]; Somali military commander loyal to the

Transitional Federal Government [December 2006]

ABDI_HASSAN_AWALE_QEYBDIID_ [SOMMIL]; Somali military commander

loyal to the Transitional Federal Government [December 2006]

ABDI_HASAN_AWALE_ [SOMMIL];

MAHMOUD_HASSAN_ALI_ [SOMGOV]; Mahmoud Hassan Ali, mayor of

Mogadishu [c.2006]

ABDIRAHMAN_DINARI_ [SOMGOV]; Somali interim government spokesman

[c. 2006]

DINARI_ [SOMGOV]; Somali interim government spokesman [c. 2006]

SALAD_ALI_JELLE_ [SOMGOV]; Deputy Minister of Defence of the

Transitional Federal Government [c.2007-present]

SALAT_ALI_JELLE_ [SOMGOV];

JVA_ [SOMPROREB]; opponent of the Islamic Courts Union in Somali

Civil War [June 2001-2008]

JUBA_VALLEY_ALLIANCE_ [SOMPROREB]; opponent of the Islamic Courts

Union in Somali Civil War [June 2000-2008]

MOHAMED_OMAR_HABEEB_ [SOMPROREB]; controlled Jowhar region with

Ethiopia's help

MUUSE_SUUDI_YALAHOW_ [SOMPROREB]; Somalia warlord involved with TFP

BARRE_ADAN_SHIRE_HIIRAALE_ [SOMGOV];

HIIRAALE_ [SOMGOV];

HUSSEIN_MOHAMED_FARRAH_ [SOMPROREB]; son of late gen. Aidid, former

U.S. marine

HASAN_MUHAMMAD_NUR_SHATIGADUD_ [SOMPROREB];

SHEIKH_ADEN_ [SOMGOV]; Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Speaker of TSP

accused of unauthorized meetings with the Islamic Courts Union

SHARIF_HASSAN_SHEIKH_ADEN_ [SOMGOV];

#Third Parties

AU_ [IGOAFRAFU]; African Union, an international organization that

works towards a united and strong Africa [May 26,

2001-present], formerly called the OAU

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United Nations [January

1, 1997-December 31, 2006]

UNITED_NATIONS_HIGH_COMMISSIONER_FOR_REFUGEES_ [IGOUNOHCR];

mandated to protect and support refugees at the request of a

government or the UN itself [December 14, 1950-present]

UNHCR_ [IGOUNOHCR]; mandated to protect and support refugees at the

request of a government or the UN itself [December 14,

1950-present]

HIGH_COMISSIONER_ [IGOUNOHCR]; mandated to protect and support

refugees at the request of a government or the UN itself

[December 14, 1950-present]

KONARE_ [IGOAFRAFU]; Chairman of the Commission of the African

Union [September 16, 2003-February 1, 2008]

ALPHA_OUMAR_KONARE_ [IGOAFRAFU]; Chariman of the African Union

[September 16, 2003-February 1, 2008]

OCHA_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs,

UNITED_NATIONS_OFFICE_FOR_THE_COORDINATION_OF_HUMANITARIAN_AFFAIRS_

[IGOUNO]; OCHA,

EGELAND_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Undersecretary-General for

Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator [June

2003-December 2006]

JAN_EGELAND_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Undersecretary-General for

Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator [June

2003-December 2006]

HUMANITARIAN_AFFAIRS_ [IGOUNO];

OAU_ [IGOAFROAU]; Organization of African Unity, promoted unity and

solidarity of African states

AL-QAEDA_ [IMGMOSALQ]; global militant Islamic organization

[1988-present]

FRANCOIS_FALL_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Special Representative for

Somalia [2005-September 12, 2007]

WORLD_FOOD_PROGRAMME_ [IGOUNOWFP]; WFP, food assistance branch of

the United Nations [1961-present]

WFP_ [IGOUNOWFP]; World Food Programme, food assistance branch of the United Nations [1961-present]

UNMEE_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea [July 31, 2000-July 31, 2008], monitor the ceasefire in the border war between Ethiopia and ERIT

UNITED_NATIONS_MISSION_IN_ETHIOPIAN_AND_ERITREA_ [IGOUNO]; UNMEE [July 31, 2000-July 31, 2008], monitor the ceasefire in the border war between Ethiopian and Eritrea

COMESA_ [IGOAFRBUSCEM]; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, a free trade zone and pillar of the African Economic COMMUNITY_OF_SAHARAN_STATES

