

*UNA REVOLUCION, NI MAS NI MENOS: THE ROLE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT
IN THE SUPREME JUNTAS IN QUITO, 1765-1822*

Thesis

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role the European Enlightenment played in the political sphere during the late colonial era in the Audiencia of Quito. Until the eighteenth century, Creole elites controlled the local economic and governmental sectors. With the ascension of the Bourbon dynasty in 1700, however, these elites of Iberian descent began to lose their power as new European ideas, emerging from the Enlightenment, led to a process of consolidating and centralizing power into the hands of Peninsular Spanish officials. Known as the Bourbon Reforms, these measures led to Creole disillusionment, as they began losing power at the local level. Beginning in the 1770s and 1780s, however, Enlightenment ideas of “nationalism” and “rationality” arrived in the Andean capital, making their way to the disgruntled Creoles. As the situation deteriorated, elites began to incorporate these new concepts into their rhetoric, presenting a possible response to the Reforms. When Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, the Creoles expelled the Spanish government in Quito, creating an autonomous movement, the Junta of 1809, using these Enlightenment principles as their justification. I argue, however, that while these ‘modern’ principles gave the Creoles an outlet for their grievances, it is their inability to find a common ground on how their government should interpret these new ideas which ultimately lead to the Junta’s failure.

This conclusion challenges previous historiography which contends that the political and economic turmoil in Quito were the only prominent factors leading to the Junta Era of 1809 to 1812 and when discussed, scholars view the Enlightenment as a catalyst for beneficial change in the region. This thesis contends that the Enlightenment principles adopted by local elites, while giving them the opportunity to revolt, also divided the Creole elite, ultimately ending the possibility of any successful autonomous movement. In the end, I contend that it is necessary for scholars to look at both the positive and negative ramifications of Enlightenment principles when studying the Latin American movements for independence.

Dedication

Dedicated to my mother, Kate

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AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain
ANM	Archivo Nacional de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Chapter 1: Introduction

On December 25, 1808 a small group of Creole elites (American born people of Spanish descent) met in the Valle de los Chillos near the city of Quito at the hacienda of the Marqués de Selva Alegre, Juan Pío Montúfar, in an attempt to devise an immediate action in response to the political turmoil in Spain accompanying the French invasion of February 1808. News of the ensuing Spanish imperial crisis, in which King Charles IV abdicated the throne to his son, Ferdinand VII, who in turn was forced by Napoleon Bonaparte to abdicate in favor of Joseph Bonaparte reached Quito on September 19, 1808.¹ The clandestine meeting at the Montúfar estate was typical of the responses of Creole elites throughout the Indies, who questioned the legitimacy of Joseph Bonaparte. The usurpation of the throne posed a serious constitutional question: who ruled as the sovereign leader in the Andean capital? As a backdrop to the meeting at the Chillos Valley, an economic recession had plagued the region for almost the entire eighteenth century contributing to political unrest in the Audiencia, including the Quito Insurrection of 1765 and numerous highland indigenous revolts. The participants in the Christmas Conspiracy, as it was referred to by locals in the Andean capital, however, were unable to come to an agreement about what actions to take in response to the political turmoil in Spain. The participants decided to meet at a later date, leaving open the possible

¹ Martin Minchom, *The People of Quito, 1690-1810: Change and Unrest in the Underclass* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 243. Douglass Washburn, *The Bourbon Reforms: A Social and Economic History of the Audiencia of Quito, 1760-1810* (PhD diss., University of Texas-Austin, 1984), 221.

responses for the elite population in Quito. This meeting demonstrates the culmination of a cultural shift (heavily influenced by enlightened notions of human rights and rational reasoning) in local understandings about political power, the role of the colonial subject (in Quito), and his relationship with Madrid.

The ideas of the Enlightenment were popularized into the Audiencia or Kingdom of Quito through two main avenues: the visits of Alexander von Humboldt and the works of Eugenio Espejo. These two men brought two separate interpretations of what the Enlightenment possibly meant to those living in Quito.² Beginning as a French movement going as far back as Michel de Montaigne in the 1580s and brought to the forefront of European intellectual discourse by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 1750s, Enlightenment philosophy resonated with Quiteño elites who utilized such terms as the “noble savage” and “popular sovereignty” in local rhetoric.³ Other Enlightenment ideals, such as the notions of “human rights” and “the use of human reason” worked their way into the local political rhetoric of the region, which helped to shape the reaction of Creole elites to the events leading up to the Spanish imperial crisis. Not all Creoles accepted these new intellectual notions, however, and as a result divisions among the local elites emerged.

A group of Creole elites, influenced by Enlightenment ideas of popular sovereignty, overthrew the existing Spanish government and set up an autonomous government, or junta, ruling in the name of the deposed king, Ferdinand VII on August 10, 1809. The motives of the leaders of this movement, known as the Junta of 1809,

² Espejo, a local intellectual originally from the lower class in Quito, wrote primarily on bringing about equality across social lines, a side many local elites refused to take in 1809, as they only took notions that suited their purpose; restoring power into the hands of Creole elites. Von Humboldt, who focused on scientific ideas and notions of modernity, brought a political message that resonated more so with Creole concerns over power within the region.

³ See M.A. Screech, trans., *The Complete Essays* (London: Penguin Books, 1987), Maurice William Cranston, trans., *Discourse of Inequality* (London: Penguin Books, 1984) and G.D.H. Cole, trans., *The Social Contract & Discourses* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1920)

revolved around their belief that the existing Spanish government, under the control of Napoleon Bonaparte of France, did not merit the loyalty of the citizens of the Audiencia.⁴ These Creoles believed that in the absence of a legitimate monarch, sovereignty reverted to the people.⁵ The Creoles in the Andean capital decided that their loyalty was to Ferdinand VII, the Bourbon ruler, as their sovereign leader, a stance also taken by the viceroys in Lima and Santa Fé de Bogotá. What set them apart, however, was their belief that local citizens, not the colonial bureaucracy in Quito, should exercise power at the local level, paving the way for the Junta of 1809.

The movement to form a junta in Quito added to the already turbulent political atmosphere of the Spanish Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Reforms designed to centralize Madrid's control of her colonies (known as the Bourbon Reforms) led to unease among elites in the American colonies as the Crown began to centralize its power over the colonies. Later Bourbon reforms only exacerbated the problem by creating rifts not only between Creole and peninsular elites, but among the Creoles, as power then emanated from Madrid. The reforms and Enlightenment ideas on how to handle the economic and political situation divided the once united city leaders. Local Creole elites, already dealing with an economic recession faced the prospect of losing more of their political power. The situation in Quito is an example of how empire-wide concerns shared from Buenos Aires to Mexico, proved particularly serious in this regional context. When Don Manuel Morales, secretary of the Interior in the later Junta

⁴ Manifestó de la Junta Suprema de Quito al Público, Quito, August 10, 1809, ANM. Published by Alfredo Ponce Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812, Según los Documentos del Archivo Nacional de Madrid* (Madrid: Imprenta, 1960), 137-139

⁵ Without a sovereign ruler after Ferdinand VII was forced into exile by Napoleon, local juntas formed across Spain as a way to rule in the name of the Bourbon monarch instead of being subjects of the Napoleonic invaders. This decision shows the power entrusted on the local level when an imperial crisis takes place, giving sovereignty to the people.

government, wrote his brief account to the President of the Audiencia Conde Ruiz de Castilla he spoke of these concerns, warning of the “present unsettled state in Spain,” the “annihilation of the lawfully constituted authorities,” and the “Crown of Ferdinand VII and his domains falling in the hands of a tyrant,” showing the claim to sovereignty held by the local elites in Quito.⁶ Such rhetoric emphasized a shift in the beliefs of some citizens on who should rule in Quito, the Madrid government or local Quiteño elites.

When examining the Junta of 1809 and the subsequent Junta of 1810, empirical evidence shows their failure was directly linked to the inability of Creoles to overcome their personal, and sometimes intellectual, differences. Therefore, identifying those involved in the Juntas based on their place of birth or residence does not give a clear understanding of the ideological tensions existing among elites in Quito. Benedict Anderson shows how Creoles, through ideas linked to the different strains of the Enlightenment, established a ‘cultural revolution’ in Latin America, defining how these people viewed their evolving society during the late colonial era.⁷ For some, such as Eugenio Espejo and the Marqués de Sánchez-Orellana, the arrival of the enlightened ideas of human rights and liberty meant a total split from the existing monarchical system and they advocated forming an independent republic. This feeling did not hold true for some local elites, such as Juan Pío Montúfar or the local bishop Jose Cuero y Caicedo, who believed in forming a more conservative, autonomous government in Quito, but one still linked directly to Madrid. While economic and political problems played a significant role in leading to the revolt, the divergence in Creole interpretations of

⁶ William B. Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative of Twenty Years Residence In South America: Volume III* (London: Hurst, Robinson, and Company, 1825), From the sovereign junta to the Count Ruis, ex-president of Quito, 11.

⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 51.

different European and foreign concepts of power and control, and how to implement them in Quito, ultimately explain why Creole elites could not find a consensus on how to rule their newly-formed government in 1809, leading to its rapid demise.

While the example in Quito relies heavily on local and regional events, it also exists within a broader imperial context. The centralizing impulse under the Bourbons corresponds directly with the alienation of the Creole elites in Quito. Juan Pío Montúfar, leader of the Junta of 1809, spoke consistently about their beloved, deposed king, Ferdinand VII and against the French invaders. Scholars have shown the political, economic, and social impacts of the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century through studies of the Bourbon Reforms, the indigenous revolts across South America, and the Napoleonic invasion, but they have not yet examined the ideological impact of these events and their role in the formation of new nation states across Latin America.⁸ The Junta in Quito is an important example of how drastically the relationship between Madrid and its colonies became transformed in a forty year period, foreshadowing the wars for independence that gripped Spanish America in the coming fifteen years.

⁸ See Kenneth J. Andrien. *The Kingdom of Quito, 1690-1830: The State and regional development*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Christian Büchges, *Familia, Honor y Poder: La Nobleza de la Ciudad de Quito en la Época Colonial Tardía (1765-1822)*, (Quito: FONSAL, 2007). Minchom, *The People of Quito*. John Liddy Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century: Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966). Demetrio Ramos Pérez, *Entre el Plata y Bogotá: Cuatro Claves de la Emancipación Ecuatoriana*, (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica del Centro Iberoamericano de Cooperación, 1978), Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *La revolución política durante la época de la independencia: El Reino de Quito, 1808-1822*, (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2006). Washburn, *The Bourbon Reforms*.

Chapter 2: Historiography

Over the past forty years, the historiography of Latin American independence has experienced four distinct paradigm shifts. In the 1970s, studies began to incorporate comparative analysis of diverse regions in Spanish America.⁹ In response to structuralist approaches focusing on the dependency paradigm, social historians in the 1980s argued for more subtle approaches to and recognition of localized individual groups.¹⁰ With the cultural turn in the 1990s, historians emphasized the connection between cultural and political events in Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula.¹¹ More recent scholarship has stressed bottom-up, social and cultural histories that focus on external events that led to social and political breaks from the Spanish Crown.¹² Within this new paradigm, the emergence of Atlantic studies has sent many independence scholars toward a multi-hemisphere approach. The study of the Ecuadorian independence movement has not followed the trends of the field at large. A lack of methodological diversity and continuity has left the field as more of a collection of sporadic works than an expanding study following a specific paradigm. Future study of the Ecuadorian independence movement should incorporate similar approaches used within the larger study of

⁹ See John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions* (New York: Norton Press, 1973).

¹⁰ Such approaches focus on ideas stemming from dependency theory and other Marxists explanations for independence.

¹¹ See François-Xavier Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas* (Madrid: Editorial Mapfre, 1992).

¹² See Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

independence. These studies need to combine the internal, regionalist studies of earlier scholars with more recent works that emphasize external, European events instead of focusing on high politics. This integration of new methodologies has the potential to modernize the Ecuadorian historiography and present a more comprehensive understanding of the Ecuadorian past.

Latin American Independence

In the 1970s, the historiography of Latin American Independence incorporated comparative works focusing on regional diversities within the Spanish and Portuguese American empires.¹³ Scholarly works focused the historical narrative on a more regionalized path to independence. John Lynch's foundational text, *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826*, is a comparative analysis giving importance to economic factors, such as the Bourbon Reforms in the eighteenth century, and political factors, such as the attempts by the Creole elites to set up regional independent states. Lynch uses a top-down approach with each chapter devoted to a specific region, which includes a survey of population, commerce, and social structure. For Lynch, and others who have written in this classic political history format, the policies of the Crown and the internal reaction by the local Creole elites played a central role in understanding the events that took place during the independence era. According to Lynch, "Independence...was the culmination of a long process of alienation in which Spanish Americans became aware of their own identity, conscious of their own culture, jealous of

¹³ Victor M. Uribe, "The Enigma of Latin American Independence: Analysis of the Last Ten Years," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997), 237. Uribe's essay also gives a comprehensive list of works done before 1997 on Latin American Independence.

their own resources.”¹⁴ This work can be seen as a cornerstone for the regional-based political and economic synthesis of Latin American independence.

By the end of the 1970s, comparative studies had become the most prominent approach used when looking at Latin American independence; however, a shift to emphasis on external factors also emerged. Timothy Anna challenged this internal approach that focused on events within the Western hemisphere. Through his 1983 book, *Spain and the Loss of America*, Anna emphasized the importance of the “highest levels of power in the empire,” as he focused on the failure of Spanish elites to adopt consistent policies for the Empire, which encouraged revolutionary activity.¹⁵ While keeping the political focus used by Lynch and those who focused on regional issues, Anna explains independence as a consequence of the inability of the Spanish Crown to carry out and implement consistent policies. This approach as with Lynch left out the non-elites in American society.

Social histories dominated the 1980s as several historians switched their approach from comparative analysis to individual case studies. Finding their theoretical basis in works by social scientists such as Theda Skocpol and Immanuel Wallerstein, this trend, exemplified by George Reid Andrews and Nicole Bosquet, looked at the general structural explanations of Latin American independence. Social historians concerned themselves with the breakdown of social control, the rupture of the colonial state and its integration into the world economy.¹⁶ William B. Taylor, in his seminal essay, “Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiry into Early Latin American Social

¹⁴ Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, 1.

¹⁵ Timothy Anna. *Spain and the Loss of America* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). See Uribe, “The Enigma of Latin American Independence,” 238.

¹⁶ Uribe, “The Enigma of Latin American Independence,” 239.

History, 1500-1900,” critiqued the shortcomings of dependency theory and Marxist approaches to history as he attempted to give importance to individual groups while studying Latin American history. Taylor asserted that social historians need to find a “realistic link between social structure, *mentalité*, and social theory.” According to Taylor, the move in the field toward an emphasis on European events created an oversimplified view of “cause and effect and ignores many of the local small-scale changes in social life”.¹⁷ Therefore, the study of social movements, and history from the bottom-up, was an approach that found a middle ground between Lynch’s “regionalism” and Anna’s focus on European policies.

Following the rise of social history in the 1980s, cultural histories became an important theoretical approach in the 1990s. François-Xavier Guerra wrote in 1992 one of the central works contributing to the Latin American historiography, *Modernidad e Independencias: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas*. Guerra’s work connected the independence movement to the Napoleonic Invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808 by stressing the role of modernity, specifically the “imaginary” in pre-revolutionary Hispanic societies and how it shaped the movement. He links Latin American independence to the larger political and cultural events, specifically French expansion and Napoleon Bonaparte, taking place at the same time in Europe, specifically during the period of 1808 to 1812. Instead of focusing solely on the role of the government Guerra highlighted cultural meanings, identity, and the collective understanding of Latin American independence.¹⁸ This work is one of the cornerstone studies connecting the

¹⁷ William B Taylor, “Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiry into Early Latin American Social History, 1500-1900” in *Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History*, ed. Oliver Zunz (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1985) 8,117.

