SUPPORT FOR CENSORSHIP, FAMILY COMMUNICATION, FAMILY VALUES,
AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

DISSERTATION

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By

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ABSTRACT

There are disagreement and varied results in the research literature when it comes to the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship. In order to better understand how people's self-identification as more liberal or conservative relates to their opinions about expression rights issues, I draw on theory that explains political ideology in terms of ideas about the family. I begin by proposing a model wherein family values and family communication patterns contribute to ideological self-identification, and all three concepts contribute to support for censorship. I then provide detailed definitions of the support for censorship and political ideology concepts.

I test the model using data from three samples, collected at different times, using different operationalizations of the concepts of interest. Cluster analysis of family variables and political ideology indicates two groups of respondents that replicate across data sets. Members of the first group come from families with relatively greater conversation orientation in their communication, they also have relatively nurturant family values, are relatively liberal, and support censorship relatively less. Members of the second group come from families with relatively greater conformity orientation in their communication, they also have relatively strict family values, are relatively conservative, and support censorship relatively more.

Consistent with the proposed model, individuals who are more strict in terms of their family values tend to be more conservative and support censorship more, whereas individuals who are more nuturant in their family values tend to be more liberal and support censorship less. Additionally, those who come from families where communication is relatively more conformity oriented tend to be relatively more conservative as well. However, family communication was not directly related to support for censorship. Political ideology mediates the relationship between family variables and support for censorship.

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me that sometimes the best thinking is done out on a good, long run – a lesson that I've been able to put to good use ever since.

At Miami University, Dr. Robert Vogel's class was my first introduction to mass communication studies. Dr. David Sholle, as my undergraduate advisor, provided thoughtful and competent guidance during my time as a student in the Department of Communication. Dr. Glenn Platt with the Interactive Media Studies program showed me how to put theory into practice, and gave me my first opportunity to interview members of the public to get feedback on the Web site our team developed for a museum. This was my first experience with public opinion research.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since Socrates drank his hemlock for offending the gods and corrupting the

youth of Athens with his teachings almost 2,500 years ago, the role of controversial

expression has been of particular concern in western societies. In the United States, we

have settled on a system where decisions regarding the regulation of public

communication are made primarily by elites who are largely insulated from public

opinion – the judiciary. It seems that the framers of the U.S. Constitution, and those

who have interpreted their work over the last two centuries, intuitively if not empirically

understood that it would likely take especially calm, measured, considered, and

informed thinking to apply the generally beloved notion of "free expression" to specific

instances of communication that wide majorities of the public may find outrageous,

offensive, disgusting, or otherwise intolerable. The framers certainly understood the

necessity of such communication in a democratic system and so, by adding the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution, ensured that the courts (with their special

ability to determine whether laws passed by the public and its representatives are, or are

not, constitutional) were entrusted with the ability to decide whether particular types

of communication could be constrained.   Thus, controversial communication was at least partially sheltered from the sometimes ill-considered and often turbulent impulses of the public's opinion.

Nevertheless, the will of the people on matters of free expression is not wholly impotent. Public attitudes about free expression matter (Ammori, 2006; Gaziano, 1978; Lambe, 2002). Normatively, scholars have recognized the importance of public support for expressive rights in terms of maintaining long-term protection for those freedoms (e.g., Blasi, 1985; Bollinger, 1986). Without public consent, no policy can endure. Thus, public opinion on expressive issues shapes the landscape of free expression and censorship.

Indeed, there are many examples of areas where expression has been challenged, and even constrained in the United States in direct or indirect response to public concerns. For instance, from time to time the U.S. Congress has debated constitutional amendments to make flag burning illegal. The majority of the public finds this form of political protest particularly noxious and strongly favors a ban (e.g., Carroll, 2006). Although the United States Supreme Court decision declaring a Texas state statute against flag desecration a violation of First Amendment freedoms (Texas v. Johnson, 1989) still stands, the strength of public opinion on this issue clearly determines at least how Congress spends some of its time.

Another legal example of the role of public opinion in determining how constraints may be placed on communication by the government is the Miller test, which was devised by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether particular content

should be considered obscene, and thus be denied protection under the First Amendment. The test relies in part on *contemporary community standards* – the determination of the community that the expression takes place in, at the time it takes place, as to where the line between what is merely indecent or profane and what is obscene is drawn. These standards are *de facto* perceptions of public opinions. What is ruled obscene in one community might not be considered as such in another community because the standards, or public opinion, regarding what "appeals to the prurient interest" (Miller v. California, 1973) may differ between those communities.

Similarly, for a plaintiff to win a privacy lawsuit for the torts of false light and disclosure of private facts, it must be found that the material in question is "highly offensive to a reasonable person" (Pember & Calvert, 2007, pp. 322, 338). Here the determination of whether content should be protected by the First Amendment or censored is determined by an assessment of whether, in the opinion of a reasonable, or typical, or average person content is not merely offensive, but *highly* offensive. This is a question that seems most readily answered by some assessment of public opinion.

In addition to matters of abstract legal precedent, there is no shortage of controversy described in the contemporary news media regarding free expression issues. Should members of a Kansas church be allowed to picket at the funeral of a Marine killed in Iraq, with signs suggesting deaths of U.S. military members are God's punishment for America's tolerance of gays and lesbians ("Right to Hate" 2007)? Should U.S. entry visas be denied to international scholars who have been publicly critical of U.S. foreign policy (Eligon, 2007)? Should the Federal Communications

Commission fine broadcasters who air live content where participants unexpectedly use expletives (Biskupic, 2007) or physically expose themselves in a manner some viewers find offensive (Levinson, 2004)? Should the government be able to compel the producers of political advertisements to disclose information about themselves, or limit what can be said as part of those advertisements in accordance with the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (Von Drehle, 2003)? Is it acceptable for the government to confine those who wish to protest either of the two major parties' presidential nomination conventions to so-called "free-speech zones" that are outside of sight or hearing from the convention sites (Lithwick, 2004)? These are just a few contemporary situations involved in public debate about free expression. Groups with various perspectives on these and other, similarly controversial issues seek to influence public opinion, and ultimately to persuade officials in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government at the local, state, and federal levels to support their positions (e.g., Poniewozik, 2005).

From a less applied but arguably just as important perspective, public opinion on censorship is a matter of concern outside of the law or the newsworthy events of any given day. Social scientists have noted with seeming chagrin the apparent inconsistency between the public's broad belief in the desirability of free expression and its general willingness to support the censorship of communication that it finds objectionable. This *support for censorship paradox* has been consistently replicated in the research literature (e.g., Andsager, Wyatt, & Martin, 2004; Chanley, 1994; Chong, 1993; Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002; Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, & Wyer, 1991;

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Wyatt, 1991; Zellman, 1975). Large majorities of people tend to oppose censorship in the abstract, responding with an emphatic *yes!* to questions like *Do you think that there should be freedom of speech in this country?* but are much more likely to support censorship when presented with specific examples of controversial expression.

Cantril (1951) is generally acknowledged (e.g., Andsager et al., 2004; Wyatt, 1991) as the first to document this phenomenon by providing the results of a 1938 American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) poll of U.S. residents. There, respondents were first asked, "Do you believe in freedom of speech?" (Cantril, 1951, p. 244). Next, respondents who replied in the affirmative were asked: 1) "Do you believe in it to the extent of allowing radicals to hold meetings and express their views in this community?" 2) "Do you believe in it to the extent of allowing Communists to hold meetings and express their views in this community?" and 3) "Do you believe in it to the extent of allowing Fascists to hold meetings and express their views in this community?" (Cantril, 1951, p. 244). As can be seen in Figure 1.1, although 96% of the sample indicated opposition to censorship in principle, only 34% to 38% opposed censorship for each of the situations in which nonconformist groups and expression situations were specified.

One might wonder how well the results of a poll of the American public conducted some 70 years ago compare to measurements of more contemporary opinion. Every year since 1997 the First Amendment Center has conducted a survey on the state of the First Amendment (SOFA; First Amendment Center, 2007a). In 2006, the center

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
Figure 1.1 Affirmative responses to 1938 AIPO survey items as reported by Cantril (1951, p. 244).

obtained responses from a national random digit dialed (RDD) sample of 1000

Americans (First Amendment Center, 2007b) to, among others, the items 1)

> The First Amendment became part of the U. S. Constitution more than 200 years
>
> ago. This is what it says: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an
>
> establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging
>
> the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
>
> assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.' Based on
>
> your own feelings about the First Amendment, please tell me whether you agree
>
> or disagree with the following statement: The First Amendment goes too far in
>
> the rights it guarantees. (First Amendment Center, 2006, p.1).

and 2) "Newspapers should be allowed to freely criticize the U.S. military about its

strategy and performance" 3) "Musicians should be allowed to sing songs with lyrics

that others might find offensive" 4) "People should be allowed to say things in public

that might be offensive to religious groups" and 5) "People should be allowed to say

things in public that might be offensive to racial groups" (First Amendment Center,

2006, p. 2). Respondents indicated whether they *strongly agreed, mildly agreed, mildly*

disagreed, or *strongly disagreed*. Only 18% of respondents agreed either mildly or

strongly with the proposition that the First Amendment goes too far. However, 39%

supported, again either mildly or strongly, censorship of newspaper criticism of the

military. Furthermore, 34% of respondents either strongly or mildly supported

censorship of musicians who sing offensive lyrics. Moreover, 43% of respondents said

that they felt either strongly or mildly that people shouldn't be allowed to say things in

public that might be offensive to religious groups, and a majority of respondents – 55% – either strongly or mildly supported censorship of people who say things offensive to racial groups in public. According to the SOFA survey results, between 16% and 37% of the American public stands behind the principles of the First Amendment but are willing to see the liberties it enshrines denied in at least one specific context; and they report willingness to do so immediately after being primed to think in terms of those liberties by a prior item on the questionnaire which includes the text of the First Amendment.

So there is a multitude of perennial and contemporary controversies involving freedom of expression and censorship, public opinion on these controversies matters, and opinions on particular controversies often depart dramatically from the avowed value of free expression toward support for censorship.

1.1 Rationale

In the preceding pages I have discussed many ways in which issues of free expression and censorship appear in society, the law, and science, their importance, and the role of public opinion in how they play out. Support for censorship is an important topic for continued scholarly attention. My main interest in this area is the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship – a relationship that has been debated and identified inconsistently in the results of previous research. In order to add to the body of knowledge on this topic, I have turned to recent discussions of how people's thinking about family relates to how they think about politics. Furthermore, I

am interested in how communication in individuals' families of origin relate to how they think about and respond to communication in terms of support for censorship.

1.2 Overview

Other studies (e.g., Hense & Wright, 1992, Suedfeld, Steel, & Schmidt, 1994) have included variables similar to family values and family communication to explain support for censorship and many have included measures of political ideology, but the present study improves on prior research in three main ways. First, I examine the implications of Lakoff's (2002) theory of moral politics for the relationships between family, political ideology and support for censorship. This application of theory is a much-needed addition to what is a largely atheoretical body of research on support for censorship. Second, I utilize three data sets (described in Chapter 4) based on very different samples, modes and times of administration, and operationalizations of the variables of interest in order to triangulate results. Third, I utilize analytical methods not employed elsewhere in research on support for censorship, such as cluster analysis and tests for indirect effects, in the interest of better describing and understanding the relationships identified.

1.2.1 Moral politics and family values. Lakoff (2002) contends that there is an explicit link between ideas about the family and political ideology. He argues that the basis for an individual's political ideology is the metaphorical family model that she or he applies to government. Fundamentally, people understand the nation as a family with the government acting as parent. The two predominant ideological positions in American politics are liberal and conservative. The two metaphorical parents types that

adherents to these ideological positions tend to believe the government should act in accordance with are the *nurturant parent* model and the *strict father* model, respectively.

The nurturant parent model emphasizes empathy, cooperation, equality, and social responsibility. In this worldview, the mother and father share family leadership as equals, and the parents' primary duty is to nurture children and instill empathy in them. According to the nurturant parent model, people *learn* to be good by observing and interacting openly and (to the greatest extent possible) equally with good others, especially good parents. Good people are empathetic people, who help and nurture others and themselves, which leads to happier, more fulfilling lives for all. Thus, those who cooperate with and help others as equal and responsible members of society out of empathy are good people, and those who are uncooperative, selfish, unhelpful, and do not consider the well-being of others (un-empathetic) are bad people in the context of this metaphor. With the emphasis on group well being and equality, adherents to the nurturant parent worldview tend to be less trusting of centralized authority because of the resulting unequal distribution of power.

Lakoff's (2002) second metaphorical family model is the strict father, which emphasizes the values of self-discipline, hard work, tradition, conformity, obedience to authority, and the belief that people tend to naturally get what they deserve. Individuals who think about politics in terms of this model tend to believe that people face constant temptation and risk of evil and are only *made* good through discipline and hard work. As its name implies, in the strict father worldview, the father figure is the family's sole,

ultimate authority figure, and the parents' primary duty is to discipline children so that they will become self-disciplined. According to the strict father worldview, good people are self-disciplined people, self-discipline leads to hard work, and hard work leads to success. Thus, successful people are self-disciplined, hard-working, good people, and unsuccessful people lack self-discipline, and are lazy, bad people. Therefore the wealthy, leaders, and those in places of authority tend to be good people in the context of this metaphor. Accordingly, adherents to the strict father worldview tend to be deferential to authority.

As a cognitive linguist, Lakoff (2002) drew on an understanding of language and communication to formulate this explanation of political ideology. So the theory is applicable not only to how people think about politics and communicate about politics, but also to how we think about political communication. Additionally, although Lakoff's (2002) theory deals with the connections between *metaphorical* family models and political ideology rather than *actual* family models, it is an important lynchpin of the dissertation in that it provides a clear connection between people's family values, especially regarding the relationships between adults and their children, and political ideology.

1.2.2 Family communication patterns. Despite its origins in and applicability to communicative phenomena, Lakoff's (2002) theory deals with broad, abstract, metaphorical ideas about family values. In order to balance this with a more communication-centric, specific, concrete conceptualization of thoughts about the family, the dissertation also examines family communication patterns (FCP).

Chaffee, McLeod, & Wackman (1973) proposed the FCP model as a means of classifying family communication structures as they are related to the political socialization of children. The model draws on Heider's (1946, 1958) and Newcomb's (1953) coorientation and has two dimensions, *socio-orientation* and *concept-orientation*. In more recent work Ritchie and Fitzpatrick (e.g., 1990; Fitzpatrick & Richie, 1994) refer to these dimensions as *conformity* and *conversation*. As Koerner and Fitzpatrick (2002) explain, the conformity orientation is the degree to which family communication stresses a climate of homogeneity of attitudes, values, and beliefs. And the conversation orientation is the degree to which families create a climate in which all family members are encouraged to participate in unrestrained interaction about a wide array of topics.

Family communication patterns provide a means of directly assessing how perceptions of communication in the family of origin relate to support for censorship. Taking this conceptualization of the family into account will allow me to assess how perceptions of *actual* family dynamics relate to support for censorship rather than focusing only on *metaphorical* family values as discussed by Lakoff (2002).

1.2.3 Political ideology. As reviewed by Reineke (2006), there is much inconsistency in the social science literature regarding the relationship between political ideology and support for centoship. For example, in a series of three articles published in the Journal of Applied Social Psychology, authors concluded that 1) conservatives tended to be more supportive of censorship than liberals (Hense & Wright, 1992), then that 2) either liberals or conservatives may be more support for censorship, depending

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on who found the communication in question more offensive (Suedfeld et al., 1994),

and that 3) social conservatives (populists and conservatives) tended to be more

supportive of censorship than social liberals (libertarians and liberals) while economic

ideology was unrelated to censorship opinions (Fisher, Lilie, Evans, Hollon, Sands,

DePaul, et al.,1999). Reineke (2006) discovered statistically significant evidence

suggesting that a quadratic model may best represent the relationship between liberal

versus conservative political ideology and support for censorship, with those holding

extreme ideological positions tending to be more supportive of censorship than the

linear relationship would predict. However, Reineke's (2006) quadratic model added

little in terms of the variance in support for censorship explained. The contention in the

literature over the matter remains unresolved.

1.3 Model

The fundamental questions that this dissertation is designed to answer are how

family communication and family values relate to political ideology, and how all three

relate to support for censorship. Figure 1.2 depicts the proposed overall model of the

relationships that are examined as the main focus of this dissertation. Although I

present more detailed arguments for the expected relationships in later chapters, I shall

describe the basic premises on which the present research proceeds now.

The relationship between political ideology and support for censorship has been

inconsistently identified in the literature. In order to gain a better understanding of this

relationship I have turned to Lakoff's (2002) moral politics theory of political ideology.

Figure 1.2. Major concepts and proposed model.

In addition to measures of ideological self-identification (where a respondent may indicate that she or he is "slightly liberal," "extremely conservative," "moderate," or the like), I also use assessments of nurturance versus strictness in family vales and FCP in order to gain a better understanding of the values and perceptions of parental communicative behavior that may contribute to political ideology and support for censorship.

Lakoff (2002) presents a cognitive theory which also has developmental implications. It seems reasonable to expect that individuals who report coming from families with more conformity oriented communication, with its emphasis on supreme parental authority in the family and obedience in children, should end up self-identifying as relatively conservative. Individuals who report relatively more conversation orientation in their families of origin with its emphasis on egalitarianism and encouraging children to express themselves even when their parents disagree with them, should end up self-identifying as relatively liberal. The communicative nature of these positions means that they should have relationships with support for censorship as well, such that individuals who report that they grew up in with greater conformity orientation in their families of origin should be more supportive of censorship, while those who report growing up in families with greater conversation orientation should be relatively less supportive of censorship.

Similarly, those who hold more strict family values, such as emphasizing children's unquestioning obedience of their parents, deferrence to their elders, and exact adherence to the rules at all times should also tend to self-identify as more conservative,

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while those whose family values are more nurturant and emphasize children thinking

for themselves, following their own consciences, and helping others should be more

liberal. Nurturance and strictness should also be associated with support for censorship,

given the more repressive, authoritarian nature of strictness such that individuals with

more strict family values should tend to be more supportive of censorship while

individuals with more nurturant values should tend to be less so.

Because strictness in family values and conformity orientated family

communication are expected to be associated with both more conservative ideological

self-identification and greater support for censorship, more conservative ideological

self-identification is also expected to be associated with greater support for censorship.

Conversely, since nurturant family values and conversation orientation in the family of

origin are expected to be associated with both more liberal ideological self-

identification and less support for censorship, more liberal ideological self-identification

is also expected to be associated with relatively less support for censorship.

1.4 Development or Cognition?

Though one might easily infer as much from an examination of Figure 1.2, it

would be incorrect to refer to the research described in the follow pages of this

dissertation as a developmental study. The time and resources to collect data tracking

the variables of interest from early childhood through young adulthood and beyond are

unavailable, and I am unaware of any available data sets that would allow such an

analysis. The data sets described in Chapter 4 include assessments of concepts that may

be good indicators or proxies for developmental phenomena, but they do not directly assess those phenomena.

Nonetheless, like Lakoff's (2002) theory, the study does have developmental implications. For example, one of the data set used for this research includes a measure of FCP. The measure was only given to undergraduate university students (but not their parents), who had mostly, presumably, recently left their families of origin. As such it indicates the individual's memories and perceptions of the communicative behaviors and values in the family of origin, which may be quite similar to, but are probably not the same as, the actual behaviors and values in question. Similarly, family values are not the behaviors in which individuals engage during the daily process of child rearing, but they are indicative of the abstract and general values that the individual holds regarding that process. In this sense, this study might be considered quasi-developmental. I can examine whether the results are consistent with developmental explanations or not, but I am unable to directly examine developmental phenomena with the data available.

However, as mentioned above, Lakoff (2002) is a cognitive linguist, and his arguments deal not with development, but with cognitions; individuals who see politics in terms of the strict father worldview may have been raised by nurturant parents or be strict in their parenting, and individuals who see politics in terms of the nurturant parent worldview may have been raised by strict parents or be strict in their parenting. It's about the application of a metaphor, not the development of a value system. But it seems reasonable to assume that, given the over-arching and wide-ranging nature of a

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term like worldview, which presumably subsumes many other clusters of feelings and cognitions, that consistency would dictate that individuals who hold nurturant or strict general family values would tend to also apply similar (if not the exact same) values in their metaphorical, political model. I shall revisit this discussion of whether this study is best interpreted from a cognitive or developmental standpoint in Chapter 10.

CHAPTER 2

DEFINING SUPPORT FOR CENSORSHIP

Support for censorship as a concept must be carefully contemplated and situated in the research literature before consideration of its origins can commence in earnest. A lot of studies involve asking respondents questions about expression rights. But depending on how the responses are aggregated in terms of the topics or items that they're combined with they may end up being used as measures of support for censorship or something else. Typically, that something else is *intolerance* or more commonly its opposite, *tolerance*, but it may also be labeled *support for civil liberties* or given a similar name. Furthermore, one should be forgiven for confusing these concepts with another topic that has been prominent in the social sciences since the 1950s – *authoritarianism.*

Moreover, are we talking about support for censorship, or support for freedom of expression? And what kind of rights are involved? Should only the individual's right to speak be considered? What about freedom of the press? What about the right to assemble, and the right to conduct peaceful public demonstrations?

2.1 Support for What?

        The first question to examine is whether people's opinions should be conceptualized as either support for the status quo, *free expression*, or an alternative action *censorship*. Both conceptualizations have been used in the research literature. For example, major studies by Andsager et al. (2004), and Wyatt (1991) claim to assess *free expression*. McLeod, Voakes, Guo and Huang (1998) modeled *support for First Amendment rights*. Andsager and Miller (1994) measured *support for freedom of expression*.

        But it is more common for those who assert that they are studying opinion on expression rights decisions to define the concept in the opposite manner, as *support for censorship*. Lambe (2002) defines her scale as measure of *willingness to censor* and, in another study, asks, "Who wants to censor pornography and hate speech?*"* (Lambe, 2004, p. 279). Other scales measure *attitudes toward censorship* (Hense & Wright, 1992; Suedfeld et al., 1994) and *support for censorship* (Fisher et al., 1999). Many studies on third-person perceptions assess *support for censorship* or *regulation* as an outcome of the perceptual inconsistency that persuasive communication tends to have much greater influence on others than on the self (e.g., Chia, Lu, & McLeod, 2004; Dupagne, Salwen, & Paul, 1999; Gunther, 1995; Gunther & Hwa, 1996; Hoffner & Buchanan, 2002; Hoffner, Buchanan, Anderson, Hubbs, Kamigaki, Kowalczyk et al., 1999; Huh, Delormen, & Reid, 2004; Lee & Tamborini, 2005; Lo & Paddon, 2000; Lo & Wei, 2002; McLeod, Detenber, & Eveland, 2001; McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997; Neuwirth, Frederick, & Mayo, 2002; Salwen, 1998; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999; Shah, Faber, & Youn, 1999; Wu & Koo, 2001).

The latter conceptualization, that of *support for censorship*, seems best. As written in the Bill of Rights, the default condition is freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble. Because of this, expression is presumed to be free unless some authority determines otherwise. Therefore the opinion that supports some departure from the status quo is support for censorship. Similarly, support for censorship is more easily distinguished from ambivalence. An individual may express support for expression rights in and of itself, or out of ambivalence that results in support for the default, free expression, position because she or he simply does not care about the content. Support for censorship, however, is a distinct position of opposition to an expression right.

Because I have settled on *support for censorship* as the preferred conceptualization, whenever possible and appropriate I have thus far and will continue to report the results of reviewed studies in these terms. However, it should be noted that quotes taken from various sources, due to the variety of labels applied to the concept, sometime do not conform to this nomenclature.

But what counts as support for censorship? For the purposes of social science research, I define support for censorship as *a preference for the restriction of another's public communication*. A preference for restriction may be indicated in a number of ways. For example, Lo & Paddon (2002) examined behavioral intention, as indicated by the likelihood that respondents said they would do things like sign a petition or write lawmakers in support of regulation or an outright ban on pornographic Web sites. Preference for restriction may also be assessed by examining opinion more directly. Items on Lambe's (2002) willingness to censor (WTC) scale present specific expression

rights situations, and then ask respondents to indicate what they think a specific

government authority (such as a judge or city council) should do in response. Support

for censorship items on the General Social Survey (GSS), which are based on a

tolerance measure first developed by Stouffer (1955), don't specify an authority who

might enforce the preference, but simply ask respondents whether they think particular

instances of expression should be allowed in three public contexts (a public speech, a

book in a library, and teaching at a university).

I define public communication as that which is *intended for public reception.*

This includes teaching, public speeches and demonstrations, and mass media

communication such as newspapers, television programs, films, and Web content.

Public communication falls under the sole legal jurisdiction of the government.

Communication that occurs in private places or contexts, such a homes or businesses,

also occurs under the authority of those who hold property rights, etc. in those places or

context. So although intended public expression is protected as the default from the

only entity that has jurisdiction over it, private communication is subject to a more

complex system of potential constraints. The above definition of support for censorship

is parsimonious and consistent with prior social scientific research as well as the typical

political, legal, and philosophical conceptualization of the subject. It also allows a

conceptual distinction to be made between support for censorship and two other

concepts from social science with which it is occasionally confused.

2.2 Authoritarianism, Intolerance, and Support for Censorship

Figure 2.1 depicts a conceptual diagram of the relationship among authoritarianism, intolerance, and support for censorship. Altemeyer (1981) defines authoritarianism as composed of three attitudinal inclinations:

1. Authoritarian submission – a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives;

2. Authoritarian aggression – a general aggressiveness directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities; and

3. Conventionalism – a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authorities, (p. 148)

Note that none of these traits explicitly mentions anything immediately identifiable as support for censorship. So it is clear that, at the very least, authoritarianism and support for censorship are not the same thing. However, the inclinations do have implications for support for censorship. For instance, Altemeyer (1996) describes authoritarian aggression as

> …intentionally causing harm to someone. The harm can be physical injury, psychological suffering, financial loss, social isolation, or some other negative state that people usually try to avoid. Aggression is authoritarian when it is accompanied by the belief that proper authority approves it or that it will help preserve such authority … Anyone could become the target of authoritarian aggression, but unconventional people (including "social deviants") … are attacked more readily than others. (p. 10)

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
Figure 2.1. Conceptual diagram of authoritarianism, intolerance, and support for

censorship

Consideration of this information in light of the conventionalism inclination (as implied by Altmeyer's mention of "social deviants"), it seems safe to assume that right-wing authoritarians would tend to go to the aggressive extreme of denying another's expression rights in order to enforce conventionalism. But none of the items from Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford's (1950) original F-scale deal directly with expression rights issues, and only two items in Altemeyer's (1996) 30-item (excluding un-scored "table-setter" items) right wing authoritarianism scale deal with support for censorship:

> 23. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to
>   our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence
>   troublemakers spreading bad ideas …
>
> 33. We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds,
>   since new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change. (pp. 14-15).