IGAD_ [IGOEAFDEVIAD]; Inter-Governmental Authority of Development, an East African trade block [January 1986-present]

GBAGBO_ [CIVGOV]; Laurent Gbagbo, President of Cote D'Ivorie [October 26, 2000-April 11, 2011]

LAURENT_GBAGBO_ [CIVGOV]; President of Cote D'Ivorie [October 26, 2000-April 11, 2011]

CHAMBERLIN_ [IGOUNOHCR];

WENDY_CHAMERLIN_ [IGOUNOHCR];

ISSAIAS_ [ERIGOV]; Isaias Afwerki, President of Eritrea [April 27, 1991-present]

AFWERKI_ [ERIGOV]; President of Eritrea [April 27, 1991-present]

ISSAIAS_AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV]; President of Eritrea [April 27, 1991-present]

KIBAKI_ [KENGOV]; Mwai Kibaki, President of Kenya [December 30, 2002-April 9, 2013]

MWAI_KIBAKI_ [KENGOV]; President of Kenya [December 30, 2002-April 9, 2013]

FRAZER_ [USAGOV]; Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs [August 29, 2005-January 20, 2009]

JENDAYI_FRAZER_ [USAGOV]; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs [August 29, 2005- January 20, 2009]

MUBARAK_ [EGYGOV]; Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt [October 14, 1981-February 11, 2011]

ALI_ABDU_ [ERIGOV]; Deputy Minister of Information of Eritrea [2003-present]

ALI_ABDU_AHMED_ [ERIGOV]; Deputy Minister of Information of Eritrea [2003-present]

CHARLES_KONAN_BANNY_ [CIVGO];

BANNY_ [CIVGOV]; Charles Konan Banny, Prime Minister of Cote D'Ivorie [December 7, 2005-April 7, 2007]

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#CHAD-SUDAN III (2007)

#Sudan and anti-Chad Rebel Groups

BASHIR_ [SDNGOV]

AL-BASHIR_ [SDNGOV]

OMAR_AL-BESHIR_ [SDNGOV]; President of Sudan [June 30, 19889-present]

SUDAN_ARMED_FORCES_ [SDNMIL]

ARAB_JANJAWEED_ [SDNPROREB]

JANJAWEED_ [SDNPROREB]; Arab militia operating in eastern Chad,

western Sudan, and Darfur [1987-present]

JANAJAWID_ [SDNPROREB];

LAM_AKOL_ [SDNGOV]; Foreign Minister of Sudan, [January 20,

2005-October 17, 2007]

MACHAR_ [SSDGOV]; Riek Vice President of Southern Sudan [August 11,

2005-July 9, 2011]

RALLY_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_ [TCDANTREB]

RALLY_FOR_DEMOCRACY_AND_LIBERTY_ [TCDANTREB]

RDL_ [TCDANTREB]

PLATFORM_FOR_CHANGE_UNITY_AND_DEMOCRACY_ [TCDANTREB]

FUC_ [TCDANTREB]; United Front for Democratic Change, a Chadian

rebel alliance [December 2005-present]

FRONT_FOR_CHANGE_ [TCDANTREB];

UNITED_FRONT_FOR_CHANGE_ [TCDANTREB];

UNITED_FRONT_ [TCDANTREB];

SCUD_ [TCDANTREB]; Platform for Change, Unity, and Democracy, a

Chadian rebel group [October 2005-present]

#Chad and anti-Sudan Rebel Groups

DEBY_ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

IDRISS_DEBY_ [TCDGOV]

IDRISS_DEBY_ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

DEBY_ [TCDGOV]; Idriss Deby Itno, President of Chad [December 2,

1990-present]

AHMAT_ALLAMI_ [TCDGOV]; Chadian Foreign Minister [c. 2005-c.2007]

Abdel_Wahed_Al-Nur_ [SDNANTREB]; leader of SLM

AL-NUR_ [SDNANTREB]

SLA_ [SDNANTREB]

SUDAN_LIBERATION_ARMY_ [SDNANTREB]

MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; Minni Minawi, leader of the largest faction

of the Sudan Liberation Army [2002-2011]

MINNI_MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]

MINNI_MINAWI_ [SDNANTREB]

SULIMAN_ARCUA_MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; see Minni Minnawi

SUDAN_PEOPLES_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

ALLIANCE_OF_REVOLUTIONARY_FORCES_OF_WEST_SUDAN_ [SDNANTREB]; formed

in early 2006 when JEM and SLM merged into one group

ARFWS_ [SDNANTREB]

