The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy in International Politics

Dissertation

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Abstract

The problem of intentions is central to all major paradigms of international relations theory. Each paradigm has offered mechanisms by which intentions can be approximated, though not known. These mechanisms range from costly signaling in rationalism, iterative interaction in institutional liberalism, to reflected appraisals and identity in constructivism. Each of these perspectives involves agents observing the external behavior of actors and creating a theory about that behavior based on folk psychology reasoning. In this dissertation I present an alternate mechanism for understanding intentions that relies on simulating the intentions of others rather than theorizing about them. I argue that through face-to-face interaction actors are able to simulate the intentions of others, creating a one-to-one physical correspondence in the brain between individuals. This simulation allows actors to understand and replicate the intentions of others from an internal first-person perspective rather than an external third-person perspective. I investigate the implications of this finding for international relations theory, face-to-face diplomacy, and illustrate its effects empirically in diplomatic history.

Dedication

Dedicated to Lindsay.

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Fields of Study

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Introduction: Divergent Outcomes in Personal Diplomacy

Many leaders and diplomats throughout history have described the virtues of what is commonly referred to as "personal diplomacy." The idea is simple. By physically meeting a counterpart in a face-to-face interaction, greater understanding and cooperation may be obtained. Winston Churchill, for instance, believed that it was "informal conferences without any strict agenda" that would "further world peace and… ensure Britain's continued status as a great power."[1] Ronald Reagan pushed his advisers, many of whom were against the idea, on the need for meeting face-to-face with Soviet leadership during the Cold War. He believed that persuasion was best accomplished not through cable wires but by sitting down and speaking directly with an adversary.[2] This idea of sitting down with another to obtain cooperation is not a new one. Mary Stuart in the 16th Century lamented the fact that she was never to meet her cousin, Queen Elizabeth I, and attributed mistrust to their inability to relate to each other face-to-face. As Jane Dunn notes, "The fact they were never to meet is the black hole at the heart of their relationship, the dramatic axis of their story. It fueled the tragedy that ended in bitterness, fear and death. The lack of human connection allowed

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[1] Larres 2002, 28.
[2] Mann 2009.

each to make what she would of the other."[3] Personal diplomacy continues to be debated into the present, exemplified by recent debates in the 2008 United States Presidential campaign which focused on whether or not the U.S. should "sit down with terrorists," in this case Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, in order to negotiate and better understand the other's positions.[4]

Despite this widely-shared belief of many world leaders that sitting down face-to-face inspires cooperation, the historical record has left many, and in particular scholars of International Relations (IR), pessimistic. Deception, not sincere dialogue, and misperceptions, not mutual understanding, often underpins these tête-à-têtes. Confronted with what seemed to be inevitable war, Neville Chamberlain in September 1938 traveled to meet Adolf Hitler in Berchtesgaden in order to, in his words, "change the whole situation," by persuading Hitler to accept a negotiated settlement that would provide breathing room and mitigate the prospects of war.[5] In that infamous encounter, Hitler signaled to Chamberlain that allowing Germany to annex Sudetenland would make Germany content, enabling cooperation. Chamberlain left the meeting trusting Hitler, taking him at his word. Upon returning to Britain, Chamberlain remarked to his Cabinet, "when Herr Hitler announced that he meant to do something it was certain that he would do it."[6] Chamberlain would later be disappointed that he had seemingly read Hitler's intentions incorrectly and Britain soon found itself at war. The failure of face-

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[3] Dunn 2005, 238.
[4] Gordon and Zeleny 2007.
[5] Quoted in Self 2000.
[6] Meetings of the British Cabinet 23(95).

to-face to mitigate international crises as led some analysts, such as Sol Sanders, to suggest that "personal diplomacy, whether practiced by Franklin D. Roosevelt with the cool disdain of a Hudson River patroon or Henry Kissinger with his accent 'mit schlag', has largely led to disaster."[7]

Yet, other episodes in diplomatic history illustrate the significant and sometimes truly transformative force of face-to-face interactions in overcoming long-standing cultural and identity conflicts. According to leaders in Europe in 1988, the notion that Soviet leadership would accept an end to the Cold War that included a unified Germany integrated into NATO ranged from unlikely to inconceivable. As late as October of that year, Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany, responded to the likelihood that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev would provide unity to Germany as "the realm of fantasy." There was little indication that unification would even be on the agenda of negotiation topics for the coming year. After all, there were far more pressing concerns such as arms reduction agreements that needed attention. Yet, less than one year later, by the summer of 1989, events in Hungary kicked off a chain of reactions that ultimately resulted in the Berlin wall falling in November. German unification and NATO membership quickly followed in 1990. What was once believed to be fantasy had become real, and in very short order. What explains this drastic change of course in world history? Dennis Ross, Condoleezza Rice, President George H.W. Bush, and others, who took part in negotiating the reunification of Germany, credit the face-to-

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[7] Sanders 2008.

face initiatives they undertook with their Soviet counterparts.[8] Ross, for instance, notes that these meetings, echoing Neville Chamberlain's words, fundamentally changed the entire situation, transforming reunification as inconceivable to inevitable.[9]

Finally, the belief that face-to-face is beneficial for cooperation extends beyond security concerns to nearly all aspects of international politics. Despite the significant changes in communication and transportation that globalization has brought to the world, the structure of international politics and diplomacy has, in many ways, remained unchanged. Today's leaders and diplomats travel the globe to meet personally with friends and adversaries just as their counterparts in the 14th and 15th centuries did. Teleconferencing and internet communication technologies (ICTs) have fundamentally changed the way that business and other types of social interaction are conducted, yet the basic process of negotiating while looking the other in the eye continues to dominate diplomacy efforts, both bilaterally and multilaterally. With the advent of these new communication tools, some have questioned whether these tête-à-têtes are necessary. Consider the recent United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. Political pundits astutely observed the irony in negotiators traveling thousands of miles in high-emissions aircraft in order to discuss how best to reduce overall emissions.[10] Similar criticisms have been levied at other multilateral conferences, such as the G-20 Summit. Critics of the 2010 Toronto conference asked whether it was wise for

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[8] Cf. Zelikow and Rice 1999; Ross 2008; Maynard 2008; Bush and Scowcroft 1999.
[9] Ross 2008, 39.
[10] Miller 2009.

statesmen and women to engage in costly extravagant meetings at a time of global recession.[11] These concerns are important and go beyond partisan rankle. They speak to a number of salient theoretical and policy questions.

First, why do diplomats and leaders travel the globe to meet face-to-face when communication technologies should theoretically make such travel unnecessary? Does face-to-face *actually* improve the prospects for cooperation or do leaders choose it for other reasons, such as false beliefs about its effectiveness, overconfidence in their own persuasion abilities, habit, tradition and symbolism, and so forth? Second, if face-to-face does provide something unique of value, under what conditions does it not achieve its desired outcome, notably cooperation? That is, what is it about face-to-face contact that sometimes results in mutual understanding and cooperation and in other cases creates misperception or enables some of the most infamous cases of deception and misdirection in history?

Theories of cooperation and conflict often ignore the role of individuals and their modes of interaction. State estimates of power and resolve are said to matter, not those of diplomats or individual leaders. This article joins a growing chorus of views that suggest individuals and individual psychology need to be incorporated into our explanations of political outcomes. Following decades of separation of individual psychology from IR theory's main focus, understanding the nature and structure of the

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[11] "The G20 Summit: A Billion-Dollar Waste of Time," Macleans Online, June 17.

international system[12], psychology is now a fixture in the IR landscape and influences diverse approaches from decision-making[13], to nationalism and identity[14], to potentially even the structure of the international system itself[15]. The study of psychology and role of individuals in IR is now being used to understand core mechanisms and structures of international politics. The justification for this move is an understanding that ultimately the *how* of politics, however complex, is ultimately conducted by individuals and existing theories about state power or resolve often cannot explain the variation in outcomes that occur through the practice of politics.

In this dissertation I suggest that in order to understand the puzzle of face-to-face interaction we not only need to account for the individuals involved in the practice of politics but the core mechanisms of face-to-face communication that may make it different than other types of interaction. Recent advances in the neurosciences have identified the neurophysiological mechanisms by which individuals empathize, trust, and understand others. As will be illustrated, these mechanisms are different in face-to-face interaction and other types of interaction, suggesting specific reasons why face-to-face politics may be a unique form of international political practice. These findings suggest that IR need to take seriously not only the practice of diplomacy and the divergent outcomes that obtain from face-to-face interaction, but the neural correlates of social behavior as well.

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[12] Waltz 1979; Wendt 1999.
[13] Levy 1997.
[14] cf. Herrmann et al. 2004.
[15] Wendt 2010.

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Just as all politics is ultimately conducted by individuals, all politics is also reflected in the brain. The brain has largely been treated as a black box by political scientists, largely because of limitations in the ability to study it and make inferences from it. The relatively new field of Social Neuroscience (SN) is problematizing this position and has already made significant contributions to psychology and economics with respect to consistent and replicable insights into decision-making, judgment, and human nature. SN holds particular promise for the study of international relations because it provides new insights into how individuals see the political world, the international system, and other actors within the system. Further, SN insights help us to make sense of long-standing puzzles and theoretical problems that have been difficult to address without access to knowledge about how politics is reflected in this brain. In this article I will suggest that the puzzle of face-to-face diplomacy, specifically why it sometimes results in more cooperative outcomes and other times results in furthering a crisis, is one where knowledge of the brain provides new perspectives and potential answers.

Specifically, I argue that face-to-face interaction involves greater activation of mirroring systems in the brain than in other interaction modalities. This mirroring involves a discrete set of neurons, aptly titled "mirror neurons," whose function is to replicate and simulate what occurs in the brain of the other individual. Put another way, in a face-to-face interaction the brains of individuals are actively simulating what is going on in the other's head. This creates what some have referred to as a "shared

circuit," a unique connection between people. The shared connection serves a number

of purposes. First, mirror neurons are heavily implicated in empathy, the ability to

understand what it is like to be someone else and feel what is occurring within another

individual. Second, mirror neurons are also involved in specific intention

understanding. The shared circuit allows individuals to better understand what the other

intends to do, how they intend to act, and whether they are being truthful with respect to

very specific intentional acts. This simulation of the other, engendered through the

shared neural circuit that is created when individuals interact face-to-face, and its ability

to aid in understanding intentions helps to explain why face-to-face may lead to greater

cooperation under some conditions and not others. As I will suggest below, the shared

circuit predicts that face-to-face will be most useful with respect to cooperation when

salient questions involve the specific intentions of others. This finding therefore not

only speaks to face-to-face diplomacy and when it should be pursued, but also informs

the long-standing problem of intentions in IR theory. If intentions *can* be understood

through face-to-face interaction, then this provides an important corrective to the claim

that intentions are fundamentally unknowable in IR.

Face-to-Face Findings in Other Disciplines

The observation that face-to-face interaction has an effect on social outcomes is

not new. In the early negotiations literature, for instance, Morley and Stephenson found

that you could reach different agreements in the same negotiation, depending on

whether the exercise took place face-to-face or through audio only.[16] Psychologists have demonstrated through many years of clinical investigation how face-to-face interaction creates more trust in the relationship between individuals, a finding that has significantly affected the way therapists conduct psychotherapy,[17] and in some instances these efforts have been applied to long-standing emotional, cultural, and prejudicial conflicts as well.[18] Economists have demonstrated that even in bargaining games with mixed motives and various "social dilemma" structures, such as a prisoner's dilemma (PD), face-to-face interaction is a significant predictor of greater cooperation, even more so than identity and group relations.[19] David Sally, in a comprehensive review of over 130 PD treatments buttresses this claim by finding support that visual interaction and discussion are highly predictive of cooperation.[20]

Chartrand and Bargh have taken the effects of face-to-face interaction further, demonstrating that not only do individuals reach different agreements, find more trust, understand and cooperate each other more in a face-to-face interaction, they also tend to mimic each other.[21] Participants in experiments will smile more times per minute if they are faced with a smiling confederate, will rub their faces more when faced with a confederate who rubs their face, and if students are interacting with professors before taking a test they will perform better than if they were interacting with soccer hooligans.

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[16] Morley and Stephenson 1969; 1970.
[17] cf. Kraut et al. 1998.
[18] Allport 1954; Kelman 1958.
[19] cf. Ostrom and Walker 1997; Ostrom 2000.
[20] Sally 1995.
[21] Chartrand and Bargh 1999.

This "chameleon effect" has illustrated that not only does face-to-face have an impact on a number of overt outcomes (or dependent variables) such as cooperation and IQ, it has a significant impact on sub-conscious and unreflective outcomes as participants. When debriefed after the experiments, participants typically fail to note their partners' mannerisms that they were mimicking.[22]

While researchers have long understood that face-to-face makes a difference, the reasons how and why have been contested. Explanations of how and why have tended to center on what face-to-face is *correlated with* and not necessarily what is *saliently different* about face-to-face relative to other modalities. For instance, rationalists often interpret the findings of face-to-face leading to more cooperation by noting that through face-to-face interaction one gains new information and this accounts for the changing of preferences in the game.[23] Consider the idea that diplomacy can be somewhat accurately described by the metaphor of a poker game, complete with bluffs, concealed information, deception, and rational risk-taking.[24] Any new information at all, be it a twitch, a wry smile, etc. is theoretically useful information to be analyzed. Thus, the value of face-to-face is that it provides new information that is not available through other interaction modalities.

Business managers and scholars suggest that face-to-face communication creates a structure of informality that results in better access to the "real" individual, not

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[22] Goldman 2006.
[23] cf. Ross 2008.
[24] cf. Fiddick 1989; Sartori 2005.

clouded by formality.[25] Others might suggest that it is publicity and location that matter: the audience has the ability to adjudicate truth claims and critically think about the positions presented,[26] forcing participants to interact in ways they would not in private (such as over the telephone). Scholars of discourse argue that it is the communication itself that results in more cooperation in face-to-face interaction,[27] but for reasons to be discussed below, less cooperation in written communications.[28] Finally, a sociologist might contend that through face-to-face interaction a relation, or rapport, with the other is developed, thereby lessening *self*-interest and promoting a more *common*-interest.[29]

As David Sally points out, there is a fissure between theory and experience.[30] We have experimental findings to know that face-to-face makes a difference and we have a variety of different explanations for why face-to-face makes a difference; what we lack is compelling evidence to adjudicate between our various theories of why. Most importantly, without understanding what it is about face-to-face that makes a difference, it is difficult to predict under what conditions face-to-face will fail to produce a normatively desirable outcome: when might face-to-face lead to misunderstanding? When does face-to-face fail to engender cooperation?

Neuroscience helps us to fill in these gaps in understanding and propose specific hypotheses about face-to-face in diplomatic contexts. I argue that the social

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[25] cf. Misztal 2000.
[26] cf. Mitzen 2005.
[27] Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee 1977; Loomis 1959.
[28] Sheffield 1989; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman 1998.
[29] Drolet and Morris 2000.
[30] Sally 1995.

neuroscience findings suggest that the added value of face-to-face ultimately resides in intention understanding and trust, which are central building blocks of *robust cooperation*. I conceptualize robust cooperation as both agreement regarding an action to be taken (intention) and belief that the other will uphold the agreement and take that action (trust). The shared circuit and mirroring system suggest that face-to-face helps individuals to better understand and read the specific intentioned behavior of each other. I argue that face-to-face is best viewed as a key later step in the negotiation process, not a first step. Simply placing two individuals in a room to work out their differences will likely produce undesirable results, as the empirical literature demonstrates. Rather, face-to-face is best utilized when the final roadblock to cooperation is belief that the other will uphold a *specific* intention. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, many of the "failures" of face-to-face can be attributed to a lack of discussion focus on specific intentions and rather broad thematic or historical areas of discontent. Finally, this mechanism of the shared circuit leading to intention understanding and trust takes place in complicated social and political environments, with a number of intervening variables at work. Desire to deceive the other, long-standing emotional responses, cultural conflict, power, and identity differences may all have an effect on how effective face-to-face is at building trust around intentions. This dissertation seeks to evaluate these intervening variables and produce specific conditions under which we should expect face-to-face to aid and hinder robust cooperation.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, having briefly provided an overview of the perspective this dissertation will take and the general argument, I will develop the argument in depth and more concretely by tracing the problem of intentions in IR theory. I will argue that the intentions problem in IR is, in large part, manifestation of the larger philosophical problem of other minds. That is, if the larger philosophical problem can be overcome, so too may part of the intentions problem. I will next demonstrate how neuroscience findings suggest ways in which under a number of certain conditions, the problem of other minds is mitigated and intentions can be understood through face-to-face. From this novel understanding of face-to-face interaction I develop hypotheses regarding instances when the IR problem of intentions might be mitigated. I will conclude by discussing how these hypotheses will be tested in real-world cases involving complex social and political contexts. It is, after all, one thing to argue that neuroscience would predict intention understanding under *perfect* conditions, but another to argue that neuroscience can inform anything about complex and often messy political conditions. The final section of the chapter addresses the structure of the dissertation.

The Difficulty of Intentions: A Philosophical Problem of Human Interaction
<u>The Political Problem</u>

The problem of intention understanding is central to much of IR theory. For realists, the problem forms the basis of uncertainty, the notion that in an anarchic world without a government to oversee the actions of states, states can never be sure about

how others will act.[31] Consequently, this uncertainty leads to many roads of potential

conflict, often in the form of security dilemmas and a disincentive to cooperate. Much

of the theoretical developments seek to understand ways in which this problem might be

overcome. For liberal institutionalists, the realist pessimism is misplaced as intentions

can be understood through repeated interactions and reciprocity often leading to

cooperation.[32] For constructivists, socialization and common identity creation can help

to create common expectations regarding intentions.[33] At the end of the day, however,

intentions remain fundamentally unknowable; there are a variety of mechanisms

whereby states may derive beliefs regarding the intentions of others, but knowing them

seems to be an unobtainable goal.

  Ultimately the problem of intentions in IR lies in the inability to get inside the

head of other leaders and diplomats in order to understand their true intentions.

Extrapolating intentions from behavior, words, prior actions, etc. are all *approximations*

of intentions based on inference. One can never confirm how another state is intending

to act as states do not have access to the minds of decision-makers; they only have

access to behaviors and words that may or may not be correlated well with actual

intentions. As Alexander Wendt notes, the problem of intentions boils down to this lack

of an ability to get inside the heads of others. "It is hard to read individual minds

because we cannot see inside them. Lacking telepathic powers, we have to fall back on

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[31] Rathbun 2007.
[32] Keohane 1984.
[33] Wendt 1999.

context and behavior to infer what others are thinking."[34] This is the standard story told with respect to many face-to-face interactions, including Chamberlain and Hitler's encounters. Chamberlain, unable to "get inside the head" of Hitler was left to infer and approximate (incorrectly as it turned out) what he believed Hitler was thinking. Thus the root cause of the political intentions problem in IR relates to the inability of individuals to read the minds of others. The counterfactual seems clear: if we *had* the ability to read minds then the intentions problem would be severely undercut.

The Philosophical Problem

The IR problem of not being able to know intentions of actors stems, I argue, from larger philosophical questions that relate to how actors interact and can come to know the mental states of each other without being able to "look inside" their heads. Put simply, how is it possible to know that other actors think like I do, let alone be able to understand and predict their intentions? John Austin frames the problem simply: "How do we know that another person is angry? … Do we ever know?"[35] Philosophers of mind have unpacked this puzzle into two components: the problem of "other minds" and what "theory of mind" helps us to understand human interaction. The problem of other minds asks how it is possible for actors to know that other actors are similar in thoughts of mind. After all, we often take as a given that all humans experience states of mind similar to what we experience: pain, pleasure, fear, etc. Yet, what justifies that

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[34] Wendt 1999, 222.
[35] Austin 1979, 76.

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certainty? The second problem, assuming that we can be justified in thinking that others have similar minds to our own, is how through human interaction we come to know the mental states of others. While it seems clear that humans experience certain emotional states, for instance, how do actors, through the course of interaction, come to understand those states in others? This problem, categorized broadly as a conception of theory of mind, gets to the heart of intention understanding. If we can delineate how human interaction leads to intention beliefs, we can begin to understand how intentions might be predicted and understood.

The notion that others have minds like our own is almost universal in our everyday language. It is taken as a given, for instance, that we can speak of foreign leaders, diplomats, decision-makers, voters, etc. in terms that would be used to describe other human minds. In election cycles it is routine to speak of "unhappy voters" and the ability to predict what candidates will do, such as drop out of a race or continue on in the cycle.[36] We thus routinely refer to others as if they possess emotions, motivations, intentions, etc., similar to our own. In human interaction, it is understood that the actors engaging with each other share and experience similar states of mind. Indeed this is what seems to make communication possible: the ability for two actors to engage with each other and understand what the other is talking about requires at some level similar minds. An actor in an interaction with another might note that they are in serious pain. This interaction will only have the desired effect (exchanging information about a

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[36] cf. Phillips, Lueck, et al. 2008.

mental state) if both actors have some shared understanding of what it means to experience serious pain. Both actors, in other words, must have a shared mental framework about pain or else they are simply speaking past each other.

The problem of other minds occurs precisely because there is a large disconnect between our access to our own inner experience and our access to the *experience* of others. We can often tell when we are in serious pain, for instance. Yet, we do not have access to the mental states of other humans to tell whether or not *they* are in serious pain. This creates an information asymmetry between what we know about ourselves and what can be known about others. The problem has both epistemological and conceptual components. The epistemological problem is that understanding the mental states of others requires a specific type of knowledge. Observational or empirical evidence of serious pain is not enough. An actor can observe the mental state of pain in another human being, but this does not solve the problem. What is needed is the ability to observe the mental state of pain as a mental state belonging to another human being. Put another way, to truly be able to solve the problem of other minds, one must be able to *experience* another's mental state, providing something of a guarantee that the other actor is experiencing pain. From an epistemological perspective then the problem of other minds is significant because observation or communication about a mental state does not satisfy the experiential necessity of experiencing someone else's mental state as one's own.

The conceptual problem of other minds is that it is very difficult to envision a set of interactions by which it would be possible to acquire the mental states belonging to human beings other than ourselves. Every experience we have, every interaction we have with others, is necessarily our own mental state *and not* the mental state of others. As mentioned above, we may be told in an interaction that another actor is in pain, and we might be able to witness evidence of such a claim (such as an open wound or the sight of blood), but this does not satisfy the conceptual problem of experiencing the pain of others as the pain of ourselves. Indeed any experience is our own and by definition, it would seem, cannot be that of another actor. Wittgenstein sums up the problem succinctly: "If I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had."[37] Put another way, is the pain another experiences the same as the pain I experience? At base, the experience of pain, and every other mental state, is experienced in one's own mind and thus it is difficult to justify that one's experience is at all similar to the experience that another goes through under similar conditions. Our own experience is necessarily the lens through which all experience, even that of others, is felt.

While there is no agreed upon solution to the problem of other minds, one method is worth mentioning here: analogical inference. J.S. Mill[38] and others[39] have argued that a simple, if not elegant, solution to the problem is that we understand other

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[37] Wittgenstein 1953, 350.
[38] Mill 1865.
[39] cf. Melnyk 1994.

minds through analogical inference. That is, in our lives we tend to view other human beings performing and acting in very similar manners to the ways in which we live our lives. Just as I might cry or wince when I cut myself in the kitchen, so too do others cry and wince when they cut themselves. Just as I take pleasure from a walk through a park on a nice day, it seems as if others do as well. Through our witnessing the behavior of others, which all seem very similar to behaviors that we experience, we are able to *infer* that others are like ourselves. Put simply, because other humans share many similarities with myself, I am able to infer that they have an inner life that it is very similar to my own.[40] This analogical inference seemingly is at the heart of all social interaction. Our ability to interact with others relies on an inference that who we are acting with is, at some level, like ourselves. This is one of the reasons why interacting with other social beings is different from interacting with other animals.

The problem with the analogical inference is that it does not meet the criteria needed to solve the epistemological problem. While inference about shared mental behaviors seems reasonable, and arguably we all do it when we interact with others, there is no way to falsify or confirm the inference. As Ryle has pointed out, it is logically impossible to validate the conclusion that others are like ourselves based on inference: there is no way to "check up" on the outcome.[41] Further objections to the analogical inference solution note that at best the analogy is drawn based on one case

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[40] Hyslop and Jackson 1972; Hyslop 1995.
[41] Ryle 1949, 15.

(i.e. one's own mental state) and therefore will always be fatally flawed.[42] Various other modifications have been made to the inference argument, but in the end the analogy between *observed behavior* and *inferred mental states* will always rely on the idea that mental states and behavior are linked, perhaps causally, and that because other humans have behaviors similar to my own, we know their mental states are the same as mine.[43]

Recent neuroscientific evidence problematizes this view. The discovery of the mirroring system in the brain suggests that we come to understand each other's mental states not by inference but rather by simulating the other's mental states. This new evidence states that actors share certain neural and biological responses which allow them to "get in the head" of the other by *experiencing* what the other experiences. What is produced in the brain of one actor in a given interaction is reproduced in the mind of the other. This suggests that not only do individuals share similar minds, but we can literally "get into" each other's minds more easily than previously thought, and we experience the pain others experience, by focusing on our reactions to particular stimuli. Importantly, this simulation of experience allows us to make progress on both the epistemological and conceptual questions regarding mind reading and intentions, which in term informs the political problem of intentions.

Understanding Intentions: The Role of Mirroring
A Cognitive Approach to Mind-Reading: "Theory-Theory"

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[42] Malcolm 1962.
[43] cf. Ayer 1956.

Contemporary research in the philosophical problem of how we ascertain the mental states of others falls into two broad theoretical camps. One perspective that has dominated much thought on this topic is that we rely on innate theories of mental states that we have derived throughout our lives. To use a simple example, if I witness someone sitting at a restaurant with their face in their hands crying, I can infer through my experiences in life, that this individual is sad. I have, put another way, a folk-psychological theory of how others think. The cognitive mechanisms at work here are reasoning, observation and intuition. We use these mechanisms to understand, explain, and predict the mental states, intentions, and behavior of other individuals.

Theory of mind scholars have termed this view "theory-theory" (TT) which suggests that individuals observe the other and derive predictions from law-like "folk" generalizations that are based on their own experiences. After observing behavior, we create theories about their mental states, just as an untrained folk physicist might create theories that explain physical systems and phenomenon. We then look for evidence to support the theory, usually in the form of finding individual beliefs, desires, motivations, etc. that "cause" their behavior. The key to understanding others, is quite simply, to figure out those beliefs and motivations. Clinical psychologists and developmental specialists have explored theory-theory empirically with children, arguing that a child grows in ability to mind-read and their propensity to get better at it as they age, provides evidence of theory-theory because the folk theory they possess

grows and becomes more robust.[44] Finally, individuals in TT are decidedly autonomous

and detached from each other; the observation and mental processing occurs completely

within the domain of each individual, such that "never the twain shall meet." As will be

discussed below shortly, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers have begun to,

perhaps counter-intuitively, shed their theories of this important assumption.

If the TT mode of reasoning the intentions and behaviors of other actors seems

natural and intuitive, it is likely because positivist social science in general and much of

cognitivist IR scholarship in particular, operate along these lines. As behaviorism in

fields such as psychology began to decline in the 1950s and 60s, cognitive scientists

looked inward rather than outward for explanations of mental states. Rather than

behavior explaining what individuals were thinking, cognitivists argued that individuals

possessed inner "representations" or "symbols" about the world in front of them and the

word "theory" was adopted to describe what these representations/symbols constituted

and how they operated.[45] For cognitivists, our mental representations and symbols could

be understood and deduced through law-like rules and algorithms if we knew how the

representations were created. Whereas a behaviorist might suggest "X believes that it is

raining if X is disposed to take an umbrella if he goes out," this only works if the rain

believer does not like getting wet. It could be, after all, that the person does not take an

umbrella but still believes it is raining. The behavior does not say much about the

underlying mental state.

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[44] Astington et al. 1988; Perner 1991; Gopnik and Wellman 1992.
[45] cf. Sellars 1955; Lewis 1972.

Cognitivists attacked this problem by suggesting it is not just the behavior that matters, but indeed inner beliefs as well as desires that explain mental states. Cognitivists posited that we each possess an inner representation of the beliefs and desires of others that constitute a commonsense theory of what others are thinking: there is no straight line from behavior to mental state, but rather we invoke a theory of desire + belief, in conjunction with behaviors in understanding mental states. Therefore, one might possess a "theory" about individuals who do like getting wet in the rain and those who do not, honed through time and experience, constantly updating like a database of experiences. As noted above, the Self and Other are distinct and separate entities. Each side in an interaction internally responds to presentations of the Other,[46] signals/indices,[47] behaviors,[48] words/discourse,[49] identity,[50] and images,[51] among others, through processes of observation, deduction of beliefs/desires, interpretation, and reasoning. Ultimately, an explanation of behavior is deduced through a theoretical/folk-psychology perspective that brings together all of this "data" and checks it against the database of experiences the individual has amassed over time. As other IR scholars have pointed out, many of our own theories, be they realist, liberal, or constructivist, invoke either implicitly or explicitly, cognitivist perspectives.[52]

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[46] cf. Goffman 1959.
[47] cf. Jervis 1989.
[48] cf. Simmons 2000.
[49] cf. Schimmelfennig 2003.
[50] cf. Wendt 1999.
[51] cf. Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995.
[52] Tetlock 1998.

The recently identified mirroring system in the brain suggests that rather than other minds posing an intractable problem of access, we actually have quite sophisticated access to other mental states, even if it is unknowingly.[53] This access relies on *simulating* the mental states of others. The ramification for this is that in addition to a folk psychology used to understand and explain the behavior of individuals, there might exist another mechanism by which individuals come to understand each other.

An Alternative Explanation: "Simulation Theory"

The second approach, termed "simulation theory," proposes that we come to understand the mental states of others by "putting ourselves in the other's shoes." Simulation theory pre-dates the discovery of mirror neurons and mirroring capabilities in the brain and stems from skepticism about theory-theory's claim that individuals possess a folk psychology that encompasses vast laws of social behavior. Kahneman and Tversky illustrate this skepticism with a thought experiment.[54] Subjects were told a story about two travelers who shared the same limousine to the airport and were delayed in traffic. Both were scheduled to fly on flights that left at the same time, but both arrived to the airport thirty minutes late. Airline personnel told actor A that his flight left on time. Actor B was told that his flight was delayed and he had just missed it five minutes ago. The question posed to subjects was: "Who was more upset?" Nearly

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[53] cf. Iacoboni 2008.
[54] Kahneman and Tversky 1982.

everyone in the subject pool (96%) chose Actor B. This is an excellent experiment for

the question of how we come to know mental states because it explicitly asks subjects

to read the minds of the two fictitious actors in the story. For theory-theory to be right,

there has to exist some folk psychology causal explanation or law that subjects used to

come to the conclusion that Actor B was upset. While such a law conceivably could

exist, the experiment shows just how robust and comprehensive one's folk theory of

behavior and mental states must be in order to account for the many behavior

possibilities in life. Far more likely, simulation-theory proponents argue, is that the

subjects in the experiment are putting themselves in the shoes of the fictitious travelers.

They are trying to imagine how *they* would feel in the place of Actor A and Actor B.[55]

This concept can be extended to decision prediction as well, as Gallese and

Goldman note.[56] They suggest in a game of chess, in order to predict the next move of

the opponent, one tries to simulate in one's own mind what they would do in a similar

situation.[57] They argue that what is occurring in these examples and illustrations of

decision-making is the inner creation of *pretend* desires, preferences, etc., that one

assumes the other actor to hold and then these pretend desires and preferences are

inputted into one's own decision-making. The output of this pretend decision becomes

the predicted output of the other individual. Thus mind-reading, the ability to

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[55] Goldman 1989.
[56] Gallese and Goldman 1998.
[57] Ibid, 496-497.

understand and predict mental states in others, occurs by largely simulating the same decision in one's own mind.

Perhaps most important in assessing the two theories is the difference between theory-theory and simulation theory. As Gallese and Goldman argue, the key point in delineating the two theories of mind is that theory-theory is a detached theoretical activity while simulation theory is an attempt to replicate, mimic, or impersonate the mental states of the target.[58] In simulation there is a "correspondence between the mental activity of the simulator and target" that does not exist in theory-theory.[59] This difference between the two theories suggests that we can empirically test which one is correct. For simulation-theory to be correct we would expect to find evidence of mental mimicry in the brain. Since theory-theory makes no claim about mimicking, such evidence would support the simulation theorists' view of mind-reading. If simulation-theory is correct, this has significant ramifications for our problem of intention understanding since the base problem about not being able to get into the heads of others is mitigated.

Using Neuroscience to Understand Intention-Reading: Mirror Neurons

Recently, Italian neuroscience researchers were amazed at a discovery involving macaque monkeys. A distinctive class of neurons in the brain fire both when a monkey

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[58] Gallese and Goldman 1998, 479.
[59] Ibid.

executes a motor act *and* when it observes another performing the same motor act.[60] If a monkey saw someone else eating an ice cream cone, neurons would fire in the monkey's brain *as if* the monkey itself was eating an ice cream cone as well. Further, these neurons do not discharge when simple presentation of an ice cream cone or banana is present. Nor do they fire when the monkey observes hand actions without a target (such as an ice cream cone). Rather, the neurons *only* fire when the researcher's hand is *specifically interacting* with an object.[61] These neurons have thus been termed "mirror neurons" because of the functional role they play in the brain: they actively replicate, or mirror, the intentional actions of others.[62]

A growing body of literature suggests that this same type of "mirroring" apparatus is not relegated to monkeys; humans exhibit these mirror neurons as well. A number of theories exist as to why we would possess such apparatus. Some scholars argue that the mirroring system presents a type of learning tool: it is through visual perception of action that we come to understand action and imitate it.[63] Others have argued that mirror neurons are central to language evolution. While human communication is conducted mostly through sounds, hand gestures, facial gestures, facial expressions, etc., all are part of the human communication complex and, in a sense, contribute to language. Some have taken mirror neurons to support a "gestural theory of speech origin," arguing that the neurons provide a direct link between the

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[60] Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996a.
[61] Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996a.
[62] Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004.
[63] Rizzolatti et al. 2001; Buccino et al. 2004.

message (such as a gesture) and its understanding by the receiver.[64] Others argue that

the apparatus is central to linking individuals together such that we can understand each

other and work together.[65] While all of these hypotheses are interesting and contribute

to the literature, it is likely a mistake to look for one single evolutionary function of

mirror neurons, as neural structures rarely have a single function. Rather, they likely

contribute to a number of functions, including motor imitation, language development,

intention understanding and empathy. It is these latter two functions that are of

particular relevance to political science.

Any action performed by an actor is comprised of two distinct elements: the

"what" and the "why." The "what" is typically a simple observation of the action taken.

Actor A grabs a basketball. The "why" is an inference of intention. Actor A grabs a

basketball because he intends to shoot it at the basketball hoop. Gallese and Goldman,

in a seminal article, hypothesized that mirror neurons serve as the link between the

action "what" and the action "why."[66] That is, the mirror neurons help us to understand

the intentions of the actor by observing the act. Recent fMRI experiments have

supported this hypothesis of "action what" to "action why" mapping. One experiment,

for instance, presented subjects with two conditions. The first involved viewing hand

actions without a particular context. The second involved viewing hand actions

executed in a context that would allow the subject to infer the intention, or the why of

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[64] Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998.
[65] Iacoboni 2008.
[66] Gallese and Goldman 1998.

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the actor. The result was striking: actions embedded in a context produced activation of the mirror neuron system, whereas those actions without context did not. As argued, their experiment illustrates that mirror neurons are involved in the "why" of action: they help us to understand the other's intention in performing a particular act.[67]

A reasonable criticism to this approach, however, is that it is possible that the context is doing all the work and not the neurons. In a social context, this might be termed a more sociological view: the structure and context of the situation provide the clues to intentions, not the neurons. That is, it seems reasonable that we can understand intentions if the context is thick enough. To be convinced that the mirror neurons are doing some work, we need evidence of specific mechanisms underlying the understanding of intentions and not just context. A second experiment attempts to illustrate these mechanisms of intention understanding separate from context alone.[68] Monkeys were trained to perform two actions with different goals. The first monkey was trained to grasp an object in order to place it into a container. The second was trained to grasp an object in order to eat it. What is relevant here is that the initial act, grasping the object, is identical in both cases. Yet, the final goal of the two actions, that which shows intention, is different. The results of the experiment showed that while a few neurons fire selectively when the first act (grasping) is executed, *most* fire only when the subsequent act takes place (placing or eating). Further, some of the mirror neurons selectively discharged during the viewing of motor acts when embedded in a

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[67] Iacoboni et al. 2005.
[68] Fogassi et al. 2005.

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given action. That is, some fired when the hand grasped the object for eating but not when the hand grasped an object for placing. The conclusion that the researchers draw from this is that activation of the mirror neurons is providing information not only about an action, but *why* an action occurred (placing versus eating). This level of specificity is helpful in allowing the observing monkey to: 1) recognize the motor act and 2) code that act as being intended for something to follow. Put simply, the mirror neurons are helping the observer to understand the intentions of the action's agent.

Critically for the purposes of understanding intentions of a political nature, there is evidence to suggest that mirror neurons and simulation are activated not only with simple low-level instrumental *action* understanding, but higher-level *abstract* thinking as well.[69] Indeed, recent theorizing suggests that abstract thinking may be derived from the same processes involved with perception of action, making abstract thinking a form of an "inner motor action."[70] Further, while the mirroring system is invoked in a number of contexts, it is invoked most strongly in face-to-face interaction, presumably because of the rich inputs available through vision, auditory input, and so forth.

One final piece of evidence is relevant in making the case that mirror neurons have a hand in intention understanding. It has been shown through a number of brain imaging studies that children with autism have a damaged mirror neuron system.[71] Thus, the difficulty autistic children have in relating to other individuals, understanding

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[69] Keysers and Gazzola 2007.
[70] Keysers 2007, 4.
[71] Ramachandran and Oberman 2006; Dapretto et al. 2006.

the intentions of others and the world around them might be linked to an ill-functioning

mirroring system. While there is no consensus on this issue as of yet, the autism and

mirror neuron system hypothesis provides an additional way to think about the role of

mirror neurons in mediating intention understanding in everyday life.

In sum, these empirical experiments on simulation, mirroring, and the neural

circuitry invoked tell us quite a bit about social interaction between the self and other.

First, the experience the other goes through, when observed or imagined by the self,

invokes much of the same neural circuitry in the self as it does in the other. This "shared

circuit" is implicated in empathy and shared experiences. Where the other feels pain and

emotional distress, so too does the self. In a very real sense what the other goes through

the self goes through as well. Pain, happiness and other emotional and physical

experiences are shared between the self and other. Second, the mirror neuron system is

most engaged with respect to specific intentional acts. As demonstrated above, the brain

is simulating what is occurring in the other and its ability to do so is mediated by the

specificity of the action; specific actions and intentions are easier to simulate than vague

ones. Third, the mirroring system is invoked in many different communication

modalities, such as listening, reading, and imagining, but is most strongly invoked in

face-to-face interaction. This suggests that simulation will be its strongest when

individuals are interacting face-to-face and have access to a wealth of information from

the face, eyes, and so forth. Finally, recalling the principles of SN identified above, the

mirroring system exists at one level of analysis and must interact with a number of

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variables from other levels, including social and political contexts. It would be a mistake, therefore, to interpret mirroring as the *only* mechanism that matters with respect to face-to-face interaction.

The preceding analysis suggests that in face-to-face interaction policy-makers and diplomats may have a greater ability to understand the specific intentions of the individual they are negotiating with. It is for this reason, I argue, that face-to-face represents a unique interaction modality and might help explain why it continues to dominate as the main structure of diplomacy even with the existence of efficient communication technologies. Put simply, the neuroscience literature would suggest that Winston Churchill and Ronald Reagan were on to something when they believed that there was no replacement for face-to-face. We are now beginning to understand why.

Evaluating the Force of Face-to-Face Interactions in International Politics
Face-to-Face Hypotheses

So far I have presented the problem of other minds as the core problem of intentions in IR scholarship. I have also presented neuroscience findings that suggest, under certain conditions, we can gain access to the minds of others by simulating in ourselves the experiences the other goes through. Pain experiments involving individuals witnessing the pain of others face-to-face illustrate this phenomenon nicely. The principle has been extended to intentioned action as well: we possess architecture in our brains that help us to, unconsciously simulate the intentioned actions of others. But does the same principle apply for abstract political concepts? Is it possible, under

any circumstances, to accurately simulate inside oneself the political intentions of another individual The overarching research question for the dissertation is whether face-to-face can help actors in international politics overcome the well-known problem of intentions. And if so, to what extent?

I argue that the neuroscience findings regarding shared circuits suggest that one reason researchers have noticed that face-to-face interaction is different from other interaction modalities is the active simulation of brain states that occurs when one looks another in the eye. Further, if face-to-face aids in understanding intentions through simulation, then one value of face-to-face interaction in diplomatic contexts is the ability for statesmen to better understand each other by overcoming the fundamental political problem of intentions identified above. It may be in some instance that statesmen wish to cooperate but cannot get past the final step in the process: believing that the other side will uphold their agreement. In such instances the problem of other minds is impeding the potential for robust cooperation. If face-to-face in these political situations operates along the same lines as face-to-face in other non-political situations in that it aids in understanding specific intentions of the other, then face-to-face should help provide a key building block of robust cooperation: intention understanding. Thus, the first research question to be tested is the extent to which individuals in diplomatic face-to-face settings understand the intentions of their counterpart. I argue that face-to-face will yield more accurate understanding of intentions than other interaction modalities, such as cable wires and telephone calls (H_1).

One important difference between the experiments conducted in the neuroscience literature and the real political world is the existence of messy social and political contexts that introduce a number of important variables such as power, identity and faith. It may be that neural mechanisms promote intention understanding, but in political contexts this may not always imply that cooperation follows. Consider a skilled liar operating in a diplomatic context. If the liar enters a negotiation, with the intention to deceive, then the notion that face-to-face may engender intention understanding could aid a liar in enabling deception. Therefore, crucial to our analysis of face-to-face is what happens when an agent attempts to deceive the other. Does the mirroring system imply that it will be easier or harder to be deceived? Based on a large body of literature on the neuroscience of lie detection, I hypothesize that under many conditions face-to-face makes deception more difficult. Building off the work of Paul Ekman and psychologists who study lie detection, I argue that face-to-face, through simulation processes, make deception detection more likely than in other interaction modalities (H_2).[72]

Another variable often present in complex political negotiations is emotion. It is intuitively difficult to understand how face-to-face can be of value when two actors fundamentally distrust or, in extreme cases, hate each other. The conflict resolution literature has long recognized that some disputes are so highly emotional and involve so

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[72] Ekman 2009.

many complexities that they are *intractable*.[73] In these intractable conflicts it is not

clear that simply placing two individuals in a room together will produce a desirable

outcome. Indeed, that strategy may serve to make the conflict worse. Thus, a key

question is whether or not face-to-face can provide a valuable mechanism for

understanding intentions in the most difficult of intractable negotiations. Herbert

Kelman's work on interpersonal relations in conflict resolution settings is seminal in

this regard. Kelman demonstrated through a number of real-world simulations with

Israeli and Palestinians, for instance, that bringing individuals together face-to-face can

have a salient effect on trust-building and "humanizing" the experience, thereby

softening positions and discourse.[74] But does this humanizing effect often translate to

cooperation? And under what conditions does humanizing not take place? I hypothesize

that as face-to-face is ultimately about reading intentions, what aids prediction of what

face-to-face will be successful in emotional conflicts is the specificity of intentions

under consideration. Building off of the neuroscience findings regarding simulation of

specific intentions, I argue that simply placing individuals into a context where they are

asked to cooperate face-to-face is not sufficient for cooperation. Face-to-face is most

helpful for cooperation, when the remaining questions are those of *specific* intentional

actions (H_3). Put another way, negotiations must be advanced to a stage where the final

roadblock regards intentions.

