

**THE 4.3 INCIDENT:
BACKGROUND, DEVELOPMENT, AND PACIFICATION,
1945 - 1949**

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the background and the development of the 4.3 Incident in South Korea. The 4.3 Incident was an insurgency that lasted nine years in Cheju-do off the Korea peninsula from April 3, 1948. The Cheju Communists took the political initiative based on their long lasting anti-Japanese movement and the late establishment of the local Military Government in Chejudo after the liberation in 1945. The Cheju Communists played roles of a de facto government in the island, and passed the General Strike and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion of 1946 because of their independence from a national Communist organization.

However, with the installation of provincial system on the island in late 1946 and the creation of the South Korea Labor Party (SKLP), the Cheju Communists transformed from workers of the de facto government to the members of a political party. The Military Government and the Cheju Communists began to confront each other after the memorial service of the March 1 Movement in 1947. Under the increasing pressure of the Military Government, young Cheju Communist leaders became determined to rise against the Military Government, and the Chollanam-do SKLP exploited their intention to sabotage the general election on May 10, 1948.

The disturbances in the beginning phase of the 4.3 Incident were common disturbances led by decentralized SKLP organizations. However, due to the strong

reactions of the Military Government, the Cheju Communists evolved from street fighters to guerrilla warriors. With the intervention of the Central SKLP, the guerrillas were reorganized into a Soviet Military style, and Dalsam Kim, the guerrilla leader, evacuated the island and became a representative of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea.

The Military Government, at first, tried to resolve the disturbance by police operations and peace talks. Then, the Military Government understood the insurgency as guerrilla warfare. The Korean Constabulary took the responsibility of the pacification under the command of U.S. officers. After the establishment of South Korean government and the intervention of the Central SKLP, the insurgency turned into a war between South Korea and North Korea. The 4.3 Incident was the first round of the Korean War.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation has confirmed the promise of God that the Lord is my shepherd, I shall not be in want (Psalms 23:1). God led me to study history, sent me great people to help me, and filled my life with his wonderful love. I appreciate God everything what he did for me and for this dissertation.

As a professional soldier of the Republic of Korea Army, I would like to express my appreciation to relevant individuals of the Army Headquarters for providing me with enough time for study and financial support. I also give my special thanks to Colonel Changil Ohn at the Korea Military Academy and Colonel Namsung Huh at the Korea National Defense University. They recommended me to begin the study and never ceased to encourage me.

I owe great help to the professors in the Department of History at the Ohio State University. Dr. Mark Grimsley and Dr. John F. Guilmartin have always given me insights on military affairs in world history. Dr. David Stebenne and Dr. James R. Bartholomew have guided me to the deep understandings of modern United States and modern Japan. A special mention should go to Dr. Allan R. Millett, my adviser. He always inspired me with constructive criticism on my ideas and his endless pursuit for the truth of the Korean War. At the same time, he eagerly helped me to correct my writings. My two friends, Jungtae Kim and Eric Gulley, should be thanked for their efforts to enhance my English writing.

I have been indebted to many people including my family members during the five-year-long study. Pastor Geunsang Lee and his wife Sarah Lee have prayed for me and my wife and taken care of us like their son and daughter. Brothers and sisters in the Korean Church of Columbus, specifically the members of Buckeye Christian Fellows and KCC College and Career Group gave me their endless love in Lord God. My two sons, Kiju and Kiseok and nephew Uooseob Kang have been the messengers of God, who gives me joy and peace. My parents, brother, mother-in-law, brother-in-laws, and sister-in-laws encouraged me to continue to study in a foreign country. Finally, my wife, Kwang Ja Seo has supported me with everything she could do. Her love and prayer made this dissertation possible.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Abstract | Page ii |
| Acknowledgments | iv |
| Vita | vi |
| List of Tables | vii |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTERS | |
| 1. LIBERATION AND TRANSFORMATION | 16 |
| 2. CREATION OF THE CHEJUDO PEOPLE’S COMMITTEE | 50 |
| 3. FACING EACH OTHER: THE BIRTH OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE..... | 86 |
| 4. RUNNING AGAINST EACH OTHER: RISING TENSION AND THE COMING CRISIS | 128 |
| 5. GUERRILLA WARFARE AND PACIFICATION | 171 |
| 6. A WAR BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA | 210 |
| CONCLUSION | 244 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 257 |
| APPENDIX | |
| MAPS | 266 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | Page |
|----------------------------------------------|------|
| 1. Persons connected to Cheju Yacheica | 68 |

LIST OF MAPS

| Map | Page |
|---------------------------|------|
| 1. Korea | 267 |
| 2. Cheju-do in 1948 | 268 |

INTRODUCTION

The 4.3 Incident, a Communist rebellion on April 3, 1948 on Cheju Island, ended with the surrender of the last guerrilla on April 2, 1957. The nine-year- long incident ended 15,000 lives on Cheju-do, devastated the island in the physical sense, and left deep scars within modern Cheju society. Many islanders lost family members, relatives, homes, farms, and other businesses by hands of Communist guerrillas or government forces.

The incident was the longest and most violent insurgency after the liberation of 1945. The Autumn Harvest Rebellion of 1946 and Yosu Rebellion in 1948 ended after a few months, and even the Korean War lasted only three years. At the same time, the casualties of the 4.3 Incident surpassed those of the two rebellions.

Three issues concerning the 4.3 Incident are significant to address. First, as Allan R. Millett asserts in his book, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning*, the 4.3 Incident was the beginning of the Korean War. The 4.3 Incident, guerrilla warfare between Communists, represented by the South Korea Labor party, and nationalist government supported by right wing groups in continued North Korean tanks crossed the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950. With the outbreak of the 4.3 Incident and the Yosu Rebellion, the SKLP changed its direction of movements from legal political action and illegal subversion to armed resistance to the Military Government and the Republic of Korea (ROK) from August 1948. After Chejudo, the regions of Chiri Mountains, the

Odae Mountains, and the border between North and South Korea turned into battle grounds.

Second, the 4.3 Incident shows how the Cold War was conducted in a backward' decolonized area. In Cheju Island, the Cold War ideology fused with the local residents' political identification. Due to Communist movements over decades, pushed by local elites to gain independence from Japan, indigenous people regarded Communism as their ideology. Anti-Communist nationalism and capitalism advocated by the Military Government officials, Korea National Police and paramilitary groups, was a foreign ideology that came from mainland. In the eyes of the majority of Chejudoans, the 4.3 Incident was the struggle between their local political values and an alien ideology from the mainland.

Finally, this incident is a typical case of communal violence, which has been rampant in modern Korean history. Conflict between two different ideological groups, the cruel treatment of people by governmental officers, murder and retaliation, merciless suppressive operations of governmental forces against the people's forces, and atrocities by each side fill the story of the 4.3 Incident. The Koreans experienced a cycle of violence from the liberation in 1945 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. The incident can be studied as a model of the violence in Korean society.

Students of the 4.3 Incident focus on several controversial questions. First, they have tried to identify a main culprit who provoked the insurrection. Until late 1980s, spearheaded by Korean government, most studies suspected the central organization of the SKLP of directing the insurgency through the Chejudo SKLP. Bonghyun Kim and Minju Kim, who fled to Japan during the incident after short involvement and wrote

Chejudo Inminduru 4.3 Mujang Tujaengsa [The History of Armed Resistance of Chejudo People] (1963), spearheaded leftist studies that criticized the Korea National Police (KNP) and the North West Young Men's Association (NWYMA) for starting the revolt by their harsh treatment, brutality, and torture of the islanders. The leftist studies argue the Communist perspective that local Cheju SKLP leaders decided to rise against police suppression without outside orders.

Second, most researchers deal with the responsibilities of North Korea and the United States. Rightist studies contended that North Korea supported the efforts of Chejudo guerrillas by sending military experts, equipment, and supplies. This suspicion began during the incident with the United States Armed Forces In Korea (USAFIK) *G-2 Reports*. On the other hand, leftist works suggest that U.S. Army advisors were responsible for the operations of the Korean Constabulary regiments on the island during the incident, which produced massive casualties and huge economic damage. Recently, with the disclosure of Lt. Col. Ikryol Kim's memoirs, an account of his service as the commander of the 9th Constabulary Regiment right after the break of the incident, the U.S. military officials were blamed as an architect of scorched earth operations.

Finally, the level of violence of the incident has been one of the major foci. Studies present vivid explanations about atrocities committed by Communists and government troops. Specifically, "genocide" by the KNP and the Constabulary became a continuing issue. Studies from the perspective of the SKLP emphasize that the governmental forces inflicted colossal costs on lives and property upon the islanders. On the other hand, rightist researchers indicate that atrocities by the Communists initiated the process of mutual massacre.

Studies of the incident were little conducted until the late 1980s. Because of the strong anti-Communism governments after the end of the Korean War, scholars could not easily explore all dimensions of the incident without violating the Korean National Security Act (1948), which criminalized criticism. Few objective military history books and articles about Communism in South Korea could deal with the incident before the end of 1980s. The treatments of the incident in the books that were published were limited to operational military history, although not in detail. The history of the Communist movement in modern Korean history was only critical. *Gongbiyeonhyuk* [The Story of Guerrillas] (1971) from the Republic of Korea Army is an example of a military history book, and Namsik Kim's *Namrodang Yeongu* [The Study of the South Korea Labor Party] (1985) typifies the studies of Communist movement in Korea.

However, even in this period, there were some important efforts to study the incident. Jeomgon Kim revealed his point of view on the incident as on anti-Communist crusade in 1973, and John Merrill studied the incident for his M.A. thesis in 1975 by using newly-opened records of the U.S. Army. In addition, Bonghyun Kim and Minju Kim left a study covering the whole story of the incident based on the accounts of participants of the incident in Japan in 1963.

Jeomgon Kim represented right wing's view of the incident in his book *Hanguk JeonJaenggwa Nodongdang Jeonryak* [The Korean War and the Strategy of Labor Party] (1973). He argued that the SKLP exploited tensions between the islanders and the American military government. According to his book, the islanders complained about the cruel treatment by the Korean police and its auxiliary forces upon the islanders, and the Communist party encouraged the people to rise against the American military

government and to sabotage an election for the establishment of a separated government. However, based on the general strategy of the SKLP and the isolated geographic location of Chejudo, Kim questioned the involvement of the central SKLP at the beginning of the 4.3 Incident.

In “The Cheju-do Rebellion,” John Merrill argued that the incident happened not by the central command of the SKLP, but by the spontaneous action of the islanders. He saw the incident in the historical context of the island, which resisted central authorities for centuries. The thesis explicitly stated that the incident was designed by local Communists and explained the large casualties as a product of the government force’s coercive operations. His thesis played a role in introducing the incident to Western society and also had significance as it tapped the records of U.S. military government in Korea, though the use of such records was limited.

In the book *Chejudo Inminduru 4.3 Mujang Tujaengsa* [The History of Armed Resistance of Chejudo People] (Osaka, 1963) which contained many guerilla accounts, Bonghyun Kim and Minju Kim insisted that the incident was caused by a confrontation between islanders and American military government that began on March 1, 1947. They characterized the incident as anti-foreign and self-determination movement. They emphasized that the incident was planned and executed by local members of the SKLP. This book and Bonghyun Kim’s later book, *Chejudo Hyului Yeoksa* [The Bloody History of Cheju Island] (Tokyo, 1977) contains details of the guerrilla activities and the atrocities of the governmental forces that produced large casualties during the incident.

The study of the incident reached a major turning point in 1989 with the foundation of the Sasam Yeonguso or Cheju 4.3 Research Institute. The institute

collected materials about the incident by interviewing the victims, gathering newspapers of the time, excavating remains from execution sites, and investigating U.S. military records at the National Archives in Washington D.C. Based on these materials, the 4.3 Research Institute published about twenty books and research materials. *Ijesa Malhamsuda I, II* [Now I Have Talked] (1989), *Mudeomeseo Saranaon 4.3 Suhyungjadul* [The 4.3 Prisoners Who Survived from Tombs] (2002), *Irobeorin Mauleul Chajaseo* [Looking for Lost Villages] (1998) are personal accounts that can be used as primary sources. In addition, the institute issued *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident], a monthly journal that included, reports of historical sites, and articles for several years.

At the same time, the *Jemin Ilbo* played a significant role in discovering materials about the incident. The *Jemin Ilbo*, a Chejudo based newspaper, printed a series of articles related to the incident for ten years. The reporters of the newspaper collected verbal records from about 6,000 persons, disclosed important documents, investigated important sites of the incident, and collected basic materials from the NARA II. The articles were published as a five volume book from 1994: *4.3eun Malhanda* [The 4.3 Talks].

Another big turning point in the 4.3 study was the creation of a government supported research commission and the publication of its *Truth Report of the 4.3 Incident*. The results of the strong lobbying by the Chejudo people to recover their honor, the Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honor of Victims was established under the supervision of a prime minister in 2000 by the Daejung Kim government, known for its liberal sympathies. The commission published *Truth Report of the 4.3*

Incident in 2003. It was one of major efforts of South Korean government to reestablish modern Korean history on the basis of “venting grudges” of the victims by “unjust violence.” The commission revealed its findings in the United States at Harvard University’s Korean Institute.

The report contributed to the studies of the incident in several ways. First, the report clearly established that the beginning of the incident was waged by local Communists, based on the testimony of participants in a key leadership meeting before the incident. Secondly, the commission produced a vast collection of basic materials about the incident. The collections include three volumes of newspapers, three volumes of governmental records, and five volumes of U.S. Army materials. Finally, the report opened the way of honoring and compensating the victims by characterizing the incident as governmental violence toward innocent civilians.

Young Korean scholars took the advantage of the works of the Cheju 4.3 Research Institute and the commission for their research. Most of researchers adopted the revisionism about the incident. Hangweon Yang, Myeongrim Park, Hojun Heo, and others wrote their M.A. theses about the incident, and Jeongsim Yang completed her Ph. D. dissertation in 2005.

In his thesis, “Chejudo 4.3 Pokdongegwanhan Yeongu” [A Study about the 4.3 Insurgency] (Seoul National University, 1988), Hangweon Yang revealed that the incident was the result of the interaction between historical tradition of resistance to central government and extremely hard socio-economic conditions. He attached importance of the weak industrial structure and the social instability in Chejudo as factors

which contributed to the incident. His thesis did not offer enough analysis of the role of the American military government.

Myeongrim Park, now a prominent professor at Yonsei University, contended that the incident was organized by local Communists to prevent the success of the national elections of 1948 in his thesis, “Chejudo 4.3 Minjunhangjaenge Gwanhan Yeongu” [The Study of 4.3 Civil Uprising] (Korea University, 1988). He argued that the people in Chejudo had a long tradition of self-determination. Severe political suppression and economic hardship in 1945-1948 drove the people to rebel against the government. His analysis of the incident focused on the characteristics of leaders of the rebellion as his thesis disclosed detailed information about the Communists in Chejudo and their activities during the Japanese occupation of Korea well before the incident.

Hojun Heo argued that the USAMGIK was responsible for the heavy casualties in his thesis, “Cheju 4.3ui Jeongae Gwajeonggwa Migunjeongui Daeung Jeonryak Yeongu” [The Study of the Developmental Process of the 4.3 Incident and the Strategy of the American Military Government] (Cheju University, 2003). He insisted that the USAMGIK was eager to build an anti-Communist regime on the Korean Peninsula and allowed heavy casualties of civilians inflicted by Korean Constabulary and Korean National Police.

Okgum Ham focused on the process of the scorched earth operations and the responsibility of the USAMGIK at that time in her thesis, “4.3ui Chotohwa Jakjeongwa Daeryang Haksalegwanhan Yeongu” [A Study about Scorched Earth Operations and the Huge Casualties of the 4.3 Incident] (Cheju University, 2004). She described the detailed pacification operations by governmental forces and argued that the USAMGIK played a

key role in adopting depopulation and scorched earth operations. She argued that the USAMGIK intended to execute scorched operations from the initial phase of the incident. However, her thesis has some shortcomings by relying on only one source for her critical argument, Lt. Col. Ikryul Kim's posthumous memoir of his command of the Korean 9th Regiment.¹

Recently, Jeongsim Yang defined the 4.3 Incident as a righteous resistance movement to an anti-national South Korean government in her dissertation, "Cheju 4.3 Hangjaeng Yeongu" [The Study of the 4.3 Resistance] (Seonggyungwan University, 2005). She indicated that the *Truth Report of the 4.3 Incident* only succeeded in recovering the honor of 4.3 victims by characterizing the incident as a "sacrifice by governmental power," but it failed to disclose that the uprising was the just resistance to an illegitimate South Korean government. At the same time, her dissertation offered a well-crafted description about the culture of the island, information of individuals, relations of groups, movements, and the social conditions of the time.

The book *4.3eun Malhandha* [4.3 Talks] from the *Jemin Ilbo* in 1989 reconstructed the incident in accordance with the stories of the victims and documents of the USAMGIK and the Republic of Korea. It emphasized that the incident was governmental violence toward innocent victims. Several books offering the testimony of victims makes the same argument: *Ijesa Malhamsuda* I, II [Now I Have Talked] (1989), *Irobeorin Mauleul Chajaseo* [Looking for Lost Villages] (1998), and *Mudeomeseo Saranaon 4.3 Suhyungjadul* [The 4.3 Prisoners Who Survived from Tombs] (2002).

¹ See Ikryul Kim, "4.3ui Jinsil [The Truth of the 4.3 Incident]," Jemin Ilbo, ed., *4.3un Malhandha*, vol. 2 [The 4.3 Talks] (Seoul: Jeonyewon, 1994), 271-357.

Sanggyun Shin published a thick two volume book, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon* [The Cheju 4.3 Incident] (Hanguk Bokji Haengjeong Yeonguso, 2000) which contained materials relevant to the incident. The book provides full texts of relevant documents produced by the SKLP, North Korean agencies, KNP, the USAMGIK, and the USAFIK. This book suggests that the central SKLP might have involved in the beginning of the incident. Seodong Park's *Youngwonhan Wooriduru Apum 4.3* [Our Everlasting Pains 4.3] (1990) contains the testimony of victims of the Communists during the incident and Jaewoo Go's *Cheju 4.3 Pokdongui Jinsangeun Irotta* [This is the Truth of the Cheju 4.3 Rebellion] (1998) supports the idea of Sanggyun Shin.

Yeoksa Bipyeongsa published an edited book, *Cheju 4.3 Yeongu* [The Study of the Cheju 4.3 Incident] (1999) including issues of the incident. Finally, The Institute for Military History Compilation of the Ministry of Defense published a book, *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa* [The History of Pacifying the 4.3 Rebellion] (2002) that explained the government's policies and operations and provided details of the pacification campaign. *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa* represents traditional view of the South Korean government that the incident came from the Central SKLP's Committee's direction. This book provides details of operations based on *Daebijeonggyujeonsa* [The History of Anti-Guerrilla Warfare] (1989), published by the same institute.

Meanwhile, two more American scholars provided their analyses of the incident. Bruce Cumings briefly introduced the incident with the perspective of the SKLP in his book *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. II, *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947 – 1950* (Princeton University Press, 1990). Fifteen years later, Allan R. Millett provided a different interpretation of the incident from the point of the Military Government in his

book *The War for Korea:1945-1950: A House Burning* (University Press of Kansas, 2005). Specifically, Millett argues that the 4.3 Incident was the beginning of the Korean War but leaves forwards the local SKLP initiative explanation of the revolt's origins. Millett added to the debate by collecting the testimony of American and Korean officials who served on Cheju-do, which he also explored.

This dissertation tries to combine the research of the 4.3 Incident in Korea in an updated English army sources as well monograph that includes U.S. materials. The personal accounts from the 4.3 Research Institute, the five volumes of *4.3eun Malhandu*, the six volumes of collections from the Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honors of Victims, and testimony in Seodong Park's *Youngwonhan Wooriduru Apum* and *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa* were extensively investigated.

At the same time, this research presents a new perspective about the beginning of the incident. Unlike other studies, this dissertation asserts that not the Chejudo SKLP or the Central Headquarters of the SKLP, but the Chollanam-do SKLP, a regional Communist group, played the major role in launching the 4.3 Incident. The Chollanam-do SKLP exploited willingness of Cheju Communists to rebel against the Military Government and guided the Chejudoans to vent their frustration in violence. Furthermore, my dissertation argues that neither the Chollanam-do SKLP nor the Chejudo SKLP intended to conduct protracted guerrilla warfare. Instead, the Communists started the insurgency with scattered assaults on police substations, killing right-wing persons, and sabotaging communication facilities. However, the incident developed into guerrilla warfare due to Chejudo's isolated geographic location and the

determination of the new Syngman Rhee government to crush Communism through out Korea.

In addition, this dissertation provides unique insight into the current 4.3 studies by analyzing the characteristics of the Cheju Communists. Because they were the actors who triggered the incident in response to misgovernment, they are the people who deserve intensive research. The important changes of leaders among them are well known. However, there were more critical facts that should be understood. The Cheju Communists had moved from the post of semi-administrators of the island to mere party members during the period from 1945 to 1947. Alienation from governmental affairs and strong subordination to the central SKLP induced the local Communists to take road to rebellion.

Finally, my dissertation offers a balanced and detailed account of events of the events of 1945-1948 that contributed to the break of the 4.3 Incident. By comparing accounts from rightist and leftist studies and cross-checking the written materials with the verbal records, this dissertation attempts to find the essential reality of Cheju's history. In addition, the dissertation advocates the understanding of the causal relationship of occurrences by scrutinizing the personal interactions and results of those happenings.

In Chapter I, the dissertation offers an overview of the Korean situation from the liberation of 1945 to the end of 1946. The chapter introduces the change of the ideological topography in southern Korean society at that time. My dissertation contends that by the end of 1946 southern Korean society in the American occupation zone moved from a pro-Communism society to an anti-Communism orientation.

In Chapter II, my dissertation argues that Cheju Communists maintained the dominant influence over Cheju society. With its leaderships of deep rooted protest movement against Japan and with its cooperation with the Military Government, the Communists could dominate local politics after 1945. In addition, the Cheju Communists could take independent action based on their autonomy from the central Korea Communist Party (KCP). As a result, the Cheju People's Committee acted as a de facto government.

Chapter III reveals the waning of Communists' influence in Cheju society. Due to the introduction of a new provincial system, the Cheju Communists lost their open involvement in administrative affairs. In addition, with the changes of leadership, the Cheju Communists became more obedient to the central SKLP's control. Consequently, instead of being a de facto government, the Cheju Communists' identity shifted to a typical party branch. After this change, the March First Incident and the March 10 General Strike of 1947 occurred in part a local SKLP effort to reestablish its power.

Chapter IV deals with the political interaction that concluded the 4.3 Incident. After the March First Incident and the general strike, the relationship between the Cheju Communists and the Military Government deteriorated. The Cheju police became hostile to the islanders, and the newly inaugurated Korean governor, a main proponent of anti-Communist convictions suppressed the local Communists. Furthermore, strong anti-Communist rightwing groups began to grow on the island. One of them was the NWYMA of North Korean refugees who were eager to terrorize and exploit Communists. The Cheju SKLP planned a revolt but the Chollanam-do SKLP guided the decision to execute the rebellion.

In Chapter V, the dissertation explains how an ill-organized revolt developed into an extensive guerrilla insurgency. Isolated from the mainland by sea, the rebels who did not get a fortune to escape the island moved deep into the Mountain Halla forests, a volcanic wilderness that dominated central Cheju-do. The Chollanam-do SKLP, the central SKLP, and North Korea contributed to the roar; they sent military experts to Chejudo, and compelled Chejudoans to defend Communism.

Chapter VI analyzes pacification operations that caused many casualties. Most violent atrocities were executed by Korean soldiers without appropriate control of American advisors. The insurgency ended with more moderated pacification efforts beginning spring 1949.

This dissertation uses data files of the U.S. Army in Record Group (RG) 554: Records of General Headquarters, Far East Command, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, and United Nations Command, 1945-1957 to find basic facts and to understand the perspective of the U.S. Military Government In Korea (USAMGIK).² Specifically, ninety-seven boxes of files in Entry 1256 in the Record Group were frequently conferred. The materials produced by the History Section of the Intelligence Division of the Headquarters USAFIK were used to write “History of the United States Army Forces in Korea,” an unpublished manuscripts. The files contained the drafts of unit histories, basic statistics, ordinances, operational maps, and G-2 and G-3 reports. Needless to say, these files are essential to the research of the 4.3 Incident, but there may be some losses of critical materials. For instance, the file named Cheju-do Political Situation 1948 in

² Recently, the NARA moved these files from the RG 332 to the RG 554.

Box 83 is empty, which was supposed to hold “Report of Special Investigation-Governor Ryu, Hai Chin of Cheju-do Island.”

This dissertation also relies on the collections of materials published by the Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honor of Victims taken from the records of the U.S. Military Forces In Korea. There were many missing files due to the NARA’s relocation projects that began in 2005. Korea-related materials in RG 332 and 338 were transferred to RG 554 without proper matching numbers. Even with the help of archivists, it was hard to locate materials with old numbers in the new record group.

The Cheju-do commission dispatched researchers to the NARA to investigate and compile materials about the 4.3 Incident. Unfortunately, these materials were translated into Korean for the convenience of Korean researchers. However, if researchers can fix the problems that happened in translation, the collection can be trusted as reliable primary source for American perspectives. At the same time, Sanggyun Shin’s book was often consulted, due to its faithful reproduction of direct quotes of not only key sentences, but also the full texts.

Finally, this dissertation reflects vivid voices of participants of the 4.3 Incident, though limited. In July 2006, I visited Cheju-do to interview victims, former policemen, former Communist leaders, and local researchers. In addition, I paid a visit to the garrison of former Constabulary units in Mosulpo now occupied by a ROK Marine battalion, and some execution sites. The collection of oral records and the visits of the historical sites nurtured this dissertation with deeper understandings of the sorrows of the victims, the agonies of the policemen, and the ambitions of the Communists.

CHAPTER 1

LIBERATION AND TRANSFORMATION

U.S. Policy over Liberated Korea

The Koreans could not decide their destiny after the liberation from Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) due to the lack of enough contribution for defeating Japanese imperialism. The Koreans suddenly experienced independence after a long period of pain without effective resistance against their rulers within Korea. As a result, Koreans had to rely on the mercy of the Allies for their future; mainly two powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, who intervened in Korea and established two separate occupations with separate goals.

China defined Korea's problem for the allies rather than by the Koreans. Korea under Japanese colonial rule became the issue among the allies at the First Cairo Conference by the request of Nationalist China. The Nationalist Chinese government requested that "China, Great Britain, and the United States should recognize the independence of Korea after the war." In addition, the Chinese government attached that

it would welcome the participation of the Soviet Union in the recognition of Korean independence.¹

President Roosevelt had cultivated the idea of trusteeship for colonies that would be liberated from Axis Powers in Africa and Asia. Specifically, he regarded that trusteeship was the ideal system to handle former Japanese territory in the Pacific area.² The idea reflected paternalistic sympathy to people in colonies, a concept of tutelage, and the conviction that America should assist underdeveloped nations. It showed great confidence in America's role in civilizing and uplifting colonial peoples who had been suppressed for a long time. As a result, the idea of trusteeship was devised on the basis of ignorance of the capacity of nations that had previously held a long tradition of self-government such as Korea.

At the Cairo Conference, Korean issues were explored by the leaders of the three major powers: President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. However, the terms of trusteeship was not mentioned in the communiqué. In the American draft, the independence of Korea was promised "at the earliest possible moment after the downfall of Japan," but "the moment of independence" was later changed to "in due course" in the British draft. The final communiqué describes the Korean matter as followings:

¹ Hopkins Papers, "Memoranda by the Chinese Government," November 24, 1943, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic papers* (Hereafter FRUS): *Conferences at Cairo and Tehran* 1943, 387-89.

² J.C.S. Files, "Minutes of the President's Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pre-Conference Papers before Cairo Conference," November 13, 1943, *FRUS: Conferences at Cairo and Tehran* 1943, 197.

... The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.³

The independence of Korea received the consent of Stalin at the conference of Tehran that was held after the conference of Cairo. On the fourth day at the Tehran Conference, the communiqué of the Cairo Conference about the Far East was discussed during a luncheon meeting among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin. Churchill asked if Stalin read the communiqué, and Stalin replied that he thoroughly approved the communiqué. Stalin mentioned that Korea should be independent and that former Chinese territories should be returned to China.⁴

During the Yalta Conference, the allied leaders discussed Korea's future only one time. Roosevelt suggested implementing twenty to thirty years of trusteeship over Korea, but Stalin requested a shortened time of trusteeship. In addition, Roosevelt mentioned that Great Britain would be excluded from Korean affairs; again Stalin opposed the exclusion of Great Britain, but both agreed not to allow the permanent stationing of foreign troops in Korea. Based on these common understandings, President Truman notified Generalissimo Chiang that "the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain agreed to a Four-Power Trusteeship for Korea" on June 15, 1945.⁵

However, after the beginning of Harry S. Truman's presidency, U.S. policymakers began to devise a different approach to the Korean matter. Due to the occupation policy

³ Cairo Legation Records, "Final Text of the Communiqué," *FRUS: Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943*, 448-49.

⁴ "Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin Luncheon Meeting," November 30, 1943, *FRUS: Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, 565-67.

⁵ Truman Papers, "Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Else)," undated, *FRUS: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*, vol.1, 309-310.

of the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central European countries, State Department advisors suggested that President Truman should occupy the Korean peninsula without cooperating with the Red Army. U.S. policymakers lamented situations in Soviet-occupied countries. They embraced deep suspicion toward their wartime ally and began to develop plans to prevent the same situation in other areas using America's superiority in military strength. Edwin W. Pauley, the repatriation commissioner of President Truman, recommended that Truman should "Occupy industrial areas of Korea and Manchuria" to avoid the Polish economic savaging based on his experience in Poland.⁶ At the same time, General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King proposed landing operations in Korea before the arrival of Soviet troops.⁷

However, President Truman stuck to the idea of trusteeship for Korea that he inherited from his predecessor. Although Pauley indicated that Korea was an essential area in postwar stability, Truman did not pay enough attention to the country.⁸ There were too many things that had higher priority than the Korean issue at the end of World War II, so Truman set aside the problem and resorted to the idea of trusteeship without developing policies for Korea.

Finally, trusteeship was reaffirmed by the United States, Great Britain, and China in Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945.⁹ Based on this concept, the Department of State presented a policy recommendation for the implementation of trusteeship. The recommendation evaluated that trusteeship could enhance Koreans' ability for self-

⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, "Korea in U.S. Politics," 278, in Yunosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 277-298; Henry S. Truman, *Year of Decision* (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1956), 433.

⁷ Truman, *Year of Decision*, 433.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The U.S. Department of State, "Excerpt from the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," Potsdam, July 26, 1945, *Korea's Independence* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 17.

government by including qualified Koreans in the administration, and would decrease international friction among major powers by allowing them participate in supervision over Korean matters.¹⁰

The Department of State presented a three phase recommendation for the future of Korea. The first step involved “Allied Military Government with the completion of military operations in Korea.” The next step was the establishment of an “Interim International Supervisory Administration” that would succeed the military government and continue to work until Koreans were able to run their own government. The final phase was a “Free and Independent Korea” promised in the Cairo Conference.¹¹

Developments in the Far East were so rapid that American policy makers had to struggle to keep up with the changes. After the drop of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, based on the Japanese government’s refusal of the Allies’ request to surrender on July 26, 1945.¹² However, the Japanese emperor suddenly accepted the terms of surrender of the Potsdam declaration on August 15. This rapid development forced the Department of State and armed forces to consider proper arrangements in receiving the surrender of Japan in Korea.

Reacting to Japan’s imminent collapse and the fast advance of Soviet troops in Manchuria, the United States hurried to halt the Soviet’s march to the south. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) held several meetings to set a line “as far north as practicable” to receive Japanese forces’ surrender on August 10 to 11, 1945.

¹⁰ “Briefing Book Paper,” July 4, 1945, *FRUS: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*, vol.1, 311-12.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 314.

¹² The U.S. Department of State, “U.S.S.R. Declaration of War Against Japan,” August 8, 1945, *Korea’s Independence* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 17.

Military representatives, Colonels Charles Bonesteel III and Dean Rusk, were asked to devise a line that had the greatest likelihood of reconciling Soviet acceptance and American desire. The team chased the 38th Parallel, which allowed the United States to occupy the capital of Korea. The Soviet Union accepted the line to the surprise of the planners in spite of no appearance of American troops in Korea.¹³

The U.S. XXIV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge landed at Incheon to occupy Korea south of the 38th north Latitude on September 8, 1945. The mission of the occupying force was to disarm Japanese forces and repatriate Japanese military and civilian persons at the earliest possible time. At the same time, the XXIV Corps was expected to maintain order and establish a military government.

The U.S. Military Government vs. Communists

There were some movements among Japanese and Koreans to grasp the political initiative in Korea on the verge of Japanese surrender. Before American troops landed, General Governor Abe Nobuyuki offered to hand over governmental power to the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) or Geonjun, spearheaded by Unhyong Yo to protect 600,000 Japanese military and civilian populations in Korea. Abe was concerned about Russian occupation over the Korean Peninsula without the knowledge of the U.S.-Russian agreement on zonal division by the 38th Parallel. He needed a person who could guarantee the safe repatriation of Japanese who escaped the coming Russian troops. At first, Abe contacted Jinwoo Song, a nationalist long dedicated

¹³ Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Draft Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," undated, *FRUS, 1945*, vol. VI, 1037-39.

to the independence movement, and was declined, but Yo accepted Abe's offer with five conditions.¹⁴

On August 15, 1945, General Abe agreed to Yo's terms, and soon Yo assembled the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. Yo and his Communist colleagues, Gangguk Lee, Yongdal Choi, and Jeong Baek, selected Yo as the chairman of the committee and Chaihong An to the vice chairman. Then on the next day, without enough members to fill the seats of the organization, the Communists announced the foundation of the committee. Yo gave a public address to inform the establishment of the CPKI and urged participation in the founding ceremony that was held at Hwimun Middle School. At the same time, An announced the committee's existence through the Gyungseong Broadcasting System.¹⁵

The committee expanded rapidly through out the Korean Peninsula. Local nationalist leaders as well as Communists led the creation of local CPKIs. The organization absorbed the passion of Koreans to establish an independent country. The local committees were spread out to small towns with the support of majority of dwellers and developed to larger committees for cities and provinces. The number of local committees reached to thirteen provincial committees for thirteen provinces and 215 county committees for 218 counties in southern and northern Korea by the end of November 1945.¹⁶

¹⁴ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 44-5.

¹⁵ Dongan Yang, *Daehanminguk Geonguksa: Haebang 3Nyunui Jeongchisa* [The History the Foundation of the Republic of Korea: The Three Years' Political History] (Seoul: Hyunumsa, 2001), 51-5.

¹⁶ Myengrim Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, vol.2 [The Outbreak and Origin of the Korean War] (Seoul: Nanam, 1996), 39-40.

Communists dominated the CPKI and excluded active participation of nationalists and moderates. The initial committee consisted of Yo's Korean Independence League, moderate leftists, and the Communists of Changan Faction of the Korea Communist Party (KCP). The only minor group in the committee composed of Centrists like Chaihong An and his comrades, but they were not important members. On August 22, 1945, the CPKI expanded its central organization. Twenty-four persons entered the central body of the committee; fifteen were Communists, four were leftists, and five held unknown ideological position. The second expansion was conducted according to the design of a new ally, Honyong Pak who led the biggest Communist faction in the KCP, Gyungseong Com Group or Gyungseong Communist Group on September 4, 1945. As a result, Pak's followers occupied major posts of the committee. With this change Vice Chairman An declared his withdrawal from the committee because he realized that he did not have a political chance in the committee.¹⁷

To consolidate the dominance, the Communists changed the CPKI into the Korean People's Republic on September 6, 1945. It was designed to make the Korean People's Republic a de facto government before the landing of American troops.¹⁸ Most officers of the republic came from a Communist group led by Pak; twenty-two among fifty-five seats of the Central People's Committee of the republic were taken by Pak's faction, three from Heo Hon's group, who supported Pak, two came from Yo's group,

¹⁷ Yang, *Daehanminguk Geonguksa*, 62-4.

¹⁸ Namsik Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu* [The Study of the South Korea Labor Party] (Seoul: Dolbege, 1985), 48-50.

and others were nationalists who were not willing to participate in the republic, like Syngman Rhee.¹⁹

The KCP was under the absolute control of Honyong Pak, who was born at Shinyang in Chungcheongnam-do in 1900. The KCP was created on April 17, 1925 and was abolished in 1928 due to factional struggles. Pak led the Korean Young Men's League as a member of Irkutsk Faction of the Koryo [an old name of Korea referring the dynasty right before Chosun Dynasty] Communist Party. After his first imprisonment in 1922, he participated in the creation of the KCP in 1925. He was the member of Hwayo Faction, which consisted of Communist students who had studied in Japan. In the same year, he was arrested due to his involvement in the KCP and was released on bail. He moved to Moscow and entered the Eastern Workers University in 1929. After the school, he was imprisoned again when he tried to reestablish the KCP in Korea in 1933. Upon his final release in July 1937, Pak organized Gyungseong Com Group or to continue Communist movement. After December 1942, he disguised himself as a laborer at a brickyard in Gwangju to avoid a fourth arrest and awaited liberation.

After the liberation, Pak initiated the reorganization of the KCP by composing a committee to reconstruct the party on August 20, 1945²⁰, and cracked down on the Changan Faction, which already proclaimed the reconstruction of a Communist party in Korea. He recruited the members of the old KCP, mainly from Hwayo Faction and Gyungseong Com Group. After consolidating his power base, he planted his men in

¹⁹ Yang, *Daehanminguk Geonguksa*, 69-70.

²⁰ The KCP's reconstruction was formally proclaimed on September 11, 1945. Junseok Go, Younggu You trans., *Biwoonui Hyukmyongga Pak Hon-yong* [The Revolutionist of Tragic Destiny, Pak Hon-yong] (Seoul: Geul, 1992), 60-1.

Geonjun throughout Yo's CPKI. Then Pak dominated the Korean People's Republic by appointing his men to major positions.²¹

During the reconstruction process of the KCP, Pak dictated the party platform of the KCP, the so-called Palweol Tege [August Thesis], announced on August 20, 1945. The August Thesis stipulated that the revolutionary movement in Korea was at the stage of "bourgeois democratic revolution." Pak suggested five programs to be pursued: focusing on mass movements, increasing subsidiary organizations, fighting against both rightwing and extreme leftists, establishing the labor class' initiative, and composing national unification front line.²² Basically, Pak would cooperate with the U.S. military government and tried to steer his party in legal ways to build favorable conditions for a Proletariat Revolution.

General John Hodge and his U.S. XXIV Corps landed at Incheon without the knowledge of this situation. The fifty-two year old general had not received the benefit of West Point education, but gained his reputation at the battlefield. After a series of successes in Pacific campaigns as the commander of the U.S. Forty-third Infantry Division, Hodge took the command of the XXIV Corps in the Leyte campaign, and then moved to Okinawa to make initial landings. General Hodge received his orders to occupy Korea in order to disarm and repatriate Japanese troops and to maintain order to aid first mission on August 28, 1945.²³

General Hodge began his rule over Korea by establishing a military government as planned by the State Department, the United States Army Military Government In

²¹ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 50.

²² Ibid., 21-26; Changju Lee, ed., *Chosun Gongsandangsa Birok* [The Secret History of the Chosun Communist Party] (Seoul: Myungji University Press, 1996), 287-97.

²³ Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 57-58.

Korea (USAMGIK). The organization of the USAMGIK copied the Japanese colonial government in Korea.²⁴ The USAMGIK had a military governor who commanded the whole military government; a civil administrator who coordinated activities of the secretariat and bureaus; a secretariat who supervised eight sections that supported the military governor and nine bureaus.²⁵ Also the military government had provincial and municipal military government teams to govern effectively. The military teams were dispatched to Seoul, Busan, and Incheon at the end of October 1945, and other teams were deployed to other cities as they arrived. Military government teams belonged to local tactical units, and were under their command. Liaisons between the military governor and military government teams were kept through the secretariat.²⁶

General Hodge caused dissatisfaction of Koreans with his occupation policies, due to the lack of the detailed orders from Washington and General MacArthur. He ignored the Korea People's Republic, and let Japanese officials hold their jobs in order to keep the efficiency of administration. These, especially the latter, caused strong opposition among Koreans, who hated Japanese and dreamed of building their own independent nation. Koreans marched streets in protest, sent telegrams to President Truman, and erected posters on the walls in main cities.²⁷ To handle this situation, the SWNCC recommend General MacArthur to abolish Hodge's policy of retaining any

²⁴ Suja Kim, "Juhan Migunsawa Migunjeong Changrip Gwajeong Yeongu [History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea and the Study of the process of Establishment of the Military Government]," in *Juhan Migunsawa Migunjeonggi Yeongu* [History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea and the Study of the Era of the Military Government](Seoul: Baeksan Seodang, 2004), 109-110.

²⁵ Headquarters of the United States Army Forces In Korea (Hereafter USAFIK), *Summation of United States Army Military Government Activities in Korea* (Hereafter *Summation*) No.1, 15. This monthly report contained detailed information of policies of the military government, situations of industries, statistics, and information of northern Korea. The report was submitted to the Headquarters of the Far East Command in Tokyo.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *New York Times*, September 11, 1945.

Japanese.²⁸ Eventually, President Truman made statements to relieve those Japanese high rank officials from their offices.²⁹ In fact, before the statement of Truman, General MacArthur ordered Hodge to remove Japanese from their posts.³⁰

At the same time, the steep inflation that occurred after the liberation dissatisfied Koreans. The price of basic goods skyrocketed, due to the reduction of supplies from Japan; Korea depended on Japan for its consumer goods because the Japanese had developed Korea to be a market for their industries and a supplier of their staple grain, rice. At the same time, the shortage of materials and money stemmed from the collapse of economy and rapid decrease of production that had been maintained by Japanese capital. According to the report of the Treasury of Kyunggi Province on November 30, 1945, wholesale prices had risen 30 times since the liberation of August 15, 1945.³¹

At the same time, the shortage of rice provoked animosity of the general public toward the military government. This problem was mainly caused by a hasty policy of the military government. In October 5, 1945, the USAMGIK issued General Notice No. 1 that abolished the rules against the private sale of rice.³² The notice only regulated the sale of the rice produced at former Japanese-owned lands to be sold to the Korea Commodity Company (KCC), and the ordinance suggested the recommended price as

²⁸ SWNCC 176/4, "Memorandum by the Acting Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," September 10, 1945. *FRUS 1945*, vol. VI, 1044.

²⁹ *New York Times*, September 13, 1945.

³⁰ *New York Times*, September 12, 1945; SWNCC 176/4, *FRUS 1945*, vol. VI, 1045.

³¹ Younghi Choi, *Gyukkdongui Heabang 3Nyon* [Turbulent Three Years after Liberation] (Chuncheon: Hanlim University Press, 1996), 105.

³² USAMGIK Office of Military Governor of Korea, General Notice No. 1, RG 554 Entry 1256, The National Archives and Records Administration II, Washington D.C.

₩ 32 per straw bag of unhulled rice, 1 suk, or 119.05LB. Americans expected that the free market would work for rice and Koreans could enjoy their freedom of economy.³³

Soon the General Notice turned out to be a failure. The USAMGIK discovered that nearly 45% of the rice was consumed in four months after the harvest: the expectation of crop production was 15 to 16 million suk,³⁴ and Koreans already consumed 5 to 6 million suk.³⁵ The military government criticized lavish use of rice by Koreans making alcohol and candies and feeding chickens and pigs. The government argued that during the winter of 1945 every Korean consumed 5.6 hop or 0.27 gallons of rice per day, far more than the recommended consumption of 2.4 hop or 0.11 gallons.³⁶

Contrary to the argument of the USAMGIK, the problem was caused by the shortage of rice supply in the free market. It is hard to believe that Koreans suddenly began to eat more than two times the amount of rice than they had previously. Furthermore, the government did not provide concrete numbers of how much rice had been used for candies, alcohol, and keep livestock. The crop production of 1945 was better than the average production of previous 14 years (13, 942, 801 suk), and there was no official rice export to Japan unlike past years. In addition, the whole production of rice was allotted to feed South Koreans only due to the division.³⁷ In fact, farmers did not sell their rice in the free market but hoarded it with the expectation of the rise of rice prices. Because of the high price of consumer goods, the farmers sought to gain enough

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ USAMGIK Bureau of Public Information, "Memo to Major General Archer Lerch," RG554.

³⁵ USAMGIK Bureau of Public Information, "Special Press Release February 25, 1946," RG 554.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ USAMGIK National Food Administration, "Exports of Rice to Japan, October 26, 1946," RG554.

money for their needs. To make things worse, smugglers sold rice to Japan, and speculators intervened in the rice market to maximize their profits.

In accordance with the shortage of supply, the price of rice rose up to ¥100 per straw bag. Koreans tasted the bitterness of a free market. The military government endeavored to curb the price, but failed. Even the USAMGIK introduced “incentive buying” programs to supply the farmers with consumer goods at lower price.³⁸ Finally the military government began rice rationing in January 1946. The USAMGIK purchased rice at a fixed price with the support of policemen finding hidden rice.³⁹ Though policemen were replaced with village heads later, farmers resented the forceful measures of the military government.

On the other hand, the Communists continued to expand their influence by organizing subsidiary organizations. Before the birth of the KCP, Chosun Gongsan Cheongnyun Dongmaeng (the Korean Communist Youth Association) was organized on August 18, 1945,⁴⁰ the Chosun Nodong Johap Jeonguk Pyenguhoi (the Korean National Assembly of Labors’ Union) or Jeonpyung, on November 6, 1945, and the Jeonguk Nongmin Johap Chongyeonmaeng (the General League of Farmers’ Union or Jeonnong) on December 10, 1945. All organizations were mobilized for political purpose of the KCP to marches and sit-in demonstrations.

³⁸ It failed soon.

³⁹ USAMGIK 67th Military Government Company Chung-Ju, “January 15-16,” RG 554.

⁴⁰ Later it was renamed to Chosun Minju Cheongnyun Dongmaeng (Mincheong) [Chosun Democratic Youth Association] on April 25, 1946.

Movement toward Anti-Communism Society

To deal with postwar problems, including the issue of Korea, the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes flew to Moscow in December 1945. Major postwar problems were discussed among delegations from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union from December 16 to 27, 1945. In the communiqué of the Moscow Conference, the allies announced Korean trusteeship by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China.

The reaction of Koreans to the communiqué of the Moscow Conference was harsh. Koreans could not accept a trusteeship by the great powers. Koreans, from extreme right to extreme left, resisted the decision by marching, conducting demonstrations, and hanging posters. General Hodge had never met such harsh protests since his landing. About 3,000 Korean officials in the Military Government resigned and marched to demonstrate their opposition.⁴¹ Chiefs of police stations in Seoul also announced their resignations.⁴² Even theaters and restaurants closed doors to resist the communiqué.⁴³ Korean newspapers criticized the trusteeship. The press used the term Gyungsul Gukchi or the national humiliation in 1910 - a symbolic expression to remember Japanese occupation-to emphasize the feeling of humiliation.⁴⁴

Every party and political organization, even the KCP, joined the opposition movement. On December 29, 1945 all the major parties, including the Communist party, contributed articles to resist the decision. At the same time, important politicians hurried to announce their opposition to the trusteeship. The anti-trusteeship movement swept the

⁴¹ *Donga Ilbo*, December 30, 1945.

⁴² *Jayu Sinmun*, December 30, 1945.

⁴³ *Chosun Ilbo*, December 30, 1945.

⁴⁴ *Chosun Ilbo*, December 29, 1945.

entire southern Korean society. In northern Korea, nationalist leaders strongly condemned the decision of the Moscow Conference, as contrasted to northern Communists' support for the trusteeship. Mansic Cho a top administrative leader as the chair of Pyongyang People's Political Committee and an educator and a heroic figure of independence movement, led the center of the opposition in northern Korea. In vain, the Soviet Union tried to persuade Cho to accept and later arrested him.

The anti-trusteeship movement had clear direction from the beginning. Koreans focused on denouncing the Soviet Union as an original provider of the idea of the trusteeship.⁴⁵ General Hodge ignored Korean presses of conveying false information about the trusteeship;⁴⁶ furthermore he said that he and his subordinates also disliked the trusteeship.⁴⁷ As a result, Koreans indicated the Soviet Union as the culprit which designed the trusteeship and severely criticized the Soviet Union.

The other direction of the anti-trusteeship movement was anti-Communism. After visiting Pyongyang during December 28, 1945 to January 2, 1946, Honyong Pak changed his stance from anti-trusteeship to pro-trusteeship.⁴⁸ Consequently, the KCP and its subsidiary organizations turned to support the decisions of the Moscow Conference around January 3, 1946. With the change of Communists' attitude, the Korean general public became upset and began to reverse their support from the KCP.⁴⁹

The Korean general public thought that there would have been no chance to gain independence from the foreign powers if the trusteeship had been implemented. So they

⁴⁵ Kennan sent a telegram of translation of the *Tass* of January 25, which indicated false reports of Korean newspapers.

⁴⁶ "The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, January 25, 1946," *FRUS 1946*, vol. VIII, 619-21.

⁴⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, January 10, 1946.

⁴⁸ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 137-149.

⁴⁹ *Chosun Ilbo*, January 5, 1946.

were eager to resist the idea of trusteeship and move to achieve independence and unification.⁵⁰ As a result, the anti-trusteeship movement turned out to be a second independence movement. In this context, Communists' pro-trusteeship attitude could not be tolerated, and Communists were identified as traitors who were manipulated by the Soviet Union.

The trusteeship controversy presented unexpected gifts to nationalist groups. Throughout the anti-trusteeship movement, nationalists began to dominate politics. The general public's disappointment with the Communist party played a pivotal role in this change; nationalists exploited this adroitly. By and large, Kim Ku boosted the desire for independence, and Syngman Rhee organized the desire on his term.⁵¹

These two nationalist leaders gained new stature were repatriated with the help of General Hodge. Based on his anti-Communist attitude, General Hodge thought that Korean general public grumbled more than they should, due to Communist agitation. General Hodge telegraphed MacArthur that "Communists activities are reaching point where they may gain control unless positive action is taken" on November 2, 1945. He charged that Communists' activities and influence on people hampered major U.S. efforts in Korea to build a sound economic system and an independent government.⁵² To deal with this situation, the USAMGIK intended to utilize the popularity of the nationalist leaders: Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, and Kyusic Kim. General Hodge requested the State

⁵⁰ Kynghwan Jung, *Baekbum Kim Ku Yeongu*, vol. 3 [A Study of Kim Ku] (Busan: Ikyung, 2005), 137.

