Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Correlation Between Group Identity and Becoming

Transnational

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ABSTRACT

Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Correlation Between Group Identity and Becoming Transnational

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In asking what factors better allow foreign terrorist organizations to become global, I propose the question: in what ways and why do foreign terrorist organizations become transnational in the post-Cold War era? This research will then evaluate the strategic use of group identity – specifically ethnic, religious, and ideological – by foreign terrorist organizations in order to best determine whether or not these groups, based on their respective identities, possess the ability to become transnational. Identification with these group identities garners advantages that terrorist organizations otherwise could not, aid such groups in their expansion beyond traditional state borders, and assists in the transition towards more transnational states of being. In addressing the saliency of group identity within the broader context of international terrorism, the global community will be better suited to direct counterterrorism efforts towards the most threatening and transnational foreign terrorist organizations in regards to their tactics, strategies, organization, and networks.

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ACRONYMS

AQ	al Qaeda; al Qaeda Central
AQI	al Qaeda in Iraq
AQIM	al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AS	Abu Sayyaf
FIS	Islamic Action Front
HI	Hizbullah's Istishhadeens
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
JI	Jemaah Islamiya
JRA	Japanese Red Army
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RAF	Red Army Faction

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly globalized world, the need to destabilize, dismantle, and disengage foreign terrorist organizations is more important than ever before. These organizations must be both intrinsically understood and strategically combated in order to eliminate terrorism and its borderless movements. In order to accomplish these objectives, this research proposes the question: in what ways and why do foreign terrorist organizations become transnational? By answering this question, national security strategists will be better able to combat the terrorist threat through improved policymaking and strategic action.

In order to best evaluate this question and its findings, this research must first define two concepts: terrorism and transnationalism. Firstly, there is no legally binding or criminal law definition of the term (Hoffman, 1998, p. 13; Deen, 2005). In fact, the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines "terrorism" as simply "a system of terror" (Hoffman, 1998, p. 13-14). Ayla Schebley believes the currently accepted definition is vague and less than compelling; she proposes that terrorism be defined as a "violent act upon symbolic civilians and their properties" (2003, pp. 106-107). Furthermore, she claims that academia must demonstrate that a compelling definition should exist so as to universally describe a terrorist. This definition would promote increased cooperation among states that all share a common conceptualization of the terrorist threat that is discussed within this research.

This definitional imprecision has rendered the modern media unable to communicate a simple message when it comes to terrorism – the message is often

"complex and convoluted" (Hoffman, 1998, p. 13). "Terrorism" has often been used when describing crime in general, but due to limited airtime, media outlets resort to using this inclusive term in order to garner attention. As Hoffman explains, "virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence that is perceived as directed against society… is often labeled 'terrorism'" (1998, p. 13). However, due to this imprecision, this research utilizes the following definition, drawing on the most frequently cited components of terrorism: therefore, terrorism is the systematic use of terror by subnational or clandestine actors against noncombatant civilians to achieve a political motive, though this definition is oftentimes wholly unsatisfying (Hoffman, 1998, p. 14).

Secondly, it is important to make the distinction between what is "cross-national" and what is "transnational" terrorism; this research makes an important distinction, one that is often overlooked, and hopes to delineate the range of terrorist activity into two conceptual categories. While "cross-national" terrorism refers to a domestic organization that makes the decision to strike a target in another country while still retaining its primary goals and operations in its home country, "transnational" terrorism instead refers to an organization that is both stateless and globalized, where attacks not only cross state borders but where actors have a significant and sustained presence. The latter is the form of terrorism this research is primarily concerned with, though both have an effect on significant counterterrorism policymaking.

Since September 11, 2001, terrorists have had to adapt in order to remain operational. While foreign terrorist organizations were once able to seek refuge, hiding out in nations across the world, they are no longer afforded this luxury. Former Secretary

of State Condoleezza Rice changed the way in which counterterrorism specialists see the world, stating:

> Today, however, we have seen that these assumptions no longer hold, and as a result the greatest threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones. (Rice, 2005)

No longer can national security strategists disregard broken and failed states and consider them a minimal security threat. It is now clear that terrorist groups within these nations may be the most dangerous organizations to consider.

Furthermore, this research will evaluate the strategic use of group identity by foreign terrorist organizations in order to best determine whether or not these organizations, based on their respective identities, possess the ability to become transnational. This research will specifically evaluate three types of terrorism: religious, ethnic, and ideological. Strategic identification with either religious, ethnic, or ideological identities has the potential to garner advantages that terrorist organizations otherwise could not receive, aid such groups in their expansion beyond traditional state borders, and assist in the transition towards more transnational states of being. Does each of these three categories of group identities have the ability to transform foreign terrorist organizations from localized groups to transnational threats? In addressing the saliency of group identity within the broader context of international terrorism, the global community will be better suited to direct counterterrorism efforts towards the most threatening and transnational foreign terrorist organizations.

Terrorism, and furthermore the group identity of terrorist organizations, are difficult concepts to tackle. As Audrey Kurth Cronin accurately states: "terrorism is a complicated, eclectic phenomenon, requiring a sophisticated strategy oriented toward influencing its means and ends over the long term" (2002/03, p. 30). Terrorist organizations are not often able to seek refuge within official state borders, and are therefore a moving target, unable to be hit back. Acts of terrorism can be ambiguous and organizations may not always take credit for an attack, leaving counterterrorism experts helpless in developing a plan against them. Terrorist organizations are constantly adapting and readapting to changes within the international system, and therefore, it is difficult if not impossible to ever truly defeat terrorism. This research is simply unable to cover every important aspect of terrorism, but it is able to evaluate the strategic context in which transnational terrorism has been constructed within an albeit permissive international system, and it can better understand the role group identity plays in an organization's global reach.

It is important to note that this study focuses solely upon foreign terrorist organizations during the post-Cold War era, in order to assure a neutral set of conditions by which to examine their impact within the larger scope of identity formation. At the end of the Cold War, terrorist organizations changed drastically. They were forced to adapt their structures of operation as well as their abilities to spread their influence (Sofer, 2011). It is crucial to understand these changes in order to make the case for a post-Cold War study.

Firstly, foreign terrorist organizations and their crafted networks have suffered a breakdown in their hierarchical systems of terror since the end of the Cold War (Sofer, 2011). Osama bin Laden envisioned al Qaeda as an "army of the faithful," whom he intended to train and organize around the notion of the protection of Muslim lands. Not only did he finance training camps in Pakistan and develop powerful recruitment tools for suicide bombers, but he also planned complex missions where their successes revolved around an adherence to a strict chain of command (Sofer, 2011). However, since the end of the Cold War as well as the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, these systems have had to change. The United States has since eliminated both al Qaeda's "operational safe haven" in Afghanistan and its core leadership, causing the foreign terrorist organization to revert to a reliance on secret networks among its leadership and its organizational cells located around the globe. Affiliate cells, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, have begun to operate independently of al Qaeda Central and do not often coordinate with one another, though they still adhere to the organization's primary message and objectives (Sofer, 2011). The hierarchical structure of al Qaeda Central designed by bin Laden in the 1970s has begun to dissipate, creating a more confederate structure for the organization.

Secondly, foreign terrorist organizations have lowered their barriers of access to terrorism since the Cold War with the advent and increased utilization of new technologies, such as public media and the Internet (Sofer, 2011). In these manners, large terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have the ability to communicate freely and spread their messages without relying upon a physical headquarters of operation. Al Qaeda and

its affiliates not only utilize their own websites as well as social media, but have also

produced propaganda documentaries, iPod files, and how-to articles such as guides on

bombmaking in order to spread their message and influence (Sofer, 2011). These

methods indicate an increased decentralization of terrorist organizations as they rely on

radical volunteers to take up the "terrorist cause" on their own, such as the Fort Hood

shooter in 2009 or the failed Times Square bomber in 2010. While this decentralization

indicates a lack of ability on the part of umbrella organizations, such as al Qaeda, to

control their own operations, it also poses various new threats in the post-Cold War era

(Sofer, 2011). Not only does it increase the difficulty of tracking terrorist organizations

both nominally and financially, but the mass production of online propaganda and

training tools eliminate in-person training and has the capability to "make everyone a

potential terrorist" (Sofer, 2011).

   Furthermore, though incidents of transnational terrorism have decreased in the

post-Cold War era, current trends actually suggest that these incidents have become far

more deadly, killing more civilians per attack than in previous years (Enders & Sandler,

2000, pp. 307-308). The chart below further depicts this trend:

Table 1

Civilian Deaths Per Transnational Attack in Recent Years

Date	Site	Deaths	Injuries
February 26, 1993	Truck bombing at the World Trade Center	6	Approximately 1,000
March 20, 1995	Attack on a Tokyo subway	12	Approximately 5,500
August 7, 1998	Simultaneous bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania	6	5,557

Enders and Sandler also maintain that the climax of transnational terrorism was the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979; the increasing severity of attacks has since shifted into the contemporary, post-Cold War era. Today, terrorists are trying to get "more bang for their buck" by achieving a greater impact through fewer events. Despite decreasing numbers of such instances, post-Cold War terrorism is undoubtedly more lethal due to the nature of each attack.

While the shift towards transnational terrorism may also include the emergence of new organizations, the most prevalent danger that national security strategists must consider is the presence of pre-established domestic groups that work to expand their influence and create links to a broader terrorist network. It is arguable that in the post-9/11 world, transnational terrorism has become even more attractive to foreign terrorist organizations. This may be due to the possibility that garnering resources from cross-border sympathizers in order to accomplish seemingly impossible goals has become more popular and increasingly operational. Terrorism is also increasingly prevalent within the

media, indicating that transnational terrorism, now more than ever, still poses an imminent threat to the lives and safety of citizens around the world.

This research is absolutely critical to understanding this transition. By developing the ability to grasp which organizations, based on their group identity, are often more transnational, we will be better suited to direct counterterrorism efforts towards the most threatening foreign terrorist organizations, utilizing crucial resources to the best of our ability. The capacity to disarm and dismantle these organizations is not unlimited, and therefore, this study proves valuable in focusing global counterterrorism efforts.

This research will be conducted qualitatively, examining the cases of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Naxalite movement of India. It will derive in large part from extensive document analysis, including unclassified government documents, such as various "Country Reports on Terrorism." It will utilize domestic and international blogs maintained by foreign terrorist organizations, as well as foreign newspapers reporting on terrorism. This research will examine scholarly articles from experts in the field surrounding transnational terrorism, group identity, and terrorist networks.

It is vital to evaluate the goals, tactics, words, and actions of terrorist organizations in order to understand their intentions. Therefore, this research will extensively analyze these three terrorist organizations by means of the direct contact they have with one another, including financial support, training opportunities, correspondence, and international visitations between terrorist leaders; the strategies and tactics these organizations share – whether they be guerilla-style warfare, hostage-taking,

or sophisticated attacks – as well as the presence of what is called the "demonstration effect" (for example, one organization "giving a nod" to another and working to emulate another organization's success); and the nominal lip-service these organizations pay to one another as well as the actions they take against civil society, praising one another, and publically highlighting acts of terror. These goals, tactics, words, and actions will provide insight into the intentions of terrorist organizations and the means by which they may attempt to become transnational. Furthermore, these insights are directly related to the group identities these organizations value.

This research's contribution to the field includes the assessment of transnational potential of group identities by evaluating each organization's abilities within four categories: tactics, strategies, organization, and networks. Each allows for transnational expansion in different manners, and so it is critical to understand each group within the context of these categories in order to better direct counterterrorism efforts. It is crucial to evaluate an organization's tactics in order to see the ways in which their terrorist attacks might or might not cross international borders. It is equally important to understand the strategies that each organization employs, as some strategies may be domestic in nature but might require external resources; it is this distinction that is important to make. It is also crucial to evaluate the organization of each terrorist group. Are they organized domestically with little outside support, or do they incorporate international actors? Finally, it is absolutely essential to understand the networks that terrorist organizations might form with one another. Terrorist groups have expanded their reach by developing "globe-circling infrastructures" that further recruitment, fundraising, transportation of

materials, and additional support functions (Pillar, 2001, p. 35). These functions of global networks improve an organization's chances of success, and are therefore critical to understand and defeat.

This manuscript will first evaluate the significant research that has already been done concerning the rise of transnational foreign terrorist organizations, how these groups become transnational, and what they might have to gain from such a position. It will then go on to discuss existing literature as it pertains to group identity. This research serves to fill a gap in current scholarship surrounding how said identities may or may not have an effect on an organization's global reach. Chapters 3-5 will go on to empirically examine al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the religious identity, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the ethnic identity, and the Naxalite movement of India and the ideological identity, respectively. Each of these chapters will first begin with an exploration of the goals, tactics, words, and actions of terrorist organizations and then wrap up with a study on the group identity each terrorist organization strategically employs when it comes to tactics, strategies, organization, and networks. This research will conclude looking towards the future of counterterrorism and how national security strategists might engage in better policymaking to more effectively combat the transnational terrorist threat as it pertains to global terrorism networks.