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[73] Bar-Tal 1998.
[74] Kelman 1982; 1994; 1995; 1999; 2011.

One alternate explanation of outcomes that engender in face-to-face interactions is that power or status does most of the work. Consider a traditional standard definition of power, "the ability to influence the behavior of others." From a power perspective it would not be surprising that individuals with more power can engender cooperation face-to-face by compelling the other to act in accordance to the desires of the other. Similarly, status may have an effect as well. Consider a thorny political problem. States may send representatives to meet with others commensurate with the importance of the problem. Mundane air space agreements are usually not negotiated by heads of state but rather lower-level diplomats. Similarly, Cold War summits were attended by head of states, reflecting the gravity of the context. Thus it may be that in most contexts the status and power of the individuals involved may effect the levels of cooperation that ensue. I argue that because intention understanding, understood from a simulation perspective, involves *unconscious* non-cognitive mirroring of the other, power (H_4) and status (H_5) should not have a significant effect on intention understanding, trust, or cooperation.

Finally, analysis of summits and personal diplomacy often places significant emphasis on personalities. The old adage "birds of a feather flock together" may explain quite a bit. Put simply, if individuals get along well and like each other, cooperation should be easier. Personalities likely involve both cognitive and non-cognitive elements and thus their effect is difficult to predict. While I agree that personalities may aid cooperation as it relates to trust, the specifics of personalities aiding in intention

understanding is less clear. I hypothesize that the pre-cognitive nature of intention

understanding suggests that personalities will have little to no effect on specific

intention understanding in a face-to-face interaction (H_6).

These hypotheses can be summarized in the following way:

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Intervening Variable	Dependent Variable and Outcome
1	Interaction modality: face-to-face (F2F) vs. not face-to-face (nF2F)	None	F2F → higher incidence of robust cooperation nF2F → lower incidence of robust cooperation
2	Interaction modality	Faith (i.e. good faith vs. bad faith/deceptive)	F2F → higher incidence of deception detection nF2F → lower incidence of deception detection
3	Interaction modality	Intention Specificity	F2F → robust cooperation when intention specificity is high F2F → no effect when intention specificity is low nF2F → no effect when intention specific is low or high
4/5	Interaction modality	Power/Status	F2F → no effect on intention understanding nF2F → no effect on intention understanding
6	Interaction modality	Personality	F2F → no effect on intention understanding nF2F → no effect on intention understanding

Table 1: Hypotheses and Variables

<u>Methodology Philosophy</u>

I test the effects of face-to-face discussed above through what King, Keohane & Verba have termed a "multiple pronged approach" that utilizes multiple methods to triangulate my research.[75] These methods include case studies of salient face-to-face interactions in diplomatic history and elite interviews. Triangulation of methods is useful in this case because each individual method has its own strength and weaknesses with respect to external and internal validity. That is, some methods, such as case studies, mirror the political world quite well as they draw directly from real world historical experience. On the other hand, case study methodology is often criticized, and rightly so in my view, for necessarily requiring the scholar to focus on what is salient in a case (usually one or two variables) and what is not from incredibly rich and detailed historical contexts. Isolating salient variables is difficult as we cannot easily divorce one causal effect from another and manipulate variables by rerunning the tape of history in order to see their effects. In the end, I argue that methods should be question-driven. In my case, as I am trying to understand a particular causal mechanism in historical and present contexts, and as such approaching the question from multiple methods allows me to isolate causal variables while also understanding their historical significance.

<u>Case Study Selection Criteria</u>

I have chosen to conduct three historical case studies of salient moments in time when face-to-face interaction served as one communication mechanism among others.

[75] King, Keohane & Verba 1994.

These cases are chosen not because the result (i.e. the dependent variable) is in line with my theory, but because they represent significant moments of face-to-face interaction in the international system. Indeed, I specifically chose cases where variation on the dependent variable constitutes "hard cases" for my theory. In addition, I attempted to find cases with rich historical detail, contextual evidence, and salient *within case* variation. This allows for rich process tracing that examines why with the same actors and subject matter some interactions resulted in cooperation and others did not. For instance, in looking at the Gorbachev-Bush interactions regarding German reunification at the end of the Cold War, significant variation in interaction exists between the two parties: letters, cable wires, telephone calls, and face-to-face. This provides a unique ability to compare modes of interaction within the same case and assess their relative effect(s).

The three cases chosen are Mikhail Gorbachev and George H.W. Bush meeting in Malta to discuss German reunification efforts at the end of the Cold War, Hitler and Chamberlain meeting at various times before and at Munich to discuss the annexation of Sudetenland, and Jimmy Carter's Camp David peace process in 1978-1979 involving Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, and their respective negotiating teams. The results of these case studies and the variation in independent, intervening, and dependent variables can be summarized as follows:

Case	Interaction Type(s)	Intervening Variables	Outcome
Gorbachev-Bush	Cable wire, telephone, letter, face-to-face	Good faith Power Personality	High levels of cooperation, trust, intention understanding
Chamberlain-Hitler	Letters, face-to-face	Deception/bad faith Power Personality	Low levels of cooperation, trust, and intention understanding
Sadat-Begin	Mediated interaction, Letters, face-to-face	Good faith Intention specificity Power Personality	Mixed levels of cooperation, trust, and intention understanding

Table 2: Case Study Results

Elite Interviews

The second method I utilize in my research is elite interviews with practitioners in the field who are conducting negotiations in both face-to-face and other settings. The aim of these interviews is to understand how well my theory and empirical evidence comport with the real world experiences of negotiators. I conducted over twenty interviews with high ranking officials, including a Colonel in the army responsible for engaging and building trust among Iraqis and other stakeholders in Baghdad, United States Institute of Peace officials responsible for facilitating Track 1.5 and 2.0 diplomacy efforts, former State department officials specializing in Eastern European affairs during the Cold War, and current United Nations practitioners who specialize in training the art of diplomacy.

Together these methods provide a robust testing strategy that satisfy both internal and external validity concerns:

Method	Internal/External Validity Scale
Case Studies	High external validity Low internal validity
Elite Interviews	Medium external validity Medium internal validity

Table 3: Methodological Validity Concerns

Methodological Concerns: Endogeneity and Confounds

There are a number of challenges posed by studying face-to-face interactions in diplomatic contexts, particularly when the dependent variable of interest involves cooperation. The first is endogeneity. Endogeneity occurs when a variable of interest is correlated with the error term. This can occur through sample selection errors. Consider the argument that face-to-face interaction usually occurs between heads of state when two parties are close to agreement. That is, face-to-face is usually reserved for instances where cooperation will likely happen anyway. If that is the case then it is easy to mistake face-to-face for a salient causal mechanism when, in reality, cooperation was likely anyway.

This is a serious concern that is dealt with through multiple strategies in the dissertation. First, I have chosen cases where cooperation was *not* preordained. The United States undertook a face-to-face strategy with the Soviet Union precisely because

they were not gaining the cooperation they sought. The same is true with the Camp David case study and Chamberlain/Hitler interaction. In all three cases face-to-face was employed precisely because cooperation was not forthcoming. While it is often true that at the highest levels head of state meetings are perfunctory public relations moments, this is not the case in the diplomatic history episodes I study here. Further, the three cases chosen for analysis demonstrate within case variation of the independent variable. This allows comparison of one interaction type with another and reduces the chance that face-to-face is correlated the error term. Finally, in some cases the face-to-face negotiations took place at multiple levels of government. Lower-level diplomats on one side engaged with lower-level diplomats on the other side, paving the way for cooperation.

Finally, one limiting factor of my research design has to do with evidence and the levels of analysis problem. Put simply, I argue that there are neural mechanisms involved in face-to-face interaction that make cooperation easier under certain conditions. While I illustrate the effects of face-to-face at the political level in this dissertation, I do not provide *direct* evidence that the *neural mechanism* I have identified is doing the work, at least with respect to the particular cases I have chosen. This is, at the current time, a technological limitation. With greater access to improving fMRI equipment, I will soon be able to identify the distinct neural components of face-to-face interaction in diplomatic contexts. I elaborate more on this current limitation in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2 - Social Neuroscientific Approaches to International Relations

Introduction

Over the last few decades International Relations (IR) has increasingly imported insights from psychology into theory building. Following decades of separation of individual psychology from IR theory's main focus, understanding the nature and structure of the international system[76], psychology is now a fixture in the IR landscape and influences diverse approaches from decision-making[77], to nationalism and identity[78], to potentially even the structure of the international system itself[79]. Put simply, the general study of psychology and role of individuals in IR theory is back in a rather large way.

One research area of psychology that is beginning to receive widespread attention is the application of findings in biology to better understand social phenomena. These approaches vary in scope and level of analysis. Some researchers have focused on the evolutionary origins of our brain and how this affects our psychological makeup and consequent social behaviors.[80] Others focus less on the details of how we got here in terms of evolutionary process and start their analysis at the genetic level, investigating gene/environment interactions and its subsequent effects on

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[76] Waltz 1979; Wendt 1999.
[77] Levy 1997.
[78] cf. Herrmann et al. 2004.
[79] Wendt 2010.
[80] Cosmides and Tooby 1994.

behavior.[81] Still others begin with the chemistry and architecture of the brain itself, investigating the neural roots of social phenomena[82]. What each of these seemingly disparate areas of research have in common is they all open up the "black box" of the individual to understand just what makes us tick and behave in the manner that we do.

The opening of the box was long believed to be impossible. In 1871, the economist William Jennings noted, "I hesitate to say that men will ever have the means of measuring directly the feelings of the human heart. It is from the quantitative effects of the feelings that we must estimate their comparative amounts."[83] As early as the 19th century economists recognized that their assumptions regarding rational and predictable behavior were problematic, though they also knew that getting inside the heads of individuals to measure these feelings, or departures from rationality, was impossible. This lack of ability to look inside the individual is evident when one considers the trajectories of both economics and political science. In the former, since the "feelings" that Jevons notes are difficult to get at, economists simply dropped them from analysis altogether or labeled them "useless intervening constructs."[84] Revealed preference theory illustrates well this move: unobserved preferences (i.e. those in the black box) are assumed to be the observed decisions individuals make (i.e. those outside the black box).[85] Economists understood this very early on. In a 1897 letter Pareto wrote:

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[81] Robinson 2002; Robinson et al. 2005; Robinson 2010.
[82] Cacioppo et al. 2007; Adolphs 2009.
[83] Cited in Camerer et al. 2005, 9.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Samuelson 1938.

It is an empirical fact that the natural sciences have
progressed only when they have taken secondary
principles as their point of departure, instead of
trying to discover the essence of tings… Pure
political economy has therefore a great interest in
relying as little as possible on the domain of
psychology.[86]

Updates and extensions to this basic premise, be it in expected utility or Bayesian

updating, improved upon the parsimony and mathematical coherence of how decisions

should be made, but nevertheless provided "as if" stories that explained human behavior

without needing to get into much psychological detail.[87] Whether or not these updates

provide any leverage as descriptive models of decision-making is the subject of great

debate.[88]

IR followed a similar trajectory with the rise of behavioralism equating

behaviors with preferences and subsequent domination of rational choice theory, which

assumes rational self-interested individuals, largely sidestepping human vagaries and

psychology.[89] Cognitivism attempted to at least approximate what mental processing

consisted of, incorporating such things as beliefs and desires into the mix, but

nevertheless also suffered from the problem that we are largely guessing about mind

states in our analyses, rather than knowing them.[90] These "as if" approaches, like

rational choice, should not be denigrated because of this guesswork nor is the term

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[86] Quoted in Busino 1964, xxiv.
[87] Rogeberg 2004; Bruni and Sugden 2007.
[88] Schoemaker 1982; Plous 1993; Rabin 2000; Rabin and Thaler 2001.
[89] Snidal 2002.
[90] Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hasenclever et al. 1997.

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meant to be pejorative. The point, however, is that the existence of a black box necessarily means that guesswork is involved. There are, however, significant differences in how this is accomplished. Consider the "armchair" guesswork that involves thinking about states from afar and what their leaders may be thinking and the guesswork of a researcher embedded in a culture for years and inductively inferring how a given leader in that culture may act.[91] Interpretive, reflexive, and ethnographic methods all attempt to approximate the thought processes of individuals and groups embedded within a given culture. Indeed these interpretations make good sense if the brain remains a black box and the approaches that have done so provide useful insights and predictions.[92]

One of the benefits of the black box remaining closed is that you can make any number of assumptions about the box itself. Consider the classical realist claims regarding human nature. For Niebuhr, man possessed a desire to dominate and is essentially evil in his nature. Humans possess "unlimited and demonic potencies of which animal life is innocent."[93] For Morgenthau, there are essentially three motives inspiring the individual: "to live, to propagate and to dominate."[94] We have according to the classical realists, an *animus dominandi*, or desire to dominate. Neorealism replaced this assumption about human feelings, to use Jevons' term, with an assumption about

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[91] Thanks to Rick Herrmann for pointing out this example to me.
[92] Bruni and Sudgen 2007.
[93] Niebuhr 1941, 178-179.
[94] Morgenthau 1960, 36-37.

security. The only requirement for man's nature for Waltz is the desire to survive.[95] In a world of scarce resources, anarchy will be enough to permit violence; no desire for power is necessary.[96] What should be clear from each of these examples is the assumption made about the black box that sets the theory in motion. It need not matter if the realists were right or wrong about their assumptions. Simply by *having* assumptions they were able to construct an overarching theory and approach to understanding world politics that could generate testable hypotheses. Whether explicit or implicit, much of IR theory rests on similar assumptions about our collective individual inner psychology.[97]

Increasingly, recent advances in biology, and specifically the neurosciences, have allowed researchers to "open up" the black box of human psychology and assess whether some of the assumptions we make regarding human psychology are accurate and derive new theoretical insights by observing the connections between social behavior and biological process.[98] Social Neuroscience (SN), a field that emerged in the early 1990s, is focused on the study of how biological, though largely focused on neural, systems both implement social processes *and* how social processes affect biological systems. This is made possible through increasingly advanced technologies, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), which allow three-dimensional precise pictures of functional

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[95] Waltz 1979; Waltz 1997.
[96] Waltz 1979.
[97] Tetlock 1994; McDermott 2004.
[98] Camerer 2007, 1.

processes in the brain and other parts of the body.[99] The study of the brain and nervous

system, allows us to measure what Jevons and social scientists of previous centuries

thought were fundamentally immeasurable: feelings, emotions, thoughts, ideas,

predispositions, instincts, and so forth. We now have the ability to assess many of the

assumptions about how individuals see the world, how they interact with others, and

how they process information, all of which have driven both theory-construction and

empirical testing. This opening of the black box challenges our understanding of social

behavior in many ways, most particularly in that the relationship between brain, mind

and action that is elucidated, or assumed, in IR theory.

    Interestingly, however, there has been considerable push back among some IR

theorists to adopting biological approaches to the study of IR. Despite all political

behavior being reflected in the brain, students of politics have often been uncomfortable

using the brain itself as a source of explanation.[100] The criticisms have been varied.

Duncan Bell has called biology a "false prophet" and warns that the claims that its

proponents tend to make are inflated and ultimately will be shown to be wrong.[101]

Although his critique is aimed more at the evolutionary psychologists, many of his

problems are attributable to biological approach writ large. A common criticism of

"sociobiological" approaches is the ethical issue created by the discipline's unfortunate

history with Nazis and justification of genocide. As Bell notes:

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[99] While out of the scope for this dissertation, there is a large literature developing on the use and misuse of fMRI data. For more see: Poldrack et al 2008; Poldrack 2008; de Beeck et al. 2008.
[100] Schreiber 2010.
[101] Bell 2006.

It is unfair to criticize people simply because their ideas are employed for purposes beyond their control… But some ideas are more susceptible to hijacking and abuse than others, especially those proclaiming that the 'truth' about human nature actually corresponds, as it does in [evolutionary psychology], with many damaging and deeply ingrained social stereotypes. If it teaches nothing else, history should caution us against these sorts of claims, as well as the endlessly recycled quest for certainty about human affairs.[102]

While it is not entirely clear how far Bell wants us to take this criticism and what types of research should apply (since the application of biology to IR can mean many different things to different scholars), the overarching point is clear: the historical linkage between biology and politics have made some, not unreasonably, uncomfortable regarding claims about human nature that rely on biological evidence. The root of this uncomfortable feeling is often a presumption of biological determinism, the notion that neuroimaging may reveal the soul to be an illusion or once and for all end the nature vs. nurture debate in nature's favor.[103]

Assuming these particular criticisms can be dealt with satisfactorily, a bigger epistemological problem remains. The notion of digging into the brain to answer questions about complex social phenomena is not entirely intuitive. The questions are multiple. Why focus on something as minute as a neuron when the behavior to be explained is abstract and political in nature? What could brain structures and chemicals possibly tell us about complex relationships, such as between Israelis and Palestinians

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[102] Ibid, 506-507.
[103] Wolfe 1996; Schreiber 2010.

that would be worth knowing? How do we move from reductionist insights of neurons to macrostructures in a compelling and falsifiable manner? What about the well known multiple realizability problem that affects reductionist and individualist analyses of all stripes? Indeed, there are no shortage of questions to answer when it comes to applying neurons and brain chemicals to complex social outcomes.

This chapter will attempt to address many of these questions and argue that there is promise for neuroscience in IR. While the social critiques, such as that of sociobiology and Nazism will be dealt with, the larger epistemological question regarding the use of biological knowledge in social analyses will be the focus. This question can be summed up simply: How can (and should) neurological findings inform IR theory that has seemingly developed quite well on its own? I will offer what I see as two broad approaches and then present a framework that justifies both. In some instances SN may help us to update our theories to reflect what is known about the brain. In other instances it may mean rebuilding a theory from the ground-up. I will focus on SN for a number of reasons. Most important among them, researchers in the area have spent considerable time thinking about how their work comports with social analyses, such as social psychology and political science. Indeed the entire enterprise is *built upon* linking complex social outcomes to brain processes. They are therefore well experienced in addressing the skeptic. I will build off their insights, based largely on the work of the two founding fathers of the field, John Cacioppo and Gary Berntson, and provide a general framework for how we can use SN in IR. Ultimately I will provide

examples of neuroscientific inquiry already in IR and suggest that SN provides a new

updated non-deterministic materialism that manages the mind-body problem in a way

that will be extremely fruitful for IR.

<u>Two Models of Incorporation</u>

In considering potential applications of social neuroscientific findings to the

study of international politics, two broad trajectories seem plausible and share a similar

epistemological justification: top-down approaches and bottom-up approaches. These

are conceptualized as a continuum, not necessarily as a binary. Nor is this structure

unique to neuroscience. Outside disciplines have historically experienced similar

dynamics in IR theory building.[104] In the top-down approach, neuroscience adds value

to existing IR theory by informing the reality upon which the theory was built. For

instance, neuroscientific insights might generate the specific conditions under which

most individuals depart from rational decision-making.[105] In this case the value of

neuroscience is to add additional variables or scope conditions to the existing theory.

For instance, one of the stumbling blocks encountered when applying prospect theory to

IR has been the difficulty of assessing, a priori, when an individual perceives oneself in

a domain of gain or a domain of losses.[106] Making such determinations post-hoc is

much easier than constructing a general theory of when prospect theory outcomes are

obtained. If we could look inside the brain to determine precise conditions under which

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[104] Holmes 2011.
[105] McDermott 2004.
[106] Levy 1997.

"loss" or "gain" are processed, this stumbling block may be overcome. Indeed the ability to predict *when* individuals will view themselves in a domain of gain or loss may be achieved is the subject of inquiry among prospect theory scholars.[107] Thus, the theory is made stronger through a greater congruence with the underlying reality of how humans make decisions. The key point here is that extant theory is *updated* by the implications of neuroscientific research.

The bottom-up approach, in contrast, builds theory directly from the neuroscientific evidence itself. It does not assume that existing IR theory is necessarily misinformed (since, as argued above, having assumptions is often enough to generate predictive theory), yet it nevertheless "turns back the hands of time" to ask how IR theory might have developed differently had the black box of the human mind and brain been open all along. Consider the following likely widely-shared claim: "War seems to many to be an irrational act of passion...Yet for all the emotion of the battlefield, the premeditation of war is a rational process consisting of careful and deliberate calculations."[108] Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests that what we think may be "rational processes" of decision-making are likely much more complex and involve emotional processing.[109] Thus, rather than decisions to go to war reflecting a cold calculation of costs and benefits, we know that emotion and affect enter the calculus as well. Depending on the weight one gives this sub-individual (i.e. in the brain) finding,

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[107] Trepel et al 2005; Rangel et al 2008; Glimcher et al 2009; Martino et al 2010.
[108] Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 19.
[109] McDermott 2004; De Martino et al. 2006.

one might be willing to turn back the hands of time and think about how rational war theory may be premised on an incorrect assumption regarding human information processing and decision-making. If decisions to go to war are based partly on "hot" emotion processing, then it may be that the default state, rather than the exception, should be one of emotional processing.

One example of where this has already occurred with neuroscientific insight is Wendt's auto-critique of *Social Theory of International Politics*.[110] While *Social Theory* builds off an implicit Cartesian dualist mind/body position ("ideas" and "rump materialism" are fundamentally irreducible), the problem is that, as Wendt puts it, "very few scientists and philosophers take it seriously."[111] There is a "reality constraint" here: the assumptions made in the theory are not congruent with what we know about reality. Put another way, *Social Theory* (and most social science) is built on an assumption about the mind: it is a *classical* mechanical phenomenon.[112] Wendt goes on the auto-critique, and subsequently in later work (forthcoming), to hypothesize what a social science that did not have this problematic assumption built-in would look like. In effect we are "turning back the hands of time" to rebuild theory from the ground-up. Extant theory therefore in this case is not necessarily updated but rather new theory *created* with the foundation of neuroscientific evidence. This is made possible, and some might

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[110] Wendt 2006.
[111] Ibid, 183.
[112] Ibid, 185.

say necessary, because of insight from the natural sciences that problematize the assumptions we have made.

Both the approaches I have identified here, whether bottom-up or top-down, presuppose that IR theory can progress through the incorporation of neuroscientific insight. This is not obvious. Indeed some have made the argument that neuroscience specifically, and biology generally, provide little additional explanatory leverage for a number of reasons including, but not limited to:

1) <u>The level of analysis problem</u>. We are normally interested in aggregated group activities (states, firms, institutions, and so on), so how is it that neural substrates help to make sense of those phenomena? Is not that chasm between neurons and an institution such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or United Nations (UN) simply too large to bridge?

2) <u>The determinism problem</u>. Philosophers of mind tell us that individuals can always tell their predispositions rooted in genes and neural substrates to "take a hike."[113] Indeed this agency is not only seemingly one of the key aspects of being human but it is a core construct of much extant IR theory. How do we square SN, which seems deterministic in making claims about the links between behaviors and brain processes, with what we know about human agency?

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[113] Pinker 2002.

3) The "old wine in new bottles" problem. Stephen Walt, in assessing rational choice theory and its applications to IR, notes that to be useful rational choice must be "precise, logically consistent, original, and empirically valid."[114] Duncan Bell et al echo a similar concern about the relationship between sociobiology and IR theory generally: "… the microfoundations that a sociobiological informed theory of international politics produces are indeterminate and contradictory. For this reason, sociobiological microfoundations provide no additional analytical leverage in explaining and understanding international politics."[115] If the theory fails at any of these then it risks not being generally accepted or simply tells us little that we already know. The same is true for SN. In order to be generally accepted, SN's theories and predictions must not only be precise, logically consistent, and empirically valid, but they must tell us something of consequence that we do not already know. Ideally SN would make different predictions than leading extant theory.

4) The "sociobiology" problem. The legitimating force of science, for all its normative good, also has an unfortunate history in the 20th century of being

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[114] Walt 1999, 8.
[115] Bell et al. 2001, 187.

used for normatively undesirable political activities. Is not this type of

research simply too dangerous for our unfortunate political reality?

Before exploring the merits of the two interdisciplinary approaches identified above and

how those approaches might inform IR, the four significant problems above must be

addressed. Put simply, the broader case that SN has a legitimate place in IR must be

made.

The Epistemology of Top Down and Bottom Up

<u>Explaining</u>

From an epistemological perspective, it is not obvious or clear why "digging

deeper" into brain neurons helps us to explain complex and inherently social political

behaviors. This is particularly true when it comes to IR and the level of analysis is

usually not individuals but states, groups, firms, and so on. Can neural substrates really

inform anything about the behavior of states? This presents the first epistemological

problem that needs to be overcome, the issue of levels of analysis: of what use is

knowledge of neural substrates for aggregate phenomena and explanation? There are a

number of different approaches to answering this question from different

epistemological perspectives.

The first option is to simply limit the level of analysis to individuals themselves.

Once this move is made, then jumping into the brain of the decision-maker seems

relatively uncontroversial. Political psychologists have a rich history of doing just this

in their analysis of decision-making under risk, decision-making using images, and so forth.[116] Scholars of personality and leadership have been looking at the "hearts" of individual leaders for years.[117] Hymans, for instance, explains the state decision to "go nuclear" not by the structure of the international system or a tragic security dilemma pitting two powers against each other, but by a shared characteristic of leaders, a shared conception of their nation's identity he calls "oppositional nationalist."[118] This shared identity characteristic drives emotions of fear and pride, which in turn may result in a desire for nuclear weapons. By focusing on actual individuals, instead of states, we transcend the problems of moving from individual neural substrates to state behavior: state behavior *simply is* the behavior (and identity conception, emotions, and so on) of individuals.

This move is justified when one considers that state policy is ultimately constructed by individuals. Consider Robert Jervis' interrogative work on the intelligence failures leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[119] While Jervis finds much blame to go around, ultimately it is characteristics of individual decision-making that played a causal role in the intelligence failures, including rampant confirmation bias and the certainty effect. For instance, he finds little support for the popular "groupthink"[120] hypothesis that previous Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) reports

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[116] Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995.
[117] Barber 1985; Hymans 2006.
[118] Hymans 2006, 2.
[119] Jervis 2006; Jervis 2010.
[120] Janis 1972.

cited.[121] Therefore, there seems to be support for the claim that state decision-making can sometimes be reduced to individual decision-making and thus it makes sense to study individuals and their intricacies (perhaps even their brains) in order to form a more comprehensive understanding.

Further, whether they acknowledge it or not, many IR theorists who are talking about states are really also talking about individuals, either metaphorically or otherwise.[122] Consider claims made about state motivation and how such claims are operationalized. State decision-making (such as "the Soviet Union wanted x concession from the United States") is often reduced in practice to what the individual leader motivates (such as "Gorbachev asked Bush for money in exchange for arms control"). Nevertheless, at least ostensibly, IR theory normally considers states first and focusing on individuals may be a way of bringing neural substrates to the discussion.

The problem with this approach is that it only weakly implicates the unit of analysis that IR theorists normally occupy themselves with, the state. Decision-maker and decision-*making* analysis certainly provide insight into how decisions at the state-level are made, but it is not the state per se that is being analyzed and described. As Kenneth Arrow pointed out, aggregating discrete individual decision-makers is not simply a matter of addition.[123] What happens, for instance, when multiple decision-makers disagree on the best course of action? Indeed if the unit of analysis is the

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[121] Jervis 2006; Jervis 2010.
[122] Jackson 2004; Wendt 2004.
[123] Arrow 1951.

individual decision-maker, the claims derived from that analysis largely need to remain at that level and cannot be aggregated upward to the state. At the very least one then needs a theory of decision aggregation. One way to conceptualize the problem here is to consider what happens when individual decision-makers disagree on a policy prescription. It may be, for instance, that diplomats do indeed construct policy,[124] but what happens when they are overruled? An analysis of decision-making might allow us to understand how each individual reached the conclusion that they did, but the "state decision" represents some other discrete process of aggregating various opinions together.

Another appealing route is to adopt an ontology of states "as people."[125] That is, even if IR is interested in states, we can make the move to reduce the state to the individual. Scholars implicitly do this routinely asking questions such as "Why does Iran want nuclear capabilities?" as if Iran is a cohesive single entity. Some scholars have made the move explicit and argue that "states are people too," sharing a number of salient characteristics and properties.[126] It occurs routinely in other disciplines and realms of social life as well. In 1886 the United States Supreme Court ruled in *Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad* that a corporation was entitled to the taxation benefits that individuals enjoy. In other words, corporations (essentially a group of individuals) could enjoy the same rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as

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[124] Neumann 2002.
[125] Jackson 2004; Wendt 2004.
[126] Wendt 2004.

did natural persons. Whether for analytical clarity, legal consistency, or a belief that states share enough characteristics with natural persons to warrant *being* persons, treating groups as individuals has a rich and useful history. Indeed this move of suggesting what applies to people usually applies to states, be it in psychology, need for ontological security[127], and so on, has provided useful theory and inferences. Indeed it is hard to imagine the counter-factual: what would IR look like if we *did not* assume that states were people?

The problem with this move for biological interdisciplinarity is while it is one thing to make the move that states and people share characteristics, it may be problematic to argue that an individual's brain state can provide explanatory leverage for aggregated behavior at the state level. Put simply, it is one thing to say that states are people too in that they share characteristics; it may be another thing altogether to say that they have the functional equivalent of neurons and chemical reactions, however. This largely turns on how far one is comfortable taking the personhood analogy. The "weak" analogy of states as individuals would view states as people for conceptual clarity. That is, lacking another fruitful metaphor, individuals seem to provide a pretty good device for making sense of the international system. This weak version would have trouble making the argument that states have neurons too, since the argument is not that states necessarily are people, just that we act as if they are. A "stronger" version of the argument that moves slightly away from analogy and more to congruence, may

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[127] Mitzen 2006.

be that states exhibit nearly all of the characteristics of natural persons and functional equivalents exist for natural things. That is, while states don't physically have neurons like people do, they have a functional equivalent. Aggregated individuals include aggregated neurons and therefore there would be some support for this argument from a conceptual level. In this case there may be justification for studying the brains of individuals to gain explanatory insight into the inner-workings of the state.

Understanding

More generally, however, there is another simple epistemological argument that suggests *understanding* at various levels of analysis is useful in and of itself as it helps to recast what we know and what we think we know. It is this comprehensive notion of understanding that I would like to advance as a key reason to pursue explanation at lower levels of analysis. Paul Churchland, philosopher of science, argues that "making theoretical progress emerges as a matter of finding ever more penetrating and successful *interpretations* of the antecedently interpreted empirical data… It is a process of trying to redeploy our existing conceptual resources in empirical domains *outside* the domain in which those concepts were originally acquired.[128] That is, one of the values of digging deeper into various levels of analysis, if nothing else, is precisely to advance our theories by seeing if they hold up to new information in new domains. But another is that it allows us to gain new models and metaphors as well.

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[128] Churchland 2006, 31.

Consider the metaphors we use and how they become updated when insights are drawn from new domains. Churchland provides the example of Newton's theory of gravity in the 17th Century. He introduced a new metaphor, that of the *flung stone*, to describe the Moon. Newton said that the stone is constantly falling toward the Earth but can never land because its velocity was too high: its tangential motion would constantly compensate for its movement toward Earth.[129] Huygens made a similar contribution by reinterpreting light as traveling waves; Bernoulli saw gas a "swarm of ballistic particles," and so forth.[130] These reinterpretations were made possible by learning and thinking about what occurs at levels deeper than what is being observed. Through these new metaphors and models, new predictions and explanations are generated. Thus, even in the toughest case, where it is argued that digging deeper does not inform *directly* anything about phenomena at other levels, we can find an epistemological justification and basis for diving in.

At first this might seem like an odd argument. If brain science can not inform anything directly about IR, why should we care about it? Churchland's argument suggests that there is value in *understanding* itself. Understanding how various levels of analysis interact with each other to produce an outcome can be beneficial even if we cannot see direct linkages between levels because analysis at new levels, at the very least, helps to provide new concepts and metaphors that can be applied to a variety of problems. It may be, for instance, that understanding how the brain is organized helps to

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[129] Churchland 2007, 472.
[130] Ibid.

make sense of how other systems are organized.[131] In 1884 the British neurologist John Hughlings Jackson made a simple discovery that would have a profound impact on the study of physical systems. His research suggested that the widely held view that the brain and body could be understood as a hierarchical system, with the "mind" on top with subservient "body" functions below, was misinformed. This understanding, while intuitive, belied the actual *heterarchical* organization of the system. According to Jackson, "There is no autocratic mind at the top to receive sensations as a sort of raw material, out of which to manufacture ideas, etc., and then to associate these ideas," but rather there exists a system of unification of the whole organism whereby the entire self adjusts, and adapts, to the environment.[132] Put simply, rather than brain/mind controlling body with high-level functions on top and low-level functions on the bottom, what we see at the brain/mind level is a representation of function that exists at lower levels in the body. There is a reliance or interdependence of function rather than subservient hierarchical function.

Borrowing this insight from neuroscience may suggest new ways of understanding for IR. Network theory and the "relational turn" in IR theory problematize the notion that international structure can be understood in hierarchical terms.[133] As Daniel Nexon argues, "Instead of approaching international politics through pre-given levels of analysis, therefore, we should think about international

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[131] Holmes forthcoming.
[132] Taylor 1931.
[133] Jackson and Nexon 1999; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Nexon 2009.

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structures as 'network[s] of networks' co-constituted by the network-structures of the actors that populate it, and also by the structure of social ties across and between them."[134] The implication here is that hierarchical or balanced systems are simply possible descriptions of international political structure, though they may not be the only descriptions. If we bring in the notion that physical symptoms are often designed heterarchically, we gain a new way of understanding, both metaphorically and empirically, how networks may operate in the international system. This heterarchical organization understanding may make for a more reality-consistent understanding of processes within the international system. Thus, at the very least, digging deeper often provides a new way of thinking about old problems, such as how the international system is constructed. It therefore satisfies the Bell et al requirement that sociobiology provide new ways of understanding.

Ultimately I am in favor of such an epistemology of understanding when it relates to brain science and IR, but I suggest that we need not concern ourselves with grand epistemological debates regarding the status of micro-reduction in explaining macro-level outcomes and structures. Rather, this dissertation suggests that there is *not* a single valid epistemological view on this topic that we need to adopt. Instead, the extent to which neuroscience helps to make sense of IR outcomes and create better knowledge is dependent on the research question and method. There are, undoubtedly, many questions where knowledge of what is occurring in the brain is simply redundant

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[134] Nexon 2009, 26.

and does not add significantly to the discussion. There are also plenty of examples where neuroscience leads to multiple, and perhaps contradictory, conclusions and thus is, at best, inconclusive in terms of updating IR theory. And finally, there are undoubtedly areas where the abyss between neurons and complex social interactions *is* so large that one needs to seriously question the value of attempting to make the jump. This then serves as our starting point: there is not one single perspective or valid argument as it relates to the virtues of incorporating brain science into IR science. We must take something of an ecumenical approach.

On the other hand, I argue that those who think that the abyss between neurons and social behavior is so large that we should not attempt to bridge it need to reconsider their positions. As I will show below, the abyss need not be as threatening and impassable as some would suggest. We *can* address the critic who believes that there can be no satisfactory epistemological perspective for incorporating brain science into political science. I argue that the mere idea of there being an abyss may be clouding connections that can be drawn between multiple levels of analysis. Disparate approaches, be they "social" or "biological," miss the point. Human behavior is ultimately rooted in biology, and as social neuroscientists quickly point out, we are learning that biology is in some sense social. That is, the biological and social are linked, not in a superficial way but in a very deep sense: they have effect on each other, and to fully understand either requires multi-level integration and approaches. Investigating the structure and processes of the brain and related biological systems

helps us to reach this goal. Importantly, however, as Cacioppo and Berntson point out, this does not mean that biological reductionism solves all problems in a satisfactory manner.[135] It may be that one level of analysis is better than the other and this is *dependent on the research question*. An anecdote that helps to make the point is of a chemist who works with the periodic table on a daily basis but nevertheless uses culinary recipes from magazines rather than the periodic table to cook. The reason is not because the food preparation could not be reduced to chemical expressions, but because it would not be efficient or useful to do so.[136] The same is true in IR. Just because all behaviors may reduce, at some level, to biology (a controversial claim in and of itself) does not mean that it is worthwhile, efficient, or interesting to do explore that reduction.

Social Neuroscience: What Does it Attempt to Do?

SN investigates the biological correlates in the brain that underlie, and are affected by, behavior. It seeks to help inform and refine theories of social behavior by understanding neural organization and function. Importantly, this is ultimately a two-way street. Social neuroscientists are interested in the interaction effects between an environment and the brain, noting that the brain and neural systems can be affected by the external environment as much as they can affect behavior of the individual within that environment. These interactions occur across multiple levels of organization and

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[135] Cacioppo and Berntson 2002.
[136] Ibid, 5.

analysis, be they molecular, cellular, system, individual, group, societal, etc. In this way while it is perhaps natural to see social neuroscience as occupying the intersection between neuroscience and social psychology, the cross-cutting levels of organization and analysis that social neuroscience is interested in suggests that it has relevance for a number of social domains, including group dynamics.[137] It is precisely through multi-level analyses that social neuroscientists believe that we can understand the diverse mechanisms affecting human social behaviors.

Interestingly, it is instructive to note that just as IR theory developed naive of the inner-workings of the black box of psychology, much of biology and neuroscience developed naive of the impact sociality has on biological systems.[138] Just as social science found advantages to doing so, biology did as well. The advantage of this assumption was that biological systems could be studied in isolation which made tracing outputs of systems to anatomical processes relatively straightforward. When neuroscientists began to study more complex behaviors, however, they realized that the assumption regarding the non-effects of sociality could not be sustained; some basic and long-held principles also came into question. Cacioppo and Berntson note for instance that while scientists understood that phenotypic expression, or behavior, in mice depended on specific genes (the "genetic background") they believed that the effects of the social context were relatively unimportant. Researchers were surprised to discover that the same genetic background could produce wildly different behavioral effects in

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[137] Decety and Keenan 2006.
[138] Cacioppo and Berntson 2002, 3.

different social environments.[139] As will be discussed below, if you give a chimp amphetamines, sometimes nothing happens and sometimes behavior changes dramatically. The key explanatory variable that was uncovered is the social hierarchy of the chimps. Concurrently, the psychology discipline was discovering that behavioral data alone provided an incomplete story of social behavior; rather, social processes are clearly the product of brain processes and understanding both provides complementary knowledge. As Cacioppo and Berntson point out, this led some scholars of social phenomena to take seriously the neural substrates of behavior.[140]

Perhaps because of the history of using biological "data" to inform social phenomena in the 20th century, usually in the form of what is (often pejoratively) termed sociobiology, social neuroscientists are usually quite clear in situating their work in non-determinism. That is, simplistic claims such as a neurological chemical reaction "causing" a complex social behavior are eschewed for more nuanced claims about understanding the building blocks of complex behaviors. Anticipating the criticism of determinism, Decety and Keenan in the very first article of the *Social Neuroscience*[141] journal quote bioethicist Paul Root Wolpe's warning:

> History has shown us again and again that society tends to use science to reinforce the moral assumptions and biases of the cultural moment. There is clearly a role for a thoughtful social neuroscience, where findings become part of considered policymaking around controversial issues. For example, research into addiction has provided new perspectives and tools for

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[139] Crabbe et al. 1999.
[140] Cacioppo and Berntson 2002.
[141] Decety and Keenan 2006.

> policymakers willing to use them. But if scientists are not clear
> about the scope and nature of their work, eager policymakers can
> seize preliminary and speculative findings and implement
> programs unsupported by the science itself.[142]

Accordingly, social neuroscientists have attempted to avoid simple deterministic claims

and instead focus on links and correlations between brain systems and social

contexts. They have also attempted to be very clear in that complex policy prescription

does not, and should not, flow from neurological data. Indeed, if anything, SN

researchers have gone out of their way to illustrate that the scope of their work falls

outside of the political realm.

There are a number of organizing principles that guide an understanding of the

links and correlations that are useful to mention here as they help to illustrate what SN

attempts to do and understand and what it does not. This will be particularly useful

because in many instances IR theorists have *had the same debates* but come up with

different conclusions. This allows for an entry-point in viewing how SN can inform IR.

The Levels of Analysis Problem in Social Behavior

The first organizing principle for SN endeavors is that it seeks to understand

"complex mental, behavioral, and social problems" through multiple integrative levels

of organization.[143] What Cacioppo and Berntson have in mind here is multilevel

analysis that studies a phenomenon from a wide-variety of scales, from the molecular

(what they term "microscopic") to the sociocultural (what they term "macroscopic").

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[142] Wolpe 2004, 1032.
[143] Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 333.

These scales are not studied in isolation but rather observations at one level are used to "inform, refine, or constrain inferences based on observations at another level of analysis."[144] The key insight here is that in order to understand a complex social behavior, the underlying systems and processes that comprise the behavior need to be understood. And these systems and processes occur at various levels of organization. Ignoring particular levels would provide an incomplete (although perhaps intuitive) understanding of the behavior.

Cacioppo and Berntson provide the illustrative example of alcohol consumption. One can construct a very intuitive and compelling account of alcohol consumption with nothing more than an understanding of osmoreceptive mechanisms and volume detectors which work together to produce a desire to drink. Yet, this tells us relatively little about alcohol consumption in bars and the social contagion effects therein. On the other hand, even sophisticated studies of barroom behavior would be unable to uncover the fundamental mechanisms of thirst and desire for alcohol. Nor would they be particularly helpful in understanding why some individuals would be more prone to such drinking behavior than others. Each account would be informative, but ultimately incomplete. Crucially, however, if one *only* looked at either, the explanation would seem satisfactory. After all, it is difficult to know what one does not know. By focusing on one level of organization one can find explanation, it just may not be a comprehensive one as possible because other levels have been bracketed from view.

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[144] Ibid.

One of the criticisms that is sometimes voiced in opposition to biological

research when it comes to explaining social outcomes is that reductionism essentially

boils down to the notion that the goal of science is "the pursuit of explanations at the

lowest possible level of analysis."[145] SN does not embrace this view. Rather, it holds

that rational reductionism, the "ability to relate one level of organization to another,"

with causal links going in both directions, is a fruitful approach to understanding social

behavior that does not replace, but rather complements, higher-level analyses. As

mentioned above, SN researchers feel that there is really no other way to

comprehensively understand a behavior; to not look at multiple levels of analysis is to

necessarily close off the possibility of gaining new insights. One does not always gain

new insight by looking across levels, but one can certainly preempt finding useful

insight by not looking.