¹⁸ François-Xavier Guerra, *Modernidad e Independencias*, 13.

events in Europe with Latin American during this era. This view of the political structure through a cultural perspective remained a common theme in the 1990s.

A new style of writing, “incident analysis,” focused on specific events in Europe and how they played out in Latin America, emerged using Guerra’s theme of incorporating European events in Latin American independence. Jaime E. Rodríguez O. in *The Independence of Spanish America* focused on the Cortes in Cadiz and the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Rodríguez O. took this event and followed its implications throughout the Spanish American empire, claiming it to be a catalyst for the eventual break from the Spanish Crown even though it held the potential to keep the empire together, which contrasted with Taylor’s attempt to downplay the importance of European events.¹⁹ To accomplish this, Rodríguez O. took a political and cultural approach to the independence movements between 1808 and 1826. Divided into two parts, the book focused on the interplay of late eighteenth century “cultural, institutional, and political transformations” that shaped revolutionary changes during the beginning of the nineteenth century. The second section examined the American response to the fall of the Spanish Crown following the Napoleonic invasion. Rodríguez O. continued the trend of examining “high politics” seen in older works as he looked at Spanish American independence within a “broader revolution for representative government within the Spanish World.”²⁰ This approach, by showing how the top-down approach to history had been used to view a specific event, also gave emphasis to events that previous scholars had seen as integral parts leading up to the independence movements, such as the Bourbon Reforms.

¹⁹ Jaime E. Rodríguez O, *The Independence of Spanish America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998), 2.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 5.

As the end of the twentieth century approached, evaluations of the historiography of the independence era were written. Victor M. Uribe's "The Enigma of Latin American Independence: Analysis of the Last Ten Years," written in 1997, pointed out the numerous works that had been published on Latin American independence as well as the various approaches used when studying this time period. Uribe's central theme was on the dearth of works that used the bottom-up approach to history, which he blamed on the comparative and structural works that focused on elite actors.²¹ A similar article written by John Lynch in 1999, "Spanish American Independence in Recent Historiography," examined the evolving study of independence by looking at different studies ranging from political, cultural, social, and economic histories. According to Lynch, while differing approaches have been prominent in studying independence, the same basic frameworks have been used. No new theories on independence have come out of the past thirty years, as new studies presented a revision on older works and the general interpretation of independence.²² Both Uribe and Lynch present compelling analyses on the historiography, showing the differing approaches scholars have used when studying the independence era.

Recently a new approach focusing on the effects the wars for independence had on the newly formed states in Latin America emerged. Christon I. Archer's edited volume, *The Wars of Independence in Spanish America* (2000), looked at the battles for independence and their role on the independent states that evolved after these wars. The political instability following the wars of independence can trace its roots to the actual

²¹ Uribe, "The Enigma of Latin American Independence," 255.

²² John Lynch. "Spanish American Independence in Recent Historiography" in *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America: Perspectives and Problems* ed. Anthony Macfarlane & Eduardo Posada-Carbó (London: University of London Press, 1999), 41-42.

independence movements themselves. The instability exposed by nineteenth-century Latin American states was not solely the effect of the Bourbon Reforms, but also the conduct of the revolutionary wars in Spanish America.²³

Works focusing on external factors when studying Latin American independence continued to be prominent after the turn of the century. José María Portillo's 2006 book *Crisis Atlántica: Autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la monarquía hispana*, paid close attention to the political ideals emerging from the Cortes of Cádiz beginning in 1810. According to this study, the Spanish crown and its vast empire had a series of specialized rules, regulations, and governmental structures that were connected by the monarchy. Therefore, when Napoleon invaded Portugal and then Spain, it became difficult to set up a "legitimate" government in its place. The Spanish Cortes had to find a way to link the already established political norms in a way that did not disrupt the balance of power in the Spanish kingdoms. Portillo spent most of the book examining what took place in the Iberian Peninsula comparing the unfolding events in the Basque Country and Navarre and how they related to the Cortes.²⁴ By doing so, Portillo tried to show just how important the "Atlantic Crisis" was, not just to Spain, but also its vast kingdom across the globe. This particular study took Rodríguez O.'s argument even closer to the events in Spain as he looked almost entirely at the Iberian Peninsula. Such a move to the "Atlantic," by directly connecting independence in the Americas to Spain, has been an important theme in recent independence studies.

²³ Christon I. Archer, *The Wars of Independence in Spanish America* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 33-35.

²⁴ José María Portillo, *Crisis Atlántica: Autonomía e independencia en las crisis de la monarquía hispana* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2006).

Up through the cultural turn in the 1990s, works on Latin American independence had focused primarily on a top-down approach. It only has been recently that scholars turned their attention away from elite based studies. Jeremy Adelman's *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*, published in 2006 focused on the issue of sovereignty seen in the merchant classes during the Spanish and Portuguese American wars for independence. Merchants had to redefine, or in many cases justify, the sovereignty of the new politics because they did not see themselves as subjects of an imperial power, but as participants in a larger economic realm across the Americas.²⁵ For Adelman, the battle for independence centered on the struggle between the various subjects within the empire and how they attempted to define themselves to each other. *Sovereignty and Revolution* continued the theory that outside events, particularly those in Europe, created political and social strife in the Americas, which eventually lead to the downfall of the Spanish and Portuguese kingdoms in America. Adelman's work is an example of the evolution of independence historiography, from a political history focusing on internal conflicts within the Americas, to a social and cultural history focusing on external events which lead to social and political breaks from the Spanish Crown.

Manuel Chust continues the theme that highlights the importance of external events on independence in his book, *1808: La Eclósión Juntera en el Mundo Hispano* published in 2007. Following a similar theme that François-Xavier Guerra used in *Modernidad e Independencias*, Chust argued that the relationship between the Iberian Peninsula and its American colonies changed dramatically following the Napoleonic Invasion. Regional Juntas, or governing councils, sprouted up throughout Latin America as they unified under a common ideological basis ruling in the name of the exiled

²⁵ Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution*, 6-9.

Spanish king, Ferdinand VII. Therefore, the events in Spain had created pockets of unification throughout the empire as the ruling Juntas followed a similar pattern of governance in their attempt to create successful autonomous movements.²⁶ Chust's book, like Adelman's, helped show contrasting approaches within the historiography of Latin American independence.

Most recently, in an article from the *Historical Journal* in 2009, Gabriel Paquette, published "The Dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy," an in-depth analysis of recent trends in scholarship surrounding the independence movements. Paquette examined the four principal approaches to the field in recent years, explaining both their relevance and effect on Spanish and Latin American studies as well as on new topics. One particular question he looked at surrounded the social implications following the formation of new republics and whether or not they can be deemed as "revolutionary." Each point, from the rise of anti-colonial sentiments among Creoles, to the increase in peninsular control, geopolitical upheaval following the Napoleonic invasion, and the rise in Enlightenment thought, presented a contrasting approach in recent studies. Paquette, however, calls for an examination of six "understudied" areas concerning Latin American independence, calling them valuable pieces that can fill the "cracks in the edifice" of existing research in the field.²⁷ The six approaches: works concerning the complexity of the late-colonial state; local response to the Bonapartist state's attempted reforms; failed movements before the wars of independence, primarily from 1809-1812; the role of regionalism in the formation of the nation-state; the role of local rebel band leaders or gangs; and the importance of catechisms, sermons, and ceremonies in shaping public

²⁶ Manuel Chust, *1808: La Eclosión Juntera en el Mundo Hispano* (México: El Colegio de México, 2007)

²⁷ Gabriel Paquette, "The Dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy" *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2009), 211.

opinion. Two of these understudied areas, the examination of early autonomous movements and the rise of regionalism, are cornerstones for this thesis.

Beginning with Lynch's seminal study on the "internal" history of Latin American independence in the 1970s, the historiography of the field has incorporated a variety of different theories and methodologies. As the field expanded, so did the ways in which these independence movements were approached. Studies ranging from William B. Taylor's essay on the problem of oversimplification when studying European events in connection with independence to François-Xavier Guerra, who focused on European importance in Latin American independence while at the same time ushering in the cultural turn, have enriched the historiography. With recent works such as Jeremy Adelman's study on the question of sovereignty through the merchant classes, the field continues to evolve by bringing in new theories to combine with the existing methodological frameworks.

Ecuadorian Independence

The diverse approaches used in Latin American independence studies are not as visible in the Ecuadorian example, which has been a sporadic array of works that do not connect to the large trends in the field. Instead, beginning in 1890 with Federico González Suárez's foundational work, the study of Ecuadorian independence has focused on "high politics" to create a political narrative centered solely on governmental and political actions. Future studies emphasized additional subjects, such as the role of religion, Creole elites, and the Spanish Constitution of 1812, but the historiography has

not gone beyond elite-based studies and has limited its growth to comparisons with Latin American independence studies as a whole.

A limited number of essays have attempted to consolidate all of the recent studies into one analysis. Juan Marchena Fernández's 2007 essay, "Los Procesos de Independencia en los Países Andinos: Ecuador y Bolivia," examined the different works that have been written on Ecuadorian independence both chronologically and thematically. Marchena Fernández points out the need to study and know the contradictions of the colonial system and how these political structures shaped what took place during the independence movement.²⁸ This essay included the essential works written outside of Ecuador into a local produced collection, creating a more diverse historiography within the Ecuadorian field.

The foundational work for modern Ecuadorian history was written by Federico González Suárez, entitled *Historia general de la república del Ecuador*. Published in 1890, this three volume work set the stage for many recent studies on Ecuador. González Suárez was a local friar, later archbishop of Quito, who studied the role of the Catholic religion in Ecuadorian society and wrote a general history about his country's past. Following top-down approach, he attempted to show the elite and religious groups as inherently important to the Ecuadorian equation. One of the shortcomings of his work is the author's obvious bias shown throughout, specifically his thoughts on the inferiority of indigenous populations and how religious acts determine what is history.²⁹ Later works that cite González Suárez normally do not force specific beliefs toward the indigenous

²⁸ Juan Marchena Fernández, "Los Procesos de Independencia en Los Países Andinos: Ecuador y Bolivia," in *Debates sobre la independencia Iberoamericanos*, ed. Manuel Chust and José Antonio Serrano. (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2007), 198.

²⁹ Marchena Fernández, "Los Procesos de Independencia en Los Países Andinos," 168.

populations upon the reader, they do follow his top-down approach to history.

Nevertheless, González Suárez's has been referenced in many works on the history of Ecuador, such as Jaime E. Rodríguez O., Segundo Moreno and Manuel María Borrero.³⁰

Following González Suárez, it would not be until the late 1950s and early 1960s before another prominent historiographic shift would take place in works that focused on Ecuadorian Independence. A trio of works presented a patriotic view of independence in classical narratives. The first, published in 1959, entitled *Quito: Luz de América*, was written by Manuel María Borrero. It is from this work that two of the more well known names for the Junta of 1809 were popularized; "Luz de América" and "Primer Grito de la Independencia", as Borrero wrote a political narrative focusing on Juan Pío Montúfar and his role in the Junta of 1809. The second book was written by Gabriel Cevallos García entitled *Reflexiones sobre la historia general del Ecuador*, published the following year in 1960. Cevallos García looks at the role of Eugenio Espejo, the well known enlightened mestizo who pushed for education reform for the lower classes in Quito. The third of these works, *Quito, 1809-1812: Según los documentos del Archivo Nacional de Madrid*, was written in 1960 by Alfredo Ponce Ribadeneira. This study looks at over 100 primary source documents, which are published in the back of the book, to construct a political narrative that attempts to show the importance of the Juntas of 1809 and 1810 in securing Ecuadorian independence.³¹ These three works show not only the wide variety of topics looked at by those who study independence, but also the diverse approaches among works published on the topic. While each of these three works is an important

³⁰ Manuel María Borrero, *Actas en La Revolución quiteña, 1809-1812* (Quito: Editorial Espejo, 1962). Segundo Moreno Yáñez, *Sublevaciones Indígenas en la Audiencia de Quito: Desde comienzos del siglo XVIII hasta finales de la Colonia* (Quito: Universidad Católica, 1976). Jaime E. Rodríguez O. *La Revolución Política durante la Época de la Independencia*.

³¹ Marchena, Fernández, "Los Procesos de Independencia en Los Países Andinos," 169-171.

contribution to the historiography of Ecuador, it is important to note that they exclude a discussion of external factors, such as events in Spain and Europe, which could have played important roles in the independence process.

Demetrio Ramos Pérez's work, *Entre el Plata y Bogotá: Cuatro Claves de la Emancipación Ecuatoriana*, published in 1978, would be the next important study on Ecuadorian Independence. Looking at not only the Juntas of 1809 and 1810 and Battle of Pichincha in 1822, Ramos Pérez pays close attention to the events leading up to independence, particularly the presidency of el Baron de Carondelet from 1799 to 1807.³² Known as the Creole President, Carondelet (a peninsular) empowered many of the Creole elites who had become disgruntled by the Bourbon Reforms of the 18th Century. One Creole family that was able to find favor with Carondelet was the Montúfars, who would play an instrumental role in the Juntas of 1809 and 1810. Ramos Pérez is able to follow the same approach used by John Lynch in 1973, thus linking the historiography of Ecuadorian independence with trends in studies on Latin American independence movements.

Instead of following the top-down approach, Martin Minchom enriches the historiography by taking a bottom up approach to viewing independence. His book, *The People of Quito, 1690-1810: Change and Unrest in the Underclass* (1994) looks in detail at some of the catalysts leading to the Junta of 1809, such as the Quito Insurrection of 1765, the attempts by Eugenio Espejo for reform, and the presidency of the Baron de Carondelet. Minchom emphasizes the lower classes of Quito during the colonial period and, therefore, only mentions these elite, political events when they directly interact with

³² Demetrio Ramos Pérez, *Entre el Plata y Bogotá*, 134.

the underclass. Although this study does not focus directly on independence, its contribution can be seen in its incorporation of lower, subjugated classes into the field.

Recently, more studies on Ecuadorian independence have emerged, specifically with the looming bicentennial of the 1809 Junta. In an article entitled “Las Primeras Juntas Quiteñas,” Carlos Landázuri Camacho, analyzes the political events involving both Juntas as he attempts to show the economic problems associated with the autonomous movements. While the leaders of the Junta of 1809 wanted to have a trading system with the existing viceregal capitals of Lima and Santa Fé de Bogotá, they were unable to establish any of the necessary economic ties since all of the surrounding regions wanted to suppress the Junta. Landázuri Camacho is able to present the events surrounding independence more clearly, but he recounts the events through secondary literature.³³

One new development in recent studies is by Jaime E. Rodríguez O. entitled, *La Revolución Política durante la Época de la Independencia: El Reino de Quito, 1808-1822*, published in 2007. Rodríguez O. accounts for both the events leading up to the independence era in Ecuador as well as the events themselves, though he pays little attention to the Juntas of 1809 and 1810 in Quito. He follows the same thesis in his 1998 work on Latin American independence, emphasizing the centrality of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, claiming it to be the central catalyst that possibly could have saved the Spanish Empire. Instead of revering independence heroes such as Simón Bolívar, Rodríguez O. claims their inability to use the Constitution to unify the colonies with Spain led to a breakdown within the empire. By focusing on external factors, this work

³³ Carlos Landázuri Camacho, “Las Primeras Juntas Quiteñas”, *La Independencia en los Países Andinos: Nuevas Perspectivas*, (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2003), 95.

becomes central to the study of Ecuadorian independence because it breaks from the narrow focus on events in Ecuador. This in-depth study brings an extensively researched book to the historiography for the first time since Ramos Pérez in 1978.

