Fixing the “Happy Valley”: British Sentimentality and Their Intervention in Kashmir, 1885-1925

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This dissertation titled

Fixing the 'Happy Valley': British Sentimentality and Their Intervention in Kashmir, 1885-1925

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Abstract

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Fixing the "Happy Valley": British Sentimentality and Their Intervention in Kashmir, 1885-1925

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My research explores the emotional resonance of the Kashmir dispute in South Asian politics. I trace the roots of this dispute back to the era of British imperialism when Kashmir was ruled by an Indian *maharaja* as part of the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir. Even in those days, Kashmir enjoyed a reputation for beauty and grandeur, which perhaps explains why the princely state to which the region belonged was so often abbreviated as simply "Kashmir." In premodern times, the region was a favorite vacation spot of the Mughal emperors, who enjoyed the cool mountain air and spectacular views of Kashmir's environment. When the British intervened directly in Kashmir from 1885-1925, partly in response to the devastating 1877-80 famine in Kashmir, they opened the region to a broad range of tourists. Like the Mughal emperors of yore, these tourists sought in Kashmir an escape from the heat of the lowland regions of India. British colonial policy toward Kashmir during these four decades of direct intervention was designed to accommodate the needs of primarily Western tourists. Today, Kashmir's physical allure remains as potent as ever, despite the region's all-too-frequent descent into political violence. My research explores how Kashmir evolved into a region whose landscapes and air, but not its inhabitants, came to matter to more powerful outsiders. This dynamic, which we still see today, developed during the British colonial era.

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Introduction: Fixing the 'Happy Valley'

While visiting Kashmir in 2016, the first thing locals told me was that outsiders care more about the place than the people. Beyond causing me to pause and reexamine my own relationship between the place and people I was visiting, this observation made me reflect on how this unsettling dynamic came to be, and how affection for a place might shape its history and people. This question is one of the primary motivators driving the subject of this dissertation.

The second question driving this dissertation is a subsidiary one that I was confronted with upon leaving Kashmir, which has continued to be posed to me ever since: why do people care about Kashmir? Are there significant natural resources in Kashmir which have pit India and Pakistan continually at war with one another over it? Is it important to the economic prosperity of either country? What are the strategic advantages derived from its possession? Does Kashmir cover the flank of either country and therefore increase the security of these rivals' heartlands?

None of the answers to these questions have ever satisfied me. While Kashmir does possess some unique agricultural resources, it remains one of the poorer provinces in India today and is still lacking in economic development. While Kashmir does produce hydroelectric power for neighboring states, it seems unlikely that this alone sufficiently explains the region's importance. As for strategic depth, it is exceedingly difficult to move troops through the north-south Banihal pass connecting Jammu and Kashmir, especially compared to the more gradual gradient running east-west along the Jhelum River into Pakistan. It is geographically isolated from mainland India, and so it seems

unlikely that the lack of Indian troops in Kashmir would create a strategic liability for the rest of the country.

Especially in comparison to the amount of intense passion generated by the topic in India and Pakistan and among the diasporic communities across the globe from the region, military or economic frameworks do not seem to capture fully Kashmir's importance. Whether it is rhetoric about Kashmir being 'integral to India' or the 'jugular of Pakistan,' there is something extremely emotionally charged about this topic in the politics of both countries which has driven citizens to kill and die over the province. While some news pieces do an adequate job breaking down the basic facts involved with the history of conflict and nature of the disputing claims between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, they do not really address why India and Pakistan are so interested in Kashmir in the first place.[1] This dissertation will explore what it is that makes the Kashmir so emotionally charged in contemporary politics in South Asia by tracing its roots back to the era of British imperialism, when Kashmir was undivided and included within the princely state of Jammu & Kashmir under the rule of a Maharaja.

In most Indian princely states, the British established a Resident, who wielded a great deal of authority over the local ruler and represented imperial interests. However, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir was more autonomous than other native rulers, owing to the agreement established with Gulab Singh, the founder of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and so the British did not impose a resident until 1885. Unsatisfied by this measure, however, in 1889 the British divested the maharaja's powers in a state council,

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[1] "Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan Fight over It," BBC News, 8 August 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/10537286

only restoring the maharaja's powers partially in 1905. The British also enacted a land settlement scheme during this period, among other reforms to Kashmir's administration, and undertook archaeological survey projects, translations of ancient texts, and museum curation to bolster the credibility of the ruling Dogra maharajas. Scholars have often explained the imposition of a Resident and implementation of administrative reforms as a rational colonial assessment of the strategic risks posed by lack of economic development, sound governance, and political legitimacy along India's northern frontier. To the contrary, using this era of British preponderance in Kashmir, from 1885 to 1925, as a case study of imperial statecraft, this project removes the connection between economic development and political stability from a rationalistic framework and places it within an emotive model in which the creation of value is the product of a politically mediated, historical process.

This work also investigates how dialogue and exchange between historical actors modified this emotive model or were produced by it. For example, Britons did not exoticize Kashmir on their own; Kashmiris played a role as well. Kashmiris perceived potential benefits from various portrayals of their homeland to outsiders, and they perpetuated these notions while trying either to encourage or discourage British intervention. Too often, scholars have portrayed princely states as "hollow crowns" that were unable to shape their own histories under the suzerainty of British imperialism.[2] In fact, the British did not create their understandings of Kashmir out of nowhere; local

[2] Nicholas B. Dirks, *The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

agency played an important role.[3] Placing British and native agency within an emotive framework creates a more dynamic understanding of the historical process by which colonial Kashmir policy developed and interrogates the often-misunderstood role of colonial 'divide and rule' tactics, credited for enabling British rule over a subcontinent of hundreds of millions of people.

Many Britons lamented the decision to rule Kashmir indirectly. From the view of some in the colonial administration, the plight of Kashmiri Muslims suffering under a Hindu Maharaja posed a strategic threat, reflecting Kashmir's position as a buffer state between British India and Afghanistan, with Russia looming just beyond, expanding southward over the course of the nineteenth century. Relying on ample historical examples, British strategists viewed their British Indian Empire as most vulnerable from invasion from the northwest, whether from their Russian rivals or the threat posed by Afghan invasions of India. Robert A. Huttenback contends that Kashmir's independence was steadily eroded by this increase in Anglo-Russian rivalry on the northwestern frontier.[4] Characterizing Kashmir as "the playing board for the Great Game," Huttenback considers Kashmir's strategic importance as an "even more irresistible temptation" for the British than its "climate and natural beauty."[5] Other work has also emphasized the

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[3] Eugene Irschick, *Dialogues and History: Constructing South India, 1795-1985* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994).

[4] Robert A. Huttenback, "Kashmir and the Great Game" in "The Man on the Spot," Roger. D. Long, ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995).

[5] Robert A. Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj 1847-1947* (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1.

strategic imperative guiding British dealing with Kashmir, written either with approval in dealing with a wayward maharaja and introducing modernity to Kashmir,[6] or scathing criticism at the British Empire's disgraceful treatment of a sovereign ruler.[7]

Even if some did not find external threats to be credible, their immediate concern was that an external threat could foment internal instability in British India. Parshotam Mehra concurs, arguing that regardless if one supported a forward position on the frontier or advocated meeting external enemies on the banks of the Indus River, policy makers were consistently concerned that external encroachment on India could incite internal complications, and worked to induce the Chinese to agree to a demarcated border line.[8] Reflecting their view of India in communal and religious terms, the British feared that Muslims suffering in Kashmir under a Hindu Maharaja could also invite relief from their Afghan co-religionists across the border. When a Resident was appointed, the given reason was to ameliorate the condition of Kashmiris and correct the Maharaja's fiscal mismanagement. This nominally economic framework of intervention was underpinned by the broader strategic imperatives placed on the region by colonial officials, though it may also have reflected interest in the lucrative Pashmini shawl trade in Central Asia.

[6] F. M. Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974), and Dilip Kumar Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition (1885-1893)* (Calcutta, World Press, 1975).

[7] Madhavi Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir, 1876-1894* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1984).

[8] Parshotam Mehra, *An 'Agreed' Frontier: Ladakh and India's Northernmost Borders 1846-1947* (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1992).

But perhaps there was more behind the decision to impose a Resident and divest powers from the Maharaja than rationalist frameworks of economic development or geostrategy allow. There is a tension between the notion that Kashmir was autonomous due to its strategic importance but also lost that autonomy due to that same reason.[9] During their intervention, the British Resident sought to induce the maharaja to reduce his military expenditure, not increase it.[10] Though the Russian threat menaced in the mid-1880s, culminating in the Panjdeh incident in 1885, the crisis had subsided by the mid-1890s. Anxiety regarding an Anglo-Russian clash subsided for a few reasons, namely the establishment of a pro-British ruler on Hunza's throne, the 1893 extension of the Afghan border further northeast to create a buffer zone, and Russia's defeat in its war against Japan.[11] However, Maharaja Pratap Singh's powers were not restored until 1905, when Lord Curzon agreed to partially restore the Dogra ruler. His powers were not restored in full until 1921, and even then, the resident remained to give the maharaja guidance, which was expected to be followed in all instances.

Mehra contends that personalities, as much as political factors or strategic considerations, played a vital role in the creation of frontier boundaries.[12] Exploring these

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[9] Christopher Sneddon, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 4.

[10] Demi-official letter from T. C. Plowden, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Kashmir Residency, 8 September 1888, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., March 1889, Nos. 6-49, National Archives of India (NAI).

[11] Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battlegrounds: Cold War in the Himalayan Highlands*, Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, Robert A. Huttenback, eds. (Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 68.

[12] Mehra, *An 'Agreed' Frontier.*

personalities and their ideas about Kashmir could reveal the emotive underpinnings of colonial frontier policies and add necessary nuance to the historiography of the 'Great Game.' These personalities were major contingencies that shaped relations with the princely states themselves. For example, Lord Lansdowne thought very little of Maharaja Pratap Singh until he finally travelled to the Kashmir Valley on a visit in 1891.[13] Residents were chosen based on their friendship to the maharaja, who meanwhile incessantly appealed his case to his British friends in high places, such as Frederick Roberts in the army and Charles Aitchison in the Punjab Government, or William Digby and Charles Bradlaugh in Parliament. These friends applied real pressure on the Government of India to relax their policy towards the maharaja, with varying success.

Meanwhile, some Britons speculated that "the very word Cashmere exercises a powerful charm over the Muscovite imagination," as Lord Lytton reported to Lord Salisbury at the Indian Office prior to the former taking office as viceroy of India in 1876.[14] *Russian World* had a similar opinion of Lytton, remarking that "Lytton, being a novelist, had a romantic mind—a dangerous trait in a statesman—'but it is an inalienable appendage to Russophobia.'"[15] This mirror imaging fueled the longing for possession of Kashmir, showing how strategic interests aligned with the heroic adventurism driving

[13] Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 140-142.

[14] British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Lytton Papers, letters dispatched, vol. 1, Lytton to Salisbury, Mar. 14, 1876; found in Huttenback, "Kashmir and the 'Great Game'" in *The Man on the Spot: Essays on British Empire History*, ed. Roger D. Long. (Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1995), 153.

[15] National Archives of India, Sec. Procs., 60-79, Nov. 1877, Proc. 76; found in Huttenback, "Kashmir and the 'Great Game,'" 155.

many British partakers in the Great Game. Ananya Jahanara Kabir has demonstrated eloquently how colonial representations of Kashmir have produced desire.[16] These emotions of desire were themselves consequential in shaping British policy towards Kashmir, and they have histories of their own.

By the time of their intervention in Kashmir in the late nineteenth century, the British sentimentality towards the Kashmir Valley was reflected in their characterization of it as the "Happy Valley."[17] The British enacted reforms to Kashmir's administration during the intervention that were often designed to accommodate the influx of tourism to the Kashmir Valley. This intervention was shaped as much by a desire for stability along India's northern frontier as it was by British sentimentality for a 'home away from home' in the Valley of Kashmir, where tourists could escape the summer heat of the plains of India amid the cool respite of the mountains. British romanticizing of Kashmir was not limited to their sense of sport and adventure but also factored into their idealization of the communities of Kashmir as existing in relative harmony with one another in the 'Happy Valley'. The British portrayed Kashmir as a space without the religious animosity that plagued the rest of the subcontinent, with Hindus disregarding caste rules and Muslims forgoing the pilgrimage to Mecca. This romanticizing was exemplified by British efforts at historic and archaeological preservation in Kashmir, which attempted to highlight this syncretic tradition in Kashmiri culture and its integral relationship with Indic civilization.

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[16] Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire: Representations of Kashmir* (Minneapolis. MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

[17] W. Wakefield, *History of Kashmir and the Kashmiris: The Happy Valley* (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1879; repr., Delhi: Seema Publications, 1975).

This notion of a "Happy Valley" was brutally contrasted by the oppressed condition of Kashmiri Muslims, who were often enlisted in a system of forced labor called *begar*. Although the British took advantage of the *begar* system, they also expressed a paternalistic concern for those suffering under a system so similar to slavery.[18] Some Britons were critical of the maharaja's oppression and advocated for British intervention into the state's internal affairs with the professed interest in ameliorating the plight of Kashmiri Muslims. These factors should not be discounted as having led to the British imposition of a Resident and the land reform settlement, whereas most scholars contend that this was the humanistic gloss placed over strategic imperatives, or irrelevant in the face of the Russian encroachment on British India's northern frontier.[19] There was genuine moral revulsion at British imperialism's support of a tyrant who reduced his subjects to a status little better than a slave. The work of Mridu Rai and Chitralekha Zutshi has shown how British support for Hindu sovereignty, tempered by their demand that the maharajas respect the rights of their Muslim subjects, forever altered identity and connections in not just Kashmir but northern India, where respective groups took up the Kashmiri cause. These emotional connections with Kashmir only intensified after Partition in 1947, the successive Indo-Pakistani Wars, and the contemporary Kashmir insurgency, demonstrating the issue's continued salience.[20]

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[18] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 65-66.

[19] Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 89.

[20] Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, *Kashmir and the Future of South Asia*, 3.

The British colonial period arguably reshaped Kashmir's collective memory, affecting its modern history and politics in a way that may shed light on the conflict's intractability today. By exploring the British intervention into the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, we may retrace the emotional resonance of Kashmir and how that dynamic shaped Kashmir's subsequent history.

These factors indicate a need for a less rationalistic assessment of British thinking and behavior towards Kashmir. I will analyze the development of emotive modes of engagement with Kashmir during the colonial era to account more fully for the human factor in this historical narrative. I will also investigate the extent to which dialogues and exchange between different historical actors modified this emotive model or were produced by it. For example, scholars have questioned whether the notion of a religiously tranquil 'Happy Valley' laid the roots for the development of *Kashmiriyat.*[21] Though *Kashmiriyat* claims roots in pre-colonial Kashmir, historian Chitralekha Zutshi contends that this was a modern creation of the Indian nationalist narrative that sought to justify Kashmir's inclusion within secular, but Hindu-majority India.[22] In fact, there are no examples of the term being used prior to 1947, the year of Partition.[23] Shahla Hussain has recently added to our understanding of *Kashmiriyat* by showing how the nationalists who first conceptualized it "drew from indigenous traditions of regional religious coexistence, in which the older mystical religious traditions of Kashmir built bridges across religiously

[21] A regional Kashmiri identity that transcends Hindu-Muslim divisions into a single ethno-national consciousness. Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging.*

[22] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging,* 2-4.

[23] Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*, 225.

defined communities.... some Kashmiris had always held out the ideal of community coexistence."[24]

Scholarship deconstructing *Kashmiriyat* centers on nationalist politics preceding Partition and post-independence nation-building reforms, but not enough attention has been given to how colonial discourse factored into its development.[25] My project adds to this scholarship questioning national mythologies that may contribute to the conflict's intractability today. This deconstruction benefits society by guiding decision makers through complex nationalist narratives with deep historical roots. Although recent colonial scholarship has humanized natives within an emotive framework, few apply this same mode of analysis to British imperialists.[26] The historiography should avoid portraying British as rational actors and natives as emotional actors, or else they risk reifying colonial-era, racist stereotypes. Although historical actors, especially the British, often ground their decision making in a rationalistic foundation, the decisions people make are often rooted in our more-multifaceted understanding of reality. To grapple with this dilemma, I read sources 'against the grain' by scrutinizing attitudes and beliefs that often go unexamined, paying attention to gaps, silences, and contradictions to reveal new insights. As a result, this project builds on recent trends within fields that engage with

[24] Shahla Hussain, *Kashmir in the Aftermath of Partition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 7.

[25] Zutshi, "Whither Kashmir Studies?: A Review," *Modern Asia Studies* 46, no. 4 (July 2012): 1033–1048.

[26] For an exception, see Johannes Fabian, *Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

themes of imperialism and adds a necessary corrective to previous historiographical interpretations.

Chapter 1 presents the case for an emotive framework for historical analysis of colonial-era Kashmir and explores the emotional resonance of Kashmir during the period. Chapter 2 applies this analytical framework to the British imposition of a Resident in 1885 and the divestment of the Maharaja's powers in a state council in 1889, explaining how British interest in Kashmir as a tourist destination led to this intervention. Chapter 3 investigates how Kashmir's emotional resonance shaped road construction efforts during the period, subordinating strategic, fiscal, and environmental realities to symbolic goals. As a result, the long-promised railroad connection between Kashmir and British India was never constructed, which had serious consequences on Kashmir's history. Chapter 4 recounts the period of British reforms in Kashmir, arguing that these were designed to accommodate increasing tourism to Kashmir. Finally, Chapter 5 explores the power of emotions in the campaign for the restoration of the maharaja's powers. I will then conclude by reviewing the significance of this period in modern history, historicizing contemporary nationalist narratives that have roots in the colonial era.

The project is primarily constructed from primary source documentation, particularly the prolific travel accounts from Europeans who visited Kashmir during the colonial era, as well as archival documents that recount British public policy in Kashmir during the period in question and newspapers that took interest in the Kashmiri cause. It also uses secondary sources to fill in the gaps, for example, from scholars who have read documents in the Kashmir State Archives in Srinagar, India. The product will hopefully be a welcome addition to the scholarship on British imperialism in Kashmir, a guide for

policymakers looking for more background into understanding the region’s history, and of use for those wondering just what it is that makes Kashmir such a contentious issue today.

Chapter 1: A Home Away From Home: British Sentimentality Toward the 'Happy Valley'

"Who can gaze on such a scene, and not exclaim, as I do, "How beautiful is Kashmir!"[27]

During the nineteenth century, Kashmir became a haven for British who were attempting to escape the unforgiving heat of the plains of British territory in India. These travelers were awestruck by the valley's natural beauty. In Kashmir the climate was temperate, where visitors could recover their health, and where gentle meadows, streams, and lakes were contrast against a background of white-capped peaks. The proximity of the mountains to the valley's population centers meant the adventurous among the European tourists could readily access them for treks, hunting Kashmir's varied fauna. Those requiring relaxation could indulge it on the many houseboats found on Kashmir's lakes. From the perspective of the British, "the valley contains nearly everything which should make life enjoyable."[28]

Visitors were awed by mountains which were "infinitely varied in form and colour, they are such as an artist might picture in his dreams."[29] The unique topography was complemented by a similarly distinguished culture, which elicited the curiosity of many of its visitors: "The beautiful valley has been for many years a pleasure resort of

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[27] Mrs. Hervey, *The Adventures of a Lady in Tartary, Thibet, China, & Kashmir. With an Account of the Journey from the Punjab to Bombay Overland* (London: Hope and Company, 1853), 116.

[28] Walter Roper Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir* (London: Henry Frowde, 1895), 14.

[29] Ibid.

Europeans, and many books have been written on the subject of Kashmir."[30] The sense that the Valley was cut off from the rest of the world by its imposing mountainous barrier reinforced Kashmir's sense of timelessness and romance. Whether inspiring searches for Kashmir's ancient civilizational greatness, or just nostalgia of home, Kashmir's epic scenery earned a place in the hearts of nearly all its visitors, who were themselves important in shaping modern Kashmir, and in particular ideas about Kashmir that continue to resonate in the region's politics.

The very name of Kashmir was widely understood to carry with it an emotional resonance. Missionary William Wakefield describes how Kashmir's "name has become associated with a high degree of picturesque beauty, something distinctive, if not unique in character."[31] The emotional weight of Kashmir's name is also indicated by British officials and the Dogra Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir's court (*darbar*) always abbreviating its name as the Kashmir *Darbar*, even though the roots of the Dogra maharajas were in Jammu, to the south. The fact that Kashmir was more widely known than Jammu (or other areas included within the state of Jammu & Kashmir, such as Ladakh) gave the state more bonafides in its political legitimacy and communications with the outside world.

This abbreviation could cause confusion at times as to what was meant by "Kashmir." For example, in 1909, when a topographical survey was ordered for Kashmir, the Surveyor-General had to clarify "what is the exact geographical area covered by the

[30] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 1.

[31] William Wakefield, *History of Kashmir and the Kashmiris: The Happy Valley* (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1879), 3.

name Kashmir?" due to the fact that "the name Kashmir is of political rather than geographic significance."[32] In another instance, when the Officer on Special Duty announced the imposition of a Resident on the maharaja in 1885, the officer intentionally changed the Viceroy's message to "Kashmir and Jammu" from "Kashmir" so as to prevent the maharaja from arguing that the "message referred to Kashmir only, and not to the whole State."[33] And in 1903, when the Resident found himself needing to expel a European traveler, he wrote the Foreign Department clarifying whether he did indeed have the ability to expel a traveler from Jammu, despite the Notification No. 605-P., dated 28 March 1873, which gave the Resident the power to expel any person from Kashmir. The Foreign Department informed him that the term Kashmir in this instance denoted the whole of Kashmir State.[34]

Even still today, the understanding of what exact area is meant by the term Kashmir is often unclear. This lack of clarity continues to obfuscate discourse regarding the region's political status and future. This dynamic is particularly relevant to debates

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[32] Letter from Brevet-Colonel S. G. Burrard, Officiating Surveyor-General of India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, No. 547, Simla, 31 July 1908, National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi, India.

[33] Letter from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, in Foreign Department, Letter no. 227, Jammu, 15 September 1885, R/2/1072/188, India Office Library and Records (IOR), British Library, London.

[34] Letter No. 2326-E., Simla, from Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, Simla, 13 November 1902, in Question regarding Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction Exercised by the Resident in Kashmir, Foreign Department, External, A., Proceedings, January 1903, Nos. 16-17, NAI.

surrounding the plebiscite promised by India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, regarding Kashmiri statehood, but which was never held. The confusion around what is to be considered Kashmir is sometimes held up as a reason for never holding the plebiscite. As a result, partly due to the political prestige attached to Kashmir's name and reputation, Kashmiri citizens have never been given the opportunity to decide their own future, as their political destinies have been intertwined with other groups within the same political unit.

Kashmir's reputation for beauty long preceded the British era, however. Chitralekha Zutshi argues that "the axiom of Kashmir as the paradise on earth… was coined by the Mughal emperor Jehangir."[35] Jehangir adored the Kashmir Valley and traveled there many times during his 22-year reign. He is said to have exclaimed, "Truly, this is the paradise of which priests have prophesied and poets."[36] But Jehangir may have been inspired by this Persian poem about Kashmir, of which the authorship is unknown but is often attributed to Amir Khusrau:

Agar Firdaus bar rōy-e zamin ast,

hamin ast-o hamin ast-o hamin ast.

If there is a paradise on earth, it is here, it is here, it is here.

[35] Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 29.

[36] G. M. D. Sufi, *Kashir: Being a History of Kashmir, From the Earliest of Times to Our Own,* Vol. I (Lahore: The University of the Punjab, 1948), 295.

Hakim Hamdani argues, however, that Zutshi's claim is "historically incorrect."[37] He instead locates the notion of Kashmir as a terrestrial paradise as extending back to "time immemorial."[38] He also asserts that it was not an idea imposed from outside but from within. Kashmiris, from the earliest of times, conceived of Kashmir as a paradise on earth as a way not just to differentiate their home from other lands but to formulate a sense of themselves, with the mountains forming a conceptual barrier that inculcated a sense of Kashmiri identity. He cites the twelfth-century CE poet Mankha, "who conveys a sense of Kashmir distinctness by contrasting it with the other: the lands that are different from Kashmir", to support his claim that "it is the geography much more than descent or language that defines the image of Kashmir."[39] This identity was syncretic in the sense of a "shared memory of the past", a memory inextricably tied to the Kashmir Valley as a place.[40]

The Mughals had annexed Kashmir under Emperor Akbar in 1586, and from that point on, "the valley cast its spell upon him, and his descendants."[41] The French physician Francois Bernier travelled with the Mughal Emperor Aurengzeb to the Kashmir Valley in 1664, and though he found the mountains Kashmir not as impressive as the Alps, he conceded that "it is not indeed without reason that the Moguls call Kachemire

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[37] Hakim Sameer Hamdani, *The Syncretic Traditions of Islamic Religious Architecture of Kashmir (Early 14th-18th Century)* (Routledge, New York, 2021), 17.

[38] Ibid., 1.

[39] Hamdani, *The Syncretic Traditions of Islamic Religious Architecture of Kashmir*, 3-4.

[40] Ibid., 4.

[41] Sachchidananda Sinha, *Kashmir: The Playground of India* (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Journal Press, 1943), 5.

the terrestrial paradise of the Indies, or that Ekbar was so unremitting in his efforts to wrest the scepter from the hand of its native Princes."[42] He reported that Aurengzeb's grandfather Jehangir loved Kashmir so much, that he used to say that would rather lose every province of his empire before he lost Kashmir.[43] Jehangir applied his passion for Kashmir to his construction of several gardens, canals, and monuments to accentuate the aesthetic of his terrestrial paradise. One of these was an octagonal stone basin at his favorite spring in the Valley at Verinag. There an inscription remarks that the scene "reminded us of the stream of paradise."[44]

But Jehangir's most well-known construction in Kashmir was Shalimar Bagh, a garden on the northeast of the capital Srinagar's Dal Lake that Jehangir dedicated to his wife Nur Jahan. P. N. K. Bamzai estimates that Jehangir's regular trips to the Valley had a positive effect on its governance by preventing local officials from engaging in corruption, and that "for Kashmiris Jehangir's reign is synonymous with justice and fair play."[45] Jehangir's love for Kashmir appears to have shaped Kashmir's history for the better despite of what is otherwise known of his personal qualities. It is important to note that Jehangir's reputation for good governance in Kashmir is at odds with his reputed

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[42] Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire, A.D. 1656-1668* (London: W. Pickering, 1826), 401.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Sinha, *Kashmir: The Playground of India*, 7.

[45] P. N. K. Bamzai, *Culture and Political History of Kashmir*, vol. 2, Medieval Kashmir (New Delhi: M. D. Publications, 1994), 404.

lack of interest in governing the rest of his empire.[46] Kashmir's beauty appears to have brought out the best in Jehangir.

The Mughal's fondness for Kashmir was a significant source of mystique surrounding the place when the British arrived in the subcontinent a century later. Travelogues written by British travelers during the period often refer to the Mughal's role and legacy in Kashmir. For example, James Arbuthnot, when describing the Shalimar Bagh in Srinagar, refers to the legend that "it was here that the famous Emperor Jehangir made up the only quarrel he ever had with his beautiful Nur Mahal" while explaining the garden's attraction.[47] Arbuthnot's interest in this scene was likely conjured from its depiction in the Thomas Moore's famous poem *Lalla Rookh* (meaning, "Tulip Cheek"):

And well do vanish'd frowns enhance
The charms of every brighten'd glance;
And dearer seems each dawning smile
For having lost its light awhile:
And happier now for all her sighs as on his arm her head reposes,
She whispers him, with laughing eyes,
"Remember, love, the Feast of Roses!"[48]

[46] Lisa Balabanlilar, *The Emperor Jahangir: Power and Kingship in Mughal India* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2020).

[47] James Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir* (1928), 15-16, in Jammu State Archives (JSA), Jammu, India.

[48] Thomas Moore, *Lalla Rookh: An Oriental Romance* (1817).

Ironically, perhaps the most influential depiction of Kashmir for nineteenth-century travelers to Kashmir was written by someone who had never been to Kashmir at all.[49] Depicting Aurengzeb's daughter's journey to Kashmir where she was to be married, Moore's description of Kashmir in *Lalla Rookh* captured the imagination of many Europeans who had an eye toward adventure in the east. Widely read back in Europe, "it indelibly glamorized Kashmir's reputation in the eyes of the [British] public."[50] Many European travelogues describing Kashmir began by identifying it as the setting of *Lalla Rookh*, connecting the Valley's global fame to the popularity of the poem.[51] Moore himself captures Kashmir's claim to fame by asking:

> Who has not heard of the Vale of Cashmere;
> With its roses the brightest that earth ever gave,
> Its temples, and grottos, and fountains as clear
> As the love lighted eyes that hang o'er their wave?
> Oh to see it at sunset,--when warm o'er the Lake,
> Its spleandour at parting a summer eve throws,

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[49] Perhaps it is not so ironic, however, considering one of the most popular references to Kashmir today is still Led Zeppelin's 1975 hit song, "Kashmir", and yet, none of the members of Led Zeppelin had ever travelled to Kashmir. William S. Burroughs, "Rock Magic: Jimmy Page, Led Zeppelin, and a Search for the Elusive Stairway to Heaven," *Crawdaddy Magazine*, June 1975: https://web.archive.org/web/20071017100737/http://www.geocities.com/thoea2004/thejimmyandbillshow.html

[50] Brigid Keenan, *Travels in Kashmir: A Popular History of Its People, Places, and Crafts* (Oxford University Press, 1990), 92-95.

[51] William Wakefield, *The Happy Valley*, 2.

Then the shrines through the foliage are gleaming half shown

And each hallows the hour by some rites of its own.

Though he had himself had never been there, Moore's account motivated his European readers to seek confirmation of Kashmir's beauty and grandeur by traveling there themselves.

Inspired by Thomas Moore's depiction of Kashmir in *Lalla Rookh*, like many of his contemporaries, photographer Samuel Bourne was in particular attracted to the varied landscape of Kashmir, which for him elicited nostalgia: "The freshness, fertility, verdure, and sylvan beauty of Kashmir is very great, and seems to remind one very forcibly of the hills and valleys, green fields, parks and pastures of England."[52] Bourne had become frustrated by what was, in his opinion, the monotonous topography of British India, lacking significant bodies of water among the "unvaried surface of barren rock and sand."[53] He lamented that if "he could only transport English scenery under these exquisite skies, what pictures would he not produce!"[54] Finally finding what he was looking for in Kashmir, his quest "was driven by a longing for what he had left behind."[55] Shaped by consumerism, nostalgia, and adventure, Bourne's photography characterizes the "extra edge" that historian Ananya Jahanara Kabir argues adds to our understanding

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[52] Samuel Bourne, "Narrative of a Photographic Trip to Kashmir (Cashmere) and Adjacent Districts," *British Journal of Photography* 13 (1866): 474-95, 524-25, 617-19; 619.

[53] Samuel Bourne, "Photography in the East," *British Journal of Photography* 10 (1 September 1863): 268-70, 345-47; 345.

[54] Ibid., 268.

[55] Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire: Representing the Valley of Kashmir* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 63.

of “the conjunction of an inherited tradition of landscape eulogy with a historically strategic location.”[56] “Slippery facts” and trepidation in the face of Eastern adventure were overcome by “photography's indexicality, and its superiority over other more equivocal signs, which gave it such importance in the colonial imagination.”[57]

Many other photographers and adventurers followed in Bourne’s footsteps, with “a penchant for high altitude landscape photography, as well as excitement generated by the Great Game,” pulling “photographers of different inclinations toward the Valley.”[58] These participants in the Great Game were in part motivated by emotions stirred by the stunning peaks of the Himalayas. Historian Elizabeth Leake argues that it has become more evident over time that “the appeal of the frontier was partly due to its remoteness.”[59] The very first participant of the Great Game, William Moorcroft, may have been pulled towards the frontier due to a similar dynamic. Historian G. J. Alder considers that it was “perhaps under the spell of the Himalayas” when Moorcroft was affected by an “elemental urge to penetrate this fascinating world of snow, mountain, river gorge, and glacier.”[60] Moorcroft’s writings indicate a fascination with the Kashmir Valley, recounting the vigor with which he sought to verify the numerous legends and

[56] Kabir, *Territory of Desire,* 66.

[57] Christopher Pinney, *Camera Indica: The Social Life of Indian Photographs* (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 20-21.

[58] Kabir*, Territory of Desire*, 66.

[59] Elisabeth Leake, *The Defiant Border: The Afghan-Pakistan Borderlands in the Era of Decolonization, 1936-1965* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 2.

[60] G. J. Alder, “Standing Alone: William Moorcroft Plays the Great Game, 1808-1825,” *The International History Review* 2 (2) (April 1980), pp. 172-215, 184.

traditions recounted to him by the Valley's inhabitants.[61] Following in Moorcroft's footsteps, the region's beauty and mystique continued to draw many more adventurers.

One of these adventurers was perhaps the most prolific photographer of the Great Game, John Burke. In contrast to Bourne's search for broad, breathtaking landscapes for his photography, Burke was more interested in capturing images of people: "Where Bourne sought tranquility, Burke sought dynamism."[62] Burke also assisted with the colonial Archaeological Survey of India's assessment of Kashmiri antiquity and heritage. This project sought to identify evidence of the ancient Hindu Kashmiri past, in a joint effort between the British and Dogra Maharajas to enhance the legitimacy of a Hindu ruling family over a majority-Muslim district. As a result, their efforts therefore coupled the institutionalization of modernity through photography with a sense of nostalgia, imagination, and loss of what was "just beyond" British India. Kabir concludes that "nostalgia thus collaborated with the struggle for the cartographic definition of the frontier region that was being played out through the Great Game."[63] As more of Kashmir was photographed, and more and more Europeans travelled to the Valley, the sense of 'just beyond' diminished as the region gradually detached from its historical connections with Central Asia and was reconstituted within British India, leading to

[61] William Moorcroft, *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab; in Ladakh and Kashmir; in Peshawar, Kabul, Kunduz, and Bokhara; by William Moorcroft and George Trebeck, from 1819 to 1825*, Vol. II, ed., H. H. Wilson (London: John Murray, 1841), 109, 130, 221.

[62] Kabir, *Territory of Desire*, 67.

[63] Ibid., 69.

Omar Khan's description of Burke's legacy as the "colonial imagination's conquest of Kashmir."[64]

This colonial reimagining of Kashmir was encouraged by the Dogra Maharajas, who sought to affirm their legitimacy as rulers of Kashmir, despite having conquered it with force only during the first half of the nineteenth century. Indologists and others, especially from the 1870s forward, sought to locate the ancientness of Hindu Brahmanism in Kashmir. For example, Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe expressed gratitude that "Kashmir fortunately possesses an ancient history, a civilization more ancient than our own."[65] For their part, as inheritors to the Mughals and as the new rulers of India, the British sensed that Kashmir was a historical prize of the subcontinents' rulers and worked to associate Kashmir with Indic civilization through their archaeological and historical preservation projects in Kashmir in order to bolster the authority of the British Raj, or their Indian Empire. As they were inheriting the mantle of rulers of India, by linking Kashmir's history with Indic civilization in general, they cast upon themselves the responsibility of restoring Kashmir (and therefore India) to its former greatness.

The British grappled with Kashmir and its historic importance through relating it to history that they knew well and considered central to what they perceived to be their own civilizational heritage. As a result, the British often compared ancient Kashmiri

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[64] Omar Khan, *From Kashmir to Kabul: The Photographs of John Burke and William Baker 1860-1900* (Ahmedabad, India: Mapin Publishing Pvt. Ltd., 2002), 63.

[65] Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade: A Description of the Beauties of the Country, the Life, Habits and Humour of Its Inhabitants, and an Account of the Gradual but Steady Rebuilding of a Once Downtrodden People* (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 1922), 67.

civilization with ancient Judaism while trying to make sense of Kashmir and its history. "Kashmir is a land of milk and honey," Tyndale-Biscoe claimed, and upon first entering the Kashmir Valley "one thinks of Moses on Mount Pisgah viewing the Promised Land."[66] Wakefield described the facial characteristics of Kashmiris as "Jewish in character, although there is nothing known that would connect their origin with any of the tribes, lost or otherwise, of that celebrated nation."[67] George Forster reported that "on first seeing these people in their country" that he believed that he "had come across a nation of Jews."[68] A missionary in Kashmir, Arthur Brinckman, compared oppression in Kashmir to "Israel in Egypt, with its cry continually going up to Heaven."[69] Walter Lawrence remarked that the most striking of faces among the Kashmiris are "always of a decided Jewish cast…. The hooked nose is a prominent feature, and the prevailing type is distinctly Hebrew."[70] European visitors to Kashmir who compared the region and its people to ancient Judaism were arguing for Kashmir's historic importance to not just Indic culture but world civilization in general.

The monument in Srinagar known as Takht-i-Suleiman, or throne of Solomon, also fueled speculation that the revered Hebrew king Solomon visited Kashmir and left

[66] Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade*, 55.

[67] William Wakefield, *The Happy Valley*, 97.

[68] George Forster, *A Journey from Bengal to England through the Northern Part of India, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Persia, and into Russia by the Caspian Sea* (London: R. Faulder, 1798), 20.

[69] Arthur Brinckman, "The Wrongs of Cashmere: A Plea for the Deliverance of that Beautiful Country from the Slavery and Oppression Under Which It is Going to Ruin" (1867), in S. N. Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir* (Freethought Literature Company, 1973), 26.

[70] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 318.

his mark on the Valley's culture and even topography.[71] Forster recounts how the "legends of the country assert" that when Solomon visited Kashmir, it was covered with water, and so "he opened a passage in the mountains" to drain the Valley of its waters, giving Kashmir "its beautiful plains."[72] There was also a reported belief among locals that Moses died in Kashmir, and that his tomb was located somewhere within the Valley.[73] Locals still today describe theories that suggest that Jesus traveled to Kashmir and rose to heaven there, so it is likely that Kashmiri legends encouraged Europeans to make connections between Kashmir and their own Judeo-Christian religious traditions.[74]

Wakefield also compared the architecture of a few temples in Kashmir "to the recorded disposition of the ark and its surrounding curtains, in imitation of which the temple at Jerusalem was built."[75] He concludes however that given Kashmir's "insulated situation" that it is more likely to be "a prototype than a copy of any known style."[76] The uniqueness of Kashmiri architecture has often been a theme in celebrations of its culture. However, Alexander Evans in his study on "Kashmiri Exceptionalism" argues that "Kashmir was never as isolated as the myths surrounding it suggest" but was instead a central location of political, religious, and economic exchange between Central,

[71] Moorcroft, *Travels*, Vol. 2, 115.

[72] Forster, *A Journey,* 11.

[73] Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, 430.

[74] This section references the author's conversations with locals in the Kashmir Valley in July 2016.

[75] Wakefield, *The Happy Valley*, 257-8.

[76] Ibid.

Southwest, and South Asia.[77] Despite Kashmir's historic interconnection with the surrounding regions, much of the writing on Kashmir suggests rather that it is a unique place, with a one-of-a-kind history, topography, climate, and culture. "Real" or not, this may reflect Kashmiri sensibilities about themselves, as European travelers' ideas about Kashmir were often shaped by local guides and other people with whom the inquired for information. For example, Moorcroft often recounted either employing locals to gather information for him,[78] or, upon hearing a story or local legend, deciding to investigate its veracity himself.[79]

This effort to reclaim Kashmir's ancient past served the purposes of the Dogra regime by refashioning themselves as Hindu rulers of an ancient Hindu state, but it also cast the majority Muslim population as latter-day interlopers, an unnatural, late addition to the Valley's heritage. Moorcroft, reflecting the racist ideas of his age, claims that the Kashmiri Hindus "have least intermixed with foreign races" and therefore lay better claim to representing the true face of Kashmiris.[80] He also laments that these days "literature of any description is almost unknown in Kashmir, and it is not easy to discover any relics of those celebrated Sanscrit compositions."[81] Administration reports from the British period reflected these bigoted assumptions about which Kashmiris were

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[77] Alexander Evans, "Kashmiri Exceptionalism," in Aparna Rao, ed, *The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture?* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2008), pp. 713-741, 720.

[78] William Moorcroft, *Travels*, Vol. 2, 142-143.

[79] Ibid., 277-278.

[80] Ibid., 128.

[81] Ibid., 130.

'authentic' in their argument that the "Kashmiri Hindus are less addicted to crime."[82] Archaeological efforts commissioned by the Dogra Darbar contended that Kashmir's seclusion was a more recent dynamic that resulted from the conversion of much of the Valley's population to Islam, whereas "in Hindu times, however, inter-communication between the mainland of India and Kashmir seems to have been, generally speaking, more frequent."[83] These archaeological efforts depicted the Hindu era as witnessing the flourishing of art and architectural craftsmanship, only to come into decline following the introduction of Islam.[84]

In this way, the existing Kashmiri Pandit population seems less a dwindling "Hindu enclave within a degenerate Muslim population but, in retrospect rather shamefully, as a 'pure,' Brahmin Hindu enclave."[85] Although the Dogra rulers were not Brahmins, they eagerly tied themselves to this legacy to bolster the credibility of their regime. The project not only sought to locate the ancientness of Hinduism in Kashmir but also the importance of Kashmir for Hinduism on the subcontinent at large. As such, the opening of the chapter on archaeology in Walter Lawrence's *The Valley of Kashmir*, which he recorded while compiling his report on the land settlement in Kashmir from 1889 to 1894, reads,

[82] Administration Report of Jammu and Kashmir State for 1893-4 (Calcutta, 1895), in JSA.

[83] R. C. Kak, Handbook of the Archaeological and Numismatic Section of the Sri Pratap Singh Museum, Srinagar (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Col., 1923), 3, in JSA.

[84] Kak, Handbook, 6-7, in JSA.

[85] Kabir, *Territory of Desire*, 90.

> The Valley of Kashmir is the holy land of the Hindus, and I have rarely been in any village which cannot show some relic of antiquity. Curious stone miniatures of the old Kashmiri temples (Kulr-Muru), huge stone seats of Mahadeo (Badrpith) [Shiva] inverted by pious Musalmans, Phallic emblems unnumerable, and carved images heaped in grotesque confusion by some clear spring, have met me at every turn.[86]

Despite Lawrence's task of reforming the relationship between Muslim peasants and Pandit landowners, his ideas about Hindu antiquity in Kashmir obfuscated his assessment of local power dynamics and reified the very injustices he was supposed to be reforming. As Mridu Rai observes, the effort to legitimize Dogra rule "allowed the Hindus of Kashmir to exclude Muslims in the contest for the symbolic, political and economic resources of the state."[87] Although Kashmir had a long history of rule under various regional empires, and its status as a kingdom under the rule of Gulab Singh was forged largely by his own personal will and military strength, this effort to locate Hindu antiquity coincided with a campaign to establish his heirs as the timeless, rightful rulers of Kashmir.