Thus, the organizing principle of multiple levels of analysis can be summed up

with three important insights. First, the various levels that contribute to a complex

social behavior must be first understood if we are to claim that we have understood the

social behavior.[146] Second, however, "almost never can a complex system of any kind

be understood as a simple extrapolation from the properties of its elementary

components."[147] For this reason, an understanding of sub-systems is helpful to the

extent that it is considered in conjunction with processes and events at various levels of

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[145] Berntson and Cacioppo 2004, 108.
[146] Marr 1982, 24.
[147] Ibid, 19.

the overall system. Finally, since each level of organization *may* provide input into a social behavior, it would be a mistake to argue that a single level of organization is *best* for explaining all social or psychological questions.[148] Clearly, SN researchers are interested in neural substrates, but it would be a misrepresentation to argue that they believe neural substrates are the best explanation for behavior. Rather, analysis at multiple levels helps to construct a comprehensive theory of social behavior.

Principles of Determinism of Social Behavior in Neuroscience

Having identified the multiple levels of analysis organization principle, we can turn to the question of how exactly SN helps to inform social outcomes. What exactly is the determinism that SN has in mind when it moves from neurons to behavior? The principle of *multiple determinism* suggests that an event at one level of organization "may have multiple antecedents within or across levels of organization."[149] The development of theories of aggression provide an interesting example.[150] As Cacioppo and Berntson note, aggressive behavior is multiply determined within and across levels. Aggressive behavior can be the result of neurochemical events in the brain, such as in the case of Charles Joseph Whitman, responsible for killing 14 people by shooting from

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[148] Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 332.
[149] Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 334.
[150] Cacioppo and Berntson also note the development of theories of emotion provides a nice example of this principle. Early theorists of emotion believed that emotions were generated by somatovisceral reactions to an event that is exciting in one form or another (James 1894). Baldwin (1894) pointed out that not all emotions followed this pattern and indeed at least for some types of emotions associative processes could lead to emotional reactions. The key point here for our purposes is that one event (emotional response) could be engendered through multiple processes (somatovisceral reaction or associative processes).

the observation deck of the University of Texas tower in 1966, whose behavior was allegedly partially indicated by a glioblastoma tumor in the hypothalamus. Aggressive behavior can also be the result of frustration or paranoid delusions at the psychological level. Joseph Stalin, for instance, allegedly suffered from moderate to severe paranoia throughout his life and some attribute this as a causal factor in Stalin's political aggression.[151] Alternately, at the social level, contexts such as overcrowding, maternal defense, or territoriality can quickly lead to aggressive behavioral outcomes.[152]

What this suggests is that integrative research that helps to specify the conditions under which each set of factors, and at what levels, contribute to a social behavior is a crucial part of theory-building. Indeed any social behavior that is observed can, and likely does, have multiple determinants within and across levels. SN adopts the view that assessing the conditions under which each level is *likely* contributing helps to provide a more complete picture of the social behavior. It recognizes the complexity and multiple determinism of social behavior and argues that these multiple pathways are worthy of investigation.

The second principle of determinism of social behavior from a neuroscientific perspective is *nonadditive determinism*. This principle suggests that properties of the collective whole are not necessarily predictable based on the parts *unless* the properties of the whole have been documented and well studied across levels.[153] Put simply,

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[151] Birt 1993.
[152] Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 334.
[153] Cacioppo and Berntson 1992, 340.

focusing on a particular level of analysis may mask properties of other levels that provide insight into the larger social phenomenon. This is similar to an old truism of social science: the questions one asks determines the answers one receives. Cacioppo and Berntson cite a study that exemplifies this point.[154] The researchers analyzed public and private responses of individuals from both individualist and collective cultures to questions regarding how enjoyable it would be to participate in a time-consuming behavior, such as visiting a friend in the hospital. In the public condition, the cultural context did not affect what individuals reported. All of the subjects reported that they would find it enjoyable to sacrifice their time in the hypothetical situation. Interestingly, however, only individuals from the collective culture reported that these behaviors would be enjoyable in the private condition. This suggested to researchers that the sociocultural context can be quite powerful on self-administered answers: the condition of being in public would change self-construal. But this insight was only possible because the researchers considered the role of emotion *across levels of organization*. As Markus and Kitayama point out, if the analysis had been conducted only at the cultural level of analysis one would likely have derived a mistaken conclusion, such as "culturally divergent individuals inhabit incomparably different worlds."[155]

Similar illustrations exist with different levels of analysis. As mentioned above, a famous study noted that administering an amphetamine to primates produces no reliable effect unless the primate's social status is taken into account. Those high in the

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[154] Triandis 1989.
[155] Markus and Kitayama 1991, cited in Cacioppo and Berntson 1992.

social hierarchy are affected by an amphetamine in that their dominant behaviors increase. Those low on the social hierarchy are affected in the opposite direction, with submissive behaviors increasing. The point here is that the physiological changes at first appeared unreliable or chaotic to researchers. It was only after considering an additional level of analysis, the social level, that the physiological level was informed. Indeed without that social level of analysis it is likely that a pure physiological study would reliably produce chaotic results.

Third, the principle of *reciprocal determinism* suggests that there can be a reciprocal relationship between multiple levels of analysis, specifically between the microscopic and macroscopic. For instance, recent research in behavioral genetics and genomics suggests that there are many genetic influences that remain dormant until certain environmental factors are expressed. Put simply, "brain and behavioral processes are a function of particular genetic factors, the expression of which is governed by environmental agents."[156] Importantly, genomics research has moved beyond relatively simple statements that "both genes and environment matter," and recognition of feedback loops, to a more nuanced understanding of precisely *how* environment matters and under what conditions the environment can affect gene expression or the *genes themselves*.

One of the clearest examples of this reciprocal determinism principle is found in honeybees. Bees share many components of the nervous system with humans yet have a

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[156] Cacioppo and Berntson 1992.

fraction of the number of genes, allowing researchers to experimentally work with a manageable amount of data.[157] One of the clear findings is that determination of which genes are active and how they are activated (gene expression) is affected by the environment. Specifically, in about 40% of the population, genes will change their activity and subsequently change the "role" that bees play. Young bees spend time helping out around the hive and then will switch roles later in life to forage outside of the hive. A number of factors affect this switch, including age and environmental factors. Older worker bees, for instance, can release pheromones to slow young bee switching. Some of this can be predicted by looking at the genetic level, some of it cannot. In some instances the environment itself can physically *change* genes through epigenetic factors. For instance, it was once thought that identical twins share 100% of their DNA with each other. Scientists have recently discovered that while the genes are very similar in identical twins, epigenetic modifications suggest that the ways genes are expressed and changed can account for significant differences between twins, even changing the DNA itself.[158] All of this suggests that the interplay between nature and nurture is not adversarial (nature *versus* nurture) but rather complementarily dynamic (nature *and* nurture).

In humans this reciprocal determinism is easy to demonstrate. In a famous study a group of students were taught to juggle and then asked to practice every day for three

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[157] Whitfield et al. 2003; Robinson et al. 2005.
[158] Bruder et al. 2008.

months.[159] After the three months were over they were then asked to not juggle for an additional three months. Images of the brain were taken before training, after the three month practice period, and again after the three month interval of not practicing. The images displayed significant increases in size of the neo-cortex as subjects learned to juggle. When the subjects stopped practicing the same areas of the brain atrophied. Therefore in a very real sense our biology, reflected in the brain, is constantly responding to the environment.[160]

Unveiling these principles of social neuroscience is helpful for three reasons. First, they help to establish the epistemological philosophy of the scientific endeavor. They help to inform the type of knowledge social neuroscience seeks and the source of that knowledge. This is useful because it clearly answers key questions of the skeptic, such as indeterminate microfoundations or reductionism that seeks to reduce all social behavior to biological levels. Second, SN's views on determinism should comfort the critic who is concerned that SN seeks to win the nature/nurture debate by removing the soul of the individual. If anything SN has adopted the view that the environment, or nurture, is as relevant for biological systems as the natural components themselves. Finally, with respect to IR, I argue that SN adopts a significantly different epistemological viewpoint from political science and this affects the way we think about importing neuroscientific (and biological generally) insights into IR. It is to this point that I now turn.

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[159] Draganski et al. 2004.
[160] Schreiber 2010.

Principles of Determinism of Social Behavior in IR

The principles of determinism of social behavior in SN identified above are significantly different from the determinants of social behavior in IR, although there are correlates. This has limited, I argue, the extent to which IR theorists have been willing to adopt neuroscientific (and to some extent biological) principles into their theory-building. To begin, like SN, IR can be said to have a multiple determinism principle as well. After all, few would argue that IR outcomes are not affected by multiple levels of analysis, ranging from macro-structures to micro-structures as well as interplay between structures. Indeed, the levels of analysis problematique has been one of the organizing principles in methodology for the field at least since Waltz originally articulated the three "images" in 1959.[161] Each level of analysis has engendered its own approach and cadre of theorists who privilege one over the other. There are key differences in approaches, however. First, to a large extent IR theorists have tended to *favor* one level of explanation over the other. Generally speaking we can normally easily differentiate scholars into those who privilege macro-structures or micro-foundations.[162] Importantly, it is not just that IR theorists favor one approach or the other, but that IR has largely decided that the two approaches are in a bit of an awkward relationship to each other.

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[161] Waltz 1959.

[162] Although there are numerous important exceptions. Since Putnam's 1988 work on two-level games, scholars have become increasingly interested in the interplay between levels of analysis. Barry Buzan's 1995 work reconsidering the level of analysis problem attempted to reconceptualize the role levels *should* play in scholarship, differentiating ontological levels from epistemological levels. Buzan favors a more interactive approach, one similar to what SN has proposed. I would still maintain, however, that most work in contemporary IR scholarship can be understood as privileging one level over the other.

For instance, scholars of microfoundations cannot very well ignore macrostructure, but rather treat the structure as a relatively fixed source of preferences, norms, etc. The problem is that structure is, at least in part, generated by microfoundations (and many different configurations of these foundations could result in the same structure; see below on multiple realizability). Therefore, microfoundation analyses are in the awkward position of arguing that the macrostructure is at once fixed (for preferences) and variable (as constituted by agents). These types of issues have largely resulted in scholars privileging either the micro foundations or macro structure, but typically not both (and for seemingly good reason given the perceived incompatibility between the two).

The other reason for privileging one level of analysis over the other in IR is an issue of pragmatism. Many would likely agree that a comprehensive theory of IR that incorporates all levels of analysis would be desirable. Many would also agree that developing such a theory would be fraught with problems. Kenneth Waltz in *Man, the State, and War* recognized that all three images play a role in causing war, there is an interplay between the images, but for reasons of theory-building one must look at one image or the other.[163] In *Theory of International Politics* this was made more explicit by noting that each image of analysis brings a different perspective on the causes of war. In an attempt to build a theory that could accommodate "the same effects [following] from

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[163] Waltz 1954.

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different causes," Waltz chose to look at the systems level.[164] The benefit here was that he could theorize continuity and structure of the system, although he could not predict any particular foreign policy outcome. Such trade-offs are normally thought to be required in theory-building.

Thus, while SN has explicitly called for a paradigm of multiple and cross-cutting levels of analyses, IR has, for legitimate reasons, maintained what I term *level-centric* paradigms. It is not that the case that cross-cutting research is not part of IR, but rather that IR theory has developed along disparate lines because of the perceived incompatibility of meshing two levels together and the practical problems associated with trying. This helps to explain, I argue, in part, IR's reluctance to embrace the notion that digging deeper into levels of analyses helps us to make sense of higher level phenomena. If digging deeper is not necessarily helpful at the aggregate level (i.e. moving from macro-structure to individuals), then it is not surprising that IR would be skeptical of a move from individual to neurons. Indeed the two disciplines, IR and social neuroscience, have developed on completely different trajectories in this regard.

IR can learn from SN's emphasis on multiple determinism in the following two ways. The first is that SN does not posit that all questions should be answered by investigating all levels of analysis. Indeed it is just the opposite. The SN view is that multiple levels need to be investigated for a complete understanding of a phenomenon, but this does not imply that every level needs the same level of investigation. Rather,

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[164] Waltz 1979, 68.

the *extent of inquiry* on any particular level will depend on the question. As such neuroscientific inquiry from a SN perspective may make sense if existing analysis at various levels if not producing compelling explanations. This is akin to what I identified above as a top-down approach. Digging deeper into a particular level of analysis may help to provide insight into a common assumption or provide a new variable to look at and this may engender progress.

The second perspective would be to note that while SN does not posit that all questions should be answered by investigating all levels and digging deeper, we nevertheless do not "know what we do not know." Put another way, digging deeper into the neural level, for instance, may elucidate findings that directly contradict a common assumption or provide a new "reality constraint" on IR theory. In such instances even though we think we have a good explanation for a social outcome, digging deeper nevertheless problematizes that explanation. This is akin to the "bottom up" approach. Once again, however, the principle of multiple determinism notes that this digging deeper cannot be accomplished in a vacuum. In both perspectives, the conservative and more liberal, all *relevant* levels of analysis should be investigated.

At this point it is likely that few would disagree with what has been described. It is relatively uncontroversial to argue that from time to time we can learn more by digging deeper into levels of analysis. One of the problems that must be overcome in applying SN to IR in particular, however, is that of multiple realizability. That is, even if we can all agree that looking at neurons might provide some interesting information,

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we need to justify that any particular finding in the brain helps to explain social outcomes. One of the reasons macro-structure theorists privilege that particular level of analysis is precisely because particular emphasis on the micro-level is often misplaced. The reasons are straightforward. First, any given macro-structure configuration can be caused by any number of configurations of the micro-level. As Wendt notes, "The best explanation for why the window broke is that John threw a rock at it, not an analysis of the particular combination of sub-atomic particles that broke it, since many other combinations would have had the same effect."[165] Indeed there are any number of configurations of particles that would end up obtaining the same effect. Second, there are some causal mechanisms that *only* operate on the macro-level.[166] As such, one may be looking at the micro-level trying to understand a given phenomenon but they have missed the causality because it is occurring at the macro-level. There is, in other words, not necessarily a benefit from digging deeper and deeper for better explanation.

These insights about multiple realizability are important, but too often theorists have interpreted them as suggesting that micro foundations lack explanatory leverage because of them. Duncan Bell, for instance, a skeptic, makes this point. "Science cannot address, let alone solve, all our enigmas. It cannot answer many of the most important questions about what it means to be human, and, the corollary of this, what is the best way to live. Nor does it help us very much in comprehending the vast and dynamic

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[165] Wendt 1999, 154.
[166] Ibid.

complexity of culture and politics."[167] One of the points Bell makes in his piece refuting the use of biological sciences in politics has to do with the notion that politics is complex and it would be foolish to reduce processes that are affected by such things as culture, desires, etc. to particular configurations at lower levels. In essence, what is going on at the lower level is in some sense irrelevant to what happens at higher levels: multiple lower level states would be affected in the same way by culture, for instance. This is a valid point in that any political outcome can have multiple micro foundations and the effects of macro-structure cannot be simply reduced to lower levels, but it does not follow it always, or even often, the case that no further insight is gained by going lower.

SN and philosophers of mind have had to deal with the multiple realizability problem at least since it was articulated in the late 1960s by Hilary Putnam.[168] Consider the concept of "being in pain," discussed in the previous article. This is an experience that is shared across individuals and species, a shared outcome at the individual and species level of analysis. Yet, if we dig deeper into the physiological substrates of pain, it is obvious that very different physical states can result in the same "being in pain" experience. The problem is this: if humans and reptiles, for instance, all realize pain yet have very different brain and other physical structures, it must be the case that pain is realized by various different physical states in various species. It is also likely the case that within humans "being in pain" is realized by various different physical structures.

[167] Bell 2006, 509.
[168] Sober 1999; Bechtel and Mundale 1999.

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The general principle is identified in the diagram below, with multiple mental states (M) being realized by multiple physical states (P):

Figure 1: Multiple Realizability

Multiple realizability is a *possible* description of reality, but it is not necessarily always an accurate description. Neuroscientists for decades have been able to delineate insights into human behaviors by looking at the brains of various types of mammals, such as macaque monkeys, dogs, etc. Contemporary neuroscience assumes a continuity in neural mechanisms between species. If it did not and multiple realizability was a genuine concern, how could neuroscience research bear fruit by looking at other species?[169] Put simply, why should imaging studies of the brains of humans and monkeys, or between humans, with resolutions capable of deducing activity at the millimeter level, show common areas of activities when psychological tasks are

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[169] Bickle 1998.

performed, show common metabolic activity in common areas of the brain? If multiple

realizability is a significant problem, neuroscientists would be, as Bickle points out,

"hopelessly naïve": "But these procedures and tools do work (and are not hopelessly

naïve)."[170] This suggests that psychological outputs are not as multiply realized as some

philosophers of science would suggest. Indeed, the whole SN enterprise, in a sense, is a

testament to dispelling the significance of the multiple realizability anti-reductionist

argument. The neuroscientific goal has been to:

> show how functional considerations get built into
> developing the structural taxonomy and how that
> taxonomy in turn can be a heuristic guide in developing
> information-processing models. This project has not been
> impaired by multiple realization of psychological states;
> rather, it relies on the assumption that there is a common
> realization of mechanisms for processing visual
> information across species.[171]

What the multiple realizability argument is useful for is a corrective to those

theorists who believe that one can simply dig deeper, find a mechanism, and think that

this mechanism explains a social behavior. Consider the example above regarding an

individual who exhibits aggressive behavior. While it is undoubtedly true that this

aggression can be "realized" by any number of causal mechanisms, such as territoriality

or brain tumors, digging into the potential explanations elucidates which ones are

supported (i.e. was there a brain tumor or not?) and which are not. This is consistent

with the principle of *nonadditive determinism* identified above. It would be a mistake to

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[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid, 201

argue that the properties of the whole (the individual in this case) is predictable based on the micro foundations of chemicals *unless* we have ruled out other explanations at various other levels (i.e. territoriality). IR, in contrast, often assumes that because of the potential condition of multiple realizability, digging deeper is unhelpful from an epistemological perspective; the multiple realizability in a showstopper, so to speak. This misunderstands the very nature of social neuroscientific inquiry: the goal is not to reduce all behaviors to chemicals and genes, but rather to elucidate the chemicals and genes that may be playing a role *when other levels of analyses are understood*.

Most importantly, the multiple realizability argument dismisses the principle of *reciprocal determinism* identified above. Bell asks how biology can inform anything as complex as politics conducted in a cultural environment. This assumes a view where biology produces an output and culture modifies it. This is a common interpretation of biological insight: biology predisposes us to certain behaviors but through culture and socialization ultimately those predispositions are overruled, so to speak. Reciprocal determinism suggests that there is an interaction effect occurring between culture and biology. Culture and socialization do not *replace* biological effects, but rather help to constitute them. Martin Seligman and Steve Maier in 1967 conducted a seminal experiment that illustrates this principle.[172] They created three groups of dogs and placed them in harnesses. Group One was put into the harness and then released a short time later. Groups Two and Three consisted of what Seligman and Maier called "yoked

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[172] Seligman and Naier 1967.

pairs." A dog in Group 2 would be subjected to pain through an electric shock. The dog could end the shock by pressing a lever. In Group 3 the dogs were wired, in parallel, with the Group 2 dogs and received shocks of identical intensity and duration, but pushing the lever in Group 3 did not stop the electric shock. For a dog in Group 3 the shocks were thus more or less random; nothing the dogs did would stop the shock. This Group 3 condition caused what Seligman and Maier referred to as "learned helplessness." The dogs would realize eventually that they could do nothing to stop the shocks and would exhibit symptoms, both physiological and social, similar to those found in clinical depression (they did not eat, did not play, did not socialize with each other, etc.). In a latter part of the experiment the Group 3 dogs were placed in a shuttle-box apparatus where, to escape the shocks, all they had to do was jump over a low partition. The dogs that learned to be helpless did not jump, they merely laid down passively and whined. Similar experiments have since been replicated with humans.[173]

What the learned helplessness paradigm suggests is that contrary to what some have interpreted the interaction of culture/socialization and biology as being, namely the former updating and reflecting on the latter, the two are tied and constituted together. This informs the multiple realizability argument because it suggests that the argument is fundamentally mis-specified in some respects. The notion of particular configurations of lower levels *leading to* the same outcome misunderstands the reciprocal relationship between lower and higher levels. Lower levels do not *lead* to anything per se. Lower

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[173] Finkelstein and Ramey 1977.

level and higher level action do. Thus, while it may be the case that higher levels could interact with a variety of different lower level configurations and produce the same outcome, it is also the case that multiple configurations at the higher level could result in similar lower level outcomes. Therefore, significant attention needs to be paid to *both* levels. The multiple realizability argument is not a boon for those who study higher level aggregates; indeed the SN findings suggest that multiple realizability need be a concern of all researchers attempting to explain social outcomes.

Perhaps most important from an IR perspective, reciprocal determinism calls into questions any approach that assumes a universal human nature or infinitely malleable individual. If the individual possesses certain genetic predispositions (perhaps a "human nature") but those predispositions are updated and constantly under refinement from the environment, as the neuroscience findings would suggest, this belies any universal claims about human nature that materialists would make. The brain is not a blank slate that functions according to, for example, self-interested logics, nor is it purely a blank slate that awaits being written upon by the environment. Instead, "the brain possesses several different, emotionally directed, problem-solving mechanisms with several different inferential patterns that evolved from past interactions with ancestral environments and that it is wired and rewired throughout life by its

interactions with its current environment."[174] As will be discussed below, this has

significant ramifications for what a SN-inspired IR might look like.

Bringing it Together: What Does a SN-Informed IR Look Like?

We can, at this point, start to build a structure of what a SN-informed IR would

look like and begin to assess the promise of SN for IR theory. The following table

highlights several of the IR perspectives on determinism and SN's corollary

perspective:

IR Problems of Determinism	SN Principled Response
Macro vs. Micro Structures	Multiple determinism
Multiple realizability	Nonadditive determinism Reciprocal determinism
Hierarchical organization of systems (higher levels replace lower levels)	Heterarchical organization (higher levels represent rerepresentation of lower levels)
Self-interest vs. "Blank Slate"	Reciprocal determinism

Table 4: Principles of Determinism

The analysis of determinism in SN and IR suggest that the former can aid theorists of

the latter in a number of ways. I will highlight three areas here: gaining purchase on the

mind-body problem as it relates to social science; a middle-ground adjudication of

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[174] Long 2006, 83; Damasio 2000; LeDoux 1996.

claims about human nature; and, a new level sub-individual level of analysis to inform

our assumptions and hypotheses. I turn first to the mind-body problem.

As Wendt's *Social Theory* makes clear, a strict materialist view of the

international system is problematic. The distribution of ideas, just like the distribution

of material capabilities, is important in constituting the structure of the system. Indeed,

material, at some level, is rather meaningless without a particular idea, or set of ideas,

attached to it. But this argument puts the relationship between ideas and material at

somewhat of an awkward position. Just how much do ideas matter? When do ideas stop

and material begin? These questions are tricky not just for IR scholars but philosophers

as well. Cartesian dualism, the idea of irreducible separation of mind and matter, is

intuitively appealing but problematic. So problematic, in fact, that as Wendt notes, few

take it seriously anymore.

One option for getting around the problem is quantum physics. This approach is

helpful because quantum provides a very different ontology of the world than does

classical physics. Indeed the mind-body problem seems to *only* really be a problem for

the classical world. Reality, in quantum, is not "out there" independent of human

involvement but rather is represented "as an immaterial wave of potential realities that

only become fixed with material properties when the subject observes them."[175] This

suggests the separation of subject/object and mind/matter is overturned.[176] This has a

variety of ramifications for epistemology, causation, methodology, etc. But do we need

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[175] Long 2006, 83-84.
[176] Wendt 2010.

to go so far as quantum physics to mitigate the mind-body problem? I suggest that a more materialist perspective, one that SN provides, can help us to bridge the mind-body gap. Admittedly, it may not do so as comprehensively as quantum does, but it allows us to *pragmatically* gain purchase on the issue without throwing the classical physics baby out with the bathwater.

The place to begin is by questioning what the analytical, as opposed to meta-theoretical, problem of mind-body is for social scientists and IR scholars specifically. I argue that for most IR scholars the mind-body problem manifests itself not so much in grand questions regarding where to locate consciousness and so on, but on rather more pragmatic questions of how to navigate various approaches *that are already separated along dualist lines.* For instance, psychology seems to be separated from brain science along dualist lines, with psychology speaking of the mind and neuroscience speaking of the body. Similarly, psychology seems to be separated from sociological approaches along dualist lines, with psychology speaking of the individual (or "body" in some sense") and sociology speaking of society ("the mind").[177] The problem for IR scholars is that conceptualizing interaction between these levels is difficult not just methodologically or epistemologically (as noted above), but practically as well: how does one reconcile studying two things that are seemingly irreducible? SN can help us here by providing a new materialist perspective, one that starts with a unity of mind and body, but not in the usual materialist deterministic fashion.

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[177] Cromby 2007.

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<u>A New Materialism</u>

SN posits brain systems that are open to social and environmental updating, determination, and shaping. The principle of reciprocal determinism discussed above is crucial here. SN does not posit a traditional materialist view that everything social or ideational is caused by material, but rather that the social and ideational can cause the material, thus the reciprocal relationship between mind and matter. Work in neuroplasticity and neurogenesis exemplifies this point. The brain comes wired with a reliable structure, but it is malleable. "The brain's circuits have a structure that is weak enough to yield to influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once. The brain is relatively stable, but its microstructure and functions can be altered."[178] Neuroplasticity refers to the altering of connections (synapses) in the brain. Scientists have known about the brain's capacity to change when it comes to storing memories, but recent work in cross-modal functional plasticity shows that the actual function of brain areas can change in response to injury or other adaptation. Importantly, "mind" events can help to shape this rewiring. Certainly experiences, such as the learned helplessness paradigm discussed above can have this effect. Amazingly, imagined events can as well. Imagined movements, for instance, if repeated enough and with great concentration, have been shown to produce the same synaptic changes as real movements.[179] One can literally use the mind to willfully shape the brain.

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[178] Long 2008.
[179] Schwartz and Begley 2003.

This materialism is a different variety than the traditional materialism that the mind-body problem critiques. Traditional materialism would hold the view that mental processes are the byproduct of brain processes; our thoughts and actions should be reducible to pure physical processes. The new materialist view that SN informs suggests that this is misleading. If the mind can affect brain in a reciprocal relationship, then the traditional materialist approach has mis-specifed the direction of the causal arrow. It should be noted that this is consistent with the findings in quantum theory as well. It too posits that the mind can affect the structure of the brain. But we need not adopt a quantum ontology to be able to use the insight from this new materialism. Indeed we need not take a stand on classical vs. quantum physics at all. The SN inspired materialism brackets that discussion in favor of a more pragmatic approach: regardless of whether classic is right or quantum is right, we now know that mind can affect the brain and this will have significant implications for how we theorize about IR outcomes.

First, any claims about a static human nature will need to be reanalyzed. If the brain is constantly rewiring itself in response to environment and mind, human nature at the very least is not static nor is it fixed or determined. Rationalist claims about the "self-interested individual" as a claim about a universal human nature are problematic.[180] Any claims about our desires for power, or *animus dominandi*, like those sometimes made by realists,[181] should also be re-evaluated. The problem is *not* that individuals are not generally self-interested or not generally for maximizing

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[180] Becker 1976.
[181] Thayer 2004.

domination; they may very well be. But the lack of a fixed human nature would suggest

that scholars can no longer take such perspectives *as assumptions*. The claims become

empirical ones. It is possible that individual brains come wired for self-interest or

power-maximization. But we now know that this may be rewired over time. As such,

those making claims about a human nature must account for the new dynamism of

mind/brain interactions. The promise of work in this area is substantial. Rose

McDermott has begun to elucidate the precise conditions under which emotional

processing is involved in decision-making processes. Rather than assuming strict

rationality or strict emotional processing, McDermott has changed the contours of the

human nature debate; the key empirical question is not *if* there is a static human nature

but *under what conditions* aspects of our human nature affect decision-making.[182]

One example of where this is paying dividends is the intersection between

economics and philosophy. Economists and philosophers have long struggled with

explaining stable departures from utilitarian thinking. The infamous "trolley

experiments" have consistently shown that individuals will choose to route a train such

that it kills one person while saving six others. However, individuals are normally

unwilling to push a person off a bridge in order to stop the train and save six people

down the track. In both instances the number of people killed and saved is identical, yet

the decision varies.[183] Rational choice theorists have had difficulty explaining this

variance in outcome, yet new research in SN is shedding light on the neural correlates

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[182] McDermott 2004.
[183] Greene et al. 2001.

of the decision. One of the key questions for not only this particular departure from utilitarian judgment, but any move away from rationalist prediction is what type of processing is taking place of rationalist processing? Is it a strong emotional response to actively killing someone? Is it a moral judgment that is underway? Brain imaging has helped scholars of this problem hypothesize that there is a "dual-process" involved with moral judgments: some moral judgments are driven by emotion, others by cognitive process. When lesions are applied to the medial prefrontal cortex the likelihood of utilitarian judgment increases.[184] Similarly, manipulating cognitive task load has effects on utilitarian processing.[185] Thus in this instance SN has helped scholars move beyond assumptions of rationality and divergences from rationality to explain the precise *mechanisms* behind those diversions. Ultimately this research contributes to a broader discussion across disciplines about our human nature and decision-making.

Similarly, just as any claims about a static human nature need to be reconsidered, so to do claims regarding an infinitely malleable one need to be reanalyzed for the same reason. Our human nature is apparently *not* a blank slate waiting to be written upon by experience. A constructivist who argues that human nature is socially constructed and deeply separated from any underlying physical reality would have to deal with the SN evidence that suggests our human natures are emergent from brain structures and processes. At this point the constructivist claim about malleability of nature can come in, but the underlying physical reality must be dealt

[184] Koenigs et al. 2007.
[185] Greene et al. 2008.

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with all the same. Recent work on the "logic of habit"[186] and "logic of practicality"[187] addresses precisely this interplay between a malleable human nature derived from process and ideational intersubjective structures. Ted Hopf illustrates how habit's microfoundations in neuroscience help to explain fundamental puzzles in IR, such as the nature of cooperation, security dilemmas, and security communities. Each of these explanations involve elucidating the causal effect of the material level (i.e. the neural) and the ideational level (i.e. intersubjective structures). This moves us beyond static debates about what matters in IR, material or ideas, to an understanding of precisely the two interact with each other.

Second, this new materialism suggests that we need to take seriously the notion that what we consider to be ideational or "mind" concepts may not only have physical roots, such as habit, but these roots can change with experience. This may severely challenge the assumptions we make about ideational concepts. Consider an ideational concept such as identity. A SN materialism suggests that the underlying basis for creating identity is in our brains. This is not a weak claim similar to "everything is in our brains," but rather a very strong one since the apparatus involved in creating a sense of identity can tell us something about identity itself. For instance, one of the claims in this dissertation is that identity is materially created through a shared circuit of two (or many) individuals' neurons firing together. The explanatory leverage here is that we can explore empirically how and when these neurons fire and what changes occur through

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[186] Hopf 2010.
[187] Pouliot 2010.

neuroplasticity over time. In a seminal article in *Nature Neuroscience* Elizabeth

Hoffman and James Haxby demonstrated how notions of identity are strongly linked to

face perception and face-to-face interaction.[188] Subsequent work has noted that

responses to faces change at a physical level over time, originally invoking regions of

the brain used in processing strangers (the "Other") and gradually invoking regions used

in processing thoughts of the "Self."[189] Further, recent research with so-called "mirror

neurons" has demonstrated links between observation of others and intentional

action.[190] This emphasis on face-to-face interaction has significant consequences for

personal diplomacy and the role of the individual in the international system. If better

understanding of political intentions can be gained through increased face-to-face

interaction, then there are important arguments, both explanatory and prescriptive, for

when face-to-face should be utilized.[191]

     Finally, there is an astounding performative implication of the new materialism

for the international system. William Long has pointed out that if we take seriously the

claim that the brain can be rewired through the mind, as SN suggests we should, then

ultimately our human natures are *what we train them to be*.[192] Put simply, if we assume

that we are indeed born with a brain structure predisposed to selfishness, anger, and fear

(perhaps because this is what is evolutionary advantageous in natural selection

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[188] Haxby and Hoffman 2000; Haxby and Hoffman 2002.
[189] cf. Gobbini et al. 2004; Uddin et al 2005; Tanaka and Pierce 2009.
[190] There is a very large literature on mirror neurons and the links to intention understanding. For a review see Iacoboni 2009.
[191] Holmes 2011.
[192] Long 2006, 90.

mechanisms), but we can train ourselves out of those predispositions, this gives agency

sharper teeth. Our brains, as Long puts it, are "as selfish or as altruistic as our mind

trains [them] to be, and our behaviors and actions are our responsibility."[193] This is a

stronger claim than saying that we can tell our genetic predispositions to take a hike.

This claim suggests that we can tell our brains *what we want our predispositions to be*.

If one is inclined to argue that individual psychology can have an effect on the

international system or at the very least international political outcomes such as

continued fighting in long-standing conflicts, this finding provides new evidence of

performativity in the system and a renewed emphasis on actor-centric theory.

Normatively, it may also provide optimism for the future state of the system. The

closest link between this idea and IR theory development is in Alex Wendt's argument

that the international system exists in the minds of individuals.[194] If we accept a

somewhat different notion of the physical and ground consciousness in quantum

mechanics, an admitted "bet" at this juncture in the quantum literature, then it may be

the case that the ontology of the social world is a flat one, where the "real" realities

exist not out there in objects such as states, but in the virtual reality of individual minds.

Therefore if the international system is in the minds of individuals, then this suggests a

performativity regarding what that system looks like.

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[193] Ibid.
[194] Wendt 2010.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to reach two broad goals. First, it creates a framework for how we should think about the incorporation of biological generally, and neuroscientific specifically, findings into IR This has included two distinct questions. First, what is the overarching epistemological argument for the applicability of the biological sciences to IR? And second, assuming there is a compelling epistemological argument, how should we go about updating or reconstructing theory to include these findings? This has been done by arguing for two distinct trajectories of incorporating biological insights, top-down and bottom-up approaches. In the top-down model we update our theories when SN findings challenge an assumption or provide us with another variable to test. The emphasis is on making the theory more congruent with the underlying physical reality. In the bottom-up model we build new theory from the ground-up because a SN finding has elucidated a reality constraint which extant theory cannot explain away. In these instances IR must "turn back the hands of time" and reconstruct theory in light of the new reality constraint. Which pathway is chosen will depend on the research question and the challenging evidence accrued from SN discovery. An ecumenical approach has been suggested.

The second broad goal was to defend this general framework against potential criticism. This is not easy as the criticisms are diverse and many are valid. Once again it was noted that the extent to which the criticisms apply will depend on the research

question and method. There is not, nor can there be, a single epistemological justification for "digging deeper" that applies to all questions. Nor would it be desirable to have an epistemological response that deflected all criticisms. Instead, I have addressed common criticisms in political science by noting that SN has heard many of the same criticisms within its own discipline and has had to deal with them. Questions such as multiple realizability, the determinism of neural substrates, the problem of multiple-level analysis, etc. are not new to scholars of the brain. Indeed these questions have spurred foundational principles of the field. Rather than attempting to address all criticisms in a new way, I let SN do the talking, so to speak, by applying their core principles to the problems political scientists have identified. The result, I believe, is a justification for the framework that relies not on grand-theorizing and novel arguments, but careful use of what SN has been discovering for decades through introspection.

More specifically the article has outlined a framework for what a new SN-inspired IR should look like. The framework starts by suggesting that the mind-body problem is not just a theoretical issue for philosophers, but rather a deeply pragmatic issue for anyone who attempts to bring such fields as psychology and sociology together. As this represents at least two of the "images" we normally study in IR, this problem affects much theoretical work. We continually run into the problem of how ideas are constituted, when they stop and material begins, and so forth. SN helps us here by suggesting that for many of the types of questions IR is interested in answering, we can take a materialist approach. But there is a significant twist here. The "new

materialism" of SN suggests not a determinism of the ideational by the physical, but rather a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the two. The mind and ideas affect and re-wire the brain, thus serving to create two causal arrows between mind and matter. This, I argue, has very significant implications for the study of IR in both bottom-up and top-down approaches. I have provided instances in the literature where this type of investigation is already in process and has produced significant new insights into old, vexing puzzles.

At the end of the day, if our brains are what we train them to be, many of IR's favorite claims about our human nature need to be reanalyzed. Perhaps even more importantly, many of our ideational concepts have physical manifestations that we need to understand. We have yet to look at these physical roots because we have adopted a dualist position of mind and matter being fundamentally irreducible. With a dualist position there would be no reason to investigate the underlying physical correlates of something like identity. But adopting the dualist position has meant that we have bracketed off half of what SN tells us is relevant for understanding social behavior, the physical components. In the end, Cartesian dualism has obfuscated our thinking of social outcomes in certain areas and it is necessary to rescue materialism in an updated form in order to gain additional explanatory leverage.

Chapter 3 - The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War

Introduction and Background to the Case

Dennis Ross, chief peace negotiator and diplomat in the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton presidential administrations, notes that if one had queried leaders in Europe, the State Department, journalists, pundits, and most foreign policy experts around 1988, they would have claimed that it was simply inconceivable that Soviet leadership would accept an end to the Cold War outcome of a unified Germany that was integrated into NATO.[195] Indeed as late as October 1988 Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998, responded to the notion that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev may provide unity to Germany in the following way: "I do not write futuristic novels… What you ask now, that is in the realm of fantasy."[196] Yet, less than one year later the Berlin Wall fell and German unification and NATO membership quickly followed in 1990. What was once believed to be fantasy had become real, and in very short order. What explains this drastic change of course in world history?

Any complex political outcome is likely the result of many causal factors. The end of the Cold War is certainly no exception. The outcome is overdetermined in the sense that one could provide many very different causal arguments that seek to explain

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[195] Ross 2008, 30.
[196] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 62.

German unification and theoretically all of the arguments could be right, assuming they were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they could all be explaining the various processes that come together to produce a complex political outcome and in doing so help to make sense of the larger pictures.[197] The key question for my purposes is to understand if there were causal factors that should be privileged. Are there causal factors where, if removed and the tape of history is rerun, we would expect a different outcome? Traditional explanations of the end of the Cold War have investigated power dynamics, domestic politics, and ideological dynamics; these are all useful analysis. An aspect of the transformation that has received less attention is the diplomatic efforts that served as the catalyst for change. I suggest that understanding intentions derived through face-to-face interactions help to explain the timing and success of the U.S. push for German reunification.

When one asks this question to the diplomats and professionals that were involved in the actual negotiations that led to German reunification, such as Dennis Ross, Condoleezza Rice, Philip Zelikow, James Baker, Sergey Akhromeyev, among others, the importance of face-to-face interaction becomes quite clear. Each argues that face-to-face interaction fundamentally changed the course of events. Further, primary documents, such as memoirs and written histories that were produced contemporaneously with the negotiations, highlight the effects of face-to-face as well. In the minds of the professionals on both sides who took part in the negotiations, it was

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[197] Herrmann and Lebow 2004.

the personal diplomacy of the negotiations that provided the impetus for change. As

will be discussed below, the counterfactual is hard to imagine: would German

reunification have occurred in the same manner (i.e. timing, concessions, etc.) or at all

had it *not* been for face-to-face? It is to that question that we now turn.

The Lead-up to "Two Plus Four": Many Obstacles

      When the George H.W. Bush administration assumed power in 1989, the U.S.

perspective on where the Cold War stood was one of caution and perplexity. While the

Reagan administration had all but declared the Cold War over, the Bush administration

was initially much more skeptical about Soviet intentions.[198] Bush himself admitted

that he was not clairvoyant and could not "claim to have understood everything that

would happen in Europe from Day One."[199] This uncertainty about Soviet intentions

perhaps makes sense of the nearly immediate tension felt between the U.S. and West

Germany over the modernization of short-range nuclear capabilities.[200] Debate raged

within West Germany about the value of modernizing NATO's short-range missiles.

Some argued short range missiles were largely useless ("The shorter the ranges, the

deader the Germans")[201]; others argued from an explicitly "antinuclear" standpoint.

The Bush administration successfully sidestepped the issue by focusing on a

conventional arms control initiative that sought to both appease West Germany's

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[198] Zelikow and Rice 1995, 20-31; Bush and Scowcroft 1998.
[199] Borchgrave 1989.
[200] cf. Asmus 1989.
[201] Quoted in Risse-Kappen 1998.

security concerns in Europe and reassure Moscow by not pursuing a visible nuclear modernization program.

The significance of this episode for the Bush administration was high and mentioned here as a backdrop to German unification for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it was an indication that uncertainty did abound and the Cold War was indeed not over. Second, however, the episode also signified that Bush could reassure the Soviets that his administration was not interested in pushing further nuclear standoffs. Third, the successful NATO conference that followed the tension provided Bush with much political capital in Europe. Reporters and analysts greeted the summit with great fanfare. While in effect the administration had simply kicked the modernization question can down the road, it was nonetheless something of a victory as Bush successfully avoided a tense standoff. This political capital and popularity, in turn, provided Bush the impetus to make public a "new theme" for Europe: "Our overall aim is to overcome the division of Europe and to forge a unity based on Western values… The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole. Today it is this very concept of a divided Europe that is under siege."[202] This early success gave Bush the confidence to pursue reunification with the Soviets. Finally, the episode is indicative of the fast sweeping change that would occur with each side moving from uncertainty of the Other's interactions to trust and understanding, as will be demonstrated below.

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[202] Zelikow and Rice 1995, 31.

The vision for a reunified Germany that the Bush administration had in mind was one that would avoid the pitfalls of Versailles. As Robert Zoellick, one of the key architects of policy that the administration would negotiate, put it, "President Bush, Secretary Baker, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and their colleagues recognized that their decisions would shape Europe for decades to come… The U.S. aim was to unify Europe in peace and freedom, while seeking to avoid a 'Versailles victory' that invited its own destruction."[203] What Zoellick meant here is that "any limits imposed from the outside would create the potential for future grievances."[204] The U.S. had to avoid what occurred after World War I with required reparations from Germany, a policy that some believed led directly to Nazi accession to power.[205] At the same time, however, the Bush administration firmly believed that Germany's past could not be ignored. "The president and his advisors believed that if Germany was not embedded in NATO, it would be a source of danger. If neutral, it would seek security by gaining its own nuclear capability, which would put Europe on a nuclear hair-trigger and cause the nuclear nonproliferation regime to unravel as other states capable of developing nuclear weapons chose to do so."[206] As such the U.S. found itself in a tricky position with respect to negotiating for German reunification. It had to, on the one hand, push for German reunification but not give in to the perceived Soviet desire to create a weakened German state. If Germany was to be reunited it had to be in

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[203] Zoellick 1990.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Ross 2008, 34.
[206] Ibid.

NATO. On the other hand, if the U.S. wanted to bring about an end to the Cold War, it would certainly have to make concessions to the Soviets.

It is important to note at the outset that in 1988 the U.S. was practically alone in its desire to see a unified Germany. The Soviets, British, and French were not enthusiastic about the prospect; each side had legitimate concerns. The Soviets viewed a divided Germany as one that could not threaten the Soviet/Russian state and therefore it was preferable to keep the nation divided. The British and the French still maintained relatively fresh memories of German domination of Europe and the consequences of a unified Germany that would perhaps weaken their power and weight in Europe was not particularly welcomed. Most important, all parties involved worried about the destabilizing force of a unified Germany. While a divided Germany was far from ideal, and each side had a desire to see the Cold War come to a close, the process of it occurring could have tremendous disruptive effects on the continent. As Bob Blackwell, national intelligence officer for the USSR in the CIA points out, the domestic situation in Germany could have significant consequences for the domestic situation in the USSR: "If it were to appear that Soviet troops were being forced to retreat from the GDR, [Gorbachev] had 'lost' Germany, and the security environment for the USSR was now more threatening, the domestic fallout – when combined with other complaints – could pose a threat to his position."[207]

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[207] Baker 1995, 234.

