

THE PRAGMATICS OF DIRECT ADDRESS IN THE *ILIAD*: A STUDY IN
LINGUISTIC POLITENESS

DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper will be to examine, in the text of Homer's *Iliad*, some of the pragmatic and sociolinguistic factors in the choice of form of address (epithet). Specifically I will look at these in light of the Parry-Lord theory of oral composition and its claims of 'economy of form.' The results of this limited examination have important implications for the viability of such methods and for our understanding of oral, traditional literature.

Milman Parry, as is well known, demonstrated that the choice of appellation for any character, between the given-name (e.g., Ἀγαμέμνων) and the patronymic (e.g., Ἀτρεΐδης) was a decision based on metrical considerations alone, and importantly, not on semantic ones. The two terms cannot simply be substituted for the other without changing the meter of the whole line. The choice between the two is, according to Parry, driven by metrical necessity alone and hence any possible distinction of meaning is automatically bleached. The two names mean the same thing (i.e., Agamemnon).

In this study I will look specifically at the use types of address within the narrative frame of the *Iliad*, in light of two potentially contributing factors. From a sociolinguistic standpoint, I will show that the distribution of these forms of address across the whole set of speakers is constrained by the relative social standing of the speaker in respect to the addressee. I will then give evidence for how pragmatic factors as well condition the appearance of one form of address over another.

The evidence in this paper, then, will show that both sociolinguistic factors such as degree of social distance and relative position within the social hierarchy combine with specific situationally defined pragmatic factors to place constraints on the appropriateness of competing forms of address, forms whose distribution was earlier ascribable to metrical constraints alone. In other words, forms of address are effected by important matters of social hierarchy and the practical movement of the plot.

Thus in line A.7 of the *Iliad*: Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς, Homer offers us a contest between Agamemnon, the holder of title and its concomitant privileged position, a man whose titles alone define him and the untitled but divinely defined and, importantly, named Akhilleus. It will be as much a contest between office and δῖος as it will be between individuals.

For AI

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*Scholars who consider Homeric epic as orally derived are sometimes accused of diminishing its (literary) artistry. This accusation stems from the early emphasis placed upon formulae and themes Several recent studies have demonstrated that some formulae ... communicate far more than simply their semantic meaning and have close relationships with their narrative contexts.*¹

The topic of this present work is speech, but speech of a certain kind. As Kirk states, “nearly half of [the text of] the *Iliad* consists of direct speech.”² In the present work, I will deal with this half of that text. I am focusing specifically on the narrativized speech of the *Iliad*, that is, text *qua* utterance that is presented within a larger narrative context.³ One of the contentions of this work is that context, narrativized or other, is crucial for understanding the language of any speech that takes place within it.⁴ In particular in this work, I will be focusing on the use of vocative forms of address within the speeches of the *Iliad*.

Adam Parry notes the importance in the *Iliad* of names and titles and other epithets which the oral theory had demoted to the status of being virtual filler. His claim

¹ Person, Raymond F. Jr., “The ‘Becoming Silent to Silence’ Formula in Homer,” *GRBS* 36, 1995, p. 327 ff.

² Kirk, J., *The Iliad: A Commentary, Volume II: Books 5-8*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 28.

³ Also referred to as *embedded direct speech* or *oratio recta*.

⁴ The ultimate formulation of this thesis would be that no language appears except against some kind of contextual field. Whether we take that field to be supplied by the context itself directly or by some creation (fantasy, if you like) of that context on the part of the hearer, all language is contextual, i.e., local.

is that the metrical functionality of the fixed epithet does not, *a priori*, divest it of its meaning. Although the force of the repetition of such formulaic phrases seems to have the effect of bleaching them of their meaning, Parry points out that in certain verses, the poet has brought the force of the meaning of these epithets to the fore. Thus when the poet identifies the two primary protagonists of the poem at A.7 as:

(1) Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς

the effect, he claims, is to focus our attention on the fact that the poem is about a struggle between the leader of all the Greek forces and its most valuable warrior. Parry's point here seems to be a robust one and serves well to highlight how such oft-repeated ornamental epithets do not, in fact, need to be meaningless, even if, via repetition, they lose some of the force of that meaning.⁵ If Parry is correct, (1) above offers *prima facie* evidence for how context can work to help construct meaning.

One question we might ask is whether these forms are equally meaningful —or equally meaning*less*— in the 'mouths' of the narrator and in those of his embedded characters. That the language of the speeches should be treatable as distinct from that of its narrative frame has already been suggested by Griffin. He has noted how the language (the 'diction') of the narrative portions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* differs in important ways from that of the speeches contained within them and how the narrator appears to have different knowledge from that expressed by his characters.⁶ In particular, the language of

⁵ Parry, Adam, "Language and Characterization in Homer," in *The Language of Achilles, and Other Papers*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 301 *ff*.

⁶ Griffin, J., "Homeric Words and Speakers," *JHS*, 1986, pp. 36-57.

the speeches shows a particular preoccupation with social values —as hinted at, for example, by the frequent use of abstract nouns and evaluative terms like αἰδώς— not shared by the narrator.⁷ Although the focus in this study on address may appear to be quite narrow, this element of speech turns out to be extremely important for the characterization of any subsequent discourse. Forms of address not only identify the intended recipient of speech, but qualify that recipient in ways that are crucially important for understanding the rest of the discourse. For example, when Hektor addresses his brother Paris as δύσπαρι (Γ.39), he not only signals his identity: “Paris,” but Hektor’s feelings about him: “Paris you asshole.” As I will discuss further in Chapter 2, this tendency of address to be used by speakers to both identify and characterize addressees is an important feature of natural language use.⁸ As Hektor appears to do at Γ.39, speakers regularly use address to socially define their addressees and their own relations to those addressees. One of the main goals of this work is to determine the degree to which this type of characterization of speech can be claimed for Homeric discourse in general. Are uses like δύσπαρι at Γ.39 or even ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν at A.7, which seem to show a high degree of contextual sensitivity, a common feature of that discourse or are they rare (or even illusory)? Given the stringencies of oral composition as it has been conceived since Milman Parry, particularly vis-à-vis his concept of the *economy of*

⁷ Bers, Victor, *Speech in Speech: Studies in Incorporated Oratio Recta in Attic Drama and Oratory*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997, p. 13 suggests that Griffen’s point is perhaps over stated: “Homeric *O[ratio] R[ecta]* and narrative draw on substantially the same lexicon.” Note also that the poet offers no obvious dialectal substitutions in the speeches analogous to the use of Doric Greek in the case of the tragic chorus.

⁸ See, *inter alios* Brown, Penelope and Stephen G. Levinson, *Politeness, Some Universals in Language Usage*, Cambridge, 1987; Ervin-Tripp, S., “Sociolinguistic Rules of Address,” in *Pride and Holms*, 1972, pp. 225-240; Hudson, Richard A, *Sociolinguistics*, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Friedrich has noted recently the importance of the difference in how Akhilleus addresses Agamemnon at A.122, and how he addresses him at T.146 κ.τ.λ. (1)

for defining their evolving relationship within the narrative frame of the *Iliad*. He notes that these two verse-long addresses mark the two ends of their relationship as it develops over the course of the poem. The former address, A.122, marks the beginning of their feud, the latter, T.146, its resolution and Akhilleus' reintegration into the society of the Greek *stratos*.¹⁰ Although his focus on the aesthetic justness of these terms is too narrow for the purposes of this study, nevertheless, Friedrich's observations are suggestive. In particular, I note that Akhilleus' addresses in (2) define not only Agamemnon vis-à-vis his social persona, his face, but also Akhilleus vis-à-vis Agamemnon. To put it another way, all three, Akhilleus, Agamemnon, and their social world seem to be indexed in these addresses.

⁹ Parry, Milman, *The Making of Homeric Verse*, Oxford University Press, 1971.

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the poet to choose one over the other? Since forms of address differ. Is their difference important? How? Does it matter who is speaking to whom? When he is speaking to him? Why he is speaking to him? What information actually seems to be communicated in the forms chosen by the poet as he has deployed them? The purpose of this study will be to attempt to answer such questions, but more importantly, to attempt to provide a methodology for answering similar questions. In this work, I will explore the notion that, as in the case of spoken language, there is a range of kinds of information that is crucial for interpreting what characters within the text of the *Iliad* ‘say,’ and how and why they say it. To put it another way, speakers and addressees have beliefs about things, about themselves, about others, about the world, and about the situation in which they are involved. These elements constitute their background knowledge and include knowledge or beliefs about social roles like those instantiated as ἀναξ ἄνδρῶν, parent or friend, about social relationships like those predicated on emotions like anger, concern, or affection, and about situational dynamics like fighting, cooperating, consoling, or cajoling.

Beginning with his 1928 Master’s thesis, *L’épithet traditionnelle dans Homère*, Milman Parry forever changed the face of Homeric scholarship and ultimately of our conception of the poet(s) of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. From the unresolved and unresolvable chaos of the previous centuries of Homeric scholarship, out of the ashes of the ‘Homeric question,’ Homer emerged as a single traditional composer of popular folk epic, albeit one of a singular character and genius. Although there was some initial reluctance to acknowledge this, this part of the picture is, for the most part, now accepted. Under the tutelage of the linguist Antoine Meillet, Parry’s next step was to cast that folk

singer in the guise of an oral singer, one defined by his technique of extemporaneous ‘composition in performance.’ What this meant to Parry (and Meillet) was that the poet was actually a singer (ᾠοιδὸς) and was envisioned as composing his song (ᾠοιδῆ) in the very act of performing it.¹¹ Therefore, there was no *Iliad*, *per se*, until the singer actually sang it; only a tradition of characters, type scenes, narratives and, of course, the epic *Kunstsprache*. This tradition was defined, at least in part, by all the versions of the story of the *Iliad* that that singer had either heard or himself sung previously. Thus, the tradition was a continuously evolving one, and the *Iliad* we have, only one instantiation of that story by one singer, perhaps named Homer. That is to say, we have *an Iliad*.

It is almost impossible to imagine a thesis having anything to do with the poetry of Homer that does not, at some point, confront the specters of Parry and Albert Lord, so far-reaching and influential has their theory of oral composition been. At the foundations of their proposal are the concepts of the *economy of expression* and its foundational notion of the *essential idea*.¹² These two concepts find their expression in the theory of the *formula* and the *formular system*.¹³ Kirk describes this system as

a conventional phraseology, amounting in many cases to a systematic corpus of phrases for different characters, objects and functions ... [that] maintains both a remarkable coverage (‘scope’) and remarkable avoidance of duplication

¹¹ That the poet therefore did not employ writing as an aid to composition, although often the feature of the oral theory that is most immediately and readily noticed, might seem in fact to be only a secondary feature of the theory, arising necessarily from the exigencies of composition in performance but not actually defining it. See, *inter alios*, Havelock, E., *The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present*, Yale University Press, 1986. Barry Powell offers a particularly extreme and problematic story. See Powell, Barry, *Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet*, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

¹² See Parry, 1971. p. 173 *ff*.

¹³ For a discussion of the difference, see Parry 71. p. 275.

(‘economy’ or ‘thrift’) in the creation, preservation and deployment of these traditional or conventional phrases know as formulas.¹⁴

For Parry, the whole formular system is based on this notion of the economy of expression or ‘thrift,’ which itself is predicated on the concept of the essential idea. However, this latter concept is left frustratingly undeveloped both by Parry himself and by later scholars, even those who are critical of Parry. Parry states the relationship as follows: a formula is “a group of words that is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given *essential idea*.”¹⁵ Parry used this feature of Homeric composition, namely the ‘regular employ[ment]’ of forms to represent an idea, to develop his notion of the economy of style. Parry stated that there was but one expression for each semantic, grammatical, and metrical nexus. Of this Denys Page says, “for a given idea within a given place in the line, there will be found in the vast treasury of phrases *one* formula and *one only*.”¹⁶ However, his substitution of “given idea” for “essential idea” is no real improvement. Parry noted that this system was simultaneously so economical and complex that it could not, he concluded, be the creation of one poet. Such a system must have evolved slowly over time, added to by each successive poet, culminating with the master poet of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

¹⁴ Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

¹⁵ Parry, 1971, p. 30, emphasis mine. For a concise ‘history’ of the development of the ‘oral theory,’ see Russo, Joseph, “The Formula,” in Morris and Powell, 1997, pp. 238-260.

¹⁶ Page, Denys Lionel, *History and the Homeric Iliad*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959, p. 224, emphasis mine.

Parry's notion of the essential idea remained ultimately unexplored presumably because it was felt to require no explanation.¹⁷ At the heart of this concept is the supposition that expressions which differ in respect to some set of features —say case, tense, or metrical shape, or some grouping of these features— but are identical in some other set of features, especially in respect to their *referent*, can be used to substitute for each other under conditions that are prescribed by the other, non-shared features. Thus, the noun phrases in Table 1.1 (p. 9), differ in case and in particular lexica but not in metrical shape or line position or, crucially, in referring to Agamemnon. They, therefore, can be substituted for each other within that line position, metrical shape, and referent under conditions prescribed by case. Although these noun phrases are different in terms of vocabulary, the claim is that there is no real difference between them in terms of semantics.¹⁸ According to Parry, 'wide-ruling Agamemnon,' 'Agamemnon McAtreus,' 'Agamemnon, shepherd of the people,' and 'lord of men, Agamemnon' all mean *essentially* the same thing, namely 'Agamemnon.' For Parry, 'Agamemnon' is the essential idea that is conveyed by all of these noun phrases. Parry's essential idea then borders on the ontological.

But is this actually true? It is true that Agamemnon in the *Iliad* is the supreme commander of the Greek forces arrayed against Troy. However, is this fact so ubiquitous that it becomes transparent to such a degree that εὐρύ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων means simply Ἀγαμέμνων? This is what is necessary for Parry's notion of the essential idea to work.

¹⁷ Edwards, p. 190, calls the term "vague semasiologically." Edwards, Mark, 'Homer and the Oral Tradition, Part 1,' *Oral Tradition*, 1986, pp. 171-230, by which I take him to mean that the 'essential idea' was purposefully semantically underspecified.

¹⁸ Note that the dative and accusative forms involve the same lexical items in the same order. It is not at all clear how 'different' these forms would have seemed to the inflected language speaking Greeks.

Agamemnon's status must become so obvious that it becomes unimportant. First, I note that the phrases εὐρύ κρείων, ποιμένα λαῶν and ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν all pertain specifically to Agamemnon's military authority within the Greek *stratos* at Troy.¹⁹ Thus, it is possible that these phrases substitute for each other under their different grammatical conditions,

<i>Nom.</i>	□ □ □ □ □ □ □	εὐρύ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
<i>Gen.</i>		Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο
<i>Dat.</i>		Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν
<i>Acc.</i>		Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν
<i>Voc.</i>		ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον

Table 1.1 Formulae for Agamemnon in Line Final Position
Following the Penthemimeral Caesura.

at line end, following the penthemimeral caesura because they actually mean something approximately the same, namely they represent the 'fact' that Agamemnon is the commander-in-chief. It is, however, not necessary to assume that these epithets have been bleached of all meaning if it is, in fact, actually important within the narrative of the *Iliad* that Agamemnon *is* the commander in chief. The question to ask now is whether these noun phrases mean simply 'Agamemnon' as only a fixed, distinct, ontological entity, with an independent, personal essence, or 'Agamemnon, the commander-in-chief,' i.e., as a social entity (irrespective of his ontological essence).²⁰ Under the strictures of the Parry-Lord model, there could in fact, be no difference between the two.²¹

¹⁹ I will discuss the function and importance of the patronymic in Chapter 4.

²⁰ Or just 'commander in chief.'

The term *essential idea* implies that the essence of εὐρύ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων is just Agamemnon. Agamemnon is always, and as far as diction is concerned, unimportantly the commander-in-chief; the two mean the same thing. But Agamemnon could inhabit other roles; he could be a brother to Menelaos, an advisee of Nestor, a lover of Kryseis, an *ekhthros* of Akhilleus, or an enemy of Priam. These roles need not replace that of commander in chief, but, by Parry's model, 'Agamemnon' as an essence must eclipse these other, situational roles, and it must be situationally unimportant that he is commander in chief.

However, there is another possibility, namely that what is at issue in εὐρύ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων is not Agamemnon, but εὐρύ κρείων. That is, we might want to ask whether or not Agamemnon's role as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν is important to how he is portrayed and characterized in the *Iliad*. Would Diomedes or Menelaos have treated the priest Khryses the same way? Is Agamemnon's position within the Greek *stratos* important when we consider Akhilleus' challenge? His attempt at murder? Would Akhilleus have withdrawn from the war if he became involved in a similar contest with another of the Greeks? Does Akhilleus have the same relationship with Agamemnon as Nestor does? as Menelaos? as Zeus? To assume that ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον is *essentially* the same as Ἀγάμεμνον is to assume that the epithet ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν is unimportant to understanding Agamemnon's role in the Greek camp and his behavior in the poem. To answer these questions in the affirmative is to assume that identity for Homer is absolute and synonymous with some kind of internally consistent, ontological personal identity, a narrative or psychological essence if you will, and has no social component. That is, we

²¹ I will leave aside for the moment the question of whether or not Agamemnon, a character in a fictional narrative, can have any ontological status.

must completely separate characters' psychology from their social position and ignore the latter. The other possibility is that social status is important for how we understand the actions of characters in Homer, and that epithets, both those that overtly reflect social position, like ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, and those that don't, like Ἀτρεΐδης, are important for understanding the social dynamics of characters within the narrative.²² That is, epithets which in some way evaluate their bearer have repercussions for how others interact with that character; it matters to Akhilleus that Agamemnon is ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν.

If it matters to Akhilleus that Agamemnon is ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, then it follows that identity within the *Iliad* contains a social component, perhaps is primarily social. Socially defined identity is important not only for how others interact with us, but for how we interact with others. If Agamemnon's role as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν is important for who he is and how he is portrayed in the *Iliad*, then it is likely that it is important whether he is called ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν. Social position is bound up in how we portray ourselves and in how others portray us, both to us and to others. Since language is one of the primary media by which we portray ourselves and our world, it follows that presentation, both self- and other-, should be found expressed in language. What we are called or what we call others matters for how we position ourselves socially. This is the heart of the project called sociolinguistics— the study of language and its role within a social setting, as a tool of social intercourse. This, for the most part is what I will be doing in this project.²³

It is clear that the answers to the questions I have posed require us to come to some sort of an understanding of the social dynamics —the social *and* personal

²² See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the sociolinguistics of the use of the partonymic as an address form in the *Iliad*.

²³ See especially Chapter 2.

dynamics— of the characters involved, if only to rule these out as a contributing factor for our understanding of Homeric or Iliadic social identity. For the Parry-Lord thesis (or the strict version of it at any rate) to be correct, Ἀγάμεμνον, ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον and φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων must all be used irrespective of the situational, social setting, i.e., the context in which they are used. Some concatenation of meter, case, position in the line, and an internally consistent personal identity, the character's *essence*, must alone determine the poet's choice. However, as we have just seen, the last of these categories is highly problematic. Parry does admit a distinction between 'generic' and 'particularized' epithets, and to that the latter group would surely belong φιλοκτεανώτατε. The claim being made here, is that, in fact, all are epithets are in some way 'particularized.'. That is, that φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων relies on ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον as a contrast and vice versa; both state something about their referent.²⁴

A study of the effect of context on speech must take into account the social and cultural world in which that speech is presented as occurring. Thus, we must say something about the Iliadic cultural context in which the speeches of the *Iliad* take place. I use the term *Iliadic* here specifically to stress that this study neither makes, nor attempts to make any claims about the context in which the poem was composed and or performed. We will want to form some kind of a picture of what values characters share, what things motivate and inhibit which actions, and so on. We will want to know how social relationships appear to be defined and negotiated, how power is displayed and exercised and to what degree social position seems negotiable within the poem. One

²⁴ Parry, 71, p. 153 ff.

thing to keep in mind is that it may be necessary to speak of Iliadic contexts. That is, the influence of context on speech, the characterization of speech may be different on the battlefield and off; in the *boulê*, and in the *agôn*; in the hut of Akhilleus, in the halls of Priam and on the walls of Troy.

When we discuss the cultural context of the *Iliad*, we must keep in mind that we are presented with only a sliver of the theoretically possible cultural pie. We see a city at war, under siege, and the Greek army besieging it. There is no real presentation of economic activity outside of plundering nearby cities; no description of agriculture, no poor.²⁵ The culture we find presented in the *Iliad* is distinctly top heavy. Homer focuses, one may safely say, on only the upper echelon of that society, the heroes, the *andres agathoi*, the *basileis*, and from a male and masculine perspective.²⁶ Although members of the *laoi* are occasionally presented to us and even occasionally given voice — as in the

²⁵ It is true that some economic and agricultural activities (assuming that the two need to be distinguished, agriculture is probably best seen *as* an economic activity) are depicted in the similes as well as on the shield of Akhilleus, but it is not at all clear whose activities are being portrayed; certainly it is never expressed that what we find depicted in the similes or the shield represents the activities of the Greeks or Trojans in the poem, although it might. Haubold, Johannes, *Homer's People: Epic Poetry and Social Formation*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 18, suggests the importance of livestock: “Odysseus wipes out an entire generation of Ithicans because they eat up his livestock. Achilles thinks an attempt on his flocks [would have been] a good reason for joining the Trojan war (*Il.* I.153 *f.*).”

²⁶ *Contra* this notion, see Rihll, T. E., “The Power of the Homeric Basileus,” in *Homer 1987: Papers of the Third Greenbank Colloquium, April 1987, Liverpool Classical Papers No. 2*, edited by J. Pinsent & H.V. Hurt, Liverpool Classical Monthly, 1992, pp. 40-50, n. 24. Rihll’s objection is based on his noting that Meriones and, in the Odyssey, Eumaios are important characters, given their long and important speeches and yet are clearly of a lower class (this fact is by no means a given in the case of Meriones, who is defined merely as Idomaneus’ Θερσίων N.244 and also is given a patronymic [the importance of which, see Chapter 4]). That members of other, lower classes would not be of interest in a work that focuses on the elite is in no way a given. For example, members of lower castes appear frequently in the Indian court poetry of Kalidasa, poetry that, by virtue of its dominant language — Sanskrit — was clearly intended for an elite audience. Rihll’s contention is contradicted by Thersites’ depiction in Book 2. One of Eumaios’ roles can, in fact, be said to be to function as an exemplum of the ideal member of the lower class, in which role he can be contrasted then with Thersites (see also, Thalmann, 82).

case of Thersites or Eumaios in the *Odyssey*²⁷ — they are always presented either in isolation, as in the case of Thersites (Book 3) or anonymously, like the ἄνδρες δήμου whom Odysseus lambastes in Book 2. The *laoi* seem to function in comparison or in contrast with the heroes, the elite. The focus of the *Iliad* seems pretty consistently to be on its elite.²⁸

Although it is safe to say that there is no culture, no human culture, which is not hierarchical, the hierarchy we find in the *Iliad* is marked as openly and, one might say, enthusiastically dynamic. For the heroes of the *Iliad*, relative social position is constantly on display and constantly subject to renegotiation.²⁹ Nevertheless, the engine that drives the primary plot along is one such hierarchical struggle, namely, that between Agamemnon and Akhilleus. The maintenance of and struggle for status, for position within a hierarchy, will turn out to be of extreme importance for any discussion of the effects of context on speech and address. This is all the more true since speech appears to be one of the primary means by which this social dynamic is negotiated. Thus, at A.122, Akhilleus' switch from the as yet unexpressed but potential address ἄναξ ἄνδρῶν 'Ἀγάμεμνον to the attested φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων presents his evaluation of Agamemnon as ἄναξ ἄνδρῶν, as the rest of his subsequent speech goes on to show.³⁰

²⁷ On the problems of this *voice* see especially Spivak, G., "Can the Subaltern Speak?," in Loomba, 1998, pp. 231-244. Spivak argues that the 'voice' of others can never be presented directly but only re-presented from the perspective of and translated into the voice of the author.

²⁸ Thalmann, claims that Thersites "need not be taken as *typical* of the common soldier, however. He represents their attitudes in exaggerated form, ... he is on the margins of society and blurs class distinctions," [emphasis mine]. Thalmann, W. G., "Thersites: Comedy, Scapegoats, and Heroic Ideology," *TAPA*, 118, 1988, p. 17.

²⁹ It should be noted, however, that relative social position is never presented as successfully redefined or overturned, the two important exceptions perhaps being found in the *Odyssey*, i.e., Odysseus and Telemakhos.

³⁰ Friedrich, *op. cit.*, argues that this form of the address is traditional, since it is numerically much more common and since φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων depends on it for comparison.

The purpose of this introduction is not to exhaustively describe Iliadic culture; however, it does seem prudent to say some things about the social dynamics that will be important in the following study, particularly as they relate to how interaction is conducted and how social spaces are navigated. I will not attempt to define Iliadic culture in essentializing terms such as ‘shame culture,’ ‘guilt culture,’ ‘tribal society,’ ‘political,’ or ‘pre-political.’³¹ Nevertheless, it does seem possible to discuss something of the social organization, some of the types of motivations that seem to drive characters’ actions. In addition, following Donlan, I will not attempt to address the relationship between Iliadic culture and any potential ‘real world’ culture (locatable “spatially and temporally”). Rather I agree with him that “the system ... in the *Iliad* may properly be analyzed in respect to its own inner logic.”³² For example, whether the society (societies?) presented in the *Iliad* represents a *polis* society or an *oikos* society only becomes a valid question if this typology is predictive, i.e., if it allows us to positively reconstruct aspects of the society not presented in our evidence (the *Iliad* in this case), and allows us to make further inferences based on those otherwise absent features. Such a positivist and essentializing typology is ultimately based on a problematic assumption, namely that types are, in fact, essentializing; that is, that a ‘polis-system’ should never contain certain

³¹ See, especially, Adkins, Arthur W. H., “Homeric Ethics,” in *A New Companion to Homer*, E. J. Brill, 1997; Cairns, Douglas L., *Aidos, the Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*, Oxford University Press, 1993; Dodds, E. R., *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Beacon Press, 1957 and “The Social Groups of Dark Age Greece,” *CP*, 1984; Hammer, Dean, *The Iliad as Politics: the Performance of Political Thought*, University of Oklahoma Press, 2002, *et alios*.

³² Donlan, Walter, “The Structure of Authority in the *Iliad*” *Arethusa* Vol. 12, No 1, 1979, p. 52. *Contra* this see Raaflaub, who states “the historicity of Homeric society has become an important problem,” Raaflaub, Kurt A., “Homeric Society” in Morris and Powell, p. 624. Much of the debate centers around typological questions of social and political structure and positivist historiographical questions which seem unanswerable and ultimately unproductive. See also Finley, 78, Van Wees, *et alios*.

features of an ‘oikos-system’ and vice versa; that such types actually determine or constrain which features a given society will be allowed to express and which ones it will not. Such a methodology actually provides us with nothing vital for our reading of the poem. Instead, I will rely on a strictly descriptive methodology by examining what features are actually present and making no assumptions about those features which are not discussed in the narrative itself.

The societies of the Greek *stratos* and the Trojan city that are depicted in the *Iliad* are, like all human cultures, hierarchical, but that hierarchy is relative, situational, and potentially always subject to renegotiation, albeit, this ability to negotiate social position is not unrestricted; Thersites cannot compete with the *basileis* as Odysseus shows. Let me clarify this; there seems to be one primary social class distinction made in the poem, that between members of the elite —referred to variously as *andres agathoi*, *esthloi*, *heroes*, and *basileis*— and the *laoi*.³³ In addition, there is a set of characters whose social position is not clear, but who probably can be classed with the *laoi*, although they function in many ways like members of the elite; these include the *mantis*, Kalkhas, and the priest, Khryses.³⁴ The members of the *laoi*, however, with the possible exceptions of

³³ Sometimes as a collective singular, *laos*. Van Effenterre (quoted in Haubold, p. 2) states that “[t]he *laoi* can equally well be soldiers of an army as members of any crowd. The only constant meaning one can ascribe to the term is that of an *undifferentiated*, and we might add, *subordinate mass* of people, viewed as being in an *inferior* or precarious position.” [emphasis mine]. Thalmann, 88, rejects the notion of hard and fast class distinctions. Nevertheless, with the exception of Thersites problematic case (see above), the *laoi* are never represented as speaking or acting as individuals whereas the *basileis* are.

³⁴ Again, any attempt to type these characters’ social position by class is only felicitous if such a typology functions predictively. That is, it is useful if we can confidently make claims about them based on their *a priori* status as members of one class or the other.

Thersites and the two just mentioned, do not appear as individuated persons, but rather *en masse* or as anonymous members of that undifferentiated mass; they are the ἄνδρες δῆμον.

Haubold suggests how the relationship between the *laoi* and the elite can be summed up in the noun phrase ποιμένι/α λαῶν. This suggests a caretaker/charge relationship which can be seen acted out in, for example, the assembly which is called in response to Apollo's plague in Book 1. The leader, Agamemnon, is responsible for the protection of the *laoi*. Although it is Akhilleus who calls the assembly at A.54, he addresses the problem to Agamemnon. For Haubold, this relationship between ποιμὴν and flock, as it is expressed in Archaic poetry, is always a failed one, which can best be summed up by the phrase at A.10: ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί. "Failure of the shepherd," he states, "is the rule not the exception."³⁵ Nevertheless, the ποιμὴν does not own the flock, he watches over it and protects it. In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon cannot merely command the army to act, but must seek its consent, or the consent of the individual leaders (cf. B.110-141). Amongst the elite *basileis*, social position seems to be determined, at least notionally, by size of one's contingent, as Nestor states at A.280 *f*.

(3) εἰ δὲ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ, A.281
ἀλλ' ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.

Even if you are stronger and the mother who bore you was a goddess,
still this one's φέρτερος because he commands a larger contingent.³⁶

³⁵ Haubold, p. 20. See, also pp. 17-31.

³⁶ I.e., the state of being φέρτερος is (partly) defined by having a larger contingent. This is reiterated in the catalogue by the narrator at B.580 "... πολὺ δὲ πλείστους ἄγε λαούς." Donlan (*op. cit.*, p. 53) rightly notes that the basis of Agamemnon's authority is actually "a complex of inheritance, remote divine sanction, age, personal wealth, and numbers of followers." See also Rihll, *op. cit.*, *et alios*. All translations are my own.

However, the primary distinction within the elite class seems to be between Agamemnon on the one side as the ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν and the remaining heroes on the other.³⁷ However, as others have noted, Agamemnon's rule is not absolute.³⁸ Decisions are made collectively in the *boulê* or elsewhere with the advisement of others present. Thus, when Khryses seeks to get his daughter back from Agamemnon at the beginning of Book 1 (4), he addresses all of the Greeks.

(4) ... καὶ λίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιοῦς, A.15
 Ἄτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύο, κοσμήτορε λαῶν·

... and he petitioned all the Akhaians
 but the two brothers McAtreus especially who were organizers of the army.

The narrator's description of Khryses' address instantiates a hierarchy, but one that will include both τῷ Ἄτρεΐδᾳ and τοὺς πάντας Ἀχαιοῦς. In addition, as has been noted by Rihll and others —something that is of critical importance for the development of the plot— the division of γέρα, the spoils of war —the chief economic activity of the Greek army, is handled by the army itself and not by Agamemnon.³⁹ When Agamemnon is compelled to give up the girl Khryseis, he cannot simply compel the army to reappoint him a compensatory prize —as Akhilleus points out (A.123-126)— but he must strong-arm one of the other leaders. Agamemnon's seizure of Briseis from Akhilleus does not

³⁷ Agamemnon will make a similar claim himself at l.160 f.

³⁸ See Rihll, *op. cit.*

³⁹ There is actually contradictory evidence regarding this claim. At l.331 ff, Akhilleus states that Agamemnon collects the γέρα from the individual soldiers and then himself makes the distribution.

τάων ἐκ πασέων κειμήλια πολλὰ καὶ ἐσθλὰ I.331
 ἐξελόμην, καὶ πάντα φέρων Ἀγαμέμνονι δόσκον
 Ἄτρεΐδῃ· ὃ δ' ὀπίσθε μένων παρὰ νηυσὶ θοῇσι
 δεξάμενος διὰ παῦρα δασάσκετο, πολλὰ δ' ἔχεσκεν.

take place under the auspices of his role as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, but involves a personal exchange between individuals. It is Agamemnon, the individual, because he is βασιλεύτερος, who takes Briseis, not ὁ ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν. His position does give him clout; however, that clout is not expressed directly through the agency of the army, but personally. Agamemnon sends his own heralds to take Briseis. His role as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν does not supersede his role as Ἀτρεΐδης, but results from it. That Agamemnon's actions in this regard are not 'official,' but personal is suggested by the fact that his actions, in fact, do not go uncontested. Akhilleus is perfectly willing at first to attempt to kill him in order to prevent Agamemnon's actions. Agamemnon's position is summed up by Rihll:

No one, least of all Akhilleus, has been brought to the point where they think it is *inherently correct* to obey Agamemnon. This is obvious, for else the various leaders would not keep trying to justify his (and their own) positions, and Agamemnon would not need to try to persuade anybody. He could simply give orders and expect to be obeyed.⁴⁰

Rihll's point is perhaps a bit overstated. A certain degree of consensus, even in the case of a ruler whom it is "inherently correct to obey" and who can "simply give orders and expect to be obeyed," facilitates rule. It is by no means clear that, given sufficient power, Agamemnon "could simply give orders and expect to be obeyed." Nevertheless, what is important about Rihll's point seems to be that Agamemnon does not simply make decisions on his own; he does not merely offer commands and expect them to be carried out, as Akhilleus himself suggests.

⁴⁰ Rihll, *op. cit.*, p. 41. Ultimately, Agamemnon's threat to take Briseis is sanctioned by the gods. This can be seen when Athene prevents Akhilleus from killing him (A.195 ff.); only then does Akhilleus relent.

- (5) ὦ μοι ἀναιδείην ἐπιδέμεν κερδαλέον φρον
πῶς τίς τοι πρόφρων ἔπειν πείθηται Ἀχαιῶν
ἢ ὁδὸν ἐλθέμεναι ἢ ἀνδράσιν ἴφι μάχεσθαι; A.149

Oh you seem covered in your own shamelessness, you fawn-heart
How could any Greek who had any sense at all listen to you
and either set out on your expeditions or fight in battle with other warriors?

His actions, especially vis-à-vis how the war is conducted, are not self-sanctioning. Rather, he consults with the other Greeks in the *boulê* before action is taken. On the other hand, his wishes are never contradicted by the *boulê* either. So, while Agamemnon's power is functionally tempered, it is effectively absolute. His orders are obeyed, even by Akhilleus, who turns Briseis over. Nestor himself points to this contradiction in Agamemnon's authority.

- (6) ὦ φίλοι Ἀργείων ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες B.80
εἰ μὲν τις τὸν ὄνειρον Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ἐνίσπε
ψεῦδός κεν φαῖμεν καὶ νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον·
νῦν δ' ἴδεν ὃς μέγ' ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὖχεται εἶναι

My dear Argive leaders and strategists
if anyone else of the Akhaians had told us this dream
we'd say it was a lie and reject it instead
but the man who saw it has the claim to be the best of the Akhaians.

Agamemnon's dream-based intention should be turned from (νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον) but, because it comes through Agamemnon ὃς μέγ' ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν εὖχεται εἶναι, they should follow its injunction. Agamemnon's authority is presented as a claim (εὖχεται εἶναι) which he himself makes and which overrides any appearances to the contrary.

Donlan notes a general tendency for individuals of different social standing to engage in what he calls *Leadership Authority*, which he defines as the “ability to make decisions, issue orders, or suggest specific courses of action ... with the expectation that

the[y] ... will be persuasive to others.”⁴¹ He notes that statistically, among the mortal characters, one has an 87% chance of having one’s requests or demands agreed to.⁴² Part of the problem with understanding how authority functions within the Iladic cultural context(s) is also stated by Donlan. In the *Iliad*, we find “a society in which the workings of the authority-system were neither precisely defined nor clearly stated.”⁴³ Note that a similar situation holds among the gods. Zeus cannot simply decree what he wishes to happen and have it happen; he also must build a consensus amongst the other gods who are often the agents of his βουλή. What is more, unlike the case of Agamemnon, he *does* concede when he is forced by the other gods to concede.⁴⁴ This tendency to concession when necessary happens despite the fact that (Zeus claims) he has the physical power to force the other side’s compliance.

(7) δεινὰ δ’ ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν Ἥρην πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν· Ο.Ι3
 ἧ μάλα δὴ κακότεχνος ἀμήχανε σὸς δόλος Ἥρῃ
 Ἑκτορα δῖον ἔπαυσε μάχης, ἐφόβησε δὲ λαούς.
 οὐ μὰν οἶδ’ εἰ αὐτὲ κακορραφίης ἀλεγεινῆς
 πρώτη ἐπαύρηαι καί σε πληγῇσιν ἰμάσσω.
 ἧ οὐ μέμνη ὅτε τ’ ἐκρέμω⁴⁵ ὑπόθεν, ἐκ δὲ ποδοῖν
 ἄκμονας ἦκα δύω, περὶ χερσὶ δὲ δεσμὸν ἦλα
 χρύσεον ἄρρηκτον; σὺ δ’ ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσιν
 ἐκρέμω· ἡλάστεον δὲ θεοὶ κατὰ μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον,
 λῦσαι δ’ οὐκ ἐδύναντο παρασταδόν· ὃν δὲ λάβοιμι
 ρίπτασκον τεταγών ἀπὸ βηλοῦ ὄφρ’ ἂν ἴκηται
 γῆν ὀλιγηπελέων· ...

⁴¹ Donlan *op. cit.*, p.52. That is, authority is based on persuasion and is not institutionally sanctioned. Batstone (personal correspondence) suggests the term *leadership* for this type of authority.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Donlan, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁴⁴ As in the cases of Sarpedon’s and Hektor’s lives, which he wishes to save, but he is compelled to concede nevertheless.

⁴⁵ West 2002, restores: ὅτε τε κρέμα’

[Zeus] glared fiercely at Here and chewed her out.
 “I just can’t deal with you, all of this conniving and trickery of yours, Hera,
 It was you that kept Hektor out of the fight and terrified his troops, wasn’t it?
 I really wonder if, out of this painful and awful act,
 you won’t be the first to get your comeuppance, maybe I’ll beat you with lashes.
 C’mon now, don’t you remember the time you hung suspended up high, and then
 from your feet
 I hung down two anvils, and I wrapped a chain around your hands
 a golden and unbreakable one, and there up in the ether and clouds
 you hung, and although the other gods were really upset, far off in Olympus,
 they were stuck on the sidelines and couldn’t free you. And if I caught one
 of them trying,
 well, I’d just grab him and throw him out the door so he’d fall
 to the earth like he was nothing. ...”

Hera’s reaction then to back off and stand down implies that his threat is perceived, at least, to be physically possible; he could do what he claims.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Zeus does not rule with an ‘iron hand,’ and he does not always get his way. He is, for example, himself convinced to back down in his desire to save his son, Sarpedon, and later to save Hektor. In both cases, although he could (Π.441 ff. ἄνδρα θνητὸν ... β ἄψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσυχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι; β *ἔρδ[ε]* ...), he agrees not to act. Thus Zeus’ power, like Agamemnon’s, is effectively limited; while the power of Zeus is not limited physically (or so the story goes), the power of both *is* limited by social considerations. Donlan concludes that Iliadic societies basically consist of *pares* each of whose striving to be *primus* is mediated by collective authority.⁴⁷ Agamemnon’s authority is based on the personal relationships he has with the individual Greek leaders and is not institutional or absolute. Note that Akhilleus’ decision to withdraw from the host does not constitute a

⁴⁶ Note also that the force of the threat is reenforced ‘visually’ by Zeus’ expression described at O.13: δεινὰ δ’ ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν, see Latiner, Donald, *Sardonic Smile: Nonverbal Behavior in Homeric Epic*, University of Michigan Press, 1995.

