Indonesia's New Order, 1966-1998: Its Social and Intellectual Origins

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This dissertation titled

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ABSTRACT

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Director of Dissertation: William H. Frederick

This dissertation tackles one central problem: What were the intellectual and social origins of New Order Indonesia (1966-1998)? The analytical lens that this study employs to examine this society is the Indonesian middling classes' pursuit of modernity. The dissertation comes in two parts. Part One reconstructs the evolution of the Indonesian middling classes and their search for progress. Part Two uses three case studies to analyze the middling classes' search for Indonesian modernity under the New Order. The first explores the top-down modernization undertaken by President Soeharto's assistants at the National Development Planning Board, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology. The second case study investigates the "bottom-up" modernization performed by the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information. The third case study deals with how several authors used popular fiction to criticize the kind of Indonesian modernity that emerged in the New Order era. This research yields several findings. First, the Indonesian middling classes championed a pragmatic, structural-functional path to modernity. Second, to modernize the country rapidly and safely, the modernizers proceeded in an eclectic and pragmatic manner. Third, between the Old and the New Order, there existed strong continuity in ideas, ideals, skills, and problems. Fourth, the middling classes' modernizing mission was fraught with contradictions, naïvetés, ironies,

and violence, which had roots in the nationalist movement in the first half of the twentieth century. The New Order was neither wholly new nor an aberration from the "normal" trajectory of Indonesia's contemporary history. The sort of modernity that the Indonesian middling classes ended up creating was Janus-faced.

Dedication

For Henky Sjarief Soeriadinata, Kartini, and Nurchayati

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GLOSSARY

Term	Definition
ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
adat	tradition, custom
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Babinsa	Bintara Pembina Desa (village NCO)
Bakin	Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Coordinating Board)
Bappeda	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Board)
Bappenas	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Board)
Bimas	Bimbingan Massal (Mass Guidance System)
BPPT	Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (Agency for the Study and Application of Technology)
BPUPKI	Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Commission to Investigate Preparatory Measures for Indonesian Independence)
bupati	regent
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
GBHN	Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Guidelines of State Policy)
GDP	gross domestic product
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Groups)
Guided Democracy	Regime led by President Soekarno, 1957-1965
HBS	Hogere Burger School (Dutch-language Secondary School)
HIS	Hollands Inlandsche School (Dutch-language Native School)
Hizbullah	army of God
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic University Student Association)
ICMI	Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals' Association)
KAMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Student Action Front)
kampung	village or urban lower-class neighborhood
KNIP	Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National Committee)
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces Command)
laras	federation of *nagari*
LBH	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Foundation)
Lekra	Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat (People's Cultural Association)
LP3ES	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information)

Manipol	Manifesto Politik (Political Manifesto)
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
MPR(S)	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Sementara) (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly)
MULO	Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (Dutch-language Junior High School)
Muspida	Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leadership Consultative Council)
Nahdlatul Ulama	Rise of the Religious Scholars—a traditionalist Islamic association
nagari	village republic in Minangkabau
Nasakom	Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme (Nationalism, Religion, Communism)
NCO	noncommissioned officer
New Order	The Soeharto era, 1966-1998
NGO	nongovernmental organization
Old Order	The Soekarno era, 1957-1965
Opsus	Operasi Khusus (Special Operations)
OSVIA	Opleidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (School for Training Native Government Officials)
P3M	Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (Center for the Development of Pesantren and Society)
Pancasila	State ideology comprising five principles: belief in one supreme God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy through consultation and agreement, and social justice
Pertamina	Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara (State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company)
pesantren	Islamic boarding school
Peta	Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland)
Petrus	penembakan misterius (mysterious shootings)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party)
PPKI	Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee)
priyayi	Javanese aristocracy
rakyat	the people, the masses, the common people
Repelita	Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan)
RRI	Radio Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Radio)
Sarekat Islam	Islamic Association
STOVIA	School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (School for Training Native Doctors)

THHK	Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (Chinese Association)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)
TVRI	Televisi Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Television)
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
USDEK	Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Sosialisme à la Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, Kepribadian Indonesia (1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity)
Victorian ecumene	A world of ideas and customs that are shared by middling classes in many parts of the globe but that have their origins in the United Kingdom during the reign of Queen Victoria, 1837-1901
Volksraad	People's Advisory Council

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INTRODUCTION

The New Order era (1966-1998) is an important period in the contemporary history of Indonesia. Under the leadership of Soeharto (1921-2008) there occurred economic growth, political stability, and cultural change that gave rise to what some observers have seen as a new society.[1] Yet despite the years that have passed by since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, students of Indonesian history have yet to capture the deeper and more complex meanings of what transpired during the controversial era. Contemporaneous observers of New Order Indonesia, indigenous and foreign alike, tended to examine this society through analytical lenses that lacked historical depth and were obfuscated by the use of pet taxonomies (e.g., civilian vs. the Army, "natives" vs. "Chinese," and nationalists vs. Muslims vs. communists). The Indonesian analysts, in particular, were overly inward-looking in many of their attempts to make sense of their own country. As a consequence, the historiography of the New Order is caught in a cul-de-sac.

To find a way out of this historiographical impasse, one must attempt interpretive breakthroughs. One way to do so is to study New Order society in a way that is inspired

[1] For the argument that political stability and economic growth created "a wholly new society," see, for example, Robert E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), vi. For an incisive discussion of the cultural change that occurred in the New Order era, consult, for instance, William H. Frederick, "Dreams of Freedom, Moments of Despair: Armijn Pané and the Imagining of Modern Indonesian Culture," in *Imagining Indonesia: Cultural Politics and Political Culture*, ed. Jim Schiller and Barbara Martin-Schiller (Athens: Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1997), esp. 71-76. In her survey of the cultural history of New Order Indonesia, Virginia Matheson Hooker observes that despite the state's attempt to homogenize and control cultural production, "Indonesian expression abounded in creativity and talent applied to diverse topics in diverse forms and styles." See Virginia Matheson Hooker, "Expression: Creativity Despite Constraint," in *Indonesia beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 291.

by world history, examining this society's evolution by employing as analytical lenses one or two major processes that have been shaping the world for the last two centuries. This is the task I set for myself in this study.

I reinterpret New Order Indonesia by investigating two social changes of world-historical proportions: the rise of the middling classes[2] and the quest for modernity that they presided over. The leading figures of the middling classes pursued an Indonesian variant of what can be described as a domesticated modernity. It was in the New Order that this strain of modernity began to take shape.

For the purposes of my investigation I must clarify the historical phenomena I call "modernity" and "the middling classes." A balanced study of modernity must attend to the intersection and interplay between its objective and subjective aspects. On the one hand, therefore, I use the term "modernity" objectively to talk about a constellation of historical phenomena that encompasses industrialization, capitalism, and globalization; urbanization and the growth of mass society and mass politics; the rise of the nation-state; the expansion of bureaucracy and the increasing intervention by the state into civil society; and the belief that man can plan social change.[3] On the other hand, aware of the

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[2] For an analysis of the victory of the middling classes as a phenomenon of world historical importance, see Charles Morazé, *The Triumph of the Middle Classes* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968). In the original French edition Morazé used the term of *les bourgeois conquérants* rather than *les classes moyennes*.

[3] For discussions of modernity as a world-historical common condition, see Roger Adelson, "Interview with Carol Gluck," *Historian* 62, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 2; Carol Gluck, "Japan's Modernities, 1850s-1990s," in *Asia in Western and World History: A Guide for Teaching*, ed. Ainslie T. Embree and Carol Gluck (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 566; Carol Gluck, "The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Now," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (June 2011): 676-687; Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, "Interview Four: Modernity," in *Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity*, ed. Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 95.

key role that human agency plays in history, I focus my attention on the ways in which leaders of the New Order's middling classes experienced this complex of social changes. I do so by examining the ideas that they had about these transformations and the ways they adopted, wrestled with, and adapted them.

As for the Indonesian "middling classes," I use this term to discuss the expanding and increasingly diverse constellations of people who first appeared in the era of the Cultivation System (1830-1870) and achieved predominance in that of the New Order (1966-1998): people who saw themselves in the social hierarchy as occupying an intermediate position below the (finally dying) aristocracy and above the agricultural and industrial masses; and people, moreover, who demanded that society provide them with the kinds of wealth, authority, and respect they believed they deserved. In most cases, they received some formal education and maintained a degree of financial independence, making their living as professionals, entrepreneurs, military officers, bureaucrats, clerics, merchants, artisans, or successful farmers. Although some—such as well-to-do farmers, Muslim clerics, or foresters—lived in or near villages, most inhabited the urban world. For all their differences in gender, ethnicity, religion, profession, and ideology, they shared common self-perceptions, social views, and core values. In general, they considered themselves modern, patriotic, rational, and sometimes even "scientific"; they championed certainty, cleanliness, order, and discipline over what they saw as uncertainty, filth, confusion, and anarchy; and they took it for granted that they and the state they sought to control had the right and obligation to lead Indonesia to the kind of "progress" they preferred. While defending the supremacy of their own classes, they were

committed—in varying degrees—to ever-rising living standards, equality of opportunity, meritocracy, and self-styled democracy. They tended to prefer private to collective ways of enjoying of their consumer goods. In my way of identifying members of the middling classes, I consider their own self-perceptions and world views to be as important as, if not sometimes more important than, the a priori features that social scientists commonly employ to classify them.

There are two reasons why the middling-classes' quest for tamed modernity has seldom appeared on the radar screen of indigenous and foreign observers of New Order Indonesia. First, whether they focus on economy or on politics, they observe this society through ideological prisms, which distort more than they reveal. Second, whether they extoll the New Order as an accomplishment or denounce it as a tragedy, they claim that it was essentially about the military.[4] Whether they consider the armed forces as a malignant institution or as a benevolent one, they look at it as a caste of its own, separate from the rest of society.[5] But New Order Indonesia was in fact not about the military and the decision-makers in the armed forces were indeed part of the middling classes. It was neither the *rakyat* (the masses) nor the dying aristocrats but rather the leaders of the middling classes who were the driving force behind the enormous changes that Indonesia

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[4] The historian Taufik Abdullah, for example, argues that "the history of the New Order can be said to be a story of military domination of all aspects of the life of the nation." See Taufik Abdullah, "Pengantar: Krisis Masa Kini dan Orde Baru," in *Krisis Masa Kini dan Orde Baru*, ed. Muhamad Hisyam (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2003), 43.

[5] Benedict Anderson is one the scholars who hold this view. In David Bourchier, "The Military and the Trauma of 1965," *Inside Indonesia*, no. 12 (October 1987): 8, he is reported as saying that "it is difficult to explain armies in class terms and that is instructive to look at them in their own terms, as institutions."

experienced in the New Order,[6] changes that they brought about to modernize their country. Before presenting the research questions around which I build my argument and employ my evidence, I must locate and justify my study in relation to others in the broader historiographical conversations about New Order Indonesia.

Historiography

Sympathizing with the oppressed and emphasizing social justice and human rights, one school of thought in Indonesian studies sees Soeharto's reign as a deviant, unfortunate episode in the history of post-independence Indonesia. The New Order period appears, in this view, to have been a dark time of corruption, oppression, economic exploitation, political demobilization, and military dictatorship; it also represents a betrayal of the ideals of the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949). Some of the champions of this school of thought include such observers as Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006), Max Lane (b. 1951), and Daniel Dhakidae (b. 1945).

In 2006, the historical novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer considered New Order Indonesia as the antithesis to the kind of nation-state he fought for during the anti-colonial struggle in 1945-1949. Lacking visionary leadership and suffering from

[6] If one is serious about understanding social change in contemporary Indonesia, one has to pay more analytical attention to the middling classes than to the aristocracy or the agricultural and industrial underclasses. This a point made by, among others, Daniel S. Lev. See the author's essay "Intermediate Classes and Change in Indonesia," in *The Politics of the Middle Class Indonesia*, ed. Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), 26-27. Indonesian history, he notes, shows that "the middle classes have been a major source of pressure for economic, social, cultural, and political change."

"limitless moral decadence,"[7] Indonesia in the New Order, he claimed, "lost all its national pride" and made "no achievements."[8] Soeharto, he went on to say, built his regime on "fascist principles"[9] and—together with his Indonesian allies and foreign capitalists—robbed the country of its wealth. Pramoedya pointed out that the New Order emerged after the complete demolition of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), during which Muslims, landlords, and the Army killed at least half a million of people associated with the Party.[10] In Pramoedya's view, Indonesia in the New Order signified a moral and political decline, and therefore paled in comparison with what it was from 1945 to 1966, when it engaged in character- and nation-building under the guidance of President Soekarno (1901-1970).

Pramoedya's view of the New Order is one-sided. For one thing, he disregarded the regime's economic achievements and the concomitant social changes. For another, he does not seem to have realized that some of the core ideas inspiring the New Order's modernization project had their roots in the anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch, for example in the ideas that Sutan Sjahrir (1909-1966) had about future Indonesia. In the early 1930s, Sjahrir argued that Indonesians were to modernize through a "mass movement" that focuses on "education" and "strategy," marching toward progress under

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[7] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Suharto's Regime and Indonesia Today," in *Exile: Indonesia's Most Celebrated Novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer in Conversation with Andre Vltchek and Rossie Indira*, ed. Nagesh Rao (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006), 119.

[8] Ibid., 121.

[9] Ibid., 124.

[10] M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since* c. *1200*, 4th ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 326-27.

the joint leadership of the intelligentsia (*de opvoeder*) and the military (*de krijgsman*).[11] This actually happened three decades later under the New Order. In line with Sjahrir's evolutionary modernism, Soeharto's economic policies prioritized the expansion of "education," health services, "infrastructure, and investment" in order to reduce poverty and economic inequality without triggering social revolution.[12]

In 2003, the Indonesian intellectual Daniel Dhakidae characterized the New Order as a "military neo-fascist regime."[13] This regime, he argued, appropriated a humanist discourse dominant during the era of the Ethical Policy (1900-1942) and turned it into a military neo-fascist discourse of "totalism." [14] Wielding not only the Pancasila but also journalism, social sciences, and religions, the New Order state forced society to embrace its totalist discourse of developmentalist humanism.[15] To impose this on the citizenry, the state penetrated every section of society, committing what he called "systemic totalization," which consisted of "formalization, bureaucratization, and militarization" and resulted in two paradoxes. First, by becoming omnipresent in society, the state—he

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[11] Sutan Sjahrir, *Renungan dan Perjuangan* [Meditations and struggle], ed. and trans. H. B. Jassin (Jakarta: Djambatan and Dian Rakyat, 1990 [1945]), 18.

[12] Robert Cribb, "Nation: Making Indonesia," in *Indonesia beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 20.

[13] Daniel Dhakidae, *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru* [Intellectuals and power in New Order Indonesia] (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2003), 288-89.

[14] Ibid., 745-46 and 749. Although the main thrust of the Ethical Policy died by the end of World War I, the Dutch colonial state kept on implementing various forms of the Policy until 1942. See Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, *Ethiek in Fragmenten: Vijf Studies over Koloniaal Denken and Doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische Archipel 1877-1942* (Utrecht: HES Publishers, 1981), 209-13.

[15] The Pancasila ("Five Principles") is Indonesia's ideological foundation that defines what it means to be an Indonesian citizen. Created in 1945 by the country's founding leaders, it includes (a) belief in one supreme God, (b) just and civilized humanity, (c) national unity, (d) democracy led by wisdom through the deliberation of people's representatives, and (e) social justice for all citizens of Indonesia.

claimed—shut itself off from the world, its remaining contacts with the latter occurring only through "money and violence."[16] Second, since the state privileged economy over politics, everything, he argued, became political:[17] religions, for example, became political the moment they adopted the Pancasila as their sole ideological basis, while social sciences, in turn, became political because the state employed them to justify its policy.[18]

Dhakidae put his finger on what may appear to be an embarrassing continuity between the Dutch colonial regime during the era of Ethical Policy (1900-1942) and Soeharto's New Order (1966-1998). He unmasked the latter's "colonial" features and thereby questioned its nationalist credentials. Yet the deployment of this rhetorical tactic reveals a misunderstanding of the nature of the Indonesian nationalist movement; for this was not about a wholesale rejection of the Ethical Policy's path to modernity that the Dutch colonial masters offered to their Indonesian subjects. In fact, many of the latter wanted the colonial state to increase the reach and speed of the modernization project already going on. It was precisely because the Dutch did not modernize the colony fast and extensively enough that the Indonesian nationalists started to seek independence as a means of self-modernization.

Dhakidae's state-centered analysis of the New Order failed to consider adequately how different sections in civil society responded differently to what the regime did. For example, he left under-analyzed the ways in which and the reasons why students, civil

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[16] Dhakidae, *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan*, 746. This is not true; there is no evidence that the New Order's generals and economists avoided any exchange of ideas with the rest of the world, or that they ignored significant international events.

[17] Ibid., 746-47.

[18] Ibid.

servants, professionals, and other members of the disgruntled middle-classes helped Soeharto and the Army dismantle Soekarno's Guided Democracy and establish the New Order in its place. He also failed to note that despite the regime's excesses, some segments of the population—such as landed farmers and small entrepreneurs in rural Indonesia—responded positively to its economic policy and ended up enjoying higher living standards.[19]

In 2008 the Australian author Max Lane contended that the New Order was an antithesis to a process that had been going on in Indonesia since 1909: nation-building through "national revolution."[20] Mass mobilization of people in political actions, he asserted, played a key role in this process, not only during the anti-colonial struggle (1908-1945) but also during the period of nation-consolidation (1945-65). He pointed out that in 1965 the ongoing national revolution was on the verge of culminating in a PKI-led social revolution.[21] Under Soeharto's leadership, the Army and its civilian allies stepped in to prevent this: they crushed the left, seized power, and established the New Order. From 1965 to 1998, the New Order carried out a "counter-revolution," banning "mass mobilization politics" and many of the political methods characteristic of the anti-

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[19] For a remarkable study of how economic development in the New Order benefitted small industries in rural Java, see, for example, S. Ann Dunham, *Surviving against the Odds: Village Industry in Indonesia*, ed. Alice G. Dewey and Nancy I. Cooper (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). For a brief but useful discussion of how social stratification changed in the New Order, see William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden, eds., "Social Classes," in *Indonesia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1993), accessed October 21, 2010, http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/35.htm.

[20] Max Lane, *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia before and after Suharto* (London: Verso, 2008), 7-8.

[21] Ibid., 43.

colonial struggle in the first half of the twentieth century. [22] The New Order substituted economic development for social revolution, and political demobilization for political polarization. Whereas many Indonesians welcomed this turn of events, Lane found it regrettable. Thus, he was glad to see that a wave of social protests reemerged in the 1990s and brought about the collapse of the New Order in 1998. This appeared to him as signaling the return of mass movement to Indonesian political culture. In sum, he saw the New Order era as a deviation in the otherwise healthy course of Indonesian history.

Lane's analysis of the New Order displays a preference for modernity through social revolution. It is hard, however, to find any compelling evidence that throughout the twentieth century the majority of middling-class and, for that matter, that of lower-class Indonesians did desire this type of modernity.

The dark views of the New Order held by observers such as Pramoedya, Lane, and Dhakidae find their rivals in the analyses offered by a number of economic historians of Indonesia, such as Anne Booth and Hal Hill. Wielding an economic lens and looking at the New Order from a long historical perspective, they have stressed the dramatic economic growth that the regime helped bring about. Examining indicators such as GDP, the shift from agriculture to industry, the achievement of a balanced budget, the betterment of infrastructure, the reduction of poverty, the expansion of education, and the control over population growth, Booth has concluded that until the crisis in 1998, Indonesians in general fared "[c]onsiderably better than before."[23] Despite the setbacks that Indonesia suffered in the wake of the East Asian economic crisis in 1997, Booth

[22] Ibid., 2-3.

[23] Anne Booth, "Development: Achievement and Weakness," in Emmerson, *Indonesia beyond Suharto*,129.

suggested in 1999 that we should not be pessimistic, reminding us that the economic growth that occurred after the economic disaster in the mid-1960s has proven the pessimists wrong.[24] (Given Indonesia's economic conditions in 2011, Booth's comment is worth serious consideration.) Like Booth, Hill has highlighted the spectacular economic recovery and expansion that Indonesia was capable of under Soeharto's leadership. In 2000, he noted how Indonesia had turned from a "basket case" in the 1960s into a fast-growing industrial economy.[25]

The economic history perspective has its limits; using an economic-historical approach, it offers abstract, objectivist, generalized "charts" of Indonesia's economy. Although in some ways such charts helped technocrats design government policies, these bird-eye views of the Indonesian economy do not tell the whole story. For example, they tell us little about what ordinary people thought, felt, and did about the impact of the New Order's economic policies on their lives. Often missing in the works of economic historians are the subjective, bottom-up views of the economy under the New Order, that is, the economy as it was experienced by Indonesians of different social classes.

Aside from these politically-oriented observers and economic historians, there are a number of scholars who offer more complex views of the New Order era, for example the historian Robert Cribb and the political scientists Donald K. Emmerson and R. William Liddle. In 1999, in an essay surveying Indonesian history, Cribb argued that the history of twentieth-century Indonesia, including the New Order era, represents the

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[24] Ibid., 135.

[25] Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-8.

nation's search for modernity,[26] for which there were three competing blueprints: leftist, Islamist, and developmentalist.[27] The struggle over the blueprint for Indonesian modernity reached its climax in 1965 and 1966 when the Army and Muslims destroyed the Indonesian Communist Party. The rise of the New Order in the wake of this bloody showdown signifies the triumph of developmentalist modernism. Emmerson refined Cribb's argument by pointing out that what the New Order regime did from 1966 to 1998 was to "moderniz[e the] country economically but not politically."[28] In other words, the New Order offered an incomplete modernization.

Cribb's argument does represent an interpretive breakthrough; not only does it urge us to look at New Order Indonesia from a long historical perspective; it also invites us to look at it through the mind-broadening leitmotif of the quest for modernity. Despite this breakthrough, Cribb's discussion of contemporary Indonesia remains trapped in the old classificatory system that divides peoples and processes in the country's history into ideological types. While employing, as Cribb did, a long historical view and a world-historical theme, my study questions his ideology-based taxonomy.

In 2010, in a review of Bradley Simpson's book on Indonesia's "authoritarian economic development," which Simpson saw as the result of the collaboration between Indonesia's generals and economists on the one hand and US Cold-War strategists on the other, R. William Liddle made an intriguing comment:

> [O]ur analytical and moral challenges would be even greater (and more honest) if we acknowledge from the start that the New Order was Janus-

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[26] Cribb, "Making Indonesia," 12-14, 18, 20-22, 34.
[27] Ibid., 20.
[28] Donald K. Emmerson, "Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis of 1997-98," in *Indonesia beyond Suharto*, 299.

> faced [*berwajah dua*]: It was at once one of the worst and one of the best governments in the twentieth-century world.[29]

Liddle's brief comment on New Order Indonesia has provoked me to ask a world-historical question: Is it not the case that all consciously-modernizing governments in the world since the nineteenth century have been Janus-faced in the sense of that they undertook a combination of repressive dictatorship and developmental program? Consider, for example, the governments of Meiji Japan, post-Mao Zedong's China, and Mahathir Mohamad's Malaysia, or those of Park Chung Hee's South Korea, and Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore. Once we stop seeing these governments as unique, isolated cases, they will appear as instances of common, world-historical conditions. One of the things that such governments have in common is their stubborn belief that one can plan modernity under state leadership.

It is necessary now for us to abandon ways of doing Indonesian history that put too much emphasis on the country's and its people's unique or exceptional qualities. Of course, there may have been uniqueness and exceptionalities in some of the ways both "proto-Indonesians" and Indonesians since 1750 have responded to their most challenging problems. Yet upon closer, world-history-inspired examination, some of these problems were by no means unique to people in the Dutch East Indies and Indonesia, for they were the same problems that confronted many other societies in the modern world. After 1750, it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to find any societies immune to the integrating and dividing, stabilizing and destabilizing processes

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[29] R. William Liddle, "Dua Wajah Orde Baru" [The New Order's two faces], review of *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968*, by Bradley R. Simpson, *Tempo*, June 28, 2010.

to which the modern age, for better or worse, has exposed them. Such processes included the spread and modification of enlightenment ideals; the coming, late-coming, or absence of the industrial revolution; imperialism and anti-colonial movements; and the fascination with and indigenous adaptations of the often conflicting modernist ideals.

There is a challenge for students of Indonesian history to question the conventional wisdoms regarding the character of the New Order era. In response to this challenge, I consider the possibility that, like modernity itself, New Order Indonesia may have had multiple and often contradictory "faces." Drawing on some insights that recent studies of world history have sparked, I do so by abandoning the notion of Indonesian exceptionalism. That is to say, I treat the New Order not only as part of the contemporary history of Indonesia, but also as part of a world-historical process: the quest for modernity.

Research Questions

To shed new light on the history of New Order Indonesia by analyzing the middling classes' quest for Indonesian modernity, three central questions must be answered. First, what were the origins of the fundamental ideas that the leaders and supporters of the New Order had about modernity? Second, what was the social background of the military, intellectual, and literary leaders who championed these ideas? Third, what were the social consequences of these ideas?

It is necessary to answer these questions because the predominant argument that New Order Indonesia was simply the product of militarism is unconvincing. More a

political outcry than an empirical analysis, this argument indicates a failure to transcend the ideological and political approaches to studying Indonesia. The first step toward a better understanding of the New Order is to reconstruct its social and intellectual origins by focusing on the middling classes. More than any social groups above and below them, these intermediate classes seem to have played the central role in determining the path and shape that Indonesia's modernity should take. This study aims to capture the historical character of the New Order era by reconstructing its social history, placing a special emphasis on the key role played in it by the middling classes. I am not convinced that the most important theme of this period was militarism or fascism à la Indonesia; nor am I convinced that it was economic development with its mixed blessings. Instead, in the following pages, I suggest that New Order Indonesia represents the problematic "victory" of the middling classes in championing a domesticated modernity.

Ultimately, this is a macro-historical issue. If we re-examine Indonesia in a global context, it exhibits interesting commonalities with the rest of the world. Consider, for example, what happened in twentieth-century Western Europe, Japan, and Indonesia. While several Western European countries experienced the clash of liberal democracy, communism, and fascism, Japan experimented with Greater Asianism, and post-independence Indonesia wrestled with political Islam, communism, and developmentalism. These seemingly disparate phenomena have one thing in common: they were variants of the same world historical process, the struggle with and over modernity. The New Order era may reveal its complexity—which the ideological and

political portrayals of it have hitherto obscured—if historians start "tickling" the sources that the era has left behind with world-historical questions.

Approach

The approach I use in my study of the New Order is that of the social history of intellectuals. So far the least used, this approach may enable interpretive breakthroughs. An analysis of the connection between intellectual and social changes may throw new light on Indonesia's evolution from 1966 to 1998. I explore this topic by examining the biographies of three related social groups that represented the New Order's middling-class leading elite. The first group includes the military and the civilian thinkers who helped President Soeharto undertake state-led modernization. These included Widjojo Nitisastro (1927-2012), the head of the Bappenas (National Development Planning Board), and B. J. Habibie (b. 1936), the State Minister of Research and Technology, but also the leaders of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), such as Ali Moertopo (1924-1984), Daoed Joesoef (b. 1926), Harry Tjan Silalahi (b. 1934), and Jusuf Wanandi (b. 1937).

The second group consists of the intellectuals who ran the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES) and the highly regarded social science journal *Prisma* [Prism]. They were Nono Anwar Makarim (b. 1939), Ismid Hadad (b. 1940), and Dawam Rahardjo (b. 1942). They championed the ideal that Indonesian modernization must encourage people's participation, promote social justice, and include more than just economic development.

My third case study deals with three writers of popular novels: Motinggo Busye (1937-1999), Teguh Esha (b. 1947), and Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi (b. 1954). These writers drew attention to the personal troubles and social ills that economic modernization unwittingly brought about. They did not, however, call for the dissolution of the New Order. Instead, they wanted to help make the New Order work.

Why examine the three social groups at once? Why not concentrate on just one of them? My analytical position is this: if we are serious about understanding the New Order's middling-classes, we must consider their points of overlap and difference. To do justice to their sociological and intellectual complexities, we must contemplate both the informal consensus they reached and the internal debates they had with regard to Indonesia's modernization.

I already indicate, on page 3, the lifestyles, self-perceptions, and social views that the three groups had in common. Suffice it to add here that—despite their commonalities and informal consensus—they also disagreed over a number of issues, such as (a) civil-military relations, (b) state-and-society balance of power, and (c) Indonesia's readiness for greater democracy, more rule of law, or more freedom of speech. Interestingly, they also exhibited differing awareness of, and responses to, the social change going on around them as a result of economic modernization.

My decision to devote the first case study in this dissertation to a group of military and civilian intellectuals requires a justification. I have two reasons for this. First, the most direct way of challenging the thesis about the New Order as militarism is to check whether these people's social ideas and actions really constituted nothing but the

quest for military supremacy and hegemony. I also employ these people's biographies to make the case that the ways they thought about and behaved toward modernity were typical of the middling-class mentality. In this regard, it is important to note that Widjojo Nitisastro and his colleagues at the Bappenas as well as Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Hoemardani and their allies at the CSIS played an important role in directing or influencing the economic development that the New Order undertook. In 1973, the CSIS published an influential booklet, *The Acceleration and Modernization of 25 Years' Development*, where he presented a blueprint for Indonesia's modernization.

Second, world history provides us with nineteenth- and twentieth-century cases where military officers played a central role in the modernization of their societies. We can consider the lives and works of people such as Egypt's Muhammad Ali (1769-1849), Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), Iran's Reza Shah (1878-1944), and Mexico's Porfirio Díaz (1830-1915).

I have two reasons why I consider the biographies of LP3ES-affiliated intellectuals as worthy of reconstruction and analysis. First, some critics portray the New Order as a dreary time of intellectual decline. A study of what the LP3ES undertook and of the lives and works of Nono Anwar Makarim, Ismid Hadad, and Dawam Rahardjo offers a compelling rebuttal of such naïve portrayal. Set up in 1971 with funding from the German Friedrich Naumann Foundation, it developed into an organizational basis from which a few Indonesian intellectuals launched their loyal, social-democratic critique of the New Order's method of modernization. In their view, by deliberately emphasizing political stability and economic growth, the regime prevented the development of other

aspects of modernization, namely equality and democracy.[30] During its most dynamic years, LP3ES published original works by Indonesian scholars and produced first-class translations of European, Australian, and American monographs in history and social sciences. It also ran the prestigious journal *Prisma* that regularly offered fine articles by both indigenous scholars and foreign specialists in Indonesian studies. If we consider the mediated-community that LP3ES, its publications, and its audience created, the image of the New Order we end up with is that of intellectual exuberance.

My second justification for looking at the lives and ideas of the LP3ES intellectuals is that doing so enables us to study the alternative visions that some members of the Indonesian intelligentsia had about the quest for modernity. While remaining committed to domesticated, middling-class-led modernity, their visions exhibit other sensibilities, accents, and priorities than those we find in Soeharto, his generals, his economists and the CSIS thinkers.

When examining the LP3ES intellectuals, I analyze the ways their social conditions and ideas affected each other over time. I look at where they came from, their family backgrounds, their socio-economic class, and their education. I also explore their visions of modern Indonesia and the reasons why they adopted them. Some of these visions were presented in the journal *Prisma* [Prism]. My goal is to discover how and why the New Order was socially and intellectually created.

Novels do not just fall from the sky; they are social artifacts, a product of the complex historical interaction that involves storytellers, their audiences, the publishing

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[30] What the New Order did was not unique. China, for example, is pursuing the same policy today.

industry, and the larger society to which they all belong. By examining works of fiction—by analyzing their contents, the intentions of their authors, the reception of their readers, and the social context in which they are produced, distributed, and consumed—the historian may ferret out part of the evidence he needs to reconstruct the past social world that has produced the literary artifacts. It is in this sense that some social historians have spoken of literary works as "mirrors of society."[31] In this dissertation I study a set of New Order best-selling popular novels to discover intended and unintended indicators of dominant, residual, and emergent attitudes, values, interests, concerns, and aspirations among their middling-class authors and readers.

The New Order period saw some developments favorable to the expansion of popular literature. Literacy increased dramatically, and so did the percentage of people with senior high school education.[32] This triggered a boom in the demand for fiction, especially in the late 1970s and the 1980s. A lot of short stories and novels were published as books or serialized in newspapers and magazines.

Some of the best-known popular writers in the New Order were Motinggo Busye, Teguh Esha, and Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi. Their works offer a retrospective look at the New Order. Motinggo was especially important because his life and work spanned two eras: Guided Democracy and the New Order. Often reflective and at times even critical, Motinggo's early novels (e.g., *Cross Mama* [Cougar]), contain some clues about how people responded to the social transition that the regime changed had caused. By the

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[31] For a discussion of what novels can teach us about Indonesian history, see, for example, A. Johns, "The Novel as a Guide to Indonesian History," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, and Volkenkunde* 115, no. 3 (1959): 232-48.

[32] Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 17-18.

same token, if we analyze Teguh’s and Yudhistira’s best-selling novels from the late 1970s and the early 1980s, we get some idea of the kind and magnitude of the social change that the middling classes experienced as a result of economic modernization under the New Order.

No less important than popular novels are their authors. For example, the lives and works of Motinggo, Teguh, and Yudhistira show that the New Order ended up creating its own critics, who problematized its brand of modernity and its dysfunctions. It is therefore important to ask the following questions: How did the New Order create these people? How did they help shape New Order society? I analyze these authors’ social origins, education, and life trajectories. I seek to discover the visions they had of the ideal, modern Indonesia.

Of course, I must pay attention to the New Order’s darker sides, for example the records of human rights abuses by actors who represented both the state and civil society. It is morally important to examine the human costs that these people were willing to bear to bring about change or to prevent it. I contemplate how some ideas about, and actions toward, modernity helped bring about the coercion, repression, and exploitation that accompanied modernization.

In the preceding pages, I have described the background of this study and introduced its topic. I also have located the investigation in the existing literature, stated the questions that it seeks to answer, and explained the approach it takes.

As for its architecture, this dissertation is organized as follows. Part I, “Historical Roots,” reconstructs the evolution of Indonesian Middling Classes, telling the story from

two angles. First, in Chapter 1—"The Indonesian Middling Classes, 1830-1965: Origins and Evolution"—I examine their emergence and development in this period, focusing on their changing internal structure and their external interaction with other classes in society.

Second, in Chapter 2, "The Indonesian Middling Classes and Their Pursuit of Modernity, 1900-1965," the story is told from the point of view of that historical act which best defined the middling classes, that is, their quest for modernity. This chapter investigates the central ideas that inspired the modernizing efforts that the Indonesian middling classes made from 1900 to 1966. The contexts and consequences of these ideas and their implementations are also explored.

The core of this dissertation, however, is Part II, "The Quest for Indonesian Modernity in the New Order, 1966-1998." Using three case studies, it aims to discover how New Order Indonesia was intellectually and socially created. In Chapter 3, "The Quest for Indonesian Modernity in the New Order: The President's Men and Their Top-Down Social Engineering," I explore the key ideas about Indonesian progress that Soeharto's advisors and assistants strove to implement. These protagonists of modernization were based at the CSIS, the Bappenas, and the State Ministry of Research and Technology. The chapter addresses the origins of their modernist ideas, their larger meanings, and their intended and unintended effects on contemporary Indonesia.

Chapter 4, "The Quest for Indonesian Modernity in the New Order: The LP3ES Intellectuals and Social Transformation 'from the Bottom Up,'" offers an intellectual history of three former directors of the LP3ES: Nono Anwar Makarim, Ismid Hadad, and

Dawam Rahardjo. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which they envisioned Indonesian modernity and the attempts they made to realize their visions. That the New Order regime allowed this NGO to operate as an agent of modernization compels us to see the New Order in a new light.

In Chapter 5, “The Quest for Indonesian Modernity in the New Order: Popular Novelists as Critics of Modernity’s Darker Sides,” I use several popular novels and the biographies of their writers to shed light on the social changes that took place during the New Order, focusing on economic development, its discontent, and the ways in which the middling classes responded to this experience.

In the “Conclusion,” I do three things: answer the historical puzzles that have driven this study, offer my reflection on the deeper meanings of my research findings, and point out emerging questions that require further study.

CHAPTER 1: THE INDONESIAN MIDDLING CLASSES, 1830-1965: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

[An] important [...] issue is the asserted "newness" of the Indonesian middle class. Are they indeed a novelty, a "class without history"?

Lizzy van Leeuwen[33]

In The Hague, on November 7, 1929, in a lecture to the Comité "Nieuw Indië" (an association of liberal Dutch intellectuals who agitated in the Netherlands for the Indies' autonomy[34]), Achmad Djajadiningrat (1877-1943),[35] a member of the Volksraad (People's Advisory Council) and head of the Inlandse Middenstandscommissie (Commission on Native Middling Classes), made an important statement. He maintained that "a Native [entrepreneurial] middling class" had been around in the Archipelago "for centuries." While in the remote past, he said, this class consisted of the great indigenous maritime traders, by the late 1920s it was comprised of "new" people who, having achieved "a degree of general development," enjoyed economic independence, such as "well-to-do farmers, big shopkeepers, master-craftsmen" as well as "carpenters," and "silver-, gold-, irons-, and coppersmiths."[36]

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[33] Lizzy van Leeuwen, *Lost in Mall: An Ethnography of Middle-Class Jakarta in the 1990s* (Leiden: KITLV, 2011), 14.

[34] "De autonomie-actie," *De Sumatra Post*, April 18, 1922, 1.

[35] Born in 1877 in Serang, West Java, Achmad Djajadiningrat was the son of a Sundanese regent. He was one of the first Sundanese aristocrats to receive a European education.

[36] Anonymous, "De Inheemsche Middenstand in Indië" [The indigenous middling class in the Indies] *De Indische Courant*, November 30, 1929, 2.

In the same year, the Commission on Native Middling Classes stated that the entrepreneurial section of the Indonesian middling classes comprised "individuals, not wage-earners, who either on their own or in cooperation with others, with their own or with borrowed capital, run a business of a certain size in trade, industry, or transport."[37] The membership of the Commission on Native Middling Classes included Achmad Djajadiningrat, R. H. Adjhoeri (member of the Tasikmalaya Regency Council), Th. H. Fruin (president of the People's Credit System), Hardjodipoero (physician), Soedjoto (official of the Indonesian Study Club), and J. Stroomberg, E. P. Wellenstein, and H. L. Welter (officials from the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce).[38]

Strangely, however, in the 1980s and 1990s, those observers of the New Order who thought in a normative-comparative manner argued that no middling classes (or no "genuine" ones) had ever existed in Indonesia. They contended that the social types who could have constituted true middling classes in the country—such as professionals, entrepreneurs, and the educated in general—failed to perform the feats that their Western European and North American counterparts had accomplished. First, they neither produced democracy nor championed transparency, human rights, economic justice, and environmental protection. Second, many, the critics claimed, were petty-minded: the educated contented themselves with securing a job in the civil service while the rich

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[37] See A. H. Ballendux, *Bijdrage tot de Kennis van de Credietverlening aan de "Indonesische Middenstand"* [A study on the granting of credit to the "Indonesian middling class"] (The Hague: Uitgeverij Excelsior, 1951), 35-36.

[38] See "De inlandsche middenstand" [The indigenous middling class], *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, March 30, 1929, 1; "Oprichting eener organisatie te Weltevreden" [The founding of an organization in Weltevreden], *Het Vaderland*, November 30, 1929, 16.

indulged in ego-centric, conspicuous consumption. Third, the entrepreneurs among the rich remained domestic players who owed their success less to business prowess than to collusion with bureaucrats for protection and privileged access to contracts, licenses, and credits.[39]

Not all Indonesia watchers embraced this thesis of the "missing" middling classes. Some maintained that the Indonesian middling classes did exist and they came into being in the New Order. One proponent of this position was the Australian Indonesia specialist Jamie Mackie (1924-2011), who remarked in 1982 that "something like 'a middle class' [was] beginning to emerge in the 1970s." As he perceived it, this class was made up of civil servants, professionals, and entrepreneurs who, despite their occupational diversity, possessed a set of common traits, such as hopes for their children's bright future,

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[39] For normative notions about the middling classes in Indonesia, consider the views taken by the Harvard-trained economist Sjahrir (1945-2008) and the sociologist Hotman Siahaan (b. 1951) in "Kelas Menengah Belum Punya Kemandirian yang Tinggi" [The middling classed do not have a high level of independence yet], *Kompas*, October 9, 1989: 8. For an argument on the "inauthenticity" of the Indonesian middling classes, see Mochtar Lubis, "Kesemuan Kelas Menengah Indonesia [The ersatz nature of the Indonesian middling classes], in *Kelas Menengah Indonesia Digugat* [The middling classes stand accused], ed. Happy Bone Zulkarnain, Faisal Siagian, and Laode Ida (Jakarta: Fikahati Aneska, 1993), esp. 117-122, and 125. Statements that the Indonesian middling classes did not exist were made by the CSIS political analyst J. Kristiadi (b. 1948), the Army's high-ranking officer Lt.-Gen. Z. A. Maulani (1939-2005), and the Catholic educator J. I. G. M Drost, S.J. (1925-2005). See "Gerakan Pro-Demokrasi Meluas" [Pro-democracy movement will spread], *Kompas*, December 21, 1996; Rachmat H. Cahyono, "Wawancara Z. A. Maulani: 'Kita Tidak Bisa Mendikte ABRI'" [Interview with Z. A. Maulani: We cannot shove the Armed Forces around], *Detektif dan Romantika*, March 8, 1997; and J. I. G. M. Drost, S.J., "Pemuda Kelas Menengah" [Middling-class youths], in *Sekolah: Mengajar atau Mendidik?* [Schools: Teaching or educating?] (Jakarta: Kanisius, 1998), 224-225. Kristiadi said that the thirty years of economic development that New Order undertook had not produced middling classes. In an interview in 1997 with Rachmat H. Cahyono of *Detektif dan Romantika* on the socio-political role of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Z. A. Maulani put it bluntly that middling classes—even in their embryonic forms—did not exist in Indonesia. What did exist, he said, were merely "people with middle-level incomes." Referring to Indonesia in 1991, Drost opined that it did not have any middling classes. But there was—he added—a small, unspecified group (the ethnic Chinese?) whose members had practiced a middling-class tradition since "before World War II."

participation in "metropolitan super-culture"[40] as well as interests in stronger protection of private property, more regularity in the behavior of the state, and more rule of law.[41]

The two conventional wisdoms are historically inaccurate. The opinion that views the Indonesian middling classes as a recent phenomenon stems from too short a view of Indonesian social history. While equally incorrect, the claim that the Indonesian middling classes are "fake" is at least analytically useful, for it is evidence of one of the ways in which critical-minded members of the Indonesian middling classes—some of whom were journalists, teachers, scholars, researchers, consultants, and military officers—appraised the behavior of their own classes in the last decades of the New Order. One can see in their appraisals a tension between what many members of the middling classes were actually doing and what they were supposed to have been doing. Yet if we are serious about understanding the Indonesian middling classes, we must suspend moral judgment and start examining their social history.

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[40] Hildred Geertz, *Indonesian Cultures and Communities,* ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), 16-17. Referring to Indonesia in 1963, she notes that the superculture "is … only two or three generations old. […]The foremost characteristic of the superculture is the colloquial everyday use of the Indonesian language [… and] the new Indonesian literature, popular music, films, and historical and political writings [expressed in that language]. […The] social goals to which the bearers of [the superculture are] committed [include] egalitarianism, socialism, economic development, and the advancement of the nation. The prime external symbols of adherence to the superculture are the acquisition of higher education, facility with foreign languages, travel experience abroad, and Western luxury goods such as automobiles."

[41] See J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesia since 1945: Problems of Interpretation," in *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*, ed. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson and Audrey Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1982), 117-130. However, Mackie changed his mind in 1990, noting that a *native* middling class had been appearing on the Indonesian urban landscape "since the early years of [the twentieth] century." This class, he wrote, consisted of a very thin layer of "professional, salaried or white-collar workers," whose position in the colonial social hierarchy was "below a Dutch bourgeoisie and a … heterogeneous Chinese trading class." See J. A. C. Mackie, "Money and the Middle Class," in *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, ed. Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), 98.

This chapter seeks to show that the Indonesian middling classes were a historical reality both in the colonial and post-colonial periods. These classes emerged in the Dutch East Indies during the second half of the nineteenth century, sought to take over control over society from the Dutch in the period from 1900 to 1949, underwent consolidation during the so-called "Old Order" period (1950-1965), and experienced expansion, diversification, and predominance during the New Order (1966-1998).

In charting the evolution of the Indonesian middling classes, this chapter points out that Indonesians and their predecessors in the colonial era played an active role in making themselves middling class. They did so in a world where their society interacted with the rest of the world. To see how and why they transformed themselves into middling-class people, I pay attention to both their social conditions and their self-perceptions and world-views. I explore the ways certain Indonesians identified themselves as middling-class and sought to make sense of and handle their changing lives, society, and times. There were, however, blind spots in people's contemporaneous views of the causality behind their thought and action. Thus, this chapter also examines the objective factors that helped produce the phenomena of being and becoming middling class in nineteenth- and twentieth- century Indonesia.

In this study, class is not merely about one's occupation or position in the social relations of production. It is also about the ideas that shape the way people perceive themselves, see the world, and behave in it. To join a class, people commit themselves to a set of common values that guide the ways they conduct themselves in their community. Thus, the things that set the middling classes from the aristocracy and the lower classes

were not simply the different ways in which the middling-class people earn a living but also, among other things, the basis of their social status. For instance, while the prestige of the aristocrats rest on kinship ties to the monarch, the middling-class people earn their status through the acquisition of modern secular education, the possession of talents, and the display of professional achievements.

The Indonesian middling classes were not monolithic, for they included entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, military officers, politicians, scholars, scientists, teachers, physicians, intellectuals, teachers, artists, clergymen, lawyers, journalists, engineers, and the families of these people. Hence, I use the term "classes" as opposed to "class." The Indonesian middling classes were also porous. Some of their denizens included both aristocrats who went down the social ladder and those from the lower classes who went up. This is the reason why this study uses the term "middling" rather than "middle." Although the term "middling classes" may sound quaint and pedantic, I have decided to use it anyway because it does justice to the complexity of the social reality it serves to describe. This study is not alone in adopting the term, for other studies also do the same or adopt its awkward equivalents, such as "middling sort(s)," "middle classes," "middle orders," or "middling ranks."

If there ever was the key feature that best defined the middling classes in Indonesian and beyond, that feature would be the attempt to create a way of life and a social world they considered modern. More than anything else, the quest for modernity is what makes people part of the middling classes. Since becoming modern and becoming middling class are intertwined, the best way to present the history of the Indonesian

middling classes seem to be by telling an undivided story that shows the development of who these people were and the evolution of their search for modernity. In this study, however, I pursue a different strategy: I present the history of the Indonesian middling classes in two stories, each using a different angle. This is because I want to stress two different but related aspects. In this chapter, the emphasis is placed on how these classes evolved in the context of their interaction with other classes in Indonesian society, especially how they struggled against the aristocracy and the masses for wealth, power, and prestige. In the next chapter (Chapter Two), the history of the Indonesian middling classes is told from another vantage point: their pursuit of modernity. Thus, Chapters One and Two are two sides of the same coin; together, they provide a background to this study's core chapters (Three, Four, and Five), which examine the intellectual histories of the think tank CSIS, the development NGO LP3ES, and three writers of popular novels, using just one angle: the Indonesian middling classes' quest for modernity.

1. 1. The Making of the Asian Proto-Middling Classes in the Dutch East Indies, *c.* 1830-1900

In discussing the origins of the Indonesian middling classes, especially their indigenous elements, some scholars, both foreign and indigenous, do not look further back in retrospect than on the first two decades of the twentieth century.[42] They fix their

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[42] W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change*, 2nd rev. ed. (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1964), 141-168; Farchan Bulkin, "Kapitalisme, Golongan Menengah, dan Negara: Sebuah Catatan Penelitian" [Capitalism, intermediate groups, and the state: A research note], *Prisma*, no. 2 (February 1984): 15; Benny Subianto, "Kelas Menengah Indonesia: Konsep Yang Kabur" [The Indonesian middling classes: A fuzzy concept], *Kompas*, October 19, 1989, 4; Daniel S. Lev, "Intermediate Classes and Change in Indonesia: Some Initial

attention on the politically eventful era of the Ethical Policy (1900-1919), when leaders of the native middling classes began a nationalist movement in pursuit of their socioeconomic and political interests, using the press, rallies, and political associations. This way of looking at the Indonesian middling classes may give the deceptive impression that the Indonesian nationalist movement they led appeared somewhat out of the blue. In my view, this was a later, explosive episode in the larger, more long-term social change that had been going on since the era of the Cultivation System (1830-1870).[43] One can better understand the genesis of the Indonesian middling classes if one examines the social history of nineteenth-century Dutch East Indies and the biographical details of some people who lived in this society.

In the course of the nineteenth century, indigenous societies in what is now Indonesia had to cope with strong waves of major historical processes that included technological revolution, industrial revolution, capitalism, and the rise and spread of nation-states. Emerging first in eighteenth-century Western Europe, and propelling modern, global empire-building, these processes reached and shook the entire world, intensifying global interconnectedness; deepening competition, conflict, and

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Reflections," in Tanter and Young, *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, 27-28; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, et al., *Kontradiksi, Aspirasi, dan Peran Kelas Menengah di Indonesia* [The contradictions, aspirations, and roles of the Indonesian middling classes] (Jakarta: Center for Information and Development Studies, 1998), 22.

[43] After losing Belgium (1830) and conducting the Java War (1825-1830), the Netherlands and its colony, the Dutch East Indies, faced a financial crisis, which the colony's governor-general, Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844), sought to solve by introducing, in 1830, a system of cash crop deliveries. In Java, it was designed to work like this: Peasants were either to pay land tax or to devote twenty percent of their lands and of their total annual labor time to cultivating commercial crops for world market (sugarcane, indigo, coffee, and tea), which they were to deliver to the government. This was the theory, though. Its implementation was anything but systematic. The System was also applied to indigenous peasants in the island of Sumatra. See, Robert Cribb, "Cultivation System," in *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 98-100.

collaboration within and between societies; and reorganizing these societies at an increasing speed. In their encounter with the at first mercantile and later industrializing Netherlands[44]—an encounter that dated back to 1596[45]—agricultural societies in the Indonesian Archipelago suffered military defeats, with the result that in the nineteenth century more and more natives had to live under Dutch rule, experiencing the rise and expansion of a colonial state that exposed them to some of the threatening and promising manifestations of modernity, such as monetized economy, the Cultivation System, sugar capitalism, Western-style secular education, powerful transportation and communication technologies, and increasingly modernized bureaucratic network.

Responding in various ways to the local manifestations of global economic integration, industrialization, and capitalism, members of the Asian communities in the Dutch East Indies underwent changes in their lives. The native upper classes found their character and function transformed by the Dutch colonial regime. In Java, as we shall see, part of the native aristocracy—especially that which included regents, district heads, assistant district heads, and village chiefs—was turned into a hereditary class of high-ranking salaried government officials. In parts of Minangkabau and Minahasa, the Dutch created such a class where none had existed before.[46] Members of that "artificial" class served as the administrative tools for the Dutch indirect rule in the former and for its direct variant in the latter.

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[44] Industrialization in the Netherlands began in the 1820s; it was not until about 1870 that it really took off. See, for example, Lee Soltow and Jan Luiten van Zanden, *Income and Wealth Inequality in the Netherlands, 16th - 20th Century* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1998), 146.

[45] In 1596, the first Dutch naval expedition to the East Indies, led by Cornelis de Houtman (1565-1599), arrived in the port of Banten, West Java.

[46] Elizabeth E. Graves, *The Minangkabau Response to Dutch Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), 42.

The peasants, too, underwent paradoxical changes in their way of life owing to the implementation of the Cultivation System. In Java, for example, as villages became territorially bounded and the peasants subject to a more rigorous discipline, they enjoyed greater mobility. Similarly, as village social hierarchy fossilized, many of them sought and found opportunities in the urban world. While agricultural work underwent more intensive and extensive exploitation under the mechanical regimentation of the Cultivation System, they learned new habits and skills necessary for the development of modern agriculture. Likewise, population boom and depletion in agricultural resources lead not only to "shared poverty" but also to "initiative and enterprise."[47]

Another important form of social change transpired in the Dutch East Indies from 1830 (or earlier) to 1900: the beginning of the making of new classes that were really middling in terms of income, influence, and status, and that identified themselves as distinct from (in many cases) the aristocrats, whom they envied for their unearned privileges and despised for their conceit, and from the peasant masses, which they saw as a backward and unenlightened. Ethnically diverse (for some were Chinese, Eurasians, and Arabs), they took up various occupations: Some served in the colonial bureaucracy as public prosecutors, schoolteachers, vaccinators, secretaries, warehousemasters, or officials of the irrigation, forestry, and telegraph services. Others made a living in the private sector, working as merchants, artisans, clergymen, or (in Java) as employers or employees in the new companies (small to large) dealing in sugarcane harvesting, bricklaying, entertainment, metalworking, agricultural processing, land transportation,

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[47] Robert E. Elson, *Village Java under the Cultivation System, 1830-1870* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), 323-324.

shipbuilding, or in the production of pottery, gunnysacks, and textiles. Still others, in Java and Sumatra, pursued careers in the publishing business as writers, editors, or journalists.

Some Asians in the Dutch East Indies, being perceptive of the changes occurring within their expanding social horizons, took advantage of the economic opportunities that the colonial society offered in the period from 1830 to 1900, such as the creation of a colonial bureaucracy to serve the Cultivation System (1830-1870) and Dutch private capitalism (1870-1900); the abolition of market tax in 1851; the expansion of money economy; the advent of wage labor and new business opportunities; the construction of networks of roads and railways; the rise of secular education (private, government-operated, and missionary-run).[48] In setting out to do so, they became middling class.

Although the complexity of the early nineteenth-century Dutch East Indies makes it hard to offer neat and definitive generalizations about its social hierarchies, we can still make some useful remarks on this subject, at least with respect to some of the communities that made up the colonial society. We may explore, for instance, the following questions: What did their social stratifications look like at the turn of the nineteenth century? Did they change in the course of the century? If so, how and why did the changes occur? And how, through this transformation, did the embryonic middling classes emerge among non-Europeans in the colony? To probe into these issues, we can examine three case studies: Java, Minangkabau in West Sumatra, and Minahasa in North

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[48] For the rise of the middling classes in nineteenth-century Java, consult, for example, M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since* c. *1200*, 4th ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 148, 156; M. C. Ricklefs, *Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830-1930)* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 24-29. For a similar phenomenon in West Sumatra, see Graves, *Minangkabau Response*, 48-49, 73-76, 83-86, 95-96, 106-107, 109-124, and 137-138.

Sulawesi. Gradually, by the end the nineteenth century, some of the Asian communities in these parts of the archipelago had found themselves living under Dutch hegemony.

1. 1. 1. The Making of the Asian Proto-Middling Classes in Java, 1830-1900

Throughout the nineteenth century Java was home to a complex society, whose component communities engaged in an interaction that involved conflict and consensus, competition and collaboration, as well as negotiation, persuasion, and coercion—within and among themselves. Enmeshed in globalization, Java was faced with the delayed and tempered impact of world-transforming events such as the French Revolution; the spread of Enlightenment ideas; mercantile and industrial capitalism; and the making of global empires. The ethnic diversity of Java's social world and its exposure to these world-historical processes meant that its social stratifications were complex and in flux. People on this island belonged to their own traditional communities and to the supra-ethnic colonial society. These social worlds had their own social hierarchies, which underwent transformation as they encountered one another in a rapidly changing global context.

For the greater part of the nineteenth century, at least two systems of social stratification existed in Java, one on top of the other: first, there was the Dutch-imposed legally-sanctioned, largely race-based social pyramid; second, there were traditional Asian social structures such as obtained among the Javanese, the Chinese, and the Arabs.[49] We can start by looking at the Javanese indigenous social hierarchy.

[49] For indigenous social structure in nineteenth-century Java, I rely on W. F. Wertheim, "Changes in Indonesia's Social Stratification," *Pacific Affairs* 28, no. 1 (March 1955): 41-42; Wertheim, *Indonesian Society*,133-169; and D. H. Burger *Structural Changes in Javanese*

1. 1. 1. 1. The Making of the Javanese Proto-Middling Classes in Java, 1830-1900

At the turn of the nineteenth century, the social stratification in central and east Java looked roughly like this. At the apex of the social pyramid were four Javanese princes, each ruling his fragment of the Mataram Empire: Hamengkubuwana and Pakualam with their realms in Yogyakarta, and Pakubuwana and Mangkunagara with theirs in Surakarta. Just beneath the princes one finds the *priyayi* (gentry), who included "nobles and officials, court-based administrators and local chiefs."[50] The nobles, who had blood ties to the princes "up to the fourth degree,"[51] and the court officials, some of whom were of commoner background, lived at or around the court. Local chiefs, not necessarily related by blood to the monarchs, governed the outer regions on behalf of the prince as *bupati* (regents) or as lower-ranking chiefs, such as *wedana* (district heads) and village headmen.[52] Together, the princes and the priyayi made up the ruling elite. An estimate in 1802 had it that the nobles constituted roughly 12.5 percent of the population.[53] Though some observers have described it as "feudal,"[54] the Javanese social

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Society: The Supra-Village Sphere, trans. Leslie Palmier (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Translation Series, 1956 [1949-1950]), 1.

[50] Heather Sutherland, "The Priyayi," *Indonesia* 19 (April 1975): 57-58.

[51] Burger, *Structural Changes*, 1.

[52] Some observers have suggested that village headmen were not part of the hereditary nobility. For an example of this view, see Leslie H. Palmier, *Social Status and Power in Java* (London: University of London's Athlon Press, 1959), 50. However, several village chiefs and their spouses in nineteenth-century East Java, for example, did hold aristocratic titles, such as *raden, raden ngabehi, raden tumenggung*, *raden ayu,* and *raden ayu tumenggung.* Consider, for instance, the parents and grandparents of the nationalist leader Dr. Soetomo. See Soetomo, *Toward a Glorious Indonesia: Reminiscences and Observations of Dr. Soetomo*, ed. Paul W. van der Veur, trans. Suharni Soemarmo and Paul W. van der Veur (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1987), 24-28.

[53] Clive Day, *The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java* (New York: MacMillan, 1904), 25-26, quoted in Leslie Palmier, "The Javanese Nobility under the Dutch," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, no. 2 (January 1960): 200.

[54] Burger, *Structural Changes*, 1.

structure did not rest on a fief system and large-scale landownership. For in Java, as in many societies in premodern Southeast Asia, the power of aristocrats stemmed from control of population and its labor and products rather than from control of land.[55] At the bottom of the social pyramid were the commoners; most of them were peasants but some were artisans or petty traders. (The peasantry had its own social hierarchy by which one's prestige was determined by such factors as landownership, age, and descent from the founders of the village.[56]) To their lords the peasants showed respect and submission, performed corvée labor, and rendered tribute. In return, the princes and the nobles not only preserved cosmic harmony and social stability but also provided their subjects with political, religious, and cultural leadership.[57]

Indigenous traders, as already mentioned, did exist in early nineteenth-century Java. Yet the current lack of precise knowledge about their social thought and core values around 1800 does not provide us with sufficient evidence to treat them as forming a commercial element of the middling classes. By 1800, the Javanese merchant communities had experienced a sharp decline in power and wealth, which we can attribute to three causes. First, since 1605 the VOC had been harassing the shipping business run by the Javanese merchants on the north coast, who dealt in the trade of rice to Malacca and spices from the Moluccas. Second, from 1616 to 1625, Sultan Agung

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[55] E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands East Indies*, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: B.M. Israël NV, 1975 [1938]), 184-185; Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968), 5-6, 68; Onghokham, "The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century" (PhD thesis, Yale University, 1975), 339-400.

[56] Palmier, *Social Status*, 38.

[57] Burger, *Structural Changes*, 1; Heather Sutherland, "The Priyayi," *Indonesia*, no. 19 (April 1975): 57-58; Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, 38, 83.

(r. 1613-1646) built his agrarian-based Mataram Empire by, among other things, crushing the north-coast cosmopolitan mercantile principalities. Third, to complete Agung's demolition job, his successor Amangkurat I (r. 1646-1677) stripped these mercantile communities of their remaining economic autonomy by wrecking their ships and imposing a prohibition on sailing. In response to this series of assaults, the merchants migrated to Banjarmasin or Makassar, relocating their operation and networks to these areas,[58] leaving behind them "a residue of small-scale indigenous traders who spread into the agrarian hinterland of Java."[59]

The Javanese social hierarchy displayed some degree of fluidity. A Javanese, male or female, could inherit nobility through both the paternal and maternal lines. And a noble's office could be bequeathed not only to his son but also to his nephew. The further one's kinship ties were from the monarch, the lower one's aristocratic status became. Thus after a few generations, a family's noble status would die out. There were ways in which one could upgrade one's nobility, for example, by marrying the king's son or daughter and by accomplishing difficult missions in the service of the monarch, to name only a few.[60]

The Javanese "feudal" social structure was to experience a metamorphosis in the course of the nineteenth century as it saw alterations in the function of the priyayi elite, changes in the life of the peasantry, and the genesis of the embryonic middling classes,

[58] Burger, *Structural Changes*, 4-5, and 7; Anthony Reid, "A Retreat from Commercialism," in *Indonesian Heritage*, vol. 1: *Early Modern History*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: Éditions Didier Millet, 1996), 76-77.

[59] Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 19.

[60] Denys Lombard, *Le carrefour javanais: essai d'histoire globale*, vol. 1: *Les limites de l'occidentalisation* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1990), 86-87; Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, 111.

both native and "foreign oriental" (Chinese and Arab). The transformation was a product of the complex and increasingly unequal encounter between Asian communities and the European agents of Dutch mercantile imperialism. It was the overall product of the various responses (compromise, negotiation, cooperation, resistance, confrontation) on the part of different, at times conflicting, social groups within the Asian communities to the attempts by competing Europeans to bring Java under their imperial rule. Of such attempts the most momentous were the administrative modernization that Napoleon's Dutch proconsul H. W. Daendels (r. 1808-1811) and the British Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles (r. 1811-1816) started and that the Dutch commissioners-general (1816-1830) continued to some degree; and the implementation of the Cultivation System (1830-1870) and economic liberalism (1870-1900).

When the bankrupt Dutch United East India Company (VOC) was officially dismantled in 1800, the state of the Netherlands assumed the merchant company's suzerainty over the Moluccas, Minahasa, Makassar, parts of Sumatra, and all of Java. In 1808 the Napoleonic regime, which controlled the Netherlands from 1795 to 1815, installed Daendels as the governor-general of Java, in charge, mainly, of defending the island from an expected British invasion. In his brief but busy reign, under the spell of Enlightenment ideals, he rushed to establish direct rule and press for efficiency, homogenization, centralization, and detraditionalization in the administration of Java.[61] To reach these objectives he took a number of measures. First, he set up a Bogor-based General Secretariat, from which he issued his policies and directives, and linked the

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[61] Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese* Priyayi (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1979), 6.

whole island together by constructing the Great Post Road. Second, he divided Java into nine roughly equally-sized prefectures and appointed former VOC officials as prefects to preside over these new administrative units. In discharging his duties the prefect was helped by his agents: the assistant residents and the *controleurs*. Of these officials some were Europeans and others were Eurasians.[62] Third, Daendels sought to convert the Javanese "feudal" elite to a class of native administrators in the service of the kingdom of the Netherlands. Accordingly, he started treating the princes as vassals and turned the regents from local lords into civil servants, bringing them under the command of the prefects, abolishing their hereditary privileges, and curtailing their customary rights to appanage benefices and to the corvée labor and tributes from the peasantry. Seeing Javanese society as consisting mainly of lords and peasants, Daendels—a son of the French Revolution—held the lords in contempt, for they seem to have struck him as icons of Java's *ancien régime*; he desired, rather unrealistically, to flush them out of Java's administration so that he could put the peasantry under his direct rule. [63]

Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Stamford Raffles, who governed Java during the British interregnum (1811-1816), picked up where Daendels had left off. In line with his English variety of the Enlightenment, he endeavored to bring Javanese peasants under British direct rule and wanted them to become free farmers, embrace money economy, and engage in free trade so that they could prosper, making enough money to pay their land tax and creating a profitable market for British textile. With this goal in mind, he

[62] Sutherland, ibid., 15.

[63] Sutherland, ibid., 7-8; Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 135; J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [1944]), 65; B. Schrieke, "The Native Rulers," in *Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke*, Part 1 (Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955), 186, 212.

pressed ahead with a reform package that included a) promoting the idea that the government was responsible for native welfare, b) making the village (not the regency) a unit of administration, and c) obliging the peasant to pay his land tax in cash to the government through the village chief and his European superiors, and d) turning the regent's territory from a regency into a district.[64] The reforms Raffles pursued sent a shock to Java's social hierarchy. For example, now that they had become district heads, the regents not only suffered the loss of their political and magisterial powers; they were also faced with the unsettling prospect of becoming salaried officials deprived of many of their traditional sources of revenue.

In the short run, the reforms undertaken by Daendels and Raffles had mixed results. On the one hand, both rulers failed to establish direct contact between the government and the peasantry. Nor did they succeed in converting the bupati to *salaried* officials of the government, for conditions required that they pay them their remunerations in the form of *ex officio* lands. On the other hand, owing to the introduction of the land tax, the regents stopped being the pivotal agents they used to be in the administration of Java; during the reigns of Daendels and Raffles, their position experienced its nineteenth-century nadir.[65]

In the long run, however, the significance of Daendels' and Raffles' reforms lay in the fact that they "set the tune for [the nineteenth] century":[66] they marked the first

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[64] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 139; Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 72, 77.

[65] Akira Nagazumi, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972), 9.

[66] C. Fasseur and D. H. A. Kolff, "Some Remarks on the Development of Colonial Bureaucracies in India and Indonesia," in *India and Indonesia from the 1920s to the 1950s: The Origins of Planning* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 35.

drive toward a modernist bureaucracy in Java, championing the conduct of a more "rational," interventionist, progress-oriented statecraft, one of whose idealist tasks being the protection of the weak from the strong and the improvement of people's well-being. This Western, Enlightenment-inspired statecraft, which would gain currency in the colony in the first decade of the twentieth century, ran counter to the current Javanese notion of statecraft, which defined as its central task the preservation of cosmic and social equilibriums with the result that kingship was about conservation rather than about development.[67]

In the decade after 1816, the restored Dutch regime pressed ahead with some elements of the Daendelsian-Rafflesian reform: a) the marginalization of the regents in the administration of Java by bringing their subordinates under the direct control of the residents, and b) the transformation of the regents and their subordinates above the village heads into salaried government officials. To the erosion of the regents' political control of their subjects was added the reduction of their revenue basis; not only were they stripped of the right to *ex officio* land; they were also prohibited from engaging in moneylending. They ended up becoming welfare officials allowed to employ their aura and prestige in the discharge of their tasks.[68] Like its predecessors, this policy was an attack on the social structure. In response to this development, the Javanese, lords and peasants alike, exercised their agency in differing ways. For example, the conservative aristocrats chafed under what they perceived as the erosion of their "feudal" autonomy, authorities, prestige, and privileges. Likewise, with the introduction of money taxation on

[67] Moertono, *State and Statecraft*, 2, 4, 38, 72, 83; Sutherland, *Bureaucratic Elite*, 4.
[68] Leslie Palmier, "Javanese Nobility," 212-213.

land, some peasants—and even some *priyayi* too—relied on Chinese, Arab, and Native moneylenders for cash and ended up falling prey to them. To make matters worse, they now had to pay tolls at the mushrooming government tollgates that Chinese revenue farmers operated. Besides these disaffected lords and peasants, there were Muslim clergymen who took offense at what they saw as the domination of Java by infidels. Before long the disaffection of these social groups boiled to a head. Finding their leader in Prince Diponegoro, they took up arms against both the Dutch and the pro-Dutch princes and nobles. The latter were no less interesting a social group to consider than their anti-Dutch counterparts; they chose to accommodate themselves to the reality of Dutch hegemony, thinking it was in their best interests to collaborate with the Dutch. Thus began the Java War (1825-1830), "the last stand of the Javanese aristocratic elite,"[69] a war the Dutch and their allies won to the detriment of the colonial government's treasury.

1830 was a watershed for Java's social history, for it was in this year that the Dutch government, seeking to save the Netherlands from the financial shambles brought about by the Java War and the secession of Belgium, decided to make its East Indies colonies profitable by introducing the Cultivation System in Java,[70] where it was to play an important role in the evolution of Java's social structure.

In Java, the Cultivation System was designed to work this way: rather than pay their land tax in cash, peasants were to set aside a portion of their lands and labor each

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[69] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 153.

[70] C. Fasseur, *The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, the Dutch, and the Cultivation System*, trans. R. E. Elson and Ary Kraal, ed. R. E. Elson (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1994), 27; Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 177; M. J. C. Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility in a Southeast Asian Society: Minahasa, 1677-1983* (Leiden: KITLV, 1998), 54.

year to grow cash crops (sugarcane, coffee, indigo) and deliver them to the colonial government, which in turn would ship the produce to the Netherlands and sell it at great profits. To ensure the Cultivation System's efficiency and preserve traditional Javanese institutions (for it was the Dutch interference in these that had caused the Java War), the Dutch colonial government "refeudalized" Javanese society by reinstating the old VOC policy of indirect rule and, treating Java as a state enterprise, it reorganized the island and its inhabitants as a cash-crop-producing "machine."[71] To this end, it sought the goodwill and support of the priyayi, putting them in charge of the preservation of peace and order and the exploitation of the Java's labor, taxes, and produce. Now, as native agents of the Dutch administration, the regents, wedanas, and village chiefs exercised their customary authority to compel the peasants to pay taxes, perform public works, and grow and surrender the specified cash crops.

From the Dutch perspective, this government-supervised program of cash crop production was quite a feat: not only did it defray the cost of administering Java and contribute one-fifth of the Netherlands's public revenue in the 1830s and the 1840s and one-third of it in the 1850s; it also resuscitated Dutch shipping (thereby ending the British-American monopoly in the Malay archipelago), restored Amsterdam's role as a great trading center for tropical commodities, and settled the Netherlands' public debt. Some of the money the Cultivation System made went into the construction of canals and

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[71] Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 174; John R. W. Smail, "Java, 1757-1875," in *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*, revised ed., ed. David Joel Steinberg (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1987), 157.

railroad networks, which played a key role in the country's economic development.[72] From the Indonesian perspective, which is of greater importance for this study, one of the Cultivation System's unintended effects was the emergence of embryonic non-European middling classes.

One can distinguish between the short-term and long-term effects of the priyayi's participation in the Cultivation System. The short-term consequences were favorable. In return for their collaboration, the priyayi were rewarded with better chances for wealth accumulation; they received a remunerative package consisting of salaries, appanage benefices, a percentage commission on cash crop deliveries, and gifts and personal services from the peasantry. In addition, now that it prioritized the appeasement of the elite over the protection of the commoners, the Dutch government strengthened the priyayi's social position, making their prestige more secure than it ever was under the VOC; for example, it provided the regents (but not their subordinates) with the right to hereditary succession of office.

In the long run, however, the priyayi's involvement in the Cultivation System from the 1830s to 1870 resulted in their deepening integration into and dependence on the colonial administration. [73] It also caused them to undergo a change from lords to bureaucrats; it led to the widening gap between the regents and the lower priyayi as well

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[72] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 144-145; Smail, "Java," 157; Michael Wintle, *An Economic and Social History of the Netherlands 1800-1920: Demographic, Economic, and Social Transition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 221; Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1965), 291-292; Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 210.

[73] The Cultivation System was liquidated piece by piece, starting with the abolition of the force delivery of pepper in 1862 and culminating with the passing of the Agrarian Law in 1870, which opened Java for private investment. Yet, it was not until 1919, that its last remnants in Java's north coast were dismantled. See, for instance, Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 150.

as to that between the entire priyayi class and the peasantry, their traditional source of support.[74]

The year 1830 was also a watershed for Java's political history in that it marked the beginning of the uncontested colonial rule by the Dutch over the island and its population. This, in essence, was an indirect rule that hinged on a collaboration of two unequal elites in the service of the Dutch crown: the senior Dutch and the junior Javanese. The smooth running of the Cultivation System relied heavily on this joint rule. The Dutch wing of the colonial administration, the *Binnenlandsch Bestuur*, consisted of the governor-general, residents, assistant-residents, and *controleurs* while its subordinate Javanese wing, the *Pangreh Pradja*, comprised the princes, regents, *patihs* (vice-regents), *wedanas* (district heads), assistant-wedanas (sub-district heads), and village chiefs. The tasks of the Pangreh Pradja involved tax collection, dispute arbitration, crime investigation, the facilitation of economic projects, and the preservation of peace and order.[75]

The trend of the *priyayi* becoming bureaucrats dependent on the colonial state and detached from the peasantry intensified during the Liberal Era (1870-1900), when the colonial government converted itself from an extractor of cash crops from Java to a provider of law, order, and infrastructure for the economic pursuits of the recently

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[74] Sutherland, *Bureaucratic Elite*, 11, 13, 16; Lombard, *Le carrefour javanais,* vol. 1, 88; M. C. Ricklefs, *Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (*c. *1830-1930)* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 23; Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 147; Palmier, *Social Status*, 32; George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952),11; Fasseur and Kolff, "Some Remarks," 39.

[75] James R. Rush, *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 19.

ascendant Dutch middling classes,[76] who sought fortunes in Java as civil servants, professionals, planters, bankers, and corporate managers. This shift in the function of the colonial government brought about the extension and modernization of the colonial administration, which in turn gave rise to the need for the professionalization of the priyayi as officials of the Pangreh Pradja. From 1878 onwards, aspiring priyayi officials were to undergo training at the chiefs' schools (*hoofdenschool*) in Bandung, Magelang, or Probolinggo. Besides the Dutch language, the curriculum of these schools seems to have covered basic, people's welfare-oriented subjects, such as "geodesy, cartography, architectural drawing, agriculture, [animal husbandry], and ethics." It was not until 1893, though, that the schools started to offer instruction in public administration.[77]

The professionalization of the native division of the colonial administration helped to bring about at least two kinds of social change. First, it undermined the social privileges of the priyayi. For one thing, mere aristocratic status did not suffice to guarantee their entry into the Pangreh Pradja; they were to acquire modern educational qualifications as well for the purpose. For another, sons of the Javanese nobles were to share access to the chiefs' schools with those of "other notable native people," for example the emergent "lesser priyayi," such as local administrators, teachers, or indigenous doctors (*dokter jawa*), or even village heads. Second, the training at the chiefs' schools exposed the sons of the priyayi to the core values of modern public service that ran counter to the traditional basic assumptions of their immediate ancestors:

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[76] Robison, *Indonesia*, 14.

[77] Nagazumi, *Indonesian Nationalism*, 16. The pilot project of the chiefs' schools was established earlier in Tondano, North Sulawesi.

"rationality, accountability, individualism, and social responsibility."[78] As I will show later in this chapter, a number of Javanese graduates of these schools, who seem to have adopted this set of values, would come to find the "traditional" Javanese order of things hard to stomach.

As far as their treatment of Javanese social stratification was concerned, in contrast to the anti-feudal, modernist drift of Daendels' and Raffles' policies, the Dutch colonial masters, from 1830 onwards, pursued a conservative policy of keeping Java's social hierarchy intact in the name of efficiency and stability; what they did was merely add themselves on top of the social pyramid. Despite this policy, the interplay between a) the attempt by some natives and "foreign orientals" at upward social mobility, and b) the structural opportunities created by the birth and development of a colonial bureaucracy gradually modernized; the pursuit of colonial economic projects such as the Cultivation System, the revenue farming, and the intrusion of private capital during the Era of Liberal Policy; and the introduction of secular and increasingly modernized schools, both private and government-operated; this complex interplay of individual agency and social structure caused the emergence of embryonic Asian middling classes in Java, native and "foreign."

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the reemergence of Javanese entrepreneurs. The Cultivation System and the liberal era meant the creation of wage labor, the growth of money economy, the abolition of market tax in 1851, the construction of railroads, the improvement of postal service, the introduction of telegraph

[78] Susan Abeyasekere, "Social and Economic Effects of Increasing European Penetration in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *Studies in Indonesian History*, ed. Elaine McKay (Carlton, Vic.: Pitman, 1976), 145.

and telephone services, and population growth. The discerning and entrepreneurial members of the Javanese society seized these opportunities to start producing a variety of services (such as bricklaying, entertainment, land transportation, and sugarcane harvesting) or manufacturing a wide range of goods (pottery, copra, and gunny sacks, tobacco goods, batik, and rubber goods, metal tools, clove cigarettes, silverware, and ships).[79] It is not yet clear, however, whether these Javanese entrepreneurs were new players or old ones. Whatever the case, they constituted the indigenous commercial section of the budding non-European middling classes in the Dutch East Indies.

No less important was the fact that in response to the job opportunities created by the rise of modern secular education, the growth of state apparatuses (since the start of the Cultivation System), and the expansion of private capital (since the beginning of the liberal era), some natives entered the lower ranks of colonial bureaucracy as government schoolteachers, *jaksas* (public prosecutors), vaccinators, and officials in charge of irrigation, forestry, telegraph service, and religion. Other natives and some Chinese found employment in private companies, sugar mills, or plantations. Still others—indigenous and Chinese—pursued independent professions as clergymen, authors, or journalists. Taken together, these new social figures made up the professional sector of the emergent middling classes in the colony.

The things that set the old *priyayi* and the commoners apart from the members of these embryonic middling classes were not simply the different ways they earned a living but also, among other things, the basis of their social status. For instance, while the

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[79] Denys Lombard, *Le carrefour javanais: essai d'histoire globale*, vol. 2: *Les réseaux asiatiques* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1990), 101; Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 148; Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 205.

prestige of the old priyayi rested on kinship ties to the monarch, the middling-class people, whom we may call "new priyayi," earned their status through the acquisition of modern, secular education, the possession of talents, and the display of professional achievements.[80] The new *priyayi*, it is important to keep in mind, were only part of the Asian early middling classes in late nineteenth-century Java.

To get some idea of what some of the middling-class people in Java looked like, the social ideas they had, and the things they did, it would be instructive to consider some biographical examples. As I will show, the indigenous early middling classes consisted of some *priyayi* who, so to speak, "went down" and some commoners who "went up."

Raden Soewadji (1865-1907), the father of the Indonesian nationalist leader Dr. Soetomo (1888-1938), was an example of *priyayi* who entered the middling classes. He adopted some middling-class values, especially freedom of expression, meritocracy, rationalism, and a sort of egalitarianism. The way in which and the reasons why he did so requires further study. He might have encountered these ideas during his study at Dutch-language schools or in the books that he read at the time. Whatever the case, he found it increasingly hard to put up with the ways of some *priyayi*, who insisted on preserving the "feudal" social hierarchy, and with those of certain colonials, who demanded that the racial hierarchy be upheld.

Soewadji was born in 1865 into a rural priyayi family. His father and mother carried the minor aristocratic titles of Raden and Raden Ayu. The father, R. Kartodiwirjo,

[80] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 156. It is important to keep in mind that in this study, class is defined not only by one's position in the social relations of production but also by the ideas that people have about themselves and the world, and by the commitment to common values, which shape the ways their possessors behave in their community.

was a wealthy, landowning village head, who had the privilege and means to send Soewadji to study, from 1881-1887, at the Dutch-administered Teachers' Training Schools (*kweekschool*) in Magelang and Bandung. [81] This training enabled Soewadji to secure a job as a teacher in government schools in Ambarawa and Rembang. After a while, he left teaching and joined the Pangreh Pradja, rising through the ranks as secretary, prosecutor, irrigation official, assistant wedana, and wedana before he died in 1907.[82]

A gentleman by birth though he was, he seems to have taken more pride as an aristocrat of the mind and expertise. In fact, he struck some of his Javanese contemporaries as a man of intelligence and assertiveness;[83] a gentleman who privileged reasonableness and individual merits over hereditary, bureaucratic, and racial ranks;[84] a stickler for neatness, cleanliness, and culinary perfection;[85] a believer in or wielder of the idea of social contract between state and society;[86] a man who—despite his weakness for card gambling—refrained from priyayi-style conspicuous consumption;[87] a person who practiced linguistic egalitarianism;[88] and a father who believed in the importance of modern education for his daughters.[89] On account of his middling-class attitudes and

[81] This was a four-year Teacher's Training School that could be attended by the graduates of seven-year primary schools. Soetomo, *Glorious Indonesia*, p. 4, fn. 142.
[82] Soetomo, *Glorious Indonesia*, 28, fn. 194.
[83] Ibid., 29, 32, 35.
[84] Ibid., 33, 36, 40.
[85] Ibid., 30-31, 32, 41.
[86] Ibid., 30, 31, 37, 39, 41.
[87] Ibid., 33, 35, 42.
[88] Ibid., 36, 38, 41.
[89] Ibid., 42.

behavior, which were untypical for Javanese priyayi at the time, some of his native contemporaries mistook him for a "Christian."[90]

Soewadji seems to have been in pain for being the new social type he was. He left the teaching profession because for the practice of it the government offered him a salary that, in his view, did not befit his station and qualifications. He switched, therefore, to the career of a Pangreh Pradja bureaucrat with the hope of finding in it some sort of a meritocracy. Much to his chagrin, however, the new job exposed him to "feudal" and ethnic discrimination, in part because—as Savitri Scherer argues—this "new highly intelligent bureaucratic official…managed to gain entry into the [Pangreh Pradja] through his professional teachers training,"[91] which was unusual. As a matter of fact, Soewadji's friends recalled how he came to verbal blows with his indigenous and European superiors, for he did not refrain from taking different stands from those of his higher-ups on issues relating to the conduct of civil administration. The job dissatisfaction he suffered led to him telling his then teenage son Soetomo: "I have only one request. I ask that none of my children will become government officials—please!"[92] In his autobiography, Soetomo remembers how the work of a bureaucrat caused Soewadji to experience his weekdays as "sacrifice":

> When my father was Assistant [Wedana] of Glodok and I happened to be home, he one day, very early in the morning, had to go by two-wheeled carriage to the Regency capital of Magetan. About 4:00 a.m., my mother was sitting in front of the charcoal brazier making toast for breakfast while my younger brother and I were also already awake. We saw our father

[90] Ibid., 42.

[91] Savitri Prastiti Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance: Early Nationalist Thought in Java" (MA thesis, Cornell University, 1975), 192.

[92] Soetomo, *Glorious Indonesia*, ibid., 57.

> come out of his room in his official uniform; standing in front of us he was grumbling about the bad state of affairs of those who worked as government officials. (I must have been thirteen then.) Because my father continued to grumble, I asked him: "Dad, why are you willing to do this kind of work?" My question was answered promptly, "[If] I do not do this work, how do you think all of us get our bread and butter?"[93]

The frustrations he faced in his day-to-day work and the tensions he experienced in the larger society might have played a part in undermining his health, leading to his early and rather sudden death.

The Javanese proto-middling classes were comprised not only of "defecting" priyayi but also of some commoners climbing up the social ladder on the strength of an alternative prestige underpinned by wealth, signs of religiosity, and expanding intellectual horizon. As Denys Lombard has pointed out, a new social type emerged in village Java of the 1890s: that of the Muslim entrepreneurial bourgeois. Examples of this new social figure included those natives who accumulated their capital by running small and medium enterprises dealing in copra, textile, batik, or clove cigarettes. Their wealth enabled them to go on a hajj to Mecca and—during their sojourns in the Hejaz—they encountered modernist versions of Islam, some elements of which they came to adopt. While their residence remained village-based, for business purposes they traveled back and forth between the country and the city. Their way of life displayed some features of the Muslim variant of the "protestant ethic" as well as an adherence to what look like middling-class core values. This social figure came into being as a result of certain native responses to the opportunities unintentionally provided by the Cultivation System (1830-1870) and private capitalism (1870-1900), such as the monetization of the rural economy,

[93] Ibid., 56.

the rise of wage labor, the indigenous entry into retail trade, and population growth. To take advantage of the new opportunities, some natives started to run small and medium enterprises, adopting some of the business practices of the Chinese entrepreneurs in Java and those of the money-lending sheiks in Mecca, creating a new sphere in the colonial economy which "existed in the shadow of the high-capitalistic Western economic life from which it benefitted partly, and by which it was checked partly, too."[94]

This road to the small entrepreneurial bourgeoisie was taken in the 1890s by, for example, a certain Haji Hassan, a man of thrift and frugality, and his enterprising son, Haji Muhammad, who lived in the Sundanese village of Ciwaduk near Cilegon, West Java.[95] As cultivators of and dealers in raw coconut, they grew wealthy and were able to go on a hajj in Mecca. Haji Hassan was a man of thrift and frugality. After the pilgrimage, Muhammad stayed behind for a while in Mecca, supposedly to deepen his knowledge of Islam, but in fact he spent most of his time studying the ways of the local men of commerce. Soon after his return to Java, he observed the Chinese to learn the technological and managerial aspects of the copra industry and then set up a family firm which specialized in copra production and marketing. He ran the company along modern lines and expanded its operation. From an entrepreneurial standpoint, the making of the company signified his advancement from a dealer in raw materials to a manufacturer of processed goods. Given the increasing size and complexity of his operation, he found it

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[94] J. Vredenbregt, "The Haddj: Some of Its Features and Functions in Indonesia," *Bijdragen tot de Land-, Taal-, en Volkenkunde* 118, no. 1 (1962): 114.

[95] For a remarkable story of these men and their family, see Achmad Djajadiningrat, *Herinneringen van Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat* [Recollections of Achmad Djajadiningrat] (Amsterdam-Batavia: G. Kolff, 1936), especially the section titled "Een vooruitstrevende familie in de desa" (A progressive village family), 238-241.

necessary to "convert" to modern ways of conducting business affairs: not only did he start to carry out his commercial correspondence in Malay and in roman script, which he and his partners learned by taking private lessons from an assistant-teacher of Cilegon; he also adopted European bookkeeping. Living the life of a respectable businessman, he found it pragmatic to dress in Western style, time-saving to travel by bicycle, and fashionable to set his village home and its furniture in European style. Likewise, his brothers, who served as his business partners, also came to adopt parts of the middling-class lifestyle. To celebrate a circumcision or a wedding in the family, for example, rather than organize the usual *selamatan*, they threw a Western-style dinner party, where the guests—facing a table and seated in a chair in an open hall well-lighted by gasoline lamps—ate their meal with a spoon and a fork in their hands. [96] The adoption of European middling-class cultural elements by Haji Muhammad and his brothers occurred bit by bit because they did not want to offend the priyayi. They seem to have been aware that they belonged, in Vredenbregt's words, to "a new class within [colonial] society in Java who emerged next to and in competition with the [priyayi]."[97]

1. 1. 1. 2. The Making of the Chinese Proto-Middling Classes in Java, 1830-1900

For the greater part of the nineteenth century, as the Dutch developed into the ruling elite of Java, they presided over the mercantile and industrial capitalist transformation of the island and its society to deliver wealth to, mainly, the ruling groups in the Netherlands. In pursuit of this goal they found it cheap and safe to exercise indirect

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[96] Ibid., 241.
[97] Vredenbregt, "The Haddj," 116.

rule, relying heavily on the Javanese, Chinese, and Arab community leaders to keep peace and order in the latter's communities and to manage the extraction of Java's money, labor, and produce. Thus, from 1830 to 1870, besides using the priyayi as junior administrators to govern the Javanese and ensure the obedient participation of the peasants in the Cultivation System, the Dutch depended on Java's Chinese dignitaries for the execution of similar tasks. For the maintenance of tranquility and social order, they put to work the Chinese officer system, whereby they placed Chinese officials they called "captains," "lieutenants," and "majors" in charge of managing their own community's affairs, ranging from customs and religion through the registration of births, deaths, marriages and divorces to the taking of oaths. For the extraction Java's wealth, the Dutch applied the revenue farming system, under which they "leased to the Chinese revenue farmers" the monopoly concessions to purchase specific agricultural commodities; levy road tolls, market fees, and tax on cattle slaughtering; operate "pawnshops, gambling dens, and brothels"; deal in salt and alcoholic beverages and harvest swallows' nests"; and most importantly, sell opium.[98] It is reasonable, therefore, to view the Cultivation System and the revenue farms as the two pillars of Dutch mercantile capitalism in Java from 1830 to 1870.[99]

In addition to serving as Chinese officers and operating as revenue farmers, the Chinese of Java played an indispensable part in the colonial economic order by conducting, as wholesalers and distributors, most of the intermediary trade in Java; they

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[98] Rush, *Opium to Java*, 98-101.

[99] Shiraishi, Takashi, "Anti-Sinicism in Java's New Order" in *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe*, ed. Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 194-195.

established the connection the urban large European companies and rural Javanese producers and consumers, enabling the exchange of imported manufactured goods and agricultural commodities.[100] Moreover, as moneylenders, they helped to intensify, for better or worse, the monetization of Java's economy.

It is important to have some idea of the social hierarchy within this indispensable minority in nineteenth- century Java and the changes it went through. Chinese trading communities had been present in the port cities of the Indonesian archipelago as early as the tenth century.[101] For centuries before 1800, Java itself had been home not only to the indigenous majority (Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese) but also to the Chinese and Arab minorities. Since the VOC era, as a community of "independent merchants and artisans," the Chinese served as the essential economic "intermediaries between the Dutch and the [native] population," not only in Java but in many parts of the Dutch East Indies.[102] Unfortunately for the Chinese, their economic importance did not translate into political power.

The Chinese population in Java and Madura experienced growth during the nineteenth century. In 1800, it numbered about 100,000 in Java alone; in 1885, there were 221,959 Chinese in Java and Madura; and in the 1890s, they increased in number to

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[100] Donald Earl Willmott, *The Chinese of Semarang: a Changing Minority Community in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), 4-5.

[101] "Chinese in Indonesia," in *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 75; Ahmat Adam, *The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Consciousness* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University Press, 1995), 58.

[102] Wertheim, *Indonesian Society*, 58, 141; "Chinese in Indonesia," *Historical Dictionary*, ed. Cribb and Kahin, 76.

277,000.[103] At the turn of the nineteenth century, most Chinese were mestizos or mestizas, the product of intermarriage between Chinese male migrants and indigenous women, and of the synthesis between Chinese and local cultures. While by profession most Chinese in Java were traders, some earned a living as cultivators, brewers, smiths, sugar millers, loggers, artisans, and craftsmen.

Chinese migration to Java was undertaken mostly by laborers, peasants, peddlers, and petty traders in search of better standards of living than those they faced in mainland China. The new arrivals started out, usually, as shop assistants or peddlers for a while until they accumulated enough capital to operate as independent shopkeepers, traders, or merchants. It is important to note that change in occupation meant upward social mobility. Most migrants were men, who then married indigenous women or with Chinese mestizas. Most members of the Chinese community in Java were not China-born (*totok*) but Java-born; Java-born Chinese (*peranakan*) had an Indonesian mother, grandmother, or great-grandmother.[104] Chinese in Java comprised a number of dialect groups: Hokkians, Hakkas, Cantonese, Hokchia, or Henghua.

The social hierarchy that obtained among the Chinese in Java and in other places in Southeast Asia differed from that which was found in mainland China. In their land of origin, the social pyramid consisted of four strata. At the top were the landowning scholarly gentry, whose prestige was based on land ownership and the mastery of classics and calligraphy. This cultural capital enabled them to take the civil service examination. The passing of this examination secured them government posts. The second level in the

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[103] Lombard, *Le carrefour javanais*, vol. 2, 211. Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 213.
[104] Willmott, *Chinese of Semarang*, 17.

social structure was occupied by farmers. The artisans and laborers made up the third layer. Standing at the bottom of the social structure were merchants. Although they might be as well-off as the scholarly gentry, their social status was the lowest.

The very act of migrating to Java had the effect of turning this social hierarchy on its head. Wealth came to be the primary criterion of success and prestige in Java's Chinese community. The second determinant of social worth was education; its acquisition, however, presupposed the possession of sufficient wealth. Occupation served as the third basis for the attainment of social prestige. Birthplace, being China-born as opposed to Indies-born, was the least important contributor to the status of the Chinese in Java.[105]

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the highest rung of the Chinese social ladder in Java was occupied by "a tiny but influential elite" whose "families and business associates" made up the Chinese community's *Cabang Atas* or highest branch.[106] These people— "the richest and most successful of the Chinese" of Java— operated the great Chinese business networks that dominated the non-European sector of Java's economy.[107] To this commercial success, the Cabang Atas Chinese added another two bases of their prestige and power: "the acquisition of revenue farms [especially opium farms] and the appointment as Chinese officers." They secured the latter by investing part of their funds in currying favor with Dutch officials.[108] At the middle level of the social scale, we find, in Java's major cities, many owners of "large and elegantly

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[105] Ibid., 116-118.
[106] Rush, *Opium to Java*, 83.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid., 88-89.

fitted up shops, filled with European, Chinese and Japanese stores. Their workmanship is generally quite equal to European, and in every case they can far undersell their Western rivals."[109] The bottom of the status system seems to have been occupied by a class of petty itinerant traders, whom Anna Forbes, the wife of the British naturalist Henry O. Forbes (1851-1932), described in 1887 as follows:

> [They went about] as peddlers, carrying all sorts of wares from silk to a linen button, from a China service to a thimble. When you emerge from the bedchamber to the verandah to sip your morning coffee, John Chinaman is before you. His wares are already undone. He presses you to buy with a persistence to which at first you fall a prey, were it only to rid you of his importunity.[110]

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the bulk of the commercial section of the embryonic Asian middling classes in nineteenth-century Java came from the Chinese community. But Java's Chinese were not simply a community of merchants and entrepreneurs. Since 1869, some peranakan Chinese had been participating in the press industry, at first as editors of periodicals and later, especially from the 1880s, as owners of printing companies and publishers of Malay newspapers.[111]

This development marked the emergence around the 1870s of the Chinese professional elements of Java's Asian middling classes and of their new "socio-cultural consciousness."[112] The peranakan Chinese writers, editors, and publishers articulated middling-class social ideas and offered printed media in which Chinese readers could

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[109] Ann Forbes, *Insulinde: Experiences of a Naturalist's Wife in the Eastern Archipelago* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1887), 15.

[110] Ibid., 15-16.

[111] Adam, *Vernacular Press*, 58, 63-69.

[112] Ibid., 61-63.

conduct public debates about this new consciousness and related issues. For example, on June 14, 1872 and July 23, 1873, the Chinese readers of the Malay newspaper *Bintang Timor* (Eastern Star) complained about two segregationist regulations that the Dutch colonial regime imposed on their ethnic community: the residential zoning system and the travel pass system; while the former "restricted their domicile to…Chinese quarters," the latter "required [them to] obtain visas "even for short trips," and apply for new visas "for every four days spent away from home."[113] At least, such complaints implied a critique of the racial order that defines one's social worth on the basis of the color of one's skin rather than on one's wealth or achievements. In addition, on November 17, 1877, a Chinese reader of the Malay newspaper *Bintang Timor* argued that Chinese children needed a kind of Dutch-language school where they could learn to synthesize Chinese tradition and Western modernity.[114]

An instructive example of the peranakan Chinese who entered the printing-press world in nineteenth-century Java and who served as the precursor of the pan-Chinese minority-nationalist movement emerging in 1900, which helped inspire similar movements among Natives in the Dutch East Indies, was the writer Lie Kim Hok (c. 1853-1912).

Born on November 1, 1853 in Bogor West Java, Lie received most of his education in Dutch Protestant mission schools.[115] From 1863 to 1866, he attended one in

[113] Ibid., 59.
[114] Ibid., 61-62.
[115] In the second half of the nineteenth century, it was common in Java for Chinese of moderate means to send their children to such schools. While they wanted Western-style, modern education for their children, access to government-funded schools that offered it was "restricted to children of the wealthy who had already possessed a good knowledge" of Dutch. Many

Cianjur, which was managed by Christian Albers (1837-1920), a missionary of the Netherlands Missionary Union (NZV). From 1866 to 1869, he undertook his study at a private Chinese school. From 1869 to 1873, he went to a mission school in Bogor that the missionary S. Coolsma (1840-1926) started in 1869 and that his future brother-in-law, the Calvinist missionary D. J. van der Linden (1837-1885), took over later on. Influenced though he was by Christian ideas—as is evident in some of his oeuvre—he never converted to the religion. While studying under the Dutch missionaries, Lie helped them as an assistant-teacher. In the process, he learned how to read and write Sundanese, Malay, and, probably, Dutch, which proved expedient for his later career as author and translator. As an assistant to Van der Linden, whom he befriended and who, from 1876 to his death in 1885, edited and published the Christian monthly *De Opwekker* [The Awakener] and the Malay newspaper *Bintang Djohar* [Morning Star], Lie received his on-the-job training in the business of writing, printing, and publishing. During this apprenticeship under Van der Linden between 1876 and 1880 he published some of his own works. In the meantime, he operated a school in Bogor, which he established, on Van der Linden's advice, for Chinese children who, for some reason, "could not attend the mission schools in the mornings." When Van der Linden died in 1885, Lie purchased the printing press from his mentor's widow and, with the startup capital provided by

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peranakan Chinese thus saw the mission schools as "an attractive alternative." While some of the Chinese students of the schools did convert to Christianity, quite a few others saw the modern education they received there simply as "a means to business success" in a changing colonial world and, consequently, were not interested in a religious conversion. See Charles A. Coppel, "From Christian Mission to Confucian Religion: The Nederlandsche Zendingsvereeniging and the Chinese of West Java 1870-1910," in *Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Indonesia: Essays in Honour of Professor J. D. Legge*, ed. David P. Chandler and M. C. Ricklefs (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 19-20.

himself and his colleagues, started producing "books for schools and office requirements" as well as accounts of Chinese conversions to Christianity and the second editions of his own works. For unclear reasons, there was a hiatus between 1887 and 1897 in Lie's participation in the printing industry. In 1898 he reappeared on the publishing landscape, serving as a journalist for the weekly *Pengadilan* [The Court]. In the meantime he contributed considerably to the Confucian revival movement in the Dutch East Indies. His contribution consisted of the publication of his Malay biography of Confucius in 1897, the promotion of modern education for Chinese children, and the organizing work he performed with his colleagues that succeeded in creating the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan in 1900, a pan-Chinese association devoted to the social progress of the Chinese community in the Dutch East Indies.[116] Lie was one of the pioneers of Malay *peranakan* Chinese literature,[117] which played an important role in the genesis of modern Indonesian literature. His output—originals and translations—included about twenty-five books of "narrative poems, novelettes, and stories" and linguistic studies.[118] As a translator of European works into *peranakan* Malay, he served as a cultural broker in three social worlds: *peranakan* Chinese, Native, and West European.

The wealthy and prominent among Java's Chinese absorbed certain ingredients of the European middling-class way of life. Following the example of the upper middling-class Europeans, some of whom in their leisure time enjoyed themselves at social clubs, called *societeits* in Dutch or *roemah bola* in Malay, such as the Harmonie or the

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[116] Adam, *Vernacular Press*, ibid., 65-66; G. L. Koster, "Making It New in 1884: Lie Kim Hok's *Syair Siti Akbari*," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, and Volkenkunde* 154, no. 1 (1998): 96.

[117] Ibid., 95.

[118] Adam, *Vernacular Press*, 66.

Concordia, the Chinese dignitaries organized, from the late 1870s on, their own similar establishments in Java. For example, in 1875, they founded the Societeit Betawie in what is now Jakarta with a view to providing a fashionable environment for the well-to-do Chinese to pursue "cultural activities," have fun, and foster mutual understanding. Later, in the 1880s, smaller Chinese social clubs proliferated in the towns of Java.[119]

1. 1. 1. 3. The Making of the Arab Proto-Middling Classes in Java, 1830-1900

The Arab community in Java comprised not only people from the Arabian Peninsula, especially the Hadramaut, but also those from "the near and Middle East" and "the Indian Muslims."[120] While Arab temporary presence in the archipelago had been reported as early as the fifth century, the large wave of Arab immigration to the region did not happen until the second half of the nineteenth century,[121] when such travel was made much easier by "the advent of steamships and the opening of the Suez canal in 1869."[122] Due to the taboo on women traveling overseas, most if not all of the Arab migrants were men, who then espoused indigenous women, started a family, and embarked on commerce. They formed an Arab mestizo community that preserved its cultural identity by preferring endogamy among their offspring and maintaining

[119] Ibid., 62.
[120] Van Niel, *Emergence*, 15.
[121] "Arabs," *Historical Dictionary*, Cribb and Kahin, 16-17.
[122] Johann Heiss and Martin Slama, "Genealogical Avenues, Long-Distance Flows and Social Hierarchy: Hadrami Migrants in the Indonesian Diaspora," *Anthropology of the Middle East* 5, no. 1(Spring 2010): 34; Huub de Jonge, "Abdul Rahman Baswedan and the Emancipation of the Hadramis in Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 32, no. 3 (2004): 375.

patrilineal genealogy.[123] The Arab community in Java and Madura increased in number during the second half of the nineteenth century. While in 1859 there were only 4,992 Arabs—including men, women, and children—on the islands, they had grown to 7,495 in 1870, 10,888 in 1885,[124] and about 18,000 in 1900.[125]

Typically, in earning their living, the Arab immigrants started as shop assistants or small traders "on behalf of [an Arab] relative or … acquaintance already resident in the colony." Once they accumulated enough capital, they began to operate as independent traders. Like the Chinese, some of them played the role of intermediary traders, who bought goods from European companies or Middle Eastern suppliers and sold them to the fellow merchants and to Native consumers. Others engaged in moneylending. Still others, the most successful among the Arab traders, evolved into landlords.[126] It is important to note that, from the Dutch perspective, the role of the Arabs as intermediary economic agents was superfluous because the most important parts of intermediate trade and revenue farming in Java had already been performed effectively by the Chinese. Yet, from the standpoint of native-migrant relations, the Arabs had the cultural advantage over the Chinese: sharing the same religion, the Arabs and many a Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese belonged to the transnational Islamic *ummah* (community).[127]

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[123]Heiss and Slama, "Genealogical Avenues," 35; Frode F. Jacobsen, *Hadrami Arabs in Present-Day Indonesia: An Indonesia-Oriented Group with an Arab Signature* (London: Routledge, 2009), 2.

[124] N. Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 21.

[125] Van Niel, *Emergence*, 15.

[126] Mobini-Kesheh, *Hadrami Awakening*, 22.

[127] Van Niel, *Emergence*, 15.

At first, the social hierarchy among the Arab community in the Dutch East Indies was “rather rigid” and based on lineage: status was determined by descent from great ancestors and strengthened by an inflexible implementation of “the Islamic legal principle of *kafa’ah*” or social equivalence, according to which marriage was to be contracted by man and woman of equivalent social standing. Yet, before long, the adaptation by the Arab immigrants to the social world of the Dutch East Indies led to considerable change in their social hierarchy.

Originally, among the Arabs in Hadramaut, for example, the social pyramid consisted of four strata: the *sayyids*, the *syaikhs*, the *qabā’il*, and the *masākīn*. The sayyids, who claimed to be the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, inhabited the top layer, forming a socio-religious elite in charge of religious instruction and conflict resolution. Never to carry weapons was one of the signs of their social distinction. They made a livelihood as traders and landowners. Together, the syaikhs (religious scholars) and the qabā’il (tribesmen) occupied the middle echelon of the social pyramid. The syaikhs were the indigenous religious elite, whose prestige was outshined by that of the sayyids, who migrated into their society. The syaikhs continued to performed religious services to the community as the sayyids did. Yet, the services offered by the former were inferior in prestige to those delivered by the latter. The syaikhs took pride in their claim to descent from famous saints. The qabā’il included “mutually competitive,” arms-carrying social groups. They served as secular rulers who controlled the countryside and were considered as less pious than sayyids and syaikhs. Their prestige was derived from their martial skills, which they deployed in defense of themselves and their dependents.

At the base of the social structure were the class of the masākīn (the poor)); to this class belonged peasants, "traders, artisans, laborers, servants, and, in the distant past, slaves." These were people who were unable to claim descent from great ancestors. The interaction among these classes in Hadramaut was subject to "explicit rules." For example, the syaikhs, the qabā'il, and the masākīn were to kiss the hand of a sayyid when they greeted him. Only the sayyids had the right to the titles of *sayyid* and *habib* (beloved). It was forbidden for the *sharifahs* (women of the sayyid class) to marry a man outside their group.[128]

Be that as it may, the reality that many of the Arabs in the Dutch East Indies earned a livelihood as merchants came to undermine the rigidity of this social hierarchy. As a matter of fact, by the late nineteenth century the social pyramid seems to have been on the verge of collapse. To begin with, some sayyids complained about the failure of Arabs of the lower strata—of whom some had become middling class—to show customary respect to them. In addition, as Van den Berg observed in the mid-1880s, the views of the sayyids no longer held sway in the public opinion of Java's Arab community. One reason for this was that they were seen to have failed to exercise self-restraint in Java. For instance, they indulged—like the rest of their fellow Arab migrants—in commerce and some of them practiced usury, even participated in dance.[129] Third, since the 1820s, the Dutch had appointed non-sayyid dignitaries as heads of the Arab settlements in Java, who—like the Chinese "officers"—bore titular military ranks (*luitenant, kapitein*, or *majoor*) and were in charge of keeping peace and order in their

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[128] De Jonge, "Baswedan," 376-377; Mobini-Kesheh, *Hadrami Awakening*, 25.

[129] L. W. G. Van den Berg, *Le Hadhramout et les colonies arabes dans l'archipel Indien* (Batavia: Imprimatur du gouvernement, 1886), 189.

ethnic community and managing its internal affairs, for example by mediating between the Arabs and the colonial government, keeping statistical records and offering advice to the government a propos their community, and spreading "government regulations and decrees."[130] More than half of the Arab officers were of non-sayyid background,[131] to the dismay of the sayyids who, clinging to the old social hierarchy, considered themselves as more deserving of such positions of authority and prestige.[132] These and similar changes in the social structures of the Arabs, Chinese, and natives were indicative of the great shift that took place in nineteenth-century colonial Java from aristocracy to plutocracy and, later, meritocracy of talents.

While some sayyids were determined to preserve their aristocratic status and traditional way of life, others undertook embourgeoisement and modernization, seeing the two processes as a key to prosperity, prestige, and meaning in the changing world. Consider, for example, Abdullah bin Alwi Alatas (*c*. 1850-1929), a third-generation Batavian sayyid who ended up building a bourgeois family of wealth, education, and influence. He took up his study in Mecca and, prior to his return to Java, not only visited some countries of the Middle East but also travelled to India, Singapore, and Australia. Within a few decades, through buying and selling houses, he amassed so much wealth that he emerged as one of the richest Arabs in Batavia.[133] He was the owner, for example, of "a fine European-style house" in Tanah Abang, which later became the

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[130] Mobini-Kesheh, *Hadrami Awakening*, 26.
[131] Ibid., 26-27.
[132] Sumit Kumar Mandal, "Finding Their Place: A History of Arabs in Java under Dutch Rule, 1800-1924" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1994), 72.
[133] Mobini-Kesheh, *Hadrami Awakening*, 26.

Museum of Textile.[134] Apparently, his overseas study and travels led him to sympathize with the pan-Islamic movement and convinced him that it was necessary to pursue a modernity that synthesized Islamic faith and European science and technology. Accordingly, Alatas played a part in promoting modern education for Hadrami Arabs in Java. He even established a school for them.[135] He sent his own sons—Usman, Muhammad, Hasyim, and Ismail—to get their education in the centers of such a pursuit: Turkey and Egypt. He provided his daughters with the chance to learn unusual subjects for Java's Arab women at the time: English and piano playing. The four sons' apprenticeship in modernity culminated in the completion of their studies in Europe. While Usman received his degree in medicine from the Sorbonne and earned one in engineering in the United Kingdom, Hasyim studied the science of agriculture in Turkey and Ismail took up economics in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.[136] In the first half of the twentieth century, Ismail and Muhammad became members of the Volksraad or the People's Advisory Council.

1. 1. 2. The European Middling Classes in Java, 1830-1900

In nineteenth-century Java, the people identified legally as "Europeans" consisted actually of Dutch, other Westerners, and Eurasians. Although they eventually achieved political, economic, military, and technological superiority, they always formed a small minority on the island. In 1811, when the British captured Java, there were no more than

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[134] Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 63-64; Alwi Shahab, *Saudagar Baghdad dari Betawi* [A Baghdad merchant from Batavia] (Jakarta: Republika, 2004), 3.

[135] Mobini-Kesheh., *Hadrami Awakening*, 28.

[136] Ibid., 27-28; Shahab, *Saudagar Baghdad*, 4.

4,000 people with European status.[137] In 1856, this number had increased to 20,000, of which most earned a living as government officials and about half were actually Eurasians. For comparison, in 1855, Java's total population was 10.9 million people.[138] In the 1870s, during the first decade of the Liberal Era, Europeans numbered 27,000 out of a total population of 18 million.[139] Finally, in 1900, Java and Madura were home to about 62,477 Europeans out of a total population of 28,746,638.[140]

From the 1860s onwards, with the advent of private capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), the ethnic configuration of Java's European community began to change in that more and more full blood Dutch entered and inhabited the island, bringing with them their wives and children and maintaining their middling-class ideas and lifestyles. It has been argued that unlike their indigenized predecessors, these new Dutch tended to live in the confines of their own socio-cultural bubble. However, there is considerable evidence of more than superficial interaction—in Java and in the "Outer Islands"—between some members of the Dutch middling classes and those of the native aristocracy, the Chinese and Arab dignitaries, and the embryonic Asian middling classes. Such interaction happened in spite of the legal racial hierarchy that some elements in the Dutch ruling elite tried to impose on the colonial society.[141]

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[137] Jean G. Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and Eurasians in Colonial Indonesia*, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009 [1983]), 128.

[138] Adam, *Vernacular* Press, 11.

[139] Rush, *Opium to Java*, 13.

[140] Joh. F. Snelleman, *Encyclopædie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Part 4 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff-E. J. Brill, 1905), 516.

[141] Consider, for example, the friendship and cultural collaboration between the Sundanese aristocrat and man of letters Moehamad Moesa (1822-1886) and the Dutch civil servant, tea planter, and, later, Honorary Advisor on Native Affairs, Karel Frederik Holle (1829-1896). Holle married one of Moesa's younger sisters. On Moesa and Holle, see Mikihiro

From the era of the VOC to the mid-1850s, the predominant group in Java's European community consisted of "Dutch royal cronies" and indigenized Eurasian elites.[142] Some were officials in the colonial administration and thanks to this position enjoyed the highest prestige in their community's social hierarchy. Others, who served the colonial government as soldiers, had a social standing that was inferior to that of the officials.[143] This social structure underwent a metamorphosis in the mid-1850s as the Dutch middling classes started to take an increasingly important role in the societies and economies of both the metropole and the colony. In 1860s, when the Netherlands experienced an Industrial Revolution, there emerged a very dynamic bourgeoisie of wealth and education championing plutocracy and meritocracy.[144] The professional and entrepreneurial elements of this bourgeoisie succeeded in having the Dutch aristocrats in the metropole share power and wealth with them. Finding their support in the criticism of the Cultivation System that Eduard Douwes Dekker conveyed in his oeuvre and that Baron van Hoëvell articulated in his speeches to the parliament (which took over control of colonial policy from the king in 1848) they succeeded in forcing the colonial government to open Java to private capital in the 1860s and dismantle the Cultivation System in 1870. Promoting economic liberalism, the Dutch middling classes wanted to channel Java's wealth to their own coffers rather than to those of the government.[145] Thus, in the 1860s and the 1870s, Java saw the influx of a new type of Dutch: middling-

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Moriyama, *Sundanese Print Culture and Modernity in 19th-Century West Java* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), 112. See also Taylor, *Social World of Batavia*, 135-158.

[142] Shiraishi, "Anti-Sinicism," 197.

[143] Wertheim, *Indonesian Society*, 138.

[144] Wintle, *Economic and Social History*, 300, 302.

[145] Van Niel, *Emergence*, 6.

class people seeking fortunes as educated civil servants, professionals, planters, sugar millers, bankers, and corporate managers. (This was indeed a new phenomenon, for in the first half of the century, to go the East Indies was the last thing the average middling-class Dutch wanted to do.[146]) In the age of private capitalism, the middling-class Dutch enjoyed high social prestige. Some planters, for example, gained power and status "often equal" to that of the high-ranking Javanese priyayi.[147] And by the 1880s, some middling-class Dutch in Java had evolved into "a class of wealthy Europeans leading a life of splendor and comfort."[148]

In spite of their commitment to the "positive balance policy" (*batig slot*) of the colonial government, the middling-class Dutch demanded that it spend public funds on a variety of facilities they found indispensable for their way of life, such as "schools for their children and subordinates, medical [care] for their families and their coolies, irrigation for their fields, and railways for their produce" as well as post, telegraph, and telephone services for their communication.[149] Consequently, in support of the expanding private capitalism—at first individual and later corporate—the colonial state undertook further rationalization, centralization, and extension. From 1866 to 1870, the colonial bureaucracy set up new divisions: first, it created the Departments of a) Interior Administration, b) Education, Religion, and Industry, c) Public Works, and d) Finance; then it established the Department of Justice.[150]

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[146] Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 300.
[147] Wertheim, *Indonesian Society*, 138.
[148] Adam, *Vernacular Press*, 1.
[149] Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 175; Shiraishi, "Anti-Sinicism," 199.
[150] Sutherland, *Bureaucratic Elite*, 14.

Besides requests for infrastructure, they presented the colonial government with political demands; for instance, they asked for more financial autonomy and more local self-government.[151] Such demands set an example which the emergent urban middling-class Asians noticed, deemed desirable, and would, from 1900 onwards, emulate.

1. 1. 3. Racial Hierarchy in Java, 1830-1900

Besides their own internal social hierarchies, the Javanese, the Chinese, and the Arabs were subjected to a racial hierarchy defined by Dutch colonial law and enforced by Dutch economic and political powers. The colonial government used legal-racial classification and stratification to make sure the Cultivation System could work in ways that it saw as more orderly and less complicated. Thus, in 1848 a legal distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans came into being with the introduction of the new commercial and civil codes together with codes of civil and criminal procedure applicable exclusively to Europeans.[152] Later in 1854 the colonial government enacted *Regeeringsreglement* (Constitutional Regulation), Article 109, distinguishing between two major ethnic groups: Europeans and native Christians on the one hand and non-Christian Natives and "Foreign Orientals" (Chinese, Arabs, and Indians) on the other. In 1855 the two-layered legal-racial classification and hierarchy became three-layered. While still sharing the criminal law with the Natives, the Chinese and Arabs were now subject to European private law. As a result, they occupied an intermediate echelon in the legal racial hierarchy below the Europeans and above the Natives; they also came to

[151] Van Niel, *Emergence*, 7-8.
[152] Cribb and Kahin, eds., "Race," in *Historical Dictionary*, 363.

enjoy a greater prestige than Native commoners.[153] The indigenous nobility, however, retained a social status higher than that of the Foreign Orientals. To simplify a bit, these developments led to the emergence of "a pyramid-like social structure…with the Europeans at the pinnacle, followed by Chinese and Arabs, then [N]atives, in decreasing order of economic and political power.[154]" If and when these and similar regulations were enforced in Java, they affected people's lives:

> A person's [legally defined] racial status … determined where one could live, what taxes one paid, to which laws one was subject, before which courts one was tried, and, if found guilty of a crime, how (and with what degree of harshness) one was punished. It even determined what a person could wear, for…it was illegal, in the words of the 1872 statute, "to appear in public attired in any manner other than that of one's ethnic group." A native could not dress up as a European, nor could a Chinese [male] cut off his Manchu braid.[155]

Yet, social reality in late nineteenth century Java seems to have been far more complicated than the law makes it appear. Despite the law, multicultural encounters occurred among ethnic groups on Java, which resulted in the adoption of hybrid cultures, interracial cohabitations and marriages, cross-cultural friendships, and cross-dressing.[156] Consider, for example, the Eurasian evangelist C. L. Coolen (1775-1873). The son of a

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[153] C. Fasseur, "Cornerstone and Stumbling Block: Racial Classification and the Late Colonial State in Indonesia," in *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880-1942*, ed. Robert Cribb (Leiden: KITLV, 1994), 37; Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 213.

[154] Mandal, "Finding Their Place," 82.

[155] Rush, *Opium to Java*, 14.

[156] See, for example, A. Th. Manusama, *Njai Dasima: Het slachtoffer van bedrog en misleiding: een historische zedenroman van Batavia* [Nyai Dasima: A victim of deceit and misleading: A historical novel of manners of Batavia] (The Hague: Moesson, 1986 [1926]). This novel is based on an event that took place in Batavia in 1813. It is about the young native woman Dasima, who became the housekeeper and mistress of the Englishman Edward Williams.

Russian father and an aristocratic Javanese mother from Solo, he founded, in 1827, a Christian community in Ngoro, Pasuruan, East Java.[157] Consider also the painter Raden Saleh (1814-1880). "[D]escended from Yogyakarta nobility and Arab immigrants," he spent twenty-three years in Europe, where he studied European painting. In 1853, he returned to Java, where he lived in Cikini, Batavia. He married a Eurasian woman, dressed in a style that blended East and West, and moved about in Batavia's elite circles, mixing with Europeans and Eurasians.[158]

For Asians in particular, the application of the legally-sanctioned racial hierarchy had some unfavorable consequences and a few favorable ones. On the one hand, power became concentrated "in the hands of the Dutch corps of the Binnenlandsch Bestuur." Second, Javanese, Chinese, Arabs, and Indians received weaker protection than Europeans did for their persons and properties and from "governmental arbitrariness in criminal procedure." Third, the Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese did not enjoy equal access to state-owned facilities, such as government schools. On the other hand, the racial judicial segregation prohibited the sale of land from Natives to Europeans and Foreign Orientals, thereby preventing the Javanese, Sundanese, and Madurese from being alienated from their own land. [159] (This attempt to protect the Natives raises a question: Did it actually help them or did it end up hurting them? But I am unable, in this dissertation, to answer this important question.)

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[157] Jan S. Aritonang, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia* [A history of the encounter between Christianity and Islam in Indonesia] (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2004), 87.

[158] On Raden Saleh, see, for example, Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 276-277.

[159] Fasseur, "Cornerstone and Stumbling Block," 34, 36.

There were a number of reasons for this racial judicial separation. First, it was a legal embodiment of the social Darwinist idea espoused by some Dutchmen at the time that Europeans were morally and intellectually superior to Asians. One of the proponents of such an idea was Governor-General J. J. Rochussen (in office from 1845 to 1851). Second, the Dutch colonial men-on-the-spot were faced with "the shortage of European judicial personnel." Third, some Dutch colonial administrators held on to the view that "the application of European judicial [system] was not…in the best interest of the indigenous peoples."[160] Fourth, it can be argued that the legal racial hierarchy was a device the Dutch employed to prevent non-Europeans (Javanese, Eurasians, Chinese, Arabs, and Indians) from forging a broad-based, cross-ethnic alliance that could sabotage the Cultivation System and the revenue farming system and jeopardize Dutch hegemony in the colony. For, even in 1872, the Dutch formed a tiny minority in Java: while Natives numbered 17.1 million, there were only 36.467 Europeans and Eurasians.[161] Twelve years before, Europeans and Eurasians numbered about 20,000.[162]

It is important to note, however, with the social historians Ulbe Rosma and Remco Raben, that in spite of its attempt to impose, through laws and regulations, a racial hierarchy and segregation on the East Indies, the Dutch colonial elite did not always succeed. In some cases, laws and their enforcement aside, the colony's social life was

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[160] The argument in favor of legal pluralism in the East Indies had already been articulated earlier during the reigns of the H. W. Daendels (r. 1808-1811) and Thomas Stamford Raffles (r. 1811-1816). See ibid., 33-35.

[161] Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, 15; E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands East Indies*, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: B. M. Israel NV, 1975 [1938]), 224.

[162] De Klerck, *History of the Netherlands East Indies*, vol. 2, 224.

"more subtle and refined" or messier.[163] In some contexts, as in friendships, marriages, intellectual collaborations, other factors than racial identity—such as commonalities in wealth, education, expertise, occupation, values, lifestyle, or personality traits—could play a more powerful role in determining the social status one had and the social networks one could enter.[164]

1. 1. 4. The Making of the Asian Proto-Middling Classes in the Outer Islands, 1800-1900

1. 1. 4. 1. Minangkabau, West Sumatra

The Cultivation System was in operation in Minangkabau, West Sumatra from 1847, ten years after the Padri wars ended, to 1907, the year an anti-tax rebellion broke out. The version of the Cultivation System that Dutch undertook in the region revolved around compulsory coffee cultivation and deliveries, and it caused Minangkabau society to undergo important changes in "transportation, urbanization, education, standardization, and administration."[165] By taking advantage of the opportunities that such changes offered to seek wealth, prestige, and meaning in society, the perceptive and ambitious among the Minangkabau underwent a transformation into the middling classes.

Before to the coming of the Cultivation System, Minangkabau society had neither a center of territorial authority nor a Java-style, full-fledged political hierarchy ruled by

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[163] Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500-1920* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 218.

[164] Pauline Dublin Milone, "Indische Culture and Its Relationship to Urban Life," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9, no. 4 (July 1967): 407-426.

[165] Kenneth R. Young, "The Cultivation System in West Sumatra: Economic Stagnation and Political Stalemate," in *Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era*, ed. Anne Booth, W. J. O'Malley, and Anna Weidemann (New Haven: Yale Center for International Area Studies, 1990), 90-92.

an echelon of hereditary aristocrats.[166] The society was comprised, rather, of networks of more or less self-governing villages called *nagari*, each presided over by its own council of lineage chiefs (*penghulu*). Members of the nagari made a living as wet-rice farmers, artisans, miners, or merchants. Prestigious standings in their fluid social hierarchy were enjoyed in some cases by individuals descended from the families that founded the nagari.[167] From the 1780s to the early 1840s, the nagari came to be polarized between two major political alliances, which differed from each other along economic, customary, and religious lines. On the one hand, the nagari in the gold-producing areas—especially those in Tanah Datar that adhered to the more autocratic Koto Piliang system of customary law—allied themselves with the Minangkabau Royal Family, still reliant for its revenue on gold trade, which was seriously in decline since the 1780s. On the other hand, there were the economically ascending nagari in Agam and Lima Puluh Kota, which embraced the more egalitarian style of customary law called Bodi Caniago and which were experiencing "a large-scale commercial revival" centering on their trade in coffee, salt, gambier, and textiles with British and American merchants. Such nagari tended to lend their political support to several groups of new leaders: the zealous and puritan Islamic reformers known as the padri. The emergent petty bourgeoisie of industry and commerce embraced the purified Islam of the padri because it provided them with a corpus of Koranic laws "for a better and more rational conduct of … mercantile and community activities." They badly needed such laws because they provided much better protection for their persons, property, and commercial contracts than the customary laws

[166] Ibid., 93.
[167] Graves, *Minangkabau Response*, 5-6.

could ever offer.[168] They supported the padri movement because its victory would mean the creation throughout Minangkabau of a new society where their class could enjoy security, predictability, and sustained economic growth. The conflict between the two economic, ideological, and political divisions in Minangkabau came to a boil, culminating in the Padri Wars (1821-1838). The Dutch and the anti-padri forces formed an alliance that emerged victorious. Though the padri were militarily defeated, their drive to Islamic reform lived on, resurfacing, from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards, in debates about adat vs. Islam, tradition vs. modernity, that is, about what it meant to be a Minangkabau in a changing world.[169] In the aftermath of the wars, in return for their military assistance, the Dutch exercised their sovereignty over Minangkabau and, after a few false starts, succeeded in installing a modified version of the Cultivation System in the region.