⁵¹ Sangyong Choi, "Trusteeship Debate and the Korean Cold War," in *Korea under the American Military Government, 1945-1948*, ed. Bonnie B.C. Oh (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 19-20.

⁵² "Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur," November 2, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, vol. VI, 1106.

Department to permit the return of Syngman Rhee from the United States and Kim Ku with the members of the Korea Provisional Government in China.

However, one of the national leaders rose against the military government. Kim Ku and his colleagues of the Provisional Government spearheaded the anti-trusteeship movement. When he learned of the Moscow communiqué, Kim Ku convened an urgent cabinet meeting, which adopted four decisions about the Moscow Communiqué on December 28, 1945. The decisions were to urge the general public to oppose the trusteehip and to conduct the anti-trusteeship movement; to invite every political organization to anti-trusteeship movement; to send telegrams of disagreement with the trusteehip to four powers; and to appeal the legitimacy of the Korean Provisional Government to the U.S. and Soviet military governments.⁵³

On the next day, Kim Ku talked with his cadres to form the Committee of National Mobilization for Anti-trusteeship. On December 29, 1945, the Committee of National Mobilization for Anti-trusteeship proclaimed that Koreans already “have an independent country and government established by Koreans’ bloods.”⁵⁴ The committee stipulated that the cabinet meeting of the Korean Provisional Government would guide the committee, and the branches of the committee should be installed in every administrative district.

The proclamation of Kim Ku kindled the fire of anti-trusteeship feeling of general public. His behavior was a near coup d’état against the U.S. Military Government. He intended to take governmental authority throughout the anti-trusteeship movement, using absolute support of Koreans. Since, most Korean officials in the military government

⁵³ *Donga Ilbo*, December 30, 1945.

⁵⁴ *Donga Ilbo*, December 30, 1945.

and chiefs of police stations in Seoul had resigned from their posts and marched to demonstrate their opposition to the trusteeship, the government came to a halt. The U.S. military government expressed deep concern about this situation by criticizing Kim Ku's presuming "prerogatives of government."⁵⁵

Kim Ku's movement evoked strong objections and much animosity against him by General Hodge. Hodge was in a position to take proper measures to calm down the situation. At first, General Hodge planned to exile Kim Ku and the cabinet members of the Korean Provisional Government to China after detaining them in a Japanese POW's camp in Incheon.⁵⁶ Hodge met Kim Ku and reminded him of the pledge of keeping order and law of the Military Government what Kim Ku signed when he returned Korea.⁵⁷ After all, Kim and Hodge agreed to stop destructive anti-trusteeship movement on January 1, 1946, and soon Hangseop Eom, the Secretary of Propaganda of the Korean Provisional Government, announced a new direction of the movement that requested moderate and peaceful movement that recognized the temporary advocated the authority of the Military Government.⁵⁸

Unlike Kim Ku, Syngman Rhee increased political power during the trusteeship controversy. After the announcement of the Moscow communiqué, Syngman Rhee maneuvered prudently. He exploited the anti-Communism of Koreans in the course of anti-trusteeship movement to consolidate his political base. He made a public announcement on January 7, 1946, that the trusteeship would be a great humiliation to Koreans and cause a debacle in Korea, due to the lack of common interests between four

⁵⁵ *Summation* No. 4, 2825.

⁵⁶ Byongok Cho, *Nai Hoigorok* [My Memoir] (Seoul: Eomungak, 1963), 165-166.

⁵⁷ Kynghwan Jung, *Baekbum Kim Ku Yeongu* [A Study of Kim Ku], vol. 1 (Busan: Ikyung, 2005), 145.

⁵⁸ *Donga Ilbo*, January 1, 1946.

powers.⁵⁹ He did not try to take over the power or authority of the U.S. military government. His criticism targeted not the United States but the Soviet Union, reflecting suspects of Korean general public about Communists in regard to the trusteeship.

He began his movement by strengthening his political organization. After the setback of Kim Ku's initiative, Rhee merged his Central Committee for the Rapid Realization of Independence into Kim Ku's Committee of National Mobilization for Anti-trusteeship and created the National Society for Rapid Realization of Korea Independence (NSRRKI) in February 1946.⁶⁰ The purpose of this organization was to counter left-wing groups on a provincial level and to form a unified right wing line for upcoming talks between the United States and the Soviet Union to prepare the measures for the trusteeship.⁶¹ Although Kim Ku played a more significant role in the new organization, based on Korean Provisional Government's domination, Rhee began to gain more power with the beginning of provincial tours since April 1946.⁶²

Syngman Rhee launched his provincial tours with the recommendation of General Hodge, who intended to send Syngman Rhee far away from Seoul during the Joint Commission that began on March 20, 1946.⁶³ He urged the general public to fight against Communists and urged nationalists to gain initiative in politics through out his tour during April to June 1946. He traveled to thirteen local cities and presented his energetic speeches to massive audiences. In many cities, local branches of the NSRRKI

⁵⁹ *Chosun Ilbo*, January 8, 1946.

⁶⁰ Choi, *Gyukdongui Heabang 3Nyon*, 168; *Chosun Ilbo*, February 8, 1946.

⁶¹ Suja Kim, *Rhee Syngmanui Jipgwonchogi Gwonryokgiban Yeongu* [A Study for Syngman Rhee's Power Base in His Early Times] (Seoul: Kyungin Munhwasa, 2005), 67.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 70-71.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

were organized, and nationalists moved to grasp political power from the hands of Communists.⁶⁴

The NSRRKI achieved great success in the arena of Korean politics. The military government recorded that "...the Society [NSRRKI] had been growing with a great rapidity, and is, in fact, the first rightist movement that has enjoyed large organizing success in the provinces."⁶⁵ Rhee, also, evaluated that his tours "have changed the entire South and everywhere the Communist organizations, both women's and men's, have declared their intention to get away from the unpatriotic organizations in order to join with the Nationalist group in our struggle for independence."⁶⁶ The rapid growth of rightists meant the demise of Communists at the same speed.

The general public's hate against Communists increased with the adjournment of the U.S-Soviet Joint Commission. The joint commission was decided at the Moscow Conference to form a provisional government to implement the trusteeship. The commission, consisting of military delegations representing the United States and the Soviet Union, began March 20, 1946 after a preliminary Joint Conference that started January 16, 1946. The talks between the United States and the Soviet Union reached an impasse due to different criteria for qualifying Korean parties or organizations for participation in the provisional government. The Soviet Union insisted on excluding parties and organizations that opposed the Moscow communiqué, but the United States did not agree with the Soviet's idea and advocated freedom of speech.

⁶⁴ Kim, *Rhee Syngmanui Jipgwonchogi Gwonryokgiban Yeongu*, 74.

⁶⁵ USAMGIK, "The National Society For Rapid Realization of Independence, July 1, 1946," RG 554.

⁶⁶ Memorandum to Colonel Preston M. Goodfellow, June 27, 1946, Institute for National History Compilation, *Daehanminguksa Jaryojip 28: Rhee Syngman Seogan Jaryojip 1* (1944-1948) [Materials for the History of the Republic of Korea, vol. 28: Syngman Rhee's Letters 1(1944-1948)] (Guksa Pyonchan Wiwonhoi), 97.

In fact, the Soviet Union was eager to exclude the possible birth of a hostile country on the Korean Peninsula. At the opening of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission on March 20, 1946, the chief of the Soviet delegation, Colonel General Terentii F. Shtykov, mentioned that the objective of the Soviet was to keep a friendly Korea that “will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union.”⁶⁷ General Shtykov had been the political officer of the Soviet Council of the First Far East Army Group since 1945 and most influential person in matters of northern Korea. He controlled the Commission of the Soviet Council of the XXV Army, Major General Nikolai G. Lebedev under the direct direction of Stalin.⁶⁸ Shtykov’s comment showed the goal of the Soviet’s Korean policy.

The adjournment of talking between the United States and the Soviet Union enabled the State Department’s initiative in Korea. The Director of Occupied Area of the State Department, Major General John Hildring, recommended that Hodge form a coalition of moderate Koreans, who would not be declined by Russians. The agenda would be backed by improvement of education and economy in Korea. As a practical method, an interim legislative was suggested by an election.⁶⁹

Based on Hildring’s recommendation, Hodge pushed the formation of a coalition of moderate Korean politicians by creating a Coalition Committee. Unhyong Yo and Dr. Kyusik Kim were selected as key figures that would lead the coalition. Extreme rightists Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku were excluded, as well as Honyong Pak for his extreme leftist stand. The goal was the formation of an interim legislative dominated by

⁶⁷ “Voice of Korea,” January 28, 1947, *FRUS 1945*, vol. VIII, 653.

⁶⁸ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 81-82.

⁶⁹ “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hildring) to the Operations Division, War Department,” June 6, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, vol. VIII, 692-699.

moderate rightists and leftists, which acceptable to the Soviet Union. With this political goal, the USAMGIK promulgated Ordinance No. 118, which created the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (SKILA) composed of 45 elected members and 45 members appointed by the Military Government. The SKILA would enact ordinances, subject to the approval of the military governor, on matters affecting the general welfare.⁷⁰

On the other hand, Russians executed their own plan on the Korean peninsula after the adjournment of the Joint Commission. The Soviet Union pursued Sovietization with great speed in northern Korea and tried to keep southern Korean society unstable. The first major step was merging the Communist parties in both territories. In northern Korea, Ilsung Kim's North Korean Labor Party merged with Dubong Kim's Korean New People's Party at the end of August 1946. At the same time, the Soviet Union ordered Pak to merge his party with Unhyong Yo's Korean People's Party and Namun Baek's South Korean New People's Party in southern Korea. However, the merge in southern Korea was not smooth, due to opposition to Pak's leadership among other Communist parties.

At the same time, the Soviet Union appointed Ilsung Kim as the leader of Communists in Korea instead of Honyong Pak at this time. Kim and Pak paid secret visits to Stalin in July, 1946. At that time, Stalin designated Kim as an official leader of

⁷⁰ *Summation* No. 13, 3.

northern Korea as well as Communist movement in all Korea.⁷¹ Pak had no choice but to follow Stalin's decision for the leadership of Communist movements in Korea.⁷²

Under this situation, the clash between the Korea National Police (KNP) and the KCP occurred. The USAMGIK endeavored to found a strong security organization. The USAMGIK attached great importance to the role of the police, because the KNP was the only civil organization to be used to provide internal security and to eliminate Communism from the society by force. Right after the occupation of Korea, the military governor established a Bureau of Police on September 17, 1945.⁷³ The bureau became belonged to the Department of National Defense.⁷⁴ Interestingly, the military governor forbade any person to operate within the jurisdiction of the police without written authorization of the Director of National Defense.⁷⁵ Later, the Police Bureau became an independent Police Department by Ordinance No. 63 in April 1946.⁷⁶

To produce "new" policemen, the military government ran various schools. On October 15, 1945, a class to train Korean recruits was opened with seventeen Korean staff officers. The first class consisted of 450 students from Seoul and 50 from Busan.⁷⁷ In addition, training schools were organized in each police division. In the case of Busan, to provide 800 Korean policemen to the city police force in Busan, the USAMGIK

⁷¹ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 244-249; Testimony of Nikolai G. Lebedev, *Jungang Ilbo*, November 31, 1991.

⁷² Honyong Pak had competed with Kim for the hegemony of Communist movement in Korea until the end of December 1945. According to Junseok Go, Pak tried to distribute booklets titled *Alun Noseonul Wihaya: Chosun Minzokui Widaehan Yongdoja Honyong Pak Dongmu Manse* [For the Right Route: The Long Live of Great Leader of Chosun, Honyong Pak] over the KCP members including northern Korea in November 1945, but the booklets were confiscated by northern Korean authorities at a border post. Go, *Biwoonui Hyukmyongga Honyong Pak*, 226-228.

⁷³ *Summation* No. 1, 185.

⁷⁴ By Ordinance No. 28 on November 13, 1945. *Summation* No. 2, 130.

⁷⁵ *Summation* No. 2, 180.

⁷⁶ *Summation* No. 7, 7.

⁷⁷ *Summation* No. 1, 186.

arranged to train 125 men per week from October 8, 1945.⁷⁸ At the same time, the police ran various kinds of schools for specific needs; a school for railroad police was established on February 15, 1946,⁷⁹ and the National Police Academy produced its first commissioned police officers on July 19, 1946.⁸⁰ With these efforts, the USAMGIK employed 15,000 Korean policemen by the middle of November 1945,⁸¹ and 28,552 policemen by June 30, 1947.⁸²

The USAMGIK raised the efficiency of the KNP by centralization and modernization of equipment. The police centralized its organization by abolishing provincial departments of police and moving the functions to divisions of the National Department of Police. The police had ten Divisions; eight Divisions for eight provinces, one for Seoul, and one for the Transportation Division.⁸³ At the same time, the USAMGIK invested a lot of money in the modernization of equipment. Even the KNP had superior firepower, communication ability, and mobility to the Constabulary Force.

In addition, to fill the vacancies of the senior police officials opened by releasing the Japanese high rank police officers, the USAMGIK hired experienced Korean policemen who had worked in the Japanese colonial police. As a result, the KNP hired former colonial police officers for major police chiefs with recommendations from Director Byongok Cho and other officers.⁸⁴ Afterwards, the recommended persons made additional suggestions for staff officers and detectives for the KNP. In June 1947, the USAMGIK reported that more than 80 percent of the KNP members did not have any

⁷⁸ *Summation* No. 1, 186.

⁷⁹ *Summation* No. 5, 288.

⁸⁰ *Summation* No. 10, 4.

⁸¹ *Summation* No. 2, 185.

⁸² *Summation* No. 22, 34.

⁸³ *Summation* No. 13, 3.

⁸⁴ Kim, *Migunjeong Sidaewi Gukgawa Hangjeong*, 263-64.

experience in the Japanese police, yet these statistics revealed that the majority of high rank officers of the KNP were the employees of the Japanese colonial police.

Due to the many policemen served in the Japanese police, the KNP inherited the work styles and traditions of the Japanese police. The influence of the Japanese police was very strong, and so decided the characteristics of the KNP from the beginning. The Japanese colonial police had ruled Koreans in every phase of daily activities. The colonial police had an extensive organization to cover all occasions in the colony and possessed unlimited authority.

In accordance with the report of Roberts-Robinson Investigation in July 1946,⁸⁵ the influence of high ranking officers who had served in Japanese police and the negligence of the USAMGIK to supervise the KNP allowed unprofessional activities of the KNP. Torturing suspects, detaining persons without proper charges, and misusing Ordinance 72 to arrest members of farmers' and labor unions with the charge of Communism were rampant in local areas. Investigators recommended the removal of ranking officers who had worked as former Japanese police.⁸⁶

The KNP began to arrest Communists since May 1946 with the occurrence of Jeongpansa Incident. Including two workers of Jeongpansa Press, seven suspects were as they had been charged with counterfeiting in May 1946. The military government discovered that the counterfeit bills were used by the KCP. Jeongpansa had printed money during the Japanese era, and the building was possessed by the KCP after the

⁸⁵ This was an informal investigation of police behavior in three provinces of the east coast. Lt. Colonel Rankin Roberts was XXIV Corps Public Relations Officer, and Captain Richard D. Robinson was Assistant Head of Military Government's Bureau of Public Opinion.

⁸⁶ USAMGIK, "History of Police Department," RG 554.

liberation.⁸⁷ The military government arrested more major party members and closed leftist newspapers.

Against the pressure from the military government, the KCP adopted the New Tactics since August 1946. Unlike the previous stance of the KCP, the New Tactics introduced tit-for-tat tactics terrorism-to-terrorism, blood to blood.⁸⁸ The New Tactics asked Communists to fight aggressively to overthrow the military government. It is not clear why and how Pak adopted the tactics; most studies suggested that Pak played a major role in this change; however it is possible to assume that the Soviet Union ordered Pak to change the tactics of the KCP.⁸⁹ Honyong Pak could not move without directions from the Soviet authorities in northern Korea.

Under the new direction, Communist aggressively challenged the military government. In late 1946, the USAMGIK had to cope with an unprecedented protest of Communists-the General Strike in September and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion in October 1946. The general strike was planned by Jeonpyung based on New Tactics and guided by the Soviet military government in northern Korea.⁹⁰ Jeonpyung intended to

⁸⁷ Go, *Biwoonui Hyukmyongga Honyong Pak*, 156-58.

⁸⁸ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 235-36.

⁸⁹ It can be advocated by two facts: Pak had been ordered by the Soviet Consul General in Seoul at this time, and the time coincided with Pak's returning from Moscow.

⁹⁰ Many studies argued that the general strike was planned to build favorable conditions to the KCP in merging three Communist parties in southern Korea. The KCP was on the way to merging three Communist parties at the direction from Russia from the beginning of August with a lot of problems. Yo Un-hyong's Chosun Inmindang [the Chosun People's Party], Baek Nam-woon's NamChosun Sinmindang [the South Chosun's New People's Party], and the KCP were divided into six groups around the issue of merging. Mainly opposition groups criticized Pak's undemocratic behaviors in the process and called to convene party assembly to decide the merge. In contrast, Communist parties in northern Korea were unified swiftly under the initiative of Kim Il Sung by the end of August. Studies suggested that Pak wanted to create a crisis to get initiative in the merge by exploiting the general strike. However, this argument conflicts with the fact that the Soviet military government intervened in the case. Furthermore, if Pak launched some serious movements without consult with the Soviet delegation, the Soviet military government must suspect Pak for his ambition to strengthen his political position. In fact, Stalin designated Kim Il Sung as the leader of northern Korea in July. Pak did not have any need to garner unnecessary

connect a general strike with farmers harvest struggle by raising the strike in October.⁹¹ However, on September 11, 1946, Shtykov advised Pak to order rallies to protest against terrorism and suppression. On September 16 Shtykov recommended Pak call for massive meetings to condemn the behaviors of the U.S. military government and right wing groups.⁹² In September, Jeonpyung launched a general strike by mobilizing railroad workers at the announcement of layoffs and change of payment system from monthly to daily by Transportation Bureau of the U.S. military government.

Seven thousand railroad workers of Busan started the General Strike and all 40,000 workers joined the strike one day later. To support railroad workers, laborers of printing companies participated in the strike on September 25, 1946. Their requests were mainly economic issues: to raise the amount of rice distribution, to raise wages, to stop layoffs and the daily payment system.⁹³ By September 28, 1946, approximately 1,470 telephone and telecommunication workers stopped their work over the country, and 3,000 workers of textile industry of Daegu walked out of factories.⁹⁴

The development of the General Strike was reported to General Shtykov promptly. On September 26 and 28, 1946, he got the detailed information about the strike by the Soviet military governor, Major General Alexei A. Romanenko. Shtykov ordered Pak to add political issues to the strike's requests: the release of arrested leftist leaders, the cancellation of arrest orders for Communist leaders, and the permission of republishing

suspicion from Kim and the Soviet Union by causing a nationwide insurgency that could be interpreted as Pak's challenge to Kim's hegemony. See Namsik Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu* [The Study of the South Korean Labors' Party] (Seoul: Dolbege, 1984).

⁹¹ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 236.

⁹² "Excerpts of Shtykov Memoir," *Chungang Ilbo*, May 9, 1995.

⁹³ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 238-39.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

leftist newspapers. At the same time, Shtykov allowed financial support of two million yen for the strike.⁹⁵

General Shtykov transmitted his order immediately to Jeonpyung. Initially, the leaders of the strike planned to make workers of printing companies return to factories to propagate the strike to general public using booklets and newspapers. However, Syungyup Lee stopped the try and ordered to request the cancellation of arrest order for Honyong Pak. Honyong Pak had been on the KNP's wanted list since September 7, 1946 after the arrest of Juha Lee, Pak's faithful subordinate with the closing of three leftist newspapers, Inminbo, Hyundai Ilbo, and Chungang Sinmun.⁹⁶ In addition, Shtykov arranged additional financial support of three million yen to the strike on October 1.⁹⁷

The KNP arrested 1,700 labors after assaulting Yongsan railroad station where the headquarters of the strike located with the support of right wing organizations on September 30, 1946. As a result, the workers called off the strike in a few days, and participants in local cities returned to their work places. In fact, local strikes were spearheaded by Communists, who were under the control of party leaders opposing Pak's leadership in merging Communist parties. So the strike could be ended easily, and the behaviors of participants were not so harsh.⁹⁸

However, the general strike turned into a violent rebellion in Daegu. Unlike other cities, laborers in Daegu kept the strike movement and expanded its forces by gaining other union members. On October 1, 1946, approximately 1,000 children and

⁹⁵ "Excerpts of Shtykov Memoir," *Chungang Ilbo*, May 9, 1995.

⁹⁶ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 237.

⁹⁷ "Excerpts of Shtykov Memoir," *Chungang Ilbo*, May 9, 1995.

⁹⁸ Haegu Jeong, *10wol Inmin Hangjaeng Yeongu* [The Study of the October People's Resistance] (Seoul: Yeolumsa, 1988), 105-106.

housewives rallied into the city hall to ask for more rice, and 500 strikers began to shout for the requests of the general strike around the Daegu Station and Taepyeongro, the main street in Daegu. Daegu police tried to scatter the groups two times but failed. Unfortunately, in this process at 11:00 p.m, a demonstrator became the victim of police fire.⁹⁹

On the next day, citizens began to gather in front of the Daegu police station from 8:00 a.m. The number of gathering reached the thousands around 9:00 a.m. Communists showed the corpse from the police fire of the previous night and agitated the masses by yelling. The mass assaulted the station, killed policemen, stole the weapons, and released detainees. The mob searched policemen in the city and killed them mercilessly, even their families. In a short time, the mob occupied seventeen police substations in Daegu and thirteen in Dalseung.¹⁰⁰ Eventually, the U.S tactical forces subdued the disturbance in Daegu.¹⁰¹

Residents in the counties surrounding Daegu started to participate in the rebellion with the news from Daegu. They were mainly agitated by groups of persons that fled from Daegu to avoid the clash with the U.S. tactical forces. The agitators arrived from Daegu using stolen trucks.¹⁰² People marched in mass for demonstration, assaulted police offices and county offices, and killed policemen and right wing persons. In some cases, mobs simply demanded to hand over administrative authorities and the weapons.

The most serious atrocities happened in Waegwan and Youngcheon. In Waegwan six police officers, including the chief of police station and the head of the section of

⁹⁹ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 241-42.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Jeong, *10wol Inmin Hangaeng Yeongu*, 103-106.

¹⁰² Ibid.

detectives, were murdered by sickles and axes while their hands were tied to poles.¹⁰³ In Youngcheon, mobs burned the head of the county to death, killed 16 policemen and officials including with a pastor, and destroyed a police box, the county office, and the houses of right wing persons.

The rebellion spread out to other provinces after October 20, 1946. Mobs assaulted police substations in eight cities in Gyungggi-do. On October 30, 1946, mine workers in Hwasun in Chollanam-do began a strike, and in November 1946, 417 prisoners escaped from Jeonju. From October 1, 1946 to November 11, mob violence occurred in 73 cities and counties.¹⁰⁴

During the rebellion, General Shtykov received questions about guiding the movement from Duwon Jo and Honyong Pak on October 21, 1946. Pak reported to Shtykov that the strike was developed into a rebellion and new direction for the struggle was necessary. Pak added that food and ammunitions should be supplied to the mobs that entered mountains.¹⁰⁵ At that time, he already had crossed the 38th Parallel to escape from the arrest of the KNP on October 7, 1946.

During the Autumn Harvest Rebellion, the U.S. forces were rarely mobilized for pacifying operations. Units of the 6th Infantry Division were dispatched to Daegu to scatter mobs and secure order on the first day. In other areas, the KNP mainly conducted pacifying operations. The KNP concentrated its troops on targeted areas with rapid motor transportation, and reinforced operational troops employing the Railroad Police

¹⁰³ *Daegu Sibō*, October 13, 1946. Cited from Jeong, *10wol Inmin Hangjaeng Yeongu*, 117.

¹⁰⁴ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 243.

¹⁰⁵ "Excerpts of Shtykov Memoir," *Chungang Ilbo*, May 9, 1995.

and other troops in peaceful areas. The KNP communicated with radios supplied by the USAMGIK and American advisors continued to provide help.¹⁰⁶

The KNP played an important role in suppressing the rebellion. However, the policemen abused their power and authority during the process. Brutality against suspects was adopted frequently to collect information of riot leaders. In addition, the policemen often revenged the deaths of their colleagues to suspects and citizens. The USAMGIK was well aware of this situation but kept silence to pacify the rebellion successfully.

A letter sent to commanders of the U.S. 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions revealed the good performance of the KNP as well as the brutality of Korean policemen:

It is essential that during control of disorders in South Korea we do all we can to support and back up the efforts of Korean police and constabulary officials. It is also essential in our dealing with them that we do not handle them in such manner as to hurt their pride with too open and direct criticism of their actions past, present, and future. With our shortage of tactical troops we must do all we can to increase efficiency, morale and self-assurance of these groups if we can expect to have their support and use them in governmental functions.¹⁰⁷

The KNP proved its ability to pacify the Autumn Harvest Rebellion successfully but left unwanted scars to Korean people. Korean policemen resorted to brutality that was learned from Japanese colonial police to deal with situations. At the same time, extremely harsh operational conditions forced policemen to use forceful measures to arrest suspects, and the deaths of colleagues by mobs drove the policemen to use their power inappropriately.

The damage of the Communists inflicted during the Autumn Harvest Rebellion was great, as Pak mentioned to Shtykov, most key members of Communist organizations

¹⁰⁶ See Haegu Jeong, *10wol Inmin Hangaeng Yeongu* [The Study of the October People's Resistance].

¹⁰⁷ XXIV Corps G-2 History Section, "TFGCT 2632 To CGS 6th Inf Div. 7th Inf Div." 19 Oct 1946, "History of Police Department" (Initial Source Materials, Draft, Notes). RG 554.

fled to mountains to save their lives. After the pacification of the rebellion, the KNP arrested 2,200 suspects and released 1,414 of them; the KNP operation during the unrest was so pervasive as to threaten the existence of the KCP.¹⁰⁸

In the midst of turmoil, the U.S. military government pushed the election of the South Korean Interim Legislative. Right wing groups tried to take part in the new political apparatus, but leftist leaders did not get a chance to be elected due to the unrest. At the same time, the Soviet Union manipulated leftists not to work with Americans. Communists in the Coalition Committee quit their participation in the committee with the order from Honyong Pak in July.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, the Russians asked Yo to leave the left-right coalition. General Shtykov ordered Yo not to join the coalition on September 26, 1946, based on the order from Stalin.¹¹⁰

The result of the election of October 17-22, 1946 for the SKILA was stunning. Contrary to Hodge's hope, the nationalists gained 31 seats among 45 seats for elected members: fourteen from Hanmindang, the Korean Democratic Party,¹¹¹ and seventeen from the NSRRKI of Syngman Rhee. Only nine independents could be counted as the fruit of Hodge's endeavor. Handokdang or Korea Independence Party, Kim Ku's faction, gained three seats. Significantly Communists won Chejudo's two seats for the SKILA. Unlike other provinces, Communists in Cheju Province ran for the election for the seats of the SKILA.

¹⁰⁸ USAMGIK, "Staff Conference 8 November 1946, History of Police Department," RG 554.

¹⁰⁹ USAMGIK, "Report on the Occupation Area of South Korea since Termination of Hostilities," RG 554.

¹¹⁰ "Excerpts of Shtykov Memoir," *Chungang Ilbo*, May 18, 1995.

¹¹¹ Hanmindang, the Korean Democratic Party was established by 1,600 conservative Koreans on September 16, 1945 to check the influence of Geonjun, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence. This party consisted of educated upper middle class who were mainly landowners and entrepreneurs. The party was the most significant rightist party in the politics of South Korea.

In 1945, Communists in southern Korea dominated politics, but in the next year they lost their foothold in the society. Nurtured by the Korean general public's passion to construct an independent country and strong complaints about the USAMGIK, Honyong Pak could build a strong Communist party that had great influence on Koreans throughout subsidiary organizations. However, Communists' power began to wane due to a series of false decisions. During the trusteeship controversy, the Communists ignored the desire of general public for independence; the KCP followed the direction of Moscow and acquired the stigma of national traitors. After the adjournment of the Joint Commission, the KCP ignited the suppression of the USAMGIK by launching massive antigovernment movements. The demise of the Communists coincided with the growth of nationalists and the KNP.

The election of the new SKILA dramatized the change of political topography in southern Korea at the end of 1946. Koreans selected rightists for their representatives. Although Communists still retained certain amount of support from Koreans, Communism began to wane in the southern Korean society. By the end of 1946, rightists began to dominate politics. The majority of Koreans rallied to the cause of anti-Communism for its ideology.

CHAPTER 2

CREATION OF THE CHEJUDO PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

After liberation, the Communists on Cheju Island took control of their land, which had been barred to them by Japanese suppression. In Cheju, leftists had a deeply rooted political base by their long term resistance in specific localities. With the evacuation of Japanese forces, the Communists formed People's Committees that dominated local politics even after the landing of the U.S. military governmental team. The Chejudo People's Committee retained power in spite of the military government because of a vigorous group of young activists and factional disputes in the Korea Communist Party. Due to their local roots and other circumstantial factors, Cheju Communists were able to survive after the Autumn Harvest Rebellion and then elect two of their own officers as representatives of the SKILA.

The Evacuation of Japanese Forces

The Chejudo or Cheju Island is fifty miles southwest off the Korean peninsula. Located in the warm waters of the East China Sea, the island is blessed with good weather and wonderful beauty. The island was created by volcanic movements that left Halla Mountain with 360 *Orums* or parasite volcanoes and caves on it. The gigantic

Halla Mountain of 6,500 ft dominates the topography of the island of 700 square miles. Covered with permeable basalt, the island has few rivers continually filled with running water; instead, water from rains soaks through the earth and rises near the coast line.

At the time of the liberation Cheju Island had become home to the biggest unit of Japanese forces in Korea, the 58th Army. The 58th Army was composed of dedicated Japanese troops and incorporated Cheju island natives. The 58th Army had been organized in April 1945 to defend the island against U.S. forces at all costs, but the troops would leave the island without any combat casualties due to Japanese surrender.¹ The strength of the 58th Army was 53,000 men and officers, which comprised a large portion of the total strength of the 179,720 men and officers of the 17th Area Army, which defended the Korean peninsula and Cheju Island.²

The force that the Japanese had sent to Cheju Island would remain intact for a long time. Until June 1944, the 405th Special Garrison Company with 120 soldiers, Koreans from Cheju Island, was the only Japanese unit.³ In June 1944, after the construction of Cheju Air Field in May, the Japanese garrison was reinforced to 500 troops with the addition of the 408th Garrison Engineer Unit. In addition, the Japanese navy also sent more troops to Mosulpo Air Field by dispatching training airplanes, anti-submarine airplanes, and anti-aircraft guns.⁴

However, with the defeat of Japanese forces in the Pacific, Japanese military planners decided to enhance the defense capability of Cheju Island by sending combat

¹USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 3, September 30, 1945, RG 554 of General HQ, Far East Command, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, And United Nations Command, Entry 1256.

²USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 1, September 16, 1945, RG 554.

³Sanggyun Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Sang* [Cheju Island 4.3 Incident, vol. 1] (Cheju: Hanguk Bokji HaengjeongYeonguso, 2000), 12-13; USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 4, October 7, 1945, RG 554.

⁴*Ibid.*

units. Based on the analysis of “Operation Ketsu-Nanago,” the U.S. forces were considering landing on Cheju Island or Gunsan in the Korean Peninsula in order to set up a base from which to launch further attacks on Japanese home islands.⁵ In regard to homeland defense, Cheju had a strategic location which would enable U.S. naval forces to cut enemy movements from the direction of Taiwan to Japan and also provided suitable terrain in its western area for airstrips.

The 58th Army had been organized to defend Cheju Island under the command of the 17th Area Army and the Chosen District Army, which were created to guard Korea from invading U.S. forces in February 1945.⁶ Although the 58th Army had been led by the commander of the 17th Area Army, the Imperial Headquarters made direct contact with the 58th Army Commander to confer about the defense of Cheju Island.⁷ At the time of surrender, the 17th Area Army was commanded by Lieutenant General Kozuki Yukio and the 58th Army was under the leadership of Lieutenant General Toyama Noboru.⁸

The 58th Army had three infantry divisions, one independent brigade, and one artillery command with supporting units. The 96th Infantry Division had been organized near Seoul and moved onto the island in March 1945 to guard the northern part of the island with 8,453 troops. The 111th Infantry Division, with the strength of 11,779 men and officers, had been created in Manchuria in July 1944 and assigned to the 58th Army to guard the western coast of the island since May 1945. The 121st Infantry Division, which had 15,118 officers and enlisted men, had been transferred from the Kantou Army

⁵“Operation Ketugso” is the operational plan to defend home islands. Nana is the number that was attached to Korea.

⁶The 17th Area Army was in charge of military operations, and the Chosen Army District dealt defensive matters. These two headquarters were commanded by one commander. USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No.3, September 30, 1945, RG 554; Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Sang*, 9.

⁷ Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Sang*, 9.

⁸USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 3, September 30, 1945, RG 554.

in May 1945 and stationed at the western part of the island as a reserve of the 58th Army. The 108th Independent Mixed Brigade had come to the command of the 58th Army from Kyushu in May 1945 and guarded the eastern part of the island with 5,998 officers and enlisted in five battalions.⁹

The U.S. XXIV Corps had paid great attention to the 58th Army of Cheju at the beginning of the occupation. The 58th Army was the only army under the command of the 17th Area Army that occupied fortified facilities on Cheju. From the first volume of *G-2 Weekly Summary* of the Headquarters of the XXIV Corps, Americans carefully handled the military situation of Cheju Island by separately recording the number of Japanese troops. At the same time, the evacuation processes of Japanese troops were being carefully recorded and monitored.

Due to the size of the 58th Army and its independent status with regard to military operations, the United States Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) accepted the surrender of the 58th Army in addition to the surrender of the 17th Area Army. On September 28, 1945, Colonel Roy A. Green, commander of the 184th Infantry Regiment and Commander A. J. Walden representing the Allies, joined the Japanese commanders for the signing of the document of surrender at the Agricultural School on Cheju Island. The Japanese signatories were Lieutenant General Toyama Noboru, Commander Hamada Shouichi, of the naval garrison in Cheju, and Senda Senpei, the chief civilian administrator of Cheju Island.¹⁰ The ceremony lasted only fourteen minutes, from 10:45a.m. to 10:59a.m.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰USAFIK, *History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea*, Part I, Chapter VII, item; “The Disarmament of the Garrison on Cheju-Do.” Cited from Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Sang*, 49.

Unlike the ceremony of surrender, disarming the 58th Army took a much longer time. The USAFIK ordered the 58th Army to collect and destroy ammunition and explosives before the arrival of the representatives of the Allies. Thus, from September 20-28 in 1945, the Japanese detonated their caches of small arms' ammunition, artillery shells, and explosives. Small arms were collected in three specific areas, while artillery pieces and tanks were collected at three different locations.¹¹ Japanese soldiers conducted the disarmament plan without the supervision of U.S. forces. Colonel G. F. Powell, ordnance officer of the XXIV Corps, was in charge of disarmament of Japanese troops in Cheju. He arrived on the island September 28, 1945. Colonel G. F. Powell's remained on Cheju Island until October 6, 1945.

The disarming process was not checked thoroughly by U.S. forces, and many Japanese reports of self disarmament proved to be inaccurate. According to the report of "Summary of Material in the Japanese 58th Army" on October 7, 1945, the 58th Army had 27,989 M99 rifles, 756 M38 rifles, 613 M38 cavalry carbines, and 2,525 pistols for a total number of 31,883 individual arms. Considering that the number of troops in the 58th Army as of September 16, 1945 was 53,000, 31,883 small arms seemed too small a number to have had equipped all these soldiers. The number of bayonets recovered was 53,294 as compared to the number of rifles 29,358, which showed that approximately 23,936 rifles might be unaccounted for.¹² The loss of so many small arms probably occurred during the dates from liberation to the time of disarmament.

¹¹USAFIK, *History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea*, Part I, Chapter VII, item; "The Work of the Japanese Liaison Detachment in Seoul." Cited from Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Sang*, 51.

¹²USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 4, October 7, 1945, RG 554.

Before the evacuation of troops, demobilization was conducted for Korean soldiers and those Japanese soldiers with homes in Korea since August 15, 1945. The Korean 405th Special Garrison Company and the 408th Special Garrison Engineer were demobilized first. In addition, 17,161 officers and enlisted men were demobilized from the 58th Army. Among them nine officers and 11,875 privates were Koreans.¹³

From September 28, 1945, the soldiers of the 17th Area Army began to be evacuated. The USAFIK decided to remove “undesirable Japs: thought policemen, Shinto priests, and geishas” ahead of civilians who were being evacuated in October 1945.¹⁴ The evacuation of Japanese soldiers was initiated on 28 September, 1945, and the troops of Cheju Island were moved to Japan by American LSTs beginning on the 23rd of October. During the period from October 23 to November 11, 1945, 46,296 soldiers were repatriated, and 2,228 soldiers were sent home the following week. By November 18, 1945, the last group had left. The total number of evacuated Japanese soldiers from Cheju Island was 48,524.¹⁵

The Root of Communists

The people of Cheju Island faced a power vacuum caused by unexpected liberation from Japanese rule. As in other provinces, the Communists took the initiative

¹³Ibid. There were two Korean officers in the 12th Artillery Command, six in the 96th Infantry Division, and one in the 108th Independent Mixed Brigade.

¹⁴USAFIK, “Report on the Occupation Area of South Korea since Termination of Hostilities,” RG 554. The “undesirable Japs” included also thought police, Shinto priests, and geishas, Japanese prostitutes, in addition to soldiers and sailors.

¹⁵USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 10, November 18, 1945, RG 554.

in organizing and mobilizing people. The Communists had built strong organizations in the 1920s and 1930s, and maintained their reputations through their protests against Japanese. The Communists and villagers had developed mutual trust by working together for such a long time. The Communists were teachers of night schools, defenders of consumers' rights, and organizers of public movements.

Cheju Communists had robust local support from their villages because they were well educated and had spent a significant amount of time working in their region. Except for some key leaders who were responsible for trans-island organizations, the majority of the Communists did not leave their hometowns. They organized young men and women from childhood, and opened night schools for the poor in villages. As a result, after the liberation, the Communists acquired natural prestige, thereby dominating the political situation with the support from people in the villages.

In general, the Cheju Communists belonged to the Seoul Faction of the Korea Communist Party. The Communists of the island began their contacts with party cadres on the peninsula in the late 1920s. At that time, the Hwayo Faction of the Korea Communist Party was dealt a devastating blow from Japanese police due to the June 10 Manse Incident in 1926, and only the Seoul Faction could continue its activities. The Seoul Faction had moved to the south-western and northern part of Chollanam-do.¹⁶ After that time, the Cheju Communists followed the Seoul Faction of the KCP.

There had been two groups of Communists in Cheju Island during the colonial period, a Japan-based group and an island-based group. The Japan-based group consisted

¹⁶Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa* [The History of Anti-Japanese Movement of Cheju Province] (Cheju, 1996), 212-213.

of small numbers of professional communist activists and their protégés, mainly from Osaka. The focus of their movement in Japan was in organizing urban laborers to join the Communist revolution in the highly industrialized Hanshin area. In contrast, the Communists on the islands had traditional jobs and sought to indoctrinate their neighbors with Communist values and ideology.

The Japan-based Communists began to emerge during the mid-1920s after the opening of the Cheju-Osaka ferry line in 1923. With the operation of the ferry, many islanders had migrated to Japan seeking manual labor jobs. Osaka became the new home of many Chejudoans because of its countless job opportunities in the new heavy industries and its easy access from Cheju. In a short time, ghettos of Cheju islanders were built in Osaka for incoming laborers. Osaka became flooded with Cheju people working at Japanese factories in harsh conditions and living in heavily congested neighborhoods.

The influx of the Cheju population to Osaka boomed for twelve years until 1934 when the Japanese government restricted the migration of Koreans, due to the economic recession.¹⁷ During the period from 1923 to 1934, 230,649 individuals moved to Japan and 192,495 had returned back to the island. At the end of 1934, 50,045 islanders remained in Japan, which was roughly one-fourth of the Cheju population.¹⁸ Among them, 60% of islanders in Japan were male and 40% were female, and the biggest age

¹⁷Gwanhun Jin, *Guendae Chejui Gyungje Byundong* [The Economic Change of Modern Cheju Island] (Cheju: Gak, 2004), 137-41.

¹⁸Cheju-do, *Cheju-dose Yoram* [The Fact Book of Cheju Island](1937), 20. Cited from Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 306. Gwanhun Jin offered the number of migration and returnees from 1923, but, he did not calculated accumulated number of migrants before 1923. In contrast, Cheju-dose Yoram shows total number of Cheju-do people in Japan by 1926, but does not handle the migration from 1923.

group of migrants was 21-25, with 10,206 people. In addition, 67% of them did not have any formal education.¹⁹

Cheju people formed neighborhoods along familial and regional lines in order to smooth the transition of settling in Japan. The Cheju people sailed to Japan with men and women from their same villages and towns. It was natural for islanders to move with their neighbors, because ferries from Cheju took passengers from eleven harbors around the island, which were scarcely connected by land transportation.²⁰ New migrants sought temporary housing with earlier settlers who had come from the same village. Some of the earlier migrants ran boarding houses for newcomers at relatively cheap prices. At that time, the biggest Cheju neighborhood was formed at Ikaino in the Higashinari District of Osaka, in present day Momotani at the Shyouno District in Osaka.²¹ Cheju islanders became a dominant group among the Koreans in Osaka. The survey of the Chosen Chongdokbu, the colonial government in Korea, in July 1924 revealed that 609 of the 1,000 Korean male workers in Osaka came from Cheju. The second largest population, 192, was migrants from Chollanam-do, located at the south coast of Korea, the closest province to Japan after Cheju. The demographics showed the relations between migration and geographic proximity.²²

The Cheju enclaves became the base of the Communist movement, supplying money, man power, and covert places in which to conduct Korean Communist activists.

Moonjun Kim, a Central Committee member of the Total League of Korean Labors in

¹⁹Jin, *Guendae Chejui Gyungje Byundong*, 137-41.

²⁰Jin, *Guendae Chejui Gyungje Byundong*, 141-48. The circular road connecting villages on coast line was constructed in 1914. However, regular motor transportation service began in 1924. See Jin, *Guendae Chejui Gyungje Byundong*, 119-23.

²¹Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 306.

²²Chosen Chongdokbu, *Hanshin Kyouhei Jibangui Chosenin Nodongja* [The Korean Workers in Hanshin and Kyouhei Area] (1924). Cited from Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 307.

Japan (TLKLJ), formed in 1924, had gained the support of the Cheju people, mainly from Ikaino. He had fled to Japan in 1927 after years of running night schools for young people following his graduation from Suwon Agricultural School, now the Seoul National University Agricultural College. In Osaka, Japan he was the most famous Communist theorist and organizer of the late 1920s.²³ He represented the Seoul Faction of Korea Communist Party in Japan.²⁴

In 1926, the TLKLJ swelled to 25 unions and 9,900 members and became a center of the Korean labor movement in Japan, focusing on advocating working rights of Koreans, helping poor Koreans with natural disasters, and encouraging nationalism among Korean laborers. Sixty percent of the TLKLJ membership belonged to Osaka, and most of them were Cheju people. Moonjun Kim guided the Osaka branch of the TLKLJ and educated young laborers in Communist ideology with the cooperation of Monggu Cho, Yonghae Kim, and Hojin Hyun, all of whom came from Cheju.²⁵ Taelim Kim, later the chairman of Bookcheon-myon People's Committee, regularly studied the theory of labor movement under Moonjun Kim with other workers from the same village.²⁶

Cheju Communists in Japan joined the Japan Communist Party after the decision of Comintern in 1928 to dismiss the KCP, due to its factionalism.²⁷ According to the decision of the Comintern, Korean Communists should enter the Japanese Communist

²³Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 331.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 331-332.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ The testimony of Seoklim Lee, Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Maul Yeoksa Siriz (1) Bookchon-ri Yeoksa (1) 1919-1930" [The History of Villages (1), Bookchon-ri (1) 1919-1930], *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (August 1990): 43.

²⁷Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 317. For more information see Changju Lee, *Chosen Kongsandang Bisa* [The History of Korean Communist Party] (Seoul: Myungju Univsertisy Press, 1996), 466-470.

Party, and the labor movement of Koreans should be integrated into Japanese organizations. The TLKLJ coalesced into the Nihon Roudou Kumiai Zenkoku Kyougikai, also called Zenkyou, or the National Council of Japanese Labor Unions.²⁸

The Cheju Communists continued their movements in the Japanese Communist Party. Due to their active participation, Cheju Communists rose to the position of cadres of central and local parties. Juho Kang and Hoggung Hyun entered the Osaka Party Committee in 1933, and Hoggung Hyun became the chairman.²⁹ Later Hyun became director of the Department of Propaganda of Cheju CPKI in 1945. Moonjun Kim organized the Osaka Branch of Chemical Zenkyou with 1,000 Cheju workers from rubber factories in 1930. After his arrest at the strike of Izumi Rubber in June 1930, Monggu Cho took the leadership and launched a general strike in May 8, 1931 which lasted one week.³⁰ In 1932, the Japanese Prosecutors Bureau of Higher Court in Korea identified that about 300 Communists from Cheju were working in Osaka, and there were 105-106 dangerous activists among them.³¹ Monggu Cho became an executive committeeman of Cheju CPKI in 1945.

Cheju Communists in Osaka contributed to the movement by funding transportation between Cheju and Osaka in the early 1930s. This movement made the relations between Cheju people in Cheju and Osaka stronger. Moreover, this improved the cooperation between Japan-based Cheju Communists and island-based Communists.

²⁸Zenkyou was organized on December 25, 1928 succeeding Nihon Rodou Hyougikai, Labor Union Council of Japan, which was established on May 25, 1925. Zenkyou had initial membership was 5,500, and less than half of the membership committed its policies. For more information see Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 23-37.

²⁹Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 319. Hoggung Hyun is the younger brother of Hojin Hyun.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 333-335.

³¹Thought Department of the Prosecutors Bureau of Higher Court, *Sasangweolbo* [Monthly Magazine of Thought] vol. 2 issue 5 (August 1932), 11-12. Cited from Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 319.

Since its inception in 1923, the Cheju–Osaka line became a lucrative prospect as many travelers, mainly from Cheju, utilized the service. In the first year, 8,340 customers used the ferry, and in the next year the number of the travelers more than doubled to 19,385.³² Japanese ship owners exploited the travelers by raising the fare by large amounts in 1928, which caused protests by the Cheju people to reduce the price, but the owners continued to raise fees. In 1928, annual passengers using the Cheju–Osaka line increased to as many as 31,465.³³

In 1929, Moonjun Kim took the initiative to build the Donga Tonghang Johab, Donga Transportation Union, with help from Changrae Moon, Daljun Kim, Seokheon Hyun, Kilhong Hyun, Dongin Kim, and Jaseon Seong, who did not join the Japanese Communist Party after 1928.³⁴ They created a union of 4,500 members, mainly Cheju-do people in Cheju who paid thirty *sen* per week on April 21, 1930. The union lent a ship, the *Gyoryonghwan*, and started the service at the price of six *yen* fifty *sen* for union members on November 1, 1930. The union struggled due to a weak financial structure and a small group of potential customers although union memberships increased to 10,000. Japanese ferries also dropped their fares three *yen*, which further exacerbated the situation of the union. In the end, the union ceased operations with a deficit of 11,944 *yen* following five months of service.

Again, the union purchased a ship to resume the service and to secure more memberships. At this time, the Zenkyou took the initiative to drive the ‘member-funded transportation’ into a Communist movement by designating Donga Tonghang Union as

³²Jin, *Guendae Chejui Gyungje Byundong*, 140.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 341.

the final authority for Communist activities.³⁵ The manifesto of the union was like that of a Communist party: to promote the cooperation between Korean farmers and laborers with those of Japanese, and to strengthen the anti-imperialism and class struggle.³⁶ The union ran its own ship, the *Bokmokhwan*, for years with 20,000 members despite the suppression by Japanese police who dealt with the union as a Communist organization and significant safety failures on the part of the ships operators. In 1935, the member-funded transportation finally closed due to financial difficulties and competition with Japanese liners.³⁷

Union members developed close ties between the Osaka and Cheju Organizations. The transportation union recruited its members by districts; there were seventeen union districts in Cheju in the period of the *Bokmokhwan*.³⁸ For the opportunity to secure low cost transportation, islanders became union members. As a result, Donga Tonghang Union began to exert influence over the islanders. The islanders regarded the *Bokmokhwan* as *woori bae*, (my ship), and supported the efforts of the union with great passion by choosing the *Bokmokhwan* rather than Japanese liners.

Island-based Communists had focused on enlightening youngsters on the island about socialism and nationalist ideas on the basis of localities. The Communists centered their base on Chongnyonhoi, [Young Men's Association] for their activities. From 1925, Communists began to dominate Chongnyonhoi on the island with the creation of Sininhoi, the association of new people on March 11, 1925. Taeksu Kim, Sangho Han, Sunil Hong, Jonghyun Song, and Changbo Kang were central members of the organization. In

³⁵Ibid., 344. Namseok Hong, Daljun Kim, Duhwan Jang, and Seook Kim had this idea.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid. 341.

addition, small Chongnyonhoi in *myon* areas were built in line with Communism; in March 21, 1925, Mosulpo Chongnyonhoi was formed by organizers Daejin Oh and Sinho Lee.³⁹ The members of Shininhoi grasped major positions in the Coalition of Cheju Chongnyonhoi (CCC) beginning with the memberships of six local Chongnyonhoi on September 23, 1925. Important persons of the Standing Committee of the CCC became Sunil Hong and Seongbaek You for administration, Changbo Kang for culture, Taemin Kim for society, and Sangho Han for investigation.⁴⁰ In addition to the creation of the CCC, Sininhoi members turned to hold staff posts of the Cheju Boy's Alliance formed on the same day. Daejin Oh, Hanjeoung Kim, Changbo Kang, Jonggeon Go, Minhwa Kim and Seongbaek You all became executives.⁴¹

Chongnyonhoi cells in villages sought to enlighten residents with Communist ideals by running night schools and launching campaigns for improvements of lives of the residents. Hyupseong Chongnyonhoi operated a worker's night school for the children of laborers and started a temperance movement. Jocheon Chongnyonhoi and Cheju Chongnyonhoi opened a village library to increase the awareness of people about pursuing independence. Cheju Chongnyonhoi intervened in the protest of the students at Cheju Agricultural School, where Korean students demonstrated against ethnic discriminations by Japanese teachers in 1926.⁴²

Chongnyonhoi leaders chose to be die-hard Communists by joining the KCP in 1927. Jonghyun Song was the first one who became a party member at that time. After

³⁹Ibid., 210-11.

