SOCIAL STRUCTURE, REDEFINITION OF THE PAST, AND PROSPECTIVE ORIENTATIONS: A STUDY OF THE POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Irina Tomescu

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
2006

Dissertation Committee:

Approved by

Professor Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, Advisor

Professor Randy Hodson

Professor Craig J. Jenkins

Advisor
Graduate Program in Sociology

ABSTRACT

The main goal of this dissertation is to analyze the role of psychological determinants for individuals' current location in the post-communist social structure. I argue that structurally determined evaluations of the past affect future orientations and, in turn, future orientations affect further structural outcomes. Evaluations of the past are conceptualized in terms of the degree of positive/negative assessment of the socialist system. This specific reference point is essential for my research expectations since "socialist system" represents an abandoned regime. Thus, change in opinion about socialism is not caused by the change in its object; it might be caused only by the change in the subject – a person and his or her conditions. Rational action theory and cognitive dissonance theory provide a strong framework within which the process of political attitude formation and its apparent inconsistencies can be considered.

This is a multi-method study, and I use both primary and secondary data. The Polish panel survey, POLPAN 1988-2003 represents the backbone for the quantitative parts of my analysis. In this survey a representative sample of adult Poles was interviewed in 1988 and re-interviewed in 1993, 1998, and 2003. In addition, I use the POLTEST 2004 – 2005 Polish panel survey to examine whether Markov-type processes have significant explanatory power for long-term change in public opinion about socialism. In a large part of my analyses I treat the data as cross-sectional, using OLS estimates for particular time-points. However, because panel data have hierarchical

structure, I also use population-averaged cross-sectional time-series analysis to account for autocorrelation and multicollinearity. In-depth interviews provide additional materials about the mechanism linking social structure, assessment of the past and future orientations.

To make this linkage more specific, I structure my analyses along two areas of inquiry. First, I examine the determinants of evaluation of socialism. I identify structural factors, contextual effects and individual-level determinants to be crucial for mass-level political attitude formation. Second, I analyze the mechanism through which positive evaluations of the past affect social-structural location, including the mediating effect of future orientations. Overall, results consistently show that psychological determinants play an important part in explaining social inequality in post-communist Poland. Positive assessment of socialism affects negatively the location of individuals in the social structure directly, and also indirectly, through optimistic future orientations. The latter affect income and class position in positive way, and independently of its being grounded in the legacy of the past.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I wish to thank my advisor, Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, for his guidance throughout my graduate school experience, which made the completion of this research project and of my education in general, much more likely. Dear Maciek, while your complaints that I do not take you seriously may sometimes be grounded, I definitely appreciate you and your impressive patience in fostering my willingness to work, and to think sociologically. I am really fortunate to have found such a wonderful friend!

Thanks go to my other committee members, Randy Hodson and Craig Jenkins, for their valuable comments. Like with Maciek, I have benefited from their expertise all the way through the graduate program, from my Master thesis, to the Generals examination, and now the dissertation. I would also like to express my appreciation to Dave Jacobs, whose insights into STATA allowed me to wrap up my analyses in due time.

Of course, this section would not be complete if I would not acknowledge my friends and my family, who are putting up with my crazy ideas with far too little complaining given the circumstances. Schimo, Josh, Alexis, Hans, Mihaela, Sara, Jill, Sergiu, Rachel, jimi—you add sparkles to my world and prove that humor, kindness, and affection easily transcend national boundaries. My family, Maca especially, is my best defense against any attacks of vanity. Dear Jerzyna, thank you very much for making the distance from home so much smaller. Dragul meu Joshi, cu tine viata este mai frumoasa.

VITA

October 3, 1974…….. Born – Bucharest, Romania

2002……. M.A. Sociology, The Ohio State University

2000 – 2006 …… Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

1. Slomczynski, Kazimierz M. and Irina Tomescu-Dubrow. 2006. "Representation of European Post-Communist Countries in Cross-National Public Opinion Surveys." *Problems of Post-Communism* 53 (4): 42-52.

2. Tomescu-Dubrow, Irina. 2006. "Intergenerational Social Mobility in Romania: Changes in the Patterns of Flows and Relationships in the Post-Communist Era." *International Journal of Sociology* 36 (1): 46-68.

3. Tomescu-Dubrow, Irina. 2005. "Systemic Transformation and Institutional Inefficiency: Children Deprived of Parental Care as a Persisting Social Problem in Romania." *International Journal of Sociology* 35 (3): 57-84.

4. Slomczynski, Kazimierz M. and Irina Tomescu-Dubrow. 2005 **"**Friendship Patterns and Upward Mobility: A Test of Social Capital Hypothesis." *Polish Sociological Review* 3:221-235.

5. Tomescu-Dubrow, Irina. 2005. "Unemployment Experience during the Transition from Command Economy to Market Economy: Event History Analysis of Polish Panel Data, 1988-2003" in 2005 *Edward F. Hayes Graduate Research Forum Proceedings* 5: 417-433. The Ohio State University Council of Graduate Students: Columbus, Ohio.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Sociology

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

I was fourteen years old, living in Bucharest, when Romanians took to the streets in what was initially referred to as the Anti-Communist Revolution of 1989. I remember clearly demonstrators' deep resentment against the communist rule and its most conspicuous feature, the Communist Party's secretary general and his wife. Since I was well acquainted with the severe deficiencies of the Socialist Republic of Romania, as well as with its constant—though voiced only in private—condemnation, I was convinced that protesters' demand "Down with Communism" echoed with everybody except the top-ranking members of the *nomenklatura*. And once the regime did fall, I, alongside many others, imagined that Romanians were through with it, for good.

Early into the post-1989 transition, however, I was confronted with the situation that some Romanians were starting to refer to the socialist period positively, and their numbers seemed to increase through time. This change was puzzling because prior to the transformation Romania had had one of the lowest standards of living and one of the most oppressive systems in the entire Soviet bloc. And yet, there I was, listening to the same persons who during my childhood used to criticize the regime, now defending it.

Once I realized that this phenomenon is present in other post-soviet countries too, I decided to study its determinants and, equally important, its likely consequences. Initially, I wanted to compare Romania and Poland, because, on one hand, of their similar

past, and on the other, of the differences in their post-communist trajectory, specifically in the pace of economic restructuring. I conducted a set of initial narrative interviews in Romania and in Poland, and saw many similarities in people's responses. Unfortunately, for Romania no appropriate data on long-term opinion change in assessment of socialism is available. For Poland, however, I have access to longitudinal data from the POLPAN survey, which covers the interval 1988-2003, divided into three phases: 1988-1993, 1993-1998 and 1998-2003. Thus, I chose to focus on Poland to understand what determines people to redefine the past communist regime, and whether positive attitudes towards socialism matter for people's further structural outcomes.

This evolved into the following general research questions: Do structurally determined evaluations of the past influence future orientations? Moreover, are future orientations the mediating mechanism of the effect of evaluations of the past on the location of individuals in the social structure? I structure my dissertation around these issues as follows: In Part 1, Chapter 1 sets the problem, provides the theoretical background, and outlines the research expectations and hypotheses. Chapter 2 provides information on the data and the methods employed throughout this study. In Chapter 3 I test the basic assumptions my dissertation is based on, namely that Poles change their assessment of socialism through time, and that there is a significant relation between evaluation of the past and future orientations. Part 2 and Part 3 deal extensively with the determinants of assessment of socialism and with its explanatory power respectively. More specifically, in Part 2, Chapter 4 looks at the effect of structural determinants, Chapter 4 examines historical generations, political biographies and friendship networks, while in Chapter 6 focus is on the role of political attitudes. In Part 3, Chapter 7

examines the causal relationship between evaluation of the past and prospective orientations. Chapter 8 extends this analysis by investigating the relation *evaluation of the past – optimistic future orientations* when other determinants, such as contextual effects, are accounted for. Finally, Chapter 9 assesses the over-time effect of optimistic future orientations on the location of the individual in the social structure above and beyond the role of 'traditional' determinants of achievement.

PART 1

THEORY, METHODS, AND BASIC PREMISES

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Central to this dissertation is to understand the role that psychological determinants play for individuals' current location in the post-communist social structure. In the context of the well-established relation between attitudes and behavior, two observations call for a specific investigation of the linkages between psychological and structural variables. I am referring to these observations, putting aside for a moment their documentation. Even journalistic accounts show that in the countries of the former Soviet bloc people remember the historical experience of communism differently, depending on their location in the social structure. We can add to this first observation the second one: within less than two decades people repeatedly change their opinion about socialism, not randomly, but in relation to their social position. These two observations prompted me to reason that evaluations of the past, while a response to the post-1989 transformations, could be themselves an important factor in shaping further structural outcomes. In particular, I reason that structurally determined evaluations of the past affect future orientations and, in turn, future orientations influence people's location in the social structure.

I conceptualize evaluations of the past in terms of attitudes towards the socialist system in Poland, i.e. in terms of the degree of positive/negative assessment of socialism.

This specific reference point is essential for my research expectations since "socialist system" represents an abandoned regime. Thus, change in opinion about socialism is not caused by the change in its object; it might be caused only by the change in the subject – a person and his or her conditions.

To make the linkages between social structure, evaluation of the past, and future orientations more specific entails breaking it down into two areas of inquiry:

(1) What explains attitudes and change in attitudes towards an already abandoned system that has stopped to change, becoming the past? and

(2) What is the mechanism through which evaluation of the past affects social-structural location, including future orientations?

Given the weight that psychological factors hold within both questions, before providing the theoretical background for answering these generic questions, I first discuss the nature and operation of attitudes. Then, I present theoretical models used through the dissertation. This chapter ends with identifying specific research expectations and hypotheses.

Insights into the Nature and Operation of Attitudes

A hallmark for the field of social sciences, social psychology especially, research on attitudes has produced a massive body of academic literature. I do not attempt to provide an extended review of this work.

Instead, I focus on the following issues that have direct bearing on my dissertation: (a) definition of attitudes; (b) characteristics of attitudes; (d) functions of attitudes; (e) the relationship attitudes-behavior; and, last but not least, (c) motives for attitude change.

Definition of Attitudes

Following long debates on how to best define attitude, currently it is generally accepted that "an attitude represents an evaluative integration of cognitions and affects experienced in relation to an object" (Crano and Prislin 2006, p. 347). The expectancy-value model represents the most common conceptualization of attitude (Fishbein 1963, Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). It assumes that individuals are goal-oriented beings, and represents attitudes as a function of expectancy/belief, and of evaluation. To influence an attitude at any given moment, beliefs need to be readily accessible in memory (Ajzen 2001, p. 30). Research demonstrates that beliefs judged to be important are more accessible in memory (van Harreveld et al 2000 as cited in Ajzen, 2001); evaluations are the result of cognitive and affective processes (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Behavioral decision theory and the theory of planned behavior theory – to which I refer later - are among the most fully developed formulations of the expectancy-value argument.

Characteristics of Attitudes

Accessibility, strength and ambivalence are relevant attributes of attitudes. *Accessibility* is the ease or speed with which evaluations can be retrieved from memory. Highly accessible attitudes are more likely to bias interpretation of relevant information, and to shape behavior such as to make it consistent with the attitude (see the review by Olson and Zanna, 1993, p. 122).

Research on *attitude strength* shows that strong attitudes are relatively stable over time; they are associated with more accessible beliefs, are more resistant to change, and predict manifest behavior (Petty and Krosnick 1995). In addition, research on changes in attitude strength over the life cycle documented that susceptibility to attitude change

declined from early to middle adulthood and then increased again in late adulthood (Visser and Krosnick 1998; Ajzen 2001 for a review on this topic). At the same time, however, studies point out the problematic nature of this characteristic, among others because it may be multidimensional: various indexes of attitude strength correlate differentially with education, gender, and race (Ajzen, 2001).

In general terms, *ambivalence* reflects the propensity of an attitude to contain both positive and negative elements (Olson and Zanna, 1993), and can result "from simultaneously accessible conflicting beliefs within the cognitive component or from a conflict between cognition and affect" (Ajzen 2001, p. 39). In his review of the subject, Ajzen (2001) documents that holding ambivalent attitudes has direct consequences for judgment and behavior.

Functions of Attitudes

Most broadly, attitudes are said to facilitate adaptation to the environment (Eagly and Chaiken 1998). Research on identifying specific functions that attitudes fulfill, as well on their formation and the consequences, is ongoing (Maio and Olson 1999). A set of functions that is already recognized by most theorists includes: the value-expressive function, for expressing values important to one's self-concept; the knowledge function, for satisfying the need to attribute meaning to existence; the ego-defensive function, for coping with anxiety stemming from internal conflicts; the "social-adjustive" function, and the utilitarian function, both for adaptation to external conditions (Katz 1960, Smith et al. 1956, Murray et al 1996). Despite the identification of multiple functions of attitudes, many studies implicitly assume that attitudes are based on economic self-interest (see Kiecolt 1988).

Also, attitudes are assumed to have a biasing effect: since they serve a variety of functions for the individual, they are likely to bias judgments and memory. It is generally hypothesized that attitudes bias information processing and memory in favor of attitude-consistent material (see Ajzen 2001, p. 41).

The Attitude-Behavior Relationship

In the social sciences, social psychology especially, the attitude-behavior relation is examined from different angles: (a) how do attitudes influence behavior (theory of planned behavior), (b) how does behavior influence attitudes (self-perception theory and cognitive dissonance theory), and (c) what are their reciprocal effects, although this issue has been dealt with to a lesser extent (see Liska et al. 1984 for a notable exception). Since my interest in this project is in the effect of attitudes on actual behavior, the discussion below refers to this line of inquiry.

The theory of planned behavior, and, to a lesser extent, its predecessor, the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen 1991, Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) are the most widely applied frameworks for research on attitudinal effects on actual behavior. According to the theory of planned behavior, people act in accordance with their intentions and perceptions of control over the behavior; intentions, in turn, are influenced by attitudes towards the behavior, subjective norms, and perceptions of behavioral control (Ajzen 2001 p. 43). This theory has received strong empirical support and has been proven successful, among others, in predicting career-related behaviors such as job search efforts and relocation decisions (see Ng et al. 2006 for a review of research on the use of the theory of planned behavior to career-related behavior).

Attitudes influence action not only through intentions, but also directly (Bagozzi and Yi 1989). What determines whether intentions moderate the attitude-behavior relationship is the degree of intention-formation. Bagozzi and Yi (1989) found that well-formed intentions completely mediated the effect of attitudes on behavior; when intensions were poorly-formed, however, attitudes had a direct effect on behavior (p. 276-277).

The theory of planned behavior is undoubtedly providing useful insights into the process of behavior formation. Yet, it has been criticized on several grounds, of which the lack of appropriately dealing with structural determinants is of main interest to sociologists. In Ajzen's model, social structure is conceptualized as a background variable, whose effect on behavior is mediated by attitudes and subjective norms, and then by intentions. While this is partially so, especially in laboratory settings, Liska (1984) accurately points out that in the "real word" social structure plays a more important role "because it allocates resources and opportunities, which directly influence behavior and which provide the medium through which attitudes, subjective norms and intentions are expressed in behavior (p. 72)" (see also Kerckhoff 1976, 1984 on social psychological models of achievement largely ignoring the direct effect of structural constraints).

Motives for Attitude Change

A recent review of the theoretical and empirical developments in studies of attitude change identifies central motives for attitude change and resistance. Specifically, the common thread among contemporary theories on persuasion and social influence is the recognition that attitude change can be motivated by normative concerns for (a)

ensuring the coherence and favorable evaluation of the self, and (b) ensuring satisfactory relations with others given the rewards/punishments they can provide, along with an informational concern for (c) understanding the entity or issue featured in influence appeals (see Wood, p. 541).

Within the social-psychology field, research on attitude functions provides a major theoretical framework for investigating motives underlying attitude change (see Eagly and Chaiken 1998). Another major research tradition is cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957, Harmon-Jones 1999) with its focus on the motivational bases for dissonance and the routes through which dissonance can be reduced. I will return to this theoretical perspective later in the chapter.

Theoretical Models

In this part I discuss the theoretical models on which my dissertation is based. The first model deals with the determinants of evaluation of the past. The second model deals with the role of evaluation of the past for the reproduction of social structure. It is assumed that assessment of socialism influences further structural outcomes mainly through its effect on future orientations.

Determinants of Evaluation of the Past and its Changes

Figure 1.1 connects four types of variables: (1) location in the social structure, (2) social context, (3) political attitudes, and (4) evaluation of the past. In this part of the chapter I explain the meaning of these types of variables and the rational for assuming specific causal relationships among them.



Figure 1.1: Assumed relationships between location in the social structure, social context, political attitudes and evaluation of the past

Structural Determinants of Evaluation of the Past

One of the main achievements of sociological research is to explain attitudes and attitude change through variables describing position of individuals in the social structure. In Eastern Europe, structural variables are found to strongly affect the way people react to social and political change (Rose et al. 1998, Slomczynski 2002). Following this line of research, and informed by rational choice theory as advanced by Goldthorpe (1998) and Boudon (2003), I expect peoples' subjective attitudes towards socialism to depend in significant way on the actual and potential gains and losses stemming from their position in the social structure—that is, their class location and their social status.

Social class relations and the stratification system are the main dimensions of social structure, yet some sociologists argue that value-based status configurations are more appropriate when studying the contemporary society (Boudon 1986, Pakulski and Waters 1996) because in the modern capitalist world classes are dissolving, so that "class maps converge with maps of stratification hierarchy" (Pakulski and Waters 1996:151).

Applied to the former Soviet bloc, the 'death of class' thesis posits that the uncertainties inherent in the post-communist transition have blurred class-based interests, and class divisions have little relevance for attitudes and behavior (Staniszkis 1991, Bauman 1994).

Researchers of both Western and post-communist societies have challenged the 'death of class' approach by showing that the distinction between class structure and social stratification continues to be justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Przeworski 1991, Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992, Hout, Manza and Brooks1993; see Slomczynski and Shabad 1997, 2000 for a detailed discussion of the theoretical distinction between social class and social stratification). My dissertation builds on this position. Hence, I examine structural effects on public opinion through the prism of gains and losses that class location and socioeconomic status confer to individuals.

Studies of the consequences of the 1989 systemic change in Eastern and Central Europe, Poland included, demonstrate that the costs and benefits of the socio-economic and political restructuring have been distributed differently across social groups, justifying the distinction between 'winners' and 'losers' of the transition. Generally, mangers, experts and the new class of employers have taken advantage of the business opportunities the post-1989 environment opened, and the *nomenklatura* has been fairly successful in translating some of its political capital into economic advantages (Rona-Tas 1994, Mach 2000). Manual workers and farmers on the other hand, have been strongly hit by the downsides of privatization, such as down-closing and/or downsizing of state-run enterprises, inflation and withdrawal of state subsidies. They make up a disproportionate share of the 'losers' category.

Moreover, as post-communist Poland illustrates, the disadvantaged are those whose position in the socialist social structure was at a relatively high level (Heyns 2005, Domanski 1996, Slomczynski 2000, Slomczynski 2002).

Rational choice theory provides good insights into why marked social inequality in post-communist societies affects public opinion about socialism: different people will evaluate the past positively based on individual interests that are well-grounded in their structural location. For example, 'losers' have good reasons to grow more appreciative of the past, especially if we consider that losses generally are experienced more intensely than gains (Crano and Prislin 2006). Managers or employers, on the other hand, who benefit form the structural change, should distance themselves form socialism. Of course, idiosyncratic attitudes/approaches can occur, but as the group size increases, these tend to cancel each other out, allowing for attitudinal, and finally, predictions of actions at the aggregate level (Hechter and Kanazawa 1998 p. 194).

The assumption that structural experiences shape evaluations of the past is pretty straightforward; yet, given the on-going debate about the applicability of rational choice theory to sociology, some aspects related to this theoretical perspective need to be addressed at this point. Within the rational choice perspective, individual action is seen as the primary determinant of any social phenomenon (Becker 1976, Coleman 1986); however, rational choice is not a unified theoretical approach, varying, among others, in how much emphasis is put on rationality and what type of rationality it focuses on (see Goldthorpe 1998 for a detailed discussion on the "family" of Rational Choice Theory and distinctions therein). I consider especially relevant for my dissertation, and for its ability to provide insights into the macro-micro-macro link in general, the version that

Goldthorpe (1998) and Boudon (2003) advocate. In short, these authors propose a rational action perspective that focuses on subjective rationality (i.e. that "treats as rational both holding beliefs and acting on these beliefs where actors have good reasons for doing so" (Goldthorpe 1998 p. 179), that has requirements of intermediate strength, that is situational (i.e. concerned with the formation of subjectively rational beliefs) and that does not claim generality. This way, rational action theory, or in Boudon's (2003) more specific version, the cognitive theory of action circumvents the main problems the rational choice approach is usually criticized for, namely: reducing all rationality to instrumental rationality, not accounting for personal preferences, and the risk of becoming tautological (Goldthorpe 1998, Boudon 2003).

The Social Context

The theoretical model in Figure I.1 specifies social context as a predictor of political attitudes and evaluation of the past. Researchers in the social sciences agree that contextual effects are important for attitudes and changes thereof, but explanations for why this would be so are diverse. Mainly, differences in opinions about the mechanisms through which the social context operates stem from the many meanings the concept can take. Depending on the problem of interest, scholars emphasize factors as diverse as region, size of place, or the individual's proximate environment, for example their family structure (see Kiekolt 1988 for a discussion of different conceptualizations of social context).

In my analyses, I concentrate on the property of the social context to link individual-level characteristics to structural properties through social interaction and

socialization processes (Erdbring and Young 1979, Sprague 1982). From this perspective, contextual effects on evaluation of the past operate through attributes of aggregates of individuals. Socialization theory allows me to identify three types of *meso*-level determinants for assessment of socialism. I propose that *historical generations* (Mannheim [1928], 1950) and *political biographical groups* as key factors in individuals' political socialization during young adulthood on one hand, and *networks of friends* as main agents of peoples' life-long socialization on the other, are of direct consequence for the type of political attitudes people hold.

Historical Generations and Past Political Biographies

Karl Mannheim's ([1928], 1950) insights into the concept of generations as social constructions, and subsequent research in political socialization and collective memories (Schuman and Scott 1989, Sapiro 2004) offers a strong theoretical justification for looking at the explanatory power of historical generations for political attitudes and evaluation of the past. Mannheim argued that the occurrence of major social/political events can leave distinctive marks on (age) cohorts, allowing for the identification of generations that have specific "historical-social" consciousness; moreover, the generational character, which is shaped primarily during late adolescence and early adulthood, will exert a significant influence on members' later attitudes and behavior, similarly to the effects of social class (see Schuman and Scott 1989 for a more detailed discussion).

Findings show that age cohorts can be re-defined generationally by a qualitatively different event that occurred during their youth (Schuman and Scott 1989, Schuman and Corning 2000). In addition, political socialization research (Jennings 2002, Sapiro 2004)

follows Mannheim ([1928] 1950) and calls attention to the importance of "generation units," i.e. "the different relationships people from a single generation had with the original event" (Sapiro 2004, p.11), for explaining differences in attitudes/behavior among members of same generations. This premise is particularly relevant to late-communist Poland, where members of the *Solidarność* (Solidarity) movement and members of the ruling communist party, the Polish United Workers' Party, took very different positions (and actions) vis-à-vis the Polish government and its ideology. Yet, it would be misleading to consider this relation entirely dichotomous: for example, numerous CP members either joined the Solidarity or manifested their support through active participation in Solidarity organized actions (Shabad and Slomczynski 2000).

Such distinctions in patterns of participation in political organizations and collective action through time are captured in individuals' *political biographies*. By means of analyzing political biographical groups we should be able to discern the effects of cultural legacies on public opinion, especially with regards to understanding differences in political attitudes and assessment of the past (see Shabad and Slomczynski 2000). On a final note it should be mentioned that both generational effects and the effect of political biographical groups need to be considered within the framework of about fifty years of Soviet-style communism, which should act as a period effect, thus cross-cutting across generations and the life cycle (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977)

Friendship Networks

Attitudes and opinions are shaped by significant past experiences, but, as they continue to change throughout most of adult life (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977, Ajzen 2000) are also open to the influence of peoples' current environment. Psychologists and

sociologists alike agree that networks of friends are a major route through which the social context operates (Bidwell et all. in Kierckhoff 1996, Wood 2000). Friendship networks are multifunctional: they represent "social structures for communicating information, arrays of sentimental bonds that ground influence and persuasion, and arenas that enable self-evaluation" (Bidwell et all. in Kierckhoff 1996, p. 109). Not lastly, friendship networks can have a significant effect on upward mobility (Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow 2005).

The central roles that friends play in peoples' lives let me assume that they would also influence one's views the former socialist regime. As they look up to each other for issues as diverse as emotional support (Coleman, 1988) to entrepreneurial advice (Osborn and Slomczynski 2005), friends engage in interactions that allow them to define and redefine various personal experiences, including ones of the past. What seems less clear is whether qualitative differences in friendship networks result in different types of attitudes towards socialism, and/or different directions in attitude change. Inferences from the two major traditions in social network analysis, Coleman's (1988, 1990) emphasis of strong ties on one hand, and Granovetters' (1972) and Burt's (1992, 2001) argument in favor of weak ties and structural holes, on the other, lead me to think that this would be the case.

Regarding social closure, studies show that cohesive social ties involve high degree of inter-personal trust and influence attitudes and behavior through persuasion (Bidwell 1996, Ajzen 2000). At the same time, however, the amount of information that enters this type of network is limited, and becomes, sooner or later, redundant (see Bidwell 1996). Networks with structural holes (Burt 2001), on the other hand, allow for a

larger degree of diversity of information: there is a good chance that if a person's friends do not know each other, they come from (at least) different occupational environments and hold less uniform opinions. Based on these insights I infer that the effects of close friendship networks and of networks with structural holes on political attitudes and evaluation of the past will be qualitatively different.

Political Attitudes

Attitudes change as a function of structural and contextual influences, but also as part of individuals' efforts to maintain a coherent and favorable evaluation of the self (Wood 2000). Cognitive dissonance theory provides a strong framework within which the process of political attitude formation and its apparent inconsistencies can be considered.

The Cognitive Dissonance Argument

Research on cognitive dissonance is concerned with two major issues: (a) what are "the motivational bases for dissonance and the cause of the aversive state of dissonance" (Wood 2000 p. 546); and (b) what are the ways through which dissonance can be reduced. While neither question has received a definitive answer, studies in this field provide valuable insights into the psychological process of attitude change.

In its original statement (Festinger 1957), cognitive dissonance theory poses that pairs of cognition (elements of knowledge) are dissonant if the opposite of one cognition follows from the other. In addition, some researchers identify commitment as an important condition for dissonance to arise (Festinger 1964, Beauvois & Joule 1996).

In its more generic form, commitment can be said to occur "...when a person considers a behavior, belief, attitude or value as a meaningful truth" (Harmon-Jones 1999 p. 95). Psychological commitment to cognition guides information processing, which further determines and guides behavior.

For my dissertation, the premise that dissonance is aroused when a person does or says something that is contrary to a prior belief or attitude (Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999) is of particular interest. Because they threaten the self-concept (Aronson in Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999), inconsistent cognitions are psychologically uncomfortable. They create a negative affective state, which determines people to try to reduce or eliminate it. When multiple routes are available people apparently prefer to reduce dissonance directly by changing attitudes and behaviors (Wood 2000); they change the belief or attitude to correspond more closely to what was said. In general, people tend to modify elements of knowledge that are less resistant to change—that is, that are less responsive to reality and are in limited agreement with other cognitions (see Harmon-Jones & Mills 1999).

Structural determinants, contextual effects and psychological determinants are complementary explanations for evaluation of the past and changes thereof. I examine each of them in detail in Part 2 of my dissertation.

The Role of Evaluation of the Past in the Reproduction of Social Structure

From the standpoint of social stratification, intergenerational and intragenerational movements along the vertical dimension are of special importance: they

provide information on the extent to which current social positions depend on achievement rather than ascribed characteristics. Since individual agency is central to my dissertation, my focus is on intragenerational mobility. The question of which factors determine people to change jobs during the life course is especially salient in countries like Poland, where job stability has decreased sharply following radical socio-economic and political restructuring (Hamplova and Kreidl 2005).

Figure 1.2 summarizes the mechanism by which (a) prior structural location, (b) evaluation of the past, and (c) prospective orientations are linked to (d) the current location of the individual in the social structure. In this part of the chapter I explain the logic behind assuming specific causal relationships between the variables of interest.



Figure 1.2: Assumed relationships between initial location in the social structure, evaluation of the past, future orientations and current location in the social structure

Social Class and Social Status in the Process of Structural Reproduction

Earlier in the chapter I distinguished between social class and socio-economic status as two indicators of a person's location in the social structure. I return to this issue now, as I examine the role of structural determinants for occupational mobility.

In terms of social class, the traditional approach to studying structural reproduction is through discrete class categories whose members share similar positions within labor-markets and production units. Career mobility is seen as tied to labor market structures (Sorensen 1975), and affected by macro-level factors such as industrial restructuring (DiPrete 1993, Hamplova dn Kreidl 2005) and the strength of the economy (see Ng et al 2006). Within this line of research individual-level determinants for job mobility receive little attention (for exceptions see Sorensen 1975, DiPrete and Nonnemaker 1997, Ng et al. 2006).

In terms of socio-economic status, the status attainment tradition (Blau and Duncan 1967) treats social mobility as a matter of hierarchical occupational attainment among competing individuals. Although special emphasis is placed on the role of social origin for individuals' current occupational status, by having status of first job in the analysis, the status attainment model directly addresses "research questions that are intragenerational in nature" (Sorensen 1975 p. 457). For the study of job mobility this approach has the advantage of accounting for the intermediating effect of psychological variables (Sewell and Hauser 1975, Mortimer in Kerckhoff ed. 1996). The problem is, however, that it pays insufficient attention to structural constraints (Kerkchoff 1996).

Whether operationalized as discrete categories and/or interval variables, the effect of peoples' initial location in the social structure on their current position is well supported in empirical studies (Sorensen 1975, DiPrete 1993, Neumark et al. 1999, Hamplova and Kreidl 2005 to mention just a few).

In addition, we know that structural variables strongly affect how people react to social and political change (Rose et al. 1998, Slomczynski 2002). Hence, evaluations of the past and future orientations are assumed to depend in significant way on the structural constraints individual face.

The Effect of Evaluation of the Past on Future Orientations

A substantial part of my dissertation follows the reasoning that structural variables affect attitudinal variables. Nonetheless, the main focus of my paper is different, in that I look at the consequences of attitudes for individuals' current position in the social structure. In doing so I build on the view of Ng et al. (2006) that a good understanding of how job mobility unfolds requires a multi-level theoretical framework, within which macro-level factors, but, equally important, individual-level determinants are seriously considered.

In the first section of this chapter I have addressed the theoretical and empirical grounds on which the assumed relation between attitudes and behavior rests. Now I concentrate on the specific mechanism by which structurally determined evaluations of the past affect further structural outcomes. Specifically, I assume that assessment of socialism mainly affects the current location of individuals in the social structure through its effect on future orientations.

The expectation that views of the past are linked in significant way to prospective orientations is grounded in the following argument: in general, people judge their current success relative to their prior life conditions, as well as to how their contemporaries perform. In this sense, evaluation of the past can be said to reflect one's relative sense of

present-day accomplishment. The post-1989 changes in positive attitudes towards socialism observed among Polish managers, experts and the new category of employers on one hand, and workers, farmers and the unemployed on the other (Slomczynski and Wilk 2002) lend themselves to this interpretation. Assuming that individuals use past and present experiences to make inferences about the future, assessment of socialism, as a reflection of a person's sense of accomplishment, induces a state of mind that directly affects his/her perception of opportunities and threats embedded in the future—that is, future orientations.

The Linkage between Future Orientations and Individuals' Location in the Social Structure

Future orientations are often conceptualized in terms of optimistic versus pessimistic attitudes towards the self and the larger social context. It is assumed that persons who regard forthcoming (social) change as conducive to new opportunities, and consider such opportunities as basis for realization of plans and projects hold optimistic outlooks on the future. By contrast, people who see upcoming change as a primary source of threats, threats they will not be able to cope with, hold attitudes that are consistent with a pessimistic view of the future.

The degree of optimism about the possibility to realize one's plans, while structurally determined, is assumed to influence peoples' readiness for actively engaging in behavior that leads to upward mobility, and thus further structural outcomes. This expectation is grounded in the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991). Ng et. al (2006) suggest that individual-level elements are core to job mobility processes: within the conditions macro-level factors create, individuals' personality traits and values influence

which mobility options a person takes seriously. In addition, individuals need to decide whether or not to pursue actions that would result in job mobility. Such decisions "are based on the evaluation of three factors, which are similar to those outlined in the theory of planned behavior: subjective norms, the desirability of the mobility option and individuals' readiness for change" (Ng et al. 2006, p. 1).