SPLM_ [SDNANTREB]; Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the

political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army [1983-2011]

NUR_ [SDNANTREB]; Abdu Wahid al-Nur, one of the leaders of the

Sudan Liberation Movement [c. 1992-present]

IBRAHIM_ [SDNANTREB]; Khalil Ibrahim, leader of JEM [2000-2012]

SLM_ [SDNANTREB]; Sudan Liberation Movement, a Sudanese rebel group

[2002-present]; Also referred to as the Sudan Liberation Army

or SLA

JEM_ [SDNANTREB]; Justice and Equality Movement, a Sudanese

opposition group [2000-present]

#Third Parties

ABDEL_SALEM_TRIKI_ [LBYGOV]; sent by Gaddafi to mediate crisis

TRIKI_ [LBYGOV]

AL-QADHAFI_ [LBYGOV]

AL-GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

QADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

MUAMMAR_GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

MOAMER_KADHAFI_ [LBYGOV]

GEORGE_SOMERWILL_ [IGOUNO]; chief spokesperson for UNMIS

UNMIS_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Mission in Sudan [March 24, 2005-July 9, 2011]

HU_JINTAO_ [CHNGOV]; Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China [March 15, 2003-March 14, 2013]

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United Nations [January 1, 1997-December 31, 2006]

#AMIS_ [IGOAFROAU]; African Union Mission in Sudan, with the goal of performing peacekeeping operations in Darfur [2004-December 31, 2007]

G8_ [IGO]; Group of Eight, consisting of the eight leading industrialized countries [1998-2014]

ARBOUR_ [IGOUNO]; Louise Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [July 1, 2004-August 21, 2008]

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#ETHIOPIA-ERITREA III (2007)

#Ethiopia and anti-Eritrea Rebel Groups

ETHIOPIA_ [ETH];

MELES_ZENAWI_ [ETHGOV]; Ethiopian PM

MELES_ [ETHGOV];

SALOME_TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

SELOME_TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

TADESSE_ [ETHGOV];

SEYOUM_MESFIN_ [ETHGOV];

MESFIN_ [ETHGOV];

COALITION_FOR_UNITY_AND_DEMOCRACY_ [ETHPTY];

ERITREAN_NATIONAL_ALLIANCE_ [ERIANTREB]; umbrella group for all

opposition to Eritrean rule, consisting of 10 opposition groups

ENA_ [ERIANTREB];

ALLIANCE_OF_ERITREAN_NATIONAL_FORCE_ [ERIANTREB];

AENF_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_DEMOCRATIC_RESISTANCE_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB]; part of

alliance of Eritrean nat'l force

EDRM_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_INITIATIVE_GROUP_ [ERIANTREB]; part of alliance of

Eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_SALVATION_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];part of alliance

of Eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_SALVATION_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_JIHAD_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_ISLAMIC_JIHAD_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];

EIJM_ [ERIANTREB];

EIJ_ [ERIANTREB];

ERIJ_ [ERIANTREB];

EISM_ [ERIANTREB];

SHAIKH_KHALIL_MOHAMMED_AMER_ [ERIANTREB]; putative leader of ERIJ

ABUL_BARA_HASSAN_SALMAN_ [ERIANTREB]; ERIJ's deputy amir

ERITREAN_PEOPLE'S_CONGRESS_ [ERIANTREB]; military faction of EIJM

ERITREAN_KUNAMAS_DEMOCRATIC_MOVEMENT_ [ERIANTREB];part of alliance
of Eritrean nat'l force

DEMOCRATIC_MOVEMENT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_ERITREAN_KUNAMA_
[ERIANTREB]; part of alliance of eritrean nat'l force

DMLEK_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ERIANTREB];part of alliance of Eritrean
nat'l force

ELF_ [ERIANTREB];

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_NATIONAL_CONGRESS_ [ERIANTREB]; part of
alliance of Eritrean nat'l force

ERITREAN_LIBERATION_FRONT_REVOLUTION-COUNCIL_ [ERIANTREB]; part of
alliance of Eritrean nat'l force

ELF-RC_ [ERIANTREB];

ABDELLA_IDRIS_ [ERIANTREB]; leader of ERDF and ELF-RC

ERITREAN_REVOLUTIONARY_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_

ERDF_ [ERIANTREB];