This type of destabilization of Europe is something the French and British would rather avoid. Gorbachev agreed. Noting to Francois Mitterrand in November 1989 that the day Germany became unified was the day that "a Soviet marshal will be sitting in my chair."[208] Margaret Thatcher laid out why Gorbachev should be wary of German reunification in a meeting with Bush: "Look at Germany. Reunification means Gorbachev is lost. He loses the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. A unified Germany would be a country of eighty million in the middle of Europe, one with a strong balance of trade."[209] Gorbachev understood this and at various times repeated that a unified Germany was "absolutely ruled out."[210] Interestingly, however, as Dennis Ross points out, the early face-to-face meetings that Gorbachev had with Secretary Baker and President Bush were far more measured. "Clearly, Gorbachev was under domestic internal pressure, and for understandable reasons."[211] As Ross alludes to, while there was grandstanding and saber-rattling occurring in public, face-to-face meetings revealed a different Gorbachev, a Gorbachev that would shortly be open to reunification despite what was being said in public.

Finally, with respect to negotiating positions, Gorbachev knew that the French and British had their reservations about pushing for German reunification.[212] Thatcher and Mitterrand indeed made their positions quite clear. Thatcher told Gorbachev that

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[208] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 137.
[209] Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 192.
[210] Baker 1995, 235.
[211] Ross 2008, 35.
[212] Ross 2008, 36.

"although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany's aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive."[213] Mitterrand contributed by noting that "reunification poses so many problems that I shall make up my mind as events occur."[214] With French and British leadership expressing skepticism, Gorbachev had significant negotiating power; he would not be alone in initially opposing the reunification idea. Thus it is perhaps a bit of an understatement when Dennis Ross notes that the "the obstacles [to reunification] were formidable."[215]

Reaching Agreement: The Force of Face-to-Face

<u>Strategies</u>

Overcoming the practical obstacles to German reunification while satisfying the needs of the various "Two Plus Four" players (the two Germanys plus France, UK, USA, and USSR) required a strategy of reassuring each party that their concerns would be accounted for and building trust that the U.S. was not simply trying to steamroll a solution onto Europe. Dennis Ross notes number of different strategies that were utilized to accomplish this. Framing the issue was critical. Ross and Francis Fukuyama, deputy on the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department constructed four principles that would help to frame the approach to unification:[216]

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[213] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 96.
[214] Ibid, 98.
[215] Ross 2008, 37.
[216] Ross 2008, 37.

1) Self-determination for Germans must occur without prejudice with respect to its outcome.

2) Unification should occur in the larger context of Germany's commitment to NATO, the European Community, and the Allied (Four) Powers.

3) Unification should be gradual and peaceful.

4) The inviolability of borders should be respected (as outlined in the Helsinki Final Act).

This framing was important because it helped to address some of the obstacles identified above with respect to instability on the European continent. The timing, pace, and inviolability of borders should help to appease the French and British. Including the Soviets in the framework as one of the Four Powers would also help to ensure that they were included in the process and reassured that this was not simply the U.S. pushing a vision onto Europe.[217] Further, by framing the issue around these four principles the U.S. effectively set the agenda with respect to unification. The questions circulating were no long about *if* but *how.*

Additionally, Ross, Zelikow and Rice, and Baker all make note of the importance of public diplomacy. Ross notes, for instance, the importance of bringing the German polity onboard with the American proposal and the reassurance given to Soviets that they would not be simply standing by. "The process… was designed in part to show Germans the practical means for making unification real, and to assure the Soviets that they would have a place at the table and that any outcome would be

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[217] Ibid.

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shaped by their participation and input."[218] Consequently, U.S. negotiators took great

care to understand how their actions would be interpreted by polities in Europe and the

Soviet Union. Brent Scowcroft notes in his memoirs that the aim was to bring the four

principles outlined above out into the open slowly and gradually, thereby gently easing

British, French, and Soviet concerns. Thus, James Baker casually outlined the four

principles in response to a question at a press conference on November 29.The position

of the United States was out in the open and available for public consumption.

The strategies of framing, reassurance, and so on would remain ineffective,

however, without convincing decision-makers, notably Gorbachev and Kohl, to go

along with the U.S.' plan. This was difficult because each individual decision-maker

had their own ideas about how reunification should proceed (if at all) and each entered

the negotiations with different identities. Further, and perhaps most discouraging,

traditional diplomatic channels, such as letters to Gorbachev were proving relatively

unproductive. As Zelikow and Rice note, in late 1989 Kohl undertook measures to try

to reassure the Soviets that their concerns would be taken seriously and maintaining

stability in Europe was a paramount concern. These measures included a letter written

by Kohl directly to Gorbachev that highlighted Kohl's emphasis on avoiding

destabilization in Europe, the fact that it was the German people that were seeking

reunification and thus any progress would be "embedded in all-European structures"

(presumably this was to reassure Gorbachev that it was not the United States pulling

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[218] Ibid, 38.

the puppet strings behind the scenes), and finally, that Kohl recognized the Soviets'

legitimate security concerns about reunification. The response Kohl received was, as

Zelikow and Rice put it "cold."[219] Gorbachev pledged to "neutralize" any intervention

in the GDR's affairs and that East Germany was fundamentally a partner of the Soviet

Union and the two Germany's were a "historic fact."[220] Clearly traditional diplomatic

channels of the written word were not engendering the type of cooperation and trust

that Kohl and the United States were seeking. What then was the catalyst for change

when faced with such significant obstacles?

Concerted Efforts at Personal Diplomacy

As Ross notes, achieving cooperation required significant efforts in personal

diplomacy. The effort to bring Gorbachev and the other major players along in

accepting a reunification plan utilized extensive face-to-face interactions:

> The diplomatic efforts at the highest levels of the
> administration were remarkable for their extensive, intensive,
> and time-consuming nature. The president and the secretary
> of state conducted a highly personal diplomacy that involved
> an extraordinary number of face-to-face meetings with other
> leaders. Certainly phone calls were made, especially in the
> interim between meetings or to brief other leaders on the
> meetings that had just taken place with their fellow leaders.
> This was especially true with both Kohl and Gorbachev.
> Following a meeting with one, President Bush would place a
> call to brief the other on where things now stood. These were
> not perfunctory phone calls, they were highly substantive and
> were designed to move the process along or undo a false

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[219] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 147.
[220] Ibid.

impression that might otherwise become rooted and create problems. Though these calls, and meetings at lower levels, were an essential part of the diplomacy, *there can be no doubt that the face-to-face meetings at the president's and secretary's level were the heart of the effort.*[221]

Both the intensity of the meetings themselves and sheer number of disparate interactions were staggering. Ross notes that President Bush met Chancellor Kohl in either a bilateral or "on the margins of broader multilateral events" nine times in the span of one year.[222] Bush met with Thatcher eight times in total, three of which were strictly bi-lateral. He met with President Mitterrand eight times, twice exclusively, in that same one year time span. James Baker exercised even greater use of the face-to-face meeting. Ross counts close to thirty different encounters with his German, British, French, and Soviet counterparts over the same year long period.

Of what use were these meetings for the American diplomacy team? One of the most important considerations for the U.S. diplomacy team was understanding if the Soviets actually had a true intention of moving forward with a unified Germany. James Baker notes that, "[The Soviets] were saying the right things, but it was important that we match action with words." In order to make a determination about intentions, Baker sought a series of face-to-face meetings with his Soviet counterpart, Edward Shevernadze. Baker notes that the meetings were critical in determining that the

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[221] Ross 2008, 39 (emphasis mine).
[222] Ibid.

Soviets could be pushed toward reunification as they provided "a determination in my own mind that it was time to move forward."[223] It was, in other words, through face-to-face interaction that Baker was able to see through public rhetoric and understand that the Soviets could be pushed.

Ross makes it clear that the meetings were not only high in quantity, but quality as well. face-to-face interactions allowed Bush and Baker to bring a level of comfort to the table when sitting down with counterparts. This was critical for reasons mentioned above: every party involved had reason to be skeptical of what the U.S. was pushing toward. German aspirations had to be balanced with British/French/Soviet concerns and fears. Both Baker and Bush found that the best way to engender comfort and trust was through the mechanism of sitting down together and following up personally with telephone calls.[224] James Baker, in reflecting back upon the period, corroborates Ross' reading of the importance of face-to-face. Baker notes that it was precisely through face-to-face interaction with Soviet counterparts, particularly Edward Shevernadze, that he was able to "[make] a determination in my own mind that it was time to move forward. I recommended that to the president I think he quickly came to the same conclusion that we needed to test Soviet intentions."[225] It was, in other words, through face-to-face interaction that Baker was able to see through public rhetoric and understand that the Soviets could be pushed.

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[223] 1997 James Baker Interview (George Washington University National Security Archive)
[224] Ross 2008, 39-40.
[225] 1997 James Baker Interview (George Washington University National Security Archive).

Face-to-face encounters also helped the United States to build assurance and

trust with their counterparts, as evidenced by an important meeting between Bush,

Scowcroft, and Kohl in December 1989 immediately following the Malta summit.

Kohl had surprised the United States and Soviets in a letter and subsequent speech

outlining his "10 Points" plan for German reunification in November. In the letter Kohl

implores Bush to push for quick reunification: "The most important decisions over

stability or destabilization will be made by the countries in Central and Eastern

Europe. The duty of the West on the other hand must be to support the ongoing reform

process from the outside… Western help is coming far too slowly."[226] The U.S.

response to the letter was trepidation that Kohl would attempt to "go it alone" with his

plan and this would upset Gorbachev. In a telephone conversation between Kohl and

Scowcroft the next day Kohl pledged that he was not going alone and that his 10 point

plan should be not be viewed as an alternative to the United States' strategy. The face-

to-face encounter that followed days later would solidify this position. Kohl repeated in

the meeting to Bush his commitment to the United States plan: "We are part of Europe

and continue as part of the EC. Ten points is *not* an alternative to what we are doing in

the West."[227] As Scowcroft notes, this face-to-face meeting marked a turning point

from the perspective of both sides: "There seemed a perfect conjunction of the minds

on reunification, and the atmosphere of comradeship in a great venture was palpable to

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[226] Letter from Helmut Kohl to George H.W. Bush, November 28, 1989. Available:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB296/index.htm
[227] Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 198.

me. The easygoing discussion seemed to give Kohl confidence, almost visible to me at the time, that he had the President behind him. Kohl, in his memoir of reunification, also points to this meeting as an important moment."[228] While the same information had been conveyed days earlier through both letters and telephone calls, there was something about the face-to-face encounter that brought comfort to Kohl that the previous interactions could not.

Importantly, it was not only the U.S. and Germany sides that found value in the face-to-face interactions. Sergey Fyodorovich Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces under Gorbachev, was heavily involved in negotiations with U.S. Joint Chiefs beginning in 1988 in the lead-up to the reunification decision. He noted in an interview that before 1988 he was very skeptical and distrustful of U.S. intentions. This changed when he had the opportunity to meet his American counterparts. John Hines summarizes Akhromeyev's position from an interview: "The first and several subsequent meetings reassured him that the joint chiefs were thoughtful and responsible people. The mutual understanding that came from face-to-face discussions helped to create a fairly stable situation in Europe. The intentions ascribed for many years by each side to the other were incorrect."[229] Akhromeyev, like Ross, attributes intention understanding to the face-to-face encounters he had with American counterparts. He further suggests that stability in Europe itself was aided by

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[228] Ibid, 199-200.
[229] Hines interview, February 8, 1991 (George Washington University National Security Archive).

the face-to-face interactions he participated in. Akhromeyev would enter the face-to-face interaction with one understanding of U.S. intentions and exit with a different understanding.

Face-to-face Interaction: Providing Clues Beyond Rhetoric

While it is clear that participants on both sides of the negotiations agree that face-to-face interactions made a salient difference in engendering cooperation, a key question is exactly what the participants were deriving from these meetings that made a difference. For instance, it is possible that it was not the face-to-face part of the interaction that made the salient difference, but instead the information that was transmitted during these interactions that made a crucial difference. Bush's fateful one-on-one interaction with Gorbachev aboard the Soviet cruise liner *Maxim Gorkii* during the 1989 Malta conference provides an excellent example of the shared empathy that can be transmitted through a face-to-face interaction but not necessarily through other modalities, illustrating that it is not just the information but how the information that is transmitted that matters. As Condoleezza Rice recounts the history, President Bush was eager to have a face-to-face one-on-one meeting with Gorbachev in order to affirm support for democracy in Eastern Europe and show the Soviets that the U.S. was serious about cooperation and relationship-building. [230] Brent Scowcroft, was more skeptical. He feared a face-to-face interaction would put undue pressure and expectations on both sides to reach a monumental agreement. Worse, "the Soviets

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[230] Rice interview, December 17, 1997 (George Washington University National Security Archive).

might grandstand and force [the United States] into agreements that would ultimately not be good [for us]."[231] Nevertheless, Bush maintained that the time had come for a meeting, likely in part because of what is discussed above: letters were not producing the desired results.

Through declassified transcripts of the encounter as well as memoirs written by the participants, we have insight into the nuances of what occurred in the interaction. The specifics are important as they help to illustrate precisely what face-to-face can accomplish that other modalities cannot. Bush knew in 1989 that Gorbachev and Soviet military leaders such as Akhromeyev were skeptical of U.S. intentions and believed that Bush "did not support perestroika.[232] Bush therefore decided to open the interaction with a lengthy discussion about the need for more U.S.-Soviet economic cooperation and more arms control on both sides. He also attempted to put Gorbachev at ease by highlighting that the U.S. had not responded to the Berlin Wall coming down, even though his administration had encouraged him to do so. "But I was persistently advised to do something of that sort--to climb the Berlin Wall and to make broad declarations. My administration, however, is avoiding these steps; we are in favor of reserved behavior."[233] Gorbachev responded favorably to this by laughingly noting that "jumping on the wall is indeed not an occupation for the President."[234]

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[231] Ibid.
[232] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 127.
[233] USSR Transcript, 1989.
[234] Chernyayev, 309-310.

Importantly, this information was not new: the U.S. had communicated to Gorbachev and the Soviets immediately following the events that led to the fall of the wall that their response would be subdued.[235]

Among the substantive give and take of the interaction, both sides made clear what their concerns and intentions were moving forward. Bush emphasized that the United States could not be asked to disapprove of German reunification. Gorbachev offered a veiled, but optimistic, reading of the situation: "You can tremble and some panic, but if you look at it philosophically – things fall into place. We are dealing with fundamental processes if nations and people are involved in the developments – one can't expect it to be smooth."[236] The two agreed that democratic values are universal and not simply "Western," as Bush and his officials had intimated in earlier letters correspondences and that both leaders had the same vision for self-determination of political, cultural or economic systems moving forward. As Zelikow and Rice point out, the entire meeting was cordial and relaxed.

The press conference following the face-to-face interaction exhibited similar non-confrontational tones. The two leaders spoke together and noted that both sides would show restraint. The U.S. would not demonstrate "on top of the Berlin Wall to show how happy we are about the change, [but] we are happy about the change."[237]

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[235] Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 190; Maynard 2008.
[236] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 129.
[237] Ibid.

For Gorbachev's part, he intimated that the German question was "the decision of history" and "history itself decides the processes and fates on the European continent and also the fates of those two states."[238]

For the United States contingent, the change in tone and demeanor at the Malta interaction from earlier interactions was striking. Gorbachev had previously given the impression, publicly and privately, of being uneasy" about the developments in Germany. Indeed just one week earlier Gorbachev expressed great concern about German unification to Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney (who later told his American counterparts about the interaction), noting to Mulroney: "people have died from eating unripened fruit," an allegory to the problem of hastily uniting the two Germanys.[239] Just days before the Malta meeting, on November 28, Helmut Kohl announced his "10 Points" plan for unification. The Soviet Foreign Ministry responded to the notion as pushing "a nationalist direction." Gorbachev himself noted to Bush at the very beginning of their face-to-face interaction that Kohl had not acted "seriously and responsibly."[240] Similar unease was conveyed in correspondences between Soviet leadership and U.S. counterparts.[241]

It was thus surprising that the uneasy and anti-unification Gorbachev would be replaced by a more open and philosophical Gorbachev during the face-to-face

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[238] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 130.
[239] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 124.
[240] http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB296/doc03.pdf
[241] Ibid.

interaction. As Zelikow and Rice noted, "Gorbachev's relaxed demeanor convinced the Americans that the Soviet leader was malleable on the German question."[242] Akhromeyev, for his part, later reflected that Gorbachev had made a crucial error in this soft demeanor and failure to give a "concrete answer" to the German question opened the door for the West to move ahead with their vision, albeit softly and strategically.[243] The lack of a strong stance by Gorbachev in the face-to-face interaction with Bush meant that Bush would not face strong opposition on the German question. As Akhromeyev reflects on the meeting, "Bush realized that had a position like this been formed, it would have been expressed by M. Gorbachev in Malta... It is hard to doubt that G. Bush informed H. Kohl about this."[244] Indeed shortly after the Malta meeting, Bush met with Kohl in Brussels and the two began crafting a gradual process toward reunification. Bush referred to Gorbachev's new disposition as one of openness to the German question, if there was "a formulation which doesn't scare him."[245]

As Zelikow, Rice, and Ross note, these crucial face-to-face encounters are precisely where the groundwork for a plan was created. Gorbachev went into Malta having just expressed considerable public disdain for the idea of a unified Germany and left the Malta interaction having impressed upon Bush that progress on unification

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[242] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 130.
[243] Ibid.
[244] Cited in Zelikow and Rice 1999, 131.
[245] Ibid.

was possible. Literally in hours "positions" had changed. The face-to-face interactions

allowed Bush to read Gorbachev's true (but not public) intentions with respect to

progress moving forward; his easy demeanor and relaxed nature was a stark contrast to

the rhetoric exhibited earlier. This signaled to the President that Gorbachev did not

intend to put up much opposition. The words being said publicly were attempts to

shield what Gorbachev evidently internally believed: the German question should be

reopened. Had it not been for the face-to-face interactions with Gorbachev, Bush

would have only had the stark public discourse for intention-understanding and would

have ready tremendously different conclusions. As Akhromeyev notes, ultimately these

face-to-face interactions likely resulted in an outcome that many in the USSR did not

want. While he was encouraged to convey a hard-lined position to Bush in their

meeting, he was able to do this in rhetoric only. Ultimately this intention understanding

that Bush gained opened the door to an outcome favorable to the United States.

While it is often difficult to discern precisely what a politician's intentions are,

in this case there is significant evidence to suggest that Gorbachev indeed intended

German unification, despite his public stance. As Pavel Palazhencko, Gorbachev's

translator, recounts, the intentions had been set by December 1989, despite domestic

consternation at the idea:

> No one was happy in Moscow either. Men as different as
> Shevardnadze and Ligachev said the same thing at the Central
> committee plenum in January 1990: the pace of Germany's
> unification was alarming, and its membership in NATO would

be dangerous. But even in December 1989, on the plane to
Brussels, one thing clearly emerged from our heated discussion:
we were dealing with a national issue and a national drive;
unification was inevitable; we could perhaps slow it down but
we could not stop it.[246]

It is this understanding of intention that unification was inevitable, that Bush ultimately

gains in Malta through face-to-face interaction with Gorbachev.

Likewise, Gorbachev at Malta read from Bush that the United States would not

utilize the current political situation in Germany to press a solution onto the Soviets.

Gorbachev read Bush's intentions of allowing for self-determination and universal

democratic values to be more than simple rhetoric. He read correctly that Bush

sincerely intended to not exploit German instability. As Shevardnadze noted following

the meeting, "We attach special significance to our mutual understanding with the

Americans. Our current relations with that country permit us to work jointly in

guaranteeing security in Europe."[247] As the historian David Shumaker notes, this

"mutual understanding" really began in the interaction in Malta. "Both Gorbachev and

Bust came away convinced of the other's sincerity and trustworthiness. In particular,

the US guarantee that it would not exploit the instability in Eastern Europe reassured

Gorbachev as to Washington's intentions.[248] Put simply, the face-to-face interaction

created trust and successful intention reading by both parties.

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[246] Palazhencko 1997, 159.
[247] Sidorova interview, 1990.
[248] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 132.

Finally, it is important to note that Bush was risking quite a bit on this intention-understanding derived through the face-to-face meeting. As he notes:

> I took a great deal of flak in the press, from leaders in the US Baltic communities, and from 'experts,' that I was too accommodating, accepting Gorbachev's 'new thinking' and reforms at face value. I was acutely aware of the dangers, but my experience with Gorbachev at Malta, and Baker's excellent relationship with Shevardnadze, made me confident that Gorbachev was sincere in his efforts to match his words with actions.[249]

Put simply, the consequences for being wrong about the intentions and misreading the seemingly cooperative demeanor and tone of Gorbachev would have significant consequences for Bush. He was placing a large bet that his reading of Gorbachev and Baker's reading of Shevardnadze were correct.

While we will never be able to definitively know whether similar cooperation would have obtained if not for the face-to-face interactions between U.S. and Soviet officials, and in particular the meetings between Bush and Gorbachev, the rich contextual evidence suggests that we have reason to doubt that agreement would have been reached as quickly and efficiently as it was. First, there is the evidence with respect to prior efforts regarding letters and telephone calls. As Zelikow, Rice, and Ross all note, letters only took the U.S. contingent so far; face-to-face efforts were required for intention understanding and cooperation building. Second, there is the interpretation of those involved in the interactions themselves that face-to-face was

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[249] Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 207.

critical. It would be easy to suggest that Rice, Zelikow, Ross, Baker, Bush, etc. obviously believe their face-to-face efforts were instrumental since they are on the "winning" side and their efforts did indeed bring Gorbachev and others along with the plan. But this does not explain the Soviet counterparts agreeing that face-to-face was critical as well. Indeed if face-to-face actually was not that important but it was rather something else, perhaps a material or political constraint that led Gorbachev to cooperate, we would expect the Soviet counterparts to suggest so. The fact that they admit that face-to-face was critical as well strengthen the evidence that face-to-face made a difference. Finally, even if we grant the counterfactual that German reunification was somehow determined by various material path dependencies and two Germany's could never sustain themselves individually thus ensuring reunification would happen sooner or later, we still need a way of explaining why reunification happened when and in the manner that it did. Through this lens the critical question is why positions and intentions changed so quickly. The evidence presented suggests that it was the face-to-face interactions that were critical to engendering this timely positional change.

Bringing the Case Together: Lessons Learned

What the German reunification case demonstrates is that face-to-face interactions can have a material effect on trust building and intention understanding , both components of robust cooperation. A number of specific lessons and observations in these areas can be drawn. Specifically, we can delineate from the empirical

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illustration under what conditions we would expect face-to-face to be particularly powerful in helping to engender cooperation.

First, it is important to note that one of the points that Zelikow and Rice make in their recanting of the history is that the face-to-face interactions help to make "true" intentions available by shielding politicians from the public. That is, for political reasons leaders in the unification discussions would often exhibit two types of rhetoric: that purposed for public consumption and that purposed for private consumption. Publicly it was important for Gorbachev, for example, to take a strong stance against the United States and appear to be cornering others into positions and not the other way around. Privately it was important for Gorbachev to achieve an outcome that would be viable for the Soviets. Often these two discourses were not identical. The face-to-face meetings that were held in relative privacy, such as on the *Maxim Gorkii*, allowed for better revealing of true intentions. As Zelikow and Rice point out, the face-to-face interactions between Bush and Gorbachev allowed Bush to "read" Gorbachev's intentions that he was open to the German reunification project *even though* he was simultaneously against the idea publicly. Importantly, it was not just in Gorbachev's words that Bush came to understand his intentions, but his demeanor that seemingly is only available in a face-to-face interaction. Thus the first lesson that can be drawn from the reunification case is that face-to-face is perhaps most effective when conducted in relative privacy where leaders can focus on each other rather than the public audience.

Second, Ross makes a point of noting that the extensive face-to-face interactions were not the end of negotiations, but rather something that occurred in the middle of negotiations. When letters were not enough, the U.S. diplomats invoked a strategy of extensive face-to-face meetings. One the meetings were conducted and cooperative positions reached, the negotiations did not end. Telephone conversations and follow-up letters were used to maintain and solidify the cooperation that was created face-to-face. Ross explicitly notes that the follow-up telephone conversations helped to maintain what had been reached in face-to-face interaction. Thus we should see face-to-face interaction not simply as one modality of interaction that should be used or not used in a given instance, but rather one tool of the negotiator among many. Face-to-face helps to engender cooperation, but that cooperation must be sustained once the interaction is over. This is where other types of interaction modalities may be used for "maintenance" of cooperative positions.

Third, it is important to note that for negotiators on both sides intention reading and understanding were hindered early on in the process precisely by a lack of face-to-face interaction. As Akhromeyev noted in his memoirs and interviews, it was only through the face-to-face interaction with U.S. counterparts that he came to understand that his reading of the intentions was incorrect. As he notes, the hostile intentions that he read into his counterparts, derived through non-face-to-face interactions, ended up being incorrect. Thus what we see on both sides of the negotiation is that parties possessing very different identities are able to understand each other better, read the

other's intentions, and build trust much more successfully through face-to-face interaction, relative to other modalities.

While it is impossible to rerun the tape of history and suggest to both sides that they meet each other face-to-face earlier in the process, it is reasonable to ask whether or not earlier face-to-face interaction would have led to quicker cooperation. There are arguments in both directions. First, if face-to-face helps to clarify intentions in a way that other forms of interaction, such as letters and cable wires do not, then it is reasonable to think that early face-to-face is better than late face-to-face. On the other hand, letters and other traditional diplomatic methods do help to communicate preferences and create baselines. Both sides of a negotiation need to think through positions and alternatives in order to reach a place where they are able to begin cooperating. As noted earlier, in 1988 neither side thought there was much chance at negotiating a reunification plan. Face-to-face interactions this early on would likely have simply reinforced this understanding on both sides. Bush and Baker were very cognizant of the timing of face-to-face interaction. They waited until they believed the Soviets were *ready to be convinced*. The initial negotiation and legwork was provided in other modalities and powerful face-to-face reserved for reaching final agreement. Thus an additional lesson from the case is that participants must be very careful in choosing when, or when not, to engage in face-to-face interactions. If face-to-face leads to better understanding of the Other and cooperative agreement, then it is critical

that face-to-face not be invoked before one is *ready to share* their intentions and ready for cooperation.

Brent Scowcroft was well aware of this pitfall of face-to-face and expressed concerns to Rice and Bush about engaging in face-to-face too quickly. There are number of legitimate reasons for this. First, as Scowcroft argued, face-to-face interactions between heads of state are necessarily high-profile. As such they may produce expectations for action and cooperation that each side may not want. Second, there is the problem of deception. Akhromeyev's recanting of the Gorbachev-Bush meeting is illustrative here. Akhromeyev laments the fact that Gorbachev could not put on a stronger demeanor and give the false appearance of strength, thus allowing him to negotiate a stronger position. His demeanor and the understanding given to Bush through the face-to-face interaction that he was willing to compromise made any deception about Gorbachev's intentions and desires impossible. The lesson here is that face-to-face has a unique tendency to "show one's cards" in a diplomatic setting. In some instances this is precisely what both sides want (as was the case with Akhromeyev and his counterparts in attempting to understand the other), but in others it is precisely what one *does not* want. Deception is part of negotiation and politics. Consistent with the theory suggested in this dissertation, deception is easier to catch in face-to-face than in other interactions and therefore great care should be taken with face-to-face if one's goal is to deceive.

Alternate Explanations Correlated with Face-to-Face

It is important to situate my argument amongst the other explanations of German reunification. On the one hand, I am providing a new explanation of the process of politics, suggesting that face-to-face interaction had important effects on intention understanding. On the other hand, this explanation does not so much compete with, but rather sheds light on, existing explanations. For instance, the theory and evidence presented here supports a signaling story, though not the one that is normally told. That is, one could argue that the major effect face-to-face had in the German reunification case was a costly signal sent from both sides that they both had an interest in cooperation. The signal is costly presumably because the failure of reaching agreement in a high-profile meeting would enact significant costs for both actors. Thus by the time the face-to-face interaction actually occurs, both sides having received the signal from the other, already have a pretty good sense of the others' intentions: each side wants to cooperate. One problem with this argument is that it is not at all clear that face-to-face meetings actually do send a *materially* costly signal. Andrew Kydd has written extensively on the application of signaling games to the end of the Cold War and finds that there was signaling occurring from the Soviet side, but it took the form of nuclear force treaties (the INF in particular), the 1988 withdrawal from Afghanistan, announcements of convention force reductions, and so forth.[250] It is not clear that

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[250] Kydd 2005, 215.

meeting face-to-face is similar in kind to a truly costly signal in material terms, though it may very well be from a symbolic perspective.

Even from a symbolism perspective, however, it is important to recall two points. First, many of the face-to-face interactions that led to cooperation took place without great fanfare without heads of state present. Sergey Akhromeyev, for instance, credits the face-to-face interactions he had with U.S. Joint Chiefs with engendering a correct understanding of intentions. It is not clear that these interactions were greatly affected by symbolism. Second, the discussions amongst the two delegations prior to the decision to meet suggest that both sides were skeptical of the intentions of the other side. As Baker notes, the Soviet Union had been sending signals that they were serious about cooperation, but the American delegation was not convinced and Bush, in particular, was concerned.[251] They sought the face-to-face interactions precisely as a way of validating the intentions of Gorbachev. Finally, bringing Bush around on the idea to meet with Gorbachev directly was not a result of simply responding to a costly offer from the Soviet Union; rather, it required significant discussion and debate among the team. Thus it may undoubtedly be the case the high-level face-to-face interactions bring in symbolism and send signals, but from an *intention understanding* perspective my argument is that the decision to meet is not what provides the intention, the *actual meeting* provides the intention. Put another way, my argument suggests that the signaling story is right, though the signal has been misunderstood. The face-to-face

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[251] Baker 1995, 230; James Baker interview, October 1997.

interaction itself is the signal as it provides a physical simulation of what the other intends.

Nevertheless, while my argument is not necessarily a rival of higher level explanations, it is important to specify here exactly why this case supports my theory of shared circuits and how it either complements or problematizes existing theories. This is important precisely because there is no shortage of other explanations available that are often highly correlated with face-to-face interaction. For instance, some might argue that it is not the face-to-face aspect so much as it is the private setting that matters. Without audience costs, individuals are free to be more forthright with their counterparts on the other side and this is ultimately why we see cooperation. Others might argue that it is simply the power of the better argument that matters. That is, what we really see going on in the Bush and Gorbachev interaction, for instance, is Bush convincingly showing Gorbachev that he has no better option other than German reunification following the U.S. plan. Here it is the argument that matters and the face-to-face aspect is simply a correlate to that agreement. With no shortage of reasons why face-to-face should make a difference, and the number of theories that bring in face-to-face in some form or fashion, it is important to be clear about what this case shows with respect to the theory of shared circuits developed in previous chapters. While it will be impossible to definitively eliminate competing theories, we can at the very least fairly provide evidence for and against many of them. Recalling the main argument, the shared circuit hypothesizes a non-cognitive material identity connection between

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individuals. This connection is created in a face-to-face interaction and accounts for the increased cooperation and trust we see engendered through those interactions. With this argument in mind we can turn to addressing the correlates of face-to-face.

Public vs. Private Interactions

It is conceivable that interactions in public and private would have a material affect negotiation outcome. After all, if an audience is present there are audience costs that need to be taken into account. Politicians may be more forthright in a private interaction and show true intentions, etc. In this case, however, there were multiple examples of private interactions and public interactions that did not engender the level of cooperation that face-to-face interactions did. Consider the various letters and telephone calls that preceded the face-to-face interactions. While they were helpful in setting the stage and agenda for negotiations, with each side providing its positions and interests, both sides are clear in their memoirs that it was not until the interactions were moved to the face-to-face modality that significant progress was achieved. If privacy helps to explain cooperation, then why were the private telephone calls not more fruitful? If public/private variable is explanatory here, we would expect to see significant progress engendered when the discussions were taken privately. Thus while it is likely that privacy is one *condition* for fruitful face-to-face engagement, since the audience variable is limited, it is difficult to make the case that it is a crucial explanatory (i.e. causal) variable, at least in this case.

<u>The Better Argument and Rhetoric</u>

Another explanation is that the United States simply presented the better argument to the Soviets. That is, the argumentation process, persuasion, etc., all take time and multiple rounds of convincing the Other of one's position. Thus while the Soviets may have been hostile to the idea of German reunification in 1988, after reflecting on the various advances by the United States they simply became persuaded that it was the best course of action for the future. Since many of the arguments took place face-to-face, the modality is a correlate of the main causal mechanism here of argumentation. This point has merit. The fact that the Soviets eventually did go along with the United States' plan suggests that at some level they must have been persuaded. After all, their position changed in relatively short order. The key question however is to what extent the positions changed because of realizing that the United States had the better argument.

A couple of points suggest that this is unlikely. First, as noted above, Akhromeyev's remarks suggest that the Soviet side was not particularly thrilled with the outcome. His interviews after the process is complete suggest a lamentation that the Soviets were not *stronger*, not that they were persuaded that they were wrong. If the better argument had been convincing we would expect to see Soviet counterparts expressing confidence that both sides had reached a viable solution together. Akhromeyev's views suggest just the opposite: a weakness displayed by the USSR that led to cooperation. Second, it seems peculiar that the Soviets would understand the

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better argument only through face-to-face interaction. If the argument was indeed better, why did letters and telephone calls not suffice in terms of persuasion? As Dennis Ross makes quite clear in his memoir, the United States was gaining limited traction through letters and telephone calls. The move to face-to-face was not about making a better argument (indeed, the argument had always been the same), it was about switching the mode of interaction to something more personal.

New Information

Another possibility is that face-to-face interaction is correlated with new information, provided either during or before the interactions. The new information could be the causal link to the outcome witnessed and the face-to-face interactions are simply the mechanism by which the information is transmitted, for instance. In this case the new information would be the relevant causal link with the outcome witnessed. As noted above, it is difficult to make the case the new information played no role at all in the negotiations; the situation was fluid and often changing by the hour. As Rice points out, "..one of the things about this period that you have to keep in mind is that events were unfolding so quickly that you would make a policy or make a decision or arrange a meeting, and before you could get there, everything had changed, and indeed the world changed dramatically between President Bush's first overture to Gorbachev in, I believe, August, and December when we actually met. The Wall had come down in Berlin, Poland was no longer a communist country, Hungary was no longer a communist

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country, and everything had changed.[252] Thus to a certain extent there was significant

new information being presented at the meetings precisely because the situation was

dynamic and changing on a day-to-day basis and each side had to react to what was

occurring quickly.

Further, at the most rudimentary level cooperation itself is defined by reaching

agreement, which usually includes some type of compromise by both parties.

Compromise, in turn, is reached by changing ones position over the course of a

negotiation. Therefore any change in what is being offered is a type of new information.

In essence *any* negotiation is going to new information transmitted by virtue of the

process of negotiating and the give and take involved. But to argue that new

information explains cooperation and changed positions, one needs to show that it was

particular information presented that moved politicians to cooperate.

While there was certainly new information and give-and-take presented during

negotiations with the Soviets, there was little surprising new substantive information

presented during the face-to-face encounters. It is useful here to distinguish substantive

verbal information, such as a new position or a new thought a proposal, from new non-

verbal information, such as demeanor and facial expressions. That is, if one examines

the salient meeting between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta, for instance, they are largely

talking about proposals that had been communicated earlier, not new proposals. The

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[252] Rice interview 1997.

substantive new information argument would be much stronger if Bush had surprised

Gorbachev with a brand new proposal in the encounter and Gorbachev then changed his

position. The transcripts of the interactions show just the opposite. Gorbachev and Bush

spend the majority of their meeting stressing what they have already agreed to in

previous interactions and reassuring each other that neither wants to push for rapid

progress. From the U.S.' perspective, this was the entire goal. According to Rice, "the

essentials of the meeting had not changed, and that was that this was an effort to build a

trust between Bush and Gorbachev, where they could talk about very difficult issues

without a coterie of aides around them."[253]

The closest expression of potential substantive new information comes from

Gorbachev when he asks Bush whether a unified Germany could be neutral or a

member of NATO. This can be interpreted as evidence that Gorbachev had given some

thought to the proposal made by Bush's administration in letters and he was seriously

considering (or at least imagining) the latter. It can also be interpreted, however, as

simply an acknowledgment of Bush's position of two potential roads for Germany that

must be discussed. Gorbachev further makes it clear in his rhetoric that he wants history

to decide the course for Germany and Bush reassures Gorbachev with words that

convey the reserved position of the United States: "I hope that you understand that you

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[253] Rice interview, 1997.

cannot expect us not to approve of German reunification. At the same time… we are trying to act with a certain reserve."[254]

On the other hand, it is clear that non-verbal new information was presented. Demeanor, defined by such things as facial expression, body posture, etc., is data that needs to be interpreted by the viewer but new non-verbal information nonetheless. In the Malta case, non-verbal new information was high. Needless to say, assessing demeanor and facial expressions (and understanding/interpreting what they mean) would be quite difficult in other modalities such as a telephone call or letter. Therefore face-to-face is necessarily always correlated with new non-verbal information by its very nature.[255]

Emotion and Personality

Another explanation involves emotional beliefs, motivated reasoning, and personality. Put simply, it is possible that Gorbachev and Bush simply liked one another, connected at a personality or cognitive level, and therefore were more likely to perceive each others' intentions in more generous terms. This has been a popular argument and one that was being developed contemporaneously with events at the end of the cold war[256] and the so-called "Gorby effect" has remained a compelling

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[254] USSR Transcript of meeting, 1989.
[255] Ekman 1975; Ekman 2003.
[256] cf. Winter et al 1992.

explanation.[257] As Winter et al argued, "We can characterize both Bush and Gorbachev as leaders who want to be peacemakers, concerned with development and not prone to seek political ends through violence and war."[258] As such they suggested that Bush and Gorbachev shares almost ideal political orientations and thus we should be sanguine about the prospects for cooperation and super-power peace.[259] My perspective here need not be viewed as mutually exclusive to the personality arguments; it may be the case that personality contributed to trust-building. However, the physical explanation of mirror neurons and simulation does suggest that understanding intentions is possible through face-to-face interaction even when the participants do not share personality characteristics or cognitive frameworks.

The test for this within the Cold War case is not the interactions between Gorbachev and Bush, but rather the other salient interactions that may have involved individuals who may not share similar personalities. That is, if Gorbachev's "new" perspective and personality congruence explains cooperation between Gorbachev and Bush, what explains the other moments of seminal intention understanding that occurred earlier in the case? For instance, this explanation seems to have difficulty explaining the intention understanding that occurred between the U.S. delegation and counterparts who harbored the "older" Soviet perspective. Whereas Gorbachev reportedly placed greater emphasis on interpersonal dynamics than task items and

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[257] cf. Schneider et al 1993.
[258] Ibid, 237.
[259] Ibid, 241-242.

portrayed a sense of optimism,[260] Akhromeyev, was reportedly quite different. Igor

Korchilov, one of the veteran Soviet translators, notes that Akhromeyev referred to

himself as "the last of the Mohicans," to George Shultz, a reference to one of the last

World War II remaining Soviet stalwarts, and that the Americans had referred to him as

"very much a soldier's soldier"[261] When Akhromeyev says something, it sticks," one

U.S. official reportedly noted, suggesting a certain rigidity of personality.[262]

Nevertheless, despite the traditional stance, stoic personality, and the lack of a "new

perspective" that Gorbachev brought, Akhromeyev was able to better understand the

intentions of the U.S. Joint Chiefs in a series of face-to-face interactions,

problematizing the "Gorby effect" proposition.

Addressing Power: A Structural Account?

Finally, there is another salient counter-argument to the one presented in this

chapter. Namely that power explains the outcome. The argument made so far, that the

extraordinary events leading up to German reunification, specifically the Soviet

Union's change in position over the course of less than a year, would not have been

possible without significant face-to-face interaction is essentially about statecraft. As

Paul Sharp has noted "diplomacy remains the 'engine room' of international relations,

as both the site of most of the actual relations we study and as the immediate motive

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[260] Ibid 231-232.
[261] Korchilov 1999, 125.
[262] Ibid.

force of their being undertaken."[263] The German reunification project is no exception. The United States successfully lobbied the Soviets not through displays of power or major concessions, but rather through trust-building and intention-understanding engendered in one-on-one meetings at multiple levels of diplomatic structure. This is a controversial argument. To argue that statecraft helps to make sense of the end of the Cold War suggests that material or structural explanations leave something out. For instance, the Soviet Union in early 1990 was suffering from a major economic crisis. It is not inconceivable, and perhaps probable, that Gorbachev felt that he had little choice in dealing with the West, given that he was dependent on Western aid at the time.[264] Thus by the time that the Two plus Four talks were starting, the USSR would have had no choice but to capitulate on the German question with respect to unification and NATO membership. Put simply, does not power explain the outcome here?

One of the problems with this explanation is that it belies the domestic politics Gorbachev was facing at home. As illustrated above by Ross, Zelikow and Rice, Gorbachev was under intense domestic pressure *not* to give in to United States demands regarding Germany. Each decision reached by Gorbachev was very controversial at home; there was not widespread agreement among Soviets that the state should go along with the U.S. This is why the outward appearance of Gorbachev in front of cameras and in press conferences was strikingly different than his appearance in face-to-face settings. Thus while not giving in may have hurt the

[263] Sharp 1999, 34.
[264] Risse-Kappen 1997, 163.

USSR's economic position, politically for Gorbachev it likely would have been more profitable. This then represents a significant choice that Gorbachev had to consider: do political concerns outweigh economic concerns? As Shevardnadze noted, "the conviction was too deeply rooted in the consciousness of our people that the existence of two German states provided a reliable guarantee for the security of our country and the whole continent – the conviction that an enormous price had been paid for this and that it would be inadmissible to forget it."[265] Additionally, "the 27 million Russian deaths that Nazi Germany had inflicted upon the Soviet Union during World War II could not be forgotten easily, not to mention the perception of NATO as a possible hostile threat."[266] The point here is that for a variety of reasons domestic politics significantly counterbalanced structural reality. While structurally Gorbachev might not have had a choice, given the economic and military realities on the ground, politically he had to make a choice that would satisfy the demands on the polity.

Second, as Zelikow and Rice point out, Moscow did have an alternate choice when it came to negotiating with the United States and Germany: it could have offered a choice between unification and NATO membership. This would have allowed Gorbachev to "[channel] the surging tide for unity against the supporters of the alliance,"[267] thereby creating a structure where Germans had to choose. As Risse points out, elections in East Germany were coming up in March and West German elections

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[265] Risse-Kappen 1997.
[266] Ibid, 165.
[267] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 196.

followed later in the year. If pressured for a choice by Gorbachev, Kohl likely would have had a difficult time supporting a unified Germany and a Germany in NATO.[268] "What if the Soviet Union had continued much longer than until the summer of 1990 to present the Germanys with a choice between unification and NATO membership? How would this have affected the German domestic debate on unification? And what if the Social Democrats had won elections in the German Democratic Republic in March 1990."[269] These domestic politics questions, while representing counterfactuals, are useful for conceptualizing the choices Gorbachev had at the time. While structural accounts tend to view Gorbachev has having no choice in the matter, counterfactuals problematize this view. As Risse argues, it is likely that Gorbachev could have pressured Germans to make a choice, if he were so inclined.