This research concludes that while foreign terrorist organizations nearly all have the potential to become transnational in nature, few truly actualize this goal. Rather, those foreign terrorist organizations that affiliate with either a religious or an ethnic group

identity have a higher chance of achieving transnational status than those of an ideological group identity.

This is because the religious identity more easily crosses international boundaries due to its lack of borders; faith can touch any of its followers all across the world. For example, Islam is not solely present in Iraq or Afghanistan, but also in Algeria, Libya, Mali, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, and many more countries around the world. Religion has the ability to be transmitted throughout whichever countries find faith prominent, spreading influence and thus, providing an opportunity for terrorist organizations to become increasingly transnational. It is more susceptible to instances of extremism, is better able to fundraise effectively and quickly, and has a depth of networks unparalleled by other types of terrorist organizations.

Similarly, the ethnic identity often allows for the sharing of common experiences with other ethnic groups in various parts of the world and draws on ethnic kinship to compel support from diasporas across the globe. It embodies separatists both supporting and looking for support from other ethnic separatists across the world for self-determination, and makes claims of oppressed minority status on the world stage. These characteristics of the ethnic identity all lead to transnational influence.

However, the ideological identity is less likely to expand transnationally due to a lack of desire to move beyond the domestic sphere and the inability to translate their message outside their home country. Research indicates that ideological causes such as antiglobalism, animal rights, ecology, abortion, and anarchism are often prevalent in numerous countries, though different terrorist organizations serve as representatives for

the cause. For example, the Oxford Arson Group of the United Kingdom, the Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade of the United States, and Fighting Ecologist Activism of Greece are all environmental terrorist organizations, though none of the three have significantly spread to any other country besides their own, indicating that ideological terrorism is more limited in scope and influence in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the term "ideological" is often used as a catch-all within the terrorism literature. Ideological terrorism can incorporate any type of left-wing or right-wing terrorism, making research concerning ideological terrorism so difficult to streamline as the category is exhaustive. It is also difficult to conceptualize what denotes a terrorist organization versus a social movement, as Fiona Adamson (2006) discusses, explaining how social migration and social movements can often be a cause of concern when it comes to national security. Ideological terrorism is not a simple form of terrorism to understand collectively.

It is crucial to note that in examining the group identities of terrorist organizations and how they become transnational, the findings of this research should not be taken as law and should not be over-generalized. I expect these findings to be significant and accurate, though when it comes to terrorism, each organization has the potential to become a transnational threat; whether they are given the opportunities is a different matter. I believe many of these opportunities depend on group identity, how they connect with other organizations, and the goals they set for themselves.

The findings of this research are significant as these results may have the ability to further aid national security precautions and help determine which kinds of terrorist

organizations may be most internationally threatening. With terrorist threats at an all-time high and as the world witnesses the consistent emergence of new terrorist organizations, it is imperative that counterterrorism be successful in the 21st century. By understanding how the tactics, strategies, organization, and networks of foreign terrorist organizations extend a group's global reach, this research provides an avenue by which to better evaluate the transnational potential of an organization by means of evaluating its group identity in order to minimize the terrorist threat.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Thus far, this research has given readers a broad overview as to what constitutes terrorism, how it is (or is not) defined, and why group identity plays a critical role in assessing a foreign terrorist organization's motives and methods of operation. Now, it is important to further understand why terrorist groups desire transnational status and how they acquire it, how "new" terrorism permits more precise dangers than did "old" terrorism, how terrorist organizations form networks with one another, and in what ways group identity does or does not perpetuate transnationality. This research will then go on to address the conspicuous gap in the literature as it pertains to the correlation between transnationality and group identity. While many scholars discuss identity, the evidence of its effects on the spread of terrorism is not specifically outlined in relation to the religious, the ethnic, and the ideological group identities.

Why Foreign Terrorist Organizations Desire Transnational Status

There are many different reasons as to why terrorist organizations desire transnational status. This literature review will evaluate the primary explanations that are most frequently cited by scholars in the field, namely: attention and publicity, retribution for grievances, restoration of one's culture, and to "push back" against oppressive forces in the world community.

Bruce Hoffman, a leading expert on terrorism, states that foreign terrorist organizations most desire attention and publicity for their cause. In order to advance their agenda, they must "inform, educate and ultimately rally the masses behind the

revolution" they are trying to instill (1998, p. 17). Hoffman claims that these goals can only be accomplished by means of violence; neither pamphlets, nor posters, nor assemblies would as effectively advance the cause. As Brian Jenkins so efficiently phrased the issue: "terrorists want a lot of people watching" (Miller, 2008). For terrorist organizations, it is not sufficient to discuss grievances anymore. According to Timothy McVeigh: "We needed a body count to make our point," (Hoffman, 1998, p. 177).

Hoffman also reminds readers that members of foreign terrorist organizations do not necessarily see themselves at terrorists, but rather as "freedom fighters" or God's soldiers. Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah of a Lebanese terrorist organization described this dichotomy perfectly, stating: "We don't see ourselves as terrorists… because we don't believe in terrorism. We don't see resisting the occupier as terrorist action. We see ourselves as *mujihadeen* [holy warriors] who fight a Holy War for the people" (1998, pp. 30-31). It is important to recall the rational choices actors make when discussing this concept, as many members of the *mujihadeen* believe they are protecting their territory from unwanted outside influence, fighting back against oppressive regimes, and striving toward the caliphate, or a new Golden Age for the Islamic faith; they often engage in widespread terrorism to achieve this goal.

Katerina Dalacoura explains that the rise of radical religious movements, including the increased emergence of religious terrorist organizations, has plagued the Middle East in recent decades because it has remained largely impervious to democratic institutions, which has ultimately damaged Western interests in the wake of September 11 (2006, p. 508). In creating a network of terrorist cells across Northern Africa, various

foreign terrorist organizations have been able to reach beyond borders, showing that any type of terrorism – whether it be religious, ethnic, or ideological – has the potential to become transnational when disenfranchised and excluded from democratic institutions. On the other hand, many foreign terrorist organizations push back against democratic processes as they view this imposition as an invasion of their culture and of their space, motivating extremist individuals to engage in acts of terror.

Finally, David Kilcullen presents an additional argument in *The Accidental Guerrilla*, in which describes "freedom fighters" who do not engage in terrorism because they themselves might disagree with the enemy's ideology, but because they desire retribution for the enemy's invasion of their space. In this manner, Kilcullen claims that al Qaeda effectively acts as an "inciter-in-chief" (2009, p. 14), initiating widespread provocation and resistance towards its rivals, namely the United States of America. This results in accidental and unintended cooperation with terrorist organizations on the part of local citizens, many of whom may eventually take part in terrorist training camps and join in on inciting acts of terror. His first-hand research indicates a connection between these "inciter-in-chief" organizations and the manpower used to carry out terrorist attacks. While the "accidental guerrilla" may be the "weakest motivational link" within these groups (2009, p. 54), he or she has a profound impact on the unrestricted and asymmetrical war at hand. They have the ability to expand a terrorist organization's ideology beyond state borders and to spread violence and retaliation, allowing for the movement to become more transnational.

How Foreign Terrorist Organizations Become Transnational

Foreign terrorist organizations cross international borders in a variety of manners. These methods include specialized tactics such as suicide bombing, the ways in which these groups present themselves to the public, and the utilization of transnational resources and state sponsorship.

Foreign terrorist organizations who strive to be transnational in nature utilize a variety of methods that not only cross borders, but that are clearly outlawed in the Geneva and Hague Conventions on Warfare of the 1860s, 1899, 1907, and 1949 (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 34-35). These groups frequently take civilians hostage, occasionally executing them; kidnap, abuse, and murder military personnel; carry out brutal terrorist attacks against innocent civilians; and repeatedly target embassies abroad and various diplomatic institutions, such as the United Nations. Each of these tactics displays a desire to expand beyond traditional state borders and to affect global institutions and citizens from civilizations across the world.

One such tactic that has been seen among different group identities is that of suicide bombing. Though terrorist organizations often exploit religious beliefs when indoctrinating suicide bombers, secular volunteers also utilize this tactic, as is exemplified by the Black Tigers of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. While the concept of sacrificial martyrdom, a global concept, is considered to be religiously rewarding, other influences motivate even non-religious terrorists to adopt this method, such as patriotism, an intense hatred of the enemy, a sense of victimization, and both political and psychological circumstances (Hoffman, 1998). These suicide units have

increasingly become an integral part of organizations' general culture. This psychological

warfare, often being waged against innocent civilians, is prevalent across a wide

spectrum of group identities.

Robert Pape (2003) argues that suicide terrorism is a strategic tactic designed to

force modern liberal democracies to make considerable territorial concessions, and as

terrorist organizations have discovered, it has enormous potential to work. Pape cites

various cases where significant gains were made where suicide bombing was present:

> Suicide terrorists sought to compel American and French military forces to
> abandon Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces
> to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995… and the Turkish
> government to grant autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. In all but the case
> of Turkey, the terrorist political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide
> operations than it had before. (2003, p. 343)

In fact, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam pioneered suicide bombing in an attempt to

compel the Sri Lankan government to accept an independent Tamil homeland, as chapter

four will discuss.

Foreign terrorist organizations also promote their transnational identity in the

statements they make, whether they are via social media, official news outlets, or quietly

to one another. The more terrorists are talked about, "'the more dangerous [they]

appear,'" which is all the better for them and their organizations (Hoffman, 1998, p. 177).

These organizations release videotapes, utilize Twitter, publish blogs and training

manuals, praise one another publically, and run their own media outlets, among other

methods. The ways in which terrorist organizations present themselves tells the world a

great deal as to their intentions, their goals, and their targets.

Foreign terrorist organizations also strive to be transnational in the way they utilize their constituencies and their supporters to garner resources they would not be able to receive on their own. Not only are diasporas of monumental importance to the success of a movement, as this research will highlight in chapter four, but those who share a common identity are often willing to support their comrades whether they be domestic or international. Foreign terrorist organizations also highly value state sponsorship, as such a relationship "[enhances] the capabilities and operational capacity of otherwise limited terrorist groups" (Hoffman, 1998, p. 186). Such benefits include logistical support, fundraising capabilities, false identifications, unhindered transport of explosives, and the use of diplomatic facilities, for example. Terrorist organizations could not function without international resources and this is perhaps the most crucial element to a group's transnationality, as their resilience is "doubtless a product of the relative ease with which they are able to draw sustenance and support from an existing constituency" (Hoffman, 1998, p. 171). In fact, almost all terrorist organizations need to utilize transnational resources regardless of whether or not their goals are in fact transnational, and will adopt more transnational identities when it suits their purposes. This research will distinguish between transnational goals and where a group simply goes for resources.

<div align="center">"Old" Versus "New" Terrorism</div>

There is an important debate amongst many scholars, such as Alexander and Gunaratna, concerning the nature of terrorism and whether or not an appropriate distinction exists between "old" and "new" terrorism. Spencer Alexander argues that

"new" terrorism is not really new; instead, he argues that al Qaeda, for example, is a highly effective terrorist organization that has the ability to spread its message efficiently (Gottlieb, 2010, p. 2). While some might say that the methods and tactics of terror they employ are new, others still consider them to be old, but effective and reinvigorated. While bombs are not necessarily revolutionary, it is the way in which they are used and the type of bomb – suicide bombs and nuclear bombs, for example – that may more adequately describe the power a terrorist organization has the ability to acquire.

Rohan Gunaratna, on the other hand, believes that "an identifiably new and more dangerous form of terrorism has in fact grown out of the post-Cold War globalized era" (Gottlieb, 2010, p. 2). The advent of this international, modern-day terrorism took place on July 22, 1968 when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) hijacked an Israeli El Al flight on its way from Rome to Tel Aviv. This hijacking was different than previous events, however, as the terrorists responsible intended to "[trade] the passengers they held hostage for Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel" rather than blow up a seemingly random airplane bound for Israel (Hoffman, 1998, p. 67). It was a "bold political statement" and it drastically changed the landscape of "new" terrorism. Due to this unique event, the PLO has been regarded as the first transnational terrorist organization.

Therefore, Gunaratna believes there is a distinct difference between new and old methods and tactics, and that these advances are significant to how we evaluate terrorist organizations (Gottlieb, 2010, p. 4). From this perspective, scholars can better see organizations that adopt tactics from other terrorist groups, spreading technology and know-how. New technology may be better transferable or have a greater scope of impact.