⁴⁰Ibid. The membership chongnyonhois were Mosulpo, Hyupseong (Hamduk), Jocheon, Snchon, Hwabook, Cheju Chongnyonhois. Later Gapa, Onpyong, and Seogwipo Chongnyonhoi joined. See Cheju-do, 212.

⁴¹Ibid. There were seventeen boy's associations organized in small areas under the alliance. *Donga Newspapers*, October 3, 1925. Cited from Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 212.

⁴²Ibid., 215.

Song's enrollment, Sangho Han, Taeksu Kim, Jeongro Kim, Jaehong Sin, Ikwoo Lee, and Daejin Oh joined the party. In addition, Seokwon Youn and Jeongro Kim joined the Communist Youth Association, a subsidiary organization of the Communist party. They organized a secret Communist organization in October 1927 and selected Jonghyun Song as the leader. Jonghyun Song had a connection with Communist leaders of Chollanam-do and participated in summer training camp in Gwangju.⁴³ Later, Jonghuyn Song, Taeksu Kim, Changbo Kang, Jeongro Kim, and Seokwon Youn were arrested by Japanese police on August 24, 1929.⁴⁴

After the participation in the KCP and reorganization of the CCC to the Alliance of Cheju Chongnyonhoi (ACC), following the creation of the Total Alliance of Chosun Chongnyonhoi in national level in August 1931, the young leaders strengthened their activities in their villages. Their activities thrived between 1928 and 1931. In Cheju-eup, the largest town in Cheju Island, Wonjong Go, Taeyoun Lee, Sunil Hong supported the protest of Jongsik Jang and Hyunduk Sin, newspaper agencies, against a small textile mill about the poor conditions of female workers in 1931. In Hwabook, Younok Kim and Baehyun Kim guided students of Hwabook Private School to oust a pro-Japanese teacher who beat a student while the student was planning a strike. At the same time, members of Hwabook Alliance of Chongnyons prodded young students to sing revolutionary songs during the funeral of a student in the school in February 1931. In Mosulpo, Daejin Oh organized the strike of workers of a button factory and the demonstration of boys

⁴³Ibid., 217-18.

⁴⁴Ibid. 219.

protesting the police rejection of the memorial service of Children's Day on May 5, 1929.⁴⁵

More moderate, yet effective movements were organized by the village members of the Alliances of Chongnyons (AC) in some areas. In the case of Jocheon-myon, a *myon* had smaller population than a *eup* and consisted of several *ris*,⁴⁶ young leaders concentrated on running a village library and night schools for laborers. In Hamdeok-ri, members of the AC performed a play to raise the awareness of the conflict between classes. These protests were guided by Communist leaders of the local Alliances of Chongnyons and ultimately resulted in the arrests of key members by the Japanese police.⁴⁷

In 1931, island-based Communists sought a new direction for their movements with the cooperation of Japan-based Communists. Daljun Kim of Donga Tonghang Union issued 'The Thesis about the Alliance for Fighting for Farmers' Requests' in April 10, 1931, which aimed to organize farmers instead of mobilizing only the educated Koreans. The thesis was discussed by Changbo Kang, Jaejin Moon, Sunil Hong, Moongyu Oh, Minhwa Kim, Hanjeong Kim, Dalmo Moon, and Jungheup Kim in Jongsik Jang's house on June 14, 1931. The thesis contributed to shifting the focus of communist movements from students to farmers and women divers, a specialized group on Cheju.⁴⁸

The most significant new Communist movement guided by island-based Communists was the "Protest of Women Divers" of January 1932. On May 16, 1931 after the release of Changbo Kang, local Communists decided to establish a Yacheica, a

⁴⁵Ibid., 216-26.

⁴⁶A *myon* or a *eup* will be a county, and *ris* will be villages in the United State's standard.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., 235-36.

secret organization, which would be developed into a branch of the future national Communist party. After the Korea Communist Party disappeared in 1928, the Cheju Communists prepared for its re-creation by establishing a Yacheica. Changbo Kang (Cheju-eup, Sinjwa-myon), Ikwoo Lee (Guwoo-myon), Daejin Oh (Daejung-myon, Woo-myon), Hanjung Kim (Jwa-myon, Jung-myon), and Jaehong Sin (Gujwa-myon, Jeongui-myon, Seojung-myon, Dongjung-myon) were founding members.⁴⁹

Among the Communists, Gujwa-myon leaders had been involved in the women divers' movement. In Cheju, villages along the coast relied heavily on the revenue created by women divers, due to the lack of sufficient land for agricultural production. In Jeongui-myon, women divers earned almost fifty percent of the average family's income in 1926.⁵⁰ The women divers had been exploited by the Japanese, who would not pay a fair market price for the goods, especially ear shells that they worked so hard to gather. In Gujwa-myon, the disenchanted women divers sought the support of Jaehong Sin, Dobae Moon, and Moongyu Oh, who had ran night schools for them.

The three leftist leaders organized the women divers and gave them detailed instructions to follow.⁵¹ On January 12, 1932, hundreds of women divers in Gujwa-myon and Jeongui-myon encircled the car of the newly arriving chief Cheju administrator in order to request the correction of the unfair practices. Surprised by the sudden demonstration, the chief administrator fled to the police sub-station of Sehwa-ri and

⁴⁹() represents their areas of responsibilities.

⁵⁰Hujinaga Takesi, "1932nen Saisyutou Amatousou" [Women Divers' Fighting in Cheju Island in 1932], *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (August 1990): 86.

⁵¹According to the testimony of an unnamed old woman, before the day of demonstration, women divers of Hado-ri gathered at the house of Moongyu Oh and received his directions. See Sasam Yeonguso, "Hangil Jamnyo Tujaengeul Ikkeun Sahoijuui Undongga Oh Moongyu" [The Socialist Activist Moongyu Oh who Led the Women Divers' Fighting], *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (April 1992): 58-69.

attempted to flee with the help of police, but was unable to escape. Finally, the women divers were scattered by the police, reinforced by Chollanam-do police. In the end, some of the women divers' requests were accommodated by the chief administrator.⁵²

During the investigation of the women divers, the Yacheica, the secret Communist organization, was accused of being a key organizer behind the scenes of the women divers' demonstration, and about one hundred Communists in the Yacheica were arrested. Including the three in Gujwa-myon, twenty-two Communists of the 100 total were jailed. Table 1 lists the people sentenced to jail in connection with the women divers' protests.

⁵²For the details of the Women Divers' Fighting see Hujinaga Takesi, 1932nen Saisyutou Amatousou [Women Divers' Fighting in Cheju Island in 1932], 81-117.

| Name | Age | Job | Place of Birth | Years in Prison |
|-----------------|-----|------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Changyu Park | 22 | None | Ido-ri Gujwa-myon | 2 years |
| Daejin Oh | 36 | Button Maker | Hamo-ri Daejung-myon | 4 years |
| Dobae moon | 26 | Reporter, Farmer | Sehwa-ri Gujwa-mon | 3 years |
| Goohyun An | 33 | Carpenter | Dosun-ri Jwa-myon | 10 months |
| Gwansun Kang | 26 | Reporter, Farmer | Yeonpyung-ri Gujwa-myon | 2.5 years |
| Hanjeong Kim | 38 | Reporter | Gapa-ri Daejung-myon | 5 years |
| Hyangtaek Han | 28 | Farmer | Jongdal-ri Gujwa-myon | 2 years |
| Ikwoo Lee | 34 | Farmer | Hanlim-ri Guwoo-myon | 4 years |
| Jaehong Sin | 34 | Reporter | Yeonpyung-ri Gujwa-myon | 5 years |
| Jaejin Moon | 22 | Farmer | Samdo-ri Cheju-eup | 1.5 years |
| Jongsik Jang | 28 | Nome | Samdo-ri Cheju-eup | 1.5 years |
| Minhwa Kim | 31 | Farmer | Jocheon-ri Sinjwa-myon | 1.5 years |
| Moongyu Oh | 33 | Reporter, Farmer | Haro-ri Gujwa-myon | 3.5 years |
| Seongcheol Song | 20 | None | Samdo-ri Cheju-eup | 1.5 years |
| Seongo Kim | 24 | Farmer | Pyungdae-ri Gujwa-myon | 2.5 years |
| Sigon Kim | 33 | Teacher | Sehwa-ri Gujwa-myon | 2.5 years |
| Sinho Lee | 33 | Liquor Dealer | Hamo-ri Daejung-myon | 2 years |
| Soonjong Kim | 35 | Grocer | Hado-ri Gujwa-myon | 2.5 years |
| Sunil Hong | 33 | Farmer | Yongdam-ri Cheju-eup | 6 months |
| Taeon Kim | 25 | None | Hanlim-ri Guwoo-myon | 2 years |
| Taehwan Bu | 26 | Shoe Seller | Samdo-ri Cheju-eup | 2 years |
| Woonseon Go | 27 | Grocer | Hanlim-ri Guwoo-myon | 2 years |
| Yuhwan Kim | 32 | Reporter, Farmer | Jocheon-ri Sinjwa-myon | 2 years |

Table 1. Persons Connected to Cheju Yacheica⁵³

⁵³Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 239. Changbo Kang escaped from Cheju Police Station and fled to Japan during the investigation, using the *Bokmokhwan*.

The Establishment of the People's Committee

After the liberation, the Communists in Cheju and in Osaka worked together to dominate politics on the island. Following the establishment of the Committee of the Preparation for Korean Independence (CPKI) on the Korean Peninsula, Cheju leftists concentrated on building the committee of Cheju Island. Daejin Oh, Jeongro Kim, and Yonghae Kim played leading roles in creating the Cheju Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence.⁵⁴

They were charged with the responsibility of constructing the Chejudo [Cheju Island] CPKI.⁵⁵ Daejin Oh and his colleagues stayed in Mokpo, a city at the south coast during the last days of the colonial period and observed the creation process of the committee.⁵⁶ Later, Daejin Oh became a chairman of Chejudo CPKI and Chejudo People's Committee, which replaced the CPKI. Additionally, Jeongro Kim took the post of Secretary of the Chejudo Branch of KCP and Yonghae Kim took the position of the Director of the Department of Industries of Chejudo People's Committee.

According to Woonbang Lee, who worked with Daejin Oh in Daejung-myon CPKI, they moved around towns and villages to urge residents to organize the committee

⁵⁴The testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju-do Inmin Wiwonhoi Gyulseong Gwajeong" [The Process of Establishing Cheju-do People's Committee], *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (April 1990): 77. Woonbang Lee was a cadre of Taejung *Myon* CPKI and People's Committee.

⁵⁵Woonbang Lee, "Cheju-doe Isseosoui Namchosen Gwado Ipbeopuiwon Seongeo Tujaenge Gwanhayeo[About the Struggle for the Election of the South Korean Interim Legislative in Cheju-do]," *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (October 1991):71. Woonbang Lee became a director of the Department of Propaganda in Daejung-*myon* CPKI. Lee continued his activities in Daejung-*myon* People's Committee and the SKLP. After the March First Incident, he was jailed in Mokpo. Due to his imprisonment, he escaped from being involved in the 4.3 Incident. After the outbreak of the 4.3 Incident, he exiled to Japan to save his life via Busan. He left articles about the Cheju leftist movements at this time based on his experience. He now stays at Cheju-si.

⁵⁶Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong [The Activities of Cheju Committee for the Independence of Korean Independence and People's Committee]," *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (April 1990): 9.

in *myons*.⁵⁷ At the same time, they spread the knowledge of how to organize and manage the local committees.⁵⁸ Specifically, they emphasized the necessity of the connection between Chejudo CPKI with the national CPKI organization.⁵⁹

However, the three did not monopolize the movement of creating local CPKIs. In the case of Seogwi-myon, local leaders tried to form a *myon* committee by transmitting the CPKI to other provinces.⁶⁰ However, their initial attempts failed, opposed by Japanese forces in the town. But by the end of August 1945, Seogwi-myon Committee had been organized.⁶¹ This act would come to characterize the CPKI on Cheju Island as quite spontaneous and determined.⁶²

The formation of committees was centered on *myons* at first, with the island committee being created later. At the same time, *ri* committees were initiated after the formation of *myon* committees except in Daejung-myon. At first, eleven *myon* committees and one *eup* [Cheju-eup Committee] were organized by September 1945. After the formation of *myon* and *eup* committees, the Cheju Island CPKI was organized on September 10, 1945.

Communists occupied major CPKI positions of their villages. In Gujwa-myon, Dobae Moon became the chairman of *myon* CPKI and Moongyu Oh the vice chairman. In Daejung-myon, Sinho Lee became the vice chairman of the *myon* CPKI. Gyuchan

⁵⁷Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong [The Activities of Cheju Committee for the Independence of Korean Independence and People's Committee]," 10.

⁵⁸Testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju-do Inmin Wiwonhoi Gyulseong Gwajeong [The Process of Establishing Cheju-do People's Committee]," 77.

⁵⁹Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong [The Activities of Cheju Committee for the Independence of Korean Independence and People's Committee]," 10.

⁶⁰Ibid. For the broadcasting, see Chapter I page 7.

⁶¹Ibid. Committee chair was Youngguk Oh.

⁶²For more explanation see Chapter I page 7,8.

Kang became the vice chairman of Cheju-eup CPKI; he had worked at the Textile Branch at Kansai Zenkyou.⁶³

Some members of many *myon* committees and the Cheju-eup committee were conservatives.⁶⁴ Youngha Woo, the chairman of Daejung-myon CPKI, had served as the chief of a radar site at Mosulbong under the Japanese. Bonggyu Kim, the chairman of Andeuk-myon CPKI, was head of Andeuk-myon during the colonial era, and Yongguk Oh, the chairman of Seogwi-myon, was the head of Seogwi-myon before the liberation.⁶⁵ In addition, Goonchil Oh, the vice chairman of Andeuk-myon CPKI, Jungheung Hyun, the chairman of Namwon-myon CPKI, and Goonwok Yang, the vice chairman of Aewol-myon CPKI, had served as *myon* clerks and headmen of *ris* under Japanese rule.⁶⁶ These individuals enjoyed strong support from locals because of their long history of community assistance and service. Committees on the island excluded only those who were reputed to have collaborated with the Japanese.⁶⁷

In contrast, the Chejudo CPKI was dominated by seasoned Communists who had worked in Japan or on the island. The Chairman of the Chejudo CPKI was Daejin Oh, who had spent four years in jail due to his participation in the Yacheica. Hanjeong Kim, who had been in jail for five years because of his connection to the Yacheica, was elected to be the director of the Department of Social Peace. Jeongro Kim, former member of the Communist Youth Association, was called to be the director of the Department of General Affairs, and Dobae Moon, who had served in prison for three years because of

⁶³Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 336.

⁶⁴The testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1 [The 4.3 Talks] (Seoul: Jeonyewon, 2000), 70.

⁶⁵Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong," 17.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 68-80.

his ties to the Yacheica, became an executive of the CPKI. From Zenkyou, Yonghae Kim took the post of the director of the Department of Industry, Hogyung Hyun the director of the Department of Propaganda, and Monggu Cho an executive Committeeman. Among the fifteen members of Chejudo CPKI, seven were dedicated Communists who had fought against the Japanese for independence.⁶⁸

Communists of *myons* played key roles in the creation of *ri* CPKIs. In Daejungmyon, Sinho Lee, Woonbang Lee, and Daljin Moon moved around *ris* to appeal the necessity of *ri* CPKIs. Stimulated by their arguments, young men and notables organized *ri* committees. In Bookchon-ri Jocheon-myon, Taerim Kim was elected as the chairman of Bookchon-ri CPKI. He was one of the most powerful men in the village. He had run a boarding house in Osaka mainly for people from Bookchon-ri, and after the liberation he returned to his home town. *Myon* CPKI leaders Yuhwan Kim, Eunhwan Kim, and Sibeum Kim visited him to persuade him to be a *ri*-CPKI chair.⁶⁹

The Chejudo CPKI had been developing into the Chejudo People's Committee in accordance with the national trend. The Chejudo People's Committee was created on September 22, 1945 from nearly the same members of the Chejudo CPKI: Daejin Oh continued as chairman, but instead of Namshik Choi, a teacher, Hanjeong Kim became the vice chairman.⁷⁰ After the creation of the People's Committee of the island, CPKIs of *myons* and *ris* turned into People's Committees. In the *myon* People's Committees, conservative figures disappeared. Bonggyu Kim, who was the chairman of Andeuk-

⁶⁸Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong," 11.

⁶⁹Sasam Yeonguso, "Maul Yeoksa Series (1) Bookcheon-ri Yeoksa (3) [The History of Village Series (1), The History of Bookcheon-ri (3)]," 4.3 *Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (October 1991): 41-43.

⁷⁰Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 83.

myon, yielded his position in the *myon* People's Committee to a communist activist, Woonseon Go, who had been jailed due to his involvement in the Yacheica. Dobaek Lee also replaced Youngguk Oh of Seogwi-myon.⁷¹

Along with the development of CPKIs into People's Committees, the Chejudo Branch of the Korea Communist Party (CBKCP) was established in late September 1945 with Jeongro Kim as the Secretary.⁷² Cadres of the CBKCP had not been revealed, but it must have been true that most Communists in the Chejudo People's Committee were officers of the CBKCP.

Jeongro Kim dominated party affairs using his post and the connection with the Chollanam-do KCP. He gained the membership of the Chollanam-do Communist Youth Alliance in 1927, but was later jailed for two years due to his participation. During his residence in Mokpo, Chollanam-do at the end of Japanese colonial rule, he must have had connections with Chollanam-do Communists who mainly belonged to the Seoul Faction. This could be proven by the fact that he took the responsibility of creating Chejudo CPKI with Daejin Oh and Yonghae Kim, and became the secretary of the CBKCP by beating many prominent Communists.

Jeongro Kim let Cheju Communists elect the chief administrator of the island. According to the testimony of Woonbang Lee, the election of the chief administrator was conducted at the end of September 1945. Woonbang Lee recalled that Jeongro Kim led people to select Sehoon Ahn as the chief administrator, even though Sehoon An was

⁷¹Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong," 17.

⁷²Woonbang Lee, "Cheju-doe Isseosoui Namchosen Gwado Ipbeopuiwon Seongeo Tujaenge Gwanhayeo," 76.

absent. Woonbang Lee could not understand why Sehoon An was elected instead of Daejin Oh, who was the Chair of Cheju People's Committee.⁷³

Daejin Oh did not play a leading role in the committee although he was the chairman. He had his family in Mokpo and traveled back and forth to take care of them. E. Grant Meade, who served in the Chollanam-do Military Government Company, argued that Daejin Oh had no power, Hanjeong Kim and Yonghae Kim had real strength.⁷⁴ An unidentified source, a cadre of the CBKCP and later Cheju SKLP, supported this argument about Daejin Oh and Hanjeong Kim.⁷⁵

The Success of the People's Committee

The Chejudo People's Committee had enjoyed great autonomy under the military government and the inland KCP. Unlike other People's Committees, the Chejudo Committee functioned as a de-facto government and survived for a long time. The Chejudo People's Committee and the military government collaborated in many areas. In addition, Cheju Communists did not seriously follow the direction of higher Communist organizations thoroughly. After all, Communists on the island survived after the Autumn Harvest Rebellion and were able to preserve their strength.

In his book *American Military Government in Korea*, E. Grant Meade argued that the Cheju People's Committee functioned autonomously:

Cheju, With its 250,000 persons in thirteen *myon*, Cheju was Chollanam's [Chollanam-do] largest administrative unit. The People's Committee was the only party on the island,

⁷³Sasam Yeonguso, Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju-do Inmin Wiwonhoi Gyulseong Gwajeong [The Process of Establishing Cheju-do People's Committee]," 78.

⁷⁴E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government In Korea* (New York: King's Crown Press Columbia University, 1951), 185.

⁷⁵Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda* [Now I Have Talked] (Seoul: Hanwool, 1989), 161.

and for all intents and purposes, it was the only government as well. It functioned completely independently of provincial direction.⁷⁶

According to Bruce Cumings, there were several factors enabling strong and enduring People's Committees: (1) a pattern of population loss in the 1930s or early 1940s that was followed by sharp population gains after liberation, (2) land conditions in which peasants were not primarily tenants but possessed some independence and leverage within eroded or weak landlord power structures, (3) a long interregnum between Japanese and American rule, (4) either relative difficulty in communications and transportation or possession of those facilities by the committee, (5) a history of peasant radicalism, (7) a relatively differentiated occupational structure, and (8) a political complexion where, over a substantial period of time, neither Right nor Left were completely dominant, or where a dominant Left followed moderate policies."⁷⁷ Cumings stated that Chejudo was a case that embodied every condition listed above.⁷⁸

The most significant factor was "a long interregnum between Japanese and American rule." The long continuation of a power vacuum contributed to the formation of a robust People's Committee and its long existence. The rule of military government in Chejudo was established on October 27, 1945 with the inauguration of the provincial governor of Chollanam-do, Lieutenant Colonel Julius H. Lintner. On that day, the Japanese governor and other officers were replaced with American military officers.⁷⁹

⁷⁶Meade, *American Military Government In Korea*, 185.

⁷⁷Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regiments 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 348-349.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹USAFIK, "Provincial History: Cholla Nam-do Past 1945." RG554.

However, the 59th Military Government Company assigned to Cheju Island, did not land at Cheju-do until November 9, 1945.⁸⁰

The Chejudo People's Committee served as the de facto government during the transition of occupation, liberation, and the intervention of US forces. The Chejudo People's Committee also functioned as a monitor of Japanese troops on the island before their evacuation which began on October 23, 1945, in addition to accommodating repatriated Koreans. The People's Committee worked tirelessly in order to maintain social order, which contributed to its recognition as a prevailing force on the island.

Another factor that bolstered the power of the Chejudo People's Committee was the support of youth groups. People's Committees in Cheju had the manpower to enforce their policies and rules in their administrative districts. After the liberation, with creations of *myon* and *ri* CPKIs, young men built their own organizations in villages. With the launch of the Cheju CPKI, youth organizations in small towns and hamlets were integrated into Geonjun Chongnyon Dongmaeng [Alliance of CPKI Youth] by the end of September 1945. Jaejin Moon, a former member of the Yacheica, became the chairman of the Alliance. The Alliance of CPKI Youth later had its name changed to Cheju Chongnyon Dongmaeng, or the Alliance of Cheju Youth (ACY). In December 1945, the ACY had branches in *myons* and *ris* and supported the policies of People's Committees in their villages.⁸¹

Repatriated Koreans returning to their villages from Japan became a major force in the Alliance of Cheju Youth. After the liberation, many Koreans who had been sent or

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong [Progressive Youth Movements after the Liberation in Cheju]," 4.3 *Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (April 1992):27.

gone voluntarily to Japan to work in mines came back in large numbers. Most of them returned right after the liberation. Approximately 788,979 Koreans arrived from Japan by the end of 1945, and an additional 418,706 individuals departed from Japan for their home by the end of July 1947.⁸² In the case of Cheju, many islanders had moved to Osaka to seek jobs after the opening of the Osaka-Cheju sea ferry service. Repatriated Cheju people had been exposed to Communism throughout their labor movements. Without specific jobs in Cheju, many returnees naturally joined the Alliance of Cheju Youth in their villages. The exact number of members of the ACY was not clear, but it was the largest organization of its kind in the area. For example, in Gasi-ri, there were only three non-members. People did not get appropriate treatment without a membership in the ACY.⁸³

The ACY and the People's Committee had a close relationship. Local People's Committees gained control of local ACYs and both organizations used the same buildings for their offices. The ACY members became a major security force for People's Committees. The Chejudo People's Committee had direct control over the Chejudo ACY, *eup* and *myon* People's Committees also exerted control over *eup* and *myon* ACYs. However, the Chejudo ACY did not retain direct control over *eup* and *myon* ACYs. ACYs, filled with youthful members, were executive organizations of People's Committees.⁸⁴ According to Gyungheup Go, who had been the chief of the Hanlim-myon Security Force of the Hanlim-myon People's Committee and the Chair of Hanlim-myon ACY, both organizations used the same offices and the only difference

⁸²USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 16 December 30, 1945; No 98, July 27, 1947.

⁸³ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong," 33.

⁸⁴Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong," 34-36.

between the ACY and the People's Committee was the age their members; people over thirty joined the People's Committee and people between the ages of sixteen to thirty belonged to the ACY.⁸⁵

Organized by veterans of the anti-Japanese movement and equipped with the social power strength of ACYs, the People's Committees dominated Cheju Island even after the landing of 59th Military Government Company as well as before the landing of the U.S. military personnel. The foci of activities of People's Committee were maintaining social order and protecting property from the Japanese forces. A major concern in maintaining social order was protecting Cheju islanders against Japanese forces and shielding islanders who had collaborated with the Japanese against the retribution of their neighbors. The People's Committees also sought to protect Japanese assets that could later be used to benefit the people of Cheju.

During Japanese rule, village heads of *ris* and *gus* (a *gu* was a smaller district than a *ri*) had been the lowest administrative authority responsible for selecting young men to serve in Japanese forces or Japanese industries. These village heads were also charged with the task of collecting materials for the Japanese war effort. As a result, they had been the target of hostile actions by villagers who had lost family members and experienced hardships because of the decisions and actions made by the heads of *ris* and *gus*. After the liberation, furious villagers began taking revenge. People's Committees intervened in order to maintain social order. The People's Committees arranged court proceedings and handed out penalties in order to prevent extreme civil unrest.⁸⁶ On

⁸⁵The testimony of Gyungheuo Go. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong," 31.

⁸⁶Ibid, 14; Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 74.

occasion, People's Committee members assaulted Japanese soldiers in order to protect Koreans and Korean's interests. Gyungheup Go commanded his men to attack a Japanese warrant officer who was suspected of illicit activity with local girls. Evidence suggests that the Japanese warrant officer bribed a local Korean merchant, so that the merchant would arrange sexual encounters for him with local girls. Gyungheup Go's surprise attack failed as the warrant officer was able to escape from him and his men.⁸⁷

Securing Japanese properties required more organized actions. At the moment of liberation, there were seventy-two economical enterprises run by Japanese on Cheju. The People's Committee took the responsibility of managing these facilities under the control of the Director of the Department of Industries, Yonghae Kim. Jongseok Go, the Hanlim-myon Director of the Department of Industries, supervised one canned food factory and one drug company in Hanlim-myon.⁸⁸ At the same time, People's Committees prevented Japanese soldiers from selling their assets for their own benefit. In Changcheon-ri, Andeuk-myon, village residents monitored a situation in which lumber was held by Japanese forces. The village residents made sure that the assets of the lumber yard would not be sold off or destroyed. The attentive villagers would later use the lumber to build an elementary school in Changcheon-ri.⁸⁹

The activities of People Committee's were backed by the Cheju Military Government. Due to the lack of manpower and the moderate policies of People's Committees, the Military Government acknowledged the ruling power of committees. Cheju Military Government requested that the People's Committees and the ACY

⁸⁷The testimony of Gyungheup Go. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 75.

⁸⁸Testimony of Jongseok Go cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwionhoi Hwaldong," 12.

⁸⁹Ibid.; Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 75-76.

cooperate to maintain social order and to block the illegal treatment of military material by Japanese soldiers at the end of October 1945.⁹⁰ In recognition of the power and influence exerted the People's Committees and ACYs, the Military Government listed these organizations as primary recipients of official documents, and in some cases the names of ACY and People's Committee chairman appeared prior to those of local sub-station police chiefs.⁹¹ The recognition of the People's Committee as an existing power was also reinforced by the appointment of People's Committee chairman as *myon* heads. Beumgu Cho was appointed a *myon* head in Pyoseon-myon, Junghong Hyun in Namwon-myon, Sibeum Kim in Jocheon-myon, and Youngha Woo in Daejeong-myon.⁹²

At the same time, the Cheju Communists retained autonomy toward the KCP. The Korea Communist Party was rebuilt on September 11, 1945 under the initiative of Honyong Pak and his Hwayo Faction. Members of the Seoul Faction were not allowed to enter the cadre corps of the party. In this situation, Chejudo Branch of the Korea Communist Party, with its alignment to the Seoul Faction, could maintain a certain distance from the central party. The cadres did not have strong motivation to submit to the central party, which was occupied by competing factions. Although Moonseok Kang, a Cheju Communist and protégé of Honyong Pak, became a member of the Bureau of Secretary, he did not have his base on the island. After his service in the Zenkyou, he moved to China to continue his communist activities.⁹³

⁹⁰Testimony of Gyungheup of Go. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong," 34-35.

⁹¹Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong," 20.

⁹²The Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honors of Victims (Hereafter CDTRHV), 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo* [The Report of the Truth of the 4.3 Incident] (Seoul, 2003), 76.

⁹³Cheju-do, *Cheju Hangil Dokrip Undongsa*, 358.

An additional factor that made the Cheju Communists autonomous was their focus on the activities of the People's Committees rather than party activities. Because of the need to complete pressing tasks after the liberation and before the landing of the military government, People's Committee concentrated on preserving social order and protecting assets that could be used for the Cheju people. Even after the landing of the 59th Military Government Company, People's Committees continued their job as a de facto government. According to the testimony of Woonbang Lee, the Chejudo People's Committee did not foster party activities.⁹⁴

The evidence of Cheju Communists' focus on People's Committees was the delay of the creation of the Minjujueui Minjok Jeonseon or the Democratic National Fighting Front (DNFF), Minjeon. The Minjeon was established to push the pro-trusteeship movement at the initiative of the KCP on February 15, 1946.⁹⁵ After its creation, the Minjeon became an important vehicle executing the policies of the KCP. In Chollanam-do, the branch of Minjeon was created in March 1946.⁹⁶ However, Chejudo Communists did not build the counter part of Minjeon for nearly one year; the Cheju DNFF was established on February 23, 1947.⁹⁷

The autonomy of Chejudo Communists from the central KCP enabled the islanders to avoid participation in the General Strike in September and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. At the same time the islanders were able to participate in the election of representatives to the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. These events

⁹⁴Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 186.

⁹⁵For more information see Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 191-206.

⁹⁶The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 144, March 11, 1946, RG 554.

⁹⁷*Cheju Sinbo* February 26, 1947. Cited from Jaewoo Go, *Cheju 4.3 Pokdongui Jinsangeun Ireota* [The Truth of the 4.3 Cheju Rebellion Is Like This] (Cheju: Baekrok Chulpansa, 1998), 18-20.

enabled the survival of Communists in Cheju after October 1946, though the election results were surprising since the islanders selected many radicals.

At first, the Chejudo People's Committee would have been ordered not to join the General Strike in September or the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. These two consecutive events happened on the verge of merger three leftist parties. Not all of the party members of the KCP were enthusiastic about the General Strike and the rebellion. Anti- Honyong Pak leaders opposed the General Strike, which led to the Autumn Harvest Rebellion during the unification of the three socialist parties. They believed that the strike would hinder free meetings and conversations regarding the merger, which would be helpful to Honyong Pak, who preferred to merge without democratic procedure. The anti-Pak leaders, Daehoipa, or Calling Conference for Merge Faction, were represented by Young Lee, Ikhan Choi, Cheolsu Kim, Jin Kang, Daehi Kim, and Gapsong Moon. Among them, Young Lee and Ikhan Choi were Seoul Faction members. They directed local Communist Parties to refrain from joining the General Strike.⁹⁸ It is not clear if they ordered Chejudo Communists not to participate in the General Strike or the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. However, it could be assumed that Chejudo Communists might have followed the direction of the Seoul Faction instead of submitting to the central party.

The Chejudo Communists did not have an adequate environment in which to launch a general strike and insurgency. The main factor which prohibited involvement in the strike and uprising were good relations between People's Committees and police. People's Committees had been regarded as protectors of social order along with local police, so they could very well not encourage laborers to walk out or attack police sub-

⁹⁸Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 258-59.

stations. People's Committees used the same offices as police and received the same governmental documents from the military governor. The People's Committee, as the unofficial government, would not seek to destroy the social order that it had also worked tirelessly to maintain.

The cholera outbreak which had spread over southern provinces of the Korean peninsula in 1946 was also a contributing factor in the decision making process of the Chejudo People's Committee as whether or not to participate in the General Strike and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. At the onset of the cholera pandemic, the People's Committee was concerned about containing the spread of the disease. 15,748 cases occurred in 1946, of which 10,191 resulted in deaths.⁹⁹ The cholera outbreak reached its peak in June and sharply decreased in July of 1946.¹⁰⁰ In Chejudo, the first case was reported in June, and cases increased rapidly after June 18 1946. Eighteen cases of cholera were reported on June 16th, nineteen cases on the 17th, and then 106 cases on June 21st. The mortality rate of cholera in Cheju was over 50 percent, and the death toll rose to 369 of 708 reported cases by August.¹⁰¹ Despite the best efforts of American and Korean personnel, the cholera outbreak continued to worsen after August 1946.¹⁰²

The cholera outbreak prevented the Chejudo Communists from joining the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. As a main body that would conduct quarantines and

⁹⁹USAFIK Bureau of Preventive Medicine, "History: Office of Public Health and Welfare," RG 554.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹The US 6th Infantry Division, Periodic Report No 241, 242, 246, 252, 253; USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No 317 August 29, 1946. Cited from CDTRHV 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 7, 30.

¹⁰²According to the report of August 29, 1946 national cases were 10,995 and deaths were 7,193. The overall report of Bureau of Preventive Medicine implied that after August 29, cholera cases and victims increased about 50 per cent of those as of August 29 by the end of the year. As a result, cases and death toll could be assumed to 1,062 cases with 554 deaths. In fact, August 29 report described another 424 cases happened in Chejudo. In this case, considering the mortality victims could be 589 persons. CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo* [The Report of the Truth of the 4.3 Incident], 98.

isolations with the cooperation of police, they did not have any intention to harm police or burn police stations. Woonbang Lee testified that under the spread of cholera and famine, (they) could not rise (against the military government) unconditionally.¹⁰³ The main concern of the People's Committees in Cheju Island was not revolution, but cholera. Young men who belonged to Chiandae, a security force, were mobilized for the war on cholera.¹⁰⁴

With the lapse of a rebellion in October 1946, Communists in Cheju Island preserved their strength. Leftists could still dominate local politics; they even earned the trust from villagers for their devotion during the cholera struggle. It created a sheer contrast with the situation in the mainland. After the Autumn Harvest Rebellion, the majority of Koreans turned against Communists. Consequently, the Communists lost their manpower, money, and organizations, but the Cheju Communists were dominant and still enjoyed support from the masses.

The election for the SKILA showed the broad support for leftists in the local politics. Initially, participation in the election was considered by Cheju Communists in contrast to central direction to oppose it. According to the Ordinance 118 of the USAMGIK, Chejudo people should elect two representatives for their seats in the SKILA.¹⁰⁵ At the beginning, the island's People's Committee was ordered to boycott the election from the upper command of the organization.¹⁰⁶ However, soon Cheju Communists devised an idea to make the election a chance to demonstrate their power

¹⁰³Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju Jibang Geongook Junbi Wionhoiwa Inminwiwonhoi Hwaldong," 21.

¹⁰⁴Sasam Yeonguso, "Maul Yeoksa Series(1): Bookcheon-ri (3)," 49; Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 187.

¹⁰⁵See Chapter 1.

¹⁰⁶Woonbang Lee, "Cheju-doe Isseoseoui Namchosen Gawdo Ipbeupuiwon Seongwo Tujaenge Gwanhayeo," 69.

and examine islanders' supports in lieu of taking a passive stand. The movement was initiated by Cheju-eup Party's letter to *myon* parties without the permission from Cheju-do Party, and later the Chejudo Party accepted the new idea.¹⁰⁷

The result of the election and the behaviors of electives were astonishing to South Korean society and the USAMGIK. Dobae Moon and Sitak Kim were elected, and they were the only leftists in the SKILA. Both went to Seoul and announced their resignation at the building of the DNFF in December 12, 1946. They denounced the election as a plot to nullify attempts to unify Korea and its undemocratic procedure. They proclaimed that they had no intention of joining the SKILA from the beginning. At the same time, they contended that eighty per cent of the islanders were under the rule of People's Committee and they would take unified action under the guidance of the DNFF.¹⁰⁸

The Communists in Cheju achieved great success under the military government. They worked as the members of a de-facto government throughout the People's Committees. The Communists enjoyed great autonomy from the military government as well as from the central KCP authorities. Based on this autonomy, the Communists could survive the General Strike and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. As a result, the Cheju People's Committee won the two seats in the SKILA for Cheju. However, the leftists' victory in the election startled and angered the mainlanders who recently selected anti-Communism as an ideology for southern Korean society.

¹⁰⁷Ibid, 69-70.

¹⁰⁸ *Dokrip Sinbo*, December 15, 1946. Cited from CDTRHV 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 41.

CHAPTER 3

FACING EACH OTHER: THE BIRTH OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE

Cheju society should follow the experience of the larger society on the Korean peninsula. At first, the people in Chejudo worked with the Military Government, but later changed their stance. As the Military Government in Cheju expanded, the Cheju People's Committee lost its influence. The Communists became a political party faithful to the newly organized SKLP. Under orders of the SKLP, the Cheju Communists organized a street demonstration on March 1, 1947. The demonstration brought unexpected six civilian casualties. Following these tragedies, a general strike further alarmed the Military Government, due to the large number of participants and the surprising involvement of government employees. The police brutally crushed the general strike, which again drew the attention of the Military Government. By the end of May 1947, the people and the police came to despise one another.

Creation of the Military Government in Cheju

Based on the Operation "Blacklist" to occupy Japan and Korea, the XXIV Corps should occupy Seoul in the first phase, Busan in the second, and Gunsan-Jeonju line in

the final phase.¹ According to the plan, the XXIV Corps executed the sub-operations of Blacklist Operation “Baker-Forty” and “Baker-Forty one,” using the 7th Infantry Division and the 40th Infantry Division. However, the sudden diversion of the 96th Infantry Division to China to deal with a disturbance delayed the third phase operation. Instead, the 6th Infantry Division took over the mission of the 96th Division to occupy Gunsan - Jeonju line.²

The 6th Infantry Division, moved rapidly to Korea to take over the mission of the 96th Division after being attached to the XXIV Corps as of September 23, 1945. The regiments under division were ordered to install military governments in their operational areas. In the field order 1, the regiments of the division should “be prepared to assist in the establishment of military government and later post-war civil government in accordance with instructions to be issued by this Headquarters.”³ Based on the order, the 20th Regiment succeeded in occupying assigned areas and establishing a Military Government in the cooperation with the 101st Military Government Team on October 25, 1945.⁴

In Cheju, as the first governmental authority, the 59th Military Government (MG) Company landed on November 9, 1945.⁵ The 59th MG Company was activated in

¹ U.S. Army, Pacific, General Headquarters, “Basic Outline Plan for “Blacklist” Operations to Occupy Japan and Korea after Surrender or Collapse,” United States Army Military History Institute (Hereafter USAMHI), Carlisle Pennsylvania.

² USAFIK, *History of the United States Military Government In Korea* (unpublished), 13, USAMHI.

³ U.S. 6th Infantry Division, Blacklist Operation 6th Infantry Division Field Order 1 and Administrative Order 1, RG 554.

⁴ USAFIK, Provincial History: Cholla Namdo [Chollanam-do] Past 1945, RG 554 Entry 1256 Box 29.

⁵ “Unit History of the 59th Military Company.” Cited from the National Institute of Korean History (Hereafter NIKH), *Migunjeongdan Gunjeongdae Munseo*, vol. 4 [The Documents of U.S. Military Government Teams and Military Government Companies], <http://db.history.go.kr/> (accessed March 3, 2008).

Monterey, California on September 17, 1945.⁶ The company began its voyage to Korea on September 26, 1945 and landed at Incheon on October 21. The company departed Incheon on LST 657 on November 5 and arrived at Cheju four days later. The 59th MG Company consisted of nine officers and forty enlisted men under the command of Major Thuman A. Stout.⁷ By the way, the detachment from the 51st Field Artillery Battalion which was under the control of the 20th Regiment, arrived at the island on November 10, 1945.⁸

Before the arrival of a civil affairs company, the 749th Field Artillery Battalion played a role of a military government in a limited range. The 749th FAB was dispatched to repatriated Japanese troops from the island.⁹ The unit was dispatched to downtown Cheju-eup to quash fighting between two rival Korean groups on November 5, 1945. The incident was started by Boandae (later the name was changed to Chiandae), the security force of the Chejudo People's Committee, which became unnerved by the actions of Halladan members.

Halladan was formed by capable young men who had returned from the Japanese Army and desired to maintain social order independent of the People's Committee. The Halladan punished those who collaborated with Japanese and supported the repatriation of Koreans from Japan by providing a ship to transport islanders back to Cheju. Halladan

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ The CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Bogoseo*, 81.

⁹ The 749th Field Artillery Battalion consisted of fourteen officers, two warrant officers, and 503 men, was dispatched only to repatriate Japanese troops in the island on October 22, 1945. The unit left the island on November 29, 1945. USAFIK, *History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea*, Part I, Chapter VI, item: "Filling in the Void" (cited from CG XXIV Corps to CG ASCOM 24, CG the Inf Div, 15 Oct. 1945, "Evacuation of Japanese from Cheju Island to Sasebo, Japan"). Re-cited from Shin, *Cheju 4.3 Sageon-sang*, 40, 58-60.

and the People's Committee competed with each other and engaged in violence.¹⁰ Boandae members, numbering 175, beat ten Halladan members during this incident on November 5, 1945. The Boandae were seeking retribution for previous assaults carried out by Halladan.¹¹ The American troops arrested 154 Boandae members and confiscated their arms.¹²

The arrested Boandae and Halladan members were faced trial by a Korean judge and prosecutor appointed by Major Emery J. Woodall, chief of the Bureau of Justice of the United States Army Military Government In Korea (USAMGIK).¹³ He visited Cheju Island on September 30, 1945 to re-establish the judicial system due to the flight of Japanese judges and prosecutors from the island. The presiding judge was Wonsun Choi, and the prosecutors were Honggi Yang and Jonghun Park. The judge sentenced the Boandae members to pay fines of fifty yen, and found the Halladan members not guilty. The People's Committee was extremely dissatisfied with the court's decision,¹⁴ but the USAMGIK had maintained the minimum level of government in Cheju before the arrival of a military governmental company.

In Chollanam-do, military governmental companies did not have appropriate personal or material resources that would enable them to successfully complete their missions. According to E. Grant Meade, military government officers in the province could not afford to pay much attention to detailed matters, due to the multiplicity of tasks that they faced. Self-appointed individuals, along with the People's Committee,

¹⁰ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1 [The 4.3 Talks] (Seoul: Jeonyewon, 2000), 124-27.

¹¹ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 22, November 9, 1945, RG 554.

¹² USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 9, RG 554.

¹³ USAFIK, *History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea*, Part III, Chapter V, IX, item: "Restoration and Reorganization of the Judiciary." Cited From Shin, *Cheju 4.3 Sageon-sang*, 52.

¹⁴ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 124-27.

dominated local politics.¹⁵ In addition, military governmental companies did not have enough information about their areas. Even cooperation between local tactical units and civil affairs units did not happen.

The 59th Company did not have the support of the 749th Field Artillery Battalion. The initial shortage of information about the island and its poor road conditions were discussed in the report of the 59th MG Company:

Little is known about this island....Its rather small agricultural population is clustered around the margin. A road connects all the towns situated on or near the coast. The character and condition of the road are not known....It is probably a dirt road and had been reported capable of allowing a speed of 25 miles an hour....Numerous trails cross the mountains interior, or connect inland villages with the coastal road.¹⁶

At the same time, communications from Chollanam-do to the island were poor. "Air service is spasmodic, courier service only on clear days."¹⁷ Furthermore, the military government did not have the skilled interpreters that it needed to deliver and receive crucial communications.¹⁸

Under these poor conditions, Major Thruman A. Stout struggled to fulfill his duties as a governor of the island, having inherited the power of the Japanese chief administrator. Upon its arrival in Cheju, the military government team dealt with Japanese supplies: food reserves were turned over for distribution, vehicles were assigned to governmental offices and business, and medical supplies were allocated to hospitals.¹⁹ Generally, Major Stout admitted the influence of the local politics,

¹⁵ E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government In Korea* (New York: King's Crown Press Columbia University, 1951), 79.

¹⁶ USAFIK, "Provincial History: Cholla Namdo Past 1945."

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Provincial Governor Colonel Terrill E. Price confessed that the few interpreters had poor abilities in Chollanam-do on 27 April 1946. USAFIK, "Administration of Provincial Government: Cholla Namdo [Chollanam-do]," RG 554.

¹⁹ Ibid.

dominated by the Chejudo People's Committee. He asked for the cooperation of Cheju Chongnyon Dongmaeng, the Alliance of Cheju Youth (ACY), and the Chejudo People's Committee to deal with Japanese soldiers. Additionally, Major Stout appointed the People's Committee *myon* chairmen to be the heads of the *myons*.

To a certain degree, the 59th MG Company was well received by the residents of the island. The 59th Company was able to acquire the cooperation of the local people. The Military Government in Cheju continued its moderate policies up to the middle of 1946. The period coincided with the time of the leftist's absolute dominance on the island. However, there were some factors that made the islanders suspect that the Military Government intended to rule the island without much local influence.

One factor that contributed to the islanders' suspicions was the tendency of U.S. troops to fire indiscriminately at Koreans on the island. This was caused by the shortfall of appropriate education and training of the troops. The 59th MG Company had been prepared for duty in Japan; they were trained to fight. The 59th MG Company had not been trained as a liberation or governmental force.²⁰ On November 18, 1945, a Korean woman was shot to death when she exited a warehouse with Japanese clothes. In this case, the guards ordered the woman to halt using the Japanese language several times, but the woman did not follow their orders.²¹

The second killing happened at the scene of an attempted lynching on December 12, 1946. Angry villagers seeking to terrorize the head of the Jocheon-myon fled as U.S. troops emerged to prevent the violence. The vigilantes disregarded the troops' orders to halt and shots were fired. One of the shots killed a villager named Heung Kim [Hango

²⁰ USAFIK, "Provincial History: Cholla Namdo Past 1945.

²¹ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 35 November 22, 1945, RG 554.

Kim].²² Another killing occurred on December 15, 1946 when a U.S. sentry guarding a warehouse tried to stop a man fleeing from the location after having stolen Japanese supplies.²³

Firing at fleeing Koreans was regarded as an indicator revealing the nature of the Military Government. In a field order of the XXIV Corps, the use of fire was strictly confined to cases of “positive resistance” and to maintain “law and order.”²⁴ Except on two occasions, the commanders of the XXIV Corps were asked to control the use of weapons strictly, and every effort would be made to “protect Korean civilians, who were being liberated from the violence [of Japanese rule].”²⁵ However, the three killings made Koreans believe that Americans did not obey the intent of their commanders to be careful of the lives of Korean civilians. In the case of the attempted lynching, a participant testified that the U.S. soldiers fired upon arriving [without giving any order or action] which caused people to flee in panic.²⁶

Furthermore, the People’s Committee and the USAMGIK were unable to resolve their ideological positions on the broader national level. Since its establishment, the USAMGIK had been watchful of the activities of Communists under the name of the Korean People’s Republic. The Communists proudly used term “Republic” in its party name. The military government denied the existence of the Korean People’s Republic by mentioning that there was only one government, the USAMGIK, in southern Korea on

²² The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 61.

²³ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 58.

²⁴ XXIV Corps, “Tentative Field Order,” RG 554.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ The testimony of Sanghyo Kang. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 129-30. Sanghyo Kang was wounded at the place with the fire of American soldiers.

October 10, 1945.²⁷ Communists did not agree with the announcement of the USAMGIK. Furthermore, during the convention of the Korean People's Republic, which was held November 20-22, 1945, the Communists declined the request of the USAMGIK to delete the word "Republic" from its party name. The Korean People's Republic argued that changing its name would lead to confusion among the 80 percent of Koreans in the south familiar with its current title.²⁸ Though officials of the Korean People's Republic protested, the military government would eventually succeed in convincing the organization to change its name.

At the national level the Jeongpansa Incident in May, 1946 became the turning point of the military government's attitude toward to the Communists.²⁹ In Cheju, the first major clash between the military government and the People's Committee happened in June, 1946. During "The Rice Incident," leaders of the Cheju People's Committee were arrested by Cheju police.

The military government handed over some stocks of rice left by Japanese troops to the Cheju People's Committee. The problem occurred when some committee members improperly dealt with the rice. The military government issued warrants for Hanjeong Kim, the Director of the Department of Security, Hogyung Hyun, the director of the Department of Propaganda of the Cheju CPKI and later an executive of the Cheju People's Committee, and Jaejin Moon, the Chairman of the ACY.³⁰ The military government did not overlook the incident due to the escape of Hanjeong Kim and Jaejin

²⁷*Mail Sinbo*, Autumn Harvest 11, 1945. Cited from Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 119.

²⁸The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 44, Extract: Report of Convention of the Chosen People's Republic, RG 554.

²⁹For more information see Chapter I, 26.

³⁰Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 160-61; Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong [Progressive Youth Movements after the Liberation in Cheju], 4.3 *Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident]," 27.

Moon. They succeeded in capturing Hokyung Hyun, whom they jailed.³¹ Kim and Moon never returned to the island.

Nonetheless, the 59th MG Company managed to maintain good relations with the Chejudo People's Committee in general, at least until the end of December 1946. The relationship was the result of the collaborative efforts of the Military Government and the People's Committee on the island. The report below was released on December 9, 1945 by the Department of Public Information of the USAMGIK regarding the political situation on the island during that time.

They [members of the People's Committee] are still the mild leftist socialistic minded people of that era of Korean history. Police, American personnel, and the general public all say that there has never been any trouble or riot on the island. People's Committee representatives have given their word to the Korean Police that there will be no riots in the future....Heard from the Provincial Chief Prosecutor, the rightist groups complain that the police and Military Government do nothing to suppress the People's Committee.³²

The report revealed that the Military Government and the People's Committee made endeavors to avoid conflict with each other by working toward the common good. The report disclosed that the People's Committee should be treated as a legitimate public organization as opposed to an enemy threat. To the officers of the USAMGIK in Seoul, the moderate policies of the Military Government toward the People's Committee were difficult to understand. To the right-wing nationalist conservatives of the island, the military government's inclination to collaborate with rather than confront the Communists was more than hard to comprehend. It was unpardonable.