The installation of the Cultivation System in Minangkabau caused it to undergo several changes. To make the Cultivation System work, the Dutch created the requisite bureaucracy, legal system, and infrastructure. To begin with, they created, *ex nihilo*, a hereditary class of supra-nagari, pseudo-customary paramount chiefs—*penghulu kepala* (nagari chiefs), *tuanku laras* (heads of the nagari federation), and *penghulu suku rodi*—to help them, as salaried government agents under a system of indirect rule, to keep peace and order and make sure that the villagers carried out the corvée labor and the

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[168] Christine Dobbin, "Economic Change in Minangkabau as a Factor in the Rise of the Padri Movement, 1784-1830," *Indonesia*, no. 23 (April 1977): 1;7, 16-25, 27-29; Young, "Cultivation System," 92-93; Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 172; Graves, *Minangkabau Response*, 22-24.

[169] See, for instance, Taufik Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century," in *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Claire Holt, Benedict Anderson, and James Siegel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 216.

compulsory production and deliveries of coffee.[170] This collaboration with the Dutch—which carried little or no adat-based legitimacy, as well as the emergence of the middling classes in the Minangkabau society served to undermine the prestige of these pseudo-traditional leaders and their more genuinely traditional subordinates (the *penghulu*) in the second half of the nineteenth century.[171]

Second, the Dutch had to hire natives with some education to fill a variety of middle-level positions in the steadily growing coffee-extracting bureaucracy as agricultural inspectors, warehouse masters, clerks, secretaries, pawnhouse masters, prosecutors, vaccinators, and schoolteachers. Seeing that this development was offering a new road to money, status, and influence,[172] many Minangkabau took up these jobs while a few set up and ran secular schools to help youngsters qualify for such posts, the demand for which far exceeded the colonial government's ability and willingness to meet. Thus, from the 1840s to the 1860s, local-initiative schools mushroomed in the coffee-growing regions of Minangkabau. It was not until the 1870s that government-funded schools began to appear.

Third, to facilitate the transportation of coffee from the highlands to the west coast, the Dutch built a network of roads.[173] Many Minangkabau responded to this development and to the demands in world market for new cash by starting small and medium enterprises. Some ran coffeehouses, rest stations, and grass shops. Others entered the transport services. Still others combined family capital and resources to set up

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[170] Graves, *Minangkabau Response*, 38-39, 42; Abdullah, "Modernization," 206-207.
[171] Ibid., 206-208; Young, "Cultivation System," 93-94, 108.
[172] Graves, *Minangkabau Response*, 137.
[173] Ibid., 56, 66-67.

sizable companies specializing in "wholesale, bulk commodities" and grew into "regional merchant dynasties," whose members intermarried with those of the class of educated civil servants.[174]

Although initially many Minangkabau treated the burgeoning secular schools merely as a new means of acquiring "tools of trade," some came to discern in them an essential preparation for a financially rewarding, socially prestigious participation in the wider, modern society that was the Dutch East Indies.[175] Typically, it was "middle-level" Minangkabau parents (such as merchants, artisans, or clerks) with hopes of upward social mobility for their children who sent the latter to study at the nagari schools or, if they could afford it, the Teachers' Training School in Bukittinggi. [176] The years the youths spent at the schools introduced them to middling-class values, for the local-initiative nagari schools of the 1840s were modeled on that which was designed by the then Resident of Padang Highlands C. P. C. Steinmetz (1837-1848) to teach the native youths not only how to read, write, and do arithmetic but also to acquire what he called "civilized behavior," "good hygiene," and several other elements of "a European lifestyle and culture" so they would grow up to be "good citizens" and effective civil servants. [177] Likewise, at the three-year Teachers' Training School at Bukittinggi, the students were to master not only useful subjects for their future career as a schoolteacher or a civil servant (Malay, geography, surveying, bookkeeping, correspondence, preparing official reports); they were also trained to adopt a few components of a middling-class way of life, such as

[174] Ibid., 68.
[175] Ibid., 110, 134.
[176] Ibid., 79, 107, 119.
[177] Ibid., 79.

proper everyday behavior, correct dress code, and personal hygiene.[178] Since many Bukittinggi Teachers' Training School students succeeded in securing high-status employment as warehouse masters, prosecutors, teachers, the upwardly mobile Minangkabau came to view it as a sort of elite institution of learning. The school's elite aura intensified during the liberal era (1870-1900), partly because the quality of education it provided was upgraded in 1872 and partly because admission to it was enjoyed in many cases by the children of the new elite of educated civil servants, such as prosecutors, warehouse masters, and other administrative officials.[179] It was indicative of its rising prestige that the school came to be known as Sekolah Radja (literally School of Kings) and that its students seem to have been self-conscious about their elite status:

> They dressed in fine clothing of European style. Each had an individual room in the long dormitory building attached to the school complex, and there were servants assigned to look after their needs. The school had been built as a showcase for Dutch efforts to improve local "civilization" and … it compared favorably with any secondary school in the Netherlands itself. In their free hours, the students walked proudly through the streets of Bukittinggi. [… S]treet vendors and other lesser beings would give way before the strolling students, proof positive of the latter's lofty status. […T]hey studied in a wide variety of subjects designed to produce "cultivated" and "well-versed" teachers who could serve as fitting examples to all residents of the town to whose school they would later be assigned. One European observer commented that the effect of all this privilege was sure to produce "dandified" Minangkabau….[180]

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Sekolah Radja in Bukittinggi served as the cradle of the Minangkabau elite, counting among its graduates

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[178] Ibid., 84.
[179] Ibid., 114.
[180] Ibid., 114.

some of the early leaders of Minangkabau modernization.[181] In addition, while some of its alumni established and taught in their own schools or enjoyed well-paid careers in the civil service, some earned college degrees in Batavia and in the Netherlands.[182]

One of the consequences of attending the Sekolah Radja was the broadening of the students' geographical horizon. This was evident, for example, in a Malay poem written by one of the students in about 1888:

> Start off in the highlands
> board a ship in the lowlands
> ride the ship to Aden
> arrive safely in the Netherlands.[183]

As a result of this experience and in response to new career opportunities that accompanied the expansion of the colonial state, the Minangkabau middling classes widened their sphere of operation to cover the whole of the Dutch East Indies. [184] Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, they supplied the "archipelago-wide" colonial bureaucracy with "a corps of civil servants, doctors, and professional men."[185]

With their entry to the colonial bureaucracy under the Cultivation System, many Minangkabau commoners developed into educated, non-adat, middle-ranking civil servants increasingly exposed to and participating in meritocratic ideas and practices. The trend continued well into the age of private capitalism (1870-1900) as both the colonial bureaucracy and the private sector experienced considerable expansion.

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[181] Abdullah, "Modernization," 212.
[182] Jeffrey Hadler, *Muslims and Matriarchs: Cultural Resilience in Indonesia through Jihad and Colonialism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 96-97.
[183] Quoted in Hadler, *Muslims and Matriarchs*, 97.
[184] Graves, *Minangkabau Response*, 134.
[185] Ibid., 111.

As it happened, the artisans and merchants, who practiced the tradition of traveling beyond their home village in search of wealth and knowledge, did not constitute the only social groups that, through their exploitation of the economic opportunities present under the Cultivation System and in the era of private capitalism, evolved into the middling classes; for this trend was also followed by members of the adat "aristocracy." Consider, for example, the case of Dt. Soetan Maharadja (1860-1921), the son of Dt. Bandharo, who was a penghulu in his lineage group, an adat expert in his community, and a tuanku laras in the political hierarchy grafted by the Dutch onto the Minangkabau society. A dropout from the Padang Dutch-language primary school, Dt. Sutan Maharadja took up an apprenticeship in law that secured him a job in the colonial administration as a deputy public prosecutor. In 1892, he switched careers from the civil service to Malay journalism. As an editor and writer coming from an adat aristocratic background, he grappled with the key issues of adat, Islam, and modernization, arguing in favor of a pro-Dutch, adat-based road to Minangkabau modernity. Like other members of the middling-classes in the Dutch East Indies at the time, he circulated, since the late 1880s, in the social clubs in West Sumatra, serving in some of them as president or adviser; he was even the founder of one such club, called Medan Perdamaian (Forum of Peace), where educated Minangkabau could relax, reading newspapers and periodicals and playing indoor games. On the basis of his pioneering contribution to the field, he was regarded by many as "the father of Malay journalism."[186]

[186] Abdullah, "Modernization," 214-218; Adam, *Vernacular Press*, 135-137.

1. 1. 4. 2. Minahasa, North Sulawesi

Up to the 1670s, before coming under the domination of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), Minahasan society exhibited egalitarian and hierarchic features. It was egalitarian in the sense that it possessed no kinship-based system for passing status from one generation to the next. It was hierarchical in it recognized status differences that governed social interaction, causing everyone to have "a position inferior or superior to that of others." At any rate, the social hierarchy was in a state of flux, enabling people to enhance their standing by amassing agricultural wealth, capturing enemy heads, attracting a great many followers, or sponsoring prestige feasts.[187]

The Minahasans of the pre-VOC era lived in self-sufficient communities practicing shifting dry-rice agriculture and at perpetual war with one another. [188] The society lacked a state, consisting, rather, of a number of *walak* (constellations of villages). Forming an endogamous, independent politico-ritual unit, each walak—which was led in politics by a male chief called *hukum* and in rituals by a female shaman known as *walian*—presided over the founding of a new village and exercised control over land.[189]

Owing to the fact that Minahasans were embroiled in internal struggles for wealth, prestige, and power and to the fact that they had been interacting with the outside world for centuries, their society was anything but static. Life for Minahasans was already in flux before the advent of VOC hegemony. Even in the new, unequal social structure ensuing from the Minahasan-Dutch encounter in the VOC era (1669 to 1800)

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[187] Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility*, 27, 30, 37-38.
[188] Ibid., 2, 11, 19.
[189] Ibid., 22

and in the course of the nineteenth century—an encounter that itself took place in a changing world order—the Minahasans did not stop exercising their agency to win respect, fortune, and power. The choices they made and the courses of action they took produced a range of consequences, of which some were unintended, unexpected, unimagined.[190] As it turned out, some Minahasans were more successful than others in taking advantage of the opportunities that emerged in their changing social world.

Among the indigenous beneficiaries of the social change Minahasa went through in the VOC era was a tiny new elite of three hoofd-hukum-majoor and their families. The VOC created this very thin lawyer of supra-walak leaders and grafted it on top of Minahasan society with a view to using them to stop chronic civil wars and start a peaceful society where these chieftains could mobilize their people to produce more rice and perform corvée labor for the company. What this meant was the coming into being of a despotic, all-powerful, supra-walak type of indigenous chief with multiple power bases that included the military backing of the VOC, the support of people in his own walak, and his control over those in other walak under his jurisdiction.[191] Yet the VOC's policy failed to reach its intended aims in that headhunting expeditions and tribal warfare remained "the order of the day," creating a political mess that disturbed rice production.[192]

In the period of 1817-1942, Minahasa formed a part of the territory of the Dutch East Indies. From 1822 to 1899, in particular, the Dutch operated a variant of the Cultivation System that revolved around the forced cultivation of rice and coffee by

[190] Ibid., 4.
[191] Ibid., 44, 46.
[192] Ibid., 42-43, 49.

Minahasan villagers and the surrender of these cash crops to the government at low fixed prices.[193] In addition, the villagers were to carry out corvée labor, such as the construction and upkeep of roads and bridges. To run the Cultivation System in Minahasa, the Dutch exercised direct rule, breaking the territory down into several divisions, which they placed under the command of Eurasian controleurs, who governed the indigenous population through two layers of indigenous leaders: the walak chiefs (*hukum besar*) and village chiefs (*hukum tua*).

The application of this policy changed Minahasa's social structure. From the 1820s onwards, by using descent as the foremost criterion for appointing hukum besar and hukum tua, the Dutch fostered the making of a more rigid social hierarchy comprised of two strata: on top of the social ladder there was a hereditary elite of hukum besar and hukum tua and their families; at bottom there was a mass of commoners.[194] To minimize the commoner's chance to join the new elite, its members practiced endogamy.[195] The chieftains and their kinfolk were among the main beneficiaries of the new social order developing in the course of the nineteenth century. They enjoyed greater prestige, authority, and revenue basis. For instance, in return for keeping peace and organizing corvée labor and coffee production for the government, the hukum besar and hukum tua received political backing, a percentage of the cash crop deliveries, a local tax in cash, and the right to sport the prestige paraphernalia that came with their office.[196] The walak

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[193] Ibid., 54.
[194] Ibid., 75, 93.
[195] Ibid., 93.
[196] Ibid., 63-64, 79; Helmut Buchholt, "The Impact of the Christian Mission on Processes of Social Differentiation," in *Continuity, Change, and Aspirations: Social and Cultural Life in Minahasa, Indonesia*, ed. Helmut Buchholt and Ulrich Mai (Singapore: ISEAS, 1994), 13;

heads were also provided with the right to impose fines on villagers in punishment for a variety of wrongdoings. And the walak chiefs often abused this right to enrich themselves. In payment for the cash crops they delivered to the government, the villagers, through their hukum besar and hukum tua, received a payment in linen and, later on, in cash. It was common for the chiefs to impose an arbitrary excise on this payment to the villagers.[197]

The constellation of social changes that nineteenth-century Minahasa went through included not only the implementation of the Cultivation System, the introduction and extension of the colonial bureaucracy, and the resulting transformation of its social hierarchy; it also involved the spread of Christianity, the advent of increasingly modern schools (both missionary- and government-run), and the emergence of something like the middling classes among the Minahasans.

Unlike Islamized Java and Minangkabau, Minahasa was one of the few parts of the Dutch East Indies that had a majority Christian population. By about 1800, three hundred years of Minahasan-European contact had produced nothing more than a small number of indigenous Christians in Manado. It was in the mid-1850s that the Minahasans on the coast and in the hills converted—en masse and precipitously—from paganism to Christianity, in enthusiastic response to the proselytization that pietistic German preachers undertook on behalf of the Netherlands Missionary Society (NZG).[198] It was also part of a cluster of attempts made by natives to get ahead in a changing society that

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David E. F. Henley, *Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the Dutch East Indies* (Leiden: KITLV, 1996), 39.

[197] Schouten, *Leadership and Mobility*, 57.

[198] Gerry van Klinken, *Minorities, Modernity, and the Emerging Nation: Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical Approach* (Leiden: KITLV, 2003), 86-87.

included urbanization within Minahasa, migration to Java, obtaining education, and securing jobs in the Binnenlandsch Bestuur.

From 1832 to 1850, the number of schools increased in Minahasa: from only 20 with 700 pupils to 80 with 10,000 students. While most were run by missionaries, a few were government-funded. Their curriculums were similar.[199] By the end of the 1890s, Minahasa was ahead of other Dutch colonial possessions in the East Indies in terms of the ratio between the number of primary schools and the size of the population.[200] By 1880, at least 10 per cent of Minahasa's total population spoke Malay.[201] To get secondary and higher education, however, the Minahasans were to study in Java and only members of the well-to-do elite could afford doing so.

The decision of some Minahasans from both elite and common backgrounds to embrace Christianity, obtain education, and get a job in church, schools, and colonial bureaucracy led them to middling class status. The criteria for determining their standing in social hierarchy became complex. Descent from village and walak chiefs and the possession of wealth were to compete with individual achievements, level of education, and the adoption of modern values and lifestyles in defining their prestige and authority.[202]

Teachers were among the members of these nascent middling classes. The growth of schools and of student enrolments increased the demand for teachers. The year 1857 saw the opening at Tanawangko of the first Teachers' Training School in Minahasa. By

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[199] Buchholt, "Impact," 16-17.
[200] Ibid., 17.
[201] Ibid., 18.
[202] Helmut Buchholt and Ulrich Mai, "Introduction," in Buchholt and Mai, *Continuity*, 6-7; Schouten, *Leadership and Social Mobility*, 107.

1868 native teachers had found employment “at all of the 157 schools” in the region.[203] Despite their meager salaries, they enjoyed middling-class advantages, both material and non-material. For instance, not only were they spared from corvée labor; on the basis of their possession of modern knowledge and skills and their command of the Malay language, they achieved a high status in the village world. As a result, teaching soon became a highly desirable profession in Minahasa.[204]

The conversion of many natives to Christianity went hand in hand with their appropriation of middling-class ideas, values, and dress style of the Dutch colonial elite stationed in Minahasa. The former engaged in this self-Christianization and self-Westernization in order to distinguish themselves from the masses of the commoners in the context of long-standing intra-societal “battle” for prestige.[205] One of the ways in which some members of the Minahasan elite took up their apprenticeship in the Christian middling-class way of life was the so-called *murid* system, whereby young natives worked in the household of a missionary. In return for their service, the missionary provided them with an instruction in Malay, Christian values, and European lifestyle that would enable the Minahasans “to advance…Christianity and civilization.” In general, it was the chiefs who sent their children to study the Western middling-class way of life in the missionaries’ homes and the schools they ran. This they did in order to enhance their status and improve the prospects for their children’s future—not exactly in order to make them middling class.[206] Their entry to the middling classes was the byproduct of their

[203] Buchholt, “Impact,” 17.
[204] Ibid., 17.
[205] Ibid., 18-19.
[206] Ibid., 19.

attempt to attain old goals (power, wealth, and prestige in their own community) by using a new method (adoption of some elements of Western lifestyle).

To provide an idea of how the murid-system and one sort of Minahasan-Dutch friendship played a role in the formation of the middling-class Minahasan in the late nineteenth century, it is useful to consider the case of Maria Walanda-Maramis (1872-1924), an intelligent, broad-minded Minahasan lady whom the New Order honored, in 1969, as one of the heroes of the Indonesian nationalist movement in recognition for her pioneering endeavors in the emancipation of Minahasan women.

In Kema, a small town on the eastern cost of Minahasa, on December 1, 1872, Maria Josephine Catherina Walanda-Maramis was born to the family of Maramis, a retail merchant, and Sarah Maramis-Rotinsulu, a housewife. After the couple's death in a cholera epidemic that struck Kema, Maria and her two siblings—Antje and Andries—were taken under the custody of their maternal uncle, Ezau Rotinsulu, the head of the district of Tonsea.[207] In contrast to her brother Andries, who attended not only the primary school but also the school for the sons of indigenous chiefs (*Hoofdenschool*) in preparation for a career in the civil service or in the police department, the formal education of Maria and her sister Antje consisted of no more than the three years they spent at the village elementary school. In accordance with the then prevailing custom in Minahasa, upon completion of her basic education Maria was lined up for an arranged marriage.

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[207] A. P. Matuli-Walanda and Jan V. Matuli, *Women's Emancipation in North Sulawesi: The Story of Maria Walanda-Maramis* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1989), 16-18.

Smart and progressive-minded, however, Maria had bigger dreams. Before entering matrimony, she wanted to broaden her view of the world; she desired to be able to read about it in the Dutch books available in Tonsea. With this plan in mind, one day she pleaded with her uncle to enroll her at the Dutch-language, missionary-run secondary school for girls in Tomohon. The man objected to the idea; the money that Maria's parents bequeathed, he explained, had been spent for her brother Andries' education. To find consolation for her frustration, she immersed herself in a kind of self-directed study: from the guests that her uncle entertained in his house Maria learned the basics of organizing a middling-class home. She learned, that is, to "bake cakes, tarts, and…cookies"; to decorate tables and serve food for a dinner in honor of certain VIPs; and to master European etiquette. In the course of this independent study, Maria conceived of her idea of a good middling-class woman. This was a woman who strove to be as highly educated as possible, all while preserving her womanhood; a woman, that is, of "pleasant personality" who radiated intelligence and refinement in her manners as she interacted with various people in her society[208]

In 1891, Maria married a teacher named Jozef Walanda, a graduate of the Teachers' Training School in Ambon. Soon after, the couple moved to Maumbi, a village midway between Airmadidi and Manado, where to her delight she got the chance to socialize more closely with people of educated middling-class background. She befriended the Ten Hoves, a Dutch preacher family in charge of the Protestant community in Maumbi. Every Sunday after church, Maria would visit Mrs. Ten Hove at her home and learned from her—through observation or talks over coffee—many a thing

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[208] Ibid., 20-22.

of interest from hygiene and pedagogy through Dutch etiquette and manners to "keeping order and discipline" in the household.[209] In one such visit, Maria was struck by something she found appealing as a method to create good middling-class women: the murid-system:

> [Maria noticed] the presence of a neatly dressed girl serving coffee and cookies for the guests. [Seeing her] surprise, Mrs. Ten Hove told her that she had admitted about ten…such girls into her house. All of them assisted in the household of the [Ten Hoves], where they were able to learn cooking, baking cakes and cookies, washing, ironing, sewing, mending and patching of clothes, embroidering and knitting, housekeeping, and gardening. […] The girls was required to always appear properly dressed when serving the guests, even if [the latter] happened to be members of the family, [for] a neat and clean appearance presented a mark of esteem towards the visitors, and promoted a more comfortable and pleasing atmosphere.[210]
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> […]
>
> [Once a month,] the parents of the [murid would] visit the rectory of the preacher family at Maumbi…to see their kids. On those occasions they [would bring] all kinds of foodstuff with them: …rice, eggs, chickens, fish, vegetables, coconuts, and…fruits. […] This was…their way of expressing their sincere gratitude to the Ten [Hoves] for their willingness to admit the girls into their midst for so long and…teach…them all the tricks they had to know in organizing and maintaining an appropriate and efficient household, without any charge.[211]

As it happened, the apprentice-girl (murid) whom Maria saw at the Ten Hove's embodied for her the very idea she had long been having about a good educated middling-class Minahasan woman. In the way Maria saw her—which we must read in the context of nineteenth century Minahasa—the murid emanated the bodily and mental signs of being highly educated: not only was she well-dressed and well-groomed, she

[209] Ibid., 22, 26-27.
[210] Ibid., 28.
[211] Ibid., 28-29.

also displayed good manners as well as the knowledge and skills of an effective housewife, without which a middling-class family was impossible.

It was this encounter with the Ten Hoves and the murid system they organized at their home that provided Maria with some of the core ideas that animated the project she started in Manado in 1919: “a special household school for girls” where they could “learn all the skills and know-how of keeping and maintaining a neat and clean household.”[212] It was to be called PIKAT boarding school. PIKAT itself, which stood for *Percintaan Ibu kepada Anak Temurunnya* or a mother’s love for her children, was an organization she founded in 1917 in Manado, the first of its kind in Minahasa, to promote education for native girls whose parents could not afford to send them to secondary schools in Java.[213]

Maria practiced what she preached. After a series of persistent attempts, Maria and her husband Jozef managed to put through school two of their three daughters.[214] Anna Pawlona (b. 1896) and Albertine Pauline (b. 1898) received their education first in Manado and then in Batavia. In the former, from 1905 to 1910, they attended the Dutch-language European elementary school (ELS); in the latter, from 1912 to about 1914, they went to a Dutch-language secondary school (MULO) and earned a teaching certificate from a Teachers’ Training School. Upon completion of their studies in Batavia, they served as teachers at the Dutch-language Chinese primary school in Manado (HCS).[215]

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[212] Ibid., 48, 52.

[213] Ibid., 44.

[214] Owing to a severe typhoid fever in her infancy, the first-born, Wilhelmina Frederika, suffered from mental retardation; she died at the age of thirty, ibid., 93-94.

[215] Ibid., 42-43.

1. 2. The Indonesian Middling Classes, 1900-1965

Having examined the genesis of the Asian proto-middling classes in nineteenth-century Dutch East Indies, we can now discuss the way they evolved as they shaped and were shaped by the changing social world surrounding them, from the start of the Ethical Policy in 1900, through the Declaration of Independence in 1945, to the collapse of Guided Democracy in 1965.

1. 2. 1. The Indonesian Middling Classes, 1900-1945

From 1900 to 1942, the colonial state undertook territorial, bureaucratic, and economic expansions. Through a series of colonial wars from 1873 to 1909, the Dutch succeeded in building an archipelago-wide empire, stretching from Sabang to Merauke.[216] To govern it, the colonial state expanded its scope of activities, adding more branches to the civil administration: a Department of Education, Religion, and Industry; a Department of State Enterprises; and a Department of Public Works. As a result, there emerged new sections in the Civil Service other than the Europeesch Bestuur and the Pangreh Pradja, offering government jobs as doctors, engineers, foresters, state railway officials, or as clerks at the Postal, Agricultural Credit, or Pawnshop Services.[217] In addition, the colonial state also took an interventionist turn vis-à-vis the Native populace. Between 1901 and 1919, for humanitarian and economic reasons, it carried out the so-called Ethical Policy (a Dutch version of "the white man's burden") to provide Natives with education, agricultural assistance, credit, population management, and a chance for a

[216] Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10-14.

[217] Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 251, 266-267.

degree of political participation so they could partake in Dutch-guided progress and earn more cash to buy Dutch imports. In the meantime, from 1900 to 1930, with the influx of foreign investment the private sector flourished, seeing a steady rise in its export performance, especially in sugar, tea, tobacco, oil and rubber.[218] Infrastructure, like railroads and tramways, underwent considerable expansion.[219] It was not until 1930, however, that there began a serious industrialization drive. Prompted by a fear that Japanese products would dominate the East Indies market, the government gave boost to industrialization by offering an attractive environment for foreign investment.[220] Its efforts bore fruit. The last decade of the Dutch rule saw not only the coming of new industries (e.g., in beer, rubber tire, textile, soap, margarine, bicycle, and light bulb)[221] but also an increase in industry's contribution to national income (from 4.7% in 1929 to 10.4% in 1939). The workforce absorbed by the industrial sector grew from 1.5 million in 1928 to 2.8 million in 1938. (The benefits of these developments were offset by a population boom and the onset of the Great Depression. As a consequence, the standards of living among Natives in 1930 were lower than they were in 1900. [222]) This constellation of developments contributed substantially to the evolution of the Asian middling classes.

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[218] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 184-186; Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 336-338; Anne Booth, *The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed Opportunities* (London: MacMillan, 1998), 38-39.

[219] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 187.

[220] Booth, *Indonesian Economy*, 43-44

[221] Ibid.

[222] Chr. L. M. Penders, *Indonesia: Selected Documents of Colonialism and Nationalism, 1830-1942* (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1977), 64. Native population experienced considerable growth. In Java, from 1900 to 1930, they grew from 28.38 to 40.89 million; in the Outer Islands, from 1905 to 1920, their numbers increased from 7.3 to 18.25 million. See, Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, 347.

The Asian middling classes continued to rise, albeit slowly, above the urban and rural masses. In the period of time under discussion, the indigenous middling classes were still small in number. If we consider their educated members alone, for instance, we shall see that from 1924 to 1938 there existed no more than 597 Natives with high-school education and between 1923 and 1940 only 230 Natives went on record as being college graduates.[223] (Yet, it should be kept in mind that these figures had to with government schools; they did not refer to privately-run ones.) Another estimate offers a much greater number: in 1930, of the colony's twenty-million-strong workforce, there were no less than half a million Natives who were classifiable as middling class; half of them knew some Dutch and most took a government job.[224] Even this number amounted to a mere 0.82 per cent of a total population of 60,731,025.[225] Despite their tiny size, the Asian middling classes in the Dutch East Indies made their presence felt. For example, early in 1929, the government put together the *Inlandse Middenstandscommissie* (Commission on Native Middling Classes) to conduct research into the conditions of the indigenous entrepreneurial middling class and into the ways in which to further its development.[226]

The ongoing evolution of the Asian middling classes in the Dutch East Indies was not just a spinoff of the configuration of such structural factors as the increasing intrusion

[223] Abeyasekere, "Effects of European Penetration," 145.

[224] Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Modernity and Cultural Citizenship in the Netherlands Indies: An Illustrated Hypothesis," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (October 2011): 438.

[225] Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems, and Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), 5.

[226] Ballendux, *Bijdrage tot de Kennis*, 35-36; see "De inlandsche middenstand," 1; "Oprichting eener organisatie te Weltevreden," 16.

of foreign capital, the expansion of the Civil Service, and the Ethical Policy.[227] The part played by these structural factors tells only half the story. As a matter of fact, Asians exercised a decisive role in their metamorphosis into the middling classes. The importance of their agency is evident in the ways they acquired and deployed their intellectual, economic, and political resources to create and recreate themselves. Figuring out how the colonial "machine" worked, breaking their way through the economic and racial barriers to quality education, they managed to send their children to Dutch-language schools and colleges. They developed, in this way, the necessary intellectual capital to join or stay in the middling class of education. On the strength of their Dutch educational credentials, some Asians won highly competitive though not necessarily well-paid jobs in business firms and in the new specialized sections of the Civil Service (neither the Pangreh Pradja nor the Europeesch-Bestuur) while others started full- or part-time private practice as lawyers (e.g. M. Yamin), doctors (e.g. Soetomo), or architects (e.g. Roosseno [1908-1996]), or operated nationalist "wild schools" as teachers (like Soewardi from 1922 onwards), or edited their own Malay periodicals as contributing editors and journalists (like Tirtoadhisoerjo [1875-1918]). In so doing, they formed the Asian middling classes of bureaucrats, employees, and professionals.

[227] For instance, European capitalism had operated for quite a while on the margins of the Batak society without the concomitant emergence of a Batak middling class. It was not until some Bataks chose to take advantage of the existing opportunities—some of which were created by the penetration of foreign capital in North Sumatra—that a Batak entrepreneurial middling class came into being. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Entrepreneur and Middle Class," in *Indonesia in the Modern World*, Part II (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1956), 9. The Padri-sympathizing Minangkabau entrepreneurial middling class emerged on their own in the last decades of the eighteenth century; before long they came to blows with *adat*-oriented fellow Minangkabaus and the latter's Dutch allies.

By the same token, in spite of the much-highlighted encroachments of European capitalism, urban and rural Asian entrepreneurs of various ethnicities and levels of education were capable of holding their own ground.[228] From 1900 to 1942, even Native small entrepreneurs grew in number.[229] Members of the Asian "middling class of wealth" proved capable of tapping many sources of working capital, ranging from personal savings and ethnic credit unions (e.g., the Chinese *hui*); through government credit banks (Volkscredietwezen) and political party-affiliated credit cooperatives (like those operated by the Parindra); to the pooling of family funds.[230] While there were some who ended up

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[228] Consider, for example, the rise of the Toba Batak entrepreneurial middling class in the early twentieth century. See Abraham Johannes van Zanen, "Voorwaarden voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling in het Centrale Batakland" [Conditions for social development in central Tapanuli] (PhD diss., Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1934), chapter 3. For a summary of van Zanen's findings regarding Toba Batak businesspeople, see Van der Kroef, "Entrepreneur and Middle Class," 6-10.

[229] Although, as George Kahin points out, "much of the indigenous village industry" disappeared in the first quarter of the twentieth century, Native "small-scale industrial enterprises" in general was on the rise from 1929 to 1939. Likewise, H. J. van Mook observes that in 1922 Kota Gede, a small town about 4 miles southeast of Yogyakarta, boasted a sizeable proportion of a middling class of tradespeople and entrepreneurs. They made up about 19 percent of the town's total population of 1,073; see Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 28; Penders, *Selected Documents*, 64; H. J. van Mook, *Kutha Gedhe*, trans. Rachmadi Ps. (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1986), 13-14.

[230] Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia* (London: MacMillan, 1994), 157-158; Denys Lombard, *Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya* [Java: A crossroads of cultures] Part 2: *Jaringan Asia* [Asian networks] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1996), 115; Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises from the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983), 51; Christine Dobbin, "Accounting for the Failure of the Muslim Javanese Business Class: Examples from Ponorogo and Tulungagung (c. 1880-1940)," *Archipel* 48 (1994): 91; Jan T. M. van Laanen, "Between the Java Bank and the Chinese Moneylender: Banking and Credit in Colonial Indonesia," in Booth, O'Malley, and Weidemann, *Indonesian Economic History in the Dutch Colonial Era* (New Haven: Yale Center for International Area Studies, 1990), 256-262; Van Mook, *Kutha Gedhe*, 14-15.

in bankruptcy, others prospered as they reinvested their profits in the expansion of their operation, in moneylending, or in real estate.[231]

The Native and foreign oriental middling classes in the Dutch East Indies demonstrated a capacity for creating and deploying political capital, especially in the form of modern associations for well-organized collective actions to win respect, raise their social standing in the colonial hierarchy, improve their business chances, forge a new unifying identity, and pursue progress. In 1900, for example, a number of Chinese journalists and businesspeople established the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK), perhaps the first truly modern organization among Asians of the Archipelago, to promote re-Sinification as a way to unify the colony's hitherto internally-divided Chinese communities. Disappointed in what they viewed as the colonial government's neglect of their needs for modern education, the THHK activists, through collective self-help, managed to build and run their own schools where their children could be trained to succeed in business and become both modern and yet Chinese.[232] While the re-Sinification project achieved little result, through the mobilization of their Malay-language newspapers and of the THHK and its sister organizations the Soe Po Sia and the Siang Hwee, the middling-class Chinese succeeded in pressuring the colonial government to provide Dutch-language Chinese primary schools (HCS), allow their representatives to exercise a measure of political participation in the Volksraad, and put an end, by 1917, to

[231] Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 27-28; Justus M. van der Kroef, "The City: Its Culture and Evolution," in *Indonesia in the Modern World*, Part I (Bandung: Masa Baru, 1954), 151.

[232] In 1900, the mercantile and entrepreneurial middling classes constituted about 57 percent of Java's Chinese workforce. Lea Williams, *Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1916* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 12.

all racial discriminations against their community. The THHK set a highly inspiring example for middling-class Arabs and Natives to follow. And follow they did. In 1905, a group of Asians of means—of whom most were Arabs and a few were Javanese (such as Ahmad Dahlan, who later set up the Muhammadiyah)—founded Djamiatul Chair (Association for the Good) to offer modern primary education for Muslims and send Muslim youngsters to continue their studies in Turkey.[233] In 1909, four Arabs and five Javanese entrepreneurs established the Sarekat Dagang Islamiah (Islamic Commercial Union) in Bogor to empower Muslim traders in their competition with Chinese and European businesspeople.[234] It was such politically modest, middling-class-oriented associations that broke the path for the subsequent emergence of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

The evolving Asian middling classes in the Dutch East Indies in this era were defined as much objectively (by their occupations, amount of wealth, and level of modern education) as subjectively (by their self-consciousness and their ideas about themselves and the world). To understand these classes, one must take both factors into consideration. For evidence of the Asian middling-class self-consciousness, one can look at the content of the East Indies press of this era. As early as 1902, the intelligentsia component of these groups had made a public declaration of their existence. In an essay in the *Bintang Hindia* [Star of the Indies], a fortnightly which he edited, the Minangkabau physician-cum-journalist Abdul Rivai (1871-1937), the son of a teacher, called the reader's attention to an emergent social group he termed "aristocrats of the intellect"

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[233] Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), 58-59.

[234] Mobini-Kesheh, *Hadrami Awakening*, 42-45.

(*bangsawan pikiran*), to which he and his readers belonged. Seeing themselves as distinct from the urban poor and the common peasantry beneath them and the hereditary aristocrats above them, these self-styled aristocrats of the mind were professionals who derived their status from education and individual achievements, and who chafed under the colonial order that favored indigenous "aristocrats of blood" and Europeans.

On January 28, 1908 a young Christian Ambonese physician W. K. Tehupeiory (1883-1946), the younger brother of the doctor-turned-journalist J. E. Tehupeiory (1882-1908), presented a lecture to the Indies Society in The Hague on the social conditions of Native medical students and physicians in the colony.[235] The speech offers a "window" on some of the self-perceptions and social thought that some Native physicians at the time had as members of the Asian middling class of professionals. Tehupeiory talks about, among other things, the "destructive influence" that encounter with kampong dwellers could exert on Native students of the STOVIA (School for Training Native Doctors).[236] The implication was that the latter, normally, were higher in moral standing than the former. Committed to meritocracy, he deplores its absence in colonial society, expressing his regret that wealthy Eurasians did not have any compunction about treating even the refined and educated among the Natives as "inferior creature[s]": for instance, they abhorred the mere idea of "playing on a tennis court" with even "a Native doctor

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[235] W. K. Tehupeiory, "The Native Physicians" [*Iets over de Inlandsche Geneeskundigen*], in *Regents, Reformers, and Revolutionaries: Indonesian Voices of Colonial Days: Selected Historical Readings, 1899-1949*, trans. and ed. Greta O. Wilson (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 1978). The Moluccan doctors W. K. Tehupeiory and J. E. Tehupeiory were born in Ema, Ambon, Maluku. They studied medicine at the University of Amsterdam. I have not been able to find details about their family background. For a biographical sketch of W. K. Tehupeiory, see Emile Schwidder, "Between Ambon and Amsterdam," last modified 2006, http://www.iisg.nl/collections/tehupeiory/, accessed April 13, 2012.

[236] Ibid., 50.

who had a flourishing practice among European officials."[237] He describes in detail the backbreaking workload that Native doctors must carry as an employee of the Civil Medical Service and for a salary that was embarrassingly low for them, never mind for their families, too low to lead a middling-class way of life. For, to begin with, "because of his position the Native physician [just] cannot live in a boarding house …." As for clothing, he must dress in a way that made them living examples of good personal hygiene.[238] And as any decent member of the middling class of professionals, the Native doctor could not live by bread, or rice, alone:

> He has…a need for…music…and wants his children to attend a good European school.[239] […H]e…has to furnish his home comfortably…and pay for newspapers, journals, and books.[240] [For] it is important that he keeps abreast of current events…and practice his Dutch constantly… [so he could] participate in the spiritual life of the educated families….[241]

Tehupeiory also notices that as members of the professional middling class, the Native doctor had more in common with his European counterparts than he did with even "Native [hereditary] chiefs":

> [The indigenous physician] is not pressured as much to observe the *adat* [custom], is freer and can behave more like a European official. For that reason he is more likely to associate with the European official…. […T]he friends of *doktor djawa* [are found] in better circles…among the [European] postal employees, supervisors, and teachers. But here we encounter a stumbling block. The way of life of these European officials and that of the Native physicians differ too much; only if the Native

[237] Ibid., 52.
[238] Ibid., 55.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid., 57.

> doctors earn a higher salary could there be more social contact with [them].[242]

It was no exaggeration on Tehupeiory's part to underscore the social distance between Native doctors and Pangreh Pradja officials. Some regents did regard Native doctors as social inferiors. For example, as he recalls in his memoir, in spite of his fine Western education and understanding of meritocracy, Achmad Djajadiningrat (1877-1943), the regent of Serang (1901-1920) and Batavia (1924-1927) behaved haughtily toward the *doktor djawa* [indigenous doctor] who treated his sick wife.[243]

On September 15, 1929, in Weltevreden, Batavia, a meeting was convened to establish the Native Middling-Class Association (*Inheemsche Middenstandsvereeniging*). Among the speakers addressing the audience, which consisted of about a hundred people, was *Bintang Timoer* journalist Parada Harahap (1899-1959).[244] While engrossed in political activism, he argued, Natives left their commercial life "unorganized." As a result, none of them had as yet built a company of stature. In this respect, he observed, Natives differed from Europeans and Chinese, who constantly explored new roads to economic progress. If the history of the European middling classes was a guide, he reasoned, it was that the key to their economic supremacy was the effective use of "a good organization" in harnessing collective "energy, initiative, and knowledge."[245]

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[242] Ibid.

[243] Djajadiningrat, *Herinneringen*, 236-237.

[244] The Indonesian journalist Parada Harahap was born in 1899 in Pargarutan, Padangsidempuan, North Sumatra. His title, Mangaradja Sutan Gunung Muda, suggests that he came from a Batak aristocratic family.

[245] Dr. Soetomo made the same point in 1932; see Soetomo, "Maju Bersama-sama untuk Bekerja" [All of you, be willing to work with one accord], in Soetomo, *Kenang-Kenangan Dokter*

Natives, he contended, must emulate Europeans; they must show the world that they too were capable of large-scale economic orchestration and of serving as “the backbone” of their society. Harahap closed his speech with a suggestion that the Native Middling-Class Association refrain from political activism.[246] This point was reiterated by the next speaker, the Volksraad member M. H. Thamrin (1894-1941),[247] who noted with delight that Natives had now come to see the central role that the middling class could play in the betterment of their society’s overall welfare. One way in which the Association could help Native entrepreneurs, he pointed out, was by offering them some assistance in obtaining bank credits.[248]

In the Dutch East Indies of the late 1920s and the 1930s there were several associations, commissions, and committees whose members (Europeans and Asians alike) identified themselves as “middling-class people” by wielding Dutch terms like “middenstander” and “Middenstandsvereeniging.” Some of these were established by Europeans, like those in Malang,[249] Medan,[250] and Yogyakarta[251] while others—such as Batavia’s Inheemsche Middenstandsvereeniging and a special commission in Soetomo’s Studieclub in Surabaya[252]—belonged to Natives.

Soetomo [The recollections of Dr. Soetomo], ed. Paul W. van der Veur (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984 [1932]), 85.

[246] “Vereeniging Inheemsche Middenstand” [Native middling-class association], *De Indische Courant*, September 17, 1929, 1.

[247] M. H. Thamrin was born in Jakarta, February 16, 1894. The son of Thamrin Mohammad Thabrie (a district head in Jakarta) and the grandson of a Mr. Ort (an English hotel owner), he got all of his education, primary and secondary, at the city’s fine Dutch-language schools: the Bijbelschool, the Instituut Bos, and the Koning Willem.

[248] “Vereeniging Inheemsche Middenstand,” 1.

[249] “Middenstandsvereeniging Malang,” *De Sumatra Post*, January 4, 1938, 3.

[250] “Middenstandsvereeniging ‘Medan,’” *De Sumatra Post*, March 24, 1934, 2.

[251] “Djokjasche Middenstandsvereeniging,” *De Sumatra Post*, June 1, 1928, 11.

[252] “De Inlandsche Middenstand in Ned.-Indië,” *Het Vaderland*, November 30, 1929, 9.

One key motif in the social thought of the Asian middling classes in the Dutch East Indies was the great weight some of their members assigned to modern education. Consider, for example, the great financial sacrifice that some middle-ranking Javanese priyayi professionals had made to enable their children to attend Dutch-language schools and universities.[253] In his autobiography, Indonesia's first president Soekarno (1901-1970) recalls a conversation he had in the 1920s, as a student of the Bandung Institute of Technology, with Professor J. Klopper, the Institute's president. Concerned with the young student's political activism, the professor said: "Is it not your custom for a whole family to deny themselves in order to further the education of one gifted member?"[254] To this question, Soekarno remembers replying that

> […N]ot even starvation would prevent my family from furnishing the funds necessary for my education. As a schoolmaster, Father toils as hard as any laborer. Mother sits hour after hour into the night until her candle and her eyesight grow dim as she handpaints *batik* cloth. To scrape together the precious 300 guilders [for my] yearly tuition, they have recently added roomers. My sister and her husband also contribute a certain amount monthly.[255]

At the time, admission to top schools in the colony was the privilege of Europeans and Eurasians. While the middling-class European children could attend Dutch-language primary and secondary schools at little or no cost,[256] the parents of Asian children were

[253] See, for example, Soekarno, *Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams* (Hong Kong: Gunung Agung, 1966), 29-30, 35, 55.

[254] Ibid., 55.

[255] Ibid.

[256] European and Eurasian children whose parents earned no more than 1,200 guilders per annum were exempt from tuition and fees. Native students at the ELS paid 15 guilders per month (which amounted to 10 per cent of the maximum monthly salary of a Native doctor) while their

required not only to prove their membership in the elite of their own community but also to pay very costly tuition and fees for their children if they were serious about enrolling them in such schools.[257] As a result, in their student body, Asians made up a tiny minority. For example, there were only seven Native children at the first-class Dutch primary school that Mohammad Hatta (1902-1980) attended in Padang from about 1913 to 1916.[258] Similarly, of the 300 pupils at the Surabaya HBS that Soekarno went to between 1916 and 1921, only 20 were Natives.[259] In colleges, too, Natives formed a minority. As Soekarno remembers in his autobiography, there were less than a dozen Indonesian students at the Bandung Institute of Technology:

> I was one out of 11 dark faces bobbing around in an ocean of white skin, red hair, freckles, and eyes the color of a cat's. […T]he Dutch ignored us on campus. If they did pay attention it was to disparage or sing out, "Hey you stupid Native boy, c'mere."[260]

Besides fundraising within one's extended family, another way for Natives to cover the costly tuition and fees in elite schools was by organizing community scholarship funds. This was what some Minangkabau did in Kotagedang, West Sumatra. Under these arrangements, gifted youngsters used a student loan to finance their study in

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European colleagues paid only 8 guilders and yet more than half of the latter enjoyed exemption from tuition. See Kahin, *Nationalism*, 55; Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance," 28-29.

[257] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 29.

[258] Mohammad Hatta, *Untuk Negeriku: Sebuah Otobiografi* [For my country: An autobiography], Part 1: *Bukittinggi-Rotterdam lewat Betawi* [Bukittinggi-Rotterdam via Batavia] (Jakarta: Kompas, 2011 [1979]), 40.

[259] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 43; John D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 29-30.

[260] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 68.

Batavia or in the Netherlands; they were to repay the debt once their study was done and they got a job.[261]

What was so special about Dutch-language education? Why did many Asian middling-class parents find it so desirable they were willing to spend a lot of money, make elaborate plans, pull a lot of strings, sacrifice principles, and expose their children to being treated in school as lesser beings by their schoolmates? There were, at least, three reasons for this. To begin with, there was a utilitarian, tool-of-trade view of education; they figured out—as their own parents and grandparents had in the nineteenth century—that "under colonial rule, nobody can think of a career without a Dutch education…."[262] Theirs was a fast-changing world, in which to hold their own some people believed they must have a career. It was also a world where even princes could go broke, as was the case with Soewardi Soerjaningrat (1889-1959) and Soerjopranoto (1871-1959) of the House of Pakualam in Yogyakarta: compelled by their declining economic circumstances, the two brothers went to the STOVIA (which was tuition-free and offered stipends[263]) and the OSVIA (Training Schools for Native Officials), respectively, in preparation for professions they hoped would enable them to lead a way of life befitting their self-esteem and social standing.[264]

Another reason for the strong desire on the part of some middling-class Asians for elite schools was their top intellectual quality. In line with the principle of "concordance"

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[261] Hatta, *Otobiografi*, 34; Rudolf Mrázek, *Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1994), 21.

[262] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 29.

[263] As such, Javanese aristocrats scoffed at the STOVIA (School for Training Native Doctors) as "a school for the poor." Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance," 30, 32.

[264] On Soewardi and his brother Soerjopranoto, see Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance," 60-94.

(*concordantie*), the colonial government required that "education in the Indies…be equal to that in the Netherlands not only in…standards but in everything else…."[265] The policy was intended to meet the educational needs of the Dutch children and youths whose families moved, for job-related reasons, between the metropole and the colony.

Third, as Asian students came to find out during their study, there was more to life in the elite secondary schools—such as the HBS's in Batavia, Bandung, and Surabaya—than just monetary sacrifice, hard work, and racial harassment. Of his study in the 1910s at the Batavia Prins Hendrik School (PHS), which was a business high school, Hatta recalls in his memoir that some of his Dutch teachers were quite competent and demanding. Often, he and his colleagues were assigned the same textbooks as those used by their counterparts in the Netherlands. The teachers taught him some thinking skills—such as capturing key ideas in the subjects under discussion, "cracking" difficult passages in books, and handling history conceptually (emphasizing "the spirit of the times" and "the interconnections among events" rather than senseless memorizing of facts[266]— that he found useful in his development as an intellectual:

> […I]t was not until I attended the PHS that I encountered different ways of thinking and made real headway in my education. […] It was not until I studied under Dr. Broesma that I felt I really learned history. His way of teaching kindled my desire for historical study.[267]

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[265] See, for example, J. F. H. A. de la Court, *Paedagogische Richtlijnen voor Indonesië* (Deventer: van Hoeve, 1945), 69-70, in Penders, *Selected Documents*, 176; John D. Legge, *Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1988), 17.

[266] Hatta, *Otobiografi*, 86-90.

[267] Ibid., 90.

Contemporaneous Malay novels are a good place to look for fictionalized self-images of the colony's Asian middling classes. For instance, the semi-autobiographical novella *Busono*, which Tirtoadhisoerjo published in 1902, contains a set of traits that characterized at least three variants of the middling class Native: the medical doctor, the journalist, and the entrepreneur, or the hybrids thereof. First, a Javanese STOVIA student in the novella sees his ethnic community in an international context, measuring its civilizational attainments against those of others, with educational credentials serving as a key point of comparison. Given good education, the student believes, Native commoners will be on a par not only with indigenous aristocrats but also with Europeans: they will speak as fluent French and achieve as deep an expertise in theosophy as white men do.[268] Second, as the novella suggests, some STOVIA graduates or, for that matter, dropouts, embraced an enterprising way of life, which was riskier but could also be highly rewarding. For example, the novel's namesake and protagonist, the doktor djawa Busono, stands for those real-life educated Natives who opted for the independent life of professionals or entrepreneurs (*orang particulier*). Rather than join the Civil Service as a government physician, Busono prefers to be his own boss: he establishes, edits, and contributes to his Malay newspaper.[269] Third, the educated Natives saw themselves as rational beings quite distinct from the superstitious masses. Busono envisages his wife as an intellectual peer: a Dutch-speaking, newspaper-reading lady with whom he can engage daily in an intelligent conversation about world affairs.[270] Fourth, as exemplified in the

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[268] Tirtoadhisoerjo, *Busono*, in *Sang Pemula* [The pioneer], ed. Pramoedya Ananta Toer (Jakarta: Lentera Dipantara, 2003), 452-453, 470.

[269] Ibid., 469, 480-481, 493-494.

[270] Ibid., 466, 479, 487-488.

novella by Busono himself, enlightened Native professionals, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs took it upon themselves to champion social justice, fight corruption, and lead his people to progress, using, among other devices, the printing press.[271] To win the credibility necessary in such a struggle, they thought they had to live up to high moral standards.[272] Sixth, and finally, they expressed discontent at the absence of meritocracy in, among others, the Civil Service, and at the refusal by indigenous aristocrats to cease treating them as social inferiors.[273]

In the period 1900-1942 Asian middling classes showed changes over time. Besides growing in number, they became more internally differentiated, for already at this stage of their evolution there were a few varieties of middling class: civil servants, professionals, small and medium entrepreneurs, and well-to-do farmers. Significantly, there also occurred generational shifts in their social attitudes as well as visions of their society in the future. Whereas in the first decade of the twentieth century the older generation of middling-class Asians took an ambiguous and rather cautious stance vis-à-vis the "feudal" and colonial orders, seeking progress for their own ethnic communities *within* the framework of the Dutch-dominated colonial society,[274] their younger counterparts, from the 1910s onwards, became increasingly convinced that self-rule and the quest for progress were inseparable parts of one and the same social

[271] Ibid., 456, 464, 482, 496.
[272] Ibid., 455.
[273] Ibid., 476, 480, 494.
[274] This older generation of Asian middling-class activists included people like the Javanese physician Wahidin Soedirohoesodo (b. 1857), the Minangkabau editor-publisher Dt. Soetan Maharadja (b. 1860), the Minahasan educator Maria Walanda-Maramis (b. 1872), the Arab founders of the Djamiatul Chair, and the Chinese intellectuals of the THHK.

transformation.[275] Tjipto and E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, for instance, wanted "freedom," by which they meant self-rule"[276] while Soetomo was once quoted as saying, "In everything…Indonesians do, they must keep freedom before their eyes. Politics and economics are simply the means to move to 'Free Indonesia.'"[277] Such a shift also occurred among those at the lower strata of the evolving Asian middling-classes. For instance, whereas the older members of the kampung middling class in Surabaya of the 1930s harbored a still "uncomplicated vision of life without Dutch rule," their better educated children dreamed of a prosperous, respectable, and modern Indonesia, which they sought to help create through "unity," "organization," and "activism."[278] Why this shift? What does it mean? What did the Asian middling-class think was wrong with the colonial order? Did not, under the Ethical Policy, the Dutch colonial masters attempt to lead the Natives to progress? To answer these questions, we must compare what the middling-class Asians wanted to have and what the colonial system was able or willing to provide. It is instructive to consider, on the one hand, the major grievances that the Asian middling classes had and, on the other, the colonial masters' conservative and repressive responses to the Native's demands of redress.

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[275] Among those who took this view were East Indies middling-class intellectuals, most of whom born between the 1880s and 1910, such as the Eurasian E. F. E. Douwes Dekker (b. 1879), the Javanese Tjiptomangoenkoesoemo (b. 1886) and Soetomo (b. 1888), the Chinese journalist Liem Koen Hian (b. 1896), the Javanese-Balinese Soekarno (b. 1901), the Minangkabau M. Hatta (b. 1902), and the Arab journalist A. R. Baswedan (b. 1908).

[276] E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, Tjiptomangoenkoesoemo, and Soewardi Soerjaningrat, *Mijmeringen van Indiërs over Hollands feestvierderij in de kolonie* [Musings of Indiers about Dutch merrymaking in the colony] (Schiedam: De Toekomst, 1913), 13,14, in R. E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 19.

[277] Politiek-Politioneele Overzicht, July 1927, in Harry A. Poeze, ed., *Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten van Nederlansch-Indië* [Netherlands-Indies secret police overview], vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 82.

[278] William H. Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 26, 32-33, fn. 74.

They had a few major grievances. One of these was racial discrimination**,** which they saw as evidence of contradiction in the colonial order of things. For, on the one hand, wittingly or otherwise, the Dutch-language schools that they attended exposed them, among other things, to the ideals of the French Revolution[279] (liberty, equality, and fraternity) and to the principle of meritocracy. On the other hand, they witnessed and/or experienced varieties of racial discrimination against Asians. Besides the petty forms of racial discrimination that Native schoolchildren had suffered in Dutch-language schools—for example, race-based unfair grading practices of their European teachers and racial bullying by their European schoolmates[280]—there were other, more serious ones. To begin with, as we have seen above in the case of Soekarno and Hatta, the colonial government restricted non-European access to first-rate schools.

Second, in response to pressures from European professionals who feared indigenous competition, the government resisted Natives entry to the professions, such as medicine and law. Thus, although the first law school for Natives who would fill low-ranking posts in the civil service was opened in 1909, it was not until 1924 that the colonial government allowed the founding of a full-fledged College of Law in Batavia open to both Europeans and Asians.[281] It imposed a quota on the recruitment of educated Natives to middling-class jobs in the Civil Service; when it did employ Native civil servants, it did so at lower salaries than it paid Europeans and Eurasians of equal positions and qualifications. And this was despite the fact that in their training at the

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[279] Mohammad Hatta, “National Claims,” in *Portrait of a Patriot: Selected Writings by Mohammad Hatta* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), 313.

[280] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 43-47; Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia Free,” in *Portrait of a Patriot*, 209.

[281] Fasseur, “Cornerstone and Stumbling Block,” 34.

OSVIA (School for the Training of Native Civil Servants), Natives were introduced to the idea of meritocracy and such norms as “rationality, accountability, individualism, and social responsibility.”[282] If they were employed at all, as Natives these OSVIA graduates had to content themselves with positions in the inferior branch of the Civil Service, the Pangreh Pradja, for the superior branch of it, the Europeesch Bestuur, was open—with few exceptions—to Europeans and Eurasians only. Although Natives, Eurasians, and Europeans could compete on an equal footing for better-paid jobs in the newly created departments of the Civil Service, the senior positions in such departments were reserved exclusively for Europeans.[283] Overall, this constellation of policies resulted in the arrested development of Asian middling classes of civil servants and professionals[284] and in the formation of an “army” of frustrated Asian intellectuals who were either jobless or employed in jobs below their qualifications.[285]

Two other forms of racial discrimination also mattered to Asians. There was race-based inequality before the law. As late as 1941, the so-called Visman Committee reported that Natives and Chinese complained forcefully about “racial differentiation in law” as evident in “unequal treatment in criminal procedure.”[286] Likewise, the Volksraad, too, was racially segmented. From 1925 onwards, it was divided up into three race-based electorates, preventing the formation of a Native majority within it.[287]

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[282] Abeyasekere, “Effects of European Penetration,” 145.

[283] Palmier, *Indonesia*, 19-20.

[284] As late as 1939, there were only about thirty Indonesian judges in the colony who were law school graduates. Of about 200 professional attorneys, 63% were Dutch, 19% Chinese, and 18% Natives. Fasseur, “Cornerstone and Stumbling Block,” 34.

[285] Kahin, *Nationalism*, 52-54; Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 36.

[286] Fasseur, “Cornerstone and Stumbling Block,” 53.

[287] Kahin, *Nationalism*, 21, 23; Fasseur, “Cornerstone and Stumbling Block,” 53.

To a significant degree, Dutch rule in the Archipelago was indeed racist. Consider, for example, what Mohammad Hatta said in "Indonesia Free," which was his plea before the court of Justice in The Hague, March 9, 1928:

> […F]rom childhood [Indonesian youth] undergoes the bitter experience of national and racial subordination. Already in primary school it feels the lashing blows of the colonial antithesis and the racial conflict. It studies this not from learned books but on its own skins. It experiences on its own body the sharp conflict between *white* and *brown*, between *ruler* and *ruled*.[288]
>
> […]
>
> In this colonial society now, a society of sharp racial conflicts, of racial hatred and discrimination, Indonesian youth has grown up. Already from its earliest years it carries a piece of "colonial experience" with it along the path of life.[289]

Yet, it is also true that this racism was a complicated one, which had to compete with other criteria for determining one's position in the social hierarchy. It is true that some Dutch considered Natives in general as backward, lazy, unfit for the modern world, and therefore in need of protection from the upsetting aspects of the modern world. Some of the Dutch who did take this view meant well and took it seriously. For them it was about "the white man's burden." It is also true, however, that some Europeans of Batavia did invite Natives of high-status to play tennis with them or to chill out at their social clubs. Middling-class people of different races did intermarry in the Dutch East Indies from time to time. As a matter of fact, some prominent Native intellectuals and nationalist leaders had a European or Eurasian spouse, for example Abdul Rivai,[290] Tjipto,[291]

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[288] Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 209.

[289] Ibid., 211.

[290] Parada Harahap, *Riwajat Dr A. Rivai* [Life story of Dr. A. Rivai] (Medan: Indische Drukkerij, 1939), 8.

Soetomo,[292] Sjahrir, [293] Mohammad Amir (1900-1949),[294] and W. K. Tehupeiory.[295] Many also had European and Eurasian close friends.[296] Thus, the colonial law, which stipulated racial segregation, did not actually reflect social reality. In the early twentieth century, interracial marriage had become increasingly common. While in 1905, fifteen percent of Europeans in the colony married non-Europeans, in 1925 the number jumped to 27.5 percent. In the meantime, there emerged a new type of Dutch-speaking, ethnically heterogeneous, and culturally modern society among the middling and upper classes in the colony's large cities.[297]

Another grievance that the middling-class Natives had was the persistence of what they saw as the "feudal" social order that privileged the hereditary aristocracy. From their perspective, the problem with the colonial regime was that even throughout the period of 1900-1942 it still relied on Pangreh Pradja aristocracy to administer the colony, providing the adat rulers with greater powers in the areas under indirect rule (Yogyakarta and Surakarta and half of the Outer Islands). It did this in order to thwart the spread of the Native nationalist movement from the directly ruled parts of Java to the Outer Islands.

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[291] Balfas, *Dr Tjiptomangoenkoesoemo: Demokrat Sedjati* [Dr Tjiptomangoenkoesoemo: A genuine democrat] (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1952), 48.

[292] Soetomo, "Reminiscences," in *A Glorious Indonesia*, 93-99.

[293] Kees Snoek, "The Postponement of an Apotheosis: Sjahrir's Lengthy Exile," in *Janus at the Millennium: Perspectives on Time in the Culture of the Netherlands*, ed. Thomas Frederick Shannon and Johan P. Snapper (Dallas: University Press of America, 2004), p. 161.

[294] Anthony Reid, *An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), 418.

[295] "Willem Karel (Wim of Empie) Tehupeiory," *genealogieonline*, http://www.genealogieonline.nl/en/genealogie-van-elk/I1397.php, accessed on April 19, 2012; see also a family photograph of the Tehupeiorys, *International Institute of Social History*, http://www.iisg.nl/collections/tehupeiory/c16-57.php, accessed on April 19, 2012.

[296] Shiraishi, *Age in Motion*, 122.

[297] William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden, eds., *Indonesia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2011), 40.

The Dutch noticed that interventionist direct rule in Java had brought about rapid social change resulting in nationalist "excesses" among Natives.[298] The middling-class Natives were deeply displeased at the policy of favoring the aristocrats.

The upwardly mobile, educated middling-class Natives were irritated at the fact that the colonial government continued providing the adat aristocrats with privileges. For example, most of the students admitted to the OSVIA came from the aristocratic families. Besides, even the mediocre aristocratic graduates of the school received preferential treatment over their smarter competitors from the non-aristocratic background in the recruitment to the Pangreh Pradja. In about the late 1930s Abas Soeria Nata Atmadja, then the regent of Cianjur, West Java, recalled the jockeying for jobs in the Pangreh Pradja in the period of 1900-1920 between middling-class youths and the sons of hereditary chiefs as well as the tension between meritocracy and aristocracy:

> […A] rapidly increasing number of a newly educated people developed within native society. Confronted by this new group, the native administrative officials, including the bupati, were threatened by a loss of status. […] Thus, an antagonism arose between the native administration and the newly educated elite. […]
>
> [Consequently…] the government…[made] academic training available to the best native administrative officials. In improving the standard of…the administrative *prijaji*, the government had come face to face with the principle of heredity. In some cases [the] application of this principle, which…stress[ed]…lineage as opposed to qualification…resulted in the nomination of youthful, inexperienced individuals, who often lacked competence. There were also cases in which the available sons of conservative *bupati*, who had not been provided with a proper Western education, left little of substance from which to choose. Hence, the government sometimes…[was forced to choose between]…nominating a less efficient official to the post of *bupati* [and] disregarding the principle of heredity.

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[298] Kahin, *Nationalism*, 56-58.

> On top of this, the sons of the bupati *often* [disdained] serving within the native administration…. They…attended the HBS and university and went into the…free profession. As a result, the sons of the lower officials, employees, and private persons were the only ones who received the education necessary to satisfy the higher requirements for the position of *bupati*. […T]hese developments led to the increasing prominence of the *homines novi*.[299]

Atmadja's observation also testifies to the emergence of a Native middling class of education and expertise whose members included not only the upwardly mobile commoners but also aristocrats who became professionals, civil servants, or businesspeople. Among the former was Wahidin Soedirohoesodo (1857-1917), a smart boy from a rural petty priyayi family who grew up to be a doktor djawa.[300] Among the latter were people such as Tirtoadhisoerjo (1875-1918),[301] Soewardi Soerjaningrat,[302] Soerjopranoto,[303] and H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934).[304]

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[299] Soeria Nata Atmadja, *De Regenten-positie* (Bandung, A. C. Nix, 1940), 41-42, in Akira Nagazumi, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1972), 23-24.

[300] Nagazumi, *Dawn*, 27.

[301] Tirtoadhisoerjo dropped out of his study at the STOVIA in 1900. Although he was the son of the regent of Bojonegoro, he preferred journalism, business, and politics to a career in the Pangreh Pradja; see Sutherland, *Bureaucratic Elite*, 57; Pramoedya, *Sang Pemula*, 29, 44-50, 69-73.

[302] For financial reasons, in 1909 Soewardi quit his study at the medical school STOVIA. After a stint as a clerk in a sugar factory in Probolinggo and as a technician a pharmaceutical firm in Yogyakarta, he served as an editor of the *De Expres* and engaged in politics. In 1922, he founded the nationalist school Taman Siswa (Garden of Pupils); see Kenji Tsuchiya, *Democracy and Leadership: The Rise of the Taman Siswa Movement in Indonesia*, trans. Peer Hawkes (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1987).

[303] Shiraishi, *Age in Motion*, 110. Soerjopranoto, a graduate of the OSVIA and the Bogor Agricultural School, was employed by the Agricultural Information and Extension Service for a while before he became a professional politician.

[304] Born in Madiun in 1882 to a priyayi family—his grandfather was a regent and his father was a wedana—Tjokroaminoto was comfortable with neither the priyayi way of life nor a career in the Pangreh Pradja. As a graduate of the OSVIA, he took a job as a regency clerk, a position he later quit in favor of a career as an engineer in a sugar mill in Surabaya. While working there, he entered the Sarekat Islam, of which he soon emerged as its formidable leader.

The commercial and entrepreneurial members of the Natives middling classes had their own grievances. They were subject to severe competition from the much stronger European and Chinese businesspeople. After the abolition of the pass- and zoning-system in, respectively, 1915 and 1918, which was one of the fruits of the pan-Chinese movement led by the THHK, the Siang Hwee, and the Soe Po Sia, the Chinese began living and operating in villages and in the fields of business that were traditionally Native.[305] From time to time, in defense of indigenous entrepreneurs, Native intellectuals articulated their displeasure at the "foreign" capitalists and the colonial government which they saw as giving preference to non-Natives. At the 1917 congress of Sarekat Islam, for instance, Tjokroaminoto denounced "sinful capitalism," by which he meant capitalism as practiced by European, Eurasian, and Chinese entrepreneurs.[306] Tjokro favored Muslim small entrepreneurs, some of whom contributed to Sarekat Islam's funds.[307] Indeed, the Sarekat Islam started out in 1912 as an organizational front that the Muslim batik entrepreneurs of Surakarta used to cope with their Chinese competitors.[308] In November 14, 1918, radical Native members of the Volksraad decried the government for "favoring the interests of European capital."[309] Even the Arab middling class of

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See, for instance, Jajat Burhanudin, "Traditional Islam and Modernity: Some Notes on the Changing Role of Ulama in Early Twentieth Century Indonesia," in *Varieties of Religious Authority: Changes and Challenges of 20th-Century Indonesian Islam*, ed. Azyumardy Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J. G. Kaptein (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010), 58.

[305] Palmier, *Indonesia*, 14.

[306] Kahin, *Nationalism*, 73.

[307] Palmier, *Indonesia*, 17-18.

[308] Shiraishi, *Age in Motion*, 41, 45-48.

[309] Penders, *Selected Documents*, 122.

moneylenders, whose members shared the same religion as the Native majority, was not spared from condemnations by Native middling-class nationalists.[310]

Finally, and to anticipate a theme that I will discuss in Chapter 3, mention must be made of the fourth grievance that the Asian middling classes harbored against the colonial order. Many middling-class Natives and some of their Eurasian counterparts took the view that the problem with the colonial regime was not that the Dutch colonial masters had not produced any progress whatsoever. The problem was that despite and because of the changes brought about by the Ethical Policy, they found—to their dismay and frustration—that the ongoing social, educational, and economic improvements under Dutch tutelage was too little, too slow.[311] Many middling-class Asians in the colony had grown up intellectually, socially, and culturally to a point that they came to consider as inadequate any variant of the Ethical-Policy format of development. The truth of their view was vindicated by the resistance on the part of the colonial government to mass education, meritocracy, the creation of Native professionals, and an all-out industrialization. Some Dutch contemporaneous observers acknowledged that it was precisely the injection of progress (e.g. in the form of modern education) into the veins of the Native society that had produced frustrated Native intellectuals.[312] Yet rather than advocate the extension and acceleration of progress, the Dutch colonial masters recommended that it be held in check and slowed down: whereas Soekarno and his PNI

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[310] Mobini-Kesheh, *Hadrami Awakening*, 139.

[311] Shiraishi, *Age in Motion*, 58.

[312] Resident of Besuki, “Education and Radical Nationalism, 1924,” in Penders, *Indonesia*, 171-172; see also J. Meyer Ranneft, “Speech on Education and Radical Nationalism, 1927,” in Penders, *Selected Documents*, 1972-1973.

(Indonesian National Party) wanted nothing less than "radical and swift change,"[313] the Dutch politician Hendrik Colijn suggested that the expansion of Native education be suspended till the indigenous economy was able to employ all Native graduates.[314] The Dutch moved to crack down on the Native middling-class nationalists, using repressive tools like the police, the army, and the intelligence service, as well as provisional arrests, exile, censorship of the press, and bans on meetings.[315]

To recap, the Native middling classes of intellectuals, civil servants, professionals, and entrepreneurs not only had grievances; unlike the masses, they also had a sophisticated array of resources they could and did draw on to seek redress. The resources included education, expertise, and analytical skills; a strong grasp of what was happening in the contemporary world; and collective funds, the press, the Volksraad, nationalist "wild schools," and modern associations. Deploying these resources and the masses, many strove to generate favorable economic, social, cultural, and political changes through social reform rather than social revolution. Their efforts in this direction manifested themselves at first in the proliferation of mutual-help, education-promoting, and welfare-oriented organizations and later in a fiercely Indonesian nationalist movement.[316] Why the quick shift? The main reason was that even when Native intellectuals employed moderate methods in reaching their goals, the Dutch colonial overlords—who had much in common with them, like education, language, lifestyles,

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[313] Legge, *Sukarno*, 115.

[314] Kahin, *Nationalism*, 55.

[315] Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 226-231.

[316] Daniel S. Lev, "Intermediate Classes and Change in Indonesia: Some Initial Reflections," in *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, ed. Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), 27.

and views of the indigenous masses—responded to them by stubbornly refusing to make meaningful concessions and accommodations. It is worth highlighting that at the start the middling-class Natives were split into four positions vis-à-vis the colonial order. To begin with, some "accommodate[d] themselves to Dutch rule"; having secured comfortable positions in the colonial system, they supported the status quo. Others opted to work with the Dutch for gradual march toward "autonomy for the [East] Indies." Still others wanted a Dutch-Indonesian partnership. Finally, there were those who would settle for nothing less than complete independence achievable, they believed, only through an "uncompromising," perhaps bloody, showdown.[317] The refusal by the Dutch to meet the demands of even the moderate-leaning nationalists converted many in the Native middling classes to the fourth stance: to the argument that progress was impossible short of self-rule or to the conclusion that "anything Indonesia achieved had to be extorted from the oppressor."[318]

The younger leaders of the Native middling classes who took the fourth position had decided in the mid-1920s to achieve progress and self-rule by building what Semaoen (1899-1971)[319] and Hatta called "a state within a state,"[320] which was an attempt, under the existing Dutch colonial order, to prepare for the creation of an independent nation-state they called Indonesia. These native middling-class leaders were aware that they formed a tiny elite (about ten per cent of the indigenous population) and

[317] Legge, *Sukarno*, 34.
[318] Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 244.
[319] Born in 1899 in Mojokerto, Surabaya, East Java, Semaoen was the son of a minor employee of the Dutch railroad company. In the late 1910, he emerged as one of the key leaders of the political organization Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union).
[320] Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 272.

that they must build and move a mass following to bring down the colonial order.[321] Though they preferred social reform to social revolution, they anticipated that the struggle for self-rule was likely to involve violence.[322] They saw it as a matter of course that the nation-state they envisioned as Indonesia would be the same as the Dutch East Indies, except that they would call it Indonesia and that it should be administered by middling-class people like them.

In consonance with the state-within-a-state strategy, Indonesian middling-class nationalists struggled for progress and self-rule in many areas of life, not only in politics but also in economy, culture, and everyday life. In 1928, at the Youth Congress in Batavia they decided that from then onwards they would speak a national language they called Indonesian. In the 1930s, they furthered the development of the indigenous entrepreneurial middling class. For example, under the leadership of Dr. Soetomo (1888-1938), the nationalist party Parindra (Greater Indonesia Party) organized schools, banks, cooperatives, farmers' associations, women's organizations, and a boy-scout movement.[323] In the 1930s, they conducted intense debates over what modern Indonesian culture should be.[324] On a personal level, they led a regularized way of life and maintained a well-ordered household, for they were convinced that armed struggle alone

[321] Kahin, *Nationalism*, 60; Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 275; Hatta, "National claims," 314.
[322] Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 283.
[323] Wertheim, *Indonesian Society*, 73. Scouting movements had already appeared among Natives prior to the 1930s.
[324] Achdiat K. Mihardja, ed., *Polemik Kebudayaan* [Polemics on culture] (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2008 [1948]).

would not suffice to liquidate colonial rule but that they must also cultivate "discipline," "realism," and self-confidence.[325]

Aware though they were of the need for mass mobilization in the nationalist movement, the urban, middling-class intellectuals lacked a well-grounded understanding of the rural masses. In reaching out to the masses, they received considerable help (intended or otherwise) from "intermediaries": people familiar with both traditional rural and modernizing urban worlds or people with one foot in elite nationalist circles and another in the urban kampung world. Neither full-fledged intellectuals nor parochial peasants nor unschooled industrial workers, these intermediaries were literate and a bit well-off (but increasingly under economic pressure) and had access to new ideas circulating in their own milieus or in periodicals printed in Malay and other ethnic languages that they subscribed to. These were the people who built (deliberately or otherwise) the bridge between the middling-class nationalists and the masses. Examples of such people included the nationalist-cum-successful tailor Achmad Djais of urban Surabaya[326] and the former *bekels* and appanage holders in rural Surakarta who—embittered by their economic dislocation in the wake of the Dutch move since 1912 to abolish the appanage system and the bekelship—organized peasants into Insulinde-affiliated circles, listened to the peasants' grievances over land tax, corvée labor, patrol and night-watch obligations, and low wages at the plantations, and finally led them in strikes against both the authorities and plantation managers.[327]

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[325] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 39.
[326] Ibid., 45-46.
[327] Shiraishi, *Age in Motion*, 152-165.

Native peasants and workers did have a range of grievances; otherwise, they would not have responded with such enthusiasm to the agitations and propaganda by major nationalists and "people-in-between." After a period of moderate prosperity between 1900 and 1929—as evident, for instance, in the rise of living standards among Natives from 1900 to 1913[328]—there came the Great Depression of 1930-1931, which resulted in job losses, declining per capita consumption of foodstuffs, and cutbacks on government spending on education.[329] To add insult to injury, when Natives created and ran their own schools (the so-called "wild schools"), the colonial government responded in 1932 by passing an ordinance that outlawed such schools. (Yet, the "outcry was so loud and so unequivocal" among Indonesians "that the ordinance had to be modified, and in the following decade the number of Indonesian-run and -financed private schools grew rapidly."[330]) In general, throughout the first half of twentieth century, the peasantry was displeased at the increasing tax burden and the erosion of their way of life caused by the intrusion of the colonial state and private capital into the village world. In the meantime, under the weight of the Penal Sanction, indigenous laborers suffered maltreatments and poor working conditions in East Sumatran plantations.[331] In brief, many elements in the masses, both conservative and progress-minded, were resentful of the colonial order.

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[328] Booth, "Indonesian Colonial Economic Performance in an East Asian Perspective," in *Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Regional and International Perspective*, ed. Thomas J. Lindblad and Peter Post (Leiden: KITLV, 2009), 137; see also C. J. Hasselman, "General Survey of the Results of the Investigation into Economic Prosperity in Java and Madura, Held in 1904-5," in Penders, *Selected Documents*, 90.

[329] See Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 236-237, where he quotes the findings of a survey conducted by Meyer Ranneft and Huender on the Native population of Java and Madura.

[330] Frederick, "Historical Setting," 48.

[331] Hatta, "Indonesia Free," 241-242.

Yet despite efforts on their part to reach out to, mobilize, and defend the masses, the way middling-class Natives saw the masses seem to have changed very little between 1900 and the 1930s. In a survey in 1904-1905, when asked why the peasants were poor, some middling-class Natives opined that "the Javanese masses [were]…lazy," lacked "self-control," "courage," and "perseverance"; suffered from "intellectual…backwardness"; and were under the spell of "religious beliefs" and "customs." Likewise and curiously, at the turn of the twentieth century some well-meaning Dutch champions of the Ethical Policy—for example, the journalist Piet Brooshoft (1845-1921)—saw the Native peasants as "primitive" and "childlike" in their "love of pleasure" (gambling, opium, and prostitution) and unproductively culture-bound in their way of handling cash (spending it on wasteful ceremonial feasts).[332] The Native middling-class interviewees in the same survey argued that to uplift the Native peasantry the colonial government was to provide it with "mass education"; cease relying on hereditary chiefs; ensure equality before the law; shield the peasants from the impact of sugar capitalism; and encourage the development of Native entrepreneurship by offering credit and special training in business.[333] Three decades later, the middling-class leaders regarded the indigenous masses in much the same light, that is, as ignorant, timid, apathetic, indolent, and tradition-bound. By this time, though, many of them had abandoned the hope that the colonial government would be willing to do anything of significance to uplift the masses. They saw it as their moral obligation to provide

[332] P. Brooshoft, "The Ethical Direction in Colonial Policy," in Penders, *Selected Documents*, 69.
[333] Penders, *Selected Documents*, 86.

peasants with example, guidance, and leadership; and to discipline and modernize them. And they set themselves up as models to shape the masses.[334]

The Japanese Occupation (1942-1945) and the National Revolution (1945-1949) accelerated and intensified a trend already underway in 1900-1942: the transition away from birth- and race-based social stratification toward meritocracy of one sort or another,[335] or, to put it differently, the ascent of the Indonesian middling classes at the expense of the imperial collaboration between Dutch colonizers and Native hereditary chiefs. One of the consequences of the Japanese-Indonesian political encounter was that the existing racial stratification found itself turned upside down. Supplanting the Dutch, the Japanese ruled at the top of the new colonial order while Natives came second in rank. Inhabiting a stratum beneath them were the Chinese, whom the Japanese held in suspicion in view of the ongoing deadlocked Japanese-Chinese armed confrontation in mainland China. Europeans found themselves downgraded to the bottom of the social ladder: most were interned in concentration camps and some, who possessed certain skills that the Japanese needed, were forced to serve in the newly created occupation institutions.

Within indigenous society itself, the Indonesian middling classes of wealth and of education (both secular and religious) saw their status, authority, or economic chances upgraded. The Pangreh-Pradja aristocrats, by contrast, suffered salary cuts, diminished

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[334] Sjahrir, *Renungan dan Perjuangan* [Meditations and struggle] (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1990), 81, 85-86, 89, 114-115. Yet in some passages of the same memoir, he also sees Indonesians in positive light, e.g., as "flexible" and "adaptive" with respect to foreign influences. He notes that "our people" had been changing rather quickly since about 1912. See ibid., 192 as well as Soetomo, *Kenang-Kenangan*, 83.

[335] W. F. Wertheim, "Changes in Indonesia's Social Stratification," *Pacific Affairs* 28, no. 1 (March 1955): 49.

control over economic resources, the loss of some privileges, and a decline in prestige. The Japanese still employed them (on the basis of merit) to run the bureaucracy, however, for the Japanese, like the Dutch before them, had to rely on them (especially the bupatis and the wedanas) to keep the masses under control.[336] By 1950, princes and kings had lost all or most of their political power, except in cases where they were shrewd enough to have played the nationalist game during the Revolution.

The political collaboration between Japanese empire-builders and the Indonesian middling-class nationalists meant at least two things. In the first place, the former harnessed the latter to organize mass support for Japan's war effort. In the second place, however, Indonesian intellectuals and the Islamic clerics of the 1920s and 1930s played much bigger political parts now than they had ever done under the Dutch.[337] In so doing, they took up their on-the-job training to become statesmen. Secular nationalists managed to employ Japanese-established mass movement institutions to pursue nationalist agenda, for example for propagating their ideas and ideologies among the masses in ways more pervasive and penetrative than they had been able to do prior to the Second World War.[338] Some of them admired Japan's military-industrial prowess and were persuaded, at least for a while, by its Greater East Asianist blueprint for modernization. Others were anti-fascists and opted to operate underground. Likewise, using the Japanese-created Masyumi (Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslims), Islamic clerics enjoyed

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[336] John R. W. Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1964) 13; Wertheim, "Changes," 44; Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 351.

[337] Wertheim, "Changes," 45.

[338] Smail, *Bandung*, 13; Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesian Social Evolution: Some Psychological Considerations* (Amsterdam: C. P. J. van der Peet, 1958), 165-166.

greater prestige and influence on the urban and rural landscapes, able, for instance, to create youth mass-organizations and armed struggle groups.[339] In the administration, Indonesian middling-class intellectuals occupied key positions in Japanese-created institutions, which took over many of the functions that the Pangreh Pradja used to perform under the Dutch. In the appointment of Natives to senior posts, the Japanese tended to prefer middling-class intellectuals to hereditary chiefs.[340] In the economy, indigenous traders saw the strengthening of their associations at the expense of their Chinese competitors.[341] In sum, as Wertheim points out, the general picture was that under the Japanese occupation, the Indonesian middling class of nationalist intellectuals emerged as "a new privileged group holding positions comparable to those formerly occupied by prewar upper classes [European, Eurasian, and Native alike]."[342]

Near the end of World War II, soon after the Japanese promise to grant independence to Indonesia, it was the middling-class nationalists who, serving as "political engineers," laid the foundation for the Indonesian nation-state. As members of the Committee for the Investigation of Independence, they designed the sort of nation-state that Indonesians should have; fashioned the state ideology called Pancasila (Five Principles);[343] and prepared the constitution of 1945 to provide for a hierarchical, centralist, integralistic, and corporatist state that was to bind all Indonesians together.[344]

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[339] Wertheim, "Changes," 45; Elson, *Idea*, 10.
[340] Wertheim, "Changes," 45-46.
[341] Ibid., 43.
[342] Ibid., 44.
[343] The Five Principles are a) belief in one supreme god, b) humanitarianism, c) national unity, d) popular sovereignty through deliberation and representative or consultative democracy, and e) social justice.
[344] Elson, *Idea*, 105.

1. 2. 2. The Indonesian Middling Classes, 1945-1965

Between 1945 and 1950, it was the middling-class intellectuals, both civilian and military, and from both the older and the younger generation, who announced Indonesia's independence; led the diplomatic and armed struggles to render the declaration of independence internationally credible; and rejected the resurrection of Dutch rule, a Japanese-style regime, and aristocratic privileges. It was they who "grop[ed] for doctrines, policies, and governmental methods with which to fill the tabula rasa of the new independence."[345] It was they who occupied many top posts in the cabinet and the Pamong Pradja and some high-ranking positions in the Armed Forces.[346] They decided to run the newborn Republic under a Western-style parliamentary system. They shaped Indonesia to be a society in which they could continue to play the leading role and in which full-fledged modernization would benefit, first of all, people like them and, later and gradually, all Indonesians who were willing to follow their guidance.

A new social group that arose from the Japanese-Indonesian encounter in 1942-1945 would prove to help shape the direction of Indonesia's evolution: the Indonesian middling class of Army officers. As young men in their twenties, these people—such as Soedirman (1912-1950), Soeharto (1921-2008), Kemal Idris (1923-2010), or Ali Moertopo (1924-1984)—received their military training in Japanese-sponsored Native militias (e.g. Peta, Heiho, and Hizbullah), which converted at least some of them to the martial versions of national self-discovery, the restoration of national self-esteem, and the

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[345] Herbert Feith, "Introduction," *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965*, ed. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 3.

[346] Ibid.

ideal of national glory.[347] The products of this paramilitary training would play a defining role in Indonesian society. As late as 1971, for instance, the Peta veterans constituted roughly 75 percent of the top-ranking officers in the Indonesian Army.[348]

The road to middling-class predominance during the National Revolution (1945-1949) was anything but smooth. On the one hand, in some areas of the country, the Revolution sped up the transformation of the social hierarchy. The aristocratic bureaucrats of the Civil Service (which from 1946 onwards was known as the Pamong Pradja) had to acknowledge the predominance of the middling-class nationalist intellectuals, who created and presided over the Republic. The former had to surrender some of the Pamong-Pradja posts to the latter.[349] On the other hand, the middling-class intelligentsias were faced with the specter of the angry underclass, which reared its head during the outbreak of "social revolutions" from 1945 to 1946 in Aceh, East Sumatra, West Java, and Central Java, where aristocrats were lynched by mobs or kicked out of their posts in the local bureaucracy. Likewise, by mobilizing radical youths, senior communists such as Tan Malaka (1897-1949) and Musso (1897-1948) sought to establish a classless society. Social revolution, however, was the last thing that most of the middling-class intellectuals wanted. For better or worse, they remained conservatives, wanting little more than national liberation and the consolidation of their grip on society, to be safely followed by gradual social reform, on middling-class terms and under

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[347] Ethan D. Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture, and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2003), 595, 620.

[348] Ibid., 578.

[349] Smail, *Bandung*, 156.

middling-class tutelage.[350] As it turned out, the forces in favor of immediate social revolution ended up on the losing side; the conservatives organized around Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, and A. H. Nasution (1918-2000) got the upper hand.[351] (A deeper and more detailed discussion of the evolution of the Indonesian middling classes from the perspective of their quest for modernity during the Revolution is offered in Chapter Two).

During the so-called Old Order era (1950-1965), in contrast to their underdog position under the Dutch overlords from 1900 to 1942, the Indonesian middling classes played a dominant role or at least a major one in many of the key areas of life.[352] The nationalist intelligentsias of the 1920s and 1930s had by now emerged as leaders in national and regional politics. Thanks to their intensive and prolonged involvement in nationalist politics under the Dutch, during the Japanese occupation, and throughout the Revolution, many had grown more adept at politics than at the original professions for which they undertook their academic training. Having created an independent, unitary nation-state by 1950, they found it reasonable to be full-time, professional politicians. With the Dutch and Japanese removed from the political scene, and with the power of the aristocracy considerably eroded and "tamed," the opportunity emerged for them to start their attempt to become the country's ruling elite. It is worth pointing out that from 1950 to 1955 they behaved as politicians but they were, in fact, politicians without elections. For Indonesia's first elections did not take place until 1955.

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[350] Elson, *Idea*, 126-128, 140.
[351] Anderson, *Java*, viii-ix, 332-369.
[352] Lev, "Intermediate Class," 28.

The Old Order era saw the increase in size and importance of the middling classes. As was the case in the first half of the twentieth century, their growth owed in part to the downward mobility of some aristocrats. For example, Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004), the son of a Batak aristocratic bureaucrat in the colonial Civil Service, became a journalist and a writer during the Revolution and for the rest of his life. [353] It also resulted in part from the entry of ex-freedom fighters, "former federal and Republican officials," and the high-school and college graduates of the expanding educational system to the expanding civilian and military bureaucracy. While in 1950 the country employed 420,000 civil servants, by 1960 the number had risen to 807,000.[354] Middling-class Indonesians served in the bureaucracy as administrators, judges, prosecutors, officers of the armed forces, [355] doctors, teachers, and university instructors.[356] This development meant that civil servants of aristocratic origin had to share positions, power, privileges, and control over state resources with more and more colleagues of middling-class background. Both groups were to cooperate with each other as social equals.

It is worth highlighting that—with very few exceptions, such as A. H. Nasution, T. B. Simatupang, and A. E. Kawilarang—they were not the products of a military academy. In fact many were originally students, who took up arms during the Revolution

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[353] See David T. Hill, *Journalism and Politics in Indonesia: A Critical Biography of Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004) as Editor and Author* (London: Routledge, 2010), 14-16, 25-32, 35-158.

[354] On this, see, for example, Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 275.

[355] A dropout of the MULO in 1941 and later a Hizbullah veteran, Ali Moertopo decided in 1950 to be an Army officer. Consult, for instance, CSIS, *Ali Moertopo, 1924-1984* (Jakarta: CSIS, 2004), 14-15.

[356] The ex-guerrilla fighter Daoed Joesoef, for instance, took up his undergraduate studies at the Department of Economics, Universitas Indonesia, between 1950 and 1959 and then joined its teaching staff from 1954 to 1963. *Dia dan Aku: Memoar Pencari Kebenaran* [He and I: Memoir of a truth-seeker] (Jakarta: Kompas, 2006), 923.

against the Dutch who sought to reinstall their empire. Whereas at the end of the Revolution some resumed and completed their studies, or otherwise rejoined civilian life, others opted for a career in the military. In terms of social background, education, lifestyles, and values, however, many of these officers had a great deal in common with the civilian politicians. Many could talk to each other in Dutch. Some attended the same type of Dutch-language secondary school.[357] Some even came from the same families or were connected to each other by marriage. For example, the Chief of Indonesian Army intelligence Maj. Gen. S. Parman (1918-1965) and member of the PKI's Politburo Ir. Sakirman (1911-1967) were brothers.[358] At any rate, like the civilian politicians, the military officers wanted a share in the political and economic rewards of the Revolution. They asserted their right to shape the course of national politics.[359] They wielded their power to control some of the country's economic resources. For example, when foreign enterprises were taken over in 1957 and 1964 by labor unions affiliated with the PKI and the leftwing section of the PNI, the Army intervened and seized managerial control over these corporations, which operated in such fields as "plantations, mining, banking, and trade."[360] In addition, sometimes in cooperation with Chinese entrepreneurs, the Army set up and operated its own business firms.[361]

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[357] For example, both Daoed Joesoef and Ali Moertopo attended the MULO.

[358] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 315.

[359] Ibid., 302.

[360] Ibid., 298, 313; Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 72; Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 38-39.

[361] Crouch, ibid., 39.

The upshot of this all was that by 1965 the Army had emerged as "the most powerful politico-bureaucratic force in Indonesia."[362] That is to say, some of its officers had come to form a hybrid middling class of people who were at once intellectuals, politicians, military officers, private businesspeople, and managers of state-owned enterprises. Examples of this type of military man included, among others, Ali Moertopo (1924-1984), Soedjono Hoemardani (1919-1986), Soewarto (1921-1967), and Ibnu Soetowo (1914-2001).

Besides military officers and civilian government employees, the middling classes in the Old Order included younger people with secondary or higher education—still in their twenties or thirties by 1950—who entered the liberal professions,[363] joined the Islamic or Christian clergy,[364] or became entrepreneurs.[365] Mention must also be made of the rural middling class of well-to-do farmers. In Java, a good proportion of this class included the landowning Islamic clerics and the devout Muslims; some ran village

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[362] Robison, *The Rise of Capital*, 96-97.

[363] A good example of the Indonesian middling-class of independent professionals in the 1950s and 1960s was Yap Thiam Hien (1913-1989), a lawyer of Chinese descent, who from the late 1960s onwards was a prominent defender of human rights. Born in Banda Aceh, he received his education in Java and Leiden. See Daniel S. Lev, *No Concessions: The Life of Yap Thiam Hien, Indonesian Human Rights Lawyer* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011).

[364] After the revolution, the former guerilla fighter Y. B. Mangunwijaya (1929-1999), for example, entered the Catholic priesthood and studied to be a professional architect.

[365] One interesting example is that of A. Kasoem (1918-1979). A son of a well-to-do farmer in Garut, he received his secondary education in a Dutch *schakel school* and the nationalist Taman Siswa. He emerged in the 1960s as the pioneer of the Indonesian optical industry. In 1943, when he opened his optical shop at the famous shopping quarter in Bandung, the Braga Street, he was the first Native businessman ever to operate there. So great was his success throughout the 1950s as a dealer in spectacles that in 1960 he decided to start out as a manufacturer of spectacles, photographic equipment, and microscopes. He was able to do this after having studied the technology in West Germany and combined his own capital with a loan he took from government bank. See Lombard, *Nusa Jawa*, vol. 2, 121-122.

Islamic boarding schools and many organized themselves politically around the Nahdlatul Ulama.[366]

There was a racial divide within the Indonesian middling class of entrepreneurs. The Chinese businesspeople, "who had substantial commercial networks but no political support" were pitted against the Native entrepreneurs, "who had less extensive networks and only limited political support."[367] Ethnic Chinese businesspeople, who dealt in "retail and distributing trade, transport, credit, [and] *klontong* trade…cottage industries," seem to have constituted the greater part of Indonesia's entrepreneurial middling class.[368] In general, the modern sector of country's economy (banking, finance, manufacturing, and international commerce) remained European-dominated until 1957 and 1964, when foreign companies were nationalized. From 1950 to 1957, in an attempt to favor the development of indigenous capitalists over Chinese ones, the state provided prospective Native businesspeople with government credit and protection in various fields, such as rice milling, bus transportation, private banking, agribusiness, and (under the Benteng policy) import.[369] The whole project failed to indigenize the ownership of capital in the country. Pursued from 1950 to 1957, the Benteng [Fortress] policy, which was meant to encourage indigenous entrepreneurs by discriminating against Chinese and European businesspeople, foundered and resulted in corruption by politicians and bureaucrats.[370]

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[366] They were faced with increasingly serious political and economic challenges from the PKI, especially after the latter managed, by championing the cause of land reform, to win the votes of tenant and small farmers in the 1955 elections and to mobilize them around its Peasant Front (the BTI).

[367] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 274.

[368] Van der Kroef, *Indonesian Social Evolution*, 167.

[369] Robison, *Rise of Capital*, 42-43.

[370] Crouch, "The Missing Bourgeoisie," 41.

On balance, however, the "affirmative action" did help several indigenous businesspeople to widen their scope of operation.[371] Consider, for example, Rahman Tamin, Agoes Dasaad, Hashim Ning, and the batik merchants of the GKBI (the Association of Indonesian Batik Co-operatives).[372] Some would grow further in the New Order. Whether or not one likes the benteng entrepreneurs, one must admit that they were an element, a corrupt one, in the entrepreneurial middling classes. In many cases, they cooperated with their Chinese partners. They enjoyed privileged access to government licenses and credit owing to their strong connections with the strongmen in the parliament and bureaucracy. They managed to form a profitable alliance not only with Chinese businesspeople but also with the old nationalist leaders, the old aristocrats, and the new priyayi, who were now in control of the state and the bureaucracy.[373]

It has frequently been argued that the Indonesian middling classes of this period were internally divided along multiple axes, such as religion (Islam vs. Christianity), ethnicity (Javanese vs. non-Javanese or Natives vs. Chinese), geography (Java vs. "Outer Islands"), ideology (Islam vs. nationalism vs. democratic socialism vs. communism), and profession (civilians vs. the military).[374] Though analytically useful and to some degree accurate, such a perspective does not reveal the whole story. Most importantly, it fails to appreciate many of the underlying commonalities that different, often squabbling, social groups in the Indonesian middling classes shared with one another. Their internal divisions notwithstanding, the bulk of these classes shared a number of ideas and ideals.

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[371] Robison, *Rise of Capital*, 51, 63-64.
[372] Ibid., 51.
[373] Van der Kroef, *Indonesian Social Evolution*, 167-168.
[374] See, for instance, Feith, "Introduction," 12-17.

First, they believed that independent Indonesia must be modern but they disagreed with each other over whether they should prioritize political or economic modernization and whether Indonesia should attain modernity through reform or revolution.

Second, they concurred that people like *them* (that is, the middling classes) and the state they ran were to direct the nation-building project.[375] Indeed, as Herbert Feith points out, they saw nation-building as their "noblesse oblige responsibility."[376] Importantly, there was one old, persistent motif in the way many of them, both on the Right and on the Left, saw the people (rakyat): that condescending view that people were ignorant. For example, even a leftist like the general secretary of the Lekra, Joebaar Ajoeb (1926-1996) expressed his fear in 1951 that the people would fall victim to the invasion of the decadent American popular culture because they were "for the most part [were] still backward in their [intelligence]."[377]

Third, as Herbert Feith and Hildred Geertz have observed, they shared a common culture, termed by Geertz as a "metropolitan superculture." As participants in this culture, they had a great deal in common, for example the modern education they had received; the books they cared to read; the foreign languages in which they were proficient; the commitment to the central use of the Indonesia language in their daily communication; the key social issues over which they debated; the kind of everyday life they led (e.g., the sort of house they lived in, the regular reading of newspapers, and the emphasis on such

[375] Feith, *Decline*, 35.
[376] Ibid.
[377] Quoted in Keith Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts: The Indonesian"Institute of People's Culture" 1950-1965* (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 35-36. See also Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Holt, Anderson, and Siegel, *Culture and Politics*, 50-51.

values as order and discipline); the membership in voluntary associations; the personal cultural tastes they had developed; the kind of people they married; and the social background many of them came from.[378]

Fourth, they also shared a great deal intellectually. Whether secular or religiously devout, most—if not all—appealed regularly to a set of contested but shared ideals such as rationality, progress,[379] democracy, socialism, nationalism,[380] and meritocracy of sorts in their debates over issues of utmost importance to the nation. And they were all true believers in the typical modernist notion that one can actually plan social change to improve the human condition, although the pragmatists among them championed the primacy of economic development over "social ideals" whereas their ideology-oriented colleagues privileged utopian socio-political progress over short-term economic problem-solving.[381]

The underlying commonalities and shared basic assumptions as indicated above go a long way toward explaining why, for instance, friendships had developed, and intermarriages had occurred, among them. It was not uncommon, moreover, to discover that many of them belonged to the same nuclear or extended family.[382] It was such commonalities, I think, that enabled them to understand one another even as they were

[378] Feith, "Introduction," 5; Feith, *Decline*, 108-112; Geertz, *Indonesian Cultures and Communities*, 16-17.

[379] Feith, "Introduction," 20.

[380] Feith, *Decline*, 34-35, 38.

[381] Herbert Feith uses the terms "administrators" to describe the first group and "solidarity-makers" to refer to the second one. See Feith, *Decline*, 32-37.

[382] For example, in the 1950s, Mochtar Lubis, a leading journalist close to PSI circles, had brothers in the Armed Forces: one, Maj. Bachtiar Lubis, was in the Army; the other, Maj. Achmad Lubis, served in the Navy. The Peta veteran Zulkifli Lubis was one of their distant cousins. On this subject, see Hill, *Journalism*, 29.

being embroiled in the bitterest of their political feuds. Arguably, the majority of the middling classes were ultimately social conservatives. They wanted a social order in which they could consolidate and enlarge the social, economic, and political gains they had made so far.

In spite of their differences in principle and working, the parliamentary order (1950-1957) and Guided Democracy (1959-1965) served the same functions. Both were systems for the middling-class ruling elite to regulate its jockeying for the spoils of independence[383] as well as methods for it to achieve the objective of the Revolution, which was the creation of a just and prosperous, integrated, and respectable society. The parliamentary system was based on "meritocracy" of sorts. The way many members of the middling-class ruling elite behaved from 1950 to 1957 suggests a shared underlying idea that by virtue of their educational credentials and of the diplomatic or military "contribution" they made to the struggle for independence, they considered themselves as entitled to a lion's share in the control and enjoyment of state's funds, powers, and machinery.[384] During their experiment in parliamentary democracy, to secure the largest

[383] For contemporaneous views of the parliamentary order and Guided Democracy as mechanisms for the allocation of spoils among members of the middling-class ruling elite, see, for example, Mohammad Hatta, "A Revolution Should Not Last Too Long" [1956], in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 94-95; Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "The Failings of Sukarno" [1959], in ibid., 143. An example of the contemporaneous perception of both orders as ways to realize the objective of the Revolution was that of Soedjatmoko, as told to Soe Hok Gie in February 1963. See Soe Hok Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [The diary of a student activist] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989), 147.

[384] Jose Eliseo Medalle Rocamora, *Nationalism in Search of Ideology: The Indonesian Nationalist Party, 1946-1965* (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines, 1974), 12. The idea that the criteria for the distribution of postindependence spoils among members of the middling-class elite should include not only the possession of modern education but also the sacrifices made during the Revolution had already appeared in the late 1940s during Hatta administration. See, among others, Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 89.

possible portion of these resources, they used and abused political parties in a rat race for seats in the parliament and cabinet as well as sinecures and strategic posts in the bureaucracy.

Intra-elite struggle was exacerbated by the campaigning for and the inconclusive results of the 1955 elections. Rather than produce a winning majority, the elections simply made official the existing political divisions within the middling-class ruling elite. Its leaders failed to make compromises and arrive at consensus, on whose basis they could have collaborated to push the nation closer to its goals. Facing a deadlock, the ruling elite succeeded in creating neither a cabinet nor a new constitution. This was not, however, the only problem that resulted from its botched experiment in parliamentary system.

The exercise in electoral democracy also destabilized society. In their struggle for votes, local party campaigners excited the masses to a state of high political arousal. The secular nationalists of the PNI did so among civil servants; the modernist Muslims of the Masyumi among Muslim traders and entrepreneurs, especially in the Outer Islands; the traditionalist Islamic clerics of the NU among Muslims of rural East Java; and the communists of the PKI among industrial workers in town and cities as well as poor farmers, sharecroppers, and *abangan* well-to-do landowners. By so doing, they set people against one another, amplifying pre-existing cultural and ideological divisions within the masses as well as intensifying their longing for a better life, which the Revolution promise.

Indonesia experienced a convergence of problems in 1957. While the parliamentary system wound up in intra-elite logjam and divisiveness and left the masses politically over-excited, the economy suffered a downturn. The period of economic growth that the country had been enjoying since 1950—which resulted from the export boom stimulated by the Korean War and the growth of the international consumer society—came to an end. So did the time when the country managed to amass a considerable amount of foreign exchange reserves and amortize the colossal national debt it inherited from the Dutch. So did the time when more and more Indonesians enjoyed higher standards of living than those in the colonial era; moved from subsistence to cash economies; and participated in the consumer culture.[385]

Even while it still lasted, the economic achievement of the parliamentary democratic regime between 1950 and 1957 was neither substantial nor fast enough to meet people's remarkably high demands for employment, goods and services, and chances for upward social mobility. The high expectations were stimulated not only by the promises of the Revolution but also by greater postindependence chances for people to get education, consume the media, and undertake travel; and by the promises made by leaders of political parties when they wooed the masses to get their votes for the 1955 elections.[386] The discrepancy between what the squabbling middling-class leaders were able to deliver and what the people wanted led to "[m]ore and more Indonesians

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[385] Vickers, *History*, 133-134.

[386] Herbert Feith, "The Study of Indonesian Politics: A Survey and an Apologia," in *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*, ed. Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1982), 50.

[becoming] impatient with the unfulfilled promise of progress," as "[i]nflation ate into wages, and most civil servants could not live off their incomes."[387]

When all was said and done, a large section of the middling-class ruling elite concluded around 1957 that the parliamentary system did not work. It ended up in the deadlock, polarization, and corruption among the elite as well as in the instability, impatience, and demoralization among the masses. It also led to the outbreak of regional rebellions that threatened the young unitary nation-state. These problems undermined the capacity of the middling-class leaders to push Indonesia far and quick enough toward prosperity, social justice, strength, and respect. To pull the country out of the social and political mess, President Soekarno and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces A. H. Nasution intervened. They put the Indonesia under martial law (1957-1963) and replaced the parliamentary system with a new way of organizing state and society known as "Guided Democracy," which would operate from 1959 to 1965, during which no elections were held.

As a way of governing the country, Guided Democracy revolved around a presidential, non-party cabinet as well as a parliament whose members were not the products of general elections but were appointed by President Soekarno. Rather than represent political parties or ideological camps, they stood for various "functional

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[387] Vickers, *History*, 135. From the early 1950s onwards, many of the country's leaders were aware of the general disillusionment in society with the fact that the government was doing a poor job of fulfilling the promises of Revolution, for which people had made a lot of sacrifices. See, for example, Mohammad Natsir, "Lassitude and the Display of False Glitter" [1951], in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 72; Soekarno, "The Crisis of Authority" [1952], in ibid., 76-77; Mohammad Hatta, "A Revolution" [1956], in ibid., 95; and Soedjatmoko, *Economic Development as a Cultural Problem* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Translation Series, 1962 [1954]), 2.

groups" in society (workers, the peasantry, the intelligentsias, women, youths, and so forth).[388] Under Soekarno's close guidance, they were to collaborate as a cohesive team to create government policies, not through voting but through consensus. It was hoped that these new arrangements, under which all members of the middling-class leaders could rule the country together, would enhance their capacity to lead it to create a just and prosperous society.

Guided Democracy reduced the centrality of party politics as the middling-class ruling elite's competitive mechanism for the distribution of power, prestige, and wealth among itself. It increased the importance of the bureaucracy as the major arena for Army officers and civilian bureaucrats to compete for such resources.[389] It also led to the intensification of the contest between political parties (especially the PKI, the PNI, and the NU) for mass support and mass mobilization. With the exceptions of those affiliated with the Masyumi and the PSI, which were abolished in punishment for their participation in regional rebellions, many members of the middling-class political elite, whether civilian or military, supported and participated in Guided Democracy. It was mainly for economic reasons that professionals and military officers threw their weight behind the new system. They were tired of the political infighting under liberal democracy, which they saw as the cause of the economic decline that Indonesia had been suffering since the mid-1950s. Too much politics, they opined, was an obstacle to economic development.

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[388] See, among others, Mohammad Hatta's article written in 1960, "A Dictatorship Supported by Certain Groups," in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 139.

[389] Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1956-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 127.

Like parliamentary democracy, Guided Democracy, too, ended up in failure. In the first place, it failed to end intra-elite antagonism and regional resistance to the central government. The Islamists were still disgruntled with the order of things. The Communists and the Army still struggled against each other. The balance of power among the major contending groups (the Army and Muslims vs. the PKI) depended precariously on the ailing and aging Soekarno, who presented himself increasingly as a radical nationalist. He used ideology and anti-imperialist campaigns to forge national unity. In 1959 he promulgated a national ideology known as the Manipol, which every Indonesian was to comply with. It was based on the Pancasila and included a Soekarnoist synthesis of nationalism, religion, and communism. In the early 1960s he led Indonesia into wars against the Dutch in West New Guinea and with the Commonwealth Forces in the jungles of Kalimantan. In 1965, he pulled the country out of the United Nations.

In the second place, the Soekarnoist experiment during Guided Democracy to conduct politics in an ideology-oriented way was a fiasco. Rather than unite the country, it sharpened and magnified the hostility and power struggle between two major camps: the leftist radicals of the PKI and its left-leaning allies on one side and the conservative majority in the middling classes on the other. Members of the latter included Army officers, civilian bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, rural landowners, Islamic clergymen, and the greater part of the urban intellectuals. Both camps belonged to the middling classes but championed two different blueprints for organizing state and society. The middling-class social conservatives envisioned a politically stable, economically growing Indonesia, where they could consolidate their economic, social, and political leadership, while

allowing the folk to have a gradually increasing share in the expanded economic pie. By contrast, the PKI leaders and Soekarno's left-leaning supporters (radicalized middling-class Indonesians who believed that communism offered the best path to modernity and who despised fellow middling-class Indonesians for pursuing their own interests as opposed to the interests of the masses)[390] insisted on pursuing an increasingly confrontationist, anti-Western foreign policy. The PKI, in particular, aimed at nothing less than a fundamental restructuring of the Indonesian society. Once they were in power, they would liquidate not only the "remnants of the feudal class" but also the anti-communist or pro-Western elements of the middling classes. They would press ahead with the collectivization of the national economy,[391] the ending of economic

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[390] While Sudisman was the son of minor municipal official, M. H. Lukman came from the family of an Islamic clergyman. Aidit's father, Abdullah Aidit (d. 1968), was a forester in the colonial government's employ on the island of Belitung while his mother Mailan (d. 1927) hailed from a local aristocratic family. As for Njoto, he was a member of the middling classes by choice. For by birth he was an aristocrat. His father, Raden Mas Sosro Hartono, had blood ties to one of the two royal houses in Surakarta, Central Java. Njoto's mother, Masalmah, was the daughter of a building contractor of petty aristocratic background. In his youth, Njoto was uncomfortable in the company of Javanese aristocrats. Later, though, Njoto struck some of his contemporaries as a rather "unseemly" communist. For although by political ideology and party membership he was on the Left, his manners, interests, tastes, and styles could easily be recognized by his contemporaries as those of the bourgeois dandy. Njoto received his primary and secondary education at Dutch-language schools: the Hollandsch-Inlandsch School in Jember and the Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs in Jember and Surakarta. For a biographical sketch of D. N. Aidit, see Wenseslaus Manggut, et al., *Aidit: Dua Wajah Dipa Nusantara* [Two faces of Dipa Nusantara Aidit], Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2010). For a biographical sketch of Njoto, see Budi Riza, et al., *Njoto: Peniup Saksofon di Tengah Prahara* [Njoto: A saxophonist in the midst of the storm] (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2010).

[391] In 1962, D. N. Aidit said that one of the PKI's long-term objectives was the collectivization of agriculture. See, for example, Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism*, 288-289.

imperialism,[392] the elimination of class society, and the imposition of communism as state ideology.[393]

Under Guided Democracy the PKI made remarkable progress, which frightened its opponents. With no elections held under martial law, it succeeded in attracting massive followers among Java's sharecroppers and poor farmers by attending to their plight under deteriorating economic conditions and, more importantly, by championing the unilateral implementation of land reform.[394] Had elections been held, many thought, the PKI would have emerged victorious. In the meantime, it infiltrated the officer corps of the Armed Forces, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, and the core of the cabinet. The party enhanced its anti-imperialist credentials and won Soekarno's favor by mobilizing its mass followers in support of the president-led campaigns to take over West New Guinea from the Dutch and to "crush" Malaysia. It also campaigned for the formation of the "fifth force" of armed peasants and workers with a view to ending the Armed Forces' monopoly of the means of coercion. These moves were unmistakable signs of the PKI's bid for power.

The PKI's increasing radicalism and strength threatened many in the socially conservative or otherwise anti-communist middling classes. They were Army officers; rightwing bureaucrats and politicians of the PNI; NU-linked Islamic clerics in rural Java; Muslim entrepreneurs in the Outer Islands; and social democratic, Western-educated

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[392] Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1964), 37-38.

[393] Daniel Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1969* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1966), 191; David Levine, "History and Social Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia, in Anderson and Kahin, *Interpreting Indonesian Politics*, 32; Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism*, 59-60, 169.

[394] Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism*, 271, 277, 279, 282.

intellectuals and professionals. Aware of the PKI's active infiltration into their circles, they put up resistance to it, either on their own or in collaboration with each other. The aristocratic and middling-class civil servants in Java, whose shared worldview was a combination of the priyayi and the Western bureaucratic ethos, were determined to protect the economic and political gains they had won in the central bureaucracy from the PKI's encroachments.[395] Top bureaucrats saw to it that "no communist [be] given charge of a ministry or any government position of actual power."[396] University students and teachers resisted PKI's recruiting efforts on campus. As a result, the "PKI has had indifferent success among intellectuals as a whole…."[397] While D. N. Aidit blamed it on the prevalence of such bourgeois ideologies as "idealism and individualism" in the Indonesian academia,[398] Donald Hindley attributes it to the intellectuals' social background. Most, he points out, came from middling-class families, which supported the socio-economic and political views of the PNI, the Masyumi, or the PSI.[399] For them to embrace communism would have meant committing "class suicide." (Unlike their non-communist counterparts, the communist intellectuals, being radical, were willing to commit such suicide.) High-ranking officers in the Army and the Navy, especially those

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[395] Ibid., 61.

[396] Hindley, *Communist Party*, 502.

[397] Ibid., 196. Herbert Feith noted in 1962 that "[t]he number of the PKI members of university education or completed secondary education was very small indeed, and the party had almost no support among students." See Feith, *Decline*, 134. Compare this, however, with the claim made by the CGMI (the PKI-affiliated student association) in 1960 that it had 7,000 members. Even if the claim did reflect reality on the ground, it was small compared to 26,000-strong membership in the non-communist student associations in 1963: 10,000 in the Muslim HMI, 10,000 in the secular nationalist GMNI, and 6,000 in the Catholic and Christian PMKRI and GMKI. See Hindley, *Communist Party*, 196. As Hindley also observes in ibid., 198, "…there were very few Communist university teachers, and so few who could render expert assistance to the students in CGMI's groups."

[398] Hindley, ibid., 196.

[399] Ibid., 198.

who rallied around A. H. Nasution, did their best to protect the commanding cores of the two services from infiltrations by the PKI. In the early 1960s a number of college teachers of Universitas Indonesia and high-ranking officers Army officers of the Staff and Command College (the SSKAD, later Seskoad) formed an anticommunist alliance.[400] The middling-class conservatives believed that a communist victory would mean the end of the world as they knew it. They saw no future for them in the kind of society the communists wanted to build. The trouble for them was that throughout the first half of the 1960s, PKI's prospect for victory grew stronger day by day. And by the mid-1960s, in the light of their remarkable success in building up the largest mass base of any party and because of their increasingly close and intensive alliance with President Soekarno, the PKI seemed poised to seize power.[401]

However, we will miss the complexity of the Indonesian middling classes throughout the "Old Order" (1950-1965) as long as we pay attention to their politics alone. It is at least equally important that we consider their social dimension, for example the views they had on society and the ideas they formed around the conduct of their daily lives. In the early 1950s, the observation that Clifford Geertz made of the middling-class Javanese in the town of Pare, East Java revealed a noticeably petty bourgeois element in these people's way of life. He discovered, for instance, that the women had the habits of "embroidering, giving wedding presents, furnishing their homes with heavy baroque furniture, and decorating the walls of their little box-shaped cement houses—which often would look less out of place in The Hague—with cozy landscapes." The men, he found

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[400] Soe, *Catatan*, 142-143.
[401] Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism*, 274.

out, "engaged in tennis, chess, swimming, and hunting." Some of them read "Dutch novels and magazines" and "did pencil sketches"—"hardly a Native Javanese custom," commented Geertz.[402] Equally interesting was the way these small-town middling-class people viewed the peasantry:

> The peasants…are something of an embarrassment: they are not only ignorant and lacking in proper manners…[but also] "disorderly," "dirty," and "lazy" and they bring up their children in an irregular fashion.[403]
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> [Rekso, head of the local PNI,] thought [that] Javanese children weren't "trained"; that they were just let alone to eat what and when they wanted, sleep when they wanted; and some never bathed or got their clothes washed. *His* children get up at a certain time, bathe, eat breakfast, go to school; and only after school can they play. The old lady (a distant relative of the informant) chimed in, echoing Rekso, remarking that peasant children don't eat regularly, are dirty, have to go gather wood and grasses for their mother instead of going to school.[404]

Geertz's observation reveals at least two things. First, the middling-class view of "the people" had changed very little since 1900. It differed very little as well from what it was during the Revolution, when middling-class Indonesians, whether civilian or military, whether rightwing or leftwing, perceived "the people" as irrational, inert, ignorant of their own interests, incapable of speaking for themselves, and having neither mental complexity nor a sense of individuality.[405]

Second, the observation throws into relief the core values by which some of the middling-class Indonesians of the 1950s defined themselves: order, cleanliness, industry,

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[402] It is important to remember that in the Old Order, some middling-class Indonesians also played Western musical instruments. For example, Njoto, a PKI leader, played the saxophone.

[403] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 235-236. A PKI leader might have agreed with this middling-class view of the peasantry.

[404] Ibid., 236.

[405] Elson, *Idea*, 128, 141-142, 162.

education, and the cultivation of leisure. Geertz rightly noticed that this set of values and the related petty bourgeois practice of daily life were some of the things that the middling-class Natives acquired when they attended Dutch-language schools, either in the colony or in the Netherlands. He also pointed to other petty bourgeois cultural elements they had absorbed. These included, among others, "Dutch manners and values" and welfare organizations such as "women's clubs," "credit cooperatives," and "noblesse oblige adult education movements to uplift the masses."[406]

In the early 1960s, the clash between the leftist and non-leftist camps within the Indonesian middling classes took place not only in domestic and foreign politics but also in culture. Just as, in the political sphere, to broaden its mass followings and boost its radical-nationalist credentials in support of its demand for a share in the key positions in the civil service and the armed forces, the PKI mounted their attack on NU-affiliated landowning Muslims in East Java through land-reform campaigns[407] and threw its weight behind Soekarno's campaign to "Crush Malaysia," so on the cultural landscape, the PKI-linked Lekra, too, went on the offensive. The Lekra did this by "crushing" the non-communist intellectuals and artists who, in September 1963, published what it viewed as the "reactionary" Cultural Manifesto [*Manifes Kebudayaan*, or *Manikebu* for short]. The struggle between the Lekra and the Manikebu camps boiled down to two conflicting assessments of the Indonesian society as it now stood, and to two opposing prescriptions for the direction in which it must go in the future.

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[406] Geertz, *Religion*, 236.

[407] Leslie Palmier, *Communists in Indonesia: Power Pursued in Vain* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), 228.

In general, the Lekra intellectuals—many of whom were from a middling-class background—adopted the PKI's view that the Revolution of 1945-1949 was a failure. It failed for the reason that it consisted of only political decolonization; it neither came with economic and cultural decolonizations nor culminated, as the leftists thought it should, in a social revolution. The Revolution, they averred, failed to effect economic decolonization because of the "betrayal" by the Indonesian "bourgeois" negotiators under Hatta's leadership who, in exchange for Indonesia's sovereignty, made unforgivable concessions to the Dutch at the Round Table Conference in The Hague in late 1949, concessions that "fixed Indonesia's status as semicolonial." [408] For besides having to take over the debts of the former Netherlands Indies (a total of NLG 4.3 billion), Indonesia was to safeguard, on its territory, the security and smooth running of large Dutch-owned companies and plantation estates.[409] As a result, the leftists contended, in the postindependence era the modern sector of the Indonesian economy remained under the control of a handful of large Dutch corporations.[410] What this meant was the restoration of "Dutch imperialist power over Indonesia's economy." [411] From a social viewpoint, the Revolution was a failure as well: not only did it fail to eliminate the nobles and "the feudal landlord class"; it also resulted in the ascent in society of what the leftists saw as the domestic bourgeois "compradors" of Dutch, British, and American imperialist

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[408] See, for instance, Justus M. van der Kroef, *The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program, and Tactics* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), 43; and D. N. Aidit, "A Semifeudal and Semicolonial Society" [1957], in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 247.

[409] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 269.

[410] Aidit, "Semifeudal," 249.

[411] Ibid., 248.

powers.[412] From a cultural perspective, the Lekra intellectuals claimed, the Indonesian people were living under the weight of feudal and imperialist cultures, whose malignant artifacts "poisoned and destroyed…[their] character and soul…."[413] For this, the leftwing intellectuals charged, the Indonesian (petty) bourgeois writers and artists were to blame because even in the postindependence period many, especially those in the circles around the critic H. B. Jassin (1917-2000) and his literary periodical *Sastra* [Literature], kept alive and disseminated the liberal ethos in literature and the arts that the agents of Dutch imperialism deployed between 1900 and 1942 to counter the pointedly anti-colonial Indonesian alternative. In sum, the intellectuals on the Left adopted D. N. Aidit's judgment that the Indonesian Revolution, which had "not yet been completed," was to be pursued to its ultimate conclusion.[414]

In contrast to their counterparts on the Left, as early as the first half of the 1950s and increasingly so under Guided Democracy, there were many in the non-communist middling-class intellectual circles who were of the opinion, expressly or tacitly, that the Revolution—the prolonged conduct of which had caused regional rebellions, "political anarchy and adventurism," and economic disorder—must end so the nation could start performing the task of "consolidation" to reach the very goals that had propelled the Revolution in the first place.[415] Committed to a Fabian variety of socialism, they believed

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[412] Ibid., 249-250; see also D. N. Aidit, "The Three Political Forces" [1959], in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 257-258.

[413] Lekra, "The Lekra Manifesto of 1950," in Keith Foulcher, *Social Commitment*, 209.

[414] Aidit, "Semifeudal," 251.

[415] See, for instance, a 1956 essay by Mohammad Hatta, "A Revolution Should Not Last Too Long," in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 96. In 1963, the PSI-linked intellectual Soedjatmoko (Koko) took a similar view. As Soe Hok Gie noted in his diary, Koko maintained that the task of the intelligentsia in postindependence era was twofold: to "integrate

that to develop its economy Indonesia needed the supervised participation of foreign capital, at least until its own domestic industry and industrialists had reached maturity.[416] Socially, they rejected the Communist utopia of a classless society for two major reasons. First, they held that "the world is not heaven" and social reality, therefore, "always contains problems and each challenge…we meet will always give rise to new problems."[417] Second, they were not willing to sacrifice the economic, political, and cultural gains they now had in pursuit of the communist utopia they thought was bound to fail.[418] They were concerned about the growing tendency under Guided Democracy for what they viewed as "totalitarianism," a political order in which the citizens' activities in all areas of life were to toe the line of the doctrine and program of one Great Leader, a single Party, or the state,[419] because life, as one of them insisted, was so complex that "no formulas…can encompass the totality of … [its] meanings."[420] Culturally, they were cosmopolitan, open to the cultures of the whole world. They were opposed to the vision of a rigidly planned culture and to the ideal that the production, distribution, and

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Indonesia despite its diversity" and "to undertake economic development as rapidly as possible in order to elevate the standards of living." Soe, *Catatan*, 146-147.

[416] One of the earlier proponents of this view was the pragmatic, democratic-minded Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-1989) of the Masyumi. See Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "The Causes of Our Failing Production" [1953], in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 385-389; Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "Recollections of My Career," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 23, no. 3 (December 1987): 104-106.

[417] H. B. Jassin, et al., "An Explanation of the Cultural Manifesto," Goenawan Mohamad, *The Cultural Manifesto Affair Revisited: Literature and Politics in Indonesia in the 1960s, a Signatory's View*, trans. and ed. Harry Aveling (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute Press, Monash University, 2011), 31.

[418] Goenawan Mohamad, "Peristiwa 'Manikebu': Kesusastraan dan Politik di Tahun 1960-an" [The "Manikebu" affair: Literature and politics in the 1960s], in *Kesusastraan dan Kekuasaan* [Literature and power] (Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1993), 38; Iwan Simatupang, *Surat-surat Politik Iwan Simatupang, 1964-1966* [The political letters of Iwan Simatupang] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986), 37-38.

[419] Soe, *Catatan*, 127-128.

[420] Mohamad, "Peristiwa," 40.

consumption of arts and sciences were to serve top-down revolutionary politics.[421] For them to sacrifice, in the name of the Communist utopia, their individual freedom to think, speak, write, and create was the last thing they wanted. In support of their position, some of them used the evidence they found in the works of dissidents in the actually existing communist countries, such as Yugoslavia's Milovan Djilas (1911-1995), Hungary's Arthur Koestler (1905-1983), and Soviet Union's Boris Pasternak (1890-1960). With the PKI emerging as a formidable political force apparently poised to grab power, they read, for example, *The New Class*, a critique of communist regimes that Djilas published in 1957. The author revealed that communist revolutions in Eastern Europe led not to a classless society but to the domination and exploitation of society by a new class of "political bureaucrats," who used the communist party as their power base.[422] If Indonesia fell under Communist totalitarianism, the middling-class intellectuals feared, the same thing would happen. For even now they were already on the defensive, faced with the growing tendency on the part of leftwing leaders and Soekarno's hardline nationalists to stifle intellectual freedom in the name of the Revolution or in favor of Soekarno's ideology the Manipol-USDEK.[423] It is small wonder that Arthur Koestler's

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[421] See, for instance, ibid., 25.