In terms of job mobility in general, "a person may be more inclined to pursue an opportunity for job mobility if he/she feels that it is consistent with norms to engage in the transition, has favorable attitudes towards that type of job mobility, and believes that he/she can successfully make the transition" (Ng et al. p. 14).

The latter element speaks directly to the assumed relation between future orientations and individuals' location in the social structure, because it refers to individuals' efficacy beliefs and their perceived control over the environment. People who are optimistic about the future may be psychologically more ready to pursue activities that result in change, including changing jobs, than those with pessimistic future orientations.

Research in psychology links subjective expectations and evaluations of the future to individuals' decision-making processes, especially with regard to goal-oriented striving and strategies for dealing with uncertainties, such as preference for delayed gratification, readiness for investing and risk assumption (Zuckier, 1986; Lens and Moreas, 1994). Thus, through their impact on behaviors such as planning, problem solving, coping, differences in the character of future orientations affect not only the individual but the larger social environment as well (see Trommsdorff, in Zaleski, ed. 1994).

Research Expectations and Hypotheses

The basic models discussed in this chapter imply two sets of research expectations, the first revolving around determinants of evaluation of the past, the second around its explanatory power, which can be translated into statistically testable hypotheses. Although I explain all specific hypotheses while describing the results of statistical analyses, this section gives the reader the general guidelines pertaining to research expectations.

Determinants of Evaluation of the Past

1. *Location in the social structure influences one's evaluation of the past, in this case the socialist system.* People assess the same past differently, depending on their class location and their stratification position before and after the systemic change. In addition, *changes in one's view of socialism are brought about by the dynamics of the transition process to democracy and capitalism.* Whether the reassessment is positive or negative depends on the nature of the overall change a particular person experiences.

To illustrate how I approach these research hypotheses, let us denote location of individuals in the social structure by variable S, with high values reflecting relatively privileged social class or high social status. Next, denote evaluation of socialism by variable E, with low values for negative opinions and high values for positive opinions. Then the null hypothesis can be expressed as $\beta_{ES.C} = 0$, where β is a measure of the impact of S on E, and C refers to the vector of control variables. The research hypothesis, suggested by theoretical argument raised in this chapter, would be $\beta_{ES.C} < 0$. Although this kind of formulation is a clear oversimplification, it seems to be a good

starting point for planning the analyses of the relationship between people's location in the social structure and their assessment of the past.

2. *Attitudes towards the past depend on the historical generation people belong to, their past political biography, and their current friendship networks.* For example, experiences of different major social/political events during peoples' youth, such as the end of the 2nd World War or the imposition of Marshal Law, allows for age cohorts to be re-defined generationally; the *generational character*'s long-lasting effects should include assessment of socialism. At the same time, evaluation of the past should depend on *political biographical groups*, as members of same generations had different relationships with the socialism regime. If this assumption holds, we should see marked differences in retrospective assessment of socialism between former Solidarity members and former members of the communist party. Finally, generational experiences and political biographies shape the *network of friends* with whom we are in contact and this, in term may influence how perceive the old regime. More diversified and fragmented network patterns should lead to more critical evaluation of the past than less diversified and fragmented network patterns.

In this case, the null hypotheses stipulate that historical generation people belong to (G), their past political biography (B), and their current friendship networks (N) have no effects on how people assess the past. In terms of regression analysis, this is expressed simply by $\beta_{EG.BNC} = \beta_{EB.GNC} = \beta_{EN.BGC} = 0$, where β is a measure of the impact of G, B, N, respectively, on evaluation of socialism (E), and C refers to the vector of control variables. Research hypotheses postulate that particular variables of the social

context affect the dependent variable – i.e., respective β-coefficients are different from zero at the acceptable statistical level of significance.

3. *People change opinion of socialism as a way to reduce or eliminate cognitive dissonance.* Dissonance is likely to occur when a person's evaluation of socialism is inconsistent with another attitude that he/she considers to be "a meaningful truth" (Harmon-Jones 1999, p. 95). Attitudes towards state paternalism can be regarded as fulfilling this condition as this is a strong attitude that relates to values of equality. Most often people tend to modify attitudes that are more general in nature and at the same time relatively weak (Krosnick 2001). According to the theory, to eliminate the psychological discomfort created by the cognitive inconsistency, people should change their attitude towards socialism.

Testing this hypothesis would ultimately require the assessment of the cognitive inconsistency at time $t_{0,}$ and measuring the dependent variable – evaluation of socialism, E - in terms of increase/decrease through time, that is, as Et_1 - E t_0. For example, for "assessment of socialism too high relative to state paternalism" at time t_0 it is expected that the mean value of Et_1 - E $t_0 < 0$; for "assessment of socialism too low relative to state paternalism" at time t_0 it is expected that the mean value of Et_1 - E $t_0 > 0$. According to the cognitive dissonance hypothesis, one would also predict that the difference between mean values for both groups is substantial and statistically significant.

Evaluation of the Past, Optimistic Future Orientations, and Individuals' Structural Location

1. *Peoples' view of the past influences their attitude towards the future beyond the impact of social structure.* The post-1989 changes in positive attitudes towards socialism observed among Polish managers, experts and the new category of employers on one hand, and workers, farmers and the unemployed on the other (Slomczynski and Wilk 2002) lend themselves to the interpretation that evaluation of the past reflects one's relative sense of present-day accomplishment. Assuming that individuals use past and present experiences to make inferences about the future, assessment of socialism induces a mindset that directly affects their perception of opportunities and threats embedded in the future—that is, future orientations. I expect future orientations to be rooted in peoples' assessment of the past; however, I realize that this relation would be rather weak, given the effect of other determinants. Analyses will test the null hypothesis of no relationship between evaluation of the past and prospective orientations, controlling for other factors.

2. *Prospective orientations depend in significant way not only on individuals' class position and on their socioeconomic status, but also on age, political biographies and the network of friends*. In general sense, to address this type of hypotheses I will formulate the null hypotheses in analogous way to that presented in the section devoted to structural and contextual effects on evaluation of socialism.

3. *Future orientations have a long-term effect on individuals' location in the social structure above and beyond the traditional determinants of occupational achievement, and of assessment of socialism and its correlates.* The core of this

hypothesis is that optimistic future orientations act as a mediator for evaluation of the past on further structural outcomes. For testing it, I rely on panel regression analysis in which individuals' location in the social structure (S) at the initial state is measured prior to assessment of socialism (E) and future orientations (F). The generic regression equation is $St_3 = a + \beta_0 St_0 + \beta_1 Et_1 + \beta_2 Ft_2$, with the expectation that $\beta_2 > 0$ at the statistically significant level. Note that coefficients β_1 and β_2 are interpretable as coefficients of change since the expression $\beta_0 St_0$ can be moved to the left side of equation giving the score of difference $St_3 - \beta_0 St_0$. Since error terms for variables St_3 and $\beta_0 St_0$ are not independent the problem of autocorrelation must be addressed.

The first set of research expectations is dealt with extensively in Part 2 of my dissertation. Chapter 4 looks at the effect of structural determinants, Chapter 5 examines historical generations, political biographies and friendship networks, while in Chapter 6 focus is on the role of political attitudes. Part 3 of my dissertation is dedicated to the empirical analysis of the second set of research hypotheses. Chapter 7 examines the causal relationship between evaluation of the past and prospective orientations, Chapter 8 extends this analysis by investigating the relation *evaluation of the past – optimistic future orientations* when other determinants, such as contextual effects, are accounted for; finally Chapter 9 assesses the over-time effect of optimistic future orientations on the location of the individual in the social structure above and beyond the role of 'traditional' determinants of achievement.

CHAPTER 2

DATA AND METHODS

This is a multi-method study, and I will use both primary and secondary data to answer the research questions. Because a central problem of my dissertation is to understand, in a dynamic framework, the mechanism behind reassessments of the past and behind the influence that social structure and past have on future orientations, I use *panel data*. The POLPAN survey (Slomczynski et al. 1988, Slomczynski 200, 2002) represents the backbone for the quantitative parts of my analysis; in addition I use the POLTEST survey (Simkus et al. 2002). In-depth interviews with Poles who have experienced the communist regime, and since 1990, the new socio-economic, political and cultural settings, provide insights into how/why individuals redefine the past experience of socialism.

The POLPAN Panel Survey

Administered and supported by the Polish Academy of Sciences, POLPAN is a survey research on a random (probability) sample of the adult population aged 21 years and older in Poland. The survey covers the interval 1988–2003, divided into three phases: 1988–1993, 1993–1998, and 1998–2003. The first wave, conducted in 1988 was followed again in 1993 (N= 2,600). The core of the sample, 72% of the individuals, was interviewed in all four waves (1988, 1993, 1998 & 2003) and consists of respondents 36

years old or older. In addition, the sub-samples include those respondents who were interviewed in 1998 but not earlier (i.e. aged 21 to 30 years in 1998) and new cases (persons 21 to 25 years old in 2003).

All four waves of the POLPAN survey were conducted by personal interviews. The purpose of the study was to observe social structure and its change during the post-communist transformation in Poland. Thus, the questionnaire included extensive batteries of questions on the socio-demographic composition of the household, economic situation, including housing and possession of durable goods, intergenerational and intra-generational mobility, employment and unemployment history, voting behavior and membership in political organizations.

Political and social attitudes were central to all four waves of the survey. Among them, opinions about Poland's past—that is, the socialist regime—as well as peoples' evaluation of the future were important topics. Friendship patterns were also among the important topics of the questionnaire. One set of questions aimed at recovering some important features of *ego-centered networks*. Each respondent, termed *ego*, reported on *alters* and on the ties among them. More detailed discussions on how information on these issues translates into the variables of interest for my research questions are provided in the following chapters.

The POLTEST Panel Survey

The POLTEST survey is a three-wave panel survey on a national representative sample of adults in Poland. It involves one one-month inter-interview interval and one

one-year inter-interview interval and was recently executed by the Polish Center for Public Opinion Research as a part of a larger a project (for details, see Simkus, Ringdal, Slomczynski, Zagorski, and Mach 2002).

All waves of POLTEST were conducted through personal interviews in March 2004 (N=1458), April 2004 (N=767) and again in March 2005 (N = 850). Altogether, 665 people took part in all three waves (Wenzel and Zagorski, 2005). Since this new panel study contains the same central questions about assessment of the experienced socialist regime as does POLPAN, it is essential for examining whether Markov-type processes have significant explanatory power for long-term change in public opinion about socialism, an issue I will return and discuss in detail in Chapter 3.

Qualitative Materials

A focus-group interview and a set of in-depth interviews constitute additional materials about the mechanism linking social structure, assessment of the past and future orientations. In autumn 2004, in Warsaw, Poland, eight selected informants formed a focus group. An interview scenario for this group was used to guide the discussion lead by professionally trained interviewer. However, respondents were not restricted to the questionnaire items. They were allowed to develop themes they considered relevant, and to interact with each other in dynamic fashion.

I conducted 19 in-depth interviews with people in Poland who have experienced both the communist regime and the post-communist transition. To be considered for the interview, potential respondents had to have been at least 18 years old in 1989. In choosing the respondents I relied on personal referrals and snowball sample techniques.

An interview covered various types of questions. At the beginning of the interview, respondents were asked to tell on their experience in the post-communist period. Then, such topics as satisfaction with personal achievements since the fall of communism, current political and economic conditions in the country as compared with the pre-1989 situation, the efficiency of the socialist economy *vs*. the current economic system were explored. Next, respondents were asked their opinions on why people remember past events differently, and what triggers changes in one's memory of the past. This was inquired especially in relation to people's recollection of the former socialist regime.

The last part of the interview explored how respondents resolved certain contradictory situations regarding opinion about the socialist regime, and change in such opinions. In particular, respondents were given four scenarios: two presented the story of persons that changed their opinion about the socialist system from negative to positive; the other two scenarios centered on people who despite negative experiences in the post-communist years, argue in favor of the systemic change. In all instances, respondents were asked to explain why the players acted the way they did.

I conducted all interviews personally, in English. The questions were open-ended, allowing respondents to add other comments and to express their opinions with minimal interference from the interviewer. All interviews took place in Warsaw, in settings where the subjects felt safe and comfortable. Typically, interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one hour. All responses were tape recorded, and were accompanied by extensive field notes.

At the completion of the interview, I administered a brief survey covering demographics and basic questions on the respondent's political engagement prior to and after 1989.

Methods

Since I operationalized the main dependent variables as both interval and categorical, I applied regression analysis in the metric and logistic form. In a large part of my analyses I treat POLPAN data as cross-sectional, using OLS estimates for particular time-points. However, I also recognize that panel data have hierarchical structure. For POLPAN 1988-2003, the structure of the data can be represented as follows:

respondent [i]	time [t]	year (y)	measurement [X_{it}]
1	1	*1988*	X_{11}
1	2	*1993*	X_{12}
1	3	*1998*	X_{13}
1	4	*2003*	X_{14}
2	1	*1988*	X_{21}
2	2	*1993*	X_{22}
2	3	*1998*	X_{23}
2	4	*2003*	X_{24}
….	….	....	....
n	4	*2003*	X_{n4}

Each respondent (i = 1, 2, …n) is represented (nested) in four waves (t = 1, 2, 3, 4), conducted in 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003. The measurement X refers to the respondent (first subscript), and the wave (second subscript). Thus, we distinguish two levels of analysis. The first level corresponds to individuals, with n units of analysis. The second level consists of four observations and corresponds to four waves of the panel. From the hierarchical nature of the data we may expect that the measurements for the

same respondents will be more similar to each other than across-respondents, involving case-dependency. Two-level analyses enable estimating regression-like models that takes this phenomenon into account.

I use a two-level model in which time is modeled as a random effect. In this respect it is a random coefficient model as specified in the panel regression procedure of STATA in the average population form. In the case of my analyses, the data on the level of respondents (first level) are a four-point time series (second level). Therefore, I introduce an autocorrelation component – for example, the correlation of an income with its value in the previous period. To be exact, the model fits a first-order autocorrelation function to regression residuals. This corresponds to an AR(1) process according to the time series analysis framework formulated by Box and Jenkins (1970).

Population-averaged linear models also allow me to adjust the standard errors by using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance.[1] Population-averaged logistic models are by default equal-correlation models, with the option of using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance.

I also use a set of structural equations to create a path model that summarizes complicated causal relationships between my variables of interest. This allows me to discuss direct and indirect effects of psychological determinants on income.

[1] In population-averaged linear regression models, the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance produces valid standard errors even if the correlations within group are not as hypothesized by the specified correlation structure. It does, however, require that the model correctly specifies the mean. As such, the resulting standard errors are labeled "semi-robust" instead of "robust". Although there is no cluster () option, which specifies that the observations are independent across groups (clusters), but not necessarily within groups, results are as if there were a cluster() option and one specifies clustering on i() (STATA help menu, estimation options).

Working with categorical data, allowed me to study matrices of transition from one state to another. In Chapter 3 the reader will find a test of whether the observed transition matrices reflect Markov processes.

Each chapter provides a detailed discussion of what variables will be used to answer which questions, and with what statistical tools. The qualitative materials were helpful for an interpretation of statistical results through the entire dissertation, although I do not often refer to them explicitly.

CHAPTER 3

REDEFINTION OF THE PAST AND PROSPECTIVE ORIENTATIONS

The main premises this dissertation is based on can be expressed as the following testable assumptions: (1) people change their opinion about socialism through time, (2) long-term changes in assessment of socialism are not reducible to short term changes, even if the reliability of measurement is taken into account, and (3) individuals' assessment of socialism is linked to their prospective orientations, in the form of optimism about the future. The purpose of this chapter is to empirically examine each of these assumptions.

Stability and Change in Assessment of Socialism

The distribution of assessment of socialism in the four POLPAN waves for both the entire sample and the panel sample (Table 3.1) provides information on how Poles evaluate the communist period across time. The questionnaire item asks: "*Do you think that the socialist system brought to the majority of people in Poland: (1) gains only, (2) more gains than losses, (3) as many gains as losses, (4) more losses than gains, or, (5) losses only?*"

Since I am interested in a clear-cut distinction between outlooks on the past, I regroup the five-choice answer into three categories: *positive assessment* of socialism,

comprised of 'gains only', and 'more gains than losses'; *neutral assessment*, corresponding to 'as many gains as losses'; and *negative assessment*, which includes 'more losses than gains,' and 'losses only.'

Year	Assessment of Socialism[a]					N = 100%
	Three Categories			Five Categories[1]		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative			
	Percentages			Mean	SD	
	Full Samples					
1988	27.1	49	23.9	3.064	0.851	5817
1993	29.3	37	33.7	2.941	0.917	2258
1998	31.2	35.9	32.9	2.984	0.960	2133
2003	36.3	33.1	30.6	3.032	0.975	1631
	Panel Sample					
1988	29.2	47.0	23.8	3.077	0.869	1241
1993	29.8	38.1	32.1	2.965	0.913	1240
1998	33.2	35.5	31.3	3.015	0.943	1241
2003	40.1	32.4	27.5	3.107	0.974	1214

Table 3.1: Distribution of Assessment of Socialism in 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003

First, let us notice how close the percentage distributions of assessment of communism for the whole sample and for the panel data are. The almost identical results across all types of evaluation, as well as the high similarity in mean values and standard deviation values indicate that the panel sample is not biased, and reflects the larger sample well. The means and standard deviations, calculated for the five-category measure of assessment of the past, also show that the overall distribution of answers is relatively stable across time as far as central tendency and distributional variation are concerned.

Next, of particular interest are the results showing peoples' preferences for socialism across waves. Both samples tell the same story: from 1988 to 2003 the proportion of people holding a positive view of the past is not diminishing; if anything,

positive answers become more common. There is a decrease in the proportion of neutral responses, while proportions for negative assessment first increase (from 1988 to 1998), and then decrease slightly (from 1998 to 2003). This latter drop in negative evaluations of socialism should be understood in relation to some negative aspects of the economic transformation Poland was undergoing in preparation for joining the European Union (Slomczynski and Shabad, 2003).

What do these by and large equal distributions of answers for the two types of samples mean, however, in terms of fluctuations in public opinion? In a previous analysis on the 1988-1998 POLPAN data, Slomczynski and Wilk (2002) have shown that despite an overall stability in positive evaluations of socialism over the 1988-1998 period, significant change was occurring at the individual level. Comparing responses across the 1988-1993, 1993-1998, and 1998-2003 intervals reveals a considerable degree of stability, with coefficients varying between 39 and 58 percent, but also substantial change in peoples' evaluations of the past (Table 3.2).

Over the years following the systemic transformations in Poland, one fifth of the respondents switch from negative to positive assessment of socialism. Change also occurs in reverse direction, from positive to negative outlooks, but after 1993 its magnitude is lower than for switches to positive evaluations. In addition, as time passes, the proportion of people who initially held a neutral view on socialism but then switched to a positive one is increasing.

Assessment Of Socialism:	Assessment of Socialism*			N=100%
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	
	Percent of Persons			
In 1988	Changes btw. 1988-1993[a]			
Positive	38.8	37.2	24.0	363
Neutral	27.5	40.4	32.1	582
Negative	23.4	34.6	42.0	295
In 1993	Changes btw. 1993-1998[b]			
Positive	50.5	31.4	18.1	370
Neutral	29.0	45.8	25.2	472
Negative	22.1	27.4	50.5	398
In 1998	Changes btw. 1998-2003[c]			
Positive	57.6	24.3	18.1	403
Neutral	39.5	43.3	17.2	430
Negative	22.3	28.6	49.1	381

*Changes are examined on the panel sample
[a]Gamma=0.215; [b]Gamma=0.396; [c]Gamma=0.431

Table 3.2 Changes in Assessment of Socialism in the Periods 1988-1993, 1993-1998, and 1998-2003

Another way of looking at the issue of opinion change is by focusing on longer time spans that also contain a qualitatively different period of reference. For this purpose, I examine answers to the assessment of socialism question for the 1988-2003 and the 1988-1998 intervals, and contrast results for the latter with an equally long period, which extends from 1993 to 2003 (Table 3.3). Overall, the results for patterns of change are very similar to those presented in Table 3.2. The coefficients of stability range from 33% to 59%, the proportion of switches from negative evaluations of the past to positive ones are higher than in the reverse direction, and for people who held a neutral opinion of socialism, more switch to a positive appraisal than a negative one.

Assessment Of Socialism:	Assessment of Socialism[1]			N=100%
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	
	Percent of Persons			
In 1988	Changes btw. 1988-2003[a]			
Positive	42.1	35.4	22.5	365
Neutral	39	32.9	28.1	569
Negative	39.8	27.7	32.5	289
In 1988	Changes btw. 1988-1998[b]			
Positive	37.7	38.8	23.4	363
Neutral	30.9	36.9	32.2	583
Negative	32.2	28.8	39	295
In 1993	Changes btw 1993-2003[c]			
Positive	59	25.5	15.5	361
Neutral	35.7	40.7	23.6	462
Negative	27.9	29	43.1	390

[1]Changes are examined on the panel sample
[a]Gamma=0.074; [b]Gamma=0.135; [c]Gamma=0.379

Table 3.3: Changes in Assessment of Socialism in Fifteen- and Ten-Year Periods

Finally, let us focus on one more aspect, namely the extent to which previously held opinions about the past are linked to one's later opinions. Is this relation equally strong across time? The correlation coefficients for the four survey waves (Table 3.4) indicate a positive, significant relationship between assessment of socialism at time *t* and at time *t +1*; that is, positive evaluations of the past in one survey are associated with positive evaluations at the next survey time. Considering five-year periods, the strength of the relationship increases at first (the correlation coefficient for the 1993 & 1998 evaluations is twice the size of that for 1988-1993), and then stabilizes.

If, on the other hand, we assess the relation between opinions over the 1988-2003 interval we find that the strength of the correlation decreases as more time passes between peoples' answers. The non-significant correlation for the 15-year period 1988-2003 could be explained based on the argument Rose et al (1998) advance, that the more distant the past becomes, the lesser an impact then-held opinions have for current views.

Year	Assessment of Socialism[1]			
	1988	1993	1998	2003
1988	1.000	0.145**	0.121**	0.042
1993	0.145**	1.000	0.303**	0.286**
1998	0.121**	0.303**	1.000	0.310**
2003	0.042	0.286**	0.310**	1.000

[1]Correlation coefficients are calculated on panel sample
**p<0.01

Table 3.4: Correlations of Assessment of Socialism in 1988, 1993, 1998 and 2003

Nonetheless, comparing the intervals of 1988-1998 and of 1993-2003 suggests that the passing of time may not be the only factor that affects the relationship between prior and current opinions. In both cases the time span is of ten years, but the correlation coefficient is much weaker (r = 0.121) when the late communist period is included, compared to the coefficient for the post-communist period (r = 0.286). This suggests that the particularity of the period that is examined also counts.

Decomposition of Long-Term Changes in Individuals' Opinion of Socialism into Short-Term Changes and the Reliability of Responses

So far, I have shown that individuals significantly modify their assessment of socialism through time. The next logical question, in the framework of this dissertation, is whether such changes are due to some universal and time-constant processes, and/or the extent to which they actually reflect structural transformations. One way to tackle this question is to examine individuals' opinion change by means of statistical analysis of two components of long-term change: (1) short-term change, and (2) the reliability of responses, by formulating the problem in terms of Markov-type processes. Specifically, we can ask: Is the observed transition matrix for long-term change decomposable into

two types of matrices, the first of Markov Equilibrium Matrix M, and (2) the Reliability Matrix R?

Defined briefly, a Markov process is a random process whose future probabilities are determined by its most recent values. A problem can be considered a (first-order) Markov chain if it has the following properties:

a. For each time period, every object/person in the system is in exactly one of the defined states. At the end of each time period, each object either moves to a new state or stays in that same state for another period.
b. The objects move from one state to the next according to the transition probabilities which depend only on the current state (they do not take any previous history into account). The total probability of movement from a state (movement from a state to the same state does count as movement) must equal one.
c. The transition probabilities do not change over time (the probability of going from state A to state B today is the same as it will be at any time in the future). This is not a requirement of Markov chains in general, but for a homogeneous Markov chain.

Hence, the transition matrix used to model the Markov chain will have the following properties:

a. Each element of the transition matrix is a probability; therefore, each is a number between 0 and 1, inclusive.
b. The elements of each row of the transition matrix sum to 1 (This is due to property (b) of a Markov chain.
c. The transition matrix must be square because it has a row and a column for each state (http://ceee.rice.edu/Books/LA/markov/index.html).

I provide detailed analyses for assessing the fit of the observed transition matrix for the 10-year period 1993-2003 as a linear combination of matrices $M_{t,\ t+1}$ and $M_{rel} = R$, expressed in the equation:

$$M_{t,\ t+10} = a + \beta_1(M_{t,\ t+1})^{10} + \beta_2(R) + E, \text{ where E is a matrix of residuals,}$$

below.

The reason for focusing on Poland 1993-2003 is twofold. Methodologically, having a longer time span is better because it allows the transition matrix to achieve stability and it is easier to see whether we deal with a Markov-type process or not. Substantively, to assume that the process could be potentially of Markov type, it is better to start in the post-communist period already, as the 1988-1993 interval was characterized by radical socio-economic and political transformations.

Information from the POLPAN and POLTEST surveys allows me to obtain three types of stochastic matrices: $M_{t,\ t+10}$, $M_{t,\ t+1}$, $M_{rel} = R$, where M refers to a matrix of opinions in time *t* by opinions in subsequent time, t refers to specific years, and R is the reliability matrix from the measurement of opinions in one-month period. More specifically, I use POLPAN to create the *observed* transition matrix for long-term change. The one-year inter-interview interval in the POLTEST survey allows for assessing the short-term changes and constructing the corresponding *stability* matrix $(M_{t,\ t+1})^{10}$, while the one-month inter-interview interval in POTEST captures reliability of answers. Reliability means to what extent the measurement is reproducible. Assuming that people do not change their opinion within one month, the transition matrix for one month would be the *reliability* matrix.

Figure 3.1 displays the observed matrix for 10-year change ($M_{t,\ t+10}$) for 1993-2003, N_{ij}, calculated on the POLPAN panel sample of people who in 1993 belonged to the categories of Winners, Neutrals or Losers (N = 833).[2] For each element N_{ij}, *i* represents the starting location, and *j* the ending location for that move (i.e. the row is the beginning location, and the column is the ending location after one move).[3] I denote with 'A' positive assessment of socialism, with 'B' neutral assessment of socialism and with 'C' negative assessment of socialism.

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ A \\ B \\ C \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} A & B & C \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 0.60 & 0.25 & 0.15 \\ 0.35 & 0.42 & 0.23 \\ 0.29 & 0.28 & 0.43 \end{array}\right] \end{array} = N_{ij}$$

Figure 3.1: Transition Matrix for Observed 10-Year Change in Assessment of Socialism ($M_{t,\ t+10}$), 1993-2003.

Next, I construct the homogeneous transition matrix of the type $M_{t,\ t+1,}$ denoted S_{ij} (Figure 3.2), which captures the observed one–year change in assessment of socialism among Winners, Neutrals and Losers based on panel data from the POLTEST data set (N = 296).

[2] Given that opinion about socialism could be different in different segments of the population, I chose this sample to be able, later on, to capture group-dependent Markov processes.

[3] The transition matrices in this chapter were computed using the Matrix Algebra Tool available through the Department of Mathematics, Hofstra University, http://people.hofstra.edu/faculty/stefan_waner/RealWorld/Summary8.html

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ A \\ B \\ C \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} A & B & C \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 0.48 & 0.40 & 0.12 \\ 0.16 & 0.60 & 0.24 \\ 0.07 & 0.24 & 0.69 \end{array}\right] \end{array} = S_{ij}$$

Figure 3.2: Homogeneous Transition Matrix of Change in Assessment of Socialism ($M_{t, t+1}$), 2004-2005.

Raising S_{ij} to the 10th power gives the homogeneous equilibrium matrix $S_{ij}^{A} = (S_{ij})^{10}$, which corresponds to *computed* 10-year change (i.e. the transition matrix after ten steps, see Figure 3.3).

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ A \\ B \\ C \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} A & B & C \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 0.18 & 0.42 & 0.40 \\ 0.18 & 0.42 & 0.40 \\ 0.18 & 0.42 & 0.40 \end{array}\right] \end{array} = S_{ij}^{A}$$

Figure 3.3: Homogeneous Equilibrium Matrix, $S_{ij}^{A} = (S_{ij})^{10}$

Clearly, S_{ij}^{A} is very different from N_{ij}, the transition matrix for observed 10-year change. This indicates that a homogeneous transition process does not capture the process of long-term change in opinion of socialism well, and raises the question of whether a heterogeneous transition process would be a better fit. By heterogeneous process I understand the group-dependent process—that is, that the equilibrium matrices for specific groups differ.

Table 3.5 shows change in evaluations of socialism (in percentages) from 2004 to 2005 for Winners, for Neutrals and for Losers respectively, obtained from the POLTEST panel data.

Observed One-year Change in Assessment of Socialism among 'Winners'(S_W)[1]				
March 2004	March 2005 To			N
From	Positive	Neutral	Negative	(100%)
Positive	58.3%	16.7%	25.0%	12
Neutral	14.8%	59.3%	25.9%	27
Negative	0.0%	8.3%	91.7%	24
Observed One-year Change in Assessment of Socialism among 'Neutrals'(S_N)				
March 2004	March 2005 To			
From	Positive	Neutral	Negative	
Positive	52.4%	28.6%	19.0%	21
Neutral	10.5%	76.3%	13.2%	38
Negative	2.9%	26.5%	70.6%	34
Observed One-year Change in Assessment of Socialism among 'Losers'(S_L)				
March 2004	March 2005 To			
From	Positive	Neutral	Negative	
Positive	44.8%	48.3%	6.9%	58
Neutral	19.6%	50.0%	30.4%	56
Negative	19.2%	34.6%	46.2%	26

[1]Calculated on POLTEST panel sample; results multiplied by 100.

Table 3.5: Observed One-Year Change in Assessment of Socialism for Different Social Groups, 2004-2005

Based on Table 3.5 I obtain the observed one-year transition matrices for each of these social groups. The transition matrices raised to the 10^{th} power give the equilibrium matrices for Winners, for Neutrals, and for Losers respectively (Figure 3.4). Figure 3.4 shows three equilibrium matrices that are very different from each other. Hence, the assumption that the propensity of changing opinion about socialism is the same across social groups does not hold.

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ A \\ B \\ C \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} A & B & C \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 0.07 & 0.18 & 0.74 \\ 0.07 & 0.18 & 0.74 \\ 0.07 & 0.18 & 0.74 \end{array}\right] \end{array} = S_{Winners}^{10}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ A \\ B \\ C \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} A & B & C \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 0.14 & 0.53 & 0.33 \\ 0.14 & 0.53 & 0.33 \\ 0.14 & 0.53 & 0.33 \end{array}\right] \end{array} = S_{Neutrals}^{10}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ A \\ B \\ C \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} A & B & C \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 0.26 & 0.45 & 0.29 \\ 0.26 & 0.45 & 0.29 \\ 0.26 & 0.45 & 0.29 \end{array}\right] \end{array} = S_{Losers}^{10}$$

Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Matrices for Winners, for Neutrals and for Losers.

However, when I calculate the transition matrix in which the group-specific equilibrium matrices are components with appropriate weights, I receive a group-dependent equilibrium matrix (Figure 3.5) that is very similar to the homogeneous one (S_{ij}^{A}).

$$\begin{array}{c} \\ A \\ B \\ C \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{ccc} A & B & C \end{array} \\ \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 0.19 & 0.44 & 0.37 \\ 0.19 & 0.44 & 0.37 \\ 0.19 & 0.44 & 0.37 \end{array}\right] \end{array} = S_{ij}^{B}$$

Figure 3.5: Group-Dependent Equilibrium Matrix

The following equation provides the group-dependent equilibrium matrix:

$$S_{ij}^{B} = a^{*} (S_W)^{10} + b^{*} (S_N)^{10} + c^{*} (S_L)^{10}, \text{ where}$$

- a, b, and c are the proportions of Winners, Neutrals and Losers in 1993 in POLPAN,[4] and

- $(S_W)^{10}$, $(S_N)^{10}$, $(S_L)^{10}$ are the equilibrium matrices for Winners, Neutrals and Losers respectively, calculated using POLTEST panel data.

Since S_{ij}^{B} is very similar to S_{ij}^{A}, either one can be used in estimating the fit of the transition matrix for the observed 1993-2003 change as a linear combination of matrices $M_{t,\ t+1}$ and $M_{rel} = R$. What is still needed is R. The transition matrix of observed one-month change in evaluation of socialism raised to the 12th power gives us R (see Figure 3.6 for the two matrices).

	A	B	C
A	0.59	0.28	0.13
B	0.21	0.64	0.15
C	0.16	0.24	0.60

= Transition Matrix for Observed One-Month Change

	A	B	C
A	0.32	0.42	0.26
B	0.32	0.42	0.26
C	0.32	0.42	0.26

= R

Figure 3.6: Transition Matrix for Observed One-Month Change in Assessment of Socialism, March 2004-April 2004 (POLTEST), and the Reliability Matrix, R

[4] Proportion of Winners = 0.156 (N = 133); proportion of Neutrals = 0.322 (N = 274); proportion of Losers = 0.522 (N = 444).