British officials intimately involved with the intervention considered the Maharaja to be a "regular petty Raja of the ancient type," wrapping their disgust with his maladministration in the notions of Oriental despotism so common during the imperial

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[86] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 161.

[87] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 14.

era.[88] Those Britons who opposed stripping the Maharaja of his powers grounded their support of him in the idea that he was the rightful, accepted ruler of Kashmir. Of all the Oriental despots you might have to work with, they argued, Pratap Singh was far from the worst luck of the draw: "But here was a sympathetic, tender-hearted, kindly despot, who was extremely anxious for the happiness of his people."[89] Yet the reality was the legitimacy of Dogra rule in Kashmir was based on conquest, not because of any 'naturalness' to their rule as Hindus. Just as any other form of nationalism finds some basis in myth, [90] the British sought to affirm the Dogra's right to rule Kashmir by transforming Kashmir from a state with a Hindu ruler to a Hindu state.[91] The British recognized that religion played a dual role in British Indian society: "it sustained and justified the established order while also providing an instrument for challenges to that order."[92] By intervening in the Kashmir State the British sought to entrench that state's stability by alleviating the condition of the impoverished Kashmir Muslim population and bolster the Dogra regime's legitimacy.

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[88] Confidential note on Kashmir Affairs in 1907-8 by Sir Francis Younghusband, Resident in Kashmir, India Office Records (IOR), British Library, London, United Kingdom.

[89] William Digby, "Condemned Unheard" (1890) in Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: British Intervention in Kashmir,* 70.

[90] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 1983).

[91] Rai, *Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subjects*.

[92] Kenneth W. Jones, *Socio-religious Reform Movements in British India* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 14.

This Oriental despot trope is one that Thomas Metcalf associates with the underpinnings of the British imperial project in India. Britons perceived India as alternately both similar and different to Britain in ways that simultaneously benefited the British Raj. At times, Britons believed that India could be transformed into something like Britain; but Metcalf argues they most often emphasized difference, especially by the end of the nineteenth century. As the British empire grew, so did its imperial identity, part of which emphasized its 'civilizing' mission to spread rational governance to India. The notion of Oriental despotism, the type of absolutism associated with a master and a slave, was deployed for this purpose. Part of the British imperial project in India sought to uncover India's ancient laws and culture in their effort both to rule India more effectively and justify their supplanting of native rule.[93] Bernard C. Cohn argues that this colonial knowledge project "had the effect of converting Indian forms of knowledge into European objects"; this knowledge and the Indian holders of the knowledge were transformed into "instruments of colonial rule."[94]

Yet, C. A. Bayly argues that British understanding of Indian society was more influenced by lack of reliable information than consequence of orientalist stereotype. These orientalist stereotypes were therefore not tools of epistemological conquest but tools to conceal ignorance.[95] One sees this especially in the travel account of George

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[93] Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 41.

[94] Bernard C. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 21.

[95] C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53.

Forster, who was forced to go to Kashmir in disguise, and therefore relied heavily on local intermediaries to acquire information for him, which often became distorted into stereotypes.[96] Bayly argues that Orientalist discourse "was only one among a variety of localised engagements between power and knowledge."[97] British knowledge of Kashmir followed this same pattern. British travelogues of the period are frank in their recounting of how they acquired information about the region from locals.

British assessments of crime, religion, and the character of natives could often be more indicative of the colonizers' insecurity and ignorance than that of their hegemony. Historian Antoinette Burton has argued that the theme of "perpetual insecurity" should be central to scholarship on modern British imperialism.[98] As a result, native agents were active and not passive agents in their own constructions as they filled in the gaps in British knowledge about India. As Kashmir was on the edge of their empire, and in a less accessible region for which information was relatively scarce, this dynamic was especially prevalent as the British sought to learn and assert ideas about Kashmir and its history, society, and culture.

For example, Chitralekha Zutshi points out that much of the history of Kashmir recounted in Walter Lawrence's *The Valley of Kashmir* (1895) is heavily influenced by his assigned guide by the Dogra court, Pir Hassan Shah Khuihami, author of a four-volume history of Kashmir, *Tarikh-i-Hassan*, the first volume of which was only

[96] Forster, *A Journey*, 144, 146, 250.

[97] Bayly, *Empire and Information*, 143.

[98] Antoinette Burton, *The Trouble with Empire: Challenges to Modern British Imperialism* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 4.

published in 1954.[99] Kashmir's remoteness likely also contributed to British speculation to fill in their gaps in knowledge. Lawrence confirms this dynamic, acknowledging that though people say Kashmir had changed little from the times of ancient Hindu kings, given that the things said about Kashmir often come from foreigners, it is hard to know for certain.[100] The sense of mystery around Kashmir's past alone could drive adventurous Britons to search for answers among Kashmir's ruins and ancient texts.

However, regardless of the intention, Zutshi argues that increased British involvement in Kashmir at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries resulted in the Dogra state emerging "as the primary, though not exclusive, point of reference for Kashmiri Muslim communitarian discourses of the early twentieth centuries."[101] Though the British may have not intended to sharpen differences between religious communities by entrenching the Maharaja's rule, "what they did was to provide conditions, practical and ideological, which allowed people to reproduce these forms of social power and division."[102]

Indians were actively engaged in the process by which these constructions were formed. For example, Amar Singh, the younger brother of Maharaja Pratap Singh and rival in the Kashmir *Darbar*, is thought to have been behind much of the proliferation of

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[99] Chitralekha Zutshi, *Kashmir's Contested Pasts: Narratives, Sacred Geographies, and the Historical Imagination* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 139-140.

[100] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 4-5.

[101] Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging*, 139.

[102] Bayly, *Empire and Information*, 168.

rumors surrounding Pratap's weakness of character.[103] The Maharaja long complained that his brother was undercutting him at every turn."[104] The British in turn feared that if they did not placate Amar Singh with sufficient power and responsibility, it would exacerbate him as "a source of intrigue and difficulty to the ruling Chief."[105] As Amar Singh was considered far more capable an administrator than his brother, British officials reasoned that if Amar Singh's "powers if not employed for the State and the Maharaja are likely to be employed against them."[106] Many of the problems associated with reforming the administration of the state were considered as stemming the personal problems that stemmed between these two brothers.

Despite his work in Kashmir having been intended to resolve communal disputes arising from land inequality, Lawrence nevertheless reified the notions which led to Hindus and Muslims to see their interests as divergent. Although the project to legitimize the Dogra regime entrenched the credibility of the British clients, it simultaneously worked against British interests by causing local disputes and insecurity that continued to

[103] Letter from His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir to the Marquess of Landsdowne, Kashmir, 14 May 1889, from the Appendix of Digby, "Condemned Unheard," in Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: British Intervention in Kashmir*, 167.

[104] Letter from Pratap Singh to S. M. Fraser, Secretary to the Government of India, 28 September 1905, in Foreign Department, Secret-I, Progs., May 1906, Nos. 44-52, R/1/1/332, IOR.

[105] Letter from Lt. Col. T. C. Pears, Resident in Kashmir, to S. M. Fraser, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 5 October 1905, in Foreign Department, Secret-I, Progs., May 1906, Nos. 44-52, R/1/1/332, IOR.

[106] Note by S. M. Fraser, Secretary to the Government of India, 11 October 1905, in Foreign Department, Secret-I, Progs., May 1906, Nos. 44-52, R/1/1/332, IOR.

draw the British into the princely state's domestic affairs. For example, local Kashmiri Muslims saw the archaeological survey reclaiming the Hindu heritage of the Kashmir Valley and sought to press their own claims to archaeological heritage, agitating against both the Dogra regime and their British rulers along these lines. When representatives from Kashmir Muslims approached the British Viceroy in 1909 regarding a needed increase in their community's representation in Kashmir, the British official in the Foreign Department noted that "in view of past practices on special mention in Kashmir, we must be careful how we play the non-interference card."[107] Kashmir Muslims often saw the British as a useful bulwark against the repression of the Dogra regime, and attempted to garner favor by praising the British for stopping the "horrible atrocities" that "reigned here before the establishment of the British Residency."[108] At the very least, the Kashmiri Muslims recognized the British as a potential card to play against the maharaja.

This dynamic provides clarity into the often-misunderstood role of "divide and rule" in colonial India by showing how it could both work for and against British colonial interests. The British used examples of what they saw as religious communalism to justify their fitness to rule 'dispassionately' over Indians, and they used such instances in 'traditional' princely states to separate them from their enlightened rule in 'modern' and 'progressive' British India. However, they also could not afford to let communal discord threaten to bring their Indian empire to its knees. On the one hand, 'divide and rule' bolstered their authority by establishing a Hindu client as a buffer state against a

[107] Foreign Department General-B Proceedings, January 1909: Petition from the Representatives of the Kashmiri Mussalmans Regarding the Employment of Mussalmans in the Kashmir State, 1909, NAI.

[108] Ibid.

predominantly Muslim northwest frontier, and by forcing Muslims to petition the British to intervene on their behalf as their patron. However, on the other hand, 'divide and rule' posed a threat to British imperial security. The British began to stress the importance of the obligations of rulers to their subjects, and by 1884, the Viceroy of India, Lord Ripon, was arguing for the appointment of a Resident in Kashmir on the grounds of instituting administrative reforms to adopt a more responsible position towards the Maharaja's subjects, with the underlying context being the fear of disturbances along the Afghan border having a ripple effect in creating additional uprisings. When Ranbir Singh died, his chosen successor Amar Singh was passed over for Amar's elder brother, Pratap. In exchange, Pratap agreed to a Resident, who later divested the Maharaja's powers into a State Council to oversee reforms, in particular a new land settlement, for which reports were compiled by Andrew Wingate and, later, Lawrence. Pratap's powers were later restored to him in 1905 by Lord Curzon, perhaps influenced by the latter's personal friendship with Pratap.

Lawrence's description of Kashmir not only shows how British interest in archaeology affirmed the ancientness of Hinduism in Kashmir along with the alien nature of "pious Musalmans" but also demonstrates the colonial linkage between Kashmir's Hindu antiquity and natural beauty. Emphasizing this connection further is the French archaeologist Alfred Foucher's contention that "this special charm of Kashmir" is found in "the grouping of two kinds of beauty," which he identifies as, first, Kashmir's "magnificent woods, the pure limpidity of its lakes, the splendor of its snowy mountain tops, the happy murmur of its myriad brooks sounding in the cool soft air," and, second,

"the grace or majesty of its ancient buildings."[109] The long-held notion among Europeans (appropriated by the Dogra maharajas) that Kashmir is the "Switzerland of Asia" speaks to this theme as well. European travelers to Kashmir were inspired to search for any possible evidence of Greco-Roman influence over ancient Kashmiri architecture. Wakefield contended that these examples of Kashmiri architecture "should be visited and studied by all tourists as emblems of the former prosperity of a country which they could not do otherwise than have adorned."[110] This connection between tourism and academic Indology leads Kabir to conclude that it is tourism, "in conjunction with philology and archaeology, which has contributed to Kashmir's removal, by interpretation, from materialist consideration."[111]

British tourism was significant enough during the mid-nineteenth century that the sole responsibility of the first British officer appointed to Jammu and Kashmir in the 1850s was to "regulate the conduct of European visitors."[112] The Maharaja's concern regarding European tourism was a significant factor in his decision to bar non-residents of Kashmir from purchasing immovable property in Kashmir. Europeans maneuvered around this restriction by purchasing houseboats in Srinagar, which the city is now famous for. These houseboats were often given names such as 'New London' or 'New

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[109] Alfred Foucher, introduction to *Ancient Monuments of Kashmir* by R. C. Kak (London: The India Society, 1933), xii-xiii, JSA. Kak's account was funded by the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir.

[110] Wakefield, *The Happy Valley*, 259.

[111] Kabir, *Territory of Desire*, 96.

[112] H. B. Edwardes and H. Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence* (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1873), 175.

Melbourne', reflecting Britons' desire for a home away from home. Some of these boats are still owned by the same families, holding collections of writing, photographs, and other items and documents from the era in which British officials, academics, and tourists would find their haven from the plains of India. The association between tourism and increased external involvement in Kashmir was apparent to British contemporaries such as Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe, an influential missionary active in Kashmir from the late nineteenth century to the end of British rule in 1947, and whose legacy endures still in Kashmir today.[113] He explains that "Kashmir, being one of the most lovely countries in the world, very naturally became the desire of all who visited it."[114] This link between beauty and desire to rule was also made by Viceroy Lord Curzon, who describes Kashmir as "a noble and enviable dominion of which to be the ruler. Its natural beauties have made it famous alike in history and romance, and they draw to it visitors from the most distant parts."[115] With India being the British Empire's most important imperial possession, control over Kashmir was considered essential for their legitimacy as rulers of India.

Dating back to the seventeenth century, Europeans portrayed Kashmir as a space without the religious animosity that plagued the rest of the subcontinent, with Hindus

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[113] Hugh Tyndale-Biscoe, *The Missionary and the Maharaja: Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe and the Making of Modern Kashmir* (Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2019), xiii.

[114] Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade*, 26.

[115] Printed Papers from Lord Curzon's Administration, 1899-1905, India Office Library and Records, British Library, in Native States, Part III, Principal Events, 41, British Online Archives (BOA).

disregarding caste rules and Muslims forgoing the pilgrimage to Mecca.[116] Lawrence wrote how in the "hearts" of Kashmiri Muslims, "they are Hindus," for "the religion of Islam is too abstract to satisfy their superstitious cravings."[117] However, as Ayesha Jalal has demonstrated in her many works, such religious syncretism was by no means uncommon on the Indian subcontinent in general.[118] British travelers and officials applied this characteristic to Kashmir in particular to emphasize further its uniqueness. Moorcroft observed that for a Kashmir, "religious bigotry forms no part of his character," and that the holy men of either Hindu or Muslim faith "possess little influence."[119] He also describes how the "cruel obligation" of sati, in which Hindu widows would self-immolate on their husband's funeral pyre, "was never very popular in Kashmir."[120]

Not all scholars agree in the first place that the British era represents continuity in the history of Kashmir's mythology. Ronald Inden contends in his essay "Kashmir as Paradise on Earth" that the British bypassed Kashmir in their search for a haven from the heat in favor of newly constructed colonial hill stations such as Mussoorie and Shimla, and "avoided older 'native' towns such as Srinagar in Kashmir."[121] It is unquestionable

[116] Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire AD 1656-1668* (London: W. Pickering, 1826; repr., New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1989).

[117] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 286.

[118] Ayesha Jalal, *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

[119] Moorcroft, *Travels*, Part 2., 129.

[120] Moorcroft, 131.

[121] Ronald Inden, "Kashmir as Paradise on Earth," in Aparna Rao, ed., *The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture?* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2008), 553.

that Inden is correct in his assertion that more Britons went to Simla than Kashmir, which was inaccessible for much of the year from British India. However, this only contributed to the romanticism of those who were adventurous enough to make the trek, as argued in the opening pages of this chapter. Inden argues that "the British did not want to travel to an Islamic paradise on earth, but to a 'picturesque' landscape." Instead, they treated their hill stations as European-style tourist resorts where they could rest and enjoy games of golf, to the extent that Inden suggests that "one might think that after about a hundred years of British rule, the idea of Kashmir as a paradise in either the older Hindu or Mughal sense would have faded away."[122] This argument, that the British era represented a discontinuity in the notion of Kashmir as a paradise, integral the religious heritage of the subcontinent, is not supported by the evidence. The British were instrumental in the development of these narratives about Kashmir's ancient integrity to India and Hinduism, which later became appropriated by secular nationalist leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru during the construction of the modern Indian nation-state. They saw themselves as inheritors of the Mughals as the rulers of India, and the British retraced the Mughals' footsteps by spending their summers along the same Kashmiri gardens and canals, imagining themselves as a part of this historical legacy. The colonial era, far from a historical aberration, represents a continuous link in this history.

Where there is discontinuity in Kashmir's history, it can be found in the opening of Kashmir up to tourism to a broader range of people than merely the Mughal *Darbar*. In the mid-to-late-nineteenth century, travelers to Kashmir were still rare; only the most adventurous dared to make the trek to such a remote location. But during their period of

[122] Inden, "Kashmir as Paradise on Earth," 554.

intervention in Kashmir, the Valley saw a rapid influx of visitors. In 1889, the Jhelum Valley Cart Road was completed to Baramulla, and by 1895 the road was extended to Srinagar, greatly increasing the access of visitors to the Valley by opening it up to wheeled traffic.[123] Although a railway connection to Kashmir was long proposed, British officials and the Maharaja's Darbar were loath to consider shutting down the Jhelum Valley Cart Road for several years to make way for its construction, effectively blocking European travelers in the meantime.[124] After the Third Anglo-Afghan War demonstrated the future uses of air travel, it was determined that air traffic would soon suffice for bringing visitors to the Kashmir Valley for their holiday travels. Though an air connection would not be adequate or profitable for economic connections in and out of the Valley, which caused it to suffer from a lack of economic development in subsequent years, the airway link satisfied the needs of the tourist interest in Kashmir which has so long dominated the Valley's relationship with the outside world. As a result, the railway connection was abandoned.[125]

By 1920, the number of European visitors had increased so much that it was "impossible to insisting upon their obtaining passes" for entry into Kashmir, and so the

[123] Alternative Alignments and Cost of Working of the Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings June 1903, No. 449, NAI.

[124] Demi-official letter from L. W. Dane, Secretary to E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, 11 July 1904, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[125] Report and Estimates of the Kashmir Rail and Ropeway Project, by Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Col., Ltd., Karachi, 1919, in Foreign and Political Department, Internal B., Pros., November 1920, Nos. 338-339, NAI.

requirement that visitors gain passes was dropped.[126] The effect on the Valley brought by the increase in visitors was palpable for many. Sportsman James Arbuthnot laments that "sport in Kashmir is, alas! Not what it used to be."[127] British officials made efforts to preserve Kashmir as a haven for sportsmen, however, enacting stricter game laws that they hoped would allow game to replenish stocks.[128] They also made efforts to introduce trout to Kashmir's waterway for the enjoyment of fishermen.[129]

Even if the British imposition of a Resident and divestment of the Maharaja's powers was not wholly driven by their sentimentality for the Kashmir Valley, their attempts at reforming the 'Happy Valley' were very much affected by romantic attachment to a place so often compared to a paradise on earth. It was a bad look for such a paradise to be on such hard times while under the rule of a British Empire that liked to think of itself as a benevolent one. Wakefield glowed that "Kashmir is a theme well worthy of a poet. Nowhere in Asia, nor even perhaps in the remaining quarters of the globe, can the parallel be found of such an earthly paradise; a paradise in itself formed by Nature, but made doubly beautiful by its surroundings."[130] This juxtaposition of a Kashmiri earthly paradise with a downtrodden and oppressed Kashmiri people drew all

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[126] Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. A. G. Bannerman, Resident in Kashmir, to the Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Delhi, September 1920, in Foreign and Political Department, Internal A., Proceedings, September 1920, Nos. 25-28, NAI.

[127] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir*, 21.

[128] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1921. Appendix A: Kashmir Games Laws Notification, JSA.

[129] Kashmir Residency File No. 35: Rearing of Trout in Kashmir, 1900, JSA.

[130] William Wakefield, *The Happy Valley*, 2-3.

the more alarm and attention at the Maharaja's misgovernment, and was responsible for much of the imperial drive to intervene and reform it.

Brinckman expressed belief that the Maharaja's government was responsible for the negative character reputation of Kashmiris. Despite reports from many English travelers that the Kashmiri is habitually dishonest, he said "I never yet heard of an Englishman having had anything stolen by a Cashmeerie."[131] Lawrence recounted that officials under the scope for their maladministration waved their hands at such accusations at being the product of deceitful Kashmiris, but Lawrence doubted that Kashmiris were the liars they were made out to be.[132] A couple of other Europeans travelers to Kashmir, Bernier and Jacquemont, also reported an endearing portrayal of the Kashmiri character, despite also hearing such stereotypes.[133]

Nevertheless, much of the colonial-era impression of Kashmiris was scathingly critical, depicting Kashmiris as weak, timid, deceitful, and lazy.[134] Mrs. Hervey was outward in her disdain for Kashmiris, which she described as "dishonest and crafty, subtly and avaricious, with but few good qualities to redeem their unamiable dispositions."[135] Wakefield considered that "in character Kashmiris have some good

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[131] Brinckman, "Wrongs of Kashmir," 69.

[132] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 5-6.

[133] Bernier, *Travels in the Mughal Empire*, 1826, and Victor Jacquemont, *Letters from India: Describing a Journey in the British Dominions of India, Tibet, Lahore, and Cashmere, during the years 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, Undertaken by Orders of the French Government*, Vol. 1 (London: Churton, 1834).

[134] Evans, "Kashmiri Exceptionalism," 722.

[135] Hervey, *Adventures of a Lady*, 118.

qualities, but these are outnumbered by their failings and faults," chiefly that "they are the most inveterate liars to be met with in the East."[136] He speculated that the weakness of Kashmiris is the consequence of their oppression.[137] Lord Birdwood also expressed the stereotype that Kashmiris are weak, explaining how Kashmiris have remained "hypnotized rabbits" despite repeated foreign domination.[138] Lawrence also believed that "the Kashmiri is what his rulers have made him," but hoped that "just and honest rule will transform him into a useful, intelligent, and fairly honest man."[139] This belief that Kashmiri's timid nature stems from their oppression may have originated in part from Kashmiris themselves, as Edward Knight reported that "he theory held by the Kashmiris themselves is that they were once an honourable, brave people, and that they were reduced to their present abject state by continued foreign oppression."[140] The 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica described how "Superstition has made the Kashmiri timid; tyranny has made him a liar; while physical disasters have made him selfish and pessimistic."[141]

Even Tyndale-Biscoe, who spent most of his life in Kashmir, concurred that "to call a man a 'Kashmiri' is a term of abuse, for it stands for a coward and a rogue, and

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[136] Wakefield, *The Happy Valley*, 100.

[137] Ibid., 101.

[138] Lord Birdwood, "Kashmir Today," *Asian Affairs* vol. XLII, parts III & IV, July October 1955, 246.

[139] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 283.

[140] Edward Knight, *Where Three Empires Meet: A Narrative of Recent Travel in Kashmir, Western Tibet, Gilgit and the Adjoining Countries (1891-1892)* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1895), 111.

[141] Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 15, 1911.

much else of an unpleasant nature."[142] Tyndale-Biscoe is still remembered in Kashmir today for establishing a number of schools in Kashmir, with which he intended to invigorate the "physically lazy" Kashmiri youth.[143] He lamented, "I hate having to write thus of the Kashmiri, as I am really very fond of him," but,

> I must say that the ordinary Kashmiri such as I have known for thirty years is a coward, a man with no self-respect and deceitful to a degree, and I perhaps may write with a clear conscience, for I have told this to all classes of them to their faces times without number, and, to give them all credit, they never resent it, because they know it is true.[144]

Wakefield also compared the supposedly contemptible character of Kashmiris to their more beautiful surroundings. He wrote that his own experiences "decidedly suggest the idea that upon the whole the character of the inhabitants of the Happy Valley is not an elevated one, and far from keeping their poetic surroundings."[145] Moorcroft likewise described the contrast in how "the beauty of the scenery" was "ill harmonized with the appearance of the peasantry."[146] Lawrence reported that Kashmiris themselves compared their mountainous borders to a "rock-bound prison" from which "the great snow mountains suggested nothing to them beyond the hopelessness of flight from tyranny."[147]

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[142] Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunshine and Shade*, 78.

[143] National Geographic Magazine, Vol. LVI, 1927, 445.

[144] Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunshine and Shade,* 79.

[145] Wakefield, *The Happy Valley,* 100-101.

[146] Moorcroft, *Travels*, 232.

[147] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 13.

Tyndale-Biscoe identified this connection between the Valley's beauty, misgovernance, and the Kashmiris' weak character, explaining that "because they happen to live in one of the most beautiful countries on earth," and "therefore other people have coveted it, Kashmir has been conquered and reconquered by invaders, who have… so ground the life and heart out of (Kashmiris) that their better selves have been crushed."[148] Resulting from living nearly six decades in Kashmir, Tyndale-Biscoe's understanding of this dynamic was shaped in part by his Kashmiri friends and acquaintances who were attempting to grapple with their predicament themselves.[149]

Just as British onlookers saw Kashmiris' negative characteristics as stemming from their oppressive governance, they believed that by reforming the governance they could see corresponding improvement to the Kashmiri character. Lawrence speculated that "confidence and capital would make Kashmir the wonder and envy of the world," and the British set themselves busy making Kashmir one of the most desirable destinations in all of the empire.[150] By the end of the intervention, British officials and visitors to Kashmir were pleased with their efforts at molding what they saw as the reformed Kashmiri citizen. Tyndale-Biscoe's efforts at educating the "whole man" by emphasizing physical activity and public service had made a conspicuous impact on his students, many of whom were trained as firefighters or lifeguards to save drowning

[148] Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunshine and Shade*, 79.

[149] Hugh Tyndale-Biscoe, *The Missionary and the Maharaja.*

[150] Walter R. Lawrence, Lecture at a Meeting of the East India Association in 1895, JSA.

citizens in times of flooding.[151] Arbuthnot reported after the intervention in 1928 that after having "been subjected to so many years of misrule and martyrdom," Kashmiris had begun "to realize that good fortune has at last come to them, and that the strange epithet which they had earned, 'worshippers of tyranny,' no longer applies."[152]

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the British began to stress the importance of the obligations of rulers to their subjects, and by 1884, the Viceroy of India, Lord Ripon, was arguing for the appointment of a Resident in Kashmir on the grounds of instituting administrative reforms to adopt a more responsible position towards the Maharaja's subjects. When Ranbir Singh died the following year in 1885, his chosen successor Amar Singh was passed over for Amar's elder brother, Pratap. In exchange, Pratap agreed to a Resident, who later in 1889 divested the Maharaja's powers into a State Council to oversee reforms, in particular a new land settlement, for which reports were compiled by Andrew Wingate and, later, Lawrence. Pratap's powers were later restored to him in 1905 by Lord Curzon, perhaps influenced by the latter's personal friendship with Pratap. But the Resident continued to play an enormous role in the governance of the state, and as such the interest of the state's affairs was continually guided towards accommodating the increased tourism to the Valley. As Chapter 2 will

[151] 1895 Log, Coaching in Kashmir, 4, in Hugh Tyndale-Biscoe, *The Missionary and the Maharajas,* 68.

[152] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir*, 21.

demonstrate, British officials were aware that without the tourist interest in Kashmir, there would likely have never been any intervention at all.[153]

When the intervention had fully concluded by the end of Pratap's reign in 1925, Kashmir had transformed into a more robust tourist destination with tens of thousands of visitors every summer season. Golf courses, tennis courts, and polo and cricket grounds had been constructed, a gentleman's club had been established, and the Resident was known for throwing delightful parties.[154] Though regulars lamented that in the old days, "after a week or so, one used to know everybody" by this point there were so many visitors that "boats simply line the banks, and at night there is almost one continuous line of lights."[155] For those who desired more comfort, hotels and dak bungalows or guesthouses had been constructed throughout the Valley and along the routes leading into it, and the road construction into the Valley meant that one could take a car all the way to Srinagar. Still affordable, Kashmir had become known as a tourist destination open to a much broader range of travelers than before the intervention, which allowed its allure to persist in the minds of not just Britons but Indians who were beginning to articulate a conception of the nation after colonialism had ended, of which Kashmir was considered a part.

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[153] Position of the Cultivating Classes in Kashmir, W. R. Lawrence, K. W. No. 3, Confidential, Camp, Kashmir, 2 December 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret-E. Pros., February 1890, Nos. 106-110, NAI.

[154] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir*, 10.

[155] Ibid.

This chapter has argued that ideas about Kashmir, infused with romantic notions of adventure and beauty, had deep historical and emotional resonance. The British themselves were not only shaped by these ideas but in turn transformed them in accordance with their political uses in their effort to produce knowledge about their Indian Empire. As the rulers of India, ideas about Kashmir and its essential importance to Indian civilization perhaps made it inevitable that some form of intervention was coming in the Himalayan province. Though strategic factors were important to this narrative, scholars should not overlook the sentimental attachment on the part of Britons towards Kashmir. This intervention was shaped as much by a desire for stability along India's northern frontier as it was by British sentimentality for the Valley of Kashmir as a 'home away from home,' where tourists could escape the summer heat of the plains of India amid the cool respite of the mountains. British romanticizing of Kashmir was not limited to their sense of sport and adventure but also factored into their idealization of the communities of Kashmir as existing in relative harmony with one another in the 'Happy Valley', drawing sharp contrast to the unrest in the plains of northern India. This romanticizing was exemplified in British efforts at historic and archaeological preservation in Kashmir, which often attempted to highlight this syncretic tradition in Kashmiri culture. This colonial period of intervention was crucial in reshaping Kashmir's collective memory, affecting its modern history and politics in a way that may shed light on the conflict's intractability today. In the following chapter, this emotive framework will be applied to the decision to intervene and impose reforms on the Maharaja's administration, which has heretofore only been explored through the prisms of more rational explanations of geostrategic and security.

Chapter 2: British Intervention in Kashmir

In the early nineteenth century, it became increasingly clear that a conflict between the British East India Company and the Sikh Empire was on the horizon. The Sikhs were the last remaining serious threat to the British position on the subcontinent, with their well-trained army and stalwart Maharaja Ranjit Singh at the helm. However, the British exerted patience, waiting for the death of Ranjit Singh to make their move on the rich and productive lands of the Punjab, which finally came in 1839. The British kept a keen watch on the subsequent Sikh rulers for an opportune moment to strike. W. G. Osborne, military secretary to Lord Auckland, anticipated in 1840 that the English's "throats will be well oiled by the rapidly increasing revenue."[156] Sir John Hobhouse, the president of the Company Board of Control, expressed his concern after the murder of Maharaja Nao Nihal Singh that the new ruler, Sher Singh, would be sufficiently compliant as to prevent the British an excuse to annex the Punjab, as Sher Singh was "less disposed to quarrel with us than Nao Nehal Singh."[157] The British needed to wait for more instability to arise before they would have sufficient justification for annexing the Punjab.

These plans may have come to nothing without the intervention of Gulab Singh. Gulab was a Hindu Raja who ruled Jammu until it was conquered by the Sikhs in 1808. Seeing the writing on the wall, Gulab switched sides along with his brothers, who alongside him became among Ranjit Singh's most loyal, trusted servants. Gulab proved

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[156] W. G. Osborne, *The Court and Camp of Runjeet Singh* (London, 1840), 53-54.

[157] Hobhouse to Bagley, 11 January 1841, Hobhouse Papers, DCCCXVI, 184, India Office Records (IOR), British Library, London, United Kingdom.

himself valuable, expanding the Sikh Empire's territory, especially with his conquest of the northeast region of Ladakh in 1834. These conquests were ostensibly conducted for his lord, but Gulab calculated that if he maneuvered himself right, the territories would fall to him when the Sikh Maharaja died. Many rumors spread as to the Jammu Raja's intentions. The British agent in Lahore, Claude Wade, believed that Gulab and his brothers "would attempt to seize Kashmir" and perhaps had designs on all of the Punjab.[158] While his brothers ingratiated themselves within the Sikh court, creating instability before being assassinated amid the turbulence following Ranjit Singh's death, Gulab solidified his position in the hills and waited until the time was right to play his cards.

When the first Anglo-Sikh War began in 1845, Gulab Singh began to conduct his own strategy of divide and rule. While encouraging the Sikh army to wage war against the British, he inserted himself as an intermediary with the British, assuring them of his friendship and that he would not bring his forces to bear against the British along with the Sikhs. How Gulab Singh would choose to deploy his Dogra forces was recognized as a potential decisive factor on both sides, and the Sikh *Darbar* was demanding that he join the Sikh army in Lahore. Gulab waited, however, for the Sikh *Darbar* to grand him the title of vizier, which essentially acted as the prime minister to the Maharaja, to come down to the plains of the Punjab. When he finally did, he announced that his policy as vizier was to seek peace terms with the British. Stunned, the Sikh state was forced to sign the Treaty of Lahore on March 9, 1846, which reduced the Sikhs to a vassal state of the

[158] Claude Wade to W. H. MacNaghten, 1 January 1838, Political Consultations, 14 February 1838, No. 57-58, IOR.

East India Company and recognized Gulab Singh as an independent ruler.[159] In addition, the British imposed a war indemnity of one crore (10 million) rupees on the Sikhs, which their treasury could not pay.

At this stage in the negotiations, Gulab Singh stepped in and offered to pay the war indemnity—but only in exchange for the province of Kashmir.[160] After Gulab required British support to conquer Kashmir, which had, under the leadership of its governor, attempted to resist the Dogra invasion, and after the British occupied the regions of Kulu and Mandi to the east, the crore was reduced by a fourth to 75 lakhs rupees. In this manner, Gulab Singh and his heirs became rulers of Kashmir by paying the Sikhs' war indemnity for them, rather than having simply purchased the province from the British outright, as is often portrayed. The fact that this historical complexity is often flattened into a "sale" is instructive: in retellings of this story, the oppression of Kashmir is rooted in the greed of both Gulab Singh and the British. One of the most influential poets of South Asia, Muhammad Iqbal, lambasted the sale in his lines:

> Their fields, their crops, their streams
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> Even the peasants in the vale
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> They sold, they sold all, alas!

[159] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* (Calcutta, 1931), Vol. XII, Treaty of Lahore, March 9, 1846, 50-54.

[160] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* (Calcutta, 1931) Vol. XII, Treaty of Amritsar, March 16, 1846, 21-22.

How cheap was the sale.[161]

Indian nationalist histories have also been cognizant of the troubling implications of the sale narrative for questions of national integrity, and as such have sought to combat the notion of a sale as historically inaccurate. The reason Jammu and Kashmir are currently combined in one administrative unit in modern India is because it acceded to India that way upon independence, and it only acceded to India that way because of its arbitrary creation under the paramountcy of British imperialism. For a country whose foundational myth rests on resistance to British imperialism, the imperial origins of lumping together Jammu and Kashmir is problematic.

That is why K. M. Panikkar, for example, argues that the notion of a "sale" has been "attacked as a foolish and short-sighted policy by men who now realise how that cool and temperate valley could have been utilized as a British colony."[162] For Panikkar, it is "important to remember that there was no sale of Kashmir at all" – Gulab was simply given Kashmir both as a reward for his loyalty and due to the fact that he was already the ruler in the lands adjoining Kashmir to the south and east.[163] This was about establishing order, not about making money: "It is purely a vain retrospective regret which sees in the acquisition of Kashmir by Gulab Singh a short-sighted policy meant to enrich the coffers

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[161] Muhammad Iqbal, cited in Bawa Satinder Singh, *The Jammu Fox* (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1988), p. 221, fn. 115.

[162] K. M. Panikkar, *The Founding of the Kashmir State: A Biography of Maharajah Gulab Singh, 1792-1858* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953), 100.

[163] Ibid., 104.

of the Company."[164] Regardless of the historicity of the 'sale', however, the idea that Kashmir was sold to the warlord Gulab Singh, without Kashmiris' consent, has been a powerful foundational piece of modern Kashmir's narrative and what it means to be Kashmiri. British imperialists hated it, because they "did not like that such an ideal place for colonization should go out of (their) hands," but also Kashmiris, from whom "the whole transaction was made behind their back," have long deplored the transaction.[165]

Some speculated that Governor-General Dalhousie may have regretted his predecessor ceding Kashmir away to Gulab Singh after he annexed the Punjab fully three years later in 1849.[166] However, the task of defending Kashmir's vast mountainous territory, whose frontiers reached as far as Afghanistan, China, and Russia, from their newly acquired base in the Punjab, projected as far too daunting for British policymakers to countenance at the time. The Governor-General during the Treaty of Amritsar, Lord Hardinge, "considered the occupation of the whole of this territory inadvisable" as the British could not defend such extensive borders at the time.[167] It was thought better to reward Gulab for his loyalty and friendship to the British.

Many Britons believed it was a mistake to 'sell' Kashmir to Gulab Singh at the end of the First Sikh War. Many argued that the Empire should still annex the province directly. Many Britons were frustrated that a province with a climate suited to

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[164] Ibid., 105.

[165] Prem Nath Bazaz, *Inside Kashmir* (Srinagar: Kashmir Publishing Company, 1941), 31.

[166] Arthur Neve, *Thirty Years in Kashmir* (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), 47.

[167] "Brief History of Kashmir State," in Foreign Department, Internal B, November 1904, No. 330, National Archives of India (NAI).

colonization was allowed to slip away. Wakefield, for example, lamented at the wasted "chance we wantonly threw away of doing what seems impossible in India otherwise—colonizing a portion of our Eastern possessions."[168] Whereas "the climate and other reasons forbid" settler colonization in India, "no such factors exist against the colonization of Kashmir by us…. The climate is all that can be desired."[169] Wakefield even saw it potentially as "a miniature England in the heart of Asia."[170]

Some nineteenth-century observers considered Britain's annexation of Kashmir as an inevitability. The traveler Mrs. Hervey thought her account would be useful for "when" the British annexed Kashmir.[171] She also claimed that "the People all pray the country may soon be taken from its present possessor… by placing them under the protection of British rule."[172] Those especially who held faith in the moral rectitude of the Empire were critical of the decision to transfer hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris under the rule of an autocratic leader, who was regarded by many as little more than a tyrant. The abuses of the Afghan Durrani Empire (who ruled Kashmir 1747-1819) and the Sikh Empire (who ruled Kashmir 1819-1847) had already elicited the sympathy of these British subjects in both Britain and India. Now, it appeared Gulab Singh was little better than his predecessors, which had the effect of making uncomfortable the highest officials

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[168] William Wakefield, *History of Kashmir and the Kashmiris: The Happy Valley* (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1879), 85.

[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid., 86.

[171] Mrs. Hervey, *The Adventures of a Lady in Tartary, Thibet, China, & Kashmir. With an Account of the Journey from the Punjab to Bombay Overland* (London: Hope and Company, 1853), 205.

[172] Ibid., 2014.

of the Government of India. Captain Arthur Broome, on the ground in Kashmir as Gulab Singh took control, wrote to Governor General Hobhouse to warn him of the Jammu raja's rapaciousness. These reports rattled Hobhouse so that he wrote in response, "These reports of the character of Golab Singh are such as to promise ill for his subjects and for the arrangements made in Cashmere." Another British officer, Colonel Steinbach, who had commanded some of Gulab Singh's troops, believed it was a great mistake to have granted Kashmir to Singh, and if that the Governor General were to visit Kashmir, the entire population would prostrate "themselves at your Lordship's feet, to beg to be relieved from the Maharajah's rule."[173] Even Lord Hardinge wrote that "In no case will the British Government be the blind instrument of a ruler's injustice towards his people," and if "not corrected, a system of direct interference must be resorted to."[174]

Decades later, F. Henvey, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir during the 1877-1880 famine, argued that whatever one thought of the transaction with Gulab Singh, "the moral responsibility of the British Government towards the Kashmiris is exceptional."[175] This position was even shared by officials who believed the maharaja's independence should be preserved. The anti-slavery position of the British public at large

[173] Colonel Henry Steinbach to Dalhousie, 4 August 1851, in Robert A. Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj, 1847-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 22.

[174] Governor-General Lord Hardinge to Gulab Singh, 28 June 1848, in Foreign Department, Secret, No. 43-A, NAI.

[175] The Famine in Kashmir during 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

stood in stark contrast to their support of an Indian maharaja who seemed to be little more than a tyrant.

As a result, despite Gulab Singh's role in tipping the balance towards the British in the Anglo-Sikh war, and the importance of his state's position along the northern frontier of British India, British officials warned him from the beginning that oppression of his subjects could result in a reconsideration of his autonomy as a ruler. "It was expected," wrote Lt. Col. Henry Lawrence to Gulab Singh in response to reports of the maharaja's oppression, "that you would arrange for the comfort and well-being of your subjects generally."[176] Lawrence warned Singh on another occasion that the condition of the latter's subjects was an issue on which Singh's autonomy could be eroded, spelling out clearly that he "gave him plain rules how to remain independent."[177] Lawrence reminded the maharaja that if he would not arrange "for the protection of the hill people," that "the least that will occur that one or two officers will, at an early date, proceed to Kashmir to examine and report on the real state of the country."[178] And yet, on a third occasion, Lawrence wrote to Gulab to warn him that the British Government would not

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[176] Lt. Col. Henry Lawrence letter to Gulab Singh, 6 November 1846, Enclosure no. 3, Memorandum on the Proposal to Appoint a Permanent Resident in Kashmir, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

[177] Lt. Col. Henry Lawrence to H. M. Elliot, Secretary to the Government of India, No. 95, 2 August 1847, Enclosure no. 3, Memorandum on the Proposal to Appoint a Permanent Resident in Kashmir, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

[178] Ibid.

"permit tyranny in Cashmir."[179] Despite his personal friendship with Gulab and sympathy for him after their shared experience during the Anglo-Sikh War, Lawrence was nevertheless not shy from admonishing his friend for his rapacity and reminding him of the possible consequences.

In fact, even European critics of the British Empire thought the British should take over Kashmir, dating back from before Gulab Singh initiated Dogra rule in Kashmir. Victor Jacquemont, a French scientist who traveled to Kashmir during the Sikh period, estimated that Kashmir was far more impoverished compared to places he had seen in India, and thought that it would do better under British control.[180] Though the British government in India was in need of "some reforms," Kashmir under British rule would enjoy "immense blessings."[181] Jacquemont's presence in the Valley appears to have sparked speculations and rumors about his purpose for being there, with some Kashmiri politicians believing he was secretly there to "reconnoitre the state of the country" in preparation for "its cession to the English government."[182]

The British transfer of Kashmir to Gulab Singh only continued to fuel this sort of speculation that the British takeover was a matter of time. It seemed possible that the British would intervene if any sort of instability arose following Gulab Singh's death,

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[179] Lt. Col. Henry Lawrence to Gulab Singh, 28 January 1848, in Foreign Department, Secret, No. 35, NAI.

[180] Victor Jacquemont, *Letters from India: Describing a Journey in the British Dominions of India, Tibet, Lahore, and Cashmere, during the years 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, Undertaken by Orders of the French Government*, Vol. 1 (London: Churton, 1834), 88.

[181] Ibid., 90.