⁴⁷ Donlan, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

coupe d' état, but the severing of one individual relationship; the other Greeks don't follow him.⁴⁸

Despite limitations on his power, we may wish to ask whether Agamemnon's status as leader, as ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν, is confirmed in any substantive way.⁴⁹ Another way to formulate the question is to ask how, outside of speech, power, or better, social position, is manifest in the *Iliad*. In a project that attempts to show how address is able to be a marker of social status in the *Iliad*, can we confirm or deny a correlation between address and social status by looking for other overt cues which confirm and conform to characters' status? That is, is social status also displayed through the display of overt symbols? I note that there appear to be visual symbols that serve as markers of social position. Both Agamemnon and Khryses carry a stick which symbolizes and so makes visible their claim to a certain position. However, in both cases, that symbol and thence its effectiveness are called into question. For Agamemnon, the device that seems to act to confirm and instantiate his social position is the *skeptron* whose pedigree the narrator lays out in Book 2 (101-108 (8) below). There seems to be an equation between the display of the symbol and a manifestation of one's power and position.

(8) αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Θυέστ' Ἀγαμέμνονι λείπε φορῆναι, Β106
πολλῇσιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν.

Then Thyestes left it [the *skeptron*] to Agamemnon to wield,
to rule the many islands and all of Argos.

⁴⁸ Although his Mermedons do. That is, Akhilleus position vis-à-vis his own contingent may be more institutionalized, but that relationship is never developed in the poem.

⁴⁹ We have already seen Nestor's claim that, in comparison to Akhilleus, Agamemnon γε φέρτερός ἐστιν ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.

Wielding the *skeptron*, φορῆναι, in this case constitutes ruling, ἀνάσσειν. However Akhilleus has already challenged, or flouted the authority of this symbol at A.234-239.

Similarly, Agamemnon questions the salience of Khryses' staff.

- (9) μή σε γέρον κοίλῃσιν ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχείω A.26
ἢ νῦν δηθύνοντ' ἢ ὕστερον αὐτίς ἰόντα,
μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμη σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο

“Do not, old sir, let me catch you beside my hollow ships
don't hang around now, and don't come back again later either.
No, that *skeptron* won't help you then, the god's ribbons won't either.”

Agamemnon threatens the old priest, not as a priest, but as a γέρων. He then directly and strongly (μή ... οὐ) challenges the authority of Apollo's σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα. Agamemnon's actions here are similar in effect to Akhilleus' casting down of Agamemnon's *skeptron* later at A.234ff. In both cases the authority of an individual is challenged via a symbol of his authority. In both cases, that symbol is linked directly to a god, as if it proclaimed that the holder's authority were sanctioned by that god. In the first instance (9), that authority is invoked in the very act of challenging that authority, by the one making the challenge. In fact, as Vodoklys suggests, Agamemnon's treatment of Khryses itself represents a display of his own position.⁵⁰ His treatment of Khryses says that he can so treat him. That he is not challenged in this action suggests that he is not challenged in his right to do so.

As has been mentioned, size of one's contingent can be invoked as a source of authority and thus as a sign of social worth, cf. A.281, (2) above. This again represents a situation in which a theoretically visible token, the size of one's fleet, host, compound,

⁵⁰ Vodoklys, John E., Jr., *Blame-Expression in the Epic Tradition*, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1979.

etc. translates into a claim for position. This claim seems then to be acknowledged by others, as Nestor, A.281 (2), supports Agamemnon's claim to being φέρτερός, and bases that on the size of his contingent: ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει.

It is not merely the size of one's fleet that functions to mark one's status. In Book 9 (122-161), when Agamemnon first attempts to make amends with Akhilleus, we see him offering a large and elaborate inducement in the form of treasure, a daughter to marry, and culminating in a list of seven cities which he will hand over to Akhilleus to rule. The entire elaborate and lengthy list, which Agamemnon lists off himself, lasts for 39 lines, longer than many whole speeches. If Agamemnon can afford to hand over so much, how much greater must his remaining holdings be. The list of what Agamemnon can afford to dispense with in order to make amends with Akhilleus effectively puts him, and the other Greeks in their place. This list of inducements is notoriously capped with a disclaimer of sorts.

- (10) ταῦτά κ' εἰ τελέσαιμι μεταλήξαντι χόλοιο.
δηθήτω· Ἄϊδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἦδ' ἀδάμαστος,
τοῦνεκα καὶ τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν ἔχθιστος ἀπάντων·
καὶ μοι ὑποστήτω ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι
ἦδ' ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος εὖχομαι εἶναι.

“And I’d do all of that for him, but he has to turn off his anger first.
Let him then be broken. Recall Hades, he is not gentle, in fact, he’s *unbroken*
and that’s why he’s the most hateful of all the gods in the eyes of men.
And so, [Akhilleus] must place himself under me, I’m really βασιλεύτερος,
and I also claim to be that much more his elder.”

The final verses of Agamemnon's speech suggest how his offer is not about reconciliation at all, but Akhilleus' concession. If Akhilleus does not want to be hated like death is hated, he has to be tamed, broken, and broken by the man who is his βασιλεύτερος and his προγενέστερος, Agamemnon. Agamemnon's offer is ultimately about his claim to authority and not about his largesse.

In the narrator's description of Agamemnon's *skeptron*, which I have already mentioned ([8] above), we can see another kind of self presentation, the history.

- (11) ἔσθῃ σκῆπτρον ἔχων τὸ μὲν Ἥφαιστος κάμε τεύχων. B.101
 Ἥφαιστος μὲν δῶκε Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι,
 αὐτὰρ ἄρα Ζεὺς δῶκε διακτόρῳ ἄργεῖφόντῃ·
 Ἑρμείας δὲ ἄναξ δῶκεν Πέλοπι πληξίππῳ,
 αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Πέλοψ δῶκ' Ἀτρεΐ ποιμένι λαῶν,
 Ἀτρεὺς δὲ θνήσκων ἔλιπεν πολύαρνι Θυέστῃ,
 αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Θυέστ' Ἀγαμέμνονι λείπε φορῆναι,
 πολλῇσιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν.

He stood there holding the *skeptron*, which Hephaistos labored on and made.
 Hephaistos gave it to Zeus, ruler of the House of Kronos;
 of course Zeus passed it on to the messenger Argosdeath;
 lord Hermes gave it to Pelops Horsegoad;
 then Pelops passed it on to Atreus, shepherd of the people.
 When Atreus died, he left it to wealthy Thyestes,
 then Thyestes left it to Agamemnon to wield,
 to rule the many islands and all of Argos.

Agamemnon's *skeptron* comes with a history and as such manifests that history when it is displayed. What is more, this history consists of names, and so too Agamemnon's names (specifically the patronymic) also display that history, a history that apparently can be traced directly to the gods themselves. The story of Agamemnon's staff reinforces the importance of the history implicit in Agamemnon's names. When Akhilleus throws down Agamemnon's staff, he is rejecting that history and the position which flows from it. This then forces the question of how important Agamemnon's names are and what

significance it has when he is addressed with them. Does the patronymic function like the *skeptron* to invoke Agamemnon's history, and is that history an important feature of how he and others construct his social position? We can see another example of the importance of the history implicit in names for position and for positioning in the *xenia*-swap of Glaukos and Diomedes in Book 6 (119-236). In this case, the whole social dynamics of the encounter change once the histories of the two warriors are revealed. Again, history helps define social position and enemies become *xenoi*.

Social position in the *Iliad* is performed both by the individual and by his or her interactants. Agamemnon and Khryses perform it when they display their staves; Akhilleus and Agamemnon perform it when they reject those displays; and Glaukos and Diomedes perform it when they perform their histories and then accept the other's performance. We should rightly ask then whether address, which Glaukos and Diomedes implicitly relate to history, performs a similar function?

This presentation or projection of the social self is referred to as *face*.⁵¹ However face is constituted, the cultivation and protection of that face is an important part of social interchange. Implicit in 'protection' is the notion that one's face is potentially and variably fragile and subject to harm. Social interaction puts people in the position of having their social position negatively affected, say, by being insulted, embarrassed, beholden, etc. Hudson states that face is "linked to observable behaviour."⁵² For Agamemnon, and other characters in the *Iliad*, the performance of their social position

⁵¹ See, especially, Brown, P., Stephen G. Levinson, *Politeness, Some Universals in Language Usage*, Cambridge, 1987, and Hudson, Richard A, *Sociolinguistics*, Cambridge University Press, 1996 (Chapter 2). For a more complete discussion of face, especially as it is being used in this study, see Chapter 2.

⁵² *Op. cit.* p. 231,

consists of (amongst others) not only their physical appearance, including their expression, their costume (e.g., armor), and other tangible appurtenances (e.g., *skeptrā*) but also their histories (via names etc.) and also their words.

If position, both social and political, is bound up in display —displays of wealth, displays of power, displays of position, displays of history —then it follows that challenges to the tokens of that display would constitute challenges to position both personal and professional. Individuals present a constructed persona, a front, called in sociolinguistics their *face*. Face is manifest through visible (concrete) means like costume and accoutrements, and (of particular interest for this study) verbally. That face becomes the point at which people are socially and thence professionally vulnerable. Thus, when Agamemnon attacks the staff and ribbons that mark Khryses' position and connect him to Apollo, he effectively attacks the man. For the moment, Agamemnon's subsequent expressed intention to iteratively molest Khryses' daughter constitutes a threat against Khryses' position, as a priest and especially as a father. Both the staff and the daughter, Khryseis, in the hands of Agamemnon, become a psychosocial cudgel to assault the old priest-father. Similarly, in Book 9, Agamemnon's vast and almost hubristic bribe is intended, as he himself states, as a goad to break (δαμᾶν) Akhilleus, and Akhilleus recognizes it as such and rejects it. Akhilleus' casting down of Agamemnon's *skeptron* also marks visually (in a way that his abortive attempt to kill Agamemnon could not) Akhilleus' ultimate rejection of Agamemnon's ability to command him into battle.

In the *Iliad* then, it seems that the clothes do make the man. Language is also an important way (perhaps the most important way) people display their social status,

affiliations, and attitudes. One one end of the spectrum, the dialect or accent we use reflects the social group in which we received the majority of our acculturation. On the other end of the spectrum, linguistic features like lexical choice, tone, amplitude, and speed of speech speak about our immediate states of mind and our attitudes to the current state of affairs. Visual and linguistic displays combine to project a social version of the person at the point of interaction, one's *face*. Sometimes, these are in contrast as in the case of Thersites who speaks as a *basileus* but whose right to speak as one is betrayed by his appearance.⁵³ Agamemnon's language also manifests a social version of himself. By addressing Khryses as γέρον and by then making the threats he does, he not only constructs a version of himself as able to act in such a way, but he constructs a version of the priest as unable to prevent such treatment. And Khryses at first appears to accept these versions: ἔδεισεν δ' ὁ γέρον καὶ ἐπείθετο μύθῳ.⁵⁴ It is not then the display of ones face *per se* that is ultimately important, but the acceptance or rejection of that display by others, and of particular importance for this study, the display of that acceptance or rejection. Akhilleus' rejection of Agamemnon's authority through the physical display of rejecting of his staff represents one way this can be manifest. As we have seen in Hektor's speech to Paris at (Γ.39 ff.), where he addresses him as Δύσπαρι, address is another such display. Agamemnon, by addressing Khryses as γέρον —followed by his injunctions— rather than as, say, ἱερεῦ, suggests that he also rejects the priest's presentation of himself.

Language is then, one way, albeit a primary one, of marking social identity. What we can and cannot say, who we can and cannot speak to, what we can and cannot call

⁵³ See Thalmann 88, p. 17 ff.

⁵⁴ A.33, 'But the old man grew afraid and obeyed his *mythos*.'

someone all reflect and therefore make statements about our social position. The latter of these, what we can and cannot call someone, called *address*, is an area of language use which is particularly sensitive to social constraints and is therefore, particularly important for defining and *redefining* both speakers and addressees within their immediate social relationship. It is address, then, as a linguistic medium of social interaction and social negotiation which I will address in this study.

CHAPTER 2

A METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

*To speak accurately, a word or phrase by itself does not actually mean anything. It is, of course, the speaker who means something, which he can signal to hearers who share his linguistic acculturation by means of utterances that are recognized as words, phrases, and so forth. It is necessary to recall this simple fact from time to time, to remind us that the art language cannot compose for the poet.*⁵⁵

- 2.1. Introduction
- 2.2. Pragmatics
 - 2.2.1. Pragmatics
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 - 2.3.3. Face-Threatening Activities and Face Work
 - 2.3.4. Off-Record, Positive and Negative Politeness Strategies
 - 2.3.5. Impoliteness strategies

2.1 Introduction It would appear obvious that language use —some might argue most, I will contend all— does not happen in isolation. People speak or sing or even write in a particular setting and for a particular reason or reasons. What is more,

⁵⁵ Nagler, M., *Spontaneity and Tradition*, UC Press, Berkeley, 1974, quoted in Friedrich, P., J. Redfield, "Speech as a Personality Symbol: The Case of Akhilleus," *Language*, Vol 54, 1978, pp. 263-288.

these contextual factors (reason and setting) directly influence what people say, sing or write. Although these facts may seem self-evident, they have the force of arguing against the notion of the autonomous, authorless, context-free text.⁵⁶ Texts, spoken texts, sung texts, written texts, even mimed texts arise within a context that is unique to each individual text; what is more they are informed, shaped, and —one might even argue— determined by that context. The study of language in context and the influence of that context on its situated text is called *pragmatics*, and will be, in the most general sense, the topic of this work.

The specific purpose of this work then is to discuss the influence of context, the narrative setting of the *Iliad*, on dialogic speech, in this case, the reported (or better, *represented*) speeches of the characters in the *Iliad*.⁵⁷ The basic premise will be that certain aspects of the language of these characters cannot be explained by reference to grammar alone, but will require reference to some other aspect of language —perhaps in conjunction with grammar— to be fully understood. Let us take an example: at the beginning of Book 1 of the *Iliad*, during *the* event which sets in motion the entire narrative of the following poem, Khryses, who is a priest of Apollo, comes to the Greek camp to ransom his daughter. How do the relationship between Khryses and Agamemnon, their relative social roles, their specific roles in this interchange, the nature of Khryses' request, and the setting of this event all influence how Khryses speaks, the

⁵⁶ See especially Barthes, Roland, "The Death of the Author," in Rice, Philip and Patricia Waugh, eds., *Modern Literary Theory: a Reader*, New York : E. Arnold, 1992, Ch. 6. pp. 114-121. See also; Lamarque, Peter, *Fictional Points of View*, Cornell University Press, 1996, Ch 11. Graham, Allen, *Intertextuality*, New York : Routledge, 2000. Ch. 2. Wolff, Jane, *The Social Production of Art*, New York University Press, 1993, Ch. 5. Newton, K.M., ed., *Twentieth Century Literary Theory: a Reader*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, Ch. VI.

⁵⁷ These are reported in the sense that the poet is (re)presenting them within a narrative frame which he is also representing.

language he uses, and how Agamemnon reacts to it?⁵⁸ That these factors should be influential seems obvious, but the precise nature of that influence has been less easy to state, except in vague and nonsystematic ways. When Khryses, addressing the Greek army and Agamemnon, its commander, makes his two requests, to free his daughter and to accept her ransom, he says:

(1) παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι A 20

“Please free my dear child; here, take this ransom.”

Why is he represented as using an optative λύσαιτε for the first request and an infinitive δέχεσθαι for the other? If one were to follow Parry’s argument, one would need to argue that meter alone determined the choice of forms.⁵⁹ But such an explanation fails, at least in the case of the second verb, because the possible alternate forms, δέχοισθε and δέχεσθε, are metrically equivalent at line end to the infinitive which actually occurs, and therefore, all three potential forms are metrically interchangeable.⁶⁰ Thus, we wind up being forced to conclude that the choice of at least δέχεσθαι, and probably λύσαιτε as well, was deliberate on the part of the poet and that his choice was governed by other than metrical constraints. We must again ask the same question about his choice of these two forms we asked earlier, why did the poet choose the optative for one verb and the

⁵⁸ I use phrasing like “how Khryses speaks ...” and similar as shorthand for how the poet, based on his own pragmatic competence and background knowledge, presents Khryses as speaking.

⁵⁹ See, Parry, *The Making of Homeric Verse*, 1971 and Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, 1960.

⁶⁰ And these are in fact attested in some variant readings. The retention of the reading, λύσαιτε, is most likely due to the principle *difficilior est melior*, by which variants that can be explained as corrections are judged to be later emendations. That is, variants which are regular are more likely to have replaced irregular readings rather than the other way around.

infinitive for the other? Are the natures of the two different requests not part of the answer to this question? This project then will be about just such choices and the forces at work which motivate them.

As Jucker *et al.* state in their introduction to the volume *Historical Dialogue Analysis*, “[I]n essence all language is dialogic, whether it is written or spoken Speakers use language to communicate with some actual, potential or merely fictional addressee.”⁶¹ However, the processes involved in dialogue and the influence of speakers and settings on each other and the course of their dialogue is most readily available for study only when information about the setting and the text of both speakers is available at the same time. Such is the case with ‘paired speeches’⁶² like the dialogues found in the *Iliad*. The dialogic nature of speech and the effects of interactants and setting on each other is easier to study in cases where we have the text of a conversation, in the form of a dialogue, coupled with information about its setting, in the form of a narrative frame, preserved together.

The methodology of this work will be to approach the analysis of the speeches found within the *Iliad* as if they function in a way that is analogous to how spoken language functions ‘in the world.’ In order to do this, I will first introduce some of the analytical machinery used to investigate spoken language and spoken discourse and discuss how it can and cannot be adapted to the analysis of dialogue in a narrative setting —as opposed to the real world. It will not be enough, I will argue, to merely state that, for example, the optative is used in *Iliad* A.20 to make a request and the infinitive an

⁶¹ Jucker, Fritz and Lebsanft, eds., *Historical Dialogue Analysis*, John Benjamins Publishing Co., p. 1.

⁶² Often referred to as an *adjacency pair*, see Verschueren, Jef, *Understanding Pragmatics*, Oxford University Press, 1999.

offering. We will want to be able to say, if this is actually the case, why it is the case. If there is nothing about the grammar of optatives and infinitives that required their use in this passage as opposed to some other form, on what basis was the choice made? By asking such questions as this, I suggest, we will be able to do more than simply amass a set of statistics about the distribution of, say, optatives and infinitives or patronymics and given-names, but begin to say something about how the poet represents the characters in the *Iliad* speaking to each other; how their ‘world-view’ frames their speech and how their speech defines them. Let me stress here, that the pragmatic constraints I will be looking at occur within a constructed, narrative setting. Thus, we are not talking about Akhilleus’ world view, but the poets construction of Akhilleus’ world view; we are not talking about Agamemnon’s words but the poet’s version of Agamemnon’s words.

2.2 Pragmatics

2.2.1 Introduction Let me begin generally by defining the term *pragmatics*, which I introduced above. My purpose here is not to attempt to define what the field of *pragmatics* is qua field,⁶³ but to construct a site-specific definition for the term for use in this paper. Collinge nicely describes pragmatics as “[the] study of [...] what utterances achieve in interactive communications; that is, how speaker works on hearer in real exchanges.”⁶⁴ Grundy puts it this way: “[pragmatics] defines the systematic ways by which we decode indeterminacy.”⁶⁵ Thus, for him, “pragmatics has to do with the

⁶³ For problems with the scope of the field of *pragmatics*, see especially Levinson, Stephen C., *Pragmatics*, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1-54; also Blackmore, 1992; Lakoff, 1972; Leech, Geoffrey, *Principles of Pragmatics*, Longman, London, 1983; Grundy, Peter, *Doing Pragmatics*, E. Arnold; New York, 1995.

⁶⁴ Collinge, “Thoughts on the Pragmatics of Ancient Greek,” *PCPhS* 214, 1988, pp. 1-13

distinction between what a speaker's words mean and what a speaker might mean by his words."⁶⁶ For us, *pragmatics* will be the study of the role of context in language use. That is, it will be the study of how context functions to shape what people say and how it works to determine how others interpret what has been said. Thus, pragmatics takes as its data not the sentence, but the *utterance*. By *sentence* I mean, not the grammatical unit that is usually defined as a fully saturated verb phrase (VP) with some indication of subject, but a unit which consists of the expression of a single thought.⁶⁷ This definition is more in keeping with the word's etymology that takes it as derived from Latin *sententia* which in turn means something like a *thought*. Under such a definition, the string 'the store' would constitute a sentence in:

- (2) A: "Where are you going?"
B: "The store."

But not in:

- (3) A: "Where are you going?"
B: "The store on Lane Avenue."

⁶⁵ Grundy, p. 10. Daniel Collins (personal correspondence) states that he "find[s] Grundy's definition to be too limited. "Decoding" suggests only the work of the interpreter, whereas pragmatics can also focus on production. Moreover, pragmatics is not limited to the issue of indeterminacy (though that is the preoccupation of one of its traditional strands, the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Austin, Grice and Searle)." On the other hand, as Derrida pointed out (see *Limited Inc.*) there are problems with proceeding from the point of view of production as the facts of production can only be inferred and not known. This work does not intend to treat this debate but I will proceed conservatively in regards to the facts of speech and meaning production.

⁶⁶ Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 217

⁶⁷ VP is common short hand for a verb phrase (NP for noun phrase, XP for an unspecified phrase level constituent). In much syntactic theory, an XP, i.e., a phrase level constituent (or projection) is any constituent that consists of an element, X, and all of its syntactic dependants. See for example: Pollard, Carl and Ivan A. Sag *Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar*, Center for the Study of Language and Information; University of Chicago Press, 1994.

wherein the sentence is, strictly speaking, “*the store on Lane Avenue*” and “*the store*” is only a fragment. I define *utterance* here as a single sentence produced by a single ‘speaker’ used in a specific context, for a specific purpose. We will see that context can serve to influence both how some particular utterance is to be understood by the addressee and what utterances are more or less acceptable to use in any particular setting.

2.2.2 Context A definition of *context* is all the more important as the term is so ubiquitous in common parlance that it is not always clear how it is to be taken if it is not first defined. In this paper, I will want to understand *context* in a very precise way. For my purposes then, *context* refers to only those factors outside of the content of some utterance *U*, which influence the form and interpretation of that utterance. Defined in this way, *context* can contain a very broad range of phenomena. Note that by such a definition, utterances other than utterance *U*, specifically those which precede it, can and do form part of the context for *U* itself. Thus defined, *context* can then be further subdivided into three general feature areas: *setting, participants, and purpose* (see Table 2.1, p.39).

It is not always possible, however, to separate the physical and the social setting completely. Many social occasions are tied to particular settings. Thus trials take place in courtrooms, lunches in cafes and diners, football games on football fields, etc. On the other hand, two people may engage in any number of talk exchanges that are not *a priori* tied to particular places. It is for this reason that I have maintained a distinction between the physical setting (place) and the social setting (occasion). Such a distinction still allows for their occasional overlap. Further, it seems that, if there is any theoretical potential for the same social setting to exist within two or more physical settings, the

differences in place will influence the direction and form of any talk exchanges. For example, it is likely that a casual lunch involving the same interactants might proceed somewhat differently depending on whether it takes place in the four-star dining room of the Clift Four Seasons Hotel or at Denny's. In addition, since all the previous utterances in any talk exchange⁶⁸ potentially contribute to the setting of the utterance in question, and hence its context, context is by definition always changing. Another influence on the shape of any talk exchange lies in the mental states of the participants, in how they feel and what they think. All participants have some beliefs about themselves, about their addressee and about anyone who may be listening in. I will call these beliefs *histories*.⁶⁹ Note, also, that it is not the actual history of the addressee (and the audience) that is important for defining the context of any utterance, but rather the speaker's knowledge of, or better, beliefs about, those histories. That is to say, the addressee's history would actually be the speakers' beliefs about the addressees' beliefs about themselves. All of the above falls out from the fact that speakers do not have access to the contents of others' minds and so can only construct an approximation of those contents; people cannot know what other people believe or know, but they can, and do, make inferences about it, and these inferences are based, in part at least, on what, how and why they speak and act themselves. What results from those inferences can only constitute belief. From this fact about speaker knowledge, which I have argued forms part of the context for speech, it becomes clear that context is slightly different relative to each interactant,

⁶⁸ Grice, H. P., "Logic and Conversation," *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3, Speech acts*. 1975. See below.

⁶⁹ However, as these histories are really no more than a set of beliefs, they might better be called *historiographies*.

I. Setting:

A. Culture: the set of social values ascribed to speaker and addressee (and audience)⁷⁰

B. Place: the physical setting (e.g., a diner, courtroom, football field, etc.),

C. Occasion: the social setting (e.g., a casual lunch, job-talk, funeral, etc.),

D. The illocutionary force of any previous utterances.⁷¹

II. Participants:

A. Speakers and

i. Their history (background beliefs about themselves)

ii. Their beliefs about the context (also called *background knowledge*)

B. Addressee

(C. Audience (also called *bystander*))⁷²

D. The relationship of the speaker, the addressee (and the audience) defined as:⁷³

i. Power: the relative position in a social hierarchy of the interactants

ii. Relation: the degree of intimacy between interactants also called *solidarity*

iii. The imposition caused by the illocutionary force of the utterance

III. Purpose: what kind of speech act *U* is, and why the speaker is making it.⁷⁴

Table 2.1: A Schematization of Context

⁷⁰ See Verschueren, *op. cit.*, p. 92 *ff.* for a discussion of some of the problems with this concept.

⁷¹ See below for a definition of *illocutionary force*.

⁷² The relationship between addressee and audience is potentially quite complex. There are clearly a wide range of degrees of other involvement in speech events. The term is used here merely to indicate others who are not specifically addressed by some utterance *U*. See Verschueren, Clark, *et alios*.

⁷³ This item (II D) will form the basis for my definition of politeness below.

⁷⁴ Cf. definition of *speech act* below.

because interactants have slightly different knowledge of, and beliefs about, the setting; their knowledge is idiosyncratic. This is not to argue that interactants do not share knowledge; they may. In fact, interactants count on the fact that they share knowledge to some degree with their addressee(s), when making decisions about how to formulate an utterance. Nevertheless, shared knowledge does constitute a belief system, i.e., is idiosyncratic, even if a very well-founded and well-supported belief system. Thus, ‘shared knowledge’ constitutes part of the belief system of speakers and is only verified in the successful or unsuccessful transaction of some utterance —that is, when the utterance is perceived by the speaker to be, in some way, “understood” by the addressee.

Let us take an example of the factors involved in how some particular utterance can be understood by an addressee, in order to look at the processes involved in how context serves to determine the interpretation of an utterance. Let us take as an example the imaginary utterance:

(4) “It sure is hot in here.”

As a *sentence* these words have a semantically determined logical meaning such that a locus designated by the term *here* has a temperature that can be described as *hot* (say above 72° F.).⁷⁵ This meaning can be either true or false, and is true every time the temperature is 73° F. or higher in a locus designated as *here*. The truth value of (1) is the same regardless of where its setting might be and who might be uttering it. That is, its

⁷⁵ What constitutes ‘hot’ is of course open to individual and perhaps cultural interpretation. What is universal here is that there is a range of temperatures that constitute what one might call ‘hot.’ In addition, as Daniel Collins has pointed out (personal correspondence) this example points up the problem with the notion of *sentence*. The term *here* as with other deictics, is meaningless outside of some context, although we might attempt to solve this problem by defining the term in some way like ‘*here* indicates the location of speaking in time and/or space as an abstract concept.’ The real problem is, of course, that no language exists outside of its context yet we feel a need to be able to discuss it as an abstract.

meaning is said to be invariant. I will call this kind of meaning *sentence-meaning*. Sentence-meaning then is that meaning which is available every time that sentence is used.⁷⁶ However, note a couple of things about this sentence. First, the designation of $>72^{\circ}$ F. for *hot* is arbitrary; it is not clear that a change in temperature from 71° to 72° F would even be perceptible by the average person. However, according to the above imaginary definition for *hot*, this point on the temperature scale marks the transition between the state of being *hot* and that of not being *hot*. Second, and more important for my purpose here, such a sentence as (4) when used as an utterance, is almost never (one might comfortably assert *never*) used specifically to communicate information about temperature. This is because, as I argued above, without being stated explicitly or agreed upon in advance, the referent for the term *hot* is arbitrary, undefined and hence ambiguous. Thus, to utter (4) in order to convey to addressees meaningful information about temperature fails since the term *hot* is undefined and hence meaningless as factual information beyond what addressees could themselves perceive. That is, it is *already* part of the speaker's and addressees' shared knowledge (as defined above).⁷⁷ It is for this reason that sentences like (4) are rarely used, as utterances, to convey their sentence meaning.

If one is to imagine, however, that this same sentence were uttered in a particular context, by say a hospital patient to her nurse, one clearly can then read the sentence (4) to have an utterance meaning (or *implicature*, see below), something like (5):

⁷⁶ See especially, Levinson, *op. cit.*, p 17 ff.

⁷⁷ Note, the utterance is not “I *think* it sure is hot...”, nor “It seems to me to be hot ...”. That is, the utterance, as worded, does not seem to constitute a communication about the speaker's beliefs or perceptions, but about a fact (i.e. *here* = *hot*) of their shared context which is already self evident. Note further, the utterance in (1) would likely have a different reading if uttered over the phone or by mail.

(5) Lower the temperature.

A meaning such as (5), which in this case can neither be true nor false and is recovered from the use of (4) within a particular context, is called the *utterance meaning*. One can see at once that the particular reading in (6) is determined to an extent *E*, by the setting in which the sentence (4) is uttered, and is based in part on the sentence meaning of (4), coupled with an understanding of the relationship between the speaker of (4) and her addressee.

Another thing that one notices is that there are certain contexts in which a sentence like (4) would be unlikely or even inappropriate to utter —even if the temperature at the time were $>72^{\circ}$ F. Thus someone is unlikely to utter (6) in response to a question like “How do you plead?”.⁷⁸ The degree to which an utterance is used appropriately is called its *felicity*⁷⁹ and the conditions that determine whether such a sentence is uttered felicitously are called *felicity conditions*. Thus, sentences can be +/- true but utterances can be +/-true and *n* felicitous. Note here that the use of the variable (*n*) indicates that I take felicity to have a scalar value whereas truth is binary. Sentences may be more or less felicitous than others in some setting, and *vice versa*. Whether an utterance is felicitous and how felicitous it is, is determined by the context in which it is uttered.

The difference between sentence meaning and utterance meaning and the importance of the latter for understanding speech cannot be overstated. In spoken discourse, the percentage of utterances in which the truth value constitutes the only or

⁷⁸ Note that such a response would likely communicate a very different message.

⁷⁹ Also called *appropriacy* by Grundy, *op. cit.*

even the primary meaning communicated by that utterance is relatively small. Sentences like “That costs \$7.95 with tax,” or “You can park two blocks down Neil at Third, on the left” do convey truth-value laden information. However, such sentences are relatively infrequent as utterances when compared with examples like “Hi,” “Let’s get some pizza” or “Nice job, Ace.” which are of a type very common in spoken discourse but which convey no facts and thus can carry no truth-value at all. Nevertheless, such utterances manage to be communicative, in all likelihood because they are assumed to be communicative. That is, speech implies communication.

2.2.3 Speech Acts One of the first steps in the development of the notion that language functions as more than a medium to communicate facts is found in the works of Austin and Searle,⁸⁰ who developed the notion of the *speech act* to describe the fact that when language is used, it performs a function, it does something. One of these functions is clearly to convey factual information (whether true or not), but a close examination of language use shows that language performs many other functions as well. Searle states, that “speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises and so on.”⁸¹ Of the activities listed here, only the first, *making statements*, corresponds to the fact-conveying function traditionally assigned to language. Searle further proposes the following types of speech acts found in Table 2.2 (p. 44). Thus, statements like “Pass the salt” constitute directives; ones like “I promise I won’t let go of your hand,” are commissives; ones like “Thanks,” are expressives, and ones like “I dub thee sir Gawain” performatives.

⁸⁰ Austin, J. L., *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford, 1962, and Searle, John R., *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*, Cambridge University Press, 1969.

⁸¹ Searle, 1969, p. 16.

In each of the above cases, the type of speech act that the sentence performed was concomitant with its surface meaning. Recall that I said that sentences have a sentence meaning that is context-insensitive. Such a meaning would be, by definition, the same in all contexts, i.e., abstract. I also claimed that utterances (sentences used in a context)

ASSERTIVES:	stating, classifying.
DIRECTIVES:	ordering, requesting, begging, supplicating,
COMMISSIVES:	swearing, offering, promising.
EXPRESSIVES:	thanking, apologizing.
DECLARATIVES:	appointing, dismissing, resigning, naming. ⁸²

Table 2.2: Speech Acts

have a meaning, called their utterance meaning, which may or may not be equivalent to their sentence meaning. Thus, utterances perform a function called, after Austin and Searl, a speech act. Thus, (4) (above) had the sentence meaning $\Box here = hot \Box$ and in one imaginary setting it could have the utterance meaning [lower the temperature].⁸³ Sentences like “Pass the salt,” “I promise I won’t let go of your hand,” and “Thanks,” do not state facts (they do not present *data*) and so cannot have logical truth values which can be stated as abstracts. Nevertheless, they do have both context insensitive (i.e., abstract) meanings and particular context sensitive meanings. These are referred to as

⁸² *Ibid. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 12-20.

⁸³ See, Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 236ff.

their *locutionary force* and their *illocutionary force*, respectively.⁸⁴ Thus, an utterance like “Thanks” has the locutionary force of offering thanks —it functions as an expressive— and it may have a further illocutionary force of reproaching the addressees for their thoughtlessness.

Not all speech acts are performed by an utterance’s locutionary force. We must differentiate between an utterance’s meaning as a speech act, its locutionary force, and its intended use within the talk exchange in which it is found, i.e., its illocutionary force. Thus as I showed above, a sentence like (4) has the locutionary force of being an assertive since it states a fact about perceived temperature □ assert: *here = hot*□. However, in the right context this same sentence has the illocutionary force of being a directive (5) to turn down the temperature [lower the temperature]. Further, if the utterance of (4) results in some action, or lack thereof, by the addressee, that result is called its *perlocutionary* effect, e.g., turning down the thermostat.

2.2.4 Grice’s Cooperation-Principle and Conversational-Implicature If, as Grundy states “people don’t always mean what they say,”⁸⁵ how are people able to communicate? That they do implies that they are able to figure out what their interlocutors mean, seemingly despite what they say. When, in *Iliad* A, 202 f. Akhilleus has been arguing with Agamemnon over the latter’s behavior in general and his threat to take the γέρας of some other hero in reparation for his own loss in particular, he appears

⁸⁴ I shall adopt the following convention □sentence meaning or locutionary force□and [utterance meaning or illocutionary force].

⁸⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 73.

to have had enough. As the narrator tells us, he begins to draw his sword intending to kill Agamemnon. It is then that Athena appears to stop him —and does stop him. When he recognizes her he says:

(6) τίπτ' αὖτ' αἰγίοχοιο Διὸς τέκος εἰλήλουθας; A.202
ἦ ἵνα ὕβριν ἴδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο;

“Why have you come back, child of Aegis-holding Zeus? Is it to see the hubris of Agamemnon?”

Of course the narrator has told us (A.197) that Athena has already grabbed Akhilleus by his hair and restrained him from killing Agamemnon. He knows why she has come, to stop him from killing Agamemnon, which at this point is effectively a *fait accompli*. He may try again later, but while he is speaking to her, he is not killing Agamemnon. Thus Akhilleus’ question appears to be vacuous as a question. In this context, his question functions rather as an indirect directive, something like:

(7a) “Do something about Agamemnon’s hubris.”

or

(7b) “Don’t stop me from killing Agamemnon.”

The philosopher Paul Grice posits that one thing that allows communication to take place is that when people speak to each other (talk exchanges), they assume that their interactants are attempting to communicate something.⁸⁶ This insight leads to what he calls the *Cooperation Principle* (commonly abbreviated CP). By this, Grice posits

⁸⁶ Grice, H. P., *op. cit.*

that addressees assume that the speakers' utterances constitute good-faith efforts to communicate and are not just purposefully indeterminate and hence meaningless.⁸⁷ Addressees assume that the speaker's utterance means something and that they can determine what its meaning is. Grice further proposed that the *Cooperation Principle* be elaborated into four maxims, which the addressee assumes the speaker will abide by. These are seen in Table 2.3 (p. 48). Based on the assumption that the speaker is abiding by these maxims, when the speaker appears to fail to cooperate in some utterance, *the addressee* infers some implicit meaning and ascribes that meaning to it. This inferred meaning Grice calls an *implicature*. Implicatures are of two types. *Generalized implicatures* are those that are inferred irrespective of context (e.g., *some* implies 'not all').⁸⁸ On the other hand, *particularized implicatures* are those which arise out of the context alone and are not generalizable. Many utterances frequently appear not to abide by Grice's maxims. When this is not done by accident, it is referred to as *flouting*. We can see at once that implicatures arise from flouting. For example:

- (8) A. "Where's Bill?"
 B. "Well, it IS Wednesday."
 A. "Oh yeah, it's his golf day."

B's reply does not appear to respond to *A*'s query. The response to a [where is X?] question should be either a statement about *X*'s location or a denial of knowledge about *X*'s location.

⁸⁷ Of course, they may, in fact, be purposely indeterminate, meaningless, or outright lies. The point is that addressees *usually* take them to be good-faith attempts to communicate, and act to interpret them as such.

⁸⁸ In this case, [not all], is the generalized implicature of the utterance [some].

The flouting of the Relation Maxim (be relevant) here forces another kind of non-generalizable, context-specific implicature, in this case, [Bill is playing golf]. It is implicature, then, that allows for the distinction between locutionary force and illocutionary force to be made. This ability of hearers to infer implicatures allows, for example, [Is there any salt?] an assertive in the form of a question, to be read as a directive, [Pass the salt].

Quality: The utterance should be true:

- 1) don't lie,
- 2) don't say that for which you don't have adequate knowledge.

Quantity: The utterance should:

- 1) be as informative as necessary,
- 2) not be over informative.

Relation: the utterance should be relevant.

Manner: The utterance should:

- 1) be perspicuous,
- 2) avoid obscurity,
- 3) avoid ambiguity,
- 4) be orderly.

Table 2.3: Conversational Maxims

A question, however, should now arise; why flout the maxims of the Cooperative Principle in order to force a context-specific implicature? Why did *B*, in (8) above, not simply reply "He's playing golf." One reason might be that often, in certain contexts, if one were to make certain speech acts directly, such acts might have some additional negative results for either the speaker or the addressee which might not be encountered if

one were to make the speech act indirectly. For example, a direct response might have implied that A does not know Bill very well, and hence impeach his authority to make claims about Bill's whereabouts. By using the indirect response, A implies his familiarity with Bill and confirms his authority to speak about him. Thus, by choosing to make some speech act either directly or indirectly, speakers might be able to garner some further positive results for themselves, their addressees, or both.