After looking at various studies on Ecuadorian independence, the lack of methodological diversity becomes evident. A variety of theoretical approaches have created separate paradigm shifts throughout the past forty years in the historiography of Latin American independence as a whole. Similarly, the rise of the Atlantic World field has attempted to place the independence movements within a broad Atlantic framework, helping expand the study to include external events and their implications across various regions. Latin American studies have, therefore, created a solid body of well-researched works. The majority of the Ecuadorian independence historiography has focused on political narrative of elites and focused on only local, or regional causes. Aside from Rodríguez O., all studies ignore the external factors that could have contributed to independence. This emphasis on high politics has made it difficult for the Ecuadorian field to reflect trends within the larger study of independence in the rest of Latin America. It is necessary for the Ecuadorian field to “modernize” its studies by integrating new methodologies and theoretical approaches to better understand the independence movements, its social actors, and connect these works to the field at large.

Chapter 3: Charles III and the Quito Insurrection of 1765

Following the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, a member of the Bourbon family, which held power in France, officially began control of the Spanish throne, ultimately creating a new relationship with its colonies. The transference of power from the Hapsburg family had its most direct effect on the American colonies when Charles III became king of Spain in 1759. Throughout Spanish America, the Bourbon Reforms, a series of policies aimed at centralizing colonial power into the hands of the Spanish Monarchy, intensified as Madrid implemented fiscal, commercial, and defense changes. A primary goal of the reforms was to bring about a more centralized state structure through the placement of key officials directly loyal to the Crown within the colonies. They sought to “demolish the authority of the colonial elites, severely restricting their right to hold office and tightening peninsular control over colonial trade.”³⁴ During the Hapsburg regime in the seventeenth century, Creole elites had much local political power, enabling them to control affairs in their region. In doing so, large revenues from the colonies never made it to Madrid, and local Creoles gained prominent positions in the bureaucracy, such as governorships and audiencia presidencies. The Bourbon monarchy wanted to secure this power and wealth for the central government in Spain. One aspect of centralization was to replace Creole elites with peninsulars; which created dissention between the two social groups in the Spanish Indies. For the Creoles, this was a violation of their traditional

³⁴ Gabriel B. Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808* (Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 128.

liberties since they had long held power on the local level. Madrid viewed such ideas of a ‘composite monarchy’, where a common monarch united distinct provinces or kingdoms, as notions of the past.³⁵ An un-written understanding between Madrid and its colonies based on accepted ideologies of governance stemming from the medieval document, the Siete Partidas, existed under the Hapsburgs.³⁶ This agreement, however, was gone by the 1760s as the changing of prevailing notions of government in Spain forced local Creole elites to redefine their political role in both the local and imperial level.

One region where these ideological differences disrupted the political order was in the Audiencia of Quito. Following the decline of the silver mines to the south, primarily in Potosí, and the importation of European cloth into Spanish American markets, the Quito economy, which depended mainly upon the production of coarse woolen cloth, entered into a prolonged decline, beginning in the early 1700s. The established Spanish system under the Hapsburgs made the region surrounding Quito the center of production for cloth used in Potosí. With a population within the Andean city as high as 150,000 in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, there was a high demand in Potosí for Quiteño woolen cloth. Their secondary market, Lima, infiltrated with cheaper European clothes, created a sharp decline in sales of textiles from the North-Central Sierra. One way local elites attempted to overcome the economic decline was through investments into the *aguardiente* industry. As a staple drink for the local indigenous populations and urban mestizos, the sugar alcohol was a self-sustaining

³⁵Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire*, 128. Essay on ‘composite monarchy’, J.H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past and Present* No. 137, (1969), 51.

³⁶ The Siete Partidas were written in the 13th Century during the reign of Alfonso X of Castile with the intentions of creating a unified legal system for Central Spain. The document was influential in Spanish America throughout the colonial era, especially under the Hapsburgs (1506-1700). Even though the Siete Partidas still remained the main basis for law in Spain and its colonies during the Bourbon dynasty (1700-present), a more practical and rational approach to law became prominent.

business and did not rely on foreign markets or the Spanish economy to determine its value. Local *obrajes*, or factories, continued to decline, causing more and more Creoles to invest in *aguardiente* to make up for their economic losses.

In 1764, the Viceroy of New Granada, the administrative leader of the region, Don Pedro Messía de la Cerda, attempted to establish a monopoly over the production of *aguardiente*, and take *alcabala*, or local sales tax, away from the control of local tax farmers and place it under the direct administration of the royal treasury.³⁷ The leader of the *aguardiente* monopoly before this administrative change had been Mariano Solano de Salas, a member of the local Creole elite.³⁸ Tensions elevated between the local elites and the newly appointed peninsular officials sent from Spain to carry out the Bourbon's reform of the *aguardiente* and *alcabala* forced local Creoles to lose control of these existing enterprises. The incoming Spaniards became part of the local peninsular population, creating a clear distinction between the established Creole elites and the incoming Spaniards, exacerbating the rift forming within the upper class in Quito. The success of Don Juan Diaz de Herrera, representative of the Viceroy sent to implement these new laws, in Popayán in late 1764 only heightened existing problems in Quito as the reforms gained support at the governmental level.³⁹ The local elites who first began to oppose the new measures met on December 7, 1764 at a *cabildo abierto*, or town-hall meeting, led by the Creole Francisco de Borja, in order to express their discontent. The

³⁷ Andrien, "Economic Crisis, Taxes, and the Quito Insurrection of 1765," *Past and Present*, No. 129, (1990), 120.

³⁸ Minchom, *The People of Quito*, 223.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 223.

royal government, however, held firm on implementing the monopoly on the *aguardiente* and the new sales tax, and on May 21, 1765, the new measures were set in place.⁴⁰

The very next day, May 22, a rebellion broke out in Quito, eventually growing to include seven thousand disgruntled subjects who demanded a revocation of the tax reforms and a pardon for all the demonstrators.⁴¹ The economic declines, combined with the Crown's attempt to impose a royal monopoly, presented a common ground for the Creole elites and the plebeians, the laboring class in Quito, enabling them to unite in an attempt to stop these incoming reforms. A first riot that night succeeded, as many as seven thousand strong from the *barrios*, neighborhood, of San Roque, San Sebastián and San Blas, successfully forced the Audiencia to submit to a "humiliating process of negotiation," eventually agreeing to a suspension of the monopoly. After a second riot on June 24th, the judges decided to surrender all weapons to the plebeians, and expel all peninsular Spaniards who were not married to local Creoles within the city.⁴² The Viceroy in Santa Fé de Bogotá sent a small group of about two dozen troops to quell the riot in Quito, but their appeals to the locals were of no avail as the troops made little impact.⁴³

By sending a meager force to stop the riot, the Viceroy showed his inability to understand the local grievances. *Aguardiente* had been a staple for the lower class and they did not want to pay the high prices charged by the new Crown monopoly to buy it. For the local elite, the *aguardiente* replaced textile production as a main source of income

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 224.

⁴¹ Andrien, "Economic Crisis," 126.

⁴² Minchom, *The People of Quito*, 223-224. See also Anthony McFarlane. "The 'Rebellion of the Barrios': Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 69, No. 2, (1989), 303-305.

⁴³ McFarlane, "The 'Rebellion of the Barrios,'" 303.

following the decline in textile sales from the North Sierra. On July 4, 1765, the plebeians reassembled at the Plaza Mayor in Quito and declared their loyalty to the king, though the success of the riots effectively ended royal rule in the city as power now rested in the hands of the unstable coalition consisting of both the lower and upper class.⁴⁴

Class and ethnic divisions that existed within the loosely formed coalition of Creoles and plebeians proved to be the downfall of a promising attempt to overturn the new tax reforms. The contrasting goals among those within the coalition caused tensions before the revolt even took place. Martin Minchom looked at a secret investigation by the order of Gregorio Ignacio Hurtado de Mendoza, a private investigator sent by the viceroy, shortly after the rebellion began in August 1765. A notary by the name of Juan Matheo Navarette claims to have seen an unsigned letter where the members of San Roque, a mestizo *barrio*, threatened the local indigenous population to come to their defense or the locals would burn their houses. These tensions within the coalition, as Minchom shows, may have signified a front unified by Creole force, not by choice.⁴⁵ This unsigned letter helps demonstrate the diversity among the loose coalition. The stratified society in eighteenth-century Quito gave clear roles of power to the Creoles, leaving the lower classes to work under the local elites and thus, not equal to them. While both sides agreed that the reforms went against existing political norms, the process of how to stop their implementation and later to rule the city of Quito differed dramatically. In the end, the popular coalition made up of both Creoles and plebeians could not find enough common ground and a royal army led by Antonio de Zelaya, on September 1, 1766, took back the city with ease. The inability of the coalition to see past class and

⁴⁴ Andrien, "Economic Crisis," 135.

⁴⁵ Minchom, *The People of Quito*, 231. Taken from Archivo Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá. Historia Civil Tomo 4, fol. 951.

ethnic differences shows the difficulty faced by those attempting to unite the city, making it nearly impossible to see any unity among the classes in the immediate future.⁴⁶

The bonds of unity between the classes failed to hold the governing coalition together in the year after the rebellion. The lack of popular uprisings after the Insurrection of 1765, even while Quito faced extreme fiscal problems, shows the strong divisions between the social groups.⁴⁷ The possibility of losing control was real for these local elites as the threat emanated from above (Madrid) and below (plebeians). Within a short time, Creoles, who had almost total control of the government on the local level now had to deal with the prospect of losing power to the plebeians and the peninsulars.⁴⁸ Both sides could not consent to each other's desires, as Creole elites were not able to see past the stratified society (plebeians vs. elites) in their attempt to regain power. Madrid and its attempts at reform created both a physical and psychological threat. Losing control of the *aguardiente* and *alcabala* not only meant a loss in revenues and political power, but it also represented a change in ruling policy in Quito. Borja and the Creole elites believed they controlled local affairs as their natural right, but at the same time their legitimate ruler, the King in Madrid, attempted to take away this ancient liberty. From below, the plebeians remained a serious threat as the Insurrection of 1765 left a "legacy of mistrust and fear...dividing the city's social groups."⁴⁹

After reassuming power in Quito, the Crown decided it needed to restructure its administrative system in the Audiencia. The city was now in an uneasy peace, while the

⁴⁶ Andrien, "Economic Crisis," 128.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁴⁸ Tamar Herzog points out in her book *Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System (1650-1750)* how local Creoles were able to buy offices and titles, giving them almost total control on the political level up until the implementation of the Bourbon Reforms in the middle of the eighteenth century.

⁴⁹ Andrien, "Economic Crisis," 129.

rest of the surrounding Audiencias became entrenched in rebellions such as the Tupac Amaru revolt in Peru in the 1770s and the Comunero Rebellion near Bogotá in the 1780s.⁵⁰ Fear among the Creole elites had now shifted its focus from the fiscal problems mentioned earlier to the plebeians and possible lower class revolts.⁵¹ This shift, it appears, marked a new approach to power for the Creole elites within the city. With their attention now focused on the lower classes instead of the economic problems facing them, it is possible a new dynamic centering on the loss of power added to the problems for the Creoles. Instead of turning to Madrid for help, which continually ignored requests from later Presidents of the Audiencia, the elites had to handle the issues on their own. This inability to reconcile ideological differences only heightened tensions between Madrid and its subjects in the region. Sensing the need for swift action, a new political figure came to Quito in 1778 extinguishing any hope of a united front.

⁵⁰ See Yáñez, *Sublevaciones Indígenas en la Audiencia de Quito* for an in-depth look at the smaller scale uprisings that took place in the Audiencia during this time.

⁵¹ Andrien, "Economic Crisis," 129.

Chapter 4: Contrasting Presidencies: José García de León y Pizarro and Barón de Carondelet

In 1778, Jose García de León y Pizarro, sent by the Spanish Crown to help remedy the economic problems within the region, became President of the Audiencia of Quito. Being a protégé of José de Gálvez, who had established himself as a powerful Minister of the Indies after his work in New Spain, García Pizarro established a strong line of communication between the Andean capital and Madrid through his connections with the Council of the Indies. In doing so, he created a more centralized government gaining power through higher taxes, ultimately having a negative effect on the other sectors of society. García Pizarro held the position of *visitador*, president-regent, treasury subdelegate, and captain general marking the first time that one man controlled the political, fiscal, judicial, and military decisions within the Audiencia.⁵² Shortly after taking control he sent a letter to Gálvez on June 18, 1779, stating the many problems he had found concerning the region, including in the coastal city of Guayaquil. The economic situation had continued to worsen and García Pizarro's intent was to reinvigorate the economy by limiting the sale of European textiles in the Audiencia, providing local miners with cheap mercury to help stimulate production, and subsidizing the importation of the African slaves in an attempt to make up for labor shortages.⁵³ At its base, the implementation of these new measures would have been helpful for the

⁵² Andrien. *The Kingdom of Quito*, 192.

⁵³ Ramos Perez, *Entre Bogotá y la Plata*, 112-113, 139 and Andrien, *The Kingdom of Quito*, 192-193.

Quiteños as an improving economy would affect both the Creoles, through increased revenues from high textile sales, and the lower classes, through work and income. The local elites, despite having to endure a more centralized government limiting their power under García Pizarro, would reap the rewards of increased sales from their *obrajes*, while at the same time an increase in mine production would mean more work for the locals.

When officials in Madrid and Lima received García Pizarro's letter, his ideas were immediately rejected forcing the president to alter his policies. Based on this decision, he decided to follow a successful model laid out by Gálvez in New Spain. The ultimate goal was to increase the power of the state, leading to an exploitation of the economic resources within the Audiencia. To do so, the president collected revenues from the locals and put them into the local royal treasury in an attempt to increase Crown funds. In 1783, with the creation of his centralized state financial bureaucracy, García Pizarro implemented this model. Headed by the *Dirección general de rentas*, the reforms took control of collecting taxes from the most lucrative business ventures in the Audiencia. The program proved to be successful and an increase in revenues soon took place in the three treasury districts of Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca.⁵⁴ The successes seen under García Pizarro relied on the state's ability to draw from its local resources, including the textile industry in the highly populated Sierra region. Quito suffered severely from the economic depression as one of the principal contributors to the downturn, the importation of European clothes, still existed under García Pizarro's new plan. During his time as President of the Audiencia the textile industry had not improved. These reforms led to an increase in taxation, yet there had not been an increase in

⁵⁴ Andrien, *The Kingdom Of Quito*, 193-195. For exact incomes see Andrien, *The Kingdom of Quito*, 197, 199, 201.

personal revenues which only increased the burden of those living in the region.⁵⁵

Therefore, García Pizarro's plan left the Audiencia in economic shambles heading into the nineteenth century.

The reforms implemented by García Pizarro had social consequences as the high tensions that existed between the different social groups in the Audiencia led to fear among the local Creoles as they lost power on the local administrative level and lost control of the local economy. The local elites, specifically Juan Pío Montúfar, the Marqués de Selva Alegre, turned to the ideas of a local intellectual and journalist Eugenio Espejo to handle the high tensions within society. Born in 1747 in Quito to an indigenous father and mulatto mother, Francisco Eugenio de Santa Cruz y Espejo graduated from the University of Santo Tomás in 1767 with a degree in medicine.⁵⁶ Dealing with intense discrimination while attending college because of his racial background, Espejo became an activist for changing the local society in Quito, based on notions of regionalism, nationalism and human rights for all. While practicing as a physician, he wrote satires about the distinctions between the rich and the poor, the abuses of the Church, poor sanitation in the city, and the lack of education among children and non-elites. Even though Espejo attacked the stratified society in Quito, it was not until 1783, and his “retrato de Golilla” did he attack the actual governing political structure. In his writing, Espejo criticized both King Charles III and Gálvez, claiming the leaders in Spain had not focused on improving the colonies, but instead on exploiting them.⁵⁷ This attack took place two years after the Tupac Amaru revolt in Peru, giving its presentation even more potency, as the revolt spread fear of lower class unrest across the Andean region. Espejo,

⁵⁵ Andrien, *The Kingdom of Quito*, 204.