Bringing the reliability matrix allows to test the hypothesis about the explanatory power of Markov-type process. Returning to the basic equation,

$$M_{t,\ t+10} = a + \beta_1(M_{t,\ t+1})^{10} + \beta_2(R) + E$$

the coefficients for $\beta_1 = -0.553$ and for $\beta_2 = 0.361$, with constant $a = 0.397$. The bootstrap standard error for β_1 is 0.484 and for β_2 is 0.581, with 50 replications. Bootstrapping is a method for estimating the sampling distribution of an estimator by resampling (with replacement) from the original sample. I use this method because it does not require the normality assumption to be met, and because it can be effectively utilized with smaller sample sizes ($N < 20$).

The coefficients for both matrices are far from being statistically significant (for the minimum $p < 0.10$). The residuals are also very large. Moreover, the $R^2 = 0.222$ and the Wald Chi2 = 1.65 (df = 2) show that the model fits the data very poorly. Overall, these findings demonstrate that Markov-type processes do not have significant explanatory power for long-term change in public opinion about socialism. It would be easy to explain long-term public opinion changes in socialism, if for these changes only the previous state would matter. This, however, would mean that history is irrelevant. Then, from a substantial point of view the findings discussed above are good news, because they show that the legacy of the past cannot be ignored.

Evaluation of the Past and Prospective Orientations

The third assumption this chapter aims to test is that individuals' assessment of socialism is related in significant way to their prospective orientations, in the form of optimism about the future. For now, the primary interest is the link between the two

variables, and not causality; thus, cross-tabulation of assessment of socialism by optimistic future orientations and correlation coefficients will provide the sought-after information. The nature of the questions dealing with respondents' perceptions of the future is not uniform across the POLPAN data. This is why I first discuss how future orientations are operationalized and what time spans are considered, before presenting empirical results.

Measurement of Future Orientations

The Questions in the POLPAN study

In the 1993, 1998, and 2003 waves of the POLPAN study three questions deal with the respondents' subjective reaction to the opportunities and threats brought about by the current social changes. In the 1993 wave, the questions read:

J06. Changes in our country bring about both new opportunities and threats. For people like you, do these changes carry:

(1) more new opportunities (-> J06A), or
(2) more threats? (-> J06B)
(8 – I don't know, I have no opinion on this matter)

J06A. A number of people expect that presently opening new opportunities will allow them for fast realization of their plans and projects. Do you belong to this kind of people?

(1 - yes)
(2 – no)
(8 – I don't know, I have no opinion on this matter)

J06B. Some people are afraid that they will not be able to cope with threats. Do you belong to this kind of people?

(1 - yes)
(2 – no)
(8 – I don't know, I have no opinion on this matter)

In the questions J06A and J06B the simple future tense is used: "new opportunities will allow [people] for fast realization of their plans and projects" and "[people] will not be able to cope with threats." The Polish words *pozwolą* (in J06A) and *nie będzie* (in J06A) indicate the forthcoming time-frame -- that is the future. The context in which these questions appear in the questionnaire reinforces the prospective interpretation of their contents, since the preceding questionnaire item contrasts living conditions in Poland in the present time with conditions in the next 4-5 years. Thus, the assumption that the questions J06, J06A, and J06B are related to future orientations is well grounded.

The wording of the same set of questions in the 1998 wave is very similar to the 1993 wave, but the "realization of plans and projects" and "coping with threats" refer to the future as continuation of the past and present situation. For example, the best interpretation of the Polish wording is "new opportunities have allowed people and are allowing them for fast realization of their plans and projects." The implication is that "plans and projects" are in the process of realization and their outcome will depend on the future conditions. Moreover, the context of the J06, J06A, and J06B questions in the 1998 questionnaire is similar to the 1993 wave, providing prospective framework. Like in 1993, the preceding questionnaire items contrasts living condition Poland in the present time (1998) with those in the next five years, and in the next 10 years respectively.

In contrast to the 1993 and 1998 waves, however, the wording of the same set of questions in 2003 is drastically different, since the reference time frame of changes in Poland is limited to the period from 1989 to the time of the survey (2003).
Thus, all analyses of the future orientation questions must be limited to the 1993 and the 1998 waves.

Measurement of Optimistic Future Orientations

It is assumed that answering (1) on J06 and (1) on J06A – that is seeing more opportunities than threats, and considering these opportunities as basis for realization of plans and projects – places respondents on the highest level of optimistic future orientations; this level is scored 5. The next level, 4, is reserved for those who answered (1) on J06 – "more opportunities than threats" – and (2) on J06A – new opportunities will not be conducive for people to realize their plans and projects.

At the opposite end of the scale are people who answered (2) on J06 – "more threats than opportunities" and (1) on J06B, indicating an inability to cope with these threats. Such answers are scored 1. A score of 2 is given to individuals who answered (2) on J06 and (2) on J06B – that is to people who perceive threats, but are not afraid that they would not be able to cope with them. The middle score, 3, is assigned to the rest of respondents. This category consists of those who answered questions J06 and J06A/J06B with "*I don't know,"* or *"I have no opinion on this matter*," or in a similar manner.

For the purpose of the following analysis, I regroup the five levels of the optimistic future orientations variable into three categories: *high optimism*, comprised of

level 5 and level 4; *medium optimism,* corresponding to level 3; and *low optimism*, which includes levels 2 and 1.

The Relationship of Assessment of Socialism and Optimistic Future Orientations

Empirical results from the 1993 and the 1998 analyses confirm my assumption that peoples' evaluation of the past is linked to their prospective orientations (Table 3.6). In both cases, the correlation coefficients are statistically significant and negative. That is, as positive assessment of socialism increases, degree of optimism decreases, and less positive evaluations of socialism are associated with higher levels of optimism about the future. This relation is stronger in 1998.

Assessment of Socialism:	Optimistic Future Orientations			N=100%
	High	Medium	Low	
	Percent of Persons			
	A: 1993[a]			
Positive	12.2%	17.0%	70.8%	657
Neutral	19.5%	23.5%	57.0%	831
Negative	29.0%	17.2%	53.7%	756
	B: 1998[b]			
Positive	31.7%	23.5%	44.8%	660
Neutral	49.8%	20.2%	30.0%	761
Negative	63.5%	14.7%	21.7%	699

[a]Gamma = -0.231; [b]Gamma = -0.345 ($p<0.01$);

Table 3.6: Relationship between Assessment of Socialism and Optimistic Future Orientations, 1993 and 1998

The distribution of answers to the two types of questions examined in Table 3.6 gives a more detailed image of how individuals' responses are connected. In 1993, 71% of persons who respond that socialism had been primarily positive for Poland express low levels of optimism about the future, while only 12% report high optimistic orientations.

Among those assessing socialism negatively, 29% hold high optimistic orientations – more than twice as many as in the previously discussed group. Similarly, in 1998 the proportion of people expressing high optimistic future orientations and negative evaluations of the past is double the size of those who make positive assessments of socialism. Finally, let us also notice that, while the pattern of the two variables' relation is similar across waves, information already conveyed by the gamma coefficients, the percentage of high optimism in 1998 is greater for all types of assessment of socialism.

Summary and Implications

Empirical analyses performed in this chapter demonstrate that the main premises my dissertation is based on are justified. Poles change their opinion of socialism through time. By and large, one fifth of the respondents in each POLPAN wave switched form a negative to a positive assessment of socialism; change also occurred in reverse direction, from positive to negative outlooks. In addition, the proportion of people who initially held a neutral view on socialism but then switched to a positive one increased over time.

The implication this finding has for my project becomes fully clear once we see that Markov-type processes do not have significant explanatory power for long-term change in public opinion about socialism. The non-significant coefficients for the homogeneous equilibrium matrix corresponding to *computed* 10-year change, and for the reliability matrix (R), the very large residuals, and the fit statistics showing a poor fit of the model to the data demonstrate that long-term changes in assessment of socialism do not depend only on its most recent state. Therefore, I have solid grounds for assuming

that changes in evaluation of the past are not due to some universal and time-constant processes, and the task is to identify its main determinants.

Finally, in this chapter I was also concerned with testing the assumption that peoples' evaluation of the past is significantly related to their prospective orientations, in the form of optimism about the future. For both 1993 and1998, the two survey waves which allow for the measurement of optimistic future orientations, I find a significant negative correlation between the two variables. As positive assessment of socialism increases, degree of optimism decreases, and less positive evaluations of socialism are associated with higher levels of optimism about the future. This relation is stronger in 1998.

To return to an issue mentioned earlier in the chapter, for now I was primarily interested in proving that evaluations of the past and prospective orientations are linked in statistically significant way. Since results show that this is the case, I have the preliminary basis for building the more complex argument of causality. Chapter 7 examines in detail the effects of assessment of socialism on optimistic future orientations.

PART 2

DETERMINANTS OF EVALUATION OF THE PAST

CHAPTER 4

LOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Empirical studies on public opinion in Poland show that cross-sectional evaluation of socialism is relatively stable over time, especially with regards to positive assessments: between 1988 and 2003 about one third of adults express positive attitudes towards the socialist regime (Slomczynski and Wilk 2002, chapter 3 in this dissertation). Nonetheless, significant opinion change occurs at the individual level. For example, about one fifth of respondents in each POLPAN wave switch form negative to positive views of the past. This chapter builds on the previous finding that long-term change in evaluation of socialism cannot be reduced to Markov-type processes, and examines, from a structural perspective, the factors that trigger people's reassessment of the socialist regime.

In Eastern Europe, structural variables are found to strongly affect the way people react to social and political change. Slomczynski and Wilk (2002) show that in 1988-1998 Poland different people hold positive attitudes towards socialism based on individual interests that were well grounded in their social class location. Following this line of research, and informed by rational action theory (Goldthorpe 1998), I expect peoples' subjective attitudes towards socialism to depend on the actual and potential gains and losses stemming from their position in the social structure. Discussions with

my interviewees also helped shape these research expectations. Invariably, my respondents, who experienced both the communist regime and the post-1989 transition, pointed out that marked differences in Poles' evaluation of socialism are strongly related to individuals' material situation prior to and following 1989.

> "People do not have a unitary view of communism because they had different experiences with communism, as they have with the current time. For some people it's really great, they have own business, they have developed. And some other people have lost jobs… so, you know, they have completely different personal opinion on the current situation and concerning the 'good old days'… Their memory depends very much on their personal situation. For some people the question of freedom was irrelevant. It was important that they had apartments, food and so on." (male, mid-fifties)

My dissertation builds on the argument that the distinction between the social class structure and the stratification system is justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds (see Chapter 1). This position and the corresponding expectation that peoples' class location and their socioeconomic status determine their views of the socialist system shape the structure of this chapter: first, I present the operationalization of social class and of social status, an discuss the relationship between them. I expect that social classes—those formed as a result of the communist system, as well as those that emerged after the systemic change—will not be consistently ordered along the basic dimensions of social stratification, that is, formal education, occupational rank and total income of their group members.

Second, I analyze both the separate and the combined effects of these structural variables on evaluation of the past and changes thereof. The chapter ends with a concluding section.

Social Class and Social Stratification

Mapping Social Classes

In conceptualizing class structure in Poland, I follow the class scheme constructed by Kohn and Slomczynski (1990), as modified by Slomczynski and Shabad (2000). Kohn and Slomczynski (1990) distinguish classes on the basis of three major criteria: (1) control over the labor, (2) type of work in terms of mental/physical component, and (3) ownership of the means of production. The first two criteria apply to state employees only.

During the communist time, two groups exercised control over the labor: managers and supervisors. *Managers* formed a group that was directly involved in the process of economic planning. At the same time, mangers had to insure that economic decisions be subordinated to ideological goals, which affected the group's interests in relation to other classes.

Supervisors – immediate control over labor identified them as a class exercising control over others; supervisors were, on the other hand, distinguished from managers, as they lacked any decision power over the production process.

Type of work in terms of mental/physical component is a criterion for distinguishing non-manual workers and factory workers. *Non-manual workers* – in a

state-own economy, the mental component of performed work differentiated non-manual workers from all manual workers. In socialist societies, white-collar workers constituted a class that did not have an antagonistic counterpart.

Factory workers – production work set factory workers at the core of the working class, differentiating them from all other types of manual workers. Economically, manual factory workers were central to socialist industrialization; politically, their concentration and the means of resistance (e.g. demonstrations and strikes) that such concentration allowed for, made this group the main bargaining force with the government, especially in countries like Poland.

In Poland more than in any other socialist country in the region, *farmers* succeeded in maintaining ownership of the means of production. The *petty bourgeoisie* – outside agriculture, this was the only class holding ownership over the means of production. In socialist countries, the petty bourgeoisie was a residual class. Its link to traditional economic activities, and the increasing role of the "second economy" during late socialism (Gabor, 199iv) justify, however, its inclusion in the class schema.

As far as the late communist period in Poland is concerned, Slomczynski and Shabad (1999) have shown that the category of white-collar workers had become rather heterogeneous since the 1970s. Hence, they separate office workers from experts, a change that I incorporate in my analysis.

For post-communist Poland, I use a class schema that keeps the basic class distinctions for the 1980s, but introduces certain modifications for specific categories.

Following Slomczynski and Shabad (1997; 2000), I differentiate employers from the self-employed, to capture the emerging capitalist class. In addition, I introduce the

distinction between skilled and unskilled manual workers to reflect a new social division among workers following economic restructuring. As the privatization process of the Polish economy progressed, having specialized skills increased workers' chances to avoid lay-off and/or to get jobs in the private sector, placing them in a more favorable position relative to unskilled workers. Thus, the class schema I apply to post-communist Poland is the following:

(1) Employers;
(2) Managers;
(3) Experts;
(iv) Supervisors;
(5) Self-employed;
(6) Technicians & Office workers;
(7) Skilled manual workers;
(8) Unskilled manual workers;
(9) Farmers

The Polish schema keeps the basic class distinctions for late socialism, but introduces certain modifications for specific categories to account for post-communist change. For comparison of the Polish schema with the Wright's WRI and the Erikson-Golthorpe-Portocarero EGP schemas, see Table 4.1.[5] In this table I indicated what categories of the WRI and EGP schemas correspond to the Polish schema. Some correspondence is perfect. For example WRI "petty bourgeoisie" and EGP "small proprietors without employees" well match self-employed. Similarly, WRI "non-skilled workers" and EGP "semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture)" correspond to unskilled manual workers. However, neither WRI nor EGP employs the full range criteria of our schema. For example, WRI lacks the division of type of work and, in consequence, it does not distinguish between manual and non-manual work, or between

[5] In Table 4.1 I put the names of some WRI and EGP classes in parentheses since they correspond to more that one category in our schema.

agricultural and non-agricultural work. In consequence, for my categories of "technicians and office workers" on the one hand, and "farmers" on the other we could find appropriate categories only among those that fit also in other places. The main problem with EGP schema is that in distinguishing class categories it does not use the criterion of control over the work of others. Thus, EGP has no specific categories fitting to our managers, and, in contrast to our schema, supervisors are lamped together with technicians. Slomczynski (2002) and Domanksi have applied the EGP and/or Wright schema, and these instruments explain less of variation in education, occupational status/rank and income than does this schema.

Polish Schema	Wright's Schema	Eriksion-Golthorpe-Portocarero Schema
Employers	1. Capitalists 2. Small employers	I. Upper service class IVa. Small proprietors with employees
Managers	4. Expert managers 5. Skilled managers 6. Non-skilled managers	(I. Upper service class) (IIIa. Routine non-manual employees, higher grade)
Experts	(4. Expert managers) 10. Experts (7. Expert supervisors)	II. Lower service class IIIa. Routine non-manual employees, higher grade
Supervisors	(6. Non-skilled managers) 7. Expert supervisors 8. Skilled supervisors 9. Non-skilled supervisors	(V. Technicians and supervisors) (IIIb. Routine non-manual employees, lower grade)
Self-employed	3. Petty bourgeoisie	IVb Small proprietors without employees
Technicians & office workers	(11. Skilled workers)	IIIb. Routine non-manual employees, lower grade V. Technicians and supervisors
Skilled manual workers	11. Skilled workers	VI. Skilled manual workers
Unskilled manual workers	12. Non-skilled workers	VIIa. Semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in agriculture)
Farmers	(2. Small employers) (11. Skilled workers) (12. Non-skilled workers)	IVc. Farmers and self-employed workers in primary production VIIb. Semi- and unskilled manual workers in agriculture

Table 4.1: Polish Social-Class Schema as Compared to Two Major Schemas: Wright's Schema, and Eriksion-Golthorpe-Portocarero Schema

Measuring Social Status

Table 4.2 presents the measurement of social status and the distribution of its components for the whole sample and for the panel sample. Across all waves, factor

loadings for education and occupation are high, ranging from 0.854 to 0.914, which indicates a strong correlation between each of these variables and the factor. While the factor loading for income is lower, its correlation with social status is still strong.

Components of social status	Factor loadings	
	Full sample	Panel sample
1988		
Education (years)	0.910	0.918
Occupational rank (SEI score)	0.909	0.918
Income (zlotys)	0.449	0.475
Eigenvalue	*1.857*	*1.910*
% of Variance	*61.91*	*63.67*
1993		
Education (years)	0.914	0.914
Occupational rank (SEI score)	0.897	0.892
Income (zlotys)	0.500	0.495
Eigenvalue	*1.890*	*1.876*
% of Variance	*62.98*	*62.53*
1998		
Education (years)	0.909	0.909
Occupational rank (SEI score)	0.905	0.905
Income (zlotys)	0.471	0.471
Eigenvalue	*1.867*	*1.867*
% of Variance	*62.23*	*62.28*
2003		
Education (years)	0.902	0.902
Occupational rank (SEI score)	0.854	0.854
Income (zlotys)	0.610	0.610
Eigenvalue	*1.915*	*1.915*
% of Variance	*63.85*	*63.85*

Table 4.2: Measurement of Social Status, 1988-2003

Comparing results across waves, it is interesting to notice that although changes over time are small, they involve an increased balance between factor loadings: for

education and occupation there is a slight decrease, while the factor loading for income increases a little. Since the eigenvalue associated with the factor is around two, and the variance explained is above 62 percent, I conclude that the measurement model for social status fulfills the basic statistical requirements for constructing complex variables.

The Relationship between Social Class and Social Status

I examine the relationship between social class and social inequality in Poland over the 15-years time span that comprises the periods of late socialism and early stage of post-communist transition, as well as the later phase of the systemic transformation towards capitalism. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 present the results for the 1988-1993 and for the 1998-2003 periods, respectively.

Late Socialism and the Early Stage of Post-communist Transformation

Confirming prior research on the role of class in socialist societies (Bauman 197iv; Slomczynski and Shabad, 1997; 2000), the 1988 results show that in communist Poland class matters. The high and statistically significant eta coefficient between social class, and status and its components, indicates that people enjoy different advantages in terms of distribution of valued goods depending on their class membership. Managers are at the top of the status hierarchy, followed by experts and supervisors. The self-employed, technicians and office workers are in the middle, while manual workers and farmers are at the bottom of the stratification ladder (Table 4.3).

Social classes	Social status	Status components			N
		Formal education	Occupational rank (SEI)	Income	
	Means [a] (Standard deviations)				
1988[b]					
Managers	2.199 (0.623)	1.649 (0.709)	2.447 (0.727)	0.932 (0.671)	130
Experts	2.024 (0.498)	1.847 (0.604)	2.135 (0.472)	0.399 (0.816)	265
Supervisors	0.921 (0.885)	0.707 (0.940)	0.945 (0.907)	0.578 (0.778)	328
Self-employed	0.312 (0.503)	0.341 (0.935)	-0.125 (0.056)	0.950 (0.848)	130
Technicians & office workers	0.466 (0.714)	0.576 (0.783)	0.488 (0.670)	-0.091 (0.830)	987
Factory workers	-0.272 (0.436)	-0.332 (0.543)	-0.270 (0.294)	0.197 (0.934)	1295
Manual workers other than factory	-0.693 (0.462)	-0.527 (0.518)	-0.765 (0.299)	-0.180 (0.299)	686
Farmers	-0.697 (0.424)	-0.721 (0.614)	-0.836 (0.000)	0.333 (1.129)	835
F(df)	*1396.3 (df=7)*	*806.7 (df=7)*	*2683.8 (df=7)*	*100.5 (df=7)*	
Eta^2	*0.707*	*0.560*	*0.809*	*0.148*	
1993[b]					
Employers	0.400 (0.917)	0.562 (0.826)	-0.224 (0.167)	1.926 (3.104)	58
Managers	1.749 (0.692)	1.565 (0.613)	1.995 (0.616)	1.153 (2.463)	49
Experts	1.542 (0.338)	1.711 (0.380)	1.810 (0.431)	0.271 (0.656)	116
Supervisors	0.842 (0.825)	0.909 (0.896)	1.018 (0.829)	0.454 (0.814)	100
Self-employed	-0.029 (0.613)	0.239 (0.900)	-0.094 (0.325)	0.359 (1.164)	83
Technicians & office workers	0.264 (0.607)	0.507 (0.782)	0.399 (0.569)	0.039 (0.522)	228
Skilled manual workers	-0.588 (0.284)	-0.429 (0.469)	-0.448 (0.085)	0.063 (0.657)	252
Unskilled manual workers	-0.963 (0.396)	-0.540 (0.600)	-1.034 (0.423)	-0.184 (1.099)	134
Farmers	-1.028 (0.347)	-0.628 (0.613)	-0.923 (0.000)	-0.359 (0.470)	250
F(df)	*375.1 (df=8)*	*238.3 (df=8)*	*1013.4 (df=8)*	*28.2 (df=8)*	
Eta^2	*0.738*	*0.584*	*0.856*	*0.175*	

[a] In standardized metric N(1,0)

[b] Number of cases included in the analysis varies with respect to status dimensions; average N for the three status components is reported.

Table 4.3: Relationship of Social Class to Social Status and Its Components, 1988-1993

The early years of post-communist transition in Poland bring little change in the overall relationship between class and status, although the economic and political context is undergoing major restructuring. For 1993, the eta coefficients between social class and social status remain high and statistically significant. Their values are very similar to those in 1988, only slightly higher, a clear indication that class membership continues to play an important role in peoples' access to valued resources. Moreover, while at this point the process of transition to capitalism is still in an initial phase, one can already see that social classes feel its effects differently. The position of certain 'old' classes, manual workers and farmers in particular, has declined; other 'old' classes, such as managers, experts and supervisors, have successfully maintained their advantages. At the same time, the new class of entrepreneurs has relatively rapidly moved into a 'privileged' position.

The 1998-2003 Period

Ten years into the post-communist transformation of the Polish society, the relationships between class and social inequality, as expressed in terms of eta coefficients, continues to be strong and statistically significant (Table 4.4). The same holds for 2003. Overall, the class hierarchy for the 1998-2003 interval – that is, the period of post-communist stabilization, resembles the one of the early stage of post-communist transition well. Managers and experts are in the most privileged position, followed by employers and supervisors, while manual workers and farmers find themselves at the bottom of the stratification ladder. The self-employed, technicians and office workers continue to remain in the middle of the distribution.

Social classes	Social status	Status components			N
		Formal education	Occupational rank (SEI)	Income	
	Means [a] (Standard deviations)				
1998[b]					
Employers	0.648 (0.955)	0.475 (0.828)	0.416 (0.000)	2.145 (3.940)	47
Managers	1.677 (0.517)	1.646 (0.361)	1.957 (0.450)	0.907 (2.099)	50
Experts	1.498 (0.395)	1.663 (0.339)	1.749 (0.484)	0.308 (1.090)	86
Supervisors	0.232 (0.641)	0.503 (0.864)	0.254 (0.555)	0.254 (0.787)	99
Self-employed	0.229 (0.555)	0.575 (0.971)	0.196 (0.334)	0.285 (0.815)	75
Technicians & office workers	0.145 (0.592)	0.521 (0.799)	0.199 (0.616)	-0.044 (0.405)	223
Skilled manual workers	-0.768 (0.355)	-0.454 (0.542)	-0.710 (0.376)	-0.066 (0.415)	219
Unskilled manual workers	-0.817 (0.284)	-0.536 (0.446)	-0.724 (0.292	-0.156 (0.317)	105
Farmers	-1.016 (0.367)	-0.534 (0.617)	-1.091 (0.000)	-0.144 (0.890)	131
F(df)	*309.6 (df=8)*	*147.8 (df=8)*	*626.3 (df=8)*	*25.2 (df=8)*	
Eta^2	*0.744*	*0.562*	*0.812*	*0.158*	
2003[b]					
Employers	0.518 (0.764)	0.606 (0.906)	-0.432 (0.124)	1.560 (1.682)	43
Managers	1.350 (0.960)	1.379 (0.798)	1.221 (0.940)	0.977 (1.366)	45
Experts	1.550 (0.412)	1.879 (0.405)	1.802 (0.680)	0.071 (0.520)	72
Supervisors	0.844 (0.914)	0.954 (0.968)	0.815 (0.971)	0.518 (0.928)	67
Self-employed	0.013 (0.871)	0.332 (1.036)	-0.373 (0.614)	0.639 (1.673)	59
Technicians & office workers	-0.109 (0.662)	0.310 (0.764)	-0.015 (0.802)	-0.372 (0.390)	192
Skilled manual workers	-0.690 (0.290)	-0.510 (0.429)	-0.547 (0.429)	-0.291 (0.359)	172
Unskilled manual workers	-0.999 (0.303)	-0.483 (0.576)	-1.089 (0.107)	-0.541 (0.210)	41
Farmers	-0.733 (0.411)	-0.522 (0.555)	-0.557 (0.108)	-0.389 (0.792)	98
F(df)	*161.9 (df=8)*	*118.6 (df=8)*	*161.7 (df=8)*	*44.3 (df=8)*	
Eta^2	*0.630*	*0.546*	*0.622*	*0.317*	

[a] In standardized metric N(1,0)

[b] Number of cases included in the analysis varies with respect to status dimensions; average N for the three status components is reported.

Table 4.4: Relationship of Social Class to Social Status and Its Components, 1998-2003

In light of the theoretical debate over the 'death of class' thesis (Pakulski and Waters 1996), the results in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 are of special interest: they show that class is not only conceptually but also empirically distinct from social stratification. Confirming Slomczynski and Shabad's findings (2000) the descriptive statistics demonstrate that for all waves, the relations between social class and status components are not consistent. For example, employers are at the top of the economic (income) dimension, but rank lower than managers, experts and supervisors in the educational dimension, as well as on the occupational scale; experts rank highest in the education hierarchy, followed by managers, but score much lower on the income scale; the self-employed rank lower than supervisors on the occupational scale, but not on the income scale. It is noteworthy that the social classes at the bottom of the stratification hierarchy also fail to be consistently arranged across all dimensions of social inequality. These kinds of rank shifts support the argument that classes are discrete categories rather than categories consistently arranged along a multidimensional stratification continuum.

The Effects of Social Class and Social Status on Assessment of Socialism

Social Class and Evaluation of Socialism

Research on post-communist European countries documents an overall increase in social inequality following 1989, and distinguishes between 'winners' and 'losers' of the post-communist transformation (Domanski 1996, Slomczynski 2000; 2002, Hamplova and Kreidl 2005, Heyns 2005). Generally, managers, experts and the new class of employers belong to the 'winners', while manual workers and farmers make up a disproportionate share of the 'losers' category. Following the logic of rational action

theory (Goldthorpe 1998, Boudon 2003) I expect members of the disadvantaged groups to hold more positive views about the past than winners, or those for whom the regime change has not entailed dramatic social loss. Moreover, I expect that class location also affects *changes* in individuals' evaluation of socialism. Whether the reassessment is positive or negative depends on the nature of the overall change a person experiences.

Descriptive statistics in Table 4.5 show how members of different social classes evaluate the communist period across time. Although the overall relationship between class and assessment of socialism is weak, as indicated by the correlation coefficients, we see important between-group differences. In 1988, the proportion of positive assessment is highest among managers, experts and supervisors. This is not surprising: these social groups were often tied to the *nomenklatura*, which offered certain political and economic privileges (Mach 2000), while leaving little room for open criticism against the party-state.

For the same period, the self-employed, factory workers and manual workers are last to praise socialism, for rather obvious reasons: the Polish communist system, while tolerating certain types of small enterprises, was not supportive of private businesses; as for workers, their discontent with the regime over the gap between ideology emphasizing the leading role of the working class and the grim reality of every-day life had translated into the well-known Solidarity movement.

Social Classes	Assessment of socialism					N
	Three categories			Five Categories		
	Posit4e	Neutral	Negat4e			
	Percentages			Mean	SD	
1988						
Managers	47.3	33.6	19.1	3.32	0.839	131
Experts	32.3	48.0	19.7	3.18	0.782	269
Supervisors	31.4	41.0	27.5	3.06	0.862	334
Self-employed	19.2	51.7	29.1	2.91	0.890	151
Technicians & office workers	28.8	50.7	20.5	3.13	0.808	1008
Factory workers	23.4	50.0	26.6	2.98	0.851	1325
Manual workers other than factory	21.7	52.5	25.8	2.98	0.864	706
Farmers	26.9	50.0	23.1	3.09	0.854	892
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.10*			*Eta^2 =0.01*		
1993						
Employers	14.5	29.0	56.5	2.50	0.954	62
Managers	35.3	35.3	29.4	3.09	0.847	51
Experts	21.3	41.0	37.7	2.80	0.827	122
Supervisors	24.5	38.7	36.8	2.84	0.874	106
Self-employed	20.5	43.2	36.4	2.84	0.850	88
Technicians & office workers	21.0	47.1	31.9	2.89	0.859	238
Skilled manual workers	31.9	37.6	30.4	3.02	0.878	263
Unskilled manual workers	26.6	30.9	42.4	2.81	0.929	139
Farmers	39.7	30.7	29.7	3.06	0.969	300
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.15*			*Eta^2 =0.02*		
1998						
Employers	23.1	34.6	42.3	2.77	0.921	52
Managers	20.8	31.9	47.2	2.69	0.874	72
Experts	12.9	33.3	53.8	2.54	0.833	93
Supervisors	29.0	30.8	40.2	2.83	0.976	107
Self-employed	24.7	27.0	48.3	2.71	0.953	89
Technicians & Office Workers	22.4	45.2	32.4	2.88	0.902	250
Skilled Manual Workers	28.1	38.4	33.5	2.96	0.948	242
Unskilled Manual Workers	27.1	34.7	38.1	2.89	0.953	118
Farmers	41.9	31.8	26.4	3.17	0.999	148
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.15*			*Eta^2 =0.03*		
2003						
Employers	7.1	42.9	50.0	2.48	0.773	42
Managers	20.5	29.5	50	2.59	0.948	44
Experts	15.7	45.7	38.6	2.69	0.843	70
Supervisors	25.4	41.8	32.8	2.91	0.900	67
Self-employed	32.2	37.3	30.5	2.97	0.946	59
Technicians & Office Workers	31.3	31.9	36.8	2.93	0.946	182
Skilled Manual Workers	37.4	34.4	28.2	3.06	0.947	163
Unskilled Manual Workers	34.1	31.7	34.1	2.95	0.999	41
Farmers	51.0	28.0	21.0	3.33	0.975	100
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.18*			*Eta^2 =0.05*		

Table 4.5: Social Class and Assessment of Socialism, 1988-2003

After the systemic transformations, we see a distinctively different pattern in classes' evaluation of socialism that mirrors their experience under the new socio-economic and political conditions. Skilled and unskilled manual workers, and farmers become most appraising of the past, and their proportions increase over time. Managers and experts, as well as the new class of employers, on the other hand, become last in describing the former regime positively.

Social Status and Evaluation of Socialism

The relationship between social status and assessment of socialism (Table 4.6) follows a similar pattern to that between class and evaluation of socialism. Prior to the systemic change, the correlation coefficient is positive, showing a significant, albeit weak, association between the variables. That is, the degree of expressed content with the regime goes up as social status increases. Following 1989 the direction of the relationship between status and evaluation of the past changes. The association becomes negative, and its strength increases.

Independent variables	Assessment of socialism			
	Years			
	1988	1993	1998	2003
Social status	0.053**	-0.088**	-0.182**	-0.202**
Components of social status: Education	0.026*	-0.089**	-0.173**	-0.140**
Occupation (SEI)	0.074**	-0.061**	-0.156**	-0.136**
Income	-0.015	-0.084**	-0.122**	-0.179**

** p<0.01; * p<0.05

Table 4.6: Correlation of Assessment of Socialism with Social Status and its Components, 1988-2003

For a more detailed look at how each of the components of status relate to opinions of socialism, Table 4.6 also presents the correlation of assessment of socialism with education, occupation and income. As expected, the overall pattern of association is similar to the one described above. The correlation coefficients for education and for occupation are significant in all waves, but they change sign after 1989. The association of income and evaluation of socialism, on the other hand, becomes significant only after the regime change. This result can be interpreted in light of the growing economic inequality manifest in post-communist Poland.