2.3 Politeness

2.3.1 Introduction In addition to what we might call the dynamics of immediate interpersonal interaction, which we have looked at in the previous section, language has a not distinct, but distinguishable, social function. Humans are social animals. What is more, unlike ants or bees, their social relationships are complexly hierarchical. Within some contexts, one individual has more power, importance, influence, than (an)other(s). Humans, in the process of interacting with each other, construct hierarchies. These hierarchies may be societal (as in a caste or a class system), institutional (as in policeman/citizen, teacher/student or priest/parishioner relationships) or situational (as when one asks or gives directions). Since human language is a reflection of the social nature of humans, the hierarchical nature of human social relations should be reflected in the way they socially interact, including how they use language. The hierarchy of human social relations reflects two features of interaction: 1) how much more important one interactant is than the other in some socially defined way, called *Power*, and 2) the degree of intimacy or familiarity between the speaker and the addressee, called *Distance* or *Solidarity*. It is likely that people involved in speaking to one another (often called a *talk exchange*) will use different language if they are more intimate or familiar than if they are

less so. Thus, I may use a hypocoristic (like *Al*) for a close friend but a full given-name (like *Donald*) for someone I am less well acquainted with. Hudson states that “solidarity is expressed through choice of language, subtle ‘accommodation’ ... and the use of purpose-built solidarity expressers such as names and pronouns.”⁸⁹ How I address someone is determined by my perception of our mutual relationship and, in turn, our relationship determines what is and is not an appropriate way for me to address the other. As Hudson states, word choice (vocabulary) is the primary way we signal social information in language.⁹⁰ Note that, depending on the context, it is just as inappropriate to address someone who is socially close by a more formal term of address as it is to be too familiar with someone who is socially distant. Note also that a change to a more or less familiar form of address marks an attempt by the speaker to renegotiate the social relationship held with the addressee. Thus, language can be used to reinforce and/or redefine social relationships.

Politeness, even in its colloquial usage, refers to which kinds of speech are appropriate to which contexts. Since, as I have maintained, social relationships, which form the basis of our definition of context, are hierarchical, following Brown and Levinson, I shall define *politeness* in the following way:

- (9) The (linguistic) manifestation of the social hierarchy which exists between speaker and addressee at some time *T* in terms of: 1) the social distance between the speaker and the addressee (*Power*); 2) the power differential between the speaker and the addressee (*Distance, Solidarity*); 3) The degree of imposition on the addressee involved in making the speech act.

⁸⁹ Hudson, p.235. “Accommodation” here is the desire to minimize behavioral (in this case linguistic) differences in order to stress solidarity, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁹⁰ Hudson, R. A., *Sociolinguistics*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 130, *ff.* Thus, in culturally specific ways, vocabulary combines with costume, body position (body language), facial expression, etc., to signal social role.

Politeness, by this definition, is a heuristic for explaining the particular form of an utterance in a particular context by making reference to the social relationship that exists between the speaker and the addressee and to the effect which the speaker perceives that utterance will have on that relationship. This definition arises from the observation that, beyond making their desired speech acts, speakers wish to achieve certain psychological or cognitive effects in their addressees and to avoid others. For example, they are likely to desire that the requests they make are not just communicated, but agreed to as well. They usually want their apologies to be accepted, their warnings to be heeded, etc. Sometimes they may want to avoid angering their addressees, at other times they may want to anger them. They may wish sad news to be received with or without excessive sorrow, and good news with or without excessive elation. Thus, in making utterances, speakers desire two results: 1) to communicate clearly the desired speech act; 2) for the talk exchange to result in some desired psychosocial state of affairs in their addressee. Yet often, these two goals can be in direct conflict. It is at such times that maxims, of which politeness constitutes an important variety, are likely to be flouted. That is, speakers flout the maxims of the *Cooperation Principle* in order to best reconcile the often conflicting needs of communicative efficiency and social regulation ([1] and [2] above, respectively). Of these two potentially conflicting needs, I have already discussed the first in my brief discussion of the *Cooperation Principle* and its maxims above. To the second of these I now turn.

2.3.2 Face Speakers are not simply vague or quixotic for no reason. Leaving aside those situations where speakers may be impaired in some way (e.g., intoxication, misunderstanding, etc.) something other than communicative clarity compels them to

make problematic utterances. Brown and Levinson state that the “C[*ooperation*] P[*rinciple*] defines an ‘unmarked’ or socially neutral presumptive framework for communication,”⁹¹ that is to say, one in which there is no departure from the desire to communicate efficiently. The need to depart from this framework and hence the need to be indirect, for Brown and Levinson, seems to revolve around the concept of *face*.

I have already argued that interactants in a talk exchange, or any other social interaction, have needs beyond the mere conveyance of some speech act. The term used most often to refer to the psychosocial needs of interactants is called *face*.⁹² This term as a feature of a comprehensive theory of social and specifically linguistic interaction was first developed by Erving Goffman in *Interaction Ritual*, 1967. Goffman developed his notion of face out of its colloquial use in phrases like *lose face*. For Goffman, face was:

[the] positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line [a pattern of acts one takes which express one’s view of the situation and the participants in it] others assume he has taken during a particular contact.⁹³

For Goffman, face is an image of the self, defined in terms of social attributes. It is constructed, in the process of interaction, by one’s interactants and not by one’s self. Social interaction then constitutes a commitment on the part of the actor since it involves

⁹¹ Brown, P., S. G. Levinson, *Politeness, Some Universals in Language Usage*, Cambridge, 1987. p. 5.

⁹² See Goffman, E., *Interaction Ritual; Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour*, Anchor Books, 1967; Brown and Levinson, 1978, (re issued 1987); Blum-Kulka, S., “Indirectness and Politeness in Requests: Same or Different,” *Journal of Pragmatics*, 1987 pp.131-146; Culpeper, J., “Towards an Anatomy of Impoliteness,” *JoP*, 1996, pp. 350-353; Foley, W. A., *Anthropological Linguistics: An Introduction*, Blackwell Publishers, 1997; Leech, 1983; Matsumoto, Y., “Re-Examination of the Universality of Face: Politeness Phenomena in Japanese,” *JoP*, 1988, pp. 404-425; Watts, 1992, *et al.*

⁹³ Goffman, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

an externally constructed valuation of the self. One can lose or gain face but always/only in the presence of others. This concept of face was later expanded and developed by Brown and Levinson.

By 'face' we mean something quite specific again: [people are] endowed with two particular wants —roughly the want to be unimpeded and the want to be approved of in certain respects.⁹⁴

It seems that in respect to their social identity, people want to feel approved of or 'liked,' and people want to feel free to act in those ways they wish to act. Brown and Levinson thus posit two complementary aspects to face, which they then call *positive* and *negative* face, respectively.⁹⁵ Certain actions can present threats to either of these distinct aspects of face, or to both simultaneously. Actions that pose a threat to one's face are referred to as *Face-Threatening Activities* (often *FTAs*). Actions can threaten either one's own face or one's interactant's or both. For this paper, I will adopt the following definition of *face*.

(10) The psychosocial manifestation of social worth

- *Positive Face*: approval of public self (Public Image)
- *Negative Face*: perceived ability to engage in one's activities

Brown and Levinson claim that their model of face is universal. However, it should be noted that not all scholars are satisfied with Brown and Levinson's claim of universality

⁹⁴ Brown and Levinson, *Op. cit.*, p. 58. It is not altogether clear that these two wants are always distinguishable and it should become clear that many actions tend to violate or address both types of face simultaneously. Also, see note 95 below.

⁹⁵ These terms *negative* and *positive face* are perhaps not well chosen, the two aspects of face that Brown and Levinson propose are not, in fact, as strictly opposite as the terms that designate them seem to imply, rather they complement each other. Furthermore, it is not always possible, or desirable, to keep the two types of face distinct (as in the case of *scolding* or other types of assault). Nevertheless, as the two terms and their corresponding concepts are now well established in the literature, it seems necessary to maintain them here, albeit, with some hesitation. One of the projects of this paper will be to test the appropriateness of this distinction for Homeric epic.

for their model.⁹⁶ Part of the purpose of this paper will be to test the viability of this model to describe the social activity of characters within the culture described in the *Iliad*.

2.3.3 Face-Threatening Activities and Face Work We have noted that activities that are not directly related to considerations of face may, in fact, constitute threats to the face of either the speaker or the addressee. Thus, asking for money may affect one's desire to be approved of (*Positive Face*). Asking people to be quiet may affect their desire to be unimpeded in their activities (*Negative Face*). Speakers' utterances may then affect either their own or their addressee's positive or negative face. A general model of which sorts of speech acts have which affects on face is:⁹⁷

	NEGATIVE FACE THREATS	POSITIVE FACE THREATS
<i>S</i>	excusing, thanking, accepting offers, promising	apologizing, accepting compliments, confessing, crying, ordering
<i>H</i>	ordering, requesting, compliments, threatening, warning, bad news	complaining, boasting, criticizing, broaching taboo topics, disagreeing

Table 2.4: Sample Face-Threatening Activities⁹⁸

⁹⁶ See particularly Matsumoto, *op. cit.* Matsumoto claims that the concept of negative face does not apply in Japanese society specifically because the self is not conceived of as primarily motivated by individual needs and wants but by societal or collective needs and wants.

⁹⁷ This chart is based on ones found in Meier, A. J., "Passages of Politeness," *JoP*. 1995, p. 382, and Van de Walle, Lieve, *Pragmatics and Classical Sanskrit, A Pilot Study in Linguistic Politeness*. John Benjamins Publishing, 1993. p. 73. Not all of these actions will always result in actual loss of face (e.g. one might have found President Clinton's confession, had he actually made one, refreshing, and thereby granted him greater face), rather, these acts are felt by the speaker to run the risk of loss of face.

⁹⁸ *S* stands for *speaker* and *H* for *addressee*. The above list is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely suggestive. Note also that which sorts of actions constitute which types of Face-Threatening Activity will vary, and certain acts may well fit in more than one box as well.

Threats to the speaker's negative face are found in those acts which put the speaker under some obligation to someone else and hence limit the speaker's freedom to act independently. For example, being forced to excuse oneself for some act can impinge on one's ability or willingness to perform that act.⁹⁹ Positive face threats to speakers are constituted by those acts which lessen speakers' perception of their own social worth. A similar reasoning lies behind the classification of negative and positive face threats to the addressee (*H*) as well. Note that some kinds of speech acts are potential face threats to both parties, as in the case of compliments and orders (above). Thus, face can be seen to be mutually vulnerable, since talk exchanges involve potential threats to both the speaker's and the addressee's face.

Since, as I have stated, social interaction presents the potential for threats to face (i.e., *Face-Threatening Activities*), we should expect that there are redresses available for such threats. Brown and Levinson state, "in the context of mutually vulnerable face, any rational agent will seek to avoid these face-threatening acts, or will employ certain strategies to minimize the threat."¹⁰⁰ The speaker's reaction to the potential for a *Face-Threatening Activity* afforded by any speech act can be of three types: 1) the speaker can ignore the face-threatening nature of the act and proceed most directly, 2) the speaker can engage some strategy to lessen the face threat inherent in the act, or 3) the speaker can avoid the act all together. We can now see what advantages there might be to flouting the maxims of the *Cooperation Principle* as we discussed above. We saw that to flout the maxims of the *Cooperation Principle* invariably results in a less direct form of some

⁹⁹ Again, it is not clear that this perceived loss of freedom does not simply arise out of the same desire to be approved of.

¹⁰⁰ Brown and Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

speech act. Directness is a potential threat to either the speaker's or the addressee's face. The advantages of lessening the threat to face, which some act presents, are then weighed against the potential for miscommunication presented by the act of flouting some maxim of the *Cooperation Principle*, as against the failure to achieve the desired ends by altogether foregoing some threat to the face of either. The most direct strategy Brown and Levinson refer to as a "bald, on record" act. The speakers commit *Face-Threatening Activities* openly in order to take advantage of the communicative directness implicit in the *Cooperation Principle*, to maximize clarity, and thus achieve their ends most directly. Obviously there are times when being direct and to the point is the necessary strategy, as in (11):

(11) "Shut up Bill; he's got a gun; he'll kill you if you don't shut up."

In other cases, some degree of overt *politeness* is employed to lessen the force of the potential threat to someone's face.

Brown and Levinson propose a hierarchy of strategies which can be employed by speakers to mediate between the need to maximize efficiency and the need to minimize the threat to face (Figure 1, p. 59). The choice between these two conflicting needs is decided by weighing the cost of the threat to face against the communicative benefit implicit in directness.¹⁰¹

By *on-record* I mean those speech acts whose illocutionary force is clear from the surface form. Thus a 'bald, on-record' command might be "Get out!" A polite on-record

¹⁰¹ This figure is based on the one found in Brown and Levinson, p.69, but modified to show the cost/benefit of the various strategies. The terminal nodes reflect actual strategies (which are indicated by being italicized).

command might be “Please, leave now”; an off-record command might be “Boy, it sure is getting late.” Based on Figure 1 (p. 59), one can see that there is an almost linear relationship as is indicated by the dotted arrow between efficiency (i.e., clarity) on the one hand and lessened face threat (politeness) on the other. Thus, a bald, on-record act is maximally efficient but also maximally face-threatening. Avoidance of the *Face-Threatening Activities* is minimally face threatening, but at a cost of being minimally efficient.

2.3.4 Off-Record, Positive, and Negative Politeness Strategies Off-record strategies are those strategies that allow for more than one reading; that is, they allow the speaker an “out,” so to speak, by means of “plausible deniability.” By not making the speech act directly, the speaker is potentially able to deny having made it at all. Thus, (3) above (“It sure is hot in here.”), in the context of the hospital-room scenario, functions as an off-record request to lower the temperature by flouting the Relation Maxim (be relevant). Many cases in which speakers flout the relation maxim constitute off-record politeness strategies. The down side to such strategies is that, by allowing multiple readings for the utterance, off-record politeness strategies increase the possibility that one of the alternate possible readings will be the one accepted by the addressee. One example might be the case of (6) above. Athena at A.207 *ff.* in fact replies to Akhilleus’ statement at 202-03 as if it were a genuine question and answers it:

- (12) ἦλθον ἐγὼ παύσουσα τὸ σὸν μένος,
 “I came to stop this rage of yours.”

Thus, the potential for a misfire in the case of off-record politeness strategies is real.




Figure 1: Cost/Benefit of Politeness Strategies Against Efficiency (Clarity)
Based on Brown and Levinson (strategies in **boldface**)

Off-record politeness also seems to be nonspecific in that it may address either the positive or negative face of either party. In the case of (6), Akhilleus' off-record directive seems designed to placate his own face. Thus, by putting his directive in the form of a question, he is able to deny the complaining tenor which a directive, like "see how badly he is treating me" would carry. Note, that Akhilleus does use a complaining tenor when he addresses his mother later. Therefore, it is not complaining *per se* that is the problem, but complaining in a specific context (in this case, nonfamilial). In fact, Athena's reply at A.207 *ff.* is probably not due to her misreading Akhilleus' actual speech act, but to her desire to shift the discourse away from Agamemnon's *hubris* to Akhilleus' *menos*. She may also wish to allow him to maintain the fiction of a genuine question and hence avoid confronting the threat to his own face contained in his complaint. It seems, then, that the acknowledgment of a threat to one's own face is itself face-threatening. So Athena's reply further helps to support Akhilleus' positive face as well, by allowing him an "out."

Thus, off-record strategies are not specific in respect to which face needs they address.¹⁰² On the other hand, negative- and positive-politeness strategies seek to address directly the positive and negative face of the addressee. Positive-politeness strategies are designed to show solidarity between the speaker and the addressee by suggesting that the speaker wants what the addressee wants (they are allies). These strategies include statements that 1) display a greater degree of intimacy and a lower power differential when the *speaker* is in a position of superiority, or 2) indicate solidarity and acceptance of the established power structure when the *addressee* is in the socially superior position.

¹⁰² This suggests that, again, Brown and Levinson's distinction may not always be applicable.

Positive face work includes expressions of affiliation and friendship. Positive-politeness strategies seem most often to be used in cases where the speaker is in a socially superior position (or perhaps equal) to the addressee. Negative face work, on the other hand, seeks to address addressees' desire to be unimpeded in their actions. These strategies include expressions of deference, hedges, impersonal constructions, and passives, along with expressions that allow the addressee an 'out.' Negative politeness work, then, seems most felicitous when the speaker is in a position of social inferiority (or perhaps equal).

2.3.5 Impoliteness Strategies So far then, politeness strategies “presuppose that potential for aggression as they seek to disarm it, and make possible communication between potentially aggressive parties.”¹⁰³

Obviously, not all speech involves attempts on the part of speakers to ameliorate threats to face, i.e., to be polite. Indeed, certain acts seem to be inherently impolite. No amount of deference or indirectness can make a request for someone to take an all-too-needed bath not seem face-threatening to a certain degree. No matter how much one may have that person's best interest at heart, such a request will likely be perceived as embarrassing and hence as a threat to that person's sense of positive face. Other acts, however, can be purposefully face threatening. It is difficult to imagine how someone could intend a statement like “drop dead!” to be taken as a face saving or face-neutral act, nor is that sort of an utterance likely to be interpreted by the addressee as such. Let us call instances of such speech acts *impoliteness*. Culpeper distinguishes two kinds of impoliteness — *inherent impoliteness* and *mock impoliteness*. Those acts that are not amenable to what I have called *politeness work* — actions which are designed to mitigate

¹⁰³ Brown and Levinson, *op. cit.*, p.1.

the force of the *Face-Threatening Activities* of some action— are inherently impolite.¹⁰⁴

The above examples are likely to be interpreted as inherently impolite because they are themselves a source of embarrassment and hence represent a threat to the addressee's face. This is because of the fact that, although they are a source of embarrassment, this embarrassment is not contextually determined but is general. They are likely to be perceived as a *Face-Threatening Activities* despite their intended purpose, which, I have suggested, might be to somehow benefit the addressee by helping him obviate potential future embarrassment. The effect of inherently impolite acts will depend on three factors: *Power*, *Relation*, and *Degree of Imposition* (see (9) above § 2.3.1, p. 50) which pragmatically define the relationship of the speaker to the addressee. In addition to attempting to correct behavior that speakers perceive as faulty, impolite speech acts will often be used by speakers to help define their relationship to their addressees. Thus, if my boss might say "Brown, get your ass in here, NOW," the utterance has three effects; 1) to convey the surface request (the *locutionary* force), 2) to convey anger directed by the speaker to the addressee, and 3) to convey a power relationship such that the speaker (claims to) have the authority to insult the addressee and compel that addressee's compliance (the *illocutionary* force). Culpeper states:

There are circumstances when the vulnerability of face is unequal and so motivation to cooperate is reduced. A powerful participant has more freedom to be impolite, because [they] can (A) reduce the ability of a less powerful participant to retaliate with impoliteness (e.g., through denial of speaking rights), and (B) threaten more severe retaliation should the less powerful participant be impolite.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Culpeper, J., *op. cit.*, p. 354.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

Conversely, Culpeper's other type of impoliteness, mock impoliteness, often involves social relationships marked by lower degrees of *Power*, *Relation*, and *Degree of Imposition*. Culpeper states that politeness is "less necessary and important"¹⁰⁶ in the case of people who are more intimate or more socially equal. In such cases, impolite acts are often not understood by the addressee to be *Face-Threatening Activities* on the part of the speaker. Of this Leech says that in relationships marked by greater intimacy and a lesser degree of power difference, the speaker,

in order to show solidarity with the addressee, [will] say something which is (i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to the addressee [who interprets that] what (speaker) says is impolite and untrue to the addressee. Therefore, what the speaker means is [something else which is] polite to the addressee and true.¹⁰⁷

Thus we can see that the flip side of politeness, impoliteness, can frequently be employed as a conscious strategy for (re)defining and/or maintaining relationships between people. Boxer and Cortés-Conde, in discussing what they call *teasing and shaming*, state another use of impoliteness strategies, to wit:

Teasing and shaming [can be attempts] to inhibit or change a person's actions as well as convey a particular effective message about the relationship of those individuals involved and in an audience or potential audience of family, peers and community.¹⁰⁸

Thus, impoliteness and impolite utterances, despite their apparent disregard for face, seem, nonetheless, to important in regulating social relationships as well. The manner in

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* p. 352

¹⁰⁷ Leech, Geoffrey, *Principles of Pragmatics*, Longman, London, 1983; p. 144. It seems likely that such uses of *mock impoliteness* are highly culturally defined.

¹⁰⁸ Boxer, D., F. Cortés-Conde, "From Joking to Biting: Conversational Joking and Identity Display," *JoP*, 1997, p. 280.

which they do this and the strategies in which they will be employed, however, will vary greatly depending on the relationship of the participants to each other, vis-à-vis the factors of *Distance*, *Power* and *Relation* (see (9) above § 2.3.1, p. 50), and the particulars of the specific context in which these acts are employed. For our purposes we might consider a tripartite model of impoliteness:

INTENTIONAL IMPOLITENESS: acts that depend on relatively higher *Power* and greater *Distance* and serve to regulate and maximize social distance and power differential.

MOCK IMPOLITENESS: acts that depend on relatively low social distance and little or no *Power*, i.e., intimate relationships, and serve to define and confirm social bonds.

CORRECTIVE IMPOLITENESS: acts that depend on relatively low social distance and little or no *Power*, i.e., intimate relationships, but ones in which some situational authority is claimed by the speaker and serves to inhibit, compel, or correct the addressee's actions or beliefs.

This typology of impoliteness is dependant not on the form of the threat to face, but on its context —especially vis-à-vis *Power*, *Relation*, and *Degree of Imposition*, and on its purpose.

Let us then sum up the model of conversational interaction we will be using here. Conversations involve either one or the other or both of two motivating factors which are often in conflict with each other: the desire to make speech acts and the desire to regulate social interaction. The *Cooperation Principle* serves to maximize the former of these, politeness work, to facilitate the latter. Although not all talk-exchanges necessarily involve the *Cooperation Principle* directly (see above), most are assumed to do so. Any

apparent deviation from the *Cooperation Principle* is assumed by the addressee not to be such. Politeness work usually results in some deviation from the *Cooperation Principle*, and hence it generates conversational implicatures according to which of the maxims the speaker has flouted in order to “be polite.” The desire to ameliorate the threats to face posed by the face-threatening nature of many speech acts prompts the invocation of politeness work in the form of the flouting of some maxim(s) of the *Cooperation Principle*. *Face-Threatening Activities* often result for social rather than discourse-internal reasons.¹⁰⁹ This, then, is what is called *politeness work* (Culpeper’s *Politeness Principles*). Much (perhaps most or even all) social interaction, including the negotiation of relative social position (*Power*) and/or degree of intimacy (*Relation/Solidarity*) or the desire on the part of the speaker to alter the addressee’s behavior or beliefs, involves the potential for threats to one or the other’s face, and hence politeness work. Thus, politeness should be almost ubiquitous in speech since all persons involved in a talk exchange are involved in a socially defined hierarchy with their addressee, and most speech acts involve some degree of a *Face-Threatening Activity*. The next step is to examine the social structure and the types of social relations defined in the narrative of the *Iliad* in order to begin to build a model of *Iliadic* politeness.

¹⁰⁹ That is, discourse internal organizational markers like deixis, anaphora, or focus do not regularly lead to *Face-Threatening Activities* directly, although some times they may.

CHAPTER 3

PRAGMATICS OF DIRECT ADDRESS IN THE *ILIAD*: GENERIC FORMS OF ADDRESS

Ἀνδρομάχη δέ οἱ ἄγχι παρίστατο δάκρυ χέουσα, Z.405
ἐν τ' ἄρα οἱ φῦ χειρὶ ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζε·
δαιμόνιε φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος, οὐδ' ἐλεαίρεις
παῖδά τε νηπίαχον καὶ ἔμ' ἄμμορον, ἧ τάχα χήρη
σεῦ ἔσομαι· τάχα γάρ σε κατακτανέουσιν Ἀχαιοὶ
πάντες ἐφορμηθέντες· ἐμοὶ δέ κε κέρδιον εἴη
σεῦ ἀφαρμαρτούση χθόνα δύμεναι· οὐ γάρ ἔτ' ἄλλη
ἔσται θαλπωρὴ ἐπεὶ ἂν σύ γε πότμον ἐπίσπης
ἀλλ' ἄχε'· οὐδέ μοι ἔστι πατήρ καὶ πότνια μήτηρ.

*And Andromakhe stood next to him, wept,
took his hand and addressed him and spoke
“Daimonie, that force of yours will destroy you. Don't you care
about your infant son or me, ill-fated, who will
lose you forthwith since the Akhaians will soon all gather together
and cut you down? It would be better for me
to go to my own funeral than to lose you, for there will no longer be any other
consolation for me once you've gone to your fate,
only grief; I no longer have a father or mother.”*

Part I: The Function of Address

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3.4. The Sociolinguistics of Address

Part I: The Function of Address

3.1 Introduction At Z.407 (above), Andromakhe addresses her husband, Hektor, as δαῖμόνιε. This is not the first time this address has been used in the poem, although it is the first time it has been addressed to Hektor. Unlike an address such as Ἕκτορ, which is applicable only to Hektor,¹¹⁰ the term δαῖμόνι may felicitously be applied to more than one potential addressee.¹¹¹ I introduced a model of language use in Chapter 1 in which speech, immediate setting or context,¹¹² and social role all function together in a cycle of mutual information, each informing and informed by the others. As I am dealing in this project with a specifically literary examination, in this case the *Iliad*, I have focused in this study specifically on the role of speech vis-à-vis the other two. Nevertheless it is important to remember that all these operators function as a single complex system of mutual information. In this system, *address*¹¹³ —the vocal recognition and identification of the addressee— plays a pivotal role. Coming as it often does at or near the initiation of some discourse, address has a demarcative and constitutive function in speech. By naming or otherwise identifying the addressee, address indicates the present —whether physically or metaphorically present— intended recipient of speech at the same time as it helps orient the addressee and the speaker to

¹¹⁰ This is certainly true for the context of the *Iliad*, although it may not be so beyond that context.

¹¹¹ At this point, I am refraining from saying ‘any addressee’ because there may turn out to be some restrictions on this form’s applicability. What is clear, is that, unlike the case for *names*, specific token identity is not one of them.

¹¹² See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of how I am defining *context* in this study.

¹¹³ Occasionally this phenomenon is referred to as *apostrophe* in some of the literature.

each other.¹¹⁴ This orientation is, however, strictly local both in time and space within a created or invoked setting, a social space, although it may reference non-local and/or chronic states of affairs. Any form of address, A, functions to orient the addressee to the speaker at that point at which it is uttered, in that setting in which it is uttered. That is, address creates or invokes a context, a social space, and orients the addressee to the speaker within that social space. In this work, I will focus on forms of address specifically in the *Iliad* to see how they help define and negotiate Homer's narrativized social space(s).

In this chapter, I will begin by looking at what might be termed 'generic' forms of address. That is to say, I will begin by examining the use-patterns of forms of address which, like δαίμονιε, might felicitously be applied to more than one specific individual addressee (e.g., τέκνον or φιλοκτεανώτατε). I will save for the next chapter discussion of those forms of address which serve token-specific identification (i.e., names like Ἀτρεΐδῃ, and terms of office like ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν). This taxonomy, however, is not intended to be absolute or essentializing. It serves merely as a convenient logistical tool for deploying the data.¹¹⁵

One of the only focused and extensive treatments of address in Homer is by Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson, from 1955.¹¹⁶ Although she focuses primarily on the use of

¹¹⁴ Recognition that addresses may come in positions other than discourse-initial position anticipates the argument that they can have functions other than strictly signaling the beginning of a new discourse.

¹¹⁵ Note that forms like Ἀτρεΐδῃ may potentially be applied to more than one individual (see Chapter 4) and that terms like φιλοκτεανώτατε, while formally generic, are in essence addressee-specific even within the general context of the *Iliad* as a whole. One reason why this taxonomy ultimately cannot serve as more than a convenient organizational tool is the case of the hero specific 'ornamental epithets' like ποδάρχης for Akhilleus.

forms of the vocative, substantivised adjective *δαυμόνιε*, she does take the time to discuss the use of other forms of address as well. One of the theoretical positions she takes which is relevant for this study is her subsuming, under the term *apostrophe*, all extra sentential expressions.¹¹⁷ This has the effect of conjoining two formal categories which are often kept separate, namely interjections¹¹⁸ and terms of address. Her taxonomy, on the surface, may seem like a problematic theoretical position to take. There seems to be an intuitive link between these formal categories (substantives and particles) and real distinctions in use; the vocative can serve to identify the addressee, whereas interjections, being non-referential, would seem not to be able to do so. However, as with most areas of language use, the formal distinction does not in practice seem to reflect hard and fast distinctions of use, and speakers themselves do not seem to be held to it. On the one hand, vocatives like *Paul* or *Mr. President* are often used to attract the attention of some addressee by identifying them. Similarly, interjections like *hey*, *no* and *fore* also function to get the attention of a (potential) addressee. The main difference is that the latter do not specify, lexically, who that addressee is. However, in many cases, this is already made explicit by other exigencies of the context. Other interjections, like *yo*, *groovy* or *word-up*, can serve to signal group membership or social allegiance and so have a function

¹¹⁶ Brunius-Nilsson, Elisabeth, *Δαυμόνιε, An Inquiry into a Mode of Apostrophe in Old Greek Literature*, Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, Uppsala, 1955.

¹¹⁷ I.e., forms which do not participate in any system of syntactic relations, such as case, person, number, gender, etc., agreement.

¹¹⁸ There is no good universally acceptable term which covers this group of forms. *Interjection*, is typically taken to refer to an element which stands outside of syntactic relations and expresses emotion; Brunius-Nilsson's term *apostrophy* seems to have little current use but seems to generally refer to something which is turned away (ἀποστρέφω), presumably from the rest of the sentence; *expletive* refers to three phenomena, 1) so called dummy subjects like *it* in sentences like 'It was raining.' 2) 'swear words,' and 3) words inserted into a poetic line for metrical reasons. The term *particle*, is far too vague and ill defined to be of much use here and typically does not cover phrasal phenomena like *word up*. See Trask, R. L., *A Dictionary of Grammatical Terms in Linguistics*, Routledge, 1993.

similar to many forms of address like *dude*, *bro* and hypocoristics, whereas other interjections like *shit* may not.¹¹⁹ Often interjections and overt vocatives are combined into a single accentual phrase, e.g., *hey Paul, yo dude* or ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ. Furthermore, as I suggested above, vocatives do not always function specifically to identify the speaker at all. This is especially the case in settings where the context itself makes it obvious just who the addressee is —as in the middle of an ongoing discourse, or when there is only one person present,¹²⁰ or in *embedded* speech as in (1) where ‘dude’ does not represent the addressee but some third party whose speech is being reported.

(1) “And I was like ‘dude, where’s my car?’”

Hudson suggests that in language in general function operates independent of formal structures. Language is constantly being adapted to its function, Hudson suggests because speakers are often engaged in multiple tasks simultaneously and that these tasks are often in conflict. Language is then an “unstable compromise” and liable to change.¹²¹ Thus, the formal distinction between ‘interjection’ and vocative address, which Brunius- Nilsson rejects, seems not to be rigidly maintained by speakers either, and therefore is much less productive for our purposes than a pragmatic mode based on function. As I have suggested before, this latter approach will be the general thrust of this project.

¹¹⁹ Even this distinction is not without its problems. Speakers often use socially marked vocabulary (often referred to as ‘slang’) like *shit* to indicate to both addressee(s) and hearer(s) that they either consider them to be members of a group with whom it is appropriate to use such language (i.e., to indicate group inclusion), or to indicate their own indifference to any potential objection on the addressee’s or hearer’s part (group exclusion) also referred to as *impoliteness*, see Chapter. 2.

¹²⁰ An example would be when facial, or other gestures, like hand shaking or embracing, indicate recognition prior to the initiation of speech.

¹²¹ Hudson, *op. cit.*, p.236.

Brunius-Nilsson however does draw other distinctions. An important one is a formal distinction between forms of address where the speaker's "expressed purpose [is] not clearly apparent" and those where it is. She divides addresses into two types, one of which has as its "chief purpose [...] to give the speech a certain polite point of departure or framework and which are [sic] *not* intended to influence the behavior of the person addressed through stimulation or its contrary." Although it is not at all clear what this statement actually means, it is difficult to imagine how *any* form of address (or any use of language which is perceived by another) could not "influence the behavior of the person addressed."¹²² It seems that, for Brunius-Nilsson, some instances of speech are intended to influence addressees and others to do other things, like "set [...] mood." Yet clearly all speech which is heard influences those who hear it, and "set[ting the] mood" —however this is to be interpreted; Brunius-Nilsson herself is not clear on this point— must constitute an influence on the addressee as well. It is in the very nature of language that it has an effect on all those who perceive it. How could it not? Thus, Brunius-Nilsson seems to be drawing distinctions based on *a priori*, formal criteria which she herself is not at all clear about, but which —whatever they are— speakers themselves do not draw.¹²³ That is, she seems to make the error, which this study will try and avoid, of insisting that formal categories are essentializing, i.e., that they define usage in a prescriptive way rather than functioning in a strictly descriptive way.

Given, then, that all speech influences those who perceive it in some way —including any addressee(s)— in a study of address, like the present one, one ought,

¹²² Brunius-Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp.41 *f.*, emphasis mine.

¹²³ Even overtly ignoring someone qualifies as both affecting him and being affected by him.

ideally, to focus on the kinds of influence speakers (like us) wish to exert over their addressees, i.e., their pragmatic ends, and the strategies by which they achieve these ends rather than *a priori*, formal categories. That is to say, I am proposing that the function to which some formal speech element will be put will always be seen to flow from speaker intention and not the other way around. This *should* seem axiomatic.

However, there is one important concession which I must make at this point. As Derrida has already pointed out, the project of analyzing of language that proceeds from the point of the speaker's intention runs into the problem that, as perceivers of language (as hearers, addressees or readers) we do not have access to speakers' (or writer's) intentions, only to the results of those intentions, the surface forms of language.¹²⁴ In this project, we are further hampered by the fact that we are dealing with a dead language and so do not have access to any actual speakers and cannot query them about their intentions.¹²⁵ Therefore, one must, acting as if one were oneself an addressee, starting from the surface forms of address, work backwards, and keep in mind at all times, however, that such a project is being driven in reverse. That is, while intention precedes and produces speech, we cannot read speech through intention, but intention through its resultant speech. Yet this is, in fact, what addressees do when they understand speech. That is not knowing, *a priori*, the speaker's intention(s), understanding speech needs must involve the act of (re)constructing *a* speaker intent, *a* speaker meaning. The act of understanding involves the same kind of reconstruction as I will employ in this project. Therefore, in order to proceed, I will begin with the same formal distinctions as other

¹²⁴ Derrida, J., *Limited Inc.*, Northwestern University Press, 1988.

¹²⁵ I agree with Parry *et al.* that the Homeric *Kunstsprache* was never a spoken vernacular language in the sense that Attic Greek or Roman Latin were.

studies, namely distinctions of surface forms, and attempt to show whether pragmatics, and not formal class membership, defines their individual usage across the text of the *Iliad*.

3.2 The Use of Generic Epithets: a Pragmatics-based Account Strictly speaking, the term ‘generic epithet’ is not very useful when we begin to examine how forms of address are used, and the designation is used here for purely organizational purposes. Names like Agamemnon, although they are generally coindexed with a specific individual, are, nevertheless, potentially applicable to multiple persons. Note, for example, that the name Agamemnon is used of one character in the *Satyricon*, and that the name Akhilleus appears 10 times on inscriptions from Attica alone.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, it is usual for names to bear a specific token index (to be coindexed with a specific token item, within a narrow social setting) whereas other addresses like *dude* or *honey* or *you* are generally applicable to a broader but finite and contextually defined set of felicitous *referenda*. That is to say, in the abstract, these forms may be applied to a potentially infinite set of *referenda*. However, forms of address, like all language, do not appear in the abstract and so are always contextualized. When we examine forms in use, in context, we see that such abstractly generic epithets as ποδάρκης or φιλοκτεανώτατε, even within as broad a context as the *Iliad*, clearly function as if they were token-specific. That is, coindexing effectively takes place at the point of use. Thus, in cases like (2), where there is a mismatch between abstract token index and addressee,

¹²⁶ See Osborne, M. J., and S. G. Byrne, eds., *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names, Volume II Attica*, Oxford, 1994, specifically: *IG* ^{III/2} 2068, 2097, 2245, 2284, 2460 (2x), 6148; *ID* 2614; Ag. XV 322; and *SEG* XXXIV 136.

- (2) A: “Hey, Mark.”
 B: “Mark?”
 A: “Mark? Sorry, Matt, I mean Matt, I don’t know where ‘Mark’ came
 from.”¹²⁷

B still recognizes the address form ‘Mark’ as addressed to him. This suggests that indexing between an address form and an addressee happens at the point at which the address is made.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, while *B* recognizes that he has been addressed as ‘Mark,’ he also recognizes that the address is not felicitous. He is not Mark, he has merely been so addressed and that address form is felt to be somehow ‘incorrect.’ This suggests that addresses can carry, in fact, two indices, one abstract and one contextual. As long as the two are compatible, the address is made ‘correctly.’ We can then distinguish between an abstract index and a contextual index. The abstract index for address forms like names relate primarily to token identity, although, as I will argue in Chapter 4, not exclusively, nor even most importantly. Conversely, the abstract index for a generic epithet should relate primarily to some quality associated with that epithet, such as ‘swift-footedness,’ or ‘possession-lovingness’.¹²⁹ Thus, at the point of use, the address constructs an association between the physical object addressed and the quality or token identity (or both) associated with the form of address, e.g., ‘Akhilleus-hood’ or ‘swift-footedness.’ When that abstract quality associated with the address form is related or

¹²⁷ Overheard at a recent graduate student colloquium.

¹²⁸ This is often aided by non lexical aspects of address including direction of glance, posture, hand gesture, etc.

¹²⁹ Ultimately, these two indices are not really so clearly distinct so we can say that someone is acting like, or even, being an ‘Agamemnon.’ Thus the token specific address can come to refer to some imagined set of qualities such as, for example, an ‘Agamemnon’ would have.

relatable to some aspect of social structure —and most qualities are so relatable, then the use of that address in a specific talk exchange will construct associations between the addressee and that socially relevant quality or set of qualities.¹³⁰

3.2.1 Structuring the Discourse The discourse-structuring use of the vocative address arises, in part, from its relative syntactic freedom. From a syntactic standpoint, vocatives are often said to be *extra-sentential*. This is to say, they do not participate in regular syntactic relations, such as agreement, with other elements in the sentence but stand on their own. Thus, for example, the presence or absence of a vocative noun phrase in a sentence cannot result in that sentence being well or ill formed.¹³¹ This extra-sententiality is often reflected prosodically as well. In languages like Greek and English for example, for which we have evidence about accent, vocatives form their own accentual unit separate from the matrix sentence.¹³² Thus in the first line of the *Iliad*, (example (3) below) the vocative θεά, marked as it is by a final acute rather than grave accent, clearly does not form part of the same prosodic unit as the following genitive, in which case it would be required to bear a grave accent:¹³³

¹³⁰ On the social relevance of address, see below.

¹³¹ There are some language specific restrictions on the placement of vocatives. In English, vocatives tend to either precede or follow an S and may not interrupt a constituent (e.g., *The, hey Paul, purpose ...). In Greek, the restriction on constituency does not hold to the same degree, but vocatives do not appear between a preposition and its noun complement (e.g., *... ἐπί, ᾧ γέρον, ἡλίου ...).

¹³² *Matrix* refers to an element within which some other element is embedded. In Vedic Sanskrit, a related language for which we have some information about accent, vocatives, unless verse- or sentence-initial, are unaccented and pattern prosodically with other unaccented forms (clitics) vis-à-vis Wackernagel's law.

¹³³ Although the significance of this orthographic fact is not secure, the consistency of its use in the manuscript tradition conjoined with other evidence suggests that it likely reflects some prosodic fact of the language, although, what that fact is, is open to much debate. (note: the vocative is followed by a caesura which further strengthens these prosodic claims). See, especially, Devine, A. M., Laurence D. Stephens, *The Prosody of Greek Speech*, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.180 ff.

(3) μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος A. I

Similarly words which are ordinarily oxytones exchange their final grave for an acute before a vocative; e.g., σὺ in (4).

(4) ... ᾗ τε σὺ Κάλχαν A. 86

As is well known, this same phenomenon of accentuation holds for ‘sentence’-final oxytones as well. Thus, the linear position before and after a vocative seems prosodically indistinguishable from sentence-final position.¹³⁴ Based on this, we can say that a vocative, by default, always marks the end of an accentual phrase and itself ends its own accentual phrase.¹³⁵ We can see from the above evidence that the position of a vocative address within the sentence, and hence within the discourse, is not subject to any strictly syntactic restrictions.¹³⁶ Since these elements are not syntactically bound, they are not necessarily bound formally to any particular clause within the discourse, and therefore may be placed seemingly anywhere with apparent freedom. Nevertheless, we shall see that there are what might best be called *favored positions* which restrict the placement of vocatives, but that these restrictions are not grammatical.