Third, and most simply, there was an additional option on the table for Gorbachev that involved asserting on legal rights to East Germany and declaring Germany, as a whole, as an Allied Power.[270] This is indeed what the Bush administration originally believed the Soviets would attempt to do. The option was discussed and debated by Soviet leadership in the lead-up to the Two plus Four talks.[271] While the USSR did not want to use military force to prevent German unification, it could have theoretically tried to use legal force. The counterfactual here

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[268] Risse 1997, 164.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Zelikow and Rice 1999, 196-197.
[271] Risse 1997, 164.

is straightforward: if Gorbachev had confronted the United States and asserted a legal right to Germany, what would have happened? An international crisis was not in the United States', Germany's, or NATO's interest. It is conceivable that a strong stance on Germany by the Soviets would have been met with capitulation. If nothing else, it certainly does not seem to be the case that the outcome is preordained. As Risse points out, the Soviets had 300,000 troops deployed in East Germany to help make their case. If there had been no Two plus Four agreement, would the troops "have remained there until today?"[272]

In total, while the structural explanation for German reunification is appealing, given the Soviets severe economic and political constraints in 1989-1990, the explanation is less satisfying when one considers the counterfactuals raised above. Indeed it is relatively easy to construct a scenario that does not dismiss the structural constraints whereby Gorbachev chooses precisely the opposite path of the one taken. But perhaps the structural account is not supposed to predict foreign policy decisions at all. Structural realists have long argued that material structure creates a set of conditions that constrain the choices of states, but they do not necessarily tell us what decision a state will make. In this case structural accounts help us to understand the legitimate choices that Gorbachev had in front of him, but they do not help us to understand why he chose to agreement with the United States and opted for reunification. A structural account leaves us with the same puzzle we started with: why

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[272] Ibid.

did Soviet leadership change their preferences with respect to German reunification in such a short amount of time?

Conclusion and Rejoinders

By way of conclusion, it is worth assessing a potential criticism of the approach taken in this chapter. I have argued that it is difficult to conceive of German reunification occurring with the manner and speed in which it did if not for the extensive face-to-face interactions that occurred between negotiators at various levels among the major parties involved. Rather than isolate face-to-face interaction as *the* causal variable that explains German reunification, I have opted instead to grant that the outcome is likely over-determined and therefore have not made the traditional social science causality claim that *x* leads to *y,* but rather have conducted something of a thought experiment that involves imagining reunification without face-to-face. As evidence I have presented the opinions of the individuals involved on both sides that argue that face-to-face was critical and have shown empirically how it was face-to-face and not other types of interaction that ultimately led to cooperation and trust building. I can do this with the end of the Cold War because we have, as Ned Lebow puts it, rich contextual evidence upon which I can build the counterfactual. Memoirs and published/personal interviews with the participants have proven quite valuable in assessing the relative effect of face-to-face with respect to the reunification project.

But is a counterfactual claim really all that different from a simple causal claim? If the argument is that indeed we could not imagine German reunification occurring the way it did without face-to-face then does not this mean that face-to-face really *is* the causal variable at work? Put simply, why use a counterfactual argument here at all if the end result seems to be eerily similar to a causal claim? The difference between a traditional positivist causal claim that face-to-face interaction led to the events of reunification and my counterfactual is that the former does not allow for variation in speed and configuration of change on the dependent variable. A simple positivist claim similar to the one I make in this chapter is the following:

> Claim A: If not for face-to-face, German reunification would not have occurred.

Here both the independent variable (face-to-face) and dependent variable (German reunification) are measurable. The problem is that, for reasons discussed above, it would be very difficult to convincingly argue that this causal claim is correct. How is it possible to show the effect of one causal variable, among many potential variables, in the historical past?

This problem has led philosophers of epistemology to turn to counterfactuals and specifically the notion of other possible worlds. Specifically, David Lewis argues that since we cannot go back into time to isolate causal variables, we need to conduct thought experiments regarding other possibilities (he calls worlds) and assess their

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likelihood.[273] Consider a simple example such as "Had I made that shot our team would have won the game." This is a counterfactual that relies on another possible world out there somewhere where the person makes the shot and the team wins the game. In this world we will never know for sure as we cannot rerun the tape of history. But in that other possible world the counterfactual may be analyzed. Applying Lewis' other world counterfactual reasoning to the claims of the chapter, the question becomes not "was face-to-face responsible for German reunification" but rather "can we imagine an alternate world where Germany reunification would have occurred as quickly or with as much cooperation without face-to-face?" Given the rich contextual history we have to work with, it is possible to construct that other world and think through what may have happened without face-to-face interaction. Certainly in the view of the participants taking part in the actual negotiations, imagining such a world without face-to-face involved and achieving the same outcome is difficult.

Therefore while there is certainly a connection between counterfactuals and causal claims, the way we go about constructing, analyzing, and thinking about both is slightly different. With counterfactuals we are attempting to actively imagine something that did not happen but are using what we know about what did happen to construct that story. We cannot make the strong causal claim that face-to-face was *the* variable that led to a particular configuration of German reunification, but we can make the claim that it is difficult to imagine this particular configuration of German

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[273] Lewis 1973.

reunification without face-to-face. The difference is subtle, but important. Finally, such

counterfactual reasoning should not necessarily be viewed as "weaker" or "less strong"

theorizing. As critics of positivism have pointed out, reducing complex social relations

to single causal variables and relationships is often unrealistic. What we gain in

simplicity we lose in congruence with reality. Therefore in some sense the stronger

claim might be the one that embraces complexity and asks the analyst to think through

the various complexities face-to-face might have on relationships and the meaning of

interaction to the participants. If nothing else, as Ned Lebow points out,

counterfactuals help us to closely think through what it is we think we know about

over-determined events.[274] The events surrounding the end of the Cold War and

German reunification seem to be particularly amenable to this type of analysis.

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[274] Lebow 2000.

Chapter 4: Bad Faith Deception: Case Study of Hitler and Chamberlain in Munich

"Perhaps the greatest task of the prudent and responsible
statesman is to be able to judge when appeasement will and will
not lead to peaceful resolution of disputes."[275]

Introduction

In previous chapters I have argued that specific conditions face-to-face

interaction in a diplomatic setting can lead to, or enhance, robust cooperation.

Ultimately this occurs because face-to-face allows for better understanding of the

other's specific intentions. I conceptualize robust cooperation as including both the

process of reaching agreement as well as the *outcome* of intention understanding

between parties. In negotiations and diplomacy, agreement and intention understanding

are often desirable ends, but they do not always obtain in cooperation. One risk-taking

party might agree to cooperate with another even if they are not sure about the

intentions of the other (such as in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation). This is a thin version

of cooperation. Face-to-face interaction, on the other hand, helps to create robust

cooperation where agreement is not only reached but both sides obtain an understanding

of the other's specific intentions. Ultimately, I argue, this is one reason why politicians

are willing to fly halfway around the world in order to meet with friends and enemies,

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[275] Gilpin 1983, 207.

even though sophisticated telecommunications equipment has existed for some time that should theoretically make such travel unnecessary.

Yet, there is an important uncomfortable fact that is associated with face-to-face diplomacy and creates something of a puzzle for why diplomats would engage in it. As prominent historical examples illustrate, face-to-face interaction is sometimes correlated with what some might view as the opposite of understanding intentions and meaningful cooperation: deception. Consider Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler famously meeting in Munich in 1938 to sign a cooperative agreement that would ultimately be broken. This is perhaps the most famous example of deception and mistrust exhibited in modern political history and it occurred as Hitler was looking Chamberlain in the eye. The two "cooperated" but the cooperation was based on a falsehood, a lie. Similarly, Andrei Gromyko's face-to-face interaction with President Kennedy in 1962 at the height of the Cold War illustrates a similar mechanism. Sitting in Kennedy's office at the White House, Gromyko calmly looked Kennedy in the eye and asserted that the missiles in Cuba were defensive anti-aircraft weapons, not knowing that the United States had days earlier obtained photographic intelligence of the existence of *offensive* weapons. Indeed, as Gromyko was uttering these words the evidence falsifying his claims sat in Kennedy's desk.[276] Finally, more recently, George W. Bush's first meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin was an illuminative one for Bush. At the end of their summit meeting in Slovenia, Bush remarked to the press: "I looked the man in the

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[276] Detzer 1979.

eye. I was able to get a sense of his soul."[277] Putin then proceeded over the next few

months to disappoint President Bush and betray the common understanding they

seemingly developed. Whether or not Putin was actively trying to deceive or simply

managing the impression he created, Bush walked away from the meeting with an

understanding of Putin that ultimately would be invalidated.

Why do leaders continue to seek out face-to-face interaction with their

counterparts despite evidence that they can be easily deceived in such encounters? As

these salient episodes from World War II to the present illustrate, deception, either in its

weak form of impression management or its strong form in lying, plays a role in

international politics. At some of the most critical junctures in international political

history, leaders were meeting with each other face-to-face and lies were told in order to

deceive the other. In each case one side was seeking cooperation from the other and the

other was seeking deception in order to gain strategic advantage.

These prominent examples of deception and mistrust engendered in face-to-face

constitute hard cases for my theory. Put in methodological terms, they represent

significant variation of the dependent variable (robust cooperation) while my

independent variable (face-to-face interaction) is present. More generally they point to

major questions that must be addressed if one is to claim that face-to-face enhances

cooperation: *when does it not work*? Does face-to-face only work if both sides are trying

to cooperate in good faith? What about cases where one side, but not the other, enters in

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[277] "Bush and Putin: Best of friends." 2001. *BBC*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1392791.stm

bad faith with an intent to deceive? Might it be the case, as the historical examples above seemingly illustrate, that in some instances face-to-face interaction actually makes cooperation less likely and deception easier? If this is true not only is my theory on shaky grounds, but the inverse of my theory might actually have support. These are the difficult questions this chapter will attempt to answer.

I will argue that these hard cases pose a challenge to the theory presented, but they do not falsify it. Rather, the opposite is true. The hard cases help us to further understand the force of face-to-face in diplomatic settings. Specifically, I argue that robust cooperation with understanding of intentions is best accomplished when both sides of an interaction enter into it in good faith. Problem solving, crisis management, etc. are all types of diplomacy where diplomats will enter the interaction attempting to be truthful and honest. On the other hand, when one or both sides enter into an interaction in bad faith, with the intent to deceive or conceal, face-to-face will often not result in robust cooperation, since deception is notoriously difficult to detect. Critically, however, not only does face-to-face not make it easier to be deceptive, but it often makes it much *harder*. This is ultimately because of the shared neural circuit described in previous chapters that engenders in face-to-face interaction. It is relatively easy to pass off a lie undetected in a cable wire where no shared neural mechanism exists; it is much harder to do so face-to-face. Recalling Gorbachev and Bush at Malta, from the previous chapter, Gorbachev wanted to display to Bush that he had the resolve to stand strong, but Bush could read his true mental state from his face and understood that

Gorbachev was open to a unified Germany (and indeed he was, as his confidantes later recalled). It is this type of information, a reading of intentions from the face, that, *ceteris paribus*, makes deception more difficult in a face-to-face interaction. Thus, if a diplomat finds himself or herself in an interaction where the other is trying to deceive, there may be no better modality to be interacting in than face-to-face. In this way episodes of deception can often be understood as occurring *despite* face-to-face interaction, not because of it. Put simply, diplomats and leaders engage in face-to-face interactions not just because they believe they are good deception detectors but because face-to-face provides the best opportunity to ascertain truth or fiction in an opposing counterpart.

Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, while the case that will be examined in this chapter illustrate that face-to-face interactions may lead to mistrust or an agreement based on falsehoods, the face-to-face modality increases the likelihood that the participants will be able to detect deception and read intentions correctly. Therefore, even in these "hard cases" where we witness face-to-face leading to mistrust, it is possible to see the basic causal mechanism of shared neural circuits at work. We then need to investigate how that shared circuit works in social and political contexts. This allows us to draw specific scope conditions for when we should expect face-to-face to engender robust cooperation.

It is important to note that these scope conditions are numerous and complex. As will be discussed in more detail below, the neural causal mechanism I have identified

exists not in isolation, but within a rich social and political context. These contexts will often have an effect on outcomes. For instance, if a diplomat is up against a skilled liar, someone who possesses either through training or natural ability a disposition toward effective deception, then detection of deception will be all the more difficult. The same is true of poor lie detectors. In these instances it may be the case that face-to-face actually works to the deceiver's advantage. Therefore, recalling the earlier theoretical chapter, it is important to point out at the outset that neural mechanisms and social/political contexts will often have complex interaction effects, but interactions that we can nonetheless analyze and understand.

It is also worth discussing what it is that I am *not* going to argue in this chapter. I will not make the claim that face-to-face leads to deception detection. Far from it. Indeed I will present a case where deception was not fully detected so that we can understand why it failed. There are a variety of intervening variables that come into play in detecting intentions in a given face-to-face encounter. One such variable that will be discussed below is desire to believe the liar. In many instances the psychological need to believe that the other is telling the truth outweighs any evidence of deception that is picked up by the participants. I will also not argue that face-to-face interaction is the *only* way to determine whether someone is lying. Indeed while face-to-face is useful for gathering data about the intentions of others, it must be combined with other data points. This is a point continually made by current and former diplomats I have interviewed. Face-to-face interaction data is but one input into a larger calculus that

needs to be considered when assessing the intentions of the other. Finally, I will also not argue that face-to-face interactions are always a good idea as there are significant drawbacks to entering a negotiation face-to-face as well. All of this combines to create an intricate model of the force of face-to-face in international politics.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, a brief review of theories of deception in IR will be reviewed. Despite some attention paid to the topic, there is a lack of consensus on how much deception plays a role in everyday international political life. This is important to establish because if deception is an outlier, and the vast majority of interactions in international politics are undertaken in good faith, this should inform how often the scope conditions of the theory come into play. Next, I will present evidence from psychology and neuroscience that suggest that deception-detection is inherently difficult, but if one is going to do it successfully one is, all else being equal, best off in a face-to-face interaction because of the shared circuit. Put simply, it is easier to detect deception while looking at someone's face than reading their words in a letter or hearing their words on the telephone because we are able to read clues from the face's direct and often unconscious connections to the brain. Ultimately these findings support my theory of intention reading. Finally, perhaps the hardest of hard cases, deception in Munich between Hitler and Chamberlain, will be looked at in some detail. The key question to keep in mind is why, despite meeting Hitler several times face-to-face Chamberlain was unable to derive Hitler's true intentions. I will argue that in the Munich case the level of successful deception was

actually relatively low. There is evidence to suggest that Chamberlain did indeed have an understanding of Hitler's intentions, but for a variety of cognitive and psychological reasons could not admit this possibility to himself. I am not the first to make this argument. Historians have spent much effort reconstructing Chamberlain's decision-making during this period and there are a number of good reasons to believe that Chamberlain was not the naïve idealist as he is often portrayed. Finally, while the Munich case will serve as the main focus of the chapter, I will also provide insights from the elite interviews I have conducted with former government officials and diplomats vis-à-vis lying and deception detected. I first, however, turn to deception and lying in the international system.

Deception and Lying in IR

<u>Prevalence in Theory</u>

Deception plays an interesting role in the IR literature. On the one hand, it is in some sense central to realist theory of various kinds. Deception for structural realists, for instance, stems from the idea that states need to constantly worry about the uncertain intentions of others in an international system where anarchy orders interactions.[278] No matter what states say they are going to do, the prudent strategy for everyone in the

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[278] Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001.

system is to assume they cannot know with certainty what will occur in the future;[279] the "shadow of the future," in other words looms large. It could very well be, for instance, that other states are simply lying about their intentions. Yet, structural realism does not *need* deception in order to come to the same conclusions. Even if states are being exceedingly truthful about what they believe their intentions to be at the moment, those are always subject to change. Thus, even in a situation where states understand that they can believe each other, uncertainty about the future continually lingers.

Similarly, for rationalists generally deception can play a role in a variety of interaction games. While we normally associate deception with normatively negative outcomes, Arthur Stein notes that from a rationalist perspective deception need not necessarily lead to normatively negative outcomes, deception can also, counter intuitively, lead to peace as well. He argues that deception can "facilitate the avoidance of conflict rather than exacerbate the possibility of its occurrence."[280] Consider the difference between a game of "chicken" and a game of "bluff." If a state can deceive the other into believing that it truly has resolve and will not back down, it has bluffed the other into capitulation. Stein argues that this is precisely what happened in the Cold War: "the United States had an incentive to deceive the Soviets, and the Soviet *misperception* facilitated de-escalation and the avoidance of greater conflict."[281]

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[279] Waltz 2000.
[280] Stein 1990, 73.
[281] Ibid, my emphasis.

Therefore it may be "rational" for states to deceive others (at least in the short-term) and may result in a desirable outcome for both parties to be deceived.

Stein notes that deception can occur through one side misperceiving the other. Psychological approaches to IR have long documented how biases, images, cognitive limitations, emotion, etc. can all affect how states are perceived. As Robert Jervis notes, actively *helping* states to misperceive your intentions can be a useful tool of the state.[282] The "image" a state strives to put forth can have significant effects on how other states respond to it. In his seminal treatment of deception in international relations, Jervis notes that while states undoubtedly are worried about the reputation costs of deceiving others, those costs may be overcome "… when successful deception can change the basic power relationships in the international system. For if the use of a lie can help a state gain a dominant position in the world it may not matter a great deal that it has a reputation for lying."[283] Thus, states may be able to gain through aiding in misperception, or perhaps more deviously, flat-out lying, even when their reputations are damaged.

While there is general agreement that states can often engender gains through deception or lying, it is far less clear exactly how often this actually happens. This is striking because for a concept that plays such a central role in theory-building, we have substantial disagreement on just how often it occurs in actual diplomatic contexts. The reasons for this are multiple. First, while it is true deception can raise benefits, it can

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[282] Jervis 1976, 206.
[283] Jervis 1970, 89.

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also raise costs with respect to reputation. Risk adverse states may be less inclined to take that gamble, since they know good reputations may be valuable in the future. Thus, while we may know *theoretically* that states can gain an advantage when the rewards outweigh the risks, it is difficult to know how often they do so because reputation costs and risks are often subjective. Second, as John Mearsheimer points out, if statesmen lied to each other often it would be impossible for them to interact in any kind of meaningful fashion.[284] There needs to be at least a baseline of "good faith" going into an interaction in order to accomplish anything. Perhaps most importantly, lying only works if the other thinks one is telling the truth. As such, there may be diminishing returns with lying: too much of it renders the strategy ineffective.

Further, from an international society perspective, there is reason to think that deception would be antithetical to cooperation and therefore not serve as a useful long-term strategy. As Robert Keohane has pointed out, iterative cooperation in the system tends to produce logics of "diffuse reciprocity" where general standards of state action exist.[285] This diffuse reciprocity allows states to feel comfortable in cooperating with others because they trust that their cooperation will be returned. Presumably this reciprocity extends to not telling lies as well. Similarly, Alexander Wendt argues that one reason we see trust in the system is through reflected appraisal.[286] Put simply,

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[284] Mearsheimer 2011.
[285] Keohane 1986.
[286] Wendt 2006, 211.

through time states gain significant knowledge about the Other which allows them to think probabilistically about their intentions.

These two perspectives would tend to suggest that deception would be relatively rare. While Jervis is right to point out that states can gain from deception, assuming the benefits outweigh the reputation cost, Keohane and Wendt both provide arguments for why this should happen relatively infrequently: deception tends to go against operating logics in the system. Reciprocity and pools of common knowledge should make deception a less desirable strategy for states. Finally, precisely because we see significant levels of cooperation and trust in the system, it seems likely that states do not operate in a world where they constantly let their worry of being deceived affect their ability to cooperate.

In the end, while it may be appealing to assume that states are constantly acting deceptively for rational gain or largely being honest with each other in order to find cooperative agreements, it is very difficult to know whether examples such as Munich are indicative of the rule or the exception. The relevance of this empirical fact for this dissertation is that without knowing how often deception occurs, particularly in face-to-face interactions, it is difficult to know how many instances of "hard cases" obtain in day-to-day international political life. There are, however, salient reasons to believe that deception in diplomacy is not the norm.

Prevalence in Practice

Switching to a praxis perspective, there is evidence from practitioners of international politics that deception and lying are counterproductive. Henry Kissinger notes, for instance: "Only romantics think they can prevail in negotiations by trickery… trickery is not the path of wisdom but of disaster for a diplomat. Since one has to deal with the same person over and over again, one can get away with it only once at best, and then only at the cost of [permanent] stifling of the relationship."[287] This might explain some of the more highly salient episodes of deception and trickery as they often involve revisionist states. Hitler presumably was unconcerned about his state's future reputation when he deceived Chamberlain. Similarly, Stalin likely knew that his reputation with Western Europe would be trampled with expansionism and therefore deception would not fundamentally alter his costs. Indeed as Stalin put it, "[A] diplomat's words must have no relation to actions – otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? . . . Good words are a concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood."[288] Stalin could take this position ultimately because of his state's revisionist status: it did not aim to be a cooperative member of the international community and therefore he may have discounted the importance of future bargaining. Recent examples of this include Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf, otherwise known as "Baghdad Bob," the Iraqi diplomat charged with distributing pro-Iraqi propaganda to the press. This type of deception is congruent with the notion of revisionism: when the future is discounted, there is little reason to tell the truth.

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[287] Kissinger 1986, 214; Kissinger 1986, 485.
[288] Quoted in Jervis 1970, 69.

Officials in government echo both Kissinger's and Stalin's claims and note that it often depends on the context and the extent of the deception. One retired army colonel noted that building relationships on the ground is crucial to agreement and ultimately deception and lying is harmful to relationship building and therefore must be undertaken with great caution. Most diplomatic and military encounters are about trying to best understand each other so that the other side does not get the wrong idea about intentions. Clarity of intentions is therefore often a crucial strategy. As such, in the vast majority of cases there is a good faith effort being put forth by both sides as both parties want the other side to be clear about aims and goals. In such cases deception and lying would be antithetical to the rational goal. Others, including a former minister-counselor at the U.S. State Department, note that states continually practice something akin to latent deception by spinning public rhetoric one way and private discourse another way. Put simply, what a state's policymaker says in front of a public audience will be very different from the "coffee break" discussions with other policymakers held in private. Discussions in the public sphere may be deceptive with the "real truth" conveyed at the Starbucks down the street. This will be discussed in more detail below as the social context and situation may have a significant effect on deception and its detection.

These personal experiences with deception suggest that there are various kinds of lying or concealment; not all deception is created equally. We should differentiate between flat-out lies told in a face-to-face setting and the more diffuse "image management" strategies that states routinely engage in. The latter may happen more

often than the former, after all. Paul Ekman, a psychologist, neuroscientist and social scholar who has spent a career investigating lies and those who tell them, defines deceit in the following way: "In my definition of a lie or deceit … one person intends to mislead another, doing so deliberately, without prior notification of this purpose, and without having been explicitly asked to do so by the target. There are primarily two ways to lie: to *conceal* and to *falsify*."[289] Erving Goffman presents a similar typology, noting that there are multiple types of deceit. "Barefaced lies," ones "for which there can be unquestionable evidence that the teller knew he lied and willfully do so" are distinct from image management techniques which are more ubiquitous.[290] "There is hardly a legitimate everyday vocation or relationship whose performers do not engage in concealed practices which are incompatible with fostered impressions."[291] Thus, it may very well be that some types of deceit (or lying) occur in the international system routinely, while other types do not.

Image management, for instance, may not only be common but unavoidable in a social setting. As Goffman puts it, when individuals are on the public stage, they are performing. They are presenting images and are playing roles that may or may not be congruent with what exists "back" stage.[292] States arguably do the same thing. Image theory argues that states perceive each other through the use of cognitive images, and

[289] Ekman 1985 (2009), 28.
[290] Goffman 1959, 59.
[291] Ibid, 64.
[292] Goffman 1959, Chapter 6.

these images are affected by perceptions of threat, opportunity, culture, norms, etc.[293]

Thus, a state that has revisionist aims might take actions that would help others "misperceive" them as status quo. They might tone down expansionist public discussion and increase discourse regarding international community building, for instance. The current debate regarding the "rise of China" is illustrative here. Is China concealing a true desire to become the sole superpower (i.e. a threat) or is it comfortable with a cooperative arrangement (i.e. an ally), as it is currently projecting.[294] As Jervis notes, regardless of the aims of states, they will likely always try to manage their image in the most favorable light. "Both an honest man and a liar will answer affirmatively if asked whether they will tell the truth," after all.[295]

Finally, elite interviews with officials in the U.S. government and nonpartisan federal institutions such as the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) suggest that the character of modern diplomacy is largely defined by multilateral problem-solving and crisis management. The question of what to "do" about North Korea or Iran's nuclear ambitions, for instance, does not simply involve U.S. diplomat traveling to Pyongyang or Tehran in order to divine the intentions of their leadership, but rather involves extensive collaboration and coordination with allies and affected parties to solve problem that North Korea or Iran pose. These coordination events happen at various levels of government and are used, the officials argue, to help bring together good faith

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[293] cf. Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995.
[294] cf. Betts and Christensen 2000; Johnston 2003.
[295] Jervis 1970, 67-68.

efforts by all affected to find a solution. Whether or not Iran or North Korea are lying or telling the truth about their intentions may be less relevant, since the international community views the *potential* of a nuclear Iran or North Korea to be the problem. Further, the majority of diplomacy in the international system does not involve highly salient (and dangerous) problems to be solved, such as a nuclear rogue state, but more mundane matters such as international air space regulation. In these types of initiatives deception may be counterproductive as the problems to be addressed are not one-off events but rather iterative in nature. If we build off of these insights to suggest that much of (most?) diplomacy in the modern unipolar period is about problem-solving, then we have further reason to believe that deception plays less of a role in international politics than we might expect or less of a role than in previous periods of history.

In the end however, without a systematic empirical study of how and when states lie to each other it is difficult to know precisely when to expect deception. The prudent statesman therefore must always be alert to the *possibility* that in a given interaction the other party may not be interacting in good faith. This will not be news to policymakers or theorists, as a rudimentary understanding of the role of deception in international affairs has existed at least since Thucydides and Sun Tzu. Even if we were to grant that deception does not occur very often, the critic would rightly point out that at some of the most important junctures of time, such as the outbreak of World War II and during the Cold War, it was precisely deception that helped flame the crisis. As such, while deception may be rare, it can be extremely powerful. Importantly, however,

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while we have known for some time that statesmen may deceive, we are just now

beginning to understand, with the help of neuroscientific insight, how deception may be

detected.

Deception Detection

<u>Deceit and Truth Clues: The Face</u>

Paul Ekman argues that the keys to detecting deception and truth often lay in the

face.[296] The reasons for this are many. First, from a perception perspective, recent

neuroscientific insight suggests that looking at, recognizing, and understanding

intentions from faces occurs in specialized areas of the brain that are designed to help us

perceive them. We know this, in part, because some individuals are born without this

ability to recognize faces, a condition called prosopagnosia. Others gain this affliction

through brain damage to the specialized parts of the brain that aid in facial recognition

(in particular the fusiform gyrus). On the other end of the scale are individuals who

have a surplus of neurons in these regions, so called "super-recognizers" who, quite

literally, often "never forget a face."[297] Additionally, facial recognition is also tied to

emotion. When those suffering from prosopagnosia are shown familiar faces, they may

not be able to consciously report that the person seems familiar, but they will exhibit an

emotional response (such as sweat produced, changing measures in skin conductance).

This is evidence that the brain is "recognizing" the face without the mind knowing

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[296] Ekman 2009 (1985), Chapter 4.
[297] cf. Russell et al. 2009.

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about it. Thus, when we discuss face-to-face interaction there are a multitude of

biochemical and neurological discrete processes, both conscious and unconscious, that

are occurring that do not exist in other modalities. Put simply, face-to-face involves

different parts of the brain that have seemingly evolved specifically for facial

perception.

Second, and more directly related to deception, the face is often a window to

emotions. This is because from a neural perspective the face is tied directly to brain

regions implicated directly in the production of emotion.[298] Just as one's heart may race

when a fear emotion is triggered, so too will their face often exhibit a particular

expression. When emotions are implicated, facial muscles and their associated neurons

will fire involuntarily, just as heart rate increases involuntarily. We know that emotions

are often triggered when lies are told; this is the original basis for the polygraph lie-

detecting device. The face thus holds clues to both truth and deception since expressions

are difficult to disguise. While words can be rehearsed over and over with different

voice timbres to disguise, facial expressions largely cannot. Further, when individuals

do attempt to control facial expressions, the result is often something that appears

unnatural and therefore informative. As with lie detecting polygraph machines, there are

undoubtedly false positives that occur as emotions are invoked often in a face-to-face

encounter for a variety of reasons.

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[298] Ekman 2009, 84.

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With respect to specifics in the face, Ekman argues that it contains two messages in a deceptive interaction: "what the liar wants to show and what the liar wants to conceal."[299] We can therefore differentiate two types of facial expressions: those that express untrue information and those that express truthful information:

> The true, felt expressions of emotion occur because facial actions can be produced involuntarily, without thought or intention. The false ones happen because there is voluntary control over the face, allowing people to interfere with the felt and assume the false. The face is a dual system, including expressions that are deliberately chosen and those that occurs spontaneously, sometimes without the person even aware of what emerges on his own face.[300]

What makes lie detection possible is that we have some capacity to differentiate expressions that are involuntary from those that are controlled through intention, though it is not easy.[301] Recent research on micro-expressions suggests that individuals who view facial displays very briefly can judge the emotions displayed. Micro-expressions are split-second (usually less than one quarter of a second) full-face expressions on the face that may be tied to an emotion. These condensed expressions are reflective of an underlying emotion. Studies have shown a correlation between accuracy in judging micro-expressions and identifying lying. Since lying requires a voluntary facial movement that differs from the involuntary movement at the micro-level, differences

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[299] Ekman 2009, 123.
[300] Ibid.
[301] cf. Hill and Craig 2002; 2004; Krumhuber et al. 2007.

between the two can be detected.[302] Importantly, the accuracy of micro-expression

detection can increase over time with training. Put simply, humans seem to be

biologically equipped with mechanisms to detect emotion in faces in a pre-cognitive

split-second.

What makes lie detection difficult is that there are thousands of facial

expressions that are different from each other and have nothing to do with emotion or

lying at all. As Ekman points out, "there is not one expression for each emotion but

dozens and, for some emotions, hundreds of expressions."[303] This suggests that there

are literally thousands of things going on in a face and only a small percentage might

have anything at all to do with truth-telling or lying. This makes the job of the lie

detector daunting. One has to be able to pull out an informative micro-expression in a

sea of non-useful expressions. Further, not everyone who is concealing an emotion will

necessarily show a micro-expression. On the other hand, micro-expressions are

relatively rare and when they do appear, are information rich. Often, individuals will

attempt to *squelch* a micro-expression, perhaps with a smile. This has the effect of

disruption on the face: the facial movement will be in one direction, perhaps toward an

expression of sadness and a smile will appear quickly to squelch the micro-expression.

In these cases the interruption itself, the desire to conceal an emotive response, may be

noticeable.

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[302] cf. Rehm and Andre 2005.
[303] Ekman 2009, 127.

There are many other sources of deception and truth-telling that exist in the face.[304] One area of particular import to the cases in this dissertation is the eyes. The notion of looking someone in the eye to infer sincerity and intentions is not just limited to George W. Bush's strategy with Putin, but has been the subject of significant scientific inquiry. Ekman, in a review of the scientific findings, suggests that there are five common sources of information as it relates to the eyes, three of which have merit with respect to detecting deception. The overall impression of the eye, derived largely from the muscles controlling the eyelids, do not provide reliable clues to deceit since it is easy to control the muscles involved. Similarly, many have argued that gaze is informative: the nervous liar may look away with disgust or shame, avoiding eye contact at all costs. The problem here again is that the skilled liar can train himself to "appear honest" by looking his adversary in the eye. On the other hand, blinking, pupil dilation, and tears are all largely involuntary responses. While blinking can be controlled voluntarily, blinking rates increase dramatically when individuals are emotionally aroused.[305] Pupils will also dilate and there is not a known pathway for voluntary control of the pupils.[306] Similarly, tears are produced through the autonomic nervous system and are particularly useful because they, unlike other eye expressions, are only tied to certain emotions such as distress, sadness, laughter, etc.

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[304] cf. DePaulo et al. 2003.
[305] cf. Fukuda 2001.
[306] cf. Heilveil 1976; Heilveil and Muehleman 1981.

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The upshot of all of these findings is that the face does provide numerous clues to detecting truth-telling and deception and therefore is one source of understanding intentions in a social interaction. For concealed information alone Ekman identifies 22 specific clues to deceit and the information that they may reveal.[307] Included in these are tirades which may lead information that is unrelated to emotion, micro-expressions discussed above that may link to a specific emotion, facial reddening, blanching, etc. Each of these offers a clue to the reader of intentions about whether information is being concealed (such as the intention to defect, potentially).

This is not to say that the task is easy. A meta-analysis of deception studies conducted by Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo finds that while, in general, individuals perform better than chance at picking out deception, it is still difficult.[308] Interestingly, while the study found an overall lie-truth discrimination of 54%, the truth-detection rate was 60%. Lie detection is difficult, but it not simply a game of chance either. There are two important points to consider. First, with minimal training on micro-expressions and facial clues to deceit, individuals are able to increase their rates of deception detection substantially. Second, there is a performative aspect with respect to training. Simple knowledge of the facial clues and limited practice increase the rate of deception detection. If training increases deception detection rates, then theoretically the rate of successful deception in the international system could decrease with more deception-detection training. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if one is going to detect

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[307] Ekman 2009, 366 Table 1.
[308] Charles Bond and Bella DePaulo 2006.

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deception in a social interaction, one is better off doing it face-to-face. This is not to suggest that the only way to detect deception is to meet one-on-one in order to look the other in the eye. John F. Kennedy did not need facial expressions to know that Andrei Gromyko was lying; he had the physical evidence in his desk drawer. But in those cases where there is a lack of other evidence, meeting face-to-face greatly increases the odds of success and being able to correctly read the intentions of the other, even when one side enters the interaction in bad faith. As mentioned above, words spoken over a telephone can be rehearsed. Voice timbre can be controlled with practice. Words written on a cable wire do not provide much to read into. All of this suggests that if one is going to be lied to, one may be better off having it occur in a face-to-face interaction.

Institutionalized Deception Detection: Business and Law

Before turning to examples of deception and its possible detection in international politics, it is worth noting that other disciplines have long understood the importance of face-to-face interaction with respect to detecting deception. Businesses and other organizations have taken costly steps to increase face-to-face interaction even when technological mediation would seemingly suffice. Consider an organization that wishes to modify its current business network such that electronically mediated exchange replaces many of the traditional face-to-face relationships within the organization. As electronic networks are more efficient and less costly than traditional face-to-face networks, this is a temptation that many organizations and businesses

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confront.[309] Yet, as a report in Harvard Business Review points out, what businesses gain in more efficient communication they lose in the ability to accurately understand counterparts. The problem is that "issues of uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk – the daily fare of a network organization – are difficult to address through electronically mediated exchange. Effective network organizations also require the kind of rich, multidimensional, robust relationships that can be developed only through face-to-face interaction."[310] More specifically, and important for our purposes, business process theorists have argued that that it is precisely opportunistic behavior that electronic networks may aid. "Lying, fraud, sabotage and other anti-social actions are hard to detect in electronically mediated exchange. Without the full bandwidth of face-to-face communication, how can you tell whether someone is being profoundly sincere or totally deceptive?"[311] As John King notes, "Free riders, log-rollers, back-stabbers, and other vermin are much more easily rooted out when subjected to the sensitive noses of the angry wolfpack, *in vivo*."[312] Surveys of business executives echo these findings. One study that interviewed over 750 executives noted that the majority preferred face-to-face business meetings largely because of the ability to read body language and facial expressions (77%).[313] Further, face-to-face scored highly among executives with respect to the ability for persuasion (91%) and accountability (79%). Thus, despite the appeal of

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[309] Nohria and Eccels 2000.
[310] Ibid, 1660.
[311] Nohria and Eccels 2000, 1669.
[312] Cited in Nohria and Eccels 2000, 1670.
[313] cf. Rizy 2009.

more efficient communication through technology, both the theoretical literature and practice of executives point to the benefits of face-to-face, particularly because of issues of deception detection.

The study of face-to-face interaction and its inherent transmission of nonverbal cues and deception communication have also been significant in the courtroom. Cottage industries have formed around the notion of coaching witnesses on the stand. "It is indisputable that some prosecutors coach witnesses with the deliberate objective of promoting false or misleading testimony.[314] This coaching is based on a long-understood maxim of legal studies: testimony need not be only verbal. Legal studies scholars have investigated the effect of non-verbal cues as the testimony of witnesses and judges over the past few decades and have determined that the mere appearance of a witness, defendant, or attorney can have a salient effect on judicial outcomes.[315] Juries in particular are susceptible to reading non-verbal clues from a witness (or a judge), perhaps because they are seeking any evidence available in order to make a decision of guilt or evidence. One of the early observations about nonverbal content in the courtroom was that some juries place *more* emphasis on the non-verbal clues than the verbal ones. "Research suggests that observers do rely more upon nonverbal communication than upon verbal content when making judgments in certain situations."[316] This may have a significant effect on the outcome of the case. "If, as

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[314] Gershman 2001, 833.
[315] cf. LeVan, 1984.
[316] Ibid.

these studies suggest, juries do rely on nonverbal behavior more than verbal content in

making judgments, the accuracy of their interpretations of such nonverbal behavior

might be crucial to the outcome of a case… The jury's ability to interpret will often be

tested when the jury tried to determine whether a witness, client, or attorney is

deceiving them."[317] It is perhaps unsurprising that prosecutors and defenders will spend

significant time (and money) coaching witnesses (and attorneys) on how to avoid

detrimental nonverbal communication.[318]

In addition, the courts have explicitly validated the notion that one can read

deception from the nonverbal communication of an individual by explicitly allowing

juries to form judgments based on nonverbal data. In an influential and upheld 1995

Utah Supreme Court case the court deferred to a jury's decision even though that

decision was based on a judgment call regarding the credibility of a witness:

> As has often been said, the jury is in a favored position to
> form impressions as to the trust to be reposed in
> witnesses. They have the advantage of fairly close
> personal contact; the opportunity to observe appearance
> and general demeanor; . . . manner of expression, and
> *apparent frankness and candor or want of it in reacting to*
> *and answering questions* on both direct and cross-
> examination in determining whether, and to what extent,
> witnesses are to be believed.[319]

This notion of jurors using facial expressions as a way of understanding the truth has

not only been upheld by higher courts, but in some jurisdictions jurors are explicitly

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[317] Ibid.
[318] cf. Neal 2009.
[319] Gittens v. Lundberg, 284 P.2d).

asked to judge the person's truthfulness by such observations as "demeanor upon the witness stand" and "manner of testifying."[320] According to some law scholars, the jury represents the best lie detector of all; indeed, "lie detecting is what our juries do best."[321]

The assumption here is that jurors have a unique ability to assess truth based on appearance. A key outstanding question is how often jury assessments that are based on non-verbal cues are correct. This is difficult to assess given that jury assessments often are assessments that are never validated or invalided (guilty defendants found to be innocent rarely admit to the crime after being exonerated). Nevertheless, law has taken seriously the idea that face-to-face interaction provides useful mechanism for detecting truth and deception.

These examples from business and law are presented as evidence that other disciplines with high stakes take seriously the notion that face-to-face provides a mechanism of deception detection. Thriving literature in journals such as *Harvard Business Review* and *Yale Law Review* have investigated precisely this phenomenon. If these disciplines take face-to-face seriously, study it, and accept truth-detection through appearance as a maxim, it raises the question of why analysts of international politics do not. I argue that we should take a cue from business and law and take seriously the notion that deception detection through face-to-face *can* occur under certain conditions

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[320] Judicial Committee on Model Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit 2002, 53.
[321] Fisher 1997, 575.

and thus provides a compelling reason for diplomats and politicians to consider the costs and benefits of endeavoring to meet face-to-face.

The chapter will now turn to one of the most salient examples of deception in international politics in order to understand how the dynamics discussed above regarding deception-detection may have occurred in a real high-stakes political situation.

Lying Face-to-Face: The Case of Munich

Among the famous episodes of deception in international politics, perhaps none is more infamous than what occurred in September, 1938 in Munich, Germany between Adolf Hitler and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. While the history is likely familiar to most, and has been covered from a number of different historical and political perspectives (including into the present where the case still generates controversy and diverse interpretations as to Britain's aims), I will provide a brief background to the interaction and highlight aspects of the meetings that are relevant to face-to-face deception. The key questions for our purposes is how Chamberlain came to trust Hitler during these fateful meetings and what lessons can be drawn from their interaction to inform the conditions under which face-to-face may lead to understanding of intentions, or its opposite, deception.

Background: Chamberlain's Developing Theory in the 1930s

Before analyzing the actual interaction between Hitler and Chamberlain that ultimately resulted in betrayal and the outbreak of World War II, it is worth considering Neville Chamberlain's own intellectual development as it relates to appeasement. Contrary to what some have described as an ill-thought-out response to Germany's rise, Chamberlain had been cultivating a theory of appeasement since the early 1930s. Even before taking office as Prime Minister, Chamberlain was cognizant of the fact that there existed a "yawning gulf… between Britain's vast imperial commitments and its limited military capabilities.[322] Chamberlain understood that the small nation of 47 million people was in a position of needing to defend imperial installments encompassing a quarter of the world's land and population. Worse, it was forced to do so with what Robert Self, one of Chamberlain's biographers, has termed "dismally depleted military resources of a third-rate Power."[323] This is coupled with the realization that Japan, Germany, and Italy all provide significant potential challengers to Europe generally and Britain in particular, should they want to revise the status quo in the system. The relative power situation, in other words, was bleak. As Kennedy notes, "the fighting strength of the British Empire was weaker in relation to its potential enemies than at any time since 1779."[324] Faced with this grim reality, Chamberlain and his government faced a fundamental problem of how to best protect a nation with relatively limited resources.

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[322] Self 2006, 236.
[323] Ibid.
[324] Kennedy 1983, 99-100.

Many in his Cabinet favored rearmament and a significant strengthening of military assets, but depressed economic times of the 1930s required an effective balance to be struck. Public opinion favored reduction of military spending with many viewing defense spending as a luxury, not a necessity.[325] Chamberlain continually struggled with the compromise required to "strike an appropriate balance, to achieve the maximum of effective deterrence for the minimum outlay of non-productive (and possibly unnecessary) expenditure."[326] Put simply, Chamberlain understood that Britain was required to deter future aggression from adversaries, but it had few resources with which to do it.