However, there are several others that refer more generally to the denial of rights.

Stenner's (2005) view on authoritarianism is helpful in interpreting this information. According to Stenner (2005), Altmeyer's (1996) scale assesses *attitudinal outcomes* of authoritarianism. Stenner (2005) argues that authoritarianism itself is a predisposition or a "…preexisting and relatively stable tendency to respond a particular way to certain objects or events" (p. 14). Stenner (2005) also argues that, "The predisposition is labeled 'authoritarianism' because suppression of difference and achievement of uniformity necessitate autocratic social arrangements…" (p. 15). So the authoritarian predisposition *gives rise* to a number of attitudinal outcomes which, Stenner (2005) argues, are what Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) actually addresses.

These outcomes include preferences for strong leaders, aggressive enforcement of social norms, and above all, according to Stenner (2005), intolerance of those whose opinions, behaviors, or existence the authoritarian finds offensive.

Stouffer (1955) says that those who are more tolerant are those who are "…*more respectful of the civil rights of those with whom they disapprove*" (p. 27, emphasis original). Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982) write that "Tolerance refers to the willingness of citizens to apply procedural rules (within some general limits) on a neutral basis to those groups they oppose, so long as those groups themselves do not violate constitutional guarantees" (p. 52).

McClosky and Brill (1983) imply that the distinction between tolerance and intolerance is one of priorities in asking, "what influences prompt some men and women to honor and protect civil liberties, while others give priority to obedience and conformity" (p. 4). Thus, those who are more intolerant are less respectful of, less considerate of, and thereby less supportive of civil liberties for those of whom they disapprove. As noted above, the aggression and conventionalism aspects of authoritarianism are generally understood to contribute to intolerance, but there are other contributing factors as well. For example, there is a well-established link between intolerance and perceived threat (e.g., Chanley, 1994; Davis & Silver, 2004; Davis, 1995; Gibson, 1998; Gibson & Gouws, 2001; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Pierson, 1981). Authoritarians would be expected to consistently exhibit more intolerant reaction to that which they find threatening than non-authoritarians, but people in general would be expected to tend to react to more threatening stimuli more intolerantly than less threatening stimuli.

Freedom of expression is just one of the civil liberties that the intolerant may think should be denied for a group that they disagree with, dislike, or find threatening. Others include the right to own property (Lee, 2000; Roberts, Walsh, & Sullivan, 1985; Sotelo, 2000a; Sotelo, 200b), the right to vote (Finkel & Ernst, 2005; Stein, 1998) the right to run for or hold public office (Davis, 2000; Duch & Gibson, 1992; Gibson, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1982; Gibson & Duch, 1993; Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992; Golebiowska, 1999; Hutchinson & Gibler, 2007; Manale, 1990; Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton, 2007; Owen & Denns, 1987; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003; Roberts et al., 1985; Shamir, 199l; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983; Stein, 1998; Sullivan, Walsh, Shamir, Barnum, & Gibson, 1993; Sullivan et al., 1982), *habeus corpus* (Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004) and even the right to exist under the law (Gibson, 2002; Sullivan et al., 1985; Gibson & Duch, 1993; Gibson et al.,1992; Golebiowska, 1999; Manale, 1990; Mutz, 2002; Roberts et al., 1985; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983; Sullivan et al., 1982; Sullivan et al., 1993). Thus, support for censorship is often a particular form of intolerance, but not the whole of intolerance.

And, as noted by Andsager et al. (2004), not all support for censorship is encompassed by intolerance toward particular groups as typically conceptualized in the political science literature. For example, support for censorship also involves issues such as whether the press should be able to report on particular issues unfettered (e.g., McLeod et al., 1998), the sale of pornography (Lambe, 2002, 2004), and flag burning in protest of the U.S. government (e.g., Wyatt, 1991). Thus, in many respects support for censorship is based more upon the content or ideas present in communication in a particular context whereas intolerance is based more on the actions of a particular

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group, which may include expression presumed to be representative of views perceived to be common within that group. Typically in instances where support for censorship is mislabeled intolerance, the content is implicitly defined for the purposes of measurement by the group engaged in expression. Such mislabeling occurs when researchers claim to be assessing intolerance only with indicators involving responses to controversial expression situations, and fail to include examinations of the support for or denial of any of the other rights noted above that constitute similarly important aspects of intolerance.

In summary, authoritarianism, intolerance, and support for censorship are related but distinct concepts. Authoritarianism contributes to intolerance. Some other factors contribute to both authoritarianism and intolerance, while still other factors contribute to them separately. Support for censorship is an important form of intolerance, but it is by no means alone – there are several other forms of intolerance, or support for the denial of others' rights, that are widely addressed in the research literature as well. Furthermore, aspects of support for censorship that deal primarily and explicitly with the suppression of particular communication content rather than the suppression of the rights of a particular group are outside the bounds of intolerance as typically conceptualized and operationalized. This distinct portion of support for censorship has its own contributing factors as well, just as authoritarianism and intolerance do.

CHAPTER 3

DEFINING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Political ideology is at the very heart of the model depicted in Figure 1.2. A review of the most relevant literature defining political ideology revealed that its conceptualization is just as controversial as its relationship with support for censorship. This chapter presents that review, and arrives at some tentative conclusions regarding just what researchers and the public mean we consider political ideology.

Recall from Chapter 1 that the central premise of Lakoff's (2002) theory of moral politics is that Americans' political ideologies are best understood in terms of metaphorical models of the government and people as parent(s) and children, respectively, in a family. The nurturant parent model, which emphasizes empathy and equality is associated with more liberal ideology, and the strict father model, which emphasizes hard work and obedience, is associated with more conservative ideology according to Lakoff (2002). But before accepting Lakoff's (2002) views on the nature of political ideology, an examination of additional perspectives on the concept is warranted.

3.1 Qualitative and Theoretical Definitions

Recently Fleming (2006) has both criticized and built on the work of Lakoff (2002). Fleming (2006) also draws on Berlin's (2002) work, which suggests that liberals conceptualize liberty as *positive*, or *freedom to* define one's self and achieve one's own goals, while conservatives conceptualize liberty as *negative*, or freedom from others telling one what to do. As a liberal professor of English literature at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland (which he characterizes as a definitive bastion of conservative values), Fleming (2006) engaged in an ethnographically based study of ideology. He concludes that liberalism is focused on words, questions, truth, and inclusion while conservatism is focused on actions, answers, belief, and exclusion. Liberals favor talking about things and asking questions in order to arrive at, in their view, new, better truths and to achieve progress. Conservatives favor actions to defend, in their view, known, established, effective answers, based on traditional beliefs that must be protected for the culture to endure. Liberals attempt to include the other with dialogue, while conservatives attempt to defend against the other with actions.

Brock, Huglen, Klumpp and Howell (2005) define ideology primarily in terms of attitudes toward change. Radicals (extreme liberals) feel that politics and policy at a given time are woefully inadequate given circumstantial changes that have occurred since their inception, and therefore believe that large, rapid, dramatic changes to politics and policy are needed to address society's problems. Liberals feel that changes in politics and policy are often justified as a natural aspect of progress. Conservatives believe that changes in politics and policy are seldom justified, and tend to favor the status quo with changes only made rarely and carefully. Reactionaries (extreme

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conservatives) believe that change has occurred much too rapidly, and favor efforts to return to older policies and ways of doing thing.

3.2 Empirical Definitions

The most common contemporary starting point for an empirical understanding of ideology in the U.S. is probably Converse (1964), but it is not a very encouraging place to begin for those hoping for a discussion of the value systems held by Americans. Converse's position is that the general public's attitudes lack consistency to such an extent that no reasonable organization of their opinions can be discerned – and that most people cannot be considered as having clear value systems. However, just because no organizational factors or form of consistency are apparent to Converse does not mean that such factors do not exist. Rather than berating or belittling the public when we have trouble understanding their responses, perhaps social scientists should work harder to make sense of the things that don't fit neatly into our preconceived notions of how things should be organized, or the criteria by which we judge consistency.

Rokeach (1973) is also highly critical of ideology, at least as it is typically conceptualized in terms of a single most liberal to most conservative dimension. He argues, 1) the labels do not carry the same meanings through history or across cultures, 2) there is little agreement as to what specific attributes define ideological positions, 3) both general and domain-specific attributes contribute to the conceptualization, 4) it is often confused with authoritarianism (or vice versa), and 5) there is difficulty and disagreement when it comes to attempts to place two political orientations relative to one another when they are both on the same side of the center of the continuum (e.g., are communists more liberal than socialists?). But, unlike Converse (1964), rather than

proposing that there is no such thing as ideology, Rokeach (1973) proposed a different, two-dimensional conceptualization with freedom on one axis and equality on the other. Communism is high equality, low freedom; socialism is high equality, high freedom; fascism is low equality, low freedom; and capitalism is low equality, high freedom.

Rokeach (1973) demonstrates the validity of this model by applying it to a content analysis of speeches by various representatives of the four groups. Others have proposed two-dimensional conceptualizations of ideology as well. For example, Eysenck (1956) proposed a radicalism dimension and a tendermindedness dimension. Similarly, Asher (1988) describes an economic dimension and a social dimension. Nonetheless, single-dimension measures of liberal/conservative political ideology continue to be used and discussed in the social science literature. A recent review by Kroh (2007) recounts the wide variety of research questions in public opinion studies that have been addressed using liberal/conservative continuum questions on surveys. Furthermore, the popular media frequently conceptualize ideology in this manner as well. A search of the LexisNexis Academic news database limited to only articles published in major U.S. and world publications between January 1 and December 31, 2007 based on the phrase "liberal AND conservative AND ideolog*" returned 819 results, and a recent Google search on the same phrase returned about 1,560,000 hits. But despite the prevalence of this conceptualization both popularly and in the social science literature, it is still fair to ask just what people mean when they talk about being liberal or conservative. More importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, when individuals respond to survey questions about ideology, what are they telling us about themselves?

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Using methods similar to Rokeach (1973), Tetlock (1983) looked at political ideology in terms of cognitive style. Specifically, Tetlock (1983) used content analysis of congressional speeches given by U.S. senators in 1975 and 1976 to determine if there were ideological associations with integrative complexity, or

> …the cognitive differentiation and integration of information. Differentiation refers to the variety of aspects of an issue that a person recognizes … A more differentiated politician would recognize that policies have multiple, sometimes contradictory effects that cannot be easily classified on a single evaluative dimension … Integration refers to the development of complex connections among differentiated characteristics. The complexity of integration depends on whether the individual perceives the differentiated characteristics as operating in isolation (low integration), in simple patterns (moderate integration), or in multiple, complex patterns (high integration) (pp.119-120).

Ideology was determined based how the senators were rated by Americans for Democratic Action (a liberal political organization) and Americans for Constitutional Action (a conservative political organization). Integrative complexity scores were determined by a team of trained coders who examined the text of speeches by the sampled senators from the *Congressional Record* without prior knowledge of the study's hypotheses. Tetlock (1983) found that more liberal senators tended to exhibit greater integrative complexity. However, as Tetlock (1983) notes, "The less complex policy statements of conservative senators may not so much reflect variation on cognitive style as in rhetorical style." In other words, how a politician appeals to the people may be more indicative of how she or he thinks the people think about the issue

than about how the politician herself or himself thinks about the issue. Nonetheless, the finding still speaks to worldview, and is communicative in nature – more conservative legislators tended to speak in starker terms while more liberal legislators tended to be more ambivalent.

In contrast to Tetlock's (1983) focus on the cognitive aspects of ideological differences, Fiskin, Keniston, and Mackinno's (1973) interest lies in what moral value systems those with more liberal or conservative perspectives tend to espouse. They devised a list of 31 political slogans, and participants indicated how much they liked or disliked each on a five-point scale. Fishkin et al. (1973) then used factor analysis to identify ideological concept groupings. The process initially yielded three separate factors. The first was labeled conservatism, with the highest loading slogan of "Better dead than red." Fishkin et al. (1973) describe this scale as emphasizing "opposition to Communism, traditional patriotism, a cynical attitude toward poverty programs, and a hawkish position on the war in Indochina" (p.112). The second scale assessed what Fishkin et al. (1973) call peaceful radicalism, though it is also referred to as a "'liberal,' peaceful, nonviolent approach to change" (p. 112). This scale's highest-loading slogan was "Give peace a chance." Finally, Fishkin et al. (1973) call their last scale a measure of violent radicalism, with the a highest-loading slogan of "Kill the pigs." Fishkin et al. (1973) state that this scale assesses a form of radicalism that emphasizes "violence, power, and revolution" (p. 112). Liking scores for items on each of these scales were aggregated into an overall score for that scale for each participant. However, due to the turbulent social and political climate in America at the time, Fishkin et al. (1973) caution that the results of their ideological analysis and classification procedure

"…reflect a period of intense ideological and moral conflict, and their generalizability to other periods needs to be studied further" (p. 113).

Perhaps this is part of the reason why the violent and peaceful radicalism scores were not only analyzed separately, but averaged together into a general radicalism score for analysis as well. Additionally, they constructed a unidimensional, radical versus conservative score by subtracting each respondents conservatism score from this general radicalism score. I focus on Fishkin et al.'s (1973) analysis of this last operationalization of ideology.

Fishkin et al. (1973) were primarily interested in defining ideology in terms of different stages of moral reasoning (see e.g., Kohlberg, 1963, 1969). This typology describes distinct stages of thinking about what is morally right and morally wrong. Fishkin et al. (1973) found that greater conservatism (on their unidimensional, radicalism versus conservatism measure) was associated with greater role conformity moral reasoning (stage 3), which is characterized especially by adherence to gender norms, and greater law and order reasoning (stage 4), which is focused on maintenance of traditional community morality and behavior, especially when those traditions are codified. In contrast, greater radicalism, according to analyses involving the same measure, was associated with greater social contract reasoning (stage 5) where morality judgments are based on the promotion of the long-term good of the community as a whole, and individual principles reasoning (stage 6) wherein a variety of abstract concepts including equity, universality, and inclusion. However, like violent radicalism, greater liberalism on the single-dimension radicalism versus conservatism

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measure was also associated with greater preconventional reasoning (stage 2) where the egocentric satisfaction of personal desires is the main factor in morality judgments.

From a methodological standpoint, the most prominent study directly relevant to this dissertation is Conover and Feldman's (1981) work on the origins and meaning of liberal and conservative self-identifications. Conover and Feldman (1981) set out to uncover the meaning of the "liberal" and "conservative" ideological labels in terms of the structure, issue-oriented content, and what they refer to as *symbolic group evaluation* content of those labels. Symbolic group evaluations involve peoples' reported affective responses toward groups of different types of people associated with different aspects of society. In their endeavor to explain ideological self-identification, Conover and Feldman (1981) used data form the 1976 American National Election study, with a standard, single-dimension, seven-point, extremely liberal to extremely conservative self-identification item.

They found that affective evaluations of liberals and conservatives, as assessed by respective feeling thermometer measures, explained 36% of the variance in ideological self-identification. Furthermore, these affective evaluations mediated the relationship between ideological self-identification and evaluations of both the radical and reformist left as well as capitalists symbolic groups. Similarly, affective evaluations of liberals and conservatives mediated the relationship between social issue positions and ideological self-identification. Indeed, the only variable that exhibited a significant relationship with ideological self-identification that was not mediated by affective evaluations of liberals and conservatives was economic issue position. Conover and Feldman's (1981) final regression model, in which evaluations of status

quo, radical left, capitalist, reformist left, disadvantaged, and social control groups, as well as positions on economic, racial, and social issues, and affective evaluations of liberals and conservatives were included as predictors of ideological self-identification explained 65% of the variance in the outcome variable. Based on these and follow-up analyses Conover and Feldman (1981) conclude that 1) there is evidence that affective evaluations of ideological labels lead causally to ideological self-identification 2) their evidence leads them to question a bipolar conceptualization of ideology, since affective evaluations of conservatives and liberals were only weakly, negatively correlated, and 3) ideological labels and self-identifications are based less on political issue positions and more on other meanings which the labels and identifications are symbolic of.

Conover and Feldman's (1981) last point directs attention back to the theoretical explanations described previously. The qualitative definition of ideology discussed above suggests what ideological self-identification is symbolic of – worldview and metaphor (e.g., Lakoff, 2002).

In an excellent and recent review of literature on the subject, Jost (2006) points out several attributes of liberalism and conservatism consistently identified in the literature. Two specific definitions are held up as prime examples. First, McClosky and Zaller (1984) summarize that liberals emphasize equality, aid to the disadvantaged, tolerance of dissenters, and social reform while conservatives emphasize order, stability, the needs of business, differential economic rewards, and defense of the status quo. And second, Erikson, Luttbeg & Tedin (1988) say that liberals are equalitarian and believe that planned changes bring the possibility of progress, while conservatives believe that people are inherently unequal and therefore deserve unequal rewards, and

that the best conditions exist through adherence to tradition, order, and authority. Jost

(2006) concludes that liberals and conservatives primarily differ in terms of attitudes

toward change and equality. Conservatives are more resistant to change and hold more

traditional cultural and family values, including an emphasis on traditional religious

beliefs and morality. Conservatives are also more likely to support established

authority figures as opposed to activists who seek to change the status quo, especially if

the change is directed toward greater egalitarianism. Liberals, on the other hand,

emphasize equality and are relatively less likely to hold prejudices against minorities or

disadvantaged groups (Jost, 2006).

Additionally, relevant to the measurements of ideology used in this dissertation,

Jost (2006) points out that among American National Election Study respondents over

two-thirds since 1972, and over three-fourths since 1996, were able to self-identify on a

unidimensional, seven-point, liberal to conservative ideology scale.

3.3 Summary

As the work described above shows, identification on such measures has

meaning for respondents and researchers alike, contrary to Converse's (1964)

contention that, for the most part, the public is too inconsistent and ignorant to provide

reasonable answers. But what is that meaning? What are these worldviews about, what

are respondents telling us when they say that they are extremely liberal, liberal, slightly

liberal, moderate, slightly conservative, conservative, or extremely conservative in

response to a standard, seven-point questionnaire item on ideology?

The liberal, nurturant parent worldview emphasizes empathy and equality, while

the conservative, strict father worldview emphasizes obedience and hard work. Liberals

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conceptualize freedom as the freedom to pursue fulfillment while conservatives conceptualize freedom as freedom from the interference of others. Liberals use words to ask question in a dialogue with others to arrive at truth. Conservatives believe that they have answers that must be defended with actions. Liberals value planned change and progress while conservatives value tradition and the status quo.

Liberals value complexity and see things from a more ambivalent perspective while conservatives value simplicity, and they see the world in terms of stark contrasts. Liberals believe in cooperation to fulfill the social contract, but conservatives favor enforcement of law and order. Liberals value nonviolence but conservatives are hawkish. Liberals value universalism but conservatives value traditional patriotism. Liberals value inclusion of individuals who may choose atypical means of satisfying their personal desires and achieving their personal goals, even if those desires or goals don't conform to norms or tradition. Conservatives prefer role conformity in the form of adherence to social norms of traditional morality and behavior. Liberals see the community as an egalitarian whole, and believe that it is right to provide aid to the disadvantaged. Conservatives believe that interpersonal inequalities are inherent, and that differential rewards are a just response, leading to a focus on the needs of capitalistic business ventures and cynicism toward poverty programs. At a higher level of abstraction, liberals prefer change, social reform, progress and tolerance while conservatives favor order, stability, tradition, and authority.

Jost (2006) states that a broad majority of the public has at least a basic, general understanding of these differences, and uses that understanding to self-identify on the standard seven-point measures of ideology. Conover and Feldman (1981) say that this

process is based on affective evaluations of objects that are seen as being conservative or liberal – with people much more likely to identify with the group that they like more. Such affective evaluations are based in part on policy and issue positions, but also on the broader, value-oriented, and abstract worldview attributes that are the focus of the qualitative literature and also identified in the quantitative literature.

While contrasts and differences between conservatives and liberals are apparent, they are not always perfectly, diametrically opposed. Furthermore, the differences are often matters of valuing one thing more than another, not valuing one thing rather than another. Thus, ideological self-identification is a matter of assessing salient others who the respondent perceives as liberal or conservative, and the salient values embodied by those individuals, and then orienting one's own beliefs on the response scale relative to those perceptions based on how strongly the respondent identifies with one position or the other.

Who are the salient others? According to Lakoff (2002), ideas about the metaphorical nation as family are essential to ideology. Many people may be important individuals in the formation of political worldviews, but the literature indicates that the family of origin is especially important in the determination of ideology.

CHAPTER 4

DATA SETS AND MEASUREMENT

Three data sets were analyzed for this dissertation to examine the relationships between family variables, political ideology, and support for censorship. The first is composed of undergraduate students' responses to a battery of relevant items, including Lambe's (2002) WTC scale. The second data set is composed of 4 years (2000, 2002, 2004, 2006) of responses to the GSS, which consists of a number of relevant items, including a measure of support for censorship based on questions originally developed by Stouffer (1955) for the first major empirical study of tolerance in America. The third data set is part of the Multi-Investigator Study II (MISII), which was collected in 1998 and 1999 as described by Hurwitz and Mondak (2002). These data include responses to support for censorship items manipulated in a split-ballot experiment.

4.1 Students

The first data set is composed of a convenience sample of university students. Students enrolled in a research methods course required for communication majors at The Ohio State University were surveyed during winter quarter 2005 ($n = 119$), winter

quarter 2006 (*n* = 76), spring quarter 2006 (*n* = 87), and autumn quarter 2006 (*n* = 60; *N* = 342). In exchange for their voluntary participation, students were given a small amount of extra credit in the course, and access to the data (with identifying information removed) if they choose to use them for their term papers. The paper and pencil questionnaire was included as part of each student's course packet. Full text of each item, as well as response frequencies, are reported in Appendix A.

4.1.1 Demographic controls. Of the student respondents, 66.4% said that they were female and 32.7% said that they were male; 3 individuals did not respond to the sex item and were therefore excluded from analyses involving the variable. Their average age was 22.115 (*SD* = 2.292) years, but 2 individuals did not respond to the age item. On average, the students had completed 15.726 years of formal education (*SD* = 0.976). There were 21 students who did not respond to the years of education item. Since the students were so homogeneous in terms of their age and the number of years of formal education they had completed, these variables were excluded from analysis. However, I did include the students' cumulative grade point averages (GPA) at Ohio State (*M* = 3.105, *SD* = 0.419) in analyses. Only 8 participants did not respond to the GPA item, and these cases were excluded from analyses involving that item. Presumably, those who have sat in a classroom for relatively more years tend to have more of the type of knowledge gained through education than those who have spent less time in school. Individuals with higher GPAs presumably have more of that same kind of knowledge than those with lower GPAs.

4.1.2 Family communication patterns. Ritchie and Fitzpatrick's (1990) revised FCP instrument was used to assess the students' perception of communication practices

in their families of origin. Responses were provided on 5-point strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1) scales. The measure includes 11 items assessing perceptions of the family's conformity orientation, such as "My parents often say something like 'My ideas are right and you should not question them.'" For individuals who responded to at least 10 of these items ($n = 337$), responses were averaged into a single, overall conformity orientation score ($\alpha = .824$, $M = 2.726$, $SD = 0.629$), with higher scores indicating greater conformity orientation. The measure also includes 15 items assessing perceptions of the family's conversation orientation, such as "My parents encourage me to challenge their ideas and beliefs." For individuals who responded to at least 14 of these items ($n = 336$), responses were averaged into a single, overall conversation orientation score ($\alpha = .913$, $M = 3.486$, $SD = 0.708$), with higher scores indicating greater conversation orientation. As for nonresponse, 5 participants did not answer enough of the FCP conformity items for a score to be calculated, and 6 individuals did not answer enough of the FCP conversation items for a score to be calculated. These individuals were therefore excluded from analyses involving family communication patterns. Individuals with relatively higher conformity orientation scores tended to have relatively lower conversation orientation scores ($r = -.308$, $p < .001$).

4.1.3 Political ideology. In response to the question, " When it comes to politics, how would you describe yourself?" students could choose their responses on a 7-point scale: very liberal (1), liberal (2), slightly liberal (3), middle of the road (4), slightly conservative (5), conservative (6), and very conservative (7; $M = 3.679$, $SD = 1.502$). Only 6 of the students did not respond to this item.

4.1.4 Willingness to censor scale. Lambe's (2002) WTC scale was designed as an ecologically valid measure of support for censorship. The measure's design was based on actual cases and issues decided by U.S. courts. Specifically, Lambe (2002) explains:

> The United States Supreme Court has afforded different levels of First
> Amendment protection according to the category of expression involved. Seven
> categories of expression are included in the WTC scale: pornography, hate
> speech, speech the raises privacy issues, political speech, abortion speech,
> defamatory speech and commercial speech. These categories were selected by
> examining distinctions made in recent Supreme Court decisions and media law
> textbooks … In addition … the Supreme Court has used a medium-specific
> approach to First Amendment litigation, creating different models of protection
> for different forms of communication. Seven media were incorporated in to the
> WTC scale items: "pure" speech, demonstrations (defined as including some
> conduct, such as picketing, as well as speech), newspaper, magazine, television,
> cable and the Internet. (p. 199-200)

By combining the seven types of expression with the seven media, Lambe (2002) created 49 items. Each presents a brief vignette describing a hypothetical, controversial situation (though these are frequently based on actual cases that have come before U.S. courts) involving the particular type of expression within the particular type of media. Respondents are then asked to indicate what they think some authority (usually a judge or jury, always a representative of the government, public official, or someone acting with the sanction of such an authority) should do about the situation. Again, response

options are based on categories of government action toward public communication that have been defined in existing case law:

> Prior restraint - stopping the communication before it happens; this is the classic form of censorship … Subsequent punishment - imposing fines or other penalties after the communication has taken place … Time, place and manner restrictions - regulating some content-neutral aspect of expression … Allowing expression - not taking any action one way or another, thus permitting the expression to happen by default … Protecting expression - actively ensuring that the expression will take place … (Lambe, 2002, pp. 200-201)

Prior restraint responses receive the highest score (5), and protection responses receive the lowest (1). Thus, response options for items on the WTC scale are scored ordinally. Response options are also worded to conform to the specifics of each item's vignette. As an example the item from the WTC scale concerning hate speech in the demonstration medium is shown in Figure 4.1, and the scale is reproduced in it's entirety in Appendix A.