To get better insights into the relationship of education to assessment of socialism, particularly to see whether people with different schooling levels change their view about communism over time, Table 4.7 presents the distribution of assessment of socialism by education level for the 1988-2003 period. Three aspects are easily identifiable: (a) across all waves, there are marked differences in regards to how people with different education levels evaluate the past; (b) as expected, the 1989 systemic change prompts a switch in which groups view socialism most favorable. While during communism the largest proportion of positive evaluations came from the most educated, under the post-1989 regime the largest proportion comes from people with the lowest levels of schooling; and (c) as was the case for social class and for social status, the relationship of education to assessment of socialism is statistically significant, yet weak.

Education	Assessment of Socialism					N
	Three Categories			Five Categories		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative			
	Percentages			Mean	SD	
1988						
Elementary	26.0	50.6	23.4	3.07	0.861	1990
Some Secondary	23.6	51.6	24.7	3.01	0.847	1693
Secondary	28.9	47.4	23.7	3.07	0.851	1269
Tertiary	33.6	42.9	23.5	3.14	0.831	865
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.06*			*Eta^2 =0.002*		
1993						
Elementary	35.5	33.6	30.9	3.05	0.955	605
Some Secondary	32.5	34.9	32.6	2.97	0.942	634
Secondary	24.5	40.5	35.0	2.88	0.884	551
Tertiary	22.6	40.2	37.2	2.84	0.851	468
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.08*			*Eta^2 = 0.008*		
1998						
Elementary	43.7	33.1	23.2	3.23	0.976	426
Some Secondary	38.2	33.5	28.3	3.13	0.994	495
Secondary	29.0	40.8	30.2	2.98	0.900	441
Tertiary	22.0	35.9	42.1	2.77	0.873	397
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.14*			*Eta^2 =0.031*		
2003						
Elementary	49.0	23.7	27.3	3.21	1.046	355
Some Secondary	39.8	32.2	28.0	3.10	0.993	522
Secondary	31.2	36.1	32.7	2.97	0.910	413
Tertiary	23.7	40.5	35.8	2.82	0.896	338
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.13*			*Eta^2 =0.02*		

Table 4.7: Education and Assessment of Socialism, 1988-2003

The Overall Impact of Structural Factors on Assessment of Socialism

So far, I have shown that individuals' class and stratification positions are significantly related to their opinions about socialism. The next logical step is to examine these relations in terms of causality. The effect of social class and of status are first considered separately, and then combined. For this part of the analysis I measure class in terms of belonging to the privileged social groups (i.e. employers, managers or experts),

to the disadvantaged ones - that is, skilled and unskilled manual workers and farmers, or to a third category, made up by supervisors, the self-employed and technicians. This latter can be said to be in the middle of the social hierarchy as far benefits and costs of the post-1989 transition are concerned. I use logistic regression to determine the effects on positive assessment of socialism (positive evaluation = 1), and linear regression for the full distribution of scores on gains from socialism (five categories).

Table 4.8 presents the results for three groups of models. The first group deals with the effects of social class, the second one with the effects of social stratification, while in the final model the effects of both types of structural position are considered together.

For social class position, both types of regression yield similar results. In 2003, employers, managers and experts are less likely to evaluate socialism positively, compared to supervisors, the self-employed and technicians. On the other hand, members of disadvantaged classes have a more positive outlook on the past than the comparison group. This finding holds when controlling for gender and age, as well as when controlling for positive evaluation in 1988. While the coefficient for gender is not significant in either of the models, the effect of age is significant as long as 1988 assessment is not in the equation, with which it correlates too highly. As expected, older people have a more positive view of socialism.

Independent variables	Logistic regression for positive assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression DV = scores from 1 to 5		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	BETA
A. Model I: Effect of Social Class without Controlling for Lagged Assessment of Socialism						
Gender	0.024	0.167	1.024	-0.066	0.069	-0.034
Age	0.023**	0.007	1.023	0.011**	0.003	0.137
Privileged classes	-1.021**	0.261	0.360	-0.372**	0.092	-0.157
Disadvantaged classes	0.475**	0.176	1.608	0.209**	0.077	0.107
Constant	-1.776**	0.326	0.169	2.507**	0.131	
Fit statistics N = 768	*-2LH = 909.9* R^2 *= 0.08*			*F= 12.4 (df=4)* *Adjusted* R^2*=0.06*		
A. Model II: Effect of Social Class Controlling for Lagged Assessment of Socialism						
Gender	-0.183	0.202	0.833	-0.109	0.086	-0.057
Age	0.020	0.014	1.020	0.010+	0.006	0.075
Privileged Classes	-0.709**	0.287	0.492	-0.294**	0.109	-0.130
Disadvantaged Classes	0.692**	0.220	1.997	0.295**	0.096	0.154
Assessment of socialism, 1988	0.190	0.221	1.209	0.066	0.048	0.060
Constant	-1.715**	0.692	0.180	2.341**	0.326	
Fit statistics N = 511	*-2LH = 629.4* R^2 *= 0.08*			*F= 6.2 (df=5)* *Adjusted* R^2*=0.05*		
B[b]. Model I: Effect of Social Status without Controlling for Lagged Assessment of Socialism						
Gender	0.092	0.166	1.097	-0.044	0.069	-0.023
Age	0.023**	0.007	1.023	0.011**	0.003	0.135
Social Status	-0.581**	0.093	0.559	-0.207**	0.034	-0.217
Constant	-1.839**	0.326	0.159	2.504**	0.131	
Fit statistics N = 742	*-2LH =875.6* R^2 *= 0.10*			*F= 15.5 (df=3)* *Adjusted* R^2*=0.06*		
B. Model II: Effect of Social Status Controlling for Lagged Assessment of Socialism						
Gender	-0.092	0.200	0.912	-0.076	0.086	-0.040
Age	0.018	0.014	1.018	0.009	0.006	0.065
Social Status	-0.627**	0.109	0.534	-0.217**	0.040	-0.241
Assessment of socialism, 1988	0.190	0.227	1.209	0.061	0.050	0.055
Constant	-1.529*	0.689	0.217	2.462**	0.325	
Fit statistics N = 490	*-2LH = 597.3* R^2 *= 0.08*			*F= 7.6 (df=4)* *Adjusted* R^2*=0.05*		
C[c]. Final Model: Effect of Social Class and Social Status						
Gender	0.052	-0.172	1.053	-0.069	0.071	-0.036
Age	0.025**	0.007	1.025	0.012**	0.003	0.142
Privileged Classes	-0.673*	0.305	0.510	-0.275**	0.110	-0.115
Disadvantaged Classes	0.147	0.208	1.159	0.104	0.090	0.053
Social Status	-0.389**	0.128	0.678	-0.109*	0.050	-0.114
Constant	-1.823**	0.333	0.162	2.506**	0.133	
Fit statistics N = 743	*-2LH = 869.9* R^2 *= 0.11*			*F= 10.1 (df=5)* *Adjusted* R^2*=0.06*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1

Table 4.8: Regression of Assessment of Socialism in 2003 on Class and Social Status, controlling for Gender and Age

Results in the second group of models reveal that one's position in the stratification hierarchy has similar effects on assessment of the past as class position. The higher a person's status in 2003, the less likely she/he is to evaluate socialism positively. Linear regression on the full distribution of scores yields similar findings. Controlling for gender, age, and evaluation of socialism in 1988 does not alter the basic relationship: older people are more likely to say they gained from socialism; gender, on the other hand, does not significantly affect how one evaluates the past in 2003, nor does 1988 positive assessment of socialism.

The general model in Table 4.8 looks at the effect of social class and social stratification combined. Since the two variables are strongly correlated, one cannot expect that everything would be statistically significant. The overall pattern of the relationship, however, holds: people belonging to the privileged classes, as well as those having a higher social status, are less likely to make a positive assessment of the past, and in both instances the coefficients are significant. For disadvantaged classes, the coefficients are not significant, but in the expected direction. While there are no gender differences in assessment of socialism, age matters.

Accounting for the Hierarchical Structure of Panel Data

To address the issues of autocorrelation and multicollinearity that are inherent in panel data, I also estimate the last group of models in Table 4.8 (models C) using population-averaged cross-sectional time-series (hereafter, pa) analysis. Model 1 in Table 4.9 is estimated based on pa linear regression, with specification of a one-lag within-group correlation structure for the panels; in addition, using the

Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance produces valid standard errors. For Model 2, I use pa logit regression, with adjusted standard errors.

For these last models, I rely on estimated social status and estimated class location, to avoid restricting the analysis to working respondents only. The status variable is constructed using respondents' *estimated* household income, computed for each survey wave on the basis of individual income and total household income. To avoid any problems that could follow from the dramatic metric changes the Polish national currency (the Zloty) underwent between 1988 and 2003, the income variables are expressed in z-scores. For social class position, whenever a respondent's occupation, coded according to the SKZ - Social Occupational Classification (Pohoski and Slomczynski 1974), is not available, I take into account the score corresponding to the spouse's occupation. When this is not available either, I use the SKZ code that corresponds to the occupation of the respondent's father.

Panel-Regression Models: The Effects of Social Class and Social Status					
Independent Variables	Logistic regression for positive assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression[a] DV = scores from 1 to 5	
	B	Semi-robust SE	Odds Ratio (e^B)	B	Semi-robust SE
Gender	0.004	0.077	1.004	-0.686^{+}	0.367
Age	0.022**	0.003	1.022	0.006**	0.001
Privileged Classes (estimated)	0.115	0.120	1.222	0.084	0.052
Disadvantaged Classes(estimated)	0.170^{+}	0.102	1.185	0.090*	0.045
Social Status (estimated)	-0.123*	0.056	0.884	-0.047^{+}	0.026
Constant	-1.877**	0.157		2.725**	0.071
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 97.48 (df=5)* N = 1241			*Wald Chi2 = 47.81 (df = 5)* N = 1045	

[a] Estimated within-panel autocorrelation = 0.240
$^{**}p > 0.01$; $^{*}p > 0.05$; $^{+}p > 0.1$

Table 4.9: Regression of Assessment of Socialism on Estimated Class Location and Estimated Social Status, controlling for Gender and Age

By and large, the panel regression results confirm the prior analyses. That is, people who hold disadvantaged locations in the social structure are more likely to make positive assessments of socialism, whereas the opposite is true for those who are better off. Also, controlling for other factors, age has a positive effect on positive evaluation of the past.

Conclusions

Results in this chapter provide important information on two issues of interest for my dissertation. On a more general level, analyses for 1988-2003 Poland support the position that the social class structure is not only theoretically but also empirically distinct form the stratification system. I demonstrate that in late socialism and in post-communism too, the relations between social class and status components are not consistent. For example, following the end of communism, employers are at the top of the economic (income) dimension, but rank lower than managers, experts and supervisors in the educational dimension, as well as on the occupational scale; experts rank highest in the education hierarchy, followed by managers, but score much lower on the income scale. Social classes at the bottom of the stratification hierarchy also fail to be consistently arranged across all dimensions of social inequality. These kinds of rank shifts show that classes are discrete categories rather than categories consistently arranged along a multidimensional stratification continuum.

Second, I find strong empirical support for the assumed relation between the location of individuals in the social structure and their evaluation of socialism. Comparing late socialism to the post-1989 years, marked differences in positive assessment among members of different social groups and of different socioeconomic

status become apparent. Prior to the regime change the proportion of positive assessment was highest among managers, experts and supervisors. These social groups were often tied to the *nomenklatura*, which offered certain political and economic privileges (Mach 2000), while leaving little room for open criticism against the party-state. It is also likely that the expressed views did not necessarily reflect individuals true beliefs about the party state, as

> "people were often lying before (the systemic change) , to get a job, to get a career" (female, early eighties)

Factory workers and manual workers, on the other hand, were most discontent with the system, due to the deepening gap between the party-state ideology, emphasizing the leading role of the working class, and the shortcomings of every-day life. For this period, the relationship between social status and assessment of socialism is similar: the degree of expressed content with the regime goes up as social status increases.

Following 1989, a distinctively different pattern in classes' evaluation of socialism emerges. Skilled and unskilled manual workers, and farmers become most appraising of the past, and their proportions increase over time. Two main reasons account for this type of opinion change. First, the costs of transition hit these groups particularly hard, in the form of unemployment, inflation and withdrawal of state subsidies following economic restructuring (Slomczynski 2002). One of my interviewees summed the situation up eloquently:

> "Unqualified workers and people who live in small towns where almost everybody was employed in the same industry are in bad situation now, and they think that socialism was better. Unemployment in these towns is very high, even

up to 40%. …Before, the factory that they worked at organized everything, beginning with flats, schools, kindergartens, organized holidays. Now they don't have this any more, they don't have work, and no perspectives." (female, early fifties)

Second and closely related, 'losers' of the post-communist transformation developed a strong sense of unfulfilled expectations following 1989. We should remember that the working class was the driving force behind the resistance movement against the party-state in the 1980s, and, ultimately, behind its demise. With the coming to power of Lech Walesa, the lower classes hoped to finally achieve what they had been long struggling for, namely a better life. And many expected the positive change to be immediate. Of course, for most this failed to happen. Moreover, many people lost even the basic assistance the state used to provide during socialism. The following quotation from the in-depth interviews gives good insights into these processes:

"People from Solidarity, workers from big factories they feel unsatisfied, they were involved in the resistance movement but in the process of (post-communist) restructuring they lost their jobs, they have little money, they are disappointed" (female, mid-thirties).

Managers and experts, as well as the new class of employers, on the other hand, become last in describing the former regime positively. Similarly, we see the direction of the relation between status and evaluation of the past change: under post-communism the association becomes negative, and its strength increases. The literature on post-communist transformation in Eastern Europe shows these groups to have emerged as

winners of the transition. While some did so thanks to their link to the *nomenklatura*, for most what mattered was

> "better education, they have better skills which allow them to understand and to adapt to the new mechanism of the capitalist economy; they understand that they have new opportunities" (male, mid-fifties).

Put shortly, as individuals who are well-located in the social structure

> "receive a lot of rewards in post-communism, their opinion of socialism becomes negative" (male, early fifties)

These findings support the rational action perspective that assessment of socialism is based on individual interests that are well grounded in peoples' position in the social structure. Regression analyses demonstrate the causal effects of class and status on evaluation of socialism. Since they involve panel data, in the models controlling for prior assessment of socialism, the regression coefficients can be interpreted as weighted change. Thus, we see that individuals' position in the social structure determines in statistically significant way long-term change in evaluation of socialism.

Finally, it is worth pointing out these results hold once autocorrelation and multicollinearity are accounted for. For example, in the presence of both types of structural variables (Table 4.9) membership in the privileged classes decreases the likelihood of positive assessment by 19%, compared to that of supervisors, the self-employed and technicians. Correspondingly, higher social status has a negative effect on positive evaluations of the past regime, net of all other factors considered.

CHAPTER 5

HISTORICAL GENERATIONS, POLITICAL BIOGRAPHIES AND FRIENDSHIP NETWORKS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine contextual effects as operating through attributes of aggregates of individuals. In my analyses, I concentrate on the property of the social context to link individual-level characteristics to structural properties through social interaction and socialization processes (Erdbring and Young 1979, Sprague 1982). Based on the theoretical premises provided in Chapter I (see Section 2.1.2), I identify three *meso*-level determinants for assessment of socialism: (1) *historical generations* (Mannheim [1928], 1950) and (2) *political biographical groups* are key factors in individuals' political socialization during young adulthood, and represent a major way by which the legacy of the past affects current attitudes and opinions; and (3) *networks of friends* as main agents of peoples' life-long socialization provide the route for the influence of the current environment on evaluation of socialism.

Research Hypotheses

Experiences of different major social/political events during peoples' youth, such as the end of the 2nd World War, or the crash of the Solidarity and the imposition of Marshal Law, informs the redefinition of age cohorts into historical generations. Since the generational character has long-lasting effects (Mannheim ([1928] 1950, Schuman

and Scott 1989) I expect generational differences in assessment of the past. In addition, I expect that within generations people will hold different views of socialism due to the fact that members of same generations related to the party-state in distinct manner. These distinctions in patterns of participation in political organizations and collective action through time are captured in peoples' past political biographies. Finally, current contextual effects on evaluation of the past should operate through the types of friendship networks people have.

This chapter consists of four parts. First, I discuss the concepts of historical generations and political biographies in the context of Poland. Here I also present descriptive statistics for how the two variables relate to evaluation of the past over the 1988-2003 period. In the second part of the chapter I examine this relation in terms of causality. The effects of friendship networks are analyzed in the third part, while the fourth part presents conclusions.

Historical Generations, Political Biographies and Assessment of Socialism

Historical Generations

Age cohorts can be redefined generationally by a qualitatively different event that occurred during peoples' youth (Mannheim [1928] 1950, Schuman and Corning 2000). The following major political events inform my distinction between five historical generations in Poland of the second half of the 20th century: (1) the end of the 2nd World War and the imposition of socialism; (2) the "small stabilization" and the coming of Edward Gierek to power; (3) the crash of the Solidarity movement and the imposition of the Marshal Law; (4) the fall of communism; and (5) post-communist stabilization.

Table 5.1 shows how historical generations, demographic cohorts, political events and respondents' age at the occurrence of the event correspond.

Generation	Year of Birth	Events, Year	Age at Event
2nd World War (Generation 1)	1920 – 1933	End of War, 1945	12 – 25
Socialist State (Generation 2)	1934 – 1948	Gierek's coming to power, 1970	22 – 36
Solidarity (Generation 3)	1949 – 1960	Crash of Solidarity, 1981	21 – 32
Radical Social Change (Generation 4)	1961 – 1971	Fall of communism, 1989	18 – 28
Post-Communist (Generation 5)	1972 – 1982	Post-communist stabilization, 1998	16 – 26

Table 5.1: Historical Generations defined by Demographic Cohorts, Historical Events & Respondents' Age at Event.

In their youth, these persons have experienced different major political events, which affected their opinions of socialism aside of aging processes. For example, members of Generation 1, who witnessed the end of the 2nd WW and the early years of socialism of massive industrialization and the redistribution of land should have by and large positive views of the system; for Generation 3, on the other hand, defining were the crash of Solidarity and the imposition of the Martial law, events that may make this group less likely to evaluate the past positively.

My interviewees also brought up the role of generational differences in evaluation of socialism:

> "In Poland, immediately after the 2nd WW more than 60% of society lived in the countryside. During the next 20 years more than 20% of them moved to the city (following rapid industrialization) and it is indisputable that their standard of living changed for the better. Before the war, polish farmers, that is, peasants lived in bad conditions. Illiteracy was very high, and they were poor. Socialism gave them land. Thus, when these people looked at how their fathers and their grandfathers had lived, they say that communism did something for them, that without it, they wouldn't have had any chance to advance" (male, mid-thirties).

Also, for example, regarding Generation 2,

> "Plenty of people have very positive recalls of the time of Gierek, of the first half of the 1970s. Compared with the sixties, it was a time of relative economic development. It was the time of the small car FIAT … people could afford it. For part of the people it was a time of quite good level of economic welfare, the so-called small stabilization. This started to change with the end of the 1970s, because all these economic reforms introduced by Gierek failed" (male, late forties).

Political Biographies

Political socialization research (Jennings 2002, Sapiro 2004) shows that "the different relationships people from a single generation had with the original event" (Sapiro 2004, p.11) can lead to differences in attitudes/behavior among members of same

generations. This premise is particularly relevant to late-communist Poland, where members of the *Solidarność* (Solidarity) movement and members of the ruling communist party, the Polish United Workers' Party (hereafter, CP), took very different stance towards the Polish government and its ideology. Yet, it would be misleading to consider this relation entirely dichotomous: numerous CP members either joined the Solidarity or manifested their support through active participation in Solidarity-organized actions (Shabad and Slomczynski 2000). Such distinctions in patterns of participation in political organizations and collective action through time are captured in individuals' *political biographies*. While research in political science and sociology usually focuses on political biographies of leaders, I study political biographies of regular people. Material from the in-depth interviews illustrates the relevance of past political biographies for assessment of socialism:

> "When you try to understand why Poles see socialism differently, think about these three different groups of people: first, was that person member of the CP or involved in the system of government; or, two, was he/she an active member of the opposition movement; or, three, are these people who did not engage in communism but also didn't take part in the underground movement (male, mid forties).

In the initial period of Solidarity's legal functioning, it is estimated that about 10 million Poles (nearly one third of the adult population) joined the movement. It is difficult to gauge membership levels after Solidarity went underground. During the early period of Solidarity, CP membership, on the other hand, experienced an over 20% drop, from

3,092,000 members in 1980 to 2,327,000 in 1982. By 1984, communist party membership had declined to 2,117,000, and then reached 2,132,000 in 1988 (until once again thousands submitted their resignations from the Party in 1989). Hence, we can say that *time-wise*, central to political biographies in Poland are: (a) the period September 1980 - December 13, 1981, which spans the time between Solidarity's emergence as the first independent trade union movement in the Soviet bloc, to its banning following the imposition of martial law; and (b) the period December 13, 1981 -1988, a year prior to the holding of the Round Table talks between the party-state and Solidarity.

Historical Generations and Evaluation of the Past

Results in Table 5.2 show how members of each generation evaluate the communist period across time. Although the overall relationship between the variables is weak, we see important differences between generations. In each wave, the proportion of positive assessment is highest among the "1945 generation" (hereafter, Generation 1) and the "1970 generation" (hereafter, Generation 2), which are also the oldest. The most marked differences, as expected, are between Generation 1 and Generation 4 (the "1989 generation") or Generation 5 (the "1998 generation") respectively, depending on the survey year. Differences notwithstanding, the reader should also notice an over-time trend in how socialism is being evaluated: after an initial drop in positive assessment in the early period of the post-communist transformation, the proportion of positive views of the past increases for all generations.

The information presented so far shows that historical generations are significantly, albeit weakly, related to evaluation of the past. It is not clear, however,

whether the correlation is to be attributed to these discrete categories, or just to the effect of age. To find out, I have regressed evaluation of socialism in 1993, 1998 and 2003 on historical generations and on age (results not shown).

Historical Generations	Assessment of socialism					N
	Three categories			Five Categories		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative			
	Percentages			Mean	SD	
1988*						
Generation 1	32.6	46.4	21.0	3.16	0.867	1364
Generation 2	28.0	48.4	23.6	3.08	0.846	1769
Generation 3	24.2	49.6	26.2	3.00	0.853	2020
Generation 4	22.2	54.3	23.5	3.00	0.808	663
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.06*			*Eta^2 =0.01*		
1993*						
Generation 1	35.7	34.3	30.0	3.05	0.952	443
Generation 2	32.8	36.3	30.9	3.00	0.924	702
Generation 3	26.5	38.2	35.2	2.90	0.898	840
Generation 4	18.7	39.2	42.1	2.73	0.853	273
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.09*			*Eta^2 =0.01*		
1998						
Generation 1	39.7	34.8	25.5	3.18	0.979	325
Generation 2	36.2	34.4	29.5	3.05	0.986	553
Generation 3	31.1	36.5	32.4	3.00	0.929	672
Generation 4	22.3	37.8	39.8	2.81	0.919	349
Generation 5	21.4	36.8	41.9	2.79	0.950	234
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.11*			*Eta^2 =0.02*		
2003						
Generation 1	50.3	25.7	24.0	3.24	1.017	175
Generation 2	40.5	31.1	28.4	3.10	0.975	412
Generation 3	37.8	36.1	26.1	3.10	0.956	479
Generation 4	33.5	33.1	33.5	2.99	0.983	236
Generation 5	23.4	35.3	41.3	2.77	0.924	329
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.13*			*Eta^2 =0.02*		

*Given their age at the time of the surveys, members of the 5th Historical Generation are part of the 1998 & 2003 waves only.

Table 5.2: Historical Generations and Assessment of Socialism for 1988, 1993, 1998 & 2003.

For 1993 and for 2003, I cannot distinguish between the effects of the historical events that people experienced and the effect of peoples' age (coefficients for neither variables are significant). In one case - that is, 1998 - the effect of age overruns the effect of historical generations. This indicates that for this particular wave, the linear component is more important than the discrete categories of people facing unique events.

Political Biographies and Evaluation of the Past

Constructing Political Biographies

This part of my analysis builds on Shabad and Slomczynski's (2000) and Slomczynski et al. (2005) work on the effects of political biographies, defined for the 1980-1988 period, on political attitudes in post-communist Poland. To capture potential experience with the Solidarity and with the Communist Party I restrict the POLPAN sample to respondents aged 41 years and over in 2003.

To construct a person's past political biography, information on his/her relation to the Solidarity movement, as well as on membership in the CP is necessary. Moreover, *time-wise* two periods are essential: (a) the September 1980 - December 13, 1981 interval, which spans the time between Solidarity's emergence to its banning following the imposition of martial law; and (b) the period December 13, 1981 -1988, a year prior to the holding of the Round Table talks between the party-state and Solidarity. The following dichotomous variables provide this information:

Solidarity Membership (Solidarity Member = 1; else = 0). The 1988 and 1993 survey waves provide information with regards to respondents' belonging to the Solidarity movement in 1980-1981. Overlap between respondents' two declarations of

involvement is very high (r = 0.894). For membership in Solidarity in 1988, I relied on information provided by respondents in the 1993 wave only.

Solidarity Sympathizers (Solidarity Sympathizers = 1; else = 0). Belonging to the Solidarity is a direct indicator of individuals' interest in this political movement, but not the only one. Support for the Solidarity in the 1980s also took the form of participation in various events the union organized, although participants were not necessarily members of the movement. The POLPAN data contains detailed questions about the dates and frequency of involvement in strikes and street demonstrations between 1981-1988, most of which were either sponsored or organized by Solidarity. On the basis of this information, I was able to identify a group of respondents who, while not members, can be considered, by virtue of their political activity, to have been sympathizers of Solidarity.

Communist Party Membership (Pro-solidarity CP members & Traditional CP members). In this case, both the 1988 and 1993 surveys questioned respondents about their entire history of involvement in the Polish United Workers' Party. While membership for both 1980 and 1988 could be established, previous analysis showed that only CP membership matters, not the period of party belonging. Thus, I consider CP membership for the 1980-1988 period.

It is important to point out that the category of CP members is not uniform as far as their relation to the Solidarity movement is concerned. During the 1980-1988 period, some CP members joined the Solidarity, while others just participated in Solidarity-organized events; yet others kept distance from the movement altogether. To capture this distinction, which I envision to be of consequence for peoples' later political orientations

and attitudes, two variables are constructed for CP members. The first, *pro-solidarity CP members*, comprises respondents who between 1980 and 1988 belonged to the CP, and were also members or sympathizers of Solidarity (Pro-solidarity CP members = 1; else = 0). The second variable, *traditional CP members* (traditional CP member = 1; else = 0), includes only CP members who were not related to Solidarity (neither members, nor sympathizers).

Finally, I construct respondents' past political biography by counting their involvement in any of the activities described above. The resulting variable comprises five categories, coded as follows: respondents who did not belong to the Solidarity, nor supported the movement, and who have not been members of the CP are coded 0; Solidarity members = 1; Solidarity sympathizers = 2; Pro-solidarity CP members = 3; and 'Traditional' CP members = 4.

Political Biographies within Historical Generations

Before looking at the distribution of political biographies and assessment of socialism, I briefly examine individuals' political involvement within historical generations. Results in Table 5.3, calculated on the 1993 survey data, indicate that between 1980 and 1988 most active politically were individuals belonging to Generation 2 and Generation 3. These are people whose youth was marked by Gierek's coming to power, and by the crash of the Solidarity, and who have also experienced at length the matured socialist rule.

Political Biographies	Historical generations[a]				
	Generation 1	Generation 2	Generation 3	Generation 4	Total
	Percentages				
No political involvement	21.3	27.9	35.5	15.2	1378
Solidarity members	13.0	31.8	48.8	6.4	424
Solidarity Sympathizers	11.4	29.7	40.0	18.9	175
Pro-Solidarity CP members	19.6	55.7	22.7	1.1	185
Traditional CP members	29.7	41.1	28.1	2.1	97
Total	19.6	31.1	37.2	12.1	2259

[a]Given their age at the time of the surveys, members of the 5th Historical Generation are part of the 1998 & 2003 waves only.

Table 5.3: Political Biographies by Historical Generations, 1993

The proportion of persons witnessing in their youth the end of the Second World War and the early years of socialism (Generation 1) is slightly smaller as far as political participation is concerned, followed by Generation 4.

These findings are informative for the further analysis: they provide good grounds for deciding which historical generation to take as the reference category when building this variable into regression models. Since individuals in Generation 2 and Generation 3 are the most involved politically, it would make sense to have one of the two as the comparison group. Generation 3 seems better suited, because (a) the nature of the political events around which Generation 3, 4 and 5 are build let me to expect a shift in the type of evaluation of socialism compared to the first two generations; and (b) it represents the cutting point between the older generations and the younger ones.

Political Biographies and Assessment of Socialism

The relation between political biographies and evaluation of the past across time is summarized in Table 5.4, which presents the percentage distribution for three categories of assessment of socialism, and descriptive statistics for the more refined distribution of five categories.

Political Biographies	Assessment of socialism					N
	Three categories			Five Categories		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Mean	SD	
	Percentages					
1988						
No political involvement	25.4	51.3	23.3	3.06	0.841	4143
Solidarity members	23.4	46.9	29.6	2.93	0.857	850
Solidarity Sympathizers	23.4	44.0	32.6	2.90	0.884	175
Pro-Solidarity CP members	39.9	41.8	18.3	3.24	0.825	153
Traditional CP members	45.0	37.9	17.1	3.34	0.852	496
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.10*			*F = 21.99* *Eta^2 =0.02*		
1993						
No political involvement	30.8	36.5	32.8	2.98	0.910	1377
Solidarity members	22.6	34.4	42.9	2.74	0.960	424
Solidarity Sympathizers	18.3	44.0	37.7	2.73	0.889	175
Pro-Solidarity CP members	34.0	46.4	19.6	3.15	0.723	97
Traditional CP members	41.6	35.1	23.2	3.20	0.863	185
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.11*			*F = 13.17* *Eta^2 =0.02*		
1998						
No political involvement	31.1	36.1	32.8	2.98	0.966	1438
Solidarity members	27.6	35.3	37.1	2.90	0.940	326
Solidarity Sympathizers	29.1	31.2	39.7	2.89	0.971	141
Pro-Solidarity CP members	28.8	45.0	26.3	2.99	0.907	80
Traditional CP members	43.9	35.1	20.9	3.27	0.912	148
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.07*			*F = 4.25* *Eta^2 =0.01*		
2003						
No political involvement	36.6	32.8	30.6	3.03	0.969	1151
Solidarity members	24.8	38.5	36.7	2.85	0.943	226
Solidarity Sympathizers	34.0	27.7	38.3	2.89	1.052	94
Pro-Solidarity CP members	45.3	34.0	20.8	3.25	0.979	53
Traditional CP members	55.1	29.0	15.9	3.39	0.919	107
Correlation	*Cramer's V = 0.12*			*F = 6.75* *Eta^2 =0.02*		

Table 5.4: Political Biographies and Assessment of Socialism for 1988, 1993, 1998 & 2003.

The overall relationship between the variables is weak, at least in terms of correlation coefficients, but there are important differences in assessment of socialism between the types of political involvement, in 1988, as well as after the regime change. In all waves, positive evaluation is most common among traditional CP members, followed by pro-solidarity CP members. Solidarity members and solidarity sympathizers, on the other hand, are least keen in making positive assessments of socialism, while people with no political involvement find themselves in-between CP members and Solidarity supporters. In light of the opposition that pinned the Solidarity movement against the party-state in socialist Poland, these results are expected.

The Effects of Political Biographies and Historical Generations on Evaluation of the Past

In this section I examine the relation between political biographies and historical generations, on one hand, and assessment of socialism on the other, in terms of causality. The main research hypotheses are that, compared to no political involvement, participation in the Solidarity movement, either as members or sympathizers, decreases the level of positive evaluation of the past, while any type of involvement in the Communist Party increases it. Since political biographies are assumed within historical generations, I examine their effects controlling for historical generations. With regards to the latter, I expect that Generations 1 and 2 will have a positive effect on positive views of socialism, while the effect of the other generations will be negative.

Evaluation of Socialism in Early Post-Communism

Table 5.5 presents the regression results of assessment of socialism in 1993 on past political biographies, without and with controls for historical generations. For both models, the two regression types yield similar findings, which support the research hypotheses of the effects of political biographies and of historical generations on evaluation of the past. The relationship between the independent and the dependent variables, however, is very weak – at least as shown by the coefficients of determination.