⁵⁶ José María Vargas, *Biografía de Eugenio Espejo*, (Quito: Edición Santo Domingo, 1968), 17.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 77.

at first, attempted to work within the existing structure to rebuild Quito at the local level, though his efforts did not produce immediate results. In 1787, local government officials arrested him for his controversial piece about a group of corrupt friars in Riobamba, *Al Defensa de los Curas de Riobamba*. Instead of standing up for the local religious leaders, Espejo revealed the problems associated with the local Church's power over the Audiencia, specifically their exploitation of Church taxes for personal gain.

Espejo's rhetoric turned to civic improvement, rather than criticizing religious bigotry, when he favored the creation of the *Sociedad de Amigos del Pais* (Society of Friends of the Country) on November 30, 1791. Meeting at the Jesuit's school in Quito, with twenty-eight other citizens, including Juan Pío Montúfar, Espejo publicized many of the injustices forced upon those living in Quito, including Creole concerns over power within the local administrative structure. While not calling for independence immediately, Espejo and his fellow members did call for radical change. On Thursday, January 5, 1792, the Society published the first newspaper in Quito, *Primicias de la Cultura de Quito* (First Fruits of the Culture of Quito). Espejo, however, was only able to publish seven editions, with the final printing on March 29. In 1793 a royal cédula, sent by King Charles IV, disbanded the Society which led to the termination of the newspapers' publication, claiming it attacked the sovereignty of the King, specifically because of its personal attack on the King and the royal court.⁵⁸ The short lifespan of both the Society and the newspaper, however, did not diminish its importance to the future leaders of the Junta. For the first time in Quito, controversial material about the government, whether about the ineptitude of child care (1st Issue) or the need for math, science, technology, and philosophy to become prominent subjects studied in school (2nd

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 86.

Issue), entered into the public sphere. Espejo died four years later in 1796; however, his attempts to restructure government control and action in Quito showed the conspirators of 1809 a means voice their grievances with the Spanish Crown. By the end of the eighteenth century Enlightenment ideas of nationalism penetrated the Spanish colonies, and having an intellectual of Espejo's status in Quito only heightened the awareness of the problems within the city.

Espejo's brother, Juan Pablo followed in his sibling's path by helping to instill more nationalistic ideas into the minds of the local elites. Following the news of the French Revolution, the younger Espejo declared that France had been right in choosing "liberty" and felt Spanish America, specifically Quito, should do the same. By 1795, such statements combined with the elder Espejo's writings rekindled the anti-Spanish sentiments that had appeared in 1765. The Audiencia district still suffered from an economic recession, worsened by the policies of the García Pizarro regime in the 1770s and 1780s. Juan Pablo became an advocate for change, proclaiming that these nationalistic feelings existed throughout the city. A sense of nationalistic pride began to work its way into the minds of some Quiteños as "most people in this city [Quito] are determined to ask for liberty."⁵⁹ Therefore in 1795 it seemed as though the elites in the city found a common ground to escape the economic problems by demanding sweeping change, as these emotions mirrored those felt in 1765. Similar to thirty years earlier, the local populations did not like the Crown's reaction to the economic problems as the arrival of the printing press in 1780 and Espejo's controversial publications gave the public more access to information, however, there was a difference. The Creole elites had

⁵⁹ Minchom, *The People of Quito*, 239. Source is taken from a conversation between Juan Pablo Espejo and Dona Francisca Navarette.

such Enlightenment ideals as liberty and nationalism, giving them an ideology to express their disgust within the existing Spanish system.

What do the reforms of García Pizarro and the immediate reactions they caused have to do with the Juntas of 1809 and 1810? By coming in and carrying out new, and in some cases, harsher tax controls and reforms, the García Pizarro regime increased profits for the royal treasury. In doing so, however, he set up a centralized bureaucratic structure where only the top few elites reaped the rewards, which in many cases were peninsulars and not local Creoles.⁶⁰ The Garcia Pizzaro regime established the governmental model used until 1799.

As Quito inched closer to the nineteenth century the rift between the local elites and the newly installed peninsular population became a central concern for the Creoles. Even Enlightenment ideals could not hide the fact that the region had been going through an economic recession causing even greater friction as creoles and peninsulars competed for different commercial and governmental jobs within the city and throughout the Audiencia.⁶¹ For example, in Guayaquil, the production of cacao, a highly important and successful crop for the economy on the coast, had brought about conflicts between prominent exporters and newly incoming peninsular governmental officials.⁶² Jaime E. Rodriguez O. attributes some of this economic trouble to the creation of a new viceroyalty in Buenos Aires in 1776, shifting trade away from Quito, which added to the problems already mentioned during the García Pizarro regime.⁶³ The tide began to shift

⁶⁰ The rule of García Pizarro embodied the absolutist policies emanating from Madrid over its colonies.

⁶¹ Rodríguez O, *La Revolución Política*, 62.

⁶² *Ibid*, 63.

⁶³ Rodriguez O, *The Independence of Spanish America*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998), 67.

as Creoles gained the sympathy of Francois-Louis Héctor, Barón de Carondelet, who became president of the Audiencia in 1799.⁶⁴

Taking over in February 1799, the former governor of Louisiana found himself in a difficult situation, which forced him to seek favor from the local elites. Carondelet arrived in Quito with barely enough money to secure his passage and needed to obtain personal loans quickly.⁶⁵ After surveying the Audiencia and realizing the enormous amount of restructuring that would be necessary, Carondelet devised a plan to invigorate the Audiencia, similar to the plans of his predecessors. He set out to increase agriculture in lowland regions, and improved production in the *obrajes*, by incorporating the stagnant labor force into the economy through public work projects.⁶⁶ Once Madrid and Bogotá rejected his plans, he only had one option: to turn to the Creoles. As Thomas Marc Fiehrer states, “It was his [Carondelet’s] law, but their [Creoles’] society.”⁶⁷ Taking a different stance than García Pizarro, Carondelet decided to incorporate the Creoles into his economic and social programs, helping reestablish their control on the local level. His first project entailed the reconstruction of the economic infrastructure of Riobamba, a city located in Andean Sierra, destroyed by an earthquake in 1797. Carondelet put Javier Montúfar, a prominent member of the Creole elite, in charge. At the same time Carondelet spent three weeks at the Hacienda de Chillo, property of Javier’s cousin, Juan Pío Montúfar.⁶⁸ The Montúfar family emerged as a prominent family in Quito following the tenure of the First Marqués de Selva Alegre, Juan María de Montúfar y Fraso, who

⁶⁴ Rodríguez O, *La Revolución Política*, 63.

⁶⁵ Thomas Marc Fiehrer, *The Baron de Carondelet as Agent of the Bourbon Reforms: A Study of Spanish Colonial Administration in the Years of the French Revolution*, (PhD Diss., Tulane University, 1977), 585.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 595-610.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 685.

⁶⁸ Ramos Pérez, *Entre el Plata y Bogotá*, 148.

arrived in May 1758 as President of the Audiencia. Carondelet would continue to work closely with the family, as well as other prominent Creole figures, throughout his reign as President of the Audiencia. Combining his progressive ideas with those of the local elites, Carondelet established a *Libre Comercial*, or open commercial venture, which attempted to open up the economy in the Audiencia to the benefit of the local elites. The President also saw the two viceroyalties of Peru and New Granada as administrations that were hurting the economy in Quito. The viceroys in Lima and Bogotá, according to the President, helped create the problems with the local textile industry by allowing the importation of European clothes into the Andean region.⁶⁹ Carondelet sent letters to Madrid and Lima in an attempt to address the economic problems in Quito, yet he received the same response as García Pizarro twenty years earlier. The Spanish Crown viewed the Audiencia of Quito as a backwater. Lima and Bogotá both benefited from the importation of European clothes as it was cheaper to buy higher quality imported textiles because of their lower price. Therefore, the Crown did not solve any of the problems faced by the Audiencia at the end of the eighteenth century.

Carondelet's improvements to the local Creole society also created a unique *metalité* among the local elite. By the end of Carondelet's presidency, the Creoles had regained much of the local influence they possessed before the Insurrection of 1765. While they were unable to buy governmental and administrative offices like before, they did regain control of certain economic ventures lost to peninsulars. Seeing similar examples of revolt in the United States in 1776 and France in 1789, some elites saw revolt as the necessary goal. At the same time, the Andean region experienced three lower class revolts to the south, Tupac Amaru (1779-81) in Cuzco, Tupac Katari (1781)

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 148, 150-151.

in La Paz, and Tomas Katari (1780-81) in Charcas and one, the Comunero Rebellion in New Granada (1780-81) to the north. Creole elites split over how to approach the situation, as the lingering fear of the lower classes following the Insurrection of 1765 only grew upon hearing of the lower class revolts in the surrounding regions. At the same time, Espejo and his fellow enlightened supporters called for immediate changes, both on the local and imperial level. By 1800, a similar rift formed between the Creole and peninsular populations, complicating the situation by adding to the existing quarrels between the Creoles over power and the economic decline. This only reinforced the need for unity across class lines if the Creoles wanted to hold their new-found power. With Carondelet's death in 1807 the Creoles had to decide what path to take and how specific Enlightenment ideas, introduced to the region in the 1780s and 1790s, would affect their decision.

As Quito emerged from the Insurrection of 1765 into the later part of the eighteenth century, two contrasting presidents implemented policies attempting to reinvigorate the local economy. García Pizarro, following a similar model as his mentor José de Gálvez, incorporated an absolutist approach by bringing together the economic and political sectors of society under his control. It was clear that Madrid did not want to invest money into Quito, forcing the President to tax the local business owners (primarily Creoles) in order to collect required revenues. By the 1790s the North-Central Sierran economy fell behind the coastal regions as new policies of free trade brought prominence to the port city of Guayaquil, making it the most important economic center in the Audiencia. When Carondelet was named President in 1799, the local elites saw an opportunity to reincorporate themselves into the local economy. New policies using

Creole capital as well as the placement of key elites into local offices gave hope to the beleaguered Quiteños. Even as the local economy's decline remained a constant in the late colonial era, the approaches chosen by Audiencia Presidents varied, creating an unstable landscape for local businesses. For a select few, the contrasting presidencies only contributed to the need for change in Quito.

Chapter 5: Napoleonic Invasion and the Junta of 1809

Upon his arrival in Quito in 1808 to become President of the Audiencia, the collegians of San Fernando presented Manuel Ruíz de Castilla y Cavero, Conde Ruiz de Castilla four theatrical presentations based on local indigenous heritages: the Cato, the Andromacha, the Zoraida, and the Aurauca. Carefully imposed within each piece was a “spirit of freedom, a love of liberty, and principles of republicanism.”⁷⁰ William B. Stevenson, in 1825, writing about his travels through Quito as secretary to the count, makes an interesting observation about Conde Ruiz de Castilla’s reaction to the pieces:

However, as is often the case with people who visit public exhibitions with a predetermination to be pleased, this tendency passed unobserved by the president (Ruiz de Castilla) and the other members of the government. Inattentive to what the state of affairs in the mother country might produce in the colonies, the American rulers judged that they themselves were surrounded by the same obedient vassals whom their predecessors had governed, without ever dreaming that the people were awake to what was actually passing in the parent state.⁷¹

The elites were now on the brink of revolt, yet the governments, both in Madrid and the Andean city, were oblivious to local affairs as complex ideologies such as “liberty, and republicanism” permeated from the elite core as shown in the plays. This, however, was not the first time locals in Quito dealt with disagreements about governmental ideas of control as seen in the Quito Insurrection of 1765. Quito, by 1808, experienced the introduction of Enlightenment ideals into the elite mainstream by the Espejos, altering the

⁷⁰ William B. Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 1.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 1-2.

possible responses from the Creole population, giving them a new approach to protest. Turmoil in the Spanish Empire, particularly back home in Spain, only complicated the matter presenting disgruntled elites with a new, revolutionary, method to voice their complaints.

During the same year in Europe, Napoleon had begun his quest to take over the continent, and soon after he set his eyes on Spain. In 1807, Manuel de Godoy, Minister of the Indies, gave Napoleon and his army permission to cross Spain in order to attack Portugal. When Charles IV allowed Napoleon to cross Spain, he opened the door for the French ruler to take over his country. In March 1808, Napoleon forced Charles IV to abdicate the Spanish throne and along with his son and heir, Ferdinand VII, left for exile in France in the same year. The French general made his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain.⁷² Citizens across the Peninsula became infuriated with “Pepe Botellas” as many did not accept him as the legitimate King of Spain since he was not part of the Bourbon Dynasty.⁷³ By May 1808, each province in Spain had set up its own provincial junta; however, individually they did not pose much of a threat to Joseph Bonaparte’s new found power, and on September 25, 1808 the *Junta Suprema Central y Gubernativa de España e Indias* was formed.⁷⁴ The Junta Central was established in an attempt to unify the empire against Napoleon and the French invaders, by deciding that in the absence of the ruler, sovereignty rested with the people. News of the events in Spain spread

⁷² Rodriguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America*, 51.

⁷³ The term “Pepe Botellas”, was used to drum up support against Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain as many referred to him as a drunkard and unable to rule the empire.

⁷⁴ Rodriguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America*, 59. In the absence of a legitimate King, locals in Spain believed power reverted to the people.

throughout the New World leading to colonial support for Ferdinand VII, opposition to Napoleon, in order to defend the Spanish people against the invading French.⁷⁵

One key attempt by the Spanish to avoid losing the colonies to Napoleon had been to set up elections in the colonies. By giving them representation in the Junta Central, the elections established each region as a “kingdom” and for the first time gave the colonies representation in Spain.⁷⁶ The elections, however, did not always have a positive effect in the colonies. An example of unrest over the proposed elections took place in Quito, where the locals had no vote, as the Junta Central had them represented by New Granada, leading to unrest among certain Quiteños. Their allegiance had been to Ferdinand VII and by sending a delegate to Spain they would have their own say in helping restore their rightful ruler. Even so, the Marqués de Selva Alegre, as proclaimed leader of the Creoles, and his followers did not see the elections as a means to solve their quarrels with the existing government. It was not until September 16, 1809, that the final elections took place, a little over a month after the formation of the First Supreme Junta in August, 1809.⁷⁷

Following the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, the local Creole elites decided to form their own autonomous government in an attempt to reestablish their power on the local scene. Conde Ruiz de Castilla had ruled for only one year and nine months as concerns about his age and ability to govern (he was 84 years-old) worried the local elites as they hoped to continue the reforms started by Carondelet.⁷⁸ News of the Napoleonic invasion reached Quito in September 1808, prompting locals Creoles to take action. Dr.

⁷⁵ *Ibid* , 52.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 61.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 68.

⁷⁸ Manifestó de la Junta Suprema de Quito al Público, Quito, August 10, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 137-139.