For individuals who responded to at least 44 of these items responses were averaged into a single, overall WTC score ($\alpha = .917$, $M = 2.818$, $SD = 0.484$), with higher scores indicating greater willingness to censor. There were 22 participants who did not respond to enough of the WTC items for a score to be calculated, and who were therefore excluded from analyses involving this variable. However, there were no statistically significant differences between those who did respond to enough WTC items for a score to be calculated and those who did not in terms of the independent and control variables described above.

The Ku Klux Klan has filed for a permit to hold a march through your town.

I think the city permit office should:

☐ refuse to give them a permit (prior restraint, scored as 5)

☐ hold them responsible for any physical or personal damage that occurs as a result of the march (subsequent punishment, scored as 4)

☐ require them to hold the march in a sparsely populated area of town (time, place, and manner restriction, scored as 3)

☐ issue a permit for the march (allow, scored as 2)

☐ issue a permit, and provide police escorts to make sure their right to march is protected (protect, scored as 1)

Figure 4.1. Hate speech / demonstration item from Lambe's (2002) willingness to censor (WTC) scale. Information included in parentheses is to aid interpretation, and is not included in the actual item as it would be presented to a respondent.

4.1.5 Use in analysis. The relationships between the individual items that make up the FCP and WTC scales are discussed in Appendix A. The two primary strengths of the student data set are the presence of responses to the revised FCP instrument and the WTC scale. No measure of FCP is present in either of the other data sets examined as part of this dissertation. The WTC scale is a recently developed, ecologically valid measure of support for censorship that thoroughly covers a wide range of expression rights situations. This data set allows for analysis of the relationships between FCP, political ideology, and support for censorship.

4.2 General Social Survey

The University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) currently administers the General Social Survey (GSS) once every two years. Trained NORC interviewers go door-to-door across the country in order to obtain a representative cluster sample of the American public. One of the GSS's main strengths is that it provides estimates of the American public's opinions regarding a core set of widely varying issues over time (Smith, 2005). Fortunately for the purposes of this dissertation, one of those core issues is censorship, support for which has been assessed using the same fifteen-item measure since the GSS's inception. Data from the 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 administrations of the GSS are examined here.

Initially, there were 12,904 GSS respondents to these four administrations of the survey. Though the GSS includes items assessing family values and support for censorship, which are described below, only 3,780 respondents were presented with both measures, due to the split-ballot design of the survey. There were two versions of the survey in this ballot, but the methodological details (e.g., why particular measures

were included, or the order of measures in the survey) are not provided for ballots or versions in the documentation from the survey data archive which was the source of the GSS data. Analysis was limited to these 3,780 cases. There were 940 cases from the 2000 administration, 921 from the 2002 administration, 919 from the 2004 administration, and 1,000 from the 2006 administration. All analyses were limited to these 3,780 respondents.

Weights were provided for the GSS data, but were not used for this research. Therefore the data were not adjusted to reflect the population according to known characteristics.

Item wording and response frequencies for GSS items are reported in Appendix B.

4.2.1 Demographic controls. GSS respondents were 55.5% female (0) and 44.5% male (1). Sex was recorded for all 3,780 of the analyzed cases. Their ages (M = 46.552, SD = 17.114) were recorded as a score from 18 to 89. Points 18 through 88 simply indicated the respondent's age in years at last birthday, and 89 indicated 89 years old or older. There were 12 analyzed cases where the respondents did not provide their age; they were excluded from analyses involving this variable. Respondents also indicated the number of years of formal education that they had completed ($M = 13.462$, $SD = 2.986$). There were 5 individuals among the analyzed cases who did not provide responses to the education question; they were excluded from analyses involving this variable.

4.2.2 *Family values.* Some GSS respondents were presented with both a ranking task to determine what qualities they believed were most important for children to have

and a measure of support for censorship. For the family values measure, respondents were asked, "If you had to choose, which thing on this list would you pick as the most important thing for a child to learn to prepare him or her for life? Which is the next most important? Which comes third? Which comes fourth?" The list of qualities was: *to obey*, *to work hard*, *to think for one's self*, *to help others*, and *to be well liked or popular*. The quality, or value, that was ranked most important was scored as a 1, followed by 2 for the next most important, 3 for the third, and 4 for the fourth most important, with the remaining value being scored as a 5.

So there are five variables, one for each option on the list. These data were processed into a unidimensional scale with higher scores indicating relatively strict family values and lower scores indicating relatively nurturant family values. The values *to obey* and *to work hard* were considered representative strict family values, so their rank scores were reversed in order to yield higher scores for more important rankings. The rank score for *to think for ones self*, and *to help others* were considered representative of nurturant family values, so their rankings were maintained as recorded since lower numbers indicated greater nurturance and higher numbers indicated greater strictness.

However, *to be well-liked or popular* presented a problem for aggregation since it was not clearly indicative of either of Lakoff's (2002) proposed worldviews, and the rank ordering task rendered all scores dependent on all others. To address this, a simple algorithm was devised to re-score responses on a four-value (rather than five-value) ranking, including only the relevant values (*to obey to work hard*, *to think for ones self, to help others*) relative to each other, while excluding *to be well-liked or popular* from

aggregation into the overall nurturant parent and strict father values score. The SPSS

syntax for this algorithm is included in Appendix C. This process yielded a 5-point

scale with possible scores of 6, 8, 10, 12, or 14 ($M = 8.927$, $SD = 2.461$), with higher

scores indicating more strict values and lower scores indicating more nurturant values.

There was a noteworthy amount of missing data for the ranking task. There

were participants who completed the ranking task in both versions of the ballot that

included it and the support for censorship measure, so it does not appear that these

individuals were did not have data on this measure due to documented methodological

exclusion. Furthermore, the Davis and Smith (2007, p. 258) indicate that there were no

filters, such as whether or not the respondent had children. Family values scores were

incalculable for 1,461 of the 3,780 analyzed GSS cases. Thus, these cases were

excluded from analyses involving this variable. Appendix B includes details on

nonresponse for the family values measure.

4.2.3 *Political ideology.* For an overall self-assessment of their political

ideology, GSS participants responded to the item "We hear a lot of talk these days about

liberals and conservative. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the

political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal – point 1 – to

extremely conservative – point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?" ($M =$

4.149, $SD = 1.398$).

Despite the fact that there were participants who responded to this ideology item

in both versions of the ballot that included the family values and support for censorship

measures, there was a noteworthy amount of missing data for this variable among the

analyzed cases. The data file and documentation indicated that, among analyzed cases,

there were 955 for which the political ideology response was not applicable, and 102 cases for which the respondent indicated that she or he did not know what her or his political ideology was. Appendix B includes details on nonresponse for the political ideology measure.

      4.2.4 Support for Censorship Scale. Support for censorship is measured in the GSS using 15 items based on some of Stouffer's (1955) tolerance questions. The items asked whether five types of person (an atheist, a racist, a communist, a militarist, and a homosexual) should be allowed or not allowed to express themselves in three ways (making a speech, teaching in a college or university, or placing a book he or she authored in the respondent's public library).

      Many researchers have treated responses to these items, from various administration of the GSS, as a measure of tolerance (e.g., Bobo & Licari, 1989; Brace, Sims-Butler, Arceneaux, & Johnson, 2002; Bryson, 1996; Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005; Chong, 2006; Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Ellison, 1993; Gay & Ellison, 1993; Golebiowska, 1995; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990; McCutcheon, 1985; Mondak & Sanders, 2003; Moore & Ovadia, 2006; Murphy Beatty & Walter, 1984; Mutz & Mondak, 2006; Persell, Green & Gurevich, 2001; Wilcox & Jelen, 1990; Wilson, 1994). Presumably this is due to the fact that the scale is based on items that originally appeared in Stouffer's (1955) willingness to tolerate nonconformists (WTTN) scale, which also includes items that deal with jailing or denying employment to individuals because of their views, and is therefore a better measure of tolerance as a whole. However, it is more accurate to say that the GSS items form a measure of support for censorship rather than one of general tolerance. After all, these items are concerned solely with the

respondent's willingness to support the denial of the subjects' expression rights. They say nothing about voting rights, or property rights, or being allowed to hold public office, or freedom from undue imprisonment, or any of the other rights involved in tolerance judgments. To the extent that support for censorship is an indicator of attitudes about these other subjects, the GSS items may provide a decent proxy measurement of tolerance, but on its face the measure's focus is narrowly honed in on expression rights. Thus, despite the fact that it is often inaccurately labeled, the GSS items are one of the most widely used measures of support for censorship.

The full text of this measure is included in Appendix B. Responses indicating that the participant felt the expression in question should be allowed were coded as 0, and those indicating that the participant felt the expression in question should not be allowed were coded as 1. For individuals who were presented with both the family values and support for censorship measures, and responded to at least thirteen of the fifteen support for censorship items (n = 2,688), an average of responses provided, or the proportion of responses that favored censorship, was calculated (α = .904, M = .313, SD = .295), with higher scores indicating greater support for censorship.

There was a noteworthy amount of missing data for the support for censorship measure among analyzed cases. However, there were individuals who responded to the support for censorship measure in both version of the ballot that included it and the family values measure, so the missing data among analyzed cases does not appear to be due to documented methodological factors. Of the 3,780 analyzed cases, 1,092 were missing data on the support for censorship measure. Details of nonresponse for the support for censorship measure are included in Appendix B.

The relationships between the items in the in the GSS support for censorship measure are also reported in Appendix B.

4.2.5 Use in analysis. The GSS data set's strengths lie in its large sample (even after many cases were excluded due to missing data) the presence of data indicating family values, and data indicating support for censorship gathered using one of the most widely used measures of the concept. The data set allows for examination of the relationships among family values, political ideology, and support for censorship.

4.3 Multi-Investigator Study II

The National Science Foundation funded the Multi-Investigator Study II (MISII). Data collection was conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of California, Berkley. The survey was administered between June 21, 1998 and March 7, 1999 as part of a project that bundled 13 different studies together into a single questionnaire. Data collection was done via telephone interviews of a sample generated using list-assisted random digit dialing, resulting in 1,067 completed interviews (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002).

Weights were provided for the MISII data, but were not used for this research. Therefore the data were not adjusted to reflect the population according to known characteristics.

Item wording and response frequencies for MISII items are reported in Appendix D.

4.3.1 Demographic controls. Respondents were 54.3% female (0) and 45.7% male (1). Sex was recorded for all MISII participants. Their ages ($M = 45.566$, $SD = 16.591$) were assessed with the question "How old were you on your last birthday?"

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individuals 85 and over were coded as 85. There were 6 MISII participants who did not

provide their age and were excluded from analyses involving that variable. Education

was measured on a 6-point scale: eighth grade or lower (1), some high school (2), high

school graduate or GED (3), some college (4), college graduate (5), some graduate work

or graduate degree (6). "Some college" was the median response. There were 3

individuals who did not respond to the education question and were excluded from

analyses involving that variable.

    4.3.2 Family values. The MISII included three items that each asked respondents

to choose which of two seemingly contradictory qualities in children they thought

should be most encouraged. These items were prefaced with the statement "Our next

questions are about children. I'm going to read pairs of qualities that one might try to

encourage in children. As I read each pair, please tell me which one you think is more

important to encourage in a child." The first item asked, "If you absolutely had to

choose, would you say it is more important that a child obeys his parents, or that he is

responsible for his own actions?" with 62.2% of respondents saying that it was more

important for children to obey their parents (1), 35.1% saying that it was more

important for children to be responsible for their own actions (0), and 2.1%

volunteering that both were equally important, and 0.7% not providing a valid response.

The second item asked, "Is it more important that a child has respect for his elders or

that he thinks for himself?" with 71.9% of respondents stating that it was more

important for children to respect their elders (1), 24.7% saying that it was more

important for children to think for themselves, 3.3% volunteering that both were equally

important, and 0.1% not providing a valid response. Finally, the third item asked

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respondents "Is it more important that a child follow his own conscience, or that he follows the rules?" with 26.1% of respondents indicating that it was more important to them that children follow their own consciences (0), 70.5% saying that it was more important for children to follow the rules (1), 3.4% volunteering both were equally important, and 0.1% not providing a valid response.

For individuals who provided decisive responses (i.e. not equally important or refusal) to at least one of these items ($n = 1,062$), response values were averaged into an overall score between 0.000 and 1.000, as unidimensional measure of nurturant (lower scores) versus strict (higher scores) family values ($\alpha = .649$, $M = .705$, $SD = .348$). There were 5 MISII participants who did not respond decisively to at least one of the family values items, and were therefore excluded from analyses involving that variable.

Relationships between the MISII family values items are reported in Appendix D.

4.3.3 Political ideology. Political ideology was assessed using contingent questions, and ultimately recorded into a single variable. The first question simply asked respondents, "Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't you thought much about this?" Of the respondents, 16.4% of respondents were liberal, 22.2% were moderate, and 26.8% were conservative (34.6% said that they hadn't thought much about it said that they didn't know, or refused to respond).

Next, participants who provided answers indicating an ideological position to the first item were presented with one of three follow-up questions based on the participant's first response to construct a 7-point measure of political ideology ($M = $

4.460, *SD* = 2.098), with higher scores indicating greater conservatism and lower scores

indicating greater liberalism. If the responded said that she or he was a liberal, she or

he was then asked, "Do you think of yourself as a strong liberal, or a not very strong

liberal?" with 8.0% of all respondents saying that they were strong liberals (1), and

8.4% saying that they were not very strong liberals (2). If the respondent indicated that

she or he was a moderate, the follow-up question asked, "Do you think of yourself as

more like a liberal or more like a conservative?" with 8.2% of all respondents saying

that they were more like a liberal (3), 2.4% reiterating that they were moderates (4), and

11.6% stating that they were more like a conservative (5). Finally, if the respondent

indicated that she or he was a conservative in response to the first political ideology

question, the follow-up question asked, "Do you think of yourself as a strong

conservative or a not very strong conservative?" with 13.0% of all respondents

indicating that they were not very strong conservatives (6) and 13.8% of respondents

indicating that they were strong conservatives (7).

Political ideology was the only variable in the MISII data with a large amount of

missing data, with 34.6% (*n* = 369) of respondents not having indicated an ideological

position.   The vast majority of the missing data in these cases was due to respondents

stating that they "hadn't thought much about" their political ideology, as detailed above.

Details of nonresponse for the political ideology item are reported in Appendix D.

4.3.4 Support for censorship scale and procedure. Measurement of support for

censorship in the MISII sample was based on Sullivan et al.'s (1982) content-controlled,

or least-liked group approach to assessing tolerance. Sullivan et al.'s (1982) developed

this method to address two main deficiencies that they saw in measures of tolerance

such as Stouffer's (1955) WTTN scale and questions that ask directly about support for abstract rights. First:

> Tolerance cannot be measured using a narrow range of political groups or ideas as points of reference. This approach tends to confuse tolerance with respondents' evaluations of particular groups on the questionnaire. Neither can tolerance be measured in terms of the respondents' willingness to endorse highly abstract principles. Since such abstract statements tend to be disconnected from actual political groups or situations, responses to them tell us little about how respondents might be prepared to act. (p. 52)

And second:

> Stouffer's method of measuring tolerance with reference to communists, socialists, and atheists is inadequate and, to a large extent, time-bound. It is inadequate because, for reasons just mentioned, it does not fully capture the meaning of tolerance. It is time-bound because it presumes that these particular groups are the only important targets of intolerance in the society. This may have been true in 1954, and Stouffer's conclusions may have been appropriate for the purposes of his research, but it is certainly not true now. Attempts to monitor changing levels of tolerance with this procedure are thus inappropriate and produce misleading conclusions. (p. 53)

With regard to measurement, Sullivan et al. (1982) conclude that

> … it is more appropriate to use some kind of self-anchoring measure that allows respondents themselves to choose the groups they most strongly oppose. Then

they might be asked about what steps, if any, they are prepared to take against these groups. (pp. 52-53)

Thus, in Sullivan et al.'s (1982) procedure, respondents are first presented with a list of groups that are extreme or nonconformist is some way. Sullivan et al. (1982) say that the list should range from the far left to the far right politically, and also include groups that are perceived to be outside of the American mainstream but are not readily classifiable in a political sense. For instance, Sullivan et al. (1982) provide the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society as examples of extremists from the right wing that are on the list, and communists and socialists as examples of left wing extremists that are on the list. Though the classification may seem puzzling to a reader today, Sullivan et al. (1982) mention atheists, pro-abortionists, and anti-abortionists as examples of people who "represent positions that are independent of the left-right dimension" (Sullivan et al., 1982, p. 61).

Since Sullivan et al. (1982) devised this approach to assess tolerance, after identifying a least-liked group participants in their study were then asked if members of this least-liked group should 1) be allowed to be President of the United States, 2) be allowed to teach in public schools, 3) be outlawed, 4) be allowed to make a speech in the respondent's community, 5) have their phones tapped by the government, 6) be allowed to hold public rallies in the respondent's community; and if the respondent would 7) be willing to invite a member of the group into his or her home for dinner, 8) be upset if a member of the least-liked group moved in next door to the respondent, and 9) be pleased if his or her son or daughter dated a member of the least-liked group. Participants respond simply by agreeing or disagreeing.

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Sullivan et al.'s (1982) content-controlled method has been used in several

studies that assess support for censorship rather than tolerance (e.g., Gibson, 1989;

Gibson & Gouws, 2001; Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002; Tyler & Rasinski, 1991), though in

all of these studies, despite dealing only with expression rights, the measure is still

referred to as an assessment of tolerance. The MISII items, which were previously

analyzed by Hurwitz and Mondak (2002) as part of what they claim is an examination

of discriminatory (group-based) and general (behavior-based) intolerance, are a good

example; though respondents were presented with a least-liked group selection task, the

only activities they were asked to evaluate are forms of expression. Though Hurwitz

and Mondak (2002) further claim that "Political tolerace has typically been

conceptualized as an unwillingness to extend expressive rights to disliked groups or

individuals" (p. 93), they provide no citation to bolster the assertion. As discussed in

Chapter 1, there are certainly many studies that mis-operationalize intolerance as

support for censorship, or mis-label support for censorship as intolerance. But (again)

conceptually, intolerance is clearly not the same thing as support for censorship.

Support for censorship in the MISII sample was assessed using a split-ballot

experimental manipulation. Respondents were assigned to one of four conditions.

Those in the first ($n = 272$) and second ($n = 265$) conditions initially completed a least-

liked group identification task after being told by the interviewer, "Now I'm going to

read a list of groups in politics. After I read the list, please tell me which group you like

the least. The Ku Klux Klan, Nazis, gay rights activists, communists." If a respondent

in the first, *least-liked group* condition said that she or he disliked more than one of the

groups, but couldn't choose the one that she or he liked the least ($n = 45$), the response

was coded as the first response in the list given by the respondent. If a respondent in this condition said that she or he didn't know which group she or he liked least ($n = 7$), or refused to answer the item ($n = 2$), the support for censorship items asked next referred to the Ku Klux Klan.

Aside from respondents in the first and second condition being asked about their least-liked group initially, the reference group for the three censorship items asked was the only methodological difference between these two conditions. Those in the first condition were asked about support for censorship of their least-liked group. Those in the second, *people with prime* condition were asked about "people" after essentially being primed to think about their least-liked group. Those in the third, *people without prime* ($n = 261$) condition were asked about their support for censorship of "people" as well, but without the least-liked group prime. Finally, those in the fourth, *people like you* condition ($n = 269$) were asked about support for censorship of "people like you" without being primed to think about their least-liked group.

The interviewer gave respondents the instruction "As I read each of the following statements, please tell me how much you agree or disagree." The first support for censorship item presented to respondents was "How about '[least-liked group, people, or people like you] should be allowed to make a speech in your city to protest against the government?' Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?" The second item was "How about '[least-liked group, people, or people like you] should be allowed to hold public rallies in your city to protest against the government'? Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?" The third and final item was "How about '[least-liked group,

people, or people like you] should be allowed to burn the American flag to protest against the government'? Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?" For each of these items, responses were coded as agree strongly = 1, agree somewhat = 2, disagree somewhat = 3, and disagree strongly = 4, because greater disagreement with the statement indicated greater support for censorship. For respondents who answered at least two of the items ($n = 1,066$), an average score was calculated for all items answered, with higher scores indicating more support for censorship. There was only 1 participant in the MISII data set who did not answer enough of the support for censorship items to calculate a score, and was excluded from analyses involving that variable. Means and standard deviations of support for censorship scores for each conditions are shown in Table 4.1.

Relationships between the support for censorship items for each condition are reported in Appendix D.

4.3.5 Use in analysis. Among the strengths of the MISII are a second operationalization of nurturant parent and strict father family values (in addition to that in the GSS), and a variety of different measurements of support for censorship provided by the split-ballot manipulations. The MISII data set will be used to further and alternatively examine the relationships between family values, political ideology and support for censorship.

4.4 Summary

The data sets used for this dissertation were gathered using different procedures; a paper and pencil questionnaire for the student data, face-to-face interviews for the GSS data, and telephone interviews for the MISII data. The student data come from a

	Least-liked group	People with prime	People without prime	People like you
M	3.070	2.509	2.356	2.266
SD	0.921	0.779	0.720	0.678
α	.648	.687	.637	.622
n	271	265	261	269

Table 4.1

Support for Censorship Descriptive Statistics for MISII Conditions

One-way ANOVA: F (3, 1065) = 57.528, $p < .001$

Higher scores indicate greater support for censorship.

One case was excluded from the least-liked group condition subsample for not

responding to more than one of the support for censorship items.

convenience sample while the GSS and MISII data were collected from nationally

representative samples. The student data set includes assessments conformity and

conversation orientations in FCP, while the GSS and MISII data sets include

measurements of more abstract family values of nurturance versus strictness held by

their respondents. The three data sets were gathered using dramatically different

measures of support for censorship. The differences between data sets may make it

difficult to determine what any differences in results might be attributable to. However,

if results are similar across data sets, that triangulated evidence will be especially

compelling.

CHAPTER 5

CLUSTER ANALYSIS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON MORAL POLITICS

Lakoff (2002) contends that family values in the form of a metaphorical worldview are intimately intertwined with political ideology. One of the main purposes of this dissertation is to determine whether this insight from Lakoff's (2002) theory of moral politics can shed light on the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship. However, to date there has been no known empirical examination or application of Lakoff's (2002) work. I will now use the data sets described in Chapter 4 to engage in such an examination. Asked simply, is there evidence that it is reasonable to classify people as *nurturant parents* and *strict fathers*? And if so, what are the characteristics of these groups aside from their differences in ideology and family values? Most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, do they differ in terms of support for censorship?

Based on Lakoff's (2002) work, I expected my analysis to reveal consistently two groups of people across data sets with the first being relatively lower in FCP conformity orientation, relatively higher FCP conversation orientation, relatively more nurturant family values, and relatively more liberal, and the second being relatively

higher in FCP conformity orientation, relatively lower in FCP conversation orientation, relatively more strict family values, and relatively more conservative. The latter (*strict fathers*) should also be relatively more supportive of censorship than the former (*nurturant parents*).

To determine if Lakoff's (2002) typology is discernable in people's responses to questions about family communication, family values, and political ideology, I employed the technique of cluster analysis. Essentially, cluster analysis provides a way of classifying respondents into groups according to their attributes on two or more variables.

Sharma (1996) states that, conceptually, cluster analysis classifies cases so that those within a group are as similar to each other as possible, and the groups are as different from each other as possible in terms of the variables of interest. Each of these *clustering variables* is treated as a dimension in a space. Cases are then plotted in that space, and a geometric algorithm is used to group cases based on either how close they are to each other or how far they are from other cases in the space.

5.1 Cluster Analysis Procedures and Solutions

For the student data, a three-dimensional space was created using political ideology, FCP conformity, and FCP conversation as the dimensions. For the GSS and MISII data, two-dimensional spaces were created, with political ideology and family values as the dimensions. For all the data sets, standardized versions of the dimension variables were created for use in the cluster analysis to avoid distorted, "oblong" spaces that would result from using variables on different numerical scales as dimensions in the same space (e.g., a 1.000 to 7.000 ideology dimension and 1.000 to 5.000 FCP

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conformity and FCP conversation dimensions). The MISII data were divided into four

separate samples for the procedure, one for each experimental condition.   I did this

because I intended to examine the final cluster solutions in terms of support for

censorship and, as noted in Chapter 4, there were significant differences in support for

censorship between the different MISII conditions. Thus, this chapter discusses data

analysis in six samples: *students*, *GSS*, *MISII least-liked group condition, MISII people

with prime condition, MISII people without prime condition,* and *MISII people like you

condition*.

A procedure originally developed by Caspi and Silva (1995) and refined by

Asendorpf, Borkenau, Ostendorf and Van Aken (2001) to classify individuals into

groups according to their traits in the five-factor model of personality was used to

classify the cases in the six data sets. First, Ward's method of hierarchical clustering

was used with the squared Euclidean distance equation to determine initial two-, three-,

four-, five-, six-, and seven-cluster solutions in the data sets. Hierarchical clustering

procedures begin with each case as a cluster and group cases step by step, starting with

the two cases that are closest together in the space, so that at each step there is one less

cluster than in the step before (e.g., Sharma, 1996). Ward's method is one of several

hierarchical clustering techniques. It creates clusters with maximized within-group

homogeneity as opposed to between-group heterogeneity as is the case with other

hierarchical methods (e.g., Roskos-Ewoldson & Roskos-Ewoldson, 2008; Sharma,

1996). This is accomplished by creating clusters that minimize the error sum of squares

as determined by the distances between cases in a cluster and the center of the cluster

(the mean for each cluster on each dimension; e.g., Sharma, 1996). The squared

Euclidean distance equation is used to calculate the distance between two points in a multi-dimensional space (e.g., Sharma, 1996). I started with a two-cluster solution because a one-cluster solutions would essentially be the entire data set, and I determined that solutions with more than seven clusters seemed unlikely to replicate between data sets, would be difficult to interpret in a meaningful way, and would likely be bested by more parsimonious solutions in the two and three dimensional spaces.