Independent variables	Logistic regression for positive assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression DV = scores from 1 to 5		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	BETA
Model I: Effect of Political Biographies without Controlling for Historical Generations						
Solidarity members	-0.441**	0.128	0.643	-0.245**	0.050	-0.110
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.626**	0.188	0.535	-0.228**	0.069	-0.071
Pro-Solidarity CP members	0.644**	0.237	1.905	0.416**	0.099	0.092
Traditional CP members	0.472**	0.160	1.602	0.221**	0.071	0.066
Constant	-0.810**	0.058	0.444	2.979**	0.024	
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 2696.70* R^2 *= 0.02*			*F = 13.18 (df = 4)* *Adjusted* R^2 *= 0.02*		
Model II: Effect of Political Biographies Controlling for Historical Generations						
Solidarity members	-0.463**	0.129	0.630	-0.256**	0.050	-0.115
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.586**	0.189	0.557	-0.212**	0.069	-0.067
Pro-Solidarity CP members	0.530*	0.239	1.700	0.375**	0.100	0.083
Traditional CP members	0.355*	0.162	1.426	0.176**	0.071	0.053
Generation 1	0.333**	0.128	1.396	0.102+	0.054	0.044
Generation 2	0.252*	0.114	1.287	0.071	0.047	0.036
Generation 4	-0.479**	0.176	0.619	-0.190**	0.064	-0.068
Constant	-0.893**	0.087	0.409	2.966**	0.035	
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 2671.62* R^2 *= 0.03*			*F = 10.51 (df = 7)* *Adjusted* R^2 *= 0.03*		

[a] Given their age at the time of the surveys, members of the 5th Historical Generation are part of the 1998 & 2003 waves only.

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 2257

Table 5.5: Regression of Assessment of Socialism in 1993, on Political Biographies, without and with Controls for Historical Generations.[a]

Compared to individuals who were not politically involved between 1980 and 1988, being a member or a sympathizer of the solidarity movement has a negative effect, which remains substantial and significant when historical generations are controlled for. Involvement in the CP party, on the other hand, has a positive effect on assessment of socialism. Interestingly, among the two types of CP membership, belonging to the pro-solidarity CP group has a stronger positive effect.

Logistic regression results in Model II show that, compared to the category of no political involvement, pro-solidarity CP members are 70% more likely to express positive views of the former regime, while for traditional CP members, the likelihood is 43%. A possible explanation for this result could be the fact that these people have experienced, in a sense, a double disappointment. Prior to the systemic change, they belonged to the CP but decided to support, in one form or another, the Solidarity movement, as they were dissatisfied with many shortcomings of the socialist regime. In other words, they were not entirely committed to the Solidarity, but saw the movement as a way to correct for the problems the party-state had run into. In 1989 however, the CP loses power, it is replaced by a Solidarity-formed government); moreover the changes that follow the systemic change, through the measures implemented by the Solidarity-led government are far from satisfactory (second one). Traditional CP members, on the other hand, do not have to deal with the disappointment in the Solidarity, only with the one of the consequences of the socio-economic and political changes.

As far as historical generations are concerned, their effects are as expected. Belonging to the groups of people whose youth was marked by the end of the 2nd WW and the early years of socialism, and to the group of those witnessing the 1968 events has

a positive effect on evaluation of socialism, while being part of the youngest generation – that is, the one for which defining was the fall of communism, has a negative effect. More concretely, compared to Generation 3, prior generations are between 29% and 40% more likely to assess socialism positively, while the Generation 4 is 40% less likely to make a positive evaluation of the former regime (logistic regression results in Model II, Table 5.5).

Evaluation of Socialism in 1998

Similar analyses on evaluation of socialism in 1998 show more clearly that the relationship between political biographies and evaluation of the past appear within historical generations. From Table 5.6, which displays the regression results of assessment of socialism in 1998 on past political biographies, without and with controls for historical generations, the reader can see that, as along as political generations are considered by themselves, only the fourth category, traditional CP members, reaches statistical significance (for the rest of the variables, the signs are still in the hypothesized direction).

The situation changes once historical generations are accounted for, although the results yielded by the two regression types are slightly different. In Model II, when linear regression analysis is employed, all coefficients for political biographies except for pro-solidarity CP members become significant. Logistic regression analysis, on the other hand, produces significant results only for the effects of two categories: solidarity members and traditional CP members.

Independent variables	Logistic regression for positive assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression DV = scores from 1 to 5		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	BETA
Model I: Effect of Political Biographies without Controlling for Historical Generations						
Solidarity members	-0.144	0.133	0.866	-0.079	0.025	
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.151	0.187	0.860	-0.109	0.058	-0.032
Pro-Solidarity CP members	0.034	0.268	1.035	0.092	0.081	-0.030
Traditional CP members	0.552**	0.175	1.736	0.284**	0.116	0.018
Constant	-0.796**	0.057	0.451	2.983**	0.083	0.075
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 2635.71* R^2 *= 0.01*			*F = 4.27 (df = 4)* *Adjusted* R^2 *= 0.01*		
Model II: Effect of Political Biographies Controlling for Historical Generations						
Solidarity members	-0.305*	0.138	0.737	-0.149**	0.059	-0.060
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.258	0.190	0.772	-0.156*	0.081	-0.043
Pro-Solidarity CP members	-0.074	0.270	0.928	0.056	0.116	0.011
Traditional CP members	0.294+	0.180	1.342	0.175*	0.084	0.046
Generation 1	0.326*	0.142	1.385	0.143*	0.065	0.053
Generation 2	0.209+	0.123	1.232	0.028	0.055	0.013
Generation 4	-0.495**	0.156	0.610	-0.216**	0.064	-0.083
Generation 5	-0.589**	0.185	0.555	-0.254**	0.075	-0.083
Constant	-0.714**	0.094	0.490	3.043**	0.042	
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 2595.16* R^2 *= 0.03*			*F = 6.73 (df = 8)* *Adjusted* R^2 *= 0.02*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 2132

Table 5.6: Regression of Assessment of Socialism in 1998, on Political Biographies, without and with Controls for Historical Generations.

Two initial conclusions follow from here. First, the lack of relationship in Model I (Table 5.6) is spurious; in the context of historical generations the impact of involvement in Solidarity on evaluation of socialism appears to be significant. Second, it is worthwhile to use both linear and logistic regressions: only by comparing their results is it possible to see that for the categories of solidarity sympathizers and pro-solidarity CP members the cutting point of the positive vs. non-positive evaluation of socialism is not optimal for representing a full range of one's view of the past. The linear component of attitudes toward socialism is important for understanding their determinants.

The overall picture for evaluation of socialism in 1998 is very similar to that for 1993. Regression results lend further support to the hypotheses that that past political biographies and historical generations have long-lasting effects on views of the socialist regime. Nonetheless, one could raise the question of whether these effects may be confined mainly to the period of initial post-89 transformation of the Polish society, and would disappear once a substantial amount of time elapsed after the systemic change. To look into this issue, I repeat the analysis for 2003, more than 13 years after the end of communism, when the transition process in Poland can be regarded as completed.

Evaluation of Socialism in 2003

The regression results of assessment of socialism in 2003 on political biographies and historical generations (Table 5.7) clearly indicate that these contextual effects continue to be substantial and significant under stable post-communism. The proportion of variance explained, as indicated by the coefficients of determination, while still low, is slightly higher than for the previous models (1993 and 1998).

In contrast to the 1998 analysis, here the logistic and the linear regression coefficients for all categories of the political biography variable are significant, and in the expected direction. It is noteworthy that once again, compared to people with no political involvement, pro-solidarity CP members are even more likely to make positive evaluations of the past than are traditional CP members.

Independent variables	Logistic regression for Positive Assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression DV = scores from 1 to 5		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	BETA
Solidarity members	-0.748**	0.166	0.473	-0.298**	0.072	-0.112
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.461*	0.222	0.631	-0.264**	0.099	-0.069
Pro-Solidarity CP members	0.691*	0.306	1.996	0.359**	0.143	0.065
Traditional CP members	0.437*	0.211	1.548	0.216*	0.100	0.055
Generation 1	0.392*	0.182	1.480	0.085	0.085	0.027
Generation 2	0.055	0.140	1.056	-0.020	0.065	-0.009
Generation 4	-0.277	0.172	0.758	-0.141+	0.078	-0.051
Generation 5	-0.851**	0.169	0.427	-0.396**	0.073	-0.163
Constant	-0.334**	0.107	0.716	3.168**	0.050	
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 2060.85* $R^2 = 0.05$			*F = 8.51 (df = 8)* *Adjusted* $R^2 = 0.04$		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 1630

Table 5.7: Regression of Assessment of Socialism in 2003, on Political Biographies, controlling for Historical Generations

By and large, the relationship of historical generations and assessment of socialism is as hypothesized, although for some coefficients reaching statistical significance varies by regression type. The positive effect of Generation 1 is significant (alpha = 0.05) in the logistic model, but not in the linear model. Compared to the reference group (Generation 3), belonging to the subsequent generations has a negative effect on evaluation of the past. While the logistic regression coefficient for Generation 4 misses statistical significance, it does so by very little for the expected one-tail relation (alpha = 0.107). The coefficients for Generation 5 are significant in both regression models.

By now, results have lend substantial support to the hypothesis that the legacy of the past, in the form of political biographies and historical generations, has a significant effect on assessment of socialism not only in the immediate years following the regime

change, but long after the communist system has ceased to exist. It is time to take the analysis further, and to examine contextual effects by means of the role of friendship networks.

Friendship Networks and Evaluation of the Past

Measuring Friendship Networks[6]

Friendship patterns are among the important topics of the POLPAN questionnaire. One set of questions aimed at recovering some important features of *ego-centered networks*. Each respondent, termed *ego*, reported on *alters* and on the ties among them. Table 5.8 provides basic information on the network variables used in this chapter. The first one*, number of close friends,* is measured for 2003 only. Respondents were asked how many of their close friends they knew for longer than 10 years. The other independent variables are measured for all survey waves. The next variable is *number of all friends*. In all waves of the POLPAN study the respondents were asked: "How many friends do you have?"

In the 1988 wave, this question was asked after several specific items pertaining to the characteristics of the best friend. The context of the question on number of friends clearly suggested close friends. In other waves this was not the case—the definition of friends was left to the respondent. This difference in context might explain the relatively small mean number of friends in 1988 in comparison with the analogous numbers for 1993, 1998, and 2003. For the end of the communist era the mean number of friends is

[6]Information in this section comes largely from Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow (2005).

10.1, while in the period of 1993–2003 it varies from 16.2 to 19.4. It should be noted that for all waves the standard deviation is close to the mean, sometimes exceeding it, indicating the significant variability of this network characteristic.

Variables	**Years**			
Number of close friends known longer than 10 years	**2003**			
Mean	12.9			
Standard deviation	14.8			
	1988	**1993**	**1998**	**2003**
Number of friends (*N*)				
Mean	10.1	18.0	19.4	16.2
Standard deviation	13.1	19.0	21.1	17.2
Density of ties (*K*)				
Mean	0.76	—[a]	0.72	0.71
Standard deviation	0.29	—[a]	0.24	0.26
Average network size (*S*) $S = 1/2[(N \times N) - N]$ [b]	46	153	178	123
Average number of existing ties (network constraints, *T*) $T = K \times S$ [b]	35	—[a]	128	87
Average number of potential bridges (*H*) $H = S - T$ [b]	11	—[a]	50	36
Number of cases	1,886	2,247	2,128	1,693

[a] Data unavailable in that the item on density of ties among friends was not included in the 1993 wave of POLPAN.

[b] Formulas are for an average individual.

[*] Source: Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow, 2005

Table 5.8: Basic Information on Friendship Patterns, 1988–2003[*]

The third variable is the *density of ties among friends*. Respondents provided information about how many of their friends knew each other, using pre-categorized answers: “all friends know each other,” “some friends know each other,” “only a few

friends know each other," and "almost nobody knows each other."[7] Arbitrary proportions were assigned to respondents' answers: 1.000 for "all friends know each other," 0.666 for "some friends know each other," 0.333 for "a few friends know each other," and 0.165 for "almost nobody knows each other." We assume that these numbers reflect the density of ties among respondents' friends expressed as a proportion of all possible ties for a given set of friends. The density calculated in this manner is stable over time, ranging on average between 0.71 and 0.76, with the highest number in 1988.

Actually, there is a weak inverse relationship between number of friends and density of ties. This is in agreement with the notion that if one has many friends, than they are likely to be recruited from different milieus and therefore some of them would not know each other. In case of the POLPAN data, number of friends explains around 5% of the variance in network density.

Table 5.8 also provides the average *network size*, understood as the number of all possible ties among friends. It is assumed that each friend could be connected with any other, and no friend has a tie with himself or herself. An interaction of density of ties among friends and the network size provides the number of already established ties, which are considered *network constraints*.

The last variable in the table, the number of ties that the respondent could exploit as a broker, is central to this paper. It is calculated by subtracting the number of network constraints from the number of all ties that might connect friends. For short, I call it *the number of potential bridges* or *the number of structural holes*. Assuming that a person's

[7] For a detailed discussion of why this variable refers to relations and not to actors, that is, nodes or vertices in graphs, see Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow (2005).

friends also have friends, this concept corresponds to Burt's (1992) original concept of structural holes, since holes are among clusters.

In chapter 1 I have argued the two major traditions in social network analysis, Coleman's (1988, 1990) emphasis of strong ties on one hand, and Granovetters' (1972) and Burt's (1992, 2001) argument in favor of weak ties and structural holes, on the other, lead me to infer that qualitative differences in friendship networks will result in different types of attitudes towards socialism, and/or different directions in attitude change. More specifically, I expect close friends to be conducive to more positive assessments; networks with structural holes, on the other hand, should have a negative effect on evaluation of socialism. I examine these relations for assessment of socialism in 2003, using logistic and linear regression analysis.

Findings

Table 5.9 presents the results for two groups of models: in the first one, the effects of number of close friends and of number of potential bridges on assessment of socialism in 2003 are examined by themselves; the second group of models ties the analysis to the previous sections in this chapter, by introducing political biographies and historical generations into the equations.

Although very weak, at least as indicated by the coefficients of determination, the basic relationships between a person's types of friendship networks and the way in which he/she evaluates the past are as expected (Model I). Whether logistic or linear regression is employed, the coefficients for both independent variables are significant and in the hypothesized directions. They show that a larger number of close friends is conducive to

more positive assessments of socialism; networks with structural holes, on the other hand, have a negative effect on the dependent variable.

Once political biographies and historical generations are accounted for (Model II), the coefficients for close friends, while still in the right direction, lose statistical significance. This is not the case for the coefficients of potential bridges in a person's network, which remain in the predicted direction and significant.

Independent variables	Logistic regression for positive assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression DV = scores from 1 to 5		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	BETA
Model I: Effect of Friendship Networks without Controlling for Political Biographies & Historical Generations						
Friendship Networks						
No. of Close Friends, 2003	0.012*	0.005	1.012	0.005*	0.002	0.072
No. of Potential bridges, 2003	-0.007**	0.003	0.994	-0.003**	0.001	-0.112
Constant	-0.664**	0.074	0.515	2.997**	0.034	
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 2029.89* R^2 *= 0.005*			*F = 5.56 (df = 2)* *Adjusted* R^2 *= 0.01*		
Model II: Effect of Friendship Networks Controlling for Political Biographies & Historical Generations						
Friendship Networks						
No. of Close Friends, 2003	0.003	0.005	1.003	0.001	0.002	0.012
No. of Potential bridges, 2003	-0.004+	0.002	0.996	-0.002*	0.001	-0.077
Past Political Biography						
Solidarity members	-0.743**	0.171	0.475	-0.298**	0.073	-0.112
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.423+	0.229	0.655	-0.253**	0.102	-0.065
Pro-Solidarity CP members	0.712*	0.315	2.039	0.348*	0.147	0.063
Traditional CP members	0.495*	0.218	1.640	0.250*	0.103	0.063
Historical Generations						
Generation 1	0.361+	0.191	1.434	0.085	0.089	0.026
Generation 2	0.124	0.144	1.132	0.023	0.066	0.010
Generation 4	-0.252	0.176	0.778	-0.137+	0.079	-0.049
Generation 5	-0.812**	0.174	0.444	-0.381**	0.074	-0.159
Constant	-0.372**	0.124	0.690	3.160**	0.057	
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 1961.08* R^2 *= 0.05*			*F = 7.68 (df = 10)* *Adjusted* R^2 *= 0.04*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 1558

Table 5.9: Regression of Assessment of Socialism in 2003, on Friendship Networks, without and with Controls for Political Biographies and Historical Generations

The ‘political biography’ and the ‘historical generations’ variables continue to behave as expected: involvement in the solidarity movement as members or sympathizers has a negative, significant, effect on assessment of socialism, while any type of membership in the CP has a positive and statistically significant effect. The overall relation between historical generations and the dependent variable also holds, although, as already seen in Table 5.8, for some groups reaching statistical significance varies by regression type.

If assessment of socialism in 1998 is included, the number of potential bridges is significant in the linear regression analysis, but not in the logistic one. Similarly, for generation1 reaching statistical significance varies by regression type. This is also the case for the political biographical group of Solidarity sympathizers. The overall relation between the independent variables and the dependent one holds, and the effects are in the expected directions.

Of course, assessment of socialism in 1998 has a clear positive effect on positive evaluation of the past in 2003. These results are presented in Appendix B, Table B-1.

Finally, Table 5.10 presents the findings from the pa cross-sectional time-series regressions. The picture is very similar to the previous analysis. A higher number of potential bridges in a person’s networks of friends decreases positive evaluation of the past.

At the same time, the social context continues to operate through both historical generations, and past political biographies especially. Since this analysis is done on panel respondents, generation 5 has been dropped from the models.

Independent variables	Logistic regression for positive assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression[a] DV = scores from 1 to 5	
	B	SE	Odds Ratio (e^B)	B	SE
Friendship Networks					
No. of Close Friends	0.001	0.003	1.001	0.000	0.001
No. of Potential bridges	-0.003*	0.002	0.996	-0.002**	0.001
Past Political Biography					
Solidarity members	-0.628**	0.130	0.533	-0.284**	0.058
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.400*	0.179	0.670	-0.242**	0.084
Pro-Solidarity CP members	0.386	0.250	1.471	0.262*	0.118
Traditional CP members	0.407*	0.177	1.502	0.250**	0.079
Historical Generations					
Generation 1	0.214	0.146	1.239	0.062	0.073
Generation 2	0.181	0.112	1.198	0.041	0.052
Generation 4	-0323	0.158	0.724	-0.136+	0.071
Constant	-0.477**	0.092		3.125**	0.043
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 51.55 (df = 9)* N = 1240			*Wald Chi2 = 64.59 (df = 9)* N = 1144	

[a] Estimated within-panel autocorrelation = 0.281
** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05; + p > 0.10

Table 5.10: Regression of Assessment of Socialism on Friendship Networks, controlling for Political Biographies, Historical Generations and Age

Conclusions

Analyses in this chapter have focused on characteristics of small-groups of people as major routes by which the social context determines differences in public opinion about past political outcomes. Two types of determinants were considered: (a) historical generations and political biographical groups within generations as key parts of the legacy of the past, and (b) networks of friends as main means through which the current environment operates.

In statistical terms, the null hypotheses stipulate that historical generations people belong to, their political biography, and their friendship networks have no effects on how they assess the former socialist regime. Based on the empirical findings in this chapter,

all three null hypotheses need to be rejected. There are marked differences in the effect of generational character on evaluation of socialism: members of Generation 1 and 2 are more likely to evaluate the past positively, while subsequent generations take a more critical stance towards it. These findings lend support to the argument that the generational character has a long-lasting effect on individuals' political attitudes. To a certain extent, they can also be interpreted as aging effects, since the first two generations correspond to the older respondents in the survey: it may be that people, especially old ones, look back to their youth as the better time of their life for the advantages that are traditionally linked to youth, such as better health, a greater capacity for work, hope that there is still plenty of room for substantial improvement in one's life. This viewpoint came up repeatedly during the in-depth interviews:

> "People remember good times, good moments… they simply remember that they were young, nice, in love, happy…" (male, mid-forties).

Similarly,

> "We tend to forget the rough edges of the past… we tend to idealize the past. We want to be young, healthy …" (male, late fifties).

Another important determinant for differences in evaluation of socialism is peoples' past political biographies, for *within* generations individuals took different stances towards the socialist regime. The following interview quotes illustrate this point:

"I was not active in the opposition, but I know people who were, and who were persecuted. While I felt that things were stupid, I didn't feel persecuted. Their memories (of the regime) are different than mine (female, mid-fifties).

Also,

"There are strong differences between parts of society (in assessing socialism), which stem from the fact that in the 1980s many people were very much against the regime and involved in opposition movements, while others were not. Today, supporters of the Solidarity generally do not hail the system, they continue to be anti-communist" (female, mid-thirties)

Results confirm the hypotheses that involvement in the Solidarity and in the Communist Party, the two political movements that defined Poland in the 1980s, has a long lasting but qualitatively distinct effect on retrospective views of the past. Compared to no political involvement, membership in the Solidarity lowers the likelihood of positive assessment of socialism across all waves of the analysis in a substantive and significant way. Moreover, the degree of commitment to the Solidarity is important, in that members are less likely to make positive assessments than sympathizers. For example, in 2003 Solidarity members are, compared to the non-involved, 53% less likely to evaluate the past positively, whereas for sympathizers the likelihood is 37% (Table 5.7). The situation is similar for 1993, the other wave for which both types of coefficients are significant.

Overall involvement in the CP party has, as expected, a positive effect on assessment of socialism, but there are nuances depending on type of CP membership: in

the waves where both coefficients are significant (1993 and 2003), belonging to the pro-solidarity CP group has a stronger positive effect than traditional CP membership. This result is, at least at first glance, less intuitive than in the case of the Solidarity variables. It can be explained, however, if we consider the fact that pro-solidarity CP members have experienced, in a sense, a double disappointment. Prior to the systemic change, they belonged to the CP but decided to support, in one form or another, the Solidarity movement, since they were dissatisfied with the performance of the government. While not entirely committed to the Solidarity, they regarded the movement as a way to correct for the problems the party-state had run into. In 1989 however, the CP lost power to the Solidarity, a political outcome they did not seek and that most likely disappointed them. In addition, the rapidly growing social inequality under the post-1989 Solidarity-led government, the cutback in state-assisted social programs sent the message that the Solidarity too failed to deliver the promised 'better' society. By contrast, traditional CP members faced only the second type of disappointment, that of the consequences of the post-1989 socio-economic and political changes.

By and large, the results in this chapter are consistent for the entire 1993-2003 interval, demonstrating that the legacy of the past, through generational and past political biography effects, influences assessment of socialism not only in the immediate years following the regime change, but long after the communist system has ceased to exist. At the same time, peoples' attitudes towards the former regime also depend on their current environment, as the results on friendship networks indicate. When the basic relationship is considered, a larger number of close friends is conducive to more positive assessments of socialism; networks with structural holes, on the other hand, have a negative effect on the

dependent variable. After controlling for political biographies and historical generations, the coefficients for close friends lose statistical significance. The number of potential bridges in one's network continues to have a negative significant effect.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL ATTITUDES

In previous analyses I have shown that structural determinants, through the gains and losses linked to them, as well as contextual effects influence Poles' evaluation of socialism and changes thereof (Chapter 4, 5). This chapter focuses once more on the question of why people modify their attitudes towards an already abandoned economic/political system, but aims to answer it from a different angle, namely by examining possible psychological mechanisms behind changes in assessment of socialism. Focus group discussions let me think that cognitive dissonance theory could provide a strong framework within which the process of political attitude formation and its apparent inconsistencies can be considered (this perspective is detailed in Chapter 1). During the focus group interview some respondents referred to a schizophrenic mentality, which people want to overcome. By schizophrenic mentality they meant contradictory opinions about the desired social order. They claimed that people want unregulated labor market, which gives new opportunities, yet on the other hand they are against increasing inequality. Interviewees also mentioned the incompatibility of endorsement of state support of disadvantaged groups during the communist era and the condemnation of the pre-1989 regime on the other hand. Respondents used the term "normal society" by reference to societies such as France and Western Germany, in which such

contradictions, in the interviewees' opinion, are almost nonexistent. Interestingly, throughout the focus group discussions respondents referred to various contradictions in opinions as diminishing through time. Yet, it is not clear whether they referred to what is/will be observed or whether this claim was a projected desire, i.e. wishful thinking.

For my dissertation, the premise that dissonance is aroused when a person does or says something that is contrary to a prior belief or attitude (Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999) is of particular interest. Because they threaten the self-concept (Aronson in Harmon-Jones and Mills ed. 1999), inconsistent cognitions are psychologically uncomfortable. They create a negative affective state, which determines people to try to reduce or eliminate it. When multiple routes are available people apparently prefer to reduce dissonance directly by changing attitudes and behaviors (Wood 2000); they change the belief or attitude to correspond more closely to what was said.
In general, people tend to modify elements of knowledge that are less resistant to change—that is, that are less responsive to reality and are in limited agreement with other cognitions (see Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999).

Assuming that individuals strive to maintain a self that is positive and consistent (Aaronson p. 111 in Harmon-Jones and Mills ed. 1999), opinions about the socialist regime should be modified if they are inconsistent with another belief, attitude or value that is considered a meaningful truth. Poles' attitudes towards *state paternalism* fulfill this condition. State paternalism represents a main feature of the communist rule, and refers to the state's responsibility to provide social welfare and economic security: in socialism, the party-state ought to guarantee jobs, subsidize housing and basic food, transportation and medical care (see Shabad and Slomczynski, in Slomczynski ed.2000).

Then, Poles' support for state paternalism indicates their support for state interventionism, and equally important, for collectivist and egalitarian policies. In this sense, state paternalistic attitudes, while correlated with the socialist system, go beyond the former regime. They reflect a particular worldview of the extent to which the state *should be* responsible for social equality. Because attitudes towards the welfare state involve important values such as social justice and equality, they should be stronger, and less open to change, than evaluations of socialism.

To provide a comprehensive picture of state paternalism, the first section in this chapter discusses the factor components of this determinant, and the basic statistical characteristics of the measurement model. In the second section, I examine whether empirical data support the cognitive dissonance argument that people would change their evaluation of socialism to bring them closer to their attitudes on the state's role in regulating social welfare.

Measurement of State Paternalism

In the 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003 waves of the POLPAN study three questions are particularly relevant for capturing respondents' attitudes towards the extent to which the state should intervene in social welfare issues. Based on the five-point Likert scale, respondents were asked to express agreement or disagreement with the following issues:

(1) The state should assist children from poor families in facilitating their access to higher education;

(2) The state should decrease inequality;

(3) The state should provide jobs for everyone who wants to work.

Combined, these questionnaire items are a good indicator of state paternalism. Table 6.1 presents the means, standard deviations and the factor loadings for the items across the four survey waves. Factor loadings for all components are high, ranging from 0.652 to 0.795, which indicates a strong correlation between each of these variables and the factor.

Item	Mean	SD	Factor Loading
	1988[a]		
State Should Help Children	4.19	1.004	0.754
State Should Reduce Inequality	3.75	1.171	0.717
State Should Provide Jobs	4.54	0.850	0.732
	1993[b]		
State Should Help Children	4.29	0.861	0.695
State Should Reduce Inequality	3.61	1.251	0.764
State Should Provide Jobs	4.29	1.044	0.795
	1998[c]		
State Should Help Children	4.49	0.724	0.652
State Should Reduce Inequality	3.47	1.235	0.715
State Should Provide Jobs	4.19	1.083	0.793
	2003[d]		
State Should Help Children	4.63	0.607	0.655
State Should Reduce Inequality	3.73	1.178	0.728
State Should Provide Jobs	4.32	0.996	0.781

[a]Eigenvalue = 1.618; % of variance = 53.96; N = 1959
[b]Eigenvalue = 1.699; % of variance = 56.63; N = 1158
[c]Eigenvalue = 1.564; % of variance = 52.14; N = 2124
[d]Eigenvalue = 1.569; % of variance = 52.29; N = 1699

Table 6.1: Measurement of State Paternalism in 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003

The relations between the factor components themselves are also pretty strong, as seen in Table 6.2. Since the Eigenvalue associated with the factor is above 1.5 and the variance explained is above 52 percent, I conclude that the measurement model for state paternalism fulfills the basic statistical requirements.

Item	State Should Help Children	State Should Reduce Inequality	State Should Provide Jobs
	1988		
State Should Help Children	1.000	0.313**	0.330**
State Should Reduce Inequality	0.313**	1.000	0.284**
State Should Provide Jobs	0.330**	0.284**	1.000
	1993		
State Should Help Children	1.000	0.286**	0.334**
State Should Reduce Inequality	0.286**	1.000	0.422**
State Should Provide Jobs	0.334**	0.422**	1.000
	1998		
State Should Help Children	1.000	0.186**	0.297**
State Should Reduce Inequality	0.186**	1.000	0.356**
State Should Provide Jobs	0.297**	0.356**	1.000
	2003		
State Should Help Children	1.000	0.208**	0.283**
State Should Reduce Inequality	0.208**	1.000	0.356**
State Should Provide Jobs	0.283**	0.356**	1.000

** $p > 0.01$ two-tailed

Table 6.2: Correlations of the Items Measuring State Paternalism, 1988, 1993, 1998, & 2003

Findings

To examine whether the data support my expectation that opinions of state paternalism change less than those of socialism, first I compare over-time stability in correlations of state paternalism with over-time correlations of evaluation of socialism. The Pearson's coefficients for the four survey waves (Table 6.3) show a positive, significant relationship between state paternalism at time t and at time t+1. When 10-years intervals are considered, the relation between initial and later opinions about state paternalism strengthens a little, while for the 1988-2003 interval, the strength of the correlation decreases slightly. Overall, the positive correlations of attitudes towards state paternalism are significant and relatively stable across the entire period under analysis.

Item	State Paternalism 1988	State Paternalism 1993	State Paternalism 1998	State Paternalism 2003
	Panel Sample			
State Paternalism 1988	1.000	0.365**	0.388**	0.255**
State Paternalism 1993	0.365**	1.000	0.371**	0.397**
State Paternalism 1998	0.388**	0.371**	1.000	0.374**
State Paternalism 2003	0.255**	0.397**	0.374**	1.000

**p > 0.01 two-tailed

Table 6.3: Correlations of State Paternalism for 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003

In contrast, the relationships between opinions of socialism over the 1988-2003 interval are far less stable. In chapter 4 (Table 4.3) I have shown that the strength of the correlation between earlier and later evaluations decreases as more time passes between peoples' answers, to the point where the Pearson's coefficient for 1988 and 2003 evaluations is no longer significant. This supports my expectation that opinions about state paternalism are more stable than those about the past.

Second, I look at the correlations of state paternalism and assessment of socialism across time. According to the cognitive dissonance argument, the relation between the two variables should initially be weak, but then strengthen as people attempt to reduce the dissonance by bringing the two attitudes into closer agreement. Results in Table 6.4 show that for the initial stage of post-communist transformation, this is indeed the case: in late communism, the relation between state paternalism and assessment of socialism, as measured by the correlation coefficient, is random. In 1993, however, the relation becomes positive and significant. It is still significant in 2003, although after a period of stabilization (1998) the strength of the correlation decreases.

Item	Assessment of Socialism, 1988	Assessment of Socialism, 1993	Assessment of Socialism, 1998	Assessment of Socialism, 2003
	Panel Sample			
State Paternalism 1988	**-0.065**	0.041	0.167**	0.014
State Paternalism 1993	0.000	**0.280****	0.270**	0.170**
State Paternalism 1998	0.012	0.222**	**0.223****	0.050
State Paternalism 2003	-0.010	0.175**	0.149**	**0.173****

** $p > 0.01$ two-tailed

Table 6.4: Correlations of State Paternalism with Assessment of Socialism in 1988, 1993, 1998, and 2003.

Finally, Figure 6.1 shows that the crisscrossing effects of state paternalism on evaluations of socialism are higher, and once, equal, to the crisscrossing effects of evaluations of socialism on state paternalism. Therefore, the assumption that at a given time-point the effect of state paternalism on socialism is higher than the feedback is justified (see Blalock 1985).



**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1

Figure 6.1: Crisscrossing Effects of State Paternalism and Evaluation of Socialism, 1998-2003

Overall, findings suggest that reduction in cognitive dissonance occurs at the beginning of the transition process. Then, key to test whether individuals adjust their view of socialism the way cognitive dissonance theory would predict involves the comparison of assessment of socialism to state paternalism in late socialism and early post-communism, and the analysis of later changes in opinions of the past. Specifically, if at time *1* assessment of socialism is too high compared to expressed support for state paternalism, at later times we should see a decrease in its mean value; if, on the other hand, evaluation of socialism is too low, we would expect its mean value to increase in the subsequent survey waves as part of the process of reducing cognitive inconsistency.