¹³⁴ This position is often, and more correctly, referred to as *pre-pausal* position.

¹³⁵ The exception is that a string of vocatives will act together as a single accentual phrase. However, this fact does not invalidate the above claim or its significance.

¹³⁶ The only potentially grammatical restriction on the position of vocatives is what is referred to as Wackernagel’s law. That is, vocatives which appear within the margins of a clause (its *matrix*) are usually found after the first accented element within that clause, or following any enclitics which themselves follow that element, e.g.:

κλυθί μεν ἀργυρότροξ’ ... A. I. 37

However, this restriction is probably, in actuality, prosodic and not grammatical.

3.2.1.1 Change of Speaker One obvious use of address is to indicate change of speaker. It perhaps borders on the axiomatic to state that, in the Homeric corpus, the most common position for vocatives to appear within a speech is before or within the first clause. In this position, they can serve to signal the beginning of that speech and also to identify the addressee or addressees. Thus when Khryses speaks to the Greeks at A.17, *ff.* he begins by addressing the two Atreidai and then the other Greeks:

(5) Ἀτρεΐδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι εὐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί

This pattern of marking the beginning of a speech with a vocative address is repeated hundreds of times throughout the poem. However, within the narrative frame of the poem as a whole, this function is redundant, since speeches are almost invariably introduced by some sort of discourse marking phrase, usually itself formulaic.¹³⁷ Thus at A.15, *f.*, immediately prior to Khryses' address (5), the narrator states:

(6) ... καὶ λίσσετο πάντας Ἀχαιοὺς,
Ἀτρεΐδα δὲ μάλιστα δύω, κοσμήτορε λαῶν·

and he [Khryses] entreated all the Akhaians
but the two sons of Atreus especially, as they were in charge of the host

This passage signals, within the narrative frame, the imminent beginning of a speech. Nevertheless most speeches in the *Iliad* also begin with some overt form of address. Such overt forms of address are redundant, but may serve the poetic function of imitating colloquial patterns of speech. However, examples like the beginning of Khryses' address ((5) above) highlight another use for address. By positioning the vocative address at the

¹³⁷ E.g., τὸν δ' ἀπομειβόμενος προσέφη, *et alia*.

beginning of a speech, it serves the further function of identifying who the specific addressee is. That is, it aids the speaker in fashioning, or attempting to fashion, an *audience*, an *addressee*, out of a (set of) bystander(s).

Although this may seem to be stating the obvious, this function has important pragmatic effects on the following discourse. In the context of *Iliad* A.15 (5), it would have already been clear to the audience who was going to be addressed since the narration states the intended addressees explicitly ('Αχαιοί κ.τ.λ.). Standing before the Greek army assembled in the agora, who else could Khryses have intended to address but them? In the case of (5) however, rather than merely identifying the individual tokens of address, the vocatives also serve to create a hierarchy of address. Khryses' speech is meant foremost for Agamemnon and Menalaos. We know this specifically because the sequence of token addresses, 'Ατρείδαι first, then the other 'Αχαιοί, instantiates this hierarchy, despite even the appearance of equality created by the τε καὶ construction. The structure of this hierarchy is reinforced in the next line by the weight given to the noun phrase and by the use of the postponing force of δὲ μάλιστα. This hierarchy is all the more noticeable because the narrator himself describes Khryses initially as addressing only an undifferentiated Αχαιοί.¹³⁸

When the vocative address is found in other positions within a speech, the vocative can often function to signal change of addressee when that is necessary. Thus at A.277, after having spoken to Agamemnon for two lines, Nestor switches and addresses Akhilleus as Πηλεΐδῃ in order to indicate that he and not Agamemnon is now the addressee. This same speech, however, offers an example of how the poet need not

¹³⁸ Thanks to Professor Victoria Wohl for pointing this out.

be compelled to mark change of addressee by the use of a vocative which specifically indicates token identity. Nestor's speech is introduced at A.254 with the interjection ὦ πόπποι; the speaker does not specifically name his intended addressee(s). However, from the context alone, the immediate fight between Akhilleus and Agamemnon, it is clear who Nestor must be addressing, both to us as the audience, and to the characters within the narrative as well. This example illustrates a critical point: when the context makes it clear, no overt address is *required*. This factor has the further effect of allowing overt address forms to be used for other pragmatically determined reasons. That is to say, when it is clear whom the speaker is addressing, it is easier to recognize the salience of that fact (who is addressed) and of *how* they are addressed.

At A.275 when the focus of Nestor's address narrows to Agamemnon alone, this change is signaled not by a coindexed tag like Ἀτρεΐδῃ but merely by the use of the second person singular pronoun σύ. This pronoun signals that there has been a change of addressee by substituting a singular address in a context which has up till now been one of plural addressees. We as the audience only really become aware of who is addressed when we come to the verb phrase ἀποαίρεο κούρην at the end of the line.¹³⁹ At this point within the narrative context of the poem, this verb-phrase can only have Agamemnon as its implied subject as he is the one who actually possesses the girl in question, Khryseis. Thus, again, context alone serves to confirm the identity of the addressee which, in this case, has been indicated by a pronoun alone. Agamemnon is, in fact, not named until A.282, and then to signal a third change of addressee.¹⁴⁰ From the example of A.275 we

¹³⁹ Kirk, G. S., *The Iliad: A Commentary, Volume I: Books 1-4*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, states that here "Nestor ... can be *imagined* as turning to [Agamemnon]," p. 81, emphasis mine.

can see that an overt vocative address is not necessary to signal change of addressee when context makes this clear. Again, this suggests that when such address forms appear, they serve some other function.

Conversely, the appearance of a vocative within a speech may not necessarily signal any change in addressee. Nestor begins his speech at B.337 *ff.* by addressing the assembled Achaeans *en masse*. Then, at B.344, he switches to addressing Agamemnon alone. This change of addressee is marked, as we might expect, by the use of a vocative address, in this case, Ἀτρεΐδῃ. Nestor then switches back to the collective whole at B.354 by stating τῷ μὴ τις πρὶν ἐπειγέσθω ... This switch in addressee is not marked by a formal address (a vocative), as was the case at B.344; however the use of the indefinite third person τις has the function of expanding the implied addressee beyond Agamemnon alone to any one of those assembled and by implication to them all. This switch is achieved because an indefinite pronoun cannot logically refer to a specific individual and hence, the collective whole follows as a generalized implicature.¹⁴¹ Agamemnon is again invoked as an individual addressee at B.360, this time by use of the vocative ἄναξ.¹⁴² He then remains the addressee throughout the remainder of the speech. However, he is again addressed formally at 362; this time by the singleton vocative

¹⁴⁰ Kirk, *Ibid.*, notes the emphatic nature of this transition; σὺ δὲ παῦε.

¹⁴¹ See Ch. 2. *Generalized implicatures* logically follow in the way that ‘not all’ follows logically from ‘some.’

¹⁴² Formally ἄναξ is nominative singular. The historically predicted vocative ἄνα, appears only in the collocation, Ζεῦ ἄνα. The form ἄνα also appears as a singleton at I.247, Z.331 and Σ.178 where it is taken to be a form of the preverb ἀνά with accent shift, and ellipsis of the verb, and translated as something like “come on now.” However, in these settings, the form could well represent the vocative of ἄναξ. Within the context of the Greek camp, Agamemnon is the ἄναξ (see below). Kirk, *op. cit.* p. 154, describes this passage as “solemn.”

Αγάμεμνον.¹⁴³ Although the identity of the addressee has not changed, Nestor nevertheless specifically re-addresses him. Again, this last example (B.362) suggests that, although vocatives *can* function to signal (change of) addressee, this is not a necessary function. Thus, although vocatives may serve to signal articulations of addressee within an extended discourse, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient function for them. This in turn pushes us to consider the possibility that they serve some additional, perhaps more important, function. I have already hinted at part of this other function, above, in my discussion of the hierarchy created in Khryses' address to the Greek host at A.17 ff.

3.2.1.2 Emphasis¹⁴⁴ In not a few instances, a vocative address can be considered to introduce a speech which does not absolutely begin that speech but is preceded by some material which, despite its linear position within the discourse, 'belongs' in some sense to what follows the vocative address rather than to what precedes it. Let us take a case as an example.

(7) μή σε, γέρον, κοίλῃσιν ἐγὼ παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχέω A.26

Similar to what we saw above in (3), in this line as well, the speech initial elements, in this case μή σε, are separated off from the rest of their sentence by the vocative γέρον. This vocative address, as we discussed above, does not participate in any syntactic relations with the words in the rest of the line; it is *extragrammatical* and hence is said to

¹⁴³ For the significance of the use of Agamemnon's given name alone as an address, see Chapter 4.

¹⁴⁴ Although it is admittedly vague, I use this term as opposed to distinguishing strictly between, say, *focus* and *topicalization*, because I do not wish to begin a protracted discussion of what 'kind' of emphasis is being defined in these cases. Such a discussion would be quite involved and lies well outside the scope of this project.

be *extrasentential*. The effect is to separate out μή σε from the rest of the line, with which it is nevertheless still linked by the regular rules of grammatical dependency. However, such a word order is by no means necessary, either grammatically or metrically, as the potential, but unattested line (8) suggests.

(8) *ὦ γέρον, ἦ μή ἐγὼ σε θοῆς παρὰ νηυσὶ κιχείω¹⁴⁵

The attested order in (7) has the result of making μή σε seem quite prominent. It achieves this ‘prominence’ in the following way; since μή σε is grammatically dependant but that dependency is left unfulfilled, this has the effect of suspending the discourse until after the vocative address; ‘don’t, old man, let me catch you at the hollow ships.’ Note that Kirk describes Agamemnon’s language here as “smooth and indirect (but sinister).”¹⁴⁶ Rather the effect, produced by the grammatical suspension caused by the placement of the vocative, seems to be jarring, and the emphasis placed on the negation seems to add a forceful tone. Rhetorically this word order results in segregating out μή σε from the rest of its clause, and allows that segregation to suggest just how the whole point of Agamemnon’s command to Khryses is reducible to *don’t*. His rhetoric is about power, *his* power, over the old man, and this is expressed most directly and succinctly by the negation μή, ‘don’t.’ Given this then, what might we make of a similar structure found at A.I, which we discussed briefly above (3)?

(9) μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά, Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος A.I

¹⁴⁵ Note, that in this case, in order to maintain meter, the attributive adjective θοῆς must substitute for κοίλῃσιν in the attested line.

¹⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 56. Kirk offers no explanation for his particular reading. One may speculate that it arises out of the poet’s choice of vocative address, which is often used in contexts (as in the case of Nestor) where respect seems to be implied.

We might begin by suggesting that, similar to γέρον at A.26 (7), the vocative, θεά, here has the effect of separating out μῆνιν ἄειδε out and throwing it into highlight. Note, however, that μῆνιν ἄειδε constitutes a fully saturated verb phrase (VP) and hence is itself syntactically complete and can stand by itself. Note also that μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά forms a complete thought. This suggests the need for a different analysis. What is being separated out and emphasized in this line is perhaps the genitive complement of the noun phrase (NP) μῆνιν; “Sing about *whose* anger? oh, Akhilleus McPeleus’.” If we can accept these analyses, we can say then that vocatives, by potentially dividing up larger syntactic structures such as clauses (XPs¹⁴⁷), allow some other, specifically nonsyntactic, structuring to be (super)imposed on those syntactic structures. I say that this imposed structuring is ‘nonsyntactic’ because it does not appear to affect the syntactic relationships of dependency within the other structure. That is, a sentence like (10) while un-metrical, would express the same syntactic relations as are found in the attested line (9), but without the strong postponement of the qualifying genitive which the use of the vocative creates.

(10) * μῆνιν ἄειδε Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος

Thus, vocatives in *interclausal* positions create suspensions of syntactic dependency relations and thence suspensions of thought, which we may, for convenience sake, call *emphasis*.

¹⁴⁷ According to standard practice in Linguistics, by XP I mean any phrase level constituent. A phrase level constituent is, according to some models of syntax, some element X and all of its complements, if it has any, taken as a unit of syntax (a *constituent*). See Pollard and Sag *op. cit.*

3.2.2 Structuring the Social Space The strongest and most long-lived evidence which Parry marshaled in support of his proposition of an orally composed *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was the poet's use of a system of what has come to be termed the *fixed ornamental epithet*. In such a system, contrasted forms like Ἀτρεΐδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον are not to be considered as semantically distinguishable. A *fixed ornamental epithet* consists of a noun phrase containing a name or other head noun plus one or more of a special set of modifiers, for example: ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς or ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων. One of the key points of the oral theory as it has been advanced since Parry is summed up in the term *ornamental*. This term is attributed to an adjective or adjective phrase which is said to have been used without regard to its semantic content and with indifference to the context. In the above examples, the adjective-phrase ποδάρκης δῖος and the appositional noun-phrase ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν are said to be ornamental because they are considered to be semantically bleached.¹⁴⁸ In addition, when meter and grammar required, another adjective was substituted, again, seemingly with no regard to that modifier's specific lexical meaning or the way in which it modified the meaning of the head noun. In a compositional framework in which meter alone determined which of two 'equivalent'

¹⁴⁸ For a critique of this position see especially A. Parry, "Language and Characterization in Homer", in *The Language of Achilles, and Other Papers*, Oxford, 1989, pp.301 ff. Adam Parry's basic premise is worth noting. His claim is that the functionality of the fixed epithet does not, *a priori*, divest it of its meaning. This is surely an important point. Although the force of the repetition of such formulaic phrases seems to have the effect of bleaching the salience of their meaning, perhaps *this* is a more helpful way of formulating the force of the effect of such repetitions. Parry points out that in certain verses, the poet has brought the force of the meaning of these epithets to the fore. Thus when the poet identifies the two primary protagonists of the poem at A.7 as:

Ἀτρεΐδης ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς

The effect, especially of the displaced NP ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, is to focus our attention on the fact that the poem is about a struggle between the leader of all the Greek forces and its most valuable warrior. Parry's point here seems to be a robust one and serves well to highlight how such oft repeated ornamental epithets are not, in fact, meaningless, but may, via repetition, lose some of the force of that meaning.

appellations was to be used, the decision to refer to Akhilleus as, for example, ποδάρκης δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς at A.121 was determined by the poet's need to fill a space at the end of the line with a noun phrase of the metrical shape $\square \square \square \square \square \square$ in the nominative case, referring to Akhilleus and *not* by any particular desire on his part to characterize Akhilleus as swift as opposed to something else. Thus, for Parry, the only pragmatic effects on composition were those of gender and strict co-referential identity. The corresponding accusative case form, ποδαρκέα δῖον Ἀχιλλέα, since it could not be fitted into the hexameter line —without employing synezesis of έα which is not attested for the acc case form— is unattested only *because* it could not be fitted into the line. Thus, for contexts grammatically defined to require the accusative case, the poet was forced instead to use the noun phrase ποδώκεα Πηλείωνα if he wanted to fill the same metrical space ($\square \square \square \square \square \square$). Note that, as in the case of Agamemnon above, the shift from given name to patronymic seems to have been driven by considerations of meter alone, and the choice of modifier seems to be similarly motivated. If, as seems likely, there is little qualitative difference between ποδάρκης and ποδώκεα, does it likewise follow, that there is little difference between the designations Ἀχιλλεύς and Πηλείωνα when referring to Akhilleus? This latter question will be addressed more fully in Chapter 4.

Part II: Uses of 'Generic' Epithets in Address

3.3 Generic Addresses As was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, there may not be any —or any important— functional distinction between those epithets that are token specific and those that are 'generic.' In this section, I will look at some, but by

no means all, of the ‘generic’ epithets used as addresses in the *Iliad*. The purpose of this section is to examine whether, on the one hand, there are any pragmatic constraints on their use, and, if so, what they are, or whether, on the other hand, their use is ascribable to metrical necessity alone. This set of generic epithets includes those marking specific, formal social relationships like τέκνον, πάτερ and μητέρα, and those expressing more pragmatic or situational relationships like φίλοι and Δαιμόνιε.

3.3.1 Τέκνον/τέκος There are a number of epithets that are clearly not ornamental. Within this set we can probably include those which constitute *hapax legomena* and those which function as generic epithets, like τέκνον, and that may be applied seemingly to anyone, but which nevertheless, have a limited currency because they would create interpretational inconcinnities if used without any regard to context.

When Thetis addresses Akhilleus as τέκνον at A.362 *et aliis*,¹⁴⁹ it would seem that she does so because she is, in fact, his mother and he her child. Thus, there is already apparent a difference in degree of appropriacy between forms like ποδάρκης and those like τέκνον, despite the fact that both are technically ‘generic.’ In all cases, in fact, the vocative τέκνον is addressed by parents to their children. Therefore, the social relationship of parent and child must be considered a further factor in defining what is and what is not an appropriate context for the use of this term in address. While Thetis may address Akhilleus as τέκνον, Agamemnon, for example, does not.

¹⁴⁹ Specifically: A.414; Σ.128; T.8, 29; □.128.

However, we should now be prepared to ask whether the social relationship is the only factor in defining the appropriate use of this term of address? When Thetis addresses Akhilleus as τέκνον at A.362, she has found him crying at the shore where he has summoned her after his public humiliation at the hands of Agamemnon. She addresses him:

(11) τέκνον τί κλαίεις τί δὲ φρένας ἵκετο πένθος A.362

The interpersonal context in this scene is clearly one distinguished by feelings of sorrow and consolation.¹⁵⁰ A similar context is found a bit later in the same scene, at A.414, where Thetis laments having borne a son to such an unfavorable fate, i.e., an early, violent death, and also later in the poem at T.8 and T.29. In these last two scenes, Akhilleus must put aside his mourning over, and concern for, the fate of Patroklos' body, and, although he is sad (ἀχνύμενοί περ), he must return to battle against Hektor. In both these cases, Thetis is reacting to Akhilleus' performance of his loss. At E.382 Dione, and at E.428 Zeus, similarly are found consoling Aphrodite after her humiliating wounding at the hands of mortal Diomedes. In the former, the verb τέτλαθι extends even further the notion of consolation. In both these cases, she is addressed as τέκνον ἐμόν.¹⁵¹ At Σ.128, the context is somewhat different. Here, Thetis is expressing her support, albeit grudgingly, for Akhilleus' fatal decision to return to battle, and to seek out and kill Hektor. The context of this scene does not involve expressions of consolation for the addressee's sorrow but rather expressions of the speaker's own sorrow, in this case

¹⁵⁰ Kirk, 85, describes this address as an "urgent enquiry," and "emotional," p. 90.

¹⁵¹ Kirk, 90, defines Zeus' address here as "benevolent," p. 100.

arising from the recognition of her son's now inevitable death. This expression of sorrow is coupled with support for his decision to nevertheless pursue this path.¹⁵² The narrative context then, the death of Patroklos, the hunting of Hektor and its subsequent consequences for Akhilleus himself, is still one marked by the expression of feelings of sorrow.

This same address, τέκνον, is also used in two scenes in which fathers are quoted giving advice to their sons. At I.254, Phoinix, in attempting to persuade Akhilleus to give up his feud with Agamemnon and return to the battle, quotes his father, Peleus' advice that he avoid evil-contriving strife (ἔριδος κακομηχάνου). At Λ.785, Nestor quotes Menoitios' advice to Patroklos to act as an advisor to Akhilleus since he is the elder of the two. In both cases the quoted fathers employed the vocative τέκνον by way of introduction to their advice. In a similar vein, Hekabe, at Z.254 questions Hektor as to why he has left the battle:

- (12) τέκνον τίπτε λιπών πόλεμον θρασὺν εἰλήλουθας Z.245
 ἢ μάλα δὴ τείρουσι δυσώνυμοι υἱὲς Ἀχαιῶν
 μαρνάμενοι περὶ ἄστυ. ...
 Τέκνον, why have you left the seething battle and come here?
 For god's sake, the terrible-named sons of the Achaeans are pressing us hard
 as they battle about the city.

Hekabe's concern here is not for her son directly — she can see he is alive— as much as it is for Troy as a whole. If Hektor has left the battle, things must really be going badly; he

¹⁵² Catalin Anghelina (personal correspondance) has pointed out that the language of T.71, ... κάρη λάβε παιδὸς ἐοῖο, where Thetis comforts Achilles at the death of Patroklos is similar in gesture, if not exact vocabulary to that found at Π.724 where Andromakhe laments the corpse of Hektor. The parallel in gesture, taking hold of the head, in Thetis' case, seems to reflect the fact that prior to Patroklos' death, Akhilleus has two possible fates but, by this act, Patroklos' death, one has effectively been removed and he is now destined to die. Thetis' actions, as if she were actually mourning his corpse, seem to signal this resignation to fate, and add an additional tone to her following speech and its address

would only leave to seek Zeus' help. Her tone soon seems to change as she decides she wants him to stay awhile, pour a libation to Zeus and rest.¹⁵³ However her initial reaction seems to be one of shocked surprise; “τέκνον, why have you left the fight?” Along the same lines, at .128, Thetis attempts to ready her son to release Hektor's body to Priam, against his own wishes, but as Zeus has ordered. In X.82 and again two lines later at 84, Hekabe, calling to her son from the walls δάκρυ χέουσα, pleads with him, saying that he will go unburied:

(13) ... ἀνευθε δέ σε μέγα νῶϊν Χ.88
 Αργείων παρὰ νηυσὶ κύνες ταχέες κατέδονται
 ...but far apart from us
 by the ships of the Argeives, swift dogs will devour you.

Although the specific contexts are different, what all of these passages have in common seems to be that they involve parents, either advising, consoling or feeling consternation, fear or sorrow for their child. What is more, these all take place in a setting marked by warfare and terror, as (13) graphically illustrates. Τέκνον (ἑμόν) seems never to be used to address a child in a specifically positive emotional context, i.e., one defined by positive emotions like happiness or joy. Thus beyond the social context of parent/child relations, there is a further pragmatic context which correlates to the use of the address τέκνον, one defined by parental concern, urgency, sorrow or alarm, specifically for a child. One potential problem with the previous analysis is that there appear to be so few instances of parent-to-child address which do not fit the above context with which we might test the hypothesis. That is to say, for the above analysis to be proven correct, we must find a

¹⁵³ This change in request seems to signal a shift in her focus from Troy to her, her son and *their* relationship.

form of address which is used in the same social context but with a different distribution vis-à-vis the specific pragmatic context.

Τέκος as a form of address is almost identical in meaning to τέκνον, differing only in its metrical shape.¹⁵⁴ In terms of strict numbers, the distribution we find of the two forms differs by only a little. The latter appears 17 times in the *Iliad*, the former appears 27 times. However the pragmatics of their distribution is marked by a somewhat greater difference. With three exceptions,¹⁵⁵ τέκνον is found used to address humans and is used specifically by parents to address their child. On the other hand, τέκος is most often found addressed to a god and may be used by one who is not the parent or in the stead of a parent. In 8 of its occurrences τέκος appears in the formulaic phrase αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, and twice in an abbreviated form, Διὸς τέκος. In all occurrences where a human addresses a god using the vocative of τέκος, one of these two formulae is used.¹⁵⁶ Although uses of the formula (αἰγιόχοιο) Διὸς τέκος are not limited to prayer, all of the remaining occurrences of it involve Hera addressing Athene. In these contexts τέκος seems to function in place of the otherwise unattested vocatives παῖ or κούρη. However, in its other contexts, often modified by the adjective φίλον, and all involving human to human address and speakers who are either the addressee's parent or parent surrogate, τέκος functions much like τέκνον with one important difference. This address is found used for parent-to-child addresses but in a wider range of pragmatically defined contexts.

¹⁵⁴ Both terms derive from the root **√tek*, meaning something like “bear (children),” morphologically these are *tek-n-on* and *tek-os* respectively.

¹⁵⁵ E. 382, Dione to Aphrodite; E.428, Zeus to Aphrodite; Φ.379, Here to Hephaistos.

¹⁵⁶ A.202; E.115; K.278, 284. We may include Skamander's address to Apollo here at Φ.229 as it is formally very like other prayers in the *Iliad*, albeit, uttered by a god.

Thus, when, at Γ.162 and 192, Priam addresses Helen as φίλον τέκος, the context is different from those in which τέκνον is found. Here Priam, although he is acting *in loco parentis*, is, nevertheless not consoling or comforting Helen, instead he asks her to identify three of the Greeks arrayed below the walls.

- (14) δεῦρο πάροιθ' ἐλθοῦσα φίλον τέκος ἴξεν ἐμεῖο, Γ.162
 ὄφρα ἴδῃ πρότερόν τε πόσιν πηοῦς τε φίλους τε·
 οὐ τί μοι αἰτίη ἐσσί, θεοί νύ μοι αἴτιοί εἰσιν
 οἳ μοι ἐφώρμησαν πόλεμον πολύδακρυν Ἀχαιῶν·
 ὥς μοι καὶ τόνδ' ἄνδρα πελώριον ἐξονομήνης
 ὅς τις ὅδ' ἐστὶν Ἀχαιοὺς ἀνὴρ ἡὺς τε μέγας τε.

Come here, φίλον τέκος, and sit before me
 so you can see you former husband, your husband's kin and yours.
 you are not responsible as far as I am concerned, it is the gods who are the cause;
 they have roused against me this tearful war with the Akhaians.
 (sit here) so you can identify who that huge man is.
 Who is that handsome and great Akhaian man?

Kirk describes the tone of Priam's speech here as "kindly."¹⁵⁷ In response, Helen's mood here appears to be sad, she begins her speech at Γ.172-6 with a lament, which constitutes the majority of that speech:

- (15) αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἐσσι φίλε ἐκυρὲ δεινός τε Γ.172
 ὥς ὄφελεν θάνατός μοι ἄδειν κακὸς ὅππότε δεῦρο
 υἱεῖ σῶ ἐπόμεν θάλαμον γνωτοὺς τε λιποῦσα
 παῖδα τε τηλυγέτην καὶ ὁμηλικίην ἐρατεινήν.
 ἀλλὰ τὰ γ' οὐκ ἐγένοντο· ...

You are worthy of αἰδῶς to me, dear father-in-law, and of awe.
 Would that evil death had been the pleasure I took when here
 I followed your son and abandoned my marriage bed and my kin
 and my daughter of marrying age and my dear peer group;
 but that didn't happen, ...

¹⁵⁷ Kirk, 85, p. 288.

Nevertheless, Priam's tone in response is not actively consoling; it is, instead, almost light. In fact, by way of response, he addresses not Helen herself, but the Greeks whom she has pointed out to him.

(16) ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρεΐδῃ μοιρηγενὲς ὀλβιόδαιμον, Γ.182
ἦ ῥά νύ τοι πολλοὶ δεδμήατο κοῦροι Ἀχαιῶν.

Oh blest house of Atreus, aptly born, watched by a friendly spirit,
of course (now I see why so) many Akhaian youths are your subjects.

It is not wholly clear whether this speech is intended as a performance for Helen's sake, which we might well expect, or is to be taken as an aside, as if Priam has drifted off into some sort of reverie. The example of the use of τέκος in Γ.162 is illustrative of some instances of its use in Homer and suggests that the term has a wider range of acceptable contexts than τέκνον. Therefore, τέκος can function as the desired *comparandum* for testing our hypothesis about the contextual restrictions on the use of τέκνον we discussed above. The term τέκος, then, appears to have two complementary uses, one as part of the formulaic address to a second generation Olympian god, the other as a metrical variant of τέκνον, but with seemingly wider contextually appropriate use.

I would advise a note of caution here, however. The sample size for the use of both terms is quite small and therefore, must have a correspondingly large 'standard deviation.' Therefore, any conclusions which might be drawn from such a sample should be considered tentative (albeit valid for the *Iliad*). Furthermore, the narrative frame of the *Iliad* offers a rather limited range of narrative settings, and this fact also serves to limit the firmness of the conclusions I have drawn. Nevertheless, the facts as stated do stand and suggests that the restrictions on the appropriacy (see Chapter 2) of the use of some form of address must extend beyond the mere lexical 'essential idea.'

3.3.2 Πάτερ/μήτερ

These two terms correspond to τέκνον and τέκος and

(17) ... οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἄλλη Z.411

3.3.2.1 Πάτερ

The vocative address *πάτερ* appears most commonly in the

the history of the form Ζεῦ Πάτερ see Hopkins, Grace Sturtevant, *Indo-European *deiws and Words*, Linguistic Society of America, 1932; Boisacq, E., *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue étudiée dans ses rapports avec les autres langues indo-européennes*, C. Winter, Paris, C. Beck, 1938; Chantraine, P., *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: histoire des mots*, C. Beck, 1983-1984; Frisk, H., *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, C. Winter, 1973-1979; Cook, J. E., *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion*. The Cambridge University Press, 1914-40 *et alios*.

within the epic corpus as a whole, and especially within the context of the *Iliad*, there are few opportunities for children to address their fathers. Thus the attested distribution may less reflect epic social constraints than purely narrative constraints. This is suggested by two cases where this address is used not to address Zeus but is used by a son to his father, both from the *Odyssey*.

- (18) τοῦ δ' ὠρίνετο θυμός, ἀνὰ ῥίνας δέ οἱ ἦδη
 δριμὺ μένος προὔτυψε φίλον πατέρ' εἰσορόωντι. ω.318
 κύσσε δέ μιν περιφὺς ἐπιάλμενος, ἥδ' ἐπροσηύδα·
 κείνος μὲν τοι ὅδ' αὐτὸς ἐγώ, πάτερ, ὃν σὺ μεταλλᾷς,
 ἦλυθον εἰκοστῷ ἔτει ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.
 ἀλλ' ἴσχεο κλαυθμοῖο γόοιό τε δακρυόεντος.

But his (Odysseus') spirit roused itself and right then up from his nose
 a sharp force shot as he looked at his dear father.
 He kissed him as he rushed to him and hugged him and then he spoke
 "That men is right here, it's me, father, the one you seek,
 I came home after twenty years to my homeland,
 get a hold of your grief and tearful grief."

The issue Odysseus is confronting here is his father Laertes' chronic paternal grief over the 'loss' of his son (because of this grief he long ago left the *oikos* and went to live on his own). Odysseus the son κείνος μὲν τοι ὅδ' αὐτὸς is now revealing himself to his father as that son. While the address may indicate the speaker's wish to honour the addressee (i.e., do positive face work), given the content of 319 and given how πάτερ, in 320, echoes φίλον πατέρα in 319, it seems here that the address form πάτερ is used to make reference directly to the familial relationship of son to father and not strictly as a tool of positive face. We can say the same for ω.369, below.

- (19) ... θαύμαζε δέ μιν φίλος υἱός, ω.369
 ὥς ἴδεν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιον ἄντην·
 καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·
 ὦ πάτερ, ἦ μάλα τίς σε θεῶν αἰιγενετῶν
 εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε ἀμείνονα θῆκεν ἰδέσθαι.

... his dear son marveled at him,
 when he saw how in his face he looked like an immortal god.
 And he spoke to him, and addressed him with winged words:
 “father, wow, one of those gods that are born to eternal life
 has made you appear better both in your complexion and your stature.”

In this case, an argument that this address makes its appeal strictly to the familial relationship of the interactants in that discourse is more difficult to make. Here the contrast is between Odysseus’ father’s *appearance* before and his appearance now, not on his identity as the speaker’s male parent. In fact, it is not clear that ὦ πάτερ is not functioning here both to address the positive face needs of Laertes and to reflect the fact that, to Odysseus, the man who is his *father*, now looks ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος. That is, the term seems to invoke both face needs and social relations.

In other cases, it appears that this address is intended to function to strictly affect the positive face needs of the addressee and not to reflect any familial relationship. As stated above, most instances of this vocative appear in the traditional phrase Ζεῦ (τε) Πάτερ which appears to have its origins in prayer.¹⁵⁹ However, at □.362, we find the address used for Priam. Here, Hermes has come, disguised as a mortal youth (... κούρω αἰσუმνητῆρι ἐοικώς β᾽ πρῶτον ὑπηνήτη, τοῦ περ χαριεστάτη ἦβη □.346, *f.*), to lead Priam into the Greek camp to Akhilleus’ tent. Hermes does not appear as a god, but neither does he appear as one of Priam’s sons (although we might forgive the old man if he couldn’t tell) but merely κούρω ἐοικώς. In this guise, he addresses the king.

(20) ὥς φάτο, σὺν δὲ γέροντι νόος χύτο, δαΐδιε δ’ αἰνῶς, □.358
 ὀρθαὶ δὲ τρίχες ἔσταν ἐνὶ γναμπτοῖσι μέλεσσι,
 στῆ δὲ ταφῶν· αὐτὸς δ’ ἐριούνιος ἐγγύθεν ἔλθων

¹⁵⁹ See especially Dumézil, G., *Archaic Roman Religion, with an Appendix on the Religion of the Etruscans*, Translated by Philip Krapp., University of Chicago Press, 1970. Latin *Jupiter* and Vedic *dyauṣpitar* (e.g., *Rg Veda*, 6.51.5) are approximately cognate with it.

χεῖρα γέροντος ἑλὼν ἐξείρετο καὶ προσέειπε·
 πῇ πάτερ ὦδ' ἵππους τε καὶ ἡμιόνους ἰθύνεις
 νύκτα δι' ἀμβροσίην, ὅτε θ' εὐδουσι βροτοὶ ἄλλοι;
 οὐδὲ σύ γ' ἔδειςας μένεα πνείοντας Ἀχαιοῦς,
 οἳ τοι δυσμενέες καὶ ἀνάρσιοι ἐγγὺς ἔασι;
 τῶν εἴ τις σε ἴδοιτο θοῇν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν
 τοσσάδ' ὄνειάτ' ἄγοντα, τίς ἂν δῆ τοι νόος εἴη;
 οὔτ' αὐτὸς νέος ἐσσί, γέρων δέ τοι οὗτος ὀπηδεῖ,
 ἄνδρ' ἀπαμύνασθαι, ὅτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνη.
 ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν σε ρέξω κακά, καὶ δέ κεν ἄλλον
 σεῦ ἀπαλεξήσαιμι· φίλῳ δέ σε πατρὶ εἴσκω.

So he (Hermes) spoke, and the old man's mind was stirred up, and he was greatly
 afraid,

and his hairs stood on his bent-over limbs,
 and he stood lost in wonder; but the Helper god himself came up to him;
 he took the old man's hand and asked him, saying,
 "where to, father, where are you driving your horses and mules in this way
 through the ambrosial night when other mortals are asleep?
 You aren't afraid of the Akhaians, are you, who breath their might
 and who are hateful and hostile towards you *and* are nearby too?
 If one of them should see you bringing all this treasure
 through the black night, what do you think you'd do?
 You're not young yourself and that guy who is helping you is too old
 to ward off some man if he treats you harshly.
 But I won't do anything wrong to you, in fact, if someone else tried
 I'd defend you. You seem like my own dear father."

This speech is in many ways confusing. At □.354, Hermes has already addressed Priam
 as δαρδανίδη, 'oh house of Dardanos,' which itself makes reference to Priam's elevated
 status (see Chapter 4). The use of πάτερ at □.362, since it seems to invoke the
 imprecational formula Ζεῦ πάτερ, would similarly seem to honour Priam This time by
 invoking his status as almost like a god (i.e., Zeus).¹⁶⁰ Given that this address is made in
 a setting in which the two characters are in isolation and not in the presence of others, it
 is unlikely that the term is used here to publicly honour the addressee, but to privately
 honour him. In this speech, the speaker claims to be surprised that the old man is not
 afraid although, by all rights, he should be. Give these two facts about the discourse, we
 might say that the use of πάτερ at 362 further serves to also address Priam's positive

¹⁶⁰ Priam is in many ways analogous to Zeus. Both hold similar positions in their relative societies.

face, that is, to honour him. However, at the end of the speech Hermes as a *kouros* invokes his own fictionalized father and compares Priam to him.¹⁶¹ This comparison comes within the context of Hermes *kouros*' expressed intention to defend the old man from possible attack. 'If someone attacks you, I'll defend you, you're like my old man.' By invoking his own, albeit fictional, father, Hermes' discourse moves towards the familial and suggests that his first use of the term *πάτερ* may have familial implications after all. That is, it might seem to invoke the familial. However, it cannot indicate that Hermes *is* addressing Priam as his father.

3.3.2.2 Μητερ This term, as an address, has even more limited use. In the *Odyssey*, it is used almost exclusively by Telemakhos as an address for Penelope and thus reflects the expression of a more strictly familial relationship than does *πάτερ*. In the *Iliad*, this address is used, with one exception, as an address for Thetis by Akhilleus. The one exception (Z.264) the term is used by Hektor and is addressed to his mother, Hekabe. Again, the relative infrequent use of this address must be ascribable to the fact that the contexts in which characters address their mothers is so restricted, especially within the narrative frame of the *Iliad*. This fact further suggests that the poet's use of the vocative address *μητερ* should probably be considered as restricted to cases where it refers strictly to the familial relationship of child to mother in a way that is not possible to say about the masculine *πάτερ*, because of its special use in prayers to Zeus, especially in the traditional phrase *Ζεῦ (τε) Πάτερ*.

¹⁶¹ As Priam does not recognize Hermes as Hermes *qua* god, we should not take φίλω δέ σε πατρὶ ἔϊσκω as a referring to Zeus, but to some fictional old father. That is, here, *πάτερ* does not mean *πάτερ Ἑρμοῦ* but *πάτερ κούρου*.

3.3.3 Φίλε This term, rather than invoking more or less fixed or institutional social relationships as τέκνον, πάτερ and μητερ do, invokes rather situational, and therefore more readily negotiable social relationships. It is found in three basic uses: 1) as a modifying adjective as in φίλε τέκνον (e.g., X.84); 2) with a dative complement, usually in the phrase Δὴ φίλε; 3) In the plural alone as a substantive (x20), but often modifying ἡγήτορες or ἥρωες (x16). In the first cases, the term is found in family (e.g., Zeus and Apollo) or family-like (e.g., Priam and Helen) contexts. In these cases, there does not seem to be any obvious hierarchical restrictions on its use. Thus the word is found modifying ἐκυρέ, κασίγνητε, γέρον and τέκνον. All of these imply different hierarchical relations. In the case of the phrase Δὴ φίλε, the term seems to imply that the addressee has a status which derived from an implied relation with Zeus rather than based on the addressee's relationship with the speaker. In the last set of examples where the term is used as a substantive in the plural, it is found often addressed to the *laoi* or to some undifferentiated group of Greek leaders. Thus, outside of the family set of relations, the term seems to apply to an addressee who does not hold a superior social position.

Unlike in later, especially Attic, Greek, in the singular, the forms φίλε and φίλη are never used alone, substantively as addresses but are always found either as modifying adjectives complementing some other vocative or less often (twice) substantivized with Δὴ as a dative complement. In both these cases, its function seems distinctly adjectival. In the plural, φίλοι is found 15 times as a vocative substantive and 13 times as a vocative

adjective modifying either ἡγήτορες or ἥρωες. This contrasts with what Dickey has found for later Greek where φίλε is often used as a singular substantive. The address is especially well attested in Plato.¹⁶²

The vocative address φίλε is clearly a form of the adjective φίλος, η, ον. In Homer, as later, this adjective implies a context of particularly close relations, relations characterized by low degree of distance in terms of what is called in politeness theory literature *Solidarity/Distance* (see (20) below and also Ch. III). At the same time it seems to have few implications in terms of the corresponding hierarchical axis of *Power*. Thus, Helen may address Priam with φίλε at Γ.172, Agamemnon Menelaos at Δ.155 and Zeus Apollo at Ο.221 and Π.667. In this capacity, as an indication of relatively low social distance, φίλε often appears to act in a way somewhat similar to a possessive adjective, e.g., Α.491 where φίλον κῆρ seems to mean little more than ‘my heart.’