Once the Ward's method solutions were determined for each data set, a confirmatory *k*-means clustering procedure was used to determine how reliable each solution was in each data set. This procedure begins with the specification of the number of clusters as well as the cluster centers as determined by the Ward's method solution. Essentially, *k*-means starts at these pre-determined (from the Ward's method solution) points in the space, and then assigns each case to a cluster based on which of the points it is closest to as calculated using the squared Euclidean distance equation. The cluster centers are then re-calculated, and the process repeated until either a specified maximum number of iterations is reached or there is non-significant change in cluster centers (e.g., Sharma, 1996). In my *k*-means analyses, I used the SPSS default of 10 maximum iterations, but all solutions resolved before reaching this maximum.

Next, for each solution set in each data set, I cross-tabulated Ward's method and *k*-means cluster membership for cases to determine how well the clusters replicated between procedures. Table 5.1 shows the average percentage of cases that remained in the same cluster between the two procedures across all six data sets. These cases were treated as prototypical, and comprised the final cluster members; cases that did not remain in the same group between clustering procedures were excluded from further

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	Number of clusters					
Average	2	3	4	5	6	7
% in same cluster	96.8%	91.0%	91.5%	95.4%	95.0%	93.9%
R^2 cluster membership	.331	.632	.805	.825	.837	.861
R^2 FCP conformity	.206	.298	.404	.547	.640	.750
R^2 FCP conversation	.079	.411	.631	.650	.693	.726
R^2 strictness	.819	.828	.828	.887	.946	.948
R^2 conservatism	.258	.613	.812	.818	.842	.864

Table 5.1

Aggregate cluster solution metrics

No. of classifiable cases: students = 331, GSS = 2,319, MISII least-liked group = 171, MISII people with prime = 180, MISII people without prime = 170, MISII people like you = 173

% in same cluster is the percentage of classifiable cases that remained in the same cluster between Ward's and k-means clustering procedures.

R^2 cluster membership is the portion of variability in cluster membership explained by clustering variables. All other R^2 are portion of variability in clustering variable explained by cluster membership.

R^2 FCP conformity and R^2 FCP conversation figures are based only on the student data.

R^2 strictness is the average from GSS and MISII data sets only.

analyses involving cluster membership. Cases with missing data on one of the clustering variables had already been excluded as unclassifiable at the outset of the Ward's method procedure.

Five criteria were used to judge the cluster solutions. First, the percentage of cases that were reclassified in the same group between Ward's and *k*-means procedures was used as a metric of solution reliability. Second, I determined how much of the variability in cluster membership was explained by the clustering variables, and how much of the variability in the clustering variables was explained by cluster membership, favoring solutions with greater explanatory power. Third, solutions were examined across data sets for qualitative consistency. For example, were the characteristics of the two-cluster solution in the GSS data similar to the characteristics of the two-cluster solutions in the MISII data sets? Fourth, more parsimonious solutions were favored. Fifth, solutions were examined for their theoretical interpretability. Essentially, a tie goes to Lakoff (2002).

As shown in Table 5.1, the two-cluster solution had the highest percentage of cases that were classified in the same cluster between the two procedures – 96.8%, on average across data sets. The five-cluster and six-cluster solutions were a close second and third (95.4% and 95.0% of cases clustered in the same group between procedures, respectively).

As can also be seen in Table 5.1, the most notable increase in the amount of variability in cluster membership explained by clustering variables averaged across all six data sets was between the three-cluster ($R^2 = .632$) and four-cluster ($R^2 = .805$)

solutions, seeming to indicate that the four-cluster solution represented the best balance of simplicity and representation of the clustering variables.

In the student data, the last major increase in explanatory power for FCP conformity is between the six-cluster ($R^2 = .640$) and seven-cluster ($R^2 = .750$) solutions. For FCP conversation, the last big increase was between the three-cluster ($R^2 = .411$) and four-cluster ($R^2 = .631$) solutions. With regard to strictness in family values, there were not any remarkable increases in variability explained by cluster membership from one solution to the next although R^2 did, of course, increase as more clusters were allowed. The most notable increase in the variance in conservatism explained by cluster membership was between the three-cluster ($R^2 = .613$) and four-cluster ($R^2 = .812$) solutions. It seems that the four-cluster solution was the best in terms of explanation of clustering variable variance, over all.

Further examination revealed marked inconsistencies in the qualities of the clusters between data sets in terms of the clustering variables for all but the two-cluster and four-cluster solutions. For example, for the three-cluster solution in the student data set, the first group had a relatively low average FCP conformity score, a relatively high average FCP conversation scores and were relatively liberal. The second group exhibited a relatively high average FCP conformity scores, a relatively low average FCP conversation scores, and were relatively conservative. The third cluster in the student data set had a relatively low average FCP conformity scores, a relatively high average FCP conversation scores, and were relatively conservative. Similarly, in the GSS data set the first group was relatively nurturant and liberal, the second was relatively strict and conservative, and the third was relatively nurturant and

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conservative. However, in the three-cluster solutions in all four MISII condition data sets the first group was relatively nurturant and liberal and the second was relatively strict and conservative, but the third group was relatively strict and liberal (rather than nurturant and conservative). Similar, though more complicated, inconsistencies existed in the five-, six-, and seven- cluster solutions.

Since the two-cluster solution had fewer categories it was, of course, a simpler typology than the four-cluster solution. But parsimony prefers simplicity only when all other things are equal, and although the two-cluster solution replicated better between clustering methods, the four-cluster solution has much more explanatory power. The cluster qualities in terms of the clustering variables were consistent between all six data sets for both solutions. For the two-cluster solution, the first group was relatively low in FCP conformity, high in FCP conversation, nurturant, and liberal, and the second was relatively high in FCP conformity, low in FCP conversation, strict, and conservative. For the four-cluster solution, the first group was relatively low in FCP conformity, high in FCP conversation, nurturant, and liberal. The second was relatively high in FCP conformity, low in FCP conversation, strict, and conservative. The third was relatively low in FCP conformity, high in FCP conversation, nurturant, and conservative. And the fourth was relatively high in FCP conformity, low in FCP conversation, strict, and liberal.

The two-cluster solution is also easily interpretable in terms of Lakoff's (2002) theory in that it categorizes individuals into one of two prototypical groups – nurturant parents and strict fathers. There is not a readily apparent theoretical rationale for the four-cluster solution.

The four-cluster solution was better at explaining variance (1) tied with the two-cluster solution for replication between data sets (2) and tended to be most parsimonious (3). However, the two-cluster solution (1) best replicated between clustering methods, tied with the four-cluster solution for replication between data sets (2) and was most consistent with theory (3). By these counts of judgment criteria met, the two-cluster and four-cluster solutions tied.

5.2 Solution Selection

For the purposes of this research, theory was the tiebreaker, and the two-cluster solution was more consistent with theory despite the fact that the four-cluster solution was in some ways superior. This dissertation was designed to apply Lakoff's (2002) theory in order to better understand the relationship between support for censorship and political ideology. With this approach of application rather than testing in mind, and without overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the solution that was consistent with theory was accepted over the inconsistent solution. A tie is, practically by definition, *not* overwhelming.

Furthermore, recall that for five of the six data sets, cases were plotted in a two-dimensional space. The strongest evidence in favor of the four-cluster solution was the variance it explained and its appeal to parsimony as a solution with a moderate number of clusters that explains an impressive amount of variance. However, if the data are spread relatively homogeneously through the space the solution with 2^d clusters, where *d* is the number of dimensions in the space, is inherently favored with respect to variance explained since it will tend to put together groups that are combinations of highs and lows on the clustering dimension. Thus, the appeal of the four-cluster

solution, and the evidence it is based on, are more statistically driven (and perhaps so due to an artifact) than theory driven.

Although the two-cluster solution was selected for further examination in this research, future studies, with the goal of more directly challenging Lakoff's theory rather than applying it, should certainly examine the possibility that it may be reasonable to add strict liberal and nurturant conservative categories into Lakoff's typology.

5.3 Differences in Nurturant Parents and Strict Fathers

Figure 5.1 shows the *z*-scores for clustering variables and support for censorships for nurturant parents and strict fathers in the two-cluster solution for each data set. In the student data, 46.7% of classifiable cases were nurturant parents (*n* = 127), and 53.3% of classifiable cases were strict fathers (*n* = 145). In the GSS data, 55.6% of classifiable cases were nurturant parents (*n* = 1,289) and 44.2% were strict fathers (*n* = 1,030). In the MISII least-liked group condition, 39.5% of the classifiable cases were nurturant parents (*n* = 66) and 60.5% were strict fathers (*n* = 101). In the people with prime condition 40.6% of classifiable cases were nurturant parents (*n* = 71), and 59.4% were strict fathers (*n* = 104). In the people without prime condition, 40.7% of classifiable cases were nurturant parents (*n* = 68) and 59.3% were strict fathers (*n* = 99). In the people like you data set 39.1% of the classifiable cases were nurturant parents (*n* = 66) and 60.9% were strict fathers (*n* = 103).

Table 5.2 shows the results of binary logistic regression analyses estimating membership in nurturant parent (0) or strict father (1) groups for all six data sets from variables not used in the clustering process. More educated individuals had greater

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
Figure 5.1. Family and ideology for final, two-cluster solutions for all data sets. Support

for censorship was not a dimension in clustering procedure

| | | MISII | | | |
Variable	Students	GSS	Least-liked group	People with prime	People without prime	People like you
Constant	1.053	-41.659	-1.466	0.044	-2.917*	-1.068
GSS year	--	0.021	--	--	--	--
Male	0.004	0.350****	0.815*	0.606	0.649	0.662
Age	--	-0.005	0.026*	0.020	0.050****	0.029*
Education/GPA	-0.675*	-0.077****	-0.473*	-0.757****	-0.132	-0.473**
Support for Censorship	0.420	1.423****	0.841****	1.040****	0.587*	0.949***
Cox & Snell R^2	.030	.066	.220	.270	.175	.178

Table 5.2

Unstandardized Binary Logistic Regression Coefficients Estimating Nurturant Parent or Strict Father Group

nurturant parent = 0, strict father = 1

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .005$. ****$p < .001$.

odds of being nurturant parents according to the GSS (b = -0.077, p < .001) data set as well as the MISII least-liked group (b = -0.473, p < .001), people with prime (b = -0.757, p < .001) and people like you (b = -0.473, p < .01) data sets. Similarly, students with higher GPAs (b = -0.675, p < .05) also had greater odds of being nurturant parents.

Men had greater odds of being strict fathers in the GSS (b = 0.350, p < .001) and MISII least-liked group (b = 0.815, p < .05) data sets, but this result was not replicated elsewhere. Older individuals had greater odds of being strict fathers in the MISII least-liked group (b = 0.026, p < .05), people without prime (b = 0.050, p < .001), and people like you (b = 0.029, p < .05) data sets.

There were convincing results with regard to the relationship between nurturant parents or strict father worldview and support for censorship. GSS respondents who indicated that they were more supportive of censorship (b = 1.423, p < .001) had greater odds of being strict fathers. This result was replicated in all four of the MISSII conditions: least-liked group (b = 0.841, p < .001), people with prime (b = 1.040, p < .001), people without prime (b = 0.587, p < .05) and people like you (b = 0.949, p < .005). The students exhibited similarly greater odds of being strict fathers the more willing to censor they were, but the tendency was not statistically significant (b = 0.420, p = ns).

5.4 Summary

In all data sets except for the GSS, the strict fathers outnumbered the nurturant parents. However, follow-up analysis showed that GSS participants who responded to the political ideology item (M = 8.898) tended to have more nurturant family values than those who did not respond to that item (M = 9.617; t = 2.779, df = 2,317, p < .001).

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This item nonresponse problem likely made the strict father group smaller than it would have been had more individuals with relatively more strict family values responded to the political ideology item.

It is probably best to say that the data suggest Lakoff's (2002) typology is *not incorrect* rather than stating with greater confidence that it is the best way of categorizing individuals with regard to political ideology and family values. The two-cluster solution was consistent with Lakoff's (2002) conceptualization of nurturant parent and strict father groups, replicated well across clustering procedures and data sets, and was related to support for censorship in the expected manner; those who were more supportive of censorship tended to have greater odds of being strict fathers. However (though I note the point above it seems important enough to bear repeating), the two-cluster solution was strongly challenged by the four-cluster solution and future research should be designed and executed with goal of more rigorously evaluating Lakoff's (2002) typology on empirical grounds.

Nonetheless it appears from these initial analyses that the connection that Lakoff (2002) makes between family values and political ideology may have important implications for understanding support for censorship. In this chapter I created and analyzed a variable that amalgamated family values or FCP with political ideology and classified individuals as either nurturant parents or strict fathers. In the following chapters I separate the family variables and ideology again to better understand with greater detail how they relate to each other and support for censorship.

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CHAPTER 6

FAMILY AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Moving from left to right across Figure 1.2, the first linkages proposed are

between family values and family communication and political ideology. Lakoff's

(2002) core proposition is that more strict family values are associated with

conservatism, and more nurturant family values are associated with liberalism. In the

previous chapter, cluster analysis consistently revealed one group with relatively less

FCP conformity orientation, greater FCP conversation orientation, relatively more

nurturant family values, and relatively liberal political ideology (*nurturant parents*), and

another with greater FCP conformity orientation, lesser FCP conversation orientation,

relatively more strict family values, and relatively more conservative political ideology

(*strict fathers*). In this chapter, I will review literature describing how family values

and family communication relate to political ideology, and examine my data sets to test

for associations between family values, family communication, and political ideology.

6.1 Family Values and Political Ideology

6.1.1 Literature. The best-known, seminal piece on the family and political

ideology is probably that by Merelman (1969).   This work is based upon the

fundamental assumption that Converse (1964) is correct, and most of the public fails to exhibit coherent political thought. The attention of the bulk of the piece is focused on a proposal of how and under what circumstances ideology in general, and to a lesser extent particular ideological positions, might form in the allegedly rare cases when they do. According to Merelman (1969), in order to be considered ideological, an individual must:

> 1) have cognitive skills which allow him to see linkages between ideas and events. Such linkages determine the amount of constraint in his belief system. 2) Have a developed morality which allows him to evaluate consistently the ethical meaning of political events. In order, therefore, to explain the development of political ideologies, we must explore the course of cognitive and moral development, (p. 753).

Note the similarities between the above quote and the work of Tetlock (1983) and Fishkin et al. (1973), respectively as discussed in Chapter 3 – ideology is defined by cognitive and moral attributes.

Drawing on work by Piaget (e.g., 1999) and Hoffman (1962), Merelman (1969) concludes that parenting that encourages children to take up responsibility early in life, uses psychological instead of physical discipline, and continually reinforces a sense of emotional warmth is most conducive to moral development. With regard to cognitive development, Merelman (1969) concludes, based on a number of experiments involving various forms of physical punishment on humans and animals, that the frustration and anxiety that results from parenting that utilizes physical punishment may "… prevent the growth of cognitive and evaluational skills sufficient for the development of

political ideology" (p. 762). Note the similarities between the parenting approaches discussed by Merelman (1969) and values emphasized by nurturant parents and strict fathers discussed by Lakoff (2002).

Merelman (1969) discusses the parenting values most conducive to the formation of a set of political attitudes that meet his (and Converse's) criteria for ideology. But what manner of ideology is formed under what conditions? In answer to this question, Merelman (1969) states:

> Assuming, as I have, that early learning and conceptualization processes have lasting impacts, the sequence of development favors some political movements and regimes over others. Specifically, movements of the left rest on a less secure psychological base than do the right. Left movements, in their call for innovation and their emphasis upon the secular over the sacred and equity over expiation, appeal to high levels of moral and cognitive development. Movements of the right stress the need to respect authority, tradition, and punitive law. In so doing, they appeal to the earliest inculcated and most "natural" forms of thought. Therefore, more people are capable of reaction than reform, (p. 766).

Thus Merelman (1969) is really discussing the parenting values most conducive to the formation of *liberal* ideology. Merelman (1969) also appears to assume that conservative ideological positions involve less moral and cognitive development, and perhaps that they should not even really be considered ideological under Converse's (1964) definition.

In later work, Kraut and Lewis (1975) identify several important aspects of the formation of particular ideological positions. As part of a longitudinal study that examined the development of political orientations among Yale College undergraduate students, Kraut and Lewis (1975) compared the student's own ideological positions with their assessments of those of their parents, and both those positions with various types of conflict between the students and their parents. They found that a student's own reported political ideology tended to mirror their perceptions of their parent's ideology, especially that of their mothers. However, Kraut and Lewis (1975) also found that greater reported conflict between students and their parents the more likely the students were to hold more liberal ideological perspectives. Furthermore, in a path analysis model, perceived parental ideology and conflict were equally substantial in their estimation of student ideology.

Kraut and Lewis (1975) contradict the idea that that students' rejection of their parents is simply mirrored by a rejection of the perceived parental ideological positions. Interestingly, although students who rebel against conservative parents tend to become more liberal, students who rebel against liberal parents tend to become more extremely liberal rather than moving toward the conservative end of the spectrum.

Additionally, Kraut and Lewis (1975) propose an explanation of the relationship between perceived parent and student ideology very much in line with Lakoff's (2002) ideas.

> An individual patterns his style of relating to political authority in part on a basic orientation toward authority is established within the family … a person relates to powerful authorities as substitutes for his father, and if he has not

adequately resolved his rebellion against his father, he will reenact these

conflicts with other authority figures, including governmental authority. A

social learning version of the model is similar. Since the family and the

political system are analogous social institutions, both oriented to power,

allocation of resources, and social welfare, much of the child's experiences with

these, and hence his strategies for dealing with them, will have been developed

in the context of the family, if the student develops a conflictful and antagonistic

relationship with authority in the family, he may transfer this to a political

realm, (Kraut and Lewis, 1975, p. 798).

In this somewhat Freudian explanation, Kraut and Lewis (1975) identify the family as

the model for government. Furthermore, acceptance or rejection of the strict father's

authority is related to ideological positions with regard to governmental authority. As

noted above, perceptions of the mothers' ideology are especially important in the

formation of student ideology as well, and those with more liberal parents tend to be

more liberal themselves. Thus Kraut and Lewis (1975) provide an empirical basis for a

family values explanation of political ideology involving the role of authority as well as

fatherly and motherly ideology.

  6.1.2 Analysis. As described in Chapter 4, the GSS and MISII data both contain

measures of family values and political ideology. As expected, in the GSS data,

individuals with more strict family values tended to be more politically conservative (r

$= .122, p < .001$). This result was replicated in the MISII least-liked group ($r = .375, p$

$< .001$), people with prime ($r = .346, p < .001$), people without prime ($r = .233, p <$

$.001$), and people like you ($r = .329, p < .001$) conditions. In all four MISII data sets

individuals with more strict family values also tended to be more politically

conservative.

6.2 Family Communication and Political Ideology

6.2.1 Literature. Recall from Chapter 1 that Chaffee, McLeod, and Wackman

(1973) presented the two-dimensional FCP model as a means of classifying family

communication structures as they relate to the political socialization of children. As

originally proposed, the dimensions were labeled *socio-oriented* and *concept-oriented*

which describe the way that families tend to form a consensus on the evaluation of

some object through communication. The socio-orientation emphasizes the

relationships between family members – consensus is achieved through conformity.

The concept-orientation emphasizes a focus on the object – the object is discussed until

consensus is achieved. Ritchie and Fitzpatrick (e.g., 1990; Fitzpatrick & Richie, 1994)

refined the conceptualization of these dimensions, as well as their measurement,

renaming them *conformity* and *conversation*, respectively. The conformity orientation

is the extent to which homogeneity of attitudes, values, and beliefs are emphasized in

family communication. The conversation orientation is the extent to which families

create a climate in which all family members are encouraged to fully participate in

discussion on many topics (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002).

Though both deal with types of families, there are marked difference between

Lakoff's (2002) family values and FCP. Lakoff (2002) makes it clear that he is not

modeling family behavior – rather, he discusses sets of values in terms of the family as

a metaphor for government in order to explain American political ideological

perspectives.

FCP deals with perceptions of actual communication in actual families. The students who responded to Ritchie and Fitzpatrick's (1992) revised FCP instrument indicated whether the statements presented in the measure were consistent with their recollection of things their parents actually said. When the students responded to items such as "My parents often say something like 'Every member of the family should have some say in family decisions" or "In our home, my parents usually have the last word" they are providing information about specific types of communicative content and behavior. Although such content and behavior may be indicative or particular values, the responses are not direct assessments of values in the same way that responses to the family values items in the GSS and MISII are.

McDevitt (2005) reports the only study found to date that examines the relationship between FCP and ideology. However, this work utilizes the original concept- and socio-orientation conceptualization of the FCP dimensions, and only examines if they are associated with children's reports of having any ideological position (be it liberal or conservative) or not, without specifying what that position was. From a 2000 survey of middle school students in Lubbock, Texas McDevitt (2005) found that greater reported concept-oriented (conversation) communication from parents was associated with greater odds of reporting an ideological position, but socio-oriented (conformity) communication from parents was not significantly associated with ideological identification.

6.2.2 Analysis. The student data set was examined to determine if there were relationships between FCP dimensions and political ideology. Although FCP conversation orientation in the family of origin was not significantly correlated with

conservatism ($r = -.046$, $p = ns$), individuals who reported that their parents exhibited greater FCP conformity orientation did tend to be more conservative ($r = .147$, $p < .01$).

6.3 Summary

A dominant theme in the literature on the relationship between family and political ideology is a focus on what parenting attributes tend to lead to the formation of ideology in children (e.g., Merelman, 1969; McDevitt, 2005), rather than an examination of what parenting attributes are associated with particular ideological positions. Lakoff (2002), however, proposes that more strict family values tend to be associated with more conservative ideological positions while more nurturant values tend to be associated with more liberal ideological positions. This proposition was supported by zero-order analysis of the data. Individuals with more strict family values and, similarly, those who reported greater FCP conformity orientation both tended to be more conservative in their political ideology.

Not only can individuals be empirically grouped (using cluster analysis, as described in Chapter 5) as nurturant parents and strict fathers, but there are also significant, linear relationships between family variables and political ideology. This simple result encourages more sophisticated analyses of the network of expected relationships shown in Figure 1.2. Since family variables are associated with particular ideological positions in a linear fashion, they may also help to explain the linear relationship, if indeed there is one, between political ideology and support for censorship.

CHAPTER 7

FAMILY AND SUPPORT FOR CENSORSHIP

After the links between family variables and political ideology in Figure 1.2 the next set of links, moving from left to right, is between family variables and support for censorship. I have proposed that family variables may shed new light on the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship, so before moving on to the link between political ideology and support for censorship, which has caused so much disagreement in the literature, it seems important to consider whether family variables are related to support for censorship in their own right. In this chapter I will review literature on family variables and support for censorship, and examine my data sets for relationships between these variables.

7.1 Literature

Two of the three works that most directly focus on the contentious relationship between political ideology and support for censorship also examine how certain attitudes about family relate to support for censorship. The first is Hense and Wright's (1992) piece on the development of their attitudes toward censorship questionnaire (ATCQ). This measure was constructed over the course of two studies, both of which

enlisted students in Florida as participants. The initial version of the measure included

37 items involving censorship of art, music, films, periodicals, television, and the press

with five-point Likert type response options. Hense and Wright (1992) conducted a

factor analysis on responses given to these items. The results of this analysis indicated

a three-factor solution. Based on a combination of factor loadings and item-total

correlations, items were either retain or discarded from the measure. Following this

rather arbitrary procedure, Hense and Wright (1992) determined that one of their two

remaining factors assessed *general censorship*, dealing with "…general issues related to

freedom of speech and a variety of censorship issues" (p. 1670) while the other

concerned "…obscenity and sexual explicitness" (p. 1670) and was thus labeled

censorship of pornography.

In order to validate their measure, Hense and Wright administered it in a survey

that assessed several other variables that they though should be correlated with support

for censorship. One of these variables was *traditional family ideology*, which was

measured using an unspecified selection of twelve items from Levinson and Huffman's

(1955) 40-item scale, which assesses a single democratic-autocratic continuum. Higher

scores represent more traditional family ideology, or more autocratic family ideological

positions, which Levinson and Huffman (1955) say "…involve an hierarchical

conception of familial relationships, emphasis on discipline in child-rearing, sharp

dichotomization of sex roles, and the like" (p.251). Less traditional, or democratic

positions "…tend to decentralize authority within the family, to seek greater equality in

husband-wife and parent-child relationships, and to maximize individual self-

determination" (Levinson & Huffman, 1955, p. 251). Note the similarities between

these positions and those of Lakoff's (2002) strict fathers and nurturant parents, respectively.

Hense and Wright's (1992) first sample consisted of high school and university students, and the second was composed solely of undergraduate university students. In both of these samples, more autocratic family ideology was associated with greater support for general censorship and greater support for censorship of pornography. In their discussion of these findings, Hense and Wright state "Evidence for convergent validity emerged for both factors through positive correlations with … traditional family values" (p. 1674). However, Hense and Wright (1992) do not offer any specific theoretical reason *why* more autocratic family ideologies ought to be more supportive of censorship.

Suedfeld et al. (1994) leveled the accusation that Hense and Wright's (1992) measure was content biased:

> The specific question is whether attitudes toward censorship, as defined and measured by a recent questionnaire, are actually attitudes toward the censorship of a particular subset of social and political issues positions rather than principled orientations toward censorship regardless of what may be censored (Suedfeld et al., 1994, p. 765).

Suedfeld et al. (1994) acknowledge that many of the items in the ATCQ refer vaguely to communication that is "unpopular" or "controversial" rather than describing details that may bias the hypothetical situation. But they also point out that because all of the more-specific items in Hense and Wright's (1992) measure dealt with forms of expression and content that more conservative individuals would tend to find more

objectionable (e.g., sacrilegious images, depictions of homosexual behavior, and other sexually explicit material), there was likely a carry over effect by which respondents inferred content that would tend to be more offensive to conservatives in the vaguely-worded items. Thus, despite an appearance of at least some impartial items, Suedfeld et al. (1994) argue that the entire ATCQ is biased in a manner that tends to skew results such that conservatives are falsely depicted as more supportive of censorship than liberals simply because liberals are not confronted with communication that they tend to find particularly offensive.