To perform this test I identified three categories of respondents: (1) individuals who in 1988 scored highest on assessment of socialism (a score of 4 and a score of 5), but lowest on support for state paternalism[8] – that is, in the 1st percentile; (2) individuals who in 1988 scored lowest on assessment of socialism (a score of 1 & a score of 2), but highest on state paternalism (they were in the 5th percentile); and (3) individuals whose assessment of socialism matched that of state paternalism – that is, there was no inconsistency between their expressed attitudes on these two factors. Similar groups were identified for 1993.

Next, I calculated for each pair of groups mean changes in assessment of socialism for the 1993 - 1988, the 1998 - 1988, and for the 1998 - 1993 intervals, respectively (see Table 6. 5 and Table 6.6).

[8] For state paternalism, I calculated percentile ranks, with the 1st percentile corresponding to weakest support for state paternalism, and the 5th percentile, to highest support for it.

The results for all three periods support the cognitive dissonance argument: mean changes in evaluation of socialism are in the expected directions, and the differences between means for the examined groups are statistically significant.

1988	Mean Differences in Assessment of Socialism	
	1993-1988	1998-1988
A. Assessment of Socialism too High Relative to State Paternalism	-0.846 N = 52	-1.051 N = 39
B. Assessment of Socialism neither too High Nor too Low	-0.210 N = 679	-0.084 N = 516
C. Assessment of Socialism too Low Relative to State Paternalism	1.091 N = 49	1.400 N = 40
Difference between A & B[a]	-1.056**	-1.135**
Difference between C & B[a]	1.301**	1.484**
Difference between A & C[a]	-1.937**	-2.451**

[a] To test the null hypotheses that the differences between means = 0, I used ANOVA, with df = 1 (for one independent variable, $F = t^2$); **p > 0.01 two-tailed

Table 6.5: Over-time Changes in Assessment of Socialism in response to Attitudes on State Paternalism, 1993-1988 & 1998-1988.

1993	Mean Differences in Assessment of Socialism
	1998-1993
A. Assessment of Socialism too High Relative to State Paternalism, N = 31	-0.871
B. Assessment of Socialism neither too High Nor too Low, N = 518	0.096
C. Assessment of Socialism too Low Relative to State Paternalism, N = 46	0.717
Difference between A & B[a]	0.967**
Difference between C & B[a]	0.621**
Difference between A & C[a]	-1.588**

[a] To test the null hypotheses that the differences between means = 0, I used ANOVA, with df = 1 (for one independent variable, $F = t^2$);
**p > 0.01 two-tailed

Table 6.6: Over-time Changes in Assessment of Socialism in response to Attitudes on State Paternalism, 1998-1993.

The persons who gave high positive assessments of socialism, while at the same time expressing low support for state paternalism adjusted, in later waves, their opinion of socialism by lowering their support for the past. On the other hand, individuals who initially held negative views of socialism while expressing strong support for state paternalism changed, in subsequent survey waves, their attitude towards the past, and provided more positive evaluations of socialism.

Conclusions

People change opinion of socialism to reduce or eliminate psychological discomfort following from the inconsistency between evaluation of socialism and another attitude considered to be "a meaningful truth" (Harmon-Jones 1999, p. 95), in this case attitudes towards state paternalism. Analyses in this chapter examined this hypothesis by assessing the cognitive inconsistency at time $t_{0,}$ and measuring the dependent variable – evaluation of socialism, E - in terms of increase/decrease through time, that is, as Et_1 - E t_0. I calculated for three pairs of groups—(1) individuals who in 1988 scored highest on assessment of socialism, but lowest on support for state paternalism, (2) individuals who in 1988 scored lowest on assessment of socialism, but highest on state paternalism, and (3) individuals whose assessment of socialism matched that of state paternalism,—mean changes in assessment of socialism for the 1993 - 1988, the 1998 - 1988, and for the 1993 - 1988 intervals, respectively.

The findings for all three time periods show that for "assessment of socialism too high relative to state paternalism" at time t_0, the mean value of Et_1 - E $t_0 < 0$.

On the other hand, for "assessment of socialism too low relative to state paternalism" at time t_0, the mean value of $Et_1 - E\ t_0 > 0$. In addition, the differences between mean values for the examined groups are substantial and statistically significant. Altogether, these results support the expectation that people modify their evaluations of socialism as part of the psychological mechanism of reducing inconsistency between pairs of cognition. On a more general note, the empirical findings suggest that cognitive dissonance theories can be a useful tool for understanding the process of political attitude formation and its apparent inconsistencies.

PART 3

EVALUATION OF THE PAST, FUTURE ORIENTATIONS AND THE LOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOCIAL STTRUCTURE

CHAPTER 7

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVALUATION OF THE PAST AND FUTURE ORIENTATIONS

A substantial part of my dissertation follows the reasoning that structural variables affect attitudinal variables. The main focus of my project, however, is different, in that I look at the consequences of attitudes for individuals' current position in the social structure. Structurally determined evaluations of the past are assumed to affect further structural outcomes, mainly through their effect on peoples' future orientations. Chapter 1 discusses in detail the argument behind these research expectations. In general, people judge their current success relative to their prior life conditions, as well as to how their contemporaries perform. In this sense, evaluation of the past reflects one's relative sense of present-day accomplishment. The following quotation from one of my interviewees illustrates this point:

> "Before (1989) the economic differences between people were not that big. The group, the class that was the owner class was so small that the envy of the other people who didn't posses these things, the money and the houses, was not really there. Now, those who have are much more visible. Now the differences between those who have and those who have not is so very big and I think it makes many people very unhappy when they can't afford things.

When they can't afford to buy things for their children, or when they can't afford the education, and so on." (female, early fifties)

Assuming that individuals use past and present experiences to make inferences about the future, assessment of socialism is likely to induce a mindset that directly affects a person's perception of opportunities and threats embedded in the future—that is, their future orientations. In Chapter 3 I proved that there is a negative, significant, correlation between positive evaluations of the past and optimistic future orientations. Empirical analyses in this chapter deal with the more complex issue of causality.

The Main Hypothesis

I argue that peoples' attitude towards the former socialist regime represents a particular mindset that is likely to affect one's views of the future beyond the impact of social structure. Specifically, holding positive attitudes toward socialism should have a negative effect on optimistic future orientations. While I expect attitudes towards the future to be rooted in peoples' assessment of the past, I realize that this relation would be rather weak, given the effect of other determinants, structural factors especially. Analyses in this chapter test the null hypothesis of no relationship between positive evaluation of the past and optimistic prospective orientations. The reader should be aware that the nature of the questions dealing with respondents' perceptions of the future is not uniform across the POLPAN data. For the measurement of optimistic future orientations, see Chapter 3.

Findings

The Effects of Evaluation of the Past on Optimistic Future Orientations

I begin by analyzing the effects of positive assessment of socialism without and with controls for individuals' demographics, that is, gender and age. The basic models for 1993 and for 1998, the two periods for which the POLPAN data allow measurement of prospective orientations, are presented in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1993					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Constant	2.850**	0.132		4.610**	0.484	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.051	0.034	0.032	0.068*	0.033	0.043
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.239**	0.032	-0.159	-0.223**	0.032	-0.148
Gender				0.289**	0.057	0.105
Age				-0.075**	0.020	-0.654
Age^2				0.064**	0.021	0.548
Fit statistics	*F = 28.38 (df =2)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.02*			*F = 24.28 (df =5)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.05*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05
N = 2239

Table 7.1: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1993 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988 & 1993), without and with Controls for Gender and Age.

By and large, results in both models are very similar. Positive evaluation of the socialist regime in 1988 has a positive effect on optimistic future orientations in 1993 and in 1998, whereas positive evaluation of socialism after the systemic change decreases the level of optimism. Controlling for other factors, the effect of age is non-linear, taking a U-shape: getting older initially decreases one's level of optimism about the future, but after reaching a certain age, the effect of aging becomes positive. With gender, the picture is less uniform.

In 1993, males are more optimistic about the future than are women; in 1998 however, sex differences are no longer significant. I will return to this issue in the discussions section.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1998					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Constant	4.534**	0.174		5.901**	0.724	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.088*	0.040	0.051	0.093*	0.040	0.054
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.197**	0.040	-0.120	-0.188**	0.040	-0.115
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.357**	0.038	-0.229	-0.353**	0.038	-0.226
Gender				0.111	0.069	0.037
Age				-0.052+	0.027	-0.414
Age^2				0.044+	0.026	0.371
Fit statistics	*F = 50.65 (df =3)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.08*			*F = 26.99 (df = 6)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.08*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 1735

Table 7.2: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988, 1993 & 1998), without and with Controls for Gender and Age

In sum, the basic models indicate that the legacy of the past, as expressed in terms of assessment of the socialist regime, affects peoples' outlook on the future. Although the relationship between positive evaluation of socialism and optimistic future orientations is very weak – as the coefficients of determination indicate – the null hypothesis of no relation is rejected. The question becomes whether assessment of socialism would still matter once peoples' position in the social structure is accounted for.

Controlling for Structural Determinants of Optimistic Future Orientations

Given the assumed distinction of the stratification structure from the class structure, I examine both the separate and the combined effects of social status and of social class. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 present the results for the regression of optimistic future orientations on assessment of socialism, controlling for position in the stratification structure, gender and age. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the effect of assessment of socialism once class is built into the equation, while in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 the effects of status and class are considered together.

Results in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show that social status affects individuals' perception of emerging opportunities and of their realization. As expected, both in 1993 and in 1998 better structural location increases one's optimism about the future as far opportunities and their fulfillment are concerned.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1993		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	5.681**	0.736	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.040	0.045	0.025
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.215**	0.044	-0.137
Gender	0.297**	0.077	0.106
Age	-0.121**	0.032	-0.843
Age^2	0.119**	0.035	0.769
Social Status	0.420**	0.039	0.301
Fit statistics	*F = 30.81 (df = 6)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.14*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05
N = 1139

Table 7.3: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1993 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988 & 1993), and Social Status in 1993, Controlling for Gender and Age

Compared to the other variables in the model, the effect of status on optimistic future orientations is the strongest. Nonetheless, having this determinant in the model leaves the basic relationship between evaluations of the past and prospective orientations relatively unaltered. What happens is that assessment of socialism in 1988, while still positively related to optimism, loses statistical significance.

Positive evaluations of the past after the systemic change, on the other hand, remain statistically significant, and continue to have a negative effect on optimistic future orientations. Unaffected by the introduction of the stratification variable are also the effects of gender and age. Like in the basic model, males differ significantly from women with regards to optimistic future orientations only in 1993 (although for 1998, the gender coefficient misses significance for one-tailed relation by very little—alpha = 0.13).

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1998		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	7.398**	1.351	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.045	0.058	0.025
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.216**	0.060	-0.125
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.260**	0.058	-0.157
Gender	0.147	0.101	0.047
Age	-0.104+	0.057	-0.529
Age^2	0.088	0.059	0.427
Social Status	0.322**	0.051	0.209
Fit statistics	*F = 17.33 (df = 7)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.12*		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05
N = 856

Table 7.4: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988, 1993 & 1998), and Social Status in 1998, Controlling for Gender and Age

The effect of age is non-linear both in 1993 and in 1998. While the proportion of variance explained continues to remain low, the null hypothesis of no relationship between assessment of socialism and prospective orientations is again rejected.

Next, I am interested in the class membership-prospective orientations relation. Informed by prior findings on winners and losers of the post-communist transition, I examine how belonging to privileged social groups—i.e. employers, managers and experts—or to a disadvantaged one—that is, manual workers and farmers—affects individuals' perceptions of opportunities *vs.* threats, and of possibilities for realization of plans. I contrast the privileged and the disadvantaged to a third group, consisting of supervisors, the self-employed and technicians. The latter are positioned relatively in the middle of the social hierarchy as far benefits and costs of the post-1989 transition are concerned, which justifies their choice as the reference category.

Not surprisingly, the effect of social class on optimistic future orientations is substantial and significant (Tables 7.5 and 7.6). In 1993 as well as in 1998, members of the privileged classes have a brighter outlook on the future than supervisors, the self-employed and technicians. Manual workers and farmers, on the other hand, see less opportunities and room for realization of future plans than does the comparison group.

Clearly, class location matters, but it does not wash out the effect of positive views of the past. While 1988 assessment of socialism is no longer significant, positive evaluations of socialism after the systemic change continue to have a negative, statistically significant effect on optimistic future orientations, controlling for peoples' demographics.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1993		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	4.805**	0.697	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.051	0.043	0.031
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.213**	0.041	-0.136
Gender	0.293**	0.075	0.103
Age	-0.079**	0.030	-0.542
Age^2	0.071*	0.032	0.456
Privileged Classes	0.583**	0.111	0.154
Disadvantaged Classes	-0.341**	0.085	-0.120
Fit statistics	*F = 21.02 (df = 7)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.09*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05
N = 1359

Table 7.5: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1993 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988 & 1993), and Social Class in 1993, Controlling for Gender and Age

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1998		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	7.369**	1.323	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.039	0.057	0.022
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.211**	0.059	-0.120
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.280**	0.056	-0.167
Gender	0.227*	0.101	0.073
Age	-0.098+	0.055	-0.493
Age^2	0.082	0.058	0.397
Privileged Classes	0.321*	0.134	0.084
Disadvantaged Classes	-0.531**	0.113	-0.169
Fit statistics	*F = 16.69 (df = 8)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.12*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 922

Table 7.6: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988, 1993 & 1998), and Social Class in 1998, Controlling for Gender and Age

It is interesting to notice that in 1998 sex differences with regards to degrees of optimism about the future remain statistically significant, as men perceive more opportunities and possibility for fulfillment of plans than women do. Nonetheless, its effect seems weaker than in 1993.

In Tables 7.7 and 7.8 social status and class location are modeled together. Since the two structural variables are strongly correlated, not everything can be expected to be statistically significant. The overall pattern of the relation between assessment of socialism and future orientations, however, holds: positive assessment of socialism after the systemic change has a negative, significant effect on optimistic future evaluations beyond the impact of social structure. The latter, as already seen, is an important determinant for prospective orientations.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1993		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	5.396**	0.765	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.052	0.047	0.032
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.217**	0.046	-0.139
Gender	0.247**	0.083	0.088
Age	-0.114**	0.033	-0.799
Age^2	0.113**	0.036	0.737
Social Status	0.446**	0.066	0.326
Privileged Classes	0.120	0.131	0.033
Disadvantaged Classes	0.155	0.121	0.055
Fit statistics	*F = 21.72 (df = 8)* *Adjusted R^2=0.14*		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05
N = 1063

Table 7.7: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1993 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988 & 1993), and Social Status and Social Class in 1993, Controlling for Gender and Age

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation,1998		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	7.562**	1.354	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.043	0.058	0.024
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.210**	0.060	-0.121
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.263**	0.058	-0.159
Gender	0.196+	0.105	0.063
Age	-0.108+	0.057	-0.549
Age^2	0.091	0.059	0.444
Social Status	0.212*	0.092	0.138
Privileged Classes	0.072	0.175	0.019
Disadvantaged Classes	-0.262+	0.152	-0.084
Fit statistics	*F = 13.83 (df = 9)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.12*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 856

Table 7.8: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988, 1993 & 1998), and Social Status and Social Class in 1998, Controlling for Gender and Age

Social status affects peoples' view of the future positively, and the effect is statistically significant. For privileged classes the coefficients are not significant, but in the expected direction. The coefficients for disadvantaged classes are in the right direction and significant one-tailed only for 1998. Thus, despite the low levels of variance explained, these findings are worthwhile looking at. They clearly indicate that the null hypothesis of no relation between evaluation of socialism and prospective orientations needs to be rejected even when structural determinants are accounted for.

Finally, I model the relationship between structural determinants and optimistic future orientations using pa panel regression analysis. Table 7.9 presents two models. Model 1 controls for estimated social class position and peoples' basic demographics. In Model 2 estimated class location and estimated social status are included together (see

Chapter 4 on measurement of estimated status and class). In both cases, I account for autocorrelation within panels, and use adjusted standard errors. Once more, the findings allow me to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between evaluation of the past and optimistic future orientations. Positive assessment of socialism lowers optimism about the new opportunities and the possibility to realize one's plans net of the effects of structural factors. The latter remain important determinants of individuals' future orientations, and we see that being better off in the social structure, whether in terms of class or stratification position, positively affects optimistic future orientations.

Independent variables	Optimistic Future Orientation			
	Model 1[a]		Model 2[b]	
	B	Semi-Robust SE	B	Semi-Robust SE
Evaluation of Socialism	-0.259**	0.033	-0.238**	0.036
Gender	0.257**	0.062	0.216*	0.068
Age	-0.069**	0.020	-0.087**	0.022
Age^2	0.001**	0.0001	0.001**	0.0002
Privileged Classes (estimated)	0.317**	0.091	0.003	0.118
Disadvantaged Classes (estimated)	-0.387**	0.074	-0.024	0.098
Social Status (estimated)			0.334**	0.056
Constant	5.054**	0.499	5.258**	0.542
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 203.48 (df = 6)* N = 1226		*Wald Chi2 = 219.42 (df = 7)* N = 1025	

[a] Estimated within-panel autocorrelation = 0.081; [b] Estimated within-panel autocorrelation = 0.058
**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10

Table 7.9: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientations on Evaluation of Socialism and Estimated Structural Location, controlling for Gender and Age

In addition, it is interesting to notice that the coefficients for both gender and age are statistically significant. Men perceive more opportunities and possibility for fulfillment of plans than women do. The effect of age is non-linear: initially we a negative relation, but after reaching a certain point, it tips over, and becomes positive.

Discussions and Conclusions

This chapter brings a turning point in my dissertation, in that empirical analyses start to be primarily concerned with the consequences of individual-level determinants for further structural outcomes. A main assumption I build on is that structurally determined evaluations of the past affect the location of people in the social structure mainly through their effects on prospective orientations. The purpose of this chapter was to assess the causal relation between positive assessment of socialism and future orientations expressed in terms of levels of optimism about new opportunities and the possibility to fulfill one's plans. I expected this relation to be rather weak, given the role of other determinants, such as individuals' basic demographics and, more importantly, their location in the social structure. Regression results for both 1993 and 1998, the two survey waves in which the data allow for measurement of the dependent variable, clearly show that the null hypothesis of no relation between assessment of socialism and prospective orientations needs to be rejected. Positive evaluation of socialism after the systemic change has a significant negative effect on optimistic future orientations, controlling for gender, age, and structural factors.

Regarding the role of gender, I suggest that the seeming irregularity in how this variable behaves across waves disappears if we look at the overall picture and consider the 1993 and 1998 models simultaneously (for status and social class, too). Then we can see that men perceive more opportunities and possibility for fulfillment of plans than women do. The reason this effect is more readily visible in 1993 than in 1998 is related to women worrying more about the future in times of greater hardship. The initial phase of the post-communist transformation (1989-1993) created a lot of economic hardships to

which women reacted in a particularly negative manner, by condemning the direction of economic reforms. During the advanced phase of the transformation (1993-1998), as economic reform settles, this kind of gender differences weaken but do not disappear.

The regression results regarding the effect of age are consistent in all models, showing a non-linear, U-shaped relation. We could interpret it as follows: the young are at the beginning of their occupational careers, as well as their social lives, and see in the time lying ahead significant room for realization of their plans. However, as people approach middle age they are experiencing many of the uncertainties (e.g. in terms of job security) and downsides (growing inequality) of post-communism (we should remember that the analysis refers to Poland 1993-1998—that is, a context of significant restructuring). For those with small children, such feelings of anxiety could be even more acute. Older people, on the other hand, may be less concerned with themselves, but rather project attitudes about the future in terms of the opportunities that will open for their children and grandchildren, wherefrom their higher levels of optimism.

Clearly, optimistic future orientations depend in significant way on individuals' location in the social structure. The finding that in the models examining the combined effects of social status and of class position not all stratification variables are significant is due to their strong correlation. By and large, belonging to the 'winners' of the post-communist transition (in terms of social status and/or privileged classes) has a positive effect on optimistic future orientations, whereas belonging to the category of 'losers' lowers one's optimism about the future.

These findings conform to the expectation grounded in rational action theory (Goldthorpe 1998) that gains and losses associated with the location of persons in the social structure affect how people react to social and political change (Rose et al. 1998, Slomczynski 2002).

CHAPTER 8

DETERMINATS OF OPTIMISTIC FUTURE ORIENTATIONS: EXTENDED MODELS

Empirical results in Chapter 4 show that peoples' different attitudes towards the socialist regime depend in significant way on past and current contextual effects. It is reasonable to expect that the social context would also affect peoples' attitudes towards the future. This chapter examines the role of past political biographies and peoples' friendship networks for their future orientations, and whether these determinants wash out the effect of evaluation of the past. In the analyses to follow I chose to include age instead of historical generation: while early adulthood experience with a qualitatively different social/political event affects collective memory (Schuman and Scott 1989, Schuman and Corning 2000), for appraisals of the future a person's age at the time of the survey should be more relevant.

In addition, I examine the influence of attitudes towards state paternalism on prospective orientations. Earlier empirical analyses indicate that individuals, in an attempt to reduce cognitive inconsistencies, tend to adjust their opinions of socialism to correspond closer to their priory-expressed opinions about the normative role of the welfare state.

Also, when five- and ten-years intervals are considered state paternalism at the earlier stage has a positive, significant effect on later evaluation of socialism (Chapter 5). Given these findings, it is logical to inquire whether positive assessment of socialism would continue to decrease the level of optimistic future orientations in the presence of state paternalism.

Extended Models

One of the main research expectations in my dissertation is that structurally determined evaluations of the past influence further structural outcomes mainly through prospective orientations. This implies that positive assessment of socialism after the systemic change would affect optimistic future orientations above and beyond the effects of the other important determinants, such as structural and contextual variables, state paternalism and peoples' demographics. I examine whether this is so following three steps: first, I deal with the small-group determinants, in a basic model, and in a more extended one, which accounts for evaluation of socialism, structural factors, and peoples' basic demographics. Second, I analyze the effects of assessment of socialism on optimistic future orientations in the presence of state paternalism. In the third part, I bring all these determinants together. The final extended model assesses whether evaluation of socialism continues to influence optimistic orientations in significant way when structural and contextual effects, state paternalism and basic demographics are included.

Findings

The Effects of Friendship Networks and Past Political Biographies

Table 8.5 presents the regression results of 1998 optimistic future orientations on friendship networks and past political biographies, controlling for the non-linear effect of age. While none of the friendship variables is significant, three out of four coefficients for the political biographies variables are.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1998		
	B	SE	BETA
Constant	4.854**	0.742	
Friendship Networks			
No. of Friends, 1998	-0.001	0.002	0.009
No. of Potential bridges, 1998	0.001	0.001	0.040
Past Political Biography			
Solidarity members	0.209*	0.093	0.058
Solidarity Sympathizers	0.257*	0.128	0.050
Pro-Solidarity CP members	-0.227	0.182	-0.032
Traditional CP members	0.263*	0.133	0.049
Age	-0.062*	0.029	-0.487
Age^2	0.049+	0.027	0.415
Fit statistics	*F = 3.02 (df = 8)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.01*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 1729

Tables 8.1: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998 on Friendship Networks and Political Biographies, Controlling for Age

Compared to individuals with no with political involvement, respondents who prior to 1989 were Solidarity members or Solidarity sympathizers have, at the time of the survey, more optimistic future orientations. The same holds for traditional membership in the communist party. However, the overall relationship between these small-group

determinants and future orientations is very weak: the model explains only one percent of the variance in the dependent variable.

A more complex regression model is presented in Tables 8.2, which brings evaluation of socialism and structural determinants back into the picture. It is remarkable that in this model the 'Pro-Solidarity CP members' variable is the only contextual variable whose coefficient is significant.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation,1998		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	7.531**	1.373	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.044	0.058	0.025
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.200**	0.061	-0.116
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.260**	0.058	-0.157
Gender	0.189+	0.109	0.061
Age	-0.110+	0.057	-0.558
Age^2	0.093	0.060	0.455
Social Status	0.198*	0.094	0.128
Privileged Classes	0.106	0.177	0.028
Disadvantaged Classes	-0.291+	0.153	-0.093
Friendship Networks			
No. of Potential bridges, 1998	0.002	0.001	0.048
Past Political Biography			
Solidarity members	0.076	0.128	0.021
Solidarity Sympathizers	0.054	0.163	0.012
Pro-Solidarity CP members	-0.410+	0.250	-0.056
Traditional CP members	-0.011	0.211	-0.002
Fit statistics	*F = 9.19 (df =14)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.12*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 855

Tables 8.2: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998: The Initial Extended Model

In brief, positive evaluation of socialism after the systemic change has a negative significant effect on optimistic future orientations, even when friendship networks, past political biographies, structural variables and age are accounted for. What happens, however, when state paternalism is also accounted for? Will inclusion of this variable eliminate the effects of evaluation of socialism? The next section aims to answer these questions.

The Effects of State Paternalism

For 1993 optimistic future orientations, the presence of state paternalism eliminates the effect of evaluation of the past (Tables 8.3).

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1993		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	5.006**	1.196	
Evaluation of Socialism, 1988	-0.013	0.075	-0.008
Evaluation of Socialism, 1993	-0.097	0.079	-0.062
Gender	0.252+	0.136	0.091
Age	-0.097	0.051	-0.713
Age^2	0.085	0.055	0.591
Social Status	0.306**	0.112	0.230
Privileged Classes	0.094	0.213	0.028
Disadvantaged Classes	0.130	0.196	0.047
State Paternalism, 1988	-0.004	0.066	-0.003
State Paternalism, 1993	-0.280**	0.077	-0.208
Fit statistics	*F = 8.33 (df = 10)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.16*		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05; N = 381

Tables 8.3: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1993 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988, 1993), Social Status and Social Class (1993), State Paternalism (1988, 1993), Gender and Age.

Since the negative coefficient for 1993 state paternalism is statistically significant, I conclude that in 1993 attitudes towards state paternalism represent a more powerful determinant of future orientations than attitudes towards the socialist regime.

Table 8.4 presents corresponding analyses for 1998. Since persons who were optimistic in 1993 may be so again in five years later, two sets of regression results are reported. Model 1 controls for prior optimism, model 2 does not. In both instances, findings are noticeably different from the 1993 results and concern the role of evaluation of socialism and of structural determinants.

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1998					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Constant	10.104**	1.824		10.624**	1.782	
Evaluation of Socialism, 1993	-0.080	0.081	-0.047	-0.105	0.082	-0.062
Evaluation of Socialism, 1998	-0.255**	0.079	-0.157	-0.261**	0.080	-0.161
Gender	0.009	0.139	0.003	0.079	0.140	0.026
Age	-0.239	0.075	-1.273	-0.237	0.074	-1.272
Age^2	0.223**	0.077	1.155	0.215**	0.076	2.855
Social Status	0.009	0.126	0.006	0.037	0.127	0.771
Privileged Classes	-0.072	0.233	-0.019	-0.018	0.236	-0.005
Disadvantaged Classes	-0.282	0.197	-0.091	-0.293	0.200	-0.095
Optimistic future orientations, 1993	0.193**	0.052	0.176			
State Paternalism, 1993	-0.115	0.075	-0.080	-0.149*	0.075	-0.104
State Paternalism, 1998	-0.121+	0.074	-0.083	-0.164*	0.074	-0.113
Fit statistics	*F = 9.34 (df = 11)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.17*			*F = 8.51 (df = 10)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.14*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
Model 1: N = 451; Model 2: N = 454

Tables 8.4: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998 on Evaluation of Socialism (1993 & 1998), Social Status and Social Class (1998), State Paternalism (1993 & 1998), and of Prior Optimistic Future Orientation (1993)

The coefficient for positive assessment of socialism in 1998 remains significant when state paternalism is accounted for. In the presence of attitudes towards the welfare state, however, none of the stratification variables is significant any longer.

To examine whether this situation is due to the high correlation between social status, class location and the state paternalism variables, Tables 8.5 presents the separate effects of social status and of class on optimistic future orientations in 1998, controlling for the other factors of interest.

The coefficient for social status remains non-significant even after the class variables are removed (Model 1 in Tables 8.5).

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation, 1998					
	Model 1 with Social Status			Model 2 with Social Class		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Constant	9.993**	1.823		9.837**	1.778	
Evaluation of Socialism, 1993	-0.085	0.081	-0.050	-0.092	0.079	-0.054
Evaluation of Socialism, 1998	-0.250**	0.079	-0.154	-0.253**	0.076	-0.154
Gender	-0.045	0.134	-0.015	0.026	0.135	0.008
Age	-0.238	0.075	-1.267	-0.231	0.073	-1.208
Age^2	0.222**	0.077	1.147	0.219**	0.076	1.110
Social Status	0.087	0.078	0.057			
Privileged Classes				-0.080	0.185	-0.021
Disadvantaged Classes				-0.370*	0.152	-0.118
Optimistic Future Orientations, 1993	0.191**	0.052	0.175	0.200**	0.050	0.180
State Paternalism, 1993	-0.111	0.074	-0.078	-0.117+	0.070	-0.083
State Paternalism, 1998	-0.124+	0.074	-0.085	-0.132+	0.070	-0.091
Fit statistics	*F = 11.15 (df = 9)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.17*			*F = 11.57 (df = 10)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.18*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
Model 1: N = 451; Model 2: N = 482

Table 8.5: Regression of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998 on Selected Independent Variables, Controlling for Prior Optimistic Future Orientations (1993)

Results in Model 2 show that without status, the effect of belonging to the disadvantaged classes reaches statistical significance. Compared to supervisors, the self-employed and technicians, skilled and unskilled manual workers as well as farmers are less optimistic about emerging opportunities and the possibility of fulfilling one's plans. Structural factors aside, the two models yield similar findings (in terms of sign, magnitude and significance of coefficients) for the other included variables.

The Final Extended Model

To round up all the factors that so far have proven relevant for explaining differences in peoples' attitudes towards the future, and to see how they work together, I regress optimistic future orientations in 1998 on assessment of socialism, controlling for respondents' current position in the social structure, for small-group (friendship networks and past political biographies) and for psychological (attitudes towards the welfare state and 1993 optimistic future orientations) determinants, as well as for peoples' basic demographics (gender and age). The results of the final extended model are shown in Tables 8.6.

First and foremost, the reader should notice that positive evaluation of the past at the time of the survey has a negative significant effect on optimism about the future in the presence of all the other determinants. This allows me once more to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between evaluation of the past and prospective orientations.

As we would expect based on the premises of rational action theory, the location of individuals in the social structure affects how optimistic people are about future opportunities. 'Losers' of the post-communist transition have less optimistic future

orientations compared to supervisors, the self-employed and technicians. The other two structural variables are not significant, but this is to be expected given the high correlation of social status and class position. A possible explanation for why 'the disadvantaged groups' is the significant structural determinant among the three included, is that losses are generally experienced more intensely than gains (Crano and Prislin 2006).

Independent variables	Optimistic future orientation,1998		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	9.674**	1.856	
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.081	0.083	-0.048
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.250**	0.080	-0.154
Gender	0.002	0.145	0.001
Age	-0.222	0.076	-1.187
Age^2	0.207**	0.078	1.071
Social Status	-0.026	0.128	-0.017
Privileged Classes	-0.048	0.236	-0.013
Disadvantaged Classes	-0.342+	0.199	-0.111
Friendship Networks			
No. of Potential bridges, 1998	0.003+	0.002	0.076
Past Political Biography			
Solidarity members	-0.064	0.172	-0.018
Solidarity Sympathizers	0.161	0.224	0.034
Pro-Solidarity CP members	-0.427	0.330	-0.059
Traditional CP members	-0.017	0.264	-0.003
Optimism, 1993	0.204**	0.052	0.187
State Paternalism, 1993	-0.104	0.075	-0.073
State Paternalism, 1998	-0.125+	0.074	-0.086
Fit statistics	*F = 9.19 (df =16)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.17*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 450

Tables 8.6: Determinants of Optimistic Future Orientation in 1998: The Final Extended Model

Regarding the role of small-group determinants, it is interesting to notice that number of potential bridges in a person's friendship networks has a positive (significant one-tailed) effect on optimistic future orientations. In this model, none of the coefficients for past political biographies are significant.

Attitudinal determinants, on the other hand, matter: optimistic orientations in 1993 increase the level of optimism five years later. Positive attitudes towards state paternalism at the time of the survey have a negative effect, significant one-tailed.

As far as peoples' demographics are concerned, controlling for all the other factors, in 1998 I find no gender differences in optimistic future orientations. The effect of age is significant, and non-linear: after an initial negative effect, getting older affects optimistic future orientations positively.

Another aspect I was interested in was whether other variables could potentially eliminate the effects of evaluation of the past. Given the high level of religious homogeneity and of reported religiosity among Poles, as well as the connection between Catholicism and national identity in Poland, I took into consideration the possibility that religion may shape the way people see the future. The POLPAN data provides information on respondents' religious identity and frequency of mass attendance for 1988, 1998 and 2003, but not for 1993. Optimistic future orientations, on the other hand, cannot be measured for neither for 1988 nor for 2003. Thus, I focused on the 1998 survey wave and used correlations to explore the relationship between religion, measured through church membership and mass attendance, and optimistic future orientations. The correlation coefficients were not significant (results not shown).