[422] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1957), 37-69. Soe Hok Gie, then a seventeenth-year-old high school student in Jakarta, read this book in mid-1960. Five years later, as a history student at Universitas Indonesia, he became one of the key leaders of anti-Soekarno and anti-PKI student activists. See Soe, *Catatan*, 101. A few decades later, Goenawan Mohamad suggested the impact that Djilas' book had on the way the signatories of the Cultural Manifesto thought about what a PKI's victory had in store for them. See Mohamad, "Peristiwa," 38. In 2012, Goenawan remembered having read the book in 1962. See Goenawan Mohamad, "Tanggapan untuk Martin Suryajaya" [A rejoinder to Martin Suryajaya], Goenawan Mohamad (blog), May 24, 2012, http://goenawanmohamad.com/esei/tanggapan-untuk-martin-suryajaya.html.

[423] See, among others, Soe, *Catatan*, 127-128.

novel *Darkness at Noon* resonated with some Indonesian non-communist intellectuals living in such a cultural atmosphere. On January 27, 1962, for example, in his diary the student activist Soe Hok Gie quoted disapprovingly one passage from the work where one of the characters, Rubashov, says, "The Party can never be mistaken. You and I can make a mistake. Not the Party. […] The Party is the embodiment of the revolutionary idea in history."[424]

In their conduct of the culture war, the Lekra-affiliated intellectuals and artists called for a ban on what they deemed as "reactionary" or "counter-revolutionary" works of art, whether homemade or imported from the West.[425] Such works neither embraced socialist realism nor championed the struggle of the peasantry and the working class under the leadership of the PKI against feudalism and imperialism for the creation of a People's Democratic Republic to realize the communist utopia. Reactionary and counter-revolutionary were works that "made the Indonesian people ignorant, […] planted in them the spirit of cowards, […] disseminated among them a weakness of character and a sense of humility, an inability to work and take action on their own initiative."[426] On February 28, 1964, for example, in his address to the plenary meeting of the Institute of People's Culture in Palembang, the author Pramoedya Ananta Toer opined that to awaken the peasantry and create a genuine national culture, Indonesia must purge itself of the corrupting influences of American imperialist culture. Should any of the Lekra intellectuals become a Minister of Culture, he or she must "throw all American movies [into] the sea" and "ban the AMPAI [American Motion Picture Association in Indonesia]

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[424] Ibid., 126.
[425] Vickers, *Indonesia*, 153.
[426] Lekra, "The Lekra Manifesto," 213-214.

from the beloved Indonesian soil."[427] Pramoedya railed against the counter-revolutionary character of the domestic pop culture that Indonesian youths were producing and consuming. Under heavy American influence, he charged, current Indonesian popular songs were leading the young astray to the nonsense that erotic love would "solve" all problems.[428] He also mounted his attack on posters of American movie stars of contaminating the minds of Indonesian youths:

> If comrades have time, pay a visit to the rooms of our bourgeois girls and boys. You'll see that the walls of their rooms teem with [the posters of] American gods and goddesses of love. Every time these boys and girls play guitar, gazing at the pictures…the souls of these boys and girls engaged in [fantasized] obscenities with the images of the [American] movie stars.[429]

On balance, though, it must be mentioned that the Indonesian leftwing intellectuals and artists did embrace some of the classics and canons of the world's cultures[430] and what they saw as the best of the world's contemporaneous works of art. For example, while they lambasted the Beatles' songs, Henry Hathaway's biographical motion picture of Erwin Rommel *The Desert Fox* (1951), and Boris Pasternak's novel *Doctor Zhivago* (1957), they had a soft spot for the musical works of Frédéric Chopin (1810-1949) and the film *Modern Times* (1936) by the left-leaning Charlie Chaplin (1889-1977).[431]

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[427] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Kenapa Kebudajaan Amerika Serikat jang Harus Didjebol?"[Why the US culture must be uprooted?], in *Prahara Budaya: Kilas Balik Ofensif PKI/Lekra dkk* [Cultural tempest: a retrospective on the PKI/Lekra offensive], ed. D. S. Moeljanto and Taufiq Ismail (Jakarta: Mizan and Republika, 1995), 96.
[428] Ibid., 95.
[429] Ibid.
[430] Lekra, "The Lekra Manifesto of 1955," in Foulcher, *Social Commitment*, 219.
[431] Foulcher, *Social Commitment*, 44, 116.

While ideological and political battles were raging in the early 1960s, the economy worsened. Too much money was being spent on the confrontation against Malaysia; exports plummeted; inflation skyrocketed; government deficit went up. To make matters worse, in 1962 the country suffered from drought, crop failures, hunger, and malnutrition. In 1965, the economic crisis came to a head. “Wages,” historian Adrian Vickers notes, “could not keep pace with prices. By mid-1965, prices increased week after week and rice jumped from Rp 380 to 450 per kg in July.”[432] Consumer goods were in short supply. Foreign reserves were depleted. Civil servants and college students were among the hardest hit.

Severe economic crisis and the round-the-clock conduct of political warfare both within the elite and the masses combined into a recipe for disaster. The political contest between the communists and the middling-class conservatives, which had developed into a zero-sum game, came to a head in 1965-1966. When on September 30, 1965 a group of left-leaning middle-ranking officers kidnapped and murder six Army generals, a coalition of the Army, anti-communist Muslims, and rightwing members of the PNI responded by destroying the PKI and its affiliated organizations. Hundreds of thousands of PKI’s supporters were either massacred or jailed without trial. As it turned out, Soekarnoist synthesis of ideological opposites—in the context of the pursuit of militant nationalism, the political mobilization of the masses, rampant corruption, the chronic neglect of the

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[432] Vickers, *Indonesia*, 152.

economy, and the ongoing Cold War—just did not work. And this was something that Hatta warned against at the beginning of Guided Democracy.[433]

In sum, to live a middling-class way of life, some sections of Indonesian society mobilized economic, social, cultural, and symbolic resources not only in the midst of political events but also in their everyday lives. During the period 1900-1965, members of the Indonesian middling classes used these resources to assert their existence; voice their ideas and values; further their interests; maintain their way of life; and seek to create a new country for them to lead and shape. The devices they used for these purposes included not only the press and modern social associations—as some scholars have pointed out—but also the family, schools, textbooks, urban planning; novels, music, and sports; food, clothes, houses, and means of transportation; and hygiene, sanitation, and time management; as well as lifestyles in general and social policies.

There were stages in the evolution of the middling classes from 1900 to 1965. First, between 1900 and 1945, their leaders conceived of and disseminated the idea of Indonesia as a national community, found it necessary to mobilize the masses, and led a nationalist movement against the Dutch colonial rule in pursuit of socioeconomic and political emancipation. Second, from 1945 to 1950 the civilian and military leaders of the middling classes directed the diplomatic and armed struggles to secure Indonesia's independence. While doing this, they neutralized any attempt at social revolution. Third, from 1950 to 1965, the middling classes underwent consolidation. In 1965, when the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia)—whose top leadership consisted of middling-class

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[433] Mohammad Hatta, "Oil and Water Do Not Mix" [1957], in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 366.

intellectuals such as D. N. Aidit, Njoto, Lukman, and Sudisman—seemed poised to capture the state and installed a classless society, a coalition of anti-communist "aristocrats of the mind"—which included Army generals, intellectuals, college students, urban professionals, and the rural Muslim clerics—moved and demolished the party and its allies, causing the massacre of about half a million suspected communists and the incarceration of thousands more of leftists.

CHAPTER 2: THE INDONESIAN MIDDLING CLASSES AND THEIR PURSUIT OF MODERNITY, 1900-1998

Using different angles and approaches, and focusing on different time periods, some Indonesia specialists have examined the quest for economic, political, and socio-cultural modernity in the Indonesian archipelago. In his 1994 monograph, *De laatste eeuw van Indië* (The Last Century of the [Dutch East] Indies) J. A. A. van Doorn offers a history of the attempt by the late colonial state to modernize society by restructuring its social relations and implementing interventionist technocratic projects. In his 1964 book, *Indonesian Society in Transition*, W. F. Wertheim describes and explains the modernization projects carried out by elements in the emergent Indonesian middling classes. He identifies, for instance, the middling-class modernizing agendas pursued by Indonesian intellectuals and mass organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah and the Sarekat Islam. Adrian Vickers organizes his 2005 book, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, around the central theme of the search for modernity. He discusses the modernist dreams and projects not only of the colonial state and its agents but also of Indonesian intellectuals, activists, and novelists. In his 2011 article, "Modernity and Cultural Citizenship in the Netherlands Indies,"[434] Henk Schulte Nordholt aims to "disconnect modernity from nationalism by focusing on the role of [the native middling classes as] cultural citizens in the late colonial period for whom modernity was a desirable lifestyle."[435] He tests a hypothesis that "the majority of the indigenous native [middling]

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[434] Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Modernity and Cultural Citizenship in the Netherlands Indies: An Illustrated Hypothesis," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (October 2011): 435-457.

[435] Ibid., 435.

classes were not primarily interested in joining the nationalist movement" but rather "in modernity."[436] In an article published in 2007, R. E. Elson suggests that there existed two variants in the early Indonesian nationalist movement: One was secular while the other was Islamist, with the latter being a late-comer in the game. [437] Robert Cribb sees the pursuit of Indonesian modernity and the nationalist movement as two different yet closely-related manifestations of one phenomenon. In a 1995 monograph he and Colin Brown claim that the last two decades of Dutch rule in the East Indies saw four streams of nationalist thought: modernist, communist, Islamist, and neo-traditionalist.[438] In a 1999 book chapter Cribb classifies both the Indonesian nationalist movement and the Indonesian search for modernity into three streams: Marxist, Muslim, and developmentalist, with the last-mentioned emerging victorious in the New Order. [439]

This chapter presents a critique of the interpretations that have been offered by Schulte Nordholt, Elson, and Cribb. In performing the critique, I employ intellectual and social history and place Indonesia in a world-historical context. While I applaud Schulte Nordholt's strategy of privileging social over political history, I am not convinced by his argument for the disconnection between the *pergerakan* (nationalist movement) and the pursuit of modernity. He based his claim on the evidence he ferreted out from contemporaneous advertisements and school posters. As Schulte Nordholt has done, I too

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[436] Ibid., 438.

[437] See, for instance, Robert E. Elson, "Islam, Islamism, the Nation, and the Early Indonesian Nationalist Movement," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 1, no. 2 (2007): 231-66.

[438] Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, *Modern Indonesia: a History since 1945* (London: Longman, 1995), 5-13.

[439] Robert Cribb, "Nation: Making Indonesia," in *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 3-38.

will employ socio-historical evidence (e.g., novels, poems, and autobiographies) and pay attention to lifestyles. Unlike him, however, I will do so to reconnect the political, the ideational, and the social.

Elson's analysis of the Indonesian nationalist movement and Cribb's treatment of this and of the quest for Indonesian modernity throw up three problems. First, both scholars remain captive to the use of an ideological or *aliran* ("stream") lens in interpreting contemporary Indonesia. Second, they rely too much on the use of political history in their study of Indonesia's nationalism and modernization. Third, both Elson's and Cribb's typologies are one-dimensional; they privilege surface political differences over underlying socio-cultural similarities. True, Cribb suggests that it was possible for some nationalists in the 1920s to embrace two or more ideological streams at the same time. Yet he offers no more than a political explanation for the phenomenon, referring only to the nationalists' need to create a more powerful critique of, and a broader base for unity against, colonialism.[440] Neither Cribb nor Elson probes into the deeper social commonalities among Indonesian modernists of various ideological persuasions. Did these missionaries of Indonesian modernity share nothing at all behind and beneath their conflicting ideologies? Did they differ fundamentally in the practice of their everyday lives? Did they share no common core values? The application of intellectual history and social history to the investigation into such questions may yield new insights. Takashi Shiraishi, for instance, has debunked the rigid ideological template of Islamism vs. nationalism vs. communism in his revisionist study of the pergerakan in Surakarta from

[440] Cribb and Brown, *Modern Indonesia*, 12.

1912-1926.[441] It is time, I think, to carry Shiraishi's revisionism further by applying it to the post-1926 history of Indonesia.

What if, on closer examination, the advocates and adopters of Indonesian modernity—whether they were communist, Islamist, social-democratic, or syncretic—might have said and embraced the same basic things? This possibility deserves study. It is historiographically rewarding to uncover the underlying commonalities beneath these people's conflicting ideas about and competing blueprints for Indonesia's modernity; commonalities that could explain why some Indonesians in the 1920s could be both Muslims and Marxists or at once Muslims and social-democrats. What if—ideology aside and at deeper levels—these people's ideas of Indonesian modernity were perhaps of the same pragmatic, ecumenical Victorian type? By "Victorian ecumene" I mean a world of ideas and customs that are shared by the middling classes in many parts of the globe but have their origins in the United Kingdom during the reign of Queen Victoria, 1837-1901.[442] Is it not significant that despite their differing ideological orientations, middling-class people in Surabaya of the 1920s, for example, believed that it was modern for them to lead a regulated life, to have their meals at the same time every day, for their children to have a bedtime, and for the kids to come home at a prescribed time?[443]

Besides enabling us to explore such questions, a careful consideration of the existing evidence may also help us challenge the modernization theory that was most

[441] Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), xi-xvi.

[442] For a useful discussion the Victorian ecumene, see Carol Breckenridge, "The Aesthetics and Politics of Colonial Collecting: India at World Fairs," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 2: 195-216.

[443] William H. Frederick, *Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), 39.

widely adhered to in Indonesia and beyond during the Cold War. This chapter interrogates the basic assumptions of that theory: the simplistic dichotomy of tradition and modernity; the claim that there are clear-cut stages in the transition from traditional to modern society; and the belief that history has an a priori goal (e.g., liberal democracy).

As Chapter One has demonstrated, in the context of intensifying and expanding global encounters (economic, political, and cultural) among societies in the modern era, Asian proto-middling classes had, by the second half of the nineteenth century, begun to appear in the Dutch East Indies. To adapt to the social change that was going on around them, some Natives, Chinese, and Arabs embraced, and even propagated, ideas, values, and practices that constituted—if we see them from a world-historical perspective—the symptoms of becoming middling class. Yet, over this period (1830-1900), few of these Asians were also middling class in the sense of being consciously modern and modernizing. It was during the late Dutch colonial era (1900-1942) and the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945), that middling-class Indonesians undertook the first phase of their modernizing mission. It was then that membership in the middling classes and the pursuit of modernity began to be intertwined in their lives. This chapter narrates and interprets the history of this pursuit from 1900 to 1998, focusing on the Indonesian middling-classes' visions of modernity, the projects they carried out to realize these visions, and the impact that their modernizing mission had on society.

2. 1. The Quest for Indonesian Modernity in the Colonial Era, 1900-1945

2. 1. 1. Pioneering Indonesian Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

What did it mean for middling-class Indonesians to become modern from 1900 to the collapse of the colonial order in 1945? One of the key historical informants to turn to for illumination is Raden Adjeng Kartini (1879-1904). True, being an aristocrat, she did not belong to the middling classes. Yet she was one of the early and highly influential Indonesian intellectuals who articulated some of the ideas, dreams, and projects that would soon constitute the core elements in the Indonesian middling-classes' quest for modernity.

Kartini came from a progressive-minded aristocratic family. Her father, Raden Mas Adipati Sosroningrat, the regent of Jepara, was the son of Pangeran Ario Tjondronegoro, the regent of Demak. In their own day, both men were known as the enlightened ones among Javanese aristocrats. Wishing "to equal the European in education and enlightenment,"[444] Tjondronegoro provided his sons and daughters with Dutch-language education.[445] Still, the burden of tradition pressed heavily on Kartini's family,[446] preventing her formal education from going beyond the Dutch grammar school.[447] Yet she managed to work her way to enlightenment: She observed the world, read and wrote about it in Dutch,[448] embraced an idea of progress, and sought to reform

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[444] Letter to Stella Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in Raden Adjeng Kartini, *Letters of a Javanese Princess*, trans. Agnes Louise Symmers (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976 [1911]), 38.

[445] Letter to Marie C. E. Ovink-Soer, 1900, in ibid., 50.

[446] Letter to Rosa Manuela Abendanon-Mandri, August 1900, in ibid., 59.

[447] Ibid., 57. See also letter to Ovink-Soer, August 1900, in ibid., 88.

[448] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, August 1900, in ibid., 65. Kartini was an avid reader of books, novels, newspapers, magazines, and letters from friends. See ibid., 67.

her society. She promoted people's artworks, educated Native girls, and championed gender equality in education and enlightenment. To the historian's delight, she wrote a great deal to her Dutch friends. This body of writings is a storehouse of her feelings and ideas about Indonesian proto-modernity.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the times were changing. Kartini—who was still in her early twenties at the time—felt this keenly. The struggle between continuity and change raged at her home, in her family, and in her head, causing her to feel pleasures and pains, promises and frustrations. On May 25, 1899, in a letter to Stella Zeehandelaar, she wrote, "Oh, you cannot know what it is like to love…this new age…with heart and soul, while…be still…chained to the laws, practices, and customs of one's land…."[449] She burned "with excitement about this new era."[450] She sensed the great, unstoppable power that the spirit of times unleashed to restructure the world:

> […T]he resounding steps of the spirit of the age…could be heard everywhere: at their approach proud, solid, old structures tottered on their foundations, strongly barricaded doors sprang open, some as if by themselves, others with difficulty. But open they did and they allowed the unwelcome guest to enter. […W]herever he came, he left behind traces.[451]

Kartini noticed that the spirit of progress (*De geest om te "vooruit" te komen*) left no one untouched. It had penetrated and moved the minds of the Javanese people.[452]

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[449] Letter to Zeehandelaar, May 25, 1899, in Kartini, *On Feminism and Nationalism: Kartini's Letters to Stella Zeehandelaar, 1899-1903*, ed. and trans. Joost Coté (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 2005), 23.

[450] Ibid.

[451] Ibid., 25.

[452] Kartini, *Door Duisternis tot Licht: Gedachten over en voor het Javaansche Volk* [Through darkness to light: Thoughts about and on behalf of the Javanese people] ('s-Gravenhage: Luctor et Emergo, 1912 [1911]), 115.

They, too, were the children of the Age of Progress. For all their shortcomings—their "mischief," "ignorance," "stupidity," "indifference," "indolence," profligacy, immaturity, and lack of initiatives and ideals[453]—they were "slowly awakening."[454] Undergoing "fermentation" (*gisting*),[455] they were "standing on the eve of the new age."[456] They engaged in gradual self-development through education, with the result that "every now and then a brown person [appeared] who demonstrate[d] that he [had] just as good a set of brains in his head and heart in his body as [a] white person."[457] To Kartini, the Javanese journey to modernity seemed slow but unstoppable: Neither the Dutch contempt for upstart Native moderns nor the Native stubborn love for old customs and conservative interpretations of Islam seemed strong enough to stop it. [458] No one and nothing seemed able "to hold back the tide of the times."[459]

Kartini took an ambivalent view of the Dutch. On the one hand, she regarded them as tutors in civilization, who, being much more advanced in their passage to modernity,[460] could serve as a model for the Javanese to look up to and emulate.[461] "[M]y

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[453] Letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in *Javanese Princess*, 38-39; for "indolence," poverty in ideals, and profligacy, see letter to Marie Ovink-Soer, 1900, in ibid., 48-49; and for immaturity, see letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 44, where Kartini viewed the Javanese as "big children."

[454] Letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in *Javanese Princess*, 43.

[455] Letter to Hilda Gerarda de Booij-Boissevain, August 19, 1901, in *Javanese Princess*, 116 and in *Duisternis*, 115.

[456] "Wij hier op Java staan pas aan den vooravond van den nieuwen tijd." See letter to Zeehandelaar, August 23, 1900, in *Duisternis*, 68.

[457] Letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 49 and in *Duisternis*, 36.

[458] Ibid. and in Kartini's letter to de Booij-Boissevain, August 19, 1901, in *Duisternis*, 115.

[459] Letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 49.

[460] Letter to Zeehandelaar, August 23, 1900, in ibid., 58 and in *Duisternis*, 68.

[461] Letters to de Booij-Boissevain, May 26, 1902 and June 17, 1902, in *Javanese Princess*, 197 and 200.

people…are capable of so much," she once told her friend Hilda Gerarda de Booij-Boissevain, "but you Hollanders must lead us."[462] In one of her letters to Abendanon-Mandri, she even exclaimed: "Europe will teach us truly to be *free*!"[463] And to Stella Zeehandelaar she confessed that she was "very, very fond of the Dutch people" and "grateful for much" that [she and her kinfolk] "enjoy[ed] from them and because of them,"[464] and for "the awakening and the development of [their] intellect."[465] Kartini even desired to spend some time in the Netherlands to study the sciences she deemed useful for improving the wellbeing of her people (e.g., human biology, pathology, and hygiene) and to learn to see the relativity of her own customs, the better to modernize them.[466]

On the other hand, however, Kartini discovered that the behavior of some Dutch in the colony and in the metropole left much to be desired. In the East Indies, they behaved to one another and toward the Natives in ways that the civilized would find abominable. First, they used double standards: "[They] laugh and make fun of our stupidity, but if we strive [to develop ourselves], then they assume a defiant attitude toward us."[467] Second, even some intellectuals among them were not above treating

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[462] Letter to de Booij-Boissevain, June 17, 1902, in ibid., 201.

[463] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, January 3, 1902, in *Letters from Kartini: An Indonesian Feminist, 1900-1904*, trans. Joost Coté (Clayton: Monash Asian Institute, 1992), 234; emphasis in the original.

[464] Letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 49.

[465] Letter to Zeehandelaar, August 23, 1900, in *Duisternis*, 69.

[466] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, January 3, 1902, in *Letters from Kartini*, 234.

[467] Letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in *Javanese Princess*, 39. In contrast to the Dutch double standards, Kartini and the progressive members of her family adhered to the principle that "the rights [to education and enlightenment] which we demand for ourselves, we must also give to others [the people]." See ibid., 38.

Kartini in a "haughty and overbearing" manner.[468] Third, it appeared to her that the Dutch colonial government put "stumbling blocks in the way of the education of the [Javanese]."[469] As for the Dutch in the Netherlands, Kartini had an image of them that was far from flattering. She once put the matter quite bluntly to Rosa Abendanon-Mandri:

> […W]ould you deny that beside the very beautiful, the grand and the lofty in your society, there is much that often makes a mockery of the name, civilization? […D]o not think that in the [Netherlands] which [I] want to enter to [undertake my study], [I] do not expect to find…*pettiness*. […] You yourself know […] that amongst the thousands whom society regards as "civilized," only *very few* are so in *reality*…and that even in the most elegant, famous, most glittering salons, *narrow-mindedness* and *short-sightedness* are not unknown.[470]

In her correspondence with her friends, Kartini spent plenty of time, energy, ink, and paper discussing modernity, that is to say, its representatives, its character, the method to attain it, and its relation to womanhood. On May 25, 1899, she wrote to Stella Zeehandelaar, "I have so longed to make the acquaintance of a 'modern girl' [*een modern meisje*]…."[471] Two years later, in a letter to Hilda Gerarda de Booij-Boissevain, she expressed a desire to meet the modern Chinese girls of the Dutch East Indies:

> I should like to meet the gallant little Chinese girls to know something of their thoughts and feelings, their 'soul.' […] I have often wondered about the inner life of such a girl. It must certainly be full of poetry.[472]

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[468] Letter to Zeehandelaar, August 23, 1900, in ibid., 75.

[469] Letter to Zeehandelaar, January 12, 1900, in ibid., 38.

[470] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, October 27, 1902, in *Letters from Kartini*, 308-309. Emphasis in the original.

[471] Letter to Zeehandelaar, May 25, 1899, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 23. Kartini did use the Dutch word *moderne* [modern] in this letter; see Kartini, *Door Duisternis tot Licht* ('s-Gravenhage: N. V. Electrische Drukkerij "Luctor et Emergo," 1912), 332.

[472] Letter to de Booij-Boissevain, June 17, 1902, in *Javanese Princess*, 200.

Later, writing to Rosa Manuela Abendanon-Mandri in 1903, she described herself as a "modern woman" (*een moderne vrouw*).[473] Some of Kartini's letters reveal that at the turn of the twentieth century she learned much about the making of the Modern Woman in Western Europe through her reading of Western European didactic novels that dealt with the theme. Her reading list included such fictional works as *Barthold Meryan* (1897) by Cornélie Huygens (1848-1902), *Hilda van Suylenburg* (1897) by Cécile de Jong van Beek en Donk (1866-1944), and the Dutch translations of *Les Vierges fortes* (The Stout Virgins, 1900) by Marcel Prévost and *Femmes nouvelles* (New Women, 1899) by Paul Margueritte (1860-1918) and Victor Margueritte (1866-1942). At times, this literary encounter with the women's movement in Europe so fascinated Kartini that she wished to participate in it, thinking that she, in a way, belonged to it:

> […A]s regards my thought and feelings, I am not part of today's [East] Indies, but completely share those of my progressive white sisters in the far-off West. […] And if the laws of the land allowed, I would like nothing [other] than to devote myself totally to the activities and efforts being undertaken by the new women in Europe.[474]

Scholars have recently pointed out that the Modern Girl and the Modern Woman were two social figures of global significance that appeared in metropolises around the world in the first half of the twentieth century.[475] That by the first years of the twentieth century Kartini had already adored and embodied this pair of global figures is evidence of how swiftly the enlightened section of indigenous society in the Dutch East Indies came to

[473] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, August 25, 1903, in ibid., 285.

[474] Letter to Zeehandelaar, May 25, 1899, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 23.

[475] Consult a fine collection of articles on this fascinating subject in Alys Eve Weinbaum, et al., eds., *The Modern Girl around the World: Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008).

participate in world culture. It is also evidence of the strong ties that bound the world together in the last century, connecting peoples within and between metropoles and colonies.

But what did Kartini mean when she talked about being or becoming modern? Or, to put it differently, what characteristics, ideals, and way of life, and what visions, institutions, and social reality did she have in mind when she discussed modernity in her letters and called it by its many names, such as *vooruitgang* (progress), *ontwikkeling* (development), and *beschaving* (civilization)? We might as well look at her concept of the Modern Girl and the Modern Woman. As it turned out, to Kartini the Modern Girl was "proud" and "independent," a girl who

> confidently step[ped] through life, cheerfully and in high spirits, full of enthusiasm and commitment, working not just for her own benefit and happiness alone but also offering herself to wider society, working for the good of her fellow human beings.[476]

In Kartini's universe, the Modern Girl would, in time, grow up to be the Modern Woman: a lady who accomplished "high moral and intellectual development coupled with what [was] eternally womanly, the most beautiful crown with which a woman may be adorned."[477] She was a lady who succeeded in becoming "a *complete person*, without ceasing to be *completely* a *woman*!"[478] Kartini envisaged the Modern Girl and the Modern Woman as agents of change who would play a strategic role in bringing progress to their society. Espousing Dr. Abdendanon's idea of "woman as carrier of

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[476] Letter to Zeehandelaar, May 25, 1899, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 23.

[477] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, August 1900, in *Letters from Kartini*, 25.

[478] Ibid. emphasis in the original. This idea would be one of the key ideas in New Order thinking.

Civilization,"[479] she strongly believed that it was women who could do "most" to "rais[e] the moral standard of the human race," for it was from them and on their laps that "people received their first education," learning "to feel, to think, to speak…." This early education, she maintained, would affect all the subsequent stages of people's development.[480] In espousing these ideas, Kartini belonged to an international generation of intellectuals who envisaged women as agents of modernization. The historian Carol Gluck has observed in this connection that in many societies pursuing modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, women—besides youth—were "often made to bear the symbolic weight of social change."[481]

There were two other ways in which Kartini was part of contemporaneous worldwide developments: her advocacy for the union of reason and morality in education and her idea that to become modern was to strengthen—not dilute—one's cultural identity. Let us begin by considering why she advocated the integration of reason and morals.

Kartini was convinced that the Javanese would become modern if they "civilized" themselves, that is to say, if they cultivated reason and raised their moral standards. "To be truly civilized," they needed "intellectual and moral education [that went] hand in hand."[482] For she herself had encountered cases in which mere intellectual training

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[479] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, in ibid., January 31, 1901, 78.

[480] Ibid., 78-79.

[481] Carol Gluck, "Japan's Modernities, 1850-1990s," in *Asia in Western and World History: A Guide to Teaching*, ed. Ainslie T. Embree and Carol Gluck (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 579.

[482] Letter to Ovink-Soer, 1900, in *Javanese Princes*, 48. Consult also her letter to Abendanon-Mandri, January 31, 1901, in *Letters from Kartini*, 78.

proved inadequate, even among the elite, to create the kind of modern Javanese she dreamed of:

> Cultured, very cultured Javanese, one can find by the score, but culture and education are not yet excuses for immorality. Seek and request anything from the native aristocratic male world but not this, morality, because you will search in vain.[483]

Kartini despised those Javanese gentlemen who, in spite of their Western education, still practiced polygamy.[484] She regarded this as proof that nobility of intellect did not guarantee nobility of character.[485] She rejected, however, the idea that people were evil by nature; she attributed people's immoral conduct to their imbalanced upbringing. People, she believed, "always have beauty within [them]," which they would be able to cultivate and express if they received the kind of education that emphasized "character forming" and inculcated "strength of will."[486] This vision of education was to enjoy a long social life in contemporary Indonesia. Leaders of the New Order, for example, turned it into a doctrine, which they preached and promoted. Even in the post-New Order era, education specialists and administrators continued to champion Kartini's idea.[487] Seen from a world-historical perspective, Kartini was not alone in her conviction that to attain wellbeing in the modern world, people needed both intellectual and moral education. Many contemporaneous society leaders were proponents of the same view.

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[483] Letter to Zeehandelaar, November 6, 1899, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 34.

[484] Ibid., 35.

[485] Ibid., 35; see also letter to Abendanon-Mandri, January 31, 1901, in *Letters from Kartini*, 78.

[486] Letter to Dr. Abendanon, August 15, 1902, in *Javanese Princess*, 258.

[487] See, for example, Prayitno and Belferik Manullang, *Pendidikan Karakter dalam Pembangunan Bangsa* [Character building and nation-building] (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 2011), 1-15. Read also the Minister of Education's preface to the book, v-vi.

Consider, for instance, the United States president Theodore Roosevelt who, in his 1901 address to the Long Island Bible Society, remarked:

> […I]t is not enough only to cultivate the mind. With education of mind must go the spiritual teaching which will make us turn the trained intellect to good account. A man whose intellect has been educated, while at the same time his moral education has been neglected, is only the more dangerous to the community because of the exceptional additional power which he has acquired. […E]ducation must be education of the heart and conscience no less than of the mind."[488]

Let us turn to what she thought this modernity should consist of. Here and there in her epistles, Kartini put her finger on the cultural elements that the Javanese ought to assimilate to become modern. First, they should develop their intellectual skills, learning to read and write and studying the sciences. Second, the artistically gifted must receive training in the arts so they could cultivate their aesthetic prowess. Third, a believer in the centrality of women and of their mastery of the domestic science in the running of a modern family, Kartini recommended that girls ought to learn first aid, nursing, cooking, needlework, and domestic handicraft as well as pathology, human biology, hygiene, and sanitation. Fourth, she held that for their moral education young Natives must appropriate certain virtues and practices of European provenance. For example, they were to adopt the practices of good housekeeping, home economics, small business, and monogamy as well as embrace such values as individualism, independence, love, justice, frugality, industriousness, good conduct, prosperity, and social commitments.[489] As a whole, most

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[488] Ferdinand Cowle Iglehart, *Theodore Roosevelt: The Man as I Knew Him* (New York: Christian Herald, 1919), 308-309.

[489] Letter to Dr. Abendanon, August 15, 1902, in *Javanese Princes*, 48-49. Kartini was surely incorrect to think that the Javanese had not had any of these practices.

of the elements in this prescription suggest that Kartini had adopted and was advocating a Victorian model for modernity. Underlying her vision was the Victorian idea that poverty was a vice and a social ill that people must overcome, while economic growth was a virtue and a beacon of progress. One of the central tasks in the journey to modernity was to advance from poverty to prosperity by adopting a way of life whose emphasis on education, thrift, moral restraint, hard work, and enterprise strikes us as bourgeois, Calvinistic, and late ecumenical Victorian.[490]

When Kartini talked about *vooruitgang* (progress), which was one of modernity's core elements, she talked about certain social phenomena of global reach that made themselves felt in the Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth century. One of them was this: Breaking out of the straightjacket of tradition, young girls in the colony took the courage to pursue professions in the public sphere. In 1902, Kartini's heart leaped with joy as she "read in the paper that some Chinese girls had asked permission to stand for the teachers' examinations":

> Hurrah for progress! I feel like shouting aloud in my joy. Of what good is the preservation of a few old traditions? We see now that the strongest and oldest traditions can be broken; and that gives me courage and hope.[491]

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[490] For comparison, consider the middling-class Victorian values that the Scottish reformer Samuel Smiles (1812-1904) promoted in his books. According to him, the key to progress in the modern world lay in "self-help," "thrift," and physical fitness as well as "individual industry, energy, and uprightness." Consult Samuel Smiles, *Self-Help; with Illustrations of Character and Conduct* (London: John Murray, 1860), 1-2 and 255-256.

[491] Letter to de Booij-Boissevain, June 17, 1902, in *Javanese Princess*, 200.

In thinking this way, Kartini had gone beyond the Victorian prescription that women should civilize their society simply by serving as wives and mothers in the domestic sphere, without pursuing a career in the public sphere.

Besides education, social reform, and the pursuit of profession, to Kartini progress also meant the struggle for gender equality as well as the advocacy against polygamy and arranged marriage in favor of monogamy and the freedom to choose one's spouse.[492] These issues constituted some of the common focal concerns among non-European modernizers of various ideological persuasions and ethnic origins in the Dutch East Indies.[493] That Kartini ended up becoming a second wife of an enlightened but polygamous Javanese regent does not mean that she had abandoned her ideals. It was a strategic compromise she had to make with Tradition in order to save her modernizing project, seeking to win the "war," not the "battle." Moreover, as was common among figures of transition to modernity, Kartini could not afford being totally modern in her own lifespan (which was cut short anyway).

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[492] This was the reason why some Indonesians would later see Kartini as a feminist.

[493] For an advocacy for free-choice, love-based marriage and a critique of polygamy and arranged marriage from the Indonesian left in the early twenties, please read passages in Semaoen's *Hikajat Kadiroen* [Story of Kadiroen] (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 2000 [1920]), 46-62. At the same time, young ethnic-Chinese moderns in the colony also championed the ideal of love marriage. See, for instance, the contemporaneous disapproving comments made on it by Kwee Tek Hoay in his *Drama di Boven Digul* [Drama in Upper Digul], in *Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa dan Kebangsaan Indonesia* [Chinese-Malay literature and Indonesian nationhood], vol. 3 (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2001 [1927-1932]), 407-408. He observed that "nowadays young moderns…would rather find their own spouses, following the customs of the Westerners." They took love to mean "getting together with one's sweetheart all the time, sometimes kissing each other in the presence of family members, walking hand- in-hand in public, and exchanging long letters, photographs, and gifts with each other…." Kwee asserted that these were signs not of true love but rather of lust that often occurred between men and prostitutes.

Regarding the potential clash between the search for modernity and the preservation of identity, Kartini affirmed that in modernizing themselves the Javanese were not mindlessly mimicking Europeans; they were striving to become what they thought was the best version of themselves. They were developing creative syntheses: appropriating useful elements from contemporaneous European cultures, blending them with healthy components of their own tradition, they were attempting to forge a new way of life at once modern and Javanese. While planning to teach Western knowledge to the Javanese, Kartini herself made it clear that "We don't wish to change [their] spirit…but to cultivate the good which is latent in them."[494] The last thing she wanted to do was "to make them half European or European Javanese." [495] The goal she set for herself as an educator of her own people was

> to make … real Javanese, Javanese inspired by a *love* and *passion* for their land and people, with an *eye* and *heart* for their beautiful qualities and—needs! We want to give them the finer things of the European civilization, not to force out or replace the finer things of their own, but to *enrich* it.[496]

Countering the allegations that she and her siblings were "more European than Javanese" in their sensibilities, Kartini once said, "Well, we may have been and are being completely permeated by European ideas and feelings—but that…Javanese blood, which lives and flows warmly through our veins, cannot be silenced."[497]

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[494] Letter to de Booij-Boissevain, May 26, 1902, in *Javanese Princess*, 197.

[495] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, January 3, 1902, in *Letters from Kartini*, 232. Italics in the original.

[496] See ibid. Emphases in the original.

[497] Letter to Abendanon-Mandri, August 1, 1901, in *Letters from Kartini*, 97.

In sum, an examination of Kartini's ambition for and endeavors in education, women's emancipation, and social reform provides us with sufficient evidence to suggest, as Joost Coté has done, that she was one of the precursors of Indonesian modernization and nationalism.[498]

Contemplating the life of the Javanese Kartini or that of the Minahasan Maria Walanda-Maramis leads to this insight: What produced Native moderns and modernizers in the Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth century was not so much Dutch-language education as what Natives chose to do about and with it. For, as Kartini herself observed, "[m]any other regents [had] or [were] giving their [children] the same education as we had, and it [had] had or [was] having no other effect than that of producing Dutch-speaking young native ladies with European manners." She knew, moreover, that the same was true of many Dutch-educated Eurasian women.[499] In this respect, two points are worth highlighting. First, Kartini-like figures did not just come out of the blue: In fact, they continued a process that their biological or social predecessors had started a couple of decades before. Second, the desire for progress had its origin in the Natives themselves. Take Kartini, for example. Even as a little girl, even before she devoured articles, newspapers, novels, and books, she already wanted "freedom" and "independence."[500] It is no exaggeration to suggest that to an important degree the quest for Native modernity was an Asian business in which Asian initiatives and agendas played a central role. In other words, people like Kartini and Maria Walanda-Maramis

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[498] See Joost Coté, "Introduction," in Kartini, *Letters from Kartini*, xxii.
[499] Letter to Zeehandelaar, November 6, 1899, in *Feminism and Nationalism*, 34.
[500] Letter to Zeehandelaar, May 25, 1899, *Feminism and Nationalism*, 23.

were largely the product of Natives exercising their agency in response to the threats and opportunities posed by the encounter between colonized and colonizing societies.

2. 1. 2. Exploring the Marxist Path to Indonesian Modernity in the Late 1910s

Kartini was not the only educated Asian in the Dutch East Indies in the first half of the twentieth century to struggle with and for modernity. Many other intellectuals-cum-activists—men and women, indigenous and non-indigenous, from aristocratic and middling-class backgrounds, on the left and right—did the same. By examining a sample of such people, we can get an idea of the themes, variations, and development of their quest for modernity during the time period. Let us start with an intriguing figure on the Indonesian Left: the journalist, writer, and political activist Semaoen (1899-1971).

An Indonesian modernist of the pre-World War II era, Semaoen was at once unusual and typical. Born in 1899 in Mojokerto, East Java, as the son of a railway employee,[501] he capitalized on such opportunities as came his way in the Dutch East Indies: elementary education at the first-class Native school, employment at the State Railway Company (SS), the acquisition of Dutch (around 1915-1916) as a gateway to the wider world and as a tool to learn what he saw as forward-looking ways of interpreting it, and a political apprenticeship under Dutch socialists. He was unusual because intellectually and socially he grew up at a breakneck speed, as if to catch up with the

[501] Unless his job was completely menial, as a railway employee Semaoen's father would probably have been literate. Economically, he belonged, perhaps, to the lower middling classes.

world, which itself was experiencing seismic shifts.[502] In 1912, at age thirteen, he started out as a clerk at the SS; at fifteen he served as secretary of the Surabaya chapter of the Sarekat Islam [Islamic Union]; at sixteen, he played leading roles at the Surabaya branch of the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV) and the Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel (VSTP); a year later, he took up a full-time career in politics; at eighteen he headed the radical SI branch in Semarang; three years later, in 1920, he was chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).[503] Semaoen's meteoric ascent to prominence in the Indonesian nationalist circles was possible partly because he and the world happened to go through their "growth spurts" at the same time; and partly because he seems to have had a strong work ethic and shrewdly exploited his social networks.

For all his extraordinary accomplishments, and despite his ideological commitments, Semaoen was in several ways typical of the pre-World War II generation of educated Indonesians, especially in terms of the way he perceived his own era and conceived Indonesian modernity. He was aware that his was a new age, noticing many of its signs, such as the expansion of the colonial state, the shift from agriculture to industry, the penetration of money economy and private capital into the village world, and the failures of bureaucrats and villagers to comprehend each other. The expanding colonial state, he observed, raised more taxes, spent more funds on projects, and enforced more regulations. The higher his position in the hierarchy, the less time and the less ability a civil servant had to keep track of the psychological changes that the rakyat experienced

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[502] Consider, for example, those symptoms of the transformation which the world underwent in this period: the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Great War of 1914-1918.

[503] Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 28, 88, 91, 94, and 99; Ricklefs, *Polarising Javanese Society*, 231.

because of the regulations that the government introduced to the village world. The rakyat, for their part, often misunderstood the best intentions of well-meaning administrators. In the modern world, society had become too complex for mere good intentions on the part of civil servants to guarantee success in helping the rakyat enjoy salvation and prosperity.

Semaoen struggled for a communist Utopia, a goal that the more right-leaning Indonesian modernizers did not find appealing and compelling enough to cherish, never mind to die for. Yet, apart from his communism—which was hybrid, as he blended it with his version of Islam—his vision of Indonesian modernity had some core elements in common with those of his less and non-leftist rivals. And, regardless of their ideological differences, he and they employed the same tools to attempt to mobilize the Natives to attain their political agendas. For instance, Semaoen, like non-communists, organized people into cooperative societies, trade unions, and political parties, and sought to shape their minds with journalism and literature. He coedited the daily *Sinar Hindia* [Light of the Indies],[504] to which he contributed articles the colonial authorities considered disruptive of tranquility and order. In 1919, punishing him for such writings, they put him behind bars for four months, during which he composed, in colloquial Malay, a nationalist novel titled *Hikajat Kadiroen* [The Story of Kadiroen].[505]

The novel is about the individual and collective modernization carried out by four young Javanese—Kadiroen, Tjitro, Sarinem, and Sariman—who come from different

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[504] Henk Maier, "Phew! *Europeesche Beschaving*! Marco Kartodikromo's *Student Hidjo*," *Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (June 1996): 196.

[505] Semaoen, *Hikajat Kadiroen: Sebuah Novel* [The story of Kadiroen: A novel] (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 2000 [1920]), ix.

social backgrounds. While Kadiroen is born into the family of a plebeian village head and an aristocratic woman (a *raden ayu*), the brother and sister Tjitro and Sarinem are the offspring of a forward-looking bricklayer.[506] Sariman, who later marries Sarinem, is the humblest of them all. Because his father dies young, he is raised mainly by his mother, who ekes out a livelihood as a food-seller. By charting the evolution of these characters, Semaoen shows the personal and societal paths to modernity for his readers to follow in their own life journeys. As a social document, the novel teems with clues to the modernist ideas that may have guided its author's own leftwing politics. It is instructive to consider these ideas and see how they compare to those of other Indonesian modernists from different ideological camps.

One of the revealing thematic lenses to use for this purpose is education. Like Kartini, Semaoen championed it, seeing it as a powerful tool to deliver people from superstition, ignorance, egocentrism, poverty, crime, and dependency—traits he and many other moderns had learned to view as social ills. Since the world had grown perplexingly complex,[507] if people really wanted a good, peaceful, and meaningful life, they had, as individuals and a community, to accomplish manifold transformations—cognitive, ethical, bodily, and political. Thus, like Kartini, he envisioned education to include both intellectual and moral training. Unlike her, though—and this was a sign of the changes Native society had undergone during the Ethical Policy—he added two more components: keeping fit[508] and…mass political movement.[509] The masses, not only the

[506] Ibid., 8-10 and 192.
[507] Ibid., 111-118.
[508] Ibid., 196.
[509] Ibid., 126-127.

elite, had to appropriate the sciences to broaden their horizon and upgrade their intellectual armature,[510] so they could comprehend how the world worked, diagnose its problems, and change it for the better.[511] It makes sense, therefore, that Semaoen portrays all the novel's main characters as zealous, ingenious knowledge-hunters. Kadiroen, a well-to-do STOVIA (School for the Training of Native Doctors] graduate and a *Pangreh Pradja* (Traditional Administrative Corps) official, sharpens his intelligence by investigating crimes, researching people's declining welfare, and studying the theory and praxis of Marxism. Similarly, having received their elementary education at the second-class Native school, the much less well-off mason's children Tjitro and Sarinem continue their intellectual development through self-study, which they juggle with family, work, and politics. But the most heroic of all learners in the novel is Sariman. In defiance of his poverty, the man cultivates his mind primarily through auto-didacticism. As a small boy, while earning his living as a grass-cutter, he learns to read and write from his neighbor and friend Tjitro. In his early teenage years, he wisely spends part of his savings on private lessons in Dutch and mathematics to help him—as they help Tjitro and Sarinem—to pass the *Kleinambtenaars-examen* (lower civil service examination). This enables him, as it does Tjitro, to get a job as a clerk. In their spare time, assisted by a hired Dutch tutor, both young men are busy cracking thorny passages in Dutch books they read to study the sciences and religions.[512] Semaoen offered the examples of Tjitro, Sarinem, and Sariman to convince his readers that even underprivileged commoners

[510] Ibid., 194. A "broad horizon" and "a wide array of sciences," Semaoen believed, "are sources of human power." See also 195-196.

[511] Ibid., 195.

[512] Ibid.

could use education to open the path to modernity. The "children of villagers," he affirmed, "[could] become smarter than the snobbish children of priyayi."[513] One way or another, they would find the means to attain intellectual prowess, provided they had "the iron will" (*niat besi*) and the perseverance to learn.[514]

Reason, Semaoen realized, was neutral: The educated had been using it to serve good and evil purposes. Education, therefore, must entail character building, so it produced individuals of great intellectual prowess and high moral standards, who would apply their skills not to the oppression but to the liberation of their fellow men, not to the exploitation of others but to helping them prosper. In his moral education efforts, Semaoen enlisted literature and mass political movement.

Semaoen took a moral-didactic approach to literature. In *Hikajat Kadiroen*, he uses the conduct of its characters to make moral points. Kadiroen, Tjitro, and Sariman pursue their education to the full: they grow up intellectually and morally. Kadiroen, to begin with, is portrayed as "a virtuous human being":[515] a knightly gentleman[516] whose mind is full of "dignity," "righteousness,"[517] and a strong sense of duty towards the rakyat, and who keeps avoiding sins,[518] staying away from prostitutes and extramarital sex.[519] What is more, if Kadiroen, Tjitro, and Sariman assiduously study as many subjects as they can, it is to acquire the necessary expertise to achieve not only their own progress

[513] Ibid., 194.
[514] Ibid., 194, 196, and 197.
[515] Ibid., 214.
[516] Ibid., 9.
[517] Ibid., 26.
[518] Ibid., 9.
[519] Ibid., 214-215.

but also that of the “thousands of people” (the *rakyat*),[520] for the free and enlightened ones must help others who are still shackled in the dark. In other words, they wanted to serve as bodhisattvas of modernity. Thus, besides making money as clerks (in the case of Tjitro and Sariman) or as a Pangreh Pradja official (in the case of Kadiroen), they play leading parts in the pergerakan. They engage in mass movements because it is a source of great political energies for them to effect social change, and because they see cooperative societies, trade unions, and political parties as “schools” to train the rakyat in the “sciences” of self-rule, which include, among other things, people’s democracy, planned economy, and Marxist theories of history. The powers that be, however, will not let these leftist modernizers have one foot in the “system” and another in the pergerakan. Consequently, they have to give up their jobs and start serving the leftwing pergerakan on a full-time, salaried basis, as treasurer, propagandist, or journalist.[521]

To create modern Indonesia and Indonesians was a tall order, which required not only intelligence and good morals but also physical fitness. In order that they are always up to their task as agents of social change, the husband and wife Sariman and Sarinem adhere to a daily routine that includes simple but wholesome meals, early-morning workouts, and a late afternoon walk.[522]

This mention of everyday routine brings us to Semaoen’s conception that the modernization of the individual was to be an integral part of the modernization of society. It is small wonder that in *Hikajat Kadiroen* he instructs his readers in what he sees as the progressive way of organizing their everyday life. While modern living required, in the

[520] Ibid., 194-198.
[521] Ibid., 177.
[522] Ibid., 183-184, and 196.

public sphere, people's conversion to political-economic rationalism in the form of self-rule, democracy, and socialism, it demanded, in the private domain, the rejection of arranged marriage and polygamy and the espousal of the new, middling-class, nuclear family. The making of such a family was to begin with heterosexual romantic love and culminate in a monogamous marriage. Once established, this family must champion a set of values, prime among which was the studied devotion to temporal, spatial, and behavioral regularities. Sariman and Sarinem lead a structured life in their household. They take a bath and have meals, go to bed and get up, go to work and relax, study and work out—all at set times.[523]

In their struggle to build the world anew, to carve out, that is, concentric circles in it where they can feel at home, Sariman and Sarinem enact a gendered division of labor. Sariman takes care of the "macrocosm"; working outside the home, he attempts to transform society through mass political movement. Sarinem, for her part, is the custodian of the microcosm; toiling at home, she keeps it clean, cool, and comfortable as well as neat, pretty, and filled with affection. While the goal Sariman strives for is a textbook communist Utopia, the objective Sarinem pursues is more concrete, direct, intimate, and quotidian: the creation of the petty bourgeois nuclear family.

Again, this division of labor recalls Kartini's and Maria Walanda-Maramis' recommendation that women were to play a crucial role in modernization. It also reflects Semaoen's own position, which echoed that of Kartini, that while modernizing themselves, their families, and their society, women must remain women. Thus, in addition to learning politics (through, among other things, the critical reading of

[523] Ibid., 184.

newspapers) as well as mathematics, geography, and the natural sciences (under the tutorship of her husband) to make sense of the processes shaping the "age of progress" (*zaman kemajuan*),[524] Sarinem retains and enhances her womanhood by training herself in the domestic sciences, which include cooking, batiking, and sewing,[525]—skills that are necessary for keeping a modern home.[526]

What does Sarinem, a fictional image of the leftist modern woman, look like? And how does she dress? Semaoen portrays her like this: Neither beautiful nor ugly, she has a sweet-looking face. Being of moderate means, she dresses modestly at home, wearing neither makeup nor jewelry, save a wedding ring made of a copper-and-gold alloy (*swasa*). Her simplicity notwithstanding, she looks clean, neat, graceful, and happy.[527]

There is nothing exclusively communist about what Sarinem seeks to accomplish in the "domestic front." In fact, it is a middling-class ideal, which Maria Walanda-Maramis, as we have seen in Chapter One, taught her fellow Minahasans to actualize. It has to do with the creation of a safe haven to which even revolutionaries—such as Sariman—need to retreat every day, to take a break from their political battles, savoring the small joys that heal their "wounds" and recharging their "batteries" so that the next day they may wake up coiled and ready to resume their struggle. In Semaoen's *Hikajat Kadiroen*, the safe haven is this: a little house with clean cement floor, tiled roof, and whitewashed bamboo walls; one whose living room boasts shipshape furniture and

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[524] Ibid., 183.

[525] Ibid., 197.

[526] Importantly, from 1973 to 1998, the leaders of the New Order propagated these ideas through a program called Family Welfare Movement (PKK).

[527] Semaoen, *Kadiroen*, 179.

framed pictures on the wall; whose verandah is adorned with pots of flowers; and in whose modest yard stand shade trees. It is a microcosm which embodies care, cleanliness, knowledge, beauty, refinement, and progress;[528] which offers the reassuring feeling that everything is "properly arranged";[529] and where a couple may live "a married life so blissful"[530] it feels as though they "lived in heaven."[531] It is a frugal but full life in which they study together,[532] have healthy meals together,[533] conduct pleasant conversations,[534] soothe each other with kind words and tender looks, with caresses and kisses.[535]

But what was the point of keeping one's domestic life in temporal, spatial, and behavioral order? Semaoen was convinced that doing so would serve two purposes. First, this would produce certainties in life, which ensured "perpetual happiness." Second, such a practice would enable people to stay in good shape. For, it took mental, physical, and spiritual well-being for modernizers to endure hardships and "carry the heavy weight of obligation to the pergerakan."[536]

To build a forward-looking family, one must start, according to Semaoen, by experiencing romantic love. As Kadiroen says, "I will marry only the person I really love."[537] Modern love seems to have been blind to class barriers. The educated, socially prominent Kadiroen marries a village divorcee. But, as it turns out, she is not just an

[528] Ibid., 178-179.
[529] Ibid., 180.
[530] Ibid.
[531] Ibid., 182.
[532] Ibid., 183.
[533] Ibid., 179-182.
[534] Ibid., 182-183.
[535] Ibid., 179-180.
[536] Ibid., 185.
[537] Ibid., 57.

ordinary village woman. She comes across as pretty, sympathetic, independent, courageous, and magnanimous. Semaoen conceived modern marriage as that in which husband and wife expressed love and respect for each other, and were equals in heart, mind, and personality.[538] It was the kind of marriage without which Indonesian nationalists were bound to lack the physical, mental, and moral capacities to defend the rakyat:

> …a mature man who refuses to get in touch with women lives against nature. As a result, he will grow sickly and forgetful, age quickly, and lack the strength to attain life-goals. […W]hen the time comes, a man must get married. […I]f you want to keep fighting for the rakyat, get married! I wouldn't like it if you spend time with loose women.[539]

While the path to domestic modernity is represented by Kadiroen's and Ardinah's struggle for their marriage based on romantic, free-choice, and mutual love as well as by the way Sariman and Sarinem conduct their everyday family life,[540] the road to public modernity is exemplified by the metamorphosis of Kadiroen from a reformist civil servant to a (leftwing) political activist. Since, by Semaoen's standards, the reformist bureaucrat Kadiroen—as well as the Ethical Policy he stands for—is not modern enough, the character must morph into a morally upright, religiously-minded communist activist. Whereas Kadiroen I (the good Native bureaucrat) seeks to reform society by working within the colonial system, Kadiroen II (the communist modernizer) aims to do so by

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[538] Ibid., 62.

[539] Ibid., 216-217. It is important to note how moral Indonesian communism was.

[540] This is a common and recurring theme one can find not only among leftwing intellectuals but also among social democrats (e.g., as in Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana).

working outside the colonial structure. In pursuing his objectives, though, Kadiroen II offers to work together with the colonial government.

Like Kartini before him, and the New Order technocrats after him, Semaoen considered poverty a social ill to remedy.[541] That is why in *Hikajat Kadiroen* he makes the title character wonder about the social origins of poverty. He weighs the relative merits of two ways of eliminating poverty: the reformism of the Ethical Policy and the communist social transformation. Ventriloquizing through Kadiroen's mouth, Semaoen critiques the piecemeal method that the colonial government used to tackle the problem of the people's declining welfare. He rejects the assumption underlying the method: that the poverty resulted from adat-influenced conspicuous consumption and the irrational way the masses handled household economy: they were like "children who still love[d] playing with cash."[542] As such, they ended up on the losing side in their economic encounter with moneylenders and owners of sugar mills, who were good at exploiting their childlike, irrational, indulgent economic behavior. Guided by this basic assumption, supporters of the Ethical Policy took several measures to save the villagers from the cruelty of modern life:[543] teaching them home economics, trying to protect them from the predatory practices of sugar capitalists and moneylenders, and advocating the creation of village banks. This reformist method, Semaoen argues through the propagandist Tjitro, was bound to fail as it did not address the systemic origins of people's poverty: the rise of capitalism, its global spread, and its penetration into the village world. Reformist measures might put a brake on the decline of the people's welfare. It was not, however,

[541] Ibid., 13.
[542] Ibid., 90.
[543] Ibid., 92.

going to lead the masses from poverty to prosperity.[544] This, Semaoen maintains, was the problem with the Ethical Policy, that is to say, with working from within the colonial system. By Semaoen's standards, reformism was not sufficiently modern; at one point in the novel he even calls it *cara kuno* (old-fashioned).[545] He spends about a third of the novel showing how Kadiroen tries to use this method to help the rakyat—to no avail.[546] As the *only* effective way of achieving a decent life, Semaoen advocated communism.[547] This, he believed, was the scientific,[548] natural (*sesuai dengan kodrat*),[549] and up-to-date road for the rakyat to take to reach prosperity and, yes, optimum *spiritual* development.[550]

2. 1. 3. Chinese Middling Classes and the Quest for Modernity in the Late 1920s

Other Indonesian intellectuals in the Dutch East Indies, however, found Semaoen's Islamo-Marxist path to progress unpersuasive, too risky, and too costly. Consider, for example, what the Chinese-Indonesian writer Kwee Tek Hoay (1885-1951) had to say on this subject. Although he received his formal education in a traditional Chinese school, Kwee managed to master Malay and English. From 1900 to the 1920s, he played a leading role in the modern Chinese association THHK (Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan). In the first half of the twentieth century, he published a number of novels and religious studies.

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[544] Ibid., 95 and 97.
[545] Ibid., 144.
[546] Ibid., 1-98.
[547] Ibid., 142.
[548] Ibid., 127.
[549] Ibid., 142.
[550] Ibid., 138-139.

Despite his sympathy for the Indonesian nationalist movement, he disapproved of its leftwing manifestations, especially the communist-inspired rebellions in Banten, West Java, and Minangkabau, West Sumatra, which broke out in 1926-1927. In his masterpiece *Drama di Boven Digul* [Drama in Upper Digul], a 700-page novel he published as feuilleton in the weekly *Panorama* from 1927 to 1932,[551] Kwee applauds the modernist vision that Indonesian communism stood up for: a community whose members would enjoy progress, equality, and solidarity, [552] seeing that such a vision was "the essence of all great religions" like "Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity."[553] On the other hand, he rejects the rigid and divisive class analysis the communists used to interpret society and the revolutionary method they employed to reach their goals. For, as he asserts through one of his fictional characters, the Assistant-Wedana [Assistant District Head] Mustari, "there are good people and bad people in all social classes"[554] and it would be "several centuries" before Indonesians could to attain such modernist goals.[555] To rush the process through revolution, as the Islamo-communists attempted to do in 1926 and 1927, would not guarantee success but surely produce bloodshed and chaos. Thus, "so long as there are peaceful and gradual ways of bringing the rakyat to prosperity and progress," he

[551] For a biographical sketch of Kwee Tek Hoay, see Myra Sidharta, "Kwee Tek Hoay (1885-1951): Dari Penjaja Tekstil Menjadi Pendekar Pena" [Kwee Tek Hoay (1885-1951): From a itinerant cloth-peddler to a man of letters], in *Dari Penjaja Tekstil sampai* Superwoman*: Biografi Delapan Penulis Peranakan* [From an itinerant cloth-vendor to a superwoman: Biographies of eight peranakan writers] (Jakarta: KPG, 2004), 1-21.

[552] Kwee Tek Hoay, *Drama di Boven Digul* [Drama in Upper Digul], vol. 3 of *Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa dan Kebangsaan Indonesia* [Malay-Chinese literature and Indonesian nationhood], ed. Marcus A. S. and Pax Benedanto (Jakarta: KPG, 2001 [1927-1932]), 7.

[553] Ibid., 8.

[554] Ibid., 7. In the novel itself, Kwee uses the characters Mustari and Radeko to show that there were, respectively, good people among the priyayi and morally corrupt men among the communists.

[555] Ibid., 8.

cannot see why people should "take the dreadful, radical path."[556] Rather than expose oneself to what he calls "the Moscow disease," which caused many in the world to "lose their minds," Kwee advises his readers "to find [their] own way to prosperity [*kaberuntungan*]."[557] In his view, one of the steps to take in the evolutionary road to progress was moral reform, for example by getting rid of egocentrism and immorality.[558]

In some of his works, Kwee critically addresses the everyday articulations of modernity among peranakan Chinese women. He expresses concerns, for example, about their appropriation of the unseemly forms of Western modernity, such as wearing a masculine hairstyle, sporting a miniskirt, riding around on a bicycle, dancing European dances, hanging out unsupervised, and becoming the mistress of a rich man[559] (apparently to secure the funds to support their modern lifestyles). Kwee wanted peranakan Chinese women to study philosophy and religion so they could acquire a moral compass for navigating the stormy modern world. This was one of the main messages he tries to convey in *Drama di Boven Digul* [Drama in Upper Digul].

While Kwee promoted evolutionary modernization and recommended religion, theosophy, moral philosophy as an antidote to excesses of modernity, the Sino-Indonesian writer Liem Khing Hoo (1900-1945) preached a modernist vision that synthesized philanthropy, collectivist solidarity, business ethics, and cooperative capitalism—a vision that the champions of the New Order would have found congenial, except that its scope should be considerably broadened to include the entire Indonesian

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[556] Ibid.
[557] Ibid., 6.
[558] Ibid., 8.
[559] Sidharta, "Kwee Tek Hoay," 8 and 18.

nation rather than merely the Sino-Indonesian community. Liem was born in Blitar, East Java, in 1900 and received his education at the THHK schools. From 1920 to 1940, he published a number of novels that portrayed social life in the Dutch East Indies.

In a novel titled *Masyarakat* [Society], Liem laments what he perceives as the general malaise afflicting the Chinese communities in Indonesia in the late 1930s. Numerous ethnic-Chinese organizations, he observes, had degenerated into useless "associations of rotting corpses." Neglecting real social issues, Chinese schools, he charges, produced people with "half-baked brains."[560] Driven by the egocentric quest for individual profits, unable to think in big-picture terms, and lacking a pioneering spirit, Chinese merchants, in his view, engaged in anarchic, cutthroat, and self-defeating competition, dragging one another down into bankruptcy.[561] The upshot of these processes, he argues, would be the socio-economic collapse of the entire Sino-Indonesian community. The ethnic Chinese, he writes, were behaving like housemates who, in their fierce quarrels with one another, ended up burning down their own home.

As a remedy for the crisis, Liem recommends that Sino-Indonesians take steps to ensure that they and their descendants would enjoy social stability and great economic opportunities.[562] First, ethnic-Chinese merchants should organize themselves into a Middling-Class Association (*middenstandsvereniging*) to operate as a cartel that would enforce price controls and fair business practices on its members. This association should be directed by a full-time, dedicated, and draconian supreme leader who was not only

[560] Liem Khing Hoo, *Masyarakat* [Society], in vol. 6 of *Kesastraan Melayu Tionghoa*, ed. Marcus A. S. and Pax Benedanto, 369.
[561] Ibid., 370, 372-373.
[562] Ibid., 387.

good at "making speeches and presiding over meetings" but able and willing to preserve collective order, honor, and wellbeing by "punishing and excommunicating" such antisocial elements as "corrupt leaders," parasites ["bedbugs"], and those who violated price controls.[563]

Second, the ethnic Chinese were to join forces, pooling their different resources (capital, state-of-the-art technology, and modern management), to undertake innovative industrialization. Rather than compete, as they had long been doing, with one another in already overcrowded lines of business, they must try their hands in new fields of industry, for example the manufacturing of "tin cans, safety matches, alcohol, nails and metal wires," and all kinds of canned food and beverages.[564] In addition, they were to carry out vertical integration in which one holding company was to combine the extraction of raw materials (e.g., fishing companies), the manufacturing of consumer commodities (e.g., footwear factories, fruit-canning companies, or apparel workshops), and retail networks (e.g., high-tech department stores) into one synergistic constellation.[565] While conducting large-scale self-industrialization, they must foster the development of small and medium enterprises, thereby creating even more jobs and investment opportunities.

Third, to achieve balanced, full-fledged modernity, the ethnic Chinese must strive for "intellectual and spiritual progress," hence Liem's recommendation for philanthropic projects. In *Masyarakat*, the progressive daughter of a successful Chinese modern entrepreneur leads a Chinese women's association whose activities include running orphanages, improving general public health, and alleviating poverty among kampong-

[563] Ibid., 376.
[564] Ibid., 384-385.
[565] Ibid., 388.

dwellers.[566] She also champions the ideal that educated Chinese women should pursue a professional career, thereby achieving social and financial independence.[567] Fourth, no matter how modern their Western schooling had made them, the ethnic Chinese must preserve their cultural identity and observe the best elements of their Confucian tradition, especially filial piety.

2. 1. 4. Striking a Balance in the Mid-1930s between Reason and Emotion, City and Village, and East and West in the Pursuit of Indonesian Modernity

In the mid-1930s, what did it mean for some Indonesians to be modern? For some answers to the question, one may turn to Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (1908-1994) and examine his modernist novel *Layar Terkembang* [With Sails Unfurled]. Born on February 11, 1908 in Natal, North Sumatra, he was the son of Raden Alisjahbana, a Javanese aristocrat who deserted his class and took middling-class jobs, first as a teacher and, later, as a shyster lawyer. In 1932, Takdir began serving as an editor of the magazine *Panji Pustaka*. From 1929 to 1941, the Balai Pustaka, the government publishing house, published his novels, through which he disseminated his modernist ideas. In 1942, he graduated from the Dutch-language Law School in Jakarta.

In *Layar Terkembang*, which was first published in 1936, Takdir Alisjahbana addressed the conflicts in which educated Indonesians found themselves embroiled as they strove to modernize themselves and their society. At the center of the story are such Indonesians: Tuti (a teacher at a Dutch-Native elementary school); her younger sister

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[566] Ibid., 389.
[567] Ibid., 390 and 392.

Maria (a final-year student of HBS, or Citizen's High School); Maria's fiancé Yusuf (an advanced medical school student); and the sisters' relatives: the man and wife, Saleh and Ratna: an AMS graduate and an alumna of Teachers' Training School, respectively, who become commercial farmers. Set in Java's Batavia, Bandung, and Pacet as well as in Sumatra's Martapura, Liwa, Kotabatu, and Krui in the first half of the 1930s, which many an apostle of Indonesian modernity perceived as a time of and for change, the novel presents a group of Indonesians seeking progress, balance, and plenitude in a world caught up in a series of clashes: reason vs. emotion, culture vs. nature, city vs. village, East vs. West, and high vs. low modernism. The "thesis" in Takdir's unabashedly didactic novel is that to be a healthy, happy, and fully-functioning modern Indonesian, one must synthesize all these divisions save one: that between East and West. For reasons to be discussed below, Takdir remained adamant that the East had little to offer to Indonesians in their quest for modernity. (In 1961, however, he took a synthetic stance on the matter, arguing that Indonesians were to pick out "certain skills and talents developed by [their] traditional cultures, [free] them from their traditional 'functions,' and [use] them to express new ideas and …emotions within the framework of a modern system of values.")[568]

Quite significantly, Takdir begins *Layar Terkembang* with a head-on and vivid presentation of two fictional modern Indonesian women, Tuti and Maria, detailing how they dressed in public:

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[568] Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, *Indonesia in the Modern World*, trans. Benedict R. Anderson (New Delhi: Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1961), 190-191.

> The door creaked open and two young ladies, dressed in Western style, entered the aquarium building. The older one, who stepped in first, wore a modest, white Tobralco[569] frock adorned with small blue flower motifs. She had her hair tied up in a bun, Surakartan-style, hanging ponderously over the nape of her neck. The younger one, who walked in after her, was dressed in a brown skirt and a yellowish blouse, both made of silk chiffon. The blouse's long sleeves, made of soft, crinkly georgette and flaring at the wrist, looked gorgeous. Her thick, well-groomed hair was elaborately plaited into two beautiful buns.[570]

This opening paragraph prepares the readers for Takdir's treatment of the opposition between "low" and "high" modernisms.

The affirmation and negation of such an opposition is one of the novel's central motifs. To become modern the hardcore way, one studies the sciences and technology at Dutch-language schools; enters the professions (e.g., as a teacher, physician, journalist, writer, entrepreneur, or commercial farmer); and dedicates oneself to social reform by being a leader in the Indonesian nationalist movement. This is the idea that Yusuf conveys in one of his early chats with Maria, his future fiancée:

> You may as well join [the Putri Sedar (Conscious Women) group] as soon as you can, Sis. The days are gone when the young ones like us stood idle. Our society is in motion now. We, the young and educated, are not going to be mere bystanders, are we? If we don't start participating now, we will later find ourselves out of sync. If that is the case, how can we accompany our nation's [journey to] progress? Youth associations are a kind of school where we can learn to work together in the interests of the general public.[571]

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[569] A cotton fabric manufactured by the Manchester-based Tootal [*sic*] Broadhurst Lee Company, Tobralco was advertised in the first half of the twentieth century in many cities across the world: in Singapore, Medan, and Melbourne as well as in Barcelona and New York City.

[570] Takdir Alisjahbana, *Layar Terkembang* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1982 [1936]), 7.

[571] Ibid., 18-19.

(Interestingly, young Indonesians of the mid-1930s talked about pergerakan politics even in their courtships, or so Takdir portrays them doing in his novel.) In addition, the practitioners of high modernism organize their lives around perseverance, industry, activism, and rationality; exercise self-control, self-development, autonomy, and gender equality; and cultivate punctuality, fastidiousness, order, and high spirits.[572] Educated Indonesians like Tuti and Yusuf believe that the secret of Westerners' supremacy in economy, politics, and technology lies in their embrace of hardcore modernism.

Alongside this "strong" brand of modernism there stands its "mild," quotidian, and demotic shadow: modernism as a lifestyle. Many middling-class Indonesians of the early 1930s were aficionados of this type of modernism. Tuti, for instance, draws the reader's attention to how these people delight in flaunting their fashionable clothes; filling their homes with a radio set and pieces of chic furniture; driving around in their own car; and leading a pleasant, *sans-souci* life (waking up late in the morning, taking a siesta at midday, and having tea and *kaasstengels* [cheese straws] in the verandah or going for a stroll in town in late afternoon hours). Every now and again they play tennis, watch movies, and go on picnics.

Which modernity was it that young Indonesians and their Indonesia-in-the-making must perform, and why?[573] In his novel, Takdir weighs three answers to the

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[572] Ibid., 16, 18, and 23.

[573] For some middling-class Indonesians in the interwar period, the practice of modernism as a lifestyle and their involvement in the pergerakan were intertwined. *Layar Terkembang* shows that much to the dismay of people like Tuti, the Indonesian incarnations of the Modern Girl also frequented pergerakan meetings. But it is going too far to claim, as Tuti does, that they were there simply to show off their participation in commodity culture. By the same token, many hardcore nationalists also appeared to have been aficionados of dandyism, which was a form of modernist lifestyle. They did not find dandyism detrimental to nationalism.

question: Some middling-class Indonesians chose mild modernity; women like Tuti observes the hardcore one; and people like Yusuf embrace both. Tuti commends high modernism and condemns its low alternative, seeing both as mutually exclusive. Much to her consternation, many women practitioners of softcore modernism flock to Putri Sedar meetings simply to impress one another with their trendy clothes, making the pergerakan events look like ridiculous fashion shows. (Very few women, Tuti claims, join the pergerakan out of earnest nationalist spirits.) She is put off by these enthusiasts of what she considers a silly, superficial, and self-indulgent path to progress: They are people who want to be modern the cheap way; content with wearing the "skin" of modernity (*kemoderenan kulit belaka*), they fall short of internalizing its essence.[574] Tuti refuses to put up with their frivolous modernism; she longs for the day when such young women leave Putri Sedar; they belong more, she thinks, to "a tennis club, a diners' club, or a picnic club." With them out of the picture, Putri Sedar will have the chance to become an organization of enlightened cadres.

To Yusuf, on the other hand, hardcore and softcore modernisms do not represent a dilemma. As Takdir's mouthpiece on this matter, he views both variants as complementary; they are but two aspects of one substance. He seems to think that it is wholesome for Indonesians to practice both. Just as the strong variant offers them the key to economic, political, and technological powers, the mild one makes life cozy, colorful, and convivial. On this, he once says to Tuti:

> I agree with you: the kind of Western-ness that manifests itself in going to the cinema, playing tennis, and the fad about chic clothes and fancy

[574] Alisjahbana, *Layar*, 116.

> furniture must be distinguished from the core Western spirit that has enabled Europeans to build world-encompassing empires […] conquer nature, fly in the air, and dive at sea. But we must also acknowledge that in reality both types [of Western-ness] are the product of the same mindset. The human mind is not all intellect, which does nothing but weigh good and bad. People cannot live merely on what is good or useful.[575]

While quite a few of his colleagues in the interwar period championed the vision of Indonesian modernity as a synthesis of the best of East and West, Takdir maintained, both in his op-ed articles and in *Layar Terkembang*, that Indonesian modernizers were to look to the West for a cluster of attitudes which, he believed, defined modernity, such as individualism, intellectualism, positivism, materialism, and joie de vivre.[576] (When he said "West," Takdir referred more to these outlooks on life than to Western European and North American societies.)[577] There is an episode in the novel where on Takdir's behalf, Tuti and Yusuf dismiss what they take to be a Hindu-Buddhist idea that since the world is "illusory," "ephemeral," and "meaningless," there is no point in striving for individual development and social progress. They object to such a worldview because it stands in the way of progress. Acting as Takdir's spokesperson, Tuti makes her point:

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[575] Ibid., 51.

[576] Consult Takdir contributions to the "Polemic on Culture" in 1935, 1936, and 1939 as compiled by Achdiat K. Mihardja in *Polemik Kebudayaan* [Polemic on culture] (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1977 [1948]). Pay close attention, in particular, to "Menuju Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Baru" [Toward new society and culture], 18-19; "Semboyan yang Tegas" [Categorical dictum], 40-42; "Pekerjaan Pembangunan Bangsa sebagai Pekerjaan Pendidikan" [Nation-building as an educational task], 126.

[577] Takdir believed, for example, that Japan was already "Western," that is to say, already significantly modern in its philosophy of life prior to its encounter with Western Europeans. See Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, "Synthese antara 'Barat' dan Timur'" [Synthesis of the East and the West], in *Polemik Kebudayaan*, 95-96.

> People who take this attitude stand helpless and indolent. They wind up occupying a humiliating position in the world. They see poverty as normal, sometimes even desirable. They seek happiness and glory in the afterlife…. Our people must adopt a different attitude. […R]ather than live the yoga way and bring thinking to a standstill, they must do more thinking, for the perfect mind is that which attains perfection in *this* world. Characters and deeds are real things; people must strive to develop their capacities. This is the path to perfection, physical and mental. Before entering the afterlife, we must first seek this-worldly perfection.[578]

Apropos the vision of Indonesian modernity as a creative synthesis of East and West, Takdir showed that some of its champions (e.g., Sanusi Pané) had seriously misunderstood Western Europe. This was evident, he pointed out, in their claim that Western civilization was one-sided: high on intellectualism, materialism, and individualism but low on spirituality. Takdir dismissed such a claim and reminded his colleagues that the West, too, had produced its great mystics (e.g., Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Eckhart).[579] Spirituality, therefore, was not the East's monopoly.

The Indonesian nation, Takdir believed, could not create a better future for itself simply by chasing after and mimicking the early modernizing nations in the West. Such a strategy was not going to work. What it must attempt was accelerated modernization. "We must achieve in the shortest possible time all that the West has accomplished only in centuries."[580] Takdir, therefore, had already envisioned in the mid-1930s the very type of

[578] Alisjahbana, *Layar*, 89.
[579] Alisjahbana, "Synthese," 93-94.
[580] See Takdir's rejoinder to Poerbatjaraka's "Sambungan Zaman," in *Polemik Kebudayaan*, 33.

self-modernization that the New Order had the opportunity and resources to carry out from 1966 to 1998.[581]

Besides the subject of speed, another pressing question for Takdir in the quest for Indonesian modernity was how to forge a synthesis, not between East and West, but between enlightenment and romanticism. As it appears in *Layar Terkembang*, enlightenment à la Takdir revolves around a rationalist approach to life and around a constellation of ideals, such as autonomy, gender egalitarianism, orderly progress, economic advancement, secularism, universalism, and utilitarianism. In the political sphere, it manifests itself in the pergerakan. In contrast to Takdir's enlightenment, his romanticism is an aesthetic way of life: it asserts the primacy of nature over culture, of emotion over reason; it celebrates beauty, romantic love, and the love of nature. He wants to show that unless one succeeds in harmonizing both ways of life within one's person, family, organization, and society, one's modernity is bound to be partial, off-balance, and even harmful, and one will never feel at home in the world.[582]

The cerebral, politically active Tuti takes a one-sided road to Indonesian modernity by rejecting romanticism in favor of enlightenment. In her zeal to embody reason, autonomy, and equality, she steels herself and resists being in love because she believes love sabotages self-control and is a triumph of emotion over reason. She fears that the collapse of self-control and the ensuing defeat of reason will make her dependent on, and inferior to, the man she loves. For her to take a leap into sentimentalism,

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[581] Consider, for example, Ali Moertopo, *Some Basic Thoughts on the Acceleration and Modernization of 25 Years' Development* (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1973).

[582] Cf. Matthew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, *Zizek and Politics: A Political Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 24.

dependency, and inequality is to betray her very mission in the pergerakan, to which she has devoted her life since she is still a student at the Teachers' Training School.[583] For about a decade now she has been striving to create modern Indonesian women. The modern Indonesian woman, as Tuti envisions her,

> … can no longer be confined to the domestic sphere; the whole world is her arena. Marriage is not her only goal in life. Restless and inquisitive, her mind pursues gratification in a range of projects. She plunges herself into the world of science; helps build and run the country; and expresses her soul in the arts. She carries out and leads various endeavors and enterprises. The Putri Sedar advocates this kind of woman: not a woman who slaves in society, but one who, being equal to man, knows no fear and asks no pity. She won't do anything that goes against the dictates of her conscience. She won't get married simply for man's pity and protection. She won't contract a marriage that forces her to give up her rights as a human being who has a life of her own. In short, she is a free human being, free in all respects.[584]

In the 1930s Indonesian nationalists held the view that this kind of women, enlightened and emancipated, played a strategic part in nation-building by raising a generation of modern people. As a spiritual daughter of Kartini and Maria Walanda-Maramis, who believed that to transform society one must reform the family, Tuti goes to great lengths in pergerakan meetings

> … to explain the impact of a mother on the upbringing of her children who were to grow up to be great people. It was women who first led the children and instill noble traits into their psyches, traits that would live on throughout their lives. The contemporary woman, who simply served as a kind of hatching machine, was not going to deliver useful offspring to the world. Unless it involved an effort to ameliorate the condition of women, any attempt to improve the condition of the nation was bound to fail ….[585]

[583] Alisjahbana, *Layar*, 100, 101, and 126.
[584] Ibid., 38.
[585] Ibid., 37 and 126.

There is a price, however, that Tuti has to pay for her anti-romantic, ruthlessly rational way of becoming modern. For all her incisive intelligence, respectable career, and prominence in the pergerakan, she is unhappy. An overdose of ratiocination, political work, and city life has cut her off from nature and its charm, beauty, and majesty. At the age of twenty-seven, she "wakes up" and realizes what she has been missing out: a happy married life and a loving appreciation of nature, which could have made her a well-balanced person and a wiser pergerakan leader.[586]

In contrast to the political bluestocking Tuti, the nineteenth-year-old Maria comes across as a sensual-aesthetic Modern Girl. Takdir employs her as a beacon for romantic modernity, which privileges emotion over reason and where the participation in commodity culture and the pursuit of romantic love feel more concrete, more urgent, than women's emancipation and nation-building. As a romanticist, Maria embraces the emotional intoxication that erotic love produces in her body. Note, however, that she does so without overstepping the bounds of middling-class propriety. As a modern girl, she chooses her own fiancé. That she opts for Yusuf is evidence that her modern love is blind to ethnicity but not to class. Granted, Maria is Sundanese and Yusuf comes from Palembang. But both of them are Dutch-educated children of retired Pangreh Pradja bureaucrats. On the whole, for all the emotional flux she goes through as a result of her sentimental modernism, she is happy.

Takdir concludes his novel by "killing" Maria and letting Tuti live on. As Maria savors erotic love and then fights with tuberculosis, Tuti re-examines her own life and

[586] Ibid., 126.

resuscitates her petrified heart. By the time Maria dies, Tuti has already learned her lesson and converted to a new life of whole and healthy modernity, which is a fusion of enlightenment and romanticism, and of pergerakan politics and family life. Maria, in a way, lives on too: Her variety of modernity is assimilated into and completes Tuti's. When Yusuf and the new Tuti get married, they stand for Takdir's ideal of modern Indonesian family, one of the main engines of social reform. This is, I think, the message that Takdir tries to get across in Tuti's transition from cerebro-political to the full-fledged modernity.

Early in the novel, this type of modernity, which combines reason and emotion, order and beauty, finds its practical embodiment in the way Tuti and Maria collaborate in organizing their home:

> Strong-willed and persistent, Tuti managed to keep the house in order. In fact, it was better organized now than it had been when her mother was still alive. Every piece of furniture occupied its own place within some intelligible design. Since Tuti was a stickler for punctuality, everything was to occur at a fixed time.
>
> […]
>
> Hadn't it been for Maria, however, all this neatness would've been gloomy, even lifeless. Thanks to her passion for beautiful and colorful flowers, she brought life and joy to the house. A lover of music, every now and then she would either sing or play the gramophone, protecting the home all day, holding mortal silence at bay.[587]

It is not going too far, I think, to say that Takdir uses housekeeping à la Tuti and Maria as a metaphor for how modern Indonesia society itself was to be organized.

Another objective that Takdir set for himself in *Layar Terkembang* was to show how Indonesian modernizers could work out a progressive integration of the rural and the

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[587] Ibid., 23.

urban. This integration was required if they were serious about modernizing not only people like themselves, which was a minority anyway, but also the entire Indonesian society whose majority consisted of village farmers. Accordingly, to bring Indonesian society to modernity, an attempt must be made to update the villagers and their agricultural way of life. The problem, Takdir thought, was that in the mid-1930s many Indonesian intellectuals neither knew the peasantry nor appreciated the strategic role that agriculture played in nation-building. To show how the rural-urban synthesis should be made, Takdir presents Saleh and Ratna: the urban, middling-class, Western-educated Indonesian couple who, much to the consternation of Saleh's father, leave their life and work in Batavia, the capital city of the Dutch East Indies, for the highland village of Sindanglaya, Pacet, West Java, where they start a new life as intellectuals-cum-farmers and self-styled missionaries of Indonesian modernity.

Saleh and Ratna attempt to modernize the village gradually. They start by offering themselves as the prototypical family of modern farmers for the villagers to emulate. In contrast to their traditional, subsistence-oriented neighbors, they do agriculture as a business enterprise, which is to be managed in a rational fashion to make constant growth and expansion possible. At the same time, besides providing the village girls with instruction in needlework, embroidery, and general knowledge, Ratna teaches them to read and write.[588]

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[588] Ibid., 132.

The next thing in the couple's agenda to "lead the farmers to progress"[589] is helping the farmers organize themselves in defense of their collective interests. A cooperative is to be set up that will provide them with soft loans and thereby free them from the clutches of unscrupulous rice-dealers and moneylenders. An association of flower growers is to be established so they can get rid of middlemen and improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the florists in Batavia.[590] If they are to run well and successfully, Saleh thinks, these organizations must be led by "an honest intellectual." To guide the villagers in the journey from timeless, "thick darkness" to "the light of a new age," Saleh considers[591] a plan to build an agricultural center in the village of Sindanglaya for urban intellectuals to try their hand at commercial farming. While doing so, they can reach out to the villagers and preach modernity to them.

Takdir sensed a fear among Dutch-educated Indonesians of the mid-1930s that life and work in the countryside might result in de-modernization. In *Layar Terkembang* he touches on those MULO (Dutch-language Junior High School) graduates who preferred to take a low-paying and tedious job as an apprenticed clerk in Batavia rather than enter the more independent, more venturesome, and (potentially) more lucrative career as a commercial farmer in Java's countryside.[592] To allay such fears, he tries to reassure his city-dwelling, educated readers that they are not going to lose their modernity by living in the countryside. He tells them that although

[589] The original Indonesian reads "memimpin kaum tani supaya mereka maju." See ibid., 130.

[590] Ibid., 131.

[591] Ibid., 132.

[592] Ibid., 129.

> […Saleh and Ratna] live way up in the mountains, far removed from all that modern pergerakan, [Ratna] locks neither herself nor her heart. She has enough magazines and newspapers to read. Her husband's bookcase contains books on all kinds of subjects: chicken farming, psychology, sociology, and literature, even the women's movement in Germany under Nazi leadership.[593]

The husband and wife not only rear chickens, tend a fishpond, and work on their rice field and vegetable garden; they also regularly read plenty of newspapers and magazines to keep up with what is going on in the world. Ratna even contributes articles to a number of women's periodicals, discussing, among other things, the joy of agriculture and the life and work of village women in Sindanglaya.[594]

As we have seen, they do not just preserve their modernity in the village; they also inject modernity serum into the blood stream of the local community. They do this in order to cure the villagers of what they see as the lethargy, inertia, ignorance, and disorganization that have been afflicting them since times immemorial. Saleh sums up his social diagnosis of them as follows: "Their mind is powerless; their soul is dead. They lack initiative; they don't know how to think. They lack the enthusiasm and courage to try out new things."[595] With regular shots of modernity serum, they will—Saleh hopes—acquire the know-how, the mindset, and the élan vital to accomplish the transition from backwardness, indebtedness, and poverty to progress, freedom, and prosperity.

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[593] Ibid., 132.
[594] Ibid., 128.
[595] Ibid., 130.

2. 1. 5. Pursuing Indonesian Modernity Pragmatically: Soetomo (1888-1938)

Soetomo came from a middling-class Javanese background. Owing to this social background, the Ethical Policy, and his own talents and hard work, he succeeded in becoming a doctor. He underwent his training in Batavia (1903-1911), Amsterdam (1919-1921), and Hamburg (1921-1923). He and "the first Filipino" José Rizal (1861-1896), who was roughly three decades his senior, had a great deal in common. Like Rizal, Soetomo was a physician and a political activist. Indeed, he was one of the principal leaders of Indonesian nationalist movement in the early twentieth century. Like Rizal and the Chinese reformer Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Soetomo considered modern education as the key to modernity and the necessary foundation for political emancipation.[596] It was not until a nation was "enlightened" that it deserved independence. For a modern state and its apparatuses could not possibly be run by the uneducated. In 1908 he co-founded the Budi Utomo, an association of Javanese students, doctors, and aristocrats for self-help and mutual progress.[597] In 1924, he founded and led the Indonesian Study Club to provide Indonesian intellectuals with the social and political training necessary for them to be future social reformers.[598] The Club did much, among other things, to keep trade unionism alive in Java after the Dutch crushed the communist rebellion in 1926.[599] In 1930, the Club morphed into a political party known as the Party of the Indonesian Nation (PBI), which in 1935 fused together with the Budi Utomo into

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[596] Soetomo, *Toward a Glorious Indonesia: Reminiscences and Observations of Dr. Soetomo*, ed. Paul W. van der Veur, trans. Suharni Soemarmo and Paul W. van der Veur (Athens: Ohio University, 1987), xliii-xliv.

[597] Ibid., xxi-xxii.

[598] Ibid., xxix.

[599] See John Ingleson, "Soetomo, the Indonesian Study Club and Organised Labour in Late Colonial Surabaya," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, 1 (February 2008): 31-57.

the Greater Indonesian Party (Parindra).[600] Like Rizal, Soetomo married a European woman; mastered one or more European languages; traveled extensively to compare and contrast contemporary societies of the world;[601] and composed an autobiography and several travelogues.[602]

In 1934, in response to the requests of friends and journalists, Soetomo published his Malay-language autobiography titled *Reminiscences* [originally, *Kenang-kenangan*].[603] He wanted to inspire his Indonesian readers to think sociologically and historically, to realize how self and society shaped each other, to understand how the Javanese-Indonesian individual could gradually achieve self-actualization and progress throughout his lifespan and through encounters with good people.[604] To write such a book was to carry out a modern literary project. We can use the work to shed light on the quest for Indonesian modernity in the first half of the twentieth century. One way of reading this work will serve our purpose: it is by examining how he designed the text and what he said in it, both explicitly and explicitly.

We can start by observing the book's design. One of the challenges facing Soetomo was how to minimize autobiography's costs while maximizing its benefits. He dealt with this challenge by modifying the genre. The result was an "autobiography as montage" where he presents the reader with a collection of images: a few images are of his own but most are of his significant others. If we put these images together, we may

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[600] Soetomo, *Glorious Indonesia*, xxxi.
[601] Ibid., xxxi-xxxii.
[602] Ibid., lxviii-lxxv.
[603] Soetomo, *Kenang-kenangan*, in *Glorious Indonesia*, 6. My discussion of it refers to its English translation. That is why I cite the work using its English title *Reminiscences* rather than its Indonesian one *Kenang-kenangan*.
[604] Ibid., 4-5.

get at the true portrait of Dr. Soetomo. The autobiography, however, may yield an array of different portraits of the man, giving us the privilege of figuring out the meanings of his life and work. Soetomo does not tell his personal history; he shows it. *Reminiscences* is a sort of a reader-centered, create-your-own-Soetomo autobiography. Read in its own historical context (the Dutch East Indies of the 1930s), the work comes across as super-modern, even bordering on the avant-garde. For comparison, it was not until 1960, for instance, that the American film historian Jay Leyda (1910-88) performed a "biography as montage" in his *The Years and Hours of Emily Dickinson*.[605] I would even argue that without Soetomo's knowing it, in *Reminiscences* he adopts a strikingly "structuralist" approach to autobiography, which rests on the premise that meaning resides in relationship. To capture the meaning of his life, one should focus not on the man himself but on those social ties that bind him to a circle of people, people who mattered to him.

Reminiscences invites multiple readings. Soetomo himself, however, recommended a way of reading that aims at three objectives: First, to discover Soetomo's personality through his portrayals of the characters of his ancestors;[606] second, "to compare conditions in the past with those of the present"; and third, to inspire the reader "to model [his own life]" on those of the good people who appear in the autobiography.[607] One of the points Soetomo tried to make was that he was the product of his family and communal history. The second point was that nation-building must begin by making oneself aware of one's origins and goals in life. He opined that the safe path to

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[605] Jay Leyda, *The Years and Hours of Emily Dickinson* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.

[606] Soetomo, "Reminiscences," 3.

[607] Ibid., 5.

progress was through consensus rather than through revolution. A fully-functioning society was comparable to a gamelan orchestra. It was as a musician in this orchestra that a good Indonesian should contribute to his nation's progress.

Reminiscences is an autobiography in a roundabout way. Staying mostly on the margins of the story, he calls the reader's attention less to himself than to his significant others, highlighting their merits, deemphasizing their shortcomings. Soetomo warns the reader that his perceptions of the world do not necessarily correspond to the world out there.[608] As far as *Reminiscences* is concerned, though, he hastens to add that he has verified his memories by checking them against the data provided by his relatives and the friends of his family.[609] Aiming at propriety and intersubjectivity, Soetomo uses multiple narrators, each telling his story in first person singular. To talk about his father, Soetomo presents us not only with his memories of but also with other people's accounts of the man. To touch upon the crucial role he played in the nationalist movement, Soetomo points to the achievements of fellow nationalists. Alluding to how he has suffered in his struggle to lead his people to progress, Soetomo describes the drudgery, the sickness, and the loneliness his wife had endured.

Structuring *Reminiscences* as a narrative montage, Soetomo invites the reader to use it as a medium for meditation on modern themes: the interplay of change and continuity, the paradox of origins and goals, and the synthesis between Javanese and Indonesian identities. Soetomo offers himself up as a case study to illuminate these issues from three perspectives: biographical, historical, and cosmic. At first glance, the format

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[608] Ibid., 3.
[609] Ibid., 4.

makes the book a bit confusing. Yet once we recall the goals Soetomo seeks to achieve, the design is justifiable. Chronology helps to order the events in the autobiography. We are to "enter" *Reminiscences* as a house of memories. Though we see only a bit of Soetomo there, the house teems with special guests, to whom he introduces us. It is as if he said, "If you are serious about knowing who I am, here are the better informants for you."

Reminiscences comes in six thematic parts. The first part—"Preface" and "For All Readers"—states Soetomo's purpose. He lists here the sources that he has processed to produce the autobiography and they are his memories and the accounts offered by his relatives and associates. He tells us of the circumstances under which the text came into being: his wife's sickness and death. This is to point out how the cosmic haunts the historical. As the book finally contains the story of his wife, it became inappropriate for Soetomo to sell its copies. To do so was to transfigure the sacred memories of her into a profane commodity. He decided therefore to circulate the copies free of charge.

Constituting the bulk of the autobiography is the second part, which is titled "The Nature and Character of My Ancestors." This part serves at least two functions. First, by using his genealogy (both real and mythical) and the biographical sketches of his ancestors, Soetomo formulates and advances the "thesis" that the essence of his personality resides in his genealogy. The genealogy then becomes an allegory in which Soetomo's ancestors stand for his cardinal traits. For instance, Soetomo makes his paternal uncle, Soejoed—who was a teacher—to stand for one of his own major traits: the capacity for adoption by adaptation. Owing to this capacity, Soejoed, and by

implication Soetomo as well, remained a good Javanese by appropriating Western cultural elements creatively. These cultural elements are just "forms"; what matters is the essence. More importantly, to underscore his own commitment to equality, social justice, and public interests, Soetomo tells the story of his father, R. Soewadji, a teacher-turned-civil servant who showed a tendency toward democracy: He sought to "level up" the masses by abolishing Low Javanese, and he did not have any compunction about criticizing his Dutch and Native superiors.

Second, Soetomo uses the stories of his ancestors to express his own position in the debate over the major issues confronting the Indonesian quest for modernity and national emancipation in the 1930s. The first issue was that of social change. In their transition from tradition to modernity, people should learn not only to bring about change but also to domesticate it. Soetomo's proposal was for Indonesians to keep cool and protect themselves from the shock of the new and the bizarre, hence the importance of seeking to integrate the self into the cosmos. One might achieve this through asceticism: by fasting, keeping vigil, engaging in meditation, and…examining one's own journey in life. Soetomo's maternal grandparents believed in asceticism. Another way of domesticating change was by traveling considerably, learning from other people's cultures in order to rejuvenate one's own. Soetomo spends pages discussing his maternal grandfather, Raden Ngabehi Singowidjojo, a village head who had not only gone to Mecca to perform the hajj but also travelled extensively in East Java in search of Islamic enlightenment; of modern technological stuff such as matches, kerosene lamp, and postal

service; and of curios such as fat-tailed sheep and new plants. He introduced many of these to his village, linking it—as a cultural broker—to the outside world.

Besides social change, Soetomo deals also with tensions in the late colonial society. He uses the stories of his father, Suwaji, and his maternal grandfather Singowijoyo to illustrate some of these tensions. His father wanted Soetomo to be a doctor; his grandfather suggested he be a civil servant. The quarrel was indicative of the rise of the professional Native middling class (the neo-*priyayi*). The father serves also as a case study to point out the widening gap between what the Dutch colonial regime could offer and what the new Native middling classes wanted. People like Suwaji wanted both respect and a salary commensurate with their status. Tired of the colonial hierarchy, they asked for more equality, dignity, and free speech. Many of Soetomo's contemporaneous readers would see themselves in Suwaji. Soetomo stops short, however, of writing a hagiography of his ancestors. He tells us, for instance, that his grandfather entertained his guests with liquor and opium[610] and that his father had a quick temper and, for quite a while, was a moderate gambler. All of these were rather minor vices.

The third part of the book, the truly autobiographical part titled "My Own Story," shows young Soetomo as a spoiled brat. He cheated in exams, stole money from his parents, and played his grandmother off against his mother. It is rather hard for the reader to imagine that this Soetomo would grow up into one of the greatest of the early Indonesian nationalists. But this is exactly the point. It does not take a moral genius to be a good, modern, progressive Indonesian. Any ordinary person can accomplish this task. The brat Soetomo was living proof. To educate the young for the future, all it takes is

[610] Ibid., 16.

persistence, trust, and time. Education was about more than schooling. It was about a journey of self-discovery, at once intellectual and moral. It involved the rise of shame and the transition from rote-learning to critical thinking; from self-indulgence to asceticism; from dependency to self-reliance; from clowning around to taking up a mission. Education needed moments of epiphany. In Soetomo's case these included the discovery of his capacity for analytical reasoning, the death of his father, and the encounter with Wahidin. This part of *Reminiscences* suggests that Soetomo makes himself symbolize Indonesia, using his journey of self-discovery as a metaphor for Indonesia's quest for modernity and political independence.

In the fourth part of his autobiography, Soetomo presents the biographical sketches of eleven major Indonesian nationalists, ranging from Wahidin and Cipto to Douwes Dekker and Rajiman. Soetomo also includes two Dutchmen: D. van Hinloopen Labberton (teacher of Javanese language and theosophist) and H. F. Roll (the director of the medical school Soetomo attended). The core idea that propels this part is that the pursuit of progress and national emancipation was an endeavor at once collective and international. Soetomo uses the occasion to express his appreciation of what his Indonesian and Dutch friends had contributed to the movement. Soetomo presents the idea that he and his colleagues formed stellar constellations on the modern sky.

Soetomo closes his autobiography by discussing his childhood. Using the stories of his family's retainers, he advances a number of arguments about the Indonesian nationalist movement, proper relations among classes, and the social change that "Indonesia" went through in the 1930s. He presents us with his retainer Kek Golo's

personal memories of the Java War (1825-1830), led by Prince Diponegoro against the Dutch. Soetomo quotes Kek Golo as saying that acting like bands of bandits Diponegoro's troops harassed "local inhabitants."[611] Soetomo deploys this story to critique certain tendencies in the Indonesian nationalist movement. Some Indonesian nationalists, he implies, were acting like twentieth-century incarnations of Diponegoro: in pursuit of personal interest they were toying with the idea of winning independence through provocative and radical methods.[612] This Diponegoroism, Soetomo reasons, would spark Dutch military retaliation, thereby ruining the achievements of the reform movement led by people like Soetomo himself. In addition, Soetomo contends that respect and collaboration among classes, rather than social revolution, was the key to progress. He uses the brief life stories of his family's retainers as evidence in support of his argument for social reform under the guidance of the middling classes. With the close tutelage of the enlightened members of these classes, "the little people" could achieve upward social mobility. If they did not, then their descendants would.[613]

2. 1. 6. The Call for Native Industrialization in the Late 1930s

In the 1930s, certain members of the Indonesian middling-class intellectuals had begun to see industrialization as an indispensable component in modernization. Mohammad Husni Thamrin (1894-1941) was one of the advocates of this view. After a stint at the office of the Patih of Batavia, he served as a bookkeeper at the Royal Packet

[611] Ibid., 100-101.
[612] Ibid., 101.
[613] Ibid., 101-105.

Lines Company (KPM) from 1914 to 1924.[614] It was during his employment with the KPM that Thamrin entered pergerakan politics. In 1919, with the support of his friend the Dutch Christian-socialist Daan van der Zee (1880-1969), he became member of the City Council and later, in 1923, founded the ethnically-based political association Kaum Betawi (People of Batavia).[615] Soon enough, he developed from a champion of indigenous Batavians into the most competent of Indonesian nationalists who, in their quest for self-rule, took a cooperative stance toward the Dutch. In the Volksraad

Figure 1. Thamrin at a trade expo for Indonesian manufactures.[616]

[614] Anhar Gonggong, *Pahlawan Nasional Muhammad Husni Thamrin: Riwayat Hidup Singkat dan Kutipan-Kutipan Buah Pikirannya* [The national hero Muhammad Husni Thamrin: A biographical sketch and excerpts from his writings and addresses] (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1992), 9.

[615] Gonggong, *Thamrin,* 9-11. Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin, “Betawi,” in *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 55.

[616] Anonymous, *Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin (1894-1941)* (Jakarta: Pemerintah Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, 1982), 14.

(People's Council), of which he became a member from 1927 to 1941, and in the Parindra, a political party he joined in 1935, he energetically and skillfully pursued Indonesia's independence.[617] In addition to democracy and equality (economic, political, and educational), [618] the modernist goals he crusaded for in the Volksraad included state-led, import-substitution industrialization to be dominated by Indonesians entrepreneurs. (This signifies a big leap in the search for Indonesian modernity, for in the early years of the twentieth century Kartini planned to set up a craft workshop in Rembang.[619])

In his address to the Volksraad on July 12, 1938, Thamrin remarked that the rakyat desired to exercise "self-determination" and "participate in the international contest for progress."[620] This desire, however, was frustrated by the economic policy that colonial government had been pursuing since the onset of the Great Depression. It privileged major Dutch enterprises, which invested foreign capital in various large-scale industries in the colony and repatriated the profits to the metropole, over Native entrepreneurs whom it let content themselves with micro-industries, as well as over indigenous workers and small farmers who it forced to suffer, respectively, low wages and the ongoing loss of fertile land for food production. This policy, he maintained, led to the decline in the *rakyat*'s buying power and to the hemorrhage of capital from the colony to the metropole. The colonial government owed it to the *rakyat* to do for them

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[617] Gonggong, *Thamrin*, 26 and 36.

[618] Ibid., 36-37, and 71.

[619] Kartini, letter to Rosa Abendanon-Mandri, August 23, 1903, in *Letters from Kartini*, 137.

[620] Mohammad Husni Thamrin, "Pidato Mohammad Husni Thamrin dimuka Volksraad" [Mohammad Husni Thamrin's address to the Volksraad], in Anonymous, *Thamrin,* 19. But Thamrin had been an advocate of Native industrialization since as early as 1932. See, for example, Suzanne Moon, *Technology and Ethical Idealism: A History of Development in the Netherlands East Indies* (Leiden: CNWS, 2007), 136-137.

what the Meiji government did for the Japanese, that is, produce a rapid, planned, and large-scale industrialization to be led by the state and later transferred to indigenous capitalists. Some of the steps the colonial government was to take toward indigenous industrialization included increasing wages and spending less on defense and more on infrastructure, housing, health, and job creation.[621] It was necessary for Indonesian society to undertake government-assisted industrialization, for it was impossible to support its growing population by relying merely on dwindling agriculture.[622]

Aside from prominent nationalists like Thamrin, members of the newspaper-reading, cigarette-smoking middling classes seem to have found the industrial dimension of modernity really appealing, especially from the consumer's point of view. It was to attract such people that on January 25, 1930 in the daily *Kengpo* the Trio Sam Hien Kongsie, a manufacturer of *kretek* (clove cigarettes), put up an advertisement showing off the modernity of its workshop in Kudus, central Java. "Please visit and have a look around our factory…," the advertisers said, "[and] you will get more knowledge about the most modern of all industries throughout Indonesia: our cigarette- and kretek-producing factory." "We respectfully await your visits, dear gentlemen!"[623]

2. 1. 7. The Quest for Islamic Indonesian Modernity in the 1930s and Early 1940s

The version of Indonesian modernity that some influential middling-class Muslim intellectuals stood up for was a synthesis of what they considered Islam's progressive elements and certain healthy components of foreign civilizations (especially the West)

[621] Thamrin, "Pidato," 21-22.
[622] Ibid.
[623] *Kengpo*, January 25, 1930.

that they believed they could reconcile with Islam to make the Indonesian Muslim community in particular, and the Indonesian nation in general, more enlightened, virtuous, prosperous, powerful, and respectable. To explore Islamic visions of Indonesian modernity, it is instructive to consider some of the ideas of two these Muslim intellectuals: Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993) and Tamar Jaya (1913-1984).

Natsir came from an ethnic Minangkabau middling-class family. His father was a clerk with the colonial Civil Service. On July 17, 1908, he was born in the coffee- and vegetable-producing highland of Alahan Panjang, West Sumatra. The hybrid education he received is indicative of the kind of modernity his parents wanted him to acquire: It was both Islamic and Western. Besides attending the Dutch-language schools (the HIS and the MULO in Padang and the AMS in Bandung),[624] he also went to the madrasah to study Arabic, the Koran, and Islamic jurisprudence.[625] While in Bandung (1927-1930), he continued his double-tracked education.

At the AMS, focusing on the European humanities,[626] he learned Latin and Greek and attained proficiency in Dutch. In the meantime, he also studied Islam under the modernist Ahmad Hassan (1887-1958). While studying, he developed a keen interest in politics. He joined the local branch of the Jong Islamieten Bond (Young Muslims Association) and served as its chairman in 1928-1932. In 1930, he finished AMS (Dutch-language Senior High School) well enough to be offered a scholarship to study law in Batavia or economics in Rotterdam. But he declined the offer in favor of founding a

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[624] Eko Punto Pambudi, et al., *Natsir: Politik Santun di antara Dua Rezim* [Decent politics between two regimes] (Jakarta: KPG and Tempo, 2011), 9-11.

[625] Ibid., 14.

[626] Ibid., 17.

modern Islamic school in Bandung that was to blend Islam and Western knowledge, faith and the sciences—a plan that materialized in 1932.[627] Though a staunch nationalist, Natsir wanted Islam to play a more central role in future Indonesia than many of his non-Islamist colleagues could accept.[628] In the 1930s, when Islam was under attack from secular Indonesians and Dutch critics, he came to its rescue by contributing counterarguments to the periodical *Pembela Islam* [Defender of Islam].[629]

Natsir championed Islam as the ideological basis and core for Indonesian modernity. Modernization, in his view, required integrating faith and reason and forging a cosmopolitan synthesis that such integration guided and justified. In many of the articles he wrote in the 1930s, he took pains to demonstrate that Islam—especially during its Golden Age (from the seventh century to the thirteenth)—embodied a complete civilization[630] that advocated and practiced a set of values which latter-day thinkers would identify and extoll as the essence of modernism, as the secret of Western hegemony. The first of these values was rationalism. According to Natsir, Islam required that all Muslims, men and women, investigate the workings of the universe,[631] the better to know and love its Creator, and that they make scientific discoveries and inventions to achieve success, individual and collective, in their worldly affairs.[632] The future

[627] Ibid., 28. See also Audrey Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism, and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 28-29.
[628] Ibid., 15.
[629] Pambudi, *Natsir*, 30-33.
[630] Following the British historian H. A. R. Gibb, Natsir viewed Islam as “a complete civilization.” See Mohammad Natsir, “Islam dan Kebudajaan: Djuni 1936” [Islam and civilization: June 1936], *Capita Selecta* (Bandung: Van Hoeve, 1954), 3.
[631] Natsir, “Hakikat Agama Islam: Oktober 1938” [The essence of Islam: October 1938], in ibid., 121.
[632] Natsir, “Islam dan Kebudajaan,” in ibid., 9; see also Natsir, “Hakikat,” in ibid., 122.

Indonesian society would enjoy wealth, power, and wisdom if its ruler—inspired by Islam and its Golden Age[633]—would actively sponsor the scientific explorations conducted by its intellectual elite.

Second, Islam preached the integration of faith and reason. While teaching people not to believe in anything unreasonable, it warned people that without the discipline and moral guidance which only faith could provide, "freedom to think [would] spell chaos."[634] Implied in this warning was the idea that reason was a morally neutral tool; faith in God alone could inspire people to wield it in the service of the common good. Another implication was that reason was bound to meet its limits, at which point the believers could plead with God for guidance.[635] Islam, in Natsir's interpretation, rejected irrational faith and faithless rationalism.[636] Faith and reason completed and shepherded each other.

Third, Islam advised the believers to take a cosmopolitan approach to their search for knowledge, for truth remained truth, no matter who presented it, whether compatriots or foreigners, whether Muslims or non-Muslim. Muslims should travel overseas, study multiple societies, and accumulate a treasure of knowledge on which to draw in the production of cultural syntheses, which the quest for progress required.[637] Becoming modern, therefore, was neither about being torn between East and West nor about

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[633] Natsir, "Islam dan Kebudajaan," 4.

[634] Natsir, "Sikap Islam terhadap Kemerdekaan Berfikir: April-Djuni 1940" [Islam's position on the freedom to think: April-June 1940], in ibid., 210.

[635] Natsir, "Ibnu Sina: Pebruari 1937" [Avicenna: February 1937], in ibid., 14-15; see also Natsir, "Abu Hamid bin Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali: April 1937" [Al-Ghazali: April 1937], in ibid., 21.

[636] Natsir, "Sikap Islam," 210-211.

[637] Natsir, "Islam dan Kebudajaan," 5.

occupying the "right" geography and having the "right" genes.[638]The ultimate question, even for modernizing Muslims, remained choosing between right and wrong. As regards the beneficial things that Indonesian Muslims could borrow from the West, Natsir gave such examples as technology, élan vital, social organization, and emphasis on precision.[639]

Having established the case for Islam's pro-modernity core values, Natsir acknowledged that "the Islamic world was suffering a crisis"[640] and that Muslims were the underdog in a world dominated by the West. But it was not because they were Muslims, he argued. It was because they failed to be the best Muslims they could be, for while preserving their faith in God, they had neglected the cultivation of the critical mind and the pursuit of the sciences. This neglect led to incapacitating psychological conditions, such as inferiority complex, superstitions, fetishism, and helplessness.[641] It also resulted in their failure to develop a "strong economic foundation," superior administration, and effective leadership, and—Natsir suggested—to avoid subjugation by foreign powers.[642] To modernize themselves, which they must, Indonesian Muslims were to accomplish the reintegration of faith and reason, the fostering of the critical mind, and the purge of Islam, not of certain Western influences that had proved invigorating but of any superstitions, perverted innovations, and blind imitations, even if these were of

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[638] Natsir, "Ideologi Didikan Islam: 17 Djuni 1934" [Islam's educational ideology: June 1934], in ibid., 54.

[639] Natsir, "Sikap Islam," 229.

[640] Ibid., 211.

[641] Natsir, "Djedjak Islam dalam Kebudajaan: 1937" [Islam's footprints in civilizations: 1937], in ibid., 26 and 28.

[642] Natsir, "Hakikat," 132.

Eastern provenance.[643] In the 1930s, Natsir was convinced that the modernization of Indonesian Muslims required a type of education that taught the unity of faith and reason; the pursuit of spiritual and economic wellbeing; the training of professionals in theology, government, and the sciences; the protection of one's rights; and the cultivation efficiency and competitiveness. [644]That was why he founded a school offering this type of education in Bandung. That was why he published numerous articles discussing Islamic and modernist themes in periodicals such as *Pembela Islam* [Defender of Islam] and *Pandji Islam* [Banner of Islam].

Muslim intelligentsias performed their Islamic variety of Indonesian modernity not only in politics but also in everyday life. In February 1938, for example, Natsir criticized what he considered as a wrongheaded pursuit of modernity: that "new kind of women's emancipation" whose champions encouraged women to get as much education as possible, compete as professionals with men in the workplace, secure financial independence, free themselves from traditions, and abandon their social duties, which, according to Natsir, must include serving as a wife who provided her activist husband with a revitalizing home to return to at the end of his daily political struggle, and serving as a mother who took care of her children's moral education so they would grow up to be full-fledged, well-integrated champions of religious and national progress.[645]

Underlying this argument was the same idea as that which Semaoen had advocated in *Hikajat Kadiroen*: that the struggle for Indonesian modernity was to take

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[643] Natsir, "Djedjak Islam," 28-29.

[644] Natsir, "Ideologi," 53, 55, and 59.

[645] Natsir, "Disekitar Soal Krisis Perkawinan: Pebruary 1938" [On marital crisis: February 1938], in ibid., 392-393, 395, and 398.

place simultaneously in the public and domestic spheres and that while men were to fight outdoors in the political arena, women were to do so at home and in the moral battlefield. Natsir, however, did not argue for a strict adherence to this gendered division of labor. He appreciated the fact that Indonesian women had been "willing to struggle in convention halls," "governmental councils," and companies. But he made it clear that women should privilege their domestic roles over their public ones. No one, he argued, could perform the former roles better than women. It is interesting to ask why it did not occur to Natsir that men and women could learn to share responsibilities in both fronts of their struggle for Indonesian modernity. This suggests the perimeters that Natsir's modernist vision dared not go beyond, perimeters that are also observable among male Indonesian intellectuals in other social groups, for instance the more left-leaning Semaoen in 1919 and some ethnic Chinese writers in 1900-1942.

By the 1930s, the spirit of modernity had also touched the Islamic boarding schools.[646] Embracing Indonesian nationalism, teachers and students in these schools participated in pergerakan politics, organizing themselves in associations and using the press to shape public opinion. Santri youths in central Java attended meetings dressed in ways they considered modern: they sported neckties, shirts, pantaloons, and Nehru's white skullcaps.[647] They spent part of their leisure time reading Malay-language periodicals and novels. Of these novels, some were originals; others were translations.[648] They adopted the practice of having family meals together: Properly dressed, they would sit at table, eating with spoon and fork and keeping up a light, pleasant conversation,

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[646] Saifuddin Zuhri, *Guruku Orang-orang Pesantren* (Bandung: Alma'arif, 1974), 58.
[647] Ibid., 83 and 151.
[648] Ibid., 40.

treating one another in a polite, relaxed manner.[649] In Batavia, successful Minangkabau Muslim shopkeepers attired themselves in style, traveled in cars, and lived in fancy houses, where they listened to the radio and enjoyed the food their cook prepared for them. They had a telephone installed in their stores, employed assistants, and promoted their business with impressive ads.[650]

That some pesantren served as a cultural laboratory where educated Muslims worked out a synthesis of tradition and modernity should not come as a surprise. These institutions had a long history of mixing the old and the new, the indigenous and the alien.[651] Some pesantren in Java started out as missionary communities that penetrated the island's interior to Islamize its inhabitants, preaching to them an overseas religion meant to renew their tradition, not by substituting the former for the latter, but by merging the best parts of both. For example, in 1899, in Cukir, Jombang, East Java, Hasyim Asyari established the pesantren Tebu Ireng in an area close to a Dutch-owned sugar factory (an incarnation of Western capitalism) that had spawned around it prostitution, gambling, and alcoholism. By doing so, Asyari and his followers sought to cure the social ills that Western economic modernity had inflicted on the village world it penetrated.[652] Tebu Ireng offered the people of Cukir an Islamic modernity they could deploy to cope with the moral hazards of economic globalization.

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[649] Ibid., 126-129.

[650] Tamar Jaya, *Dari Desa ke Kota* [From village to city] (Fort de Kock [Bukittinggi]: Penjiaran Ilmoe, 1940), 34.

[651] Zuhri, *Guruku*, 77.

[652] Ronald Lukens-Bull, *A Peaceful Jihad: Negotiating Identity and Modernity in Muslim Java* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 27.

Indonesian middling-class Muslims took a critical stance toward Western modernity, whose overseas incarnations they read about in the media and whose local ones they witnessed in their own milieus. They were as enthusiastic to adopt its beneficial elements as they were resolute to reject its detrimental manifestations. Thus, as much as they appropriated literacy, journalism, technology, the sciences, industrialization, entrepreneurship, nationalism, cooperative societies, social democracy, and what they considered the beneficial elements of middling-class lifestyles,[653] they censured the Great Depression, the Great War, colonialism, the excesses of capitalism and communism, and the "corrupt" forms of urban middling-class lifeways, going so far as to interpret this cluster of phenomena as the syndrome of Western modernity undergoing a major crisis. It was to the Great Depression that the Minangkabau writer Tamar Jaya[654] attributed, in 1940, the social ills he observed in West Sumatra and urban Java in the 1930s, such as bankruptcies, unemployment, poverty, prostitution, venereal diseases, overpopulation, the disintegration of the family, and the estrangement between the city and the countryside.[655] He also deplored what he saw as the egoism, the excessively free interaction between the sexes, the extreme multiculturalism, and the erosion of etiquette, morals, tradition, and religiosity among the Native residents of Java's big cities.[656] He saw Batavia in 1936 as a ship sunk by waves of pleasures and desires.[657] Thus, to the future male visitors to this city, he offered tips on how to resist the temptation of

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[653] Jaya, *Dari Desa ke Kota*, 48-49, and 72-73.

[654] The journalist and novelist Tamar Jaya was born in Sungai Jariang, Bukittinggi, West Sumatra on March 12, 1913.

[655] Jaya, *Dari Desa ke Kota,* 7, 38-40, 42, 43, 51, 65-66, 68, and 164.

[656] Ibid., 32-33, and 47.

[657] Ibid., 37.

prostitutes, e.g., never to walk alone at night and always to keep in mind the physical and mental havoc that syphilis could wreak in its victims.[658] In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, some of Tamar Jaya's fellow Muslim modernists, male and female, expressed concerns about the emergence of the Indonesian incarnations of the global Modern Girl, that is, Native young ladies who—wearing skimpy, body-hugging clothes or masculine hair- and dress styles—hung out too much and too intimately with young gentlemen (the indigenous versions of the Modern Boy) at mixed-sex swimming pools and dancing halls. In embracing this brand of global modernity, these girls, some observers opined, were deviating from their "womanly nature."[659] In the political sphere, Tamar Jaya noticed that the pergerakan was undergoing a slump owing to the Dutch crackdown on all Indonesian political organizations striving for independence. This policy appeared to some Indonesian Muslims intellectuals (e.g., to the socialist-Muslim novelist Achdiat K. Mihardja in 1948) as evidence of the failure of Dutch moderns to live up to the Enlightenment ideals they claimed they personified,[660] and as an illustration of Western colonial modernity trying to arrest the development of Indonesian modernity.

Yet, ambivalence is detectable in the way some middling-class Muslim intellectuals responded to the expressions of modernity they encountered in their surroundings, expressions already mestizo or hybrid to begin with, being neither purely "Western" nor purely "Eastern." One of these was the kind of city life that young

[658] Ibid., 39-40.

[659] See, for example, Moendjiah, "The Status of Woman," in Susan Blackburn, *First Indonesian Women's Congress of 1928* (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2008), 63-64; and Mohammad Natsir, "Sikap Islam," in *Capita Selecta*, 229, which first appeared in the April-June 1940 issue of *Pandji Islam*.

[660] Achdiat K. Mihardja, "Kata Pengantar dari Pengumpul" [Preface by the compiler], in *Polemik Kebudayaan*, 6.

middling-class Natives led in Medan, Batavia, Bandung, Semarang, or Surabaya. Note, for example, the mixture of fascination and revulsion with which Tamar Jaya (at age twenty-three) reacted to what he, in 1936, found in Bandung, which many considered the Mecca of fashion in the Dutch East Indies,[661] and which he, perhaps a bit enthralled by it, called "a factory of fun" and "a passion-arousing city."[662] Our gentleman from West Sumatra observed how at four in the afternoon the city—blessed with ideal size, cool air, well-planned streets, and eight cinemas[663]—turned into "a glowing paradise," where "romantic pairs" of young ladies and gentlemen, all dressed in the latest fashion of the day, took a stroll from Pasar Baru through the Groote Postweg to the city's main street: the Braga Road. None of these Modern Boys wore sarong; they sported woolen clothes. Their partners, the Modern Girls, revealed much of their skin, sighed "I love you," and cast enchanting glances. These young women of Bandung, Tamar Jaya surmised, lived a life that centered on winning men's attention and admiration.[664] He himself was not a fan of romantic love, which he dismissed as irrational and incapable of preventing divorce.[665]

The encounter with modern metropolises stirred, in some Muslim middling-class youths in the 1930s, a longing for its perceived opposite: the pristine, authentic countryside and its idealized people. Shocked by or weary of city life, they found momentary refuge in the rural world and the wilderness. Tamar Jaya, for one, saw in the

[661] Jaya, *Dari Desa ke Kota*, 62-63.
[662] Ibid., 63-64.
[663] Ibid., 61.
[664] Ibid., 62.
[665] Ibid., 74-78.

villagers he met in West Java the embodiment of kindness, generosity, sincerity, and cultural "authenticity."[666]

To sum up, during the first four decades of the twentieth century, a small multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and ideologically diverse sub-elite of Indonesian nationalist intelligentsias carried out the preparatory phase of creating, within the perimeters of the Dutch East Indies, a new nation state that was to be modern and Indonesian. This two-pronged project, nation-building and modernization, was faced with two major tasks. One was to triumph over their social Others, which consisted of the indigenous masses, the Dutch colonial overlords, the "feudal" Native aristocracy, and the middling-class ethnic Chinese. As time went on, most leaders of this sub-elite concurred that they must steer the masses toward their vision of progress, replace the feudal and colonial masters, and keep the Chinese entrepreneurs in check to speed up the growth of Native bourgeoisie. The second task, no less intimidating, was that of designing Indonesian modernity. The winning position in the long series of debates they conducted on this matter was that they should aim for a genuinely Indonesian modernity. There were two main reasons for this. First of all, they had to comply with the unspoken international rule that every nation must possess an "authentic" identity. A nation would suffer shame if its neighbors called it a Western copycat. What is more, a national identity—imagined as original, deep-rooted, and enduring—provided a nation with the ballast to maintain its composure and equilibrium in the face of the confusion, pains, and shocks that modernization, no matter how carefully planned, might bring about. Another strong reason why they deemed it foolish, even catastrophic, for Indonesians to simply replicate any variant of Western

[666] Ibid., 52-54, and 60.

modernity was that by the late 1930s the very societies advocating and personifying this modernity were themselves embroiled in and responsible for the great crises that expressed themselves in World War I, the Great Depression, social revolution, and diehard colonialism. Many Indonesian middling-class intellectuals viewed such events as proofs that Europe had made a mockery of its own Enlightenment ideals and that its versions of modernity just did not work. In spite of their intense and prolonged arguments over the nature of Indonesian modernity, these intellectuals had a considerable area of consensus: They agreed that freedom was an expression of and a necessary condition for Indonesian modernity, which was to result from a dynamic, creative synthesis of the best elements of indigenous traditions and foreign civilizations, embody the nation as a whole, and transcend its class divisions.

2. 1. 8. The Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945: Attempted Meijification of Indonesia

During the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945), it was the same middling-class nationalist intelligentsias from the 1930s (people such as Soekarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir) who led the quest for Indonesian modernity. Their agendas revolved on the creation of an independent nation-state whose politics was to rest on popular sovereignty, whose economy was to be decolonized and industrial, and whose territory and administrative structure were takeovers from the Dutch East Indies. As hybrid as it was, the culture of the new nation-state was to be distinctively and genuinely Indonesian.