In addition to the recognition of the Military Government, the Seoul newspapers reports reported the dominance of leftists on the island. On December 10, 1946, reporters

³¹ Ibid.; the testimony of Woonbang Lee cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 186.

³² USAFIK, "Report of trip to the Province of Cheju during the period 4-6 December 1946 by under director of the Department of Public Information, Arthur N. Feraru," December 9, 1946.

from major newspapers were invited to visit Cheju Island by the USAMGIK. The USAMGIK invited the reporters with the hope that their inspection and findings would silence rumors that the United States was seeking to install military bases on the island.³³ The reporters not only fulfilled the expectations of U.S. officials, but also left valuable records about the political situation of Cheju. The most common observation about Cheju was the dominance of the People's Committee on the island, and the second was the delay of industrial rehabilitation. Factories of alcohol and canned food in Cheju had not fully recovered because of a deficient budget and scarce material resources.

The Military Government watched the movement of the leftists carefully, and, if necessary, prompted the police to take action. Despite the influence of the People's Committee, the Cheju police arrested an islander who spread leaflets that demanded the arrests of all Japanese collaborators. The police also removed posters that asked for rice and posters that opposed the election for the members of the South Korea Interim Legislative (SKILA). Police actions were extremely harsh at this time, evidenced by the fact that they even jailed a citizen for eight months for verbally waging opposition to Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee in a conference.³⁴

However, the Military Government continued to tolerate the leftists, even favoring them on the island. The military government allowed the People's Committee to have various gatherings in order to avoid conflict with the organization. According to Changsong Moon, a former policeman of Cheju during the 4.3 Incident, the police of Cheju gave permission to leftists for outdoor gatherings. However, the police prohibited conservatives from holding meetings. As a result, Moon speculated that some leftists had

³³ *Donga Ilbo*, December 19, 1946. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 48-9.

³⁴ *Dokrip Sinbo*, December 19, 1946. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 46-7.

infiltrated the police force, which led to his decision to enter the system [to rout leftists from the police force].³⁵

The Military Government might have felt it was necessary to cooperate with the Communists to accomplish goals that would be hard to achieve without the cooperation of the People's Committee. Rice collection and cholera control were two primary instances where collaboration was essential. The farmers would not move without a request from the People's Committee to support the policy of the military government. In 1946, the Chejudo quota for rice collection was 5,000 suk of 7,000 suk for the annual harvest, the smallest quota among the provinces. The total quota was 4,358,000 suk and the second smallest quota was 60,000 of Gangwon-do, a mountainous province in central-eastern Korea.³⁶

Collecting rice in Cheju seemed a hard job for the military government. The reports of the rice collection from the National Food Administration, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and Statistics Section do not reveal the number of collected rice from Chejudo. Instead Chejudo's rice quota collection was reported within the numbers of Chollanam-do. The amount of rice collected from Cheju and Chollanamdo was 110,360 suk as of December 31, 1946; the quota for Chollanamdo was 750,000 suk, the second biggest quota next to that of Chollabuk-do of 798,000 suk.³⁷ In any case, the amount of rice collected from Chejudo was likely to insignificant to be recorded. In the next year, the rice collection quota of Cheju was reduced to 2,500 suk.³⁸ This evidence

³⁵ Interviewed by Kyengho Son at his home on July 8, 2006.

³⁶ USAFIK National Food Administration, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Statistics Section, "Rice Data," RG 554.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

illustrates that the rice collection in Cheju was a wearisome job for the Military Government.

In addition, control over cholera was an ordeal for the military government as well as for residents of Cheju. Due to the lack of manpower, the military government required the cooperation of the People's Committee. Rather than police officers, young men from villages were assigned the duty of preventing possibly infected strangers from traveling through cholera zones, thereby reducing the risk of further contamination. Members of committees worked to contain patients and infected families. Remains of the dead were buried with the help of People's Committee members or the Alliance of Cheju Youth (ACY).

At the same time, the military government did not have a strong right-wing group to support the Military Government. Rightists on the island existed in relatively small numbers and were without coherent organizations. The branch of the League of Youth for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (LYRRKI), which was affiliated with the Korea Independence Party (KIP) of Kim Ku, was not organized until March 15, 1946.³⁹ After its creation, the members of Cheju LYRRKI began holding conferences to gain members and to spread its own ideology. The rightist members had problems in accomplishing their goals due to the strong influence of the local People's Committees and ACYs. In Aewol-myon, Hanlim-myon, Jocheon-myon, and Daejung-myon rightists could not hold meetings, and in some cases the organizers were actually stoned by villagers.⁴⁰

³⁹ The testimony of Changsong Moon. Interviewed by Kyengho Son at his home on July 8, 2006; Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3eun Malhandu vol.1, 148-49.

⁴⁰ The testimony of Moon.

National rightists never took an active role in local politics. Unlike other provinces, Syngman Rhee did not campaign or orate on the island. The absence of the charismatic nationalist contributed to the failure of the local conservatives to gain influence within their communities. There were no mass gatherings prepared by rightists and no enthusiasm for their movement.

Instead of Dr. Rhee, Kim Ku visited the island on July 14, 1946, but the impact of his visit was less than inspirational. Before the arrival of Kim Ku, rightists organized the Cheju branch of the National Society for Rapid Realization of Korea Independence (NSRRKI) on July 9, 1946.⁴¹ Again, the growth of the Cheju NSRRKI was not impressive; activists criticized the failures of the organization and the ordered the resignation of cadres during a meeting on January 15, 1947.⁴²

The USAMGIK needed to maintain social order so that it could install a provincial system of government in Cheju, which became effective August 1, 1946, by Ordinance 94. Rightists on the island petitioned the military government for their right to form their own self-governing province on several occasions.⁴³ The rightists surmised that by becoming an independent province from Chollanam-do, they would gain commercial and agricultural developments, utilizing Cheju Island's specific geographic location and climate.⁴⁴ In addition, because of the poor infrastructure, the central

⁴¹ *Donga Ilbo*, July 26, 1946. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 35-6.

⁴² *Cheju Sinbo*, January 18, 1947. Cited from, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 59.

⁴³ Honseok Kim, Wonsun Park, Woosang Park, Myunghyo Park, Jongsil Park, Chunghee Kim, Namhyun Kim, Sunyoung Hong, Yunhee Lee, Namsik Choi, Honggi Yang, Jonghyun Kim organized Committee for the Promotion to a Province and petitioned to Major Genral Arnold and later Lerch. Cheju-do, *Cheju-doji* [History of Cheju-do] (Cheju, 1993), 14-15.

⁴⁴ *Seoul Sinmun*, July 13, 1946. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 34.

government promised to handle provincial problems of commerce, industry, finance, education, and healthcare on Cheju Island.⁴⁵

In order to accomplish the complicated goals, organizations expanded, people were moved, and new officers were elected. According to the Seoul Sinmun or Seoul Newspapers on July 13, 1946, two *guns* – Namcheju-gun and Bukcheju-gun, were established to supervise *myons* under the direction of the province. Namcheju-gun was supposed to control seven *myons* in southern Cheju: Seongsan-myon, Namwon-myon, Jungmun-myon, Daejung-myon, Pyoseon-myon, Seogwi-myon, and Andeok-myon. Bukcheju-gun dealt with Cheju-eup and five *myons* in northern Cheju: Gujwa-myon, Chuja-myon, Hanlim-myon, Jocheon-myon, and Aewol-myon. Chuja-myon consisted of small islands around Cheju.⁴⁶ Two rightists were selected to act as the heads of the guns; for the head of Namcheju-gun Youngjin Kim was selected, and Myonghyo Park for the head of Bukcheju-gun.⁴⁷ Gyunghun Park was selected to be the Korean governor as the counterpart to Major Stout, who was designated as the Military Governor.⁴⁸ In addition, governmental workers in Chollanam-do who had been involved in Cheju affairs were ordered to move to Cheju.⁴⁹

One of the most important things to occur during the provincial administrative independence movement was the expansion of Cheju police forces. Directly following the liberation, there was only one police station in Cheju-eup and sixteen police sub-

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ *Dokrip Sinbo*, August 13, 1946. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 36.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ *Seoul Sinmun*, July 13, 1946.

stations with 101 policemen, fifty-one of whom were Korean.⁵⁰ Like other administrative organizations, police had been under the jurisdiction of Chollanam-do, but due to the promotion of administrative independence, Cheju-do, Cheju Province, came to have an independent police agency. Based on its small population, Cheju-do was allowed to run a downsized command, the Cheju Inspection Command, in lieu of full divisional organizations.⁵¹ Daebong Kim became the first inspection commander after having previously worked as an entrepreneur and a newspaper reporter.⁵²

In any case, changes in the police organizations meant the expansion of the police forces. The table of organization of Cheju-do Police in 1948 stipulated the total strength of the Cheju-do Inspection Command as 500 policemen along with 313 patrolmen. The inspection command consisted of five sections: Administrative, Uniform, Detective, Public Relations, and Communications. The territorial divisions created the 1st District Command and the 2nd District Command. The Police Academy undertook recruitment and training.⁵³ However, the increase of police strength was not realized immediately. In June 1947, the total strength of the Cheju-do Police was 231 officers and patrolmen. Among the officers and patrolmen, eighty-four percent did not have pre-liberation experience as colonial policeman.⁵⁴

In order to conduct the promotion of administrative independence for the province, the military government required the time and cooperation of Cheju leftists. Developing administrative districts, moving persons, and expanding organizations were not easy tasks.

⁵⁰ Cheju-do, *Cheju-doji*, 11-4; USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 26, Autumn Harvest 5, 1945. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo* [The Report of the Truth of the 4.3 Incident] (Seoul, 2003), 86.

⁵¹ *Donga Ilbo*, August 29, 1946. Cited from the CDTRHV. *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 137.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ USAFIK, *History of Police Department*, RG 554.

⁵⁴ *Summation*, No. 21, 31-2.

The military government wanted to maintain the stability of the political situation so that it would be able to realize independent administrative governance. For this reason, the military government had to be careful not to agitate Cheju leftists.

The Change of Communists

On the other hand, leftists on the island faced changes caused by the emergence of a strong Communist party. After the Autumn Harvest Rebellion, the Communists who followed Honyong Pak succeeded in absorbing all the other Communist parties into the SKLP.⁵⁵ The fusion meeting was held on November 24 and 25, 1946 in Seoul.⁵⁶ In accordance with the dominance of the Hwayo Faction among other Communist groups, the party leadership of Cheju Communists would be altered. In addition, Cheju leftists made efforts to recruit party members just as the mainland SKLP branches had done.

The Communist leadership on Cheju Island understood the meaning of the Hwayo Faction's dominance in the newly born SKLP. It signified that the Seoul Faction in the Cheju Communist party would no longer dominate party affairs. Based on the change from the Korea Communist Party to the South Korea Labor Party at the national level, Cheju leftists renamed their party the Cheju Committee of Chollanam-do SKLP on December 25, 1946, one month after the fusion meeting in Seoul.⁵⁷ In addition, the Communists selected new leadership; Sehun Ahn became the chairmen of the committee,

⁵⁵ For more information see Chapter II page 30-34.

⁵⁶ *Chosen Ilbo*, November 27, 1946.

⁵⁷ Testimony of Youngha Woo who had been the head of Daejung-myon CPKI and later People's Committee of the myon. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 180-81. Regardless of promotion of Cheju-do to a province, Communists still stuck to sub-structure of Chollanam-do.

and Monggu Cho, the director of the Department of Organization.⁵⁸ Daejin Oh and Jeongro Kim lost their power as the chairman of the Chejudo People's Committee, and the secretary of Cheju Committee of Chollanam-do KCP. At that time, Hanjeong Kim, the real power of the Cheju People's Committee, was not on the island in order to avoid arrest for his role in the Rice Incident. At any rate, the exclusion of these three figures from top positions displayed the latest characteristics of the Cheju Committee of Chollanam-do SKLP (Cheju SKLP). The three belonged to the Seoul faction, and the Communists in Cheju-do began to accept the rule of the central SKLP by eliminating the influence of the Seoul faction within their cadre structure.

After the emergence of the SKLP, party recruitment became the main task for Communists. In fact, the KCP lost many party members and organizations during the General Strike and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion on a national scale. Although the party became the SKLP by combining the New People's Party and the People's Party, new memberships were essential for party activities. In addition, the SKLP presented its image as a popular party not limited in the ideological sense, which made gaining membership easier for people.⁵⁹ The SKLP had mainly concentrated on increasing

⁵⁸ The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 94; Jeongsim Yang, *Cheju 4.3 Tujaeng Yeongu* [The Research about Cheju 4.3 Uprising] (Seonggyungwan Univ. Ph.D. Diss., 2005), 36. Jaewoo Go and Seodong Park argue that the creation of the Cheju Committee of Chollanam-do SKLP was conducted on February 1947 in their books, Jaewoo Go, *Cheju 4.3 Pokdongui Jinsangeun Irotta* [This is the Truth of the Cheju 4.3 Rebellion] (Cheju: Baekrok Chulpansa, 1998), and Seodong Park ed., *Yongwonhan Wooridurui Apeum 4.3* [The Our Everlasting Pain, 4.3] (Cheju: Taehwa, 1990).

At the same time they reveal detailed information of the committee like following: Sehun An became the Chairman of the committee, Sinho Lee the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Younghong Kim the Director of the Department of General Affairs, Monggu Cho the Director of the Department of Organization, Changwook Lee the Director of the Department of Finance, Yonghae Kim the Director of the Department of Propaganda, Changlim Jwa the Director of the Department of Women's Affairs, Eunhwan Kim the Director of the Department of Youth, and Yonggwon Kim the Department of Agriculture. Go, *Cheju 4.3 Pokdongui Jinsangeun Irotta*, 15, Park, *Yongwonhan Wooridurui Apeum 4.3*, 6.

⁵⁹ Namsik Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu* [The Study of the South Korea Labor Party] (Seoul: Dolbege, 1985), 276.

membership and “swaying the populace into adherence to the leftist principles” in 1947.⁶⁰

In accordance with the policy of the central SKLP, leftists on the island tried to expand party membership and bring the general public into party organizations. Cheju Communists began to recruit members for the SKLP at the end of 1946.⁶¹ Youngha Woo obtained a party membership at this time. Although he had been the chair of the Daejung-myon People’s Committee, he could not become a member of the KCP due to his service for the Japanese.⁶² At first, recruiting was limited to one or two men per village. Later, two or three men were accepted as party members, and finally, after mid - 1947, every volunteer was allowed to have a party membership.⁶³ By this process, party membership reached around 3,000 by March 1947.⁶⁴ The Cheju Communists succeeded in turning broad supporters from the islanders into organized forces by enlisting party members under the flag of the SKLP.

At the same time, the leftists created subsidiary organizations around the SKLP. The Chosen Minju Cheongnyon Dongmaeng [the Alliance of Chosen Democratic Youth] or Mincheong, was the main Communist youth organization on the island. The Seoul branch of the organization was created on April 22, 1946, and the national organization meeting was held three days later.⁶⁵ Cheju Mincheong was established on January 12, 1947⁶⁶, and *myon* Mincheongs were created thereafter. Jocheon-myon Mincheong was

⁶⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 98, July 27, 1947, RG 554.

⁶¹ The testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 188.

⁶² Testimony of Youngha Woo. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 181.

⁶³ Ibid.; Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 198.

⁶⁴ The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 94.

⁶⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 98, July 27, 1947, RG 554.

⁶⁶ *Cheju Sinbo*, January 10, 1947. There was notification of holding ceremony of establishing Mincheong. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 58.

built on January 25, 1947,⁶⁷ Gujwa-myon on January 30,⁶⁸ Seogwi-myon and Hanlim-myon on February 9,⁶⁹ Daejung-myon on February 10,⁷⁰ Cheju-eup and Namwon-myon on February 16,⁷¹ and Aewol-myon on February 22.⁷² ACYs were simply converted to Mincheongs in most cases.

The strength of the Mincheongs was as great as that of the ACYs. The number of representatives at organizational meetings was formidable: Jocheon-myon 100, Gujwa-myon 279, Hanlim-myon 350, Cheju-eup 300, Namwon-myon 100, and Aewol-myon 424.⁷³ In villages, Mincheong came to dominate local politics as the ACYs had once done. In many cases, the Mincheong were almost the only organization for young men and women in villages. An unnamed man testified that if a person did not belong to a Mincheong, he or she would face discrimination.⁷⁴

In contrast to ACYs, which submitted to village People's Committees, the Mincheong had a vertical command line of their own; *do* Mincheong commanded *myon* Mincheongs directly.⁷⁵ The leadership of the Mincheongs was more respected than the leadership of the ACYs. Taeksu Kim, who led the Mincheongs, was a seasoned Communist and a veteran leader, whereas Jaejin Moon, who led the ACYs, was far younger and less experienced. For this reason, Mincheongs were considered more

⁶⁷ *Cheju Sinbo*, January 28, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 63.

⁶⁸ *Chju Sinbo*, February 4, 1947. Citer from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 69.

⁶⁹ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 16, 1947; *Cheju Sinbo*, February 20, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 81-4.

⁷⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 16, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 81.

⁷¹ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 18, 1947; *Cheju Sinbo*, February 20, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 83-5.

⁷² *Cheju Sinbo*, February 24, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 86-87.

⁷³ Above citations of *Cheju Sinbo* of foot notes from 76 to 80. Cases of Seogwi-myon and Daejung-myon had total numbers of representatives and observers which were 600 and 500.

⁷⁴ Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 221.

⁷⁵ Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong" [Progressive Youth Movements after the Liberation in Cheju], *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (April 1992):37- 40.

prestigious than ACYs. Taeksu Kim had the same credentials as Jeongro Kim, who had been the Secretary of the Cheju KCP. The power of the People's Committee decreased as that of the SKLP increased.

The emergence of a strong Mincheong leader and the unique directional system of Mincheongs revealed the demise of the People's Committee in Cheju. The main cause of the waning strength of the People's Committee was the embarkation of the provincial system. Woonbang Lee recalled that the People's Committee had failed by missing the chance to take administrative power on the island.⁷⁶ With the expansion of its administrative apparatus, the Military Government could handle the details of public lives. Leftists could no longer expect to hold control of villagers due to the infiltration of governmental authorities.

The characteristics of the Cheju Communist party were changing significantly due to its diminishing role as an administrative body. The change from the KCP to the SKLP was not a change in title alone. Cheju Communists under the KCP had been administrators working with officials of the military government. In this way, The People's Committee was a ruling apparatus, not strictly tied to the central party leadership. At the same time, youth organizations supported the People's Committees, not party organizations. Specifically, Communists had relied on broad support from the strength derived from the general public in their capacity to carry out the policies of People's Committees.

However, under the SKLP, Communists were no longer administrators, but mere party members. Although the People's Committee still existed, it was not the center of

⁷⁶ The testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 186.

Communist activities. With new leadership, Cheju Communists became more obedient to central organizations. Mincheongs were not supposed to be auxiliary units of the People's Committee. Instead, Mincheongs were strong subsidiary organizations of the SKLP under assertive leaders with their own command line.

Amid the rapid increase of leftist strength, the Military Government began to lose its trust in the people of Cheju, due to smuggling and a bribery incident. Since the liberation, Cheju had been infamous for smuggling because of its geographic location.⁷⁷ As a result, Koreans with connections in the Military Government tried to make a fortune. On January 11, 1947, the *Boksihwan* was seized due to suspicion of smuggling by the Coast Guard. It was revealed that government interpreters plotted to sell confiscated materials illegally using their influence. The government interpreters, the Coast Guard, and the Cheju police were involved in the illegal transportation and sale of materials, intimidation of smugglers, bribery, and corruption. The problem was that the Cheju police chief, Woogyun Sin, who had inherited his position from Daebong Kim,⁷⁸ had received bribes from the interpreters.⁷⁹ Later Shin was summoned to a committee for a hearing with the Korea National Police. In Shin's absence, Insu Kang took the post of chief of police.⁸⁰ This incident severely crippled the prestige of the Military Government.

Meanwhile, leftists consolidated their power by launching another organization. On February 23, 1947, Communists on the island established the branch of the Minjujueui Minjok Jeonseon, the Democratic National Fighting Front (DNFF) or

⁷⁷ A comment on Cheju Island in a G-2 report of the USAFIK read following: Cheju-do is an island province off the southwestern coast of Korea. It is frequently mentioned in mail interception as a rendezvous of smuggling activities. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 452, February 10, 1947, RG 554.

⁷⁸ *Seoul Sinmun*, December 8, 1946. Cited from the the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 40.

⁷⁹ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 12, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 76-80.

⁸⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 20, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon jaryojip*. vol. 1, 85. Kang was director of the General Affairs of the National Police Academy.

Minjeon.⁸¹ Since its inauguration on February 15, 1946, the central DNFF had focused on bringing representatives of diverse social and cultural organizations from southern Korea under its influence. The DNFF was the largest subsidiary organization of the SKLP. One year after the formation of the central DNFF, Cheju Communists organized the branch. It may have been a natural step for Cheju Communists to have a DNFF branch after the center of their activities had moved from the People's Committee to the SKLP.

The DNFF held various organizations within its domain. At the formation meeting, representatives of social organizations attended as well as Communists. To symbolize the broad spectrum of the characteristics of the DNFF, Ilseon Lee, the supreme monk of Gwaneum Buddhist Temple, was elected to one of the chairmanships. The other two chairmen elected were Sehun Ahn and Hogyung Hyun.⁸² The standing committee consisted of Communists; Jeongro Kim was appointed to act as the director of the Department of Administration and the director of the Department of Administration, Changrim Jwa the director of the Department of Propaganda, Bonghyun Kim the director of the Department of Culture, Sangjo Jung the director of the Department of Investigation, and Doohun Kim the director of the Department of Finance.⁸³

Although, Jeongro Kim gained two positions, he did not recover his former power among Communists on the island. The main power of the Cheju branch of the DNFF rested in the hands of Sehun An. In fact, before the creation of the Cheju-do DNFF, there was a conflict between the Communists. At the beginning of February 1947, Daejin Oh

⁸¹ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 26, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 88-90.

⁸² Four Vice Chairmen were Taeksu Kim, Yonghae Kim, Sanghun Kim, and Changheun Oh. Ibid.

⁸³ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 26, 1947, Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 91.

and Jeongro Kim lost their positions in the Central Committee of the Cheju Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP at a meeting at Hagwi-ri in Aewol-myon. At the meeting in November of 1946, Woonbang Lee suggested the removal of Daejin Oh and Jeongro Kim accepted it. At the same time, Jeongro Kim was excluded by the initiative of Monggu Cho. Two posts in subsidiary organizations like the DNFF were not significant to Communists. Entering central committees was more important in the world of Communists. Interestingly, Daejin Oh's exclusion was actively supported by Jeongro Kim when he still held power as the secretary of the Chejudo Committee of the KCP. Jeongro Kim, removed from the top position of Cheju Communists during the change to the SKLP, lost his seat in the central committee at this time.⁸⁴

At this meeting, Sehun An conflicted with Monggu Cho, who had been the director of the Department of Organization of the Chejudo Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP. Sehun An scolded Monggu Cho for criticizing Moonseok Kang, who was working tirelessly at the central SKLP. When Monggu Cho and Moonseok Kang were in Japan, they clashed with each other about the difference in direction of their activities. Later, Monggu Cho continued his movement in Japan and returned to his home island, but Moonseok Kang joined the inner circle of Honyong Pak. Sehun Ahn's attitude explicitly showed the dominance of pro- Honyong Pak group among Cheju Communists at that time. Monggu Cho did not protest this trend.

Another important indicator of this trend was the ascent of Dalsam Kim. Dalsam Kim was a son-in-law of Moonseok Kang. His real name was Jinseung Lee. He went to

⁸⁴ The testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju-do Inmin Wiwonhoi Gyulseong Gwajeong [The Process of Establishing Cheju-do People's Committee]," *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (April 1990): 84-5.

a middle school in Kyoto and later entered Chuou University. After his marriage, he spent some time in Daegu and came back after the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. He taught history at Daejung Middle School three or four months with the recommendation of Woonbang Lee.⁸⁵ According to Woonbang Lee, Dalsam Kim was at the meeting.⁸⁶ It reveals that Dalsam Kim already possessed an important position in the Cheju SKLP even before the break of the March First Incident.

The March First Incident

The Cheju DNFF had a specific mission from its birth. At its initial meeting, Sehun An mentioned holding the memorial ceremony of the March First Movement and pledged to conduct it peacefully.⁸⁷ The March First Movement occurred in 1919 when Koreans fought to achieve independence from Japanese rule. It was the first major movement that the general public participated in. Since the liberation, both leftists and rightists attached great importance to the March First event as a symbol of national unity against foreign interference. The Cheju DNFF selected the March First memorial service as the first rally in which they would mobilize people under their flag.

In fact, the SKLP planned to hold the memorial service at the national level and exploit it for political purposes. The Communists intended to urge the resumption of the U.S-Soviet Joint Commission through demonstrations at the memorial services. Because the SKLP leaders approved the decisions of the Moscow Conference, they hoped that the SKLP would be the organization to which the commission would grant trusteeship and

⁸⁵ Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 189, 237.

⁸⁶ The testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju-do Inmin Wiwonhoi Gyulseong Gwajeong [The Process of Establishing Cheju-do People's Committee]," 84-5.

⁸⁷ Cheju Sinbo, February 26, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 88-90.

the accompanying power. At that time, the SKLP was the only prominent party that supported the idea of trusteeship. To expect this react, reopening of the U.S-Soviet Joint Commission was essential. The March First commemoration, in the estimation of the SKLP, provided the perfect opportunity to realize their aspirations.⁸⁸

The Cheju SKLP began to prepare for the event during the ides of February in two ways. First, the SKLP used its own cell organizations on the island to popularize the activities of the March First ceremony. The cells were organized according to administrative units and places of business. On February 16, 1947 the Chejudo Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP sent orders regarding plans for pre-meditated violence to each cell organization. The orders contained the goals for the March First ceremony of inciting violence, directives of the fighting, and slogans. The Cheju SKLP ordered *eup* and *myon* cells to organize committees for the March First memorial service to mobilize representatives of businesses and social groups, such as Women's League. In the case of schools, committees would be organized by teacher and student representatives. Every cell would report the estimated number of participants by February 24, 1947, to the Cheju SKLP, and open preparatory meetings by each committee to urge member participation from February 25-27, 1947. Commanders and two or three guards, who were selected by committees, were designated to move people into place on March 1, 1947.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ *Dokrip Sinbo*, March 1, 1947. Cited from, Institute for Military History Compilation (Hereafter IMHC), *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jeonsa* [The History of Pacifying Operations of the 4.3 Incident] (Seoul: Gukbangbu, 2002), 77.

⁸⁹ The Cheju-do Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP, "Orders for the March First Memorial Fighting." Cited from Go, *Cheju 4.3 Pokdongui Jinsangeun Irotta*, 21-2. Later, Cheju-do police announced that the SKLP members prepared the March First Memorial Fighting since February 16. *Cheju Sinbo*, March 28, 1947.

The second way in which the Cheju SKLP prepared for the event was by using subsidiary organizations like the DNFF and Mincheong to mobilize non-Communist organizations. On the date of the planning meeting, the chairman of Cheju DNFF, Sehun Ahn, appealed to the participants to have a peaceful demonstration at the March First memorial service. Additionally, before the creation of the DNFF, Sehun Ahn organized the Cheju-do Committee of the March First ceremony with party members and representatives from social organizations and schools at the house of Doohun Kim on February 17, 1947.⁹⁰ The members present at the meeting created the committee, agreed to follow the directions of the committee, and elected Sehun Ahn as the chairman of the committee with Kyungho Hyun and Changheun Oh as vice chairmen.⁹¹ The gathering included local elites from a wide range of occupations. Changeun Oh was a doctor who served as the head of the Cheju Provincial Hospital.⁹² Even Chabong Kim, the vice chief of Cheju-do Police, was elected as the director of the Department of Finance.⁹³

In the case of Mincheongs, their well established cell organizations in small villages were used to mobilize people because the members of Mincheongs were composed of dynamic young villagers. Core members of Mincheongs were SKLP members of which the majority were radical Communists. Cheju-eup Mincheong sent letters urging participations in the March First movement to villages in the *eup* on February 25, 1947.⁹⁴ Based on the letter, Communists in Mincheong aimed to gain the support of the general public for the Communists' to reopen the U.S. – Soviet Joint

⁹⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 18, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 83.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3 *eu Malhanda* vol.4 [The 4.3 Talks] (Seoul: Jeonyewon, 1997), 206.

⁹³ The testimony of Chabong Kim at the court on May 6, 1947. Next day, he cancelled his position. *Cheju Sinbo*, May 8, 1947. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3 *eu Malhanda* vol.4, 171.

⁹⁴ Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong," 40-1. Letters from Cheju-do Mincheong to *eup* and *myon* Mincheongs might have sent the letters before February 24, 1947.

Commission using the March First ceremony. The slogans of Mincheong included; “To practice the resolutions of the Moscow Conference” and “To transfer political powers to People’s Committees.”

The Military Government endeavored to prevent a violent confrontation on March 1, 1947. The Military Government had been informed about the Communist plan to use the March First commemoration as a chance for a massive demonstration. Communist papers calling for riots and acts of terrorism were confiscated by the military government in Suwon at the end of January, 1947.⁹⁵ At the same time, clashes between leftists and rightists were expected. As a result, the Military Government took steps to prohibit marching as part of the demonstrations for the March First memorial. The Cheju-do police announced that marching would not be allowed on February 18 and on February 22.⁹⁶ In addition, police reinforcements, consisting of fifty officers, were dispatched from Chungcheongnam-do and Chungcheonbuk-do to Cheju-do on February 21, 1947.⁹⁷

The Cheju Communists worked to put the March First ceremony and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion in the same light. They thought that the March First Movement in 1919 had failed due to the lack of significant support from the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Communist party, and the lack of the formation within working class. In contrast, the Autumn Harvest Rebellion experience provided more favorable conditions compared with the March First Movement; the existence of the Soviet Union, the many victories of Democracy [Communism] in Europe, and the strong leadership of the KCP over farmers and the working class. However, the Autumn Harvest Rebellion

⁹⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 445, February 1, 1947, RG 554.

⁹⁶ Cheju Sinbo, March 18, 1947; *Cheju Sinbo*, February 24, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 84.

⁹⁷ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 20, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 85.

failed due to reactionaries such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku and “betrayers” who compromised it with the USAMGIK.⁹⁸ Based on this analysis, Cheju Communists stressed the idea that in order to be successful on this occasion, they must learn from the Autumn Harvest Rebellion, and apply those lessons for the March First Movement.⁹⁹

In order to deal with the anticipated mob actions of the March First event, Cheju police also applied lessons learned from the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. During the rebellion, police stations had been the main targets. The victims of attacks were mainly policemen and their families in most villages. Based on this experience, the Cheju police set the focus of operations on protecting the First District Police Station in Cheju-eup and the building of the Cheju-do Inspection Command as well as maintaining order in the streets. Armed policemen, with machine guns, deployed at the two points.¹⁰⁰ Specifically, U.S. troops were dispatched at the front of the Cheju-do Inspection Command headquarters under Captain John S. Partridge, the advisor to the Cheju police.

Cheju police mobilized all the reserves of local police and reinforcements. Cheju police directed some reinforcements to guard the First District Police Station with a machine gun on the top of the station. Then, American soldiers and Korean police officers were set to defend the Inspection Command. A truck-mounted machinegun was dispatched to the Inspection Command to support American and Korean police officers. In addition, the police used patrolmen to regulate gatherings and disperse them. Finally,

⁹⁸ A letter sent from Cheju-do Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP to cell organizations February 20, 1947. Cited from IMHC, 4.3 *Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa*, 80

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Testimonies about machineguns refer only the tow spots. See Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3 *Jeun Malhanda* vol.1, 262-285; Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 26-28.

mounted police troops were deployed for liaison purposes.¹⁰¹ The total strength of the police in Cheju was 430 men and officers, along with 100 reinforcements.¹⁰² The reinforcements had experienced the Autumn Harvest Rebellion first hand and understood the capabilities of angry mobs.

Without knowing the posture of the police, Cheju Communists pushed their plan of holding an aggressive memorial ceremony. About 25,000 people were mobilized to the event that was held at North Elementary School in Cheju-eup. According to the reports of executive officials at the ceremony, 17,000 people were mobilized from the SKLP, Mincheong, DNFF, and Women's League, and 8,000 were simply participants.¹⁰³ Considering that the total population of Cheju-do was 300,000, this gathering made record numbers. In other places, services were held within the administrative districts. In Daejung, 6,000 people participated in the ceremony at Daejung Elementary School.

The memorial ceremony at North Elementary School ended with an unexpected clash between the police and villagers, resulting in six deaths. After an outdoor service, the huge crowd began to march through the streets of Cheju-eup around 2:00 p.m. Approximately 10,000 people poured out of North Elementary School and marched along designated routes. The marching unit was organized into five columns; the first unit of the march included the local branch of Jeonpyung, The Korean National Assembly of Laborers' Unions, which led the General Strike in 1946. The last unit was the unified

¹⁰¹ The mounted police troop was organized at the end of January 1947 to cope with emergencies. *Cheju Sinbo*, January 26, 1947.

¹⁰² The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 497, February 27, 1947, RG 554.

¹⁰³ Cheju-do Police, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* [The History of Cheju Police] (2000, Cheju), 684. Cited from IMHC, *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa* [The History of Pacifying Operations of the 4.3 Incident] (Seoul, 2002), 87. The number was recorded on "3.1 Ginyom Haengsaui Jinsang Bogoseo" [The Report of the Truth about 3.1 Memorial Service] possessed by Wanbae Kim who was the chair of Jocheon-myon Mincheong. The report was revealed in *Cheju Gyungchalsa*.

Aewol-myon group.¹⁰⁴ One group moved toward the west, passing the First District Police Station through South Gate Road and West Gate Road. The marching group threatened to destroy the police station and the jail by organizing their bodies into an “S” formation when they passed.¹⁰⁵ The other group marched east, passing the Cheju-do Inspection Command. Marchers sporadically shouted “Wassha![Hurray]” to raise their overall morale.

The Cheju police fired on the mass by accident near the end of the March First ceremonies. After a group of marchers passed the police station, a mounted police officer unintentionally rode over a child and then tried to flee the scene of the accident without regard for the child’s condition. Spectators who were near Gwandeukjeong unsurprisingly became enraged by the despicable behavior of the police officer and began to stone him. Stunned by the action of the demonstrators, the mounted police fled to the police station. A howling mob of nearly 200 pursued the mounted police officers toward the gates of the police station. The guards who were close to Gwandeukjeong opened fire on the crowd, as did policemen in the watchtower. The police may have been unjustified in firing, but the officers may have frightened from their experience with violent mobs in the infamous Autumn Harvest Rebellion. Four protestors were shot to death, and the two

¹⁰⁴ Cheju-do Police, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* [The History of Cheju Police] (2000, Cheju), 683-684. Cited from IMHC, 4.3 *Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa*, 89.

¹⁰⁵ USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 79, March 20, 1947, RG 554; the testimony of Yonggi Kim. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3eun *Malhanda* vol.1, 277.

that were mortally wounded.¹⁰⁶ Most victims were shot in the back as they fled the gunfire.¹⁰⁷

Soon after the incident near the First District Police Station, a small group of student marchers was confronted by U.S. soldiers and Korean police in front of the Cheju Inspection Command. The police immediately ordered the students to disperse, which infuriated the students. The students vigorously attempted to break the police line, but the officers held firm. The students abandoned their attempts after being informed by reporters of the *Cheju Sinbo* that the police had already fired upon and killed other demonstrators.¹⁰⁸

The second shooting happened at the Provincial Hospital. A police officer named Moongyu Lee, who would be responsible for the shooting, was sent to the hospital to protect a fellow officer who was being treated for injuries suffered from a car accident before March 1.¹⁰⁹ Lee was a member of the Chungcheongnam-do reinforcement detachment. During the massacre, Lee showered bullets into the crowd indiscriminately releasing horrific noises of gunshots and screams, and leaving bloodied bodies strewn about the area. For whatever reason officer Lee had become mentally damaged. He inflicted serious wounds to two passers by and beat nurses and doctors.¹¹⁰ His mad shooting delayed proper treatment for persons injured from police fire in front of the police station.

¹⁰⁶ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 262-285; Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 26-28; USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 79, March 20, 1947, RG 554; the testimony of an unnamed person cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 26-28.

¹⁰⁷ The testimony of a physician who examined bodies of the victims. *Dokrip Sinbo*, April 5, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 144.

¹⁰⁸ Testimony of Jinsu Kim, the reporter who persuaded students. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 283-284.

¹⁰⁹ USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 79, March 20, 1947,.

¹¹⁰ See testimonies in Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 278-281.

The first consequence of the March First ceremony was the destruction of the previously successful relationship between the islanders and the police. The March First ceremony was the first major conflict between residents and police on the island. Unfortunately, the conflict resulted in long-lasting, mutual hatred. At the planning meeting of the Cheju DNFF, Yonghae Kim mentioned that there were a few hostile police officers on the island, and that this low number might make it difficult to generate public outrage.¹¹¹ His statement accurately shows that the police and the islanders had good relations before the March First incident.

Communist leaders should have been more considerate in their planning of the memorial ceremony rather than pushing for unauthorized marches. The six deaths of spectators proved to be a fatal blow to the integrity of the Cheju SKLP. Although the Communists preached that they had learned a lesson from the events of the notorious 1946 Rebellion, the incidents of the March First demonstrations proved that they had learned nothing. As a U.S. Weekly Summary indicated, many Korean National Police were killed or severely wounded during assaults on police stations by protestors during the Autumn Harvest Rebellion.¹¹² For the police, attacking their stations would not be tolerated under any circumstances. The Cheju police even took the precaution to dispatch two officers to protect a vulnerable, hospitalized colleague from possible attacks during the March First ceremonies. After his return to Cheju, Byongok Cho stated that the actions of police stemmed from the bitter experiences of the Autumn Harvest

¹¹¹ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 26, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 88-90.

¹¹² USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 79, March 20, 1947.

Rebellion.¹¹³ The Cheju SKLP should have been more attentive not to provoke the police by showing hostility near police and avoiding any sort of miscommunication.

Islanders' attitudes after the incident were decidedly expected. Families of the victims in the Provincial Hospital were obviously upset about the actions of the mentally unstable police officer. Handbills criticizing police behavior and requesting a formal apology from police were distributed on the streets in Cheju-eup and other *myons*. The funeral service for Jaeok Park, who was killed by the police, was conducted with the participation of every resident of Dodu-ri on March 8, 1947. Deep sadness and fierce anger dominated the hearts of all participants in the service.¹¹⁴ Condolence money was raised by islanders for the victims.¹¹⁵

The Cheju-do police exacerbated the situation by taking steps to further upset the islanders. The police report on the events of the time of the shootings was littered with inaccuracies. Police attempted to justify the actions of officers by arguing that the shootings occurred in response to protestors who had encircled the police station and threatened its officers. The police further reported that marchers had encircled the Cheju-do Inspection Command and the residence of the Inspection Commander.¹¹⁶ In addition, the police declined the suggestion of the DNFF for a joint investigation on the incident.¹¹⁷ Instead, as part of their investigation, the Cheju-do police arrested staff members of the Committee for the March First Memorial Service and students of the elite middle schools; twenty-five students were arrested on March 2, 1947. Rumors that the

¹¹³ *Dokrip Sinbo*, March 21, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 117-18.

¹¹⁴ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 18, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 96.

¹¹⁵ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 8, 10, and 12. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 96-9.

¹¹⁶ *Hanseong Ilbo*, March 4, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 94-5.

¹¹⁷ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 8, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 94-5.

police had beaten and tortured the students were widely circulated.¹¹⁸ Finally, the Cheju police requested the reinforcement of 100 officers from Chollanam-do.¹¹⁹

The March 10 General Strike

Communists devised a way to exploit the incident of March First. They plotted to launch a general strike that would appeal to the embittered islanders. The Communist call for a general strike was well received and widely agreed to by the islanders. Not only workers of private companies, but also government employees and even some local police joined the strike. The military government was of course, surprised, and its reaction became more intense. Hundreds of people were arrested and tortured under suspicion of prodding violence during the March First incident. As a police investigation proceeded, islanders came to hate the police even more than before.

The general strike reflected mass support for action and central approval for action. The Chejudo Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP could not take measures to deal with the incident without receiving a decision from the central party. Members of the Chejudo SKLP were concerned about losing the trust of the general public, due to the casualties suffered on the March First event.¹²⁰ Daejung-myon Communists suggested launching a general strike as “a peaceful resistance” to police brutality.¹²¹ The idea of the peaceful strike was adopted by the Cheju SKLP, and a cadre meeting was held on

¹¹⁸ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 8, 14. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 95, 105.

¹¹⁹ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 500, March 3, 1947, RG 554. The reinforcement was dispatched on March 1, 1947 by a ship.

¹²⁰ Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* [The History of Cheju Police] (2000, Cheju), 688-89. Cited from IMHC, *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa*, 94.

¹²¹ Woonbang Lee, *Migun Jeomryonggi Cheju-do Inmin Banje Tujaeng* [The Cheju People's Anti-imperialistic Fighting under the U.S. Occupational Period] (1991, Unpublished), 38.

March 5, 1947 at Haengbaek Kim's house in Cheju-eup agreed on guidelines for the general strike.¹²²

First, the Communists immediately organized the SKLP Fighting Committee for the 3.1 Incident, naming Yonggwan Kim as chairman and Jeohaeng Lee as vice chairman.¹²³ In addition, the Communists decided initial directions for the protest in the following list;

1. To launch general strike in every work place and other forms of resistance
2. To organize a committee for the 3.1 incident with people who were not recognized as SKLP members to disguise the protest as a voluntarily movement
3. To start the general strike from the noon of March 10, 1947
4. To execute Donghyo Kang, Cheju-do Inspection Commander, and the policemen who opened fire as murderers
5. To submit proclaims to the military government by work places.¹²⁴

Based on the decision at the meeting to stress the spontaneous movement of the islanders, the SKLP established the Committee for the March First incident on March 9, 1947 under Sehun Ahn's chairmanship. The vice chairman was Sunyong Hong, who was the chairman of the Cheju-do Branch of the rightist Korea Independence Party.¹²⁵ Before the creation of the committee for the March First incident, the Chejudo SKLP sent directives to cell organizations in Cheju-eup and every *myon* on March 7, 1947.¹²⁶

The directives of the Chejudo SKLP revealed its unpleasant predicament. The March First movement was planned by the order of the central SKLP, and it produced unexpected casualties. However, the central party did not give clear directions for further

¹²² Cheju-do Police, *ibid*; Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* [The History of Cheju Police] (1990, Cheju), 289. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3eun Malhanda vol.1, 295.

¹²³ Cheju-do Police, *ibid*.

¹²⁴ Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa*, 689. Cited from IMHC, 4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa, 94; Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* (1990, Cheju), 289. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3eun Malhanda vol.1, 295.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*.

action. Reflecting upon this uncertainty, the directives included the phrase of “based on the suggestion of Daejung-myon.”¹²⁷ The phrase enhanced the authority of the Cheju SKLP under the situation lacking central orders for movements. But, the Chejudo SKLP had not been recognized as a provincial party by the central party. The Chejudo SKLP was a mere committee that belonged to the Chollanam-do SKLP. Therefore, Chejudo Communists should have waited for the decisions from the Chollanam-do party.

However, if the directive was really based on the suggestion of Daejung-myon, the story would have been different. Daejung-myon’s suggestion could be regarded as Dalsam Kim’s, who was the son-in-law of Moonseok Kang, agreement on the general strike. In fact, Dalsam Kim was dispatched to suggest the idea of the general strike by Daejung-myon to the Chejudo SKLP, and was implored to write the directive by the Chejudo SKLP.¹²⁸ The Cheju Communists should have expected that there must have been unofficial communication between Kim and Kang about future actions or that the Cheju-do SKLP’s actions would be approved later by the central party.

The Communists focused on exploiting the situation for their goals. The March First incident was clearly a good pretext with which to incite people to challenge the Military Government. The Communists intended to use the incident to mobilize people to challenge the policies of the Military Government and especially of the police. In addition, they wanted to create the pre-conditions for further “proletarian revolution.”

¹²⁷ Sasam Yeonguso, *Cheju Hangjaeng* [The Resistance of Cheju] (Seoul: Silcheon Munhaksa, 1991), 189, cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3 *Jeun Malhanda* vol.1, 294; Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* (1990, Cheju), 289, cited from Sin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Ha*, 68.

¹²⁸ The testimony of Woonbang Lee, cited from Sasam Yeonguso, “Cheju-do Inmin Wiwonhoi Gyulseong Gwajeong,” 87-8. Woonbang Lee lamented that Dalsam Kim inserted the phrase stemmed from personal heroism to show off the initiative of Daejung-myon. If it is true, other Communists might have believed that the idea of the general strike had come from some higher places in the SKLP. In addition, it will imply that Dalsam Kim had strong influence in the Cheju-do SKLP at that point.

The directive that the aims of the general strike were to continue the goals of the March First incident, gain legal status for the party, to launch a decisive final blow to weaken reactionary groups and the military government, and to achieve preparedness in thought and action for the popular protest for second stage of the revolution, which was armed resistance.¹²⁹

Following the directive from the Chejudo SKLP, government employees held a meeting at noon on March 10, 1947 to request that the truth of the March First incident be revealed by the Investigation Committee, consisting mainly of governmental representations. The Investigation Committee predictably declined. One hour later, an employees' convention at the provincial office was opened with the presence of Korean governor Gyunghun Park and the director of the Department of General Affairs, Doohyun Kim, along with another one-hundred participants.¹³⁰ The employees read their prepared statement and announced the beginning of their strike. At the same time, the teachers and students of Cheju Agricultural School, Ohyun Middle School, Cheju Middle School, and the Teacher's School made a similar statement and then closed their doors. In addition, *gun* and *eup* offices, post offices, wireless communication offices, and food distribution offices were closed. At the same time, private companies such as transportation companies and bank branches joined the general strike.¹³¹ In total, 41,211

¹²⁹ Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* (1990, Cheju), 289. Cited from Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Ha*, 69.

¹³⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 12, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1 vol.1,98-100.

¹³¹ Ibid.

workers from 166 organizations participated in the general strike.¹³² Even sixty-six police officers, mainly from Cheju-do, joined the general strike.¹³³

The slogans for the general strike were designed by the Cheju SKLP. The Cheju SKLP generated eleven general slogans and sixteen specific slogans for various groups: teachers and students, labors, farmers, policemen, and citizens. Each strike group was asked to select some general slogans and specified slogans.¹³⁴ Generally, strikers asked for the punishment of the head of the Cheju Inspection Command and police officers that had killed islanders. Those on strike asked that the use of torture be banned and that islanders arrested because of involvement in the March First incident be released, and that compensation for the victims' families be provided. In addition, the slogans of students and teachers asserted, "Do not intervene in matters of schools!" "Guarantee the minimum standard of living for teachers and students!" "End the process of establishing a national university!"¹³⁵

The strike of the Cheju-do people alarmed the military government. Strikes of private companies were acceptable, but the participation of government officers and police was taken seriously. To investigate the truth, the head of the Korea National Police, Byongok Cho flew to Cheju on March 14, 1947.¹³⁶ On his arrival, he declared

¹³² Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* (1990, Cheju), 290. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 116.

¹³³ *Jungwoi Sinbo*, April 2, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 135.

¹³⁴ Cheju-do Police Bureau, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* (1990, Cheju), 289. Cited from Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Ha*, 71-2.

¹³⁵ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 12, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 98-100.

The opposition to establishing a national university was an irrelevant issue to the 3.1 Incident. In early February 1947, the military government pushed for a national university by merging scattered colleges around Seoul to promote the efficiency and quality of education. However, the SKLP encouraged students and professors to protest it. Cheju middle school students adopted this slogan for their struggle against the 3.1 Incident.

¹³⁶ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 16, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 110.

that the total collapse of governmental functions brought him to the island and that he had the authority to protect the lives and property of the people. He further stated that he would root out the subversives who led Cheju-do to chaos by deceptive propaganda and destructive plots.¹³⁷

In his statement, Cho clearly revealed the reaction of the Military Government on the Cheju crisis; the military government was shocked by the success of the Communist movement and determined to crush Communist organizations on the island. The incomparable success of the general strike, which included the participation of government officers and police in Cheju-do evoked serious concerns within the Military Government. The distress now felt was similar to the anxiety experienced when two leftists from the island were elected for the SKILA, and, as one of the leftist officials commented; eighty-percent of the residents of Cheju-do were united under the leadership of the People's Committee beginning at the end of 1946. In March 1947, Cheju-do looked like an island captured by the appeal of Communism, ousted from the peninsula in 1946 by the government's suppression of the Autumn Harvest Rebellion.

Dealing with the general strike meant arresting Communists and Communist suspects by the Military Government. In his interview with the *Cheju Sinbo* on March 12, 1947 Major Stout, governor of Cheju-do, mentioned that all striking groups seemed to have the same origin.¹³⁸ On the *G-2 Periodic Report* from March 14-17, 1947, the USAFIK analyzed that hatred of the police after the March First incident had been "encouraged by agitation from the South Korea Labor Party."¹³⁹ Those assumptions

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 14, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1,104.

¹³⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 481, March 17, 1947, RG 554,.

were proven to be true by the Cheju Police when they confiscated documents of the SKLP about the March First tragedy and the general strike.¹⁴⁰

According to Woonbang Lee, the police discovered letters summoning members for a gathering of the SKLP at the house of a Daejung Elementary School teacher. With this finding, lower structures of the SKLP in Daejung-myon and cell organizations of teachers became apparent. In addition, directives for the general strike were found at the house of a party member at Sincheon-ri. Woonbang Lee confessed to the police about the involvement of the SKLP in the March First incident and the general strike.¹⁴¹

A massive wave of arrests overtook the island. The KNP dispatched a three-hundred reinforcement force of police officers from Chollanam-do and Chollabuk-do on March 12, 1947.¹⁴² By March 28, 1947¹⁴³ the police arrested 230 individuals for their alleged involvement in the general strike. The number increased to five-hundred by April 10, 1947.¹⁴⁴ At first, Mincheong members of Seongsan-myon were arrested for distributing handbills.¹⁴⁵ Later the scope of the arrests and investigations were widened to include the staffs of any business or organization that had joined the general strike.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, the cadres of the Cheju-do DNFF were arrested under the suspicion of plotting the general strike.¹⁴⁷ Even major government officials were arrested for investigation; the director of the Bureau of Commerce and Agriculture Gwanho Lim, the

¹⁴⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 28, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 128.

¹⁴¹ The testimony of Woonbang Lee, cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Cheju-do Inmin Wiwonhoi Gyulseong Gwajeong," 86-8.