Manuel Rodríguez Quiroga and Don Manuel Morales, members of the lower elite who selected the four plays shown upon the arrival of the Conde Ruiz de Castilla, began working on plans to overthrow the existing Spanish authorities in Quito. Beginning with the “Christmas Conspiracy,” a group of locals met on December 25, 1808, to forge a consensus on how to reestablish Creole power in Quito. They failed and agreed to meet at a later date. Captain Juan Salinas, commander of the infantry in Quito, attempting to recruit support, told two local friars of the conspiracy, who immediately reported the information to the President. Within a month the government arrested Quiroga and Morales as well as Captain Salinas and a local parish priest in Sangolquí, Dr. Juan Riofrio. After increased pressure from the local Creoles, Don Javier Manzanos, judge in the case, gave the case to Don Felipe Fuentes Amar, good friend of the Marqués de Selva Alegre.⁷⁹ Luckily for the prisoners, in April the main testimonies “came up missing,” forcing the secretary, who was a peninsular, Don Pedro Muños, to release those arrested. The inability of the Audiencia government to prosecute the captured conspirators demonstrates both the power local elites had within the city, as well as the ineptness of the existing governmental structure in the eyes of the Creoles. Having the primary documents of a treason case stolen days before the trial shows the local government’s inability to separate corruption from official business.⁸⁰

Quiroga, Morales, and Salinas were local Creole elites, whose contrasting backgrounds and involvements in local society, shows the diversity among elites supporting autonomy at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Quito. Born in

⁷⁹ Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 5-7. Washburn., *The Bourbon Reforms*, 222.

⁸⁰ To see examples of corrupt actions by the government in Quito see: Kenneth J. Andrien, “Soberanía y Revolución en el Reino de Quito, 1809-1810.” Paper presented for the *El Umbral de las revoluciones hispánicas: el bienio 1808-1810*. April 10-11, 2008.

Arequipa, before moving to Quito upon getting married, Quiroga was a rash, undaunted, and self-opinioned member of the Creole aristocracy in the city, but originating from the lower elite in Quito left him with little money, and he spent the majority of his time in debt. Working as a bureaucrat during the presidency of Baron de Carondelet, Quiroga constantly quarreled with the judicial tribunal of the city. Instead of paying his debts, he claimed the tribunal was incompetent to enforce such actions, based on his knowledge of local laws and his lack of faith in the existing governmental structure.⁸¹ Don Pedro Morales, born in Mariquita in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, was a member of the Creole aristocracy; however, since he belonged to the upper elite, he grew up in a wealthy family, unlike Quiroga. Upon the arrival of Baron de Carondelet, Morales quickly lost favor with the new President when he questioned some of his reforms to invigorate the stagnant local economy and was relieved of his duties as secretary to the government. The irritated Morales believed his removal unlawful. Quiroga and Morales began a close relationship when both felt their treatment by the existing government unjust and arbitrary. These two contrasting figures, from different levels of elite society, evince the contrasting backgrounds among the elites in Quito, as well as the general grievances that their fellow Quiteños held against the existing governmental structure. Both figures believed the corrupt system was not upholding the traditional mode of governance in place before the Bourbon Reforms, and it was their belief in Creole empowerment that gave them the ability to question the system.⁸² Like many Creoles in Quito, they questioned the specific reforms implemented by the Spanish Crown.

⁸¹ Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 4-5.

⁸² *Ibid*, 4.

Following the failed conspiracy, anti-governmental activities ceased for the next several months as news about the Napoleonic Invasion in Spain presented several problems for the Creole elites. Conversations around the city focused on what the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula meant to the colonies in America.⁸³ By 1809, certain individuals such as Quiroga and Morales pushed for the overthrow of the existing government and the establishment of an independent government. The more conservative section of the elites, led by Juan Pío Montúfar, Marqués de Selva Alegre, agreed that change was necessary, though they believed that forming a separate junta did not necessarily mean complete independence from the Spanish Crown. After all, the Cortes in Cadiz, which began as a resistance to French troops in Spain, formed to represent those who still followed the Bourbon dynasty, and it chose Ferdinand VII as the true monarch, not Joseph Bonaparte. Therefore, the central problem existed in determining who the real king of Spain was and what role the colonies played in any new system of government. Never before did the Spanish colonies have to answer such important and profound questions.

Creole elites were unhappy with the direction of the Bourbon Reforms and the forced imposition of peninsular leaders in local government positions. Yet the Creole elite never advocated a total separation from the Spanish Crown. When faced with similar problems in the past, particularly during the Insurrection of 1765, the elites attempted to work inside the existing governmental structure in order to solve their problems. By forming a *cabildo abierto*, they believed their open protest to the laws would be enough to get them revoked. It was the plebian population who were able to overwhelm the Spanish officials and to take control of the city. The ideological landscape changed

⁸³ *Ibid*, 9.

dramatically between 1765 and 1809, when the first Supreme Junta formed. Loss of power, economic recession, and fear of the lower classes added to the anxiety among Creole elites in the later part of the eighteenth-century. The Enlightenment discourse first introduced through the works of Eugenio Espejo and the travels of Alexander von Humboldt gave the Creoles an outlet to express their grievances with the Spanish Crown.

On the night of August 9, 1809 a group of forty-five conspirators met at the house of Doña Manuela Cañizares in order to finalize their plans to overthrow Spanish control on the following day. Their goal was to depose the existing royal government in Quito and establish their own Supreme Junta, or governing council, in its place. A variety of subjects assembled that night; thirty were *plebeyos*, twelve *nobles*, and three *eclesiasticos curas* (priests) with many of them representing the various *barrios*, or neighborhoods, across Quito.⁸⁴ Manuel Quiroga was the most vocal at the meeting advocating the existing Crown government's intention to swear sovereignty to Napoleon. For the Creoles, the French invader's real threat was to the legitimacy of the royal government in Madrid. As many of the local Creoles already agreed beforehand of the need to depose the government, questioning the legitimacy of the Spanish throne (in this case Joseph Bonaparte) presented local elites with justification for setting up their own government. In their eyes, the only possible way to save Quito was to establish a provincial junta in the name of Ferdinand VII. Following Quiroga's speech, Captain Juan Salinas gathered his infantry in an adjacent patio and informed his soldiers of the plans to overthrow the existing government in order to preserve the city. The soldiers took an oath of allegiance to Ferdinand VII, to defend the Holy Roman Catholic Church, and to obey the constituted

⁸⁴ Andrien, "Soberanía y Revolución en el Reino de Quito," 2. Taken from "Memoria de la Revolución de Quito en 5 cartas escritas a un amigo," Quito, 25 Octubre de 1809, Estado 72, carta 1, folio 4 v, AGI.

authorities. Following this ceremony, each member of the infantry stationed themselves in front of the houses of local officials of suspected royalists. The final act that night sent a messenger to the Valle de los Chillos in search of Juan Pío Montúfar, Marqués de Selva Alegre, who upon receiving the message agreed to come to the city and lead the autonomous movement.⁸⁵ For many this new government symbolized a new beginning in Quito, one that returned power into the hands of the Creoles. They were willing to fight for their natural rights as leaders of the city under the rule of Ferdinand VII.

The next morning at around 5:30 AM the first actions of the Supreme Junta took place when a letter from the conspirators reached the hands of the President, the Conde Ruiz de Castilla, ordering him to resign his post. In the letter, the newly appointed secretary of the interior for the Supreme Junta, Don Manuel Morales, explained the reasoning for establishing an autonomous government:

The present unsettled state of Spain, the total annihilation of the lawfully constituted authorities, and the dangers of the crown of the beloved Ferdinand VII, and his domains falling into the hands of the tyrant of Europe, have impelled our trans-atlantic brothers to form provincial governments for their personal security, as well against the machinations of some of their traitorous countrymen, unworthy of the name of Spaniards, as against the arms of the common enemy.⁸⁶

Upon reading the letter, Conde Ruiz de Castilla attempted to leave his antechamber, but could not pass the sentries who blocked his path. The “ex-President,” seeing his former guards supporting the new government, turned himself over to Creole leaders. Later that day, insurgent troops escorted the Count to the hacienda of the Marqués de Selva Alegre in the Valle de los Chillos outside of Quito.

⁸⁵ Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 12-15.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 11.

Festivities began around five or six on the morning of August 10 as royal salutes rang out every fifteen minutes until six o'clock that evening.⁸⁷ The Supreme Junta officials took over in front of the Gran Palacio in the Plaza Mayor at six in the morning marking the official end of Spanish rule in Quito. At this same hour a royal salute rang throughout the central plaza as military music began playing in the background, lasting for three hours. A large throng of people assembled to see the events as the focus shifted to the leaders of the Junta who formed at the center of the Plaza. The Marqués de Selva Alegre assumed the office of President. Along with him were other well known members of the Creole elite, including the Marqués de Sánchez Orellana, the Marqués de Solanda, Conde de Casa Guerrero, the Marqués de Miraflores, Juan Morales (Secretary of State) and Dr. Manuel Rodríguez Quiroga (Secretary of Interior).⁸⁸ As the procession continued Captain Salinas and others in the infantry came out in their lavish military uniforms, filled with medals and other marks of achievement. The celebration spread through the adjacent *barrios* and into the plazas throughout the central city.⁸⁹

The new autonomous government sent out two manifestos detailing their reasons for disposing the old government as well as their intentions for the new Supreme Junta. The first, *Manifiesto de la Junta Suprema de Quito al Público*, focused on the justification of the actions by the Creole elites:

The Spanish nation...forgot that her citizens (*vecinos*) are also for the most part descendents of the Spanish...the word *criollo* in their lips has been an insult and a mockery...We swear to the King Ferdinand VII, to purely conserve the Religion [Roman Catholicism], defend and protect the *Patria*, and to shed all our blood for

⁸⁷ Memoria de la Revolución de Quito en 5 cartas escritas a un amigo, Quito, 25 Octubre de 1809, Estado 72, carta 1, folio 4 v, AGI.

⁸⁸ Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 12.

⁸⁹ Memoria de la Revolución de Quito en 5 cartas escritas a un amigo, Quito, 25 Octubre de 1809, Estado 72, carta 1, folio 4 v, AGI.

the sacred and honorable motives. We swear to the face of the entire world the validity of what we show.⁹⁰

For them, Conde Ruiz de Castilla was “a man absolutely inept at governing” who has led the Audiencia like a child of four years old. The count represented the corrupt system of government, which in their eyes took power out of the hands of the locals and into hands of the peninsulars. Ruiz de Castilla’s inability to rectify the situation only added to his incapability to govern. Notions of patronage played an important role in determining who filled which spot in the existing Spanish government. New ideas, however, focusing on connections to local Creole elites, instead of royal officials sent from Madrid, added a new dimension in deciding whom should hold local administrative offices.

Their second justification directly related to the ideological development of the local Creoles. When there was a crisis in Europe, it was the responsibility of “the Americans to defend reciprocally” and to do what is necessary to defeat “Bonapartismo” in America. Creole rhetoric during the Insurrection of 1765 did not give the people in the New World the ability to make their own governmental decisions in a time of crisis. The Enlightenment idea of rule at the local level, and later nationalism, used in the manifesto justified the actions of the new government. As Creoles from Quito, they were the ones who should rule the city, not peninsulars sent by the Crown. A third justification lay in the recent actions of the peninsulars, who “without previous provocation, have altered the peace...in this Capital.”⁹¹ Even while the local Creole elites dealt with an economic recession, they did not find enough faults in the governmental structure in Quito to call for its overthrow. It was not until peninsulars entered the city attempting to centralize

⁹⁰Manifestó de la Junta Suprema de Quito al Público, Quito, August 10, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 137-139

⁹¹Manifestó de la Junta Suprema de Quito al Público, Quito, August 10, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 137-139.

power into the hands of royal officials that Creoles complained about the government. Political and economic strife, therefore, became the central basis for Creole distrust, with justification coming from their new-found ideologies stemming from the Enlightenment.

The formation of a Supreme Junta in Quito mirrored the actions of Spaniards fighting against Napoleon in the Iberian Peninsula. In 1809, the *Junta Suprema de Gobierno* formed in Seville in an attempt to lead resistance against the French invader. At the time, the existing government in Madrid fell under the power of Joseph Bonaparte and not the exiled Bourbon king, Ferdinand VII. Therefore any resistance to French rule in Spain had to come from local juntas, but questions of legitimacy arose as small regional juntas fighting French troops. The question surrounding who was the real king also questioned the legitimacy of forming an individual junta. For Montúfar and his fellow Creole elites, it made logical sense to form a supreme junta, ruling in the name of the deposed king, Ferdinand VII, and not to remain under the existing government of Joseph Bonaparte. While the Supreme Junta declared itself sovereign from Bonaparte, it did so in an attempt to return parts of the old regime (before the Bourbon Reforms) back to a Creole led society.

On August 10, the Marqués de Selva Alegre, sent out letters to all the provinces in the Audiencia asking for their support of the Junta. Written in a language similar to the manifestos, they claimed their “independence” from the Bonapartist regime but loyalty to Ferdinand VII. The Creoles also sought unification with its neighboring regions. Montúfar stated “without a doubt [I] prefer you to reunite with Quito more so than to Santa Fé [de Bogotá],” since the local Creoles felt Santa Fé de Bogotá, the viceregal

capital, by not leaving the existing government, supported the Bonapartist regime.⁹² The request was not well received in Popayán, and a letter dated only ten days later, was sent from the Governor of the province, Miguel Tacón, to the Viceroy of New Granada, Antonio de Amar y Borbón giving him his support and calling the Marqués de Selva Alegre a “traitor and seducer.”⁹³ Tacón promised Amar y Borbón he would form an army to recapture Quito and to give his aid wherever needed. At the same time he pointed out his worry, possibly stemming from the widespread fear of the lower classes following the revolts from 1778-81 along the Andes, and the Haitian Revolt only a few years earlier, about the fifteen to twenty thousand African slaves living the province of Popayán. While the center of the conflict was in Quito, its reverberations extended to regions outside the Andean capital. If the surrounding regions did not put down the Junta in the Andean capital, revolt and unrest could spread to their front doors, leading to a revolt of the African slave population. On August 20, local elites in Popayán formed a *cabildo*, town-hall meeting, to publically declare the illegitimacy of the Junta in Quito, while at the same time declaring their allegiance to Ferdinand VII, claiming the Marquis de Selva Alegre and his followers to be “insurgents and rebels” who had created an autonomous movement “against the Royal authority and its Ministers”.⁹⁴

While both Popayán and Quito claimed to follow the same leader, Ferdinand VII, each city had different perspectives on how to support him. In Quito, anyone who did not separate from the existing government automatically declared their allegiance to the

⁹²Oficio del Marqués de Selva Alegre al Ayuntamiento de Popayán, Quito, August 10, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812* 139-140.

⁹³ Oficio del Gobernador de Popayán al Virrey de Santa Fe, Popayán, August 20, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 151-152.

⁹⁴ Acta de La Sesión Celebrada por el Cabildo de Popayán, Popayán, August 20, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 152-154.

Bonapartes, not the Bourbon regime. The power rested at the local level and when an illegitimate king sat on the throne, in this case Joseph Bonaparte, they had the right to rule until the legitimate dynasty returned. As seen in both the letter to Santa Fé de Bogotá and the *cabildo* in Popayán, the surrounding provinces did not view events in Spain from the same perspective. For many of the remaining government officials in the Americas, the power still rested in Spain and therefore the only way to change the existing governmental structure in the Americas was from direct orders in Spain. This meant the established order before the Napoleonic invasion should remain the same until the legitimate king, Ferdinand VII returned. The root of this divide is in the rhetoric used by the elites in Quito versus those in Popayan and Santa Fé in 1809. Words such as ‘nacion’ ‘patria’ and ‘libertad’ exist throughout the Manifestos written by the Junta in Quito, whereas this same rhetoric was not used in the writings from the surrounding regions when describing their actions.