POPULAR_DEMOCRATIC_FRONT_FOR_THE_LIBERATION_OF_ERITREA_ [ERIANTREB];

#Eritrea and anti-Ethiopia Rebel Groups

387

ERITREA_ [ERI];

ISSAIAS_ [ERIGOV];

ISSAIAS_AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

ISAIAS_ [ERIGOV];

ISAIAS_AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

AFEWORKI_ [ERIGOV];

YEMANE_ [ERIGOV];

YEMANE_GHEBREMESKEL_ [ERIGOV];

GHEBREMESKEL_ [ERIGOV];

HAILE_WOLDENSAE_ [ERIGOV];

CUD_ [ETHPTY]; Ethiopia's main opposition party

OLF_ [ETHANTREB];

OROMO_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [ETHANTREB];

ONLF_ [ETHANTREB]; fighting against ETH to make ogaden its own

independent state

#Third Parties

SOMALIA_ [SOM];

AIDID_ [SOMGOV];

HASSAN_ [SOMGOV]; peacefully withdrew as Yusuk took over

YUSUF_ [SOMGOV]; elected president of transitional federal

government, backed by ETH

ZAKARIYA_MAHAMUD_ABDI_ [SOMANTREB]; top official in umbrella group

of all forces against gov.

OGADEN_NATIONAL_LIBERATION_FRONT_ [SOMANTREB];

ONLF_ [SOMANTREB];

MOHAMMED_OMAR_OSMAN_ [SOMANTREB]; leading chairman of ONLF

ICU_ [SOMANTREB]; briefly controlled parts of Somalia before being

ousted by gov forces and Ethiopian troops

ISLAMIC_COURTS_UNION_ [SOMANTREB];

SHEIKH_SHARIF_SHEIKH_AHMED_ [SOMANTREB]; ICU chief; exiled from

Eritrea

SHEIKH_SHARIF_ [SOMANTREB];

OMAR_AL-BESHIR_ [SDNGOV];

EEBC_ [IGO]; made decision to cease attempts at making further

progress on demarcating the border between the two countries

ERITREA-ETHIOPIA_BOUNDARY_COMMISSION_ [IGO];

PERMANENT_COURT_OF ARBITRATION_ [IGO];

EU_ [IGOEUREEC];

EUROPEAN_UNION_ [IGOEUREEC];

AFRICAN_UNION_ [IGOAFR];

OAU_ [IGOAFROAU];

ORGANIZATION_OF_AFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

ORGANIZATION_OFAFRICAN_UNITY_ [IGOAFROAU];

SALIM_AHMED_SALIM_ [IGOAFROAU];

MOHAMED_SAHNOUN_ [IGOAFROAU]; OAU's assistant secretary general

SAHNOUN_ [IGOAFROAU];

OUYAHIA_ [IGOAFROAU]; OAU mediator, Algerian politician

UN_ [IGOUNO]

UNITED_NATIONS_ [IGOUNO];

UN_SECURITY_COUNCIL_ [IGOUNO]; sent Japanese envoy oshima on fact

checking tour

UNSC_ [IGOUNO];

KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

SECRETARY-GENERAL_KOFI_ANNAN_ [IGOUNO];

UN_MISSION_IN_ETHIOPIA_AND_ERITREA_ [IGOUNO];

UNMEE_ [IGOUNO];

PATRICK_CAMMAERT_ [IGOUNO]; Dutch General leading peacekeeping

mission known as UNMEE

CAMMAERT_ [IGOUNO];

KI-MOON_ [IGNOUNO] ;

JEAN-MARIE_GUEHENNO_ [IGOUNO];

GUEHENNO_ [IGOUNO]; UN undersecretary-general for peacekeeping

KADHAFI_ [LBYGOV];

SERRI_ [IGOEUREEC]; EU representative present at signing of peace

between Ethiopia and Eritrea

RINO_SERRI_ [IGOEUREEC];

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#CHAD-SUDAN IV (2007)

#Chad and anti-Sudan Rebel Groups

IDRISS_DEBY_ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

AHMAT_ALLAMI_ [TCDGOV]; Chadian Foreign Minister [c. 2005-c.2007]

ALLAMI_ [TCDGOV]

DEBY_ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

IDRISS_DEBY_ [TCDGOV]

IDRISS_DEBY_ITNO_ [TCDGOV]

DEBY_ [TCDGOV]; Idriss Deby Itno, President of Chad [December 2,
1990-present]