¹⁴² *Cheju Sinbo*, March 14, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 108.

¹⁴³ *Seoul Sinmun*, March 30, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 129.

¹⁴⁴ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 12, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 154.

¹⁴⁵ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 16, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 111.

¹⁴⁶ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 18, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 113.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

director of the Department of Education Gwanseok Lee, and the director of Department of Account Sanyeom Kang had to speak to the investigations.¹⁴⁸

Islanders became more hostile to the police, with their primary concerns being increasing police brutality by island police and their mainland reinforcements. On March 18 and April 1 of 1947, a reporter of the *Cheju Sinbo* revealed concerns regarding the suspected practice of torture and other illegal technique used by the police reinforcements during the interviews with Insu Kang, chief of Cheju-do Inspection Command.¹⁴⁹ Specifically, the islanders had become more fearful about the actions of police from the mainland. After all, officers from the mainland had opened fire in front of the First District Police Station and at the Provincial Hospital. Combining with inherent animosity against the people of the mainland, hatred for the reinforcement officers increased sharply. Strained relations between the islanders and the police contributed to the assaults of islanders on police sub-stations in Chungmun-myon and Woodo Island off Seongsan-myon on March 17, 1947.¹⁵⁰

Cheju society had changed a great deal since the autumn of 1946. The growth of administration system brought about by the implementation of a provincial system weakened the influence of the Chejudo People's Committee. In addition, the rise of young Communists who were loyal to the SKLP and Mincheong, far more radical than the ACY, shifted the fundamental orientation of the Communists of Cheju-do. They did not follow all the directives of the central party any longer, and as a result, at the moment

¹⁴⁸ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 4, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 139.

¹⁴⁹ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 18, 1947; April 4, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 112-13, 138.

¹⁵⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, March 24, 1947; March 28, 1947, Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 123, 128.

of the creation of the Cheju-do DNFF, the Cheju Communists transformed themselves into a more hostile organization that sought to challenge the military government.

The March First incident changed beyond repair the once cooperative relationship between the police and islanders. Unlike Koreans in other provinces, the Chejudoans had maintained peaceful relations with the police, regardless of, leftist dominance in politics. The six deaths on March 1 and the following general strike destroyed the relations between the police and the people. Many islanders did not understand the implications of the unusual success of the general strike. The Military Government remembered the shock of 1946 while dealing with Cheju problems. In order to prevent any further outbreaks of civil unrest, the Military Government along with the Korean Police would be more ruthless in rooting out Communism.

CHAPTER 4

RUNNING AGAINST EACH OTHER: RISING TENSION AND THE COMING CRISIS

With low strategic value and a limited budget for Korean defense, the United States decided to withdraw its forces from Korea after the impasse at the second Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission. The United Nations was considered as an alternative protector to the United States. At the end of 1947, the United Nations decided to hold a general election to establish a unified, independent Korea if possible. However, the Soviet Union opposed the idea and blocked the activities of UN Commission on Korea in northern Korea.

Meanwhile, the Military Government and Cheju Communists sparred more fiercely than ever before. A rightist governor, supported by the Cheju police and reinforced by many mainland recruits, ruled the island. Newly emergent, strong rightist youth organizations began confront the Communists with the intimidation of street politics. The Cheju Communists struggled to maintain their party organization and their influence over the islanders by forming new organizations, strengthening their propaganda activities, and constructing secret bases in Halla Mountain.

The Cheju Communists followed the directives of the Chollanam-do SKLP in preparing the March disturbance of 1948 and initiating the February violence of that same year. With the exposure of the SKLP organization, the Cheju Communists encountered the threat of collapse and decided to rise against the Military Government. After the decision of the Cheju SKLP, the Chollanam-do SKLP encouraged the action and guided the movement of the Cheju SKLP. The 4.3 Incident brought a new phase of Communist resistance in modern Korean history.

Exit Korea

In Washington D.C., about two and a half days after the beginning of the March 10 General Strike in Cheju, President Truman delivered a famous speech to a joint session of the 80th Congress, asking for \$400 million to support “free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure.”¹ Although, the “Truman Doctrine” proclaimed to support the people who were under the threat of Communism, the assistance of the United States had to be done within budget constraints, and it focused exclusively on Europe based on “the Marshall Plan.”

After World War II, the United States had reduced its federal budget dramatically in the process of demobilization. In the fiscal year 1945, the budget was \$92,712 million, of which \$82,965 million was earmarked national defense. In the next year, the U.S. federal budget decreased to \$55,232 million, and military spending to \$42,681 million. In addition, in the fiscal year 1947, the U.S. budget was reduced to

¹ Truman Library, “Special Message to Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” March 12, 1947, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/> (accessed February 5, 2008)

\$34,396 million and the budget for national defense was lowered to \$12,808 million.² The \$400 million was the maximum amount committed to overseas anti-Communism endeavors in the fiscal year 1947.

The Truman Doctrine was good news for Europeans, but not for South Koreans. At the end of February 1947, before the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the officials of the Department of State designed a Korea aid proposal. The Korea aid package provided \$600 million for “economic rehabilitation, and educational and Governmental improvement.”³ Within the proposal, \$250 million would be used in fiscal year 1948. This was an increase of \$113 million from the War Department’s budget for occupied areas.⁴ Before the State Department brought the Korea plan to Congress, the Truman Doctrine was announced, explicitly formulated to assist Greece and Turkey. When Congress reviewed the Korea aid plan, the legislators declined it, due to concerns of a possible financial deficit.⁵

The officials of the U.S. State Department wanted to display firm support for Korea in order to contain the Soviet Union’s influence in Asia. Unlike Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who wanted to pull out U.S. forces from Korea based on its low strategic value, the State Department hoped to strengthen the position of the United States by showing a solid commitment to a free Korea. Patterson reluctantly agreed not to

² The White House, “Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 2004, Historical Tables, Table 6.1-Composition of Outlays: 1940–2008,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/> (accessed February 7, 2008).

³ “Memorandum by the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea,” February 25, 1947, *FRUS* 1947, vol. VI, *The Far East*, 608-09.

⁴ *Ibid*, 614.

⁵ Hubert S. Ellis of West Virginia said in mid April 1947 that “there is no doubt that a transfusion for Korea and a bloodletting for Uncle Sam to the tune of \$600 million is in the making and will be presented to Congress after the disposal of the Greek-Turkish question.” In addition, Congressman of Pennsylvania Robert F. Rich remarked that “we must economize or bust....We will wreck our country unless we can balance our budget.” Cited from Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1981), 95-6.

oppose the passage of the Korea aid plan on the suggestions of the State Department.⁶ Because the U.S. was so focused on providing funds to assist Europe, the Korea aid package was ignored.⁷

Before the Korea aid bill was rejected, Secretary of State George C. Marshall made a proposition to Foreign Minister Molotov to reopen the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission to resume talks about establishing a provisional Government and a unified administration. Marshall handed a letter to Molotov urging the Soviets to reconvene the Joint Commission on April 8, 1947. In the letter, Marshall criticized the Soviet Union for ignoring U.S. suggestions to reopen the commission, and for neglecting to fulfill the promises of the Moscow Conference.⁸

The U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission reopened talks on May 21, 1947 with a glimmer of hope. In the northern part of Korea, the Soviet Union had already consolidated a socialist regime. After removing Mansik Cho from the chairmanship of the Pyongan Nam-do People's Committee because of the trusteeship issue, Russian officials rapidly expelled nationalists from positions in Governmental institutions.⁹ On February 8, 1946, the Communists in the north established Bukchosun Imsi Inminwiwonhoi, or the Temporarily North Korea People's Committee (TNKPC), as an administrative organization.¹⁰

At the same time the Russians changed North Korean society by executing land reform at the beginning of 1946. On January 2, 1946 the commander of the USSR 25th

⁶ Letters to Times, John Carter Vincent to editor. *New York Times*, January 30, 1957.

⁷ William W. Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 81-2.

⁸ "The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State," April 2, 1947, *FRUS* 1947 vol. VI, *The Far East*, 623-25.

⁹ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 148-67.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Army, Colonel General Ivan M. Chistiakov, gave the order to finish basic inventory of lands by February 15, 1946.¹¹ Extensive land reform followed: nearly half of the land was confiscated and redistributed to landless peasants.¹² Of 1,121,295 families working in agriculture, 405,603 lost their land without compensation. About 724,522 poorer families received confiscated lands.¹³ In the case of landlords and “national traitors,” North Korean Communists took not only land but also houses, tools, livestock, and every other means of production.¹⁴ After land reform, the wealthy, and traditionally conservative class lost their economic base in northern Korea; eighty-seven percent of landlords moved to the south of Korea. Eventually, the northern area of Korea turned into a monolithic society, consisting of farmers that had benefited from the Communist reform and the Communist party bureaucrats.¹⁵

The Russian Communists organized People’s Committees as formal Governmental institutions. The law for the People’s Committees was announced September 5, 1946, one week after the creation of the Chosun Labor Party. The election for representatives of provinces, cities, and counties was conducted on November 3, 1946. In February, 1947, Bukchosun Inminwiwonhoi or the North Korean People’s Committee (NKPC) was launched as a supreme sovereign organization. It was one year after the emergence of the TNKPC. With the successful creation of the NKPC, the Soviet Union consolidated the foundation of North Korea as a separate state.¹⁶

¹¹ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 184.

¹² Total agricultural land was 4,856,807.7 acres, and confiscated land was 2451958.3 acres.

¹³ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 196-197.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 200.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 196-211.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 268-93.

The reconvened U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission ended without any success for the independence and unification of Korea. The Soviet Union again tried to exclude the participation of nationalist and conservative groups in South Korea in the consultant organization of the interim Korean Government. The Soviet Union did not need to cooperate in establishing a unified Korea. The Soviet occupational zone already became a friendly country, according to the comments of Stalin and Shtykov. The Russians Communists strove to prevent any further development of Korea into a healthy anti-Communist country, which would have been possible through decisions of the Joint Commission.

Due to the impasse of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission and the failure of the Korea aid bill, the officials of the State Department began to consider bringing the case to the United Nations.¹⁷ The officials believed that if the United States withdrew from Korea, the Soviet Union would dominate the nation. This would damage the prestige of the United States by causing disenchantment among small countries struggling against the Communist threat. The United States needed to show that it did not abandon its responsibilities for those countries. At the same time, the United States needed to reduce the financial burden in protecting Korea from Soviet dominance.¹⁸

The United States discussed the challenges in Korea at the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 17, 1947. During the general debate, Secretary of the State Department George C Marshall stated that: "We do not wish to have the inability of two powers to reach an agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the

¹⁷ Stueck, *The Road to Confrontation*, 88-95.

¹⁸ SWNCC 176/30, "Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Korea," August 4, 1947, *FRUS* 1947, vol. VI, *The Far East*, 738-741; Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 119-21.

Korean people to independence.”¹⁹ Then Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, criticized the United States for violating the Moscow Conference agreement.²⁰ The process to the U.N. resolution about Korea was the continuous confrontation between U.S led countries and the Soviet bloc.²¹ Finally, based on a U.S. proposal, the United Nations decided to conduct a general election no later than March 31, 1948 to choose representatives for a national assembly and to form the United Nations Temporarily Committee on Korea (UNTCOK) to supervise the process.²²

The Confrontation Becomes Imminent

In Cheju, the conflict between the Military Government and the Communists heightened after March 1947. The March First Incident and the March 10 General Strike turned the Cheju Communists into “the enemy” in the eyes of the Military Government. The SKLP and the DNFF came under the surveillance of Cheju-do police, and the members of these organizations were regarded as agitators and subversives. From their perspective, the Communists hated the massive arrests and the brutal interrogation by the police.

The year of 1947 brought increased conflict between Communism and nationalism. The two Communist-led disturbances caused an ideological confrontation in Cheju society. The character of the confrontation was the struggle between Communism,

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol.17 September 28, 1947, 620, <http://heinonline.org/> (accessed February 10, 2008).

²⁰ Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: the Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950* (Hague: Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 15.

²¹ Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 122-126; Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea*, 14-20.

²² United Nations General Assembly Resolution 112(II), November 14, 1947. <http://daccessdds.un.org/> (accessed February 11, 2008).

advocated by local leaders, and nationalism, pushed by governmental authorities that came from mainland. As a result, common islanders in villages and hamlets defined the ideological confrontation as the conflict between “themselves” and “others.”

Cheju islanders retained a deep rooted heritage of fighting against outsiders. The islanders rose against tax collectors, who were mainly Catholics, in April 8, 1901. The Catholics had been exiled to the island in the 1860s during the Chosun Government’s persecutions and gained many converts through the endeavors of French missionaries.²³ According to John Merrill, “as the most modernized group on the island and the least attached to the traditional social structure, Catholic converters quickly found places on the staff of the tax agency.”²⁴ The islanders, who suffered from heavy taxes, were to prodded by local officials. The locals wanted to continue corrupt businesses that had been criticized by missionaries and the tax collectors appointed by central Government.²⁵ In addition, Japanese fishing companies supported the islanders by providing swords and rifles to maintain their lucrative fishing in Cheju waters.²⁶ The result of all of the compounded tension materialized in the massacre of Catholics by islanders. The massacre was led by Jaesu Lee, a subordinate of the head of Daejung County.²⁷

Furthermore, due to the island’s isolated location, Cheju natives often married neighbors, which resulted in the formation of very close-knit, even clannish relationships. Even as late as the 1970s, 79.8 percent of families in rural areas of Cheju were engaged

²³ John Merrill, “The Cheju-do Rebellion,” *The Journal of Korean Studies*, vol. 2 (1980): 143.

²⁴ Ibid., 144.

²⁵ Okhi Kim, *Chejudo Sinchuknyon Gyonansa* [The History of Sinchuk Persecution in Cheju] (Taehwa Chulpansa, 1980), 37-60. Sinchuknyon is the thirty eighth year in Chinese cyclical sixty year system. In this case, the Sinchuknyon indicates the year of 1901.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

in same-village marriages or in neighboring-village marriages.²⁸ These types of local marriages made the relationships among villagers strong and resulted in an aversion to outsiders. At the same time, the unique dialect of the island played a role in excluding mainlanders from the society of the island people. The intra-village marriages and the unique local culture contributed to the islanders' strong sense of family and unity.

At the beginning of the ideological confrontation, the Military Government replaced the American advisor and the Korean governor of Cheju-do. In fact, on February 15, 1947, the Military Government appointed a Korean governor rather than an American governor. American governors were reassigned as advisors to Korean governors. As a result, Gyunghun Park became as the governor of Cheju-do and Major Thurman A. Stout served as the chief civil affairs officer of the island.²⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Russell D. Barros was appointed as the chief civil affairs officer replacing Major Stout on April 2, 1947.³⁰ At the same time, Haejin Yu replaced Park on April 20, 1947.³¹ Haejin Yu was a member of the Korea Independence Party an ultra nationalist party led by Kim Ku.³²

As directed from Seoul, Governor Haejin Yu concentrated on eliminating Communists from Cheju-do's administrative apparatus and Communist influence from Cheju's security forces. He fired officials in Cheju Government and subsidiary organizations which had been involved in the March 10 General Strike after his inauguration. Later, mainlanders who had strong anti-Communism credentials filled the

²⁸ Jaeseok Choi, *Chejudoewi Chinjok Gwangye* [The Kinship Relationships in Cheju] (Seoul: Iljisa, 1984), 142-143.

²⁹ USAMGIK, Appointment No. 118; Removal No. 101. Cited from Sanggyun Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Sang* [Cheju Island 4.3 Incident vol.1] (Cheju: Hanguk Bokjihaengjeong Yeonguso, 2000), 378.

³⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 6, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 147.

³¹ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 22, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 161.

³² Ibid.

vacancies. Yu cancelled the license of a midwife due to her affiliation with Communism. He did not give permissions for leftist gatherings but encouraged rightist groups. His strong anti-Communist attitude angered the islanders. The special report of Lt. Col. Lawrence A. Nelson, asserted who investigated the Governor Yu from November 19, 1947 to February 28, 1948, that Yu's rightist policies increased the number of Communists increased who became to organize subversive underground.³³

In addition, Yu's inefficiency provoked strong animosity among the Chejudoans. The governor did not know much about feeding the islanders, providing proper medical service and housing for the people, and maintaining governmental facilities in good condition. The Nelson report revealed that Yu was not aware of the rice imported from Chollanam-do for the islanders, did not take proper measures to store collected grains, did not pay attention to the provincial hospital, and neglected to unload bamboo for the construction of houses for refugees. The report also indicated that thirty-four trucks assigned to Cheju-do did not get necessary maintenance, so fifteen trucks had become dedlined. Moreover, the report criticized Yu for not understanding the regulations about collecting grains and distributing them to residents.³⁴

More importantly, the Military Government changed the heads of the Cheju-do Police. In order to address the tumultuous relationship between the police and islanders, the Military Government selected moderate figures. The KNP relieved Insu Kang from his position as the chief of the Cheju Inspection Command, and then appointed Yongbae

³³ USAFIK, Lawrence A. Nelson, "Report of Special Investigation." Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 8, 92-5.

³⁴ Ibid.

Kim on April 9, 1947.³⁵ He was not a professional policeman and had, in fact, only worked in the field of education prior to this position.³⁶ In the middle of June, 1947, the advisor of the Cheju police was changed to a person who had served with the U.S. police forces for fifteen years.³⁷ He advised Cheju policemen to halt torture-based interrogation immediately after his arrival.³⁸

However, the efforts of the new police chief and the new advisor would be undermined by the mainland policemen. On April 28, 1947, after a few days of his arrival, Yongbae Kim announced that the Cheju police would increase by 245 policemen from the mainland to maintain the strength of 500 policemen.³⁹ The majority of the recruits came from the Division 9: the Railroad Police, which was on the brink of abolition. With this large recruitment of the mainlanders, the Cheju police became more prone to conflict with the islanders.

The Communists endeavored to retain the support of islanders and to strengthen the party organization. In addition, the leftists strengthened their propaganda, using handbills that mainly appealed to the grievances of islanders. To preserve the party organization, the Cheju SKLP leaders employed *myon* party members to replace major Cheju-do committee members who were arrested or pursued by the police. At the same time, Cheju Communists secretly created the fifth column in the Constabulary.

The Cheju Communists may have been concerned about losing the support of the islanders, due to the growing callousness and severity of police attitudes and actions. The

³⁵ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 12, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 153.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Cheju Sinbo*, June 18, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 184-85.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 28, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 164.

general public may have chosen to move from the side of the Communists to the side of the police, in an attempt to preserve their own lives and ensure their safety. The power of the Cheju police could have forced the residents to support the Military Government. In addition, the Communists had lost some influence when important SKLP and Mincheong leaders moved away from their villages to avoid arrest. Moreover, the Military Government classified the Mincheongs as illegal organizations on May 16, 1947, and, the Cheju Police raided the homes of Mincheong members on May 22, 1947.⁴⁰

To hold the general public under Communist influence, the Communists organized Self-Protecting Units in every *myon* based on the direction of the Chollanam-do SKLP.⁴¹ From the name, the “Self-Protecting Unit” appeared to many to be an armed force to guard villagers from the Cheju police. While the Communists evaluated the performance of the Self-Protecting Units and then determined they did not meet their expectations, the activities of the Self-Protecting Units were not revealed.⁴²

By the end of 1947, the Cheju Communists organized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in accordance with direction from the Chollanam-do SKLP. The PLA was under the control of the Department of Armed Forces in the Cheju SKLP. The PLA was supposed to be organized only in provinces, but the Cheju SKLP was ordered to establish its PLA due to its geographic distinction. The PLA was designed to be a center of armed resistance to the Military Government. However, the PLA was uncovered by the KNP and suppressed in November 1947. It is not clear when the PLA began to be organized

⁴⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, May 26, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 178.

⁴¹ Changsong Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeongdae Tujaeng Bogoseo* [The Report of People’s Guerrilla Force] (Cheju, 1995), 16-7. This report was kept by Communist guerrillas during the 4.3 Incident, and later confiscated by Cheju police in 1949 summer. Changsong Moon, then a policeman of the island, had retained a copy and released it later.

⁴² Ibid.

and trained. In the case of Cheju-do, a small number of troops gathered at a point in the camp on Halla Mountain and received training no later than January 1948.⁴³

At the same time, Communists actively criticized the policies of the Military Government and propagated their ideology. At the beginning of June, 1947, handbills were distributed in Cheju-eup and Jocheon-myon.⁴⁴ The distribution of handbills became rampant in August 1947. The action proposed in the leaflets was to oppose the rice collection.⁴⁵ Students played important roles in printing and delivering these handbills. The Cheju police arrested students of the Cheju Agriculture School, the Teachers' School, and Jocheon Middle School for subversive activities. Generally, Communists had strong control over schools, and students had useful tools-books and ink.

In the case of Jocheon Middle School, the student cadre of the SKLP received orders from the Cheju-do SKLP to make and distribute leaflets.⁴⁶ The students did not have a choice in following the orders; they did so to avoid harsh criticism from their peers. A Communist cell organization controlled the students at their school, and most of the teachers were Communists. Deoggu Lee, the second commander of guerrilla forces during the 4.3 Incident after Dalsam Kim, was also a teacher at the school. The teachers educated students about Communist ideology during the classes and at after school

⁴³ Letter from W. F. Dean to Major Edgar A. Noel, July 17, 1948. Col. Rothwell H. Brown, "The Partial Report of the Results of Investigation on Chejudo SKLP, June 20, 1948," USAFIK, RG 554, File Adjutant General 000.5, April 29, 1948. The report was taken based on the interrogations on guerrillas who were captured during the 4.3 Incident.

⁴⁴ *Cheju Sinbo*, June 6, 8, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.1, 180-81.

⁴⁵ The CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 132.

⁴⁶ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 47-9.

meetings. Teachers even sent students to Halla Mountain to transfer messages to Communists.⁴⁷

To compensate for the loss of Chejudo SKLP leadership caused by the arrests, *myon*-based Communists moved to the Chejudo committee, and the *myon* parties decreased in size. Consequently, inexperienced young Communists gained chance to work for the Cheju SKLP. Dalsam Kim transferred to Cheju SKLP from Daejung-myon Party and served as the chairman of the Cheju-do Committee.⁴⁸ In addition to Dalsam Kim, Jongwoo Lee moved to the Cheju SKLP from Daejung-myon. Jongwoo Lee became the director of the Department of Organization of the Cheju SKLP.⁴⁹

The SKLP's policy of expansion held troubling implications for the relationship between the Military Government and the Communists. By the end of 1946, the SKLP had started the movement of expanding its membership. After the reopening of the U.S-Soviet Joint Commission, the SKLP reinforced the effort to enlist party members. The SKLP leaders intended to show off their strength, and to be admitted as the largest party in southern Korea. The SKLP leaders launched a three to five fold-enlargement program to increase the numbers of party members by the middle of 1947.⁵⁰ Cheju-do SKLP also participated the membership expansion program. New members were enlisted without

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ The testimony of Woonbang Lee. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 193. However, Jaewoo Go's *Cheju 4.3 Pokdongui Jinsangeun Ireota* shows that Dalsam Kim was the director of the Department of Organization. This coincides with Saengmin Kim's testimony, which reveals that Dalsam Kim directly controlled Communist agents in the Cheju Governmental organization as a director before December 1947. Testimony of Saengmin Kim, cited from IMHC, *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa*, 241.

⁴⁹ Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 253. He went to the same middle school with Dalsam Kim in Japan by three years earlier. He was arrested right after the 4.3 Incident and was shot to death. According to Jaewoo Go's *Cheju 4.3 Pokdongui Jinsangeun Irotta*, Lee served as the Director of the Department of Labor and the Department of Agriculture.

⁵⁰ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 290-95.

proper screening.⁵¹ Joining the SKLP meant the rejection of the Military Government. By joining the SKLP, many islanders became tied together in an association beyond their villages.

At the same time, the Cheju Communists expanded their influence by planting party members in the Constabulary. The Constabulary was organized with the initiative of Lt. General John R. Hodge on January 15, 1946. On November 13, 1945, the Military Government announced Ordinance 28, which stipulated the establishment of the Office of Director of National Defense. This office consisted of Armed Forces Bureau and the Police Bureau.⁵² The Military Government intended to prepare southern Korea to cope with armed units in northern Korea and to abandon private military organizations in southern Korean society.⁵³

General Hodge suggested creating a Korean security force to General MacArthur in November, 1945. General MacArthur forwarded the question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the response from the Joint Chiefs was negative, due to the act's potential in disturbing the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ Meanwhile in December 1945, expecting the denial of his proposal, General Hodge ordered Colonel Arthur Champeny, director of National Defense, to devise a plan for a lightly armed police reserve force to support police operations in case of emergency. The operation was named "Bamboo Plan," and its goal

⁵¹ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 167; The testimony of Youngha Woo. Cited from, Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 181.

⁵² USAFIK, "Transmittal of Proposal Plan for the Korean National Defense Program," Appendix No. 1, Ordinance 28, November 13, 1945, RG 554.

⁵³ Ibid. See section I and II.

⁵⁴ IMHC, *Geongunsa* [The Construction History of Armed Forces] (Seoul: Jeongmunsa, 2002), 129-133.

was to build a Para-military Constabulary force as a police reserve force.⁵⁵ According to the plan, a Constabulary regiment would be established in every province.⁵⁶

The Bamboo Plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 9, 1946. General MacArthur set the Constabulary's size at 25,000 officers and enlisted men and its weapons as personal arms only. The Military Government merged Haebang Byungdan or the Maritime Defense Corps to transform it into the Coast Guard. The government sent organizational teams to establish Constabulary regiments in each province.⁵⁷ With its promotion to a province, Cheju gained its Constabulary regiment, the 9th Regiment in Mosulpo, on November 12, 1946.⁵⁸ The first regimental commander was Major Changguk Jang who graduated the Japanese Military Academy as the 59th class. He entered the Constabulary through the Military Language School.⁵⁹ He recruited soldiers from May 16 to May 18, 1947.⁶⁰

The Communists entered the Constabulary forces without obstacles; the Constabulary did not conduct political screening in its recruiting. It was a national trend for Communists to join the Constabulary to avoid arrest and to build secret operational cells.⁶¹ Because officers were selected at the national level, the central SKLP party controlled Communist officers in the Constabulary. On the contrary, provincial SKLP parties managed privates and sergeants, because they were recruited by Constabulary

⁵⁵ Ibid., 134.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 135-139.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ USAFIK, "United States Military Advisory Group Semi-Annual Historical Report," RG 554, Entry A-1 1354.

⁵⁹ Chosun Ilbo Database of People, <http://search.chosun.com/search/humanSearch.jsp>.

⁶⁰ The 9th Regiment advertised the recruitment on the *Cheju Sinbo* on April 28, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 166-67.

⁶¹ Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 80; Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 379-83.

regiments in the provinces.⁶² Based on this rule, the Cheju Communists infiltrated the Constabulary 9th Regiment; the Daejung-myon SKLP ordered its party members to enroll in the regiment. Seongok Go, Duman Jeong, Gyungdae Ryu, and Deokho Moon became common soldiers and then organized cells in the 9th Regiment under the guidance of the Daejung-myon SKLP.⁶³

Amid the confrontation between the Military Government and the Communists, some islanders attacked police officers. On June 6, 1947, people in Jongdal-ri beat three police officers during the meeting of Mincheong. The meeting was not authorized, and the police officers tried to scatter the participants. In fact, the intention of the Jongdal-ri Mincheong members' meeting was to decide their future actions.

At the national level, Mincheong became Minaecheong, Chosen Minju Aegug Cheongnyon Dongmaeng, or the Korea Democratic Patriotic Youth Alliance, on June 6, 1947. In Cheju, this change recurred in July 1947, and Daeseok Kang became the chief of the Cheju Minaecheong. Basically, Minaecheong inherited Mincheong's manpower and organization without change. Later the Minaecheong members became the nuclei of guerrilla forces during the 4.3 Incident.⁶⁴

Upon the appearance of the police officers, the participants resisted the order to disperse, and then the demonstrators attacked the police. Surprised, the police officers tried to escape the mob, but it was not easy. When some police officers jumped into the sea in an attempt to save themselves from the violent demonstrators, the rioters fished them out using a hooked pole, which was used to collect sea weed. The three officers

⁶² Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 379-83.

⁶³ Moon, *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 75.

⁶⁴ The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 95; Sasam Yeonguso, "8.15 Jikhu Cheju Jiyeokui Jinbojeok Chongnyon Undong," 42.

were nearly beaten to death. Later, more policemen from the Sehwa-ri police substation rescued the injured police officers.⁶⁵

Police investigations and arrests followed the incident. The participants of the meeting and the violence hid in secret places. Some participants sought refuge in the houses of friends and then attempted to flee the island. The Cheju police arrested twenty-three suspects on June 16, 1947. Okman Boo, who led the violence on June 18, 1947, was among those captured.⁶⁶ Of the forty-two suspects arrested, eighteen were sentenced at a trial on July 10, 1947. Okman Boo was sentenced to four years in jail; three were sentenced to one year each in jail; nine were sentenced to ten months each in jail with three years probation; and still others were penalized with fines and shorter jail terms.⁶⁷

Within two months of the Jongdal-ri incident, another confrontation occurred at Bukchon-ri. On August 13, 1947, two police officers pursued and then fired upon leftists who had been placing leaflets on walls. The villagers of Bukchon-ri gathered, and then assaulted the police officers. The villagers became upset by the actions of the police officers that resulted in the injuries of several persons. After beating the police officers, the angry mob moved to the police substation of Hamdeuk-ri to protest the police's tyrannical measures in enforcing rules. The police officers in the police substation scattered the mob by threatening to fire upon them with a machine gun.⁶⁸ This incident led to the arrest of forty villagers suspected of participating in the violence.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ The testimony of Yeopyo Kim. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 445-446; Cheju-do Police, *Cheju Gyungchalsa* (1990, Cheju), 295-296. Cited from Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Ha*, 185-86.

⁶⁶ *Cheju Sinbo*, June 18, 22, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 185, 188.

⁶⁷ *Cheju Sinbo*, July 12, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 195.

⁶⁸ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 665, August 14, 1947, RG 554; *Chungang Sinmun*, August 17, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 206-07.

⁶⁹ *Cheju Sinbo*, August 30, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 208.

The Bukchon-ri incident occurred when the police focused special attention on Communist movements around Liberation Day, August 15, 1947. The KNP assumed that there would be large-scale demonstrations by leftists and rightists, which would then lead to clashes between the two groups. On the same day, the KNP obtained information about Communist plans to assault police substations. To exclude any possibility of a disturbance on the Liberation Day, the USAMGIK issued Executive Order No. 5, which declared that all celebrations would be under the control of the officials of the Military Government.⁷⁰ In addition, the KNP launched a surprise operation to arrest leftists, based on the information that predicted an assault on the police.⁷¹ The Cheju-do police also arrested cadres of the DNFF and the SKLP on August 14.⁷² Under this situation, putting handbills on walls was an action that would no doubt bring more police enforcement.

The two incidents further destroyed the relationship between the Military Government and the islanders. Lynching police officers came to be a common behavior that could no longer be ignored. The Cheju police arrested suspects and tortured them to extract information about the role of Communists in the two incidents. As a result, the people who were already hostile to the police became more resentful of the police forces and the Military Government that commanded the police.

The rising tension between the Military Government and the Communists encouraged militant nationalist movements, which had been dormant on the island. Conservatives on the island established the branch of the Daedong Cheongnyon Dan, or

⁷⁰ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 664, August 13, 1947, RG 554.

⁷¹ *Choseon Ilbo*, August 19, 1947.

⁷² *Cheju Sinbo*, August 20, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 205.

the Great Unification Youth Corps (GUYC), Daecheong. At the same time, Seobuk Cheongnyonhoi, or the Northwest Young Men's Association (NWYMA), Seocheong, arrived on the island.

At the national level, the GUYC was organized under the leadership of General Cheongchun Lee, a stalwart of the independence movement, on September 21, 1947.⁷³ The organization was established to train officers of the future South Korean armed forces, and to support Syngman Rhee.⁷⁴ Specifically, the GUYC supported the idea of Dr. Rhee, which held that to end the political turmoil in southern Korea, a general election should be conducted.⁷⁵ For the creation of the GUYC, General Lee merged twenty-two youth organizations under the name of the GUYC.

In Cheju, the branch of the National Society for Rapid Realization of Korea Independence (NSRRKI) and the branch of the Liberation Youth Alliance (LYA) agreed to form the Cheju-do Branch of GUYC on November 4, 1947.⁷⁶ At first, they could not reach an agreement, so two different GUYC branches based on each other's initiative at the beginning of October 1947 were launched.⁷⁷ They later succeeded in merging the two organizations by sharing major posts of the new branch of the GUYC. Chunghee Kim, the chairman of the Cheju NSRRKI, became the Chairman of the Cheju GYUC, and Inseon Kim, who was the chair of the Cheju LYA, became an advisor.⁷⁸

The Cheju GUYC rapidly expanded its influence throughout the island. Before the official merging of the two branches, small branches at the level of *ris* and *myons*

⁷³ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 106, September 14-21, 1947, RG 554.

⁷⁴ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary* No. 105, September 7-13, 1947, RG 554.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ *Cheju Sinbo*, November 8, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 224.

⁷⁷ *Cheju Sinbo*, October 4, 6, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 213-15.

⁷⁸ *Cheju Sinbo*, December 24, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 229.

were created. On October 14, 1947 Gimnyong-ri Gujwa-myon people gathered to establish their GUYC branch,⁷⁹ and Manseok Kim became the chairman. On the next day, about 1,000 residents of Seongsan-myon formed the *myon* branch of the GUYC and selected Seongjung Go as the chairman.⁸⁰ The Namcheju [South Cheju]-gun branch of the GUYC was created on October 18, 1947⁸¹ and the Daejung-myon branch on December 5, 1947.⁸²

Except for the Seongsan-myon, GUYCs in *myons* and *ris* did not enjoy large memberships. Mincheongs, later Minaecheongs, had already enlisted prominent youths in villages. Furthermore, Communists had firm control of most villages and hamlets. In most cases, the GUYCs were inferior to Mincheongs in terms of manpower and financial ability.

Although the GUYC was limited in size, its impact was significant. It provided conservatives with a chance for more unified action. Due to the emergence of local GUYCs, scattered rightists began to cooperate. The branches of the Cheju GUYC became the vehicle of rightist movements in villages. GUYC members challenged Communists and checked leftist activities in their towns. In Gujwa-myon, fifty Woljeong-ri GUYC members clashed with local young men in Haengwon-ri. The locals tore up the handbills that called for the creation meeting of the GUYC branch. An outbreak of fighting occurred between the locals and rightist young men, who had

⁷⁹ *Cheju Sinbo*, October 14, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 220.

⁸⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, October 22, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 219.

⁸¹ *Cheju Sinbo*, October 22, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 218-19.

⁸² *Cheju Sinbo*, December 8, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 227.

distributed handbills in Haengwon-ri. The GUYC members of Woljeong-ri moved to Haengwon-ri to help the rightists.⁸³

At the same time, the GUYC would be a loyal proponent of the policies of the Military Government. The provincial government and local police would enjoy the support of local GUYCs. The GUYC assumed the role of the People's Committees and ACYs, which had supported the Military Government during the period between the liberation and the end of 1946. In fact, after the break of the 4.3 Incident, the GUYC members assisted the police by acting as an auxiliary force. Understanding the usefulness of the GUYC, Governor Haejin Yu became the advisor of the Cheju GUYC.⁸⁴

In contrast to the GUYC, which consisted of local Cheju-do people, the NWYMA was the organization of North Korean refugees. Due to the rapid land reform and other suppressive actions in northern Korea, 700,000 North Koreans fled to South Korea in 1946. After a brief pause, the flood of refugees revived in 1947 because of severe persecution of land owners and Christians by North Korean authorities.⁸⁵ By the end of 1947, additional one million North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel to save their lives.⁸⁶

Young refugees from North Korea created the NWYMA to counter the Communists. Refugee groups from five provinces in northern Korea (Pyongannam-do, Pyonganbuk-do, Hamgyungnam-do, Hamgyungbuk-do, and Hwanghae-do) allied together and launched the organization, boasting a strength of 6,000 members on

⁸³ *Cheju Sinbo*, October 14, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 217.

⁸⁴ The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 144.

⁸⁵ Dongwon Lee and Seongnam Jo, *Migunjeonggiui Sahoi Idong, Baegyung, Teokseong Geurigo Geu Younghyang* [The Social Movement and its Background, Character, and Influence under the Rule of the U.S. Military Government] (Seoul: Ihwa University Press, 1997), 28.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 51.

November 30, 1946.⁸⁷ The NWYMA published its platform of four missions: to achieve the unification of South and North Korea, to destroy Communism, to contribute to world peace, and to create a society that served the people's welfare.⁸⁸ Founders of the NWYMA intended to create an organization that would to terrorize Communists.⁸⁹

The NWYMA embraced militant anti-Communism ideology. The NWYMA was made up of vengeful individuals who had lost their property and even family members to the hands of Communists in North Korea. Consequently, the members of the NWYMA hated Communism and Communists. Fighting against Communism became the ultimate goal of the NWYMA. A manifesto was distributed in Busan in February 1948 summed by the NWYMA's goal:

As soon as all North Korea youth start the movement, let all other patriotic young men rush into North Korea, grab the 38 barrier, and smash all Reds and Soviet imperialists! Then our suffering comrades in the hell of North will stand up immediately to answer for it. Let us shed our fresh blood until the last drop to liberate our Motherland and thirty million of our dear nation.⁹⁰

The NWYMA expanded its organization by creating local branches in January, 1947. To create local branches, key NWYMA cadres moved to cities and recruited members, mainly from northern Korean refugees. After the establishment of the branches, the NWYMA held lectures about the reality of North Korea. The main purpose of forming local NWYMA's was to fight against local Communists in streets, schools, and market places of Korea.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Bongje Moon, "Seobuk Cheongnyonhoi," *Chungang Ilbo*, December 21, 1972.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 753, February 06-07, 1948, RG 554.

⁹¹ Moon, "Seobuk Cheongnyonhoi," *Chungang Ilbo*, January 10, 1973.

To maintain its organization, the NWYMA needed money. The NWYMA relied on donations from wealthy North Korean refugees. At the same time, the cadres of the NWYMA exaggerated its number of members in order to get more food than regulated by the Military Government food rationing agencies. The cadres then sold the surplus foods on black market to raise more money. Sometimes, the cadres bought surplus or condemned equipment from the Military Government to sell on the black market with the help of governmental officials who were from North Korea.⁹² In addition, when the financial situation was critical in spite of their best efforts, the NWYMA resorted to violence to raise money. The NWYMA collected money from merchants and entrepreneurs while offering security to those businesspersons from leftist strikes. In some cases, the members of the NWYMA threatened business owners with injury or destruction if they were reluctant to give money.⁹³

The NWYMA established its Cheju-do branch at the end of 1947. Like other provinces, some officials of the NWYMA moved into the island, and the officials recruited local members. The first appearance of the NWYMA members occurred with the arrival of the new Korean Governor, Haejin Yu. Governor Yu brought seven NWYMA members as his private guards.⁹⁴

Cheju-do became a target for a branch of the NWYMA. In July 1947, North Korean refugees entered Cheju-do to restart their lives. It was one of the efforts of the Military Government to offer another chance to the refugees by moving them to the

⁹² Moon, "Seobuk Cheongnyonhoi," *Chungang Ilbo*, February 1, 1973.

⁹³ USAFIK, *G-2 Summary*, No. 90, June 30, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 7, 156-59.

⁹⁴ The testimony of Unbong Park. He was the chief of the Surveillance Section of the First District Police Station. Cited from *Jemin Ilbo* 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 404. The numbers of NWYMA members in Cheju-do Police and Cheju-do Provincial Government is not disclosed.

provinces. The refugees came to settle in villages and hamlets. Some of them volunteered to enter the NWYMA during the recruitment campaign.⁹⁵ Later, cadres from the central NWYMA and local enlistments created the Cheju-do branch of the NWYMA. The members chose appointing Dongchun Jang to the position of chairman on November 2, 1947.⁹⁶

To the NWYMA, the year of 1947 was an ordeals. Due to the nationwide struggle against Communism, the NWYMA lost the strength of its local branches, not to mention those members who lost their lives in conflicts.⁹⁷ In addition, there was an internal struggle caused by the deteriorating financial situation. With these hardships, the NWYMA members became more hostile toward Communists and more determined to ensure their survival.

In Cheju, the NWYMA enjoyed unusual benefits at that time. Confronted by the Cheju Communists, the Military Government of Cheju-do favored the NWYMA. Some NWYMA members were employed by the provincial government and the Cheju police beginning in July of 1947.⁹⁸ Considering the Cheju people's exclusionist attitudes toward individuals from the mainland, hiring NWYMA members could have been regarded as an extraordinary case. It could only have been done by the decisions from the top authorities of the provincial Government and the police. The militant anti-Communist ideology of the governor and the police chief made strong anti-Communist NWYMA members attitude candidates for government posts.

⁹⁵ Some victims of the 4.3 Incident recalled the NWYMA members were rice candy sellers. Typical items that were sold by the NWYMA members were national flags and portraits of Syngman Rhee. Those rice candy sellers seemed to be North Korean refugees who could not get good money making jobs in Cheju. See the testimony of unnamed person in Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 148.

⁹⁶ *Cheju Sinbo*, November 8, 1947. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 224.

⁹⁷ Moon, "Seobuk Cheongnyonhoi," *Chungang Ilbo*, January 23, 24, 1973

⁹⁸ The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 143.

The birth of the local NWYMA chapter had a great impact on Cheju society. It was an outsider organization that consisted of hardcore anti-Communists who did not have kinship relations with the local people. The members of the NWYMA felt no identification with the Chejudoans and behaved with their own interests in mind. In addition, in the confrontation with the Communists, the strong anti-Communism of the NWYMA endowed its members with enormous powers against ordinary Cheju people. Most of all, the rise of the NWYMA made common islanders identify anti-Communism as a foreign idea, as the NWYMA was a group of mainlanders or foreigners.

The Cheju NWYMA caused more harm than good from its inception. Following their habits on the mainland, the NWYMA members extorted money from local islanders and practiced terror as they saw fit. The NWYMA apologized to the 971st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment for terrorizing islanders on November 18, 1947.⁹⁹ The members of the Cheju NWYMA lynched five persons and intimidated five islanders to collect money. A cadre man of the Cheju NWYMA revealed his extreme disgust toward Cheju-do by calling it “Little Moscow.”¹⁰⁰

The Decision to Rebel

The SKLP launched the Chejudo bloody insurgency. The decision to engage in an insurgency against the Military Government drove the entire island to into an unbearable ordeal. The confrontation itself needed not have developed into a violent rebellion. However, Cheju Communists’ decision to meant an insurgency and the poor

⁹⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 692. Cited from the CDTRHV. 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.7, 48.

¹⁰⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 693. Cited from the CDTRHV. 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.7, 48.

guidance of the higher SKLP organization provoked tragedy by focusing the confrontation into a total war.

At the beginning of 1948, the SKLP leaders plotted to embark on a nationwide disturbance in March of 1948. A directive about the disturbance was distributed to all provincial branches around January 2, 1948.¹⁰¹ The disturbance would disrupt the general election that would be conducted under the supervision of the UNTCOK.¹⁰²

In the directive, the SKLP attached great importance to the Autumn Harvest Rebellion as an repeatable event. The SKLP leaders planned to “organize the People’s Committees” in small administrative units: *guns*, *myons*, and *ris*, and to “fight to gain the political control and make the People’s Committees keep the control.”¹⁰³ The People’s Committees that played a significant role during the Autumn Harvest Rebellion had been destroyed by the Military Government. The SKLP leaders still viewed the People’s Committee as useful tools for their political victory.

However, the SKLP did not have enough strength to execute the decision. The officers of the SKLP assumed that only thirty percent of the former party strength remained.¹⁰⁴ This assessment was supported by the Daegu SKLP party leaders’ analysis on their strength:

...if present conditions continue for another six months that Communist South Korea Labor Party will lose all of its former power and be first over-run and then suppressed and dissolved by the right-wing.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 734, January 17, 1948, RG 554, Entry 1256; *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 745, January 30, 1948, RG 554.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 745.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 725.

In any case, the SKLP leaders decided to block the general election not on careful calculation of their strength but on a desperate need to spoil the election. The Soviet Union disliked the idea of the general election under the control of the United Nations. In accordance with the Soviet opposition to the general election, the SKLP moved to block the effort of the UNTCOK and the USAMGIK.

The Cheju SKLP received the same directive from the Chollanam-do SKLP. The directive requested “for riots to break out in Cheju-do between the middle of February and March 5.”¹⁰⁶ The directive from Chollanam-do SKLP specified the period of the planned disturbance. It also dictated the types of violence required for March 1948. The disturbance would consist of a series of riots. The period of the disturbance would take place from the middle of February to the beginning of March. The disturbance was not intended to become a full scale insurgency, but a limited insurrection.

Following the directive from the Chollanam-do SKLP, the Cheju SKLP planned to start riots on February 15, 1948, and continue through March 5, 1948. This plan appeared in handbills that were confiscated by Cheju police and the CIC on February 12, 1948. The Cheju police and the CIC raided the SKLP headquarters and found the handbills.¹⁰⁷ The Cheju SKLP intended to carry out its orders for the disturbance faithfully.

However, the Cheju Communists lost their opportunity to cause an extended disturbance in March due to a preemptive strike by the police. According to the *G-2 Periodic Report* of the USAFIK, the Cheju police raided a secret gathering of the Communists in Jocheon-myon on January 22, 1948. The 106 participants of the meeting

¹⁰⁶ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 752.

¹⁰⁷ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 847, February 13, 1948.

were arrested, and an additional 115 were later detained.¹⁰⁸ The massive arrest was conducted with the cooperation of former SKLP Sincheon-ri director of Jocheon-myon, Saengmin Kim. He was arrested in December, 1947 and divulged the names of Cheju SKLP cadres during the police interrogation.¹⁰⁹

The Cheju police arrested not only Cheju SKLP cadres but also young men who might have possibly joined the SKLP.¹¹⁰ The police tried to uncover the web of the SKLP organization. Consequently, the police tortured detainees brutally in order to collect information about the SKLP membership. Although the chief of the Cheju Inspection Command, Yongbae Kim, contended that the police did not stop people from joining the SKLP, but they did prohibit participation in the SKLP's illegal movements.¹¹¹ Chunseop Heo was arrested at this time. During his detention and interrogation, Chunseop Heo was beaten with firewood in attempt to extract information regarding his party membership. He was released ten days later with a broken shoulder caused by torture. Like Chunseop Heo, people who were not members of the SKLP began to be released.¹¹²

The arrest campaign of Cheju SKLP cadres by the police continued. Sehun Ahn, the chair of the Cheju-do Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP, Yuhwan Kim, Eunwhan Kim, Yongggwan Kim, Jwagu Lee, and Deoggu Lee were all arrested during this time. Dalsam Kim was also arrested, but fled while he was being transferred to a

¹⁰⁸ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 752; No. 753.

¹⁰⁹ The testimony of Saengmin Kim. Cited from IMHC, *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa*, 243.

¹¹⁰ The testimony of Chunseop Heo. Cited from CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 154. At the same time, Saengmin Kim testified that he was embarrassed when the police arrested common villagers.

¹¹¹ *Cheju Sinbo*, February 4, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 1, 233-34.

¹¹² Ibid.

police station.¹¹³ According to Chunseop Heo, Deoggu Lee was one of the six persons detained for forty-two days.¹¹⁴ Based on Heo's testimony, March 3, 1948 was the date when Deoggu Lee and five cadres were released.

It is clear that the Cheju Communists did not have a clear plan to launch a large insurgency until the end of January in 1948. Many Cheju SKLP leaders were interrogated for a long time; Deoggu Lee was held for forty-two days, but there was no confession of a planned large scale rebellion. There was not even a mention of any information about the February violence from the suspects. These facts show that the February violence was ordered at the last minute from the central SKLP authorities, later than January 23, 1948.

A Communist-organized civil disturbance occurred on the night of February 6, 1948. The nationwide disturbance reached its peak on the afternoon of February 7, 1948.¹¹⁵ Between February 6 and February 13, 1948, thirty-two police substations were attacked, and twelve policemen and thirty-seven civilians were killed. In addition, fifty-two locomotives were sabotaged and two highway bridges were destroyed.¹¹⁶ During the turmoil, 1,741 civilians were arrested.¹¹⁷ This was the February violence. Chollanam-do, Chollabuk-do, Gyungsoangnam-do, and Gyungsoangbuk-do were the provinces that suffered the most Communist violence.¹¹⁸

The SKLP published a lengthy proclamation and sent a letter to General Hodge about the purpose of the February violence. The main cause was to oppose the general

¹¹³ The CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 156.

¹¹⁴ The testimony of Chunseop Heo. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 156.

¹¹⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 754, February 7, 1948, RG 554.

¹¹⁶ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 758.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 754.

election and the activities of the UNTCOK.¹¹⁹ However, the general public rejected the SKLP actions. The USAMGIK concluded that “it [February Violence] has so far won little if any popular support.”¹²⁰ On the other hand, the Communists succeeded in acquiring arms and ammunitions from police substations.¹²¹

From all accounts, the uprising of February violence was planned and carried out in haste. Until January 22, 1948, the Cheju SKLP members had no information about the February violence. The directive issued for the disturbance at the beginning of 1948 was irrelevant to the February violence. The period of the February violence was outside dates of the planned disturbance. In fact, the planned disturbances occurred around March 1, 1948. At the same time, the *G-2 Periodic Report* of the USAFIK did not identify the movement of the February violence until it actually occurred.

In Cheju, the Cheju Communists joined the February violence a little bit later. There were limited instances of illegal meetings and the distribution of handbills on February 7, 1948.¹²² According to a *G-2 Periodic Report*, seventeen riots and demonstrations took place from February 9, 1948 to February 11, 1948. Six police substations were assaulted by mobs, additional handbills were distributed, and two police officers were severely beaten.¹²³ During the three day period, 290 islanders were arrested on suspicion of active participation in the disturbances.¹²⁴

In fact, the Cheju-do version of the February violence was moderate in comparison with other provinces. There were no deaths of police officers or civilians. In

¹¹⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 753.

¹²⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 754.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 759.