The question is whether φίλε, by invoking *solidarity* also necessarily implies affection. As Dickey has noted, the term is especially common in Plato. Here, the term can be found in numerous sociolinguistic contexts from praise (e.g., *Symposium* 199c) to outright condemnation. An example of the latter is found at *Apology* 26d. The question we should ask of this passage is whether ὦ φίλε Μέλητε indicates that the speaker, in this case Socrates, is constructing a social space, albeit a fictional one within the context of the narrative frame of Plato’s *Apology*, which is predicated on speaker-to-addressee affection (addressee’s positive face) or not?

- (21) Σ. [26δ] ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;

¹⁶²Dickey, Eleanor, *Greek Forms of Address from Herodotus to Lucian*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996.

Μ. μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν.

Σ. Ἀναξαγόρου οἷε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε; καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἷε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων;

S. Oh, come on now Meletos, why do you say things like that; namely that, as far as the sun and moon are concerned, I don't really believe, like others do, that they are gods?

M. No by god, I don't, gentlemen judges, not when he says that the sun is a rock and the moon is dirt.

S. Who do you think that you're accusing here, φίλε Meletos, Anaxagoras? Do you also have so much contempt for these men here, and do you imagine that they are so un-read that they don't know that the works of Anaxagoras the Klazomenian swell with statements just like that/

In this passage, Socrates is cast as attempting to refute Meletos' accusation of impiety. Socrates has already expressed his shock at the accusation by the use of the address ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε. In this context, are we to read φίλε as nevertheless implying affection for Meletos on Socrates' part, i.e., as addressing the positive face needs of Meletos in the context of low social distance? One possibility is that this passage offers an example of what Boxer and Cortés-Conde call *teasing and shaming*.¹⁶³ In an adversarial context, like Socrates' imagined dispute with Meletos, where consideration for the addressee's positive face needs is difficult to reconcile with the rest of the context, the use of such politeness terms may signal the opposite. That is, by appearing seemingly inappropriate, they call attention to their very inappropriateness (see, also, the discussion of δαιμόνιε below).

¹⁶³ Boxer, D., F. Cortés-Conde, "From Joking to Biting: Conversational Joking and Identity Display," *JoP*, 1997, p. 280.

In the case of the *Iliad*, we find that the majority of instances of the use of φίλε as an address are family situations where the social setting is consistent with low social distance and where face concerns, especially addressee face concerns, are appropriate. Thus at Δ.155, Agamemnon is in essence apologizing for causing Menelaos to be wounded and, by implication, vowing to still take Troy.

- (22) τοῖς δὲ βαρὺ στενάχων μετέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων Δ.153
 χειρὸς ἔχων Μενέλαον, ἐπεστενάχοντο δ' ἑταῖροι·
 φίλε κασίγνητε θάνατόν νύ τοι ὄρκι' ἔταμνον
 οἷον προστήσας πρὸ Ἀχαιῶν Τρωσὶ μάχεσθαι,
 ὥς σ' ἔβαλον Τρῶες, κατὰ δ' ὄρκια πιστὰ πάτησαν...

With a great groan, Agamemnon the King spoke to them
 holding Menelaos by the hand and his companions added their laments
 “φίλε brother, I marked out death for you with my oath
 when I sent you out before the other Akhaians to fight with the Trojans, alone,
 as the Trojans shot you, they trampled down that trusty oath. ...”

Φίλε here seems to address both Menelaos' and Agamemnon's positive face needs simultaneously. As κατὰ δ' ὄρκια πιστὰ πάτησαν implies that the oath which ended the war is no longer in effect, this has the further implication that Agamemnon will go on to try and take the city for his wounded brother. Thus, Agamemnon would seem to be addressing Menelaos' 1) positive face needs, by attempting to confirm Agamemnon's affection despite getting his brother wounded; 2) his negative face needs by placating his desire for Troy to fall (*cf.* (23)). At the same time, it appears to address 3) Agamemnon's positive face needs —i.e., to still be thought well of by his brother, a brother he seems to believe he has gotten killed. That is, φίλε seems to imply Agamemnon's desire to still be thought φίλος by his brother. Its use invokes or even creates its own appropriateness.

- (23) ἔσσεται ἡμαρ ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρὴ Δ.164
 καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίῳ Πριάμοιο,

“There will be a day when sacred Ilium will perish
and Priam and the people of Priam holder of the good ash spear.”

At Γ.172, Helen uses the same term to address Priam in a speech which seems to function as an apology for bringing the war upon the Trojans. As in Agamemnon’s address ((22) above), the term here would seem to reflect Helen’s own positive face needs. It is as if φίλε here means something like ‘let me still be φίλη to you, despite the fact of this war which is fought for my behalf and which has cost you so many sons.’ The term then initiates the very relationship which it names. At Π.667, Zeus addresses Apollo as φίλε Φοῖβε in an attempt to get him to go and help his son Sarpedon. In this situation the use of the term would seem to address Zeus’ negative face —his desire to get his wants fulfilled— and Apollo’s positive face. At Χ.84 Hekabe addresses Hektor as φίλε τέκνον in her attempt to get him not to go and fight Akhilleus. This would again seem to be an appeal to his positive face and her negative. Lastly, at Ω.560, Akhilleus addresses Priam as γέρον φίλε. Here he requests that Priam sleep outside his seating area, suggesting that this is so none of the Greeks, who are wont to come by, will see him and go and tell Agamemnon. Akhilleus is clearly addressing his fantasy of Priam’s fear—he does not know that Priam is afraid, but might well suspect he is— and hence his negative face by showing concern for that fear. By extension, perhaps this address also addresses Priam’s own positive face needs.¹⁶⁴ Thus, which face needs are met by the use of φίλε at any one time seems to depend on the context in which the address is used,

¹⁶⁴ It is not at all clear that Akhilleus responds to his own personal positive face needs, as much of his action in the poem seems to contravene those needs. He does, however, seem to be acutely aware of his own negative face needs as much of the plot of the poem falls out from those needs and the failure of them to be met.

coupled with its ascription of a low degree of social distance to its use. That the same term can address the positive face needs of both speaker and addressee suggests that it, in fact, implies close and mutual social relations.

In the plural, the term in the vocative (φίλοι) appears both as an attributive adjective and as a substantive. As an adjective, as stated, it is found with the ἡγήτορες or ἥρωες. In all of these cases, the speaker is also a member of this group, most often Agamemnon. When used as a substantive, the speaker set is approximately the same, being restricted to the set of Greek or Trojan leaders. The addressee set consists of either the same leaders or the army, these include: βουλήν μεγαθύμων γερόντων, B.56; ἡ πληθὺς, B.299; ὅσοι κεκλήατο βουλήν, K.204; ὅς τε μεσῆεις ὅς τε χειρίτερος, M.269-70; εὔταίρους, N.477; ἐν Ἀργείοισιν, □.787, etc. In all of these cases, the addressee is consistently not in a superior position within the relevant social hierarchy. Based on this statistic, it seems likely that the term, when it is used outside of the family setting (or a setting constructed as familial, e.g., Priam and Helen), is restricted to address to non superiors (see Figure 2, p. 103 below).




Figure 2: A Schematized Social Space
(X axis is *Power*, Y axis is *Distance/Solidarity*)

3.3.4 Δαιμόνιε This form of address (which appears in the singular and plural, masculine and feminine) is in origin the vocative of the adjective δαιμόνιος, η, ον, derived ultimately from the *n*-stem noun δαίμων. In Homer, unlike φίλος, this adjective appears only in the vocative case and only substantivized, never as a modifying adjective. The only really thorough treatment of this form is Brunius-Nilsson.¹⁶⁵ She begins by correctly complaining that most previous scholarship on this term, including attempts at translation, has been hampered by *a priori* assumptions that the meaning of the term must somehow reflect its derivational history from the noun δαίμων. This can be seen, for example in the lexical entries of Cunliffe, Autenrieth and Liddell, Scott and Jones.

Δαιμόνιος, -η [δαίμων]. Under superhuman influence, ‘possessed,’ whose actions are unaccountable or ill-omened.¹⁶⁶

Δαιμόνιος, in Hom. only voc, δαιμόνιε, δαιμονίη, δαιμόνιοι: under the influence of a δαίμων, possessed; used in both good and bad sense, and to be translated according to the situation described in the several passages where it occurs.¹⁶⁷

Δαιμόνιος, α, ον: also ος, ον: of or belonging to a δαίμων: properly miraculous, marvelous, but: I. in Hom. only in voc, δαιμόνιε, -ίη, good sir, or lady, addressed to chiefs or commoners, Il.2.190,200, al., Hes. Th.655: pl., Od.4.774: esp. in addressing strangers, 23.166,174; used by husbands and wives, Il.6.407,486 (Hector and Andromache), 24.194 (Priam to Hecuba)¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Her work is, in fact, the only treatment of the use of the vocative in Homer and as such will furnish our only really useful comparison methodologically.

¹⁶⁶ Cunliffe, Richard, *A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1963, p. 82 (original publication date, 1924).

¹⁶⁷ Autenrieth, Georg, *A Homeric dictionary for schools and colleges*, Translated by Robert P. Keep, Revised by Isaac Flagg, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1958.

¹⁶⁸ Liddell, H. G., Robert Scott and H. Stuart Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, edited by E. A. Barber, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1968.

As Brunius-Nilsson notes in general, all three make immediate and often explicit reference to the adjective's derivational history. One who is addressed as δαίμονι somehow exhibits or is possessed of or by qualities which may be attributed to a δαίμων, although Cunliffe notes that these qualities may be "lost" in the case of some uses.¹⁶⁹ Part of the problem with this approach can be seen at once because, as Brunius-Nilsson points out, there is no universal and consistent use in Homer for the term δαίμων itself. Not all commentaries on the use of this term make specific reference to its derivation but nevertheless all seem to operate from this implicit assumption. In Hooker's commentary to *Iliad* Γ, Helen's address to Aphrodite at Γ.399 is a case in point.

δαίμονι: the use of this word in the voc. shows that the speaker is baffled by the motives of the person addressed. It cannot be translated directly into English. Perhaps it would render the meaning here if Helen were to say: 'I don't understand you.'¹⁷⁰

Although not stated expressly, Hooker's 'baffling motives' are likely an oblique reference to the influence, or appearance of influence, on the addressee of something like a δαίμων. For Kirk, the term here is "ironic" because it is properly applied to a mortal. That is, its function is to compare a mortal to a δαίμων.¹⁷¹

For Brunius-Nilsson, the main problem seems to be one of translation. This can be seen in the title of her concluding chapter "The Question of Translation." For her, the problem is that translators cannot agree on how to interpret the vocative δαίμονι in Homer (e.g., Z.407 as "du Böser Mann," "Hector, you are possessed," and "dear my

¹⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, particularly in the case of Priam's address to Hekabe at Π.194.

¹⁷⁰ Hooker, J. T., *Homer Iliad III, With Introduction, Notes & Vocabulary*, Bristol Classical Press, 1980, p. 68.

¹⁷¹ See, Kirk, 85, p. 321 f. In all these cases, the assumption is that the word has a basic lexical 'meaning' which ascribes some set of characteristics to the noun which it somehow 'modifies' and that that meaning is reflective of the word's diachronics.

lord.”¹⁷²). To be fair, she recognizes a set of theoretical issues lying behind this particular problem, but interpretation in the form of translation is never far out of her sight. The importance of Brunius-Nilsson’s work lies in the fact that she did recognize, early on, that the problems of interpretation arose from one of two problematic strategies. The first was necessarily associating the use of the vocative δαίμονι with the meaning of its derivational source noun δαίμων. Another solution was to set aside associations with the derivational source and focus on how the term δαίμονι was being used. These two strategies resulted, according to Brunius-Nilsson, in great difficulties in interpretation, which she gauged by examining the strategies used by different authors to translate the term δαίμονι.

If one persists in regarding the adjective δαίμονι as firmly linked up with δαίμων, considerable difficulty arises with regard to its interpretation merely owing to the fact that the basic word itself is not clearly defined. ... My method must thus include a psychological appraisal of the situation and an estimate of the role which δαίμονι might be allotted in the context in view.¹⁷³

Another important part of her methodology was to claim that the term did not, as others had decided, reflect some evaluation of the addressee by the speaker, namely that it functioned “*in malam partem* and *in bonam partem* ... as a word of *valuation* in either a pejorative sense or the contradictory.” In the end, however she is forced to conclude that one is¹⁷⁴

justified in seeing in this word —irrespective of the episode in which it occurs— a consistent basic meaning throughout. This basic meaning is neither positive nor negative. The essential characteristic of the word is that it expresses intensity, force —a force of

¹⁷² Brunius-Nilsson, p. 6.

¹⁷³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

¹⁷⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 19, emphasis mine.

the kind realized by a speaker using the *name* of the person addressed ... Δαιμόνιε has the same power of creating this intimate atmosphere and obliging the person addressed to co-operate.¹⁷⁵

Despite the weakness of her theoretical base, which she both simultaneously maintains and abandons above, her conclusions point in a useful direction. Δαιμόνιε, rather than having a basic meaning qua definition, in the common sense, has a meaning which is the instantiation of a relationship between the speakers and their addressees, a relationship which, according to Brunius-Nilsson, is both intimate and obliging. While, we may wish to quibble about specific points, the basic conclusion, formed without a consistent theory of pragmatics, is still pragmatically sound. Thus, Δαιμόνιε, in a way analogous to forms like modern American vernacular *dude*, ‘means’ that it instantiates a social space where a certain kind of talk exchange is possible and appropriate. Let us now look at what kind of a social space this is.

Brunius-Nilsson’s basic methodological problem is that she fails to consider systematically how social space is constructed by interactants, specifically that social space is composed along both a power dimension and an intimacy dimension and that both are negotiable at all times. In (24), we find two parallel speeches with parallel uses of the address δαιμόνιε, but which differ in important ways. Her claim that the term creates an “intimate atmosphere” and obliges the addressee to “co-operate” (above) hints at a tacit understanding of just these dynamics. Kirk also notes a difference in “tone” between the two.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 142.

¹⁷⁶ Kirk, 85, p. 139 *f.*

(24) ὄν τινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη
 τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς·
δαιμόνι· οὐ σε ἔοικε κακὸν ὥς δειδίσσεσθαι,
 ἀλλ' αὐτός τε κάθησο καὶ ἄλλους ἵδρυσε λαούς·
 οὐ γάρ πω σάφα οἶσθ' οἷος νόος Ἀτρείωνος·
 νῦν μὲν πειρᾶται, τάχα δ' ἵψεται υἱᾶς Ἀχαιῶν.
 ἐν βουλῇ δ' οὐ πάντες ἀκούσαμεν οἷον ἔειπε.
 μή τι χολωσάμενος ῥέξῃ κακὸν υἱᾶς Ἀχαιῶν·
 θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων,
 τιμὴ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐστὶ, φιλεῖ δέ ἐ μητίετα Ζεὺς.
 ὃν δ' αὖ δῆμον τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι,
 τὸν σκῆπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ·
δαιμόνι· ἀτρέμας ἦσο καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε,
 οἱ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι, σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἀναλκις
 οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ·
 οὐ μὲν πῶς πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί·
 οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω,
 εἷς βασιλεύς, ὃ δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω
 σκῆπτρόν τ' ἡδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσι βουλεύησι.
 ὥς ὁ γὰρ κοιρανέων δίεπε στρατόν

Whatever *basileus*, whatever outstanding man he came upon,
 he would stand beside him and speak to him with soft words
 “δαιμόνιε, its not fitting that *kakon* frighten you in this way,
 but hold yourself up, and settle the host down.
 You just don’t yet see clearly the Atrian’s plan.
 Just now he’ll test them and quickly he’ll beat down the sons of the Akhaians
 — We did not all hear in council what he said —
 so he won’t get pissed off and do some harm to the sons of the Akhaians.
 The mind of Zeus-nurtured *basileis* is great.
 But his *timê* is from Zeus and the counselor god loves him.”
 Whenever he saw a common man and found him crying-out
 he would hit him with his *skeptron* and reproach him with a *muthos*.
 “δαιμόνιε, calm down and sit down and listen to the *muthos* of others
 who are your betters. You are not a warrior but a coward.
 You’re never of account, either in battle or in the *boulê*.
 There’s no way for all of us Akhaians to act as *basileis*.
 there’s no good in democracy. Let there be one man be in charge,
 one man *basileus*, the one to whom the child of crooked-councilled Kronos gave
 the *skeptron* and the established judgments.”
 This is how he went throughout the camp and gathered the men up.

In book B.188 ff., Odysseus has been asked by Athene to rally the troops after Agamemnon’s disastrous test of their resolve. In doing so, he makes two parallel speeches, one to ὄν τινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη and the other to ὃν δ' αὖ δῆμον τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι. Prior to both speeches, the intended addressee is characterized by the narrator. The first address is made to the group which consists of

men who are called by the poet βασιλεῖς and outstanding ἄνδρες. Men of the other group are described as ‘of the *demos*’ and ‘crying out.’ As the membership of these two groups of potential addressees is different, so the treatment of members of each group is also different. When Odysseus finds a βασιλεὺς καὶ ἔξοχος ἄνηρ, he stands close to him and that man is addressed with soft (ἀγανὰ) words. When he finds a man δήμου, he beats him with the scepter —the very symbol of Agamemnon’s supreme authority— and reproaches him with a *muthos*.¹⁷⁷ Odysseus’ rhetoric also distinguishes the two groups. The first group are not to act frightened; they are to control themselves and their men, and they are not to jump to conclusions since they don’t really know what either Agamemnon or Zeus is planning. The second group are to sit down, shut up and listen to their betters. In essence, the two groups are to perform the same acts, but the language in which these actions are couched differs strongly. The former group are to control αὐτόν τε καὶ ἄλλους. That is they are to obey authority and in turn exercise authority. Each member of the latter group is only to obey authority: ἥσο καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε.

Odysseus’ speech is about authority and knowing one’s proper place in the chain of authority at the top of which, by virtue of his exercising of authority, he seems to place himself.¹⁷⁸ Importantly, the former group is given special knowledge not imparted to the latter (νῦν μὲν πειρᾶται, τάχα δ’ ἵπεται υἱᾶς Ἀχαιῶν). The physical treatment of members of each group is different, and so Odysseus’ demands of them are different —if complementary. Nevertheless, members of both groups are addressed as δαιμόνιε. This

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Martin, Richard P., *The Language of Heroes*, Cornell University Press, 1989 for a discussion of the importance of the term *muthos* in Homer.

¹⁷⁸ Odysseus’ authority to make these demands comes from Athene, not Agamemnon, so the precise position of Odysseus vis-à-vis Agamemnon in the chain of command is unclear at this point. Agamemnon commands the army (with Zeus’ help), but Odysseus is acting under the direct authority of Athene.

suggests that the address does not formally or directly reflect either social rank or the speaker's temper towards the addressee. Δαιμόνιε is equally felicitous whether for a general or a grunt, whether for soft words or a drubbing.

That this form of address does not directly reflect relative social rank can be further illustrated by looking at its use in Diomedes' address to Agamemnon at l.40 f.

- (25) Δαιμόνι' οὐτῶ που μάλα ἔλπεαι υἱᾶς Ἀχαιῶν
ἀπτολέμους τ' ἔμεναι καὶ ἀνάλκιδας ὥς ἀγορεύεις
l.40
- “Δαιμόνιε, do you really expect the sons of the Akhaians
to be as un-warrior-like, as cowardly as you suggest?”

Thus, this form of address is as fitting for Agamemnon as for a δῆμον τ' ἀνδρί. This fact, again, points out how formal, institutional social position does not determine the appropriateness of this term. Now we should note that in the above cases, and others, the context involves speakers reproaching or otherwise criticizing their addressees; however, as Brunius-Nilsson notes, there are cases where reproach or criticism is clearly not part of the contextual matrix in which the address takes place.

An example of this is found at Z.482 ff. Here, Hektor addresses his wife, Andromakhe and attempts to console her in preparation for his imminent return to battle. Prior to this address, she has faulted him for not pitying her or their son whom Hektor's death will leave bereft and ultimately at the mercy of the Greeks.¹⁷⁹

- (26) ὥς εἰπὼν ἀλόχοιο φίλης ἐν χερσὶν ἔθηκε
παῖδ' ἐόν· ἦ δ' ἄρα μιν κηῶδαι δέξατο κόλπῳ
δακρυόεν γελάσασα· πόσις δ' ἐλέησε νοήσας,
χειρὶ τέ μιν κατέρεξε νῆπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζε·
δαιμονίη μή μοί τι λίην ἀκαχίζω θυμῷ·
οὐ γάρ τίς μ' ὑπὲρ αἴσαν ἀνὴρ Ἄϊδι προΐαψαι·
Z.482

¹⁷⁹ In this speech, Hektor is also addressed as δαιμόνιε.

μοῖραν δ' οὐ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν,
οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα γένηται.
ἀλλ' εἰς οἶκον ἰοῦσα τὰ σ' αὐτῆς ἔργα κόμιζε
ἱστόν τ' ἡλακάτην τε, καὶ ἀμφιπόλοισι κέλευε
ἔργον ἐποίχεσθαι· πόλεμος δ' ἀνδρεσσι μελήσει
πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ' ἐμοί, τοῖ Ἰλίῳ ἐγγεγάασιν.

So he spoke and put in the hands of his dear wife
his child. And she took him to her sweet breast
and shed a tear. But her husband pitied her when he saw this
and caressed her with his hand and spoke to her and addressed her.
“Δαιμονίη, don’t grieve for me so much in your heart,
no man will cast me to Hades unless that is what is fated.
It’s my position that no man has ever escaped his fate,
not a coward, nor a hero, once it has first been set in motion.¹⁸⁰
So go into the house and take care of your own work,
the loom and the weaving and get the servants ready
to do their work; let this war be the concern of men
all of them who live in Ilion, but especially me.”

Hektor’s address here is difficult to construe as reproachful. The choice of whether to live or die is out of his hands and only fate will be able to kill him now. She should take comfort from this and go back to work. We may well read Hektor’s speech as sadly ironic, but are we to read him as intending it as scolding? There is no ascription of blame to Andromache for anything; her ‘error’ only has repercussions for her. His request of Andromakhe calls for a (re)turn to a *status quo*. The implication of Hektor’s speech is that nothing has, in fact, changed, and, if nothing has changed, that he is not about to die. This should be the source of Andromakhe’s comfort, the *status quo*, that his speech promises. Nevertheless, the form of Hektor’s address, if not its function, is a corrective; not fear and lament, rather *status quo*. If there is a disjunction between form and function in discourse (as is suggested by Grice’s explanation of the origins of *conversational implicatures*), then the use of δαιμονίη here might well simply follow the form of

¹⁸⁰ Kirk, 90, suggests: “when once he has been born,” p. 224. This reading depends on whether or not one takes τὰ πρῶτα as the subject of γένηται or not.

In examining Brunius-Nilsson's self-defined problematic examples of the use of δαίμονιαι (Z.486, □.194, ξ.443), all three involve relationships (Hektor and Andromakhe, Priam and Hekabe, Odysseus and Eumaios) which are otherwise marked by fairly low degrees of social distance. Let us examine, then, the second example.

And he went down into the chamber himself, with its vaulted
lofty roof, smelling of cedar, which contained many gem-stones,
and he called out to his wife Hekabe and spoke to her
“Δαίμονι, an Olympian messenger came to me from Zeus
to go to the Akhaian ships and free our son,

111

I'm to bring gifts to Akhilleus to persuade him.
But come on now, tell me, what do you think?
because this is really important and my desire and my mind compel me to
go to the ships and the wide camp of the Akhaians.”

What unites all of these examples is not either reproach or formal hierarchical position, but rather the fact that in all three instances, the speaker's expectations or hopes have somehow been unmet or contradicted by some aspect of the preceding state of affairs. In this last example, there is clearly no attempt on Priam's part to reproach or criticize Hekabe. In fact, he appears to ask her advice about what he has been told to do (τόδε εἶπε τί τοι φρεσὶν εἶδεται εἶναι).

Thus, δαίμονι in □.194 seems to reflect not Priam's surprise at Hekabe, but at what he has been told to do, namely go to the enemy camp in time of war and ask the man who has killed his son for his son's body. Although the term clearly shows grammatical agreement—in terms of gender and number—with the implied antecedent Ἑκάβη, functionally it does not seem to reflect any evaluation or characterization of that addressee but of the content of the subsequent message. In this way, it seems to function analogously to English evaluative particles like *man* or *shit*. However, by virtue of its very grammatical agreement marking, this form is not *formally* a particle, but a vocative noun-phrase.¹⁸² In this way, δαίμονι functions at □.194 in a way similar to that found in the other cases we have examined. That is to say, the vocative address, while agreeing formally with the addressee, seems to function to reflect the speaker's evaluation of the state of affairs which prompted that address, a state of affairs which is unexpected (and perhaps (but not necessarily) undesired. That the term responds directly to the context, to

¹⁸² It is cases like this, which call into question the value of formal categories over functional ones in linguistic descriptions. However this topic lies well beyond the scope of this work.

the state of affairs, which precipitated the utterance in which it is found, and not to any characterization of the addressee qua person, is at the heart of the problems noted by Brunius-Nilsson. Thus, in Homer's use of δαίμονιε we can begin to see exactly how discrete, formal categories like *particle* or *vocative NP* are functionally difficult to maintain.

3.3.5 Hapax Legomena While not a formal category, the other set of epithets which seem clearly to be necessarily situational are a small set of *hapax legomena*. Since these forms appear only once, it is harder, although not impossible, to argue that they are formulaic, and it seems also more likely, although by no means provable, that they are *ad hoc* creations of the poet. Chief among these are a number of terms used by Akhilleus to characterize Agamemnon in Book I. In response to Agamemnon's seemingly irrational anger and the imminent danger of his actions which come in response to being told he must return the daughter of the priest, Khryses in order to stave off Apollo's plague, Akhilleus addresses him at A.122 as φιλοκτεανώτατε. It is possible that such an epithet existed as part of the poet's inherited folk vocabulary, his *Kunstsprache* —in which case it would have been a generic epithet, potentially applicable to any number of characters and simply fails to reappear in the text. But this epithet, as it is used here, does not merely take the place of the name of the character addressed and fill some needed metrical space (in the way that semantically bleached epithets like ποδάρκης δῖος are claimed to). Since the adjective φιλοκτεανώτατε fits the context so well and since it appears nowhere else, it seems very unlikely that it was ever used —whenever it was created— as a generic *ornamental* epithet. That is, it is not used as if Agamemnon were φιλοκτεανώτατος in the same way that Akhilleus is ποδάρκης and δῖος. Although there

is no way to prove that φιλοκτεανώτατε is the invention of the poet of the *Iliad*, there is, similarly, no evidence to support any claim that it is anything other than his invention, coined to fit this specific instance. However, when Agamemnon states that he is in essence willing to play the wellbeing of the whole Greek army off against his desire for γέρατα, for Akhilleus to then characterize him as φιλοκτεανώτατος is difficult to reconcile with the notion that the term is empty of semantic content, i.e., *ornamental* in Parry's sense. The meaning just is too well suited to the context. It is not that Agamemnon is somehow eternally φιλοκτεανώτατος (Akhilleus would have been unlikely to have followed him to Troy had he been¹⁸³), it is that he is φιλοκτεανώτατος specifically here. Akhilleus' use of the term to address Agamemnon at A.122 corresponds, and seems to be a response directly to his behavior and his rhetoric. That this term does not serve simply as a metrically determined essentialization of Agamemnon is supported when we examine two similar addresses for Agamemnon one containing this term and one not. Friedrich Rainer has pointed out the strong parallelism between:¹⁸⁴

(28) Ἄτρεΐδη κύδιστε φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων A.122

and

(29) Ἄτρεΐδη κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον T.146, κ.τ.λ.

The parallel between these two full line addresses is striking. Since, it is clear that a verse like (29) was available to the poet, his use of (28) at A.122 cannot be attributed to

¹⁸³ Akhilleus will make just this point at A.149 ff.

¹⁸⁴ Rainer Friedrich, " 'Flaubertian Homer' The *Phrase Juste* in Homeric Diction," *Arion*, 102, 2002 p. 1 ff.

the constraints of meter alone but must reflect his desire to present Akhilleus as characterizing Agamemnon in this way, at this point in their ongoing discourse. The term is not simply a metrically determined equivalent for ‘Agamemnon.’ Freidrich has argued that T.146 reflects an established formulaic address for Agamemnon and that the address found at A.122 (28) acknowledges that formulaic address and responds to it. It seems, in fact, that in (28), Akhilleus is contrasting Agamemnon’s own version of himself as Ἀτρεΐδης κύδιστος, with his contextual spin on Agamemnon’s persona as φιλοκτεανώτατος πάντων, a version which is based on his perception of Agamemnon’s current behavior. Akhilleus contrasts Agamemnon’s version of himself (Ἀτρεΐδης κύδιστος) with his perception of Agamemnon’s actions (φιλοκτεανώτατος πάντων).

We can see something similar at work at Γ.39 *ff.* When Hektor catches hold of Paris as he attempts to avoid the consequences of his own challenge at Γ.19-20, he addresses him as Δύσπαρι, “Paris you asshole.”¹⁸⁵ Hektor’s address to his brother seems to reflect a number of situational and social factors. Paris is his brother. He has made a challenge to the Greeks (Γ.19, Ἀργείων προκαλίζετο πάντας ἀρίστους) which has been accepted but the man who has accepted the challenge is Paris’ *ekhthros*, his personal enemy, a man for whom he had violated the customs of hospitality (*Xenia*). Now Paris, upon seeing that Menalaos is the one who has taken his challenge up, has skulked off to hide among the other Trojan soldiers (Γ.32, ἄψ δ’ ἐτάρων εἰς ἔθνος ἐχάζετο), and looks pale with fear (Γ.35, ὥχρος τέ μιν εἶλε παρειάς) like a man who has seen a snake (Γ.33,

¹⁸⁵ While this address form actually appears twice in the poem, here and at N.769, its rarity and aptness suggest that it may profitably be addressed here. Brian Joseph (personal correspondence) has suggested that this formation may represent a colloquial usage which has crept into the text.

ὥς δ' ὅτε τίς τε δράκοντα ἰδών). Hektor's address seems to reflect all of these factors: Paris' foolish, perhaps hubristic challenge, his subsequent cowardice, the resulting shame Hektor seems to feel.¹⁸⁶

Similar, although weaker, claims can be made for the adjectives κυνῶπα at A.159 and οἰνοβαρές at A.225. These forms are also *hapax legomena*. Terms like *dog-faced* and *wine-heavy*, however, do not seem suited specifically to their context in the way that φιλοκτεανώτατε was at A.122, and thus these terms seem to function like insults with a more general applicability, in a way analogous to contemporary English *putz* or *asshole*.¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, in the context of a publicly performed and personal feud —one which is spiraling out of control and which will penultimately result in near-regicide— such forms are clearly not contextually non-reflective, semantically bleached epithets, they don't mean in essence 'Agamemnon' and no more; they actively characterize him. Such adjectives could conceivably be applied to other characters in a way that ποδάρκης never could, but only in the appropriate context. That is, Akhilleus is ποδάρκης even when he is sitting in his tent, but Agamemnon is κυνῶπα, and οἰνοβαρές only in the context of a verbal fight. That the applicable contexts for their use is so limited compared with that for *ornamental* adjectives is supported by their failure to appear elsewhere in the corpus of Homeric poetry. Furthermore, as I have discussed (Chapter 1), since Iliadic culture is characterized by the poet as one in which social position is based to a high degree on the display of authority —which is achieved through both self presentation and also the presentation of tokens of status— terms which label one as

¹⁸⁶ Γ.38, τὸν δ' Ἐκτωρ νείκεσεν ἰδὼν αἰσχροῖς ἐπέεσσιν.

¹⁸⁷ Since they are less context-specific and have wider potential applicability, they seem, therefore, more likely to be inherited.

‘ugly’ and ‘drunken’ are likely to appear as highly charged terms and hence are probably unsuitable for more general, merely metrically determined application.¹⁸⁸ These terms, as insults, are fitted specifically to the particular context of insulting, angry speech such as Akhilleus’ and Agamemnon’s discourse has developed into at this point in the text.

The above examples would seem to indicate that at least some forms of address are reflective of the pragmatics of the situation in which they are said by the poet to be uttered. That is to say, they are subject to both pragmatic and metrical constraints on their use. However, there are a number of address forms which show greater widespread currency and greater metrical conditioning; I will turn to these in the next chapter.

3.4 The Sociolinguistics of Address We have seen how some forms of address are clearly more sensitive to pragmatic factors like context than was originally allowed in the strictest formulation of Parry’s theory of oral poetry. In Parry and Lord’s conception, the ‘essential idea’ and meter determined which form the poet chose. Parry’s conception of *essential idea* comes close to doubling for *lexical meaning* but is even more restricted, in a way which is not clearly articulated but seems to approximate *token identity*. Thus what is *essential* about Argives, Akhaians, or Danaans is that they are not Trojans or Trojan allies —although it is possible that such a distinction might actually be important in some contexts. Nor is it always true that a contrast with Trojans is at issue in the context in which these words are found. To be sure, these three terms are metrically distinct (thence in complementary distribution) and Homer never seems to exploit the distinction between them beyond metrical necessity. However, within the context of the

¹⁸⁸ For the essentializing nature of one’s physical appearance we can compare Homer’s description of Thersites at B.211 ff. and his subsequent treatment at the hands of Odysseus. Note that Thersites’ critique of Agamemnon is nearly identical to that of Akhilleus.

Iliad, the distinctions between people based on political or national affiliations within the Greek camp, although mentioned frequently, does not seem to be an issue, although it could have been. That is, disputes between characters do not arise out of nor are they based openly on political affiliation or national identity. Akhilleus does not challenge Agamemnon because he is Myceaan, but because of his actions. Homer does have Nestor acknowledge the possibility for Iliadic characters to make such distinctions an issue at B.362ff. Here he suggests dividing the army up by tribe (φῦλον) and *phretria* (φρήτρι) because they will fight better this way.¹⁸⁹ Thus national identity could translate into political affiliation within the Greek camp, but it doesn't.

We have also seen that some forms of address do reflect, or are sensitive to the social relationship which exists between speaker and addressee. Terms like πατήρ and τέκνον are reflective of specific institutional, social relationships between speaker and addressee. This is unlike the case for τέκος in Homer or πατήρ in later Greek, where these terms are used as address in the case of relationships which are analogous in terms of *Distance* and *Power* to that of the parent/child relationship, but are not limited in their scope by the institutional social relationships of the family. These terms perform the relationships they name at the point that they are used as forms of address. This is perhaps most clearly seen at Γ.172 where Helen addresses Priam as ἐκυρὲ. Her address serves to instantiate a form of family bond between them, as she then explains, since she

¹⁸⁹ Actually, it is not clear what Nestor means here exactly by ὡς φρήτρι φρήτριφιν ἀρήγει, φύλα δὲ φύλοις, but the implication seems to be that individual members of these designations will 'back up,' ἀρήγειν, their own. Akhilleus' own acknowledgement at A.153ff. that he has not come to Troy because the Trojans ever invaded Phthia, but out of loyalty to Agamemnon suggests that such a distinction between Phthian and non Phthian could be an issue, but that that issue is overruled in this case by his oath to Agamemnon, an oath which he is now prepared to set aside due to Agamemnon's behavior.

has lost her γνωτούς, παῖδα, and ὀμηλικήν.¹⁹⁰ Hermes' use of πάτερ at Π.362 also seems to invoke a relationship analogous to that of parent and child. In this use, the term πάτερ comes closest to its later use as an honorific, as LSJ states, similar to ἄπφα and ἄττα.¹⁹¹

In this chapter, we have begun to see how the semantic reduction or bleaching implicit in Parry's use of the term *essential idea* need not always be the case. Even when meter is an issue in the choice of form —as between τέκνον and τέκος— clear semantic differences can be seen when we look at the contexts in which certain forms are found over against others. The need to question Parry's notion of the essential idea becomes even more clear when we examine cases where meter cannot be established as an only rubric for the poet's choice. Thus, forms of address which appear only once in the text, *hapax legomena*, seemed particularly prone to a context sensitive reading, as the comparison between A.122 (28) and Υ.146 (29) above suggests. Example (28) especially highlights how, in formulating an address, both token identity and psychosocial factors related to context —as I defined it in the previous chapter (see Table 2.1, p. 39)— are represented in the choice of form used, even in Homer. Agamemnon is φιλοκτεανώτατε not because he is Agamemnon [] [] [] [] [] [],¹⁹² but because *here* Akhilleus is angry with him and that anger is presented as reflecting Akhilleus' critique of Agamemnon's greed, a greed which is expressed at the expense of his own army's well being. That is, φιλοκτεανώτατε reflects Akhilleus' feelings about Agamemnon, or

¹⁹⁰ Andromakhe will make a similar claim of Hektor at Z.441, this time within a preexisting relationship of husband and wife.

¹⁹¹ The latter is used by Akhilleus for Phouinix at I.607, and at R.561, and in the *Odyssey*.

¹⁹² It is likely that, in fact, the address is φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων and the poet needs to fill a space with the shape [] [] [] [] [] [] [].

his representation of those feelings and not Agamemnon's identity qua 'Agamemnon.' It is in this way that forms like φιλοκτεανώτατος differ from forms like ποδάρκης in being non-essentializing, but pragmatic, and in particular, in reflecting the psychosocial roles of individual speakers to their specific addressees in specific settings for specific reasons.

CHAPTER 4

PATRONYMICS AND GIVEN NAMES IN DIRECT ADDRESS

φθέγγεο δ' ἣ κεν ἴησθα καὶ ἐγρήγορθαι ἄνωχθι
πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον,
πάντας κυδαίνων· μηδὲ μεγαλίζεο θυμῷ, K.66

*“Give a shout wherever you go and order them to wake up
by naming each man by the ancestry of his father
and so giving all their kudos, and don’t take a haughty tone with them.”*

4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. The System of Greek Patronymics

4.1.2. Parry-Lord Thesis Revisited

4.2. Address by Name, Address by Title

4.2.1. Akhilleus

4.2.2. Agamemnon and Menalaos

4.2.3. Diomedes

4.3. Conclusion

4.1 Introduction In this chapter, I will proceed with an examination of the use of the vocative forms of characters’ given names and patronymics. I will argue that they function not only in terms of structuring the discourse vis-à-vis their ability to reference the identity of some specific addressee, but in respect to their potential as markers of the speaker’s attitude towards that addressee and/or the content of his discourse, i.e., their sociolinguistic function. I will look at how and when forms of address differ for the same

addressee. Specifically, is there a pragmatic or specifically social motivation for the choice of one form of address over another? In general, I will look at how these names can be shown to mark the speaker's beliefs about his relationship to the addressee, either to confirm a preexisting relationship or to attempt to renegotiate it. In particular, I will suggest that choice of name for address reflects primarily the social aspect of the psychosocial complex of speaker/addressee interaction. All of this, of course, should take place within the context of the Iliadic speaker's social setting and within the context of the specific discourse. As forms of address ordinarily 'in the world,'¹⁹³ represent the nexus of speaker, addressee, physical setting, social setting and discourse setting, do they function similarly in the world of the *Iliad*, or have they been bleached of all but their token identification function? That is, while forms of address like φιλοκτεανώτατε now seem to reflect something of the speakers' feelings about their relationship to their addressees, can names, given that addressees often have multiple names and titles, reflect pragmatically conditioned aspects of the context and signal speaker beliefs about that context or do they reflect only the essential idea of the addressee, their lexical or token identification?