On September 4, 1809, a letter was sent from Guayaquil to Quito making similar accusations, calling the actions of the Junta “arrogant” and claiming the feelings of Creole elites in Quito to be opposite of the “patriotismo” they claimed.⁹⁵ On the same day, the Junta in Quito sent a manifesto to the United States, asking for recognition and support. Written by Dr. Manuel Rodríguez Quiroga, the Minister of Justice for the Junta, the letter used enlightened rhetoric making a connection between the former British colonies and themselves. Referring to the benefits of “human rights” which did not exist in Quito under the existing political system and how a “national government” represented the people on a local level, Quiroga attempted to show how the two regions were

⁹⁵Oficio del Gobernador de Guayaquil al Marqués de Selva Alegre, Guayaquil, September 4, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 159-160.

related.⁹⁶ If the Supreme Junta could gain recognition from the United States, they would have the support of fellow Americans, who also dealt with the same attempts to reestablish colonial power following the Seven Years' War in North America. Thus, the Junta saw it necessary to gain not just local support, but support of the other nation in the Americas, outside the existing Spanish realm.

During the same month, Viceroy Amar y Borbón issued an edict calling for the termination of the Junta in Quito by all the loyal subjects in the viceroyalty. Within a month the Junta had lost support from two of its strategic cities, Guayaquil to the southeast and Popayán to the north, whose cooperation was vital to the Junta's survival. Guayaquil was the main port for Quiteño goods that connected the Audiencia with the rest of the Spanish Empire as well as Europe, while Popayán, to the north, situated on an important trade route, ensured security for the northern frontier. By November 4, Riobamba, Guaranda, Ibarra, Cuenca, and Otavalo had all responded in favor of the viceroy, ruining any possibility of support from outside the city.⁹⁷

The inability to gain Creole support from surrounding regions made it difficult for the Junta to continue. Why did fellow Creoles across the Audiencia not join in support the Supreme Junta? During this era of confusion, it was not clear who supported which leader, as the Creole leaders in the Indies had to react with a direct response to indirect knowledge of the situation in Spain. Their lack of support shows two important elements of the Junta of 1809: (1) the Junta was a regional movement, isolated to the city of Quito and (2) that not all Creoles supported the Junta. The inability of the Junta to gain support

⁹⁶Manifiesto de la Junta Suprema de Quito a América, Quito, September 4, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 157-158.

⁹⁷Edicto del Virrey de Santa Fe, Antonio Amar y Borbón, Santa Fe, 4 September, 1809, Estado 72, AGI.

from the rest of the Andean region led to its quick demise.⁹⁸ It also helps define the attitude of fellow Creoles throughout the region. By 1809, ideas of regionalism and nationalism spread throughout Spanish America, but what these ideas meant varied from region to region. Even if Creoles felt Joseph Bonaparte was not a legitimate king, some believed they did not have the right to overthrow the existing Spanish structure. For some, the Iberian crisis, while having a direct impact on the American colonies, should be limited to the Iberian Peninsula. Not until the elections of 1810, when those in Spain called upon their American subjects to vote, would they take a direct role in the Iberian situation. Discontent existed across the Audiencia, but, Quito would be the only place where a local autonomous movement existed.

A royalist collection of letters, written from his house just outside the Plaza Mayor gave an eyewitness account of the opening procession for the Junta from within the city, showing the distinct ideological shift that formed in Quito. Referring to the conspirators as “estupidos” (stupid) and to the leaders of the Junta as “bárbaros” (barbarians), the author argued that the Junta was unjust and a disgrace to Quito. He felt the local elites had no right or power to break away from the Crown government. While he agreed with the Junta that Napoleon was not the legitimate ruler, the issue of how to handle the usurpation of the throne by Joseph Bonaparte became a central issue. For him, the Junta was a failure and a fight that had already “created a river of blood” before, probably in reference to the indigenous revolts in the 1780s, with a principle part of the problem centering on gaining legitimacy, not just from the local populations, but from the surrounding regions. As he pointed out, why would Lima or Santa Fé de Bogotá support

⁹⁸ The Supreme Junta had support from the hinterlands around the city, but that was the extent of support outside of Quito.

a junta in Quito when they could form their own autonomous government and have their own city named capital, especially since Quito was already under the jurisdiction of the viceregal capital in Bogotá in the existing Spanish system. For this royalist, the leaders of the Junta were “without honor, without light, without experience, without politics, or support.”⁹⁹ Therefore, the movement lacked the necessary means, motive, and application necessary for a successful overhaul of the governmental structure.

The author also pointed out that the rhetoric used by the leaders consisted of “wandering words and contradictions.”¹⁰⁰ In a poetic tone, he compared the events of the opening celebration to a dream or a fantasy that went wrong, accusing the leaders of going mad, even calling them out by name, such as Montúfar, Morales, and Quiroga.¹⁰¹ Being an anonymous account, there is no way of knowing who wrote the letters, but his response to the deposing of the Spanish government in Quito offered an account of how certain locals viewed the actions of the Supreme Junta and clearly aligns him with the royalists. Not only did the writer not support the Junta, but he also felt those who formed it were “locos” (crazy) for attempting to create a new political system in the city. The clear ideological rift seen here explains the inability of local elites to gain total support within the city. Certain Creoles believed their treatment was unjust and broke away from the established code of law in the Spanish Empire, whereas others did not agree with deposing the existing Spanish government.

The rift between the Creoles and peninsulars in Quito reached a boiling point by the time of the Junta of 1809, adding to the desire to create a separate governmental

⁹⁹ Memoria de la Revolución de Quito en 5 cartas escritas a un amigo, Quito, 25 Octubre de 1809, Estado 72, carta 1, folio 4 v, AGI.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*

structure. The appointment of peninsular leaders was a central focus of the Bourbon Reforms, ultimately occupying many of the same local economic and administrative offices originally held by Creoles. One particular example of the hostile feelings that existed between the two groups took place in August 1809, after the Supreme Junta began. A group of peninsular “extremists” plotted to assassinate some of the Creole nobility nine days after the overthrow of the Spanish government on August 19.¹⁰² The international problems facing the Spanish Empire at the end of the eighteenth century forced the Madrid government to adopt new policies, such as the Bourbon Reforms, which represented a new understanding of political control.¹⁰³ Therefore, the peninsulars sent to the colonies brought with them a different background than the Creoles who lived in Quito. These newly appointed elites, the peninsulars, felt those in Quito should do what was best for the Spanish Empire, even if that meant losing power and placing it into the hands of the peninsulars. While the Creoles remained loyal to the Spanish Crown, they did not believe they should sacrifice local power within the governmental structure in order to improve the empire. For them, their role in the procedures of the Audiencia before the reforms had been their natural right of power given to them under the rule of the Hapsburgs since they had lived in the region their entire life.¹⁰⁴ A sense of nationalism, brought on by enlightened rhetoric, spawned out of the Creole vs. peninsular dispute in Quito.

Following the take over and subsequent failures by the Junta to garner support outside its inner circle, the movement died quickly, lasting only seventy-nine days, as the

¹⁰² Robert L. Gilmore, “The Imperial Crisis, Rebellion, and the Viceroy: Nueva Granada in 1809.” In *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1960), 8

¹⁰³ Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire*, 46-55.

¹⁰⁴ Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire*, 128.

Marqués de Selva Alegre returned power to Conde Ruiz de Castilla on October 29, 1809. A conservative movement from its beginning, the junta looked only at the problems of a select few within the city. After all, it was the Creoles who believed their treatment was unfair and chose to ignore the grievances expressed by the lower classes. Creole and peninsular elites only amounted to 7.7% of the total population in Quito at that time, leaving out an overwhelming majority of the people living in the Andean capital.¹⁰⁵ To garner support, local elites had attempted to convince other Creoles across the Audiencia to join the cause, as they experienced similar economic and political problems in their regions. In the letters showing their support to Santa Fé de Bogotá, however, the local elites did not present any regional connection to their fellow Creoles in Quito. The ideological breakthrough stemming from the ideas of rule at the local level, which many Creoles thought would lead them back to power, doomed the Junta from its inception.

¹⁰⁵ Washburn, *The Bourbon Reforms*, 257. This was the number used by Washburn for the male white population in 1779, which included peninsulars. Jose Manual Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia*, Jorge Salvador, ed., *La Revolución de Quito 1809-1812, según los primeros relatos e historias por autores extranjeros*, (Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional, 1982), 266, 300, gives similar numbers for the population by 1809.

Chapter 6: Massacre of August 2 and the Junta of 1810

On December 4, 1809 the armies sent by Viceroy Abascal (Perú) and Amar y Bourbon (New Granada), totaling four-hundred men, took over the city, reestablished the Audiencia of Quito, and apprehended those who had been in charge of the Junta of 1809. The prosecutor and interim fiscal of the Audiencia, Don Tomás Aréchaga, conducted a quick review of the case and presented his findings to the local courts. Aréchaga wanted eighty-four of the prisoners promptly executed for their involvement with the Junta. The Count Ruiz de Castilla, who had the power to sign into law their death warrants, however, decided to pass the judgment to Viceroy Amar y Bourbón in Santa Fé de Bogotá, shifting responsibility for the punishment. Dr. San Miguel, a local advocate of Aréchaga, informed the viceregal capital of Ruiz de Castilla's decision. Upon his departure, supporters of Junta who had fled the city when royalist troops arrived in Quito returned under the pretense that they could live safely within the city walls. As soon as they entered the city, however, royalist troops captured and imprisoned around one-hundred of them and they remained in jail over the next few months. As food and supplies throughout the city became scarce, tensions increased between the local population and the occupying troops.¹⁰⁶ While many locals felt the Supreme Junta had been illegitimate, they did not want foreign troops walking the streets of their city, and soldiers from Lima and Santa Fé de Bogotá began to outlast their welcome in Quito.

¹⁰⁶ Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 20-27.

Almost one year after the formation of the Junta of 1809, on August 2, royalist troops plunged the city into chaos, ultimately putting in motion the Second Junta. During the “hora de comer” (lunch) nineteen or twenty prisoners who supported the Junta, killed the guards at the prison, dressed up in their uniforms and assaulted the armory near the barracks, ultimately killing the Limeño Captain Don Nicolas Balpay, and Battalion Captain, Don Joaquin Villa, among others.¹⁰⁷ Upon hearing the shots, the local officers sent out alarms and ordered their soldiers to open fire on all the insurgents, including those released. For ten minutes both sides fought as royalist troops fired on both those escaped as well as the not yet released prisoners. Eventually, royalist officers ran to the barracks to inquire about the shooting. Confusion arose as neither the scrambling officers nor the infantry knew who had started the firefight. Upon reaching the holdings, the royal officers found a majority of the captured conspirators and their own officers lying lifeless on the ground. In response to the scene, royalist troops became enraged, screaming revenge.¹⁰⁸ Captain Juan Salinas, Don Manuel Rodriguez Quiroga, and many other Creole leaders during the Junta died. The next day, August 3, the Conde Ruiz de Castilla declared martial law in the city, as royalist troops went around “killing, robbing, and raping” citizens throughout Quito. Around three-hundred innocent citizens perished in the streets, many of them having no affiliation with the Junta.¹⁰⁹ William Stevenson, secretary to Ruiz de Castilla described the city immediately following the bloodbath:

The streets of the city were entirely deserted; groups of people were scattered about on the neighboring hills, looking wistfully at their apparently desolated

¹⁰⁷ Relación anónima de otro motín acaecido en Quito el 2 de agosto de 1810, Quito, 10 Agosto, 1809, Estado 72, AGI.

¹⁰⁸ Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 27-28.

¹⁰⁹ Relación anónima de otro motín acaecido en Quito el 2 de agosto de 1810, Quito, 10 Septiembre, 1809, Estado 72, AGI.

town; dead bodies were strewed about the streets and squares, and all was horror and dismay.¹¹⁰

The massacre made many citizens in the Audiencia put aside their ideological differences among the Creoles in Quito. Firing on and killing Quiteños without following the Spanish legal procedure infuriated the citizens in the city. Even through all the failures of the Junta of 1809, the local Creole elites did not openly kill innocent citizens. Support arose for these elites as the actions of the royalist troops outraged locals. Citizens of the Andean capital wanted foreign, royalist troops to leave the city immediately. Dr. Juan Rodríguez, a local priest from outside the city, summed up the feelings of local Quiteños:

I allude, to the officers and troops; they have already made upwards of three hundred unoffending fellow-creatures, as faithful Christians and as loyal subjects as themselves, the peaceful tenants of the grave, and, if not stopped in their career of slaughter, they will soon convert one of the most fruitful regions of the Spanish monarchy into a desert; and future travellers [sic], while execrating their money, will exclaim, 'here once stood Quito.'¹¹¹

Creole elites in Quito now held the necessary power and resources to gain support within the city, especially with the distrust exhibited toward the royalist officers and troops. They believed it was their natural right to rule in Quito and viewed the new-found support of local citizens as a step toward regaining control within the city. The impact of the massacre resonated throughout the Spanish Empire, as during the Council of Tucuman in 1816, where the United States of Argentina declared its independence from Spain, a memorial honoring those slain gave them then name "martyrs of Quito."¹¹² It

¹¹⁰ Stevenson, *A Historical and Descriptive Narrative*, 30.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 33.

¹¹² Edward J. Payne, *Historical Course for Schools: History of European Colonies*, (London: MacMillian and Company, 1889), 251.

would not be long before news of the massacre reached Spain and the governing junta, which relocated to the only spot still held by anti-French forces, Cádiz.

Once the Council of Regency, which had been set up as a replacement to the Junta Central in order to eliminate the dozens of minor resistance groups against the French and form one, unified governing council, received word of the atrocities of 1810, they decided to send Carlos Montúfar, son of Juan Pío Montúfar, the Marqués de Selva Alegre, to bring peace and stability to the city. Carlos was a logical choice, since he came from a prominent family, and having fought the invading French at Bailén (Spain), earned popularity back home. The would-be third Marqués de Selva Alegre became involved with Enlightenment ideas from a young age. He received a degree in philosophy in 1800 from the University of Santo Tomás in Quito, the same university attended by Eugene Espejo. Shortly after finishing school, Carlos became part of the local elite that accompanied Alexander von Humboldt, the German scientist who went to Latin America to perform scientific experiments throughout the region, in 1802. Montúfar became close friends with von Humboldt and ascribed to many of his ideas about science. Two years later he left for Europe, where he became friends with Simón Bolívar while visiting in Paris. In 1810, before the Council of Regency chose him to return to Quito, he joined the Sociedad de Lautaro, a secret organization similar to the Free Masons, whose objective was to gain independence for America.¹¹³ Montúfar's involvement in these pro-Enlightenment projects shows his liberal ideology and connection to future leaders of Latin American independence, all before he was chosen to restore order in Quito.

¹¹³ Jorge Salvador Lara, *Breve Historia contemporánea del Ecuador*, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994), 291-292.

The royalist leaders in Lima and Santa Fé de Bogotá became hesitant about installing another Montúfar in power after seeing his father, Juan Pío Montúfar, as President of the First Junta. Reluctantly, they let the younger Montúfar enter Quito, because they were not willing to challenge the appointee of the Council of Regency in the politically unstable Spanish Empire, which they recognized as the legitimate government in the absence of King Ferdinand VII. Their skepticism was well founded. In a letter written on November 20, 1809, Carlos gave his father, Juan Pío, his full support in his political ambitions. While not stating anything specifically about the First Junta, his actions show his devotion to his father as well as the Creole cause. A matter of family pride was at stake.¹¹⁴ Connecting the letter with Carlos's involvement with the Society of Lautaro, the choice to put another Montúfar in office, while puzzling, shows the Council of Regency's lack of understanding for the situation unfolding in Quito. The Council wanted to establish its power in the Americas by sending over a member of the local elite to reestablish order and stability to the city. There are signs, however, that Carlos Montúfar believed in independence before the Council chose him to restore order in Quito. For the Spanish, Quito had become a backwater town and with the imposition of Joseph Bonaparte to the Spanish throne, the events in Quito were far less important when compared to what was taking place in Spain. Therefore, the combination of the massacre of August 2, which gave the Creoles the public support they needed, and the arrival of Carlos Montúfar to the city, made the prospect of a widespread revolt imminent.