DEBY_ [TCDGOV]; Idriss Deby, President of Chad, [December 2,
1990-present]

ALLAM-MI_ [TCDGOV]; Ahmad Allam-Mi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
African Integration of Chad [2005-2008]

YORONGAR_ [TCDPTY]; Ngarlejy Yorongar, Executive Federal
Coordinator of the Federation, Action for the Republic, a

radical opposition party [c. 1997-present]

FAKI_ [TCDGOV]; Moussa Faki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad
[April 23, 2008-present]

MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; Minni Minawi, leader of the largest faction
of the Sudan Liberation Army [2002-2011]

SPLM_ [SDNANTREB]; Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the
political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army [1983-2011]

NUR_ [SDNANTREB]; Abdu Wahid al-Nur, one of the leaders of the
Sudan Liberation Movement [c. 1992-present]

SLM_ [SDNANTREB]; Sudan Liberation Movement, a Sudanese rebel group
[2002-present]

EASTERN_FRONT_ [SDNANTREB]; a coalition of rebel groups operating
in eastern Sudan [c. 2005-present]

JEM_ [SDNANTREB]; Justice and Equality Movement, a violent Sudanese
opposition rebel group [2000-present]

SUDAN_LIBERATION_ARMY_ [SDNANTREB]

SUDAN_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

JUSTICE_AND_EQUALITY_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

Abdel_Wahed_Al-Nur_ [SDNANTREB]; leader of SLM

AL-NUR_ [SDNANTREB]

SLA_ [SDNANTREB]

SUDAN_LIBERATION_ARMY_ [SDNANTREB]

MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; Minni Minawi, leader of the largest faction
of the Sudan Liberation Army [2002-2011]

MINNI_MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]

MINNI_MINAWI_ [SDNANTREB]

SULIMAN_ARCUA_MINNAWI_ [SDNANTREB]; see Minni Minnawi

SUDAN_PEOPLES_LIBERATION_MOVEMENT_ [SDNANTREB]

ALLIANCE_OF_REVOLUTIONARY_FORCES_OF_WEST_SUDAN_ [SDNANTREB]; formed

in early 2006 when JEM and SLM merged into one group

ARFWS_ [SDNANTREB]

KHALIL_IBRAHIM_ [SDNANTREB]; leader of JEM [2000-2012]

IBRAHIM_ [SDNANTREB]; Khalil Ibrahim, leader of JEM [2000-2012]

#Sudan, pro-Sudan Rebel Groups and anti-Chad Rebel Groups

OMAR_AL-BASHIR_ [SDNGOV]; President of Sudan [June 30, 19889-present]

AL-BASHIR_ [SDNGOV]

AL-BESHIR_ [SDNGOV]

OMAR_AL-BESHIR_ [SDNGOV]

BESHIR_ [SDNGOV]; Omafr al-Bashir, President of Sudan [June 30,

1989-present]

BASHIR_ [SDNGOV];

TURABI_ [SDNGOV]; Secretary General of the Popular Congress Party

[1999-present]

TAHA_ [SDNGOV]; Ali Osman Taha, Vice President Of Sudan [January 9,

2005-December 6, 2013]

LAM_AKOL_ [SDNGOV]; Foreign Minister of Sudan, [January 20,
2005-October 17, 2007]

AKOL_ [SDNGOV]

JANJAWEED_ [SDNPROREB]; Arab nationalist militia operating in
Sudan, Chad, and Darfur [1987-present]

JANAJAWID_ [SDNPROREB];

ARAB_JANJAWEED_ [SDNPROREB]

MAHAMAT_NOURI_ [TCANTDREB]; Former Chadian government minister and
current insurgent leader who commands the Union of Forces for
Democracy [2006-present]

NATIONAL_ACCORD_OF_CHAD_ [TCDANTREB]

NATIONAL_ACCORD_CHAD_ [TCDANTREB]

CNT_ [TCDANTREB]

NAC_ [TCDANTREB]

SCUD_ [TCDANTREB]; Platform for Change, Unity, and Democracy, a
Chadian rebel group [October 2005-present]

FUC_ [TCDANTREB]; United Front for Democratic Change, a Chadian
rebel alliance [December 2005-present]

FRONT_FOR_CHANGE_ [TCDANTREB];

UNITED_FRONT_FOR_CHANGE_ [TCDANTREB];

UNITED_FRONT_ [TCDANTREB];