In the preceding chapter, we have examined several facts concerning address. First, we saw that forms of address serve other functions in the discourse beyond merely identifying the intended addressee(s) like marking various kinds of emphasis, second that formal (grammatical) categorization does not necessarily correspond to function, and third, that forms of address, rather than reflecting a strict personal identity, were often subject to social and situational constraints on use, that is, they functioned pragmatically.

¹⁹³ Often referred to as *natural language*.

Thus, forms of address are now seen, even in Homer, to play a complex part in the developing discourse of the speeches in which they occur. Rather than simply marking identity, they function to organize both the space of the discourse and the social space of the participants in that discourse.

We saw that formally generic epithets like τέκος and πάτερ on the one hand and hapaxes like φιλοκτεανώτατε and οἰνοβαρές on the other, while not lexically specifying identity, nevertheless do make claims about identity, but that identity is a social one. Thus, while τέκνον and τέκος both reflect social relations based on that of parent and child, they do not construct the same relationships; while τέκνον constructs a parental relationship, τέκος constructs a paternal one. Both invoke the αἰδώς of the parent/child relationship, both from the perspective of the parent-figure as speaker, but differently; the former characterizes the addressee as *their* child, the latter as *a* child. We saw that πάτερ when used of Priam —or Laertes in the *Odyssey*— can seem to address addressees' face needs by associating them obliquely with Zeus.

Hapax address forms like φιλοκτεανώτατε and οἰνοβαρές seem to function to define the situational relationship between the speaker and the addressee and not some eternal, internal, personal identity. Agamemnon is not eternally φιλοκτεανώτατος, as Akhilleus' address to him at T.156 shows, but he is declared to be so at A.122. Akhilleus address defines him *eo tempore* and *in situ* not *in perpetuum*. In this way, an address like οἰνοβαρές seems to differ from one like Ἀτρεΐδη.

Finally, the case of δαιμόνιε highlighted the problematics of even the basic notion that forms of address necessarily characterize, if not specifically identify, the addressee to whom they refer. It was seen that δαιμόνιε, rather than characterizing the addressee (with

whom the form formally agreed) but defined the state of affairs as the speaker viewed it. In this case, the formal categories of vocative address and interjection begin to collide. In this chapter, I will explore whether forms of address which formally identify the addressees' personal identity, specifically names and titles, do not have a wider range of pragmatically determined functions as well.

Although Parry's model of economy of expression has proven for the most part resilient, cracks in the façade are clearly in evidence. As I will discuss more fully in this chapter, David Shive has shown that characters, especially important characters like Akhilleus, may be named or otherwise identified by a plurality of metrically equivalent expressions which he refers to as *equivalencies*.¹⁹⁴ Akhilleus, for example, may be addressed line initially not only by the address ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ (e.g., A.74, Π.214, etc.) but also as Πηλεΐδη (e.g., Υ.200, 431, etc.).¹⁹⁵ Given Parry's model of composition, in which the poet was constrained by having only one term for one use for one position, what are we to make of Shive's findings? Why should the poet of the *Iliad* employ two forms for the same character which were in every way interchangeable?

One possibility is that the two terms function as parts of other formulaic complexes and therefore came for free with those 'matrix' formulae. It is true, that each of these forms appears in larger formular phrases in some of their uses (twice each).

- | | | |
|-----|---|-------|
| (1) | ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ Πηληϊός υἱὲ μέγα φέρτατ' Ἀχαιῶν | Π.21 |
| | Πηλεΐδη μὴ δὴ ἐπέεσσὶ με νηπύτιον ὥς | Υ.200 |
| | ἔλπεο δειδίζεσθαι, ἐπεὶ σάφα οἶδα καὶ αὐτὸς | |
| | ἡμὲν κερτομίας ἡδ' αἴσυλα μυθήσασθαι. | |
| | □ □, Πηλεΐδη πάντων ἐκπαγλότατ' ἀνδρῶν, | Α.146 |

¹⁹⁴ Shive, David M., *Naming Achilles*, Oxford University Press, 1987.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 151.

The first and last of these clearly represent longer and more probably formulaic addresses. The second represents a repeated discourse and may or may not be, in the strict sense, formulaic. However, such a line of reasoning does not take into account the remaining cases (three each) which are not formulaic and has the effect of only pushing the choice between forms back onto ‘the tradition.’ Thus, the appeal to traditional formulae only really explains six of the occurrences and leaves the other six unaccounted for.

As we will see, the actual use of these metrical equivalents, as we find them in Homer, seems to violate the principle of economy which lies at the heart of Parry’s model. The obvious answer is that, at least in line initial position, these forms were *not* interchangeable. Since appeals to meter cannot account for the distribution of forms, some other consideration had to have driven the poet’s choice of term of address, at least in this position. Given examples like A.73 and Φ .153 above, and others catalogued by Shive,¹⁹⁶ once we have established these facts, namely, that in certain cases meter alone could not have been the only deciding factor in the choice of epithet, these examples immediately raise a more fundamental question to be raised: whether meter alone *ever* was the sole deciding factor in determining which form of address the poet employed at any point in his work. In order to begin to form a hypothesis about the poet’s choice of name for Akhilleus, we will begin by looking at the forms of address for Agamemnon.

¹⁹⁶ See, for example, Tables 4.2 and 4.4 below.

Adam Parry in his now famous work, *Language and Characterization in Homer*, cites *Iliad* A.7 (2) as an important line for the discussion of epic diction.¹⁹⁷

(2) Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς

As Parry notes, this line contains no elements that are foreign to that diction. Every word, every phrase in the line is well represented in other lines within the Homeric corpus. However, he goes on to note that the line itself is unusual nevertheless. Although the choice of elements is traditional, their arrangement is not. Specifically, the phrase ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν appears in this position, after the penthemimeral caesura, in no other line in epic. The unusual placement of this phrase, Parry claims, draws attention to it, and thereby to the line that contains it. It is as if the poet, by using this particular arrangement, were drawing our attention to the line and thence to its contents. This poem will be about a contest yes, but an unusual one; a contest between Agamemnon, the commander of the whole Greek army (ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν) and Akhilleus his most important warrior (δῖος).

This is what the line says, and yet, it is not what it says. For the contest is not going to be one between Agamemnon and Akhilleus but between the *son of Atreus* and Akhilleus. Parry fails to mention this distinction, presumably, because it is a trivial one. After all, Milman Parry had demonstrated that the choice of appellation for Agamemnon, as for any character, between the given name, e.g., Ἀγαμέμνων, and the patronymic Ἀτρεΐδης was a decision based on metrical considerations alone and not on semantic ones. The two terms, Ἀτρεΐδης being a choriambic, and Ἀγαμέμνων an ionic metron,

¹⁹⁷ In Parry, Adam, “The Language of Achilles,” in *The Language of Achilles and Other Papers*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. It should be noted, that Parry does not reject outright his father’s conclusions about the essentializing effects on content of Homer’s formulaic *Kuntzsprache*.

are in complementary metrical distribution. One cannot simply be substituted for the other without affecting the meter of the rest of the line. The choice between the two is, according to Milman Parry, thus, driven by metrical necessity alone and hence any possible distinction of meaning is necessarily bleached. In essence, the two names mean the same thing, i.e., Agamemnon. This is what we are to believe, and Milman Parry's evidence in support of this argument is a compelling one.¹⁹⁸

4.1.1 The System of Greek Patronymics Unlike what Dickey has found for Attic Greek, there were two common ways of referring to characters in the Homeric epics —what Dickey after others calls *nomenclature*, their given name and their patronymic. In Homer, these two forms of nomenclature are used with approximately equal frequency.¹⁹⁹ The term *patronymic* is used here as a cover term to refer to any nominal formation that is used to refer to a person or god, which at the same time signals their patrilineal descent.²⁰⁰ It need not refer to the referent's father specifically, as in the case of Orestes whose patronymic in Homer is given as both Ἀτρεΐδης (*Odyssey* α.30) and Ἀγαμέμνονιδης (*Odyssey*. α.40), but whose father was, strictly speaking, Agamemnon. In Homeric Greek there are three basic ways of forming patronymic noun phrases (NPs). The most straightforward method involves the use of a noun phrase consisting of some inflected form of the word for 'son,' υἱός, plus the genitive of the father's name, e.g.,

¹⁹⁸ See especially Parry, Milman, *The Making of Homeric Verse*, Oxford University Press, 1971; Lord, A., *The Singer of Tales*, Harvard University Press, 1960.

¹⁹⁹ Dickey, Eleanor, *Greek Forms of Address from Herodotus to Lucian*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996. Dickey uses the term *first name* (FN) for what I am terming *given name*, after standard sociolinguistic practice, pp. 44-45.

²⁰⁰ For a brief but thorough discussion, see Smyth §§845-850.

Πηλέος υἱός etc. Not strictly patronymic is a related use of υἱός in the phrase υἱὲς Ἀχαιῶν, which, in essence, stands for Ἀχαιοί, and so might better be termed a *phylonymic* or an *ethnonymic*.

One thing which stands out at once is that only mortal characters are addressed in this fashion, although parallel to this formation are addresses like θύγατερ μέγαλοιο Κρόνιοιο for Here (□.194, 243). The other formations used as patronymics rather than being noun phrases, consist of single, morphologically complex lexical items.²⁰¹

CHARACTER	FATHER	LOC
Ἀγαμέμνων	Ἀτρέος	B.23, 60, Z.46, Λ. 131,
Μενέλαος	<i>idem</i>	δ.543 ²⁰²
Πάνδαρος	Λυκάονος	Δ.93
Μενεσθεύς	Πετεῶο	Δ.338
Διομήδης	Τύδεος	E.277, Z.46, Λ.200, Θ.152, K.159, 509,
Σῶχος	Ἰππάσου	Λ.450
Μηριόνης	Μόλου	N.249
Ἔκτωρ	Πριάμοιο	O.244
Ἀχιλλεύς	Πηλέος	Π.21, 203, Σ.18, T.216, Υ.2, Χ.8, 250

Table 4.1: Characters Addressed as Genitive of Father + υἱέ

4.1.1.1 Stems ἰδης, -άδης, -ιάδης, -ίων and κώνα. By far the most common patronymic formation consists of a masculine *a*-stem derivative in -(ι)δης. The origin of these forms is taken to be from an original *d*-stem, e.g., ἐλπίς, ἐλπί-δ-ος; Πάρις, Πάρι-δ-ος. And φυγὰς, φυγά-δ-ος. A number of these athematic *d*-stems indicate what Buck translates roughly as, ‘territory of X,’ e.g., Θηβαῖς ‘land of Thebes.’ These, when applied by transfer to refer to a female person, are used as a feminine polyonymic

²⁰¹ Zeus is regularly addressed as Ζεῦ, Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ζεῦ ἄνα, Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε, or Κρονίδη.

²⁰² On the significance of the distribution of forms of address for Menelaos, see below.

‘woman of Thebes.’²⁰³ Thus, at least some of these *d*-stems functioned to indicate some relationship between the referent and the root, e.g., φαρμακίς, ‘witch,’ from φάρμακον. Some of these, like Ἀτλαντίς, ‘daughter of Atlas,’ are used as feminine patronymics. It is likely then that the masculine *a*-stem patronymics in -ίδης, -άδης, and -ιάδης, are derived forms such as these. Note, however, that these later formations are, in Homer, used strictly as patronymics. We do not find forms like *Αργίδης meaning an ‘Argive man.’ In Homer, these forms function strictly to indicate ancestral affiliations.²⁰⁴

Related functionally but not morphologically to these are a series of patronymic *n*-stems, like Κρονίων, Κρονίονος/ Κρονίωνος, ‘son of Kronos,’ or related thematized patronymics like Τελαμωνίος, ‘son of Telamon.’ And finally there is a hybrid type represented, for example, by forms like Τελαμωνιάδης, also ‘son of Telamon.’ These forms are in origin probably derived from a set of original agent nouns in *-iôn, and so related to stems in -ion in Latin (e.g., *histrion*, ‘actor,’ or *ludio*, ‘player’) but otherwise unattested in Greek.²⁰⁵ Another possibility we might consider is that these forms are related to comparative/intensive adjectives in *-is-ôn, e.g., ἡδίων, ἡδίονος, ‘sweeter.’²⁰⁶ This latter type of patronymic is relatively rare.

²⁰³ Buck, C., *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, University of Chicago Press, 1933, p. 340.

²⁰⁴ In post Homeric Greek, these forms no longer carry the patronymic significance and simply serve as names, cf. names like *McDonald* which no longer means strictly ‘son of Donald’ (technically a borrowing from Scotts Gaelic).

²⁰⁵ See Buck, p 311, *ff.*, especially pp. 321-322.

²⁰⁶ See here, Sihler, A., *A New Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 356, *ff.*

4.1.2 The Parry-Lord Thesis Revisited

William Parry's idea of metrical economy was a simple one, namely that for every 'essential idea,' there was at most one form for each applicable grammatical category —say *case* or *person/tense*, for each metrical slot in the hexameter line. Thus, the poet would choose Ἀτρεΐδης when he needed to fill a CHORIAMB with a nominative for Agamemnon and Ἀγαμέμνων when he needed to fill a ION. Thus, the only semantic correlate was with the essential idea, in this case, 'Agamemnon.' However, there are serious problems with this concept. It is not at all clear what Parry means by 'essential idea,' and we should be suspicious of it. Is what is important about Akhilleus his one-to-one, token identity, his ontological state as a fixed individual,²⁰⁷ or is it his situationally defined, pragmatic, epistemological status as a character in interaction with other characters and in particular settings within the narrative of the *Iliad*?

Behind Parry's use of the term 'essential idea' lies the notion that characters, objects and actions are all and always essential monolithic wholes, as if my father were the same person to me as he is to my mother, as he is to his boss, as he is to the clerk in the store. We may wish to make such a claim from an ontological standpoint, but from a social, i.e., epistemological standpoint, this is at once clearly problematic. Actors interact with items in the external world, like, say, people, based on what they believe and what they believe they know about them, not based on their knowledge of those objects' inner eternal essences. Human interaction is therefore socially, i.e., *pragmatically*, and not

²⁰⁷ This is already a problematic notion in a fictional narrative setting.

essentially motivated. This is not to say that some form of internal, personal, *essential* identity is not possible, but that speakers cannot perceive such an essence, only the external social manifestations of identity.

In Homeric Greek, for example, the pronoun τὸν can be used only when it refers back to an antecedent which is masculine in gender (grammatical); however, whether or not that antecedent is a person is irrelevant, its agreement is predicated strictly on grammatical gender. The pronoun μιν on the other hand may have an antecedent that is either male or a female, but that antecedent must be a person, regardless of its grammatical gender (masculine, feminine or neuter). So what is important in Homer as regards deixis —that is, whether it is sensitive specifically to grammatical gender or some other categorization like personhood— seems to be lexically variable. This seems to contradict the very notion lying behind Milman Parry's use of the term 'essential,' which implies ontological invariance. Agamemnon is Agamemnon is Agamemnon after all. That gender and sex are not essential, but rather can be a pragmatically sensitive categories is further illustrated by Thersites' address at B.235 (3) where 'Ἀχαιῖδες, 'daughters of Achaeans,' is clearly addressed to the male soldiers as the following word 'Ἀχαιοὶ attests.

(3) ὦ πέπονες κάκ' ἐλέγχε' Ἀχαιῖδες οὐκέτ' Ἀχαιοὶ

In fact, it is the category of gender *ipsud* which Thersites has manipulated here. That Thersites feels able to address the Greek soldiers as female suggests that gender is a pragmatically fungible category and that it is socially, rather than biologically, assigned

and that it is, therefore, manipulable for the speaker's purposes.²⁰⁸ If gender is not an essential category, what else that goes into defining personhood is also pragmatically sensitive?²⁰⁹

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss particular forms of address —namely given names and patronymics— and to tease out what, if anything, that study may say about Milman Parry's concept of the 'essential' and his 'economy of form,' about Homeric characterization and hence about Homeric diction and style in general. In this chapter I will show that the choice of term of address is highly contextual and part of a system of rich characterization which can help inform our reading of the Homeric poems.

4.2 Address by Name, Address by Title Previously, in the second chapter, I set forth a model of language use in which speech, immediate context, and social role function in a cycle of mutual information, all three informing and informed by the others. I have focused in this study on the role of speech vis-à-vis the other two specifically. Nevertheless it is important to remember that all three operators function as a single system. In this system, *address* —the vocal recognition and identification of an addressee— because it is most easily and directly manipulable of the three, plays a central role. Address has both a demarcative and a constitutive function in speech. By naming or otherwise identifying the addressee, address indicates or invokes as present an intended recipient of speech at the same time as it helps orient speaker and addressee to

²⁰⁸ Perhaps it is both socially *and* biologically conditioned.

²⁰⁹ This question can be extended to the case of objects like ships. Do Trojan characters have the same relationship to the Greek ships as the Greeks do? Does Akhilleus have the same relationship to them in Book 1 when he is threatening to leave as he does when they are being burned by Hektor in Book 15? Are we?

each other. As it functions within two parallel matrices, that of the specific discourse itself and that of the social world of the participants, it affords one way of linking the former to the latter.

In this chapter we are looking at the use of forms of address which are claimed to function to identify the speaker's intended addressee by referring directly to his identity. Thus, unlike the forms of address we looked at in the previous chapter, names and titles are used frequently to specify any desired addressees by indexing them. However, this cannot be the only function for such address forms. Often the same or a similar form of address will be used in situations in which it is already clear who is being spoken to—for example, where there is only one addressee, where the addressee is indicated, say, by gesture or facial expression, or where they have already been specified in some other fashion. That address is not used for strict token, ontological identification alone is suggested by the fact that in different situations, the 'same' individual—ontologically—can be addressed by different forms of address. Thus, my former pediatrician could be referred to as *Dr. Fredrick Burke*, *Dr. Burke*, *Mr. Burke*, *Fredrick*, *Fred*, or even *Freddie*. What changes when one or another of these forms of address is used is not the ontological identity of the person addressed, but the relationship which the speaker wishes to construct between themselves and that addressee. Thus, if what was essential in making an address to the individual, whom I will label here 'Dr. Fredrick Burke MD, Pediatrician, Male, Husband of ... etc.,' were only his ontological identity, then, in Parry's system of economy, whether he were addressed as *Dr. Fredrick Burke* or *Freddie*, would be determined by some formal mechanism alone, and speaker and setting would play no part whatsoever in the choice of the particular form of address. This is, of

course, clearly absurd and Parry, of course, intended his claims to apply only to orally composed poetry. The question before us is whether the poet of the *Iliad*, operating in a metrical context, coöpted a preexisting set of terms of address for use in a specifically poetic context and then chose between members of that system based on metrical considerations or whether he made his choices based on other pragmatic consideration(s), or both. That is, he sometimes made his choice based on metrical and compositional expediency and at other ‘key’ times his choice was driven by specific pragmatically determined semantic needs.

In spoken discourse there are two basic sets of factors, outside of absolute ontological identity, which seem to determine what form of address is perceived by speakers as appropriate at any given time. These are 1) the perceived degree of intimacy or familiarity felt to exist or desired to exist between speaker and addressee; and 2) the perceived relative social position of speaker to addressee within some social hierarchy. These factors can be conceived of as two separate axes of relation —one of intimacy (referred to as *Distance* or *Solidarity*) and one of power (See Figure 2, p. 103). A third factor, related to the second, is the addressee’s specific social role. Thus, Doctor Burke can be addressed as [daktə] because he has the specific role of medical doctor (MD), because I know he has that role and because I wish to express that to him (and/or any potential audience), for any number of socially or *discursively* determined reasons (for instance to indicate that my speaking to him is predicated on his role as my *doctor* and not as my *friend*), that it is his role as doctor that is significant to our interaction. The question is whether there is any way of showing that the same or a similar or analogous situation holds or does not for forms of address in Homer.

In the previous chapter, I have already discussed cases of pragmatically defined epithets which do not specifically refer to the ontological identity of the addressee, such as τέκνον or οἰνοβαρές. It was clear in those cases, that the only role which was left for such forms to serve was to indicate social or pragmatically relevant information pertaining to the discourse in which they were found. There seems to be some evidence for the importance of role in some cases of address in the *Iliad* which, nevertheless, do function to indicate the addressee. Thus, Kalkhas is addressed by Agamemnon as μάντι at A.106

- (4) μάντι κακῶν οὐ πῶ ποτέ μοι τὸ κρήγυον εἶπας²¹⁰
 “Prophet of evils, you have never ever had anything favorable to say to me.”

Since he is a *mantis*, it seems reasonable to speculate that it is because he is a *mantis* that he is so addressed here.²¹¹ However, there is more to the picture than that. He is, in fact addressed as μάντι κακῶν here. Unless we are to assume that μάντι κακῶν and Κάλχαν could represent the same ‘essential idea,’ and that the choice of the former is predicated solely on metrical grounds, then the poet’s choice of the former in this passage perhaps reflects more than simple identity, but how the poet wishes us to read Agamemnon’s reaction to the seer here, specifically in light of *his* previous speech.²¹² Note that μάντι (κακῶν) and Κάλχαν are metrically complementary and thus we *could* claim that they are mere metrical variants of the same essential idea, namely, ‘Kalkhas’ in the vocative case. However, this tack forces us to assume that it is a case of mere accident how well

²¹⁰ West, 1989, p. 10, reads εἶπες.

²¹¹ Kalkhas is the only character addressed as *mantis* within the Homeric narrative although others, most notably Teiresias, are referred to as such by the narrator.

²¹² Kalkhas is addressed by the vocative Κάλχαν alone at A.86 by Akhilleus.

the former address fits the tone of Agamemnon's speech and how redundant the latter would have been in this context. Although this does not serve as sufficient proof that the poet's choice was determined, at least in part, by pragmatic factors, it opens up the possibility that that was the case. This example does perhaps lean a bit *ad absurdum*, and such cases as μάντι κακῶν or οἰνοβαρές would surely constitute examples of what Parry called particularized epithets. The point is, however, that the poet did in fact have the ability to employ such particularized forms when he so chose. That is to say, he was not *always* hamstrung by meter in the way that Parry *et alii* do, in fact, claim.

As Kalkhas alone is addressed as μάντι, so Agamemnon is alone addressed as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν —although the *narrator* often refers to others by this epithet.²¹³ It is a common feature of languages that epithets that relate directly to high or supreme social position —like *Sire, your Majesty, your Honour, or Mr. President*— are severely and often formally restricted in terms of when they may be felicitously, or even legally applied.²¹⁴ We may speculate that the cultural setting portrayed within the text of the *Iliad* could reflect such a restriction, namely that it was because Agamemnon is the commander and chief of the Greek host that, in the reported speech contained within that narrative frame, he and he alone is addressed as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν. That the same restriction

²¹³ Referred to by the narrator with the epithet ἄναξ, are 48 characters, amongst them: Akhilleus 6 times, Menelaos 3 times, Nestor 3 times, Odysseus 35 times (*Odyssey* only), Priam 9 times. Ankhises, Aineias, Augeias, Eumelos and Euphetes are referred to by the fuller phrase ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, each once. Note, that Akhilleus is twice addressed as ἄναξ. This distribution provides *prima facie* evidence for a distinction between Epic and intra-narrative contexts, for a distinction between the poet's context and that of his characters.

²¹⁴ See *inter alios*: Brown and Levinson, also: Dickey, especially Chapter 3; Fraser, B., W. Nolen, "The Association of Deference with Linguistic Form," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 1981, pp.93-109, Bassett, Samuel, 'The Omission of the Vocative in Homeric Speeches,' *AJP*, 1934, pp. 140-152. Ervin-Tripp, S., 'Sociolinguistic Rules of Address', in *Pride and Holms*, 1972, pp. 225-240. *etc.* Dickey's findings for post-Homeric Greek are in contrast to what we have found here for the *Iliad*. See especially Dickey, Chapter 3.

does not hold for the narrator may be explained by suggesting that, outside of the world constructed within the narrative of the *Iliad*, within the Epic tradition —that is, the frame which contains the narrator’s voice— the term has broader currency and may be more freely applied. Such a situation would be in a way analogous to how historians are able to refer to more people as *President* than may be felicitously so addressed in person.

Thus, it would seem necessary to include social role, along with gender, within the set of features that seem necessarily to be part of what Parryists would have to label as ‘essential.’ Yet by comparing the situation within the narrative frame of the *Iliad* with what holds for the Epic tradition as a whole (i.e., by contrasting the narrator with his characters) we are compelled to call it a pragmatically determined feature of identity. Identity is defined differently within the narrative world of the *Iliad* (i.e. reported speech) than within the frame of the tradition as a whole as represented by the voice of the narrator. Thus, on the one hand, social roles, like μάντις or ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, seem to be ‘essential’ to Kalkhas or Agamemnon in the same way that a characteristic like ‘swift-footedness’ is essential to Akhilleus or ‘twisty-council-possession’ is to Odysseus. However, that Agamemnon alone is addressed as ἄναξ (ἀνδρῶν) by characters within the narrative world of the poem, while outside that frame the narrator often refers to others by this same epithet suggests that, if we are to keep Parry’s notion of ‘essential idea’ viable, we must assume that what is essential for Homer, the poet, differs from what is essential for Homer’s characters. Thus, we are forced to conclude that these ‘essential characteristics’ are at least pragmatically defined as applying either within the narrative frame or without.

4.2.1 Akhilleus The above discussion has, I hope, suggested how Parry's category of 'essential idea' is hardly unproblematic for any discussion of Homeric style or composition, and is, in fact, in need of re-evaluation.

One critique of Parry's notions of 'economy' and 'essential idea' could be offered by exploring cases in which two or more metrically parallel forms of address are applied to the same character. David Shive has noted that, in line initial position, the two vocative phrases Πηλεΐδῃ (Υ.200, 431; Φ.153, 288) and ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ (Α.47; *Π.21; *Τ.216;²¹⁵ Φ.214; Ψ.103) are metrically equivalent.²¹⁶ As this is the case, then meter alone *cannot* have been the deciding factor, or even a factor at all, in the poet's choice between one or the other of these two forms of address. There are a few possible explanations for such data, some of which must suffer the burden of proof. One might suggest that the distinction in form of address could be the result of interpolation, because of multiple authors or multiple editors/redactors. The distinction in form could simply be the result of *variatio* on the part of the poet.²¹⁷ Finally, the distinction in form could have some discourse-specific, pragmatic explanation. The first two explanations are ultimately unprovable and therefore should be resorted to only in the complete absence of any other provable hypothesis. The last of these hypotheses is, however, testable.²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Those citations marked with an asterisk appear in the phrase ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ Πηληϊὸς υἱέ.

²¹⁶ See Shive, *op. cit.*

²¹⁷ In this case, one would then be forced to ask why and how the poet was able to employ *variatio*, which must operate at the expense of the improvisation enabling 'economy,' and why similar sets of optional forms are not widely attested if *variatio* were a feature of Homeric compositional technique.

²¹⁸ Friedrich *op. cit.*, p. 1, *ff.*, has noted a similar situation involving four verse long addresses for Agamemnon, one of these used 10 times:

19.146 etc. Ἄτρειδῃ κύδιστε ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον

First, I note that Akhilleus is addressed as ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ by the seer Kalkhas, A.47; by Antilokhos, Ψ.543; by Patroklos, Π.21; by Odysseus, T.216, and by Skamander, Φ.214. On the other hand, he is addressed as Πηλεΐδῃ by Aineias, Υ.200; by Hektor,

FORM OF ADDRESS FOR AKHILLEUS	LOC
Ἀχιλ(λ)εῦ	28 Times
Πηλεΐδῃ	7 Times
Πηλέος υἱέ	7 Times
ἄναξ	Λ.276, *Τ.177

Table 4.2: Frequency of Forms of Address for Akhilleus

Υ.431; by Asteropaios, Φ.153, and by Poseidon, Φ.288.²¹⁹ This set of addresses exhibits an interesting distribution of speaker/address pairs for Akhilleus. In the case of this pair of addresses (ὦ Ἀχιλλεῦ and Πηλεΐδῃ), where meter cannot be a factor in the poet's choosing one over the other, the patronymic is found used by Trojans or Trojan allies and by Poseidon, the given name by Greeks and by the river Skamander. Leaving the two gods aside for a moment, we can say that, in the line initial, choriambic position, Akhilleus is addressed by his given name by characters who can be fairly designated as friends or allies; on the other hand, he is addressed with his patronymic by Trojan

and three of which are used only once by Akhilleus in Book 1 in his quarrel with Agamemnon, the first of which is clearly modeled on the above:

I.122	Ἄτρειδῃ κύδιστε φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων
I.149	ὦ μοι ἀναιδείην ἐπιειμένε κερδαλέοφρον
I. 225	οἶνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο,

As Friedrich notes (p. 3) "[T]he sarcastic and insulting addresses respond perfectly to their respective contexts: they open speeches which mark the development of the quarrel-scene in *Iliad*1."

²¹⁹ For a comparison of forms of address for Agamemnon between given name and patronymic, see (Figure 4.4) below.

enemies. Specifically, he is never addressed as ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ by Trojans. On the basis of the above distribution of forms of address, I suggest that the given name Ἀχιλ(λ)εῦ can be correlated with a greater degree of intimacy on the part of the speaker towards the addressee than the corresponding patronymic. Given this provisional finding, what might we wish to say about the two cases involving address by a god, namely, Φ.288, where Poseidon uses the patronymic to address Akhilleus over against Φ.214, where the river Skamander uses the given name Ἀχιλεῦ? Can these cases act as a test for the above hypothesis that, meter aside, the patronymic suggests greater distance and power on the part of the addressee and that the given name suggests more equality and intimacy?

At Φ.214, the god-river Skamander addresses Akhilleus for the first time with ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ. Previously, Akhilleus has been filling that river with the corpses of dead Paionians. Although Skamander's address is described by the narrator as given *χωσάμενος*, nevertheless, the tone is clearly not one of anger, least of all with Akhilleus, but of something perhaps more along the lines of consternation or distress.

- (5) ... *χωσάμενος* προσέφη ποταμὸς βαθυδίνης Φ.211
 ἀνέρι εἰσάμενος, βαθέης δ' ἐκ φθέγξατο δίνης·
 ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ, περὶ μὲν κρατέεις, περὶ δ' αἴσυλα ῥέζεις
 ἀνδρῶν· αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἀμύνουσιν θεοὶ αὐτοί.
 εἴ τοι Τρῶας ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς πάντας ὀλέσσαι,
 ἐξ ἐμέθεν γ' ἐλάσας πεδίον κάτα μέρμερα ῥέζε·
 πλήθει γὰρ δὴ μοι νεκύων ἐρατεινὰ ῥέεθρα,
 οὐδέ τί πη δύναμαι προχέειν ῥόον εἰς ἄλα δῖαν
 στεινόμενος νεκύεσσι, σὺ δὲ κτείνεις αἰδήλως.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ ἔασον· ἄγη μ' ἔχει ὄρχαμε λαῶν.²²⁰

²²⁰ For a discussion of ὄρχαμε λαῶν in this passage see below,

... all in a swivet, the deep-eddied river addressed him
as if he were a man, and spoke forth from his deep eddies:
“Oh Akhilleus, you surpass men in force and in doing violence,
for always the gods watch over you themselves.
If the son of Kronos gives you Trojan sons, kill them all,²²¹
just drive them from me at least and treat them to your mischief out in the field.
My lovely streams are filling with bodies,
and I cannot find any way for my current to flow to the glorious sea
as I groan with the bodies you go on killing mercilessly.
But come on and leave me out of this; I am shocked at a great leader like you.”

In general, the tone of Skamander’s address does not seem consistent with that of a god who is angry, *χωσάμενος*,²²² with a mortal. He uses none of the rhetoric associated with threatening. He does not claim to be interested in stopping Akhilleus. His language seems to indicate his desire, not to coerce, but rather to persuade Akhilleus to stop polluting his streams with corpses, e.g., εἴ τοι Τρῶας ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς πάντας ὀλέσσαι, ἢ ἐξ ἐμέθεν γ’ ἐλάσας πεδῖον κάτα μέρμερα ῥέζε·. In this context, the familiar tone of the address serves to define the relationship as more petitionary than adversarial. His attempt to change Akhilleus’ behavior is defined by him not as the attempt of a powerful god to force Akhilleus’ compliance—a fact that his subsequent battle with Akhilleus will show him capable of— but rather as someone attempting to appear less as his addressee’s superior, and within *that* context, to persuade him. And the tack appears to work. As (6) below shows, Akhilleus verbally agrees without hesitation to Skamander’s request.

²²¹ I am translating this line as if ὀλέσσαι were an imperitival infinitive. The infinitive is also possibly formally a complement of ἔδωκε; however, “If the son of Kronos gives you all the Trojan sons to kill, just drive them from me at least and treat them to your mischief out in the field” amounts to the same thing.

²²² I note here that this form *χωσάμενος* may derive from either of two verbs, either *χώομαι* or *χόω*. It is generally taken to be from the former, and that is how I have translated it here. However, if derived from *χόω*, it could be taken to refer to the river’s swelling up with water, perhaps behind the dam of human corpses, which Akhilleus has made, a gory but startling and entirely apt image.

(6) τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς· Φ.222
ἔσται ταῦτα Σκάμανδρε διοτρεφές, ὥς σὺ κελεύεις.

And Footwise Swift Akhilleus answered him and said:
“It will be, oh Zeus-raised Skamander, as you request.”

Granted, Skamander’s real intent seems actually to have been to stop Akhilleus from killing any more Trojans, a fact that Skamander’s subsequent address to Apollo at 229 *ff.* and his following battle with Akhilleus show. Nevertheless, at this point in the narrative, the river’s tack is characterized as one of familiar persuasion. Part of what helps us to read Skamander’s speech in the way I have suggested is the form of address used to introduce it.

At Φ.288, Poseidon has come at Akhilleus’ request to help him in his battle with the now enraged Skamander. In this speech, although Poseidon appears as an ally, he addresses him as Πηλεΐδην. Although we might well have expected the comfort of a friendly tone from the god, Poseidon’s address suggests that he perceives Akhilleus’ need to be that of a powerful ally, not a comforting friend. Here, the more formal tone of the patronymic helps to emphasize just that, the god’s ability to offer protection based on his greater power and authority, but at the expense of not appearing familiar. It is the presentation of the god’s power and authority which will here offer comfort to Akhilleus, not familiarity. Note that Poseidon’s address is defined by the poet as a *muthos*.²²³

(7) τοῖσι δὲ μύθων ἦρχε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων· Φ.287
Πηλεΐδην μήτ' ἄρ τι λῖν τρέε μήτέ τι τάρβει·
τοίῳ γάρ τοι νῶϊ θεῶν ἐπιταρρόθω εἰμέν·
Ζηνὸς ἐπαινέσαντος ἐγὼ καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη·
ὥς οὔ τοι ποταμῷ γε δαμήμεναι αἰσιμόν ἐστιν,
ἀλλ' ὅδε μὲν τάχα λωφήσει, σὺ δὲ εἴσεαι αὐτός·

²²³ Martin, *op. cit.*

With words like these, The Earthshaker Poseidon began his *muthos*.
“McPeleus, come now, do not cower or tremble
for of the gods, both of us are that kind of defender,
at Zeus’ approval, Pallas Athene and I,
that it is not your fate to be tamed by this river;
rather this one here will forthwith give up, and you will see it by yourself.”

Both examples (6) and (7), in fact, act as that sort of ‘exception’ which we can use to test the hypothesis I have proposed above, namely that the patronymic affords a more formal, distanced, and authoritative tone to a discourse by defining the relationship of speaker to addressee as based on social distance and/or greater authority. Likewise, the given name defines the relationship of speaker to addressee as potentially more intimate and more equal. Skamander, wishing to persuade Akhilleus, attempts to appear more intimate, more peer-like and thereby less threatening. Poseidon, by using the patronymic appears as more authoritative and hence as a more viable and secure source of reliance and aid in a time of perceived distress. In these two examples we can see how context and form function in a mutually informing relationship. By adopting such a model we can gain additional insights into Homer’s ability to characterize episodes in his narrative within the confines of what has come to be termed the Oral Style.

Examples (6) and (7), both involving situations where a divinity is addressing a mortal, also serve to show how pragmatically defined social relations can interact with situational pressures. Such examples show how these two ‘forces,’ social relations and situational pressures, are in dynamic interaction right at the point of social contact, i.e., the speech event or utterance. These two examples also clearly demonstrate how social relations are not fixed but are in a constant state of renegotiation and that that renegotiation is often driven by particular, immediate situational needs. Skamander (6), wishing to persuade Akhilleus and avoid the inevitable conflict between them, adopts a

peer-like position, as defined by his use of the given name as a form of address despite his status as divine and Akhilleus' as mortal. Poseidon (7), wishing to show that he can offer comfort and support to the embattled Akhilleus in the very midst of battle, uses the patronymic in order to adopt a more authoritative, more paternal tone.

A tentative conclusion to be drawn here is that the patronymic patterns with contexts in which the speaker wishes to project social distance and/or hierarchical difference and the given name with the situations where social distance (D) and hierarchical distance (power) are lessened. We may situate these onto our map of social space from Chapter 2 (Figure 3, below).

The above hypothesis can be immediately tested by comparing what we have said above with what we find for the use of the vocative 'Αχιλλεῦ, the metrically complementary form of Akhilleus' given name. This form shows both a complementary distribution with ὦ 'Αχιλλεῦ and has no metrically parallel form of the patronymic.




Figure 3: Schematized Social Space with Names

In theory, the distribution of just such a form should adhere most easily to the notion of a distribution based solely on economy, as suggested in the Parry-Lord model, and be potentially most easily separated from extra-metrical constraints such as situational pragmatics. If this were the case, we should expect the distribution of forms of the vocative 'Αχιλλεῦ to be pragmatically neutral.

In attempting to answer this question, we can see that there will be two mutually exclusive predictions for the distribution of 'Αχιλλεῦ. It could follow the pragmatically, socially context-sensitive distributional model we have suggested for the form 'Αχιλεῦ, or it could show the distribution which is predicted by the Parry-Lord model, one that should show a pragmatically context-*insensitive* distribution. If the former were the case, we should expect to find the form 'Αχιλλεῦ used in contexts analogous to those we have found for ὦ 'Αχιλεῦ, and different pragmatically from those suggested for the patronymics. Thus, the distribution of the form 'Αχιλλεῦ can act as a test for the tentative conclusions I have drawn based on the distribution of the metrically parallel forms ὦ 'Αχιλεῦ and Πηλεΐδῃ above.

At this juncture we might want to ask two questions. First, again, how does the poet's use of these vocative case forms relate to the social dynamics of the situation in which he has placed them, if at all? Second, does the additional presence of one of the above epithets relate to how the address is used, and if so, how? That is, does qualifying Akhilleus as god-like or glorious relate to the function to which the address so characterized functions in the discourse?

In respect to the first question, one of the first things to note is that this address is used two thirds of the time by Greeks and to a lesser degree by gods allied with them.

Loci	Speaker	Additional modifiers	Previously addressed in speech as
A.131	Agamemnon	θεοείκελ'	not previously addressed
l.434	Phoinix	φαίδιμ'	not previously addressed
l.485	Phoinix	θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ'	φαίδιμ' Ἀχιλλεῦ
l.490	Phoinix	θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ'	θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ
Π.29	Patroklos	none	ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ Πηληϊλος υἱέ μέγα φέρτατ' Ἀχαιῶν
Π.155	Odysseus	θεοείκελ'	not previously addressed
Π.408	Hera	ὄβριμ'	not previously addressed
Φ.160	Asteropaios	φαίδιμ'	Πηλείδη μεγάθυμε
Φ.583	Agenor	φαίδιμ'	not previously addressed
Χ.216	Athene	δίφιλε φαίδιμ'	not previously addressed
Χ.255	Hektor	none	Πηλεος υἱε
Χ.279	Hektor	θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ'	not previously addressed
Ψ.69	Patroklos' ghost	none	not previously addressed
Ψ.80	Patroklos' ghost	θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ'	Ἀχιλλεῦ
Ψ.83	Patroklos' ghost	none	θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ
Π.486	Priam	θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ'	not previously addressed

Table 4.3: Distribution of the Bacchiac (ν □ □) Vocative, Ἀχιλλεῦ, by Speaker

Based on these statistics, we may tentatively assign Ἀχιλλεῦ the status of a metrical variant of ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ. However, there are some notable exceptions, namely its use by the Trojans Asteropaios, Agenor, Hektor, and Priam. Let us begin by examining these five cases of the use of Ἀχιλλεῦ by a Trojan.²²⁴

At Π.486, Priam has come to Akhilleus' tent as a suppliant, to ransom his son. However, his coming has been announced to Akhilleus in advance; he is under divine auspices and led by Hermes. He therefore inhabits a polysemic social space. He is a

²²⁴ see Table 4.3 above.

king, but a suppliant. He is old and infirm — from a heroic standpoint, impotent²²⁵ — yet under Zeus’ explicit protection. He is defined by the narrator as μέγας, yet his body language projects a humbled stance:²²⁶

(8) χερσὶν Ἀχιλλῆος λάβε γούνατα καὶ κύσε χεῖρας □.478
δεινὰς ἀνδροφόνους ...²²⁷

with his own hands he took Akhilleus’ knees and kissed his hands
those terrible man-killing hands ...