Although Suedfeld et al.'s (1994) argument is presented primarily in terms of political ideology, as seen in the analyses presented in the previous chapters of this dissertation, political ideology and family variables are related, and Hense and Wright's (1992) results suggested that they associate with support for censorship in similar manners. Since Suedfeld et al. (1994) also assess autocratic family ideologies, it is important to consider their study at this point.

To address the alleged content bias in Hense and Wright's (1994) measure, Suedfeld et al. (1994) constructed a modified form of the attitudes toward censorship questionnaire. This measure is refered to as the *attitudes toward censorship questionnaire, modified* (ATCQM) and it "…deals explicitly with the censoring of materials that may violate the sensitivities of feminists, homosexual activists, and ethnic and religious minorities" (Suedfeld et al., 1994, p. 769), using items otherwise worded similarly to those in the ATCQ.

The ATCQM was administered to Canadian undergraduate students and, unlike Hense and Wright (1992), Suedfeld et al. (1994) settled on three factors using principal

component analysis. The first, and most significant was labeled "politically correct Puritanism" (Suedfeld et al. p. 774). The second and third dealt with the sales of controversial materials and public displays that were sexually explicit or violent, respectively. For analysis all ATCQM item responses were aggregated into a single, overall scale score.

Suedfeld et al. (1994), like Hense and Wright's (1992) before them, including Levinson and Huffman's (1955) traditional family ideology measure in their survey. Despite the fact that content for the ATCQM was chosen to be especially offensive to more liberal sensibilities (which tend to be associated with more less strict values) individuals with more autocratic family values tended to be more supportive of censorship in terms of their ATCQM responses.

Although to date I am not aware of any research that has been done on FCPs, or any concepts approximating them, it was expected that those who reported greater FCP conformity orientations (like strict fathers) would tend to be more supportive of censorship, and those who reported greater conformity orientation (like nurturant parents) would tend to be less so.

7.2 Analysis

Despite this expectation, FCPs did not relate directly to WTC in the student data. There was not a significant zero-order correlations between FCP conformity ($r =$ .050, $p = ns$) or FCP conversation ($r = .052, p = ns$) and WTC.

Analysis of the GSS data indicated that individuals who were more strict in their family values also tended to support censorship more ($r = .242, p < .001$). This result was replicated in the MISII least-liked group ($r = .370, p < .001$), people with prime (r

= .356, $p < .001$), people without prime ($r = .347$, $p < .001$), and people like you ($r = .300$, $p < .001$) condition. For all four of the MISII data sets, individuals who indicated more strict family values tended to be more supportive of censorship.

7.3 Summary

Of the research most directly relevant to the debate regarding the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship, two pieces (i.e. Hense & Wright, 1992; Suedfeld et al., 1994) include measurement of autocratic family values as well. The similarity of the democratic to autocratic family values continuum to Lakoff's nurturance and strictness suggests that this dissertation is on the right track in seeking to better understand the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship by applying moral politics. The findings that those with more autocratic family values were more supportive of censorship regardless of who the expression presented in ATCQ or ATCQM was presumed to offend more suggested that individuals with more strict values should also be expected to support censorship more. This expectation was confirmed in analysis.

However, FCP were not associated with support for censorship. Thus the proposition of a quasi-developmental relationship such that differences in FCP conformity orientation or FCP conversation orientation (as recalled by the student respondents) lead *directly* to differences in WTC was not supported by the data. But an *indirect* relationship may yet exist because, as noted in the previous chapter, greater FCP conformity orientation was associated with more conservative political ideology. If political ideology is related to support for censorship, then ideology might *mediate* a relationship between FCP conformity and support for censorship.

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CHAPTER 8

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND SUPPORT FOR CENSORSHIP

The final link in Figure 1.2 is between political ideology and support for censorship. This relationship at the center of the diagram, just as it is at the center of this dissertation. In this chapter I review literature on this contentious relationship, and present analyses designed to determine whether, as expected, more conservative individuals tend to be more supportive of censorship.

8.1 Literature

The literature is riddled with varying depictions of the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship. The most common finding is that more conservative individuals tend to be more supportive of censorship (e.g. Andsager & Miller, 1994; Lambe, 2002, 2004; McLeod et al., 1997; McLeod et al., 1998; Rojas et al., 1996; Wilson, 1975). However, there is also evidence that moderates may be slightly less supportive of censorship than liberals or conservatives (e.g. Immerwahr & Doble, 1982). And Lambe (2002) found that, when it came to expression opposing abortion, more conservative individuals tended to be less supportive of censorship. However, when I reconstructed the seven–item abortion content WTC subscale in the

student data for individuals who had answered at least five of the abortion content items

($\alpha = .629$, $M = 2.926$, $SD = 0.572$, $n = 329$) that relationship ($r = -.020$, $p = ns$) was in

the same direction as Lambe's (2002) result, but was not statistically significant.

In the most recent comprehensive study of support for censorship, Andsager et

al. (2004) re-analyze data from Wyatt's (1991) American sample.   This analysis

considered both support for censorship of speech rights and support for censorship of

media rights. Overall, Andsager et al. (2004) did not identify a significant difference in

support for censorship of speech in terms of political ideology, which was assessed on a

three-point (liberal, moderate, conservative) continuum. Andsager et al. (2004) then

separated their examination of speech into five different topics. Political speech

involved issues such as an individual's right to disagree with the president, speak in

favor of any candidate for public office, or differ with his or her boss about a political

issue. Morality-based speech dealt with topics such as an individual's right to buy

magazines or books featuring depictions of nude people, dance in a sexually suggestive

manner, use slang words that refer to sexual acts, or take the name of God in vain.

Extreme speech involved topics such as advocating Satanism or other cults, advocating

homosexual behavior, or using obscene gestures. Offensive speech included using

words or phrases that offend a racial or ethnic group, discussing the sexual habits of

others, and children "cussing out" their parents.   Finally, dangerous speech involved an

individual giving classified information to a foreign government, defaming others, or

yelling "fire" in a theater (Andsager et al., 2004, p. 84). In terms of these five different

types of individual speech rights, there was only a significant relationship between

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political ideology and morality based speech, such that more conservative individuals tended to be more supportive of censorship when it came to these particular topics.

Andsager et al. (2004) did not identify a significant relationship between political ideology and support for media censorship overall. Support for media censorship was separated into four different topics. Harmful content included topics such as false or misleading advertising, television programming showing drug-use, and allowing teenagers to see R-rated movies. Objectionable content included television broadcasts of nudes, newspapers running graphic photos of violent events, and advertising guns for sale. Routine journalism included reporting the sexual habits of public figures, televised projections of the winners on an election night, newspapers editorializing during an election, and reporting national security stories without approval. Finally, topics labeled by Andsager et al. (2004, p. 104) as "identification" involved reporting the name of either a juvenile charged with a crime or a rape victim. With regard to these press issues, political ideology was only significantly associated with support for censorship when it came to objectionable content, and then only as part of an interaction. When education level was categorized as low, middle, and high, moderates in the middle education group tended to support censorship of objectionable content less than liberals or conservatives, but in the other two groups the more conservative an individual was, the more he or she tended to support censorship of objectionable content. Overall, Andsager et al. (2004) found little evidence that political ideology was related to support for censorship.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Hense and Wright's (1992) and Suedfeld et al.'s (1994) studies are two of the most prominent in the debate over the relationship

between political ideology and support for censorship. Hense and Wright (1992)

assessed political ideology using an unspecified selection of thirty items from Comrey

and Newmeyer's (1965) 120-item scale.   The original version of this measure covers

topics such as capital punishment, pacifism, welfare, rapid social change, and

contraception with higher scores representing more conservative ideological positions,

and lower scores representing more liberal ideological positions. In both of their

samples, Hense and Wright found that more conservative ideology, as indicated by

responses to the measure based on Comrey and Newmeyer's scale, tended to be

associated with greater support for censorship, as indicated by the ATCQ.

In the studies presented in their response to Hense and Wright (1992), Suedfeld

et al. (1994) included Nettler and Huffman's (1957) measure of political ideology in

their in their surveys as well as Comrey and Newmeyer's (1965), arguing that the

former had been validated in Canadian samples such as theirs while the latter had not.

The relationship between political ideology as indicated by Nettler and Huffman's

(1957) measure of political ideology and support for censorship as indicated by the

ATCQM was in the direction that Suedfeld et al. (1994) expected. It was more liberal

individuals who tended to support censorship more in this analysis, since the ATCQM

was designed to present expression situations that they in particular should find

especially offensive. However, the result was not statistically significant. But when the

third of respondents who indicated that they were most conservative on Nettler and

Huffman's (1957) scale were compared to the third who indicated that they were most

liberal, there was a statistically significant difference such that the liberals were

significantly more supportive of censorship than the conservatives. Surprisingly, more

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conservative individuals, as indicated by scores on Comrey and Newmeyer's (1965)

measure, actually tended to give responses to the ATCQM that were relatively more

supportive of censorship, even though the measure was designed to present expression

situations offensive to liberals. This result was replicated when the most conservative

and most liberal thirds of respondents as indicated by responses to Comrey and

Newmeyer (1965) were compared. The conservatives were again significantly more

supportive of censorship than the liberals. However, Suedfeld et al. (1994) invest

greater faith in the results involving Nettler and Huffman's (1957) measure, since they

utilized a Canadian sample.

In response to Hense and Wright (1992) and Suedfeld et al. (1994), Fisher et al.

(1999), put both the ATCQ and the ATCQM together in a single survey with a third

measure of support for censorship they developed, the *support for censorship scale*

(SCS). The SCS is based on a set of questions previously asked by the Gallup

organization. It lists several types of potentially controversial entertainment and asks

respondents whether each should be totally banned, allowed to be shown for adults who

wish to view it but not publicly displayed, or available without restrictions.

In the results of a first survey of Florida undergraduate students, Fisher et al.

(1999) found that ATCQ and ATCQM scores were highly correlated, "…indicating that

those who support censorship of pornography, sacrilegious images, and depictions of

homosexual behavior are also likely to support the censorship of racist, sexist, violent,

and homophobic images or messages" (Fisher et al., 1999, p. 1713). With respect to

political ideology, in addition to the Nettler and Huffman's (1957) and Comrey and

Newmeyer (1965) measures, Fisher et al. (1999) included a two-dimensional (support

for government intervention in economic issues, support for the expansion of personal freedoms) measure of political ideology, and a single-dimension, five-point (very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, very liberal), ideological self-identification item. Individuals who self-identified as more conservative tended to also be more conservative in their responses to the Comrey and Newmeyer (1965) measure, the economic ideology measure, and the personal freedoms measure. But there was not a significant relationship between more conservative self-identification and responses to the Nettler and Huffman (1957) measure, which was the assessment of political ideology involved in the results that had partially supported Suedfeld et al.'s (1994) hypotheses. More conservative self-identification was associated with greater support for censorship on all three measures of support for censorship (ATCQ, ATCQM, and SCS).

Fisher et al. (1999) then categorized respondents as conservatives (low support for government economic intervention, low support for the expansion of personal freedoms), liberals (high support for government economic intervention, high support for the expansion of personal freedoms), populists (high support for government economic intervention, low support for expansion of personal freedoms), and libertarians (low support for government economic intervention, high support for the expansion of personal freedoms; e.g. Maddox & Lillie, 1986). Populists and conservatives tended to be more supportive of censorship, across measures, than liberals and libertarians.

Fisher et al. (1999) conducted a second study by interviewing registered voters in the state of Florida over the telephone. Here, the measures of support for censorship

were an abbreviated version of the SCS and two other measures constructed *post hoc*

from the data collected. Fisher et al. (1999) argue that these latter two measures involve

similar types of content as the ATCQ and the ATCQM. The SCS items were also

separated into two groups in this study: one containing items pertaining to sex, and the

other with items pertaining to violence. This division was based on the assumption that

social liberals (liberals and libertarians) would tend to find violence especially offensive

and that social conservatives (conservatives and populists) would tend to find sexual

content especially offensive. The only assessments of political ideology in this sample

were economic intervention and personal freedom dimensions. The results here

indicated that those who were more opposed to the expansion of personal freedoms, and

thus more socially conservative, tended to be more supportive of censorship across all

four measures, while economic ideology was not significantly related to support for

censorship as indicated by any of the measures.

Fisher et al. (1999) conclude their study, and to date the only known work that

has been done with the ATCQ, ATCQM, and SCS, by summarizing their findings

relative to Suedfeld et al.'s (1994). First, they note that, "…at least some persons

support the censorship of a wide range of forms of expression" (Fisher et al., 1999, p.

1727). While they did find some evidence of "politically correct" (or socially liberal)

censorship among their student sample, Fisher et al. (1999) state that their results

overall

> …strongly challenge the … propositions in Suedfeld et al.'s (1994) analysis.
>
> First we found consistently positive correlations between various measures of
>
> censorship, despite the varying ideological content of the works censored …

Second, we consistently failed to find that liberals favored politically correct

censorship more than did conservatives. Rather, we found, with few exceptions,

that support for censorship, regardless of the political content of the works to be

censored, was greater among persons who scored at the right end of

unidimensional scales of political attitudes rather than at the left end ... (p. 1728)

The above quote could as easily be applied to the literature regarding the

relationship between political ideology and support for censorship as a whole as it is to

Fisher et al.'s (1999) study in particular. Though there has been much debate and

several studies that have under certain circumstances, with certain measures, and certain

samples uncovered a finding here or there to the contrary, taken as a whole the evidence

suggests that more conservative individuals tend to be more supportive of censorship.

That is what I expected to find in analysis of my data sets as well.

8.2 Analysis

Among the students, those who were more conservative tended to be more

willing to censor ($r = .131$, $p < .05$). GSS respondents who indicated that they were

relatively more conservative also tended to be more supportive of censorship ($r = .140$,

$p < .001$). In MISII least-liked group ($r = .373$, $p < .001$), people with prime ($r = .339$,

$p < .001$), people without prime ($r = .147$, $p < .05$), and people like you ($r = .273$, $p <

.001$) conditions the results were also statistically significant and in the direction

expected. The more conservative an individual was, the more she or he tended to

support censorship.

8.3 Summary

A careful review uncovered a few example studies where relatively liberal individuals tended to support censorship more than relatively conservative individuals, or liberals and conservatives tended to support censorship more than moderates, or no evidence of a relationship between political ideology and support for censorship was found at all. But the preponderance of findings in the literature, even in a study where the authors come to a contradictory conclusion (i.e. Suedfeld et al., 1994) suggests that more conservative individuals tend to be more supportive of censorship.

Although I did not assess political ideology in as complicated a manner as Hense and Wright (1992), Suedfeld et al. (1994), or Fisher et al. (1999), I did supplement my student sample with two, nationally representative samples of adults, whereas the most far-flung sample in these three prior studies was statewide. For my research, support for censorship was measured using techniques and scales that were more rigorously-developed, better validated, and that have been put into wider use in the social sciences than those utilized in the three previous studies. In many ways, the data sets and measurement used in this dissertation are superior to all of those described in the three prior studies combined. Using the same metric of association that was the main form of analysis in the three previous studies (Pearson's r) all of my data unequivocally indicated that the more conservative a respondent said that she or he was, the more she or he tended to support censorship.

But a question remains: *why* do more conservative individuals tend to be more supportive of censorship? Analysis that provides a way of examining how family

variables and political ideology relate to support for censorship while statistically

controlling for each other might provide some insight.

CHAPTER 9

REGRESSION AND INDIRECT EFFECTS: PUTTING THE MODEL TOGETHER

Up to this point in the dissertation I have addressed the model proposed in Figure 1.2 in a piecemeal fashion, examining each of the links one by one. In this chapter I examine the model in a more holistic manner.

The model in Figure 1.2 is best described as a mediation model. Though the model depicts both family values and FCP as having direct relationships with support for censorship (though this hypothesis was only supported by analyses thus far in the case of family values) these variables were included in this study mainly to provide an explanation for the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship, an explanation which has been lacking in the prior literature. Based on the literature and analyses described in prior chapters, it is expected that 1) greater strictness in family values will be associated with greater support for censorship after controlling for political ideology, 2) greater conservatism in political ideology will be related to support for censorship after controlling for strictness in family values, 3) results will be consistent with strictness in family values and FCP conformity orientation having indirect effects on support for censorship through political ideology.

9.1 Indirect Effects

The most common method of assessing indirect effects is described by Baron and Kenny (1986). In this approach, an indirect effect is said to occur if three conditions are met. First, the independent variable must predict the dependent variable. Second, the independent variable must predict the mediator. Finally, the mediator must predict the dependent variable controlling for the independent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Despite its popularity, the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach does not assess the indirect effect (between the independent and dependent through the mediator) itself.

Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008, in press) discuss and provide analytical tools for using an approach that better assesses the indirect effect: the Sobel test (e.g. Sobel, 1982). According to the Sobel test, mediation is determined to have occurred if the indirect effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable through the mediator is significantly different from zero. This is determined by examining whether there is a significant difference in the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable between the model without the mediator and the model with the mediator. The difference is the strength of the indirect effect.

Classically, when using the Sobel test a large sample is assumed. Preacher and Hayes (2004) use bootstrapping circumvent the problems of small samples. Bootstrapping is a resampling method that eliminates problems associated with small samples through "…repeated resampling of the sample in order to generate the sampling distribution of a statistic" (Hayes, 2005, p. 155). The initial sample, of size N, is resampled with replacement until an additional sample of size N has been created.

The statistic of interest is then calculated in the new sample. This process is repeated

many times (Preacher and Hayes recommend at least 1,000) to generate a distribution of

the statistic of interest. The mean of these statistics is a *point estimate*. If the values in

that distribution are then sorted from lowest to highest values, a 95% confidence

interval for the statistic can be determined simply by looking at the values that are 2.5%

of the number of statistics/resamples away from the beginning and the end of the list.

For example, if 1,000 resamples are conducted, when the statistics are ordered from

lowest to highest number the 25th statistic in the ordered list is the lower bound of the

95% confidence interval, and the 976th statistic is the upper bound (Hayes, 2005).

9.2 Analysis

As shown in Table 9.1, I calculated an OLS regression equation estimating

support for censorship in each data set. For the GSS data I controlled for GSS

administration year ($b = -0.001$, $p = ns$). Recall from previous chapters that the zero-

order relationships between family values and political ideology, family values and

support for censorship, and political ideology and support for censorship were all

statistically significant and in the same direction across MISII data sets. This being the

case, for simplicity I examined the MISSII data set as a whole, dummy coding and

controlling for differences in support for censorship attributable to least-liked group

condition ($b = 0.646$, $p < .001$), people with prime condition ($b = 0.165$, $p < .05$), and

people like you condition ($b = -0.035$, $p = ns$), using the people without prime condition

as the reference.

Variable	Students	GSS	MISII
FCP conformity	0.021	--	--
FCP conversation	0.059	--	--
Strictness in family values	--	0.021****	0.484****
Conservatism	0.037*	0.017****	0.069****
Adjusted R^2	.057	.185	.327
Indirect effect through conservatism			
FCP conformity	0.014	--	--
95 % confidence interval	0.001 to 0.037	--	--
Strictness in family values	--	0.001	0.103
95% confidence interval	--	0.001 to 0.002	0.057 to 0.158

Table 9.1

Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients and Mediation

Dependent: support for censorship; higher scores indicate more support

Students control variables: sex, GPA

GSS control variables: year, sex, age, education

MISII control variables: experimental condition, sex, age, education

Indirect effect estimate confidence intervals bias corrected and accelerated, 5,000 bootstrap resamples

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .005$. **** $p < .001$

The associations between support for censorship and the demographic variables sex, age, and GPA/education are discussed in Appendix D. Let it suffice here to say that all relationships between these variables and support for censorship were statistically significant and in the direction expected.

The regression equation calculated using the student data did not provide evidence of a direct relationship between WTC and FCP conformity orientation ($b = 0.021$, $p = ns$). Nor was there a direct relationship between WTC and FCP conversation orientation ($B = 0.059$, $p = ns$). However, the equations calculated using the GSS ($b = 0.021$, $p < .001$) and the MISII data ($b = 0.484$, $p < .001$) both suggested a direct effect of family values on support for censorship, such that those who held more strict family values tended to be more supportive of censorship.

Conservatism was associated with support for censorship in the student data ($b = 0.037$, $p < .05$), the GSS data ($b = 0.017$, $p < .001$), and the MISII data ($b = 0.069$, $p < .001$). Once again, as with the zero-order relationships discussed in the previous chapter, the more conservative and individual was the more supportive of censorship she or he tended to be, controlling for strictness in family values.

Table 9.1 also depicts the results of indirect effect point estimates for FCP conformity orientation and strictness in family values on the dependent variable support for censorship with conservatism as the mediator after accounting for the relationships between support for censorship and the other variables in the equations. In the student data the result was consistent with conservatism mediating a relationship between FCP conformity orientation and support for censorship (*point estimate* = 0.014, *95% confidence interval* = 0.001 to 0.002). Greater FCP conformity orientation was

associated with greater conservatism, which was associated with greater support for censorship. Likewise, in both the GSS data (*point estimate* = 0.001, *95% confidence interval* = 0.001 to 0.002) and the MISII data (*point estimate* = 0.103, *95% confidence interval* = 0.057 to 0.158) the results were consistent with conservatism mediating the relationship between strictness in family values and support for censorship. Individuals with more strict family values tend to be more conservative, and more conservative individuals tend to be more supportive of censorship.

9.3 Summary

Even after controlling for other relevant variables, more conservative individuals and those with more strict family values still tended to be relatively more supportive of censorship. Furthermore, the evidence was consistent with conservatism mediating relationships between both FCP conformity orientation and strictness in family values and support for censorship. However, it is important to remember that statistical evidence that is consistent with mediation does not imply causation, especially when data are collected cross-sectionally. This fact has important implication for my findings with regard to the model depicted in Figure 1.2, as I discuss in the next, and final, chapter.

CHAPTER 10

DISCUSSION

The research presented in this dissertation was designed to examine whether the

implication of Lakoff's (2002) theory of moral politics could help to explain the

relationship between political ideology and support for censorship. I believe that it has

been successful in this respect, and has added to the body of knowledge on opinions

regarding freedom of expression and censorship. In this chapter, I discuss some of the

study's strengths and shortcomings and comment on what has been learned.

10.1 Measurement of Support for Censorship

The three measures of support for censorship used for this dissertation each have

strengths and weaknesses. The WTC scale is ecologically valid, but it is also long and

unwieldy. Furthermore, though it seems as true to the law as a survey instrument can

be, that very commitment may render the instrument less psychometrically valid than it

could be. It is not clear that the public conceptualizes expression rights issues in the

same manner as the courts do.

The GSS support for censorship measure, based on Stouffer's (1955) WTTN

scale, has been widely employed elsewhere in the social science literature, but its utility

has also been called into question by Sullivan et al.'s (1982) arguments against it. Though the least-liked group approach is utilized in various ways in the different MISII conditions, the MISII measure, like the GSS items, does not involve communication that takes place over mass media or some of the most prominent types of communication content that people tend to be most willing to censor, such as pornography.

What of the debate over content bias in measurement? Much has been made of measures that predominantly present groups or content in expression rights situations that may be perceived as much more offensive or threatening to some respondents than others (e.g. Sullivan et al., 1982; Suedfeld et al., 1994). But content bias only seems to be of particular concern for the measurement of support for censorship when it is especially pronounced and relevant to some variable used by researchers to differentiate respondents. In the analyses presented in preceding pages of this dissertation, more conservative individuals, those with more strict values, and those who classified as strict fathers consistently indicated greater support for censorship in response to the ecologically valid WTC scale, the GSS measure that is the focus of Sullivan et al.'s (1982) scorn, and even the least-liked group measure given to some MISII respondents, which was based on Sullivan et al.'s (1982) work. In spite of the differences between, and strengths and weaknesses associated with the various operationalizations of support for censorship used for this dissertation, the results were quite similar across data sets.

10.2 Limitations of Individual Samples and Data Sets

Furthermore, the data sets examined for this dissertation were in many ways superior to those collected in most studies involving support for censorship. The

students responded to a large battery of items, including the lengthy WTC scale and revised FCP instrument. It would be difficult to effectively administer the latter to a nationally representative sample, and nearly impossible to do so with the former, due to time and financial constraints imposed by their length. The GSS and MISII data sets were collected from nationally representative samples and included responses to measures based on well-known and widely used techniques for assessing support for censorship. But of course the samples and data were not perfect.

When interpreting results, though obvious, it is important to remember that the students were quite homogeneous in terms of their age and education level. There was so little variability in their age that I excluded it from analysis, even as a control variable. It is impossible to say for sure how responses to the WTC scale, and associations between scores on that measure and the other variables examined in this study, might differ had this particular sample been more diverse in terms of age. However, if it is assumed that accurate recall of one's childhood tends to diminish with age, the disproportionate youth of the student sample relative to the population as a whole may actually have been an asset. In place of years of formal education, highest degree held, or some other measure similar to those used for the GSS and MISII samples, for the student data I used GPA to roughly assess variation in the kind of knowledge that one acquires through formal education, though years spent in classrooms, degrees held, and general evaluations of academic performance are clearly not the same thing.

There were troubling amounts of missing data among the GSS responses. This diminishes the extent to which the findings in the GSS data may be said to represent the opinions and other characteristics of the public at large.

A large percentage (34.4%) of cases from the MISII data were excluded from analysis involving political ideology due to missing data that resulted from the respondents indicating that they hadn't thought much about whether they considered themselves to be liberal, moderate, or conservative, or simply not answering the item. Because of the experimental manipulation in the MISII data the number of respondents in each subset, which were examined separately for many of the analyses in this dissertation, were quite small, though some comfort can be taken in the fact that participants were randomly assigned to the different conditions. The age of the MISII data set, which was collected nearly ten years ago as of this writing, is also a problem. The MISII data were collected before the events of September 11, 2001, the declaration of the "war on terror," and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. It seems likely that these events may have changed how at least some portion of the population thinks about the consequences of communication that they perceive to be dangerous, controversial, or unpatriotic. Similarly, 21.8% of all GSS cases were collected in 2000.