Were terrorist organizations to acquire an unmanned aerial vehicle, for example, they would then have the capability to revolutionize the way in which they instill terror. Gunaratna believes that terrorist groups are approaching these possibilities and that current counterterrorist operatives should account for them.

Capell and Sahliyeh make the distinction between "old terrorism" and "new terrorism" in their article, which primarily serves as a literature review coupled with an original quantitative study on suicide bombing. "Old terrorism," as it is described in this article, is primarily focused on left-wing ideological terrorist organizations and often concentrates on the origins, structures, motivations, and tactics of terrorist groups (2007, p. 268). However, "new terrorism" concentrates on the lethality of the weapon at hand, perhaps explaining why religious terrorism is so transnational. Religious terrorist organizations have achieved their aim of maximizing carnage through various tactics and strategies that result in massive bloodshed.

The contrast between old and new terrorism is further exemplified by the attempted assassination of the Grand Duke Serge Alexandrovich in 1905, in which "the terrorist tasked with the assassination saw that the duke was unexpectedly accompanied by his children and therefore aborted his mission rather than risk harming the intended victim's family" (Hoffman, 1998, p. 18). However, it is contrasted by Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, in which the terrorists at work indiscriminately claimed the lives of 259 innocent civilians on board as well as 11 civilians on the ground. While terrorist groups may call these deaths "regrettable," ultimately, they view them as a circumstance of war (1998, p. 34). This trend of targeting innocent civilians as opposed

to sparing their lives has come about with the age of new terrorism, so much so that Brian Jenkins updated his original hypothesis, stating in 2006 that "many (although not all) terrorists want a lot of people watching *and* a lot of people dead" (Miller, 2008).

<div align="center">The Networks of Foreign Terrorist Organizations</div>

While tactics, strategies, and organization and important in evaluating the global reach of foreign terrorist organizations, the networks that these groups form, regardless of group identity are the most valuable indicator of one's transnational status. They are imperative to the research at hand and intrinsically pertain to how the world community should be manage the modern terrorist threat.

David Kilcullen first analyzes counterterrorism strategies in the "globalized Islamist insurgency" in his article "Countering Global Insurgency," highlighting how financial, religious, educational, and cultural networks unify the *jihad* community, explaining how religious terrorist organizations most often become transnational. He states that while there is clearly a global *jihadist* movement, it comprises a "loosely aligned confederation of independent networks and movements" (2005, p. 602) Global actors form networks with local actors through what Kilcullen calls "regional affiliates." In this manner, for example, al Qaeda would not interact directly with aspiring affiliates, but instead sponsor and support them through intermediaries. He then discusses his theories of "de-linking" and "disaggregation" and how they can best dismantle the links between these "regional affiliates" and terrorist organizations in the global *jihad*. Disaggregation focuses not on putting an immediate end to insurgencies, but rather to

isolate terrorist insurgents from global organizations, those who have become transnational in nature.

He then goes on to explain in *The Accidental Guerrilla* how globalization has "connected geographically distant groups" who were previously unable to coordinate with one another (2009, p. 10). This connectedness, previously unprecedented, means that these "microactors" may better combine their various efforts in order to achieve outcomes "disproportionate to the size and sophistication of their networks" (2009, p. 10). These networks are imperative for organizations to utilize should they wish to achieve their broader goals, and they must be a point of focus for national security strategists when it comes to defeating the terrorist threat.

Finally, Jean-Luc Marret studies terrorist organizations and the extent to which they are dual-natured. While many political grievances are domestic in nature, there is evidence of transnational expansion and connections with other terrorist organizations, specifically the global branch of al Qaeda, the pragmatic "umbrella organization" (2008, p. 549). They have been providing resources, an identity affiliation, higher levels of expertise, shared strategies and tactics, "economies of scale," and intrinsic support to smaller terrorist groups on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. Even the label "al Qaeda" alone is enough to increase public awareness. According to Marret, terrorist organizations under this "umbrella" have:

> [P]rogressively and openly adopted broader goals, from "regionalization" to solidarity and cooperation with transnational jihadi networks. While the group and its affiliates have recently imitated other forms of jihadi violence across the world, connection with this global violence is nevertheless not new. Its own use of violence is based on traditional historical, geographical, and cultural reasons.

> But mixing old (networks in Europe) and new (targeting, satellite imagery), local (classic Arab conception of war, tactical use of mountainous areas, Saharan informal economy) and global (VBIEDs, "Al Qaeda branding"), the group is certainly at a turning point. (2008, p. 549)

Though the context in which Marret writes specifically references al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, this concept can potentially be applied to each organization and identity this research includes. This dichotomy revolutionizes local terrorist organizations and allows for them to find international influence.

How Group Identity Plays a Role

While the literature regarding individual group identities will be discussed at length in their respective chapters, this brief introduction to the matter of group identity serves as an explanation as to why this question is critical and in what direction various scholars believe transnational terrorism is headed.

Kurth Cronin describes four different types of terrorism: left-wing terrorism that is intertwined with the Communist movement, and right-wing terrorism that stems from Fascism (these first two help to make up this research's ideological terrorism component); ethnonationalist and separatist terrorism, which "accompany the wave of decolonization," particularly in the post-World War II era; and what she calls "sacred," or religious terrorism, which is rapidly becoming the most significant type of terrorism on the planet today (2002/03, p. 39). These different types of terrorist organizations, she states, employ different motivations and different styles of terrorism, and therefore, must also be combated in different manners. When it comes to religious terrorism, the

seemingly most transnational form of terrorism in the current era, Kurth Cronin states

that religious terrorists often feel called upon by their deities to engage in the struggle of

good versus evil, are dramatically unpredictable, consider themselves "unconstrained" by

the rule of law, and often appear alienated by society (2002/03, p. 41).

Hoffman (1995) also helps gets to the heart of this research when it comes to

determining which group identity is the most threatening in terms of becoming

transnational in nature. He states that religious terrorist organizations are much more

lethal than their non-secular counterparts, a point which will be thoroughly discussed

throughout the remainder of this research. He claims that religious extremists view

violence as a "divine duty" to their god. While he writes this piece pre-September 11, he

accurately predicted a far more dangerous future for religious terrorism as the world

community entered the new millennium. He states that to extremists, "religion provided

the only acceptable justifications for terror" (1995, p. 272), and cites statistical increases

in religious terrorism since 1968, the advent of modern terrorism. He goes on to evaluate

the radically different forms of value systems that religious terrorists have come to adopt,

value systems that play a substantial role in one's ability and motivation to commit acts

of terror. It is the presence of this ability and this motivation on the part of a terrorist

organization that better allows them to become transnational. Hoffman goes on to

compare religious terrorists to ideological and other non-secular terrorist organizations,

providing an appropriate platform by which to evaluate the question this research poses.

CHAPTER 3: AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB AND THE RELIGIOUS

IDENTITY

The religious terrorist organization of interest during this research is al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, more commonly discussed as AQIM. AQIM is extensively documented in the U.S. Department of State's "Country Reports on Terrorism" and its expansion into surrounding North African nations has been closely monitored. While this chapter will focus almost exclusively on terrorism surrounding Islamic extremism, it is not to say this is the only form of religious terrorism present in the world community today. Christianity and Hinduism see their fair share of violent extremism; for example, Anders Behring Breivik of the Oslo massacre in 2011 called himself a "Christian crusader," claiming that immigrants to Norway were undermining traditional Christian values (Schwirtz, 2011). However, Islamic extremism is widely held to be the most prevalent and the most deadly form of religious terrorism in the modern era, and will therefore be a primary focus of this research.

Religious terrorist organizations, as this research documents, are indeed increasingly transnational. This is due to the fact that religious groups are more often subjected to extremists within their ranks, religion crosses borders with great ease, and Islamic *jihad* has taken place since the 7th century. Children are more readily indoctrinated into Islamic fundamentalist cultures and widespread tactics such as suicide bombing are used frequently to instill panic and take lives. Most importantly, religious terrorist networks have expanded throughout the world, spanning from South Asia to Northern Africa to the Middle East, many operating under the "umbrella" that is al

Qaeda. Religious terrorism is not new; rather, it is simply more dangerous than ever before, especially in the post-Cold War era.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQIM is an Islamic al Qaeda affiliate cell based out of Algeria in northern Africa, born after the second round of parliamentary elections was cancelled by Algeria's military regime in 1992 when it seemed likely that the Islamic Salvation Front might win and take power (Hanson & Vriens, 2009). Previously called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat – or the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, as designated by the U.S. Department of State pre-2006 – this Sunni organization officially merged with and was recognized by al Qaeda in 2006. While its original aims included the "overthrow of Algeria's secular military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate," counterterrorism experts believe its shift towards a transnational state of being has indicated its plans to "take up the banner of global *jihad* and collude on future attacks in North Africa, Western Europe, and Iraq" (Hanson & Vriens, 2009).

AQIM, harmonious with other foreign terrorist groups, desires various resources that come with transnational status. Some scholars advocate that terrorist organizations desire increased financial support or enhanced training techniques from their advocates in other parts of the world, such as diasporas, or from "umbrella" terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, in order to aid their missions at home. Terrorist organizations may desire state sponsorship or the acquisition of nuclear technology and weaponry. Other organizations

simply wish to spread their message, whether it is religious, ethnic, or ideological in nature.

While many political grievances of foreign terrorist organizations are domestic in nature, there is evidence of transnational expansion and connections with other terrorist organizations. For example, while AQIM is primarily an armed Islamist resistance movement against the secular Algerian government, it has also been utilizing various resources, identity affiliation, higher levels of expertise, shared strategies and tactics, economies of scale, and intrinsic support from the global branch of al Qaeda, the pragmatic 'umbrella organization' (Marret, 2008, p. 549). Even the utilization of the 'al Qaeda' label, for example, is enough to increase international awareness of AQIM. According to Marret, terrorist organizations under this 'umbrella' adopt broader goals, "from 'regionalization' to solidarity and cooperation with transnational jihadi networks" (2008, p. 549).

Terrorist organizations obtain global influence in the ways in which they share strategies and tactics with one another. AFRICOM, the Unified Combatant Command of the U.S. Department of Defense responsible for military operations and relations with the African sphere, highlights several terrorist attacks for which AQIM has taken credit, including vehicle bombs outside UN facilities, an attack on the Algerian Supreme Court, and the murders of French tourists in Mauritania (University of Maryland, 2012). AQIM has been called lethal in the audacity of their attacks, especially as most target American, French, and Algerian citizens. Many suggest that these strategies were learned at Zarqawi's camps, indicating a sharing of tactics (Lund, 2006).

Post-al Qaeda merger, AQIM has adopted suicide bombing, a highly effective tactic indicating that when one is willing to die for their cause, mission completion is increasingly possible; whereas humans can adapt to their environment and the requirements of the mission, technology cannot. The U.S. Department of States' "Country Reports on Terrorism" states that "this development is a nod to [al Qaeda] and a wish to emulate the success of suicide bombings in Iraq" (Hansen & Vriens, 2009).

A report from the U.S. Department of State that was made public through Wikileaks claimed that, in regards to AQIM's transnational efforts and 'copycat tactics,' the organization "subscribes to international *jihadist* goals as well as attacking the Algerian government" ("U.S. embassy cables," 2010). The once classified report goes on to describe the adaptability of AQIM and the ways in which it has discredited the Algerian government. Says the report: "Its tactics have evolved and it is more frequently targeting foreigners. AQIM seeks to copy tactics used by [al Qaeda] in Iraq."

AQIM has also adopted the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in order to attack Algerian military forces, indicating its guerrilla warfare-style approach to terrorism. In June of 2009, it utilized this tactic against 24 Algerian paramilitary policemen (Hansen & Vriens, 2009). AQIM learned how to build and use IEDs through al Qaeda, as this approach is "reminiscent of the tactics employed by [al Qaeda] and Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq" (Hansen & Vriens, 2009).

AQIM has been known to not only launch guerrilla-style attacks, but also to take hostages. "To continue its tradition of self-financing… AQIM operatives may be turning

more to kidnapping as a source of income," as was evidenced by the group's request for five million pounds as the ransom of two Austrian tourists in 2008 (Hansen & Vriens, 2009). The kidnapping of 32 European tourists in February of 2003 brought in as much as ten million dollars. These types of kidnapping are of "routine occurrence" for AQIM operatives, and they do not discriminate between the hostages they take; such persons come from a variety of nations. The ransom funds they acquire are used to purchase surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning equipment.