To complete the analysis of determinants of optimism, I examine the main relationships using panel regression with specification for within-panel correlation, and with adjusted standard errors. Table 8.7 presents the findings of the final extended model. The reader should notice that I have omitted the network variables. As seen so far, the 'close friends' variable is not significant in the presence of other contextual effects. As for the number of structural holes, this variable cannot be included in the panel regression equation due to measurement constraints (the dependent variable can be measured for 1993 and 1998 only, whereas the 'structural holes' variable only for 1998 and 2003).

Independent variables	Optimistic Future Orientations [a]	
	B	Robust SE
Evaluation of Socialism	-0.260**	0.053
Gender	0.241*	0.103
Age	-0.102**	0.032
Age^2	0.001**	0.0003
Social Status (estimated)	0.200**	0.081
Privileged Classes (estimated)	-0.220	0.162
Disadvantaged Classes (estimated)	-0.210	0.137
Past Political Biography		
Solidarity members	-0.039	0.124
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.044	0.187
Pro-Solidarity CP members	-0.389*	0.180
Traditional CP members	-0.146	0.163
State Paternalism	-0.222**	0.054
Constant	5.830**	0.775
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 149.72 (df = 12)*	

[a] Estimated within-panel autocorrelation = 0.070;
** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05; + p > 0.10
N = 517

Tables 8.7: Determinants of Optimistic Future Orientation: The Panel Regression Model

By and large, the panel regression results in Table 8.7 are similar to those in Table 8.6. Nonetheless, a few differences stand out: first, the coefficient for gender is significant, showing that men perceive more opportunities about the future than women do. Second, the pro-solidarity CP member variable is significant. With estimated structural location variables in the model, it is the positive effect of social status that is statistically significant.

Conclusions

The finding that retrospective assessment of socialism continues to act on the dependent variable even after structural factors, past and current contextual effects, and other attitudinal determinants are accounted for demonstrates that the negative effect of positive evaluations of the past on optimistic future orientations is robust. In the context of my interest in attitudinal variables, noteworthy is also the role of positive attitudes towards state paternalism. The latter affects the dependent variable negatively and is the only factor that eliminates—for 1993 only—the effect of assessment of socialism.

Individuals' basic demographics behave in these analyses in the same way as they did when focus was on the effect of evaluations of the past (Chapter 7). In short, men perceive more opportunities and possibilities for fulfillment of future plans than women do. Age continues to have a non-linear U-shaped relation to optimistic future orientations that is significant in all models.

Finally, I return once more to the issue of attitudinal determinants, to highlight the implications of having been able to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between evaluation of the past and prospective orientations even when structural factors,

contextual effects and other attitudinal determinants were accounted for. This finding suggests that in Poland, and by extrapolation in other European post-communist countries, understanding the legacy of the past and its consequences requires one to look beyond 'typical' socio-economic outcomes, such as institutional inefficiency, dysfunctional economies and weak civil societies; at the individual level, the former socialist regime continues to affect peoples' lives by representing a main yardstick against which individuals assess their accomplishments, and induces a state of mind that directly affects how opportunities and threats embedded in the future are perceived. The link between attitudes towards the past and how people respond to their environment is of great interest to me, given the effect of the subjectively conceived future on actual behavior (see Zuckier, 1986; Lens and Moreas, 1994). This latter aspect represents the subject of inquiry in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 9

THE EFFECTS OF OPTIMISTIC FUTURE ORIENTATIONS ON LOCATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Individuals' prospective orientations are the main route through which evaluations of the past influence further structural outcomes. The theory as to why future orientations should determine structural location is detailed in Chapter 1. To reiterate briefly, I expand the argument that people decide to pursue actions that would result in job mobility based on their evaluation of subjective norms, the desirability of the mobility option, and their believes that they can successfully make the transition from one job to another (Ng et al. 2006, p. 1 and p. 14). The latter element speaks directly to the assumed relation between future orientations and individuals' location in the social structure, because it refers to individuals' efficacy beliefs and their perceived control over the environment. People who are optimistic about the future may be psychologically more ready to engage in actions that lead to upward mobility than those with pessimistic future orientations. In addition, literature in psychology links subjective expectations and evaluations of the future to individuals' decision-making processes, especially with regard to goal-oriented striving and strategies for dealing with uncertainties, like preference for delayed gratification, readiness for investing, and risk assumption (Zuckier 1986; Lens and Moreas 1994).

I expect prospective orientations to mediate the role of evaluation of the past in affecting further structural outcomes above and beyond the role of 'traditional' determinants of occupational achievement. I have already provided empirical support for optimistic future orientations being grounded in Poles' retrospective assessment of socialism (Chapter 7 and 8); now I need to show that attitudes towards the future influence socioeconomic status and class position over time, generally mediating the effect of assessment of socialism. Since status attainment research often operationalizes gains in status in terms of income mobility, I first test the null hypothesis of no relation between optimistic future orientations and income attainment when evaluation of socialism is present. The second part of the analyses deals with the role of optimistic future orientations for membership in the privileged classes, which comprise the categories of employers, of managers and of experts. Third, I examine how prospective orientations act, in turn, on income and on class position, in the presence of two other important determinants, state paternalism and education. Since future orientations can be measured in 1993 and 1998 only, and I am interested in this variable's effect on intragenerational mobility, all analyses in this chapter examine structural outcomes in 1998 and 2003, respectively.

The Mediating Effect of Optimistic Future Orientations on Income Attainment

The purpose of this section is to assess how individuals' view of the future at time *t* affects their income at time *t+1*, after evaluation of the past is accounted for. The income variables are based on respondents' total individual income. To avoid any

problems that could follow from the dramatic metric changes the Polish national currency (the zloty) underwent between 1988 and 2003, the income variables were originally expressed in z-scores. Because income is skewed, I use the logarithmic transformation log (z*10+50). I have also experimented with other transformations, especially the cubic root of income. Analyses performed on the cubic root of income produced very similar results to those performed on the log of income. Thus, I chose the most common transformation of income—that is, the logarithmic function. For the present analysis, I use the more refined distribution of five-category evaluation of socialism.

Figure 9.1 summarizes the mechanism by which (a) income at time *t*, Y_t, (b) evaluation of the past at time *t,* P_t, and (c) optimistic future orientations at time *t*, F_t, are causally related to (d) income at time *t+1,* Y_{t+1}. Theoretically, evaluation of the past (P) determines evaluations of the future (F). There may be some feedback between P and F, but it does not influence the estimates of direct effects of both these variables on Y_{t+1}.



Figure 9.1: Assumed relationships between initial income, evaluation of the past, future orientations and current income.

Given the measurement constraints on prospective orientations, and the variable's expected over-time effect, I examine the basic model in Figure 9.1 with regards to respondents' income attainment in 1998 and in 2003, respectively.

The Effect of Future Orientations on Income in 1998

The two models in Table 9.1 correspond to the regression of income on assessment of socialism without and with optimistic orientations in the equation. If the relation between the independent and the dependent variables is to confirm my expectations, then outlooks on the future, once included, should be significant and most likely should mediate the effect of evaluation of the past. Results indicate that this is indeed the case: Model 1 shows that, controlling for previous income, positive assessment of socialism in 1993 has a negative, significant, effect on income in 1998.

Independent variables	Income 1998 in logarithmic form					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Constant	3.933**	0.016		3.896**	0.018	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	-0.001	0.004	-0.006	-0.002	0.004	-0.010
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.009*	0.004	-0.057	-0.006	0.004	-0.038
Income 1988	0.011**	0.004	0.080	0.010**	0.004	0.068
Income 1993	0.066**	0.004	0.427	0.063**	0.004	0.411
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1993				0.014**	0.003	0.132
Fit statistics	*F = 80.18 (df =4)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.21*			*F = 69.88 (df =5)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.23*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05
Model 1: N = 1179; Model 2: N = 1170

Table 9.1: Regression of Income in 1998 on Evaluation of Socialism (1988 & 1993), Controlling for Income (1988 & 1993), without and with Optimistic Future Orientations (1993) in the Equation

Yet, once optimistic future orientations are included, the coefficients for evaluation of the past, while in the right direction cease to be significant. Optimistic future orientations in 1993, on the other hand, positively affect income in 1998, and their effect is substantive and statistically significant.

Including individuals' demographics does not change these findings (Table 9.2). The effect of age is modeled as non-linear to correspond to the well-documented inverted U-shape relation between aging and income. For 1998, neither of the demographic variables is significant. Overall, the model captures the relationships between the variables of interest pretty well, as it explains 23% of the variance in individuals' income.

Independent variables	Income 1998 in logarithmic form		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	3.907**	0.081	
Evaluation of Socialism 1988	0.000	0.004	-0.003
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.005	0.004	-0.031
Income 1988	0.009*	0.004	0.068
Income 1993	0.062**	0.004	0.403
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1993	0.013**	0.003	0.128
Gender	-0.001	0.008	-0.005
Age	0.000	0.003	0.030
Age squared	-0.001	0.003	-0.110
Fit statistics	*F = 45.12 (df =8)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.23*		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05
N = 1170

Table 9.2: Regression of Income in 1998 on Optimistic Future Orientation (1993) and Other Selected Variables: A Generic Model

The Effect of Future Orientations on Income in 2003

The results of the 2003 analysis are very similar to what we have seen for 1998, namely the significant (negative) effect of assessment of socialism in 1998 is washed out when 1998 optimistic future orientations are introduced (Table 9.3). The latter, as expected, have a positive, significant effect on income in 2003.

Independent variables	Income 2003 in logarithmic form					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Constant	3.950**	0.026		3.872**	0.033	
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.015+	0.009	-0.077	-0.010	0.009	-0.048
Income 1993	0.074**	0.008	0.482	0.072**	0.008	0.466
Income 1998	0.018**	0.006	0.164	0.017**	0.006	0.150
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1998				0.018**	0.005	0.159
Fit statistics	*F = 68.46 (df =3)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.37*			*F = 56.35 (df =4)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.39*		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05; + p > 0.1
Model 1: N = 352; Model 2: N = 351.

Table 9.3: Regression of Income in 2003 on Evaluation of Socialism in 1998, Controlling for Income in 1993, without and with Optimistic Future Orientations (1998) in the Equation

Also, the coefficients for gender and age are not significant (Table 9.4). Like in 1998, the important determinants are prior income and optimistic future orientations. Overall, the proportion of variance explained is slightly higher in the 2003 model: the independent variables explain almost 40 percent of the variance in income.

Independent variables	Income 2003 in logarithmic form		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	3.705**	0.257	
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	0.000	0.010	-0.002
Evaluation of Socialism 1998	-0.007	0.009	-0.036
Income 1993	0.072**	0.008	0.465
Income 1998	0.016**	0.006	0.145
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1993	0.011+	0.006	0.089
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1998	0.015**	0.005	0.129
Gender	-0.001	0.016	-0.004
Age	0.007	0.010	0.279
Age squared	-0.008	0.009	-0.338
Fit statistics	*F = 25.63 (df =9)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.39*		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05; + p > 0.1
N = 348

Table 9.4: Regression of Income in 2003 on Optimistic Future Orientation (1993 and 1998) and Other Selected Variables: A Generic Model

In conclusion, the null hypothesis of no relationship between optimistic future orientations and subsequent material well-being, expressed in terms of individuals' income, needs to be rejected. Empirical results for both 1998 and 2003 strongly support the expectations that peoples' optimistic future orientations matter net of structural variables, and that they act as an intervening variable between evaluation of socialism and further income attainment.

Optimistic Future Orientations and Social Class Position

I examine the role of peoples' prospective orientations on their later position in the social class structure through logistic regression analysis of privileged class position at time *t+1* on optimistic future orientations at time *t*, controlling for prior class location, without and with controls for gender and age. As in the prior analyses, the privileged

classes consist of the categories of employers, managers, and experts. The dependent variable, membership in the privileged classes, is defined as logarithm (p / 1 – p), where *p* is the probability of belonging to the privileged classes.

The Effect of Future Orientations on Class Position in 1998

Results for 1998 are presented in Table 9.5. They clearly indicate that people who are optimistic about new opportunities and the possibility of realizing their plans in the future have significantly higher chances of belonging to the privileged classes five years down the line. For interpretation purposes, it is useful to remember that the variable optimistic future orientations is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where a score of 1 indicates the lowest level, and a score of 5 the highest level of optimism (Chapter 3; 7).

Independent variables	Privileged Classes, 1998 DV = log (p /p-1)					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism, 1993	-0.763**	0.257	0.466	-0.620*	0.267	0.538
Privileged Classes, 1988	3.041**	0.232	20.931	2.958**	0.237	19.254
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1993				0.289**	0.071	1.335
Constant	-1.878**	0.127	0.153	-2.654**	0.243	0.070
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 649.14* $R^2 = 0.23$			*-2LH = 628.33* $R^2 = 0.25$		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05
Model 1: N = 842; Model 2: N = 835

Table 9.5: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes in 1998 on Positive Assessment of Socialism in 1998, Controlling for Social Class Position in 1988, without and with Optimistic Future Orientations (1993) in the Equation

Hence, its corresponding beta exponent can be interpreted as follows: each level increase in optimism (in1993) produces a 34% increase in one's likelihood of being an employer, a manager or an expert in 1998 (Table 9.5, Model 2); consequently, individuals scoring 5 on optimistic future orientations have 136% higher chances to be in the privileged classes in 1998, compared to people who scored 1 on the optimism variable.

Optimistic future orientations act on the dependent variable above and beyond the effect of prior class location, and of peoples' basic demographics (Table 9.6). In this regard, the income and the class models are alike. But there are also some differences.

Independent variables	Privileged Classes, 1998 DV = log (p /p-1)		
	B	SE	Exp(B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism, 1993	-0.609*	0.267	0.544
Privileged Classes, 1988	2.920**	0.242	18.545
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1993	0.311**	0.072	1.364
Gender	-0.249	0.212	0.780
Age	0.268*	0.131	1.308
Age squared	-0.262*	0.134	0.769
Constant	-9.214**	3.161	0.000
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 621.75* $R^2 = 0.25$		

*p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1
N = 835

Table 9.6: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes in 1998 on Optimistic Future Orientations (1993), Controlling for Social Class Position in 1988, Positive Assessment of Socialism in 1993, Gender and Age.

Especially interesting is the finding that 1993 positive evaluations of the past decrease the likelihood of belonging to the privileged classes in 1998 significant way, after optimism and demographics are included. Also, the effect of age is significant; it assumes, as expected, an inverted u-shape relation to income attainment.

The Effect of Future Orientations on Class Position in 2003

Logistic regression analysis for 2003 yields slightly different results, in that positive assessment of socialism is not significant even in the absence of optimistic future orientations (Table 9.7, Model 1).

Independent variables	Privileged Classes, 2003, DV = log (p /p-1)					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism, 1998	-0.468	0.327	0.626	-0.181	0.342	0.834
Privileged Classes, 1993	2.791**	0.286	16.294	2.742**	0.293	15.525
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1998				0.329**	0.093	1.389
Constant	-1.819**	0.173	0.162	-3.053**	0.413	0.047
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 385.01* $R^2 = 0.23$			*-2LH = 371.13* $R^2 = 0.25$		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05
Model 1: N = 461; Model 2: N = 460

Table 9.7: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes in 2003 on Positive Assessment of Socialism in 1998, Controlling for Social Class Position in 1993, without and with Optimistic Future Orientations (1998) in the Equation.

Optimistic future orientations in 1998, on the other hand, have a positive, significant effect on privileged class location in 2003, controlling for prior privileged position, but also for prior income, and for peoples' demographics (Table 9.8). While in 2003 the coefficients for age are not significant, I find that men are less likely to be in the

category of employers, experts or managers than are women. This result can be explained in the following way: during the initial phase of systemic transformation women were particularly hardly hit by economic restructuring, and their possibility for upward mobility was very much suppressed. The second phase of transition in Poland was characterized by increased economic stability, and under the new circumstances, women were able to take advantage of economic opportunities. However, their higher chances of belonging to winner categories than men need to be interpreted in the context of controlling for prior structural location.

Independent variables	Privileged Classes, 2003, DV = log (p /p-1)		
	B	SE	Exp(B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism, 1998	-0.209	0.358	0.811
Privileged Classes, 1993	2.451**	0.314	11.606
Income, 1998	0.460**	0.149	1.585
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1998	0.305**	0.101	1.356
Gender	-0.606*	0.288	0.546
Age	0.075	0.168	1.1078
Age squared	-0.056	0.177	0.946
Constant	-4.863	4.002	0.008
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 338.68* $R^2 = 0.27$		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1
N = 428

Table 9.8: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes in 2003 on Optimistic Future Orientations (1998), Controlling for Social Class Position in 1993, Positive Assessment of Socialism in 1998, Income in 1998, Gender and Age.

To get a better sense of how prospective orientations relate to class location, Figures 9.2 and 9.3 display the predicted probability of being an employer, a manger or an expert in 1998 and in 2003, based on optimistic future orientations in 1993 and in 1998, respectively.

The graphic representations for both time periods tell the same story, namely that higher scores on optimistic future evaluations are associated with higher chances of either remaining or entering into the privileged classes. Not surprisingly, it is much more likely for a person who started out as privileged at time *t*, to find himself/herself in a similar position at time *t+1* (as compared to individuals who did not belong there at time *t*). Nonetheless, in both situations people scoring higher on optimism about the future have better chances at being in the privileged classes.

For example, looking at the graph depicting the probability of belonging to the privileged classes in 2003 based on optimistic future orientations in 1998, the reader can see that people belonging to the privileged groups in 1998 who score highest on optimism (score of 5) have a .78 probability of social inheritance in 2003, versus a .6 probability for those who also start out as privileged, but who are pessimistic about the future (score of 1).



Figure 9.2: The Probability of Belonging to the Privileged Classes in 1998 based on Optimistic Future Orientations in 1993



Figure 9.3: The Probability of Belonging to the Privileged Classes in 2003 based on Optimistic Future Orientations in 1998

In sum, empirical results for the 1998 and the 2003 periods show that optimistic future orientations are important determinants for peoples' subsequent location in the privileged classes. For example, net of other factors, for each level increase in optimism in 1998 there is a 36% increase in the probability of belonging to the categories of employers, of managers or experts in 2003. Put differently, compared to those scoring lowest on optimistic future orientations, people scoring highest on this variable in 1998 have 144% higher chances of being in the privileged classes in 2003, independently of structural factors, assessment of socialism, gender and age (see Table 9.8). According to the Cox and Snell R^2 values, the 1998 and 2003 models explain between 25 and 27 percent of the variance in belonging to the privileged classes.

What happens, however, when yet another important determinant dealing with the legacy of the past, state paternalism, is also introduced? Will the positive effect of prospective orientations remain significant, especially if we control for differences in peoples' education? The next section aims to answer these questions.

The Extended Models: The Role of Prospective Orientations in the Presence of State Paternalism and Education

In chapter 7 I have shown that prospective orientations are grounded in the legacy of the past, which, on attitudinal level, is manifest in positive evaluations of the pre-1989 socialist regime, but also in positive attitudes towards state paternalism. With the latter an important determinant of optimistic future orientations (their negative effect was both substantive and significant), the question arises of whether peoples' views of the future would still matter for their location in the social structure when the state paternalism variables are present.

To answer it, models for 1998 and 2003 are estimated, which deal, in turn, with income and class position as the dependent variable. In addition to the factors examined in Section 2 and to state paternalism, these equations also account for the effect of education, a "traditional" determinant of social attainment. For as long as the relations between the assessment of socialism variables and structural factors, on one hand, and the dependent variable on the other hand, does not change significantly from the results presented in Section 2, the discussion of the findings in the following sub-sections will focus on the relationship between optimism and income/class location in the context of the newly added variables and their effects.

Future Orientations and Income, with State Paternalism and Education Included

The results in Table 9.9 prove that optimistic future orientations act on the dependent variable beyond the effects of state paternalism and education. The latter also count for explaining individuals' income attainment. Holding positive attitudes towards the normative role of the state affects income negatively (the coefficient is significant one-tailed). The coefficient for years of education is, as expected, positive and significant. This regression model finds no significant gender or age differences in earnings.

By and large, the pattern of relations between the independent variables and income is the same in 2003 (Table 9.10). Optimistic future orientations have an over-time effect on income attainment, that is substantive and significant net of the other factors, state paternalism and education included. While state paternalism is no longer significant, education remains an important determinant of income attainment.

Independent variables	Income 1998 in logarithmic form		
	B	SE	Beta
Constant	3.757**	0.122	
Evaluation of Socialism, 1988	-0.001	0.006	-0.004
Evaluation of Socialism, 1993	0.001	0.006	0.008
State Paternalism, 1993	-0.011+	0.006	-0.078
Income, 1988	-0.003	0.006	0.019
Income, 1993	0.063**	0.006	0.417
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1993	0.008*	0.004	0.075
Education (in years), 1988	0.005**	0.002	0.119
Gender	0.005	0.012	0.019
Age	0.004	0.004	0.285
Age squared	-0.004	0.004	-0.337
Fit statistics	*F = 14.97 (df = 10)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.27*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1
N = 590

Table 9.9: Regression of Income in 1998 on Optimistic Future Orientations (1993), Controlling for Assessment of Socialism (1988; 1993), State Paternalism (1993), and Other Selected Variables

Independent variables	Income 2003 in logarithmic form					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
Constant	3.533**	0.234		3.338**	0.313	
Evaluation of Socialism 1993	-0.007	0.008	-0.034	0.009	0.012	0.043
State Paternalism, 1993				-0.026	0.011	-0.147
Income 1993	0.058**	0.006	0.422	0.056**	0.008	0.436
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1998	0.016**	0.005	0.138	0.014*	0.007	0.114
Education (in years), 1993	0.018**	0.002	0.352	0.015**	0.003	0.283
Gender	0.028+	0.015	0.075	0.019	0.020	0.052
Age	0.006	0.009	0.218	0.013	0.012	0.515
Age squared	-0.007	0.009	-0.286	-0.014	0.011	-0.583
Fit statistics	*F = 43.45 (df = 7)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.47*			*F = 22.46 (df =8)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.47*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.01
Model 1: N = 369; Model 2: N = 197

Table 9.10: Regression of Income in 2003 on Optimistic Future Orientations (1998), Controlling for Assessment of Socialism (1993) and Other Selected Variables

Future Orientations and Class Position, with State Paternalism and Education Included[9]

Accounting for the role of state paternalism and of education for belonging to the privileged classes in 1998 produces important differences form the models examined so far (Table 9.11). It is the first instance in which the coefficient of optimistic future orientations is not significant. It is also the first instance in which the influence of all attitudinal factors pertaining to the legacy of the past is significant net of the other variables included.

Independent variables	Privileged Classes 1998, DV = log (p /p-1)		
	B	SE	Exp(B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism, 1988	0.646^{+}	0.339	1.909
Positive Assessment of Socialism, 1993	-1.010*	0.453	0.364
State Paternalism, 1993	-0.488**	0.156	0.614
Privileged Classes, 1988	1.470**	0.396	4.348
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1993	0.148	0.116	1.160
Tertiary Education, 1988	1.822**	0.360	6.186
Elementary Education, 1988	-1.650	1.046	0.192
Gender	-0.279	0.339	0.757
Age	0.214	0.185	1.239
Age squared	-0.191	0.186	0.826
Constant	-8.517^{+}	4.555	0.000
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 266.26* $R^2 = 0.34$		

$^{**}p > 0.01$; $^{*}p > 0.05$; $^{+}p > 0.1$
N = 441

Table 9.11: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes in 1998 on Optimistic Future Orientations (1993), Controlling for Positive Assessment of Socialism (1988; 1993), State Paternalism (1993), and Other Selected Variables

[9] For the 1998 and 2003 logistic regression analyses, I use two dichotomous variables to capture the role of education: (a) having completed tertiary education—that is, university degree and above (yes = 1, else = 0), and (b) having completed elementary education, i.e. four years of schooling (yes = 1, else = 0). The comparison group is the category of secondary education.

Positive assessment of socialism after the systemic change, on the other hand, significantly decreases one's likelihood of belonging to the privileged classes. The 1993 state paternalism variable acts in similar way. As expected, persons who have completed tertiary education have much higher chances of belonging to the 'winners' of the post-communist transition than those who finished only secondary education; elementary education, on the other hand, is not significantly different from the reference category.

Finally, Table 9.12 shows the extended model for belonging to the privileged classes in 2003. Results here return to the pattern of relations found throughout this chapter, exception being the previously discussed ones.

Independent variables	Privileged Classes 2003, DV = log (p /p-1)		
	B	SE	Exp(B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism, 1998	-0.058	0.387	0.944
State Paternalism, 1998	-0.049	0.148	1.051
Privileged Classes, 1993	1.627**	0.337	5.087
Income, 1998	0.304*	0.149	1.355
Optimistic Future Orientation, 1998	0.298**	0.104	1.347
Tertiary Education, 1993	1.684**	0.325	5.389
Elementary Education, 1993	-18.640[a]	5574.662 [a]	0.000 [a]
Gender	-0.443	0.309	0.642
Age	0.078	0.198	1.081
Age squared	-0.049	0.188	0.952
Constant	-5.830	5.217	0.003
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 297.45* $R^2 = 0.34$		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05; + p > 0.1

[a] There are no people with 1993 elementary education in 2003 privileged classes.

N = 427

Table 9.12: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes in 2003 on Optimistic Future Orientations (1998), controlling for Positive Assessment of Socialism (1998), State Paternalism (1998), and Other Selected Variables

Once again, optimistic future orientations increase, in significant and substantive way, the chances of belonging to the 'winners' categories later in time. Net of other factors, people scoring highest on optimistic future evaluations in 1998—that is, a score of 5—have 140% more chances to be in the privileged classes in 2003 than those scoring lowest on this variable (i.e. a score of 1).

Remarkably, this positive effect holds in the presence of all other determinants, previous class location, income, and education included. With regards to the latter, people who have completed tertiary education are five times more likely to be an employer, manager or expert in 2003, compared to people with secondary education. Interestingly, this is slightly less than it was for 1998.

Accounting for Autocorrelation and Multicollinearity in Panel Data

Population-averaged cross-sectional time series analysis with specification of the within-panel correlation structure and semi-robust standard errors allows me to account for problems of autocorrelation and of multicollinearity common to panel data.

Table 9.13 shows the results of the linear regression on income. Optimistic future orientations act in significant way on the dependent variable, net of other factors, especially education and the legacy of the past. The latter, expressed as positive assessment of socialism and state paternalism, affects earnings negatively. Not surprisingly, the effect of education is positive and highly significant.

Moreover, the panel regression model yields significant coefficients for both demographics variables. Being male has a positive effect on income attainment. The relationship between age and income is non-linear, taking an inverted U-shape, as the economic literature would let us expect.

Independent variables	Income in logarithmic form[a]	
	B	Semi-robust SE
Positive Assessment of Socialism	-0.012*	0.005
State Paternalism	-0.016**	0.005
Optimism	0.007**	0.003
Education, in years	0.013**	0.002
Gender	0.060**	0.011
Age	0.014**	0.003
Age squared	-0.0001**	0.00002
Year (1993 =1)	0.020**	0.007
Constant	3.409**	0.084
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 68.23 (df = 8)*	

[a] Estimated within-panel autocorrelation = 0.491
**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1
N = 439

Table 9.13: Linear Regression of Income on Optimistic Future Orientations, controlling for Positive Assessment of Socialism, State Paternalism, and Other Selected Variables

The last table, Table 9.14, models the probability of belonging to the privileged classes. By and large, the pattern of relations between the independent variables and the likelihood of being an employer, a manger or an expert is the same as discussed previously. Optimistic future orientations increase the chances of membership in the privileged classes controlling for all the other factors.

One should notice that state paternalism is not included in this analysis. In its presence, the coefficients for optimistic future orientations become insignificant (see Appendix B, Table B.2) since optimism is grounded not only in positive assessment of

socialism and but also in support for state paternalism and these variables are strongly related to education. Thus, if education is excluded but state paternalism is in the model, optimism is again significant (see Appendix B, Table B.3).

Independent variables	Privileged Classes, DV = log (p /p-1)		
	B	Semi-robust SE	Odds Ratio (e^B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism	0.029	0.91	1.029
Optimistic Future Orientation	0.110*	0.051	1.116
Tertiary Education	2.607**	0.201	13.556
Elementary Education	-1.806**	0.594	0.164
Gender	0.316+	0.189	1.371
Age	0.202*	0.085	1.224
Age squared	-0.002*	0.001	0.998
Year (1993 =1)	-0.032	0.141	0.968
Constant	-8.284**	2.050	
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 250.3 (df = 8)*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1
N = 934

Table 9.14: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes on Optimistic Future Orientations, controlling for Positive Assessment of Socialism and Other Selected Variables

In both models (Tables 9.13 and 9.14) I introduced a dummy for 1993. This year is special, in that it ends the first phase of the restructuring of the Polish economy. The 1993 elections led to the formation of a new government, and new policies were put in place that affected the larger society (Slomczynski 2000). Herein lays the rationale of controlling for it.

Summary and Conclusions

Core to this chapter was the relation between Poles' attitudes towards the future on one hand, and their location in the social structure, on the other hand. To find out

whether optimistic views of the future are relevant for peoples' socio-economic outcomes, as studies in psychology would let us infer, I analyzed their over-time effect on income and on social class position, two important indicators of achievement. Given previous results showing that prospective orientations are grounded in the legacy of the past, expressed as positive opinions of the socialist regime and supportive attitudes towards state paternalism (see Chapter 7), in addition to controls for prior structural location and individuals' background characteristics (gender and age), I also included assessment of socialism and state paternalism in the regression equations. The most extended models also accounted for the effect of education.

Results for structural outcomes in 1998 and 2003, the two survey waves on which the relationship prospective orientations-structural location could be analyzed, highlight the following issues:

- The legacy of the past, in the form of positive evaluations of the pre-1989 regime, and of support for state paternalism, has a long-term effect on peoples' position in the social structure, which is significant net of the role of prior structural variables. With OLS regression these attitudinal variables' negative effects are, for most of the part, washed out by optimistic future orientations. Exception is the 1998 analysis, when the influence of the legacy of the past on the location of individuals in the social structure remains significant independently of future orientations. The regression results of privileged classes in 1998 (as well as the corresponding cross-sectional time-series analysis) are of special interest in this regard: it is the only instance when the effect of optimism is not significant (Table 9.11; Appendix B, Table B.2).

- Individuals' levels of schooling, as well as their prior location in the social structure, are important determinants for later socio-economic outcomes. Higher education has a clear positive effect on the position of individuals in society, although its effect is slightly lower for 2003 than for 1998. Prior structural location, whether measured in terms of earnings or class position, also matters. For example, persons who in 1993 belonged to the 'winners' categories are five times more likely to be in the same groups in 2003 than are those who did not belong to the winners groups in 1993, independently of other factors, education included (Table 9.12).

- Most important for the premises of this chapter are the findings related to the psychological determinant of optimistic future orientations. Except for the one instance discussed earlier, analyses consistently show that prospective orientations mediate the effect of evaluation of the past and of state paternalism on the location of individuals in the social structure. Optimistic future orientations have a positive over-time effect on the dependent variable, be it income or belonging to the privileged classes, which is substantive and significant, independently of structural determinants, attitudes towards the past, education and peoples' basic demographics.

- Regarding the latter, initially it seems that there are no significant gender and age differences. Nonetheless, once autocorrelation and multicollinearity are accounted for, the picture changes. Both the linear and the logistic cross- sectional time-series regressions produce significant coefficients for gender and for age.

Males seem to be better off with regards to structural outcomes in post-communist Poland, while the effect of age is of an inverted U-shape.

In conclusion, this chapter demonstrates that psychological determinants play an important part in explaining social inequality in post-communist Poland. Dwelling in fond evaluations of the pre-1989 socialist regime and of state paternalism has a significant negative effect on individuals' income and membership in the privileged classes. Optimism about future opportunities and the possibility of realizing one's plans, on the other hand, affects earnings and class position in positive way, and independently of its being grounded in the legacy of the past. Since these analyses involve panel regressions, the coefficients can be interpreted as weighted change. Thus, in terms of over-time change in income, the higher the coefficients of optimistic future orientations, the higher the increase in income. For class location, optimistic future orientations increase the chances of moving from non-privileged to privileged location, but the interpretation of the metric of the change variable is cumbersome.