10.3 General Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research

Five main limitations applied to the study as a whole. First, in all three data sets political ideology was assessed using a unidimensional, seven-point liberal to conservative continuum. As made clear during the description of other studies throughout this dissertation, there are certainly other ways to assess to political ideology. As the works reviewed in Chapter 3 showed, there is some debate over the

validity and meaning of measurements of political ideology made using a single seven-point item. Though one of the strengths of this dissertation is its triangulation of results, future research on the subject should continue to triangulate findings through the use of other operationalizations of political ideology. This should include multi-item scales that assess the various policy preferences, values, and worldview attributes that the literature indicates are associated with liberalism and conservatism as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as individuals' self-identifications.

Second, all of the data sets analyzed in this dissertation were cross-sectional. Though the GSS data include cases from 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 administrations of the survey, it was not panel data. As such, analyses did not have the benefit of including time order, so it is impossible to say with confidence whether relationships progress as proposed from left to right across Figure 1.2. Future research should utilize longitudinal measurement of children and families as they develop over time in order to better determine the causal order of the relationships depicted in Figure 1.2.

Third, the perceptual inaccuracies or recall difficulties of a single family member might lead to inaccuracies in family communication patterns data. Indeed, Ritchie and Fizpatrick (1990) recommend administering the revised family communication patterns instrument to parents as well as children. Future research should assess more than just one family member in order to include the perspectives of the family as a whole on family communication patterns. Such an approach would also be useful for family values, since it would allow researchers to obtain not just the individual's values in adulthood, but also data on general family values in the family of origin.

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Fourth, despite their various, respective, strengths and weaknesses, the measures used to assess support for censorship to do not capture the full, current landscape of issues involving controversial communication. As discussed in Chapter 1, this landscape is constantly changing, so the use of static measures makes it impossible to achieve the goal of assessing support for censorship in a manner involving the most pertinent issues at a given moment.

The GSS and MISII data sets were especially problematic in this respect. The GSS support for censorship items involve expression by groups identified as controversial or nonconformist in from the 1950's to 1970's. Both the GSS and MISII measures involve only a few communication media which do not include media, such as newspapers, television, and the Internet, which have become important parts of American society and culture since the nation's inception. Furthremore, with their emphasis on the expressive rights of groups, the GSS and MISII measures only assess the portion of support for censorship that overlaps with tolerance. Future research should better operationalize support for censorship by including contemporary issues and contexts, and representing the concept as a whole to the greatest extent possible.

The study's greatest deficiency was the lack of a single data set that included all of the variables of interest. There was no way, using only the student, GSS, and MISII data, to assess whether FCPs are related to family values. Thus, future research should include measures of all relevant concepts in a single, omnibus survey.

10.4 Revised Model: Cognition and Quasi-Development

Though the present research had limitations, the results were nonetheless consistent with some interesting, albeit speculative, possibilities. Figure 10.1 shows a

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
Figure 10.1. Revised model.

revised version of the model depicted in Figure 1.2 based on what has been learned over the course of this research.

The diagram is now split into two parts, cognitive and quasi-developmental. The quasi-developmental portion involves the mediated relationship between FCP conformity orientation and support for censorship through conservatism. Because the data are cross-sectional, and measurement of FCP conformity orientation was assessed based on participant recall rather than longitudinal data, I can't in good conscience as a scientist say for certain that FCP conformity orientation leads to more conservative political ideology. Causality may flow in other directions. Nonetheless, it clearly seems most sensible to assume that assumed that greater FCP conformity orientation contributes to the formation of more conservative political ideology, then the results of the indirect effect analysis would seem to suggest that greater conservatism in turn contributes to greater support for censorship, since FCP conformity orientation was not directly related to support for censorship.

In many ways, things are more complicated on the cognitive side of the diagram. Strictness in family values, political ideology, and support for censorship were not only all measured at the same time, but also represent the current state of attitudes in the respondent's mind, as opposed to remembered attributes of the respondent's family. Furthermore, all three concepts are positively related to one another. The mediation analysis was conducted under the assumption that greater strictness in family values leads to greater conservatism, which in turn leads to greater support for censorship, while more strict family values also contribute directly to greater support for censorship as well. But this is just one possible explanation of many for the results obtained. For

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instance, it could be that some other variable represented by ideological self-identification influences both support for censorship and strictness in family values, leading to a spurious correlation between the latter two. Or perhaps strictness in family values contributes to both support for censorship and political ideology. Maybe support for censorship and strictness in family values are just two of many sets of attitudes that all go into the formation of ideological self-identification. Alternative explanations abound.

Consistent with Lakoff's (2002) theory and its implications, these cognitive attributes are related such that more strict family values tend to be associated with more conservative ideology, and both tend be associated with greater support for censorship. However, the exact manner in which these variables influence each other remains unknown.

10.5 Implications for and of Communication Theory

The communication theory context in which support for censorship is most often discussed is the third-person perception, which deals with the details and implications of the consistent finding the individuals tend to perceive persuasive communication as having a greater impact on others than themselves. Due to this perception, when confronted with communication that the individual finds in some way threatening, she or he may support censorship as a means of avoiding undesirable consequences. This dissertation was not concerned with third person perceptions, but future research should examine whether liberals or conservatives are more prone to these perceptions, or more likely to support censorship as a result of these perceptions.

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Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley (1997) discuss how the media frames used to describe an expressive rights controversy influenced support for censorship with regard to the situation. Framing research would could also be usefully applied in the context of the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship. In future research, expression controversies might be framed to appeal to or offend the values linked with liberal or conservative ideology, such as those identified in Chapter 3. For example, when a controversial communication situation is presented to respondents, it might be framed as a matter of equality, emphasizing everyone in society's right to have her or his say, to appeal to this important liberal value. Or, with a hate speech for example, the lack of empathy in the message could be emphasized in order to present the situation in a manner that would make it especially offensive to liberals. The presentation militarist expression might be framed as strong on defense to appeal to this specific conservative value. Or the potential social change that could result from communication that challenges the status quo could be emphasized in order to present an expression rights situation in a manner that would make it especially problematic for conservatives. Through the use of framing future research might better be able to tap into whether particular ideological positions are more or less supportive of censorship when expression is presented in a way designed to appeal to or offend the values inherent to that position.

10.6 Summary

In this dissertation I have discussed the importance and prominence that issues involving freedom of expression hold in society as well as the role that public opinion plays in these issues. I provided a detailed definition of support for censorship, and

identified an important relationship, that between political ideology and support for censorship, where more research was needed. I applied a theory of political ideology, Lakoff's (2002) moral politics, for insight into how the relationship between political ideology and support for censorship might be understood. I also reviewed research literature on alternative conceptualizations of political ideology.

Using three very different data sets with three very different operationalizations of support for censorship, I examined the evidence for a relationship between support for censorship and political ideology. To better understand this relationship, under the guidance of Lakoff's (2002) theory, I included variables that indicated nuturance and strictness in family values as well as conformity and conversation orientations in FCP.

I first conducted a cluster analysis to determine whether Lakoff's (2002) categorization of people as having either *nurturant parent* or *strict father* world views could be empirically confirmed. Indeed, in a two-cluster solution, the first cluster was relatively less conformity oriented and relatively more conversation oriented in their family communication patterns, held relatively more nurturant family values, and were relatively liberal in their political ideology. These individuals were labeled nurturant parents. The second group exhibited relatively greater conformity orientation and relatively less conversation orientation in their family communication patterns, relatively more strict family values, and relatively conservative political ideology. These individuals were labeled strict fathers. The two groups were differentiated from each other in terms of demographics and there was consistent evidence that individuals who were relatively more supportive of censorship had greater odds of being strict fathers. Though this typology replicated across data sets and was consistent with

Lakoff's (2002), there was also some evidence that a four-cluster solution, including *strict liberals* and *nurturant conservatives* as well as nurturant parents and strict fathers might be a superior typology from at least a statistical standpoint.

After confirming that Lakoff's (2002) ideas had empirical support, I set about testing a model wherein family values and family communication patterns have indirect effects on support for censorship through political ideology. This model was predominantly supported by analyses including zero-order correlations, multiple regression, and estimation of indirect effects. Greater FCP conformity orientation and more strict family values are associated with more conservative political ideology, which is associated with more support for censorship. More strict family values are also directly associated with greater support for censorship.

10.7 Conclusion

The free flow of ideas is essential in a democracy. Without the ability to express themselves, individuals cannot pursue their interests or advocate their values and beliefs. Without a free media system to disseminate information, the public's ability to make informed decision is hindered. However, society also prohibits, with good reason some forms of communication, such as child pornography and intentional lies that damage private individuals' reputations. The checks and balances that the framers of the U.S. Constitution included in their design for this nation include the judiciary's ability to override the entirety of the American public and its representatives should the Constitution be violated, and free expression is clearly protected in the First Amendment.

This may lead some to question why we should be concerned with public opinion in support of censorship. But without the consent of the people the law is no more durable than the paper that it is written on. In a less absolute sense, the law may be interpreted in different ways, and society faces new situations where freedom of expression comes into conflict with other values on a seemingly daily basis. These gray areas, where precedent has yet to be established or may be reframed, where it has yet to be determined what is expression and what is not, and what is protected and what is not, are where the public's opinion and influence is mostly likely to either shore up or chip away at free expression in our society. Though our measures are imperfect, they do provide some insight as to what we can expect.

This research identified two prototypes of political positions with respect to support for censorship. The first group reports that their families of origin emphasized open and egalitarian conversation, they held nurturant family values, they tended to classify themselves as relatively liberal, and they supported censorship relatively less. The second group reported that communication in their families of origin emphasized parental authority and obedience in children, they held relatively strict family values, they tended to classify themselves as relatively conservative, and they supported censorship relatively more. How we are raised and how we think others should be raised influences our political thoughts and opinions. Support for censorship is just one issue; a node in a larger network of political cognitions, affective evaluations, values, and identifications.

But it is an important issue, in terms of both its relevance to public opinion researchers and, in a larger sense, the republic. We might sigh in exasperation when the

phone rings just as we sit down to dinner in the evening and a pre-recorded message

asks us to press a button to indicate who we plan to vote for in an upcoming election.

We might be annoyed by the animated ad that floats across our computer screen as we

try to read asking if we'd be willing to take a brief survey. We might ignore the

volunteer in the street who asks us to take a moment to hear her out and perhaps sign

her petition because we are too busy and don't have the time. We might decry what can

at times be a vacuous, biased, and mean-spirited news media. But these situations all

provide opportunities to consider one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed to

citizens by the founders of the country, a right which has been restricted in some ways

and renewed in other through the consent of the public for well over 200 years –

freedom of expression.

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APPENDIX A

STUDENT DATA ITEMS, FREQUENCIES, AND SCALE ITEM RELATIONSHIPS

All analyses are for all 342 cases in the student data.

A.1 Demographics

A.1.1 Sex.

Female: 66.4%

Male: 32.7%

A.1.2 Grade point average. What is your OSU grade point average (for all

classes taken)?

GPAs ranged from 2.00 to 4.00.

A.2 Revised Family Communication Patterns Instrument

This section lists a number of statements that may or may not apply to *your*

family. If you no longer have contact with your parents, think back to when you did

have contact with them and respond accordingly. Please check or mark with an "X"

only one box per statement that reflects whether you strongly disagree with the

statement, disagree with the statement, neither agree nor disagree with the statement,

agree with the statement, or strongly agree with the statement. Don't spend too much time on any question. Simply record your first impression.

Please mark the one answer that best indicates your level of agreement for each statement.

A.2.1 Conformity orientation.

My parents often say something like "You'll know better when you grow up."

Strongly disagree: 11.1%

Disagree: 27.5%

Neither agree nor disagree: 22.2%

Agree: 29.2%

Strongly agree: 8.5%

Refused: 1.5%

My parents often say something like "My ideas are right and you should not question them."

Strongly disagree: 28.4%

Disagree: 41.2%

Neither agree nor disagree: 17.0%

Agree: 9.6%

Strongly agree: 2.0%

Refused: 1.8%

My parents often say something like "A child should not argue with adults."

     Strongly disagree: 24.0%

     Disagree: 33.9%

     Neither agree nor disagree: 21.1%

     Agree: 17.5%

     Strongly agree: 1.8%

     Refused: 1.8%

My parents often say something like "There are some things that just shouldn't be talked about."

     Strongly disagree: 26.0%

     Disagree: 37.7%

     Neither agree nor disagree: 20.5%

     Agree: 13.2%

     Strongly agree: 1.2%

     Refused: 1.5%

My parents often say something like "You should give in on arguments rather than risk making people mad."

     Strongly disagree: 39.5%

     Disagree: 42.4%

     Neither agree nor disagree: 11.4%

     Agree: 4.4%

     Strongly agree: 0.9%

     Refused: 1.5%

When anything really important is involved, my parents expect me to obey without question.

Strongly disagree: 10.5%

Disagree: 27.2%

Neither agree nor disagree: 27.5%

Agree: 26.9%

Strongly agree: 6.4%

Refused: 1.5%

In our home, my parents usually have the last word.

Strongly disagree: 6.7%

Disagree: 21.3%

Neither agree nor disagree: 28.4%

Agree: 33.0%

Strongly agree: 9.1%

Refused: 1.5%

My parents feel it is important to be the boss.

Strongly disagree: 9.9%

Disagree: 23.4%

Neither agree nor disagree: 33.6%

Agree: 25.1%

Strongly agree: 6.4%

Refused: 1.5%

My parents sometimes become irritated with my views if they are different from theirs.

Strongly disagree: 6.7%

Disagree: 33.3%

Neither agree nor disagree: 25.1%

Agree: 27.8%

Strongly agree: 6.4%

Refused: 0.6%

If my parents don't approve of it, they don't want to know about it.

Strongly disagree: 10.5%

Disagree: 41.8%

Neither agree nor disagree: 24.9%

Agree: 18.7%

Strongly agree: 3.8%

When I am at home, I am expected to obey my parents' rules.

Strongly disagree: 2.6%

Disagree: 6.1%

Neither agree nor disagree: 18.4%

Agree: 51.5%

Strongly agree: 21.1%

Refused: 0.3%

A.2.2 Conversation orientation.

In our family we often talk about topics like politics and religion where some persons disagree with others.

Strongly disagree: 7.0%

Disagree: 23.1%

Neither agree nor disagree: 20.5%

Agree: 36.8%

Strongly agree: 12.0%

Refused: 0.6%

My parents often say something like "Every member of the famile should have some say in family decisions."

Strongly disagree: 8.5%

Disagree: 30.1%

Neither agree nor disagree: 25.4%

Agree: 30.4%

Strongly agree: 5.0%

Refused:

My parents often ask my opinion when the family is talking about something.

Strongly disagree: 4.4%

Disagree: 14.6%

Neither agree nor disagree: 19.9%

Agree: 45.6%

Strongly agree: 14.9%

Refused:0.6%

My parents encourage me to challenge their ideas and beliefs.

Strongly disagree: 6.1%

Disagree: 31.0%

Neither agree nor disagree: 30.1%

Agree: 27.2%

Strongly agree: 5.0%

Refused: 0.6%

My parents often say something like "You should always look at both sides of an issue."

Strongly disagree: 3.8%

Disagree: 16.7%

Neither agree nor disagree: 21.9%

Agree: 46.5%

Strongly agree: 10.5%

Refused: 0.6%

I usually tell my parents what I am thinking about things.

     Strongly disagree: 2.3%

     Disagree: 12.9%

     Neither agree nor disagree: 13.2%

     Agree: 50.3%

     Strongly agree: 20.8%

     Refused: 0.6%

I can tell my parents almost anything.

     Strongly disagree: 5.0%

     Disagree: 12.9%

     Neither agree nor disagree: 11.7%

     Agree: 43.3%

     Strongly agree: 26.3%

     Refused: 0.9%

In our family we often talk about our feelings and emotions.

     Strongly disagree: 8.5%

     Disagree: 19.6%

     Neither agree nor disagree: 22.5%

     Agree: 33.6%

     Strongly agree: 14.9%

     Refused: 0.9%

My parents and I often have long, relaxed conversations about nothing in particular.

    Strongly disagree: 5.3%

    Disagree: 11.7%

    Neither agree nor disagree: 17.0%

    Agree: 44.2%

    Strongly agree: 21.3%

    Refused: 0.6%

I really enjoy talking with my parents, even when we disagree.

    Strongly disagree: 3.5%

    Disagree: 11.1%

    Neither agree nor disagree: 21.1%

    Agree: 42.7%

    Strongly agree: 21.1%

    Refused: 0.6%

My parents like to hear my opinions, even when they don't agree with me.

    Strongly disagree: 3.2%

    Disagree: 13.2%

    Neither agree nor disagree: 19.6%

    Agree: 48.2%

    Strongly agree: 14.3%

    Refused: 1.5%

My parents encourage me to express my feelings.

Strongly disagree: 1.8%

Disagree: 7.0%

Neither agree nor disagree: 18.1%

Agree: 50.3%

Strongly agree: 21.3%

Refused: 1.5%

My parents tend to be very open about their emotions.

Strongly disagree: 5.8%

Disagree: 21.3%

Neither agree nor disagree: 25.1%

Agree: 33.9%

Strongly agree: 12.3%

Refused: 1.5%

We often talk as a family about things we have done during the day.

Strongly disagree: 3.8%

Disagree: 12.0%

Neither agree nor disagree: 14.9%

Agree: 48.2%

Strongly agree: 19.6%

Refused: 1.5%

In our family we often talk about our plans and hopes for the future.

Strongly disagree: 2.9%

Disagree: 9.6%

Neither agree nor disagree: 11.7%

Agree: 51.8%

Strongly agree: 22.5

Refused: 1.5%

A.3 Political Ideology

When it comes to politics, how would you describe yourself?

Very liberal: 3.8%

Liberal: 24.0%

Slightly liberal: 17.8%

Middle of the road: 23.7%

Slightly conservative: 14.3%

Conservative: 12.6%

Very conservative: 2.0%

Refused: 1.8%

A.4 Willingness to Censor Scale

In Part 1 you will be presented with situations in which freedom of speech comes into conflict with other important social and individual values. There are five possible responses listed for each situation. Please put a check or an X in the box next to the one response out of the five that you think is best. Please select no more than one response to each question. Don't spend too much time on any question. Simply record your first impression.

Please mark the one answer that you feel to be most appropriate.

1. A company promoting a rock musical, which contains scenes where the actors are naked, wants to lease a municipal auditorium to present their production. I think city officials should:

   □ refuse to allow them to lease the auditorium for this production: 7.3%

   □ grant the lease for the production, but sue the producers if they leave the scenes with nudity in the show: 5.6%

   □ grant the lease for the production, but require that audience members be 18 or older, or accompanied by an adult: 78.1%

   □ grant the lease with no conditions: 5.3%

   □ grant the lease, and provide police officers to insure the security of the performers: 3.5%

   Refused: 0.3%

2. The Aryan Nation, a white-supremacist group, is publishing and distributing a newspaper in your state.

   I think state officials should:

   ◻ close down the newspaper: 16.4%

   ◻ levy a tax on special interest newspapers, like this one: 12.9%

   ◻ not allow the publisher to send the newspaper through the mail: 26.0%

   ◻ allow the newspaper to be distributed: 21.3%

   ◻ protect the publisher's right to print and distribute the newspaper: 23.1%

   Refused: 0.3%

3. A television news photographer takes video of a famous person entering a house of prostitution. The celebrity seeks a court order to stop the TV station from using the footage.

   I think the judge and/or jury should:

   ◻ order the TV station not to air the video: 15.5%

   ◻ fine the TV station to compensate the celebrity: 5.6%

   ◻ order the TV station to alter the video so the celebrity can't be identified: 28.9%

   ◻ take no action, thereby allowing the TV station to air the video as is: 31.9%

   ◻ issue a ruling protecting the right of the TV station to use the video: 17.3%

   Refused: 0.9%

4. An anti-government militia group maintains a page on the World Wide Web that

   includes step-by-step instructions for making bombs.

   I think the government should:

   □ confiscate their computer equipment so they can't have a site on the

   WWW: 6.7%

   □ bring criminal charges against the militia's members: 21.9%

   □ require them to take the bomb information off their web site: 50.6%

   □ take no action against the militia group: 12.0%

   □ protect their right to publish on the WWW: 8.8%

   Refused: 0.0%

5. A group of protesters is picketing outside an abortion clinic, sometimes

   obstructing the paths of patients who are entering the clinic.

   I think city officials should:

   □ forbid the protesters from picketing outside the clinic: 6.4%

   □ arrest the protesters for disturbing the peace: 6.1%

   □ require the protesters to stay at least 15 feet away from the clinic: 80.4%

   □ allow the protest to continue without restriction: 2.6%

   □ protect the right of the protesters to express their beliefs: 4.4%

   Refused: 0.0%

6. During a campaign, the current mayor was speaking at a civic group's meeting.

   Discussing his opponent, he commented that she had the same name as a

   missing Nazi war criminal and asked "Is this the same Ilse Koch? Who knows?"

   Koch sued the mayor for trying to destroy her reputation.

   I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

   □   order the mayor not to talk about his opponent in public anymore: 3.8%

   □   fine the mayor to compensate Koch: 16.4%

   □   require the mayor to make a public apology: 55.6%

   □   not take any action against the mayor: 14.6%

   □   issue a ruling upholding the mayor's right to speak: 7.9%

   Refused: 1.8%

7. A local pharmacist places an ad, which includes price information for

   prescription medication, in a magazine targeted at the elderly.

   I think the government should:

   □   forbid the pharmacist from advertising prices for prescription

   medication: 5.6%

   □   fine the pharmacist for advertising price information: 5.0%

   □   require the pharmacist to list the price information in small print: 10.5%

   □   take no action against the pharmacist: 48.5%

   □   protect the right of the pharmacist to advertise price information: 27.5%

   Refused: 2.9%

8. As you are surfing the World Wide Web, you accidentally come across a site that contains graphic sexual images.

   I think the U.S. government should:

   ☐ confiscate the computer equipment of the site's producers: 2.3%

   ☐ fine the producers of the site: 4.1%

   ☐ require the site's producers to install a blocking mechanism so that it can't be accessed accidentally: 62.9%

   ☐ let the site's producers decide what to do: 9.9%

   ☐ protect the right of the producers to choose what to include in their site: 18.7%

   Refused: 2.0%

9. A newspaper publishes a story that reveals that a certain community member is gay. He had not wanted to reveal this fact publicly, and he sues the newspaper for invading his privacy.

   I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

   ☐ order the newspaper not to publish such information again: 11.4%

   ☐ fine the newspaper to compensate the man: 44.4%

   ☐ require the newspaper to issue a public apology: 24.9%

   ☐ take no action against the newspaper: 10.2%

   ☐ issue a ruling supporting the right of the newspaper to publish such information: 6.7%

   Refused: 2.3%

10. A group protesting the U.S. government's foreign policy in Iran burns the flag on a street corner outside a government building.

I think the government should:

- ☐ make it illegal to burn the flag: 18.1%

- ☐ arrest the protesters for disturbing the peace: 34.2%

- ☐ require the protesters to hold their demonstration in a less crowded area: 9.6%

- ☐ take no action against the protesters: 15.8%

- ☐ protect the protesters right to demonstrate: 19.3%

Refused: 2.9%

11. The first of a three part TV mini-series just aired on your local NBC affiliate. It included two characters who frequently make racist remarks against African-Americans and Mexicans.

I think the Federal Communications Commission, which grants the station's license, should:

- forbid the station from airing the last two parts of the mini-series: 13.7%

- revoke the station's license to broadcast if it airs the last two parts of the mini-series: 14.0%

- require that the last two parts of the mini-series be aired after 9:00 p.m.: 40.5%

- let the local station decide whether or not to air the last two parts of the series: 28.3%

- make sure that the last two parts of the series air as scheduled: 3.6%

Refused: 1.8%

12. A newspaper editor publishes an editorial on election day endorsing a particular candidate.

I think state officials should:

☐ make it illegal to solicit votes on election day: 9.6%

☐ fine the editor for his partisanship: 9.6%

☐ require the editor to issue a special edition with a statement supporting the other candidate: 16.1%

☐ take no action against the editor: 34.2%

☐ protect the editor's right to express his views on the election: 29.5%

Refused: 0.9%

13. An arts and entertainment program on your cable system included a negative review of a local restaurant. The critic said that the restaurant owners "are rude and vulgar people" and are "pigs." The owners sued the critic for ruining their reputations.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

☐ forbid the critic from doing any more negative reviews: 2.9%

☐ fine the critic to compensate the restaurant owners: 17.3%

☐ require the critic to issue a public apology: 22.2%

☐ not take any action against the critic: 31.6%

☐ issue a ruling defending the critic's right to express his opinion: 24.9%

Refused: 1.2%

14. The chamber of commerce issues a yearly magazine that profiles the various civic organizations in your community. A chamber staff member, who is the head of a local pro-life group, plans to include a feature on his group in the next issue.

I think the city officials who oversee the chamber of commerce should:

☐ refuse to allow an article on the group to be included in the magazine: 7.9%

☐ fire the staff member if he insists on publishing the article about his group: 5.8%

☐ require the staff member to include an article about pro-choice groups, also: 36.8%

☐ let the staff member decide what to do: 22.5%

☐ protect the right of the staff member to include the article in the magazine: 25.4%

Refused: 1.5%

15. An online company provides its subscribers access to "photo libraries" where they can pay to download pictures. In the "California Girls" section, the images are of women hoping to become fashion models. They didn't give permission to use their pictures, and have sued the company for invasion of privacy.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

- issue an injunction prohibiting further publication of the photographs: 47.4%

- fine the company to compensate the women: 35.4%

- require the company to put a caption on the photos explaining they are included without permission: 9.9%

- take no action against the company: 3.5%

- issue a ruling protecting the right of the company to include the photographs: 2.6%

Refused: 1.2%

16. A new certified public accountant (CPA) is going door-to-door soliciting

business.