¹²³ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 781.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

addition, the groups assaulting police substations did not resort to violence; they were easily dispersed by police fire. The two policemen who were beaten in Sagye-ri Andeuk-myon met their misfortune not in a police substation, but in a local tavern on February 9, 1948. Unlike other provinces, Cheju-do rioters did not try to take arms and ammunitions when they assaulted police substations. In Seongsan-myon, the villagers even played traditional musical instruments during the demonstration as if it were a feast.¹²⁵

The Cheju SKLP could not launch aggressive riots during the February violence due to the arrests of cadre men after January 22, 1948 and continual police surveillance thereafter. The lack of strong participation in the disturbances could also be attributed to the possibility that the directive on the February violence could have been delivered to the Cheju Communists too late. As a result, the Communists had little or no time to arrange their actions by the first day of the February violence. All these factors contributed to the comparably moderate outcome of Cheju-do's February violence. It was in stark contrast to the actions of the Chollanam-do Communists, evaluated as the most violent group by the Military Government.

The Cheju police and the CIC raided the headquarters of the Cheju SKLP on February 12, 1948.¹²⁶ It was the Military Government's reaction to the February Violence on Cheju Island. During the investigation, the police confiscated documents and handbills that revealed the coming disturbances from February 15, 1948 to March 5, 1948.¹²⁷ This discovery implies that the Cheju Communists did not seriously consider preparation for the February violence.

¹²⁵ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.1, 542-50.

¹²⁶ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 847, February 13, 1948, RG 554.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

The Cheju Communists held meetings to plan countermeasures against the police crackdowns and became determined to rise against the suppression of the police. In response to the actions of the Military Government, the Communists began to devise their future movements. The Communists had a couple of meetings between February 13, 1948 and February 28, 1948.¹²⁸ In these meetings, the Communists discussed future steps for the Cheju SKLP. The Cheju Communists decided to rebel against the Military Government in their meeting at Sincheon-ri Jocheon-myon.¹²⁹

The decision to launch an insurgency was made from considerations about the current situation of the Cheju SKLP. Samryong Lee, who was at the Sincheon meeting, testified that Dalsam Kim raised the agenda of uprising. The Sincheon meeting was a full scale meeting that had nineteen participants from the Cheju Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP and *myon* SKLPs. At that time, Dalsam Kim was the director of the Department of Organization of the Cheju SKLP at the age of twenty-three.¹³⁰ Samryong Lee recalled that there was no direction from the central SKLP authorities.¹³¹ It was natural for the Cheju Communists to consider launching an insurgency against the Military Government as one of their options. The exposure of the Cheju SKLP organization and subsequent police enforcement might have threatened the Communists.

The decision might have been supported by the culture of the SKLP. The SKLP had attached great importance to the Autumn Harvest Rebellion as it is a model. The spirit of the rebellion was emphasized at the planned March First conflict in 1947 and at

¹²⁸ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 162-63. The person argued that meetings were held at Aewol-ri, Ojo-ri or Jongdal-ri, and Sinchon.

¹²⁹ Ibid; the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 157-58.

¹³⁰ The testimony of Samryong Lee. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 158.

¹³¹ Ibid.

the February violence. Assaulting police substations, killing police officers and rightists, and holding People's Courts against reactionaries typified the SKLP resistance toward the Military Government. The Autumn Harvest Rebellion had become a powerful myth for the Communists and their followers, and the rebels who died in 1946 entered martyrdom. However, the Cheju Communists lacked the experience of the rebellion. The Cheju Communists might have wanted to have the same experience with other Communists and to be anointed as qualified comrades.

This important decision to rebel was made without serious calculation. The participants mainly regarded the targets of the insurgency would be police officers and the members of the NWYMA. The Communists were never concerned about the Constabulary and the U.S. forces on the island. The overriding opinion of participants at the meeting was that the insurgency would end in a short time.¹³²

The decision of the Sincheon meeting showed the naivety of the participants. Most of them were inexperienced young Communists. Seasoned Communists like Taeksu Kim, the former leader of the Mincheong, and Sehun Ahn, the former chair of the Cheju SKLP, were not present at the meeting.¹³³ As was discussed, the Cheju SKLP lost veteran leaders that belonged to the Seoul Faction when the SKLP seized control of the party. In addition, many senior leaders were in prison at that time, related to charges stemming from the March First Incident and March 10 General Strike. Woonbang Lee spent this period in Mokpo Prison. As a result, young Communists took charge of the Cheju SKLP. There were nineteen participants at the Sincheon meeting: Monggu Cho, Daeseok Gang, Dalsam Kim, Samryong Lee, Jongwoo Lee, Dubong Kim, Chiljong Go,

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

Yanggeun Kim, and others.¹³⁴ Among these participants, only Monggu Cho could claim to be an experienced Communist, since he had begun party activities during the Japanese ruling era. Twelve of the participants supported the idea, and seven, including Monggu Cho, opposed it. The decision was accepted by a senior representative from the Chollanam-do SKLP. The representative that joined the meeting, listened to the opinions of each member, and may have reported to the Chollanam-do SKLP. He participated in every meeting.¹³⁵ Usually, the representative reported cases to the Chollanam-do SKLP to obtain the decisions from provincial or central authorities, and sometimes the representative made decisions at the scene and then reported the decisions to the Chollanam-do SKLP.¹³⁶

The decision of the Cheju SKLP received approval by the Chollanam-do SKLP in a very short time. As a result, the Cheju SKLP created a new organization. Guguk Tujaeng Wionhoi or the Committee for Saving the Country (CSC) may have been established in the Cheju SKLP at this time; however, there is no documentation that explains the timing of the creation of the CSC. On the other hand, it is certain that the Cheju SKLP had a CSC before March 15, 1948. The *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo* [The Report of People's Guerrilla Force] revealed that the Committee of Armed Forces was created to control the rebellion, on the basis of the CSC on March 15, 1948.¹³⁷ The report also revealed that the CSC consisted of members of the island's

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ The testimony of Saengmin Kim. Cited from IMHC, *4.3 Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa*, 243. In addition, he argued that Cheju Communists could not hold a meeting without supervisors from higher SKLP parties.

¹³⁷ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 17.

Standing Committee, which was the top authority of the Cheju SKLP.¹³⁸ At the same time, there was no need to create the CSC before the Sincheon meeting. The Cheju SKLP focused on the training of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), forming throughout South Korea in late 1947.¹³⁹ From late 1947 to the beginning of 1948, the Cheju SKLP began to train the PLA at Halla Mountain. In addition, the Cheju Communists had no time or reason to create another organization after January 22, 1948. Based on the preceding arguments, the CSC seems to have been established after the Sincheon meeting to prepare for the rebellion.

The creation of the CSC within the Cheju SKLP implied that the Chollanam-do SKLP directed the execution of the insurgency to the Cheju SKLP. The creation or change of organizations within a Communist party is an important insight into the influence of higher party authorities. The Cheju SKLP established the Self-Protecting Units in villages, following the direction from the Chollanam-do SKLP after the March First Incident. In addition, the Cheju SKLP organized the PLA under its command. To the Chollanam-do SKLP, the creation of the CSC with members of the Standing Committee was not an issue that could be ignored. The change might have been directed or at least accepted. With this change, the Cheju Communists' "dream" became an operational plan for the Chollanam-do SKLP.

The Chollanam-do SKLP set the goal for the insurgency. The Chollanam-do Communists wanted to disrupt the general election in southern Korea. In an official announcement given prior to launching the rebellion, the Chejudo committee members of the Chollanam-do SKLP defined the goals of their action: to preserve the Cheju SKLP

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 755, February 10, 1948, RG 554.

organization and to oppose the separate election on March 15, 1948.¹⁴⁰ Preserving the Cheju SKLP was the initial aim that motivated young Communists in Cheju to rise. Opposing the separated election was not the original goal of the Cheju Communists. At the Sincheon meeting, nobody mentioned the coming election.

Opposing the separate election, not the general election, was the newly adopted slogan that reflected recent developments of the election issue. Due to the opposition of the Soviet Union, the UNTCOK could not work in northern Korea to organize a general election. As a result, the UNTOCK brought the case to the Interim Committee of the UN General Assembly, and the UN decided to conduct an election, even if only in southern Korea.¹⁴¹ The election date was rescheduled for May 9, 1948.¹⁴²

It is hard to believe that the Cheju SKLP could have decided its slogans without consulting to the Chollanam-do SKLP; Communist parties of lesser authority followed the direction of the higher parties. At this time, Communist disturbances did not target separate election. Communists opposed the general election, specifically the work of the UNTCOK, until mid March, 1948. The handbills of a students' demonstration in Gwangju on March 16, 1948, condemned the UNTCOK.¹⁴³ It is unusual for the Cheju SKLP to specify its slogan as opposing the separate election rather than resisting the general election or the UNTCOK. Without the direction or agreement from the Chollanam-do SKLP, the Cheju Communists might not have been able to adopt the slogan of blocking the separate election.

¹⁴⁰ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 17.

¹⁴¹ *Chosun Ilbo*, February 28, 1948; Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea*, 73-76.

¹⁴² The Statement of General Hodge, March 4, 1948. The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 872, March 9, 1948, RG 554.

¹⁴³ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 789, March 22, 1948, RG 554.

Under the guidance of the Chollanam-do delegate, the Cheju SKLP proclaimed the launch of the armed rebellion at a meeting on March 15, 1948. At the meeting, Cheju Communists stated the background of their uprising, the goal of their actions, the organization for the movement, and the timeline. The Communists argued that police and right wing organizations harshly suppressed the islanders with indiscriminate massive arrests, beating, and torturing resulting in two deaths after the March First Incident and the March 10 General Strike.¹⁴⁴ At the same time, the Communists contended that there was no need for the separate election or the establishment of a separate Government, and UNTCOK. The Communists allotted missions of logistics, obtaining arms, and distributing propaganda to staff members in preparation for the rebellion. At the meeting, the leftists designated March 25, 1948, as the deadline for preparations to be completed.

The meeting on March 15, 1948 seemed to be convened for the official announcement of moving toward rebellion. The meeting was mentioned only in the *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo* [The Report of People's Guerrilla Force]. The report indicates that the rebellion was decided at the meeting on March 15, 1948. However, most accounts by the participants of the 4.3 Incident argue that the rebellion was decided upon during the meeting at Sincheon at the end of February in 1948. In addition, the sequence of actions for the preparation looked inappropriate in terms of logistics. Ten days would not be enough time to prepare a full scale rebellion. In fact,

¹⁴⁴ Two deaths of suspects by police torture could not be the cause for the 4.3 Incident. Those two incidents happened after Cheju Communists decided the uprising. Yongcheol Kim died by police torture on March 6, 1948, and Eunha Yang was put to death by police brutality on March 14, 1948. Samryong Lee testified that after the decision for the rebellion, the news of the two deaths made the members of the Sincheon meeting justify their decision as righteous one. See the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 158. For the date of deaths see *Cheju Sinbo* March 12, 1948 and March 16, 1948.

the Cheju SKLP sent cadres to Japan, to the Cheju people living in the ghettos of Osaka to collect money and purchase necessary items for the insurgency.¹⁴⁵ Traveling to Japan, raising funds, purchasing goods, and traveling back to Cheju-do would have required more than ten days at that time, considering the transportation and communication systems. Jwagu Lee, the brother of Deoggu Lee, was in charge of fund raising and preparations in Japan. The short preparation schedule shows that the rebellion had been decided before the March 15 meeting.

The discrepancy between the report and the personal memories about the decision to rebel suggests the involvement of the Chollanam-do SKLP in the 4.3 Incident. The report was kept during the 4.3 Incident to record ‘the resistance movement of the Cheju Communists’ in their view. In other words, the report contains the official view of the Communists about the 4.3 Incident. In their official record, the Communists indicated the meeting on March 15, 1948, as the meeting of decision rather than the meeting at Sincheon. In addition, the report contended that the meeting on March 15, 1948, was held under the direction of the representative from the Chollanam-do SKLP.¹⁴⁶ The Cheju Communists intentionally omitted the meeting at Sincheon from the record to show that they moved under the guidance of upper organizations, not by their own desires. As a result, it is conceivable that the Chollanam-do SKLP accepted the petition from the Cheju SKLP for raising an insurgency and guided the Cheju SKLP in the 4.3 Incident.

At the meeting on March 15, 1948, the Cheju Communists changed the organization for the rebellion. The Cheju Communists created the Committee of Armed

¹⁴⁵ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 165.

¹⁴⁶ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 17.

Forces (CAF), which consisted mainly of members of the CSC, to organize the Self-protecting Force and to stockpile arms and ammunitions. Each *myon* SKLP also retained *myon*-CAF to push the effort. Under the control of the CAF, the Cheju SKLP organized the Self-Protecting Force at the strength of 200 officers and men, organized as twenty platoons. In addition, the Cheju SKLP created Assault Units with 100 officers and men in ten platoons. The Cheju Communists prepared twenty-seven Japanese Type 99 rifles, three pistols, twenty-five grenades, and seven smoke shells.

The central SKLP headquarters may not have ordered guerrilla warfare on Cheju. The SKLP pursued legal and illegal resistance at the same time until the break of Yosu Rebellion in October of 1948.¹⁴⁷ Although the SKLP launched several protests before the Yosu Rebellion, including the February violence, the SKLP focused on maneuvering for power, though it might cast street fighting, some terrorism, and assassination, but it had not begun guerrilla warfare. After the Yosu Rebellion, the SKLP turned into an illegal underground organization and adopted armed resistance.

At this point in time, the SKLP focused on political bargaining rather than armed provocation. The Communists in northern and southern Korea concentrated on holding Jeonchosun Jejeongdang Sahoidanche Yeonseok Hoi or the Convention of All Parties and Social Organizations in Korea in Pyongyang from April 19 - 26, 1948.¹⁴⁸ It was devised to undermine the efforts of the separate election in southern Korea. Kim Ku and Kyusik Kim, who opposed the UN decision of the separate election, proposed to have a dialogue between North and South Korea on February 16, 1948,¹⁴⁹ the Communist

¹⁴⁷ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 393-95.

¹⁴⁸ Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Ha*, 1095-96.

¹⁴⁹ *Chosun Ilbo*, February 17, 1948.

organizations in North Korea invited seventeen important politicians in South Korea via Pyongyang Broadcasting System on March 26, 1948.¹⁵⁰

The convention was a good propaganda for the purpose of the Soviet Union and their North Korean comrades. The Soviet Union intended to use the convention to insist the abolishment of the separate election, the end of the UNTCOK, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, and a true national election after the evacuation of all foreign forces.¹⁵¹ Kim Ku and Kyusik Kim would be strong symbolic figures to justify the arguments of Communists at the convention. The two Kims had officially opposed the separate election and criticized Syngman Rhee and his followers, who advocated the election.¹⁵² Kim Ku was more aggressive in the opposition than Kyusik Kim.

The central SKLP ordered the provincial SKLPs to resist to the separate election using legal and illegal methods. According to the *CIC Semi-Monthly Report*, No. 7 (April 1- April 15, 1948), the SKLP directed four actions to sabotage of the election. The first step was to persuade voters not to participate in the elections, March 31 - April 5, 1948. The second step would start on April 6, 1948, to impede the activities of the candidates. The third stage was to announce the problems of the election between April 10, 1948 and April 15, 1948.¹⁵³ The actions of the final step were not directed. The CIC report concluded that “the minor local incidents are locally inspired, and are not condoned by the South Korea Labor Party headquarters.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ *Chosun Ilbo*, March 27, 1948.

¹⁵¹ The Memoir of General Lebedev. Cited from *Chungang Ilbo*, November 15, 1944.

¹⁵² Choi, *Gyekdongui Haebang 3nyon*, 451-61.

¹⁵³ USAFIK, *CIC Semi-Monthly Report*, No. 7 (Period from April 1, 1948 to April 15, 1948). Cited from Institute of Asian Culture Studies Hallym University, *CIC Reports* (1945.9-1949.1), 367-70.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

The Chollanam-do SKLP was the culprit setting off the 4.3 Incident by exploiting the ill-considered decisions of the Cheju SKLP's young Communists. The *CIC Semi-Monthly Report*, No. 7 produces the central SKLP's additional directions toward its sub-organizations. One of the directives stated: "If any province has a separate plan, campaign, or system, they should get it approved by Central Headquarters."¹⁵⁵ The directive implies that the Chollanam-do SKLP acquired a special permission from the central SKLP to launch the insurgency in Cheju on April 3, 1948. The CIC report was based on SKLP documents from a secret informant on April 2, 1948.¹⁵⁶ It is conceivable that when the central SKLP devised the ways of opposing the election, the Chollanam-do SKLP brought its plan to central headquarters, and the central authorities approved the rebellion as a special case for its sabotage of the separate election.

The Chollanam-do and Cheju SKLP adopted a de-centralized organization to execute the planned rebellion. The Self-Protecting Forces and the Assault Units belonged to *myon*-CAFs rather than Cheju CAF. Instead, the Cheju CAF possessed a Special Guard of twenty officers and men. The Special Guard may have been established for the defense of the headquarters of the Cheju SKLP, not for operations.

Not only the Cheju SKLP, but also the Chollanam-do SKLP did not take the rebellion very seriously. The organization for the rebellion did not show any consideration for protracted, extensive armed struggle; there was no central unit that could counter large police forces, and the Department of Organization of the Chejudo SKLP rather than the Cheju CAF controlled each *myon*-CAF. Initiatives of operations

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

looked to nest in *myon*-CAFs; the insurgency would be the sum of the *myon*-CAFs' actions rather than an integrated and well organized at Cheju SKLP level.

De-centralized and scattered uprisings were the principal approach of the Communists after the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. Provincial SKLPs caused disturbances by launching scattered and de-centralized acts of violence in small areas. The recent February violence was conducted by small Communist groups, labor unions and *myon* SKLPs, although it was planned by central authorities. In fact, the Chollanam-do SKLP organized several insurgencies in March 1948; two hundred mobs clashed with the KNP on March 1, 1948.¹⁵⁷ The Communists assaulted three police substations, March 13-15 1948.¹⁵⁸

The 4.3 Incident became the gateway to the guerrilla warfare that lasted twenty months before the Korean War.¹⁵⁹ At the stage of planning, neither the Cheju SKLP nor the Chollanam-do SKLP could predict that the rebellion would lead to the extensive guerrilla warfare that followed the 4.3 Incident. The 4.3 Incident brought a new paradigm of Communist insurgency in southern Korea. No one could have foreseen the change or prepared for the new style of resistance appropriately. The 4.3 Incident was plotted as a de-centralized scattered insurgency and ended in tragic guerrilla warfare.

¹⁵⁷ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 772, RG 554.

¹⁵⁸ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 785.

¹⁵⁹ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 393-95; Shin, *Chejudo 4.3 Sageon-Ha*, 1095.

CHAPTER 5

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND PACIFICATION

The rebellion of Cheju developed from a limited local protest into a guerrilla war. Due to the strong response of the government force, the Communist leaders made their organization more centralized and militarized. The Communists made repeated changes to deal with increasing government forces. Eventually, the Cheju Communists adopted a Soviet style military organization, forced by the involvement of the Central SKLP. According to the changes of the Communist organization, the Cheju Communists underwent a metamorphosis from street protestors to guerrilla warriors.

Outbreak of the 4.3 Incident

The Cheju Communists assaulted their planned targets at 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1948. Under the command of each *myon*-CAF, the communists attacked police substations, boarding houses of NWYMA members, offices of right-wing groups, the homes of prominent rightists, bridges, and communication facilities. The attacks mainly occurred in the northern part of the island. Communists in four *myons* in Namcheju-gun [South Cheju-gun] failed to launch assaults: Andeuk-myon, Jungmun-myon, Seogwi-myon, and Pyoseon-myon.

In Cheju-eup, rebels assaulted three police substations in Samyang-ri, Hwabuk-ri, and Oido-ri. During the attack on Hwabuk-ri police substation, the communists killed a houseboy. Later, the rebels moved to government housing for police officers where they killed a police officer and his wife.¹ Aewol-myon Communists attacked police substations in Gueom-ri and Aewol-ri but failed to destroy the substations due to their poor planning and hasty actions. Instead, the Communists burned two reactionaries' houses.² Hanlim-myon leftists intended to kill police officers in the Hanlim-ri police substation and the Jeoji-ri substation, but failed. At the same time, the leftists raided Hanlim Inn, Sinchang Inn, and Maeripji Inn where members of the NWYMA stayed. Hanlim rebels murdered one police officer, one GUYC member, and seven NWYMA members at the attack on those inns. In addition, Hanlim Communists destroyed a road in two areas and cut telephone lines in four places.³

Gujwa-myon Communists killed one police officer during the attack on Sehwa-ri police substation. The plan to murder Daehong Kim, a powerful conservative in the village, failed due to Daehong's stubborn defense using a pistol.⁴ Jocheon-myon SKLP surprised two police substations in Hamdeuk-ri and Jocheon-ri, but failed to kill any police officers. Instead, the communists raided the boarding places of the NWYMA and murdered one police officer and four NWYMA members.⁵

The Daejung-myon CAF commanded local communists to damage the Daejung police substation and the office of Daejung-myon GUYC. The GUYC office was at the

¹ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 34-5.

² Ibid., 40-2.

³ Ibid., 46-8.

⁴ Ibid., 60.

⁵ Ibid., 62.

house of Pilsaeng Kang, “the worst reactionary in Cheju” according to the Cheju Communists. The rebels killed one police officer at the Daejung police substation, but failed to murder Pilsaeng Kang and his family.⁶ Mobs in Namwon-myon wiped out the Namwon-ri police substation, killing one police officer, an office boy, and a reactionary and wounded another police officer. They burned the substation to the ground.⁷ Seongsan Communists enveloped the Seongsan police substation, but later withdrew following aggressive police fire.⁸

During the operations, the Assault Units worked together with the Self-Protecting Force in each *myon* under the command of *myon*-CAF. Unlike the Assault Units, the members of the Self-Protecting Forces stayed in the villages rather than go to base camps on Halla Mountain. The Self-Protecting Forces gathered detailed information about pre-selected targets, guided the Assaulting Units to targets, and joined attacks.⁹ In addition, cell organizations in each village regularly communicated with *myon*-CAF two times per day, and three times in emergency situations.¹⁰

In fact, the rebels tried to annihilate the Cheju Inspection Command and the First District police station by mobilizing the Constabulary 9th Regiment. The Communists plotted assaults on those targets based on the direction of the representative from the Chollanam-do SKLP. The representative reported that the SKLP cell in the 9th Constabulary Regiment could be used for this insurgency, and the 9th Regiment should be mobilized to assault the Cheju Inspection Command and the First District police

⁶ Ibid., 51-2.

⁷ Ibid., 58.

⁸ Ibid., 59.

⁹ Colonel Brown, “The Partial Report of the Results of Investigation on Chejudo SKLP, June 20, 1948.”

¹⁰ The testimony of an unmanned person. He was the participant of the Assault Unit of Daejung-myon. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, “Naega Gyukkeun 4.3 [The 4.3 Incident what I experienced],” *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (September 1993): 84.

station.¹¹ Following the advice of the representative, the rebels assigned the Constabulary cell to attack the police headquarters.

The troops did not move on the day of the outbreak of the insurgency. The Cheju Communists failed to contact the agents in the regiment for the Daejung-myon SKLP because they had been arrested. Instead, the Cheju Communists met First Lt. Sanggil Moon to demand the mobilization of the Constabulary troops. He was an agent from the Central SKLP and refused to follow the request of the Cheju SKLP because he had no orders to join the insurgency from the central authorities.¹² He was unmoved by the appeal of the Cheju SKLP to join the insurgency, as he would only accept orders from the Central SKLP. Moon had graduated from the Korean Military Academy in the Third Class and served as a platoon leader and a company commander in the 9th Regiment. The Third Class of the Military Academy was famous for its many Communist officers. While they were candidates, they were under the influence of a numbers of Communist instructors and commanders such as Ilgyun Oh, Byunggeon Jo, Hakrim Kim, and Jongseok Kim.¹³

Some studies argue that the 4.3 Incident was planned by the Cheju Communists, based on Lt. Sanggil Moon's rejection of the appeals of the Cheju SKLP. The studies credit the assertion of Sanggil Moon that 'there was no directive to join the insurgency' as the evidence of the Cheju SKLP's autonomous decision to put the 4.3 Incident. However, the failure to mobilize the Constabulary cell reveals only the general policy of the central SKLP at that time. The leaders of the SKLP still pursued political power by

¹¹ Ibid., 76.

¹² Ibid., 77.

¹³ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 421-22.

means of legal and illegal methods short of warfare. The full scale armed struggle involving the Constabulary mutineers was not considered at this time. As a result, the central SKLP did not send a directive for battle to the cell in the 9th Constabulary Regiment.

The Central SKLP did allow the Chollanam-do SKLP to have a special insurgency as part of the anti-election campaign, which was conducted in restrained ways. The Chollanam-do representative's mention of using the fifth column in the 9th Constabulary Regiment seems to have implied permission to employ provincial cell members. Provincial SKLP headquarters planted Communist sergeants and enlisted men in Constabulary regiments. As a result, the Constabulary controversy proves the leading role of the Chollanam-do SKLP in plotting the 4.3 Incident. At least, it is clear the Chollanam-do SKLP asked the Cheju SKLP to commit the Constabulary troops. In any case, the Cheju police barely escaped the debacle.

The Military Government reacted to the insurgency immediately, mainly by employing the KNP. The KNP dispatched one hundred new officers from the Chollanam-do police district on April 5, 1948.¹⁴ On the same day, the KNP established an Emergency Security Command and appointed Jeongho Kim, the chief of the Department of Public Security at KNP headquarters as the commander. Five days later, the KNP sent one hundred cadets from the National Police Academy as a second group of reinforcements. The total police strength increased to almost 700 on Cheju.¹⁵

¹⁴ *Seoul Sinmun*, April 8, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 32; the U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 903, April 9, 1948, RG 554.

¹⁵ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 13, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 40.

The KNP did not initially counterattack, overwhelmed by terror and surprise. The reinforcing policemen were assigned only to guard police substations around the island.¹⁶ After the initial attack, the rebels attacked their targets, even in daytime, because of the KNP's unwillingness to react. In Cheju-eup, two members of the GUYC were killed at Eho-ri, and one GUYC member was murdered at Bonggae-ri on April 6, 1948.¹⁷ In Hanlim-myon, when the rebels surrounded Jungdong village on April 7, 1948, the police officers in Jeoji-ri police substation deserted their posts.¹⁸ The rebels burned down the building. The KNP could not get information from civilians about rebel activities. In addition, the Cheju police lost six U.S. carbines, one Japanese Type 99 rifle, and a total of 119 rounds of ammunition to rebels on April 8, 1948.¹⁹

In a public announcement on April 12, 1948, the KNP revealed that the aim of the insurgency was to oppose the general election.²⁰ In addition, the KNP identified mainland Communists, specifically the SKLP, as the subversive force which plotted the insurgency.²¹ Upon his arrival to Cheju, Police Superintendent Jeongho Kim blamed Communists from the mainland for encouraging Chejudoans to rise against the Military Government.²² As a result, the KNP intended to separate innocent islanders from the Communist rebels. In his public order on April 8, 1948, Jeongho Kim directed each village to organize Hyangbodan or the "Village Protective Association (VPA)." The aim of the VPA was to work against rebels, to stop the flow of information, food, or housing

¹⁶ In Byungok Cho's assessment about the 4.3 Incident on July 23, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol.9, 57.

¹⁷ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 900, April 7, 1948, RG 554; the testimony of Namjin Kim. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3 *eu Malhanda* vol.2, 67-8.

¹⁸ The testimony of Gunchil Go. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3 *eu Malhanda* vol.2, 68.

¹⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 804, April 9, 1948, RG 554.

²⁰ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 12, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 38.

²¹ Ibid.

²² *Cheju Sinbo* April 8, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 35.

to the rebels, and to cooperate with the police.²³ The police announced the casualties on April 12, 1948 as twenty-two killed, including four policemen and six rebels, fifty wounded, and twelve missing.²⁴

The Military Government and the KNP understood the insurgency in terms of the other protests that were rampant at that time. Their understanding was correct, and consequently, the KNP expected to deal with the case like other disturbances. In fact, the Communists rose against the Military Government to oppose the general election, not only in Cheju, but also on the mainland. A member of the Election Committee was attacked in Gwangju on April 3, 1948, and persons related to the election were assaulted in Seoul between April 5 and 6, 1948. In addition, two offices for voting and keeping electoral records were burned in Cheongju April 9- 11, 1948.²⁵ In the Gyungsangbuk-do area, mobs attacked registration offices, beat guards, and stole registration records, April 8-10, 1948.²⁶

The Cheju Communists continued their offensive until April 20, 1948, when they reshaped their organization.²⁷ The aim of the reorganization was to strengthen the central power of the Cheju SKLP. In the second reorganization, the Communist rebels abolished the Cheju SKLP's CAF and established the Cheju Command. The Cheju Command established staff offices: general staff, ordnance, communication, sanitation, and accounting departments. At the same time, *myon*-CAFs were replaced by *myon* commands, which had similar staff functions to the Cheju Command. In addition, unlike

²³ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 10, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 36-7.

²⁴ *Cheju Sinbo*, April 12, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 36- 9.

²⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 806, April 12, 1948, RG 554.

²⁶ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 808.

²⁷ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 20.

the Cheju CAF, the Cheju Command shared the power to control *myon* commands with the Department of Armed Forces in *myon* SKLPs.²⁸

Another goal of reshaping the organization was to reduce the resistance forces. After the initial operations both the Assault Units and the Self-Protecting Forces moved to Halla Mountain. Due to the active participation of the Self-Protecting Forces in the operations, the members could not stay in their villages. They were concerned about being arrested by the KNP. The increased population in the mountain bases caused problems in logistics and security. Therefore, in the second organization, the Communists strictly reduced the strength to 400 officers and soldiers and moved other rebels down to the base of the mountain.²⁹

According to Bonghyun Kim, the Cheju SKLP held a plenary meeting to examine the future of movement on April 15, 1948. At the meeting, the Communists discussed the political situation of Cheju and the reaction of the Chejudoans, analyzed their own and the KNP, and discussed flaws in military strategy and tactics.³⁰ In addition, the Communists decided to create centralized and mobile forces consisting of certified soldiers after dismissing the Self-Protecting Forces.³¹ At the same time, the Communists clearly defined their goal, which was to block the general election.

The meeting and the reforming of the Cheju SKLP showed the inevitable change from a de-centralized, scattered protest movement into a plan for guerrilla warfare. After their assaults, the Cheju Communists realized that they had crossed a bridge over which

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 21.

³⁰ Bonghyun Kim, *Chejudo Hyului Yeoksa* [The Bloody History of Chejudo], Minyoung No ed., *Jamdeulji Anneon Namdo* [A Never Sleep South Island] (Seoul: Onnuri, 1988), 147.

³¹ Ibid.

they could not easily return. They saw the rapidly increased KNP police force and the emergence of a special police command. All at once, the guerrillas in villages fled to Halla Mountain in an attempt to avoid capture and punishment after killing police officers, rightists, and others. Accordingly, the Communists intensified the power of the central command to deal with the increasing strength of the KNP.

The rebels moved in large numbers in coordinated efforts, which seems to prove the centralization of the Communist forces and demonstrated their initiative over the governmental forces. The rioters assaulted registration offices on Eho-ri and Iho-ri in Cheju-eup, Bukchon-ri in Jocheon-myon, and Tongil-ri in Daejung-myon during the nights of April 21-22, 1948. On April 22, 1948, the rebels raided Daejung-myon office, killed an election official, wounded another, and stole all registration records.³² A group of two hundred rebels exchanged fire with a police patrol at Nohyung-ri in Cheju-eup at 5 p.m. on April 19, 1948.³³

The Communist rebels killed reactionaries and raided police substations relentlessly. At Hwabuk-ri in Cheju-eup the rebels kidnapped the village head on April 27, 1948, at Sineom-ri in Jocheon-myon, the rioters attacked six local officials on their way back from election duties on the same day, in Jocheon-myon the Communists kidnapped a GUYC member on April 30, 1948, and the raiders killed an election official

³² The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 915, April 23, 1948, RG 554; *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 920. The wounded at Daejung-myon Office was Geunsik Park, who was an official at Daejung-myon. He died on the next day. The testimony of Pyunghwa Park, who is the sister of Geunsik. Interviewed by Kyengho Son at her house on July 14, 2006.

³³ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 915.

at Sinpyung-ri in Daejung-myon on the same day.³⁴ On May 4, 1948, the mobs hurled an explosive device into a police substation at Mosulpo, but it failed to detonate.³⁵

Meanwhile, the Military Government decided to mobilize the Constabulary to pacify the insurgency. The Military Governor, Major General William F. Dean, ordered the dispatch of one battalion from the 5th Regiment from Busan by Coast Guard vessels on April 16, 1948.³⁶ The Constabulary battalion arrived at the island on April 20, 1948. At the same time, Major General Dean indicated that rebels should be given the opportunity to surrender.³⁷

Mobilizing the Constabulary did not necessarily mean that the Military Government had come to view the insurgency as a guerrilla war. This would be proven by the style of the first large scale counter operation mobilizing the KNP and the 9th Constabulary Regiment on April 22, 1948. The combined forces raided houses of suspected participants in Cheju-eup between April 22 and 23, 1948. The Cheju police investigated the houses, and the Constabulary isolated the operational areas. With these efforts, sixty leftists were apprehended.³⁸ During the Communist offensives, the Cheju police patrolled suspected areas, raided former Communists' houses, and moved to fight against the rebels upon requests from villagers.³⁹ By these efforts, the police confiscated 500,000 *won* worth of first aid kits, suspected to be for the raiders at Hwabuk-ri in Cheju-

³⁴ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 823, May 1, 1948, RG 554.

³⁵ The U.S. 6th Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 928, May 5, 1948, RG 554.

³⁶ "Message," A letter from Col. Terrill E. Price to Captain Clarence D. DeReus, April 17, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 9, 24-5. Colonel Price was the advisor to the Chief of Tongwibu [The Department of Internal Security].

³⁷ "Cheju-Do Operation," A telegram from Major General William F. Dean to Lt. Col. John S. Mansfield, April 18, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 9, 25-26.

³⁸ The U.S. 6th Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 918, April 24, 1948, RG 554.

³⁹ See the U.S. 6th Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 928, May 5, 1948, RG 54.

eup on April 27, 1948, and arrested eight people in raids at six villages on April 30, 1948.⁴⁰

Before large scale Constabulary operations, the Military Government tried to give rebels a chance to surrender. In accordance with the direction of Major Gen. Dean, the chief civil affairs officer tried to make contact with rebels and negotiate with them. According to Lt. Col. Ikryol Kim, Lt. Col. John S. Mansfield recommended to Governor Haejin Yu and high ranking police officers, including Jeongho Kim, to engage in talks with rebels. However, Yu and others did not intend risk their lives and fled before any negotiations could be conducted. Naturally, Lt. Col. Kim took over the responsibility of the negotiations.⁴¹ In fact, Kim and Mansfield devised a plan to induce the surrender of the rebels by using the peace talks to separate them from civilians. After the separation, Kim and Mansfield planned to suppress the rebels with force.⁴² To contact the rebels, Lt. Col. Kim made handbills and distributed them over the island using an L-5 light airplane. Eventually, he succeeded in communicating with Dalsam Kim, the Commander of the rebels, on April 28, 1948.⁴³

The peace talks seemed to be an important milestone that could possibly bring the end of the insurgency. In the talks, Dalsam Kim agreed to cease to hostilities in five days, to disarm gradually, and to submit the names of major cadre men. In return, Lt. Col. Ikryol Kim promised to expel the NWYMA from the island, to remove evil police officers and “national traitors” from the island, to dismiss the Cheju police, and to

⁴⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 823, May 5, 1948, RG 554, Entry 1256.

⁴¹ Ikryul Kim, “4.3ui Jinsil [The Truth of the 4.3 Incident],” Jemin Ilbo, ed., *4.3un Malhanda* vol. 2 [The 4.3 Talks] (Seoul: Jeonyewon, 1994), 309-329.

⁴² Kim, “4.3ui Jinsil [The Truth of the 4.3 Incident],” 308-309.

⁴³ Ibid.; *Chosun Ilbo*, May 3, 1948.

commit the Constabulary to secure social order, and to guarantee the security of rebellion participants. For the last item, Lt. Col. Kim compromised by suggesting that he would not care if anyone fled overseas to preserve their lives, and even mentioned that he could provide a ship for their escape.⁴⁴

However, the Communists never intended to end the insurgency. Dalsam Kim expressed his commitment to continue fighting at a cadre's meeting in Mosulpo on the night of May 2, 1948. Dalsam moved to Mosulpo on the day of the peace talks and presided over the meeting which was held at the house of Seonghwan Lee at Hamo-ri in Daejung-myon.⁴⁵ In addition, a few days after the meeting, Dalsam Kim confidently predicted the victory of the Communists by saying that the police was weak, the Constabulary was neutral and sympathetic to the rebels, and the American troops were reluctant to intervene, due to the possibility of the provocation of an international crisis.⁴⁶ The Communists interpreted the peace talks as an indicator of the Constabulary's neutrality and sympathy toward the rebels. The Communists tried to delay the involvement of the Constabulary forces. They were aware of the immanent Constabulary operations and the enlargement of the troop numbers. At the same time, the Military Government decided to resort to military operations rather than peaceful measures. The G-3 of the USAFIK intervened in the 4.3 Incident and urged the chief civil affairs officer in Cheju to end the disturbance as soon as possible. Lt. Col. M. W. Schewe of the G-3 of the USAFIK paid a visit to the Cheju Military Government on April 27, 1948. Lt. Col. Schewe met Col. Rothwell H. Brown, the commander of the 20th

⁴⁴ Kim, "4.3ui Jinsil [The Truth of the 4.3 Incident]," 327-429.

⁴⁵ Woonbang Lee, "4.3 Hangjaenge Gwanhan Il Gochal" [Contemplation of the 4.3 Incident], *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (November, 1990):86-87.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 87.

Infantry Regiment; Major Russell C. Geist, who was in charge of the troops of the 20th Regiment in Cheju; and Captain Clarence D. DeReus, the advisor to the 5th Constabulary Regiment with Lt. Col. Mansfield at the Cheju Airfield. Lt. Col. Schewe clearly presented the direction of the USAFIK: the Constabulary should take up the pacification mission immediately. All kinds of civil riots should be ended, the KNP and the Constabulary should cooperate with each other to weaken the guerrilla activities, and American forces should not intervene in the operations.⁴⁷

The new direction demanded immediate action of the Constabulary forces, and defined the disturbance as guerrilla warfare. The new direction of the USAFIK G-3 may have been the idea of Lt. General John Hodge. In addition, Hodge called for rapid pacification of the situation by swift operations by the Constabulary units without the participation of the U.S. troops. General Hodge intended to conduct the incoming general election successfully and to use the pacification of Cheju-do as an example to demonstrate South Koreans' will and ability to establish an independent country.

Unlike the Military Government, which had relied on the KNP to quell Communist insurgencies, USAFIK analyzed the Cheju-do case from a military point of view. The USAFIK explicitly used the term 'guerrilla' instead of mobs or "rioters" to describe the Communist rebels. Therefore, the USAFIK G-3 wanted Lt. Col. Mansfield to conduct anti-guerrilla warfare. At the same time, the G-3 intended to check the plausibility of the plans that had been presented to the headquarters of the USAFIK by Lt. Col. Mansfield, which sought to control civilians and weaken guerrilla activities. The

⁴⁷ "Disposition Form, Report of Activities at Cheju Do Island," USAFIK, RG 554, File Adjutant General 000.5, April 29, 1948.

plan might have been the same one that had been developed by Lt. Col. Kim, Captain DeReus, and Lt. Col. Mansfield.

A model case operation was prepared by Lt. Col. Mansfield. Upon his arrival, Lt. Col. Schewe observed the operation in which the 5th Constabulary Regiment searched for suspected persons and weapons under the command of Col. (Lt. Col.) Kim. This action may have been arranged to show the effectiveness of the plan to Lt. Col. Schewe; the operation began thirty minutes after the arrival of Lt. Col. Schewe.⁴⁸ The Constabulary soldiers advanced to targeted villages, sealed approaches to the sea and roads, and searched for suspects and weapons. Police officers interrogated villagers under the control of the Constabulary.

However, the results of the operation were not impressive.⁴⁹ Lt. Col. Schewe suggested a new concept of operations and evaluated the abilities of the Constabulary to execute the new plan. With the presence of Schewe, the officers carefully discussed the operations of the next day. Then, Lt. Col. Schewe emphasized the importance of the pacification operation to Lt. Col. Kim. On the next day, the Constabulary executed an operation in a different style; without the help of the Cheju police, the soldiers raided remote villages and gathered all residents and passers-by at one location. Lt. Col. Schewe was satisfied with the operation as he observed it from the air. In addition, Lt. Col. Mansfield planned to search for guerrillas at Noru Orum [a parasite volcano, Cheju dialect], No. 4 area (unidentified), and an *orum* at Gyorae-ri by using 5th Constabulary

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

and 9th Regiments between April 29 and May 1, 1948.⁵⁰ These locations had been identified as guerrilla bases by military intelligence. In his evaluation, Lt. Col. Schewe stressed attacks on *Orums* to eradicate guerrilla encampments and criticized the passive operations in Cheju-do before April 28, 1948.⁵¹ Unlike the KNP efforts, the new operations aimed to assault guerrilla camps around Halla Mountain.

The evaluation of enemy movement in Cheju and the new suggestions from the USAFIK G-3 originated with the Military Governor. Then, the change of the operational concept might have brought the visit of Major General Dean on April 29, 1948.⁵² He might have become aware of the success of the peace talks that were pushed by Lt. Col. Kim. However, he was no longer concerned with the peace talks. General Dean may have confirmed the view of the USAFIK G-3 about the insurgency. After returning to his Seoul office, he became determined to launch aggressive offensives to end the insurgency in a short time. Col. Ilgweon Jeong, the chief of staff of the Korean Constabulary testified that the decision to carry out the offensive was finalized on May 3, 1948, by Major General Dean and Colonel Brown.⁵³ Col. Jeong's testimony implies that General Dean met Col. Brown during his visit to Cheju on April 29, 1948.

To confirm the change in the operational concept, Major General Dean made a second visit to the island with several senior officers on May 5, 1948: Brigadier General Hoseong Song, the commander of the Korean Constabulary, Byungok Cho, the chief of the KNP, and Chaihong An, the civilian chief administrator of the Military

⁵⁰ Ibid., These areas had been identified as assembling areas of the Communist rebels before April 22, 1948. See the U.S. 6th Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 917, April 24, 1948, RG 554.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² *Seoul Sinmun*, April 7, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 202.

⁵³ *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 14, 1948. Cited from CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 201.

Government.⁵⁴ In a meeting, Lt. Col. Ikryol Kim presented a plan to separate the rebels from the people with propaganda and to suppress the rebels with force. At the same time, Lt. Col. Kim accused the Cheju police of agitating Chejudoans with offensive behavior. Kim's accusation caused a fracas between Kim and Byongok Cho.⁵⁵

Lt. Col. Ikryol Kim could not change the USAFIK G-3's official view on the Communist rebellion. General Dean already adopted the new concept of pacification operations and decided to reinforce the pacification unit. In addition, he appointed Lt. Col. Jingyung Park to the position of commander of the 9th Constabulary Regiment on May 6, 1948. Lt. Col. Park had service experience in Cheju as a Japanese second lieutenant and spoke fluent English, which was essential to effective communications with American advisors.⁵⁶ Initially, Tongwibu [the Department of Internal Security] considered Lt. Col. Park, who was the chief of G-1, and Lt. Col. Changguk Jang, the chief of G-3, who established the 9th Regiment, as the candidates to replace Kim. Tongwibu preferred to retain Lt. Col. Jang at Tongwibu headquarters as the chief of G-3 based on the prospect that the pacification operation would require joint operations between the Coast Guard and the Constabulary. The American advisors respected the decision of Tongwibu and accepted Lt. Col. Park.⁵⁷

The abrupt changes in operations and local commanders became critical mistakes in guaranteeing the general election. Due to the sudden change of commanders, the 9th

⁵⁴ *Chosun Ilbo*, May 6, 1948.

⁵⁵ Kim, "4.3ui Jinsil," 338-43.

⁵⁶ Changguk Jang, "Yuksa Jolyeopsaeng [The Alumni of the Korea Military Academy]," *Jungang Ilbo*, January 20, 1983. He graduated from Osaka Foreign Language University.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Constabulary Regiment could not move effectively to prevent sabotage by the Communist rebels during the most pivotal time.

On the opposite side, the Communists moved with determination to block the general election. The rebels forced villagers to move to Halla Mountain before election day, damaged election buildings, and terrorized people by killing many rightist election officials. The Communist rebels drove villagers of Hwabuk-ri to Halla Mountain to block the peoples' opportunities to vote on May 8, 1948. The rebels were the same individuals who kidnapped the village head of Hwabuk-ri on April 27, 1948. They killed the village head and then mutilated the body after his murder. The rebels forced the people to stay at one place and spoke about the reasons to boycott the election. The people were allowed to go home beginning one day after the election.⁵⁸

At Dodu-ri in Cheju-eup, the rebels ordered the residents to move to the mountain a week before the election. On May 10, 1948, the rioters forced the people to climb Saengi Orum and make shelters with trees and grass. The Communist rebels encouraged them to oppose the election through speeches and group activities: forming scrums and running back and forth to villages by chanting *Wassha* [hooray]. Meanwhile, the Communists killed residents who did not move to the mountain; the rebels killed Bangok Jeong, the chief of Dodu-ri GUYC, and Yongjo Kim, a GUYC member, by fixing sticks on their arms and legs and burying them alive on May 11, 1948. The rioters murdered Haeman Kim, the chair of the election committee of the village, Taekhun Kim, a GUYC member, and Sangok Kim, father of Taekhun Kim, by crushing them with large stones on

⁵⁸ The testimony of Gyuntaek Oh. Cited from Park ed., *Yongwonhan Wooridurui Apeum* 4.3, 132-38.

May 14, 1948. The murderers killed six villagers, mainly families of rightists, including a nine year old boy and the wife of Bangok Jeong on May 18, 1948.⁵⁹

The removal of residents to Halla Mountain occurred mainly in the northern part of Cheju-do. The Communist rebels forced people in Cheju-eup except those in ‘inner wall areas,’ - Jocheon-myon, Gujwa-myon, Aewol-myon, and Hanlim-myon - to move to Halla Mountain beginning on May 5, 1948.⁶⁰ The removal effort was so pervasive that few people stayed in their homes. The relocation prevented the villagers from voting effectively and enabled the rebels to hold firm control. To avoid being identified as reactionaries or wobblers, the majority of the villagers went to the mountain and received the Communist reeducation. A police report proved the large number of residents who migrated to the mountain by recording that “2,000 persons were found in the area living in brush shelters and were started on the road back to their homes in Hanlim and Aewol.”⁶¹

American advisors in the Cheju-do military government did their best to conduct the election. However, many Korean election officials resigned from their duties in the interest of self-preservation. In the case Jocheon-myon, approximately fifty percent of the election committee quit their job. Hence, sixty-five voting districts failed to work over the island on election day. As a result, the military government mobilized the officials of the government to “distribute and collect election materials.”⁶² In Andeuk-

⁵⁹ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Park ed., *Yongwonhan Wooridurui Apeum* 4.3, 222-26; Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol. 3, 46.

⁶⁰ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol. 2, 218-20.

⁶¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 835, May 15, 1948, RG 554.

⁶² USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 831.

myon, a U.S. soldier carried a ballot box to a voting place at Gwangpyung-ri to prevent Communist raids.⁶³

The Communists succeeded in boycotting the election in Bukcheju-gun. Due to the forced migration to Halla Mountain and assaults on voting places on election day, registrants in the northern part of Cheju-do could not cast their votes freely. Because the majority could not vote, the elections in Bukcheju-gun were invalidated; in electoral district A, 11,912 voters participated in the voting among 27,560 registered voters, and 9,724 voters voted among 20,917 registrants in the electoral district B.⁶⁴ Therefore, the elections of Gwijin Yang and Byungjik Yang were invalidated. Yongguk Oh from Namcheju-gun turned out to be the only representative in Chejudo for the first term National Assembly.⁶⁵

General Dean declared the invalidation of the elections and ordered the re-election on June 23, 1948.⁶⁶ However, the chairman of the Cheju-do Election Committee suggested postponing the re-election based on the erratic Cheju situation.⁶⁷ He said that fifteen election committee members were murdered, and no one was willing to continue the job. He added that it was impossible to recover half of the registration records stolen by the Communists.⁶⁸ Eventually, General Dean cancelled the re-election and put it off indefinitely on June 10, 1948.⁶⁹

⁶³ The testimony of Bongseok Kim. Cited from CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 208.

⁶⁴ A letter from the Chairman of the National Election Committee, Ro Chin Sul, to General Dean on May 19, 1948, "UN Temporary Commission: Observation of South Korean Election," RG 554.

⁶⁵ *Chosun Ilbo*, May 20, 1948.

⁶⁶ *Chosun Ilbo*, May 27, 1948.

⁶⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, June 10, 1948.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ *Seoul Sinmun*, June 13, 1948. Cited from CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 134; USAFIK, G-2 *Periodic Report*, No. 858, June 12, 1948, RG 554.

Constabulary Actions

After the failure of the election, the Military Government poured great efforts into suppressing the insurgency. The Military Government mobilized additional Constabulary units to Cheju-do. The Military Government dispatched the 11th Regiment to Cheju on May 15, 1948 and merged it with the 9th Regiment. Lt. Col. Park became the commander of the 11th Regiment. In addition, the government transferred one battalion from the Constabulary 6th Regiment to the 9th Regiment. Lt. Col. Park was able to command almost a regular regiment.

At that time, the Korean Constabulary was in the process of rapid expansion because of the planned establishment of the South Korean government and the expected withdrawal of the U.S troops. Based on the NSC 8 adopted on April 8, 1948, the United States decided to withdraw its troops from Korea after the establishment of the South Korean government. The first day of the withdrawal would be August 15, 1948, and the final date of departure was designated as December 31, 1948.⁷⁰ The Army was more aggressive than the Department of State in pulling out U.S. forces. The Department of State requested the gradual and extended withdrawal in accordance with the change of the international environment and internal situation of the newly born South Korean government.⁷¹

Based on the withdrawal plan of the U.S. troops, the USAMGIK intended to strengthen the Constabulary, Coast Guard, and the KNP. The main points were to enlarge the size of the military forces and to train them to cope with internal and external

⁷⁰“The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Army,” June 23, 1948, *FRUS* 1948, vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia, 1224-26.