Of course, structural factors determine to a large extent how people assess the past and the future, as analyses in previous chapters have clearly shown. Nonetheless, the finding that attitudinal variables, optimism especially, act on individuals' position in society beyond and above the effects of other important determinants, such as prior structural location and education, is remarkable. The results are robust under the specification of models in cross-sectional and panel regression forms.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

The observation that in the countries of the former Soviet bloc people repeatedly change their opinion of the historical experience of communism not randomly, but in relation to their social position, prompted me to reason that evaluations of the past, while a response to the post-1989 transformations, could be themselves an important factor in shaping further structural outcomes. Specifically, I argued that structurally determined evaluations of the past affect future orientations and, in turn, future orientations affect further structural outcomes. I conceptualized evaluations of the past in terms of the degree of positive/negative assessment of the socialist system. This specific reference point was essential for my research expectations since "socialist system" represents an abandoned regime. Thus, change in opinion about socialism is not caused by the change in its object; it might be caused only by the change in the subject – a person and his or her conditions.

To make the linkages between social structure, evaluation of the past, and future orientations more concrete, I structured my analyses along two areas of inquiry, determinants of evaluation of socialism and its explanatory power, respectively. My main data come from the Polish panel survey, POLPAN 1988-2003. In this survey a representative sample of Poles was interviewed in 1988 and re-interviewed in 1993, 1998, and 2003. This survey as well as additional data is described in Part 1, Chapter 2.

In Part 2 of this dissertation I examined the determinants of assessment of socialism and changes thereof. Confirming previous research on the link between structural factors and political attitudes in post-1989 Eastern Europe (Rose et al 1998, Slomczynski 2000) regression analyses demonstrate the causal effects of class and status on evaluation of socialism: Poles evaluate the past according to their experience with the post-communist transformation. 'Winners' of the transition such as mangers and experts who prior to 1989 used to appraise socialism more positively than any other groups, denounce the past as they recognize and are able to take advantage of the opportunities that post-communism opened. 'Losers' of the transition, especially manual workers and farmers, who used to be most outspoken against the socialist rule while it was in power become first in evaluating the past positively, as they bear an unequal share of the "transition costs." These findings support the rational action perspective that assessment of socialism is based on individual interests that are well grounded in peoples' position in the social structure (Chapter 4).

Next to structural variables, I showed that differences in public opinion about past political outcomes are shaped by contextual effects. Two types of determinants were considered: (a) historical generations and past political biographies as key parts of the legacy of the past, and (b) networks of friends as main means through which the current environment operates. In statistical terms, the null hypotheses stated that historical generations people belong to, their political biography, and their friendship networks have no effects on how they assess the former socialist regime. Based on the empirical findings in Chapter 5 all three null hypotheses had to be rejected.

In the last chapter in Part 2, Chapter 6, I looked at psychological mechanisms behind changes in assessment of socialism in the framework of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957, Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999). Results support the expectation that people change opinion of socialism to reduce or eliminate psychological discomfort following from the inconsistency between evaluation of socialism and another attitude considered to be "a meaningful truth" (Harmon-Jones 1999, p. 95), in this case attitudes towards state paternalism.

Part 3 of my dissertation dealt extensively with the mechanism through which positive evaluations of the past affect social-structural location, including the mediating effect of future orientations. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 proved that optimistic future orientations are grounded in positive evaluations of socialism. The coefficient for assessment of the past remains significant even after structural factors, contextual effects and other attitudinal determinants are accounted for, which demonstrates that the negative effect of positive evaluations of the past on optimistic future orientations is robust. This finding suggests that in Poland, and by extrapolation in other European post-communist countries, understanding the legacy of the past and its consequences requires one to look beyond 'typical' socio-economic outcomes, such as institutional inefficiency, dysfunctional economies and weak civil societies; at the individual level, the former socialist regime continues to affect peoples' lives by representing a main yardstick against which individuals assess their accomplishments, and induces a state of mind that directly affects how opportunities and threats embedded in the future are perceived.

Clearly, optimistic future orientations also depend in significant way on peoples' location in the social structure. By and large, belonging to the 'winners' of the post-

communist transition (in terms of social status and/or privileged classes) has a positive effect on optimistic future orientations, whereas belonging to the category of 'losers' lowers one's optimism about the future. These results conform to the expectation grounded in rational action theory (Goldthorpe 1998) that gains and losses associated with the location of persons in the social structure affect how people react to social and political change (Slomczynski 2002). Individuals' basic demographics also matter. In short, men perceive more opportunities and possibilities for fulfillment of future plans than women do; age has a non-linear U-shaped relation to optimistic future orientations.

Finally, in Chapter 9 I focused on the mechanism by which evaluations of the past affect the location of individuals in the social structure. Results highlight the following issues: (1) the legacy of the past, in the form of positive evaluations of the pre-1989 regime, and of support for state paternalism, has a long-term effect on peoples' position in the social structure, which is significant net of the role of prior structural variables; (2) individuals' levels of schooling, as well as their prior location in the social structure, are important determinants for later socio-economic outcomes; (3) prospective orientations mediate the effect of evaluation of the past on the location of individuals in the social structure. Optimistic future orientations have a positive over-time effect on the dependent variable, be it income or belonging to the privileged classes, which is substantive and significant, independently of structural determinants, attitudes towards the past, education and peoples' basic demographics. The results are robust under the specification of models in cross-sectional and panel regression forms.

The pa models and the OLS models for specific waves are equivalent to each other as models of change to the degree of the b coefficient for the lagged variable. Thus,

the estimation techniques should not produce very different results, especially if we consider only the one lag, and not distributed lags. The proof that there is not much distortion is given by the random effects models, which provide exactly the same relationships between key variables. The only noticeable difference pertains to the effect of age and gender on structural location, and this can be interpreted in the following way: if one slices the reality, demographics do not matter; they do, however, if one looks across waves. Moreover, change score regression on change in income between 1998 and 1988 (Y = Income 1998 – Income1993) on optimistic future orientations, evaluation of socialism, state paternalism and other selected independent variables reveals the same significant, positive effect of optimism net of other factors, as the other regression types (see Table B.4).

A different way of summarizing the main ideas of this dissertation is given in Figure 1, with help of path coefficients (see Appendix B, Tables B.5: B.7 for the regression equations the path model in Figure 1 is constructed on). The correlation between evaluation of the past and income is modest but significant. For example, the correlation between positive assessment of socialism in 1998 and income in 2003 is -0.141, significant at alpha = 0.01.

The path model in Figure 1 shows that the net effect of evaluation of socialism on income becomes insignificant in the presence of other variables.[10] It is also clear that a considerable proportion of its total effect is exercised through optimistic future orientations. Indeed, these latter are a powerful predictor of income. In two-variable regression, a one standard deviation change in optimism produces a 0.25 standard

[10] Under a different specification model, the long-term negative effect of positive assessment of the past on income remains significant (see Chapter 9, Table 9.13).

deviation change in income. In terms of net effects, optimistic future orientations in 1993 and in 1998 exercise a significant influence on the outcome variable. Keeping constant income in 1988, education, gender and age, persons who score highest on optimistic future orientations in 1993 and in 1998 would earn 700 zloty more than persons scoring lowest on the optimism variable. Taking into account that the mean value of income is 1,540 with a standard deviation of 1,342, the effect of optimism is large.

Overall, results consistently show that psychological determinants play an important part in explaining social inequality in post-communist Poland. Positive evaluations of the pre-1989 socialist regime has a significant negative effect on individuals' income and membership in the privileged classes.



**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05;

Figure 10.1: Psychological Determinants of Income: Path Coefficients. Controlled for Gender, Age, and Education

Optimism about future opportunities and the possibility of realizing one's plans affects earnings and class position in positive way, and independently of its being grounded in the legacy of the past. The fact that in all post-communist countries a sizable proportion of people evaluate the former regime positively (Rose et al. 1998) suggests that assessment of socialism is an important variable, and that we could expect similar findings in terms of its relation to both optimistic orientations and to further structural outcomes. In other words, the mediating role of optimistic future orientations should not be restricted to the case of Poland.

This research has important implications for modeling income attainment and social mobility. Traditional status attainment literature includes certain psychological variables pertaining to intelligence (IQ) and motivation for achievement (Sewell and Hauser 1975). Similarly, even classical studies on social mobility take into account psychological determinants, especially aspirations (Lipset and Bendix 1959). However, none of the studies in either the status attainment tradition or the social mobility tradition consider the role of evaluations of the past and of prospective orientations. Future research should clarify whether dwelling in fond memories of the 'the good old days' and optimism about the future matter for the location of the individual in the social structure only in the countries that experienced radical social change. Since it is more difficult to speculate to what extent these variables play similar roles in stable capitalist societies, more empirical work on this topic is needed.

APPENDIX A

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction

Introduction of myself and my research interest.

Research focus: to understand, in a comparative perspective, how people assess the past communist regime, and what factors determine them to redefine this past.

Participation is voluntary.

I inform respondents that the interview is expected to take between 45 minutes and an hour.

Explaining the confidential character of the interview, the right to refuse any questions that may not be comfortable to answer, the right to end the interview at any given point.

Open-ended questions - feel free to add any other comments that come to mind.

Reminding again that identity will be kept confidential; consent form.

Background of Individual

Probing questions:

What is your age? What is your education? What is your current occupation? What was your occupation before the fall of communism?

Have you participated in political organizations during the communist era? If so, which ones?

Have you been participating in political organizations after the fall of communism?

Are you currently involved in political organizations?

Assessment of the Political and Economic Situation

Probing questions:

How satisfied are you with the current economic situation of the country? Comparing the current economic system with the socialist economy before 1989, which of the two would you characterize as working better for this country?

How satisfied are you with the current political situation of the country? The present system of government is not the only one that this country has had, and some people say the country would be better off if it would be governed by communist rule. What do you think?

Considering your current situation, how satisfied are you with your everyday life? How satisfied are you with your life achievements since the fall of communism? Considering the changes in society after the fall of communism, would you say that they have advantaged or disadvantaged you and your family?

How do you appreciate current conditions in the country, as compared with conditions before 1989?

Opinion Questions**:**

Do you think that people may remember past events differently? How would you explain this situation?

For roughly forty years we had a different system of government and people have different views about it. Please tell me why do you think that people assess the same past differently?

Since 1989, it happens that people who viewed the former communist regime negatively are now having a more positive image of it, while others who initially assessed communism positively now distance themselves from that opinion. How would you explain such changes in peoples' evaluation of the past?

Do you think that people may remember past events differently? How would you explain this situation?

Reaction to Scenarios Questions:

Please imagine the following scenarios:

1. After 1989, a former communist party member becomes owner of a major Polish (Romanian) factory. When he bought the factory, he was very much in favor of the capitalist rules. Later on however, when asked about what type of system he would rather support, a communist or a capitalist one, he strongly argued in favor of the communist system. How would you explain this discrepancy in opinion and attitude?

2. Now, please think of this scenario: a medical doctor who lived a significant time under communism, hated this regime and was more than happy when, in 1989, the system collapsed and communism was abandoned. Five years after 1989 however, the same

medical doctor was strongly arguing in favor of the past communist regime. How would you explain this change in the medical doctor's attitude towards the past communist system?

3. A young person graduating from business school after 1989 gets hired at a large private company. She works well and hard, and after a few years is promoted into a position of leadership. A year and a half ago, however, following a significant restructuring of the company due to economic problems, the person in question gets laid off. And, as of now, does not succeed in finding a new job. This person is asked what type of system, socialist (communist) or capitalist she prefers (supports). She enthusiastically argues for capitalism. How do you explain this person's stance?

4. A shoemaker, who was having his own store/business since the 1970s. He continued for a while after 1990. Given the increase in prices, taxes, and much higher rent he had to pay, he is forced to close down his business. Asked about what type of system he endorses, the shoemaker says he is very much in favor of the systemic change, and that he strongly supports the new type of regime. How do you explain his attitude?

Relative Importance of Political Events

Thinking back at the period before 1989, what political event was most important for you? Why so? Do you think that people from your generation assess this event similar to how you do?

Focusing on the period between 1989 and today, which political event bears the highest importance for you? Why? Do you think that people from your generation assess this event similar to as you do?

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL TABLES

Independent variables	Logistic regression for positive assessment, DV = log (p /p-1)			Linear regression DV = scores from 1 to 5		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	BETA
Friendship Networks						
No. of Close Friends, 2003	0.003	0.005	1.003	0.001	0.002	0.011
No. of Potential bridges, 2003	-0.004	0.003	0.996	-0.002*	0.001	-0.072
Past Political Biography						
Solidarity members	-0.603**	0.173	0.547	-0.222**	0.071	-0.088
Solidarity Sympathizers	-0.326	0.236	0.772	-0.195*	0.099	-0.053
Pro-Solidarity CP members	0.653*	0.324	1.922	0.299*	0.142	0.058
Traditional CP members	0.411+	0.223	1.509	0.181+	0.099	0.049
Historical Generations						
Generation 1	0.403*	0.189	1.496	0.076	0.086	0.025
Generation 2	0.147	0.138	1.158	0.013	0.064	0.006
Generation 4	-0.050	0.211	0.951	-0.080	0.077	-0.030
Generation 5	-0.674**	0.234	0.510	-0.314**	0.096	-0.094
Assessment of Socialism, 1998	0.571**	0.067	1.770	0.284**	0.027	0.273
Constant	-2.200**	0.233	0.111	2.292**	0.100	
Fit statistics	*-2LH = 1669.54* R^2 *= 0.10*			*F =15.87 (df = 11)* *Adjusted* R^2 *= 0.11*		

** p > 0.01; * p > 0.05; + p > 0.10
N = 1360

Table B.1: Regression of Assessment of Socialism in 2003, on Friendship Networks, controlling for Political Biographies, Historical Generations and Assessment of Socialism in 1998

Independent variables	Privileged Classes, DV = log (p /p-1)		
	B	Semi-robust SE	Odds Ratio (e^B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism	0.108	0.109	1.114
State Paternalism	-0.395**	0.096	0.674
Optimistic Future Orientation	0.074	0.063	1.077
Tertiary Education	2.558**	0.230	12.905
Elementary Education	-1.357*	0.608	0.256
Gender	0.307	0.214	1.360
Age	0.156	0.100	1.169
Age squared	-0.001	0.001	0.999
Year (1993 =1)	-0.034	0.181	0.967
Constant	-7.472**	2.472	
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 225.51 (df = 9)*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1
N = 813

Table B.2: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes on Optimistic Future Orientations, controlling for Positive Assessment of Socialism, State Paternalism, and Other Selected Variables

Independent variables	Privileged Classes, DV = log (p /p-1)		
	B	Semi-robust SE	Odds Ratio (e^B)
Positive Assessment of Socialism	0.561	0.086	1.058
State Paternalism	-0.569**	0.081	0.566
Optimistic Future Orientation	0.168**	0.056	1.183
Gender	0.028	0.178	1.028
Age	0.158	0.092	1.171
Age squared	-0.001	0.001	0.999
Year (1993 =1)	-0.021	0.145	0.979
Constant	-6.635**	2.234	
Fit statistics	*Wald Chi2 = 77.73 (df = 7)*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.1
N = 813

Table B.3: Logistic Regression of Privileged Classes on Optimistic Future Orientations, controlling for Positive Assessment of Socialism and State Paternalism, without controls for Education

Independent variables	Change in Income, Y = Inc1998-Inc1988			
	B	Standard Errors		BETA[a]
		Regular	Robust	
Evaluation of Socialism, 1993	-0.371	1.041	1.026	-0.010
Income, 1988	-23.864**	1.065	1.167	-0.716
Education (years), 1988	2.581**	0.299	0.275	0.264
Optimism, 1993	1.206	0.745	0.737	0.048
Optimism, 1998	1.918**	0.659	0.686	0.085
Gender	8.241**	2.021	2.091	0.124
Age	0.350	0.791	0.827	0.120
Age squared	-0.551	0.738	0.758	-0.203
State Paternalism	-1.279	1.051	1.027	-0.038
Constant	-41.153+	21.541	22.849	
Fit statistics[b]	*F = 62.39 (df = 9)* *R^2 = 0.459, Root MSE = 24.541*			

[a] The Beta coefficients are calculated for the model with regular standard errors. For this model, the Adjusted R^2 = 0.453

[b] Fist statistics given for the model with robust standard errors.

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10

N = 741

Table B.4: Change Score Regression of Income (Y = Income 1998-Income 1988) on Optimistic Future Orientations, and other Selected Independent Variables

Independent variables	Evaluation of Socialism, 1993			Optimism, 1993		
	B	SE	BETA	B	SE	BETA
Income, 1988	-0.011	0.030	-0.012	-0.020	0.043	-0.015
Education (years), 1988	-0.014+	0.008	-0.052	0.097**	0.012	0.242
Gender	-0.001	0.058	-0.001	0.250**	0.085	0.091
Age	0.010	0.002	0.122**	-0.009**	0.004	-0.072
Constant	2.719**	0.151		1.479**	0.220	
Fit statistics	*F = 5.85 (df = 4)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.02* N = 1142			*F = 23.35 (df = 4)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.07* N = 1135		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10

Table B.5: Regressions of Assessment of Socialism and of Optimistic Future Orientations in 1993 on Income (1988), Education (1988), Gender and Age

Independent variables	Evaluation of Socialism, 1998			Optimism, 1998		
	B	SE	BETA	B	SE	BETA
Income, 1988	-0.010	0.029	-0.011	0.021	0.047	0.014
Education (years), 1988	-0.023**	0.008	-0.085	0.061**	0.013	0.138
Gender	0.001	0.057	0.000	0.118	0.092	0.039
Age	0.002	0.002	0.026	0.003	0.004	0.024
Evaluation of Socialism, 1993	0.290**	0.029	0.281	-0.243**	0.047	-0.148
Optimism, 1993	-0.076**	0.020	-0.111	0.242**	0.032	0.221
Constant	2.500**	0.173		2.475**	0.276	
Fit statistics	*F = 25.94 (df = 6)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.12* N = 1134			*F = 25.69 (df = 6)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.12* N = 1128		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10

Table B.6: Regressions of Assessment of Socialism and of Optimistic Future Orientations in 1998 on Income (1988), Education (1988), Gender, Age, Evaluation of Socialism (1993) and Optimistic Future Orientations (1993)

Independent variables	Income, 2003		
	B	SE	BETA
Income, 1988	0.189**	0.055	0.162
Education (years), 1988	0.119**	0.015	0.353
Gender	0.139	0.103	0.062
Age	-0.006	0.007	-0.035
Evaluation of Socialism, 1993	-0.044	0.058	-0.035
Evaluation of Socialism, 1998	-0.021	0.056	-0.017
Optimism, 1993	0.080*	0.035	0.103
Optimism, 1998	0.081**	0.031	0.115
Constant	-1.484**	0.373	
Fit statistics	*F = 18.81 (df = 6)* *Adjusted R^2 = 0.24*		

**p > 0.01; *p > 0.05; +p > 0.10
N = 457

Table B.7: Regression of Income in 2003 on Income (1988), Education (1988), Gender, Age, Evaluation of Socialism (1993, 1998) and Optimistic Future Orientations (1993, 1998)

REFERENCES

Adler, Michael. 1999. "Reactions to Empirical Studies" *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 37(1, 2):127-136; available on-line at http://www.ohlj.ca/archive/articles/37_12_adler_commentary.pdf, last accessed October 8, 2006

Ajzen I, Fishbein M. 1980. *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior*. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Ajzen Icek. 1991. "The Theory of Planned Behavior" *Organizational Behavior and Huand. Decision Processes.* 50:179–211

Ajzen Icek. 2001. "Nature and Operation of Attitudes" *Annual Review of Psychology* 52: 27-58

Bagozzi P. Richard and Youjae Yi. 1989. "The degree of Intention Formation as a Moderator of the Attitude-Behavior Relationship" *Social Psychology Quarterly* 52(4):266-279.

Bandura, A. 1969. Social-learning theory of identificatory process. In *Handbook of Socialization: Theory and Research,* ed. D. Goslin, pp. 213-62. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Bassili John N. 1996. Meta-judgmental versus operative indexes of psychological attributes: the case of measures of attitude strength. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71:637–53

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1994. "After the Patronage State: A Model in Search of Class Interest." Pp. 14-35 in *The New Great Transformation?* Edited by C.G. Bryant and E. Mokrzycki. London: Routledge.

Becker, Gary S. 1976. *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Bidwell Charles E., Stephen Plank and Chandra Muller. 1996. "Peer Social Networks and Adolescent Career Development" in Kerckhoff ed. *Generating Social Stratification: Toward a new Research Agenda*. p:107-131.

Blalock, H.M. Jr. 1985. Editor. *Causal Models in the Social Sciences*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Blau, Peter and Otis Dudley Duncan. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure.* New York: Wiley.

Boudon, Raymond. 2003. "Beyond Rational Choice Theory" *Annual Review of Sociology* 29:1-21.

Box, George and Gwylim Jenkins,. (1970) *Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control*, San Francisco: Holden-Day.

Breen, Richard. 2004. Foundations of a Neo-Weberian Class Analysis http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Chapter%202%20--%20Breen%20Jan%202004.pdf, last accessed October 8, 2006

Brim, Orville G. Jr. 1966. "Socialization Through the Life Cycle". In *Socialization After Childhood,* ed. O. G. Brim, Jr., S. Wheeler, pp. 1-49. New York: Wiley

Bryant, Christopher G.S. and Edmund Mokrzycki. 1994. *The New Great Transformation?* London: Routledge.

Burt, Ronald S. 1992. *Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Burt, Ronald S. 2005. *Brokerage and Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burt, Ronald.S. 2001. "Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Capital," in: Nan Lin, Cook K, and Burt, R. S. Eds. *Social Capital: Theory and Research*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, pp. 31-56

Castle, Marjorie and Ray Taras. 2002. *Democracy in Poland.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Chavance, Bernard. 1994. *The Transformation of Communist Systems: Economic Reform Since the 1950s.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Coleman, James, S. and Thomas, J. Fararo. 1992. *Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique*. Newbury Park, Calif: Sage Publications.

Coleman, James. 1986. *Individual Interests and Collective Action: Selected Essays* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coleman, James. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (Supplement): S95–S120.

Coleman, James. 1990. *Foundation of Social Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Crano William D. and Radmila Prislin. 2006. “Attitudes and Persuasion” *Annual Review of Psychology* 57: 345-374

Deacon, Bob. 1993. “Social Change, Social Problems and Social Policy” in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis, eds. *Developments in East European Politics* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Domanski, Henryk. 1996. *On the Verge of Convergence: Social Stratification in Eastern Europe*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Eagly Alice H, Chaiken S. 1993. *The Psychology of Attitudes*. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace

Erdbring Lutz and Alice A. Young. 1979. “Individuals and Social Structure: Contextual Effects as Endogenous Feedback”. *Sociological Methods and Research* 7:396-430.

Erikson, Robert John H. Goldthorpe and Lucienne Portocarero. 1979. “Intergenerational Class Mobility in Three Western European Societies: England, France and Sweden,” *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 30(4): 415-441.

Erikson, Robert John H. Goldthorpe and Lucienne Portocarero. 1983. Intergenerational Class Mobility and the Convergence Thesis: England, France and Sweden.” *The British Journal of Sociology*, 34 (3): 303-343.

Feather NT. 2004. “Value Correlates of Ambivalent Attitudes toward Gender Relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.*30:3–12

Festinger, Leon. 1962, c1957. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.

Ganzeboom, Harry B. G., Paul de Graaf, and Donald J. Treiman. 1992. "An International Scale of Occupational Status." *Social Science Research* 21:1-56.

Glenn Norval D. 1977. *Cohort Analysis.* California: Sage.

Goldthorpe, John H and Keith Hope, 1974. *The Social Grading of Occupations: A New Approach and Scale*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldthorpe, John H. 1980. *Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain.* Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Selected Chapters)

Goldthorpe John H. 1998. "Rational Action Theory for Sociology" *The British Journal of Sociology* 49(2):167-192.

Goldthorpe John H. and Gordon Marshall. 1992. "The Promising Future of Class Analysis: Response to Recent Critics" *Sociology* 26:381-400.

Granovetter, Mark. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology* 78: 1360-1380.

Harmon-Jones, Eddie & Judson Mills, editors. 1999. *Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory in Social Psychology.* Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Heyns, Barbara. 2005. "Emerging Inequalities in Central and Eastern Europe." *Annual Review of Sociology* 31:163-97.

Holford Theodore R., 1991. Understanding the Effects of Age, Period, and Cohort on Incidence and Mortality Rates. *Annual Review of Public Health* 12:425-457.

Holland RW, Meertens RM, Van Vugt M. 2002a. Dissonance on the road: self esteem as a moderator of internal and external self-justification strategies. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.* 28:1713–24

Hout, Michael, C Brooks and J Manza. 1993. "Persistence of Classes in Post-Industrial Societies" *International Sociology* 8: 259-277.

Jennings Kent M. 2002. Generation Units and the Student Protest Movement in the United States: an Intra- and Intergenerational Analysis. *Political Psychology.* 23(2):303–24

Kerckhoff, Alan C. 1976. "The Status Attainment Process: Socialization or allocation?" *Social Forces* 55:368-380.

Kerckhoff, Alan C. Ed. 1996. *Generating Social Stratification: Toward a New Research Agenda.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press

Kiekolt, Jill K. 1988. "Recent Developments in Attitudes and Social Structure" *Annual Review of Sociology* 14:381-403.

Kohn, Melvin and Carmi Schooler. 1983. *Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification* Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.

Kornai, Janusz. 1992. *Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Laba, Roman. 1991. *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working Class Democratization.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. York: St. Martin's Press.

Linz, Juan L. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour M. and Reinhardt Bendix. 1959. *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Liska, Allen E. 1984. "A Critical Examination of the Causal Structure in the Fishbein/Ajzen Attitude-Behavior Model" *Social Psychology Quarterly* 47(1):61-74.

Liska, Allen E., Richard B. Felson, Mitchell Chamlin and William Baccaglini. 1984 "Estimating Attitude-Behavior Reciprocal Effects Within a Theoretical Specification" *Social Psychology Quarterly* 47(1):15-23.

Lowenthal, Marjorie F, Majda Thurnher and Dvaid Chiriboga. Eds. 1975. *Four Stages of Life*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Mach, Bogdan W. and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski. 1995. "The Polish Experience: From Nomenklatura to Where? Occupational Trajectories of State-Socialist Managers under Conditions of Systemic Change: Poland 1988-1993." Pp. 145-162 in *Zwischenbilanz der Wiedervereinigung: Sozialstrukturanalyse*, edited by Martin Diewald and Karl Urlich Mayer. Opladen: Leske and Budrich.

Maio GR, Olson JM, eds. 1999. *Why We Evaluate: Functions of Attitudes*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum

Mannheim K. 1952 (1928). The Problem of Generations. In *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. P Kecsckemeti, pp. 276–322. New York: Oxford Univ. Press

Mucchi-Faina A, Costarelli S, Romoli C. 2002. The effects of intergroup context of evaluation on ambivalence toward the ingroup and the outgroup. *European Journal of Social Psychology.* 32:247–59

Murray SL, Haddock G, Zanna Mark P. 1996. On Creating Value-Expressive Attitudes: An Experimental Approach. In C. Seligman, J.M Olson and M.P. Zanna Eds. The Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium. Vol. 8:107-133. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates

Newby-Clark IR, McGregor I, Zanna MP. 2002. Thinking and caring about cognitive inconsistency: When and from whom does attitudinal ambivalence feel uncomfortable? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.* 82:157–66

Niemi, Richard G and Barbara I Sobieszek. 1977. "Political Socialization" *Annual Review of Sociology* 3:209-233.

Offe, Clause. 1991. "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe." *Social Research* 58: 867-892.

Osborn, Elizabeth, and Kazimierz M. Słomczyński.E, and Słomczyński K. M. 2005. *Open for Business: The Persistent Entrepreneurial Class in Poland.* Warsaw:Warszawa: IFiS Publishers.

Ost, David. 1990. *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Ost, David. 2005. *The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Pakulski, Jan and Malcolm Waters. 1996. *The Death of Class.* London: SAGE.

Petty RE, Krosnick JA, Eds. 1995. *Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences*, Vol. 4. Ohio State Univ. Series on attitudes and persuasion. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum

Petty Richard E., Tormala ZL, Rucker DD. 2004. Resisting persuasion by Counterarguing: an Attitude Strength Perspective. In J. T. Jost, M. R. Banaji, & D. A.Prentice Eds. *Perspectivism in social psychology: The yin and yang of scientific progress* (pp. 37-51). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association

Prislin R, Brewer M, Wilson DJ. 2002. "Changing Majority and Minority Positions within a Group versus an Aggregate." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.* 28:504–11.

Przeworski, Adam, Maichael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limogi. 2000. *Democracy and Development.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market, Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ragin, Charles C. c1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. *Democracy and Its Alternatives. Understanding Post-Communist Societies.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rosenberg Stanley D. and Michael P. Farrell 1976. "Identity and Crisis in Middle Aged Men" *International Journal of Aging and Human Development* 2:153-170.

Rosow, Irving. 1974. *Socialization to Old Age.* Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Sapiro, Virgina. 2004. "Not Your Parents' Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation" *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:1-23.

Schumann Howard and Amy D. Corning. 2000. Collective Knowledge of Public Events: the Soviet Era from the Great Purge to Glasnost. *American Sociological Review* 105(4):913–56.

Schumann Howard and Jaqueline Scott. 1989. Generations and Collective Memories. *American Sociological Review* 54:359–81.

Sears, David O. 2002. "Long-Term Psychological Consequences of Political Events." In *Political Psychology*, KR Monroe Ed., pp. 249–69. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Sewell, William and Robert Hauser. 1975. *Education*, *Occupation*, *and Earnings: Achievement in the Early Career*. New York: Academic Press.

Slomczynski, Kazimierz M. and B. W. Mach. 1996. 'The Polish Experience: From Nomenklatura to Where? Occupational Trajectories of State-Socialist Managers under Conditions of Sustemic Change: Poland 1988-1993" Pp. 145-162 in *Zwischenbilnaz der Wiedervereinigung* ((Mid-term Review of the Reunification**:** Analysis of Social Structure)*,* edited by M. Diewald and K.U. Mayer. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Slomczynski, Kazimierz M. and Goldie Shabad. 1997. "Systemic Transformation and the Salience of Class Structure in East Central Europe." *East European Politics and Societies* 11: 155-189.

Slomczyński, Kazimierz.M., (ed.) 2000. *Social Patterns of Being Political: The Initial Phase of the Post-Communist Transformation in Poland*. Warsaw: IFiS Publishers.

Slomczynski Kazimierz, M. (ed.) 2002. *Social Structure: Changes and Linkages. The Advanced Phase of the Post-Communist Transformation in Poland*. Warsaw: IFiS Publishers.

Slomczynski, Kazimierz M. and Katarzyna M. Wilk. 2002 "Who Still Likes Socialism and Why? Time-variation of Political Opinions in Poland" *International Journal of Sociology* 32 (3): 64-77.

Slomczynski, Kazimierz M. and Goldie Shabad. 2003 "Dynamics of Support for European Integration in Post-communist Poland" *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (4): 503-539.

Sprague, John. 1982. "Is there a Micro Theory consistent with Contextual Analysis?" In *Strategies of Political Inquiry* E Ostrom Ed. Pp. 991-121. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Staniszkis, Jadwiga. 1991. "Political Capitalism in Poland" *East European Politics and Society* 5: 58-86.

Stark, David. 1992. "Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe." *East European Politics and Societies* 6(1):17-51

Szeleny, Ivan. 1994. "Post-Industrialism, Post-Communism, and the New Class." *In Social Stratification in Sociological Perspective: Class, Race and Gender*, edited by David B. Gruski. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.

Szelenyi, Ivan and Szonja Szelenyi. 1995. "Circulation and Reproduction of Elites in Post-Communist Transformation." *Theory and Society* 24(5): 615-638.

Szelenyi, Ivan, Eva Fodor, Eric Hanley. 1997. "Left Turn in Post-communist Politics: Bringing Class Back in?*" East European Politics and Societies 11 (1): 190-224.*

Tajfel, Henry. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Tajfel, Henry and John C. Turner. 1986. The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In S. Worchel and L. W. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Chigago: Nelson-Hall

Taras Raymond. Editor. c1992. *The Road to disillusion: from critical Marxism to postcommunism in Eastern Europe*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe

Treiman, Donald J. 1976. "A Standard Occupational Prestige Scale for Use with Historical Data." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* Vol. 7:283-304.

Visser PS, Krosnick Jon A. 1998. Development of attitude strength over the life cycle: surge and decline. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.* 75:1389–410

White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis, eds. *Developments in East European Politics* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Wood, Wendy. 2000. "Attitude Change: Persuasion and Social Influence" *Annual Review of Psychology* 51:539-570

Wright, Erik, Olin. Ed. 1989. *The Debate on Class.* London: Verso.

Wright, Erik Olin http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/, last accessed October 8, 2006

Wright Erik Olin. 1997. *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Zamfir, Catalin 2004. *O Analiza Critica a Tranzitiei (*A critical analysis of the transition) Editua Polirom, Bucuresti (Bucharest).

Ziółkowski, M. 2002. "Memory and Forgetting After Communism." *Polish Sociological Review* 137(1): 19-24.