[182] Jacquemont, *Letters from India*, 66.

which motivated Gulab to install Ranbir as Maharaja in 1856 to try to establish a stable transition of power. But fortunately for his heir, Gulab died the following year in 1857, which was a "critical time" for British imperialism on the Indian subcontinent.[183] Amid the Indian Rebellion of 1857, much of British territory in northern India rose in rebellion against the rule of the East India Company, and British allies in Indian princely states were a decisive factor in determining whether the British could suppress the rebels. Ranbir Singh followed his father's precedent by remaining loyal to the British, sending nearly 3,000 troops, which played a crucial role in the recapture of Delhi.[184]

Despite this, however, the British could not help but assert their moral stance over one of the ceremonial aspects of State's transfer of power. Though the British supported Ranbir's succession with a "Khillat," or gifted robe that symbolized the investiture of power, they could not support the transfer of power with their attendance of the funeral as planned.[185] As the maharaja's minister Dewan Kirpa Ram informed Lieutenant Urmston, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir at the time, four widows of Gulab Singh had made clear their intention to perform *sati*, or ritual self-immolation, on the maharaja's funeral pyre. Though the minister claimed that the widows would die by suicide one way or another if prohibited from doing this, the British officials absolutely refused to attend

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[183] "Brief History of Kashmir State," in Foreign Department Internal B, November 1904, No. 330, NAI.

[184] F. M. Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974), 38.

[185] Report by Lieutenant Urmston, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, Punjab Progs., 16 August 1857, Nos. 3-4, Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/190, IOR.

the event if "such a crime were likely to occur." Finally, the minister relented, and the ceremony "went off without any disturbance" with the four widows "placed under restraint in separate rooms."[186] The episode demonstrates that although they were loath to interfere with the administration of the state, the British were willing to interfere with some issues of a moral concern, an opening in the door that would continue to grow bigger and bigger as the nineteenth century progressed.

Nevertheless, the fact that Gulab's demise occurred at the same time when British imperialism on the Indian subcontinent was most imperiled played a decisive role in the history of Kashmir, as it delayed British intervention for yet another generation. The British could hardly intervene in Ranbir Singh's internal administration so soon after the maharaja had proven his loyalty to them. Though they would be dissatisfied with the state of affairs through Ranbir's nearly 3-decade reign, Queen Victoria's proclamation on November 1, 1858, that the British would not extend "present territorial possessions," and they would "respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes," presented an obstacle for their desired reform of Kashmir's state.[187] As Ranbir Singh pointed out in a meeting with British officials on December 5th, 1873, increased British interference in his internal affairs would be "regarded throughout Hindustan" as a "diminution of the

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[186] Report by Lieutenant Urmston, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, Punjab Progs., 16 August 1857, Nos. 3-4, Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/190, IOR.

[187] "Proclamation by the Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India" (Allahabad, November 1, 1858), British Library.

dignity of his State."[188] An outright intervention would not be possible for some time yet, though individual travelers and missionaries continued to champion the cause throughout Ranbir's reign.

Most of the British interaction with Kashmir during this time consisted of these individual travelers to Kashmir, especially missionaries and soldiers on leave. One significant change resulting from replacing Sikh rule in Kashmir with Dogra rule was that European visitors to Kashmir increased exponentially. Before, Europeans would need to receive permission from the Sikh maharaja to visit Kashmir, which could prove difficult to procure. Jacquemont, for example, only received his permission by befriending the maharaja and convincing him of the value of his scientific research.[189] He even considered it probably that he only received his permission on account of the fact that he wasn't an Englishmen, of whose motives in Kashmir the maharaja was suspicious.[190]

However, following Gulab Singh's acquisition of Kashmir, with British assistance, he was expected to accommodate British visitors to the Kashmir Valley, and many took up the opportunity to travel to a region that was to this point inaccessible to them. For the maharaja's part, by accommodating for their travel, this was a way of ensuring his control over visitors, what they saw, and who they interacted with. These visitors posed a potential threat to the maharaja's autonomy as a ruler, and though he couldn't turn them away, he did what he could to limit their number and scope of what

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[188] Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab Robert Henry Davies to Lord Northbrook, Lahore, 7 December 1873, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

[189] Jacquemont, *Letters from India*, Vol. 1, 262.

[190] Ibid., 378.

they could do in Kashmir. Travelers could only enter Kashmir with a pass, and passes were kept limited for several decades as the maharaja sought to perpetuate the fiction among his subjects that he was a fully independent sovereign ruler, rather than a feudatory of the British Empire. For example, it was found that in some of the northern districts of the maharaja's domain, it was "generally believed" that "the Kashmir Ruler was an independent and powerful sovereign; and the Kashmir government had naturally done everything to keep up this illusion."[191] Ranbir Singh kept up this pretense of independence in his will, Dastur-ul-Amal, which was printed in 1882, declaring the state to be "in full sovereignty."[192]

After 1847, British visitors to Kashmir began to increase, and the question arose of how to handle these travelers.[193] The maharaja complained about the expanding number of visitors and that they were taking advantage of his hospitality.[194] As a result, in 1852 a British Officer on Special Duty was appointed to stay in Kashmir for 6 months of the year to regulate the conduct of European visitors to the State. In particular, the officer was expected to be the "referee in any misunderstandings that may arise between the authorities of the country and British visitors, and to take cognizance of any

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[191] A. C. Lyall, Memorandum on Kashmir, 19 November 1879, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, IOR.

[192] "Dastur-ul-Amal," the English translation of the will of His Highness Maharaja Ranbir Singh, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, dated 1st Sawan Samvat 1939 (AD 1882), Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1067/88, File No. 107, 1921, IOR.

[193] Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)*, 30.

[194] John Martin Honigberger, *Thirty-Five Years in the East: Adventures, Discoveries, Experiments, and Historical Sketches, Relating to the Punjab and Cashmere* (Calcutta: Bangabasi Office, 1905), 183.

oppression."[195] Maharaja Gulab Singh tried to reject the proposal, concerned it would serve to limit his autonomy as a ruler. However, because the British were the paramount power, he could not refuse, and under heavy pressure, he conceded to allow the placement of this officer.[196] When Gulab's son, Ranbir, acceded to the *gadi*, or throne, he continued to object to the placement of a British officer in Kashmir, but was told that the officer would remain, as "the purpose of visiting Kashmir by the British will result in serving the bondage between the subjects and for bondage of friendship and love between the Governments."[197] For the British, that the promotion of tourism in Kashmir would result in closer relations with Kashmir was desirable. But for the maharaja's *darbar*, or court, it needed to be avoided at all costs. At first, only 200 soldiers were allowed to receive passes per season; then it was changed to 200 at one time, allowing soldiers to visit Kashmir on interval.[198] The maharaja correspondingly regarded his efforts to exclude Europeans from the affairs of his state as "one of his proudest privileges," though eventually passes were opened up to surveyors, traders, missionaries, and other travelers.[199]

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[195] Board of Administration Recommendation to the Government of India for the Deputation of a British Officer to Cashmere for the Summer Season, Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/189, No. 206, 27 February 1852, IOR.

[196] Foreign Department, Political, 1852, Nos. 82-83, NAI.

[197] File No. 122-A (P.R.) K.G.R., cited in Hassnain, *British Policy towards Kashmir (1846-1921)*, 34.

[198] Ibid.

[199] P. D. Henderson, Memorandum on Kashmir, 8 November 1879, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

One of the first matters for the officer on special duty to resolve was to stop travelers from taking advantage of the maharaja's hospitality. It was previous practice for visitors to Kashmir to borrow money from the maharaja during their stay. Upon their departure, these visitors would square up their accounts with the maharaja's *vakil*, or agent, at Lahore. However, it appears many British travelers were abusing this system, and so the *vakil* was then in these cases forced to apply to the East India Company's Board of Administration for reimbursement. Concerned that "a certain degree of reproach might be attached to the British character," British officials prohibited British travelers from borrowing money from the Maharaja and tasked the officer on special duty with enforcing this restriction.[200] However, the measure did not stop travelers from taking advantage of local moneylenders, and so further provisions eventually needed to be made by the officer on special duty to prevent the return of any travelers who failed to settle previous debts in Kashmir.[201]

What this episode demonstrates is how the emotionality of Kashmir placed a central role in British relationships with Kashmir from the earliest of their interactions with the place. For travelers, Kashmir was a place where one might be able to live adventurously well beyond their means, even as a maharaja might live; whereas for British officials trying to reign in such practices, this arrangement threatened to besmirch imperial honor in India. This dynamic helps explain how some of the most pro-imperial voices in the subcontinent could find themselves opposed to policy in Kashmir, in a

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[200] Foreign Department, Punjab Progs., No. 2, 19 February 1853, IOR.

[201] Lt. Col. P. Maxwell, Deputy Commissioner, Firozpur, Late on Special Duty, Kashmir, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government, Punjab, no. 60, Firozpur, 2 December 1872, IOR.

manner that brings to mind Rudyard Kipling's short story "The Man Who Would Be King."[202] Though Kipling was every bit of the imperial apologist his reputation suggests, he nevertheless found himself repulsed by unscrupulous character taking advantage of the ambiguities of the subcontinent when subjected to the new power dynamics introduced by British imperialism. In the story, Kipling depicts two British goons who, tired of having their money-making schemes disrupted by the authorities of colonial India, settle on traveling to Kafiristan in Afghanistan, beyond the northwest frontier of the subcontinent, and declare themselves kings. Though initially successful, their lack of virtue eventually becomes their undoing as one character is killed and the other run out of Kafiristan and into madness. The tale highlights the importance, in Kipling's mind, for British officials and subjects alike to take seriously their responsibility to uphold the imperial moral order. British officials who most believed in the civilizing mission of the empire, like Kipling, were most interested in reforming affairs along the frontier and curtail the rapaciousness of travelers to these remote regions now under British protection.

The decision to intervene was based on a number of factors, and it was many years in the making. However, there was a genuine moral revulsion among British at an Indian feudatory's oppression of his subjects. Under the *begar* system, Kashmiri villagers could be commissioned against their will to perform manual labor, usually as coolies, or porters, carrying baggage for armies or royal caravans. This was partly a system devised due to the obstacles faced by the environment: the roads leading into the Kashmir Valley

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[202] Rudyard Kipling, "The Man Who Would Be King," in *The Phantom Rickshaw and other Eerie Tales* (Allahabad: A. H. Wheeler & Co., 1888).

were too narrow and inadequate for animal-drawn carriages, creating the need for human carriers. The remarkable Himalayan traveler Mrs. Hervey remarked upon seeing Kashmiris being seized as *begarie*s that “I never saw a more distressing scene…. Women and children, and aged men, weeping and wringing their hands, at the loss of husbands, brothers, and sons.”[203] To many Britons, this reduced the status of Kashmiri villagers to the Maharaja’s slaves—a Maharaja under British suzerainty.

The *begar* system captivated particularly on the moral predispositions of the British public imagination, and its existence and the desire to abolish it played an important factor in the story of the British involvement in Kashmir. Officials regarded it as imperative to end the practice, and not only did it factor into the minds of officials involved with devising the intervention, it also overshadowed reforms introduced during the intervention, in particular the construction of roads. As chapter 3 will demonstrate, the construction of good roads was considered an avenue by which they could eliminate the need for *begar*. With cart roads, they could use animal-drawn wagons and later automobiles to carry supplies in and out of the Valley—human porters would no longer be necessary.

The imperative placed on ending the practice partly stemmed from the litany of eye-witness accounts from European travelers on the horrors of the system that reached back to British officials or the public at large. These travelers drew more attention to these accounts of oppression than they might have normally, as there were surely many other instances of oppression in Indian princely states that escaped the attention of British officials for the simple reason that these were not vacation destinations. This information

[203] Mrs. Hervey, *The Adventures of a Lady*, 204.

bias was not lost on these officials, however. Walter Lawrence pointed out that "it has struck me, as it has probably struck others, that if three or four hundred English people visited Indore or Gwalior annually, we should hear very much the same tales of oppression as we hear regarding Kashmir."[204] This dynamic was readily perceived by the Kashmir government as well. Kashmir officials sought to accommodate European travelers whenever they could, with special attention given to sheltering their eyes from the kinds of oppression that could erode Kashmir's independence. This was done "so long as Europeans are in the country," for the Kashmir government's "apprehension of our occupying Kashmir it wants to avoid the chance of hostile criticism on their return to British India."[205] However, Kashmir officials could not entirely prevent Europeans from leaving Kashmir with fresh tales of oppression and persecution. As a direct result of Kashmir's attraction for tourists, in the decades leading up to the British intervention in Kashmir, there was much speculation and advocacy for the British Government to alleviate the condition of downtrodden Kashmiris.

In his 1868 pamphlet "Wrongs of Kashmir," Arthur Brinckman, a missionary active in Kashmir, lamented that the "poor Cashmerees have been shamefully oppressed

[204] Position of the Cultivating Classes in Kashmir, W. R. Lawrence, K. W. No. 3, Confidential, Camp, Kashmir, 2 December 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret-E. Pros., February 1890, Nos. 106-110, NAI.

[205] Letter No. 144, from C. E. R. Gridlestone, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government, Punjab, Lahore, 28 November 1871, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1042/189, F2(1)-C/1886, IOR.

by the rulers we put over them, and that this oppression is getting worse and worse."[206] Advocating for direct annexation of Kashmir by British India, Brinckman appealed to the civilizing ethos of the British Empire, arguing that "the day of the annexation of Cashmere would occasion one of the most affecting scenes that Asia ever bore witness to."[207] He speculated that Kashmir, with its "traditions coeval with the flood, the garden of the world, the paradise of Asia," under British control "would suddenly seem touched with a divine wand."[208]

Until this happens, let every one who writes and talks about our fostering care for the people of India, our justice, our mercy, our honour, our religious tolerance, and our hatred of oppression, be silent. No historian or legislator who loves truth can talk of our enlightened rule in India, and the blessing it is to natives, so long as Cashmere remains trodden down and trampled on as at present, giving all such assertions the lie.

Brinckman regretted that Kashmir preoccupied Britain's imagination but not its care: "Because Tom Moore wrote a poem and mentions Cashmere in it, are we to think its existence only a myth?"[209] He admitted, however, that he was not the only one advocating on behalf of oppressed Kashmiris: "It is not as if I was the only person who

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[206] Arthur Brinckman, "Wrongs of Cashmere: A Please for the Deliverance of that Beautiful Country from the Slavery and Oppression under which It Is Going to Ruin" (1868), in Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir,* 3.

[207] Ibid., 10-11.

[208] Ibid., 11.

[209] Brinckman, "Wrongs of Cashmere," 25.

sorrows over the wrongs of Cashmere. Almost every traveler who goes up there comes back saying that a shame it was to sell it, and what a shame not to take it back again."[210] Brinckman concluded his pamphlet by reprinting articles in the Anglo-Indian press to reinforce his point that "others besides myself have called attention to the wrongs of Cashmere."[211]

Brinckman was joined in his call for annexation by Lieutenant Robert Thorp, who penned an account of the Maharaja's oppression of Kashmiris in his essay, "Kashmir Misgovernment" (1870). Thorp challenged Britain's moral authority in light of their toleration of the Maharaja's oppression.[212] He described the British Government as having "committed a wanton outrage, a gross injustice, and an act of tyrannical oppression, which violates every humane and honourable sentiment, which is opposed to the whole spirit of modern civilisation, and is in direct opposition to every tenet of the religion we profess."[213] Thorp framed the problem in communal terms, lambasting the installation of a Hindu ruler over a Muslim population, claiming that "those who know the feelings that exists between the two races, do not require to be told that country whose population is entirely composed of followers of one creed and whose governing

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[210] Ibid., 23.

[211] Ibid., 27-46.

[212] Robert Thorp, "Kashmir Misgovernment: An Account of the Economic and Political Oppression of the People of Kashmir by the Maharaja's Government," (1870), in Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, 82.

[213] Ibid., 88.

power is entirely composed of adherents of the other, must be oppressively and unjustly ruled."[214]

Thorp also criticized British travelers for viewing Kashmir as a playground and failing to take notice of the plight of the Kashmiris, observing that knowledge about the average Kashmiri is filtered through "interested people, who support the Jamoo (Kashmir) Government."[215] These interested people were often agents working on behalf of the maharaja's *darbar*: an agent was to follow the British officer at all times, and in each village what was known as a "zillahdar" or "harkara" (often a woman) was placed to spy for the *darbar*.[216] The *darbar* also established a system of registering servants for European travelers, in addition to licensing venders, so they would know who was interacting with the European visitors and could therefore control the kinds of information to which travelers had access.[217]

This observation is reinforced by works on British India by Bayly and Irshick that place the role of colonial subjects at the center of colonial knowledge production.[218] Lord Curzon's official papers from his viceroy's administration lamented that Kashmir in particular, "so fertile in all its resources, has always been more productive of strange

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[214] Robert Thorp, "Kashmir Misgovernment," 61.

[215] Ibid., 69.

[216] Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Jammu, 15 September 1885, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

[217] Kashmir Visitor's Rules, 1916, in Jammu State Archives (JSA).

[218] C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Eugene F. Irschick, *Dialogue and History: Constructing South India, 1795-1895* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

rumours than any other Native State in India."[219] What the British understood of Kashmir was often shaped by what information they were exposed to, the agenda of the issuant of that information, or how that information conformed or conflicted with past beliefs or predispositions. Even well-placed, established officials such as the Officer on Special Duty (or later, Resident) needed to cultivate their own networks of local informants. If they did not, then they were at risk of having the wool pulled over their eyes by the *darbar*'s many agents who were tasked with monitoring the English officer's activities and, at times, intervening to present obstacles in the officer's way.

For Thorp's choosing to champion the Kashmiri cause, he would pay a steep price. He was so struck by the persecution of the Kashmiris and motivated to act that he "made it his business to collect information" in order to bring "the evil condition of the people to the notice of the Indian Government."[220] But this earned him the ire of the Kashmir State under Gulab Singh's son Ranbir Singh, which sought to have him either removed from the state or eliminated. Upon thwarting the first attempt to have him physically removed, he succumbed to poison at the young age of 30. Ultimate responsibility for his death was never determined, but it seems likely that his poisoning was intended to silence him and therefore stifle efforts to bring relief to Kashmiris. His

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[219] Printed Papers from Lord Curzon's Administration, 1899-1905, Native States, Part III, Principal Events, 41, British Online Archives (BOA).

[220] Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade: A Description of the Beauties of the Country, the Life, Habits and Humour of Its Inhabitants, and an Account of the Gradual but Steady Rebuilding of a Once Downtrodden People* (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 1922), 239.

grave inscription in the Christian cemetery in Srinagar pays respect to the nature of his sacrifice, reading succinctly, "He died for Kashmir."[221]

As conditions deteriorated in Kashmir, accounts from travelers to Kashmir and officials stationed there began to add pressure to British officials to do something about the conditions in Kashmir. An attempt at assassinating Ranbir Singh took place in 1859, and though it was an elite rather than popular affair, involving an illegitimate son of Gulab Singh, the *Times of India* noted the concern that "the present ruler of Cashmere is not liked by his troops."[222] A more grass-roots threat to the Dogra regime emerged in the following decade, however. The shawl strike on April 29, 1865, especially drew attention to the plight of shawl workers who were becoming impoverished over the decline of the shawl trade, and they were left with no option to migrate or find alternative employment. Agitating against the Dogra officials, workers joined in demanding improved conditions in what F. M. Hassnain describes as "perhaps the first organised demand day in the history of class struggle in India."[223] The Dogra regime responded with force by ordering soldiers to attack the workers. Fleeing the onslaught, protestors ran into a marshy canal, in which dozens drowned.[224]

Due to the world-wide fame of the Kashmir shawl industry, the notion that the artisans of such beautiful craftsmanship should be subjected to such oppression elicited

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[221] Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)*, 55-56.

[222] *Times of India*, 20 January 1859, cited in Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)*, 40.

[223] Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)*, 46.

[224] Naba Shah, Wajeez-ul-Tawarikh, 201; and Sahibzada Hassan Shah, Tarikh-i-Kashmir, 98.

sympathy among British officials, who regarded it as "always a marvel how the industry could have outlived the impositions to which it was subjected."[225] Despite claims that Kashmiris were essentially lazy, officials pointed to the shawls as evidence to the contrary: "it is hard to imagine that a people gifted with such a fine appreciation of form and color, and capable of manufacturing most excellent and delicate fabrics, can be averse to industry."[226] The Kashmir shawls played an important role in the imagination of Kashmir as a place in the minds of Europeans, and the idea of reviving the industry to its former glory was attractive for those advocating for intervention and reform.

As horrifying reports of these events trickled back to British India, travelers and newspapers began calling for the British to reverse their established policy towards Kashmir. Dr. Cayley of the Indian Medical Service, stationed at Leh, suggested in 1969 that there be a residency established in Srinagar.[227] The newspaper *Friend of India* also argued for such in 1870, contending that the British should place a permanent Resident in Kashmir rather than the mere seasonal officer on special duty.[228] In 1873, it was recommended to Lord Northbrook's government to change the officer on special duty's status to year-round and to institute reforms in Kashmir's administration.[229] But during the reign of Ranbir Singh, however, the Maharaja was seen as too strong and fit a ruler to

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[225] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[226] Ibid.

[227] Dr. Cayley to Major Burne, 26 August 1869, IOR.

[228] *Friend of India*, 1870, in Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)*, 45.

[229] Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, India Office, London, 23 May 1884, Secret Letter No. 11.

intervene on his affairs, as Ranbir could more easily "set the political officer aside."[230] Ranbir Singh was widely seen as an unpopular maharaja who oppressed his subjects, but due to his loyalty to the British during the 1857 Rebellion, the British felt themselves unable to interfere with his administration during his reign, despite many of them desiring to alter the presently unsatisfactory conditions. As a result, Lord Northbrook subsequently withdrew the proposal for a year-round Resident, and was satisfied that instead the Officer on Special Duty would remain for eight months out of the year as opposed to six.[231]

Hassnain contends that "fear of an advancing Russia prevented them from taking this action, "as they "did not like to antagonize the feelings of Russia."[232] However, this contradicts the prevailing notion in Kashmir's Great Game historiography, exemplified by the arguments of Robert Huttenback, that Kashmir's independence was eroded by intensifying Anglo-Russian rivalry.[233] As Christopher Snedden has put it, "the claim that the British tolerated authoritarian excesses in Kashmir due to Kashmir's vital-geostrategic importance in the 'Great Game' rivalry between and Russia sits in tension between the notion… that the British became more involved in Kashmiri domestic affairs

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[230] Mr. Henvey's Report upon the Condition of Kashmir and the Reforms Required in the Administration, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. January 1883, Nos. 239-40, NAI.

[231] Kashmir Memorandum, P. D. Henderson, Simla, 8 November 1879, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[232] Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)*, 71.

[233] Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj 1847-1947*, 44.

when tensions between Russia and Britain were greatest."[234] In fact, the British avoided involving themselves in the Kashmir domestic situation while they still needed to rely on Kashmir as a buffer state to monitor and stifle Russian advances southwards towards India. When the Russian threat had become less dire, the British felt more liberty to interfere in Kashmir's internal matters, unconcerned that they were possibly driving the maharaja into the Russians' hands. But these weren't solely European problems extended to Asia without local agency. Local conditions continued to play a major role in shaping British relations with Kashmir. As we have and will continue to see, Kashmir's importance as a tourist destination, and what tourists were likely to witness there, was a far more consistent factor eroding Kashmir's independence throughout the Dogra era, cutting through the tension underlying the argument that geostrategic factors were the dominant historical force stifling Kashmir's independence.

Also in 1869 was the publication of Charles Dilke's *Greater Britain*, which included a section on Kashmir. Dilke argued that the "only district that appears to be thoroughly suited to English settlement" in India was the Kashmir Valley:

With the exception of Cashmere, none of the deep mountain valleys are cool enough for permanent European settlement. Family life is impossible where there is no home; you can have no English comfort, no English virtues, in a climate

[234] Christopher Sneddon, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015), 4.

which forces your people to live out of doors, or else in rocking-chairs or hammocks.[235]

With this in mind, Dilke advocated the government to “encourage European settlement in the valley of Cashmere.”[236] Describing the people as “unhappy” and “sold by us without their consent or knowledge, to a family which has never ceased to oppress them,” Dilke claimed the proof of this lies in the fact that they “petition us continually for relief.”[237] His conclusion was that “there is ample ground for immediate repurchase or annexation,” and even that “the non-annexation of the country almost amounts to a crime against mankind.”[238]

Dilke’s account is important, as it was a bestseller back in Britain and highly influential all over the empire.[239] In a letter to the Editor of the Times, an anonymous official known only as “N. M. E.” describes how “after many years of Indian service and long residence in Kashmir,” he could confirm that “the very best account of Kashmir is published in Sir Charles Dilke’s *Greater Britain*.”[240] Noting that he was “glad to see the maladministration of one of the most lovely countries in the world brought to notice of

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[235] Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and 1867* (New York: Harpers and Brothers Publishers, 1869), 446.

[236] Ibid., 477.

[237] Ibid., 489-490.

[238] Ibid., *Greater Britain* (1869), 490.

[239] Thomas M. Costa, “Dilke, Charles Wentworth” in James S. Olsen and Robert Shadle, eds., *Historical Dictionary of the British Empire* (Greenwood Press, 1996).

[240] N. M. E., Letter to the Editor of the Times, 20 April 1880, in K. W. No. 3, Foreign Department, Secret- E., Pros, March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

the Home Government," the author made the damning accusation that the Maharaja received 15 to 25 percent of his State revenue from taxing prostitution, "which, for sentimental reasons, has never been officially reported to the Indian Secretary of State."[241] Pointing out that officials "are not always able or willing" to speak their conscious regarding Kashmir, N. M. E. insinuated that many officials concurred with Dilke's depiction, but due to the requirements of their position could not go public in the way Dilke did.[242] It seems likely that many British officials agreed with N. M. E.'s position that Kashmir would be better off under direct British rule.

This report, especially the mention of prostitution, so alarmed the Secretary of State in London that he at once asked the Government of India's Foreign Department to look into the matter. Henvey prepared a report on the taxation of prostitutes, relying on his native informants to give the officer the information and evidence he needed, which included bills of sales for children sold into prostitution that revealed various tiers of tax classification "according to their 'gratifications.'"[243] Although N. M. E. had apparently exaggerated the numbers and proportion of State revenue the trade represented, "the facts are sufficiently disgraceful." Making matters worse, British travelers to Kashmir were intimately involved in such immoral activity, and Henvey claims that he "hardly know(s) two out of ten that have escaped" from venereal disease. Not only were British travelers engaging the services of these prostitutes, one young Englishman was discovered to be

[241] N. M. E., Letter to the Editor of the Times, 20 April 1880, in K. W. No. 3, Foreign Department, Secret- E., Pros, March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[242] Ibid.

[243] Taxation of Prostitutes, F. Henvey, Special Officer on Duty in Kashmir, 1 June 1880, in Ibid.

involved in running an "open system of pimping which was being carried on by the boatmen." And on top of this shameful state of affairs, the prostitutes were being used as spies on British visitors, and one of Henvey's informants told him that "he himself had heard one of the daily reports read out in Darbar before the Maharaja."[244]

One of the most important events that altered British policy towards Kashmir was the devastating 1877-1880 famine. A newspaper article in the *Hull Packet* described masses of children on the brink of starvation, crying out for help, with nothing left for them "but to lie down and die."[245] The current maligned condition of the Kashmiris drew contrast to their noble background as the "fine handsome race" of Kashmiris, "probably descendants of the ancient Aryans," whom the author saw as "more like ourselves than the dark aboriginal races of Hindustan."[246] Establishing this sense of racial affinity and appealing to Christian religious duty, the *Hull Packet* asks, surely "there must be many a heart in England willing to respond, 'Here am I, Lord, send me.'"[247] The stories of missionaries Dr. Downes and Reverend T. R. Wade of the Church Mission Society saving children from starvation by opening an orphanage, fed with wheat they imported

[244] Taxation of Prostitutes, F. Henvey, Special Officer on Duty in Kashmir, 1 June 1880, in K. W. No. 3, Foreign Department, Secret- E., Pros, March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[245] *Hull Packet and East Riding Times*, December 19, 1879, in British Newspaper Archives (BNA).

[246] Ibid.

[247] Ibid.

from the Punjab, inspired a younger wave of missionaries to come to the Valley to practice their spiritual work.[248]

Henvey's report and recommendations to the Government of India at the famine's conclusion was especially crucial in convincing British officials at the levers of power to act. The report was damning and highly influential, and it was referenced repeatedly throughout the next several years as more and more officials came around to the idea of intervention. Henvey's report made clear that the weather could not be blamed for the famine, which was caused instead by a combination of avarice and maladministration. In Kashmir all the land was considered belonging to the ruler, with the State possessing a monopoly on grain. Because officials collected agriculture revenue in kind, and took as much as they cared to take, this could leave the cultivators in an extremely precarious position, not to mention the system disincentivized cultivators from increasing their yield. Because there were no official private grain dealers, everything was collected to the State, but nevertheless, corrupt officials purchased government grain on the side, creating stockpiles that they would sit on and wait for a scarcity to result to capitalize on the "greatly enhanced" profits.[249] This left the mass of cultivators impoverished with a class of officials inured to the consequences of such policy. Kashmiri Pandits, often filling these administrative roles, were seen as primary culprits in the matter, and it was

[248] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[249] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

observed that "not a Pandit died of starvation."[250] Villagers were unable to help themselves by planting their own gardens or fruit-bearing trees, for any tree planted "is immediately claimed by the Government," and so "in consequence of which scarcely a young fruit-tree is to be found in the Valley."[251]

When starvation conditions set in, masses of Kashmiris sought to leave their homes in search of food, but the maharaja's forces sought to repress them in any way they could and prevent them from leaving their homes. The stories of cruelty were numerous. There were "tales of men and women being stripped naked, because a village could not pay up the revenue" while "fortunes were made by cornering grain which was made over by the Maharaja for the relief of the people."[252] Meanwhile, masses of emaciated, starving Kashmiris began to line the sides of roads throughout the valley, while those living in rural areas did what they could to scavenge for edible roots and bark to stifle their hunger. City dwellers potentially had it worse as they were prohibited from leaving the city, and Srinagar and other large cities were "treated like besieged cities, in which the poorer inhabitants were put on half or quarter rations, while the ruling classes

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[250] Position of the Cultivating Classes in Kashmir, W. R. Lawrence, K. W. No. 3, Confidential, Camp, Kashmir, 2 December 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret-E. Pros., February 1890, Nos. 106-110, NAI.

[251] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[252] Position of the Cultivating Classes in Kashmir, W. R. Lawrence, K. W. No. 3, Confidential, Camp, Kashmir, 2 December 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret-E. Pros., February 1890, Nos. 106-110, NAI.

feasted to their heart's content."[253] Guards manning the passes turned away any Kashmiri attempting to leave the Valley, and importations of grain from the Punjab were seized by officials seeking to add to their fortunes. The depopulation of the Valley was "extreme" and Henvey reported that possibly "3/4ths of the peasants have disappeared."[254] With the lack of hands to participate in agriculture, harvest yields continued to decline, continuing the yearly cycle of extreme famine conditions in the Valley.

A particularly harrowing incident from the spring of 1879 defined the oppression associated with the famine in the minds of British officials. Starving peasants were herded onto boats in Wular Lake, the largest lake in the Kashmir Valley, that were then sunk. Hundreds of people drowned. A witness, "who professed himself to be a survivor from the scuttled boats, and to have beheld his children drowned before his eyes, was brought to Mr. Henvey," giving him a vivid account of the atrocity before dying in Henvey's compound. A post-mortum was performed showing that he was poisoned to death, but to Henvey's dismay, the investigation of the murder was put "into the hands of Kashmir officials, that is, of the men to whose interest it was that evidence of the murdered man should be suppressed."[255] The incident perhaps more than any other convinced the British of the "alienation of sympathy" towards the Muslim cultivators on

[253] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[254] Conditions and Prospects of Kashmir, F. Henvey, 1 June 1880, No. 264, in Foreign Department, A-Political-E, 1882, No. 253/65A, Confidential, NAI.

[255] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

the part of the ruling class in Kashmir.[256] The harrowing tale convinced the British that "a country has seldom come nearer to being left absolutely desolate on the face of the earth than Kashmir."[257]

In order to rectify the shockingly bad state of affairs, the first and most essential action in the mind of Henvey was to bring the maharaja of Kashmir "under the control of the Paramount Power" and induce the state "to make needful reforms."[258] Among these, the most important was to build "good roads" leading in and out of the Valley that were "fit for the traffic of wheeled carts."[259] After this, the system of land-revenue needed to be revised with a more moderate assessment of the tax share established, fixed for a set term of years, to be paid in cash rather than kind. He hoped the effect of this reform would be to "sweep away a crowd of corrupt officials and to give the agriculturists a direct interest in augmenting the produce of their fields."[260] It was additionally obvious that the restriction on movement of people needed to be abolished, along with forced labor and state monopolies.

Henvey saw the problem in Kashmir as being fundamentally different as in other princely states and under more unique circumstances. In other princely states the ruler "is

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[256] Arthur Neve, *Thirty Years in Kashmir* (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), 31.

[257] The Famine in Kashmir, No. 82, H. C. Fanshaw, Assistant to the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 18 October 1879, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., March 1883, Nos. 81-82, NAI.

[258] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[259] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[260] Ibid.

generally more or less in sympathy with the ruled," often being "the head of a clan, of which the members are the majority of his subjects," and so as a result, "the rigour of an Asiatic despotism is tempered by the kindly feelings springing from a community of tribe and religion."[261] This status quo did not exist in Kashmir, where the maharaja was Hindu, and the vast majority of his subjects Muslim. On top of this incongruity was the maharaja's "deep religious bigotry and detestation" of Muslims, ruling the population "by means of an oligarchy of Hindu officials, who, with rare exceptions, are mere vulgar plunderers."[262] Not only this, the Maharaja's court and home was Jammu, some 150 miles from Kashmir. There was a profound disconnect between the ruler and the ruled, inviting the British to insert themselves in between the two.

The only way this situation could be rectified, in Henvey's mind, was to replace the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir with a Resident or Agent, whose advice the maharaja would be required to follow. This would also require the ending of all of the maharaja's communication with the British through his vakil (agent) with the Punjab Government in Lahore, and to be redirected through the officer in Kashmir. Though this would not require the officer to stay year-round, it would be important to change the name of the officer on special duty, which Henvey found "cumbrous and absurd."[263] Instead, the title "agent" seemed more appropriate as it was "one less likely to terrify the

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[261] Ibid.

[262] Ibid.

[263] Confidential Letter from F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, to C. Grant, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 9 December 1882, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. January 1883, Nos. 239-40, NAI.

Maharaja."[264] Henvey ended his report with a microphone drop of sorts by asking the British public and government if they have "no blessing left for the unhappy Mussulmans (Muslims) of Kashmir, whose lot they could ameliorate by a word or hint?"[265] For Henvey, there was a powerful moral imperative placed on the British to act decisively here to ameliorate the condition of the people.

Henvey's report was highly influential in moving the needle towards his advocated intervention, and the Government of India cited the report as having been essential in bringing to their notice the oppression and misgovernment in Kashmir.[266] Many other officials agreed, believing the time had come to reform the state along lines more acceptable, and that it had been long overdue. The Secretary of State for India wrote to the Government of India in 1884 that "the intervention of the British Government" may have "already been too long delayed," but there could be little done at the moment, with Ranbir Singh in firm control of the state.[267] As mentioned earlier, Ranbir's position was relatively secure in that he could set aside an English officer if he so wished. Although sometimes the English officer could use tact and persuasion to get his way, as Henvey describes, "the moods of the Maharaja are, to use a native expression,

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[264] Ibid.

[265] The Famine in Kashmir During 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[266] Secret Letter No. 19, from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Earl of Kimberly, Secretary of State for India, Simla, 7 April 1884, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

[267] Secret Letter No. 11, from the Secretary of State for India, Earl of Kimberly, to the Government of India, India Office, London, 23 May 1884, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

like pictures drawn on water."[268] In the meantime, Henvey tried "to gradually work the Officer on Special Duty into the position of the recognized advisor of the Government in Kashmir affairs."[269]

The impending likelihood of Ranbir's death, however, allowed for "an opportunity, which will not occur again for a generation" to institute reforms which would be an "enormous convenience" to "British visitors in Kashmir."[270] Because the British recognition of the new maharaja was crucial for the legitimacy of the succession, the transfer of power gave them the opportunity to alter the constitutional arrangements with their feudatory state. The British had found themselves regretting handing over Kashmir to Gulab Singh, and the timing of the 1857 Indian Rebellion prevented them from rectifying this mistake when the throne succeeded to Ranbir Singh. The British were not going to allow the opportunity to pass again.

So as not to squander their chance, the British planned out well in advance how they were going to impose the Resident and reform the administration of Kashmir's government. It should not be seen as an action taken in response to Anglo-Russian tensions on the frontier, for example the Panjdeh Incident in March 1885, which nearly

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[268] Confidential Letter from F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, to C. Grant, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 9 December 1882, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. January 1883, Nos. 239-40, NAI.

[269] Note on the Position of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, presented privately to Sir Charles Aitchison, 4 April 1882, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

[270] Letter from H. E. M. James to H. M. Durand, Simla, 14 September 1885, in Foreign, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

brought Britain and Russia to the brink of war. The decision to intervene was made well in advance of that crisis. On April 24th, 1884, H. M. Durand, the Secretary for the Foreign Department of the Government of India, drafted a memorandum on measures to be adopted in the event of the Maharaja's death. The Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, Colonel Berkeley, had received verbal instructions to go to Jammu immediately upon hearing of any serious illness afflicting the Maharaja, and was to "use his influence to preserve order" and formally recognize the succession of the eldest heir.[271] However, Berkeley was due to be replaced by Sir Oliver St. John, and so the British took the opportunity to equip Oliver St. John in person with special instructions without risking publicity if the documents were read and leaked to the press. Oliver St. John therefore was instructed to first attend to Simla, where he received details of the plan.

As soon as news arrived indicating that Ranbir Singh's death seemed imminent, Oliver St. John was to attend to the maharaja wherever he may be. If he was to go to Jammu, it was recommended that the officer go by whatever road he thought best, but to consider whether the "direct route through Kashmir territory," from Srinagar to Jammu through the Banihal Pass, might be best in having "a good effect in maintaining quiet and order."[272] Upon Ranbir Singh's death, Oliver St. John was ordered to recognize the new maharaja and issue further instructions immediately. The officer would then inform the

[271] Memorandum, H. M. Durand, 24 April 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[272] Letter from C. Grant, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Oliver St. John, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, Simla, 1 August 1884, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/191, File No. 13-C, Part II, IOR.

Maharaja that the "Viceroy regards the existing State of affairs as most unsatisfactory and that substantial reformed are required," and that in order to fix these affairs and carry out these reforms, he had decided to give the maharaja "the assistance of a resident English Officer," who will have the status and duties of a Political Resident, to be the sole channel of communication between the Maharaja and the Government of India.[273] By giving the instructions over to the officer ahead of time, which include in plainly terms what are the intentions of the Government of India, the British hoped to prevent causing "unnecessary alarm and to give rise to mischievous rumours."[274]

Despite arguments made by Huttenback and others that the decision was made to impose a Resident due to factors related to the Great Game with Russia, there was little discussion of the importance of this issue, or instructions as to how frontier policy would change as a result. H. M. Durand, the Secretary for the Foreign Department of the Government of India at the time, argued that he did "not think it necessary" to include the "views of the Government about frontier matters."[275] When asked of the strategic advantages of stationing British troops in Kashmir, General D. M. Stewart replied that though "strategically the position is one of some importance," information indicated that "an invasion in force in that quarter by Russian troops is not to be apprehended" due to the immense geographical obstacles preventing an army from moving through the

[273] Memorandum, H. M. Durand, 24 April 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[274] Ibid.

[275] Memorandum, H. M. Durand, 24 April 1884, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

region.[276] Considering the widespread appeal of "Kashmir being a good place for Europeans," the general endorsed the plan despite the murky strategic benefits.[277] The issues officials emphasized as leading to the intervention were ones connected to Kashmir's domestic administration and geographic desirability, not matters beyond its frontier.

As was established policy in other native states, the British intended to recognize the eldest legitimate son of Ranbir Singh, Pratap Singh, as the heir and successor, in accordance with their established policy of primogeniture. This was in spite of the fact that Ranbir's third son, Amar Singh, appeared to be the favorite, and there were rumors that Ranbir desired to partition his territories and inheritance to his three children.[278] This was a totally unacceptable outcome in the minds of the British. A partition of the maharaja's inheritance was in fact only one of two scenarios in which the officer was permitted to interfere with the administration of the state before Ranbir's death.[279] The other was the possibility that the successor, Pratap Singh, was afflicted with "actual incapacity to rule," and for this "nothing but the clearest evidence" should be the standard

[276] Letter from General D. M. Stewart, to H. M. Durand, Simla, 10 September 1885, in Ibid.

[277] Ibid.

[278] Demi-official letter from the Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department, to F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 16 December 1882, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/191, File No. 13-C, Part II, IOR.

[279] Letter from C. Grant, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Oliver St. John, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, Simla, 1 August 1884, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/191, File No. 13-C, Part II, IOR.

to judge upon.[280] Though Pratap's vices were considered severe, particularly his opium addiction and habit of rendering himself gullible to poor influences, there were not considered significant enough to stand in the way of him becoming maharaja. In fact, they were seen as adding to the nature of the opportunity presented to the British. Though Amar Singh was seen as the more competent brother, the fact that Pratap was considered weak, pliant, yet loyal made it easy for the British to decide to make Pratap the maharaja who would oversee Kashmir's necessary reforms.

The British considered that mixed with strict supervision, Pratap's bumbling competence yet steadfast loyalty was a decent enough combination to achieve the reforms they desired. To do so, the Resident imposed needed to be consulted fully at all times and his advice, when offered, needed to be followed. The Resident was informed that he should "not hesitate to offer your advice freely whenever you may think it desirable to do so" as "the conditions of Kashmir must be thoroughly reformed."[281] These reforms included a lighter assessment of land revenue collected in cash, not kind, construction of good roads, cessation of state monopolies, revision of existing taxes, abolition of revenue farming, regular payment of officials in coin, removing restrictions on emigration, implementation of stricter financial control, reorganization and regular payment of the

[280] Secret Letter No. 19, from the Foreign Department, Government of India, to the Earl of Kimberly, Secretary of State for India, Simla, 7 April 1884, in Ibid.