Upon his arrival in Quito, Don Carlos Montúfar found the city "in the most disorder and confusion" creating a mutual lack of trust between the city government and

¹¹⁴Carta de D. Carlos Montúfar a su Padre, El Marqués de Selva Alegre, Quito, August 10, 1809, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 198-199.

its people, making it nearly impossible to stabilize the city under the existing government.¹¹⁵ On September 20, 1810, a meeting of local notables set up by Conde Ruiz de Castilla, named the Council of Notables, and established the Second Supreme Junta in Quito. Using Ruiz de Castilla, whom many still believed was the rightful President in Quito, the Creole elites attempted to gain support of the peninsulars, as Montúfar wanted to establish a unified Quito under local rule.¹¹⁶ Unlike the first Junta, the Creoles had a citizenry angry with the existing Spanish government, given the widespread hatred for the royalist troops. As early as May 10, in a letter to his sister, Doña Rosita Montúfar, Carlos laid out the difficulty facing him upon reaching the city. The next Marqués de Selva Alegre vowed to obey the orders sent to him by the Council of Regency, but at the same time he realized the unrest in Spain was different from the situation in the Andean capital. The rebellion in Quito was a localized movement which lacked the necessary support to legitimize its cause, as local circumstances (economic problems, and loss of Creole power) were central to the elite-led movement. Able to surround himself with family friends and acquaintances, Carlos Montúfar accepted the difficulty awaiting him in Quito, not only to unify the city, but to do so under the specific detailed instructions given to him by the Council.¹¹⁷ For the second time in as many years, the Creole elites in Quito believed the only way to return the city back to a tranquil and stable state, was through the formation of a new Supreme Junta.

¹¹⁵ Oficio del Comisionado Regio D. Carlos Montúfar al Consejo de Regencia, Quito, 1810, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 203-204.

¹¹⁶ Acta del Cabildo Publico celebrado en Quito el 20 de Sbre, de 1810, Presidido por el Comisionado Regio D. Carlos Montúfar, Quito, 1810, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 198-199.

¹¹⁷ Carta de D. Carlos Montúfar a su Hermana Da. Rosa, Cartagena, 1810, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 201-202.

Ruling in the name of the deposed Spanish king, Ferdinand VII, the Catholic Religion, and the Council of Regency in Cádiz, the Junta of 1810 based its claims to sovereignty on similar principles used in the first junta. The Creole elites who survived the Massacre of August 2 became the leaders, with Conde Ruiz de Castilla named President and Juan Pío Montúfar named Vice President.¹¹⁸ Their first objective was to gain the support of surrounding regions, primarily Guayaquil, which in 1803 became a part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, and Cuenca, a southern royalist stronghold where the deposed Spanish government, under the rule of General Joaquín Molina, had relocated upon the creation of the Junta in Quito. Facing limited success similar to its predecessor, these two important political and economic centers turned down the opportunity to create similar juntas, and both cities refused to accept Quito's leadership. An Act by the *cabildo* in Cuenca on October 6, 1810, used the same three reasons used by the Junta to gain its support; Ferdinand VII, the Catholic religion, and the Council of Regency in Cádiz. For the Royalist government in Cuenca, any supporter of these three institutions would not alienate himself from the rest of the American colonies, but would attempt to unify to overcome the Napoleonic invasion.¹¹⁹ It is through these three institutions that an individual council could convene, but once a group separated themselves from the existing government structure (Council of Regency), they forfeited these rights. This strong ideological divide between those in Quito and their fellow Creoles across the Audiencia made it extremely difficult to gain any support outside the city.

¹¹⁸Acta Constitutiva de la Junta de Gobierno de Quito. 22 Septiembre 1810, Quito, 1810, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 205-206.

¹¹⁹Acta del Cabildo de Cuenca, 6 Octubre 1810, Cuenca, 1810, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito:1809-1812*, 212-214.

For Guayaquil, a thriving port city and a large producer of cacao, being a subject of Quito did not make sense because the port had become an economic center by the end of the colonial era. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the annual intake of goods at the port was three times that of Quito. In 1787, Guayaquil's intake of 76,371 pesos from *almojarifazgo* (2.5% port tax on all imported and exported goods) eclipsed the Andean capital's total revenue of 51,103 pesos; its highest intake during the late colonial era, even though only 14.3% of the population in the Audiencia lived in the coastal region.¹²⁰ Of those totals, only 1,324 pesos, or 2% of the total, that entered Guayaquil came from the Highlands, showing that the port city was not dependent on goods from Quito. These totals are telling when looking at the relationship between the two economic centers of the Audiencia, as Guayaquil's role in the expanding imperial market grew, while Quito's role diminished. In 1799, the total intake of goods from the Highlands to the port city reached its highest point, at 12% of all the goods entering Guayaquil, showing that 88% of the goods that left the port came from surrounding regions. A new economic equilibrium within the Audiencia emerged as Guayaquil became more relevant in the Spanish Empire than the Andean capital.¹²¹ Quito, the once powerful economic center in the Spanish American system, was not even the most important city in its own region. As Guayaquil continued to be an important port city along the Pacific Coast, there would be no reason to alienate itself from the rest of its trading partners in Spanish America in order to support Quito, when they did not have any economic or political reasons to unite.

¹²⁰ Washburn, *The Bourbon Reforms*, 255 and Andrien, *The Kingdom of Quito*, 141, 151.

¹²¹ Andrien, *The Kingdom of Quito*, 140, 141, 150, 151.

The lack of support from the port city is evident by its lack of involvement in the Supreme Junta. In a list of over six-hundred people involved in the Junta, only eight were from Guayaquil, and of those eight, only one supported the autonomous government.¹²² Therefore, the beginnings of the rivalry between Quito and Guayaquil that plagued Ecuadorian politics in the nineteenth century evolved out of the economic disparity between the two regions. Following the original Audiencia divisions, which gave Quito the central power, seemed logical to royal officials in 1563 with its creation. Guayaquil was yet to play an important role in the Spanish American economy, and Quito was the most prominent northern city within the Incan Empire. Two-hundred and fifty years later, through the growth of the port city and the influx of ideas of regionalism, Guayaquileños believed they deserved to control their own affairs, just as Quito did during the entire colonial era. The conservative background of the Quiteños, evident in their politically conservative juntas, believed Guayaquil should always be a subject of the Andean capital. Therefore, the liberal vs. conservative rivalry between the two cities was in full effect by the Junta of 1810.

There were two primary advantages the Junta of 1810 had over its predecessor in 1809: newly gained support from those within the city and a stronger more unifying military, evident in the four-thousand men constituting the local army.¹²³ The ability to maintain initial support within the city made it possible for the leaders to focus on other regions outside the capital. Carlos Montúfar, a veteran of the wars in Spain against the French invaders, decided to spend a majority of his efforts on controlling the Sierra region by capturing Cuenca to the south and Popayán to the north. Both campaigns

¹²²Carta de Ramón Nuñez del Arco sobre la Junta Suprema en Quito, Quito, 20 May, 1813, Quito 258, AGI.

¹²³ Cartas de Senor Caizado a Don Joaquin Arrieta, Audiencia de Quito, 1811, Quito 258, AGI.

stretched the Junta forces and supplies, as they faced a far superior army in both size and training. The battle at Paredones, on February 17, 1811, ended in a draw as Brigadier Melchor de Aymerich y Villajuana held his position outside Cuenca, eventually forcing Montúfar to withdraw toward Quito as his forces ran low of supplies. The Junta government had a hard time raising enough money to support the army, as their tax base existed primarily in the north-central highlands. In a letter written to Dr. Don Joaquín Arrieta, supporter of the Junta, on March 6, 1811, Señor Don Manuel José Caizedo, member of the Junta army, outlined their fight at Paredones. Caizedo points out some of the problems facing the insurgent army, ranging from food to weapon shortages and how the royalist troops had the numbers to move quickly, enjoying the support of both Bishops in Cuenca and Guayaquil who gave them access to money and transportation.¹²⁴ Even though the insurgents held support in the interior regions, such as Ambato, Latacunga, and Riobamba, their inability to capture royalist strongholds assembled in Cuenca, and Guayaquil greatly diminished their chances to obtain the supplies needed to continue fighting.

One of the reasons the royalist troops had a large number of soldiers was their ability to incorporate local indigenous and African populations into their forces. By reducing tribute to those who agreed to fight for the royalist forces, the troops sent from Lima and Santa Fé de Bogotá bolstered their numbers greatly increasing their ability to stop the insurgent forces in the northern campaigns.¹²⁵ Jaime Rodríguez O. points out similar attempts by the insurgent army in Riobamba to enlist local indigenous populations

¹²⁴Cartas de Señor Caizado a Don Joaquín Arrieta, Audiencia de Quito, 1811, Quito 258, AGI.

¹²⁵ Marcela Echeverri, "Popular Royalists, War and Politics in Southwestern New Granada, 1808-1820." Written for the International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1825, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2008)

into the Junta army, but they were unable to gain much support since they did not see the Junta as a better alternative to the royalists.¹²⁶ Montúfar and the forces assembled by the Junta captured Esmeraldas in May 1811 and reached both Popayán and Cuenca in the same year. The Army of Quito, sitting outside Cuenca with as many as six-thousand men, was unable to penetrate the city walls.¹²⁷ This was the limit of their military success, as neither city fell into the hands of the insurgents.

The military failures of 1811, exposing the inability of the Army of Quito to control the Sierra did not completely defeat the Supreme Junta. Political and ideological divisions among those in favor of the movement and the lack of support from the Cortes in Cádiz ultimately derailed the autonomous movement. On September 8, 1810 the Council of Regency announced their intentions to have representatives from the American colonies in their government in Spain. Seeing this as an opportunity for the Supreme Junta to gain legitimacy from the Council, they nominated Juan Matheu y Herrera, Conde de Puñonrostro as their representative from the Quito region. Instead of recognizing the Junta as a legitimate government, the Council of Regency denied the nomination, and named General Joaquín Molina, situated in Cuenca as the real President of the Audiencia of Quito.¹²⁸ The Junta was never able to overcome the lack of legitimacy in Spain. The only regions to recognize the autonomous movement were those occupied by the insurgent army.

At the same time, the political coalition within the Junta began to fracture. On December 4, 1811, *el Soberano Congreso de Quito* (Sovereign Congress of Quito), the

¹²⁶ Rodríguez O, *La Revolución Política*, 77.

¹²⁷ "Informe del Gobernador de Guayaquil al Ministro de Gracia y Justicia sobre varios acontecimientos de Quito, 15 Febrero 1811," Guayaquil, 1811, ANM. Published by Ribadeneria, *Quito: 1809-1812*, 222-223.

¹²⁸ Andrien, "Soberanía y Revolución en el Reino de Quito," 21.

local ruling body set up by the Junta, was established as a formal legislature. It consisted of 18 members from the different regions under the Junta's control. Seven days later, on December 11, Congress officially declared its independence from Spain.¹²⁹ This act of separation from the Crown, combined with the failure to gain legitimacy, forced the Junta to defend itself on its own against royalist forces that completely surrounded Quito. During the process of writing a constitution for the now independent junta, an ideological divide among the Creoles split the autonomous movement. The supporters of the Montúfars, *montufaristas*, wanted a more conservative, constitutional monarchy, with the Montúfar family acting as the head of state, but were opposed by the supporters of the Marqués de Villa Orellana, who wished to set up a republic with the Creole elites of the city in charge.¹³⁰ Although the elites produced the Constitution of 1812 in Quito, the rift within the leadership proved too great and the power of the Supreme Junta began to decline.

From the beginning of the Junta in September 1810, royalist troops worked their way toward Quito. The leader of the coalition against the autonomous movement in Quito was General Joaquín Molina, who became President of the Audiencia in November 1810. The vastly superior army consisted of two main leaders, Brigadier Ayermich and Mariscal Toribio Montes, the latter leading reinforcements from Lima up to Cuenca and eventually to Quito. On November 8, 1812, royalist troops from Lima entered the city, facing no resistance. By this time, the ideological divisions that divided the Junta and supporters of the autonomous movement, and the remaining supporters fled to Ibarra. At the battle of Yaguarchocha in December, Royalist General Juan Samano defeated the

¹²⁹ Rodríguez O, *La Revolución Política*, 78.

¹³⁰ Andrien, "Soberanía y Revolución en el Reino de Quito," 21-22.

remaining insurgent troops, reestablishing Spanish rule in the city and officially ending the Junta Era in Quito.¹³¹

¹³¹ Carlos Landazuri Camacho, *Las Primeras Juntas Quiteñas*, 100-101.

Chapter 7: An Era of Uneasy Peace: Quito 1812 to 1822

The end of the Junta of 1810 marked the end of the Junta Era in Quito, leading to a ten-year period marked by uneasy peace and questions over the direction of royalist rule in the Audiencia. The royalist government of Toribio Montes centered its attention on how to handle the insurgents left in the city and their response to the reimposition of royal rule to forestall another autonomous movement. Empire-wide conflicts and events, such as the Hidalgo Revolt in Mexico from 1810 until 1813 and the return of Ferdinand VII to assume the throne as King of Spain in 1814, directly affected royal policy in the Audiencia and governmental reaction to the Juntas.¹³² Local royalists focused on the political situation in Spain as they waited to see how Ferdinand VII's return affected the Andean capital. An uneasy peace settled on the city, but the royalists remained alert to any suspicious actions possibly connected to an autonomous movement. In response to the heightened tensions, a new president, Don Toribio Montes, instituted a new conciliatory policy focused on finding a balance between punishing the remaining insurgents and incorporating them into the new royalist society. By doing so, Montes was able to reassert control in this turbulent, yet peaceful, era in Quito until the Battle of

¹³² Quito emerged as a politically unstable city as the fear of lower class revolt only escalated following the Hidalgo Revolt in Mexico from 1810 to 1813. The return of King Ferdinand VII only marked the return of a hardliner, conservative government, as he dissolved the Council of Regency in Cadiz and reestablished an absolutist regime.

Pichincha in 1822, when insurgent troops from Venezuela and Colombia forced their way into the city, officially separating the city from Spanish rule.¹³³

When examining the effects Juntas of 1809 and 1810 in post-Junta Era Quito, two key characteristics define these autonomous movements: their regionalist nature and the ideological divisions between the supporters of the Junta and the Crown. A letter written by a Creole royalist, Ramón Nuñez del Arco in 1813, presents detailed information about those involved in the Juntas. He sent to Spain a list of those who supported the Juntas from 1809-1812. 81% (361) of supporters were Creoles in Quito. Del Arco also shows that 61% (154) of royalists were Creoles.¹³⁴ This division among Creoles added to the insurgents' inability to spread the autonomous movement and provides evidence of their lack of support outside the North-Central Sierra. In this intriguing situation, as Montes was forced to appease the royalist government in Cádiz and at the same time relieve uneasy tensions surrounding the large amount of locals who supported the movement. The lack of insurgent support outside the city enabled the President to focus on what went on Quito instead of the peripheral regions within the Audiencia.