Given this and given Priam’s mission, by opening his verbal exchange with Akhilleus, δεινὸς ἀνδροφόνος, with the given name Ἀχιλλεῦ, the narrator seems to imply that Priam’s intention is to narrow the social gulf that potentially exists between himself and Akhilleus, his enemy, as a means to achieve his ends, the retrieval of his son’s body for burial. Thus, Priam’s actions, his taking a suppliant posture, (8) above, and his language, especially (9), belies that mixed or liminal social space he has come to occupy in this scene; he is simultaneously Akhilleus’ superior and inferior, both king and suppliant.

(9) μνησάι πατρός σοῖο, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ’ Ἀχιλλεῦ □.466
Recall your own father, oh Akhilleus like the gods.

Furthermore, we may want to see in the epithet, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελε, an attempt to build into the address something approaching the social force of the patronymic. It is as if Priam

²²⁵ This fact will be exploited brilliantly by Virgil in Book II of the *Aeneid*.

²²⁶ I think Richardson’s suggestion that we are to picture Priam appearing to Akhilleus “present in all his greatness” actually misses the point of the epithet’s use here. It is not Priam’s greatness we are to see here, but Priam’s humbled greatness. The poignancy of the scene comes from this contrast. Richardson, Nicholas, *The Iliad: A Commentary, Volume VI: Books 21-24*, p. 233.

²²⁷ The use of this epithet for χεῖρας reinforces our awareness of Priam’s humiliation. He is forced to grasp the hands that killed his son in order that he may receive back the corpse of that same son for burial.

cannot help but take on a magisterial tone at the same time as he recognizes the need to be humble. Is Priam ordering Akhilleus to recall his own father in the form of Priam, or is he suggesting it? Perhaps he himself is not sure. Thus, we can see in the address θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ, Priam hedging his own social position vis-à-vis Akhilleus. And language, specifically the form of address, rather than being static, economical, bleached of all force except for that of token identification has become, in the hands of the poet, a powerful tool for characterizing the emotional force of this scene.

In Book 22, Hektor addresses Akhilleus twice as Ἀχιλλεῦ, at ln. 258, and again at ln. 279. At 254 *ff.*, Hektor famously appeals to Akhilleus for a mutual non-defilement pact. The winner will return the loser's body for burial.

(10) ἄλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο θεοὺς ἐπιδώμεθα· τοὶ γὰρ ἄριστοι Χ.254
 μάρτυροι ἔσονται καὶ ἐπίσκοποι ἁρμονιάων·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ σ' ἔκπαγλον ἀεικίω, αἴ κεν ἐμοὶ Ζεὺς
 δώῃ καμμονίην, σὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀφέλωμαι·
 ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ἄρ' ἐκέ σε συλήσω κλυτὰ τεύχε' Ἀχιλλεῦ
 νεκρὸν Ἀχαιοῖσιν δώσω πάλιν· ὥς δὲ σὺ ρέζειν

“Rather come here; let’s take the gods as witnesses for they will be the best witnesses and guardians of our agreements.
 For I won’t treat you, who are dread, in an unseemly way if Zeus should give the victory to me, and I take away your life.
 But of course, once I finally strip you of your arms, Akhilleus,
 I will give your body back to the Achaeans and thus, you do too.”

Here, Hektor’s appeal is to an imagined relationship of mutual respect between warriors; a relationship that, at this point, Akhilleus has clearly moved beyond. The use of ἄλλ' ἄγε and the first person plural, hortatory subjunctive at ln. 254, mark Hektor’s speech in this way. The use of the familiar address at ln. 258 suggests that his appeal to Akhilleus is predicated on a relationship intended to be marked by lower hierarchical distance and higher familiarity, feelings that Akhilleus does not share. We can see in this, Hektor’s

attempt to reduce the potential threat to face implicit in this scene of mutual conflict, in the attempt to direct Akhilleus' actions and in the implication that Akhilleus would otherwise be likely to defile his corpse. That Hektor's observation is prophetically acute when viewed from outside of the context of the narrative frame, across the epic as a whole, does not reduce the force of the face threat implicit in his request when viewed within that frame.²²⁸

Akhilleus' reply at ln. 261 *ff.*, offers us an excellent example which highlights well how understanding context must play a role in analyzing the force of some formal element in the discourse.²²⁹

(11) Ἔκτορ, μή μοι, ἄλαστε, συνημοσύνας ἄγορευε Χ. 261
 ὥς οὐκ ἔστι λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὄρκια πιστά

“Hektor, you must be crazy,²³⁰ do not talk to me about agreements
 there are no oaths you can trust made between lions and men.”

Here the vocative of the given name, Ἔκτορ, has quite different politeness implications from those we saw in (10) for Ἀχιλλεῦ. From this quick comparison, we can begin to see how complex the relationship between form and context is in defining politeness and how an understanding of form alone is not sufficient to define its social or pragmatic implications in any given instance. Instead, such an understanding is ultimately dependant on an analysis of how the form is used within its specific context. Form and

²²⁸ The first person plural injunction, since it is formally inclusive, is also clearly an attempt at politeness work on Hektor's part intended to reduce the negative-face threat which a bald direct command to Akhilleus would have held.

²²⁹ Richardson defines Akhilleus' response to Hektor's request as “brutal,” *v.* Richardson, p. 133.

²³⁰ ἄλαστε means something like ‘not to be forgotten.’ Although formally modifying Ἔκτορ, here, it has the force of “do you think I would just forget what you have done to me (i.e., kill Patroklos).” Richardson takes it to mean ‘accursed,’ Richardson, *Ibid.*

context are always in a dynamic, albeit constrained, relationship of mutual information. In the case of (10), the use of an address in the form of the given name which is found in the context of the preceding phrase ἄλλ' ἄγε, implies a diminished social distance as well as a contracted hierarchical distance and therefore functions as an example of Brown and Levinson's *negative-politeness work*. Brown and Levinson use this term to refer to acts which addresses the addressee's negative face needs, i.e., his desire to be unimpeded in his actions.²³¹ In the mouth of Akhilleus (11), the element which functions analogous to ἄλλ' ἄγε is the vocative adjective ἄλαστε and the imperative μή ἄγορευε which implies the opposite of what we saw in Hektor's use of ἄλλ' ἄγε in (10). Hektor has been for some time concerned about the very real possibility that Akhilleus will desecrate his corpse should he die. This seems a constant fear for the Iliadic warrior for whom proper burial and especially a *sema* guarantees *kleos* in the future.²³² For him, the use here (10) of the informal familiar form of address for Akhilleus seems to convey his desire to contract the social distance between the two of them to downplay Akhilleus' hostility over Patroklos' death in order to achieve his goal, guaranteeing Akhilleus will respect for his corpse upon his death. Akhilleus' use of the analogous term Ἑκτορ in (11), by seeming to invert the implied contraction of social distance, constitutes what we have earlier called *impoliteness*. This is because of the difference in power implicit in Hektor's request.²³³ In situations of social disparity along the power axis (hierarchy),

²³¹ See Chapter 2.

²³² See Van Wees, *op. cit.*

²³³ Hektor's request implies here that he fears for his own body and hence that he, to some degree, has already accepted the possibility of his own death. Akhilleus' reaction implies, conversely, that he does not have the same fear. The whole exchange is characterized by the knowledge that the relationship between the two warriors is *not* equal. This implied unequal relationship vis-à-vis who holds the superior position helps to inform how the two uses of the familiar given name are to be read.

individuals holding the higher position are often able to use language more freely. Akhilleus' use of familiar language here seems to imply not in fact familiarity, but rather, his situationally defined superior position. In a context where we might expect a more formal expression, the familiar implies not politeness work, but rather, the fact that Akhilleus does not need to consider Hektor's face by using a more formal form, and this in turn implies his situational power. As Culpeper states:

There are circumstances when the vulnerability of face is unequal and so motivation to cooperate is reduced. A powerful participant has more freedom to be impolite, because [they] can (a) reduce the ability of a less powerful participant to retaliate with impoliteness (e.g. through denial of speaking rights), and (b) threaten more severe retaliation should the less powerful participant be impolite.²³⁴

In the context of Akhilleus' pursuit, his use of the familiar form of address for Hektor then is not to be read as polite but reflects his own implicit acknowledgement of Hektor's situational inferiority. As Culpeper suggests, in settings marked by explicit social roles vis-à-vis the power axis —as in the case of social 'class' or 'caste' or 'office' (see (4) above)— it is commonly the case that speakers holding the higher position are more free to use more familiar language when speaking to an addressee holding a lower position, and that those of lower station are, conversely, constrained to use less familiar, more 'formal' language when speaking to those in a superior position.²³⁵ We may suspect that a similar situation holds for situationally defined hierarchical disparities. In the case of Akhilleus' address to Hektor at X.261 *ff.*, his use of the distributionally more familiar

²³⁴ Culpeper, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

²³⁵ See, Brown and Levinson, and Culpeper, *op. cit.*

given name as his address can be read as implying that he is claiming situational superiority for himself over Hektor. The act of claiming that superiority, in fact, seems to enact it.

At 279 *ff.*, Akhilleus has declined Hektor's request for mutual oaths of respect and has instead begun their final duel by throwing his spear, which, although it misses, is secretly returned by Athene.²³⁶ Despite the preceding characterization of their relationship, Hektor's response to Akhilleus' attack comes, characteristically for Epic, in the form of a boast.

- (12) ἤμβροτες, οὐδ' ἄρα πῶ τι, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ Φ.279
ἐκ Διὸς ἠείδης τὸν ἐμὸν μόρον, ἧ τοι ἔφης γε·
ἀλλὰ τις ἀρτιεπὴς καὶ ἐπὶ κλοπῆς ἔπλεο μύθων,
ὄφρα σ' ὑποδείσας μένεος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.
οὐ μὲν μοι φεύγοντι μεταφρένω ἐν δόρυ πῆξεις,
ἀλλ' ἰθύς μεμαῶτι διὰ στήθεσφιν ἔλασσον
εἴ τοι ἔδωκε θεός· νῦν αὖτ' ἐμὸν ἔγχος ἄλυναι
χάλκεον· ὥς δὴ μιν σῶ ἐν χροῖ πᾶν κομίσαιο.

“You missed, godlike Akhilleus. It seems you didn’t get the truth about my fate from Zeus after all, as you claimed rather, you were just sort of a wordy, clever speaker hoping I would fear you and forget my own power and valor. You won’t drive your spear through my back as I run away. Rather, stab me through my breast as I come straight after you, if the gods let you. C’mon now keep your eye out for my spear I hope you give its bronze a nice home in your flesh.”

Hektor's rhetoric is clearly boastful. Akhilleus is either deluded or a liar, possibly both; he was counting on timidity on the part of Hektor; his reliance on the gods is misplaced; the falseness of his position is evidenced by his failed spear throw. The meter of the speech is highly dactylic and so fast moving; verses 279-81 which are perfect spondaic

²³⁶ For example in *ln.* 275 *ff.*

lines.²³⁷ The potential optative in ln. 286 could be functioning as a hedge: “I hope I can ...”, but given the context of the rest of Hektor’s speech, it seems rather to exude Hektor’s false confidence; that is to say, it functions as a mock hedge.

How then should we read Hektor’s address θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ’ Ἀχιλλεῦ? The modifying epithet θεοῖς ἐπιείκελε seems to parallel the mock humility of the optative in ln. 286, in which case Ἀχιλλεῦ may simply be a metrical expedient that allows the poet to use a verse-final address for Akhilleus with such a modifying expression. However, a line like (13) while unattested would have conveyed the same meaning and allowed the poet to convey more consistently the mock humility implied in an address that in this context (a boast) is marked by a high degree of social distance and high hierarchical position.

- (13) * ἤμβροτες, οὐδ’ ἄρα πῶ τι, μεγαθυμε Πηλεος υἱέ ²³⁸
 “You missed, godlike son of Peleus. It seems you didn’t get”

In this setting, Hektor’s address seems ambiguous. It conveys a mixed message. The familiar address Ἀχιλλεῦ, because Hektor is in a position of situational inferiority, seems to work to close the social distance, to build intimacy, as we saw in (13) above.²³⁹ The epithet θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ’ conversely, functions to acknowledge the addressee’s elevated

²³⁷ verse 282 is metrically corrupt, having an opening that consists of one heavy syllable followed by three light syllables, i.e., - **υ υ υ** - -.

²³⁸ Part of the problem with such a line is the unattested position for the vocative noun phrase μεγαθυμε Πηλεος υἱέ. However as Adam Parry has suggested (see concerning (1) above), Homer can and does place formulaic phrases in unusual positions for specific effects.

²³⁹ This is especially the case as he has allowed Akhilleus to make the first move by preemptively throwing his spear.

position hierarchically. Sperber and Wilson’s notion of *relevance* may be useful here. For Sperber and Wilson, in cases of indeterminacy, the meaning which is recovered is that meaning which is recovered most directly, with the least interpretational effort.²⁴⁰ In the context of “you missed,” the address seems to function as a boast, yet a complex and internally inconsistent one. The two parts of the address itself seem here to be working at cross-purposes; one directly emphasizes relative superiority and hence, distance, the other familiarity; both of which are then inverted. Such mixed messages, because they formally act to acknowledge the other’s superiority while they attempt to build intimacy upon that position, can be useful, especially in situations where cooperation is desired.²⁴¹ Hektor’s ambiguous address here may hint at his own conflicted state of mind. He seems unsure how to approach Akhilleus. A boast to ‘psychout’ his opponent and bolster his own sense of self-confidence is desirable at this point, but the result of Hektor’s rhetoric seems to suggest that he himself does not quite believe his own hype.

The cases of Asteropaios at Φ.153 *ff.* and Agenor at Φ.583 *ff.*, are similar to this last example and further illustrate well how understanding context is necessary for understanding how formal elements function to help construct social space. In the former case, Asteropaios’ address to Akhilleus is afterwards defined by the narrator as ἀπειλήσας, ‘challenging,’ and hence seems to constitute a boast

(14) Πηλεΐδῃ μεγάλῃ τι ἢ γενεὴν ἐρεεῖνεις; Φ.153
 εἴμ’ ἐκ Παιονίης ἐριβώλου τηλόθ’ ἐούσης
 Παίονας ἄνδρας ἄγων δολιχεγχείας· ἦδε δέ μοι νῦν
 ἤως ἐνδεκάτῃ ὅτε Ἴλιον εἰλήλουθα.
 αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γενεὴ ἐξ Ἀχαιοῦ εὐρὺ ρέοντος
 Ἀχαιοῦ, ὃς κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἵησιν,

²⁴⁰ See Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, Blackwell, 1986.

²⁴¹ Examples can be found in the case of Phoenix, I.485, 490; Odysseus, T.155; Patroklos’ ghost, Ψ.80, and Priam, Ω.456. Agamemnon famously misuses this combination address to Akhilleus at A.131 with now famous results.

ὅς τέκε Πηλεγόνα κλυτὸν ἔγχεϊ· τὸν δ' ἐμέ φασι
γείνασθαι· νῦν αὖτε μαχώμεθα φαίδιμ' Ἀχιλλεῦ.
ὥς φάτ' ἀπειλήσας, ...

“Proud McPeleus, why do you care about my ancestry?
I come from far-off, rich Paionia,
and I’m the captain of the long-speared Paionians. In fact,
I just came to Ilion eleven days ago.
But I come from the house of the wide river of Axion,
the most beautiful river on the face of the Earth.
He sired Pelegon, who was famed for his spear-work and who, the story goes,
sired me. But c’mon now, glorious Achilles, let’s get to fighting.”
In this way he made his challenge ...

We may contrast this speech with Glaukos’ at Z. 145 *ff.* Note, in this speech, Asteropaios uses both the patronymic and the given name to address Akhilleus. Richardson’s suggestion that, at ln. 160, Asteropaios has changed his tack from the “courtesies of heroic war” and wishes to get down to business seems to fit well with what I have been arguing here. The given name, implying less social distance, can function as insulting when viewed within the context of a boastful speech and when contrasted with the earlier, more formal, more traditional Πηλεΐδη μεγάθυμε, which opened the speech. The switch from patronymic to given name helps to ratchet up Asteropaios’ rhetoric in preparation for the imminent fight. In contrast with Hektor’s use, (13) above, the plural hortatory subjunctive here fails to act to create an intimate space. Again, we can see how it is necessary to consider not merely form, but form within context to see how language functions to shape social space.

In Agenor’s speech at Φ.583 *ff.*, the given name is used in a way similar to that found in Asteropaios’ speech, (17) above, where it seemed to function in the context of a boast to attempt to diminish the standing of the opponent.

- (15) ἦ δὴ που μάλ' ἔολπας ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φαίδιμ' Ἀχιλλεῦ Φ.583
 ἦματι τῷδε πόλιν πέρσειν Τρώων ἀγερῶχων
 νηπύτι' ἦ τ' ἔτι πολλὰ τετεύχεται ἄλγε' ἐπ' αὐτῇ.
 ἐν γάρ οἱ πολέες τε καὶ ἄλκιμοι ἀνέρες εἰμέν,

“You were really hoping in your heart of hearts, glorious Akhilleus,
 that you would sack the city of the proud Trojans today.
 Idiot, there will still be a lot of agony in her,
 for she is full of many us fearsome warriors.”

Here the address is compounded with νηπύτιε in ln. 585 which shows that it must clearly be taken as insulting and hence the epithet φαίδιμε should be read as sarcastic. In addition, the verb phrase μάλ' ἔολπας ἐνὶ φρεσὶ, ‘hope/expect’ in the first line suggests that his expectations will, in fact, be overturned. Here, again, rather than implicating greater intimacy or familiarity, the given name address implies rather the speaker’s wish to give a diminished status to the addressee. That is, it is movement along the hierarchy axis, not the intimacy axis, that is intended by the use of the familiar term here. These examples hint at the mechanism by that the same form, say given name or patronymic, can function in what appears as opposite functions. As Figure 4 suggests, since these two




Figure 4: Shift in Status within a Schematized Social Space

forms of address occupy quadrants in our proposed map of the social space of address which are diagonally opposite to each-other, the choice of one or the other can be used to

suggest movement along either axis of that social space, or both, and which direction is intended, is determined by the context in which this utterance takes place.

The importance of context for the interpretation of the pragmatic force of forms can be further illustrated by the use of ὄρχαμε λαῶν in Φ.221; (5) above. Recall that here the god-river Skamander is addressing Akhilleus and that his address was described as informal and familial in part based on the use of the given name over the patronymic to open the address. Formally, ὄρχαμε λαῶν, as an address, refers to Akhilleus' official status as a Greek war leader. As such, the term seems to imply the opposite force of the given name used to initiate the address. However, when taken in the context of a speech already characterized by a familiar address and a simple request to do his killing elsewhere, we can read this address closely in the line in which it is found:

(16) ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ καὶ ἕασον· ἄγη μ' ἔχει ὄρχαμε λαῶν

“but come on and leave me out of this; I am shocked at a great leader like you”

The address seems here to indicate the locus of the god-river's ἄγη. He is surprised at Akhilleus' behavior in light of his status as ὄρχαμος λαῶν. The address does not serve to highlight Skamander's relationship to Akhilleus as ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ did, but his view about the relationship of his ἄγη to Akhilleus.

4.2.2 Agamemnon and Menelaos Let me now return to the two forms of address for Agamemnon mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, i.e., Ἀτρεΐδης and Ἀγάμεμνον. As I have said, like the two forms for Akhilleus that we have been discussing, namely, Ἀχιλλεῦ and Ἀχιλεῦ, these two appellations are in a metrically

complementary distribution and cannot simply be substituted.²⁴² Yet, unlike the case of the forms Ἀχιλλεῦ and Ἀχιλεῦ, Ἀτρεΐδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον are not simply metrical variants of the same form but are distinct morphemes, namely the patronymic and the given name, respectively, a distinction that I have already argued is pragmatically sensitive. This distributional fact regarding Ἀτρεΐδῃ and Ἀγάμεμνον stands in contrast to that holding between the analogous forms, Πηλείδῃ and ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ. However, when we examine the distribution of the forms of address for Agamemnon, an interesting wrinkle is added to the picture of the pragmatics of address that I have constructed up to this point. Agamemnon is addressed as Ἀτρεΐδῃ 36 times, 25 times with no other epithet or indication of office, and twice by the metrical variant form Ἀτρέος υἱέ. On the other hand, he is addressed by the epithet Ἀγάμεμνον alone only once (B.362). These distributional facts are striking and contrast strongly with what we have found for Akhilleus. It is difficult to imagine that they are due to the work of a poet whose decisions about word choice were driven by

FORM OF ADDRESS FOR AGAMEMNON	LOCi
Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον	8 Times
Ἀτρεΐδῃ alone	25 Times
Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε alone	A.122; Θ.293
Ἀτρεΐδῃ ... ἄναξ	B.284
Ἀτρέος υἱέ	B.32, 60
ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον	Ψ.49
ἄναξ alone	B.284, 360; I.33
Ἀγάμεμνον alone	B.362

Table 4.4: Frequency of Forms of Address for Agamemnon

²⁴² Their distributions do not overlap but *complement* each other.

metrical constraints alone.²⁴³ This distribution stands in contrast to what we find for other Homeric characters.²⁴⁴ Agamemnon is practically never addressed except with his patronymic or with the title of his office, namely ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, included in that address. Simply put, he is, with one exception, never addressed simply as Ἀγάμεμνον. For Agamemnon, the given name, especially in isolation, is the marked member of the set of available terms of address. The marked member is that term that is not associated with high status. This fact suggests that for Agamemnon, within the context of the *Iliad*, status, particularly in relation to ancestry and office, is of great importance for defining his social persona, perhaps to a fault. We can compare the distribution of terms of address with what we found in the case of Akhilleus (see Table 4.2, p. 140 above), who is addressed as Ἀχιλ(λ)εῦ 28 times, Πηλεΐδῃ 7 times, and Πήλεος υἱέ 7 times. Thus, Agamemnon is addressed by his given name alone only once, but Akhilleus is so addressed twice as often as he is by his patronymics. Although I have argued the opposite above, nevertheless, it is possible that the distributional facts regarding the forms of address for Akhilleus may be ascribable merely *metri gratia* or due to *variatio*; they may be due to interpolation or have crept into the text —perhaps as glosses— during the long history of transmission. Because of the remarkable disparity in the distribution of terms of address, the facts about Agamemnon are harder to rationalize in this way. I have already suggested that the patronymic functions vis-à-vis the given name to suggest

²⁴³ Note that the vocative epithet Ἀγάμεμνον is, in fact, attested eight times in the full line address Ἀτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον, and once in the half line address ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον. Therefore, its rarity as a singleton form cannot be explained by recourse to any features of the Parry-Lord model. The address can appear line-finally; it just never does so by itself, with one exception.

²⁴⁴ A notable exception to this, Diomedes, will be discussed below.

greater social distance and power on the part of the addressee. When, in addition to what we have stated about sociological implications of address vis-à-vis Agamemnon, we add still further facts regarding those forms of address that are found applied to his brother, Menalaos, and *their* distribution across the two epics, a stronger picture begins to arise of how these two forms of address, patronymic and given name, function socially within the narrative frame of the *Iliad*.

4.2.3 Menalaos Although Menalaos is addressed as Ἀτρεΐδα in the dual or Ἀτρεΐδαι in the plural, a number of times, by definition these addresses always include Agamemnon. Frequently, as in A.17, the address, while formally plural, is functionally directed at Agamemnon —alone or at least primarily so. Menalaos is addressed as Ἀτρεΐδη in the singular only once in the *Iliad*, and when he is addressed as Ἀτρεΐδη, at P.12, it is not by a Greek but by the Trojan, Euphorbos, as he stands guarding the fallen body of Patroklos.

(17) Ἀτρεΐδη Μενέλαε διοτρεφεὺς ὄρχαμε λαῶν
 χάζεο, λείπε δὲ νεκρόν, ἕα δ' ἔναρα βροτόεντα·
 οὐ γάρ τις πρότερος Τρώων κλειτῶν τ' ἐπικούρων
 Πάτροκλον βάλε δουρὶ κατὰ κρατερὴν ὕσμινην·
 τῷ με ἕα κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἐνὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀρέσθαι,
 μή σε βάλῳ, ἀπὸ δὲ μελιηδέα θυμὸν ἔλωμαι

P.12

Menalaos McAtreus, Zeus-reared Leader of the people,
 stand back, leave the corpse, leave me his bloodied spoils;
 since no Trojan or their glorious allies before
 hit Patroklos with a spear in terrible battle.
 So let me win noble glory among the Trojans by this,
 and I won't shoot you and take away your honey-sweet spirit.

This fact gibes nicely with what we have said about Akhilleus above, namely, that within the context of a boast, delivered within the setting of a duel, the patronymic —here part of a verse-long address— seems to function, not to imply feelings of respect, but of

sarcasm. This is because, while the patronymic does seem to reflect a less intimate relationship, here (17), in this context, which involves a boast delivered to an enemy, it does not imply the respect that comes with the acknowledgement of social distance between members of the same community. Thus, social distance, when viewed either within or without one's own social group, bears different implications.

While Akhilleus and Menalaos, within their native social setting (the Greek army), can be addressed by the more intimate and familiar form of the given name —obligatorily so for Menalaos— and hence participate in more intimate and familiar relationships with their fellow Greeks, Agamemnon seems to be defined by those who address him as obligatorily participating in less intimate, more distanced relationships with members of his own social group. These relationships appear to be defined as less intimate, more distanced than even those of Menalaos on whose behalf the entire expedition and war with Troy has been undertaken. We may view this against Agamemnon's position as leader of the Greek host, as ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν.

While Menalaos is never addressed as Ἀτρεΐδῃ within his own *Iliadic* Greek society, he is, however, so addressed eight times in the *Odyssey*. What is important to consider here is that, mythologically, the *Odyssey* 'takes place' after Agamemnon's narrative death. We can imagine then, that within the frame of Homeric Epic (Nagy's tradition), Menalaos is not called —it seems, cannot be called— Ἀτρεΐδῃ by members of his own society until after the death of his brother. And conversely, Agamemnon is almost never addressed by members of his own society by his given name alone, i.e., as just *Agamemnon*.²⁴⁵ These facts of distribution suggest that Agamemnon has some fun-

²⁴⁵ Other heroes show distributions of forms of address that are more or less like what we see for Akhilleus. They are apparently addressable by both their patronymic and their given name. We may suspect that how

damentally different status within his own society than do either Menalaos or the other *basileis*, and that that status is reflected in how he may be addressed. We deduce this fact about his status from the distributional facts surrounding how he and others are addressed within the narrative setting of the *Iliad*. Support for this comes from another fact already noted above, that while the narrator may refer to other characters as ἄναξ (ἄνδρῶν), only Agamemnon is so addressed by characters within the narrative frame. Thus, within the narrative setting of the *Iliad*, Agamemnon alone may be addressed as ἄναξ, and his address must contain that title or he must be addressed by his patronymic, Ἀτρεΐδῃ. However, Menalaos, who is also of the ‘house of Atreus,’ is not —and so presumably may not— be addressed as Ἀτρεΐδῃ until after his brother’s death. This would seem to function as *prima facie* evidence that, within the narrative world of Homeric epic, the patronymic functions in address as an indication of status, not only within the society as a whole, but within a family lineage as well. Specifically, it functions like ἄναξ ἄνδρῶν, as if it were a title. Agamemnon is not just Ἀτρεΐδης, he is, until his death, *the* Ἀτρεΐδης. After his death Menalaos becomes *the* Ἀτρεΐδης.²⁴⁶

As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is an exception to the story I have just laid out about how Agamemnon is addressed in the *Iliad*. Agamemnon is, in fact, addressed solely as Ἀγάμεμνον once, at B.362. This address comes in a speech by

Homeric heroes are addressed is subject to pragmatic constraints analogous to those which hold for Akhilleus. On the case of Diomedes, see below.

²⁴⁶ Higbie has shown that a similar situation holds for the two sons of Τελαμῶν, Τευκρός and Αἴας, where only Aias can be addressed as Τελαμονιάδῃ. Note in this case though, that Teukros is an illegitimate child. See Higbie, Carolyn, *Heroes' Names, Homeric Identities*, New York: Garland Pub., 1995. Dan Collins (personal correspondence) has pointed out a similar phenomenon in the case of 19th century unmarried English women as represented, for example, in Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*. The oldest unmarried daughter would regularly be referred to (and would refer to her self) by the title *Miss* plus surname (e.g., Miss Bennett). Any younger sister would, by contrast, be referred to by the title *Miss*, followed by both her given- and surnames (e.g., Miss Mary Bennett). When the oldest daughter married, the honour would fall on the next oldest unmarried daughter and she would be referred to as Miss Bennett.

Nestor to Agamemnon about how to proceed with the war preparations. Beginning at B.337, Nestor has been haranguing the Greeks for their childishness and lack of reliability. At 344, he turns to Agamemnon and begins giving him advice as to what he should do in light of his earlier disastrous test of the men's commitment at B.110 ff. This new advice will ultimately lead up to the catalogue of ships at B.492. Nestor's address to Agamemnon begins at B.344 ff. with, what we should now come to expect, the vocative of the patronymic Ἀτρεΐδης.

(18) Ἀτρεΐδῃ σὺ δ' ἔθ' ὥς πρὶν ἔχων ἀστεμφέα βουλήν
 ἄρχευσ' Ἀργείοισι κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμῖνας,
 τοῦσδε δ' ἔα φθινύθειν ἓνα καὶ δύο, τοί κεν Ἀχαιῶν
 νόσφιν βουλευώσ'· ἄνυσιν δ' οὐκ ἔσσεται αὐτῶν·
 πρὶν Ἄργος δ' ἰέναι πρὶν καὶ Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο
 γινώμεναι εἴ τε ψεῦδος ὑπόσχεσις εἴ τε καὶ οὐκί.

B.344

...

τὼ μὴ τις πρὶν ἐπειγέσθω οἶκον δὲ νέεσθαι
 πρὶν τίνα παρ Τρώων ἀλόχῳ κατακοιμηθῆναι,
 τίσασθαι δ' Ἑλένης ὀρμήματά τε στοναχὰς τε.
 εἰ δέ τις ἐκπάγλως ἐθέλει οἶκον δὲ νέεσθαι
 ἀπτέσθω ἧς νηὸς εὐσέλμοιο μελαίνης,
 ὄφρα πρόσθ' ἄλλων θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπίσπῃ.
ἀλλὰ ἄναξ αὐτός τ' εὖ μήδεο πείθεό τ' ἄλλω·
 οὗ τοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος ἔσσεται ὅττι κεν εἴπω.²⁴⁷
 κρῖν' ἄνδρας κατὰ φῦλα κατὰ φρήτραις Ἀγάμεμνον,
 ὥς φρήτρη φρήτρηφιν ἀρήγῃ, φῦλα δὲ φύλοις.
 εἰ δέ κεν ὥς ἔρξης καὶ τοι πείθωνται Ἀχαιοί,
 γνῶσθι ἔπειθ' ὅς θ' ἡγεμόνων κακὸς ὅς τέ νυ λαῶν
 ἦδ' ὅς κ' ἐσθλὸς ἔησι· κατὰ σφέας γὰρ μαχέονται.

B.354

House of Atreus, just like before, keep your unshaken plan
 and lead the Argives down into their awful encounters;
 but like these here, let them perish, the one or two who
 make their own plans apart from the Akhaians, we will get no use from them.
 Let them go to Argos before they learn from aegis-bearing Zeus
 if his promise were false or not.

...

Thus, let no one be anxious to return home
 before he has made it with some Trojan's wife
 and paid them back for our groans and for Helen's wandering off;

²⁴⁷ Kirk describes these two lines (360-361) as "a solemn introduction," Kirk, G. S., *The Iliad: A Commentary, Volume I Books 1-4*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 155.

but if someone in his mindlessness wishes to return home,
 let him take his own black and well-benched ship
 so, in sight of the others, he may meet death and his fate.
 But *Anax*, reflect yourself and listen to another,
 and what I say will not be something for you to cast aside lightly.
Now Agamemnon, arrange the men according to their tribe and their phratre
so tribe can back up tribe and phartre, phratre.
If you do this, and the Akhaians obey you,
you will know then which commander is kakos
and which is esthlos, since they will be fighting on behalf of their own.

In this speech, Nestor begins by giving Agamemnon some of advice that might best be characterized as ‘general’: “keep an unshakable plan,” “lead the Argives down into their awful encounters,” “let them die who make plans on their own.” However at 362 Nestor re-addresses Agamemnon, this time merely as *Agamemnon*, and the advice he gives him now is specific and, more importantly, as it pertains to testing the men’s reliability and dedication, it cannot be for general consumption.²⁴⁸ It is specific advice on how he can tell whom he can and whom he cannot rely on. It is not that the men cannot know that they will be arranged by tribe and *phratre*; they will know this at once, once the order has been given. What they cannot know is *why* the order has been so given, namely to test their reliability. In order for such a test to work practically, the men cannot know they are being tested. One reading, which is consistent with what I have laid out above, is that the familiar form of address marks this part of Nestor’s speech, beginning at 362 *ff.*, as an aside meant for Agamemnon alone. The shift from address by title to address by given name (re)constructs the social space within which Nestor’s discourse will now take place. The use of the given name alone, because this pattern is as statistically marked as it is, in fact helps us as the audience read this portion of the speech

²⁴⁸ See note in Kirk, 85, on B.365-8.

as marking Nestor's attempt to build a more intimate frame for the following discourse, a discourse that I have suggested has to be more intimate in order for it to work. Nestor's advice needs to be given in secret; his use of the given name merely suggests to us that it *is* given in secret. We can see how Nestor's address does this because we know that Agamemnon is not addressed solely as Ἀγάμεμνον in any other instance, except here. When we consider this fact in conjunction with the content of the following discourse which it introduces, we can read this section of Nestor's speech as not taking place in the presence of the other Greeks. That the other Greeks never seem to be able to address Agamemnon in this way, and the fact that Nestor so addresses him *only here*, combine to suggest that Nestor's address is special, singular, but special in terms of its degree of intimacy specifically. This is what the use of the given name suggests here. It is not just the very oddness of this form of address, but the way in which it is odd, that suggests that here its discourse, the rest of Nestor's speech, is meant to be read as not made openly. Form and context, speech within a social context, combine to inform our reading of that speech.

Let me be clear here. The given name *qua* address does not *per se* mark the address as more intimate. Agamemnon is often addressed with by his given name, however always in conjunction with either the patronymic or the title ἀναξ. If the given name itself always implied greater intimacy, than those addresses which contained both the given name and one or more of the deferential terms of address would be internally inconsistent.²⁴⁹ Rather, it is the absence of deference implicit in an address which does

²⁴⁹ Note that addresses like φίλ' Ἀτρεΐδῃ *vel sim.* Are not attested. Addresses so characterized (e.g., *my dear Mr. President*) usually seem to imply that the more intimate address 'trumps' the more deferential and also seems to have the further implication that speaker claims to be able to trump the more deferential address. By such an address, the speaker constructs a social position in which deference is not only not

not contain a specifically deferential term like the patronymic which further implies intimacy. Lack of deference where deference is expected ascribes a lack of superior status for the addressee and can have a number of further potential and contextually determined implications. In the case of the older Nestor (who already has some age-defined status) imparting advice to the younger Agamemnon, the implication is clear and further defines a setting in which such advice can be most felicitously be given in secret.

This particular example points up an aspect of address. In forming an utterance, speakers consider not only the potential impact of their statement on the specific addressee, but also its impact on other bystanders who may perceive it. Thus, Nestor's desire to address Agamemnon as Ἀτρεΐδῃ or Ἀγάμεμνον may derive not only from his desire to construct a specific social space between himself and Agamemnon, but a desire to be perceived constructing such a space by others.

The form which [one] gives his utterance may as much be inspired by what he expects the reactions to be on the part of any known presence ...²⁵⁰

Since any utterance *U* may take place in the presence of non-participating bystanders, the social space constructed by it takes place within and further constructs a larger social space that includes those bystanders.²⁵¹ In the case of Nestor, since he is allowed to address Agamemnon as Ἀγάμομνον —note, he is not reproached here by

necessary but is often overtly rejected. Note that something similar happens at A.122 with κύδιστε and φιλοκτεανώτατε where by the latter, Akhilleus makes specific claims about the appropriateness of Agamemnon's claim to *kudos*.

²⁵⁰ Verschueren, Jef, *Understanding Pragmatics*, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 90. Verschueren defines *presence* as “[a person] who [is] ‘present’ at or in the vicinity of a speech event or, put differently, in a position that would enable them to become engaged in the event.” *op. cit.*, p. 82.

²⁵¹ Cf. Goffman, 81.

Agamemnon for being ‘too familiar’ — his use of the patronymic in other contexts may be understood as reflecting a primary concern for the construction that larger, more general social space that includes the other Greek leaders as bystanders.

Some independent support for the importance of the patronymic as a sign of status comes from Agamemnon himself. Near the beginning of Book 10, the Greek camp is under threat of falling to the Trojans. The Greek leaders are in genuine fear for their ships. The embassy to Akhilleus of the preceding book has failed to draw him back into the fight. Now Agamemnon summons a second council, to get advice from Nestor on how to proceed. Agamemnon is seen here ordering that the men be awoken from sleep and called to council. As a way of assuring that this goes well he says to Menalaos:

(19) φθέγγεο δ' ἥ κεν ἴησθα καὶ ἐγρήγορθαι ἄνωχθι K.67
πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων ἄνδρα ἕκαστον,
πάντας κυδαίνων· μηδὲ μεγαλίζεο θυμῷ,

“Give a shout wherever you go and order them to wake up
by naming each man by the ancestry of his father
and so giving all their kudos, and don’t take a haughty tone with them.”

Here Agamemnon directly equates πατρόθεν τινὰ ἐκ γενεῆς ὀνομάζων with κυδαίνων αὐτόν. Its opposite in turn is μεγαλίζων θυμῷ. The implications of this are that for Agamemnon, one’s πατρόθεν ἐκ γενεῆς ὄνομα is equivalent to one’s proper *kudos*. To not acknowledge another’s patronymic is to overstep one’s place, to be haughty. Thus, (23) above strongly suggests the importance of proper address within the context of the *Iliadic* world.

4.2.3 Diomedes The preceding analysis of Nestor’s speech to Agamemnon, if valid, can be extended, and allows us a tool with which to critique other passages in the

Iliad. In particular, when we extend the above analysis to consider forms of address for Diomedes, we are presented with tools that allow us to say some things about his characterization in the *Iliad*.