[281] Letter from C. Grant, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Oliver St. John, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, Simla, 1 August 1884, in Ibid.

army, and reform of the judicial administration.[282] In addition, some other matters identified as important were the rights of European traders in Kashmir, a connection of Kashmir's postal service with British India, the conversion of local Kashmir chilkis into British Indian rupees, the extraterritoriality of Europeans in Kashmir, criminal extradition, the improvement of roads, and the question of building a railway connection with Kashmir.[283]

Rehearsed months in ahead and planned to meticulous detail, the plan was executed much as was anticipated. St. John, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, first heard news of Ranbir's declining health on September 4th, when Minister Dewan Anant Ram informed him that the maharaja was "seriously ill of dysentery."[284] St. John waited to move until September 11th, when it was determined that the maharaja was "unlikely to live."[285] However, rather than transfer his duties to the residency surgeon, Dr. Lealy, as instructed, St. John appointed J. R. Maconochie, the Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon who was vacationing in Kashmir at the time, as the temporary officer on special duty. St.

[282] Letter from C. Grant, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Oliver St. John, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, Simla, 1 August 1884, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/191, File No. 13-C, Part II, IOR.

[283] Letter No. 1629-E., from H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Resident in Kashmir, Simla, 19 October 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[284] Telegram from Dewan Anant Ram, Jammu, to Sir Oliver St. John, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 4 September 1885, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/191, File No. 13-C, Part II, IOR.

[285] Telegram from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla, Srinagar, 11 September 1885, in Ibid.

John explained that he considered "him better fitted for the post than Dr. Lealy whose experience in India has been very short."[286] Officers in princely states, as the men on the spot, often had the freedom to take action as they saw appropriate.[287] However, it was only due to the special circumstances associated with the Kashmir province that rendered an officer this competent available to St. John, as other princely states were not desirable tourist destinations.

Confident order would be preserved in Kashmir in Maconochie's capable hand, St. John continued with the plan. Upon arrival in Jammu, he requested to see the new maharaja, and after presented with some obstruction that the maharaja was in morning, consented to meet with the maharaja sitting on the floor in a room with no furniture. At first the maharaja sought to meet with St. John alone, and "it was clear that an unpalatable communication was anticipated, and that it was hoped to confine it to as small a circle of hearers as possible."[288] It seems likely that Pratap intended to continue the work of his father in perpetuating the fiction among his subjects that his state was truly an independent, sovereign one, but the decision that had already been made would forever prevent that as again being a possibility. St. John told Pratap that the message from the viceroy was intended to be delivered in the presence of his council in his

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[286] Letter No. 497 from the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla, Srinagar, 11 September 1885, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/191, File No. 13-C, Part II, IOR.

[287] Roger D. Long, *The Man on the Spot: Essays on British Empire History* (Praeger, 1995).

[288] Confidential Letter No. 227, from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Jammu, 15 September 1885, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

darbar, and he convinced the reluctant maharaja to at least bring in his ministers. Once they entered the room, St. John told the maharaja that the Viceroy recognized his succession to the *gadi*, which "was received with expressions of gratitude and loyalty, the Maharaja rising and bowing his thanks."[289]

The maharaja would not remain happy for long. St. John then translated the substance of the Viceroy's message into Urdu: "the first part of the message referring to the introduction of reforms was received without any mark of surprise," however, "the announcement of the immediate appointment of a Resident was evidently an unexpected blow."[290] The maharaja and his ministers spent the next few weeks trying to wriggle their way out of this provision. Later, when asked what was meant by the "assistance of the Resident," St. John replied that he "could not undertake to define the exact duties of the Resident," but that the Resident should be made appraised of all details of the administration, would give advice "on any point he thought proper," and "would expect his advice to be followed."[291] To this, the officials begged that the appointment of a resident might be delayed so the maharaja might gain credit for his reforms, and revealed that their "main objection was to the name 'Resident.'"[292] St. John replied that this had already been decided and was no longer under discussion, as it was believed that the

[289] Confidential Letter No. 227, from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Jammu, 15 September 1885, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1072/188, IOR.

[290] Ibid.

[291] Ibid.

[292] Ibid.

imposition of a Resident would show corrupt officials that the reforms were serious, while assuring the people of the substance of the reforms.[293]

Meanwhile, Kashmir officials sought to undercut the new Resident by sending the Minister Dewan Gobind Sahai to Simla with over a lakh of rupees "with which he intended to try to bribe certain officials to reverse the imposition of a permanent Resident being appointed in Kashmir."[294] Gobind Sahai managed to receive an audience with the Viceroy on September 24, where Gobind explained to the Viceroy that the new maharaja "had been very much surprised and pained to hear" of the decision to impose a Resident, as "such a change at the outset of his rule would weaken his loins and lower his prestige, in the eyes of both of his subjects and of the Chiefs of India."[295] Though their prior deliberations indicated the British understood why the maharaja would feel this way, the Viceroy's response pretended not to, pointing out that the maharaja could hardly feel inferior to fellow "chiefs of India" who themselves had British Residents stationed in their courts.[296] The Viceroy made it clear that the maharaja had no wiggle room, though he made sure to make the maharaja understand that Gobind Sahai had faithfully represented him and could not be blamed for failing to move the Viceroy.[297]

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[293] Ibid.

[294] Confidential Letter from P. D. Henderson to H. M. Durand, 26 September 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[295] Memorandum No. 239, J. A. C., 28 September 1885, in Ibid.

[296] Memorandum No. 239, J. A. C., 28 September 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[297] Ibid.

However, reforms were slow to enact and officials evasive and corrupt. St. John believed their sole purpose for the state was to invent “plausible pretexts for resisting the supremacy of the British Government and for evading compliance with its advice.”[298] In addition to the problems with officials with actual authority in the administration of the state, there were many “irresponsible and private advisers” who were “interfering in the affairs of the State.”[299] Oftentimes these were personal acquaintances and friends of the maharaja who were believed to have an inappropriate level of influence with him. Rumors circulated that “the Maharaja thought he had effected the death of his father by sorcery, and that he was consequently in the most abject fear of… the actual sorcerer.”[300] Lord Dufferin, laying the groundwork for further intervention in the maharaja’s administration in a letter to Queen Empress Victoria, wrote:

> … The Ruler of Cashmere is a very weak and almost imbecile young man, and completely under the influence of astrologers. Moreover, his private life is, even for a Native Prince, extremely disreputable;… To give Your Majesty… a notion of the folly of the present Maharajah, Lord Dufferin may mention that one of his astrologers told him that he could ascertain whether his father’s spirit was angry with him or pleased by placing four gold mohurs at the four corners of his bedstead every night. If the old

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[298] Letter from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, 20 March 1886, in Foreign Department, External-A., Progs., March 1886, NAI.

[299] Letter from His Excellency the Viceroy of India, to His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir, 28 February 1887, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1073/194, IOR.

[300] Note by H. M. Durand, in Foreign Department, Secret E. Procs., 80-98, 16 March 1889, NAI.

> Maharajah approved of the proceedings, the mohurs would have disappeared by morning. It is needless to say that the spirit of the father scarcely ever evinced displeasure towards the son.[301]

The press piled on, with the *Morning Post* portraying the maharaja as "a thoroughly conservative adherent to the principles of the old-fashioned Kashmiri rulers, which provided for the king's ease and pleasure and let the country take care of itself."[302] These reports relied on tropes of Oriental despotism to lay advance the case that Pratap Singh was unfit to govern.

Yet while his brother Amar was seen as more capable, Pratap's loyalty to the British Empire was considered secure, and so it was never seriously considered to pass over Pratap and install Amar as maharaja. Outside a situation in which the heir was genuinely incapable of holding office, the British imposed a policy of primogeniture on the princely states under British paramountcy, ensuring the eldest son would be heir to promote an orderly succession. The British were stuck with Pratap, with loyalty as his only apparent attribute to them.

The British believed loyalty was enough to achieve their aims, though, if they could only alter the constitutional arrangements to enable their reforms to be carried out. Again, they were opportunistic, waiting for the right moment for a plausible revision of the conditions by which their intervention's reforms were to be carried out. The British

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[301] Lord Dufferin to Queen Victoria, 29 May 1888, Dufferin Papers, IOR, in Robert A. Huttenback, "The Emasculation of a Princely State: The Case of Kashmir," *Journal of Asian History*, 7, no. 3 (1973): 17.

[302] *Morning Post*, "The Deposition of the Maharajah of Kashmir," 2 July 1890, in BNA.

could see that "the condition of Kashmir is still in some ways very deplorable" and began to consider alternative arrangements to enact their reforms.[303] In 1888, the Resident T. C. Plowden argued that the maharaja's chance of implementing the necessary reforms was hopeless and pushed for the maharaja to be stripped of all powers so that, "he may reign, but not govern."[304] However, the government declined to take this step just yet, giving the maharaja one more chance, possibly due to their lack of faith in Plowden.[305]

At the end of 1888 Lord Dufferin was replaced as Viceroy by Lord Lansdowne, who also believed that the maharaja was "quite unfit to govern his State."[306] However, he did not want to give the maharaja an opportunity to claim that they had hampered his efforts to reform his state, and so replaced Plowden as Resident with Colonel R. Parry Nisbet, who was a personal friend of the maharaja.[307] The maharaja having a Resident he could trust ended up working against him, however. Residents had a great deal of power

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[303] Confidential note by H. M. Durand, 16 March 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E, April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[304] T. C. Plowden, Report on the affairs of the State of Jummoo and Kashmir, Confidential, 5 March 1888, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1073/194, IOR.

[305] Confidential note by H. M. Durand, 16 March 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E, April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[306] Letter from Lord Lansdowne to Lord Cross, India Office, Cross Papers, v. 26, 20 March 1889, IOR, in Madhavi Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir, 1876-1894* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1984), 47.

[307] Confidential note by H. M. Durand, 16 March 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E, April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

on the spot to manipulate events as they saw desirable, and Nisbet was able to take advantage of his friend's trust in the drama that soon went down.

In February 1889, Nisbet revealed to the Government of India that he had been given letters written by the maharaja that revealed "treasonable correspondence." They included fourteen documents in Dogri with Persian translations annexed and one document in Dogri without translation that indicated "disloyalty or utter imbecility" on the part of the maharaja.[308] Some of the letters were addressed to Russians beyond the frontier, and others were addressed to Dulip Singh, the heir to the Sikh empire who had recently been preventing from returning to India and was soon to die, bitter, alone, penniless in Paris. Other letters were addressed to individuals who the maharaja wanted to murder or otherwise remove Plowden, his brothers Ram and Amar Singh, and one of the maharanis (princesses). Nisbet was moved to action by the letters, convincing him that "though with lucid intervals of good sense and propriety, the maharaja is utterly incapable of being left in charge of his own affairs."[309]

Armed with his natural energy, his personal connection with the maharaja, and the authority as the man on the spot, Nisbet quickly confronted the maharaja without hearing back from the Government with clearer instructions. Speaking with the maharaja on the 7th of March, Nisbet confronted him about the letters:

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[308] Letter from R. Parry Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Sialkot, 27 February 1889, in Ibid.

[309] Letter from R. Parry Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Sialkot, 27 February 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E., 1889, Pros., April 1889, Nos. 80-98.

> His manner as excited, and he made many appeals to me to help him and to save him from disgrace, saying I was such an old friend I was altogether in place of his own father…. The Maharaja then went on to say that you have always been urging me to pay attention to State affairs and give powers to my Council. I will give them full powers, and they shall manage everything, I will have no more to do with affairs.[310]

The following day the Maharaja wrote his brother, Raja Amar Singh, announcing his intention to retire from public life and appoint a council which would for a period of five years govern the state.[311] Nisbet recommended that the council consist of the Rajas Amar Singh and Ram Singh, Rai Bahadur Suraj Kaul and Rai Bahadur Bhag Ram, along with an English member specially selected by the Government of India.

Nisbet's proactive response was deplored by officials in the Government of India, and he was accused of appearing "to be wanting in discretion."[312] Though the authenticity of the letters was not in doubt, Durand believed they were not "of a very startling character."[313] Merely confirming the maharaja's weaknesses, "they teach us very little that is new about the Maharaja's character, and they reveal no treasonable conspiracy….

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[310] Confidential Letter No. 66 from R. Parry Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Calcutta, 16 March 1889, in Ibid.

[311] Letter No. 555 from His Highness the Maharaja Pratap Singh, to Raja Amar Singh, 8 March 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. May 1889, Nos. 553-567, NAI.

[312] Confidential note by D. Barbour, 21 March 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E, April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[313] Confidential note by H. M. Durand, 16 March 1889, in Ibid.

I do not think that an officer who had seen anything of Native States would have attached so much importance to them as Colonel Nisbet had done."[314]

> The appointment of an energetic administrative officer like Colonel Nisbet to be Resident in a Native State is always a more or less dangerous experiment. His sense of right and wrong is often too acute, and his energy explosive. Colonel Nisbet should, I think, be restrained.[315]

However, because "their discovery has frightened the Raja into this abdication," the letters "have been forced into a position of rather more importance than they intrinsically deserve."[316]

The viceroy agreed, stating that he did not "attach much importance to the letters, but they strengthen our right to intervene." As a result, the British resolved themselves that "the opportunity of establishing a stable and efficient Government in Kashmir should not be allowed to pass by."[317] The question was now how to justify further intervention on letters that the British themselves considered unimportant. It was determined that the action to divest the maharaja's power in a state council was decided "not exclusively upon the letters, or upon the Maharaja's offer, but to take notice of them both," and when

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[314] Ibid.

[315] Ibid.

[316] Confidential note by Charles A. Elliot, 26 March 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E, 1889, Pros., April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[317] Letter No. 707E., from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Resident in Kashmir, Fort William, 1 April 1889, in Ibid.

in combination with the mismanagement of the state, provided sufficient reason to hand over the maharaja's powers to a state council.[318] They insisted that this was not a bargain, however, and they were not beholden to the terms established by the maharaja's letter of resignation: the term would not be fixed at five years, but powers would be restored at a point when the Government of India considered appropriate. In order to dissuade rumors that they intended on annexing the state, however, Nisbet's suggestion that an English member of the council be appointed was rejected, as

> It is important to avoid as far as possible the appearance of annexing Kashmir. We have often been accused of a desire to do so. If the Native States came to believe that we were practically annexing the country their confidence would be shaken, and the effect upon their loyalty would be very serious indeed.[319]

Nevertheless, many onlookers saw the intervention in the maharaja's administration as unprecedented, and correctly ascertained that the Resident was now the de facto ruler of the state. With this accomplished, reforms began to be enacted with greater success, and as the state's administration improved, the Valley became even more attractive to European tourists. During this period European travelers increased from a few hundred each season to a few thousand as it opened up to a broader range of tourists looking to escape the heat of India. Several reforms enacted during this period were designed to accommodate this increase in tourism, which will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

[318] Confidential note by H. M. Durand, 16 March 1889, in Ibid.

[319] Confidential note by H. M. Durand, 16 March 1889, in Foreign Department, Secret E, April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

However, from the moment of the maharaja's abdication, advocacy began on his behalf to try to restore his powers to him, a story that will be picked back up in chapter 5.

Kashmir's reputation for beauty played a defining role in the story of the British intervention in the state. Without European interest in Kashmir as a vacation destination, there would never have been an officer on special duty imposed on the state in 1852. There also never would have been the litany of European witnesses on hand to report back to the British Government of the oppression and mistreatment of the Kashmiris by the maharaja's government. Although Kashmir's strategic position on the northern frontier of India was a major factor in how the British formulated their policy toward Kashmir, Kashmir's reputation for beauty so contrasted with the condition of its people that it compelled many British missionaries, officials, and travelers to try to improve their condition. British officials also keenly sensed Kashmir's historic importance to Indic civilization and considered it a noble imperial project to restore the province to its former glory. Their sentimentality for the place played a major role in their decision to intervene on the maharaja's government and would continue to shape how that intervention took shape, as we will see in the next chapter.

Chapter 3: Not All Roads Lead to Kashmir: British Road Construction in the High Himalayas

> The Indians and Persians call Cashmere the terrestrial paradise. They tell us that the road leading to the other is very strait and difficult: it is the same with that to Cashmere in every possible sense.[320]

For many European travelers during the nineteenth century, the fact that travel to Kashmir was no simple matter was part of its appeal. The journey through the high, narrow passes, which were not fit for wheeled traffic, made the adventurer earn the satisfaction of reaching the fabled valley on the other side. As they wound their way through the Himalayan passes necessary to reach Kashmir, travelers imagined themselves on the journey to heaven on earth. These roads were therefore themselves interlinked with the concept of Kashmir as an earthly paradise, as the above comparison reported by Jacquemont demonstrates.

However, during the British era, changed modern notions of good governance altered the relationship of these roads with the idea of Kashmir as a paradise: now the lack of good roads was preventing Kashmir from achieving its full potential as a tourist destination. In a display of imperial grandeur that was typical of other technological victories over the environment during the period, the British would assert themselves over nature's obstacles to connect Kashmir with the rest of their empire via the

[320] Victor Jacquemont, *Letters from India: Describing a Journey in the British Dominions of India, Tibet, Lahore, and Cashmere, during the years 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, Undertaken by Orders of the French Government*, Vol. 1 (London: Churton, 1834), 31.

establishment of good roads fit for wheeled vehicles.[321] Particularly important was an all-weather road leading east to west along the Jhelum River towards present-day Pakistan, but also vital symbolically to the state was a road through the Banihal Pass connecting Srinagar and Jammu, the summer and winter capitals, respectively. These triumphs would demonstrate themselves as worthy successors to the Mughals as the rulers of India, who like the British were drawn to Kashmir as a place of rest and relaxation. British road construction in Kashmir, especially their failed efforts at establishing a railroad connection with Kashmir, were often defined by emotion and sentiment at what those constructions represented, as opposed to practical concerns. The symbolic meaning of road construction was emphasized even though hidden under those sentiments were serious political and strategic considerations that India and Pakistan are both still wrestling with today.

During the British intervention in Kashmir, one of the most essential tasks in reforming the state was seen as improving these roads leading into the Valley. As discussed in the previous chapter, much of the impetus for this reform was driven by the devastation of the famine, and how that contrasted brutally with the beauty associated with Kashmir. As F. Henvey observed in his famine report, "the most serious obstacle to the work of importation [of food] arose from the want of good roads leading across the Pir Panjal mountain range or up the valley of the Jhelum from the plains of the

[321] William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, *Environment and Empire* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Christopher V. Hill, *South Asia: An Environmental History* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008).

Punjab."[322] These bad roads had long contributed to the impoverishment and oppression of the people, explaining the "local proverb that 'Kashmir is a prison without chains.'" Therefore Henvey argued that it was essential to bring the maharaja of Kashmir "under the control of the Paramount Power, and induced… to make needful reforms." The most important of these was that "there should be one or more roads over the mountains fit for traffic of wheeled carts." The Punjab Government agreed, suggesting as "the one remedy for famine in Kashmir" being "the construction of a good cart-road" leading into the Valley.[323]

The famine was perhaps the singular event that most moved the British to intervene in Kashmir, as such, it was only natural for them to address first what they saw as the most obvious culprit in the famine. Building good roads into Kashmir was part of the whole reason for imposing a Resident in the first place, and so now that there was a Resident, it was time "to insist on roads being made."[324] As such, the Resident was

[322] The Famine in Kashmir during 1877-78-79-80, F. Henvey, Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, 15 May 1880, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros. March 1883, No. 86, National Archives of India (NAI).

[323] Note by T. C. P., Punjab, No. 1287, 3 December 1879, in Foreign, Secret E., Pros., March 1883, Nos. 81-82, NAI.

[324] Kashmir Memorandum, A. C. Lyall, 19 November 1879, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

directed to devote his attention to "the improvement of the Kashmir roads" and "the Kashmir railway question" as two of the most principal reforms of the intervention.[325]

However, it remained difficult to push the state into action until the maharaja's powers were divested into the Kashmir State Council in 1889. Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe tells us that it was largely due to the "tact and energy" of the Resident R. Parry Nisbet's "great personality" that was responsible for opening up the Jhelum Valley cart road, which connected Baramulla in the western part of the Kashmir Valley to British India for wheeled traffic.[326] This cart road was later connected all the way to Srinagar in 1897, and only after that was it really "working well" as it was finally connected to Kashmir's primary urban trade center.[327] Quickly, the Jhelum Valley cart road became the favorite for European tourists looking to visit the Kashmir Valley, and visitor numbers began to rise as the geographical inconvenience of such an excursion became more surmountable. Opportunity beckoned, as one hotel owner, Mr. Atkinson, foresaw as early as 1891: "the need for a hotel is greatly felt at Srinagar, and the opening of the Jhelum Valley Road…

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[325] Letter No. 1629-E. from H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Resident in Kashmir, Simla, 19 October 1885, in Foreign, Secret E, Pros. December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[326] Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade: A Description of the Beauties of the Country, the Life, Habits and Humour of Its Inhabitants, and an Account of the Gradual but Steady Rebuilding of a Once Downtrodden People* (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 1922), 76

[327] Letter No. 3779, from Louis W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, to H. S. Barnes, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Srinagar, 28 May 1902, in Foreign, External A, Proceedings, August 1902, Nos. 91-92, NAI.

will naturally attract a larger number of visitors every year to Kashmir."[328] The opening of the road linkage between Kashmir and Punjab along the Jhelum River also became important for connecting Kashmiris with the outside world and vice versa. These linkages "increased interactions between the state and expatriate Kashmiris, and generated wider sociopolitical awareness in the Valley, manifesting in renewed demands for "freedom."[329]

This road would also have downstream effects on other desired reforms, as well. For example, it would be easier to collect taxes in cash rather than kind if cultivators were able to sell their produce directly to markets in the Punjab rather than to the Kashmir Government.[330] The construction of the road was also seen as one of the primary reasons for the success of the silk industry during the intervention, as well as the rise in prices for a number of agricultural products grown in the Kashmir Valley.[331]

The issue of European access for travel to Kashmir loomed large over reform schemes that, on the face of things, had little to do with tourism. For example, on the

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[328] Letter from Mr. Atkinson to W. J. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir, Lahore N. W. Hotel, 11 January 1891, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1062/15, Hotels in Kashmir, 1891, India Office Records, British Library (IOR).

[329] Shahla Hussain, *Kashmir in the Aftermath of Partition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 30-31.

[330] Letter No. 32 A., 22 February 1886, from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

[331] Letter from E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to Louis W. Dane, Secretary for the Government of India, Foreign Department, 16 August 1903, in Foreign Department, Internal-A, Proceedings, January 1904, 30-31, NAI.

question of currency reform, in 1896, the Kashmiri Darbar inquired to the Resident H. S. Barnes whether they might be able to convert the local subcurrency, the Chilki, to British rupees, which had become the Darbar's standard despite the fact that much of the economic activity in Kashmir was still conducted in Chilkis. The British decided instead that it would be sufficient for the maharaja to simply stop minting the local currency, the chilki, as "owing to the influx of visitors, British rupees are common and circulate freely along with the native coin."[332] As a result, given such a conversion would prove costly and that British tourism to Kashmir was increasing, the best action was to do nothing, as the "Chilki appears to be diminishing, and the natural increase of coinage is taking place in British rupees."[333] Given that visitors were increasing yearly, it followed that in regards to the currency standard, "matters will improve yearly, and the natural increase to the coinage will take place in British coin."[334] Road construction prevented the need for action on some fronts.

However, anticipation of other downwind effects of the Jhelum Valley cart road construction could also cause the British to balk at some of their other reform projects. One of the principal reforms to be made during the intervention was to protect the rights

[332] Note by R. A. Gamble, 25 August 1896, in Currency Reforms in Kashmir State, Foreign Department, Internal A, 1896, December, F-nos. 1-8, NAI.

[333] Note by J. Westland, 2 September 1896, in Currency Reforms in Kashmir State, Foreign Department, Internal A, 1896, December, F-nos. 1-8, NAI.

[334] Note by H. S. Barnes, Resident in Kashmir, 21 October 1896, in Ibid.

and position of European traders in Kashmir.[335] Yet, when discussing the question of European land rights in Kashmir, the Resident at the time, D. W. K. Barr, considered that due to the construction of the cart road, "it is probable that the value of land in Kashmir will rise considerably, and speculators in land will at once come forward if the right to sell and mortgage the occupancy right in land is now conferred by the State."[336] As a result Barr recommended that the Darbar should not grant the right to sell, mortgage, or transfer land, at least until the land market corrected itself. This anticipation of a rise in prices caused the British to stall with their other reforms as well. When the rise in prices owing to the road construction motivated officials to reexamine the land settlement revenue terms to prevent the state from missing out on lost revenue, it was considered that after a railroad was constructed, the prices may rise again, bringing them back to the same problem as before. It was then decided to delay on revising the settlement terms, in the false confidence that the railroad would be built.[337]

A more positive downstream effect resulting from the construction of the Jhelum Valley cart road was the reduction in demand for impressed labor. As discussed in

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[335] Letter No. 1629-E., from H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Resident in Kashmir, Simla, 19 October 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[336] Letter No. 3568 from D. W. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Gulmarg, 1 August 1894, in Foreign Department, External A, Pros., January 1895, Nos. 13-19, NAI.

[337] Letter No. 5331, from E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Srinagar, 13 August 1903, in Foreign Department, Internal-A, Proceedings, January 1904, Nos. 30-31, NAI.

previous chapters, the practice of *begar* was common, in which peasants would be impressed against their will to perform labor, usually as porters or coolies, carrying goods or supplies over the high mountain passes in and out of the Valley. Because these passes were not wide enough for wheeled traffic, animals were less useful than people in carrying sufficient supplies for armies, courts, or even individual travelers. But now that the Jhelum Valley cart road was open, armies, courts, or travelers could now arrange for animals to carry their supply trains in and out of Kashmir. Nisbet confirmed that the Maharaja's use of the Jhelum Valley Road in 1889-1890 "both coming to and going from Kashmir" had "freed thousands of coolies from impressed service."[338]

Begar was officially abolished by the State Council in 1891, but in reality, the practice continued.[339] The British were confident that the improvement of roads would have an effect on the practical demand for impressed labor in a way that legal proclamations from the State Council could not. As a result, the Dogra administrators caught on and over time began to highlight in yearly administrative reports the efforts taken to reduce demand for *begar* through these indirect actions. For example, in 1911-12, the Dogras reported that "the pressure of *begar*… was minimized by… placing the transport arrangement on the Jammu-Banihal Road in the hands of a contractor."[340] Later,

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[338] Demi-Official Letter No. 1849 from R. Parry Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, to W. J. Cunningham, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Sialkot, 8 November 1890, in Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 152-158, NAI.

[339] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report 1890-91, in Jammu State Archives (JSA). See also F. M. Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974), 112.

[340] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report for the Sambat year 1968 (1911-12), in JSA.

in 1923-24, the Dogras argued that the opening of the Banihal Cart Road "has proved highly beneficial in mitigating the evils of forced labour which had to be resorted to for want of wheel traffic roads."[341]

By making these arrangements for their transportation and establishing a new cart-road directly between Jammu and Srinagar through the Banihal Pass, the Dogra officials learned not to embarrass their paramount power with stories of slavery appearing in the newspapers. Because of the immense number of visitors to the Kashmir Valley, such exposure was considered more likely than in other areas of India. These stories criticizing the situation in Kashmir especially attracted the ire of British officials during the intervention because it disrupted their self-directed congratulations for reforming Kashmir's administration along modern, civilized grounds. For officials in the Foreign Department, "the most satisfactory conclusion" they could gain from reading reports that "we have in the present generation been able to confer great and lasting benefits on the population of this formerly unhappy valley."[342] Success could provide justification for the imperial project at a time when the Indian independence movement was beginning to pick up steam. As a result, these officials were eager to congratulate themselves on saving Kashmir in yet another happy story of imperial benevolence and Pax Britannica. Nisbet wrote the Viceroy Lord Lansdowne in July 1889 urging him to visit Kashmir once the road had been opened. Believing it to "be of immense public advantage to the State," he only wished that he would come in the autumn so as to enjoy fully the "pleasure of a

[341] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report for the Sambat year 1980 (1923-24), in JSA.

[342] Note by J. Wilson, 20 July 1906, in Assessment Reports and Reviews of Certain Tahsils of the Kashmir Province, in Foreign Department, Internal-A, Proceedings, August 1906, Nos. 128-9, NAI.

visit in this beautiful country."[343] The viceroy obliged him soon after with a visit to Kashmir in November 1891.[344]

Indeed, for the Settlement Commissioner, Walter R. Lawrence, the Dogra period of Kashmir history demonstrated the greatness of British imperialism. The "anarchy and constant warfare" had been replaced with "complete peace," and the foreign rulers "who pillaged the country" and oppressed the Kashmiris, had "given place to a welcome invasion of European visitors, who spend large sums of money in the happy valley."[345] Within a few years following the completion of the cart road, these European visitors increased from a few hundred per year to over a thousand for the first time in 1899.[346] This is not to mention the many people who entered the Valley but were not counted, a situation that had increased in frequency at this time, "and with a climate better than Europe and with a field for all forms of out-door sport it is certain that, with the journey

[343] Demi-official letter No. 189 from R. Parry Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, to the Marquess of Lansdowne, Gulmarg 12 July 1889, in Kashmir Affairs, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. August 1889, Nos. 162, 203, NAI.

[344] Brief History of Kashmir State, 1904, by the Resident in Kashmir, No. 6237, 1 November 1904, in Brief History of Kashmir State, Foreign Department, Internal B, November 1904, No. 330, NAI.

[345] Walter R. Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir* (London: Henry Frowde, 1895), 202-203.

[346] Note by Louis W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, 14 August 1902, in Alternative Alignments and cost of working of the Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings June 1903, No. 449, NAI.

shortened, Kashmir must attract a yearly increasing number of Europeans and other residents of India."[347]

As Lawrence saw it, of all the reforms instituted by the British, the "most important" was the "completion of the cart road from India to Baramula."[348] This accomplishment was not merely a commercial or military achievement, but instead marked a major watershed on a grand scale in Kashmiri history. Lawrence argued that the isolation of Kashmir was the most important variable in its existence, as it "has had a powerful influence on the character of the people" and was responsible for that "the people of the valley should have retained their peculiar nationality unimpaired."[349]

> The isolation of Kashmir accounts in a great measure for this, and it is quite possible that the Jhelum valley road will effect a change in the customs and ideas of the Kashmiris which Mughals, Pathans, Sikhs and Dogras could never have accomplished.[350]

This imperial triumphalism in initiating Kashmiris' cultural evolution would not be limited to the simple construction of roads, however. One of the most ambitious projects the British undertook in their rule of South Asia was their construction of railroads. At the beginning of the intervention, the British Government of India's Foreign Department

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[347] Note by Louis W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, 14 August 1902, in Alternative Alignments and cost of working of the Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings June 1903, No. 449, NAI.

[348] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 203.

[349] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 203.

[350] Ibid.

identified "the Kashmir railway question" as one of the principal areas of reform for the Kashmir State.[351]

As a result, the British set about solving the easier part of that puzzle: a railroad connection with Jammu. Though the winter capital of the Jammu and Kashmir State, it is difficult to build a railroad accessing Kashmir from Jammu. However, it was not so difficult for Jammu to be placed into connection with British India, being less than 27 miles away from the nearest station in Sialkot. As a result, a line was constructed that connected the Sialkot station to Jammu, with work beginning in 1888 and finishing in 1890. This territory would go through both Kashmir territory and British territory, so it would require some ceding of jurisdiction of Kashmir territory to the railway, with the Kashmir State paying for the line in its territory, while loaning to the North Western Railway the money to construct the line in British territory, receiving one per cent investment.[352]

However, the Kashmir *darbar* was hesitant to grant jurisdiction of territory, concerned that this would cause a loss of internal autonomy in the state's administration. It also appears that the maharaja believed that he should have some right to the railway in British territory since he would provide the money to construct it on loan.[353] The

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[351] Letter No. 1629-E., from H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Resident in Kashmir, Simla, 19 October 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[352] Agreement between the British Government and His Highness Pratap Singh, Simla, 14 July 1888, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, September 1888, Nos. 22 to 40, Part A, NAI.

[353] Note by J. Westland, 26 September 1887, in Ibid.

project's prospects apparently were so hopeless that at one point an official argued "that the financial interests of Government are so slightly involved that we might well withdraw from the undertaking."[354] The Foreign Department was able to continue to push forward with the project, though, stating that it was "decidedly desirable" that the line be constructed.

It is noteworthy that even while discussing a railway line from Jammu to Sialkot that would not go through "Kashmir Proper" (meaning the Kashmir Valley), the maharaja's court is always referred to as the "Kashmir Darbar" rather than the "Jammu Darbar."[355] One never comes across the latter in any of the British archival documents, despite the fact that the maharaja's family located its original seat of power in the Jammu hills. Likewise, this line was considered to be in "Kashmir territory" despite connecting areas outside the Vale of Kashmir. The maharaja emphasized an association of the name of Kashmir with his entire state, which has spilled into the messy contemporary politics of the region that now sees India, Pakistan, and China all occupying former parts of the maharaja's territories.

The Resident was ultimately able to surmount the *darbar*'s hesitation by asking them "what they thought a cession of jurisdiction really meant."[356] Agreeing that "this cession of jurisdiction is restricted absolutely to railway limits and to cases occurring

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[354] Note by E. J. S., 26 December 1887, in Ibid.

[355] Letter no. 260 from the Government of India, Public Works Department, to the Director General of Railways, 25 February 1888, in Ibid.

[356] Note by J. A. C., 27 July 1887, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, September 1888, Nos. 22 to 40, Part A, NAI.

within those limits," and did "not confer any right of interference in the internal administration" of the state, the *darbar* agreed to the construction of the short line connecting their winter capital with British India. Though the railway did not yet access the Kashmir Valley, the British were halfway towards connecting their vassal with the rest of their Indian empire via the railway network.

One of the most promising reforms that never came to fruition during the British intervention was the construction of a railroad that would connect the Kashmir Valley itself with the railway system in British India. It is worth examining why this railroad never came about, despite so many officials believing it would eventually be built. A line was considered very desirable to connect Kashmir via railway with markets in British India as well as making the travel to and from the Valley far more accommodating. Officials argued that

> A very great number of people who would much like to visit Kashmir are now-a-days deterred from doing so by the expenses, worries and fatigues of the present long road journey. If only they could accomplish the journey by putting in a few hours comfortably in a train… people by the score would take their 10 days' leave to Kashmir as a matter of course.[357]

The accessibility of travelers to Kashmir was an important issue that needed to be corrected. The railroad promised to fix that, as it was seen plainly that "the main reason

[357] Project Report and Construction estimated of the Kashmir Railway, in Railway Department, Railway Board, Railway Construction A., Proceedings, February 1911, Nos. 75-82, NAI.

which prevents more visitors from going to Kashmir is the difficulty of access to it."[358] As "the natural attractions of Kashmir vastly exceed those of any other Himalayan summer resort" with "the scenery… unrivaled," St. John believed that the number of visitors would "increase enormously if Srinagar were 12 hours run by rail from the plains of India, instead of 12 days march."[359]

As discussed previously, the British saw Kashmir as a "country, rich by nature," and "poor only because it has no means of conveying its surplus products to the outer world."[360] With this in mind, "there can be no doubt about the benefit" a railroad would confer on the country, as

> From the political point of view, the railway would be the means of bringing wealth and good Government to a people, who have as yet hardly met justice at the hands of the paramount power, and would strengthen the bonds between India and her remote northern dependencies.[361]

This political point of view was the primary concern motivating the cause for constructing a railroad into Kashmir Valley. The geographical challenges, and the corresponding fiscal and military concerns, were obstacles facing the construction of such

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[358] Letter No. 32 A from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 2 February 1886, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

[359] Ibid.

[360] Letter No. 32 A from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 2 February 1886, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

[361] Ibid.

a line, but it was ultimately the resisting of these very real constraints in favor of political imperatives on the part of both the Kashmir *darbar* and British officials that caused the railroad project to fail before the tracks could be laid.

Despite the clear military and fiscal advantages of the construction of a railway line leading westward out from the Kashmir Valley, along the Jhelum River to Abbottabad, the *darbar* insisted on a much more dangerous and expensive line, leading through the treacherous Banihal Pass southward, over a range of mountains about 9,000 feet high, connecting the state's summer capital of Srinagar to its winter capital of Jammu. The engineer assigned to survey both routes in 1903, W. J. Weightman, slammed the Maharaja's preference as "sentimental" and lacking "sound practical advice," as the purpose of the road was essentially political and would not serve as much traffic.[362] Additionally, a railway through the Banihal pass "would be excessively costly; there would be an enormously long Summit Tunnel; and very severe grades throughout."[363] Another engineer found that "of all the feasible routes for railway communication between the Punjab and Kashmir, this Banihal route is the most difficult and costly to construct."[364]

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[362] Reports and Estimates by Mr. W. J. Weightman on the Kashmir Railway by the Banihal and Abbottabad Routes, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings February 1903, Nos. 226-230, NAI.

[363] Project Report and Construction estimated of the Kashmir Railway, in Railway Department, Railway Board, Railway Construction A., Proceedings, February 1911, Nos. 75-82, NAI.

[364] Kashmir Railway Survey, Report No. I, the Banihal Route, General deBourbel, October 1890, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

The route the Maharaja preferred is no stranger to accidents and natural disasters still today. Most recently, a landslide on May 19, 2022, struck a tunnel under construction in Ramban along the same route connecting Jammu and Srinagar, killing ten workers.[365] This is at a location not uncommon to such tragedies, marked by its infamous local characterization as *khooni nallah*, or bloody stream. The national borders of this mountainous region may have changed, but the geographical realities have remained the same. It appears that the symbolic importance of this route continues to outweigh practical concerns today, just as it did during the era of the British Empire and its intervention into the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Outside the North Western Railway company and the British Government of India Military Department, Weightman found few allies among British political officers in his preference for the Abbottabad line. From the Resident in Kashmir, to officials in the Foreign Department, all the way up to the Viceroy Lord Curzon, British officials concurred with the Maharaja's desires for a railway connection between his two capitals. Curzon argued that he "never from the state (as many previous notes of mine will show) entertained the least doubt that the Banihal route was the preferable route." Even when rejecting Weightman's characterization of the Maharaja's interest in the Banihal Route as purely sentimental, Resident in Kashmir, and later Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Louis W. Dane, explained that the importance of the Banihal

[365] Arjun Sharma, *The Tribune India*, "J&K Tunnel Accident: All 10 Bodies Recovered; FIR Against Construction Company," Jammu, 21 May 2022 https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/j-k/j-k-tunnel-collapse-three-more-bodies-recovered-search-on-for-six-others-396802

Line would be powerfully symbolic for the political integration of the state.[366] This was despite the fact that most of the trade and traffic leading into Kashmir went through the far more gradual incline of the route running East-West along the Jhelum River Valley. The reality was that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was an artificial, political creation, and the construction of a road linking the cities would smooth over some of the rough edges underneath such a creation.

Also under consideration was the fact that the Jhelum Valley route already had a good cart road that most travelers in and out of the Kashmir Valley now used. If a railroad would be constructed along that same valley, it would be necessary to shut down that road to traffic for a period, which would result in "the absolute exclusion of practically all visitors to Kashmir for three years at least, and as far as possible the dispersal of European residents permanently settled in the valley."[367] As a result, Dane explained that "we cannot permit the Jhelum cart-road to be closed to wheeled traffic for even one year."[368] An investigation was conducted as to whether there was any "possibility of laying the proposed line on the existing cartroad, without entirely

[366] Note by Louis W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, 14 August 1902, in Alternative Alignments and Cost of Working the Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings June 1903, No. 449, NAI.

[367] Note by M. Thornhill, February 1903, in Punjab Kashmir Railway Jhelum Valley Section, Public Works Department, Railway Construction, Nos. 227 to 234, February 1903, NAI.

[368] Note by Louis W. Dane, Secretary for the Government of India, Foreign Department, 11 September 1903, in Project for the Tawi Talwara route, Kashmir Railway, Railway Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings, July 1904, Nos. 27-38, Government of India, Public Works Department, NAI.

disorganising the traffic between Kashmir and India during the period of construction."[369] However, the valley was found to be much too narrow to have any hope of keeping the road open "while railway construction is going on."[370] It was also pointed out that the advantage of building the Banihal line would, when the dust on construction settled, provide two good transportation routes into the Kashmir Valley. Building the Jhelum Valley line, on the other hand, would result in only one good access route at the end of the day.[371]

Therefore, "it was clearly shown that the best route of the line in the interests of the State was that from Jammu to Srinagar."[372] Dane also pointed out that the *darbar* was also "likely influenced by other considerations than that of making money, such as placing the welfare and benefit of the State and its people to be a paramount duty."[373] F. Anderson, the Accountant General for the Kashmir State, concurred, arguing that "quite

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[369] Letter no. 1312 C., from E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to Professor C. A. Carus-Wilson, 4 September 1903, in Punjab Kashmir Railway Jhelum Valley Section, Public Works Department, Railway Construction, Nos. 227 to 234, February 1903, NAI.

[370] Demi-official letter from E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to Louis W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[371] Kashmir Railway Survey, Report, No. I, The Banihal Route, by General deBourbel, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

[372] Note by Louis W. Dane, 21 February 1903, in Alternative Alignments and Cost of Working the Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings June 1903, No. 449, NAI.

[373] Note by Louis W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, 14 August 1902, in Ibid.

apart from all commercial and strategical advantages" the railway line connecting Kashmir "ought to be warmly supported" on the basis that it would provide "considerable populations of Europeans and Eurasians and numerous cantonments of the Punjab and North-West ready access to a temperate and healthy climate."[374] The idea that the railroad would be the key to unlocking the colonization of Kashmir appears to have been a common one. General deBourbel, the State Engineer for the Kashmir State, estimating that the number of visitors to "this wonderful garden of nature" each year would "probably be doubled" if a railway was completed, and confirmed his belief that Kashmir was a "desirable" location for colonization.[375]

Meanwhile, officials coming operating from an engineering point of view were growing impatient. One Public Works Department official grew frustrated that "the question of a choice between the two routes is less one of engineering and of traffic than of which of the two the Kashmir Darbar will definitely choose."[376] It was even pointed out by one official in the Foreign Department that "the question of rail communication into Kashmir will not be settled on purely engineering considerations, so they need not be

[374] Note by F. Anderson, Accountant General, Kashmir State, 1904, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[375] Kashmir Railway Survey, General Report, by General deBourbel, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

[376] Note by N. J. E. Spring, 3 November 1902, in Alternative Alignments and cost of working of the Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings June 1903, No. 449, NAI.

analyzed too minutely."[377] Dane continued to insist that the Abbottabad line was "politically the wrong line to adopt."[378] The *darbar*, with their allies among British political officers, continued to issue surveys of the two routes in hopes they would provide sufficient justification for paving the way for a connection between Jammu and Srinagar. The Viceroy Lord Curzon remarked that he hoped that the railway construction could begin during his tenure as viceroy, as "it is now over 5 years since I first put the idea into the mind of the Maharaja, and I seem almost to have a parental connection with it."[379] Curzon only hoped that a railroad could be constructed without "sacrificing the picturesque detachment that renders it so attractive to visitors."[380]

Eventually, however, the geographic obstacles facing the proposed Banihal Route proved too much to overcome. Engineer after engineer, surveyor after surveyor, explained to the *darbar* and British officials that the Banihal route would be extremely dangerous, difficult to maintain, and prohibitively costly. The rising cost of each report was considered to be complicating the possibility a line could be built, and compilers of

[377] Note by A. Brereton, Foreign Department, 3 October 1903, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[378] Letter from L. W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to B. Thornhill, Chief Engineer, Jammu and Kashmir State, Simla, 12 August 1903, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[379] Note by Viceroy Lord Curzon, April 1904, Internal B., Nos. 3-4, in Ibid.