⁷¹ “The Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Army,” July 8, 1948, *FRUS* 1948, vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia, 1234-35.

crises.⁷² The Constabulary was expanded rapidly in terms of organization. After the creation, the Constabulary intensified the commanding structure by grouping three regiments into three brigades on December 1, 1947. The 9th Regiment belonged to the 3rd Brigade in Busan. With the progress of the expanding plan, the Constabulary added two more brigades on April 29, 1948: the 4th in Seoul and the 5th in Gwangju. Consequently, the 9th Regiment was changed to the 5th Brigade. In addition, the Constabulary created the 10th Regiment in Gangreung, the 11th in Suwon, the 12th in Gunsan, the 13th in Onyang, the 14th in Yosu, and 15th in Masan from May 1, 1948 to May 4, 1948.⁷³

Lt. Col. Park took the responsibility of pacifying the insurgency under the command of Lt. Col. Mansfield like Lt. Col. Kim. However, Park's operations were quite different from his predecessor's. Park divided Cheju-do into a number of operational districts and dispatched his battalions or companies to those areas. The units were sent to Hanlim-myon, Seongsan-myon, Seogwi-myon, Gujwa-myon, and Cheju-eup. He ordered his men to guard the districts from guerrilla attacks and to search for the enemy. At the same time, he tried to separate residents from the rioters by building stone walls around villages.⁷⁴ Park pursued more aggressive and pervasive operations using his abundant troops.

Park's units captured prisoners in cooperative actions with the KNP and during search-and-clear operations. At Hanlim-ri, the Constabulary killed five rioters with

⁷² Robert K. Sawyer, *United States Military Advisory Group To The Republic of Korea* (Washington D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army), 43-4.

⁷³ IMHC, *Geongunsa*, 153.

⁷⁴ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa* [The History of Anti-Guerrilla Warfare] (Seoul: Gukbangbu, 1989), 55. For the places of dispatched units see *Seoul Sinmun*, June 4, 1948.

policemen while dispelling 200 raiders attacking Hanlim police substation.⁷⁵ Some units had searched for guerrillas between the area from Songdang-ri in Gujwa-myon and Gyorae-ri in Jocheon-myon from May 14, 1948 to May 21. The units killed seven guerrillas and took 200 prisoners.⁷⁶ A unit at Songdang-ri captured forty prisoners with nineteen rifles, forty-four bamboo spears, and 333 rounds of ammunition at Seonhol-ri in Jocheon on May 21, 1948.⁷⁷

The Constabulary began to lose its reputation for loyalty when forty-one soldiers deserted on May 20, 1948. Eleven NCOs and thirty enlisted men, mostly Cheju natives, fled to Halla Mountain with their M-1 rifles and 5,000 rounds of ammunition. On their way, the deserters assaulted the Daejung police substation, killing four police officers and one houseboy.⁷⁸ Four days later, twenty of the deserters were captured along with nineteen M-1 rifles and 5,000 rounds of ammunition.⁷⁹ The deserters were captured by the Constabulary because they failed to contact the guerrillas. In fact, the guerrillas in the southern part of Cheju had prepared facilities accommodate them.⁸⁰ Seungok Go, who was planted in the regiment by Daejung-myon SKLP before the insurgency, joined the desertion.⁸¹

Amid clashes with the government forces, the Communist rebels reshaped their organization right after the election. The rebels intended to stiffen the discipline, the

⁷⁵ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 938, May 14, 1948, RG 554; the testimony of Dongwoo Park-a participant of the raid. He said that the raiders were one hundred persons. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.3, 35.

⁷⁶ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 842, May 24, 1948, RG 554.

⁷⁷ *Seoul Sinmun*, June 4, 1948. Cited from CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 117.

⁷⁸ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 946, May 22, 1948, RG 554; Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.3, 106-37.

⁷⁹ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 948.

⁸⁰ The testimony of an unnamed person-he was a company commander of the guerrilla force. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Naega Gyukkeun 4.3, 78-9.

⁸¹ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.3, 114.

counter-intelligence posture, and the rapidity of unit movements.⁸² The Communists might have felt the needs for strong centralization of troops and intelligence to cope with the increasing government forces in the island.

To achieve their goals, the rebels abolished the *myon* Commands and *myon* Assault Units. From this point, *myon* SKLPs maintained the Self-Protecting Forces only. All units were reorganized into three regiments under the Cheju Command in the Cheju SKLP. The Cheju Command gained more staff functions: intelligence, inspection, and counter-intelligence. The Special Guards were dismissed, and the members were transferred to staff offices in the Cheju Command. The Cheju Command no longer needed to coordinate with *myon* SKLPs to mobilize troops. The total troops were 370 men: each three regiment retained 110 members in two battalions; each two battalion possessed forty-nine persons in two companies; companies had two platoons consisting of ten members; platoons held three squads of three men.⁸³ Upon assaults, the central guerrilla troops coordinated with the Self-Protecting Forces in target areas.⁸⁴

The reorganization has great significance. The reorganization showed the change of the rebels' attitude toward their struggle. In fact, the Cheju Communists succeeded in blocking the election, but, instead of abandoning the struggle, they increased their efforts. They realized that they had to deal with the government forces in order to protect their lives, so the rebels devised a strong command structure that could mobilize every resource. After the reformation, the Communists rebels became a well-organized

⁸² Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 21.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁸⁴ See the testimony of Dongwoo Park in Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.3, 37. For the attack on Hanlim police substation, sixty troops came from the Cheju Command and other villages, and forty men joined from Hanlim-ri.

guerrilla force. They understood that they could not return to their previous lives; they had no option but to be guerrillas.

The Chollanam-do SKLP did not have any idea about future movements. Stopping the fighting would mean the deaths of all guerrillas. On the other hand, continued fighting would bring extreme hardship for the Cheju Communists, even the sacrifice of their lives. Although there were representatives from the Chollanam-do SKLP, including experts of organization, they could not devise workable future plans that would preserve the lives of the guerrillas.⁸⁵

From this point, the central SKLP started to control the Cheju Communists. The central SKLP covered the insurgency on *Noryuk Inmin* [The Efforts of People], the SKLP's internal newspaper, from May 25, 1948. At first, the central SKLP mainly encouraged the Cheju Communists by exaggerating the actions of the Cheju rebels in the paper. The message of the Central SKLP was clear; the Cheju Communists should fight until the SKLP grasped dominant power in southern Korea. The SKLP would struggle to prevent the establishment of South Korean government. As long as Cheju-do could remain in turmoil, the creation of the Republic of the Korea would be disturbed. In addition, the Cheju case became served as a useful propaganda tool for the Communists to demonstrate the failure of the USAMGIK and the unwillingness of southern Koreans for a separate government.

After the failure of the general election in Cheju, the Communist guerrillas moved actively. The Cheju Communists insisted that they had gained most glorious

⁸⁵ Colonel Brown, "The Partial Report of the Results of Investigation on Chejudo SKLP, June 20, 1948."

success at this time.⁸⁶ They concentrated more troops for larger operation. At Hagwi-ri in Aewol-myon, about 300 raiders fired on a police truck on May 12, 1948.⁸⁷ In Andeuk-myon, approximately one hundred rebels assaulted a police substation on May 23, 1948.⁸⁸ Astonishingly, only forty of the rebels were armed with rifles while the others used spears. The guerrillas were able to use forty rifles in one assault: at least one guerrilla battalion was armed. It showed that the Communists had acquired significant number of rifles. Generally, the rebels gained arms by assaulting police substations and from the deserters from the 9th Constabulary Regiment. Once a *myon* SKLP cell collected arms, it sent the arms to the Cheju SKLP.⁸⁹

During the period from May 11, 1948 to May 31, 1948, the guerrillas attacked several villages for eleven days. They moved most actively from May 12 to May 14, 1948. During this period, they attacked multiple targets in several *myons* by mobilizing large numbers of troops; the attacks on Hagwi-ri, Andeuk-myon, and Hanlim occurred at this time. The second most attacks were launched during May 19 to May 23, 1948. This time, the guerrillas attacked relatively few targets in limited areas using small numbers of raiders; the general size was thirty men except in the attack on Andeuk-myon, which mobilized one hundred rebels. It showed the decrease of the guerrilla activities due to the counter-operations of the KNP and the Constabulary. During this period, the rebels murdered six police officers and twenty-nine civilians and burned 143 houses, including

⁸⁶ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 32.

⁸⁷ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 936, May 12, 1948, RG 554.

⁸⁸ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 951.

⁸⁹ The testimony of an unnamed person-he was a company commander of the guerrilla force. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, "Naega Gyukkeun 4.3," 77.

the Namwon-myon office building. In response, forty-eight guerrillas were killed, and 1,015 persons became as prisoners.

The KNP responded to the Communist attacks with brutality. The number of police officers increased rapidly with the addition of reinforcements from the mainland: 350 policemen from the Railroad Police, and 100 police officers from the 6th and 8th Districts.⁹⁰ The reinforcement police officers were not familiar with the customs of the islanders and held strong anti-Communist feelings. At the same time, they were extremely nervous of being targeted by the Communist guerrillas. Some Cheju police officers were also eager to take revenge on the Communist rebels for the murders and assaults of colleagues and family members. Unfortunately, it was difficult to distinguish Communist rebels from innocent villagers.

Furthermore, the Military Government hired the NWYMA as an auxiliary force to the KNP. This aggravated the situation on Cheju, as the NWYMA deeply despised the Communists and would seek vengeance against them because of the Communists' brutal acts against the NWYMA and their families. Also at this time, Chejudoans hated the North Korean refugees due to the NWYMA's unlawful behavior before the beginning of the 4.3 Incident. In fact, the Communist rebels explicitly mentioned the NWYMA's atrocities as one of the main causes of their uprising at the meeting of March 15, 1948. The members of the NWYMA inflicted countless abuses upon the islanders during the 4.3 Incident.

Police brutality occurred frequently during interrogations and operations. After the fire of Jeoji police substation in Hanlim-myon on April 7, 1948, the police officers

⁹⁰ *Seoul Sinmun*, May 21, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 99.

interrogated the families of suspects. The suspected atrocities were thought to be the same persons who led the demonstration in the village on February 9, 1948. At the demonstration, one hundred-fifty young men stoned the police substation and distributed handbills. The police investigation focused on the residents at Myungi-dong. To get the information about the suspects' location, the police officers beat the families every day and night. The police officers even shot the wife of a suspect when she said she did not know her husband's whereabouts. They also killed a suspect's father in law by torture.⁹¹

The Communist assault resulted in further police brutality. The rebels attacked Jeoji right after the dawn on May 13, 1948. The guerrillas murdered one police officer and three rightists with bamboo spears. The civilian victims were mainly the members of a police support committee.⁹² After the Communist attack, forty police officers moved into the village and searched for Communists. They were reinforcements from Chollanam-do and were commanded by two police second lieutenants. On June 7, 1948, the Chollanam-do police went to an adjacent village, Geumak-ri, to capture guerrillas with seventy members of the VPA.⁹³ On the way back to Jeoji, the police officers murdered three women and two old men without cause.⁹⁴ Thirty-one of the police officers were later apprehended on charges of killing civilians.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.3, 30-1.

⁹² Such a committee had been organized to offer lodgings and food to police officers in villages. Specifically, reinforcements from the mainland had difficulties to get beds and warm foods with their small amount of salaries. Most police officers were billeted in private houses during their missions in the island. See The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 271.

⁹³ The Village Protective Association (VPA) was organized before the general election on May 1, 1948 for safe election. The VPA consisted of male adults aged between eighteen and fifty-five. The VPA was officially dismissed on May 22, 1948, but in Cheju it still worked until June 1948. Later, Civil Protective Association (CPA) was created in national level at the end of October 1948, but in Cheju it was organized from August 11, 1948. See The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 272-73.

⁹⁴ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.3, 34-5.

⁹⁵ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 968, June 13, 1948, RG 554.

On May 20, 1948, about one hundred police officers and NWYMA members raided Dodu-ri in Cheju-eup to avenge the deaths of right-wing persons.⁹⁶ Their approach was detected by a *bikke* or “watchman,” who alerted the residents using a bugle. The troops opened fire on fleeing residents indiscriminately. The police officers selected ten villagers and brought them to the peak of the Dodu Orum. One of the ten was decapitated because he possessed a Communist handbill. In total, five residents were shot to death without any justifiable reason. Disturbingly, the pacification troops threatened two fishing boats close to land, and took some fish; after eating the fish, the police officers killed five fishermen at Dodu Orum.⁹⁷

Forceful police operations and the use of the NWYMA caused serious repercussions. Young male adults fled to Halla Mountain to avoid arrest and execution by government forces. If they were not a former GUYC member, they could be accepted by the Communist rebels. The government forces were composed of mainlanders, but the rebels were islanders. Chejudoans could communicate with the rebels using their unique dialect, but could not effectively relate to the government troops. The islanders could find some relatives or familiar faces among the rebels, but the government troops appeared foreign. Only children, women, and elders who could not flee to the mountain remained at villages.

Many refugees were arrested during police and the Constabulary operations. Dongyul Yu, the minister of the Department of Internal Security, announced that the number of prisoners and surrendered reached 3,126 between April 27, 1948 and May 27, 1948. On the contrary, the government forces only seized three Japanese rifles, twelve

⁹⁶ See this chapter, page 17.

⁹⁷ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3eun Malhanda vol.3, 49-52.

bamboo spears, fifteen grenades, and seventeen helmets.⁹⁸ The notable discrepancy between the numbers of the weapons and prisoners showed that the majority of the arrestees were noncombatants taken from villages or secluded places.

The pacification operations entered into a new phase with the arrival of command of Colonel Brown. He was the man in charge of Chollanam-do, Chollabuk-do, and Cheju-do as the commander of the U.S. 20th Infantry Regiment. He came to the island on May 20, 1948. He planned to end the chaos in two weeks by employing swift action.⁹⁹

Colonel Brown decided to limit police operations to areas within 2.5 miles from coast line, pushed the Constabulary sweep to the mountainous area from east to west, and ordered the Coast Guard to circle the island twice a day.¹⁰⁰ He focused on sweeping operations to round up the rebels. A *G-2 Weekly Summary* recorded that the Constabulary continued to mop up the guerrillas from east to west and took 596 prisoners by June 2, 1948.¹⁰¹ To prove that the results of the sweeping operations were effective, Brown passed through Halla Mountain using mountain trails with news reporters from Cheju-eup to Seogwi-myon and back via Pyoseon-myon, Gujwa-myon, to Cheju-eup on June 3, 1948.¹⁰²

Colonel Brown's operation pressed the Communist guerrillas harshly. The *G-2 Report* showed the sudden decrease of the guerrilla actions after May 23, 1948. Until May 31, 1948, the only organized assault occurred on May 25, 1948 with 10 guerrillas,

⁹⁸ *Seoul Sinmun*, June 3, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 113.

⁹⁹ *Chosun Chungang Ilbo*, June 8, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 125.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 142, June 4, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 7, 180-81.

¹⁰² *Seoul Sinmun*, June 4, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 116-17.

which claimed the lives of civilians at Seohong-ri in Seogwi-myon.¹⁰³ On the other side, the KNP killed and arrested the guerrillas in many places during the same period. The pacification operations seemed to be effective, and Cheju-do looked to be peaceful.

In fact, at the end of May 1948, the Communist guerrillas reformed their organization to preserve their strength from the relentless pressure of the government forces. The guerrilla leaders intended to avoid clashes with the Constabulary and promote cohesion in the central units. First, the Communists decreased the number of troops on a large scale; the rebels reduced their strength from 370 to 240 men and women. Second, the leaders integrated three regiments into one regiment under the direct command of Dalsam Kim. Finally, the Cheju Command abolished personnel of counter-intelligence, inspection, and account and installed logistics, operation and education, and adjutant general. The regiment consisted of two sub-commands, Gidongdae or mobile troops which had two detachments. The detachments had limited staff functions.

The Cheju Command turned into a more militarized organization. In addition, the reform brought the increase of troops in low level units. Squads increased to five men, and platoons had sixteen members, including a platoon leader.¹⁰⁴ The third squad in every platoon was for cooking, communication, and sanitation.¹⁰⁵ It showed that the guerrillas could stay on the mountain in their platoons. Instead of companies of twenty-three men and women, platoons became the nuclei of operations.

Reducing conflict with the Constabulary forces was the pervading motivation of the Cheju Communists. From the beginning of the 4.3 Incident, the Communist rebels

¹⁰³ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 845, May 27, 1948, RG 554.

¹⁰⁴ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 23-4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

had avoided conflicts with the Constabulary. When Constabulary units arrived at places of engagement between police and rebels, the rebels withdrew without firing on the Constabulary soldiers.¹⁰⁶ The involvement of the Constabulary was the unexpected event to the Communists, so the Communists might have intended to prevent further commitment of the Constabulary by curbing hostilities.

According to the *G-2 Periodic Report*, during the period between May 27, 1948 and June 17, 1948, the Communist guerrillas only succeeded in conducting four small scale operations.¹⁰⁷ Forty guerrillas attacked Jocheon-ri, Hamdeuk-ri, and Gimnyong-ri, on June 2, 1948, but inflicted no casualties.¹⁰⁸ Ten guerrillas assaulted one village in Seogwi-myon and killed one GUYC member on June 10, 1948.¹⁰⁹ Two days later, eight rioters kidnapped six villagers at Doryun-ri in Cheju-eup.¹¹⁰ Finally, the rebels murdered two policemen and kidnapped four travelers on a ferry at Bukchon-ri in Jocheon-myon, on June 16, 1948.¹¹¹

In response, under the command of Colonel Brown, the government forces launched aggressive pacification operations. The records of the Communist guerrillas shows that during the same period, the Constabulary launched four attacks in Halla Mountain. The guerrillas carefully watched the movements of the Constabulary units. According to the record, the Constabulary searched guerrillas at the bases of Halla

¹⁰⁶ A constabulary officer described the behaviors of the guerrillas to a reporter. *Chosun Ilbo*, June 9, 1948.

¹⁰⁷ The dates of the period were designated by Communist guerrillas for their fifth offensive. See Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeongdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 33.

¹⁰⁸ The U.S. 6th Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 958, RG 554.

¹⁰⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 858, June 12, 1948, RG 554.

¹¹⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 859.

¹¹¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 877.

Mountain between May 27, 1948 and May 28, 1948. During this offensive, the guerrillas lost their Daejung-myon base on May 27, 1948.¹¹²

The Constabulary began to sweep the mountain from east to west. The units conducted reconnaissance in four directions between May 30, 1948 and June 2. One unit moved from Hanlim-myon to Gujwa-myon, two units moved from Hanlim-myon to Seongsan-myon, and the last unit moved from Daejung-myon to Seongsan-myon. From the beginning of the second offensive, the Constabulary forces took seventy prisoners and confiscated one M-1 rifle, three Japanese rifles, and some spears on June 1, 1948.¹¹³ For the third counter attack, the Constabulary forces remained in separated areas and rounded up the Communists at nearby locations on June 3, 1948. The final offensive plan was to envelope guerrillas around the top of the mountain.¹¹⁴

The pacification operations on the mountain produced favorable results. The Constabulary found a cache of the guerrillas near the Eoseungsaeng Orum on June 14, 1948.¹¹⁵ The guerrillas recorded this action as ‘the raid on Cheju base’ on June 13, 1948.¹¹⁶ The Constabulary and the police killed forty-five guerrilla suspects and took 795 prisoners during the period. Surprisingly, the damage to the government forces was limited to three wounded police officers, which occurred during a gunfight at Guemak-ri in Hanlim-myon on June 12, 1948.¹¹⁷ The commanders on the island believed that the governmental forces cleared the mountainous areas of Communist forces.¹¹⁸

¹¹² Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 84.

¹¹³ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 848, June 1, 1948, RG 554.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 860.

¹¹⁶ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 85.

¹¹⁷ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 967, June 12, 1948, RG 554.

¹¹⁸ USAFIK, *G-2 Weekly Summary*, No. 144, June 18, 1948. Cited from CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 7, 183.

Intervention of the Central SKLP and North Korea

Soon after the reformation, the central SKLP became strongly involved with the Cheju Communist guerrillas. Unlike the Cheju Communists, the Central SKLP wanted active guerrilla movements in Cheju. The national Communist leaders worked to encourage guerrilla resistance by installing new organization in Cheju. In fact, the *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo* [The Report of People's Guerrilla Force] recorded that a supervisor arrived from the central SKLP on May 7, 1948.¹¹⁹ However, major intervention seemed to occur from the middle of June 1948.

The Cheju Communists must have received the direction of reorganization before June 18, 1948. After first reorganization that only provided supplemental staff members to the Cheju Command and the headquarters of each detachment, the Communist guerrillas started the reformation that took nearly one month. The most distinctive feature of the new organization was the political officers at the Cheju Command and headquarters of detachments.¹²⁰ In general, political officers guided units to follow the direction of a central party and checked military commanders ideologically. The political officers had independent command line, and the political officers belonged directly to the Cheju SKLP.¹²¹ The political officers were the product of the Soviet military system installed in the People's Army of North Korea on February 8, 1948.¹²²

The emergence of the political officers in the Cheju guerrilla forces showed the direct involvement of the central SKLP. The central SKLP copied a new military system

¹¹⁹ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 78.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 26.

¹²¹ Ibid., 28.

¹²² Junik Jang, *Bukhan Inmin Gundaesa* [The History of North Korean Army] (Seoul: Seomundang, 1991), 76-88.

from the People's Army and applied it to the Cheju guerrilla forces. The Chollanam-do SKLP could not have had access to the new system that occurred in North Korea. Additional evidence of central intervention was the increase of troop numbers. In the new organization, active guerrillas were doubled to 501 men and women.¹²³ The Chollanam-do SKLP had advised a reduction in troop numbers to avoid conflict with the Constabulary, but the Central SKLP requested an enlargement in forces to activate the resistance.

The new organization had four detachments which had specific unit names: the 30th, 31st, 43rd, and 50th. Each detachment covered its own operational areas; the 30th acted in Cheju-eup, the 31st moved in Aewol-myon, Jungmun-myon, and Seogwi-myon, the 43rd operated in Hanlim-myon, Daejung-myon, and Andeok-myon, and the 50th covered Jocheon-myon, Gujwa-myon, Seongsan-myon, Pyoseon-myon, and Namwon-myon.¹²⁴ The operational areas were formed to enhance the mobility around Halla Mountain. Except for the 30th Detachment in Cheju-eup, the guerrillas could move easily from one *myon* to other *myons* using trails to and from the mountain.

The new organization sought a balance between operations and logistics. Each detachment consisted of one Assault Unit and small numbers of the Special Forces; the Assault Unit had thirty men and women in three platoons, and the Special Forces had no set number of troops. The Assault Units were for attacks and the Special Forces for intelligence, individual terrorism, and logistics.¹²⁵ Except for the 30th Detachment, thirty soldiers of one Assault Unit could gain the support of more than eighty members of the

¹²³ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 27.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 26.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Special Forces. At this time, the guerrilla forces possessed 148 rifles, including six M-1 rifles and nineteen U.S. carbines.¹²⁶ The number of the arms reveals that every soldier in the Assault Units could be armed with rifles. In addition, every detachment had strengthened staff functions: operations and education, intelligence, logistics, ordinance, and sanitization.¹²⁷

On the verge of reorganization, the Communist guerrillas assassinated the commander of the 11th Constabulary Regiment, Colonel Jingyung Park in his office on June 18, 1948. The assassination had been planned for some time. According to the *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo* [The Report of People's Guerrilla Force], the assassinations of reactionary officers, specifically Lieutenant Colonel Park in the Constabulary, were decided by guerrilla leaders around May 10, 1948.¹²⁸ The decision was made after the arrival of the supervisor from the Central SKLP.

The time of 3:00 a.m. on June 18, 1948, was chosen for murdering Park, because he was drunk at a party during the previous night. The party was to celebrate the Park's promotion to full colonel, effective on June 1, 1948. At the same time, the Constabulary finished the fourth operation on Halla Mountain by June 17, 1948. It seemed to be a good time to rejoice in the promotion and the accomplishments of the Constabulary units. After returning from the party, Colonel Park slept at his office as usual. A few hours later, Staff Sergeant Seonho Son stepped into Jingyung Park's office aimed his M-1 rifle at Park's head, and pulled the trigger.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Ibid., 27.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 26.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 79.

¹²⁹ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 973, June 18, 1948, RG 554.

The key planner of the assassination was First Lieutenant Sanggil Moon, who declined to commit the Constabulary troops to the insurgency. He and seven other accomplices were arrested after about twenty days, and sent to Seoul on July 12, 1948¹³⁰ for a general court-martial, which began August 9, 1948.¹³¹ Moon testified that he met Dalsam Kim two times, first before the peace talks to discuss the success of the talks between Dalsam Kim and Ikryol Kim, and after the inauguration of Lt. Col. Park to the position of commander of the 11th Regiment. Moon stressed that although Dalsam Kim suggested killing Colonel Park, Moon did not agree with Dalsam Kim.¹³² In fact, as a member of the central SKLP cell organization, he was not in the position to receive an order from the local guerrilla commander. Moon and his subordinates argued that Colonel Park's merciless attitudes motivated them to kill Park.¹³³

However, the *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo* [The Report of People's Guerrilla Force] (Cheju, 1995) recorded that the Communist guerrillas succeeded in reducing the pressure from the Constabulary by killing Col. Park. The guerrillas had had hard times because of Constabulary operations.¹³⁴ The Communists tried to kill Park based on the decision of May 10, 1948, before the occurrence of Colonel Park's alleged "merciless attitudes" to Chejudoans.

Lieutenant Colonel Gyongrok Choi took the command of the 11th Regiment on June 21, 1948.¹³⁵ In addition, Major Yochan Song became the vice commander of the

¹³⁰ *Jayu Sinmun*, July 13, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 166-67.

¹³¹ *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 8, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 188.

¹³² *Chosun Jungang Ilbo*, August 14, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 191-92. Ikryol Kim's memoir did not mention about Moon's effort for the success of the peace talks.

¹³³ The testimonies of Sangho Sin and Seonho Son on *Hanseong Ilbo*, August 14, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 191-92.

¹³⁴ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 33.

¹³⁵ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 70.

regiment on the same day. The two officers had served in the Japanese Imperial Army and graduated from the First Class of the Military Language School.¹³⁶ The new commander continued rounding up guerrillas on the mountain under the direction of Colonel Brown. Colonel Brown let the Constabulary units continue their operations in spite of the loss of Colonle Park. On June 18, 1948, the soldiers captured four SKLP members at Waheul-ri in Jocheon-myon, in addition to taking nine rebels as prisoners and seizing one Japanese rifle at the Gumak Orum in Hanlim-myon.¹³⁷

The Constabulary units mopped up the Communist guerrillas in their operational areas. The Constabulary captured forty-eight rebels at Songdang-ri in Gujwa-myon and twenty-nine at Samyang-ri in Cheju-eup on June 22, 1948.¹³⁸ In addition, the Constabulary arrested nine raiders in a cave at Bukchon-ri in Jocheon-myon. The raiders murdered two police officers aboard a boat and kidnapped four passengers on June 16, 1948.¹³⁹ On June 26, 1948, the Constabulary units captured 176 suspected guerrillas, confiscated 30,000 *won*, and seized enough food for fifty persons.¹⁴⁰ Two days later, the Constabulary took seven suspects from Nohyung-ri in Cheju-eup and nine former Constabulary men in Jocheon-ri.¹⁴¹ On the same day, the KNP also raided two guerrilla bases at Gamsan-ri in Andeuk-myon, where they arrested five rebels carrying five grenades, secured 134 rounds of Japanese ammunition, and confiscated a small number of swords.¹⁴²

¹³⁶ Chosun Ilbo Human Data Base, <http://search.chosun.com/> (accessed March 2, 2008).

¹³⁷ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 866, June 22, 1948, RG 554.

¹³⁸ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 868.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 871.

¹⁴¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 872.

¹⁴² USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 880.

Lieutenant Colonel Choi worked to separate villagers from guerrilla forces by transferring villagers in the area on the middle of the mountain, to internment camps.¹⁴³ He ordered his troops to capture suspected persons from villages on the mountain and interned the villagers in camps. The guerrilla record revealed that from June 17, 1948, the Constabulary operated around villages in the mountain area.¹⁴⁴ Lt. Col. Choi's operations led to the assaults and deaths of countless innocent victims. While sweeping the middle areas of the mountain, the Constabulary captured 1,454 persons in about twenty days. Among them, there was not one confirmed guerrilla; there were only eight prisoners who would be charged with supporting the rebels.¹⁴⁵

The Central SKLP intervened in the situation by encouraging the guerrillas on their internal newspaper. The editorial of June 28, 1948, complimented the resistance of the guerrillas in their efforts to sabotage the separate election and recommended that they continue their struggles.¹⁴⁶ To the Central SKLP, the guerrillas should relentlessly fight against the Military Government. That would justify the SKLP's efforts to delay the establishment of South Korean government.

In response to the encouragement from the central SKLP, the Cheju Committee of the Chollanam-do SKLP sent a letter of gratitude and resolution in July 1948. In the letter, the Cheju SKLP explained the reasons behind the 4.3 Incident and revealed the process followed in reaching the insurgency. The Cheju Communists revealed that the insurgency occurred due to the combination of the voluntarily decision of the Cheju Communists and the guidance from higher party authorities. The letter was ended with

¹⁴³ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 71.

¹⁴⁴ Moon ed., *Inmin Yugyeogdae Tujaeng Bogoseo*, 33.

¹⁴⁵ *Chosun Ilbo*, July 21, 1948.

¹⁴⁶ *Noryuk Inmin*, June 28, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 155-57.

resolute determination to continue the resistance.¹⁴⁷ The exchange of letters between the central SKLP and the Cheju SKLP provided further evidence of the direct connection between them.

The disturbance of Chejudo gradually developed into guerrilla warfare. At the same time, the government forces' operations evolved from simple police search operations to anti-guerrilla warfare. This was the unavoidable conclusion that neither the Communists, nor the Military Government expected. The intervention of the Central SKLP in the Cheju case changed the ideas of Cheju guerrillas how they dealt with the Constabulary.

¹⁴⁷ *Noryuk Inmin*, November 7, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 241-43.

CHAPTER 6

A WAR BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA

The Cheju rebellion became a vehicle of North Korean aggression against South Korea when the Communist leaders joined the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea. In reaction to North Korean aggression, the South Korean government suppressed the Chejudoans mercilessly. The national efforts to crush the Cheju crisis were intensified due to the occurrence of the Yosu Rebellion in October 1948. In spring 1949, the ROK Army began to pacify the Cheju crisis using more moderate efforts toward guerrillas and refugees.

The Involvement of Politics

There was another intervention of the Central SKLP on Cheju society, which drove some South Koreans to unnecessary ordeals. The Central SKLP started an underground election to select 1,080 individuals who would vote for 360 representatives for southern Korea to the Supreme People's Assembly, the legislative institution of the future Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).¹ In fact, the election in southern Korea was the idea of North Korean leaders. In the second South and North Conference

¹ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 342.

that was held between June 29, 1948 from July 7, 1948, Ilsung Kim argued for the need to create a new government controlling the whole of the Korean peninsula.² The North Koreans planned to take the necessary steps to announce the establishment of the country that already existed under the intensive support of the Soviet Union.

Based on the announcement of Ilsung Kim, a detailed procedure to shape the Supreme People's Assembly was decided on July 10, 1948.³ According to the procedure, the 360 representatives of southern Korea would be elected from the 1,080 persons at the Haeju Conference on August 21, 1948. The underground elections for 1,080 members began in the middle of July 1948.⁴ The Election Committee of the Central SKLP designated Chejudo as "People's Liberation Army District" and divided the island in three electoral districts.⁵

Without continuing raids, the Cheju Communists pushed the underground election. Communists moved around villages to collect the votes for the election. The election was carried out in a simple way; electoral officials circulated paper that had the names of residents of a village on it, and the residents put their seals or fingers beside their names.⁶ Because people did not have proper information about the election, Communists simply forced residents to put their fingers or seals on the voting paper.⁷ Under threats from the Cheju Communists, many people followed their suggestion to show their support for the Cheju rebels.

² Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 337.

³ Ibid., 338.

⁴ Ibid., 342.

⁵ USAMGIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 910, August 13, 1948, RG 554.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.3, 247.

However, in Cheju, putting seals or fingers on the voting paper would jeopardize the owners of the seals and finger prints. Names and seals were indisputable evidence of support for the Communist guerrillas. Once they had joined the underground election, people had to be extremely careful not to be stopped by the KNP or the Constabulary. In fact, a woman was shot to death because the police discovered her seal on voting paper.⁸ The police did not understand the reprisal common villagers faced from rebels if they did not comply with the Communists' directions.

After the election, the central SKLP made an important decision to evacuate Dalsam Kim from Chejudo. Dalsam Kim was elected as a participant of the Haeju Conference with Sehun Ahn, Gyuchan Kang, Jinhee Go, Jeongsuk Lee, and Deungyong Moon.⁹ The evacuation of Dalsam Kim and the cadres of the Cheju SKLP would cause significant setbacks in the continuation of the resistance. Specifically, Dalsam Kim was the commander who had taken the responsibility of conducting guerrilla warfare. However, the Central SKLP gave priority to politics rather than the morale of Cheju guerrillas.

The evacuation of Dalsam Kim may have been decided before the underground election. According to Woonbang Lee, Dalsam Kim stayed at a house in Daejung-myon for fifteen days beginning at the end of June 1948. The hideaway of Kim was adjacent to the house of Woonbang Lee. His long absence from his headquarters caused complaints to arise from the guerrillas. In the eyes of Lee, Kim seemed nervous and lethargic; the confidence that he had once shown had departed. One day, Kim told Lee that he would

⁸ The testimony of Sihun Kim. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 239.

⁹ The CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 240.

be leaving for the mainland and could not answer Lee's question about who would be responsible for the struggle after his departure.¹⁰

Dalsam Kim received a hero's welcome at the Haeju Conference that was held for six days beginning on August 21, 1948. In spite of his young age, he was selected as one of thirty-five chairmen and delivered a speech about the 4.3 Incident.¹¹ He was elected to be a representative for the Supreme People's Assembly at the Conference with Sehun Ahn, Gyuchan Kang, Jinhee Go, and Jeongsuk Lee.¹² Later Dalsam Kim and his cadres participated in the first term of the Supreme People's Assembly to establish the DPRK and to adopt the constitution, beginning on September 2, 1948. After his evacuation, Dalsam Kim never returned to the island. According to Byungryul Park, who had been the superintendent of the Kangdong Political Institute, Dalsam Kim entered this school to take guerrilla trainings.¹³ Later, Kim became a commander of a North Korean guerrilla unit.¹⁴

The participation of Dalsam Kim in the Haeju Conference and the Supreme People's Assembly held great significance. The Cheju rebellion became a vehicle of North Korean aggression to newly formed South Korea. In fact, the Cheju guerrillas were organized in the same manner as the North Korean Army from the middle of June 1948.

¹⁰ Woonbang Lee, "4.3 Hangjaenge Gwanhan Il Gochal" [Contemplation of the 4.3 Incident], *4.3 Jangjeong* [The Long Way of the 4.3 Incident] (November, 1990): 93-94.

¹¹ Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 343-45; *Chosun Jungang Ilbo*, August 25, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 199.

¹² Kim, *Namrodang Yeongu*, 530-31.

¹³ *Jungang Ilbo*, June 23, 1988. The institution was established by SKLP members to train guerrilla leaders. The school was the main vehicle of the SKLP to produce party cadres and guerrilla warriors. For further information, see Millett, *The War for Korea 1945-1950*, 104.

¹⁴ He commanded a guerrilla unit which was dispatched to the northeastern part of South Korea on August 4, 1949. The unit was annihilated by ROK Army units by the end of March 1950, but he again survived. IMCH, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 126.

By ‘appointing’ Dalsam Kim as the representative to the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Koreans exploit the 4.3 Incident to subvert the South Korean government. Chejudo became a battlefield of North Korean guerrilla warfare, and the Cheju Communists fell under the influence of North Korea. Then, the North Korean government grasped control of Cheju Communists; North Koreans put Dalsam Kim in a guerrilla training course and transferred him to another place rather than returning him to the island with his colleagues.

Because of the change in the characteristics of Cheju guerrillas, the South Korean government could abandon any restraint on Cheju. After the Haeju Conference and the establishment of the DPRK, the Cheju guerrillas became national traitors cooperating with the enemy to turn over the country. The guerrillas were viewed as a group to be crushed by any means necessary.

In fact, the South Korean government had great security concerns from the time of its establishment. After the division in 1945, southern Koreans had been sensitive to the situation of northern Korea, specifically the increase in military strength of the northerners. In addition, South Koreans had experienced the ferocity and cruelty of Communist insurgency in the Autumn Harvest Rebellion in 1946. Furthermore, the South Korean government faced a hostile Communist China, established on October 1, 1949. The Nationalist China lost Manchuria to Communists in November 1948.¹⁵ Above all, the U.S. forces planned to withdraw in accordance after the establishment of the South Korean government.

¹⁵ William W. Stueck, *The Road to confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 58-72.

The Communist-led guerrilla warfare in Cheju proved to be a lengthy and serious dilemma for the South Korean government. From their perspective, the South Koreans was pressed by Communists from three sides: North Korea, Cheju-do under the influence of North Korea, and Communist-dominated China. South Koreans could not even expect aid from U.S. forces after the end of 1948.

The South Korean government resumed pacification efforts with great eagerness. The government dispatched 800 police reinforcement troops by August 29, 1948. This act of the South Korean government was not divulged to Cheju police beforehand.¹⁶ Later, Cheju Inspection Commander, Bongho Kim, who succeeded Youngbae Kim, was notified of the direction of the new government to pursue strong pacification operations, at the conference of provincial police chiefs.¹⁷ Bongho Kim contended that the new direction was decided by the highest authorities.¹⁸

The South Korean government must have suspected the connection between the Cheju Communists and North Korea. According to Bongho Kim, the new government adopted harsh policies for the rebellion illustrated in these four reasons: recent appearance of a strange ship near Cheju-do, revived action of the Communist guerrillas in Cheju, the murder of the chief of the Hanlim police station, and the evacuation of Dalsam Kim to Pyongyang.¹⁹ The resumption of guerrilla action and the death of a police officer would not be a proper reason for strong pacifying operations; at this point they were

¹⁶ *Chosun Jungang Ilbo*, September 1, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 201-02.

¹⁷ *Seoul Sinmun*, September 3, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 205-06.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

routine occurrences in Cheju. The police officer was killed surprised by raiders on his way to Wolryong-ri to disperse guerrillas on August 19, 1948.²⁰

The first reason reflected the concern of the South Korean government. A news report said that an unidentified ship, when encountered by a Coast Guard vessel, fled and fired mounted machineguns at the Coast Guard.²¹ The incident implied that the Cheju guerrillas received outside support from North Korea or possibly the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the *G-2 Report* of the USAFIK handled the occurrence as unevaluated.²² However, the G-2 evaluation of the information might be inappropriate. A USAFIK Adjutant General record revealed that the *Gwang Ju* of the Korean Coast Guard encountered a Soviet cargo ship and failed to stop the Soviet ship due to its hostile action; the Soviet ship made a 90° turn toward the *Gwang Ju*.²³

The link between the Cheju Communists and North Korea, or the Soviet Union, would be the most dangerous situation to the newly emerging South Korean government. Consequently, the South Korean government became nervous at the presence of a Soviet vessel and upset by the participation of Kim in the Haeju Conference and the Supreme People's Assembly. The South Korean leaders may have intended to terminate the North Korean action in Cheju quickly, so they exaggerated the situation by raising other two reasons: the appearance of a strange ship and the death of a police officer.

²⁰ *Chosun Ilbo*, August 21, 1948; USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Repot*, No. 923, August 28, 1948, RG 554.

²¹ *Chosun Jungang Tongsin*, August 21, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 198.

²² The *G-2 Report* evaluated this case as F-6. USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 913, August 17, 1948, RG 554. The G-2 assessed the credibility of information with a combination of reliable sources represented by letters from A to F and the plausibility of information showed by numbers from 1 to 6. A meant very reliable sources and 1 revealed that the information was confirmed by another source. F-6 showed neither the truth of the information nor the reliability of the source could be judged.

²³ Letter from chief advisor, Korean Coast Guard Captain H.L. Sutherland, to commanding general, PMAG, August 18, 1948, USAFIK, RG 554, Entry A1 1378, Adjutant General Correspondent (Decimal Files) 1945-1949, AG000.5 Reports 1947-1948.

In accordance with the establishment of South Korea, Koreans began to play a significant role in the new phase of the anti-guerrilla warfare. The former American commander, Colonel Brown, ended his command in Cheju and was relieved from his position on July 1, 1948. He left his report which detailed his activities from May 22, 1948 to June 30, 1948 in Cheju.²⁴ The removal of Colonel Brown seemed to reflect the policy, to return governmental functions to newly born South Korean government, of the USAMGIK. The USAMGIK handed over its governmental functions to the new South Korean government, and the Civil Affairs Section began to work for further transitional works on August 15, 1948.²⁵

However, the commander of the USAFIK still retained the control over “organization, training, and equipping” of the KNP and armed forces of South Korea by an agreement between President Syngman Rhee and General Hodge on August 24, 1948.²⁶ At the same time, the commanding general of the USAFIK could exercise operational control over South Korean security forces “(including the Constabulary and Coast Guard and Such National Police detachments as may be stationed in critical areas) as he deems necessary in the interests of common security, or to facilitate the organization, training and equipping of the Security Forces of the Republic of Korea.”²⁷

²⁴ Now, the report can be read at the United States Army Military History Institute in Carlisle Pennsylvania.

²⁵ “Address by General John H. Hodge upon the occasion of Korean Celebration of Formation of Government of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.” USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 912, August 16, 1948, RG 554.

²⁶ Syngman Rhee and John Hodge agreed to prolong the control of the U.S. commander in Korea over organization, training, and equipping of South Korean armed forces until the withdrawal of U.S. troops. See “Executive Agreement between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, Concerning Interim Military and Security Matters during the Transitional Period,” *Gukbang Joyakjip* [the Book of Defense Treaties] (Seoul, 1981), 33-5.

²⁷ Ibid.

The agreement was designed to support the formation of a strong army and navy of South Korea before the evacuation of U.S. troops.²⁸

To assist the commanding general of the USAFIK, a Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) was established under the command of Brigadier General William L. Roberts on August 15, 1948.²⁹ The PMAG expanded from 100 officers and men in August to ninety-two officers and 149 enlisted men at the end of the year.³⁰ Advisors of the PMAC were dispatched to ROK Constabulary and Coast Guard units. At first, the function of the PMAG was limited to administrative goals in 1948.³¹

The Reality of the Anti-Guerrilla War

The South Korean government created the Cheju Security Command (CSC) on October 11, 1948. The CSC was commanded by Col. Sanggyum Kim, the commander of the 5th Brigade. He had served in the Soviet Army as a Lieutenant Colonel and Polish army as a Colonel.³² The CSC controlled all security forces in Cheju: the South Korean Army units, the South Korean Navy vessels, and the KNP. To support the mission of the CSC, one battalion from the ROK 14th Regiment in Yosu was ordered to move to Cheju. The Constabulary and the Coast Guard were renamed Army and Navy on September 5, 1948.³³

²⁸ USAFIK, "Historical Report 1 January-31 December 1949, vol. II, G-3 Section," RG 554, Entry A1 1378, Adjutant General Correspondent (Decimal Files) 1945-1949, 25; Sawyer, *United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea*, 52

²⁹ Sawyer, *United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea*, 53

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 54.

³¹ Sawyer described the role of the PMAC as "In 1948, it was little more than a grouping of advisory personnel for administrative purposes." See Sawyer, *United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea*, 53.

³² The CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 263.

³³ IMHC, *Geongunsa*, 163.

The highest Korean Army and Navy officers were involved in establishing the CSC. Before the creation of the CSC, the Army Chief of Staff, Col. Ilgweon Jeong, and the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Col. Youngcheol Kim, paid visits to the island on October 1, 1948.³⁴ They stayed on the island for five days. They might have devised strategies for new operations in terms of military efficiency. Accordingly, they may have designed an integrated commanding structure under an army commander. In fact, they decided to dispatch one army battalion to enhance operational efficiency on Cheju.³⁵

At the same time, the South Korean government appointed a new police chief in Cheju. Bongho Kim, the chief of Cheju Inspection Command, was replaced by Sunbong Hong on October 5, 1948.³⁶ Bongho Kim was the only native Cheju police officer who had led the Cheju police. After his inauguration, he endeavored to alleviate hardships of Chejudoans by abolishing the ban on fishing and commerce.³⁷ Sunbong Hong was the Director of the Department of Public Security of the headquarters of the KNP. Hong was born in Pyongannam-do in North Korea and did not have any experience in the island.

Under the control of Col. Sanggyum Kim, Major Yochan Song would execute pacification operations with his 9th Regiment. Song took the command of the 9th Regiment, when the 11th Regiment returned to its base in Suwon on July 24, 1948. The 9th Regiment consisted of one battalion of the 9th Regiment, another battalion from the 11th Regiment, and a battalion from the 6th Regiment.³⁸ In addition, one more battalion

³⁴ *Gukje Sinmun*, October 7, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 229.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Chosun Ilbo*, October 6, 1948.

³⁷ *Daedong Sinmun*, July 6, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 160.

³⁸ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 59.

from the 14th Regiment intended to join his command. Allan R. Millett evaluates Song following famous Korean generals, Seonha Lim and Seonyeop Paik:

“His “work hard and play hard” approach to duty earned him the nicknames “Tiger” from his followers and “Rock Head” from his critics. He was a hard-case field soldier with warlord instincts who knew how to push troops through either charm of intimidation.”³⁹

The first step of the CSC was to announce the suspension of traffic in the mountainous area or 3.2 miles from the coast line on October 17, 1948.⁴⁰ It was declared by the commander of the 9th Regiment, Major Yochan Song. The announcement added that anyone who disobeyed the order would be killed, and that the suspension would be effective beginning on October 20, 1948.⁴¹ The suspension of traffic actually forced residents in the mountain areas to leave their villages; according to the announcement the villagers would be killed immediately if they didn’t obey the orders. The CSC intended to clear the mountainous villages which had been used as shelters and supply posts by the guerrillas.

The content of the announcement was illegal. The CSC did not retain the right to kill persons if they violated the orders. Guerrilla suspects were to be investigated first and judged lawfully, based on their deeds. Specifically, capital punishment would be decided by judges in courts, not by military officers in field. In addition, it was unreasonable to publish the order under the name of the commander of the 9th Regiment. The order would have been better announced under the name of Col. Sanggyum Kim, the commander of the CSC.

³⁹ Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 148.

⁴⁰ *Chosun Ilbo*, October 20, 1948.

⁴¹ Ibid.

After Dalsam Kim left the island, Deoggu Lee took over the command of the guerrilla forces. He had served the Japanese army as a second lieutenant while he was at Litusmeikan University. After the liberation, he had taught history and physical education at Jocheon Middle School. He was arrested after the March First Incident, charged with participation in the Communist movement.⁴² His brother, Jwagu Lee, was in charge of logistics for the rebels during the 4.3 Incident.⁴³ The guerrillas moved sporadically in August 1948; the guerrillas of the 43rd Detachment had a gunfight with the police at Seogwang-ri in Andeuk-myon on August 2, 1948.⁴⁴ The 50th Detachment had training for its troops on August 9, 1948 and raided the Geumgnyong-ri police substation in Gujwa-myon on August 11, 1948.⁴⁵

In October 1948, the guerrillas resumed their offensive. The rebels attacked several police substations on October 1, 1948. In these attacks, five police officers were killed and some were wounded.⁴⁶ The 31st Detachment killed the five police officers at Dosun-ri in Jungmun-myon; the victims were reinforcement police officers from the mainland.⁴⁷ At Donma-ri in Cheju-eup, a small number of raiders, disguised in Constabulary uniforms, kidnapped four rightists and killed three of them.⁴⁸ In addition, the forty guerrillas of the 50th Detachment clashed with twenty police officers on October 6, 1948, and 200 guerrillas demonstrated in front of the Jocheon police substation on the next day.⁴⁹

⁴² Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 250.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 251.

⁴⁴ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 907, August 10, 1948, RG 554.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*; USAMGIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 928.

⁴⁶ USAMGIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 952.

⁴⁷ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 35.

⁴⁸ USAMGIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 952.

⁴⁹ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 36.

Before the creation of the CSC, Song assigned operational areas to his companies and directed his units to chase guerrilla forces.⁵⁰ He dispatched his battalions to three points on the island: the First Battalion in Cheju-eup, the Second Battalion in Seongsanpo, and the Third Battalion in Moseulpo. The headquarters were located in Cheju-eup.⁵¹ After October 11, 1948, Lieutenant Colonel Song and his units entered under the command of the CSC and began to report to Colonel Kim.

Incidentally, due to the unexpected occurrence of the Yosu Rebellion on October 19, 1948, the 4.3 Incident entered into a new phase. One battalion of the 14th Regiment under the 5th Brigade in Yosu mutinied before its planned movement to Cheju-do. First Lt. Jihoi Kim and his colleagues encouraged the soldiers. Kim and other soldiers armed themselves after destroying the warehouse of ammunition. They killed some officers. The rebels expanded rapidly to 2,000 after gaining civilian participation the next day, and easily occupied Yosu and Suncheon, a neighboring city.⁵² The two cities did not experience the tragedies of the Autumn Harvest Rebellion in 1946, so the Communists in the cities were able to recruit more rebels like Chejudoans.⁵³ During their occupation, the rebels executed countless police officers, rightists, and their families by trials held in People's Court.

From the beginning of the Yosu Rebellion, the South Korean government was determined to launch stronger pacification operations. President Syngman Rhee preached strong warnings to rebels, that they would be judged under martial law, on

⁵⁰ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 64.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² USAFIK, "History of the Rebellion of the 14th Regiment and the 6th Regiment of the Korean Constabulary," RG 554, Entry A1 1378, Adjutant General Correspondent (Decimal Files) 1945-1949, AG000.5 Reports 1947-1948.

⁵³ Park, *Hanguk Jeonjaengui Balbalgwa Giwon*, 410-11.

October 23, 1948.⁵⁴ He contended that Communists were plotting insurgencies to undermine the security of the newly established government and conspiring to communize the whole country.⁵⁵ Rhee's point of view was reiterated by his cabinet members; the minister of Homeland, Yoon Chi Young, indicated the subversive attempts of Communists from the establishment of South Korea were the back ground of the rebellion.⁵⁶

The leaders of the Yosu Rebellion fled to mountain areas and constructed their guerrilla camps in the mountainous areas in the mainland. The SKLP entered into a new phase of armed struggle with the formation of these resistance bases. The leaders of the SKLP moved into mountains and established four operational districts over the country: Chiri Mountain, Taebaek Mountains, Youngnam Area, and Honam Area. At the same time, the SKLP leaders counted Chejudo as the fifth operational area.⁵⁷

The Yosu Rebellion brought the halt of American forces' withdrawal, which had begun on September 15, 1948. Combined with the recent success of the Communists achievements in China, the soldier-driven rebellion threatened the survival of the newly born South Korean government. At that time, the South Korean government was trying to earn the approval of the establishment from the United Nations General Assembly that was held in Paris. Consequently, President Syngman Rhee frequently asked the U.S. Special Representative in Korea, John J. Muccio, to cease the withdrawal of the U.S.