One of the ways Chamberlain found to strike this balance was to argue for the importance of active diplomacy. Chamberlain was realistic about what Britain could hope to achieve through armament and what it could not. As such, Chamberlain argued that the country must obtain security that it could afford and use diplomacy to appease challengers. Chamberlain viewed Japan and Italy as secondary challengers with the main security focus remaining on Germany as the principle historical threat. Chamberlain further believed that if Britain could successfully help to settle Germany's legitimate Versailles Treaty grievances, it could remove Germany as a potential threat, thereby reducing the danger from Japan and Italy.

Further, far from being idealist, British governments before and including Chamberlain's were quite realistic about the threat posed by Hitler's Germany. As early

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[325] Levy and Ripsman 2008, 159.
[326] Self 2006, 236.

as 1933 Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs noted that "[Hitler's] militant, very dangerous and incompetent administration will remain in charge of the centre of Europe in strict training for mischief… the number of years for which real hostilities can be staved off would, in all European opinion, be doubtful."[327] Chamberlain agreed regarding Germany's uncertain and potentially dubious intentions. In Cabinet documents relating to the relationship of Britain with France, and potentially using France to make concessions to Germany, Chamberlain argued that "France ought not to be pushed by us into a position of weakness, more particularly as he [Chamberlain] felt misgivings about the attitude of Germany."[328] Pessimism, rather than idealism, permeated Cabinet discussions regarding Germany and its future. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs described the situation as "definitely disquieting" and argued that for the first time since World War I Germany was cultivating an "attitude of mind" and "military training" which "could end in only one way."[329]

When Chamberlain becomes Prime Minister in May 1937, he actively addresses the concern posed by Germany and seeks a level of rearmament that would not leave the country in economic destitution. His chiefs of staff warn that the pace of rearmament will not be sufficient to protect the country from challenges from Germany, Italy, and Japan.[330] Chamberlain understood that the only way to build defenses sufficient to protect against a challenge would be to buy time. By seeking a strategy of

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[327] CAB 52 (33), 10-11.
[328] CAB 48 (33), 343-344.
[329] CAB 35 (33), 88.
[330] CAB 46 (37).

appeasement Chamberlain was hoping to satiate desires of challengers in the short term. As Robert Paul Shay puts it, "Conciliation was the only course they could see by which it was possible to save the nation from the threat posed from without by too few arms and from within by too many."[331] While there is disagreement about what Chamberlain's ultimate strategy was, avoiding short-term crisis with Germany is documented in the Cabinet notes and was clearly an aim. Less clear is whether Chamberlain believed in the "buying time" strategy such that Britain could prepare for the long-term possibility of war with one of its main challengers.[332] Regardless of what Chamberlain's long-term vision was, one point that is well supported is that his appeasement theory was not simply about idealistically satiating desire of land for long-term peace, but rather was based on the realistic assessment of Britain's capabilities and its prospects of fighting a short-term war with Germany.

This is important for our purposes because many have argued that Chamberlain was ultimately deceived by Hitler because the intellectual capacity deck was stacked against him. Indeed it is easy to come to the conclusion that Chamberlain was easily deceived *if* one believes that he was an idealist hoping for an outcome rather than analytically assessing one. If, in contrast, Chamberlain was more shrewd and realistic than normally portrayed, this raises the bar required to argue that he was blindly duped.

Leading up to Face-to-Face: Germany's Rise

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[331] Shay 1977, 175.
[332] Barros et al., 2009.

The threat Germany posed to Britain was ultimately rooted in Germany's rise to power after World War I. From early in his rise to power Hitler pursued a goal of a "Greater Germany," a political concept derived from the early 19th century that proposed the unification of German-speaking areas.[333] Hitler referred to this proposed area of land in *Mein Kampf* as what Friedrich Ratzel termed "Lebensraum" or "living space." The living space notion stemmed from a belief that the development of a given people required significant and specific geographical space. Once a people had adapted to one location they would proceed to another. This type of expansion was viewed by Ratzel and subsequent followers of the notion as a natural process. Hitler, upon gaining power, began efforts to expand the Lebensraum, reuniting the Saar with Germany in 1935 and Austria in early 1938. The result of annexing Austria into Greater Germany was that Czechoslovakia bordered Germany on three sides. Further, the area of Czechoslovakia that bordered Germany, Sudetenland, had a substantial population of ethnic Germans, almost 70 percent of whom supported the German nationalist movement.[334] These factors, geography and demographics, combined to make Sudetenland a significant next target for Lebensraum expansion.

The international community initially responded to Germany's annexation of Austria and discourse surrounding the Sudetenland situation with protestation and veiled threats. After the German invasion of Austria, in a letter to his sister, Chamberlain noted it is "evident now that force is the only argument Germany

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[333] cf. Wanklyn 1961.
[334] Bendersky 2000.

understands and that 'collective security' cannot offer any prospect of preventing such events it can show a visible force of overwhelming strength backed by the determination to use it… ... Heaven knows I don't want to get back to alliances but if Germany continues to behave as she has done lately she may drive us to it."[335] Despite this strong language, the British Cabinet's Foreign Policy Committee chose not to seek a "grand alliance" to deter Germany from aggression and decided instead to advocate that Czechoslovakia attempt to negotiate directly with Germany.[336] What the Czech government did not know was that Sudeten leader Konrad Henlein had direct instructions from Hitler not to reach agreement with the Czechs. Thus, negotiations continued through 1938 but little progress engendered.

The turning point with respect to Britain's position that the Czech government should negotiate directly with Germany itself came on the 12th of September at the annual Nuremberg Rally, a political event of the Nazi Party. Chamberlain understood that the negotiations were going poorly and that this speech might indicate Hitler's intentions with respect to moving forward toward war and the annexation of Sudetenland. In anticipation of this prospect, Chamberlain worked closely with his adviser and emissary to Hitler, Sir Horace Wilson and together created a secret "Plan Z": if it seemed from Hitler that war was inevitable, Chamberlain would involve himself directly in the negotiations with Germany by flying to negotiate directly with

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[335] Chamberlain letter quoted in Self 2006, 304.
[336] Faber 2008, 159-160.

Hitler.[337] The "Z" would stand for zero hour and the plan invoked as a last ditch effort

to prevent war. Meeting face-to-face was crucial, for Chamberlain: "you could say more

to a man face-to-face than you could put in a letter."[338] Perhaps more importantly,

Chamberlain believed that face-to-face would help Hitler to better understand Britain's

intentions: "Doubt about the British attitude would be better removed by discussion."[339]

In the September speech Hitler made it clear that his words would be backed by

action:

> The condition of the Sudeten Germans is indescribable. It
> is sought to annihilate them. As human beings they are
> oppressed and scandalously treated in an intolerable
> fashion ... The depriving of these people of their rights
> must come to an end. ... I have stated that the Reich would
> not tolerate any further oppression of these three and a
> half million Germans, and I would ask the statesmen of
> foreign countries to be convinced that this is no mere
> form of words.[340]

As one historian recorded the event, words do little justice to describe the delivery and

enthusiasm from the crowd: "At every pause, the deep baying of the huge crowd

gathered. . . and the roar of '*Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil! Sieg Heil!*' supplied a sinister

background."[341] While Hitler did not declare war in the speech, he made it clear to the

international community that he reserved the right to deal with the Sudetenland problem

himself, demanding justice and self-determination for the region.

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[337] CAB 23 (95).
[338] Ibid.
[339] Ibid.
[340] Quoted in Faber 2008, 263-266.
[341] Bullock 1965.

The next morning Chamberlain received word from his secret service that all

German embassies had been told that Czechoslovakia would be invaded in less than two

weeks, on the 25th of September. With this knowledge, combined with the threatening

speech made the day earlier, Chamberlain activated "Plan Z" and sent a message to

Hitler noting that he was willing to fly to Germany in order to negotiate directly. Hitler

accepted and the following morning Chamberlain flew to Munich in order to meet

Hitler at his retreat outside of town at Berchtesgaden. While some historians believe the

trip had modest goals, the chief of which "at this stage was to find out what Hitler's

terms were for settling the crisis,"[342] Chamberlain's own letter to the King George of

England informing him of the trip suggests that he had loftier goals for the session:

> I have been considering the possibility of a sudden and
> dramatic step which might change the whole situation.
> The plan is that I should inform Herr Hitler that I propose
> at once to go over to Germany to see him. If he assents,
> and it would be difficult for him to refuse, I should hope
> to persuade him that he had an unequalled opportunity of
> raising his own prestige and fulfilling what he has so
> often declared to be his aim, namely the establishment of
> an Angle-German understanding, preceded by a
> settlement of the Czech-Slovakian question.[343]

Whether Chamberlain believed that meeting Hitler face-to-face would "change the

whole situation" and "save the situation at the 11th hour," as he wrote to his sister, or

merely believed it would better enable Chamberlain to understand Hitler's aims, it is

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[342] McDonough 1986.
[343] Quoted in Fair 1992, 284.

clear that the Prime Minister believed in the transformative ability of meeting face-to-face.[344] What seemed to be an intractable situation could be ameliorated by a state visit.

The decision to meet with Hitler would not be without critics. Winston Churchill called the visit as "the stupidest thing that has ever been done."[345] Chamberlain's own colleagues, while more muted, similarly expressed concern. The Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha believed that the visit was "not without risk" and warned that Hitler's recent actions were "all part of a relentless plan on the lines of *Mein Kampf*."[346] Oliver Stanley, another minister in the Cabinet noted that the meeting would "give Herr Hitler everything which he was now demanding by force and would be a complete surrender." Nevertheless, as Faber points out, "nothing could dampen Chamberlain's enthusiasm."[347] Chamberlain was so confident that he boasted to his sister: "Hitler was entirely at my disposal and would not Mrs. Chamberlain come too![348] Clearly Chamberlain had confidence in his ability to persuade and had invested significant political capital in that ability. But persuasion would only be possible if he first understood Hitler's true intentions.

Meeting with Hitler Face-to-Face

Memoirs and letters written by Chamberlain himself, the German translator present in the room, Paul Schmidt, and meeting minutes released by the UK National

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[344] Chamberlain letter quoted in Self 2005, 344-345.
[345] Rose 1995, 299.
[346] Hore-Belisha 1961, 139.
[347] Faber 2009, 283.
[348] Chamberlain letter quoted in Self 2005, 345-347.

Archives organization provide a relatively rich descriptive account of the various

encounters Chamberlain and Hitler had in face-to-face settings over the fortnight.[349] The

first meeting at Berchtesgaden lasted three hours and laid the groundwork for

agreement. Chamberlain later relayed to his Cabinet that Hitler, "on first view" was

"unimpressive."[350] He later wrote to his sister his impressions upon seeing Hitler face-

to-face at his estate:

> He was bareheaded and dressed in a khaki coloured coat
> with a red armlet and a swastika on it and the military cross
> on his breast. He wore black trousers such as we wear in the
> evening and black patent leather lace-up shoes. His hair is
> brown, not black, his eyes blue, his expression rather
> disagreeable, especially in repose and altogether he looks
> entirely undistinguished. You would never notice him in a
> crowd and would take him for the house painter he once
> was.[351]

Later Chamberlain remarked to his Cabinet that Hitler seemed to be "the commonest

little dog he had ever seen," but nevertheless "it was impossible not to be impressed

with the power of the man."[352] After a half hour of platitudes over tea, Hitler jumped

abruptly into substantive discussions and suggested that Chamberlain and he proceed in

private, with only the interpreter present for the actual negotiation.[353]

The conversation involved heated discourse at times. Chamberlain attempted to

frame the discussion around the creation of a "new understanding between England and

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[349] cf. Schmidt 1951.
[350] CAB 23 (95).
[351] Chamberlain letter quoted in Self 2005, 346.
[352] CAB 23 (95).
[353] Faber 2009, 289.

Germany." Hitler characteristically abruptly pointed out that the situation involving

Sudeten Germans was "of the utmost urgency and could not wait."[354] As Hitler's

interpreter notes illustrate, Hitler launched into a rather lengthy speech, reciting a

number of German grievances with respect to the Treaty of Versailles, the League of

Nations, etc.[355] Chamberlain later reflected on Hitler's style: "For the most part H.

spoke quietly and in low tones. I did not see any trace of insanity but occasionally he

became very excited and poured out his indignation against the Czechs in a torrent of

words so that several times I had to stop him and ask that I might have a chance to hear

what he was talking about."[356] Chamberlain nevertheless listened quietly to most of

what Hitler presented, interjecting for clarification when needed. As he had told his

Cabinet earlier, his goal in the trip primarily was to better understand Hitler's goals and

intentions. For Hitler's part, Schmidt took note that "nothing in [Chamberlain's] clear-

cut, typically English features with their bushy eyebrows, pointed nose and strong

mouth, betrayed what went on behind his high forehead."[357] The intention reading

attempts evidently were occurring on both sides of the interaction.

The culmination of Hitler's monologue was an emotional outburst

regarding the fate of Sudetens. He angrily suggested to Chamberlain that he would

make it his mission to answer the call of the three million Sudeten Germans just as

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[355] Faber 2009, 291.
[356] Chamberlain letter quoted in Self 2005, 312.
[357] Faber 2009, 291.

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he had answered the call of the seven million Germans in Austria.[358] Further, he

noted that he would do it at any cost: "I am ready to face a world war. I am forty-

nine years old, and I want still to be young enough to lead my people to victory,"

he shouted. Chamberlain interjected and moved straight to the heart of the logic of

the appeasement strategy:

> Hold on a minute; there is one point on which I want to be
> clear and I will explain why: you say that the three million
> Sudeten Germans must be included in the Reich; would
> you be satisfied with that and is there nothing more you
> want? I ask because there are many people who think that
> is not all; that you wish to dismember Czechoslovakia.[359]

Hitler responded with another "rambling speech"[360] and the impression Chamberlain

was left with was that it was "impossible that Czechoslovakia should remain like a

spearhead in Germany's side [but] he did not want a lot of Czechs, all he wanted was

Sudeten Germans."[361] Chamberlain replied by noting that he would be prepared to

consider solutions to Germany's interests as long as the use of force was ruled out:

> Hitler: "Who is speaking of force? Herr Benes is using
> force against my countrymen in the Sudetenland. Herr
> Benes, and not I, mobilized in May. I won't accept it any
> longer. I'll settle this question myself in the near future
> one way or another."
>
> Chamberlain: "If I've understood you correctly, then
> you're determined in any event to proceed against

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[358] Faber 2009, 291.
[359] Quoted in Faber 2009, 291.
[360] Faber 2009, 292.
[361] Ibid.

Czechoslovakia. If that is your intention, why have you
had me coming to Berchtesgaden at all? Under these
circumstances it's best if I leave straight away.
Apparently it's all pointless.'

Hitler: "If you recognize the principle of self-
determination for the treatment of the Sudeten question,
then we can discuss how to put the principle into
practice."[362]

Chamberlain notes to Hitler that he would have to consult his cabinet, but understood

that he had Hitler's agreement to not take military action in the meantime." The meeting

ended with a "win" for Chamberlain: Sudetenland would be allowed self-determination,

but that would be an end of expansion and force.

Aftermath of Negotiation: Assessing Winners and Losers

Curiously, immediately following the meeting the British diplomatic party was

refused a copy of interpreter Schmidt's transcript of the interaction. As Ian Kershaw

points out, this was a tremendous "breach of diplomatic courtesy" that had come from

Hitler himself.[363] "He evidently wanted his bargaining position to be kept as open as

possible, and to avoid being bound by particular verbal formulations."[364] While Hitler

did not share the transcript of the interaction with Chamberlain, he did share his

admiration for him through back-channel communications. Joachim von Ribbentrop,

Hitler's Foreign Minister had his personal secretary confide to Horace Wilson that

"Hitler told me he felt he was speaking to a *man*." As Robert Self argues, this calculated

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[362] Kershaw 2008, 434-435.
[363] Kershaw 2000, 111.
[364] Ibid.

flattery was quite successful in playing into Chamberlain's vanity and providing him

with the sense that he had won the negotiation.[365] In a letter to his sister, Chamberlain

expressed his pleasure with being viewed favorably by Hitler: "Afterwards H. Wilson

heard from various people who were with Hitler after my interview that he had been

very favourably impressed. I have had a conversation with a *man,* he said, and one with

whom I can do business."[366]

Externally, Chamberlain conveyed a strong confidence upon arriving home to

Britain. To the public, on a live radio broadcast on BBC, Chamberlain proudly

announced the mutual understanding he and Herr Hitler had arrived at:

> I have come back again rather quicker than I expected,
> after a journey which, had I not been so preoccupied, I
> should have found thoroughly enjoyable. Yesterday
> afternoon I had a long talk with Herr Hitler. It was a
> frank talk, but it was a friendly one, and I feel satisfied
> now that each of us fully understands what is in the mind
> of the other. You will not, of course, expect me to
> discuss now what may be the results of these talks. What
> I have got to do now is discuss them with my colleagues.
> Later – perhaps in a few days – I am going to have
> another talk with Herr Hitler; only this time he has told
> me that it is his intention to come half-way to meet me.
> That is to spare an old man such another long journey.[367]

The BBC reports that the crowds gathered responded with applause and joy. This, in

turn, affected Chamberlain and increased his confidence that he had succeeded in

preventing war.

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[365] Self 2006, 314.
[366] Chamberlain letter quoted in Self 2005, 348.
[367] BBC Written Archives, R34/325.

To his Cabinet Chamberlain expressed similar sentiments and addressed

concerns from a concerned government body that perhaps he had been deceived.

According to Cabinet minutes, Chamberlain said:

> Herr Hitler had a narrow mind and was violently
> prejudiced on certain subjects; but he would not
> deliberately deceive a man whom he respected and with
> whom he had been in negotiation, and he [Chamberlain]
> was sure that Herr Hitler now felt some respect for him.
> When Herr Hitler announced that he meant to do
> something it was certain that he would do it. . . The
> crucial question was whether Herr Hitler was speaking
> the truth when he said that he regarded the Sudeten
> question as a racial question which must be settled, and
> that the object of his policy was racial unity and not
> domination of Europe. Much depends on the answer to
> that question. The Prime Minister believed that Herr
> Hitler was speaking the truth. Herr Hitler had also said
> that, once the present question had been settled, he had
> no more territorial ambitions in Europe. He had also
> said that if the present question could be settled
> peaceably, it might be a turning-point in Anglo-German
> relations.[368]

Chamberlain's entire justification for believing Hitler rested on the personal relationship

he had cultivated with the man and that the leader could be trusted to honor his word.

Importantly, Chamberlain pointed to changes in Hitler's behavior as an indication of his

true intentions. Cabinet notes suggest that "Herr Hitler's manner was definitely different

when they left his study; he [Hitler] had stopped halfway down the stairs and lamented

the fact that the bad weather made it impossible for him to take the Prime Minister to

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[368] CAB 23 (95).

see the view from the top of the mountain. Herr Hitler had said that he had hoped this might be possible on some other occasion."[369] Chamberlain further insinuated to the Cabinet that the Fuhrer had been "favorably impressed" and that Chamberlain had "now established an influence over Herr Hitler, and that the latter trusted him and was willing to work with him."[370]

The Admiralty was not as confident as Chamberlain that Hitler could be trusted. The First Lord of the Admiralty, for instance, noted that Hitler had gone back on previous statements. According to the Cabinet notes, "He (First Lord of the Admiralty) was afraid that, after the second rebuff which Herr Hitler had delivered to the Prime Minister, the House of Commons and the country would not accept the settlement proposed. What then would become of the influence which the Prime Minister had established over Herr Hitler."[371] The First Lord went on to note "he was certain that Herr Hitler would not stop at any frontier which might result from the proposed settlement."[372] Rather than wait and see whether Hitler would keep his word, what the First Lord suggested "was to order general mobilization forthwith. This would make [Britain's] position clear to the German Government and might yet result in deterring them from war."[373] Thus, while Chamberlain was deriving confidence from his face-to-

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[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.
[371] Ibid.
[372] Ibid.
[373] Ibid.

face encounter with Hitler, his Cabinet remained unconvinced. Chamberlain's confidence in Hitler's intentions was not winning over the Admiralty.

While this was occurring publicly in front of his Cabinet, there is some indication not only that privately Chamberlain had at least a passing moment of doubt of his success, but of Hitler's trustworthiness as well. In a letter to his sister written shortly after his meeting with Hitler, Chamberlain notes "… in spite of the *hardness and ruthlessness* I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word."[374] Just months earlier he had further written that he was convinced of Germany's fundamental "untrustworthiness." Throughout the crisis he also noted on several occasions in letters to his sister that he believed Hitler was "half mad" and a "lunatic." Finally, as noted above, Chamberlain also famously proffered to his Cabinet that "force is the only argument that Germany understands." Thus, while Chamberlain was publicly conveying a level of confidence, it is not immediately clear that this confidence was mirrored on the inside as well. One should not make too much of single words or sentences written in letters, but the disjuncture between Chamberlain's words to the Cabinet (strong, confident) and the words he uses with his sister (questioning, conjecture) is striking. It is noteworthy that Chamberlain did not express to the Cabinet that he thought he saw *ruthlessness* on Hitler's face. We will return to this point subsequently.

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[374] Chamberlain letter quoted in Self 2005, 348.

Nevertheless, shortly after meeting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden, the agreement

was formalized in Munich early in the morning of September 30. At Chamberlain's

request Hitler signed a peace treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany,

ostensibly ensuring the two countries would never be at war in the future. Chamberlain

returned to Britain with a piece of paper that promised Britain "peace for our time" and

received a hero's welcome. A few months later Nazi expansion continued out of

Sudetenland and into the rest of Czechoslovakia, betraying the agreement that

Chamberlain and Hitler had reached some months earlier. This ultimately served as a

significant causal factor in the outbreak of World War II.

Assessing Chamberlain's Personal Diplomacy: Was He Duped?

There is some evidence to suggest that Neville Chamberlain never saw Hitler's

deception coming. Indeed, this is the way the history is normally told. As Groth notes,

for instance, "a very short personal exposure was sufficient to create, or at least strongly

confirm, a misinterpretation of Hitler's policy."[375] This seemingly empirical "fact" that

Chamberlain was duped has had consequences for his historical image. As Robert Beck

has noted, the orthodox characterization of Chamberlain is of a "wishful-thinking

bumbler," an "umbrella-toting utopian" or "self-deluded Lear."[376] It is therefore

relatively easy to construct a story of blind deception: Chamberlain naively visited

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[375] Groth 1964, 836.
[376] Beck 1989, 167-169.

Hitler believing in the ability for personal encounters to transcend political reality and could not see that Hitler was lying through his teeth.

This orthodox story has, over the last few decades, been challenged on a number of fronts. First, with respect to personality and personal characteristics, even critics of Chamberlain note that the characterization of a blindly following naïve utopian is unfair. As one critic puts it, "the truth was that Chamberlain's diagnosis of Nazi Germany and its intentions was not constant and consistent; that behind his policy lay not a single, simply motive, but several interwoven motives, partly idealistic, partly expedient, partly inspired by hope and partly by fear; and sometimes one element and sometimes another came to the fore."[377] Other historians highlight that while Chamberlain may have suffered from momentary doubt, he was highly intelligent and once he had reached a decision he had a profound ability, much to his detriment, to steadfastly believe he was right:

> In fact, Neville Chamberlain belies his traditional image as a weak and cowardly politician. It is important to recognize the reverse was true. Chamberlain was a strong-willed, intelligent and clear-sighted political tactician, who followed a foreign policy he was convinced was not only the right one but vastly superior to any of the alternatives. He sometimes wrestled with private doubts and uncertainties, but it was a confident, even obstinate, belief he was right which determined his actions.[378]

This characteristic of firmly believing in a given course of action meant that

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[377] Barnett 1972, 514.
[378] McDonough 1988, 46.

Chamberlain ultimately was able to ward off criticism in the knowledge that he was making the right decision.

Yet, if Chamberlain was often realistic in his assessment of Hitler and understood his ruthlessness and untrustworthiness, how did he not see the deception coming? The narrative described in his diaries provides evidence that there *were* the type of clues Ekman identifies as crucial indicators for lie detection: high emotions, reading an expression of "ruthlessness" on the face, tirades, etc. Chamberlain's letters can be read as a checklist of facial clues to deceit:

Behavioral Clue of Concealed Information in Face-to-Face Encounters[379]	Type of Information Concealed	Chamberlain and Hitler Interaction at Berchtesgaden
Tirades	Non-emotional information (facts, plans)	"Czechoslovakia… rambling speech"[380] "indignation against the Czechs in a torrent of words"[381]
Emblems	Emotions (happiness, surprise, distress)	"Emotional outburst" regarding fate of Sudetens[382]
Slow speech	Sadness (maybe guilt & shame)	"[Hitler] spoke quietly and in low tones"[383]
Soft speech	Sadness (maybe guilt & shame)	"[Hitler] spoke quietly and in low tones"[384]
Unclear	Merciless demeanor?	"Despite the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face"[385]

Table 5: Hitler's Behavioral Detection Clues

Why was Chamberlain unable to catch these clues? The importance of the personality characteristics discussed by Chamberlain's biographers and what is revealed in his letters is that they may shed light on the various psychological mechanisms at work when Chamberlain was assessing Hitler's intentions. First, the counter-orthodox characterization of Chamberlain fits the profile of what Phil Tetlock has termed the

[379] Ekman 1991, 333.
[380] Faber 2009, 292.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Faber 2009, 291.
[383] Self 2005, 312.
[384] Ibid.
[385] Chamberlain letter in Self 2005.

dogmatic "hedgehog."[386] Tetlock sums up the hedgehog and its corollary, the fox quite

succinctly with the words of Isaiah Berlin: "The fox knows many things; the hedgehog

one great thing."[387] Hedgehogs perform worse at prediction tasks not because they are

less intelligent or necessarily naïve, but because they view events through the lens of

what they know or believe to be correct. Put another way, they have difficulty updating

their grand theory based on new information that is presented if that information poses a

challenge to the theory. Recalling Chamberlain's long process of crafting his theory of

appeasement and his obstinate refusal to give in to criticisms from his Cabinet, it seems

reasonable to conclude that he may have exhibited characteristics of the hedgehog.

There is evidence that Chamberlain saw himself in this light. Reflecting after the

outbreak of World War II: "Everything I have worked for, everything that I have hoped

for, everything that I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins."[388]

Chamberlain here is admitting to thinking as a hedgehog does: appeasement is what he

knew. Appeasement is what he believed in. Recall from above that the decision to

appease Hitler was not something that was crafted overnight, but rather the product of a

decade-long project of theory building. Appeasement was, quite literally, the grand

theory that Chamberlain used to understand Germany.

 Chamberlain as a hedgehog who views Germany through an appeasement lens

makes sense of why he believed Hitler in their interaction. As Paul Ekman has argued,

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[386] Tetlock 2006.
[387] Ibid, 67.
[388] Chamberlain diary entry quoted in Self 2006, 3.

lies often work because they are colluded.[389] Put simply, lies are sometimes believed

because the one deceived *wants the lie to be true*. This interpretation is compelling

given what we know about the personal and political realities of the day. First, the

personal distress of realizing that one's grand theory that one has invested time, effort,

and political capital in would be tremendous. If nothing else, the personal toll of

admitting to oneself that an entire project was misplaced would be significant. The

Chamberlain quotation about his world crashing around him conveys the distress he

went through upon finally realizing his theory had been shown wrong.

Second, the political reality suggests that if Chamberlain was wrong, his country

would soon be at war. Put simply, Chamberlain likely understood that if appeasement

did not work, not only would his personal theory be destroyed, but the survival of his

state may be at risk as well. "If Chamberlain were to have recognized Hitler's lie, he

would have had to confront the fact that his policy of appeasement had put his country

at grave risk."[390] Thus, there is a very compelling psychological, but not rational, need

for Chamberlain to believe he is being told the truth when meeting with Hitler. In a

sense, he had little choice. If Chamberlain realizes that Hitler is lying, then war is

inevitable; if Chamberlain believes that Hitler may be telling the truth, war need not

necessarily follow.

As Ekman points out, this type of lie collusion is exceedingly common.

"Chamberlain was not unique. The targets of lies, often unwittingly, collusively want to

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[389] Ekman 2009, 260.
[390] Ekman 2009, 344.

believe the liar. The same motive – not wanting to recognize impending disaster –
explains why the businessman who mistakenly hired an embezzler continues to miss the
signs of the embezzlement."[391] From a rational perspective the businessman and
Chamberlain would both be better off realizing they were mistaken and taking
immediate steps to mitigate the situation. But a profound psychological principle of not
updating what we know often prevents this from occurring.

The interpretation that Chamberlain colluded with Hitler's lie also makes sense
of why Chamberlain did not recognize the deception clues that were presented to him.
First, not everyone believed that Hitler could be trusted. Chamberlain was routinely
criticized and questioned by members of his Cabinet, Admiralty, the press, etc. for
believing Hitler, a politician who had a history of diplomatic deception and had directly
written in *Mein Kampf* about deception. Second, there was also the clue that Hitler's
story would later change when Chamberlain was not presented with a copy of the
interaction transcript. Finally, and quite important for our purposes, Chamberlain's
collusion of Hitler's lie also sheds light on the evidence that Chamberlain did indeed
understand some of the clues. Recalling Chamberlain's letter to his sister, "in spite of
the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here
was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word," there is evidence
here to suggest that Chamberlain *was* able to read something about Hitler's intentions
from his face (what he "thought" he saw). Chamberlain evidently believed, perhaps pre-

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[391] Ibid.

cognitively from a micro-expression, or the stark emotions he was displaying, that

Hitler was a hardhearted man who would likely show no mercy. Cognitively, however,

the psychological need to be correct and the grand theory to remain intact took over.

This is aligned with the two stream theory discussed in the introductory chapter: the

cognitive stream is in conflict with the simulation stream.

Further, as many historians have pointed out, there is a sense in which for

Chamberlain the *only option* he had was to believe Hitler. This is because Britain

simply had no attractive response should Hitler be deceiving them. As Self notes:

> Was Britain prepared to threaten Germany with force on
> behalf of a state to which it had no formal treaty
> obligations, which it certainly could not save and which
> would probably never be resurrected in its existing form –
> but with the absolute certainty that any attempt to do so
> would provide a ruinous and probably unwinnable war
> which would soon bring in Japan and Italy, destroy the
> British Empire, squander its wealth and undermine its
> position as a Great Power? In this context, notwithstanding
> retrospective wisdom about the insatiable nature of Hitler's
> ambitions, it should not be forgotten that Chamberlain's
> dismal prediction about the cost and dangers of war for
> Britain proved only too accurate.[392]

If Chamberlain was acutely aware of the potential costs of a war with Germany, it is not

at all surprising that he would simply want to believe in any alternative. The attractive

possibility Hitler was providing in the face-to-face interaction was that Hitler was

telling the truth. Put another way, even if Chamberlain knew that Hitler was lying,

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[392] Self 2006, 295.

there was little he could do about it. As Paul Schroeder points out, appeasement was in some sense inevitable:

> If one begins to tot up all the plausible motivations for appeasement – fear and horror of another war, Britain's state of unpreparedness, fear for the British economic and the Empire, the unprepared state of public opinion, the isolationism of the Dominions and the United States, lack of confidence in France, lack of interest in Central Europe, failure to understand Hitler and Nazism, fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and communism, the absence of a viable alternative presented either by the Conservative Opposition or Labour, and more – one sees that these are far more than enough to explain it.[393]

Put another way, appeasement in Munich by Chamberlain was "massively overdetermined." Indeed any other outcome would have been "an astonishing, almost inexplicable divergence from the norm."[394]

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while Chamberlain had momentary doubts, he seemed to truly believe and have confidence in his abilities to persuade face-to-face. In October 1937 Chamberlain had boldly proclaimed to his sister of "the far-reaching plans which I have in mind for the appeasement of Europe & Asia and for the ultimate check to the mad armaments race."[395] Again to his sisters he noted, "I could hardly have moved a pebble: now I have only to raise a finger & the whole face of Europe is changed." In response to the publication of H.A.L Fisher's *History of Europe* in March 1938, Chamberlain replied: "At the present moment I am too busy trying to

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[393] Schroeder 1976, 242.
[394] Ibid.
[395] Quoted in Goldstein 1999, 277-278.

make the history of Europe to read about it."[396] This was a man who was confident in his ability to change Europe and undoubtedly Hitler's mind as well. It is perhaps unsurprising that this overconfidence contributed to significant confirmation bias: that which confirmed his ability to persuade was retained; that which should have problematized his ability was quickly forgotten.

All of this suggests that while Chamberlain might not have known that Hitler was lying, it was cognitive mechanisms that prevented him from picking up clues. While I do not make the strong claim that Chamberlain *knew* Hitler's intentions but decided not to believe them, there is significant evidence that he did pick up on something untrustworthy from meeting with Hitler face-to-face but could not, for psychological reasons, privilege what he saw. If nothing else, clues were presented that provided at least a possibility condition for understanding Hitler's true intentions. This argument should not be taken too far. It is possible that even sophisticated trained lie detectors would not have been able to detect Hitler's deception and act upon it, for Hitler seemingly was a well-trained liar himself. We cannot re-run the tape of history to find out. What we do know, however, is that what Chamberlain has written about his impressions of Hitler provides some evidence there were clues and he unknowingly picked up on some of them, a feat that is unlikely to have occurred in written correspondences.

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[396] Ibid.

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Scope Conditions: Explaining Variation in Deception Ease and Detection

By way of conclusion, we can use the case of Munich presented above to help draw conditions under which face-to-face should help to create robust cooperation and when we should expect the opposite, deception and mistrust, to occur. While ostensibly a case of face-to-face engendering mistrust and a lack of cooperation, the analysis in this chapter has illustrated that the basic causal mechanism of face-to-face leading to intention understanding still holds. Even in the starkest example of deception, we find that face-to-face provides, at the very least, a possibility of understanding intentions that would be difficult in other modalities. Micro-expressions, emotion, tirades, a variety of pre-cognitive facial movements, among others, all help to reveal what is being felt on the inside. This is the clue to intentions of the other. We are capable of "feeling" what the other feels because of the shared empathetic circuit connection engendered in a face-to-face encounter with the other. As such, even in an instance when one is trying to deceive and lie, the physical act of seeing the other face-to-face may present clues that belie deception.

At the same time, however, the Munich case is illuminative because it points to the force of social and political contexts in affecting deception and its detection. While Chamberlain had useful data available to him that Hitler may have been lying, ultimately, Hitler succeeded in pushing Chamberlain to arrive at the wrong conclusion. There are a variety of reasons for this that will be discussed below, but arguably the most important is the power of political and social contexts. Chamberlain found himself

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in a context where he wanted to believe Hitler. Put in psychological terms, he was motivated to believe Hitler and therefore discounted disconfirming evidence. Part of this was the political reality that Chamberlain faced: by admitting to himself that Hitler was lying was to admit that war was inevitable. The other part was social: Hitler created an environment where Chamberlain wanted to believe that he was not being lied to. Through the use of flattery and stoking Chamberlain's ego, Hitler was able to convince Chamberlain that he was to be trusted. These political and social contexts, and their effects, will be discussed below.

Good Faith, Bad Faith

When two individuals enter into an interaction with good faith, understanding of intentions is aided by the shared neural circuit engendered between the two. This circuit allows both sides to feel what the other is feeling and gain an appreciation and understanding of the other's intentions. I have argued that much of contemporary diplomacy is entered into in good faith. My interviews with policy professionals suggest that much of diplomacy is about problem-solving, an exercise where it is often the case that neither side has a specific interest in being deceptive. Rather, the goal is to better understand positions and intentions so that a preferable solution may be found. In these cases face-to-face is particularly useful as it allows both parties to reach understandings that may be difficult to engender in other interaction modalities. All else being equal, two parties entering a face-to-face interaction in good faith creates the best prospects for robust cooperation. Yet, as we know, all else is *not* equal in the international political

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realm. Individuals differ in their abilities to negotiate, political and social contexts change from situation to situation, and power differentials provide an ever-present overarching structure. These contexts affect outcomes and need to be analyzed.

When one individual enters into an interaction in good faith, and the other in bad faith, such as in the Munich case presented here, there are a variety of conditions that will make understanding of intentions more or less likely. As we saw with Chamberlain, face-to-face interaction provided clues about Hitler's intentions, clues that Chamberlain admittedly processed and understood, but chose not to privilege, for a variety of reasons.

<u>Conditions that Affect Deception Detection</u>

First, most obviously, Hitler *was a skilled liar*. As Ekman notes, all liars are not created equally. Some are more comfortable with deception and have an easier time masking the signs of deception that can be read from the face and body language. The corollary to this is Chamberlain was not *a skilled lie detector*. As Ekman points out, individuals can improve on their lie detection (and lying) capabilities through simple training exercises (the U.S. Government's Department of Defense conducts such training). There is no evidence that I have found to suggest that Chamberlain had similar training. The importance of this as a condition is clear. If one is up against a liar with a particular skill-set in lying, either through training or natural ability, then face-to-face may not only result in a lack of intention understanding, but it may aid in deception. That is, face-to-face may provide clues to deception and truth, but they will

be more difficult to discern if the liar is skillful. It should be noted that this does not imply that one can never know *a priori* whether someone entering an interaction is a skilled liar or not. Indeed in the Munich case Chamberlain's Cabinet had warned that Hitler had reneged on his word earlier, with respect to attacking Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Second, there is evidence to suggest that Chamberlain *wanted to believe* Hitler. Chamberlain colluded Hitler's deception because the alternative, recognizing he had been lied to and a strategy of appeasement he had a great stake in had failed, would be difficult to deal with psychologically and practically. As a condition for understanding the true intentions of another, wanting to believe that one is being told the truth may serve as a strong motivating factor for collusion.

Third, Chamberlain *seemingly ignored a variety of data points.* In retrospect there were a number of data points in the case that the face-to-face information could have informed, including Hitler not providing a transcript of the interaction immediately following it. In addition, many in Chamberlain's own Cabinet read the tea leaves differently than he did, interpreting troop movements as unchecked aggression, leading to a feeling that Hitler would lie if it meant obtaining significant gains. If Chamberlain had coupled what he thought he saw in Hitler's eyes regarding ruthlessness and anger with other available data, this may have bolstered the notion that Hitler was planning on reneging on his words.

In speaking with former officials and negotiators, they often emphasize the notion that face-to-face provides useful data, but it must be used in consultation with other data. One official recounted President George W. Bush's face-to-face interaction with Vladimir Putin where Bush reported afterward: "I looked the man in the eye. I was able to get a sense of his soul." The problem with Bush's statement was not that he was attempting to derive intentions by reading a face (as discussed above this can lead to useful data); the problem was *privileging* that information because of overconfidence in one's ability to read faces. "What Bush should have done was balance what he saw in Putin's face against the mounting evidence that Russia was going to go its own way." Put another way, Bush made the opposite mistake of Chamberlain. Where Chamberlain thought he read something in Hitler's face that would suggest he was untrustworthy but decided not to follow-up on that idea (for a variety of reasons), Bush, despite significant evidence from his advisers that Russia may be untrustworthy, took one data point derived in a face-to-face encounter and made a decision.

Fourth, as is often the case in international political negotiations, Hitler was *able to construct a social setting that made deception easier*. Recall from Chamberlain's own account of arriving in Germany that Hitler made use of flattery to bring the two individuals together. This undoubtedly had an effect on Chamberlain's psychology as he returned home and reported to the Cabinet that Hitler could be trusted. As mentioned above, the business literature has long recognized the importance of "liking": bringing two individuals closer together as friends or acquaintances can have an effect on the

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ability to persuade (or sell a product). Successful salesmen are, as Mayer and Greenberg have argued, first and foremost effective empathizers.[397] Creating a social structure where Chamberlain believed that Hitler liked him, respected him, empathized with him and were close as individuals, made deception easier. This social setting perhaps explains why Chamberlain was quick to believe Hitler when his Cabinet and Admiralty was not. Chamberlain attempted to read Hitler's intentions from within the social structure of flattery, self-importance, confidence, etc. as noted above. The Admiralty, working in London hundreds of miles away, was not subject to this same structure. Their more careful approach signifies that the social structure Chamberlain found himself embedded in may have had an effect.

There are also a variety of personality characteristics that may have affected the outcome. First, Hitler *utilized personal power to his advantage*. As Chamberlain's letters suggest, Chamberlain was greatly impressed and intimidated by Hitler's stature. Hitler was able to utilize this by playing to Chamberlain's *ego*, suggesting to Chamberlain that he was glad to be negotiating with "a man" and showering praise upon him. According to Self, this had a significant effect on Chamberlain as Hitler became more approachable and likable.[398]

From a cognitive perspective, there are a number of factors that led to Chamberlain's inability to detect Hitler's true intentions. As mentioned above, Chamberlain illustrates many of the characteristics of Tetlock's hedgehog: *rampant*

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[397] Mayer and Greenberg 2006.
[398] Self 2006.

confirmation bias excluded the possibility of other perspectives. As Chamberlain's

biographers point out, while Chamberlain occasionally suffered from doubt, once he

had made a decision he stuck with it unfailingly. As appeasement had been in the works

for the better part of a decade, it is relatively easy to see how the "decision" regarding

how to approach Germany generally and Hitler specifically would have been formed

from early on in the conflict. Related to this, Chamberlain displayed significant

overconfidence in his ability to persuade. Chamberlain believed that by being allowed

to sit-down with Hitler, he could persuade Hitler to accept Chamberlain's plan. This

overconfidence banished any thought that it would be Hitler who would emerge as the

successful persuader.

What these conditions from the Munich case illustrate is that face-to-face

interaction may help intention understanding in a case of one party entering in bad faith,

but the interaction modality is one piece of a larger cognitive and structural framework.

All of the stable psychological and cognitive biases politicians routinely exhibit become

significant factors in the ability for one to detect bad faith. These conditions can be

summarized as follows:

Conditions that Affect Deception Detection	
Personality Characteristics	Skillfulness of liar
	Skillfulness of lie detector
	Personal power/stature
	Self-confidence/ego
	considerations
Cognitive Biases	Confirmation bias
	Overconfidence
	Too much certainty
Structural Considerations	Social context
	State power
	Personal power

Table 6: Conditions that Affect Deception Detection

Chapter 5: Intractable, Emotional Negotiation: Case Study of Sadat and Begin at Camp David

Intractable Conflict and Resolution

The previous two empirical chapters have investigated the conditions under which face-to-face interaction may help or hinder robust cooperation. I have argued that under specific conditions face-to-face aids intention understanding among negotiating parties and this, in turn, provides a foundation for *robust* cooperation. Not only do negotiators find agreement, but they also believe that the other will uphold that agreement. In the first case, George H. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev negotiating the reunification of Germany at the end of the Cold War, it was argued that face-to-face provided an opportunity for Bush to "read" Gorbachev's intentions with respect to the extent to which Gorbachev would push back on reunification efforts, specifically the U.S. plan. Face-to-face in this instance provided new information that would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in another interaction modality; after all, the information was not transmitted through verbal words or written sentences but through the shared circuit engendered by face-to-face contact. Importantly, this case, I argue, was marked by a problem-solving characteristic. That is, the remaining superpower (United States) and previous superpower (USSR) needed to solve a problem facing the future of the international system: what would happen with Europe after the fall of the

Iron Curtain? In this sense both parties entered the negotiation in good faith in order to find an amicable solution and thus the case is marked by shared good faith efforts to solve a common problem. The only question for Bush was how far Gorbachev could be pushed toward the preferred U.S. solution to the problem. Face-to-face allowed the United States and USSR to find agreement on German reunification in incredibly short order, an outcome that was believed to be "fantasy" just months earlier.