Numerous accounts of rhetoric can also be seen in the 'lip-service' common among transnational terrorist organizations. AQIM has issued various public statements praising Osama bin Laden, and even went as far as to adopt the 'al Qaeda' brand name. On September 11 of 2006, al-Zawahiri announced that the terrorist group, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, had joined the global al Qaeda organization and had become a priority to the global Islamic *jihad* (Gray & Stockham, 2008, p. 91). "May this be a bone in the throat of American and French crusaders, and their allies, and sow fear in the hearts of French traitors and sons of apostates," al-Zawahiri stated in his appraisal of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Gray & Stockham, 2008, p. 91; Lund, 2006).

AQIM and other Islamic terrorist organizations also utilize verses of the Quran to justify their actions, claiming they are engaging in a Holy War on behalf of Allah. One revelation commonly cited in such rhetoric is 22:39-40, stating that "Permission is given (by God) to those who are fighting because they have been wronged… those who were driven from their homes for no reason but that they say 'God is our Lord'" (Inamdar,

2001, pp. 148-149). Such verses give terrorist action legitimacy in the eyes of the 'freedom fighters.' Furthermore, the Prophet Muhammad preached that the *haram* [sanctuary] of Islam had "no natural boundary limits" and claimed universalism (Inamdar, 2001, p. 232). The power of the Islamic faith, he taught, was meant to be expressed explicitly, which included expeditions of conquest in order to return to the caliphate (Inamdar, 2001, p. 235). In using the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad's teachings as a source of justification, believers in the faith became universally united against the nonbelievers in their holy mission.

Since merging with al Qaeda, AQIM has taken to the airwaves and utilized the media to publicize its attacks (Callimachi, 2010). On September 30 of 2010, AQIM published several photos depicting four armed insurgents standing behind five hostages of European descent. In publishing these photos, AQIM affirmed that it wished to move beyond its reputation as a local force in Algeria, and instead be recognized as a transnational organization capable of such extreme and transnational tactics. Such a motion called for a united *jihadi* movement against Western ideologies (Callimachi, 2010).

AQIM, al Qaeda Central, and its various affiliates not only utilize their own websites, but have also taken to Twitter, making statements such as: "@HSMPress1: Our war against the West is a war for the sovereignty and dominance of Allah's Law above all creation. No to democracy and *#Kafir* [infidel] laws!" (Clayton, 2013). These proclamations and this liberal use of social media sites to set an agenda among religious terrorist organizations depict a shift in its focus from local concerns to international goals.

AQIM and the globalized al Qaeda show signs of interconnectedness through the direct contact they have with one another; this contact may take the form of correspondence, visits to one another's countries and cities, or funding from one to the other. While AQIM has traditionally pushed its influence south, into Mauritania, Niger, and Mali, evidence of strong connections to Iraq and Syria are also apparent (Hunt, 2005). Letters exchanged between current al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri and Afghanistan training camp specialist/al Qaeda in Iraq leader al-Zarqawi have recently been uncovered, which discuss and clarify the tactics, goals, and strategies of the global al Qaeda network, also highlighting AQIM's progress in northern Africa (Bar & Minzili, 2006). Furthermore, an Algerian named al-Mukni is suspected of facilitating the transfer of AQIM *jihadists* to al-Zarqawi's network in Afghanistan and Iraq (Hunt, 2005; Menelik, 2008, p. 33).

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has been noticed around the world, illustrating its expanding network, which appears to be its most valuable asset, perhaps even moreso than its tactics, strategies, and organizational structure. In 2006, for example, "Italian police reported that they had broken up an Algerian cell that 'financed and gave logistical support to Islamic terrorism responsible for massacres in Algeria" (Lund, 2006). In December of 2007, French police arrested eight Parisians suspected of providing 'material support' to AQIM (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2007, p. 65). In 2009, AQIM achieved multiple kidnappings of Spanish, French, German, and Italian citizens in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2009). While AQIM is generally self-funded, there is evidence indicating that during the terrorist organization's

formation in the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden provided funding for these Algerian Islamic extremists (Lund, 2006). Additional AQIM terrorist operatives have been uncovered in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, and the Netherlands (Hansen & Vriens, 2009). These transnational instances serve as an example of the global reach AQIM is capable of developing, and one that the United States needs to be aware of.

AQIM's affiliate cells in Mali have themselves shifted towards goals of expansion, even as recently as December 3, 2012. Moktar Belmoktar, leader the Mali cell, is characterized as "one of the most prolific kidnappers operating in Mali's lawless north" (Ahmed, 2012). He has been linked to the abduction of tourists in 2003, as well as Robert Fowler in 2008, the top United Nations diplomat in Niger. Belmoktar recently left the al Qaeda franchise "so that [the cell] can better operate in the field… We want to enlarge our zone of operation throughout the entire Sahara, going from Niger through to Chad and Burkina Faso," stated one of Belmoktar's associates (Ahmed, 2012). Such statements inexplicably indicate that al Qaeda is expanding its areas of operation; AQIM and its Malian cell play an essential role in such an endeavor.

Former-CIA counterterrorism official Bruce Riedel notes that "AQIM has been steadily building up its capacity to carry out attacks in Western Europe and even North America" (Hansen & Vriens, 2009). With the adoption of al Qaeda's tactics and the presence of AQIM operatives in other European countries due to its expansive network, Riedel believes that the transnational expansion of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is of paramount concern to U.S. national security.

As stated in the Wikileaks report, "in the weeks and months ahead, we will have

to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat" ("U.S.

embassy cables," 2010). As evidenced, terrorism in the 21st century has become more

lethal than ever before. Organizations adopt tactics from other terrorist organizations,

spreading technology and know-how. New technology may be better transferable or have

a greater scope of impact. The United States would be smart to take al Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb seriously, as prescribed by international relations and security studies

scholars, as well as various U.S. government officials. With increasing frequencies of

Western targets, enhanced training methods and financial support from al Qaeda, and the

reinforced connections terrorist organizations have with one another, al Qaeda in the

Islamic Maghreb has become a transnational force that the United States and other global

superpowers must disrupt, dismantle, and defeat.

The Religious Identity

Therefore, it is arguable that religion is the most defining characteristic of foreign

terrorist organizations today. Capell & Sahliyeh, Hoffman, and Kurth Cronin would

agree. Kurth Cronin explains, stating:

Given the historical patterns [of religious terrorism], it is likely to last at least a
generation, if not longer. The jihad era is animated by widespread alienation
combined with elements of religious identity and doctrine-a dangerous mix of
forces that resonate deep in the human psyche. (2002/03, p. 38)

This is evidenced by the fact that the most serious attacks of the 1990s, whether judged

by fatalities or political implications, all have religious motivations (Hoffman, 1998, pp.

92-93). These attacks in the post-Cold War era include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1996 attack on Western tourists outside a Cairo hotel, just to name a few. As the "driving force" behind the increased lethality in contemporary modern terrorism, religion alters commonly held beliefs and assumptions about terrorists. Hoffman states that religious terrorist organizations are much more lethal than their non-secular counterparts. He claims that religious extremists view violence as a "divine duty" to their god. It was once widely believed that terrorists wanted more people watching them and listening to their rhetoric than dead – this no longer seems to be true. Instead, it seems terrorists "want a lot of people watching *and* a lot of people dead" (Miller, 2008).

Subhash C. Inamdar explains the evolution and the rise of Islam, specifically highlighting its religious group identity and how through this identity, extreme Islamic terrorism became so pervasive throughout today's society. Inamdar explains how religion as an entity crosses borders, embeds itself within communities around the world, and is transnational in nature. With the rise of the prophet Muhammad, the Islamic *umma* [community] expanded; it began as a small religious association, which eventually developed its own system of taxation, its own rule of law, and its own economy (Inamdar, 2001, p. ix). The "Arab historiography" has detailed the *jihad* of the faith against the nonbelievers since the 7th century, "lovingly" documenting its Holy War against Christians, he states. Capell and Sahliyeh, Hoffman, and Enders and Sandler agree that this revival in religious fundamentalism stems from the Islamic revolution in the Middle East after the Shah of Iran fell from power in 1979 (Capell & Sahliyeh, 2007,

p. 269). It is this *umma* and this shared history that so readily creates Islamic terrorist networks.

It is crucial to evaluate whether or not it is increasingly common to see instances of religious-based terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda in order to affirm the claim that religious terrorism is increasingly transnational due to its group identity. While instances of nationalist, ethnic, separatist, or ideological terrorism were prevalent throughout the Cold War, motivations for terrorism have changed since the 1990s, making religious terrorism more commonplace in today's society due to idiosyncratic and millennial movements (Enders & Sandler, 2000, p. 310). The proportion of religious groups within active terrorist organizations has increased substantially since 1980, where two of 64 groups were religious-based, or approximately three-percent. As of 1995, religious terrorist groups have grown to account for 25 of 58 groups, or approximately 43-percent (Ender & Sandler, 2000, p. 310). The RANDS-St. Andrews University Chronology report states that in 1995, one-quarter of transnational terrorist attacks were religiously-motivated and that more than one-half of these events resulted in one or more deaths (2000, p. 310). Based on the evidence provided by Enders and Sandler, it is evident that even though a decline in transnational terrorism is apparent, religious terrorism is on the rise, as each incident of terrorism is nearly 17 percentage points more likely to produce death or injury (Enders & Sandler, 2000, p. 329).

The increase in religious-based terrorism, the authors explain, can be attributed to the growth of worldwide religious fundamentalism, the Iranian Islamic revolution, and the previous millennium. Enders and Sandler view this new breed of terrorism as more

threatening to society, more prevalent within the international system, and more deadly per attack than ever before (Enders & Sandler, 2000, p. 310). Hoffman confers, stating that this new terrorism is likely to bring about "an even bloodier and more destructive era of violence ahead" (Miller, 2008).

This is, in part, because religious terrorist organizations have come to view civilians, not just state officials, as legitimate targets of the decadent society such groups generally identify as their enemies (2000, p. 311). This means that not only are terrorist attacks presently designed to target civilians, but that the precision and accuracy of said attacks that terrorist organizations once had has been abandoned for more lethal methods that are sure to affect the broader population.

Notorious religious terrorist organizations, particularly those of Islamic extremism, have also formed networks between one another to better engage in worldwide *jihad*. It is important to distinguish between umbrella organizations and those who fall underneath it. Al Qaeda is known to facilitate hundreds of cells in many countries across both the developed and developing world, a clear demonstration of its transnational intentions, capabilities, and goals ("Al-Qaeda around the world," 2011).

Figure 1. Al Qaeda "may have underground cells in dozens of countries, but its main areas of activity, and those of some of its affiliates, are detailed [above]" ("Al-Qaeda around the world," 2011).

As is evident, al Qaeda Central is undoubtedly the most notorious and widespread religious terrorist organization in the world, but to truly examine the motives of religious terrorists as a whole, this research must focus on cells that wish to gain transnational advantages from these umbrella organizations. It is not unreasonable to expect that one of the reasons al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb desired transnationality was to garner resources from its parent organization, al Qaeda Central.

Other religious terrorist organizations from the al Qaeda network have done the same, evidencing the importance of networks within religious terrorism. For example, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has become increasingly transnational in a variety of manners with the help of the broader al Qaeda. Formed in 2004 by long-time Sunni extremists, AQI eventually led to the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2007, a local front-group

for AQI though which their terrorist actions have been politicized. Led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the scope of their attacks has quickly expanding since 2005, peaking in 2006 and 2007 (Masters & Bruno, 2012).

These links to al Qaeda Central are evident in a variety of manners, as with AQIM. Recalling the previously mentioned letters exchanged between al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri and al Qaeda in Iraq leader al-Zarqawi, it is important to note al-Zawahiri's concerns over the intended goals of al-Zarqawi's *jihad* mission (Bar & Minzili, 2006, p. 39). Al-Zawahiri discusses the connection between "purity of faith" and success in the field, claiming that they are not necessarily linked and that AQI should better align their beliefs with their tactics. To remedy these faults of AQI, al-Zawahiri sets straight the stages of the jihad in Iraq: expel the Americans, establish an Islamic authority, extend the *jihad* to the secular countries surrounding Iraq, and a clash with Israel. He advocates for the success of short-term goals and recognizes that AQI and AQ may only achieve their long-term goals by gaining support from the Muslim community and the *mujihadeen*. He then wraps up his letter by giving support and outlining his own predictions as to how the insurgency should continue.

AQI had received its funding through al-Zarqawi's support networks before his death, but more commonly fund themselves through smuggling and crime (Masters & Bruno, 2012), as does AQIM. There is also evidence to support the idea that AQI has previously been funded by Tehran, despite the fact that al Qaeda is a Sunni organization. In paying lip-service to other organizations, AQI has continuously and publically supported the efforts of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. AQI pledged their allegiance to

bin Laden at the time of their formation and it as a whole eulogized bin Laden upon his death in 2011, again pledging their support to new leader al-Zawahiri.