[380] Printed Papers from Lord Curzon's Administration, 1899-1905, Native States, Part III, Principal Events, 41, in British Online Archives (BOA).

each report began to criticize each other's work for causing the delay in line construction. One official noted that "the capital outlay required for the construction" was "greatly under-estimated," and that "it is doubtless due in great measure to the erroneous nature of the forecasts in question that the construction of the Railway to Kashmir has for so long been held in abeyance."[381] Dane noted in frustration that "nearly every engineer who has approached the question has condemned the proposals of his predecessors and developed a scheme of his own."[382]

In a similar spirit, the Railway Company and Military Department championed the profitability and strategic benefit of the far easier Jhelum route to Abbottabad. "From the point of view of the North-Western Railway, the Abbottabad route is of course the best," argued one another Public Works Department official, but he conceded that he did "not think Government can well weigh that consideration against the public interest."[383] The Public Works Department, "from a technical point of view only" supported "the

[381] Project Report and Construction estimated of the Kashmir Railway, in Railway Department, Railway Board, Railway Construction A., Proceedings, February 1911, Nos. 75-82, NAI.

[382] Demi-official letter from L. W. Dane, Secretary to E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, 11 July 1904, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[383] Note by N. Priestly, 11 November 1902, in Alternative Alignments and cost of working of the Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction A, Proceedings June 1903, No. 449, NAI.

Abbottabad-Jhelum valley route," but they understood that "the more direct Banihal" route was instead "preferred for political reasons."[384]

Viceroy Lord Lansdowne had also pointed out that the Abbottabad line was "that for which the Military authorities expressed a strong preference on the grounds of its superior strategical advantages."[385] Military officials confirmed their belief that the Jammu-Srinagar line "would not, in a military point of view, much conduce to the security of the country."[386] Those who knew well the extreme inhospitality of these mountain passes realized "that to invade India on this side would be a wild and profitless undertaking."[387] Even political officials who favored the Banihal line conceded it wouldn't provide much strategic good, as Resident Oliver St. John stated, there was not any real "possibility of any actual invasion of India through the passes over the Hindu Kush between Thibet on the east and Afghanistan on the west," which roughly corresponded with the frontier of the Kashmir State.[388]

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[384] Note by F. D. Couchman, Public Works Department, 23 March 1904, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[385] Note by Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, 9 December 1890, in Punjab-Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction, 1891, Nos. 213 to 237, NAI.

[386] Note no. 395 by Quarter Master General, 17 February 1891, in Ibid.

[387] William Wakefield, *History of Kashmir and the Kashmiris: The Happy Valley* (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1879), 13.

[388] Letter No. 32 A. from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 2 February 1886, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

For this reason, it was considered "hardly necessary to contemplate making provisions for conducting military operations" in Kashmir.[389] It was much more important to defend the north-west flank of India, to the west of Kashmir State, than to defend the northern territories of Kashmir State, which seemed an unlikely staging ground for an invasion of India. For this, the east-west Jhelum Valley railroad promised to be more helpful to imperial security interests than a direct north-south link between Srinagar and Jammu through Banihal. As this Jhelum Valley line would be "considered a frontier line of railway, it would no doubt serve well for military purposes."[390] If there was a disturbance along the northwest frontier of India, this route could have been potentially helpful in transporting reinforcements from Kashmir's Imperial Service Troops.

Nevertheless, it was clear that "Lord Curzon will not give up the direct line unless it is shown to be impossible."[391] Dane pointed out that although "the Abbottabad route has the greatest advantages for the British Government," it was however "much less

[389] Note by G. C., 5 February 1891, in Punjab-Kashmir Railway, Public Works Department, Railway Construction, 1891, Nos. 213 to 237, NAI.

[390] Kashmir Railway Survey, Report No. IV, Abbottabad Line, by General deBourbel, in Public Works Department, Railway Construction, June 1890, Nos. 200-235, NAI.

[391] From Louis W. Dane, Secretary to the Governemnt of India, Foreign Department, to E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, Simla, 27 July 1904, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

beneficial to the Durbar."[392] Engineers continued to work to convince political officers of the dangers and futility of construction the Banihal route. One engineer argued that in his opinion, "no railway could ever be maintained at the mouth of the Banihal Valley" as he had "never seen such unsound ground anywhere."[393] A key turning point was when E. G. Colvin, the Resident in Kashmir in 1904, inspected the Banihal route himself and determined that it was far too difficult to conceive of creating a railroad at such "steep gradients."[394] The necessary tunnel would also "likely to be longer and much more difficult" than previously thought, with the "difficulty" of working at such a place "enormous, and the task itself will be stupendous."[395] Though he was "sorry [he] could not agree with [Dane's] views about the Banihal," the more he reflected "on the pros and cons," the more he became "convinced that the Jhelum valley line is the right one."[396] Colvin's recommendation that the Banihal route should be abandoned was seconded by

[392] Note by Louis W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 4 September 1904, in Ibid.

[393] Letter from B. Thornhill to Louis W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in Ibid.

[394] From E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to L. W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Gulmarg, 31 July 1904, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[395] Demi-official letter from E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to Louis W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Camp Ganderbal, 2 July 1904, in Ibid.

[396] From E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to L. W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Gulmarg, 31 July 1904, in Ibid.

Public Works Department officials, who pointed out that a railway into Kashmir "must enter the valley by the Jhelum river route, and not traverse the huge mountain range between Srinagar and Jammu."[397] As such, the plan to construct the Banihal route was abandoned, a conclusion which Dane saw as a "pity."[398]

To some observers, particularly the engineers, the *darbar* seemed resigned to the circumstances. To more canny contemporaries, such as Dane, who knew the *darbar* better, the maharaja seemed to be playing the long game, stalling to prevent the construction of a line along the Jhelum Valley connecting his state to British India, eroding his state's autonomy amid the inevitable influx of travelers who would follow it. Dane believed at this point that the maharaja "would not have a railway at all if he could help it" and is "quite prepared to vote for a different route each time if this could put off construction" as he "will do anything he can to stop it."[399] Dane considered holding the restoration of the maharaja's powers over Pratap's head to try to "keep the Maharaja up to his promise to make the railway."[400] However, Lord Curzon decided to restore the maharaja's powers upon the end of the viceroy's tenure of office.

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[397] Note by C. W. Hodges, Public Works Department, 30 July 1904, in Ibid.

[398] Note by Louis W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 7 August 1904, in Ibid.

[399] Note by Louis W. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 31 July 1904, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[400] Letter No. 6282 ½ from Louis W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, 16 September 1902, in Proposed Administrative Changes in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret E., Proceedings, December 1902, No. 112, NAI.

Because the railway line would need to be constructed in both British and Kashmir territory, the railway would not begin construction on its line until the *darbar* began work on theirs, as the former would be useless without the latter.[401] Both sides settled into this stalemate for some time. The *darbar* put up various objections, citing the need for more surveys of the route, with each survey increasing the estimated cost of the project. At one point, the *darbar* objected that there were "too many opinions of experts" to consider.[402] Finally, in 1907, the *darbar* gave up this game of chicken when they admitted that they did not have the money for such a route and did not desire to take a loan for it, despite Dane's judgement that they possessed more than enough funds.[403]

However, the *darbar* still desired improvement to their connection between winter and summer capitals and the symbolic importance of such a measure. As early as 1904, the darbar began taking measures to begin to improve portions of the existing

[401] From the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to T. C. Pears, Resident in Kashmir, No. 2919-I. B., Simla, 24 July 1905, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[402] Telegram No. 6528, from the Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Simla, 11 November 1904, in Proposal for the Construction of a Railway to Kashmir, Military Department, Communications, Railway A, Military Works Proceedings, September 1905, Nos. 242-243, NAI.

[403] Enquiry by Professor C. A. Carus-Wilson Regarding the Proposed Construction of a Line from Serai Kala through Abbottabad to the Kashmir Frontier, 1908, in Railway Board, Railway Projects A, Proceedings February 1908, Nos. 11-13, NAI.

road.[404] A few years later sanction was granted for the construction of a new cart road through the Banihal Pass.[405] Work "pushed on with vigor" throughout the decade, in particular on the tunnel 660 feet long through the Banihal Pass, "to make the whole road from Jammu to Srinagar fit for wheeled traffic."[406] While the Banihal Cart Road "was in full swing with construction of bridges and culverts, the widening and metaling of the road surface and various other improvements," the Srinagar-Anantnag road was metaled and the Jhelum Valley Road improved and repaired.[407] Although the tunnel was still in progress by the end of the decade, 136 miles out of about 206 miles of road had been completed.[408] The Banihal cart road was finally was opened in 1922, which quickly attracted an conspicuous increase in traffic that was believed to have reduced the demand for forced labor.[409] This is the road which now connects India to the portion of Kashmir it occupies, by which Indian tourists today travel to Kashmir if they choose to forgo a flight.[410]

By the end of the British intervention, the Dogras boasted that though "the problem of communication in a country so mountainous as Jammu and Kashmir will always be serious," they had constructed both the Jhelum Valley and the Banihal cart

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[404] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report, Sambat 1961 (1904-05), in JSA.

[405] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report, Sambat 1968 (1911-12), in JSA.

[406] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report, Sambat Year 1970 (1913-14), in JSA.

[407] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report, Sambat Year 1973 (1916-17), in JSA.

[408] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report, Sambat Year 1975 (1918-1919), in JSA.

[409] Jammu and Kashmir State Administration Report, Sambat Year 1980 (1923-24), in JSA.

[410] Vijay Kumari Koul, *Kashmir Greets You (Guide to Lalla Rookh)* (Srinagar: Chronicle Publication House, 1973), 2, in JSA.

roads, which "together form one of the largest system of mountainous roads in the world available for wheeled traffic."[411] This triumphalism over nature is consistent with other patterns of colonial relationships with the environment during the period.[412] The British took a similar outlook, citing the construction of these two roads as primary examples of the "considerable changes for the better since the succession of the present maharaja" that helped initiate Kashmir into the modern era.[413] However, they still regretted that after much deliberation over a railway connection between Kashmir and British India, "the scheme did not materialize."[414]

Railway companies nevertheless undertook surveys at their own expense to try to convince the darbar of the merit of the construction of a link between Kashmir and British India. Lamenting that "the great handicap under which the Valley of Kashmir at present labours is its inaccessibility," Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co., Ltd., conducted a preliminary survey of the routes in 1919, only to find that the cost of such a proposed project had again continued to rise in the meantime.[415] As the report also foreshadowed,

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[411] Accession No. 15 J&K Govt., A Note on J&K State, (Jammu: Ranbir Press, 1925), in JSA.

[412] Beinart and Hughes, *Environment and Empire* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Hill, *South Asia: An Environmental History* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008).

[413] Note on Kashmir Affairs, 1921, in Foreign and Political Department, Deposit-Internal, Pros., October 1921, No. 38, NAI.

[414] Note on Kashmir Affairs, 1921, in Foreign and Political Department, Deposit-Internal, Pros., October 1921, No. 38, NAI.

[415] Report and Estimates of the Kashmir Rail and Ropeway Project, by Forbes, Forbes, Campbell & Co., Ltd., Karachi, 1920, in Foreign and Political Department, Internal B., Pros., November 1920, Nos. 338-339.

however, the ongoing Third Anglo-Afghan War demonstrated that air traffic would soon suffice for bringing visitors to the Kashmir Valley for their holiday travels. Though an air connection would not be adequate or profitable for economic connections in and out of the Valley, which caused it to suffer from a lack of economic development in subsequent years, the airway link satisfied the needs of the tourist interest in Kashmir that has so long dominated the Valley's relationship with the outside world. As a result of the Maharaja's successful stalling, the railway connection to British India was abandoned as no longer necessary. The Maharaja, so often maligned by British officials as an incompetent, conversely achieved his goal of either building a line between his two capitals or building none at all.

What the historical record shows us is that the considerations behind road construction go beyond mere numbers regarding trade and troop movements. The current construction of the Jammu-Srinagar highway through the Banihal Pass cannot be boiled down to such statistics or rational explanations, and the intangible motivations behind such a project have a much broader political complexity linked to efforts to promote state integration and unity. These efforts to penetrate the state into the high Himalayas can also be traced directly to the broader present-day mania for road construction in the region by not just India but also China. They are important efforts to support the national project by enhancing the central government's control over regions formerly only loosely connected under its authority. This authority is not only exemplified in the promotion of economic development and state security, but also by promoting the idea of the nation in the minds of the region's inhabitants. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, argued that the construction of colonial railways was a crucial step in cultivating a shared sense of Indian

nationalism and civilization, and current efforts at road construction in these inhospitable regions can be located along this same historical continuity.[416]

Mahnaz Ispahani argued in her study *Roads and Rivals* that though economic development and state security are commonly seen as separate issues, they are instead often intertangled. Roads, as Ispahani sees it, are "also 'dual-use': depending on its location and specifications, it can be an instrument of economic development or a tool of internal security or external defense."[417] Afghanistan, as a buffer space between the British and Russian Empires amid the Great Game, began to pursue a policy of access denial in their territories to deter Russian aggression southwards and British interference in their internal affairs.[418] Afghans "considered route building—especially by the British—as an intrusive attempt to control their land, their leaders, and their economy."[419] The price to pay for this enhancement to their internal autonomy and therefore political consolidation was the full potential of economic development that road construction could promise. British official Olaf Caroe described it as "the price they (the Afghans) paid for their independence and the realization, in practice, of the buffer-state concept."[420] Ispahani further argued that "British antipathies against transport

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[416] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1946), 533.

[417] Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals: The Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989), 10.

[418] Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals*, 94-98.

[419] Ibid., 99.

[420] Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans, 550 BC-AD 1957* (London: Macmillan, 1965), 538-9.

development were a natural concomitant of Afghanistan being a buffer zone."[421] She traced this tricky dynamic to the present day in her warning that the pursuit of improved transportation infrastructure and economic development during the American-led occupation of Afghanistan would not lead to an increase in positive security outcomes: "Historically, improved economic conditions have not necessarily improved the security of states."[422]

Using this case of road construction in Kashmir, I have built on Ispahani's argument by adding that these frameworks also need to consider political considerations of the emotional resonance these roads can cultivate for the purposes of national integration. Just as access denial promoted political cohesion for the Amir of Afghanistan, promoting selective road construction while engaging in access denial on other projects proved a successful strategy in some ways for the maharaja of Kashmir. At the end of the day, the predictions made by Lawrence that the construction of the Jhelum Valley cart road would change Kashmir's cultural uniqueness proved only partially true. While it did open up Kashmir to many of the ideas about democracy, constitutionalism, and socialism that were spreading on the rest of the subcontinent, causing unrest to break out against the next maharaja in 1931, it did not fully throw open Kashmir to the outside world the way a railroad might have. And who is to say what might have happened if the railroad along the Jhelum Valley Route was constructed: this was the route taking by the Pashtun *lashkar* or army that invaded the Kashmir Valley for Pakistan in 1947, forcing

[421] Keith McLachlan, "Afghanistan: The Geopolitics of a Buffer State," *Geopolitics and International Boundaries* 2 (1) 1997, 82-96.

[422] Ispahani, *Roads and Rivals*, 221.

the maharaja to sign the instrument of accession, joining India. If the Pashtun *lashkar* had arrived in Srinagar before Sikh paratroopers were able to reach the airfield, Kashmir's modern history, and the history of the subcontinent, may have unfolded very differently.

What this historical example also demonstrates, however, is that the geographical complications behind such route-building remain obstructive no matter how humans might feel about it. The challenges posed by physical geography will continue to make contemporary road construction in the Himalayan region difficult despite advances in technology and the will of political imperatives behind it. It is not clear whether contemporary road building in Kashmir will result in the national integration that Nehru argued made the colonial railways so important, and geographical realities will remain constant. The Banihal Pass remains as dangerous as it did over a century ago, as the recent landslide at Ramban has so tragically shown us.

Chapter 4: British Transformation of Kashmir Into a Tourist's Paradise

Before the British intervention into the Kashmir State, a mere few hundred European travelers visited Kashmir each season. Forty years later, by the conclusion of the intervention and Maharaja Pratap Singh's reign, this number was in the thousands. That this intervention opened Kashmir to a broader range of tourists is an underappreciated aspect of the period. Indeed, when exploring the reforms carried out during these four decades, it appears that much of the Resident's time was preoccupied with accommodating the increasing tourism to the Kashmir Valley. Scholars have identified continuity with the British following their Mughal predecessors in their practice of resorting to Kashmir during the summers. However, that this destination became opened to a broader class of Europeans is a significant discontinuity in the story of Kashmir's relationship with outsider tourism. Kashmir was affordable for Europeans of modest means to travel and live a life modelled after the privileges and pleasures enjoyed by aristocrats back home. Their status as imperial rulers allowed non-aristocrats to pursue social mobility in the Empire's domains in ways that would not be possible in the metropole. While this was a dynamic not uncommon throughout the Empire, it was especially prevalent in Kashmir. Kashmir's romantic allure was a powerful motivating force that shaped colonialism in the state in ways that were unique on the Indian subcontinent during the period.

As recounted in chapter 2, the British saw their intervention into Kashmir's administration as "an opportunity, which will not occur again for a generation" to institute reforms which would be an "enormous convenience" to "British visitors in

Kashmir."[423] Two of the principal areas of Kashmir's administration where the British most saw need for reform were "the position of European traders in Kashmir" and "the question of jurisdiction over Europeans in Kashmir."[424] In fact, in the view of one Resident to Kashmir, there was "hardly a question connected with Kashmir of more pressing and permanent importance… than the question of the conditions on which European British subjects are to be allowed to carry on business in Kashmir."[425]

The British Government's priorities in Kashmir were reflected as such in the negotiations between the Viceroy Lord Dufferin and Maharaja Pratap Singh shortly after the imposition of a Resident in mid-January 1886. While the Viceroy was unwilling to move from his insistence that a) all communications between the maharaja and the British government be directed through the British Resident and b) that British traders have the right to purchase land in Kashmir, he was more amenable to the maharaja's insistence against the establishment of a British military cantonment in Kashmir.[426]

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[423] Letter from H. E. M. James to H. M. Durand, Simla, 14 September 1885, in Foreign, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, National Archives of India (NAI).

[424] Letter No. 1629-E., from H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Resident in Kashmir, Simla, 19 October 1885, in Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., December 1885, Nos. 192-245, NAI.

[425] Letter No. 32-G., from Francis Younghusband, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Camp Gulmarg, 2 July 1908, in Question of the Rights of European British Subjects to acquire houses and land in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret-I., Proceedings, September 1908, Nos. 31-33, NAI.

[426] Memorandum of a Conversation between Lord Dufferin and Pratap Singh, 15 January 1886, in Foreign Department, Progs., Sec. E., July 1886, Nos. 16-142, NAI.

Dufferin accepted the maharaja's promise that he would dedicate his own troops to the defense of British interests in the frontier and redirected his attention to more pressing matters.

As a result, the Viceroy informed the maharaja that it was "necessary that British traders in Kashmir should be allowed all necessary facilities, including the power to buy or lease suitable buildings for carrying on their business, and to acquire land for the erection of such buildings."[427] However, "in spite of this statement of the views of the Paramount Power," the maharaja "continued persistently to thwart the acquisition of land by European British subjects."[428] This was seen as an important issue to resolve, given that "the climate and surroundings of Kashmir, and of Srinagar in particular, are such as to attract settlers of European origin, and there can be no doubt that some of these might be unwelcome citizens of Kashmir."[429] The job of the Resident was thus to ensure these visitors would be welcome, despite whatever opposition they faced from local Kashmir officials.

That visitors to Kashmir would increase was seen as an inevitable outcome of the intervention. Anticipating "a rush of European settlers to Kashmir within the near future," some officials even speculated that Kashmir's settlement could create an "Uitlander"

[427] Letter from Viceroy Lord Dufferin to His Highness the Maharaja Pratap Singh, 16 March 1886, Secret E., July 1886, Nos. 423-428, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/1/1/368, Question of Right of Europeans to Own Immovable Property in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret I, Proceedings, February 1909, Nos. 33-34, British Library, India Office Records (IOR).

[428] Letter from Morley of Blackburn, to His Excellency the Governor-General of India, India Office, London, 13 November 1908, in Ibid.

[429] Ibid.

question.[430] The "uitlanders" were mainly British migrant workers in the Transvaal Republic in the late nineteenth century. Granted limited rights by the independent Boer Republics, their presence was one of the contributing factors behind the Second Boer War in South Africa. Keeping this recent historical lesson in mind, the British were aware that Kashmir's attraction could distort the demographics in a way that could compel the British to directly take over the state.

One of the issues which the Darbar claimed was the basis for their opposing the acquisition of immovable property in Kashmir was jurisdiction. European British subjects in Kashmir were not subject to the local civil courts, and all legal matters arising from their stays were handled by a court consisting of the Resident and his assistants.[431] In his 1886 instructions to the Maharaja, the Viceroy dismissed this concern, pointing out that European British subjects would be "equally free from jurisdiction of your Courts whether they lived in houses supplied by Your Highness or in houses belonging to themselves."[432] This logic does not seem to have swayed the maharaja, however, who continued to view the acquisition of property in Kashmir as a powerfully symbolic issue

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[430] Letter No. 163 of 1908, to the Viscount Morley of Blackburn, Secretary of State for India, Simla, 3 September 1908, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, in Question of the Rights of European British Subjects to acquire houses and land in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret-I., Proceedings, September 1908, Nos. 31-33, NAI.

[431] Letter from D. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir, to A. Williams, Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 19 June 1894, in Jurisdiction over European British Subjects in Kashmir, Foreign Department, External A, Pros., January 1895, Nos. 13-19, NAI.

[432] Letter from Viceroy Lord Dufferin to His Highness the Maharaja Pratap Singh, 16 March 1886, Secret E., July 1886, Nos. 423-428, in Ibid.

of his authority and sovereignty, and a bulwark against the settlement of the Kashmir Valley by Europeans.

Although the British were fine with giving up civil jurisdiction if it meant "granting concessions to Europeans to settle in Kashmir," the Resident doubted whether this "concession would produce the required result."[433] Instead, the Resident estimated that what Kashmir really wanted was "that Europeans who settle there shall simply fall into line with the rest of the population, and to this proposition we have not so far been able to consent."[434] There was "no doubt" that "sentiment, rather than abstract reasoning, underlies this view of the case, but sentiment is a very important factor in a Native State."[435] As a result, the British decided not to demand any broad concession for British traders, but decided to handle such situations on a case-by-case basis, allowing the maharaja to be "master of his own house."[436]

In many instances, however British traders were unable to procure these concessions and were left to work around the rules however they could manage. This left

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[433] Letter from D. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir, to A. Williams, Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 19 June 1894, in Jurisdiction over European British Subjects in Kashmir, Foreign Department, External A, Pros., January 1895, Nos. 13-19, NAI.

[434] Ibid.

[435] Letter No. 3567 from D. K. Barr, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary tot the Government of India, Foreign Department, Gulmarg, 1 August 1894, in Ibid.

[436] Letter from Morley of Blackburn, Secretary of State, to His Excellency the Governor-General of India in Council, India Office, London, 13 November 1908, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/1/1/368, Question of Right of Europeans to Own Immovable Property in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret I., Proceedings, February 1909, Nos. 33-34, NAI.

them in a vulnerable position, though. For example, a Mr. Hadow of the Kashmir Manufacturing Company, a carpet manufacturer was only able to lease land in the name of a Kashmiri subject. Hadow found himself in trouble when this Kashmiri died, as the son who inherited the land "refused to recognize Mr. Hadow and claimed the land as his own."[437] Another businessman, Mr. Anderson, held lands from peasants for cultivation of fruit, but once the trees became bearing, the peasants refused recognize his claim. After several years of pressuring by multiple Residents, the Darbar finally agreed to let these two businesses register their lease of land and mortgage in their own names, in return for placing themselves under the civil jurisdiction of the Kashmir Courts regarding all suits connected with the businesses.[438]

Other companies and individuals were officially granted concessions by the Darbar with less trouble, permitting them to lease land and buildings directly from the Darbar. However, these leases were equally precarious as they were renewed regularly and therefore liable to be turned out at a moment's notice wholly at the discretion of the Darbar. The Punjab Banking Company, Messrs. Cox & Co., and Messrs. Cockburn Agency were some of the European businesses operating on this uncertain basis. In

[437] Letter No. 31-G, From Francis Younghusband, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Camp Gulmarg, 2 July 1908, in Question of the Rights of European British Subjects to acquire houses and land in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret-I., Proceedings, September 1908, Nos. 31-33, NAI.

[438] Letter No. 484-G, from S. M. Fraser, Resident in Kashmir, to Arthur Henry McMahon, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla, Camp Gulmarg, 30 July 1912, in Question of the Disabilities of Europeans Trading in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Internal-A, Procedings, November 1912, No. 27, NAI.

particular, the Cockburn Agency was established in 1892 "to meet a need that was felt for affording assistance to the yearly increasing number of visitors."[439] When they applied for permission to lease land from the state for business purposes, they gave the Darbar two options: either erect a building on the premises and charge the Agency rent or allow the Agency to construct a building at its own expense. The Darbar was able to stall this project successfully by keeping the question of its mortgage in abeyance for several years, resulting in the Cockburn Agency finally have to turn over all its assets to the aforementioned Messrs. Cox & Co, who also supplied Europeans in Kashmir with necessary goods, and left the Kashmir Valley altogether.[440]

Regardless, by avoiding the general question and handling circumstances on a case-by-case basis, the British Residents were able to gradually open up the Kashmir Valley to more European traders and businesses over time. However, in a situation that demonstrates the importance of officials on the spot in the empire, these efforts suffered a setback in 1908 when the Secretary of State for India in London, Viscount Morley of Blackburn, described to Parliament how the Kashmir Darbar was "entirely within their rights" to restrict European enterprise or settlement in Kashmir and that "it would be wholly contrary to public policy for the Government of India to interfere with free

[439] Appendix C., in Difficulties experienced by European British Subjects in Acquiring Land for Business Purposes in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Internal-A., Proceedings, October 1910, Nos. 19-23, NAI.

[440] Appendix C., in Difficulties experienced by European British Subjects in Acquiring Land for Business Purposes in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Internal-A., Proceedings, October 1910, Nos. 19-23, NAI.

discretion of the Darbar of a Native State."[441] Outraged, the Resident at the time, Sir Francis Younghusband, wrote that the Secretary of State could not "have any idea of the disastrous effect" of this statement, which "undermined years of strenuous effort of the Government of India and their local agents."[442] This placed the Resident in a difficult position, as "the Government of India, on the other hand, have held, for over 20 years, that they have a right… to insist on the Darbar giving to all classes of British subjects the same facilities which the British extend to Kashmiri traders in British India."[443] The damage this statement dealt to Britain's position in Kashmir was felt immediately, when the Resident was informed that in light of the Secretary of State's comments, "in the future the Resident would not be able to interfere with the Darbar."[444] Though Younghusband's letters in response to the statements in Parliament were "not respectful" and would "probably arouse Secretary of State's ire," the Viceroy Lord Minto decided to

[441] "Acquisition of Land in Kashmir," *Pioneer*, 25 March 1908, in Question of the Rights of European British Subjects to acquire houses and land in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret-I., Proceedings, September 1908, Nos. 31-33, NAI.

[442] Confidential Letter from Francis Younghusband, Resident in Kashmir, to S. H. Butler, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 31 August 1908, in Question of the Rights of European British Subjects to acquire houses and land in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret-I., Proceedings, September 1908, Nos. 31-33, NAI.

[443] Note by J. B. Wood, 1 August 1908, in Question of the Rights of European British Subjects to acquire houses and land in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret-I., Proceedings, September 1908, Nos. 31-33, NAI.

[444] Letter No. 32-G., from Francis Younghusband, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Camp Gulmarg, 2 July 1908, in Ibid.

forward Younghusband's "heated" response as "it certainly further explains the case" as "exceptional."[445]

Europeans continued to complain of their inability to purchase immovable property in Kashmir for travel or business purposes. For example, in 1925 the European Association in Calcutta wrote the Government of India asking them "to press on the State authorities the desirability of equality of treatment" in allowing British travelers the privileges any Kashmiri state subject might.[446] However, the British Government continued to handle the matter as they did before, on a case-by-case basis, where "if any case arises in which a British subject complains of unfair treatment it can be considered on its merits."[447] In this manner, the British could gain the necessary facilities for British traders while allowing the Darbar to maintain their principle on the matter.

However, Europeans continued to find ways to maneuver around the maharaja's injunction against their owning immovable property in Kashmir. One way they worked around this restriction was by purchasing houseboats in Srinagar, which the city is now famous for. Introduced by a Mr. M. T. Kennard in the 1880s, by the 1900s they numbered in the hundreds.[448] Some Europeans lived in them throughout the year, but

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[445] Note by Lord Minto, 6 August 1908, in Ibid.

[446] Letter from the President of the European Association, Calcutta, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, 7 April 1925, in Complaint by the European Association, Calcutta, Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, No. 19(8)-0, 1925, NAI.

[447] Foreign Department Notes, Question of the Rights of European British Subjects to acquire houses and land in Kashmir, Foreign Department, Secret-I., Proceedings, September 1908, Nos. 31-33, NAI.

[448] Sir Francis Edward Younghusband, *Kashmir* (1908), 45.

mostly they were leased for the summer season. These houseboats were often given names such as 'New London' or 'New Melbourne', reflecting Britons' desire for a home away from home, or what Ananya Jahanara Kabir calls "the longing for England."[449] They could be used as transport throughout the Valley and could thus serve as a base for treks into the mountains. The boats themselves contained sitting-rooms with fireplaces, bedrooms, bathrooms, and a cook-boat attached for cooks and servants.[450] The erection of houseboats created an increased demand for boatmen, which pushed the state's labor supply to its limits.[451] The Darbar, for its part, seized the opportunity to impose licensing obligations for house-boat occupants, the fee based on tiers associated with the size and quality of the boat.[452] Some of these boats are still owned today by the same Kashmiri families, holding collections of writing, photographs, and other items and documents from the era in which British officials, academics, and tourists would find their haven from the plains of India.[453]

The houseboat was often central setting from which the British referenced their Kashmiri summers. For example, it was from her houseboat, replete with a backdrop of magnificent mountain views, that Mrs. Percy Brown wrote in her book of poetry, *Chenar Leaves*:

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[449] Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire: Representing the Valley of Kashmir* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 74.

[450] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 45.

[451] Kashmir Visitor Rules, 1902, JSA.

[452] Kashmir Visitor Rules, 1902, JSA.

[453] Kabir, *Territory of Desire*, 97.

Floating serene upon the Jhelum's breast,

Lies my dear Kashmir house,

'Tis here my spirit is at peace and rest

How far so ever I roam!

My home is formed when Kashmir forests fair

Proud deodar and pine

The graceful walnut—all their beauty share

To build this home of mine

Ah! Who could have a dearer home than mine!

My home in far Kashmir![454]

In Kashmir, British visitors were able to capture the feeling of being at home while simultaneously achieving the sense of romantic eastern adventure that often drove them to India in the first place.

This "longing for England" was also reflected in the British Residency house and Garden in Srinagar. A regular English country-house, Resident Francis Younghusband described it as "one of the most charming houses in India," and its garden as "among the beauties of Kashmir."

> Here grows in perfection every English flower. The wide lawns are as soft and green as any English lawn. All the English fruits… grow to perfection and in prodigious quantities.[455]

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[454] Mrs. Percy Brown, *Chenar Leaves: Poems of Kashmir* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1921).

[455] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 66.

Near the Residency House was the Munshi Bagh, a garden along the Jhelum River where European travelers were permitted to pitch their tent and spend the summer months.[456] As such, every summer a European community sprang into being in the Munshi Bagh. In the earlier years, a visitor staying in Munshi Bagh might quickly get to know everyone else residing there for the season, forming close friendships. By the end of the intervention, however, all available spaces for tents found themselves occupied, with boats meanwhile simply lining the banks of the river.[457]

For travelers unwilling to spend the summer months in a tent or houseboat, Michael Nedou's Hotel in Srinagar was opened year-round.[458] Nedou, an Austro-Hungarian entrepreneur who already owned successful hotels in Lahore and Gulmarg, requested permission from the Darbar in 1891 to erect this 100-room hotel, which would "be a great comfort to the visitors."[459] The Resident pointed out that "the need for a hotel is greatly felt at Srinagar, and the opening of the Jhelum Valley road… will naturally attract a larger number of visitors every year to Kashmir."[460] The Darbar successfully stalled the project for the better part of the decade, however, reducing the term of the

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[456] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 52.

[457] James Arbuthnot, *A Trip to Kashmir* (1928), 10, in JSA.

[458] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 45.

[459] Letter from Michael Nedou, Proprietor Nedou's Hotel Lahore, to W. J. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir, Sialkot, 5 December 1891, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1062/15, Hotels in Kashmir, 1891, IOR.

[460] Letter from W. J. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir, to Cunningham, Secretary to the Foreign Department, February 1891, in Ibid.

lease from a first-proposed 75 years to a term of 15 years, finally agreed upon in 1899.[461] By 1904, just a few years later, the *Imperial Guide to India* was advising travelers to Kashmir to apply early for accommodation in the hotel, or else "the visitor will have to fall back on tents."[462] Nearby, one of the first buildings constructed during the intervention was the Zenana hospital that included an all-white wing for European visitors, which reflected the racial prejudices of the imperial era. This hospital was built and maintained from funds coming from both Darbar donations and a collection of subscriptions purchased by visitors to the Valley.[463]

Near the Residency, Munshi Bagh, and hotel, Srinagar's summer playgrounds were placed for the convenience of European visitors: tennis courts; cricket, polo, croquet, and badminton grounds; and a golf course. These activities appeared almost immediately following the British intervention, with the golf course, for example, constructed in 1887. Accounts describe "games going on every day, dances nearly every week, dinners, garden parties, and picnics."[464] Within a few decades, bicycle riding had also become popular.[465] There was additionally a gentleman's club with a reading room,

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[461] Agreement between His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and Michael Nedou of Lahore regarding the Srinagar Hotel, February 2, 1899, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1065, File No. 82, Hotels in Kashmir, 1899, IOR.

[462] *The Imperial Guide to India: Including Kashmir, Burma, and Ceylon* (London: John Murray, 1904), 186.

[463] Construction of a Hospital at Srinagar, 1891-1919, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1062/18, file no. 57, IOR.

[464] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 77.

[465] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir*, 15.

often frequented in the afternoon heat. The Resident regularly threw parties to entertain his guests. Newspapers avidly described these occasions down to the details of the ladies' dresses and the presents issued to guests, with dancing and music "kept up until the small hours of the morning."[466] The British also assembled a cricket team to play during such events against the Maharaja's team, who imported four professionals from the Punjab to make the match a fair fight. While enjoying the entertainment, guests would meanwhile discuss the hot-button worldly issues of the day, one evening debating the suffragette movement, though "one could hardly call it a debate for the speakers were all in favour of the cause."[467]

It was considered an essential part of the Resident's duties to accommodate the European visitors to Kashmir, and he was granted a considerable sumptuary allowance to be dedicated towards these ends. The visitors themselves "expect[ed] the Resident to entertain," and coupled with his day-time duties, the Resident was a very busy official.[468] It was widely believed that the Resident's responsibilities were "greater in Kashmir than in any other important State."[469] Before the twentieth century had even begun, the

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[466] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 8 January 1909, in Kashmir Residency Office, Mss. Eur. F 197/578, Newspaper Clippings Regarding Lady Younghusband 'at home' in Kashmir, IOR.

[467] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 24 August 1909, in Kashmir Residency Office, Mss. Eur. F 197/578, Newspaper Clippings Regarding Lady Younghusband 'at home' in Kashmir, IOR.

[468] Letter from A. C. Talbot, Resident in Kashmir, 1 March 1897, to W. J. Cunningham, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in Expenditure incurred by the Darbar on account of the Resident, Foreign Department, General B, July 1899, No. 48, NAI.

[469] Confidential Report by S. M. Fraser, Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar, 8 April 1912, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/1/1/881, Foreign Department, Deposit-I., Progs., May 1912, Nos. 13-14, IOR.

"weekly garden parties" at the Residency in Srinagar consisted of over 100 guests.[470] During Francis Younghusband's tenure as Resident, he and his wife's "Moonlight at Home" party was described as "the success of the season":

> The trees were all illuminated with countless Chinese lanterns and electric light, and the effect was truly fairylike…. There was some excellent vocal and string music. Captain Giles again treated us to a display of his skill on the banjo and was uproariously encored. The Kashmir minstrels, who treated us to "old king Cole," again afforded everyone great amusement, and canon Cole took part in his name-sake's song with much gusto…. Sir Francis and Lady Younghusband left nothing undone to make their entertainment a complete success."[471]

That Lady Younghusband cut out and collected these articles, preserved later in the Kashmir Residency Files in the India Office Records, demonstrates the fond memories elicited by these social gatherings in Kashmir.

During the summer months, from June to September, the Residency moved 26 miles away to Gulmarg, with "the centre of gravity of the social season" moving there with it.[472] Rising 2,000 feet from Srinagar, which itself is 5,000 feet above sea level,

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[470] Letter from A. C. Talbot, Resident in Kashmir, 6 August 1897, to W. J. Cunningham, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, in Expenditure incurred by the Darbar on account of the Resident, Foreign Department, General B, July 1899, No. 48, NAI.

[471] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 24 June 1909, in Kashmir Residency Office, Mss. Eur. F 197/578, Newspaper Clippings Regarding Lady Younghusband 'at home' in Kashmir, IOR.

[472] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 8 September 1909, in Kashmir Residency Office, Mss. Eur. F 197/578, Newspaper Clippings Regarding Lady Younghusband 'at home' in Kashmir, IOR.

Gulmarg "consists of a cup or hollow in the mountains of an irregular form."[473] At Gulmarg, there was a Residency house, post-office, telegraph office, gentleman's club, and another hotel owned by Nedou, which included a theater and ball-room, and still stands today. The gentleman's club contained a reading room, the library being supplied with new books each season. The British also constructed a golf course, two polo grounds, a cricket grounds, four tennis courts, and two croquet grounds, with level circular roads running around it. It had water piped in,[474] and by the late 1910s, electric lighting was installed in Gulmarg as well.[475] These accommodations were all maintained by visitors purchasing subscriptions upon arrival, which had proved to be a sound model for raising funds in Kashmir. Believing there to be "no other place like Gulmarg," Younghusband expected that this would be "one day known as the playground of India."[476]

By 1910, some 700 Europeans spent their summers in Gulmarg. As the years went on, there was a sense among visitors who knew what Kashmir was like in the old days that the Valley was changing. By 1928, the trip to the Kashmir Valley had been made "so easy of access that a visit is becoming quite a popular form of holiday."[477] The

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[473] Harriet Georgiana Maria Maria Murray-Aynsley, *Our Visit to Hindostan, Kashmir, and Ladakh* (London: Allen & Co., 1879), 80.

[474] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 73-4.

[475] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat year 1974 (1917-18), JSA.

[476] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 73-4.

[477] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir*, 1.

old hands lamented this, believing it to be "spoilt" and "lost its former charms."[478] James Arbuthnot described the "feeling of relief when one gets away to the jungle," where "we find the country in all its old loveliness; man has not yet begun to interfere with the wonders and glories of the most lovely country under the sun, which the Persians in old time so justly named the unequalled."[479]

Not everyone considered this change bad, however. Younghusband conceded that though the "Arcadian simplicity" of the olden days of Gulmarg "had many charms," it "had also its drawbacks."[480] Although there was great benefit to the serenity and fresh, clean air, "man cannot live forever on walks however charming…. his soul yearns for a ball of some kind…. Until he has a ball of some description to play with he is never really happy."[481] Younghusband believed that Gulmarg had "not yet reached the zenith of its attractions," and during the British intervention a number of measures were carried out to pursue this zenith for the pleasure of Europeans spending their holidays in Kashmir. Younghusband believed that "one very important political question which will always affect Kashmir is the relations between Europeans and Indians" as there was no other "Native State in India which is so much visited by Europeans and many desire to permanently settle here."[482] Younghusband also saw that "in many different ways the

[478] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 74.

[479] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir,* 10.

[480] Younghusband, *Kashmir*, 74.

[481] Ibid.

[482] Confidential note on Kashmir Affairs for 1906-7 by Sir Francis Younghusband, in R/1/1/349, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, Progs., August 1907, Nos. 1-3, IOR.

pressure of Europeans upon Kashmir is increasing."[483] This was "not really liked by any Kashmir Prince, official, or subject" who "at the back of their minds have the idea that some day we will say that as there are so many Europeans here the valley must be handed over to us."[484] A year later, Younghusband noticed "a pronounced and increasing antagonism to Europeans."[485]

The issue of European travel to Kashmir loomed large over reform schemes that, on the face of things, had little to do with tourism. For example, in 1896, the Kashmiri Darbar inquired to the Resident H. S. Barnes whether they might be able to convert the local subcurrency, the Chilki, to British rupees, which had become the Darbar's standard even though much of the economic activity in Kashmir was still conducted in Chilkis. The British were disinclined to grant such a request, in part because "in Srinagar owing to the influx of visitors, British rupees are common and circulate freely along with the native coin."[486] Given that such a conversion could prove costly, and that the shift from Chilkis to British rupees was already occurring gradually due to the increase in European tourism to Kashmir, the Government of India instructed the Darbar merely to refrain from minting new Chilkis, and allow the currency reform to take place without any other overt action. The Resident predicted that "matters will improve yearly, and the natural increase

[483] Ibid.

[484] Ibid.