If we see the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia through the prism of the quest for alternative, non-Western modernity, it will appear not merely as a story of Japan

exploiting Indonesia for the resources that it needed to win the Pacific War but also as a collaboration between Indonesian and Japanese middling-class nation-builders to overcome the dilemmas of modernity. On the one hand, both parties desired to be modern, progressive, and wealthy. On the other, they needed to look culturally "authentic" in their own and Europe's eyes. Besides, they were torn between two desires: On the one hand, they needed to mobilize the masses to overthrow the feudal and colonial elites. On the other, they feared social revolution. Their problem boiled down to this: how to achieve social justice and maintain the hegemony of the middling classes.[667] In this cross-cultural cooperation, Japan sought to use imperialism to solve domestic problems. Acting as the model and leader of Asia, Japan attempted to mobilize the Netherlands Indies' natural resources and manpower. Japanese imperial missionaries wielded Greater Asianism to win the hearts and minds of the Natives. For their part, the Indonesian participants in the Greater Asianist project wished to attain some practical objectives: national independence, the elimination of their major enemies (the ethnic Chinese and the Europeans), and modernity (which meant education, military training, industrialization, and economic growth). For nation-building purposes, the Indonesians were in need of a unifying ideology: a cultural blueprint for the kind of modern Indonesia where they could increase their power, status, and privileges.[668]

During the Japanese Occupation, the search for Indonesian modernity transpired under a colonial order that differed considerably from its Dutch predecessor. Assisted by collaborating Indonesian nationalists, the occupation government mobilized the

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[667] Mark, "Appealing to Asia: Nation, Culture, and the Problem of Imperial Modernity in Japanese-occupied Java" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2003), 4-5.

[668] Ibid., 4.

indigenous masses in support of their war effort. For mobilization purposes, it made "public use of [Indonesian] nationalist appeals" (thereby giving a boost to a nationalist movement that had been weakened by Dutch crackdown) and provided Indonesians with military and paramilitary training. It also further diluted the power and prestige of the Pangreh Pradja and local traditional elites.[669] As in other societies, the decline of the aristocracy and the concomitant ascendancy of the middling classes were among the key elements in the transition from feudalism and colonialism to modernity.

Since the 1920s, middling-class Indonesian nationalists had been divided in their political attitude toward Japan. During the Occupation, those like Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin who saw fascist Japan as a greater evil than the more or less social democratic Netherlands went underground and organized resistance. Others, such as Soekarno, Hatta, and Wahid Hasyim, took a pragmatic view of Japan: While acknowledging the threats it posed to Indonesia (e.g., militarism, expansionism, and over-regimentation of social life), they found in it things they deemed worthy of emulation like its work ethic, social stability, and Asian variety of accelerated modernization.[670] These pragmatists collaborated with the Japanese Occupation authorities. Perhaps, Wahid Hasyim of the Nahdlatul Ulama best summed up the rationale for the collaboration when he said,

> We help ourselves through the opportunities which [the Japanese] give us. Possibly they will make use of us as their tools. But we are not silent tools.

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[669] Aiko Kurasawa, "Social Change," in *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War*, ed. Peter Post, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 287-288; William H. Frederick, "The Aftermath," in Post at al., *Encyclopedia*, 57.
[670] William H. Frederick, "Indonesian Views," in *Encyclopedia*, 456.

> What is important is to use the opportunities…they give us, as much as possible.[671]

The encounter between Soekarno and General Imamura Hitoshi is an example of how the collaboration worked. This major Indonesian nationalist was willing to cooperate because he thought Japan would help Indonesian nationalists to learn modern, Asian-style nation-building, which included military and administrative trainings, character-formation, cultural mobilization, and the creation of social unity without solving social inequality.[672]

From the Indonesian perspective, the most powerful product of Soekarno-Imamura cooperation (and other similar ones between Indonesian and Japanese nation-builders) was the confirmation of the familiar pergerakan idea that nation-building depended considerably on character-building.[673] Soekarno became more convinced that Indonesians needed "Asian" cultural capital (national pride, national unity, spirit of sacrifice) to overcome the bankruptcy of Western modernity.[674] "Revolution in thinking" was necessary for "physical revolution."[675] During the occupation era, besides Soekarno there were other nationalists who adopted this cultural interpretation of national greatness. Asmara Hadi, for example, concluded that what made Japan great was its "national myth."[676] Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, for his part, believed that like the Japanese,

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[671] Yasuko Kobayashi, "Islam during the Japanese Occupation," in ibid., 309.
[672] Mark, "Appealing to Asia," 373, 392, and 374.
[673] Ibid., 394-419.
[674] Ibid., 396.
[675] Ibid., 397.
[676] Ibid., 395.

Indonesians needed a "national religion," by which he meant "authentically" Indonesian culture.[677]

Some of the collaborating Indonesian nationalists also looked forward to getting Japan's assistance in undertaking one of the key components of modernization: industrialization. Many still had fresh memories of how Japan managed, in the 1920s and even through the Great Depression years), to display its industrial prowess, flooding the Dutch East Indies with consumer goods cheaper than European imports,[678] thereby challenging Western economic hegemony in the colony.[679] In the early 1930s, the colony's mostly Western-owned manufacturing companies "could not [even] produce" everyday commodities such as "textiles, paper, bicycle tires, plates, or cups."[680] It is worth noting that in the view of some Indonesian nationalists the collapse of the Dutch colonial order in the Archipelago meant the removal of one huge obstacle to Indonesian industrialization. As Hatta, among others, observed at the time,

> Dutch capitalism, which impeded the rise of people's industries in Indonesia, has now lost its protector. Applying scorched-earth policy [against the invading Japanese], the Dutch tore down what they had taken great pains to build. This offers us the chance to assess Indonesia's industrial conditions [and potential for] bringing prosperity to the rakyat. Without neglecting agriculture, Indonesia must turn into an industrial country. And let there be a balance between agriculture and industry!"[681]

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[677] Ibid., 394.

[678] On the enormous influx of Japanese goods into the colony in the 1920s and 1930s, see, for example, Ken'ichi Goto, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), 118.

[679] Peter Post, "Introduction," in *Encyclopedia*, 5.

[680] Frances Gouda and Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *American Visions of the Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign Policy and Indonesian Nationalism, 1920-1949* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002), 88.

[681] Hatta, "Dapatkah Industri Rakyat," 146.

The Japanese seem to have discerned a strong desire among Indonesians for industrial modernity and that some of the latter wanted an Asian-style, accelerated industrialization and looked to Japan for ideas, model, assistance, and tutelage. That was one of the reasons why the Japanese propagandists portrayed their society as a better modernizer and a better teacher in modernization than its Western counterparts. This was evident, for example, in some of the articles they presented in the biweekly magazine *Jawa Baroe*. Consider, for instance, one that appeared on its February 15, 1944 issue (see Figure 2). The textual section of this ad says, "At a railway workshop in Java, many Indonesians work. Thanks to the guidance they received from the Japanese nation, they now know how to repair trains and make their spare parts."[682] The second article, which showed up in the same magazine on January 15, 1944 (see Figure 3), gives a clue to contemporaneous Indonesians views of the comparative opportunities for industrialization under the Dutch as opposed to under the Japanese, for it was to such views, I think, that the article was a calculated response. The caption says:

> In the Dutch era, pharmaceutical raw materials used to be shipped off to and processed in The Netherlands. The manufactured drugs would then be sold at high prices to Indonesians, causing them much trouble. Nowadays, the [Japanese Occupation] government [in Java] establishes laboratories, develops numerous efficacious medicines, produces them in great quantities, and distributes them throughout the island at amazingly low prices, thereby making people happy.[683]

[682] "Bengkel Kereta Api" [Railway workshop], *Djawa Baroe*, February 15, 1944, 22.
[683] "Obat[2] Jang Dibikin di Djawa" [Medicines produced in Java], *Djawa Baroe*, January 15, 1944, 14.

BENGKEL KERETA API

Dibengkel kereta api di Djawa banjak orang Indonesia bekerdja. Mereka kini telah sanggoep memperbaiki kereta api atau membikin alat² bagian berkat pimpinan bangsa Nippon.

Gambar kiri: *waktoe menoeangkan besi tjair kedalam tjetakan.*

Atas: *waktoe menjamboeng besi.*

Kanan: *roda-roda kereta api jang soedah selesai.*

キシヤ、シユウリコウジヨウ

ジヤワニアルキシヤノシユウリコウジヨウデハ、タクサンノインドネシアジンガハタライテヰマス。ニツポンジンノオカゲデキシヤノシユウリヤ、ブブンヒンノセイサクガデキルヤウニナリマシタ。シヤシンヒダリハ、イガタニテツヲナガシコムトコロ、ウヘハ、ヨウセツ。ミギハ、デキアガツタキシヤノシヤリン。

Figure 2. Japan’s promise to help Indonesians master modern technology. *Djawa Baroe*, February 15, 1944, 22.

OBAT² JANG DIBIKIN

di Djawa

Dizaman Hindia Belanda biasanja segala bahan-bahan oentoek membikin obat diangkoet kenegeri Belanda, laloe diolah disana. Kemoedian obat-obat itoe dengan harga jang mahal didjoeal kepada bangsa Indonesia, hingga hal itoe sangat menjoesahkan benar. Tetapi pemerintah sekarang mendirikan laboratorioem, menemoei banjak obat-obat jang moestadjab. laloe memboeat sebanjak-banjaknja jang dibagi-bagikan keseloeroeh Djawa dengan harga jang boekan main moerahnja, hingga sangat menjenangkan orang.

Gambar ini pemandangan dalam laboratorioem dan orang² jang bersenang hati menerima pembagian obat dari Koetjo.

Figure 3. Japan claimed to promote pharmaceutical industrialization in Indonesia. *Djawa Baroe*, January 15, 1944, 14.

Implied in this message was the knowledge on the part of the Japanese propagandists that one of the grievances Indonesians harbored against the Dutch was that the industrialization this Western colonial power was willing to undertake was too primitive and limited. The Dutch held on to the economic policy of operating their colony mainly as a supplier of cheap labor and natural resources while conducting the more capital- and technology-intensive sectors of their national industries mainly in the metropole. Such a division of labor not only hurt Indonesians as consumers; it slowed down their march to industrial progress. In contrast to the Dutch, the advertisement suggests, the Japanese were up to something very different: they were serious about teaching Indonesians to industrialize.

The collaboration between the middling-class nation-builders of Indonesia and Japan was made possible by a number of factors: the global crisis in modernity;[684] the sociological compatibility of agrarian, mostly uneducated, Dutch-colonized Indonesia and industrial, highly educated, mass-society Japan; and the commonalities of Japanese and Indonesian middling classes. The middling classes—Japanese and Indonesian alike—despised the Western-dominated global order and suffered identity crises due to rapid social change. They dreamed of overcoming Western imperialism and modernity. They believed they could make this dream come true by undertaking social renovation, establishing Japan-led East Asian empire, rediscovering Asian traditions, reaping the social, economic, and technological benefits of modernity, and exorcising the specters of liberalism and communism. Finally, the middling-class modernizers of both societies

[684] "The crisis of modernity" refers to individualism, national identity crisis, anomie, social injustice, social instability, fierce struggle for power and economic resources, and the primacy of money and machine in social life. Mark, "Appealing to Asia, 27 and 30.

shared common ideological sources: Okakura Tenshin's idea that "Asia is one" and Rabindranath Tagore's critique of "blind revolution" and his promotion of mass education.[685]

From the Indonesian perspective, collaboration with Japan proved costly. Hundreds of thousands of Indonesians were drafted as forced laborers (*romusha*), many of whom suffered malnutrition, overwork, torture, and death.[686] Against their will, many Indonesian women were recruited to provide Japanese soldiers with sexual services.[687] Rather than flood Indonesia with all kinds of cheap consumer goods from Japan, the occupation brought about acute shortages of basic necessities.[688] As the historian Shigeru Sato observes, during the occupation Indonesians experienced "a sharp decline in the general standard of living…."[689]

On balance, however, some favorable outcomes did result from collaboration. The Japanese took such modernizing steps as the unification of administration, legal code, and educational system; the uniform treatment of rural and urban societies; the professionalization of judicial personnel; and the promotion of meritocracy in the Pangreh Pradja. From the 1910s to the 1930s, Indonesian nationalists had pressed the Dutch to take such measures but to no avail.[690]

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[685] Ibid., 267-270 and 645-673.

[686] Shigeru Sato, "Introduction," in *Encyclopedia*, 197-201.

[687] William Bradley Horton, "Comfort Women," in *Encyclopedia*, 184-196.

[688] Mark, "Appealing to Asia," 533 and 542.

[689] Shigeru Sato, "Economic Life in Villages and Towns," in *Encyclopedia*, 267.

[690] William H. Frederick, "The Aftermath," in ibid., 57-58; "Indonesian Views," 459; and "Reflections on a Moving Stream: Indonesian Memories of the War and the Japanese," in *Representing the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Personal Testimonies and Public Images in Indonesia, Japan, and The Netherlands*, ed. Remco Raben (Zwolle: Waanders, 1999), 21.

It is also important to note that certain modernist ideas that Indonesian intellectuals had been developing since the Dutch era were reinforced by their experiences of cooperating with the Japanese and by their "participant observations" of Japanese ideas, practices, and institutions during the occupation. To some degree, the Japanese occupation affected the evolution of modern Indonesian thinking on statecraft. Consider, on this score, the case of the legal scholar Soepomo (1903-1958). While working on his doctorate in the Netherlands in the mid-1920s, he studied, among other subjects, Indonesian customary law and the legal theories of such continental thinkers as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), and Adam Heinrich Müller (1779-1829). Drawing on the insights he derived from his studies in Holland and encounter with Japanese political thinking during the occupation, he proposed—on May 31, 1945 as a member of the BPUPKI (Commission of Inquiry into Preparatory Measures for Indonesian Independence)—a vision of Indonesia as an "integral," organically unified state based on the family spirit: a state that would transcend multiple social cleavages, ethnic, religious, class, and majority vs. minority. Individuals and social groups must realize that they were parts of an "organic," "undivided" state, which "respected and recognized" them; they also must shore up "social unity and harmony."[691] Rejecting both the individualistic and class theories of state, Soepomo championed an Indonesian state that united the ruler and the rakyat, state and society, in a total, spiritual manner.[692] Enjoying support from members of the BPUPKI, part of Soepomo's idea of state was

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[691] See *Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI), 28 Mei 1945-22 Agustus 1945* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara, 1995), 37. It should be pointed out that he later changed his view somewhat.

[692] Ibid., 33 and 35; see also Frederick, "Aftermath," 59.

incorporated into the Constitution of 1945, which Indonesia adopted in the period of 1945-1949 and from 1959 onwards. While showing that his idea of state had several elements in common with those adopted by the fascist societies of Nazi Germany and Showa Japan, Soepomo believed that it also had roots in what he perceived as the "indigenous Indonesian society," that is, in what he took to be the nation's "mental structure," which exalted the union, balance, and synthesis between "lord and servant, inner and outer worlds, microcosm and macrocosm," "mind and matter." These ideals, he claimed, were still practiced by contemporaneous village societies, for example in Java and Sumatra.[693]

We will better understand some of the societal ideas that members of the Indonesian military middling class (e.g., Soeharto and his generation of military officers) promoted in the New Order (1965-1998) if we consider the kind of training these people received in such occupation institutions as the *Seinen Kunrenjo* (Youth Training Center), the *Seinen Dojo* (Youth Drilling Center), and the PETA (Defenders of the Fatherland). The education they got from the true believers in Great Asianism (Lt. Yanagawa Motoshige, Capt. Tsuchiya Kiso, and Togashi Takeomi) included not only physical and military exercises but also character-building "courses," which centered on, among other things, the cultivation of assiduousness, courage, honesty, and self-reliance; the promotion of anti-Western sentiments and the pride of being Asian; the privileging of a military over a diplomatic road to national independence; the idealization of village community; and anti-Communism and anti-Sinicism.[694] Ideologically, this military-

[693] *Risalah*, 35.
[694] Mark, "Appealing to Asia," 584, 587, 589-190, and 593.

educational encounter gave rise to national self-discovery, the restoration of national self-esteem, and dreams of national greatness—all packaged in military formats.[695] Politically, the graduates of these paramilitary trainings would play a defining role in Indonesian society, including the kind of modernization they undertook. As late as 1971, for instance, the graduates of the PETA constituted about 75 percent of the top-ranking officers in the Indonesian Army.[696]

Quite a few Indonesian nationalists came to see potentials for postwar modernization in some Japanese institutions, policies, and techniques they encountered during the occupation. Consider the *tonarigumi* (neighborhood association), which survives in Indonesia into the twenty-first century because all the post-independence regimes in the country found it useful for maintaining stability and implementing government projects.[697] Consider also the deeper penetration of the countryside by the central government of occupation for economic, political, and cultural purposes.[698] The New Order regime would carry out such a policy to undertake its modernization project. Indonesian nationalists would realize that the mass mobilization techniques they learned through their participation in the Triple A Movement, the Putera, and the Jawa Hokokai were quite useful,[699] not only during the Revolution to defend Indonesia's political independence but also in post-independence internal struggle for ideological, economic, and political supremacy (e.g., for mobilizing the urban and rural masses to win elections

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[695] Ibid., 595 and 620.
[696] Ibid., 578.
[697] Aiko Kurasawa, "Social Change," in *Encyclopedia*, 284-285.
[698] Ibid., 282-284.
[699] Ken'ichi Goto, "Indonesia during the Japanese Occupation," in *Encyclopedia*, 35, 41, and 44-45.

in the 1955, intimidate one another during Guided Democracy (1957-1965), or annihilate their political enemies in 1965-1966. Finally, during the Revolution, some Indonesian thinkers (e.g., Takdir Alisjahbana) came to appreciate the value of certain Japanese techniques of social organizing for post-revolutionary nation-building. Chief among such techniques were letting school children learn natural sciences through hands-on encounter with nature (e.g., by tending their school gardens and—in the process—discovering how Nature worked); using the scouting movement to teach girls and boys how to know Nature and to love their country by appreciating its beauty and bounty;[700] and fashioning a strong central government : one that "knows—and is willing to achieve—what it wants; and one that has the guts to assume responsibility for what it does"; and that stayed active and took the right action at the right moment.[701]

2. 2. The Quest for Modernity in Postcolonial Indonesia, 1945-1998

2. 2. 1. The Revolution, 1945-1949: Making Indonesians More Modern

From 1945 to 1949, finding themselves at the helm of a new state, Indonesian nation-builders faced a formidable task: constructing a unitary nation-state, which was a sign of and a means to progress. Some of the necessary resources for executing the task were at their disposal: military organizations (many of whose members had obtained weaponry and training from the Japanese); inclusive nationalism which leaders like Soekarno and Sudirman wielded to effect national unity; and vast popular support for the

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[700] Takdir Alisjahbana, "Membuat Pemandangan Hidup dan Dunia jang Baru" [Fashioning a new world and a new worldview], in Gadis Rasid, *Ditengah-tengah Perdjuangan Kebudajaan Indonesia* (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1949), 34.

[701] Takdir Alisjahbana, "Mendidik Generasi jang Lain Mentalitetnja" [Educating a generation that has a different mentality], in Rasid, *Ditengah-tengah*, 44.

Republic.[702] Other crucial resources, however, were lacking: a binding consensus on a coherent, executable plan for modernization; prior experiences in a sort of self-rule; and technology, capital, managerial expertise.[703] Meanwhile, great obstacles stood in the way of their nation-building project: blinding fascination with ideologies, internal contests for power, the Dutch attempt at recolonization, and the beginning of the Cold War. These were the cards the nation-builders received from history; how they played them helped to shape the kind of Indonesia they ended up creating after late 1949.

One of the unfortunate intellectual consequences of Dutch rule in Indonesia was that in responding to it, the nationalists among the tiny Western-educated Indonesian elite came to espouse—at various points in the first four decades of the twentieth century—one of many versions of the theory (at once attractive, convenient, and fashionable) that most of their (and, by extension, the people's) sufferings were attributable mainly to "feudalism," "capitalism," "colonialism," and "imperialism." Though such a view may have contained elements of truth, these intellectuals' increasingly rigid reliance on it undermined their capacity for creative, critical thinking; blinding them to the ambivalences and complexities of the historical phenomena they referred to by these terms, and to the uncomfortable possibility that, to some degree, such sufferings were the unintended products of the ways in which they and/or their ancestors had responded to the forces, domestic and international, that impinged on their lives.

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[702] Mohammad Hatta, "Tentara Kita" [Our military], in *Karya Lengkap Bung Hatta* [The complete works of Brother Hatta], vol. 2: *Kemerdekaan dan Demokrasi* [Independence and democracy] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2000), 27. This was a radio address Hatta delivered on February 15, 1946.

[703] See, among others, Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 292, where he, in 1964, recalls how "[t]otally inexperienced Indonesia had to start from scratch. We…desperately need[ed] technical and managerial know-how, but this [would take] generations to develop."

During the Revolution, while united by their commitment to independence, condemnation of capitalism and imperialism,[704] and vision of an industrialized Indonesia,[705] Indonesian middling-class intellectuals disagreed over the road to economic modernity that their country should take. The hardcore Left advocated a two-segment path: first socialist and then communist. For example, in 1945 and some time later, the PKI wanted the transformation to start with the dictatorship of the proletariat, the collectivization of agriculture, and the state takeover of foreign enterprises.[706] Likewise, the radicals who rallied around Tan Malaka (1897-1949) championed the communist way to industrialize Indonesia rapidly. Since the nation was still struggling for complete independence, he and his followers sought short-term goals such as food and clothing sufficiency, shelters for city-dwellers, smooth circulation of goods, and preparation for foreign relations.[707]

In contrast to these hardcore leftists, the Islamic social democrats of the Masyumi recommended a mixed economy (supposed to embody a religiously-based synthesis of individualism and collectivism) as well as the state's protection of political, economic,

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[704] J. A. C. Mackie suggested in 1971 that among Indonesian intellectuals in the 1940s to 1960s to be anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist was one of the signs of being "progressive." See his article: "The Indonesian Economy, 1950-1963," in *The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings*, ed. Bruce Glassburner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 44.

[705] See, for example, Soekarno, *To My People*, 2nd ed. (Jakarta: Haji Masagung,1989 [1948]), 12-13; see also Tan Malaka, *Politik* [Politics], in *Merdeka 100 %: Tiga Percakapan Ekonomi-Politik* [One hundred percent independence: Three political-economic conversations] (Serpong: Marjin Kiri, 2005 [1945]), 33-36, where he considers "100 percent independence" as a necessary basis for *rapid* industrialization; it was not until Indonesia possessed "heavy industries," able to produced welfare and welfare apparatuses, that it could safeguard its freedom.

[706] John O. Sutter, *Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955*, vol. II (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1959), 318-319, 339-340.

[707] Tan Malaka, *Rencana Ekonomi Berjuang* [Economic plan for struggle], in *Merdeka 100 %*, 117.

and entrepreneurial freedom.[708] One of their spokesmen, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (1911-1989), while rejecting class warfare and "collectivization from above," approved of the nationalization of foreign enterprises not as "an end-goal" but simply as an "incidental" way of boosting production and ensuring an "even distribution" of necessities.[709]

Soon after its birth in 1945, the infant Republic faced two major threats: the Allies and the Dutch, as well as divisive internal power struggle. Nationalists were split along multiple lines: diplomacy vs. military struggle, youngsters vs. older generations, left vs. right, secularism vs. Islam, and national revolution vs. "social revolution."[710] Social turmoil erupted in north-central Java, Aceh, and East Sumatra.[711] In 1948, a civil war exploded between pro-government forces and the PKI in Madiun, East Java.[712] In the same year, S. M. Kartosuwiryo (1905-1962) began an Islamist rebellion against the Republic.[713] The lack of prior experience in self-rule contributed to the elite's inability to handle its differences in peaceful, constructive manner.

Despite conflicts within the pro-Republican forces, independence and the Revolution enjoyed great popular support. For example, the writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006) observed that all of a sudden the declaration of independence caused

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[708] Safrudin [*sic*] Prawiranegara, *Politik dan Revolusi Kita* [Our politics and revolution] (Medan: Andalas, [1948]), 40-42.
[709] Ibid., 43.
[710] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 248.
[711] Sutter, *Indonesianisasi*, 255-257.
[712] Ibid., 265-266.
[713] Ibid., 264.

Jakarta, "a city dead from the Japanese occupation," to "come to life again."[714] People were willing to sacrifice their lives to save the young Republic, moved as they were by religious zeal, nationalism, and the promises of the Revolution. Among the promises were an independent and unitary nation-state plus a new life of prosperity and social justice based on popular sovereignty.[715] In Yogyakarta in 1987, a man recalled that, "emblazoned" by Soekarno and Sudirman with "nationalistic and patriotic fervor" and told by the latter that Indonesia was "a heritage," he was willing to die for it and to butcher its enemies (the Dutch and their Native spies.)[716] The price Indonesians paid for the promises of the Revolution was high: 45,000 to 100,000 fighters and 25,000 to 100,000 civilians died and 7,000,000 people were displaced.[717]

During the Revolution (1945-1949), while defending the Republic through diplomacy and military struggle, middling-class nationalist leaders were busy constructing modern Indonesia, fashioning and assembling its parts into a makeshift structure: a national ideology and a constitution, the machinery of government, a national economy, a national culture. In the political field, they created the Pancasila, the

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[714] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *Biographical Notes* (typewritten manuscript in Indonesian), quoted in A. Teeuw, *Modern Indonesian Literature*, vol. I, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 125.

[715] Mohammad Hatta, "Kemerdekaan dan Kedaulatan Jembatan ke Kemakmuran dan Keadilan" [Independence and sovereignty: A bridge to prosperity and justice], in *Karya Lengkap*, vol. 2, 325-326. Hatta delivered this address to a general meeting in Medan on November 21, 1950. The promises of independence were enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution of 1945: "an independent Indonesian State…is free, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous." See "Preamble to the 1945 Constitution," in Feith and Castle, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 50.

[716] Anonymous, "A Soldier in the Revolution," in Walter L. Williams, *Javanese Lives: Women and Men in Modern Indonesian Society* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 40-43.

[717] Vickers, *Modern Indonesia*, 100.

Constitution of 1945, the KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee), a cabinet and ministries, political parties, and armed forces.

One of the first economic steps that Indonesian administrators took was take over foreign companies[718] and run them as orderly, safely, and reliably as possible in order that the Republic looked credible in the world's eye.[719] In 1947, under Hatta's direction, the Committee to Devise an Economic Strategy drew up a plan for Indonesia's economic development, according to which the Republic was to adopt a mixed national economy that encompassed state-owned enterprises, the private sector, and cooperatives. The state was to be an activist one, which regulated production, consumption, distribution, capital, and labor as well as fostered economic growth and equity. To run its programs, it should accumulate capital through domestic savings and foreign loans; export primary products; and import textile, vehicles, and capital goods. To improve people's standard of living, it should expand the infrastructure; increase productivity in agriculture and fishery; carry out industrialization; develop the human resource by regulating wages, improving people's housing, and conducting transmigration.[720] Due to the Revolution, however, much of this plan remained on paper. Later, in the period of 1948-1950, the government, under the Kasimo Plan, worked toward self-sufficiency in food and clothing.[721]

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[718] Sutter, *Indonesianisasi*, 293-294, 305.

[719] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 233.

[720] "Dasar Pokok dari Rantjangan Ekonomi Indonesia" [Outlines of Indonesia' economic plan] *Mimbar Indonesia* 1, no. 2 (November 22, 1947): 7 and 40.

[721] Tim Wartawan Kompas, *I. J. Kasimo: Hidup dan Perjuangannya* [I. J. Kasimo: Life and struggle] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1980), 58-59; J. Panglaykim and K. D. Thomas, "Economic Planning and Experience in Indonesia," Occasional Papers No. 5 (Singapore: Institute of Business Studies, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University, 1971), 1.

Believing that a modern country needed its own national culture, middling-class nation-builders volunteered to put together, as the novelist Akhdiat K. Miharja put it in 1948, "a new culture that better fitted modern minds and modern society."[722] On August 20-24, 1948, they held a Congress on Indonesian National Culture in Magelang, Central Java where they—responding to "a cultural crisis"—looked for ways "to push [Indonesian] culture forward rapidly" and to help it shed its colonial features and "oppose every element of cultural imperialism."[723] In his welcome speech, the Minister of Education, Training, and Culture, Ali Sastroamijoyo (1903-1976), argued that the cultural crisis stemmed from the Revolution, the "loss of balance between material and spiritual cultures," and the clash between the older and the younger generations.[724] Wongsonegoro (1897-1978), the chair of the Congress, believed that to serve as an engine of struggle, Indonesian culture needed a renaissance.[725] The participants concurred that while representing the nation's identity, national culture could be fashioned by synthesizing "valuable elements of all times and places."[726] One of the institutional results of the Congress was the founding, in the early to mid-1950s, of several schools for the arts, such as the ASRI, the Asdrafi, and the ATNI.[727]

In one of their conclusions the participants in the 1948 Cultural Congress agreed to see culture broadly as encompassing "the entirety of human life in society," in its

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[722] Achdiat K. Mihardja, "Kata Pengantar," 7.

[723] Quoted in Nunus Supardi, *Kongres Kebudayaan,1918-2003* [Congresses on culture, 1918-2003] (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2007), 132.

[724] Ali Sastroamidjojo, "Pidato Menteri Pendidikan" [Address by Minister of Education], *Indonesia*, no. 1-2 (1950): 13.

[725] Supardi, *Kongres Kebudayaan*, 137.

[726] Ibid., 145.

[727] Ibid., 420. ASRI was Academy of Fine Art; Asdrafi was Indonesian Academy of Drama and Film; and ATNI was Indonesian National Academy of Theater.

"material and mental" manifestations. On a different occasion, in an interview with Gadis Rasid, which was conducted at some point between July and December 1947, Takdir Alisjahbana told her that economy was just one of the manifold manifestations of culture.[728] As part of the larger endeavor to build national culture, in May 1949 the Jakarta-based Pustaka Rakjat (People's Literature), a publishing house founded by Takdir Alisjahbana, launched *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup* [Science, Technology, and Life] (Figure 4), a magazine he and his colleagues dedicated to introducing "the underlying logic, the

Figure 4. The front cover of the first issue of *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup*.[729]

[728] Takdir Alisjahbana, "Mendidik Generasi jang Lain Mentalitetnja" [Educating a generation having a different mentality], in Gadis Rasid, *Ditengah-tengah Perdjuangan Kebudajaan Indonesia* [In the midst of Indonesia's cultural struggle] (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1949), 42.

[729] K. Atmojo, "Majalah Lama: *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup* Tahun 1950," http://koleksikemalaatmojo.blogspot.com/2009/09/majalah-lama-ilmu-teknik-dan-hidup.html (accessed October 28, 2012).

workings, and the products of modern science and technology"[730] to the people so they became "so accustomed to them that they desired to integrate them into their daily lives,"[731] using them to "exploit natural resources in pursuit of happiness."[732] The magazine was intended as a site for "intellectuals to share their ideas and experiences in their disciplines with the general public so that the latter may benefit from them."[733] The magazine's first issue presented articles on various topics, ranging from dams, chickens, and plastics; through house construction and contagious disease control; to Socrates and nature in poetry. Its front cover showed a black-and-white photograph of two scientific-looking Indonesians at work in a laboratory, each with a microscope before him. Serving on the board of editors were the physician Sutomo Cokronegoro, the engineers S. Udin and Roosseno, and Mohd. I. Thayeb and Takdir himself (both of whom held law degrees).

It is worth pointing out that Indonesian intellectuals at the time placed the search for modern Indonesian culture in a comparative, international context. The founding of *Ilmu, Teknik, and Hidup*, for one, seems to have been the operationalization of that insight which Takdir had during his recent visits to Western Europe and observations of its societies: the idea that the key to Western Europe's progress was the fact that science and technology—that is, their underlying worldview and their material embodiments—

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[730] Thus said the advertisement for *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup* in Rasid, *Ditengah-tengah*, 48.

[731] Takdir Alisjahbana, "Kata Pengantar" [Preface,] *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup* no. 1 (May 1949), 3-4.

[732] See the ad for *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup* in Rasid, *Ditengah-tengah*, 48.

[733] Alisjahbana, "Kata Pengantar," 3-4.

had struck roots among the masses so deep they became part of everyday life.[734] Takdir became convinced that an attempt should be made to advertise scientific thinking among the literate rakyat of Indonesia and encourage them to master science and technology and apply them in day-to-day life, thereby creating a modern Indonesian culture.

In Medan, north Sumatra, when the Revolution was nearing its end, the urban, magazine-reading middling-class Indonesians came to notice that a sort of modernity was also taking shape in their midst, that is, in the very interaction between man and woman. On June 15, 1949, the women's magazine *Dunia Wanita* [Women's World] carried a comic strip that gave a humorous and very brief "history" of how—from the "conservative" through the "half-modern" to the "modern" era—the way Romeo and Juliet conducted their courtship had changed so much it resulted in the reversal of the old gender roles (Figure 5). "In the conservative era," [*zaman kolot*]," so the cartoonist said, "[the marriageable] Juliet was secluded at home. But when their love caught fire, Romeo carried her off." Later, "in the age of half-modernity, [they] were allowed to see each other. Juliet played shy—that is, as shy as that cat which meowed behind your back." Finally, "[i]n modern times, [if] Romeo plays shy, Juliet will give up; [but if] he turns her down, she will go on the offensive."[735] As much as it might have exaggerated the actual

[734] Alisjahbana, "Kata Pengantar," 3.
[735] "Romeo dan Julia" [Romeo and Juliet], *Dunia Wanita*, June 15, 1949, 18.

Romeo dan Julia

Atas sekali: Zaman kolot...
Julia dipingit. Tapi karena tjinta sudah berkobar...
Romeo bawak lari.

Tengah: Zaman setengah madju..
Julia dan Romeo sudah bisa berdjumpa-djumpaan. Tapi Julia malu2 kutjing, belakang ngeong-ngeong.

Bawah: Zaman modern...
Romeo malu2, Julia menjerah.
Romeo tidak mau. Julia menjerang.

Figure 5. In courtship, transition to modernity could mean the reversal of gender roles.

state of affairs in Medan (it might, arguably, have been a translation from a Western original), the comic strip was symptomatic of the awareness among the city's middling-class residents that Indonesian women had become more assertive of their sense of individuality and agency.

By the time Indonesia's sovereignty was recognized by the Dutch in December 1949, the Revolution had yielded mixed results. Addressing a general meeting in Medan in 1950, Mohammad Hatta noted that the Revolution gave Indonesians sovereignty and political independence.[736] These triumphs, however, did not result in "prosperity" and "social justice"[737] because independence was not about the government providing as many people as possible with jobs in the Civil Service and the Armed Forces.[738] Independence was rather a means for allowing people to strive for wealth and justice. Doing this, he went on to say, was "an even harder task" than national liberation.[739] If Indonesians desired prosperity and social justice, then they should "develop" (*membangun*) their country, for example by inculcating nationalism into children and youths, putting together an effective representative democracy, improving agriculture, running an "orderly and disciplined" system of education (for the era of "wild schools" was long gone), creating professional armed forces, and protecting the rights of citizens and foreigners (to show the world that Indonesia was a responsible member of the international community).[740]

Whatever leaders like Hatta said, the expectations of many Indonesians ran high. They expected independence to deliver quick and easy economic results (e.g., freedom from poverty, debt, hunger, unemployment, and landlessness). As Soekarno recalled in 1964, soon after independence was declared in August 1945, nationalist leaders had trouble making the rakyat pay tram fares: "'Why?' they would cry with a hurt and

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[736] Hatta, "Kemerdekaan dan Kedaulatan," 325.
[737] Ibid., 326.
[738] Ibid., 328 and 332.
[739] Ibid.
[740] Ibid., 327, 329-332.

bewildered look. 'We're free, aren't we?'"[741] In 1949 and the early 1950s, with the Revolution delivering none of its economic promises, many Indonesians, including those with some education, were bitterly disillusioned. For instance, frustrated by a failure to win a job as a military officer (which he considered a fair reward for the martial contribution to the Revolution), the ex-freedom fighter Kusni Kasdut (1929-1980) protested against the government by starting a long career as a high-profile bandit, employing his cognitive and military skills against society.[742]

It is worth noting, albeit in passing, that even during the Revolution many an educated Indonesian took an interest in a military career. In 1947, Takdir Alisjahbana observed how teachers, doctors, aficionados of languages and archeology entered the armed forces in search of "better salaries and opportunities for promotion." He deplored this as a waste of creative potential: these people would have attained greater achievements if they pursued a career in their own fields.[743]

Using vivid imagery, Soekarno told his biographer Cindy Adams in 1964 that the Revolution ended in 1949 with a great disappointment:

> The deed to the house called Indonesia was now securely in our hands, but it was a badly damaged house. It leaked aplenty. Its windows, doors, roof, and walls were broken. Our economy, government, administration, transportation systems, communications media, methods of production were all damaged. Even morally and mentally we needed repairs. […] With industry completely undeveloped, with insufficient foodstuffs and

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[741] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 243.

[742] Parakitri [Simbolon], *Kusni Kasdut* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979); S. Saiful Rahim, *Perjalanan Hidup Kusni Kasdut: Dari Pejoang sampai Penjahat yang Dihukum Mati* [Kusni Kasdut's life journey: From a freedom fighter to a criminal sentenced to death] (Jakarta: Pustaka Antar Kota, 1980).

[743] Takdir Alisjahbana, "Melahirkan Pentjipta jang Bebas" [Producing free creators], in Rasid, *Ditengah-tengah*, 23.

> insufficient confidence, with a people…most of whom could not read and write—we still had to pick up and make order out of chaos. We nearly sank.[744]

2. 2. 2. In Search of Progress in the Liberal Era and under Guided Democracy, 1950-1965

In 1950, once sovereignty and a unitary state (minus West Papua) had been secured, Indonesian intellectuals debated the way they should inject "content" into political independence. (Indeed, some doubted that full political independence had been attained.) The artists who participated in the debate focused their attention on the cultural part of freedom's "substance." On December 10, 1950, Asrul Sani (1926-2004), one of the protagonists of the 1945 Generation of writers, was of the opinion that one of the central projects post-independence Indonesia should undertake was creating a national culture. He wrote:

> Whether or not we can fill independence with substance depends on our capacity to fashion a culture…. […L]et us face it: …if the way things are now is any indication, Indonesian culture does not exist yet. What now exist are provincial cultures.[745]

By saying this, Asrul rejected Ki Hajar Dewantara's earlier contention that a national culture could be put together by compiling the "masterpieces" of local cultures because doing so amounted to a return to tradition.[746] Asrul maintained that rather than "polish up" and exalt the artifacts of provincial cultures, modern Indonesian artists should

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[744] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 264.

[745] Asrul Sani, "Fragmen Keadaan IV" [Fragments on current circumstances, Part IV], *Siasat*, December 10, 1950; reprinted in Asrul Sani, *Surat-Surat Kepercayaan* [Testimonials], ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1997), 616-617.

[746] Ibid., 617.

assemble a new, truly national culture by synthesizing dynamic elements they could borrow from "all corners of the world." Defining their Indonesian identity less by their physical features than by the sentiments and ideas they expressed with honesty, Asrul and his like-minded colleagues believed they could be at once true Indonesians and "the true heirs of world culture."[747]

Asrul endorsed a bottom-up, pragmatic, and non-programmatic approach to cultural production. Culture, in his view, was "the soul … that animates all the routine comportments we witness in everyday life." Thus, to craft a national culture, Indonesian artists should draw not on trendy theories ensconced in libraries, but on the "great values" they could distil from quotidian, "small events."[748] He saw no use in Marxist analysis of culture and in clichés of anti-imperialist discourses. They were obstacles to fresh, sincere, and independent thinking.[749] Moreover, he disapproved of artists speaking on behalf of the rakyat because this practice implied the assumption that the latter had "no mouths of their own." Artists must not pretend, in his view, to be society's leaders, for they were, first and foremost, professionals in the arts, whose social duty it was to create in such a way that precisely by expressing their subjectivities with candor and courage, they would also reveal the "heartbeat" of their society.[750] It was not their business to wield arts as a cultural weapon to set the working class free from feudalism, capitalism, and

[747] Asrul Sani, "Surat Kepertjajaan *Gelanggang*" [*Gelanggang* Testimonial of Beliefs], *Siasat*, October 22, 1950; reprinted in Sani, *Surat-Surat Kepercayaan*, 3-4.

[748] "Fragmen Keadaan IV," 616.

[749] Asrul Sani, "Fragmen Keadaan V," [Fragments on current circumstances, Part V], *Siasat*, March 4, 1951; reprinted in Sani, *Surat-Surat Kepercayaan*, 621.

[750] Ibid., 622.

imperialism. Finally, Asrul rejected as spurious the dilemma in artistic production between individual freedom and social solidarity.

This standpoint, which came to be identified as "universal humanism," found its impassioned opponents among Indonesian artists who espoused a variety of socialist realism and organized themselves into the Lekra (the Institute of People's Culture). The "August Revolution," they believed, failed because it gave rise to what they saw as a "semi-colonial society" that lived under threats from the economic, political, and cultural embodiments of "feudalism" and "imperialism," and whose "ruling elite" wielded its "degenerate bourgeois" culture "to oppress" workers and poor peasants.[751] What this proletariat needed, the Lekra artists contended, was a People's Democratic Republic, where they could hope to "control" culture (defined as arts, sciences, and industries) and use it to build "a beautiful, joyful, and happy" life for all.[752] Since establishing such a society was a tall order, artists, workers, and peasants must join forces to fashion and use People's culture as "a weapon of struggle," that is, as a stimulant to encourage the masses, a device to teach the rakyat to become their own heroes, and a sledgehammer to "demolish feudalism and imperialism."[753] The social duty of the artist was to help create People's Democratic Republic by "defending and reinforcing the fortress of People's Culture."[754]

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[751] Lekra, "The Lekra Manifesto of 1950," 209.
[752] Ibid., 210.
[753] Ibid., 211. The Lekra artists were not unique in their condemnation of "feudalism." Their colleagues in rival ideological camps also critiqued what they saw as the adoption by some middling-class Indonesians of "feudal attitudes" that characterized the members of the dying aristocratic elites. See, for instance, Takdir Alisjahbana, "Kedudukan Kaum Terpeladjar Indonesia" [The position of Indonesian intellectuals], in Rasid, *Ditengah-tengah*, 37.
[754] Lekra, "The Lekra Manifesto of 1950," 210.

People's Culture, of course, would be national for two reasons. First, it was the product, property, articulation, and instrument of the rakyat, who accounted for "more than 90 percent" of the Indonesian population. Second, it was also a critical synthesis of what the champions of socialist realism saw as "progressive" cultural elements from local traditions and world cultures.[755] The Lekra's cultural program was intended as an even more modern (that is, "progressive") alternative to the "degenerate bourgeois culture" offered by the advocates of "universal humanism," such as Asrul Sani and his like-minded colleagues.[756]

As it turned out, the debate between the advocates of "social realism" and the champions of "universal humanism" were to intensify and—in the early 1960s—come to a head. This should not blind us, however, to the fact that their quarrels notwithstanding, they displayed points of consensus. First, they acknowledged that culture lay at the heart of what it meant to be Indonesian.[757] Second, both sides were convinced that the sorts of and the ways in which culture was created and used by Indonesians were going to play a decisive role in determining the shape of modernity that the Indonesian society would take. Third, being at once Indonesian and cosmopolitan, the self-styled "universal humanists" and "socialist realists" believed in creative synthesis as the most reasonable way to proceed in crafting modern Indonesian culture. Fourth, many, if not most, were children of the Enlightenment, who—like their counterparts overseas—deemed it

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[755] Ibid., 212.
[756] Ibid., 212.
[757] Jennifer Lindsay, "Heirs to World Culture 1950-1965: An Introduction," in *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian 1950-1965*, ed. Jennifer Lindsay and Maya H. T. Liem (Leiden: KITLV, 2012), 2.

possible, even desirable, to improve society; their bone of contention lay in how to do so in the cultural sphere.

Outside the circles of intellectual leaders in Jakarta, local thinkers too conducted their debate over how to add substance to independence in other spheres of life, for example in economy. On March 18, 1950, in the Surabaya-based left-leaning daily *Trompet Masjarakat* (Society's Bugle), the Ambonese intellectual M. Kolibonso asserted that "political independence" was not "our goal"; it was "a road to economic independence," which was "the substance of our independence." "[W]e must," he stated, "ensure that we all can taste this substance."[758]

On January 28, 1950, R. Slamet argued in the same newspaper that there was more to independence than being able to fly the national flag, which was a mere symbol for something far more substantive: the perception "that the gate to happiness and prosperity is now open to the Indonesian nation." "[F]reedom without prosperity for the rakyat," he went on to say, "has no meaning; it is a big zero." To his chagrin, however, he noticed that "[i]n general, the rakyat do not sense any atmosphere of independence." Civil servants, he pointed out, still "behaved in the same colonial way." He suggested that the government see to it that there would be no corruption anymore.[759]

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[758] M. Kolibonso, "Rasionalisasi dan *Efficiency*" [Rationalization and efficiency], *Trompet Masjarakat*, March 18, 1950.

[759] R. Slamet, "Kemerdekaan Indonesia Harus Berisi" [Indonesia's independence should have a content], *Trompet Masjarakat*, January 28, 1950; see also "Rakjat Ingin Demokrasi Ekonomi" [The rakyat wants economic democracy], *Trompet Masjarakat*, July 27, 1950, where "politicians in Jakarta" were reported to have said that Indonesia having attained political democracy, the rakyat needed "social and economic democracy." They cited the land reform that the communist government in Chine undertook as an example of "economic democracy.

On March 18, 1950, Wiyana H.D. reported that leaders of local political parties in Surabaya had recently met and concluded that political stability was among the prerequisites for Indonesia's reconstruction. People, he observed, desired a return to normalcy so they could taste "the joys of life," being "free from fears and threats." He was quick to add that political stability did not mean stifling "the spirit of dynamism." To secure stability, he reasoned, in its foreign relations Indonesia must stay clear from the "cold war" that was being waged by capitalist America and communist Russia. In conducting its domestic affairs, it should put together a "national program" that all political groups could agree upon.[760] Wijana's opinion was evidence that that well before the New Order an argument had been made in favor of a balance between stability and dynamism to enable the nation to realize the promises of independence.

In the early 1950s, economic progress was still out of the reach of average Indonesian, whose economy was in "stagnation." Indonesia had "an annual per capita income below $100" and "a population of [more than] 80 million people," growing at the rate of "one and a half million per year."[761] Its GDP was even lower than it was in the mid-1930s in the wake of the Great Depression.[762] People's daily food consumption was a bit below the minimum requirement (1,900 kcal).[763] Education attainment and life

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[760] Wijana H.D., "*Politieke Rust…*" [Political stability], *Trompet Masjarakat*, March 18, 1950.

[761] Benjamin Higgins and Jean Higgins, *Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1963), 7.

[762] Pierre van der Eng, "Indonesia's Economy and Standard of Living in the 20th Century," in *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History*, ed. Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 182.

[763] Ibid., 191.

expectancy, however, were slightly better than they were in the 1930s.[764] The Indonesian economy remained primarily agrarian, with "manufacturing account[ing] for only 8-10 percent of net domestic product" and agriculture making up "about 56 percent."[765]

To make things more difficult, until 1956 Indonesia suffered the legacy of the Round Table Conference in 1949, where in return for a transfer of sovereignty, the Indonesian negotiators agreed to two extortionary provisions. First, Indonesia would appropriate the debt of US$ 1,130 million that the Dutch East Indies government owed to the Netherlands and another US$ 70 million of its "external floating debt."[766] Second, the Indonesian government must protect the freedom of Dutch companies to operate in Indonesia. These firms could be nationalized only if both the Indonesian and the Dutch parties agreed.[767] As a result, in the early 1950s a quarter of the modern sectors of Indonesia's economy—for example, "estate agriculture, mining, manufacturing, interisland shipping, international trading and banking"—was still Dutch-owned;[768] more than half of its exports was operated by "eight Dutch trading-firms;" and its import trade was under the domination of the Dutch "Big Five": Borsumij, Geo. Wehry, Internatio, Jacobson van den Berg, and Lindeteves.[769] In 1953, "of the total profits" that foreign

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[764] Ibid., 192-193.

[765] Thee Kian Wie, "Introduction," in *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s-1990s*, ed. Thee Kian Wie (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian National University, 2003), 15-16.

[766] Thee Kian Wie, "Indonesianization: Economic Aspects of Decolonization in Indonesia in the 1950s," in *Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Regional and International Perspective*, ed. J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post (Leiden: KITLV, 2009), 21. See also Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 262.

[767] Thee, "Indonesianization," 22.

[768] J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post, "Introduction," in Lindblad and Post, *Indonesian Economic Decolonization*, 2.

[769] Ibid.

enterprises made in the country, “no less than 70 percent” was shipped to the Netherlands.[770]

It was in such a context that Indonesian nation-builders designed and tried to execute a series of economic plans to deliver the promises of the Revolution. The Economic Urgency Plan (1951-1956), prepared under the direction of the economist Soemitro Djojohadikusumo (1917-2001), indicated that they pursued a balanced economic development strategy; they aimed to accomplish food sufficiency, stimulate small and medium industries, and initiate large industries (the fertilizer plant in Palembang and the cement factory in Gresik). For economic and political reasons, these programs came to nothing. The lack of professional administrators in the bureaucracy and in the private sector was a serious obstacle. The foreign companies could have provided foreign managers for some time and trained Indonesian managers in addition to offering capital and equipment. But the inflexible economic nationalism that policy-makers pursued prevented this from happening to an optimum degree.[771]

In this period, which coincided with the political era of constitutional democracy, beyond a small circle of intellectuals with solid administrative and economic expertise, there were hordes of professional politicians with little clue about managing a national economy, who vied for post-revolutionary spoils so ferociously that “almost every six months a cabinet fell”—the sort of political volatility which undermined economic

[770] Thee, “Indonesianization,” 23.

[771] J. Panglaykim and K. D. Thomas, *Economic Planning and Experience in Indonesia*, Occasional Papers no. 5 (Singapore: Institute of Business Studies, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University, 1971), 12-14.

reconstruction and the quest for people's welfare.[772] In 1964, such politicians appeared in Soekarno's memories in unfavorable light:

> I asked party chairmen, "What are your plans for our future if you get into power?" Very few had a concrete picture. […P]ractically nobody offered constructive ideas…. Their exact blueprint was vague, undefined. […E]ach had a mental "dream house," but how to build it—that they did not know.[773]

Soekarno himself was among these senior nationalist leaders who were far from concrete, operational, and constructive in their responses to the challenges of developing a modern national economy.

The economic picture of this era (1950-1957) was not completely bleak, though. Some observers took note of certain achievements, no matter how small. On April 14, 1956, "Fatmah"—Indonesia's first sewing machine factory—was launched in Kramat Jati, Jakarta. Four days later, the PSI-linked daily *Siasat* reported that Fatmah's workforce was capable of assembling domestically made boxes and imported parts into no less than 6,000 sewing machines a month. The labor force comprised 143 workers, of whom twenty were women. At the head of the sales department was Mrs. Do Walandouw, then "Indonesia's one and only female sales manager."[774] A year before, an author remarked in the journal *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup* [Science, Technique, and Life] that the plan to establish Fatmah was part of "that new wind which we hope will blow away the dark clouds," by which he or she meant the post-colonial mentality that had

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[772] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 265-266.
[773] Ibid., 265.
[774] Laila, "Sesuatu jang Perlu Njonja Miliki" [Something you, madam, need to have], *Siasat*, April 18, 1956.

made Indonesians more interested in admiring and consuming manufactured goods than in creating them and mastering the scientific principles governing their designs and production.[775]

To shift our focus away from the commanding heights of the economy and toward everyday life in 1950-1957, what did economic modernity mean to some people in this sphere at the time? For some clues to this question, let us have a look at contemporaneous advertisements and works of literature. In a short story titled "Mrs. Veterinary Doctor Suharko," which first appeared in 1957, the socially perceptive author Pramoedya Ananta Toer describes how the eponymous character—a Europe-educated young modern woman—communicated her sense of modernity to herself and to the world:

> [She] rearranged the furniture along the lines suggested by the latest women's magazines. She…bought…a table clock of the latest design. […] With the money she had saved up bit by bit [she] bought decorations for the house which felt very alien to her husband: wire furnishings and maquettes made of clay, velvet, and rice-straw. […] In time, […there] came cabinets trimmed with steel-and-chrome tubing…a Grundig stereo … [and] a 150-cc. Express motorcycle.[776]

It is through her specific use of this motorcycle that Kiki delivers an outdoor statement of her modernity:

> [O]n this motorcycle [she] went roaming every day: to buy flowers or *saté*, to go shopping in Pasar Baru, or to go to the movies. On the 150-cc.

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[775] "Mesin Djahit Indonesia" [Indonesian sewing machines], *Ilmu, Teknik, dan Hidup* 17 (1955): 65-66.

[776] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Mrs. Veterinary Doctor Suharko," in *Tales from Djakarta: Caricatures of Circumstances and their Human Beings* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1999 [1957]), 134.

> Express she felt herself an advanced, modern woman, and: eye-catching to the men.[777]

It was at middling-class Indonesians (whom the eponymous Mrs. Suharko represented) that the Dutch electronics multinational Philips aimed its advertisement in the daily *Kengpo* on January 12, 1956 (Figure 6). This ad demonstrates that one way of being modern in the 1950s was to keep a clean, tidy, and comfortable kitchen equipped with easy-to-use, state-of-the-art appliances, such as a Philips kerosene stove. This domestic device, as the ad told its audience, enabled housewives to have a "modern kitchen," even in areas where "there [was] no gas and electricity available for cooking."

Figure 6. Philips kerosene stove advertisement in *Kengpo*, January 12, 1956.

[777] Ibid.

An examination of what urban middling-class Indonesians in the 1950s communicated to one another in their magazines may reveal that they perceived some kitchen types as expressive of modernity in the domestic sphere. In December 1955, in the monthly *Keluarga* [Family] that she co-edited, Kardinah Sumaji presented an article titled "This is the Kitchen of My Dreams," where she asserted that the modern kitchen (whose pictures some of her readers might have encountered in "the advertisements" in "foreign magazines") was "coming near to reality." The eponymous dream kitchen was furnished with, among other items, such technological wonders as all-electric refrigerator, dishwasher, and stove. She described the fun that housewives could have by cooking in such a kitchen (Figure 7):

> [You] push a button, and the fridge opens up, offering room for all kinds of stuff: a freezer chest and special compartments for vegetables, eggs, meat, bottled beverages, canned and fresh fruits, and so forth. [You] turn a switch, and the electric cooker is on. You can use it for frying, grilling, and heating. What is more, it comes with a special device for cooking a kind of fowl. [In such a kitchen,] it takes just a few minutes to prepare a stew. It's like magic! It brings to mind that childhood tale about a houseboy with a [magic] dining table, which he uses to conjure and deliver all kinds of fine food for his master's enjoyment. All this houseboy has to do is call out: "Table! Serve up tasty dishes!"[778]

Kardinah acknowledged that a truly modern kitchen would remain a dream for her and her generation. She assured her readers, however, that in the future it would be available in Indonesia. "Perhaps," she hoped, "our children and grandchildren [that is to

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[778] Kardinah Soemadji, "Dapur Matjam Inilah Angan²ku" [This is the kitchen of my dreams], *Keluarga* 3, 12 (December 1955): 30.

say, their daughters and granddaughters] will enjoy it—who knows?" "They will realize our ideal: to be a Queen in a modern Realm [kitchen]!"[779]

The forms that modernity took in the lives of middling-class Indonesians in the 1950s were sometimes so concrete they were—literally—edible, for if an article in the same issue of *Keluarga* is any indication, its readers also desired what they took to be modern meals. As its author, Mrs. S. K. A., remarked:

Figure 7. The caption says: "This is what my dream kitchen looks like." This was the image of domestic-sphere modernity Kardinah Sumaji used in her article in *Keluarga*, December 1955.

> […C]hanging times express themselves not only in clothing styles and furnished homes but also in changing menus. These changes are observable in big cities among people who can afford them. […F]or comparative insights, let us have a…look at how at reception dishes were served then and how they are presented now.[780]

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[779] Ibid.

[780] Ibu S. K. A., "Menu dan Perobahan Zaman" [Menus and changing times], *Keluarga* 3, 12 (December 1955): 31.

After presenting her brief analysis, Mrs. S. K. A. concluded: "As times change, so do menus and the way people serve dishes."[781]

It is important to note that in the mid-1950s some Indonesian intellectuals had begun to discern the importance of encouraging people's enjoyment of consumer goods, not only because—as we have seen—to do so enabled the latter to express their ideas of modernity but also because it was a necessary stimulus for industrialization. In 1954, Soedjatmoko, among others, realized that

> … economic development is in the final analysis related to a rise in the level of consumption and … to the growth of the desire of the population to possess and use the products of industrial life.[782]

If Indonesians were to attain economic modernity, he argued, they must undertake a cultural self-transformation in which they rejected the "feudal-agrarian" ideal of renouncing the world and embraced the modern-industrial vision that pursuing "the fullest possible material and spiritual satisfaction" was "a legitimate purpose in life."[783] Soedjatmoko opposed the anti-industrial stance that Gandhi took in his struggle against British imperialism.

The industrial idea of Indonesian modernity found its adherents not only among "pragmatist" intellectuals such as Soedjatmoko but also among solidarity-makers such as Soekarno. The president, too, conceived of Indonesian modernity as scientific, technological, and industrial. In a lecture concerning the Pancasila which he delivered in

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[781] Ibid.

[782] Soedjatmoko, *Economic Development as a Cultural Problem*, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1962 [1954]), 11-12.

[783] Ibid., 12.

the presidential palace on May 26, 1958, Soekarno disclosed this view through his critique of Gandhi's anti-industrialism, which he took to mean anti-modernity:

> […O]ne of the shortcomings of the Swadeshi movement led by Mahatma Gandhi was its rejection of modernity. Gandhi … bestowed upon his people a philosophy that was anti-machine. He called machines the devil's work. [… H]e rejected [them] because he discovered that in Western Europe they were used to oppress human beings. […] He was [therefore] against things modern; his social visions were conservative.[784]

In the mid-1950s, even the less cutting-edge varieties of modernity-expressing consumer durables (e.g., Philips kerosene stoves from Holland and Grundig hi-fis and Express motorcycles from West Germany), which some middling-class Indonesians enjoyed in their everyday lives, were beyond the reach of the masses, of whom many—as Pramoedya reported in his 1955 short story "Creatures behind Houses"—had to survive as housemaids suffering humiliation, exploitation, and abuse in the homes of urban lower middling-class Indonesians (the latter-day incarnations of the old priyayi class) who used idleness as a status symbol.[785] (Interestingly, in 1947 Takdir Alisjahbana bemoaned what he perceived as the poor work ethic and the absence of creativity among middling-class Indonesians who, he charged, held on to a "clerk's mentality" or a "worker's mentality."[786]) Pramoedya asked: "What is the significance of the Revolution for these maids, the Revolution that has claimed thousands of victims from their families?"[787]

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[784] Bung Karno, *Pantjasila: Dasar Filsafat Negara* [Pancasila: The philosophical foundation of the state] (Djakarta: Empu Tantular, 1960), 18-19.

[785] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Creatures behind Houses," in *Tales from Djakarta*, 104, 106-107.

[786] Alisjahbana, "Melahirkan Pentjipta jang Bebas," 23-24.

[787] Ibid., 106.

If the evidentiary materials we have examined do carry enough truth, then we can make the case that the ways in which middling-class Indonesians communicated their everyday, low-brow modernity seem to have changed little between the mid-1930s (when Takdir Alisjahbana launched his *Layar Terkembang*) and the era of constitutional democracy (1950-1957). The Revolution seems to have had the unintended effect of delaying the attainment of a level of economic growth that could have enabled Indonesians to pay for the paraphernalia of low-brow modernity.

Visions of Indonesian economic modernity circulated not only among policy-makers in cabinet meetings, housewives at home, people travelling around in motorcycles in the street, and shoppers in the market; they also passed around in schools as well. In the early 1950s, a primary-school Indonesian language reader by Sutan Sanif treated its audience of sixth graders to passages and images that portrayed the material aspects of modernity (see Figure 8). At one point, the book offers a fictional classroom dialog between a teacher and his students where the former says:

> Please note that times keep changing. Things are getting more modern every day. Gone is the time when [people proceeded by] crawling and leisurely strolling. If you want progress, you must think progressively.[788]

As the teacher explains, people who think progressively run their society at high speed: churning out new inventions every day and transporting raw materials and finished products swiftly and in bulk at sea, on highways, and on railroads—weaving together far-flung sites of production, consumption, and distribution into wealth-generating webs.

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[788] Soetan Sanif, *Pantjaran Bahagia* [Rays of happiness], vol. 2, 4th ed. (Djakarta and Amsterdam: W. Versluys, 1953), 11. The first edition of this reader appeared, perhaps, in 1949.

One of Indonesia's major obstacles to [economic] progress, the dialog reveals, is its current lack of speed-enhancing infrastructure:

> [I]n reply, a student [says]: "There still are a lot of poor and narrow roads in our country."
>
> "That," the teacher says, "stands in the way of our country's progress. Keep this in mind: Great highways [will] bring about progress in our country."[789]



11

„Tentu tidak", udjar murid2 serempak.

„Pikirkupun demikianlah pendapatmu semua", kata guru sambil tersenjum. „Djadi rupanja belum tjakap kamu menjesuaikan dirimu dengan keadaan sekarang. Hal itu salah se-mata2. Tjoba dengarkan!

Perlu kamu ketahui, bahwa zaman selalu ber-ubah2. Makin lama keadaan makin moderen. Zaman me-rangkak2, zaman berlenggang pandjang tak laku lagi waktu kini. Oleh sebab itulah bila kamu ingin madju, hendaklah kamu mempunjai tjara berpikir jang madju pula.

Memang telah begitulah adat manusia jang berpikiran kolot. Tak dapat mereka menjesuaikan pikirannja dengan keadaan baru. Mereka rupanja menjangka, bahwa dunia ini akan tetap sebagai jang lama. Rupa2nja tak insjaf mereka itu, bahwa dunia ini selalu berputar. Tiap2 hari diperoleh orang pendapatan baru.

Tjobalah lihat! Dinegeri kita ini masih banjak orang jang memikul beban ber-puluh2 kilometer djauhnja.

Tahukah kamu apa sebabnja? Ingatlah akan keadaan djalan dinegeri kita ini".

Mendengar utjapan guru itu, seorang murid mendjawab: „Dinegeri kita ini masih banjak djalan jang buruk dan sempit".

„Hal itulah jang mengalang2i kemadjuan negeri", udjar guru. „Ketahuilah, bahwa djalan raja jang bagus membawa kemadjuan dalam negeri.

Tjobalah perhatikan! Pada beberapa tempat di Indonesia ini tak tepermanai banjaknja barang2 jang masih terpendam.

12

Di Sumatera, Kalimantan, Irian dan pada beberapa pulau jang lain, masih terdapat hutan kaju jang ber-ibu2 ha luasnja.

Kaju itu masih terpendam, sebagai kukatakan tadi. Adakah harga kaju jang sebanjak itu?"

„Tidak ada", djawab murid2.

„Benar. Harganja tak ada sama sekali. Ketahuilah, bahwa sesuatu barang, baharulah mempunjai nilai, bila barang itu dapat dipergunakan orang. Kaju jang sebanjak itu, dapatkah dipergunakan orang?"

„Tidak dapat", udjar murid2 itu pula.

„Hal itu sama dengan barang tambang. Minjak tanah, arang batu, emas, timah dll. jang masih terpendam didalam tanah, adakah nilainja pada pikirmu? Tentu tidak, bukan? Barang itu baharulah mempunjai harga, bila telah dikeluarkan dari dalam tanah. Kemudian dibawa kepada orang jang membutuhkannja.

Sekarang aku bertanja kepadamu, apakah jang sangat perlu untuk melakukan barang2?"

Figure 8. A portrayal of modernity in a 1953 reader for six-graders in Sekolah Rakyat (primary school). Notice the contrastive images of old-fashioned and modern ways of transporting goods.

As we shall see below, campaigns for modernization—in classrooms by teachers using textbooks such as this one by Sutan Sanif and in speeches by leaders like Soekarno—helped fire up, among Indonesians born in the early 1940s, so urgent and

[789] Ibid.

great a desire for material and intellectual progress that Indonesia's poor economic performance in the early 1960s failed to satisfy.

In response to the intense longing among Indonesians for economic modernity, the government of Indonesia, between 1956 and 1965, drew up two plans for economic development. In the First Five-Year Plan (1956-1961), it committed itself to a balanced-growth strategy, treating agriculture and industry as complementary. It aimed for sufficiency in foodstuffs and the development of electric, manufacturing, and transportation industries. Many of these goals remained unrealized, which gave rise to an acute feeling among many that even now the struggle for independence still yielded no tangible results. For example, in June 1958, the Surabaya-based journalist Suripto Putera Jaya remarked:

> Until now the rakyat of Indonesia have not enjoyed the boons of independence, during the struggle for which they shed tears and blood, and made other sacrifices. […] It is high time they lived in a just and prosperous society."[790]

It was to the lack of expertise, capital, and political stability that some scholars have attributed the government's failure to reach the objectives of its economic development plan. The years 1957-1958 saw economic and political turmoil, such as accelerated inflation, the takeovers of Dutch plantations and enterprises, the expulsion of Dutch nationals (including top managers), and rebellions in Sumatra and North Sulawesi (areas

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[790] Soeripto Putera Djaja, "Dibentuk Dewan Perantjang Nasional" [A National Planning Council has been established] *Skets Masa* 2, no. 11(June 1959): 11.

blessed with rich natural resources). These crises led to setbacks in Indonesia's agriculture, industry, and trade.[791]

Contemporaneous Indonesian non-economists gave different explanations for Indonesia's failure in the 1950s to effect economic progress. Some reasoned that the failure to build a wealthy and equitable society stemmed from the absence of "industrialization," which they saw as resulting from corrupt leadership, national disunity, the erosion of the spirit of mutual help, and the domination of "foreign traders" of European, "Chinese," and "Indian" origins.[792] Thinking along these lines, government high official Kartawiguna took economic nationalism to mean the indigenization of the national economy, calling for a ban on "foreigners" (which included Indonesians of Chinese origin) conducting wholesale and retail trades in basic necessities. He saw this measure as one of the ways to give economic substance to the return to the Constitution of 1945, which he welcomed.[793]

In 1957, the Secretary General of the PKI, D. N. Aidit (1923-1965), contended that the poor living conditions of the Indonesian people resulted from the persistence in Indonesia of the vestiges of colonialism and feudalism. He considered the country "semicolonial" because "big foreign capitalists" still dominated its economy and shaped

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[791] Panglaykim and Thomas, *Economic Planning*, 12; J. A. C. Mackie, "The Indonesian Economy," 50.

[792] See, for instance, Kartawiguna, "Pedagang[2] Asing jang Harus Ditegasi" [Foreign traders are to be cracked down on], *Skets Masa* 2, no. 11 (June 1959): 17-18.

[793] Ibid., 19. The year 1959, the year this article by Kartawiguna came out in Surabaya, saw the outburst of anti-Sinicism as a political issue. Lance Castles and Herbert Feith have noted that from 1959 to 1960 the ethnic Chinese [in Indonesia] were "banned from retail trading in rural areas and over 120,000 persons left [the country] for China"; see Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 341.

its politics, thereby obstructing the development of its productive forces.[794] He saw it as "semifeudal" because the survival of landlordism impoverished the peasantry. Imperialism and feudalism, Aidit argued, were an obstacle to Indonesia's economic modernization; they resulted in the backwardness of its agriculture and in its "inability" to undertake "industrialization."[795] Thus, to bring economic progress to the Indonesian people, the PKI organized workers, landless peasants, and the "petty bourgeoisie" to topple down landlordism and to free the country from imperialism. It did the former by pushing for land reform; it carried out the latter by championing the nationalization of Dutch-owned enterprises, the liberation of West Papua, and the confrontation against Malaysia.[796]

In 1954, underscoring the agency that Indonesians could still exercise in the face of the unfavorable global economic order, the pragmatist Soedjatmoko (1922-1989) took the view that the economic stagnation that bedeviled Indonesia stemmed mainly from a crisis of leadership.[797] Political and cultural leaders, he believed, were blind to the social

[794] D. N. Aidit, "Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution," in *Problems of the Indonesian Revolution* (Bandung: Demos, 1963), 5-61; quoted in D. N. Aidit, "A Semifeudal and Semicolonial Society (1957)," in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking* , 249.

[795] Ibid., 250; D. N. Aidit, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964), 12.

[796] Believing that that the Indonesian economy was still in the stage he called "national democratic" (that is, not yet socialist), D. N. Aidit, in 1964, kept arguing that these steps should be taken so the country could make advances toward *socialist* economic modernity. He added three more measures, though: attaining food sufficiency, promoting Marxian economics, and denouncing counter-revolutionary social theories, which included liberal economics. D. N. Aidit, *Pemetjahan Masalah Ekonomi dan Ilmu Ekonomi Indonesia Dewasa Ini: Prasaran dimuka Musjawarah Besar Sardjana Ekonomi Indonesia tgl. 8 Djuli 1964 di Djakarta* [Solutions to the contemporary problems in economics and in the Indonesian economy: Paper presented at the National Conference of Indonesian Economists in Jakarta, July 8, 1964] (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), 5-6, 10, 19, 23, 25, 27, 35-37.

[797] Soedjatmoko, "Mengapa Konfrontasi?" [Why confrontation?], in *Etika Pembebasan: Pilihan Karangan tentang Agama, Kebudayaan, Sejarah, dan Ilmu Pengetahuan* [The ethic of

changes that had occurred in the country since the revolution. In particular, they failed to understand two crucial points: a) that the post-independence world "where Indonesians had taken their rightful place" was in fact different from the pre-independence world that they perceived—because they had to—from "a limited nationalist vantage point," and b) that "it [was] different in the demands that it [made] of [them]."[798] The elite, he thought, must set new national goals and pursue them in fresh ways that could restore "confidence," "capacity," and "ideals," all while keeping in mind "the limits of our means, skills, and capacities."[799] To do this required "creative adjusting" among Indonesian politicians and intellectuals. (The masses, Soedjatmoko claimed, had been making their contribution to the quest for economic progress, for example by showing their "vitality" and actively demanding change.[800]) It was the dearth of creativity within the elite, he argued, that lay at the heart of the national crisis in the 1950s.[801]

In a 1961 paper, Soedjatmoko explained what he meant by Indonesian intellectuals thinking and acting creatively as leaders in the national quest for economic progress. Rather than narrowing down their cognitive horizon by merely debating the relative merit of socialist and capitalist economies,[802] they must, he contended, start by

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liberation: Selected essays on religion, culture, history, and science] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984), 11. It is a reprint of the original that appeared in 1954 in the first issue of the journal *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation).

[798] Ibid.

[799] Ibid., 11-12.

[800] Ibid., 11.

[801] Ibid.

[802] Soedjatmoko's diagnosis that that there was a tendency toward this direction was attested by the fact that in the second half of the 1950s, in response to the intensifying Cold War, intellectuals in Surabaya, among others, spent pages in local newspapers and magazines debating the relative superiority of communism and capitalism. See, for example, Mr. X, "Rentjana 7 th. Sovjet Uni" [The Seven-Year Plan of the Soviet Union], *Skets Masa* 2, no. 10 (May 1959): 7-10; Indra Sakti, "Kaum Elite di Sovjet Uni: Kelas Tertinggi di Negara jang Tidak Berkelas" [The

examining the complexity of Indonesia's reality and proceed by unearthing facts, discerning their inner logic, fashion new analytic tools for understanding their country's problems (for which interpretive templates borrowed from other societies—whether they were socialist or capitalist—might be inadequate), and even construct their own theories about the Indonesian economy.[803] As it turned out, in defiance of what he saw as ideology-based reasoning as practiced by people like D. N. Aidit, Soedjatmoko called for studying and overcoming Indonesia's economic challenges in ways that were inductive, history-grounded, and rigorously "scientific."[804] (In fairness to the Indonesian communists, it must be pointed out that they were convinced that Marxism offered a "scientific" theory of history and a "scientific" blueprint for modernization.) To provide Indonesian scholars with an institutional framework in which they could operate in these manners, he suggested that the government establish a number of think tanks for investigating "the process of economic development" along the lines of the RAND Corporation in the United States or the Council of Economic and Industrial Research in India.[805]

As important as economic development was to many Indonesians, few, if any, considered it as all there was to achieve in their pursuit of modernity. In fact, echoing

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elite in Soviet Union: The uppermost class in a classless country], *Skets Masa* 2, no. 10 (May 1959): 30-32 and 34; Kartawiguna, "Mungkinkah Indonesia Mendjadi Komunis?" [Will Indonesia become communist?], *Skets Masa*, Eid al-Fitr edition (April 1959): 4-5; S. Diro, "Indonesia Bukan Negara Kapitalis Liberal atau Komunis Totaliter" [Indonesia is neither a liberal capitalist nor a totalitarian communist country], *Skets Masa* 2, no. 13 (1959): 8-10.

[803] Soedjatmoko, "Dayacipta sebagai Unsur Mutlak dalam Pembangunan: Konsepsi dan Institutionalisasi" [Creativity as a necessary element of [economic] development: Conception and institutionalization], in *Dimensi Manusia dalam Pembangunan: Pilihan Karangan* [The human dimensions to development: Collected essays] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983), 46.

[804] Ibid., 46.

[805] Ibid., 51.

pre-independence Native intellectuals (e.g., Kartini, Semaoen, and Takdir) and anticipating New Order social critics (such as Motinggo Busye and Teguh Esha), some insisted that people could not live by rice alone. They conveyed their concerns about the dangers in adopting those blueprints for modernization which, in their view, placed too heavy an emphasis on the economic dimension of human life, to the exclusion of its spiritual one. Such blueprints included not only communism but also the more "capitalist" adoption of conspicuous consumption for achieving and articulating modernity. As a case study, I offer what some Catholic writers had to say concerning the subject in the 1950s.

In October 1951, the editors of the Catholic-affiliated cultural monthly *Basis* observed that the world was seeing another round of the contest between "spirit" and "matter," which manifested itself in culture, family life, and international relations.[806] At the heart of the battle, they contended, were two central questions: "Where does ultimate happiness lie?" and "Which political system…can best guarantee the attainment of this goal?"[807] They were opposed to what they considered the materialist road to happiness that the USSR stood for and promulgated. Taking this road, they reasoned, amounted to accepting the idea that happiness consisted in "having enough food to eat" and "decent clothes to wear" as well as "working according to one's skill" and "earning according to one's needs." They considered this notion as just another version of the "water buffalo's sleep-well-eat-well concept of happiness."[808] This view, they warned, was a spiritual

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[806] Redaksi, "Psyche Nikai" [The soul vanquishes], *Basis* 1, no. 1 (October 1951): 1.
[807] Ibid.
[808] Ibid.

menace because its operationalization would mean renouncing God.[809] In another article in the same issue, K. Hardana attempted to show his readers that communist China was clamping down on freedom of religion because, in line with the *Communist Manifesto*, communists must pursue such a policy.[810] Along the same lines, in April 1952, *Basis* presented an Indonesian translation of an article by the American Catholic priest Rev. Thomas Stephen Langley that discussed the various forms of repression (e.g., house arrests and public humiliation) that believers suffered in Red China.[811]

In the mid-1950s, some Catholic intellectuals in Indonesia also perceived communism in terms of the threat it posed to the sort of middling-class family they defended. In early 1956, the editors of *Basis*—that is, the Jesuit priests J. Bakker, A. Jayaseputra, J. Dijkstra, R. Sukarto, G. Vriens and P. Zoetmulder—presented an Indonesian translation of Gerhard Möbus' article "Die Familie in der Sowjetpädagogik" (The Family in Soviet Pedagogy) [812] to drive home the point that in its pursuit of communist modernity, the Russian government had treated "thousands of young people as 'guinea pigs' just to test Marx's theory, which it ended up discarding" anyway, in favor of an "antiquated" view that "family was the first and most important site for

[809] Ibid.

[810] K. Hardana, "Tiongkok Menindas Agama" [China suppresses religions], *Basis* 1, no. 1 (October 1951): 3.

[811] Thomas Stephen Langley, "Di Bawah Pandji-Pandji Merah" [Under the red banner], *Basis* 1, no. 7 (April 1952): 235. On charges of being an American spy, Father Langley was expelled from China on December 13, 1951; see also "U.S. Priest's Ordeal in Red Streets," *The West Australian*, December 14, 1951, 1.

[812] Gerhard Möbus, "Keluarga dalam Pendidikan Sovjet, I" [The family in Soviet pedagogy, I], *Basis* 5, no. 5 (February 1956): 145-149; Gerhard Möbus, "Keluarga dalam Pendidikan Sovjet, II" [The family in Soviet pedagogy, II], *Basis* 5, no. 6 (March 1956): 181-187.

education."[813] The editors put forward this Soviet experiment with the family as evidence of the cruelty of Marxist sciences playing around with people's lives to test new theories in disregard of age-old wisdom and experiences."[814] Möbus' own article starts by saying, "When in 1917 the Bolsheviks succeeded in seizing power in Russia, one of the goals in the communist government's political program was the abolition of family."[815] This might have sounded terrifying to *Basis*' middling-class readers,[816] for whom—it is safe to say—the family served as one of the key spheres in which they articulated their versions of modernity and sought wellbeing and meaning in life.

These Catholic intellectuals in Indonesia were not alone in seeing communism as a threat to the survival of the family as an institution. In a 1957, the Masyumi leader M. Natsir maintained that "religion and communism, even if you boil them [in one pot], are not going to coalesce" because they were at odds with each other on several counts. First, communism's historical materialism contradicted Islam's doctrine that everything was created by God. Second, being hostile to religions, communism "denied the existence of God." Finally, not only did "[c]ommunism abolish family ties" but it also, he claimed, "turned women into a collective property" whereas Islam upheld the sanctity of marriage and family bonds and prohibited adultery.[817]

In 1952, as an ideological weapon to tackle the spread of "totalitarian society," the Jesuit priest Jan Bakker (also known as Rahmat Subagya) offered his interpretation of

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[813] See the editor's postscript to Möbus, "Keluarga dalam Pendidikan Sovjet, II," 186.
[814] Ibid., 187.
[815] Möbus, "Keluarga dalam Pendidikan Sovjet, I," 145.
[816] In 1955, *Basis* sold more than 3,000 copies per issue. "*Basis*, Still Strong, Fifty Years On," *The Jakarta Post*, November 30, 2011.
[817] M. Natsir, "Politik Menyodorkan Tangan dari Kaum Anti-Tuhan" [The friendly gesture of the anti-God groups]," in *Capita Selecta*, vol. 3 (Jakarta: Abadi, 2008 [1957]), 50, 55.

the Pancasila. He identified two kinds of totalitarian society: the indigenous one, still prevalent in Indonesia, and the Western one, which the Soviet Union was championing.[818] In his opinion, indigenous society was totalitarian in the sense that it privileged collectivism over individualism. The problem with indigenous totalitarianism, he reasoned, was that although in practice it acknowledged individualism, in reality it placed too great an emphasis on collectivism. Likewise, communism rejected individualism in theory and suppressed it in practice. It glorified collectivism and imposed it on society. Unlike indigenous and Western totalitarianisms, the Pancasila, he asserted, called for the balance between self and society, and the harmonious interplay between the material and the spiritual worlds.[819] He claimed that totalitarian ways of life—whether homegrown or Western—stood in the way of progress.[820] The Pancasila offered itself as a weapon for people to fight off "imported collectivism on the Left," "crush [homegrown] conservative collectivism on the Right,"[821] and disseminate humanitarianism as a key factor for the development of the Indonesian society.[822]

In its Eight-Year Overall Development Plan (1961-1969), the government aimed for balanced economic development. Its budget allocation showed this intention: industry (30 percent), food (15 percent), clothing (18 percent), and distribution (36 percent). As before, it failed to meet many of its goals. Since the budget deficit continued, Indonesia made too little progress in industrialization; the country's productive capacities suffered

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[818] Rahmat Subagya [Jan Bakker], "Pantjasila, Manusia, dan Masjarakat" [Pancasila, man, and society], *Basis* (August 1952): 361-362.
[819] Ibid., 362, 364.
[820] Ibid., 362.
[821] Ibid., 366.
[822] Ibid.

steep decline due to lack of maintenance. The government's policy of printing more money to deal with the budget deficit resulted in hyperinflation: from 19 percent in 1960 to 636 percent in 1966, which caused food shortages and undermined the government's capacity to take action, for example, failing to improve transportation infrastructure.[823]

The government's failure arose from several factors, which included the debt to the Netherlands, insufficient funds, the dearth of managerial expertise, and the departures of foreign enterprises (which could have provided expertise, managerial training, and capital), the pursuit of destabilizing and costly foreign policy (e.g., the military campaigns to liberate West New Guinea and "crush" Malaysia), and sacrificing economic policy to political strategy.[824]

To a significant degree, Indonesia's economic breakdown arose from the failure of leadership, that is, from the reckless attitude Soekarno and other leaders in his entourage adopted toward the handling of his country's economic affairs. Consider, for example, the statement he made on April 18, 1965 in his opening speech to a meeting in Bandung that commemorated the Bandung Asia-Africa Conference of 1955 and that was attended mostly by many delegates from communist Asian countries: "The imperialists accuse our countries of being 'unstable' and of having 'hopeless economies.' But I think

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[823] See, among others, Panglaykim and Thomas, *Economic Planning*, 13-15; Thee Kian Wie, "Introduction," 17-19; Hal Hill notes that in the mid-1960s that the country's "manufacturing sector" remained "small," contributing a mere "8 percent of GDP" and employing only "6 percent of the workforce"; see Hal Hill, *Indonesia's Industrial Transformation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 2.

[824] Panglaykim and Thomas, *Economic Planning*, 13-15; Thee Kian Wie, "Introduction," 17-19; and Thee, "Indonesianization," 21.

… national instability is a thousand times better than colonial stability."[825] Convinced that Indonesians were living in a world dominated by neo-colonizers and imperialists, Soekarno maintained in 1963 that his country's economic problems could not possibly be overcome "in the routine fashion" (that is, in the manner advocated by economists), for this was effective, he claimed, only in developed countries. Indonesia's economic problems, he went on, must be solved politically by conducting a revolution in which the people demolished the vestiges of feudalism and imperialism, "stood on their own feet," and rejected any foreign loans with strings attached. "Better to eat poverty rations of cassava," he said, "than eat beefsteak and be enslaved."[826]

As a result, in mid-1965 the "social, political and economic structures of the nation were now near collapse."[827] Many among the post-Revolutionary middling-class youths (i.e., senior high school and college students born in the second half of the 1940s) feared that they were about to witness the demolition of their dreams of modernity (economic, intellectual, and cultural). In their view, the new regime of Guided Democracy failed at least on two counts: to keep national integrity and to improve the standard of living.[828] Society, these youths sensed, was in a cul-de-sac.

Like their predecessors in the colonial era, many of these young intellectuals couched their economic frustrations in relation to those of the rakyat. On January 15,

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[825] Soekarno, "Storming the Last Bulwark of Imperialism," in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 468-469.

[826] Soekarno, "The Economics of a Nation in Revolution" [1963], in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 393-394.

[827] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 318.

[828] See, for example, Soe Hok Gie, "19 Februari 1963" [February 19, 1963], *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [Notes by a student demonstrator] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989), 147.

1966, Yozar Anwar (1940-1999)[829], a student activist at the School of Economics, University of Indonesia, jotted down these lines in his diary:

> I woke up at 5 a.m.! […] As I was getting myself ready for a trip with friends to Bogor [to stage a demonstration in front of the presidential palace], I daydreamed: "When will life get better? […I mean,] a better life for the poor who have long been living in shacks cheek-by-jowl, shacks whose floors get muddy when it rains. The poor who earn a living like chickens scratching at the ground for food. [Consider] their filthy quarters and their neglected health. [Consider] the headache-provoking smell of shit, and the rats, the mosquitoes, and the bedbugs that roam around to their heart's content."
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> Forced to read by the light of a kerosene lantern, my eyes got a bit fuzzy. Well, there was no electricity! Eating irregularly had left my body weak. I thought to myself: "Is it life under pressure, life under poverty, that has made me and my friends join the struggle?"[830]

Later, on February 9, 1966, Yozar waxed self-referential in explaining to himself why he and his friends rebelled against Guided Democracy:

> They [he and his colleagues] want progress and face a logjam. They hope for a normal life, a normal career, but the economy grows too little to create enough jobs. Feeling that they live in a situation so different [from the one they desire], they are determined to find their own way.[831]

They also chafed at what they considered as intellectual and cultural oppression. In pursuit of their version of modernity, they saw no problem in drawing on elements from the cultures and intellectual traditions of the world, including those of the West. As

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[829] Yozar Anwar was born on October 17, 1940 in Sungai Penuh, Kerinci, Jambi, West Sumatra. In the 1930s and 1940s, his father, Anwar Mahardja Soetan, served as *demang* (subdistrict head) in Padang and, later, in Kerinci. Yozar was the younger brother of the prominent journalist Rosihan Anwar (1922-2011).

[830] Yozar Anwar, *Angkatan 66: Sebuah Catatan Harian Mahasiswa* [The Generation of '66: A student's diary] (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1980), 30.

[831] Ibid., 99.

Yozar put it in 1966, they could not see why doing so would render them un-Indonesian or "uncivilized," for "anywhere in the world … in this age of instant communication, youths—and especially teenagers—tend to mimic one another." He deemed it all right that in Indonesia, "as in Russia," "the Beatles' music and hairstyle, pop music and stuff like that, become in vogue" among the young. As for college students, such as Yozar himself and many in his generation, they wanted to preserve their freedom to use the works of international scholars, Marxist and non-Marxist, in their studies. In the last years of Guided Democracy, having the upper hand in the political arena, some leftists and ultranationalists acted as self-styled agents of Thought Police and the "high priests of Indonesian authentic culture," calling for a ban on non-Marxist social theories, pop music, Hollywood films, and the Beatles' dress- and hairstyles. Many students felt that such a move "stifled the growth of teenage life," sowed "political and mental terror," and intruded on their right to enjoy what their leftist critics called "bourgeois" pleasures, and attacked their sense of autonomy and intellectual superiority.[832]

As a result, some middling-class youths came to resent what they saw as their leftwing oppressors. The botched coup on September 30, 1965, of which they considered

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[832] See, for example, Hasyrul Moechtar, "Ir. Sarwono Kusumaatmadja," in Hasyrul Mochtar, *Mereka dari Bandung: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Bandung, 1960-1967* (Bandung: Alumni, 1998), 449-451; Yozar Anwar, "Sekilas Perjuangan Kami untuk Kemerdekaan" [On our struggle for freedom], *Protes Kaum Muda!* [The protest of the young!] (Jakarta: Kartini Group, 1982), 39. On why some Indonesian leftist intellectuals condemned the consumption by Indonesians of Western popular culture, see, among others, Utami Suryadarma, "Fight Cultural Imperialism," in Feith and Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking*, 306-310. In this address, which she delivered at the fourth Asian-African Film Festival in Jakarta in February 1964, Utami contended that "[i]mperialism … still [tried] with all its strength to defend its cultural influence [on Afro-Asian soil] over music, dance, literature, drama, sculpture, and especially films, which [had] a great attraction for the masses." She viewed this social phenomenon as proof of "cultural penetration by colonial or ex-colonial powers" (p. 308). It did not occur to her that the masses were capable of responding in a critical fashion to the various manifestations of this "cultural penetration."

the PKI the mastermind, provided them with a reason to press for the liquidation of the party, which they held responsible for their intellectual and cultural frustrations and viewed as the icon of what went wrong under Guided Democracy. Thus, in late 1965, after having been "buried for years," their anger at the Left exploded—"like a volcano."[833]

The self- and social perceptions of the student rebels in the 1960s offer a window to look on the social changes that had occurred to the Indonesian society since 1949. In 1969, one such student, Soe Hok Gie (1942-1969),[834] saw himself and his colleagues as part of the emergent post-revolutionary generation of Indonesian youths. Born in the early 1940s, they regarded themselves as "new Indonesians," ones whose lives orbited around worldviews that differed from those of their seniors, such as Soekarno and his cohorts. Culturally, unlike Takdir and his generation in the 1930s, they felt no sense of being torn between East and West and they doubted if "the spirit of 1945" (heroism, martial nationalism, and revolutionary passion) was adequate for or even relevant to the tackling of Indonesia's contemporaneous problems.[835] This does not mean, however, that they were less nationalist and less desirous of modernity than their seniors.

Soe Hok Gie viewed his generation as a predictable product of the post-revolutionary Indonesian society. They grew up, he observed, on a diet of

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[833] Anwar, *Protes Kaum Muda!*, 39.

[834] Born in Jakarta on December 17, 1942, Soe Hok Gie was the youngest child of the Sino-Indonesian novelist Soe Lie Piet (b. 1904). From 1962 to 1969, Soe Hok Gie studied history at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.

[835] Soe Hok Gie, "Generasi yang Lahir setelah Tahun Empat Lima" [The generation born after 1945], *Kompas*, August 16, 1969; reprinted in *Soe Hok Gie…Sekali Lagi: Buku, Pesta dan Cinta di Alam Bangsanya*, ed. Rudy Badil, Luki Sutrisno Bekti, and Nessy Luntungan R. (Jakarta: KPG, 2010), 463.

"post-transfer-of-sovereignty optimisms," "great expectations for Indonesia's glory in the future," and the "progressive-revolutionary spirit" whose flames Soekarno kept fanning during Guided Democracy. In the early 1950s, their schoolteachers exposed them to romantic visions of "filling independence with substance." In the fourth grade, Soe himself was trained by his teacher to envision Indonesian modernity in a nationalist, geographical context. He recalled listening to the teacher talk about Sumatra as "a Land of Hope," about the "unexplored riches in the interior of Borneo," or about the "backward lives of Indonesia's indigenous tribes." Even in 1969, Soe still remembered the teacher's exhortation: "We must bring them [the indigenous tribes] to the center of the world's progress."[836]

From the late 1950s and early 1960s, many middling-class youths of Yozar Anwar's and Soe Hok Gie's generation entered universities. With their minds bubbling with "childhood modernist ideals and idealism," they expected to find there "a new world" where they could take up research projects devoted to "the progress of their people and country." Thus, a nineteen-year old chemistry student, for instance, was bent on inventing a chemical solution that could "launch man to the moon." His colleague, an anthropology student, longed to do fieldwork in the interior of Kalimantan. They soon found, however, that owing to lack of resources it was impossible for them to conduct proper fieldwork and chemistry experiments. As a result, the aspiring anthropologist had to content himself with writing a thesis on "local fruit vendors in Pasar Minggu" and the aspiring chemist had to give up her scholarly dreams, reconciling herself to a dreary job at "a margarine factory." "Nothing," Soe Hok Gie wrote, "was crueler than shattering the

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[836] Ibid., 463-464.

hopes of the post-independence generation."[837] These bright, idealistic students faced "two options": Either they "went with the flow," joining one of the "powerful cliques" and learning to "slander and curry favor," or they held on to their idealism. Both paths, Soe maintained, led to frustration. Option 1 produced "a pilot who never flew any aircraft" and Option 2 created "a windmill-fighting Don Quixote." To add insult to injury, these disgruntled post-revolutionary youths were forced to watch the "collapse of the political structure," "economic bankruptcy," and "demoralization in all aspects of life." This constellation of experiences cut deep wounds in their psyches.[838]

In the 1950s and 1960s, the awareness among Indonesian intellectuals that their society was backward in science and technology cut across ideological boundaries. PSI-linked intellectuals, such as Soedjatmoko and Soe Hok Gie, were not alone in articulating this awareness. In 1959, for example, the left-wing intellectuals of the Lekra (the Institute of People's Culture) acknowledged that Indonesia lacked the essential resources for conducting pure and applied research, such as research centers, state-of-the-art laboratories, museums, libraries, cultural centers, scientific periodicals, and financial support for students and scholars. Consequently, the country had made no advances in technology, public health, transportation, historiography, and people's welfare. To overcome this problem, they suggested that the gap between the intelligentsia and the people be closed, and that the intellectuals learn from East and West to use science to

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[837] Ibid., 464.
[838] Ibid., 464-465.

improve people's quality of life. The Lekra intellectuals were of the opinion that such steps could only be taken if Indonesia had "political stability."[839]

Rural Indonesia, too, had its share of middling-class youngsters who felt that the multiple failures of Guided Democracy threatened to smash their modernist dreams to smithereens. In 1966, while on a climbing expedition in Mt. Pangrango, near Bogor, West Java, J. M. V. Suwarto, a student activist at the University of Indonesia's School of Medicine, confessed to his friend Soe Hok Gie that he was the only person ever in his village to have gone to college. "I am the hope of my village, a symbol of its desire for progress. I must persevere and make headway."[840] Later, in the middle of a forest of orchids on the slope of Mt. Pangrango, and in a tone that echoed some of the ideals that both the Muslim communist Semaoen in 1919 and the Jesuit editors of *Basis* in 1956 had championed, the Catholic Suwarto said: "In my view, the foundation of society is God and family. Both are essential."[841] The emergence of people like Suwarto raises a question: Had the Indonesian middling classes increased? If they had, then how and why did the expansion of these classes occur? Further study needs to be conducted on this topic.

Despite their differences, Soekarno's generation and that of Soe Hok Gie, Suwarto, and Yozar Anwar had much in common. As the twentieth-century children of the Enlightenment, most believed in the possibility, desirability, and necessity of

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[839] On this, see Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat, *Usul Atjara Kongres Nasional Ke-1 Lekra di Solo* [Proposed program for Lekra's first national congress in Solo] (Djakarta: Lekra, 1959).

[840] Soe Hok Gie, "Bersama Mahasiswa UI Mengikuti Kembali Jalan yang Sudah Hilang di Pangrango" [Together with the students of the University of Indonesia: Retracing the lost trails on Mt. Pangrango], in *BARA Eka* 3, no. 13 (March 1966); reprinted in *Soe Hok Gie … Sekali Lagi*, 425.

[841] Ibid.

progress, that is to say, of consciously and rationally shaping individual and national lives. In this respect, Soekarno, Soedjatmoko, and Aidit would have nodded their assent to what Yozar Anwar wrote in his diary on February 11, 1966:

> Poverty is nothing new to Indonesia. What is new is…the idea that poverty is neither ineluctable nor predestined, and that man can do something to improve his lot. One of the greatest social forces in the 1960s is the fact that the people now know they do not have to be forever poor and hungry. They want education and freedom—and they want them now.[842]

As far as solving the problem of poverty was concerned, as early as 1954 Soedjatmoko had come to the conclusion that "the process of economic development can be controlled and directed." It was possible, he thought, "to accelerate the process," "diminish the hardships" it entailed, and minimize "the element of compulsion" that it involved.[843]

In the early 1960s, some university students in Jakarta and Bandung were unhappy about President Soekarno's suppression of criticism and freedom of the press. In self-justification, Soekarno said that he did so in order to serve the permanent Revolution. As he told his biographer Cindy Adams sometime between December 1963 and June 1964:

> Revolution needs leadership. Without it there is panic and fear. It is because we are still in an economic revolution that I shall not allow destructive criticism of my leadership nor do I permit freedom of the press. We are too young a country to encourage more confusion than we already have.[844]

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[842] Anwar, *Angkatan 66*, 107.
[843] Soedjatmoko, *Economic Development*, 17.
[844] Soekarno, *Autobiography*, 279.

And to critics who questioned his policy of spending money on prestige projects, Soekarno replied in a way that only intensified the discontent among student activists. In the president's scheme of things, semiotic modernity seems to have been as urgent and important as its pragmatic counterpart. Soekarno once said:

> Man does not live by bread alone. Although Djakarta's alleys are muddy and we lack roads, I have erected a brick-and-glass apartment building, a clover-leaf bridge, and [a] superhighway …. I must make Indonesians proud of themselves. [… I must …] get my whole nation respected by the world. […] Yes, eradicating hunger is important, but giving downtrodden souls something to be justifiably proud of—that, too, is important. […] After I'm gone the only cement to hold the islands together will be their national pride.[845]

When instead of a higher living standard, more stable political life, and greater opportunities to have fun and pursue academic and professional goals, the regime offered monuments, slogans, speeches, indoctrination,[846] economic collapse, political mess, and the interference with their right to enjoy themselves,[847] the middling-class youths—as Yozar and others pointed out—became so angry that they exploded in street

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[845] Ibid., 293; see also Thomas A. Markus and Deborah Cameron, *Words Between the Spaces Building and Language* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 147; for Yozar Anwar's report on Soekarno's justification for his prestige projects on January 15, 1966, see Anwar, *Angkatan 66*, 37.

[846] For a brief personal account of a college student in Yogyakarta in the early 1960s, see Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Titik-Titik Kisar di Perjalananku: Autobiografi Ahmad Syafii Maarif* [Turning points in my life journey: The autobiography of Ahmad Syafii Maarif] (Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka, 2009), 123-124.

[847] One of the factors that provoked students to rebel against Guided Democracy was their anger at Soekarno's and the PKI's attacks on their middling-class and often "Western" lifestyles. On this, consult, among others, Hasyrul Moechtar, "Dr. Ir. Muslimin Nasution Membuat DM-ITB Menjadi 'the Last Stronghold'" [Muslimin Nasution made the Student Council of Bandung Institute of Technology the last stronghold], in *Mereka dari Bandung*, 390; "Ir. Sarwono Kusumaatmadja," in ibid., 449-451; and "Ir. Abu Rizal Bakrie," in ibid., 483.

demonstrations, demanding "change" and "progress," or "democracy and development."[848]

In response to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to agree on Indonesia's state form (unitary vs. federal) and state ideology (Pancasila vs. Islam)—a failure that seemed to undermine the country's unity and impede its progress—President Soekarno proclaimed, on August 17, 1959, his "Political Manifesto" (Manipol), which demanded that Indonesia "return to the rails of the Revolution" and modify its government structure. To strengthen the Manipol, he introduced the USDEK (a new state ideology consisting of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity) and, later in the mid-1960s, the Nasakom (a synthesis of nationalism, religion, and communism). The president and his supporters required civil servants and students to attend workshops that indoctrinated them in Manipol, USDEK, and Nasakom.[849]

Hating this ideologization of society, middling-class university students rebelled against it, refusing to explore the reasons why senior Indonesian nation-builders undertook it. Had they done so, they would have discovered that its long-term purpose was to ensure that while modernizing themselves (whether through Revolution or otherwise) Indonesians would preserve or even strengthen their national identity. This was the point made by, for example, Akhmad Notosutarjo, a Soekarno loyalist of the Nahdlatul Ulama, in 1962:

> In the struggle … for … modernity and progress, we must not lose touch with [our] Indonesian identity. We must hold fast to it, lest we get lost in such a tempestuous pursuit. […] We are conducting a revolution now,

[848] Anwar, *Angkatan 66*, 14.
[849] Frederick, "Historical Setting," 65-66.

> which itself must be based on our Indonesian identity. […] Even Bung Karno, the godfather of Indonesian politicians, has invented an Indonesian strain of socialism: "socialism à la Indonesia …. […] I publish this book in order to flesh out [these] points.[850]

Indonesian nation-builders like Notosutarjo were not alone in fearing that people ran the risk of losing their identity as they modernized themselves. Such an apprehension had appeared as early as the mid-1930s when Takdir and his colleagues conducted their "Polemic on Culture." This finding leads us to an important question: Why had things not changed all that much from the mid-1930s to the mid-1960s? In reply to this question, it would be instructive to conduct a study which investigates the possibility that the Revolution (1945-1949) and parliamentary democracy (1950-1959) had slowed down, rather than speed up, social change in Indonesia.

From a world-historical perspective, these pre- and post-independence Indonesian intellectuals were not unique in trying to preserve, even strengthen, their national identity while they pursued modernity. The year 1962 saw the publication in Iran of a book titled *Occidentosis: A Plague from the West*, whose author, the Iranian intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969), warned his compatriots against the danger that they might suffer the loss of their cultural identity through their appropriation of Western cultural elements. In the late Meiji era as Japan was carrying out rapid modernization, many Japanese intellectuals—for example, Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927), Miyake Setsurei (1860-1945),

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[850] Achmad Notosoetardjo, *Kepribadian Revolusi Bangsa Indonesia Berlandaskan 5 Amanat Bung Karno* [The revolutionary identity of the Indonesian nation on the basis of Bung Karno's five instructions] (Jakarta: Endang-Pemuda, 1962), 11-13. Notosutarjo saw the symptoms of identity loss in the following behaviors: the adoption of Western-sounding names, the showing off of one's command of foreign languages, and the rise of juvenile delinquents known as "cross-girls" and "cross-boys" (p. 23).

and Kuga Katsunan (1857-1907)[851]—worried about Westernization and called for the preservation of national identity. Kuga Katsunan, for his part, expressed his anxiety that "a flood of Westernization" was going to undermine his people's "national autonomy" and "sweep away" their "manners," "customs," "institutions ," " civilization," "historical spirit," and "national spirit."[852]

2. 2. 3. The New Order, 1966-1998: Mesocracy and Pragmatic Modernization

We can see the history of the New Order as consisting of two segments. In Phase One, 1966-1985, it underwent birth and rise; in Phase Two, 1985-1998, it experienced decline and demise. The major themes that characterized the whole New Order era were mesocracy (government by the middling classes) and the pragmatic modernization that these classes carried out.

The New Order was born in the bloodbath that occurred in 1965-1966. On September 30-October 1, 1965, a group of left-leaning junior officers kidnapped and murdered six anticommunist Army generals. This operation, which the PKI supported, failed. In response, an anti-communist middling-class alliance of the Army's remaining top brass, university teachers and students, and Muslim activists sought the liquidation of the PKI, which they accused of masterminding the botched coup attempt. In 1965-1966, anti-communist forces carried out, in Java and Bali, the mass murder of people with actual or suspected links to the PKI. The purges resulted in the death of at least half a

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[851] Jilly Traganou, *The Tokaido Road: Traveling and Representation in Edo and Meiji Japan* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 126-127.

[852] Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myth: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period* (New York: Columbia University, 1977), 113.

million people considered communists. While demolishing the PKI and its allies, the New Order forces replaced Soekarno with Soeharto. Supporters of the New Order viewed Soekarno and the PKI not merely as political adversaries but also as obstacles to their pragmatic, pro-capitalist, and pro-Western road to Indonesian modernity. They pursued political stability and economic growth, which Guided Democracy had failed to bring about. The New Order did not, however, constitute a complete break with Guided Democracy. The top leaders of both regimes exhibited several similarities. Like Soekarno, Soeharto embraced the ideal of a powerful, centralized, and secular state; rejected liberal democracy and political Islam; promoted their version of national identity; and ended up becoming an authoritarian leader.

The New Order forces not only murdered; they also created. In 1966-1985, the New Order's leaders attempted to attain Indonesian modernity in various fields. Supported by President Soeharto and his generals, the technocrats helped the country's economy to achieve stabilization, recovery, and growth. They did so by stopping hyperinflation, rescheduling Indonesia's foreign debt, securing foreign aid and investment, repairing the infrastructure, reintegrating the country to the world economy, attaining self-sufficiency in food through the green revolution, controlling population growth, investing in public health and education, and encouraging industrialization. The result was amazing. From 1967 to 1973, Indonesia's economy grew at an annual rate of 7 percent; gross investment went up from 8 percent of GDP in 1967 to 18 percent in

1973;[853] and implemented foreign direct investment leaped from US$ 83 million in 1967-1969 to US$ 271 million in 1972.[854] Per capita food supply rose from 1,832 kcal in 1961-1965 to 1,863 kcal in 1971-1975[855] while total agricultural outputs increased from 65 tons of rice equivalents in 1961-1965 to 75 tons in 1971-1975.[856]

The New Order's leaders strongly believed that economic growth depended on political stability. In search of stability, they pursued a series of policies. They controlled a) Parliament by handpicking some of its members, b) general election by reducing the number of political parties and creating a pro-government political party called Golkar, and c) the voters by limiting political campaigns to the district level. In the mid-1970s, to ensure that no communist regime emerged in East Timor, they moved to occupy the territory. In 1978, they began to depoliticize students' lives on campus, urging them to concentrate on the pursuit of knowledge and expertise. In the early 1980s, the army and the police carried out extrajudicial killings of gangsters. The aforementioned policies received both support and criticism from the middling classes.

The New Order's leaders were also committed to the vision that the modern Indonesian state must be unitary, secure, centralized, and powerful. Accordingly, in 1969 they took over West New Guinea and, from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, took military action to crush secessionist movements in this area and in Aceh.

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[853] Thee Kian Wie, "The Suharto Era and After: Stability, Development, and Crisis, in *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000*, ed. Howard Dick, et al. (Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), 206.

[854] Ibid., 207.

[855] Pierre van der Eng, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 30, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 616.

[856] Keith O. Fuglie, "Productivity Growth in Indonesian Agriculture, 1961-2000," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 40, no. 2 (2004): 217.

The period 1966-1985 saw the expansion of those elements of modern Indonesian culture that had been on the defensive or inexistent under Guided Democracy. In July 1966, a group of anticommunist men of culture in Jakarta—H. B. Jassin (1917-2000), Mochtar Lubis (1922-2004), Zaini (1926-1977), Taufiq Ismail (b. 1935), Goenawan Mohamad (b. 1941), and Arief Budiman (b. 1941)—founded the literary magazine *Horison* [Horizon], which advocated "universal humanism" as opposed to social realism and offered a space for new experiments in Indonesian literature. They magazine ended up playing a vital role in facilitating the emergence of major Indonesian writers, including Umar Kayam (1932-2002), Putu Wijaya (b. 1944), Danarto (1940), and Budi Darma (b. 1937) in prose, as well as Goenawan Mohamad, Sapardi Djoko Damono (b. 1940), Soebagio Sastrowardoyo (1924-1995), and Sutardji Calzoum Bachri (b. 1941) in poetry.

From the 1970s to the mid-1980s, Indonesian popular culture exhibited vitality. Indonesian artists produced syntheses, undertook experiments, and offered social criticism. In music, Rhoma Irama (b. 1946) invented *dangdut* by mixing Malay, Indian, Arab, and Western elements. In popular literature, Remy Sylado, Teguh Esha, and Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi wrote plays, poetry, and novels through which they expressed frank, witty, and sarcastic criticism of what they considered the problems that afflicted the society the New Order had created, such as hypocrisy, corruption, inequality, or the breakup of the nuclear family.

The first decade of the New Order era saw the birth and rise of the weekly magazine *Tempo* [Time], which played a large role in shaping the intellectual landscape

of the country's middling classes. *Tempo* offered "literary journalism," blending journalistic and literary ways of writing,[857] which its middling-class audience enjoyed.[858] One of them was the historian Ong Hok Ham (1933-2007), who once noted that the weekly served as a national institution and an important tool for national integration.[859] He praised *Tempo* for "liberating the language of the Indonesian press [from] affected seriousness, clichés, and slogans, which still characterized Jakarta's large newspapers."[860] The magazine injected new blood into the Indonesian language through a mixture of "seriousness" and "play." Rejecting bureaucratic language, it used new, archaic, local, and expressive words creatively.[861]

In religion, a younger generation of Muslim intellectuals called for what they saw as a modern way of practicing Islam. Among these thinkers were Nurcholish Madjid, Ahmad Wahib, Djohan Effendi, and M. Dawam Rahardjo, who privileged "program-oriented" over "ideology-oriented" brand of Islam. Mention must also be made of Mukti Ali, who, as Minister of Religious Affairs, advocated the modernization of Islamic boarding schools in the 1970s.

Efforts to bring Indonesia to economic progress were made not only by state-based technocrats but also by actors in civil society. Consider, for example, the former

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[857] H. Mahbub Djunaidi, "Akil Balig" [Coming of age], in *Cerita di Balik Dapur Tempo: 15 Tahun (1971-1986)* [Stories from Tempo's kitchen: 15 years, 1971-1986], ed. Eko Pambudi, et al. (Jakarta: KPG, 2011 [1986]), 173-174.

[858] Ibid.

[859] Onghokham, "Orang-Orang Jebolan di Dalam Kolong" [Dropouts from an emptiness beneath], in *Cerita di Balik Dapur Tempo: 40 Tahun (1971-2011)* [Stories from *Tempo*'s kitchen: 40 years, 1971-2011], ed. Eko Pambudi, et al. (Jakarta: KPG, 2011), 167.

[860] Ibid., 165.

[861] Anonymous, "Bahasa *Tempo* Bahasa Kita" [*Tempo*'s language is our language], in Pambudi, et al., *Cerita di Balik Dapur Tempo: 40 Tahun*, 99-103.

anticommunist student leaders who ran the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES). In August 1971, with support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and some of Soeharto's technocrats, they established the LP3ES to carry out a pragmatic, participatory, and populist variant of economic modernization. They focused many of their projects on the urban and rural poor; they championed basic needs, equality, and minimum government intervention; and they sought to enlarge the Indonesian middling classes.

In the view of some Indonesian intellectuals, to become modern was to uphold the rule of law. In 1971, lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution set up the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) to provide free legal counsel to the poor and protect their interests from the state, which, in pursuit of its development goals, was often willing to sacrifice them.[862]

The economic, political, and cultural transformations that the middling-class modernizers undertook in Indonesia from 1966 to 1985 created a new society. The younger and older members of this society developed new ideas, attitudes, and expectations. Some desired political rights, freedom of the press, more meritocracy, social justice, protection of human rights, and deeper meanings in life. Many developed more complex views of themselves and the world because under the New Order. For, unlike their forebears, they experienced greater exposure to the world through the mass media, that is to say, through radio, TV, pirated audio cassettes, magazines, newspapers, books, graphic novels, video cassettes, photocopy machines, public libraries, and, in the

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[862] "Menagih Lampu Hijau" [Asking for a green light], *Tempo*, December 11, 1971; Adnan Buyung Nasution, "Defending Human Rights in Indonesia," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 114. Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 102.

mid-1990s, the Internet. Greater participation in the global marketplace of ideas and goods rendered obsolete those rigid mental templates with which the older generation had interpreted their cultural experiences (East vs. West, tradition vs. modernity, and local vs. national). Globalization enabled young Indonesians to enjoy greater cultural hybridity. The architects of the New Order failed to understand these social transformations. To render society intelligible and controllable, the political leaders of the New Order, from the late 1970s onwards, required the citizenry to participate in indoctrination sessions in the state ideology Pancasila, requiring young Indonesians to adopt, among other ideas, "the values of 1945," such as courage, mutual aid, sacred struggle, patriotism, and the primacy of national interests.[863] Whether it was delivered through indoctrination sessions or school textbooks, Pancasila education was not merely about the state's attempt to bring society under control. A close reading of Pancasila textbooks used in elementary schools in the New Order reveals that it was also about bringing young Indonesians, whether they lived in the city or in the countryside, to modernity, that is to say, to the middling-class way of life that revolved around the nuclear family, order, and progress. This was a way of life that many teenagers in the New Order wanted to have.

By the mid-1980s, when the New Order entered the second phase of its evolution, it had accomplished several feats in economic modernization: not only self-sufficiency in rice and effective control over population growth but also rapid economic growth and

[863] See, for instance, Mochtar Lubis, *We Indonesians*, trans. Florence Lamoureux, ed. Soenjono Dardjowidjojo (Honolulu: Southeast Asian Studies, Asian Studies Program, University of Hawai'i, 1979), 28.

industrial transformation. The industrial sector of the national economy increased from 13 percent in 1965 to 43 percent in 1996.[864]

Two decades of rapid economic growth resulted in the expansion of the middling classes, which included the industrial bourgeoisie. Like many of their counterparts elsewhere, many middling-class Indonesians, whether they liked this fact or not, were dependent on the state. They were willing to tolerate the abuses that the regime committed (such as authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism, and even the violations of human rights), seeing them as the price they had to pay for political stability and better standard of living that it made possible. When the regime stopped delivering prosperity, as it did during the economic crisis of 1997-1998, they withdrew their support and began condemning the "corruption, collusion, and nepotism" that the leaders of the New Order had perpetrated.

For some middling-class Indonesians in the New Order, technology was one of the core elements of their vision of modernity. The second phase of the New Order's evolution saw the rise to influence and fame of the Minister of Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie, who, with Soeharto's support, championed rapid, capital-intensive, and high-tech industries, such as aircraft, shipbuilding, and ammunition. Although some considered him reckless and extravagant, others saw him as the icon of Indonesian technological modernity.

Social life in this segment of New Order's evolution exhibited an important phenomenon. Having enjoyed a degree of prosperity, some in the middling classes

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[864] Thee Kian Wie, "The Soeharto Era and After: Stability, Development, and Crisis, 1966-2000," in *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 199.

developed a strong interest in religion. They needed to add a spiritual substance to economic progress. In the 1980s, this development manifested itself in, among other phenomena, Motinggo Busye's popular novels, Emha Ainun Najib's poetry, and the wearing of veils among Muslim girls and women.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, some Indonesians modernizers, both in the state and in civil society, had begun to worry about the damage that the quest for industrial progress did to the environment. As a result, in 1978, President Soeharto created the Ministry for the Environment, charging the technocrat Emil Salim with finding ways to foster sustainable economic development. Aware that the state could not do this alone, Emil help founded, in 1980, the Walhi, a forum that Indonesian environmental NGOs mobilized to handle ecological issues. By the 1990s, or perhaps even earlier, some university mountaineering clubs had begun to participate in the protection of the environment.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the aspiring intellectuals among Indonesian university students engaged in spirited quests for interpretive frameworks to understand the changing world they lived in. They read and discussed a wide range of thinking styles, including liberation theology, leftist pedagogy, liberal Islam, Marxism, and postmodernism. Many aspiring writers took an interest in world literature; they read, wrote about, and appropriated elements from the works of African, Middle Eastern, Indian, Eastern European, Japanese, and Latin American authors. Later, in the post-New Order era, many of these young thinkers and writers became key players in the Indonesian intellectual and literary scenes. To an important degree, these people created

themselves by taking advantage of the opportunities that the New Order made available from 1966 to 1998. In some ways, however, they were also the products of the New Order. This is an important subject matter for us to explore through biographical studies if we are serious about understanding the historical roots of post-New Order Indonesia.

In sum, by the late 1990s, three decades of economic modernization under the New Order had created a generation of middling-class Indonesians who were more open to individualism and hybridity; had little need for romantic nationalism and ideological tutelage; participated in the global marketplace of cultures and remained Indonesians; and believed more and more in meritocracy. These are the people who nowadays rule and shape Indonesia.

The New Order has been said to have collapsed in 1998. It disintegrated, some people believe, because the middling classes stopped supporting the regime after its leaders had failed to handle the economic crisis wisely. But the New Order was not merely a regime; it was a way of thinking, even a way of life. It remains to be seen if the regime change that occurred in May 1998 meant the end of the New Order as a way of life.

CHAPTER 3: THE QUEST FOR INDONESIAN MODERNITY IN THE NEW ORDER: THE PRESIDENT'S MEN AND THEIR TOP-DOWN SOCIAL ENGINEERING

This chapter deals with this major question: what happened, in the New Order era, to the old quest for Indonesian modernity, a pursuit that was rooted (as Chapter Two has shown) in the encounter between the Indonesian nationalist movement and Dutch colonialism? To try to answer this question, this chapter employs "engineering" (economic, social, political, and technological) as an analytical lens, and some of Soeharto's most important advisers as case studies. These people include the Bappenas director Widjojo Nitisastro; the CSIS thinkers such as Ali Moertopo, Daoed Joesoef, Harry Tjan Silalahi, and Jusuf Wanandi; and the State Minister of Research and Technology B. J. Habibie.

The study of this group of military and civilian modernizers requires justification. First, the most direct way of challenging the facile argument that the New Order is mainly about militarism is by checking whether these people's ideas and actions constituted nothing but the quest for military supremacy and hegemony. The biographies of these people demonstrate that the ways in which they envisioned and sought to attain modernity were typical of the middling-class (as opposed to military) mentality. This study will show that Widjojo Nitisastro and his colleagues at the Bappenas, as well as Ali Moertopo and their allies at the CSIS, played an important role in directing or influencing the economic development that the New Order undertook.

The second reason for studying this cluster of modernizers was that world history provides us with nineteenth- and twentieth-century cases where military officers played a central role in the modernization of their societies. Consider, for example, the lives and works of people such as Egypt's Muhammad Ali (1769-1849), Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), Iran's Reza Shah (1878-1944), and Mexico's Porfirio Díaz (1830-1915). Indonesia, therefore, was not alone in having carried out a modernization that was supported and supervised by high-ranking military men.

As key players in the quest for Indonesian modernity in the New Order, the people we examine in this chapter had two features in common. First, for quite a while and notwithstanding their rivalry, they were all Soeharto's aides. They helped him seize power, stay in it, and use it for, among other things, modernization. Second, it was in cooperation with him that they drew on state authority and resources to realize their visions of Indonesian progress. They engaged in a top-down sort of modernization, using economic, political, ideological, or technological engineering. Let us start by studying the case of Widjojo Nitisastro, taking a close look at his ideas about economic progress and at the consequences that such ideas had on Indonesian society.

3. 1. Widjojo Nitisastro (1927-2012): The Architect of Indonesian Economic Modernity

As the captain of the New Order technocrats, Widjojo Nitisastro practiced such a strict economy of words that—as the former Ford Foundation representative in Indonesia John Bresnan (1927-2006) once remarked—the official statements he made from 1965 to

1993 could perhaps "be counted on the fingers of one hand."[865] Throughout his life Widjojo also refrained from autobiographical self-indulgence.[866] There is enough evidence, however, to suggest that in addition to his training at the University of Indonesia (*c*. 1950-1955) and the University of California at Berkeley (1957-1961), which converted him to Keynesianism, there were life experiences—being brought up in a *pergerakan* family in East Java in the 1930s, fighting in the Revolution (1945-1949), witnessing the Indonesian ruling elite's poor performance in fulfilling the promises of the Revolution—that played an important part in shaping the way he envisioned Indonesian modernity from 1950 onwards and the economic policies he later wanted President Soeharto to execute to realize his modernist dreams. It is instructive to consider the links between Widjojo's pre-New Order life experiences and his core ideas on what it took to bring the rakyat to economic progress.

On September 23, 1927, Widjojo Nitisastro (see Figure 9) was born in Malang into a middling-class family of nationalist teachers.[867] Rising through the ranks, his father became a primary school inspector, whose duties caused him to move house frequently; they lived in places like Malang, Surabaya, Jombang, and Bali.[868] As a result of this

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[865] On Widjojo's studied reticence, see John Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 75; Mar'ie Muhammad, "Between an Intellectual Worker and an Intellectual," in *Testimonials of Friends about Widjojo Nitisastro*, ed. Moh. Arsjad Anwar, Aris Ananta, and Ari Kuncoro (Jakarta: Kompas, 2008), 83; Ginandjar Kartasasmita, "New Order Pillar," in ibid., 294.

[866] H. W. Arndt, "Is Equality Important?" *Tributes for Widjojo Nitisastro by Friends from 27 Foreign Countries*, ed. Moh. Arsjad Anwar, Aris Ananta, and Ari Kuncoro (Jakarta: Kompas, 2007), 171.

[867] Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 79; see also, Arifin M. Siregar, "Considerations of the Association of Indonesian Economists in Conferring the Hatta Award upon Prof. Dr. Widjojo Nitisastro, Jakarta, January 27, 1985," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 103.

[868] Djoko Pitono and Kun Haryono, *Orang-Orang Jombang: Profil Tokoh Kabupaten Jombang* [People of Jombang: The profiles of leading public figures from the District of

moving about, Widjojo attended junior high school in Praban, Surabaya, but finished his senior high school in Oro-Oro Dowo, Malang.[869] In his retirement, Widjojo's father

Figure 9. Widjojo Nitisastro, 1971 [*Tempo*/Bur Rasuanto].

dedicated his time and efforts to the Parindra—"the most influential" of the Indonesian nationalist parties in the 1930s that took a cautious, cooperationist stance vis-à-vis the Dutch colonial regime[870]—and to its farmers' organization, the Rukun Tani. Widjojo had seven siblings, who, because of their refusal to cooperate with the Dutch, taught at

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Jombang] (Jombang: Pemerintah Kabupaten Jombang, 2010), 60-61, http://masjidkurumahku.blogspot.com/2012/04/orang-orang-jombang.html; Nur Huda, "Mengenang Pejuang ITS (2)" [Remembering the hero of the ITS (2)], accessed March 29, 2013, http://www.its.ac.id/berita.php?nomer=9768.

[869] Harun Zain, "True Patriot of National Development: Honest and Unpretentious Reflections from an Old Friend," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 17; Rachmat Saleh, "New Approach with a Proven and Consistent Implementation," in ibid., 87.

[870] Ken'ichi Goto, *Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asian in the Colonial and Postcolonial World*, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), 125.

nationalist Taman Siswa schools.[871] His older brother, Angka Nitisastro, who eventually became a doctor in Surabaya, helped to establish there in 1957 the November 10 Institute of Technology.[872] In the post-revolutionary era, as a socially committed economist Widjojo knew how to both resist the ruling elite and collaborate with it in pursuing his modernist goals.

While seeking Indonesia's independence through peaceful means, the Parindra endeavored to create middling classes among the Natives in urban and rural Java by offering them information, education, and economic aid. Through the Rukun Tani, which Widjojo's father organized, the Parindra helped Javanese farmers to form cooperative societies and credit facilities, provided them with practical training, and mediated their transactions with the administrators of Dutch sugar mills.[873] It is not to militarism but to a fusion of a) the Parindra brand of welfarist, pragmatic, and moderate nationalism, b) Sjahrir's vision of social democracy which he absorbed through his mentor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, and c) the Keynesian economics he studied at the University of Indonesia and Berkeley that we should attribute the origins of the tendencies, emphases, and priorities in the method that Widjojo (and his team of technocrats) applied as key managers of their country's economic modernization in the New Order.

The Revolution, during which Widjojo and his friends joined the student militia (TRIP), exposed them not only to the risk of death[874] but also to the rural world of East

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[871] Frederick, *Visions and Heat*, 74, n. 21.

[872] Huda, "Mengenang Pejuang."

[873] Robert E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 61.

[874] Pansa Tampubolon, an old friend of Widjojo's, once recalled how the latter "nearly died somewhere between Ngaglik and Gunungsari [in Surabaya], fighting and throwing grenades

Java, for the war they waged against the returning Dutch forces compelled them to frequently retreat to the countryside,[875] where the peasants offered them food and shelter. This experience awakened in these middling-class youths a sense of solidarity with the peasantry.[876] It kindled in Widjojo a desire to free these people from misery by improving their lot.[877] It was not in political ideologies but in the sciences that the young Widjojo hoped to find the means to accomplish his mission. Thus, no sooner had the Revolution ended in late 1949 than he took up his education again.