The next case study modified the faith variable in order to investigate the effects of face-to-face when one side attempts to deceive the other. The motivation for this manipulation stems from the observation that if the international system and its politics are akin to a poker game, as some scholars argue, then actors sometimes will attempt to deceive each other in order gain strategic advantage. It is therefore important to assess the role of face-to-face in an arguably common situation where one side enters the negotiation in bad faith. After all, if face-to-face only "works" with respect to understanding intentions if both sides are operating in good faith, then this limits the generalizability of the theory when it comes to explaining empirical outcomes. Therefore it is important to investigate how face-to-face operates when one (or both) side(s) enters the negotiation in bad faith. Does face-to-face help to engender understanding of intentions in cases of deception? Or, might it be that in some instances face-to-face helps the deceiver and aids in the hiding of intentions?

The infamous "Munich" case was analyzed as an example of face-to-face deception *par excellence*. Evidence was presented that suggests that even in a case of

one entering a negotiation in bad faith, face-to-face provides clues to understanding

intentions that are difficult to mask. While Neville Chamberlain ultimately claimed to

his Cabinet that he believed Hitler, there is evidence that suggests he was not as

confident privately as he was publicly. There is reason to believe, in other words, that

he *did* pick up some of the clues that belied Hitler's face-to-face performance of

sincerity, but at the end of the day he did not act on them for a variety of psychological

and structural reasons identified in the chapter. Put another way, it was not face-to-face

that led to deception; indeed, it was quite the opposite: face-to-face made deception

more difficult and less likely to succeed. The chapter proceeded to delineate the various

ways that the critical social and political context can provide conditions under which

understanding of intentions is made difficult, including psychological biases and

motivation to believe the deceiver. Ultimately, the chapter argued that even in cases of

overt deception, face-to-face may provide clues regarding true intentions.

This empirical chapter continues this theme of assessing the generalizability of

the theory and its scope conditions by investigating another critical variable that has

been known to exacerbate problems of intention understanding: long-standing

emotional conflicts. It may be that for collaborative problem-solving missions, such as

the German reunification process, face-to-face adds value because it helps the various

parties present to understand the intentions of each other. Similarly, when one is being

deceived, face-to-face may have value because it provides clues of that deception, thus

providing new information that may be highly salient if processed and acted upon. But

it is intuitively difficult to understand how face-to-face can be of value when two actors

have, at best a personality conflict and do not get along, or, at worst, distrust or hate for

each other. The conflict resolution literature has long recognized that some disputes are

so highly emotional and involve so many complexities that they are *intractable*.[399] In

these intractable conflicts it is not clear that simply placing two individuals in a room

together will produce a desirable outcome.[400] Indeed, that strategy may serve to make

the conflict worse. As will be analyzed below, Jimmy Carter's experience at Camp

David mediating negotiation between Israeli and Egyptian leadership is often told as a

story of the *failure* of face-to-face to overcome intractable conflict. The case is often

remembered for Carter having to separate Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat as the

two could not get beyond emotional outburst and argumentation when meeting face-to-

face.[401] Thus, the key research question for this chapter is to what extent face-to-face

can play a role, either positive or negative, in understanding intentions in the most

difficult intractable and emotional negotiations.

Investigating this link between face-to-face and intractable conflict is important

because despite the high profile failure of some of these negotiations, bringing together

leaders to work out differences has long served as a strategy in conflict resolution.

Herbert Kelman's work on interpersonal relations in conflict resolution settings is

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[399] Bar-Tal 1998; Bar-Tal 2000.
[400] Ross 1991.
[401] Princen 1991.

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seminal in this regard.[402] Kelman demonstrated through a number of real-world

simulations with Israeli and Palestinians, for instance, that bringing individuals together

face-to-face can have a salient effect on trust-building and "humanizing" the

experience, thereby softening positions and discourse. Similarly, the "contact

hypothesis" in psychology and sociology studies has led to a variety of conditions under

which prejudice and stereotyping are reduced.[403] Perhaps based partly on this intuitive

logic, between pre and post World War leadership meetings, Cold War summits, and

the various incarnations of the Middle East peace process, the 20th century was often

marked by efforts that attempted to produce progress on intractable conflict by bringing

individuals together to work out differences face-to-face.[404]

This has continued into the present. While the Cold War is over and global

World War seems unlikely, intractable conflict in the Middle East remains; so too do

attempts at resolving it. Recently, for instance, the Obama administration has renewed

efforts to bring Israeli and Palestinian leadership together in hopes of finding common

ground. Interestingly, the administration has advocated "proximity talks," rather than

direct bilateral negotiation. According to George Mitchell, the U.S.' envoy to the

region, the goal is to lay the foundation for negotiation that might result in direct

bilateral talks later. This logic recalls Henry Kissinger's efforts of "shuttle diplomacy"

in 1973 to end hostilities between Israel and Egypt following the Yom

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[402] Kelman 1976; Kelman 1979
[403] Allport 1954; Rothbart and John 1985.
[404] Reynolds 2009.

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Kippur/Ramadan/October War. Kissinger was successful, he notes, in part because an intermediary can help to diffuse an otherwise toxic environment and provide a framework for more direct negotiation.[405]

The historical success of shuttle diplomacy or proximity talks provide an interesting test for the argument in this dissertation because it seemingly is evidence that under certain conditions it is better for adversaries *not* to meet directly. On the other hand, Kelman's research and subsequent attempts by psychologists to look at face-to-face's humanizing aspects lend support to the notion that even in highly emotional states individuals may benefit from meeting face-to-face. This chapter will attempt to make sense of this puzzle by investigating proximity talks and direct bilateral negotiations that involve actors with high emotional valences. This will help to not only delineate further theoretical scope conditions of the larger theory, but also should help to provide salient practical consideration of the merits of shuttle/proximity/mediated talks versus direct face-to-face interaction between hostile partners.

The case chosen for analysis is the Camp David Accords of 1978 between Israel and Egypt. This case is chosen for a number of reasons. First, while the case has generated vast attention, it still represents a significant puzzle.[406] After years of conflict and four devastating wars, Egypt and Israel came together amid great hostility and seemingly intractable positions to sign a historic peace agreement. From a bargaining perspective, both sides exhibited perplexing behavior. Egypt, for instance, ended up

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[405] Kissinger 1994.
[406] For Camp David bibliographic information see Russell Renka (2010) and Terry Sullivan (2010).

shifting its long-held historical pattern of behavior of backing the Pan-Arabist movement, at tremendous risk of isolating itself from the rest of the Arab world. Similarly, Israel made concessions regarding the Sinai Peninsula that were deemed unlikely prior to the negotiations. How and why these concessions were made on both sides continues to generate significant debate in the academic literature decades later and thus can be informed by the results of this study.[407]

Second, as with the previous cases of German reunification and the Munich agreement, there is rich historical primary evidence available. Diaries and memoirs written contemporaneously to the event by parties on all sides, including those who took part in the negotiations and those who observed, help to provide detail as to what occurred and what each side was thinking throughout the process. As noted in the introductory chapter, from a methodological perspective it is important, when possible, to combine memoirs written after the fact (presumably written in a manner to make the main protagonist look favorable) with texts written at the time of the interactions in order to cross-check and corroborate what is reported.

Third, similar to the Gorbachev-Bush case, there is significant *within case* variation to analyze. As will be demonstrated, at various times through the two-week meeting, Jimmy Carter asked Israeli and Egyptian leadership to meet bilaterally with each other and at other times he mediated the interaction, transforming the negotiation into a multilateral affair. Indeed, as mentioned above, at times the face-to-face

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[407] cf. Lasensky et al. 2005.

interaction between Sadat and Begin was so poor that Carter decided to separate the two. This provides a unique opportunity to compare instances of mediated vs. direct negotiation *within the same case*. This variation extends to the outcome as well. Neither side in the interaction achieved everything they were hoping for, nor did either side successfully prevent conceding important points. This allows us to analyze in fine detail what strategies led to cooperation on certain issues and what strategies led to non-agreement. Relatedly, the negotiations at Camp David were incredibly well-defined, continuous, and in a very real sense isolated from the rest of the world, thus providing a unique opportunity to understand the process of negotiations at the highest levels of government, somewhat removed from day-to-day politics.

Finally, while Camp David is a historical case, many of the same political dynamics are occurring in the present. As mentioned above, a key current policy question for lessening or resolving Middle East conflict is to what extent direct face-to-face interactions should occur between parties who are hostile to each other. If lessons can be drawn from this particular historical case, they may inform policy prescriptions for the present.

Before continuing, it should be noted that volumes have been written about Camp David and its associated effects and ramifications. The vast majority of this literature has investigated the inherently *strategic* nature of the negotiations: the interests of each party, the bargaining strategy and tactics used by each party, the relative power of each side, the historical precedence of various negotiations, the wins,

losses, concessions therein, etc.[408] My interest with the case is slightly different as I am

interested less in the positions of each side and what specific negotiating tactic they

utilized to achieve those interests, and more interested in the effect the *mode* of

interaction had on the negotiations. I will therefore spend less space investigating

positions and interests and more space investigating how each side responded to the

interaction modality. What was each side thinking when negotiating face-to-face versus

the intermediary? Did the individuals believe that they could trust each other? Were the

intentions of the other made clear? These questions will be the focus of this chapter as

we seek to understand what effect face-to-face in particular had on the prospects for

cooperation. I will, however, attempt to address counter-arguments and criticisms of my

approach after making my case.

The Personalities Involved in the Idea for Peace

Background: Thirty Years of Conflict and Diverse Personalities

The Camp David summit was an attempt, initiated and pursued by Jimmy

Carter, to settle conflict in the Middle East that had been present, in modern form, since

the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. The Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949 resulted

in over six hundred thousand Palestinians fleeing Israel and taking residence in refugee

camps in Jordan and the Gaza Strip. This twenty-eight mile strip of land would, over the

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[408] cf. Hare 1984; Powell 1985; Stein 1985; Bercovitch 1986; Quandt 1986; Quandt 1988; Telhami 1990; Kriesberg 1991; Safty 1991; Brams 1996.

next decades, serve as one of the roots of Palestinian resentment and discontent.

Further, surrounding Israel were Arab states that rejected Israel's right to exist: Egypt,

Jordan, and Syria all would become more-or-less permanent enemies of the state of

Israel. In addition to the latent political questions of recognition and border disputes, the

Levant, or large area of to the east of the Mediterranean Sea represents the Holy Land,

with significant religious importance for Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Bahá'í faiths.

Dispute over who should occupy and control portions of the Holy Land resulted in

conflict in the 1960s and 1970s, shaping Carter's perspective on the need for a lasting

peace plan.

A devout Southern Baptist, and well read with respect to the Bible and other

religious documents including Hebrew scripture, Carter viewed the Holy Land in both

political and personal terms.[409] Carter recounts in his memoirs about a memorable trip

to Israel in May 1973 where he first saw the River Jordan:

> All our lives we had read about this river, studied and sung about
> it, so we visualized a mighty current with almost magical
> qualities. We were amazed. In fact, it was not as large as many of
> the tributary creeks that flow into the small rivers of Georgia.[410]

The trip instilled in him a sense of the spectacular nature of the Holy Land and a strong

sympathy for the Zionist movement and cause:

> Like almost all other American Christians, I believed that Jewish
> survivors of the Holocaust deserved their own nation and had a
> right to live peacefully with their neighbors. This homeland for
> the Jews was compatible with the teachings of the Bible. These

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[409] Carter 2009, 13.
[410] Carter 1998, 25.

beliefs gave me an unshakable commitment to the security and peaceful existence of Israel.[411]

Shortly after his trip, in October 1973, the Yom Kippur (or Fourth Arab-Israeli) war erupted between Israel and a coalition of Arab states including Egypt and Syria. In addition to the Middle Eastern states, the United States and Soviet Union found themselves drawn into the engagement and peace was eventually settled after sixteen days of tense standoff. This truce was brought about in part by negotiation efforts by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This period was an important one for Carter as it solidified the extraordinary fragility of Israel and introduced a significant situation he would be inheriting as president. At the same time, however, Carter also exhibited strong sympathies for the Palestinians predicament and cause, often linking the situation to the United States civil rights movement, and Martin Luther King's push for peace and recognition of rights, a decade earlier.[412] Finally, Kissinger's success in pressuring Israel to cede some of the newly captured territories back to Arab states served to warm relations between the U.S. and Egypt.

In addition to the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war leaving an indelible mark on Carter's sensibilities and producing a salient effect on U.S.-Egyptian relations, it also served to increase the world price of oil and slow economic growth. As William Quandt, staff member of the National Security Administration and key negotiator at Camp David notes, the combination of religious imperative and economic imperative

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[411] Carter 2009, 13.
[412] Carter 2006.

meant that progress in the Middle East was to be a priority early in Carter's

presidency.[413] Specifically, Carter understood the need to make progress in the Middle

East before midterm elections in 1978 and second-term campaigning took hold.

Carter began his efforts shortly after his inauguration with two salient meetings,

the first with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the second with Anwar Sadat,

President of Egypt. The former was quite different from the latter in terms of positions

and personalities. It was immediately made clear to Carter the level of distrust and

entrenched positions that existed between the two parties. Carter's diary and subsequent

memoir portrays a rather frigid first meeting with the Israeli President:

> Prime Minister Rabin came over from Israel. I've put in an awful
> lot of time studying the Middle East question and was hoping that
> Rabin would give me some outline of what Israel ultimately
> hopes to see achieved in a permanent peace settlement. I found
> him very timid, very stubborn, and also somewhat ill at ease…
> When he went upstairs with me, just the two of us, I asked him to
> tell me what Israel wanted to do when I met with the Arab
> leaders and If there were something specific, for instance, that I
> could propose to Sadat. He didn't unbend at all, nor did he
> respond. It seems to me that the Israelis, at least Rabin, don't
> trust our government or any of their neighbors. I guess there's
> some justification for this distrust. I've never met any of the Arab
> leaders but am looking forward to seeing if they are more flexible
> than Rabin.[414]

It is not hyperbole to note that this meeting had a profound effect on Carter. In his

memoirs he notes that "[Rabin's] strange reticence caused me to think again about

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[413] Quandt 1986, 30-32.
[414] Carter 1983/1995, 287.

whether we should launch another major effort for peace."[415] Carter came to quickly

realize that the issue of trust was not simply a problem for Israel/Egypt, but

Israel/United States relations as well.

For his part, Sadat was privately put-off by some of Carter's pro-Israel

comments during the election, though the meeting between the two leaders stood in

stark contrast to Rabin's meeting and the two hit it off almost immediately.[416] "There

was an easy and natural friendship between us from the first moment… It soon become

apparent that he was charming and frank, and also a very strong and courageous leader .

. . extraordinarily inclined toward boldness."[417] Sadat later in his life would remark that

Jimmy Carter "is my very best friend on earth"[418] and their first meeting remained in

Sadat's consciousness as a positive experience. As David Reynolds points out, however,

it would be a mistake to take Sadat's display of affection toward Carter too far, as he

was prone to similar displays of affections with other leaders. In January 1974, for

instance, Sadat kissed Henry Kissinger and declared: "You are not only my friend, you

are my brother."[419] Nevertheless, the positive personal connection between Sadat and

Carter stood in stark contrast to that of Carter and Rabin.

The significance of these personality characteristics is that they convinced

Carter that the potential for Middle East peace was real. Although Carter found little to

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[415] Ibid.
[416] Rosenbaum and Ugrinsky 1994.
[417] Carter 1983/1995, 289.
[418] Reynolds 2007, 291.
[419] Hirst and Beeson 1981, 51.

work on with respect to Rabin, Carter was undoubtedly encouraged by the frank and collaborative approach of Sadat. Reflecting on their initial meeting, Carter notes that he was able to push "him hard on [Carter's] ultimate goals: Israeli use of the Suez Canal, his diplomatic recognition of Israel, and exchange of ambassadors – and he finally agreed that these goals might be possible 'after five years of peace.'"[420] Carter reflects that the day he met Sadat was, up to that point, his "best day as president" as it provided an impetus for attempting a peace settlement.[421]

This enthusiasm would be short lived, however. Shortly after Sadat's visit to Washington the personalities that would be involved in Carter's peace process plan changed markedly. Rabin announced that he would be leaving office by not seeking reelection. In addition, to the surprise of many analysts, the *Likud* (Unity) party, one of center-right political disposition, gained control from the Labour Party, which had been in office since the country's political inception in 1948. This *Mahapakh,* or "upheaval," placed the head of the party, Menachem Begin, into power. Begin, the former leader to the militant Zionist organization *Irgun*, whose mandate was a form of revisionist Zionism based on the writings of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, maintained conservative views with respect to the Holy Land. "The policy of [Irgun] was based squarely on Jabotinsky's teachings: every Jew had the right to enter Palestine; only active retaliation would deter the Arabs; only Jewish armed force would ensure the Jewish state."[422]

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[420] Carter 2009, 29.
[421] Ibid, 30.
[422] Sachar 1976/2007, 265-266.

Carter's reaction to the election was similar to many in the United States. "Israeli citizens, the American Jewish community, and I were shocked. None of us knew what to expect."[423] The problem for Carter and the United States was that while Rabin was not the most forthcoming with respect to concessions or ideas for the peace process, nor was he particularly amenable to Carter from a personality or trust perspective, Begin was known mostly as "a radical firebrand," who was best known perhaps for "previously [being] named by the British as one of the most notorious terrorists in the region after a bombing by his organization in 1946 killed almost a hundred people in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem."[424] Perhaps most important, Begin was an outspoken critic of the idea of Israel giving up any gains it had made in the 1967 war. "In short, he rejected the principle of trading 'land for peace' on which both UN Security Council Resolution 242 and Carter's diplomacy were based."[425] This introduction of a new leader worried Carter and introduced pessimism that a framework for peace could be constructed.

Despite the inauspicious background of Begin and the tension it engendered among Carter's administration with respect to the prospects for negotiation and peace, the Prime Minister's personal visit to Washington belied the tough public exterior he projected. Prior to Begin's visit, Carter described his feelings in his diary: "It was frightening to watch his adamant position on issues that must be resolved if a Middle

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[423] Carter 1983/1995, 292.
[424] Carter 2009, 30.
[425] Reynolds 2007, 292.

Eastern settlement is going to be realized."[426] Carter found a more open and

accommodating Begin in Washington when the two finally met face-to-face. From his

diary notes Carter penned, "There have been dire predictions that he and I would not get

along, but I found him to be quite congenial, dedicated, sincere, deeply religious. . . I

think Begin is a very good man and, although it will be difficult for him to change his

position, the public-opinion polls that we have from Israel show that the people are

quite flexible. . . and genuinely want peace."[427] His final diary note on the subject

suggested optimism: "My own guess is that if we give Begin support, he will prove to

be a strong leader, quite different from Rabin."[428] Carter needed the perceptual

assurance that both Sadat and Begin would be accommodating of a peace process.

Receiving this assurance, obtained largely through reading the personality of the other

through their various visits to Washington, allowed the Carter administration to shift

focus to the political problems that would need to be addressed before face-to-face

negotiations could occur.

Leading to Face-to-Face: The Political Idea for Camp David

While Carter was heartened by the personalities he would need to negotiate with

in the Middle East, and believed that they could provide the impetus for real change,

most of 1977 resulted in little headway. In March, Carter dealt with fallout from a

speech where he highlighted at least two prerequisites of lasting peace: recognition of

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[426] Carter 1983/1995, 284.
[427] Carter 1983/1995, 297.
[428] Ibid.

Israel's right to exist and "a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who had suffered for many, many years."[429] Carter was the first American president to make a commitment to a Palestinian state and the response from Jewish-Americans and Israelis was strong. In a memo written by Hamilton Jordan, one of Carter's assistants, Hamilton warned that such statements regarding a Palestinian state were difficult because there was "no political counterforce" to the political pressure that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) could mount. Indeed as David Reynolds points out, in 1977 AIPAC represented "an effective veto in the upper house," given the number of seats it has influence over in the Senate.

Despite this early lesson in the need to soften rhetoric regarding the Israel/Palestine situation, Carter's administration envisioned a large regional settlement involving Israel, Palestinian leadership, and Egypt, backed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R, the two superpowers. While Carter read Begin and Sadat's willingness to talk correctly, the notion of bringing together all of the relevant parties quickly hit a roadblock. While Begin might be willing to listen to Carter, he had no inclination to negotiation with anyone in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which maintained that Israel did not have a right to exist. Similarly, Sadat and Hussein of Jordan and President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria had little use for each other. Sadat's enthusiasm for a Middle East summit was generally quite low and preferred that the United States pressure Israel

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[429] Carter Speech in Clinton, MA: March 16, 1977.

directly rather than multi-laterally.[430] Sensing that the prospects for a summit were

dwindling quickly, Carter used his friendship with Sadat for personal appeal. On

October 21 Carter sent Sadat a handwritten note with "a very personal appeal for [his]

support."[431] While Sadat did not respond immediately in a way favorable to the U.S. (he

recommended an unrealistic meeting of UN Security Council leadership in Jerusalem),

he would soon strengthen the idea of a potential summit in November in historic

fashion.

     On November 9 Sadat gave a speech to the Egyptian parliament where he noted

that he would "go to the ends of the earth for peace… to the Knesset itself." This salient

statement was incredibly important in reinvigorating the peace process and, in a very

real sense, positively answered Carter's plea for help. By stating that Sadat would travel

to Israel to talk about peace, it signaled a credible commitment to progress. This

commitment was credible because it was politically costly for Sadat to make such

statements that stood in stark contrast to public opinion vastly throughout the Arab

world.[432] The idea that an Egyptian leader should travel to Israel to speak in front of the

Knesset was an unpopular one. Nevertheless the visit to Israel later that month set the

peace process forward. In his address Sadat noted the mutual distrust and suspicion that

kept Israel and the Arab world apart:

> Yet, there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a
> psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier

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[430] Reynolds 2007, 297.
[431] Quandt, 1986, 139-145).
[432] Quandt 1986, 146.

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of rejection; a barrier of fear, or deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action, deed or decision. A barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is this psychological barrier that I described in official statements as constituting 70 percent of the whole problem.[433]

Sadat was making a clear argument. While part of the barricade between Israel and Egypt was based on political positions, another significant barricade was psychological. Suspicion, mistrust, fear, etc. would need to be overcome in order to obtain lasting peace. Resolving political differences would only be effective, according to Sadat, if each side could trust that the other would follow through and were acting in good faith. It is important to note that this was not simply a case of framing the issue; as Sadat's Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel noted, Sadat really believed that the trip to Jerusalem and eventually the Camp David summit would help to "remove suspicions and psychological barriers."[434] Breaking down the barrier of mistrust, suspicion, deception and distortion would undoubtedly be difficult, and some might argue impossible. Yet, advisors in Carter's administration and Carter himself eyed a mechanism for transcending this psychological barrier: face-to-face talks.

The idea for face-to-face meetings between Sadat and Begin was rooted in the lack of political progress following Sadat's speech in Jerusalem. Three months after the visit there had been little political movement and the Begin-Sadat relationship was deteriorating as both sides retrenched into familiar positions with no compromise.

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[433] Sadat speech in Jerusalem: November 29, 1977.
[434] Kamel 1986, 282.

Further, neither side was living up to commitments they had made earlier. "The Israelis were not honoring the commitment Dayan had given me about their settlement policy, but were building up those enclaves in the occupied territories as rapidly as possible."[435] Similarly Sadat was threatening to "renounce the talks with Israel because of his growing embarrassment and frustration" with the entire process.[436] In order to save what remained of good spirit following Sadat's visit, Carter proposed to his administration bringing Sadat and Begin together in order to induce agreement. Carter envisioned crafting a rough "American plan" that was as comprehensive as possible and use the face-to-face meetings in order to find compromise between the two individuals based on the American framework.[437] Ideally, the psychological barrier of mistrust would be broken with Carter playing a mediation role. In addition, Carter believed that bringing Sadat and Begin together to meet face-to-face would have a positive effect on the two understanding each other's intentions.[438]

The plan was not particularly popular. "My advisers feared that such a meeting would fail, with dire consequences for the United States and the Middle East."[439] While Henry Kissinger agreed with Carter's analysis and approach of face-to-face talks, he "cautioned against coming back from Camp David with any indication of substantial agreement between Sadat and [Carter], because that would put the Israelis on the

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[435] Carter 1983/1995, 312.
[436] Ibid, 313.
[437] Carter 2009, 34.
[438] Rosenbaum and Urginsky 1994.
[439] Carter 2009, 34.

defensive."[440] Advisers warned that if the meeting took place and progress was not made, the consequences might be worse than not having the meeting at all. Trying and failing, in other words, would be worse than not trying as it would signify that even with superpower mediation a peace agreement was not possible. This was particularly true given Carter's weak favorability ratings. At the time Carter had a 61 percent negative rating in the Harris Polls, while his strong approval rating was limited to 11 percent.[441]

In addition, there was considerable skepticism among the Carter contingent about the focusing on psychological aspects of trust and intention understanding. William Quandt notes that upon hearing Carter's plan for bringing the two individuals together to work out differences, he had a negative reaction. "Oh my goodness. We're here for group therapy. What are we doing?"[442] While the group therapy idea might make for a good speech in front of the Knesset, clearly not everyone agreed that it was practical, achievable, or worth trying at all.

Interestingly, while some in the Carter camp doubted the strategy, there is indication that even before Carter mentioned the idea of a Camp David Summit to Begin, Israel believed that face-to-face interactions might be worthwhile, though the role the United States would play should be fairly minimized. Moshe Dayan, Israel's Foreign Minister at the time, notes that Israeli leadership was seeking "direct face-to-

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[440] Carter 1983/1995, 313.
[441] Glad 1980, 443.
[442] Rosenbaum and Ugrinsky 1994, 162; Quandt 1986, 206.

face negotiations [with Egypt], without intermediaries, and under no foreign patronage.[443] As Shibley Telhami argues, this was a strategic move to reduce the leverage of the Arab states; rather than bargaining with a collective Arab contingent, Israel reasoned that their interests would be better served through individual bilateral negotiations.[444] In addition, Israel perceived the United States' interests more closely aligned with Egypt. As Ezer Wizman put it, "My objections to excessive American involvement in the negotiations with Egypt stemmed from a simple consideration: I foresaw that U.S. interests law closer to Egypt's than to ours, so that it would not be long before Israeli negotiators would have to cope with the dual confrontation as they faced a Washington/Cairo axis."[445] For Sadat's part, there is little evidence to suggest that he was interested in face-to-face direct meetings with Begin, particularly after his visit to Jerusalem had not been met, in his view, with significant progress on the Israeli side. As Carter noted from one of his meetings with Sadat, Sadat was "bitter" and "disillusioned" with Begin's position; "Sadat was convinced that Begin did not want peace."[446]

Finally, after a significant period of no progress in the region in late 1977 and early 1978, war was beginning to look likely. In March, 1978 Israeli soldiers crossed the Lebanese border in Operation Litani, aimed at eradicating what Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman referred to as "terrorist concentrations in Southern Lebanon."

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[443] Dayan 1981, 102.
[444] Telhami 1992, 3.
[445] Weizman 1981, 87-88.
[446] Carter 1983/1995, 315.

Sadat intimated wide-spread conflict in the Middle East would soon develop. Despite

pressure from Congressional Democrats to not pursue the idea of face-to-face talks,

Carter decided to attempt to break the cycle of heated rhetoric and intimation of

violence:

> There was no prospect for success if Begin and Sadat stayed apart, and their infrequent meetings had now become fruitless because the two men were too personally incompatible to compromise on the many difficult issues facing them. I finally decided it would be best win or lose, to go all out. There was only one thing to do, as dismal and unpleasant as the prospect seemed – I would try to bring Sadat and Begin together for an extensive negotiating session with me.[447]

The Camp David face-to-face talks would ultimately affect the Middle East peace

process in a definitive way, regardless of the result. Success would mean that at least for

the short-term peace would reign. Failure might mean renewed war, oil embargos, and

significant consequences for the United States.

As Carter told his advisors before the conference began, the emphasis would

have to be resolving trust issues and misunderstandings. And the timeline would have to

be relatively quick. "Let me tell you what's going to happen at Camp David. I've

invited Sadat and Begin here to overcome a real problem, and that is the fact they don't

trust one another, and they don't see the good point in each other's position… I think I

can bring them to understand each other's positions better. My intention is to meet with

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[447] Carter 1983/1995, 316.

them for a couple of days, try to work through the misunderstanding, and within a very few days – two or three at the most, we will reach agreement on broad principles."[448]

Camp David, 1978: Begin, Carter and Sadat Face-to-Face

Face-to-Face Interactions at Camp David: The Early Discussions

There are a number of characteristics of Camp David and the summit design that are noteworthy as they had a material effect on the face-to-face interactions. First, in order to ensure that neither the Egyptians nor Israelis were speaking for a broader audience or grandstanding instead of focusing on each other, Carter decided to minimize access for the press:

> I felt that in going to Camp David we would be burning our bridges, that the meeting was an all-or-nothing gamble, and that what the press might report during the negotiating session was no longer important to me. It was imperative that there be a minimum of posturing by Egyptians or Israelis, and an absence of public statements, which would become frozen positions that could not subsequently be changed.[449]

This largely removed the "public" element from the negotiations. The U.S. press secretary Jody Powell would provide daily updates, but the negotiations themselves would take place in private.[450]

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[448] Rosenbaum and Urginsky 1994, 162 (my emphasis).
[449] Carter 1983/1995, 318.
[450] Powell 1984.

In addition, Carter sought to ensure that the meetings were kept informal. Unlike some other summits, Camp David would be bereft of protocols for speaking, meetings, seating at meals, and especially dress. President Carter led by example in this regard by donning blue jeans. Moshe Dayan reciprocated with khaki pants ("Since I was neither a President nor an American, I possessed no jeans"),[451] though the Egyptian delegation remained relatively formal.[452] In keeping with the notion of building trust, Carter viewed his role "as a bridge between the other two camps and tried to ease tensions and make everyone feel at home."[453]

Finally, the cabins that each of the leaders stayed in were chosen on a proximity basis, such that informal meetings and face-to-face interactions would be relatively easy. As will be discussed below, many of the salient interactions that occurred at Camp David resulted from ad-hoc moments where Carter visited a neighboring cabin to discuss issues. As Betty Glad argues, the camp arrangement allowed for individual meetings as they were required. Rather than having to deliver messages through formal means that would have harmed the negotiations process, the leaders were able to meet with each other informally to talk.[454]

The aims of the meetings, at least from the perspective of the Carter administration, echoed this relaxed approach to atmosphere. While a comprehensive peace plan would be ideal, transcending the psychological barrier would be most

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[451] Dayan 1981, 155.
[452] Carter 1983/1995, 330-339.
[453] Ibid,
[454] Glad 2009, 146.

important. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, noted in a memo to the President: "Our main objective at Camp David is to break the present impasse at the highest political level so that ministerial-level negotiations can proceed towards detailed agreements. Our objective is not to achieve a detailed agreement." Carter had more ambitious goals. "We had already risked the possibility of total failure and great embarrassment. We could not lose much more by aiming at success."[455]

The summit began on Tuesday, September 5, 1978 with Sadat's delegation arriving first. Almost immediately upon arrival Sadat and Carter began substantive discussions. "[Sadat] emphasized that he was eager to conclude a total settlement of the issues, and not merely establish procedures for future negotiations. He was convinced that Begin did not want an agreement and would try to delay progress as much as possible."[456] Sadat further noted that he was prepared to be flexible on all issues except for land and sovereignty. His bottom line was quite clear: Israelis must be prepared to leave Egyptian territories and any agreement must have provisions for the Palestinians and West Bank. Carter delayed proposing anything substantive until he had a chance to speak with Begin, but expressed positivity and hope for the negotiations that were to ensue.

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[455] Carter 1983/1995, 320-321; see also Quandt 1986, 218.
[456] Carter 1983/1995, 336.

Menachem Begin and his delegation arrived two hours later. Unlike the previous interaction with Sadat, Carter noted that he and Begin were "somewhat ill at ease."[457] Contributing to this perhaps was Begin's emphasis on formality:

> I had wanted to generate an atmosphere of informality from the beginning, but in his attitude and words, Begin approached the initiation of talks in a very thorough and methodical way. His questions were not about substance; he was concerned about the daily schedule, the procedures to be followed, the time and place of meetings, how a record of the proceedings would be kept, how many aides would be permitted on each side, and so forth… I responded that my preference was to meet privately and separately with him and Sadat first, and then the three of us could decide how best to proceed. He seemed reluctant about his kind of session with principals only, and was eager to have us meet with at least two advisers each, referring to this as a "three-three-three meeting."[458]

Later the evening of the first night Carter met with Begin again and made a plea for giving Sadat a chance in a more intimate setting than three-three-three. "I spelled out to Begin the advantages of a good rapport between him and Sadat during the days ahead. I believed that as they got to know each other, it would be easier for them to exchange ideas without rancor or distrust."[459] While reluctant, Begin eventually agreed to consider the proposition of direct face-to-face talks.

Carter's optimism for a good rapport and building trust between Sadat and Begin was dealt a significant blow on the second day prior the first tripartite meeting between leaders. Carter visited Sadat to set the stage for the meeting and Sadat relayed

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[457] Carter 1983/1995, 336.
[458] Carter 1983/1995, 337.
[459] Carter 1982, 340.

the position he would bring to Begin. While "[Sadat] promised to go to extremes in being flexible," he also noted that "if our efforts at Camp David should be unsuccessful, then when the equitable Egyptian proposal were made known, they would bring the condemnation of the world on the Israeli leader.[460] The proposal that Sadat had formulated was one of extreme positions and shocking to Carter. Dismantling of settlements, banning nuclear weapons, transferring authority in the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan and Egypt, etc. were all included in the demands. No one in the room would believe that this was a serious proposal aimed at specific actions to be taken. Rather, it read more as an airing of grievances.

If this proposal were to be presented to Begin as written, it would clearly set back discussion rather than propel them forward. As Quandt put it, "Carter realized that Begin would violently reject almost all of the Egyptian document."[461] Nevertheless, Sadat assured Carter of his flexibility and supported the strategy by providing Carter with a three-page list of concessions that Sadat was willing to make. Put simply, Sadat was "showing his cards" before the discussions with Begin had even begun. Sadat's strategy seemed to be to confront Begin with extreme demands all the while using the United States as a broker for compromise. Extreme demands would hopefully result in a favorable compromise for Egypt. Sadat's strategy exposed the disjuncture in aims between Sadat and Carter. Whereas Carter hoped to build trust and overcome misunderstanding, Sadat was focused on political positions and negotiating strategy.

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[460] Carter 1983/1995, 346.
[461] Quandt 1996, 222.

The first meeting between the three parties took place on day two in the

afternoon. Begin arrived first and Carter immediately warned that Sadat would propose

an aggressive proposal and asked Begin not to overreact. Interestingly, it was Sadat who

expressed signs of discomfort as he read his framework. From Carter's notes, "I noted

that Sadat was strangely ill at ease, uncharacteristically fumbling for words and

repeating himself several times."[462] We know from Sadat's discussions with Carter that

Sadat was being deceptive about Egypt's intentions. These positions did not represent

realistic groundwork to build from, but rather represented a negotiating strategy.

Recalling Paul Ekman's work from previous chapters, it is interesting to note that Sadat

was illustrating some of the visible signs of a liar, including repeating of words,

fumbling for words, etc. This will be discussed further below, but it is worth noting here

that Begin left the meeting unclear about Sadat's intentions. Sadat had read his positions

from a piece of paper, but Begin was not convinced that these were his true intentions.

As Moshe Dayan notes after speaking to Begin following the meeting:

> We broke up our meeting with Begin without being certain of
> Egyptian intention. Was their proposal really submitted as
> material for negotiation, in the knowledge that they would have
> to climb down later and change most of its clauses? Or were they
> intending to make it public in order to show the Arab rejectionist
> States that Egypt had herself taken the very aggressive and
> extreme position they themselves held.[463]

It is possible that Sadat's fumbling and repetition belied his true intentions. Or,

alternately, perhaps the positions were so extreme that no one would assume that they

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[462] Carter 1983/1995, 352.
[463] Dayan 1981, 162.

were legitimate. In either case, the Israelis were left somewhat confused. If the goal of the talks had been to *reduce* misunderstanding, the initial meeting had not been a productive one.

Carter's role in the first direct talks meeting was relatively limited. "I decided to play a minimal role during these first sessions, so that the two leaders could be come better acquainted and have a more fruitful exchange."[464] Congruent with the notion that the most important activity that could occur was the building of trust between Sadat and Begin, Carter took a backseat in order to give that process time to develop. In addition, Carter could recite the positions of both sides and what they would say "in [his] sleep."[465] It was more important for Sadat and Begin to work together than it was for Carter to mediate at this point. The meeting ended lightheartedly and while the substance of the positions may have been disappointing to Carter and Begin, it seemed as if both Begin and Sadat could at least work together in a face-to-face environment.

From the very first meetings each side used the face-to-face interaction to read the intentions of the others. In addition to Carter's interpretation of Sadat's fumbling for words and being at unease, Moshe Dayan notes that Begin similarly paid attention to facial expressions and clues regarding intentions. "While arguing with Sadat… [Begin] took careful note of the remarks – and facial expression – of Carter to try to discern which points he supported and which he opposed."[466] Begin would later use this data to,

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[464] Carter 1983/1995, 350.
[465] Ibid.
[466] Dayan 1981, 163.

in Dayan's words, "detect [Carter's] pattern of thinking on some of the subjects."[467] The most significant subject for Begin was Carter's claim that if Begin proposed a Knesset motion to remove Israeli settlements in Sinai that it would be passed. Dayan notes that even though Begin analytically disagreed with Carter, it did worry him.[468]

The second meeting the following day was far less collegial. Having had time to review Sadat's proposal in detail, Begin was, as Carter recounts, "irate."[469] In a breakfast meeting between Begin and Carter, Begin responded to Sadat's proposal: "This smacks of a victorious state dictating peace to the defeated! This document is not a proper basis for negotiations."[470] With this serving as the emotional background, Carter chose to have Sadat and Begin converse with minimal interruptions. Carter situated the two leaders directly across from each other, facing each other across Carter's desk. Begin began his rebuttal of Sadat's proposal from the day before and the atmosphere was collegial until Begin derided the notion of Israel's "paying reparations for the use of the occupied lands."[471] Sadat became incensed and the two began arguing over which state had conquered whom. Carter diffused the situation by convincing both that neither were defeated nations and negotiations should continue. When questions of territory were raised, heated arguments resumed. Sadat at one point leaned forward and pointed directly at Begin shouting: "Premier Begin, you want land!" As Carter recounts:

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[467] Dayan 1981, 163-164.
[468] Dayan 1981, 164.
[469] Carter 1983/1995, 354.
[470] Ibid.
[471] Ibid.

> All restraint was now gone. Their faces were flushed, and the
> niceties of diplomatic language and protocol were stripped away.
> They had almost forgotten that I was there, and there was nothing
> to distract me from recording this fascinating debate… It was
> mean. They were brutal to each other… personal.[472]

The argument that ensued moved on to the West Bank and Lebanon. Eventually, later in the session, Sadat summed up his point of view succinctly: "Minimum confidence does not exist anymore since Premier Begin has acted in bad faith."[473] Sadat presumably referring here to his trip to Jerusalem, was insinuating that previous progress on confidence building and breaking down the psychological barrier has been materially affected. And it all occurred as Sadat and Begin were looking each other in the eye.

"I did not know where to go from there," Carter would later confess in his memoirs.[474] The idea of bringing Sadat and Begin together face-to-face in order to transcend psychological barriers had clearly not worked as he had hoped. While there had been moments of inspiration and signs of the potential for progress, the talks were going extremely poorly and both sides were moving toward the exit, both figuratively and literally. Toward the end of a negotiating session on Day 3, it looked as if the talks would come to an end:

> [Begin and Sadat] were moving toward the door, but I got in
> front of them to partially block the way. I urged them not to break
> off their talks, to give me another chance to use my influence and
> analysis, to have confidence in me. Begin agreed readily. I

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[472] Carter 1983/1995, 359.
[473] Ibid, 360.
[474] Carter 1983/1995, 363.

While neither side knew it at the time, this would be the last time the two leaders would

meet each other for a face-to-face meeting during the summit.

From Direct Talks to Shuttle Diplomacy

The result of this breakdown was a change in strategy. With word leaking that

the talks were on the brink of failure and both Sadat and Begin ready to leave, Carter

switched gears by placing himself in the center of the negotiations. The Americans

would put together a draft document and Carter would pursue mediated "shuttle" or

"proxy" negotiations, serving as the intermediary. This would involve Carter interacting

with Begin and Sadat independently and conveying to each other the ideas and

intentions of the other. Facet-to-face talks would continue, but the actors involved in the

interactions would change. Rather than Sadat and Begin interacting face-to-face, Carter-

Begin and Carter-Sadat would interact. This changed the dynamics in several ways.

First, while Sadat and Begin would be integral to the process, shuttling between camps

allowed Carter some flexibility in who he dealt with and when. On the Egyptian side,

for instance, Carter found that dealing with Sadat directly was often easier than

involving his aides. With Israel, the opposite held true; Carter would bring in Moshe

Dayan and Ezer Weizman as a way of balancing Begin's rigidity with flexibility.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, shuttle diplomacy allowed Carter to set a

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[475] Carter 1983/1995, 367.

specific agenda with each meeting he had with the various leaders. Rather than a spiraling argument that would encompass everything from territory to disagreements about history, Carter could seek agreement on smaller, specific issues as a way of building momentum, and hopefully, consensus on a shared plan for peace.

Over the next few days Carter had multiple meetings with the two delegations as well as face-to-face meetings with Sadat and Begin separately. Each team worked with Carter on finding flexibility in positions and areas for potential agreement, though the challenges were formidable. As Carter notes, "A sense of gloom and foreboding still prevailed, and my personal notes indicate how anxious I was."[476] The American delegation's draft was being held up at every turn. The Israelis often debated the meaning of words such as "sovereignty" and "autonomy," resorting to the dictionary in order to settle disputes. While Sadat had given Carter his bottom line up front, Begin's bottom line was still something of a mystery. Since they were haggling over nearly every point in the document, it was difficult to discern priorities.[477] In an effort to placate the Israelis, many of the most contentious issues including the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, were left out of the discussions. This kept Israel engaged, but it severely disappointed the Egyptian delegation, which believed that agreement on the above issues would be central to any peace plan.

Viewing the likelihood of agreement on the contentious issues as quite low, Sadat's Foreign Minister Kamel urged Sadat to leave Camp David and suspend the

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[476] Carter 1983/1995, 373.
[477] Carter 1983/1995, 375-379.

summit. Kamel argued that if agreement could not be reached with Israel on these major

issues, they would be better off negotiating with other Arab states instead. Kamel's idea

was to bring King Hussein and the Saudis into the discussions and possibly form a

unified allied block. After a particularly heated argument with Dayan, Sadat's

delegation requested a helicopter and Sadat began packing his things:

> It was a terrible moment. Now, even my hopes for a harmonious
> departure were gone. I sat quietly and assessed the significance of
> this development – a rupture between Sadat and me, and its
> consequences for my country and for the Middle East power
> balance. I envisioned the ultimate alliance of most of the Arab
> nations to the Soviet Union, perhaps joined by Egypt after a few
> months had passed.[478]

Carter's advisors had seemingly been correct. The threat of no agreement was

beginning to look worse than not having the summit at all. While Carter momentarily

did want to give up and simply announce that the talks had failed, he resorted to one last

face-to-face encounter with Sadat in an attempt to change his mind.