Del Arco's letter confirms that the Juntas of 1809 and 1810 were regionalist movements, as support did not spread outside the North-Central Sierra. As Graph 1 shows, unsurprisingly, only 2% of the local population supporting the Juntas came from outside the Andean region (peninsulars), and all of them resided in Quito during the Junta Era. Of the remaining population, less than 1% (7) came from regions outside the North-Central Sierra, further showing the inability of the local elites to incorporate Creoles


¹³³ Montes was president of the Audiencia until 1817, when General Juan Ramírez became President until independence in 1822.

¹³⁴ Carta de Ramón Nuñez del Arco sobre la Junta Suprema en Quito, Quito, 20 May, 1813, Quito 257, AGI.


outside the Andean region. Old textile producing strongholds, however, such as Ambato and Riobamba, sided with Quito during the Junta era. This helps demonstrate why local Creoles were unable to gain support for the Juntas in Cuenca, Guayaquil, and other regions in the Audiencia.

Another key concept that Del Arco's letter shows is that not all Creoles in Quito supported the autonomous movements, instead a large portion of the elite population allied with the Spanish Crown. Graph 2 shows that of the 154 people identified as being Royalist supporters, 94, or 61%, were Creoles from Quito. Only 27% of Royalist support came from Spaniards (peninsulars), with the other 11% coming from surrounding regions. Such a trend shows the regionalist nature of the movement, as well as the importance of the Creole split in support. A once unified elite population fragmented, making it difficult to forge a consensus over the future of the Andean capital. Such a division, also, was not common among other autonomous movements across Latin America during the independence era, creating a unique situation for the Andean capital. Such a disparity in support from within the city only added to the inability of local insurgents to create a stable governmental structure.

The enlightened elite population within Quito, the ones responsible for both Supreme Juntas, followed a different path than those in other regions across the Audiencia. From a political standpoint, the Quiteños were not the only ones losing local power and control, therefore presenting the question, what made the situation in Quito



Graph 1: Breakdown of Insurgents, those supporting the Juntas, based on Origin. *Criollos* refer to Creoles within the city of Quito. Each part of the graph resembles a local within the Andean region (except Spaniards). Source: Carta de Ramón Nuñez del Arco sobre la Junta Suprema en Quito, Quito, 20 May, 1813, Quito 257, AGI.



Graph 2: A breakdown of Royalists, those against the Juntas, based on Origin. Each part of the graph resembles a local within the Andean region (except Spaniards). Source: Carta de Ramón Nuñez del Arco sobre la Junta Suprema en Quito, Quito, 20 May 1813, Quito 257, AGI.

different from other regions in the Audiencia ultimately leading to revolt? The answer lies in its ideological make up based on its political affiliation within the Spanish Empire. Quito, being the capital of the Audiencia and primary supplier of textiles to the silver mines to the south, was an influential city in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; however, with the implementation of Bourbon reforms, the cities importance and prestige diminished. Each President of the Audiencia, following the Insurrection of 1765, asked for aid from Council of Indies in Seville, and each time they did not receive anything in return.¹³⁵ Accompanying this decline in power came the Enlightenment, giving the Quiteños the ideological justification needed to pursue a return to power. Therefore, the Juntas of 1809 and 1810 are the culmination of the Creole desire for power, specifically power lost in the latter half of the eighteenth century. With the influence of outside ideals, such as notions of regionalism and self rule, these local elites believed it was their natural and divine right to be the rulers of the political and economic scene in Quito. The Napoleonic invasion gave these beleaguered elites an avenue to regain power, not once, but two times in as many years, showing both their diligence and strong belief that forming a junta was the true way to reestablish their dominance in the political and economic sphere. In the end, however, many of these elites dropped out of the political and economic scene and with them the desire for an autonomous government.¹³⁶

Mariscal Don Toribio de Campo Montes, a former Marshal in the Spanish Royal Army, became President of the Audiencia of Quito in April 1812 following his appointment by the Council of Regency in Cadíz. Having assumed this position while the Insurgent government controlled Quito, the new president assumed power in Cuenca,

¹³⁵ Andrien, *The Kingdom of Quito*, 191 and Ramos Perez, *Entre la Plata y Bogotá*, 131.

¹³⁶ The Spanish also killed or exiled many supporters of the autonomous movements, as seen in the Massacre of 1810 and with the exile of Juan Pío Montúfar to Spain following the Junta of 1810.

a royalist stronghold during the Junta Era. The downfall of Carlos Montúfar and the Second Junta led to royalist control in the Andean capital, ultimately bringing Montes to power in Quito by 1813. In the same year, Montes proclaimed general amnesty for all members in Quito who participated in either Junta. Through such political measures, the new President attempted to stabilize the region through a conciliatory policy, ultimately facing opposition from the conservative Royalists in Quito. Even though many of the initial Junta government either were killed in the Massacre of August 2, or exiled from the Audiencia, some of the political divisions that divided the population during the autonomous movements still remained following the return of Spanish control. Questions over how to handle those supporters of the failed Juntas as well as how to proceed if any new movements took place created a divide in the government at this time.

One way that Montes reestablished control over the Audiencia was through the shuffling of political and governmental positions. In Ramón Núñez del Arco's letter, there were fifty-six (56) governmental positions that changed hands following the Second Junta. Of those fifty-six (56), twenty-five (25) of them originally belonged to supporters of the Junta. Instead of allowing them to retain their position, the new royalist government gave these positions to known supporters of the royalist cause.¹³⁷ The new government under Don Toribio Montes put people he knew would stay loyal to the Spanish government, but at the same time gave certain Creole elites power at the local level in an attempt to quell any leftover sentiments of revolt. Upon his return to power as King of Spain in 1814, Ferdinand VII either exiled or jailed many of the liberal supporters of the Council or Regency. Instead of embracing the Constitution of 1812 in

¹³⁷ Carta de Ramón Núñez del Arco sobre la Junta Suprema en Quito, Quito, 20 May 1813, Quito 257, AGI.

Cádiz and the idea of a limited monarchy where local governments controlled local affairs, the reinstated king abolished measures giving power to the regional level and adopted a policy of absolute monarchy. One of the primary goals of the Juntas was to rule in the name of the disposed king until his return, there would be limited opportunity to form another separatist movement, especially with Ferdinand VII's strong hatred for any of the enlightened principles that fueled both juntas.

On the night of June 27th, 1815 a group of local royalist soldiers went into the house of Don Antonio Ante, who along with his brother Don Juan Ante, and Don Manuel Zombrano, and Don Joaquin Borja was arrested for an alleged conspiracy against the Spanish government.¹³⁸ Later that evening, royalist troops arrested José Barba y Sánchez de Orellana, Bernardo Ignacio de León y Carcelén, Manuel Matheu y Herrera and Joaquin Sánchez de Orellana, all of whom were both elites in Quito as well as prominent members of the insurgency during the Juntas. Don Juan Bautista Heredia, Lieutenant of the Army, and Captain Don José Cornejo of the Royal Guard of Honor, along with six soldiers, received orders from Sergeant Don José Gonzáles to arrest the locals for creating a “commotion” and breaking public peace.¹³⁹ In the weeks that followed, the local government interviewed several people living near the center of the city in an attempt to find more information about the alleged foiled revolt. Many of those questioned, however, claimed to have known nothing about the events and did not hear or see any unrest within the city during the day of the arrest.

Montes, in response, wrote a letter to the Secretary of the State on November 7, 1816 stating his own confusion about what exactly took place during the so-called revolt.

¹³⁸ Testimonios de la sublevacion de 1815, Quito 1815, Quito 258, AGI.

¹³⁹ Büschges, *Familia, Honor, y Poder*, 263.

Acting in his conciliatory manner, Montes responded that there was no revolutionary fervor growing in the city, and that the actions of June 27th were out of spite against former insurgents who had done nothing wrong.¹⁴⁰ The President of the Audiencia went on to list names of local royalists whom he believed sought vengeance against the former members of the Junta, which included Don Ramón Nuñez del Arco, who earlier collected a list of over six-hundred people involved with the Juntas. Therefore, Montes wrote to Spain pointing out that the city was at peace, and if any unrest existed, it was not over issues of autonomy, but over how to treat former members of the Juntas.

When examining this movement in a broader perspective, it becomes clearer as to why conservative royalists wanted to rid Quito of all supporters of the Juntas. Don Ramón Nuñez del Arco wrote his list of names in 1813, directly after the Hidalgo Revolt in Mexico. While not specifically mentioning the revolt, he does mention countless local parish priests (113) who supported the Junta, pointing out his fear of a revolt supported by rural religious leaders taking place in Quito.¹⁴¹ Montes also mentioned Nuñez del Arco in his letter to Spain, pointing out his involvement in the overreaction of local leaders during the phantom Revolt of 1815. These measures helped return power to the hands of conservative royalists, including those in Quito, giving them a motive to eradicate the local elites who supported the Juntas.

Thus, even with political tensions still high among local elites, the royalist government established by Montes following the fall of the Junta of 1810 remained in power until the Battle of Pichincha in 1822. The Revolt of 1815 shows the fear exuded by

¹⁴⁰ Carta de Don Toribio Montes a Secretario del Estado, Quito 1816, Quito 275, AGI.

¹⁴¹ Father Miguel Hidalgo was a local parish priest who led an uprising outside of Mexico City beginning in 1810. The movement eventually called for total Independence from Spain and grew to upwards of 80,000. Fear of such a revolt in Quito was possible since, just like Mexico, there was a large indigenous and mestizo population.

conservative royalists in the Quito government and the arrest of some of most prominent members of society symbolizes a new policy focused on scrutinizing former members of the autonomous movements from 1809 to 1812. This fear, however, turned political tensions away from the idea of an independent state, and now centered on how the government should conduct itself in the post-junta era. Spanish control survived the autonomous movements, and until the arrival of Antonio José de Sucre in 1822 there would be no more large scale rebellions against the government.

When Antonio José de Sucre's Venezuelan Army defeated royalist troops at the Battle of Pichincha on May 24, 1822, outside of Quito, to give the city total independence from the Spanish Crown, it came at the hands of a foreign leader ultimately forcing the city to join a foreign nation; Gran Columbia. Conde Ruiz de Castilla died at the hands of Creole leadership in 1812, Carlos Montúfar died in battle in 1816 while fighting for Simon Bolivar, and Juan Pío Montúfar died in exile in Seville in 1819.¹⁴² Therefore, Quito officially gained its independence from the Spanish Crown in 1822; however, it was not at the hands of the Creoles who established the Juntas of 1809 and 1810.

¹⁴² Macelo Ortiz Villacís, *Origen del Poder Político en el Ecuador*, (Quito: Gráficas San Pablo, 1995) 35-36.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Awakened by a cannon blast at six in the morning on August 10, 1809, an anonymous local elite inquired as to the causes of the commotion at such an early hour. Confused and befuddled he arose to find a grand procession in the center square of the city, to which he heard the response, “What a surprise, a revolution.” This startled the anonymous gentleman, causing him to ask, “Revolution?,” to which one in the growing crowd around him replied, “*Si Señor, ni más ni menos.*”¹⁴³ Those six words help define the local political divisions with the city of Quito during the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Conflicting Enlightenment ideas had entered the Andean capital, creating divergent responses to the Junta of 1809 among the local elite. The revolution surprised the author of this unsigned letter, who was a member of the upper class residing along the city square. For some, however, the arrival of the revolution did not come as a shock, but many believed it was a necessary response to the political turbulence in Spain. It is not clear whether or not the author was a peninsular or a Creole, though he clearly was a royalist.¹⁴⁴ His total disbelief of the situation became apparent when he wrote, “I see that this is not a shadow that sets on my fantasy, but a real body [of events]”. He continued, “With what certainty am I not dreaming? That I am in

¹⁴³ Memoria de la Revolución de Quito en 5 cartas escritas a un amigo, Quito, 25 Octubre de 1809, Estado 72, carta 1, folio 4 v, AGI. Translated as: “Yes sir, nothing more, nothing less”. Italicized for emphasis.

¹⁴⁴ Of course ignorance of the rebellion would not identify a person as a Creole or a peninsular, though his word choice and constant bemoaning of the local government leads me to believe that he was a peninsular.

my right mind? That these men are not crazy?”¹⁴⁵ Though this member of the upper class did not know about the Junta before its formation, it did not take him long to denounce totally its legitimacy. This letter gives an indication of the polarization of the Quito elite about the proper approach to governance in the troubled state of the Audiencia.

Such division stems from the incorporation of different Enlightenment principles, such as the “rational thought” and notions of “sovereignty,” into elite discourse, creating a multitude of responses about how to handle the unstable political situation in Quito. A host of variables, such as local power struggles between the Creoles and peninsulars, an economic recession related to the implementation of the Bourbon Reforms, and the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, represented the unrest mounting within the Andean capital. Terms, such as “liberty” took on multiple meanings, as the incorporation of foreign ideas led to their evolution. Juan Pablo Espejo in 1796 referred to a “liberty” connected to the improvement of medicine in Quito, whereas Juan Pío Montúfar used “liberty” to justify an elite-led autonomous movement thirteen years later. Local elites, therefore, divided on key issues concerning how to rule in Quito, even though they used similar ideas and concepts.

While economic and political problems played a significant role in leading to the Junta of 1809, the divergence in Creole interpretations of different European and foreign concepts of power and control and how to implement them in Quito, ultimately explain why Creole elites could not find a consensus on how to rule their newly-formed government in 1809. Unlike other autonomous movements across Spanish America in the first part of the nineteenth century, a large divide formed among local Creole elites. This

¹⁴⁵ Memoria de la Revolución de Quito en 5 cartas escritas a un amigo, Quito, 25 Octubre de 1809, Estado 72, carta 1, folio 4 v, AGI.

lead to the rapid demise of the movement, as well as any subsequent autonomous movements emphasizing radical changes to the existing governmental structure in Quito.

This focus on the ideological formation among the Creole elites presents a new explanation as to why the Marqués de Selva Alegre and his followers could not forge a consensus among local elites. Junta leaders saw their actions as necessary and just, and they believed ultimately would gain the support of Creoles in surrounding regions since they experienced similar economic problems stemming from the Bourbon Reforms. Enlightened movements, such as the Patriotic Society of Friends of the Country, founded in 1791, and enlightened figures, like Eugenio Espejo and his brother Juan Pablo Espejo along with the travels of Alexander von Humboldt exposed local elites in Quito to these new ideas.

Quito was an important political and economic site for the Inca Empire and became the primary textile provider for the silver mines in the Audiencia of Charcas to the south. Beginning in the eighteenth century, Madrid sent presidents dedicated to absolutist Bourbon ideas espoused by Ministers of the Indies, José de Gálvez (1775-1787). While Spanish officials saw the measures as essential to improving the empire, local elites viewed their actions as an infringement upon their right to rule, and Douglass Washburn referred to them as ‘nativists.’¹⁴⁶ These leaders saw themselves as the natural rulers of Quito as they drew upon their connection with the *patria*, or homeland. For some within the movement these ideologies justified this new Quiteñan ‘nativism.’ Ultimately, however, a large portion of Creoles did not support the Juntas, demonstrating the discrepancy of how local elites in Quito interpreted Enlightenment principles.

¹⁴⁶ Washburn, *The Bourbon Reforms*, 21.

By 1809, the political and ideological divisions had reached their breaking point as the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula gave the Creole leaders the opportunity to re-establish control over the Audiencia. Within three years the city experienced two unsuccessful autonomous governments, a massacre, and the reestablishment of Spanish order, until the Battle of Pichincha in 1822. Enlightenment ideals became the basis of the nation-state in Ecuador. In 1809 and 1810, however, these ideas were still inchoate and only a select few in the Andean capital envisioned a completely autonomous Ecuador. Thus, “El Primer Grito de la Independencia” was not the birth of the Ecuadorian state.

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