Following his graduation in about 1950 from the Catholic Senior High School St. Albertus in Malang,[878] Widjojo moved to Jakarta to study economics at the newly founded School of Economics at the University of Indonesia.[879] During his undergraduate years, he led a life that struck his colleagues as "serious," cerebral, "industrious," "orderly," and goal-driven.[880] (Many years later, as the godfather of Soeharto's economic

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with his bare hands"; see Goenawan Mohamad, et al., "Technocrat Number One: Widjojo Nitisastro," in *Celebrating Indonesia: Fifty Years with the Ford Foundation 1953-2003*, ed. Suzanne Siskel, et al. ([Jakarta]: Ford Foundation, 2003), 50.

[875] Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, ["Recollections of My Career"], in *Recollections: The Indonesian Economy, 1950s-1990s*, ed. Thee Kian Wie (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 168; Mohamad, et al., "Technocrat Number One," 50.

[876] Harun Zain, "True Patriot," 169.

[877] Ibid.

[878] Rachmat Saleh, "New Approach," 87.

[879] The Department of Economics was founded on September 18, 1950; see, for example, "Sejarah FEUI" [The history of the University of Indonesia's School of Economics], accessed March 29, 2013, http://www.fe.ui.ac.id/index.php/tentang-fe-ui/sejarah. Indonesia had no more than ten professional economists in 1949; of these "only a few were interested in teaching"; see Mohamad, et al., *Celebrating Indonesia*,45; Goenawan Mohamad, et al., "Institution-Builder: Sumitro Djojohadikusumo," in ibid., 46.

[880] See, for instance, Budhi Paramita, "A Great Thinker," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 429. He would observe this kind of academic work ethic in his years as a graduate student at Berkeley. The purpose of it all, he said to his American friend Guy Pauker, was to set a good example for his Indonesian colleagues to follow; see Guy Pauker, "He Worked Hard Also to Set an Example," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Tributes for Widjojo Nitisastro*, 354.

advisers, he impressed people around him as the incarnation of meticulousness, "perfectionism," workaholism, and expertise.)[881] Thanks to his brilliant mind, Widjojo won the respect of his colleagues and that of Sumitro Joyohadikusumo, the founding dean of the School of Economics, who considered him his own worthy successor[882] because he saw in him not only "first-rate intelligence" but also "leadership skills, tenacity," and "an ease with rural life."[883]

Widjojo graduated cum laude from the School of Economics in 1955 and left for the United States in 1957 to take up economics and demography at Berkeley, where as a graduate student he practiced a rigorous work ethic, in part to set an example for his Indonesian colleagues to follow. He earned his PhD in 1961, after defending a dissertation titled "Migration, Population Growth, and Economic Development: A Study of the Economic Consequences of Alternative Patterns of Inter-Island Migration."[884] In 1996, Irma Glicman Adelman (b. 1930), a member of Widjojo's dissertation committee at Berkeley, remarked that he was "by far the brightest and most energetic of the Indonesian students [that Berkeley] had." In her view, "he by himself would be a

[881] Fuad Hassan, "Prime Example Who Dedicates Himself to the Science of Charity and to the Charity of Science," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 127; Kunarjo, "Giving Respect to the Little People," in ibid., 202; J. B. Sumarlin, "He Never Winced in a Crisis," in ibid., 260; Bustanil Arifin, "Loyal Public Servant," in ibid., 313; Paramita, "Great Thinker," 431; Emil Salim "Economic Team Village Chief," in ibid.,13-14.

[882] Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 79; Paramita, "A Great Thinker," 429; Mohamad Sadli, "Recollections of My Career," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 29, no. 1 (April 1993): 39.

[883] Mohamad, et al., "Technocrat Number One," 50.

[884] According to John Bresnan, it is "the first comprehensive demographic study of Indonesia"; see John Bresnan, *At Home Abroad: A Memoir of the Ford Foundation in Indonesia 1953-1973* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2006), 121.

sufficient payoff for the whole Indonesia-Berkeley project…."[885] In August 1962, the University of Indonesia's School of Economics promoted him to full professorship.

The history of Widjojo's ideas and their impact on Indonesian society is worth examining. For, when executed, some did much to mold the economic transformation that Indonesia experienced in the New Order. Let us begin with 1954, the year that saw the publication of a booklet titled *On Indonesia's Population and Development*, which Widjojo—then a 27-year-old student assistant at the National Planning Bureau (BPN)[886]—coauthored with Harvard demographer from Canada, Nathan Keyfitz (1913-2009)[887] and in which he put forward his ideas about Indonesia's economic modernization. The central task of the government in the postindependence era, he argued, was that of economic development, whose aim was to enable the people to enjoy the highest possible living standards.[888] Activities in all other areas of life must contribute to economic development,[889] which was to focus on a balanced pursuit of agricultural modernization and industrial transformation, the former serving as the basis for the latter. In a Keynesian vein, Widjojo wanted the government to help farmers increase their productivity and earn higher incomes, which they could then spend on industrial goods.

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[885] Mohamad, et al., "Technocrat Number One," 50-51.

[886] At the time Indonesia suffered from such a lack of professionals that bright undergraduate students like Widjojo had to serve as assistants in government agencies; see, for instance, Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 78.

[887] Nathan Keyfitz and Widjojo Nitisastro, *Soal Penduduk dan Pembangunan Indonesia* [On Indonesia's population and development] (Djakarta: Pembangunan, 1964 [1954]). Widjojo thanked Keyfitz for having stimulated his research interest in demographic matters; see Widjojo Nitisastro, *Population Trends in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), x.

[888] Keyfitz and Nitisastro, *Soal Penduduk*, 89, 135. Widjojo, his fellow US-trained economists at University of Indonesia, and Sumitro Joyohadikusumo all believed that the government should be "the source of plans, guidance, and direction for economic growth." On this, see Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 83.

[889] Keyfitz and Nitisastro, *Soal Penduduk*, 112-113, 116.

Industrialization, in turn, should prioritize the creation of small and medium industries in the countryside to provide farmers with industrial side jobs, thereby curbing disguised unemployment.[890] It fell to the government, he went on to say, to coordinate economic development in a way that could strike a balance a) between agriculture and industry, b) between natural resources and demographic distribution, and c) between food production and population growth.[891]

In this 1954 booklet Widjojo identified several obstacles to economic progress. To begin with, there were "petty issues"—that is to say, the ruling elite's domestic ideological battles and international adventures—that had been blown so out of proportion they overshadowed the economic challenges facing the nation.[892] Second, while it was blessed with a large population and abundant natural resources, Indonesia suffered from uneven demographic distribution: Too many people dwelled in fertile Java while too few inhabited the mineral-rich, export-producing Outer Islands.[893] Third, low incomes, the lack of capital, and the dearth of entrepreneurial, managerial, and technical skills stood in the way of industrial transformation.[894]

To overcome these impediments, Widjojo proposed that the government take several measures: a) move a portion of Java's population to the Outer Islands; b) help farmers increase their productivity; c) provide people with training in technology and business skills; and d) through export of highly profitable commodities, accumulate as much funds as possible and invest it in infrastructure, domestic industries, and the import

[890] Ibid., 114.
[891] Ibid., 114, 118.
[892] Ibid., 15, 109.
[893] Ibid., 20-21.
[894] Ibid., 104, 107-108, 110, 114.

of agricultural machinery.[895] If the government carried out these steps successfully, there would be no need, in Widjojo's view, for it to curb population growth through fertility control (which Sukarno despised[896] but which Soeharto later supported). Considering the combative nationalism prevalent in the mid-1950s, Widjojo did not recommend foreign aid and foreign direct investment as tools to jump start industrialization.[897]

Already in the mid-1950s, some of the focal themes in Widjojo's thought about Indonesia's economic modernization had manifested themselves. The first was the weight he attached to improving life in the countryside, that is, to increasing agricultural productivity as the basis for industrialization. As an assistant at the National Planning Bureau and chair of the Institute for Economic and Social Research (LPEM) at the University of Indonesia's School of Economics, he charged his advanced students with studies on village communities throughout Indonesia. It was part of his endeavor to acquaint the budding economists with the social conditions of the peasantry.[898] With his colleague Julius E. Ismael, Widjojo himself undertook one such investigation in Central Java.[899] Later, as Soeharto's long-serving chief economic adviser, he went on field trips to the countryside, observing the challenges that farmers faced in their everyday lives as

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[895] Ibid., 87-88, 108, 113, 115, 133.

[896] Masri Singarimbun, "Family Planning in Indonesia," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 4, no. 10 (June 1968): 49.

[897] Keyfitz and Nitisastro, *Soal Penduduk*, 112-113.

[898] Siregar, "Considerations," 104.

[899] Widjojo Nitisastro and Julius E. Ismael, *Pemerintahan, Keuangan, dan Padjak di Suatu Desa di Djawa Tengah* [Government, finance, and taxation in a village in Central Java] (Djakarta: Lembaga Penjelidikan Ekonomi dan Masjarakat, 1957).

well as the execution of government-sponsored agricultural extension programs.[900] Sometimes, on such trips he brought his daughter Widjajalaksmi along with him, trying to instill in her a sense of *noblesse oblige*. Four decades later, she recalled this childhood experience:

> I was born into a family that highlighted the importance of education and humanitarianism. When I was a kid, my father and I would take a walk in rice fields. And [he] would advise me to grow up to be somebody useful for others.[901]
>
> Pointing his finger to those peasants, he would say to [me]: "Be somebody who can help them."[902] […] Since then I wanted to be … a physician. […] In my teenage years, I came to admire Florence Nightingale …. My desire to be a doctor grew stronger.[903]

The second leitmotif in Widjojo's thinking was his commitment to a mixed economy, a realistic middle way between command economy and full-fledged liberalism. On September 23, 1955, in a debate with Wilopo—an intellectual affiliated with the Indonesian National Party (PNI)—over the form of the national economy, Widjojo contended that to ensure success, Indonesia's economic development must aim for both growth and equity (in the New Order, from mid-1977 onwards, growth, equity, and

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[900] Wardojo, "Touring Villages Plagued by Drought, Pests, or Lack of Fertilizers," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 28-29; Permadi, "Direct Cross-Checking with Farmers about Credit Disbursement, and Fertilizer and Pesticide Distribution," in ibid., 213-214.

[901] "Profil" [Profile], *Nova*, accessed March 29, 2013, http://nostalgia.tabloidnova.com/articles.asp?id=6827&no=2.

[902] "Profil Bakal Calon Rektor: Dr. dr. Widjajalaksmi Kusumaningsih, SpKFR (K). MSc" [Profile of a university presidential candidate: Widjajalaksmi Kusumaningsih], accessed March 29, 2013, http://pemilihanrektor.ui.ac.id/kampanye/profil-bakal-calon-rektor/103?destination=kampanye/profil-bakal-calon-rektor/103.

[903] "Profil," *Nova*, http://nostalgia.tabloidnova.com/articles.asp?id=6827&no=2. Widjojo married Siti Sudarsih, who, like him, was a teacher for a time. They had two children: Widjajalaksmi Kusumaningsih and Doddy Setiawan Widjojo. While Doddy makes a living as an entrepreneur, Widjajalaksmi is a doctor specializing in Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine and teaches at the University of Indonesia's School of Medicine.

political stability were enshrined as the "Trilogy of Development"[904]) and embrace a mixed economy in which the state, the private sector, and the whole nation ought to play an active part. While the state directed and executed economic development, the private sector helped it by providing the extra domestic capital needed for productive investments.[905]

The third core idea guiding Widjojo's quest for Indonesia's economic progress was the belief that a society can and should plan its economic future and that its leaders ought to do the planning in a scientific fashion.[906] On August 10, 1963, in explicit defiance of President Soekarno's anti-scientific approach to economic affairs, Widjojo articulated this idea in his inaugural address as professor of economics at the University of Indonesia. Economic planners, he contended, must make sure that economic development would proceed in a stage-by-stage, sustained, coherent, and consistent manner;[907] they should draw on the sciences (especially economics) to make sure that plans were drawn up and carried out in a realistic and rational fashion. Economic development, in his view, was about boosting national wealth; it was to be a well-integrated, large-scale project whose organizers should manage all the key factors of

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[904] Anonymous, "Hasil Pertama DPR" [First results of the House of Representatives], *Tempo*, October 8, 1977. Saleh Afiff, "'Village Chief' Role Model Figure," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro *Testimonials*, 273; William Hollinger, "The Interaction between Economic Growth and Welafre Is Summed Up in the 'Development Triad' of Growth, Stability, and Equity," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Tributes for Widjojo Nitisastro*, 272.

[905] Widjojo Nitisastro, "A Second Interpretation," in Wilopo and Widjojo Nitisastro, *The Socio-Economic Basis of the Indonesian State* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1959 [1955]), 15-18.

[906] Widjojo Nitisastro, "Analisa Ekonomi dan Perencanaan Pembangunan" [Economic analysis and development planning], in *Pengalaman Pembangunan Indonesia: Kumpulan Tulisan dan Uraian Widjojo Nitisastro* [Indonesia's development experience: Collected writings and analyses by Widjojo Nitisastro] (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 5-28; Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 83.

[907] Nitisastro, "Analisa Ekonomi," 11.

production: from labor, capital, and technology to natural resources, culture, and politics.[908] Economic modernization, he continued, called for investments in all sectors and a strict adherence to efficiency, rationality, and cross-sectional consistency.[909] The government was to make sure that bureaucracy and politics worked in ways that supported the planning and execution of economic development; it should mobilize the citizenry to implement development plans[910] through a combination of material incentives, coercion, and persuasion; and it must deploy the civil service to monitor, control, and coordinate this implementation.[911] In an enlightenment vein, he was adamant that just as humans had been able to control nature by wielding science and technology in accordance with the laws of nature, so would they also be able to engineer their economic lives by wielding policy tools in line with economic laws.[912]

It is safe to say—as Ali Wardhana did in 2007—that already in his undergraduate years at the University of Indonesia, Widjojo had developed his key ideas about the modernization of Indonesian economy; his advanced training at Berkeley served only to reinforce these ideas.[913]

Under Guided Democracy, Widjojo and his team of economists lacked the necessary political backing to realize their vision of Indonesia's economic modernity. They were on the defensive: the School of Economics had to sustain pressures from the

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[908] Ibid., 18-19, 21, 27.
[909] Ibid., 24.
[910] Ibid., 25.
[911] Ibid., 26.
[912] Ibid., 28.
[913] Ali Wardhana, "Acquainted for 45 Years," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 7.

PKI.[914] To make matters worse, President Sukarno, who viewed Indonesian modernity primarily in terms of prestige projects and permanent revolution, had no patience with economists and their positivistic, pragmatic ways of tackling economic challenges.[915] He dismissed their preoccupation with inflation, trade deficits, demography, and unemployment as a petty exercise in "textbook thinking,"[916] which resulted—so he claimed—from cultural imperialism whereby the West, in the name of intellectual freedom, was subverting Indonesia with propaganda, films, and textbooks from "Rotterdam, Utrecht, Harvard…and Cambridge."[917] In August 1964, to those who dared say that Indonesia was "going to [undergo] economic collapse," the president said they should "go to hell"[918]

The year 1965 was a turning point in the careers of Widjojo and his technocrats. The coincidence of economic bankruptcy with the collapse of Guided Democracy vindicated their position on the ongoing debate over what the government should prioritize in the post-independence era. In his address to the "Symposium on the Rise of the Spirit of '66: Setting a New Course," which took place at the University of Indonesia

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[914] Soebroto, ["Recollections of My Career"], in Thee, *Recollections*, 229; Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 81; Goenawan Mohamad, et al., "An Evening with the Technocrats," in *Celebrating Indonesia*, 59; Mohamad et al., *Celebrating Indonesia*, 57.

[915] Peter Coleman, Selwyn Cornish, and Peter Drake, *Arndt's Story: The Life of an Australian Economist* (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2007), 257-258.

[916] Benjamin Higgins, *All the Difference: A Development Economist's Quest* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1992), 55-56; Mohamad, et al., *Celebrating Indonesia*, 64; Soebroto, ["Recollections"], 229.

[917] Soekarno, "Tahun Vivere Pericoloso" [The year of living dangerously], in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi* [Under the banner of the Revolution], vol. 2 (Djakarta: Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1965 [1964), 594.

[918] Ibid.

on May 6-9, 1966, Widjojo[919]—then dean of the School of Economics—noticed that things had changed in their favor:

> Prior to March 11, 1966, the problem was to make high officials recognize that economic matters were crucial, could not be brushed off, and should be handled in an economically rational way. Now, by contrast, the government needs no reminder anymore....[920]

Beyond mere vindication, Widjojo quickly perceived that the downfall of Guided Democracy gave him and his colleagues a golden opportunity to reshape the economy according to their vision of economic modernity.[921] In pursuit of this goal, they found sympathetic and powerful supporters and protectors in a group of army officers who rallied around Soeharto.[922]

One of the pivotal moments in the encounter between the technocrats and the generals occurred at the Second Army Seminar at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad) in Bandung, on August 25-31, 1966, where they collaborated to set goals and

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[919] This symposium, sponsored by the Indonesian Students Action Command (KAMI) and the Indonesian University Graduates Action Command (KASI), discussed the problems in Indonesia's economy, politics, culture, and foreign relations as well as proposed their solutions. The blueprint for Indonesia's economic development that Widjojo and his colleagues presented at this symposium was adopted in July 1966 by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly; see Soebroto, "Recollections of My Career," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 34, no. 2 (August 1998): 74; Widjojo Nitisastro, "Perbandingan antara Pasal-Pasal Sumbangan Pikiran Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia untuk Sidang MPRS 1966 dan Ketetapan MPRS No. XXIII/1966 (1966)" [Comparison between articles in the recommendation of the University of Indonesia's School of Economics to the session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly and the latter's Decision no. XXIII/1966 (1966)], in *Pengalaman Pembangunan*, 77-115.

[920] Widjojo Nitisastro, "Menyusun Kembali Sendi-Sendi Ekonomi Indonesia dengan Prinsip Ekonomi" [Restructuring Indonesian economic fundamentals with economic principles], in *Pengalaman Pembangunan*, 46-47.

[921] Mohamad et al., "An Evening with the Technocrats," 59.

[922] Jusuf Wanandi, *Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965-1998* (Singapore: Equinox, 2012), 85.

design plans for managing the country's politics and economy in post-Soekarno era. They discussed political stability, economic recovery, and the role of the military in society. The army generals attending the seminar included Soeharto (1921-2008), Soewarto (1921-1967), Maraden Panggabean (1922-2000), Soemitro (1927-1998), Darjatmo (b. 1925), and Soedjono Hoemardani (1919-1986). Among the civilian participants were the Cornell-trained sociologist Selo Soemardjan (1915-2003), the psychologist Fuad Hassan (1929-2007), and the mostly US-trained economists Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana (b. 1928), Mohammad Sadli (1922-2008), Sarbini Soemawinata (1918-2007), Soebroto (b. 1923), and Emil Salim (b. 1930).[923] The economists convinced the generals that the new regime must bring about economic stabilization, recovery, and growth by balancing the budget, reforming "exchange rate mechanisms," rehabilitating infrastructure, and increasing agricultural productivity.[924]

So convinced was Soeharto by Widjojo's and his colleagues' presentations at the seminar that the general not only adopted their policy recommendations but also recruited all five economists (Widjojo, Ali Wardhana, Sadli, Emil Salim, and Soebroto) on September 12, 1966 into his Team of Experts in Economics and Finance.[925] From then to mid-1968, he tasked the technocrats with normalizing the country's exports, industry,

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[923] Elson, *Suharto*, 148.; Sarbini Soemawinata, ["Recollections of My Career"], in Thee, *Recollections*, 113; Mohamad Sadli, ["Recollections of My Career"], in ibid., 126-127; Emil Salim, ["Recollections of My Career"], in ibid., 199-200; Soebroto, ["Recollections"], 231; except for Soebroto who got his MA from McGill and PhD from the University of Indonesia, all the economists earned their graduate degrees in the United States, mostly from Berkeley.

[924] Salim, ["Recollections"], in Thee, *Recollections*, 199-200; Elson, *Suharto*, 149-150; Mohamad, et al., "Technocrat Number One," 51.

[925] Sadli, ["Recollections"], 127.

infrastructure, and the production of food and textiles.[926] This was a major beginning in what would be their long-term joint enterprise to modernize Indonesian economy.

There were considerable social and intellectual affinities between the generals and the economists that made their deep and longstanding collaboration possible. They were born, between 1918 and 1930, into more or less middling-class families.[927] As teenagers or young adults, they took part in the Revolution and were shaped by it. In spite of their diverging career trajectories in the post-Revolutionary era, they discovered—when they crossed paths again in the mid-1960s—that they still shared underlying commonalities. It is a mistake, therefore, to see these people as belonging to different castes. In 1998, when he recalled this encounter, Soebroto underlined their differences in occupation but similarities in outlooks:

> There was something special in the relationship between us economists and the army, because all of us had participated in the war of independence. After independence was achieved, some of us continued to "wear a green shirt," while others "wore a white shirt." But since we had all experienced the same struggle for independence and had more or less the same ideals and enthusiasm, this military-civilian relationship in 1966 was unique.[928]

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[926] Soebroto, ["Recollections"], 231.

[927] Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 78, 81. Emil Salim, for example, was the son of Baay Salim, a Minangkabau civil servant who, during the Revolution, served as the mayor of Palembang. Baay Salim was the brother of the prominent nationalist leader Agus Salim; see Emil Salim, "Recollections of My Career," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 33, no. 1 (April 1997): 45; Eka Budianta, "Hitam Putih Emil Salim" [Emil Salim's black and white], in *Pembangunan Berkelanjutan: Peran dan Kontribusi Emil Salim* [Sustainable development: The role and contribution of Emil Salim], ed. Iwan Jaya Aziz, et al. (Jakarta: KPG, 2010), 536. Soebroto was the son of Sinduredjo, "a civil servant at the court of the [Susuhunan] of Surakarta, and later a *bupati* (district head)"; see Soebroto, ["Recollections"], 221. Widjojo's parents, as we have seen, were teachers.

[928] Soebroto, ["Recollections"], 231.

With regard to common social attitudes, the soldiers (who were not products of a military academy[929]) and the technocrats (who had five years of military experience under their belts) rejected both communism and hard-core economic liberalism; they believed instead in an Indonesian variant of mixed economy.[930] Adamant that the Revolution should have been over in 1949, they felt it was high time that the nation undertook economic development. Both sides took the view that the nation's economic affairs should be handled in a pragmatic, rational, and empirical manner (see Figure 10).[931] Widjojo and Soeharto, in particular, assigned considerable importance to evidence-based policy-making.[932] The two men were also compatible in culture and temperament, both "giving great importance to politeness, decorum, and proper respect for position and relationship."[933] Finally, the two groups they led saw each other as a necessary partner in preserving political order and conducting economic development.[934]

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[929] See, for instance, Alfian, "Peranan ABRI dalam Pembangunan" [The role of the Indonesian Armed Forces in economic development], in *Diskusi Tjibulan: Bersama[2] Membangun Masadepan, 20-22 Djuni 1969* [Discussions in Cibulan: Building the future together, June 20-22, 1969], ed. Rosihan Anwar and Alfian (S.l.: s.n, 1969), 19.

[930] Mohamad, et al., "Technocrat Number One," 50; Mohammad, et al., *Celebrating Indonesia*, 65. Visiting China and Eastern Europe in 1964 and 1965, Widjojo saw examples of command economy, which he did not like. On this, see Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 81-82.

[931] Soemawinata, ["Recollections of My Career"], 113; Elson, *Suharto*, 148-149; Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 81-82; William C. Hollinger, *Economic Policy under President Soeharto: Indonesia's Twenty-Five Year Record* (Washington, DC: The United States-Indonesia Society, 1996), 12.

[932] Hollinger, *Economic Policy*, 11; Kunarjo, "Giving Respect," 202; Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Recollections of My Career," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 22, no. 3 (December 1986): 32-33; Elson, *Suharto*, 168.

[933] Hollinger, *Economic Policy*, 10-12; for brief but useful description of Widjojo's communication style, see Wardhana, "Acquainted for 45 Years," 2-3. Bresnan once noted Widjojo's "elegant use of the Indonesian language" and reported that the poet Goenawan Mohamad admired Widjojo's for "the purity of his language"; see John Bresnan, *At Home Abroad*, 120.

[934] Hollinger, *Economic Policy*, 10, 13; Sadli, ["Recollections"], 127; Mohamad, et al., *Celebrating Indonesia*, 67; Retnowati Abdulgani-Knapp, *Soeharto: The Life and Legacy of*



Figure 10. This cartoon by G. M. Sudharta (*Kompas*, April 25, 1967) captures the self-perception of many New Orderists as the advocates of the victory of reason over emotion—a victory necessary for economic and political stabilization.

In the period 1966-1983, Widjojo served as head of the Bappenas (1967-1983), Minister of Planning (1971-1973), and Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance, and Industry (1973-1983).[935] During this period, the collaboration[936] between Widjojo with

Indonesia's Second President; An Authorized Biography (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2007), 82-83; Bruce Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy and Its Sociopolitical Implications," in *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, ed. Paul D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 166-167; Martin Rudner, "The Indonesian Military and Economic Policy: The Goals and Performance of the First Five-Year Development Plan," *Modern Asian Studies* 10, no. 2 (1976): 253, 255; John James MacDougall, "The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order," *Asian Survey* 16, no. 12 (December 1976): 1166. The technocrats were not alone in seeing the Army as an agent of Indonesia's economic modernization. Younger intellectuals also took this view, for example those anti-communist student activists known as the Generation of '66; see, among others, Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 107.

[935] Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Tributes for Widjojo Nitisastro*, xvii-xviii; "Rekam Jejak Widjojo Nitisastro" [Widjojo Nitisastro's track records], *Suara Merdeka*, March 9, 2012, http://www.suaramerdeka.com/v1/index.php/read/news/2012/03/09/111862/Rekam-Jejak-Widjojo-Nitisastro; *Tempo*, "Nitisastro, Widjojo," in *Apa & Siapa Sejumlah Orang Indonesia, 1985-1986* (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1986), 591-593; "Profil dan Karirnya," *Tempo*, March 26, 1983.

[936] Sadli, ["Recollections"], 128.

his technocrats and Soeharto with his generals did much to shape Indonesia's journey to economic progress in the New Order era. Soeharto provided Widjojo and his "Berkeley Mafia" with the support, protection, and substantial freedom to carry out their policies to modernize the national economy.

From 1966 to 1968, they undertook a program of economic stabilization and recovery.[937] They introduced debureaucratization, stopped hyperinflation, exercised budgetary restraints, controlled balance-of-payments deficits, raised interest rates, got Indonesia's foreign debts rescheduled, obtained foreign aid as well as domestic and foreign investments, adopted a fluctuating exchange rate, and repaired the economic infrastructure, and normalized food production and distribution.[938] While taking these measures, they reintegrated the country to the world economy[939] and aimed for a balance between government intervention and a greater trust in market forces.[940]

From 1969 to 1973, under the guidance of the president and his technocrats, the government carried out its First Five-Year Development Plan, placing a special emphasis on improving the economic infrastructure, achieving rice self-sufficiency, promoting

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[937] Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy," 138.

[938] Sadli, ["Recollections"], 128; Booth, "Development: Achievement and Weakness," 111-112; Hollinger, *Economic Policy*, 20-24; Thee, *Recollections*, 23-25; Thee Kian Wie, "Soeharto Era and After: Stability, Development, and Crisis, 1966-2000," in *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000*, ed. Howard Dick, et al. (Crows Nest, Allen and Unwin, 2002), 204; Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 330-333. The priorities we see in the First Five-Year Development Plan reflect the central role that Widjojo played in the drafting of the Plan. On this, see, for instance, Widjojo Nitisastro, "Beberapa Segi Pola Dasar Repelita" [Some aspects in the blueprint for the Five-Year Development Plans], in *Pengalaman Pembangunan*, 167-171, 173-174; for Ali Wardhana's recollections of the process, see his "Acquainted for 45 Years," 4-5.

[939] Thee, "Soeharto Era and After," 203.

[940] Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy," 142, 166; Panglaykim and Thomas, *Economic Planning Experience*, 33.

exports, and encouraging import-substitution industries.[941] (During this first five-year development, the foundation was to be constructed for a national economy that was equally strong in agriculture and industry.[942]) In pursuit of these goals, it took several steps. It helped farmers set up village cooperatives (KUD) and, under the Bimas (Mass Guidance) program,[943] undertook the green revolution by encouraging farmers to use subsidized high-yield rice seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. It also ran the Bulog (National Bureau of Logistics) to stabilize food prices.[944] The new regime stimulated the emergence of domestic industries by providing direct and indirect subsidies.[945] To control population growth and promote public health, it started the family planning program in May 1968 and built a web of community health centers (Puskesmas).[946]

Later, between 1974 and 1979, in the implementation of the Second Five-Year Development Plan, and using "some of the windfall oil tax revenues"[947] (a step that Widjojo had already advocated in the 1954 booklet he coauthored with Nathan Keyfitz), the technocrats and the president sought to build on economic stability and aim for higher

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[941] Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy,"143; Hollinger, *Economic Policy*, 24; Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 337.

[942] Nitisastro, "Beberapa Segi," 171.

[943] The Bimas program was invented by some engineers at the Department of Agriculture, Bogor Agricultural Institute in 1963. Considering it a useful tool to increase the nation's agricultural productivity, the New Order took it over; see, for example, Anonymous, "Merubah Orientasi Petani" [Changing farmers' orientation], *Tempo*, March 24, 1973.

[944] Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy," 146-149; Hollinger, *Economic Policy*, 48; Rudner, "The Indonesian Military," 267-268.

[945] Ibid., 271-275.

[946] H. W. Arndt, "Survey of Recent Developments," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 5, no. 3 (November 1969): 26-27; Joel S. Kuipers, "The Society and Its Environment," in William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden, *Indonesia: A Country Study*, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2011), 157-158.

[947] Thee, "Soeharto Era and After," 201.

growth rates.[948] To reach these ends, for about twenty five years since 1969 Widjojo and his team of technocrats operated several programs, which Soeharto supported politically and fiscally. Among these were income-redistribution projects such as family planning, the construction of elementary schools, and the creation of village cooperatives, and such agricultural extension programs as Bimas and Inmas.[949] In these programs we can see the realization of some ideas about Indonesia's economic modernization that Widjojo had already articulated in his 1954 booklet, his 1955 rejoinder to Wilopo, and his 1970 monograph *Population Trends in Indonesia*[950]—ideas that also reflect the influence of his father's activism in the Parindra and its Rukun Tani in the 1930s and the early 1940s.

Overall, despite problems and deviations from the First Five-Year Plan,[951] the results of the new regime's attempt at stabilization, rehabilitation, and growth in the period 1966-1973 were significant. Inflation dropped from 839 percent in 1966 to 85 percent in 1968.[952] Although it suffered serious damage caused by drought in 1972,[953] agriculture enjoyed an increase in annual growth rate from 1.4 percent in 1960-1965 to 3.8 percent in 1965-1970.[954] Per capita rice consumption rose from 91 kg in 1967 to 118

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[948] Elson, *Suharto*, 217.

[949] Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, "Developing and Placing the Administrative Foundation for Development in Indonesia," in Anwar, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 340.

[950] In the conclusion to this monograph, Widjojo argues that Indonesia needed "a massive development effort to create expanding employment opportunities" and "a rapid spread of fertility control"; see Nitisastro, *Population Trends*, 238.

[951] Rudner, "The Indonesian Military," 266-281.

[952] Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i, 1980), 79.

[953] Glassburner, "Indonesia's New Economic Policy," 144.

[954] Ibid., 84.

kg in 1973.[955] Between 1967 and 1973, the economy grew at an average rate of 7 percent per annum. Gross investment leaped from 8 percent of the GDP in 1967 to about 18 percent in 1973. Actual foreign direct investment jumped from "a cumulative USD 83 million" in the period 1967-1969 to USD 271 million in 1972.[956]

Seen from a long perspective, the period 1966-1998, during the greater part of which Widjojo and his colleagues played a key role in managing the country's economic affairs, Indonesia experienced impressive transformation. As William H. Frederick sums it up,

> Indonesia averaged a real GDP growth of roughly 5 percent and real per capita GDP trebled. Average caloric intake increased by 70 percent, average life expectancy rose from about 47 to 67 years, and the manufacturing and industrial sectors' combined share of GDP rose from 19 percent to roughly 65 percent while agriculture's share dropped from 53 percent to 19 percent. The incidence of poverty dropped from 61 percent to 10 percent on Java, and from 52 percent to 7 percent elsewhere in the country. In 1993 the World Bank placed Indonesia among the highest-performing developing economies and pointed to its success in achieving both rapid growth and improved equity.[957]

It is worth noting that the economic development that Soeharto and the technocrats carried out received considerable support from the middling classes.[958] Its loyal but critical supporters included, among others, Soe Hok Gie (1942-1969), a former anticommunist and anti-Sukarno student activist in 1966, who had become by 1969 an

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[955] Leon A. Mears and Sidik Moeljono, "Food Policy," in *The Indonesian Economy during the Soeharto Era*, ed. Anne Booth and Peter McCawley (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), 28.

[956] Thee, "Soeharto Era and After," 206-207.

[957] William H. Frederick, "Historical Setting," in Frederick and Worden, *Indonesia: A Country Study*, 77.

[958] Booth, "Development: Achievement and Weaknesses," 111.

instructor in history at the Department of Literature, University of Indonesia. In March 1969, the month Soeharto announced the First Five-Year Development Plan, Soe asserted that

> […] I support the current government because President Soeharto is development-oriented. I won't hesitate, though, to criticize the government, for it is only through frank criticism that we can enforce objectivity.[959]

Four months later, Soe did offer his critique. He understood that the economic development project was meant to help farmers have better lives. Seeing that this undertaking was far greater than Soekarno's prestige projects, he knew it required not only seriousness and capital but also people's participation. The trouble, in his view, was that owing to their too prosaic and pragmatic approach to economic development, Soeharto and his economists were doing a poor job of arousing people's zest for the project. For example, they talked to the rakyat in a language shot through with "stupid" statistics. They also dressed in a way that projected neither confidence nor vitality: They looked either like "portly beer-drinkers" or like "emaciated civil servants."[960] This manner of communicating with the masses, he thought, was not going to inspire them to embrace economic development as their own enterprise. Soe argued that Soeharto and the technocrats should behave as experts and missionaries. Besides improving their self-presentation tactics, they must, he suggested, begin by taking a number of popular

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[959] Soe Hok Gie, "Saya Bukan Wakil KAMI" [I do not represent the KAMI], *Sinar Harapan*, March 1969; reprinted in Badil, Bekti, and Luntungan, *Soe Hok Gie…Sekali Lagi*, 486.

[960] Soe Hok Gie, "Betapa Tak Menariknya Pemerintah Sekarang" [The current government is so uninteresting], *Kompas*, July 16, 1969; reprinted in Badil, Bekti, and Luntungan, *Soe Hok Gie…Sekali Lagi*, 477.

measures: a clampdown on corruption among high officials and juvenile delinquency among their children, the promotion of rule of law, the protection of human rights, and pro-development publicity campaigns.[961]

In late 1970, Widjojo and his confrères suffered an attack from the American New Left. In an article appearing in the October 1970 issue of *Ramparts*, David Ransom, then "a member of the Pacific Studies Center," used—in a simplistic and ahistorical manner—a cluster of interviews to make the case that Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Mohammad Sadli, Soebroto, and Emil Salim were just tools the United States wielded to pry open Indonesia's abundant natural resources to American "oil companies and corporations."[962] In Ransom's portrayal of them, Indonesian economists and generals appeared to sacrifice their country to US economic imperialism in "a saga of intellectual international intrigue" where they collaborated with the Ford Foundation, the CIA, and the American multinationals.[963]

On September 25, 1971, in defense of Widjojo and his colleagues, Goenawan Mohamad, the editor-in-chief of the weekly *Tempo*, mounted a counter-critique of Ransom's article. He called it "a figment of superstition," an arbitrary deductive misreading of contemporary Indonesian history. Ransom, he went on to say, refused to see the Indonesian economists as having "their own dynamics." Arguing, as Ransom did, that the anti-communist student protests in 1966, the new foreign investment law, Soeharto's technocrats, and the First Five-Year Development Plan resulted from the evil

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[961] Ibid., 478.

[962] David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre," *Ramparts* 9, no. 4 (October 1970): 27.

[963] Ibid.

maneuverings of a few US agencies was tantamount to claiming that Indonesians—"the brown-skinned people of a backward country"—were stupid "water buffaloes" that intelligent Americans could order around. Goenawan did a fine job of showing that by overdoing his First-World radicalism Ransom inadvertently exposed his own subconscious reactionary (even colonial) attitudes. Goenawan suggested that sometimes well-meaning leftist foreign observers—themselves beneficiaries of Western capitalism—could not fathom that at stake in the debate about current economic policy-making in Indonesia were neither "academic conclusions" nor "ideological triumphs" but rather the lives of the "tens of millions" of Indonesians still living in poverty.[964]

Widjojo passed away in Jakarta on Friday, March 9, 2012 at the Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital and was buried at the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery.[965] This happened almost seven years after Sudarsih, his wife, died at age 79 in Jakarta on November 20, 2005.[966] In the printed media she left behind very few details about her own life and ideas. But it is known that in 1978 she co-founded an association of women amateur painters, most of whom were wives of active or retired senior officials in and around Jakarta.[967] Sometimes, to friends of the family Sudarsih sent greeting cards

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[964] Goenawan Mohamad, "Dari Kisah 'The Berkeley Mafia,'" [The story of the "Berkeley Mafia"], *Tempo*, September 25, 1971.

[965] "Rest in Peace," accessed March 29, 2013, http://www1.kompas.com/obituary/view/3415; Nur Alfiyah and Ferry Firmansyah, "Habibie Minta Widjojo Dimakamkan di Kalibata" [Habibie requested that Widjojo be buried at Kalibata], accessed February 3, 2013, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/03/09/078389078/Habibie-Minta-Widjojo-Dimakamkan-di-Kalibata.

[966] "Istri Ekonom Widjojo Nitisastro Meninggal Dunia" [The spouse of economist Widjojo Nitisastro passed away], *detiknews*, November 21, 2005, accessed February 3, 2013, http://news.detik.com/read/2005/11/21/110207/482685/10/istri-ekonom-widjojo-nitisastro-meninggal-dunia.

[967] "Istri Pejabat Rame-Rame Melukis" [High officials' wives pick up painting], *Angkatan Bersenjata*, April 21, 1989.

decorated with her own paintings.[968] She was the manager of the Nitisastro household, that safe haven which enabled Widjojo to function at full throttle as one of the key "architects" of Indonesian economy in the New Order.[969] Their kind of family, it is safe to say, would have earned the approval of the pre-independence Minahasan modernist Maria Walanda Maramis and even that of the Semaoen of 1919, author of the didactic novel *Hikajat Kadiroen*.

The search for Indonesian modernity in the New Order was both a top-down and a bottom-up undertaking. While its bottom-up side will receive treatment in Chapters 4 and 5, it is one of the tasks of the present chapter to demonstrate that the state-led part of this enterprise was shaped not only by the partnership of Soeharto and the Bappenas economists but also by the collaboration between the president and several other modernizers, especially the large-scale, high-speed, and high-tech industrializers Ibnu Sutowo and B. J. Habibie as well as the multifaceted modernists at the CSIS such as Ali Moertopo, Daoed Joesoef, and Harry Tjan Silalahi. It is time for us to examine these people's contributions to the quest for Indonesian progress.

It is useful to identify in the modernist vision of Widjojo and his entourage the central ideas that guided their actions and that, in turn, provoked the reactions of their rivals. First, the "Berkeley Mafia" remained a band of self-conscious academics and professional economists. Unlike the CSIS thinker Ali Moertopo, for instance, they were persistent specialists. In their pursuit of Indonesian modernity, they focused their efforts on its economic side, for modernity was—first and foremost—rooted in economic

[968] Suntoro Isman, "Intellectual, Researcher, Educator, Public Servant, Family Figure," in Arsjad, Ananta, and Kuncoro, *Testimonials*, 447.

[969] Permadi, "Direct Cross-Checking," 212.

prosperity and demanded a conversion to a new way of life that was "rational," "scientific," "realistic," pragmatic, "efficient," "calculating," and "commercial."[970] They left it to others to take care of the non-economic dimensions of modernization.

Second, Widjojo and his associates were economists of a Keynesian bent. On the one hand, they thought that the best way to develop the national economy was by setting the market free from state control to boost up efficiency and productivity on the basis of comparative advantage.[971] They argued for a small public sector and wanted the government to focus on "helping private business exploit Indonesia's competitive advantage," especially its cheap labor. On the other hand, these technocrats held that the government should act as the coordinator and engine of economic modernization.[972] It should intervene whenever the economy was in trouble. Yet they were aware that many bureaucrats were not economically rational enough to help economic modernization. Thus, they wanted the state to keep an eye on them.[973] The technocrats were opposed to the argument that the extravagant, large-scale, high-speed, and high-tech industrialization championed by Ibnu Sutowo and Habibie could serve as the engine of economic growth.[974]

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[970] MacDougall, "Technocratic Model," 1169.
[971] Richard Borsuk, "Markets: The Limits of Reform," in Emmerson, *Indonesia beyond Suharto*, 140.
[972] MacDougall, "Technocratic Model," 1177.
[973] Mohamad et al., "Technocrat Number One," 50
[974] Ibid.

3. 2. Ali Moertopo (1924-1984): Strategist of Indonesian Modernization

Once, in parachuting training, I jumped out of an airplane. At the moment it occurred to me that my life depended on whether my parachute would open. By analogy I thought that if we want to survive, we must keep our minds open.

Ali Moertopo[975]

The unconventionality of this man! […] […H]e was…naturally smart, but you could…see the lacunas because of a limited educational background. Sometimes he would jump to something and the logic would be missing.

Jusuf Wanandi[976]

And he had one obsession: how to make the Indonesian people modern, progressive and well-developed.

Jusuf Wanandi[977]

Ali Moertopo was a middling-class, nationalist, freewheeling modernizer in the New Order era who pursued a grand-strategy vision of Indonesian modernity. Unlike the technocrats (such as Widjojo Nitisastro) and the engineers (such as B.J. Habibie) who specialized in either the macroeconomic or the industrial dimension of this enterprise, Ali operated as an uninhibited, formidable jack of all trades who, bristling with ideas and schemes, modernized his nation by reformatting its ideology, economy, domestic politics, and foreign relations. As a modernizer, he built and destroyed; he made friends and enemies: his allies saw him as a pragmatist; his detractors considered him a

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[975] Daoed Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku: Memoar Pencari Kebenaran* [He and I: The memoir of a truth seeker] (Jakarta: Kompas, 2006), 470.

[976] Bill Tarrant, *Reporting Indonesia: The Jakarta Post Story, 1983-2008* (Singapore: Equinox, 2008), 36 and 41.

[977] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 226.

"Machiavellian."[978] Whatever the case, it is imperative that we study his modernist ideas. Doing so will enable us to grasp the logic that propelled many of his exploits as one of the most gifted of New Order social engineers. It will also throw into sharp relief the promises and the depredations of modernization that occurred in New Order Indonesia.

On September 23, 1924, Ali Moertopo was born into a Javanese, Muslim, priyayi family of modest means in Blora, Central Java. He was the third-born of nine siblings: four sisters and five brothers. His mother, Soekati, made a living as a small-time batik trader and his father, Soetikno Kartoprawiro, quit his job as a forester to be a tailor and an agent of Singer sewing machines.[979] The business was not very successful. The family's unfavorable economic situation and a strong belief in education as a road to success led Soekati to farm out her children to her more well-to-do brothers in Pekalongan so they could attend good schools.[980] Thus, Ali spent the greater part of his childhood and early adolescence in Krapyak, North Pekalongan, living in the household of his maternal uncle, Ali Rahman Sastro Koesoemo.[981] Some of Ali Moertopo's sisters grew up to be teachers. Like him, most of his brothers pursued a military career.[982] In 1956, Ali married Wastoeti (1929-2008), a teacher of Javanese aristocratic origin.[983] Neither of their two children, Harris Ali Moerfi (1959-2010) and Lucky Ali Moerfiqin (b. 1963), entered the armed

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[978] "Meninggal Dunia" [Passed away], *Tempo*, May 26, 1984; Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 226, 228. Why so many people in the New Order did not take Ali Moertopo seriously is a very important question that I am still unable to answer.

[979] Ali Moersalam, "Dari Dulu Mangkyo Suka Kerja Keras" [From the start, Mangkyo was a hard worker], in CSIS, *Ali Moertopo, 1924-1984* (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 145, 147-148.

[980] Ibid., 145.

[981] Ibid.

[982] Ibid., 145, 150.

[983] Wastoeti, "Urusan Negara dan Urusan Keluarga: Dua Hal yang Terpisah" [We do not mix state affairs and family matters], in CSIS, *Ali Moertopo*, 122.

forces. The former was lecturer at the School of Engineering, University of Indonesia;[984] the latter is a Golkar politician.[985] Both of them hold a master's degree.

Ali Moertopo did not complete his education at the MULO (Dutch-language junior high school)[986]—he quit at 15 to enter Hizbullah, a Muslim paramilitary organization founded by the Japanese during their occupation of Java.[987] Yet he was no less an intellectual than, say, Widjojo Nitisastro. In his attempt to make up for his lack of higher education, he undertook lifelong self-study: Besides spending his insomniac nights reading,[988] he enjoyed a daily exchange of ideas with intellectuals. In 1971, with Soedjono Hoemardani, Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sofjan Wanandi, he cofounded the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think tank that offered policy recommendations to Soeharto in the 1970s and 1980s.[989] He seems to have mastered the art of wielding informal conversations as a potent research tool. Thus, from morning to night, in the office and at home, he received a stream of guests from all walks of life, from whom he tapped information on and insight into society.[990] It was quite a feat that through this idiosyncratic self-training he turned himself into a grand strategist of Indonesian modernization.

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[984] Universitas Indonesia, "Web Dosen" [Lecturers' website], accessed March 29, 2013, http://staff.ui.ac.id/profil/detail_dosen.php?id=131476427.

[985] Lucky Ali Moerfiqin, "Pemimpin Berkompetensi Penegakan Hukum" [Leaders with expertise in law enforcement], *Suara Karya Online*, February 28, 2012, http://www.suarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=298171.

[986] "Meninggal Dunia"

[987] Tarrant, *Reporting Indonesia*, 33-34, 41.

[988] Wastoeti, "Urusan Negara," 126; Harris Ali Moerfi, "Ali Moertopo Seorang Otodidak" [Ali Moertopo was an autodidact], in CSIS, *Ali Moertopo*, 138-139; Lucky Ali Moerfiqin, "Membaca Hingga Larut Malam" [Reading until late at night], in ibid., 141.

[989] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 111.

[990] Moerfi, "Ali Moertopo," 129; Wastoeti, "Urusan Negara," 126; Moerfiqin, "Membaca," 141; Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 226.

So much has been made of Ali Moertopo's background as a soldier. Many have pointed out that he entered the profession during the Japanese occupation; battled with the Indonesian Left and the Dutch during the Revolution; crushed a regional rebellion in Sumatra in the 1950s; and demolished the PKI, unseated Sukarno, and engineered Soeharto's rise to the presidency in the second half of the 1960s.[991] There is no denying that a military career provided Ali Moertopo with the launching pad from which he catapulted himself to power and prominence in the New Order. Yet to stay fixated on Ali's army background is to misunderstand the man and to miss the opportunity to wield his body of ideas as a lens to study the intellectual foundation of New Order Indonesia.

Before examining Ali Moertopo's core ideas in detail, I would like to point out that his life trajectory illustrates a central theme in contemporary Indonesian history: the triumph of the middling classes. Though the first cards that life dealt him were not very promising, he played them so well that in three decades he not only achieved success in the military but became one of the leading modernizers of his country. He took a central part in those great efforts that went into the making of modern Indonesia à la the New Order: political stabilization; the destruction of communism and the domestication of political Islam; the quest for a structural-functional society through deideologization,[992] professionalization,[993] and Pancasilaization; the development of an Indonesian industrial bourgeoisie; the propagation of an economic-development mindset; and the pursuit of peaceful and cooperative foreign relations.

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[991] McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*,100; "Meninggal Dunia."

[992] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar Pemikiran tentang Akselerasi Modernisasi Pembangunan" (1972) [Some basic considerations on accelerated modernization], in *Strategi Pembangunan Nasional* [National development strategy] (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi CSIS, 1981), 97.

[993] Ibid., 96, 107.

Beyond his occupation as an army officer, Ali Moertopo is best seen as a middling-class man. At home, he was one of those middling-class Indonesians who believed in the centrality of self-management as a way of ensuring success and peace in life. With this goal in mind, he encouraged his children to practice what he called "management by compass." As his son Harris once put it:

> I [was advised to] organize my daily schedule not by time but by goals [and] directions…. This helped me ward off the feeling of being hounded by time. It saved me from having to lead a frantic life. With my goals serving as a guiding star…I was able to go about my life in peace day by day.[994]

In other words, Ali Moertopo wanted his son to conceive a grand vision and pursue it:

> You need to have one big vision. Wherever you are, if you have a vision you'll know where to go; you'll know what your goals are. You'll never go astray. And no shock can throw you off balance.[995]

Just as Ali Moertopo wanted his children to adopt management by compass, so he urged his compatriots to cling to Pancasila as their national guiding vision because he regarded it as their best bet for keeping their poise and staying on track in the midst of those shocks and shakes which rapid modernization was bound to bring about.

Among the other core values that Ali Moertopo attempted to impart to his next of kin were work ethic, meritocracy, "lifelong education," can-do mindset, "optimism," "attention to details," perfectionism, autonomy, the pursuit of a single encompassing vision, nationalism, and loyalty to one's leader.[996]

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[994] Moerfi, "Ali Moertopo," 135.

[995] Ibid., 138.

[996] Moerfiqin, "Membaca," 142; Moerfi, "Ali Moertopo," 135, 138-139; Moersalam, "Dari Dulu," 146.

Eager to make his children share his fascination with experts and intellectuals, Ali Moertopo often took them to the CSIS. As his firstborn son, Harris, recalled in 2004, "Dad often told me that the CSIS was the habitat of the brilliant and the learned."[997] This tactic does not seem to have worked at the time, for the teenager was apparently less enthralled by the eggheads than he was by the architectural features of the think tank:

> I found the atmosphere impressive…. Since few people occupied this large building, serenity reigned there. It was not as flashy as the buildings on Jalan Thamrin and Jalan Sudirman, all furnished with fancy carpets and articles of furniture. Still, [the CSIS building] looked neat and tidy: everything was in its rightful place and nothing was superfluous. What I found most striking was that at the researchers' offices the walls were covered with shelves full of books and the desks were cluttered with stacks of books and paper.[998]

Phobic about prejudices and ideologies, which he dismissed as agents of stagnation, Ali Moertopo pinned his modernist dreams on intellectuals, whom he considered as the "engine of social development":[999]

> […E]xperts are now playing a key role in the development [of our country], [which]… is proof that [it] no longer emphasizes sectarian ideologies. These professionals are scholars who have got rid of those prejudices which still hold sway over traditional entrepreneurs. One day… experts will become key players in the expansion of [Indonesia's] development. Whether…at…the Bappenas…or in the private sector, [they will] draw up the plans for development in various areas of social life.[1000]

This was a vision that had deep roots in the nationalist movement in the Dutch East Indies (both among Natives and ethnic Chinese), one that Kartini, Sjahrir, Tirto Adhi

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[997] Moerfi, "Ali Moertopo," 136.
[998] Ibid.
[999] Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 233.
[1000] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 50.

Soerjo, and Kwee Tek Hoay—had they been still around (and not changed their minds) in the New Order—would have endorsed.

Ali and his wife Wastoeti attempted to run a well-functioning middling-class household, where calm, affection, and dining together played a constructive role. A relative who stayed with the Moertopos puts it this way:

> […] I admire Uncle Ali and [Aunt Wastoeti]. […N]ever did they have an argument in front of me and their sons Harris and Lucky. Never did I see them quarrel in public. They never cast an angry look at each other at the dining table. Aunt [Wastoeti] was the kind of wife a man could count on. She herself prepared the tea and coffee [for her husband to drink and …] the clothes [for him to wear]. No housemaid was allowed access to their bedroom. Uncle Ali was a foodie but he didn't like eating alone. He liked taking the whole family out to dinner, for example at the *soto kudus* restaurant in Cawang.[1001]

To show his affection to the kids, Ali Moertopo did what a storybook father often does:

> […A]t night he…would come up to my room or read a book before he went to sleep. If he found that I was still awake, he would have a bit of a chat with me. If I was already asleep, he would adjust my blanket and pat my head….[1002]

Yet bringing up children to be upright middling-class adults turned out to be a formidable task, even for a versatile social engineer like Ali Moertopo. Like many middling-class parents in Indonesia and beyond, he had his share of parenting failures. For instance, on August 13, 1977, in a brawl that took place on Jalan Batu, Central

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[1001] Juniarti Hatta, "Lebih Baik Berdiri daripada Bergantung" [Self-reliance is better than dependency], in CSIS, *Ali Moertopo*, 158.

[1002] Moerfiqin, "Membaca," 141.

Jakarta, Harris Ali Moerfi, then age 18, reportedly shot Rudy Chaidir to death. The victim, age 21, was the son of another military officer, a certain Colonel Hamsil.[1003] This was one of the frequent cases of juvenile delinquency that had bedeviled the urban middling classes in Indonesia since as early as the 1950s: the problem of so-called "cross-boys" and "cross-girls."[1004]

I offer the foregoing images of Ali Moertopo in the domestic sphere to make the case that what he stood up for was not militarism but a version of modern middling-class way of life. If we take a look at what he strove to accomplish beyond his home, it will become clear that he sought to convert his compatriots to such a lifestyle.

From the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, during which period he worked as a high-ranking Army officer and served as President Soeharto's advisor, deputy chief of the State Intelligence Coordinating Body, and Minister of Information, Ali Moertopo operated as a very busy social engineer. His many undertakings constituted one big project: building a new society whose conduct of life centered on his vision of Indonesian modernity. It turned out to be a modernity defined by order,[1005] consensus, progress, efficiency,[1006] the triumph of reason[1007] (see Figure q), prosperity, meritocracy,[1008]

[1003] "Ali Moertopo Menjelaskan" [Ali Moertopo explains], *Tempo*, August 20, 1977.

[1004] Loren Ryter, "Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto's Order?" in *Violence and the State in New Order's Indonesia*, ed. Benedict Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001), 138.

[1005] Ali Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional" (1974) [National political strategy], in *Strategi Pembangunan Nasional*, 145.

[1006] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 78.

[1007] Moertopo, "Penutup," [Concluding remarks], in *Strategi Pembangunan Nasional*, 394.

[1008] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 77.

professionalism,[1009] inclusive nationalism, rapid industrialization,[1010] the rule of law,[1011] and the integration of the city and the countryside.[1012] As a man of the Enlightenment, he saw it as his task to manage social change.[1013] He did this through a creative use of as many resources as he was able to draw on: support from the president, extra budgetary sources of funds, science and technology, a think tank, the military, the intelligence service, the bureaucracy, political parties, and diplomatic relations.

One of the major lessons that Ali Moertopo drew from his country's contemporary history was that communism,[1014] Islamism,[1015] liberal democracy,[1016] and racism[1017] brought about logjam, disintegration, class warfare, and instability.[1018] By so doing, these ideologies stood in the way of progress. To embark on modernization, society must be cleansed of them. Seeing the military as the most "program-oriented" of all social groups in Indonesia, Ali believed that it was also the most capable of exorcising these agents of instability, hence the necessity, in his view, for the armed forces to perform a "dual function": defender and stabilizer.[1019]

To enter modernity, Indonesia should, in Ali's view, carry out legal reform. Its laws needed codification, unification, and updating.[1020] The country ought to have a truly

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[1009] Ibid., 99; Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 201.
[1010] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 90-92, 94.
[1011] Ibid., 103.
[1012] Ibid., 103-104.
[1013] Ibid., 60.
[1014] Ibid., 111; Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 143, 178.
[1015] Ibid.
[1016] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 95; Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 178.
[1017] Moertopo, "Strategi Kebudayaan," [Strategy of culture], in *Strategi Pembangunan Nasional*, 321.
[1018] Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 132-134, 210.
[1019] Ibid., 254-255.
[1020] Ibid., 102.

"national law" that was "clear, distinct, practical, pragmatic, and comprehensive."[1021] It was to be purged of its "feudal-colonial" heritage and animated, instead, by Pancasila.[1022] Modern Indonesia, he argued, should be based on the rule of law.[1023] He welcomed the participation of non-state actors in its promotion. It was thus small wonder that he endorsed the founding by Adnan Buyung Nasution in 1971 of the Legal Aid Foundation (LBH).[1024] He did not move to annihilate this NGO even when in fighting for the rule of law it came into conflict with the military.[1025]

Ali Moertopo believed that in its journey to progress Indonesia ought to be guided by the middling classes, which must develop, among other things, an industrial bourgeoisie[1026] strong enough to tackle its transnational rivals. Entrepreneurs were, for him, one of the most potent incarnations of the modern man and the source of national strength.[1027] That was why he recommended that "the economy…be increasingly left to the private sector," save some of its parts that dealt with strategic commodities like petroleum, which ought to remain under state management.[1028]

Taking into account his ardent, steadfast support for industrialization, we may regard Ali Moertopo as one of the intellectual heirs of the Parindra leader Mohammad Husni Thamrin and the writer Kwee Tek Hoay. (For a treatment of their advocacy for

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[1021] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 101.
[1022] Ibid.
[1023] Ibid., 100.
[1024] "Menagih Lampu Hijau" [Asking for a green light], *Tempo*, December 11, 1971.
[1025] Daniel S. Lev, "Between State and Civil Society: Professional Lawyers and Reform in Indonesia," in *Legal Evolution and Political and Political Authority in Indonesia: Selected Essays* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 300-301.
[1026] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 82, 87.
[1027] Moertopo, "Strategi Kebudayaan," 309.
[1028] Moertopo, "Penutup" 383.

industrial transformation, see Chapter 2.) Industrialization figured prominently in Ali's vision of modernity, as it did in those of Thamrin and Kwee. In 1972, in a book titled *Basic Considerations on Acceleration of Modernization in 25-Year Development*, he wrote that Indonesian society was in need of a new culture that encouraged its members to live by a cluster of pro-industrialization values, which included the love of material wealth, the appreciation of technological progress, future-oriented mentality, and entrepreneurial way of life.[1029]

In 1982, while acknowledging that Indonesia had made significant strides in industrialization,[1030] he contended that its national interests—that is, minimum industrial import, maximum industrial export, and economic independence and prowess [1031]—demanded that the industrial transformation should run faster, deeper, and more extensively. The share of industry in GDP should reach that point at which industry became the core and backbone of the national economy.[1032] The country's import-substitution industries ought to go into the production of intermediate and capital goods.[1033] In exports, a shift should occur from the preponderance of primary commodities toward that of high value-added products.[1034] If this dream of a modern industrial Indonesia was to become reality any time soon, the state should play a leading role in its realization:[1035] It should not only protect domestic industries[1036] and enforce

[1029] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 44.
[1030] Ali Moertopo, "Tinjauan Strategis Mengenai Industrialisasi" [Strategic considerations of industrialization], *Analisa* 11, no. 5 (May 1982): 406, 411.
[1031] Ibid., 411, 413.
[1032] Ibid., 406, 408, 413, 424.
[1033] Ibid., 407-408.
[1034] Ibid., 408-409.
[1035] Ibid., 422.

process standardization;[1037] it should also forge an integrated industrial base. It was a task that called for a close collaboration between the public sector (for example, state-owned enterprises and government banks) and the private sector (that is, the domestic industrial bourgeoisie).[1038] It also required that the state coordinate the formation of forward and backward linkages among the domestic industries.[1039]

In crafting this strategy of accelerated industrialization, Ali Moertopo derived part of his inspiration from postwar Japan's industrial policy known as Japan, Inc. Just as Japan's industrial prowess fascinated Thamrin in the 1930s, so it inspired Ali forty years later. But Ali enjoyed in New Order Indonesia what Thamrin could only wish for in the Netherlands Indies: control over state resources, which he drew on to carry out wide-ranging reforms (economic, political, sociocultural, and diplomatic) that his state-led accelerated modernization demanded.

Ali Moertopo pursued a state-guided, "efficient," "accelerated," rationally planned, and coffee-without-caffeine kind of modernity.[1040] He wanted Indonesia to become modern without going through the growing pains that he thought had accompanied other societies' passages to modernity.[1041] Among the growing pains he identified were identity crisis,[1042] nihilism,[1043] ecological crisis, aggressiveness,[1044] and

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[1036] Ibid., 423.
[1037] Ibid., 423.
[1038] Ibid., 417, 422-423.
[1039] Ibid., 410.
[1040] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 56, 58, 60.
[1041] Ibid., 57.
[1042] Ibid., 67, 125.
[1043] Ibid., 67.
[1044] Ibid., 106, 124.

profound cultural disquiet.[1045] To ensure that modernization did not result in Westernization and instability[1046] and that society was able to weather the shocks that rapid modernization brought about, it must hold on to Pancasila and follow a reliable national leadership.[1047] For the modernization that Ali had in mind was a very quick one. In 1972, he wrote that the Indonesian economy should grow "threefold" in "twenty-five years" and at a rate of "8 percent per annum." It was possible, he thought, to do so with minimum social disruption,[1048] provided that both "the prosperity approach" and "the security approach" were implemented[1049] or as long as the "trilogy of development" guided the whole process. The trilogy consisted of the maintenance of stability, the attainment of high growth, and the equitable distribution of the fruits of economic development.[1050] Economic development, though, was not an end in itself; it was just a way to create better Indonesians, a means to enable them to be "the cultural subjects in the history of the modern world."[1051]

Ali Moertopo's modernist ideas became the subject of public debate in the middling-class print media. For example, in the August 16, 1971 issue of the daily *Kompas*, the cartoonist G. M. Sudharta offered the image of Ali Moertopo as a champion of Japanese-inspired, state-led, rapid modernization. Just as in the nineteenth century Japan was able to catapult itself into modernity in thirty years, so in the twentieth century Indonesia would be able to accomplish a similar feat in just twenty-five years. Critical of

[1045] Moertopo, "Strategi Kebudayaan," 310.
[1046] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 119.
[1047] Ibid., 125; Moertopo, "Strategi Kebudayaan," 308.
[1048] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 63, 81, 121.
[1049] Ibid., 59.
[1050] Ibid., 92-93.
[1051] Moertopo, "Strategi Kebudayaan," 307.

Ali Moertopo's recipe for progress, the economist Sarbini stands by, fixing his look on the broken rungs in the former's ladder to modernity (see Figure 11).



Figure 11. A cartoon by G. M. Sudharta in *Kompas*, August 16, 1971. The cartoonist portrays the debate between Ali Moertopo and Sarbini as that between the soldier and the thinker—as if this military-civilian dichotomy really worked as a tool to understand the quest for Indonesian modernity in the New Order. Why not see both men as middling-class modernizing intellectuals?

To attain accelerated modernity, Ali constructed, in the early 1970s, a new political life free from…politics: a life cleansed of ideological, ethnic, religious, and class conflicts. Redefining politics as the pursuit and use of power to aid national development,

Ali compelled political parties to abandon ideology-mindedness, embrace a development-oriented mindset, and undertake mergers.[1052] In election campaigns, political parties ought to outdo each other in offering their development programs.[1053] He offered the Golkar ("Functional Group") as the embodiment of his idea of a truly modern political party: one formed not by men of ideologies but by professionals-as-agents-of development.[1054] He even saw Golkar as a miniature of his version of the modern Indonesian society.[1055]

That in the recent past the way political parties worked had caused serious troubles in the public and domestic spheres (and therefore needed modification) was an idea widely shared by leading members of the Indonesian middling classes in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Consider the treatment of this theme by Mochtar Lubis in his novels *Twilight in Jakarta* (1963) and *Waste Land* (1964). As well, the fusion of political parties to fashion a new political structure deemed more supportive of modernization received considerable backing from those intellectuals who played a vital role in engineering the downfall of Guided Democracy and the rise of the New Order, such as Mar'ie Muhammad, Nono Anwar Makarim, Marsillam Simandjuntak, and Subchan Z. E.[1056] It is wrongheaded, therefore, to claim that the amalgamation and

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[1052] Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 185, 193, 199-201; "4 Fraksi, 3 Parpol, & Pimpinan…" [Four fractions, three political parties, and a leadership…], *Tempo*, October 16, 1971.

[1053] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 99.

[1054] Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 199-200.

[1055] Ibid., 204-205.

[1056] Mar'ie Muhammad, Nono Anwar Makarim, and Marsillam Simandjuntak, *Diskusi Kita: Kumpulan Kertas Karja*[Our discussion: Collected working papers] (Djakarta: Sekretariat Diskusi Kita, 1970).

reformatting to which Ali Moertopo subjected the political parties was a poster case of militarism. It was rather a middling-class political project.

Ali Moertopo believed that if modernization was to succeed, Indonesians ought to get rid of ideologies and espouse professionalism:

> The challenge confronting us today is that of organizing all social forces into professional groupings. Professionalism is the best answer [to that challenge]; it is the way the enlightened members of society can participate and perform their duties in national development. Indonesia's development called for investment in skills and expertise; this undertaking will be futile if [carried out without managing] the available funds and the rich natural resources [in a professional fashion].[1057]

He demanded that his countrymen adhere to what he deemed as a rational division of labor.[1058] Peasants were to focus on farming so as to increase their own prosperity and their country's agricultural productivity.[1059] To ensure that this happened, Ali pursued the "floating-mass" policy of disconnecting these people (whom he considered as not rational enough[1060]) from political parties and reduced their political rights to voting in general elections.[1061] By the same token, he urged college students—whom he viewed as "the source and the disseminators of modernity"[1062]— to focus on their studies so they quickly developed into competent specialists[1063] capable of interdisciplinary collaboration to "solve society's problems" using "reason," "expertise," and "moral integrity."[1064] Aware

[1057] Moertopo, "Penutup," 387.
[1058] Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 202-203.
[1059] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 96, 98; Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 201.
[1060] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 97.
[1061] Ibid., 97-99.
[1062] Ibid., 70.
[1063] Ibid., 71-72.
[1064] Moertopo, "Penutup," 391-392.

that the government had to depend on the bureaucracy to implement its development programs, he required the civil servants to espouse pro-development values, such as meritocracy, professionalism, efficiency, effectiveness, pragmatism, and loyalty to the state as opposed to political parties.[1065] They ought to speed up modernization.[1066] All professional groups in society, he argued, must collaborate with each other in support of national development, promoting consensus and minimizing conflict.

Ali Moertopo knew that for Indonesia to succeed in self-modernization, there should be peace and economic cooperation in Southeast Asia. It was thus small wonder that he was an enthusiastic advocate for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.[1067] In fact, the first step he took to build peace in the region was that of ending the confrontation against Malaysia.[1068]

Ali Moertopo's modernization yielded mixed results. Always a wide-ranging modernizer, he crafted a series of "strategies" to reorganize his country's politics, economy, culture, law, peasantry, working class, and foreign relations. By modifying society according to these plans, he reached some of his objectives, such as peaceful and cooperative relations between Indonesia and its neighbors, high and rapid economic growth, and the rise of domestic bourgeoisie. Yet, this engineering helped produce a new society that differed in outlooks, values, and expectations from the one he had in mind.

[1065] Moertopo, "Dasar-Dasar," 77, 79-80.
[1066] Ibid., 78-79.
[1067] Moertopo, "Strategi Politik Nasional," 276.
[1068] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 68-71.

3. 3. Daoed Joesoef (b. 1926): A Latter-Day Man of the Enlightenment

I go on dreaming; I keep on trying to make my dreams come true: I [keep] disseminating the Enlightenment ideas through my writings.

Daoed Joesoef[1069]

I am…a specialist in the construction of the whole….

Daoed Joesoef[1070]

Daoed Joesoef (see Figure 12) was born into a rural middling-class family in Kampung Darat, Medan, North Sumatra, on August 8, 1926. His parents, the Acehnese Moehammad Joesoef and the Malay Siti Djasi'ah, operated a dairy farm and had, prior to the Great Depression, twenty milk cows. In 2003 he published a novelistic memoir titled *Emak* (Mother), which highlights the strategic role Djasi'ah played in the metamorphosis that Daoed underwent from a young boy of Kampung Darat to a Sorbonne-trained scholar. Indeed, despite her modest education—she read and wrote in Malay, but only in Arabic script—Djasi'ah was a modern and modernizing woman of the kind Maria Walanda Maramis advocated among the Natives of Minahasa in the early twentieth century. Djasi'ah was one of the first women in her village to incorporate things modern into her life: She travelled by bicycle, played harmonium, taught herself domestic science (skills such as cooking, needlework, gardening, and the art of flower arrangement), and urged her kids to develop the habit of reading. And she sent all her five children (three girls and two boys) to Dutch-language schools so they could master the mental powers

[1069] Daoed Joesoef, "Aku Tetap Bermimpi" [I keep on dreaming], in *Guru-Guru Keluhuran* [Teachers in excellence], ed. St. Sularto (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 74.
[1070] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 314.

that she thought had enabled people to invent modern gadgets.[1071] In his own quest for modernity, Daoed Joesoef picked up where his mother left off: After undertaking self-modernization, he went on by bringing his fellow Indonesians—sometimes even dragging them kicking and screaming—to his vision of modernity.

Figure 12. Daoed Joesoef, 1978 [*Tempo*/Eddy Herwanto].

To sum up his vision of Indonesian modernity, Daoed Joesoef sometimes quoted Hatta who in turn quoted Charles Fourier: “We want to build a world where everyone will be happy.”[1072] “[O]ur image of happiness,” as Walter Benjamin pointed out in 1940, “is indissolubly bound up with the image of redemption.”[1073] This observation applies to

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[1071] Daoed Joesoef, *Emak* [Mother], (Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2003), 109, 112, 141-142, 386, 390.

[1072] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 235; Joesoef, “Aku Tetap Bermimpi,” 66.

[1073] Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 253-254.

Daoed Joesoef's idea of happiness, which was linked to his vision of emancipation. In a talk with Soeharto in 1978, he presented his image of modern Indonesia in terms of Enlightenment-style multiple emancipations:

> We're still oppressed by the forces of Nature. Floods, prolonged droughts, earthquakes, and diseases beset us. We, therefore, must undertake "physical emancipation"…through the mastery of science, technology, and skills, hence the necessity…of visionary education. […]
>
> We're still oppressed, too, by poverty, folly, ignorance, hunger, and injustice as well as by the powers of the privileged [in our society]. We, therefore, must encourage "social emancipation"…by engaging in a nation-building that is sustainable, consistent, equitable, and democratic. […]
>
> And we're still oppressed by the interests of developed countries and the…international institutions that champion these interests. We, therefore, must undertake "international emancipation": we must break free from the domination by developed countries and their international financial institutions.[1074]

What did Daoed Joesoef mean? What did he do to realize his modernist dreams? What were the social consequences of his efforts? I shall answer these questions by exploring the ideas that inspired his attempt, mostly in the New Order, to make Indonesia modern.

First, Daoed Joesoef believed that, armed with philosophy, science, and technology, the enlightened section of the middling classes was the spearhead of Indonesia's self-modernization. One of the key ingredients of the modernity they desired was economic progress.[1075] As early as 1974, Daoed Joesoef realized that since the end of World War II humankind had been living in global Information Age; it was a new world

[1074] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 708-709.

[1075] Daoed Joesoef, "Bapak Soedjono Hoemardani dan Metoda Tradisional Kontemplatif-Integralistik" [Soedjono Hoemardani and the traditional, contemplative-integralistic method], in *Soedjono Hoemardani: Pendiri CSIS, 1918-1986* [Soedjono Hoemardani: A cofounder of the CSIS], ed. CSIS (Jakarta: CSIS, 1987), 28; Daoed Joesoef, "Knowledge Economy and World Economy," *The Indonesian Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (January 1974): 37.

where prestige, wealth, and power flowed to societies led by "knowledge workers,"[1076] an elite class that commanded information and communication technology, research and development institutes, industrial centers, and great cities.[1077] This social group consisted of scholars, scientists, experts, CEOs, and top government officials; they led universities and think tanks, the bureaucracy and the armed forces, business and the media, political parties and social movements. Many embraced a new nationalism that argued that a nation's prosperity no longer depended on mere control over land but on advances in technology. Some had even gone beyond this new nationalism; they formed a global, post-nationalist class of managers in charge of multinational corporations (MNCs).[1078] From the Indonesian point of view, the question become this: How was the country to survive in this kind of world?

Daoed Joesoef was a nationalist, but of a sophisticated type.[1079] He dismissed autarchy as a stupid, even suicidal response to the challenges of living in the knowledge-based, global economy. He argued that Indonesia's survival and progress would depend on its ability to join the world economy as a fit and creative participant. This could be done this way: As it opened itself to foreign capital and the MNCs, Indonesia should take three self-strengthening measures. First, it ought to create "Indonesia Incorporated": a strong national economic coalition capable of dealing with the MNCs on the same footing. This united front was to consist of the government, the bureaucracy, the

[1076] Joesoef, "Knowledge Economy," 37.
[1077] Ibid., 40.
[1078] Ibid., 39-40.
[1079] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 120. His nationalist feelings, he wrote in retrospect in 2010, came into being in the 1930s in context of his resentment toward the Dutch racism he suffered in his childhood in Medan at the time; Joesoef, "Aku Tetap Bermimpi," 61-64.

technocracy, and the industrial bourgeoisie. Second, the country's private industries, trading firms, and banks should integrate themselves into large-scale constellations supported by a national consortium of state and private banks. Finally, an Educational Foundation should be set up to train middle-level technicians, whose task it was to carry out the decisions made by their higher-ups: the "knowledge workers." The Foundation was to be funded by obligatory contributions from foreign companies operating in Indonesia.[1080]

Another theme stands out in Daoed Joesoef's vision of Indonesian modernity. He was a man of the Enlightenment—a crusading one at that. One of his fixed ideas was that only self-reliant, critical-thinking individuals could bring society to modernity in economy, politics, religion, and culture. Reason, he claimed, was the foundation of order and liberty; it was the key to progress and well-being in family, society, and the state. To modernize Indonesia, he needed to enlist the help of a whole lot more men of the Enlightenment, that is, more Daoed Joesoefs. And to create such people as quickly as he could, he deployed a variety of institutions, which included his family and the kindergarten and grade school it owned; the Association of Indonesian Students he joined in France; the Department of Education and Culture he presided over; the Supreme Advisory Council where he served as a member; the print media, and the Jakarta-based think tank CSIS where he served as director and researcher.[1081]

In the period 1978-1983, as Minister of Education and Culture Daoed Joesoef attempted to realize a dream of modern Indonesia that he conceived, he said, in his mid-

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[1080] Joesoef, "Knowledge Economy," 41-44; see also Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 402-403.
[1081] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 135-136, 191, 241, 407, 430, 480, 668, 808.

twenties in North Sumatra during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945). What he envisioned was an Indonesia that was based neither on religion nor on ethno-racial identity, but on the scientific way of life; it was to be a nation-state governed by intellectuals.[1082] This concept of modern Indonesia had its roots in the sort of nationalism that Sjahrir, Hatta, and Takdir Alisjahbana preached in the 1920s and 1930s. (Indeed, in memoir in 2006, Joesoef acknowledged the intellectual debt he owed to Hatta.[1083]) One day in the 1970s, it dawned on him that if Indonesians were left to their own devices, very few would transform themselves into "men of analysis," the agents of modernization. Thus, for their own good and, more importantly, for the good of the whole nation, he made up his mind that he must intervene, dragging his compatriots kicking and screaming to modernity. This, in my view, was the motive behind a number of social engineering projects that he undertook in the New Order.[1084]

Daoed Joesoef did not like what he saw when he observed Indonesian college students in the 1970s. They led a life that struck him as "spoiled," puerile, pretentious, and too political.[1085] And they posed as fully-fledged intellectuals and champions of the people. He wanted to stop this buffoonery. He stripped these kids of their self-illusions, exposing them as pathetic incarnations of H. C. Andersen's emperor with no clothes. On July 15, 1978, to a reporter of the daily *Kompas*, he said:

> They are still stupid and badly in need of education. When it comes to [the mastery of] science, who are the weakest in the academic community? It is

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[1082]"Konsep dan Fabel Andersen" [Concepts and Andersen's tales], *Tempo*, July 15, 1978.

[1083] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 123, 315.

[1084] Ibid., 797, 808.

[1085] Ibid., 686, 701-704.

> the students, right? […I know that] the ignoramuses in [our] society glorify [them]. But I say to these students: "Look! You're naked![1086]

He told Ali Moertopo, his colleague at the CSIS, that the intellectual powers of these students were, for the time being, "no better than those of men in the street."[1087] As a holder of two doctorates (the first one from the Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques at the Université de Paris and the second one from the Sorbonne),[1088] he saw no use in seeking their input before he designed and introduced the policy he termed the "Normalization of Campus Life."

Although Daoed Joesoef at times looked down his nose at college students for what they were, he always looked up to the great people they could become:[1089] professionals, intellectuals, and technocratic philosophers as agents of Indonesia's democratization, "physical emancipation," social liberation, and international greatness.[1090] He once told Soeharto in 1978: "We've got to be tough with the students, precisely because they are our hope for the redemption of our nation-state and for the development of genuine democracy in the future."[1091] He saw tremendous modernizing potentials in these young people—potentials, however, that were in danger of being wasted because they led an "abnormal," even "corrupt," lifestyle on campus. They fooled around as "men of mass political rallies" instead of as "men of analysis" and they treated

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[1086] "Normalisasi Kampus Tidak Menyempitkan Aktivitas Mahasiswa" [Normalization of campus will not narrow down student activities], *Kompas*, July 11, 1978; cf. Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 702.

[1087] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 481.

[1088] Ibid., 128, 729-730; "Daoed Joesoef," in *Apa & Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Indonesia, 1983-1984*, [An Indonesian who's who, 1983-1984] (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1984), 332.

[1089] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 708, 714-715.

[1090] Ibid., 708, 710.

[1091] Ibid., 708.

their campuses as political arenas, rather than as scientific communities.[1092] A way of life like this violated his ideal of the reasonable society, each of whose members performed his or her professional function.[1093]

Daoed Joesoef made up his mind in 1978 that he had to bring universities back to normalcy, that is, to their original function as centers for scholastic studies where students honed their skills in individual scientific reasoning (as opposed to political groupthink), learning to collect data, analyze them, and write theses to present their findings.[1094] Thus, as Minister of Education and Culture, Joesoef introduced the semester credit system, banned intramural politics, and dismantled its vehicle, the Student Councils.[1095] To those student activists who were desperate to scratch their political itches, he offered the option of doing so off-campus, not as students but as members of youth organizations or political parties.[1096] He had no respect for student demonstrations, seeing them as political circuses in which unreason prevailed, leading their participants to engage in disorderly and destructive behaviors, which were beneath the dignity of any aspiring intellectuals, the budding agents of modernization.[1097] He once wrote that rather than fight against Soeharto, Daoed Joesoef, and the NKK, they should have been spending their energies competing with their counterparts in advanced countries for

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[1092] "Antara Buku-Pesta-Cinta dan Politik" [Between study-party-love lifestyle and politics], *Tempo*, May 27, 1978; "Saya Akan Berani Bertindak"; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 686.

[1093] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 635.

[1094] "Daoed Joesoef tentang Mahasiswa" [Daoed Joesoef on university students], *Tempo*, April 22, 1978; "Normalisasi Itu Banyak Disorot" [Normalization is under scrutiny], *Tempo*, June 17, 1978; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 230.

[1095] "Antara Buku-Pesta-Cinta dan Politik"; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 629, 699-700.

[1096] "Antara Buku-Pesta-Cinta dan Politik"; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 633, 701.

[1097] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 196.

scientific and technological supremacy.[1098] For, during his own studies at the Sorbonne, it occurred to him that the highly diligent, intelligent, and creative students in developed countries would soon emerge as the leaders of their nations who would employ their philosophical, scientific, and technological expertise to help their countries dominate the world.[1099] Daoed Joesoef had already practiced as a graduate student what he later preached as a cabinet minister. During his studies at the Sorbonne, while preparing his two doctoral dissertations, he drew up plans for the modernization of Indonesia's education, culture, economy, and national defense in the context of nation-building. And he presented some of his ideas on these subjects at the conferences held by the Associations of Indonesian Students in Europe.[1100] He wanted Indonesian students in the New Order to channel their political aspirations into such academic exercises.[1101]

To give Indonesia a strong push toward modernity, Daoed Joesoef, during his tenure as Minister of Education and Culture, intensified the pursuit of science in schools, championed a rational interpretation of Islam, and promoted the ideal of the secular state.[1102] He did so by, among other measures, requiring that all children attend school during the fasting month, receive no more than two hours of religious instruction per week, take up Pancasila moral education, and—if they were Muslim females—not wear headscarves at school.[1103] He encouraged Muslims to express their piety by practicing

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[1098] Ibid., 480.
[1099] Ibid., 345-346.
[1100] Ibid., 169, 669-670.
[1101] Ibid., 630.
[1102] Ibid., 674.
[1103] Ali Hasjmy, "Catatan Kecil tentang Dr. Daoed Joesoef" [Brief notes on Dr. Daoed Joesoef], in *Nalar dan Naluri: 70 Tahun Daoed Joesoef* [Reason and instinct: Festschrift in honor of the seventieth birthday of Daoed Joesoef], ed. Kadjat Hartojo, Harry Tjan Silalahi, Hadi

tolerance and studying philosophy and the sciences. [1104] It was this way of practicing Islam, he pointed out, which brought about its Golden Age (750-1100).[1105]

The ideal of a unitary nation state constituted the third motif in Daoed Joesoef's dream about Indonesian modernity. To protect the country's integrity in the face of ethnic, religious, racial, and economic diversity was a formidable task that only reasonable people were able to accomplish. Thus, the government ought to train as many Indonesian citizens as possible to be such people; it also should neutralize those religious fanatics and the evil politicians who wield ideologies to exploit ethnic, racial, and religious sentiments in their pursuit of power and money.[1106] The government must see to it that the state remained secular,[1107] thereby protecting gender equality and the rights of minorities.[1108]

The fourth feature that defined Daoed Joesoef's brand of Indonesian modernity was democracy, which he understood not as government by the common people but government by the wise and the enlightened. Modern Indonesia was to be "a democratic society" whose members conducted their political lives in an orderly, rational, and constructive manner. For such a society to take shape, it fell to the government to ensure that universities produced an intellectual elite[1109] of independent and creative thinkers,[1110]

Soesastro (Jakarta: CSIS, 1996), 29; "Mau Apa, Libur?" [What is the school break for?], *Tempo*, July 15, 1978; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 689.

[1104] Joesoef, *Emak*, 236, 241, 246, 366, 369, 375; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 550.

[1105] Joesoef, *Emak*, 241-242; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 612, 694.

[1106] Joesoef, *Emak*, 247; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 803.

[1107] Joesoef, *Emak* , 94, 246; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 674.

[1108] Joesoef, *Emak*, 204, 231.

[1109] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 628.

[1110] "Daoed Joesoef tentang Mahasiswa."

whose behavior was governed not by emotion but by reason.[1111] Reason, he believed, was the bedrock of order and progress.[1112] Forming the key section of this elite were the "technosophes," that is, technocrats-cum-philosophers in charge of managing the country in accord with a set of philosophical ideas as it undertook modernization.[1113]

Unlike the technocrats at the Bappenas, who were basically specialists, the technosophe took a holistic and strategic approach to modernization.[1114] As a self-styled technosophe, Daoed Joesoef often argued that economic development and politics were too important to be left to economists and politicians alone, respectively.[1115] Joesoef placed economic development in the wider context of nation-building, for economy, he once wrote, was part of culture; it was really "a cultural affair."[1116] Nation-building was to take place not only in the economy but also in education, culture, religion, domestic politics, national defense, and foreign relations[1117]—and the reason was that there was more to modernity than just prosperity; to become modern was to enjoy freedom, intelligence, creativity, and security (domestic and regional).[1118] It was as a technosophe that Daoed Joesoef played his role as Minister of Education and Culture in the New Order.

[1111] "Normalisasi Itu."
[1112] Ibid.; see also Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 806.
[1113] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 663-664, 509.
[1114] Ibid., 314.
[1115] Ibid., 231-232, 543; Goenawan Mohamad, et al., "Daoed Joesoef," in Siskel, *Celebrating Indonesia*, 43.
[1116] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 232.
[1117] Ibid., 169, 351, 509, 670.
[1118] Ibid., 508-509.

One of the social types that Daoed frequently denounced as standing in the way of Indonesian modernity was the politician, whom he once called "a necessary evil."[1119]

> […] I hate politicians. […] The further I go in my study of political science, the greater becomes my disgust at … [them]; their behavior strays very far from the truth that political science has revealed.[1120]
>
> My aversion to [them] began in the liberal era [1950-1959] when I noticed that … they no longer defended the interests of the people…and the country. This stood in stark contrast to what the freedom fighters did in the colonial era and during the Revolution. [In the liberal era], politicians vied for power; it was all about power for power's sake. They lusted for power as a means to control the economic assets that the Dutch left behind, such as plantations, factories, buildings, and bungalows. [They desired power because] it enabled them to occupy strategic positions in the government, which gave them access to state funds.[1121]

Politicians were members of a culture and an institution that, in Daoed Joesoef's view, were "neurotic" and, therefore, hindered progress.[1122] It was a reactionary culture that fostered the bad habit of finding fault with their rivals. This habit stood in contrast to "critical thinking,"[1123] which exposed falsehoods, championed truth, and could not grow in political parties because party ideology and "party discipline" were bound to kill it.[1124]

Daoed Joesoef distrusted politicians because they behaved as agents of disorder and stagnation. In their egocentric struggle for power and economic spoils, they, being unenlightened and uncivilized, resorted to ideology-mongering and the mobilization of the ignorant masses.[1125] As they did so, they dragged the rest of the society into the mess

[1119] Ibid., 543.
[1120] Ibid., 663.
[1121] Ibid., 663-664; see also 383.
[1122] Ibid., 424.
[1123] Joesoef, *Emak*, 247-248.
[1124] Ibid., 248; see also Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 384.
[1125] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 383.

they had created,[1126] thereby provoking confusion, unrest, and rebellions. For him, their modus operandi signified the triumph of emotion over reason, the victory of ideology over science.[1127] The misbehaviors of the politicians in the 1950s, he argued, had caused distrust of democracy, which was regrettable since there was no modernity without democracy. The crux of the matter was that regular politicians lacked statesmanship; they did not have the ethos and the expertise to behave responsibly in a republic. Exterminating them, however, would plunge the country into greater chaos and deeper backwardness. For the time being, Daoed Joesoef recommended treating this social type as a "necessary evil," which the government and intellectuals must keep under control, engaging them in sustained "dialog" that gave them guidance.[1128] At this stage in Indonesia's evolution, politics was still "too dangerous" to be left to politicians.[1129] Only "autonomous" and rational citizens could behave as statesmen; they alone knew how to manage democracy in a republic,[1130] for democracy required intelligent, scientific, and civilized dialog.[1131] They alone could foster order and progress in such a heterogeneous country as Indonesia.[1132] Concerted efforts must be made, therefore, by the government, scholars, teachers, and parents to convert the nation from unreason and darkness to reason and illumination.[1133] Indonesian politics would be modern the day statesmen

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[1126] Ibid., 507, 669.
[1127] Ibid., 384-385.
[1128] Ibid., 385.
[1129] Ibid., 543.
[1130] Ibid., 426, 430, 669, 798.
[1131] Ibid., 518, 481.
[1132] Joesoef, *Emak*, 249.
[1133] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 430.

triumphed over politicians; it would be a politics not of ideology and mass-mobilization but a politics of education and enlightening conversations.[1134]

Daoed Joesoef often argued that for progress to triumph in Indonesia, the apostles of modernity must vanquish its enemies. And these included not only regular politicians but also racists, communists, ethno-nationalists, and religious fanatics. This is the fifth theme in Daoed Joesoef's "theory" of Indonesian modernity. Throughout his intellectual career, he exposed, critiqued, and fought these agents of darkness, chaos, and destruction. He pointed out that by treating the ethnic Chinese as second-class citizens the racists did Indonesia a great disservice. Sino-Indonesians constituted the bulk of the nascent Indonesian industrial bourgeoisie, which he considered one of the key segments of the modernizing middling classes and one of the core members of the class of "knowledge workers"[1135]—the very spearhead of progress in the global Information Age.[1136] If Indonesia was to profit from the economic boom that took place in the Pacific Basin, leaders of the indigenous middling classes must renounce racism and fundamentalism and start treating Sino-Indonesians as full-fledged Indonesians. In the meantime, the government must encourage this creative minority, well-known for its work ethic and business acumen, to undertake a metamorphosis from distributive traders to captains of industry. If Singapore could do this, he did not see why Indonesia could not.[1137]

Just as he censured Islamic fundamentalism as anti-modern, so Daoed Joesoef rejected the claim that communism offered the best blueprint for modernity. He

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[1134] Joesoef, *Emak*, 239-240.
[1135] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 468.
[1136] Ibid., 406.
[1137] Ibid., 467-468, 491.

considered communism, instead, as standing in the way of progress or, more precisely, his kind of progress.[1138] He found problematic the centrality of class warfare in the Marxist vision of human history. He regarded as simplistic the Marxist philosophy of man that saw work as man's essence, paying too little attention to individual liberty and reason, which in his view, offered the key to finding creative solutions to economic conflicts and other social problems.[1139] Daoed Joesoef did not subscribe to the Marxist idea that one could change society simply by changing the economy. He saw economy as just one of the driving forces behind human behavior. Ideas, science, technology, politics, geography, and culture must be factored into the studies of human social behavior.[1140] He himself looked for a way of standing in solidarity with the poor and suffering masses and of saving them but without having to sacrifice his freedom to ideologies and political parties,[1141]and without playing the romantic game of being a redeemer, for whom "the end justifies the means."[1142] He believed that he had discovered it; it was education, the cultivation of reason, and the propagation of the scientific mind.[1143]

We can turn now to the sixth theme in Daoed Joesoef's conception of Indonesian modernity: the necessity of stability. From one perspective, one could not undertake nation-building if society was in a state of chaos. From another, nation-building itself was bound to create some amount of disorder, such as unrest, discontent, escape to ideologies,

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[1138] Joesoef, *Emak*, 275.
[1139] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 125.
[1140] Ibid., 350, 424.
[1141] Ibid., 185.
[1142] Ibid., 186-187.
[1143] Ibid., 708.

sub-nationalism, insurgency, and … national disintegration.[1144] He noticed that already in the mid-19th century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had called attention to this destabilizing aspect of modernity when they wrote, in their *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, that in the transition to modernity, "All that is solid melts into air."[1145] Thus, like his fellow New Order modernizer Ali Moertopo, Daoed Joesoef decided that what Indonesia should attempt was a safe, peaceful, conflict-free, well-balanced, and orderly self-modernization. In brief, Indonesian modernity ought to be an excess-free, sanitized one. If this was to be attained, then efforts must be made, he went on to say, to create a set of enabling conditions, such as strong national defense, geopolitical security, and synergy between capital and labor.[1146] It was for the sake of development-enabling stability that Daoed Joesoef, as a pragmatist, could accept the military's participation in the non-military affairs of his country:

> I must confess that although I was not a big fan of the dual function of the armed forces (ABRI), I did not reject it in an *a priori* manner. There were extraordinary conditions that brought it into being. […] [It was a response to] the misbehavior of politicians and their political parties. […F]or the sake of democracy, the principle of civilian supremacy was implemented [in our country] but the result was disappointing. The general public thought that leaders of political parties had performed miserably. [As a result,] they supported the armed forces' dual function, without, however, abolishing democracy. The prevailing conditions [at the time] justified active military intervention in civilian affairs….[1147]

It is worth pointing out that Daoed Joesoef was once a military man. During the Revolution (1945-1949), in east Sumatra, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta, he served in the

[1144] Ibid., 597.
[1145] Ibid.
[1146] Ibid., 509.
[1147] Ibid., 811.

Republic of Indonesia's Student Army. In 1950, he gave up his military career so he could focus on his university studies.

Finally, given the fact that Daoed Joesoef once served as Minister of Education and Culture in the New Order, I would like to make two remarks on the way he envisaged modern Indonesian culture at the time. First, this culture was one that accomplished creative syntheses of what was best in indigenous and Western traditions. This stance is evident in a number of cases: a) the appreciation he showed to the interplay of the pursuit of Javanese gnosis and the unstinting support for strategic scientific studies in the life of Soedjono Hoemardani, his close associate at the CSIS;[1148] b) the praise he paid to the fusion that he thought his wife Soel had performed between Javanese ethics and Western legal reasoning; c) the crusade that he carried out for a blend of Islam and the Enlightenment; and d) the case he tirelessly made that the triumph of reason over emotion paved the way to progress in Indonesian society.

My second observation on Daoed Joesoef's way of thinking about modern Indonesian culture was that he held in contempt one of this culture's core elements that had been taking shape since the *pergerakan* era: modern popular culture. On the kind of popular music that flourished in the country in the late 1970s, he once said:

> I refer to [Indonesian] pop music as "modern cat's music" because it gives you the sort of sounds that cats usually make: It is hard for you to tell from the sounds whether the cats are fighting or whether they're making love.[1149]

[1148] Joesoef, "Bapak Soedjono Hoemardani," 24-37.
[1149] Joesoef, "Saya Akan Berani Bertindak."

There is no evidence, however, that he tried to control, never mind repress, any form of popular culture that emerged in the New Order. It is safe to say that Daoed Joesoef was out of sync with and refused to take seriously some of the unintended effects of the very modernization project he championed and presided over.

On a personal level, what did becoming modern mean for Daoed Joesoef? As it turned out, Indonesian modernity meant, among other things, leading a *teratur* (well-ordered) life. This was the main reason why despite his talents in painting, he decided, in his mid-twenties, not to be an artist but to be a scholar:

> Artists are good people. They stand in solidarity with others and are often sensitive to the plight of the people. Unfortunately, most of them lead messy lives. They don't care about order. And, despite the watches they wear, they don't care about time. I do love the arts but the bohemian life of the artist is not for me—it's just chaos.[1150]

Daoed Joesoef had a problem with an unstructured, unpunctual, and "easygoing" lifestyle.[1151] (As a friend of his once remarked, he had all the qualities of a colonial civil servant except the habit of smoking shag tobacco or Havana cigars.[1152]) He took refuge in science because it offered not only "beauty" but also a way of life that centered on "order" and "discipline," both in thought and in behavior.[1153] Since the end of the Revolution, he had been living as a man of science. In the 1950s, after saying goodbye to professional painting and his military career,[1154] he took up economics at the School of Economics, University of Indonesia, where he, from 1954 to 1963, served as an

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[1150] Joesoef, *Emak*, 341.
[1151] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 132.
[1152] Ibid.
[1153] Joesoef, *Emak*, 342.
[1154] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 123.

instructor. From 1972 to 1998, he served as Chair of the Board of Directors at the CSIS. As a researcher at this think tank, he has written two autobiographical works, a book on defense studies, and numerous articles on a range of topics: ethics, law, the arts, Javanese mysticism, culture, economics, geopolitics, and the natural sciences.[1155]

As a middling-class Indonesian, Joesoef achieved and articulated his modernity not only by leading a scholarly life and serving, for a time, as a bureaucrat but also by practicing a rational brand of Islam.[1156] As Minister of Education and Culture, he was once quite appalled when certain Islamic clerics, who took offence at some of his policies, accused him of marginalizing and emasculating Islam:[1157]

> How dare they say that! My [paternal] grandfather died as a martyr in a battle against the Dutch colonial armies in Central Aceh. [He did so] in defense of Aceh's freedom and sovereignty. It would be a betrayal of his legacy for me not to stand up for Islam. I do so, however, in my own way.[1158]
>
> I am a Muslim. Well before I received Western education, I had already been drilled in the traditional Islamic system of learning.[1159]

Joesoef is best seen, therefore, as an ardent champion of an inclusive, secular, modernist Islam.[1160] Indeed, this is also how he saw himself.

> [In the New Order] I was determined to place Islam in a scientific atmosphere, which I think remains its authentic character since its birth

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[1155] Ibid., 923. The multidisciplinary range of Daoed Joesoef thinking is demonstrated by a recently published collection of his essays: Daoed Joesoef, *Pikiran and Gagasan Daoed Joesoef: 10 Wacana tentang Aneka Masalah Kehidupan Bersama* [Daoed Joesoef's thought and ideas: Ten discourses on a variety of social issues] (Jakarta: Kompas, 2011).

[1156] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 545.

[1157] Ibid., 611, 687-688, 719.

[1158] Hasjmy, "Catatan Kecil," 2; see also Joesoef, "Aku Tetap Bermimpi," 63.

[1159] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 754.

[1160] Ibid., 544, 673-674, 742.

> and early stage of development. With its scientific spirit, it then succeeded in bringing about the enlightenment and renaissance; it revived openness and scientific values, at the time when the West had forgotten them.[1161]

To his chagrin, nowadays Islam neglected the sciences and the scientific lifestyle. As a Muslim who admired Islam's modernist spirit during its "Golden Age," he considered it his task to help fellow Muslims in Indonesia to revive the age of enlightenment, which he knew they badly needed, as well as to "restore" Islam's former dignity and greatness.[1162] "I just cannot stand the thought," he wrote, "that one day history will find Islam guilty of obstructing the cultivation of reason."[1163] It was thus with a view to delivering fellow Muslims from decline, poverty, and injustice that he kept egging them on to study, come to grips with, and apply the sciences. This was not about Westernization at all. It was about self-modernization—a struggle, that is, for an Islam and an Indonesia that were wealthier, stronger, smarter, wiser, more civilized, and … happier.[1164]

Like the apostles of Indonesian modernity in the first half of the twentieth century, Daoed Joesoef strongly believed that one of the most effective, bottom-up ways of creating modern Indonesians was by operating a modern household. The Joesoefs performed this task in accord with the same division of labor that the Nitisastros practiced—one that both the communist leader Semaoen and the Muslim modernist Natsir would have endorsed. As it worked during their eight and a half years' sojourn in Paris, it was an arrangement under which his wife Sri Soelastri (Soel), a "visibly

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[1161] Ibid., 742.
[1162] Ibid., 754.
[1163] Ibid.
[1164] Ibid., 690, 693, 696.

intelligent…and vibrant" lady,[1165] gave up her teaching job at University of Indonesia's School of Law (where she was groomed to succeed Hazairin (1905-1975), professor in customary law at the school) and turned down the offer of a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship to pursue a PhD in law in Paris (or anywhere for that matter) in favor of shouldering the responsibility for raising their baby on a full-time basis in order that Daoed Joesoef could "focus on his studies"—"in peace and undisturbed." Soel made the sacrifice to ensure her husband's academic success.[1166] In his 2006 memoir, Daoed Joesoef considered this sacrifice in need of explanation and justification:

> [But] why should [this] intelligent woman find her satisfaction in preparing [a range of Indonesian dishes] and in heating up [a] soup or *jangan asem*? [It was because] she [decided that] her current job was to be a full-time mother and wife. […S]he did this by choice. She saw it as her sacred, personal mission in Paris. She must take care of Yanti, whom—for almost five years—we had been waiting for to come into our lives and whom God, finally, had entrusted to us and […Soel] wanted to give her full support to my studies…. [S]he thought that my academic success was a challenge that our family must face and overcome; it's a matter of family honor…. As she always told me: "You may [lose] everything but your honor." Thus, she always defined herself as a wife and [a] mother."[1167]

On several occasions, Daoed Joesoef reveled in what his family had accomplished. It managed to help him obtained two PhDs from the Sorbonne, one of which he dedicated to Soel. He admired his wife for the synthesis she made of what was best in Javanese ethic and the juridical rationality of Western culture.[1168] Together, they succeeded in raising their daughter Yanti to be a scientist and a dedicated teacher. Yanti

[1165] Ibid., 166.
[1166] Ibid., 135.
[1167] Ibid., 167.
[1168] Ibid., 677.

earned a PhD in microbiology from the University of Kentucky in 1997. She married Bambang Pharmasetiawan, a professor at Bandung Institute of Technology ITB), who got his MA in electrical engineering from the University of Kentucky and his doctorate from the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). After an eight-year stint as a lecturer at Bogor Agricultural University (IPB),[1169] Yanti—with the support of her parents and husband—founded the kindergarten TK Kepompong ("Chrysalis") in 2004 and the grade school SD Kupu-Kupu ("Butterfly") in 2005.[1170] The schools stand inside the Joesoefs' compound on Jalan Bangka, Jakarta. It is a vehicle for the family to realize its vision of modern, and modernizing, primary education. The Joesoefs believe that kindergartens and grade schools are of enormous strategic importance and should, therefore, be handled by idealistic, intelligent, and highly educated people who have gone through all the stages of formal education, which includes, preferably, attending first-class elementary school in a developed country.[1171]

I close this discussion of Daoed Joesoef and his dreams about Indonesian modernity with an observation. The service that he—as a citizen, a scholar, and a statesman—rendered to the New Order regime should not be taken simplistically to mean

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[1169] Darmansyah, "Menteri 'Kutu Buku' yang Pernah Menceramahi Pak Harto" [The bibliophilic cabinet minister who once reprimanded President Soeharto], *Kecap Nuga*, September 22, 2012, accessed January 17, 2013, http://www.nuga.co/nuga-tokoh/menteri-kutubuku-yang-pernah-menceramahi-pak-harto.html#.UPh5ux2x9BM.

[1170] "D[a]oed Joesoef: Jangan Hanya Membangun Ekonomi" [Don't just develop the economy], *Kompas.com*, June 27, 2012, accessed January 17, 2013, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/06/27/12470193/Doed.Joesoef.Jangan.Hanya.Membangun.Ekonomi; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 191.

[1171] "Keluarga Daoed Joesoef: Sosok Pengabdi di Dunia Pendidikan" [The Joesoefs: A family of committed educators], *Jawa Pos*, September 13, 2008, accessed February 3, 2013, republished in *Rumah Pengetahuan*, http://rumahpengetahuan.web.id/keluarga-daoed-joesoef-sosok-pengabdi-di-dunia-pendidikan/; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 191.

the triumph of militarism. He served the Soeharto administration because he regarded it as his best bet to realize his vision of Indonesian progress. And he saw in Soeharto, at least in the period from 1969 to 1982, just the kind of leader that the country needed to guide its quick but orderly transition to modernity. The image he had of the modernist general when they first encountered each other in 1969 was worth an open-minded and thoughtful consideration:

> Before returning to Indonesia, [Soeharto] invited the leaders of the Associations of Indonesian Students in Western Europe to visit him at a farm in a certain agricultural area in West Germany. He showed a strong interest in the modernization of agriculture. […] He presented a plan for Indonesia's development and encouraged us to ask questions…. Before the meeting ended…he said something so lucidly and vividly it would stay forever in my memories. […]
>
> What he said was that he's not going to let politicians play a leading role in the running of the country; it's the scholars, the experts, whom he trusted to do the job. Accordingly, he wanted all of us—Indonesian students who were pursuing science and technology at home and overseas—to study harder and more seriously and not to waste time so we could graduate as soon as possible.
>
> On the face of it, his statement sounded undemocratic; but I understood [the historical reasons behind] his view.[1172]

It is small wonder that in 2010, in an essay titled "I'm Still Dreaming," Daoed Joesoef expressed his disappointment at what he saw as the return of selfish, irresponsible, and irrational politicians in the so-called "age of reform."[1173]

[1172] Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 668-669.
[1173] Joesoef, "Aku Tetap Bermimpi," 71.

3. 4. Harry Tjan (b. 1934) and Jusuf Wanandi (b. 1937): Double-Minority Modernizers

In the following pages, I use the intellectual histories of Harry Tjan (see Figure 13) and Jusuf Wanandi (Figure 14) as a double case study to examine several fundamental ideas behind the top-down modernization that took place in the New Order. An analysis of the ideas that guided their actions can highlight the ethnic, racial, and religious boundaries that some Indonesian leaders wanted to set around Indonesian modernity—boundaries that Tjan, Wanandi, and other like-minded intellectuals were determined to dismantle. Both men represent a section of the Indonesian middling classes that championed a bourgeois and (ethnically and religiously) inclusive vision of progress.

Figure 13. Harry Tjan Silalahi, 1992 [*Tempo*].

The case study also presents material for probing into the problems of ethics that confront modernizers in New Order Indonesia. It was not for nothing that Wanandi uses "shades of grey" as the title of his 2008 political memoir. It is significant that when Harry Tjan urged Catholic politicians in October 2011 to observe Catholic morals, he mentioned I. J. Kasimo (1900-1986), former chairman of the Catholic Party, as an example of a Catholic politician who "could manipulate things, but was still committed to [ethical] cleanliness."[1174] (Tjan could have offered himself as another example.) And it is important that Tjan sees life from the prism of *wayang*-inspired moral relativism.[1175] As he said to me in an interview, wayang stories "relativize our idea of moral good: People are good only within the limits of the roles they play."[1176] It was this kind of morality—not an absolute one—that Harry Tjan practiced as a protector of two minorities: Catholics and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.[1177]

Harry Tjan and Jusuf Wanandi were Catholic Indonesians of an ethnic Chinese, middling-class background. On February 11, 1934, Harry Tjan was born, as the second of ten children, into a family of modest means in Kampung Terban, Yogyakarta. "Illiterate," "apolitical," and "non-ideological," his father earned a living as a male nurse (*mantri*) to the eye specialist Dr. Jap Hong Tjoen (1882-1952) while his mother supplemented the

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[1174] Mathias Hariyadi, "Indonesia: Catholic Politicians and the Challenge of Morality," *AsiaNews.it*, October 26, 2011, accessed January 22, 2013, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Indonesia:-Catholic-politicians-and-the-challenge-of-morality-23015.html.

[1175] Interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011.

[1176] Ibid.

[1177] Nono Anwar Makarim, "Bila Dadu Terlempar" [When the dice were cast], in *Budi dan Nalar: 70 Tahun Harry Tjan Silalahi* [Wisdom and reason: Festschrift in honor of Harry Tjan Silalahi's seventieth birthday], ed. Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi, and Arief Priyadi (Jakarta: CSIS, 2004), 204.

family's income by selling *gudeg* (jackfruit curry) and other dishes.[1178] Jusuf Wanandi was born on November 15, 1937 in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, into a family that was much better-off than that of Tjan. Wanandi's parents attended Dutch-language schools. His father was an entrepreneur who operated several businesses.[1179] Both Tjan and Wanandi entered the University of Indonesia's School of Law in 1955;[1180] the former completed his studies in 1960 while the latter graduated in 1962.[1181]

Schooling played a key role in Tjan's and Wanandi's socialization as members of the middling classes. While attending the Canisius College (a Jesuit-run boys' boarding school) in Jakarta in the early 1950s, Wanandi underwent training in regular, disciplined way of life:

> I…learned …what discipline meant…: waking up at 5:15 every morning, starting with mass. It was most challenging but I enjoyed it thoroughly. Everything was orderly: after school, a 1:15 p.m. lunch. After that you could take a siesta or study, at 4 p.m. sports, then 6 to 8 p.m. study, 8 p.m. dinner, and 10 p.m. to bed.[1182]

[1178] Harry Tjan views his family of origin as lower middling class. Interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011; J.B. Soedarmanta, *Tengara Orde Baru: Kisah Harry Tjan Silalahi* [The signs of the New Order: The story of Harry Tjan Silalahi] (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 2004), 21; "Harry Tjan Silalahi," in *Apa & Siapa, 1983-1984*, 815. Born in Yogyakarta in 1882, Jap Hong Tjoen was a Dutch-trained eye specialist and founder of Dr. Jap Eye Hospital in Yogyakarta. In 1912-1914, he served as president of the Chung Hwa Hui (Association of Ethnic Chinese Students) in the Netherlands. In1927 or 1928, he set up the Dutch East Indies chapter of the Chung Hwa Hui. At first, he promoted Dutch education and Dutch nationality among Indies-born Chinese. Later, he supported Indonesia's independence. On Dr. Jap, see Sam Setyautama, *Tokoh-Tokoh Etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia* [Prominent ethnic Chinese in Indonesia] (Jakarta: KPG, 2008), 100; Leo Suryadinata, *Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese, 1900-1995* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1999), 22.

[1179] Jusuf Wanandi, "Sahabatku! Hubungan dan Cita-Cita Kami" [My friend! our relationship and visions], in Soesastro, Kristiadi, and Priyadi, *Budi dan Nalar*, 110-111; Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 23; Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 21-22.

[1180] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 25.

[1181] Ibid., 23; Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 56-57, 65, 68-69.

[1182] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 23. He and his younger brother Sofjan Wanandi recall how their father enforced a strict discipline in the family. On this, see Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 20;

(It is important to note that among Wanandi's schoolmates at Canisius at the time were middling-class Muslim youths who—just like him—would grow to be leaders in New Order Indonesia, such as Akbar Tanjung, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, Ginanjar Kartasasmita, Rachmat Witoelar, and Wimar Witoelar.[1183]) Later, at the University of Indonesia's School of Law, Tjan and Wanandi accumulated the intellectual and social capital they needed to enter the upper layer of the Indonesian middling classes. In the case of Harry Tjan, college education gave him the chance to learn to think systematically, prepare for a career as a new *priyayi*, and place himself "in the orbit."[1184] He thanked the Revolution (1945-1949) for having created a society where lower middling-class children could get enough education to achieve upward social mobility. "Were it not for the Revolution," he said, "I would have become a shop assistant."[1185] In the case of Jusuf Wanandi, he went to college because he desired "to become a professor."[1186]

Tjan and Wanandi realized, however, that mere schooling did not guarantee success in life. To improve their life chances, they became student activists, joining the Association of Indonesian Catholic Students (PMKRI), where they acquired political savvy, honed leadership skills, built strategic networks, took advantage of the opportunity to attend student conferences and short courses overseas, and found a launching pad from

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Sofjan Wanandi, "Saya Ingin Jadi Pejabat" [I want to be a top government official], *Matra*, October 1991, 20.

[1183] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 25.

[1184] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 55; interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011.

[1185] Interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011.

[1186] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 23.

which to shape society.[1187] It was in the PMKRI that Tjan and Wanandi first met each other.[1188] From 1960 to 1961, Tjan served as the secretary-general of the PMKRI.[1189] Representing the PMKRI, he also sat in the presidium of the Federation of Indonesian Student Associations (PPMI).[1190] Wanandi, for a time, served as chairman of the Jakarta chapter of the PMKRI.[1191]

Figure 14. Jusuf Wanandi, 1991 [*Tempo*].

By the mid-1960s, their involvement in student activism plunged Tjan and Wanandi into the maelstrom of ideological warfare between Left and Right.[1192] The circumstances sharpened their ideological awareness and pressured them to defend their vision of modern Indonesia. As middling-class Catholics, they were adamant that

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[1187] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 58, 61-62; Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 25-26.

[1188] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 26; Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 109.

[1189] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 62-63.

[1190] Ibid., 60.

[1191] Jusuf Wanandi, "Catatan tentang CSIS" [Notes on CSIS], in *CSIS 20 Tahun* [CSIS: 20 years of existence], ed. CSIS (Jakarta: CSIS, 1991), 32.

[1192] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 61, 69.

Indonesia remain based on Pancasila and rejected both communism and the idea of an Islamic state.[1193] At the time, the prospect of a communist victory in the country seemed real to them. As a result, they prepared for the worst. As Wanandi puts it in his memoir:

> […W]e, the Catholic intellectuals and the students, started to think that we had to prepare for the eventuality that within five years Indonesia would most probably become a communist-run country legally and constitutionally. […W]e, as Catholics, knew that we would be the first up against the wall. […W]e Catholics were more anti-communist than other Christian groups in the country.[1194]

For Tjan and Wanandi, at stake in the struggle for power between Left and Right was the survival of their Catholic middling-class way of life. Tjan opposed the PKI because he thought that under the leadership of D. N. Aidit (1923-1965) it was determined to install the dictatorship of the proletariat (which signified the defeat of the middling classes) and champion atheism (which meant the abolition of morals).[1195] A PKI victory, he thought, would lead to moral chaos: Without morals, people would become the slaves of their own desires, use any means to attain their goals, and stop being humans. Moreover, if the USSR under Stalin was an indication, communist systems, Tjan believed, were bound to sacrifice the lives of the innocent.[1196] Seeing that around mid-1965 Indonesia was in a state of emergency, Wanandi cancelled his plan to take up a PhD program in the United States. "What should I do with a PhD," he wrote, "if my country in the meantime will

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[1193] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 24.
[1194] Ibid., 32.
[1195] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 102; interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011; Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 111.
[1196] Ibid., 103-104.

change into a communist state?"[1197] Similar considerations seem to have led Tjan to quit his job at an oil company in Pekanbaru, central Sumatra.

Aside from what they saw as the imminent victory of the communists,[1198] other problems loomed large in the early 1960s, which persuaded Tjan and Wanandi (and many middling-class Indonesians for that matter) that they had no choice but to unseat Soekarno and liquidate Guided Democracy. Wanandi summed up the problems this way:

> [President Soekarno] was a romantic, never paying attention to the economy. He was impatient with institution building and never took that part of his role seriously. His leadership was based on his charisma and on the mechanisms he had created to enhance his grip on the government. At the top there was just him—and then the masses. […] He would rule by mobilizing the masses in direct support of his policies.[1199]

To this list of obstacles to Indonesian modernity, he and Tjan added one more item: racism[1200] and political instability (which resulted, they argued, from ideological warfare and mass mobilization).[1201] It was economic bankruptcy that precipitated the middling classes, in the mid-1960s, into withdrawing their support from Guided Democracy.[1202] Taking this blend of issues into account goes a long way toward understanding why Tjan, Wanandi, and their comrades did what they did in Guided Democracy and the New Order.

In the mid-1960s, as leaders of Catholic students Tjan and Wanandi attempted to overthrow Soekarno and crush the PKI by forging an alliance with a range of

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[1197] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 35.
[1198] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 67.
[1199] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 26-27.
[1200] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 63
[1201] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 38.
[1202] Ibid., 27.

anticommunist forces: college students, the Army, the Islamic Students Association (HMI), and the association of Muslim scholars Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).[1203] They found formidable allies in Subchan Z. E. (1931-1973), the vice chairman of NU, and in Army leaders such as Soeharto, Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Hoemardani, A. H. Nasution, and Soewarto.[1204] Tjan saw in Soeharto a reasonable leader whom the middling classes could rely on in their quest for stability and progress.[1205]

The collaboration between Tjan and Wanandi on one side, and Soeharto, Ali Moertopo, and Soedjono Hoemardani on the other proved enduring and transforming. For about two decades, they carried out a joint project of establishing and running the New Order. The partnership lasted till around the mid-1980s, when Ali and Soedjono died and Tjan and Wanandi fell out of favor with Soeharto.[1206] By contrast, Tjan's and Wanandi's strategic alliance with Subchan Z. E. was short-lived owing to the latter's reluctance to thwart efforts by some Muslim leaders to Islamize the state.[1207]

Throughout the New Order era, Tjan and Wanandi sought to realize their vision of Indonesian modernity. We must consider this vision if we want to understand the various missions they carried out as New Orderists. Wanandi once offered a list of what to do to make Indonesia modern:

[1203] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 52-53; Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 106, 125; Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 110; Sulastomo, "Harry Tjan Silalahi," in Soesastro, Kristiadi, and Priyadi, *Budi dan Nalar*, 187; Makarim, "Bila Dadu Terlempar," 202.

[1204] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 45, 47-48; interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011; Fikri Jufri, "Menapak di Jalan Lurus" [Walking the straight path], in Soesastro, Kristiadi, and Priyadi, *Budi dan Nalar*, 79; Cosmas Batubara, "Pemikiran dan Pandangan Harry" [Harry's ideas and visions], in ibid., 107; Firdaus Wadjdi, "Sosok Yang Kehadirannya Selalu Bermanfaat" [A figure whose presence is always beneficial], in ibid., 129; Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 111.

[1205] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 186.

[1206] Jufri, "Menapak di Jalan Lurus," 79-80.

[1207] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 146-147.

> […A] plentiful population and natural resources do not automatically translate into greatness. Much more is needed: economic growth, productivity, political stability, and democratic development, a high level of education throughout the populace, as well as widespread healthcare and social safety nets.[1208]

According to Tjan and Wanandi, the problem with Guided Democracy was its failure to deliver the key elements of Indonesian modernity. Thus, with their allies in the middling classes (college students, scholars, professionals, clergymen, civil servants, entrepreneurs, and Army officers), they set up a new regime that would carry out modernization. Calling it the New Order, they offered it as "a total corrective" to bankrupt Guided Democracy. Its mission was to introduce "a strong and clean government," encourage a "rational" way of life,[1209] and replace "ideology-oriented politics" with economic development.[1210] Led by Soeharto and supported by the sensible middling classes (civilian and military), the New Order was Tjan's and Wanandi's best bet for a better future.[1211]

From a world-historical perspective, the original intention of some New Orderists was to pursue the South Korean strategy of modernization. As Wanandi admits in his autobiography,

> The model that most appealed to us back in the early days [of the New Order] was South Korea, and we convinced Soeharto that this was the way to go. Politics later, economics first and rule with an iron hand for the time being. We talked about the men on horseback, and we considered the

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[1208] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 78.

[1209] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 125, 165, 208.

[1210] Interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011; Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 125; Jufri, "Menapak di Jalan Lurus," 79.

[1211] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 141.

> Latin American models, but the Korean model was the most attractive one because we knew it well at that time because it was nearest.[1212]

As it was applied in the first two decades of the New Order era, the strategy included the following elements: open markets, light industries, export-led growth, foreign direct investment, and an open foreign exchange regime.[1213] Wanandi adds that

> With economic development comes a critical mass of middle class—a prerequisite for establishing a democracy. […W]e believed the Army could do exactly that [i.e., leading the South Korean style of modernization].[1214]

Unlike their critics, Wanandi and Tjan understood that the 1945 Generation of military officers were part of the (pragmatic section of) the Indonesian middling classes; they did not form a caste apart from the rest of Indonesian society. It was participation in the armed struggle for independence that had plunged many (e.g., Ali Moertopo) into a military career.[1215] Some—such as Daoed Joesoef, Widjojo Nitisastro, and Soebroto—went back to a civilian life, making a living as civilian professionals. We should keep in mind that in a great many cases military and civilian New Orderists came from similar social backgrounds (even the same families); attended similar secondary schools; went through a youth that was shaped by the Revolution; and…shared a set of values. There were enough social commonalities between civilian and military New Orderists to allow them to forge a strategic alliance in the first place.

[1212] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 263.
[1213] Ibid., 102.
[1214] Ibid., 107.
[1215] Interview with Harry Tjan, Jakarta, March 9, 2011.

As regards to common values, Wanandi once called attention to the commitment to modernization among civilian and military New Orderists: "[…W]e…were looking for the Army, which we thought was more enlightened—one that would develop and modernize the country's economy."[1216] Wanandi and Tjan were not alone in taking this view in the mid-1960s. Many fellow intellectuals (e.g., Soe Hok Gie, Arief Budiman, and Umar Kayam) did the same. However, unlike Kayam, who argued that military intervention in civilian affairs should be allowed only during political emergency, Tjan and Wanandi needed the military to play a decisive role in civil society for a long period of time, that is, until most leaders of the middling classes reached higher levels of nationalism and enlightenment. And this was because as Christians and ethnic Chinese they faced certain problems that Javanese Muslims like Kayam did not.

Even though by the late 1960s Indonesia had been purged of the communists, Tjan and Wanandi could not afford to be complacent, for they discovered that the specters of sectarianism and racism still haunted the country. For example, in the General Session of the MPRS in 1968, several Muslim leaders and sectarian generals attempted to smuggle Sharia elements into the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) and into the formal interpretation of the 1945 Constitution.[1217] Tjan and Wanandi found out that moderate Muslim leaders—out of fear of losing the support of their constituency—did nothing to contain sectarianism. Thus, they relied on the military, many of whose key leaders shared their commitment to the ideal of a secular state.[1218] They concluded that to ensure that Indonesia remained secular and multicultural they had to keep the military in

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[1216] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 107.
[1217] Ibid., 62, 257; Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 146; Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 112.
[1218] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 147.

the driver's seat of the state until the time came when most civilian leaders succeeded in overcoming racism and sectarianism. For the time being, full-fledged democracy would only lead to the return of a racist and ideology-oriented way of life.[1219]

The way Tjan and Wanandi responded to the threat of racism and Islamism points to one of the key themes in their vision of modern Indonesia. To become really modern, they argued, Indonesia had to embrace "political pluralism." They regarded racist and sectarian attitudes as symptoms of backwardness. To enter modernity, Indonesians must get rid of ethnic, racial, and religious discrimination.

Tjan and Wanandi were dismayed at the racism that the ethnic Chinese suffered in Indonesia. "I am an ethnic Chinese," Wanandi once wrote, "in a country that has traditionally made use of us and marginalized us."[1220] "Even our ID [cards]," he observed, "contained a certain number that was only issued to Chinese Indonesians."[1221] The government, he pointed out, did not provide them with equal "access to tertiary education and employment in the bureaucracy, military, and politics…."[1222]

Political pluralism, Tjan and Wanandi argued, was the key to strengthening Indonesia's unity and facilitating its progress: It would allow Chinese Indonesians to play an energizing role in nation-building.[1223] Wanandi once expressed his aspirations this way:

> We ethnic Chinese were such a small proportion of the population[,] only three to four percent. Since we had been diligent, hardworking and good at

[1219] Ibid., 148.
[1220] Ibid., 121.
[1221] Ibid., 126.
[1222] Ibid., 125-126.
[1223] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 285.

> trade, industry and finance, we felt we should be accepted as an important part of the Indonesian family as a whole. We should not only be active in the economy but also in other professions.[1224]
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> We…hoped…we could be accepted in every field of work and in every sector of society.[1225]

Imagining Indonesian modernity from the prism of ethnic relations, Wanandi and Tjan wanted Indonesia to be more like Thailand.[1226]

> We felt that it was better to follow the Thai model of assimilation. According to this strategy, the Chinese would completely assimilate themselves within the society of the majority. In Thailand, that meant that they not only took on Thai names, but participated in society—attending only Thai schools and behaving like any other Thai[s].[1227]
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> […] I … noticed how differently ethnic Chinese fared in Thailand compared to those in Indonesia. Thai Chinese seemed to be running the economy, and they were very successful. But they were also well assimilated. They, too, were asked to change their names and send their children to local schools.[1228]

To abolish racism and sectarianism that impeded Indonesia's modernization, Tjan, Wanandi, and their military allies promoted Pancasila-based Indonesian nationalism and political ethics.[1229]

Implied in Tjan's and Wanandi's call for political pluralism and thoroughgoing assimilation were two key ideas. First, they considered professionals and entrepreneurs as the driving force of modernization. And second, the ethnic Chinese constituted the bulk of Indonesia's entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. To prevent professionals and entrepreneurs of Chinese descent from contributing fully to nation-building was to commit economic

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[1224] Ibid., 125.
[1225] Ibid., 125-126.
[1226] Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 121.
[1227] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 125.
[1228] Ibid., 130.
[1229] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 197, 213, 264; Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 66.

suicide. Tjan and Wanandi discovered that few indigenous New Orderists were broadminded enough to share their inclusivist nationalism. Among these were Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardani:

> […They] were [not] afraid or reluctant to recognize the role of ethnic Chinese in the economy. […N]either [of them] had been corrupted by their relations with [Sino-Indonesian and Japanese entrepreneurs] because money had never been the most important factor for them.[1230]

Wanandi also acknowledged Ali Moertopo's contribution to the fight against racism in Indonesia:

> In accordance with Law No. 3/1946, he supported accepting every Chinese born in Indonesia as an Indonesian citizen—an effort he achieved by having [Soeharto] sign a Presidential Decree in 1982. In six weeks the following year, he oversaw 500,000 ethnic Chinese becoming citizens.[1231]

The technocrats, such Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana, did not have the courage—until the end of the oil boom years—to take the steps that Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Hoemardani, and Daoed Joesoef had taken.