I think the government should:

- ☐ not allow CPAs to solicit clients in this way: 10.2%

- ☐ fine the CPA for violating people's privacy: 3.8%

- ☐ only allow the CPA to solicit to people who have expressed an interest in
receiving such information: 38.3%

- ☐ take no action against the CPA: 35.4%

- ☐ protect the right of the CPA to solicit clients door-to-door: 11.1%

Refused: 1.2%

17. A cable channel is promoting an upcoming series about the assassination of

President John F. Kennedy. The promotion names several authors that it claims

are "guilty of misleading the American public" about the assassination. One of

the authors sues the cable channel for portraying him in a false light.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

- ☐ order the cable channel not to air the series: 7.3%

- ☐ fine the cable channel to compensate the author: 12.6%

- ☐ require the cable channel to include an interview with this author in their
series, so he can state his point of view: 46.5%

- ☐ take no action against the cable channel: 24.3%

- ☐ issue a ruling protecting the right of the cable channel to air the series:
8.2%

Refused: 1.2%

18. An alternative newspaper in your community runs a singles column each week which sometimes includes graphic descriptions of sexual encounters.

    I think city officials should:

    ☐ force the paper to stop running that column: 10.2%

    ☐ fine the paper each time the column includes graphic descriptions of sex: 9.1%

    ☐ require the paper to run a warning on the front page of any issue that contains graphic sexual descriptions: 49.1%

    ☐ let the paper decide what to do: 18.4%

    ☐ protect the paper's right to publish the column: 11.1%

    Refused: 2.0%

19. A magazine article about on-duty drunkenness by certain police officers mistakenly included a picture of an officer who was not involved. The officer sued the magazine for damaging his reputation:

    I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

    ☐ not allow the magazine to publish any more articles about police behavior: 2.3%

    ☐ fine the magazine to compensate the officer: 40.9%

    ☐ require the magazine to make a public apology: 46.5%

    ☐ not take any action against the magazine: 3.8%

    ☐ issue a ruling protecting the magazine's right to publish, even when they've made a mistake: 3.8%

    Refused: 2.6%

20. The names and home phone numbers of an abortion clinic's medical staff and board of directors are provided by an anti-abortion activist on the Internet.

I think the government should:

☐ confiscate the activist's computer equipment so she can't publish such information on the Internet: 5.0%

☐ press charges against the activist for endangering the lives of the clinic's staff and directors: 43.0%

☐ order the activist to remove the phone numbers from her Internet site: 35.4%

☐ take no action against the activist: 9.6%

☐ protect the right of the activist to provide the information on the Internet: 4.1%

Refused: 2.9%

21. In a meeting at a public hall, a speaker is preaching hatred against gays and lesbians.

I think the police officers on the scene should:

☐ arrest the speaker to stop him from finishing the presentation: 7.9%

☐ fine the speaker for disturbing the peace: 11.7%

☐ require the speaker to apologize for the offensive language: 18.1%

☐ take no action, thus allowing the speaker to continue: 35.7%

☐ protect the speaker's right to say whatever he thinks: 24.6%

Refused: 2.0%

22. A television station which broadcasts into two states accepts advertising for a lottery in one of the states. The other state prohibits lotteries.

I think the Federal Communications Commission, which grants the station's license, should:

- ☐ forbid the TV station from broadcasting any lottery advertising: 7.6%

- ☐ fine the TV station for accepting the lottery advertising: 5.6%

- ☐ require the TV station also to run public service announcements about the dangers of gambling: 22.8%

- ☐ take no action against the TV station: 39.8%

- ☐ protect the right of the TV station to accept the lottery advertising: 21.9%

Refused: 2.3%

23. A pro-life corporation published a special edition of its quarterly newspaper the week before national elections, urging people to vote for anti-abortion candidates.

I think the Federal Election Commission should:

- ☐ make it illegal for corporations to spend money in support of particular candidates: 4.4%

- ☐ fine the corporation for publishing a special "election edition" of its newspaper: 7.3%

- ☐ require the organization to provide space in its newspaper for candidates to respond: 18.7%

- ☐ take no action against the organization: 35.4%

- ☐ protect the right of the organization to express its views concerning political candidates: 31.3%

Refused: 2.9%

24. The local news programming on a TV station in your city always favors one

political party over the other.

I think the Federal Communications Commission, which grants the station's

license, should:

- ☐   not allow the station to cover political stories: 3.2%

- ☐   fine the station to compensate the other political party: 3.8%

- ☐   require the station to give an equal amount of favorable coverage to the

    other political party: 52.9%

- ☐   take no action against the TV station: 28.4%

- ☐   issue a ruling supporting the right of the TV station to choose what to

    include on its news programs: 9.9%

Refused: 1.8%

25. A magazine is planning to publish an in-depth article about a 20-year old

murder case, involving a son convicted for murdering his parents. The piece

discusses family relationships while raising issues of child abuse and

rehabilitation. The murderer's brother sues the publisher for invading his

privacy.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

- □ order the magazine not to publish the article: 7.3%

- □ fine the magazine to compensate the brother: 6.1%

- □ order the magazine to change the names in the article so that the brother won't be identified: 51.2%

- □ take no action against the magazine: 22.5%

- □ issue an order protecting the magazine's right to publish the article: 11.1%

Refused: 1.8%

26. College students are holding a rally to protest the University's decision not to allow condoms to be distributed in residence halls. They are carrying signs and banners with sexual language and pictures.

I think University officials should:

☐ forbid protests on campus: 4.4%

☐ put the students who participate in the rally on probation: 4.4%

☐ take the signs and banners from the rally: 15.8%

☐ allow the rally to continue as is: 35.7%

☐ supply campus police to provide security for the rally: 38.0%

Refused: 1.8%

27. A group of neo-nazis produces a weekly call-in show on the public access channel of your cable system.

I think the city officials who granted the cable company its franchise should:

☐ demand that the group's program not appear on your cable system: 20.2%

☐ fine the group and the cable company each time the program appears: 11.1%

☐ require that the program only be shown after 9 p.m.: 33.0%

☐ allow the cable company to handle the situation: 22.5%

☐ protect the right of the group to produce the program on public access 11.1%

Refused: 2.0%

28. An on-line service provides a forum for information about and discussion of current events. In the forum, allegations were made about the illegal actions of an investment company. The investment company sued the on-line service for damaging its reputation.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

   □ force the on-line service to close down its forum for discussion of current events: 5.3%

   □ fine the on-line service to compensate the investment company: 15.8%

   □ require the on-line service to make a public apology: 19.9%

   □ take no action against the on-line service: 34.5%

   □ issue a ruling protecting the right of the on-line service to provide a forum for discussion: 22.5%

   Refused: 2.0%

29. A personal injury lawyer is running an ad on your cable system, soliciting business from people who had suffered injuries as a result of using a certain product.

I think the government should:

   □ forbid the lawyer from soliciting clients through advertising: 5.6%

   □ fine the lawyer for soliciting business in this manner: 5.8%

   □ require the lawyer to mention his fees for service in his ad: 13.7%

   □ not take any action against the lawyer: 45.0%

   □ protect the lawyer's right to solicit clients through advertising: 27.5%

   Refused: 2.3%

30. A newspaper ran editorials and cartoons stating that anti-nuclear protesters are "bums," "deluded," and "insane" and that signs they have been carrying are "gibberish," "un-American," and "trash." The protesters have sued the newspaper for attacking their reputations.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

- ☐ stop the paper from printing any more editorial commentary on the protesters: 7.6%

- ☐ levy a fine against the newspaper to compensate the protesters: 9.9%

- ☐ require the newspaper to run guest editorials from the protesters point-of-view: 33.3%

- ☐ not take any action against the newspaper: 26.9%

- ☐ issue a ruling protecting the newspaper's right to express its editorial position: 19.6%

Refused: 2.6%

31. One of the new prime-time television series this year on the ABC affiliate in your city regularly includes explicit nudity.

I think the Federal Communications Commission, which grants the station's license, should:

   □   require the station to stop airing any episode with explicit nudity: 20.5%

   □   fine the station each time an episode with explicit nudity airs: 9.9%

   □   require the station to air the series after 9:00 p.m.: 47.7%

   □   let the station decide the appropriate action to take: 12.6%

   □   protect the right of the station to air the series: 6.7%

   Refused: 2.6%

32. A magazine for U.S. members of the socialist party regularly publishes articles in support of foreign governments and against the U.S. government.

I think the government should:

   □   close down the magazine: 8.5%

   □   fine the magazine's publishers: 7.9%

   □   make the publishers include articles explaining the U.S. government point of view: 19.9%

   □   take no action against the magazine: 31.6%

   □   protect the right of the magazine's publishers to express their opinions: 29.5%

   Refused: 2.6%

33. The Ku Klux Klan has filed for a permit to hold a march through your town.

    I think the city permit office should:

    □ refuse to give them a permit: 29.5%

    □ hold them responsible for any physical or personal damage that occurs as a result of the march: 21.6%

    □ require them to hold the march in a sparsely populated area of town: 7.3%

    □ issue a permit for the march: 10.5%

    □ issue a permit, and provide police escorts to make sure their right to march is protected: 27.5%

    Refused: 3.5%

34. An individual who is opposed to abortion is shouting his beliefs in front of a doctor's office where abortions are performed. The office is in a residential neighborhood.

    I think city officials should:

    □ forbid him from protesting there in the future: 8.2%

    □ arrest him for disturbing the peace: 31.9%

    □ require him to protest with signs instead of by shouting: 31.6%

    □ allow him to continue to protest: 13.2%

    □ protect his right to protest: 11.7%

    Refused: 3.5%

35. A group advocating welfare reform publishes a leaflet with photos and stories about women who are "shamelessly and brazenly violating the law by having children out of wedlock and receiving welfare to support them." One of the women whose photo is included sues the group for portraying her in a false light.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

- □ order the group to stop distributing the leaflet: 13.5%

- □ fine the group to compensate the woman: 29.8%

- □ order the group to take the woman's photo out of the leaflet: 40.4%

- □ take no action against the group: 7.0%

- □ issue a ruling protecting the right of the group to publish their leaflet: 5.6%

Refused: 3.8%

36. A bookstore in your city sells magazines featuring pictures of nude and

partially-clothed adults in various sexual positions.

I think city officials should:

   ▢ force the bookstore to stop selling the magazines: 4.1%

   ▢ file charges against the bookstore's owner for distributing pornographic

   material: 2.6%

   ▢ require the store to place the magazines behind the counter, so customers

   have to ask for them: 52.3%

   ▢ let the store's owner decide what to do: 22.5%

   ▢ protect the right of the bookstore to sell the magazines: 17.3%

   Refused: 1.2%

37. A radical Jewish organization advocating violence against Muslims has a site

on the World Wide Web.

I think the government should:

   ▢ confiscate the group's computer equipment so they can't have a web site:

   5.8%

   ▢ fine the group's leaders for advocating violence: 19.6%

   ▢ require the organization to place a warning about the content that appears

   before their page is accessed: 40.4%

   ▢ do nothing, thereby allowing the web site to remain unchanged: 18.4%

   ▢ protect the organization's right to express its beliefs: 14.0%

   Refused: 1.8%

38. An anti-abortion organization produces a monthly program on the public access channel on your cable system. During the program, they show pictures of local physicians who perform abortions, and label them as "murderers" and "killers."

I think the city officials who run the public access channel should:

☐ not allow the organization to air their program on the public access channel: 14.3%

☐ fine the organization for improper use of a public facility: 13.7%

☐ require the organization to refrain from identifying any particular physician: 53.5%

☐ take no action against the organization or its program: 9.6%

☐ protect the right of the organization to air its program: 6.7%

Refused: 2.0%

39. Several students at a public university were protesting the university's contracts with two businesses known to be anti-union. They were speaking on the library lawn in the center of campus, using bullhorns to amplify their voices.

I think University officials should:

☐ have campus police remove the protesters: 6.4%

☐ put the students involved in the protest on probation: 3.8%

☐ require the students to stop using bullhorns: 32.7%

☐ allow the protest to continue uninterrupted: 27.2%

☐ protect the students' right to speak their opinions: 28.7%

Refused: 1.2%

40. A liquor store includes price information in their newspaper ads for alcoholic beverages.

I think the government should:

☐ issue on a ban on price advertising for alcohol: 6.4%

☐ fine the liquor store for advertising alcohol prices: 5.0%

☐ require the liquor store to advertise prices in very small print: 12.3%

☐ take no action against the liquor store: 56.4%

☐ issue a ruling supporting the right of the liquor store to advertise price information: 17.8%

Refused: 2.0%

41. A TV news program showed unrelated video of a local doctor while the voice-over indicated that some health practitioners use "quack machines, fraudulent tests, and illegal drugs to treat cancer." The doctor has sued the television station for damaging his reputation.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

☐ not allow the TV station to run these kinds of stories in the future: 8.8%

☐ fine the TV station to compensate the doctor: 31.6%

☐ require the TV station to broadcast a story correcting their mistake: 47.4%

☐ take no action against the TV station: 6.7%

☐ issue a ruling supporting the TV station's right to air these kinds of stories: 3.8%

Refused: 1.8%

42. A black separatist organization in your city is publishing a "humor" magazine

which makes fun of whites, especially Jewish people and Catholics.

I think city officials should:

    ☐ close down the magazine: 15.8%

    ☐ levy a tax on special interest magazines, like this one: 17.5%

    ☐ revoke the special mailing rates for their magazine: 15.5%

    ☐ allow the group to continue to publish and distribute the magazine:

       29.2%

    ☐ protect the right of the group to publish and distribute the magazine:

       20.2%

Refused: 1.8%

43. In a public speech criticizing the practice of placing mentally ill people in boarding homes, the speaker reveals that Ed Samuels, one of the boarding home operators, had been convicted of certain criminal sexual acts 30 years ago. Samuels sues the speaker for disclosing private facts.

    I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

    ☐ forbid the speaker from commenting publicly on the boarding home issue again: 7.3%

    ☐ fine the speaker to compensate Samuels: 14.6%

    ☐ require the speaker to make a public apology: 27.8%

    ☐ take no action against the speaker: 33.9%

    ☐ issue a ruling protecting the right of the speaker to criticize the boarding home operators: 12.9%

    Refused: 3.5%

44. Volunteers for a political advocacy group set up a table outside the post office to solicit contributions and sell subscriptions to their newspaper.

    I think post office officials should:

    ☐ order the group to leave the premises: 20.8%

    ☐ fine the group's members for soliciting on government property: 16.4%

    ☐ make the group move so they are not blocking the path of post office customers: 40.1%

    ☐ not take any action against the group: 12.3%

    ☐ protect the group's right to solicit contributions and subscriptions: 7.9%

    Refused: 2.6%

45. A locally produced, sexually explicit program has begun to air on a public access channel on your cable system.

I think the city officials who granted the cable company its franchise should:

- □ require the cable company to stop airing the program: 15.8%
- □ fine the cable company each time the program airs: 4.7%
- □ require that the program be aired after 9:00 p.m.: 54.4%
- □ let the cable company decide what to do: 16.7%
- □ protect the right of the local producers to show their program: 6.7%

Refused: 1.8%

46. A pro-life organization has bought time on an independent television station in your city. They want to air a 15 minute program which includes graphic pictures of aborted fetuses.

I think the Federal Communications Commission, which grants the station's license, should:

- □ forbid the station to air the program with the graphic footage included: 18.4%
- □ fine the station if it airs the program as is: 5.6%
- □ allow the station to show the program with the graphic footage, as long as it is shown after 10 p.m.: 44.2%
- □ leave the decision of whether or not to air the program up to the station: 23.7%
- □ require the station to let the program air as scheduled: 5.6%

Refused: 2.6%

47. A man with a small business is advertising his products by sending 500,000 unsolicited e-mails each week. Several people who have received the messages have complained to their state attorney general.

I think the attorney general's office should:

- ☐ confiscate the man's computer equipment to prevent him from sending unsolicited e-mails: 4.7%

- ☐ fine the man for each unsolicited e-mail he sends: 14.9%

- ☐ require him to stop sending e-mail messages to those individuals who make such a request: 60.8%

- ☐ not take any action against the man: 10.5%

- ☐ protect the right of the man to send e-mail messages to promote his products: 7.0%

Refused: 2.0%

48. On a picket line during a strike, one of the union banners says "#1 Scab Jacobsen Sucks." Jacobsen has sued the union leader, saying that his character was called into question.

I think the judge and/or jury hearing the case should:

- ☐ forbid the union leader from having any signs directed at individual workers: 23.4%

- ☐ fine the union leader to compensate Jacobsen: 12.6%

- ☐ require the union leader to make a public apology: 20.2%

- ☐ not take any action against the union leader: 29.5%

- ☐ issue a ruling protecting the union leader's right to speak freely: 12.9%

Refused: 1.5%

49. A cable channel is planning to air films, produced outside of the U.S., that

   explore global political issues like acid rain and nuclear power.

   I think the U.S. government should:

   ☐ not allow the cable channel to air the programs: 3.8%

   ☐ fine the cable channel for airing these programs: 5.0%

   ☐ require the cable company to label the films as "political propaganda":

      17.5%

   ☐ let the cable channel decide whether or not to air the programs protect

      the cable channel's right to air the films: 41.8%

   ☐ protect the cable channel's right to air the films: 30.7%

   Refused: 1.2%

A.5 Scale Item Relationships

   Sex, GPA, and political ideology were all assessed with single items in the

student data, but FCP and WTC were assessed using scales. FCP and WTC responses

were essentially, treated as ratio data although they are technically ordinal. Pearson's *r*

was used to determine the relationships between items in each of these scales.

   A.5.1 Family communication patterns. For FCP conformity, the highest

correlation (*r* = .550, *p* < .000) was between the items "In my home, my parents usually

have the last word" and "My parents feel it is important to be the boss." The lowest

correlation (r = .002, *p* = *ns*) among the FCP conformity items was between the items

"My parents often say something like 'You should five in on arguments rather than risk

making people mad'" and "When I am at home, I am expected to obey my parents'

rules."

For FCP conversation, the highest correlation ($r = .638$, $p < .000$) was between the items "I usually tell my parents what I am thinking about things" and "I can tell my parents almost anything." The lowest correlation ($r = .170$, $p < .005$) between FCP conversation items was for "In our family we often talk about topics like politics and religion where some persons disagree with others" and "My parents often say something like 'You should always look at both sides of an issue.'"

A.5.2 Willingness to censor scale. There were both positive and negative correlations between WTC items. The strongest positive correlation ($r = .479$, $p < .001$) was between the pornography/television item "One of the new prime-time television series this year on the ABC affiliate in your city regularly includes explicit nudity" and the pornography/cable item "A locally produced, sexually explicit program has begun to air on a public access channel on you cable system." The strongest negative correlation ($r = -.096$, $p = ns$) was between the privacy/Internet item "An online company provides subscribers access to 'photo libraries,' where they can pay to download pictures. In the 'California Girls' section, the images are of women hoping to become fashion models. They didn't give permission to use their pictures, and have sued the company for invasion of privacy…" and the abortion/newspaper item "A pro-life corporation published a special edition of its quarterly newspaper the week before national elections, urging people to vote for anti-abortion candidates."

APPENDIX B

GSS ITEMS, FREQUENCIES, SUPPORT FOR CENSORSHIP SCALE ITEM

RELATIONSHIPS, AND MISSING DATA

All analyses are for the 3,780 analyzed GSS cases unless otherwise noted.

B.1 Methodological and Demographics

   B.1.1 Year. GSS year for this respondent.

        2000: 24.9%

        2002: 24.4%

        2004: 24.3%

        2006: 26.5

   B.1.2 Sex. Code respondent's sex.

        Female: 55.5%

        Male: 44.5%

   B.1.3 Age. Respondent's age.

        Ages ranged from 18 to 89, which was coded for 89 years or older.

   B.1.4 Education. What is the highest year of school that you finished and got

credit for?

        Years of education ranged from 0 to 20.

B.2 Family Values

　　　If you had to choose, which thing on this list would you pick as the most important for a child to learn to prepare him or her for life? Which comes next in importance? Which comes third? Which comes fourth?

　　B.2.1 To obey.

　　　　　Most important: 9.2%

　　　　　2nd important: 7.8%

　　　　　3rd important: 9.4%

　　　　　4th important: 24.8%

　　　　　Least important: 10.1%

　　　　　Not applicable: 38.7%

　　B.2.2 To think for one's self.

　　　　　Most important: 31.5%

　　　　　2nd important: 11.2%

　　　　　3rd important: 8.8%

　　　　　4th important: 7.7%

　　　　　Least important: 10.1%

　　　　　Not applicable: 38.7%

B.2.3 To work hard.

> Most important: 10.8%

> 2nd important: 21.6%

> 3rd important: 20.6%

> 4th important: 7.4%

> Least important: 1.0%

> Not applicable: 38.7%

B.2.4 To help others.

> Most important: 9.5%

> 2nd important: 20.0%

> 3rd important: 20.6%

> 4th important: 9.9%

> Least important: 1.3%

> Not applicable: 38.7%

B.2.5 To be well liked or popular.

> Most important: 0.4%

> 2nd important: 0.7%

> 3rd important: 2.0%

> 4th important: 11.5%

> Least important: 46.7%

> Not applicable: 38.7%

B.3 Political Ideology

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal – point 1 – to extremely conservative – point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Extremely liberal: 2.2%

Liberal: 8.3%

Slightly liberal: 7.9%

Moderate: 28.5%

Slightly conservative: 10.8%

Conservative: 11.6%

Extremely conservative: 2.7%

Don't know: 2.7%

Not applicable: 25.2%

B.4 Support for Censorship Scale

There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people.

For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion … If such a person wanted to make a speech in your (city/town/community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?

Allowed: 57.8%

Not allowed: 16.5%

Don't know: 0.7%

Not applicable: 25.0%

Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

Allowed: 43.8%

Not allowed: 28.9%

Don't know: 2.2%

Not applicable: 25.1%

If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

Remove: 18.4%

Not remove: 54.8%

Don't know: 1.0%

Not applicable: 25.1%

Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not?

Allowed: 46.3%

Not allowed: 27.5%

Don't know: 1.0%

Not applicable: 25.1%

Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

Allowed: 34.0%

Not allowed: 38.7%

Don't know: 2.1%

Not applicable: 25.2%

If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

Remove: 23.5%

Not remove: 49.4%

Don't know: 1.9%

Not applicable: 25.1%

Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?

Allowed: 50.9%

Not allowed: 22.5%

Don't know: 1.5%

Not applicable: 25.0%

Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?

Fired: 27.0%

Not fired: 44.4%

Don't know: 3.5%

Not applicable: 25.2%

Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

Remove: 21.5%

Not remove: 51.6%

Don't know: 1.7%

Not applicable: 25.0%

Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak, or not?

Allowed: 49.9%

Not allowed: 23.7%

Don't know: 1.3%

Not applicable: 25.0%

Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

Allowed: 38.4%

Not allowed: 34.3%

Don't know: 2.2%

Not applicable: 0.2%

Suppose he wrote a book advocating doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. Somebody in your community suggests that the book be removed from the public library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

Remove: 21.9%

Not remove: 51.3%

Don't know: 1.7%

Not applicable: 25.0%

And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual? Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?

Allowed: 62.3%

Not allowed: 11.3%

Don't know: 1.2%

Not applicable: 25.2%

Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

Allowed: 58.1%

Not allowed: 14.8%

Don't know: 1.8%

Not applicable: 25.2%

If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

Remove: 17.8%

Not remove: 55.3%

Don't know: 1.7%

Not applicable: 25.1%

B.5 Support for Censorship Scale Item Relationships

Since the family values variable was based on a ranking task where the scores for all items were dependent upon the scores for all other items, and all of the other variables assessed in the GSS data were measured using single items, the only scale for which item relationships are relevant is the support for censorship scale. Because the responses are recorded as nominal data (i.e., allowed or not allowed, or remove or not remove), chi-square was used to assess the relationships between items in this scale. The weakest relationship was between the racist teach and homosexual book items ($\chi^2 =$

93.164, *df* = 1, *p* < .001) and the strongest relationship was between the homosexual speech and homosexual teach items (χ^2 = 1173.690, *df* = 1, *p* < .001). All relationships were statistically significant at the *p* < .001 level.

B..6 Missing Data

A noteworthy amount of GSS cases were excluded from analyses in this dissertation. Of these 3,780 GSS respondents who were presented with presented with to both the family values and support for censorship measures there were many who had "don't know" or "not applicable" recorded in the data set for their political ideology, family values, or support for censorship items to such an extent that the cases were not included in analyses involving these variables. In this section I describe the differences between cases that were analyzed, and those that were not.

Of the 3,780 cases eligible for analysis, 2,319 responded to all of the family values items, and 1,461 did not respond to any of the family values items. Though neither the ballot nor survey version data indicates methodological reasons for these missing data, the "all or nothing" nature of these data seems to indicate some undocumented methodological decision to present some respondents among the analyzed cases with the family values items and not others.

Those who responded to the family values items (*M* = 2002.449) tended to have been surveyed in earlier administrations of the GSS than those who did not (*M* = 2003.996; *t* = 21.733, *df* = 3,778, *p* < .001). Those who did respond to the family values items were 53.3% female and 46.7% male, and those who did not respond to the family values items were 58.9% female and 41.1% male. There was not a significant age difference between those who did respond to the family values items (*M* = 46.487) and

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those who did not ($M = 46.655$; $t = 0.293$, $df = 3,766$, $p = ns$). Nor was there a

significant difference in years of education between those who did respond to the family

values items ($M = 13.450$) and those who did not ($M = 13.482$; $t = 0.320$, $df = 3,773$, $p = ns$). There was not a significant difference political ideology between those who did

respond to the family values items ($M = 4.147$) and those who did not ($M = 4.159$; $t = 0.168$, $df = 2,721$, $p = ns$). Nor was there a significant difference in support for

censorship between those who did respond to the family values items ($M = .313$) and

those who did not ($M = .316$; $t = 0.256$, $df = 2,686$, $p = ns$).

Of the 3,780 GSS respondents eligible for analysis, 955 had responses of "not

applicable" recorded for their political ideology, and 102 had "don't know" responses

recorded for the same variable. As with the family values variable, neither ballot nor

survey version data indicated methodological reasons the missing data, though it is

possible that there was some undocumented methodological explanation.