[485] Confidential note on Kashmir Affairs in 1907-08 by Sir Francis Younghusband, in R/1/1/359, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, Progs., July 1908, No. 13, IOR.

[486] Note by J. Westland, 2 September 1896, in Currency Reforms in Kashmir State, Foreign Department Internal A, December 1896, F, Nos. 1-8, NAI.

to the coinage will take place in British coin, which is what the Darbar themselves desire."[487]

One measure the British carried out to enhance the experience of visitors to Kashmir was to introduce trout to Kashmir's waterways for fishing. In 1900, the scheme was hatched, with first Brown and then Rainbow Trout ova imported to Kashmir and raised there.[488] With similar schemes finding success in other colonies and in Japan, British sportsman pushed forward the project, again collecting subscriptions from visitors along with State grants. These original subscribers were then exempt from fishing licenses, which were necessary to "protect and distribute the trout throughout the valley."[489] Kashmir's waters were considered ideal for the fish, where the winters were "sufficiently cold to enable the *salmo fario* to reproduce its kind."[490] The first group of 10,000 arrived in December 1900, and by the following spring, 6,000 healthy fry from this group were released into Kashmiri waters at Panchgam.[491] The second group was less successful, with only 1,800 out of 10,000 surviving. Problems associated with leaky pipes were corrected with the Public Works Department erecting a large cistern which provided a more reliable source of water for the cultivation of trout.[492]

[487] Note by H. S. Barnes, Resident in Kashmir, 21 October 1896, in Ibid.

[488] Rearing of Trout in Kashmir, 1900, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1065/59, File No. 35, IOR.

[489] Note on Kashmir Trout Culture, in Ibid.

[490] Report on Trout Culture for Season 1900-1, in Ibid.

[491] Report on Trout Culture for Season 1900-1, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1065/59, File No. 35, IOR.

[492] Ibid.

Although a few years later the project had been considered "not so successful as had been expected,"[493] by 1912 trout culture was considered "to have passed the experimental stage, the species having been already firmly established in some of the Kashmir waters."[494] During World War I, the number of sportsman traveling to Kashmir was greatly reduced, which gave "the rivers a very necessary rest."[495] This respite, however, resulted in "excellent sport" for those who could make the trip, with several grand trout of 7 and 8 pounds caught, and the general average much larger than that in normal years.[496] By the end of the war, a 10 pounder was caught in the Bringhi River, which quickly grew in its reputation for having "offered the best sport."[497] When Viceroy Lord Chelmsford visited Kashmir in October 1918, he was reported to have "greatly enjoyed the trout fishing."[498] This was in spite of the fact that the fishing season ended in September.[499] The British efforts at rearing trout in Kashmir altered the ecology of

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[493] Jammu and Kashmir Administration Report Sambat 1961 (1904-05), JSA.

[494] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat year 1968 (1911-12), JSA.

[495] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat year 1972 (1915-16), JSA.

[496] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat year 1972 (1915-16), JSA.

[497] The Annual Administration Report Jammu and Kashmir State for Sambat 1980, (1923-4), JSA.

[498] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1975 (1918-19), JSA.

[499] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1921, JSA.

Kashmir's waterways, causing native fish to decrease.[500] Today, Kashmir's streams continue to boast prolific stocks of trout, which was first introduced during the British period to attract more sportsmen to the Valley.

Sportsmen were also drawn to Kashmir due to the incredible wealth of shooting game the state offered. Memoirs describe the "delight of finding with one's telescope a head which you estimate as better than any you have shot yet."[501] The annual administration reports for the state proudly boasted of the large Ibex and Markhor stags shot by hunters each year.[502] Rules were implemented to keep hunters from killing stags that had not reached their prime, issuing fines for kills that didn't meet the required size, and shooting females was prohibited.[503] Special licenses were issued for specific types of game. For example, a license to shoot brown bears, stags, etc., was Rs. 60, reduced to Rs. 50 during the winter season.[504] For black bears, leopards, and pigs, a Rs. 20 special game license was required. Bird hunting licenses varied based on the classification of bird being hunted, and fines were imposed on those who killed animals not covered by their license. Meanwhile, if a hunter managed to kill a leopard or its cubs, wolves, foxes, jackals, or other animals considered vermin, they would be given a reward, from Rs. 15 for an adult leopard to 4 annas for a fox. Sportsmen were allowed in their personal

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[500] The Annual Administration Report Jammu and Kashmir State for Sambat 1980, (1923-4), JSA.

[501] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir*, ii.

[502] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1973 (1916-17), JSA.

[503] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1902, Appendix A: Game Laws Notification, JSA.

[504] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1910, Appendix A: Game Laws Notification, JSA.

luggage to import 2 guns, 2 rifles, 500 cartridges and one pistol or revolver.[505] Ammunition and firearms beyond this required a license from the district magistrate in Rawalpindi to export sporting ammunition into Kashmir.[506] The licenses and fees associated with the Game Laws provided the state with a reliable source of revenue, and other than the decline in numbers during World War I, saw a steady rise throughout the period of British intervention.

The rapid increase in hunting undeniably altered Kashmir's ecology. As early as 1905, there were "indications that the game of the country cannot stand any further increase in the number of sportsmen."[507] The state tried to register and license all Kashmiri shikaris taking service with sportsmen, yet still unregistered shikaris were common.[508] Despite the numbers of hunters engaging in shooting lawfully under license, poaching and offenses against the Game Laws were not infrequent. Meanwhile, the European demand for mounted heads and pelts motivated native shikaris to "palm off on sportsmen old heads," creating a "direct incentive to the encouragement of poaching."[509] This illicit trade gained an infamous reputation among established hunters in Kashmir, who disdained these "so-called sportsmen" who were "too lazy to do the shooting

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[505] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1910, Appendix A: Game Laws Notification, JSA.

[506] Grant of Conditional Powers to the District Magistrate of Rawalpindi to issue licenses for the export of sporting ammunition to Kashmir, in Home Department, Public-A, Proceedings, June 1900, No. 3, NAI.

[507] Jammu and Kashmir Administration Report Sambat 1961 (1904-05), JSA.

[508] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1902, Appendix A: Game Laws Notification, JSA.

[509] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1916, Appendix A: Game Laws Notification, JSA.

themselves."[510] Though it was seen as "a pity that these game laws had not been brought into force years ago," it was hoped that "they may yet be in time to save one of the most beautiful shooting grounds in all the world."[511] By the end of the intervention, it was obvious to old hands that the game in Kashmir was "not what it used to be."[512]

The alteration of Kashmir's ecology can perhaps be well attested to by evidence of how well it recovered during World War I. Visitors to the Kashmir Valley declined drastically during the war, as every able-bodied man was expected to be ready to serve. Those military officers who were able to gain leave to Kashmir were limited to one month to be spent within 48 hours' recall, which made it impossible for them to visit shooting grounds beyond Srinagar.[513] Administrative reports recount the yearly increasing quantities of game during the war. When the trend was first noticed, it was "hoped that the rest which the hunting grounds have enjoyed" would allow the game to recover and "greatly add to their value and attraction."[514] As the war progressed, it was observed that "the interval of rest and recuperation enjoyed by the big game since the commencement of the war seemed to have had a beneficial effect on their number and

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[510] Arbuthnot, *Trip to Kashmir*, 25.

[511] Ibid.

[512] Ibid.

[513] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1972 (1915-16), JSA.

[514] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1973 (1916-17), JSA.

size."[515] By the end of the war, Kashmir's ecology was "in a flourishing condition," and several of the best kills on record were shot during the 1918-1919 season.[516] Within a few years, annually issued sport licenses surpassed pre-war levels, and Kashmir's fauna was again feeling the effects of overhunting.[517]

British officials were concerned with the financial profitability of hunting, but instead its potential for adventuring European sportsmen. In fact, the "rapid increase in number of visitors who come to the valley for the purposes of sport" had caused an alarming reduction of game in Kashmir, especially after the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh.[518] Walter Lawrence claimed that British efforts in 1890 to establish rules for the preservation of big game had already made a difference in its replenishing. However, the primary culprit was not Europeans, Lawrence asserted, but instead Kashmiris, who in their "greed" slaughtered stressed stags to survive the winter. Consequently, Lawrence worried that the 1890 reforms would not be enough to change public opinion on the preservation issue and advocated forming an association to control sport in Kashmir. Although the "State is anxious to co-operate in the interests of game preservation, and recognizes that it is the sport of Kashmir which chiefly attracts the European visitors whom His Highness the Maharaja welcomes so hospitably," Lawrence believed reforms

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[515] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1974 (1917-18), JSA.

[516] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1975 (1918-19), JSA.

[517] The Annual Administration Report Jammu and Kashmir State for Sambat 1980, (1923-4), JSA.

[518] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 106.

needed to go further to check “all unsportsmanlike behavior.”[519] Lawrence was unsympathetic to hungry Kashmiris who hunt stags for their venison in the winter, and instead framed the issue through his sense of honor regarding how one hunts. He argued the state hunting association should commission and register approved shikaris, or hunters, who demonstrate proper sportsmanship, to the exclusion of those “imposters” who “are a plague to the country.”[520] This association would prohibit most Kashmiris from hunting out of need in its effort to preserve the state’s game for a more exclusive group of hunters, especially the Europeans.

One might think the Lawrence’s preoccupation with the preservation of game stemmed from his more straightforward duty to reform Kashmir’s administration, but he revealed that “at present, the forests of Kashmir and the neighbouring countries bring no revenue to the State, so far as game is concerned.” Nor did the Maharaja have any intention of changing this. “Nothing could be further from the mind of the ruler of Kashmir,” Lawrence argued. Instead, His Highness’s chief concern was that “Europeans should enjoy themselves as cheaply and as freely as possible, while they are in his country.” Lawrence rather worried that the “increased number of sportsmen and the decreased stock of game” would change the Maharaja’s perspective on the matter by reducing “the happy hunting-grounds of Kashmir to the business level of a ‘shooting to let.’”

> The question is of considerable importance, as Kashmir and its neighbouring mountains have afforded health and excitement to British

[519] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 106-107.

[520] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 108.

> officers serving in India, and it would be a matter of serious regret if game were exterminated by the selfish and ignorant conduct of the 'fin de siecle' sportsman, and if the grand stalking of the Kashmir mountains, so congenial a relaxation to the soldier, became a thing of the past.[521]

The Kashmir state, at the prodding of the British Resident, attempted to safeguard the state's game was by conserving forests as State Game *Rakhs*, or hunting preserves, as restricted areas. These preserves were also considered essential to preserving enough game to "make the game more attractive and interesting" for VIPs visiting the state. For example, when Viceroy Lord Chelmsford visited Kashmir in October 1918, "some of the rakhs were specially got ready for His Excellency."[522] When Lord Rawlinson, Commander-in-Chief in India, shot in the state *rakhs* in 1923, it was considered that the conservation efforts in the state were "engaging the attention of the Government."[523] Beyond British officials, many native maharajas and their *darbars* were hosted in the state *rakhs*, including the Maharaja of Baroda in 1916,[524] and the Maharaja of Patiala in 1923.[525] Eventually, the whole of Dachigam Valley, east of Dal Lake, was made over as a

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[521] Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 107.

[522] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1975 (1918-19), JSA.

[523] The Annual Administration Report Jammu and Kashmir State for Sambat 1980, (1923-4), JSA.

[524] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1973 (1916-17), JSA.

[525] The Annual Administration Report Jammu and Kashmir State for Sambat 1980, (1923-4), JSA.

state *rakh*, with visitors only allowed entrance with special permission, and today, Dachigam remains preserved as a National Park.[526]

The amount of state lands set aside as game preserves increased throughout the British intervention in Kashmir.[527] This was done mostly at the behest of British officials who argued that Kashmir needed to establish "a proper system of management of its splendid forests."[528] In 1898, the maharaja was sternly rebuked by the Resident, who told Pratap that he was ruining the forests as a result of his unchecked authority over them, and he was informed his control over these forests would be relinquished.[529] The forests were being rapidly depleted for their capital, with unchecked felling and lopping conducted throughout the Valley, as well as herdsmen who were allowing their animals to graze on state forests. With goats chewing on "every young tree they come across," and herdsmen lopping and hacking "all trees which their animals are unable to reach," the "fine birch trees" which were "a feature of the scenery in the Kashmir mountains" were "rapidly being destroyed."[530] In addition, the demand for firewood arising from the influx of visitors was also resulting in many parts of the Kashmir Valley to become "almost

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[526] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1916, JSA.

[527] Jammu and Kashmir Administration Report Sambat 1961 (1904-05), JSA.

[528] Notes on a Tour in the Forests of Jammu and Kashmir State in 1905 by Mr. S. Eardley Wilmot, Inspector General of Forests, in Department of Revenue and Agriculture, Forests, August 1906, Proceedings A, Nos. 28-30, NAI.

[529] Letter from A. C. Talbot, Resident in Kashmir, to Maharaja Pratap Singh, 5 January 1898, in F. M. Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 86-87.

[530] Jammu and Kashmir Administration Report Sambat 1961 (1904-05), JSA.

completely denuded."[531] The destruction of forests was also seen as contributing to the severity of flooding not just in Kashmir but also downstream in British territory in the Punjab. Consequently, rules were passed banning the felling, barking, or otherwise destruction of trees without the permission of the Conservator of Forests in Srinagar.[532] Trees were marked annually for controlled, sustainable felling, and visitors were given allowances of firewood to alleviate the demand for timber.[533]

Many rules of these sort were crafted during the British intervention to regulate the conduct of European visitors to Kashmir. At first, all travelers were required to obtain passes to receive entrance to Kashmir, and passes were limited. Over the years these passes were expanded, and in 1888, military officers and officials were exempted from passes.[534] By the end of the British, intervention, however, conditions changed considerably as the number of European visitors had greatly increased, making it "impossible to insist upon their obtaining passes before they actually enter the State."[535] Entering Kashmir first, and only then applying for a pass, many a traveler's holiday was concluded by the time they had even received their passes, rendering the system

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[531] Ibid.

[532] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1902, JSA.

[533] Rules Relating to the Buildings in Gulmarg, 1918, Section VIII: Forest Rules, JSA.

[534] Notification No. 85-E., 13 January 1888, in External A., February 1888, Nos. 21-25, NAI.

[535] Letter from A. D. A. G. Bannerman, Resident in Kashmir, to the Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi, in Amendment to the Rules for Visitors to Kashmir, 1920, Foreign and Political Department, Internal A., Proceedings, September 1920, Nos. 25-28, NAI.

ineffective. Considering that passes were very rarely rejected in the first place, the system was seen fit to be abolished in 1920.

Unable to stem the tide of European visitors to the Valley, the Darbar implemented more specific rules to regulate the conduct of visitors in Kashmir. For example, they regulated sanitation practices to try to prevent the seasonal tourist crowd from polluting the local water sources.[536] Offensive matter was collected regularly from houseboats and European camping grounds and deposited in dry areas away from the rivers and lakes.[537] Houseboats were also required not to be built with water-closets leading directly open into the waters. There were also rules prohibited the areas in which one could walk or cycle, which also set aside special areas where visitors were allowed to tether their horses and let them to graze.[538] There were also rules attempting to regulate the use and ill-treatment of horses by weighing luggage and imposing a maximum weight limit, and boats were instructed to dock with enough space between them for smaller boats to navigate. Visitors were required to take their own carriage and supplies with them on shooting expeditions, and they were forbidden to "demand them in places were no regular arrangements exist for supplying them."[539] To preserve the moral integrity of unmarried visitors, bachelors were required to camp within Chenar Bagh, whereas ladies were not permitted to encamp within this area.[540] Visitors who interacted with the

[536] Rules Relating to the Buildings in Gulmarg, 1918, Section VII: Sanitary Rules, JSA.

[537] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1902, JSA.

[538] Ibid.

[539] Ibid.

[540] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1902, Section 3(a), JSA.

maharaja were given strict guidelines of decorum to perform, including always addressing him as "Your Highness" and themselves as "Your Highness's obedient servant," and to uncover their heads and stand at attention during the playing of the Kashmir Anthem.[541] They were also expected to abide by proper formal dress requirements for such occasions. Visitors were also strictly prohibited from killing cows or importing beef into the state.

The Darbar also tried to regulate the conduct of visitors by controlling the Kashmiri subjects who visitors interacted with. An officer of the Darbar, known as the Motamid Darbar, was appointed "to attend to the wants of the European community at Srinagar," and all matters and requests were to be made directly to him and not any other officials of the state.[542] There was also a registration system for Kashmiri servants seeking employment with European visitors, and all such servants were required to have their names and addresses listed with the Darbar. Visitors meanwhile were encouraged to only hire servants from the approved list provided by the Darbar.[543] The Darbar also implemented a system in which approved supplies were given a "receipt stamp" that demonstrated that the merchant was approved for selling supplies to Europeans.[544] If he did not provide such a receipt then he could be fined. The Darbar also saw fit to establish a special court of summary jurisdiction to handle the frequent "complaints of theft,

[541] Instructions for Guidance of Visitors to Kashmir with Respect to Their Dealings with His Highness the Maharaja, 1923, in Foreign and Political, Honours, Progs., Nos. 1296-H, 1923, NAI.

[542] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1902, JSA.

[543] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1916, JSA.

[544] Kashmir Visitors' Rules, 1902, JSA.

cheating, and insubordination" made by European visitors against Kashmiri servants, which included powers to issue fines and whipping up to 20 strokes.[545]

Nevertheless, despite the Darbar taking such measures, European visitors' conduct could leave much to be desired at times. In most years, there was an increase in the consumption of country liquor, charas, as well as opium, which was "attributed to the large influx of visitors to the Kashmir Valley."[546] As mentioned in chapter 2, European men's involvement in local Kashmiri prostitution created a number of concerns for British officials, which ranged from the health of officers on leave in Kashmir, intelligence leaks due to the maharajas use of prostitutes as spies, as well as the shame felt by British officials as a result of their countrymen's lapse of moral judgement.[547] One young Englishman in particular appeared to being engaged in the "open system of pimping," which was facilitated by boatmen who transported the prostitutes to their clients via Kashmir's waterways.[548]

The Resident in Kashmir was given the power and duty to expel any European from Kashmir state territories under such circumstances, and there were a number of occasions in which he was required to take such action. For example, tourists were not permitted to travel beyond the border between Kashmir and Tibet, yet in 1896, one young

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[545] Administrative Report for Jammu and Kashmir State for 1893-4, JSA.

[546] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat year 1968 (1911-12), JSA.

[547] Taxation of Prostitutes, F. Henvey, Special Officer on Duty in Kashmir, 1 June 1880, in K. W. No. 3, Foreign Department, Secret- E., Pros, March 1883, No. 86, NAI.

[548] Ibid.

American named Mr. Morse forced his servants to cross the border on a hunting expedition. Upon a disagreement with local Champas, nomadic people living in western Tibet, Mr. Morse shot one of the Champas' ponies. Mr. Morse, "who is very young," seems to have believed that he was wronged by the Champas somehow in this scenario, and took his case to the Assistant Resident in Leh, who informed the young American that "he had made himself liable to be turned out of Kashmir."[549] In another situation, a Mrs. Sydney Collins was turned out of the state due to her "dangerous character" and "constitutional incapacity… to tell the truth."[550] With the Resident contending that "her morals are as bad as they well can be," Collins was accused of traveling under multiple identities and even of poisoning her former employers.[551] Staying at Nedou's Hotel in Gulmarg, Mr. Nedou was "anxious to get rid of her" and as such asked the Resident to expel her from the state, which he promptly did.[552]

[549] Diary of the Assistant to the Resident in Kashmir for Leh for the month ending 31 July 1896, No. 2, in Foreign Department, Frontier A., Pros. December 1896, Nos. 1-10, NAI.

[550] Letter No. 63-F of 1915, Gulmarg, 24 June 1915, from H. V. Cobb, Resident in Kashmir, to J. B. Wood, Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/1/1/1137, Proposed Expulsion from Kashmir of a Miss Kimber alias Mrs. Sydney Collins, Foreign and Political Department, Confidential-B, Internal Branch, Section A, Progs., 1915, Nos. 53-534, IOR.

[551] Ibid.

[552] Letter No. 63-F of 1915, Gulmarg, 24 June 1915, from H. V. Cobb, Resident in Kashmir, to J. B. Wood, Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/1/1/1137, Proposed Expulsion from Kashmir of a Miss Kimber alias Mrs. Sydney Collins, Foreign and Political Department, Confidential-B, Internal Branch, Section A, Progs., 1915, Nos. 53-534, IOR.

In another particularly outlandish situation, a Mr. J. Lonsdale Bryans was travelling in Kashmir when his father cut him off from "further money to continue his wanderings."[553] While living on a houseboat on Dal Lake, he refused to pay his landlord and also came into a disagreement with a local merchant, and was brought before the Motamid Darbar. Bryans then "lost control of his temper and used abusive language to the Motamid Darbar and even went the length of vilifying His Highness the Maharaja."[554] Ordered to appear before the Resident to explain himself, Mr. Bryans ignored the summons, leaving Srinagar and continuing his tour of the state, leaving in his wake a litany of abused locals whom he had attempted to bully into giving him services free of charge. The Resident continued to try to locate him and expel him from the state, while Bryans continued to travel "with utter disregard of the rules, and withheld payment for supplies and transport whenever and wherever he could."[555] Attacking and causing injury to a number of locals as he traveled, he was finally located in Pahlgam, beating a postmaster who had merely asked him to sign in receipt of his mail and abusing him as

[553] Letter from C. J. Windham, Resident in Kashmir, to the Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Srinagar, 19 September 1922, in Misconduct of Mr. J. Lonsdale Bryans in Kashmir and his Expulsion from the State, Foreign and Political Department, Internal, No. 1006, 1922, NAI.

[554] Ibid.

[555] Letter from C. J. Windham, Resident in Kashmir, to the Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Srinagar, 19 September 1922, in Misconduct of Mr. J. Lonsdale Bryans in Kashmir and his Expulsion from the State, Foreign and Political Department, Internal, No. 1006, 1922, NAI.

"damned Kashmiri swine."[556] When he wrote a letter to the Resident explaining himself, he bizarrely wrote that he "had the honour of following in the footsteps of General Dyer," the infamous perpetrator of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in Amritsar in 1919 in which over a thousand Indian men, women, and children were gunned down in an enclosed urban park.[557] Describing him as possessing "an attitude of mind and a recklessness of behaviour that are bound sooner or later to have the most serious consequences to himself… [and] to the Government of the country and to Europeans in general," the Resident finally sent an escort of British infantry to expel Bryans out of the state.[558]

Such recklessness was not limited to tourists. Officials were guilty of misconduct as well. In 1905, the Accountant-General for the Kashmir State, Mr. F. G. H. Anderson, was found to have invested 9 lakhs of state money in unsecured business venture overseen by a Calcutta broker named Mr. Sarkies, without a guarantee of return. Making matters worse, he was found to have done this behind the backs of the Resident and the State Council.[559] Officials found it "impossible to resist the suspicion that Mr. Anderson

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[556] Letter from Captain H. A. O'Connor, Staff Captain, Lahore Brigade Area, to the Sub-inspector of Police, Pahlgam, Report of the incident which took place in the post office on September 11, 1922, in Misconduct of Mr. J. Lonsdale Bryans in Kashmir and his Expulsion from the State, Foreign and Political Department, Internal, No. 1006, 1922, NAI.

[557] Letter from J. Lonsdale Bryans to C. J. Windham, Resident in Kashmir, in Ibid.

[558] Letter from C. J. Windham, Resident in Kashmir, to the Political Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Srinagar, 19 September 1922, in Ibid.

[559] Letter from E. G. Colvin, Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana, to T. C. Pears, Resident in Kashmir, Abu, 27 July 1905, in Investment of Kashmir State money and irregular proceedings of Mr. F.

meant to benefit a friend as well," as it seemed "almost inconceivable that Mr. Anderson would have taken the very risky course which he has adopted throughout unless he had a very good chance of feathering his own nest at the same time."[560] When asked to explain himself, Mr. Anderson admitted that he "kept the Resident in the dark in order to avoid blame for the loss which seemed likely to accrue."[561] Mr. Anderson was barred from further employment in British India as a consequence of his actions, and on account of his poor health, returned to Britain.

With all this in mind, one might be inclined to agree with Ronald Inden's argument that British interest in Kashmir was less rooted in an understanding Kashmir as a "paradise in either the older Hindu or Mughal sense" as it was in their search for a home away from home or a mere escape from India's hot summers.[562] However, it is clear from the evidence that the British were aware of their inheriting a province with a legacy far deeper than that of a mere hill station. Seeing themselves as successors to the Mughals, British travel accounts of Kashmir often related their experience through the Mughal history in the Valley. They avidly described how the Mughals transformed Kashmir, imagining themselves spending their afternoons in the gardens and canals or hunting in the mountains, just as the Mughals might have done.

G. H. Anderson while acting as Accountant General of Jammu and Kashmir, Finance Department, Accounts and Finance, A, Proceedings, November 1906, Nos. 612-35, NAI.

[560] Note by H. F. Howard, 2 February 1906, in Ibid.

[561] Note by W. S. Meyer, 2 November 1906, in Ibid.

[562] Ronald Inden, "Kashmir as Paradise on Earth," in Aparna Rao, ed., *The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture?* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2008), 554.

The imperatives of modern tourism also connected to popularized notions of Kashmir's history. Indeed, by investing in architectural restoration, museum conservation, and translation of ancient texts, the British were simultaneously engaging in and transforming ideas about Kashmir while also providing new attractions for tourists to the state. For example, the Sri Pratap Singh Museum was opened during the intervention, seeking to highlight aspects of Kashmir's rich history and culture as well as tying Kashmir to Indic civilization at large. Intended to be both "instructive and entertaining," the museum explicitly fused together the interests of the tourist industry with grander notions of Kashmir's history and importance.[563] It was also made imperative due to the fact that ancient antiques and manuscripts were disappearing throughout the Valley and appearing in foreign museums, a problem plaguing much of the colonized world at the time.[564] When the Viceroy visited Kashmir in October 1918, an exhibit was prepared at the museum to highlight the rich heritage of the state and was met with "special interest."[565] Throughout the period under study, the museum increased its visitor

[563] Letter from S. H. Godfrey, Resident in Kashmir to Amar Singh, Vice-President State Council, Srinagar, 8 June 1898, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1064, File No. 143, Proposed Kashmir Museum, 1898, IOR.

[564] Preliminary note on the Pratap Singh Museum of the Jammu and Kashmir State by S. H. Godfrey, Honorary Secretary of the Museum, 28 December 1900, in Kashmir Residency Office, R/2/1065/61, File No. 143, Kashmir Museum, 1900, IOR.

[565] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1975 (1918-19), JSA.

attendance, which demonstrated "that the institution is growing in popularity every year."[566]

The creation of this museum was coupled with an expansion of architectural restoration activities in the state. In 1899, the State Council issued orders regarding the preservation of antiquities in the Jammu and Kashmir State. The impetus for this was partly due to the recent change in administration in Kashmir, and partly due to the activities of unauthorized Europeans in these territories, extracting items of historical value from the state, necessitating its insertion in the matter. The Council declared these unauthorized activities were essentially of a "commercial and not scientific nature" and would be punishable with a fine or imprisonment.[567] In 1903, the Director-General of Archaeology in India, Dr. Vogel, toured Kashmir at the request of the State Council "to advise as to the preservation of the ancient monuments there."[568] As a result of his report in the advice contained, the following May the State Council created an archaeological and research department "to entrust it with the care and supervision of all ancient monuments and their maintenance."[569] Mr. J. C. Chatterji, who was formerly the Darbar's

[566] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat Year 1972 (1915-16), JSA.

[567] Orders issued by the Kashmir durbar in respect to the presentation of antiquities in the Jammu and Kashmir State, 15 August 1899, Revenue and Agriculture, Archaeology and Epigraphy, No. 8, Part B, NAI.

[568] Director-General's note on archaeological work in Kashmir, in Government of India, Home Department, Archaeology and Epigraphy-A, Proceedings, May 1908, Nos. 6-7, NAI.

[569] Ibid.

Director of Sanskrit Research, was put in charge of this department and was sent to England to study archaeology at Cambridge "in order to equip him for his new duties."[570]

Mridu Rai has shown how the Kashmir Darbar indeed had an interest in preserving and highlighting the particular Hindu history and culture of the state in order to "legitimize its own authority."[571] For example, Kashmir administration reports emphasized Kashmir's "reputation of having once been the cradle of Sanskrit literature."[572] As such, the works of native archaeologist R. C. Kak emphasize the Hindu history of the state as Kashmir's golden age, while portraying the Muslim era as one of civilizational decline. One way he does this is by contending that "all major Muslim religious buildings have been constructed on ruins of ancient Hindu temples," which Hakim Sameer Hamdani argues is "a premise that ignores the localized architectural response in the society to the introduction of Islam."[573] Hamdani observes that Kak's interpretation was based on other colonial studies on Kashmiri architecture, such as the work of W. H. Nicholls, and therefore reflected these colonial prejudices. These prejudices in turn influenced a new generation of scholars on Kashmiri history, such as Hermann Goetz who himself argued that "in Srinagar there is hardly a house in the

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[570] Ibid.

[571] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 183.

[572] Administration report for Jammu and Kashmir State for 1893-4, JSA.

[573] Hakim Sameer Hamdani, *The Syncretic Traditions of Islamic Religious Architecture of Kashmir (Early 14th-18th Century)* (New York: Routledge, 2021), 11.

foundation of which fragments of old Hindu temples have not been built."[574] Indeed, the British found that they needed help from the privileged class of Hindu Kashmir Pandits, as it was "probably impossible to find anything whatsoever in Kashmir without the assistance of a local Pandit."[575] To further demonstrate how ideas about Kashmir became intertwined between Dogra and British legitimation efforts, during the Imperial Coronation Darbar in Delhi in December 1911, the state administration report boasted of how "the tasteful decorations of the Kashmir Camp won universal admiration, and it is a matter for pride to the Durbar that the carved wooden frontage—a highly finished specimen of the best Kashmir art—attracted the notice of His Imperial Majesty the King Emperor," who accepted it as a present.[576]

As one might expect, then, this was also an endeavor pushed by the British imperial state, largely at the behest of personalities like Viceroy Lord Curzon (1899-1905), who possessed a great passion for historical conservation, believing it to be "one of the primary obligations of government."[577] Rai has also demonstrated how this project

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[574] Hermann Goetz, *Studies in the History and Art of Kashmir and the Indian Himalayas* (Wiesbradan: Otto Harrasswitz, 1969), 63.

[575] Notes on a tour in Kashmir by Dr. Sten Konow, late Government Epigraphist for India, in Government of India, Home Department, Archaeology and Epigraphy-A, Proceedings, October 1909, Nos. 29-30, NAI.

[576] Report on the Administration of the Jammu and Kashmir State for the Sambat year 1968 (1911-12), JSA.

[577] Speech by Viceroy Lord Curzon at a meeting of the Bengal Asiatic Society at Calcutta, 6 February 1900. In Appendix II, Dilip K. Cakrabarti, A History of Indian Archaeology (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1988), 179-80.

simultaneously placed the British rulers along a historical continuity with past foreign rulers of India by the "contradictory exercise of affirming its separateness from India."[578] This served the interests of the British imperial state because it provided the justification for the British as "better fitted to guard, with a dispassionate and impartial zeal, the relics of different ages."[579] Seeing Indian civilization in decline, in large part due to religious antagonisms, the British sought to reclaim India's glorious past as a project that legitimized their ruling over a subcontinent of hundreds of millions. And as the British had only recently inserted themselves over Kashmir's administration and at great controversy, there was a special emphasis on these legitimizing efforts in Kashmir. These efforts also attempted to highlight Kashmir's historic connection to Indic civilization, which was again a shared interest of both the Dogra regime and the British Empire. As a result, Kak's work for the Archaeological Survey of Kashmir emphasized evidence for "the existence of a close connection between Kashmir and the mainland of India in the first two or three centuries of the Christian era."[580]

The state as such also sought to reform Kashmir's preservation of antiquities and documents along what was considered to be more modern lines. This meant that in 1910 the responsibilities for archaeological work and research work were separated into two different positions. Vogel wrote enthusiastically in approval of this proposition, suggesting that the idea was "an excellent one" that "cannot fail to greatly benefit both

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[578] Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*, 187.

[579] Speech by Viceroy Lord Curzon, op. cit., 229-30.

[580] R. C. Kak, Memories of the Archaeological Survey of Kashmir, in the Archaeological Survey of Kashmir, 1924, JSA.

the important scientific branches." The previous director of archaeology and research in Kashmir was primarily a linguist, and so this was an opportunity to move this officer to primarily concern himself with research responsibilities (in this case, translating and editing Sanskrit manuscripts) and select a "thoroughly trained archaeologist" to head the task of preserving Kashmir's architecture and antiquities. This delineation of duties would also improve the preservation of Kashmir's archaeological heritage, as the director was having to divide his time between archaeology and research, and so both of his responsibilities were suffering as a result. Dr. Vogel emphasized the importance of this position, "considering the great antiquarian interest and world-wide renown of the ancient monuments of Kashmir."[581] This reform of the archaeological preservation process in Kashmir was also urgently needed due to monuments being in "precarious state" and action was needed or "otherwise their originality will be lost forever"[582] Mridu Rai has pointed out that that by separating the work between archaeology and research, the Darbar were able to control the research branch better by placing a Kashmiri Pandit in charge, guarding "the task of research, and the 'knowledge' produced by it, from colonial intrusion."[583]

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[581] Letter from J. PH. Vogel, Officiating Director-General of Archaeology in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, in Proposed Separation of archaeological and research work in the Kashmir State, Archaeology and Epigraphy, Proceedings, August 1910, Nos. 17-20, NAI.

[582] Home Minister's Memorandum No. 6466-G, 5 February 1910, in Government of India, Home Department, Archaeology and Epigraphy-A. Proceedings, July 1910, Nos. 21-22, NAI.

[583] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects*, 196.

Meanwhile, the Mughal gardens were placed under the Public Works Department, with loose inscriptions found during archaeological excavations sent over to the Pratap Singh Museum at Srinagar. Given their "great historical importance," efforts were made to restore the gardens "on proper lines," and as such, an "expert gardener" was arranged to help construct a "suitable plan."[584] By the end of the British intervention, these reforms were considered to have successful reorganized what was previously "most meagre character" of archaeological efforts in the state.[585]

By the end of the British interventions, conservation work was being "very carefully and skillfully done."[586] Nevertheless, it was still being shaped by the impact of tourism to the Valley, as Kashmir had undeniably become "a tourist's country."[587] Even when officials got word of important artifacts, they often were "carried away by an unknown European" before the artifacts could be secured.[588] Officials also sought to focus their restoration and conservation work on areas which they thought tourists were

[584] Demi-Official Letter No. R-887, from J. H. Marshall, Revenue Minister, Kashmir State, to J. Ph. Vogel, Lahore, 27 July 1912, in Restoration of the Mughal Gardens at Srinagar in the Kashmir State, Education, Archaeology and Epigraphy, August 1912, No. 36, NAI.

[585] R. C. Kak, Handbook of the Archaeological and Numismatic Section of the Sri Pratap Singh Museum, Srinagar (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, & Co., 1923), JSA.

[586] Memorandum on Archaeological Work in Kashmir State, 1922, in Foreign and Political Department, Internal, no. 944, NAI.

[587] Notes on a tour in Kashmir by Dr. Sten Konow, late Government Epigraphist for India, in Government of India, Home Department, Archaeology and Epigraphy-A, Proceedings, October 1909, Nos. 29-30, NAI.

[588] Ibid.

likely to visit. For example, the Buniar Temple was identified as an important site as it was "on the high road between Domel and Srinagar" and therefore "seen by almost every visitor to Kashmir."[589] Meanwhile, officials faced some resistance from local Pandits, who would take artifacts and "jealously keep them concealed."[590] In one instance, officials considered that the "only feasible method of saving" the Pandrethan Temple from "eventual collapse is to remove it stone by stone from the morass where it now stands to the higher ground about 100 yards away."[591] However, as it was anticipated that "some people might be disposed to object—and not unreasonably—on purely sentimental grounds," the plan to relocate the temple was abandoned and the site was merely excavated.[592]

The state also sought to preserve and translate ancient manuscripts and inscriptions that were deemed to have significance to the history of the state. European officials were especially interested in locating and preserving the few remaining birch-

[589] Memorandum on Archaeological Work in Kashmir State, 1922, in Foreign and Political Department, Internal, no. 944, NAI.

[590] Notes on a tour in Kashmir by Dr. Sten Konow, late Government Epigraphist for India, in Government of India, Home Department, Archaeology and Epigraphy-A, Proceedings, October 1909, Nos. 29-30, NAI.

[591] Memorandum on Archaeological Work in Kashmir State, 1922, in Foreign and Political Department, Internal, no. 944, NAI.

[592] Memorandum on Archaeological Work in Kashmir State, 1922, in Foreign and Political Department, Internal, no. 944, NAI.

bark manuscripts on which the ancient texts were written.[593] The most important Sanskrit manuscript translated during this period, however, was Kalhana's twelfth-century *Rajatarangini*, or the *History of Kings*.[594] The British considered that the "chronicle is practically the sole extant Sanskrit work of a truly historical character and for this reason occupied a position of exceptional interest in the range of Indian literature."[595] As such, then, the work was crucial for producing important knowledge about Britain's Indian Empire, and it was argued that the translation was "likely to create an interest in the history of India," which was a subject "too much neglected in this country, having in view the enormous interests involved and the number of Englishmen who annually take up appointments in India."[596]

The man chosen for the work was Hungarian-British archaeologist and orientalist Aurel Stein, who was at the time the principal at Oriental College, Lahore. Stein was considered "an exceedingly competent man for the work" and would be perform the job

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[593] Notes on a tour in Kashmir by Dr. Sten Konow, late Government Epigraphist for India, in Government of India, Home Department, Archaeology and Epigraphy-A, Proceedings, October 1909, Nos. 29-30, NAI.

[594] Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5.

[595] Letter from Archibald Constable & Co., Ld., to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India in Council, India Office, Whitehall, in Dr. Stein's new annotated translation of Kalhana's Rajatarangini or chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir, Home Department, Books, Part B, Proceedings, January 1901, No. 119, NAI.

[596] Ibid.

"far more effectively than… any other person available."[597] As a result, the Kashmir Darbar was pushed to pay half his salary while compiling the translation.[598] Later, when an introduction was "recognized as a necessary part of the work,"[599] the Darbar was pressured to issue Stein a payment of Rs. 1,000 for the completion of the introduction.[600]

One of the appeals about Kashmir as a tourist destination was its remoteness lent itself to being an adventure one could afford. But if Kashmir was to become a developed economy integrated with the rest of the subcontinent, it would no longer become as appealing of a holiday. This happened on a small scale during the period of the British intervention: travelers who regular visited Kashmir complained that the increase in visitors had made it costlier a trip. But by and large, at the conclusion of the British intervention, the trip to Kashmir had conversely been opened to a broader range of tourists than the more select crowd who made the trek in the nineteenth century. British attempts to develop Kashmir's economy were mostly limited to the construction of power plants, dredging operations to prevent flooding, and the establishment of hotels, golf courses, polo grounds, etc., or similar types of transformations that could more ably accommodate visitors to the Valley without fundamentally altering society as a whole. As a result, though the British deployed the language of economic development to justify

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[597] Note by D. I., 26 September 1894, in Deputation of M. A. Stein to Kashmir, 1894, Home Department, Books and Publications, B, Proceedings, November 1894, NAI.

[598] Ibid.

[599] Note by A. T. Pringle, 4 March 1898, in Deputation of M. A. Stein to Kashmir to prepare an historical introduction to the translation of the Sanskrit chronicle of Kashmir, Foreign, External, Proceedings, April 1898, NAI.

[600] Note by H. Daly, 16 February 1898, in Ibid.

their intervention in Kashmir, their actions showed that their interests in the Valley were shaped more by the imperatives of tourism. Even in the area of historic preservation, the British focused mostly on architectural sites that tourists could visit, while ceding most of the research initiatives to the Dogra state.

Yet, despite the lack of genuine economic development, Kashmir was nevertheless transformed during the period and placed on its contemporary trajectory. The British period saw a significant shift in the Valley's journey towards the stagnant tourist economy Kashmir has become today. The damage incurred by the environment was noteworthy, and, for example, Kashmir's waterways still churn out an overabundance of trout, first introduced by the British in the era under question.[601] But also important was the evolution in ideas about Kashmir during this time. The British solidified the historic cultural connectivity between Kashmir regional history and identity and Indic civilization as whole, while establishing Kashmir as the peak tourist destination in the subcontinent through creating an ideal experience for the Valley's visitors. By creating norms about Kashmir's relationship with Indian society, the British placed the region on its historical path that sees it today as a valued vacation destination for Indians but yet as one of the poorest economies and most politically turbulent states in modern India.

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[601] Professor Upendra Kaul, "Trout: A Treasure of Kashmir," Greater Kashmir, 31 January 2022, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/amp/story/todays-paper/editorial-page/trout-a-treasure-of-kashmir [Accessed 20 August 2022].

Chapter 5: Restoration

From the moment Oliver St. John announced to the new maharaja, Pratap Singh, that the Government of India was imposing a Resident on his court, the maharaja and his allies began to work to restore him to power. The maharaja, sensing that St. John was to deliver unwelcome news, even attempted unsuccessfully to stall a meeting between the two.[602] When the news was given to him, Pratap begged St. John to delay the appointment of the Resident, so that the maharaja might get credit for the reforms he planned to introduce.[603] Though St. John remained steadfast in his insistence on the change, the maharaja continued to search for wiggle room. Pratap then contested the name of "Resident," arguing the term of "Officer" would save him from much humiliation.[604] St. John would not be persuaded, however, arguing that the title of Resident was "all-important" as it would demonstrate the reforms as mandatory to His Highness's officials. The previous title, "officer on special duty" was disliked by its bearers, who found it "cumbrous and absurd."[605] The title of Resident would place these officers on an equivalent footing with Residents in other native states in British India.

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[602] Letter no. 227 from Oliver St. John, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Jammu, 15 September 1885, in Kashmir Residency Office, India Office Library and Records, British Library (IOR), R/2/1072/188, Appointment of a Resident in Kashmir.

[603] Ibid.

[604] Ibid.

[605] Mr. Henvey's Report upon the Condition of Kashmir and the Reforms Required in the Administration, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. January 1883, Nos. 239-40, National Archives of India (NAI).