NATIONAL_ALLIANCE_ [TCDANTREB]; Chadian rebel group [c. 2008-present]

UNION_OF_DEMOCRATIC_FORCES_FOR_FUNDAMENTAL_DEVELOPMENT_
[TCDANTREB]; UFDD-F, a Chadian rebel group [c.2007-present]

UNIFIED_MILITARY_COMMAND_ [TCDANTREB]

UFDD_ [TCDANTREB]

UFDD-F_ [TCDANTREB]

UNION_OF_FORCES_FOR_DEMOCRACY_AND_DEVELOPMENT-FUNDAMENTAL_

[TCDANTREB]

RFC_ [TCDANTREB]

#Third Parties

MOAMER_KADHAFI_ [LBYGOV]

AL-QADHAFI_ [LBYGOV]

AL-GADDAFI_ [LBYGOV]

GADAFFI_ [LBYGOV]

QADAFI_ [LBYGOV]

QADAFFI_ [LBYGOV]

EUFOR_ [IGOEUREEC]; European Union Force, a rapid reaction force,

deployed to Chad [2007]

EUFOR_CHAD-CAR_ [IGOEUR]

UNAMID_ [IGOAFRUNO]; African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation

in Darfur, a peacekeeping mission to bring stability to Darfur

[July 31, 2007-present]

SARKOZY_ [FRAGOV]; President of France, [May 16, 2007-May 15, 2012]

SOLANA_ [IGOEUREEC]; Javier Solana, Secretary General of the

Council of the European Union [October 18, 1999-December 1, 2009] and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy [October 18, 1999-December 1, 2009]

MORIN_ [FRAGOV]; Herve Morin, French Minister of Defence [May 18, 2007-November 14, 2010]

ELIASSON_ [IGOUNO]; Jan Eliasson, UN envoy to Darfur [c. 2007]

PING_ [IGOAFRAFU]; Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission [April 28, 2008-Ocytober 15, 2012]

CEN-SAD_ [IGOAFR]; Community of Sahel-Saharan States,a free trade organization in Africa [February 4, 1998-present]

COMESSA_ [IGOAFR];

NASH_ [IGOEUREEC]; Patrick Nash, Operation Commander for EUFOR in Chad

GUEHENNO_ [IGOUNO]; Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations [October 1, 2000-June 30, 2008]

JEAN-PHILLIPE_GANASCIA_ [IGOEUREEC]; Force Commander of the European protection operation in Chad and the Central African Republic [October 15, 2007-March 15, 2009]

AU_ [IGOAFRAFU]; African Union, working for a united and strong Africa, formerly called the OAU [July 9, 2002-present]

HU_JINTAO_ [CHNGOV]; Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China [March 15, 2003-March 14, 2013]

ANNAN_ [IGOUNO]; Secretary-General of the United Nations [January 1, 1997-December 31, 2006]

ZOELLICK_ [USAGOV]; Deputy Secretary of State [February 22, 2005-July 7, 2006]

EGELAND_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator [June 2003-December 2006]

AMIS_ [IGOAFROAU]; African Union Mission in Sudan, with the goal of performing peacekeeping operations in Darfur [2004-December 31, 2007]

OBASANJO_ [NGAGOV]; Olusegun Mathew Okikola Aremu Obasanjo, President of Nigeria [May 29, 1999-May 29, 2007]

MACHAR_ [SSD]; Riek Vice President of Southern Sudan [August 11, 2005-July 9, 2011]

G8_ [IGO]; Group of Eight, consisting of the eight leading industrialized countries [1998-2014]

KIIR_ [SSD]; Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of Southern Sudan [July 30, 2005-July 9, 2011]

KONARE_ [IGOAFROAU]; Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairman of the Commission of the African Union [September 16, 2003-February 1, 2008]

MCCORMACK_ [USAGOV]; Sean McCormack, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs [June 2, 2005-January 20, 2009]

PRONK_ [IGOUNO]; Jan Pronk, UN Special Representative for Sudan [2004-2006]

ARBOUR_ [IGOUNO]; Louise Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [July 1, 2004-August 21, 2008]

HILARY_BENN_ [GBR]; Secretary of State for International

Development [October 6, 2003-June 28, 2007]

DJINNIT_ [IGOAFROAU]; Said Djinnit, Comissioner for Peace and

Security at the African Union [c. 2006-2007]

UNMIS_ [IGOUNO]; United Nations Mission in Sudan [March 24,

2005-July 9, 2011]

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