⁵⁴ *Gookmin Sinmun*, October 24, 1948. Cited from the NIKH, *Jaryo Daehanminguksa*, vol. 9 [The Materials of Modern Korean History], <http://db.history.go.kr/> (accessed March 1, 2008).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ The Record of the 89th National Assembly dated October 27, 1948, 649-651. Cited from the NIKH, *Jaryo Daehanminguksa*, vol.9, <http://db.history.go.kr/> (accessed March 3, 2008).

⁵⁷ Jeonjaeng Ginyum Saeophoi, *Hanguk Jeonjaengsa* vol.1[The History of the Korean War] (Seoul: Haengrim Chulpansa, 1992), 109.

troops.⁵⁸ In addition, the legislatures of the National Assembly passed ‘the Resolution of the Station of the U.S. Troops’ on November 20, 1948.⁵⁹ Finally, the remaining U.S. troops came to stay for the time being until the U.N. admitted South Korea as a lawfully established country, and South Korea could retain enough military strength to deal with internal and external challenges.⁶⁰ The ROK obtained the affirmation of the establishment from the United Nations on December 12, 1948.⁶¹ At the same time, the South Korean government proclaimed the National Security Law to enforce subversive actions on December 1, 1948.⁶²

The Yosu Rebellion contributed to the harsh suppression of the Chejudoans. The South Korean government relieved Colonel Sanggyum Kim from his position of commander of the CSC on October 21, 1948.⁶³ He had been the commander of the 5th Brigade, which controlled the 14th Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Song became the commander of the CSC. After the end of Yosu Rebellion, Cheju, again, became the front line in the war against Communists. Moreover, due to the influence of the Yosu Rebellion, the islanders drew more national attention as the public expected an imminent resolution.

Before the launching of full scale operations, Lieutenant Colonel Song purged his unit of traitors. Accidentally, he overheard a telephone conversation between

⁵⁸ “The Special Representative in Korea to the Secretary of State,” November 19, 1948, *FRUS 1948*, vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia, 1332-33.

⁵⁹ *Seoul Sinmun*, November 21, 1948. Cited from the NIKH, *Jaryo Daehanminguksa*, vol.9, <http://db.history.go.kr/> (accessed March 5, 2008).

⁶⁰ “The Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman),” December 22, 1948, *FRUS 1948*, vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia, 1341-43.

⁶¹ Resolution 195(III), “The Problem of the Independence of Korea, December 12, 1948,” *The U.N. General Assembly’s Resolutions*. <http://www.un.org/> (accessed March 6, 2008).

⁶² Gwanbo 18 Ho [The Governmental Issue, No. 18]. Cited from the NIKH, *Jaryo Daehanminguksa*, vol. 9, <http://db.history.go.kr/> (accessed March 7, 2008).

⁶³ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 61.

Communists in his unit and the Cheju Police Station. In fact, Song planned to land some of his troops disguised rebels from Yosu to trick Cheju guerrillas in Jocheon-myon area. After Song tried to relate his plan to the Chief of Cheju police by telephone, Song overheard the conversation about his plan from a Communist spy in his unit to a Communist agent in the police. The two Communists were talking on a telephone accessible to the regimental commander. The Communist spy had eavesdropped on Lieutenant Colonel Song's telephone conversation.⁶⁴

Lieutenant Colonel Song took actions rapidly. After he listened to the conversation on October 28, 1948, he apprehended seventeen soldiers immediately. The next day, six of them were executed without trial. The number of suspects increased to eighty following a continuous investigation. Arrestees revealed, under torture, the names of their colleagues, whom some of were innocent. They, many of them were native Cheju soldiers, were sent to a tunnel made by Japanese soldiers outside of Cheju-eup and shot to death by military policemen. Though there were Communists like Second Lt. Nogu Park, who sang *Jeokgiga* or "The Red Flag" until he died, almost half of the victims were not interrogated before the execution. Four of the rebels survived the massacre; eventually two were killed by police, and one by guerrillas on their way home.⁶⁵

Meanwhile the 9th Regiment claimed a victory over large numbers of guerrillas who were gathering at Goseong-ri in Aewol-myon October 28-29, 1948. According to a newspaper, the soldiers killed thirty-one guerrillas and captured twenty prisoners.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 62-3.

⁶⁵ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3eun Malhanda vol.4, 120-29.

⁶⁶ *Gookje Sinmun*, November 2, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 Sageon Jaryojip. vol. 2, 239.

Additionally, this engagement was reported to the USAFIK, but in this report it was claimed that 135 raiders were killed.⁶⁷ The same report said that a Communist plot was detected, which intended to take over governmental buildings utilizing the cooperation between the guerrillas and Communist agent in government agencies.⁶⁸ In fact, the police would eventually arrest eighty-three persons from governmental agencies who were involved in the plot.⁶⁹

The 9th Regiment moved to Jungmun-ri in Jungmun-myon in response to the guerrilla attack on Jungmun police substation on November 5, 1948. The guerrillas assaulted the Jungmun substation at dawn, as a small group of guerrillas lurked at Aeoduwun Maru or Dark Hill to cut reinforcements from Seogwi-myon. While containing police officers in the Jungmun substation, the guerrillas stole rice from a governmental warehouse.⁷⁰ In addition, the guerrillas at Dark Hill attacked police officers moving toward Jungmun from Seogwipo.⁷¹ The guerrillas killed three police officers during the skirmish at Jungmun and Dark Hill, but lost three comrades along the way.⁷² The 9th Regiment was unable to make it to the scene due to road blocks.

The soldiers killed residents at Jungmun-ri while searching for guerrilla suspects. When the soldiers entered the village after firing mortars under the command of Song, but they could not contact the guerrillas. They tracked guerrillas under the guidance of a

⁶⁷ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 979, November 3, 1948, RG 554.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ The testimony of Byngtak Kim. Cited from Jayusuho Hyupuihoi, *Cheju 4.3 Sageon Jaryojip* [The Materials of the Cheju 4.3 Incident] (Cheju, 1997), 30-4.

⁷⁰ The testimony of Daljin Go. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 242.

⁷¹ The testimony of Jeonghyung Kang. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 245.

⁷² IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 63; Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda* vol.4, 246. Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban suggested accurate information of the victims based on investigation at the police cemetery and the testimonies of the residents in the village.

police officer.⁷³ After failing to find the guerrillas, soldiers gathered villagers together. Tragically, the soldiers then selected six residents and killed them. Among the murdered villagers were the mother and the sister of a deserter who joined the rebels.⁷⁴

The 9th Regiment executed civilians in other villages during operations. After the guerrilla attack in Jungmun, the units of the 9th Regiment searched for guerrillas in adjacent villages. On November 6, 1948, the soldiers of the 9th Regiment raided Seohong-ri in Seogwi-myon. The soldiers opened fire as they entered the village and proceeded to burn down homes. Six villagers were shot to death, and two persons suffered serious wounds from which they would later perish. The troops moved to Hogeun-ri, next to Seohong-ri at dusk. At Hogeun-ri, the soldiers showered bullets after round upon villagers, killing ten of them, including a ninety-six year old woman. After sweeping the village, the soldiers murdered another six young men at an elementary school. The men were gathered by the soldiers and killed because they were young.⁷⁵ However, the USAFIK G-2 reported claimed that fifty raiders were killed during the operation.⁷⁶

On the next day, the guerrillas engaged the soldiers of the 9th Regiment by burning about seventy houses in downtown Seogwi-myon. According to Youngok Kim, who had worked at Agricultural Association in Seogwi-myon, four raiders set fire to houses at 7:30 a.m.⁷⁷ At that time, police troops and soldiers in Seogwipo moved out of

⁷³ The testimony of Dumun Oh. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 247.

⁷⁴ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 247-48.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 274-75.

⁷⁶ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 983, November 8, 1948, RG 554.

⁷⁷ The testimony of Youngok Kim. Interviewed by Kyengho Son at his house on July 10, 2006.

the town for routine operations.⁷⁸ After the fire, the soldiers of the 9th Regiment searched for the rebels at Seohong-ri, Hogeun-ri, and Seoho-ri in Jungmun-myon for one week. The soldiers raided three villages every day, but failed to arrest young men who could be judged as guerrilla suspects. At dawn, on November 11, 1948, the soldiers surprised the villages and succeeded in capturing the young men, who had spent nights at their homes. The troops murdered eighteen villagers in a week.⁷⁹

The USAFIK did not control the details of the operations of ROK units. The command over the Constabulary and the KNP was transferred from the USAMGIK to South Korean government upon its creation. The Constabulary and the KNP had been the security forces of the USAMGIK before August 15, 1948, but after the date, they became the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. Consequently, advisors in the Constabulary or the ROK Army after August 15, 1948, had a relatively lower status as compared to the advisors of the USAMGIK.

In addition, the PMAG advisors could not conduct their missions efficiently due to their limited numbers. In fact, it was hard to supervise pacification operations of the Constabulary units because of the small number of advisors in Cheju. The advisors relied on combat reports submitted by executive officers from battalions or a regiment. The activities of the advisor of the 9th Regiment did not appear to be aggressive. The advisor of the regiment, Captain F. V. Burgess, mainly kept the record of *Daily Reports of the 9th Regiment*. The report showed that his main duty was to inspect the arms of the regiment. Except for that, the report does not reveal any clues about his responsibilities in terms of

⁷⁸ The testimony of Taeju Heo. Cited from Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 278; the testimony of Youngok Kim.

⁷⁹ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 285-89.

supervising operations. Moreover, the reports from August 25, 1948, to November 25, 1948, were missing.⁸⁰ It is not clear if the advisor did not record daily operations during the period, or the reports were simply lost.

In some cases, the CSC might have not submitted its actions to the advisor; so, the USAFIK recorded the pacification operations not based on information from the 9th Regiment, but based on CIC reports. The *G-2 Report* of the USAFIK described the arson as such, “unknown number of raiders attacked and burned a police box and approximately 7 buildings in Seogwi-po” based on a *CIC Flash Report*.⁸¹ The CIC may have collected the information from secondhand sources. This implies that the PMAG advisor did not exercise his control over the regiment appropriately.

By the way, newspapers exaggerated the report, claiming that the police exchanged fire with the guerrillas in the street of Seogwi-myon, and the soldiers drove the rebels out of the town and killed sixty of them, and forty more from three neighboring villages.⁸² According to witnesses to *4.3eun Malhanda*, there was no skirmish in Seogwi-myon on that day.⁸³ There were only innocent victims at Seohong-ri, Hogeun-ri, and Seoho-ri. Civilian casualties began to be calculated as the casualties of the guerrillas. Furthermore numbers were exaggerated.

The CSC might have felt pressure from the central government to end the turmoil in a short time. Due to the influence of the Yosu Rebellion, the South Korean government became impatient at the slow progress in resolving the Cheju insurgency.

⁸⁰ The U.S. 6th Division, *The 9th Regiment Cheju-do Daily Report*. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 8, 55-78.

⁸¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 983, November 8, 1948, RG 554.

⁸² *Gyunghyang Sinmun*, November 12, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 2, 244.

⁸³ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 278-80.

The higher authorities in the South Korean government might have urged the CSC for rapid pacification. As a result, the CSC may have offered false information to newspapers to satisfy the government. This caused a significant discrepancy between the reports of the Seogwi arson in the *G-2 Report* and in the newspapers.

The soldiers felt no guilt in killing Communists since Communists were their enemies. Even, instead of Communist, Palgaengi or “The Red” was used to identify them in a degrading way. This word evokes extreme animosity and anger in Communists. It has the same effect as Bandong or reactionaries would have against rightists. In Cheju, the Communists used ruthless violence against reactionaries beginning on April 3, 1948, and now it was the reactionaries’ time to take revenge on the Palgaengis. Once an individual was identified as a Palgaengi, he or she was no longer considered human by soldiers, and he or she could be treated as a beast or an evil criminal.

At the same time, mainlanders regarded most Chejudoans as Communists. The soldiers of the ROK 9th Regiment had already experienced removing Communist soldiers, mainly Cheju natives, without following proper procedure. During the purge, the soldiers learned how to deal with Cheju Communists. In addition, the officers of the regiment made the soldiers to believe that Chejudoans were Palgaengis.⁸⁴ Therefore, as the Chejudoans were demonized in the soldiers’ minds, the soldiers were more likely to fire on Cheju civilians. Young male Chejudoans were special targets as Palgaengis.

The difficult operational situation and the negative attitude of the soldiers toward the islanders, contributed to the formation of discriminatory ideas about the Chejudoans.

⁸⁴ The testimony of Dumun Oh. He was the policeman who guided ROK soldiers to find guerrillas in Jungmun on November 5, 1948. When he protested to killing civilians, a soldier replied that he was educated by his officers. See Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 246-47.

There was no distinction between combatants and noncombatants in guerrilla warfare. In fact, the Cheju guerrillas established Self-Protecting Forces among villages for logistics, intelligence, and village operations. The members of the Self-Protecting Forces lived in villages with other residents and offered information about the movements of the governmental forces to the Assault Units. In the case of a village operation, the members of the Self-Protecting Forces guided guerrillas to targets and participated in killing reactionaries.

To the soldiers and policemen from the mainland, it was hard to distinguish innocents from the guerrillas. Communication between soldiers and natives were hard because of the unfamiliar Cheju dialect. Furthermore, due to close kinship relations among the islanders, many of Chejudoans were relatives of the guerrillas. The anti-guerrilla warfare in Cheju seemed to be a fight not between Communists and government forces, but between islanders and outsiders.

Before coming to the island, the officers of the ROK Army and the KNP believed that Chejudoans were Communists. On the mainland, anti-Communist became social norm after the trusteeship controversy and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion in 1946. However, Cheju society did not have the same experience in the same period. As a result, Mainlanders were shocked when two representatives to the SKILA claimed that the majority of Chejudoans were under the control of the People's Committee at the end of 1946, and were surprised at the participation of governmental officers and policemen in the March 10 General Strike in Cheju in 1947. This social memory might have influenced mainlanders to think of Chejudo as an island of Communists.

The CSC continued bloody operations until the end of 1948. On November 13, 1948, the 9th Regiment soldiers assaulted Gyorae-ri, a village in the mountains in Jocheon-myon at 2 a.m. The soldiers began to burn houses and kill villagers. Twenty-five residents were murdered.⁸⁵ On the same day, other soldiers raided villages north east of Cheju-do: Haga-ri and Wondong Sogil-ri in Aewol-myon. The soldiers burned houses and executed thirty-six villagers at one place at Haga-ri.⁸⁶ Later, the soldiers moved to Wondong, set fire to houses, and murdered at least sixty residents. The soldiers went so far as to burn the bodies.⁸⁷ It was a scorched earth operation to eradicate guerrilla bases from Halla Mountain. One of the soldiers told survivors that the soldiers would burn the village again within three days, and that the villagers should move out to the coast line or to the mountain.⁸⁸ The USAFIK G-2 recorded the operations, reporting that the 9th Regiment killed 115 raiders in Haengwon-ri (in Gujwa-myon) and 37 in the vicinity of (937-1133: the coordinates indicated Sogil-ri).⁸⁹ The USAFIK received incorrect information about the operations.

The USAFIK seemed to be uninformed of the scorched earth operations until the end of November, 1948. The air observation of the USAFIK found the scene of houses burning accompanied by the presence of ROK soldiers. In addition, on November 19, 1948, the soldiers of the 9th Regiment were observed at a burning site at Wolpyong-ri in Cheju-eup.⁹⁰ Due to the frequent appearance of the ROK soldiers at burning villages, the

⁸⁵ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 393-95.

⁸⁶ Cheju 4.3 50 Junyon Haksul, Munhwa Ginyum Saeophoi, *Irobeorin Mauleul Chajaseo* [Looking for Lost Villages] (Seoul: Hakminsa, 1998), 248.

⁸⁷ The testimonies of Chunbu Kang and Nambo Go. Cited from Cheju 4.3 50 Junyon Haksul, Munhwa Ginyum Saeophoi, *Irobeorin Mauleul Chajaseo*, 249-54.

⁸⁸ The testimony of Nambo Go.

⁸⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 989, November 16, 1948, RG 554.

⁹⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 994, November 22, 1948, RG 554.

USAFIK investigated the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Song. Song denied “emphatically” the possibility of his soldiers being involved in setting fires. Instead, a police chief reported that raiders were burning villagers wearing the uniforms of ROK soldiers.⁹¹

The South Korean government proclaimed martial law throughout Cheju-do on November 17, 1948, under presidential order.⁹² However, the martial law was not announced by newspapers or radio to the public. Moreover, South Korea did not have the martial law at that time. The law passed the National Assembly on November 24, 1949.⁹³ Hence, not only the general public but also governmental agencies were confused about the practicing the martial law. Even the Ministry of Defense denied the ‘rumor’ that martial law was declared on Chejudo.⁹⁴

The declaration of martial law brought destructive impacts on Chejudo. The martial law designated the commander of the 9th Regiment as the chief martial law administrator. Lieutenant Colonel Song issued evacuation orders to residents in mountain villages beginning in mid November 1948.⁹⁵ After publishing the order, his troops moved into the villages, burned down every house, and killed civilians without hesitation. The scorched earth operations became public with the issuance of the evacuation order.

⁹¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1001.

⁹² Gwanbo 14 Ho [The Governmental Issue, No. 14], November 17, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 6, 86-7.

⁹³ Suntae Kim, “Cheju 4.3 Dangsi Gyeemui Bulbeobseong [The Unlawfulness of Martial law in Cheju during the 4.3 Incident],” Yeoksa Munje Yeonguso, Cheju 4.3 Yeonguso, and Hanguk Yeoksa Yeonguhoi ed., *Cheju 4.3 Yeongu* [The Research on Cheju 4.3] (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyungsa, 1988), 153.

⁹⁴ *Chosun Ilbo*, November 20, 1948.

⁹⁵ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 366-67.

A *G-2 Report* of the USAFIK revealed a marked imbalance of the casualties of the government forces and the guerrillas at this time. According to a report, the soldiers of the 9th Regiment killed eighty-eight raiders near Daejung-myon on November 21, 1948, fifteen at Seonhol-ri in Jocheon on November 23, and seventy-nine at Nohyung-ri in Cheju-eup on November 24, without any casualties of soldiers.⁹⁶ These results of operations seemed strange. Engaging guerillas must have resulted in some casualties of the ROK soldiers. However, there were no casualties of the ROK units. The reports show that the soldiers killed noncombatants without mercy. The records were published in newspapers as the results of victorious operations.⁹⁷ This time, the USAFIK and the newspapers reported the same number of enemy casualties. In fact, the regiment advisor reported the 'combat results' to the USAFIK on November 26, 1948.⁹⁸

At this time, the guerrillas slaughtered not only reactionaries but also innocents, and set fire on houses. The Communist guerrillas assaulted Jocheon-myon on November 4, 1948, killing rightists and burning forty houses.⁹⁹ On November 19, 1948, the guerrillas killed the wife and the daughter of a rightist, took properties, and burned houses at Woljeong-ri in Gujwa-myon. The raiders even murdered a fetus in the womb of the woman using a Samurai sword.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the Communist guerrillas surprised Namwon-ri and Wimi-ri in Namwon-myon and burned down hundreds of houses and slaughtered innocent residents on November 28, 1948.¹⁰¹ Specifically, raiders captured

⁹⁶ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 998, November 27, 1948, RG 554.

⁹⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, November 26, 27, 1948.

⁹⁸ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *The 9th Regiment Cheju-do Daily Report*, November 26, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 8, 69-70.

⁹⁹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 982, November 6, 1948, RG 554.

¹⁰⁰ Park ed., *Yongwonhan Wooridurui Apeum* 4.3, 158-65.

¹⁰¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1000, November 30, 1948, RG 554.

200 hostages for the purposes of carrying rice, clothes, and other goods stolen from civilians.¹⁰²

In December 1948, the 9th Regiment continued the ‘irregular operation’ to terminate the guerrillas from the island. The regimental soldiers killed 105 raiders and captured forty prisoners during the period between December 3, 1948 and December 6 without any wounded or killed soldier.¹⁰³ At the same time, the ROK soldiers took down guerrillas and killed 105 of them at four places: Moseul-po, Seogwi-po, Namwon-ri in Namwon-myon, Halla Mountain on December 10, 1948.¹⁰⁴ At the latter operation, the regiment mobilized 3,000 members of Minbodan or the Civil Protective Association.

The 9th Regiment was ordered to move to Daejeon after relief from the pacification mission. Before the end of their mission, the soldiers of the 9th Regiment committed one last atrocity at Baksongnae in Jocheon-myon. During the operation, the regiment advised the villagers to confess their previous cooperation with the Communists. The regiment announced that the confessors would be forgiven for the past behaviors. According to the recommendation of the regiment, many residents reported their past actions and were taken to Hamdeuk Elementary School. Additionally, the ROK soldiers sent almost 150 persons to Bakseongnae by deceiving them that they were going to search for guerrillas on December 21, 1948. Then, the soldiers executed them and burned their bodies.¹⁰⁵

This was not reported to the USAFIK by the regimental advisor; a skirmish at Gyora-ri was the last combat reported to the USAFIK, where forty-three rebels were

¹⁰² Park ed., *Yongwonhan Wooridurui Apeum* 4.3, 192-97.

¹⁰³ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1007, December 8, 1948, RG 554.

¹⁰⁴ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1014.

¹⁰⁵ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 405-408; Cheju 4.3 50 Junyon Haksul, Munhwa Ginyum Saephoei, *Iroborin Mauleul Chajaseo*, 230-31.

killed, on December 20, 1948.¹⁰⁶ The ROK 9th Regiment soldiers may have withheld information about the Bakseongnae massacre from the advisor. If they had reported the massacre as an operation, the Bakseongnae incident would have appeared on the USAFIK report, though under a different name. At this time, the PMAG advisor was familiar with inconsistent combat results and did not hesitate to report the results to the headquarters of the PMAG.

The 2nd Regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Byungseon Ham replaced the 9th Regiment on December 29, 1948.¹⁰⁷ Lt. Col. Ham dispatched the 1st Battalion in Seogwi-po, the 2nd in Cheju-eup, the 3rd in Odeung-ri south of downtown Cheju-eup. The 2nd Battalion was the regimental reserve.¹⁰⁸ At first, Lt. Col. Byungseon Ham worked to persuade the guerrillas to surrender, however after a violent raid by the rebels, he adopted forceful pacification operations.¹⁰⁹

On January 1, 1949, a guerrilla force assaulted the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment at Odeung-ri and inflicted seven casualties. In the raid, the guerrillas suffered ten casualties. It was the fourth day after the regiment took over the mission of pacification. The assault distressed Ham, so he asked for the continuation of martial law on the island.¹¹⁰ Martial law was lifted on December 31, 1948.¹¹¹ In addition, the guerrillas attacked the 2nd Company stationed at Uigwi-ri in Namwon-myon at dawn on

¹⁰⁶ The U.S. 6th Infantry Division, *The 9th Regiment Cheju-do Daily Report*, December 20, 1948. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 8, 78.

¹⁰⁷ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 78.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ The CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 310.

¹¹⁰ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1029, January 5, 1949. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 7, 104.

¹¹¹ Gwanbo 93 Ho [Governmental Issue, No. 93]. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 6, 93.

January 12, 1949. The two hour battle claimed four victims from the 2nd Regiment and fifty-one casualties from the rebels.¹¹²

The raids of the guerrillas brought massive casualties to the villagers of Uigwi-ri. On the next day of the raid on the 2nd Company, the soldiers of the 2nd Regiment murdered eighty residents who had been interned at Uigwi Elementary School.¹¹³ The victims had been staying at the school, captured by the 2nd Regiment soldiers, beginning on January 9, 1949. Uigwi-ri was a village in Halla Mountain; guerrillas could move to Namwon-ri and two other coast line villages via Uigwi-ri. Since mid November 1948, based on the evacuation order, ROK soldiers frequently raided Uigwi-ri to find guerrillas. Furthermore, due to the fire at Namwon-ri on November 28, 1948, the residents of this village became the target of soldiers. There were children among the victims.

Another raid on the guerrillas resulted in tragedy at Bukchon-ri in Jocheon-myon. On January 17, 1949, raiders ambushed near Bukchon-ri and assaulted an army truck, killing two soldiers. The village had been identified as a Communist village by policemen due to an incident that occurred on June 15, 1948; guerrillas killed two police officers and kidnapped passengers on board a ferry from the Woo Island.¹¹⁴ Therefore, policemen became determined to take revenge on the Communists in the village.¹¹⁵

Instead, the soldiers of the 2nd Regiment moved to the village, to avenge the deaths of the two soldiers. The soldiers drove the villagers to Bukchon Elementary School and burned houses. The leader of the troops executed the head of Bukchon-ri

¹¹² USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1037, January 14, 1949. Cited from the CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 6, 106; The testimony of Yun Lee. Cited from IMHC, 4.3 *Sageon Tobeol Jakjeonsa*, 221.

¹¹³ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, 4.3 *eun Malhanda*, vol.5, 139-41.

¹¹⁴ The testimony of Deokseon Kim. He was one of the passengers. Cited from Chunguihoi Cheju Jibu, *Cheju 4.3 Sageon Jinsangjosa Bogoseo Banron* [Critics on The Report of the Truth of the 4.3 Incident] (Cheju, 2003), 83-5.

¹¹⁵ The testimony of an unnamed person. Cited from Sasam Yeonguso, *Ijesa Malhamsuda*, 146.

CPA, claiming that the CPA had failed to monitor Communists. The villagers became surprised at the death, and the soldiers fired again to silence the commotion. The soldiers tried to identify Communists by questioning school boys and girls, but their efforts failed. Then, soldiers began to take the villagers to a neighborhood field by groups except the families of policemen and army soldiers. The executions continued until stopped by the order from a high ranking officer. The families of the victims claim that at least 300 residents were killed at that time.¹¹⁶

The End of the War

The CSC was replaced by the Cheju Combat Command (CCC) under the command of Col. Jaeheung Yu. The CCC inherited the troops of the CSC and gained an independent counter-partisan battalion on March 2, 1949.¹¹⁷ Colonel Yu graduated from the Japanese Military Academy in 1941 in the 55th class and entered the Constabulary via the First Class of the Military Language School.¹¹⁸ The army headquarters intended to end the anti-guerrilla warfare in Cheju before the coming of summer.¹¹⁹

Colonel Yu focused on persuading villagers in the mountain to surrender voluntarily. To avoid killing and arresting by government forces, most of the residents in the mountain villages fled deep into Halla Mountain region or concealed themselves in caves or *orums*. Moving to accommodating camps was not easy for these residents. They were frequently suspected as guerrilla supporters and tortured by the police. At the

¹¹⁶ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*. vol.2, 405-08.

¹¹⁷ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 81.

¹¹⁸ Chosun Ilbo Human Database, <http://search.chosun.com/> (accessed April 4, 2008).

¹¹⁹ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 81.

same time, the villagers in the coast line area did not like to live with the people from the mountain due to mutual distrust.¹²⁰

A USAFIK report concluded that Colonel Yu brought tangible success in the pacification efforts. According to the report, the forceful operations of the 9th Regiment produced a lot of refugees, who eventually roamed around the mountain and joined the guerrillas. The report added that the operations of the 9th Regiment seemed successful but a new style of guerrilla attacks followed when the regiment was changed into the 2nd Regiment. At the same time, the report stated that the 2nd Regiment failed in persuading people to surrender and executed many people without trial. The report contended that during the year after the outbreak of the 4.3 Incident, 14,000 to 15,000 civilians were killed and 80% of them were murdered by government forces. In contrast, Colonel Yu accommodated surrendered persons in camps and released innocents. In addition, he banned indiscriminate killing during operations.¹²¹

The combat reports of the CCC seemed to be reasonable. At skirmishes in Geumak-ri in Hanlim-myon, the ROK soldiers killed three and captured thirty raiders during the period from March 4 to March 5, 1949. On the next day, the army-police combined forces surprised guerrillas at Gwaneum Temple killing five and taking twenty prisoners. On March 7, 1948, a ROK army unit suffered two deaths at an confrontation that killed two raiders and captured ten at Aewol-ri in Aewol-myon.¹²² The ratio

¹²⁰ For the ordeals of the residents in mountain villages, see Cheju 4.3 50 Junyon Haksul, Munhwa Saeop Chujin Wiwonhoi ed., *Illobeorin Maulul Chajaseo*.

¹²¹ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 7, 117-25.

¹²² USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1085.

between killed and captured and the casualties of soldiers versus rebels showed that soldiers did not massacre innocent residents.

During the period from March 5 to March 9, 1949, the ROK soldiers killed eighty-nine guerrillas and took 167 prisoners, who possessed three Japanese rifles. In contrast, twenty-six ROK soldiers were killed and three were wounded during the same period. In addition, the soldiers lost two light machineguns, six M-1 rifles, and seven Carbines to the enemy.¹²³ The large casualties of the ROK soldiers and the loss of weapons indicated that the soldiers exchanged fire not with unarmed villagers, but real guerrillas.

The Communist guerrillas nearly lost their strength at this time. Because of the long lasting pacification operations and the loss of the mountain villages, the members of the guerrilla forces decreased, and supplies became scarce. In his book, Bonghyun Kim argued that the guerrillas reached the point where they could not continue resistance in February 1949.¹²⁴ At the same time the USAFIK concluded that the guerrillas could not launch offensives any further after the ambush attack on one army platoon on March 9, 1949.¹²⁵ In addition, about 6,000 refugees surrendered to government force by the end of April 1949.¹²⁶ The surrender of thousands of refugees meant that the guerrillas were isolated from Chejudoans.

Based on this success, the South Korean government took steps to restart the stalled elections. The government announced the plan of the resuming elections in Cheju

¹²³ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1087.

¹²⁴ Kim, *Chejudo Hyului Yeoksa*, 242.

¹²⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949, RG 554.

¹²⁶ *Gyenghyang Sinmun*, April 26, 1949. Cited from the CDURHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 3, 69.

on March 20, 1949.¹²⁷ President Syngman Rhee visited the island on April 9, 1949 to evaluate the successful achievement of pacification efforts.¹²⁸ The Chejudoans elected their representatives for the two seats for Cheju representatives, which had been vacant for one year on May 10, 1949;¹²⁹ Sunnyong Hong and Byungjik Yang were elected.¹³⁰

The South Korean government dismissed the CCC on May 15, 1949.¹³¹ Deoggu Lee, the commander of the guerrilla forces after Dalsam Kim, was killed by police on June 7, 1949.¹³² Before Lee's death, the chair of the Cheju SKLP, Yonggwon Kim was killed on April 21, 1949.¹³³ Although pacification efforts were continued in Cheju, the success of the re-election encouraged the South Korean government. In fact, it brought the real turning point to the guerrilla resistance in Cheju. The guerrillas never launched another major offensive until April 2, 1957, except for a small numbers of raids after the break of the Korean War in 1950, the day of arresting the last guerrilla, Wongwon Oh.¹³⁴

The casualties of the 4.3 Incident over nine years were beyond imagination. A G-2 Report contended that 14,000 to 15,000 persons were killed from the beginning of the incident to the end of April 1949.¹³⁵ The number of casualties contained only the victims of the one year. The 4.3 Incident lasted nine years, though the first year produced most casualties. Generally, the number could be trusted, because it covered the victims of the

¹²⁷ *Chosun Ilbo*, April 20, 1949.

¹²⁸ *Donga Ilbo*, April 13, 1949.

¹²⁹ *Chosun Ilbo*, May 12, 1949.

¹³⁰ *Donga Ilbo*, May 14, 1948.

¹³¹ IMHC, *Daebijeonggyujeonsa*, 84.

¹³² *Donggwang Sinmun*, June 11, 1949. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 3, 96.

¹³³ *Gyenghyang Sinmun*, April 26, 1949. Cited from the CDURHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 3, 69.

¹³⁴ *Chosun Ilbo*, April 3, 1957.

¹³⁵ USAFIK, *G-2 Periodic Report*, No. 1097, April 1, 1949. Cited from the CDTRHV, *4.3 Sageon Jaryojip*. vol. 7, 117-25.

first year when the majority of the casualties occurred, and it came from the USAFIK which had access to various reliable sources.

Two additional considerations would be needed for the calculation. During the 4.3 Incident, many Chejudoans were executed at prisons on the mainland. In addition, after the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, the KNP captured hundreds of one time arrestees during the insurgency, and killed many of them.¹³⁶ The casualties would be better calculated based on the number that was suggested by the USAFIK and the modification that reflected additional sacrifices. The modification would not be more than the number of the USAFIK based on logical reasoning. The murdering of 14,000 to 15,000 was the result of genocide for one year, but other cases occurred in limited situations. In other words, the casualties would be close to the number of the USAFIK.

The most pervasive investigation efforts were made by the Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honor of Victims. The commission conducted thorough research about the casualties from June 8, 2000 to May 30, 2001. According to the commission, 13,886 persons were killed and 142 men and women were wounded during the incident. This number is close to the report of the USAFIK. A few more casualties could have been added, had surviving relatives been able to make such reports. At the same time, a few casualties would be subtracted due to false reports.¹³⁷ Casualties of children younger than 10 year old were 814, and the casualties of elders older than

¹³⁶ Jemin Ilbo 4.3 Chuijaeban, *4.3eun Malhanda*, vol.4, 152, 165, 179-80.

¹³⁷ See the cases of false reports in Chunguihoi Cheju Jibu, *Cheju 4.3 Sageon Jinsangjosa Bogoseo Banron*, 78-82.

sixty was 860. In addition, the commission argued that 7,439 victims were killed between November 1948 and January 1949.¹³⁸

The South Korean government pacified the Cheju rebellion that had exasperated the government for an extended period of time. It was the victory of South Korea over North Korea. However, the South Korean government gained the victory on the backs of the enormous sacrifices of Chejudoans.

¹³⁸ The CDTRHV, 4.3 *Sageon Jinsang Josa Bogoseo*, 369-73.

CONCLUSION

The 4.3 Incident was one of the great tragedies of modern Korean society. It was guerrilla warfare that initiated the Korean War. Armed forces of South Korea and guerrilla units clashed with each other in the island. The guerrillas came under the control of the Central SKLP and North Korea. The Cheju guerrillas and the government forces exchanged violence without mercy causing countless casualties of civilians. The guerrilla war was the precursor that showed the cruelty and brutality of the Korean War. During the anti-guerrilla war campaign, American military officers commanded pacification forces, and, later Korean officers took the initiative of operations with the help of American advisors.

The 4.3 Incident was a struggle between a central government and a local Communist organization. However, the local Communist organization was connected to a national Communist Party and received direct control from the party headquarters later. Geographically, the war was conducted in an island which locates in south west of the Korean Peninsula. Government forces from the mainland fought against Communist guerrillas who were mainly local islanders.

Before the beginning of the 4.3 Incident, the mainlanders and the islanders stayed at different stages of political changes. After experiencing the trusteeship controversy and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion, the mainlanders already moved away from a pro-

Communist society by the end of 1946. When the United Nations decided to establish a national government based on a general election and the UNTUCK encountered Soviet opposition for their mission in northern Korea, most mainlanders in southern Korea believed the necessity of building a zonal country.

However, Cheju society was still pro-Communist at the end of 1946 due to the lack of violent Communist insurgency and the robust activities of the People's Committees. The Chejudoans were way behind to the mainlanders in terms of shifting ideology. Unlike the mainlanders, the Chejudoans needed more time to move to anti-Communist nationalism. In spring 1948, most Chejudoans still respected local Communist leaders who were anti-Japanese activists and mentors of young students.

The geographic sense of being islanders who were isolated from mainlanders and the different stage of social change contributed to the formation of distinctive self image among the islanders. In the eyes of the Chejudoans, their identity was defined by their willingness to accommodate Communism. In other words, the mainlanders or opponents to Communism could not be accepted as Chejudoans. The same criterion could be applied to the mainlanders; the mainlanders considered Chejudoans to be Communists, though there were some exceptional cases.

The 4.3 Incident was the conflict between two groups of people who retained very different self images. The mainlanders could not tolerate Chejudoans who were Communists, and the islanders could not accept anti-Communist nationalism that was brought by the mainlanders. The struggle between the mainlanders and the islanders was facilitated by a strong dialect and kinship relations among the islanders. At the same time,

the employing of the NWYMA for pacification hardened the conflict of the two different ideologies.

The persecuting Communism was conducted by the Korea National Police. Inheriting authoritative Japanese attitude and armed with the Cold War ideology, the KNP pursued to eradicate Communists from South Korea. Suffering from the Autumn Harvest Rebellion, the KNP became a locomotive of social change toward anti-Communist society. The KNP was well organized and furnished with American arms and equipment.

The South Korea Labor Party drove Communist movement in southern Korea after its creation. The SKLP had nationwide organization and many subsidiary organizations to mobilize people in every part of South Korean society. The Soviet Military Government in northern Korea controlled the SKLP and offered financial support. The leader of the SKLP, Honyong Pak, followed the direction from the Soviet Military government faithfully.

Communist activists took the political initiative in Cheju after the liberation in 1945. The Communist activists claimed the legitimacy of their control based on their long lasting anti-Japanese movements not only in Chejudo but also in Japan. During the power vacuum that happened after the surrender of Japan, the Communists rapidly seized the control of the situation. The CPKI and the People's Committee were the main vehicles for Communist control over the island. In addition, the late establishment of the local Military Government furthered the expansion and control of the Communists.

The permissive actions of Cheju Military Government allowed the Cheju Communists to maintain their control for a significant time. Because of the lack of man

power and experience in Cheju, the Military Government relied on the functions of the People's Committee to continue the function of the government. Local Communists worked together with the officials of the military government, and young Communists in the ACY cooperated with police officers to secure social order.

The People's Committee in Cheju played the role of a de facto government. It had strong physical support from the local ACYs. As a de facto government, the Cheju People's Committee took unique steps amid the eruption of Communist disturbances over the country. The Cheju Communists passed the General Strike and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion in 1946. The Cheju People's Committee was active in supporting the lives of Chejudoans; specifically the spread of the cholera drove leading Communists to focus their efforts on helping their own island. The independence of the Cheju Communists was partially enabled by factional disputes which had been rampant among Korean Communists.

However, with the installation of provincial system on the island in late 1946, the Cheju Communists began to lose their work as a the de facto government. Expanded administrative functions of the Cheju Military Government replaced the People's Committee with formal governmental agencies. Specifically, enlarged police officers brought by the promotion of Cheju's status to a province caused the exclusion of the Communists from security works.

In addition, with the creation of the SKLP, the Cheju Communists lost their autonomy from national Communist organization. The establishment of the SKLP induced the change of leaders in the community of the Cheju Communists. Communists

who were younger and more obedient to the central SKLP Communists took important positions in the Chollanam-do SKLP Cheju Committee.

Due to isolation from the Military Government and the loss of the autonomy from the central Communist organization, the nature and the characteristics of the Cheju Communists changed dramatically. They were no longer valued members of the de facto government, but simple party members who sought political power. Consequently, the ACYs which were under the control of local People's Committees to support the People's Committees, reorganized into Mincheongs that were under the direct control of the Cheju SKLP.

However, the change of the Communists did not mean the loss of the power of Communists in the society of Cheju. Chejudoans elected two leftists for their representatives of the SKILA. They were the only two leftists in the SKILA. Moreover, they resigned from their posts after denouncing the Military Government at the building of the DNFF when the first term of the SKILA began.

The election of leftists to the representatives to the SKILA and their resignation shocked mainlanders. The mainlanders were moving toward to an anti-Communist society after the trusteeship controversy and the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. At the same time, the KNP was cleansing Communists with great ferocity. The KNP lost a lot of members following Communist terrorism attacks during the rebellion. The mainlanders also surprised at the mentioning of the two Cheju SKILA electives that Chejudoans were under the control of the People's Committee. The People's Committee was stigmatized by the mainlanders as an evil agency plotting murdering and destroying during the rebellion.

The difference between the two societies gave the mainlanders the idea that all Chejudoans were Communists. This idea dominated the minds of political leaders, policemen, and military officers during the 4.3 Incident. Furthermore, the conception would not be erased easily because of cultural barriers between the mainlanders and the Chejudoans. The mainlanders and the Chejudoans could not understand each other's ideas.

The Military Government and the Cheju Communists clashed at the memorial service of the March 1 Movement in 1947. In accordance with the past experience of Communist disturbance, the headquarters of the KNP alerted the provincial police chief and dispatched reinforcement troops to Cheju. At the same time, the Cheju Communists were determined to hold an aggressive out door memorial service disregarding the police direction for the service. The police troops prepared for assaults on police stations based on the experience of the Autumn Harvest Rebellion, and the Communists intended to show their power by dauntless march.

During the March 1 service, six civilian deaths occurred because of police fire. Threatened by stone-throwing mobs that chased a mounted policeman, reinforcement policemen guarding the police station fired on civilians. The actions of the police and the resulting deaths had a great impact on Cheju society. The Chejudoans began to feel that their actions under the command of the Communists did not agree with the Military Government or mainlanders represented by the reinforcement police officers.

The sacrifice of the Chejudoans compelled the Cheju SKLP to seek a solution to recover their trusts. At the same time, the Communists could not accept the reality of being attacked by the Military Government. The Communists had been cooperators to

the Military Government, protectors of social order, and were still leaders in the eyes of the villagers. The Cheju Communists soon realized the hostility the Military Government held toward Communists.

As the challenge to the Military Government, the Cheju Communists launched March 10 General Strike before the shock of March First Incident had subsided. Not only laborers in private workplaces, but also governmental officials joined the general strike. Unfortunately for the Cheju Communists, the success of the strike surprised and distressed the Military Government that would come to react harshly. The beliefs of the mainlanders would be confirmed, that most Chejudoans were Communists or Communist sympathizers.

After the March 10 Strike, the Chejudoans had consistently encountered strong police actions to any demonstrations or protests. The Military Government dispatched reinforcement police troops to quell the strike, and the mainland policemen exercised forceful measures in dealing with the Chejudoans. Hence, the Chejudoans hated police and the Military Government. The relationship between the Chejudoans and the Military Government was aggravated by inappropriate actions of a newly inaugurated right-wing governor.

With continual confrontation between the Chejudoans and the Military Government, rightist movements became active. The local GUYC was established and began to gain strength in villages. At the same time, the NWYMA came to the island and initiated terrorism against the islanders. Yet the rightists did not dominate the Cheju society due to the strong remaining influence of the Communists.

The arrest of Communist cadres after the March 10 General Strike forced Communist leaders to hide themselves. Some of them moved into Halla Mountain. At the same time, young more radical Communists took over the seats of arrested Communist officials in the Cheju SKLP. The Cheju Communists felt strong dissatisfaction with the Military Government.

Under the increasing pressure, young Communist leaders became determined to rise against the Military Government. Their intention coincided with the desire of the Chollanam-do SKLP to sabotage the general election on May 10, 1948. As a result, for the survival of the Cheju Communists and to block the separated general election, the Cheju Communists launched a disturbance under the guidance of the Chollanam-do SKLP.

The 4.3 Incident was the second challenge of the Cheju Communists against the Military Government. Unlike the March 10 General Strike, the Communists resorted to violence: assaulting police substations and killing policemen and right-wing persons. The actions of the Cheju Communists were planned and guided by supervisors from the Chollanam-do SKLP. At that time, such kinds of actions were generally organized by the SKLP over southern Korea.

The disturbances in the beginning phase of the 4.3 Incident were scattered actions led by decentralized SKLP organizations. However, due to strong reactions from the Military Government, the Cheju Communists should devise methods to raise the strength of their organization. The Cheju Communists were gradually centralized and militarized. They began to evolve from street fighters to guerrilla warriors.

At first, the Military Government tried to resolve the disturbance by police operations and peace talks. In fact, the commander of the Constabulary 9th Regiment succeeded in negotiations with Dalsam Kim, the military leader of the Cheju SKLP. In contrast, the G-3 of the USAFIK identified the Communist actions as unusual challenges. The Military Government changed its stance from peace talks to forceful suppression and from police operations to Constabulary operations. Furthermore, the government sent a U.S. Army Colonel to command the operations in Cheju.

The Cheju Communists gained great success in boycotting the general election. Due to the shortage of effective votes, the election of two electives of north Cheju became invalidated. At least, the Communists achieved one goal to block the election, but the Communists realized that they could not save their lives even if they cease to fight. The Communists continued their resistance even with more eagerness. The situation seemed to be impasse.

The Constabulary forces, under the control of Lieutenant Colonel Park and Col. Brown, actively searched guerrillas in Halla Mountain under the control of a new commander. The soldiers did not reach the guerrillas easily, but continued to press the guerrillas to stop their activities. The guerrillas downsized their organization and reduced actions to survive. Meanwhile, the Constabulary successfully reached to the fourth phase of their pacification operations by June 17, 1948.

With the intervention of the Central SKLP, the guerrillas moved in a new direction. The Central SKLP encouraged the Cheju guerrillas and dispatched representatives to the island. The guerrillas reorganized themselves into a Soviet Military style and expanded troop numbers. At the same time, the guerrillas succeeded in

assassinating the commander of the 9th Regiment. In addition, the Central SKLP pulled out Dalsam Kim from the island after the underground election. He became the representative of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK.

The evacuation of Dalsam Kim and the participation in the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK changed the characteristics of the guerrilla war in Cheju. It became the confrontation between the South Korea and the North Korea. To the South Korean government, the Cheju insurgency appeared to be a seditious act by the North Korean government. This conclusion made the South Korean leaders, led to their ruthless suppression of the Cheju turmoil. At the same time, the occurrence of Yosu Rebellion stiffened the will of the South Korean leaders to use forceful measures in suppressing Communist activities.

The South Korean government concerned about the situation that was caused by the Yosu Rebellion and the success of the Communists in China. At that time, the ROK government was trying to get the affirmation of the establishment from the United Nations' General Assembly at the end of 1948. As a result, President Syngman Rhee and legislatures struggled to delay the withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea.

The pacification operations by the South Korean government were different from the previous operations as more coercive measures were adopted. In some instances, soldiers killed innocent residents without investigation. The villages in Halla Mountain were burned down and the villagers were hunted. The scorched earth operations were adopted based on unconstitutional martial law. The Cheju was the battle ground between South Korea and North Korea, and South Korea should win employing any means necessary.

Extreme anger against Communists and preconception of the mainlanders that Chejudoans were Communists enabled the ROK soldiers to convict the worst genocide in modern Korean history. Cultural barriers between the Chejudoans and the soldiers from the mainland worsened the situation. At the same time, the USAFIK did not retain proper control over the operational units. Chejudoans suffered great casualties from mid November 1948 to the end of February 1949.

The pacification of the guerrilla war was brought by persuasive efforts initiated by the CCC beginning in March 1949. The ROK soldiers began to fight the Communist guerrillas and innocent Chejudoans started to move down to accommodating camps. The guerrillas lost strength to continue resistance from this time. The Chejudoans returned to South Korean society by electing two representatives in the re-election on May 10, 1949.

The unintentional guerrilla war caused by Cheju Communists brought the beginning of the Korean War. Though it had started with disturbances, the Communists' resistance developed into guerrilla warfare. Because of the guerrillas in Halla Mountain, the South Korean government mobilized one army regiment to Cheju. Moreover, deserted Communist soldiers of the 14th Regiment entered Chiri Mountain and became guerrillas. Following that time, the SKLP turned its policy to armed resistance, and South Korea should fight a guerrilla war over the country. It was the first round of the Korean War.

As a result, even after great success in Cheju, the South Korean government had continual security concerns due to the guerrillas. The ROK Army dealt with the guerrillas in the mainland by employing the anti-guerrilla warfare experience retained through the 4.3 Incident. Fortunately, the ROK Army managed to pacify most guerrilla

activities by spring 1950. From June 25, 1950, South Korea began another round of the Korean War.

The United States eventually left South Korea in mid 1949. It was already predicted when the United States brought the case to the United Nations. The Truman Doctrine brought frustration to southern Koreans by nullifying the Korea Aid Fund. Due to marginal strategic value of Korea, the U.S. did not intend to protect the country with a limited budget. However, the U.S. extended planned withdrawal of the U.S. troops due to the argument of the State Department which evaluated Korea relatively important.

The Cold War in Korea was not a war between simple ideologies. Koreans attached self images to each ideology. In addition, the violence that occurred by a group holding certain ideology generates severe animosity toward the ideology and the ideology holders. For instance, most of the NWYMA members had extreme enmity against Communists based on the violence exercised by North Korean Communists. In the same way, Chejudoans before the outbreak of the 4.3 Incident disliked rightists and the Military Government due to their brutal suppression.

In this process, demonizing opponent ideology holders occurred. The NWYMA and the soldiers of the ROK regiments called Communists as Palgaengi or the red, and the Cheju Communists degraded rightists as Bandong or reactionaries. Both sides handled each other with brutality. The meaning of the Palgaengi coincides with the meaning of a destroyer or a murderer. At the same time, the Bandong indicates enemy or national traitor.

Once a side exercised violence toward the other side, the other side retaliated with higher intensity. This is the mechanism of communal violence that had been rampant in

Cheju during the 4.3 Incident. In Cheju, the final winner of the communal violence was the South Korean government. During the Korean War, and even after the war, the communal violence was pervasive over the country. The communal violence was the distinctive feature to explain the characteristics of the Cold War that Koreans fought.

The 4.3 Incident concluded southern Koreans long lasting efforts of nation building. They received the liberation from the allied forces at the end of World War II. The Koreans abolished Communism as their ideology after realizing its imperialistic character controlled by the Soviet Union and the brutality during the Autumn Harvest Rebellion. After the beginning of the 4.3 Incident, the South Koreans struggled to crush North Korean plot on Chejudo and to complete the construction process throughout the U.N. resolution. The high intensity of the pacification efforts were required to guarantee the survival of the country.

The 4.3 Incident typified the structure of conflicts between internal South Korean groups and between foreign countries surrounding the Korean peninsula, which had lasted for decades during the Cold War. Leftist Koreans had protested to South Korean government for decades. North Korea frequently had supported these movements with the same desire that they had in 1948 toward Cheju. Enveloped by Communist super powers, South Korean governments had tried to get the support from the United States as Syngman Rhee did in 1948. The United States was concerned about the movements of the Soviet Union and the Communists in China. Within two years after the outbreak of the insurgency, the participants of this external structure of conflict entered into a hot war, which became the symbol of the Cold War.

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
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
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APPENDIX: MAPS



[Source: Arc View GIS 3.2a]

Map 1. Korea



[Source: Arc View GIS 3.2 a]

Map. 2 Cheju-do in 1948