Chapter 2 recalls how upon the conclusion of this meeting, Pratap Singh immediately entrusted his Diwan, or Prime Minister, Gobind Sahai, with a lakh of rupees, with which he was to persuade British officials, potentially even the Viceroy, in Simla to reverse the appointment of a Resident. He meanwhile deployed his Finance Minister, Babu Nilambar, to stifle efforts of the newly appointed British Resident. With this twin-pronged approach, the maharaja found more success in the latter. Viceroy Lord Dufferin did not find Gobind's arguments (or rupees) convincing, but he became so dissatisfied with St. John's performance that he eventually replaced him with T. J. C. Plowden in 1887.[606] However, Plowden had even less success managing the personalities of the Darbar, particularly Nilambar, who "was a thorn in Plowden's flesh, as he was always outwitted by him."[607] As recounted in chapter 2, Plowden was dismissed after failing to reform the state's administration along adequate lines. Matters were so poor in Kashmir that Lord Dufferin had to cancel his visit to the Valley, lamenting that he was "missing a sight of that wonderous valley" on account of the fact that he was "not satisfied with the condition of public affairs in the State" due to the failures of successive Residents.[608] Dufferin thought very poorly of this crowd, who were "either lazy or stupid, or vulgar-

[606] Letter from Dufferin to Cross, 1 June 1888, in Cross Papers, 24, No. 96, NAI, in Madhavi Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir, 1876-1894* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1984), 43.

[607] Madhavi Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir, 1876-1894* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1984), 43.

[608] Letter from Dufferin to Cross, 16 April 1888, in Cross Papers, 24, No. 89, NAI, in Ibid.

minded bullies, or disreputable or amicable gentlemen, devoid of any real grasp or energy."[609]

Meanwhile, the maharaja travelled to Calcutta to present his case directly to Lord Dufferin in mid-January 1886. From the maharaja's perspective, the chief object of this meeting was to restore alternative communications with the British government through his maharaja's vakil, or agent, with the Punjab Government. If the maharaja could maintain communications through his vakil, then he could severely undercut the authority of the Resident. This was a method that Pratap's father had mastered in previous years to isolate the British officer on special duty from the affairs of the state.[610] In fact, the maharaja believed his good relations with the Punjab government could help him here. Before traveling to Calcutta, he stopped in Lahore to meet with Charles Aitchison, Governor of Punjab, to plead for his old connection with Lahore to be restored. Aitchison was sympathetic and wrote to Dufferin to ask for a fair reconsideration of the maharaja's case.[611] The discussion with the viceroy itself centered on three topics: the establishment of a British military cantonment in Kashmir territory; the restoration of a Kashmir vakil

[609] Letter from Dufferin to Cross, 16 April 1888, in Cross Papers, 24, No. 89, NAI, in Ibid.

[610] Mr. Henvey's Report upon the Condition of Kashmir and the Reforms Required in the Administration, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. January 1883, Nos. 239-40, NAI.

[611] Letter from Charles Aitchison to Lord Dufferin, 30 December 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 460(a)-62, in Dilip Kumar Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition (1885-1893)* (Calcutta, World Press, 1975), 29.

at the Punjab Government; and the right of British traders to purchase land in Jammu and Kashmir.[612]

The maharaja was only able to score a partial victory, and the outcome is revealing of British priorities in Kashmir. While the Viceroy was unwilling to move from his insistence that all communications between the British Government be directed through the British Resident and that British traders have the right to purchase land in Kashmir, he was more amenable to the maharaja's resistance to the establishment of a military cantonment in Kashmir. Scholars such as Dilip Kumar Ghose have argued that of British interests in Kashmir, "by far the most important of all was the location of a British force at some point or points within the Maharaja's territories."[613] Madhavi Yasin also characterizes British motives in Kashmir as part of their obsession with warding off Russian encroachment toward their Indian Empire.[614] Robert A. Huttenback describes Kashmir as "the playing board for the 'Great Game'."[615] It seems unlikely, however, if the interest of the British in Kashmir was mainly strategic and related to the Great Game with Russia, that the British would be willing to trade away measures to address the frontier issue in exchange for holding fast to internal reforms. To the contrary, the British were far more amenable to compromise with the maharaja on frontier issues than they

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[612] Memorandum of a Conversation between Lord Dufferin and Maharaja Pratap Singh, 15 January 1886, in Foreign Department, Progs., Secret E, July 1886, NAI.

[613] Dilip Kumar Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition (1885-1893)* (Calcutta, World Press, 1975), 29.

[614] Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir,* 132.

[615] Robert A. Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj, 1847-1947* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), xi.

were on internal ones. This stance was consistent between viceroyships as well; when the maharaja and his State Council met with the next viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, in November 1889, the latter instructed them of "the necessity for reducing military expenditure" when the maharaja raised the issue of the restoration of his powers.[616]

When Pratap met with Dufferin again in Lahore in November 1886, the latter likewise focused on internal matters regarding the constitution of the State Council, directing Pratap to dismiss his Diwan Gobind Sahai and reconstitute a new council consisting of his brothers Amar Singh and Ram Singh along with the new Diwan Lachman Das, chosen by the British. However, a rift in the council between Amar Singh and Lachman Das resulted in the maharaja choosing the latter as a sacrificial lamb. Plowden was sent off as well, his time as Resident marked up as a failure for being unable to manage these personalities. Huttenback estimates that the "maharaja's dismissal of Lachman Das, who was the nominee, probably went a long way toward sealing his doom."[617] With the new Resident Nisbet, who the maharaja trusted as a personal friend, and the continued feud between the maharaja and his brother Amar Singh, the treasonous letters scandal was unfurled in 1889, resulting in the maharaja's

[616] Letter No. 6282 ½ from Louis W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 16 September 1902, in Proposed Administrative Changes in Kashmir: Request of the Maharaja for increased powers, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Proceedings, December 1902, No. 112, NAI.

[617] Robert A. Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj, 1847-1947* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 67.

temporary abstention from his government and unlocking the full potential of the British to transform Kashmir into their tourist ideal.

Belying British characterizations of his weakness and timidity, Pratap Singh did not take his predicament sitting down, and sought to rally supporters to his cause. He regularly asked visiting British officials to plead his case for him. For example, when Sir Frederick Roberts visited Kashmir in April 1889 to inspect its army, the maharaja implored him to ask the Viceroy to restore his powers.[618] He deployed several of his agents to meet with various British officials, writers, lawyers, and politicians, who might be capable of bearing some influence on the matter. He found willing participants in the Indian press, who took a keen interest in Kashmir issues and regularly featured them. Prior to the intervention, the pro-government, Anglo-Indian press advocated reform in Kashmir's administration. The death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh and the accession of his son Pratap Singh was widely seen as the appropriate time to initiate a change.[619] The *Englishman*, anticipating that Pratap would be a weak ruler, endorsed the "stationing of a Political Resident of the first class" to assist the maharaja.[620] However, once the intervention took place, it sparked criticism across the board, from both pro and anti-

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[618] Letter from Frederick Roberts to Maharaja Pratap Singh, 21 June 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File 100/6, in Dilip Kumar Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 90.

[619] *Civil and Military Gazette*, 16 September 1885, p. 1; *Englishman*, 23 September 1885, p. 5, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 33.

[620] *Englishman*, 25 September 1885, p. 5, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 33-34.

government press outlets, who were armed with leaked documents and correspondence provided by the maharaja and his agents.[621]

Meanwhile, Punjabi media outlets defended Kashmir's Punjabi officials by maligning the influence of Bengali officials on the state.[622] The *Delhi Punch* in Lahore published a cartoon that depicted a Bengali leading a camel (representing Kashmir) astray, while the British tried to lead the camel back by its tail.[623] It later wrote that Bengali officials were displacing "natives" in favor of their "country men."[624] Another cartoon entitled "Present State of Affairs in Kashmir" depicted the Bengalis eating grapes as the Punjabis helplessly looked on.[625] Another outlet, *The Liberal*, released a list of Bengalis employed by the maharaja, which prompted Aitchison to complain that Kashmir was "rapidly becoming the happy hunting ground of Bengali Babus."[626] Reporting that in the Punjab, Kashmir was becoming known as the "Babu Raj," in reference to the Bengali finance minister, Babu Nilambar Mukherjee, Aitchison worried that these Bengali

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[621] Memorandum: Report for Week Ending 16 November 1889 by R. P. Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, in Interference by the Proprietors of Native Newspapers in Kashmir Affairs, with a View to Petitioning Parliament for the Restoration of the Maharaja to Power, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 232-242, NAI.

[622] Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 65.

[623] *Delhi Punch*, Lahore, 24 February 1886, in Ibid.

[624] *Delhi Punch*, 14 April 1886, in Ibid.

[625] *Delhi Punch*, 26 May 1886, in Ibid.

[626] Letter from Aitchison to Wallace, 16 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 464-65, in Dilip Kumar Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 40.

ministers were having too heavy and corrosive an influence on the maharaja.[627] The *Pioneer* reported that the situation was threatening to compromise the independence of the Kashmir state judiciary.[628]

Plowden wrote to Durand asking him to limit the appointment of British subjects in Kashmir as "the employment of Bengalis" in Kashmir State "was highly objectionable."[629] He furthermore contended that they should act on the authority given to them under Article VII of the Treaty of Amritsar to "control the appointment of British subjects to offices in Kashmir."[630] The Resident was relying on the English version of the treaty, which reads as "The Maharaja Gulab Singh engages never to take or retain in this service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American State, without the consent of the British Government."[631] However, this article was never acted upon. Madhavi Yasin has shown this was because the maharaja's court relied on the Persian version of the treaty, which prohibited employment of "the people of the foreign country of England and other European people or residents of America."[632] As a result, the

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[627] Letter from Aitchison to Wallace, 16 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 464-65, in Dilip Kumar Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 40-41.

[628] Kashmir Correspondent, *Pioneer*, 9 June 1886, p. 5, in Dilip Kumar Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 41.

[629] Demi-official letter from Plowden, Resident in Kashmir, to Durand, Foreign Secretary, 14 June 1886, in Foreign Department, Secret E., October 1886, Cons. 238, NAI.

[630] Ibid.

[631] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* (Calcutta, 1931) Vol. XII, Treaty of Amritsar, March 16, 1846, 21-22.

[632] Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 67.

maharaja had freely employed British subjects without consulting the British government. Although the British had considered enforcing Article VII as early as 1881, they had declined making a controversy out of it until they had sufficient reason to exert a "hitherto dormant treaty right."[633] When the maharaja requested the return of Nilambar Mukherjee following the fall of the Lachman Das ministry, Plowden determined to make his stand on this issue, and told the maharaja he was not permitted to employ a British subject on a permanent basis.[634] The maharaja replied that the Persian version of the treaty gave him permission to appoint any British subject without British subject, but Plowden insisted that the English version was authoritative, denying the maharaja's request for Nilambar to return.[635]

The press paid special attention to the intrigue between Kashmiri ministers and the British role in it. For example, when Dufferin imposed the state council led by Lachman Das on the government, the *Punjab Punch* published a cartoon "in which the new council in the shape of a vile hag was beheading with a sword the Maharaja's Government."[636] When Das was dismissed, the Anglo-Indian press "took keen interest" and "squarely put the blame on the shoulders of the Resident for his failure."[637] The *Hindustan* also blamed Plowden for "the present unsatisfactory state of things in

[633] Foreign Department, Secret E., Progs., February 1887, Nos. 10-13, NAI.

[634] Foreign Department, Secret E, Progs., March 1889, Nos. 107-200, NAI.

[635] Ibid.

[636] *The Punjab Punch*, 19 March, 1887, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 44.

[637] *The Pioneer*, 21 March 1888, p. 1, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 47.

Kashmir."[638] Plowden was also accused of gross misconduct, which included, among other things, stealing artifacts and antiques from the museum at Jammu.[639] The *Charpaz* vividly conjured the state of affairs in a cartoon "in which the British lion was represented as casting a wistful glance at a lamb called Kashmir."[640] Adjoined to the cartoon, the editor warned that if the lion "devours the lamb, he will find it difficult to digest the animal, and that other lambs will be put on their guard."[641] The implication of the threat was clear: British annexation of Kashmir would put the rest of their Indian empire at risk.

The alarm bell was further raised in the Urdu newspaper *Punjab Gazette* when Lord Dufferin stated openly before the Chamber of Commerce in London in October 1889 that he supported removing the maharaja from power.[642] The *Punjab Gazette* also included details from official documents originally published by a Calcutta newspaper, the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, which along with the *Gazette* endeavored to defend the maharaja. The maharaja was rumored to have given the editor of the *Patrika* a sum of 5,000 rupees to take up his cause, and journalists were regularly seen visiting the

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[638] *Hindustan*, 13 May 1888, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 47.

[639] *Khair Khwah-i-Kashmir*, 16 October 1888, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 47.

[640] Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 48.

[641] *Charpuz*, 21 August 1888, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 48.

[642] Speech of Dufferin on 29 October 1889 as reported in *Punjab Gazette*, Sialkot, 2 November 1889, in F. M. Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir (1846-1921)* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1974), 80.

maharaja's court in Jammu to meet with him.[643] The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* accused the British of desiring to "colonise the Kashmir Valley with European families and turn out the 'black people.'"[644] The *Punjab Gazette* concurred, drawing comparisons to the violent settlement of the Americas in its prediction that "the Kashmiris would become victims of the British, just as the Red Indians have been done away with in America."[645] Meanwhile, the *Taj-ul-Akhbar* ran a story describing how a telegram from the maharaja had reached the Resident while drunk and among a "wandering caravan of pleasure-seeking depraved men, engaged in drinking wine, and immersed in the enjoyment of satanic pleasures," outraging British officials.[646]

The story in the *Taj-ul-Akbhar* reflected questions among the Indian press about whether the British were genuine in their claims to be reforming the state. *The Bengalee* argued that accusations of the maharaja's maladministration were just an excuse for taking control of his state.[647] *The Indian Mirror* released an article accusing the British of

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[643] Memorandum: Report for Week Ending 16 November 1889 by R. P. Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, in Interference by the Proprietors of Native Newspapers in Kashmir Affairs, with a View to Petitioning Parliament for the Restoration of the Maharaja to Power, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 232-242, NAI.

[644] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, 24 October 1889, in Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 80.

[645] *Punjab Gazette*, Sialkot, 2 November 1889, in Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 80.

[646] *Taj-ul-Akbar*, 7 June 1890, in Libelous Charge against Colonel R. P. Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, in the *Taj-ul-Akhbar*, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 212-213, NAI.

[647] *The Bengalee*, 30 March 1889, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 79.

being responsible for the state's financial misfortune by draining Kashmir's treasury to fund their ambitious reform projects.[648]

The *Amrit Bazar Patrika* shortly later released a similar article contending the same, pointing out several British officials had been appointed to positions in the state with high salaries—"need anybody now wonder why there is no money in the treasury?"[649] Furthermore, a new Residency was being built in Jammu, despite him already having one there. Great sums of money were "being spent like water" in preparation for Lord Lansdowne expected visit the following year.[650] Meanwhile, "Durand is making himself merry at the expense of the poor people of Kashmir," having organized a week of horse-racing, polo, and other sports in Gilgit.[651] The *Patrika* also alleged that the "deposition of the Maharaja caused immense sensation amongst the people of Kashmir," so much so that "an outbreak was seriously apprehended, and the European officials of the State passed their time in great anxiety."[652] The Chief Engineer

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[648] *The Indian Mirror*, 3 October 1889, in Ibid.

[649] *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, Kashmir under the British administration, 30 January 1890, in Interference by the Proprietors of Native Newspapers in Kashmir Affairs, with a View to Petitioning Parliament for the Restoration of the Maharaja to Power, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 232-242, NAI.

[650] *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, Kashmir under the British administration, 30 January 1890, in Interference by the Proprietors of Native Newspapers in Kashmir Affairs, with a View to Petitioning Parliament for the Restoration of the Maharaja to Power, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 232-242, NAI.

[651] Ibid.

[652] Ibid.

of the State, Marquis de Bourbel, was even reported to have sent his family away from the state. With the maharaja and his brothers in charge of the army, "a hint from them was enough for the Dogras to rise against this new order of things and commit horrible deeds."[653] But instead, they trusted in the "sense of justice of the British Government" and "firmly restrained the Dogras from committing any act of violence."[654]

The normally pro-government *Pioneer* even piled on, accusing British officials of engaging in *begar* forced labor practices,[655] which was one problem the British had claimed their intervention would solve. British Foreign Secretary W. J. Cunningham complained that this criticism was "not helpful,"[656] though he later admitted to the Viceroy that there was still "a good deal to do."[657] A few days later, Cunningham settled on the defense that, as "bad as the state of affairs is," the article "does not give credit for

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[653] *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, Kashmir under the British administration, 30 January 1890, in Interference by the Proprietors of Native Newspapers in Kashmir Affairs, with a View to Petitioning Parliament for the Restoration of the Maharaja to Power, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 232-242, NAI.

[654] Ibid.

[655] *The Pioneer*, "A Cry from Kashmir" by F. A. Redslob, 5 November 1890, in Article in the *Pioneer* of the 5th November 1890, regarding the system of *begar* (forced labour), Foreign Secret-E, Pros., December 1890, Nos. 152-158, NAI.

[656] Note by W. J. Cunningham, Foreign Secretary, 16 November 1890, in Article in the *Pioneer* of the 5th November 1890, regarding the system of *begar* (forced labour), Foreign Secret-E, Pros., December 1890, Nos. 152-158, NAI.

[657] Letter by W. J. Cunningham to Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, 5 December 1890, in Ibid.

what has been done, nor recognize that things are better than they were."[658] British officials took notice of these press criticisms and adapted their policies in response to them. The next year after the *Pioneer* article, the Resident had the State Council abolish *begar* officially, though it continued in practice for decades.[659]

British responsiveness to negative media attention was evident as well in their aversion to appointments of Punjabi or Bengali officials to the Kashmir government to deflect press criticism of the practice. To introduce and carry out their desired reforms, the British recognized the need to bring qualified administrators to oversee such changes.[660] This was also desirable because Kashmir officials were seen as responsible for much of the maladministration and corruption that afflicted the state. However, the appointment of British state subjects, as opposed to Kashmir state subjects, seemed to confirm the theory that the British intended to annex Kashmir and take over its government. For this reason, when the maharaja stepped down and divested his power into the state council, H. M. Durand wrote that it was "very important to start the re-organization fairly and to avoid having a Punjabi ring."[661] With the press "teeming with

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[658] Letter by W. J. Cunningham to W. F. Prideaux, Resident in Kashmir, Calcutta, 11 December 1890, in Ibid.

[659] Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir*, 112.

[660] Letter from Plowden to Durand, 9 October 1886, in Foreign Department, Progs., Secret E, October 1886, Nos. 235-300, NAI.

[661] Telegram No. 726 E., from H. M. Durand to Lieutenant Governor, North-Western Provinces, 2 April 1889, No. 559, in Kashmir Affairs, Abandonment by Maharaja of Direct Management of the Jammu and Kashmir State for a Term of Five Years, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., May 1889, Nos. 553-567, NAI.

misrepresentations," the Viceroy instructed Durand to release a memorandum outlining the changes to the composition of the State Council while affirming that "rumours of an intention on the part of the Government to annex Kashmir are totally groundless."[662]

Preempting accusations of annexation with this memorandum was furthermore the basis for the Government's rejection of Nisbet's suggestion that one of the members of the State Council be an Englishman.[663] Durand said plainly that he did not like the idea at all, as it was "important to avoid as far as possible the appearance of annexing Kashmir" for "we have often been accused of a desire to do so."[664] It was also thought that one of the members of the State Council should be Muslim, as it was "only fair in a State where the bulk of the population" was Muslim that "some representative of that creed should be admitted to the administration."[665] Nisbet recommended Khan Bahadur Ghulam Mohiuddin, who had served under him as the Extra Assistant Commissioner of Mianwali. Before the memorandum was released, Durand struck a passage which stated that the reforms would rely on indigenous agency, worried that the clause seemed "a little apologetic" and "may give a handle for criticism."[666] This memorandum was then issued

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662 Demi-official letter from H. M. Durand to J. C. Ardagh, 26 April 1889, in Ibid.

663 Letter No. 11C from Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, to Amar Singh, Prime Minister, 17 April 1889, in Ibid.

664 Confidential Note by H. M. Durand, 16 March 1889, in Affairs of the Kashmir State, Discovery of Treasonable Letters, Maharaja's Resignation of Power, Reorganization of the Government, 1889, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

665 Demi-official letter from Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, to H. M. Durand, Srinagar, 30 April 1889, in Ibid.

666 Demi-official letter from H. M. Durand to J. C. Ardagh, 26 April 1889, in Ibid.

to the correspondents of the *Englishman*, *Pioneer*, and *Civil and Military Gazette,* who were present at Simla, all publications generally supportive in their coverage of the government.[667] The entire process was managed carefully to leave as little room for press criticism as possible. Durand was concerned that the whole affair would result in a scenario in which "we should have to wash a great deal of dirty linen in public."[668]

Despite all the tight media maneuvering, however, the Secretary of State for India was warned that summer that the abdication of the maharaja "appears to have been regarded in many quarters as the result of a selfish desire on the part of the Government of India to extend its influence in Kashmir, and possibly to prepare the way for the ultimate annexation."[669] As early as March 1889, the same month the maharaja was removed from power, the Bengali weekly *Dacca Prakash* "earnestly entreat[ed] the English Government not to do injustice to the Maharaja of Cashmere."[670] In May, the newspaper *Praja Bandhu* concluded that the Resident had become the de facto ruler of the state, and warned that "this virtual annexation has struck terror into the hearts of the

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[667] Demi-official letter from H. M. Durand to J. C. Ardagh, 26 April 1889, in Ibid.

[668] Letter from Durand to Wallace 3 March 1889, Lansdowne Papers, VII(a), p. 190, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 73.

[669] Letter No. 105, Secret-External, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, Simla, 26 July 1889, in Kashmir Affairs, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., August 1889, Nos. 162-203.

[670] Reports of the Native Press, *Dacca Prakash*, Bengal, March 1889, IOR, in Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj,* 75-76.

people of that State. Heaven alone can say what all this will culminate in!"[671] By August, the *Bandhu*'s tone had soured further:

> The British Government in its blind greed for lucre heeds not the loud cry for justice, which has been raised all over India. But history will reveal and hand down to future generations this gross abuse of power; this cowardice of triumphing over the fallen and trampling under foot of all just and fair dealing.[672]

Also in August, the Hindoo Patriot predicted that by the end of Lansdowne's term as viceroy, Kashmir would become directly governed as British territory. That same month, the *Amrit Bazar Patrika* further published letters which showed the Government of India believed the Resident abused his authority, which further embarrassed the government into taking a more gradual stance towards restoration.[673] Meanwhile, however, the Government of India passed the Official Secrets Bill to gain the authority to exact punitive measures against newspapers releasing official government documents and correspondence.[674]

One of the maharaja's strongest supporters was the Bengali editor of the newspaper *The Tribune*, Jogendra Chandra Bose, who had also been briefly employed in

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[671] Reports of the Native Press, *Dacca Prakash*, Bengal, March 1889, IOR, in Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj,* 76.

[672] Reports of the Native Press, *Dacca Prakash*, Bengal, 30 August 1889, IOR, in Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj,* 76.

[673] Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj*, 76-77.

[674] Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 101.

the maharaja's administration. Bose wrote a pamphlet in 1889 entitled "Cashmere and its Prince" in defense of the maharaja by refuting the charges of maladministration. Raising the alarm bell regarding concerns of British interests in Kashmir, Bose quoted British diplomat Sir Lepel Griffin's suggestion that British settlers should colonize Kashmir.[675] Although "the Indian population have been somewhat reassured by Lord Cross's generous declaration in the House of Lords that the Government had no intention of annexing Cashmere and that powers would be restored to the Maharaja," Bose cautioned that "contingency with which he coupled this promise has bred considerable misgivings."[676] Denying charges of personal wrongdoing and extravagance, Bose observed that most of the state's expenditure derived from reforms initiated by the Resident, whereas the maharaja's virtue was respected throughout India. Some of the state's expenditure was even connected to the expectation that the maharaja play host to esteemed guests visiting Kashmir, most recently the Commander-in-Chief of India and the Raja of Kapurthala. Bose's case rested on the notion that the rest of India was in common cause with the maharaja, fusing Kashmir's interests with that of India. The pamphlet concluded with a demand that the maharaja be given a fair trial, along with several appendices which contained letters of confidential correspondence between the maharaja and the viceroy, presumably provided to Bose by the maharaja.[677] This defense hit its mark as it "attracted the attention of the British Parliamentarians."[678] The attention

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[675] Jogendra Chandra Bose, *Cashmere and Its Prince* (Calcutta: Bee Press, 1889), 81.

[676] Jogendra Chandra Bose, *Cashmere and Its Prince* (Calcutta: Bee Press, 1889), 81.

[677] Ibid., 88.

[678] Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 65.

paid to the maharaja's case by British Press and Parliament "started" the "lengthy process of restoring powers to Pratap Singh."[679]

One of the documents included in the pamphlet was "a rather pathetic letter" sent to Viceroy Lansdowne by Maharaja Pratap Singh on May 14, 1889.[680] The letter was written on the heels of the first meeting of the new State Council on April 18, 1889, and the maharaja had the letter sent privately by Pandit Gopinath, the editor of the *Akbar-i-Am*, thus ensuring its leaking to the public.[681] Pratap lamented that "it is after great suffering and distress, and undergoing greatest contempt and taunt at the hands of my inferiors, that I have, with fear, decided to send the special message to Excellency."[682] Claiming that "necessity and feelings loyalty have obliged me to seek advice from your Excellency and take shelter under your Lordship's fatherly care," the maharaja laid blame for everything on the feet of his "chief enemy"—his brother, Amar Singh—and their rivalry for power.[683] Pratap twice considered removing him from State affairs and forcing him to retire to his jagir, or family estate, prompting dramatic scenes in which his younger brother burst into his room in tears, threw his turban at the maharaja's feet, and

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[679] Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 1.

[680] Huttenback, *Kashmir and the British Raj*, 72.

[681] Letter from Maharaja Pratap Singh to Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, in Affairs of the Kashmir State, Discovery of Treasonable Letters, Maharaja's Resignation of Power, Reorganization of the Government, Foreign Department, Secret E., April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[682] Ibid.

[683] Ibid.

begged for mercy.[684] Only then, out of his proclaimed love for his younger brother, did Pratap forgive him, but still the younger raja responded by continuing to foment intrigue.

Pratap described his joy when Nisbet was installed as Resident, for the maharaja "looked upon him as my safe friend," and so he thought his "difficulties were at an end."[685] But soon, the maharaja found Nisbet's motivations changed as he fell "in the very clutches of the very same secret and powerful enemy of mine, Raja Amar Singh." At this point, the "brewing plot of much-talked-of-letters" came about, which Pratap steadfastly denied writing, claiming, "Raja Amar Singh was at the bottom of the whole thing."[686] He pointed out that there was not likely anyone in all of Russia who could even read the letters, which were written in Dogri. The maharaja describes Nisbet rushing into his room and

> …brought such a great and many-sided pressure in all solemnity and seriousness that I was obliged to write what was desired, rather demanded by him, in order to relieve myself for the moment, having full faith that your Excellency's Government will not accept such a one-sided view of the case, and that full opportunity will be given to me of defending myself.[687]

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[684] Letter from Maharaja Pratap Singh to Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, in Affairs of the Kashmir State, Discovery of Treasonable Letters, Maharaja's Resignation of Power, Reorganization of the Government, Foreign Department, Secret E., April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[685] Ibid.

[686] Ibid.

[687] Ibid.

Pratap concluded his appeal by dramatically requesting that if the Government of India did not see fit to restore his powers,

> and I have to remain in my present most miserable condition, I would most humbly ask your Excellency to summon me before you—and I will be most happy to obey such summons—and shoot me through the heart with your Excellency's hands, and thus at once relieve an unfortunate prince from unbearable misery, contempt and disgrace forever.[688]

After receiving the letter, Durand rebuked the Maharaja and instructed him to observe the proper channels for communication and to cease his obstruction of orders from the Government of India, Pratap lamented if "I know that I am injured, then why should I not cry?" and asserted that "if you kindly peruse carefully and personally into my circumstances, your heart will at once be melted into pity."[689]

Yet the viceroy was also not persuaded, replying much the same, adding that the maharaja had essentially already received his trial and failed to carry out the necessary reforms to the state.[690] For now, the viceroy urged the maharaja to focus on demonstrating the "qualities of a wise and prudent ruler" by "bearing in a dignified

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[688] Letter from Maharaja Pratap Singh to Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, in Affairs of the Kashmir State, Discovery of Treasonable Letters, Maharaja's Resignation of Power, Reorganization of the Government, Foreign Department, Secret E., April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[689] Demi-official letter from Maharaja Pratap Singh to H. M. Durand, 15 June 1889, Jammu, in Kashmir Affairs, 1889, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros. August 1889, Nos. 162-203, NAI.

[690] Letter from Viceroy Lansdowne to Maharaja Pratap Singh, Simla, 28 June 1889, in Enclosure no. 3, S. N. Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir* (Freethought Literature Company, 1973), pp. 173-176.

manner the loss of power which you have sustained."[691] Lansdowne encouraged the maharaja that when the administration of the state improved, then his powers could be restored—"much would, in such a case, depend on your own conduct in the meanwhile."[692] The viceroy ended his letter by cautioning the maharaja not to associate with people with malign interests, who may gain influence over him and lead him astray.

The release of these documents was discussed widely, both inside and outside India. The intervention caught the attention of many British onlookers sympathetic to the maharaja, including politicians. One such politician was the writer and Liberal reformist William Digby, a critic of British policy in India, who wrote several letters to newspapers in Britain condemning the treatment of the maharaja and defending him, arguing that the British had forcibly procured his letter of resignation from him.[693] Digby contended that no accusations of misgovernment had ever been proven against the maharaja. Pratap Singh had been vilified despite having been "animated by a staunch loyalty to the British dominance."[694] Digby called for the House of Commons to produce all the relevant

[691] Letter from Viceroy Lansdowne to Maharaja Pratap Singh, Simla, 28 June 1889, in Enclosure no. 3, S. N. Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir* (Freethought Literature Company, 1973), pp. 173-176.

[692] Letter from Maharaja Pratap Singh to Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, in Affairs of the Kashmir State, Discovery of Treasonable Letters, Maharaja's Resignation of Power, Reorganization of the Government, Foreign Department, Secret E., April 1889, Nos. 80-98, NAI.

[693] William Digby, Letter the Editor entitled, "Lord Lansdowne to Maharaja of Kashmir," *The London Times*, September 7, 1889, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 81.

[694] William Digby, Letter, 31 July 1889, PSHC/1908, p. 1001(a), in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 98.

documents, and a committee formed to investigate the treatment of the maharaja. Digby's writings ignited a backlash in which the Evening News described his accusations as "a mixture of cant, exaggeration, ignorance and partisanship of the most exaggerated character." Yet, the letters prompted discussion in Parliament. Lord Cross was asked in the House of Lords if there was truth to the rumor of the Government of India's intention to annex Kashmir. Cross insisted there was no truth of this, and suggested that when the state's condition became improved, the maharaja would be restored to power.[695] The latter statement earned Lansdowne's ire back in India, who remained steadfast that restoration of the maharaja "will depend a good deal upon his own personal conduct, as well as upon the general situation at the moment."[696]

Digby attended the 1889 meeting of the Indian National Congress in Bombay along with Member of Parliament Charles Bradlaugh to try to bring more attention to the situation.[697] The maharaja meanwhile sent his own agent, Moti Lal Ghose, to debrief Bradlaugh, who was given three gifts on behalf of the maharaja, including "an enameled necklace of jewels."[698] They also had documents that they shared with Bradlaugh

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[695] Hansard, Third Series, House of Lords, 27 August 1889, Vol. 340, Col. 573, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 98-99.

[696] Letter from Lansdowne to Cross, 23 September 1889, No. 43, Cross Papers/27, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 159-61, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 99.

[697] Yasin*, British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 81.

[698] Memorandum: Report for Week Ending 16 November 1889 by R. P. Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, in Interference by the Proprietors of Native Newspapers in Kashmir Affairs, with a View to Petitioning Parliament for the Restoration of the Maharaja to Power, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 232-242, NAI.

regarding the maharaja's predicament, and asked him to bring up the case in Parliament. He replied that he could only do so if the maharaja himself petitioned Parliament, but they insisted that the maharaja could never go against the government so openly.[699] A compromise was settled upon where subjects of His Highness would petition Parliament on his behalf. The subjects "who sign must remain firm and loyal, so that they do not deny the signatures if questioned."[700] They also arranged to send Digby money to prepare and distribute a pamphlet arguing the maharaja's case, even "trying to raise some money by public subscription."[701] Moti Lal Ghose even resolved to send Mr. Digby his own money if he could not raise the necessary funds.

British officials, who obtained this correspondence, believed that this Moti Lal Ghose was one of the proprietors of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*.[702] They instructed Nisbet, the Resident at the time, to not "take any action whatever to prevent people signing the petition."[703] Rather, he should ascertain the methods taken to obtain signatures, albeit while doing so he "should avoid the slightest appearance of using any pressure to prevent the petition being signed" as "the mere fact, indeed, of your making any enquiries might,

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[699] Letter from Moti Lal Ghose to "D. M. C." Calcutta, 7 January 1890, in Ibid.

[700] Letter from Moti Lal Ghose to "D. M. C." Calcutta, 7 January 1890, in Interference by the Proprietors of Native Newspapers in Kashmir Affairs, with a View to Petitioning Parliament for the Restoration of the Maharaja to Power, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Pros., December 1890, Nos. 232-242, NAI.

[701] Ibid.

[702] Demi-official letter from W. J. Cunningham to R. P. Nisbet, 25 February 1890, in Ibid.

[703] Ibid.

if known, be twisted into a menace."[704] Nisbet was told to pay special attention to the caste and religion of those who signed, before being cautioned a final time that "it would be better to have no information at all than to purchase it at the price… of anyone having the shadow of an excuse for saying that obstacles were put in the way of the people who wished to sign."[705]

The petition was signed and returned to Bradlaugh, who brought it back to Parliament, asking for the papers to be discussed on May 14, 1890. Lansdowne was greatly anxious about this, and asked Lord Cross to show Bradlaugh all the papers to convince him that such a public discussion would only make the maharaja look even worse.[706] Bradlaugh was not convinced, however, and resolved to pursue the matter further in Parliament unless the Government of India presented the maharaja with a fair trial.[707] This he did on July 3, 1890, in the House of Commons, when he moved the adjournment of the House on the question of the Government of India taking away the maharaja's powers.[708] Without ever receiving the fair trial he requested, Bradlaugh described the maharaja as having "been condemned unheard."[709] Even "the meanest person in this country" would be entitled to submit a defense for accusations brought

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[704] Demi-official letter from W. J. Cunningham to R. P. Nisbet, 25 February 1890, in Ibid.

[705] Ibid.

[706] Letter from Lansdowne to Cross, 19 June 1890, PSHC/115, p. 761, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 111.

[707] London Correspondent, *Bengalee*, 19 July 1890, p. 343, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 111.

[708] Parliamentary Debates in House of Commons, 3 July 1890, Hansard Staff, in Appendix B of Gadru, ed, *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, pp. 190-220.

[709] Ibid.

against them, or to hear from witnesses against them.[710] Even this fundamental fairness had been denied the maharaja, argued Bradlaugh, who "may be good or bad" but was nevertheless "entitled to justice."[711] The Government of India itself did not find important the supposedly treasonous correspondence with Russia, which was the issue which triggered the maharaja's abdication, so why should Parliament? Bradlaugh also brought to attention the allegations that the maharaja only abdicated under duress, which surely, in his view, were sufficiently serious enough to merit the creation of a committee to investigate. Bradlaugh concluded that although the Government of India may know India better than him, if this was how they treated their Indian subjects, then "English justice in India is a shadow and a delusion."[712]

His opposite, the Under Secretary of State, Sir John Eldon Gorst, who was shaking his head in dissent throughout Bradlaugh's motion, then rose to defend the government's actions. He recounted instances of the maharaja's chronic misgovernment, which resulted in famine and depopulation of the "unhappy people of Kashmir."[713] He also reminded the House of the circumstances of how Kashmir came under Dogra rule as a feudatory of the British Empire. Gorst emphasized the British Empire's responsibility for the welfare of Kashmir's subjects, which they placed under the rule of a Hindu king, and questioned whether this "intervention of the British Government on behalf of the

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[710] Parliamentary Debates in House of Commons, 3 July 1890, Hansard Staff, in Appendix B of Gadru, ed, *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, pp. 190-220.

[711] Ibid.

[712] Ibid.

[713] Ibid.

Muhammadan people had not already been too long delayed."[714] Gorst concluded his reply by pointing out the

> Irony of fate that the Radical member for Northampton should be pleading in this House the Divine right of an Oriental despot to deal with his people as he pleases and that I a humble but reactionary Tory should be pleading the right of these poor Moslems to cultivate their own land. But we have of late been accustomed in this House to strange sights.[715]

Bradlaugh in his rebuttal conceded that "like all Oriental governments" the Kashmir government "had many defects," but that there was "no specific act of misgovernment" that the Government of India could point to beyond the fact that the bulk of the population lived in dire poverty—a condition which, he pointed out, was not much dissimilar to how Indians lived in territory directly ruled by the British.[716]

J. G. Swift MacNeill, MP from Donegal, Ireland, then rose to give his response, as Gorst had questioned the Irish MP's seriousness due to his laughing and smiling throughout Gorst's defense. MacNeill explained that he was not laughing at the plight of the deposed maharaja or his people, but his laughter was in response to Gorst's hypocrisy claiming benevolence while "robbing an ancient prince of his inheritance."[717] MacNeill

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[714] Parliamentary Debates in House of Commons, 3 July 1890, Hansard Staff, in Appendix B of Gadru, ed, *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, pp. 190-220.

[715] Ibid.

[716] Ibid.

[717] Parliamentary Debates in House of Commons, 3 July 1890, Hansard Staff, in Appendix B of Gadru, ed, *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, pp. 190-220.

then curiously claimed that a plebiscite of Kashmiris would "find that three-fourths of the people favoured the restoration of the prince."[718] MacNeill did not find Gorst's "shifting answer" convincing.[719] Being from Ireland himself, MacNeill recognized "land grabbing" when he saw it.[720] Before sitting back down, he reminded the House that an aggressive annexation policy was one of the causes of the Indian Rebellion. Dr. William Hunter, Scottish MP from Aberdeen, then rose to concur with MacNeill, pointing out that Gorst was trying to impose a kind of divide and rule strategy by intervening in a Hindu government on behalf of a Muslim people.[721]

Sir Richard Temple, MP for Evesham in Worcestershire, who had a length career of service in India, next spoke against the motion. Having a great deal of experience in India, he contradicted MacNeill's pointed about the ancientness of the maharaja's rule by explaining how the people of Kashmir were "placed under an alien prince by the action of the British Government."[722] He pointed out that "of all countries, Kashmir is the most favoured in climate" and with a summer season that is "fertile and bountiful as any place in the world."[723] The mere fact that its population was decreasing in spite of such ideal conditions was itself a sign of misgovernment. He also argued that with three separate Residents coming to the same conclusion about the maharaja, there had already been

[718] Ibid.

[719] Ibid.

[720] Ibid.

[721] Ibid.

[722] Ibid.

[723] Ibid.

sufficient trial given to the maharaja to demonstrate his capacity for reform. Imperial duty demanded that they take necessary action to bring good government in every corner of the empire, nothing more. It was not a selfish desire to profit which induced the Government of India to intervene in Kashmir—"England remains exactly in the same position as she was, and is in no wise benefitted."[724] Temple pointed out that the British "have no military frontiers in that direction" as "it is not from there that we should be invaded."[725] Rather, the government acted with "entire disinterestedness," only intending to benefit the people of Kashmir.[726] With this, and a few short words from Plowden in defense of the government's actions, the debate concluded with a vote that resulted in the motion failing, 88-226.

Digby made one final attempt to have the maharaja's case re-heard before Parliament with a letter addressed to Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, MP for the Clitheroe division of Lancashire, entitled "Condemned Unheard." Just as Arthur Brinckman and Robert Thorp criticized the British on moral grounds that it was abhorrent to hand over Kashmiris to a tyrant, as recalled in Chapter Two, Digby condemned the British intervention in Kashmir on the high-minded, democratic principle that "surely the Kashmirian population may be permitted to have something to say about the deposition

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[724] Parliamentary Debates in House of Commons, 3 July 1890, Hansard Staff, in Appendix B of Gadru, ed, *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, pp. 190-220.

[725] Ibid.

[726] Ibid.

of their ruler."[727] Digby compared the issue to the sale of Heligoland to Germany, with observers objecting that Heligoland's 2,000 inhabitants deserve a say in the matter—how this does not also apply to Kashmiris, Digby asks?

> As a matter of fact, the Government of India has professed to act in the interests of the people of Kashmir in removing their ruler, no complaint whatever has been made by them. They do not declare that they are aggrieved. On the contrary, if a plebiscite were taken, it is believed nine-tenths or more of the people would call for the Maharaja's speedy restoration. No doubt there was misgovernment in Kashmir, as there is misgovernment in many parts of British India.[728]

Digby dismissed Anglo-Indian accusations of the Maharaja's abuses of power, "which existed only in their imagination," claiming that the Maharaja has been cruelly maligned by anonymous slanderers.[729] He pointed out that Andrew Wingate, the settlement officer in Kashmir who was cited as a witness by the Government of India, described the maharaja as having "a ready sympathy for the poor, a keen interest in land questions, and a determination to protect the cultivators against the officials."[730] Digby blamed the Government of India for going rogue and behaving in a way that "could not receive

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[727] William Digby, "Condemned Unheard" (1890), in Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, 20.

[728] Ibid., 20-21.

[729] William Digby, "Condemned Unheard" (1890), in Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, 22.

[730] Ibid., 21.

sanction in any English Parliament which this century has known."[731] The result was that "another independent State in India was wiped out of existence."[732]

Shuttlesworth did not raise the Kashmir issue again in the House, and Lansdowne and Cross were pleased with the results. However, many in India did not believe the matter settled.[733] Pratap Singh himself did not relent in his quest for restoration. He continually appealed for support from Roberts, who continued his work in Kashmir to reform the army and help the state reduce its military expenditure.[734] He also wrote Lansdowne's Private Secretary, J. C. Ardagh, appealing to his influence over the viceroy.[735] He even requested a meeting with Prince Albert Victor to present an appeal for his restoration to the prince during his visit of India, a meeting which was denied him.[736]

Meanwhile, Nisbet suddenly reversed his stance on the situation, proposing that the maharaja be brought back into the government by appointing him as President of the

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[731] William Digby, "Condemned Unheard" (1890), in Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir*, 27.