> [They] did not dare use the private sector, due to the constraints of their ideology [Fabian socialism], and because of political factors: Ethnic Chinese dominated the real economy, and it would not have been palatable politically to encourage them to play a bigger role in Indonesian business.[1232]

We must remember, however, that in their search for Indonesian economic modernity, Tjan, Wanandi, and their associates at the CSIS also advocated the expansion

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[1230] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 115.
[1231] Ibid., 227.
[1232] Ibid., 115.

of the Indonesian entrepreneurial bourgeoisie as a whole rather than just its ethnic Chinese elements. "We attempted," Wanandi wrote, "to teach entrepreneurship to Indonesian society by enlisting the help of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs." With this goal in mind, Tjan and Wanandi supported the founding of the Prasetiya Mulya Business School.[1233]

As I hope the foregoing discussion makes clear, Tjan's and Wanandi's vision of Indonesian modernity involved a strong rejection of communism. This anti-communist modernism echoed, and had roots in, that modernist vision which was propounded in the early 1950s in, for instance, the journal *Basis* by the Catholic priests Jan Bakker, A. Jayaseputra, J. Dijkstra, R. Sukarto, G. Vriens, and P. Zoetmulder (see Chapter 2). Like their predecessors, Tjan and Wanandi were convinced that a modern Indonesia that was religious, secular, multicultural, wealthy, democratic, legal-rational, Pancasila-based, and bourgeois-led was not going to grow in a communist environment.

It is by reference to this anticommunist dream of Indonesian modernity that we can better understand some of the missions that Tjan, Wanandi, and their associates at the CSIS undertook to create and preserve the New Order. Among these missions were the destruction of the PKI; the founding and development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and the occupation of East Timor. Tjan, Wanandi, and their associates at the CSIS carried out these missions in collaboration with Bakin (State Intelligence Coordination Agency) and Opsus.[1234] Thus, once they had gotten rid of the

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[1233] Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 121.

[1234] Opsus, short for *Operasi Khusus* (Special Operations), was "the ad hoc troubleshooting unit that answered to [Soeharto] since the West Irian campaign"; see Ken Conboy, *Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2004), 51.

PKI, they set up the ASEAN in 1967 to contain communism in Southeast Asia, ensure stability in this region, and place it in the orbit of the West. As for the annexation of East Timor, it was a response to the fear that it was going to emerge, if left alone, as a leftist country threatening Indonesia at its "backdoor," a sinister satellite of the communist bloc.[1235] These missions can be seen as the New Order's answers to the challenges of building a non-communist modern Indonesia in a world polarized by the Cold War. One of these challenges was to keep Indonesia and Southeast Asia stable. Without stability, economic development would have been impossible to carry out. As Wanandi notes in his memoir,

> […ASEAN's] existence and Indonesia's restraint…may be the main reasons why Southeast Asia, once known as the Balkans of the East, has largely been at peace for the past 40 years. Indonesia's role—not trying to dominate the grouping and not opposing others' initiatives—has guaranteed ASEAN's progress.[1236]

There were two other contentious missions that Tjan, Wanandi, and Ali Moertopo conducted in the first decade of the New Order: keeping Soeharto in power and changing the way Indonesians engaged in politics—all with a view to safeguarding their brand of modernization. The first challenge to tackle after "Soeharto became acting president in March 1967," Wanandi explained,

> was the case of West Papua. It was Soeharto, as commander of Trikora, who wrested West Papua from the Dutch in 1963. But still outstanding was an Act of Free Choice in the territory required by a 1962 UN-brokered agreement. It would be very bad for Soeharto's image if as

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[1235] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 164; Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 197; see also McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, 198-199.

[1236] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 129.

> president he lost an important and strategic territory by failing to keep Indonesia's part of the bargain.[1237]

Wanandi and Ali Moertopo worked together to ensure Indonesia's victory in the plebiscite. The former persuaded tribal leaders to vote in favor of joining Indonesia. He supplied them with the consumer goods they loved. With the help of the Catholic Church networks, he sent 250 students to the region, where they served as "domestic peace corps," helping to improve the material conditions of the indigenous community. Ali Moertopo provided the money to finance the operation. He drew on the Opsus funds deposited in Singaporean and Malaysia banks. (The money was raised by Ali Moertopo through the smuggling of rubber and other commodities in the mid-1960s to finance the normalization of Indonesia's relations with Malaysia.)[1238]

The second task facing Tjan, Wanandi, and Ali Moertopo was to provide Soeharto a powerbase to win the 1971 elections. For this purpose they empowered Golkar because they saw it as the most program-oriented of all political parties in the country. All others, in their judgment, were too ideology-minded and still obsessed with mass mobilization. With the help of the Army, Wanandi pressured civil servants to give their votes to Golkar only (the principle of "mono-loyalty"), thereby ensuring the victory of professionalism over ideology.[1239] Thanks to this political engineering, Golkar did win in the 1971 and 1978 elections.[1240]

[1237] Ibid., 96-97.
[1238] Ibid., 98-100
[1239] Ibid., 103-107.
[1240] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 155.

Tjan, Wanandi, and Ali Moertopo (as well as many in the middling classes) saw the mobilization of the uneducated masses by ideology-minded politicians as the source of instability, which stood in the way of modernization. To prevent political parties from mobilizing the masses, they implemented a tactic known as the floating-mass policy, which was not—it is important to note—the brainchild of Ali Moertopo but that of HMI leaders, such as Nurcholish Madjid, Sulastomo, and Dawam Rahardjo.[1241] It was historically inaccurate to treat the policy as evidence of militarism. As regards keeping the masses politically "afloat," Wanandi later said

> Our original idea was to replace the organized mass rallies especially liked by [Soekarno] and the…PKI strategy of permanent revolution where the masses were the driving force of change. We argued that this politicking based on mass action had disrupted political stability and economic development. Mass rallies and other mass actions, we argued, should be limited mainly to elections. The masses should be floating in the sense that they should not be organized around every political issue as during [Soekarno's] final years of power, but primarily during election campaigns.[1242]

Like many modernizers in Indonesia and beyond, Tjan and Wanandi believed in the decisive role that the middling-class nuclear family played in the construction and maintenance of modern society. As Harry Tjan said to his biographer J. B. Soedarmanta:

> The family…is the nucleus of society. If families are prosperous, then the whole society will be prosperous as well. Conversely, if families are in chaos, then chaos will reign in society.[1243]

[1241] Ibid., 153; Ken Ward, *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case* Study (Clayton: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1974), 188-189. In a focus group discussion organized by the Freedom Institute in Jakarta in March 3, 2011, M. Dawam Rahardjo claimed ownership of the idea of the floating mass.

[1242] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 108.

[1243] Soedarmanta, *Tengara*, 127.

Tjan and Wanandi thought that the New Order made remarkable achievements. It succeeded in inculcating pragmatic outlooks in Indonesian society.[1244] It created stability; attracted foreign investment; undertook economic development; contained population growth; carried out the Green Revolution, and helped Indonesia gain respect and prestige in the international community.[1245]

The New Order, they thought, began to go wrong in 1987, when Soeharto thought he should stay on in power—against the will of the middling classes, which—thanks to economic development—had changed their minds and expanded: They began to make demands that Soeharto was unwilling to meet.[1246]

One of the problems with Soeharto was that he deviated from his pledge to run a strong and clean government. For instance, he not only failed to control his children; he even encouraged them to establish monopolies. He turned into an irrational autocrat, who ruled on the basis of like and dislike.[1247]

Having examined the key ideas that Ali Moertopo, Daoed Joesoef, Harry Tjan, and Jusuf Wanandi had about Indonesian modernity, we can now turn to look at how they used their think tank CSIS to implement these ideas.

[1244] Ibid., 142.
[1245] Ibid., 192; Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 101-102.
[1246] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 109.
[1247] Ibid., 192.

3. 5. Center for Strategic and International Studies: Think Tank for Modernization

One of the promising ways of making sense of New Order Indonesia is by analyzing the intellectual-historical processes that shaped the modernization the country underwent during this era. Four think tanks offer themselves as case studies of the intellectual histories of New Order modernization: They are the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES). For reasons of space, however, I have looked at the Bappenas only indirectly by examining the visions that its captain, Widjojo Nitisastro, strove to realize. To conclude this chapter, I will discuss, albeit briefly, what the CSIS and the BPPT did in the New Order as modernization think tanks. The intellectual history of the LP3ES thinkers will be the subject of the next chapter.

Whereas the private research center LP3ES served as a vehicle for public intellectuals to modernize Indonesian society "from below"; and whereas the state-based Bappenas and BPPT provided the institutional bases for the technocrats to orchestrate economic development and for the technologists to engineer technological modernization "from above"; the CSIS was a private think tank that was halfway between the LP3ES on the one side and the Bappenas and the BPPT on the other. Keep in mind that these centers for modernization were all founded and run by middling-class thinkers. As a result, among many of these people the ideas of Indonesian modernity—as we have seen and shall do so again—became intertwined with the ideals of a middling-class way of life.

Like the main founders of the LP3ES, some of the key architects of the CSIS (e.g., Harry Tjan and the Wanandi brothers) were former leaders of the "1966 Generation" of college students who, in the second half of the 1960s, collaborated with the Army in the demolition of Guided Democracy and the construction of the New Order. Although the CSIS and the LP3ES were private research centers, the former, unlike the latter, had a special partnership with President Soeharto from 1971 to 1987. Although they differed in priorities, approaches, and methods, the Bappenas, the BPPT, the LP3ES, and the CSIS strove to make the New Order work. Later, however, the leaders of these think tanks would have their share of disappointments in the way things actually unfolded in the New Order. Their ethnic, religious, and professional diversities notwithstanding,[1248] the founders of the CSIS and the LP3ES were all middling-class intellectuals united by the quest for a modern Indonesia[1249]—now that they had succeeded in eliminating, or containing, what they considered its obstacles: Soekarno, communism, and Islamism.[1250]

The CSIS was founded in Jakarta on September 1, 1971 by Harry Tjan, Jusuf Wanandi, Sofjan Wanandi, Daoed Joesoef, Hadi Soesastro (1945-2010), Soedjati Djiwandono (1933-2013),[1251] and Clara Joewono.[1252] Ali Moertopo and Soedjono

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[1248] While Daoed Joesoef and Ali Moertopo were Muslims, Harry Tjan, the Wanandis, and Clara Joewono were Catholics. Likewise, while Ali and Soedjono were Javanese military officers, all the rest were either Acehnese or Chinese.

[1249] Clara Joewono, "Seorang 'Nest Builder'" [A nest builder], Soesastro, Kristiadi, and Priyadi, *Budi dan Nalar*, 143-144.

[1250] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 110; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 471.

[1251] "In Memoriam 'Pak' Soedjati: A Beacon of light on Dark Truths," *The Jakarta Post*, January 11, 2013, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/01/11/in-memoriam-pak-soedjati-a-beacon-light-dark-truths.html (accessed January 28, 2013).

Hoemardani joined this think tank, protected it, and helped its members gain access to and exercise influence on Soeharto's policymaking. Soeharto permitted the establishment of the CSIS because he considered it a useful resource center that he could draw on to undertake political and economic modernization. In fact, the president wanted Harry Tjan and the Wanandi brothers to serve as his personal advisors. Being ethnic Chinese, however, they thought that it was wiser for them to serve him in their capacity as members of an independent think tank. The funding for the CSIS—in the forms of donations and endowments—came initially from the Opsus funds and Ali's and Soedjono's friends in the Sino-Indonesian business community. From 1980 onwards, the CSIS also received financial backing from a group of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs who organized themselves under the Prasetiya Mulya Foundation,[1253] which was established on May 19, 1980 by, among others, Sofjan Wanandi and Liem Sioe Liong.[1254] The Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurs supported the CSIS for two reasons: a) it encouraged

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[1252] Jusuf Wanandi, "Catatan tentang CSIS" [Notes on the CSIS], in CSIS, *CSIS 20 Tahun* [CSIS: 20 years] (Jakarta: CSIS, 1991), 30; Joesoef, *Dia dan Aku*, 136, 470; Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 115. I have not succeeded in finding Clara Joewono's biographical details.

[1253] Interview with Sukardi Rinakit, Jakarta, December 6, 2010. Sukardi was a former researcher at the CSIS. See also Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 111, 255. According to Eki Sjachrudin, the CSIS got its funds from the Prasetiya Mulya Foundation led by Sofjan Wanandi; see Eki Sjachrudin, "Subchan Z. E. dalam Kenangan" [Remembering Subchan Z. E.], in *Subchan Z. E.: Sang Maestro: Politisi Intelektual dari Kalangan NU Modern* [Subchan Z. E. the maestro: A politician-intellectual from the modern wing of the NU], ed. Arief Mudatsir Mandan (Jakarta: Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2001), 279-280. The Prasetiya Mulya Foundation, in turn, was funded by Sino-Indonesian entrepreneurs. On this, see Hugh P. Levaux, "Commercial Power Centers in Indonesia: A New Paradigm to Analyze the Role of Business Groups in Policy Making" (PhD diss., RAND Graduate School, 1999), 127. As for the Opsus funds, Conboy has reported that the money came from "state-owned enterprises," "Chinese business leaders looking to curry favor with the New Order," and donors in "the Republic of China on Taiwan"; see Ken Conboy, *Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2004), 78, footnote 14.

[1254] Kwik Kian Gie, "Politik Itu Nikmat Sekali" [Politics is so much fun], *Matra*, October 1988; reprinted in *Para Tokoh Angkat Bicara* [Prominent figures speak up], vol. 1 (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1995), 32-33; Sofjan Wanandi, "Saya Ingin Jadi Pejabat," *Matra*, October 1991; reprinted in ibid., 81-84.

interethnic harmony, political stability, and an economic climate conducive to business, and b) it built links between them and international capital.[1255]

In late 1971, having established the New Order and helped Soeharto win reelection, Tjan, the Wanandis, Joewono, Ali, and Soedjono sought to direct Indonesia's modernization by providing the Soeharto administration with advice on policymaking, strategic planning, and foreign relations.[1256] Being ethnic Chinese, for Harry Tjan and Jusuf Wanandi to serve Soeharto as official advisers would have gotten the President into trouble, hence the decision to make the think tank a private establishment.[1257] Tjan, the Wanandis, and Joewono were not unique in undertaking the transition from student activism to "think-tankism." In the same year, Nono Makarim and Ismid Hadad—their comrades-in-arms from the 1966 student front against Soekarno and the PKI—set up the LP3ES. Founding the CSIS and the LP3ES was a way for these intellectuals to implement the ideals that drove them, in 1966, to overthrow Guided Democracy. And, whether they realized it or not, it was the fulfillment of the recommendation that Soedjatmoko made in 1961 (see Chapter 2).

The CSIS undertook three missions. First, it offered "advice, ideas, and support" to President Soeharto, the parliament, Golkar politicians, military leaders, entrepreneurs, and intellectuals.[1258] Its researchers conducted strategic studies that provided the president with insights into Indonesia's politics, economy, and defense. As Jusuf Wanandi tells us in his memoir,

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[1255] Interview with Sukardi Rinakit, Jakarta, December 6, 2010.
[1256] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*,109.
[1257] Ibid.
[1258] Ibid., 111; Jusuf Wanandi, "Catatan tentang CSIS," 24.

> CSIS formulat[ed]…the future of Indonesia[,…] think[ing] strategically about Indonesia and its future…. In so doing we organized public debates on these issues…giv[ing] a voice to…important personalities who otherwise might not be heard by Soeharto's…regime. We would then publish and socialize those ideas through conferences, seminar, books, magazines, and media articles.[1259]

The scholarly journals that the CSIS published included *The Indonesian Quarterly* and *Analisa* (now *Analisis*).[1260] In its early years, most of the studies that the CSIS conducted had to do with politics and international relations.[1261] Later, in the period 1981-1991, it also dealt with other subjects, such as education, urban-rural information gap, ethnic relations, corporate philanthropy, labor issues, industry, energy, tourism, decentralization, deregulation and privatization, maritime laws, and globalization.[1262]

The second mission that the CSIS undertook was the promotion of mutual understanding and cooperation between Indonesia and the rest of the world. It introduced Indonesia's policies and economic development to international politicians and entrepreneurs. It provided the government of Indonesia and the general public with information on the development policies and the conditions of other countries in the world.[1263] To carry out this mission, the CSIS did research projects on, among other topics, Indonesia's foreign relations with Japan and, later, China. In the 1970s and the

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[1259] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 178.

[1260] Wanandi, "Catatan tentang CSIS," 24. In the 1980s, the perception that the CSIS was Soeharto's think tank led certain university instructors at the University of Indonesia to forbid their students from using the CSIS journals in their studies. Interview with Sukardi Rinakit, December 6, 2010.

[1261] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 116.

[1262] CSIS, *CSIS 20 Tahun*, 98-137.

[1263] Ibid., 111.

1980s, as a CSIS expert, Jusuf Wanandi played a role in "improving the relations" between Soeharto and certain senior US officials.[1264]

As regards its third mission, in the 1970s the CSIS advocated that the state foster the quick development of a national industrial bourgeoisie[1265] robust enough to tackle the multinational corporations as well as facilitate the making of an Indonesian "super-MNC."[1266] As Panglaykim once said to Tjan, "[T]he task facing Indonesia in the next decade will be that of becoming as a successful trading nation. To accomplish the task, we need…the CSIS."[1267] As a CSIS economist, Panglaykim encouraged the government, the technocrats, and the bourgeoisie to work together and forge big public-private "joint ventures," which the government would choreograph to manage nationwide production and finance in ways that would empower Indonesia to carry out accelerated industrialization, distribute capital ownership among social groups in a rational fashion, and win national economic independence.[1268] Panglaykim's crusade enjoyed considerable support not only from his associates at the CSIS (Daoed Joesoef, Ali Moertopo, and Soedjono Hoemardani) but also from people like the economist Kwik Kian Gie and the oil czar Lt.-Gen. Ibnu Sutowo.[1269] The CSIS's stance on the method to foster the rise of

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[1264] Ibid., 184.

[1265] Jusuf Panglaykim, "Domestic Economic Structures for Global Interdependence" [1973], in Chalmers and Hadiz, *Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia*, 79.

[1266] Rizal Mallarangeng, "Liberalizing New Order Indonesia: Ideas, Epistemic Community, and Economic Policy Change, 1986-1992" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2000), 77.

[1267] J. Panglaykim, "CSIS Relevan pada Saat Ini" [CSIS is relevant today], in *CSIS 20 Tahun*, 3.

[1268] Panglaykim, "Domestic Economic Structures," 78-82; Jusuf Panglaykim, "Economic Development, Multinational Corporation, and National Integrated Units," in CSIS, *The World of Strategy and The Foreign Policy of Nations* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1973), 113-125.

[1269] Robison, *Rise of Capital*, 150-152.

Indonesian industrial bourgeoisie was not static. It changed in response to the negative consequences of dirigism (the idea that the government should play the leading role in the national economy), like corruption, inefficiency, the malignant growth of the bureaucracy, and the bureaucratic obsession with irrational regulation. Thus, while in the 1970s the CSIS thinkers like Ali Moertopo, Daoed Joesoef, and Panglaykim championed dirigism, in the 1980s the CSIS economists like Hadi Soesastro and Marie Pangestu called for market-oriented reforms (through deregulation, privatization, and liberalization).[1270]

In the New Order era, the CSIS also helped Ali Moertopo's Opsus to maintain political stability in the country by undertaking a three-part program. First, there were researchers whose task it was to carry out policy-oriented studies. Second, there was a "service division" at the CSIS tasked with preparing speeches for generals and cabinet ministers (e.g., Edi Sudrajat and Rudini). Third, there was a clandestine network of New Orderist politicians who were "planted" in political parties, youth organizations, and universities.[1271]

In a nutshell, the CSIS, as Ali Moertopo put it in 1982, was a vehicle for political and economic modernization. It was an example of a strategic center that Indonesians needed to "build a modern nation-state" capable of "coping with the challenges of the times." In addition to centers for the strategic studies of national and international affairs

[1270] Mallarangeng, "Liberalizing New Order Indonesia," 146-147, 163.
[1271] Interview with Sukardi Rinakit, Jakarta, December 6, 2010.

like the CSIS, Indonesian modernization also called for centers for “information,” “business,” and “culture.”[1272]

In his trip to the United States in 1972, Jusuf Wanandi paid a visit to the RAND Corporation, which led him to consider it as a possible model for the CSIS. What he found particularly attractive at the RAND were its “intellectual rigor” and interdisciplinary approach.[1273] These were the features that the CSIS tried to emulate. Yet, the fact that Indonesia was a developing country demanded that the CSIS concentrate its studies on “economic development,” nation-building, and “democratization.”[1274]

In the mid-1970s, to assist the Soeharto administration in neutralizing what it saw as the specter of communism emerging at Indonesia’s backdoor. As CSIS experts, Harry Tjan and Jusuf Wanandi played a vital role in one of the stages of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. To Soeharto and the State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin), Tjan and Wanandi gave intelligence input on the political conditions in East Timor and the policies of Australia, Portugal, and the United Nations on the subject of East Timor.[1275] In collaboration with Bakin and Opsus, they sought to “creat[e] inroads into East Timor’s political parties” and “prepare East Timor for a peaceful, diplomatically-driven act of self-determination that would favor absorption by Indonesia.” Such were the tasks they performed in their involvement in “Operation

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[1272] Ali Moertopo, “*Centre* ini Harus Menjadi Milik Bangsa Indonesia” in CSIS, *CSIS 20 Tahun*, 1.

[1273] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 178.

[1274] Ibid.

[1275] Ibid., 194, 196.

Komodo."[1276] In addition, they handled the international aspect of this Operation, seeking a green light from Australia, Portugal, and the US.[1277]

Besides popularizing the ASEAN in the mind of the Indonesian public,[1278] the CSIS also promoted peace, understanding, and cooperation among the governments of its member countries.[1279] Jusuf Wanandi did his best to facilitate a partnership and intellectual exchange among Southeast Asian think tanks, including the CSIS, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore, the Philippines Center for Advanced Studies (PCAS), and the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia, and Institute for Security and International Studies in Thailand.[1280] Later, in response to the reforms that Deng Xiao Ping presided over in China, the CSIS campaigned for the normalization of Indonesia's relations with the country[1281] because to do so would serve Indonesia's economic development. Owing to Soeharto's rigid view of China, however, it was not until 1990 that the attempt was successful.[1282]

In March 1988, the CSIS fell out favor with Soeharto. To his cabinet ministers, he said: "I don't want to have anything to do with CSIS anymore, and I don't want you to do so either."[1283] There were two reasons for the falling-out. First, Soeharto took offense at CSIS criticism of his children's misconduct as businesspeople. In 1984, Ali Moertopo had already observed with displeasure that Soeharto's children had established

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[1276] Ibid., 197.
[1277] Ibid., 198.
[1278] Joesoef, "Renungan tentang Studi Strategis dan Hubungan Internasional di CSIS" [Reflections on strategic and international studies at the CSIS], in CSIS, *CSIS 20 Tahun*, 8-9.
[1279] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 135-162.
[1280] Ibid., 135; Wanandi, "Catatan tentang CSIS," 29.
[1281] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 168-173.
[1282] Ibid., 173.
[1283] Ibid., 219.

monopolies, thereby distorting the country's industries and "undermin[ing] the New Order."[1284] But why didn't Soeharto just shut down the CSIS? Despite his anger at its members, he recognized the great service they had rendered to the creation of the New Order and the modernization of Indonesia. He seems to have thought that the CSIS would continue to play a positive role in society. He might also have acknowledged in silence that there was truth in their criticism of his children.

The second reason for the rift was that in 1987 Jusuf Wanandi advised Soeharto to prepare a plan for a smooth and peaceful succession. To the president, he sent a note that said something along these lines:

> You have been successful in developing the country…economically. [As a result,] society has moved forward…and…become more complex. It is not easy to run a country like this anymore. […I]t [is] important to think about training a young generation of leaders who can do the job in the future—people who can cope with this new situation.[1285] […]
>
> […Y]ou have been president for 20 years…. [W]ould it not be wise to take something of backseat and give the opportunity to your coordinating ministers to handle day-to-day matters? So that then you can think about the long-term vision of what Indonesia is and is to become?[1286]

As it turned out, there was a dark side to the top-down modernization that the New Order regime had undertaken with CSIS support. That dark side included the human casualties that resulted from, among other things, the destruction of the PKI in 1965-1966 (which paved the way for the establishment of the New Order) and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 2002 (which was meant to exorcise communism). On the former catastrophe, Jusuf Wanandi says this in his memoir:

[1284] Ibid., 223.
[1285] Ibid., 231-232.
[1286] Ibid., 232; Wanandi, "Sahabatku," 117.

> […The creation of the New Order] was overshadowed by the terrible massacres of the PKI leaders and members, their families and sympathizers. It is the most abominable episode in our country's history. It was a horrible mistake, and both Sukarno and Soeharto must accept some responsibility.[1287]

And he goes on to say that he

> harbored some feelings of guilt that so many people—PKI or not—were killed in 1965-1966 and later in West Kalimantan, without my being able to do something about it. […] It could be true that had we, the anti-communists, lost the struggle, we might instead have faced the same treatment the PKI got, if not worse.[1288]

It should be kept in mind the destruction of the PKI involved the killings of at least half a million Indonesians accused of being communists.

As for the inability of his political groups in the mid-1960s to prevent the massacres of communists, Jusuf Wanandi explains in his memoir that at "the time, we were concerned more with our own survival—individually, as a group, and the nation—than with protecting the lives and rights of others."[1289]

Apropos the catastrophe that the New Order regime inflicted on the people of East Timor—one estimate says Indonesia's invasion in 1975 caused 60,000 civilian deaths[1290]—he writes:

> Whatever happened in 1974 and after, whatever mistakes we made in those early months, the real tragedy was what followed. Instead of giving the people of East Timor rights and a decent life when we "liberated"

[1287] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 79.
[1288] Ibid., 190.
[1289] Ibid., 83.
[1290] Ricklefs, *Modern Indonesia*, 342.

> them from "Portuguese neocolonialism," we made them our colonial subjects for over 20 years and imposed on them so much misery and abuse.[1291]

3. 6. B. J. Habibie (b. 1936): An Apostle of Rapid, Expensive, and High-Tech Modernity

Science and technology are actually the keys to a country's progress.

B. J. Habibie[1292]

We begin at the end, and we end at the start.[…] [If] we know how to build an aircraft, people will believe that we can build motor cars….

B. J. Habibie[1293]

I want to multiply myself by a thousand….

B. J. Habibie[1294]

Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (see Figure 15) was born on June 25, 1936 in Pare-Pare, South Sulawesi. He is the fourth of eight siblings. Coming from a Buginese-Makarese aristocratic background, his father, Alwi Abdul Jalil Habibie (1908-1950), enjoyed a Dutch-language education. Alwi's father—Abdul Jalil Habibie—was an Islamic clergyman and an *adat* chief in Gorontalo. After completing his training at the

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[1291] Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, 218.

[1292] Paul Reinshagen, "The Architect of Indonesian Technological Development," *Volkskrant*, October 20, 1984; reprinted in A. Makmur Makka, ed., *Habibie: From Pare-Pare via Aachen* (Jakarta: Swakarya, 1989 [1982]), 257.

[1293] A. M. Satari, "Engineer, Scientiest, and Manager," in *Prof. Dr. Ing. B. J. Habibie: Half a Century: Impressions and Reminiscences*, ed. A. Makmur Makka (Jakarta: Cipta Kreatif, 1987), 291.

[1294] Anthony J. Lawrence, "Minister B. J. Habibie: Bringing the Technological Age to Indonesia," in Makka, *Habibie: From Pare-Pare*, 85.

Agricultural School in Bogor, West Java, Alwi worked as an agricultural extension specialist in Pare-Pare and, later, in Makassar, South Sulawesi. B. J. Habibie's mother, Tuti Saptomarini Puspowardojo (1911-1990), was of Javanese aristocratic origin. Her father, Puspowardjo, was a school inspector while her maternal grandfather, Tjitrowardojo (1847-1922), was perhaps the first Javanese to become a medical doctor. From his parents, B. J. Habibie adopted a set of values that encompass discipline, work ethic, and the centrality of education.

Figure 15. B. J. Habibie.

Until 1948, Habibie lived in Pare-Pare, where he attended primary school. From this year to 1950, when his father died, he lived with his family in Makassar, where he went to the local Dutch-language secondary school, the HBS. Soon after the death of his father, he moved to Bandung, West Java, in pursuit of what his mother saw as the best education. In Bandung, he completed his secondary education at the city's Catholic

Senior High School. Again, wanting to provide Habibie with the best education she could afford, Tuti sent him to West Germany to study aeronautics at the Technische Hochschule in Aachen. To pay for Habibie's education in Germany, Tuti raised funds by engaging in trade in foreign exchange and, later, by running her own export-import company. He earned his PhD in 1965.

On May 12, 1962, Habibie married Hasri Ainun Besari (1937-2010). In 1961, she earned her MD from the University of Indonesia. They had two children: Ilham Akbar Habibie (b. 1963) and Thareq Kemal Habibie (b. 1967). In 1994, Ilham received his PhD in aeronautics from the Technical University of Munich, Germany. He makes a living as an entrepreneur. In 1993, Thareq got his MA in engineering from the Braunschweig University of Technology. He is President Director of Ilthabi Energia, a company specializing in energy business. The key values that Habibie and Ainun have sought to inculcate in their children included discipline, hard work, self-reliance, and the quest for knowledge.[1295]

Striving to modernize Indonesia from above, Soeharto collaborated not only with the Bappenas technocrats (who specialized in economic development) and the CSIS technosophes (who concentrated on grand-strategic modernization). He also enlisted, in the 1980s and 1990s, the service of the German-trained engineer B. J. Habibie.

Several factors brought the general and the engineer close together. First, it was chance. During his stint in Makassar in 1950 to quell a rebellion led by Andi Azis, Soeharto and his officers came to befriend the Habibie family. One of his officers,

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[1295] In writing the preceding biographical sketch of B. J. Habibie, I relied on these sources: A. Makmur Makka, *Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie: His Life and Career* (Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1996), 11-41; Makka, *Habibie: From Pare-Pare*, 194-412.

Capt. Subono Mantofani married Habibie's elder sister, Titi Sri Sulaksmi. The friendship between Soeharto and the Habibies proved long-term.[1296]

Second, although (or perhaps because) the modernist Soeharto lacked adequate education, he became entranced by intellectuals. And he seems to have desired that one of his children would grow to be one. This never happened, though. As a result, he was attracted to the wunderkind B. J. Habibie, whom he treated as an adopted son.

Third, both Soeharto and Habibie shared a vision of high-tech-based Indonesian modernity—a vision that they got the chance to try and realize in the New Order. As Soeharto told his biographers:

> I am especially conscious of just how important it is to master science and technology for the progress of our nation in the future. To be able to achieve "take-off," in the coming years we need to make greater progress in the fields of science and technology.[1297]

Likewise, as early as the late 1950s, while he was still a graduate student of aeronautics in Aachen, West Germany, Habibie came to believe that the mastery of science and technology held the key to national progress. "I belong to a generation," he said, "that must give substance to our independence with technical and economic

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[1296] Soeharto, "Some Notes Concerning Prof. Dr. Ing. B. J. Habibie by the President of Republic of Indonesia," in *Prof. Dr. Ing. B. J. Habibie: Half a Century: Impressions and Reminiscences*, ed. A. Makmur Makka (Jakarta: Cipta Kreatif, 1987), 6-7.

[1297] Soeharto, *Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan: Otobiografi seperti Dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K. H.* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), 404; quoted in Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, 264.

programs."[1298] In addition, he saw science and technology as the tools for creating a new breed of Indonesians:

> [I]t is only through the mastery of science and technology that the Indonesian man can be developed into the most modern human potential, and *no longer be a social problem*.[1299]

Moreover, the mastery of science and technology, Habibie believed, was one of the necessary elements that went into the transformation of Indonesians into complete human beings:

> […] Indonesia is endeavoring to build up an Indonesian human being as a whole and complete being. […He or she] masters technology for the sake of [creating] added values …. [He or she] should possess a healthy body, [be] mentally healthy…and hav[e] a healthy knowledge of culture…religion and Pancasila.[1300]

In the eyes of many of his compatriots, Habibie—with all his academic and professional accomplishments—appeared as a shining embodiment of the ideal Indonesian. As Sjarif Thajeb (1920-1989)—a Brigadier General and a Harvard-trained pediatrician—wrote:

> [Before 1974] I visited him while he was employed at the…Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm…factory in Hamburg, where he headed a division, with several tens of German engineer[s] being subordinated to him. […] I was quite proud that an Indonesian could head a number of foreigners in a foreign country.[1301]

[1298] Toeti Adhitama, "From Pare-Pare via Aachen," *Eksekutif*, July 1979; reprinted in Makka, *Habibie: From Pare-Pare*, 29.

[1299] "Lebih Jauh dengan Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie" [More about Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie], *Kompas*, December 23, 1984; reprinted in Makka, *B. J. Habibie: From Pare-Pare*, 280.

[1300] "Prof. Dr. B. J. Habibie: My Wife Left Her Profession for Our Family's Sake," *Kartini*, January 14-27, 1985; reprinted in Makka, *B.J. Habibie: From Pare-Pare*, 304.

[1301] Sjarif Thajeb, "Bequeath Your Knowledge to the Successor Generations!" in Makka, *Habibie: Half a Century*, 32.

Lt.-Gen. Achmad Tirtosudiro (1922-2011)—former head of the State Logistic Board (Bulog) and former ambassador to West Germany—noted with delight that Habibie and his wife taught their children to lead a life that pursued "harmony between science, good deeds, and faith."[1302] And it is not hard to see that Habibie fulfilled Daoed Joesoef's criteria of the Indonesian version of man of the Enlightenment—despite the critical attitude that CSIS thinkers took toward the former.

With Habibie's help, Soeharto undertook a special component in the top-down modernization of Indonesia: the making of a high-tech nation-state capable of solving its strategic problems.[1303] To do so was to fulfill one of the objectives of the prewar nationalist movement, the collaboration between Indonesia and Japan during the occupation, and the Revolution. As Chapter 2 has shown, technological modernity figured prominently in the visions of Indonesian (or proto-Indonesian) progress in the writings of Takdir Alisjahbana, Liem Khing Hoo, Mohammad Husni Thamrin, and Mohammad Natsir. And, as is evident in the writings of the student activist Soe Hok Gie, it turned out to be one of the motives behind the student rebellion against Guided Democracy in 1966. Although in this respect, Habibie and Soeharto had their share of detractors, they also had their supporters among Indonesians who went through the *tiga jaman* (the colonial era, the Japanese occupation, and independence). In 1986, one member of this generation, Sajidiman Soerjohadiprodjo (b. 1932), was able to see the

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[1302] Achmad Tirtosudiro, "A Scientist Who Is a Faithful and Practicing Believer," in Makka, *Habibie: Half a Century*, 56.

[1303] Reinshagen, "Architect," 257.

historical connection between the dream of progress in the *pergerakan* era and Soeharto's and Habibie's attempt to realize it in the New Order:

> Now we have lived in independence for some forty years, and it appears that our dreams of half a century ago are not unattainable for the Indonesian people. In the past, when waking up from dreaming, we wondered fearfully whether our dreams may ever come true. […] But it now has become evident that the Indonesians are not ignorant and incapable (retarded is what the Dutch called us). And Indonesians now already can build aircraft[s] as we once used to dream about.[1304]

Soeharto and Habibie were not the only top-down modernizers in the New Order who pressed for the mastery and application of science and technology. Actually, in their own ways, the technocrats and the CSIS technosophes also factored these variables in their blueprints for Indonesian modernization. Yet unlike these people, Soeharto and Habibie were far more daring (or just reckless and inefficient, depending on one's point of view) in their quest for a high-tech Indonesia. They wanted a highly accelerated technological modernization. On this, they gambled large sums of state funds. It is simplistic to claim—as some critics did—that Soeharto and Habibie did this just to plunder the state treasuries: Under the guise of promoting the development of Indonesia's strategic industries, they made money for themselves by exploiting their special access to army and navy procurements. It is true, of course, but it is not the whole story.

It must be kept in mind, too, that in the 1980s many Indonesians—old and young, women and men—shared Habibie's and Soeharto's fascination with science and

[1304] Sajidiman Soerjohadiprodjo, "Not Really an Unattainable Dream!" in Makka, *Habibie: Half a Century*, 61.

technology. In January 2013, a lady college teacher in Bogor reminisced on her blog about her perception in the 1980s of Habibie and his vision of Indonesian modernity:

> As a teenager in the 1980s, I was one of those fans of Habibie: the then [State] Minister of Research and Technology. He was versatile, and always enthusiastic about everything. When he talked about aircraft, his eyes always shone. He pioneered the construction of the aircraft enterprise [Nurtanio] in Bandung. He was totally cool, wasn't he? At the time, as an agrarian country, Indonesia had achieved self-sufficiency in rice. Nurtanio would complete our pride as Indonesians by making our own aircraft.[1305]

The historian Robert Elson has done a fine job of capturing the high-tech modernist vision behind the high-tech, capital-intensive, and economically impatient projects that were undertaken by Habibie (and by extension Soeharto) in the 1980s and the 1990s:

> [Habibie] offered a new vision, not one based…on the exploitation of Indonesia's abundant supplies of [labor] and low-wage regime…. Rather, he sought a state-sponsored technological revolution: the accelerated development of technologically advanced industries, strategically chosen, and the highly trained and skilled workers to operate them, whose expertise would have innumerable multiplier effects across the economy….[1306]

It was to implement this vision that Habibie, with Soeharto's full support, established a number of indigenous strategic industries, such as the aircraft factory IPTN,

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[1305] Annis, "Dari Habibie ke Ainun" [From Habibie to Ainun], *Kata-Kata Menuju-Mu* [My words reach to you], January 9, 2013, accessed January 31, 2013,http://annisdr.blogspot.com/2013/01/dari-habibie-ke-ainun.html.

[1306] Elson, *Suharto: A political Biography*, 164.

the shipyard PAL, the small arms and ammunition factory PINDAD, the railway and train company INKA, and the great steel mills of Krakatau Steel.[1307]

As State Minister of Research and Technology and as head of the government think tank BPPT, Habibie sought to produce a new generation of great engineers to serve as the engine of Indonesia's technological revolution. He once said, "I want to multiply myself by a thousand…."[1308] And that was why every year in the 1980s and the 1990s, through the BPPT he sent several hundred bright senior high school graduates abroad to study science and technology.[1309] It was also reported that he took "Indonesian graduates (of universities abroad [and] at home) in science and technology at ages of 23-30…and [had] their careers develop under the guidance of his policies…" He sought to inspire these young engineers and scientists to "serve the country in developing its industries." In doing so, Habibie acted as an apostle of Indonesian technological nationalism.[1310]

It is important to mention in this connection that in response to Habibie's suggestions on how to create Indonesian men of science and technology, the then Minister of Education and Culture, Sjarif Thajeb, created and introduced the new national curriculum of 1975.[1311]

As technological modernists, Soeharto and Habibie did not want to wait any longer. They believed that Indonesia's technological modernization was to be an accelerated one. In reply to his critics, Habibie explained that his brand of technological

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[1307] Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia*, 266.

[1308] Lawrence, "Minister B. J. Habibie," 85.

[1309] *Femina* 17, no. 41-43 (1989): xiv; "Banyak Jalan Menuju Roma" [Many road lead to Rome], *Mingguan Hidup* 49, no. 13-22 (1993): 21; Erlita Rachman, "92 Million Dollars for 1,500 Cadres," *Gadis*, January 9-18, 1986; reprinted in Makka, *Habibie: From Pare-Pare*, 417-423.

[1310] Lawrence, "Minister B. J. Habibie," 85.

[1311] Thajeb, "Bequeath Your Knowledge," 33

modernity was to be achieved back to front, that is, from high tech to low-tech. This, he argued, was the best way for Indonesia to catch up with advanced countries. As he once said, "Indonesia can and will be another Japan. You will see."[1312]

[1312] Kieran Cooke, "A Man Who Works to Build Indonesia into a Technological 'Japan,'" *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 11, 1985, http://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0311/ohab.html (accessed January 31, 2013).

CHAPTER 4: THE QUEST FOR INDONESIAN MODERNITY IN THE NEW ORDER: THE LP3ES INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION "FROM THE BOTTOM UP"

President Soeharto's technocrats, engineers, advisors, and strategists were not the only protagonists of Indonesian modernization in the New Order era (1966-1998). True, they played leading roles in restructuring Indonesia's domestic politics, reorienting the country's foreign relations, managing its economic development, and accelerating its entry into technological progress. Yet, despite their belief that it was the state's right and duty to direct the pursuit of Indonesian modernity, they knew that they needed the citizenry to take part in the project in ways that they deemed orderly, safe, and supportive. They also realized that to modernize the country, they could not work alone. They needed the help of fellow modernizers who, like them, belonged to the same middling classes but who, unlike many of them, pursued careers in the private sector.

In many cases, these state-based modernizers and their civil-society-based counterparts knew each other or, had mutual friends. They were part of overlapping networks of agents of modernization, some of whose members engaged in complex and enduring encounters and exchanges.[1313] These people had come to know each other in the mid-1960s, when they forged a political, economic, and intellectual alliance to overthrow Guided Democracy and construct a new way of life they called the New Order. During the second half of the 1960s, some members of this New Order alliance decided to

[1313] This is a topic that merits further investigation. One of the pioneering studies of this topic is Rizal Mallarangeng, "Liberalizing New Order Indonesia: Ideas, Epistemic Community, and Economic Policy Change, 1986-1992" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2000).

operate or keep operating within the state; they led the Armed Forces, served the new regime as technocrats, ran state-owned enterprises, worked as members of Parliament, or ran a think tank that worked closely with President Soeharto.

Other New Orderists, however, chose to realize their modernist visions by operating in the private sector. These people built several institutions, some of which would shape the kind of life that developed in New Order Indonesia. For example, in 1966, the critic H. B. Jassin and his colleagues set up the literary magazine *Horison* [Horizon], which offered itself as a cultural laboratory where Indonesian writers could carry out their literary experiments. In 1971, Goenawan Mohammad founded the weekly magazine *Tempo* [Time], which stimulated new ways of using the Indonesian language and provided a mirror for its middling-class readers to engage in self-reflection and a medium for them to monitor the changes that transpired around them. In the same year, with the support of some of Soeharto's technocrats, the former student activists Nono Anwar Makarim and Ismid Hadad cofounded and led the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES).

Established in Jakarta in 1971, the LP3ES was Indonesia's first development NGO. It was the executive body that the Bineksos (the Indonesian Society for the Advancement of Economics and Social Sciences) used to realize its modernist visions. The Bineksos was set up in Jakarta in 1970 by a group of New Orderist leading intellectuals, including the economists Emil Salim, Ali Wardhana, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo; the sociologist Selo Soemardjan, the anthropologist Koentjaraningrat, and the historian Taufik Abdullah; the foreign minister

Adam Malik and the governor of Jakarta Ali Sadikin; and the former anticommunist student activists Nono Anwar Makarim and Ismid Hadad.

When Emil Salim and Ali Wardhana cofounded the Bineksos and the LP3ES in 1970 and 1971, they were still working at the Bappenas (the National Development Planning Agency) together with their teammates Widjojo Nitisastro and Mohamad Sadli for President Soeharto, helping him coordinate Indonesia's economic development. At this point, Ali Wardhana had served as Minister of Finance in 1967-1969 while Emil was Vice Chairman of the Bappenas and Minister of State for the Improvement of State Apparatus. The fact that through the Bineksos, Emil and Ali cofounded the LP3ES in 1971 and that Emil, since then, provided it with guidance and protection suggests that their superior, President Soeharto, might have agreed with the LP3ES' modernizing vision and mission. Throughout its history the LP3ES never opposed the New Order regime and the economic development that it carried out. As one of the LP3ES' directors later put it, this NGO played the role of the New Order's "critical partner" in economic development. Thus, it is small wonder that Soeharto did not crush the LP3ES even though from time to time its leading members criticized the economic policies that his regime pursued.

The key point I seek to make in this chapter is that New Order Indonesia was not the sole creation of Soeharto and his generals, technocrats, and engineers; it was, rather, a joint creation of the missionaries of modernization who came from the country's middling classes. Using the history of the LP3ES and the intellectual biographies of its three directors (Nono Makarim, Ismid Hadad, and M. Dawam Rahardjo), I attempt to

show that the quest for Indonesian economic modernity was undertaken not only by Soeharto and his assistants. This quest is best seen, rather, as the Indonesian middling classes' key social mission, whose protagonists also included non-state actors. Although these people often criticized the New Order, their intention was not to destroy it; they wanted to improve it and make it work. And, despite their attempts to promote a more bottom-up economic modernization, they ended up—in pursuing some of their goals—acting in a top-down manner.

4. 1. Nono Anwar Makarim (b. 1939): Renaissance Man and "Decaffeinated" Modernity

Born on September 25, 1939, Nono Anwar Makarim (see Figure 16) was the oldest of four siblings in a middling-class family of Arab descent in Pekalongan, Central Java. His Dutch-educated father, Anwar Makarim,[1314] made a living as a notary and considered himself "a Muslim Calvinist." As Nono recalled, "He worked, worked, and worked. Quoting the Bible, he often said, 'By the sweat of thy brow, thou shalt earn thy daily bread.'" The man tried his hand at business but all his attempts were fruitless; aparently, he was too cerebral and "too soft" to be an entrepreneur.[1315]

[1314] Unlike many mestizo Arabs in Indonesia, who are partly of Hadrami origin, the Makarims may have been descended from Druze ancestors, who intermarried with Natives and mestizo Arabs in the Indonesian Archipelago. Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011. Some sources mention that Nono's father also had Minangkabau blood in his veins. On this, see, for instance, François Raillon, *Les étudiants indonésiens et l'ordre nouveau: Politique et idéologie du* Mahasiswa Indonesia *(1966-1974)* (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1984), 328.

[1315] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

Nono's father was a champion of "the Renaissance man" and freedom of speech. He wanted his children not to confine themselves to one field of interest; he urged them to develop skills in a variety of areas, including the arts, which he deemed a fertile source of ideas.[1316] He also urged his children to speak their minds:

> When I was a kid, at 11 p.m. my brothers, my sister, and I would emerge from our rooms. It was time for a small discussion with our father. But we had an ulterior motive: We just wanted him to treat us to noodle soup or fried noodles. The itinerant noodle vendor would pass by our house at about midnight. Thus, while waiting for the vendor, we conducted our conversation.[1317]
>
> [Father] let us criticize not only one another but also him and Mom. […] We must, however, base our criticisms on a [well-reasoned] argument. Otherwise, he would just slap us.[1318]

Figure 16. Nono Anwar Makarim, 1974 [*Tempo*].

[1316] Ibid.

[1317] Ibid.

[1318] Tempo, "Nono Anwar Makarim," in *Apa & Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Indonesia, 1985-1986* [Indonesian who's who, 1985-1986] (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1986), 467.

Nono's mother was the granddaughter of Awab Soengkar Aloermei, the founder of a textile empire in Solo and a close friend of Pakubuwana X (r. 1893-1939) of the royal house of Surakarta. She was an apostle of morals and individuality in her family.

> […M]y mom adopted a black-and-white approach to morals: This was good; that was evil. With tears in her eyes, she sometimes pleaded with me to pray. […] Although she considered religion a private relationship between man and God, she urged her kids to pray because she thought that the communion between man and God did not happen automatically. […] Prayer helped people, she argued, to enter that mental state where an encounter with God could transpire.[1319]

Besides teaching Islamic morality to her children, she trained them, right from their early childhood, to stand out from the crowd. What this meant was that as elementary schoolchildren in Jakarta, Nono and his younger brothers—Chaidir and Zacky—had to go to school wearing a cap and a pair of sunglasses and carrying a lunch box and a bottle of milk.[1320]

Thanks to the kind of upbringing he received from his parents, Nono grew up "between two poles: morality and human frailty" and became what he called "a Libra person," who thought in a way that was "full of 'yes buts' and 'howevers,'" making him unfit to become "a revolutionary." In addition, having to change schools several times in his childhood caused Nono to suffer "nervousness" and have difficulty making friends—the latter problem continued to trouble him as a freshman at the University of Indonesia.

[1319]Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.
[1320] Ibid.

But it seems to have disappeared in the early 1960s, when he developed friendships with other bright students who shared his interests.[1321]

Nono spent his early childhood in Pekalongan, where he went to a Catholic grade school and, later, to an Islamic one (the Ma'had Islam). One day during the Revolution, his family moved to Central Jakarta, in the Cikini area. He completed primary school there in 1952. Then, from 1953 to 1958, he attended the Dutch-language five-year high school HBS-A Carpentier Alting Stichting,[1322] where he got rigorous instruction in modern European languages (Dutch, German, French, and English).[1323] Besides attending the HBS-A in the morning, Nono went to the madrasah in his neighborhood to receive Islamic education. "From early childhood," he said, "I straddled two cultures… one foot in the West and another in the East."[1324]

Much to the consternation of his parents, it took Nono a long time to complete his studies at the University of Indonesia's School of Law. He enrolled in 1959 but did not graduate until 1973. There were two reasons for this. First, to turn himself into a

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[1321] Ibid.

[1322] The school was on Koningsplein Oost (now Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur), Jakarta. In 1961, the school became State Senior High School 7. Prior to 1950, the school seems to have been open mainly to European children and a few Chinese and Native children from prominent families. Afterward, it was open to everyone regardless of ethnicity. On this school, see René Persijn, "Op de CAS" [On the Carpentier Alting Stichting], *Tempo Doeloe (Vroegere Tijden)*, February 19, 2008, http://blog.seniorennet.be/renepersijn2008/archief.php?ID=35 (accessed February 6, 2013); Tineke Nauta-Meertens, "CAS historie: De geschiedenis van de Carpentier Alting Stichting (CAS) scholen en pensionaat" [The history of the Carpentier Alting Stichting (CAS) schools and boarding school], http://cas-reunisten.nl/index_files/Page404.htm (accessed February 6, 2013).

[1323] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

[1324] Tempo, "Nono Anwar Makarim," 466.

Renaissance man, he adopted a bohemian lifestyle, "treating night as day and day as night." He hung around with artists and "almost became one."[1325]

Second, like his close friends—such as Ismid Hadad (b. 1940), Goenawan Mohamad (b. 1941), Arief Budiman (b. 1942), Fikri Jufri (b. 1936), and Salim Said (b. 1943)—Nono considered himself a successor to the pre-Independence generation of nationalist leaders. He and his friends took on the roles of student activists and public intellectuals. As Nono later recalled, there was a bit of megalomania in their self-perceptions in the 1960s.

> We had an extraordinary élan back then. We pursued intellectual prowess and thought we were so brilliant. […] Goenawan Mohamad, for example, was steeped in Mao Zedong. […] And one day I contested the indoctrination lecture that Roeslan Abdoelgani [1914-2007] gave at a student meeting dominated by members of the [PKI-affiliated] CGMI.[1326]
>
> We hungered for ideas. But the lectures that our professors gave in the classrooms failed to satisfy our hunger. So we held these small discussions—sometimes at one of those coffee shops on Gang Ampiun, Cikini, and sometimes in Wiratmo Soekito's [pavilion] on nearby Jalan Cilosari. Wiratmo [1929-2001] would buy us coffee and snacks.[1327]
>
> We…felt we were responsible for the world. We thought we had the expertise to solve the world's problems. There's so much idealism.

[1325] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

[1326] Ibid.

[1327] Ibid.; cf. Arief Budiman, "Wiratmo Soekito: Sebuah Kenangan" [My memories of Wiratmo Soekito], *Tempo*, March 25, 2001; Goenawan Mohamad, "Ong" [Onghokham], *Tempo*, September 3, 2007. Born on February 8, 1929 in Solo, Central Java, Wiratmo Soekito was the son of the chief librarian at the Mangkunegaran royal house. After studying philosophy at the Catholic University of Nijmegen, he worked at the Radio of the Republic of Indonesia from 1957 to 1972, co-edited the magazine *Kebudayaan Indonesia* [Indonesian Culture] from 1965-1969, and taught literary criticism and theater studies at the National Academy of Theater (ATN) from 1960 to 1962. In his adolescence, he took an interest in Marxism. Later, however, he became one its staunch critic in Indonesia. He was one of the key writers of the "1963 Cultural Manifesto," which defended artistic freedom and creativity in a cultural setting that, in the early 1960s, was dominated by the Left. On Wiratmo, see Suryansyah"Wiratmo Soekito: Ini Bukan Manifes Kebudayaan II" [Wiratmo Soekito: This is not Cultural Manifesto Part II], *Tiras*, June 1, 1995.

> The upshot of this all was that I often came home at the wee hours. And I spent too many years living this kind of life.[1328]

As Nono's friend Arief Budiman recalled, the discussions that they often held at Wiratmo's home dealt with politics, literature, and philosophy.[1329]

In the 1960s, as an intellectual and a student activist, Nono did many other things than just engage in discussions. From the mid-1960s to 1973, he helped establish the New Order and promote his version of it. In 1966, he sat as a political adviser of sorts on the central committee of the KAMI (Indonesian Student Action Front), which staged demonstrations to overthrow Guided Democracy. He also produced pamphlets to direct and support such demonstrations. Soon, with other leaders of the KAMI,[1330] Nono set up the student daily *Harian KAMI*[1331] and acted as its editor-in-chief. He and his comrades used the newspaper to attack the PKI, advertise the New Order, monitor its development, propagate New Orderist values and ideas, and reveal corruption.[1332] As well, he was active in the Indonesian Student Press Association (IPMI). From 1967 to 1971, representing the IPMI, he served as member of Parliament (DPRGR).[1333]

[1328] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

[1329] Budiman, "Wiratmo Soekito."

[1330] In addition to Nono Anwar Makarim, *Harian KAMI*'s board of editors included, among others, Ismid Hadad, Anis Ibrahim, Cosmas Batubara (b. 1938), Zamroni, David Napitupulu, and Zulharman Said (1933-1993); see the masthead of the *Harian KAMI* on July 19, 1966.

[1331] Janet Steele, *Wars Within: The Story of* Tempo*, an Independent Magazine in Soeharto's Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox, 2005), 47-48.

[1332] This is evident in the subject matters of the articles that appeared in *Harian KAMI* in 1966-1970; see also Steele, *Wars Within*, 49.

[1333] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011; interview with Ismid Hadad, February 28, 2011.

In 2002, looking back on his youth in the late 1960s, Nono stated the reasons why he attempted to liquidate Guided Democracy and install the New Order:

> There was a short period of nation-building under [Soekarno]. But then there was the arrest of the opposition [leaders of PSI and Masyumi], and that was not pretty. We didn't know at the time that you have to be patient [and] that you have to continue to muddle. A period of nation-building must be followed by state-building, which is actually governance. […]
>
> In 1965, I was a student leader. I demonstrated and helped topple [Soekarno] because nation-building didn't bring in the goods, and people were suffering. I had to queue for rice, for shirts, for kerosene for cooking; I had to queue for gasoline, in an oil-rich country. Even salt—can you imagine? We are an archipelago! So, he was toppled.
>
> We wanted an administrative government, no longer a solidarity-making government. We had had enough of that with its 600% galloping inflation. […]
>
> State-building occurred. The Berkeley mafia was wonderful. They had [studied in the US] and came back to be leaders. They brought back concepts[.] […E]ven though these concepts were sometimes wrong, these individuals and their ideas formed a coherent group. The first fifteen years of [Soeharto] were wonderful years.[1334]

As this recollection shows, Nono wanted his country to modernize its economy and bureaucracy. Indeed, "modernization" was one of the buzzwords that popped up frequently in *Harian KAMI* until its demise in early 1974.

The vision of modernity that Nono advocated in the first decade of the New Order era also carried a host of other elements. These included democracy and meritocracy; victory of fact over myth and of work over rhetoric; clean government; free and rational thinking; rule of law and equality before the law; "depersonalized" and progress-oriented

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[1334] Fund for Peace, [Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim], *Reality Check: Diverse Voices of Internal Conflict*, no. 6 (2002): 1-2; see also Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, "KAMI," in *Ensiklopedi Pers Indonesia* (Jakarta: PWI, 2010); quoted in Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, "K dari Ensiklopedi Pers Indonesia (EPI)," n.d. <http://www.pwi.or.id/index.php/presspediapwi/797-k-dari-ensiklopedi-pers-indonesia-epi> (accessed February 7, 2013).

leadership; problem-solving attitude; the absence of polarizing conflicts; the rise of orderly politics; and the pursuit of efficiency, productivity, and discipline (see Figure 17).[1335]

In the years 1968-1971, Nono examined the New Order and his role in it. Like some of his close friends, he had mixed feelings about the direction the New Order was taking. On the one hand, he was glad that the PKI was gone and that Indonesia had embarked on economic development. On the other hand, he was displeased at what he saw as the rise of military dominance in socio-political affairs and the government's disrespect for freedom of the press.[1336]

From a personal standpoint, he also had doubts and discontents. First, although he had "fun" as a prolific writer of editorials for *Harian Kami*, there was a time he felt he had just been "running around in circles": "pontificating wisdom and knowledge about politics."[1337] About a decade later, he would say that what he did in *Harian KAMI* was "primitive journalism."[1338]

[1335] Mar'ie Muhammad, Nono Anwar Makarim, and Marsillam Simandjuntak, "Koalisi Besar" [Toward a broad-based coalition], in *Kumpulan Kertas Karja* [Working papers], ed. Diskusi Kita (Djakarta: Sekretariat Diskusi Kita, 1970), 4-5; see also, Anonymous, "Apa Itu Orde Lama dan Orde Baru" [Comparison between the New Order and the Old Order], *Harian KAMI*, July 25, 1966.

[1336] Steele, *Wars Within*, 50-51; Ismid Hadad, "Masa Awal Bersama LP3ES" [My early years at the LP3ES], in *Profil dan Pendapat: Kenangan 30 Tahun LP3ES* [Profiles and opinions: Recollections in the thirtieth anniversary of the LP3ES], ed. Dwi Arya Wisesa (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2001), xxiv-xxv; Sukardi Rinakit, *The Indonesian Military after the New Order* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005), 33.

[1337] Steele, *Wars Within*, 48.

[1338] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

Apa Itu Orde Lama & Orde Baru

Djakarta, 23-7 (IPMI) –
Musjawarah Kerdja KAMI Pusat baru2 ini telah merumuskan pengertian daripada orde lama dan orde baru. Orde lama adalah suatu sistim atau tjara berfikir, bersikap dan bertindak jang tidak sesuai dengan aspirasi perdjuangan dan perkembangan masjarakat serta nilai peradaban manusia. Sedangkan orde baru adalah sebaliknja. Lengkapnja perintjian perbedaan kedua orde tsb. adalah sbb. :

ORDE BARU

— mementingkan rakjat
— mengemban Ampera
— berpikir setjara realistis
— berpikir setjara bebas
— lepas dari mythos
— berdasarkan fakta
— taat dengan reserve, ialah ketaatan dibatasi oleh norma2 hukum
— the rightman on the right place
— membersihkan penjelewengan dari siapa sadja dan dimanapun djuga
— demokrasi jang njata jang dipimpin oleh Hikmah kebidjaksanaan Permusjawaratan perwakilan
— sosial-control terhadap pimpinan siapa sadja
— tindakan konsekwen dan prinsipiil
— tidak puas dengan sembojan2 dan kata2 muluk
— mendukung orang2 achli, djudjur dan effisien
— revolusioner ialah mendjebol untuk membangun
— bersikap konsekwen dan tegas
— anti musuh dan lawan Revolusi Pantjasila setjara mutlak
— pikiran positif dan konstruktif setjara njata
— politik mentjari kawan
— orang jang mengakui kenjataan2
— politik terbuka dan selektif serta pertjaja pada diri sendiri.

ORDER LAMA

— mementingkan golongan /klik atau diri sendiri
— tidak memikirkan dan tidak terharu oleh penderitaan Rakjat
— berpikir irriil sadja
— bersikap yes-man, „asal bapak senang"
— berdasarkan mithos
— memutarbalik fakta, puas dengan chajalan belaka
— taat tanpa reserve, taat tanpa tanggung djawab sendiri
— sistim relasi dan proteksi
— mempertahankan penjelewengan demi kepentingannja / golongan atau diri sendiri
— demokrasi terpimpin jg dipimpin oleh salah seorang pribadi atau oleh klik/golongan
— menjerahkan sadja kepada pimpinan
— tindakan plin-plan, bunglon
— puas dengan sembojan2 jang bagus tetapi tidak dilaksanakan
— menerima korupsi, mismanagement dan birokrasi
— mendjebol tanpa ketjakapan untuk membangun
— bersikap kompromi, lemah, tawar-menawar
— takut terhadap musuh revolusi Pantjasila pro Nasakom, Pro Pantja Azimat Revolusi, pro PKI/Komunisme
— pikiran negatif, ialah selalu anti dan destruktif terhadap mereka jg mau membangun tanpa memikirkan kepentingan vested interest
— orang jang tidak mengakui kenjataan2
— politik mentjari musuh
— politik zeno phobie (takut kepada asing).

Figure 17. An article comparing the New Order and Guided Democracy [July 25, 1966 issue of *Harian KAMI*].

Second, as a member of Parliament (1961-1971), he was frustrated at what he considered the institution's disrespect for meritocracy. In the late 1960s, he wanted Parliament to send him to the UN General Assembly to represent Indonesia's interests in the question of West Papua. Having firsthand knowledge of the issue[1339] and believing that of all members of Parliament he was the most proficient in foreign languages, he

[1339] It was Ali Moertopo who sent to West Papua to cover the Act of Free Choice.

deemed himself the right man for the task. "Yet," he recalled, "the Parliament ended up sending this Haji from Political Party A and that Haji from Political Party B."[1340]

In 1971, having married Atika Algadri[1341] and completed his stint as member of Parliament, Nono accepted an offer from D. G. Wilke[1342]—the representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNS) in Indonesia—to serve as the first director of the LP3ES (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information), while keeping his post as the chief editor of *Harian KAMI*. Under his directorship (1971-1973), the LP3ES carried out a set of modernization projects aimed at creating a generation of intellectuals capable of carrying out social research and transformation, and facilitating the rise of middling classes from among the urban and rural poor.[1343] In the meantime, Nono resumed his studies of law at the University of Indonesia, which he completed at some point in 1973.

Later, Nono took up a fellowship at the Center for International Affairs (CFIA) at Harvard in 1973-1974. In response to the accusation that in doing so he deserted student activism, he explained that since "the movement was [already] over," it made no sense for him to hang around in the Action Front (KAMI).[1344] Upon completion of his

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[1340] Interview with him, March 10, 2011; Nono Anwar Makarim, "LP3ES Pernah Berfungsi sebagai Mercu Suar" [The LP3ES once served as a lighthouse], in Wisesa, *Profil dan Pendapat*, xxxvii.

[1341] Atika is daughter of the PSI leader of Arab descent Hamid Algadri (1910-1998); see Rosihan Anwar, "In Memoriam: Hamid Algadri, Perintis Kemerdekaan" [In Memoriam: The freedom fighter Hamid Algadri, January 26, 1998 <http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1998/01/26/0051.html> (accessed February 10, 2013).

[1342] Born circa 1936, Dieter G. Wilke received a PhD in political science from the University of Freiburg in 1967; on Wilke, see Anonymous, "Tentang Penulis Nomor Ini" [On the contributors to this issue], *Prisma* no.7 (December 1972): 95.

[1343] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxviii-xxix, xxxi-xxxiv.

[1344] Tempo, "Nono Anwar Makarim" [1984], 446.

fellowship at the CFIA, he stayed on at Harvard for another four academic years. With a scholarship from the Ford Foundation, he studied law, earning his LLM in 1975 and PhD in 1978. "I felt totally intimidated at Harvard," he recalled.[1345] He met so many bright graduate students there that he wrote to his father, "All the things…worth saying—things that'll change people's minds if we express them—have already been said [at Harvard], not by the professors but by the grad students."[1346] He added,

> I was to have lunch with big shots like [Samuel] Huntington [1927-2008] and [Paul] Samuelson [1915-2009]. Lucian Pye [1921-2008] invited me to contribute an article to a book he was editing. I came to know critical legal studies, a movement in legal thinking pioneered by Roberto Unger [b. 1947]. Too bad I did not have enough of an abstract mind to figure out his lectures.[1347]

Besides academic degrees, what did Nono take home from his studies at Harvard? He learned "hard work," he said, and received "damned hard training." Though he was a bibliophile, he found his reading load at Harvard "too heavy."[1348]

Many years later, it occurred to Nono that in the early 1970s the Opsus[1349] (the New Order intelligence body) and the CIA might have been responsible for exiling a few troublemaking ex-student activists (Sjahrir, Arief Budiman, and himself) to the United States to undertake graduate studies in order that they could broaden their horizons and

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[1345] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

[1346] Anonymous, "Bukan Kelerengnya tapi Permainannya" [Not the marbles but the game], April 4, 2012, <http://www.omipunk.com/2012/04/nono-anwar-makarim-lawyers-serial-kisah.html> (accessed February 9, 2013).

[1347] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

[1348] Ibid.

[1349] The Opsus was the Indonesian Army' intelligence body that Lt.-Col. Ali Moertopo founded in 1962 to expel the Dutch from West Papua. From the mid-1960s to 1984, when it was disbanded, the Opsus engaged in the political engineering of Indonesian society.

enhance their scholarly skills. Ali Moertopo and other like-minded military leaders seem to have thought that it was in Indonesia's interest that these young intellectuals undertake their apprenticeship overseas rather than disturb the country's politics. "Perhaps," Nono speculated, "the Opsus' policy on young intellectuals was something like this: Destroy the group but save its members because they were the nation's assets."[1350] He remembered that from the mid-1960s to about the mid-1970s the relationship between New Orderist generals and student activists was "too close"—very much like that between "uncles and their nieces and nephews." For the generals to strike the students there should have been enough space between them.[1351]

From Nono's own perspective, he studied law at Harvard in response to the criticism he had received from the Bappenas technocrats, whom he came to know while taking part in the student movement in the mid-1960s:

> One day Emil Salim said to me, "What is the matter with you lawyers? You cannot do this and you cannot do that. We economists are different: If we push a button over here, we will produce results over there."[1352]

Upon completion of his studies in the US, Nono returned to Indonesia in 1978. Saying goodbye to journalism and politics, he pursued a fulltime career as a lawyer. Some friends, who regretted this decision, accused him of seeking mere wealth. He told them that "money matter[ed] only up to some point," beyond which it no longer occupied

[1350] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.
[1351] Ibid.
[1352] Ibid.

top priority. And he added that "[…P]olitics and the press were not my vocations, to begin with. I was a passerby in those fields."[1353]

In the late 1970s, Indonesia was busy undertaking economic modernization. While the Bappenas technocrats played a key role in this grand project as "engineers," Nono chose to contribute to it "as a mechanic."[1354]

> [The technocrats and the lawyers] lived in two different worlds. In the lawyers' world, we had to embrace our tasks—whether we liked them or not. We had to do our jobs, if we were serious about giving [something] to society. Our world did not consist of the things we love.[1355]

In 1980, after spending about a year as a senior partner at Adnan Buyung Nasution and Associates (a law firm), Nono and Frank Taira Supit (a former colleague at Harvard) established their own law firm, which they called Makarim and Taira S.[1356] His law practice flourished under the New Order. He represented a series of major clients, such as Bata, ICI, Citibank, Paninbank, and American Express.[1357]

Nono also engaged in philanthropy. In 1998, when the New Order collapsed and he had retired, Nono established the Aksara Foundation, a tool he used to encourage the development of a civil society that was intelligent and well-informed, understood the social change it experienced, and was capable of adapting to changes without losing its

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[1353] Tempo, "Nono Anwar Makarim" [1986], 467.
[1354] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.
[1355] Ibid.
[1356] Anonymous, "Bukan Kelerengnya."
[1357] Makarim and Taira S., "Nono Anwar Makarim," <http://www.makarim.com/index.php?lang=en&mod=our-people&sub=of-counsel&id=13> (accessed February 11, 2013).

identity.[1358] One of the programs it carried out was combatting the mediocrity that Nono thought had plagued the country's intellectual life since independence:

> […T]hrough Aksara, I hope to make Indonesians talk and think smarter. I want to make it a little easier for those who are already active by showing interest in their activities. I want to provide reading material, to expose what is really happening to us. Basically, it is an effort to contribute a little, to [take] the national discourse to a higher level.[1359]

To reach this objective, the Aksara Foundation ran a library in Jakarta, to which Nono and his brother-in-law Maher Algadri contributed their own private collections.[1360]

Nono's own household can be seen as an example of a successful and modern upper-middling class family. His wife Atika Makarim née Algadri earned an MA in education from Harvard. In the 1960s, she had served as a reporter of the *Harian KAMI*. In 1972, together with Mirta Kartohadiprodjo (b. 1944)[1361] and Goenawan Mohamad's wife Widarti (b. 1944), she co-founded the women's magazine *Femina*, whose mission was to empower Indonesian women so they could contribute to the social transformation that was going on in the New Order. She and her colleagues did so by promoting

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[1358] Yayasan Aksara, "Profil Yayasan Aksara," 2006, < http://www.aksara.or.id/def_menu.php> (February 10, 2013).

[1359] Fund for Peace, [Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim].

[1360] Amang, "Daftar Perpus di Sekitar Kita (Silakan Dilengkapi)" [A list of libraries around us (feel free to add to it)], August 26, 2008, <http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/52873-daftar-perpus-di-sekitar-kita-silakan-dilengkapi> (accessed February 11, 2013).

[1361] Mirta Kartohadiprojo is the daughter of Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana. In 1968, she received her BA in literature from the University of Indonesia. In the 1930s, her father created a stir in the Indonesian intellectual circles when he argued that Indonesian modernity should be based on Western models.

"education, good housekeeping, good health, and fashion."[1362] Later, in 1987, she co-founded the Lontar Foundation and served, for a time, as its treasurer.[1363] The foundation sought to foster the "development of Indonesian literature," introduce it to the world, and "preserve Indonesia's literary records for future generations."[1364] Nono's and Atika's children received fine educations and enjoyed rewarding professions. Holder of a BA in film studies from Vassar College in 1997 and an MA in modern literature from Goldsmiths College, University of London, in 2005, Rayya Makarim is an award-winning scriptwriter and a film curator. Hana Makarim got a BA in economics from Tufts in 2000 and an MBA from Yale in 2007. She worked at the Investment Coordination Board. Nadiem Makarim completed his studies of international relations at Brown University in 2006 and of business administration at Harvard in 2011. He is the CEO of Go-Jek, a motorcycle taxi firm he co-founded in January 2011.[1365]

Already in the New Order era, Nono and all his siblings had succeeded in attaining all or most of the goals that their fathers set for them: be useful members of

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[1362] Carla Bianpoen, "'Femina' Set Tone for Continuity, Change," *The Jakarta Post*, September 21, 2002, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/09/21/039femina039-sets-tone-continuity-change.html> (accessed February 12, 2013).

[1363] Adila Suwarmo et al., "Urgent Message from Yayasan Lontar," February 5, 1998, <http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1998/02/11/0006.html> (accessed February 13, 2013); Lontar Foundation, "Honorary Board," <http://www.lontar.org/index.php?page=organization&id=5&lang=en> (accessed February 13, 2013).

[1364] Lontar Foundation, "Welcome to the Lontar Foundation," <http://www.lontar.org/index.php?lang=en> (accessed February 12, 2013).

[1365] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011; Hana Makarim, <https://www.facebook.com/hana.makarim/info> (accessed February 13, 2013); Modernisator, "Resepsi bagi Profesional Muda di Sektor Publik" [A reception for young professionals in the public sector], June 3, 2010, <http://www.modernisator.org/berita/resepsi-bagi-profesional-muda-di-sektor-publik> (accessed February 13, 2013); Brenda Whatley, "From Ojek to Go-Jek," *One North* 9 (May-June 2012): 6-8, <http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/alumni.uwcsea.edu.sg/resource/resmgr/Docs/OneNorth_MayJune2012.pdf> (accessed February 13, 2013).

society, achieve economic independence, and become a Renaissance man or woman.[1366] A holder of a PhD from Texas A & M University, Chaidir Anwar Makarim is professor in geotechnical engineering at Tarumanegara University, Jakarta. Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim was former head of the military intelligence agency (1997-1999); now he is president commissioner of the state-owned steel mill Krakatau Steel. Irma Anwar Makarim is a physician who received her training at the University of Indonesia's School of Medicine and the Catholic University of Leuven; she pursues a synthesis of Western medicine, Eastern acupuncture, and Sufism.[1367]

Born in Jakarta on April 14, 1948, Zacky Anwar Makarim (see Figures 18 and 19) offers a useful case study to point out that rather than come from different castes, as certain observers have claimed, the military and civilian leaders of New Order Indonesia belonged to the middling classes and even to the same nuclear or extended family. Thus, to an important degree, and despite their often bitter quarrels, they shared common middling-class core values, which included a commitment to modernity. Studying Nono and Zacky in tandem help us see that New Order Indonesia was not about the triumph of militarism; it is best seen as the supremacy of the middling classes and their modernization project.

[1366] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

[1367] Ibid.; see also Anonymous, "Dr. Irma Anwar Makarim: Konsisten Menebar Nilai-Nilai Kehidupan" [Dr. Irma Anwar Makarim: A consistent propagator of living values], *Rumah Puan*, http://rumahpuan.com/puanofmonth/detail/35 (accessed February 5, 2013); Sutji Decilya, "Dirut Krakatau Steel Diganti" [Krakatau Steel's president director has been replaced], *Tempo*, June 14, 2012, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/06/14/088410574/Dirut-Krakatau-Steel-Diganti> (accessed February 11, 2013).

Figure 18. Zacky Anwar Makarim, 1999 [*Tempo*/Amatul Rayyani].

Figure 19. Zacky Anwar Makarim, c. 2011 [Krakatau Steel].

In the mid-1960s, with his sons Nono and Chaidir already studying law and engineering, respectively, Anwar Makarim wanted Zacky to be a doctor. It was still common among middling-class parents at the time to see law, engineering, and medicine as prestigious professions. In compliance with his father's wishes, Zacky took up medicine at the University of Indonesia—but only for a semester. After quitting the Medical School, saying to this father he had done what he wanted him to do, he

undertook his training at the National Military Academy in Magelang from 1967 to 1971.[1368]

Explaining his decision in the mid-1960s to pursue a military career, Zacky said in 2011:

> We are the product of our environment. The PKI staged a rebellion [in 1965]. The military [then] emerged as…the savior; they're the heroes. I was attracted to this hero[ism]. At the time the RPKAD [Army Paratroop Regiment] happened to be the elite within the military. So I entered the [National] Military Academy [in 1967] and graduated in 1971. Upon graduation, I worked there as an instructor for two years. Then, for two decades, I served in the Kopassus [Army Special Forces], rose through the ranks, and emerged as a colonel.[1369]

Nono once offered a psychological analysis of sorts to explain why Zacky developed a strong interest in the military:

> As a boy he had an extraordinary respect, I think, for traffic policemen. To him—as to all his siblings—Father was a hero-figure. Yet, one day he saw with his own eyes how even [this hero figure] complied when a traffic policeman told him to pull over. Zacky loved everything powerful. One day, he said to his father, "Pop, I want to study at the military academy." This went against Father's ideological grain. For we were liberals; we were freethinkers who questioned everything. […] So, Zacky started from a weakness complex, from a yearning for power. Actually, all of us were shy persons. It took me a great effort to overcome shyness. And Zacky was the shyest of us all.[1370]

Whatever his early psychological motives in joining the military may have been, from 1973 to the late 1990s as a commanding officer in the Army's Special Forces,

[1368] Interview with Zacky Anwar Makarim, March 24, 2011.

[1369] Ibid. In 1971, the RPKAD changed its name to Kopassandha. In 1985, Kopassandha became Kopassus. On this, see Ken Conboy, "Army Special Forces," in his *South-East Asian Special Forces* (Oxford: Osprey, 1991), 21-22.

[1370] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

Zacky executed a number of military operations that the leaders of the New Order regime designed to provide the political security, stability, and integrity they considered necessary for the success of their top-down modernization. Such military operations included a) the neutralization of radical Islam in Pandeglang, West Java, in the early 1970s; b) crushing the leftwing guerillas PGRS-PARAKU in the border between West Kalimantan and Sarawak in 1973-1975; c) combatting separatist movements in Aceh in the 1990s and in West Papua in 1976, 1979, and 1980; and d) occupying East Timor in 1978 and in 1983-1989.[1371]

Nono cringed at this dark side of the New Order's top-down modernization. As we have seen, this was not what he had in mind when he helped establish the New Order in the late 1960s. As a result, he and his brother Zacky often conducted a vigorous debate over the issue:

> At the dinner table at our parents' home, we siblings were often engaged in spirited discussions. We kept clashing [with Zacky]. When we talked about politics, [he] remained silent. One day as we washed our hands at the kitchen [sink], I asked him, "Why didn't you respond to us?"
>
> "Well," he said, "just imagine! What would've become of the Republic if our military officers had thought like you guys? What would've become of the Armed Forces if the officers had talked like you? What the military needs is an effective striking force. It's our job to strike. If we thought too much, it would be too late."[1372]

[1371] Interview with Zacky Anwar Makarim, March 24, 2011; see also Anonymous, "Yang Terpilih dari Lembah Tidar" [The chosen ones from Tidar Valley], *Gatra*, November 25, 1995, <http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1995/11/23/0011.html> (accessed February 12, 2013); Elizabeth F. Drexler, *Indonesia: Securing the Insecure State* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 75-76.

[1372] Interview with Nono Anwar Makarim, March 10, 2011.

Nono's attitude toward the New Order's top-down modernization was complex. On the one hand, he opposed the New Orderist "radicals" (e.g. H. R. Dharsono [1925-1996] and Rachman Tolleng [b. 1937]) who, in their quest for Indonesian modernity, sought to force politicians to adopt a two-party system in 1967. Nono wanted modernization to transpire "on its own."[1373] On the other hand, as we have seen, Nono applauded the achievements of the top-down economic modernization orchestrated by the Bappenas technocrats. And yet, unlike his brother Zacky as well as the CSIS thinkers Harry Tjan and Jusuf Wanandi, Nono could not put up with the reality that to build an environment where moderate modernization (both top-down and bottom-up) could take place, someone had to do those necessary demolition jobs which involved barbarism. On this, Zacky once said:

> Stability was not free of charge. We paid dearly for it. If some people said that for thirty-three years we enjoyed stability, that's the fruit of [the military's] work.[1374]

It is true that the New Order regime's security approach to modernization, which the military applied, resulted in a series of human rights disasters. For example, during the DOM (Military Operation Zone) period (1989-1998) in Aceh, it caused "39,000 civilian and GAM deaths."[1375] According to one estimate, the Indonesian occupation of East Timor caused 33,658 deaths[1376] while another reported a death toll of 200,000.[1377]

[1373] Ibid.

[1374] Interview with Zacky Anwar Makarim, March 24, 2011.

[1375] Matthew N. Davies, *Indonesia's War over Aceh: Last Stand on Mecca's Porch* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 161.

[1376] Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo, "Indonesia, 1975-1979," in *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007), 434.

Zacky argued, authoritarianism enabled the New Order's modernization project to achieve results. As one of its tools, the Armed Forces—Zacky recalled—helped make sure that leaders at all levels of the government did carry out President Soeharto's modernization programs:

> *Pak* Harto did have a strategy—the GBHN [the Broad Outlines of State Policy]. […] In the authoritarian era, we had [this civilian-military partnership in] the Regional Leadership Councils [Muspida], the Sub-District Regional Councils [Muspika], and the village assemblies [*rembug desa*]. […] [At the village level,] the *babinsa* [Village Guidance NCO] and the village chief worked together to make sure that bags of fertilizer arrived at the thresholds of the farmers' homes—even three months prior to the harvest time. It's the soldiers who actually dropped the fertilizer at the villagers' doors: Thump! Thump! Thump![1378]

By the same token, Zacky noted that the New Order's family planning program also benefited from the support it received from the Armed Forces:

> International NGOs reported that people were forced to participate in the [program] at gunpoint. And this story sticks with us. But it did not happen quite that way.
>
> [It worked this way:] A village head summoned the villagers to gather together. […] Since in the eyes of his people his authority was not strong enough, he asked the *babinsa* or the sub-district military commander to keep him company. […] The village chief said, "Family Planning is good for your health."
>
> Then, a clergyman gave a speech in support of Family Planning. But had it been the village chief who invited him, the cleric would have refused. The man was willing to help because it was the military officer who made the request.
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> That was the way the Family Planning program worked. People gladly took part in it. And that was how the [President's] orders flowed through the chain of command and got implemented in villages.[1379]

[1377] Robert Cribb, "East Timor," in *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, ed. Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 127.

[1378] Interview with Zacky Anwar Makarim, March 24, 2011.

[1379] Ibid.

Besides its success in preserving stability, getting people to take part in development programs, and obtaining results, the New Order regime had two features that Zacky extolled: It crafted and carried out a blueprint for modernization, and its leaders thought and behaved in a long-term perspective. These, he now points out, are exactly the characteristics that have been missing among the country's top leaders in the following era of Reform. He admitted, though, that the New Order had its weaknesses:

> [First, Soeharto's] fault was that he stayed in power too long. Second, his children went into business. [Third,] there was something that we must acknowledge as the New Order's flaw. The G30S/PKI is a dark episode in Indonesian history. Overkill occurred because, I think, our hatred of the PKI at the time was excessive. As a nation, we seem accustomed to indulging in excesses.[1380]

The case of Nono and Zacky presents a useful reminder that the New Order's modernization was the project of the middling classes. With the help of his wife, the anti-Soekarno notary Anwar Makarim[1381] raised two types of leader from among his children. While Nono operated in civil society as a champion of bottom-up modernization, Zacky was part of the coercive apparatus of the state in the service of top-down modernization. Despite their prolonged quarrels over the ways of achieving national progress, they did have a wide area of consensus, which had enabled them to engage in the debates in the first place. They saw communism and religious fundamentalism as obstacles to Indonesian modernity. They considered economic growth as one of its key elements. Finally, the case of Nono and Zacky points to, among other things, the fact that

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[1380] Ibid.

[1381] On Anwar Makarim's anti-Soekarno attitude, see Christianto Wibisono, "Doktrin Anwar Makarim" [The Anwar Makarim Doctrine], June 17, 2003, <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/tionghoa-net/message/17479> (accessed February 13, 2013).

Indonesian modernization and the middling classes that presided over it were Janus-faced.

4. 2. Ismid Hadad (b. 1940): Managing Holistic and Participatory Modernization

True, it was economic crisis that triggered the student protest movement. But we demanded truth and justice—as simple as that. [...W]e started by pursuing moral values. It was only later that we thought about the economic format for Indonesia in the post-Guided Democracy era.

Ismid Hadad[1382]

Ismid Hadad (see Figures 20 and 21) was born in Surabaya on April 29, 1940 into a well-to-do Muslim family of Arab origin. He was the sixth of eleven children.[1383] His father, Abdul Kadir Alhadad, was a businessman. Saleha Algadri, Ismid's mother, was the younger sister of Hamid Algadri (1910-1998), a key member of the Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI) and one of the pioneers of Indonesia's independence. Abdul Kadir and his wife Saleha lived in Surabaya.[1384] Their son Ismid, however, spent his entire childhood and his early adolescence in Pasuruan, East Java, where he went to the city's state primary and junior high schools and lived with his wealthy grandparents, who owned a movie theater (Bioskop Kusuma) and a big house with a large garden and a swimming pool.[1385] Between 1958 and 1960, Ismid attended the Catholic St. Louis

[1382] Interview with Ismid Hadad, February 28, 2011.

[1383] Ida Hadad, "Sekelumit tentang Ismid Hadad" [Few biographical details about Ismid Hadad], in *Celebrating the 70 Memorable Years [in the] Fulfilling Life of Ismid Hadad*, ed. Imlati Hadad (Jakarta: n.p., 2010), 33.

[1384] Tempo, "Hadad, Ismid," in *Apa & Siapa, 1983-1984*, 224.

[1385] Tempo, "Hadad, Ismid, in *Apa & Siapa, 1985-1986*, 245; Ina Hadad, "Si Mbueng Kecil" [Little Mbueng]," in Hadad, *Celebrating*, 37; Hamid Algadri, *Mengarungi Indonesia: Memoar Perintis Kemerdekaan* [Navigating Indonesia: Memoir of a pioneer of freedom], ed. Hamid Basyaib (Jakarta: Lentera, 1999), 6; Toriq Hadad, "Bioskop," *Tempo*, December 13, 2008.

Senior High School, majoring in economics. Throughout the first half of the 1960s, he studied economics at the Christian University of Indonesia (UKI), Jakarta, from which he earned a BA in 1966.[1386] Ismid lived in the household of his maternal uncle Hamid Algadri, on Jalan Tosari, Jakarta.[1387] In the early 1960s, the government held Hamid under suspicion as he was a key member of the PSI, one of whose leaders, the economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, participated in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in the late 1950s. In punishment for this, the regime banned the PSI in 1960.

Figure 20. Ismid Hadad, as Director of the LP3ES and editor-in-chief of the social science journal, *Prisma*, 1978 [*Prisma*].

Ismid felt frustrated, even terrified, by the sort of life he experienced in Jakarta in the early to mid-1960s. As a member of the pragmatic section of the middling classes, he found this life excessively politicized, economically mismanaged, and on the verge of becoming ideologically monolithic.

[1386] Tempo, “Hadad, Ismid,” in *Apa & Siapa, 1985-1986*, 245.

[1387] Algadri, *Mengarungi Indonesia*,176, 181; Fikri Jufri, “Pekerja Keras, Kepala Keluarga yang Bijaksana” [A hard worker and a wise paterfamilias], in Hadad, *Celebrating*, 41.

> […] I saw how the socioeconomic conditions became more and more oppressive every day. Even more oppressive were the limits that [the regime] imposed on our freedom of expression, movement, and organization. [Life] became increasingly stifled and [we felt] terrorized in a way.[1388]

Figure 21. Ismid Hadad [right], Berlin, West Germany, 1969 [Zainuddin Maidin].

Since his own extended family became the target of harassment and intimidation by the Left, whose leaders saw the PSI politicians and intellectuals as their enemies, it was small wonder that Ismid felt "terrorized." Thanks to the pressures exerted by the communists, his cousin Maher Algadri (b. 1946)—simply because he was the son of Hamid Algadri—was expelled from Bung Karno University, where he studied marine engineering.[1389] On top of that, the Central Bureau of Intelligence (BPI) had the home of the Aldgradis on

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[1388] Interview with Ismid Hadad, February 28, 2011.
[1389] Algadri, *Mengarungi Indonesia*, 175.

Jalan Tosari under surveillance.[1390] Ismid held President Soekarno and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) responsible for making life miserable for the middling classes and for plunging the country into trouble:

> The years 1964-1966 were the heyday of the Communist Party of Indonesia. I did not suffer from Communist phobia. It was just that President Soekarno gave too much opportunity for the PKI to exploit. Although it was not the…ruling party, the PKI dominated the political scene.[1391]

And, in Ismid's view, as a result of the PKI having the upper hand,

> […D]aily life [in the mid-1960s] was chock-full of posters, speeches, slogans, and [political] maneuvers, which forced people to go along with a single current of thought. [As university students,] we felt cornered…and frightened. We were afraid to go to classes, to study, and to write.[1392]

To prevent the Left from achieving victory and to champion what could be described as a social democratic way of life, Ismid took action. At one point in 1964, he began organizing student discussion groups, in which he and some like-minded friends kept a close watch on current political developments, presented their critiques of Guided Democracy, and explored ways to establish an alternative society:

> We…refused to let [the regime] stifle our expressive and creative powers any longer. We explored [alternative] media of expression, which were hard to find at the time. We…organized discussion groups, which met regularly but clandestinely. We held our discussions sometimes at those roadside cafés on Jalan Cikini and sometimes at the nearby home of Wiratmo Sukito, that is to say, in his dusty, humid, and book-filled room,

[1390] Ibid., 176.
[1391] Interview with Ismid Hadad, February 28, 2011.
[1392] Ibid.

> where we sometimes spent the night, using a thick book or a block of wood as a pillow.[1393]

One of the discussion groups he cofounded and coordinated was Gymnasia, which was active from 1964 to 1965 (prior to the September 30 Movement). Gymnasia's members included no more than seven young intellectuals: Ismid Hadad, Nono Makarim, Fikri Jufri (b. 1936), Goenawan Mohamad, Taufiq Ismail (b. 1935), and W. S. Rendra (1935-2009).[1394] In 1971, some of these young men—Ismid, Nono, and Fikri—became relatives: Nono married Ismid's cousin Atika Algadri while Fikri married Ismid's younger sister Anisa Hadad (d. 1988).[1395] In Gymnasia, and similar discussion clubs they organized, Ismid and his friends conducted brainstorming sessions on the country's politics and economy:

> We [also] read Czesław Miłosz [1911-2004] and Franz Kafka [1883-1924] and found inspiration in their works. There was a bit of the snob in us, the so-called young intellectuals. But what we read would stay with us. Usually, it was Nono and Goenawan who developed the results of our discussions into policy or reflection papers.[1396]

Ismid and his colleagues intended the discussions to be a first step in their attempt at social change. They wanted to use the ideas they came up with to construct a new society. Aware that doing so required the support from powerful like-minded allies, they approached the key forces in the anticommunist circles, especially the Army, Islamic clerics, and Christian intellectuals.

[1393] Ibid.
[1394] Ibid.
[1395] Jufri, "Pekerja Keras," 43-44; Tempo, "Jufri, Fikri" in *Apa & Siapa, 1985-1986*, 367.
[1396] Interview, February 28, 2011.

> We sent our reflection papers to the high-ranking Army officers we knew well, such as A. H. Nasution [1918-2000], Kemal Idris [1923-2010], and H. R. Dharsono [1925-1996]….We saw the Army as a strategic ally. They alone were capable of serving as a counterbalance to the alliance between the PKI and President Soekarno. The [Navy] took sides with Soekarno; the Air Force appeared undecided; and the police were politically negligible. Thus, we thought it made sense for us to forge an alliance with the Army. We also made contact with the Islamic clerics of the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhamaddiyah […] and with Catholic and Protestant groups.[1397]

In order to fight against the over-ideologization and over-politicization of Indonesian society, Ismid had to play politics and propagate an alternative ideology. As he put it in retrospect in the mid-1980s, "At the end of the day, political upheavals decide man's fate. If we do not keep a close watch on political developments, we will end up becoming their victims."[1398]

In the second half of the 1960s, Ismid played a key role in the demolition of Guided Democracy and the construction of the New Order. "Those years," he remembered, "I was at the peak of my creativity." He experienced self-discovery: he emerged as "a man of action" quite adept at finding, mixing, and deploying a variety of resources to help reshape Jakarta and, by extension, Indonesia in accord with Nono Makarim's ideas. To delegitimize and crush the PKI, Ismid made clever use of mass mobilization, the mass media, and student organizations. On October 27, 1965, he helped found the Indonesian Students Action front (KAMI) and acted as its spokesperson. Later, between 1966 and 1969, he led its Bureau of Information. In 1964, with the help of Nono Makarim, then the secretary-general of the IPMI (Indonesian Student Press League),

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[1397] Ibid.
[1398] Tempo, "Hadad, Ismid," in *Apa & Siapa, 1985-1986*, 245.

Ismid took over its Jakarta chapter. From 1964 to 1968, he served as its chairman. Through this organization, he secured access to the national television and radio (TVRI and RRI) and operated the *Harian KAMI* [KAMI daily], where he served as managing editor. Besides the TVRI, the RRI, and the *Harian KAMI*, Ismid also mobilized amateur radio, protest poetry, posters, leaflets, and photo exhibitions to orchestrate the anticommunist student movement and preach the New Order's point of view to the masses.[1399]

The second half of the 1960s was Ismid Hadad's period of apprenticeship as a bottom-up agent of modernization. Through his participation in student journalism and activism, he developed a set of skills that would define his expertise, such as editorship, the implementation of ideas, teamwork coordination, and the creative mobilization of resources. Between 1964 and1971, he wielded these skills to help establish the New Order. From 1971 to 1980, he used them to ensure that Indonesia modernized itself in a participatory, balanced, and holistic manner. Since 1982, he has been using his expertise in the service of ecological activism. We can view Ismid's professional life in terms of three episodes: student activism (1966-1971), the LP3ES (1971-1982), and development consultancy and environmental movement (since 1982).[1400]

Ismid Hadad's career was shaped less by what he studied at school than by what he learned through his attempt to change society. Yet, it is useful to take a look at his formal education, which was one of the key forms of cultural capital he used to attain his objectives. In 1966, he earned a BA in economics from the Christian University of

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[1399] Interview with Ismid Hadad, February 28, 2011; Tempo, "Hadad, Ismid," in *Apa & Siapa, 1983-1984*, 224-225; Tempo, Hadad, Ismid, in *Apa & Siapa, 1985-1986*, 245-246.

[1400] Interview with Ismid Hadad, February 28, 2011.

Indonesia (UKI). Many decades later, he remarked that the kind of economics he studied at the UKI was unrealistic for a Third World country like Indonesia.[1401] And yet besides his family ties to Hamid Algadri, it was his status as a UKI student that provided him with the necessary "ticket" to enter Jakarta's intellectual elite and move about in it. Later, from January to March 1969, in recognition of the substantive part he played in Indonesian student press, he won a fellowship to participate in a certificate program in advanced journalism at the International Institute for Journalism, Berlin, West Germany. In the early 1980s, on the strength of his achievements as a leader of the LP3ES, he got a scholarship to do an MA program in Public Administration at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The graduate studies he conducted in the United States helped him acquire some of the analytical frameworks he found useful in his work, from the mid-1980s onwards, as a development consultant.

From 1971 to 1980, as one of the founding leaders of the LP3ES, Ismid contributed significantly to the quest for Indonesian modernity. He pioneered some of the Institute's key programs and threw his weight behind others that his gifted colleagues designed. In the early 1970s, to modernize the country's regional press industry, he offered journalism training to youths outside Jakarta, thereby creating a new generation of professional journalists in the country. One of the program's successful alumni is Dahlan Iskan (b. 1951), the founding CEO of the *Jawa Pos* media conglomerate.[1402]

[1401] Tantri Yuliandini, "Ismid Speaks Out for Biodiversity," *The Jakarta Post*, June 11, 2004.

[1402] Rustam Ibrahim, "Ismid Hadad: Satu Dasawarsa Membangun Kelembagaan LP3ES, 1970-1980" [Ismid Hadad: Institution-building at the LP3ES, 1970-1980] (unpublished paper, [Jakarta?], n.d.), 7; Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxix; Tempo, "Hadad, Ismid," in *Apa & Siapa, 1983-1984*, 224.

During the same decade, Ismid did a great service to the emergent generation of Indonesian intellectuals in the New Order. In 1971, he established the highly influential social-science journal *Prisma* [Prism] (see Figure 22); he intended it as a forum for Indonesian "experts, scholars, and professionals" to talk intelligently about their country's economic modernization and sociocultural change.[1403] As the journal's editor-in-chief (1972-1980), he encouraged Indonesian intellectuals to transcend political activism and start thinking about their nation's search for economic modernity in ways that emphasized deep analyses, long perspective, and the big picture:

> We are…so immersed in everyday problems and practical political maneuvers that we miss the chance to think deeply about long-term plans. In the modern era, however, the challenges of developing the Republic demand well-conceived ideas. Thus, we are increasingly aware that as we are busy catching up [with the developed world], we must engage in deep contemplation. Otherwise, we will face catastrophes the day we start implementing the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1974-1979).[1404]

In the journal's first two years, Ismid worked almost single-handedly. It was he who planned the journal's topics, contacted the printing house, invited the contributors, edited the articles they submitted, and wrote the preface to each issue.[1405]

[1403] Ismid Hadad, "Madjalah 'Prisma'" [The periodical *Prisma*], *Prisma*, no. 1 (November 1971): 2; Ibrahim, "Ismid Hadad," 4.

[1404] Ismid Hadad, "Pengantar Redaksi" [Editor's preface], *Prisma* no. 1 (November 1971): 2.

[1405] Ibrahim, "Ismid Hadad," 5.

Figure 22. First issue of *Prisma*, November 1971 [*Prisma*].

The editor's prefaces with which Ismid introduced *Prisma*'s issues, the articles he contributed to the journal, and the guiding ideas animating the programs that he coordinated at the LP3ES in the 1970s deserve careful reading. They point to the core elements in the variant of modernity that he wanted Indonesia to attain. First, he maintained, Indonesian modernity must be holistic. Indonesians, he argued, must seek not only material wealth but also spiritual well-being and cultural development. Thus, Indonesians, most of whom were religious, must "not only renew their religious lives"; they must develop knowledge and skills in such secular areas as technology, economy, social organization, and state administration.[1406]

Holistic modernity should be available to the majority, who still lived in poverty. In August 1975, Ismid warned against the danger that Indonesians, especially the poor

[1406] Ismid Hadad, "Pembangunan: Mengapa Harus Urusan Rakyat Kecil?" [Why should development be the poor man's business?], *Prisma* 4,no. 4 (August 1975): 75

ones, would be lost in a society that concentrated too much on achieving mere economic modernity. Such a society would create a dehumanized world:

> […] the poor are reduced to demographic figures, treated as if they were cogs in a gigantic machine called Development. Small wonder that this kind of development displays an inhuman face…. [It looks] robust, luxurious, and sinister: skyscrapers, factories and smokestacks, magnificent highways, deafening jet planes, splendid metropolises, great tractors crushing the jungles…. This face of development is amazing, especially if we view it from the outside, and especially if it is reported statistically as attainable goals. But if we look at it closely, if we look at it from within, we will face a question: Who benefits from this kind of development? And how many people do so?[1407]

Thus, to attain modernity with a human face—because man must be the subject in and beneficiary of modernization[1408]—Ismid believed that religious and cultural traditions be deployed to add substance to the modern life that was taking shape as a result of economic development. Ismid went so far as to assert that religious values constituted a solid basis for economic progress. The absence of these values would render economic wealth devoid of meaning.

Second, at the LP3ES, Ismid—like his colleague Dawam Rahardjo—advocated the use of tradition and religion (as social and cultural capitals) in bringing the village world and the villagers to economic and sociocultural progress:

> When will [we] rediscover and develop the cultural and religious potentials available in [our country] in order to energize the kind of development that will improve the living standards and the dignity of the poor? For instance, how can we reactivate the tradition of mutual help so

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[1407] Ibid., 75.

[1408] Ismid Hadad, "Persoalan dan Perkembangan Pemikiran dalam Teori Pembangunan" [Issues in and the intellectual history of development theories], *Prisma* 9, no. 1 (January 1980): 42-43.

> that it is not reduced to another form of forced labor? How can we institutionalize the traditional principle of "free from self-interest and active in duties" to overcome joblessness? How are we supposed to encourage the clergy and the customary leaders as well as the mosques and the customary councils to play a more positive role in the development of village societies?[1409]

Ismid wanted Indonesian intellectuals to explore religion's capacity for "helping people keep in check their growing desires and needs for material goods, which have come to be seen as the normal requirements of [living in] modern society.[1410]

Third, in the pursuit of economic progress, Indonesia must strike a balance between growth and equity, the city and the countryside, and the center and the periphery. For, as he wrote in June 1975, "Indonesia is not just Jakarta. Thus, developing Indonesia means developing the greater part of the country's territory, that is to say, those regions beyond its capital city."[1411]

Fourth, Indonesian modernization must take place not only from the top down but also from the bottom up. Government-led programs remained necessary but so did people's participation in the processes and outcomes of economic modernization. It was for this reason that Ismid and his colleagues at the LP3ES fostered the emergence of small and medium entrepreneurs in the city and the countryside. It was also for this reason that they employed religion, local traditions, and indigenous values to encourage villagers to play an active role in economic development. Ismid was convinced that

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[1409] Hadad, "Pembangunan," 80.
[1410] Ibid., 78.
[1411] Ismid Hadad, "Pengantar Redaksi" [Editor's note], *Prisma* 4, no. 3 (June 1975): 2.

religion would give the rural poor a language they could use to manage this project and make it their own.[1412]

Fifth, the transition to economic modernity, Ismid warned, would be fraught with dangers. Modernizing people would be faced with social ills, for example juvenile delinquency, crime, population explosion, unemployment, landlessness, the proliferation of slum areas in the urban world, and growing social tensions and inequality.[1413] They would also have to grapple with ecological crises.[1414]

In May 1976, having considered how the passage to economic modernity had been taking place throughout the world, Ismid Hadad remarked that it "ha[d] been accompanied by conflict." Indonesia, he noted, was experiencing the same phenomenon. He then summed up the strategy of economic modernization that Indonesia had been implementing since the late 1960s, putting in the broader context of the country's contemporary history:

> Having gained independence in 1945, this "[girdle of] emerald[s flung around the…] equator" started out with an almost exclusive concern for the growth of her GNP, due to the feeling that her poverty [arose] from [a] long period of little or no economic growth. What was needed was rapid growth as soon as possible—which was generally interpreted to mean one thing: rapid industrialization. It [was] assumed that jobs [would] be created by industries, and with [the] accelerat[ion of] industrial growth, some portions of the economic pie would trickle down to the majority of the poverty-stricken population. [1415]

[1412] Hadad, "Pembangunan," 76, 80.

[1413] On Ismid Hadad's key ideas about Indonesian modernity, see also the editorial notes he published in the following issues of the journal: *Prisma*, no. 1 (November 1971): 1-2; *Prisma* 2, no. 3 (April 1973): 2; *Prisma* 1, no. 4 (June 1972): 2; *Prisma* 1, no. 7 (December 1972): 2; *Prisma* 4, no. 4 (August 1975): 2; see also Ibrahim, "Ismid Hadad," 15-19.

[1414] Hadad, "Teori Pembangunan," 43.

[1415] Ismid Hadad, "A Note from the Editor," *Prisma: Indonesian Journal of Social and Economic Affairs*, no. 3 (May 1976): 2.

This strategy, he pointed out, brought about in Indonesia—as it had done elsewhere—a set of social ills, which exemplified some of the evils of modern living: "maladjustment," "dislocation," "imbalances," and "injustices."[1416] Thus, he went on to say, desirous of getting rid of these malignant aspects of economic modernization, some Indonesian "scholars, intellectuals, and…policymakers" responded with enthusiasm when they heard, in the mid-1970s, about a call, throughout the world, for economic development strategy that "incorporate[d] income distribution" and about the emergent "struggle" by "the Third World" for "a new international economic order" that stressed "justice and humanity" and sought to prevent "the ever-widening gap in income and prosperity [among] nations."[1417]

In his preface to the June 1979 issue of the English edition of *Prisma*, Ismid drew attention to the dangers of the kind of economic modernization that had been going on in Indonesia since 1967. In his view, it had concentrated too much on growth at the expense of equity and the attainment of meaningful life:

> Ever since the New Order began in 1967, free enterprise in Indonesia has had more opportunities to flourish. From the sidewalk vendors to the biggest multinationals, there has been a surge of business activities and industrial growth during the past ten years.[1418]

Ismid attributed this expansion of the country's entrepreneurial activities to the policies that the New Order government had been pursuing: "open-door economic policy," "cheap

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[1416] Ibid.
[1417] Ibid.
[1418] Ismid Hadad, "A Note from the Editor," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*, no. 13 (June 1979): 2.

labor," "tax incentives and duty concessions to investors," foreign direct investment, technological borrowings, and the government's shrewd exploitation of the oil boom.[1419] Yet, he was quick to mention the darker sides of economic modernity that resulted from the implementation of such policies:

> While this [set of policies has] benefitted certain strata of the modern economic sectors in the urban areas, one cannot overlook the adverse effects created by such an economic growth[:] [a] the [rapid growth] of consumerism and commercialized life-style in a society which is still facing endemic problems of poverty and mass-unemployment[; and] [b] the structural obstacles encountered by small-scale and indigenous entrepreneurs in the face of competition against powerful corporations[,] such as the multinationals.[1420]

In this regard, it is important to note that at this point (the late 1970s and the 1980s) many members of the Indonesian middling classes shared some of Ismid's focal concerns. Consider, for instance, the social views that these writers of popular novelists articulated in their works: Motinggo Busye, Teguh Esha, and Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi (see Chapter 5). Ismid was not alone, crying in the wilderness.

It is safe to say that Ismid was actually expressing a New Order consensus when at this point he argued that Indonesian modernity must include not only economic growth but also social justice and that Indonesians must achieve not only material wealth but also psychological well-being. On how to attain equality, he argued that economic progress must be made available to the majority. What this recommendation implied was that more and more Indonesians should be empowered to leave poverty and enter the middling classes. In September 1979, he wrote:

[1419] Ibid.
[1420] Ibid.

> During the past two Five-Year Development periods [1969-1979,] Indonesia has managed to maintain a sustained and adequate economic growth. Largely derived from oil export earnings and their investment in industrial expansion, this growth has not affected all segments of society equally. Although there has been an absolute increase in measurable income even for the poorest groups in society, the distribution of wealth and income has become more skewed in favor of the rich who are those most able to take advantage of the changing economic conditions.[1421]

Thus, Ismid expressed his approval when the Third Five-Year Development Plan put an emphasis on achieving "a more equitable distribution of employment, income, and wealth."[1422]Yet, he was quick to point out that "helping the poor" attain freedom from poverty was "a difficult task." There were two reasons for this. First,

> […the] factors [that] caus[e] poverty[--such as] lack of education, poor health, isolation, lack of capital, [and] cultural rigidity [--] are the same factors [that] inhibit or defeat Government programs to help the poor.[1423]

Second, there was the extremely difficult job of reconciling two often conflicting objectives of economic modernization: a) the quest for an ever higher degree of equity, and b) the pursuit of unceasing, rapid economic growth and "the diversification of production and exports."[1424] Ismid was convinced that if the agents of Indonesian economic modernization were serious about attaining these goals simultaneously and in a balanced manner, they must pay attention to not only the "technical" and "managerial"

[1421] Ismid Hadad, "A Note from the Editor," *Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator*, no. 14 (September 1979): 2.
[1422] Ibid.
[1423] Ibid.
[1424] Ibid.

dimensions of economic development. They must also, he maintained, address its "structural and policy problems."[1425]

Many of the LP3ES programs that Ismid directed can be read as his contribution to the quest for a decaffeinated version of modernity: rapid economic growth without social inequality and "consumerism." Such programs included a) the modernization of the village world through the modernization of Islamic boarding schools, b) the creation of small entrepreneurs among the urban poor and in rural areas, c) the creation of professional journalists outside Jakarta, and d) the space he provided in *Prisma* for economists like Mubyarto (1938-2005) to champion a populist model of economic modernization.

What were the sources of Ismid's ideas about Indonesian modernity and modernization? In an essay that deals with Ismid Hadad's intellectual biography, Rustam Ibrahim (b. 1949) reveals that in forming his own modernist and modernizing ideas, Ismid owed a great deal to three Indonesian intellectuals: the economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917-2011), the social thinker Soedjatmoko (1922-1989), and the Bappenas technocrat Emil Salim (b. 1930). Using the links that his uncle Algadri had to Sumitro (for both were PSI figures), Ismid managed to befriend the latter, who—since the early 1970s—served as his mentor in his independent studies of development economics and microeconomics. From the economist, Ismid learned a great deal about public policymaking, the role of the private sector in economic development, and management by objectives—a management style that Ali Moertopo also considered useful. Ismid admired Sumitro's remarkable gift for "stripping highly complex issues in

[1425] Ibid.

development economics down to their essence so that the layman found it easy to understand."[1426]

By the mid-1980s, Ismid had become very close to Sumitro: so close that he, after having retired from the LP3ES in 1980 and earned his MA from Harvard in 1982, joined Sumitro's consulting agency Redecon in 1984, serving as Assistant Managing Director (1984-1987) and, later, as Managing Director (1987-1994) and President Director (1994-1999). From 1995 to 1999, Ismid was the Executive Director of Indoconsult, a consulting firm that Sumitro and the journalist Mochtar Lubis founded in 1969.

Ismid described his intellectual friendship with Soedjatmoko as "ideological." It started in the early 1970s as editor-contributor relationship: Ismid often invited Soedjatmoko to contribute his essays to *Prisma*. They learned from each other. Soedjatmoko helped Ismid understand the centrality of "non-economic dimensions" of development and that social and cultural factors played key roles in nation-building. On the other hand, the social philosopher learned from Ismid the art of presenting complex ideas in a format that the general reader would find easy to digest.[1427]

The intellectual collaboration between Ismid and Emil Salim began in the late 1960s. In fact, they were neighbors, for they both lived on Jalan Tosari, Central Jakarta. One of the things that Ismid did at the time as the managing editor of the *Harian KAMI* was solicit Emil's contributions to the daily. Later, in the 1970s, both men collaborated under the institutional umbrella of the LP3ES: while Ismid served there as the chief editor

[1426] Ibrahim, "Ismid Hadad," 10.
[1427] Ibid., 11.

of *Prisma* and the Institute's Deputy Director and, later, Director, Emil sat on the Institute's Steering Committee. As one of the New Order's technocrats, Emil also provided the LP3ES with a degree of protection. From 1978 onwards, Ismid and Emil collaborated even more closely. During Emil's stint as State Minister of Environment (1978-1993), Ismid served as his "informal advisor," for they had shared interest in, commitment to, and obsession with environmental problems and movement. It is small wonder that in the 1990s they cofounded three environmental NGOS: the Indonesian Eco-labeling Institute (LEI), the Foundation for Sustainable Development (YPB), and the Indonesian Biodiversity Foundation (KEHATI).[1428]

Former colleagues at the LP3ES have pointed out that Ismid Hadad was an effective leader. His leadership style emphasized synthesis, institution-building, shrewd management of resources, and the balance between action and reflection. For example, Dawam Rahardjo once remarked that "[Ismid] never pretended he knew best. Once he saw that other people had potential, he sought to mobilize their capacities [as institutional assets]."[1429] Dawam added that Ismid never saw him as a rival in an intellectual pissing contest. Ismid himself once said that "[managing] was not about exhibiting one's own intelligence; [it is] about making the most of the available resources, including the expertise of [your colleagues]."[1430]Another former coworker, Rustam Ibrahim, remembered the great skill with which Ismid bridged the differences between Dawam Rahardjo and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009) in their opinions on how community

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[1428] Ibid., 11.
[1429] Ibid., 24.
[1430] Ibid., 25.

development through *pesantren* should be undertaken.[1431] So bitter were the quarrels between them that had it not been for Ismid's mediation, the LP3ES' Pesantren Development Program would have fallen apart. For no matter how brilliant Dawam's plans were, it was impossible to execute them without Wahid's full support. Being a grandson of the great cleric Hasyim Asy'ari (1871-1947), Wahid held the key to the *pesantren* world. On reconciling the Dawam-Wahid differences, Ismid once said to Rustam Ibrahim: "[If we see that] two opposing approaches actually work toward the same goal, we must know how to combine them."[1432]

Having considered the kind of world that Ismid Hadad sought to build in the public sphere during the New Order era, we can examine the small world he managed to create in his private sphere. On September 17, 1971, Ismid Hadad married Suarhatini (b. 1946), who is the daughter of the Pujangga Baru Sariamin Ismail or Selasih (1909-1995) and was Ismid's former coworker at the Jakarta chapter of the Indonesian Student Journalists' Union (PMI). They have two daughters, Nadia and Imlati, and one son, Emil.[1433] The core values that Ismid and Tini cultivated in their children included strong work ethic, broadmindedness, equality, human rights, and the centrality of the nuclear family. Ismid told his children to work hard for themselves, their family and society, and the world.[1434] As Nadia once recalled,

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[1431] Ibid., 17.

[1432] Ibid., 18.

[1433] Tempo, "Hadad, Ismid," in *Apa & Siapa, 1983-1984*, 246; Imlati Hadad, ed., *Celebrating*, 8-24; Jufri, "Pekerja Keras," 43.; Tantri Yuliandini, "Ismid Speaks Out for Biodiversity," *The Jakarta Post*, June 11, 2004.

[1434] Nadia Hadad, "My Father," in Hadad, *Celebrating*, 10-11; Tini Hadad, [Untitled], in ibid., 4-5.

> […F]rom time to time…he…talk[s] to us…about how his work [has] kept him…alive and happy…and about his belief in…what he [does]. [He says] that money cannot buy happiness [and] power tends to corrupt. Hence, [he is not interested] in joining the…bureaucracy and [playing politics….]. His work ha[s] become his life [and] his [source of] self-fulfillment.[1435]

As was common among fathers in the Indonesian middling classes, Ismid makes it a point that the Hadads dine together regularly. One of Ismid's sons-in-law, Andrey Fahreza Bachtiar (1975-2009)—Imlati's husband and the drummer of the band Bunglon [Chameleon]—found such a habit admirable, seeing it as a good form of "discipline":

> In [Imlati's] family, [Ismid] enforces discipline: [members of the family] must have dinner together. It is unlike in [my own family, where] people are scattered: one dines here, another has meal there, and still another eats out somewhere else.[1436]

As Emil Hadad recalled in 2010, one of the subjects that the Hadads discussed during their dinners together was "social issues," which seems to have included the interaction between economy and ecology.[1437]

An example of Ismid's broadmindedness is the fact that one of his sons-in-law, Fabby Tumiwa, is a Menadonese Christian. Married to Nadia Hadad, Tumiwa got his BA in electrical engineering from Satya Wacana Christian University, Salatiga, Central Java. Since 1997, he has been active in the environmental movement, specializing in, among other areas, sustainable energy, biodiversity, and natural resource management.[1438] He

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[1435] Hadad, "My Father," 10.

[1436] Imlati Hadad, "My Dearest, Dearest Ayah…," in Hadad, *Celebrating*, 17.

[1437] Emil Hadad, [Untitled], in Hadad, *Celebrating*, 22-23.

[1438] LEAD, "Fabby V.C.M. Tumiwa Profile Page," http://www.lead.org/component/comprofiler/userprofile/fabby.

now serves as executive director of the Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR) in Jakarta.[1439]

Inspired by her father's example of social activism, Nadia Hadad, at some point in her life, opted to become an NGO activist.[1440] From 2000 to 2007, she worked as program officer and media campaigner for the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID). Since, 2007, she has served as Program Associate at the Mekong/SEA, Asia Program of the Bank Information Center.[1441] Imlati Hadad runs Baby Inc., a Jakarta-based online shop that deals in fashionable baby products.[1442] In 2007, Emil Hadad—who remembers being "raised in a socially and environmentally conscious household"—received his BA in economics (major) and environmental studies (minor) from the University of Victoria, Vancouver, Canada.[1443] Since early 2010, he is Development Support Volunteer at the David Suzuki Foundation, an environmental NGO based in Canada.[1444]

[1439] IESR, "Profil Staff" [Staff profile], http://www.iesr.or.id/about/profil-staf/.

[1440] Hadad, "My Father," 9.

[1441] Bank Information Center, "Nadia Hadad," in *Staff Directory*, accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.bicusa.org/about/staff/.

[1442] Baby Inc., "About Us," accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.thebabyinc.com/information.php?id=1&z=who-we-are.

[1443] Wilderness Committee, "Wilderness Committee Staff and Board of Directors," accessed March 27, 2013, http://wildernesscommittee.org/who_we_are/staff_board.

[1444] On this, see Emil Hadad's Linkedin page.

4. 3. M. Dawam Rahardjo (b. 1942): Muslim, Populist Economic Modernizer

I'm not an armchair intellectual!

M. Dawam Rahardjo[1445]

[…T]he Prophet Muhammad built a new society. If we think about this, we shall see that [his] standpoint was…developmentalist in that [he] sought to further improve the positive values and institutions that already existed in society.

M. Dawam Rahardjo[1446]

If the Muslim community does not participate in, and lend its support to, development, the chance is great that it will fail.

M. Dawam Rahardjo[1447]

Born on April 20, 1942, in Surakarta, Central Java, Mohammad Dawam Rahardjo (see Figure 23) was the oldest of eight siblings in the household of Zuhdi Rahardjo and Muthmainnah.[1448] A native of Surakarta, Muthmainnah once worked as a teacher at a

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[1445] Hadimulyo, "Mas Dawam: Profil Cendekiawan Aktivis" [Profil of an activist-intellectual], in *Demi Toleransi Demi Pluralism* [For tolerance and pluralism], ed. Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, Syafiq Hasyim, and J. H. Lamardy (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2007), 108.

[1446] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Penutup: Visi Sosial al-Qur'ân dan Fungsi 'Ulamâ" [Epilog: Social visions in the Koran and the function of religious scholars], in M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Ensiklopedi al-Qur'ân: Tafsir Sosial Berdasarkan Konsep-Konsep Kunci* [Encylopedia of the Koran: Social exegesis on the basis of its key concepts], ed. Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), 662.

[1447] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Mereka Tidak Konsisten Memandang ICMI" [They hold contradictory views of the ICMI], in *ICMI: Antara* Status Quo *dan Demokratisasi*, ed. Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi [ICMI: Between status quo and democratization], (Jakarta: Mizan, 1995), 329.

[1448] The details I used to piece together Dawam Rahardjo's intellectual biography come from these sources: Achmad Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam Rahardjo: Sekelumit Riwayat Hidup" [M. Dawam Rahardjo: A biographical sketch], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 3-4; Tempo, "Rahardjo, Mohammad Dawam," in *Apa & Siapa* [1984], 665-666; Tempo, "Rahardjo, Mohammad Dawam," in *Apa & Siapa* [1986], 693-694; Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, "Dawam Rahardjo," in *Apa & Siapa* [Indonesian who's who], accessed August

Sekolah Rakyat in the town of Ambarawa. (Later, Dawam would remember her as a "simple and loving mother."[1449]) Zuhdi (d. 1978)—the son of Ngali Rahardjo, a rich tobacco farmer in Klaten— started out as a teacher at a Muhammadiyah school in Surakarta. He then gave up teaching to become an entrepreneur. In the 1940s, he operated retail, spinning, and tanning businesses. In the late 1970s, he enjoyed success in the batik trade and the weaving industry. In terms of social class, Dawam's family of origin belonged to the entrepreneurial petty bourgeoisie. Culturally, it gravitated toward the Masyumi variety of Islamic modernism. As he said in May 2003, he came "from a *santri*-modernist family."

Keeping Dawam Rahardjo's social origins in mind goes a long way toward seeing the nature and limits of the alternative modernization projects that he carried out in the New Order era. Doing so keeps us from being surprised at the fact that despite his deep, enduring sympathy for the poor, he never called for class struggle, let alone the demolition of his own class (the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie). It also makes us comprehend—though not necessarily agree with—Dawam's basic assumption that piety, the search for personal wealth, and the struggle for social justice were compatible goals.[1450]

28, 2010, http://www.pdat.cod.id/hg/apasiapa/html/D/ads,20030701-60,D.html; interview with Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

[1449] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Kata Pengantar" [Introduction], in M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Ensiklopedi al-Qur'ân: Tafsir Sosial Berdasarkan Konsep-Konsep Kunci* [Encylopedia of the Koran: Social exegesis on the basis of its key concepts], ed. Budhy Munawar-Rachman (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), xxiv.

[1450] Fachry Ali, "Membaca Mas Dawam" [Understanding Brother Dawam], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 235.

Figure 23. M. Dawam Rahardjo, 1986 [*Tempo*].

By the same token, attention to Dawam's social background makes us see why in spite of his inclusive nationalism, throughout the New Order era he never stopped trying to encourage Muslim intellectuals to play a leading role in building what he considered a better Indonesia. In sum, he remained loyal not only to his nation but also to his social class and religious community.

Besides taking Dawam's social origins into account, we must also look at how he grew up, that is, at the ways he responded to the threats and opportunities that he encountered in society, for to some extent he was the "architect" of his own life.

Dawam spent his childhood and adolescence (the 1940s to the 1950s) in Surakarta, which is the birthplace of the political organization Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union). The education he got during this episode of his life would help determine the sort of person he became. Till about age sixteen, he attended two types of schools concurrently: Islamic and secular. (As was common among middling-class Muslims at

the time, this was Dawam's parents' way of ensuring that their children would enjoy success in life and salvation in the afterlife.) In his childhood, for example, Dawam went to the Loji Wetan Grade School in the morning and to the Madrasah Diniyah al-Islam in the afternoon.[1451] Owing to this hybrid education, Islam and science, faith and reason, would figure centrally in Dawam's social views in the greater part of his intellectual journey.

Wanting his son to become an enlightened entrepreneur, Zuhdi introduced the young Dawam to the art of business and made sure that he had enough pocket money to buy books.[1452] During his late adolescence, Dawam's reading material included Islamic periodicals—such as the magazines *Tjita* [Ideal] of the Masyumi-linked Indonesian Islamic Pupils (PII), *Media* [Medium] of the Association of Islamic Students (HMI), and *Misjkah* [Niche] of the Association of Aficionados of Islamic Literature (HPSI)—which exposed him to Islamic modernism in Indonesia.[1453]

In retrospect, Zuhdi's tactic seems to have worked—at least to a degree. Not only did Dawam become a bibliophile for the rest of his life; he also became a writer. When he was still in junior high school, he got his poems published in the Yogyakarta-based daily

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[1451] Alpha Amirrachman, "M. Dawam Rahardjo: Defending the Nation's Religious Minority Groups," *The Jakarta Post*, May 19, 2007, accessed February 18, 2013, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/05/19/m-dawam-rahardjo-defending-nation039s-religious-minority-groups.html; interview with Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

[1452] Pusat Data & Analisa, "Dawam Rahardjo."

[1453] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam: Sebuah Catatan Pribadi" [Renewal of Islamic thought: Personal recollections], in *Pembaharuan tanpa Apologia? Esai-Esai tentang Ahmad Wahib* [Reform without apologetics? Essays on Ahmad Wahib], ed. Saidiman Ahmad, Husni Mubarak, and Testriono (Jakarta: Paramadina and HIVOS, 2007), 269.