AQI has gained global recognition in not only the attacks they have launched, but also by the tactics they have come accustomed to using, as many mimic those of al Qaeda Central and AQIM. AQI has taken credit for the August 2003 bombings of the Jordanian Embassy, UN headquarters in Baghdad, and a Shiite mosque in Najaf; the November 2005 bombing of American-owned hotels and resorts in Jordan (killing 60); the February 2006 bombing of Shiite Islam's holiest and most sacred shrine, the al-Askari Mosque in Samara; as well as incite attacks responsible for killing hundreds of Shiites and Sunnis alike (Masters & Bruno, 2012). It has attacked the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and Western journalists' residences. AQI has on occasion launched additional, high-profile international attacks outside their state borders, such as on U.S. Navy ships near Jordan.

AQI has also orchestrated eight simultaneous bombings around Baghdad's "Green Zone" in an attempt to reduce the stability of the country in anticipation of the upcoming Arab League Summit. The ISI released a statement taking credit for the attacks that killed 46 people and wounded over 200, stating: "death is approaching you, when you least expect it" (Yacoub, 2012). These coordinated attacks indicate the "professionalism" in attacks that al-Qaeda operatives strive to achieve, indicating further contact and shared training between various organizations.

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Abu Sayyaf (AS) have also tied themselves to the al Qaeda umbrella. Both militant Islamic terrorist groups, each spans its reach across several

Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. Both were founded as a part of an earlier and extremely violent Islamic rebellion called Darul Islam, which was the origin of violent *jihadism* in Indonesia.

Evidence of direct contact between JI/AS and al Qaeda is apparent. Former Jemaah Islamiyah leader Umar Patek, the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings, was captured in Abbottabad, Pakistan in January 2011, just four months before the killing of Osama bin Laden ("Philippines," 2012). Along with the killings of three head leaders of the groups in early 2012, this has been considered one of the most important successes not only in destabilizing these terrorist organizations, but also in understanding their networks with one another. Al-Qaeda operatives have likewise been arrested in Indonesia ("Jemaah Islamiyah," 2009).

While JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir denies that his organization has any formal ties to al Qaeda, he has expressed public support for Osama bin Laden ("Jemaah Islamiyah," 2009). After JI supposedly linked up with al Qaeda in the 1990s, it has changed both its strategies and perhaps its targets. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said in January 2003 that JI operatives were "involved in a 1995 plot to bomb eleven U.S. commercial airliners in Asia and directed the late-2001 foiled plot to attack U.S. and Western interests in Singapore" ("Jemaah Islamiyah," 2009). He also referred to JI's plans to attack the United States, British, and Israeli embassies in December 2001; JI later targeted the Australian Embassy in 2004. Attacks accredited to AS are mostly restricted to Indonesia and the Philippines, though it has held several Westerners hostage in return for ransom over the years.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in Iraq, Jemaah Islamiya, and Abu Sayyaf have all clearly enhanced their connections with the larger al Qaeda network. David Kilcullen (2005) analyzes counterterrorism strategies in the "globalized Islamist insurgency." He uses the term "insurgency" rather than describe today's climate as a "war on terror," as he accurately points out the asymmetry in methods of warfare. Kilcullen highlights how financial, religious, educational, and cultural networks unify the *jihad* community. He states:

> Clearly, therefore, there is a global jihadist movement, but it comprises a loosely aligned confederation of independent networks and movements, not a single unified organization. Global players link and exploit local players through regional affiliates – they rarely interact directly with local players, but sponsor and support them through intermediaries. (2005, p. 602)

Kilcullen highlights how financial, religious, educational, and cultural networks have unified the *jihad* community. While global actors, such as al Qaeda, link and exploit local players through regional affiliates, such as AQIM, "they rarely interact directly with local players, but sponsor and support them through intermediaries" (2005, p. 602). It is this sponsorship and affiliation that AQIM desires in regard to its transnational aspirations. It is these connections and these networks that make religious terrorism so powerful and transient in the world community today.

Furthermore, AQIM, AQI, JI, and AS have all adopted suicide bombing as a result of enhanced connections with the larger al Qaeda network. Though JI and AS are notably more domestic in nature, their use of suicide bombing exemplifies the transnational nature of their tactics. Michael B. Capell and Emile Sahliyeh maintain that

religious terrorism has manifested itself on the international stage by means of suicide tactics. This method of terror, according to extremist leaders, fulfills the promise of martyrdom and the ultimate form of altruistic sacrifice (Inamdar, 2001, p. 223). The authors explain that activists from many religious traditions around the world have become increasingly involved in religiously inspired terrorism, or the "new terrorism," which increasingly includes suicide bombing tactics. Capell and Sahliyeh agree with Hoffman, as well as with Enders and Sandler, in that terrorism has become more lethal and that fatalities have increased due to this trend (2007, p. 267).

Religious terrorist groups have no consistent constituency, invoke various methods of legitimization and justification, and adhere to radically different concepts of morality (2007, p. 270). These religious organizations are borderless, and therefore, more transnational and more lethal than ever before, especially when terrorists utilize suicide bombing tactics associated with prestige, honor, and the promise of many rewards in heaven, including virgins, forgiveness for their sins, and eternal happiness (2007, p. 271).

Capell and Sahliyeh remind us that these individuals are not only Islamic suicide bombers in the Middle East, but also Jewish assassins in Israel, Buddhist sects in Japan, radical Hindus and Sikhs in India, and Christian militants in the United States. The threat posed by suicide terrorism is widespread in nature and is not limited to religious groups. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) from Sri Lanka, who are often credited with the development of the suicide bombing technique, was widely regarded as one of the most lethal foreign terrorist organizations until they became

inactive in 2009 and they were not a religiously inspired group, as will be discussed at length in the following chapter.

In light of this report, Capell and Sahliyeh maintain the argument that the religious nature of these terrorist organizations and their networks accounts for the new lethality of contemporary terrorism, with the caveat that suicide terrorism *coupled* with religion also plays a significant if not imperative role in becoming transnational (2007, pp. 267-268). They propose the following three hypotheses: Firstly, that an increase in religious terrorist organizations will lead to increased deaths as a result of terrorist acts. Secondly, that an increase in religious terrorist organizations will lead to more civilian casualties than by other types of groups. Finally, that a terrorist group's utilization of suicide terror will result in more deaths and casualties than by other groups utilizing traditional tactics.

Religious terrorism is clearly on the rise. However, it is not new in regards to the technology used to accomplish its goals. While old-fashioned bombs were used in the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, at Oklahoma City in 1995, and in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (Enders & Sandler, 2000, p. 311), today, the physical placement of the bomb is more important. The tactics of religious terrorism are more deadly because such organizations plant them to explode both when and where maximum amounts of carnage are most likely to occur. Religious terrorists, Capell and Sahliyeh explain, may also strive to both acquire and utilize a nuclear weapon across state borders to accomplish these objectives (2007, p. 270).

Additionally, in order to better understand transnational religious terrorism Schebley developed a comprehensive profile of a *religious* terrorist, moving beyond the questions as to what simply makes a terrorist (2003, p. 107). In developing her case study of Hizbullah's Istishhadeens (HI) – rather, those members who have self-chosen martyrdom by means of suicide bombing or self-immolation in the name of Allah (2003, p. 123) – Schebley asks four questions, striving to describe what factors compose a religious terrorist (2003, p. 107): Firstly, she wishes to analyze four categories of HIs according to their levels of education and religiosity, their potential affinity for martyrdom, their susceptibility to indoctrination and charismatic leadership, their potential willingness to relocate from their place of birth, and their likelihood to commit acts of terror. Secondly, she wishes to explore the relationship between an HI's diagnosis of various psychotic illnesses (including intermittent explosive personality, oppositional defiant disorder, and/or psychotic personality) and their tendency to revert to principles of absolutism, their affinity for martyrdom, their susceptibility to the "culting" process as well as psychotic depression, and the possibility of their engagement in acts of terrorism and/or self-immolation? Thirdly, she wishes to explore the relationship between an HI's personal rating of the levels of their absolutist tendencies, employability, annual household income, and geo-cultural immobility. Finally, she hopes to determine whether or not levels of religiosity and the age of an HI are ever inversely related, especially when considering one's affinity for martyrdom and/or terrorism.

Based on the quantitative results of these four research questions, Schebley's pragmatic research design ultimately puts forth a potential qualitative description of a religious terrorist:

Cochran Homogeneity Odds Ratio Tests				
Proportion of respondents' attitudes toward or position on the following dependent variables according to education	Most favorable/ affinity attitude/ position was indicated by group	Least favorable attitude/ position	Pearson chi-square	Asymp. sig.
Religiosity level/ religious training	High school education level	College education	52.588	.127
Susceptibility to the culting process/ indoctrination	Middle school education level	College education	144.255	.000
Geocultural immobility and/or willingness to relocate	College (most willing)	Elementary education	113.186	.000
Affinity for martyrdom	High school education	College education	90.078	.000
Willingness to commit terrorism	Middle school education	College education	82.587	.001
Note. N valid cases = 341.				

Figure 2. Schebley's findings on what makes a Hizbullah Istishhadeen.

These results, based on the questionnaire taken by Shi'a zealots, or Hizbullah's Istishhadeens, indicate that those who have obtained a college education are the least susceptible to indoctrination and charismatic leadership, have the least affinity for martyrdom, and are the least of those willing to engage in terrorism (Schebley, 2003, p. 114). However, high school educated HIs often have the highest levels of religious

training as well as religiosity, and are the most willing to engage in an act of martyrdom. Even more drastic, middle school educated HIs are the most susceptible to indoctrination and charismatic leadership, and are the most willing to engage in acts of terrorism.

As a result of this quantitative research and in conjunction with 15 videotapes of suicide bombers' last will and testaments and audiotapes of 918 zealots poised to self-immolate, Schebley was able to craft a comprehensive profile of a religious terrorist. She found that a religious terrorist is prescribed to be often in a state of Serene Disengagement – or a state of being that includes six factors of sensory disengagement, including a faint smile or a sense of inner peace, for example (Schebley, 2003, p. 117) – before engaging in self-immolation or suicide bombing. They are often a part of a terrorist cell that is made up of their friends and family, and they often perceive religious obligations and divine communication as transcending social consciousness (2003, pp. 119-120). Therefore, Schebley advocates that these markers better enable policymakers as to what makes a religious terrorist who, by Hoffman's standards, has the ability to act transnationally.

Terrorist organizations must also confront choice-theoretic decisions when engaging in risky behavior (Enders & Sandler, 2000, p. 311). Traditional terrorist organizations, as described by the authors, are more risk averse when it comes to terrorist and non-terrorist activities. However, religious organizations are often "risk-loving" and will engage in more risky strategies in exchange for larger payoffs. Terrorist organizations in the 1970s and 1980s often engaged in logistically simple attacks; religious organizations of the 1990s and 2000s depart from this trend and utilize

logistically complex strategies and tactics to achieve their larger goals. The recent rise in fundamental organizations is likely to continue this new, risky trend.

Dalacoura explains that the rise of radical religious movements, including the emergence of religious terrorist organizations, has plagued the Middle East in recent decades because it has remained largely impervious to democratic institutions, which has ultimately damaged Western interests in the wake of September 11 (2006, p. 508). She investigates whether exclusion from democratic political processes and the civilian experience of repression makes Islamist movements more apt to utilize terrorist methods. She also asks whether or not political participation in any form encourages citizens to pursue their objectives through peaceful means, rather than buy engaging in acts of terror. For example, the Broader Middle East Partnership Initiative was announced at the G8 Conference in Atlanta in 2004, designed to strengthen ties to the Middle East with special provisions to focus on the destabilization of the spreading religious terrorist cells (2006, p. 509). However, some have criticized this initiative, stating that the link between democracy and stability does not necessarily apply to these transnational terrorist organizations in the region, as they are often borderless and without government structures.

Dalacoura sees three types of Islamist terrorism emerge: transnational Islamist terrorism, Islamist terrorism associated with national liberation movements, and Islamist domestic insurgencies against incumbent regimes (2006, p. 510). Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas, and the Islamic Action Front (FIS) exemplify these types of Islamist terrorism, respectively. She continues by asking whether or not exclusion from

democratic processes drives Islamist movements to engage in terrorist methods, and whether they are cross-border or domestic in nature (2006, p. 510). The pervasiveness of religious education by terrorist organizations, and perhaps indoctrination, throughout the Middle East, coupled with various psychological anomalies as supported by Schebley, allows for terrorism to spread in the absence of democracy (2006, pp. 510-511). Terrorist perceive that there is an absence of choice when it comes to democracy in the region, and they therefore believe there is no other choice but to engage in terrorism.