Carter approached Sadat, who was standing on the porch of his cabin. Sadat

explained to Carter that Dayan had said that Israel would not sign any agreement and

this infuriated him. Carter listened closely and then laid out the possible repercussions

of walking away at the present:

> I explained to him the extremely serious consequences of his
> unilaterally breaking off negotiation: that his action would harm
> the relationship between Egypt and the United States, he would
> be violating his personal promise to me, and the onus for failure
> would be on him. I described the possible future progress of

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[478] Carter 1983/1995, 401.

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> Egypt's friendships and alliances – from us to the moderate and
> then radical Arabs, thence to the Soviet Union. I told him it
> would damage one of my most precious possessions – his
> friendship and our mutual trust… I told Sadat that he simply had
> to stick with me for another day or two after which, if
> circumstances did not improve, all of us simultaneously would
> take the action he was now planning.[479]

Whether it was because Sadat viewed Carter's words as a political threat or a personal

appeal (see below), he agreed to stay on one condition: if the Americans and Egyptians

made agreement, any Egyptian concessions could not be then used for Israel's benefit as

the basis for future negotiations. The Egyptian team was concerned that the Israeli team

would not sign any agreement and if negotiations were to resume in the future, the

Israelis could use what was discussed at Camp David as a new starting point. "The

Egyptians have already agreed to all these points. Now we will use what they have

signed as the original basis for future negotiations."[480] Sadat read from Carter, and later

noted in his memoir, that he could trust Carter to not use Egypt's concessions against

them. Sadat's reply to Carter renewed the process with hope: "If you give me this

statement, I will stick with you to the end."[481] Indeed, as Sadat told his aides, Carter is

"a great man" who had "solved the problem with the greatest of ease . . . I shall sign

anything proposed by President Carter without reading it."[482] The face-to-face

encounter between Carter and Sadat had saved the day for two reasons. First, Sadat

clearly cared about Egypt's relationship with the United States. Arguably this was

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[479] Ibid.
[480] Carter 1982, 393.
[481] Ibid.
[482] Quoted in Safty 1992, 83.

Sadat's *main* interest, ensuring a good relationship with Carter was perhaps even more important than arriving at a peace agreement with Begin. Second, the face-to-face personal appeal by Carter was successful because Sadat trusted what was said in the encounter. Looking Carter in the eye Sadat believed Carter's intention of not holding Egypt to what was said at Camp David in the event of a breakdown in negotiations. Put simply, a lack of trust has been transcended, at least temporarily.

Reaching Agreement

Unsure of what would happen with the remaining days of the summit, Carter and his team began to prepare for the possibility of failure. The President asked William Quandt to draft what would be known as the "failure speech." The speech would indicate that progress had been made but two key issues still needed to be resolved: Begin's unwillingness to give up settlements in Sinai and refusal by the Israelis to agree that future negotiations with respect to the West Bank and Gaza would require Israeli withdrawal, per UN Resolution 242.[483] Carter would ask the American polity for understanding and patience as the process would move forward slowly but necessarily if peace was to be achieved.

What Carter and his team did not know at the time, but would be revealed only later, is that the Israeli delegation had been authorized to concede the Sinai settlement issue:

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[483] Quandt 1986, 240.

> Unbeknownst to the Americans, members of the Israeli team had arranged to have the hawkish minister of agriculture, Ariel Sharon, telephone Begin to say he would agree to give up the settlements if that was the price for peace with Egypt.[484]

It is perhaps for this reason why Begin's position seemingly changed overnight. On September 16, Saturday, Carter was engaged with Begin, Dayan, and Barak in a final attempt to gain agreement on the American draft that had been reviewed and discussed for days. Carter's hope was that by going through the entire document it would make clear to the Israelis that they agreed with the Egyptians on more than they thought and what separated the two was a small number of issues. Begin pushed for an agreement on Sinai in which the parties would continue negotiating for a peace treaty for three months. If, after that time, they were successful he would address the Knesset about withdrawing settlements. This is a position that Sadat had refused to accept since the beginning. After much discussion, Begin finally agreed to turn the question over to the Knesset for a vote over removing the Sinai settlements. This offer was contingent upon settling all other Sinai issues, such as airfields in the region. Begin essentially had conceded on the issue and with that laid the groundwork for agreement. As Carter noted in this diary: "Breakthrough!"[485]

The next day proved to be the final day of the summit. It began with Carter reviewing with Sadat the agreement he had worked out with the Israelis the night before. While Sadat was happy with the settlement issue, a new problem emerged with

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[484] Quandt 1986, 241.
[485] Carter 1982, 405.

respect to the exchange of letters each side would send to each other. Israel was not happy with the language in the United States' letter regarding the status of East Jerusalem. The American letter reaffirmed its long-articulated position that East Jerusalem was not lawful Israeli territory. After much discussion the Americans agreed to state in the letter that it was reaffirming its previous position without stating what it actually was. Finally, after resolving some language regarding the Knesset vote and when it would commence, the Big 3 principals were ready to meet to agree to the modified document.

In the evening of Sunday, September 17, Begin visited Sadat at his lodge, discussed the agreement the two had reached, and shook hands. Shortly thereafter Sadat returned Begin's visit and the two drank to each other's health.[486] That night Carter, Begin, and Sadat flew back to Washington for a formal signing ceremony. In front of over two hundred guests, including diplomats, ambassadors, cabinet members, and Congressmen, the three signed the documents and toasts were made. Not everyone was pleased. Egypt's Foreign Minister, Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel did not attend the ceremony as he had previously urged Sadat not to sign the accords. Kamel argued privately with Sadat that any agreement with Israel that did not include a commitment to withdraw from the West Bank would be viewed unfavorably by Egypt's Arab neighbors. Kamel therefore urged Sadat to not sign the agreement and return home to

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[486] Weizman 1981, 377.

consult with Arab state allies.[487] Nevertheless, Sadat's goal that he espoused in

Jerusalem, tearing down psychological barriers of mistrust and fear had, at least for the

moment, seemingly been achieved. As Edward Walker, Jr, argues, this moment was one

of "inflated expectations" regarding their peace accord:[488]

> Sadat thought that the Israelis would take his concerns and
> interests into account after he had made such a bold opening and
> destroyed Egypt's leadership position in the Arab world. He was
> wrong. Israel's dealings with Lebanon, Hizbullah, and the
> Palestinians have nothing to do with Egypt and never will. But
> Israel too had inflated expectations of peace. When I was in
> Cairo in the mid-90s the Israeli Ambassador was constantly
> frustrated by his inability to warm up the relationship. Israelis
> had expected that peace would bring acceptance and normal
> friendly relations, not the cold peace they got. If there ever had
> been the hope of a warm peace, however, it was refrigerated in
> the follow up to Camp David and the autonomy experience, and
> it was put in the freezer when Israel invaded Lebanon.[489]

For the moment, however, the three heads of government were able to take refuge in the

notion that they had accomplished what many previous had viewed as, at best unlikely,

and at worst, impossible.

Assessing the Face-to-Face Interactions

<u>Before Camp David</u>

In assessing the face-to-face diplomacy that may have contributed to the peace

agreement, it is important to recall the central place of salient face-to-face meetings

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[487] Kamel 1986, 364-365.
[488] Walker 2009, 12.
[489] Ibid.

before anyone arrived at Camp David. First, Carter's first meeting with Rabin in Washington allowed Carter to gain an understanding that Rabin had the specific intention *not* to bend on important questions that would require bending if the negotiations were to be successful. This caused Carter to doubt whether even attempting a negotiation was a good idea. Carter changes his mind about the prospects for negotiation only after meeting Sadat face-to-face and reading his intentions of bold new thinking.

Thus there is some evidence to suggest that without face-to-face interaction the idea for Camp David itself may have never germinated. It was only through the personal connection with Sadat and understanding that Sadat had intentions to negotiate in good faith (and would bend if necessary) that spurred the idea of formal negotiations. It is unclear whether an interaction with Sadat in another modality, such as a written letter, would have produced as powerful of an understanding in Carter.

Direct Talks vs. Proximity Talks

The Camp David talks themselves exhibit two distinct structures of face-to-face interaction over the course of the fortnight. First, during the early discussions, Carter brought the "Big 3" together in hopes that the three could build trust and transcend the psychological barrier that Sadat noted in Jerusalem. When these talks began to breakdown, dissolving into emotional outbursts and arguments over history, and were not as fruitful as Carter had hoped, he switched strategies and separated the leaders. While Sadat and Begin did not meet each other face-to-face until the very end of the

summit, they would have iterative face-to-face interactions with Carter who served as the intermediary. It was this intermediated negotiation combined with the final face-to-face meeting that resulted in agreement. Therefore in assessing the effect of face-to-face at Camp David there is within case variation that needs to be explained: why did face-to-face interaction among the Big 3 fail to produce cooperation but mediated proximity talks were successful? A number of points stand out.

One way scholars have attempted to explain this puzzle of "failure early, success late" is through timing. Put simply, assuming both parties want to find agreement (that is, their alternative to a negotiated agreement is less desirable than an agreement would be), the closer a negotiation comes to stalemate the more amenable each party often becomes to proposals. William Zartman has coined the term "ripeness" to refer to this effect.[490] From this perspective early disputes are explained by the lack of a compelling need to find agreement. It could be argued that this is what occurred at Camp David: the failure early and success later were a function of each party not feeling the pressure to find agreement until significant time had elapsed. In the early days of the summit, with many days of negotiation ahead of them, each party could take hard-line positions in order to see what they would be able to get away with. As the summit progressed and the shadow of the future became significantly shortened, each side was pressed to make an agreement or walk away empty-handed.

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[490] Zartman 1985.

One problem with this explanation of timing is that it is not clear that both sides *did* prefer an agreement to no-agreement. As mentioned above, Carter had tremendous difficulty even convincing the two leaders to join him for negotiations at all. Neither side seemed to sense the impending doom that would require quick agreement. This did not change once the summit began. With respect to Egypt, for instance, Sadat was ready to leave Camp David with nothing and threatened to do so when it appeared that the negotiations were headed toward stalemate. Moshe Dayan similarly reflects on Begin's position as being one of caution. A peace agreement would be beneficial, but not at the cost of giving up significant concessions. Perhaps the only leader involved who sensed impending catastrophe if no agreement was reached was Jimmy Carter. For Sadat's part, his own Foreign Minister advised leaving with no deal, feeling that Sadat was signing a bad deal that heavily favored the Israelis by not committing Israel to a withdrawal from the West Bank.[491] It is not at all clear that Sadat would have suffered politically if the Camp David process had failed. After all, a lack of agreement on the West Bank would be a justifiable reason to break off talks, particularly in the Arab world. Carter, on the other hand, the organizer and leader of the meetings, had much to gain from a peace agreement but also much to lose if cooperation did not develop.

I argue that although Zartman's notion of ripeness may be useful in understanding some aspects of the face-to-face interactions at Camp David, we need to add another component to it in order to make sense of the variation in outcomes that

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[491] Kamel 1986, 364-365.

occurred over the fortnight. What was crucial for agreement was reaching a point where the negotiations could revolve around *specific intentional actions* that could be read by both parties involved. Timing was certainly a part of this. Carter had to take time to transform the discussion away from historical inequities and grand narrative to specific actions to be taken. But what explains the change in outcome in the early face-to-face interactions versus the mediated interactions is the level of specificity of the discussion.

As I argued in the introduction to the dissertation, mirror neurons and empathy systems in the brain are linked to specific intentional acts. We are equipped with architecture that allows us to simulate and anticipate the intentions of others, be it reaching for a coffee cup in order to drink it or understanding if an actor is lying to us about an act he or she intends to take. In the political context, the previous cases analyzed illustrated this specificity in intentions. For Bush and Gorbachev the intention was about supporting a democratic independent reunified German republic. The specific intentional act in question was whether or not Gorbachev would accept the American proposal, and thus should he be pushed in that direction. For Chamberlain and Munich the intention was about being satiated with respect to Sudetenland. The specific intention here is whether or not Hitler would indeed stop expansion if his demands were met.

What is striking about the early Big 3 discussions is that there *was no* particular specific act to form an intention belief about. As Carter notes in his memoirs regarding that first face-to-face encounter, Sadat did not dwell on details; "he spelled out his

positions in broad terms."[492] Carter had brought Sadat and Begin together explicitly in

an informal setting with minimal guidance for how the talks were to proceed. Carter

preferred to allow the two to explore differences and hopefully gain some trust by

interacting with each other. Put another way, there were no specific proposed actions by

either side that the two were close on in order to read the intentions of the other. Sadat

arrived with concerns about the past and Begin arrived with his, with little or no area of

agreement between the two. Thus, as illustrated above, the early discussions were

characterized by fighting over versions of history and who had wronged whom.

This is significantly different than what occurred in the later discussions. Carter,

realizing that the Big 3 talks were not working, shifted to proximity talks. This had two

effects. First, it separated Sadat and Begin from each other. Second, and more

importantly in my view, the talks between Carter/Sadat and Carter/Begin shifted in their

focus. The major change was not how the talks were conducted; the major change was

in what the talks *were about*. Small steps and specific proposals of action replaced the

grand discussion that had dominated the early negotiating sections. This focused both

the Egyptian and Israeli delegations on *focal points* that carried with them specific

actions to be taken. For instance, after the second face-to-face meeting between Begin

and Sadat, Carter crafted a document that included all of the remaining issues that

would need to be worked out. These included demilitarization of the Sinai, Israeli

settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and Sinai, etc. Once Carter gained Sadat and

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[492] Carter 1983/1995, 345.

Begin's agreement that the list was more or less complete, he worked with his team to develop a negotiating strategy for each particular issue and decided to tackle the larger negotiation piece by piece. Thus, on Day Three (September 8), Carter focused on discussions of Sinai with Sadat and his delegation. The specific intentions Carter sought from Sadat revolved around how long Sadat was willing to allow Israel to phase out settlements in Sinai. Once Carter was satisfied that he had Sadat's intentions of a timeframe (two to three years) on settlements, he moved on to Israel's desire to have a United States airbase near Yamit in Sinai.[493] The discussions continued in this vein until after midnight. Carter essentially developed larger agreement by working piecemeal building specific intentions upon specific intentions.

Thus what we see in the move from direct face-to-face talks to proximity talks is not just a shift in how the negotiations took place in terms of who was interacting with whom, but rather the substance of the negotiations had changed as well. The proximity talks allowed Carter to advance the negotiations by breaking the larger negotiation into focal points and then working with each side face-to-face *in order to ascertain each individual's intentions regarding that point*. Carter's team was therefore able to reach a point where both sides had agreed upon a number of specific items and (eventually) the only remaining question left was whether each side believed that the other intended to cooperate fully both now and later. Once this point was reached, Carter suspended proximity talks and brought Sadat and Begin together once again. The difference

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[493] Carter 1983/1995, 368-372.

between this later meeting and the earlier meetings is that the remaining question was a specific one: would the other side uphold the agreement?

The lesson here is that face-to-face interactions will not always produce the emotional bond and trust that one would hope for. Indeed in the case of extreme emotional distance between individuals, face-to-face may serve to produce no normatively positive effect at all or possibly a negative effect. Put another way, simply placing two individuals into a room to work together in hopes that they will develop a bond and begin trusting each other is unlikely. The Camp David example illustrates specific conditions under which face-to-face can fuel emotional distance or aid in cooperation and intention understanding. Ultimately, I argue, understanding these conditions help to explain the within case variation at Camp David: unstructured emotional talks were replaced with highly specific talks about intentions and face-to-face aided cooperation by helping to clarify the latter.

Assessing Carter's Face-to-Face Strategy

In light of the argument made above, we can assess Carter's strategy of bringing the Big 3 leaders together face-to-face. It is a strategy that has been criticized from two different perspectives. First, some have argued that it was the mediation "shuttle" aspect of the negotiations that ultimately led to success; the strong mediator (and good timing) of Carter could overcome the need for direct interaction.[494] Others have questioned whether Carter may have given up on face-to-face too early in the process. Tom

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[494] cf. Bercovitch 1986.

Princen, citing Kelman's work in simulations between Israelis and Palestinians, argues that the decision to change the structure of the talks after the first few negative interactions between Sadat and Begin may have been a mistake.[495] If the two had been given more time to flesh out their differences in a face-to-face fashion, it may be that they would have come to agreement more quickly or perhaps even found greater agreement than that which occurred through the mediated talks.

The argument and evidence presented in this chapter suggest that this claim does not hold up to scrutiny. The initial negative meetings were unproductive not because of the mode of interaction, but because of the substance of that interaction. As argued above, Sadat and Begin attacked each other about a variety of topics, all regarding grand historical narratives and questions of fairness and inequity. It was not until Carter broke the negotiations into smaller pieces that progress was made. Second, and more importantly, the evidence presented suggests that face-to-face is most likely to aid in cooperation when the question at hand is one of intentions, since intention understanding is aided by the shared neural connection. In the initial face-to-face meetings, the question of intentions never had a chance to come up. Indeed specific intentions only entered the conversation once Carter began working with Sadat and Begin individually.

Thus one of the key lessons to be learned about face-to-face interaction from the Camp David experience is that face-to-face is neither a cure-all for intractable conflict

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[495] Princen 1991.

nor a meaningless method of communication. The decision to pursue talks face-to-face

or through a mediator is an important one and can have significant consequences on the

outcome of a negotiation, as illustrated above. The results of this study suggest that

face-to-face interactions are most useful when negotiations have reached a point where

a significant question remains about the other party's willingness to uphold their

commitment. Face-to-face ultimately helps to provide each side with the ability to read

the specific intentions of the other. It therefore follows that mediators of negotiations

would be well served to initially mediate negotiations until a point is reached where the

remaining questions are those of specific intentions.

Assessing Counter Arguments and Further Observations

Power, Strategy, and Negotiating Positions

While I have privileged the interpersonal dynamics engendered in face-to-face

interaction at Camp David and have attempted to show that at certain key moments of

the fortnight each side was actively learning the specific intentions of the other through

those interactions, it is possible to construct an entirely different story about how Sadat,

Begin, and Carter came to know the intentions of each other. One way of analyzing

both the process and outcome at Camp David is through the lens of power and

negotiating positions. Specifically, Camp David presents a puzzle for scholars because

Egypt signed a bilaterally agreement seemingly at the expense of Egypt's relations with

its Arab neighbors. Viewed from a power perspective, it risked upsetting key allies in

the balance against Israel. I have suggested in this chapter that Sadat actually trusted

Carter with respect to Carter's intentions and promises and therefore was willing to potentially alienate Arab neighbors for long-term peace. But there is another explanation that has little to do with trust and future intentions and instead focuses on power and negotiating positions. Put simply, Sadat had no choice but to follow the United States' desires for peace with Israel and sign the agreement.

The focus of this particular argument lay in the distribution of economic and military power over time.[496] Specifically, Shibley Telhami argues that realist theory explains Egypt's move to agreement with Israel because of changing dynamics between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Telhami notes that the United States and Soviet Union became directly involved in the Middle East in the late 1960s and 1970s more than anytime since World War II. As the superpowers both gained strategic parity through the 1960s, Egypt came to understand that it needed a close and formal alliance with one of the superpowers in order to advance its own objectives. Sadat and his advisers originally sought alliance with the Soviet Union but "economic disparity between the superpowers limited Soviet capacity and willingness to aid Egypt."[497] In addition, the Soviet Union in pursuing détente with the West, privileged the technological transfer from the West and subordinate its relationship with Egypt.[498] The result of these key realist variables changing for Telhami is that it provided a strong

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[496] Telhami 1990.
[497] Telhami 1990, 47.
[498] Telhami 1990, ch. 3, fn. 6.

incentive for Sadat to look to the West, and specifically the United States, for a partnership.

Further, at a regional level Egypt's relative power was in decline due to the rise of oil-producing neighbors. As Neil Kressel points out, Arabism and anti-Zionism were no longer enough to maintain leadership in the region.[499] In this sense the Camp David process for Egypt was as much about Egypt's relationship with the United States as it was between Egypt and Israel. As Telhami argues based on interviews with Sadat's aides, "Sadat himself was apparently willing to live with a failure to reach an agreement with Israel as long as closer American-Egyptian relations at the expense of Israel's relations with the United States did result."[500]

While power dynamics explain the need for an agreement, Telhami uses bargaining positions in order to explain the precise terms of the agreement reached. For instance, Telhami notes that Begin's strategy was more closely aligned with "optimal bargaining behavior"[501] and Sadat's strategy was poorer. Telhami and others have noted that successful bargaining often involves holding true positions close the vest, revealing intentions only as needed. As illustrated above, Sadat laying his cards on the table for Carter, who was quite surprised at the tactic, at the beginning of the negotiation was in some sense the opposite of what is considered optimal bargaining behavior. Put simply, for Telhami part of the reason Sadat failed to obtain specific agreement on settlements

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[499] Kressel 1992, 806.
[500] Telhami 1992, 631.
[501] cf. Fisher and Ury 1981; Telhami 1990; Zartman 2000.

in the West Bank and Gaza, much to Kamel's dismay, was a result of sub-optimal bargaining behavior.

From this perspective of power and bargaining, the motivation for many of the events at Camp David become clear, while new questions are raised. First, recall Sadat's threats to break off negotiations and return home to negotiate directly with Arab states, the strategy Kamel had been advocating from the beginning. Carter approached Sadat and implored him to not break off the negotiations and return home can be read as a threat, one that theoretically could have ended Sadat's political career. In this sense if Sadat's goal was to forge a good relationship with the United States, then his threat to leave was either a bluff or a misguided tactic. If Telhami is right then Sadat at this moment is feeling desperation as he would like to call the negotiations off but is reminded that he is unable to do so. If this is true then the face-to-face nature of Sadat's interactions with Carter or Begin are much less relevant than the power predicament Egypt finds itself in. Similarly if bargaining skill explains the agreement specifics, then what is gained through face-to-face interactions at the summit is likely overstated.

While the power and bargaining theory explanation is compelling and provides a useful way of thinking about the events leading to and during Camp David, I believe the realist story overstates causal effect of power and minimizes the importance of the interaction variable. First, as Kressel has argued, just because international power balances creates the *potential* for a peace agreement and may provide incentives for states to pursue peace, those opportunities are routinely missed and could have been

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ignored here. As argued above, simply arranging for Sadat and Begin to meet for the summit required years of personal appeals, personal face-to-face visits in order to understand how far each party would go toward peace, a trip to Jerusalem by Sadat in order to signal a credible commitment to the process, and so forth. At each of these junctures the process could have easily failed. Indeed Sadat's own advisors were, at first secretly, and then outwardly hoping that they *would* fail.[502] Therefore it is unclear why one should privilege power dynamics when so many other pieces had to fall into place, a process I argue was aided through numerous personal face-to-face interactions, in order to succeed.

Second, if Egypt's interest in negotiating with the West and Israel can be explained by power dynamics, it is not clear why other states were interested or not interested in similar cooperation. Israel sought a peace agreement though it is not clear why power dynamics explain the move. As Kressel argues, "one can imagine a more extreme leader than Begin refusing to destroy Yamit or return the Sinai, even at the cost of strained relations with the United States."[503] One could also likely envision a leader other than Sadat not be willing to travel to Jerusalem and abrogate Egypt's relationship with Arab states in the process. Put another way, it is not clear that Israel's strategy is influenced by power dynamics and not domestic politics and leadership, for instance. Similarly, while Egypt sought peace, Syria did not. As Quandt notes, the original strategy within the Carter administration was to bring Assad to the table in order to

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[502] Kamel 1986, 284-285.
[503] Kressel 1986, 807.

make peace;[504] indeed Syria and Egypt shared many national interests, particularly with respect to changing regional dynamics. If power dynamics explain why Egypt sought peace, it is not clear why Syria did not as well.[505]

In addition, the bargaining strategy approach does little to explain why the early negotiations at Camp David were fraught with failure while the latter negotiations more collegial and productive. As demonstrated above, there is a marked switch in the productivity of the negotiations once Carter changes strategies and begins mediating rather than simply observing. From an optimal bargaining perspective, this outcome makes little sense. If anything, Sadat laying his cards on the table from the outset should have resulted in a quicker agreement, since he had little close to the vest to be divulged through iterative interactions. Instead what we see is piecemeal agreement building, aided through successive face-to-face interactions focused on specific intentions of the parties.

In the end this analysis suggests that there are multiple explanatory pathways when investigating both the agreement itself and the negotiations process. Indeed Camp David has been heralded as an intricate case with several causal variables in play. It is difficult, and perhaps foolish, to isolate one among others. I have attempted to show here how one particular variable, face-to-face interactions, help to explain parts of the outcome and puzzles created by standard realist explanations of power and bargaining.

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[504] Quandt 1986, 57.
[505] Kressel 1986, 808.

Chapter 6 – Conclusions

Short Summary of Argument and Findings

This dissertation has had both very broad and specific goals and ambitions. On the one hand I have tried to introduce a new set of neuroscientific findings to the field of IR and provide reasons why IR scholars should take these findings seriously. In doing so I have presented a meta-theoretical and epistemological argument for how and why neuroscience provides much promise for the study of international politics. On the other hand I have provided insight into a long-standing puzzle for IR scholars: why do some efforts of personal diplomacy result in cooperation and others mistrust and deception? In answering this question I have used to neuroscience to construct a new first-person theory of intention reading. As such this dissertation has tread diverse territory and has touched upon a number of literatures and perspectives. This concluding chapter will attempt to bring these various strands together, summarize the argument and findings, and provide next steps for future research.

I addressed the personal diplomacy puzzle by presenting a new theory of intention understanding that is unique in its perspective. Rather than approximating the intentions of others through folk-theories of behavior interpretation and observations from the outside, I have argued that face-to-face interactions provide a mechanism by which individuals can understand each other's intentions from the inside. Through the

mirroring system in the brain, individuals are able to actively simulate the mental states of others and replicate in their own brains what is occurring in the others' brain. This allows agents to physically know intentions rather than guess them. I have argued that this ability is likely mediated by the specificity of intention, with specific intentions replicated in the brain more easily than abstract or vague intentions, and have demonstrated this dynamic empirically by investigating salient moments of face-to-face and non-face-to-face interaction in diplomatic history. Thus the overarching research question for the dissertation is whether face-to-face can help actors in international politics overcome the well-known problem of intentions. And if so, to what extent?

In investigating this question I constructed a number of hypotheses regarding intention understanding and face-to-face interaction, derived from neuroscientific insights. I have addressed the hypotheses and results in each of the empirical chapters, so I will not belabor the point here except to try to bring together the various conditions under which the main claim, that face-to-face aids in understanding intentions, may obtain.

One of the first hypothesis to be investigated is whether or not face-to-face will yield more accurate understanding of intentions than other communication modalities. I tested this hypothesis by investigating salient moments in diplomatic history that involved crucial moments where each side tried to understand the intentions of the other and, importantly, previous methods of communication had not brought about the desired understanding. Through case studies of the end of the Cold War and German

reunification, Neville Chamberlain meeting Hitler in the lead-up to World War II, and

Jimmy Carter mediating negotiations at Camp David between Anwar Sadat and

Menachem Begin, I demonstrated that under certain conditions face-to-face interaction

aids in intention understanding.

Good Faith vs. Bad Faith

First, perhaps counter-intuitively, the extent to which the parties in the

negotiation enter in good-faith to find a solution has less of an effect on intention

understanding than would be predicted by extant theory in foreign policy analysis

paradigms. I argued that in the German reunification case even though both sides

wanted to find a solution to the Germany problem and there were still incentives to hide

true intentions. Gorbachev, the evidence suggests, had discussed his intentions to move

forward with German reunification prior to his meeting with Bush. Yet, he had an

incentive not to share this intention with Bush, so as to help ensure that the process

moved along on Gorbachev's terms. Bush was able to correctly read Gorbachev's true

intentions in the meeting in Malta, however, and thus was able to craft his strategy to

move forward appropriately.

The case of entering a negotiation in bad faith *par excellence* was presented with

Munich, specifically Chamberlain's trip to Germany in an attempt to ascertain Hitler's

intentions vis-à-vis territorial expansion. Hitler infamously told Chamberlain In

Berchtesgaden that his aims were limited and the cession of the Sudetenland would

meet these aims. This case is often told as the naïve and gullible Chamberlain being

persuaded by the lies and deception that Hitler used to further his interests. I found that there is some truth to this reading. Chamberlain indeed returned home to Britain and displayed confidence to his Cabinet and Admiralty that he had read Hitler's intentions and that he could be trusted. Importantly, however, there is evidence that Chamberlain privately doubted this reading. As I demonstrated, Chamberlain's diary and letters belie the stoic confidence he displayed publicly. The reason, I argue, is likely because Chamberlain picked up on salient clues from Hitler's face and demeanor that he was being deceptive. Building off of neuroscientific and psychological theories and evidence of deception-detection through face-to-face interaction, I suggest that Chamberlain likely picked up on clues to Hitler's ruthlessness, which he discussed in his letters to his sister, but nevertheless for a variety of reasons chose not to act on those inclinations. The reasons, I suggested, have to do with cognitive dissonance and the lack of an alternative strategy. As I pointed out, Chamberlain's travel to Germany represented "Plan Z," or, something of a last ditch effort to avoid war. If Hitler was lying then there would be little Chamberlain could do about it. Further, by traveling to meet Hitler and attempting to persuade him, Chamberlain personally had placed his reputation and political career on the line. There were very powerful reasons, in other words, for Chamberlain to not privilege the feelings he felt that Hitler might be lying.

Therefore in the end this study suggests that while entering a negotiation in good faith certainly helps the prospects for intention reading and cooperation, as the risk of deception and lying is low, good faith efforts are not a necessary condition for intention

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understanding. Face-to-face provides a unique opportunity to read intentions of individuals even when they are trying to be deceptive.

<u>Intention Specificity</u>

One of the conditions of intention understanding derived from the mirror neuron neuroscience literature is intention specificity. As discussed above, mirror neurons show higher activation when the action intention is a specific action with a specific goal. For instance, an outreached hand in the air will show less activation than an outreached hand that extends for an ice cream cone. The context and situation, in other words, is critical to understanding the specific intention, in this case grabbing the cone.

Each of the cases chosen for this study validated this position to varying degrees, but it was most evident in the Camp David case. Jimmy Carter was disappointed to find that his original idea of letting Sadat and Begin "work it out" face-to-face was unsuccessful. The discussion resulted in animosity and hostility, not cooperation. It was only after changing he structure of the talks, with an emphasis placed on smaller goals and specific actions to be taken on both sides, that Carter found eventual success in cooperation.

In the German reunification case the results with respect to intention specificity were mixed. On the one hand, in Malta Bush was able to discern from his specific intentions with respect to not pushing back on American efforts for reunification. On the other hand, both the American and Soviet teams report that even in instances where specific intentions were not involved, face-to-face nevertheless had value in that they

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were better able to understand each other's positions. Importantly, for diplomats on both sides face-to-face interaction brought about a general better understanding of positions.

This dissertation has demonstrated that not all intentions are created equally and indeed vary on a level of specificity that is important with respect to the effects of face-to-face interaction. This suggests that negotiations that are advanced to a point where the last remaining issue is one of trusting that the other has the intention to act in a specific way lend themselves to the face-to-face modality. An area of further research that would further help to elucidate this concept is an analysis of just how specific a specific intention needs to be. That is, can we predict a *priori* what types of intentions will be specific enough to be read through face-to-face interactions? How can we determine or operationalize specificity as an intention characteristic? I will turn to these questions below.

Other Possible Relevant Conditions: Personality

The neuroscience literature on empathy and mirror neurons note that many of the responses, such as those of simulation, are pre-cognitive and therefore do not involve reflective processing. This suggests that cognitive processes should not have an effect on the basic simulation mechanism. We know, however, that cognition and politics go hand-in-hand. Politicians and diplomats reflect and think about their positions, the positions of others, and so forth. In the Munich case, for example, I argued that from a simulation perspective it is likely that Chamberlain did indeed read

Hitler's intentions, but for a variety of cognitive reasons decided against believing his thought.

One of the difficult cognitive conditions that may have an effect on intention understanding is personality. For instance, a critique of my reading of the German reunification case is that while face-to-face interactions might explain the timing of reunification, ultimately the pursuit was successful because Gorbachev and Bush got along personally. Making comparisons across cases is useful here. Camp David, for instance, seems to problematize the view that personality makes a difference with respect to intention understanding. It did, however, have a salient effect when it came to *structuring* the negotiations themselves. Carter's personal relationship with Sadat was, I argue, incredibly important in both getting Sadat to the negotiating table and *staying* there once the going got tough.

Further, in the Munich case there is reason to believe that Hitler's personality was an important part of the deception that ensued. Recalling the way Hitler treated Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister was made to feel as if Hitler respected him and treated him as something of an equal. As I mentioned above, this likely had a positive effect on Chamberlain's trust of Hitler. Perhaps, in turn, this trust made the lie that Hitler told easier to pass off.

The results of this dissertation suggest that while personality is not the main factor when it comes to intention understanding, it certainly plays a role in negotiations. Personality clashes or personality congruence have been shown to be important in

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setting up the structure of talks and can have an ancillary effect on how engendering

trust, which in turn, may also have an effect on whether communicated intentions are

believed. As such, this dissertation is not the last word on personality effects on

intention understanding in face-to-face negotiations. As I will discuss below, this is the

subject of a future research project.

Other Possible Relevant Conditions: Power
      Power dynamics are ever-present in international politics and this dissertation is

no exception. As expected, the neuroscience literature on mirror neurons and the

simulation system have relatively little to say about the effects of power relationships.

As pre-cognitive and pre-reflective mechanisms, the effects of power are in some sense

likely separate from the mechanisms of simulation I have identified in this dissertation.

This creates a particular difficulty in assessing the relative effects of each, simulation

and power, in outcomes. It is likely that both have effects, though in varying degrees.

      Indeed, a power story can be told with all three cases I have investigated. For

George H. Bush the most significant material consideration in the United States' favor

was the decline of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. As such Gorbachev arguably had an

inferior negotiating position vis-à-vis German reunification. Britain's divestiture of

military development and infrastructure in the decades after World War I combined

with Hitler's consolidation of power in Germany certainly could be argued to have been

significant causal factors in Chamberlain's appeasement policy. Finally, the United

States' power position undoubtedly had a significant effect on both Egypt and Israel

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coming to the negotiation table and hashing out agreement. On the other hand, in each of these cases the power explanation does not tell a complete story. As examined in depth in each of the case studies, power often falls short of explaining timing and particular configurations of negotiation outcomes.

Given the difficulty of isolating power from other causal factors in the case studies, future work will be required to more specifically identify how and when power may affect simulation and mirroring processes. As I will discuss below, this is also the subject of a future research project.

Summary Table of Findings

Variable	Hypothesis	Finding
Good Faith/Bad Faith	Good faith should provide ideal conditions for intention understanding. Bad faith/Deception detection possible, but difficult.	**Strong positive results.** Good faith/problem-solving F2F dynamics provide ideal conditions for intention understanding Deception is difficult, though possible, through F2F. Cognitive and other psychological factors can make detection difficult.
Intention Specificity	Specific intentions will be easier to read than non-specific intentions.	**Strong positive results.** Specific intentions are easier to read than non-specific / general intentions. Operationalizing "general" and "specific," however, is difficult.
Personality	Personality should have little effect on intention understanding.	**Mixed results.** Personality congruence is sometimes correlated with better intention understanding, though not always.
Power	Power should have little effect on intention understanding.	**Mixed results.** Power is often correlated with better intention understanding, though not always.

Table 7: Summary of Dissertation Findings

Methodological Drawbacks

Multiple Levels of Analysis and Evidence

One potential criticism of the approach taken in the dissertation is that my theory and evidence exist at two different levels of analysis. That is, I proffer a theory of political intention understanding and face-to-face interaction that is based on and ultimately rooted in brain neurons and chemicals. The evidence I provide, on the other hand, exists purely at the political level. Thus there is a "jump" between the theory and the evidence that may be problematic.

The jump is indeed quite problematic if there are intervening variables that affect intention understanding as we move from neurons to political behaviors. One key possibility is simply cognition. Mirror neurons and empathy exist as pre-reflective and pre-cognitive states. That is, they are, unreflective in nature. Intention understanding, on the other hand, likely involves cognition. In fact I argued precisely that it does in the case of Chamberlain in Germany negotiating with Hitler. If political agents gain a particular understanding of intentions through mirror neurons but then subsequently, upon reflection of those intentions, come to believe the intentions are something else, then we are confronted with an intervening variable, in this cognition, doing the work and not mirror neurons. The best way to address this criticism is to provide evidence at both levels of analysis: neurons and politics. Through the use of fMRI equipment, this type of research is becoming increasingly possible to conduct and may serve as a future research activity.

On the other hand, precisely because my argument is grounded in the *physical* it avoids the level of analysis problem that traditionally has been problematic for ideational work. As Wendt explains in his auto-critique of *Social Theory*, dualism presents an uncomfortable position for social scientists and constructivists in particular. One the one hand it seems clear that both material and ideational aspects affect politics, but it is not clear precisely how one manages the jump or schism between the two. Where do ideas stop and material begin? Do ideas ever stop or, alternately, does material never stop? These are the types of questions that a physical explanation might be able to get around. By privileging the physical, my argument is *less* concerned with this dualist mind/body problem then many other explanations of intention understanding, such as signaling, identity, and so forth. Thus, while my argument introduces a new problem of multiple levels of analysis in the disjuncture between theory and evidence, it may avoid the traditional dualist problem that faces other explanations of intentions.

Falsifiability Problems

Another potential critique of my theory is that it could be interpreted as unfalsifiable. If the argument is that mirror neurons help to provide a *pre-cognitive* understanding of intentions, then it is ostensibly difficult to think of political situations where my argument could be shown to be wrong. That is, in a case where intention understanding does not obtain, my theory simply suggests that cognitive reflection took over or an intervening variable had an effect down the line.

There are two responses to this criticism. First, the argument is falsifiable to the extent that the <u>physical</u> nature I have identified in my theory is testable. If, for example, a future fMRI experiment allows analysts to view mirror neuron activity during face-to-face political negotiations and there is no activity, then I am likely wrong. Similarly if mirror neurons are activated to a similar extent in non-face-to-face negotiations, such as letter writing, then my theory will have been falsified. Second, precisely because the argument relies on a latent physical or material level, it could be argued that it is easier to test this theory than those that rely on folk psychology explanations. Privileging the physical, as I have done here, presents challenges with respect to testing political outcomes and linking those outcomes to an underlying physical reality, but benefits from having something to look for in testing. Put another way, folk psychology presents testing concerns that are difficult to overcome and may be more difficult than physical explanations. There are, however, ways to buttress the findings of this dissertation with evidence at the neural and political levels. It is to those next steps that I now turn.

Next Steps: Political and fMRI Experiments

<u>Political Experiments</u>

Personality and power, the two main variables identified in the case studies that may have some effect on the intention understanding outcomes identified, are often difficult to isolate in qualitative case studies. Presidents and diplomats rarely submit to sophisticated psychological analyses and power is ever-present in politics, making it

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difficult to disaggregate it as a variable from others. Political experiments provide the ability to hold a number of variables constant while manipulating others in order to assess their effects. In addition, political experiments provide an excellent opportunity to assess variation in the level of specificity of intentions. Where this was difficult to assess in case studies, manipulation of variables in experiments allows for subtle variations in intention specificity and analysis of the effect of those variations on outcomes such as understanding.

I currently have this next step of research under way, having conducted simulated international negotiations regarding an environmental treaty in a variety of conditions, including face-to-face and computer-mediated interactions. Through pre-test personality measures, manipulation of the countries the participants represent, subtle variations in the negotiation instructions, and post-test analysis, I am able to assess the comparative effects of the personality, power, and intention specificity variables. This analysis will serve as the basis for future articles.

<u>fMRI Experiments</u>

While the political experiments will be useful in assessing the effects of personality and power while gaining a better sense of intention specificity, they will not help to overcome the criticism that the argument of the dissertation and the evidence in the dissertation are at two different levels of analysis. In order to overcome this drawback in design, adding evidence at the physical level of analysis would be beneficial. fMRI technology now allows for "multiple-perspective" or two-person

testing. Indeed, social neuroscientists have identified face-to-face interaction as an ideal-type with respect to brain imaging because it allows the researcher to look at, in real-time, at variation in response between the two individuals:

> Face-to-face conversation as a dyadic interaction could be a good model system for future brain imaging of social interaction, especially when combined with eye tracking… Given the great importance of dyadic interaction in human behavior, it is important to study brain functions of two interacting subjects at the same time.[506]

Conducting a dyadic interaction experiment while monitoring the responses in the brain of each participant would be an effective way of providing the physical evidence, either confirming or falsifying my theory regarding mirror neurons and simulation of intentions.

These experiments are not without their challenges. In addition to pragmatic concerns such as access to equipment, funding, and so forth, significant methodological concerns exist. It is not clear that two-person MRI readings are as precise as singular non-portable MRIs that are traditionally used for mirror neuron research. That is, dyadic experiments may be able to provide the general areas of the brain implicated in intention understanding, and those zones can then be compared to the zones where mirror neurons operate, but single-neuron testing technology is likely in the realm of the future. On the other hand, as Hari points out, fMRI and EEG combined could provide

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[506] Hari 2009.

useful neuro-feedback with respect to the moment-to-moment facial expressions and micro-expressions discussed in Chapter 4.[507]

Certainty and International Politics

Finally, the argument in this dissertation sheds light on one other paradox at the intersection of theory and practice. As mentioned above, IR theory has concerned itself with the fundamental difficulty of understanding intentions and the consequences that follow. Neo-realists often conclude that we must assume the worst about others intentions, political psychologists conclude that our biases and cognitive frameworks will make signals difficult to interpret, and so forth. Yet, practitioners of international politics often display tremendous confidence that they know the intentions of others and sometimes are certain of it.[508] The theory of simulation and first-person perspective presented here may help to make sense of this disjuncture between the problem of intentions in IR theory and why actors do not necessarily view it as a similar problem.

One next step in this research program is to assess zones of IR where certainty obtains and the quality of the certainty engendered. Jennifer Mitzen and Randall Schweller point out that "misplaced certainty" is a significant and common pathway to war. "By misplaced certainty we mean cases where decision makers are confident that they know each other's capabilities, intentions, or both; but their confidence is unwarranted yet persists even in the face of disconfirming evidence."[509] The theory

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[507] Ibid.
[508] cf. McDermott 2004a for a review of this literature.
[509] Mitzen and Schweller 2011.

proposed in this dissertation suggests reasons why practitioners of international politics may feel certain about intentions in a face-to-face interaction. The difference here is that simulation provides an epistemologically valid reason for being certain. As such, simulation and a first-person perspective on intention reading may suggest two different pathways to certainty of different types: epistemologically sound certainty and misplaced certainty. One of the next steps in this research program is to expand up on this insight further and elucidate these pathways more clearly.

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