Nasional.[1454] And in the New Order, people would see Dawam's rise as one of the most influential Muslim thinkers and one of the most fervent champions of small and medium businesses in Indonesia. He once tried his hand at banking, running a People's Credit Bank. This attempt ended up in bankruptcy after one of the bank' customers committed a major fraud against the bank.[1455]

As a teenager, Dawam displayed a keen interest in Islamic social activism—an interest that would turn out to be enduring. He joined and led the Surakarta chapter of the PII.[1456] In addition to his good grades in English, his activities at PII enabled him to participate in the AFS (American Field Service) high-school student exchange program.[1457] On an AFS fellowship, he spent the years 1960-1961 in Boise, Idaho, the United States, where he stayed with an American middling-class Christian family and attended the Borah High School.[1458]

Dawam's sojourn in America was rewarding in several ways. First, it enabled him to master English, which would empower him in his later intellectual pursuits. Second, thanks to the program, he had the chance to appreciate and enjoy American literature. Third, it made him experience "the foreign" through firsthand, intimate, and sympathetic encounters. For example, he went to church every Sunday, participated in the church

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[1454] Tempo, "Rahardjo, Mohammad Dawam" [1984] 665.

[1455] Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

[1456] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Utomo Dananjaya: Pengawal Gerakan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam" [Utomo Dananjaya: A Guardian of the movement to renew Islamic thought], in *Mas Tom: The Living Legend*, ed. Ahmad Gaus AF and Idi Subandy Ibrahim (Jakarta: Universitas Paramadina, 2006), 277.

[1457] Ali, "Membaca Mas Dawam," 236.

[1458] Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam Rahardjo," 7-8; Rahardjo, "Utomo Dananjaya," 277-278.

choir, and attended Sunday school.[1459] In my view, this experience was one of the factors that contributed to Dawam's later transformation into an advocate of religious tolerance.

Between about 1962 and 1968, Dawam took up economics at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, majoring in banking and finance. In 1963, he began to be active at the Yogya chapter of the HMI.[1460] His decision to do so, he said, resulted, in part, from his modernist Muslim background.[1461] For reasons that I will discuss later, he chose to serve as an ideologue in charge of cadre-building at the HMI in Yogyakarta.

Dawam's student years in Yogyakarta constituted one of the key episodes in his intellectual biography. It was during these turbulent times that the contours of, and the core themes in, his social thought crystalized. In the 1960s, two key developments occurred in his intellectual journey. First, Dawam discarded an ideological interpretation of Islam along with its dream of an Islamic state.[1462] This conversion, which caused him to break away from the political stance of older modernist Muslims (e.g. M. Natsir), arose from his sojourn in the United States and from the regular debates he had with, among others, the scholar of Islamic history Mukti Ali (1923-2004) in 1967.[1463]

Second, slowly but decisively, Dawam also arrived at a synthesis between the science of economics and such ideologies as inclusive nationalism, Islamic modernism, and social democracy. As we shall see, besides the many NGOs that he mobilized under the New Order, Dawam would employ this synthesis as his main intellectual tool to bring

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[1459] Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam Rahardjo," 8.

[1460] Ahmad Wahib, *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam: Catatan Harian Ahmad Wahib* [The dynamics of Islamic thought: The Diary of Ahmad Wahib], ed. Djohan Effendi and Ismed Natsir (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1981), 149.

[1461] Rahardjo, "Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam," 268.

[1462] Wahib, *Pergolakan*, 148; Djohan Effendi, "Pendahuluan" [Preface], in ibid., 2.

[1463] Rahardjo, "Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam," 162.

the nation (and especially its Muslim members) to his kind of Indonesian modernity, which centered on interfaith harmony, economic prosperity, and social justice. Actually, this vision of modernity was a reiteration of the ideals already enshrined in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution.

This turn in Dawam's social thought about Indonesia had several causes. It seems to have resulted, partly, from his encounter with the economist Mubyarto (1938-2005),[1464] whom he befriended and studied under at the Gadjah Mada School of Economics. It was Mubyarto who drew Dawam's attention to economic inequality, rural poverty, and the capitalism's destructive consequences.[1465]

In addition, Dawam's change of mind stemmed from the political need to defend the HMI against attacks from the PKI and its student front CGMI, which called for its demolition. It was Sularso and Sudjoko Prasodjo (d. 1974)—his mentors at the HMI in Yogya—who urged Dawam to study Marxism around 1963-1965 so he could beat the communists in their own game.[1466] After a time, Dawam emerged as one of HMI's specialists of sorts on the subject of Marxism; it fell to him to give training sessions on this ideology to his colleagues in Yogyakarta.[1467]

[1464] Ali, "Membaca Mas Dawam," 239.

[1465] Ibid., 260.

[1466] Wahib, *Pergolakan*, 156, 276, 284; Mahromi, "M. Dawam Rahardjo," 9-10.

[1467] Interview with M. Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011; Djohan Effendi, "Intelektual Muslim yang Selalu Gelisah: Kesaksian Seorang Sahabat" [A Muslim intellectual who is always restless: A friend's testimony], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 34-35; M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Djohan Effendi dalam Peta Pemikiran Islam Gerakan Islam" [Djohan Effendi's position in the Islamic thought behind Islamic movement], in *Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama: Bunga Rampai 70 Tahun Djohan Effendi* [Celebrating freedom of religion: A festschrift in honor of Djohan Effendi's seventieth birthday], ed. Elza Peldi Taher (Jakarta: ICRP and Kompas, 2009), 5.

Still another factor that compelled Dawam in the mid-1960s to adopt an Islam-inspired, nationalist, social-democratic, and economy-centered vision of Indonesian modernity was his discontent with Guided Democracy's mismanagement of the country's economy:

> In the last years of the Old Order, the economy took a plunge: [About] sixty to seventy percent of the population lived below the poverty line. How was Islam supposed to tackle this predicament? That was the central question for me. My view at the time was that the problems could only be overcome by taking economic action. Perhaps it was because my academic training was in economics. And perhaps, it was also because social justice—along with pluralism—has always been my major area of interest.
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> Right from the start, I emphasized economic answers to Indonesia's problems. I was extremely upset about the ideological warfare that raged [in the early 1960s]. In my view, it stood in the way of development. Thus, when [in the mid-1960s] Widjojo [Nitisastro] and his colleagues called for economic and financial reforms, I thought to myself, "Wow! Right on. I love it."[1468]

The question became: Who should lead the search for Indonesian progress? Like Hatta and Sjahrir in the early 1930s, Dawam was opposed, in the 1960s, to mass mobilization that relied on the use of ideologies. He pinned his hopes, rather, on intellectuals as agents of social transformation. That was why at the HMI in Yogya he chose to concentrate on cadre-building, seeking to train reasonable and professional leaders.[1469] He advocated modern reinterpretation of Islamic social teachings—but not

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[1468] Interview with M. Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

[1469] Rahardjo, "Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam," 270, 279; Wahib, *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam*, 153, 159.

Islamic theology. And he called for using these new interpretations to empower Muslims in their struggles for better life.[1470]

But Dawam was not a starry-eyed modernizer. Even in late 1967, when he already espoused modernization, he remained—as a devout Muslim[1471]—critical of what he took to be modernity's darker sides: "Westernization" and "secularization."[1472] In 1969, he still felt that the time had not yet come to preach modernization to the leaders and members of the HMI.[1473]

What made Dawam's social thought even more complex was that the studies of Marxism he began in 1963 had caused him to admire some of its aspects, especially its emphasis on social justice and what he saw as its "scientificity":

> I was not an anti-Marxist, mind you. I incorporated Marxism [into my own thought]. […] Social justice was one of the key themes in Islam. Unfortunately, in Islam this theme remained theological: It was not elaborated in a scientific manner. It fell to us [Muslim intellectuals] to study social justice scientifically. The Marxists had developed ideas about social justice and ways to eradicate poverty. And they offered a scientific method to analyze social justice. Thus, we [at the HMI] decided that we ought to study Marxism.[1474]

While adopting Marxism's preoccupation with, and "scientific" approach to, social justice, the young Dawam had two reasons why he could not become a fully-fledged Marxist: he cherished freedom and found the Marxist utopia unpalatable.

[1470] Rahardjo, "Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam," 283-284; Wahib, *Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam*, 152.

[1471] On Dawam's everyday piety, see Ali, "Membaca Mas Dawam," 230-234; see also Didik J. Rachbini, "Mas Dawam Yang Saya Kenal" [The Dawam I know], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 85.

[1472] Wahib, Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam, 150.

[1473] Ibid., 151.

[1474] Interview with M. Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

> My own social philosophy was a fusion of liberalism and Marxism. Unlike some people who had studied Marxism, I did not become a utopist. I used Marxism to argue that our country's economy should focus on the small people. In my view, a people-oriented economy was the wellspring of a better future…. It was the bottom-up engine for [our country's] economic growth.[1475]

In addition, a consideration of Dawam's intellectual journey will reveal to us the third—and perhaps the main—reason why he could not be a total believer in Marxism: Throughout his life, Islam has remained the core and the basis of his worldview.

As for the ideal of freedom, there was one of its implementations that the young Dawam treasured but that a complete adherence to Marxism would have required him to jettison. It was the right for individuals to engage in business pursuits. Coming from a Muslim petty-bourgeois background, he never sought the liquidation of his own class. He strove to help the masses (who consisted largely of Muslims) to conquer poverty, ignorance, and backwardness, and to join and expand an ideal bourgeoisie that he envisioned to champion a type of modernity defined—as we shall see—by piety, morality, the happy nuclear family, religious tolerance, nationalism, noblesse oblige, rationality, and…Islam's central role in national life. In this respect, in 1986 Dawam wrote that "It is a mistake if development is not directed toward upgrading the economic basis of the lower classes so they become middling classes." To help this transformation,

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[1475] Ibid.

he said, the government should provide the lower classes with labor-intensive projects and bank credits for small and medium businesses.[1476]

When Dawam had access to the resources he needed, what steps did he take realize this type of modernity? And how did his programs affect some parts of Indonesian society? These themes are best examined by looking at Dawam's post-collegiate life in the New Order.

Upon completion of his studies at Gadjah Mada in 1969, Dawam moved to Jakarta, where he secured a well-paying job as a management trainee at the Bank of America. He found the job neither meaningful nor fulfilling. It left too little time for him to engage in social activism and intellectual pursuits. Thus, when in 1971 Nono Anwar Makarim offered him to join the newly established modernization NGO LP3ES, Dawam accepted the offer.[1477] The first time he met Nono was at some point in the second half of the 1960s when the latter, as one of the leaders of the Indonesian Student Action Front, visited Yogyakarta and delivered a speech to the city's university students. Another key person at the LP3ES whom Dawam already knew was Emil Salim, who sat on its Steering Committee. Dawam interviewed Emil in 1968 for his BA thesis on inflation. He ended up using Emil's office at the Bappenas to write his thesis. Starting out as a researcher, he rose quickly from the ranks and became a project officer, head of the Research Division, the NGO's deputy director, and, finally, its director (1980-1986).[1478]

[1476] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Mencari Format Baru Pembangunan" [In search of new formats for development], in M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Ekonomi Politik Pembangunan* [The political economy of development], ed. Faiq Ihsan and Moh. Shofan (Jakarta: LSAF, 2012), 224.

[1477] Pusat Data & Analisa Tempo, "Dawam Rahardjo."

[1478] Tempo, "Rahardjo, Mohammad Dawam" [1984], 665; Tempo, "Rahardjo, Mohammad Dawam" [1986], 694; interview with M. Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

In the early 1970s, Dawam sought two main objectives: modernizing the country and promoting the contribution of Muslim intellectuals to the grand project.

> At the time, Sumitro [Djojohadikusumo] and his [former] students[1479] talked about two strategies of modernization. First, there were people like them who entered the government [to undertake modernization from above]. Second, there were young intellectuals [like us] who worked from the bottom up, seeking to construct a civil society. To support [the bottom-up modernizers], Sumitro enlisted the help of the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung—a liberal NGO from West Germany. Civil society was indeed a liberal idea.
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> Thus, [I] was not opposed to the government. Rather, [I was] one of its critical partners. [I…] corrected the government. As a staff member at the LP3ES…I criticized the regime. I did that by pioneering economic populism and promoting the development of the regions. […].[1480]

What were the contemporaneous sources that Dawam drew on to fashion his own theory of and approach to economic modernization in the late 1960s? As Dawam recalled, at the time he came to know personally and learn from some of the engineers and key thinkers of Indonesia's economic development:

> I met Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo [1931-2009],[1481] Emil Salim, and Soedjatmoko. Soedjatmoko drew my attention to the social dimensions of development. Bintoro introduced me to its technocratic aspects. Emil Salim let me use his office in Jakarta to work on my BA thesis. It was through him that I came to know the deeper economics of development.[1482]

[1479] That is to say, Widjojo Nitisastro and his team of technocrats.

[1480] Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

[1481] Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo was second-echelon member of Widjojo Nitisastro's team of technocrats. He came from a santri background. In 1960, he got his MA in Administration for Social and Economic Development from the University of Pittsburg. On him, see Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, *Perencanaan Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1977), 220-221.

[1482] Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, January 28, 2011.

In the 1970s and 1980s, to modernize Indonesia from the bottom up and enable the rakyat to participate in the processes and rewards of modernization, Dawam Rahardjo—in his capacity as LP3ES thinker and activist—undertook a series of community development programs. He designed and directed a number of participatory action research projects to stimulate the emergence of entrepreneurship among poor Indonesians.[1483] He sought to empower certain *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) so they could serve as engines of economic progress in village Java. As his friend Didik J. Rachbini once put it, the intention was "to modernize Indonesia by modernizing *pesantren*."[1484] Through the LP3ES, Dawam offered alternative education programs to high-school dropouts, using participatory action research.[1485]

> Ideally, social change should originate from people's own realization and ideas, thereby avoiding the kind of conflicts that externally-imposed changes usually cause. The trouble, however, is that self-initiated transformation takes forever to start. As a result, changes usually have to be instigated by external agents.[1486]

In the meantime, Dawam preached grassroots models for economic development to the country's intellectual elite. He did this in two ways. First, in the 1970s and 1980s, he published waves of articles in the LP3ES journal *Prisma*. Second, he trained intellectuals, researchers, and community development activists.[1487] His trainees ended up

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[1483] Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam Rahardjo," 12-13; Hadimulyo, "Mas Dawam," 105.
[1484] Rachbini, "Mas Dawam Yang Saya Kenal," 86.
[1485] Hadimulyo, "Mas Dawam," 107.
[1486] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Dunia Pesantren dalam Peta Pembaharuan" [The world of Islamic boarding schools in the context of social change], in *Pesantren dan Pembaharuan* [Islamic boarding schools and social change], ed. M. Dawam Rahardjo] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1974), 14.
[1487] Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam Rahardjo," 13.

becoming prominent Muslim intellectuals, for example Azyumardi Azra (b. 1955), Komaruddin Hidayat (b. 1953), Bahtiar Effendy (b. 1958), Fachry Ali (b. 1954), Mansour Fakih (1953-2004), Saiful Mujani (b. 1962), and Budhy Munawar-Rachman (b. 1963).[1488]

In the early 1980s, Dawam explored the possibilities of developing an Islamic version of liberation theology. For these purposes, in 1983, he held a seminar, in which Kees Bertens (b. 1936), Harun Nasution (1919-1998), and Karel A. Steenbrink participated. As it turned out, this attempt was fruitless, primarily because Nasution was not interested in the project.[1489] On his own, Dawam finally found inspiration from the Egyptian scholar Hassan Hanafi (b. 1935) and the Iranian thinker Ali Shari'ati (1933-1977).[1490]

But why—despite his support for the economic development that the regime undertook with the help of the technocrats—did Dawam keep criticizing it? After all, economic development achieved a lot. It turned out that Dawam considered the achievements insufficient. Economic modernity, for him, was about more than just economic growth, which was enjoyed mainly by the elite, that is, the middling classes of

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[1488] Ibid., 14; Hadimulyo, "Mas Dawam," 109; Komaruddin Hidayat, "Pembelajar dan Pengajar Seumur Hidup" [Lifelong learner and teacher], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 71-73; Imam Ahmad, "Brahmana dari Solo" [A Brahmin from Solo], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 60; Utomo Dananjaya, "Dawam dan Mata Air Gagasan" [Dawam and a wellspring of ideas], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 42; Budhy Munawar Rachman, "*Ensiklopedi al-Qur'an*: Sebuah Manifesto Islam Inklusif" [Ensiklopedi al-Qur'an: A manifesto of inclusive Islam], in Ali-Fauzi, Hasyim, and Lamardy, *Demi Toleransi*, 152-153; Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 170, 218-219.

[1489] Mujiburrahman, "Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order" (PhD diss., Universiteit Utrecht, 2006), 277-278, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/10061/Dissertation%20Mujiburrahman.pdf?sequence=1.

[1490] Ibid., 278.

professionals, bureaucrats, military officers, and entrepreneurs. In his view, economic modernity should be about the economic progress of the majority of the Indonesian people. It should include social justice. In early 1981, Dawam wrote:

> What has actually been produced by development in Indonesia, apart from its high rate of growth of GNP? We can say that economic growth has certainly been rapid, but it has been unequal and distorted by the figures for the growth of the modern sector. Industry has certainly developed rapidly, but the large ones are owned by multinational corporations or certain ethnic groups that have special rights and opportunities since the colonial period. Total food production has certainly increased, but its benefits are mostly enjoyed by rich farmers and the village elite. Most people in rural areas still live beneath the poverty line….[1491]

But where did Dawam get this idea? The statistics that he could have used were not yet available in early 1981. When the figures came up later on, the actual economic inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) was actually smaller than many had thought before. In his critique in 1981 of the economic development that had been going on in Indonesia since 1969, Dawam seems to have adopted uncritically some of the major arguments in the then fashionable body of foreign literature that offered leftwing critiques of economic development. In fact, in the 1981 essay by Dawam Rahardjo from which I quote the passage above, he borrowed, from a number of foreign writers of the late 1970s, the following concepts: Herbert Feith's "repressive developmentalism"; dependency theory's "structure of domination" and its analytical distinction between "the centers" vs. the peripheries"; and the romanticist attack on "consumerism." He even

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[1491] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Struktur Dominasi dalam Proses Pembangunan" [Development and the structure of domination], (paper presented at the seminar "People against Domination," Christian Conference of Asia, Kuala Lumpur, February 23-28, 1981; reprinted as English translation in *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives*, ed. Ian Chalmers and Vedi R. Hadiz (New York: Routledge, 1997), 111.

borrowed the notion of "dualistic economic system," which J. H. Boeke had articulated in 1910.[1492] Later, in April 2012, Dawam remembered how his encounters with the champions of dependency theory in the 1980s resulted in the fact that in his essays for the journal *Prisma* in this period, he adopted the leftist perspective:

> […D]uring my service as Director of the LP3ES, I developed an international advocacy program [to promote] alternative development strategies, which led me to stumble upon Latin American dependency theory. While carrying out the program, I met and talked to world figures such as Ivan Illich [1926-2002], Andre Gunder Frank [1929-2005], [and] Theotonio dos Santos [b. 1936] [as well as] Asian thinkers such as Martin Khor [b. 1951], [Randolf] Randy [S.] David, Jomo K. Sundaram [b. 1952]…and Chandra Muzaffar [b. 1947]…. All of them were leftist thinkers.[1493]

Dawam seems to have underrated the results that economic development had yielded by 1981. He certainly knew how things had been under Guided Democracy. But he had very high expectations for the New Order and its technocrats. And we can see here his thinly veiled resentment toward the well-connected and successful ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, an attitude that fellow Muslim intellectuals like Daoed Joesoef of the CSIS did not share (see Chapter 3).

Already in 1981, Dawam was worried about what he—and other middling-class observers—saw as the darker, unintended social consequences of the economic modernization that had been going on since 1969. He lamented the rise of "luxurious housing complexes" in "areas that used to be kampongs for the poor." He complained that "Patriotism, morality and religious values have eroded sharply because of the growth

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[1492] Ibid., 109-112.

[1493] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Prakata" [Preface], in Rahardjo, *Ekonomi Politik Pembangunan*, vi.

of materialistic attitudes." He noted "growing demoralization among government officials, social leaders, and even intellectuals and artists." Rather nostalgically, he regretted that "beautiful traditional children's toys have been pushed aside by toys produced by foreign companies." And—as was common among middling-class critics of modernization at the time—he perceived that "Family and married life has begun to resemble that described in the film *Kramer vs. Kramer*."[1494]

But what was Dawam's alternative vision of Indonesian modernity? In 1979, admiring what he perceived to be the Chinese model of development, he presented the following vision. He imagined "an integrated program of rural development" that was oriented toward closing the gap between the city and the countryside. He envisioned

> labor-intensive projects to stimulate the creation of agricultural capital; the spread of development activities with a special emphasis on local and regional economies; unique mechanization of agriculture; the promotion of small and medium enterprises in villages; the construction of power plants to provide the electrification of the rural world; the application of appropriate technology; attention to ecosystem; and efficient use of economic resources through recycling….[1495]

In the post-LP3ES era, Dawam carried out a number of projects. In 1989, with the help of some of his "cadres," who organized themselves around the Institute for Religious and Philosophical Studies LSAF (est. 1983), he founded the journal *Ulumul Qur'an* [Koranic sciences], which was active until 1998.[1496] The periodical was an expression of his scholarly love for the Koran. He published entries that offered interdisciplinary

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[1494] Rahardjo, "Struktur Dominasi," 133.

[1495] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Model Pembangunan Cina: Eksperimen Sosial di Dunia Ketiga" [China's development model: A social experiment in the Third World], in Rahardjo, *Ekonomi Politik Pembangunan*, 274.

[1496] Hadimulyo, "Mas Dawam," 111.

interpretation of some major themes in the scripture. He and his cadres used the journal to propagate ideas on: the renewal of Islamic thought, Islamic civilization and the future, Islamic neo-modernism, Islamic epistemology, and the Islamization of sciences.[1497] As Mujiburrahman (b. 1971) has pointed out, Dawam intended the journal as a forum for "critical discussion on science and culture in the spirit of the [Koran]."[1498] The audience that Dawam had in mind included not only Muslim middling classes but also non-Muslim readers who wanted to "develop human civilization." As such, the journal carried articles that dealt with topics such as "Islamic philosophy, theology, mysticism and other Muslim social and cultural issues." It also offered essays on "non-Islamic religions written by Muslim and non-Muslim authors", such as the Protestant theologian Victor E. Tanja and the Jesuit Franz Magnis-Suseno.[1499]

In July 1978, with several friends (Adi Sasono [b. 1949], Abdillah Toha [b. 1942], Muhammad Amin Aziz [b. 1936], and A. M. Saefuddin [b. 1940]), Dawam founded the Center for the Development of Agribusiness (PPA).[1500] In cooperation with the government and the private sector, the Center attempted to achieve equal distribution of the results of economic development. Agriculture must contribute to job creation. There should be a shift from subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture. This required collaboration between agriculture and the industries that processed agricultural produce.

[1497] Ibid., 111-112.

[1498] Mujiburrahman, "Feeling Threatened," 290.

[1499] Mujiburrahman, 289-290.

[1500] Miqdad Rikani et al., *Tiga Tahun Pusat Pengembangan Agribisnis* [Three years of the Center for the Development of Agribusiness] (Jakarta: Pusat Pengembangan Agribisnis, 1981), 11; Zainulbahar Noor et al., *Kegigihan Sang Perintis* [The persistence of the pioneer] (Jakarta: Embun Publishing, 2007), 110.

Socially, what it hoped to do was to create an agricultural bourgeoisie.[1501] The methods used included providing business information to entrepreneurs and aspiring entrepreneurs and giving them training in business skills and management of cooperative societies, and training in community development. For instance, the organization offered training in chicken farming to the students of *pesantren*.[1502] It also conducted policy-studies on the development of plantations, animal husbandry, forestry, irrigation, cooperative societies, post-harvest technology, regional development, and small business.[1503] In 1987, the need for the PPA to specialize in agribusiness consulting led to the founding of the Center for the Development of Agribusiness Community (PPMA), where Dawam served as managing director.[1504] One of the meanings of Dawam's involvement in the promotion of agribusiness was that despite his persistent critique of capitalism as it was practiced by Sino-Indonesian and transnational businesspeople, he was a supporter of capitalism as it was pursued by Muslim entrepreneurs. In fact, following his retirement from the LP3ES, he managed Muhammadiyah enterprises.[1505] In 2004, he told the reporters of the magazine *Tempo* that he viewed himself as "a Muslim intellectual" and an entrepreneur,[1506] which is rather curious in light of the fact that he had not attained success in the world of business.

When Dawam founded the Center for the Development of Agribusiness in 1978, he knew very little about agriculture and agribusiness. What happened was that he and

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[1501] Rikani et al., *Tiga Tahun*, 11.
[1502] Ibid., 30-32, 35.
[1503] Ibid., 43-54.
[1504] Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam Rahardjo," 15.
[1505] Pusat Data & Analisa Tempo, "Dawam Rahardjo."
[1506] Ibid.

his friend Adi Sasono (a civil engineer and an activist) heard that a university lecturer named A. M. Saifuddin had recently organized a Southeast Asian workshop on agribusiness at Bogor Agricultural University. The news stimulated an enthusiastic conversation between Dawam and Adi Sasono in which they concluded that somehow agribusiness offered itself as a very promising method to help Indonesian farmers "migrate" from traditional to modern farming. The idea was that "if [Indonesian] farmers are forward-thinking and modern, [their] income will increase[.] [And this] will do much to eradicate poverty in [the] country."[1507] Lacking the expertise in agriculture and agribusiness, Dawam and Adi enlisted the help of those who did. Thus, to found the PPA, they joined forces with Muhammad Amin Aziz, (a rural sociologist with an MA from Iowa State University), Abdillah Toha (an Australian-educated businessman of Arab descent), and A. M. Saefuddin (an agricultural economist with a PhD from West Germany).[1508]

Dawam's complexities also manifested themselves in the fact that he not only advocated freedom of religion but also remained a strong defender of his community of origin: the Muslim *ummah* in Indonesia. In 2007, to the editors of the festschrift in honor of his sixty-fifth birthday, Dawam said that the founding of the All Indonesia League of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in late 1990 was a "very meaningful event" in his life.[1509]

[1507] Noor et al., *Kegigihan Sang Perintis*, 109.

[1508] Ibid., 110.

[1509] Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam, Rahardjo," 17. As Robert Elson has pointed out, from President Soeharto's perspective, the founding of the ICMI was his "attempt to claim the support of key intellectual Muslim leaders, as well as to stake out new and broader grounds for political support amongst the Muslim community which he had previously sought to browbeat and shackle." See Robert Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 269.

Yet, there were a number of fellow intellectuals (both Muslim and otherwise) who regretted Dawam's political move. For example, Hotman M. Siahaan (b. 1951)—a sociologist at the School of Social and Political Sciences, Airlangga University, Surabaya—deplored Dawam's transformation from an intellectual who took a "critical stance" toward the regime, standing outside the New Order's circles of power and development bureaucracy," to a person who "pursued power by organizing [Muslim] intellectuals."[1510]

In defense of his political move, Dawam reminded his critics that as one of the leaders of the Muslim community, he must respond to its major problems. First, although it constituted the majority of the country's population, the *ummah*—he argued—had been marginalized in the top-down development that the New Order regime undertook. This marginalization, he said, took several forms. He drew his critics' attention to the immoralities that the regime allowed to happen: "gambling projects," secularization, "corruption," and prostitution. He added that the regime favored non-Muslim big entrepreneurs (both ethnic Chinese and foreign) at the expense of Muslim small businesspeople. He then pointed out that through the think tank CSIS, Catholic intellectuals exerted too much political clout over the bureaucracy, the military, the intelligence service, and the ruling political party Golkar.[1511] In 1987, he had already pointed to other problems in the kind of modernization that the regime undertook: the dominant role of the state in the Indonesian economy, various forms of dependence, the

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[1510] Hotman M. Siahaan, "LP3ES: Agenda yang Tertinggal" [LP3ES: Agendas that have been left behind unfinished], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 144-145.

[1511] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "ICMI, Masyarakat Madani dan Masa Depan Politik Indonesia: Sebuah Catatan Akhir" [ICMI, civil society, and the future of Indonesian politics: Concluding observations], in Ali-Fauzi, *ICMI*, 339-340.

rise of monopoly, oligopoly, and monopsony; the persistence of a "dual economy."[1512] In sum, Dawam argued to the effect that this state of affairs must stop because it endangered economic development:

> […T]he success of Indonesia's development will depend heavily on [its] Muslim community, [which] constitutes the majority and espouses a set of values compatible with progress. […] Islam, therefore, is the key to the success of development in Indonesia.[1513]

Thus, to ensure that development would succeed, Muslim intellectuals—he argued—must organize themselves into the ICMI and use this institution to foster Muslims' participation in development (both in the enjoyment of its results and in the its state-level policymaking)[1514]and to close the gap between them and the government as well as between "bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats."[1515] The ICMI must help Muslims to undertake "accelerated evolution"[1516] from "poverty" and "backwardness" to not only prosperity and progress but also to equality and justice.[1517] Thus, he argued, it was a mistake to see, as some did, ICMI a "primordial" and "sectarian" organization.[1518]

Dawam's modernism is neither "generic" nor merely nationalist. While embracing nationalism and religious pluralism, he remains a Muslim modernizer. This is

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[1512] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Sekapur Sirih" [Preface], in M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Perekonomian Indonesia: Pertumbuhan dan Krisis* [Indonesian economy: Growth and crisis] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), ix.

[1513] Ibid., 344.

[1514] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Visi dan Misi Kehadiran ICMI: Sebuah Pengantar" [The vision and mission of the ICMI: An introduction], Ali-Fauzi, *ICMI*, 33, 39-40; Rahardjo, "Mereka Tidak Konsisten," 329.

[1515] Rahardjo, "Visi dan Misi," 36.

[1516] Rahardjo, "Mereka Tidak Konsisten," 330.

[1517] Rahardjo, "Visi dan Misi," 40.

[1518] Ibid., 42.

not only attested to by his involvement in the founding of the ICMI but also by the project he undertook to write the *Ensiklopedi al-Qur'an* ("Encyclopedia of Koranic Interpretation"), which he considered his masterpiece.[1519] Why did he undertake this project? Muslims, he explained, "must always use the Koran to create their future." Any attempt at social renewal by a Muslim reformer must base itself on a novel interpretation of the Koran. Creating a better life required interpreting the Koran in new ways. [1520] The values that God has revealed through the Koran, he said, are eternal. They provided man with guidance anytime and anywhere. But different times and different societies, he went on to say, require new interpretation of these eternal values.[1521]

The problem that he attempted to overcome by producing the *Ensiklopedi* was this: Although it was true that in 1996 Muslims constituted 80 percent of the Indonesian population, they and their leaders were "unable to develop Islamic concepts that could [help] them face the challenges of the times."[1522]

> By producing this book, I join those who call for intensive studies of the Koran. I do so because I want to achieve some goals. First, I want to increase the adoption of Islamic values so that these values motivate and underlie our everyday activities as well as serve as a device in our social and scientific endeavors.[1523]

According to Dawam Rahardjo, there are two ways in which Muslims can produce new ideas that they can deploy to solve problems in the modern world. First,

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[1519] Pusat Data & Analisa Tempo, "Dawam Rahardjo."

[1520] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Pendahuluan: Metodologi Tafsir dan Akses terhadap Al-Qur'ân" [Introduction: Methods to interpret and access the Koran], in Rahardjo, *Ensiklopedi Al-Qur'ân*, 2.

[1521] Ibid., 8, 11.

[1522] Ibid., 14-15.

[1523] Ibid., 15.

they can start from issues in the social sciences and philosophies and then go on to find what the Koran says regarding such issues. Second, they can begin by reflecting on the Koran's central themes and then continue by enlisting the help of social sciences to make sense of the Koran's "multidimensional" messages.[1524]

Why not just rely on the sciences, that is, on reason and empirical research? As a *Muslim* thinker, Dawam discovered that the findings of scientific studies often led to "radical and fundamental questions," which philosophy grappled with but which sciences could not answer. In seeking the answers to such questions, Muslims resorted to theology, that is, to the Koran.[1525] In sum, Dawam's own interpretation of the Koran is based on the dialog between faith and reason, between the Koran and social sciences.

Having examined the kind of Indonesian society that Dawam has attempted to help create, we need to take a look at the kind of family that he ended up building under the New Order, for—as we have seen in the preceding chapters and will see again in the next one—the Indonesian middling classes, like their counterparts elsewhere, took the nuclear family to be the building block of modern society. In the late 1990s, he told a reporter of the weekly *Tempo* that he considered himself a "lucky" man because his family was "alright." "There is no real conflict," he explained, "in the relations between my children and their stepmother."[1526] Dawam's first wife was Zainun Hawariah (d. 1994). He wrote this about her in the introduction to his *Ensiklopedi*: "She was a simple wife and a pious person. She always kept me company when I wrote at night;

[1524] Ibid., 7, 10, 33-35.
[1525] Ibid., 5.
[1526] Pusat Data & Analisa Tempo, "Dawam Rahardjo."

oftentimes she would fall asleep before the TV or beside the radio."[1527] His children from his marriage with Zainun are Aliva (b. 1972) and Jauhari (b. 1974). Aliva holds a BA in physics from Brawijaya University, Malang, East Java. In 1999, Jauhari earned a BA in electrical engineering from Pancasila University, Jakarta. In March 1995, Dawam married Sumarni, holder of an MPA from the University of California. As of 2011, she was Deputy Minister for Child Protection at the Ministry for Women Empowerment.[1528]

4. 4. The Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information

On today's market, we find a whole series of products deprived of their malignant properties: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer without alcohol….

Slavoj Žižek[1529]

[…U]nderdeveloped countries may learn from the story of the West and not repeat the same mistakes….

Nono Anwar Makarim[1530]

A part of the bourgeoisie is desirous of redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society. To this belong economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers of the conditions of the working class, organizers of charity, members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, [and] hole-and-corner reformers of every imaginable kind.

Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx[1531]

[1527] Rahardjo, "Kata Pengantar," xxiv.

[1528] Mahromi et al., "M. Dawam Rahardjo," 18-19; Anissa S. Febrina, "What Makes a Metropolis Welcoming for Children?" *The Jakarta Post*, December 8, 2006, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/12/08/what-makes-metropolis-welcoming-children.html.

[1529] Slavoj Žižek, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real* (London: Verso, 2002), 10.

[1530] Nono Anwar Makarim, "My Country: Or Tantalus Betrayed," *Quadrant* 13, no. 5 (September-October, 1969): 58.

The LP3ES (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information) was one of the products of the metamorphosis that some former pro-New Order student activists carried out in the late 1960s from protest movement to institution-building.[1532] It is of importance that three of the first four Executive Directors of the LP3ES—Nono Makarim (1971-1973), Ismid Hadad (1976-1980), and Dawam Rahardjo (1980-1986)—played a leading role in the student movement in Jakarta or Yogyakarta throughout the 1960s. It is also significant that their student activism in the 1960s and the numerous programs they later coordinated at the LP3ES from 1971 to 1986 stemmed from the desire to undertake Indonesian modernization under the leadership of the country's emergent bourgeoisie.[1533] This, in my view, was the main reason why in many of the programs that the LP3ES pursued, the so-called "bottom-up" modernization was closely intertwined with attempts to create a (petty) bourgeoisie from among the urban and rural poor.[1534]

The LP3ES intellectuals were not alone in seeing modernity—whose core elements included liberty, democracy, economic growth and equality, and control over nature and society through science and technology—as dependent on strong and sizeable middling classes. We find variants of this idea in the writings of many thinkers outside

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[1531] Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, *Manifesto of the Communist Party and Selected Essays* (Rockville, Manor Thrift, 2008), 27.

[1532] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxiv-xxv; Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, "Mempertahankan Idealisme Jauh Lebih Sulit: Pengalaman Saya dalam LP3ES" [Keeping idealism alive was way more difficult: My experience at the LP3ES], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, xlv-xlvi.

[1533] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxv.

[1534] Ibid., xxxiii-xxxiv.

Indonesia. Consider, among others, the US founding father Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), the German social liberal Friedrich Naumann (1860-1911), and the Harvard sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr. (1913-2005). The Jeffersonian ideal that inspired Douglas McArthur to undertake land reform in Japan after World War II is also worth keeping in mind.

Typically, as a member of a generation of Indonesians too young to participate in the Revolution, Nono, Ismid, and Dawam called for, in the 1960s, the abandonment of anti-colonial nationalism, which centered on ideological battles, mass mobilization, and xenophobic foreign policy. They championed a type of post-independence nationalism that revolved around economic modernization. The transition to economic modernity, they argued, must occur in ways that were not only smooth and fast but also human-centered, equitable, balanced, and participatory. They saw to it that Indonesia's economic transformation would lead not to a Janus-faced modernity from which the West had been suffering. They would like Indonesia to enjoy a populist but bourgeois variant of what we may call "coffee-without-caffeine" modernity.

The LP3ES version of wholesome modernity comprised such elements as economic growth and equality; morality and spiritual wellbeing; a synthesis of individual freedom and social responsibility; democracy and the rule of law; and control over nature and society through the ethical use of science and technology. At the same time, the LP3ES intellectuals attempted to ensure that Indonesia warded off the evils of modernity, which included alienation and inequality; secularization and moral bankruptcy; excessive individualism and the loss of identity; and the rise of a totalitarian state.

If we ponder the first decade of the LP3ES' history through the prism of international encounter, it will appear as the product of collaboration between two NGOs: the West German Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNS) and the Indonesian Society for the Advancement of Economics and Social Sciences (Bineksos). Founded in 1958 in Bonn, having strong links to the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the FNS propagated social liberalism at home and overseas.[1535] Through its activities abroad, this political foundation helped societies in the Third World to speed up their "social and economic development."[1536] The core values it promoted included "freedom," "national self-determination," "free markets," "democracy," "social justice," "human rights," and "the rule of law."[1537] The FNS can be seen as an apostle of a bourgeois synthesis of capitalism, socialism, democracy, and religion. The FNS activists believed that shaping the world in accordance with this synthesis depended on the expansion of independent and enlightened middling classes. Thus, when in 1968 or 1969 the FNS started their mission in Indonesia, they gravitated toward Indonesian intellectuals who shared their social philosophy. Some of their Indonesian counterparts came from middling-class families that were sympathetic to the pragmatic modernism of the then defunct Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Islamic political party Masyumi.

[1535] Manfred Ziemek, *FNS-LP3ES* (Jakarta: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung Indonesia Office, 1981), 2; Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, "About Us," accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.en.freiheit.org/About-us/790c709/index.html.

[1536] Ziemek, *FNS-LP3ES*, 4.

[1537] Kirstin Balke, ed., "Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für Freiheit," (Potsdam-Babelsberg: The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, 2012), 1, accessed February 22, 2013, http://www.en.freiheit.org/files/62/Imagebroschuere_2012_engl_final_28.03.12_1.pdf; Ziemek, *FNS-LP3ES*, 2.

The Bineksos was established in Jakarta, on July 7, 1970 by, as we have seen, a group of young and senior intellectuals who came, mostly, from a civilian background and championed a vision of Indonesian modernity that combined pragmatism, social-democracy, and—to differing degrees—religiosity. Seven of the Bineksos members sat on the LP3ES' Board of Directors. It was they who formulated the Institute's key policies and appointed its Executive Director.[1538]

It is instructive to look at the FNS and the Bineksos in the context of national and global histories. Viewed through the lens of national history, the FNS and the Bineksos seem to have been a response to a recent traumatic episode in the evolution of their own society. The FNS constituted the postwar answer that West German social liberals gave to the terrible experiences of living under Fascism. By the same token, the Bineksos thinkers attempted to overcome the destructive consequences of colonialism and ideology-oriented, mass-mobilization-based nation-building (which culminated in the mass murder in 1965-1966). Moreover, if we see the FNS and the Bineksos through the Cold War lens, both will appear to have been champions of democracy and "capitalism with a human face" to exorcise the specters of dictatorship and communism.

A consideration of the genesis of the LP3ES reveals at least two findings. First, there were discernible elements of economic and political liberalism that provided the affinities that enabled the LP3ES to cooperate with the FNS. Second, established by a number of leading supporters of the New Order, the LP3ES received approval from the regime. In fact, it intended to serve as a critically-minded partner of government in

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[1538] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxvi-xxvii; Makarim, "LP3ES Pernah Berfungsi," xxxix.

economic development.[1539] (It did cooperate with government agencies in carrying out its community development projects, for example in the promotion of small-scale industries.[1540]) the LP3ES saw it as its task to tackle those development challenges which the government was unable to overcome—due to lack of resources, to the limits of its reach, and to its initial emphasis on growth as against equity.[1541] Despite its intention to adopt a critical stance vis-à-vis the government with regard to economic development, the LP3ES on the one hand and Soeharto and his technocrats on the other shared a deep consensus. In 2001, Ismid Hadad (the third Executive Director of the LP3ES) acknowledged in retrospect that the LP3ES—like the Bappenas—was "under the strong influence of development and modernization theories that dominated social sciences at the time."[1542]

In Jakarta, on August 19, 1971, the Bineksos and the FNS established the LP3ES.[1543] They agreed to use the LP3ES as a tool to carry out Indonesia's bottom-up modernization by providing the younger generation with training in social and economic leadership.[1544] They also agreed to make Nono Makarim the first Executive Director of the LP3ES. There were reasons to justify this decision. First, they saw Nono as "brilliant"

[1539] Arief Budiman, "Wadah Pengembangan Pemikiran Kritis" [An institution for promoting critical thought], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 39; Bonar Tigor Naipospos, "LP3ES, Quo Vadis?" in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 140.

[1540] Dwi Arya Wisesa, "Pengembangan Industri Kecil, Kerajinan Rakyat, dan Sektor Informal" [Developing small-scale industries, people's handicraft, and the informal sector], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 6.

[1541] Zoemrotin K. Susilo, "LP3ES Kurang Melihat Perkembangan Masyarakat" [LP3ES pays little attention to changes in society], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 41; interview with Imam Ahmad, January 4, 2011.

[1542] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxxvi.

[1543] LP3ES, Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information: Objective, Program, and Activities (Jakarta: LP3ES, n.d.), 1.

[1544] Wisesa, "Kilas Balik," xii.

and "dynamic." Second, since Nono was neither the enemy of the regime nor its henchman, he was deemed capable of operating the LP3ES as the New Order's critical partner in modernization.[1545] Third, Nono won a writing contest that the FNS held in West Berlin in 1969 on the subject of what freedom meant to intellectuals in developing countries. In an essay titled "My Country: Or Tantalus Betrayed," he presented some views that the FNS people considered so impressive that they sent D. G. Wilke (see Figure 24) to Indonesia,[1546] not only to set up an FNS office in Jakarta but also to explore ways to assist with the implementation of Nono's visions.[1547] Thus, it is important for us to take a look at these visions.

Learning from his bitter experience of growing up under Guided Democracy, Nono thought that Indonesia must embrace "second-wave nationalism." To add substance to Indonesia's political independence, the country's elite, he argued, must lead the nation to carry out "[economic] development."[1548] Rather than engage in power struggles using ideologies and mass mobilization, they ought, he said, to forge a "viable," "cohesive," and broad-based coalition to execute economic development.[1549] He perceived former student activists as one of the key elements in the proposed modernist alliance. However, these young intellectuals, in his view, were faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they knew that their country was in serious trouble:

[1545] Budiman, "Wadah Pengembangan," 37-38.

[1546] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Wilke, born c. 1937, was the FNS chief representative in Indonesia and advisor to the LP3ES. In 1967, he earned his PhD in political science from Freiburg University.

[1547] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxv.

[1548] Nono Anwar Makarim, "My Country: Or Tantalus Betrayed," *Quadrant* 13, no. 5 (September-October, 1969): 54.

[1549] Ibid.

> There is no escape from a population growth that [progresses] at an average rate of 2-2½ percent per year and population explosions become a matter of time. Each year[, there are] millions more…hungry stomachs to feed and naked skeletons to clothe.[1550]

Figure 24. D. G. Wilke, early 1970s [*Prisma*].

Thus, they had no other choice than to perform economic development to solve the formidable problems. In fact, as members of the educated elite, they also wanted to have other things, such as individual freedom, equality, social justice, the rule of law, and the chance to pursue happiness.[1551]

On the other hand, through what they read about the transition from tradition to modernity in Western Europe, North America, and Japan, they had discovered the horrible life that the "modern man" led "in industrial society and [its] megalopoli[s]."[1552] They had read about the evils of modernity, such as "alienation," "quiet desperation,"

[1550] Ibid., 57.
[1551] Ibid., 56-57.
[1552] Ibid., 57.

meaninglessness, secularization, nihilism, bureaucratization of life, and disintegration of human relationships.[1553]

Nono believed that there was a way out of this dilemma. Indonesia, he suggested, should pursue a type of modernity that was purged of its malignant elements. Indonesia's modernization project, he wrote, should bring progress, curb overpopulation, and eradicate poverty—without jettisoning freedom.

> […I]ntellectuals can try to make power elites understand that a comparatively smooth transition towards moderni[ty] can be achieved by first detecting inner-mechanisms in a certain cultural pattern that has proven in the past to be a motivational force to progress, and second, by persuasively "manipulating" these inner motivation[s] in order to generate progress, or at least to weaken resistance to modernization.[1554]

Rather than reflect endlessly on the Janusian nature of modernity, Nono argued that Indonesia should strive to attain a purified modernity smoothly and rapidly. "If one must survive," he wrote, "one does not meditate, one acts."[1555]

Nono Makarim was not unique in taking this approach to Indonesian modernization. In fact, it was part of the New Order consensus, to which even top-down modernizers at the CSIS and the Bappenas subscribed (see Chapter 3). Sympathetic to this vision, the FNS wanted to see it realized. It decided to provide the LP3ES with the funds and technical assistance it needed to make this dream of disinfected modernity come true.

[1553] Ibid., 55, 57.
[1554] Ibid., 57.
[1555] Ibid., 58.

The LP3ES set three goals for itself. First, through research, training, and publishing, it wanted to equip Indonesian intellectuals and professionals with economics and social sciences so they were better able to facilitate "the socio-cultural development of the Indonesian people." Second, it aimed to foster the holistic development of Indonesia's "human resources" by empowering the younger generation to overcome the social and economic hurdles they faced in building a better future for themselves. Third, the LP3ES intended to help people in Indonesia and overseas to better understand Indonesia's "development problems." In addition, it also collaborated with other organizations (national and international) that undertook similar missions.[1556]

The LP3ES had several fields of operation. First, it conducted policy- and action-oriented research on the social and economic problems confronting the urban and rural poor. Second, it offered training in self-help and self-employment to the younger generation. Some were trained to run small businesses while others learned to become community development workers. Third, the LP3ES rendered guidance and counseling services to managers of cooperatives and to small entrepreneurs. Fourth, the Institute engaged in publishing endeavors; it produced training manuals, college textbooks (see Figure 25), monographs, scholarly journals, and Indonesian translations of foreign books. Finally, through seminars and workshops, the LP3ES fostered networking, dialog, and collaboration among pro-development researchers, policymakers, experts, community leaders, action groups, and individuals.[1557]

[1556] LP3ES, *Institute*, 3-4.
[1557] Ibid., 4-5; Hadad, "Masa Awal," xii-xiii;

In pursuit of its objectives, the LP3ES carried out a wide variety of programs throughout the New Order era. Three of their programs are worth a closer look. First, from 1972 onwards, it was busy promoting the development of small-scale industries in Java. It did so by a) setting up centers for small industries in Jakarta, West Java, and Central Java; b) providing training and consultancy in craftsmanship and entrepreneurship; and c) assisting with the marketing of the products of small industries.[1558]

Figure 25. The LP3ES advertising its own products in February 1975: college textbooks that emphasized Indonesian point of view. The ad says, “Welcome to the new academic year! Are you ready?” [*Prisma*].

[1558] LP3ES, *Institute*, 6-7.

Second, from 1973 onwards, partly in keeping with Nono's proposal of using progressive elements in traditional institutions as agents of modernization, the LP3ES carried out the *Pesantren* Development Program. The intention was to modernize *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools)—from which many poor youths received their education—so that these institutions were able to modernize the village world (in which most of the rakyat lived and worked).[1559] The LP3ES public intellectuals (e.g. Dawam Rahardjo and Ismid Hadad) and their partners (e.g. Abdurrahman Wahid) considered this program a promising way to encourage grassroots participation in economic development. In 1983, the program produced a spinoff: some LP3ES thinkers founded an NGO they called the P3M (Association for the Development of *Pesantren* and Society). Driven by the belief that "social transformation requires a theological basis," the P3M strove to develop society by developing *pesantren*.[1560]

But what did this idea mean in practice? As it turned out, "developing the *pesantren*" to facilitate modernization meant that the LP3ES provided the students at six Islamic boarding schools on Java and Madura with training in entrepreneurship, agribusiness, the application of appropriate technology, and community development activism.[1561] And, to support the entire program, in 1980 the LP3ES founded the journal *Pesan*, which both means "message" and is short for *pesantren*. Thus, it is not hard to see

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[1559] Ibid., 7-8; Anonymous, "Pesantren: A Model of Rural Education with Indonesian Ways," *Pesantren's Linkage* 1, no. 1 (1985): 4; Dwi Arya Wisesa, "Program Pesantren: Pengembangan Masyarakat Melalui Pesantren" [Pesantren Program" Community development through pesantren], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*,110.

[1560] On this, see Anonymous, "Social Transformation Requires a Theological Basis," *Pesantren's Linkage* 6, nos. 1-2 (1990): 2, 18-19.

[1561] Philip Eldridge, *NGOs in Indonesia: Popular Movement or Arm of Government* (Clayton: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1989), 33; LP3ES, *Institute*, 8.

that the LP3ES was actually trying to create middling classes from among the rural poor. This endeavor, then, flowed from the belief that these classes were the creator and the backbone of modern society.

The LP3ES was not alone in championing the use of traditional religious institutions in modernizing the village world and creating rural middling classes. This strategy also received support from Mukti Ali, who was Minister of Religious Affairs from 1973 to 1978.[1562] And, interestingly, in 1981 the Gandhiist leader Gedong Bagoes Oka (1921-2002) started a similar program in Eastern Seraya, Bali. She encouraged the landless villagers in this area to use their spinning and weaving skills to attain economic self-sufficiency. In a letter to the editor of the newsletter *Pesantren's Linkage*, she expressed her interest in learning from the success of the Islamic scholar As'ad Syamsul Arifin (1897-1990) of Situbondo, East Java, in training his students not only in theology but also in creating job opportunities for the poor.[1563]

For an example of the kind of pious petty bourgeois Indonesians that the LP3ES sought to create from among the lower classes through its *Pesantren* Development Program, we may consider the case of Sutrisno, a young Muslim man from Blitar, East

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[1562] M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Limited Group: Mengenang A. Mukti Ali, 1923-2004," *Tempo*. May 17, 2004; see also A. Mukti Ali, "Pembaharuan Sistem Pendidikan dan Pengadjaran Pondok Pesantren" [Reforming the instructional and educational systems of Islamic boarding schools] (paper presented at a seminar on education in divinity schools, Tugu, Bogor, May 31-June 4, 1971); reprinted in A. Mukti Ali, *Agama dan Pembangunan di Indonesia* [Religion and development in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 1972), 21-33. Mukti Ali advocated "empirical studies of Islam" to find ways "to reinterpret Islamic thought" "in the context of modernity"; see Ali Munhanif, "Prof. Dr. A. Mukti Ali: Modernisasi Politik-Keagamaan Orde Baru" [Prof. Dr. A. Mukti Ali: Political and religious modernization in the New Order], in *Menteri-Menteri Agama RI: Biografi Sosial Politik* [Indonesia's ministers of religious affairs: A collection of socio-political biographies], ed. Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (Jakarta: INIS-PPIM-Balitbang Depag RI, 1998), 282.

[1563] Gedong Bagoes Oka, "Pesantren and Cotton," *Pesantren's Linkage* 1, no. 1 (1985): 2.

Java—a case which suggests that the LP3ES encouraged the rise, among Indonesian Muslims, of small and medium entrepreneurs who practiced an Islamic version of Weber's protestant ethic.

After only two years, Sutrisno had to quit his studies at the Darul Fallah Pesantren in Bogor, West Java. (One of the reasons was that his father fell ill.) Established in 1960, this Islamic boarding school was famous for its experiment that combined religious and secular studies, theology and practical skills. Thanks to the training he received at Darul Fallah, Sutrisno was able to start a chicken farm in 1973. Eight years later, this *pesantren* dropout achieved success in business. He owned a chicken farm and a poultry retail shop that, together, employed a dozen workers. He sold 250 tons of eggs and 300 tons of poultry feed every month. His monthly gross profit was Rp 3 million, ten times the monthly salary of the average college graduate.[1564]

But Sutrisno was more than just a successful small entrepreneur; he remained a devout Muslim who discharged his duties to society. For example, he recited the Koran regularly with his neighbors, listened to sermons, and helped solve practical problems in his neighborhood. His wife was active in an association of the wives of poultry breeders. Together, Sutrisno and his wife contributed to the economic and psychological wellbeing in their village.[1565]

Yet, the LP3ES's *Pesantren* Development Program had its critics too. On the basis of his own participation in the program, the Islamic cleric Sahal Mahfudz (b. 1937),

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[1564] Anonymous, "The Profile of an Alumni [sic] of the Darul Fallah," *Pesantren's Linkage* 1, no. 2 (1985): 4-6.
[1565] Anonymous, "The Profile of an Alumni [sic] of the Darul Fallah," *Pesantren's Linkage* 1, no. 2 (1985): 4.

leader of the Kajen Pesantren in Pati, Central Java—offered a criticism of the way the LP3ES actually undertook the endeavor. First, he remarked that the Institute "did fashion bottom-up theories" [of development]. When it came to project evaluations, however, it ended up behaving in a top-down manner." Second, he went on to say that the LP3ES ended up concentrating on physical projects, which tended to proceed from the top down. This, in his view, "was not educational." In essence, community development "demanded that people change their views about religion, technology, and economy." The LP3ES failed to "stimulate [such] changes"—despite its serious attempt at doing so.[1566]

Unwittingly, some of the leaders of the LP3ES suggested that in their attempt to promote economic development from below, they fell into the trap of conducting an NGO-version of economic development from above. In their own ways, they acted like missionaries. As Ismid Hadad recalled in 2001, the LP3ES thinkers in the 1970s believed that

> For a society to develop, it needed [external agents] to give it a push, the motivation, and the training so that some groups emerged in it that were able to develop it on their own. […] True, injecting external elements into a community could make it more dynamic. But the community must, in the meantime, find ways to raise its own funds by exploiting the opportunities available within itself. External agents must not foster dependency. It was their job to inspire internal attempts at breakthroughs.[1567]

Some non-participant observers penetrated this missionary mentality on the part of the LP3ES. The women's activist Ruth Indiah Rahayu (b. 1963) remarked in 2001 that

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[1566] Sahal Mahfudz "Perlu Perhatian kepada Pengembangan SDM Pesantren" [The need for human resource deve1opment in pesantrens], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 125.

[1567] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxxvi.

she saw "a gap" within the LP3ES in the 1980s between its theories that attacked dependency and its real programs that created dependency among its target groups. "In practice," she noted, "the programs [that the LP3ES carried out] in the field resulted in the [target] groups becoming dependent on … the LP3ES for decades." The programs to which she referred included the micro-credits that the LP3ES offered to the urban and rural poor.[1568]

The populist rhetoric of its leaders notwithstanding, the LP3ES worked not only with the masses but also with the elite, including the bureaucrats. This is evident in the third key program that the Institute carried out early on. Interestingly, it was the first organization to offer training in development planning to local government officials. Later, this pioneering work led to the creation of the Bappeda (Regional Development Planning Board).[1569] Through this training program, the LP3ES lightened the workload of the Bappenas, which was able to handle development planning only at national level.

The fourth core program that the LP3ES undertook was the propagation of novel ideas in economics and social sciences among the country's educated elite, not only scholars and students but also other people with university education. Thus, the Institute published university textbooks, monographs on a variety of subjects, and…*Prisma*.[1570] Perhaps the best Indonesian-language social science journal in twentieth-century Indonesia, it offered a strong piece of counterevidence to the argument or complaint that

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[1568] Ruth Indiah Rahayu, "Ibarat McDonald's" [Like McDonald's], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 170-171.

[1569] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxxv-xxxvi; Adi Sasono, "Menghadapi Empat Tantangan dengan Inovatif" [Overcoming four challenges through innovation], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 15.

[1570] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xiii-xiv.

the New Order was an era of intellectual torpor. Its history is worth serious consideration—even a book-length treatment. What follows will only touch its surface.

In about 1971 the FNS suggested that the LP3ES should publish a periodical to provide a forum for public discussion about social and economic issues. Ismid Hadad looked for a model and found it in a hybrid between two American periodicals: the scholarly journal *Daedalus* (published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences) and the magazine *Dialogue* (published by the United States Information Services).[1571]

At first, *Prisma* was intended to serve as a clearinghouse on economic issues.[1572] Before long, however, it turned into a forum for Indonesian intellectuals to discuss a wide variety of topics, including politics, history, and culture. The Harvard-trained sociologist Arief Budiman credited *Prisma* with developing the traditions of critical thinking and academic debate.[1573] The journal, according to the consumer activist Zoemrotin K. Susilo, answered the need of college students and intellectuals for reference material.[1574] Sofjan Asnawi, former president of Bung Hatta University, Padang, West Sumatra, recalled that intellectuals and students loved the articles that *Prisma* offered, using them to write theses and dissertations.[1575] Mochtar Pabottingi (b. 1945), a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), went so far as to call it the "symbol" of Indonesian intellectuals in the 1970s. As he recalled in 2001:

[1571] Hadad, "Masa Awal," xxx.
[1572] Budiman, "Wadah Pengembangan," 39.
[1573] Ibid.
[1574] Susilo, "LP3ES Kurang Melihat," 41
[1575] Sofjan Asnawi, "LP3ES Juga Dikenal di Luar Negeri" [LP3ES was also known abroad], Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 43.

> In Yogyakarta, from the early 1970s to many years afterwards, no [university] student could present himself as an intellectual without reading *Prisma*. Established intellectuals had to go on talking about the contents of this journal from issue to issue if they want to retain their status as intellectuals. […] In the early years of the New Order, people loved articles by Nono Anwar Makarim and, of course, Soedjatmoko.[1576]

Prisma, Pabottingi noted, was more than just a status symbol among intellectuals. It had impact on intellectual life in the New Order. He recalled that

> […T]he proliferation of intellectual artifacts—such as standalone articles, selected essays, monographs, and scientific journals—for the last ten years [1991-2001] owed something to *Prisma*. With its each and every issue, *Prisma* set the standards for scholarly writing in [Indonesia], mainly because almost all articles it carried were based on original research.[1577]

And, broadly speaking, he observed that

> At least in the first two decades of the New Order, through *Prisma* the LP3ES played a vital role in broadening our nation's intellectual horizon, creating and strengthening its intellectual elite, and offering valuable advice to decision-makers, scholars, symbolic workers, and the general public.[1578]

Ruth Indiah Rahayu pointed out that "*Prisma* was the first scientific journal to have dealt with the subject of women…." In one of its issues in 1975, it focused on this topic: "Indonesian women: Toward a New Horizon." It concentrated on women workers

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[1576] Mochtar Pabottingi, "Prisma Simbol Kaum Intelektual" [*Prisma* as the symbol of intellectuals], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 67.

[1577] Ibid., 68-69.

[1578] Ibid., 68.

and economic development. In doing so, *Prisma* swiftly responded to the United Nations Decade for Women, 1975-1985.[1579]

The Berkeley-trained sociologist Mely G. Tan (b. 1930) praised *Prisma* for "raising the consciousness of the key role women played in the development of society."[1580] As she recalled, Indonesian intellectuals welcomed the journal enthusiastically—by contributing their articles to it and by subscribing to it, which was quite expensive—was proof that they needed this type of periodical.[1581]

The sociologist Hotman M. Siahaan (b. 1951) recalled that, in the New Order era, he saw the LP3ES as an institution that "brought together many intellectuals whose prowess lay less in their academic degrees than in their writings." "The books [that the LP3ES] published," he wrote, "served as reference material that was vital to the development of intellectual discourses in this country." And "the books," he added, "carried prestige."[1582] What he found most impressive, though, was the journal *Prisma*:

> The year was 1971. I was still a freshman at the School of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada. All of a sudden, someone offered me a journal called *Prisma*. I leafed through it and found it extremely amazing. Just imagine: a greenhorn student was overtaken by the prestige of this journal—at his first encounter with it. Afterwards, for decades, even after I became a lecturer at the School of Social and Political Sciences, Airlangga University, [Surabaya], I not only read the journal but also subscribed and contributed to it…until it was no longer published.[1583]

[1579] Ruth Indiah Rahayu, "Ibarat McDonald's" [Like McDonald's], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 168.

[1580] Mely G. Tan, "Beberapa Catatan tentang LP3ES dan Majalah *Prisma*" [Notes on the LP3ES and the magazine *Prisma*], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 101.

[1581] Ibid.

[1582] Siahaan, "LP3ES," 144.

[1583] Siahaan, "LP3ES," 144

The former anti-New Order student activist Bonar Tigor Naipospos (b. 1964) remembered that through the books and the journal *Prisma* that it published, the LP3ES helped create a critical intellectual atmosphere in Indonesia in the 1970s and the 1980s:

> The LP3ES products always presented alternative and critical voices. Thus, it was small wonder that being fed up with the humdrum life and repressive climate under the New Order, youths found [alternative] reference in these artifacts. […] The LP3ES offered counter discourse to the mainstream New Orderist political and economic thought. Along with other civil-society groups, the LP3ES played quite a role in championing popular participation, equity, and social justice in [economic development].[1584]

But who read *Prisma*? A survey that the LP3ES conducted in 1974 on a sample of 1,250 respondents in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Malang, and Ujung Pandang discovered that a) 69 percent of its readers were of ages 19-34; that b) 72 percent had education beyond senior high school; that c) 36 percent were university students; and the d) 32 percent were government officials.[1585]

What subjects appealed to the readers of *Prisma*? As same survey revealed, the articles that the readers loved most were those that dealt with social issues (24 percent), economy (21.7 percent), culture (18.9 percent), education (17.5 percent), and politics and law (16.8 percent).[1586] The five themes the readers considered most interesting in articles on social issues were the environment (13.12 percent), leadership (12.06 percent), youth (11.57 percent), urbanization (10.01 percent), and poverty (9.21). The four topics that the

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[1584] Naipospos, "LP3ES," 141.

[1585] Dwi Arya Wisesa, "Pasang Surut Sebuah Majalah Akademik" [Changing fortune of an academic magazine], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 86-87.

[1586] "Profil Pembaca Prisma" [Profile of *Prisma*'s readers], *Prisma* 4, no. 1 (February 1975): 66.

readers found most attractive in economic articles were job opportunity (14.17 percent), foreign capital (13.15 percent), ethnic Chinese vs. indigenous entrepreneurs (12.73 percent), and regional development. The three themes that the audience considered most appealing in culture articles were the intellectuals and their roles, modernization, and intergenerational conflict.[1587]

Among the editors of *Prisma*, there was the consensus that the LP3ES enjoyed its golden age between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. During this period, it produced innovative ideas; the books it published became primary reference material; and university students who thirsted for knowledge looked forward to every new issue of *Prisma*.[1588]

However, as late as 1991, the American anthropologist Robert W. Hefner still found impressive the intellectual climate he encountered at the office of LP3ES in Slipi, Jakarta:

> Although since 1978 I had subscribed to…*Prisma*, it was not until 1991 that I got the chance to visit the LP3ES office. I still remember the first impression I had …. It was very hot inside this small office on Jalan Slipi, West Jakarta, especially inside the seminar room. Yet, the seminar that went on at the time was charged with intellectual passion and intensity beyond what I had so far experienced in my life in Indonesia. "Gee!" I said to one of my friends when the seminar was over, "this is indeed an important institution!"[1589]

[1587] Ibid.

[1588] Vedi R. Hadiz, "Pengalaman Saya dengan LP3ES" [My experience at LP3ES], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 97.

[1589] Robert W. Hefner, "LP3ES Sebuah Lembaga Yang Memang Diperlukan" [LP3ES is a necessary institution], in Wisesa, *Profil & Pendapat*, 44-45.

The decline of the LP3ES and *Prisma* resulted from at least two factors. First, from the 1990s on, the LP3ES was busy conducting income-generating projects.[1590] Second, economic growth and the expansion of the middling classes meant that since the mid-1980s, there had emerged "new centers for intellectual pursuits" in major cities in Java. University students found new sources of knowledge.[1591] Many of the programs that LP3ES pioneered—social sciences publishing, participatory action research, and the promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance, small business, home industry, agribusiness, and community development through *pesantren*—became commonplace ones that other NGOS also undertook.[1592]

But there was a hidden dark side to modernity, including that which the editors of *Prisma* championed. At least in the late 1970s, beneath their call for grassroots participation, equity, and social justice in economic development there stirred bitter feelings toward a stronger section of the Indonesian entrepreneurial middling classes: Sino-Indonesian businesspeople. In May 25, 1979, two editors of *Prisma*—the Catholic Daniel Dhakidae (b. 1945) and the Muslim Aswab Mahasin (1944-1999)[1593]—made bitter statements about Sino-Indonesians to Henry Kamm of *New York Times*. Dhakidae remarked that:

> The Chinese are the real ruling class…. They control 70 percent of trade; they get 70 percent of the credit from the state banks; they have cornered

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[1590] Naipospos, *LP3ES*, 142.
[1591] Ibid., 98.
[1592] Ibid., 99; Rahayu, "Ibarat McDonald's," 171; Wisesa, "Pasang Surut," 94.
[1593] Actually, in his news article, Henry Kamm does not reveal the identities of the *Prisma* editors he interviewed. It was Daniel Dhakidae who does so in the acknowledgement section of his book published in 2003; see his *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru* [Intellectuals and power in the New Order state] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2003), xiii.

> 70 percent of the modern sector of the economy. Most Chinese say they are not running for president but only to control the president. They do. In economic and political terms they are the real ruling class.[1594] […]

Dhakidae went on to say that the "contempt of the people is growing."[1595] Aswab, for his part, was quoted as saying that

> The Chinese are so close together in their ethnic group that they form an economic unit that excludes all others. Even when they are fishermen or farmers, they are the ones with the most modern equipment and get the most benefit.[1596]

When Henry Kamm asked Dhakidae if Indonesia "should adopt the Vietnamese policy of forcing the Chinese minority out of the country by cramming them on any available boat and setting it adrift," either Dhakidae or Aswab replied this way: "It's not my solution…but a softer solution is difficult. If the people want it, it is inevitable. It is beyond our responsibility to find a solution."[1597]

From our examination of the intellectual biographies of three missionaries of Indonesian modernity (Nono Makarim, Ismid Hadad, and Dawam Rahardjo) and the history of their institution (LP3ES), we can derive a number of insights. First, to a significant degree, there was a considerable consensus between the regime and the LP3ES people. Both parties believed that Indonesia must undertake accelerated economic development and make this part of a holistic modernization of the entire nation. Some modernizers who operated within the regime and some of their counterparts that worked

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[1594] Henry Kamm, "Indonesia's Chinese: 'Real Rulers' or a Harried Minority?" *New York Times*, May 31, 1979, 2.
[1595] Ibid.
[1596] Ibid.
[1597] Ibid.

at the LP3ES not only came from the same middling classes but also were connected to each other by strong ties. The links included, but were not limited to, a) families ties (as in the case of the student activist-turned-corporate lawyer Nono Anwar Makarim and his brother Maj.-Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim); b) direct and indirect project-based collaboration; and c) friendships. As an example of the friendship between state actors and non-state actors in modernization, consider the fact that in Yogyakarta in the 1960s both A. Mukti Ali and Dawam Rahardjo organized the epistemic community they called Limited Group. Later, in the early 1970s, Mukti Ali, using his authority as Minister of Religious Affairs, and Dawam, deploying the resources of the LP3ES, attempted to modernize society by modernizing Islamic boarding schools. Both parties (state-based agents of Indonesian modernity and their more or less civil-society-based counterparts) also agreed that it was people like them (that is, the middling classes) who must theorize, design, and manage the search for Indonesian modernity.

Having said this, we need to pay attention to the differences between the two parties. Some state-based modernizers believed that they must achieve large and quick economic growth first and go on with spreading this growth through the so-called "trickle-down effect." Some civil-society-based modernizers begged to differ; they maintained that the quest for growth and equity should be done at the same time. And they insisted that the pursuit of economic growth should be carried out from the grassroots up.

Second, despite their apparent ideological differences, both the state-based modernizers (e.g. the Bappenas economists, the CSIS thinkers, and the engineer B. J.

Habibie) and their civil-society-based counterparts at the LP3ES had something very important in common. In practice, they ended up conducting top-down modernization. The main reason for this was that they were convinced that if it was up to the masses, very few of them would choose to undertake self-modernization. Self-modernization among the masses, had it happened at all, would have taken too much time and created a lot of problems, both for the middling classes and for the nation as a whole, for example the return of the specter of communism and the erosion of national independence.

Third, whether they operated in the state or in civil society, Indonesian modernizers saw the state as too important not to use as an institutional tool to bring the country to progress. Consider the case of Dawam Rahardjo. Through his student activism in the 1960s, and through his NGO projects at the LP3ES in the 1970s and 1980s, he did to an important extent seek to modernize Indonesian society "from below." It was not, however, because he lacked the desire to conduct modernization using state authorities and resources. But it was because he did not get the chance to do so. When, however, such an opportunity came his way, he grabbed it. This is evident in the fact that in late 1990, he made spirited efforts to establish the ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) and justify its establishment. This attempt did not help him capture state power for himself, though. But the desire, in my view, was there. There were modernizers who followed a different trajectory: one from student activism through state-based modernization to NGO activism. A good example of such modernizers is Emil Salim, who was a student leader in the 1950s, served as a technocrat in the early decades of the New Order, and was active in environmental NGOs later on.

Fourth, in their quest for progress from the mid-1960s to the late 1990s, they behaved in an eclectic and pragmatic way. They did not stick to one blueprint for modernization. They used a few plans, implemented them, and changed them as they went along. As for the ideas, analytical frameworks, and working methods that they used in the modernization programs that they carried out in society through the LP3ES, they relied on the international marketplace of ideas. The mental artifacts they adopted, adapted, and propagated, prior to and during their years at the LP3ES, make a curious mix, which included, among other things, the Enlightenment ideal of progress, Milovan Djilas' critique of the communist system, Weber's protestant ethic and the capitalist spirit, modernization theory, Marxist class analysis, David McClelland's achievement theory, Latin American dependency theory, participatory action research method, liberation theology, and Paolo Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed. Like state-based technocrats at the Bappenas (Widjojo Nitisastro and his colleagues), Nono, Ismid, and Dawam aimed for speedy results. They did not strive for originality in their theories and practices of modernization. What Dawam once said in 1992 about the Indonesian economists and technocrats prior to and during the New Order can be applied to Nono, Ismid, and himself:

> […F]or them to…develop their own theories was a luxury. For they were faced with a challenge that demanded an immediate response, that is to say, the challenge of adding content to independence [by undertaking] development. It was more appropriate and patriotic for them to act practically and pragmatically in response to the challenge of national development.[1598]

[1598] M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Pragmatisme dan Utopia: Corak Nasionalisme Ekonomi Indonesia* [Pragmatism and utopia: The Character of Indonesian economic nationalism] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992), 2.

Finally, the intellectual biographies of Nono Makarim, Ismid Hadad, and M. Dawam Rahardjo point to an important form of continuity between Guided Democracy and the New Order. Under Guided Democracy, they had already developed some of the key skills which they later employed in the New Order era to carry out modernization programs. It is also important to bear in mind that the call for the creation of thinks tanks (both state-owned and privately-owned) had already been made in the 1950s by Soedjatmoko (see Chapter 2). The problem was that the kind of society that Guided Democracy created did not allow the apostles of progress to use their skills and operate think tanks to pursue their goals.

CHAPTER 5: THE QUEST FOR INDONESIAN MODERNITY IN THE NEW ORDER: POPULAR NOVELISTS AS CRITICS OF MODERNITY

Modernization is a new superstition, as is economic development. Models from industrial nations are held up as superstitions and as such are new symbols with all the attending amulets or mantras which are associated with increasing the gross national product…. Yet, all the time we fail to see the damage to our values and our wellbeing.

Mochtar Lubis[1599]

The studies of the lives and works of several middling-class modernizers in the New Order era demonstrate that these people—whether they operated in state or in society—were seldom, if ever, critical of themselves, their families, and their blueprints for Indonesian modernizations. They displayed little awareness of the sort of society that they ended up creating. While modernizing the country, they spoke, wrote, and acted in ways that were—at least in retrospect—perhaps too cognitive. Theirs was a world of theories, models, methods, plans, programs, and projects. Certain elements, which could have put a human face to their grand modernizing enterprise, were missing, such as self-criticism, a sense of irony, and—because modernization was supposed to serve human beings—a sense of what it meant to live in a society that was undergoing rapid transformation as a result of economic development. It is enlightening for us to ask: how did people think, feel, and do about such a fast-changing social world? And, what did this world do to them? If technocrats, engineers, strategists, and public intellectuals cannot

[1599] Mochtar Lubis, *We Indonesians*, trans. Florence Lamoureux, ed. Soenjono Dardjowidjojo (Honolulu: Southeast Asian Studies, Asian Studies Program, University of Hawaii, 1979), 18.

illuminate these questions, then perhaps we can turn to scholarly observers for help. Yet, they do not throw light on such questions either.

Many scholarly studies have been conducted on the economic transformation that transpired under the New Order (1966-1998). Works by Richard Robison, Jeffrey Winters, Anne Booth, and Hal Hill enable us to see, beneath the facts and numbers, some patterns and connections. We grasp, for example, that a set of policies, such as the structural reform the government undertook in the early 1980s, were responses to the declining oil prices in the world market. We can understand and explain the transformation that Indonesia's economy underwent.

But political economy and economic history are not the only modes in which we can seek to understand the economic modernization that went on under the New Order. How did ordinary middling-class Indonesians experience economic development in these modes at the time? Very few Indonesians had the expertise in theoretical macroeconomics. Many adopted the everyday, commonsensical mode of actually experiencing economic modernization, a very different matter altogether.

Political economists and economic historians of New Order Indonesia provide us with abstract, objective, and generalized analyses of Indonesia's economic transformation. These analyses help us understand how technocrats' policies affected Indonesian society. Yet these bird-eye views of economic change do not tell the whole story. They tell us little about how the sections of the Indonesian middling classes actually thought and felt about the outcomes of the government's economic policies in the New Order. At the individual level, these people's ideas, attitudes, and acts were

probably of minor importance. But at the societal level, their decisions and actions as collective actors had potentially significant consequences. For example, in 1966, wanting economic improvement, the middling classes lent huge support to Soeharto, a new leader who came from the Army.

In contrast to political economists and economic historians of New Order Indonesia, and in contrast to the CSIS thinkers, the LP3ES public intellectuals, the Bappenas technocrats, and the technology czar B. J. Habibie (see Chapter 3), there were psychologically and sociologically perceptive Indonesian artists who drew attention to and warned against the promises and the dangers of economic modernization in vivid, concrete, and intimate manners. Three of the most perceptive and important of them are the poet, playwright, novelist, and filmmaker Mottinggo Busye (1937-1999); the popular novelist-turned-mystic Teguh Esha (b. 1947); and the writer-turned-educator Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi (b. 1954).

These writers were not alone in criticizing the New Order for neglecting what they saw as life's key dimensions while it carried out economic development, for Chapter 3 has shown that the intellectuals at the LP3ES also criticized the New Order, charging it with paying insufficient attention to important aspects of modernization. Yet, despite their similarities, the novelists and the LP3ES thinkers used different "tools" in their critiques. The storytellers turned their firsthand knowledge of the everyday life of Jakarta elites into novels as social critiques. The LP3ES intellectuals, by contrast, criticized the New Order's economic modernization using New Left social theories. In addition, the novelists and the LP3ES intellectuals used different angles in their critiques of the New

Order: while the former employed psychological, moral, religious, and domestic points of view, the latter wielded a political-economic lens, which focused on the questions of equity and people's participation in economic development. At bottom, both the storytellers and the LP3ES thinkers supported the New Order but served as its loyal critics, trying to make it work by cleansing it of errors, omissions, and hypocrisies. Importantly, they belonged to the same generation. They knew from experience that Guided Democracy did not work and hoped that the New Order would correct its deviations. Yet, to their chagrin, the New Order—as we shall see—failed to solve many of the problems that had afflicted Guided Democracy. They acknowledged that the New Order accomplished economic growth, but they were quick to point out that this achievement created new problems and exacerbated older ones.

An examination of contemporaneous socially-oriented popular novels and the lives of their writers helps reveal the intimate and everyday aspects of modernization and modernity in the New Order—aspects that economic theory and economic history can only scratch the surface of. When it comes to the study of the quest for Indonesian modernity in the New Order, we need to consider family life and—within this sphere—people's ideas, feelings, brilliance, and follies.

This chapter uses the lives and works of Motinggo Busye, Teguh Esha, and Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi as case studies to illuminate a number of questions. First, what did it mean for middling-class Indonesians in 1966-1998 to live in a society that was changing quickly because of economic development? Second, why were the novels of Motinggo, Teguh, Yudhistira, and their colleagues so popular? There must have been

social reasons that were deeper than just the fact that they used sex scenes in their works. Was it the case that their popularity among the audience stemmed from the fact that the readers found the reflection of their lives in these novels?

Third, the three authors offered social critiques of the kind of society that came into being in the New Order. But where did these critiques come from? For, as we shall see, these criticisms had their roots in the pre-New Order era. Thus, we can test the idea that perhaps the major difference between the Old Order and the New Order was that the New Order permitted popular novels to flourish whereas the Old Order did not.

Fourth, what kind of social critic were Motinggo, Teguh, and Yudhistira? Did they rebel against the very idea of the New Order? Did they want to see its liquidation? Or, was it the case that they actually embraced New Order ideals but attacked the hypocrisy of many members of the Indonesian middling classes, that is, their failure to practice the New Order ideals?

My analysis will proceed as follows. I will begin by discussing the lives and careers of the three novelists. Then, I will analyze some of their works, employing them to illuminate the pursuit of modernity in the New Order. Spanning the eras of Guided Democracy and the New Order, Motinggo and his works will be studied first, for they point to the changes and continuities that linked both periods. While I shall treat the biographies of Teguh and Yudhistira separately, their novels (*Ali Topan Kesandung Cinta* and *Arjuna Mencari Cinta*) will be examined in tandem, for they serve as a pair of analytical lenses to examine the same cluster of themes, as well as the same setting, period, and generational attitudes.

5. 1. Motinggo Busye (1937-1999)

At the end of the day, one returns to morals. […] Sometimes, morals are lost and man—momentarily or permanently—turns into animal. Morals should be brought back to him. And this is the task of literature.

Motinggo Busye[1600]

In my view, [Motinggo] Boesje has succeeded in…exposing the drift towards moral bankruptcy, especially among the haves.

Purnawan Tjondronagoro[1601]

Anyone who is serious about understanding New Order Indonesia cannot afford to ignore people like Motinggo Busye. For he was one of those Indonesians who lived in three eras: those of parliamentary democracy (1950-1959), Guided Democracy (1959-1965), and the New Order (1966-1998). His biography presents us with a historical lens to see what it meant for middling-class people like him to live under the New Order. Certain aspects of Motinggo's life and oeuvre in Jakarta (1961-1999) help us examine the meanings and the social impact of the pursuit of Indonesian modernity during that period.

On November 21, 1937,[1602] Bustami Dating[1603]—who from 1953 to 1999 would write under the nom de plume of Motinggo Busye[1604]—was born in Kupang Kota, Teluk

[1600] Motinggo Boesje, personal letter to the literary critic H. B. Jassin, Jakarta, October 19, 1966.

[1601] Purnawan Tjondronagoro, "Thema[2] jang Dipilih Motinggo Boesje" [Themes that Motinggo Boesje chooses to work on], *Vista*, November 30, 1969, 4. Purnawan Tjondronagoro (1934-1989) was a journalist and a novelist. He was born in Mojokerto, East Java on February 17, 1934 and died in Jakarta, May 28, 1989. In 1963, he was among the non-communist writers who signed the Cultural Manifesto. On Tjondronagoro, see Korrie Layun Rampan, "Purnawan Tjondronagoro," in *Leksikon Susastra Indonesia* [Dictionary of Indonesian literature], (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2000), 363-364.

[1602] Some sources, however, give 1936 as Motinggo's birth year.

Betung, Lampung, Sumatra.[1605] He was the third of eight siblings. His parents, who were of primarily Minangkabau descent, had migrated from West Sumatra to Lampung. His Dutch-educated father, Djalid Sutan Radja Alam (d. 1948), came from Sicincin, Pariaman, West Sumatra. He was the son of Idris Bawazir, an Arab who married the daughter of Sentot Ali Basa Prawiradirja (d. 1833)—the chief lieutenant of Prince Dipanagara (*c*. 1785-1855) in the Java War (1825-1830)—and later served as the village head of Matur, Bukittinggi, West Sumatra.[1606] Djalid made a living as a clerk at the Dutch Royal Shipping Company (KPM) and spent his leisure time painting billboards. Motinggo remembered Djalid as a strict father who trained his children to adopt a regular way of life, a strong work ethic, and an achievement-oriented mindset.[1607] Motinggo's mother, Rabi'ah Jakub (d. 1948),[1608] who came from Matur, Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, was an artist and a preacher. She played organ; composed and sang her own songs; recited the Koran in beautiful voice; and offered sewing lessons to her neighbors. She used music and sewing lessons as a medium through which she preached Islam to people in Kupangkota.[1609]

[1603] Motinggo Boesje, "Daftar Pengarang" (unpublished resume, Yogyakarta, 1958), 1. In the early 1960s, he used the name "Motinggo Djalid."

[1604] Endo Senggono, "Motinggo Busye: Sastrawan yang Konsisten dalam Kesenian" [Motinggo Busye: A man of letters committed to his craft], *Kakilangit*, no. 19 (June 1998): 8.

[1605] Ibid.

[1606] "Sosok Motinggo Busye Sudah Bertaubat" [Motinggo Busye has repented], *Terbit*, September 17, 1994.

[1607] "Tangan Maha Gaib Itu Seakan Kukenal" [As if I knew that Divine Hand], *Amanah*, July 18-31, 1986, 96.

[1608] Other sources, however, refer to Motinggo's mother as "Rajiah" rather than Rabi'ah.

[1609] "Tangan Maha Gaib," 96; "Motinggo Boesye yang Lain" [Another Motinggo Busye], *Romansa*, September 1975, 9.

Motinggo spent his childhood in Teluk Betung, where from 1943 to 1949 he went to Sekolah Rakyat (People's Elementary School). Two events in his childhood in Teluk Betung foretold his future career as a man of letters. During the Japanese Occupation, in an attempt to befriend him, a Japanese officer borrowed his tricycle, rode it, and broke it. As a compensation for the damage done, the Japanese presented Motinggo with a typewriter.[1610] One day during the Revolution, a librarian fleeing an air raid left his mobile library behind. Motinggo's father picked up the books and used them to build his own personal library.[1611] Motinggo grew up reading these books, of which many were published by the Balai Pustaka. In 1949, having turned into a bibliophile, he wrote to the UNESCO and solicited book donation. To his surprise, the UNESCO responded to his request by sending him a truckload of books.[1612]

In 1948, both Motinggo's parents died. After completing his elementary education in 1949, he moved to Bukittinggi, where he joined his grandmother and received his secondary education from 1949 to 1956. During his years in Bukittinggi, he learned painting from Wakidi (1889-1979) and writing from Ali Akbar Navis (1924-2003).[1613]

[1610] "Hubungan antara sebuah Sepeda Roda Tiga, sebuah Mesin Tik, dan sebuah Mobil Balai Pustaka dengan seorang Pengarang Motinggo Busje" [The relations among a tricycle, a typewriter, a Balai Pustaka mobile library, and the author Motinggo Busye], *Selecta*, August 26, 1968.

[1611] "'Matinggo' Busye Diangkat Anak oleh Seorang Ibu yg Punya Warung Kecil" ["Matinggo" was adopted by a mother who owned a food stall], *Berita Buana*, August 25, 1975.

[1612] "Motinggo Boesye Yang Lain," 9.

[1613] Saifullah Kamalie, "Busye Yang Kembali" [Busye has returned], *Muttaqien*, May 1979; Farida Soemargono, *Le "Groupe de Yogya," 1945-1960: Les voies javanaises d'une littérature indonésienne* (Paris: Archipel, 1979), 207.

He succeeded in exhibiting his paintings and publishing some poems and short stories. He also directed radio dramas and acted in some of them.[1614]

In 1956, Motinggo left Bukittinggi for Yogyakarta to study law at Gadjah Mada University because he wanted to be a diplomat.[1615] As it turned out, however, his heart and mind gravitated towards literature.[1616] Although financial troubles forced him to quit his studies in 1959,[1617] he stayed on in the city until 1961. During his years in Yogyakarta, which constituted his period of literary apprenticeship,[1618] he published several works (seven poems, ten short stories, and four plays[1619]) that made his presence felt in Indonesia's literary circles.[1620] In 1958, his play *Malam Jahanam* [Night of the Damned] won a prize from the Ministry of Education and Culture.[1621]In 1960, Motinggo displayed resistance towards the critic H.B. Jassin (1917-2000), seeing him as "a good old man" who "pretend[ed], sometimes, to be the Prophet of Indonesian literature." Motinggo could not accept such a pretension.[1622] In 1962, he declined the literary prize that Jassin, through his magazine *Sastra* [Literature], conferred on him for his short story "Nasehat untuk Anakku" [Advice to My Child].[1623] At some point during his stay in

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[1614] "Sosok Motinggo Busye Sudah Bertaubat" [Motinggo Busye has repented], *Terbit*, September 17, 1994; Senggono, "Motinggo Busye," 9; Kamalie, "Busye Yang Kembali"; Soemargono, *Le "Groupe de Yogya,"* 207-208.

[1615] "'Matinggo' Busye Diangkat Anak."

[1616] Soemargono, *Le "Groupe de Yogya*,*"* 208.

[1617] Ibid., 209.

[1618] Ibid., 210.

[1619] Ibid., 212.

[1620] "'Matinggo' Busye Diangkat Anak."

[1621] Senggono, "Motinggo Busye," 9.

[1622] Anonymous, "Motinggo Boesje," *Harian Umum*, January 25, 1960.

[1623] Motinggo Boesje and Virga Belan, "Motinggo Boesje dan Virga Belan Menolak Hadiah *Sastra* 1962" [Motinggo Boesje and Virga Belan declined the 1962 *Sastra* literary awards], *Minggu Pagi*, February 17, 1963. Motinggo rejected his award because he had serious doubts about the criteria Jassin used in judging the merits of Indonesian literary works.

Yogyakarta, Motinggo came to read *Studs Lonigan*, a trilogy of novels by the American writer James T. Farrell (1904-1979). He admired the work so much that he was determined to write his own trilogies.[1624] Later, he came up with one, which consisted of *Bibi Marsiti* [Aunt Marsiti], *Tante Maryati* [Aunt Maryati], and *Retak dari Dalam* [Cracks Within].

In 1961, the quest for literary success and a better life drove Motinggo to migrate to Jakarta,[1625] where he made a living by dividing his time between writing fiction and working as a journalist.[1626] In the same year, he decided to switch gears from high literature, which catered only to critics and fellow literati, to popular fiction, through which he could reach out to and affect a far wider audience. The shift became stronger in 1962, after he married Lashmi Bachtiar (b. 1946), who was exactly the kind of wife he said he had been looking for. Having no artistic ambitions, she was—as Motinggo once put it, tongue-in-cheek, to his friend Tjiptoning—calm, down-to-earth, and good at making spicy dishes and brewing coffee.[1627]

As a newcomer in Jakarta in the early 1960s, Motinggo was sensitive to the social consequences of modernization (as it manifested itself in, for instance, the rise of big-city life) that had been going on in Jakarta even before the coming of the New Order. He recalled in 1970 that his encounter with the city and its inhabitants in the early 1960s

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[1624] "Motinggo Boesye sebagai Pengarang Trilogi" [Motinggo Boesye as a writer of trilogies], *Sinar Harapan*, September 3, 1977.
[1625] "Motinggo Boesye Yang Lain," 10.
[1626] Senggono, "Motinggo Boesje," 9.
[1627] Tjiptoning, "Motinggo Boesje," *Minggu Pagi*, May 19, 1963, 29.

accelerated and intensified his transition to adulthood.[1628] Appearing to him as a cosmopolitan jungle, the metropolis precipitated a psychological crisis in him:

> As a human being and as a writer, I discovered that [Jakarta] treated me this way: "You mind your own business; I mind my own business." Consequently, my writings became sharper and…bizarre. There emerged [in me] a type of creativity that was more expressive of life.[1629]

The people in Jakarta, he observed, were "no longer the masters of their own situations." At the mercy of their circumstances, they stood helpless as their families were falling apart. This discovery as well as the necessity to provide for his family resulted in his adoption of literary naturalism. He began "ferret[ing] out ideas and [mining] raw materials from the upheaval and dynamics of Jakarta society."[1630]

> […I] must acknowledge the huge debt I owe to the social milieus in which I have lived. They exercise a considerable influence over my fiction. And this is evident in the settings that I use and in the ambiance that I seek to evoke.[1631]

Having gone through a higher degree of urbanism and urbanization, Jakarta differed from Yogyakarta, the small city that Motinggo just left behind. While Yogyakarta in the 1950s taught him the virtue of *sumarah* (to work as hard and serenely as one could and then let God decide the results), Jakarta in the early 1960s introduced

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[1628] Yahaya Ismail, "Laporan Terjemahan Motinggo Boesje" [A translated report on Motinggo Busye], *Mastika*, no. 6 (June 1970): 36.

[1629] Ismail, "Laporan," 36.

[1630] Ibid., 37.

[1631] Jus Winata, "Dapatkah Kita Terima Tulisan² Motinggo Boesje Jang Bertjiri Chas Adegan Seks?" [Can we accept Motinggo Busye's writings, which are fraught with portrayals of sex acts?], *Kami Sari*, November 1970, 3.

him to what he saw as individualism, the loss of human agency, and the disintegration of the family.[1632]

During the last years of Guided Democracy, Jakarta became more and more ideologized and politically polarized every day. Life in these years caused Motinggo to suffer a lot. Seeing himself primarily as a pater familias and a man of culture, he set two goals for himself: a long life of peace and prosperity and the freedom to practice his artistic profession.[1633] He tried to reach these objectives by playing it safe: staying away from the masses and political activities, embracing Pancasila, practicing cultural nationalism, and displaying allegiance to the teachings of President Soekarno.[1634] But this strategy proved futile. The Left, which in the early 1960s had the upper hand, denounced him and his works as "counterrevolutionary." Thanks to this political stigma, he could not sell his paintings and publishers were afraid to publish his writings.[1635] His livelihood was in jeopardy.

Before long, Motinggo feared for his life as well. His autobiographical novel *Sanu: Infinita Kembar* [Sanu: Double Infinity] gives us some idea of the calamities that he believed could strike him any time in Jakarta during those years of "living dangerously" (1964-1965). The surrealistic novel also tells the story of the desperate and bizarre ways in which he sought to protect himself against impending catastrophes. And

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[1632] "Dengan Gaya Sendiri Busye Hadapi Kritik[2] Ceramahnya di TIM" [He has his own way of handling his critics at the Jakarta Arts Center], *Berita Buana*, August 26, 1975.

[1633] Motinggo Busye, *Sanu: Infinita Kembar* [Sanu: Double infinity] (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1985), 12, 40, 97.

[1634] Ibid., 25.

[1635] Ibid., 13, 17, 21, 58, 76; see also H. B. Jassin, "*Sanu: Infinita Kembar*: Novel Mistik-Falsafi Motinggo Busye"[Sanu: Double Infinity: Motinggo Busye's mystico-philosophical novel], in Busye, *Sanu*, vi.

those were the days when newspapers served as one of the channels through which bad luck could deliver its mortal blows:

> […S]ince his name appeared [in the Sunday newspaper] along with those big shots who were branded as counterrevolutionaries, all of a sudden he had a notorious celebrity.[1636]

The political stigma not only threatened to kill Motinggo's livelihood; it also caused his life to hang by a thread. Consequently, he became paranoid:

> When I took a ride in the jitney, people look at me from the corners of their eyes. And they were like, "Oh, this guy is the counterrevolutionary [we have read about in the newspaper], isn't he?"

And in Motinggo's view, the politicized masses had morphed into assassins:

> The ignorant masses are more ferocious than intelligent tigers. Under the control of a tyrannical leader, this horde of wild beasts pretend that they understood politics.[1637]
>
> […]
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> By stigmatizing us as counterrevolutionaries, [the leftists] are trying to move the masses to capture us. […] We must save our dignity as human beings. Do not let them arrest us. We must not die a useless death. Since we cannot trust anyone to help us, we must cry out to God….[1638]

In his own way, Motinggo cried out to God. In a desperate attempt to protect his life against arbitrary killing, he took refuge in magic and mysticism. He sought to master the art of making himself invisible and engaged in spiritual exercises to turn himself into a total man capable of reconciling revolution and evolution.[1639] Relatives and friends

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[1636] Busye, *Sanu*, 1.
[1637] Ibid., 17.
[1638] Ibid., 2.
[1639] Ibid., ix-x, 40.

began to doubt his sanity. To them, he said something like this: "Well, how about those members of the political elite? Are they sane? And do you think the masses are sane?"[1640] As it turned out, however, the right wing emerged victorious in 1965. To Motinggo's great relief, his life and livelihood were safe again. On October 19, 1966, in a letter to the critic H. B. Jassin, he wrote:

> After six years in which [Indonesian] literature was incapable of speaking in a natural language, [I hope that] the New Order—as an embodiment of the freedom of Indonesian intellectuals—will regain its golden age and its full candor.[1641]

Figure 26. Motinggo Busye, his wife Lashmi Bachtiar, and their children, 1970 [*Ekspres*].

On the other hand, the Indonesian Left suffered a brutal demolition. Their organizations were liquidated. Half a million of people considered communists were massacred and

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1640 Ibid.,7.

1641 Motinggo Boesje, personal letter to the literary critic H. B. Jassin, October 19, 1966.

thousands were sent to jail and exiled without trial and, from 1965 to 1998, stripped of many of their rights as citizens.

Under the New Order, Motinggo found a much more favorable environment in which to operate as a writer of popular fiction. Having gone through a highly politicized and intensely ideologized life in the first half of the 1960s, and having survived it and seen its bloody culmination in 1965-1966, the masses felt a strong hunger for cheap, easy, and entertaining novels peppered with love scenes. Using a formula that he borrowed from, among others, James T. Farrell and Émile Zola (1840-1902), Motinggo responded to this demand.

Figure 27. Motinggo Busye on the cover of the magazine *Express*, October 10, 1970. This issue offered a lead story centering on the exploitation of sex in contemporary Indonesian popular fiction.

Motinggo Busye's literary formula paid off. In 1968, some of his risqué novels became bestsellers. In 1968, as reported by T. M. Hutabarat, owner of the publishing house Budajata, one novel by Motinggo sold 10,000 [sic] copies.[1642] In 1970, however, the sale of Motinggo's novels took a plunge: those published by Lokadjaja, for example, fell from between 80,000 and 10,000 copies per title in 1968 down to just 2,000 per title in 1970.[1643] Motinggo's answer to the problem was to take an editing job at the magazine *Tjaraka* [Courier] and write film scripts.[1644] Not long afterwards, he became a filmmaker, and by 1975 had produced seven films.[1645] Two factors, at least, caused the decline in the sale of steamy popular fiction in 1970. First, it had to compete with martial arts stories and graphic novels. Second, readers of popular fiction had become fed up with its tendency to repeat the same themes and plots.[1646]

Between 1968 and mid-1970, some critics, who applauded the literary merit of Motinggo's early writings, bemoaned the transformation he underwent after 1963. Critics Arief Budiman (b. 1941) and Salim Said (b. 1943) thought that this gifted author had degenerated into a producer of mere potboilers. Some were afraid that Motinggo's novels, which teemed with love scenes, would damage the morals of Indonesian youths who happened to read them. The male journalist Mara Karma (1926-2001) complained

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[1642] "Buku Saku jang Menurun, Seks jang Meningkat" [On pocket books that go down and sex that goes up], *Ekspres*, October 10, 1970, p. 20. These figures were given by T. M. Hutabarat, owner of the publishing house Budajata, who may not have told the truth. Further research needs to be done to reconstruct the social history of Indonesian popular novels in the New Order era.

[1643] Ibid.

[1644] Ibid.

[1645] "Motinggo Boesye yang Lain," 10.

[1646] "Buku Saku Jang Menurun," 21.

about what he considered the demeaning way in which Motinggo portrayed women in many of his novels. [1647]

In self-defense, on December 7, 1969, Motinggo argued to the effect that he considered himself an Indonesian version of Émile Zola. As a practitioner of literary naturalism, he "delved into his society" and "embraced" it—with both love and hate. His fiction portrayed, he said, the fast-changing societies that were taking shape in the country's cities, especially Lampung, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta, where he had lived. In fact, he went on to say, in writing his novels he drew on his own participant observations of social life in these cities.[1648] He was aware, he said, that by doing so he risked being castigated by critics.[1649]

In reply to the accusations that he merely churned out potboilers, Motinggo maintained that he was a writer with a social mission. He used his popular fiction to call his readers' attention to what he saw as the moral bankruptcy from which Indonesian society was suffering.[1650] Since Motinggo Busye had already dealt with moral bankruptcy in some of the novels he wrote in the early 1960s, we may conclude that this problem was one of the points of continuity that connected Guided Democracy and the New Order. In late 1970, to an audience of writers, journalists, and intellectuals, he pointed out that his novels dealt with everyday issues and events in contemporary urban societies, which its inhabitants could use as a tool for self-reflection. Every age, he argued, produces literature that deals with its basic concerns. Thus, just as Indonesian society in the 1920s

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[1647] Ismail, "Laporan," 37-38.

[1648] Ibid., 36.

[1649] Motinggo Boesje, "Sebagai Pengarang Bersedia Pikul Resiko Kritik" [As a writer [I] am willing to face criticism], *Srikandi*, December 12, 1969.

[1650] Ismail, "Laporan," 38-39.

gave birth to novels that discussed arranged marriages; and just as during the Revolution Indonesian authors were obsessed with revolutionary themes; so it was natural, Motinggo argued, that in the late 1960s he wrote novels that centered on the current interests of people in big cities.[1651]

This criticism about Motinggo's works of fiction is best viewed in the wider context of the late "Victorianism" that had already been embraced by the Indonesian middling classes well before the New Order era. In the New Order, this cultural tendency, which constituted one of the key components in the middling classes' quest for Indonesian modernity, manifested itself in, among other things, the war that the regime's culture police waged against what it saw as "moral decadence among youths." Motinggo's novels became one of the targets of this war. For example, in April 1969, among the "[sexually] arousing" books the police in Surakarta confiscated from local book rentals were Motinggo's novels. It is important to note that in 1968-1969, this city in Central Java saw the mushrooming of book rentals that catered to children and youths.[1652]

It should be pointed out that some members of the Indonesian middling classes in the early 1970s were capable of critical self-awareness. They realized that the discomfort they felt about contemporary racy popular fiction reflected their bourgeois mentality. For example, on October 10, 1970, Toeti Heraty Noerhadi-Rooseno (b. 1933)—a writer, a

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[1651] Winata, "Dapatkah Kita," 2.

[1652] "Razia Buku[2] 'Merangsang' di Solo" [A raid on [sexually] arousing books in Solo], *Indonesia Raja*, November 10, 1969; see also "Buku Tjabul, 'Kuntji Mas,' dan 'Gadis Pesta' di Kota Solo" [Obscene books, partner swapping, and Party Girls in Solo], *Pedoman*, April 3, 1969.

psychologist, and an instructor at the Jakarta Institute of the Arts (IKJ)—said this to the editor of the magazine *Ekspres*:

> The trouble is that [certain] people in our society remain bourgeois in their outlook. And this is the result of the Dutch education [they had received], which was Victorian and puritan. The same is true of the religiously devout, who always consider portrayals of sex from a dogmatic perspective.
>
> When it comes to…sex life, ordinary people are more broadminded. If we discuss sex with them, they will not only show their understanding of the subject; but [they will] also treat it as something usual, something familiar.[1653]

In 1977, Motinggo Busye met his most severe and implacable critic of his oeuvre, especially his films, in his own fourteen-year-old son Quito Riantori (b. 1963), who took a deep interest in Islam and became steeped in the medieval theologian and mystic Al-Ghazali (c. 1058-1111).[1654] By 1977, Motinggo had become a well-paid film director, who—as he put it in 1986—“rolled in money,” thanks to the “sinful” motion pictures that he had made.[1655] But Quito was deeply ashamed of his father’s way of making a living. One day in 1977, he put it bluntly to his father that his movies, which teemed with nude and sex scenes, were damaging the morals of the country’s younger generation.[1656] In protest against what he saw as his father’s irresponsible and immoral behavior, Quito went on a hunger strike for three days, refusing to eat all food that had been bought with money earned in a God-forbidden way.[1657]

[1653] “Buku Saku,” 24.
[1654] Kamalie, “Busye yang Kembali.”
[1655] “Tangan Maha Gaib,” 101.
[1656] Ibid.
[1657] Kamalie, “Busye Yang Kembali.”

Motinggo could not brush off Quito's criticism. It not only put him to shame and struck a great blow to his heart. It also compelled him—in mid-1978 when Quito left for Ponorogo, East Java, to begin his studies at the Gontor Islamic Boarding School[1658]—to repent.[1659]

> For thirty years after Mother's death, I have been something of an apostate. It was not until 1978 that I felt haunted by my religion [Islam]. God started to have a concrete presence in my soul. […] It was my firstborn son who admonished [me to return] to the Straight Path.[1660]

To atone for what he saw as his misbehavior in the past, Motinggo quit filmmaking.[1661] By the time he did so, he had already made no less than twelve films.[1662] He went on writing novels, however. But he used fewer and fewer love scenes in them, and dealt increasingly with religious themes, such as honesty, chastity, charity, respect for women, and love for one's parents, fellow human beings and God.[1663] These shifts in storytelling and themes are evident in those novels which he wrote from 1978 onwards, for example *Rosanna* (1978), *Pauline: Puteri Lucy Mei Ling* [Pauline: the Daughter of

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[1658] Gayo, "Wajah Sutradara Kita" [The face of our film director], *Sinar Harapan*, September 30, 1978.

[1659] "Tangan Maha Gaib," 102.

[1660] Ibid., 101.

[1661] "Motinggo Busye Sekarang: Idealismenya Tak akan Dibiarkan Kandas…" [Motinggo Busye Today: He is not going to give up his idealism…], *Berita Buana*, March 7, 1979.

[1662] Mulyadi, "Motinggo Busye," 2.

[1663] "Syair Abu Nawas" [Poems of Abu Nawas], *Muttaqien*, May 1979, 22-23; "Motinggo Busye: Pornografi Merubah Cara Ia Berfikir" [Motinggo Busye: Pornography changed the way he thought], *Varianada*, December 1979, 27; Syaifullah Kamalie, "Trilogi yang Agamis" [A trilogy of religious novels], *Muttaqien*, November 1979.

Lucy Mei Ling] (1978), *Puteri Seorang Jendral* [The General's Daughter] (1979), and *Rindu Ibu Adalah Rinduku* [Mother's Longing Is My Longing] (1980).[1664]

Since his repentance, Motinggo started behaving differently in the domestic sphere. He spent more time at home with his wife and children.[1665] He read the theological and mystical works of Al-Ghazali and learned from him the many ways man could thank God.[1666] He visited the Gontor Islamic Boarding School to see his son and to conduct religious discussions with the young students he met there.[1667] On the psychological change that he experienced after his repentance, he said this on March 7, 1979:

> I used to work hard; I used to work my ass off. Afraid to live in poverty, I pursued wealth. But now I see that poverty and prosperity are not simply about material issues. The most valuable thing is our heart. That is where true comfort resides. We need to treat the diseases of the heart.[1668]

In 1986, looking in retrospect at the kind of life he led in the mid-1970s, he thought that he was actually suffering from a psychological crisis at the time and that he finally managed to overcome it after his rediscovery of Islam:

> […T]he trouble was that I had misinterpreted modernization by using the logic of materialism, which taught people to love the world and its contents. Consequently, I had a hard time putting my spiritual insights into practice. I strove to accomplish a transition to a spiritual world-view based on…religion.
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> […]

[1664] "Motinggo Busye Sekarang."

[1665] "Motinggo Busye: Pornografi," 27; Sjamsoeir Arfie, "Busye Tinggalkan Film" [Busye says goodbye to filmmaking], *Sinar Harapan*, March 11, 1979.

[1666] "Motinggo Busye Sekarang."

[1667] "Saya sekarang lebih senang…" [Now I prefer…], *Kompas*, April 29, 1979.

[1668] "Motinggo Busye Sekarang."

> It dawned on me that ostentation, the love for the world, and the materialistic orientation were addictive mental disorders, [whose sufferers] required hospitalization in the House of God.[1669]

In 1983, F. X. Mulyadi (b. 1949)—a journalist from the daily *Kompas*—reported that Motinggo, after his repentance in 1978, had enjoyed not only success but also a happy life:

> He owns a decent, two-storied house [whose floor is] carpeted wall to wall…. [He also has] a car, [enjoys] fame, and [receives] a quick inflow of cash. He and his wife have a happy family of six children [Quito, Satrio, Sonata, Vera, Rafael, and Regina]….[1670]

Motinggo told Mulyadi that he saw happy families as the strong building blocks from which Indonesians could build a stable nation:

> One must disseminate the happy-family principle …. I am not claiming that my family is the happiest. I am not claiming that it will be happy forever. But I am convinced that happy families create a peaceful society. What system our society adopts does not really matter.[1671]

In 1994, looking back again to his repentance in 1977-1978, he said this to the reporter of the daily *Terbit* [Sunrise]:

[1669] "Giliran Artis Bicara Agama Islam; Motinggo Busye: 'Menghayati Islam Singkirkan Rasa Takut Miskin & Foya^2,'" [An artist's turn to discuss Islam: Motinggo Busye said, "Observing Islam drives away the fear of poverty and the temptation to indulge oneself], *Terbit*, January 20, 1986.

[1670] Efix Mulyadi, "Motinggo Busye: Tak Ada yang Perlu Disembunyikan" [Motinggo Busye: No need to cover up anything], *Kompas*, December 4, 1983.

[1671] Ibid.

> God be praised. I thank God that I was able [in 1977-1978] to turn my back to glamorous and secular life. I hope that I can spend the rest of my life atoning for the sins I committed in the past.[1672]

By 1998, Motinggo's break with the life he had prior to his repentance had sharpened so much that in March that year, speaking to youths at Al-A'raf mosque in Senen, Central Jakarta, he told those who still had his racy novels from the 1970s to burn them all.[1673] For, although he himself stopped writing racy novels in the late 1970s, publishing houses continued to print and sell the lewd novels (e.g., *Cross Mama*) that he wrote in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In Jakarta, on June 18, 1999, five days after his prizewinning short story "Dua Tengkorak Kepala" [Two Skulls] appeared in the daily *Kompas*, Motinggo Busye died of a combination of diabetes, heart problems, and liver disease.[1674]

Motinggo Busye's popular fiction, in my view, offers an instructive case study to understand the impact of economic modernization that transpired under the New Order on some middling-class circles in Jakarta and the country's other big cities. As we have seen, Motinggo was a participant observer of this social transformation. The novels he wrote between the late 1960s and the late 1970s—both those from his pre-atonement period like *Cross Mama* [Cougar] and those from his post-repentance phase like *Puteri Seorang Jendral* [The General's Daughter]—portray the ways in which some urban middling-class Indonesians struggled for wealth and stability, power and prestige, and

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[1672] "Sosok Motinggo Busye Sudah Bertaubat" [Motinggo Busye has repented], *Terbit*, September 17, 1994.

[1673] "Siapa dan Mengapa," *Panji Masyarakat*, March 1-10, 1988, 52.

[1674] Kenedi Nurhan, ed., *Dua Tengkorak Kepala: Cerpen Pilihan* Kompas *2000* [Two skulls: *Kompas* best short stories in 2000] (Jakarta: Kompas, 2000), 151.

love and meaning in the New Order era. Some succeeded; others failed; still others ended up in limbo: As beneficiaries of economic development, they attained prosperity but discovered that their wealth led to emptiness, loneliness, and the disintegration of their families. Wealth, they discovered, had its dark side. The attention Motinggo paid to the emotional and "spiritual" dimensions of the economic modernization that went on under the New Order provides an essential counterbalance to the obsession of the country's intellectuals, technocrats, and engineers with the cognitive, material, and political aspects of the quest for Indonesian progress. New Order Indonesia was not alone in experiencing the interplay between the two forces. From the world-historical perspective, it is worth remembering that in Europe of the late eighteenth century, the Enlightenment (with its heavy emphasis on the cult of Reason) ended up provoking its own antithesis: Romanticism.

Between 1961 and 1968, Motinggo produced about twenty-five novels.[1675] Some of these were of the type the masses loved; they served up a mixture of mild porn and straightforward social criticism. There were reasons why he took such a turn in his literary career. First, it was his way of implementing an advice he received from his friend Purnawan Tjondronagoro (1934-1989). In 1958, he had urged Motinggo to write novels about the lives of the elites of Menteng (Jakarta), Darmo (Surabaya), or Candi Baru (Semarang), emphasizing the sexual perversions and the moral bankruptcy among the women in these elites. Motinggo, for his part, was shocked by, and took offense at, the dizzying contrast he saw in Jakarta between the ostentatious life of the rich and the

[1675] Motinggo Busye, letter to H. B. Jassin, October 19, 1966.

miserable life of the poor.[1676] Motinggo was determined to use his entertainment fiction as a vehicle to convey his "social protest" against the moral decay which stemmed, in part, from the ongoing economic change.[1677]

It is important to note, however, that Motinggo was already a social critic in Guided Democracy. For example, in *Sedjuta Matahari* [A million of Suns] (1963)—a novel about Tumirah, a young prostitute who struggles for redemption—he criticized the social ills he observed in Yogyakarta in 1960. He pointed out that people in Yogyakarta were generally dishonest and insincere. Governed primarily by commercial considerations, their social interaction revolved around buying and selling. They were obsessed with social status. Motinggo, however, was optimistic; he showed that people could attain salvation through education, morality, true love, and a happy family. These themes would continue to figure centrally in his novels in the New Order.[1678]

The second reason why Motinggo switched to popular fiction was that like many writers, he desired literary fame and the wealth that resulted from it. He wanted to have a comfortable life in his old age.[1679] And, as he puts it in his autobiographical novel *Sanu: Infinita Kembar* [Sanu: Double Infinity], which appeared in 1985 but recounts his life in Jakarta in 1964, he was determined to be a successful breadwinner for his family. He did not have the heart to see his wife go on suffering from the poverty that she had been enduring since their marriage in 1962:

[1676] Tjondronagoro, "Thema^2."
[1677] Ibid.
[1678] Motinggo Boesje, *Sedjuta Matahari* (Jakarta: Mega Bookstore, 1963), 8, 11-14, 19-21, 26-27, 29, 31, 33, 37, 42-43.
[1679] Asbari Nurpatria Krisna, "Lima Tahun bersama Motinggo Boesje" [Five years with Motinggo Busye], *Intisari*, June 1968, 51-52.

> [Your] wife has suffered more than you do. She abandoned the comfortable life of the elite of the Menteng neighborhood simply because she loved you. While her family of origin can enjoy bread for breakfast, soup and vegetable for lunch, Cikini pastry for afternoon tea time, and beef jerky and beefsteak for dinner, she has to wear the clothes, read the newspaper, and wear the shoes that you bought her with the money you earn by selling, at the flea market, her [old] dresses, old newspapers from last year, and the expensive high-heeled shoes that her father bought her when she was a young girl. She knows nothing of the arts. But your artistic tyranny has forced her to…accept without complaint the sufferings that you went through as a result of the Malioboro variety of the Bohemian lifestyle that you worship under the influence of the Moulin Rouge dogma….[1680]

Since he was married, spurred by the will to provide his family with a decent life, Motinggo toiled like a mad man:

> I write books as if I were possessed. I write with goals in mind. For example, today I write so I can buy chairs. Later, I publish a book so I can purchase a TV set. When I was still single, I aimed low. I just needed to buy a bowl of green-bean porridge and six months of rent. [1681]

To work very hard in pursuit of a decent life—this was the meaning that Motinggo attached in the early 1970s to being a modern man: "…living in the modern world requires us to take care of [our] material affairs. I do not want to pretend in this area." [1682] And, by mid-1972, Motinggo had succeeded—from an economic point of view—in bringing his family to economic modernity. Paul L. Tobing of the daily *Sinar Harapan* [Ray of Hope] reported that

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[1680] Busye, *Sanu*, 61; see also Mulyadi, "Motinggo Busye."

[1681] Paul L. Tobing, "Motinggo Busye: Pengarang Jang Mendjadi Sutradara Film" [Motinggo Busje: A writer who became a film director], *Sinar Harapan*, June 15, 1972.

[1682] Ibid.

> By now [Motinggo Busye] has produced 70 titles, some of which became bestsellers…. This resulted in a house that is luxurious—if judged by the standards of Indonesian writers.[1683]

Producing inexpensive, light novels that offered a mixture of mild love scenes, social criticism, and moral education was Motinggo's answer to the challenge of accomplishing three tasks: providing for his family of four children, practicing his literary craft, and helping his society cope with the deleterious consequences of Indonesia's journey to economic modernity.

What even specialists in this field of study do not know yet is why people were interested in buying and reading popular novels in the New Order. Contemporaneous sources focused their attention more on the novels themselves, their writers, and their publishers than on their readers. What we do know is that—and this is one of the differences that distinguish between Guided Democracy and the New Order—the latter created better economic conditions for the production and consumption of popular novels. And, although it did not encourage this literary genre, it neither banned nor condemned it as, say, anti-Pancasila.

The next section discusses three works of fiction by Motinggo Busye that criticized New Order Indonesia: the novel *Cross Mama* [Cougar] (1968), the novel *Puteri Seorang Djendral* [The General's Daughter] (1979), and the short story "Dua Tengkorak Kepala" [Two Skulls] (1999).

[1683] Ibid.

5. 1. 1. *Cross Mama* [Cougar]: Motinggo's Early Warning of the Dangers in Economic Modernization

At first glance, the novel *Cross Mama* seems to deal with the theme of a mother gone astray or—as the title suggests (which was a parody of "cross boy" [juvenile delinquent])—that of a delinquent mother. Yet, if we read it carefully, we will see that it talks about the dangers of living in a society that is undergoing economic modernization. In this novel, which appeared in 1968, when the technocrats were still busy trying to stabilize the economy, Motinggo warned against a social problem that had already appeared among the rich in 1963 but that would become more serious among the growing middling classes in the 1970s, when Indonesia's economy was growing at its most rapid rate: that wealth which came too fast, too easily, or by illicit means was bound to result in moral bankruptcy, emotional chaos, and the breakup of the nuclear family.

The story in *Cross Mama* centers on the extramarital affair between and the daily lives of Aunt Soffie, a young, bored, and wealthy housewife, and Boyke, a rich but discontented senior high school student. Both are denizens of Menteng, one of Jakarta's elite residential areas. Through corrupt practices, Soffie's husband and Boyke's father have achieved economic modernity, that is to say, that they are among the very few Indonesians in the mid-1960s who enjoy a wide range of commodities that global capitalism has to offer. Thanks to their strong buying power, Soffie and Boyke can afford a range of luxury items. Boyke rides a 500cc Norton motorcycle; smokes VIP, State Express 555, and Lucky Strike cigarettes; and watches pornographic films on a home

projector.[1684] Soffie's consumption style is more impressive: She eats ice cream at the Tjan Njan restaurant on Jalan Cikini, Jakarta; wears a cheongsam made in Hong Kong; owns a Sony Micro TV; listens to contemporary Dutch popular music; drives around in a Hino Contessa 1300; watches westerns at the Bali Room of Hotel Indonesia, Central Jakarta; cools off at a bungalow in Puncak, West Java; and shops hard at Sarinah, the country's first modern department store, which President Soekarno inaugurated in 1967.[1685]

Despite their affluence, both Boyke and Soffie are unhappy: they feel empty and lonely[1686] because their families are falling apart.[1687] Boyke's mother Tuti is so busy selling expensive batik cloth to her rich friends that she is seldom around. [1688] His father is an extremely busy businessman: he has two companies to worry about, many colleagues to work with, and many trips overseas to make. When he is at home at all, which is very rare, he acts as if his wife did not exist.[1689] He cares very little about his children, Boyke and Elsye; he even doubts that they are really his. Boyke once complains about his absentee father: "What Dad gives us are just clothes, shoes, motorbikes, and money. He never loves us…."[1690] When Boyke comes home, he comes home not to his parents but to his old housemaid:

[1684] Motinggo Busye, *Cross Mama* [Cougar] (Jakarta: Lokajaya, 1982 [1968]), 9, 52.
[1685] Ibid., 16, 20-21, 25, 32, 33, 68, 77-78.
[1686] Ibid., 60.
[1687] Ibid., 63, 178.
[1688] Ibid., 61, 108-109, 217.
[1689] Ibid., 315.
[1690] Ibid., 233-234.

> The old housemaid noticed that Boyke seemed very happy that day. He cheered her up. Little did she know that Boyke's heart was dry and lonely at the time: as dry and lonely as that ferocious afternoon.

Another symptom of Boyle's dysfunctional family is that its members no longer have meals together:

> For months, members of the family had seldom seen one other even at the dining table. The inhabitants of the house had their meals any time they felt like. Especially since their father was no longer around, they never had meals together. They ate, slept, and came home as they wished. They obeyed no rules; they listened to no prohibition; they were the rulers of their own hearts.[1691]

To fill the void in their hearts, Elsye uses marijuana and other drugs. [1692] She is filled with deep regrets after she sleeps with an older man, Uncle Zaenal, who lures her to bed by giving her an aphrodisiac-containing chocolate.[1693] She goes mad and is hospitalized in a mental asylum.[1694]

Boyke, for his part, seeks solace in an affair with the rich, pretty, and lonely cougar Aunt Soffie.[1695] Motinggo tells us that Boyke is sexually attracted to Aunt Soffie because her looks resemble those of an actress who plays in one of the porn films that he has watched.[1696] (Boyke's friend Rika, who is Aunt Soffie's daughter, also watches pornographic films at home with her friends.[1697]) At some point in the novel, Boyke's and

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[1691] Ibid., 168.
[1692] Ibid., 165-168, 239.
[1693] Ibid., 213.
[1694] Ibid.,182-183.
[1695] Ibid., 178.
[1696] Ibid., 308-309.
[1697] Ibid., 101-104.

Elsye's father secretly marries his first wife's best friend.[1698] Owing to his involvement in check fraud with Sudarso (Soffie's cuckolded husband), he ends up in jail.[1699] Soffie is married to Sudarso, a credit manager in a Jakarta-based bank,[1700]who—to pay for his lifestyle—engages in corrupt practices.[1701] Soffie has an affair with Sudarso's superior, Sumaryo, which results in the birth of a daughter named Rika.[1702] Following a check fraud in which he is involved, Sumaryo flees abroad.[1703] At the end of the story, Soffie ends up insane after her husband goes to jail, her house in Menteng is confiscated by the government, and her daughter marries a man whom she considers of a lowly social background[1704] but who is actually the son of a tempeh (soybean cake) manufacturer.[1705]

In *Cross Mama*, Motinggo points to what he considers the wrong ways in which some members of the upper middling-classes in Jakarta had practiced modernity since the era of Guided Democracy. First, they engaged in illicit and meaningless extramarital sexual adventures. Some, like Aunt Soffie, preyed upon teenagers; others, like Aunt Deny, engaged in partner swapping;[1706] still others, like Rika [Aunt Soffie's daughter], tolerated such sexual practices, thinking that "It is commonplace in modern times, right?"[1707] Second, in their interpretation of modernity, some people in Jakarta focused

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[1698] Ibid., 298.
[1699] Ibid., 319-320, 331.
[1700] Ibid., 86.
[1701] Ibid., 161.
[1702] Ibid., 94.
[1703] Ibid., 94, 320.
[1704] Ibid., 335-336.
[1705] Ibid., 302.
[1706] Ibid., 95.
[1707] Ibid., 84.

too narrowly on its economic dimension and "measure[d] everything with money."[1708] Third, they placed so much emphasis on consumption that they consumed things that were useless and harmful, such as luxury goods and narcotics. As one of Motinggo's characters puts it,

> The name is marijuana. It is an illegally imported product. Do you remember what our economics teacher said? There is no point in importing luxurious goods that are of no use for ordinary people. There is no point either in importing destructive lifestyles, such as marijuana-lifestyles…. We must reject them.[1709]

In *Cross Mama*, Motinggo presents an example of a good modern middling-class family. It is the family of Doctor Suherman, who is a big fan of Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo. One sign of the good modernity of this family is that they dine together regularly. The dining table at the doctor's home is wide and long. The dishes are ordinary. Yet, sitting at this table is enough to make one happy, which causes Boyke to feel envy. All members of the family sit down at the table. Jamil was the last to have a seat. He does so after he grabs a chair for his youngest sister. The cheerfulness that begins the dinner turns into solemnity as they face the food. No one talks. All chew their food in silence…not noisily like people in Boyke's family. "[…E]ating regularly at set times," Motinggo writes, "resulted in good digestion and good mental health…."[1710] It is worth pointing out that this was exactly what new priyayi in the 1930s also said.

Motinggo Busye uses the character Jamil to remark that in the second half of the 1960s many Indonesians—including parents and school teachers—were too busy

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[1708] Ibid., 175.
[1709] Ibid., 176.
[1710] Ibid., 179.

handling the country's politics and economy for them to take care of the younger generation's moral wellbeing.[1711] As Jamil puts it to his father Dr. Suherman:

> [The] younger generation must receive a great deal of sex education, Dad…. They need to be fit so they produce healthy offspring. We cannot let schoolboys visit brothels. Teachers of the health sciences must disclose the facts. We must increase moral and religious education. The next generation will not be safe unless the moral foundation is firmly and openly established. Right, Dad?[1712]

5. 1. 2. *Puteri Seorang Jendral*: A Roadmap to a Wholesome Modernity

Motinggo's novel *Puteri Seorang Jendral* [The General's Daughter], which was published in December 1979 (that is, about two years after his repentance in 1977), tells the story of two middling-class families in Jakarta in the late 1970s. The first of these belongs to a major-general. This family, which lives in Jakarta, has spent some time in the United Kingdom, where the general, in his younger years, was sent to study military strategy.[1713] He has only one wife, with whom he has two daughters (Yulia and Ineke) and one son (Yanto). Motinggo offered the general's family as an example for his readers to emulate, for it embodies the virtues that he thought Indonesians must embrace if they were serious about leading a useful and meaningful life in the modern world. Members of this family seek guidance in life through Islam, that is to say, through the Koran and the hadith, which consists of firsthand records the Prophet Muhammad's words and deeds.[1714]

[1711] Ibid., 245-246.