The ongoing *jihad* in a region wrought with instability contributes to al Qaeda recruitment across borders, in which it attracts those looking for a highly militaristic Islamic cause with a violent worldview to fight for. A lack of participation in domestic politics drives their religious fanaticism worldwide, as there is no place for such extremism within their own governments (Dalacoura, 2006, p. 515). Al Qaeda is also rootless and effortlessly spreads into various states, enjoying its lack of accountability to anyone but itself. This exemplifies the transnational nature of al Qaeda (2006, p. 515).

Hamas and Hezbollah have been associated with national liberation movements, especially within the Palestinian and Lebanese contexts, respectively (Dalacoura, 2006, pp. 515-516). Neither has a specific goal to transition into an international state of being, though Dalacoura advocates that each could, should they desire. While both organizations are religious-based, they have directed their efforts towards a nationalist movement instead. Both organizations have engaged in terrorism across borders.

The FIS has emerged in opposition to previously established governments in both Algeria and Egypt. Politically excluded and repressed, this Islamic terrorist organization

linked itself with additional, radical Islamist groups who also rejected democratic ideals, and fought against political institutions such as the Muslim Brotherhood using both terrorist and insurgent tactics (Dalacoura, 2006, p. 518). In creating a network of terrorist cells across Northern Africa, these organizations were able to reach beyond borders, showing that religious terrorism is indeed transnational.

CHAPTER 4: THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM AND THE ETHNIC

IDENTITY

The ethnic terrorist organization of interest during this research is the Liberation

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a separatist group from the southern tip of India and the

island of Sri Lanka who, since the 1970s, has pursued a homeland for ethnic Tamils,

persecuted by Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority (Bhattacharji, 2009; Cronin, 2004, p. 61).

Founded by Vellupillai Prabhakaran, and infamous for the utilization of women suicide

bombers and the introduction of the suicide bomb jacket, the LTTE has claimed

responsibility for "a dozen high-level assassinations, over two hundred suicide attacks,

and its war against the government [which] has cost more than seventy thousand lives"

(Bhattacharji, 2009). Since the 2002 Norwegian ceasefire facilitation, the Tamil Tigers

declared that it would recognize a solution that respected the "principle of self-

determination," or "an autonomous area for Tamil-speaking peoples within a federal

structure" (Cronin, 2004, p. 61).

The Tamil Tigers were crushed in May of 2009 by the Sri Lankan army, and

Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the Head of the LTTE's International Diplomatic Relations unit,

issued the following statement:

> Despite our plea to the world to save the thousands of people in Vanni from the
> clutches of death, the silence of the international community has only encouraged
> the Sri Lankan military to execute the war to its bitter end. In the past 24 hours,
> over 3,000 civilians lie dead on the streets while another 25,000 are critically
> injured with no medical attention. To save the lives of our people is the need of
> the hour. Mindful of this, we have already announced to the world our position to
> silence our guns to save our people. (Pathmanathan, 2009)

Such a statement brought to an end the Sri Lankan conflict that spanned a deadly 26 years

(Bhattacharji, 2009). During this time, the Tamil Tigers pioneered various tactics of

terror, fostered an expansive communal identity, heavily utilized its Diasporas in foreign

nations, and attempted to operate as a nation in defiance of the Sri Lankan government,

citing the principles of "self-determination."

The LTTE has utilized its ethnic identity in three specific ways: as ethnic kinship

to compel support from its diaspora, as separatists both supporting and looking for

support from other ethnic separatists across the world for self-determination, and as an

oppressed minority on the world stage.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The Tamil Tigers, harmonious with other foreign terrorist groups, desired various

resources that come with transnational status. Hoffman (1998) advocates that terrorist

organizations each desire increased financial support or enhanced training techniques

from their advocates in other parts of the world, such as Diasporas, or from 'umbrella'

terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, in order to aid their missions at home. Terrorist

organizations may desire state sponsorship or the acquisition of nuclear technology and

weaponry. Other organizations simply wish to spread their message, whether it is

religious, ethnic, or ideological in nature.

The Tamil Tigers have been noticed around the world, indicating the spread of its

expansive network while the organization was active. This was primarily accomplished

through its acute utilization of the Tamil diasporas in various parts of the world,

including Canada, parts of Europe, India, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United

States (Fair, 2005, p. 139). This diaspora was produced when hundreds of thousands of

Sri Lankan Tamils escaped the civil war between the Sri Lankan military and the Tamil

rebels, fleeing to Europe, Asia, and North America (Fair, 2005, p. 126).

This ethnic divide was created in 1833 when the British developed the central and

western parts of the Sri Lankan island, marginalizing the northern and eastern regions,

thus excluding the Tamil minority (Fair, 2005, p. 137). The diaspora is primarily

comprised of Sri Lankan refugees and former refugees, constituting 700,000 to 800,000

persons or one-fourth of the Tamil population (Fair, 2005, p. 139). According to Fair,

"the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora has been a fundamental component of the Tamil

insurgency. It has been the backbone of the LTTE's global operations and has been a

financial lifeline of the militancy" (2005, p. 139).

The Tamil diaspora has also been a crucial asset to the LTTE, who has established

a transnational network of at least 40 countries dedicated to financing the Tamil Tigers;

this network is unrivaled by any other insurgent organization (Fair, 2005, p. 140).

Approximately 80-percent of the LTTE's estimated $82 million USD annual income

comes from funds raised by the Tamil diaspora. While most funds from diaspora

members are given voluntarily and in support of Tamil autonomy and security (Fair,

2005, p. 140), there has been speculation that donations have been contributed out of fear.

Regardless, in states where the Tamil Tigers have been outlawed, the diaspora cloaked

the terrorist organization's financial accounts beneath a variety of different titles, such as

the United Tamil Organization, the World Tamil Movement, and the Tamil

Rehabilitation Organization (Fair, 2005, p. 140). These organizations have been used to raise and divert funds for the LTTE for the "public perception management campaign" surrounding the Tamil separatist movement, and to legitimize the Tamil Tigers as the champion of Tamil interests.

The LTTE has crossed state borders in the way that it acts like a business, financially. In addition to a widely circulated fundraising campaign, the Tamil Tigers also acts as a "proxy lender" to Tamil-run small businesses both in Sri Lanka as well as in diaspora communities (Fair, 2005, p. 141). These revenue streams have been known to raise several hundred thousand U.S. dollars per month, sometimes nearly reaching one million – of which LTTE takes a cut – in Switzerland, Canada, and the UK, for example. The LTTE has been known to exploit non-profit medical and social groups, creating front organizations where such groups do not exist; this is beneficial to the LTTE due to the difficulties in proving that "such improprieties are occurring" (Fair, 2005, p. 142).

Furthermore, liberal democracies in the UK, Canada, and Thailand have also permitted foreign terrorist groups to raise funds openly, on occasion. For example, Canada's Finance Minister, Paul Martin, attended a fundraising dinner hosted by the LTTE in early 2000 (Gunaratna, n.d.). While Martin suffered the wrath and humiliation of the Canadian media and parliamentary opposition, "he survived the scandal." Public fundraising for a terrorist organization exemplifies the power of the LTTE's diasporas as well as what appears to be widespread acceptance of ethnic separatist movements; this does not carry the same implications of fundraising for an ethnic terrorist organization, though such a description is in the contextual framing of the group.

The Tamil Tigers also invest in stocks, money markets, real estate, farms, finance companies, and restaurants across the world (Fair, 2005, p. 142). Other methods of fundraising include gem trade, human trafficking, and narcotics trafficking, as well as other high profit margin ventures. Each of the aforementioned operations was possible only through the international diaspora involvement.

Perhaps even more vital to the Tamil separatist movement than financial backing to the LTTE was the political and diplomatic support within over 54 diaspora host countries:

> LTTE lobbying efforts have been tremendously successful in cultivating state support for their movements in state capitals throughout the world during the 1980s and 1990s. Until circa 2001, the LTTE was able to develop political sympathy for their cause by mobilizing media and "grass-roots" and other political organizations over the issue of Tamil rights and the abuse of those rights by the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE effectively coordinates these efforts through a number of "umbrella organizations" established in key countries. (Fair, 2005, p. 142)

These grassroots campaigns were only possible through the utilization of the Diaspora communities. Such "umbrella organizations" abroad included the Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations, the Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations, the French Federation of Tamil Associations, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (arguably the most valuable Diaspora group), the Illankai Tamil Sangam of the United States, the Tamil Coordinating Committee in Norway, and the International Federation of Tamils based out of the UK (Fair, 2005, p. 142).

These organizations effectively capitalized upon the philosophies of the liberal democracies in which they resided, drawing a political and diplomatic audience (Fair,

2005, p. 143). In working to win Tamil support abroad, diaspora activists circulated

LTTE propaganda through email, Internet sites, telephone hotlines, and radio shows.

Tamils abroad not only established international organizations designed to promote Tamil

equalities in Sri Lanka, but they did so by utilizing the Internet to establish cyber

communities and chat room dialogues, including Tamilnation.org, a website seeking to

"forge a trans-national Tamil nationalist identity" and to promote a democratic and

peaceful Tamil separatist movement (Fair, 2005, pp. 139-140). By capitalizing on

democratic ideals and garnering support for the Tamil rebels in the interest of "self-

declaration," the diasporic network helped legitimize the LTTE.

 Not only did the Tamil diaspora garner funds, weaponry, and support, but it also

established connections with other separatist and terrorist organizations, such as "the

Khalistani-oriented Sikhs, the Kashmiri separatists, and other militant organizations

based in the Middle East" (Fair, 2005, p. 144). When it came to weapons procurement,

relationships with these groups allowed for the circumvention of international arms

control conventions, law enforcement authorities, and various government agencies on

multiple continents. These connections also allowed the LTTE to easily raise funds in one

location while conducting military operations in another.

 Soon after the ceasefire agreement in 2002, diaspora factions encouraged the

Tamil Tigers to pursue a diplomatic solution to the ongoing conflict and to repair the

legitimacy of the Tamil demands (Fair, 2005, p. 145). The LTTE was able to "recuperate

its lost credibility both because it was de-proscribed in Sri Lanka (although not

elsewhere) and because it became a co-participant (with varying degrees of equality) in

multi-lateral forums alongside the Sri Lankan government" (Fair, 2005, p. 146). This strategy managed to restore the legitimacy that the LTTE desired within the diaspora communities and reinstated the perception that the Tamil Tigers were an insurgent organization rather than an ethnic terrorist group, a label that discouraged monetary donations and nominal support from the international population. The strategic use of the ethnic identity by the LTTE in this instance demonstrates the great advantage that diasporas can provide to a separatist movement when it comes to credibility and perception manipulation.

The Tamil diaspora was a loyal community who remained engaged in the Tamil struggle. By utilizing the Tamil diasporas across the world in a variety of financial, political, and commercial fashions, "the Sri Lankan Tamils were able to mobilize using social structures that had greater scope" (Fair, 2005, p. 127) and create a broad coalition dedicated to Tamil mobilization and the garnering of resources. This operational method of achieving global reach aided the Tamil Tigers in becoming transnational.

In addition to garnering resources, funds, and publicity through the diaspora abroad, the LTTE has been accused of maintaining contact with other terrorist organizations through illegal arms dealings in Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia (Bhattacharji, 2009). The group has also been known to smuggle weapons from Pakistan-based Islamists through Sri Lanka to their counterparts in the Philippines (Mannes, 2007). The LTTE had close connections with the Maoist-Naxalite insurgency and the Khalistan movement in India, as well as with the Kurdistan Workers' Party ("The history of the Tamil Tigers," 2009). LTTE rebels were trained by the Popular Front for the Liberation

of Palestine during the 1970s in Southern Lebanon ("The history of the Tamil Tigers," 2009). It is crucial to understand that these minority groups seem to share a connection as groups fighting for self-determination; this shared experience is an important aspect to the ethnic group identity and will be discussed at length in the following section of this chapter.

The Tamil Tigers have also provided enhance support to terrorist groups across the globe. The LTTE's shipping fleet provided logistical support to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, a Pakistani group with al Qaeda affiliations, in order to transport weapons to the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines ("The history of the Tamil Tigers," 2009). It was rumored that in 2007, the LTTE stole 130,000 Norwegian passports and sold them to al Qaeda affiliates (Jayawardhana, 2007). Norway was particular sensitive to the incident, as it had brokered the ceasefire peacekeeping agreement in 2002, which the Tamil Tigers later disregarded, sending the region back into chaos. The LTTE also sent two combat tacticians and explosive experts to the southern Philippines to train members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front ("The history of the Tamil Tigers," 2009).