Unlike Akhilleus, unlike the other heroes, but like Agamemnon, Diomedes is, with three exceptions which I will discuss below, never addressed except with his patronymics. One question we need to ask ourselves is whether this fact suggests something specifically about how Diomedes' character relates to that of Agamemnon. Both clearly do not occupy the same social position; Diomedes is not the ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν. Yet he is not like the other heroes either. In Akhilleus' absence, he is the preeminent fighter. Diomedes is clearly an unusual character. In the narrative frame of the *Iliad*, he features most prominently in the interlude between Akhilleus' withdrawal from battle and Hektor's assault on the Greek camp. Here, he seems almost to be a stand-in for Akhilleus.²⁵² He is praised by Nestor at I.57 *ff.* because, although he is young, nevertheless, he speaks like an older man (ὀπλότατος γενεῇφιν· ἀτὰρ πεπνυμένα βάζεις ... κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες), implying that he has both the strength of youth and the wisdom of old age — albeit not Nestor's wisdom.

(20) ἡ μὲν καὶ νέος ἐσσί, ἐμὸς δέ κε καὶ πᾶς εἴης, I.57
ὀπλότατος γενεῇφιν· ἄτὰρ πεπνυμένα βάξεις
Ἀργείων βασιλῆας, ἐπεὶ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες.

²⁵² For comparisons of the character of Diomedes with that of Gilgamesh, see Gresseth, G. K., 'The Gilgamesh Epic and Homer' *CJ* 70, 1-19; Burkert, W., *The Orientalizing Revolution*, Cambridge, 1992, Andersen, Ø., 'Diomedes, Aphrodite, Dione: Background and Function of a Scene in Homer's *Iliad*,' *Classica Mediaevalia* 48, 1997 pp., 25-36.

“Indeed, you are young, you could even be my son,
you are the youngest here in years, but what you say is inspired²⁵³
to the Argive leaders, since you said what was necessary.”

Another important fact stands to indicate his exceptional status. He alone of the mortal heroes in the *Iliad* is able to take on gods in battle. In fact, in both instances it is he who is successful, wounding both Aphrodite and Ares; in the latter case his actions almost constitute hyperbole —a mortal warrior defeats the god of war in battle. This act is exceptional even within the context of the exceptional world of the Homeric heroes. Ankhises may have sex with the goddess of sex, but Diomedes defeats the god of war in battle.²⁵⁴ Thus, within a work whose gestalt is battle, in this instant at least and by this act, Diomedes is presented as the supreme warrior. In the case of his attack on Aphrodite he is even verbally equated with the gods when Dione assumes that his actions must have been those of some god (21).

(21) χεῖρί τέ μιν κατέρεξε νῆπος τ' ἔφατ' ἐκ τ' ὀνόμαζε· E.373
τίς νύ σε τοιάδ' ἔρεξε φίλον τέκος Οὐρανίωνων
μαψιδίως,²⁵⁵ . . .

She [Dione] stroked her [Aphrodite] with her hand, spoke to her and addressed
her.
“What Olympian did these things to you, dear child?
rashly,” . . .

What turns out to be the actions of Diomedes, can only be conceived of as the actions of a god (Οὐρανίωνων), and a rash (μαψιδίος) one at that.²⁵⁶ Note that these acts are never

²⁵³ For a discussion of πεπνυμένα, see Austin, N., *Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer's Odyssey*, UC Press, 1975, pp. 74-75

²⁵⁴ This of course can be contrasted with his own statement at E.601-606, where he urges his men to withdraw in light of his perception that Hektor is fighting on the side of Ares.

²⁵⁵ Also spoken by Zeus to Leto Φ.509-510.

equated with *hubris*, nor do they bring the reprisal that we might well expect. Diomedes presumes to take on the gods in battle and does so and that is all. Thus, Diomedes seems to inhabit a liminal space at this point; he is not divine yet he is somehow more than human; his actions are assumed to be those of a god. Interestingly, although he is, in essence, Akhilleus' proxy in these middle books, he is also portrayed as somehow more distant, less approachable than Akhilleus.²⁵⁷ We cannot, for example, imagine Diomedes weeping for a lost companion as Akhilleus does for Patroklos.

As I have stated, Diomedes' special status is paralleled by a distinction in how he is addressed, a distinction that parallels what we have seen for Agamemnon. The first example I wish to consider takes place at an important turning point in Diomedes' *aristeia* of Book 5. Early in the book he has been wounded by Pandaros' arrow rather severely.²⁵⁸ After calling on Sthenelos to pull out the arrow, he calls upon Athene to help him. It is clear that it is the wound and Sthenelos' removal of the *belos* that prompts Diomedes' prayer, and that it is his prayer that prompts Athene's reply. Athene's reply comes, then, in the context of Diomedes' expression of his pain and his prayer for help.²⁵⁹

(22)	ὥς ἄρ' ἔφη, Σθέnelος δὲ καθ' ἵππων ἄλτο χαμᾶζε, πᾶρ δὲ στᾶς βέλος ὥκν' διαμπερές ἐξέρυσ' ὤμου· αἶμα δ' ἀνηκόντιζε διὰ στρεπτοῖο χιτῶνος. δὴ τότε ἔπειτ' ἤρᾶτο βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης· “κλυθὶ μὲν αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος Ἀτρυτώνη,	E.112 115
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²⁵⁶ μασιδίως appears only as an adverb in Homer, never as an adjective.

²⁵⁷ Here, we may wish to contrast Diomedes' meeting with Glaukos in Book 6. with the embassy to Akhilleus in Book 9. Both scenes involve the exercise of *xenia*, yet Akhilleus is portrayed as more sympathetic, more human than is the businesslike Diomedes.

²⁵⁸ Later, similarly wounded, the majority of Greek warriors will withdraw from the battle, leading to Hektor's assault on the Greek camp and ultimately to Akhilleus' return to battle.

²⁵⁹ We may compare the language of Diomedes prayer to that of Khryses in Book 1, with its traditional format of “hear me, κλυθὶ μὲν, if ever something, εἴ ποτέ ... παρέσσης, grant me something, δὸς δέ τέ μ' ἄνδρα ἐλεῖν...”

εἴ ποτέ μοι καὶ πατρὶ φίλα φρονέουσα παρέστης
 δηῖω ἐν πολέμῳ, νῦν αὖτ' ἐμὲ φίλαι Ἀθήνη·
 δὸς δέ τέ μ' ἄνδρα ἐλεῖν καὶ ἐς ὄρμην ἔγχεος ἐλθεῖν
 ὅς μ' ἔβαλε φθάμενος καὶ ἐπεύχεται, οὐδέ μέ φησι
 120 δηρὸν ἔτ' ὄψεσθαι λαμπρὸν φάος ἡελλίοιο.
 ὣς ἔφατ' εὐχόμενος· τοῦ δ' ἔκλυε Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη,
 γυῖα δ' ἔθηκεν ἐλαφρά, πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὑπερθεν·
 ἀγχού δ' ἰσταμένη ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·
 125 θαρσῶν νῦν Διόμηδες ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι·
 ἐν γάρ τοι στήθεσσι μένος πατρώϊον ἦκα
 ἄτρομον, οἷον ἔχεσκε σακέσπαλος ἵπποτα Τυδεύς·
 ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον ἢ πρὶν ἐπῆεν,
 ὄφρ' εὖ γιγνώσκῃς ἡμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα.

so he spoke and Sthenalos jumped to the ground from his chariot
 and stood beside him and drew the sharp dart out through his shoulder
 and blood spurted out through his pliant cloak.
 and then indeed war-cry-wise good Diomedes prayed,
 “hear me tireless child of Aegis bearing Zeus.
 If you ever were concerned for my father and stood by him
 in battle with the enemy, now show the same care for me, Athene.
 Allow me to take the man and get him to come into range of my spear
 who saw me first and shot me and boasts about it and says that I won’t
 for much longer see the bright light of the sun.”
 So he spoke in prayer, and Pallas Athene heard him,
 and made his limbs, his feet and his hands above, light.
 And she stood by him and spoke winged words:
 “Buck up now, Diomedes and fight against the Trojans,
 for in your heart I have placed your father’s strength
 which is un-trembling, like the shield bearing horseman Tydeus had.
 I took the mist, which was there before, away from your eyes
 so you can recognize both god and man.”

Note that Athene’s reply begins with the supplementary participle θαρσῶν, ‘buck-up.’

Her language, from the very first word, clearly denotes her intention to offer support.²⁶⁰

In fact, as Athene states, she has already taken care of his problem (ἐν γάρ τοι στήθεσσι μένος πατρώϊον ἦκα).²⁶¹ In addition, in the very act of helping him, she has also

²⁶⁰ The participle plus imperative construction —the infinitive μάχεσθαι here clearly functions imperatively as otherwise the clause would lack a main verb— is found only here. The bare imperative θάρσει is used at: Δ. 184, Menelaos to Agamemnon; Θ.29, Zeus to Athene; K.384, Odysseus to Dolon, on which, see below; O.254, Apollo to Hektor; Σ.463, Hephaistos to Thetis; X.384, Zeus to Athene; Π.171, Hermes to Priam. All (with the exception of K.384, Odysseus to Dolon) constitute entities who are kindly disposed to their addressee.

invoked his father (πατρώϊον and ἱππότηα Τυδεύς) as if she were appearing as a supporter in Tydeus' stead. In general, her language has much of the feel of paternal support, and the use of the familiar form of address adds to the feeling of intimacy in a manner similar to what we saw in Poseidon's speech to Akhilleus at Φ.288, (8) above. Note also that the alternative line (23) satisfies the meter and sense of the line that is attested —if we apply Parry's notion of 'essential idea' — with an acceptable hiatus after the vocative.²⁶²

- (23) * θαρσῶν, Τύδεος υἱέ, ἐπὶ²⁶³ Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι
 “Buck up, son of Tydeus, and go fight with the Trojans”

In fact, this line would be readily interpretable. “Buck up, son of Tydeus, and fight against the Trojans.” The difference is that the latter seems to build upon Diomedes' status and stature as the source for Athene's comfort. Diomedes should take heart because he is the mighty son of Tydeus. The former version, the one attested, predicates Athene's support on her feelings of intimate concern for Diomedes. This suggests that, as we saw in the case of Akhilleus above, the choice of familiar, given name for the address here is purposeful. The poet then seems to be attempting to convey something about the relationship that the speaker, in this case Athene, wishes to construct with Diomedes —a relationship that is predicated primarily on a degree of intimacy with the addressee, offered as a prelude to her offering of support, rather than on emphasizing his status.

²⁶¹ This is not the first time Athene has imbued him with μένος, (cf. E.1-2).

²⁶² This form of the patronymic address is found at Δ.370, Κ.159 and Θ.152.

²⁶³ Or perhaps with ποτὶ, although this word never appears with Τρώεσσι and rarely with the dative in the *Iliad*.

The next two examples occur during the episode narrated in Book 10, often referred to as the *Doloneia*.²⁶⁴ Here, Diomedes and Odysseus are out alone at night between the two camps, in the dark, on a scouting mission and raid. Diomedes has of course volunteered for this mission when no other would (K.218 ff.).²⁶⁵ As they creep along, Odysseus sees Dolon, who is also on a spy mission and raid, and he speaks to Diomedes.

- (24) ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἵππων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν κάλλιφ' ὄμιλον,
βῆ ῥ' ἀν' ὁδὸν μεμαῶς· τὸν δὲ φράσατο προσιόντα
διογενῆς Ὀδυσσεύς, Διομήδεα δὲ προσέειπεν·
οὗτός τις, Διόμηδες, ἀπὸ στρατοῦ ἔρχεται ἀνὴρ,
οὐκ οἶδ' ἢ νήεσσιν ἐπίσκοπος ἡμετέρησιν,
ἢ τινα συλήσων νεκρῶν κατατεθνηώτων.
ἄλλ' ἐῷμέν μιν πρῶτα παρεξελθεῖν πεδίοιο
τυτθόν· ἔπειτα δέ κ' αὐτὸν ἐπαΐξαντες ἔλοιμεν
καρπαλίμως· εἰ δ' ἄμμε παραφθαίησι πόδεσσιν,
αἰεὶ μιν ἐπὶ νῆας ἀπὸ στρατόφι προτιελεῖν
ἔγχει ἐπαΐσσω, μή πως προτὶ ἄστυ ἀλύξῃ.

But when he left behind the company of horses and men
he went on his way eagerly. And as he went forth, he was recognized
by god-sprung Odysseus, who spoke to Diomedes
“Hey Diomedes, there is some man coming from the camp
I don’t know whether he is a spy of our ships
or is lurking in order to strip one of the bodies of the dead.
but let’s let him pass by over the field first
a little, then let’s run up and take him
quickly; but if he runs past us on foot,
keep driving him from the camp to the ships
and go after him with your spear so he won’t somehow escape back to the city.”

²⁶⁴ This episode is assumed by some critiques to be an interpolation, on which, see *inter alios*: Shewan, Alexander, *The lay of Dolon (the tenth book of Homer's Iliad); some notes on its language, verse and contents, with remarks by the way on the canons and methods of Homeric criticism*, Macmillan and co., Ltd., London, 1911; Fenik, B., *Iliad X and the Rhesos: the Myth*, Collection Latomus 73, Brussels-Berchem, 1964; Stagakis George, ‘Dolon, Odysseus and Diomedes in the Doloneia,’ *RhM* 1987 CXXX : 193-204, and ‘Athena and Dolon's spoils,’ *Archaiognosia* 1987-1988 5 : 55-71; Davidson O. M., ‘Dolon and Rhesus in the Iliad,’ *QUCC* 1979 N° 30: 61-66. For bibliography see Hainsworth, B., *The Iliad: A Commentary, Volume III: Books 9-12*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 155. The discussion of the *Doloneia* as a Homeric interpolation lies well beyond the scope of the present work.

²⁶⁵ Once Diomedes has volunteered, others, especially the two Aiantes, Meriones, Antilokhos, Menalaos and Odysseus, immediately volunteer to accompany him.

Thus, Odysseus is addressing Diomedes in the context of an ambush that is about to be sprung. Again, as in (18) above, the address is intended for private consumption. And again, the use of the given name in Odysseus' address helps define that intimate context. We may also suggest further, that in this context, an ambush, at night, in the corpse-littered no-man's-land²⁶⁶ between the two camps, that some of the social niceties that hold in other, more public contexts can be dropped. Thus, the given name here helps define the context, the social setting, in terms of the relative power of the two participants. That relationship is one now defined by a camaraderie between soldiers who are alone in the dark, on a dangerous mission, a mission that no one but Diomedes would originally volunteer for. The given name form of address, by its potential to signal greater *Distance* (i.e., degree of social intimacy, see Chapter 2) and/or lessened *Power* (i.e., hierarchical distance) is used here by Odysseus to construct a closer situational social relationship. Since the context of their talk exchange does not involve them in a power struggle, the given name address functions here to affect only the *Distance/Solidarity* Axis of the social space (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Schematized Social Space with Shift along the *Distance/Solidarity* Axis

²⁶⁶ see K.297, f. βάν ῥ' ἴμεν ὥς τε λέοντε δύω διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν
ἄμ φόνον, ἄν νέκυας, διὰ τ' ἔντεα καὶ μέλαν αἶμα.

We can see then, that context helps define the axis or axes along which the social space will be redefined by a speaker's politeness work. Because Diomedes and Odysseus are not in a situation defined by any overt and public struggle for prestige, Odysseus' use of the more familiar, less prestigious form of address is read as involving a reduction in *Distance* and not in *Power*. The same process can be seen at work later at ln 474 ff. in Book 10, when the same two encounter the Thracian Rhesos.

- (25) Ῥῆσος δ' ἐν μέσῳ εὔδε, παρ' αὐτῷ δ' ὠκέες ἵπποι K.474
 ἐξ ἐπιδιφριάδος πυμάτης ἱμάσι δέδεντο.
 τὸν δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς προπάρειθεν ἰδὼν Διομήδεϊ δείξεν·
 οὗτός τοι Διόμηδες ἀνὴρ, οὗτοι δέ τοι ἵπποι,
 οὓς νῶϊν πίφανσκε Δόλων ὃν ἐπέφνομεν ἡμεῖς.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ πρόφερε κρατερόν μένος· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ
 ἐστάμεναι μέλεον σὺν τεύχεσιν, ἀλλὰ λύ' ἵππους·
 ἥε σύ γ' ἀνδρας ἔναιρε, μελήσουσιν δ' ἐμοὶ ἵπποι.
 ὥς φάτο, τῷ δ' ἔμπνευσε μένος γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
 κτεῖνε δ' ἐπιστροφάδην· τῶν δὲ στόνος ὄρνυτ' ἀεικῆς
 ἄορι θεινομένων, ἐρυθθαίνετο δ' αἶματι γαῖα.

But Rhesos slept in the middle, and by him his fast horses
 were tied up from the top of the car by thongs.
 Odysseus saw him first and pointed him out to Diomedes.
 “Diomedes, here’s that man and those horses
 that Dolon told us about before we killed him.
 But come on, show us that strength, you should not
 stand by idly with your gear, come set the horses free
 or you at least kill the man, and the horses will be my concern.”
 so he spoke, and Glaukopis Athene inspired Diomedes with strength.
 Back and forth, as he began to slay, an unseemly groaning arose from them
 As he struck them with his sword, and the earth reddened with blood.

The above two examples have something in common with Nestor's address to Agamemnon in Book 2, (18) above. In both cases, the address reflects the non-public nature of the encounter and the speaker's desire to exploit and manipulate that aspect of the social space, and further signals that to us as audience. Although the settings are significantly different, the social dynamics (*Distance/Solidarity* and *Power*) are significantly similar to allow the same strategy to be employed to approximately the same

ends, constructing a more intimate social space. What is significantly similar is that these two encounters are not public and that the choice of address, therefore, does not involve the dynamic of *Power* on display, which is more prominently at play in public encounters. Note, however, that this fact is not expressed in the Nestor/Agamemnon talk in Book 2, but is suggested by the nature of the content of Nestor's discourse and can be further supported by comparison with the Odysseus/Diomedes talks in Book 10, where the non-public nature of the talk exchange is explicit.

4.3 Conclusion In this chapter, I have offered evidence to support my contention that the two alternative forms of address that indicate token identity of the addressee, the patronymic and the given name, were not merely metrical alternatives for each other, and that the choice between one or the other of these forms of address was not driven merely by the exigencies of oral 'composition in performance.'²⁶⁷ Rather, I have argued that the choice of address served other, additional, specifically pragmatic needs and reflected the complex verities of Homer's narrativized social settings. Although their usefulness as aids to composition, within the formulaic scheme described by Parry *et alii* has not been challenged here, the suggestion I have advocated is that the determining factors behind the poet's choice of one form over the other involved a more complex set of determinations than meter and 'essential idea' alone. In fact, in this chapter, I have suggested that the Parryist notion of 'essential idea' is, in fact, extremely problematic. It is problematic not only because it is, in fact, undefined, but also because it is not at all clear that characterizations, at least on the social level, are essentializable. Agamemnon is not just Agamemnon; he is sometimes *anax*, sometimes *Great House of Atreus*, and

²⁶⁷ Lord, A., *The Singer of Tales*, Harvard University Press, 1960.

sometimes merely Agamemnon. Part of the thrust of this chapter has been to suggest not that this term, 'essential idea,' needs to be (re)defined, but that, in fact, it is not useful at all, and that the concept of 'essential idea' in respect to Homeric composition needs to be replaced. Thus, by looking at some of the pragmatic factors at play in Homer's choice of terms of address we are offered a window into the complexity and richness of the poet's composition and style as a whole.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this study, I have attempted to lay out a model methodology for the analysis of direct address in Homeric poetry. In particular, this method contrasts in its results with that of the oral theory of Parry-Lord, *et aliorum* and its evaluation of the formulaic style of Greek epic in one important way. According to the Parry-Lord model, the epic formulae served to aid composition in performance —and perhaps to add a traditional tone to the resultant poetry— but at the cost of what Parry calls *le mot juste*. The resultant constraint on the poet had the effect of imparting a certain semantic opacity to the forms used. This opacity is summed up in Parry's use of the term *essential idea*. By this, Parry seems to have implied that behind concepts like that embodied in the term 'Agamemnon' lay a single and simple unchanging core idea or identity, its essence, which is always implied when that term is used and is what is most important about that idea. For the oral compositionist following Parry's model, the strictures of meter and the demands of composition in performance had the result of simplifying referents by rendering all semantic baggage of such concepts, including any potential social, political, or psychological implications, effectively invisible. If Agamemnon were called Ἀτρεΐδης at some point, it was because the meter could accommodate only that term and none of the others which might potentially be used to refer to Agamemnon. Therefore, the term Ἀτρεΐδης could not be assumed to carry any other implication beyond that which

compelled its choice in the first place. From a semantic standpoint, that would be the *essential idea*, ‘Agamemnon’ at its most basic. Much work has been done in the intervening years in response to the implications of the Parry-Lord oral theory for the interpretation of Homeric poetry much of it critical to some degree of the implications of the stricter applications of this theory to the texts of Homer. This scholarship is well surveyed by Russo and it would be redundant to repeat such a survey here.²⁶⁸ This study will attempt to serve as part of that process of critique.

In the first chapter, I discussed certain features of Iliadic society that seemed important for our understanding of the context for Homer’s embedded speeches.²⁶⁹ In particular I discussed the importance of the performative nature of Iliadic social position. Thus, in the *Iliad*, social position is not institutional —although it presents elements reminiscent of institutional social structures like Agamemnon’s and Khryses’ staves— but is constantly available for (re)negotiation. In the case of Khryses, for example, his priest’s staff serves as a symbol of his social role as priest of Apollo, which in turn equates to a certain social status. However his status is successfully challenged by Agamemnon at the beginning of A.26 ff, and then again further redefined through the intervention of Apollo, Akhilleus, and Nestor during the progression of much of the rest of Book 1. We can also see how social position is constantly under renegotiation in the struggle between Akhilleus and Agamemnon, which dominates Book 1 but which is not fully resolved until Book 23. During Book 1, Akhilleus goes from a position of

²⁶⁸ See Russo, 97.

²⁶⁹ I purposefully contrasted the term ‘Iliadic’ with the often used ‘Homeric,’ to emphasise that, for the analysis of the speeches within the text of the *Iliad*, I would make no reference to any impinged performative or compositional, ‘real world’ setting.

significant importance within the society of the Greek *stratos* to one of near complete, and effective marginalization.²⁷⁰ The abortive duel between Glaukos and Diomedes in Book 6 and their subsequent acknowledgment of their mutual *xenia* re-effected by their exchange of gifts represents still another example of how status and role can be changed. In the latter case, even the seemingly fixed and institutional role of *enemy* is available for renegotiation.²⁷¹

In Chapter 2, I presented a model of language analysis based primarily on the work of Grice, Brown and Levinson, Culpeper, *et aliorum*, which can broadly be called pragmatic. In this model, language is seen as a primary feature of local social interaction and is subject, therefore, to immediate social constraints and information. In particular, I have suggested how the language of Homer, rather than being rendered static, disconnected, and abstracted through the machinations of formulaic oral composition in performance, might, while still retaining its traditional character, be seen as more flexible, more semantically sensitive, more ‘meaningful.’²⁷² I have suggested how sociolinguistics can offer up methodologies, useful already for interpreting language as it appears within a real world social context, which may fruitfully be applied to analogous uses of language in literature. In particular, I have focused on the effects of the social structures of hierarchy and familiarity, which are summed up in the term *politeness*. Politeness here, after Brown and Levinson, refers to the effects of power and solidarity on language, and to language as encoding those features of social interaction. I have

²⁷⁰ Akhilleus is never completely marginalized, and his former/potential presence is constantly referred to, which in turn allows for his eventual reintegration, in like Thersites, whose marginalization by Odysseus in Book 2 is complete.

²⁷¹ Cf. also, the case of Priam in Book 24.

²⁷² This sensitivity after all, is imparted by more than a limitation on the distribution of certain lexical items.

suggested that within Iliadic culture, which is hierarchical in an interesting and particularly manifest way, language might be sensitive to those features of that society that seemed important to the poet to express. Thus, incidents in the narrative of the *Iliad* such as the supplication of Khryses, the feud between Akhilleus and Agamemnon, the abortive duel between Glaucos and Diomedes, the embassy to Akhilleus, the supplication of Priam *et aliae res* offered the poet of the *Iliad* the opportunity to make use of language that is sensitive to the social dynamics present in those very incidents, if this kind of expression were possible for him within the strictures of Greek epic composition however that is ultimately conceived of as taking place.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I discussed specific applications of this model to the language of the speeches of the *Iliad*, which showed how the poet could express such social dynamics. For the present work, I focused on one aspect of linguistic-social negotiation, *address*. Since address represents the point in language of most direct social interaction or contact between speaker and addressee (or audience), I suggested that this is the point where language should be most acutely and directly reflective of the dynamics of the relationship under negotiation. Thus, when Hektor addresses Paris as δῦσπαρι or Nestor addresses Agamemnon as Ἀγάμεμνον, they make immediately manifest their take on the relationship existing between themselves and those they have thus addressed; in fact, they serve to construct those relationships. Different forms of address, say φίλε or τέκνον respectively, would have constructed vastly different relationships and thereby altered how the subsequent discourse (and action) would have

developed. In these chapters then, I suggested how, even for Homer, forms of address are particularly sensitive to the social and narrative contexts in which they are presented by the poet as being ‘uttered.’

In the preceding four chapters then, I have laid out a model for the analysis of Homeric poetry based on such a sociolinguistic model of politeness. I have suggested that in the text of Homer, the language of the speeches in particular has a relationship to its narrative context which is analogous to that which spoken, natural language has to its context. Specifically, I have attempted to show that the language of the speeches not only can be seen to be sensitive to the social dynamics of that surrounding narrative context, but depends crucially on information provided by that context in order to be understood. Thus, a form like *δαίμονι* depends crucially on reference to a complex complex of relevant contextual information regarding the social relationships of the speaker and addressee as well as information pertaining to the speaker’s immediate reason(s) for the address. Specifically, the speaker claims surprise at a new state of affairs and hence situational authority to act correctively towards the addressee regarding that state of affairs. In the texts of Archaic Greek epic, we are presented with an almost ideal opportunity to practice such a study, since information about the context within which speeches occur is provided by the narrative frame.²⁷³ I have suggested that the information provided by that context consists of two basic kinds of information: background information (i.e., the preexisting beliefs which interactants bring to their talk

²⁷³ I have left aside, for the moment, any discussion of the role of the ‘tradition’ in the constitution of the context of the Homeric speeches. This is not a theoretical decision but a practical one. Despite the work of scholars like Lord, Nagy, Foley, etc., we still do not securely know enough about what constituted the underlying epic tradition to base any discussion of the information value which that tradition could add to the context of the text of Homer without greatly expanding the size of this study. Such a discussion is not without merit, but lies outside of the scope of this present study.

exchange), and situational information, which is local (i.e., site-specific at the time of the talk exchange).²⁷⁴ Since context includes, crucially, information about the setting, it follows that all speech is local. Since context is predicated on speaker beliefs, yet addressees cannot know —i.e., have direct access to— speaker beliefs, it follows that hearers must construct a mental construct of those beliefs, and that participants, therefore, construct their own individual (version of the) context. The fact that interpreters construct their own mental picture of the context in which their talk exchange (or any language which is perceived) takes place allows language to have the appearance of being able to be used non-locally (e.g., as in the case of written texts or reported speech). In this way, there is no *formal* difference for those interpreting speech (addressees or hearers) between direct speech and the indirect language of reported speech or written texts; interpreters construct a context for that language as part of the process of interpretation. The chief difference lies in the confidence with which interpreters hold those beliefs, based upon which they construct the context in which that speech (or text, or language) is understood to ‘take place.’ The greater the confidence with which interpreters hold the beliefs that constitute their background knowledge, and the more the setting is directly observable to them, the more likely interpreters are to feel confident about applying their knowledge of that context to the process of interpretation and the more speakers are able with confidence to leave unexpressed elements of their intended message (ellipsis). The processes of interpreting speech that is directed at the observer and immediately situated, versus indirectly observed, reported speech (or writing) are, then, quantitatively and not qualitatively different.

²⁷⁴ ‘Local’ here implies both spatial and temporal locality.

In a narrative text such as the *Iliad*, we are presented, in the form of the narrative frame, with the narrator's version of some of that observable context. In the case of the *Iliad*, this consists not only of information about the physical setting for speech, but of some information about the mental states of speakers as well. Thus, the narrator can present his audience with speeches of certain characters whom he previously characterizes emotionally, e.g., as being angry (κεχολωμένον) or speaking confidently (μύθων), as glowering (ὑπόδρα ἰδών) or laughing (γελάσας), as understanding (πεύθετο) or not, etc.²⁷⁵ We have also seen that subsequent portions of a discourse which follow an address can and do add to the context and help inform how some element of that speech is to be taken.²⁷⁶ We can compare how the address form Ἀτρείδη κύδιστε might be seen to work in the contexts of the following two full verse addresses.

- (1)

□ φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων	A.122
Ἄτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε □	
□ ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον	T.146 κ.τ.λ.

In the former case, the subsequent φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων suggests that Ἄτρεΐδῃ κύδιστε is to be taken as, perhaps, sarcastically and critically intended. First, that reading is informed, in part, by referring to the preceding narrative context, which functions to supply aspects of the audience's *background knowledge*.²⁷⁷ Agamemnon is commander in chief (ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, A.17); he has humiliated the priest of Apollo who has come as a suppliant (λίσσεται); this has resulted in a plague that threatens his expedition; he is told he must return the priest's daughter to her father; however, he has refused to do this

²⁷⁵ See, especially, Lateiner.

²⁷⁶ That is, addressees can retroject.

²⁷⁷ Some background knowledge probably was supplied from knowledge of the contents of the epic 'tradition,' which lay behind their present story.

unless he gets another girl in exchange. Agamemnon's actions, his equivocating between the safety of the army and his immediate personal desire for γέρα, threatens the lives of the whole Greek army, who are —as they speak (so to speak)— dying (ὀλέκοντο δὲ λαοί). Second, in such a context, it is then through a comparison of the juxtaposed addresses 'most deserving of *kudos*' and 'most desirous of stuff,' that the latter can inform the former.²⁷⁸ In this case, the latter address, φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων, highlights the situational problems inherent in Agamemnon's status when that status is considered in respect to his immediately preceding actions. How can Agamemnon now be both κύδιστε and φιλοκτεανώτατε?²⁷⁹ The answer would seem to be that he cannot. Since φιλοκτεανώτατε is more consistent with the current characterization of Agamemnon, based on the current background knowledge of him, which is itself predicated on his actions and their effects, in essence φιλοκτεανώτατε overrides the expectations produced by κύδιστε, which those actions have, to some extent, contradicted. Thus, just here, φιλοκτεανώτατε redefines κύδιστε. Akhilleus' address of Agamemnon, by exposing the problems posed by Agamemnon's desire for a new replacement prize, constitutes what I have called a face-threatening act. Specifically, by exposing the problem in Agamemnon's wishes, it constitutes a threat to his positive face (his desire to be liked) and a threat to his negative face (his desire to feel unimpeded in his actions) since by criticizing those wishes, it is more likely that Agamemnon will feel inhibited in acting upon them.

²⁷⁸ This compound address, with its internal inconstancy and contrast, directly threatens Agamemnon's face and seems to function as an example of what Culpeper has called *corrective impoliteness*. Culpeper, 1996.

²⁷⁹ That is, as leader, ἄναξ, in this time of crisis, for him to put his own wants above the needs of the army directly threatens that army. Considering the performative nature of authority within the Greek *stratos*, Agamemnon's actions (φιλοκτεανώτατε) effectively undercut his own authority (κύδιστε).

We might wish to engage in a bit of speculation here. How might Akhilleus' speech at A.122 *ff.* be read if it were introduced by the address attested at T.146 κ.τ.λ.? In such a case, Akhilleus' speech might read less as an overt corrective ("Don't expect the *laoi* to just give you another prize, there are no more γέρα left to dole out"), and more as a reminder of the status ("Remember, you can't expect the *laoi* to give you another prize now, since there are no more γέρα to dole out"). That is, the tone of the following speech and hence our expectations for the subsequent discourse, and even of Akhilleus' and Agamemnon's characterizations, change if we were to substitute A.122 with T.146.

Agamemnon then, according to Akhilleus, is supreme in greed; this greed has resulted in a catastrophe for his flock, and *this* now, according to Akhilleus, is the source of his reputation; this is the kind of *kudos* he is worthy of. Culpeper's *corrective impoliteness* is impoliteness used to correct faulty behavior, and this seems to be what Akhilleus is offering here with this address at 122. The relationship between A.122 and T.146 (1) suggests the trajectory of Agamemnon's necessary redefinition. That is, Agamemnon must reestablish his *kudos*-worthiness. He must reconstruct a public identity, a face, which is no longer based on his φιλόκτημα but rather on his being effective as ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν.

But Akhilleus, by his address at A.122, also characterizes himself. He has already been seen as a man who is concerned enough about the good of the army that *he*, rather than the ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν, calls the assembly in order to attempt to solve the problem of Apollo's plague. Now, at A.122, Akhilleus presents himself as one who will stand up to that ἄναξ, whom his actions have already problematized, when that leader further

threatens the needs of the *laoi*.²⁸⁰ Akhilleus, not only declines to use the expected address for Agamemnon, but calls attention to that fact, and by doing so, redefines him. Thus, Akhilleus' speech is defined as impolite (in Culpeper's sense) by the address that opens it and this redefinition casts that speech as distinctly and strongly corrective rather than advisory and supportive (our imagined alternative version). Akhilleus' claim to the situational authority to act correctively in this way comes from (is read as arising out of) the threat to Agamemnon's *negative face*²⁸¹ —the source of his provisional authority— implicit in the contrast and the contradiction between the expected κύδιστε and the novel φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων. We can then read Agamemnon's subsequent and increasingly hostile intransigence as the result of his apparent perception of Akhilleus' *Face Threatening Act* as much as arising from some inherent character flaw.

In general, in this study, I have offered evidence for how forms of address seem to allow speakers and addressees to interact dynamically via language with the narrative contexts in which those addresses are presented as being 'uttered.' I have focused on forms of address because they seem especially sensitive to context. This is because address directly reflects the relationship constructed between speakers and their addressees at the very point of their interaction. Thus, κύδιστε above does not have a meaning, but rather, its meaning seems to change depending on how it is used. At A.122 this term might mean something like "you who *claim* to be most worthy of *kudos* (but are really just greedy)." In T.146, it might mean something like: "you who are most worthy of *kudos* (because you are ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν)." What the above discussion hints up is that

²⁸⁰ I note here Nagy's etymology (after Palmer, 1963) of Ἀχιλλεύς as from ἄχος λαῶν. Nagy, 1979.

²⁸¹ Negative face is defined as the desire to be free to act by having one's actions approved of.

forms of address act both to construct a context for speech and to react to that context. In a sense, that means that κύδιστε at A.122 is as much part of the context for φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων, as φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων is for κύδιστε, and both are embedded in a context informed by the background knowledge supplied by preceding narrative.

Some headway toward understanding how this happens can be made by referring to Eleanor Rosch's concept of the *prototype*.²⁸² For Rosch, concepts are not predicated on a set of necessary and sufficient features, but on a *prototype*. Thus, the meaning of, say 'dog,' would come from relating some contextually situated instantiation of a dog (either an actual physical animal, or a picture of one, or even the word 'dog' read or heard) to that prototype. Next, it may be helpful to think of the prototype not as a concise, well-delineated mental object, but as an abstraction across a set of exemplars. In fact, we may wish to replace the prototype with that variable set of exemplars all together. If the concept behind 'dog' is a set of example contexts in which things labeled therein 'dog' were encountered, then any instantiation of 'dog' need not refer equally well to all examples. That is, the example contexts could be ranked hierarchically according to relevance (after Sperber and Wilson). Such a model allows the actual physical animal, a picture of one, or even the word 'dog' read or heard all to be able to mean 'dog.'

In the case of more abstract concepts like κύδος or φιλόκτημα, the exemplars are not a set of prototypical κύδεα or φιλοκτήματα, but of instances, contexts in which these terms were or could be used. Such terms do not refer to objects but to states-of-affairs.

²⁸² Rosch, E., "Classification of Real-World Objects Origins and Representations in Cognition," in Ehrlich, S., and E. Tulving, eds., *Le Memoire Semantique*, Bulletin de Psychology, 1976.

In this way, such abstracts are similar to verbs, which instantiate states-of-affairs, i.e., contexts. Therefore, their prototypes must be similar to those of verbs, i.e., prototypical states-of-affairs, i.e., a set of example contexts. The upshot of this is, that while terms like ‘dog’ can refer to a prototype which is somehow abstractable (even if it is not actually so abstracted), terms like κύδος or φιλόκτημα cannot. They must always refer to states-of-affairs and hence contexts. This theory at once presents problems for Parry’s ontological notion of identity, which lies behind his concept of the *essential idea*.

Names, even in Homer, reflect a situational/social identity. This is what allows Akhilleus to be Πηλείδης, Ἀχιλλεύς, and τέκνον, while at the same time restricting when he can be addressed by these terms. If these terms all refer to the same, purely ontological identity, then they should be in free variation, and hence always equally applicable. That they are not now can be seen to follow from the fact that they refer to an identity that is socially and contextually constructed and is not fixed. Thus, that Agamemnon must be addressed at least as either Ἀτρείδης or ἄναξ follows from the fact that his social position within the Greek *statos* crucially depends on his history and his office; he is necessarily defined by these in a way that the other Greek elite are not. Agamemnon’s social position depends on maintaining maximal distance between himself and the other Greeks on the power axis of social hierarchy.²⁸³ This is achieved in the *Iliad* by an insistence on his being addressed in a way that refers not to his personal identity, but to his history and his office.²⁸⁴ When, at B.362, Nestor addresses him only as

²⁸³ Hence his insistence on a replacement girl as a symbol, both by virtue of his possession and by virtue of his ability to demand one, of his social position. Recall that distance along the power axis generally translates to distance along the solidarity/relation axis, although not necessarily.

²⁸⁴ This could also take place in a way which subsumes his personal identity under his social and situational identity as ἄναξ.

Αγάμεμνον, he effectively but momentarily collapses that distance and replaces it with an intimacy in which he may allow himself to act in an avuncular manner, dispense advice, and anticipate that that advice will be heeded.

In the discussion in Chapter 3 of address forms like φίλε and δαιμόνιε, we saw how functional rather than formal criteria determine ‘meaning.’ Such terms, while formally referring to the addressee, by showing the appropriate grammatical agreement, serve to characterize the speaker as much as the addressee and to construct a network of references between speaker, addressee(s), the previous narrative, and the content of the speaker’s subsequent speech. In this way, these forms functioned in ways that are traditionally ascribed to a formally distinct grammatical category, the interjection particle. Such an analysis, based on sociolinguistic concepts including politeness, with its reference to the features of power and solidarity, explains those aspects of use of δαιμόνιε, which Brunius-Nilsson noticed and described but was unable to fully account for. Specifically, sociolinguistics, with its insistence that function rather than form define use, allows us to account for aspects of use which Brunius-Nilsson could not account for by means of formalism alone, namely, the failure of the adjective δαιμόνιε to characterize its referent in a lexically consistent way. In a model of literary language in which form governs function, Homer’s use of this and other forms of address presents a problem. The problematics of such cases can begin to be dealt with when we approach them through the lens of sociolinguistics. In a similar fashion, the use of names as address forms, when divested of the burden of strict and inflexible ontological identity, can be seen to reflect a richness of social, political, and situational identity, and in turn, that

social world can come to inform and enrich our reading of the text in a way that was difficult and, in fact, was flatly counterindicated, under the burden of the strict economics of Parry's *essential idea*.

In conclusion then, I would like to suggest that such an approach offers a valuable means by which to view the language of what has been traditionally called traditional literature. Specifically, sociolinguistics offers tools to analyze language, which is itself placed into a social setting such as that found in the speeches of the *Iliad*. In this study I have touched on one feature of that language, the forms of address. However, sociolinguistics and politeness theory, in particular, offer tools for examining the use of many aspects of the language of such speeches or of the literary presentation of direct contextualized speech in general.

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