There was not a significant difference in years of GSS administration between

those who did provide an ideological self-identification ($M = 2003.080$) and those who

did not ($M = 2002.963$; $t = -1.424$, $df = 3,778$, $p = ns$). Of those who ideologically self-

identified, 53.8% were female and 46.2% were male. Of those who did not

ideologically self-identify, 59.8% were female and 40.2% were male. There was not a

significant age difference between those who did ideologically self-identify ($M = 46.637$) and those who did not ($M = 46.332$; $t = -0.490$, $df = 3,766$, $p = ns$). Nor was

there a significant difference in years of education between those who ideologically

self-identified ($M = 13.486$) and those who did not ($M = 13.401$; $t = -0.786$, $df = 3,773$, $p = ns$). However, those who did ideologically self-identify ($M = 8.898$) tended to be

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less strict in their family values than those who did not ($M = 9.617$; $t = 2.779$, $df = 2,317$, $p < .01$). Those who ideologically self-identified ($M = .311$) also tended to support censorship less than those who did not ($M = .404$; $t = 2.698$, $df = 2,686$, $p < .01$).

Of the 3,780 GSS respondents eligible for analysis, 1,092 had missing data on the support for censorship variable. Of these, 144 were had missing data because they had "don't know" or "not applicable" responses to between three and fourteen of the fifteen items aggregated to form the variable, and 948 had missing data because they had "don't know" or "not applicable" responses to all fifteen of the items. Although the ballot and survey version data did not indicate a methodological reason the missing data on these variables, the high number of participants who did not respond to any of the items may indicate an undocumented methodological explanation.

There was not a significant difference in year of GSS administration between those who did have a support for censorship score ($M = 2003.070$) and those who did not ($M = 2002.991$; $t = -0.976$, $df = 3,778$, $p = ns$). Of those who did have a support for censorship score, 53.8% were female and 46.2% were male. Of those who did not have a support for censorship score, 59.7% were female and 40.3% were male. There was not a significant age difference between those who did have a support for censorship score ($M = 46.552$) and those who did not ($M = 46.553$; $t = 0.002$, $df = 3,766$, $p = .998$). Nor was there a significant difference in years of education between those who had support for censorship scores ($M = 13.467$) and those who did not ($M = 13.428$; $t = -0.443$, $df = 3,773$, $p = ns$). However, those who did have support for censorship scores ($M = 8.900$) tended to be less strict in their family values than those who did not ($M = 9.441$; $t = 2.329$, $df = 2,317$, $p < .05$). And those who did have support for censorship

scores ($M = 4.135$) also tended to be less politically conservative than those who did not

($M = 4.482$; $t = 2.550$, $df = 2,721$, $p < .05$).

APPENDIX C

SPSS SYNTAX FOR GSS FAMILY VALUES SCORE

*/// GSS strict father - nurturant parent score algorithm .

*/// Case popular = 5 .

IF (popular = 5)

   stricttest = (5 - obey) + (5 - workhard) + helpoth + thnkself .

EXECUTE .

*/// Case popular = 1 .

IF (popular = 1)

   stricttest = (5 - (obey -1)) + (5 - (workhard - 1)) + (helpoth - 1) + (thnkself - 1) .

EXECUTE .

*/// Case popular = 2 .

IF (popular = 2 AND obey = 1)

   stricttest = (5 - obey) + (5 - (workhard - 1)) + (helpoth - 1) + (thnkself - 1) .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 2 AND workhard = 1)

   stricttest = (5 - (obey -1)) + (5 - workhard) + (helpoth - 1) + (thnkself - 1) .

IF (popular = 2 AND helpoth = 1)

 stricttest = (5 - (obey -1)) + (5 - (workhard - 1)) + helpoth + (thnkself - 1) .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 2 AND thnkself = 1)

   stricttest = (5 - (obey -1)) + (5 - (workhard - 1)) + (helpoth - 1) +thnkself .

EXECUTE .

*/// Case popular = 4 .

IF (popular = 4 AND obey = 5)

   stricttest = (5 - (obey - 1)) + (5 - workhard) + helpoth + thnkself .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 4 AND workhard = 5)

   stricttest = (5 - obey) + (5 - (workhard - 1)) + helpoth + thnkself .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 4 AND helpoth = 5)

   stricttest = (5 - obey) + (5 - workhard) + (helpoth - 1) + thnkself .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 4 AND thnkself = 5)

   stricttest = (5 - obey) + (5 - workhard) + helpoth + (thnkself -1) .

EXECUTE .

*/// Case popular = 3 .

IF (popular = 3 AND (obey =1 OR obey = 2) AND (workhard = 1 OR workhard = 2))

  stricttest = (5-obey) + (5-workhard) + (helpoth - 1) + (thnkself-1) .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 3 AND (obey =1 OR obey = 2) AND (helpoth = 1 OR helpoth = 2))

 stricttest = (5 - obey) + (5 - (workhard - 1)) + helpoth + (thnkself - 1) .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 3 AND (obey =1 OR obey = 2) AND (thnkself = 1 OR thnkself = 2))

 stricttest = (5 - obey) + (5 - (workhard - 1)) + (helpoth - 1) + thnkself .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 3 AND (workhard =1 OR workhard = 2) AND (helpoth = 1 OR helpoth = 2))

 stricttest = (5 - (obey - 1)) + (5 - workhard) + helpoth + (thnkself - 1) .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 3 AND (workhard =1 OR workhard = 2) AND (thnkself = 1 OR thnkself = 2))

 stricttest = (5 - (obey - 1)) + (5 - workhard) + (helpoth - 1) + thnkself .

EXECUTE .

IF (popular = 3 AND (helpoth =1 OR helpoth = 2) AND (thnkself = 1 OR thnkself = 2))

 stricttest = (5 - (obey - 1)) + (5 - (workhard-1)) + helpoth + thnkself .

EXECUTE .

VARIABLE LABELS stricttest 'nurturance – strictness in family values score'.

APPENDIX D

MISII ITEMS, FREQUENCIES, SCALE ITEM RELATIONSHIPS,

AND MISSING DATA

All analyses are for all cases in each MISII data set unless otherwise specified.

The full data set consisted of 1,067 cases.

D.1 Methodological and Demographics

D.1.1 Censorship question condition.

Least-liked group: 25.5%

People with prime: 24.8%

People without prime: 24.5%

People like you: 25.2%

D.1.2 Sex. Are you male or female?

All data

Female: 54.3%

Male: 45.7%

Least-liked group

Female: 51.5%

Male: 48.5%

People with prime

        Female: 57.0%

        Male: 43.0%

People without prime

        Female: 52.9%

        Male: 47.1%

People like you

        Female: 55.8%

        Male: 44.2%

D.1.3 Age. How old were you on your last birthday?

All data

        Ages ranged from 18 to 85.

Least-liked group

        Ages ranged from 18 to 85.

People with prime

        Ages ranged from 18 to 85.

People without prime

        Ages ranged from 18 to 81.

People like you

        Ages ranged from 18 to 85.

D.1.4 Education. What is the highest year or grade of school you completed?

All data

Eighth grade or lower: 1.5%

Some high school: 7.2%

High school graduate or GED: 30.3%

Some college: 28.4%

College graduate: 19.7%

Some graduate work or graduate degree: 12.7%

Don't know: 0.1%

Refused: 0.2%

Least-liked group

Eighth grade or lower: 1.1%

Some high school: 8.1%

High school graduate or GED: 32.4%

Some college: 30.5%

College graduate: 19.1%

Some graduate work or graduate degree: 8.5%

Don't know: 0.0%

Refused: 0.4%

People with prime

Eighth grade or lower: 1.1%

Some high school: 6.8%

High school graduate or GED: 31.3%

Some college: 27.5%

College graduate: 18.5%

Some graduate work or graduate degree: 14.7%

Don't know: 0.0%

Refused: 0.0%

People without prime

Eighth grade or lower: 3.1%

Some high school: 7.3%

High school graduate or GED: 33.0%

Some college: 24.5%

College graduate: 18.4%

Some graduate work or graduate degree: 13.0%

Don't know: 0.0%

Refused: 0.0%

People like you

       Eighth grade or lower: 0.7%

       Some high school: 6.7%

       High school graduate or GED: 24.5%

       Some college: 30.9%

       College graduate: 22.7%

       Some graduate work or graduate degree: 13.8%

       Don't know: 0.4%

       Refused: 0.4%

D.2 Family Values

Our next questions are about children. I'm going to read pairs of qualities that one might try to encourage in children. As I read each pair, please tell me which one you think is more important to encourage in a child.

D.2.1 Obey or responsible. If you absolutely had to choose, would you say that it is more important that a child obeys his parents, or that he is responsible for his own actions?

All data

       Obey: 62.2%

       Responsible for actions: 35.1%

       Volunteered both equally important: 2.1%

       Don't know: 0.5%

       Refused: 0.2%

Least-liked group

    Obey: 61.8%

    Responsible for actions: 34.9%

    Volunteered both equally important: 1.1%

    Don't know: 1.5%

    Refused: 0.7%

People with prime

    Obey: 61.5%

    Responsible for actions: 36.2%

    Volunteered both equally important: 2.3%

    Don't know: 0.0%

    Refused: 0.0%

People without prime

    Obey: 66.3%

    Responsible for actions: 31.4%

    Volunteered both equally important: 2.3%

    Don't know: 0.0%

    Refused: 0.0%

People like you

       Obey: 59.5%

       Responsible for actions: 37.5%

       Volunteered both equally important: 2.6%

       Don't know: 0.4%

       Refused: 0.0%

D.2.2 Respect for elders or think for self. Is it more important that a child has respect for his elders, or that he thinks for himself?

All data

       Respect for elders: 71.9%

       Thinks for himself: 24.7%

       Volunteered both equally important: 3.3%

       Don't know: 0.1%

       Refused: 0.0%

Least-liked group

       Respect for elders: 71.7%

       Thinks for himself: 23.5%

       Volunteered both equally important: 4.4%

       Don't know: 0.4%

       Refused: 0.0%

People with prime

        Respect for elders: 67.9%

        Thinks for himself: 29.1%

        Volunteered both equally important: 3.0%

        Don't know: 0.0%

        Refused: 0.0%

People without prime

        Respect for elders: 73.6%

        Thinks for himself: 23.4%

        Volunteered both equally important: 3.1%

        Don't know: 0.0%

        Refused: 0.0%

People like you

        Respect for elders: 74.3%

        Thinks for himself: 23.0%

        Volunteered both equally important: 2.6%

        Don't know: 0.0%

        Refused: 0.0%

D.2.3 Conscience or rules. Is it more important that a child follows his own conscience, or that he follows the rules?

All data

>Follows own conscience: 26.1%

>Follows the rules: 70.5%

>Volunteered both equally important: 3.4%

>Don't know: 0.0%

>Refused: 0.1%

Least-liked group

>Follows own conscience: 23.5%

>Follows the rules: 72.1%

>Volunteered both equally important: 4.0%

>Don't know: 0.0%

>Refused: 0.4%

People with prime

>Follows own conscience: 26.8%

>Follows the rules: 69.4%

>Volunteered both equally important: 3.8%

>Don't know: 0.0%

>Refused: 0.0%

People without prime

    Follows own conscience: 25.3%

    Follows the rules: 72.0%

    Volunteered both equally important: 2.7%

    Don't know: 0.0%

    Refused: 0.0%

People like you

    Follows own conscience: 28.6%

    Follows the rules: 68.4%

    Volunteered both equally important: 3.0%

    Don't know: 0.0%

    Refused: 0.0%

D.3 Political Ideology.

All data

Strong liberal: 8.0%

Not very strong liberal: 8.4%

More like a liberal: 8.2%

Moderate: 2.4%

More like a conservative: 11.6%

Not very strong conservative: 13.0%

Strong conservative: 13.8%

Haven't thought about it much: 34.3%

Don't know: 0.2%

Refused: 0.1%

Least-liked group

Strong liberal: 7.4%

Not very strong liberal: 8.1%

More like a liberal: 7.4%

Moderate: 1.8%

More like a conservative: 11.8%

Not very strong conservative: 14.7%

Strong conservative: 11.8%

Haven't thought about it much: 37.1%

Don't know: 0.0%

Refused: 0.0%

People with prime

 Strong liberal: 8.3%

 Not very strong liberal: 9.1%

 More like a liberal: 8.7%

 Moderate: 2.3%

 More like a conservative: 12.1%

 Not very strong conservative: 12.5%

 Strong conservative: 15.8%

 Haven't thought about it much: 31.3%

 Don't know: 0.0%

 Refused: 0.0%

People without prime

 Strong liberal: 7.7%

 Not very strong liberal: 8.4%

 More like a liberal: 9.2%

 Moderate: 3.1%

 More like a conservative: 9.6%

 Not very strong conservative: 13.0%

 Strong conservative: 14.6%

 Haven't thought about it much: 33.7%

 Don't know: 0.8%

 Refused: 0.0%

People like you

        Strong liberal: 8.6%

        Not very strong liberal: 8.2%

        More like a liberal: 7.4%

        Moderate: 2.6%

        More like a conservative: 13.0%

        Not very strong conservative: 11.9%

        Strong conservative: 13.0%

        Haven't thought about it much: 34.9%

        Don't know: 0.0%

        Refused: 0.4%

D.4 Support for Censorship Scale

As I read each of the following statements, please tell me how much you agree or disagree.

How about "[least-liked group / people / people like you] should be allowed to make a speech in your city to protest against the government?"

Least-liked group

        Agree strongly: 19.9%

        Agree somewhat: 26.5%

        Disagree somewhat: 12.9%

        Disagree strongly: 39.0%

        Don't know: 1.1%

        Refused: 0.7%

People with prime

       Agree strongly: 39.6%

       Agree somewhat: 39.6%

       Disagree somewhat: 10.9%

       Disagree strongly: 9.8%

       Don't know: 0.0%

       Refused: 0.0%

People without prime

       Agree strongly: 52.9%

       Agree somewhat: 31.4%

       Disagree somewhat: 10.3%

       Disagree strongly: 5.4%

       Don't know: 0.0%

       Refused: 0.0%

People like you

       Agree strongly: 59.9%

       Agree somewhat: 30.1%

       Disagree somewhat: 6.3%

       Disagree strongly: 3.7%

       Don't know: 0.0%

       Refused: 0.0%

Rally. How about "[least-liked group / people / people like you] should be allowed to hold public rallies in your city to protest against the government?"

Least-liked group

Agree strongly: 16.9%

Agree somewhat: 25.0%

Disagree somewhat: 14.7%

Disagree strongly: 42.6%

Don't know: 0.4%

Refused: 0.4%

People with prime

Agree strongly: 32.5%

Agree somewhat: 41.1%

Disagree somewhat: 12.5%

Disagree strongly: 13.2%

Don't know: 0.4%

Refused: 0.4%

People without prime

Agree strongly: 40.2%

Agree somewhat: 38.7%

Disagree somewhat: 12.6%

Disagree strongly: 7.7%

Don't know: 0.4%

Refused: 0.4%

People like you

    Agree strongly: 47.2%

    Agree somewhat: 35.7%

    Disagree somewhat: 10.8%

    Disagree strongly: 5.9%

    Don't know: 0.4%

    Refused: 0.0%

Burn flag. How about "[least-liked group / people / people like you] should be allowed to burn the American flag to protest against the government?"

Least-liked group

    Agree strongly: 5.5%

    Agree somewhat: 6.2%

    Disagree somewhat: 7.0%

    Disagree strongly: 80.5%

    Don't know: 0.4%

    Refused: 0.4%

People with prime

    Agree strongly: 6.0%

    Agree somewhat: 9.1%

    Disagree somewhat: 9.8%

    Disagree strongly: 75.1%

    Don't know: 0.0%

    Refused: 0.0%

People without prime

Agree strongly: 7.7%

Agree somewhat: 9.2%

Disagree somewhat: 8.0%

Disagree strongly: 75.1%

Don't know: 0.0%

Refused: 0.0%

People like you

Agree strongly: 9.7%

Agree somewhat: 7.1%

Disagree somewhat: 7.1%

Disagree strongly: 76.2%

Don't know: 0.0%

Refused: 0.0%

D.5 Scale Item Relationships

In the MISII data sets family values and support for censorship were both assessed with multiple items. Because the family values items were ultimately coded dichotomously, chi-square was used to determine the relationships between items. Though the responses option sets for the support for censorship scale items were technically ordinal, responses were treated as ratio data, so Pearson's r was used to determine the relationships between these items. Table D.1 shows the chi-square values for the relationships between family values scale items for the full MISSII data set and data in each of the censorship question conditions. Table D.2 shows the Pearson's

correlations between the support for censorship items in each of the support for censorship conditions.

D.6 Missing Data

As shown above, 34.3% of the MISII respondents indicated that the hadn't thought about their political ideology much, 0.2% said that they didn't know what their political ideology was, and 0.1% refused to self identify in terms of political ideology. This was the only major source of missing data for the MISII data set.

In the MISII data set as a whole, there was not a significant relationship between whether political ideology data were missing and support for censorship question condition ($\chi^2 = 2.093$, $df = 3$, $p = $ ns). Of those who did self identify ideologically, 50.4% were female and 49.6% were male. Of those who did not self identify ideologically, 61.5% were female and 38.5% were male. Those who did self identify ($M = 46.552$) tended to be older than those who did not ($M = 43.749$; $t = -2.596$, $df = 1,059$, $p < .05$). Those who did self identify ($M = 4.273$) also tended to have more education than those who did not ($M = 3.360$; $t = -12.684$, $df = 1,062$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, in the MISII data set overall, those who self identified ideologically ($M = .648$) tended to have less strict family values than those who did not ($M = .808$; $t = 7.221$, $df = 1,060$, $p < .001$).

In the least-liked group support for censorship condition 47.4% of those who did self identify ideologically were female, and 52.6% were male. Of those who did not self identify ideologically, 58.4% were female and 41.6% were male. There was not a statistically significant age difference ($t = -1.175$, $df = 269$, $p = $ ns) between those who did and did not self identify ideologically. However, those who did self identify

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Item	Obey or responsible	Respect for elders or think for self
All data		
Respect for elders or		
think for self	270.357****	--
Conscience or rules	88.711****	109.824****
Least-liked group		
Respect for elders or		
think for self	54.823****	--
Conscience or rules	33.418****	19.106****
People with prime		
Respect for elders or		
think for self	91.818****	--
Conscience or rules	23.896****	33.334****
People without prime		
Respect for elders or		
think for self	59.289****	--
Conscience or rules	19.026****	26.181****
People like you		
Respect for elders or		
think for self	66.109****	--
Conscience or rules	14.631****	31.872****

Table D.1

Chi-squares for MISII Family Values Items

For all chi-square *df* = 1.

* *p* < .05. ** *p* < .01. *** *p* < .005. **** *p* < .001

Item	Speech	Rally
Least-liked group		
Rally	.863****	--
Burn flag	.449****	.480****
People with prime		
Rally	.799****	--
Burn flag	.337****	.387****
People without prime		
Rally	.686****	--
Burn flag	.324****	.334****
People like you		
Rally	.641****	--
Burn flag	.238****	.315****

Table D.2

Correlations for MISII Support for Censorship Items

* *p* < .05. ** *p* < .01. *** *p* < .005. **** *p* < .001

(M = 4.199) tended to have more education than those who did not (M = 3.230; t = -7.530, df = 269, p < .001). Those who self identified (M = .647) tended to be less strict in their family values than those who did not (M = .814; t = 3.884, df = 270, p < .001). And those who self identified (M = 2.862) tended to be less supportive of censorship than those who did not (M = 3.425; t = 5.080, df = 269, p < .001) in the least-liked group support for censorship question condition.

In the people with prime support for censorship condition 53.3% of the participants who self identified ideologically were female and 46.7% were male. Of those who did not self identify, 65.1% were female and 34.9% were male. Those who did self identify (M = 47.407) tended to be older than those who did not (M = 42.855; t = -2.011, df = 263, p < .05). Those who did self identify (M = 4.286) tended to have more education than those who did not (M = 3.361; t = -6.153, df = 263, p < .001). Those who did self identify (M = .638) tended to be less strict in their family values than those who did not (M = .795; t = 3.296, df = 261, p < .005). And those who did self identify (M = 2.388) also tended to be less supportive of censorship than those who did not (M = 2.773; t = 3.823, df = 263, p < .001) in the people with prime support for censorship question condition.

In the people without prime support for censorship condition, 48.0% of those who self identified ideologically were female and 52.0% were male. Of those who did not self identify ideologically, 62.2% were female and 37.8% were male. There was not a significant age difference (t = -0.871, df = 257, p = ns) between those who self identified and those who did not. However, those who did self identify (M =4.216)

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tended to have more education than those who did not ($M = 3.278$; $t = -6.022$, $df = 259$, $p < .001$). Those who did self identify ($M = .668$) tended to have less strict family values than those who did not ($M = .837$; $t = 3.939$, $df = 258$, $p < .001$). And those who did self identify ideologically ($M = 2.219$) also tended to support censorship less than those who did not ($M = 2.615$; $t = 4.362$, $df = 259$, $p < .001$) in the people without prime support for censorship question condition.

In the people like you support for censorship condition, 52.9% of those who did self identify ideologically were female and 47.1% were male. Of those who did not self identify ideologically 61.1% were female and 38.9% were male. There was not a significant age difference ($t = -1.072$, $df = 264$, $p = ns$) between those who did self identify and those who did not. However, those who did self identify ($M = 4.387$) tended to have more education than those who did not ($M = 3.574$; $t = -5.754$, $df = 265$, $p < .001$). Those who did self identify ideologically ($M = .642$) tended to be less strict in their family values than those who did not ($M = .787$; $t = 3.286$, $df = 265$, $p < .005$). And those who did self identify ($M = 2.165$) also tended to be less supportive of censorship than those who did not ($M = 2.451$; $t = 3.371$, $df = 267$, $p < .005$).

APPENDIX E

DEMOGRAPHICS AND SUPPORT FOR CENSORSHIP

Though not the focus of this dissertation, the most frequently and consistently reported empirical findings on support for censorship in the research literature involve demographic and socioeconomic variables. As shown by Andsager, et al. (2004), a little knowledge of social context demographic and socioeconomic variables can tell researchers a lot about how people who hold different levels of status and security in a society respond to controversial communication. After extensive research on support for censorship in five different democratic publics, Andsager et al. (2004) conclude that

> The data presented here and the history of political behavior suggest what is referred to here as the *power expression protection theory*. That is, the socially empowered within a culture … possess the social standing accorded by income, education, gender, age (and, in some cases, ethnicity and religion) to protect the system by guarding against expression that may upset the balance of society either by inciting dissent among the public or enacting legislative changes. Decades of data … provide support for this theory. (pp. 259-260)

In this appendix, I provide a brief overview of the findings of research on support for censorship regarding the demographic variables *sex*, *age*, and *education*, and then

analyze my three data sets in order to determine how those relationships play out therein.

E.1 Sex

Research has consistently identified sex differences in support for censorship. Specifically, women tend to support censorship more than men (e.g. Andsager et al., 2004; Chia et al., 2004; Chong, 2006; Fisher et al.,1994; Golebiowska, 1999; Gunther, 1995; Hense & Wright, 1992; Hoffner, Buchanan, Anderson, Hubbs, Kamigaki, Kowalczyk, et al. 1999; Lambe, 2002, 2004; Lee & Tamborini, 2005; Lo & Wei, 2002; McLeod et al., 2001; Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001; Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; Shah et al., 1999). However, there have also been a few studies wherein the evidence did not support the existence of a relationship between gender and support for censorship (e.g. Atkin, Jeffres, Neuendorf, 1997; Bedard & Gertz, 2000; Bennett, Rhine, & Flickinger, 2000; McLeod et al., 1997; Salwen, 1998; Salwen & Driscoll, 1997; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999).

E.2 Age

People who are older tend to support censorship more than those who are younger (e.g. Bedard & Gertz, 2000; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Chong, 2006; Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Ellison & Musick, 1993; Fisher et al., 1999; Gilderbloom & Markham, 1995; Golebiowska, 1999; Hoffner et al., 1999; Hunter, 1984; Karpov, 1999a, 1999b; Lambe, 2002, 2004; McCutcheon, 1985; Moore & Ovadia, 2006; Nathanson, Eveland, Park, & Paul, 2002; Peffley et al., 2001; Persell et al., 2001; Reimer & Park, 2001; Rojas et al. 1996; Salwen & Driscoll, 1997; Shah et al., 1999; Tuntiya, 2005; Wyatt, Smith, & Andsager, 1996).

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E.3 Education

More education tends to be associated with less support for censorship (e.g.

Moore & Ovadia, 2006; Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Green & Waxman, 1987; Karpov

1999a, 1999b; Davis, 1995; Chanley, 1994; Norrander & Raymond, 1998; Salwen &

Driscoll, 1997; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Salwen, 1998; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999; Tuntiya,

2005; Irwin & Thompson, 1977; Ellison & Musick, 1993; Chaffee et al., 1997;

Gilderbloom & Markham, 1995; Lambe, 2002; Peffley et al., 2001; Weber, 2003; Wyatt

et al., 1996; McCutcheon, 1985; Golebiowska, 1999; Reimer & Park, 2001; Well,

1982).

E.4 Regression Analysis

Table E.1 shows the regression coefficients estimating support for censorship

from the demographic variables in each of the data sets analyzed for this dissertation.

In the student (b = -0.151, p < .001), GSS (b = -0.041, p < .001), and MISII (b = -0.275,

p < .001) data sets, men tended to support censorship less than women. Age was not

included in the student equation due to the homogeneity of the participants in that data

set with regard to that variable, but in the GSS (b = 0.003, p < .001) and MISII (b =

0.010, p < .001) data sets older individuals tended to be more supportive of censorship.

Students with higher GPAs (b = -0.222, p < .005), and GSS (b = -0.194, p < .001) and

MISII (b = -0.194, p < .001) participants with more education all tended to be less

supportive of censorship.

The relationships predicted by Andsager et al's (2005) *power expression*

protection theory between support for censorship and demographics played out

consistently as expected in the data sets examined for this dissertation.

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Variable	Students	GSS	MISII
Constant	3.399****	0.769	2.728****
MISII Condition			
Least-liked group	--	--	0.642****
People with prime	--	--	0.158*
People like you	--	--	-0.031
GSS year	--	0.000	--
Male	-0.151**	-0.041****	-0.275****
Age	--	0.003****	0.010****
GPA/education	-0.222***	-0.033****	-0.194****
Adjusted R^2	.046	.146	.244

Table E.1

Unstandardized OLS Regression Coefficients

Dependent: support for censorship, high scores indicate more support

p < .05. **p* < .01. ****p* < .005.