Despite relationships with various terrorist organizations and insurgency movements across the world, experts believe that the LTTE had no operational connections to al Qaeda or its radical Islamist affiliate cells, as the Tamil Tigers were secular in nature (Bhattacharji, 2009). However, these terrorist organizations have emulated the LTTE by utilizing some of its innovations, such as the suicide bomb jacket. Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades have all mimicked this method (Bhattacharji, 2009).

Terrorist organizations also become transnational in the ways in which they share strategies and tactics within terrorist networks, and the Tamil Tigers are no exception. The LTTE has utilized a variety of tactics that are considered commonplace for traditionally accepted transnational terrorist organizations. For example, "the LTTE is most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers. Political assassinations and bombing were commonplace tactics prior to the cease-fire" (Gamage, 2005). The Black Tiger wing of the LTTE is responsible for the murders of the former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi; the President of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa; and the attempted murder of Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, just to name a few ("Tamil Tiger 'regret,'" 2006; Karat, 2000; Baker, 2002). In fact, the LTTE was the first insurgent organization to use concealed explosive belts and vests in suicide attacks ("Sri Lanka (LTTE) historical background," 2003).

The Tamil Tigers have also executed prisoners of war, in spite of the 1998 declaration that it would abide by the Geneva Conventions. Examples include the mass murder of 600 unarmed Sri Lankan Police officers in 1990, or the execution of 200 Sri Lanka Army POWs during the Battle of Pooneryn ("Recalling the saddest day," 2011). While most of the Tamil Tigers' attacks have often involved military objectives, civilians have been targeted on numerous occasions, including during a high profile attack on Colombo's International Airport in 2001 that caused damage to several commercial airliners and military jets, and killed 16 people (Venkataramanan, 2001). This move to civilian targets is a transnational tactic and indicates a move beyond insurgency; where civilians are targeted comes international backlash.

Additional crimes and tactics of the LTTE include sea piracy, arms smuggling, human trafficking, extortion, passport forgery, fraud, and the utilization of child soldiers. The Tamil Tigers have been accused of recruiting and using child soldiers, possibly having up to 5,794 child soldiers in its ranks since 2001, of which the Sri Lankan military has also been accused (Raman, 2006).

Numerous accounts of 'lip-service' are often common among transnational terrorist organizations and their diasporas, if applicable. The rhetoric of the Tamil Tigers, as well as that of their opponents, is valuable in the analysis of the organization.

The LTTE describes itself very differently than does the U.S. Department of State. According to Eelam.com, a website run by the Tamil Tigers advocating for the advanced independence of the Tamil people, states:

> The birth and growth of the armed resistance movement should be analysed [sic] within the historical development of the Tamil struggle for self-determination… It is a history characterized by state repression and resistance by the Tamils. The political struggles in the early periods were peaceful, democratic and non-violent but later assumed the form of armed resistance as the military repression of the state intensified into genocidal proportions. ("Tamil Eelam," n.d.)

The LTTE does not describe itself as a terrorist organization or an insurgency campaign, similar to religious organizations who call themselves "freedom fighters" as opposed to "terrorists." The LTTE describes itself as a non-violent nation of people who were forced to take up arms in the face of state-sponsored genocide. The Tamil Tigers explain that "against the background of a powerful Sri Lankan diplomatic lobby, reinforced by misrepresentation of facts and falsehood, the Tamils have been making every effort in the international arena to seek legitimacy for the claim of self-determination" ("Tamil

Eelam," n.d.). The LTTE states that claims made against it are "misrepresented" and depictions of "falsehood," and that it strives to promote itself as a nation of people seeking self-determination.

However, the U.S. Department of State describes the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam quite differently, stating in its 2004 "Country Reports on Terrorism" that "the United States would maintain the designation of the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until it unequivocally renounced terrorism in both word and deed" (2004, p. 75).

Human rights advocates and Sri Lankan military members utilize the same sense of rhetoric as the U.S. government. Jo Becker, respected Children's Rights Advocacy Director for the Human Rights Watch, stated that "the Tamil Tigers are exporting the terrors of war to Tamils living in the West. Many members of the diaspora actively support the Tamil Tigers. But the culture of fear is so strong that even Tamils who don't support them still feel they have no choice but to give money" ("Tamil Tigers extort diaspora," 2006). Not only does this statement echo scholarly findings on diaspora financing, but it also caused Becker to become an LTTE target. Additionally, Colonel Karuna of the Sri Lankan military stated in 2009: "I feel very sad for the people of the north. They are Tamil people and [the Tamil Tigers] did very bad things to them. When civilians tried to escape, including children, they were shot" (Nelson, 2009).

It is evident that the LTTE and its opponents discuss the terrorist organization in very different ways. While the Tamil Tigers describe themselves as a nation seeking self-determination and an autonomous homeland, the U.S. government, human rights

agencies, and the Sri Lankan military describe them as ruthless killers who should indeed

remain on the List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Rhetoric is a powerful

tool that assists in the determination of one's transnational status. As the U.S. government

sees the LTTE as a terrorist threat and the Tamil Tigers themselves desire statehood, it is

appropriate and correct to evaluate the LTTE as a transnational terrorist organization.

In analyzing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's diaspora involvement,

contact with other organizations, globalized tactics, and the use of diplomatic rhetoric,

this research is now prepared to assess the ethnic group identity as seen among

transnational terrorist organizations, such as the Tamil Tigers. According to Gunaratna:

> A majority of contemporary terrorist groups operate beyond the national
> boundaries of their target states. In the post-Cold War era, the transnational
> character of these terrorist groups has necessarily brought forth certain
> advantages, viz., global networking with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other
> terrorist groups, as also the generation of transnational support. Instead of
> resisting globalisation, consequently, contemporary terrorist groups are actively
> harnessing contemporary forces of change. (Gunaratna, n.d.)

While contact, tactics, and rhetoric are utilized across different types of terrorism, the

ways in which the LTTE has invoked said entities is specific to the ethnic group identity.

First, "this greater trans-national Tamil identity is facilitated by numerous cultural

organizations in the countries of settlement that host Tamil language, cultural and

religious events" (Fair, 2005, p. 139). Diasporas are far more common to ethnic separatist

movements than to religious or ideological groups. This is because when it comes to

terrorism, ethnic terrorist organizations often "seek to influence their own constituencies

more than the country as a whole. Ethnic terrorists frequently seek to foster communal

identity, in contrast to an identity proposed by the state" (Byman, 1998, p. 149). The

Tamil Diaspora is particularly supportive of this identity, as its members oftentimes have

family members in Sri Lanka who have perhaps been killed, raped, or tortured in the war.

As a result, the Diasporan Tamils have a strong distrust of Sri Lanka and Colombo, and

are thus more inclined to support the Tamil Tigers financially and materially (Fair, 2005,

p. 139). In fact, Diaspora support for the LTTE was so strong that at one point in time,

approximately 80-percent of its budget came from diaspora contributions and revenue

from international trade, enterprise, and investments. Gunaratna affirms these trends, as

he explains that higher percentages of Sri Lankan Tamils living in "ethnic enclaves

isolated from mainstream host society" (n.d.) have contributed to the growing number of

LTTE terrorists and supporters alike.

<p style="text-align:center">The Ethnic Identity</p>

Ethnic terrorist groups utilize tactics, enact strategy, organize, and maintain

networks differently than religious terrorist groups, though not by much. While many

tactics, such as suicide bombing, appear to be the same, each employs a different strategy

when it comes to message-spreading. While religious terrorists seek to spread their

message to other fanatics of the same faith, ethnic terrorist seek the support of those

experiencing a similar struggle of persecution, though they may identify with a different

ethnicity. Ethnic organizations typically organize at the domestic level and only utilize

outside networks when it comes to diaspora support or training opportunities. While

different on many levels, both the ethnic and the religious identity act similarly within the broader context of transnational terrorism.

Like other forms of terrorism, ethnic terrorism requires a certain level of rationalization. The difference is that the rationalization for ethnic terrorism is grounded in reality, as various cultures are not only fearful that rival cultures will swallow their way of life, but also that they wish to subordinate and terrorize one's people. Discrimination is therefore perceived along cultural, political, and economic lines, providing more opportunities for resentment and violence than expected. Byman points out that ethnic terrorism often has an advantage over other forms of terrorism in that "their agenda usually has some resonance with a preexisting, well-defined group of people" (1998, p. 154). Thus, their actions are not those of random violence, but those of calculated retaliation.

Ethnic terrorism is often contained within a state, or at most, a particular region; mobilization of a culture most often takes place within its preexisting boundaries. However, the utilizations of diasporas across borders does not strictly limit an ethnic terrorist organizations geographically, as these types of organizations have had great successes in garnering transnational resources. This ethnic kinship to compel support from its diaspora is a powerful and strategic tool of ethnic terrorist organizations.

Ethnic terrorist organizations often contain both a militant and a political wing so that the separatist movement can better act like its own state, despite ongoing conflict. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam focused not only on a militant-based insurgency, but also on forging peaceful, diplomatic relationships with Sri Lanka during

the post-ceasefire time period of 2002. Such a strategy is vital to achieving an ethnic terrorist's long-term goal: autonomous nationhood. A militant wing could not accomplish such a goal peacefully or otherwise.

Additionally, ethnic terrorist organizations identify with the shared struggles of other ethnic groups and can therefore better support outside separatist movements, and thus are supported in return, particularly in their quest for self-determination. The strategic use of this prinicple is a unique advantage to ethnic terrorist organizations seeking a separate state. Some of the terrorist organizations the LTTE has shared support with in the past – specifically the Maoist-Naxalite and the Khalistan movements in India, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – whether it be through arms trade or training collaboration, have also been ethnic in nature, though are not Tamil. However, the shared struggle of marginalization draws ethnic groups together, where they can support one another in their separatist and/or terrorist endeavors. Despite the differences between the desire for a separate Marxist or Sikh state, a new Kurdish state, a solitary Palestinian state, or a Tamil state, the underlying struggle is the same.

However, this third point affirmed, does not necessarily indicate that terrorist organizations of different types – such as religious or ideological groups – experience the same notion. Al Qaeda, for example, is an example of a religious terrorist organization that exemplifies Islamic extremism. While it is quite clear and cannot be overemphasized enough that not all Muslims are inherently extreme, all Tamils are indeed intrinsically tied to a Tamil ethno-nationalist movement due to the nature of their ethnicity. Like some

diaspora members, they might not ascribe to terrorism but do ascribe to a radically separate Tamil state. This is different from religious terrorism, where extreme Islamists often repeatedly engage in acts of terror.

Finally, ethnic organizations want to further spread their message and gain international advocacy; it is particularly strategic to present themselves as an oppressed minority on the world stage. Those who engage in ethnic terrorism are not only fearful that rival cultures will swallow their way of life, but that these majorities truly wish to subordinate and terrorize the minority. Discrimination is therefore perceived along cultural, political, and economic lines, providing more opportunities for resentment and violence than expected (Byman, 1998). Ethnic terrorism helps keep minority identities alive and does not strive to divide the resources of a state, but instead to determine new political players and create new symbolic states to be fought for. By drawing on international legal contracts to support self-determinism, the Tamil Tigers make it clear to citizens across the world that their claim has legitimate tenants in international law.

The use of minority status as a reason for liberation has been utilized not only by the Tamil Tigers, but also by ethnic organizations across the world. For example, the Mexican Zapatista organization of Chiapas, Mexico – sometimes categorized as a terrorist organization and sometimes only as a criminal organization – made a conscious decision to strategically modify and utilize their ethnic identity so that they could then reap the benefits of becoming more recognizable on the world stage (Jung, 2003). As a result, ethnic terrorist organizations may potentially acquire increased levels of credibility in the international system, becoming more transnational in nature.

CHAPTER 5: THE NAXALITES OF INDIA AND THE IDEOLOGICAL IDENTITY

The ideological terrorist organization of interest during this research is the Naxalite-Maoist movement of India. The Naxalite threat has been called "the biggest internal security challenge ever faced" in India and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called it a "root problem" (Zissis, 2008). According to Stephen P. Cohen, a South Asia expert with the Brookings Institution, "Indian society has educated young men and young women to the point where they no longer fit into traditional society, but modern society has not been able to incorporate them" (Zissis, 2008).

Though the Naxalite movement has not been cited on the United State's "List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations," it has been designated a terrorist organization by the Indian government, qualifying it for evaluation as part of this research. The movement stems from the unequal distribution of wealth within the country.