[1712] Ibid., 245.

[1713] Motinggo Busye, *Puteri Seorang Jendral* [The general's daughter] (Jakarta: Kartini Group, 1979), 11, 69.

[1714] Ibid., 90.

The general is a devout Muslim, a gentle, loving father, and an honest soldier. He and his wife care not only about the physical and mental welfare of his children but also about their moral wellbeing:[1715]

> Since their childhood, Yanto, Yulia, and Inneke received moral education from their father and mother. They learned from their parents to distinguish between the permissible and the forbidden, and between pious and sinful behavior. Thus, they were always careful, especially when it came to morals.[1716]

Concerned about the unseemly ways boys and girls those days interact with each other, the general teaches his children, in a gentle but authoritative manner, to preserve their own and others' chastity.[1717] He once says this to his son Yanto: "You must never make other people's daughters pregnant. Treat [them] as if they were your mother. That way you'll never do them any harm."[1718] Likewise, he reminds his daughter Inneke that

> Your father is your guardian. And God entrusts children to their fathers and mothers. Since I am your leader, I share responsibility for the offenses you commit.[1719]

Motinggo sought to persuade his young readers that in a modernizing world like Indonesia in the late 1970s it was all right for them to fall in romantic love but they must not, he argued, stop there; they must carry this love to a higher level, transforming it a mature and religious one, which will help them develop into better versions of

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[1715] Ibid., 8, 65-67, 98.
[1716] Ibid., 75.
[1717] Ibid., 66, 68.
[1718] Ibid., 75.
[1719] Ibid., 69.

themselves. Throughout the novel, Motinggo repeats a line, which he aims at the young men among his readers: "Good love does not flow from a bad boyfriend. […A] bad boyfriend will never give love."[1720] He also has a fatherly advice to those young girls who read his novel:

> Remember: Do not let men's good looks deceive you…. I want to hear you tell me one day that you have got a faithful husband. Till then, beware of all men, even if they are your own cousins.[1721]

Motinggo acknowledged how hard it was for contemporaneous Indonesian parents to ensure that their children adhere to a high standard of morality. Thus, in the novel he shows that despite the general's efforts, one day his daughter Inneke and her boyfriend Jamal lose control and they kiss each other at the general's home. Feeling guilty and sinful, however, Inneke confesses to his father about the incident.[1722]

It is important to note that at a time when some members of the Indonesian middling classes despised the military, whose officers, in fact, belonged to these same classes, Motinggo presents, in *Puteri Seorang Jendral*, a figure of the morally upright general:

> This age has produced many eccentrics. Although many of these have emerged among artists, professors, politicians, and generals, this general is not accustomed to an eccentric lifestyle.[1723]

[1720] Ibid., 231.
[1721] Ibid., 60.
[1722] Ibid, 64, 66, 84.
[1723] Ibid., 187.

It is possible that with this novel, Motinggo tried to make a point that just as there were good and bad people in the civilian section of the Indonesian middling classes, so the military section of these classes was not monolithic. Generals were not all bad. Some of them were like Inneke's father. Another point he sought to demonstrate through the novel was that some generals, like Inneke's father, were committed to those core values which the good members of the civilian middling classes also attempted to live by.

Although the general belongs to the upper middling classes, he is not a snob. He teaches his children to see good in others and in life: "All members of [the general's] household had no prejudices. They chose to emphasize goodness in everything."[1724] That is why the general and his wife do not object to the romantic love that grows between their daughter Inneke and Jamal, the son of lower middling-class couple, as long as their relationship remains pure and chaste.[1725]

One of the key themes that Motinggo addresses in *Puteri Seorang Jendral* is the quest for Indonesian modernity. In some passages, he deals with it in an explicit way: At some point, through the character Jamal, he talks about how uncomfortable it was for Indonesians in the late 1970s to be caught between tradition and modernity:

> The problem is that we feel all awkward and in-between…. We have gone too far into modern life to become pious people. On the other hand, the knowledge of the things that our religion forbids keeps us from becoming thoroughly modern….[1726]

[1724] Ibid., 27.
[1725] Ibid., 55.
[1726] Ibid., 83.

And yet, Motinggo wants his readers and himself to believe that it was possible to be a devout Muslim and a modern Indonesian. He makes Inneke remark that "We have known the sharia and yet we also have become modern."[1727] In fact, as Motinggo seeks to show throughout the entire novel, his version of middling-class Indonesian modernity involves a merger of an Islamic way of life and a set of modern elements, such as technology, pragmatism, progress, cleanliness, and sense of purpose in life. Putting it differently, he argues to the effect that Indonesia must combine what is best in tradition and what is best in modernity. As the general says to his daughter Inneke:

> I do not give a damn if people consider you and me old-fashioned. There is a time for us to think in an old-fashioned way. And there is a time for us to think in a modern way. Being modern and being conservative are just different ways of thinking. Things modern are not necessarily superior to things conservative….[1728]

There are moments in the novels in which Motinggo seeks to define Indonesian modernity in positive terms. Ventriloquizing through Inneke, he offers one of his modernist visions:

> In my view, modernization is when man arrives at that way station in his journey where he thinks to himself, "This is happiness in life." Modernization is when people think they need cool air and invent the air conditioner. Modernization is when people want to make their food healthier. But [nowadays] people no longer know why they should modernize their lives. And there are a lot of snobs and fools who consider themselves modern.[1729]

[1727] Ibid., 84.
[1728] Ibid., 70.
[1729] Ibid., 86.

Besides critical technological pragmatism, Motinggo also refers to other defining characteristics of his version of Indonesian modernity, which include: happiness, cleanliness, cosmic connection with God, and distance from metropolitan mindlessness and chaotic busyness:

> An example of genuine modernization is that village near Arcamanik racetrack. The people there seem to have reached a happy life in the world. Their houses are clean. Their glowing faces are a sign that they enjoy God's mercy and blessings. These faces differ from those of the modern ladies in Jakarta. Most of them are busy—busy like crazy. In fact, they just pretend to be busy. It is just empty busyness.[1730]

Even in the late 1970s, Motinggo continued to think that the actually existing Indonesian modernity remained fraught with dangers. In 1979 in *Puteri Seorang Jendral*, as he had done in 1968 in *Cross Mama*, he warned his readers against the two dangers that stalked modernity: sexual depravity as well as obsession with, and corruption by, material wealth. Through Jamal, Motinggo remarks that in the late 1970s, "People [had] more respect for things than for human beings."[1731] They had

> no self-respect anymore. […T]hose who hold high positions…engage in corrupt practices. Such people have no self-respect because they prize material riches [above themselves….][1732]

Motinggo sounds "Victorian" when as narrator he remarks in the novel that "[…I]n the modern era, few young men are still nervous when they make love on their

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[1730] Ibid.
[1731] Ibid., 50.
[1732] Ibid.

wedding nights. Many have engaged in premarital sex."[1733] He goes on to say that as cities undergo modernization they become fraught with sexual depravity. Motinggo writes that on Jakarta's campuses in the late 1970s there were sexual predators among students and professors:[1734]

> True, sometimes when she entered her campus, [Inneke] felt that some students and professors looked at her with lustful eyes. After she had studied there for a month, many students tried to ask her out to go to who knew where and for who knew what purposes.[1735]

At one point in the novel, Motinggo even goes so far as to say, through Inneke, that in the modern world even courtship has become evil:

> Come to think of it, courtship is a time of falsehood, which may lead us to one sin after another. We may end up making Jakarta another version of Swedish society. How many girls get pregnant before they get married?[1736]

Thus, one the social purposes that Motinggo wanted his novel to serve was as a sort of manual for youngsters to navigate the dangerous modern world and preserve their chastity and moral integrity.[1737]

[1733] Ibid., 89.
[1734] Ibid., 23, 31.
[1735] Ibid., 20.
[1736] Ibid., 84-85.
[1737] Ibid., 20.

5. 1. 3. "Dua Tengkorak Kepala" [Two Skulls]: The Price to Be Paid for Political Modernity

In this short story, the narrator goes to Aceh, at the northernmost tip of Sumatra, to give a proper reburial to two important men in his life. One is his grandfather, whom the Japanese executed without trial in the first year of their occupation of the Dutch East Indies (1942-1945). The other is Ali, the narrator's best friend from high school in Sidikalang, North Sumatra. Accused of being a separatist rebel, Ali suffered a summary execution by the Indonesian Army at some point between 1988 and 1998, when it sought to pacify the province by treating it as a Military Operation Zone (DOM). The mortal remains of Ali and the narrator's grandfather will be relocated from their mass graves in Sidikalang and Lhok Seumawe, respectively, to decent graveyards.

The narrator shows that Ali's execution is unjust and such a waste. He was not a rebel but rather a good man and a talented artist, who could have been very useful to the nation if he had lived. Ali spoke fluent Acehnese, Indonesian, Arabic, and English. He was an actor who knew Shakespeare well and recited poems beautifully. He had travelled to Singapore, Egypt, and Libya, not as a terrorist but as an English teacher.

The key point that Motinggo makes in this short story is that by taking a military approach to the separatist rebels in Aceh, the New Order government treated the Acehnese as if they were colonial subjects. The two skulls—Ali's and that of the narrator's grandfather—point to what Motinggo considered the embarrassing persistence

of "colonial" state-violence from the Japanese Occupation (1942-1945) to the last decade of the New Order (1988-1998).[1738]

Another point that Motinggo makes is that the atrocities that the Indonesian Army committed against Indonesian citizens in Aceh was a greater evil than that which the Japanese perpetrated against Indonesians during the Occupation. Thus, when the narrator's relatives suggest that he ask the Indonesian government to declare his late grandfather a national hero, he refuses to do so:

> "It's useless," I said
>
> "But your grandfather was the victim of the cruelty of the Army of Occupation," my uncle said.
>
> "Well, but what about my friend Ali, then? He was not even the victim of a colonial army. He was killed by the army of his own country," I said.[1739]

In this short story, Motinggo calls attention to the price that Indonesia's political leaders in Jakarta were willing to pay for maintaining one of the key elements of Indonesian modernity: a powerful, centralized, unitary, and territoriality intact state. The political modernization that they undertook involved the use of terror against fellow Indonesian citizens.

[1738] Motinggo Busye, "Dua Tengkorak Kepala" [Two skulls], in *Dua Tengkorak Kepala: Cerpen Pilihan Kompas 2000* [Two skulls: *Kompas* best stories in 2000], ed. Kenedi Nurhan (Jakarta: Kompas, 2000), 1-11.

[1739] Ibid., 11.

5. 2. Teguh Esha (b. 1947) and Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi (1954): Two Critics of the New Order

5. 2. 1. Teguh Esha[1740]

Teguh Slamet Hidayat Adrai—who uses the nom de plume “Teguh Esha”—was born in Banyuwangi, East Java on May 8, 1947 as the seventh of eight siblings. His father, Achmad Adrai, was an electrician who came from the island of Madura, East Java. Teguh’s mother, Wiludjeng, earned a living as a tailor. After her husband’s death in 1951, she raised the children alone. She inculcated in them the virtues of religion, morals, and education, believing that these things offered the key to peace, happiness, and meaning in life. She made it a point that they must finish at least senior high school. With an upbringing like this, it is small wonder that Teguh would highlight religion and morals as the central themes in the novels he wrote in the New Order.

Teguh spent part of his childhood in Bangil, East Java. As a small boy he developed a taste not only for detective novels but also for those comic books by R. A. Kosasih (1919-2012) which presented the Mahabharata and Ramayana stories. In 1959, in pursuit of better education for her children, Wiludjeng relocated her family to Jakarta. Her daughter, Widji Andarini, had moved to the country’s capital earlier, after she married Mohamad Saleh, a diplomat of Minangkabau descent. In Jakarta, the family supported itself by trading in paper bags and children’s clothes. Wiludjeng sewed the clothes and the children sold them at the Tanah Abang Market, Central Jakarta. By so

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[1740] My biographical sketch of Teguh Esha is based, in part, on these sources: Tempo, “Esha, Teguh,” in *Apa & Siapa 1983-1984*, 191-192; Putu Wijaya, “Aje Gile” [What a crazy thing!], *Tempo*, November 18-24, 1978; “Teguh Esha,” http://www.tamanismailmarzuki.com/tokoh/esha.html.

doing, she succeeded in putting most of her children through high school and some college. Only the youngest finished her undergraduate studies, earning a BA from the Jakarta Institute of the Arts. As for Teguh, from the mid-1960s to the 1970s, he took up

Figure 28. Teguh Esha, 1984 [*Zaman*/Sjarief Hidayat].

civil engineering at Trisakti University (from 1967), journalism at Dr. Moestopo University, and political science at the University of Indonesia (from 1977) but completed none of these studies. During his college years, he was active in student organizations. In 1973-1975, he served as the chairperson of the Imada (Association of Jakarta College Students). Later, in 1976-1977, he was Deputy Secretary-General of the SOMAL (Joint Secretariat of Local Student Organizations). Teguh and his siblings succeeded in entering the Indonesian middling classes. His youngest sister, for example, joined the teaching staff of the Jakarta Institute of the Arts. His older brothers Kadjat Adrai (b. 1943) and Djoko Prajitno[1741] enjoyed success as journalists. In August 1973, they established the periodical *Sonata*, which started out as an entertainment magazine

[1741] I could not find Djoko Prajitno's date of birth.

for men. It turned into a women-oriented family magazine in 1977 and into a teen magazine in 1980.[1742]

In 1969, responding to Kadjat's and Djoko's encouragement and taking advantage of the boom in popular fiction (which lasted from the late 1960s to the 1970s), Teguh started writing novels. His first novel, *Gairah* [Desire], was serialized in the newspaper *Utusan Pemuda* [Youth Courier].[1743] Before long, his works attracted the attention of the bestselling popular novelists Asbari Nurpatria Krisna (b. 1943) and Motinggo Busye. One day, Asbari said this to Teguh:

> […Y]ou have two gifts, journalistic and literary. Motinggo…and I have been watching you. You have a distinctive style. You are in prose what Chairil Anwar is in poetry. If I may offer you advice, I suggest that you learn to be a topnotch journalist first. As a journalist, you'll get access to [a wide variety of social figures:] from hookers to the president.[1744]

The idea was that journalistic fieldwork would help Teguh collect rich material for his future novels. It would also enable him to sharpen his fiction-writing skills by providing him with the chance to study various social types and the problems they faced as they lived in a rapidly changing society.

Teguh took Asbari's advice to heart. He took a job as a journalist with *Utusan Pemuda* [Youth Courier]. In the meantime, he studied journalism at Dr. Moestopo University, where he got to know Deddy Armand (b. 1943), who was the editor of the

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[1742] Kurniawan Junaedhie, *Rahasia Dapur Majalah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1995), 49-50, 109.

[1743] Kurniawan, "Pemberontak di Zaman Pers Kuning" [A rebel in the age of the yellow press], *Tempo Interaktif*, April 17, 2011, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/04/17/161328116/Pemberontak-di-Zaman-Pers-Kuning.

[1744] Adiputro, "Teguh Esha: Ali Topan Masih Ada" [Teguh Esha: Ali Topan is still around], *Perspektif Baru*, July 1, 2011, http://www.perspektifbaru.com/wawancara/797.

humor magazine *Stop* (1969-1980). Deddy invited Teguh to contribute to his periodical. On February 14, 1972, it began serializing what would turn out to be Teguh's most successful novel: *Ali Topan*.[1745] Of the fictional character Ali Topan, Teguh said that the youth "is rich and belongs to the middling classes. He cannot stand oppression and has an acute sense of justice. He will rebel at the sight of injustice." In other words, he is "a rebel with a cause."[1746] From 1973 to 1975, he served at the magazine *Sonata* as deputy editor-in-chief in charge of music affairs.[1747] In 1975, with capital provided by the "son of corrupt customs official," Teguh established *Le Laki* [Man], an entertainment magazine for men. From 1975 to 1977, he served as its editor-in-chief. In 1976, to help him run the magazine, he employed Yudhistira Massardi as his deputy chief editor and Noorca Massardi as managing editor.[1748]

Between 1977 and 1981, having established himself as a journalist, Teguh published a few novels: *Ali Topan Kesandung Cinta* [Ali Topan Fell in Love] in 1977; *Ali Topan Detektip Partikelir* [Ali Topan: Private Detective] and *Dewi Besser: Playgirl Salah Gaul* [Dewi Besser: Playgirl Who Associates with the Wrong People] in 1978; *Dewi Besser Superstar* in 1979; *Dari Januari sampai Desember* [From January to December] in 1980; and *Izinkan Kami Bercinta* [Let Us love], *Anak Gedongan* [Rich Kids], and *Penembak Bintang* [Star Shooter] in 1981. In writing these novels, Teguh turned "news into stories."[1749]

[1745] Kurniawan, "Pemberontak."

[1746] Adiputro, "Teguh Esha: Ali Topan Masih Ada."

[1747] Teguh Esha, *Ismail Marzuki: Musik, Tanah Air, dan Cinta* [Ismail Marzuki: Music, fatherland, and love] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2005), 195.

[1748] Kurniawan, "Pemberontak."

[1749] Tempo, "Esha, Teguh," 192; Adiputro, "Ali Topan Masih Ada."

In 1977, *Ali Topan Kesandung Cinta* [Ali Topan Fell in Love] emerged as a bestseller; it ran to six reprints in six months. Just how many copies were sold remains unclear, for the publisher, Cypress, did not reveal the sales figures. Whatever the case, owing to the novel's financial success, Teguh was able to build a house on a plot of land of 360 square meters in Puri Mutiara, Kemang-Cipete, Jakarta. Cypress gave him a used Mercedes as a bonus. The same year saw the novel's film adaptation, directed by Ishaq Iskandar (b. 1942), using a score by Guruh Soekarno Putra (b. 1953), and starring Junaedi Salat (b. 1950) and Yati Octavia (b. 1954). In 1978, *Balada Ali Topan* [The Ballads of Ali Topan]—an album of songs written by Teguh and sung by Franky Sahilatua (1953-2011) and Jane Sahilatua—was released.[1750] Having achieved his great success, on May 20, 1979, Teguh married Ratnaningdiah Brotodihardjo, the granddaughter of Suratin, the founder of the PSSI (All-Indonesia Football Union). They have seven children.

In 1979, the novel *Ali Topan Detektip Partikelir* [Ali Topan the Private Detective] was adapted to the film *Ali Topan Detektif Partikelir Turun ke Jalan* [Ali Topan: The Private Detective Goes to the Streets]. It was directed by Abrar Siregar and starred, among others, Widi Santoso (d. 2012), Roy Marten (b.1952), and Rudy Salam (b. 1948). In the same year, Teguh released an album bearing the same title. The songs in it were performed by Nana and Bodi.[1751]

In the 1970s, success entered into Teguh Esha's life instantly and in a big way. It did not last long, though. In the early 1980s, his fame, fortunes, and social impact faded

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[1750] Kurniawan, "Pemberontak"; Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi, "Perjalanan (Bersama) Franky" [A Journey with Franky], *Gatra*, April 28, 2011, http://arsip.gatra.com//artikel.php?id=147883.

[1751] Jenar Maulani and Teguh Esha, *Alexandra & Ali Topan: Ku Selalu Ada* [Alexandra and Ali Topan: I will always be there] (Jakarta: Republika, 2007), 242.

away and this came to him as a great shock. He tried to cope with it by finding solace in Islam, though not mainstream Islam. As if he were a latter-day prophet, he fashioned his own Islam: he carried out exegetical adventures in it. And he became a notorious figure in the printed media after he had announced his idiosyncratic version of Islam, which embraced the truth in the Koran but rejected the hadith (firsthand records of the Prophet Muhammad's words and deeds). He formed a small circle of followers in Jakarta and in Bandung, to whom he taught a number of innovations that he introduced to Islamic rituals. He soon ran into trouble with the police, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Department of Information, and the Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars. In the mid-1980s, Syu'bah Asa of the weekly *Tempo* reported that Teguh's heresy ended up in destabilizing his own family.[1752]

Teguh Esha's emergence, success, and crisis as a writer of popular fiction in the New Order illustrate the challenges of living in a society that experienced rapid economic modernization. Critical and commercial success did not necessarily lead to happiness. It came and went quickly, causing him to suffer major shocks, mental and material. If we compare his novels with those that Motinggo Busye had written under Guided Democracy, we find that the social themes that Teguh worked on were not unique to the New Order. By the early 1960s, or perhaps even earlier, upper middling-class Indonesians had already suffered from moral bankruptcy and the breakup of the nuclear

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[1752] Syarif Hidayat, "'Ali Topan' Menggenggam Alquran" ["Ali Topan" carries the Koran], *Zaman*, May 19, 1984; "Peringatan Deppen terhadap Majalah *Zaman*" [Department of Information's warning to the magazine *Zaman*], *Suara Muhammadiyah*, Juni 11, 1984; "TSHA ('Ali Topan') Ajarannya Dilarang" [The teaching of TSHA ("Ali Topan") is banned], *Pikiran Rakyat*, November 26, 1986; Syu'bah Asa, "Ali Topan Nabi Jalanan" [Ali Topan the street prophet], *Tempo*, December 6, 1986.

family—the major social problems that Teguh worried about in the late 1970s and early 1980s. He operated, however, in economic and political contexts that were favorable to the production and consumption of popular fiction. He also talked about his major themes in ways that were distinctly New Order.

5. 2. 2. Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi

On February 28, 1954, Yudhistira Ardi Noegraha Moelyana Massardi was born into a moderately well-off family in Karanganyar, Subang, West Java. He was the sixth of twelve siblings.[1753] All, save the second one—Siti Aminah (b. 1949)—were boys.[1754] Yudhistira's father, Mohamad Sardi (*c*. 1910s-2004),[1755] came from Jatibarang, Indramayu, West Java. After fighting in the Revolution, he led a civilian life; he managed a cooperative in Karanganyar, distributing basic necessities—such as soaps, textiles, sugar, rice, and dried cassava chips—to the surrounding villages. In addition, he ran a successful bicycle repair shop and a small newspaper agency.[1756] Yudhistira's mother, Mukinah, came from Maos, Kroya, south Central Java.[1757] Despite her illiteracy, she insisted that all her children receive good education so every one of them could become a

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[1753] Tempo, "Massardi, Yudhistira Ardi Nugraha Moelyana," in *Apa & Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Indonesia, 1981-1982* [Indonesia's Who's Who, 1981-1982] (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1981), 369.

[1754] Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi, *Mencoba Tidak Menyerah* [Trying not to surrender] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979), 10.

[1755] Mohamad Sardi died in his nineties in Yogyakarta, on January 13, 2004; on this, see Rayni N. Massardi, *1.655 Tak Ada Rahasia dalam Hidup Saya* [1,655: There is no 'secret' in my life], ed. Noorca M. Massardi (Jakarta: Galang Press, 2005), 74.

[1756] Tempo, "Massardi," 369; Massardi, *Mencoba*, 7-16; Savitri Scherer, "Yudhistira Ardi Noegraha: Social Attitudes in the Works of a Popular Writer," *Indonesia*, no. 31 (April 1981): 33.

[1757] Scherer, "Yudhistira," 33.

professional.[1758] Having a passion and a talent for food business, she ran a food-stall, specializing in *sate kambing* (skewered pieces of goat meat cooked over hot coals).[1759] In the early 1960s, Sardi and his wife were able to send their oldest son to study at a university in Yogyakarta, Central Java.[1760] At the time, he was one of the only two people in his village to have university education.[1761] Sardi and Mukinah sought to impart to their children such values as persistence, hard work, progress, discipline, education, and resourcefulness.[1762]


Figure 29. Yudhistira as an iconoclastic poet in the early 1970s [Remy Sylado].

As a child, however, Yudhistira thought that his family lived in "poverty."[1763] He noticed that to earn a living his father had to work hard at his bicycle repair-shop every

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[1758] Massardi, *Mencoba*, 8.
[1759] Ibid., 12-13; Scherer, "Yudhistira," 33.
[1760] Massardi, "Mencoba," 8-9.
[1761] Scherer, "Yudhistira," 34.
[1762] Massardi, *Mencoba*, 8-10, 12, 14.
[1763] Ibid., 14.

day, getting his hands and clothes dirty in the process.[1764] On top of that, there was never free pocket money for Yudhistira and his siblings. They had to earn their pocket money by assisting their father at the bike repair-shop, helping their mother at the restaurant, or peddling newspapers at the local market.[1765]

After completing his elementary education in 1966, Yudhistira moved to Yogyakarta, joining his eldest brother, who by then had become a school teacher.[1766] In the city, he attended the Taman Dewasa junior high school (1967-1969) and the Budyawacana Christian High School (1970-1972).[1767] In the late 1960s, wanting his name and works to appear in newspapers and magazines, he began writing. [1768] When he was still in the second year of junior high school, he managed to get one of his short stories published; it was entitled "Aku Cinta padamu" [I Love You].[1769]

In 1973, after finishing senior high school, Yudhistira moved to Jakarta, where he joined his twin brother Noorca (b. 1954), who had been living there since 1969.[1770] In the same year, 1973, Yudhistira began his studies of cinematography at the Jakarta Institute of the Arts, which he pursued for only one semester.[1771]

[1764] Ibid., 9, 14.

[1765] Ibid., 13-16.

[1766] Scherer, "Yudhistira," 34.

[1767] Tempo, "Massardi, Yudhistira ANM," in *Apa & Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Indonesia, 1985-1986* [Indonesia's Who's Who, 1985-1986] (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1986), 504; Tempo, "Massardi" [1981], 369.

[1768] Tempo, "Massardi" [1981], 369.

[1769] Scherer, "Yudhistira," 34.

[1770] Tempo, "Massardi" [1981], 370; interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011; Scherer, "Yudhistira," 34.

[1771] Tempo, "Massardi, Yudhistira Ardi Nugraha Moelyana," *Apa & Siapa, 1983-1984*, 491.

From an economic perspective, Yudhistira's first three years in Jakarta were a time of hardship. Unable to afford housing, he and his brother Noorca had to spend the night at the Bulungan Youth Center, at the nearby Christina Martha Tiahahu Park in Blok M, at his friends' homes, or inside unlocked cars in a parking lot behind the Sarinah department store.[1772] Yet, from an economic perspective and from a literary one, this was also a time of great opportunity for him and other young artists, if they discerned it and knew how to exploit it. For example, on June 25, 1970, the then governor Ali Sadikin (1927-2008) opened the Bulungan Youth Center in the affluent neighborhood of Kebayoran Baru, South Jakarta. Funded by the provincial government and private donors, the Center was to provide the Kebayoran Baru middling-class youths with an arena where they could "channel" and "articulate" their "aspirations," "energies," and "talents" in ways that the governor considered "healthy" and "orderly," that is, through athletic and artistic activities.[1773] This was the governor's way of ending street fights and other forms of juvenile delinquency among teenagers in Kebayoran Baru.[1774]

When Yudhistira entered the Youth Center in 1973, he was struck and stimulated by its "fertile artistic life." He recalled that "Ali Sadikin let the youths conduct intellectual and artistic experiments." Some took courses in English, French, and German. Others played marching band music. Still others tried their hand at traditional

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[1772] Tempo, "Massardi," in *Apa & Siapa, 1981-1982*, 370; interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

[1773] "Kemana Anak[2] Muda Pergi?" [Where do the youngsters go to?], *Ekspres*, September 12, 1970.

[1774] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011; Ramadhian Fadillah, "Cerita Gelanggang Remaja Bulungan: Bang Ali dan Tawuran Pelajar" [The story of the Bulungan Youth Center: Ali and street fights among high school students], *detiknews*, September 20, 2011, http://news.detik.com/read/2011/09/20/060516/1726009/10/cerita-gelanggang-remaja-bulungan-bang-ali-tawuran-pelajar.

arts. And there were youngsters at the Youth Center who explored theater and literature. Yudhistira and Noorca, for instance, organized a theater troupe called Teater Panuluh, which they directed and played in. And, "with the funds provided by the Youth Center, [they] edited a stenciled literary magazine called *Sirkuit* [Circuit], in which [they] published poetry, short stories, and essays."[1775] It is worth noting that the Youth Center produced a generation of major Indonesian artists and journalists, who were born between the late 1940s and the late 1960s. To this generation belonged not only Yudhistira and Noorca but also people like the novelist Teguh Esha (b. 1947), the actor Slamet Rahardjo (b. 1949), the actress Christine Hakim (b. 1956), the actress and singer Renny Djajoesman (b. 1959), the writer Radhar Panca Dahana (b. 1965), and the parody musicians who formed Orkes Moral Pancaran Sinar Petromaks [The Morality Orchestra of Petromax Lantern's Light Emission].[1776] But the Bulungan Youth Center also served one unintended function: It offered a venue for youngsters from different sections of Jakarta's middling classes to meet, befriend, and date one another.[1777] Yudhistira did not, however, confine his artistic life to this Center alone. From 1973 to 1976, day by day, he divided his time among three arts centers: the Bulungan Youth Center in Kebayoran Baru, the Balai Budaya [Culture Hall] on Jalan Gereja Theresia, and the Taman Ismail Marzuki [Ismail Marzuki Arts Center] in Cikini. The governor Ali Sadikin was a big supporter and protector of the last mentioned institution.[1778]

[1775] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

[1776] "Anak Muda dari Bulungan dan Planet Senen" [Youths from Bulungan and Planet Senen], *Media Indonesia*, October 5, 2000; interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

[1777] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

[1778] Ibid.

In the early 1970s, aside from the Bulungan Youth Center, there was another major resource that aspiring artists in Jakarta drew on to assist their development: the press industry. In the first decade of the New Order, from 1966 to mid-January 1974, the press enjoyed an episode of freedom and euphoria. Like mushrooms, new dailies sprang up in Jakarta, which included, but were not limited to, the regime's organs, such as *Angkatan Bersenjata* [Armed Forces] (est. 1965), *Berita Yudha* [Military News] (est. 1965), and *Suara Karya* [Work Voice] (est. 1971). The episode also saw the emergence of new youth magazines in Jakarta and Bandung, such as the highly influential music magazine *Aktuil* [Up to Date] (est. 1967) as well as the girls' magazine *Gadis* [Girl] (est. 1973). The newspapers, most, if not all, carried a weekly youth section, which offered a space for youths to publish their poems, short stories, and sketches. As for youth magazines, it is important to note that Bandung-based *Aktuil* made a splash in the country's literary pool when its editor, Remy Sylado (b. 1945), offered a medium for unfettered experiments, from 1972 to 1978, in *puisi mbeling*, that is, innocent, iconoclastic, anti-establishment poetry.[1779] It is important to point out that none of these things had existed under the Old Order. They were indications of the kind of social transformation that the New Order brought about.

Yudhistira remembered that he successfully exploited these resources (the Bulungan Youth Center and the printed media) to fashion his "identity," carry out experiments in theater and creative writing, be literarily prolific and get published,

[1779] "Gara-Gara Remy Sylado Timbullah Pemberontakan Puisi" [Thanks to Remy Sylado, there has been a rebellion in poetry], *Yudha Minggu*, October 31, 1976.

establish a reputation, build a fan base, and—through the honoraria he received for his published works—made a living in Jakarta.[1780]

Yudhistira's financial situation started to improve in mid-1976, when Teguh Esha invited him to help edit the magazine *Le Laki* [Man] (1976-1978). He now had an office to work at and a rented house to live in. His editorship at *Le Laki* turned out to be the beginning of his long career in journalism. After his stint at this magazine, he would serve as journalist with the weekly *Tempo* (1979-1981), editor of the magazine *Jakarta-Jakarta* (1985-1987), editor of the magazine *Editor* (1988-1992), editor of the monthly *Humor* (1992-1993), managing editor and, later, senior editor of the magazine *Gatra* [Aspect] (1994-2006), chief editor of the motivational magazine *Nebula/ESQ* (2006-2009), and owner-editor of the educational magazine *Media TK Sentra* (since May 2010).[1781]

It was during his stint as assistant editor of *Le Laki* that Yudhistira came to know Ebet Winata (b. *circa* 1948), the founder of the publishing house Cypress.[1782] In December 1976, Ebet, who was formerly a dealer in paintings, joined forces with Teddy Tjahjadi (b. *circa* 1935) to establish Cypress with a view to taking advantage of the ongoing boom in popular fiction. Having made quick profits since December 1976 by publishing a steamy novel by Ali Shahab (b. 1941) and several sentimental ones by Eddy D. Iskandar (1951),[1783] Ebet urged Yudhistira to write for Cypress a novel that the youths

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[1780] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

[1781] Redaktur, *TK: Media TK Sentra*, http://tksentra.wordpress.com/redaktur/.

[1782] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

[1783] In late 1976, Cypress published Ali Shahab's *Ranjang Siang Ranjang Malam* [Bed for the day and bed for the night]. In 1977, the publishing house launched four novels by Eddy D. Iskandar: *Cowok Komersil* [Materialistic boy], *Sok Nyentrik* [Pseudo-eccentric], *Semau Gue*

would find irresistible, by which he perhaps meant the reflection in literature of their psychological and social worlds. In the meantime, Ebet was also bugging Teguh Esha to do the same. Teguh responded to Ebet's urgings by offering his *Ali Topan Kesandung Cinta* [Ali Topan Fell in Love]. From 1977 to 1985, Cypress was one of the key players in the country's popular fiction industry.[1784]

Like Teguh Esha, Yudhistira complied with Ebet's request. Yet, he was determined to present something different from both the machismo and idealism of Teguh's *Ali Topan* and from the sentimentalism of Eddy D. Iskandar's fiction. Reacting to what he saw as the widening gap between the younger generation and the wayang art form, and using as raw materials the love lives of those middling-class teenagers who hung around at the Bulungan Youth Center, in which he had been a participant-observer, Yudhistira came up with what would become his masterpiece: the novel *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* [Arjuna in Search of Love]:

> Wayang, I thought, was dying out. Many shadow puppet masters stayed idle. Traditional arts were on the brink of extinction. I'd like to introduce wayang to the younger generation. I wanted to present a novel whose characters did not carry Western names—names like Tony, Bobby, Kevin, and George. I thought it would be more fun for my characters to have wayang names instead.
>
> […]
>
> The way I wrote those days was to start by searching for a catchy title. Once I stumbled on an amazing title, it would energize me to craft the rest of the story. I made up my mind that I should use Arjuna in my title. Since parody and irony had always been my main literary techniques,

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[As I like it], and *Berlalu dalam Sunyi* [Dissolving into silence]. On Ebet Winata and Teddy Tjahjadi, see "Ledakan dalam Semusim?" [A boom in just one season?], *Tempo*, September 17, 1977.

[1784] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011; Korrie Layun Rampan, *Leksikon Susastra Indonesia* [Dictionary of Indonesian literature] (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2000), 114.

> I decided to give the Arjuna character a twist. While in the orthodox wayang story, Arjuna—being a famous and good-looking guy—was pursued by many women, my Arjuna did the opposite: he chased women, hence the novel's title: *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* [Arjuna in Search of Love]. I also messed around with the kinship ties among wayang characters. For example, Arjuna's father was no longer Pandu—as in the original wayang story—but Bratasena, who in the standard version was his big brother.
>
> […]
>
> I worked like a madman: I wrote, slept, woke up, and wrote again. But I also had so much fun with it that I often laughed to myself as I wrote the scenes.[1785] And, before I knew it, one week passed and I finished the novel, ready to be published—with no revision at all.[1786]

Yudhistira made a big break with *Arjuna Mencari Cinta*; it proved a major success from financial and critical perspectives. In 1978, it emerged as the best teen fiction of the year 1977, winning a prize from the Department of Education and Culture's Book of the Year Foundation.[1787] At the moment he handed over the prize to Yudhistira, Daoed Joesoef—who was then Minister of Education and Culture and chairman of the Book of the Year Foundation (est. 1972)—had not realized that the award-winning novel poked fun at the wayang story, which the minister considered sacred.[1788] This award—as well as the money Yudhistira received from Cypress and the salary he got as deputy editor of *Le Laki*—enabled him to pay for his younger brothers' university education. His overall income made it possible for him to live comfortably.

Arjuna Mencari Cinta caused quite a stir in the Indonesian literary scene. While some dismissed it as a "mere popular" (that is to say, insignificant) work of fiction,[1789]

[1785] Interview with Yudhistira, February 3, 2011.
[1786] Ibid.
[1787] Tempo, "Massardi," in *Apa & Siapa, 1981-1982*, 370.
[1788] Interview with Yudhistira, February 3, 2011.
[1789] Ajip Rosidi, letter to Henri Chambert-Loir, December 31, 1984, in *Yang Datang Telanjang: Surat-Surat Ajip Rosidi dari Jepang, 1980-2002* [He who came naked: Ajip Rosidi's

some observers took it seriously. The poet, essayist, and journalist Goenawan Mohamad (b. 1941) thought that the novel offered something "new" in Indonesian literature. He argued to the effect that its author treated the world in ways that were youthful, lighthearted, "spontaneous," and "playful." Sapardi Djoko Damono (b. 1940), a prominent poet and an instructor of English literature at the University of Indonesia, believed that the novel served up a portion of "useful irony." Yudhistira, he said, "trapped the readers in a variety of absurd situations." Then, Sapardi went on to say, Yudhistira "laughed at the readers" or, rather, "invited them to laugh at their own absurdity."

In the early 1980s, the novel attracted considerable attention from major Indonesia-watchers overseas. In one way or another, Benedict Anderson (b. 1936), Savitri P. Scherer (b. 1945), Takashi Shiraishi (b. 1950), Saya Shiraishi, and Kenji Tsuchiya (1942-2005) thought that the novel offered a highly revealing social document to understand the nature of New Order Indonesia in the 1970s and the social change that it was going through.[1790] In April 1981, Scherer perceived Yudhistira as a critic of the kind of society that took shape in under the New Order. Through *Arjuna Mencari Cinta*, the author, she argued, launches several attacks on such a society. For example, he displays "the callous shallowness of the ruling class and the harsh consequences for everyone else of their style of rule." He "satirizes the shallow girls of Jakarta's nouveau riche bourgeoisie…obsessed with material possessions." He "conjures up…the

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letters from Japan, 1980-2002], (Jakarta: KPG, 2008), 296. See also his letter to V. Sikorsky, November 11, 1987, in ibid., 354. Ajip (b. 1938) argued that *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* was nothing but an insignificant popular novel. It was a mistake, he said, for Umar Kayam and others to have taken it seriously.

[1790] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

lawlessness of modern Jakarta" and "the fear in which the powerless constantly live."[1791] In 1984, Benedict Anderson wrote that Yudhistira "pokes at his readers in the ribs."[1792] He argued that what Yudhistira did in the novel was play around with the original wayang story in order to criticize—in ways that are hilarious, insolent, and iconoclastic—"the casual bourgeois world of contemporary Jakarta."[1793] In 1992, in her doctoral dissertation, the anthropologist Saya Sasaki Shiraishi used *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* to shed light on the misbehaviors of Jakarta's middling classes, such as a) their illegitimate, private use of government resources, b) their monopolistic control over and arbitrary transgression of norms and rules, and c) their moral bankruptcy.[1794]

The critical acclaim that the novel earned opened many doors to Yudhistira. For example, thanks to the efforts made by Kenji Tsuchiya and Takashi Shirashi, the Japan Foundation awarded him a fellowship to conduct research and write the third of his Arjuna trilogy in Kyoto from July to October 1983 and in Tokyo from January to March 1984. Then, owing to Benedict Anderson's strong recommendation, he got the offer from the US embassy in Jakarta to take part in the International Creative Writing Program in Iowa from November 1983 to January 1984.[1795]

[1791] Scherer, "Yudhistira," 42.

[1792] Benedict Anderson, "*Sembah-Sumpah* (Courtesy and Curses): The Politics of Language and Javanese Culture," in *Change and Continuity in Southeast Asia*, ed. Roger A. Long and Damaris A. Kirchhofer (Manoa: University of Hawaii, 1984), 40.

[1793] Ibid., 39.

[1794] Saya Sasaki Shiraishi, *Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1977), 19-22. *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* was translated into Japanese by Noriaki Oshikawa from the Daito Bunka University. The young Japanese readers, however, found it unpalatable. As a result, it sold less than 2,000 copies; see "Pramoedya's Books Hit Japan's Stores," *The Jakarta Post*, November 12, 2000, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2000/11/12/pramoedya039s-books-hit-japan039s-stores.html.

[1795] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

Since 1977, Yudhistira has become one of Indonesia's key literary figures. Since then, he has written two prize-winning plays and published at least eight novels (two of which won awards), five collections of short stories, and four books of poetry. None of his literary works enjoyed as high a degree of success as *Arjuna Mencari Cinta*.

On February 28, 1985, Yudhistira married Apriska Hendriany (Siska).[1796] On September 5, 2005, in Pekayon Jaya, South Bekasi, West Java, Siska founded Batutis al-Ilmi, which offered first-class but free-of-charge kindergarten and primary education to the children of the poor families who lived near her home in Pekayon Jaya, South Bekasi, West Java.[1797] They have three children between them: Iga Dada (b. 1985), Matatiya Taya (b. 1990), and Kafka Dikara (b. 1995).[1798] Iga pursues a musical career; he is the guitarist of The Trees and the Wild.[1799] Matatiya earned a BA in psychology at the YAI in 2012; she serves as an assistant teacher at the Batutis al-Ilmi, a primary school that her parents run.[1800] Kafka studies management at Binus University.[1801]

Many of Yudhistira's siblings grew up to become professionals. His older sister Siti Aminah is an elementary school teacher and lives with her family in Tasikmalaya,

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[1796] Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi, *Arjuna Mencari Cinta: Trilogi Komplet* [Arjuna in search of love: Complete trilogy] (Jakarta: Gaya Favorit Press, 2004), 560.

[1797] "Media TK Sentra: Sekolah Unggulan Masyarakat Dhuafa" [Media TK Sentra: Top school for the poor], http://batutis.ning.com/.

[1798] Tempo, "Massardi, Yudhistira ANM," in *Apa & Siapa, 1985-1986*, 505; "Redaktur" [Editor], *TK: Media TK Sentra*, http://tksentra.wordpress.com/redaktur/.

[1799] Louise Lavabra, "Polite Rebels," *The Jakarta Post*, August 29, 2010, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/08/29/polite-rebels.html; Iga Massardi, "Sekolah?" [School?], January 26, 2010, http://igamassardi.wordpress.com/2010/01/26/sekolah/.

[1800] Matatiya Taya, "Batutis Al-Ilmi School and My Mom," *Matatiya Taya's Blog*, October 31, 2010, http://matatiya-taya.blogspot.com/2010/10/batutis-al-ilmi-school-and-my-mom.html.

[1801] "Kafka Dikara," http://1701306865.profile.binus.ac.id/.

West Java.[1802] Noorca Marendra Massardi has enjoyed a successful career in theater, literature, and journalism. Adhie M. Massardi (b. 1956) pursues a career in journalism; he was Abdurrahman Wahid's presidential spokesman in 1999-2001.

In early 2010, after reflecting on his long career in literature and journalism, Yudhistira concluded that he had achieved very little in the way of building a better Indonesia.

> The things I had said through poetry, short stories, plays, and novels; the things I had said through journalism; these were all abstract. My writings had not changed the way people behaved. They had failed to move people's souls. True, they might have been read by thousands of Indonesians. But their impact, if any, was too weak to have caused any meaningful changes in their lives.[1803]

"If we are serious about creating better Indonesians," Yudhistira believed, "we must bring about concrete changes in our society."[1804] The most effective way of doing so, he argued, was by educating young children the concrete way.[1805]

But what is wrong with Indonesian society since the New Order? The nation, in his view, is "in chaos": [1806]People engage in corrupt practices; they are hypocrites and suffer from moral bankruptcy.[1807]

[1802] Rayni N. Massardi, *1.655 Tak Ada Rahasia dalam Hidup Saya* [1,655: There's no 'secret' in my life], ed. Noorca M. Massardi (Jakarta: Galang Press, 2005), 74, 117; Taman Ismail Marzuki, "Renny Djajoesman," http://www.tamanismailmarzuki.com/tokoh/djajoesman.html.

[1803] Interview with Yudhistira, February 3, 2011.

[1804] Ibid.

[1805] Ibid.

[1806] Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi, "Kita Salah Didik sejak TK" [We have been educated the wrong way since we were in kindergarten], *Media TK Sentra*, June 30, 2010, http://batutis.ning.com/forum/topics/kita-salah-didik-sejak-tk.

[1807] Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi, "Bangsa Yang Aneh" [What a bizarre nation!], *Koran Tempo*, December 13, 2012.

> When they deliver speeches, they talk nonsense. They make rules but they do not abide by them. In everyday life, they have no discipline: they litter; they will not queue up unless they are forced to. When they behave properly, it is not out of their own will but because they are structured to do so.[1808]

When asked why this was the case, Yudhistira explained that "Indonesians have been educated the wrong way."[1809] At the kindergarten, children start by learning in an abstract fashion, which goes against human nature. For, "normal human beings learn in stages, progressing from the concrete to the abstract"—not the other way around.[1810]

Urban middling-class Indonesians, Yudhistira maintained, have put into practice the wrong idea of what it means to be modern. As a result, they destroy their own children:

> In Indonesia's big cities, children under five years old…live a life devoid of love and meaning. For the sake of convenience or because they work outside the home, "modern" mothers do not breastfeed their babies for the first six months of their lives. By so doing, they deprive their babies of the hugs, comfort, peace, and happiness that could otherwise facilitate the forging of intercellular linkages in their brains. By doing so, they undermine the development of the babies' trust in their mothers. By doing so, they refuse to follow God's way.[1811]

Yudhistira's answer to the troubles he saw in Indonesian society was to lend support to the project that his wife Siska began in 2005: deploying the Batutis al-Ilmi kindergarten and primary school to offer first-rate education to children of the poor who lived in their neighborhood in Pekayon Jaya, South Bekasi. The school uses play-based

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[1808] Massardi, "Kita Salah Didik."
[1809] Ibid.
[1810] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.
[1811] Massardi, "Kita Salah Didik."

learning methods to teach young children such values as respect, honesty, love, diligence, discipline, and responsibility. Yudhistira and Siska help these children develop into well-rounded, well-balanced, and complete human beings.[1812]

The kind of education Yudhistira and his wife practice at the Batutis al-Ilmi is a crossbreed between Creative Pre-School developed by Pamela C. Phelps in Tallahassee, Florida, the United States, and their own Islamic vision of education. Yudhistira believes that this method of education helps create new Indonesians capable of leading their nations to its second awakening.

> I used to think that the nation's future was dark. But this type of education has made me see light at the end of the tunnel. I strengthen the light by disseminating the idea that to rebuild the nation, we must start by educating young children. I founded the magazine *Media TK Sentra*. And I propagate this method of education from seminar to seminar.[1813]

At first glance, it seems that by mid-2010 Yudhistira had become more bourgeois. This man, who was a witty, insolent, and iconoclastic critic of the New Order in the 1970s and early 1980s, had now turned into a teacher of young children, one whose vision of Indonesian society shows striking parallels to that which the Islamic modernist M. Natsir expressed in the 1930s. Consider, for example, Yudhistira's emphasis on a) the centrality of the family in nation-building, b) the strategic part that mothers play in bringing up good Indonesians, and c) a set of middling-class values that includes orderliness, discipline, morality, and religiosity.[1814] On second thought, however, we

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[1812] Ibid.

[1813] Interview with Yudhistira Massardi, February 3, 2011.

[1814] It is important to point out that these values constituted the middling-class orthodoxy in the New Order era.

soon remember that in their childhood in Subang, Yudhistira and his siblings were taught by their parents to adopt such values. Just because in *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* Yudhistira deconstructs wayang and celebrates the insolence of the middling-class youths does not mean that he rejected the values that the middling classes preached. What he did was attack their hypocrisy. He did not seek the demolition of the New Order; he wanted to help improve it so that it really worked. This point will become clear if we read *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* in tandem with the protest poems that he wrote in the same period, for example those that he published in 1978 in *Omong Kosong* [Nonsense] and in 1982 in *Rudi Jalak Gugat* [Rudi Jalak Accuses].

5. 2. 3. Teguh's *Ali Topan* and Yudhistira's *Arjuna*: Critiques of New Order's Modernity

5. 2. 3. 1. Broken Homes in an Age of Parental Depravity

I feel stifled at home, Mbok. I don't like it here.
Teguh Esha[1815]

A home is but a prison, with its guards, executioners, rats, and roaches.
Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi [1816]

In the late 1970s some middling-class youths in Jakarta enjoyed quite a comfortable life. They had decent food, clothes, and houses. Yet it turned out that these were not enough to make them happy. They needed their moms and dads to love them too, to be at home when they needed them. The trouble was, sometimes love and wealth

[1815] Teguh Esha, *Ali Topan Kesandung Cinta* [Ali Topan fell in love] Jakarta: Cypress, 1978), 55.

[1816] Yudhistira A. N. M. Massardi, *Arjuna Mencari Cinta* [Arjuna in search of love] (Jakarta: Cypress, 1977), 100.

just did not go together. For Ali Topan, the protagonist of Teguh Esha's 1978 novel *Ali Topan Kesandung Cinta* [Ali Topan Fell in Love], this constitutes the crisis of his life. His is a hollow and broken home: a home which has been reduced to a mere house.

> At home, loneliness gripped Ali Topan's heart. He was often overwhelmed by loneliness. His was an empty home. His mother and father were out, in pursuit of their own interests. His older sister Windy often stayed at Uncle Harto's in Pancoran.[1817]

Topan is the protagonist in *ATKC*: a bright, good-looking, charismatic, and rebellious eighteen-year-old student of some state senior high school in Jakarta in the late 1970s. He is the son of Mr. Amir, a wealthy dandy in his late forties, whose life is organized around a bizarre mixture of identities: an indifferent father and husband at home, a senior government official in the office, and an extravagant sugar daddy elsewhere. He finds a "physiological paradise" in his sexual exploits with prostitutes.

In many respects, Mrs. Amir is pretty much like her husband, except that she is not economically productive, either as a housewife at home or as a breadwinner in the public sphere. Why be a housewife when one has a versatile housemaid? Why make money when one is rich already? But she has much time, empty time, but no love. To kill time, to kill the pain in her heart, she neither keeps a dog nor smokes marijuana, neither plays solitaire nor takes yoga lessons. She likes to go shopping: sexual shopping. It is her kind of opium. In her fancy neighborhood, the Kebayoran area in Jakarta, this forty-three-year old lady is notorious as a big fan of young and gorgeous gigolos.

[1817] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 51.

Tired of the neglect and delinquency of her absentee parents, Topan's older sister Windy takes refuge in his uncle's family. As a result, Topan often finds himself left alone at home. It is true there is always Mbok Yem at home waiting for him: an elderly, loyal, and sympathetic maid who cares about him genuinely as if he were her own flesh and blood. Yet, no matter how close Mbok Yem may be to being his mother or grandmother, a maid is a maid: she can never take the place of his mother and father. Topan knows well that his family is disintegrating. Thus on his birthday he buys himself a banner which he sticks onto the wall of his bathroom. It reads: "A house is not a home." He decides, however, to go on living at his house. It serves him as a sort of a "rest area" where he can sleep, have meals, take a bath, and change clothes. But he cannot stay there long, for the emptiness of the house can't help but remind him of how rotten his family has become. "I feel stressed at home, Mbok. I'm not at peace," he complains to his maid one day. Unlike Windy, though, he does not take refuge in Uncle Harto's home. Unlike his father, he does not take refuge in the arms of a prostitute. He takes refuge in the open, dusty air. He rides his motorbike, at breakneck speed but with great skill, through the chaotic traffic of the city. He rides away his sorrow, his pains, his loneliness. This is how he becomes a "street boy."[1818]

So obsessed is Topan with the vision of a happy family that already at the age of nineteen he decides to make it his life-goal. When his buddy Bobby asks him about what

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[1818] It is important to note that, as early as 1968, the Jakarta Police Department had already been faced with speeding as one of the typical "social troubles" that the upper-class youth gangs often made in the city. In addition to speeding, they also performed vandalism, beat people up, and committed murders. These rich children, the police complained, did not show the slightest respect towards authorities; see "Ngebut dan Kedjahatan Remadja Dewasa Ini," [Speeding and the juvenile crimes nowadays], *Kompas*, August 16, 1968, 1.

it is that he is searching for, Topan says: "In this brief life, I want nothing. What I am dreaming of is that someday, God willing, I will be a good husband to my wife and a good father to my children."[1819]

In Jakarta in the late 1970s the happy family threatened to be an "endangered species." In June 1978, Yasco, a match-making foundation, held an ideal-family contest in Jakarta, where a happy family was defined as one in which the spouses had led a married life for at least twenty-five years, were religious, had well-behaved children, supported the government-led family planning program, and set a good example for their neighbors.[1820] The contest was held in response to what the organizer saw as signs that something was going wrong with the contemporary urban family. The signs included a phenomenon such as this: "There is even a wife who thinks it does not matter that her husband hangs out at a nightclub or visits a prositute, as long as, in the end, he still goes home to her [...] This kind of thinking is unacceptable."[1821]

Topan's family has the potential to be a happy one. It is pretty much the standard four-in-one family: father, mother, a son, and a daughter. Mr. and Mrs. Amir seem to have taken the New Order's family planning program seriously. They have conformed to two out of three norms of the ideal family: small and prosperous. The only norm they have not yet conformed to is that a family should be happy. This raises a question: What does it mean, for a youth like Topan, to have a happy family? What does it look like? It turns out that a happy family is one where mother and father love each other and their

[1819] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 205.

[1820] "Keluarga Teladan: Yang Bahagia, Harmonis dan Sebagainya" [The ideal family: one that is happy, harmonious, and so on], *Tempo*, June 17, 1978, 36-37.

[1821] Ibid., 36.

children and are there at home when the children need them. A happy family is one where parents do not just feed the children like a farmer feeds his pigs. It is one in which parents do not behave like dictators or phony preachers. The idea is that parents should also be sympathetic friends to their children. One finds the image of this ideal parents-children relationship in that between Maya and her mother. But this type of parent is exceptional. What seems to be the rule among the middling- and upper middling-class households in Jakarta at the time, at least in Topan's view, is Mr. and Mrs. Amir's style of parenting. Indeed, Topan shares this bitter observation with his sister Windy: "In my view, this is really the age of parental depravity. It is not just our parents who have gone astray. Those of my buddies have too. No doubt, this is really the age."[1822]

If Topan's statement reflects the existing situation of morality in Jakarta in the late 1970s, then we are faced here with a historical irony. For, among other things, what the urban youths in Jakarta in 1966 had despised about the Old Order was that the father of the nation, that is, President Soekarno, was, in their view, too immoral to go on leading Indonesia. One of the key leaders of the anti-Soekarno student movement in Jakarta in 1966 was Soe Hok Gie (1942-1969). In one entry of his diary, this idealist, romantic, highly nationalist student of the University of Indonesia History Study Program writes his appraisal of Soekarno's morality:

> Bung Karno imagined what it felt like to caress a woman's breasts that contained plastic implants. During the talk, it was imagined what it would be like if the breasts of beautiful women were fondled very freely by Bung Karno, Chairul Saleh and Dasaad (and Hardjo too, it was said). […] How could socialism be defended in a country led by people like these? Bung

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[1822] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 117.

> Karno is so rich in obscene jokes and has interests which are so immoral.[1823]

Note that Motinggo Busye attacked similar problems in his novels. This phenomenon was indicative of one of the key areas of consensus in the Indonesian middling classes: their commitment to late ecumenical Victorian morality.

Soe Hok Gie also reports in his diary how sometime in January 1966 the leaders of the Student Senate at the Literature Department of the University of Indonesia were offended by the obscene request of the then Minister of Education and Culture Professor Prijono that "twenty attractive female students" be sent to attend an all-night Javanese shadow puppet play at the presidential palace. When the male senate leaders said no way, the minister was upset and accused them of being against the state ideology, the Pancasila. It turned out that it was actually the request of President Soekarno himself. From the perspective of these student activists, the palace had turned into a brothel. Based on events of this type, they concluded that Soekarno and his regime of Guided Democracy were morally unfit to rule the country. They thought it was their moral duty to overthrow the obscene president and his decadent regime. So infuriated were many Jakartan student activists at what they believed to be Soekarno's moral depravity that in the wave of anti-regime student demonstrations in 1966, some of them vandalized the private house of Hartini, one of Soekarno's wives, in Bogor with graffiti in which the

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[1823] Soe Hok Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* [The diary of a demonstrator] (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983), 152.

house was cursed as "the den of syphilis" and she was condemned as a "palace whore."[1824]

In my view, therefore, for some youths in 1966—that is, the anti-communist and anti-Soekarno student activists—the advent of the New Order signified the beginning of a moral reform. They seem to have hoped that the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party and economic development would bring the country to prosperity and morality. This hope, alas, did not materialize under the New Order. The younger generation of middling-class youths in Jakarta in the late 1970s found out that although the New Order's development project did bring about an impressive increase in prosperity—at least to their own families—morality did not show any improvement at all. It seemed to have gotten worse. While their predecessors in 1966 saw Soekarno as the incarnation of the national obscene father and perceived the presidential palace as the center of national obscenity, the middling-class youths in the late 1970s—as represented by the fictional character of Ali Topan—were faced with the situation where their fathers had turned into miniature lecherous Soekarnos and their mothers had morphed into high bitches. It was now their very homes—not the presidential palace—that became the symbol of immorality, despite the fact that Soeharto, as the father of the nation, was not obscene. It is true that moms and dads did not bring gigolos and whores into their homes. Yet the children knew that if their homes were empty and deserted, it was not simply because moms and dads were busy working in the office but it was also because they were too busy sleeping around to take a good care of their families.

[1824] Ibid., 193.

How did the middling-class youths deal with this age of parental immorality? Some, like Topan, tried to do their best to live up to their own version of morality while engaging in various forms of petty rebellion to mock at and challenge the hypocritical, immoral, and authoritarian teachers and parents. Topan, for instance, pursues a chaste, romantic relationship with his upper middling-class cute girlfriend Anna Karenina. They do not have sex. They just send each other letters. A bright youth, Topan always does well in exams. In addition to pornography, he is also interested in Machiavelli, Soekarno's speeches, and the history of pre-modern and modern Indonesia. On the other hand, when he does rebel, he engages in a variety of rather mild misbehaviors: speeding on his motorcycle in the city streets, cutting classes, arguing pointlessly with his teachers, performing practical jokes on strangers at the shopping malls, deliberately violating the school dress code, and talking in a cynical, insolent, devil-may-care style to parents and teachers. But he neither uses drugs nor engages in street fights nor rape girls.

Topan's is not the only way in which the middling-class youths respond to the old generation's immoral self-indulgence. In Yudhistira ANM Massardi's novel *AMC*, the protagonist is a male college student named Arjuna who adopts the modus operandi of the corrupt members of the old generation. He enjoys necking and petting with his girlfriend in his daddy's car. He enjoys driving the car around the city, visiting his multiple girlfriends. In so doing, he saves much of his pocket money, for it is not his daddy's own car; it belongs to the government agency where his daddy works. The operational costs of the car—fuel, spare parts, servicing—are all paid by the state. It is of

course an instance of corruption and Arjuna knows it but this is what civil servants do.[1825] He just follows suit. He also suspects that his daddy is having an affair with his sexy secretary in the office. He does not object to it. Arjuna himself is more of a womanizer than his daddy is. Not only does he date multiple girlfriends at once but he also ends up passionately kissing his father's secretary right in his father's office.[1826] In this way, rather than condemn on moral grounds what his daddy does (as Soe Hok Gie condemned Soekarno and as Topan silently critiques his father), Arjuna emulates him. This does not mean, though, that he respects him. He just wants to enjoy what his daddy enjoys.

While in the real-life Soe Hok Gie one encounters a morally sensitive young intellectual capable of social critique, and in Ali Topan one finds a budding Soe Hok Gie, in Arjuna one sees the type of a youth whose behavior is mostly a blind response to his sex drive: a response unmodified by ethics and well-developed ideas. So dominated is he by his impulses that he often disregards his conscience. In the vocabulary of the leftist student activists in Jakarta and Surabaya in the early 1990s, this Arjuna type was called a "hedonist."

As in *ATKC*, one finds in *AMC* the image of the broken bourgeois family where children do not feel at home anymore. Arimbi, one of Arjuna's girlfriends, complains about her home, which begins to feel like a prison:

> It turns out that a home and all the stuff in it are just a burden. A home is just a prison, with its guards, executioners, rats, and roaches. Why the heck do people yearn for it?[1827]

[1825] Massardi, *Arjuna Mencari Cinta*, 7-8.
[1826] Ibid., 150.
[1827] Ibid., 100.

Where did things go wrong? To answer this question, we need to consider the life-transforming effect of money. What happens to people who have too much or too little money?

5. 2. 3. 2. Commodity and Morality: The Destructive Power of Money

Ill-gotten wealth brings no blessing.
Anonymous

On the consumption pattern of the affluent residents of Jakarta under the governorship of Ali Sadikin (1969-1977), the historian Susan Abeyasekere writes:

> Corrupt or not, the wealthy inhabited a different world from the majority of Jakarta's residents. Increasingly they adopted the trappings of international consumerism: Volvos or Mercedes Benz cars, supermarket shopping, American films in air-conditioned cinemas, horse-racing and games of golf.[1828]

Abeyasekere's observation finds its literary confirmation in *ATKC*. The passage below gives us some idea of the taste of high civilian bureaucrats as consumers in Jakarta in the 1970s. Significantly, it is as a classy consumer that Ali Topan's daddy, a senior government official, is first introduced to the reader in *ATKC*:

> A copper-colored Fiat sports car entered Ali Topan's houseyard and stopped in front of the garage. Mr. Amir, Topan's father, got out of the car and walked toward the front door of the house, a Samsonite business case in his right hand, a coat in his left. Around his collar wound a necktie, which he had loosened up a bit before he got out of the car. Two upper

[1828] Susan Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), 235.

> buttons of his Kern shirt were left unfastened, giving him a "boyish" look.[1829]

Mr. Amir is a middle-aged man who is transformed by commodities into a man conveying wealth and virility; the world's top brand commodities envelop his body and make him look like a male model. Later on in the novel, the reader is told that Mr. Amir lights his cigarette with a Ronson lighter and wears Bally shoes to go on a date with his hooker. If one happens to be a worshiper of fashion who believes that fashion changes ordinary man into a cool and macho guy, one would envy Mr. Amir. The looks of Mr. Amir remind me of male mannequins I often saw in the window displays of a first-class boutique at Plaza Tunjungan shopping mall in Surabaya in 2002: male mannequins dressed up with all the dazzling paraphernalia of *haute couture*.

As a consumer, Mrs. Amir is hardly less impressive than her husband. She drives in black Holden Premier sedan imported from Australia. A very generous cougar, she buys her gigolo expensive Kern shirts at an exclusive boutique in the middling-class Kebayoran area in Jakarta. The gigolo ends up wearing the same brand of shirts as her husband does. Certainly, this is not the kind of "trickle-down effect" that the technocrats in the late 1970s and early 1980s had in mind. Its "correct" version was supposed to be a process by which upper-class and upper-middling-class people, who enjoyed income growth, would share the fruits of economic development with people of the lower classes, either through investment or consumption.

Mrs. Amir smokes Dunhill cigarettes, perhaps imported from the United States or the United Kingdom. Thanks to her preference for the brand, people in Kebayoran, who

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[1829] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 37.

know her reputation as a sugar mommy, call her "Auntie Dunhill." The day she marries Mr. Amir, the man's given name replaces hers and people start calling her "Mrs. Amir." When the marriage breaks down, two processes are set in motion. First, there is a shift in the way some people address her: the shift in her title from the respectable *Nyonya* (Mrs.) to the *Tante* (Auntie), which in some contexts connotes wantonness. Second, the name of a commodity (Dunhill) takes the place of that of her husband (Amir). Is it because her absentee spouse has left an empty space in her heart, which later on is filled by cigarettes? Both shifts mark her decadence in the eyes of people in the neighborhood where she lives. In Jakarta as late as the early 1990s some people still tended to perceive female smokers as wanton women (*perempuan nakal*).

It has been argued that civil bureaucrats and businesspeople were among the beneficiaries of the substantial economic growth in the oil boom period under the New Order.[1830] Mr. Amir belongs to the first category of beneficiaries. Owing to the sizable rise in his income, he is able to buy fancy commodities. He grows into the type of consumer for whom what matters in commodities is not merely the comfort they offer and the functions they have. What also matters is their symbolic value. It is this value he is after when, for his footgear, he prefers Bally to Bata. Only members of the elite could buy branded commodities such as Fiat, Samsonite, Kern, and Bally. The top brand names are signs of distinction which set people like Mr. Amir apart from the rest of society. The newly rich with their emerging new needs for status symbols constituted a new market for exclusive commodities. Through its advertising campaigns, however, capitalism

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[1830] Anne Booth, *The Oil Boom and After: Indonesian Economic Performance during the Soeharto Era* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992).

arouses in many people the desire for the stylish commodities. So the poor man thinks to himself, “I too want to wear the dazzling Bally shoes. Oh, if only I had the money!”

A great deal of money trickled down from high income-parents to their children. As their wallets got fatter, the middling-class youths and their needs began to constitute a burgeoning market for all kinds of goods and services. In *ATKC* we see how Topan’s world is filled with commodities ranging from porn novels, comic books, and blue jeans to clove cigarettes, motorbike, and the Beatles songs.

People in the radio broadcasting business, for instance, understood well that the middling-class youths often felt lonely at home. They knew that the youths would be glad to have a sort of a long-distance buddy around to keep them company and to keep them entertained while they were all by themselves, shut off in the four walls of their rooms. This was a good business opportunity. So radio stations were set up to cater to the specific needs and tastes of the middling-class youths. If the owner of a radio station was able to secure a good number of loyal listeners, capitalists would come flocking in to advertise through his radio station. One hits upon this passage in *ATKC* where the announcer of a youth radio station, aptly named *Young Romeo*, is addressing his listeners, one of whom is Topan:

> “Johnny, the announcer, and Ikhsan, the operator, are entertaining you guys who are now studying or daydreaming at home. It is our hope that the songs we play at the studio would exorcise bad thoughts and evoke sweet dreams and much good luck tonight. Ha! ha! ha!…” thus spoke the Young Romeo announcer.
>
> The giggle was followed by a fine piece of music by The Hollies: “Too Young to Be Married.” Ali Topan lay in bed. With his eyes closed, he enjoyed his mood in solitude. In solitude.
>
> […] He then picked up a cigarette from beneath his sock where he had kept it. He lighted the cigarette and puffed at it. “This song of the

> Hollies sounds so cool if you listen to it while smoking a cigarette," Ali Topan thought to himself.[1831]

Rising income and rising loneliness made profitable markets. Lonely but wealthy middling-class adults in their forties created the demands for a sex industry. Similarly, their lonely but well-funded children created the promising market for tobacco, music, and radio broadcasting businesses.

Yet to be wealthy is one thing and to be blessed with happiness is another. For, ultimately, what matters is not the wealth itself but its origin. As one Indonesian saying has it: "Ill-gotten wealth brings no blessing."[1832] It is believed that wealth amassed by immoral means will in the end spell disaster to the people who own it. They may display the outward look of happiness while they rot inside. A family that lives off ill-gotten money is like a man who drinks poisoned water. Sooner or later, either the whole family will disintegrate or some of its members will go to rack and ruin. This is one major moral theme of *ATKC*. In this novel, the reader is told that there are civilian bureaucrats who get rich by abusing their authority and plundering the government's money. It is in this way, for instance, that the father of Bobby, one of Topan's buddies, gets the money to buy a new Mercedes.[1833] It is likely that to some degree Topan's daddy too engages in corrupt practices. Mr. Amir does not spend his money on a new Mercedes like Bobby's father. But like many other senior bureaucrats, Mr. Amir spends much of his time and money on prostitutes.

[1831] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 42-43.
[1832] The original Indonesian version runs as follows: *Uang panas tidak membawa berkah*.
[1833] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 82.

In *ATKC*, Teguh Esha suggests that the New Order did not solve the moral problems of Guided Democracy. The novel makes clear that, just as the youths of 1966 were faced with what they saw as moral, political, and economic bankruptcy in the era of Guided Democracy (1959-1965), the youths of Topan's age group in the late 1970s were faced at least with the moral and financial "delinquency" of the older generation who happened to be their parents and their country's bureaucrats. The references made by the youth characters in *ATKC* to the plundering of the state's treasury by their parents agree with the historical facts. The novel is set in the late 1970s and this period (especially between 1974 and 1978) saw a wave of demonstrations in which students protested the endemic corruption of the elite supporters of the New Order: high officials in the bureaucracy as well as the alliance between the so-called "financial generals" and a handful of ethnic Chinese businesspeople close to Soeharto.[1834] A scandal broke out in 1974 in which the state oil company Pertamina almost collapsed as the officials who plundered its assets had rendered it unable to pay its debts of $ US 10 billion.[1835] The same year saw the January 15 Affair in which thousands of students staged demonstrations in the streets of Jakarta to protest the corruption by Soeharto's cronies, the dominance of Japanese capital in the city's economy, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and the conspicuous consumption of the rich. The jobless youths from the off-street kampongs who joined the demonstrations ended up burning cars and looting

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[1834] Adam Schwartz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 33.

[1835] Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order* (London: Routledge, 2000), 37.

Chinese stores.[1836] In response to the growing student opposition to the New Order, Soeharto introduced in 1978, a year after *ATKC* was published, a law that prohibited political activism on campus.[1837]

The New Order was facing a moral crisis. The people who in 1966 got rid of the villains and promised to redeem the country turned out in the 1970s to be themselves villains. So morally rotten was the New Order that some teachers even turned out to have been perverts all along. In *ATKC* Topan's senior high school principal Mr. Broto Panggabean smokes marijuana at his office[1838] while his English teacher Mrs. Mary turns out to be a lesbian.[1839] In the context of *ATKC*, the author intends lesbianism and smoking pot to be the symptoms that something is going wrong in school, which is supposed to be a moral institution.

5. 2. 3. 3. Ambiguous Faces of *Rakyat* [Common People]: the Problem of Class

He often takes pity on them, for they seem to suffer a lot.
Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi[1840]

They can fly into a rage and kill for a cigarette.
Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi[1841]

In 1966 student activists in Jakarta struggled for the dissolution of the Old Order. This they did in the name of the little people (*rakyat*). When they demanded that the

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[1836] Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History*, 240.
[1837] Schwartz, *A Nation in Waiting*, 36.
[1838] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 176-77.
[1839] Ibid., 22-23, 30.
[1840] Massardi, *Arjuna Mencari Cinta*, 10.
[1841] Ibid., 38.

regime reduce prices, liquidate the PKI, and disband the Dwikora cabinet, they spoke in the name of the people and therefore called their demands "the Three Demands of the People." But who did these youths have in mind when they uttered the word "*rakyat*"? On December 10, 1959, Soe Hok Gie, at the age of seventeen, wrote in his journal of a poor, hungry person he stumbled upon in the street in Jakarta:

> While I took my monkey for a walk this afternoon, I saw a man who was eating mango peelings. He was not a beggar. He looked hungry. This is one of the symptoms that have begun to appear in the capital. I gave him some of my money: Rp 2.50. At the time I only had with me Rp 2.50. (I kept Rp 15 for reserve fund.)
>
> Yes, perhaps, two kilometers away from the mango-peelings eater, "His Majesty" [President Soekarno] was laughing and enjoying his meal together with his beautiful wives. […] Soekarno has betrayed the [ideals of the national] Independence. […] And the people suffered more and more. I am with you, miserable people.[1842]

In Soe's view, independence should mean that the *rakyat* could enjoy prosperity and social justice. But there stood before him a member of the *rakyat* whose structural poverty had forced him to eat like a monkey. In the way Soe saw him, this wretched monkey-like man represented the miserable *rakyat* as a whole. He was also a symptom of the political and economic diseases that were undermining Indonesian society in the mid-1960s. In Soe's view, the monkeylike, garbage-eating rakyat stood in contrast to the orgiastic president. He grew angry at such an outrageous contrast. He made up his mind that Soekarno was guilty of betraying the national revolution of 1945-1949. He began to see the president as an enemy of the *rakyat*. In this perceived antagonism between the suffering *rakyat* and the decadent president, Soe took sides with the *rakyat*.

[1842] Soe, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran*, 91-92.

Yet, somewhere in January 1966, Soe, now a key figure in the student movement in Jakarta, thought that in response to the raw deal they received from the regime, *rakyat* did not always grin and bear it. They did not always stay so cool and so meek as to inherit the earth. An undergraduate student of history, Soe was aware that *rakyat* too could run amok: "If the *rakyat* of Indonesia are too poor, then "naturally" they will take action on their own. This, in turn, will spell chaos. It will be better if it is students who take action."[1843] Evidently Soe's attitude towards the miserable *rakyat* was ambivalent. On the one hand, as victims of an unjust regime they were objects of compassion. On the other hand, their misery, if it went on too long, could drive the *rakyat* into a corner and turn them into monsters. In order to save the *rakyat* from chronic misery and to keep them from committing political barbarism, student activists in 1966 such as Soe Hok Gie decided to act as the defender of the people's interests and to speak for them in the struggle against the immoral Old Order led by an immoral president who—in his youth and under the Dutch colonial regime—had put up a good fight as the "extension of the people's tongue," to defend them against the colonial oppression.

The ambiguous faces of the rakyat reappeared in the late 1970s. In *AMC* the *rakyat* enter the scene as people with no cars of their own in Jakarta and therefore obliged to take a bus every day to go to work or to search for one. In his blind quest for love, Arjuna prefers to roam about in his father's official car rather than take a ride on a bus. He just cannot bear to see the miserable *rakyat* on a bus with their tired, pale, unsmiling visages.[1844] Again, this is the image of the suffering *rakyat*. On the other hand, Arjuna—

[1843] Ibid., 160.
[1844] Massardi, *Arjuna Mencari Cinta*, 10.

the son of a civilian bureaucrat—is well aware that the rakyat too are often selfish and do not give a damn about the well-being of other people. For instance, they go on puffing on their clove cigarettes in crowded buses. Smoking in public spaces is one of the few ways in which they can have fun and forget for a moment their wretched life. If one tries to stop them from smoking on the bus, one will end up being murdered by them.[1845] It is better for one to just leave them alone and let them enjoy their goddamned cigarettes. This is the image of the violent rakyat who tolerate systematic oppression in silence but are willing to kill for a cigarette.

In addition, upper middling-class youths, such as Arjuna's girlfriend Anggraeni, find that the city bus is a dangerous setting infested with the underworld elements of the *rakyat* who in their bitter struggle for life decided to make money as pickpockets and purse-snatchers.[1846] This is the image of *rakyat* as criminals. Indeed, one day, in the wake of a quarrel with Arjuna, Anggraeni is left in the middle of nowhere and has no choice but to take a bus. And these are the nasty things that some nasty *rakyat* do to her:

> She met the *rakyat* [the common people]. And she had to stand side by side with them, hanging onto the overhead bars. For the male passengers in the bus are so inconsiderate that none of them offers her his seat. This exasperated Anggraeni. She wanted to cry as she felt insolent fingers grab her from behind and fondle her buttocks.
>
> She wanted to scream and curse at the harasser but she thought it would be inappropriate to do so. People would think she was uncouth. But to remain silent like that would not help either. People would think she was a bitch: a cheap woman who did not object to her buttocks being squeezed by just anybody at just anyplace.

[1845] Ibid., 38. I do not think that Yudhistira exaggerates things by having Arjuna think of *rakyat* in this unflattering manner. I recall reading, in the Jakartan daily *Pos Kota*, reports on kampung dwellers in Jakarta who killed their neighbors after quarrels over trifles such as Rp 50 kites, offending glances, uncouth remarks, and so on.

[1846] Ibid., 95.

> All through this journey she could do nothing but surrender. She surrendered herself totally to God. She prayed endlessly for her safety. Yet it was only too late when she found that somebody had snatched her watch. […] This gift from her father was gone. She felt so miserable.[1847]

The *rakyat* have hurt her in at least two ways: she is sexually harassed as a woman and she is denied her rights as a property-owner.

In May 1998, at the height of anti-Soeharto student demonstrations in the streets of major cities in Indonesia, *rakyat*-as-criminals re-appeared. They took to the streets and looted stores owned by ethnic Chinese merchants. Stories were later told that some of them raped ethnic Chinese women. Although it was still in the name of *rakyat* that student activists demanded Soeharto to step down, they now tried to distance themselves from the criminal elements of the *rakyat*. They saw them as "anarchist elements" who threatened to contaminate of the purity of their lofty struggle.

The contradictory images of the *rakyat* in the imagination of middling-class youths reflect an underlying conflict of interest between the middling classes and the lower classes. The specter of the conflict repeatedly haunted the New Order: in the mid-1960s, the late 1970s, and the late 1990s. Under the Old Order (1950-1965), the PKI propagandists talked about the conflict in the framework of a class analysis or at least a plethora of Marxist jargon such as the "proletariat," the "petty bourgeoisie," the "seven village devils," the "bureaucratic capitalists," and so on. But in the wake of the PKI's destruction, class analysis seems to have gone out of fashion. Members of the underclass came to be referred to merely as *rakyat* or little *rakyat*. In the late 1980s some officers in the armed forces and later Soeharto himself began to feel that the criminal elements in the

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[1847] Ibid., 130.

rakyat—who tried to collect their share of the economic pie through all kinds of violent crimes—were threatening the regime's stability. In the media, the figures of *rakyat* gone astray were called *gali*, which stood for "a band of wild children" (*gabungan anak liar*) but simply meant gangsters. In response to the threat, the repressive apparatuses of the New Order butchered the *rakyat*-as-criminals in a clandestine operation known as "mysterious shootings."[1848]

As *ATKC* suggests, for the lower-class people in Jakarta, the years 1977-1978 marked the end of the era of the oil-driven growth in material prosperity. Lea Jellinek, who undertook a study on the history of a poor community in Kebun Kacang, Central Jakarta, remarks:

> By 1978, many kampung dwellers, especially those employed in small-scale activities, were beginning to feel the pinch. Boom and bankruptcy had been the fate of many small entrepreneurs in the past, but the sudden unprecedented prosperity followed by sudden steep decline of the 1970s, seemed to be more dramatic. It differed from the more gentle continuing rises and falls of their fortunes in the past.[1849]

It seems that the people did not like getting an economic shock. In *AMC*, our protagonist Arjuna is portrayed as being discerning enough to see that the economic shock has left its marks on the faces of the little people: exhaustion, pallor, misery, and perhaps silent anger. Interestingly, in the real world, Jellinek also noticed how the sudden decline of Indonesia's economy in the late 1970s found its reflections in the visage of Ibu Bud, a

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[1848] R. E. Elson, "In Fear of the People: Suharto and the Justification of State-sponsored Violence under the New Order," in *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, ed. Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 185-186.

[1849] Lea Jellinek, *The Wheel of Fortune: The History of a Poor Community in Jakarta* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 20.

petty trader who ran a roadside food stall in Jakarta. When her business was in bloom between 1967 and 1975, she "had a beaming moon-like face with poorly fitting large false teeth."[1850] But when all of a sudden economy went into a dive by 1976, she began to look "confused" and "depressed."[1851] As Jellinek observes, in their disappointment with the painful change, some impoverished kampung-dwellers in Jakarta referred to the post-oil boom period as an age of bad manners (*zaman kurang ajar*).[1852]

We are faced with an ironic contrast. On the one hand, both Ibu Bud and Ali Topan saw the late 1970s as the age of a moral crisis. But this they did for different reasons. In the case of Ibu Bud, it was poverty. In Topan's case it was excessive wealth. The former suffered because she had too little money. The latter suffers because his parents are destroyed by too much money.

The perceived social inequality in Jakarta in the 1970s provoked an acute sense of disillusionment among some of the social groups who in 1966 supported the New Order's rise to power. True, the New Order had created striking economic growth, which to some extent trickled down to the lower classes. Yet, at the same time, the perceived gap between the poor and the rich also got deeper and wider, not least because of the flaunting consumption-style of the Jakartan upper class. The problem of perceived inequality was one of the factors that gave rise to the students protests in the January 15 Affair in 1974. Actually, Soeharto himself was not unaware of the ongoing problem of the perceived contrast between the life of the poor and that of the rich. In 1978, for instance, he made an appeal to the members of the upper class to lead a modest life

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[1850] Ibid., x.
[1851] Ibid.
[1852] Ibid., 21.

(*hidup sederhana*). He asked them to control themselves and to "cultivate a lifestyle and a pattern of consumption that fit in with the social environment of our rakyat."[1853] The rakyat's per capita income in 1978 was US$ 200 a year.[1854] In response to Soeharto's appeal, there arose skepticism of the extent to which the government could really control the lifestyle of the rich. Yet, according to the Gini index for the period between 1964/65 and the mid-1990s, economic inequality remained relatively steady, ranging between 0.32 and 0.37.[1855] Thus, the problem we see here was, to some degree, a matter of perception versus reality.

5. 2. 3. 4. The Economic and Symbolic Values of Education

The economist Anne Booth has noted that under the New Order "Indonesian families have come to realize the value of education as a means to a better life" and "[s]maller families have come to be equated with better-educated—and healthier—families."[1856] Some incidents and discussions in *ATKC* confirm this observation. In the novel there is this interesting character: Haji Akhmad Mubarraq, a wealthy land-owning farmer in a certain village in Subang, West Java. He sends his first-born son Dudung away to Jakarta to go to a state senior high school, where he can mix with urban middling-class youths and enjoy a supposedly more modern type of education than the

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[1853] "Hidup Sederhana? Tak Usah Melarat, Tapi... [To live simply? No need to live poorly, but…], *Tempo*, June 10, 1978, 52.

[1854] Ibid., 53.

[1855] Thee Kian Wie, "The Soeharto Era and After: Stability, Development, and Crisis, 1966-2000," in *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002), 227. Due to the contested nature of Gini coefficient, however, we must treat the data with caution.

[1856] Booth, "Development: Achievement and Weakness," 123.

one available in Subang. It turns out, however, that what matters for this rich farmer is not only that education is "a means to a better life" but also that it is a status symbol. By sending his son to State Senior High School 202 in Jakarta, he tries to boost the family's reputation in the village. He wants Dudung to go to college after he finishes senior high school: "I'll be proud if you could be a college student. I'll go on giving you money so that you can succeed in your study and be a bright man."[1857]

As far as Dudung is concerned, though, the point in attending school in Jakarta is not that he will get smarter than the average country boys in Subang. There is no single incident in *ATKC* in which contacts with teachers and textbooks broaden his intellectual horizon. (His bosom friend Topan, it is true, speaks like a budding "philosopher," but this is not the result of schooling. It's due to Topan's passion for high-brow books.) Though he believes that higher education will make his son Dudung a bright guy, Haji Akhmad Mubarraq has no clear idea about what constitutes brightness.

From Dudung's viewpoint, Jakarta is the center of fashion where he can learn to adopt the elegant styles of the metropolitan middling-class youths. This he does well. When he comes home to visit his parents to ask for money, his sister Romlah admires his new urban looks. This is how Dudung appears in Romlah's eyes: "He looked dashing now. His jacket and blue jeans and the tip of the sunglasses that stuck out of the jacket's pocket all magnified his brother's charms."[1858]

This event in *ATKC* finds its echo in Susan Abeyasekere' observation on the Jakartan youths and their relation to fashion: "In the *kampung* as in the suburbs,

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[1857] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 95.
[1858] Ibid., 99.

consumerism spread: young people wanted not only radios and televisions, but also motor-cycles and smart clothes."[1859]

Jakarta has its sex appeal too. Dudung finds that "girls in Jakarta are sexy." They are way more gorgeous than his sweetheart Rofiqoh, the village headman's daughter whom he has dated since they were in primary school. Now that he has seen the capital and its girls, his love for Rofiqoh dies down. He has promised to marry her. But it is over now.

In the late 1970s Jakarta was also a "sin city." So Haji Akhmad Mubarraq is a bit worried for his son's morals because rumor has it that Jakarta "has turned into the city of evil women and gamblers."[1860] Actually, this fictional rumor refers to a historical fact. From 1966 to 1977, Ali Sadikin was the governor of Jakarta. The ordinary residents of the city loved this vibrant and charming governor because he presided over the Kampong Improvement Program whereby, for instance, muddy paths were upgraded, lined drains built, and roads paved with asphalt. To the chagrin of devout Muslims, though, he legalized gambling and prostitution in stipulated areas of the city and levied taxes on the authorized brothels and casinos. This he did in order to raise funds for building the city's infrastructure such as roads, schools, and clinics. In response to his detractors, he was reported as saying jokingly: "Gentlemen, if you still wish to live in Jakarta, you might as

[1859] Abeyasekere, *Jakarta: A History*, 237.
[1860] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 97.

well buy a helicopter. For the roads in Jakarta are built with funds from gambling taxes."[1861]

The children of urban middling-class families shared their parents' belief that education is necessary not only for upward social mobility but also for making sure that the children will at least remain in the same class as their parents. Windy doesn't finish college but she gives this rather parental piece of advice to her brother Ali Topan:

> Go on with your school, Pan. Do not end up like me. School is important for your future. People who do not go to school will lead a tough life. You do not want to go on begging from your parents all your life, do you?[1862]

Similarly, as reported by Lea Jellinek, Ibu Bud, the roadside food stall owner who lived in Kebun Kacang in the late 1970s, also believed in the transforming powers of education. One of her dreams during the years of the oil boom was to be able to send her baby daughter through college so she could someday become a physician.[1863] But this dream was smashed too pieces. For the oil boom came to a sudden end. Ibu Bud's business went bankrupt. The daughter got pregnant out of the wedlock at the age of fourteen.[1864] By comparison, Topan does quite well. He goes to college and works as a "street journalist."[1865]

[1861] For Ali Sadikin's memoir from which I quote the passage, see Ramadan K.H., *Bang Ali: Demi Jakarta 1966-1977* [Brother Ali: For Jakarta 1966-1977] (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1992), 65.

[1862] Esha, *Ali Topan*, 115.

[1863] Lea Jellinek, *The Wheel of Fortune*, x.

[1864] Ibid.

[1865] For *Ali Topan Kesandung Cinta*'s sequel, see Teguh Esha, *Ali Topan Detektip Partikelir* [Ali Topan the private investigator] (Jakarta: Cypress, 1978).

5. 2. 3. 5. *AMC* and *ATKC*: Consumption and Production of Popular Novels

When *AMC* was published in 1977, it turned out to be a best-seller. The Indonesian literary establishment received it with a diversity of responses. On the one hand, the Excellent Books Foundation of the Ministry of Culture and Education declared it, together with Marianne Katoppo's novel *Raumanen*, to be "the best youth literature" of the year.[1866] Sitting in the jury were such major literary figures as the critic H. B. Jassin and the poet Sapardi Djoko Damono, who welcomed the artistic experimentation the younger writers were carrying out at the time. Sapardi, for example, was of the opinion that *AMC* was a unique work of literature. For rather than give counsel to the readers, like most serious novels did, *AMC* invited them to laugh at their own absurdity. In Sapardi's view, it was a novel of irony and self-mockery.[1867] The *Tempo*-based journalist Bambang Bujono saw in *AMC* "a caricature of the life of youth nowadays" and a criticism not only for those parents who were "so preoccupied with themselves that they let the housemaids take care of their children" but also for those "extremely impudent youths who do not bother to lead a meaningful life."[1868]

On the other hand, some Indonesian literati did not take *AMC* seriously. For example, the major novelist Umar Kayam, as reported by Sapardi, considered the novel as a work of popular art, precisely for its lack of counsel for the reader.[1869] Likewise,

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[1866] "Arjuna Kehilangan Arjuna" [Arjuna lost Arjuna], *Tempo*, January 19, 1980, 23 and Massardi, Yudhistira A.N.M. <ymassardi@yahoo.com> "Re: Arjuna Mencari Cinta pada 1977" [Re" Arjuna in Search of Love in 1977]. May 6, 2005. Personal e-mail (May 6, 2005).

[1867] Sapardi Djoko Damono, "Arjuna Mudik, ke Yogya" [Arjuna went home, to Yogya], *Tempo*, July 26, 1980, 61.

[1868] Bambang Bujono, "Arjuna Bin Yudhistira" [Arjuna the Son of Yudhistira], *Tempo*, October 7, 1978, 40.

[1869] Damono, "Arjuna Mudik, ke Yogya," 61.

another major novelist, Budi Darma, did not regard *AMC* as a true work of literature. In his view, the popularity of *AMC* was due to the fact that male readers found in it the instant fulfillment of their wishes: women, money, and comfort. In day-to-day reality, such desires were cruelly frustrated: “The Arjuna in *AMC* is a superman who conquers women, defeats a lot of competing suitors in a fantastic manner, and breathes so comfortably in the face of all kinds of troubles.”[1870] In Budi Darma’s view, Yudhistira belonged to those writers who do not go beyond crude facts of life or “literal reality.” By contrast, great writers are those in whose works literal reality is transformed, by their imagination and aspirations, into figurative realities. As one example of the writers who have achieved this feat, Budi Darma refers to Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who authored *It Is Not an All Night Fair*.[1871]

The culture bureaucrats of the New Order recoiled in horror when they finally got hold of *AMC* and read it. It was rumored that in the late 1970s Mr. Daoed Joesoef, the then minister of culture and education, condemned it as an “immoral novel.” So did, in 1980, Mrs. Harjati Soebadio, the then Director-General of Culture of the Ministery of Culture and Education. The reason for the condemnation was that *AMC* "insulted the wayang world,” a Javanese symbolic universe that Soeharto considered sacred. As Virginia Matheson Hooker observes, Soeharto utilized, among other things, the Javanese wayang from time to time to provide the New Order with a cultural legitimacy. One knows, for instance, how, when he captured the state from Soekarno’s hands in 1966,

[1870] Budi Darma, “Novel Indonesia adalah Dunia Melodrama” [Indonesian novels are a world of melodrama], in the author’s *Sejumlah Esai Sastra* [A number of literary essays] (Jakarta: PT Karya Unipress, 1984), 76.

[1871] Ibid., 74.

Soeharto identified himself with Semar, a god who masquerades as the chief squire of the Pandavas.[1872] According to the New Order's interpretation of the *Mahābhārata*, the Kauravas stood for the PKI as the national villain while the Pandavas for the Army as the national hero. It makes sense therefore that the regime was infuriated by Yudhistira ANM Massardi's disrespectful treatment of Arjuna: the prominent member of the Pandavas. A literary move like that was tantamount to a disguised attack on Soeharto, even though he never identified himself with Arjuna.

There was a great stir in Jakarta in 1980 when a movie based on *AMC* was being produced. The Ministry of Information did not like the theme and refused to issue the production permit for the movie. It could not tolerate the fact that the movie characters adopted the proper names of wayang characters. For the ministry, this cinematic gesture meant sacrilege to sacred wayang canons. In the end, though, it issued the production permit, after Yudhistira and the film director agreed to make some changes to the movie. First, the title was changed from *Arjuna in Search of Love* to *In Search of Love*. Second, all the movie characters adopt abbreviated versions of their wayang-style proper names. Thus Arjuna for instance is called "Ar" and Krishna becomes "Kres." Tamed as it was, the movie managed to emerge a box office hit. It was estimated that 700,000 people flocked the movie theaters to watch it. [1873]

AMC also found its sophisticated reader overseas in the person of the Cornell-based Indonesianist Benedict Anderson, who considered the novel as a sort of textual weapon by which Yudhistira engaged in "a Javanese cultural civil war" against the New

[1872] Consult, for example, Virginia Matheson Hooker, "Expression: Creativity despite Constraint," *Indonesia Beyond Suharto*, 270.

[1873] Personal communication with Yudhistira ANM Massardi, May 6, 2005.

Order.[1874] In Anderson's political mode of reading, the commotion that ensued in the wake of the appearance of *AMC* the novel and of *AMC* the movie was the sign of "a battle of interpretations" of the Javanese wayang between Yudhistira and Soeharto.

Similarly, Teguh's *ATKC* enjoyed a huge commercial success. A movie was produced on the basis of the novel. Unlike *AMC*, however, it did not stir up a politico-cultural debate. Nor has it stimulated a sophisticated reading by Indonesianists of Anderson's stature. In a very short review of the novel in *Kompas*, the novelist Arswendo Atmowiloto reads *ATKC* as the story of a young couple's "dating business" that "has gone awry" thanks to "parental pressures." He criticizes Teguh for adopting, in his narrative strategy, a simplistic pro-youth view of the decadent parents, in which they are represented in a stereotypical manner as a sugar daddy and a sugar mommy and no attempt is made to delve into the conflicts that bedevil them. [1875]

While Yudhistira has managed to retain his economic and cultural standing in Jakarta to this day, Teguh's fame and fortunes seemed to begin to fade away in the early 1980s. And this led to a psychological crisis, which Teguh tried to cope with by a spiritual transformation. In 1986, he was reported to have declared himself an Islamic apostle sent by Allah to declare His warnings to mankind and introduced changes to the standard procedure of the daily obligatory prayers.[1876]

[1874] Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "*Sembah-Sumpah*: The Politics of Language and the Javanese Culture," in the author's *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 211-37.

[1875] Arswendo Atmowiloto, "Resensi Buku: Ali Topan," *Kompas*, December 6, 1977, 5.

[1876] Syu'bah Asa, "Ali Topan Nabi Jalanan" [Ali Topan the roadside prophet], *Tempo*, June 9, 1984, 24.

Publishers in the late 1970s felt that there was a sizable market for popular novels waiting to be filled.[1877] Why were these novels so popular? A simplistic answer would be to argue that the writers used sex scenes to make them very attractive. This was the "theory" offered by the critics. My own view, however, is that like some of the motion pictures (e.g. *Inem Pelayan Sexy* [Inem the Sexy Servant]) that enjoyed popularity among the urban middling classes in the mid-1970s, these popular novels mirrored their social world. The readers found that their hopes and fears, strengths and weaknesses, and troubles and follies were accurately represented in the popular novels. It is important to note that the social data that Teguh and Yudhistira employed in writing *ATKC* and *AMC*, respectively, resulted from the journalistic observations which they conducted on the upper middling-class youths in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta, whom they knew well. Likewise, Motinggo's *Cross Mama* struck some of its readers as offering accurate portrayals of the inhabitants of the elite Menteng neighborhood in the second half of the 1960s.[1878]

Whatever the case, publishers thought that popular novels would make a lucrative business. Quite naturally, they invested their money in the production and distribution of such novels as *ATKC* and *AMC*. In addition to Teguh Esha and Yudhistira A.N.M. Massardi, the 1970s saw the heyday of the great writers of popular novels such as Eddy D. Iskandar and Motinggo Busye as well as Marga T. and La Rose. Virginia Hooker has

[1877] Arswendo Atmowiloto observes in 1977 that "many popular novels have been published nowadays." But he thinks it did not amount to a boom. See Arswendo Atmowiloto, "Resensi Buku," 6.

[1878] Interview with Andy Julias, February 22, 2011.

noted that Marga T.'s novel *Karmila* underwent more than ten re-printings, "averaging 70,000 copies per print run."[1879]

There are four points that I seek to make in this chapter. First, Motinggo Busye, Teguh Esha, and Yudhistira Massardi did criticize the New Order. Yet, it was never their goal to help destroy it; they sought to make it work. For they took the New Order's ideals very seriously: progress, happy family, piety, honesty, prosperity, social justice, good manners, diligence, morality, philanthropy, discipline, and orderliness. What they condemned was the hypocrisy among members and leaders of the New Order. Some observers have misunderstood people like Yudhistira, seeing him as a radical. Yet, in his childhood under the Old Order, Yudhistira was trained by his parents to adopt values that would constitute New Order orthodoxy. Importantly, even in the post-New Order era, he keeps championing these values. Thus, Yudhistira, Teguh, and Motinggo were neither rebels nor radicals; they were reformers.

Second, many of the social ills that Motinggo, Teguh, and Yudhistira condemned in the New Order had already afflicted Guided Democracy: corruption, sexual depravity, dysfunctional family, and the destructive powers of money. Thus, although the New Order managed to achieve spectacular economic growth, it failed to solve many of the major problems that had bedeviled Guided Democracy. Something, therefore, connected Guided Democracy and the New Order: the fact that the middling classes still wrestled with the same problems. The question becomes this: how is it that no iconoclastic popular novelists like Teguh and Yudhistira appeared under Guided Democracy? Why did Indonesia have to wait until the New Order to have such writers? My view is that unlike

[1879] Hooker, "Expression: Creativity Despite Constraint," 284.

its preceding regime, the New Order allowed such writers to work and articulate their critiques. This finding, which challenges the conventional wisdom that portrays the New Order as essentially repressive, needs further research and analysis.

Strangely, leaders of the New Order do not seem to have anticipated the problems that fast economic growth could cause. What they knew firsthand was that poverty was painful, humiliating, and abnormal; they feared it and could not accept it. What many do not seem to have considered seriously was that mere wealth could be disastrous. True, by the late 1960s, some New Order intellectuals had argued (e.g. the novelist Motinggo Busye and the student activist Nono Makarim) that the lives of the rich in Indonesia's big cities and the experiences of industrial societies in the West proved that mere affluence did not lead to happiness; it might, they warned, caused trouble and suffering. Yet, in general, the leaders of the New Order seem to have decided that Indonesia could worry about the dark side of economic modernity later on; they believed that the most urgent task was for the country to attain economic progress. Like many intellectuals in the world after World War II, they thought that it was possible to try to achieve a coffee-without-caffeine sort of economic modernity. When it turned out that this did not materialize in Indonesia and that Indonesians had to pay dearly for economic development, the leaders of the New Order were taken by surprise.

CONCLUSION

As a key period in the contemporary history of Indonesia, the New Order (1966-1998) saw economic growth, political stability, and cultural change that, together, produced a more complex society characterized by ironies, ambivalences, and contradictions. Contemporaneous observers of New Order Indonesia have tended to analyze this society through economic and political lenses that lack historical depth and are blurred by rigid dichotomies (e.g., civilian vs. military; indigenous vs. Chinese; and nationalists vs. Muslims vs. communists). More often than not, in their studies they also have privileged the use of ideological prisms, which distort more than they reveal. Whether they praise the New Order as a success story or deplore it as a tragedy, they claim that it was essentially about the triumph of militarism. Whether they see the Indonesian Armed Forces as an evil institution or as a good one, they look at its officer corps as a caste of its own, rather than as part of the larger middling classes. Applying such approaches, the contemporaneous studies of New Order Indonesia have yielded a number of dominant views. Besides portraying Indonesia in the New Order as a story of domination by the military, observers had argued that it was about neo-fascism; relatively successful economic development; a betrayal of the ideals of the Indonesian nationalist movement and the Revolution; or the clash of three ideological approaches to modernization (Islamist, communist, and developmentalist).

Unconvinced by these simplistic interpretations, I reanalyze New Order Indonesia by investigating two social changes of world-historical character that it experienced, namely the rise of the middling classes and their search for progress. My attempt at

reinterpretation employs, as analytical tools, a combination of intellectual and social history. The pages that follow present the key historical points that my study emphasizes.

The Indonesian middling classes who undertook modernization in the New Order (1966-1998) had a long history. Their ancestry can be traced back to those Natives, Chinese, and Arabs in the Dutch East Indies in the second half of the nineteenth century who obtained modern education, pursued middling-class careers, and adopted middling-class values. Some worked in the colonial bureaucracy as secretaries, schoolteachers, prosecutors, vaccinators, warehouse masters, and agricultural supervisors. Others made a living in the private sector as traders, small entrepreneurs, clergymen, journalists, and writers. Their different occupations notwithstanding, they shared an ecumenical Victorian way of life. They were committed to such values as literacy, meritocracy, rationalism, order, discipline, diligence, morality, cleanliness, and personal hygiene. They adopted modern etiquette, table manners, and dress style. Many spoke Dutch and some relaxed at social clubs, where they read books and newspapers, played cards, and talked to one another. They adopted this way of life because they calculated that these professions, values, and habits offered new paths to wealth, power, prestige, meaning, and pleasure. For them, entering the middling classes did not mean becoming Western; it was their way of becoming happier, wealthier, stronger, and more respectable in the Dutch East Indies.

The ancestors of the New Order's middling classes came from diverse social backgrounds. While some were commoners who climbed the social ladder, others were nobles who defected from the aristocracy. These people were not the direct products of Dutch colonialism. They created themselves by taking advantage of the opportunities that

the colonial government had unwittingly presented to them, for example the monetization of the village economy, the introduction of wage labor, the expansion of retail trade, and population growth. In the late nineteenth-century Dutch East Indies, these Asians were still middling class in terms of occupation, values, and standards. They were not yet agents of modernization.

It was between 1900 and the 1920s that middling-class-ness, modernity, and nationalism became increasingly intertwined in the lives of many middling-class Indonesians. And this was because they felt that the existing social order, which was ruled jointly by Dutch colonizers and indigenous aristocrats, had prevented them from leading the sort of life that befitted their social standing. As was the case elsewhere, the building blocks that constituted middling-class life included meritocracy, equality before the law, access to good education, decent jobs, political participation, business opportunities, and industrialization (see Chapter One). Middling-class Asians in the Dutch East Indies felt the government had not done a good job of providing them with these goods. Thus, from 1900 onwards, using the press and political associations, they pressed the government for reforms. The reforms that the government carried out in response to this demand seemed, in the eyes of many middling-class Asians, too small and too slow. For example, in 1918, rather than establish a true Parliament, the government offered them a People's Advisory Council. A year later, the Ethical Policy (a program that the government started in 1901 to improve education, health care, and infrastructure) came to an end. Many middling-class Asians thought that the society the Dutch created in the colony was rather backward and, therefore, required fast and

extensive modernization. Since, in their view, the Dutch were unwilling to undertake it, they decided that they must do it on their own. Thus, by the 1920s, they had started to seek self-rule as the only means to bring the society to progress. Aware, however, that they constituted a small minority, they organized the masses under the banner of Indonesian nationalism and their nation-building project. The economy taking a plunge after a period of growth, the masses suffered hardship and responded warmly to the calls of the nationalists. This was the beginning of the intertwining of the middling classes, modernization, and Indonesian nationalism.

As early as the 1920s, the Indonesian nationalist middling classes had already exhibited two different strategies of modernization (see Chapter Two). One group took an ideological approach; its members relied on readymade, scientific-looking blueprints for modernization which they found in the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, in modernist interpretation of Islam, or in a combination of nationalism, Islam, communism. Among the major leaders of this group were Semaoen and Soekarno. The second group favored a pragmatic approach to the quest for Indonesian progress. The members of this pragmatic school lacked fixed, coherent, and systematic plans; they did what worked for their purposes, modifying their ideas and methods as they went along. One of the champions of pragmatic modernization was Soetomo. The ideologues had the upper hand, overshadowing the pragmatists. In 1926, the ideologues of the Sarekat Islam organized a rebellion, which failed. The Dutch crushed it quickly and used it, later, as a justification to treat the nationalist movement in a repressive manner.

From 1900 to 1942, leaders of the Indonesian middling classes witnessed World War I, the Great Depression, and Dutch reactionary colonialism. These events constituted the dark side of the Western brand of modernity and pointed to a gap between the ugly reality of what the Europeans did and the Enlightenment ideals that they claimed they lived by. Indonesian nation-builders and modernizers began to explore alternative methods of modernization. Some were attracted to Japan's example of the Asian path to modernity.

As the nationalists conceived of it between the 1920s and 1942, the idea of Indonesian modernity encompassed the following key elements: nation-state, order and progress, accelerated industrialization, efficient and effective civil service, prosperity, science and technology, self-development, and social transformation. In addition, becoming modern meant attaining a synthesis of reason, emotion, faith, and morality. They argued that to enter modernity, Indonesians must act in a cosmopolitan manner, combining indigenous and foreign elements, the better to strengthen their Indonesian identity (see Chapter Two). It went without saying that to become modern, Indonesians must join the middling classes. They needed to adopt the middling-class core values: cleanliness, orderliness, punctuality, good conduct, and a gendered division of labor whereby the wife managed the nuclear family and the husband worked in the public sphere. Some Indonesian modernizers also encouraged entrepreneurship and propagated business ethics. This constellation of ideas proved influential; they took deep root in the minds of many Indonesians and their families. Being part of the Indonesian middling classes, even the communists (e.g., Semaoen) adopted most of these ideas. As we have

seen in Chapters Three, Four, and Five, the New Order's orthodoxy consisted of the same core elements. It is important to note that some of the methods for modernization that Indonesian pragmatist modernizers advocated in the 1930s would be implemented by Indonesian NGO activists more than three decades later in the New Order. Consider, for example, Soetomo's argument that Islamic boarding schools could help modernize the village world. Consider also Takdir Alisjahbana's suggestion that some intellectuals should live and work in the countryside and modernize the villagers.

Under the Japanese Occupation, the Indonesian middling classes made major gains vis-à-vis the indigenous aristocracy. They filled the posts in the civil service that the Dutch, losing its war with the Japanese, left behind. The Japanese authorities employed indigenous civil servants from aristocratic background, doing so, however, on meritocratic basis. With support from the Japanese, some Indonesian nationalist leaders prepared Indonesia's independence, drawing up its ideology and constitution. From the Japanese true believers in Greater East Asianism, they learned the idea of Asian modernity as an alternative to Western modernity and its crisis. Other middling-class Indonesians received military training from the Japanese. In the New Order, they would form a key component in Indonesia's leadership.

During the Revolution (1945-1949), the middling classes triumphed over their rivals: the indigenous aristocracy. More middling-class Indonesians entered the civil service and those who got military training from the Japanese formed the core of what would become the Indonesian Armed Forces. The Revolution promised economic, social, and cultural modernity. Indeed, the whole point of the Revolution had been to make

Indonesians more modern. While defending the infant nation-state from the returning Dutch forces, the middling-class leaders began to modernize its government, economy, and culture. In the meantime, the "social revolutions" that broke out during the Revolution highlighted the danger that mass mobilization could pose to the middling classes.

From 1950 to 1957, the quest for Indonesian modernity took place within the political framework of liberal democracy. As early as 1950, the middling classes were deeply disillusioned, for although the Revolution had produced a free nation-state, it did not bring about prosperity and social justice. The key reason for this was that the Japanese Occupation and the Revolution had caused considerable damage to the country's economic basis. Independence was just a step in a long journey to progress. During this era, the middling classes experienced expansion as school graduates and former freedom fighters joined the bureaucracy and the military.

Although pragmatic modernist intellectuals (e.g., Soedjatmoko and Asrul Sani) were on the defensive throughout the era of liberal democracy, they were busy conducting non-ideological studies on ways to modernize Indonesia's economy, culture, and scientific communities. Some of the ideas that they developed during this era would be influential in the New Order among modernizers who operated in state and in civil society.

Some middling-class leaders formed the ruling elite, many of whose members were ideology-oriented. Using political parties, they competed for control over state resources and institutions. Being ideology-oriented, they used ideologies to get votes in

the 1955 elections and win seats in Parliament. As a result, Indonesian society became ideologically divided. In Parliament, they failed to reach consensus on a state ideology and a state format, causing the political system to grind to a halt. During the deadlock, the economy worsened, and in the provinces military commanders staged rebellions. Many in the middling classes blamed liberal democracy for the outbreak of economic and political chaos. Convinced that party politics stood in the way of economic modernity, the middling classes supported President Soekarno when he, on August 17, 1957, proposed what he called Guided Democracy.

From 1957 to 1965, the country was under Guided Democracy, which was a political system without an elected parliamentary government. Under Guided Democracy, a National Council made government policies not through voting but through deliberation to reach consensus. Members of the National Council were appointed by the President. They represented “functional groups.” A functional group was defined by occupations not by ideological commitments. Supposed to represent people’s sovereignty, the National Council directed the government under Soekarno’s guidance. Guided Democracy, in its way, was Soekarno’s ideological way of organizing state and society.

At first, in the eyes of the middling classes, Guided Democracy made much sense. Yet, like its predecessor, it failed to yield stability and economic progress. Military leaders in the provinces rebelled against the central government in Jakarta. Left-right ideological polarization intensified. The communists came to blows with the Army and Muslims. From 1959 to 1965, Indonesia’s balance of power rested on a triangle of

competing actors: the Army, Soekarno, and the Indonesian Communist Party. To prevent civil war, Soekarno directed people's energies toward foreign enemies. From, 1960 to 1962, the government waged war against the Dutch in New Guinea. In 1963, it waged war against the British in Borneo. In 1965, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations, cutting itself off from the world. In the meantime, the Indonesian economy descended into chaos. Exports plummeted; Java suffered the lack of food supply; and inflation skyrocketed. Political parties expanded their urban conflicts by politicizing village communities. To hold the country together, President Soekarno invented an ideology, which he modified as he went along: Political Manifesto, USDEK (Constitution of 1945, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and National Identity), and Nasakom (nationalism, religion, and communism). Ideological synthesis, however, did not work. In this time of chaos, attempts to modernize the country's economy amounted to nothing. Although the technocrats put together development plans, none of these were implemented. The economy took a deep plunge in the early 1960s, leaving the middling classes badly hurt. Many withdrew their support from Guided Democracy and sought to build an alternative.

The collapse of Guided Democracy in 1965 revealed to middling-class leaders that President Soekarno's attempt (which he had commenced in the mid-1920s) to employ ideological synthesis (nationalism, Islam, and Marxism) to forge a broad-based unity for Indonesians to attain modernity did not work. The experience of living under Guided Democracy convinced many middling-class Indonesians that ideological ways of handling the nation's challenges did not work either. Consequently, they favored

pragmatic ways of modernizing their society from above and from below. Moreover, a good many middling-class modernizers concluded that economic progress, which they embraced and advertised as the most important and urgent of the nation's goals, called for the political demobilization of the masses and their mobilization instead for development efforts. These ideas shaped the behavior of Indonesia's middling-class leaders during the New Order, whether they operated in the state or in civil society. In the aftermath of the bloody struggle for power in the mid-1960s, the middling-class pragmatic modernists emerged victorious. They then started to bring the country to progress in a way that they considered pragmatic.

The New Order began on March 11, 1966 when President Soekarno surrendered power to Soeharto. The Soeharto administration rehabilitated the economy, secured foreign loans, and rebuilt infrastructure. The economy improved quickly. In 1968, the growth rate was 10.9 percent.[1880] Soeharto was assisted by the "Berkeley Mafia," a team of US-trained Indonesian technocrats. They helped the government modernize Indonesian economy. Soeharto and his technocrats pursued a modern, Western development strategy that was compatible with socialism and Pancasila (Five Principles).[1881] It was a mixed economy: a modified command capitalist economy, where both the government and the military were to play a key role. Indeed, in the New Order, the government and the military were major economic players that owned and managed industrial enterprises.

[1880] Hal Hill, *The Indonesian Economy*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 15.

[1881] The state ideology called Pancasila consists of belief in God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.

Soeharto was convinced that there existed a scientific approach to performing economic modernization. With the help of the technocrats, he believed that he could bring Indonesia to economic modernity the right way (see Chapter Three). Japan, the United States, and Western Europe provided the capital necessary for the New Order to start economic development. The government encouraged local entrepreneurs, disciplined labor unions, and offered advice on import and export.

Despite obvious differences, there was a certain amount of continuity between Guided Democracy and the New Order. The Soeharto administration adopted not only Pancasila but also some of the principles of Guided Democracy, for instance Soeharto despised liberal democracy and believed that political parties endangered national unity. Like his predecessor Soekarno, Soeharto was not an elected leader.

Soeharto enjoyed considerable support from the middling classes. Muslim clerics, college students, professionals, civil servants, and military officers generally supported his ascent to power. Developments in global history helped Indonesia's quest for economic progress. Oil prices skyrocketed in 1973-1974. As an oil-producing country, Indonesia benefited enormously from the oil boom. It also took advantage of the massive influx of American and Japanese capital.

From the mid-1960s to the 1990s, the New Order took a number of steps that shaped its search for modernity: it maintained a military-supervised government, operated a state party (the Golkar), and imposed state control on civil society. Whereas Guided Democracy isolated the Indonesian economy from the world, the New Order

opened the country to it, brought Indonesia back into the United Nations, and normalized its relations with Malaysia.

The outcome of economic modernization under the New Order was spectacular. In the 1960s, Indonesia was known as "the number one failure among the major underdeveloped countries" with "a little prospect of rapid economic growth."[1882] Some observers doubted that Indonesia would be able to control population growth and produce enough food to cope with population boom. And yet, things changed dramatically under the New Order. Between 1971 and 1981, the economy grew at an annual average of 8 percent. The New Order carried out a remarkable economic experiment. By 1986, Indonesia gained considerable income by selling oil to the West and Japan and used the money to invest in agriculture and industry.

In 1986, Indonesia, for the first time in its history, produced a rice surplus of 3,000,000 tons. The Green Revolution—which provided Indonesian farmers with high-yield rice varieties, fertilizers, and powerful pesticides—was a success. Indonesia exported its rice by the mid-1980s. Life expectancy increased remarkably. Many middling-class modernizers saw these accomplishments as evidence of economic progress.

It is worth highlighting that Indonesia's economic success was not achieved under a democratic government. Soeharto and the top-down modernizers who assisted him sought to craft a tightly controlled state and society that they could mobilize to produce goods and services and increase national prosperity. Economic growth expanded the

[1882] Ibid., 1.

middling classes, some whose members desired democracy. Democracy, however, did not emerge because the state became tighter and tighter.

The social and intellectual history of the New Order shows that many in the Indonesian middling classes championed a path to Indonesian modernity which they perceived as pragmatic but which also strikes us as recognizably structural-functional. They were pragmatists in the sense that in their quest for material progress and mental wellbeing, they favored the application of professional knowledge and skills over the wielding of ideologies and the political mobilization of the masses. But we may also see them as structural-functionalists on the strength of their tenacious conviction that the modernization of their society would be best served by maintaining consensus and defusing conflict and by making sure that all components of the nation worked together, each performing its regular function as professionally and productively as possible, thereby benefiting each other and the entire society. This Indonesian brand of structural-functionalism was the driving logic behind several social engineering projects that the regime carried out, such as the pursuit of the "floating-mass" policy and the Pancasilaization of society. The New Order variety of structural functionalism was an alternative to Guided Democracy's "conflict-theory" approach to Indonesian modernization, which emphasized domestic class struggle (workers and peasants vs. bureaucratic capitalists and landlords), international class warfare ("new emerging forces" vs. neo-colonialists and imperialists), and permanent revolution to wipe out the "feudal," "capitalist," and "imperial" obstacles to their sort of modernity—an approach that, as it was applied by Soekarno and the PKI—resulted in economic and political

chaos in the mid-1960s. The bloody transition from Guided Democracy to the New Order can be seen as an Indonesian enactment of the global battle between these two major camps in modern social thought. Some of the New Order modernizers were perhaps the (unwitting) intellectual offspring of Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) rather than, as one observer suggests, the exponents of "Javanese aristocratic traditionalism" and "anti-Enlightenment thought."[1883]

Determined to modernize the country quickly but safely, many agents of modernization in New Order Indonesia thought that rather than strive for originality they should proceed in an eclectic and pragmatic manner (see Chapters Three and Four). Thus, in search of theories of and methods for modernization, they depended from time to time on the international marketplace of ideas. They derived their ideas not only from scholars in North America and Western Europe (e.g., W. W. Rostow's theory of the stages of economic growth and David McClelland's theory of achievement motive) but also from the Third World (e.g., Paulo Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed and Latin American dependency theory). This means that they joined the international community of intellectuals. They also appropriated, however, many ideas that had already been crafted in 1920s-1930s by the leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement.

The transition from the Old Order (1950-1965) to the New Order (1966-1998) did not mean a complete historical break. The socio-intellectual history of the Indonesian middling classes' pursuit of Indonesian modernity reveals that there existed strong

[1883] David Bourchier, "Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia" (PhD diss., Monash University, 1996); quoted in David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz, "Introduction," in *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*, ed. David Bourchier and Vedi R. Hadiz (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 8.

continuity between the Old Order and the New. For example, New Order's modernizers (born between the 1930s and the 1940s) found some of their key ideas, ideals, and skills under the Old Order, but only had the chance to use these resources to create a modern Indonesia under the New Order. The technocrats, for instance, drew up a few development plans in the last decade of Guided Democracy but these plans were not implemented. Likewise, the call for establishing state and private think tanks in the service of modernization had already been made by Soedjatmoko in the 1950s. Yet, it was not until the early 1970s under the New Order that think tanks—such as the CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and the LP3ES (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information)—were established. There was continuity in another sense as well. True, the New Order succeeded in modernizing the country's economy. Yet, as Motinggo Busye, Teguh Esha, and Yudhistira pointed out, the New Order still wrestled with old problems from the previous eras, such as corruption, immorality, and the breakup of the idealized nuclear family.

It is not my intention to whitewash the Indonesian bourgeoisie and their modernizing mission in the New Order era. Although they brought to reality many of the ideas that all previous regimes were unable to realize for seventy years, the modernization project that the Indonesian middling classes undertook was an exercise in demolition and construction, filled with contradictions, naïvetés, ironies, and violence. The modernizers shook their society up and threw it off balance at the same time as they attempted to develop it and keep it intact and orderly.

As for the modernizers' use of violence, in the mid-1960s they started modernizing by purging the nation of what they considered the ideological and human obstacles to their kind of modernity. The obstacles included Marxism and Leninism, Soekarno and the Soekarnoists, and the Indonesian Communist Party and their supporters. The political surgery they conducted unleashed chaos, resulting in the murder of half a million and the incarceration of one and a half million of people branded as "Communists." In the early 1980s, to purge society of criminals, the New Order's protectors of security murdered thousands of alleged gangsters in a number of operations known as "mysterious shootings." Many in the middling classes condoned these extrajudicial killings.

The middling-class missionaries of modernity in the New Order often acted in a naïve way. As Chapter Four has shown, in the 1970s and 1980s self-styled bottom-up modernizers attempted to change the lives of people whose cultures they did not really know (e.g., villagers and the *pesantren* communities), and instructed them to do things in those fields in which they themselves had no expertise (e.g., entrepreneurship and agribusiness). In the late 1970s, thanks to their success in achieving political stability and rapid economic growth, the New Order's ruling elite created a new society, whose middling classes began demanding more than just security and wealth: they wanted political rights, spirituality, freedom of the press, and greater equity. Strangely, the leaders of the New Order believed that they could treat these people the same way they had treated them in the late 1960s. As we have seen in Chapter Three, to preserve stability some of the New Order's top-down modernizers (e.g., Ali Moertopo and Daoed

Joesoef) dealt with politicians, university students, and villagers in ways that were paternalistic, authoritarian, and manipulative.

The New Order's modernizers and their projects were full of ironies. For example, as Chapter Four has demonstrated, intending to modernize village Java from the bottom up, some middling-class proponents of "popular participation" in economic development ended up, in the 1970s, conducting community development programs in a top-down manner. It did not occur to them that modernization was the middling classes' project to shape the world in their own image. As such, it was bound to be a largely top-down endeavor. Likewise, to control the citizenry, which economic development had shaped and changed, Soeharto and his supporters—themselves practitioners of pragmatic modernism—ended up, in 1978, resorting to ideology: they started requiring Indonesians, young and old, to participate in Pancasila indoctrination sessions. (The ideologue Ruslan Abdulgani had run the same program under Guided Democracy.) Another irony was that the middling-class critics of the New Order turned out, nevertheless, to be true believers in what it stood for. As we have seen in Chapter Five, their work and life-journeys show that they took the New Order's vision of a petty bourgeois, beer-without-alcohol, late ecumenical Victorian modernity very seriously. Thus, when the modern Indonesia that the New Order produced came with a number of social ills, they were disillusioned. In response to their disillusionment, they employed, among other things, popular novels to argue that the elite and the masses had gone astray and to show the way back to the right path: New Order orthodoxy.

The ideas, ideals, approaches, and methods as well as the naivetés, contradictions, and ironies that we see in the kind of modernity and modernization that the leaders of the Indonesian middling classes championed and carried out under the New Order were not unique to them and their era. As early as the *pergerakan* era (1910s-1942), their forebears had already displayed these features. It was they who first crafted and propagated this vision of a decaffeinated, late ecumenical Victorian modernity, which the New Order sought to realize in 1966-1998. And it was the early *pergerakan* modernizers who first advocated some of the approaches, methods, and programs that the New Order modernizers would apply. Whether top-down or bottom-up, the pragmatic approach to modernization that the leaders of the Indonesian middling classes applied in the New Order can be traced back to the key ideas of people like Soetomo, R. A. Kartini, Takdir Alisjahbana, M. H. Thamrin, Liem King Ho, and Kwee Tek Hoay. However, from the *pergerakan* era to the end of Guided Democracy (1959-1965), pragmatism was overshadowed by its easier, more confident, more impassioned, and more "systematic" rival: the ideological way of attaining modernization, as exemplified by, for instance, the communism of Semaoen's and the latter-day PKI and Soekarno's blend of nationalism, Islamism, and communism.

These findings point to continuities in ideas, values, approaches, and methods that connected the *pergerakan* era and the New Order. One of the meanings of these continuities is that in many ways, the New Order was not wholly new. What was new in the New Order was its success in bringing about impressive economic growth, which expanded and diversified the Indonesian middling classes and joined them to the world.

Yet, the kind of life that middling-class Indonesians lived in the New Order still revolved around those ideas, ideals, standards, desires, and anxieties which their *pergerakan* forebears had articulated much earlier.

The New Order, therefore, was not a deviation from the "normal" trajectory of Indonesia's contemporary history. It was the Old Order (1950-1965) that constituted an aberration. The New Order was not "new" either, for it was a return to the fundamental ideas and ideals of Indonesian modernity as they were born in the *pergerakan* era. Nor was the New Order a complete victory for the Indonesian middling classes. They had attained only two of their modernist goals: political supremacy and economic growth. Rapid economic growth, however, engendered social, psychological, and moral disorders, which, they feared, undermined what they saw as the building block of their social world: the idealized nuclear family. The fact that the world they built was fraught with contradictions, ironies, and follies renders the idea of triumphant Indonesian middling classes ironic. Like its counterparts elsewhere and at other times, the modernization that the Indonesian middling classes presided over under the New Order—intended though it was to be a coffee-without-caffeine sort of modernity—ended up, as R. William Liddle once pointed out, Janus-faced.[1884]

[1884] R. William Liddle, "Dua Wajah Orde Baru" [The New Order's two faces], *Tempo*, June 28, 2010.

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