[732] Ibid., 28.

[733] *Friend of India*, 9 August 1890, p. 1, and *Bengalee*, 2 August 1890, p. 364, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 113.

[734] Roberts to Maharaja, 8 February 1890, Roberts Papers/100/7, p. 103, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 132.

[735] Letter from Pratap Singh to Ardagh, 2 February 1891, Ardagh Papers, Box 2, in Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir*, 104.

[736] Letter from Lansdowne to Maharaja, 21 October 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), p. 224, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 133.

State Council.[737] He had already taken action to put this plan into motion before Lansdowne rebuked him to stand down until the issue had been deliberated by Nisbet's higher ups. At the very least, if a change in policy was deserved, it could not come immediately after a debate in Parliament.[738] Ardagh wrote Nisbet to remind him that the debate in Parliament was in part a serious admonishment of his own conduct, and that he could not expect to take such actions on his own without the consent of the Government of India.[739] Lansdowne meanwhile wrote in frustration with Nisbet, explaining he did not wish to alter the existing arrangements until the maharaja demonstrated "some signs of being in earnest."[740] Nisbet then apparently assured the maharaja that, so long as he followed the advice of the Resident in all matters, that he would surely be restored to power, enraging Lansdowne, who was "much averse to anything like a transaction with the maharaja."[741] At the end of the day, during his time as Resident, "Nisbet has done a number of foolish things, and has quarrelled with half the people, with whom he has been concerned."[742] It indeed seemed that even Nisbet's fellow British officers who stationed in Kashmir with him disliked him.[743] After his subordinate, Captain Ramsay, submitted a

[737] Letter from Nisbet to Lansdowne, 5 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), p. 18, in Ibid.

[738] Letter from Lansdowne to Nisbet, 8 July 1890, Ibid., pp. 11-12, in Ghosh, Ibid.

[739] Letter from Ardagh to Nisbet, 31 July 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11, in Ibid.

[740] Letter from Lansdowne to Cross, 14 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 78-80, in Ibid.

[741] Letter from Lansdowne to Cross, 8 August 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 88-91, in Ibid.

[742] Letter from Lansdowne to Cross, 1 September 1890, Cross Papers/29, No. 90, Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 133.

[743] Letter from Chamberlain to Roberts, 5 January 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 10; Lawrence to Ardagh, 11 July 1890, Ibid., Box 11; deBourbel to Ardagh, 18 May 1890, Lansdowne Papers, VII(c), pp.

series of diary entries in which he condemned Nisbet's conduct as Resident, the writing was on the wall.[744] Nisbet spared himself the humiliation of Lansdowne recalling him by applying for an extended furlough, after which he was then reassigned quietly elsewhere.[745]

Pratap quickly began applying pressure on the new Resident, W. F. Prideaux, requesting that the viceroy come to Kashmir for an interview with the maharaja.[746] Pratap had been trying for several years running to induce the viceroy to visit Kashmir, especially during its most beautiful season of autumn.[747] He was reportedly "most anxious for it" as it would do him good to become "useful" again.[748] Lansdowne was not opposed to the idea, but he wanted first to appraise the effect of the reforms on Kashmir's administration and the maharaja's own conduct. He needed to understand that restoration was in no way guaranteed. He asked Prideaux to send him a report, but the maharaja

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340-42; Cunningham to Ardagh, 7 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), p. 23, in Ghose, Kashmir in Transition, 134.

[744] Kashmir Affairs, 1890-1890, R/1/5/18, IOR.

[745] Colonel R. P. Nisbet, Resident in Kashmir, permitted to apply for an extension of furlough, 1891, Foreign Department, Confidential-B, General Branch, Progs., 1891, Nos. 7/10, R/1/4/419, IOR.

[746] Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 139.

[747] Demi-official letter No. 189 from Nisbet to Lansdowne, Gulmarg, 12 July 1889, in Kashmir Affairs, 1889, Foreign Department, Secret E., Pros., August 1889, Nos. 162-203, NAI.

[748] Demi-official letter from Nisbet to Durand, Sialkot, 12 January 1889, in Proposal for an Interview between the Viceroy and the Maharaja of Kashmir, Foreign Department, External B., Progs., April 1889, Nos. 27-33, NAI.

remained impatient, regularly asking for updates on the planned visit.[749] The maharaja was enthused to see that the Pioneer included Kashmir in their program for the Viceroy's fall tour.[750] However, Lansdowne had made up his mind that the maharaja should not receive his full powers back as he lacked the capacity to govern.[751]

With the cart road completed between Rawalpindi and Srinagar by 1890, the improvements to transportation infrastructure seemed to be making adequate progress.[752] Other reforms were having their intended effect as well. The Resident noted that "the number of visitors to Kashmir has increased and opening the Jhelum Valley Road will doubtless attract more and more British capital in the valley."[753] Lansdowne, pleased with what he was told, consented to the visit and arrived in Kashmir on October 23, 1891. He discovered everything to be in order and came away with a more favorable impression of the maharaja than before.[754] However, the viceroy still could not return things to as they were before, and assented only to placing the maharaja as the president of the State

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[749] Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 140.

[750] *Pioneer*, 5 September 1891, p. 1, in Ibid.

[751] Letter from Lansdowne to Cross, 30 September 1891, Cross Papers/31, No. 147A, in Ibid.

[752] Cecil Tyndale-Biscoe, *Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade: A Description of the Beauties of the Country, the Life, Habits and Humour of Its Inhabitants, and an Account of the Gradual but Steady Rebuilding of a Once Downtrodden People* (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Limited, 1922), 30.

[753] File No. 6 of 1896 (O. E. R.), Kashmir State Archives, in Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 84.

[754] Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 140-142.

Council, affirming that the Resident's advice would be followed in all matters.[755] He was also not to interfere with the reforms the Council had enacted in the previous years, and he continued to be restricted by a limit placed on his personal spending.[756] Pratap Singh was also subsequently awarded G.C.S.I., so as to avoid "the little man feel[ing] out in the cold."[757] The maharaja's supporters, including Roberts, were pleased.[758]

This did not stop the maharaja to seek a full restoration of his powers, which he pursued with dedication for the next three decades. In 1894, the maharaja asked to be allowed to govern the state without the assistance of the State Council, and met with the viceroy at the time, Lord Elgin, in Lahore, to present his case for the proposal.[759] Elgin, however, was not convinced such a change would be in the benefit of the country.[760] Pratap found a more sympathetic ear in the next viceroy, Lord Curzon. The printed papers from Lord Curzon's administration contrast Curzon's policy towards the maharaja

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[755] Government of India to Lord Cross, Dispatch No. 205, 9 December 1891, in Proposal to Increase Powers of the Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, No. 73, 1905, NAI.

[756] Ibid.

[757] Demi-official letter from A. G. A. Durand to H. M. Durand, Sialkot, 8 January 1889, in Reorganisation of the Kashmir Army, Foreign Department, Secret-External, Progs., March 1889, Nos. 6-49, NAI.

[758] Letter from Roberts to Lansdowne, 15 November 1891, Lansdowne Papers VII(f), p. 294, in Ghose, *Kashmir in Transition*, 143.

[759] Brief History of Kashmir State, Foreign Department, Internal B, November 1904, No. 330, NAI.

[760] Proposal to Increase Powers of the Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, No. 73, 1905, NAI.

from his predecessors', which Curzon regarded as heavy-handed and rash.[761] Indeed, when Pratap resubmitted his appeal for full restoration in 1902, it was supported this time by the Resident, Louis W. Dane.[762] The maharaja met with Lord Curzon in Peshawar that April, and Pratap again raised the matter in his interview.[763] Although Curzon was sympathetic, he replied that "no change could be considered which would affect the powers of control and supervision then exercised by the Resident."[764] The viceroy also brought up his desire to achieve a railway connection between Kashmir and British India.[765] The maharaja promised to do this, although, as we learned in Chapter 3, he successfully stalled this project to the point where it was never completed.

Later in 1902, the maharaja requested to be conferred restoration of his powers at the Delhi Darbar, but Dane said this could not be possible until the new Resident, E. G. Colvin, could be familiarized with the situation.[766] Colvin was "sorry for the Maharaja,"

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[761] Printed Papers from Lord Curzon's Administration, 1899-1905, p. 31, in British Online Archives (BOA).

[762] Proposal to Increase Powers of the Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, No. 73, 1905, NAI.

[763] Political Memorandum of Kashmir and Jammu affairs during the years 1901-1905, Foreign Department, Frontier-B, Progs., May 1905, Nos. 613, NAI.

[764] Proposal to Increase Powers of the Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, No. 73, 1905, NAI.

[765] Letter no. 6282 ½ from L. W. Dane, Resident in Kashmir, to Foreign Department, 16 September 1902, in Proposed Administrative Changes in Kashmir: Request of the Maharaja for Increased Powers, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Progs., December 1902, No. 112, NAI.

[766] Ibid.

but could "not see what is to be done at present."[767] He suggested that perhaps the viceroy could "give him some small distinction at the Darbar, it would satisfy him and would enable us to postpone the consideration of his request for enhanced powers to a later date—a result which, I believe, would really be much the best in his own interests."[768] The viceroy replied, however, that he had "nothing to give the Maharaja at his Darbar" though he could "understand his feelings."[769] The maharaja meanwhile sent Kashmir silk brocades as a present to Queen Victoria to try and earn her favor.[770]

Pratap again met with Lord Curzon in Calcutta at 1903, with the latter coming away favoring restoring some measure of the maharaja's powers before the end of his tenure.[771] He was, in fact, prepared to mark the change in the fall of 1903 with a visit to Kashmir, but he was prevented due to the disastrous flooding that year.[772] While Lord Ampthill was serving as acting viceroy, he visited Kashmir, and "after discussing the

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[767] Letter from E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to Dane, Foreign Secretary, 30 October 1902, in Ibid.

[768] Letter from E. G. Colvin, Resident in Kashmir, to Dane, Foreign Secretary, 30 October 1902, in Ibid.

[769] Note by Lord Curzon, 11 December 1902, in Proposed Administrative Changes in Kashmir: Request of the Maharaja for Increased Powers, Foreign Department, Secret-E., Progs., December 1902, No. 112, NAI.

[770] Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 89-90.

[771] Brief History of Kashmir State, 1904, Foreign Department, Internal B, November 1904, No. 330, NAI.

[772] Proposal to Increase Powers of the Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, No. 73, 1905, NAI.

matter with the Maharaja was convinced that the powers of the latter might safely be increased."[773] Lord Curzon endorsed that view:

> It appeared to His Excellency that the Maharaja feels his present anomalous situation very acutely; and that although he is undoubtedly weak and easily led, he is now so thoroughly loyal to the British Government, and so genuinely anxious to govern his State efficiently, that there is no sufficient reason for continuing to reject the recommendation of the last three Residents that he should be restored to full authority in his State. It has for long been our feeling that the somewhat humiliating and undignified position of the Maharaja with regard to the administration of his State was one to be terminated if ever a favourable opportunity presented itself, and we have watched with satisfaction the increasing evidence in recent years of an intention on the part of His Highness to curb his natural weakness, and to deserve the favour of Government.[774]

It was decided that the State Council would be abolished, with its powers devolving to the maharaja and his prime minister, Raja Amar Singh, the Resident still resuming

[773] Proposal to Increase Powers of the Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, No. 73, 1905, NAI.

[774] Printed Papers from Lord Curzon's Administration, 1899-1905, p. 31, in British Online Archives (BOA).

oversight over all matters. However, it was still seen fit to keep the Foreign and Reception Departments out of the hands of the maharaja and under the chief minister.[775]

All that was to be decided now was the occasion. Pratap was adamant that the viceroy should announce the restoration at his Darbar in Kashmir before the end of autumn in 1905.[776] However, the viceroy wired Pratap in September to express his apologies for not being able to make the trip.[777] The maharaja replied with an emotional letter, lamenting that Curzon would not be able to come and that Pratap may not even get to see him before his tenure as Viceroy was finished: "Each day with the fading of the light of the sun, faded also the brightest colours of my hope, and now no longer being able to bear the depressing influences of my mind already made too melancholy approaching Your Excellency with the same prayer."[778] Pratap expressed his wish to "receive from you standing in your benign presence direct rays of light, wisdom on the path of my future career sketched by your master hand."[779] With the viceroy having "all along been gracious enough to evince a keen interest in my well-being and that of the Kashmir state," the maharaja expressed his "old and repeated request and long-cherished

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[775] Demi-Official Letter from T. C. Pears, Resident in Kashmir, to Fraser, Foreign Secretary, Srinagar, 5 October 1905, in Proposed Visit of Viceroy to Confer Enhanced Power on Maharaja, 1906, Government of India Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, R/1/1/332, IOR.

[776] Letter from Pratap Singh to Curzon, 26 July 1905, in Proposed Visit of Viceroy to Confer Enhanced Power on Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, 1906, R/1/1/332, NAI.

[777] Telegram from viceroy to the Resident in Kashmir, 21 August 1905, in Ibid.

[778] Letter from Pratap Singh to Curzon, 17 September 1905, Srinagar, in Ibid.

[779] Letter from Pratap Singh to Curzon, 17 September 1905, Srinagar, in Proposed Visit of Viceroy to Confer Enhanced Power on Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, 1906, R/1/1/332, NAI.

desire" to resume his control of state affairs with His Excellency's "great encouragement and vitality."[780] With this outpouring of gratitude and sentiment, Curzon found he was unable to refuse the visit, though time would not permit him coming to Srinagar. He instead arrived at Jammu on October 25, spending two days there.[781] The next day during Darbar, Curzon formally reinvested the maharaja with most of his previous powers.[782] Upon this act, Curzon reminded him that

> You rule a State in which the majority of your subjects are of a different religion from the ruling classes, and in which they are deserving of just and liberal consideration. You rule a State in which the cultivating classes are poor and liable to constant vicissitudes of fortune, so that there is frequently a call for leniency in treatment. You rule a State which is large before the eyes of the world, and is bound to maintain the highest standard of efficiency and self-respect. Finally, you rule a State which has a great and splendid future before it.[783]

The maharaja sent Curzon a follow-up letter upon the latter's departure, expressing his sincere feelings of friendship and gratitude for the viceroy.[784] However, he still did not have his full powers back, with control still divided

[780] Ibid.

[781] Telegram No. 4001-I. B., from the Foreign Secretary to the Resident in Kashmir, 29 September 1905, in Ibid.

[782] Jammu and Kashmir Administration Report, 1905-06, in Jammu State Archives (JSA).

[783] Printed Papers from Lord Curzon's Administration, 1899-1905, p. 42, in BOA.

[784] Letter from Pratap Singh to Curzon, 11 November 1905, in Proposed Visit of Viceroy to Confer Enhanced Power on Maharaja, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, 1906, R/1/1/332, NAI.

between him and his brother, Amar Singh, who resumed his administrative role in the state as chief minister.

While Pratap's pursuit for full restoration did not cease, so too continued intrigue and rumors about his erratic behavior and poor judge of friends. In 1892, several letters and telegrams were presented to the Resident, which allegedly were sent on behalf of the maharaja, demonstrating that the maharaja was trying to hire a contract killer to assassinate his brother, Amar Singh.[785] Pratap blamed the Resident, Col. A. C. Talbot, for having "created disagreement among us," and though some mediation between the brothers was attempted, no real results were achieved.[786] These disagreements between the brothers continued after Curzon's partial restoration in 1905, and the maharaja soon tested his new powers by trying to remove Amar Singh from his office as chief minister.[787] This request frustrating British officials, who pointed out that one of the conditions of Curzon's restoration decision was that "no future trouble would take place" between the brothers.[788] Dane even exclaimed, "What a donkey the Maharaja is"[789] and mocked the new Resident, Sir Francis Younghusband, who "has now found out how

[785] Letter from Parma Nand to Pratap Singh, in H. H. P. R., Kashmir State Archives, in Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 85.

[786] Letter from Pratap Singh to H. S. Barnes, Foreign Secretary, 27 August 1896, in H. H. P. R., Kashmir State Archives, in Ibid.

[787] Note by Dane, 27 March 1907, in Proposed Revision of the Administrative Arrangements in Kashmir, R/1/1/351, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, Progs., August 1907, Nos. 85-88, IOR.

[788] Note by Dane, 22 July 1907, in Proposed Revision of the Administrative Arrangements in Kashmir, R/1/1/351, Foreign Department, Secret-Internal, Progs., August 1907, Nos. 85-88, IOR.

[789] Note by Dane, 5 July 1907, in Ibid.

impossible His Highness is."[790] Younghusband soon reported that there were now even "great quarrels among the ladies of the two households."[791] He believed that it was "almost hopeless to expect the two to work together."[792] Meanwhile, Dane lost patience with Younghusband's inability to maneuver the intrigue, judging that "Younghusband has not been very helpful."[793]

Rumors continued to pour in regarding the maharaja's incapacity to rule and lack of sound judgement, who though

> sincere, candid, shrewd, warm-hearted, simple in his tastes, habits of life and dress; old fashioned and very strict in all religious observances; a vegetarian and a total abstainer: on the other hand he is apt to make favourites and is easily led by them. He is thoroughly unbusinesslike, wanting in application and the power of grasp or organization, rambling in his conversation and addicted to the opium habit.[794]

The maharaja's daily opium habit was chiefly seized upon by Residents who doubted his capacity to rule. Though one Resident conceded that "his brain, in fact, is at its best after its afternoon stimulus," it however "makes him garrulous and he often then says wild

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[790] Note by Dane, 20 July 1907, in Ibid.

[791] Letter from Younghusband to Dane, Gulmarg, 15 August 1907, in Ibid.

[792] Confidential Letter from Younghusband to Dane, Gulmarg, 21 March 1907, in Ibid.

[793] Note by Dane, 22 July 1907, in Ibid.

[794] Political Memorandum of Kashmir and Jammu Affairs during the years 1901-1905, Foreign, Frontier-B, Progs., May 1905, Nos. 613, NAI.

things which must not be taken seriously."[795] Coupled with his intense superstition, it make him especially "liable to be squeezed by any fortune-teller (Mahommedan or Hindu) who may promise him that he will beget a son or threaten him with sudden death."[796] As a result of these circumstances, the "extent of the Resident's responsibility for the internal administration is thus greater in Kashmir than in any other important State, and will, in my opinion have to remain so during the life time of the present ruler."[797] Pratap insisted, however, that "all my troubles, ever since my acceding to the Gaddi, have been the outcome of his gymnastics of intrigue with his nature full of extreme selfishness, jealousy and ambition… he has made my life altogether miserable."[798] Younghusband instructed Pratap merely "to leave him free, as the Emperor leaves the Prime Minister of England free to perform all the minor duties of a Chief Minister, while Your Highness performs all the larger and more important functions of a ruler."[799]

It seems likely that the tussle for power between the two brothers would have continued, if not for Amar's passing away in 1909 of paralysis.[800] After his brother's

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[795] Report by Fraser, Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar, 8 April 1912, in R/1/1/881, Foreign Department, Deposit-Internal., Progs., May 1912, Nos. 13-14, IOR.

[796] Report by Fraser, Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar, 8 April 1912, in R/1/1/881, Foreign Department, Deposit-Internal., Progs., May 1912, Nos. 13-14, IOR.

[797] Ibid.

[798] File No. 13 of 1908, H. H. P. R., Kashmir State Archives, in Hassnain, *British Policy Toward Kashmir*, 93.

[799] Letter from Younghusband to Pratap Singh, 11 July 1908, in Ibid.

[800] G. M. D. Sufi, Kashir: A History of Kashmir, Vol. 2 (1948), 812.

demise, the maharaja received a more pliant chief minister who ceased intrigue against him. During the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford's visit to Kashmir in October 1918, the maharaja asked for his full powers to be restored, and though these powers were not granted, restrictions were relaxed to some extent, including an increase to Pratap's personal financial allowance.[801] In 1920, the maharaja, now an old man, renewed his request, and this time, Chelmsford approved, considering that the Government of India "would not be justified any longer in maintaining a close control over the administration of the State."[802] The viceroy visited Jammu in March 1921 and in Darbar formally announced the grant of full powers of administration. His life-long mission complete, Pratap lived a few more years until his death in 1925, succeeded by his nephew, Hari Singh, the last Dogra maharaja who acceded his state to India upon independence.

Mridu Rai has observed that this period of intervention and restoration had "important consequences for the subjects of the state" by sparking "a competition… for championing the cause of the subjects of the state."[803] For example, the Resident observed in 1912 that "the people know that it is the British Government which has raised them from a state of serfdom."[804] This created conditions ripe for modern political mobilization of Kashmiri citizens, which first ignited in mass protests in 1931, just ten

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[801] Note on Kashmir Affairs, Foreign and Political Department, Deposit-Internal, Pros., October 1921, No. 38, NAI.

[802] Ibid.

[803] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 139.

[804] Report by Fraser, Resident in Kashmir, Srinagar, 8 April 1912, in R/1/1/881, Foreign Department, Deposit-Internal., Progs., May 1912, Nos. 13-14, IOR.

years after the final restoration of Pratap Singh's powers. This chapter has added to Rai's insights by showing how the political rhetoric surrounding these discussions appealed to emotional perceptions of Kashmir and its ancient, civilizational importance. These had real impacts on generating sympathy, at times, for the maharaja or, alternatively, his people, which could lead onlookers to either support his deposition or oppose it. By the end of Pratap's reign, Kashmiri Muslims were deploying political rhetoric which contrasted "the enchanting scenery of Kashmir, green fields and valleys, its forests and rivers, are such bounties of nature, which have not been bestowed in any other country," with their own condition, in which "this heaven has become a hell."[805]

The Indian press and select British politicians were especially scathing of what they saw as the intended annexation of Kashmir, as being a piece on the chessboard for control of Asia. Historians have picked up on this rhetoric, portraying British actions in this period as part of the Great Game between Britain and Russia. But as Chapters 3 and 4 have shown, British activity in Kashmir during this period was predominantly concerned with accommodating their tourist interests in Kashmir and allowing Europeans ready access to the Valley. As such, this Chapter 5 has endeavored to demonstrate that annexation was not necessary to achieve this. With the maharaja sidelined, the Resident was able to make the intended changes through the State Council that would secure Kashmir as a vacation haven in the heart of the Himalayas. As British power in the subcontinent was extinguished, modern India inherited this dynamic as well. Today, India's relationship to the Kashmir Valley is still dominated by its emotional connection

[805] Statement of Shaikh Atta Mohammad, advocate, in *Siyasat*, Lahore, 7 November 1923, in Hassnain, *British Policy Towards Kashmir*, 112.

as “integral to India,” serving as one of its most treasured tourist and pilgrimage destinations, where middle-class Indians can recreate their ‘home away from home’ on a houseboat amid Chenar leaves and mountain scenes.

Conclusion: A New Kashmir?

The episode in which the British intervened in Kashmir provides an excellent case study into how imperialism creates multitude of vagaries for postcolonial society to manage in its wake. Modern India demonstrates well the way the principles of democracy and realities of imperial consolidation are precariously fused together. The tenuous nature of this marriage is revealed by the strained critiques of British intervention in Kashmir by contemporaries. The intervention invited critics of the empire to lambast a case of imperial overreach. Yet, this meant that they were to defend an unnatural, absolutist ruler whose family was only placed on the throne through the paramountcy of British imperialism. For example, while defending Maharaja Pratap Singh, William Digby in his treatise "Condemned Unheard" dismissed concerns that Kashmir became depopulated during the famine, as eyewitness accounts indicated.[806] Likewise, the maharaja's defenders also couched their argument in the idea that the maharaja was beloved by his subjects.[807] These arguments were blunted by the reality that those subjects were only placed under Pratap Singh due to his grandfather's betrayal of the Sikhs in favor of the British. This is ultimately the reality which doomed the maharaja, the fact that his rule

[806] William Digby, "Condemned Unheard" (1890), in S. N. Gadru, ed., *Kashmir Papers: The British Intervention in Kashmir* (Freethought Literature Company, 1973).

[807] *Statesman*, 12 December 1891, in Madhavi Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir, 1876-1894* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1984), 106.

was an unnatural creation of the British and not based in the timeless, ancient tradition of Hindu sovereignty, the portrayal he and his family attempted to cultivate.[808]

More writers are becoming aware of the importance of emotions in Kashmir's history and the present conflict. Recent scholarship on Kashmir has shown that the territorial nationalism inherited from the British by India and Pakistan rested in dissonance with a Kashmiri emotional understanding of their homeland.[809] For example, Cabeiri Robinson has argued that the 1927 creation of the "state-subject" citizenship classification by the Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh helped to solidify a conception of Kashmiri identity that, due to its preexistence to India or Pakistan, persevered after Partition.[810] Due to this prior establishment of an emotional connection with the pre-independence state of Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmiris have resisted later forms of territorial nationalism imposed on them by India or Pakistan. This dissonance became even more pronounced in light of the Kashmir diaspora, instigated by the series of oppressive rule suffered by Kashmiris who sought an escape from poverty and forced labor, especially in the plains of the Punjab. This diaspora created "deep historical roots" for the "story of Punjab's intensely emotive relationship with the state of Jammu and

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[808] Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[809] Shahla Hussain, *Kashmir in the Aftermath of Partition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).

[810] Cabeiri Robinson, *Body of Victim, Body of Warrior: Refugee Families and Making of Kashmiri Jihadists* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 45.

Kashmir."[811] As the Indian independence movement picked up steam, Kashmir became integral for Punjab Muslims in the 1930s who were looking to unite co-religionists in their effort to give legitimacy to their political negotiations in the rest of India. This movement "drew upon the myth of return and the vision of a free and prosperous Kashmir."[812] This diaspora had real consequences for Kashmiri identity, as ideas about what it meant to be Kashmiri "began to transcend narrow cultural and political definitions and refer primarily to the emotive attachment self-identified Kashmiris had to their homeland, regardless of whether they resided in the state or not."[813] Chapter 3 of this dissertation has shown how the road construction projects connecting Punjab to Kashmir both simultaneously put the Kashmir issue directly in the spotlight for interested onlookers in the Punjab while exposing Kashmiris to broader socio-political trends on the subcontinent.

This period has apparent connections to contemporary dilemmas in Kashmir today. In the international sphere, Kashmir is visible component of India and Pakistan's foreign perception, for better or for worse. This was perhaps inevitable due to fact that Kashmir remains the most unresolved legacy of Partition today. However, it is also informed by a more specific legacy of the British relationship with Kashmir as a tourist haven along the frontier of their Indian Empire. Rakesh Ankit argues that British memory of the Great Game shaped post-war Anglo-American understanding of the Kashmir

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[811] Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds., *Kashmir and the Future of South Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2021), 3.

[812] Ibid.

[813] Hussain, *Kashmir in the Aftermath of Partition*, 31.

issue.[814] This memory was also imbricated with perceptions of related issues in the region as well, especially in Afghanistan. The romantic allure of the region makes its way back to American politics and society through their 20-year occupation of the country, which led American politician and military veteran Pete Buttigieg to begin his memoir with an "Afghan proverb" that says, "Everyone's own homeland is Kashmir to him."[815]

From Pakistan's perception, the Kashmir issue has become more emotionally salient in recent years during the insurgency. Because Pakistan's founding logic rests on South Asia's Muslims need for a safe homeland, the fact that Muslim-minority Kashmir suffers under Hindu-majority Indian rule seems to prove the argument for Pakistan's existence, compounding Kashmir's importance in Pakistan. Indeed, for Pakistan's asymmetrical jihadist militant outfits meant to keep India off-balance, Kashmir is the most legitimate of jihads.[816] As a result, Partition may have disconnected Kashmir from its easiest access to the outside world, through the Jhelum River Valley, but the emotional resonance across this border is not so easily severed. While the history of this emotional connection may continue to be felt among those active in the cross-border militancy between Kashmir and Pakistan, in the last two decades, public opinion in Pakistani Punjab has subtly shifted towards "letting Kashmiris shape their own destiny," showing

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[814] Rakesh Ankit, ed., *The Kashmir Conflict: From Empire to Cold War, 1945-66* (London: Routledge, 2016).

[815] Pete Buttigieg, *Shortest Way Home: One Mayor's Challenge and a Model for America's Future* (New York, Liveright, 2019).

[816] Stephen Tankel, *Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.

how histories of these emotions take on new directions as we progress further into the post-colonial era.[817]

For India, the Kashmir issue has become more emotionally salient over time as well, with expressions of Kashmir as the *atoot ang,* or "integral limb" of the nation, commonplace.[818] This explains the widespread celebration across the political spectrum in India, not just among supporters of the ruling BJP party, at the revocation of Kashmir's special status in the Indian union in August 2019. This special status had been formerly preserved in Article 370 of the Indian Constitution before its abrogation, which Indian constitutional expert A. G. Noorani argued was blatantly unconstitutional.[819] Saiba Varma has argued that "Indian state occupation is intentionally designed to produce in Kashmir a certain psychological, affective, and emotional disposition vis-à-vis the Indian state."[820] After partition, India inherited "colonial fantasies" of Kashmir as a paradise, which "became entangled with the trauma of partition, creating a zone of intense desire and ambivalent longing, a lingering sense of an unfinished colonial project."[821] Indians

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[817] Bose and Jalal, eds., *Kashmir and the Future of South Asia*, 6.

[818] Saiba Varma, "Affective Governance, Disaster, and the Unfinished Colonial Project," in Bose and Jalal, eds., *Kashmir and the Future of South Asia*, 56.

[819] Akshay Deshmane, "Kashmir: Scrapping Article 370 'Unconstitutional', 'Deceitful' Says Legal Expert A. G. Noorani," Huffington Post India, 5 August 2019, https://www.huffpost.com/archive/in/entry/kashmir-article-370-scrapping-constitutional-expert-reacts-noorani_in_5d47e58de4b0aca341206135 [Accessed 6 January 2023]

[820] Saiba Varma, "Affective Governance, Disaster, and the Unfinished Colonial Project," in Bose and Jalal, eds., *Kashmir and the Future of South Asia*, 53.

[821] Ibid. 56.

imagine their relationship with Kashmir as a motherly one, associating their rule with "love and care."[822] Nitasha Kaul describes how Indian nationalistic portrayals of Kashmir depicts it as a "feminized landscape with a restive population that needs to be controlled, chastised, disciplined and coerced into affirming its 'marital' relationship with India."[823]

Ananya Jahanara Kabir argues that the "roots of Indian desire" for Kashmir are in its "symbolic capital."[824] Fetishized portrayals of Kashmir's landscape by photography in the British colonial period increased the Valley's value, while archaeological and epigraphical projects enhanced Kashmir's emotional value by promoting ideas about its ancient connections with Indic civilization. In the postcolonial era, India continued to produce fetishized images of Kashmir and its landscape in film, photography, and artwork, constructed an emotive ideal of Kashmir within the Indian national imagination. While Kabir's study focuses on how visual representations of Kashmir created desire for it within the Indian national consciousness, my work builds on her analysis by expanding the focus to the impact of the *experience* of Kashmir during the colonial era, as tourists, missionaries, and officials, and the resultant creation of an experiental emotional desire that had real consequences for British colonial policy towards Kashmir. This experiential desire was inherited by modern India, whose relationship with Kashmir has also been

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[822] Saiba Varma, *The Occupied Clinic: Militarism and Care in Kashmir* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020).

[823] Nitasha Kaul, "India's Obsession with Kashmir: Democracy, Gender, (Anti-)nationalism," *Feminist Review* 119: 126-143, 128.

[824] Ananya Jahanara Kabir, *Territory of Desire: Representations of Kashmir* (Minneapolis. MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 97.

shaped by the Indian tourist industry. This explains why the Indian state provides constant reassurances of normalcy to stabilize the influx of visitors to Kashmir, with public relations geared towards an audience of tourists, despite recent attacks on Kashmiri pandits. Emotive notions of Kashmir's societal cultural tolerance, inclusion, and syncretism, once seen as natural fits for India's secular vision, have given way to tourist imperatives that run roughshod over among multitude of Kashmiri communities and expressions of their identity and self-determination. The emotionality of the Kashmir issue provides for avenues of resistance too, however. Shahla Hussain has shown how the "significance of belonging to Kashmir and being 'Kashmiri' began to transcend narrow cultural and territorial definitions and refer primarily to the emotive attachment self-identified Kashmiris had to their homeland, regardless of whether they resided in the state or not."[825]

Margrit Pernau writes that "emotions are no longer conceived inside neatly delineated and bounded subjects, but in the in-between" and that "emotions at the core of temporalities have to be read from a global perspective."[826] Although limited in temporal scope to the years of the British intervention from 1885 to 1925, this dissertation has sought to locate the global dimensions of emotions associated with Kashmir in considering its effect during this period on imperial statecraft. Although recent scholarship has recognized the need for an emotive model to understand Kashmiri identity, history, and politics, work on the imperialists themselves has remained static and

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[825] Hussain, *Kashmir in the Aftermath of Partition*, 31.

[826] Margrit Pernau, *Emotions and Temporalities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 3-4.

continues to emphasize British interest in the Great Game as the driving factor in their insertion into the state's affairs. Any effect on Kashmiri identity or statehood is portrayed instead as an accidental by-product of British decisions. While British policy in Kashmir was certainly blundering at times, as it was elsewhere, British actions could also be more discernably tied to their emotive, sentimental connection to Kashmir than by mere random ignorance, which the British sought to conceal with an impassioned search for knowledge about the land, and inversely, lazy assumptions about the people. Scholars should avoid portraying British as rational actors and natives as emotional actors, or else they risk reifying colonial-era, racist stereotypes.

Although the British grounded their decisions on a rational basis, the decisions they made were often instead rooted in their emotive perception of reality. For example, chapter 2 shows how the British decision to intervene was impacted greatly by the litany of eyewitness accounts of the oppression in Kashmir by travelers who had traveled there to see its natural beauty but were instead confronted with the wretched condition of its people. These accounts embarrassed the British by threatening their sense of imperial duty and honor, which drove them to intervene on the maharaja's administration, changing the trajectory of Kashmir's future. Chapter 3 then demonstrates how powerful emotions underly the strategic and fiscal deliberations behind road and railroad construction in Kashmir, ultimately preventing the latter's connection with the Indian railway network. Although it is impossible to speculate on the counterfactual of how different Kashmir's history might have been had the railroad had been built (as its presence may have enabled the Pashtun lashkar to take Srinagar for Pakistan in October 1947), avid contemporary Indian road construction in the province suggests its presence

may have assisted India promote its national project in Kashmir. Chapter 4 recounts the British transformation of Kashmir and the creation of an experiential emotive connection for tourists, which has been inherited by modern India and continues to be the primary mode of experiental connection with Kashmir for Indians. Chapter 5 recalls the process by which the maharaja was restored to power to show that annexation, which was the warning call for critics of British policy in Kashmir, was not necessary to achieve British aims at sufficiently reforming Kashmir for tourist purposes. I have also endeavored to show that rather than a feature of the Great Game between Britain and Russia, Kashmir was merely a side show in this strategic, cloak and dagger affair between the European imperial powers.

After independence, India and Pakistan's postcolonial visions of territorial nationalism clashed with one another over Kashmir, raising both its strategic importance and emotional resonance. In many ways, the post-August 2019 shift in Indian policy towards Kashmir echoes the British intervention in Kashmir and the fears it unleashed towards full-scale intervention and demographic change. Both interventions were done purportedly to relieve oppressed communities of individuals—the British on the part of Kashmiri Muslim cultivators, the Indians on the part of Kashmiri Hindu Pandits. Both interventions were done also with the expressed purpose of providing economic development or humanitarian assistance to the Valley. Yet, they are deeply colonial endeavors. Varma has shown how economic development or humanitarian assistance are used to conceal what she describes as "projects of dependency" which "fester as psychic

dependencies."[827] Mona Bhan has demonstrated this dynamic in her exploration of hydroelectric power projects in Kashmir and how for Narendra Modi's government, "strengthening India's control over Kashmir's rivers meant sealing Kashmir's fate as an integral part of India."[828] One of the most significant continuities between British and Indian interventions in Kashmir is this emotive connection underlying both imperial projects, cutting through rational claims to strategic benefits or economic growth. The emotive pull cuts through both ways: the colonial power promotes the idea of the nation to try to win the 'hearts and minds' of the indigenous population, but the colonial power also then becomes intoxicated by these same ideas themselves. Despite their stated benevolent intentions, the colonial interventions in both instances failed to curb the violations of human rights inflicted on the Kashmiri population.[829]

Economic development and tourism do not exactly go hand in hand. The tourist industry cannot create a robust, stable economy on its own. One of the original appeals about Kashmir as a tourist destination for the British was its remoteness lent itself to being an adventure one could afford. But if Kashmir was to become a developed economy integrated with the rest of the subcontinent, it would no longer become as appealing of a holiday. This happened on a small scale during the period of the British

[827] Saiba Varma, "Affective Governance, Disaster, and the Unfinished Colonial Project," in Bose and Jalal, eds., *Kashmir and the Future of South Asia*, 53

[828] Mona Bhan, "Infrastructures of Occupation: Mobility, Immobility, and the Politics of Integration in Kashmir," in Ibid., 71.

[829] Mona Bhan and Haley Duschinski, "Occupations in Context: The Cultural Logics of Occupation, Settler Violence and Resistance," Introduction to Special Issue of *Critique of Anthropology* 40, no. 3 (2020): 285-297.

intervention: travelers who regular visited Kashmir complained that the increase in visitors had made it costlier a trip. If Kashmir were to become a fully developed economy, it would become even more costly for tourists. As a result, the public works spending in Kashmir "were often wasted on extravagant and high-profile projects designed more to reflect well of the *darbar* than improve the lot of the subjects."[830] It seems likely therefore that any future economic development projects in Kashmir will be superficial and only reflect the interests of the Indian tourist industry and the Indian state. Evidence of this dynamic is already in effect in Kashmir, for example, in the most recent Christmas light show for tourists along Dal Lake's houseboats in Srinagar, even while locals received insufficient electricity to heat their homes.[831]

The military justification for security measures in Kashmir are similarly dictated by the demands of the tourist industry. The frequent assurances of restoration of "normalcy" are well documented.[832] Particularly after the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, the Indian government has had an extra interest in promoting propaganda that promises the return of normalcy, even downplaying recent violence against Kashmiri

[830] Ian Copland, *The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 231.

[831] Tweet by journalist Majid Maqbool, 7 December 2022, accessed 9 January 2023, https://twitter.com/MaqboolMajid/status/1600700581135278081?s=20&t=xOf2ZxIGrPEH0B_dChuU2g

[832] Aijaz Ashraf Wani, *What Happened to Governance in Kashmir?* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019), 4.

Hindu Pandits in the effort to demonstrate its policies are working.[833] Similarly, the British were keen to show soon after their intervention that the reforms were having their desired effect, and so they therefore sought to incorporate the maharaja back into his state's administration and bolster his legitimacy. Yet, the maharaja continued to push back, notably thwarting the construction of a railway. It seems likely that even pro-India, mainstream Kashmiri politicians and officials feel similarly treated as the maharaja did, after many were preemptively jailed in August 2019. Both are imperial clients stabbed in the back. The maharaja, though often at the mercy of the British, was able to find subtle ways to push back against their authority and to preserve his own. It remains to seen whether Kashmiri politicians will be able to maneuver this political space in a similar way in the near future.

While both British and Indian interventions in Kashmir carried the expectation of a consequential increase in tourism, they both came with a crackdown against freedom of speech for journalists and dissenters against the state. The strict censorship of journalism and freedom of expression in Kashmir by the Government of India recalls memories of the British Official Secrets Act (1889), in response to the leaking of documents related to the Kashmir maharaja by the Indian press. This act was "aimed at checking unauthorized acquirement and publication of information which was detrimental to the interests of the Government of India" and applied heavy penalties to offenders, including transportation

[833] Zulfikar Majid, "Modi Government on Backfoot as Kashmiri Pandits Seek to Flee Again," Deccan Herald, 9 June 2022, https://www.deccanherald.com/national/north-and-central/modi-government-on-backfoot-as-kashmiri-pandits-seek-to-flee-again-1116595.html [Accessed 9 January 2023].

for life.[834] However, the tactic of enforcing a complete communications blackout, regularly enforced on Kashmir by the Indian government, is a method of coercion the consequences of which can only be fully understood within the internet age we live in. Kashmiris suffer from more government-enforced blackouts than anyone else in the world today.[835] The Indian government used the Covid-19 pandemic to extend restrictions of freedoms imposed in August 2019, even though this included the enforcement of Internet blackouts, despite the necessity of conveying accurate information to the population to limit the spread of the virus.[836] Recent journalism and scholarship has shown how government enforcement of the lockdown has put Kashmiris at even greater risk than before.[837]

[834] Madhavi Yasin, *British Paramountcy in Kashmir, 1876-1894* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1984), 107.

[835] Sonia Feleiro, "How India Became the World's Leader in Internet Shutdowns: Closing Communications to Stifle Protest is a Tactic that's Stuck Even During the Covid Crisis, *MIT Technology Review*, 19 August 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/19/1006359/india-internet-shutdowns-blackouts-pandemic-kashmir/ [Accessed 9 January 2023].

[836] Moazum Mohammad, "Kashmir Survived Without 4g Internet for Months, with Coronavirus, It Really Needs It, India Today, 26 March 2020 https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/kashmir-survived-without-4g-internet-for-months-with-coronavirus-it-really-needs-it-1659883-2020-03-26 [Accessed 9 January 2023]; and Umar, Rauf, Haroon, "In Kashmir, the Coronavirus Means Increased Police Powers," Jacobin, 17 April 2020, https://jacobin.com/2020/04/kashmir-coronavirus-covid-india-lockdown-jammu [Accessed 9 January 2023].

[837] Mona Bhan and Purnima Bose, "Coronavirus, Occupied Kashmir, and India Authoritarianism and Lockdown Time," *Against the Current*, July/August 2020.

Indian officials portray Kashmiri resistance as not as a legitimate expression of self-determination but as national security matter, fabricated and instigated at every turn by their rival in Pakistan. Scholars have shown how India has successfully shielded themselves from international criticism over Kashmir by framing the issue as a bilateral dispute.[838] Yet it is also clear, judging from India's claims that Kashmir is integral to the nation, that there is an emotional significance to the Kashmir issue in India as well. This dissertation has argued that this emotive pull also shaped the British colonial experience in Kashmir, which offers important lessons for those grappling with conditions in Kashmir today. It is unfortunate for Kashmiris that the Indian nation should continue imperial patterns of engagement with Kashmir, but perhaps by shedding light on this history that is being repeated, we may offer perspectives on new avenues moving forward.

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[838] Shahla Hussain, "Kashmiri Imaginings of Freedom in the Global Arenas," in Bose and Jalal, eds., *Kashmir and the Future of South Asia*, 116.

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