However, the Naxal people appear to be strictly domestic in nature when it comes to their objectives. While the group has received training from international terrorist organizations and utilizes various transnational resources, its goals do not expand beyond India's borders and this is due in great part to its ideological group identity. The Naxalite movement is utilized within this research as a supplement to the studies on religious and ethnic identities in to explain how domestic terrorist organizations that do not desire transnational status still seek the assistance of international actors and the acquisition of resources in order to accomplish their domestic objectives.

The Naxalites

The Naxalite-Maoist movement is an ongoing conflict along the "red corridor" of India. These left-wing extremists are motivated by the alleviation of poverty across the country through Marxist values ("Maoists looking at armed overthrow," 2010). They were nearly wiped out by the Indian government in the 1970s, though they regained their momentum in 2004 and aligned their beliefs with the Communist Party of India, a Maoist conception (Zissis, 2008). While the Naxalites appear to be domestic in nature and do not transcend traditional state boundaries, they have still made connections with international actors that have furthered their cause. However, their rhetoric does not cite transnational goals and their tactics are not those of transnational fame, such as suicide bombing.

According to Gunaratna, "there is a tradition in South Asia: You train the groups in your neighboring countries" (Zissis, 2008). Therefore, is should not come as a surprise that the Naxals have sought out and received formal training from Nepal's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (Parashar, 2010). This training and these connections could have the potential to catapult the Naxalite movement towards a more transnational status should they desire to engage in more widespread conflict, as the United States does include LeT on its "List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations." Outside of the PAL and LeT, there is no evidence that the Naxalite movement might be training or making contact with additional terrorist organizations, other than the Communist Party of India, the "umbrella organization" for the Naxals (Parashar, 2010).

The methods of the Naxalite movement are also not tactics that are most commonly used by transnational foreign terrorist organizations. While both al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, for example, utilize tactics such as suicide bombing, the Naxals do not. The Naxalite outfit employs small arms, common explosives, and landmines to carry out its attacks, conventional tactics that are not so heavily favored of transnational organizations (Zissis, 2008). Transnational organizations are more likely to utilize suicide bombers or chemical weapons, and strive to use nuclear technology.

Furthermore, the Naxalite movement does not seem to desire transnational status. They have not involved themselves in the conflict of Kashmir (Zissis, 2008), have not sought expansion into other countries, and have publically stated that their goals lie within India alone ("Maoists looking at armed overthrow," 2010). It is not that they have not had the opportunities to expand had they wanted to. LeT, the training outfit of the Naxals, has been known to utilize transnational tactics, such a suicide bombers and simultaneous attacks, such as in the widespread Mumbai attacks in 2008. They have also been known to have ties to al Qaeda Central as well as the ISI (Bajoria, 2010). Conceivably, if the Naxals desired transnational status, they would be able to achieve this through LeT.

The Naxal movement makes few public statements and the rhetoric it does espouse is primarily domestic in nature. Citing poor governance on the part of the Indian state, the Naxals strive towards an armed overthrow of the Indian government; the state is "ill-equipped" to manage this threat. However, "the overthrow of the Indian state is not

something they are willing to do tomorrow or the day after. Their strategy, according to a booklet they circulated, is that they are looking at 2050, some documents say at 2060" ("Maoists looking at armed overthrow," 2010). The fact that the organization publicizes their motives through a privately-circulated booklet as opposed to videos or blog posts available to the general public, as al Qaeda does, speaks volumes to the domestic intentions of the group.

Due to the nature of the Naxalite objectives, the movement's primary targets are not innocent civilians, but rather organized and uniformed police forces, and government employees, according to data from the Global Terrorism Database. According to this database, of 64 attacks since the end of the Cold War, 16 of them have been directed towards citizens and private property, whereas 48 were directed towards police forces, government institutions, and social service utilities. Additionally, the latter category wielded a much higher body count than did attacks against citizens.

Finally, the Naxalite movement is constrained to the Indian state with little to no expansion outside traditional borders, as can be seen below:

Figure 3. The left-wing extremist (Naxalite) affected areas in India ("Conflict Map," 2005).

As is evident, the areas of conflict are restricted to India, with minimal impact in Nepal. As an indigenous movement, the Naxalite movement does not benefit from any sort of international diaspora, as does the LTTE ("Naxalites movement in India," n.d.). This means that both the Naxal's area of interest and their source of resources and funding are almost entirely limited to the geographical state of India.

Though the Naxalite-Maoist movement of India might engage with outside actors in order to receive training, the terrorist organization does not espouse rhetoric indicating any transnational goals, it does not work with any form of Naxal diaspora, and its tactics

are conventional in nature. Therefore, though the Naxalite movement may be a powerful force in India, it is not a transnational organization.

<center>The Ideological Identity</center>

Utilizing this analysis of the Naxalite-Maoist movement, this research may now better generalize about the transnationality of ideological terrorist organizations as a whole. Through the cases of AQIM and the LTTE, this research has demonstrated the transnationality of religious and ethnic groups; for the ideological group identity, it cannot do the same.

The tactics of terrorist organizations operating under the ideological identity typically do not cross borders. They primarily take place domestically and more often utilize small arms and conventional weaponry rather than the tactics used by ethnic or religious organizations, such as suicide bombing. Their strategies are to change domestic policy, similar to ethnic terrorist organizations, rather than incite global upheaval. They organize at the local level and rarely form networks with other similar terrorist organizations. Within the ideological identity, it is every organization for itself.

It has become apparent that in the post-Cold War era, ideological terrorism is on the decline. Ideological groups are generally unable to articulate alternative futures that actively solve the issue they are trying to resolve through means of terrorism. For example, when a JRA member was asked about the sort of future his terrorist organization envisioned in their post-revolutionary society, he responded as such: "'We do not really know what it will be like'" (Hoffman, 1998, p. 172). When a similar

question was posed to a RAF member, he said: "'As for the state of the future, the time after victory… that is not our concern… we build the revolution, not the socialist model.'" Ideological terrorist organizations oftentimes find it difficult to empirically devise their conceptualized visions, halting progress and preventing international expansion.

Furthermore, the data has proven that as the number of religious terrorist organizations increases, the number of ideological and separatist organizations severely declines (Hoffman, 1998, p. 91). This is due, in part, to the post-Cold War era, in which these groups found themselves "enmeshed in bitter conflict and civil war over their homelands" and the internal makeup of their states, rendering them less likely to engage in transnational terrorism (p. 91). Another reason might be that growth of the United Nations post-Cold War allowed nations to seek sovereignty through diplomatic means, signaling that there was less of a reason to engage in terrorism to be recognized on the international level; therefore, these groups engaged in terrorism domestically (p. 91).

However, ideological terrorism was extremely prevalent throughout and prior to the Cold War for the following reasons:

> 1) world power was divided in a bipolar structure; 2) there were two dominant ideologies, which were apparent; 3) there were few problems of defining the enemy; and 4) the conflict was largely conducted by state actors, either the principals or their proxies. In sum, in the Cold War the lines between good and evil, democratic and communist, the West and the rest were clear. (Kenney, 2002)

For these reasons, it wasn't difficult for particularly influential ideological terrorist organizations to achieve transnational status, creating terrorist cells in countries around

the world. For example, according to the Global Terrorism Database, the Red Brigades of Italy were effective in developing cells in Great Britain and France, spreading influence and clout.

Ideological terrorist organizations do not often reflect upon shared struggles as ethnic organizations do. Nor do they traditionally have counterparts across the globe that also desire their exact goals, as does religious terrorism. For example, while there certainly exist other Maoist terrorist organizations across the globe, they seek Maoism in their own state and are less concerned with the practice of Maoism in India, as the Naxals are. Therefore, it is clear that in the post-Cold War, ideological terrorism is less transnational than other group identities.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The need to destabilize, dismantle, and disengage foreign terrorist organizations has clearly never been more important, and as Kurth Cronin states: "the increasing threat of globalized terrorism must be met with flexible, multifaceted responses that deliberately and effectively exploit avenues of globalization in return" (2002/03, p. 30). By asking in what ways and why do foreign terrorist organizations become transnational, national security strategists should be better able to combat the terrorist threat through improved policymaking and strategic action. This question was answered by evaluating the goals, tactics, words, and actions of three terrorist organizations: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Naxalite-Maoist movement.

This research then evaluated the three types of terrorism associated with these organizations – religious, ethnic, and ideological, respectively – and identified how strategic affiliation with each either creates or does not create the opportunity to become transnational. This research concluded that while foreign terrorist organizations utilizing the religious and ethnic identities were very much able to become transnational, those utilizing the ideological identity in the post-Cold War era were not.

This is because the religious identity more easily crosses international boundaries due to its lack of borders, is more susceptible to instances of extremism, can fundraise effectively and quickly, operates under "umbrella" organizations, and has a depth of networks unparalleled by other types of terrorist groups. Its tactics cross borders, its strategies are international in nature, it organizes professionally, and it heavily utilizes foreign terrorist networks to spread its message, attack more often, and utilize

international resources to the best of its ability. The religious group identity is a power tool for a transnational terrorist organization.

Similarly, the ethnic identity draws on ethnic kinship to compel support from its diaspora, supports and receives support from other ethnic separatists across the world, and makes claims of oppressed minority status on the world stage. It uses tactics similar if not identical to religious terrorist organizations, though its strategy is appeal to the like-minded masses, as opposed to solely targeting those that share the exact same ethnicity, or religious affiliation, for example. Ethnic organizations typically organize at the domestic level and only utilize outside networks when it comes to diaspora support or training opportunities.

On the other hand, the ideological identity is less likely to expand transnationally due to a lack of desire to move beyond the domestic sphere, the inability to translate their messages outside their home country, and the conditions of the post-Cold War world community. Terrorist organizations operating under the ideological identity utilize conventional, domestic tactics as opposed to broader-reaching, transnational tactics, such as suicide bombing. They strategize only to change domestic policy and organize at the local level rather than across borders. The ideological identity does not often cross borders nor does it form networks with other terrorist organizations. The ideological identity is not like the religious or the ethnic identity – its strategic value to foreign terrorist organizations died out along with the Cold War.

In moving forward towards enhanced security in the face of transnational terrorism, national security strategists must attend to the nuances of terrorism dictated by

group identity and design better counterterrorism policies capable of dismantling terrorist

networks. Scholars such as Bruce Hoffman, Brian Jenkins, Walter Laqueur, Paul

Wilkinson, Claire Sterling, and David Kilcullen, to name a few, advocate this approach.

Kilcullen explains the basic tenants of such possible counterterrorism policies best

through his theories of "de-linking" and "disaggregation." These methods, he claims, will

be better able to dismantle the links between regional affiliates and terrorist

organizations, particularly in the global *jihad*. Disaggregation focuses not on putting an

immediate end to insurgencies, but rather on isolating terrorist insurgents from global

umbrella organizations, such as al Qaeda Central (2005, p. 609).

> Disaggregation focuses on interdicting links between theaters, denying the ability
> of regional and global actors to link and exploit local actors, disrupting flows
> between and within jihad theaters, denying sanctuary areas, isolating Islamists
> from local populations and disrupting inputs from the sources of Islamism in the
> greater Middle East. It approaches the war as a three-tier problem at the global,
> regional and local levels – seeking to interdict global links, … isolate regional
> players through a series of regional counterinsurgencies and strengthen local
> governance through a greatly enhanced security framework at the country level.
> (2005, p. 615)

Such tactics on the part of counterterrorism operatives would attack operational methods

of local terrorist cells and disable al Qaeda leadership's ability to "influence regional and

local players" (p. 614). By terminating communications between organizations and

discrediting their ideological authority among their followers, terrorist groups with

transnational reach can be weakened by eliminating their ties with international terrorist

cells, supporters, and diasporas. While there is no defined model of disaggregation, as

terrorism is continuously adapting to global conditions, a global Civil Operations and

Rural Development Support – a civilian aid and development program implemented during the Vietnam War, supported by targeted military pacification operations and intelligence activity – would serve as a strong basis of operation, Kilcullen claims.

This research indicates to national security strategists that it is critical to evaluate group identity when designing counterterrorism policies centered around national security, though identity is often overlooked. It would be a beneficial use of resources to focus counterterrorism efforts on religious and ethnic terrorist organizations, depending on one's position in the world both geographically and authoritatively, as this research explains that international ideological terrorism in the post-Cold War era is highly unlikely to prove transnational, and therefore less threatening.

In disrupting foreign terrorist networks and focusing counterterrorism efforts on the most threatening types of terrorism, perhaps the world community will begin to take steps towards a more precise criminal definition of terrorism, enact smarter and more efficient counterterrorism policies, and provide for a safer world to live in for citizens from all walks of life.

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